Case Title: Commonwealth v. O'Leary

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12445

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12445 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RICHARD O'LEARY. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     March 5, 2018. - July 12, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Citation for violation of motor vehicle law.  
Practice, Criminal, Citation for violation of motor vehicle 
laws, Dismissal.  Notice. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 23, 2014. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Beverly J. Cannone, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Douglas T. Babcock for the defendant. 
 
Pamela Alford, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The defendant, Richard O'Leary, asks this court 
to determine whether the Commonwealth met its burden of proving 
compliance with the citation requirement of G. L. c. 90C, § 2, 
which mandates the issuance of a traffic citation "at the time 
2 
 
 
and place of the violation," despite the fact that a State 
police trooper did not issue a traffic citation at the scene of 
the violation or at the hospital following the interviews he 
conducted.  Instead, before issuing the citation, the trooper 
submitted an accident report to his supervisor for approval, 
which the trooper received nine days later.  Because we consider 
this unexplained, nine-day delay in the citation's issuance to 
be inconsistent with one of the two legislative purposes of the 
"no-fix" provision -- specifically, the antiabuse purpose -- we 
affirm the dismissal of the indictments. 
 
Facts and procedural history.  We adopt the Superior Court 
judge's factual findings, which we do not disturb absent clear 
error, and supplement them with uncontroverted details from the 
record.  Commonwealth v. Burnham, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 483, 484 n.1 
(2016), citing Commonwealth v. Eckert, 431 Mass. 591, 592 
(2000).  Around 10:30 P.M. on April 19, 2014, State police 
Trooper Jared Gray responded to an accident on a highway off-
ramp.  Gray arrived to find that a single vehicle had rolled 
over and dislodged a highway sign; the police had closed the 
off-ramp, and emergency medical services were at the scene.  Two 
individuals, the defendant and a passenger, Patricia Murphy, had 
been injured in the accident.  Both the defendant and Murphy 
claimed to be passengers in the vehicle, and both were 
transported to a hospital. 
3 
 
 
 
Gray followed the ambulances to the hospital to interview 
the defendant and Murphy.  He left his citation book in his 
vehicle.  He first spoke with Murphy, who reiterated that she 
had been a passenger in the vehicle.  During this interview, it 
appeared to Gray that Murphy was intoxicated.  Gray then spoke 
with the defendant.  Gray gave the defendant Miranda warnings, 
and the defendant admitted that he had been the driver of the 
vehicle and that he had had "a couple of beers."  The 
defendant's "eyes were glassy" and "his speech was slurred."  At 
the time of the accident, the defendant was on probation for 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
(OUI), subsequent offense.  His license had been suspended, and 
he was not legally permitted to drive.  Gray informed the 
defendant that he would be receiving a summons in the mail for 
OUI, a marked lanes violation, and operating with a suspended or 
revoked license. 
 
Gray did not issue a citation at that time.  Gray later 
submitted his investigation report to his supervisor, who 
approved the report nine days later, on April 28, 2014.1  On that 
day, Gray issued citations to the defendant for a marked lanes 
violation, operation of a motor vehicle with license suspended 
                     
 
1 State police trooper Jared Gray testified at the motion to 
dismiss hearing that, upon leaving the hospital, his shift was 
over so he went home.  The record does not establish exactly 
when Gray submitted the report to his supervisor. 
4 
 
 
for OUI, operation of a motor vehicle with license revoked, and 
OUI, fifth offense.  Gray then placed the citations in the 
barracks mailbox.2  Due to a ZIP code error in the State police 
reports system, however, the defendant did not receive the 
citation until approximately five to six weeks after the 
incident. 
 
A Superior Court judge granted the defendant's motion to 
dismiss on the grounds that Gray had failed to issue a citation 
"at the time and place of the violation," as required under § 2, 
and because the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of 
demonstrating that an exception in § 2 applied.  The Appeals 
Court reversed, holding that the case fit within the third 
statutory exception, which excuses delayed delivery of citation 
"where the court finds that a circumstance, not inconsistent 
with the purpose of [§ 2] . . . , justifies the failure."  
Commonwealth v. O'Leary, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 282, 284, 286-287 
(2017), quoting G. L. c. 90C, § 2.  While noting that there did 
not appear to be "any strong reason for the delay" in issuing 
the citation, id. at 286, the court considered dismissal 
unnecessary where "there was no manipulation or misuse of the 
                     
 
2 Gray testified that, when sending mail, officers from his 
department "put mail in our barracks mail box.  That barracks 
mail box is transported to headquarters in Middleboro, and then 
sent out from there."  He agreed that "it would have been at 
least several days" between when he placed an item in the mail 
box and when that item was mailed. 
5 
 
 
citation, and [Gray] notified the defendant as soon as he had 
completed his interview . . . that a citation would be issued."  
Id. at 286-287, quoting Commonwealth v. Moulton, 56 Mass. App. 
Ct. 682, 685 (2002).  We granted the defendant's motion for 
further appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  Section 2 requires a police officer assigned 
to traffic enforcement duty to 
"record the occurrence of automobile law violations upon a 
citation, filling out the citation and each copy thereof as 
soon as possible and as completely as possible . . . .  
Said police officer shall inform the violator of the 
violation and shall give a copy of the citation to the 
violator. . . .  A failure to give a copy of the citation 
to the violator at the time and place of the violation 
shall constitute a defense in any court proceeding for such 
violation, except where the violator could not have been 
stopped or where additional time was reasonably necessary 
to determine the nature of the violation or the identity of 
the violator, or where the court finds that a circumstance, 
not inconsistent with the purpose of this section to create 
a uniform, simplified and non-criminal method for disposing 
of automobile law violations, justifies the failure.  In 
such case the violation shall be recorded upon a citation 
as soon as possible after such violation . . . ."3 
 
 
In 1965, then Governor John A. Volpe proposed what has been 
referred to as the "no-fix" provision, in response to the 
concern that "[t]he nature of traffic citations renders them 
uniquely suited to manipulation and misuse."  Commonwealth v. 
Pappas, 384 Mass. 428, 431 (1981), citing 1965 Senate Doc. No. 
839, at 2.  See Newton Police Ass'n v. Police Chief of Newton, 
                     
 
3 The relevant statutory language took its present form in 
1985 through St. 1985, c. 794, § 3.  See Newton Police Ass'n v. 
Police Chief of Newton, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 697, 700 n.5 (2005). 
6 
 
 
63 Mass. App. Ct. 697, 699 (2005).  Prior to the provision's 
insertion, a "police officer who witnessed a traffic offense 
would record the violation on a citation form and submit it to 
police headquarters.  Within three days from the receipt of the 
citation, the police chief or a designated officer of at least 
sergeant grade would decide [how] to proceed" -- for instance, 
by issuing a written warning or court complaint, or by voiding 
the citation.  Id. 
 
By inserting § 2 in the statute to require the issuance of 
a citation "at the time and place of the violation," the 
Legislature sought to eliminate "opportunity for subsequent 
maneuvering or pressure" that the prior three-day approval 
window created.  1965 Senate Doc. No. 839, at 2.  See Newton 
Police Ass'n, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 700-701 (in enacting § 2, 
Legislature deliberately transferred discretion from police 
chief to police officer at scene to deal with perceived evil of 
traffic citation manipulation). 
 
"Where the requirements of the statute are not followed, 
the complaint shall be dismissed regardless of whether the 
defendant was prejudiced by the failure."  Commonwealth v. 
Carapellucci, 429 Mass. 579, 581 (1999), citing Commonwealth v. 
Mullins, 367 Mass. 733, 735 (1975).  In this case, it is 
undisputed that the defendant did not receive "a copy of the 
citation . . . at the time and place of the violation."  G. L. 
7 
 
 
c. 90C, § 2.  It is therefore the Commonwealth's burden to 
establish that one of the three statutory exceptions applies.  
See Mullins, supra at 734-735. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the third statutory exception 
applies in these circumstances.  This exception excuses the 
"failure to give a copy of the citation to the violator at the 
time and place of the violation . . . where the court finds that 
a circumstance, not inconsistent with the purpose of this 
section to create a uniform, simplified and non-criminal method 
for disposing of automobile law violations, justifies the 
failure."  G. L. c. 90C, § 2.4  The defendant maintains that the 
third exception does not apply to these facts, and argues 
further that, even if it does, the case still must be dismissed 
in light of additional statutory language requiring that a 
citation be issued "as soon as possible" after the violation. 
 
We determine the applicability of the third exception with 
reference to the dual purposes of § 2.  The first purpose, which 
"is apparent from the common name of the statute, the 'no-fix' 
                     
 
4 The first exception, which excuses immediate issuance of a 
citation "where the violator could not have been stopped," is 
not applicable here.  Nor do these facts support an application 
of the second exception, "where additional time was reasonably 
necessary to determine the nature of the violation or the 
identity of the violator."  G. L. c. 90C, § 2.  The Superior 
Court judge observed that "[t]he defendant was present at the 
scene of the accident and Gray completed his investigation into 
the nature of the violation and the identity of the violator by 
the time he left [the hospital]." 
8 
 
 
law," Pappas, 384 Mass. at 431, is to prevent "manipulation or 
misuse of the citation process because of any unnecessary or 
unreasonable delay."  Commonwealth v. Cameron, 416 Mass. 314, 
316 n.2 (1993), citing Pappas, supra.  The second purpose is "to 
afford prompt and definite notice of the nature of the alleged 
violation to the putative violator."  Pappas, supra.  We also 
bear in mind the principle that, under the no-fix statute, 
"[e]ach case must be decided on its own peculiar facts."  
Commonwealth v. Provost, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 479, 484 (1981). 
 
In the trial court and before us, the Commonwealth's 
arguments have focused primarily on whether the defendant was 
placed on notice of the impending criminal charges, such that 
the notice purpose of the no-fix statute was satisfied.  To be 
sure, in some cases (including those on which the Commonwealth 
relies), the question of notice was dispositive of whether the 
third exception in § 2 applied, because the circumstances of 
those cases did not also implicate the antiabuse purpose of the 
no-fix provision.  See, e.g., Cameron, 416 Mass. at 316 n.2 
("The other purpose of the 'no-fix' law is not involved in this 
case.  There is no suggestion of manipulation or misuse of the 
citation process because of any unnecessary or unreasonable 
delay"); Moulton, 56 Mass. App. Ct. at 683, 685 (no-fix purpose 
of statute satisfied where "there was no manipulation of misuse 
of the citation," and officer promptly issued citation to 
9 
 
 
defendant on day of accident); Commonwealth v. Kenney, 55 Mass. 
App. Ct. 514, 518 (2002) ("The defendant makes no contention 
that the 'no-fix' ticket manipulation aspect of the statute is 
implicated.  Rather, the defendant's principal claim rests upon 
the notice provision"). 
 
Here, however, the facts mandate that we also consider 
whether the antiabuse purpose of § 2 has been satisfied.  We 
conclude that it has not.  Gray did not give the defendant a 
citation at the scene of the accident or at the hospital.  This 
is despite the fact that "[t]he defendant was present at the 
scene of the accident and Gray completed his investigation into 
the nature of the violation and the identity of the violator by 
the time he left [the hospital]."  Rather, Gray returned to the 
police station, drafted an accident report, and submitted that 
report to his supervisor -- who took nine days to approve Gray's 
report.  Only then did the citation issue.  The Superior Court 
judge deemed this delay "[i]nexplicabl[e]."5  What is more, 
Gray's testimony at the hearing indicates that the approval 
process and ensuing delay were attributable to the regular 
procedure of his department: 
                     
 
5 The Appeals Court observed in its opinion that "there does 
not appear to have been any strong reason for the delay," adding 
that it "[did] not condone Trooper Gray's election to await 
review and 'approval' of his report by his supervisor before 
issuing a citation."  Commonwealth v. O'Leary, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 
282, 286 & n.8 (2017). 
10 
 
 
Q.:  "Now, after you had left the hospital, what is the 
procedure you underwent to inform [the defendant] of the 
charges?" 
 
A.:  "Basically when it's a summons, we go back; we 
complete our investigation, write the report, print out the 
documentation, submit it to a supervisor.  A supervisor 
then approves that report.  Once it's approved, you print 
it and submit all your court paperwork.  At that time, I 
wrote the citation and put it in the mail for [the 
defendant]." 
 
 
The third exception of G. L. c. 90C, § 2, excuses delayed 
delivery of a citation where "a circumstance, not inconsistent 
with the purpose of this section . . . , justifies the failure."  
As mentioned, the no-fix provision was added to § 2 to eliminate 
not only actual manipulation or misuse of the citation process, 
but also the "'opportunity for subsequent maneuvering or 
pressure' afforded by the [prior] three-day [approval] period" 
(emphasis added).  Newton Police Ass'n, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 
699, quoting 1965 Senate Doc. No. 839.  Under the earlier 
practice that the Legislature sought to eliminate, an officer on 
traffic duty would record the citation and submit it to 
headquarters for later approval by the officer's supervisors.  
Newton Police Ass'n, supra. 
 
The circumstances that caused the delay in this case are 
strikingly similar:  rather than issue a citation "at the time 
and place of the violation," G. L. c. 90C, § 2, Gray drafted an 
accident report and submitted it to his supervisor, whose 
approval was necessary for the citation to issue.  It was this 
11 
 
 
very practice of traffic officers requiring supervisory 
approval, and the delay in time that this created between the 
traffic violation and the ultimate issuance of the citation, 
that the Legislature deemed too great an "opportunity for 
subsequent maneuvering or pressure."  Newton Police Ass'n, 63 
Mass. App. Ct. at 699, quoting 1965 Senate Doc. No. 839.  Here, 
the delay was for an "[i]nexplicabl[e]" nine days.  We cannot 
conclude, based on the history and antiabuse purpose of the no-
fix provision, that these circumstances somehow remain 
"[]consistent with the purpose of [§ 2]."  G. L. c. 90C, § 2.  
Even if it were undisputed that the defendant received 
sufficient notice of the impending charges against him, this 
same fundamental problem would remain. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the accident itself was so 
serious that it created an "ineradicable record of the event," 
Carapellucci, 429 Mass. at 581, such that any potential for a 
"fix" was eliminated.  Indeed, our cases recognize that "the 
very seriousness of particular charges tends to minimize the 
importance of absolute observance of the [citation] procedures 
because . . . 'fix' is virtually excluded, and notice is 
implicit."  Commonwealth v. Babb, 389 Mass. 275, 283 (1983).  In 
Pappas, 384 Mass. at 431-432, for example, where the defendant's 
vehicle "crossed the center line of a public street and struck a 
pedestrian," causing fatal injuries, we acknowledged that it was 
12 
 
 
"unlikely in such circumstances that police officers responding 
at the scene would regard this as a minor accident in which 
their discretion concerning whether to issue a citation would be 
absolute and unchecked."  See Babb, supra at 284, citing Pappas, 
supra (same).  On the other hand, in Carapellucci, 429 Mass. at 
580, the defendant's vehicle collided head on with a lamp post, 
resulting in minor injuries to the defendant's passenger.  This 
court observed that that was "not a case in which the serious 
injuries resulting from the traffic violation . . . put the 
defendant on notice of the potential charges against him and 
created an ineradicable record of the event."  Id. at 581, 
citing Pappas, supra at 431.  See Carapellucci, supra at 582 
(no-fix purpose furthered by "the causing of a serious injury, 
which creates such a record that manipulation is extremely 
unlikely"). 
 
This case hews more closely to Carapellucci, as it involves 
only a single-vehicle accident in which no third person was 
injured (let alone injured seriously or fatally).  To be 
certain, the accident in this case was significant:  the 
defendant's vehicle rolled over, the defendant and Murphy were 
transported to the hospital on stretchers, and Murphy testified 
that she broke several ribs.6  However, the Commonwealth -- whose 
                     
 
6 As the Appeals Court noted, "[t]here are no medical 
records pertaining to the injuries suffered by the defendant or 
13 
 
 
burden it is to establish that a statutory exception in § 2 
applies -- cites no authority holding that such a single-vehicle 
accident involving nonfatal injuries to a passenger but no third 
person creates an "ineradicable record of the event," such that 
the antiabuse purpose of § 2 is satisfied.  Carapellucci, 429 
Mass. at 581.  Cf. Burnham, 90 Mass. App. Ct. at 490 ("we are 
unaware of any authority, and the Commonwealth cites to none, 
which has held that a single-[vehicle] accident, standing alone, 
provides a defendant with sufficient implied notice that 
satisfies the requirements of G. L. c. 90C, § 2"). 
 
Conclusion.  While "failure to comply with [the citation 
requirement of § 2] is not fatal where the purposes of the 
statute have not been frustrated," Babb, 389 Mass. at 283, here, 
one of those purposes has been frustrated.  The nine-day delay 
in the issuance of the citation, in the absence of any 
justification (legitimate or otherwise), contravenes the 
original, antiabuse purpose of the statute, such that the third 
exception in § 2 does not apply.7  "[W]here an important feature 
                                                                  
Murphy in the record before us.  However, Murphy testified that 
she suffered several broken ribs."  O'Leary, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 283 n.3. 
 
 
7 Given our holding that the antiabuse purpose of the no-fix 
provision was frustrated by the initial nine-day delay in the 
citation's issuance, we need not address the additional five to 
six weeks that it took for the defendant to actually receive the 
citation.  Nor do we address the defendant's additional argument 
14 
 
 
of the statutory arrangements was flouted through sloth or sheer 
inattention of the police, the subsequent complaint [must be] 
dismissed."  Commonwealth v. Perry, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 281, 283 
(1983), citing Mullins, 367 Mass. at 735-736.  The order 
dismissing the complaint against the defendant is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                                  
that the citation was not issued "as soon as possible" after the 
violation, as required under § 2.