Case Title: Gaymon v. Gaymon

Citation: 

Docket Number: 982483

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
WILLIAM V. GAYMON, EXECUTOR OF THE  
ESTATE OF WILLIAM E. GAYMON 
 
v.  Record No. 982483    OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
September 17, 1999 
VIOLETA N. GAYMON, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Arthur B. Vieregg, Jr., Judge 
 
 
William V. Gaymon, Executor of the estate of his father, 
William E. Gaymon, appeals from a judgment of the trial court 
construing language in the decedent's will.  For the following 
reasons, we conclude that in construing the will, the trial 
court correctly held that the testator created a life estate 
in favor of the testator's widow in certain real property, but 
erred in its conclusion that the language in the will showed 
an intent by the testator to make the remainder persons 
personally liable for the interest as well as the principal 
due under the two deeds of trust on the property. 
 
The testator was survived by Violeta N. Gaymon, his 
widow, and two adult children from his former marriage, 
William Victor Gaymon and Nicole G. Gaymon (the Gaymon 
children).  The Fifth Article (Article 5) of testator's will 
provides: 
FIFTH.  I give and bequeath to my children, 
WILLIAM V. GAYMON and NICOLE G. GAYMON, share and 
share alike, the following described property, 
subject to any encumbrances upon the same upon 
the date of transfer and the mortgage remaining 
shall be paid by the remainder persons: 
 
a.  My residence, together with improvements 
thereon, located at 2619 Fox Mill Road, Reston, 
Virginia. 
 
. . . 
 
 
It is understood that in the case that Mrs. 
VIOLETA N. GAYMON and I have residence at the Fox 
Mill address at the time of my demise, she would 
have a life estate in the same for the remainder 
of her life. 
 
The language in Article 5 that is italicized above was a 
handwritten addition initialed by the testator.  
 
After the testator's death, William V. Gaymon made the 
payments due under the two deeds of trust on the Fox Mill 
residence (the property) for about eight months, although it 
is disputed whether he made those payments in his capacity as 
an executor.  After William V. Gaymon decided not to make any 
additional payments, Violeta began making the payments to 
avoid a foreclosure action.  
 
Acting as the Executor, William V. Gaymon filed a bill of 
complaint in the trial court, seeking aid and direction in the 
administration of the testator's estate.  In his amended bill 
of complaint, the Executor asked the chancellor to determine, 
among other things, whether Article 5 created a "mandatory or 
precatory life estate" in favor of Violeta in the property.  
The Executor also asked the chancellor to declare that, under 
the terms of the will, Violeta is obligated to pay expenses on 
the property, including interest on the deed of trust notes, 
 
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taxes, and insurance.  The Executor further requested that the 
chancellor order Violeta to reimburse the estate "for any 
payments made by the Estate on account of the Residence except 
for principal payments on the deed of trust notes."  Violeta 
filed an answer and cross-bill asking the chancellor to 
determine that, under the terms of the will, the remainder 
persons are liable for the entire mortgage payments and asking 
that she be reimbursed for all payments she made on the notes 
secured by the deeds of trust. 
 
The chancellor heard evidence of the circumstances 
surrounding the testator's execution of the will but later 
ruled that the testator's intent could be ascertained from the 
four corners of the will, and that extrinsic evidence was thus 
inadmissible except for the limited purpose of determining the 
meaning of the term "mortgage," as used in the handwritten 
addition to Article 5. 
 
After considering the language within the four corners of 
the will, the chancellor concluded that the testator intended 
to "will a life estate to his wife and that by bequeathing the 
property to his children, he was bequeathing it subject to 
that life estate . . . ."  In the final decree, the chancellor 
held that Violeta was entitled to a life estate in the 
property. 
 
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The chancellor next concluded that, by adding the 
handwritten language, "[a]nd the mortgage remaining shall be 
paid by the remainder persons," the testator avoided the 
common law rule requiring a life tenant to pay the interest 
due on a mortgage during the term of the life tenancy.  Thus, 
the chancellor ruled that the interlined language 
unambiguously expressed the testator's intention that the 
remainder persons pay all the mortgage expenses for the 
property.  In the final decree, the chancellor held that the 
Gaymon children are required to pay "all sums due under the 
two Deeds of Trust on the Residence, including principal and 
interest, from the date of transfer, to wit:  Testator's death 
on June 3, 1997, until paid in full."  The chancellor further 
held that the Gaymon children's interest in the property "will 
be subject to a lien for all amounts paid by VIOLETA N. GAYMON 
on said Deeds of Trust since June 3, 1997 and thereafter."  
 
The Executor appealed, asserting that the chancellor 
erred in holding that the will created a life estate in the 
property in favor of Violeta, and that the chancellor erred in 
holding that the Gaymon children were personally liable for 
the interest accruing on the notes secured by the deeds of 
trust on the property.  The Executor did not assert at trial 
or on appeal that Violeta was liable for the principal of the 
notes secured by the deed of trust. 
 
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The legal principles applicable to the construction of a 
will are well established.  The objective in construing a will 
is to determine the testator's intent by initially looking to 
the four corners of the document.  Extrinsic evidence may be 
considered only if the language of the will is ambiguous, that 
is, susceptible to more than one interpretation.  Gillespie v. 
Davis, 242 Va. 300, 303-04, 410 S.E.2d 613, 615 (1991). 
I.  Life Estate 
 
The threshold issue is whether the chancellor erred in 
determining that Article 5 of the will gave Violeta a life 
estate in the property.  The Executor argues that the phrase 
"It is understood" contained in Article 5 reflects the 
testator's request or desire that Violeta be allowed to remain 
on the property but does not give her the right to do so.  In 
support of this position, the Executor relies on Carson v. 
Simmons, 198 Va. 854, 856, 96 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1957), in which 
the phrase "with the understanding" was determined to be 
precatory rather than mandatory, thereby defeating a claim 
that a spendthrift trust was created.  However, although the 
phrases in Carson and in this case are similar, the context in 
which they appear is quite different.  Thus, applying the 
principles discussed in Carson to this case does not lead to 
the same result. 
 
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The will in Carson gave the testator's daughters an 
apartment building "with the understanding that" the daughters 
would rent out one of the apartments and use the rental income 
for the upkeep of the property until the youngest grandchild 
reached 16 years of age.  The Court concluded that this phrase 
was precatory because it directed the legatees to perform some 
act, rather than directing actions of the executor.  The Court 
reached this conclusion even though the use of the same phrase 
in a subsequent paragraph of the will was mandatory.  Id. at 
858-59, 96 S.E.2d at 804. 
 
In this case, however, reading the phrase "it is 
understood," within the context of Article 5 leads to only one 
interpretation, that the testator intended to create a life 
estate.  As noted by the chancellor, Article 5 refers to the 
Gaymon children as "remainder persons."  That reference is 
consistent only with the conclusion that a life estate was 
created in the property because, without such an estate, the 
Gaymon children would have a fee simple interest, not a 
remainder interest.  And, unlike the direction in Carson, 
Article 5 gives no direction to the Gaymon children, but only 
declares the interest created.  The only contingency attached 
to the interest given Violeta was that she and the testator be 
living at the property at the time of the testator's death.  
There is nothing in the will which supports a conclusion that 
 
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the Gaymon children, the remainder persons, had the discretion 
to determine whether Violeta Gaymon could remain on the 
property during her lifetime.  
 
The Executor also relies on the rule of construction 
recited in Smith v. Baptist Orphanage, 194 Va. 901, 75 S.E.2d 
491 (1953), and McKinsey v. Cullingsworth, 175 Va. 411, 9 
S.E.2d 315 (1940), that when an estate is conveyed in one part 
of an instrument by clear and unambiguous words, only words of 
equal clarity and decisiveness can diminish or destroy that 
estate.  According to the Executor, the phrase "it is 
understood" is too imprecise to effectively diminish the fee 
simple estate granted the Gaymon children in the property by 
Article 5 of the will.  We disagree. 
 
No specific words are required to create a life estate.  
Robinson v. Caldwell, 200 Va. 353, 356-57, 105 S.E.2d 852, 854 
(1958).  Nevertheless, the language of Article 5 – "a life 
estate in the [property] for the remainder of her life" – is 
not a vague or general description of the interest conveyed.  
Rather, this is the formal, technical language associated with 
the creation of a life estate.  Furthermore, in both the cases 
upon which the Executor relies, the Court was required to 
consider whether certain phrases allegedly describing the 
interests at issue were mandatory or precatory and, in both 
cases, we concluded that the phrases only indicated a desire 
 
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of the testator and thus were not mandatory.  Obviously, if a 
phrase in a will is precatory and creates no interest, it 
cannot be of equal dignity with words creating an interest.  
In this case, as we have already said, the language of Article 
5 is not precatory.  Therefore, the rule of construction cited 
by the Executor does not defeat the intent of the testator as 
expressed in Article 5 under the circumstances of this case. 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that there is no error in 
the chancellor's conclusion that the language of Article 5 
unambiguously creates a life estate in the property in favor 
of Violeta Gaymon. 
II.  Liability of Remainder Persons 
 
In addition to determining the testator's intent 
regarding Violeta's interest in the Fox Mill property, the 
chancellor was asked to determine the testator's intent in 
adding the phrase "and the mortgage remaining shall be paid by 
the remainder persons" to Article 5.  In resolving this issue, 
the chancellor again concluded that the testator's intent 
could be determined from the four corners of the document, 
with the exception of the meaning of the word "mortgage."  
After taking evidence on that issue, the chancellor concluded 
that the term "mortgage" included the two deeds of trust on 
the Fox Mill property securing personal debts of the testator.  
The chancellor then apparently determined that the testator 
 
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would not have added the interlined language unless it had a 
meaning independent of the instructions already contained in 
the will.  That independent meaning, the chancellor concluded, 
was that the added language negated the common law obligation 
of a life tenant to preserve the estate for the remainder 
persons, including the obligation to pay interest due on 
encumbrances on the property, and that the added language 
placed the obligation to pay interest on the remainder 
persons. 
 
Although we agree with the chancellor that extrinsic 
evidence was not necessary to determine the testator's intent 
in adding the language directing the remainder persons to pay 
the mortgages, we disagree with the chancellor's ultimate 
interpretation of the added language.  Apparently, the 
chancellor concluded that the testator used the word 
"mortgage" to mean both the principal and interest due on the 
deeds of trust.  By using that word, the chancellor concluded, 
the testator intended the remainder persons to pay both 
principal and interest, thus altering the common law principle 
that a life tenant must pay the interest on any encumbrance on 
the devised life estate property.  Livesay v. Boyd, 164 Va. 
528, 532-33, 180 S.E. 158, 159-60 (1935). 
However, there is nothing in the word "mortgage" itself 
that indicates inclusion or exclusion of interest due on the 
 
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encumbrance, and there is no other language in the added 
phrase or elsewhere in the will that addresses the treatment 
of interest.  Therefore, in the absence of more precise 
direction, we cannot conclude that by using the word 
"mortgage," the testator intended to deviate from the well-
established common law principle regarding the obligation of a 
life tenant.  
 
Having determined that the interlined language does not 
support the chancellor's interpretation of the testator's 
intent, we conclude nevertheless that the added language had a 
meaning independent of other instructions in the will.   That 
language shows the testator's intent to make the remainder 
persons personally liable for payment of the mortgage 
principal. 
The general rule in this Commonwealth is that if property 
encumbered with a lien is devised in a will, and the lien 
secures a personal debt of the testator, the decedent's 
personal estate, not the encumbered property, is the primary 
fund for discharge of that debt.  Brown, Adm'r v. Hargraves, 
198 Va. 748, 750, 96 S.E.2d 788, 790 (1957); French v. 
Vradenburg's Ex'rs, et. al, 105 Va. 16, 18, 52 S.E. 695, 695 
(1906); Elliot v. Carter, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 541, 549 (1853).  
Operation of this rule can be altered by the testator if he 
directs in his will that the encumbered property be the 
 
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primary source of his estate for satisfaction of the lien.  
Id. 
To determine the priority of the property in the 
testator's estate for satisfaction of such liens, the language 
of the will is reviewed to ascertain the intent of the 
testator, as in all cases of will construction.  In this case, 
by devising the property "subject to any encumbrances," the 
testator indicated his intent that the encumbered property, 
not his personal estate, be the primary source of his estate 
for payment of the deeds of trust.*
However, while devising the property subject to the deeds 
of trust changed the order in which the component parts of the 
decedent's estate were to be looked to for satisfaction of his 
debts, it did not go so far as to make the remainder persons 
personally liable for the debts secured by the deeds of trust.  
Personal liability was imposed when the testator added the 
language directing that the mortgages "shall be paid by the 
remainder persons."  This added language imposed a condition 
on the disposition of the testator's estate, that the 
remainder persons would assume personal liability for the debt 
secured by the deeds of trust.  This condition has meaning and 
effect independent of the direction devising the property 
                     
* Of course, if the property were sold to satisfy the 
liens but proceeds were insufficient, the unpaid balance could 
be satisfied out of the personal estate. 
 
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"subject to any encumbrances" and unrelated to the common law 
apportionment of the obligations of life tenants and remainder 
persons to make mortgage payments.  
 
Thus, we conclude that the testator's intent in adding 
the interlined phrase was to make the remainder persons 
personally liable for the debts secured by the deeds of trust, 
but not to negate the common law principle that the life 
tenant has the obligation to preserve the property, including 
among other things the duty to pay the interest on any liens 
on the property. 
III.  Disposition 
 
We now turn to the appropriate relief in light of the 
foregoing conclusions.  First, we will affirm the chancellor's 
conclusion that Article 5 of the will created a life estate in 
Violeta Gaymon in the property. 
Turning to the liability of the remainder persons, we 
note that the Executor argues, citing Hill v. Huston's Ex'r, 
57 Va. (15 Gratt.) 350 (1859), that the remainder persons 
cannot be charged with personal liability for the deeds of 
trust unless they accept the devise.  However, our role in 
this case is to interpret the will, not to determine whether 
the remainder persons have accepted or disclaimed the devise.  
Additionally, the remainder persons are not parties to this 
action.  Furthermore, the Executor limits his request for 
 
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relief to reversing "that portion of the trial court's order 
putting a charge on the real estate and holding the 
remaindermen personally liable for interest on the mortgage 
and any other expenses."  Under these circumstances, we need 
not decide if the devise has been accepted by the remainder 
persons. 
Therefore, we will reverse that portion of the 
chancellor's order holding that Article 5 of the will imposed 
liability on the remainder persons for the interest due on the 
deeds of trust on the property and that "the remainder 
interest" on the property "will be subject to a lien for all 
amounts" paid by the life tenant, Violeta Gaymon, on the notes 
secured by the deeds of trust. 
Finally, we will remand the case to the chancellor for 
allocation of liability for past payments in accordance with 
the principles set out in this opinion. 
Affirmed in part,  
reversed in part, 
and remanded. 
 
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