Case Title: New Jersey in the Interest of J.A.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2018-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

                          State of New Jersey in the Interest of J.A. (A-38-16) (077383)

Argued January 2, 2018 -- Decided June 6, 2018

FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for the Court.

         In this case, the Court considers the admissibility of evidence procured from a home after police officers’
warrantless entry.

          The victim was standing at a bus stop in Willingboro when he was approached by a young man in a hooded
black sweatshirt and camouflage shorts, who asked to use his cell phone. The man punched the victim in the arm,
took the phone, and ran. A Willingboro Police Officer was dispatched to meet the victim at the bus stop. The
victim explained that the phone was an Apple iPhone, which had been in a pink glittery case. The officer and the
victim used the “Find My iPhone” application to track the location of the phone. The application immediately
identified a house about three blocks from the bus stop as the phone’s whereabouts. After about two minutes, the
phone was shut off, which prevented the application from further tracking the phone’s location.

         Police officers decided to secure the perimeter of the house. While performing an exterior security check,
an officer peered through a first-floor window and noticed a pink glittery phone case matching the victim’s
description on a nearby bed. At that point, the police thought that the young man who took the victim’s phone may
have been inside the house. No one responded to the officers’ several knocks on the front door. One officer found
an unlocked window on the first floor, through which he and another officer entered the house. The officers found
defendant, unarmed, upstairs in the master bedroom, lying under a blanket on the bed. The officers also found a
hooded sweatshirt and a pair of camouflage shorts nearby. The officers handcuffed defendant, brought him
downstairs, and questioned him about his knowledge of the robbery. Defendant’s family members subsequently
arrived at the house, including his older brother and mother, who lived there. The latter informed the officers that
they could search the house for the missing phone. The brother asked if the officers had found the phone, and when
they responded that they had not, he said that if it was not in defendant’s bedroom, it was probably in the younger
brother’s room. Without encouragement from the police, he went to their younger brother’s room accompanied by
an officer, found a phone, and gave it to the officer. The phone matched the victim’s description of his stolen phone.
Defendant’s mother later provided written consent to search the house.

          Defendant was charged with an act that would have constituted second-degree robbery had he been an adult
at the time. He filed a motion to suppress the phone. The court held that because defendant’s brother retrieved the
phone, and because he did not act as an agent of the officers, defendant could not bring a constitutional claim to
challenge the seizure of the phone. Therefore, the court denied defendant’s suppression motion.

          The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the officers had probable cause to search and faced
exigent circumstances, which justified their warrantless entry into defendant’s home. The panel stated that “[t]he
technology that led police to [defendant’s] home provided some of the exigency supporting their entry” and
concluded that the record supported a finding that the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement rendered the
officers’ action constitutional. The panel found that because defendant’s brother, a non-state actor, uncovered the
phone, defendant’s mother’s consent was not significant to the constitutional analysis of this search.

         The Court granted certification. 
229 N.J. 164 (2017).

HELD: Neither exigency nor the hot pursuit doctrine justified the officers’ warrantless entry here. However,
defendant’s brother’s actions did not constitute state action and were sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful police
conduct to preclude application of the exclusionary rule to the evidence.

                                                          1
1. A warrantless entry into a home is presumptively invalid unless the State can show that it falls within one of the
specific, delineated exceptions to the general warrant requirement. Evidence found pursuant to a warrantless search not
justified by an exception to the warrant requirement is subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule. However, the
exclusionary rule applies to preclude the admission of evidence only when such evidence is suitably linked to the police
misconduct. Therefore, when evidence is acquired by constitutionally valid means after initial unconstitutional action
by law enforcement, courts must consider whether the exclusionary rule is applicable. Such evidence is admissible
when the connection between the unconstitutional police action and the secured evidence becomes so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint from the unlawful conduct. (pp. 13-16)

2. One recognized exception to the warrant requirement is the presence of exigent circumstances. To invoke that
exception, the State must show that the officers had probable cause and faced an objective exigency, of which police
safety and the preservation of evidence remain the preeminent determinants. For a “hot pursuit” to justify an
exception to the warrant requirement, officers must have had probable cause and have been in immediate or
continuous pursuit of the suspect from the scene of the crime. Because the “hot pursuit” doctrine is a subset of the
exigent-circumstances exception, the touchstones that would justify a warrantless entry remain the possible
destruction of evidence and the threat of violence by the suspect. In State v. Bolte, hot pursuit could not justify the
police entry when the defendant was unarmed and the police had no reason to believe he posed a danger or would
destroy evidence—a justification usually reserved for narcotics cases. 
115 N.J. 579, 593-94 (1989). (pp. 16-19)

3. Here, the Court does not need to consider whether the officer’s pursuit of defendant, facilitated by his use of the
Find My iPhone application, falls within the purview of the hot pursuit doctrine because the doctrine does not apply
for other reasons. The State failed to prove that the police had any basis to believe defendant would injure anyone
inside the house or the officers themselves, so that waiting to obtain a warrant would have been unreasonable.
Likewise, the State did not show that the officers had any reason to believe that defendant would (or could) destroy
the phone. Neither exigency nor the hot pursuit doctrine justified the officers’ warrantless entry here. (pp. 20-21)

4. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures operates as a restraint only
upon sovereign authority. State v. Scrotsky, 
39 N.J. 410, 416 (1963). Thus, “where a private person steals or
unlawfully takes possession of property from the premises of the owner and turns it over to the government, which
did not participate in the taking, it may be used as incriminating evidence against the owner in a subsequent criminal
prosecution.” Ibid. When a private person acts “as an arm of the police,” however, the private person’s seizure of
property constitutes state action for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Ibid. In Scrotsky, the landlady of an
apartment building suspected that one of her tenants had been stealing personal effects from her home and entered
the tenant’s apartment accompanied by a police detective. Id. at 413-14. The landlady “went into the apartment
with the [police] and seized the property under color of their authority and as a participant in a police action.” Id. at
415. Therefore the evidence seized by the landlady could not be introduced. Id. at 417-18. (pp. 21-23)

5. Here, defendant’s brother was clearly not acting as an agent of the State when he searched for the phone. Unlike
in Scrotsky, defendant’s brother’s actions were completely independent of the officer’s investigation. The mere
presence of an officer does not by itself indicate police coercion or influence, and no evidence in the record supports
that defendant’s brother’s search was causally or temporally connected to the police misconduct. Defendant’s
brother’s unprovoked decision to search for the phone himself is an intervening circumstance that breaks the causal
connection between the unlawful police entry and the finding of the phone. The brother’s actions were voluntary
and unsolicited by the police, and the phone is immune from the exclusionary rule. (pp. 23-26)

         The judgment of the Appellate Division is MODIFIED and AFFIRMED.

         JUSTICE ALBIN, DISSENTING, notes that the State bears the burden of proving attenuation.
According to Justice Albin, the State failed to show that the unlawful police occupation of the family home did not
heavily influence the brother’s decision to fetch the phone and that, absent the unlawful police presence, the brother
would have volunteered to look for the phone. The taint from the unconstitutional police occupation of defendant’s
home was not purged by the brother’s cooperation with the police, in Justice Albin’s view.

      CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE
LaVECCHIA joins.
                                                           2
                                     SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       A-
38 September Term 2016
                                                077383

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE INTEREST OF J.A.,

      Juvenile–Appellant.

         Argued January 2, 2018 – Decided June 6, 2018

         On certification to the Superior Court,
         Appellate Division.

         Peter T. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public
         Defender, argued the cause for appellant
         J.A. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
         attorney; Peter T. Blum, of counsel and on
         the briefs).

         Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General,
         argued the cause for respondent State of New
         Jersey (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney
         General, attorney; Steven A. Yomtov, of
         counsel and on the briefs).

         Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus
         curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New
         Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director,
         and Rutgers Constitutional Rights Clinic,
         attorneys; Alexander Shalom, Edward L.
         Barocas, Jeanne LoCicero, of counsel and on
         the brief, and Ronald K. Chen, on the
         brief).

         Jonathan Romberg argued the cause for amicus
         curiae Seton Hall University School of Law
         Center for Social Justice (Seton Hall
         University School of Law Center for Social
         Justice, attorney; Jonathan Romberg, on the
         brief).

                               1
    JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court.

    In this case, we consider the admissibility of evidence

procured from a home after police officers’ warrantless entry.

    A man was attacked at a bus stop in Willingboro and his

cell phone was stolen.    He and a police officer tracked the

phone’s location to a nearby house using a phone tracking

application.

    Several officers arrived at the house, and one spotted the

stolen cell phone’s case through a window.       When no one

responded to their knocks on the door, the officers entered the

house through an unlocked window.       Once inside, they performed a

protective sweep to determine whether the suspect was inside,

and they found defendant, J.A., then seventeen years of age,

under the covers of a bed.    Shortly thereafter, defendant’s

mother and brother arrived home.       After the officers explained

their investigation, defendant’s mother consented to a search of

the house, and defendant’s brother voluntarily retrieved the

stolen phone.   Defendant was later charged with second-degree

robbery for theft of the phone.

    Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the

officers’ entry into his home was unconstitutional because the

officers entered without a warrant and there were no

circumstances that would justify an exception to the warrant

requirement.    The trial court denied defendant’s motion to

                                   2
suppress.    The court found that, although the officers’ search

procedure may have been imprudent, it was ultimately defendant’s

brother -- without any coercion or duress from law enforcement -

- who retrieved the cell phone.       The court reasoned that

defendant could not challenge the seizure of the cell phone in

light of that lack of state action.

    Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed.

The panel held that the officers had probable cause to search

and found that exigent circumstances justified the officers’

warrantless entry into defendant’s home.       The panel also found

that the fact that defendant’s brother, and not law enforcement

officers, retrieved the phone neutralized any potential problems

with his mother’s consent.

    We disagree with the panel’s determination that the

officers’ warrantless entry was justified by the claimed

exigency faced by the officers.       However, we agree that

defendant’s brother’s actions did not constitute state action

and were sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful police

conduct.    Because we find that the brother’s independent actions

operate to preclude application of the exclusionary rule to the

evidence, we do not reach the question of defendant’s mother’s

consent to search.    Accordingly, we modify and affirm the

judgment of the Appellate Division.

                                  I.

                                  3
                                  A.

    On May 30, 2014, the victim was standing at a bus stop in

Willingboro when he was approached by a young man in a hooded

black sweatshirt and camouflage shorts.       The young man asked to

use the victim’s cell phone, explaining that he was locked out

of his house.   The victim hesitated, then reached to take out

his phone.   As the victim was facing the other direction, the

man punched him in the arm, took the phone, and ran.

    A Willingboro Police Officer was dispatched to meet the

victim at the bus stop.   The victim explained that the phone was

an Apple iPhone, which had been in a pink glittery case.

    The officer and the victim used the “Find My iPhone”

application to track the location of the phone.       The application

immediately identified a house about three blocks from the bus

stop as the phone’s whereabouts.       After about two minutes, the

phone was shut off, which prevented the application from further

tracking the phone’s location.

    The officer went to the house, and other police officers

were dispatched there as well.     The officers decided to secure

the perimeter of the house.    While performing an exterior

security check, an officer peered through a first-floor window

and noticed a pink glittery phone case matching the victim’s

description on a nearby bed.     At that point, the police thought

                                   4
that the young man who took the victim’s phone may have been

inside the house.

    The officers believed that the house was abandoned:

curtain blinds covered most of the windows, there were no signs

of life inside or cars in the driveway, and no one responded to

the officers’ several knocks on the front door.

    One officer found an unlocked window on the first floor,

through which he and another officer entered the house.    Another

officer subsequently entered through the front door.   Once

inside, the officers began searching the house for the suspect.

During their search, they observed the phone case that was

previously seen through the first floor window, but did not take

possession of it.   The phone was not found during that initial

search.

    The officers found defendant, unarmed, upstairs in the

master bedroom, lying under a blanket on the bed.   The officers

also found a hooded sweatshirt and a pair of camouflage shorts

nearby.

    The officers handcuffed defendant, brought him downstairs,

and questioned him about his knowledge of the robbery.

Defendant’s family members subsequently arrived at the house,

including his older brother and mother, who lived there.      The

latter appeared irate at defendant upon her arrival.   She asked

the police “what did [defendant] do now?” and said that she was

                                 5
“sick” of his antics and that she previously “told him if he

comes here acting up he’s got to go.”     She angrily informed the

officers that they could search the house for the missing phone.

    The officers explained to defendant’s brother that they

suspected that defendant had stolen the phone.     Defendant’s

brother irritably responded that stealing a phone is something

that defendant would be inclined to do.     The brother asked if

the officers had found the phone, and when they responded that

they had not, he said that if it was not in defendant’s bedroom,

it was probably in the younger brother’s room.     Without

encouragement from the police, he went to their younger

brother’s room accompanied by an officer, found a phone, and

gave it to the officer.   The phone matched the victim’s

description of his stolen phone.

    Defendant’s mother later provided written consent to search

the house.

                                B.

    Defendant was charged with an act that would have

constituted second-degree robbery, contrary to 
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-

1(a)(1), had he been an adult at the time.     He filed a motion to

suppress the phone, arguing that it was found as a result of an

unconstitutional search and seizure.

    At the suppression hearing, the court found that the police

did not conduct a search of the residence until his mother gave

                                   6
consent.   The court also found that defendant’s brother’s search

was not driven by “coercion or duress from law enforcement,”

explaining that although “third parties acting on behalf of the

State are bound by constitutional strictures,” the brother’s

actions here did not constitute state action.    The court opined

that the officers’ behavior in the house may have amounted to

“sloppy search procedure.”     It held, however, that because

defendant’s brother retrieved the phone, and because he did not

act as an agent of the officers, defendant could not bring a

constitutional claim to challenge the seizure of the phone.

Therefore, the court denied defendant’s suppression motion.

    The case went to trial and defendant was adjudicated

delinquent and sentenced to two years of house arrest.

    Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court should

have suppressed the cell phone evidence because the police

officers’ entrance into his home and subsequent search were

unconstitutional.   The Appellate Division affirmed.   The panel

concluded that the officers had probable cause to search and

faced exigent circumstances, which justified their warrantless

entry into defendant’s home.

    The panel explained that the “novel aspect of cutting-edge

technology” -- the Find My iPhone application -- allowed the

police to track the stolen iPhone, and that the police confirmed

that the phone was inside the house when they spotted its case

                                  7
through a window.   Together, those facts gave the officers “a

reasonable and well-grounded belief that the person who robbed

the victim minutes earlier was inside the home.”

    The panel stated that “[t]he technology that led police to

[defendant’s] home provided some of the exigency supporting

their entry.”   In particular, the court found it significant

that two minutes after the officer activated the “Find My

iPhone” application, the phone was turned off.      That led the

officer to feel that “immediate action was required because once

the phone was turned off, it could be moved and the GPS

capabilities would not function.”      The panel found that this

concern was reasonable, “as the small cell phone could easily

have been destroyed or hidden, and was the only physical

evidence linking [defendant] to the robbery.”      Thus, the panel

concluded that, “in entering the residence to secure the area,

determine whether there was any danger to anyone in the house,

and prevent destruction of the proceeds of the robbery,” the

police acted reasonably and within the confines of the Fourth

Amendment.

    The panel reasoned that had the officers identified

defendant as a suspect immediately following the taking of the

victim’s phone and then physically followed him to the house,

the “hot pursuit” doctrine, in all likelihood, would have

permitted the warrantless entry.       The panel found that, though

                                   8
those facts are not present here, there “was a close temporal

link between a serious criminal event, during which physical

force was used against the victim, and the police pursuit that

resulted in a warrantless entry.”     The panel also found that

there was “a reasonable expectation that a delay in obtaining a

warrant would result in the destruction of evidence.”

Therefore, the panel concluded that the record supported a

finding that the hot pursuit exception to the warrant

requirement rendered the officers’ action constitutional.

    Moreover, the panel noted that defendant’s brother

voluntarily retrieved the phone and handed it to police.     The

panel found that because defendant’s brother, a non-state actor,

uncovered the phone, defendant’s mother’s consent was not

significant to the constitutional analysis of this search.        The

panel consequently affirmed.

    Defendant filed a petition for certification with this

Court, again challenging the trial court’s denial of his

suppression motion.   We granted certification.    
229 N.J. 164

(2017).   We also granted amicus curiae status to the American

Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) and the Seton Hall

University School of Law Center for Social Justice.

                                II.

                                A.

                                 9
    First, defendant argues that the hot pursuit doctrine

cannot validate the officers’ warrantless entry into his home.

For the hot pursuit doctrine exception to apply, defendant

asserts, the State must show that the “suspect (1) was armed and

immediately dangerous or (2) knew that the police were in

pursuit and therefore had a reason to immediately dispose of

evidence.”   Defendant contends that the State has failed to

prove that he posed a danger to anyone or that he knew that he

was being trailed and would thus be motivated to destroy

evidence.

    Additionally, defendant suggests that whether his brother

led the police to the phone is “legally insignificant” because

the “police were not lawfully present in the home.”   Defendant

adds that his brother was not acting as a private citizen

because a police officer was “right beside” him as they searched

the house together.   Therefore, defendant asserts, his brother

was acting on behalf of the State for constitutional purposes.

                                B.

    As does defendant, amici Seton Hall University School of

Law Center for Social Justice and the ACLU claim that the

officers’ entry into defendant’s home was not justified under

any exception to the warrant requirement.   Amici argue that the

hot pursuit doctrine is not applicable because the police were

never in pursuit of defendant and there was no basis to believe

                                10
that the suspect either posed a danger to officers or anyone in

the house or knew that he was being followed and would therefore

be likely to destroy the phone.     Seton Hall University School of

Law Center for Social Justice also posits that the destruction

of the phone was not even possible, distinguishing it from

evidence in other cases, such as controlled substances, which

can actually be disposed of completely via flushing or burning.

Therefore, Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Social

Justice suggests that there could be no fear that the phone

would lose its evidentiary value.

    Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Social

Justice further asserts that the officers were not justified in

entering the home based on any other exigency because the theft

of a phone does not alone present sufficiently dangerous

circumstances and the officers could have safely waited to

obtain a telephonic warrant while securing the house.

    As to defendant’s brother’s search, amici argue it was the

product of the unlawful police entry.     Amici contend that

defendant’s brother acted only after he discovered that the

police had -- as far as he knew, lawfully -- entered the home,

gathered inculpatory evidence, and seized defendant.    Thus,

amici claim, the search was the inadmissible fruit of the

illegal entry’s poisonous tree.

                                  C.

                                  11
    The State contends that objectively exigent circumstances

existed to justify the officers’ entry because the officers

entered the house “shortly after learning that evidence of a

robbery was in the house.”   The State also asserts the officers’

reasonable concern that evidence might be destroyed if they

waited to obtain a warrant because the “suspect had already

changed the appearance of the stolen iPhone by removing it from

its case” and had “turned the phone off.”   The State stresses

that because the officers were investigating a violent robbery

and did not know the seriousness of the threat that they or the

occupants of the house faced from the suspect, they needed to

enter the house in order to protect themselves and others.

Additionally, the State disputes amici’s argument that the hot

pursuit doctrine can never be applied where the perpetrator is

unarmed or where there is no actual “chase.”

    Finally, the State emphasizes that defendant’s brother

voluntarily located the stolen phone and gave it to the

officers.   The State contends that defendant’s brother’s actions

were independent, non-state actions that were sufficiently

attenuated from any alleged misconduct related to the officers’

entry.   Thus, according to the State, the trial court properly

held that the phone was admissible at trial.

                               III.

                                A.

                                12
    When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision on

a motion to suppress, the reviewing court defers to the trial

court’s factual findings, upholding them “so long as sufficient

credible evidence in the record supports those findings.”      State

v. Gonzales, 
227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016).    “An appellate court

'should give deference to those findings of the trial judge

which are substantially influenced by [the] opportunity to hear

and see the witnesses and to have the feel of the case, which a

reviewing court cannot enjoy.’”    State v. Elders, 
192 N.J. 224,

244 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 
42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)).

    However, the reviewing court need not defer to the trial

court’s legal conclusions, State v. Bryant, 
227 N.J. 60, 71-72

(2016), which appellate courts review de novo, State v.

Hathaway, 
222 N.J. 453, 467 (2015).

                                  B.

    The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

Article 1, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution both

safeguard the right to privacy and forbid warrantless entry into

a home except under certain circumstances.    State v. Davila, 
203 N.J. 97, 111-12 (2010); see also State v. Cassidy, 
179 N.J. 150,

160 (2004) (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil

against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”

(quoting State v. Hutchins, 
116 N.J. 457, 463 (1989))).

Therefore, a warrantless entry into a home is presumptively

                                  13
invalid unless the State can show that it falls within one of

the specific, delineated exceptions to the general warrant

requirement.   Davila, 
203 N.J. at 111-12.     Courts subject

warrantless entries to “particularly careful scrutiny,” and

“only in extraordinary circumstances may . . . [such entries] be

justified.”    State v. Bolte, 
115 N.J. 579, 583-84 (1989) (citing

Welsh v. Wisconsin,