Case Title: Schmunk v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-02-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Schmunk v. State1986 WY 40714 P.2d 724Case Number: 84-176Decided: 02/13/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROBERT F. SCHMUNK, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

 
 
v. 

 
 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 

Appeal from the District 
Court, ConverseCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Terry W. Mackey and 
Robert W. Tiedeken of Terry W. Mackey, P.C., Cheyenne, and James M. Shellow (argued), Stephen M. Glynn, 
and Janice A. Rhodes of Shellow, Shellow&Glynn, 
S.C., Milwaukee, Wis., for appellant (defendant).

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

A.G. McClintock, Atty. 
Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. 
Gen. (argued), Sylvia Lee Hackl, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), and Frank D. 
Peasley, Converse County and Pros. Atty., for appellee (plaintiff).

 
 

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE,* ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Retired November 1, 
1985.

** Retired November 30, 
1985.

 
 

CARDINE, Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant was charged 
with violation of § 6-2-101, W.S. 19771 and under this statute found guilty 
of first degree murder in the drug overdose death of his wife Kay Marie Schmunk. 
He appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury's verdict and his sentence of 
life imprisonment.

 
 

[¶2.]     The critical question 
presented for our determination is whether several errors occurring during the 
course of trial, when considered together, created sufficient prejudice to 
deprive appellant of a fair trial. Without question cumulative error may 
assemble in such proportion that reversal is required. Browder v. State, Wyo., 639 P.2d 889 (1982); State v. Allies, 186 Mont. 99, 606 P.2d 1043 
(1979).

 
 

[¶3.]     We reverse.

 
 

FACTS

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant Robert 
Schmunk, and Kay Schmunk were married in 1972 while residents of the State of 
Michigan. It 
was the second marriage for each of them. Kay Schmunk's two children from her 
prior marriage, Theresa Duncan and Bill Duncan, lived with appellant and Kay 
Schmunk during the time they resided in the State of Michigan. During 1979, 
appellant, his wife Kay Schmunk, and her son Bill Duncan, moved to Douglas, Wyoming where appellant commenced a general 
practice of medicine.

 
 

[¶5.]     Kay Schmunk had 
suffered severe migraine headaches for many years prior to her death. Appellant 
prescribed oral medication and administered intramuscular injections of 
medication for these headaches on numerous occasions. Kay Schmunk was also 
examined by several physicians with respect to her headaches and other medical 
problems. On May 6, 1981, she was seen by a neurologist in Casper, Wyoming, who stated in a written 
report:

 
 

"She has had headaches 
for at least 15 years. These can be continuous for up to 2-3 weeks. Except for 
this past week, she has been fairly headache free for several months. They begin 
with a cervical muscle fullness, ringing of the ears and occipital pain. She is 
often nauseated and vomits. Headaches are hemicranial, but change sides. Vision 
is occasionally blurred, and she does have photophobia.

 
 

"Her mother has less 
severe headaches, and her son has headaches associated with tension. Past 
history includes rheumatic fever at age 13. She does report being very depressed 
and, in fact, has wondered about suicide. She has refused 
counselling."

 
 

[¶6.]     Robert Schmunk, Kay 
Schmunk, and her son, Bill Duncan, played a card game the evening of July 14, 
1983. Kay Schmunk complained of a headache and, about midnight, appellant 
administered by intramuscular injection methadone, a narcotic, to relieve her 
pain. The card game continued for perhaps another thirty minutes before Kay 
Schmunk and appellant retired for the evening. About 2:00 a.m., appellant was 
aware that his wife was still in pain and, after some discussion with her, 
administered another narcotic injection, demoral. Appellant then fell asleep. He 
was awakened again about 4:30 a.m. with Kay Schmunk advising him that her 
headache was more severe, the worst she had ever had. Appellant then injected 
her with a third narcotic drug, morphine. About 6:30 a.m., he awakened and 
observed that his wife was not breathing. Appellant attempted resuscitation but 
was unsuccessful. Mrs. Schmunk was taken to the emergency room at the ConverseCountyMemorialHospital where further efforts to 
resuscitate her failed, and she was pronounced dead.

 
 

[¶7.]     An autopsy was 
performed July 16, 1983. The autopsy disclosed no apparent cause of death. The 
results of toxicology testing revealed that two of the narcotic drugs injected 
by appellant were three times the amount that would be consistent with the 
dosages reported by appellant. Appellant said he could not account for the 
quantity of drugs found by toxicology and insisted he had injected only the 
lesser amount he had reported. The cause of death was determined to be acute 
narcotic overdose resulting in respiratory depression and acute pulmonary 
edema.

 
 

[¶8.]     The State began the 
trial in this case by telling the jury that it was not required to prove motive; 
that nevertheless it would produce evidence that would establish for the jury 
the motive, the reason why Dr. Robert Schmunk killed his wife, Kay Marie 
Schmunk. It was the theory of the State that Dr. Schmunk had "two diametrically 
opposed personalities." There was one Dr. Schmunk who was a devout person, 
worked selflessly for his church, and who appeared to have a normal loving 
relationship with his wife and a happy marriage. The other Dr. Schmunk, the 
State claimed, was a man unhappily married, whose wife was imperfect, and who 
was permanently leaving him to obtain a divorce. The imperfection in Kay Marie 
Schmunk was an apparent reference to her severe migraine headaches and 
dependency on drugs. With respect to the second Dr. Schmunk, the prosecutor told 
the jury, there is "a dark side to this man, to his mind."

 
 

[¶9.]     The State of Wyoming staked its entire 
case of first degree murder upon the proposition that there was a dark, 
mysterious side to Dr. Schmunk, a man with a split personality who could not 
accept imperfection in Kay Schmunk and who, with premeditated malice, put her to 
sleep with drugs. In final argument to the jury, the prosecutor, summarizing the 
State's case, said:

 
 

"Why did Dr. Schmunk say 
he was buying [a rifle] for his girlfriend? He didn't say that to anybody who 
had an axe to grind, just to Dr. Erickson. I don't think there is a girlfriend. 
You may. You may read that in this; that is fair. "Profit? Sure, we have given 
you testimony of profit. Everything is in the wife's name. He has been divorced 
once before. He's got a quarter million dollars, almost, in assets in her name. 
Maybe that is a motive. You know, it would be a fair one. A little bit of 
insurance. There's no proof of big insurance, nothing, not a fourteen million 
dollar fortune like you hear about in some of these exciting cases. No million 
dollar life insurance, but it could have been a motive. I think it might have. I 
didn't prove it. I didn't really try to. I just laid it out here.

 
 

"Revenge? Was she 
leaving? Was she going to go? Could that be tied in to the money and the 
property? Was she going to go back to Michigan with everything in her name? Revenge 
to stop her from leaving. It was suggested, but not proven. If you want to play 
with it, go ahead.

 
 

"Jealousy? No, we didn't 
see any evidence of that. There were little things, little teasers thrown out, 
but I'll tell you what I think.

 
 

"I think there is a dark 
side to this man, to his mind. I think he has an inability to confront and 
accept what is real and imperfect. He could not accept that Kay was real and 
imperfect, and what he can't accept, he puts to sleep. That is what he did in 
this case. There is, I'm sure, in this man's mind some sad, sick perhaps 
pathetic reason why he did what he did, but I can't get it out of him. It didn't 
come out."

 
 

Thus, the State of 
Wyoming 
conceded that Dr. Schmunk had no girlfriend and that the killing was not for 
profit or revenge or because of jealousy, but because of a mysterious side of 
Dr. Schmunk that caused him to kill what was imperfect. Appellant claims that 
there was no evidence from which the jury could find that he possessed a "dark 
side," a "mysterious side," a "split personality" that caused him to kill what 
was imperfect. He claims that the State's effort to prove that dark, mysterious 
side, the split personality, rested upon speculation, conjecture and innuendo 
resulting from the erroneous admission of a videotape interview, hearsay and 
other evidence and testimony, the cumulative effect being to deny him a fair 
trial.

 
 

[¶10.]  The issues for our determination, as 
framed by appellant, are:

 
 

"[1] Should a mistrial 
have been declared when the prosecutor, in violation of a pretrial ruling, 
introduced polygraph results connected with defendant's alleged prior 
misconduct?

 
 

"[2] Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion in admitting witnesses' conjecture and 
speculation?

 
 

"[3] Was hearsay admitted 
in violation of W.R.E. § 804(b)(6) and the Confrontation Clause?

 
 

"[4] Was the prosecutor's 
expression in summation of his opinion of defendant's insanity plain 
error?"

 
 

We will not address other 
issues raised by appellant because they are unnecessary to our decision in this 
case.

 
 

VIDEOTAPED 
INTERVIEW

 
 

[¶11.]  On September 13, 1983, at the request of 
the investigator in this case, appellant went voluntarily to the sheriff's 
office to be interviewed concerning the death of Kay Schmunk. The interview was 
recorded on videotape secretly, without his knowledge. The video camera 
photographed appellant seated at a table and mostly showed the side and back of 
his head. Appellant cooperated fully with the investigator in giving the 
interview. There is no question but that the interview was given voluntarily and 
with full knowledge and waiver of Miranda rights. The day following the 
interview, appellant was indicted by the grand jury and charged with first 
degree murder.

 
 

[¶12.]  At the end of the interview, the 
following questions were asked and answered:

 
 

"[Investigator]: Based on 
the information that you've given us, would you be willing to take a polygraph 
test?

 
 

"[Appellant]: I wouldn't 
take it; I would not take a polygraph under any circumstances for anybody 
whether I was guilty, innocent or questionable, no, I would not take a 
polygraph.

 
 

"[Investigator]: Have you 
had a bad experience with them or have you had one before that * * *

 
 

"[Appellant]: I had a polygraph taken in reference to my 
daughter's charges against me, which was totally erroneous and I'm, I'm just 
not willing to take a polygraph and hinge anything on what the, uh, the 
polygraph might suggest.

 
 

"[Investigator] Ok." 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 

The videotape was 
received into evidence and viewed and heard by the jury during the State's case 
in chief. Appellant contends that the above questions and answers should have 
been deleted from the videotape before it was offered into evidence and viewed 
by the jury. Appellant claims that the unedited videotape erroneously put before 
the jury evidence of a prior bad act (the charge by his daughter in the state of 
Michigan), the 
results of a polygraph test, his refusal to take a polygraph test, and that it 
was in violation of the court's order in limine.

 
 

PRIOR ACTS OF 
MISCONDUCT

 
 

[¶13.]  The jury learned, as a result of viewing 
the videotape, that some charge had previously been brought against appellant by 
his daughter. Appellant contends the alleged prior misconduct should not have 
been offered into evidence by the State because of the court's order excluding 
this evidence. The exclusionary order came about when, before trial at a hearing 
upon motions for change of venue and in limine, the following 
transpired:

 
 

"Gentlemen, beginning 
with the Change of Venue: You know, I have read the articles that you submitted, 
Counsel, with your brief, and I take note especially of the one article which 
goes into the Defendant's background from the State of Michigan and recites or 
reports such matters as acquittals from charges which - of course, when a person 
is acquitted of a charge and is found innocent, even though that was reported, 
the insinuation or implication might still remain in the minds of some citizens 
that those charges were properly brought in Michigan and the public sometimes 
has a way of reading into something of that nature something that isn't 
there.

 
 

"Of course, a good deal 
of this information, obviously, must have come to the paper on hearsay evidence 
or hearsay conversations with people, and having only, obviously, attempted to 
get one side of the story where there may have been another, that type of 
reporting does, in the mind of the Court, produce an atmosphere of prejudice in 
this community against the Defendant 
* * *.

 
 

"In either event, it may 
not result in a fair trial for the Defendant. So that being the case, 
gentlemen, I am going to grant the Motion for a Change of Venue * * *." 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 

"THE COURT: * * * The 
next motion is a Motion In Limine.

 
 

"MR. BURLEY: Your Honor, 
the Motion in Limine that has been filed by the Defendant in this matter is 
directed to certain matters with respect to allegations or actions that the 
Defendant, Dr. Schmunk, may or may not have committed at a prior 
time.

 
 

"Particularly any matters 
concerning the Michigan Medical Practices Board or in the State of Michigan to the State of Michigan vs. Dr. Robert Schmunk."

 
 

In response, appellee's 
attorney stated:

 
 

"We would agree with Mr. 
Burley that as far as the information from the State of Michigan is concerned, 
it would be - not be proper for us to introduce it in our case in chief * * 
*."

 
 

And, in ruling upon the 
motion in limine, the court stated:

 
 

"I will grant the 
Motion 
In Limine as to the State's case in chief as to any matters that were or may have 
taken place in the past in the Defendant's life." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶14.]  During the State's case in chief, the 
videotape, still containing references to charges in Michigan, was received 
into evidence without objection and then viewed by the jury. The court 
adjourned; and the next morning, before the trial commenced, appellant, in 
chambers, moved for a mistrial stating:

 
 

"Judge, I think we have 
an obligation to our client and our case in this matter to move for a dismissal 
in the matter by virtue of the prejudicial effect that the video tape had upon 
the jury in this matter. I think that the implication is very clear by virtue of 
the video tape and the particular portion which had to do with a polygraph 
where, number one, the Doctor indicated 
on that video that he would not take a polygraph, and the reason for him not 
taking a polygraph was a result of a 
matter that had occurred with respect to his daughter, or charge by his daughter 
* * *.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"Although, I believe - I 
assumed, because of the substantial discussion, that all the Michigan stuff would be 
cut out and that everyone would monitor that to see that that would be done. 
Speaking from a human standpoint, I think the guards are down and you're just 
expecting that the one that is in control of certain evidence, their witnesses 
as well as demonstrative evidence or video evidence, is the one that has that 
primary responsibility.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"THE COURT: Thank you, 
Counsel. Well, gentlemen, I'm going to deny the motion. * * * [A]t the time I 
heard it, I was shaken by the fact that Michigan - even Michigan was mentioned, and the accusation. I 
wish it hadn't been in there. I do want to delete it. I think that probably the 
very fact, if we make some special instruction on it, this could - this is 
strictly up to Counsel - this could serve to call it to the jurors' attention, 
or it could serve to soften the effect of it; I don't know.

 
 

"However, gentlemen, that 
I am leaving to Counsel. I don't really believe it's the State's job to be the 
watchdog over the entire plethora of evidence that has to come into the case. I 
wish it hadn't happened." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

The court had changed the 
venue for this trial from Douglas, Wyoming to Sheridan, 
Wyoming to avoid the prejudicial effect of the 
extensive pretrial publicity concerning charges against appellant in the State 
of Michigan. 
In changing venue, the court stated that the prejudicial effect of the 
Michigan 
charge "may not result in a fair trial." Admission of the unedited videotape 
informed the jury of the very evidence that the court had previously determined 
would be prejudicial and which had been the reason for the change of venue to 
Sheridan, Wyoming. And, although the jury learned that a 
charge had been brought against appellant by his daughter, it did not know the 
nature of the charge, its disposition, or how it related to this case. The jury 
was left to speculate upon this mysterious charge and could have considered it 
as evidence of the existence of appellant's dark side or split 
personality.

 
 

[¶15.]  But the error here is ever more grievous 
for although prior acts of misconduct may be admissible to show motive, 
opportunity, intent, knowledge or absence of mistake, Bishop v. State, Wyo., 687 P.2d 242 
(1984), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985); Rule 
404(b), W.R.E., there is not even a claim here that the charges against 
appellant in Michigan might establish motive, opportunity, intent, knowledge, or 
absence of mistake. The State of Wyoming conceded in argument that "it would 
not be proper * * for us to introduce it * * *." We have said:

 
 

"`It is a dangerous 
species of evidence, not only because it requires a defendant to meet and 
explain other acts than those charged against him and for which he is on trial, 
but also because it may lead the jury to violate the great principle, that a 
party is not to be convicted of one crime by proof that he is quilty of 
another.'" Gabrielson v. State, 
Wyo., 510 P.2d 534, 536 (1973) (quoting from Rosencrance v. State, 33 Wyo. 360, 239 P. 952, 953 
(1925)).

 
 

We have also stated 
that:

 
 

"[I]t is settled law in 
this jurisdiction that mere charges, accusations, and arrests are consistent 
with innocence; and they should not be inquired into if the purpose of the 
prosecution is to discredit the witness in the eyes of the jury and convey to 
the jury knowledge that such witness was charged with a crime." Gabrielson v. State, supra at 536 
(quoted in Bishop v. State, supra, 
687 P.2d  at 248 (Cardine, Justice, dissenting)).

 
 

Thus, great care should 
be exercised in the admission of prior-bad-act evidence because of the 
ever-present danger that a person accused of a crime may be convicted, not 
because of the evidence with respect to the crime charged but because of prior 
activities which a lay jury might incorrectly view as evidence of guilt. In all 
events, Rule 403, W.R.E., requires that such evidence should not be admitted if 
its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Grabill v. State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 802, 808-809 (1980); Elliott v. State, Wyo., 600 P.2d 1044, 1049 
(1979). In this case the prior act (charge) in Michigan had no probative value at all; and, 
in granting the motion to change the venue of the trial, the court had already 
determined that this evidence would be prejudicial to appellant in this case. 
When evidence of this unspecified charge against appellant was revealed and the 
prosecutor told the jury that a dark, mysterious side to appellant caused him to 
kill with premeditated malice, the jury could rationally conclude that the 
charge from Michigan was the basis for the prosecutor's 
theory. The jury was invited to speculate upon the charge - it might be 
anything, a crime involving drugs, an attempted homicide, or other activity that 
might reveal the "dark side of appellant" alluded to by the prosecutor. We are 
cognizant of the fact that the defense viewed the videotape on two or three 
occasions, but that fact alone did not relieve the State of the obligation to 
delete the references to the Michigan incidents. We think appellant's 
objection to this evidence in the limine motion and the court's ruling preserved 
the error.

 
 

POLYGRAPH 
EXAMINATION

 
 

[¶16.]  The jury also learned from viewing the 
videotape that appellant

 
 

"had a polygraph taken * 
* * which was totally erroneous * * * and [was] just not willing to take a 
polygraph [in this case]."

 
 

[¶17.]  Generally, the results of a polygraph 
examination are not admissible in evidence. Cullin v. State, Wyo., 565 P.2d 445, 455 
(1977). Improper reference to the results of a polygraph examination has been 
held reversible error. See, e.g. Birdsong 
v. State, Okla. Crim. App., 649 P.2d 786 (1982); State v. Green, 271 Or. 153, 531 P.2d 245, 92 A.L.R.3d 1301 (1975). We have approved, upon stipulation of the parties, 
admission of the results of a polygraph examination. Daniel v. State, Wyo., 644 P.2d 172, 178 
(1982); Cullin v. State, supra, at 
455. In the absence of a stipulation for admission, a conviction must be 
reversed when the results of a polygraph are revealed to the jury. State v. Sutherland, 94 Wn.2d 527, 617 P.2d 1010 (1980); State v. 
Kilpatrick, 2 Kan. App. 2d 349, 578 P.2d 1147 (1978). The 
reluctance to admit the results of a polygraph or "lie detector" examination 
stems from the fact that the results of these examinations have not been 
established as reliable. It also stems from a fear that jurors may give too much 
weight to the results of the examination, even perhaps accepting it as proof of 
guilt or innocence.

 
 

[¶18.]  The results of the polygraph examination 
here referred to by appellant did not pertain to the charge for which appellant 
was on trial, but to a charge previously brought against him in the State of 
Michigan. We 
have already held that it was error to inform the jury of the charge against 
appellant in the State of Michigan. That being so, it was also error to 
reveal to the jury the adverse results of a lie detector examination with 
respect to those charges.

 
 

THE COURT'S ATTEMPT TO 
CURE - DELETION FROM THE VIDEOTAPE

 
 

[¶19.]  The court, after the viewing by the jury, 
concluded that the reference to the charge and lie detector test in Michigan should be 
deleted from the videotape and the jury informed of the deletion. The jury, 
therefore, was instructed at the close of the case as follows:

 
 

"You are instructed that 
a certain portion of State's Exhibit 21, the same being a video tape recording, 
admitted into evidence has been deleted. You are therefore instructed that the 
deleted portion must not be considered by you as evidence."

 
 

Appellee contends that 
improper reference to the Michigan charge and polygraph was cured by the 
above instruction. Appellee concedes, however, that where appellant's 
credibility plays a vital role in the case, the reference to the polygraph may 
be prejudicial. Thus, a criminal conviction was reversed because of references 
by a prosecution witness to a polygraph examination of the defendant, despite a 
cautionary instruction to the jury to draw no inferences from the references. 
United 
States v. Brevard, 739 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 
1984). The court noted that "[t]here are instances where the jury is exposed to 
inadmissible evidence which could make such a strong impression that 
instructions to disregard it may not remove its prejudicial effect." Id. at 182. See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 
1627, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968); Throckmorton 
v. Holt, 180 U.S. 552, 569, 21 S. Ct. 474, 481, 45 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1901).

 
 

[¶20.]  Here Dr. Schmunk's credibility was 
crucial. He offered nothing but his own profession of innocence to rebut the 
inference from the testimony of the State's experts regarding the quantity of 
narcotics present in Mrs. Schmunk's body. The improperly admitted evidence 
implicating him in some mysterious crime and disclosing his failure to pass a 
polygraph test would have so affected the jury that no instruction could restore 
Dr. Schmunk's credibility or overcome its prejudicial effect.

 
 

REFUSAL TO TAKE POLYGRAPH 
TEST

 
 

[¶21.]  Even more serious, however, was the 
court's decision to receive evidence which informed the jury that Dr. Schmunk 
had refused to take a lie detector test in this case. That occurred in this 
fashion. The videotape, State Exhibit No. 21, was played for the jury. Appellant 
moved to dismiss and for a mistrial and, as one of the grounds for his motion, 
stated: "[N]umber one, the Doctor indicated on that video that he would not take 
a polygraph * * *." The prosecuting attorney, referring to Dr. Schmunk's refusal 
to submit to a lie detector test, responded:

 
 

"I think it did paint a 
bit of the Defendant's personality, which we thought was of some significance in 
the course of the investigation, the pretense of cooperation while at the same 
time trying to manipulate the investigation.

 
 

"* * * It was, I think, 
helpful to the State, but not in the sense that it painted a bad picture about 
Michigan."

 
 

[¶22.]  The court stated, "I do want to delete 
it." Surprisingly, after the deletion, the videotape that went to the jury room 
contained the following:

 
 

"[Investigator]: Based on 
the information that you've given us, would you be willing to take a polygraph 
test?

 
 

"[Appellant]: I wouldn't 
take it; I would not take a polygraph under any circumstances for anybody 
whether I was guilty, innocent or questionable, no, I would not take a 
polygraph.

 
 

"[Investigator]: Have you 
had a bad experience with them or have you had one before that * * *

 
 

"[Appellant]: * * * I'm, 
I'm just not willing to take a polygraph and hinge anything on what the, uh, the 
polygraph might suggest.

 
 

"[Investigator] 
Ok."

 
 

Thus, the videotape 
containing Dr. Schmunk's refusal to take a lie detector test went with the jury 
when it retired to deliberate and was available for repeated viewing by the 
jury. As edited, the videotape contained only his refusal with no explanation or 
reason therefor. The purpose of putting the refusal in evidence was stated by 
the prosecutor as, "it did paint a bit of the Defendant's personality" and 
revealed defendant's "pretense of cooperation while at the same time trying to 
manipulate the investigation."

 
 

[¶23.]  In effect, the prosecutor was saying that 
the refusal of Dr. Schmunk to take the lie detector test tended to show 
"consciousness of guilt," for surely only a guilty man would "try to manipulate 
the investigation."

 
 

[¶24.]  It is uniformly held that evidence that 
an accused has refused to take a lie detector test is not admissible to 
establish "consciousness of guilt." 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 296. Thus, reference 
by the prosecutor to a refusal of the accused to take a lie detector test 
required reversal, State v. Driver, 
38 N.J. 255, 183 A.2d 655 (1962), and reversal was required also where reference 
to the refusal was in a recorded, taped interview. State v. Emory, 190 Kan. 406, 375 P.2d 585 
(1962).

 
 

[¶25.]  In Mills v. People, 139 Colo. 397, 339 P.2d 998 
(1959), defendant, when asked, replied that he would not take a lie detector 
test. The evidence of refusal was admitted as showing "consciousness of guilt." 
After declining to set forth the "sordid details" of the crime for which 
defendant was convicted of first degree murder, the appellate court stated 
(quoting from State v. Kolander, 236 
Minn. 209, 52 N.W.2d 458, 465 (1952):

 
 

"`The impact upon the 
minds of the jurors of a refusal to submit to something which they might well 
assume would effectively determine guilt or innocence, under these conditions, 
might well be more devastating than a disclosure of the results of such test * * 
*.'" Id. 339 P.2d  at 999.

 
 

The court then 
said:

 
 

"All too frequently this 
court is compelled to reverse judgments of guilt in important criminal cases 
because of overzealous prosecution. It is the duty of prosecuting officers to 
guard against the introduction of incompetent evidence. Overprosecution of an 
accused should not be permitted by the trial court. In the instant case the 
district attorney insisted at great length upon introduction into evidence of 
testimony [refusal to take a lie detector test] which is uniformly held to be 
incompetent, in an unbroken line of authorities throughout the nation." 
Id. 339 P.2d  
at 999-1000.

 
 

[¶26.]  It was error to inform the jury of Dr. 
Schmunk's refusal to submit to a lie detector test. The error was repeated when, 
after objection, the videotape was edited to contain only the refusal to take a 
lie detector test and sent to the jury room to be viewed during deliberations.2

The great mass of 
authority holds it error to admit evidence of appellant's refusal to submit to a 
lie detector test. The admission of this evidence is again especially 
troublesome where the jury is informed that there is something dark and 
mysterious about Dr. Schmunk and leaves them to wonder and speculate concerning 
the reason for the doctor's refusal as it might relate to the motive for killing 
his wife.

 
 

[¶27.]  We note here that the practice of sending 
the videotaped testimony of a witness to the jury room for repeated viewing 
during deliberation poses the danger of unduly emphasizing that testimony over 
all of the other testimony in the case. That danger is even greater where 
testimony is in the form of a videotape, for:

 
 

"Videotape testimony is 
unique. It enables the jury to observe the demeanor and to hear the testimony of 
the witness. It serves as a functional equivalent of a live witness." 
United 
States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 
1985).

 
 

In this case, the jury 
could have observed and heard Dr. Schmunk on the edited videotape, repeatedly 
and emphatically refusing to submit to a lie detector test without stating a 
reason for his refusal. His credibility was crucial to his defense. In 
United 
States v. Binder, supra, the trial judge 
allowed the jury to replay the videotape in an abridged fashion, and the 
appellate court still reversed the conviction stating:

 
 

"Under these 
circumstances the videotaped testimony may have taken on great significance. 
Allowing the jury to see and hear the children's videotaped testimony a second 
time in the jury room during deliberations unduly emphasized their testimony." 
769 F.2d  at 601.

 
 

We think repeated viewing 
of the Schmunk videotape contained an enormous potential for depriving him of a 
fair trial.

 
 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM 
DUNCAN

 
 

[¶28.]  William Duncan was 17 years of age, 
attending high school, and living with appellant and his mother at the time of 
this incident. He was questioned by the investigator before trial concerning the 
death of his mother on several occasions but did not then state that he believed 
Dr. Schmunk had killed her. Then, during the trial, he testified:

 
 

"Q. Why did you leave 
Douglas, Wyoming? 

 
 

"A. Because of the 
suspicions of my father killing my mother."

 
 

There was an objection 
and the court stated:

 
 

"I would overrule the 
objection anyway."

 
 

The State argues that 
Billy Duncan's statement that he suspected that his father had killed his 
mother was properly admitted into evidence because Billy had personal knowledge 
of the matter as required by Rule 602 W.R.E.; that it concerned his state of 
mind, and was not an opinion of appellant's guilt but was a statement of fact. 
Appellant contends that the context of the statement was such that the jury 
would clearly understand that Billy was stating his personal belief, "suspicion" 
that Dr. Schmunk had killed his mother. It is a close question, but assuming 
appellant to be correct, it would have been best if the trial court had 
sustained the objection.

 
 

PERSONAL 
KNOWLEDGE

 
 

[¶29.]  Rule 602, W.R.E., provides in part: "A 
witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to 
support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter." The personal 
knowledge requirement is imposed because

 
 

"[t]he trier of fact 
should base its decision upon good and trustworthy evidence, and `personal 
knowledge' really means firsthand knowledge which has come to the witness 
through his own senses. Thus, a witness may testify to an event or occurrence 
which he has seen himself, but not one which he knows only from the description 
of others." 3 Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence § 259 at 36.

 
 

We seriously question 
that Billy had "personal knowledge" that his stepfather had killed his mother. 
No one states what firsthand knowledge Billy acquired through his own senses or 
what he observed that would constitute the necessary personal knowledge. The 
appellee in its brief merely states:

 
 

"Clearly, he had ample 
personal knowledge of the answer to that question. * * Nine days before he left 
Douglas, the grand jury indicted Appellant for 
the first degree murder of Billy's mother."

 
 

[¶30.]  Personal knowledge generally refers to 
what a witness knows because of an event he has perceived.

 
 

"[T]he testimony must be 
based upon events perceived by the witness through one of the physical senses. 
The rule - an extension of the law's preference that decisions be based on the 
best evidence available - is grounded in the realization that the possibility of 
distortion increases with transfers of testimony, and that consequently the most 
reliable testimony is that which is obtained from the witness who himself 
perceived the event." (Footnotes omitted.) 3 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence ¶ 602-[01]. See also, Joy 
Manufacturing Company v. Sola Basic Industries, Inc., 697 F.2d 104 (3rd Cir. 
1982).

 
 

There is no statement by 
anyone of what event Billy perceived that would justify his statement that his 
mother was killed by Dr. Schmunk. We suggest it was inadmissible upon this 
ground alone. But, appellee contends that what Billy said was a statement of 
fact. Billy said it was a suspicion, and we are hard pressed to agree that when 
A says "I suspect B killed C," A has stated a fact. "I believe" or "in my 
opinion" might be synonomous with "I suspect," but is not synonomous with "I saw 
B kill C." And so the statement by Billy was no more than a suspicion that Dr. 
Schmunk had killed his mother and was clearly a statement of his 
opinion.

 
 

[¶31.]  An opinion by a lay witness is admissible 
if

 
 

"his testimony in the 
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which 
are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a 
clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." 
Rule 701, W.R.E.

 
 

RATIONALLY BASED ON 
PERCEPTION OF WITNESS

 
 

[¶32.]  Rule 701, W.R.E., incorporates the 
personal knowledge requirement of Rule 602 which we have heretofore discussed. 
Thus, it is said that:

 
 

"Under Rule 701, the 
witness must have perceived firsthand the pertinent events or matters, and his 
inference or opinion must be rationally based on his perception; his testimony 
must be rejected if his firsthand observation was inadequate to support an 
opinion." 3 Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence § 376 at 618-619.

 
 
 
 

[¶33.]  In Joy Manufacturing Company v. Sola Basic 
Industries, Inc., supra, 697 F.2d  at 111, it was said:

 
 

"The court is in essence 
requiring that the best evidence available - first-hand knowledge verses 
second-hand knowledge - be presented to the jury for use in its 
deliberation."

 
 

In Gorby v. Schneider Tank Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1015, 1021 (7th Cir. 1984), the testimony of a witness who proposed to 
state that "Welch did `everything he could to avoid [the] accident,'" and that 
"Gorby could have avoided the accident" was rejected by the court because they 
were based upon speculation rather than first-hand knowledge or observation. It 
was pointed out that the witness could only observe one vehicle, could not know 
what the drivers perceived, nor was he familiar with the vehicles.

 
 

[¶34.]  Where the proffered opinion of the 
witness was an opinion by a lay witness and encompasses a legal 
conclusion,

 
 

"a trial court may very 
properly conclude that a response would not be helpful to the trier of fact. The 
danger here is that the jury could easily accord too much weight to the 
pronouncement of a lay witness unfamiliar with the standards erected by the 
criminal law, whose statement may be charged with the emotionalism of a person 
coming to the rescue of an embattled co-worker." (Citations omitted.) 
United 
States v. 
Ness, 665 F.2d 248, 250 (8th Cir. 
1981).

 
 

When Billy testified of 
his "suspicions of my father killing my mother," that suspicion was not based 
upon personal knowledge or perception and was not admissible because Dr. Schmunk 
had been indicted for first degree murder. The question and answer added nothing 
to the case. The reason Billy left Douglas was 
irrelevant to any issue before the jury. His testimony was both inadmissible and 
prejudicial.

 
 

HELPFUL TO A CLEAR 
UNDERSTANDING

 
 

[¶35.]  The opinion of the lay witness must also 
be helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony. Rule 701, W.R.E., supra. 
Where a witness is asked

 
 

"whether the conduct in 
issue was `unlawful' or `wilful' or whether the defendants `conspired,' terms 
that demand an understanding of the nature and scope of the criminal law, the 
trial court may properly conclude that any response would not be helpful to the 
trier of fact. The witness, unfamiliar with the contours of the criminal law, 
may feel that the legal standard is either higher or lower than it really is. If 
either event is true the jury may accord too much weight to such a legal 
conclusion." United States v. Baskes, 
649 F.2d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 1000, 101 S. Ct. 1706, 68 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1981).

 
 

We have said that Billy's 
statement that he suspected his father killed his mother was not rationally 
based on any perception by him. We are unable to ascertain how his opinion that 
he suspected Dr. Schmunk had killed his mother would be helpful to a clear 
understanding of his testimony.

 
 

[¶36.]  There was before this jury all of the 
facts, testimony of experts, investigators, officers, physical evidence, the 
autopsy, and toxicology. The jury was in the best position to reach a conclusion 
on the matter of guilt or innocence - the ultimate issue in this case. Should we 
condone this type of opinion evidence, we could expect in the future that the 
State might call five witnesses to say they suspect the defendant is guilty. The 
defendant then would surely be permitted to call five witnesses to testify that 
they suspect he is innocent. It is said that "`assertions which amount to little 
more than choosing up sides,' such as statements that the defendant is `liable' 
or `at fault' or `guilty,'" 3 Louisell and Mueller § 376, do not satisfy the 
helpfulness requirement. Such a procedure would be absurd. It would detract from 
important evidence and would not be helpful to the jury in deciding the ultimate 
issue in the case. This type of opinion or conclusion should not have been 
admitted.

 
 

[¶37.]  The State next contends that Billy's 
opinion was admissible as revealing his state of mind at the time he left 
Douglas, Wyoming. Suffice it to say here that Billy's 
state of mind at the time he left Douglas, Wyoming was not relevant to any issue in this 
case. The reason he left Douglas was not proof 
of any material fact relating to the charge of first degree murder against Dr. 
Schmunk.

 
 

"All relevant evidence is 
admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute, by these rules, or by other 
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible." Rule 402, W.R.E.

 
 

The statement was not 
admissible under the state-of-mind exception in Rule 803(3), W.R.E., as 
suggested because that rule concerns the admissibility of hearsay evidence, and 
this was not hearsay. It was not relevant and, therefore, not admissible. It was 
not admissible as an opinion of a lay witness. The admission of this opinion, 
therefore, was error.

 
 

ADMISSION OF HEARSAY 
STATEMENTS NOTICED APRIL 30, 1984

 
 

[¶38.]  Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
804(b)(6), W.R.E., infra, the State served appellant with a notice on April 25, 
1984, and a second notice on April 30, 1984, advising appellant of the name and 
address of the declarant who would testify to hearsay statements of Kay Schmunk 
concerning her desire to leave appellant and return to the state of Michigan. 
The place of trial had been transferred by change of venue from Douglas, Wyoming - where 
this incident occurred - to Sheridan, Wyoming. The notice of April 30 was served on 
appellant's attorney in his motel room in Sheridan two days before trial was to commence. 
Appellant's counsel objected to the notice of April 30, 1984, claiming it did 
not permit sufficient time to prepare to meet the proposed hearsay as required 
by Rule 804(b)(6), did not comply with the spirit of the rule, referred to 
hearsay statements by Kay Schmunk in October 1982 and February 1983 which were 
far removed and vastly different from the proposed hearsay in the first notice 
of April 25, and finally because appellee had interviewed all of the witnesses 
more than nine months prior to trial, had the information available and could 
offer no reasonable excuse for not having given notice sooner. Appellee 
responded that, although the notice was late, it concerned the same type of 
hearsay evidence as listed in the notice of April 25 to which there was no 
objection and, in addition, it was admissible under Rule 803(3), W.R.E., as 
establishing declarant's state of mind.

 
 

[¶39.]  The court, in ruling on the motion, 
stated:

 
 

"It does disturb me that 
you had nine months and one trip back there [to Michigan] and * * * these statements are 
coming in on the Monday of the trial. * * I'll tell you what, gentlemen. I'm 
going to overrule the motion. I'm going to allow the testimony, but I think this 
should have been discovered some time ago. If you're going to put it in, I think 
the notice should have probably been given to them before the morning of the 
trial."

 
 

[¶40.]  It is a general rule that hearsay 
evidence is not admissible. There is no opportunity for confrontation or 
cross-examination, there is no manner of judging the credibility of the person 
making the statement or the weight to be given to it, there is the potential for 
memories to dim with the passage of time, and a potential for inaccurancies and 
even falsehoods in the second-hand hearsay statements offered as evidence. This 
general hearsay exclusionary rule was incorporated into Rule 802, W.R.E., which 
provides that hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the Wyoming Rules 
of Evidence or by other rules adopted by the Wyoming Supreme Court or by 
statute. Rule 803, W.R.E., sets forth twenty-four exceptions and Rule 804 sets 
forth an additional six exceptions to the exclusionary hearsay rule. These 
exceptions permit the receipt of hearsay evidence if the requirements of the 
exceptions are satisfied.

 
 

[¶41.]  It seems clear that almost any hearsay 
statement can in some tortured fashion be claimed to fit into one of the 
exceptions provided by Rules 803 and 804, W.R.E. But to hold that all hearsay 
fits into one of the exceptions and therefore is admissible is to permit the 
exception to the hearsay rule to swallow the rule excluding hearsay evidence. 
And so the general rule is, and should remain, that hearsay is not admissible. 
Nor should the trial court, under the guise of liberal construction of the Rules 
of Evidence, admit all hearsay without giving due consideration to the 
guarantees of trustworthiness and other requirements of the rules. Ordinarily 
strict compliance with the requirements of the exceptions to the hearsay rule 
should be enforced; and, if the proposed hearsay cannot meet those strict 
requirements, it should be excluded. In this case, it is clear that with respect 
to the proposed hearsay statements of Kay Schmunk noticed on April 30, 1984, 
there was not compliance with the requirements of Rule 804(b)(6) which 
provides:

 
 

"Other 
Exceptions. - A statement not 
specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) 
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is 
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general 
purposes of these rules and interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be permitted under 
this exception unless the proponent 
of it makes known to the adverse party 
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, 
his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including 
the name and address of the declarant." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶42.]  Rule 804(b)(6) was a catchall provision 
which, when proposed for adoption as federal Rule 804(b)(5), encountered 
considerable opposition.

 
 

"The House Judiciary 
Committee proposed to delete the provision altogether, along with identical 
language which the Advisory Committee had proposed in Rule 804(b)(5). The 
accompanying Committee Report reflects the concern that these catchall 
provisions inject `too much uncertainty into the law of evidence' and impair 
`the ability of the practitioners to prepare for trial.'" (Footnotes omitted.) 4 
Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence § 437 at 463.

 
 

Courts have generally 
noted that Congress intended rigid enforcement of the notice requirement and 
have refused admission of hearsay evidence pursuant to Rule 804(b)(5) where 
reasonable notice of intent to offer the hearsay was not given. 
United 
States v. 
Rodriquez, 706 F.2d 31, 41 (2nd Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Atkins, 618 F.2d 366, 372 (5th Cir. 
1980). The giving of notice has been excused in cases in which the proponent of 
the hearsay was not at fault. United 
States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3rd Cir. 
1978). We find appellee at fault in this case for, as the court noted, the 
appellee had interviewed these witnesses and had available all of the proposed 
evidence nine months before trial.

 
 

[¶43.]  Appellant objected to the receipt of the 
proposed hearsay testimony noticed in the letter of April 30, 1984, stating the 
notice was too late, did not satisfy the requirements, spirit or intent of the 
rule, and did not afford him a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it. 
Appellant's objection was overruled, and Kay Schmunk's mother was permitted to 
testify that Kay Schmunk had returned to Michigan for a visit in October 1982 - 
eight months prior to her death - and that during that visit Kay Schmunk had 
said that things were not going well, she wanted to come back home, and that she 
would be interested in purchasing a home that would be just right for her and 
Billy.

 
 

[¶44.]  She testified further that Kay Schmunk 
told her in a telephone conversation during February 1983 that she and Billy 
were going to come home and wanted to live in a travel trailer that was 
available; that things had gotten impossible and she wanted to come back home; 
she then stated that Bob was coming down the driveway and she had better hang 
up.

 
 

[¶45.]  Finally, she testified pursuant to the 
April 30 notice that Kay Schmunk stated to her at a family reunion in Michigan during June 1983 that she would have gone crazy 
in Wyoming without the right-to-life movement 
and that she was going back to Wyoming and then 
coming back to Michigan for a "long vacation." It was said 
that meant she was coming home to stay.

 
 

[¶46.]  As we have said, hearsay evidence is not 
ordinarily admissible. If it is to be admitted pursuant to an exception to the 
hearsay rule, compliance with the requirements of that rule is necessary. There 
is not a sufficient excuse to justify the late notice in this case. The 
witnesses had been interviewed nine months before trial. Their proposed 
testimony was or should have been known to the State of Wyoming. The proposed 
hearsay generally covers a substantially different period of time from that 
noticed on April 25, 1984. Finally, its receipt was extremely damaging to 
appellant as we will discuss later. He should have had a fair opportunity to 
prepare for and meet it. The proposed hearsay should have been excluded when 
appellant objected to it being received, and it was error not to do 
so.

 
 

ADMISSION OF HEARSAY 
STATEMENTS NOTICED APRIL 25, 1984

 
 

[¶47.]  Appellant further complains that all of 
the hearsay statements of Kay Schmunk admitted into evidence, i.e., both those 
noticed April 25, 1984, and those noticed April 30, 1984, should have been 
excluded. We note here that although appellant objected to the statements 
noticed April 30, 1984, he did not object to the receipt of the hearsay 
statements of Kay Schmunk noticed April 25, 1984. Appellant seems to contend 
that an objection was unnecessary claiming that the State has the initial burden 
of establishing a foundation for the admission of this hearsay. In Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79, 131 
(1981), we said:

 
 

"[I]n order for hearsay 
to be admissible under the catchall exception [referring to Rule 804(b)(6), 
W.R.E.], certain requirements must be satisfied. First, the declarant must be 
unavailable. Second, the adverse party must either have been given pretrial 
notice or a sufficient opportunity to prepare for and contest the admission of 
the hearsay. Third, the truth of the matter asserted must be evidence of a 
material fact. Fourth, the hearsay statement must be more probative than any 
other evidence which could be procured through reasonable efforts. Fifth, and 
finally, the statement must be supported by circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness * * *."

 
 

We further said that 
additional limits imposed upon the admission of hearsay by the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 10, 
Article 1 of the Wyoming Constitution must also be satisfied, these requirements 
being that:

 
 

"It is our conclusion 
that, before hearsay becomes admissible, the Confrontation Clause imposes a burden upon the State in 
addition to those found under Rule 804(b)(6). The prosecutor is required to 
establish: (1) that the declarant is unavailable to appear at trial; and (2) 
that there exists sufficient background information concerning the circumstances 
under which the hearsay statement was made to provide the jury with an adequate 
basis to evaluate its veracity." 632 P.2d  at 132-133.

 
 

We said in Hopkinson v. State, supra, that the 
State has the burden of proving the existence of the five elements listed and 
providing sufficient background to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Appellant 
suggests that the State must satisfy its burden and the court make a 
determination of admissibility even though appellee makes no objection to 
receipt of the hearsay evidence. Appellant is not correct in this contention. To 
hold as suggested would impose an impossible burden upon a trial court to, on 
its own motion, require proof that opposing counsel has not demanded. Besides, 
opposing counsel may choose not to object to receipt of the offered evidence for 
many reasons. Trial strategy may dictate no objection; the opposing party may 
believe the offered evidence will be favorable; the opposing party may believe 
that impeachment may be more damaging and choose not to exclude the evidence. 
Rule 103, W.R.E., with respect to admissibility of evidence 
provides:

 
 

"(a) Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is affected, and

 
 

"(1) In case the ruling 
is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objection * * * appears of record 
* * *.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"(d) Nothing in this rule 
precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although 
they were not brought to the attention of the court." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶48.]  There was no objection to the proposed 
hearsay identified in the April 25, 1984 notice. In the absence of an objection, 
the erroneous admission of this hearsay must rise to plain error before it will 
be considered by this court. It has been said:

 
 

"The term [plain error] 
suggests obviousness, and most of the defining phrases include this element. 
Most of the attempted definitions also suggest that plain error is something 
more fundamental or serious than reversible error * * *. As a practical matter, 
however, it is not clear how much more serious an error must be than reversible 
error in order to merit plain error treatment, nor how to determine whether a 
given error is more serious than reversible error, for the decisions finding 
plain error reflect little more than the conclusions reached by the court, and 
the attempted definitions are probably best viewed only as general indicators of 
the nature of the inquiry.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"A determination of plain 
error will be made upon examination of the whole record. Imagination is required 
in reliving the trial and assessing the effect of the asserted error, and each 
decision will turn upon the facts in a particular case." 1 Louisell & 
Mueller, Federal Evidence § 21 at 119-124.

 
 

In Bradley v. State, Wyo., 635 P.2d 1161, 
1163-1164 (1981), we said:

 
 

"A failure to object 
constitutes a waiver of whatever error occurred, unless the error rises to the 
level of plain error. A three-part test has been established for determining 
whether an error may achieve the status of plain error. First, the record must 
be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party 
claiming that the error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that party must prove that a 
substantial right has been denied him and as a result he has been materially 
prejudiced."

 
 

[¶49.]  Rule 804(b)(6), supra, requires that the 
proposed hearsay statements be "evidence of a material fact." Appellant contends 
that the proffered hearsay statements of Kay Schmunk were not evidence of a 
material fact and, therefore, not admissible. The material fact requirement is 
satisfied if the proposed hearsay statement offered into evidence is relevant. 4 
Louisell and Mueller § 491 at 1202.

 
 

[¶50.]  Relevant evidence is

 
 

"evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." Rule 401, W.R.E.

 
 

Evidence which is not 
relevant is not admissible, Rule 402, W.R.E. Of course Kay Schmunk's state of 
mind is no more relevant nor material in this case than was the state of mind of 
Vincent Vehar in Hopkinson v. State, 
supra, where we said:

 
 

"[T]he mental state of 
Vincent Vehar prior to his death is irrelevant. There is no allegation by the 
defense that his death was suicide or in any other manner which would make his 
mental state an issue." 632 P.2d  at 130.

 
 

[¶51.]  It is Dr. Schmunk's state of mind with 
which we are concerned in this case. If Kay Schmunk's hearsay statements had an 
effect in some manner upon Dr. Schmunk's actions, motive, or purpose, it might 
satisfy the materiality requirement. But in this case not a single witness 
testified that Dr. Schmunk was aware that Kay Schmunk had thought of leaving 
Douglas nor was there, during the preceding 
eight months, any overt act or other evidence that might put Dr. Schmunk on 
notice of Kay Schmunk's alleged intention. Billy Duncan, who resided with Robert 
and Kay Schmunk at the family home and testified to all facets of their family 
life, stated that from what he knew, "she did not tell him that she was going to 
leave." Unless the evidence was such that Kay Schmunk was going to leave 
appellant and return to Michigan, and that appellant knew of this, the evidence 
was not of a material fact, for how could Kay Schmunk's secret intentions affect 
appellant's action or be relevant upon the question of motive? Thus, the 
evidence under the present state of the record did not satisfy the material fact 
requirement for admission as hearsay under the catchall exception.

 
 

[¶52.]  With respect to its admission being plain 
error, the record is clear as to the incident alleged to be error. Appellee, in 
its notices of April 25 and April 30 stated:

 
 

"These are all statements 
relating to the declarant's state of mind and her intent or plan to get out of 
Douglas, if she could, and her dissatisfaction 
there."

 
 

As we have said, 
declarant's state of mind was not an issue nor a material fact in this case. A 
clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in that the hearsay was not of a 
material fact and, therefore, was not admissible under the exception provided in 
Rule 804(b)(6), W.R.E. The admission of this hearsay denied appellant a 
substantial right.

 
 

[¶53.]  Appellee offered considerable evidence 
with respect to these hearsay statements. The evidence is extensive, appears to 
be complete, and there is nothing from which we can say, even by inference, that 
it was of a material fact. We hold, therefore, that it was plain error to admit 
the April 25th noticed hearsay statements pursuant to the catchall exception 
found in Rule 804(b)(6), W.R.E.

 
 

[¶54.]  Appellee contends finally that the 
hearsay statements of Kay Schmunk were admissible under the provisions of Rule 
803(3), W.R.E., which provide:

 
 

"The following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a 
witness:

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"(3) A statement of the 
declarant's then-existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical 
condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and 
bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the 
fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, 
identification, or terms of declarant's will."

 
 

The State, thus, contends 
that because the hearsay was admissible under Rule 803(3), W.R.E., supra, it was 
unnecessary that the State satisfy the pretrial notice requirements of Rule 
804(b)(6), W.R.E., supra. The state-of-mind exception provided in Rule 803(3), 
supra, permits hearsay to be introduced as proof of the state of mind of the 
person making the hearsay statement. The state-of-mind exception concerns the 
declarant's mental condition and ordinarily may be received if that is the 
matter ultimately to proved by the statements. 4 Louisell and Mueller § 440 at 
518. Thus: 

 
 

"When a declaration is 
used to evidence a state of mind directly in issue, one encounters little 
difficulty in justifying the admission of the declaration. State of mind has to 
be proved in some way and frequently other evidence is nonexistent or 
inadequate.

 
 

"The declarant's state of 
mind may be an issue in a wide variety of contexts. Statements may be admitted, 
for example, to show: intent to establish a particular domicile, a customer's 
reason for refusing to deal with a supplier, motive, competency, affection or 
alienation * *." 4 Weinstein & Burger, supra, at 803-111.

 
 

[¶55.]  Ordinarily, declarant's state of mind is 
not evidence of the state of mind of a third person. As here, the state of mind 
of the declarant, Kay Schmunk, was not evidence of the state of mind of 
appellant, and it was not admissible under the provisions of Rule 803(3), 
W.R.E., supra.

 
 

[¶56.]  In Alcala v. State, Wyo., 487 P.2d 448, 455 
(1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 997, 92 S. Ct. 1259, 31 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1972), we 
said:

 
 

"[I]n marital homicide 
cases any fact or circumstance relating to ill-feeling, ill-treatment, jealousy, 
prior assaults, personal violence, threats, or any similar conduct or attitude 
by the husband toward the wife [victim] are relevant to show motive and malice 
in such crimes."

 
 

The hearsay statements of 
Kay Schmunk did not concern appellant's attitude toward her. The statements did 
not concern appellant's attitude, feelings or state of mind at all. At best, 
they were evidence of Kay Schmunk's state of mind not that of appellant's. As 
such, they were inadmissible.

 
 

THE ARGUMENT AND FAIR 
TRIAL

 
 

[¶57.]  The prosecutor in his opening statement, 
after telling the jury that Kay Schmunk enjoyed the status and elegance of being 
a doctor's wife in what appeared to be a happy marriage, stated:

 
 

"Ladies and gentlemen, 
there will be a dark counter-current to all of this. The real story. * * * 
[What] we are going to present is what was known to the family members and what 
appeared from time to time on the surface of the marriage, this dark 
counter-current * * *.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"We have the three of 
them living alone in their underground home.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 
"Why did he kill her? * * 
* [I]t's not important as to guilt or innocence. It has nothing to do 

with it, but there is a 
motive.

 
 

"Remember, motive is a 
fun thing to play with in the back of your heads.

 
 

"I want you to listen for 
it. I want you to hear the bits and pieces. I'm not going to tell you what it is now. 
I'll tell you what I think it is in closing." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶58.]  During examination of the State's 
witnesses, the prosecutor suggested possible motives. He insinuated that Dr. 
Schmunk bought a rifle for his girlfriend. He suggested that Dr. Schmunk killed 
for money, property or the proceeds of an insurance policy. Witnesses testified 
that Kay Schmunk was planning to leave. Witnesses stated that they believed Dr. 
Schmunk had killed Kay Schmunk. Then, in closing argument, the prosecutor told 
the jury, "I don't think there is a girlfriend." He said he had not proven that 
the killing was for money or for revenge or because of jealousy. Then, as 
promised in his opening statement when he said "I'll tell you what I think it is 
in closing," he said it was his belief that Dr. Schmunk killed his wife because 
he was a man with a mysterious dark side, a split personality, who because of 
some mental aberration, "put to sleep what was real and imperfect."

 
 

[¶59.]  Appellant contends that the State lifted 
this theory of the case from a movie, stating in his brief:

 
 

"In the classic 1946 
film, The Spiral Staircase, the 
mystery behind a series of senseless, apparently motiveless, murders is solved 
for the audience when it is discovered that the murders are not unrelated. 
Connecting them, explaining them, was the sick logic of their perpetrator, a 
seemingly gentle professor whom no one would suspect of murder. As he tries to 
kill the mute girl who attends his invalid mother, the man admits that he is 
driven by a demented calling. It is not profit that spurs him to murder, nor 
revenge, nor jealousy: he hates imperfection in the world, and he will kill to 
eliminate it."

 
 

[¶60.]  The manner in which the State arrived at 
a theory of the case does not concern us as much as the necessity that there be 
evidence to support the theory. Here there was none. Not a single witness 
testified that Dr. Schmunk had a "split personality," that there was a dark, 
mysterious side to him or that he was sick or demented. It was contended, 
nevertheless, that there was evidence from which inferences could be drawn which 
would support the argument.

 
 

[¶61.]  We recognized that the prosecuting 
attorney may draw all legitimate inferences from the evidence when we 
said:

 
 

"Closing arguments are 
meant to be just that, arguments premised upon the evidence already submitted to 
the jury. Prosecutors are no more limited in their closing than defense counsel. 
They may review the evidence and suggest 
to the jury inferences based thereon. The purpose of closing arguments is to 
allow counsel to offer ways of viewing the significance of the evidence. 
However, there are limits, not only on prosecutors, but on all attorneys." 
(Citations omitted.) Browder v. 
State, supra, 639 P.2d 889, 893. See also, Hopkinson v. State, supra, 632 P.2d  at 
145; 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 337.

 
 

We look to see if there 
was evidence from which the jury could infer that there was a dark, mysterious 
side to Dr. Schmunk and that he was a man with a "split personality" who could 
not accept, and therefore killed, what was imperfect.

 
 

[¶62.]  Perhaps that inference could be drawn 
from the charge by his daughter against Dr. Schmunk in the state of Michigan. The jurors knew 
that the prosecutor had information about something occurring in Michigan, but they were 
never told what it was. When the prosecutor said "I think he did it because this 
man has got two diametrically opposed personalities," the jurors could not help 
but wonder whether the source of the prosecutor's information was this unknown 
Michigan 
matter. But we have held it error to have admitted this evidence.

 
 

[¶63.]  Perhaps when the jury learned that he 
refused, under all circumstances, to take a lie detector test, such inference 
might be drawn. But we have held it error to have admitted that 
evidence.

 
 

[¶64.]  Perhaps when Billy said he suspected Dr. 
Schmunk of having killed his mother, that would support an inference of his 
"dark side." But it was error to admit that evidence.

 
 

[¶65.]  And, when Mrs. Schmunk's relatives 
testified that Kay was leaving him to return to Michigan, the jury might infer that she was 
leaving because of his dark, mysterious side; but that evidence we have held 
also inadmissible.

 
 

[¶66.]  The above evidence was admitted and was 
before the jury at the time of argument. The prosecutor could not know that it 
would later be held by us to have been erroneously admitted. Where improperly 
admitted hearsay evidence is commented upon in argument, it "cannot be said to 
be improper because it was based on the evidence [citation] but seriously 
aggravated the error committed in admitting the evidence." State v. Perelli, 125 Conn. 321, 5 A.2d 705, 
707, 121 A.L.R. 1357 (1939). Perhaps his argument was proper at the time, 
although we doubt that this evidence would support an inference that Dr. Schmunk 
had a "split" or "dual" personality and, therefore, killed what was 
imperfect.

 
 

[¶67.]  It is generally held that an expression 
of knowledge, opinion or belief, not based upon or shown by the evidence at 
trial, either expressly or inferentially is improper and prejudicial error. 75 
Am.Jur.2d Trial § 261; 50 A.L.R.2d 773. The policy and reasons for the 
rule

 
 

"are that the statement 
complained of injects into the case irrelevant and inadmissible matter or a fact 
not legally produced in evidence, and adds to the probative force of the 
testimony adduced upon the trial the weight of the prosecutor's personal 
influence or knowledge, or of his professional opinion, or the influence of his 
official position." (Footnotes omitted.) 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 261.

 
 

[¶68.]  There was no other evidence from which 
these inferences could be drawn or which would support the argument of the 
prosecutor. The prosecuting attorney is the representative of the state of 
Wyoming. Thus 
we have said:

 
 

"The role of the 
prosecuting attorney in a criminal case `differs from that of the usual 
advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.' ABA Code of Professional 
Responsibility, EC 7-13 (1980)." Browder 
v. State, supra, 639 P.2d  at 893.

 
 

And, in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633, 79 L. Ed. 1314 (1935), the court said a state is the 
representative of

 
 

"a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at 
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it 
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar 
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that 
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness 
and vigor - indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is 
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use 
every legitimate means to bring about a just one.

 
 

"It is fair to say that 
the average jury, in a greater or less degree, has confidence that these 
obligations, which so plainly rest upon the prosecuting attorney, will be 
faithfully observed. Consequently, improper suggestions, insinuations, and, 
especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight 
against the accused when they should properly carry none."

 
 

Appellant did not object 
to the prosecutor's argument. An objection, however, is not necessary where the 
transgression is plain error. In Browder 
v. State, supra, 639 P.2d  at 895, we said:

 
 

"In determining whether 
plain error has occurred, the facts of the case must be viewed in light of the 
trial record as a whole and not as to whether any one single incident standing 
alone would be reversible. United 
States v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062 (2nd Cir. 
1970). This cumulative-effect 
approach has been applied in numerous cases. In particular, it was used by 
the United States Supreme Court in Berger, supra.

 
 

"Reviewing the entire 
record in this case, it is clear that the fairness of appellant's trial was called 
into question by the prosecutor's conduct." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶69.]  We have previously discussed the doctrine 
of plain error. The cumulative effect of error in admission of evidence and 
testimony utilized in the prosecutor's argument and the argument itself makes 
clear that it was plain error.

 
 

[¶70.]  We believe that sending the edited 
videotape to the jury room with Dr. Schmunk's adamant refusal to submit to a lie 
detector test and the admission of the hearsay statements of Kay Schmunk were 
prejudicial error in themselves sufficient to require reversal. We are convinced 
that the cumulative effect of putting before the jury inadmissible evidence of 
an unknown charge against Dr. Schmunk from Michigan, his refusal to take a lie 
detector test, testimony of witnesses that they "suspected" Dr. Schmunk had 
killed Kay Schmunk, testimony of Kay Schmunk's uncommunicated thoughts of 
leaving Dr. Schmunk, and then capping it all with the argument here presented, 
was to deprive Dr. Schmunk of a fair trial. Thus, our deep and abiding 
conviction that loyalty to our constitution and its provisions guaranteeing to 
everyone a fair trial, requires reversal of this case. 

 
 

THE DISSENTS

 
 

[¶71.]  It is patently obvious that there is much 
serious disagreement between the majority and the dissenting justice. Upon one 
critical point, however, there is plain and clear agreement. Thus, it is stated 
in one of the dissents that with reference to

 
 

"the unfairness which 
results from a jury viewing a video tape in the jury room and, thus, giving 
undue emphasis to a portion of the testimony, I agree. I believe that this Court 
should, by rule, direct that any verbatim record of question-and-answer 
testimony, video tape or deposition, or otherwise, whether admitted as an 
exhibit or otherwise, shall not be subject to jury inspection other than as 
permitted to be read or shown during that part of the trial in which evidence is 
being received."

 
 

It is then stated that 
although "unfair," it was all right for the videotape, with appellant's refusal 
to submit to a polygraph test, to go to the jury room in this case for two 
reasons.

 
 

[¶72.]  First, it is said there was no objection 
by appellant. We disagree. In chambers, before the tape went to the jury room, 
the following occurred. Appellant's counsel stated:

 
 

"Judge, I * * * move for 
a dismissal in the matter by virtue of the prejudicial effect [of] the video 
tape. * * * [T]he Doctor indicated on that video that he would not take a 
polygraph, and the reason for him not taking a polygraph was as a result of a 
matter that had occurred with respect to his daughter, or charge by his daughter 
* * *."

 
 

The purpose of an 
objection is to give notice of the claimed error so that the judge has an 
opportunity to rule or correct the error. It cannot be claimed here that there 
was no such notice. Appellant made a motion in limine before trial, and, during 
trial, moved for dismissal and for mistrial. Surely these motions gave notice to 
the court and preserved for review appellant's objection to the videotape 
because it contained, as he stated, the doctor's statement "that he would not 
take a polygraph." But even if that were not so and there were no objection, we 
would hold it plain error to send the videotape to the jury room.

 
 

[¶73.]  Second, it is said there was no rule in 
effect concerning sending a transcript of part of the testimony to the jury 
room. Again, we disagree. The rule against sending testimony to the jury room is 
as ancient as the common law itself. The reason for the rule is obvious. Having 
some testimony to read again and consider and discuss in deliberations, the jury 
is likely to unduly emphasize that testimony over that which was heard days 
before and which may have begun to fade from memory. The impact of visual and 
oral testimony on videotape is even greater. As the dissenting justice states, 
it is "unfair" and should not be "permitted."

 
 

[¶74.]  In State v. Wilson, 188 Kan. 67, 360 P.2d 1092, 1098 (1961), quoting from State v. 
Solomon, 96 Utah 500, 509, 87 P.2d 807, 811 (1939), the court, after noting 
that permitting exhibits to go with the jury was committed to the court's 
discretion, stated:

 
 

"`But the testimony of a 
witness is in a different category. Such is the provision of the statutes and 
the common law always excluded depositions and written testimony from being 
carried from the bar by the jury. We can see no reason why the court should 
depart from the well established rule. It may often happen that the testimony on 
one side is oral from witnesses produced before the jury, while the testimony 
for the other side on essential matters is in the form of depositions or in the 
transcript from testimony at a previous hearing. If the hearing lasts for any 
length of time and the jury takes the depositions or transcript to be read and 
discussed while the oral evidence contra has in a measure faded from the memory 
of the jurors, it is obvious that the side sustained by written evidence is 
given an undue advantage. The law does not permit depositions or witnesses to go 
to the jury room. Why should a witness be permitted to go there in the form of 
written testimony? State v. Moody, 18 
Wn. 165, 51 P. 356; Welch v. Insurance 
Company, 23 W. Va. 288; Tabor v. Judd, 62 N.H. 
288.'"

 
 

[¶75.]  The Kansas court then, in State v. Wilson, supra, reversed a 
conviction for kidnapping and forcible rape stating

 
 

"that when the court 
permitted the jury to take to the jury room the transcript of Connie Porting's 
evidence and to keep such transcript throughout almost all of their 
deliberation, such action placed undue emphasis on her testimony; in fact, it 
was equivalent to sending the complaining witness into the jury room, where she 
continued to plead her cause." 360 P.2d  at 1099.

 
 

[¶76.]  We suggest that sending the videotape 
with appellant's adamant refusal to submit to a polygraph to the jury room for 
viewing was sufficient in itself to require reversal. We presume it was for the 
purpose of being viewed again, otherwise there was no reason for the court to 
send it to the jury room.

 
 

[¶77.]  We note finally the multitude of errors 
reviewed in one of the dissents. Even if some must be considered under the 
plain-error doctrine, it would seem to establish that their cumulative effect 
deprived appellant of a fair trial.

 
 

[¶78.]  Reversed.

1 Section 6-2-101, W.S. 
1977, provides:

 
 

"(a) Whoever purposely 
and with premeditated malice, * * * kills any human being is guilty of murder in 
the first degree.

 
 

2 Article 1, § 11, Wyoming 
Constitution, provides: "No person shall be compelled to testify against himself 
in any criminal case * * *." A lie detector test involves a response to 
questions asked by the examiner. A suspect may not wish to answer those 
questions because the answers may incriminate him or the polygraph may disclose 
the answers to be lies that might incriminate him. It might be said that a 
polygraph examination is not testimonial in nature and therefore the privilege 
against self-incrimination does not apply. It is a close question. We think the 
refusal to answer the questions of a lie detector examiner is not very different 
from a refusal to answer questions of a detective at the police station. A 
suspect has a constitutional right to remain silent, to refuse interrogation, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981). Evidence or comment upon exercise of 
the right to remain silent has long been held prejudicial error. Westmark v. State, Wyo., 693 P.2d 220 
(1984).

 
 

BROWN, Justice, 
concurring.

 
 

[¶79.]  I agree that this case must be 
reversed.

 
 

[¶80.]  In the last paragraph of the majority 
opinion, reference is made to cumulative error. It seems that the doctrine of 
cumulative error, in simple terms, is that several small errors add up to a big 
error; and while none of the small errors standing alone is sufficient for 
reversal, the sum of the small errors becomes substantial mandating reversal. I 
have a continuing problem with the nebulous doctrine of cumulative error and do 
not believe it has application here. The errors in this case, standing alone, 
are sufficient to justify reversal without resorting to cumulative 
error.

 
 

ROONEY, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
joins.

 
 

[¶81.]  The majority opinion addresses and finds 
error in four of the eight issues presented by appellant on appeal. It finds no 
one of these errors to be sufficient for reversal, but that

 
 

"* * * several errors 
occurring during the course of trial, when considered together, created 
sufficient prejudice to deprive appellant of a fair trial. * * *"

 
 

I believe this to be a 
dangerous precedent, particularly in recognition that an objection was not made 
to that upon which most of the issues in this case are based. The trial court 
was thus not given an opportunity to consider the alleged errors. We should not 
expect the trial court to assume the role of presenting the case for the parties 
by correcting errors not brought to its attention by the parties, and also not 
expect the trial court to keep score of possible errors in an effort to gauge 
when they have accumulated to the point of becoming unfairly 
prejudicial.

 
 

[¶82.]  We start with Rule 103, W.R.E., which 
provides in pertinent part:

 
 

"(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. - Error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected, and

 
 

"(1) Objection. - In case 
the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike 
appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific 
ground was not apparent from the context; * * *

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"(d) Plain error. - Nothing in this rule 
precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although 
they were not brought to the attention of the court."

 
 

The rule does not address 
error as arising from an accumulation of nonerrors.

 
 

[¶83.]  Plain error is again addressed in Rule 
49(b), W.R.Cr.P.:

 
 

"Plain errors or defects 
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to 
the attention of the court."

 
 

We have said that the 
plain error rule is to be exercised cautiously and only in exceptional 
circumstances. Ketcham v. State, 
Wyo., 618 P.2d 1356 (1980); Leeper v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 379 (1979); Downs v. State, Wyo., 581 P.2d 610 
(1978). The defendant has the burden to show plain error. Campbell v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 358 
(1979). It must do so more than in an arguable way, and a mere allegation of 
prejudice is not sufficient to meet such burden. Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 
(1981).

 
 

[¶84.]  The Wyoming case cited by the majority opinion to 
validate cumulative errors as a basis for reversal concerns the cumulation of 
the same activity, and not a 
cumulation of separate activities. In that case, Browder v. State, Wyo., 639 P.2d 889 
(1982), the cumulation was repeated acts and conduct of the 
prosecutor.

 
 

[¶85.]  In any event, I cannot agree that 
reversible error exists with reference to the issues on appeal. Addressing these 
issues:

 
 

I. TESTIMONY CONCERNING 
MRS. SCHMUNK'S STATEMENTS AS HEARSAY

 
 

[¶86.]  On April 25, 1984, notice was given 
pursuant to Rule 804(b)(6), W.R.E.,1 that deceased's mother, sister and 
brother would testify to separate statements made to each of them by deceased in 
April and June 1983 concerning her intention to leave appellant. A similar 
notice was given on April 30, 1984, with reference to testimony to be given by 
deceased's mother to similar statements made to her by deceased in October 1982, 
February 1983, and June 1983.

 
 

[¶87.]  Appellant does not contend that the April 
25, 1984, notice was not timely; no objection was made to it. But, he contends 
that the April 30, 1984, notice was not timely. The purpose of the notice, as 
reflected in the rule, is to give "the adverse party * * * a fair opportunity to 
prepare to meet" the evidence. There is no contention that appellant did not 
here have sufficient time to meet the evidence referred to in the April 25, 
1984, notice, and in fact he did meet it at trial. The evidence noticed on April 
30, 1984, was similar to that noticed on April 25, 1984, and it too was met at 
trial. Adequate notice was thereby evidenced, and there was no error in 
admission of the evidence on this ground.

 
 

[¶88.]  But, the majority opinion finds the 
statements to be irrelevant, in any event, since they pertain to the deceased's 
state of mind, not that of appellant; and since there was no evidence to reflect 
that the deceased's intention to leave was communicated to appellant, the 
testimony was irrelevant. However, the majority opinion overlooks the relevancy 
of the statements in another context; i.e., to meet the defense theory that the 
marriage of the deceased and appellant was a happy one and that the death was an 
accident.2 The appellant, through his 
testimony regarding a happy marriage, sought to prove the death accidental and 
not intentional. Evidence to disprove such and to attack appellant's credibility 
- to impeach him - ought to be equally available to the prosecution. Of note is 
the fact that the testimony of William (Billy) Duncan (see ante) concerning the same matter 
(public appearance of a happy marriage but privately otherwise) was admitted 
without objection.

 
 

[¶89.]  The notice regarding this testimony was 
obviously sufficient, and the testimony was relevant for the purpose indicated. 
The admission of it was not error.

 
 

II. CHILD'S TESTIMONY 
THAT HE LEFT DOUGLAS "BECAUSE OF THE SUSPICIONS 
OF MY FATHER KILLING MY MOTHER"

 
 

[¶90.]  Again, the majority opinion forgot to hit 
the ball before starting to run around the bases. That opinion improperly 
considers the answer to the question, "Why did you leave Douglas, Wyoming?" to have been "Because I had 
suspicions that my father had killed my mother." However, the answer given by 
William (Billy) Duncan, the child of appellant and deceased, was "Because of the 
suspicions of my father killing my mother." The answer was plain. His father had 
been accused of the crime of killing his mother. The atmosphere in Douglas reflected such "suspicions." The venue of the 
action was changed because of them. It isn't surprising that the child was 
uncomfortable in Douglas with them. His 
activity in Douglas must have been affected 
because of the "suspicions." He left Douglas 
because of these suspicions in the community, and he so answered the question. 
He did not say "I left because I thought my father killed my mother." He said he 
left "Because of the suspicions of my 
father killing my mother." (Emphasis added.) This being so, the discussion of 
this issue in the majority opinion is not pertinent.

 
 

[¶91.]  Additionally, the trial objection to the 
question was not to its relevancy. The late objection made to this issue was 
that the question was "leading and suggestive." Error cannot be predicated on 
the trial court's ruling if the specific objection is not brought to its 
attention. Lee v. State, Wyo., 556 P.2d 217 (1976); Martinez 
v. State, Wyo., 511 P.2d 105 (1973). Any error alleged 
to be founded on relevancy would have to be plain error to be reversible. 
Reversible error does not exist with reference to this issue.

 
 

III. PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING 
ARGUMENT

 
 

[¶92.]  The majority opinion is critical of the 
prosecution's reference to the potential of appellant having two characters or 
appearances - a double attitude, one, that given to the public relative to his 
happy marriage; and two, the dark side being that given privately at home as 
testified by witness Duncan and by the testimony referred to supra in the 
section entitled "Testimony Concerning Mrs. Schmunk's Statements as Hearsay." 
There was no objection to the closing argument.

 
 

[¶93.]  The majority opinion recognizes the 
propriety of the prosecution presenting its theory of the case to the jury, 
reviewing the evidence with the jury, and suggesting inferences based thereon. 
It also recognizes reversal can be predicated only if there is plain error when 
no objection was made to the closing argument. But it does not find the elements 
of plain error in the closing argument except as cumulated with other alleged 
errors, again citing and quoting from Browder v. State in support thereof. As 
already noted supra, the situation in Browder was entirely different and 
distinguishable from that in this case.

 
 

[¶94.]  The elements for plain error do not exist 
for this issue.3 The record is clear as to the 
incident, but the appellant has not proven a violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law. The prosecutor was presenting his theory of the case 
and the facts in support thereof. In any event, there was no denial of a 
substantial right and no material prejudice. Such is the reason the majority 
opinion attempts to cumulate other alleged errors to arrive at reversible 
error.

 
 

IV. ADMISSION AND USE OF 
VIDEO TAPE

 
 

[¶95.]  There are three potential problems with 
the video tape: (1) reference to the Michigan incident; (2) reference to a previous 
polygraph test; and (3) reference to refusal to take a current polygraph 
test.

 
 

Michigan Incident

 
 

[¶96.]  The motion in limine was to preclude 
reference in the video tape to prior bad acts of appellant in Michigan in the 
presentation of the prosecution's case in chief. The motion was granted, but the 
video tape was not edited to delete the reference before it was shown to the 
jury. It was shown without objection. In fact, appellant stipulated to its 
admission into evidence. When the objecting motion was made the next day, the 
tape was edited before it went to the jury, and a limiting instruction was given 
to the jury:

 
 

"You are instructed that 
a certain portion of State's Exhibit 21, the same being a video tape recording, 
admitted into evidence has been deleted. You are therefore instructed that the 
deleted portion must not be considered by you as evidence."

 
 

In view of the passing 
reference to the Michigan charges, viz. "I had a polygraph taken in reference to 
my daughter's charges against me, which were totally erroneous," and inasmuch as 
juries are presumed to follow the instructions given to them, Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, 
Inc., Wyo., 664 P.2d 27 (1983); State 
Highway Commission v. Peters, Wyo., 416 P.2d 390 (1966), there was no error 
- particularly plain error - in the court's ruling on admission based on this 
aspect of the video tape.

 
 

[¶97.]  The cases cited in the majority opinion 
to support a holding that a limiting instruction is insufficient in such 
situation concern factual situations far more aggravated than here.

 
 

[¶98.]  In United States v. Brevard, 739 F.2d 180 
(4th Cir. 1984), one of those cited in the majority opinion, repeated warnings 
were given to the witness to not refer to polygraph tests. At least three 
references were made to it after objections and warnings by the trial court. In 
exasperation, the trial court instructed the jury that the polygraph references 
had nothing to do with the case, and they were to draw no inferences from them. 
In reversing the conviction, the Fourth Circuit recited the general rule to 
be:

 
 

"* * * Where an 
impermissible reference to a polygraph has been interjected, the court usually 
may cure the error by striking the evidence and instructing the jury to 
disregard it. * * *" 739 F.2d  at 182.

 
 

However, the repetition 
and aggravated nature of the references in the case were held to be sufficient 
to overcome the presumption. Objections were properly and promptly made, and the 
references were repeated and aggravated in United States v. Brevard, contrary to 
that in this case.

 
 

[¶99.]  In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968), another of the cases cited in the majority opinion, the problem was 
the admissibility of a co-defendant's statement which implicated the defendant. 
The co-defendant was not available for cross-examination; it was a joint trial 
and there was a substantial threat to defendant's constitutional rights. The 
Supreme Court recognized the general rule thus:

 
 

"* * * Not every 
admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be 
reversible error unavoidable through limiting instructions; instances occur in 
almost every trial where inadmissible evidence creeps in, usually inadvertently. 
* * *" 88 S. Ct.  at 1627.

 
 

The court found the facts 
of the case to provide an exception wherein the risk is great that the jury 
cannot or will not follow the limiting instructions, and the consequences are 
vital to the defendant. The facts in this case do not start to match those in 
Bruton so as to warrant an exception to the general rule.

 
 

[¶100.]            
In the other case cited in the majority opinion, Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U.S. 552, 21 S. Ct. 474, 45 L. Ed. 663 
(1901), the essential holding was that the instruction was not clear on what 
part of the evidence was not to be considered by the jury, and that the 
uncertainty did not result in a clear direction to not consider the evidence; 
i.e., the result was that there was no withdrawal of evidence from jury 
consideration, not that the withdrawal itself was insufficient to cure the 
error. The court did note the general rule that withdrawal of evidence cures any 
error in its admission, but that there may be instances where such a strong 
impression is made by the evidence that withdrawal will not erase it. In 
Throckmorton, there were several witnesses involved in the questioned evidence 
and long argument concerning its admissibility. Such aggravations do not exist 
in this case.

 
 

[¶101.]            
The limiting instruction in this case was well within the general rule 
with reference to the Michigan incident.

 
 

Previous Polygraph 
Test

 
 

[¶102.]            
That said in the previous subsection of this dissent with reference to a 
limiting or curing instruction relative to the Michigan incident is equally applicable to 
that relative to the previous polygraph test. The portion of the tape was 
deleted and the jury was instructed to disregard the deleted part.

 
 

[¶103.]            
The majority opinion discusses making the results of the test known to the jury, 
and it cites cases relative thereto. Certainly there is no suggestion that the 
results of the Michigan polygraph case were made known to the 
jury, and discussion concerning such is misplaced. If such discussion is founded 
upon the statement of appellant that "I had a polygraph taken in reference to my 
daughter's charges against me, which was 
totally erroneous" (emphasis added), not only are the words "which was 
totally erroneous" improperly taken to modify and apply to the results of the 
polygraph test instead of modifying and applying to the more recent words in the 
sentence, "charges against me," but such interpretation would make the comment 
to be gratuitous, and any error of the type here alleged would be invited 
error.

 
 

"The doctrine of `invited 
error' embodies the principle that a party will not be heard to complain on 
appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the opposite 
party to commit. * * *" 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 713 (1962).

 
 

The doctrine has long 
been recognized in Wyoming:

 
 

"It is a general rule 
that an error to be available on appeal must have occurred without the express 
or implied consent of the appellant. * * *" Schloredt v. Boyden, 9 Wyo. 392, 403-404, 64 P. 225 (1901).

 
 

Refusal to Take a Current 
Polygraph Test

 
 

[¶104.]            
The motion in limine was not based upon the refusal to take a current 
polygraph test. Nor was an objection made at trial. After the tape was played to 
the jury and when appellant finally objected, and although the refusal to take a 
current test was mentioned, the thrust of the objection was to the inclusion 
therein of the Michigan incident and, perhaps, with the 
polygraph taken in connection therewith. The objection was:

 
 

"* * * I think that the 
implication is very clear by virtue of the video tape and the particular portion 
which had to do with a polygraph where, number one, the Doctor indicated on that 
video that he would not take a polygraph, and the reason for him not taking a 
polygraph was as a result of a matter that had occurred with respect to his 
daughter, or charge by his daughter, which gave a clear indication that he had 
previously been charged with some criminal activity; that he had been offered a 
polygraph and had presumably taken a polygraph."

 
 

"* * * Error may not be 
assigned unless objection has been made thereto with a distinct statement of the 
matter to which objection is made and the grounds for this objection, and 
indicating with definiteness and particularity the error asserted * * *." Texas Gulf Sulphur Company v. Robles, 
Wyo., 511 P.2d 963, 968 (1973).

 
 

Accordingly, there can be 
no question but that reversal on this ground can be only for plain error. The 
elements for plain error are set forth in note 3, supra.

 
 

[¶105.]            
It must be emphasized in this connection that not only was no objection 
made with reference to admission of the refusal to take the current test, but 
its admission was actually stipulated to by appellant. The motion in limine had 
to do only with the Michigan incident and 
perhaps the Michigan polygraph.

 
 

[¶106.]            
Accordingly, the application of the plain error rule requires even more 
caution in this instance wherein the evidence was admitted on stipulation. 
Again, the potential for invited error is exceedingly great.

 
 

[¶107.]            
Although I believe the foregoing is dispositive of this issue, I comment 
on two considerations relative thereto. First, the question relative to the 
existence of error in admission of testimony concerning the willingness of a 
defendant to take a polygraph test is not only presented in cases in which he 
refused to do so, but often the defendant seeks to evidence the fact that he was 
willing to do so. Second, cases can be cited to reflect instances in which it 
was held to be reversible error to admit the testimony, and cases can be cited 
to the contrary. Cases can be cited wherein any such error was cured by an 
instruction, and cases can be cited wherein it was not. See Annotation: 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of comment or evidence as to accused's 
willingness to take lie detector test. 95 A.L.R.2d 819 (1964).

 
 

[¶108.]            
The majority opinion cites and quotes from three cases to support the 
contention that any  admission or reference to refusal to take 
a polygraph test is prejudicial and, thus, reversible error. The precedent is 
not that clear-cut, as reflected in the A.L.R.2d annotation, supra.

 
 

[¶109.]            
In State v. Emory, 190 Kan. 
406, 375 P.2d 585 (1962), one of the cases referred to in the majority opinion, 
the court found that admission of a refusal to take the test was reversible 
error, distinguishing the facts of the case from those in State v. Smith, 187 Kan. 42, 353 P.2d 510 (1960), in which the jury was admonished, and reversible error was not 
found. In a later case, State v. Roach, 
223 Kan. 732, 576 P.2d 1082 (1978), the Kansas court held that not only the 
admission of evidence that defendant submitted to a polygraph test was not 
reversible error, but the results thereof admitted into evidence were not 
reversible error in view of a 
stipulation of the parties to admit the same.

 
 

[¶110.]            
In State v. Driver, 38 N.J. 
255, 183 A.2d 655 (1962), cited in the majority opinion to hold that "reference 
by the prosecutor to a refusal of the accused to take a lie detector test 
required reversal," there was much more than a mere "reference by the 
prosecutor." In his opening statement, the prosecutor made a number of 
references to the refusal to take the test. Portions of defendant's mother's 
taped statement were played to the defendant, and after each segment, defendant 
was asked to take a polygraph test. The prosecution emphasized the refusal to do 
so saying "`every time he refused.'" At least four witnesses testified to 
interrogation of defendant, and when it came time for them to testify that he 
was asked to take a polygraph test and refused, they testified that "`I am not 
supposed to mention that'" or a similar response. During the trial the 
prosecutor made "numerous" references to the question and answer which could not 
be mentioned. The court concluded that "[t]he entire handling of the lie 
detector test aspect of the case clearly reveals prejudicial overzealousness on 
the part of the prosecution, and leaves an appellate court with no recourse but 
vacation of the conviction." The case does not stand for the proposition that 
"reference by the prosecutor" requires reversal.

 
 

[¶111.]            
In Mills v. People, 139 
Colo. 397, 339 P.2d 998 (1959), the refusal to take the test was offered over objection as evidence "`of guilt 
similar to evidence of flight.'" Obviously, such was not the purpose of the 
comment made by appellant on the video tape which was accepted into evidence 
pursuant to a stipulation and without objection.

 
 

[¶112.]            
In summary, then, I believe that whether or not a reference to the 
refusal or to the willingness to take a polygraph test is reversible error will 
depend on the circumstances of each case, with factors such as the emphasis 
given to it, the manner in which the reference occurred - intentionally or 
inadvertently - nonresponsive to a question, invited error, through stipulation, 
etc., whether or not the other evidence of guilt is exceedingly strong or 
exceedingly weak, and similar considerations. The same approach should be used 
in each case to determine if a limiting instruction, if one was given, was 
sufficient to cure the error, if error there was.

 
 

[¶113.]            
In this case, the stipulation for admission, the manner in which the 
reference occurred, and the strength of other evidence should not make 
reversible error.

 
 

[¶114.]            
Finally, with reference to the comment in the majority opinion concerning 
the unfairness which results from a jury viewing a video tape in the jury room 
and, thus, giving undue emphasis to a portion of the testimony, I agree. I 
believe that this Court should, by rule, direct that any verbatim record of 
question-and-answer testimony, video tape or deposition, or otherwise, whether 
admitted as an exhibit or otherwise, shall not be subject to jury inspection 
other than as permitted to be read or shown during that part of the trial in 
which evidence is being received.

 
 

[¶115.]            
However, such a rule was not in effect in this case. There is not even an 
allegation that the jury viewed the video tape in the jury room, let alone 
evidence that such was done. There was no objection to the video tape being 
available for jury inspection. In fact, it was stipulated that it be an exhibit. 
And the appellant does not make viewing in the jury room an issue on 
appeal.

 
 

[¶116.]            
I do not believe there is reversible error in the admission and use of 
the video tape in this case.

 
 

V. THE FOUR ISSUES ON 
APPEAL NOT REACHED IN THE MAJORITY OPINION

 
 

[¶117.]            
I agree that the other four errors alleged by appellant will not warrant 
reversal.

 
 

Dr. Graber's 
Testimony

 
 

[¶118.]            
Appellant contends that it was error to allow the emergency room 
physician who attended Mrs. Schmunk's death to testify that he would not 
prescribe narcotic drugs for his own family "[b]ecause I don't trust myself 
making therapeutic decisions about family members, and also it's too hard to get 
into an abusive matter."

 
 

[¶119.]            
Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, 
and its ruling thereon will not be reversed absent a showing of a clear abuse of 
discretion. Hopkinson v. State, 
Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982); Apodaca v. State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 1023 (1981); Sanville v. State, Wyo., 593 P.2d 1340 
(1979).

 
 

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. * * *" Martinez v. 
State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980).

 
 

[¶120.]            
Simply stated, appellant has not made any showing of a clear abuse of 
discretion in this instance. His allegation in this respect is not supported by 
any authority. 

 
 

Refreshing Recollection 
of Appellant From Deceased's Medical Records

 
 

[¶121.]            
Appellant contends the court erred by refusing to allow appellant to 
refresh his recollection of deceased's medical history by reference to her 
medical records. The refusal was because the records had not been produced by 
appellant prior to trial in response to a discovery order which specifically 
included the records as items to be produced by appellant.

 
 

[¶122.]            
That said supra relative to the discretion of the court in ruling on an 
admission of evidence is applicable to the ruling of the court on this issue. 
The sanction here imposed is within the court's discretion. Simms v. State, Wyo., 492 P.2d 516, cert. 
denied 409 U.S. 886, 93 S. Ct. 104, 34 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1972); Rule 18(h), 
W.R.Cr.P.

 
 

[¶123.]            
In any event, the entire medical history of the deceased was before the 
jury. Appellant testified as to deceased's complete medical history. Not only 
does appellant fail to show a clear abuse of discretion in the court's ruling, 
but he also does not demonstrate any prejudice from the ruling.

 
 

Admission of Prosecution 
Evidence (1) Concerning Result Of Toxicologist Test As Found by Appellant's 
Expert, (2) From Witnesses Concerning Perceived "Personality Changes" Observed 
In Deceased, and (3) From Investigator Concerning His Reasons For the 
Investigative Procedures Used by Him

 
 

[¶124.]            
On cross-examination, appellant was asked if he had employed a 
toxicologist to review the findings of the prosecution's toxicologist. Appellant 
said that he did, and, on further examination, he acknowledged that his expert 
agreed with the findings and toxicology of the prosecution's 
toxicologist.

 
 

[¶125.]            
The testimony of some of the witnesses contained perceptions of 
"personality changes" observed by them in deceased. The pathologist testified as 
to the "theories" under which the autopsy was undertaken.

 
 

[¶126.]            
The investigator testified as to his reasons for interviewing various 
individuals and for taking certain actions, and as to that which he believed his 
investigation reflected when deceased died.

 
 

[¶127.]            
There was no objection to any of this testimony, and the issues relative 
thereto were first raised on appeal. As noted supra, even if error existed in 
the admission of such evidence, it can be considered on appeal only if it 
amounts to plain error. Since the admission of such testimony does not amount to 
plain error, the existence or nonexistence of error in its admission need not be 
considered.

 
 

[¶128.]            
The elements of plain error are set forth in note 3, supra. Certainly, 
appellant has not established the violation of a substantial right resulting in 
material prejudice. As noted in the cases cited supra, the plain error doctrine 
is to be exercised cautiously and only in exceptional circumstances. Appellant 
has the burden of showing plain error. The exceptional circumstances do not here 
exist, and appellant has fallen far short of establishing plain 
error.

 
 

[¶129.]            
The results of the toxicology tests were before the jury through the 
testimony of the State's toxicologist. The tests were conclusive. The fact that 
appellant's own toxicologist agreed with them is of no real importance, let 
alone being of material prejudice. If anything, the testimony simply went to the 
credibility of appellant's own testimony concerning the tests.

 
 

[¶130.]            
Likewise, the comments of witnesses concerning observed "personality 
changes" on the part of deceased were of little weight in context of that placed 
before the jury in this many-day trial. The pathologist's testimony concerning 
his "theories" was in truth a factual recitation of the manner and purpose of 
the autopsy. Again, appellant falls far short of his burden to establish plain 
error.

 
 

[¶131.]            
The investigator "walked through" the procedure taken by him in 
investigation of the matter. In doing so, appellant could possibly have objected 
to the words used. If such had been done, the meat of the testimony would 
undoubtedly have been placed before the jury in a more precise and proper 
manner. The failure to object may have been with intent that the testimony not 
be emphasized or "cleaned up." In any event, considering the extensive testimony 
presented to the jury, I see no material prejudice from this piece of testimony. 
Applying the plain error rule cautiously, the decision that there was no plain 
error in this testimony is more than proper.

 
 

Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel

 
 

[¶132.]            
Appellant bases his allegation that he had ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the assumption that counsel did not properly object to certain 
evidence. Since I do not find any error with reference to the other issues on 
appeal, this allegation has no substance.

 
 

[¶133.]            
Counsel is presumed competent, and the standard upon which to gauge 
competency is "that which would reasonably be rendered by a reasonably competent 
attorney under the facts and circumstances of the case." Hoskovek v. State, Wyo., 629 P.2d 1366, 1367 
(1981). The decision whether or not to object in any particular instance is a 
matter of trial strategy resting with the lawyer. Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 43, cert. 
denied 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1983). Applying the 
following test set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh. denied. ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 3562, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984), there is no showing of ineffective assistance of counsel in this 
case.

 
 

"The availability of 
intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed guidelines 
for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness 
challenges. Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would 
increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel's 
unsuccessful defense. Counsel's performance and even willingness to serve could 
be adversely affected. Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for 
acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of 
defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the 
trust between attorney and client.

 
 

"Thus, a court deciding 
an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's 
challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of 
counsel's conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective 
assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not 
to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then 
determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or 
omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. In 
making that determination, the court should keep in mind that counsel's 
function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the 
adversarial testing process work in the particular case. At the same time, the 
court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered 
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment."

 
 

Also see Murry v. State, Wyo., 713 P.2d 202 
(1986).

 
 

I would 
affirm.

1 Rule 804(b)(6), W.R.E., 
provides as an exception to the hearsay rule:

 
 

"A statement not 
specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) 
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is 
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general 
pruposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be 
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the 
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to 
offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of 
the declarant."

 
 

See Cutbirth v. State, Wyo., 663 P.2d 888 
(1983).

2 First-degree murder 
would not be established in the absence of intent or malice. The jury was also 
instructed on the elements of voluntary manslaughter.

3 The elements for plain 
error as quoted in the majority opinion from Bradley v. State, Wyo., 635 P.2d 1161, 1164 
(1981), are:

 
 

"* * * First, the record 
must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party 
claiming that the error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that party must prove that a 
substantial right has been denied him and as a result he has been materially 
prejudiced. * * *"

 
 

See Daellenbach v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 679 
(1977).

 
 

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶134.]            
I join with Justice Rooney in his dissenting opinion. In the response to 
that dissenting opinion the majority opinion states that it presumes that the 
accused videotape was sent to the jury so that it might be viewed again in the 
course of the jury's deliberations. The record does not encompass any objection 
by the appellant to the videotape being furnished to the jury with the other 
exhibits nor does the record contain any indication that the jury did view it 
during the course of its deliberations. The appellant has the responsibility of 
furnishing a record upon which any issue can be decided. Salt River Enterprises, Inc. v. Heiner, Wyo., 663 P.2d 518 (1983); Scherling v. Kilgore, Wyo., 
599 P.2d 1352 (1979). In the face of a silent record I cannot agree that this 
court is justified in speculating about what occurred in the course of the 
jury's deliberations.

 
 
ROBERT F. SCHMUNK, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

 
 
v. 

 
 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 

Appeal from the District 
Court, ConverseCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Terry W. Mackey and 
Robert W. Tiedeken of Terry W. Mackey, P.C., Cheyenne, and James M. Shellow (argued), Stephen M. Glynn, 
and Janice A. Rhodes of Shellow, Shellow&Glynn, 
S.C., Milwaukee, Wis., for appellant (defendant).

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

A.G. McClintock, Atty. 
Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. 
Gen. (argued), Sylvia Lee Hackl, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), and Frank D. 
Peasley, Converse County and Pros. Atty., for appellee (plaintiff).

 
 

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE,* ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Retired November 1, 
1985.

** Retired November 30, 
1985.

 
 

CARDINE, Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant was charged 
with violation of § 6-2-101, W.S. 19771 and under this statute found guilty 
of first degree murder in the drug overdose death of his wife Kay Marie Schmunk. 
He appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury's verdict and his sentence of 
life imprisonment.

 
 

[¶2.]     The critical question 
presented for our determination is whether several errors occurring during the 
course of trial, when considered together, created sufficient prejudice to 
deprive appellant of a fair trial. Without question cumulative error may 
assemble in such proportion that reversal is required. Browder v. State, Wyo., 639 P.2d 889 (1982); State v. Allies, 186 Mont. 99, 606 P.2d 1043 
(1979).

 
 

[¶3.]     We reverse.

 
 

FACTS

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant Robert 
Schmunk, and Kay Schmunk were married in 1972 while residents of the State of 
Michigan. It 
was the second marriage for each of them. Kay Schmunk's two children from her 
prior marriage, Theresa Duncan and Bill Duncan, lived with appellant and Kay 
Schmunk during the time they resided in the State of Michigan. During 1979, 
appellant, his wife Kay Schmunk, and her son Bill Duncan, moved to Douglas, Wyoming where appellant commenced a general 
practice of medicine.

 
 

[¶5.]     Kay Schmunk had 
suffered severe migraine headaches for many years prior to her death. Appellant 
prescribed oral medication and administered intramuscular injections of 
medication for these headaches on numerous occasions. Kay Schmunk was also 
examined by several physicians with respect to her headaches and other medical 
problems. On May 6, 1981, she was seen by a neurologist in Casper, Wyoming, who stated in a written 
report:

 
 

"She has had headaches 
for at least 15 years. These can be continuous for up to 2-3 weeks. Except for 
this past week, she has been fairly headache free for several months. They begin 
with a cervical muscle fullness, ringing of the ears and occipital pain. She is 
often nauseated and vomits. Headaches are hemicranial, but change sides. Vision 
is occasionally blurred, and she does have photophobia.

 
 

"Her mother has less 
severe headaches, and her son has headaches associated with tension. Past 
history includes rheumatic fever at age 13. She does report being very depressed 
and, in fact, has wondered about suicide. She has refused 
counselling."

 
 

[¶6.]     Robert Schmunk, Kay 
Schmunk, and her son, Bill Duncan, played a card game the evening of July 14, 
1983. Kay Schmunk complained of a headache and, about midnight, appellant 
administered by intramuscular injection methadone, a narcotic, to relieve her 
pain. The card game continued for perhaps another thirty minutes before Kay 
Schmunk and appellant retired for the evening. About 2:00 a.m., appellant was 
aware that his wife was still in pain and, after some discussion with her, 
administered another narcotic injection, demoral. Appellant then fell asleep. He 
was awakened again about 4:30 a.m. with Kay Schmunk advising him that her 
headache was more severe, the worst she had ever had. Appellant then injected 
her with a third narcotic drug, morphine. About 6:30 a.m., he awakened and 
observed that his wife was not breathing. Appellant attempted resuscitation but 
was unsuccessful. Mrs. Schmunk was taken to the emergency room at the ConverseCountyMemorialHospital where further efforts to 
resuscitate her failed, and she was pronounced dead.

 
 

[¶7.]     An autopsy was 
performed July 16, 1983. The autopsy disclosed no apparent cause of death. The 
results of toxicology testing revealed that two of the narcotic drugs injected 
by appellant were three times the amount that would be consistent with the 
dosages reported by appellant. Appellant said he could not account for the 
quantity of drugs found by toxicology and insisted he had injected only the 
lesser amount he had reported. The cause of death was determined to be acute 
narcotic overdose resulting in respiratory depression and acute pulmonary 
edema.

 
 

[¶8.]     The State began the 
trial in this case by telling the jury that it was not required to prove motive; 
that nevertheless it would produce evidence that would establish for the jury 
the motive, the reason why Dr. Robert Schmunk killed his wife, Kay Marie 
Schmunk. It was the theory of the State that Dr. Schmunk had "two diametrically 
opposed personalities." There was one Dr. Schmunk who was a devout person, 
worked selflessly for his church, and who appeared to have a normal loving 
relationship with his wife and a happy marriage. The other Dr. Schmunk, the 
State claimed, was a man unhappily married, whose wife was imperfect, and who 
was permanently leaving him to obtain a divorce. The imperfection in Kay Marie 
Schmunk was an apparent reference to her severe migraine headaches and 
dependency on drugs. With respect to the second Dr. Schmunk, the prosecutor told 
the jury, there is "a dark side to this man, to his mind."

 
 

[¶9.]     The State of Wyoming staked its entire 
case of first degree murder upon the proposition that there was a dark, 
mysterious side to Dr. Schmunk, a man with a split personality who could not 
accept imperfection in Kay Schmunk and who, with premeditated malice, put her to 
sleep with drugs. In final argument to the jury, the prosecutor, summarizing the 
State's case, said:

 
 

"Why did Dr. Schmunk say 
he was buying [a rifle] for his girlfriend? He didn't say that to anybody who 
had an axe to grind, just to Dr. Erickson. I don't think there is a girlfriend. 
You may. You may read that in this; that is fair. "Profit? Sure, we have given 
you testimony of profit. Everything is in the wife's name. He has been divorced 
once before. He's got a quarter million dollars, almost, in assets in her name. 
Maybe that is a motive. You know, it would be a fair one. A little bit of 
insurance. There's no proof of big insurance, nothing, not a fourteen million 
dollar fortune like you hear about in some of these exciting cases. No million 
dollar life insurance, but it could have been a motive. I think it might have. I 
didn't prove it. I didn't really try to. I just laid it out here.

 
 

"Revenge? Was she 
leaving? Was she going to go? Could that be tied in to the money and the 
property? Was she going to go back to Michigan with everything in her name? Revenge 
to stop her from leaving. It was suggested, but not proven. If you want to play 
with it, go ahead.

 
 

"Jealousy? No, we didn't 
see any evidence of that. There were little things, little teasers thrown out, 
but I'll tell you what I think.

 
 

"I think there is a dark 
side to this man, to his mind. I think he has an inability to confront and 
accept what is real and imperfect. He could not accept that Kay was real and 
imperfect, and what he can't accept, he puts to sleep. That is what he did in 
this case. There is, I'm sure, in this man's mind some sad, sick perhaps 
pathetic reason why he did what he did, but I can't get it out of him. It didn't 
come out."

 
 

Thus, the State of 
Wyoming 
conceded that Dr. Schmunk had no girlfriend and that the killing was not for 
profit or revenge or because of jealousy, but because of a mysterious side of 
Dr. Schmunk that caused him to kill what was imperfect. Appellant claims that 
there was no evidence from which the jury could find that he possessed a "dark 
side," a "mysterious side," a "split personality" that caused him to kill what 
was imperfect. He claims that the State's effort to prove that dark, mysterious 
side, the split personality, rested upon speculation, conjecture and innuendo 
resulting from the erroneous admission of a videotape interview, hearsay and 
other evidence and testimony, the cumulative effect being to deny him a fair 
trial.

 
 

[¶10.]  The issues for our determination, as 
framed by appellant, are:

 
 

"[1] Should a mistrial 
have been declared when the prosecutor, in violation of a pretrial ruling, 
introduced polygraph results connected with defendant's alleged prior 
misconduct?

 
 

"[2] Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion in admitting witnesses' conjecture and 
speculation?

 
 

"[3] Was hearsay admitted 
in violation of W.R.E. § 804(b)(6) and the Confrontation Clause?

 
 

"[4] Was the prosecutor's 
expression in summation of his opinion of defendant's insanity plain 
error?"

 
 

We will not address other 
issues raised by appellant because they are unnecessary to our decision in this 
case.

 
 

VIDEOTAPED 
INTERVIEW

 
 

[¶11.]  On September 13, 1983, at the request of 
the investigator in this case, appellant went voluntarily to the sheriff's 
office to be interviewed concerning the death of Kay Schmunk. The interview was 
recorded on videotape secretly, without his knowledge. The video camera 
photographed appellant seated at a table and mostly showed the side and back of 
his head. Appellant cooperated fully with the investigator in giving the 
interview. There is no question but that the interview was given voluntarily and 
with full knowledge and waiver of Miranda rights. The day following the 
interview, appellant was indicted by the grand jury and charged with first 
degree murder.

 
 

[¶12.]  At the end of the interview, the 
following questions were asked and answered:

 
 

"[Investigator]: Based on 
the information that you've given us, would you be willing to take a polygraph 
test?

 
 

"[Appellant]: I wouldn't 
take it; I would not take a polygraph under any circumstances for anybody 
whether I was guilty, innocent or questionable, no, I would not take a 
polygraph.

 
 

"[Investigator]: Have you 
had a bad experience with them or have you had one before that * * *

 
 

"[Appellant]: I had a polygraph taken in reference to my 
daughter's charges against me, which was totally erroneous and I'm, I'm just 
not willing to take a polygraph and hinge anything on what the, uh, the 
polygraph might suggest.

 
 

"[Investigator] Ok." 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 

The videotape was 
received into evidence and viewed and heard by the jury during the State's case 
in chief. Appellant contends that the above questions and answers should have 
been deleted from the videotape before it was offered into evidence and viewed 
by the jury. Appellant claims that the unedited videotape erroneously put before 
the jury evidence of a prior bad act (the charge by his daughter in the state of 
Michigan), the 
results of a polygraph test, his refusal to take a polygraph test, and that it 
was in violation of the court's order in limine.

 
 

PRIOR ACTS OF 
MISCONDUCT

 
 

[¶13.]  The jury learned, as a result of viewing 
the videotape, that some charge had previously been brought against appellant by 
his daughter. Appellant contends the alleged prior misconduct should not have 
been offered into evidence by the State because of the court's order excluding 
this evidence. The exclusionary order came about when, before trial at a hearing 
upon motions for change of venue and in limine, the following 
transpired:

 
 

"Gentlemen, beginning 
with the Change of Venue: You know, I have read the articles that you submitted, 
Counsel, with your brief, and I take note especially of the one article which 
goes into the Defendant's background from the State of Michigan and recites or 
reports such matters as acquittals from charges which - of course, when a person 
is acquitted of a charge and is found innocent, even though that was reported, 
the insinuation or implication might still remain in the minds of some citizens 
that those charges were properly brought in Michigan and the public sometimes 
has a way of reading into something of that nature something that isn't 
there.

 
 

"Of course, a good deal 
of this information, obviously, must have come to the paper on hearsay evidence 
or hearsay conversations with people, and having only, obviously, attempted to 
get one side of the story where there may have been another, that type of 
reporting does, in the mind of the Court, produce an atmosphere of prejudice in 
this community against the Defendant 
* * *.

 
 

"In either event, it may 
not result in a fair trial for the Defendant. So that being the case, 
gentlemen, I am going to grant the Motion for a Change of Venue * * *." 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 

"THE COURT: * * * The 
next motion is a Motion In Limine.

 
 

"MR. BURLEY: Your Honor, 
the Motion in Limine that has been filed by the Defendant in this matter is 
directed to certain matters with respect to allegations or actions that the 
Defendant, Dr. Schmunk, may or may not have committed at a prior 
time.

 
 

"Particularly any matters 
concerning the Michigan Medical Practices Board or in the State of Michigan to the State of Michigan vs. Dr. Robert Schmunk."

 
 

In response, appellee's 
attorney stated:

 
 

"We would agree with Mr. 
Burley that as far as the information from the State of Michigan is concerned, 
it would be - not be proper for us to introduce it in our case in chief * * 
*."

 
 

And, in ruling upon the 
motion in limine, the court stated:

 
 

"I will grant the 
Motion 
In Limine as to the State's case in chief as to any matters that were or may have 
taken place in the past in the Defendant's life." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶14.]  During the State's case in chief, the 
videotape, still containing references to charges in Michigan, was received 
into evidence without objection and then viewed by the jury. The court 
adjourned; and the next morning, before the trial commenced, appellant, in 
chambers, moved for a mistrial stating:

 
 

"Judge, I think we have 
an obligation to our client and our case in this matter to move for a dismissal 
in the matter by virtue of the prejudicial effect that the video tape had upon 
the jury in this matter. I think that the implication is very clear by virtue of 
the video tape and the particular portion which had to do with a polygraph 
where, number one, the Doctor indicated 
on that video that he would not take a polygraph, and the reason for him not 
taking a polygraph was a result of a 
matter that had occurred with respect to his daughter, or charge by his daughter 
* * *.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"Although, I believe - I 
assumed, because of the substantial discussion, that all the Michigan stuff would be 
cut out and that everyone would monitor that to see that that would be done. 
Speaking from a human standpoint, I think the guards are down and you're just 
expecting that the one that is in control of certain evidence, their witnesses 
as well as demonstrative evidence or video evidence, is the one that has that 
primary responsibility.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"THE COURT: Thank you, 
Counsel. Well, gentlemen, I'm going to deny the motion. * * * [A]t the time I 
heard it, I was shaken by the fact that Michigan - even Michigan was mentioned, and the accusation. I 
wish it hadn't been in there. I do want to delete it. I think that probably the 
very fact, if we make some special instruction on it, this could - this is 
strictly up to Counsel - this could serve to call it to the jurors' attention, 
or it could serve to soften the effect of it; I don't know.

 
 

"However, gentlemen, that 
I am leaving to Counsel. I don't really believe it's the State's job to be the 
watchdog over the entire plethora of evidence that has to come into the case. I 
wish it hadn't happened." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

The court had changed the 
venue for this trial from Douglas, Wyoming to Sheridan, 
Wyoming to avoid the prejudicial effect of the 
extensive pretrial publicity concerning charges against appellant in the State 
of Michigan. 
In changing venue, the court stated that the prejudicial effect of the 
Michigan 
charge "may not result in a fair trial." Admission of the unedited videotape 
informed the jury of the very evidence that the court had previously determined 
would be prejudicial and which had been the reason for the change of venue to 
Sheridan, Wyoming. And, although the jury learned that a 
charge had been brought against appellant by his daughter, it did not know the 
nature of the charge, its disposition, or how it related to this case. The jury 
was left to speculate upon this mysterious charge and could have considered it 
as evidence of the existence of appellant's dark side or split 
personality.

 
 

[¶15.]  But the error here is ever more grievous 
for although prior acts of misconduct may be admissible to show motive, 
opportunity, intent, knowledge or absence of mistake, Bishop v. State, Wyo., 687 P.2d 242 
(1984), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985); Rule 
404(b), W.R.E., there is not even a claim here that the charges against 
appellant in Michigan might establish motive, opportunity, intent, knowledge, or 
absence of mistake. The State of Wyoming conceded in argument that "it would 
not be proper * * for us to introduce it * * *." We have said:

 
 

"`It is a dangerous 
species of evidence, not only because it requires a defendant to meet and 
explain other acts than those charged against him and for which he is on trial, 
but also because it may lead the jury to violate the great principle, that a 
party is not to be convicted of one crime by proof that he is quilty of 
another.'" Gabrielson v. State, 
Wyo., 510 P.2d 534, 536 (1973) (quoting from Rosencrance v. State, 33 Wyo. 360, 239 P. 952, 953 
(1925)).

 
 

We have also stated 
that:

 
 

"[I]t is settled law in 
this jurisdiction that mere charges, accusations, and arrests are consistent 
with innocence; and they should not be inquired into if the purpose of the 
prosecution is to discredit the witness in the eyes of the jury and convey to 
the jury knowledge that such witness was charged with a crime." Gabrielson v. State, supra at 536 
(quoted in Bishop v. State, supra, 
687 P.2d  at 248 (Cardine, Justice, dissenting)).

 
 

Thus, great care should 
be exercised in the admission of prior-bad-act evidence because of the 
ever-present danger that a person accused of a crime may be convicted, not 
because of the evidence with respect to the crime charged but because of prior 
activities which a lay jury might incorrectly view as evidence of guilt. In all 
events, Rule 403, W.R.E., requires that such evidence should not be admitted if 
its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Grabill v. State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 802, 808-809 (1980); Elliott v. State, Wyo., 600 P.2d 1044, 1049 
(1979). In this case the prior act (charge) in Michigan had no probative value at all; and, 
in granting the motion to change the venue of the trial, the court had already 
determined that this evidence would be prejudicial to appellant in this case. 
When evidence of this unspecified charge against appellant was revealed and the 
prosecutor told the jury that a dark, mysterious side to appellant caused him to 
kill with premeditated malice, the jury could rationally conclude that the 
charge from Michigan was the basis for the prosecutor's 
theory. The jury was invited to speculate upon the charge - it might be 
anything, a crime involving drugs, an attempted homicide, or other activity that 
might reveal the "dark side of appellant" alluded to by the prosecutor. We are 
cognizant of the fact that the defense viewed the videotape on two or three 
occasions, but that fact alone did not relieve the State of the obligation to 
delete the references to the Michigan incidents. We think appellant's 
objection to this evidence in the limine motion and the court's ruling preserved 
the error.

 
 

POLYGRAPH 
EXAMINATION

 
 

[¶16.]  The jury also learned from viewing the 
videotape that appellant

 
 

"had a polygraph taken * 
* * which was totally erroneous * * * and [was] just not willing to take a 
polygraph [in this case]."

 
 

[¶17.]  Generally, the results of a polygraph 
examination are not admissible in evidence. Cullin v. State, Wyo., 565 P.2d 445, 455 
(1977). Improper reference to the results of a polygraph examination has been 
held reversible error. See, e.g. Birdsong 
v. State, Okla. Crim. App., 649 P.2d 786 (1982); State v. Green, 271 Or. 153, 531 P.2d 245, 92 A.L.R.3d 1301 (1975). We have approved, upon stipulation of the parties, 
admission of the results of a polygraph examination. Daniel v. State, Wyo., 644 P.2d 172, 178 
(1982); Cullin v. State, supra, at 
455. In the absence of a stipulation for admission, a conviction must be 
reversed when the results of a polygraph are revealed to the jury. State v. Sutherland, 94 Wn.2d 527, 617 P.2d 1010 (1980); State v. 
Kilpatrick, 2 Kan. App. 2d 349, 578 P.2d 1147 (1978). The 
reluctance to admit the results of a polygraph or "lie detector" examination 
stems from the fact that the results of these examinations have not been 
established as reliable. It also stems from a fear that jurors may give too much 
weight to the results of the examination, even perhaps accepting it as proof of 
guilt or innocence.

 
 

[¶18.]  The results of the polygraph examination 
here referred to by appellant did not pertain to the charge for which appellant 
was on trial, but to a charge previously brought against him in the State of 
Michigan. We 
have already held that it was error to inform the jury of the charge against 
appellant in the State of Michigan. That being so, it was also error to 
reveal to the jury the adverse results of a lie detector examination with 
respect to those charges.

 
 

THE COURT'S ATTEMPT TO 
CURE - DELETION FROM THE VIDEOTAPE

 
 

[¶19.]  The court, after the viewing by the jury, 
concluded that the reference to the charge and lie detector test in Michigan should be 
deleted from the videotape and the jury informed of the deletion. The jury, 
therefore, was instructed at the close of the case as follows:

 
 

"You are instructed that 
a certain portion of State's Exhibit 21, the same being a video tape recording, 
admitted into evidence has been deleted. You are therefore instructed that the 
deleted portion must not be considered by you as evidence."

 
 

Appellee contends that 
improper reference to the Michigan charge and polygraph was cured by the 
above instruction. Appellee concedes, however, that where appellant's 
credibility plays a vital role in the case, the reference to the polygraph may 
be prejudicial. Thus, a criminal conviction was reversed because of references 
by a prosecution witness to a polygraph examination of the defendant, despite a 
cautionary instruction to the jury to draw no inferences from the references. 
United 
States v. Brevard, 739 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 
1984). The court noted that "[t]here are instances where the jury is exposed to 
inadmissible evidence which could make such a strong impression that 
instructions to disregard it may not remove its prejudicial effect." Id. at 182. See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 
1627, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968); Throckmorton 
v. Holt, 180 U.S. 552, 569, 21 S. Ct. 474, 481, 45 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1901).

 
 

[¶20.]  Here Dr. Schmunk's credibility was 
crucial. He offered nothing but his own profession of innocence to rebut the 
inference from the testimony of the State's experts regarding the quantity of 
narcotics present in Mrs. Schmunk's body. The improperly admitted evidence 
implicating him in some mysterious crime and disclosing his failure to pass a 
polygraph test would have so affected the jury that no instruction could restore 
Dr. Schmunk's credibility or overcome its prejudicial effect.

 
 

REFUSAL TO TAKE POLYGRAPH 
TEST

 
 

[¶21.]  Even more serious, however, was the 
court's decision to receive evidence which informed the jury that Dr. Schmunk 
had refused to take a lie detector test in this case. That occurred in this 
fashion. The videotape, State Exhibit No. 21, was played for the jury. Appellant 
moved to dismiss and for a mistrial and, as one of the grounds for his motion, 
stated: "[N]umber one, the Doctor indicated on that video that he would not take 
a polygraph * * *." The prosecuting attorney, referring to Dr. Schmunk's refusal 
to submit to a lie detector test, responded:

 
 

"I think it did paint a 
bit of the Defendant's personality, which we thought was of some significance in 
the course of the investigation, the pretense of cooperation while at the same 
time trying to manipulate the investigation.

 
 

"* * * It was, I think, 
helpful to the State, but not in the sense that it painted a bad picture about 
Michigan."

 
 

[¶22.]  The court stated, "I do want to delete 
it." Surprisingly, after the deletion, the videotape that went to the jury room 
contained the following:

 
 

"[Investigator]: Based on 
the information that you've given us, would you be willing to take a polygraph 
test?

 
 

"[Appellant]: I wouldn't 
take it; I would not take a polygraph under any circumstances for anybody 
whether I was guilty, innocent or questionable, no, I would not take a 
polygraph.

 
 

"[Investigator]: Have you 
had a bad experience with them or have you had one before that * * *

 
 

"[Appellant]: * * * I'm, 
I'm just not willing to take a polygraph and hinge anything on what the, uh, the 
polygraph might suggest.

 
 

"[Investigator] 
Ok."

 
 

Thus, the videotape 
containing Dr. Schmunk's refusal to take a lie detector test went with the jury 
when it retired to deliberate and was available for repeated viewing by the 
jury. As edited, the videotape contained only his refusal with no explanation or 
reason therefor. The purpose of putting the refusal in evidence was stated by 
the prosecutor as, "it did paint a bit of the Defendant's personality" and 
revealed defendant's "pretense of cooperation while at the same time trying to 
manipulate the investigation."

 
 

[¶23.]  In effect, the prosecutor was saying that 
the refusal of Dr. Schmunk to take the lie detector test tended to show 
"consciousness of guilt," for surely only a guilty man would "try to manipulate 
the investigation."

 
 

[¶24.]  It is uniformly held that evidence that 
an accused has refused to take a lie detector test is not admissible to 
establish "consciousness of guilt." 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 296. Thus, reference 
by the prosecutor to a refusal of the accused to take a lie detector test 
required reversal, State v. Driver, 
38 N.J. 255, 183 A.2d 655 (1962), and reversal was required also where reference 
to the refusal was in a recorded, taped interview. State v. Emory, 190 Kan. 406, 375 P.2d 585 
(1962).

 
 

[¶25.]  In Mills v. People, 139 Colo. 397, 339 P.2d 998 
(1959), defendant, when asked, replied that he would not take a lie detector 
test. The evidence of refusal was admitted as showing "consciousness of guilt." 
After declining to set forth the "sordid details" of the crime for which 
defendant was convicted of first degree murder, the appellate court stated 
(quoting from State v. Kolander, 236 
Minn. 209, 52 N.W.2d 458, 465 (1952):

 
 

"`The impact upon the 
minds of the jurors of a refusal to submit to something which they might well 
assume would effectively determine guilt or innocence, under these conditions, 
might well be more devastating than a disclosure of the results of such test * * 
*.'" Id. 339 P.2d  at 999.

 
 

The court then 
said:

 
 

"All too frequently this 
court is compelled to reverse judgments of guilt in important criminal cases 
because of overzealous prosecution. It is the duty of prosecuting officers to 
guard against the introduction of incompetent evidence. Overprosecution of an 
accused should not be permitted by the trial court. In the instant case the 
district attorney insisted at great length upon introduction into evidence of 
testimony [refusal to take a lie detector test] which is uniformly held to be 
incompetent, in an unbroken line of authorities throughout the nation." 
Id. 339 P.2d  
at 999-1000.

 
 

[¶26.]  It was error to inform the jury of Dr. 
Schmunk's refusal to submit to a lie detector test. The error was repeated when, 
after objection, the videotape was edited to contain only the refusal to take a 
lie detector test and sent to the jury room to be viewed during deliberations.2

The great mass of 
authority holds it error to admit evidence of appellant's refusal to submit to a 
lie detector test. The admission of this evidence is again especially 
troublesome where the jury is informed that there is something dark and 
mysterious about Dr. Schmunk and leaves them to wonder and speculate concerning 
the reason for the doctor's refusal as it might relate to the motive for killing 
his wife.

 
 

[¶27.]  We note here that the practice of sending 
the videotaped testimony of a witness to the jury room for repeated viewing 
during deliberation poses the danger of unduly emphasizing that testimony over 
all of the other testimony in the case. That danger is even greater where 
testimony is in the form of a videotape, for:

 
 

"Videotape testimony is 
unique. It enables the jury to observe the demeanor and to hear the testimony of 
the witness. It serves as a functional equivalent of a live witness." 
United 
States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 
1985).

 
 

In this case, the jury 
could have observed and heard Dr. Schmunk on the edited videotape, repeatedly 
and emphatically refusing to submit to a lie detector test without stating a 
reason for his refusal. His credibility was crucial to his defense. In 
United 
States v. Binder, supra, the trial judge 
allowed the jury to replay the videotape in an abridged fashion, and the 
appellate court still reversed the conviction stating:

 
 

"Under these 
circumstances the videotaped testimony may have taken on great significance. 
Allowing the jury to see and hear the children's videotaped testimony a second 
time in the jury room during deliberations unduly emphasized their testimony." 
769 F.2d  at 601.

 
 

We think repeated viewing 
of the Schmunk videotape contained an enormous potential for depriving him of a 
fair trial.

 
 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM 
DUNCAN

 
 

[¶28.]  William Duncan was 17 years of age, 
attending high school, and living with appellant and his mother at the time of 
this incident. He was questioned by the investigator before trial concerning the 
death of his mother on several occasions but did not then state that he believed 
Dr. Schmunk had killed her. Then, during the trial, he testified:

 
 

"Q. Why did you leave 
Douglas, Wyoming? 

 
 

"A. Because of the 
suspicions of my father killing my mother."

 
 

There was an objection 
and the court stated:

 
 

"I would overrule the 
objection anyway."

 
 

The State argues that 
Billy Duncan's statement that he suspected that his father had killed his 
mother was properly admitted into evidence because Billy had personal knowledge 
of the matter as required by Rule 602 W.R.E.; that it concerned his state of 
mind, and was not an opinion of appellant's guilt but was a statement of fact. 
Appellant contends that the context of the statement was such that the jury 
would clearly understand that Billy was stating his personal belief, "suspicion" 
that Dr. Schmunk had killed his mother. It is a close question, but assuming 
appellant to be correct, it would have been best if the trial court had 
sustained the objection.

 
 

PERSONAL 
KNOWLEDGE

 
 

[¶29.]  Rule 602, W.R.E., provides in part: "A 
witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to 
support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter." The personal 
knowledge requirement is imposed because

 
 

"[t]he trier of fact 
should base its decision upon good and trustworthy evidence, and `personal 
knowledge' really means firsthand knowledge which has come to the witness 
through his own senses. Thus, a witness may testify to an event or occurrence 
which he has seen himself, but not one which he knows only from the description 
of others." 3 Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence § 259 at 36.

 
 

We seriously question 
that Billy had "personal knowledge" that his stepfather had killed his mother. 
No one states what firsthand knowledge Billy acquired through his own senses or 
what he observed that would constitute the necessary personal knowledge. The 
appellee in its brief merely states:

 
 

"Clearly, he had ample 
personal knowledge of the answer to that question. * * Nine days before he left 
Douglas, the grand jury indicted Appellant for 
the first degree murder of Billy's mother."

 
 

[¶30.]  Personal knowledge generally refers to 
what a witness knows because of an event he has perceived.

 
 

"[T]he testimony must be 
based upon events perceived by the witness through one of the physical senses. 
The rule - an extension of the law's preference that decisions be based on the 
best evidence available - is grounded in the realization that the possibility of 
distortion increases with transfers of testimony, and that consequently the most 
reliable testimony is that which is obtained from the witness who himself 
perceived the event." (Footnotes omitted.) 3 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence ¶ 602-[01]. See also, Joy 
Manufacturing Company v. Sola Basic Industries, Inc., 697 F.2d 104 (3rd Cir. 
1982).

 
 

There is no statement by 
anyone of what event Billy perceived that would justify his statement that his 
mother was killed by Dr. Schmunk. We suggest it was inadmissible upon this 
ground alone. But, appellee contends that what Billy said was a statement of 
fact. Billy said it was a suspicion, and we are hard pressed to agree that when 
A says "I suspect B killed C," A has stated a fact. "I believe" or "in my 
opinion" might be synonomous with "I suspect," but is not synonomous with "I saw 
B kill C." And so the statement by Billy was no more than a suspicion that Dr. 
Schmunk had killed his mother and was clearly a statement of his 
opinion.

 
 

[¶31.]  An opinion by a lay witness is admissible 
if

 
 

"his testimony in the 
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which 
are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a 
clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." 
Rule 701, W.R.E.

 
 

RATIONALLY BASED ON 
PERCEPTION OF WITNESS

 
 

[¶32.]  Rule 701, W.R.E., incorporates the 
personal knowledge requirement of Rule 602 which we have heretofore discussed. 
Thus, it is said that:

 
 

"Under Rule 701, the 
witness must have perceived firsthand the pertinent events or matters, and his 
inference or opinion must be rationally based on his perception; his testimony 
must be rejected if his firsthand observation was inadequate to support an 
opinion." 3 Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence § 376 at 618-619.

 
 
 
 

[¶33.]  In Joy Manufacturing Company v. Sola Basic 
Industries, Inc., supra, 697 F.2d  at 111, it was said:

 
 

"The court is in essence 
requiring that the best evidence available - first-hand knowledge verses 
second-hand knowledge - be presented to the jury for use in its 
deliberation."

 
 

In Gorby v. Schneider Tank Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1015, 1021 (7th Cir. 1984), the testimony of a witness who proposed to 
state that "Welch did `everything he could to avoid [the] accident,'" and that 
"Gorby could have avoided the accident" was rejected by the court because they 
were based upon speculation rather than first-hand knowledge or observation. It 
was pointed out that the witness could only observe one vehicle, could not know 
what the drivers perceived, nor was he familiar with the vehicles.

 
 

[¶34.]  Where the proffered opinion of the 
witness was an opinion by a lay witness and encompasses a legal 
conclusion,

 
 

"a trial court may very 
properly conclude that a response would not be helpful to the trier of fact. The 
danger here is that the jury could easily accord too much weight to the 
pronouncement of a lay witness unfamiliar with the standards erected by the 
criminal law, whose statement may be charged with the emotionalism of a person 
coming to the rescue of an embattled co-worker." (Citations omitted.) 
United 
States v. 
Ness, 665 F.2d 248, 250 (8th Cir. 
1981).

 
 

When Billy testified of 
his "suspicions of my father killing my mother," that suspicion was not based 
upon personal knowledge or perception and was not admissible because Dr. Schmunk 
had been indicted for first degree murder. The question and answer added nothing 
to the case. The reason Billy left Douglas was 
irrelevant to any issue before the jury. His testimony was both inadmissible and 
prejudicial.

 
 

HELPFUL TO A CLEAR 
UNDERSTANDING

 
 

[¶35.]  The opinion of the lay witness must also 
be helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony. Rule 701, W.R.E., supra. 
Where a witness is asked

 
 

"whether the conduct in 
issue was `unlawful' or `wilful' or whether the defendants `conspired,' terms 
that demand an understanding of the nature and scope of the criminal law, the 
trial court may properly conclude that any response would not be helpful to the 
trier of fact. The witness, unfamiliar with the contours of the criminal law, 
may feel that the legal standard is either higher or lower than it really is. If 
either event is true the jury may accord too much weight to such a legal 
conclusion." United States v. Baskes, 
649 F.2d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 1000, 101 S. Ct. 1706, 68 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1981).

 
 

We have said that Billy's 
statement that he suspected his father killed his mother was not rationally 
based on any perception by him. We are unable to ascertain how his opinion that 
he suspected Dr. Schmunk had killed his mother would be helpful to a clear 
understanding of his testimony.

 
 

[¶36.]  There was before this jury all of the 
facts, testimony of experts, investigators, officers, physical evidence, the 
autopsy, and toxicology. The jury was in the best position to reach a conclusion 
on the matter of guilt or innocence - the ultimate issue in this case. Should we 
condone this type of opinion evidence, we could expect in the future that the 
State might call five witnesses to say they suspect the defendant is guilty. The 
defendant then would surely be permitted to call five witnesses to testify that 
they suspect he is innocent. It is said that "`assertions which amount to little 
more than choosing up sides,' such as statements that the defendant is `liable' 
or `at fault' or `guilty,'" 3 Louisell and Mueller § 376, do not satisfy the 
helpfulness requirement. Such a procedure would be absurd. It would detract from 
important evidence and would not be helpful to the jury in deciding the ultimate 
issue in the case. This type of opinion or conclusion should not have been 
admitted.

 
 

[¶37.]  The State next contends that Billy's 
opinion was admissible as revealing his state of mind at the time he left 
Douglas, Wyoming. Suffice it to say here that Billy's 
state of mind at the time he left Douglas, Wyoming was not relevant to any issue in this 
case. The reason he left Douglas was not proof 
of any material fact relating to the charge of first degree murder against Dr. 
Schmunk.

 
 

"All relevant evidence is 
admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute, by these rules, or by other 
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible." Rule 402, W.R.E.

 
 

The statement was not 
admissible under the state-of-mind exception in Rule 803(3), W.R.E., as 
suggested because that rule concerns the admissibility of hearsay evidence, and 
this was not hearsay. It was not relevant and, therefore, not admissible. It was 
not admissible as an opinion of a lay witness. The admission of this opinion, 
therefore, was error.

 
 

ADMISSION OF HEARSAY 
STATEMENTS NOTICED APRIL 30, 1984

 
 

[¶38.]  Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
804(b)(6), W.R.E., infra, the State served appellant with a notice on April 25, 
1984, and a second notice on April 30, 1984, advising appellant of the name and 
address of the declarant who would testify to hearsay statements of Kay Schmunk 
concerning her desire to leave appellant and return to the state of Michigan. 
The place of trial had been transferred by change of venue from Douglas, Wyoming - where 
this incident occurred - to Sheridan, Wyoming. The notice of April 30 was served on 
appellant's attorney in his motel room in Sheridan two days before trial was to commence. 
Appellant's counsel objected to the notice of April 30, 1984, claiming it did 
not permit sufficient time to prepare to meet the proposed hearsay as required 
by Rule 804(b)(6), did not comply with the spirit of the rule, referred to 
hearsay statements by Kay Schmunk in October 1982 and February 1983 which were 
far removed and vastly different from the proposed hearsay in the first notice 
of April 25, and finally because appellee had interviewed all of the witnesses 
more than nine months prior to trial, had the information available and could 
offer no reasonable excuse for not having given notice sooner. Appellee 
responded that, although the notice was late, it concerned the same type of 
hearsay evidence as listed in the notice of April 25 to which there was no 
objection and, in addition, it was admissible under Rule 803(3), W.R.E., as 
establishing declarant's state of mind.

 
 

[¶39.]  The court, in ruling on the motion, 
stated:

 
 

"It does disturb me that 
you had nine months and one trip back there [to Michigan] and * * * these statements are 
coming in on the Monday of the trial. * * I'll tell you what, gentlemen. I'm 
going to overrule the motion. I'm going to allow the testimony, but I think this 
should have been discovered some time ago. If you're going to put it in, I think 
the notice should have probably been given to them before the morning of the 
trial."

 
 

[¶40.]  It is a general rule that hearsay 
evidence is not admissible. There is no opportunity for confrontation or 
cross-examination, there is no manner of judging the credibility of the person 
making the statement or the weight to be given to it, there is the potential for 
memories to dim with the passage of time, and a potential for inaccurancies and 
even falsehoods in the second-hand hearsay statements offered as evidence. This 
general hearsay exclusionary rule was incorporated into Rule 802, W.R.E., which 
provides that hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the Wyoming Rules 
of Evidence or by other rules adopted by the Wyoming Supreme Court or by 
statute. Rule 803, W.R.E., sets forth twenty-four exceptions and Rule 804 sets 
forth an additional six exceptions to the exclusionary hearsay rule. These 
exceptions permit the receipt of hearsay evidence if the requirements of the 
exceptions are satisfied.

 
 

[¶41.]  It seems clear that almost any hearsay 
statement can in some tortured fashion be claimed to fit into one of the 
exceptions provided by Rules 803 and 804, W.R.E. But to hold that all hearsay 
fits into one of the exceptions and therefore is admissible is to permit the 
exception to the hearsay rule to swallow the rule excluding hearsay evidence. 
And so the general rule is, and should remain, that hearsay is not admissible. 
Nor should the trial court, under the guise of liberal construction of the Rules 
of Evidence, admit all hearsay without giving due consideration to the 
guarantees of trustworthiness and other requirements of the rules. Ordinarily 
strict compliance with the requirements of the exceptions to the hearsay rule 
should be enforced; and, if the proposed hearsay cannot meet those strict 
requirements, it should be excluded. In this case, it is clear that with respect 
to the proposed hearsay statements of Kay Schmunk noticed on April 30, 1984, 
there was not compliance with the requirements of Rule 804(b)(6) which 
provides:

 
 

"Other 
Exceptions. - A statement not 
specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) 
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is 
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general 
purposes of these rules and interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be permitted under 
this exception unless the proponent 
of it makes known to the adverse party 
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, 
his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including 
the name and address of the declarant." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶42.]  Rule 804(b)(6) was a catchall provision 
which, when proposed for adoption as federal Rule 804(b)(5), encountered 
considerable opposition.

 
 

"The House Judiciary 
Committee proposed to delete the provision altogether, along with identical 
language which the Advisory Committee had proposed in Rule 804(b)(5). The 
accompanying Committee Report reflects the concern that these catchall 
provisions inject `too much uncertainty into the law of evidence' and impair 
`the ability of the practitioners to prepare for trial.'" (Footnotes omitted.) 4 
Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence § 437 at 463.

 
 

Courts have generally 
noted that Congress intended rigid enforcement of the notice requirement and 
have refused admission of hearsay evidence pursuant to Rule 804(b)(5) where 
reasonable notice of intent to offer the hearsay was not given. 
United 
States v. 
Rodriquez, 706 F.2d 31, 41 (2nd Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Atkins, 618 F.2d 366, 372 (5th Cir. 
1980). The giving of notice has been excused in cases in which the proponent of 
the hearsay was not at fault. United 
States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3rd Cir. 
1978). We find appellee at fault in this case for, as the court noted, the 
appellee had interviewed these witnesses and had available all of the proposed 
evidence nine months before trial.

 
 

[¶43.]  Appellant objected to the receipt of the 
proposed hearsay testimony noticed in the letter of April 30, 1984, stating the 
notice was too late, did not satisfy the requirements, spirit or intent of the 
rule, and did not afford him a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it. 
Appellant's objection was overruled, and Kay Schmunk's mother was permitted to 
testify that Kay Schmunk had returned to Michigan for a visit in October 1982 - 
eight months prior to her death - and that during that visit Kay Schmunk had 
said that things were not going well, she wanted to come back home, and that she 
would be interested in purchasing a home that would be just right for her and 
Billy.

 
 

[¶44.]  She testified further that Kay Schmunk 
told her in a telephone conversation during February 1983 that she and Billy 
were going to come home and wanted to live in a travel trailer that was 
available; that things had gotten impossible and she wanted to come back home; 
she then stated that Bob was coming down the driveway and she had better hang 
up.

 
 

[¶45.]  Finally, she testified pursuant to the 
April 30 notice that Kay Schmunk stated to her at a family reunion in Michigan during June 1983 that she would have gone crazy 
in Wyoming without the right-to-life movement 
and that she was going back to Wyoming and then 
coming back to Michigan for a "long vacation." It was said 
that meant she was coming home to stay.

 
 

[¶46.]  As we have said, hearsay evidence is not 
ordinarily admissible. If it is to be admitted pursuant to an exception to the 
hearsay rule, compliance with the requirements of that rule is necessary. There 
is not a sufficient excuse to justify the late notice in this case. The 
witnesses had been interviewed nine months before trial. Their proposed 
testimony was or should have been known to the State of Wyoming. The proposed 
hearsay generally covers a substantially different period of time from that 
noticed on April 25, 1984. Finally, its receipt was extremely damaging to 
appellant as we will discuss later. He should have had a fair opportunity to 
prepare for and meet it. The proposed hearsay should have been excluded when 
appellant objected to it being received, and it was error not to do 
so.

 
 

ADMISSION OF HEARSAY 
STATEMENTS NOTICED APRIL 25, 1984

 
 

[¶47.]  Appellant further complains that all of 
the hearsay statements of Kay Schmunk admitted into evidence, i.e., both those 
noticed April 25, 1984, and those noticed April 30, 1984, should have been 
excluded. We note here that although appellant objected to the statements 
noticed April 30, 1984, he did not object to the receipt of the hearsay 
statements of Kay Schmunk noticed April 25, 1984. Appellant seems to contend 
that an objection was unnecessary claiming that the State has the initial burden 
of establishing a foundation for the admission of this hearsay. In Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79, 131 
(1981), we said:

 
 

"[I]n order for hearsay 
to be admissible under the catchall exception [referring to Rule 804(b)(6), 
W.R.E.], certain requirements must be satisfied. First, the declarant must be 
unavailable. Second, the adverse party must either have been given pretrial 
notice or a sufficient opportunity to prepare for and contest the admission of 
the hearsay. Third, the truth of the matter asserted must be evidence of a 
material fact. Fourth, the hearsay statement must be more probative than any 
other evidence which could be procured through reasonable efforts. Fifth, and 
finally, the statement must be supported by circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness * * *."

 
 

We further said that 
additional limits imposed upon the admission of hearsay by the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 10, 
Article 1 of the Wyoming Constitution must also be satisfied, these requirements 
being that:

 
 

"It is our conclusion 
that, before hearsay becomes admissible, the Confrontation Clause imposes a burden upon the State in 
addition to those found under Rule 804(b)(6). The prosecutor is required to 
establish: (1) that the declarant is unavailable to appear at trial; and (2) 
that there exists sufficient background information concerning the circumstances 
under which the hearsay statement was made to provide the jury with an adequate 
basis to evaluate its veracity." 632 P.2d  at 132-133.

 
 

We said in Hopkinson v. State, supra, that the 
State has the burden of proving the existence of the five elements listed and 
providing sufficient background to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Appellant 
suggests that the State must satisfy its burden and the court make a 
determination of admissibility even though appellee makes no objection to 
receipt of the hearsay evidence. Appellant is not correct in this contention. To 
hold as suggested would impose an impossible burden upon a trial court to, on 
its own motion, require proof that opposing counsel has not demanded. Besides, 
opposing counsel may choose not to object to receipt of the offered evidence for 
many reasons. Trial strategy may dictate no objection; the opposing party may 
believe the offered evidence will be favorable; the opposing party may believe 
that impeachment may be more damaging and choose not to exclude the evidence. 
Rule 103, W.R.E., with respect to admissibility of evidence 
provides:

 
 

"(a) Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is affected, and

 
 

"(1) In case the ruling 
is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objection * * * appears of record 
* * *.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"(d) Nothing in this rule 
precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although 
they were not brought to the attention of the court." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶48.]  There was no objection to the proposed 
hearsay identified in the April 25, 1984 notice. In the absence of an objection, 
the erroneous admission of this hearsay must rise to plain error before it will 
be considered by this court. It has been said:

 
 

"The term [plain error] 
suggests obviousness, and most of the defining phrases include this element. 
Most of the attempted definitions also suggest that plain error is something 
more fundamental or serious than reversible error * * *. As a practical matter, 
however, it is not clear how much more serious an error must be than reversible 
error in order to merit plain error treatment, nor how to determine whether a 
given error is more serious than reversible error, for the decisions finding 
plain error reflect little more than the conclusions reached by the court, and 
the attempted definitions are probably best viewed only as general indicators of 
the nature of the inquiry.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"A determination of plain 
error will be made upon examination of the whole record. Imagination is required 
in reliving the trial and assessing the effect of the asserted error, and each 
decision will turn upon the facts in a particular case." 1 Louisell & 
Mueller, Federal Evidence § 21 at 119-124.

 
 

In Bradley v. State, Wyo., 635 P.2d 1161, 
1163-1164 (1981), we said:

 
 

"A failure to object 
constitutes a waiver of whatever error occurred, unless the error rises to the 
level of plain error. A three-part test has been established for determining 
whether an error may achieve the status of plain error. First, the record must 
be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party 
claiming that the error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that party must prove that a 
substantial right has been denied him and as a result he has been materially 
prejudiced."

 
 

[¶49.]  Rule 804(b)(6), supra, requires that the 
proposed hearsay statements be "evidence of a material fact." Appellant contends 
that the proffered hearsay statements of Kay Schmunk were not evidence of a 
material fact and, therefore, not admissible. The material fact requirement is 
satisfied if the proposed hearsay statement offered into evidence is relevant. 4 
Louisell and Mueller § 491 at 1202.

 
 

[¶50.]  Relevant evidence is

 
 

"evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." Rule 401, W.R.E.

 
 

Evidence which is not 
relevant is not admissible, Rule 402, W.R.E. Of course Kay Schmunk's state of 
mind is no more relevant nor material in this case than was the state of mind of 
Vincent Vehar in Hopkinson v. State, 
supra, where we said:

 
 

"[T]he mental state of 
Vincent Vehar prior to his death is irrelevant. There is no allegation by the 
defense that his death was suicide or in any other manner which would make his 
mental state an issue." 632 P.2d  at 130.

 
 

[¶51.]  It is Dr. Schmunk's state of mind with 
which we are concerned in this case. If Kay Schmunk's hearsay statements had an 
effect in some manner upon Dr. Schmunk's actions, motive, or purpose, it might 
satisfy the materiality requirement. But in this case not a single witness 
testified that Dr. Schmunk was aware that Kay Schmunk had thought of leaving 
Douglas nor was there, during the preceding 
eight months, any overt act or other evidence that might put Dr. Schmunk on 
notice of Kay Schmunk's alleged intention. Billy Duncan, who resided with Robert 
and Kay Schmunk at the family home and testified to all facets of their family 
life, stated that from what he knew, "she did not tell him that she was going to 
leave." Unless the evidence was such that Kay Schmunk was going to leave 
appellant and return to Michigan, and that appellant knew of this, the evidence 
was not of a material fact, for how could Kay Schmunk's secret intentions affect 
appellant's action or be relevant upon the question of motive? Thus, the 
evidence under the present state of the record did not satisfy the material fact 
requirement for admission as hearsay under the catchall exception.

 
 

[¶52.]  With respect to its admission being plain 
error, the record is clear as to the incident alleged to be error. Appellee, in 
its notices of April 25 and April 30 stated:

 
 

"These are all statements 
relating to the declarant's state of mind and her intent or plan to get out of 
Douglas, if she could, and her dissatisfaction 
there."

 
 

As we have said, 
declarant's state of mind was not an issue nor a material fact in this case. A 
clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in that the hearsay was not of a 
material fact and, therefore, was not admissible under the exception provided in 
Rule 804(b)(6), W.R.E. The admission of this hearsay denied appellant a 
substantial right.

 
 

[¶53.]  Appellee offered considerable evidence 
with respect to these hearsay statements. The evidence is extensive, appears to 
be complete, and there is nothing from which we can say, even by inference, that 
it was of a material fact. We hold, therefore, that it was plain error to admit 
the April 25th noticed hearsay statements pursuant to the catchall exception 
found in Rule 804(b)(6), W.R.E.

 
 

[¶54.]  Appellee contends finally that the 
hearsay statements of Kay Schmunk were admissible under the provisions of Rule 
803(3), W.R.E., which provide:

 
 

"The following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a 
witness:

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"(3) A statement of the 
declarant's then-existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical 
condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and 
bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the 
fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, 
identification, or terms of declarant's will."

 
 

The State, thus, contends 
that because the hearsay was admissible under Rule 803(3), W.R.E., supra, it was 
unnecessary that the State satisfy the pretrial notice requirements of Rule 
804(b)(6), W.R.E., supra. The state-of-mind exception provided in Rule 803(3), 
supra, permits hearsay to be introduced as proof of the state of mind of the 
person making the hearsay statement. The state-of-mind exception concerns the 
declarant's mental condition and ordinarily may be received if that is the 
matter ultimately to proved by the statements. 4 Louisell and Mueller § 440 at 
518. Thus: 

 
 

"When a declaration is 
used to evidence a state of mind directly in issue, one encounters little 
difficulty in justifying the admission of the declaration. State of mind has to 
be proved in some way and frequently other evidence is nonexistent or 
inadequate.

 
 

"The declarant's state of 
mind may be an issue in a wide variety of contexts. Statements may be admitted, 
for example, to show: intent to establish a particular domicile, a customer's 
reason for refusing to deal with a supplier, motive, competency, affection or 
alienation * *." 4 Weinstein & Burger, supra, at 803-111.

 
 

[¶55.]  Ordinarily, declarant's state of mind is 
not evidence of the state of mind of a third person. As here, the state of mind 
of the declarant, Kay Schmunk, was not evidence of the state of mind of 
appellant, and it was not admissible under the provisions of Rule 803(3), 
W.R.E., supra.

 
 

[¶56.]  In Alcala v. State, Wyo., 487 P.2d 448, 455 
(1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 997, 92 S. Ct. 1259, 31 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1972), we 
said:

 
 

"[I]n marital homicide 
cases any fact or circumstance relating to ill-feeling, ill-treatment, jealousy, 
prior assaults, personal violence, threats, or any similar conduct or attitude 
by the husband toward the wife [victim] are relevant to show motive and malice 
in such crimes."

 
 

The hearsay statements of 
Kay Schmunk did not concern appellant's attitude toward her. The statements did 
not concern appellant's attitude, feelings or state of mind at all. At best, 
they were evidence of Kay Schmunk's state of mind not that of appellant's. As 
such, they were inadmissible.

 
 

THE ARGUMENT AND FAIR 
TRIAL

 
 

[¶57.]  The prosecutor in his opening statement, 
after telling the jury that Kay Schmunk enjoyed the status and elegance of being 
a doctor's wife in what appeared to be a happy marriage, stated:

 
 

"Ladies and gentlemen, 
there will be a dark counter-current to all of this. The real story. * * * 
[What] we are going to present is what was known to the family members and what 
appeared from time to time on the surface of the marriage, this dark 
counter-current * * *.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"We have the three of 
them living alone in their underground home.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 
"Why did he kill her? * * 
* [I]t's not important as to guilt or innocence. It has nothing to do 

with it, but there is a 
motive.

 
 

"Remember, motive is a 
fun thing to play with in the back of your heads.

 
 

"I want you to listen for 
it. I want you to hear the bits and pieces. I'm not going to tell you what it is now. 
I'll tell you what I think it is in closing." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶58.]  During examination of the State's 
witnesses, the prosecutor suggested possible motives. He insinuated that Dr. 
Schmunk bought a rifle for his girlfriend. He suggested that Dr. Schmunk killed 
for money, property or the proceeds of an insurance policy. Witnesses testified 
that Kay Schmunk was planning to leave. Witnesses stated that they believed Dr. 
Schmunk had killed Kay Schmunk. Then, in closing argument, the prosecutor told 
the jury, "I don't think there is a girlfriend." He said he had not proven that 
the killing was for money or for revenge or because of jealousy. Then, as 
promised in his opening statement when he said "I'll tell you what I think it is 
in closing," he said it was his belief that Dr. Schmunk killed his wife because 
he was a man with a mysterious dark side, a split personality, who because of 
some mental aberration, "put to sleep what was real and imperfect."

 
 

[¶59.]  Appellant contends that the State lifted 
this theory of the case from a movie, stating in his brief:

 
 

"In the classic 1946 
film, The Spiral Staircase, the 
mystery behind a series of senseless, apparently motiveless, murders is solved 
for the audience when it is discovered that the murders are not unrelated. 
Connecting them, explaining them, was the sick logic of their perpetrator, a 
seemingly gentle professor whom no one would suspect of murder. As he tries to 
kill the mute girl who attends his invalid mother, the man admits that he is 
driven by a demented calling. It is not profit that spurs him to murder, nor 
revenge, nor jealousy: he hates imperfection in the world, and he will kill to 
eliminate it."

 
 

[¶60.]  The manner in which the State arrived at 
a theory of the case does not concern us as much as the necessity that there be 
evidence to support the theory. Here there was none. Not a single witness 
testified that Dr. Schmunk had a "split personality," that there was a dark, 
mysterious side to him or that he was sick or demented. It was contended, 
nevertheless, that there was evidence from which inferences could be drawn which 
would support the argument.

 
 

[¶61.]  We recognized that the prosecuting 
attorney may draw all legitimate inferences from the evidence when we 
said:

 
 

"Closing arguments are 
meant to be just that, arguments premised upon the evidence already submitted to 
the jury. Prosecutors are no more limited in their closing than defense counsel. 
They may review the evidence and suggest 
to the jury inferences based thereon. The purpose of closing arguments is to 
allow counsel to offer ways of viewing the significance of the evidence. 
However, there are limits, not only on prosecutors, but on all attorneys." 
(Citations omitted.) Browder v. 
State, supra, 639 P.2d 889, 893. See also, Hopkinson v. State, supra, 632 P.2d  at 
145; 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 337.

 
 

We look to see if there 
was evidence from which the jury could infer that there was a dark, mysterious 
side to Dr. Schmunk and that he was a man with a "split personality" who could 
not accept, and therefore killed, what was imperfect.

 
 

[¶62.]  Perhaps that inference could be drawn 
from the charge by his daughter against Dr. Schmunk in the state of Michigan. The jurors knew 
that the prosecutor had information about something occurring in Michigan, but they were 
never told what it was. When the prosecutor said "I think he did it because this 
man has got two diametrically opposed personalities," the jurors could not help 
but wonder whether the source of the prosecutor's information was this unknown 
Michigan 
matter. But we have held it error to have admitted this evidence.

 
 

[¶63.]  Perhaps when the jury learned that he 
refused, under all circumstances, to take a lie detector test, such inference 
might be drawn. But we have held it error to have admitted that 
evidence.

 
 

[¶64.]  Perhaps when Billy said he suspected Dr. 
Schmunk of having killed his mother, that would support an inference of his 
"dark side." But it was error to admit that evidence.

 
 

[¶65.]  And, when Mrs. Schmunk's relatives 
testified that Kay was leaving him to return to Michigan, the jury might infer that she was 
leaving because of his dark, mysterious side; but that evidence we have held 
also inadmissible.

 
 

[¶66.]  The above evidence was admitted and was 
before the jury at the time of argument. The prosecutor could not know that it 
would later be held by us to have been erroneously admitted. Where improperly 
admitted hearsay evidence is commented upon in argument, it "cannot be said to 
be improper because it was based on the evidence [citation] but seriously 
aggravated the error committed in admitting the evidence." State v. Perelli, 125 Conn. 321, 5 A.2d 705, 
707, 121 A.L.R. 1357 (1939). Perhaps his argument was proper at the time, 
although we doubt that this evidence would support an inference that Dr. Schmunk 
had a "split" or "dual" personality and, therefore, killed what was 
imperfect.

 
 

[¶67.]  It is generally held that an expression 
of knowledge, opinion or belief, not based upon or shown by the evidence at 
trial, either expressly or inferentially is improper and prejudicial error. 75 
Am.Jur.2d Trial § 261; 50 A.L.R.2d 773. The policy and reasons for the 
rule

 
 

"are that the statement 
complained of injects into the case irrelevant and inadmissible matter or a fact 
not legally produced in evidence, and adds to the probative force of the 
testimony adduced upon the trial the weight of the prosecutor's personal 
influence or knowledge, or of his professional opinion, or the influence of his 
official position." (Footnotes omitted.) 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 261.

 
 

[¶68.]  There was no other evidence from which 
these inferences could be drawn or which would support the argument of the 
prosecutor. The prosecuting attorney is the representative of the state of 
Wyoming. Thus 
we have said:

 
 

"The role of the 
prosecuting attorney in a criminal case `differs from that of the usual 
advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.' ABA Code of Professional 
Responsibility, EC 7-13 (1980)." Browder 
v. State, supra, 639 P.2d  at 893.

 
 

And, in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633, 79 L. Ed. 1314 (1935), the court said a state is the 
representative of

 
 

"a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at 
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it 
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar 
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that 
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness 
and vigor - indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is 
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use 
every legitimate means to bring about a just one.

 
 

"It is fair to say that 
the average jury, in a greater or less degree, has confidence that these 
obligations, which so plainly rest upon the prosecuting attorney, will be 
faithfully observed. Consequently, improper suggestions, insinuations, and, 
especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight 
against the accused when they should properly carry none."

 
 

Appellant did not object 
to the prosecutor's argument. An objection, however, is not necessary where the 
transgression is plain error. In Browder 
v. State, supra, 639 P.2d  at 895, we said:

 
 

"In determining whether 
plain error has occurred, the facts of the case must be viewed in light of the 
trial record as a whole and not as to whether any one single incident standing 
alone would be reversible. United 
States v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062 (2nd Cir. 
1970). This cumulative-effect 
approach has been applied in numerous cases. In particular, it was used by 
the United States Supreme Court in Berger, supra.

 
 

"Reviewing the entire 
record in this case, it is clear that the fairness of appellant's trial was called 
into question by the prosecutor's conduct." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶69.]  We have previously discussed the doctrine 
of plain error. The cumulative effect of error in admission of evidence and 
testimony utilized in the prosecutor's argument and the argument itself makes 
clear that it was plain error.

 
 

[¶70.]  We believe that sending the edited 
videotape to the jury room with Dr. Schmunk's adamant refusal to submit to a lie 
detector test and the admission of the hearsay statements of Kay Schmunk were 
prejudicial error in themselves sufficient to require reversal. We are convinced 
that the cumulative effect of putting before the jury inadmissible evidence of 
an unknown charge against Dr. Schmunk from Michigan, his refusal to take a lie 
detector test, testimony of witnesses that they "suspected" Dr. Schmunk had 
killed Kay Schmunk, testimony of Kay Schmunk's uncommunicated thoughts of 
leaving Dr. Schmunk, and then capping it all with the argument here presented, 
was to deprive Dr. Schmunk of a fair trial. Thus, our deep and abiding 
conviction that loyalty to our constitution and its provisions guaranteeing to 
everyone a fair trial, requires reversal of this case. 

 
 

THE DISSENTS

 
 

[¶71.]  It is patently obvious that there is much 
serious disagreement between the majority and the dissenting justice. Upon one 
critical point, however, there is plain and clear agreement. Thus, it is stated 
in one of the dissents that with reference to

 
 

"the unfairness which 
results from a jury viewing a video tape in the jury room and, thus, giving 
undue emphasis to a portion of the testimony, I agree. I believe that this Court 
should, by rule, direct that any verbatim record of question-and-answer 
testimony, video tape or deposition, or otherwise, whether admitted as an 
exhibit or otherwise, shall not be subject to jury inspection other than as 
permitted to be read or shown during that part of the trial in which evidence is 
being received."

 
 

It is then stated that 
although "unfair," it was all right for the videotape, with appellant's refusal 
to submit to a polygraph test, to go to the jury room in this case for two 
reasons.

 
 

[¶72.]  First, it is said there was no objection 
by appellant. We disagree. In chambers, before the tape went to the jury room, 
the following occurred. Appellant's counsel stated:

 
 

"Judge, I * * * move for 
a dismissal in the matter by virtue of the prejudicial effect [of] the video 
tape. * * * [T]he Doctor indicated on that video that he would not take a 
polygraph, and the reason for him not taking a polygraph was as a result of a 
matter that had occurred with respect to his daughter, or charge by his daughter 
* * *."

 
 

The purpose of an 
objection is to give notice of the claimed error so that the judge has an 
opportunity to rule or correct the error. It cannot be claimed here that there 
was no such notice. Appellant made a motion in limine before trial, and, during 
trial, moved for dismissal and for mistrial. Surely these motions gave notice to 
the court and preserved for review appellant's objection to the videotape 
because it contained, as he stated, the doctor's statement "that he would not 
take a polygraph." But even if that were not so and there were no objection, we 
would hold it plain error to send the videotape to the jury room.

 
 

[¶73.]  Second, it is said there was no rule in 
effect concerning sending a transcript of part of the testimony to the jury 
room. Again, we disagree. The rule against sending testimony to the jury room is 
as ancient as the common law itself. The reason for the rule is obvious. Having 
some testimony to read again and consider and discuss in deliberations, the jury 
is likely to unduly emphasize that testimony over that which was heard days 
before and which may have begun to fade from memory. The impact of visual and 
oral testimony on videotape is even greater. As the dissenting justice states, 
it is "unfair" and should not be "permitted."

 
 

[¶74.]  In State v. Wilson, 188 Kan. 67, 360 P.2d 1092, 1098 (1961), quoting from State v. 
Solomon, 96 Utah 500, 509, 87 P.2d 807, 811 (1939), the court, after noting 
that permitting exhibits to go with the jury was committed to the court's 
discretion, stated:

 
 

"`But the testimony of a 
witness is in a different category. Such is the provision of the statutes and 
the common law always excluded depositions and written testimony from being 
carried from the bar by the jury. We can see no reason why the court should 
depart from the well established rule. It may often happen that the testimony on 
one side is oral from witnesses produced before the jury, while the testimony 
for the other side on essential matters is in the form of depositions or in the 
transcript from testimony at a previous hearing. If the hearing lasts for any 
length of time and the jury takes the depositions or transcript to be read and 
discussed while the oral evidence contra has in a measure faded from the memory 
of the jurors, it is obvious that the side sustained by written evidence is 
given an undue advantage. The law does not permit depositions or witnesses to go 
to the jury room. Why should a witness be permitted to go there in the form of 
written testimony? State v. Moody, 18 
Wn. 165, 51 P. 356; Welch v. Insurance 
Company, 23 W. Va. 288; Tabor v. Judd, 62 N.H. 
288.'"

 
 

[¶75.]  The Kansas court then, in State v. Wilson, supra, reversed a 
conviction for kidnapping and forcible rape stating

 
 

"that when the court 
permitted the jury to take to the jury room the transcript of Connie Porting's 
evidence and to keep such transcript throughout almost all of their 
deliberation, such action placed undue emphasis on her testimony; in fact, it 
was equivalent to sending the complaining witness into the jury room, where she 
continued to plead her cause." 360 P.2d  at 1099.

 
 

[¶76.]  We suggest that sending the videotape 
with appellant's adamant refusal to submit to a polygraph to the jury room for 
viewing was sufficient in itself to require reversal. We presume it was for the 
purpose of being viewed again, otherwise there was no reason for the court to 
send it to the jury room.

 
 

[¶77.]  We note finally the multitude of errors 
reviewed in one of the dissents. Even if some must be considered under the 
plain-error doctrine, it would seem to establish that their cumulative effect 
deprived appellant of a fair trial.

 
 

[¶78.]  Reversed.

1 Section 6-2-101, W.S. 
1977, provides:

 
 

"(a) Whoever purposely 
and with premeditated malice, * * * kills any human being is guilty of murder in 
the first degree.

 
 

2 Article 1, § 11, Wyoming 
Constitution, provides: "No person shall be compelled to testify against himself 
in any criminal case * * *." A lie detector test involves a response to 
questions asked by the examiner. A suspect may not wish to answer those 
questions because the answers may incriminate him or the polygraph may disclose 
the answers to be lies that might incriminate him. It might be said that a 
polygraph examination is not testimonial in nature and therefore the privilege 
against self-incrimination does not apply. It is a close question. We think the 
refusal to answer the questions of a lie detector examiner is not very different 
from a refusal to answer questions of a detective at the police station. A 
suspect has a constitutional right to remain silent, to refuse interrogation, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981). Evidence or comment upon exercise of 
the right to remain silent has long been held prejudicial error. Westmark v. State, Wyo., 693 P.2d 220 
(1984).

 
 

BROWN, Justice, 
concurring.

 
 

[¶79.]  I agree that this case must be 
reversed.

 
 

[¶80.]  In the last paragraph of the majority 
opinion, reference is made to cumulative error. It seems that the doctrine of 
cumulative error, in simple terms, is that several small errors add up to a big 
error; and while none of the small errors standing alone is sufficient for 
reversal, the sum of the small errors becomes substantial mandating reversal. I 
have a continuing problem with the nebulous doctrine of cumulative error and do 
not believe it has application here. The errors in this case, standing alone, 
are sufficient to justify reversal without resorting to cumulative 
error.

 
 

ROONEY, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
joins.

 
 

[¶81.]  The majority opinion addresses and finds 
error in four of the eight issues presented by appellant on appeal. It finds no 
one of these errors to be sufficient for reversal, but that

 
 

"* * * several errors 
occurring during the course of trial, when considered together, created 
sufficient prejudice to deprive appellant of a fair trial. * * *"

 
 

I believe this to be a 
dangerous precedent, particularly in recognition that an objection was not made 
to that upon which most of the issues in this case are based. The trial court 
was thus not given an opportunity to consider the alleged errors. We should not 
expect the trial court to assume the role of presenting the case for the parties 
by correcting errors not brought to its attention by the parties, and also not 
expect the trial court to keep score of possible errors in an effort to gauge 
when they have accumulated to the point of becoming unfairly 
prejudicial.

 
 

[¶82.]  We start with Rule 103, W.R.E., which 
provides in pertinent part:

 
 

"(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. - Error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected, and

 
 

"(1) Objection. - In case 
the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike 
appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific 
ground was not apparent from the context; * * *

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

"(d) Plain error. - Nothing in this rule 
precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although 
they were not brought to the attention of the court."

 
 

The rule does not address 
error as arising from an accumulation of nonerrors.

 
 

[¶83.]  Plain error is again addressed in Rule 
49(b), W.R.Cr.P.:

 
 

"Plain errors or defects 
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to 
the attention of the court."

 
 

We have said that the 
plain error rule is to be exercised cautiously and only in exceptional 
circumstances. Ketcham v. State, 
Wyo., 618 P.2d 1356 (1980); Leeper v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 379 (1979); Downs v. State, Wyo., 581 P.2d 610 
(1978). The defendant has the burden to show plain error. Campbell v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 358 
(1979). It must do so more than in an arguable way, and a mere allegation of 
prejudice is not sufficient to meet such burden. Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 
(1981).

 
 

[¶84.]  The Wyoming case cited by the majority opinion to 
validate cumulative errors as a basis for reversal concerns the cumulation of 
the same activity, and not a 
cumulation of separate activities. In that case, Browder v. State, Wyo., 639 P.2d 889 
(1982), the cumulation was repeated acts and conduct of the 
prosecutor.

 
 

[¶85.]  In any event, I cannot agree that 
reversible error exists with reference to the issues on appeal. Addressing these 
issues:

 
 

I. TESTIMONY CONCERNING 
MRS. SCHMUNK'S STATEMENTS AS HEARSAY

 
 

[¶86.]  On April 25, 1984, notice was given 
pursuant to Rule 804(b)(6), W.R.E.,1 that deceased's mother, sister and 
brother would testify to separate statements made to each of them by deceased in 
April and June 1983 concerning her intention to leave appellant. A similar 
notice was given on April 30, 1984, with reference to testimony to be given by 
deceased's mother to similar statements made to her by deceased in October 1982, 
February 1983, and June 1983.

 
 

[¶87.]  Appellant does not contend that the April 
25, 1984, notice was not timely; no objection was made to it. But, he contends 
that the April 30, 1984, notice was not timely. The purpose of the notice, as 
reflected in the rule, is to give "the adverse party * * * a fair opportunity to 
prepare to meet" the evidence. There is no contention that appellant did not 
here have sufficient time to meet the evidence referred to in the April 25, 
1984, notice, and in fact he did meet it at trial. The evidence noticed on April 
30, 1984, was similar to that noticed on April 25, 1984, and it too was met at 
trial. Adequate notice was thereby evidenced, and there was no error in 
admission of the evidence on this ground.

 
 

[¶88.]  But, the majority opinion finds the 
statements to be irrelevant, in any event, since they pertain to the deceased's 
state of mind, not that of appellant; and since there was no evidence to reflect 
that the deceased's intention to leave was communicated to appellant, the 
testimony was irrelevant. However, the majority opinion overlooks the relevancy 
of the statements in another context; i.e., to meet the defense theory that the 
marriage of the deceased and appellant was a happy one and that the death was an 
accident.2 The appellant, through his 
testimony regarding a happy marriage, sought to prove the death accidental and 
not intentional. Evidence to disprove such and to attack appellant's credibility 
- to impeach him - ought to be equally available to the prosecution. Of note is 
the fact that the testimony of William (Billy) Duncan (see ante) concerning the same matter 
(public appearance of a happy marriage but privately otherwise) was admitted 
without objection.

 
 

[¶89.]  The notice regarding this testimony was 
obviously sufficient, and the testimony was relevant for the purpose indicated. 
The admission of it was not error.

 
 

II. CHILD'S TESTIMONY 
THAT HE LEFT DOUGLAS "BECAUSE OF THE SUSPICIONS 
OF MY FATHER KILLING MY MOTHER"

 
 

[¶90.]  Again, the majority opinion forgot to hit 
the ball before starting to run around the bases. That opinion improperly 
considers the answer to the question, "Why did you leave Douglas, Wyoming?" to have been "Because I had 
suspicions that my father had killed my mother." However, the answer given by 
William (Billy) Duncan, the child of appellant and deceased, was "Because of the 
suspicions of my father killing my mother." The answer was plain. His father had 
been accused of the crime of killing his mother. The atmosphere in Douglas reflected such "suspicions." The venue of the 
action was changed because of them. It isn't surprising that the child was 
uncomfortable in Douglas with them. His 
activity in Douglas must have been affected 
because of the "suspicions." He left Douglas 
because of these suspicions in the community, and he so answered the question. 
He did not say "I left because I thought my father killed my mother." He said he 
left "Because of the suspicions of my 
father killing my mother." (Emphasis added.) This being so, the discussion of 
this issue in the majority opinion is not pertinent.

 
 

[¶91.]  Additionally, the trial objection to the 
question was not to its relevancy. The late objection made to this issue was 
that the question was "leading and suggestive." Error cannot be predicated on 
the trial court's ruling if the specific objection is not brought to its 
attention. Lee v. State, Wyo., 556 P.2d 217 (1976); Martinez 
v. State, Wyo., 511 P.2d 105 (1973). Any error alleged 
to be founded on relevancy would have to be plain error to be reversible. 
Reversible error does not exist with reference to this issue.

 
 

III. PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING 
ARGUMENT

 
 

[¶92.]  The majority opinion is critical of the 
prosecution's reference to the potential of appellant having two characters or 
appearances - a double attitude, one, that given to the public relative to his 
happy marriage; and two, the dark side being that given privately at home as 
testified by witness Duncan and by the testimony referred to supra in the 
section entitled "Testimony Concerning Mrs. Schmunk's Statements as Hearsay." 
There was no objection to the closing argument.

 
 

[¶93.]  The majority opinion recognizes the 
propriety of the prosecution presenting its theory of the case to the jury, 
reviewing the evidence with the jury, and suggesting inferences based thereon. 
It also recognizes reversal can be predicated only if there is plain error when 
no objection was made to the closing argument. But it does not find the elements 
of plain error in the closing argument except as cumulated with other alleged 
errors, again citing and quoting from Browder v. State in support thereof. As 
already noted supra, the situation in Browder was entirely different and 
distinguishable from that in this case.

 
 

[¶94.]  The elements for plain error do not exist 
for this issue.3 The record is clear as to the 
incident, but the appellant has not proven a violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law. The prosecutor was presenting his theory of the case 
and the facts in support thereof. In any event, there was no denial of a 
substantial right and no material prejudice. Such is the reason the majority 
opinion attempts to cumulate other alleged errors to arrive at reversible 
error.

 
 

IV. ADMISSION AND USE OF 
VIDEO TAPE

 
 

[¶95.]  There are three potential problems with 
the video tape: (1) reference to the Michigan incident; (2) reference to a previous 
polygraph test; and (3) reference to refusal to take a current polygraph 
test.

 
 

Michigan Incident

 
 

[¶96.]  The motion in limine was to preclude 
reference in the video tape to prior bad acts of appellant in Michigan in the 
presentation of the prosecution's case in chief. The motion was granted, but the 
video tape was not edited to delete the reference before it was shown to the 
jury. It was shown without objection. In fact, appellant stipulated to its 
admission into evidence. When the objecting motion was made the next day, the 
tape was edited before it went to the jury, and a limiting instruction was given 
to the jury:

 
 

"You are instructed that 
a certain portion of State's Exhibit 21, the same being a video tape recording, 
admitted into evidence has been deleted. You are therefore instructed that the 
deleted portion must not be considered by you as evidence."

 
 

In view of the passing 
reference to the Michigan charges, viz. "I had a polygraph taken in reference to 
my daughter's charges against me, which were totally erroneous," and inasmuch as 
juries are presumed to follow the instructions given to them, Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, 
Inc., Wyo., 664 P.2d 27 (1983); State 
Highway Commission v. Peters, Wyo., 416 P.2d 390 (1966), there was no error 
- particularly plain error - in the court's ruling on admission based on this 
aspect of the video tape.

 
 

[¶97.]  The cases cited in the majority opinion 
to support a holding that a limiting instruction is insufficient in such 
situation concern factual situations far more aggravated than here.

 
 

[¶98.]  In United States v. Brevard, 739 F.2d 180 
(4th Cir. 1984), one of those cited in the majority opinion, repeated warnings 
were given to the witness to not refer to polygraph tests. At least three 
references were made to it after objections and warnings by the trial court. In 
exasperation, the trial court instructed the jury that the polygraph references 
had nothing to do with the case, and they were to draw no inferences from them. 
In reversing the conviction, the Fourth Circuit recited the general rule to 
be:

 
 

"* * * Where an 
impermissible reference to a polygraph has been interjected, the court usually 
may cure the error by striking the evidence and instructing the jury to 
disregard it. * * *" 739 F.2d  at 182.

 
 

However, the repetition 
and aggravated nature of the references in the case were held to be sufficient 
to overcome the presumption. Objections were properly and promptly made, and the 
references were repeated and aggravated in United States v. Brevard, contrary to 
that in this case.

 
 

[¶99.]  In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968), another of the cases cited in the majority opinion, the problem was 
the admissibility of a co-defendant's statement which implicated the defendant. 
The co-defendant was not available for cross-examination; it was a joint trial 
and there was a substantial threat to defendant's constitutional rights. The 
Supreme Court recognized the general rule thus:

 
 

"* * * Not every 
admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be 
reversible error unavoidable through limiting instructions; instances occur in 
almost every trial where inadmissible evidence creeps in, usually inadvertently. 
* * *" 88 S. Ct.  at 1627.

 
 

The court found the facts 
of the case to provide an exception wherein the risk is great that the jury 
cannot or will not follow the limiting instructions, and the consequences are 
vital to the defendant. The facts in this case do not start to match those in 
Bruton so as to warrant an exception to the general rule.

 
 

[¶100.]            
In the other case cited in the majority opinion, Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U.S. 552, 21 S. Ct. 474, 45 L. Ed. 663 
(1901), the essential holding was that the instruction was not clear on what 
part of the evidence was not to be considered by the jury, and that the 
uncertainty did not result in a clear direction to not consider the evidence; 
i.e., the result was that there was no withdrawal of evidence from jury 
consideration, not that the withdrawal itself was insufficient to cure the 
error. The court did note the general rule that withdrawal of evidence cures any 
error in its admission, but that there may be instances where such a strong 
impression is made by the evidence that withdrawal will not erase it. In 
Throckmorton, there were several witnesses involved in the questioned evidence 
and long argument concerning its admissibility. Such aggravations do not exist 
in this case.

 
 

[¶101.]            
The limiting instruction in this case was well within the general rule 
with reference to the Michigan incident.

 
 

Previous Polygraph 
Test

 
 

[¶102.]            
That said in the previous subsection of this dissent with reference to a 
limiting or curing instruction relative to the Michigan incident is equally applicable to 
that relative to the previous polygraph test. The portion of the tape was 
deleted and the jury was instructed to disregard the deleted part.

 
 

[¶103.]            
The majority opinion discusses making the results of the test known to the jury, 
and it cites cases relative thereto. Certainly there is no suggestion that the 
results of the Michigan polygraph case were made known to the 
jury, and discussion concerning such is misplaced. If such discussion is founded 
upon the statement of appellant that "I had a polygraph taken in reference to my 
daughter's charges against me, which was 
totally erroneous" (emphasis added), not only are the words "which was 
totally erroneous" improperly taken to modify and apply to the results of the 
polygraph test instead of modifying and applying to the more recent words in the 
sentence, "charges against me," but such interpretation would make the comment 
to be gratuitous, and any error of the type here alleged would be invited 
error.

 
 

"The doctrine of `invited 
error' embodies the principle that a party will not be heard to complain on 
appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the opposite 
party to commit. * * *" 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 713 (1962).

 
 

The doctrine has long 
been recognized in Wyoming:

 
 

"It is a general rule 
that an error to be available on appeal must have occurred without the express 
or implied consent of the appellant. * * *" Schloredt v. Boyden, 9 Wyo. 392, 403-404, 64 P. 225 (1901).

 
 

Refusal to Take a Current 
Polygraph Test

 
 

[¶104.]            
The motion in limine was not based upon the refusal to take a current 
polygraph test. Nor was an objection made at trial. After the tape was played to 
the jury and when appellant finally objected, and although the refusal to take a 
current test was mentioned, the thrust of the objection was to the inclusion 
therein of the Michigan incident and, perhaps, with the 
polygraph taken in connection therewith. The objection was:

 
 

"* * * I think that the 
implication is very clear by virtue of the video tape and the particular portion 
which had to do with a polygraph where, number one, the Doctor indicated on that 
video that he would not take a polygraph, and the reason for him not taking a 
polygraph was as a result of a matter that had occurred with respect to his 
daughter, or charge by his daughter, which gave a clear indication that he had 
previously been charged with some criminal activity; that he had been offered a 
polygraph and had presumably taken a polygraph."

 
 

"* * * Error may not be 
assigned unless objection has been made thereto with a distinct statement of the 
matter to which objection is made and the grounds for this objection, and 
indicating with definiteness and particularity the error asserted * * *." Texas Gulf Sulphur Company v. Robles, 
Wyo., 511 P.2d 963, 968 (1973).

 
 

Accordingly, there can be 
no question but that reversal on this ground can be only for plain error. The 
elements for plain error are set forth in note 3, supra.

 
 

[¶105.]            
It must be emphasized in this connection that not only was no objection 
made with reference to admission of the refusal to take the current test, but 
its admission was actually stipulated to by appellant. The motion in limine had 
to do only with the Michigan incident and 
perhaps the Michigan polygraph.

 
 

[¶106.]            
Accordingly, the application of the plain error rule requires even more 
caution in this instance wherein the evidence was admitted on stipulation. 
Again, the potential for invited error is exceedingly great.

 
 

[¶107.]            
Although I believe the foregoing is dispositive of this issue, I comment 
on two considerations relative thereto. First, the question relative to the 
existence of error in admission of testimony concerning the willingness of a 
defendant to take a polygraph test is not only presented in cases in which he 
refused to do so, but often the defendant seeks to evidence the fact that he was 
willing to do so. Second, cases can be cited to reflect instances in which it 
was held to be reversible error to admit the testimony, and cases can be cited 
to the contrary. Cases can be cited wherein any such error was cured by an 
instruction, and cases can be cited wherein it was not. See Annotation: 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of comment or evidence as to accused's 
willingness to take lie detector test. 95 A.L.R.2d 819 (1964).

 
 

[¶108.]            
The majority opinion cites and quotes from three cases to support the 
contention that any  admission or reference to refusal to take 
a polygraph test is prejudicial and, thus, reversible error. The precedent is 
not that clear-cut, as reflected in the A.L.R.2d annotation, supra.

 
 

[¶109.]            
In State v. Emory, 190 Kan. 
406, 375 P.2d 585 (1962), one of the cases referred to in the majority opinion, 
the court found that admission of a refusal to take the test was reversible 
error, distinguishing the facts of the case from those in State v. Smith, 187 Kan. 42, 353 P.2d 510 (1960), in which the jury was admonished, and reversible error was not 
found. In a later case, State v. Roach, 
223 Kan. 732, 576 P.2d 1082 (1978), the Kansas court held that not only the 
admission of evidence that defendant submitted to a polygraph test was not 
reversible error, but the results thereof admitted into evidence were not 
reversible error in view of a 
stipulation of the parties to admit the same.

 
 

[¶110.]            
In State v. Driver, 38 N.J. 
255, 183 A.2d 655 (1962), cited in the majority opinion to hold that "reference 
by the prosecutor to a refusal of the accused to take a lie detector test 
required reversal," there was much more than a mere "reference by the 
prosecutor." In his opening statement, the prosecutor made a number of 
references to the refusal to take the test. Portions of defendant's mother's 
taped statement were played to the defendant, and after each segment, defendant 
was asked to take a polygraph test. The prosecution emphasized the refusal to do 
so saying "`every time he refused.'" At least four witnesses testified to 
interrogation of defendant, and when it came time for them to testify that he 
was asked to take a polygraph test and refused, they testified that "`I am not 
supposed to mention that'" or a similar response. During the trial the 
prosecutor made "numerous" references to the question and answer which could not 
be mentioned. The court concluded that "[t]he entire handling of the lie 
detector test aspect of the case clearly reveals prejudicial overzealousness on 
the part of the prosecution, and leaves an appellate court with no recourse but 
vacation of the conviction." The case does not stand for the proposition that 
"reference by the prosecutor" requires reversal.

 
 

[¶111.]            
In Mills v. People, 139 
Colo. 397, 339 P.2d 998 (1959), the refusal to take the test was offered over objection as evidence "`of guilt 
similar to evidence of flight.'" Obviously, such was not the purpose of the 
comment made by appellant on the video tape which was accepted into evidence 
pursuant to a stipulation and without objection.

 
 

[¶112.]            
In summary, then, I believe that whether or not a reference to the 
refusal or to the willingness to take a polygraph test is reversible error will 
depend on the circumstances of each case, with factors such as the emphasis 
given to it, the manner in which the reference occurred - intentionally or 
inadvertently - nonresponsive to a question, invited error, through stipulation, 
etc., whether or not the other evidence of guilt is exceedingly strong or 
exceedingly weak, and similar considerations. The same approach should be used 
in each case to determine if a limiting instruction, if one was given, was 
sufficient to cure the error, if error there was.

 
 

[¶113.]            
In this case, the stipulation for admission, the manner in which the 
reference occurred, and the strength of other evidence should not make 
reversible error.

 
 

[¶114.]            
Finally, with reference to the comment in the majority opinion concerning 
the unfairness which results from a jury viewing a video tape in the jury room 
and, thus, giving undue emphasis to a portion of the testimony, I agree. I 
believe that this Court should, by rule, direct that any verbatim record of 
question-and-answer testimony, video tape or deposition, or otherwise, whether 
admitted as an exhibit or otherwise, shall not be subject to jury inspection 
other than as permitted to be read or shown during that part of the trial in 
which evidence is being received.

 
 

[¶115.]            
However, such a rule was not in effect in this case. There is not even an 
allegation that the jury viewed the video tape in the jury room, let alone 
evidence that such was done. There was no objection to the video tape being 
available for jury inspection. In fact, it was stipulated that it be an exhibit. 
And the appellant does not make viewing in the jury room an issue on 
appeal.

 
 

[¶116.]            
I do not believe there is reversible error in the admission and use of 
the video tape in this case.

 
 

V. THE FOUR ISSUES ON 
APPEAL NOT REACHED IN THE MAJORITY OPINION

 
 

[¶117.]            
I agree that the other four errors alleged by appellant will not warrant 
reversal.

 
 

Dr. Graber's 
Testimony

 
 

[¶118.]            
Appellant contends that it was error to allow the emergency room 
physician who attended Mrs. Schmunk's death to testify that he would not 
prescribe narcotic drugs for his own family "[b]ecause I don't trust myself 
making therapeutic decisions about family members, and also it's too hard to get 
into an abusive matter."

 
 

[¶119.]            
Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, 
and its ruling thereon will not be reversed absent a showing of a clear abuse of 
discretion. Hopkinson v. State, 
Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982); Apodaca v. State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 1023 (1981); Sanville v. State, Wyo., 593 P.2d 1340 
(1979).

 
 

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. * * *" Martinez v. 
State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980).

 
 

[¶120.]            
Simply stated, appellant has not made any showing of a clear abuse of 
discretion in this instance. His allegation in this respect is not supported by 
any authority. 

 
 

Refreshing Recollection 
of Appellant From Deceased's Medical Records

 
 

[¶121.]            
Appellant contends the court erred by refusing to allow appellant to 
refresh his recollection of deceased's medical history by reference to her 
medical records. The refusal was because the records had not been produced by 
appellant prior to trial in response to a discovery order which specifically 
included the records as items to be produced by appellant.

 
 

[¶122.]            
That said supra relative to the discretion of the court in ruling on an 
admission of evidence is applicable to the ruling of the court on this issue. 
The sanction here imposed is within the court's discretion. Simms v. State, Wyo., 492 P.2d 516, cert. 
denied 409 U.S. 886, 93 S. Ct. 104, 34 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1972); Rule 18(h), 
W.R.Cr.P.

 
 

[¶123.]            
In any event, the entire medical history of the deceased was before the 
jury. Appellant testified as to deceased's complete medical history. Not only 
does appellant fail to show a clear abuse of discretion in the court's ruling, 
but he also does not demonstrate any prejudice from the ruling.

 
 

Admission of Prosecution 
Evidence (1) Concerning Result Of Toxicologist Test As Found by Appellant's 
Expert, (2) From Witnesses Concerning Perceived "Personality Changes" Observed 
In Deceased, and (3) From Investigator Concerning His Reasons For the 
Investigative Procedures Used by Him

 
 

[¶124.]            
On cross-examination, appellant was asked if he had employed a 
toxicologist to review the findings of the prosecution's toxicologist. Appellant 
said that he did, and, on further examination, he acknowledged that his expert 
agreed with the findings and toxicology of the prosecution's 
toxicologist.

 
 

[¶125.]            
The testimony of some of the witnesses contained perceptions of 
"personality changes" observed by them in deceased. The pathologist testified as 
to the "theories" under which the autopsy was undertaken.

 
 

[¶126.]            
The investigator testified as to his reasons for interviewing various 
individuals and for taking certain actions, and as to that which he believed his 
investigation reflected when deceased died.

 
 

[¶127.]            
There was no objection to any of this testimony, and the issues relative 
thereto were first raised on appeal. As noted supra, even if error existed in 
the admission of such evidence, it can be considered on appeal only if it 
amounts to plain error. Since the admission of such testimony does not amount to 
plain error, the existence or nonexistence of error in its admission need not be 
considered.

 
 

[¶128.]            
The elements of plain error are set forth in note 3, supra. Certainly, 
appellant has not established the violation of a substantial right resulting in 
material prejudice. As noted in the cases cited supra, the plain error doctrine 
is to be exercised cautiously and only in exceptional circumstances. Appellant 
has the burden of showing plain error. The exceptional circumstances do not here 
exist, and appellant has fallen far short of establishing plain 
error.

 
 

[¶129.]            
The results of the toxicology tests were before the jury through the 
testimony of the State's toxicologist. The tests were conclusive. The fact that 
appellant's own toxicologist agreed with them is of no real importance, let 
alone being of material prejudice. If anything, the testimony simply went to the 
credibility of appellant's own testimony concerning the tests.

 
 

[¶130.]            
Likewise, the comments of witnesses concerning observed "personality 
changes" on the part of deceased were of little weight in context of that placed 
before the jury in this many-day trial. The pathologist's testimony concerning 
his "theories" was in truth a factual recitation of the manner and purpose of 
the autopsy. Again, appellant falls far short of his burden to establish plain 
error.

 
 

[¶131.]            
The investigator "walked through" the procedure taken by him in 
investigation of the matter. In doing so, appellant could possibly have objected 
to the words used. If such had been done, the meat of the testimony would 
undoubtedly have been placed before the jury in a more precise and proper 
manner. The failure to object may have been with intent that the testimony not 
be emphasized or "cleaned up." In any event, considering the extensive testimony 
presented to the jury, I see no material prejudice from this piece of testimony. 
Applying the plain error rule cautiously, the decision that there was no plain 
error in this testimony is more than proper.

 
 

Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel

 
 

[¶132.]            
Appellant bases his allegation that he had ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the assumption that counsel did not properly object to certain 
evidence. Since I do not find any error with reference to the other issues on 
appeal, this allegation has no substance.

 
 

[¶133.]            
Counsel is presumed competent, and the standard upon which to gauge 
competency is "that which would reasonably be rendered by a reasonably competent 
attorney under the facts and circumstances of the case." Hoskovek v. State, Wyo., 629 P.2d 1366, 1367 
(1981). The decision whether or not to object in any particular instance is a 
matter of trial strategy resting with the lawyer. Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 43, cert. 
denied 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1983). Applying the 
following test set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh. denied. ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 3562, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984), there is no showing of ineffective assistance of counsel in this 
case.

 
 

"The availability of 
intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed guidelines 
for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness 
challenges. Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would 
increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel's 
unsuccessful defense. Counsel's performance and even willingness to serve could 
be adversely affected. Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for 
acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of 
defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the 
trust between attorney and client.

 
 

"Thus, a court deciding 
an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's 
challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of 
counsel's conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective 
assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not 
to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then 
determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or 
omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. In 
making that determination, the court should keep in mind that counsel's 
function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the 
adversarial testing process work in the particular case. At the same time, the 
court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered 
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment."

 
 

Also see Murry v. State, Wyo., 713 P.2d 202 
(1986).

 
 

I would 
affirm.

1 Rule 804(b)(6), W.R.E., 
provides as an exception to the hearsay rule:

 
 

"A statement not 
specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) 
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is 
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general 
pruposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be 
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the 
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to 
offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of 
the declarant."

 
 

See Cutbirth v. State, Wyo., 663 P.2d 888 
(1983).

2 First-degree murder 
would not be established in the absence of intent or malice. The jury was also 
instructed on the elements of voluntary manslaughter.

3 The elements for plain 
error as quoted in the majority opinion from Bradley v. State, Wyo., 635 P.2d 1161, 1164 
(1981), are:

 
 

"* * * First, the record 
must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party 
claiming that the error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that party must prove that a 
substantial right has been denied him and as a result he has been materially 
prejudiced. * * *"

 
 

See Daellenbach v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 679 
(1977).

 
 

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶134.]            
I join with Justice Rooney in his dissenting opinion. In the response to 
that dissenting opinion the majority opinion states that it presumes that the 
accused videotape was sent to the jury so that it might be viewed again in the 
course of the jury's deliberations. The record does not encompass any objection 
by the appellant to the videotape being furnished to the jury with the other 
exhibits nor does the record contain any indication that the jury did view it 
during the course of its deliberations. The appellant has the responsibility of 
furnishing a record upon which any issue can be decided. Salt River Enterprises, Inc. v. Heiner, Wyo., 663 P.2d 518 (1983); Scherling v. Kilgore, Wyo., 
599 P.2d 1352 (1979). In the face of a silent record I cannot agree that this 
court is justified in speculating about what occurred in the course of the 
jury's deliberations.