Case Title: State v. Howard

Citation: 2012-Ohio-5738

Docket Number: 2011-2126

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Howard, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5738.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5738 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HOWARD, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Howard, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5738.] 
(No. 2011-2126—Submitted August 22, 2012—Decided December 6, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 24680, 195 Ohio 
App.3d 802, 2011-Ohio-5693. 
_________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} The issue we address in this case is whether current R.C. 2950.99 or 
former R.C. 2950.99 governs the penalty for sex offenders originally classified 
under Megan’s Law who violate former 2950.05 by failing to give proper notice 
of an address change.  We hold that former R.C. 2950.99 governs the penalty in 
such cases, specifically, the version of R.C. 2950.99 in place immediately prior to 
the repeal of Megan’s Law by the Adam Walsh Act. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} The factual background in this case is as much about the changing 
landscape of sex-offender-registration law in Ohio as it is about defendant-
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appellant Donny Howard.  There is no dispute regarding the operative facts.  In 
September 2000, Howard was convicted of rape, a first-degree felony, and 
sentenced to four years in prison.  At that time, Howard was designated a habitual 
sex offender pursuant to Ohio’s Megan’s Law, which had been adopted in 1996 
and became effective on January 1, 1997. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, 
Part II, 2560, 2601.  Pursuant to that designation, Howard was required to verify 
his address on an annual basis and to notify the sheriff of any change of address. 
Former R.C. 2950.06(B)(2) and 2950.07(B)(2).  For offenders whose underlying 
offense was a felony, failure to comply with the reporting requirements of 
Megan’s Law was a fifth-degree felony.  Former R.C. 2950.99, 146 Ohio Laws, 
Part II, 2634. 
{¶ 3} Effective July 31, 2003, the General Assembly passed amendments 
to Megan’s Law in Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5 (“S.B. 5”), 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6558, 
6687-6702.  One change in the law was an increase in the punishment for failure 
to comply with former R.C. 2950.05; for offenders whose underlying sex offense 
was a first-, second-, or third-degree felony, the violation of R.C. 2950.05 was a 
third-degree felony. 
{¶ 4} In 2007, the General Assembly passed Am.Sub.S.B. No.10, Ohio’s 
version of the federal Adam Walsh Act (“AWA”), which repealed Megan’s Law 
effective January 1, 2008.  Pursuant to the AWA, Howard was reclassified by the 
Ohio Attorney General as a Tier III sex offender, subjecting Howard to Tier III 
notification provisions for life.  Am.Sub.S.B. No.  97 also became effective on 
January 1, 2008; it amended R.C. 2950.99 to make a violation of the reporting 
requirements of the AWA a felony of the same degree as the most serious sex-
offense felony that was the basis for the classification.  Thus, if applied to 
Howard, an R.C. 2950.05 reporting violation would be a first-degree felony. 
{¶ 5} On June 3, 2010, Howard was indicted for a first-degree felony for 
failing to notify the sheriff of a change of address 20 days prior to the change.  
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Howard pled no contest to the charge; on October 28, 2010, the trial court 
sentenced Howard to the mandatory minimum prison term of three years. 
{¶ 6} Also on June 3, 2010—the day of Howard’s indictment—this court 
declared unconstitutional the reclassification provisions of the AWA in State v. 
Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753.  Pursuant to 
Bodyke, the classifications and community-notification and registration orders 
imposed by judges before the AWA were reinstated. Bodyke at ¶ 66.  Thus, for 
Howard, his original classification as a habitual sex offender and the registration 
and notification requirements for that classification were reinstated. 
{¶ 7} On June 13, 2011, Howard filed a delayed appeal with the Second 
District Court of Appeals, claiming that the trial court had erred in convicting him 
of a first-degree felony; Howard based his appeal on State v. Milby, 2d Dist. No. 
23798, 2010-Ohio-6344, 2010 WL 5480656.  In Milby, the defendant had been 
convicted of a rape in 1983 and was classified as a sex offender.  In 2003, while 
incarcerated, he was reclassified as a sexual predator.  He was apparently 
reclassified under the AWA as a Tier III sex offender.  He violated his reporting 
requirements in 2009. 
{¶ 8} In a decision subsequent to Bodyke, the Milby court struck down the 
Tier III reclassification and reinstated the previous sexual-predator classification 
and the attendant reporting order.  The court further held that the increased 
penalty imposed by the AWA could not be applied to the defendant.  The cause 
was remanded for resentencing as a third-degree instead of a first-degree felony. 
{¶ 9} In the instant case, the court below applied Milby: 
 
As in Milby, when Howard's original classification and 
registration requirements are applied, his conviction for failure to 
notify is not offended.  There is no dispute that under former law, 
Howard was required to provide written notice of a change of 
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address at least 20 days prior to changing his address of residence.  
See former R.C. 2950.05(A).  However, the amendment of R.C. 
2950.99 changed the penalty for failure to notify from a felony of 
the fifth degree to a felony of the first degree, based upon the 
penalty for the underlying offense of rape, and Howard was subject 
to a mandatory term of incarceration.  As in Milby, the fact that 
Howard had committed his offense of failure to notify after the 
effective date of S.B. 97 does not affect the outcome herein as the 
state asserts.  Pursuant to Milby, we find that the trial court erred 
when it convicted Howard of a first-degree felony and sentenced 
him accordingly, instead of finding him guilty of a fifth-degree 
felony. 
 
State v. Howard, 195 Ohio App.3d 802, 2011-Ohio-5693, 961 N.E.2d 1196, ¶ 12.  
The court reversed Howard’s sentence and remanded the matter to the trial court 
for resentencing. 
{¶ 10} The appellate court applied the penalty that existed on the date of 
the defendant’s original classification under Megan’s Law in September 2000.  
The dissenter in Howard argued that the applicable penalty was the Megan’s Law 
penalty provision in place immediately before the AWA repealed Megan’s Law, 
i.e., the third-degree-felony provision first instituted in 2003 via S.B. 5: 
 
Based on Milby, as followed in [State v.] Johnson [2d Dist. 
No. 24029, 2011-Ohio-2069] and [State v.] Alexander, [2d Dist. 
No. 24119, 2011-Ohio-4015], this court has held that when a 
failure-to-notify case is reversed after an improper AWA 
reclassification, the penalty for violation of failure to notify [sic] 
reverts to that penalty that was in effect before the “offending” 
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5 
AWA legislation, which was effective January 1, 2008.  Prior to 
enactment of AWA, the penalty for failure to notify for underlying 
[first-degree felonies through third-degree felonies] was a felony of 
the third degree.  Consequently, I would remand this case for 
resentencing of the defendant for a conviction of [a third-degree 
felony]. 
 
Howard at ¶ 21 (Hall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
{¶ 11} The state appealed, raising the following proposition of law: 
 
The felony sentencing statute R.C. 2950.99 is not applied 
retroactively when the conduct for which a defendant is convicted 
and sentenced occurred after the effective date of the statute or 
January 1, 2008. 
 
{¶ 12} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. State v. Howard, 131 Ohio St.3d 1472, 2012-Ohio-896, 962 
N.E.2d 803. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 13} This is an appeal brought by the state.  The only issue we address is 
which penalty provision—that of Megan’s Law or the AWA—applies to sex 
offenders originally classified under Megan’s Law who commit violations of 
notice-of-address-change requirements after the effective date of the AWA.  The 
defendant has not raised the issue whether he was properly indicted in this case, 
that is, whether he can be convicted of a failure to provide notice of a change of 
address under Megan’s Law when he was indicted for a notice violation under the 
AWA.  We address that issue in another case announced today, State v. Brunning, 
___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2012-Ohio-5752, ___N.E.2d ___. 
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The Effect of Bodyke, Gingell, and Williams 
{¶ 14} In Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, 
this court held that the reclassification provisions in the AWA, R.C. 2950.031 and 
2950.032, were unconstitutional and severed them from the AWA.  The court 
spelled out what that meant for offenders who were originally classified under 
Megan’s Law and were then reclassified under the AWA:  
 
R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 may not be applied to offenders 
previously adjudicated by judges under Megan's Law, and the 
classifications and community-notification and registration orders 
imposed previously by judges are reinstated. 
 
Bodyke at ¶ 66. 
{¶ 15} In State v. Gingell, 128 Ohio St.3d 444, 2011-Ohio-1481, 946 
N.E.2d 192, the defendant—who was originally classified as a sexually oriented 
offender under Megan’s Law—was charged with an R.C. 2950.06 registration 
violation under the AWA.  This court held that pursuant to Bodyke, “Gingell's 
original classification under Megan's Law and the associated community-
notification and registration order were reinstated.” Id. at ¶ 8.  The court held that 
the current version of R.C. 2950.06 did not apply to Gingell. Id.  Instead, “Gingell 
remained accountable for the yearly reporting requirement under Megan's Law 
* * *.” Id. 
{¶ 16} In State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 
N.E.2d 1108, this court addressed the case of a defendant who had committed a 
sex offense before, but was sentenced after, the AWA became effective.  The trial 
court designated Williams a Tier II sex offender, and he was automatically 
subjected to the concomitant registration and notification provisions of the AWA.  
This court declared that the AWA was punitive and was unconstitutional as 
January Term, 2012 
7 
applied to Williams:  “2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, as applied to defendants who 
committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, violates Section 28, Article II of 
the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly from passing 
retroactive laws.” Id. at syllabus.  This court remanded the case “for resentencing 
under the law in effect at the time Williams committed the offense.” Id. at ¶ 23.  
Thus, this court ordered that the provisions of Megan’s Law would apply to 
defendants who committed their offenses before the enactment date of the AWA.  
In another case decided today, In re Bruce S., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2012-Ohio-
5696, ___ N.E.2d ___, this court clarified that only persons who commit their 
underlying crime on or after the effective date of the AWA—January 1, 2008—
are subject to the requirements of the AWA. 
{¶ 17} Therefore, Ohio has, in effect, separate statutory schemes 
governing sex offenders depending on when they committed their underlying 
offense.  Those who committed their offense before the effective date of the 
AWA are subject to the provisions of Megan’s Law; those who committed their 
offense after the effective date of the AWA are subject to the AWA. 
Applicability of R.C. 2950.99 to Violations of Former R.C. 2950.05 
{¶ 18} The current version of R.C. 2950.99 was not a part of S.B. 10; it 
was contained in a separate bill passed at the same time, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 97.  
We did not opine on the constitutionality of S.B. 97 in Bodyke, Gingell, or 
Williams.  Current R.C. 2950.99 remains in full vigor for those to whom it 
applies—offenders who violate the requirements of R.C. Chapter 2950 as they 
currently exist, i.e.,  as set forth in the AWA.  It reads, “[W]hoever violates a 
prohibition in section 2950.04, 2950.041, 2950.05, or 2950.06 of the Revised 
Code shall be punished as follows * * *.” 
{¶ 19} However, in this case we deal with a defendant who violated 
former R.C. 2950.05, not the current R.C. 2950.05 for which R.C. 2950.99 
provides penalties.  Pursuant to Bodyke, Howard’s original classification under 
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Megan's Law and the associated community-notification and registration order 
were reinstated. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, 
at ¶ 66.  Howard must abide by the requirements of former R.C. 2950.05, not R.C. 
2950.05.  R.C. 2950.99 describes punishments for people who violate the 
requirements of the AWA—it does not reach back to cover offenders who must 
abide by Megan’s Law.  Former R.C. 2950.99 addresses punishments for 
offenders who violate the provisions of Megan’s Law, including former R.C. 
2950.05.  Current R.C. 2950.99 applies to a different statutory landscape; by its 
own terms it applies to offenders who violate current R.C. 2950.05.  Howard’s 
sex-offender-registration obligations are controlled by Megan’s Law.  The penalty 
provisions under Megan’s law thus also apply. 
Effect of Changes to R.C. 2950.99 While Megan’s Law Was in Effect 
{¶ 20} As noted above, R.C. 2950.99 as it existed under Megan’s Law was 
in effect from January 1, 1997, through January 1, 2008.  It was amended in 2003 
to increase the punishment for violating reporting requirements.  The appellate 
panel below was split on the question of which Megan’s Law’s penalty provision 
should apply to a person who violates former R.C. 2950.05.  The majority applied 
the version in place in 2000 when the defendant was originally classified under 
Megan’s Law. 195 Ohio App.3d 802, 2011-Ohio-5693, 961 N.E.2d 1196, ¶ 12.  
The dissenting judge would have applied the version in place immediately before 
Megan’s Law was supplanted by the AWA. Id. at ¶ 21 (Hall, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  In Howard’s case, the difference is between a fifth-degree 
felony—the law at the time of his classification—and a third-degree felony—the 
law at the time that Megan’s Law was repealed and replaced by the AWA. 
{¶ 21} We hold that the appropriate version of former R.C. 2950.99 to 
apply to Howard is the one in place at the time that Megan’s Law was repealed.  
That reflects the state of the law before Megan’s Law was repealed, and that is the 
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statutory scheme governing sex offenders originally classified pursuant to 
Megan’s Law. 
{¶ 22} Howard argues that the imposition of any penalty other than the 
one in effect when Howard’s duties under R.C. 2950.05 arose would violate the 
Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 28, and the Ex 
Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.  We disagree.  The 
imposition of S.B. 5 penalties does not create an increased penalty for Howard’s 
original sex offense, but rather imposes a penalty related entirely to his later, 
separate violation of former R.C. 2950.05, a new crime.  That is, the penalty is not 
an increased penalty for his original sex offense, but rather a penalty for a new 
offense. 
{¶ 23} In State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998), this 
court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of Megan’s Law against 
challenges under the Retroactivity Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause.  In 
determining whether Megan’s Law violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, this court 
employed guideposts developed by the court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 
372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963).  The guideposts are designed 
to aid courts in determining whether a statute is so punitive as to violate the 
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.  One guidepost asks “ 
‘whether the behavior to which [the statute] applies is already a crime.’ ” Cook at 
418,  quoting Mendoza-Martinez at 168.  In addressing that factor, the Cook court 
wrote, 
 
Even prior to the promulgation of the current version of 
R.C. Chapter 2950, failure to register was a punishable offense. 
See former R.C. 2950.99, 130 Ohio  Laws 671.  Thus, any such 
punishment flows from a failure to register, a new violation of the 
statute, not from a past sex offense.  In other words, the 
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punishment is not applied retroactively for an act that was 
committed previously, but for a violation of law committed 
subsequent to the enactment of the law. 
 
Cook at 420-421. 
{¶ 24} For offenders classified under Megan’s Law, the sentence changes 
imposed by S.B. 5 did not apply to the offender’s original sex offense, but instead 
applied to a prospective failure to meet the registration requirements of R.C. 
2950.05. 
{¶ 25} In State v. Adkins, 129 Ohio St. 3d 287, 2011-Ohio-3141, 951 
N.E.2d 766, this court considered the constitutionality of R.C. 2901.08 as applied 
to a defendant indicted for drunk driving in 2007.  The defendant in Adkins had a 
record of six such offenses, including a 1987 juvenile adjudication.  In 1996, R.C. 
2901.08 was amended to include juvenile adjudications as one of the five 
convictions over a span of 20 years that could support an enhanced sentence for 
driving while impaired.  Adkins argued that the statutory change altered the 
nature of his juvenile adjudication  and was unconstitutionally retroactive.  This 
court disagreed: 
 
Adkins is not being punished for a previous juvenile adjudication; 
he is being punished for his current offense. As the United States 
Supreme Court has held, “When a defendant is given a higher 
sentence under a recidivism statute—or for that matter, when a 
sentencing judge, under a guidelines regime or a discretionary 
sentencing system, increases a sentence based on the defendant's 
criminal history—100% of the punishment is for the offense of 
conviction. None is for the prior convictions or the defendant's 
‘status as a recidivist.’  The sentence ‘is a stiffened penalty for the 
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11 
latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense 
because [it is] a repetitive one.’ Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 
732, 68 S.Ct. 1256, 92 L.Ed. 1683 (1948).” United States v. 
Rodriquez (2008), 553 U.S. 377, 386, 128 S.Ct. 1783, 170 L.Ed.2d 
719. 
 
Adkins at ¶ 15. 
{¶ 26} When S.B. 5 increased the punishment for a violation of R.C. 
2905.05, Howard had not yet committed any such violation.  He also had notice 
of the increased severity of a violation, a fact that dooms his ex post facto claim:   
 
“Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is not an 
individual's right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and 
governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment 
beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.”  
Weaver v. Graham (1981), 450 U.S. 24, 30, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 
L.Ed.2d 17. 
 
Adkins, 129 Ohio St.3d 287, 2011-Ohio-3141, 951 N.E.2d 766, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 27} As this court pointed out in Adkins, “The increase in punishment 
provided for in R.C. 2901.08 was established before Adkins committed the 
offense at issue.”  Likewise, here, the increase in punishment in R.C. 2950.99 was 
established before Howard violated former R.C. 2950.05. 
{¶ 28} We find that the penalty enhancements of S.B. 5 do not relate back 
to the original sex offense, but instead relate to a defendant’s failure to meet the 
requirements of R.C. 2950.05 subsequent to the passage of S.B. 5.  The 
enhancements therefore do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United 
States Constitution or the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution. 
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Conclusion 
{¶ 29} We hold that for a defendant whose sex-offender classification was 
determined under Megan’s Law, the penalty for a violation of the reporting 
requirements of former R.C. 2950.05 that occurs after Megan’s Law was 
supplanted by the AWA is the penalty set forth in the version of R.C. 2950.99 in 
place just before the effective date of the AWA.  In the case of Howard, then, his 
violation of R.C. 2950.05 was a felony of the third degree. 
{¶ 30} We agree with the judgment of the court of appeals that current 
R.C. 2950.99 does not apply to sex offenders originally classified under Megan’s 
Law.  However, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals because it 
imposed the penalty provision in place when Howard was classified rather than 
the penalty provision in place immediately before Megan’s Law was replaced by 
the AWA.  The cause is remanded to the trial court for resentencing as a third-
degree felony. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., 
concur. 
 
O’DONNELL and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissents and would remand for resentencing as a fifth-
degree felony. 
_____________ 
 
CUPP, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 31} Because I believe that the majority opinion’s reasoning is 
fundamentally flawed and undermines well-settled precedent in a way that will 
lead to substantial negative consequences in areas of the criminal law beyond 
those involving sex offenders, I respectfully dissent. 
January Term, 2012 
13 
{¶ 32} I would adopt the state’s proposition of law, which asserts that 
current R.C. 2950.99, enacted by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 97 (“S.B. 97”), effective 
January 1, 2008, “is not applied retroactively when the conduct for which a 
defendant is convicted and sentenced occurred after the effective date of the 
statute.” 
{¶ 33} I agree with the well-reasoned partial dissent of Judge Stewart in 
State v. Page, 8th Dist. No. 94369, 2011-Ohio-83: 
 
The enhanced penalty provision [of S.B. 97] is not couched 
in terms of the new classifications.  It refers only to “violations” of 
the reporting statutes, not to the type of tier offender involved.  
Moreover, there is no question that the General Assembly could 
validly pass a law that prospectively enhances a penalty for repeat 
offenders.  As the First District Court of Appeals noted when 
addressing a similar issue regarding a sentencing enhancement, “[the 
statute] is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against ex 
post facto laws because it is not ‘retrospective,’ i.e., it does not 
‘change * * * the legal consequences of acts completed before its 
effective date,’ but simply mandates an enhanced penalty for acts 
committed after the effective date of the provision if the defendant 
has previously been convicted[.]” State v. Clark (Aug. 5, 1992), 1st 
Dist. No. C-910541. 
 
Id. at ¶ 16 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
{¶ 34} I also agree with the reasoning of State v. Freeman, 1st Dist. No. 
C-100389, 2011-Ohio-4357: 
 
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The penalty provisions contained in current R.C. 2950.99 
became effective January 1, 2008.  Freeman pleaded guilty to 
failing to notify the sheriff of an address change on or about 
October 15, 2009.  Although Freeman’s duty to register stemmed 
from his sex offense, his failure to notify the sheriff of an address 
change was a new offense that he had committed after the 
effective date of current R.C. 2950.99’s penalty provisions.  
Therefore, current R.C. 2950.99 was not applied retroactively to 
Freeman’s conduct. 
 
(Footnote omitted.)  Id. at ¶ 18. 
{¶ 35} In State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 421, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998), 
we recognized that despite statutory changes, the type of punishment at issue in 
this case “flows from a failure to register, a new violation of the statute, not from 
a past sex offense,” so “the punishment is not applied retroactively for an act that 
was committed previously, but for a violation of law committed subsequent to the 
enactment of the law.”  (Emphasis added.)  See also State v. Adkins, 129 Ohio 
St.3d 287, 2011-Ohio-3141, 951 N.E.2d 766, ¶ 18 (there is no ex post facto 
violation when an increase in punishment is established before an offense is 
committed). 
{¶ 36} The majority cites Cook and Adkins in its partial application of 
those precedents, but fails to appreciate that the principles stated in those 
decisions definitively require the penalties of current R.C. 2950.99 to fully apply 
in this case. 
{¶ 37} The majority states, “When [Am.Sub.S.B. No.] 5 increased the 
punishment for a violation of R.C. 2905.05, Howard had not yet committed any 
such violation.  He also had notice of the increased severity of a violation * *  *.”  
The majority further states that, consistent with Adkins, “the increase in 
January Term, 2012 
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punishment in R.C. 2950.99 was established [in S.B. 5] before Howard violated 
R.C. 2950.05,” so that there can be no ex post facto violation. 
{¶ 38} The majority’s statements regarding S.B. 5 also apply with equal 
force to the changes to R.C. 2950.99 accomplished by S.B. 97.  The situation is 
exactly the same, and the same principles govern the analysis.  Consequently, 
when S.B. 97 increased the punishment for a violation of R.C. 2905.05, “Howard 
had not yet committed any such violation,” and he therefore can appropriately be 
subject to the penalties of current R.C. 2950.99. 
{¶ 39} I would fully reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
would hold that current R.C. 2950.99 should govern the penalty for the sex 
offender in this case.  Current R.C. 2950.99 should also govern the penalty for 
other similarly situated sex offenders. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
________________ 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Johnna M. Shia, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Marshall G. Lachman, for appellee. 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel T. 
Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for amicus curiae Cuyahoga County 
Prosecutor’s Office. 
________________