Case Title: State v. Gayton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2013AP000646-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2016-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2016 WI 58 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP646-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Leopoldo R. Salas Gayton, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 358 Wis. 2d 709, 856 N.W.2d 345) 
(Ct. App. – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 14, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dennis R. Cimpl and Ellen R. Brostrom 
 
JUDGE: 
Milwaukee 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, A. W., J. and ABRAHAMSON, J. concur 
(Opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, C. J. did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Colleen D. Ball, assistant state public defender, and oral 
argument by Colleen D. Ball. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Christopher G. Wren, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.  
 
There was an amicus curiae brief by Jeffrey O. Davis, Haar 
Katta, and Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee, WI on behalf of the 
Irrevocable Trust for the Benefit of Hayden Isabella Lamb.  
 
 
 
2 
There was an amicus curiae brief by Matthew S. Pinix, Karyn 
Rotker, and ACLU of Wisconsin Foundation, Milwaukee, Claudia 
Valenzuela (pro hac vice) and National Immigrant Justice Center, 
Chicago, IL, Barbara J. Graham and Catholic Charities Legal 
Services 
for 
Immigrants, 
Milwaukee, 
and 
 
Stacy 
Taeuber, 
University of Wisconsin Law School Immigrant Justice Clinic.  
Oral argument by Matthew S. Pinix.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 58
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2013AP646-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2011CF73) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Leopoldo R. Salas Gayton, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court's denial of a postconviction 
motion by Leopoldo Salas Gayton (Salas Gayton).1 
¶2 
Salas Gayton pled no contest to two charges that arose 
after he killed Corrie Damske while he was driving under the 
influence of alcohol in the wrong direction on a Milwaukee 
                                                 
1 State v. Salas Gayton, No. 2013AP646-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2014). 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
2 
freeway.  At sentencing, the circuit court focused its remarks 
on the serious crime of drunk driving and its potential 
consequences.  It ultimately sentenced Salas Gayton to 15 years 
of initial confinement, the statutory maximum, followed by 7 
years of extended supervision.  On several occasions during its 
remarks, the circuit court mentioned Salas Gayton's immigration 
status, describing him as an "illegal alien," "here illegally," 
and an "illegal."  However, the court made clear that any 
unlawful conduct related to immigration represented no more than 
a "minor factor" or "minor character flaw." 
¶3 
In a postconviction motion, Salas Gayton argued, among 
other things, that the sentencing court erroneously exercised 
its discretion by relying upon an improper factor when it 
considered his immigration status at sentencing.  The circuit 
court denied his motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.  
Because we conclude that the circuit court's comments do not 
demonstrate reliance on an improper factor at sentencing and 
therefore did not deny Salas Gayton due process of law, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶4 
While driving drunk on Interstate 94 in Milwaukee on 
the morning of January 1, 2011, Salas Gayton struck a vehicle 
driven by Corrie Damske, who died at the scene shortly after the 
collision.  The collision occurred at approximately 7:20 a.m.  
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
3 
Salas Gayton entered the freeway2 near 35th Street and began 
traveling in the wrong direction in the westbound lanes.  He 
struck one vehicle before colliding head-on with Damske near 
20th Street, at the southwest corner of the Marquette University 
campus.  His vehicle ricocheted and struck a third vehicle after 
his collision with Damske.  Salas Gayton broke his foot as a 
result of the collisions. 
¶5 
In the hours before the collision, Salas Gayton 
consumed 2 beers at home before consuming a 12-pack of beer 
while driving around Milwaukee.  He tossed empty cans out the 
car window as he drove.  After the collision, he could not 
account for a large period of time and could not remember when 
he consumed his last beer.  A test of Salas Gayton's blood 
approximately 2 hours and 20 minutes after the collision 
returned a blood alcohol content of .145. 
¶6 
When officers questioned Salas Gayton after his 
arrest, he told them that he entered the freeway because he saw 
police lights flashing in his mirror and he traveled in the 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 990.01(7a) 
(2013-14) 
defines 
an 
"expressway" as "a divided arterial highway for through traffic 
with 'full' or 'partial' control of access and generally with 
grade separations at intersections."  A freeway, in contrast, 
"means a highway with full control of access and with all 
crossroads separated in grade from the pavements for through 
traffic."  Wis. Stat. § 990.01(9a).  Although Interstate 94 
seems to meet both definitions, we use the term "freeway" 
throughout the opinion. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
4 
wrong direction out of confusion as he attempted to evade 
police.  He wanted to avoid being pulled over because he feared 
going to jail for driving without a valid license.  A report 
from the Milwaukee County Sheriff's Office indicates that at the 
time of his arrest he informed officers that he immigrated to 
the United States illegally and that he had lived in the United 
States for approximately 13 years before the collision.3  Salas 
Gayton is originally from Mexico, and he is not an American 
citizen.  At the time of the collision, he was 41 years old. 
¶7 
A criminal complaint and information filed in the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court on January 6, 2011, charged Salas 
Gayton on three counts: (1) homicide by intoxicated use of a 
vehicle, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 940.09(1)(a) 
and 
939.50(3)(d); (2) homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle 
(prohibited alcohol concentration), contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.09(1)(b) and 939.50(3)(d); and (3) operating without a 
license, 
causing 
death, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 343.05(5)(b)3.d. and 939.51(3)(a).4  Although Salas Gayton 
initially entered not guilty pleas to all three charges, he 
                                                 
3 Salas Gayton submitted a copy of the document from the 
Milwaukee County Sheriff's Office as an exhibit attached to his 
postconviction motion. 
4 The statutes cited in the complaint referred to the 2009-
10 version of the Wisconsin Statutes. 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
5 
ultimately agreed to plead no contest to the first and third 
counts.5  
¶8 
The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Dennis Cimpl, 
Judge, conducted a lengthy sentencing hearing on July 22, 2011, 
at which the court heard statements on behalf of Damske and on 
behalf of Salas Gayton.6  After an initial discussion between the 
court and the parties regarding letters sent to the court on 
behalf of the victim and the defendant,7 the hearing proceeded 
with the State's presentation. 
¶9 
The attorney for the State began with a lengthy 
summary of the reasons why the State was "recommending . . . a 
substantial period of confinement": 
Corrie Damske was a woman who simply was driving 
on the freeway.  She was going home as many people 
were going and traveling on January 1st, the holiday, 
2011. 
                                                 
5 At the plea hearing, the circuit court indicated that the 
second count would be dismissed "by operation of law" as a 
result of the conviction resulting from the plea on the first 
count.  See Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1m)(a)-(b).  The circuit court 
also explained the dismissal at sentencing. 
6 In the following paragraphs, we quote at length from 
statements in the transcript of the sentencing hearing.  To 
enhance readability, we have clarified punctuation and corrected 
several misspellings in the transcript, such as the first name 
of the deceased victim.  The unmarked alterations to quotations 
from the transcript are also reflected in subsequent quotations 
in the opinion. 
7 The court received six letters on behalf of Damske and one 
on behalf of Salas Gayton.  Although not originally included in 
the record on appeal, the letters were added to the record by a 
December 9, 2015 order from this court. 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
6 
She was secured in the fact that she was 
traveling properly in the right lane when something 
happened that could happen to make any of us victims 
of a homicide, and that is that the defendant made a 
choice——perhaps, because he was intoxicated, not a 
knowing choice——but he made a choice to get on the 
freeway and drive the wrong way. 
As the Court knows, it's probably the busiest 
freeway . . . in the whole State of Wisconsin; it's a 
freeway that leads west from downtown Milwaukee and is 
as heavily traveled as any freeway in the State of 
Wisconsin. 
The defendant traveling down that freeway had 
numerous opportunities to stop his car and realize 
that he was going the wrong way.  But he went a 
significant distance traveling the wrong way down that 
freeway almost hitting other cars. 
. . . . 
. . . He nipped a car and caused a bit of damage 
to another car, and then another woman also had her 
car damaged by the defendant, I believe after he hit 
Ms. Damske's car. 
The man that was almost hit, he actually was hit 
but he did not sustain any injuries, was a fireman for 
the City of Milwaukee Fire Department; and the 
defendant, even after that, continued travelling the 
wrong way down the freeway. 
The defendant killed a beautiful, loving mother.  
She was 34 years old. 
. . . She had a young child who has to live the 
rest of her life without her mother, and I don't know 
how one explains to a child what happened here . . . .  
That child is going to have to live the rest of her 
life without her mother because of what the defendant 
did. 
The defendant's blood level was .145, close to 
twice the amount of the legal amount allowed in the 
State of Wisconsin for a prima facie case for 
intoxication. 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
7 
. . . . 
The defendant, as the Court knows, was not 
supposed to be driving.  He did not have a valid 
driver's license; and not only that, he had been 
convicted of operating without a license two separate 
times. . . . 
. . . . 
Quite frankly, the public would have been safer 
if he was firing bullets down the freeway, rather than 
driving a vehicle the wrong way down the freeway at 
the speed that he was driving.  It was a weapon. 
Literally, the car was a weapon on that freeway, 
and anyone that came in contact with him or saw him 
coming down the freeway at the speed he was coming 
down the freeway the wrong way, obviously, would have 
been terrified and endangered. 
¶10 Following that introductory statement, the circuit 
court heard statements on Damske's behalf.  The first statement 
came from Damske's mother, Sharon Hvala, who made a few remarks 
before reading from a prepared statement, which began, 
Everyday I wake up to the unbelievable, that I will 
never see my daughter again.  The darkest day of my 
life is when the detective came to the door and showed 
me pictures to identify her, [a] parent's worst 
nightmare. 
I was never able to say goodbye or hold her in my 
arms or tell her how much I loved her and how much she 
meant to me.  She died alone in the most tragic way on 
that cold highway. 
As she neared the end of her statement, Damske's mother 
specifically requested that the court impose a harsh punishment: 
Your Honor, I know that there is nothing that 
will ever bring my daughter back.  But I do ask that 
the judgment would be a fair one, and one that will 
perhaps give others pause before they get behind the 
wheel. 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
8 
Mr. Gayton made a choice, a choice to live for 
years in this country without citizenship, a choice to 
drive without a valid license after being stopped 
twice by police, a choice again to elude police by not 
stopping, driving drunk and going the wrong way on the 
expressway.  And all of these choices that he made 
ultimately claimed the life of my daughter. 
Mr. Gayton will eventually be able to go on with 
his life.  While I'll be visiting my daughter at her 
grave.  I can't imagine life without her. 
. . . Corrie and our family have been given a 
life sentence. 
¶11 Next, the circuit court heard from Michele Friedman, 
Damske's close friend.  Friedman began by describing the severe 
impact of Damske's death on her friends and family; she then 
also asked the court to impose a harsh sentence: 
The fact of the matter is his punishment should 
follow the strictest penalties allowed by law.  He not 
only committed the crime of vehicular homicide, but he 
has committed others as well, such as being pulled 
over twice for driving without a license. 
Killing 
Corrie 
was 
not 
his 
first 
act 
of 
lawlessness.  It was just one of a series of times for 
which he was caught.  He had no intentions of 
complying with any of the laws in this country, and 
that was proven when his feet hit U.S. soil as an 
illegal immigrant. 
At the time of this homicide, he had no license, 
no insurance and no intention of respecting the law 
that governs our country. 
He came to this country and availed himself of 
the privileges we provided to our citizens, but he had 
no intentions to complying with our laws.  Then he 
stepped up his lawlessness by killing a productive, 
passionate, beautiful and loving individual. 
. . . . 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
9 
The issue of punishment is one that some judges 
are remiss to do in similar cases and give him the 
maximum.  15 years in prison and after that a swift 
deportation is a well-deserved punishment.  Please 
give him every hour of prison he deserves and let him 
sit behind bars for as long as the law allows. 
. . . . 
A punishment of less than the maximum, 15 years 
in 
jail 
and 
10 
years 
of 
supervision, 
a/k/a, 
deportation, 
would 
also 
unduly 
depreciate 
the 
seriousness of this crime. 
¶12 Following the statements on Damske's behalf, Salas 
Gayton's attorney, Heather Johnson, spoke on behalf of her 
client.  She began by extending condolences to Damske's family 
and friends and by acknowledging that "[t]his is a serious 
offense, and there is just no two ways around that."  Asking the 
circuit court to treat Salas Gayton the same as it would treat 
any other offender under similar circumstances, she noted that 
drunk driving "is an offense committed across the board in the 
community by people of all ages, races, background, citizens and 
non-citizens [alike]."  In response to the statements made on 
Damske's behalf, she reviewed Salas Gayton's "almost completely 
clean criminal record" and argued that "to say that he had no 
intention of following the laws of this country and basically 
has broken every law that he had an opportunity to do, it's just 
not true."  She focused instead on his work history, noting, 
He is proud to say that he has always supported 
himself, despite knowing that the community is upset 
that he is here.  He wants people to know that he has 
never received or applied for any help from the 
government, government aid or any other community 
resources.  He has always maintained himself and tried 
to help his family and friends. 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
10 
¶13 Salas Gayton's attorney later returned to the issue of 
citizenship status and engaged in a brief exchange with the 
court on the matter: 
[MS. JOHNSON:] The fact as I see it that Mr. 
Salas is not a citizen in my opinion, as it relates to 
this case, is not terribly relevant.  He came—— 
THE COURT: It goes to character. 
MS. JOHNSON: I agree.  He did come to this 
country to work.  He has positively supported himself 
in the community.  For the most part, he has stayed 
out of the criminal justice system.  To say that he 
does not value our laws [or has] been a detriment to 
the community, I don't think is an honest statement. 
¶14 She concluded her comments by asking the court to 
impose less than the maximum period of confinement, followed by 
extended supervision.  Following her comments, the circuit court 
heard from the mother of Salas Gayton's girlfriend and from 
Salas Gayton himself.8 
¶15 After hearing all of these statements, the court 
imposed a sentence——15 years confinement followed by 7 years of 
extended supervision9——and explained its reasons for doing so.  
We reproduce the court's statement in full: 
                                                 
8 Salas Gayton addressed the court through an interpreter. 
9 Homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle is a Class D 
felony.  Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a), (1c) (2009-10).  The 
punishment for a Class D felony is "a fine not to exceed 
$100,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 25 years, or both."  Wis. 
Stat. § 939.50(3)(d) (2009-10).  Of the maximum 25 years 
imprisonment "[f]or a Class D felony, the term of confinement in 
prison may not exceed 15 years."  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)4. 
(2009-10). 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
11 
THE COURT: When I sentence somebody, I have to 
set goals with my sentencing.  One of the goals is 
restitution.  In this case, that was very easy.  As in 
most cases, it's very easy.  It's $11,075. 
I wish the other goals were as easy.  They're 
not.  The other goals are punishment, deterrence.  
That means sending a message to you, Mr. Salas, as 
well as everybody in the community, that you just 
can't get behind a wheel of a car, 4,000 pounds, a 
4,000 pound weapon, if you're intoxicated, without 
suffering the consequences.  That's deterrence. 
Then the last goal is rehabilitation, and that's 
somewhat hampered in this case by your status.  
Because I don't know what the United States Government 
is going to do with you when this sentence is over.  I 
don't know if they are going to deport you.  I have no 
power in that regard. 
How do I accomplish these goals?  Well, the first 
thing I look at is the serious nature of the crime.  
Then I look at what the community wants and demands, 
and I don't just speak for Corrie. 
I don't just speak for anybody that died as a 
result of a drunk driver.  I speak for the entire 
community, the victim's side and the defendant's side.  
They're also victims. 
Then the last thing I have to do is consider your 
character and everything that Leopoldo Salas is.  
Let's talk about the serious nature of the crime. 
A young woman is dead, 34 years old, beautiful, 
out on the first day of the year driving.  Minding her 
own business and tragically taken away from us. 
You were driving drunk the wrong way on the 
freeway.  There was some indication that you were 
afraid that you were going to be stopped for driving.  
You apparently had been warned by somebody, maybe the 
judge in Racine County, that you can't drive. 
There is a reason that we have licenses in this 
country and all the world, and that is we just don't 
let anybody get behind that automobile which can be a 
weapon. 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
12 
Mr. Williams said in your state you might have 
been better shooting a gun at the freeway.  You 
probably would have missed everybody, rather than 
aiming the weapon that you did. 
You, by all accounts, didn't try to do anything 
about it.  You entered on 35th Street.  This happened 
on 20th Street.  That's a good mile.  You're driving 
freeway speeds, 50 miles an hour.  You sideswiped a 
firefighter.  You don't stop.  You told me in your 
letter, quote, I didn't even know I was driving. 
THE INTERPRETER: That's the truth. 
THE COURT: Yes, I know.  The fact that you're an 
illegal alien doesn't enter into the serious nature of 
the crime or the need to protect the community.  It 
goes to character.  It's a minor character flaw very 
honestly. 
The fact that you didn't have a driver's license 
entered into it, the fact that you were driving the 
wrong way, the fact that you were speeding, the fact 
you went a mile, the fact that didn't know, didn't 
even know that you were driving, that enters into it, 
because that makes what you did that much worse. 
And you were drunk, .145, and apparently this is 
the first time that you've ever been driving drunk, at 
least according to the law.  Is that the case?  I 
don't know. 
But I am struck by a statistic I read some place, 
and I don't know the exact statistic, but that drunk 
drivers who kill aren't the ones that are driving four 
or five times as drunk drivers.  It's the first time. 
That leads me to——well, a little bit more about 
the 
problems; 
apparently, 
you 
had 
an 
argument, 
disagreement, call it what you want, so you had a 
couple of beers at home, and you had 12 beers in your 
car.  You were driving around throwing beer cans out 
of the car, according to the complaint. I don't know. 
It leaves me what the community wants.  I mean, 
the newspapers, the media has just been full of 
articles and stories about drunk drivers.  Our 
newspaper did a whole year where they talked every day 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
13 
about another tragedy, about drunk drivers, people 
that died. 
Look around in the courtroom, four televisions.  
We've got four major television stations, four cameras 
in this courtroom, because the community wants to know 
what happens to you.  They want to know what happens 
to somebody who takes a car, a weapon, and drives 
drunk and kills somebody.  That's the message that I 
have to get out to the community. 
I was joking with my bailiff before the case 
started about face time that I get or he gets on TV.  
That doesn't make any difference.  If I had one wish, 
what I would ask is that the television stations say, 
you drive drunk——first time, second time, third time, 
fourth time, fifth time——you go to prison. 
I would——everybody in this community thinks, 
pauses, as this victim's mother said, before getting 
behind a wheel when you have a couple of pops. 
We talked about the victim.  Mr. Williams talks 
about my last week in this court.  Yeah, it is.  I've 
seen too many young people killed.  Too many parents 
have come here and said they're tired of burying 
[their] kids.  It is a parent's worst nightmare to 
have to bury your child.  I hope this gives you 
closure. 
There was no intent to kill here.  There was an 
intent to drive drunk.  He knew it.  You knew you 
couldn't handle that car.  That's the intent.  He 
didn't set out to kill somebody that day, but you did 
set out to drive drunk. 
I have read the letters.  It's going to be tough 
for [Damske's daughter] to get along.  She's young.  
She has got a very good support network. 
So now we talk about you, which is the last thing 
that I have to consider.  And other than January 1st 
of 2011, you seem to be a pretty decent guy. 
I ignore what went on with the presentence 
writer.  I can understand that happened, your lack of 
cooperation.  You're in this country.  You don't 
understand the way we do things.  I can understand it.  
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
14 
I don't excuse it.  It would help if I got the 
information anyway. 
You're from the nation of Mexico.  You've got a 
fifth grade education.  You're in this county for 13 
and a half years, Milwaukee for two years.  You’ve got 
three kids in Mexico. 
You've apparently got a temper.  That's why the 
mother of the children left you in Chicago.  Something 
about a restraining order is what she told Dr. 
Pankiewicz. 
You've got sporadic employment, trying to better 
yourself. 
 
That's 
why 
you're 
in 
this 
country.  
Although you're here illegally, it's a factor, a minor 
factor, but it goes to your character. 
It was interesting to read in Dr. Pankiewicz's 
report that you apparently were sober for three and a 
half years.  There it is, on page 2.  "Mr. Salas 
indicates . . . he has had a drinking problem for many 
years.  He has been able to stop drinking for long 
periods of time intermittently." 
"He states his last episode of sobriety was for 
three and a half years" without relapsing.  The 
drinking occurring on Christmas Day, 2010, and then 
your 
mother-in-law-to-be 
tells 
me 
about 
the 
disagreement that you had with your fiance.  So I 
guess I know why you were drinking on New Years Eve. 
I tend to buy that, given the letter she wrote 
me, that the change you apparently made in your life.  
She talked about how one of the children knew you. 
Alexis knew you as Miguel, knew you in a very bad 
period of time and how she said you've changed and how 
you were good to her and her kids.  "He showed me a 
whole new world, a world I never knew.  That world 
[is] his world[, a] world of God." 
"I started going to church with him.  I got to 
meet his church family.  I really enjoy this new life.  
I[t] felt like this is where I should be." 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
15 
That tends to corroborate the fact that you were 
sober for three and a half years, and something set 
you off.  Unfortunately, it resulted in a tragedy. 
Dr. Pankiewicz diagnosed you as an alcoholic.  
That's true.  You accepted responsibility.  You didn't 
put this family through the trial, of looking at the 
gruesome autopsy pictures, of sitting here in this 
courtroom for a week listening to people describe what 
happened to their daughter and friend. 
Mr. Williams talks a little bit about it and they 
burst into tears.  You deserve some credit for that.  
I see the remorse.  Rarely does a defendant come in 
here like you and exhibit tears that you did, and 
they're genuine.  I see that. 
Like so much else, I have to weigh everything.  
So you are going to go to prison.  I can't put him on 
probation. 
 
That 
would 
unduly 
depreciate 
the 
seriousness of what he did. 
When he gets out, if he's allowed to live in this 
country, well, then he'll be subject to the rules of 
extended supervision.  And if he violates those rules, 
he goes back to prison for the time that I'm about to 
give him on extended supervision. 
What are the rules?  No new law violations rising 
to the level of probable cause.  Cooperate with his 
agent.  No contact with weapons of any kind.  No 
contact at all with the family of Corrie. 
He will cooperate and participate with alcohol 
and 
drug 
assessment. 
 
Follow 
through 
with 
the 
recommended treatment.  Ms. Johnson correctly stated 
that it never intervened in his life.  Never had a 
serious enough crime for us to try and intervene.  But 
he could have done that on his own, even as an illegal 
in this country. 
There's plenty of places on the south side of 
Milwaukee that cater to Latinos that would help them 
with their drinking problems.  He could have done it 
on his own.  He didn't. 
He will be subject to random urines.  No use or 
possession of any alcohol, illegal drugs or drug 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
16 
paraphernalia.  No contact with drug dealers.  No 
contact with drug users or drug houses. 
The Department of Corrections has got to give him 
some grief counselling.  He's dealing with this too.  
He has punished himself, and he will continue to 
punish himself for the rest of his life. 
He asked me for forgiveness.  That is not within 
my power.  I can't forgive.  Judges don't do that. 
Absolutely no driving, any motor vehicle, unless 
you have a license.  I will revoke his driving 
privileges in the State of Wisconsin for five years as 
I'm required to do under this law. 
When you get out, if you're allowed to be in this 
country, 
you 
will 
seek 
and 
maintain 
full-time 
employment.  While you are in prison, you get yourself 
a GED or an HSED; so that even if you're not allowed 
back in this country and you go back to Mexico, you 
have those skills. 
You will give a DNA test, be responsible for all 
of 
the 
costs 
of 
this 
action, 
including 
a 
DNA 
surcharge.  That is part of the punishment, part of 
the rehabilitation.  The restitution will come first 
and then the costs.  We will take the costs and the 
restitution out of his prison account of 25 percent. 
The term of extended supervision finally will 
result in judgment.  He's not eligible for the 
Challenge Incarceration Program or the Earned Release 
Program.  Due to the serious nature of the offense, I 
will not give him a risk reduction sentence. 
The fact that you took remorse, that you showed 
remorse, the fact that you've accepted responsibility 
does not outweigh what you did and in the matter that 
you did it on January 1, 2011. 
So, therefore, the sentence of this Court is 
serving a term of confinement in the Wisconsin State 
Prison of 22 years, 15 years of initial confinement, 
seven years of extended supervision Count 1.  Credit 
for 203 days.  On Count 3, nine months, concurrent to 
the time in Count 1.  Credit for 203 days. 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
17 
I have tried to be fair with you.  If you don't 
feel I've been fair with you, your lawyer will tell 
you how you can appeal my decision.  Basically, you 
have 20 days. 
¶16 After receiving multiple extensions from the court of 
appeals, Salas Gayton filed a motion for postconviction relief 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.30 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(2).  He sought an order vacating his plea and 
conviction on the grounds that the circuit court failed to 
properly advise him of the immigration consequences of his no 
contest pleas, as required by Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).  In the 
alternative, he sought an order vacating his sentence and 
ordering a new sentencing hearing on the grounds that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion because it 
failed to set forth an adequate explanation for the imposition 
of its sentence.  For similar reasons, he also requested an 
order vacating imposition of the DNA surcharge.  The Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court10 denied his motion. 
¶17 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
denial of Salas Gayton's postconviction motion.  State v. Salas 
Gayton, No. 2013AP646-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Oct. 7, 2014).  Salas Gayton renewed his argument that the 
circuit court failed to provide an appropriate basis for 
imposing the maximum initial confinement period of 15 years, but 
the court of appeals concluded that the circuit court provided a 
sufficient explanation.  Id., ¶¶16-17.  Additionally, the court 
                                                 
10 Ellen R. Brostrom, Judge. 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
18 
of appeals rejected his argument that the circuit court 
improperly relied on his alien status when imposing its 
sentence.  Id., ¶¶18-19.  The court of appeals agreed with the 
circuit court that Salas Gayton's "willingness to violate this 
country's immigration laws was a reflection of his character," 
adding that, "as the circuit court also opined, it was nowhere 
near dispositive."  Id., ¶19.  Finally, the court of appeals 
also rejected his argument that the circuit court failed to 
provide a sufficient reason for imposing the DNA surcharge.  
Id., ¶¶20-22. 
¶18 Salas Gayton filed a petition for review, which this 
court granted on November 5, 2015.  This court's order granted 
review of a single issue: "[W]hether a sentencing court may rely 
on a defendant's illegal immigrant status as a factor in 
fashioning a sentence; and if such reliance is improper, whether 
it is a structural error or subject to a harmless error 
analysis . . . ." 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶19 We review a circuit court's sentencing determination 
for erroneous exercise of discretion.  State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 
42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.  An exercise of 
discretion "contemplates a process of reasoning.  This process 
must depend on facts that are of record or that are reasonably 
derived by inference from the record and a conclusion based on a 
logical rationale founded upon proper legal standards."  State 
v. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, ¶17, 289 Wis. 2d 34, 710 N.W.2d 466 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
19 
(internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting McCleary v. State, 49 
Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971)). 
¶20 A circuit court must state the reasons for its 
sentencing decision on the record.  Wis. Stat. § 973.017(10m); 
Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶40.  Under the erroneous exercise of 
discretion standard, "the circuit court's determination will be 
upheld on appeal if it is a reasonable conclusion, based upon a 
consideration of the appropriate law and facts of record."  
Peplinski v. Fobe's Roofing, Inc., 193 Wis. 2d 6, 20, 531 
N.W.2d 597 (1995) (citing Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 
66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981)).  "[A] reviewing court may search the 
record for reasons to sustain the circuit court's exercise of 
discretion."  State v. LaCount, 2008 WI 59, ¶15, 310 Wis. 2d 85, 
750 N.W.2d 780; see also Peplinski, 193 Wis. 2d at 20 (exercise 
of discretion "will be upheld if the appellate court can find 
facts of record which would support the circuit court's 
decision" (citing Maier Constr., Inc. v. Ryan, 81 Wis. 2d 463, 
473, 260 N.W.2d 700 (1978))). 
¶21 "Sentencing 
decisions 
of 
the 
circuit 
court 
are 
generally afforded a strong presumption of reasonability because 
the circuit court is best suited to consider the relevant 
factors and demeanor of the convicted defendant."  Gallion, 270 
Wis. 2d 535, ¶18 (alteration omitted) (quoting State v. Borrell, 
167 Wis. 2d 749, 781-82, 482 N.W.2d 883 (1992)); see also State 
v. Grady, 2007 WI 81, ¶32, 302 Wis. 2d 80, 734 N.W.2d 364; State 
v. Harris (Denia), 119 Wis. 2d 612, 622, 350 N.W.2d 633 (1984). 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
20 
¶22 When making a sentencing determination, a court must 
consider the protection of the public, the gravity of the 
offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, as well 
as any appropriate mitigating or aggravating factors.  Wis. 
Stat. § 973.017(2); State v. Naydihor, 2004 WI 43, ¶¶26, 78, 270 
Wis. 2d 585, 678 N.W.2d 220; Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶40.  Our 
cases have detailed various additional factors that a circuit 
court might consider within its discretion: 
(1) Past record of criminal offenses; (2) history of 
undesirable behavior pattern; (3) the defendant's 
personality, character and social traits; (4) result 
of 
presentence 
investigation; 
(5) 
vicious 
or 
aggravated nature of the crime; (6) degree of the 
defendant's culpability; (7) defendant's demeanor at 
trial; (8) defendant's age, educational background and 
employment record; (9) defendant's remorse, repentance 
and cooperativeness; (10) defendant's need for close 
rehabilitative control; (11) the rights of the public; 
and (12) the length of pretrial detention. 
State v. Harris (Landray M.), 2010 WI 79, ¶28, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 
786 N.W.2d 409 (quoting Harris (Denia), 119 Wis. 2d at 623-24); 
see also Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶43 & n.11 (citing Harris 
(Robert Lee) v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 513, 519-20, 250 N.W.2d 7 
(1977)). 
¶23 The sentencing court considers a variety of factors 
because it has a responsibility "to acquire full knowledge of 
the character and behavior pattern of the convicted defendant 
before imposing sentence."  Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 285, 
286 N.W.2d 559 (1980).  "[A] sentencing court needs the fullest 
amount of relevant information concerning a defendant's life and 
characteristics."  State v. Frey, 2012 WI 99, ¶45, 343 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
21 
Wis. 2d 358, 817 N.W.2d 436 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 
U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).  Accordingly, "The sentencing court or 
jury must be permitted to consider any and all information that 
reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular 
defendant, given the crime committed."  State v. Guzman, 166 
Wis. 2d 577, 591, 480 N.W.2d 446 (1992) (quoting Wasman v. 
United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563-64 (1984)).  The scope of the 
information that a court may consider includes "not only 
'uncharged and unproven offenses' but also facts related to 
offenses for which the defendant has been acquitted.'"  Frey, 
343 Wis. 2d 358, ¶47 (quoting State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶45, 
253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341). 
¶24 Despite the broad range of factors that a sentencing 
court may consider, its discretion is not unlimited.  Imposing a 
sentence "based on or in actual reliance upon clearly irrelevant 
or improper factors" constitutes an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  Harris (Landray M.), 326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶30 (emphasis 
omitted).  A defendant will prevail on a challenge to his or her 
sentence if he or she proves by clear and convincing evidence 
that the circuit court actually relied on an improper factor at 
sentencing.  Id., ¶34. 
¶25 A defendant's nationality is one of several factors 
that a court may not rely upon when imposing a sentence that is 
consistent with a defendant's due process rights.  See Pepper v. 
United States, 562 U.S. 476, 489 n.8 (2011) ("A defendant's race 
or nationality may play no adverse role in the administration of 
justice, including at sentencing." (quoting United States v. 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
22 
Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994)); State v. Alexander, 
2015 WI 6, ¶23, 360 Wis. 2d 292, 858 N.W.2d 662. 
¶26 Salas Gayton now contends that the circuit court 
improperly relied upon his alienage and immigration status as 
aggravating factors when making its sentencing determination.  
He argues that reference to his status as an "illegal alien" 
invoked 
prejudicial 
stereotypes 
and 
was 
an 
intrinsically 
improper factor.  He further suggests that use of such terms 
implicitly invoked his Mexican nationality and therefore was a 
thinly-veiled substitute for sentencing him based on his 
national origin. 
¶27 The State responds that barring a court from ever 
mentioning or considering a defendant's immigration status would 
be inconsistent with the longstanding principles favoring 
circuit courts having access to as much information as possible 
when sentencing a defendant.  According to the State, a 
defendant's immigration status or the fact that a defendant 
immigrated to the United States illegally can be relevant to the 
conduct for which a court imposes a sentence. 
¶28 At 
the 
outset, 
we 
observe 
that 
the 
sentencing 
transcript demonstrates that when considering the protection of 
the public, the gravity of Salas Gayton's offense, and Salas 
Gayton's rehabilitative needs, the circuit court placed an 
overwhelming emphasis on the perils of drunk driving.  As the 
circuit court imposed sentence on a person who, without knowing 
what he was doing, drunkenly drove in the wrong direction on a 
major freeway and caused a tragic, fatal collision, the court 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
23 
made clear its objective, explaining that if it "had one wish," 
it would be that the publicity surrounding the case would 
reinforce in the public's mind that if "you drive drunk——first 
time, second time, third time, fourth time, fifth time——you go 
to prison."  Expanding on that objective, the circuit court 
added its hope that "everybody in this community thinks, 
pauses, . . . before getting behind a wheel" after drinking. 
¶29 The circuit court specifically noted that Salas 
Gayton's immigration status did not "enter into [its evaluation 
of] the serious nature of the crime or the need to protect the 
community."  Rather, as the circuit court discussed the 
seriousness of the offense together with the protection of the 
public, it compared Salas Gayton's vehicle to a "weapon" that, 
under the circumstances, was more dangerous than a gun fired 
indiscriminately down the freeway.  Anything short of sending 
Salas Gayton to prison "would unduly depreciate the seriousness 
of what he did." 
¶30 Salas Gayton's personal struggles with alcoholism and 
maintaining sobriety were also a predominant factor for the 
circuit court when considering Salas Gayton's rehabilitative 
needs.  The circuit court acknowledged that, aside from Salas 
Gayton's conduct that resulted in tragic consequences on January 
1, 2011, he "seem[ed] to be a pretty decent guy."  Although he 
had "been able to stop drinking for long periods of time 
intermittently," he had never sought formal treatment——which "he 
could have done . . . on his own, even as an illegal in this 
country"——and the time in prison would give him an opportunity 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
24 
for treatment following a full alcohol and drug assessment, as 
well as skills training through a GED or HSED program. 
¶31 Relative to the circuit court's emphasis on the 
dangers of drunk driving, Salas Gayton's immigration status 
constituted no more than a "minor factor" in the court's 
sentencing determination.  Twice, the circuit court indicated 
that it considered Salas Gayton's immigration status when 
evaluating his character, first noting, "The fact that you're an 
illegal alien . . . goes to character.  It's a minor character 
flaw very honestly."  Later, the court added, "Although you're 
here illegally, it's a factor, a minor factor, but it goes to 
your character."  When discussing rehabilitation for Salas 
Gayton, the court also observed that the possibility of eventual 
deportation complicated the court's decision by making it 
difficult to predict Salas Gayton's circumstances upon release 
from confinement. 
¶32 We are not persuaded by Salas Gayton's contention that 
the circuit court in this case denied him due process of law by 
considering his immigration status as a minor aggravating factor 
when imposing his sentence.  Because Salas Gayton has previously 
engaged in conduct contrary to federal immigration law, his 
prior disregard for the law was an acceptable factor for the 
circuit court to include in its assessment of his character. 
¶33 Further, we note that his immigration status was 
directly relevant to one of the charges for which he received a 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
25 
sentence: driving without a license.11  In Wisconsin, a 
noncitizen may obtain a driver's license by presenting certain 
documentation 
that 
proves 
lawful 
admission 
to, 
permanent 
residency in, or temporary residency in the United States.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 343.14(2)(es).  There is no indication in the 
record that Salas Gayton possessed any documentation that would 
have allowed him to obtain a driver's license as a noncitizen; 
therefore, his unlawful entry into the United States prevented 
him from possessing a license to operate the vehicle that he 
used on the day of the collision.  Because his unlawful entry 
related to an element of a crime for which he was convicted, it 
was not improper for the circuit court to consider his 
immigration status as an aspect of his character for sentencing 
purposes.  Cf. Frey, 343 Wis. 2d 358, ¶47. 
¶34 Moreover, the cases that Salas Gayton cites for the 
proposition that a court may not consider a defendant's 
immigration status at sentencing do not absolutely foreclose 
consideration of unlawful conduct related to immigration. 
¶35 Unlike the sentencing court in Salas Gayton's case, 
which referred to his immigration status in a limited way 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.05(5)(b)3.d. (2009-10) provided: 
Any person who, in the course of operating a motor 
vehicle which is not a commercial motor vehicle upon a 
highway in this state knowingly without a valid 
operator's license issued to the person by the 
department . . . , causes the death of another person 
is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
26 
related to his conduct of immigrating illegally, the trial 
courts in some of the cited cases articulated an overt 
deterrence objective based on nationality.  See, e.g., Leung, 40 
F.3d at 585 ("The purpose of my sentence here is to punish the 
defendant and to generally deter others, particularly others in 
the Asiatic community because this case received a certain 
amount of publicity in the Asiatic community, and I want the 
word to go out from this courtroom that we don't permit dealing 
in heroin and . . . it is against the customs of the United 
States, and if people want to come to the United States they had 
better abide by our laws.").  In particular, the district 
court's comments under review in United States v. Borrero-Isaza, 
887 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1989), left the "unavoidable" conclusion 
that the defendant "was penalized because of his national 
origin, and not because he trafficked in drugs that emanated 
from a source country":  
[H]e comes from a country of origin, namely, Colombia, 
which is a country that supplies much of the narcotics 
to this country. 
. . . [They] are the total scourge of this 
country right now, and I am not going to tolerate it, 
and I want the message to go to Colombia that we are 
not going to accept this kind of thing. 
887 F.2d at 1353, 1355.  The circuit court in Salas Gayton's 
case certainly matched the fervor of the sentencing courts in 
Leung and Borrero-Isaza, but the court here spoke with passion 
about the evil of drunk driving and its concomitant effect on 
Salas Gayton's sentence, rather than suggesting that Salas 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
27 
Gayton's nationality or immigration status mandated a stiff 
sentence. 
¶36 Other cases that Salas Gayton cites note the principle 
that sentencing courts may not constitutionally impose a 
sentence based on national origin——a principle that this court 
unquestionably embraces.  See Alexander, 360 Wis. 2d 292, ¶23.  
But those cases nevertheless leave open the possibility that a 
sentencing court might consider a defendant's relevant illegal 
conduct related to immigration without denying the defendant due 
process of law.  See, e.g., Yemson v. United States, 764 A.2d 
816, 
819 
(D.C. 
2001) 
("This 
does 
not 
mean . . . that 
a 
sentencing court, in deciding what sentence to impose, must 
close its eyes to the defendant's status as an illegal alien and 
his history of violating the law, including any law related to 
immigration.").  Even the most inflexible of the cases that 
Salas Gayton cites——which holds that "immigration status per se 
is 
not 
relevant"——acknowledges 
that 
"circumstances 
that 
demonstrate a defendant's unwillingness to conform his conduct 
to legal requirements, whether or not there are criminal 
consequences, may be" relevant to a sentencing determination.  
State v. Zavala-Ramos, 840 P.2d 1314, 1316 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).  
"Faced with the responsibility of sentencing . . . , the judge 
[cannot], and would . . . [be] remiss if he did, ignore the 
realities of the case."  United States v. Gomez, 797 F.2d 417, 
420 (7th Cir. 1986) (concluding that when defendant's "entry 
into this county had been illegal," that "illegal act is no 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
28 
different than any other recent prior illegal act of any 
defendant being sentenced for any offense"). 
¶37 Review of the circuit court's sentencing comments in 
their entirety thus satisfy us that the court imposed a harsh 
sentence on Salas Gayton because of his dangerous conduct 
operating 
a 
vehicle 
while 
intoxicated 
and 
the 
tragic 
consequences of that act.  Any references to his immigration 
status implicated the unlawful aspects of his presence in the 
United States, which were directly relevant to his conviction 
for homicide while operating a vehicle without a driver's 
license. 
¶38 Accordingly, we conclude that Salas Gayton has not 
demonstrated that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by imposing a sentence with the maximum period of 
confinement for homicide resulting from intoxicated operation of 
a vehicle in the wrong direction on a busy freeway.  Because we 
conclude that the circuit court did not rely upon an improper 
factor at sentencing, we do not evaluate whether its references 
to Salas Gayton's immigration status constituted harmless error. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶39 Salas Gayton pled no contest to causing the untimely 
death of Corrie Damske by his action of driving a vehicle in the 
wrong direction on a freeway after consuming a substantial 
quantity of alcohol.  At sentencing, the circuit court imposed 
the maximum 15-year period of confinement, as well as a 7-year 
period of extended supervision, and in doing so the court 
discussed the seriousness of the crime and the importance of 
No. 
  2013AP646-CR 
 
29 
imposing a sentence that would deter people from engaging in 
similar conduct in the future.  As a minor aspect of its 
comprehensive evaluation of Salas Gayton's character, the 
circuit court also mentioned his immigration status, which was 
relevant to his conviction for causing a death while operating a 
motor vehicle without a license.  Because we conclude that the 
circuit court's comments did not deny Salas Gayton due process 
in the form of reliance on an improper sentencing factor, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶40 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
1 
 
 
¶41 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring).  After parsing and 
reframing the issues raised by the petitioner, this court 
ultimately asked the parties to address issues including the 
following:  "whether a sentencing court may rely on a 
defendant's illegal immigrant status as a factor in fashioning a 
sentence."1  The majority declines to address this important 
question of first impression. 
¶42 Because appeals claiming error based on a sentencing 
court's multiple referrals to a defendant's immigration status 
appear to be on the rise,2 I write separately to provide guidance 
in this ever expanding area of law.  
¶43 Rather than focusing on the facts of this individual 
case, I discuss the broader principles of law and examine the 
question the parties were asked to brief but remains unaddressed 
by the majority. 
                                                 
1 Unless it is included in quoted text, I avoid using the 
term "illegal alien."  I chose to use the term "undocumented 
immigrant" instead.  Although no shorthand term may be perfect, 
I join the United States Supreme Court as well as other courts 
that use the term "undocumented immigrant."    Mohawk Indus., 
Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009); De La Paz v. Coy, 804 
F.3d 1200 n.1 (5th Cir. 2015) (Prado, J., dissenting); In re 
Garcia, 315 P.3d 117, 120 n.1 (Cal. 2014).  Use of this term 
avoids some of the problematic and pejorative connotations of 
alternative terms. 
2 As court of appeals Judge Kessler observed in her 
concurrence, appeals claiming error in sentencing based on the 
sentencing court's multiple referrals to a defendant's race, 
ethnicity, or immigration status appear to be on the rise.  
State v. Gayton, No. 2013AP646-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶23 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2014) (Kessler, J., concurring). 
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
2 
 
¶44 Additionally, I write separately because the majority 
creates an explanation for the circuit court's exercise of 
discretion not set forth on the record.  By creating its own 
explanation, the majority contravenes Wisconsin's long-standing 
jurisprudence, which does not permit appellate courts to invent 
a rationale for sentencing decisions not found in the record.   
¶45 Instead, circuit courts must clearly set forth the 
rationale for sentencing so that it can be subject to meaningful 
appellate review.  State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶49, 270 
Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.  This requirement was established 
in McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971), 
reinvigorated in Gallion, and is sub silencio eroded by the 
majority opinion.  
¶46 Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
I 
¶47 There are three broad principles of law implicated in 
this discussion:  alienage, immigration status, and the act of 
unlawful entry into the United States.  I address each in turn. 
A 
¶48 At the onset, as the majority correctly observes, this 
court has repeatedly stated that nationality and national origin 
are improper sentencing factors.3  Majority op., ¶25 (citations 
omitted).  However, we have yet to provide similar guidance with 
                                                 
3 National origin refers to the country where a person was 
born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or her 
ancestors came.  Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86, 
88-89 
(1973). 
 
Thus 
it 
is 
"an 
immutable 
characteristic 
determined solely by the accident of birth."  Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
3 
 
respect to reliance on a defendant's alienage as an aggravating 
factor at sentencing.  
¶49 The term "alien" refers to any person who is not a 
citizen 
of 
the 
United 
States.4 
 
8 
U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(3).  
"Alienage" is the condition of being a noncitizen.  Black's Law 
Dictionary 88 (10th ed. 2014).  
¶50 In Graham v. Richardson, the United States Supreme 
Court explained that "classifications based on alienage, like 
those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and 
subject to close judicial scrutiny" and that "[a]liens as a 
class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority 
for whom [] heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."  403 
U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (internal citations omitted). 
¶51 Constitutional protections afforded to noncitizens 
include the rights of due process and equal protection.  Plyler 
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) ("Aliens, even aliens whose 
presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized 
as 'persons' guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments."); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69 
(1941) ("Our Constitution and our Civil Rights Act have 
guaranteed to aliens 'the equal protection of the laws'. . .."). 
¶52 In Plyler v. Doe, the United States Supreme Court 
struck down a Texas statute that allowed schools to deny 
                                                 
4 Finding the use of the term "alien" to be offensive, the 
Sixth Circuit has urged Congress to eliminate the term from the 
U.S. Code.  Flores v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 
718 F.3d 548, 551 n.1 (6th Cir. 2013).  I refer to it here only 
because it remains a term of art in federal immigration 
statutes. 
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
4 
 
enrollment to undocumented immigrant children.  457 U.S. 202.  
In so doing, the Court clarified that both due process and equal 
protection 
rights 
apply 
to 
all 
noncitizens 
within 
its 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 210-15.  As the Plyer court explained, the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
applies 
to 
"any 
person 
within 
its 
jurisdiction" and that noncitizens——no matter their immigration 
status——are "surely [] 'person[s]' in any ordinary sense of that 
term."  Id. at 210.  Further, the Court rejected the notion that 
due process is of greater stature than equal protection and 
therefore available to a larger class of persons, explaining 
that "both provisions were fashioned to protect an identical 
class of persons, and to reach every exercise of state 
authority."  Id. at 213.  
¶53 Similarly in Hines, the Supreme Court struck down a 
Pennsylvania Act that imposed registration requirements on all 
adult noncitizens.  312 U.S. at 74.  The Hines court explained 
that the promise and guarantee of broad rights and privileges to 
noncitizens has been vital to the federal government's efforts 
to secure treaties and advance international practices that 
provide the same protections to United States citizens abroad.  
Id. at 64-65.  It considered "the treatment of aliens, in 
whatever state they may be located, a matter of national moment" 
and that discriminatory policies directed at aliens constituted 
"a departure from our traditional policy of not treating aliens 
as a thing apart."  Id. at 73. 
¶54 Based on these constitutional implications, the State 
acknowledged at oral argument:  "it is not permissible to 
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
5 
 
sentence a person based on alienage . . ."  I agree that courts 
may not rely on alienage as an aggravating factor at sentencing.5   
¶55 This prohibition is consistent with the determinations 
in other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Yemson v. United States, 764 
A.2d 816, 819 (D.C. 2001) (citing United States v. Gomez, 797 
F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1986) for the proposition that treating 
a defendant more harshly at sentencing because of alien status 
"obviously would be unconstitutional."); United States v. Leung, 
40 F.3d 577, 586-87 (2d Cir. 1994) (remanding for resentencing 
before a different judge because there was a sufficient risk 
that a reasonable observer might infer that the defendant's 
alien status played a role in determining her sentence).  
                                                 
5 Empirical evidence indicates that a "citizenship penalty" 
exists 
when 
noncitizens——and 
undocumented 
immigrants 
in 
particular——face harsher criminal penalties than citizens.  A 
study of data from U.S. federal courts revealed strong and 
consistent evidence that non-citizens are sentenced far more 
harshly than citizens among all racial and ethnic groups.  
Michael 
T. 
Light, 
Michael 
Massoglia, 
and 
Ryan 
D. 
King, 
Citizenship and Punishment:  The Salience of National Membership 
in U.S. Criminal Courts, 79 Am. Sociological Rev. 827, 837, 841, 
843-44 (Oct. 2014).   
Specifically, documented immigrants are reported as twice 
as likely as citizens to be imprisoned, and undocumented 
immigrants are seven times more likely to be incarcerated than 
citizens.  Id. at 837.  The study further indicates that 
noncitizens receive longer prison sentences compared to U.S. 
citizens.  Id. at 839.  Additionally, citizenship status——for 
both 
legal 
and 
undocumented 
immigrants——appears 
more 
consequential for sentencing outcomes today than it was two 
decades ago.  Id. at 840 (explaining that the "citizenship 
penalty" more than doubled between 1992 and 2008).  
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
6 
 
B 
¶56 Having addressed the question of whether a sentencing 
court can rely on alienage (non-citizenship) as an aggravating 
factor at sentencing, I now narrow the focus to consider only 
those noncitizens who are undocumented.  More precisely I 
examine the question the parties were asked to brief:  "whether 
a sentencing court may rely on a defendant's illegal immigrant 
status as a factor in fashioning a sentence." 
¶57 Unlike the alienage discussion above, I offer no 
definitive answer because the law is not well-settled.  Some 
jurisdictions clearly prohibit sentencing courts from relying on 
a defendant’s undocumented status as an aggravating factor at 
sentencing.6  Others appear to.7  And still others offer a more 
nuanced approach.8  
                                                 
6 See, e.g., State v. Mendoza, 638 N.W.2d 480, 484 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2002) (determining that the sentencing court erred by 
considering the defendant's immigration status and possible 
deportation); Martinez v. State, 961 P.2d 143, 145 (Nev. 1998) 
(concluding that basing a sentencing decision, in part, upon a 
defendant's undocumented immigration status would violate the 
defendant's due process rights); State v. Zavala-Ramos, 840 P.2d 
1314, 1316 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) ("a defendant's current illegal 
immigration status cannot, per se, be considered to be an 
aggravating factor" because it is not relevant). 
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
7 
 
¶58 Even without a definitive resolution, it is still 
apparent that the inquiry gives rise to significant thorny 
issues and caution must be observed.  The law may be unsettled 
as to the direct inquiry presented, but it is well settled that 
reliance on undocumented immigrant status as an aggravating 
factor at sentencing 
can raise significant constitutional 
concerns. 
 
Due 
process 
requires 
that 
sentencing 
be 
individualized, avoiding reliance on stereotypes 
or other 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 See, e.g., People v. Hernandez-Clavel, 186 P.3d 96, 100 
(Colo. App. 2008) (concluding that the sentencing court did not 
err in considering the circumstances surrounding the defendant's 
status as an undocumented immigrant when deciding whether to 
grant or deny probation); Trujillo v. State, 698 S.E.2d 350, 354 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (determining that the trial court did not 
violate the defendant's constitutional rights by considering his 
undocumented 
immigration 
status 
as 
a 
relevant 
factor 
in 
formulating an appropriate sentence); People v. Cesar, 14 N.Y.S. 
3d 100, 102 (2d Dep't. 2015) (concluding that "while a 
defendant's undocumented immigration status may be considered by 
sentencing courts as one factor in determining whether an 
appropriate sentence should include incarceration, probation, or 
a combination of both, courts may not rely solely upon a 
defendant's undocumented immigration status in imposing a 
sentence of incarceration to the exclusion of all other relevant 
factors.").  
8 See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d 526, 
535 (7th Cir. 2013) (determining it was not improper for the 
sentencing court to state in non-hyperbolic fashion that the 
defendant was in the country unlawfully and did not speak 
English because those statements were relevant to reflect the 
strength of the defendant's ties to the community as they relate 
to 
the 
likelihood 
of 
his 
successful 
post-incarceration 
adjustments to society); United States v. Ramirez-Fuentes, 703 
F.3d 1038, 1047 (7th Cir. 2013) ("Although a sentencing court 
can, in its discretion, take into account a defendant's status 
as a deportable alien, it need not take into account those 
arguments that are frivolous or, in the context of the case, 
'stock' 
arguments 
without 
specific 
application 
to 
the 
defendant") (internal citations omitted). 
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
8 
 
inaccurate information.  State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶71, 326 
Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring); 
State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, ¶9, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 
N.W.2d 1; Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶48. 
¶59 "Individualized 
sentencing . . . has 
long 
been 
a 
cornerstone to Wisconsin's criminal justice jurisprudence."  
Gallion, 
270 
Wis. 2d 535, 
¶48. 
 
Sentences 
must 
"be 
individualized to the defendant and his criminal conduct, 
and . . . bear a reasonable nexus to the recognized sentencing 
factors and objectives."  Harris, 326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶101 (Ann 
Walsh Bradley, J., concurring); see also McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 
275 (explaining that offenders are to be sentenced according to 
the needs of the particular case as determined by the offenders' 
degree of culpability and upon the mode of rehabilitation that 
appears to be of greatest efficacy). 
¶60 Tailoring 
a 
sentence 
to 
address 
an 
individual 
defendant requires that sentencing courts refrain from relying 
on stereotypes, which are improper sentencing factors.9  Harris, 
326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶71 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring) 
(explaining that "[w]e all agree that stereotypes constitute 
improper sentencing factors . . .").   
                                                 
9 Similarly, punishment based on a particular "status" is 
prohibited.  See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 
665-667 
(1962) 
(determining 
that 
a 
California 
statute 
criminalizing the "status" of being addicted to narcotics was 
unconstitutional); United States v. Diamond, 561 F.2d 557, 559 
(4th Cir. 1977) (concluding it is improper to consider a 
defendant's status as a nonresident of the state at sentencing); 
see also Jackson v. State, 772 A.2d 273, 282 (Md. 2001) (stating 
that a defendant's geographical origins "would clearly be an 
improper factor upon which to base a defendant's sentence"). 
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
9 
 
¶61 Negative 
stereotypes 
about 
immigrants——and 
undocumented immigrants in particular——abound in some sectors.  
In response to such stereotypes, this court has recognized that 
evidence of an individual's undocumented immigration status has 
an "obvious prejudicial effect" on a jury when assessing loss of 
earning capacity in a negligence action.  Gonzalez v. City of 
Franklin, 137 Wis. 2d 109, 139-40 (1987).  Concerned about the 
effects of prejudice, the Gonzalez court explained that evidence 
of undocumented immigration status can only be introduced at the 
damages——but not the liability——phase of trial.  Id.  Similarly, 
circuit courts are prohibited from requiring defendants to 
disclose their citizenship status at the time a defendant enters 
a plea.  Wis. Stat. § 971.06(3).  
¶62 Defendants also have a constitutionally protected due 
process right to be sentenced upon accurate information.  United 
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972); Tiepelman, 291 
Wis. 2d 179, ¶9.   
¶63 As this court has warned, "immigration law can be 
complex, and it is a legal specialty of its own."  State v. 
Shata, 
2015 
WI 
74, 
¶42, 
364 
Wis. 2d 63, 
868 
N.W.2d 93.  
Accordingly, 
determinations 
about 
an 
individual's 
actual 
immigration status are left to specialized federal immigration 
courts and agencies.  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 
2498-99 (2012) (stating that determinations about immigration 
status falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
government).   
¶64 Of the estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants in 
the United States, 76,000 live in Wisconsin, a group that 
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
10 
 
encompasses a great diversity of individuals and experiences.10  
Despite a perception held by some that all undocumented 
immigrants are law breakers or criminals, many immigrants are 
undocumented due to circumstances beyond their control.  For 
example, so-called DREAMERS are undocumented immigrants who were 
brought to the United States when they were young.  Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. at 219-20 (explaining that children who were 
brought to the United States unlawfully are not similarly 
situated to adults who entered the country unlawfully). 
¶65 Other groups of immigrants who may at times be 
undocumented include asylum seekers fleeing persecution and 
victims of human trafficking.  Further, undocumented victims of 
domestic violence may lack legal status solely because their 
abusers decline to file immigration papers on their behalf.11  
Many are subsequently granted permission to remain in the United 
States.12   
                                                 
10 Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, Frequently Requested 
Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States, 
Migration 
Policy 
Institute 
(MPI) 
(Apr. 
14, 
2016), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-
statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states. 
 
11 See, e.g., Mary Ann Dutton, Leslye E. Orloff, and Giselle 
Aguilar 
Hass, 
Characteristics 
of 
Help-Seeking 
Behaviors, 
Resources and Service Needs of Battered Immigrant Latinas:  
Legal and Policy Implications, 7 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol'y 
245, 259 (Summer 2000). 
12 Memorandum 
from 
Janet 
Napolitano, 
Sec'y, 
Dep't 
of 
Homeland Sec., to David Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs and 
Border Prot., et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with 
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children 
(June 
15, 
2012) 
("DACA 
Memo"), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf; 8 U.S.C. 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
11 
 
¶66 Additionally, immigration status is mutable and can 
change frequently.  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 226 (explaining 
that undocumented immigrants may be granted permission to remain 
in the United States or even become citizens).  Indeed, nearly 
half of all undocumented immigrants entered the United States 
legally, but later violated the terms of their admission.13   
¶67 Given that immigration status is often a moving 
target, and may even change during the course of criminal 
proceedings, care should be taken to avoid making assumptions 
that may very well turn out to be false.  See Gallion, 270 
Wis. 2d 535, ¶36 ("Experience has taught us to be cautious when 
reaching high consequence conclusions about human nature that 
seem to be intuitively correct at the moment.  Better instead is 
a conclusion that is based on more complete and accurate 
information and reached by an organized framework for the 
exercise of discretion."); United States v. Velasquez Velasquez, 
524 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2008) (remanding for resentencing 
because "a judge may not impose a more severe sentence than he 
                                                                                                                                                             
§ 1101(a)(15)(T)-(U) (relief for victims of human trafficking 
and other crimes who assist in the investigation or prosecution 
of criminal activity); 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (protection for some 
battered spouses of U.S. citizens); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) ("any 
alien 
who 
is 
physically 
present 
in 
the 
United 
States . . . irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for 
asylum"); United States v. Velasquez Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248, 
1253 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that "because oppressive 
regimes do not easily permit their citizens to leave the 
country, many escape by using false papers; doing so does not 
disqualify them from seeking asylum."). 
 
 
13 Pew Hispanic Center, Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized 
Migrant 
Population, 
at 
1 
(May 
22, 
2006), 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/19.pdf. 
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
12 
 
would have otherwise based on unfounded assumptions regarding an 
individual's immigration status or on his personal views of 
immigration policy").  
¶68 In 
sum, 
relying 
on 
a 
defendant's 
undocumented 
immigrant status as an aggravating factor may lead sentencing 
courts down a slippery slope, potentially raising significant 
constitutional concerns.  Care must be taken to ensure that 
sentences are individualized and do not rely on stereotypes, 
assumptions, or other inaccurate information. 
C 
¶69 I address next how a circuit court may consider a 
defendant's act of unlawful entry into the United States. 
¶70 It is not a crime for an undocumented immigrant to 
remain in the United States.  Additionally, removal proceedings 
of immigrants who are in the United States unlawfully are civil, 
not criminal, proceedings.  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2499.  However, the act of unlawful entry into the United 
States is a federal crime, punishable by a fine and/or 
imprisonment of not more than six months for a first offense.  8 
U.S.C. § 1325(a). 
¶71 As the majority correctly states, sentencing courts 
may consider uncharged and unproven offenses as well as facts 
related to offenses for which the defendant has been acquitted.  
Majority op., ¶23 (citing State v. Frey, 2012 WI 99, ¶47, 343 
Wis. 2d 358, 817 N.W.2d 436).   
¶72 It 
follows 
that 
upon 
reliable 
and 
accurate 
information, sentencing courts may consider a defendant's act of 
unlawful entry into the United States in the same way that it 
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
13 
 
would consider any other unlawful or uncharged conduct.  Gomez, 
797 F.2d at 420 (explaining that unlawful entry is an act "no 
different than any other recent prior illegal act of any 
defendant being sentenced for any offense"); State v. Zavala-
Ramos, 840 P.2d 1314, 1316 (Or. App. 1992) (concluding that 
"[i]mmigration status per se is not relevant.  However, 
circumstances that demonstrate a defendant's unwillingness to 
conform his conduct to legal requirements, whether or not there 
are criminal consequences, may be.").  
¶73 However, circuit courts that consider a defendant's 
act of unlawful entry should set forth clearly on the record how 
any unlawful entry is relevant to the sentence.  See Gallion, 
270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶¶42-43, 46.  Sentencing courts must provide a 
"rational and explainable basis" for the sentence imposed.  Id., 
¶39 (citing McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 276).  Implied rationale is 
insufficient.  Id., ¶38.  By explaining this linkage on the 
record, "courts will produce sentences that can be more easily 
reviewed for a proper exercise of discretion."  Id., ¶46.    
¶74 Other 
jurisdictions 
emphasize 
the 
importance 
of 
establishing a linkage between the act of unlawful entry and the 
defendant's individualized sentence.  In Yemson, the sentencing 
court discussed the defendant's pending and prior charges 
including convictions for unlawful reentry into the United 
States.  764 A.2d at 818.  The District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals upheld the sentence, concluding that the defendant's 
immigration status did not serve as the basis for the sentence, 
but rather that the sentence was based on the defendant's 
"unlawful conduct."  Id. at 820.   
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
14 
 
¶75 Yemson explained that sentencing courts may consider a 
defendant's prior acts of unlawful reentry into the United 
States as such acts are relevant to the defendant's history of 
violating the law.  Id. at 819.  To successfully challenge such 
references, the defendant must demonstrate that the sentencing 
court's comments about his undocumented immigration status "bore 
no reasonable relationship to his established pattern of 
misconduct and that those comments formed the actual basis for 
the imposition of an enhanced sentence."  Id.   
¶76  Thus, sentencing courts that consider a defendant's 
prior act of unlawful entry into the United States can do so 
only upon accurate information that the defendant actually 
entered the country unlawfully, in the same way that it would 
consider any other unlawful or uncharged conduct.  Additionally, 
sentencing courts should set forth clearly on the record how a 
defendant's act of unlawful entry is relevant to the sentence 
imposed. 
II 
¶77 Finally, I write because Wisconsin's long-standing 
jurisprudence examining review of sentencing decisions does not 
permit appellate courts to invent a rationale not found in the 
record.   
¶78 Instead, circuit courts must clearly set forth the 
sentencing rationale so that it can be subject to meaningful 
appellate review.  Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶49.  This 
requirement was established in 
McCleary, reinvigorated in 
Gallion, and has become an essential part of the fabric of 
Wisconsin's sentencing law. 
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
15 
 
¶79 Nevertheless, the majority rests its conclusion that 
the circuit court properly exercised its discretion on a non-
existent sentencing court rationale.  In so doing, it appears to 
turn back the clock and erode the advances made in improving 
transparency and review of sentencing decisions.  
¶80 The majority posits that the circuit court considered 
Salas 
Gayton's 
undocumented 
immigration 
status 
only 
when 
discussing the nature of the offense of operating without a 
license.  It explains that Salas Gayton's "immigration status 
was directly relevant to one of the charges for which he 
received a sentence:  driving without a license."  Majority op., 
¶33.  Further, it contends that Salas Gayton's unlawful entry 
into the United States prevented him from possessing a driver's 
license and therefore "his unlawful entry related to an element 
of a crime for which he was convicted . . . ."  Id.  Reiterating 
its own rationale, the majority concludes that "any" references 
to Salas Gayton's immigration status were "directly relevant to 
his conviction for homicide while operating a vehicle without a 
driver's license."  Majority op., ¶37.   
¶81 The record reflects otherwise.  Rather than linking 
Salas Gayton's undocumented immigration status with the nature 
of the offense, the circuit court emphasized that Gayton's 
immigration status was relevant only to its analysis of his 
"character" (emphasis added).   
¶82 The sentencing record contains no expressed linkage 
between Salas Gayton's immigration status and the nature of the 
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
16 
 
offense of operating a vehicle without a license.14  Indeed, the 
sentencing court explicitly disclaimed it:  "The fact that 
you're an illegal alien doesn't enter into the serious nature of 
the crime or the need to protect the community.  It goes to 
character.  It's a minor character flaw very honestly."  
Majority op., ¶15. 
¶83 Thus, by determining that references to Salas Gayton's 
immigration status were related to the offense of operating 
without a license, the majority creates a rationale not 
expressed by the circuit court.  Majority op. ¶¶33, 37. 
¶84 To support its creation of an explanation for the 
sentencing decision, the majority relies on caselaw unrelated to 
sentencing.  It contends that an appellate court that reviews 
the exercise of sentencing discretion "may search the record for 
reasons to sustain the circuit court's exercise of discretion" 
and that a sentencing court's exercise of discretion "will be 
                                                 
14 The sentencing court referred to the charge of driving 
without a license twice.  First it stated: 
You apparently had been warned by somebody, maybe the judge 
in Racine County, that you can't drive.  There is a reason 
that we have licenses in this country and all the world, 
and that is we just don't let anybody get behind that 
automobile which can be a weapon. 
Later, when discussing the serious nature of the crime, the 
circuit court explained: 
The fact that you didn't have a driver's license entered 
into it, the fact that you were driving the wrong way, the 
fact that you were speeding, the fact you went a mile, the 
fact that you didn't know, didn't even know that you were 
driving, that enters into it, because that makes what you 
did that much worse. 
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
17 
 
upheld if the appellate court can find facts of record which 
would support the circuit court's decision."  Majority op., ¶20 
(citing State v. LaCount, 2008 WI 59, ¶15, 310 Wis. 2d 85, 750 
N.W.2d 780) (discussing whether a circuit court erroneously 
admitted an attorney's expert opinion testimony about the 
defendant at trial); Peplinski v. Fobe's Roofing, Inc., 193 
Wis. 2d 6, 
20, 
531 
N.W.2d 597 
(1995) 
(a 
negligence 
case 
examining the standard of review to be applied when addressing 
the sufficiency of the evidence for a res ipsa loquitur jury 
instruction)). 
¶85 However, 
Wisconsin's 
long-standing 
sentencing 
jurisprudence does not permit appellate courts to search the 
record to support sentencing rationales never expressed. 
¶86 Over four decades ago, this court in McCleary embraced 
a requirement that sentencing rationale be set forth on the 
record.  The McCleary court clarified that "[d]iscretion is not 
synonymous with decision-making.  Rather, the term contemplates 
a process of reasoning."  49 Wis. 2d at 277 (emphasis added).  
Emphasizing the import of the decision-making process, McCleary 
explained that "a principal obligation of the judge is to 
explain the reasons for his actions."  
Id. at 280-81.  
Accordingly, appellate review of sentencing decisions focuses on 
the circuit court's decision-making process, not just the 
sentence imposed.  Id. 
¶87 Gallion 
subsequently 
reinvorgated 
McCleary, 
reiterating that a sentencing decision cannot be understood or 
reviewed by appellate courts "unless the reasons for decisions 
can be examined."  270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶1 (citing McCleary, 49 
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
18 
 
Wis. 2d at 280-81).  A circuit court's rationale for its 
decision serves to demonstrate that the sentencing decision was 
exercised on a "rational and explainable basis."  Id., ¶49 
(citing McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 276).   
¶88 Relying on this distinction between making a decision 
and the process of decision-making, the Gallion court concluded 
by setting forth the requirements for appellate review of 
sentencing:  appellate courts are to review the circuit court's 
linkages between the relevant facts, sentencing factors, and 
sentencing 
objectives 
evident 
on 
the 
record 
and 
closely 
scrutinize the record to ensure that the basis of the circuit 
court's exercise of discretion is set forth.  270 Wis. 2d 535, 
¶¶46, 76. 
¶89 Because the majority opinion erodes this requirement, 
I respectfully concur. 
¶90 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2013AP646-CR.awb 
 
 
1