Case Title: McClish v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
James A. McCLISH v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-506                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 5, 1998


1.   Criminal procedure -- sentencing -- introduction of additional relevant
     evidence permitted. -- In the absence of prejudice, Ark. Code Ann.
      16-97-101(2) (Supp. 1995) permits the introduction of
     "additional evidence relevant to sentencing."

2.   Evidence -- other crimes or wrongs -- trial court's discretion in
     admitting. --  A trial court has wide discretion in admitting
     evidence of other crimes or wrongs, and its decision will not
     be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. 

3.   Criminal procedure -- sentencing -- relevant evidence includes prior
     convictions. -- Evidence relevant to sentencing may include, but
     is not limited to, prior convictions.

4.   Evidence -- introduction of nolo contendere plea in sentencing phase --
     appellant failed to demonstrate prejudicial effect. -- Appellant failed
     to demonstrate that the introduction for sentencing of an out-
     of-state plea of nolo contendere to a first-degree rape charge
     had a prejudicial effect that outweighed its probative value.

5.   Criminal procedure -- sentencing -- review of excessive-sentence claim. --
     The supreme court is unwilling to review the imposition of a
     sentence simply where the defendant maintains that his
     sentence is excessive, when the sentence is within the range
     prescribed by statute for the offense in question. 

6.   Criminal procedure -- sentencing -- appellant's sentence within statutory
     range -- no abuse of discretion. -- Where, in its instructions, the
     trial court omitted any reference to an out-of-state nolo
     contendere plea, and the jury had sufficient evidence with two
     prior Arkansas felonies to support its verdict setting
     appellant's sentence at thirty years, a sentence within the
     statutory range, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
     by sentencing appellant in accord with the jury's verdict.

7.   Criminal procedure -- sentence enhancement -- use of expunged conviction. -
     - Expunged convictions may be used to enhance a defendant's
     sentence as an habitual offender; even felony convictions
     completely expunged under the Youthful Offender Alternative
     Service Act of 1975 may be used to enhance a sentence as an
     habitual offender.

8.   Criminal procedure -- expungement -- public policy. -- The public
     policy of expungement is intended to promote the offender's
     progress toward rehabilitation, to encourage him to apply for
     a job and to assert his civil rights by registering to vote or
     running for office, but it is not intended to encourage him to
     commit another crime.
9.   Criminal procedure -- sentence enhancement -- nolo contendere plea
     qualified as previous conviction. -- Appellant's out-of-state nolo
     contendere plea qualified as a previous conviction for
     purposes of the Habitual Offender Act even though appellant's
     plea was not offered for habitual-offender purposes.

10.  Criminal procedure -- sentencing -- State is free to legislate its own
     policy and procedures. -- The State of Arkansas is undeniably free
     to independently legislate its own sentencing policy and
     procedures, which may be contrary to the law of foreign
     states. 


     Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court; Floyd Rogers, Judge;
affirmed.
     Ben Beland, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Vada Berger, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     W.H. "Dub" Arnold, Chief Justice.
     This case is an appeal from the Sebastian County Circuit Court.  The appellant, James
A. McClish, raises one point on appeal.  Specifically, McClish contends that the trial court erred
by denying his motion in limine and allowing the State to introduce, during the sentencing phase
of McClish's aggravated-robbery trial, evidence of his prior Oklahoma deferred sentence and
plea of nolo contendere to the offense of rape in the first degree.  We find that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by permitting the introduction of the prior Oklahoma plea for
sentencing purposes, and we affirm.
     On December 17, 1996, a jury found McClish guilty of robbery.  McClish was
sentenced, pursuant to the Habitual Offender Act, Ark. Code Ann.  5-4-501 to -506 (Repl.
1997), to the maximum permissible penalty of thirty years' imprisonment in the Arkansas
Department of Correction.  McClish's criminal record revealed two prior Arkansas felonies,
namely, (i) a judgment, dated October 28, 1985, resulting from a guilty plea to the offense of
breaking and entering, and (ii) a judgment and commitment order, dated September 15, 1992,
resulting from a guilty plea to the offense of carnal abuse in the first degree.
     Additionally, during the sentencing phase, the State introduced an imposition judgment
and deferred sentence from the State of Oklahoma, dated July 31, 1989, resulting from
McClish's plea of nolo contendere to the offense of rape in the first degree.  As a result of his
nolo contendere plea, the Oklahoma court deferred the imposition of a judgment and placed
McClish on probation for two years.  In Oklahoma, upon successful completion of probation,
a defendant is discharged without a court judgment of guilt, the plea is expunged from the
record, and the charge is dismissed with prejudice to any further action.  See Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 22  991c (1986 & Supp. 1998).
     Discharge and expungement are automatic in Oklahoma, and a defendant need not take
any affirmative action to have his record expunged.  United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102
(10th Cir. 1991).  Notably, the record is silent as to whether McClish satisfied his probation,
triggering expungement, and no argument is advanced that McClish was ultimately pardoned on
the ground of innocence.  Assuming, arguendo, that McClish satisfied the terms of his probation
and that his plea was expunged, we are left with the instant appeal challenging the use of that
plea in Arkansas during the sentencing phase of his aggravated-robbery trial.
     In the absence of prejudice, Arkansas law permits the introduction of "additional evidence
relevant to sentencing."  Ark. Code Ann.  16-97-101(2) (Supp. 1995); Hill v. State, 318 Ark.
408,