Case Title: Coastal Lumber Co. v. Johnson

Citation: 669 So. 2d 803

Docket Number: 1931306

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1995-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
669 So. 2d 803 (1995)
COASTAL LUMBER COMPANY
v.
Michael L. JOHNSON.
1931306.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 24, 1995.
Rehearing Denied April 7, 1995.
Jonathan S. Harbuck of Kullman, Inman, Bee, Downing & Banta, Birmingham, Jon A. Green of Crosby, Saad, Beebe, Cavender & Crump, P.C., Mobile, for appellant.
Joseph C. McCorquodale III and Jacqualyn S. Bradley, Jackson, for appellee.
HOUSTON, Justice.
The defendant, Coastal Lumber Company ("Coastal"), appeals from a judgment entered on a $400,000 general verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Michael L. Johnson, in this action seeking compensatory and punitive damages under Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-11.1, for wrongful termination of employment. We affirm.
Two issues are presented for our review:
Coastal first contends that the evidence was insufficient to submit the wrongful termination claim to the jury and, therefore, that the trial court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict and then later a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Coastal hired Johnson on August 28, 1992, as a "lumber puller" on the "green chain." This job involved removing lumber from a conveyor belt and stacking it. His immediate supervisor at that time was Ronald Mayo. Johnson injured his knee on September 3, 1992, and sought workers' compensation benefits. After missing several days of work, Johnson returned to work at Coastal, but, on his doctor's orders, he was on light-duty work. Johnson satisfactorily performed this work under supervisor Dale Goodman until September 15, 1992, when, 12 days after his injury, Coastal terminated his employment. Ronald Mayo and Coastal's plant manager, Joe Webb, noted in a "Report of Disciplinary Action" that Johnson's employment had been terminated because he had "[n]ot [been] performing [his] job duties very well" and that Johnson had been "making it hard on his fellow workers." That report also stated: "Termination due to unsatisfactory probationary period." Webb testified that Johnson had been fired because of poor job performance in connection with his work as a "lumber puller" on the "green chain."
Johnson testified, in part, as follows:
Johnson also testified that Ronald Mayo told him on September 15, 1992, that Coastal was "cutting back" and that he was not needed; that he was told two days later, on September 17, that he had been fired, but that his job performance was not mentioned at that time as a reason for his termination; and that he had never received any oral reprimands or warnings in connection with his performance as a "lumber puller." Although Webb testified that Coastal had terminated Johnson's employment because he had performed poorly as a "lumber puller" and that Coastal had made every attempt to keep good personnel records, no written reprimands or warnings appeared in Johnson's personnel file in connection with his job performance as either a "lumber puller" or as a light-duty laborer. In addition, Coastal's personnel records indicated that Johnson had been cited for unexcused absences on September 4, 7, 8, 9, 16, and 17, even though Johnson was off from work on September 4, 7, 8, and 9, because of his injury and even though he was not employed at Coastal on September 16 and 17.
Goodman, who had had no complaints about Johnson's performance of his light-duty tasks, testified as follows:
In Culbreth v. Woodham Plumbing Co., 599 So. 2d 1120, 1121-23 (Ala.1992), this Court stated:
After carefully examining the record and reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Johnson, as we must do in reviewing a ruling on a motion for a directed verdict or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Harris, 630 So. 2d 1018 (Ala.1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 2135, 128 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1994), we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to submit the wrongful termination claim to the jury. The evidence showed that Coastal terminated Johnson's employment shortly after he injured his knee and sought workers' compensation benefits and under circumstances suggesting that the termination was in response to Johnson's having sought workers' compensation benefits. The legitimacy of Coastal's stated reason for terminating Johnson's employmentthat he had performed poorly as a "lumber puller" on the "green chain"was *810 hotly contested at the trial. Coastal contended that Johnson's employment had been terminated because of poor job performance, yet Coastal's personnel records did not reflect that Johnson had received any written reprimands or warnings in accordance with Coastal's "progressive discipline policy." Coastal presented testimony that Johnson had been orally reprimanded; Johnson testified that he had received no oral reprimands. Johnson testified that he was first informed that he had been laid off as a result of Coastal's "cutting back" on the number of its employees, only to be told later that he had been fired. This Court has held that an employer is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law by merely presenting evidence suggesting, but not conclusively showing, that it had a legitimate reason for terminating an employee. Culbreth, supra, at 1123. The testimony in this case presented credibility issues for the jury. We hold that the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to submit Johnson's wrongful termination claim to the jury.
Coastal also contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a new trial on the ground that Johnson was permitted to present the testimony of an expert witness whom he had failed to identify before the trial. The record indicates that Johnson filed his complaint on December 3, 1992. As previously noted, one count in the complaint sought damages based on allegations of wrongful termination of employment; however, Johnson also included another count seeking workers' compensation benefits. Coastal, represented by Jon A. Green of the law firm of Crosby, Saad, Beebe, Cavender, and Crump, P.C., filed its answer on January 15, 1993. At the same time, Coastal propounded interrogatories to Johnson, one of which (number 11) requested that Johnson identify the expert witnesses he expected to call to testify at the trial. Although some of these interrogatories sought information relevant to both claims, most of them sought information regarding the nature and cause of the accident and resulting injury, information that, at least arguably, was relevant primarily with respect to the workers' compensation claim.
On January 29, 1993, Jonathan S. Harbuck of the law firm of Kullman, Inmon, Bee, Downing, and Banta, P.C., filed a "Notice of Appearance and Amendment to Answer"; that document stated, in pertinent part:
Thereafter, Johnson timely responded to the interrogatories that had been propounded by Mr. Green, specifically responding to interrogatory number 11 as follows: "Unknown at this time. Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response." The certificate of service attached to Johnson's answers to the interrogatories shows that they were served only on Mr. Green. The record does not indicate that Mr. Harbuck propounded any interrogatories to Johnson with respect to the wrongful termination claim. Johnson's claims were separated for purposes of trial. At the trial of the wrongful termination claim, Johnson called Thomas H. Christiansen, a licensed professional counselor specializing in vocational rehabilitation, to testify on his behalf. Coastal objected to Christiansen's testifying; however, it did not request a continuance for purposes of deposing him or in order to secure its own expert witness to testify in rebuttal. The trial court allowed Christiansen to testify; Coastal claims that the result was an inability on its part to rebut his testimony.
Coastal's basic contention is that Johnson had an absolute duty under Rule 26(e)(1)(B), Ala.R.Civ.P., to supplement his response to interrogatory number 11 before the trial on the wrongful termination claim and that Coastal had a right to rely on that supplementation being made. Coastal argues that the trial court abused its discretion in not excluding Christiansen's testimony. Johnson contends that the trial court, considering all of the circumstances, did not abuse its discretion in allowing Christiansen to testify. Johnson argues that he was under no obligation to disclose the identity of the expert witnesses he expected to call to testify at the trial of the wrongful termination claim, because, *811 he says, no discovery request for that information had been propounded to him by Mr. Harbuck. He maintains that the interrogatories propounded by Mr. Green dealt only with the workers' compensation claim.
After carefully reviewing the record and considering the circumstances underlying this issue, we cannot hold that the trial court erred in ruling as it did on Coastal's motion to exclude. This Court remains committed to the following policy regarding discovery:
Ex parte Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 397 So. 2d 98, 103 (Ala.1981). In furtherance of this policy, we have consistently recognized that the admission of testimony from witnesses whose identity may not have been disclosed in accordance with properly conducted pretrial discovery procedure is within the trial court's sound discretion. Absent palpable abuse of that discretion, the trial court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Crane v. Rush, 577 So. 2d 851 (Ala.1991). This Court has also demonstrated a general reluctance to reverse in this kind of case in the absence of an intent on the part of a party to conceal the identity of expert witnesses expected to be called to testify at trial. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Courtney, 539 So. 2d 170 (Ala. 1988); Phillips Colleges of Alabama v. Lester, 622 So. 2d 308 (Ala.1993). The record here indicates that Mr. Green, on Coastal's behalf, initially filed an answer directed toward both counts of Johnson's complaint and that he propounded interrogatories at the same time that, at least on their face, were directed toward both the workers' compensation claim and the wrongful termination claim. However, shortly thereafter, Mr. Harbuck filed his notice of appearance in the case and immediately took sole responsibility for defending Coastal with respect to the wrongful termination claim. Mr. Harbuck apparently did not propound any interrogatories of his own seeking the identity of Johnson's expert witnesses. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that Johnson's attorney associated Mr. Green's initial interrogatories, including interrogatory number 11, with the workers' compensation claim and that, because he had received no request for disclosure of expert witnesses from Mr. Harbuck, Johnson's attorney did not realize that he was obligated under Rule 26 to supplement his answer to interrogatory number 11. Stated differently, the trial court could have found that Johnson's attorney did not knowingly conceal Christiansen's identity for the purpose of "ambushing" Coastal at the trial. On the question of prejudice, the record reveals, and Coastal acknowledges in its brief, that Christiansen's name first came up during voir dire examination, before the jury was selected and empaneled. Later, before Johnson presented his case, Coastal objected to the admission of Christiansen's testimony; however, it did not seek a continuance of the trial for purposes of deposing Christiansen or obtaining a rebuttal witness. Coastal's failure to request a continuance could have suggested to the trial court that Coastal was satisfied that through cross-examination it could discredit Christiansen's testimony.
We agree with Coastal that under Rule 26(b)(4)(A), a party's attorney has the right, generally, to rely on an adverse party's answers to interrogatories, to determine the identity of any expert witness expected to be called to testify at trial, as well as "the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify," and "the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion." We also agree that when *812 interrogatories are used to discover information about experts who will testify at trial, the answering party has a duty under Rule 26(e)(1)(B) to supplement his response to the questions if the identity of the expert and information about the substance of the expert's testimony are not known when the interrogatories are answered. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. United, Inc. v. Stripling, 622 So. 2d 882 (Ala.1993). However, the particular facts in this case (the fact that Coastal was being represented by two different law firms, the absence of a knowing concealment on the part of Johnson's attorney, and the fact that Coastal's attorney did not request a continuance of the trial) militate against a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Christiansen to testify.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
ALMON, SHORES, INGRAM, COOK, and BUTTS, JJ., concur.