Case Title: Haskell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020 ME

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2020-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 88 
Docket: 
Wal-19-401 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Argued: 
May 11, 2020 
Decided: 
June 11, 2020 
 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
DAWN H. HASKELL et al. 
 
v. 
 
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
 
[¶1]  Dawn H. Haskell and Martin W. Witham appeal from a summary 
judgment entered by the Superior Court (Waldo County, R. Murray, J.) in favor 
of State Farm Fire and Casualty Company on Haskell and Witham’s complaint 
to reach and apply the State Farm vehicle insurance coverage of a man found 
jointly and severally liable to Haskell and Witham for damages.  Haskell and 
Witham argue that they were entitled to a summary judgment because the 
underlying tort judgment established that State Farm’s insured had caused 
their injuries and that the State Farm automobile insurance policy covers the 
damages awarded to them for those injuries.  We affirm the court’s judgment. 
 
 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The material facts are drawn from the parties’ statements of 
material facts, which were properly supported by citations to the record, see 
M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(4), viewed in the light most favorable to Haskell and Witham.  
See InfoBridge, LLC v. Chimani, Inc., 2020 ME 41, ¶ 12, --- A.3d ---.  On 
March 27, 2013, Grover Bragg owned a truck insured by State Farm.  Bragg 
used that truck in the early morning hours to transport an intoxicated and 
delusional friend away from Bragg’s home.  Bragg’s friend jumped out of the 
truck while the truck was moving.  Bragg pulled over but did not exit his truck.  
Bragg’s friend then broke into Haskell and Witham’s house and thoroughly 
damaged windows and other property.  At one point, he got into the bed of 
Bragg’s truck, but he left again and reentered Haskell and Witham’s house.  
When Witham attempted to restrain him, he assaulted Witham, resulting in 
injury. 
 
[¶3]  The insurance policy on Bragg’s vehicle insured Bragg “for . . . the 
ownership, maintenance, or use of” his vehicle.  The policy provided as follows 
regarding coverage for liability to others: 
We will pay damages an insured becomes legally liable to pay 
because of: 
 
a. 
bodily injury to others; and  
 
 
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b. 
damage to property 
 
caused by an accident that involves a vehicle for which that insured 
is provided Liability Coverage by this policy. 
 
(Emphasis omitted.) 
 
[¶4]  In April 2014, Bragg was served with Haskell and Witham’s 
complaint alleging Bragg’s negligence, among other claims that they brought 
against Bragg’s friend and others.  Bragg did not file a timely answer, and a 
default was entered against him in June 2014.  By March 2015, State Farm had 
received the complaint, and in 2016, it employed counsel to represent Bragg, 
admitting that it had the duty to defend.  Bragg, through counsel, filed an 
answer but did not move to set aside the entry of default. 
 
[¶5]  At a hearing on damages, Bragg raised arguments and offered 
evidence about the extent of damages attributable to him.  The court concluded 
that Bragg and his friend were jointly and severally liable to Haskell and 
Witham and awarded damages in the amount of $428,071.64.  Bragg’s 
negligence was based on findings that, worried about the safety of people in his 
home and possible property damage, Bragg took his intoxicated and delusional 
friend for a drive, rather than calling the authorities, and followed his friend’s 
directions in going down the road where Haskell and Witham live.  Based on 
 
 
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the default, the court accepted as true the allegations that Bragg was aware of 
and assisted his friend in becoming intoxicated before driving his friend away 
from his home.  We affirmed that judgment on appeal.  See Haskell v. Bragg, 
2017 ME 154, 167 A.3d 1246. 
 
[¶6]  Haskell and Witham then commenced the present action seeking to 
reach and apply Bragg’s vehicle insurance policy, see 24-A M.R.S. § 2904 (2020), 
and to obtain a declaratory judgment that the coverage applies.  State Farm 
moved for summary judgment, and Haskell and Witham filed a cross-motion 
for summary judgment. 
 
[¶7]  The court entered a summary judgment in favor of State Farm and 
denied Haskell and Witham’s motion for summary judgment.  The court 
reasoned that, although State Farm was bound by the judgment finding Bragg 
liable to Haskell and Witham, State Farm could argue that the conduct for which 
Bragg was held liable was not covered by the State Farm policy.  The court 
concluded that the damages payable to Haskell and Witham were not damages 
that Bragg became liable to pay because of “an accident that involve[d]” a 
vehicle covered by the State Farm policy and that the damages did not arise out 
of Bragg’s use of the vehicle. 
 
 
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[¶8]  Haskell and Witham timely appealed.  See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2020); 
M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1). 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
[¶9]  We review a court’s entry of summary judgment de novo as a 
question of law.  Kelley v. N. E. Ins. Co., 2017 ME 166, ¶ 4, 168 A.3d 779.  Two 
issues have been raised on appeal: (A) whether the judgment entered in the 
underlying litigation determined all issues of causation pertinent to the 
coverage decision, and (B) whether the incident for which Bragg was held liable 
falls within the coverage of the State Farm policy. 
A. 
Causation 
 
[¶10]  “Upon the entry of a default for failure to timely appear or respond 
in an action, the facts alleged in the complaint are deemed to have been proved 
and affirmative defenses are deemed to have been waived.”  Haskell, 
2017 ME 154, ¶ 4, 167 A.3d 1246 (citing M.R. Civ. P. 8(b)-(d)).  Thus, the 
complaint’s allegations that Bragg’s negligent actions caused damages to 
Haskell and Witham are deemed to have been proved.  Id. ¶ 17. 
 
[¶11]  We need not decide whether those allegations should be deemed 
proved against the insurer in this reach-and-apply action, however, because the 
parties do not dispute the material facts set forth in the summary judgment 
 
 
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record, and those facts are consistent with the complaint’s allegations.  The 
question for us to decide is whether the finding of negligence based on the 
alleged facts requires the insurance company to apply the policy’s coverage for 
bodily injury and property damages “caused by an accident that involves a 
vehicle” insured by the policy.  (Emphasis added.) 
 
[¶12]  We “have repeatedly stated that an insurer’s duty to indemnify is 
independent from its duty to defend and that its duty to defend is broader than 
its duty to indemnify.”  Elliott v. Hanover Ins. Co., 1998 ME 138, ¶ 11, 
711 A.2d 1310.  State Farm did not, by conceding that the allegations of the 
complaint may fall within Bragg’s policy and honoring the duty to defend, waive 
its claims regarding coverage.  See id.  Counsel appeared under a reservation of 
rights, and the coverage issue remained unresolved through the underlying 
litigation. 
 
[¶13]  Thus, whether or not Haskell and Witham proved causation for 
purposes of the negligence action, the terms of the policy will determine 
whether coverage is owed.  Id. (holding that, even when an insurer fails to 
defend its insured, the policy—not the finding of tort liability—determines 
whether the insurance company must pay the insured).  The court was correct 
that, although Bragg’s liability for injuries may have been established in the 
 
 
7 
underlying litigation, the injuries were not necessarily “caused by an accident 
that involves a vehicle” insured by the policy.  The question here is whether the 
facts presented on summary judgment, viewed in the light most favorable to 
Haskell and Witham, see InfoBridge, LLC, 2020 ME 41, ¶ 12, ---A.3d ---, bring the 
damages within the coverage of Bragg’s vehicle insurance policy. 
B. 
Summary Judgment on Policy Coverage 
 
[¶14]  Haskell and Witham do not contend that there are any genuine 
issues of material fact.  Rather, they argue that the court misinterpreted the 
language of the policy in concluding that the damages awarded to Haskell and 
Witham in the underlying lawsuit were not caused by an accident that involved 
Bragg’s vehicle. 
 
[¶15]  “The review of a judgment in a reach and apply action requires us 
to first identify the basis of liability and damages from the underlying complaint 
and judgment and then to review the . . . insurance policy to determine if any of 
the damages awarded in the underlying judgment are based on claims that 
would be recoverable pursuant to the . . . policy.”  Kelley, 2017 ME 166, ¶ 5, 
168 A.3d 779 (quotation marks omitted).  “The meaning of language contained 
in an insurance contract is a question of law that we review de novo.”  Patrons 
Oxford Ins. Co. v. Harris, 2006 ME 72, ¶ 7, 905 A.2d 819.  “If the language of an 
 
 
8 
insurance policy is unambiguous, we interpret it in accordance with its plain 
meaning, but we construe ambiguous policy language strictly against the 
insurance company and liberally in favor of the policyholder.”  Kelley, 
2017 ME 166, ¶ 5, 168 A.3d 779 (quotation marks omitted).  We read the 
policy’s language “from the perspective of an average person untrained in 
either the law or the insurance field in light of what a more than casual reading 
of the policy would reveal to an ordinarily intelligent insured.”  Id. (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
[¶16]  The insurance policy provided coverage to Bragg for his use of the 
vehicle and covered his liability for bodily injury or property damage to others 
“caused by an accident that involves a vehicle” covered by the policy.  Thus, we 
consider whether the causal connection between the conduct and the vehicle is 
sufficient when an insured uses his vehicle to drive an intoxicated and 
delusional person to a place where that person exits the vehicle and inflicts 
harm. 
 
[¶17]  As we have held in determining whether injuries resulted from the 
“use” of a vehicle, “[t]he causal relationship between the proper use of the 
vehicle and the subsequent injury need not be the proximate cause of the 
injury; coverage will be extended if there is a reasonable causal connection 
 
 
9 
between the use and the injury.”  Me. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Am. Int’l Underwriters 
Ins. Co., 677 A.2d 1073, 1075 (Me. 1996) (quotation marks omitted).  We 
recently opined that a dog bite that occurred in an insured vehicle did not 
constitute an “auto accident” covered by the pertinent insurance policy.  Kelley, 
2017 ME 166, ¶ 7, 168 A.3d 779.  We reasoned that an auto accident is “an 
unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence involving an automobile,” 
which may include incidents other than a collision or car crash, but which does 
not include “bodily injury from a dog bite that occurred in a car that had 
absolutely no causal connection to the injury and that was not even in 
operation.”  Id. 
 
[¶18]  Here, the policy language is similar to the terms we employed to 
construe the term “auto accident.”  Id.  We interpreted that term to mean “an 
unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence involving an automobile,” id. 
(emphasis added), and Bragg’s State Farm policy covers damages caused by “an 
accident that involves a vehicle” insured by the policy (emphasis added).  Thus, 
we find Kelley useful in interpreting the policy at issue here as we consider 
whether the causal link between the vehicle and the injuries is sufficient for 
coverage to apply. 
 
 
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[¶19]  We are also guided by our interpretations of insurance policy 
provisions covering damages arising from the “use” of a vehicle.  We held in 
Maine Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 677 A.2d at 1075, that when a person was 
injured by a dog who was tethered to a truck and sitting on the flatbed, the “‘use’ 
of the vehicle as an object to secure [the] dog was not directly incidental to the 
operation of the vehicle and, accordingly, there [wa]s an insufficient causal 
connection between the injury and the use of the vehicle to fall within the terms 
of the automobile policy.” 
 
[¶20]  In contrast, we held that there was a “reasonable causal 
connection” between the “use” of the vehicle and the injury suffered when the 
injury arose from the removal of a loaded hunting firearm from the insured 
vehicle.  Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 521 A.2d 308, 309, 
311 (Me. 1987). 
 
[¶21]  Interpreting analogous language in homeowner policy exclusions, 
we similarly held that an injury suffered when the insured and the injured 
person were carrying an item away from a vehicle to the insured’s shed did not 
fall within an exclusion in the homeowner’s policy for injuries “arising out of 
the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of” a vehicle.  Foremost 
Ins. Co. v. Levesque, 2005 ME 34, ¶¶ 4, 11, 16, 868 A.2d 244 (emphasis omitted) 
 
 
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(quotation marks omitted).  We concluded that the exclusion was inapplicable 
because the vehicle was not involved in the injury, which occurred because the 
insured had negligently placed an object in a walkway or on the floor of the 
premises.  Id. ¶¶ 11, 15-16.  Conversely, we held that an identically worded 
homeowner’s policy did exclude coverage for a gunshot wound suffered when 
another person was loading a rifle into the open back of his pick-up truck.  
Worcester Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 555 A.2d 1050, 1051-52 (Me. 1989) 
(citing Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 521 A.2d at 311-12). 
 
[¶22]  Although we have not considered issues of vehicle insurance 
coverage for damages arising from assaults or other torts committed by 
passengers outside of the insured vehicle, courts of other jurisdictions have 
confronted “the general question of whether personal injuries resulting from 
physical assaults by insured vehicle passengers or operators ‘arose out of’ the 
ownership, maintenance or use of the vehicle.”  Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Brown, 779 F.2d 984, 988 (4th Cir. 1985).  Those courts “have almost 
unanimously found no causal relation between the ‘use’ of the vehicle and such 
assault-caused injuries.”  Id.  Thus, when a person used a truck to transport a 
person to the scene of a shooting, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit held that the truck use “was merely incidental, remote from the 
 
 
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type of conduct that is reasonably foreseeable with the normal use of such a 
vehicle; and not the causative factor in producing” the resulting harm.  Id. at 
989.  The “assault, an act wholly independent of the use of the truck, caused the 
death.  Thus, the incidental use of [the] truck in the shooting does not meet the 
causal relation test of coverage.”  Id. 
 
[¶23]  Similarly, in Kangas v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 235 N.W.2d 42, 
43-44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975), the court considered whether the policy could 
cover damages incurred when the insured driver pulled his vehicle over and 
several occupants exited the vehicle and assaulted a pedestrian.  In a civil 
action, the driver was found to have aided or abetted in an assault or battery.  
Id. at 43.  The court concluded that, whether or not an exclusion for intentional 
acts precluded coverage, the acts that caused the injuries did not “aris[e] out of 
the ownership, maintenance, or use” of the vehicle.  Id. at 45-50 (quotation 
marks omitted).  The court concluded that, although in some circumstances the 
foreseeable acts of others inside the vehicle might be covered, the connection 
between the conduct and the vehicle was not “more than incidental, fortuitous 
or but for” when the passengers assaulted someone outside the vehicle.  Id. at 
50. 
 
 
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[¶24]  Thus, if the assailant left the insured vehicle to commit the 
misconduct, or “the vehicle merely provide[d] a situs for the tort,” the injuries 
do not arise out of the vehicle’s use.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 
937 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1991); see Kelley, 2017 ME 166, ¶ 7, 168 A.3d 779.  
When the use of a vehicle has been held to have a sufficient causal relationship 
to the injuries, the violence is generally perpetrated from a moving vehicle.  See, 
e.g., Davis, 937 F.2d at 1417, 1420 (shooting from a moving vehicle); Cung La v. 
State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 830 P.2d 1007, 1008, 1011 (Colo. 1992) (maneuvering 
of vehicle to facilitate a shooting from the vehicle). 
[¶25]  Consistent with these previous interpretations of analogous policy 
terms, we conclude that the conduct that occurred when Bragg’s friend exited 
the vehicle and inflicted property damage and personal injuries did not involve 
the vehicle within the plain meaning of the policy.  See Kelley, 2017 ME 166, ¶ 7, 
168 A.3d 779.  There is no “reasonable causal connection” between the use of 
the vehicle and the injuries suffered by Haskell and Witham.  Me. Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., 677 A.2d at 1075 (quotation marks omitted).  All of the acts that caused 
damages occurred while Bragg’s passenger was outside of the vehicle.  
Although Bragg’s negligent act may have incidentally involved him using the 
vehicle to take his friend away from Bragg’s home, the injuries and the property 
 
 
14 
damage are not causally connected to the vehicle use in a way that brings them 
within the insurance coverage.  See Kelley, 2017 ME 166, ¶ 7, 168 A.3d 779; see 
also Doe v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 F. Supp. 862, 867 (E.D. Va. 1995) 
(“[T]here must be a causal connection between the injury and the use of the 
vehicle as a vehicle.” (emphasis omitted)).1 
[¶26]  Because the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Haskell and 
Witham, do not bring their damages within the policy’s coverage, we affirm the 
summary judgment entered by the Superior Court. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marc N. Frenette, Esq., and Adam R. Lee, Esq. (orally), Trafton, Matzen, Belleau 
& Frenette, LLP, Auburn, for appellants Martin Witham and Dawn Haskell 
 
Matthew K. Libby, Esq. (orally), Monaghan Leahy, LLP, Portland, for appellee 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company 
 
 
Waldo County Superior Court docket number CV-2018-24 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                         
1  Because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Haskell and Witham, we conclude 
that their damages were not caused by incidents that “involved” Bragg’s truck, we do not address 
other issues of policy interpretation, such as whether those incidents constitute an “accident.”