Case Title: Duvall v. McGee

Citation: 375 Md. 476

Docket Number: 39/02

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBERT RYON DUVALL, et al.  v. JAMES CALVERT MCGEE, et al.
No. 39, September Term 2002
HEADNOTES: ESTATES & TRUSTS; SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS; INVASION;
ALIENATION;  CREDITORS; BENEFICIARIES; TORT JUDGMENT; DEBT,
DUTY
A Spendthrift Trust may not be invaded to satisfy judgments arising out of tort claims
against the trust beneficiary.
Circuit Court for Anne A rundel Co unty
Case No. C-1997-42023
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 39 
   
 September Term, 2002
                                                                            
ROBERT RYON DUVALL, et al.
v.
JAMES CALVERT MCGEE, et al.
                                                                            
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
               JJ.
                                                                            
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
Battaglia, J., Dissents
                                                                            
Filed:    June 16, 2003
1  See State of Maryland v. McGee, Case No. K-95-933 Anne Arundel Circuit
Court, aff’d by Court of Special Appeals, unreported (No. 1224, 1996 Term), cert. denied
by 346 Md. 630, 697 A.2d 914 (1997).
2  In addition to the costs of the suit, the count of the complaint alleging battery, the
appellant sought $100,000.00 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000.00 in punitive
damages  and in the conversion count, he requested an additional $100,000.00 in
compensatory damages and 1,000,000.00 in punitive damages.  
The issue presented for resolution by this case is whether a tort judgment  may be
satisfied by invading the principal of a spendthrift trust held for the benefit of the tortfeasor.
The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, recognizing that Maryland law only allows
invasion of a spendthrift trust by a narrow class of creditors, and, only in limited
circumstances, declined to expand the class or the circumstances.  It opined that to hold that
tort judgment creditors are among the class of creditors that have traditionally been allowed
to invade a spendthrift trust in satisfaction of a judgment, would be to “rewrite” Maryland
law.    Such a revision of Maryland law, it pointed out, is properly addressed by the Maryland
General Assembly or this Court.  We shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.
I.
James Calvert McGee (“McGee”), one of the appellees in the case sub judice, was
convicted of felony-murder for his participation in a robbery that resulted in the killing of
Katherine Ryon.1   Robert Ryon Duvall, the appellant, is the Personal Representative of the
Estate of Katherine Ryon.  He brought suit, in that capacity, in the Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel County against McGee, seeking both compensatory and punitive damages, plus costs
of the suit,2 for the battery of Katherine Ryon and the conversion of her personal property.
3  Because McGee averred that he did not participate in the actual killing of Ms.
Ryon, the Settlement Agreement requested a dismissal with prejudice of the battery
allegation.
4  Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 152(2) (1959) defines a “spendthrift trust” as
“[a] trust in which by the terms of the trust or by statute a valid restraint on the voluntary
and involuntary transfer of the interest of the beneficiary is imposed....”  The validity of
the provision creating the spendthrift trust is not in dispute.  We have stated, with regard
to the prerequisites of such trusts that the creator of the trust need only manifest the
intention either expressly or impliedly in the instrument creating the trust, that the
beneficiaries thereunder shall be entitled to their equitable interests in the trust property,
free from the claims of their creditors. Cherbonnier v. Bussey, 92 Md. 413, 421, 48 Md.
A. 923, 924 (1901).  Both parties have argued that Sally McGee established a valid
Spendthrift Trust.  Consequently, we express no opinion upon the validity of the language
used to create the spendthrift protection feature of the Trust. 
2
The parties settled this action, negotiating and executing an Agreement for Entry of
Judgment/Partial Release of Claims (“Settlement Agreement”), pursuant to which, in
satisfaction of the conversion count, the parties agreed to the entry of judgment against
McGee, and in favor of the appellant, for $100,000.00 in compensatory damages and
$500,000.00 in punitive damages.3   The Settlement Agreement acknowledged  that McGee
is the beneficiary of a trust established by his deceased mother, which, at the time of the
settlement, was valued at approximately $877,000.00, exclusive of early withdrawal penalties
and taxes.  Under the terms of the trust,  periodic monetary payments are to be made to
McGee, and to others on his behalf, by Frank B. Walsh, Jr., the Trustee of the trust (“the
Trustee),” the other appellee in the case sub judice.   Another provision of  the trust
established what is commonly referred to as a “Spendthrift” Trust.4  That provision
prohibited McGee from alienating the trust principal (“corpus”) or any portion of the income
from the trust while in the hands of the Trustee, and specifically shielded both the corpus and
5  The pertinent language of the Trust instrument reads:
“I hereby devise and bequeath all the rest and residue of my estate of
whatsoever character, whensoever acquired and wheresoever situated, and
to which I or my estate may in any manner be entitled at the time of my
death, to the trustee or trustees named hereinafter, IN TRUST,
NEVERTHELESS, for the following purposes:
“To pay to or for the benefit of my son, JAMES CALVERT
McGEE, such sums from the income and/or principal of said
trust funds as my trustee shall deem reasonable and necessary,
in the exercise of his sole and absolute discretion, in order to
provide property for the health, maintenance, support,
training, education and general welfare of my aforesaid son,
for and during my son’s lifetime.
*  *  *
“I direct that my trustee may, in his sole and absolute discretion,
whenever and in whatever form he deems advisable, terminate the
terms of the aforesaid trust by paying over the then remaining trust
by paying over the then remaining trust assets and any undistributed
income, absolutely, to my son and/or any of the persons or
institutions named in the following paragraphs.
“I direct that, upon the death of my son, if he has survived me; or
upon my death, if my son predeceases me; or upon the trustee’s
election to terminate the said trust; my trustee shall distribute
absolutely, the then remaining balance of the income and principal of
said trust to any one or more of the following persons, classes of
persons or institutions:
“A.  My son;
“B.  Spouse of my son;
“C.  Children of my son or their issue;
“D.  Charitable Organizations;
“E.  Medical Institutions;
3
the income from claims of McGee’s creditors.   The trust instrument also gives broad
discretion to the Trustee to terminate the Trust at any time and pay the trust assets and any
undistributed income to McGee or to any of the  remaindermen to which the trust referred.5
“F.  Educational Institutions;
“G.  Religious Institutions.
“Provided, however, that my trustee may in his sole discretion
ad [sic] absolute discretion continue to hold said assets and/or
income or any part thereof in trust for any of the persons
named in line A, B and C above.
*  *  *
“No interest of any beneficiary of this Will or any rust [sic]
created thereby shall be assignable in anticipation of payment
thereof in whole or in party by the voluntary or involuntary acts
of any such beneficiary or by operation of law.  Neither the
corpus of any trust created hereby, nor the income resulting
therefrom, while in the hands of my fiduciaries, shall be subject
to any conveyance, transfer, or assignment, or be pledged as
security for any debt or obligation of any beneficiary thereof,
and the same shall not be subject to any claim of any creditor of
any such beneficiary through legal process or otherwise.  Any
such attempted sale, anticipation, or pledge of any of the funds
or property held in any such trust or will, or the income
therefrom, by any beneficiary shall be null and void, and shall
not be recognized by my fiduciaries.” (emphasis added).
4
  The Settlement Agreement also provided that:
“The [appellant] hereby forever releases, waives, relinquishes and abandons
any rights he may have to satisfy or have paid any portion of the above-
mentioned judgment by way of attachment, garnishment or any other post-
judgment collection efforts directed against any periodic payments made by the
Trustee of the Trust to [McGee] as the beneficiary of the  Trust, or directed
against any periodic payment made to any other person or entities for the
benefit of [McGee].  The amount of any periodic payments which are immune
to such post judgment collection efforts hereunder shall not exceed the amount
of the periodic payment previously made during the preceding three (3) years,
exclusive of payments made for legal fees.  The parties understand and
specifically agree that the Trustee will continue to pay the legal fees on behalf
of [McGee] and such payment of legal fees shall be immune to any post-
judgment collection efforts as outlined above.  [McGee] agrees that he shall
provide an annual accounting in August of each year beginning in the year
5
2002 outlining the periodic payments received by him or made to others on his
behalf (exclusive of legal fees) during the preceding year.” 
Thus, it prohibited the appellant from attaching or garnishing any of the periodic payments
the Trustee made to McGee from the Trust. 
   Having surrendered all rights to attach McGee’s periodic payment from the Trust,
but armed with the judgment entered pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the  appellant
sought to satisfy the judgment by invading the corpus of the trust.   Thus, the appellant served
a Writ of Garnishment on the Trustee.  Answering the Writ, the Trustee defended on the
grounds that the trust was a spendthrift trust;  the Trustee was not indebted to McGee; and
the Trustee was not in possession of any property belonging to McGee.
Both parties moved for summary judgment.  Although  acknowledging that this Court,
in Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 14 A. 497 (1888), upheld the validity of spendthrift trusts in
Maryland and, thus, prohibited their invasion for the payment of debt, the appellant
maintained that, over time, this Court has carved out, on public policy grounds, exceptions
to the spendthrift doctrine, pursuant to which some classes of persons are permitted to invade
spendthrift trusts.  Noting one of the rationales of the Smith decision – that because “[a]ll
deeds and wills and other instruments by which [spendthrift] trusts are created are required
by law to be recorded in the public offices ... creditors have notice of the terms and
conditions on which the beneficiary is entitled to the income of the property,” 69 Md. at 89,
14 A. at 499 – the appellant argued that tort-judgment creditors should be included among
those excepted, since such creditors had no opportunity to investigate the credit-worthiness
6
of the tortfeasor prior to suffering from the tortious conduct giving rise to the claim.
Furthermore, the appellant continued, the public policy of this State dictates that tort-
judgment creditors be deemed a special class of creditors entitled to invade a spendthrift
trust.
The trial court held:
“Maryland law is what governs this case, however, and Maryland law is clear.
A spendthrift trust may not be reached in order to satisfy the judgment in the
case sub judice.  Although the facts involving the murder of the late Ms. Ryon,
and the further facts relating to the beneficiary status of the Defendant McGee,
a felony murderer, are very tempting, this Court may not rewrite the law; the
Maryland Legislature has the responsibility of that task, or the Appellate
Courts of this State must further interpret the law. . . .  This Court has a
responsibility to apply and uphold the laws of the state as its interprets they
now exist, not create new law.”
Thus, the  appellant’s motion for summary judgment was denied and the appellees’ cross-
motion, granted.   The appellant noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.   This
Court, on its own initiative, issued the writ of certiorari to address this novel issue of
Maryland law, prior to any proceedings in the intermediate court. Duvall v. McGee, 369 Md.
570, 801 A.2d 1031 (2002). 
In this Court, the appellant argues that the public policy of this State favors a rule
allowing a tort-judgment creditor’s claim to be satisfied by invading the corpus of a
spendthrift trust.  He directs our attention to Maryland precedent, reflecting the recognition
of spendthrift trusts, the rationale for that recognition and the development of exceptions to
the spendthrift trust doctrine.  More particularly, the appellant relies on Maryland’s public
6That is the statute in effect when this case was decided.   As a result of Code
Revision, it is now codified at Md. Code Ann., Criminal Procedure, §11-622 (2001).  
The Revisor’s note indicates that it was re-codified without substantive change.
7
policy against permitting criminals to benefit financially from their crimes.   As to that, he
relies on the Maryland statute, known as the “Son of Sam” statute, enacted to prevent
criminals from profiting from their own crimes through “notoriety of crimes contracts,”
Curran v. Price, 334 Md. 149, 154, 638 A.2d 93, 96 (1994), and the like, see  Md. Code
(1957, 1992 Repl. Vol., 1993 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, § 854;6  this Court’s creation in the
common law of this State of a “slayer's rule,” pursuant to which a person who kills another
is prohibited from being tangibly enriched by the death.  Ford v. Ford, 307 Md. 105, 107-08,
512 A.2d 389, 390 (1986);  Schifanelli v. Wallace, 271 Md. 177, 315 A.2d 513 (1974);
Chase v. Jenifer, 219 Md. 564, 150 A.2d 251 (1959); Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 A.
470 (1933); and Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), §§ 5-1001- et seq. of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article (Prisoner Litigation Act, requiring Department of
Correction to notify victim’s family if a prisoner successfully prosecutes a civil action and
is awarded compensatory or punitive damages).
By way of rebuttal, the appellees counter that accepting the appellant’s argument
would require and, thus, constitute a change in Maryland law and, in any event, the public
policy goals argued by the appellant will not be advanced by allowing garnishment of a
spendthrift trust by a tort-judgment creditor under the circumstances of the case sub judice.
As to the former, the appellees emphasize that the obligations, for the satisfaction of which
8
this Court has allowed invasion of the corpus and income of a spendthrift trust have not been
simple or ordinary contract debt; rather they have been “... dut[ies], not ...debt.”  Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Robertson, 192 Md. 653, 662, 65 A.2d 292, 296 (1949).   See
Zouck v. Zouck, 204 Md. 285, 298, 104 A.2d 573, 579-80 (1954) (equating a contract for
child support to “the decree of a court awarding support to the child or alimony to a wife.”).
With respect to the latter, they argue that the public policy against a criminal benefitting from
his or her crime is simply inapplicable to the case sub judice.  The payments that McGee
receives, they maintain, are in no way related to the crime that he committed.   As important,
the appellees point out, those payments are not even involved in the case, the parties, by their
settlement agreement, having expressly exempted them from attachment. 
II.
 In Maryland, it is well settled that “spend-thrift trusts” may be created.  E.g., Brent
v. State of Md. Cent. Collection Unit, 311 Md. 626, 631, 537 A.2d 227, 229 (1988); Jackson
Square Loan & Savings Ass'n. v. Bartlett, 95 Md. 661, 53 A. 426, (1902); Brown v. Macgill,
87 Md. 161, 163-164, 39 A. 613, 613-614 (1898); Reid v. Safe Deposit Co., 86 Md. 464,
467, 38 A.899, 900 (1897); Md. Grange Agency v. Lee, 72 Md. 161, 163, 19 A. 534, 535
(1890);  Smith v. Towers, supra, 69 Md. at 88-90, 14 A. at 499-501.  This Court first
recognized the validity of “spendthrift” trusts, in Smith v. Towers, supra, concluding that the
income from, and corpus of, such trusts are not subject to attachment or garnishment in the
hands of the trustee.  It is useful to review the rationale of that case.
9
In Smith, one of the judgment debtors was beneficiary of a trust, which provided for
the trustee to collect the rents and the profits of the real estate that formed its corpus, for
payment to him, “into his own hands, and not into another, whether claiming by his authority
or otherwise,” id. at 83, 14 A. at 497, and, upon his death, to convey the real estate to the
beneficiary’s surviving children.  Id.   The appellant, having obtained a judgment against the
beneficiary of the trust and another, sought to satisfy the judgment  by  attaching  the income
from the trust. 
Perceiving that the case presented two issues: whether the testator intended to give the
income of the property to his son to the exclusion of his creditors and, if so, whether the
terms and provisions of the will effected that intention, 69 Md. at 83, 14 A. at 497, the Court
had little difficulty resolving the first. As to that, we held:
“He not only gives the legal estate to the trustee, but he directs in express terms
that he shall pay the income into the hands of his son and not into the hands of
any other person, whether claiming by his authority, or in any other capacity.
Here then, is an express provision, that the income shall be paid to his son, and
an express prohibition against paying it to any other person. If the income in
the hands of the trustee is liable to the claims of creditors, the trustee it is plain
could not carry out the trust.  So construing this will as we do, and it is not we
think susceptible of any other construction, the testator meant beyond all
question that the income should be paid into the hands of his son, to the the
[sic] exclusion of all other persons, whether claiming as alienees or as
creditors.”
Id. at 84, 14 A. at 497.  Turning to the next issue, we acknowledged that the English
decisions and, indeed, those of a majority of the States deciding the issue, held that a
necessary incident to the holding of an equitable estate, or an interest for life, was the right
10
of alienation by the beneficiary, with the result that, without regard to  provisions by way of
limitation or otherwise, such estates are “liable for the payment of [the beneficiary’s] debts.”
Id.   This Court rejected the two grounds on which those decisions rested, i.e., “that the right
of alienation is a necessary incident to an equitable estate for life, and any restraint upon this
right is against the policy of the law which favors the ready alienation of property; and ... that
public policy forbids that one should have the right to enjoy the income of property, to the
exclusion of his creditors,” id. at 87, 14 A. at 498, and, concluding that “the gift of an
equitable right to the income from property for the life of the beneficiary, to the exclusion
of his alienee,” id. at 88, 14 A. at 499, is neither a restraint on the right of alienation nor
against public policy, reached the opposite result.
Our reasoning is instructive on the issue sub judice.  Acknowledging the rule favoring
the free and ready alienation of property and that “the right to sell and dispose of property
... is a necessary incident of course to the absolute ownership of. . . property,” id. At 87, 14
A. at 498,  we pointed out that “the reasons on which the rule is founded do not apply to the
transfer of property in trust,” id. at 87, 14 A. at 499, and that “[t]he law does not. . . forbid
all and any restraints on the right to dispose of [trust property], but only such restraints as
may be deemed against the best interests of the community.”  Id. at 88, 14 A. at 499.  With
regard to the policy issue, we said:
“Now common honesty requires, of course, that every one should pay his
debts, and the policy of the law for centuries has been to subject the property
of a debtor of every kind which he holds in his own right, to the payment of his
debts. He has as owner of such property the right to dispose of it as he pleases,
11
and his interest is, therefore, liable for the payment of his debts. But a cestui
que trust does not hold the estate or interest in his own right; he has but an
equitable and qualified right to the property or to its income, to be held and
enjoyed by the beneficiary on certain terms and conditions prescribed by the
founder of the trust. The legal title is in the trustee, and the cestui que trust
derives his title to the income through the instrument by which the trust is
created. The donor or devisor, as the absolute owner of the property, has the
right to prescribe the terms on which his bounty shall be enjoyed, unless such
terms be repugnant to the law. And it is no answer to say that the gift of an
equitable right to income to the exclusion of creditors is against the policy of
the law. This is begging the question. Why is it against the policy of the law?
What sound principle does it violate? The creditors of the beneficiary have no
right to complain, because the founder of the trust did not give his bounty to
them. And if so, what grounds have they to complain because he has seen
proper to give it in trust to be received by the trustee and to be paid to another,
and not to be liable while in the hands of the trustee to the creditors of the
cestui que trust. All deeds and wills and other instruments by which such trusts
are created, are required by law to be recorded in the public offices, and
creditors have notice of the terms and conditions on which the beneficiary is
entitled to the income of the property. They know that the founder of the trust
has declared that this income shall be paid to the object of his bounty to the
exclusion of creditors, and if under such circumstances they see proper to give
credit to one who has but an equitable and qualified right to the enjoyment of
property, they do so with their eyes open. It cannot be said that credit was
given upon such a qualified right to the enjoyment of the income of property,
or that creditors have been deceived or mislead; and if the beneficiary is
dishonest enough not to apply the income when received by him to the
payment of his debts, creditors have no right to complain because they cannot
subject it in the hands of the trustee to the payment of their claims, against the
express terms of the trust.”
Id. at 88-89, 14 A. at 499-500.
The appellant relies on that portion of the Court’s reasoning that indicates that the
contract creditors are on notice, at least constructively, of the terms of the spendthrift trust
prior to extending credit, along with the fact that this Court, on public policy grounds, has
exempted certain obligations of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust from the rule against
12
attachment or garnishment of the corpus or of the  income in the hands of the trustee.  He
also takes comfort from the position that treatise writers take with respect to the right of tort
judgment creditors to satisfy their judgments from a spendthrift trust; they agree with him
that it should be permitted.  
In Scott on Trusts, Fourth Edition, § 157.5, while acknowledging the paucity of
authority on the subject, it is stated:
“In many of the cases in which it has been held that by the terms of the trust
the interest of a beneficiary may be put beyond the reach of his creditors, the
courts have laid some stress on the fact that the creditors had only themselves
to blame for extending credit to a person whose interest under the trust had
been put beyond their reach. The courts have said that before extending credit
they could have ascertained the extent and character of the debtor's resources.
Certainly, the situation of a tort creditor is quite different from that of a
contract creditor. A man who is about to be knocked down by an automobile
has no opportunity to investigate the credit of the driver of the automobile and
has no opportunity to avoid being injured no matter what the resources of the
driver may be. It may be argued that the settlor can properly impose such
restrictions as he chooses on the property that he gives. But surely he cannot
impose restrictions that are against public policy. It is true that the tortfeasor
may have no other property than that which is given him under the trust, and
that the victim of the tort is no worse off where the tortfeasor has property that
cannot be reached than he would be if the tortfeasor had no property at all.
Nevertheless, there seems to be something rather shocking in the notion that
a man should be allowed to continue in the enjoyment of property without
satisfying the claims of persons whom he has injured.  It may well be held that
it is against public policy to permit the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust to
enjoy an income under the trust without discharging his tort liabilities to
others.
“There is little authority on the question whether the interest of the beneficiary
of a spendthrift trust can be reached by persons against whom he has
committed a tort.  In the absence of authority it was felt by those who were
responsible for the preparation of the Restatement of Trusts that no categorical
statement could be made on the question. It is believed, however, that there is
13
a tendency to recognize that the language of the earlier cases to the effect that
no creditor can reach the interest of a beneficiary of a spendthrift trust is too
broad, and that in view of the cases that have been cited in the previous
sections allowing various classes of claimants to reach the interest of the
beneficiary, the courts may well come to hold that the settlor cannot put the
interest of the beneficiary beyond the reach of those to whom he has incurred
liabilities in tort.”
Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Second Edition, Rev’d, § 224, p. 478, is to like effect:
“[A] person who has a claim for damages against a spendthrift trust
beneficiary, based on the commission of a tort or other wrongful act (not
including a mere breach of contract) should be allowed to secure satisfaction
from the interest of the beneficiary, apparently on the ground that the contrary
result would be against public policy.   It is true that a tort creditor has no
chance to choose his debtor and cannot be said to have assumed the risk of the
collectability of his claim.   The argument for the validity of spendthrift trusts,
based on the notice to the business world of the limited interest of the
beneficiary does not apply.   It may be argued that the beneficiary should not
be permitted to circumvent the case and statute law as to liability for wrongs
by taking advantage of the spendthrift clause.”
A similar sentiment is expressed in Comment a to § 157 of the Restatement Second of Trusts,
wherein it is said:
“The interest of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust ... may be reached in
cases other than those herein enumerated [alimony, child support, taxes], if
considerations of public policy so require.    Thus, it is possible that a person
who has a claim in tort against the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust may be
able to reach his interest under the trust.”
Neither the argument advanced by the appellant, nor the support offered for it is persuasive.
To be sure, this Court has refused to hold, and on public policy grounds, spendthrift
trusts inviolate against indebtedness for alimony arrearages, Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Robertson, supra, 192 Md. at 662-63, 65 A.2d at 296, and for child support.   Zouck v.
7In Prince George’s County Police Pension Plan v. Burke, 321 Md. 699, 584 A. 2d
702 (1991), the issue was the power of the court to “order, as part of a marital property
award, the transfer of a partial interest in a government pension plan to the former spouse
of the participant employee” and “when payable, the direct disbursement of a fractional
share of benefits to the participant’s former spouse.”  Id. at 700, 584 A.2d at 703.  
Answering that the court had such power, the Court explained:
“Whether the pension is a spendthrift trust is immaterial to the issue at
hand.   The husbands’ pensions are not being used to discharge debts that
they owed to their wives.   Rather, the courts called for the equitable
distribution of marital property and ordered that each spouse be paid his or
her rightful portion as it becomes due. ... when a pensioner becomes eligible
to collect, the spouse becomes eligible to collect his or her share as a co-
owner, not as a creditor.”
Id. at 707, 584 A. 2d at 706 (footnote omitted).  See Foley v. Foley, 1997 Conn.
Super.Lexis 2948, *21 (after explaining that the purpose of the spendthrift provision in a
police pension statute was to protect the employee from creditors, the court pointed out
that “[a] spouse is not a creditor.   Once the court exercises its power to transfer
ownership rights in a pension or retirement plan, the ex-spouse, non employee becomes
an owner of a portion of the plan, not a creditor.”).  
8 Article III, Section 38 of the Maryland Constitution provides that
“No person shall be imprisoned for debt, but a valid decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction or agreement approved by decree of said court for
the support of a wife or dependent children, or for the support of an
illegitimate child or children, or for alimony, shall not constitute a debt
within the meaning of this section.”
14
Zouck, supra, 204 Md. at 299, 104 A. 2d at 579.7   Earlier, the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland had reached the same result, permitting a spendthrift trust to be
attached for the payment of United States income taxes. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hofferbert,
58 F. Supp. 701, 705 (D. Md. 1944).   Although decided on policy grounds,  see, Article III,
Section 38 of the Maryland Constitution8 ( providing that no person shall be imprisoned for
failure to pay a debt, but expressly excluding from the definition of debt  valid court decrees
for the payment of support or alimony); Robertson, supra, 192 Md. at 663, 65 A.2d at 296
9The Court described the public policy it applied as follows: “In [the case of claims
for support or alimony] the wife is a favored suitor, and her claim is based upon the
strongest grounds of public policy.”  Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Robertson, 192 Md.
653, 663, 65 A. 2d 292, 296 (1948).
15
(“We rest our decision upon grounds of public policy, not upon any interpretation of the
instruments in question, which are not broad enough to authorize payments by the trustee for
the benefit of a divorced wife.”[9]); Zouck, supra, 204 Md. at 299, 104 A.2d at 579 (noting
that “a contract by a father to support a child, found by a court to be fair and reasonable, and
so, judicially decreed to be enforced, is the equivalent of the decree of a court awarding
support to the child or alimony to a wife, and as such, comes within the rule of public policy
announced and followed in the Robertson case”);  Hoffer Bert, 58 F. Supp. at 705 (observing
that the public policy involved when claims of creditors are pitted against the validity of a
spendthrift trust is “quite different” when the claim is by the government for taxes); none of
these cases was premised on there having been a lack of notice given to the claimants as to
the trust beneficiary’s limited interest in the trust.   Rather, the courts recognized a
fundamental difference between these obligations and those of ordinary contract creditors.
 In Robertson, we, like 1 Scott, Trusts, § 157.1, recognized, and clearly stated, that the
dependents of a spendthrift trust beneficiary “‘are not ‘creditors’ of  the beneficiary, and the
liability of the beneficiary to support them is not a debt.”’ 192 Md. at 660, 65 A.2d at 295,
quoting Scott.   Scott explained that these dependents, the beneficiary’s wife and children,
could enforce their claim for support against the trust estate, because “it is against public
10Restatement of Trusts, § 157 provided:
“Although a trust is a spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the interest of
the beneficiary can be reached in satisfaction of an enforceable claim
against the beneficiary,
“(a)  by the wife or child of the beneficiary for support, or by
the wife for alimony;
“(b)  for necessary services rendered to the beneficiary or
necessary supplies furnished to him;
“(c)  for services rendered and materials furnished which
preserve or benefit the interest of the beneficiary.”  
16
policy to permit the beneficiary to have the enjoyment of the income from the trust while he
refuses to support his dependents whom it is his duty to support,” id. at 661, 65 A.2d at 295,
their claim being “in quite a different position from the ordinary creditors who have
voluntarily extended credit.”  Id.  Focusing specifically on alimony, at issue in that case, the
Court opined:
“We think the view expressed in the Restatement[10] is sound.   The reason for
the rejection of the common law rule, that a condition restraining alienation by
the beneficiary is repugnant to the nature of the estate granted, was simply that
persons extending credit to the beneficiary on a voluntary basis are chargeable
with notice of the conditions set forth in the instrument. ... This reasoning is
inapplicable to a claim for alimony which in Maryland at least, is ‘an award
made by the court for food, clothing, habitation and other necessaries for the
maintenance of the wife. ...’ The obligation continues during the joint lives of
the parties, and is a duty, not a debt.”
Id. at 662, 65 A. 2d at 296 (citations omitted).   See, also McCabe v. McCabe, 210 Md. 308,
314, 123 A.2d 447, 450 (1956) (“This Court has held that alimony represents a duty and not
a debt.”); Oles Envelope Corp. v. Oles, 193 Md. 79, 92, 65 A.2d 899, 905 (1949) (“The
obligation to pay alimony in a divorce proceeding is regarded not as a debt, but as a duty
17
growing out of the marital relation and resting upon sound public policy.”).   Compare
Hitchens v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 193 Md. 62, 67, 66 A.2d 97, 99 (1949)
(specifically declining to apply the rule announced in Robertson to claims for support that
were not judicially-decreed alimony, but arose pursuant to a contractual agreement to pay
money).
Similarly, in Zouck, the Court drew a distinction between the considerations
underlying the balance when the monetary obligation sought to be satisfied is a contract or
ordinary debt and when it is child support.   It noted that the monetary claim in that case was
“based, in essence, upon the statutory obligation of the father, declaratory of the common
law, to support his child.”  204 Md. at 298, 104 A.2d at 579.   See Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md.
386, 398, 788 A.2d 609, 616 (2002) (“This Court historically has recognized a distinction
between a standard debt and a legal duty in domestic circumstances, specifically with respect
to child support, and subscribes to the theory that child support is a duty not a debt.”);
Middleton v. Middleton, 329 Md. 627, 629-33, 620 A.2d 1363, 1364-66 (1993)(analyzing
the debt/duty distinction with respect to parental child support obligation).  Moreover,
pointing out that in this case, the father agreed to meet the parental obligation to support his
child by the payment of $ 25.00 a week, and to this extent, exonerated the child’s mother
from her obligation, the Court was emphatic:
18
“The fact that the father has recognized his obligation and has agreed in
writing to meet it in a specified amount, does not change his duty to a debt nor
does it create the relationship of ordinary contract debtor and creditor between
the father and the child, or the father and the mother, as the representative of
or trustee for the child. ...   His obligation remains the same whether it be
calculated and required by original order of court, by voluntary agreement, or
by voluntary agreement specifically ordered to be performed by order of court.
Nor is it significant that the mother for some years has met the obligation
which the father violated, so that the money he promised to pay week by week,
would now be paid, under court order, in a lump sum. ...  The fundamental
nature of the support looked for by the agreement is not changed because the
husband is now required to pay at one time what he should have paid week by
week.”
Zouck, supra, 204 Md at 298-99, 104 A. 2d at 579 (citations omitted).   We also made the
point that, “[i]n the case of a child, the obligation of the father to support, imposed by law,
cannot be bargained away or waived.”  Id.   The Court concluded, “the agreement by a parent
to support a child, declared to be reasonable and proper, and so, enforceable by a court,
constitutes an obligation which justifies the invasion of a spendthrift trust for its fulfillment.”
 Id. at 300, 104 A.2d at 580.
Similarly, the obligation to pay taxes and, thus, tax arrearages, is not to be considered
debt, nor is the government to be viewed as a mere creditor.   Addressing and resolving this
very point, the Hofferbert court distinguished the public policy underlying the tax obligation
and that underlying ordinary or contract debts:
“The reasons which have actuated some courts, as in Maryland, to uphold
19
spendthrift trust against the claims of a creditors do not necessarily apply to tax
claims of the government either federal or State.  The public policy involved
is quite different.  In the one case the donor of the property has the right to
protect the beneficiary against his own voluntary improvident or financial
misfortune; but in the other the public interest is directly affected with respect
to collection of taxes for the support of the government.  The imposition of the
tax burden is not voluntary by the beneficiary.” 
Hofferbert, supra, 58 F. Supp. at 706 (emphasis added).  
 Ms. Ryon’s estate is a mere judgment creditor of McGee, the beneficiary.   The  Trust
simply has no legal duty to Ms. Ryon’s estate and certainly no obligation  to provide support.
Thus the rationale underlying the decisions permitting the invasion of a spendthrift trust for
the payment of alimony, child support or taxes have absolutely no applicability to the
obligation in this case.   Indeed, to permit the invasion of the Trust to pay the tort judgments
of the beneficiary, in addition to thwarting the trust donor’s intent by, in effect, imposing
liability on the Trust for the wrongful acts of the trust beneficiary, is, as the appellees argue,
to create an exception for “tort victims” or “victims of crime.”  
By equating, for purposes of determining whether to permit invasion of a spendthrift
trust, the tort judgment creditor with the dependents of a trust beneficiary, to whom the
beneficiary has a duty of support, or to the government, that is owed a duty to pay taxes, we
would create a distinction between debts and creditors and a basis for exempting such
creditors from the impediment to recovery that spendthrift trusts present.  The appellant
11  The appellant argues that McGee has invaded the Trust corpus to pay legal fees
in connection with his criminal trial and appeals to overturn his conviction. McGee does
not have authority to compel either the termination of the trust or  payments under the
trust.  The Trust grants full authority and discretion to the Trustee to decide those
questions.  McGee may request the Trustee to use the trust corpus to pay for his defense
and that could be done if, in the discretion of the Trustee, that use of the corpus is 
deemed acceptable.   A different situation is presented if the Trustee were to terminate the
20
offers a rationale for drawing the distinction, whether the interests of the creditor are “great
enough” to permit invasion of the trust.   He relies on a portion of our discussion of the
validity of spendthrift trusts in Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Washington County Nat. Sav.
Bank, 297 Md. 691, 467 A.2d 758 (1983).   After acknowledging  that Maryland generally
recognizes the validity of spendthrift provisions, which prevent creditors from reaching trust
funds and concluding that, by “logical extension ... a spendthrift trust can effectively protect
retirement benefits,” id. at  706,  467 A.2d at 766, we commented: “The employer makes
contributions to the trust to provide for the employee upon retirement. The creditor's interests
are not great enough to permit an invasion of this trust.”  Id.  From this comment, the
appellant concludes: “... the Court accepted the concept that certain creditors’ interests can
be great enough to ignore the “spendthrift” terms of a trust.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 7).
We are not convinced.   This is a very slender reed on which to base such an important
concept.   Moreover, given the context of the Court’s comment, it is not at all inconsistent
with Robertson or Zouck.11 
trust and pay the trust corpus to McGee.   The issue then would be whether that payment
would constitute a “periodic payment,” barring the appellant’s attachment.
21
To be sure, the Supreme Court of Mississippi quite recently held that, “as a matter of
public policy. . . a beneficiary’s interest in spendthrift trust assets is not immune from
attachment to satisfy the claims of the beneficiary’s intentional or gross negligence tort
creditors.” Sligh v. First National Bank of Holmes County, 704 So.2d 1020, 1029 (Miss.
1997).   There, the plaintiff and his wife brought suit against an uninsured and intoxicated
motorist/defendant for injuries arising from a traffic accident which resulted in the plaintiff’s
paralysis.  The defendant was the beneficiary under two spendthrift trust established by his
late mother.  Having obtained a default judgment for $5,000,000 in compensatory and
punitive damages in their action alleging gross negligence, the plaintiffs sought to attach the
defendant’s interest under the spendthrift trusts. 
In arriving at its holding, the court acknowledged the four exceptions to the rule
prohibiting the invasion of a spendthrift trust enumerated in the Restatement, i.e., claims: for
support of child or wife; for necessaries; for “services rendered and materials furnished
which preserve or benefit the interest of the beneficiary; for State or federal taxes, id. at
1026, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 157, and a fifth, when the trust is “a self-
settled trust, i.e., where the trust is for the benefit of the donor,”  it had itself recognized   Id.,
22
citing Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 204 So.2d 856, 859 (Miss.
1967).   Conceding that § 157 of the Restatement does not list an exception for involuntary
tort creditors, the court found support for its position in Comment a to that section, which,
as we have seen, admits of the possibility of a tort claimant with a claim against the
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust being able to reach that beneficiary’s interest.  Sligh, supra,
704 So.2d at 1026.  It also was persuaded by those portions of Scott, The Law of Trusts and
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, quoted herein and to which the appellant referred us.  Id. at
1027.   Finally, the court rejected the three public policy considerations it identified from its
own precedents upholding the validity of spendthrift  trust provisions: “(1) the right of donors
to dispose of their property as they wish; (2) the public interest in protecting spendthrift
individuals from personal pauperism, so that they do not become public burdens; and (3) the
responsibility of creditors to make themselves aware of their debtors’ spendthrift trust
protections.”  Id. at 1027.   
This is the minority position, which the Sligh court admitted.   See, Sligh, 704 So.2d
at 1026, citing Thackara v. Mintzer, 100 Pa. 151, 1882 Pa. Lexis 34, (1882); Kirk v. Kirk,
456 P.2d 1009, 254 Ore. 44 (1969).  See also, Davies v. Harrison, 3 Pa. D.& C. 481 (Pa.
1923); Kirkpatrick v. United States Nat’l Bank, 502 P.2d 579 (Or. 1972); United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Boyle, 418 F. Supp. 406 (D. D.C. 1976), aff’d, 567 F.2d 112 (D. C. Cir.
12Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts §  365 (2d ed. 1974).
23
1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 956, 98 S. Ct. 1589, 55 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1978).   In Mintzer, the
issue was whether a spendthrift trust could be attached for the payment of a judgment for
alimony awarded to the wife of the trust beneficiary.  100 Pa. at 154.  Answering in the
negative, the court stated, broadly:
“The attachment issued on a debt of record fixed by judgment and decree.
Whether the judgment be for a breach of contract or for a tort, matters not. The
testator recognized no such distinction. He impressed on the fund exemption
from all kinds of legal process against the trustee, not only for debts, but also
for ‘all liabilities whatever’ of [the beneficiary].”
Id. at 154-55.   In Kirk, the monies due to the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust were attached
to enforce the payment of a tort judgment.   Although recognizing exceptions for alimony and
child support, the court held that the beneficiary’s income from the trust could not be
attached prior to its receipt by him.   456 P.2d at 1010.
Other than language in 
Gibson v. Speegle, 1984 Del. Ch. Lexis 475, *6, characterizing
as sound the conclusion of the authors of several respected treatises on trusts, i. e., Scott,
Bogert and Griswold,12 that “tort claimants should not be considered ‘creditors’ for purposes
of a spendthrift trust provision” and an approving  reference to Comment a to § 157 of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts in Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Winter,  101 Misc. 2d 17, 20, 420
13California: Ca. Prob. Code §  15305.5 (trustee of a spendthrift trust may be
ordered to pay a judgment of restitution against a beneficiary who has committed a
felony; where the trustee has discretion whether to make payments, the trustee may be
ordered to pay the judgment if he elects to pay anything).
 Georgia: O.C.G.A. §  53-12-28 (c) (2002) (spendthrift provisions are valid except
for certain claims against distributions, among which are tort judgments).
  Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2005 (West 1991) (A beneficiary’s interest in a
spendthrift trust may be seized to satisfy a judgment for “an offense or quasi-offense
committed by the beneficiary or by a person for whose acts the beneficiary is individually
responsible.”)
14 See, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 1877, Symposium on Law in the Twentieth Century:
Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust Law at the Century’s End.
(“An almost amusing reversal of direction was the prompt 1998 legislation in Mississippi
to overturn the widely acclaimed Sligh v. First National Bank. Sligh had introduced a
policy-based spendthrift exception for the benefit of victims of a beneficiary's gross
negligence or recklessness.  Furthermore, lengthy and vigorous debates in the last few
24
N.Y.S.2d 599, 601 (1979), and statutes codifying the result,13 Sligh is the only case we have
found, and the only case that the appellant has cited, which holds expressly that a spendthrift
trust may be invaded to pay the judgment of an intentional or gross negligence tort-judgment
creditor.   See also St. Paul & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 583 F. Supp 1221, 1228-29 (N. D. Ala.
1984), aff’d. 752 F. 2d 550 (11th Cir. 1985), in which the insurer of an employer, who had
been defrauded by his employee, a beneficiary under an ERISA trust, was permitted to reach
that employee’s entire interest in the trust and, notwithstanding that the employee was
entitled to only periodic payments, to receive payment immediately.
Sligh is no longer the law of Mississippi.14   A mere five months after the decision in
years have eventually led to no significant changes or trends in rules identifying
privileged claimants who can penetrate the spendthrift shield.  This is particularly so with
reference to privileged status that applies to certain governmental claimants, and often
applies to alimony and the support claims of children and spouses and to certain claims
for necessities and for protection of a beneficiary's trust interest.”)(citations omitted).
25
Sligh, by ch. 460, §  2, Laws, 1998, effective  March 23, 1998, the Mississippi Legislature
passed the Family Trust Preservation Act of 1998.   Miss. Code Ann. §  91-9-503  (2003),
relevant to this case, provides:
“Beneficiary’s Interest not subject to transfer; restrictions on transfers and
enforcement of money judgments
“Except as provided in Section 91-9-509, if the trust instrument provides that
a beneficiary’s interest in income or principal or both of a trust is not subject
to voluntary or involuntary transfer, the beneficiary’s interest in income or
principal or both under the trust may not be transferred and is not subject to the
enforcement of a money judgment until paid to the beneficiary.”
In addition, while a New York State trial court in Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Winter,
supra, 101 Misc. 2d at 20, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 601, had held that, because of his disloyalty, the
interest of a beneficiary, who had been convicted of stealing from his employer, in an
employment trust, was not exempt from attachment, despite the spendthrift provision
applicable to it, on appeal, the Appellate Division modified that decision, holding that the
employee’s interest was exempt from the claims of tort creditors.  74 A.D.2d 195, 199, 426
26
N.Y.S. 2d 778, 781 (1980), aff’d, 419 N. E. 2d 1078 (1981).    And in Speegle, despite the
Chancellor’s favorable inclination toward tort-judgment creditors, a statute prevented him
from adopting the view he clearly favored.  1984 Del. Ch. 475, *6-7.   
 We are not persuaded, in any event, by the reasoning of the Sligh court.   It is true that
the court acknowledged the exceptions for alimony and for child support.   Missing from the
court’s opinion, however, is any analysis of the basis for those exceptions.   The Mississippi
Supreme Court, although noting the donor’s intention as, perhaps, the most important public
policy consideration it addressed, concluded that, because the law has generally recognized
exceptions, i.e., for support, alimony, taxes, to the spendthrift doctrine, the rights of trust
donors to dispose of property as they wish are not absolute. 704 So.2d at 1028.  This
statement, although accurate, does not analyze why the law carved out these particular
exceptions, which, as the court recognized, effectively takes precedence over the trust
donor’s intent.  
To be sure, a contract creditor is on notice as to the terms of a spendthrift trust and,
on that account, is able to regulate his or her conduct in light of that information.   That is not
the critical basis for the exception of alimony and support from the rule, however.  Robertson
and Zouck, as our opinions make clear, relied heavily on the fact that the obligation was a
duty and not a debt. Robertson, supra,192 Md. at 660, 65 A. 2d at 295; Zouck, supra, 204
15The Uniform Trust Act, drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws, does not advocate including tort judgment creditors among the 
creditors able to invade spendthrift trusts.  Section 503, “Exceptions to Spendthrift
Provision,” provides:
“(a) In this section, "child" includes any person for whom an order or
judgment for child support has been entered in this or another State.
“(b) Even if a trust contains a spendthrift provision, a beneficiary's child,
spouse, or former spouse who has a judgment or court order against the
beneficiary for support or maintenance, or a judgment creditor who has
provided services for the protection of a beneficiary's interest in the trust,
may obtain from a court an order attaching present or future distributions to
or for the benefit of the beneficiary.
“(c) A spendthrift provision is unenforceable against a claim of this State or
the United States to the extent a statute of this State or federal law so
provides.”
The commentary to that section indicates that “[t]he drafters ... declined to create an
exception for tort claimants.”  See, Comment, Uniform Trust Act § 503, 7C U.L.A 76
(Supp. 2002).
27
Md. at 298-99, 104 A.2d at 579.  That is also the theme that runs through Hofferbert.  58 F.
Supp. at 705.  In none of these cases was notice mentioned as a basis for the decision.   That
a tort-judgment creditor is not on notice that he or she will be injured and thereby will incur
a loss goes without saying, but, with due respect to the near unanimous commentators,15 that
fact alone does not make the claim he or she makes in respect of the loss anything other than
a debt or make its exemption from the bar of a spendthrift trust, a matter of public policy. 
There is another reason that we reject the appellant’s attempt to obtain an exemption
28
from the bar of the spendthrift trust.   Our case law reflects, as the appellant points out, that
this Court has, over time, expanded the class of persons permitted to invade a spendthrift
trust in satisfaction of obligations owed by beneficiaries, and, as a natural consequence of
that expansion, frustrated, in some cases, the intent of the trust settlors.  The exceptions to
the spendthrift doctrine were recognized by this Court based on clear public policy
considerations.  The public policy that the appellant identifies and on which he relies is that
of prohibiting criminals from benefitting financially from their crimes.   As indicated, to
establish the existence of the public policy, he points to the “Son of Sam” statute, the Slayer’s
Rule and the Prisoners’ Litigation Act.  Proceeding from that premise, he argues that McGee,
a convicted felony murderer, should not be allowed to receive benefits from the trust to the
exclusion of his creditors.  
Certainly, the public policy of this State does not countenance a system wherein
criminals are allowed to derive a financial benefit from their illegal activity, thus putting the
lie to the oft stated admonition, “crime does not pay.”   In fact, this State has announced, it
is true, a clear public policy in that regard.   We, however, agree with the appellees that the
public policy goals on which  the appellant’s arguments are based, as strong and clear as they
are, have no applicability to the case sub judice and, thus, do not, and cannot, inform our
decision.   McGee is not, in any discernible manner, benefitting from the crime for which he
29
was convicted and ultimately imprisoned.  Clearly, any benefit McGee receives from the
Trust vested prior to the commission of his criminal acts and is completely independent of,
and separate from, his criminal conviction.  As the appellees point out, “McGee’s situation
is not in any way analogous to one where a criminal is ‘rewarded’ for his criminal acts by
means of book, television, or movie royalties, or by inheriting from his victim’s estate.”
Unlike the criminal at whom the “Son of Sam” legislation and the Slayer’s Rule are aimed,
the benefit McGee derives from the Trust and the criminal acts he committed are not related
at all.  The technically and legally more accurate statement is that McGee is benefitting from
his status as a life beneficiary under a trust established by his deceased mother.  It is simply
incorrect to say that McGee is, in any manner, benefitting from his crimes.  Consequently,
we decline to frame our analysis on the public policy goals set forth by the appellant.   
 
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
 
Dissenting Opinion follows:
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 39
September Term, 2002
ROBERT RYON DUVALL, et al.
v.
JAMES CALVERT MCGEE, et al.
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:    June 16, 2003
Battaglia, J. Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Katherine Ryon was beaten to death during the course of a robbery that occurred in
her home.  After James Calvert McGee was convicted of felony-murder for his participation
in the robbery and murder of Ms. Ryon, a money judgment was entered against him pursuant
to a settlement agreement, in which McGee compromised civil claims brought against him
by Robert Duvall, the Personal Representative of the Estate of Ms. Ryon.  The majority today
concludes that Ms. Ryon’s estate cannot enforce its judgment against McGee’s interest in an
$877,000.00 spendthrift trust established for him by his deceased mother.  The majority
acknowledges that claimants seeking alimony, child support, and unpaid taxes may attach a
beneficiary’s interest in a spendthrift trust, but concludes that the victim of a violent tort may
not, reasoning that such a victim is only “a mere judgment creditor.”  For the reasons
expressed herein, I respectfully disagree.
A spendthrift trust is a trust that restrains the voluntary or involuntary transfer of a
beneficiary’s interest in the trust.  See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 152(2)(1959).  As
the majority points out, this Court first acknowledged the validity of spendthrift trusts in
Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 14 A. 497 (1888).  In that case, our predecessors recognized that
although “the right to sell and dispose of property . . . is a necessary incident . . . to the
absolute ownership of . . . property,” the “law does not . . . forbid all and any restraints on the
right to dispose of [trust property].”  Id. at 87-88, 14 A. at 498-99.  The law forbids, “only
such restraints as may be deemed against the best interests of the community.”  Id. at 88, 14
A. at 499.  “The donor or devisor” of trust, the Smith court stated, is “the absolute owner of
the property” and “has the right to prescribe the terms on which his bounty shall be enjoyed,
1 Fourth Edition, § 157.5, p. 220. 
-2-
unless such terms be repugnant to the law.”  Id. at 88-89, 14 A. at 499.  The Smith court
reasoned that the gift of an equitable right to the exclusion of creditors is not “repugnant to
the law” because “[a]ll deeds and wills and other instruments by which such trusts are
created, are required by law to be recorded in the public offices, and creditors have notice of
the terms and conditions on which the beneficiary is entitled to the income of the property.”
Id.  Thus, if creditors choose to extend credit to such debtors, “they do so with their eyes
open.”  Id.  
Ms. Ryon, of course, did not have the luxury of assessing the extent and character of
McGee’s financial resources before he robbed her and she died.  For this reason, most legal
scholars agree that tort creditors should not be precluded from recovering against a
tortfeasor’s interest in a spendthrift trust.  According to Scott on Trusts,
A man who is about to be knocked down by an automobile has no opportunity
to investigate the credit of the driver of the automobile and has no opportunity
to avoid being injured no matter what the resources of the driver may be . . .
. [T]here seems to be something rather shocking in the notion that a man
should be allowed to continue in the enjoyment of property without satisfying
the claims of persons whom he has injured.  It may well be held that it is
against public policy to permit the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust to enjoy an
income under the trust without discharging his tort liabilities to others.1 
2 Second Edition, Rev’d, § 224, p. 479.
-3-
Similarly, and significantly, in Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, it is emphasized that, “the
validity of spendthrift trusts . . . does not apply” and that the beneficiary should not,
therefore, “be permitted to circumvent the case and statute law as to liability for wrongs by
taking advantage of the spendthrift clause.”2
The majority concedes that tort creditors do not have the benefit of notice, which, as
was discussed in Smith, supra, is a primary purpose for not allowing the invasion of
spendthrift trusts.  Despite this, the majority concludes that Ms. Ryon’s estate cannot reach
the corpus of the spendthrift trust because its claim is nothing other “than a debt” and that
“its exemption from the bar of a spendthrift trust” is not “a matter of public policy.”  The
majority, in my opinion, is wrong. 
This Court has held that a beneficiary’s interest in a spendthrift trust may be attached
to satisfy claims for alimony arrearages and for child support.  See, e.g., Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. v. Robertson, 192 Md. 653, 663, 65 A. 2d 292, 296 (1949); Zouck v Zouck, 204 Md. 285,
300, 104 A.2d 573, 580 (1954).  Also, a spendthrift trust was attached for the payment of
federal income taxes in Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hofferbert, 58 F. Supp 701, 705-06 (D. Md.
1944).  “[N]one of these cases,” the majority states, “was premised on there having been a
lack of notice . . . .  Rather, the courts recognized a fundamental difference between these
obligations and those of ordinary contract creditors.”  The fundamental difference is
essentially that these obligations were premised upon judicial intervention and determination
of sound public policy.
-4-
Just as it is sound public policy to permit the attachment of a spendthrift trust for
alimony, child support, and taxes, it is also as sound to permit invasion to make victims of
tortious conduct whole.  Indeed, a tortfeasor may be liable not only for compensatory
damages, but also punitive damages, which we allow in order to “punish the wrongdoer and
to deter such conduct by the wrongdoer and others in the future.”  Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden,
330 Md. 632, 661, 625 A.2d 959, 972 (1993).  Consequently, to equate victims of tortious
conduct with contract creditors and distinguish them from recipients of alimony, child
support, and tax claims, is without merit.
As the majority concedes, spendthrift trusts are considered valid in Maryland in large
part because, by virtue of filing requirements, creditors are put on at least constructive notice
of the limited interest of the beneficiary of such a trust.  Such notice allows creditors to
protect themselves, something that Ms. Ryon could not have done.  Moreover, the “duty-
debt” distinction set forth by the majority as the basis for its holding is unavailing.  The
obligation to restitute a wrong is commensurate with the obligations to pay alimony, child
support, and taxes.  I agree with the commentators that “it is against public policy to permit
the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust to enjoy an income under the trust without discharging
his tort liabilities to others.”  See Scott on Trusts, supra.  Consequently, I respectfully dissent.