Case Title: Ex parte B.C.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1130250

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2015-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:01/30/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
____________________
1130250
____________________
Ex parte B.C.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: A.H.
v.
B.C.)
(Limestone Juvenile Court, JU-13-25.01;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2120877)
BOLIN, Justice.
This Court granted B.C.'s petition for certiorari review
based on our recent decision in Ex parte L.J., [Ms. 1121462,
1130250
September 30, 2014]     So. 3d     (Ala. 2014), in which this
Court held that a juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction
under § 12-15-114, Ala. Code 1975, of the Alabama Juvenile
Justice Act, § 12-15-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the AJJA"),
over a termination-of-parental-rights action when the subject
of the termination was not a child alleged "to have committed
a delinquent act, to be dependent, or to be in need of
supervision."  We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
In 2008, B.C. ("the mother") gave birth to a child.  In
October 2010, the Limestone Juvenile Court entered a judgment
adjudicating A.H. ("the father") to be the father of the
child.  On February 13, 2013, the mother filed a petition in
the juvenile court seeking to terminate the father's parental
rights to the child.  In her petition, the mother alleged that 
the father had abandoned the child, that he had failed to
maintain contact with the child, that he had failed to adjust
his circumstances to fit the needs of the child, and that he
had failed to provide financial support for the child.   The
mother did not allege that the child was dependent,
delinquent, or in need of supervision.
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On June 25, 2013, the juvenile court conducted a hearing
on the mother's petition at which ore tenus evidence was
presented.  The father did not attend the hearing, but he was
represented by legal counsel at that hearing.  The father's
attorney moved to dismiss the termination-of-parental-rights
proceeding 
on 
the 
ground 
of 
lack 
of 
subject-matter
jurisdiction because, he argued, § 12–15–114(a), Ala. Code
1975, 
grants 
the 
juvenile 
court 
exclusive 
original
jurisdiction 
only over those juvenile proceedings in which 
the
child is alleged to be dependent, delinquent, or in need of
supervision. Section 12–15–114(a) states that "[a] dependency
action shall not include a custody dispute between parents."
Before an amendment to the AJJA effective April 9, 2014, §
12–15–114(c) provided that the juvenile court also had
exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings "arising out
of the above juvenile court proceedings," i.e., arising out of
dependency, delinquency, and child-in-need-of-supervision
proceedings, as set out in subsection (a). The father noted
that former § 12–15–30(b)(6), Ala. Code 1975 (which had been
part of the AJJA prior to 2008 amendments to the AJJA
revising, renumbering, and merging the AJJA with the Child
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Protection Act, § 26-18-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the
CPA")), provided 
that the juvenile court 
had jurisdiction over
all termination-of-parental-rights proceedings.  The father
asserted that the legislature, when it enacted § 12-15-114,
limited the juvenile court's jurisdiction in termination-of-
parental-rights proceedings to those cases "arising out of"
dependency, delinquency, and child-in-need-of-supervision
proceedings.  Because the mother did not allege that the child
was dependent, i.e., without a fit parent to provide for the
child's care, the father argued that she, as a custodial
parent, could not seek termination of his parental rights in
the juvenile court. The juvenile court denied the father's
motion to dismiss. 
On June 27, 2013, the juvenile court entered a judgment
terminating the father's parental rights. In that judgment,
the juvenile court did not make a finding that the child was
dependent, delinquent, or in need of supervision. The father
timely filed his notice of appeal.  A majority of the Court of
Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the juvenile court,
holding that the judgment was void because the mother's
petition to terminate the father's parental rights did not
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arise out of a dependency, delinquency, or child-in-need-of-
supervision proceeding as required by § 12-15-114.  A.H. v.
B.C., [Ms. 2120877, November 13, 2013]     So. 3d     (Ala.
Civ. App. 2013).  
Discussion
In Ex parte L.J., supra, this Court explained that the
2008 amendments to the AJJA, which became effective January 1,
2009, revised and reorganized the CPA, which, until then,
governed cases involving the termination of parental rights,
and essentially merged the CPA and the AJJA. The 2008
amendments to the AJJA also revised and renumbered an earlier
version of the AJJA, resulting in what we referred to in Ex
parte L.J. as "the 2008 AJJA."  Former § 12–15–30(b)(2), Ala.
Code 1975, for example, has been revised and is now set out in
§ 12–15–115(a)(1) and (a)(2), Ala. Code 1975.
In L.J. we noted:
"Under the former Juvenile Justice Act, §
12–15–30(a)[, Ala. Code 1975,] provided that the
juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction
over proceedings in which a child was alleged to be
dependent, delinquent, or in need of supervision. 
Former § 12–15–30(b)(6) further provided that the
juvenile 
court 
also 
had 
exclusive 
original
jurisdiction over proceedings for the 'termination
of parental rights.'"
5
1130250
___ So. 3d at ___.
Under the CPA, before the 2008 amendments merging the CPA
and the AJJA, the legislature had allowed a parent to initiate
such an action.  In Ex parte Beasley, 564 So. 2d 950 (Ala.
1990), construing the CPA, this Court held that a finding of
dependency was not a requisite element of proof when one
parent sought to terminate the parental rights of the other
parent of the child.  Ex parte L.J.,     So. 3d at    . 
In 2008, when the legislature merged the AJJA with the
CPA and revised and renumbered both, the legislature set out
the juvenile court's jurisdiction in §§ 12–15–114, 12–15–115,
and 12–15–116, Ala. Code 1975.  With regard to whether a
juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction under § 12-15-114
over 
a 
termination-of-parental-rights 
petition 
when 
the 
ground
for seeking the termination does not involve a child alleged
"to have committed a delinquent act, to be dependent, or to be
in need of supervision," this Court stated in Ex parte L.J.:
"Section 12–15–114(a) grants the juvenile court
exclusive 
original 
jurisdiction 
over 
juvenile
proceedings where the child is alleged to be
dependent, delinquent, or in need of supervision.
Section 12–15–114(a) states that 'a dependency
action shall not include a custody dispute between
parents.' Section 12–15–114(c) goes on to provide
that the juvenile court shall also have exclusive
6
1130250
original jurisdiction over proceedings 'arising out
of the above juvenile court proceedings,' i.e.,
dependency, 
delinquency, 
and 
child-in-need-of-
supervision proceedings, as set out in subsection
(a).
 Former § 12–15–30(b)(6) gave the juvenile
[1]
court 
jurisdiction 
over 
all 
termination-of-parental-
rights proceedings. Construing the language in §
12–15–114, the Court of Civil Appeals concluded that
the legislature had limited the juvenile court's
jurisdiction 
in 
termination-of-parental-rights
proceedings to those cases 'arising out of'
dependency, 
delinquency, 
and 
child-in-need-of-
supervision cases. Because the mother did not allege
that the child was dependent, i.e., without a fit
parent to provide care, the Court of Civil Appeals
held that she, as a custodial parent, could not seek
termination of the other parent's parental rights in
the juvenile court.
"'We note that "[t]he intent of the
Legislature is the polestar of statutory
construction." Siegelman v. Alabama Ass'n
of School Bds., 819 So. 2d 568, 579 (Ala.
2001). See also Richardson v. PSB Armor,
Inc., 682 So. 2d 438, 440 (Ala. 1996);
Jones v. Conradi, 673 So. 2d 389, 394 (Ala.
1995); Ex parte Jordan, 592 So. 2d 579, 581
(Ala. 1992). "[T]he starting point for all
statutory 
interpretation 
is 
the 
language 
of
the 
statute 
itself," 
and 
"[i]f 
the
statutory language is clear, no further
inquiry is appropriate." Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta v. Thomas, 220 F.3d 1235,
1239 (11th Cir. 2000). "If the statutory
language is ambiguous, however, courts may
examine extrinsic materials, including
legislative 
history, 
to 
determine
As noted earlier and as noted in Ex parte L.J., an
1
amendment to the AJJA effective April 9, 2014, deleted this
language.
7
1130250
[legislative] intent." Id. It is also true
that "[i]n attempting to ascertain the
legislative intent of a particular statute
or provision therein, it is permissible to
look to the law as it existed prior to such
statute's enactment." Reeder v. State ex
rel. Myers, 294 Ala. 260, 265, 314 So. 2d
853, 857 (1975). In that connection,
"courts [also] consider contemporaneous
events 
surrounding 
enactment 
of 
the
statute." Baylor v. New Jersey Dep't of
Human Servs., Div. of Pub. Welfare, 235
N.J. Super. 22, 41, 561 A.2d 618, 628
(1989), aff'd, 127 N.J. 286, 604 A.2d 110
(1990).'
"Pinigis v. Regions Bank, 977 So. 2d 446, 450–51
(Ala. 2007).
"In Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Seven Up
Bottling Co. of Jasper, Inc., 746 So. 2d 966, 969
(Ala. 
1999), 
this 
Court 
stated: 
'[W]hen
circumstances surrounding the enactment of a statute
cast doubt on the otherwise clear language of the
statute, 
we 
must 
look 
to 
other 
factors 
in
determining legislative intent.' This Court further
stated in Archer Daniels:
"'As the plaintiff correctly points out, §
6–5–60[, Ala.Code 1975,] is not, on its
face, limited to transactions involving
intrastate commerce. We hasten to add,
however, that there is no language in §
6–5–60 that conclusively indicates an
intent on the Legislature's part to
regulate 
transactions 
involving 
the
shipment 
of 
goods 
through 
interstate
commerce. Because the language of § 6–5–60,
standing alone, is not conclusive on the
question 
of 
legislative 
intent, 
and 
because
other factors, including the legislative
history 
of 
Alabama's 
antitrust 
statutes, 
as
8
1130250
well as the state of the law at the time of
their enactment, cast doubt on the original
intent of the Legislature, we find it
necessary to look beyond the language of
the statute.'
"746 So. 2d at 973.
"The 
foregoing 
rationale 
applies 
to 
this 
Court's
determination of legislative intent with respect to
§ 12–15–114. As our earlier discussion of the
history of the 2008 AJJA indicates, it was well
settled prior to the enactment of the 2008 AJJA that
juvenile courts had exclusive original jurisdiction
over all termination-of-parental-rights petitions.
This included a petition filed by a parent seeking
to terminate the parental rights of the other parent
of the child, based on our decision in Ex parte
Beasley[, 564 So. 2d 950 (Ala. 1990),] in which we
held that a finding of dependency was not required
in such a case. We stated in Beasley that it would
be illogical for a parent, who is adequately caring
for the child, to have to prove that he or she is
not providing adequate care (i.e., that the child is
dependent) in order to bring such an action, because
the petitioning parent would then be estopped from
bringing the action. In light of the history of the
2008 AJJA, if the legislature had intended for the
circuit court, as a court of general jurisdiction,
to now have jurisdiction over termination petitions
filed by one parent against the other parent, it
would not have done so by legislative silence.
Additionally, it is unlikely that the legislature
would place jurisdiction over termination petitions
in two different courts.
"It is also unlikely that the legislature, in
providing that the juvenile court has jurisdiction
of termination petitions arising out of dependency,
delinquency, 
or 
child-in-need-of-supervision
proceedings, intended to prohibit one parent from
filing a petition seeking to terminate the parental
9
1130250
rights of the other parent. As Judge Pittman noted
in his dissent in C.C. v. L.J., [[Ms. 2120534,
September 6, 2013] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App.
2013),] the legislature, in adopting the entirety of
the 2008 AJJA, provided that a parent may bring a
petition to terminate the parental rights of the
other parent of the child. § 12–15–317. If the
legislature intended to foreclose a parent from
bringing a termination petition by first requiring
an allegation of dependency, it would not have also
provided for the right to bring such a termination
petition in the 2008 AJJA.
"It is also unlikely that the legislature
intended to foreclose a parent from filing a
termination petition against another parent, but
then to allow a parent to file a termination
petition against the other parent when a stepparent
wants to adopt the child. In S.N.W. v. M.D.F.H., 127
So. 3d 1225 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013), the stepfather of
the child filed a petition in the probate court
seeking to adopt the child. After the case was
transferred to the juvenile court, the mother filed
a petition to terminate the biological father's
parental rights in order for the stepfather to adopt
the child. The father argued that the juvenile court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under 
§ 12–15–114
to terminate his parental rights because the
underlying action did not begin as a dependency,
delinquency, 
or 
child-in-need-of-supervision
proceeding. Without referring to § 12–15–115(a)(4),
which provides the juvenile court with original
jurisdiction over proceedings transferred from the
probate court, the Court of Civil Appeals held that
§ 26–10A–3, Ala. Code 1975, a provision of the
Alabama Adoption Code, provides that the probate
court has jurisdiction over adoption proceedings and
that it has jurisdiction to transfer a case to the
juvenile 
court 
for 
the 
limited 
purpose 
of
terminating parental rights. The Court of Civil
Appeals held that because § 26–10A–3 does not
mandate that the termination-of-parental-rights
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1130250
proceeding be predicated on a dependency proceeding
or a finding of dependency, the juvenile court had
jurisdiction to entertain the mother's petition to
terminate the father's parental rights so as to
allow the stepfather to adopt the child. We see no
reason for the legislature to have provided that a
parent be allowed to terminate the parental rights
of the other parent simply because a stepparent
adoption is involved, but not allow a parent to
bring a termination proceeding when there is no
pending stepparent adoption.
"It is unlikely that the legislature intended
for a noncustodial parent to be able to bring a
termination petition against the custodial parent
while not allowing a custodial parent to bring such
a petition. In T.K. v. M.G., 82 So. 3d 1 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2011), a majority of the Court of Civil Appeals
held that a father, who was not the custodial
parent, could bring a dependency petition against
the custodial mother invoking the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court under § 12–15–114. The Court of
Civil Appeals concluded that for the purpose of
jurisdiction of the juvenile court, having a fit
noncustodial parent who is willing and able to care
for the child does not preclude a juvenile court
from finding that the child is dependent. It does
not follow that the legislature would prohibit a
custodial parent from filing a termination petition
while allowing a noncustodial parent to do so. The
2008 AJJA defines a 'dependent child' to include a
child who 'is in need of care or supervision' and
'[w]ho is without a parent, legal guardian, or legal
custodian willing and able to provide for the care,
support, 
or 
education 
of 
the 
child.' 
§
12–15–102(8)a.2., Ala. Code 1975. So long as the
parent is fit, it should make no difference whether
that parent currently has custody."
    So. 3d at    .
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We recognized in Ex parte L.J. that, while that appeal
was  pending, the legislature amended § 12-15-114 to indicate
that its intent in enacting the 2008 amendments to the AJJA
was not to change the juvenile court's jurisdiction over all
termination-of-parental-rights cases.  We held that "a
juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction under § 12–15–114
over a termination-of-parental-rights claim when the subject
of the termination was not a child alleged 'to have committed
a delinquent act, to be dependent, or to be in need of
supervision.'"  Ex parte L.J., ___ So. 3d at ___.
In the present case, we conclude, based on our holding in
Ex parte L.J., that the judgment of the juvenile court was not
void because it did not find the child to be delinquent,
dependent, or in need of supervision.   Accordingly, we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand
the cause for that court to consider any arguments that may
have been pretermitted by the Court of Civil Appeals' analysis
of the effect of § 12-15-114.  
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stuart, Parker, Murdock, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
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