Case Title: State v. Goodwin

Citation: 1999-Ohio-356

Docket Number: 19971187

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Goodwin, 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 1999-Ohio-356.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. GOODWIN, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Goodwin (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 331.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Concession of guilt by defense counsel — 
Counsel not ineffective, when — Prior calculation and design proven, when 
— Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 97-1187 — Submitted June 9, 1998 — Decided January 20, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 68531. 
 
On September 13, 1994, appellant Michael Goodwin, James Padgett, and 
James Johnson robbed the Big Star Market at East 55th Street and Quimby 
Avenue in Cleveland.  During the course of the robbery, Mustafa Sammour, a 
store clerk, was fatally shot. 
 
Between 8:55 and 9:10 a.m. on the morning of the robbery, a milk truck 
driver, Lawrence Austin, saw two men exit the market and run down the street.  
Subsequently, Austin saw Goodwin, wearing a shirt with the number “7” on it, 
also exit the market.  Austin observed that Goodwin dropped some money on the 
ground while trying to put the money in his pocket.  Austin retrieved the dropped 
money and took it inside the market, giving it to one of the clerks.  Once inside the 
market, Austin saw one clerk, Mustafa, lying on the floor.  Almohannad Sammour, 
another clerk, stated to Austin, “[T]hey shot my cousin.”  Two bystanders also 
witnessed the three men running down the street from the market.  Marilyn Rox, 
who knew Goodwin, identified him as one of the men running. 
 
Later the same morning, Goodwin called Tyrone Griffin and asked him to 
dispose of a bag.  Griffin retrieved a bag from Goodwin containing trousers and a 
shirt with the number “7” on it.  Padgett testified that Goodwin’s clothes were 
stained with blood.  Griffin destroyed the clothing. 
 
 
2
 
At the crime scene, the police found Mustafa’s body behind a counter.  
Blood was splattered about the area near his body.  On the counter, the police 
found twelve one-dollar bills.  Detectives also discovered a copper-jacketed bullet 
in the refrigeration area of the store, near Mustafa’s body.  A forensics expert later 
concluded that the bullet had been fired from either a .357 Magnum or .38 caliber 
revolver.  Near the floor by the safe, detectives found a bullet hole and fragments 
of a second bullet.  About two weeks prior to the robbery, Jermaine Brown, a 
friend of the appellant, had sold the appellant a .357 Magnum revolver. 
 
Dr. Martha Steinberg, a forensic pathologist, found that Mustafa Sammour 
died as a result of a gunshot wound to the left forehead.  The wound was described 
as a “through and through” gunshot wound, causing such extensive injury to 
Mustafa’s brain and skull that, in the words of Steinberg, “death was virtually 
immediate.”  Steinberg further stated that the impact of this type of wound would 
be so forceful that the shooter could possibly have had blood and remains of the 
victim’s brain splattered onto him. 
 
On September 14, the police arrested Goodwin.  After advising him of his 
rights, he  told police that he alone robbed the market and that Johnson and 
Padgett were customers.  He stated that he pointed his gun at the “Arab clerk” and 
ordered him to take him, Goodwin, to the safe.  Goodwin further stated that after 
Mustafa said something, “the gun just went off.”  Upon further questioning, 
Goodwin stated that he confronted the other clerk, Almohannad.  Almohannad 
took him to the safe, where, according to Goodwin, the gun “just went off” again.  
Before he left the store, Goodwin took money from the safe and the cash register. 
 
Two days later police again interviewed Goodwin.  He changed his previous 
statement by naming Johnson and Padgett as accomplices.  He claimed that 
Padgett was armed with the .357 Magnum revolver, that he had a .45 automatic 
 
 
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handgun, and that Johnson was unarmed.  Goodwin claimed that Padgett had shot 
the clerk.  While in jail, however, Goodwin confided to Antoine Robinson, another 
inmate at the jail, that he had shot Mustafa.  He also told Johnson that he would 
blame the killing on Padgett, as Padgett was the only one among the three robbers 
who did not have children. 
 
Goodwin was charged with aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 
2903.01(A), with felony murder and firearm specifications; aggravated murder in 
violation of R.C. 2903.01(B), with felony murder and firearm specifications; 
aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1); and with having a weapon 
while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13.  Padgett and Johnson were 
both offered plea agreements in exchange for their testimony against Goodwin. 
 
At trial, the following testimony was adduced.  Derrick Flonnory, a friend of 
the appellant, testified that the appellant stopped at his house around 8:15 or 8:30 
on the morning of the robbery.  Goodwin wanted Flonnory to help him rob the 
market, but Flonnory declined.  Padgett and Johnson testified that Goodwin 
suggested to them that they rob the market.  Both Padgett and Johnson testified 
that Goodwin was carrying the .357 Magnum revolver prior to entering the store.  
When the three men arrived at the market, Goodwin went inside first.  All three 
men wore hats pulled down over the faces. 
 
After entering the market, Padgett and Johnson confronted Almohannad.  
Goodwin confronted Mustafa.  Mustafa had his hands up.  There was no testimony 
that he resisted in any way.  While Mustafa stood with his arms raised above his 
head, Goodwin shot Mustafa in the head.  After Goodwin shot Mustafa, he pointed 
the gun at Almohannad’s head and ordered him to take Goodwin to the safe.  
Almohannad offered no resistance and pleaded with Goodwin not to shoot him.  
Almohannad then opened the safe and gave Goodwin the money.  While 
 
 
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Almohannad was giving Goodwin the money, Goodwin fired a shot into the floor, 
retrieved money from the cash register, and then exited the market with Johnson 
and Padgett. 
 
Testimony by Almohannad, Mustafa’s cousin, generally corroborated that of 
Johnson and Padgett.  When the three men came into the store, Almohannad 
recognized Johnson and Goodwin as regular customers.  Subsequently, Padgett 
grabbed Almohannad from behind.  Almohannad stated that both Johnson and 
Goodwin were armed.  However, Almohannad did not see who fired the shot that 
killed Mustafa. 
 
Following the robbery, the three men went back to Goodwin’s house, where 
Goodwin divided the money.  Goodwin gave the men approximately one hundred 
thirty dollars each, and kept the rest for himself.  In his statement to the police, 
Goodwin admitted stealing approximately five hundred dollars. 
 
During cross-examination, Padgett and Johnson admitted that their 
testimony conflicted with their original sworn statements to authorities.  For 
example, Johnson first told police that he had no gun, but, at trial, he testified that 
he was armed with a .45 caliber pistol.  Also both Padgett and Johnson told police 
that they had never received any money from the robbery, when in fact Goodwin 
had split the proceeds with them. 
 
The defense presented no evidence.  Rather, the defense argued that a 
reasonable doubt existed as to whether Goodwin shot Mustafa. 
 
The jury convicted Goodwin, as charged, of aggravated murder with prior 
calculation and design, aggravated felony-murder, aggravated robbery, and 
possession of a firearm while under a disability.  Both murder counts contained a 
death penalty specification. 
 
 
5
 
The defense presented no evidence at the penalty hearing.  The jury 
recommended the death penalty.  Prior to the trial court’s passing sentence, 
Rosetta Goodwin, Goodwin’s aunt, stated that Goodwin did not deserve the death 
penalty because he was born drug dependent and because his mother abandoned 
him when he was nine.  Goodwin apologized to the victim’s family.  He stated that 
he did not intend to kill Mustafa, claiming that he hit Mustafa with the gun, and 
the gun went off.  Goodwin also admitted to the trial judge that he took Mustafa’s 
life, saying, “I did take the man’s life, but I confess up to my crimes.” 
 
The trial judge sentenced Goodwin to death on the counts of aggravated 
murder.  Goodwin received additional sentences of ten to twenty-five years on the 
count of aggravated robbery, and one and one-half years on the weapon disability 
count, with an additional three years imposed pursuant to a firearm specification.  
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
George J. Sadd and Arthur A. Elkins, Cuyahoga County Assistant 
Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, Stephen A. Ferrell and J. Joseph 
Bodine, Jr., Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  Goodwin has raised fifteen propositions of law 
for our consideration.  We have independently reviewed the record, weighed the 
aggravating circumstance against the mitigating factors, and examined the 
proportionality of the sentence of death imposed in this case.  For the reasons that 
follow, we affirm Goodwin’s convictions for aggravated felony-murder, 
aggravated murder with prior calculation and design, aggravated robbery, and 
 
 
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possession of a firearm while under disability.  We further affirm his sentencing, 
including the sentence of death. 
I 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
In his first, third, and sixth propositions of law, Goodwin asserts that his 
counsel at trial were ineffective.  To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must show, first, that “counsel’s performance was deficient” 
and, second, that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. * * * 
[C]ounsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable.”  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693.  A Sixth Amendment violation does not 
occur “unless and until counsel’s performance is proved to have fallen below an 
objective standard of reasonable representation and, in addition, prejudice arises 
from counsel’s performance.”  State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 142, 
538 N.E.2d 373, 380.  To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that “there 
exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of 
trial would have been different.” Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
In his sixth proposition of law, Goodwin contends that counsel were 
ineffective for failing to adequately question jurors about their views on mitigating 
factors or on the death penalty.  During voir dire, counsel asked no questions of 
nine jurors to determine their death penalty views. 
 
We have determined previously that failure to inquire about various 
mitigating factors during voir dire does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  State v. Goff (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 140, 694 N.E.2d 916, 929.  
Asking jurors their views on mitigation is “not essential to competent 
representation.”  State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 86, 656 N.E.2d 643, 
 
 
7
659.  Additionally, there is no requirement that counsel must individually question 
each juror about his or her views on the death penalty.  State v. Evans (1992), 63 
Ohio St.3d 231, 247, 586 N.E.2d 1042, 1056. 
 
A review of the record indicates that defense counsel exercised their 
discretionary judgment.  Counsel engaged in questioning of several prospective 
jurors when those jurors expressed some reservations about the death penalty.  
Counsel also sought to rehabilitate jurors through questioning.  The decisions by 
counsel not to question jurors further was merely an exercise of their discretionary 
judgment.  “[T]rial counsel stands in the better position to determine which 
members of the venire merit in-depth examination.”  State v. Phillips at 86, 656 
N.E.2d at 659.  As such, the conduct of voir dire by defense counsel fell within 
their range of professional judgment.  There is nothing that indicates either 
deficient performance by counsel or prejudice to the defendant.  Accordingly, 
Goodwin has not demonstrated that his counsel were ineffective in their 
representation during voir dire.  Therefore, we conclude that his sixth proposition 
of law has no merit. 
 
In his first proposition of law, Goodwin asserts that his defense counsel 
were ineffective during the penalty phase of the trial.  Specifically, Goodwin 
claims that his attorneys failed to ask for a psychological evaluation, did not argue 
age as a mitigating factor, and failed to present any evidence at the mitigation 
hearing. 
 
We reject Goodwin’s contention that counsel were ineffective for failing to 
ask for a psychological evaluation.  Nothing in the record establishes that a 
psychological evaluation would have led to credible, mitigating evidence.  
Defense counsel told the jury that “there is nothing psychiatrically wrong” with 
 
 
8
Goodwin.  Accordingly, counsel’s decision not to request a psychological 
evaluation was in all respects reasonable. 
 
We also conclude that counsel’s strategy during the penalty phase was 
objectively reasonable, and, therefore, Goodwin’s complaints about the paucity of 
mitigation evidence presented and counsel’s failure to argue age as a mitigating 
factor are meritless.  The trial court instructed the jury to consider Goodwin’s age 
as a mitigating factor.  In view of such an instruction, there can be no reasonable 
probability that had counsel argued age as a mitigating factor, the outcome of the 
trial would have been different. 
 
Further, counsel made a deliberate, tactical choice to limit arguments 
presented in mitigation and instead adopted a strategy of attempting to create a 
reasonable doubt as to whether Goodwin was the actual killer.  Defense counsel 
stated, on the record, that he wanted to avoid the risk of permitting the state to 
present evidence that the defendant had committed five prior aggravated robberies.  
Counsel felt that given that risk, a strategy of presenting evidence of Goodwin’s 
character, potential for rehabilitation, or other evidence was not the best course of 
action to pursue in trying to spare his client a sentence of death.  Rather, counsel 
chose to rely upon the disparity of sentences received by the three robbers, and 
upon reasonable doubt (couched in terms of “residual doubt”) as to whether 
Goodwin was the shooter.  Although we have since determined that residual doubt 
is not to be considered in mitigation, State v. McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 
686 N.E.2d 1112, at the time of this trial, the strategy employed by counsel was 
objectively reasonable.  Moreover, the trial court did not discuss residual doubt in 
its opinion, but found that the evidence established that Goodwin was the shooter 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  There was no evidence supporting residual doubt, and 
therefore ineffective assistance of counsel could not be based on this theory. 
 
 
9
 
The choices available to counsel were limited, but counsel’s performance 
did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  “Failure to present mitigating 
evidence * * * does not in itself constitute proof of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.”  State v. Hamblin (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 153, 157, 524 N.E.2d 476, 480; 
see, also, State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 388, 513 N.E.2d 754, 763.  
Accordingly, we conclude that Goodwin’s first proposition of law has no merit. 
 
The third proposition of law presents a more difficult assertion of 
ineffective assistance.  Goodwin asserts that counsel conceded guilt during the 
trial phase, thereby rendering their representation of Goodwin ineffective.  During 
his opening statement, defense counsel for Goodwin stated to the jury: 
 
“You shouldn’t let him go, and * * * [after] we get into it, and you’ve heard 
the evidence, I’m going to suggest * * * that you should and you ought to * * *, 
let’s go a little bit stronger than that, say that you must find him guilty.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Counsel reiterated this view in closing argument, stating: 
 
“If it were not for the law of aiding and abetting,  * * * then I would argue 
vehemently to you that while he was a robber, he was not a killer.  For the 
purposes of today’s verdict, it doesn’t make any difference.  All three of these men 
are guilty of all charges in the indictment.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Concessions of guilt, in any form, are among the most troublesome actions a 
defense counsel can make during representation of a defendant.  Notwithstanding 
our concern over such an action, claims of concession of guilt, like any action by 
counsel that a defendant later asserts to constitute ineffective assistance, must be 
reviewed under the test established in Strickland and the subsequent case law. 
 
Statements of guilt must be first tested under the first prong of Strickland  to 
determine whether such a statement constitutes deficient representation.  If such a 
 
 
10
statement may be considered deficient, then it must be determined whether the 
statement is so prejudicial that a reasonable probability exists that were it not for 
such a statement, the result of the trial would have been different.  In Clozza v. 
Murray (C.A.4, 1990), 913 F.2d 1092, the court, in analyzing an ineffective-
assistance claim based on a concession of guilt by counsel, determined that 
“[t]here is a distinction which can and must be drawn between a statement or 
remark which amounts to a tactical retreat and one which has been called a 
complete surrender.”  Clozza, 913 F.2d at 1099.  We agree with this approach and 
consider it instructive in determining whether counsel’s statements in this case 
violated the Sixth Amendment. 
 
Courts, in capital cases, are divided on the question of whether a concession 
of guilt by defense counsel constitutes ineffective assistance.  In Francis v. 
Spraggins (C.A.11, 1983), 720 F.2d 1190, the Eleventh Circuit determined that 
counsel’s representation constituted ineffective assistance.  In Francis, defense 
counsel conceded guilt in his closing argument by stating, “I think he committed 
the crime of murder.”  Id. at 1194.  In Young v. Zant (C.A.11, 1983), 677 F.2d 792, 
799, counsel’s representation was determined to be ineffective where counsel, 
acting out of a mistaken understanding of the bifurcated nature of death penalty 
proceedings, conceded guilt. 
 
However, in Clozza, the court held that no ineffective assistance occurred 
where trial counsel stated that he, himself, would “probably want to kill” Clozza, 
the defendant, as a result of his alleged crimes, and that had Clozza’s attempt at 
suicide been successful, “it would not have been the greatest tragedy.”  Clozza, 
913 F.2d at 1098.  The court determined that despite those comments, the 
overwhelming case against Clozza, which included a confession, physical 
evidence, and a lack of evidence to support any defense, required his counsel to 
 
 
11
adopt a trial strategy that would preserve credibility between himself and the jury.  
Clozza, 913 F.2d at 1099-1100.  The court concluded that Clozza’s attorney did 
the best he could do under the circumstances and stated that “[t]o reasonably 
expect his attorney to extricate Clozza from this dilemma is simply not realistic.”  
Id. at 1100. 
 
Similar conclusions were made in Messer v. Kemp (C.A.11, 1985), 760 F.2d 
1080, and Bell v. Evatt (C.A.4, 1995), 72 F.3d 421, where the evidence against 
each defendant was overwhelming.  In Messer, defense counsel stated that he 
would not contest the evidence against his client, and in Bell, counsel conceded 
guilt on a key charge of kidnapping in a case where the murder resulted after an 
abduction.  Messer, 760 F.2d at 1089, and Bell, 72 F.3d at 428.  See, also, Smith v. 
Dixon (E.D.N.C.1991), 766 F.Supp. 1370, 1392, reversed on other grounds 
(1994), 14 F.3d 956. 
 
Concessions of guilt by defense counsel must be considered on a case-by-
case basis.  All of the facts, circumstances, and evidence must be considered.  
When examined within the context of the entire record of the trial proceedings, we 
conclude that the statements of guilt made by Goodwin’s defense counsel were 
neither deficient nor prejudicial.  The statements made did not constitute an 
abandonment of defense of Goodwin.  Rather, counsel’s statements appear to have 
been made to concede Goodwin’s participation in the robbery, and to preserve the 
credibility of the only plausible defense theory, given the strong evidence against 
Goodwin — that despite Goodwin’s participation in the robbery, he did not kill 
Mustafa. 
 
An examination of counsel’s other actions is demonstrative of this strategy.  
During the trial phase, defense counsel fought vigorously to suggest that his client 
was not the perpetrator of the murder.  He proficiently cross-examined both 
 
 
12
Johnson and Padgett in an effort to reflect doubt on the prosecution’s premise that 
Goodwin committed the murder.  Counsel attempted to cast doubt on the 
testimony of both Johnson and Padgett in light of the plea bargain each had 
received, and since one of them also had a gun at the scene.  Counsel also cross-
examined Almohannad to show that he did not know who shot Mustafa and that 
either Johnson or Padgett had possibly committed the crime.  These actions 
represent a “coherent and consistent defense theory.”  See State v. Ballew (1996), 
76 Ohio St.3d 244, 256, 667 N.E.2d 369, 381. 
 
Therefore, we cannot square the facts of this case with those where 
ineffective assistance has occurred.  In Young v. Zant, the court concluded that the 
defendant had not received “even a modicum of professional assistance at any 
time.”  Id., 677 F.2d at 795.  We cannot draw a similar conclusion here.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the first prong of the Strickland analysis has not 
been met. 
 
We further conclude that even assuming, arguendo, that counsel’s 
statements would constitute deficient representation, the requirement of prejudice 
has not been satisfied.  The evidence against Goodwin was overwhelming.  The 
testimony presented by the state included, as was the case in Clozza, a confession, 
strong physical evidence against the defendant, and a lack of evidence presented 
by the defense.  Goodwin told police he shot Mustafa.  The only gun observed at 
the crime scene that could have inflicted the fatal wound belonged to Goodwin, 
and testimony indicated that it was Goodwin who had the gun in his possession 
upon entering the market.  Additionally, Goodwin made sure his clothes were 
burned following the robbery. 
 
Under these circumstances, counsel’s statements made no practical 
difference in the result of the trial.  Accordingly, prejudice has not been 
 
 
13
demonstrated.  We conclude that the statements made by counsel may be 
construed as tactical in light of the overwhelming evidence against Goodwin and 
the limited defense strategies available to counsel.  Such statements do not 
constitute a “ ‘complete concession of the defendant’s guilt,’ ” such that defense 
counsel has effectively surrendered his or her case.  See Clozza, 913 F.2d at 1099.  
Rather, there appears to be an effort to enhance credibility with the jury by being 
candidly realistic.  We find that a statement by defense counsel regarding the guilt 
of a defendant that does not represent abandonment of the defense, and therefore 
may be construed as tactical or strategic, does not constitute ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  The third proposition of law asserted by Goodwin lacks merit. 
II 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
In his fourth proposition of law, Goodwin alleges three instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct:  (1) repeated references by the prosecutor to the good 
character of the victim, (2) references to the effect of Goodwin’s alleged act on the 
family of the victim, (3) improper bolstering of the credibility of Padgett, and (4) 
references by the prosecutor to matters allegedly within his own personal 
knowledge. 
 
The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether remarks were improper 
and, if so, whether the rights of the accused were materially prejudiced.  State v. 
Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 14 OBR 317, 318, 470 N.E.2d 883, 885.  
Because defense counsel did not object to these alleged instances of misconduct, 
Goodwin has waived all but plain error.  State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 
604, 605 N.E.2d 916, 925. 
 
We find no prosecutorial misconduct concerning the state’s references to the 
good character of the victim.  The alleged improprieties are nothing more than 
 
 
14
statements characterizing Mustafa as an innocent victim, a reasonable portrayal 
based on the record.  We reject this allegation of misconduct. 
 
We also find no plain error in the references by the prosecution to the effect 
of the alleged act on the family of the victim.  Merely mentioning the personal 
situation of the victim’s family, without more, does not constitute misconduct.  
See State v. Combs (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 278, 282-283, 581 N.E.2d 1071, 1076-
1077. 
 
Further, we find no plain error in the assertion that the prosecution 
improperly bolstered the credibility of Padgett by mentioning that he had agreed to 
tell the truth as a part of his plea agreement.  The plea agreements were in 
evidence, and the prosecutor was entitled to respond to comments made by the 
defense about the agreements.  See State v. Rogers (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 427, 28 
OBR 480, 504 N.E.2d 52; and State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 41, 553 
N.E.2d 576, 595-596.  Nor do we find any plain error as to the remainder of the 
prosecutor’s remarks in the record.  “Prosecutors are entitled to latitude as to what 
the evidence has shown and what inferences can reasonably be drawn from the 
evidence.”  State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 111, 684 N.E.2d 668, 689. 
 
The fourth proposition of law asserted by Goodwin has no merit. 
III 
Incomplete Record 
 
In proposition of law five, Goodwin asserts that the trial transcript is 
inadequate for appellate review because of eight unrecorded pretrials and twenty-
seven unrecorded bench conferences.  We held in State v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio 
St.3d 543, 687 N.E.2d 685, syllabus, that “[t]he requirement of a complete, full, 
and unabridged transcript in capital trials does not mean that the trial record must 
be perfect for purposes of appellate review.”  In Palmer, we determined that 
 
 
15
reversal will not occur because of unrecorded pretrials or sidebars where the 
defendant has failed to demonstrate that a request was made at trial or objections 
were made, that an effort under App.R. 9 was made to reconstruct what occurred, 
and that material prejudice resulted.  Id. at 554, 687 N.E.2d at 696. 
 
Goodwin has not met those requirements.  Goodwin did not make a pretrial 
motion to record all sidebars, nor does the record show that counsel for Goodwin 
requested that all pretrial or bench conferences be recorded.  In the absence of 
such a request, any possible error is waived.  See State v. Grant (1993), 67 Ohio 
St.3d 465, 481, 620 N.E.2d 50, 68. 
 
Appellate counsel for Goodwin did ask the trial court for such a hearing.  
However, Goodwin has made no showing of prejudice.  “Prejudice will not be 
presumed from the mere existence of * * * unrecorded bench and chambers 
conferences * * *.”  Palmer, 80 Ohio St.3d at 554, 687 N.E.2d at 697. 
 
Goodwin additionally complains that the record does not reflect trial court 
rulings on pretrial motions, but the trial docket reflects some entries, and, 
according to the court of appeals, the trial court additionally stated that “[a]ll 
motions on the defense requested rulings received same and were made part of the 
record in open court prior to trial.”  Further, Goodwin’s claims concerning the jury 
instructions have no merit.  The instructions are transcribed, and Goodwin makes 
no claim that the transcript is inadequate. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the record is adequate for appellate review.  
Proposition of law five is meritless. 
IV 
Voir Dire 
 
In proposition of law seven, Goodwin asserts that trial counsel were 
ineffective in allowing biased jurors to be seated and that the trial court improperly 
 
 
16
allowed the state to exercise peremptory challenges on jurors who had reservations 
about the death penalty.  We disagree. 
 
Goodwin’s claim about the use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution 
is without merit.  By failing to request the state’s explanation for the dismissals, 
Goodwin waived the issue.  State v. Lundgren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 485, 653 
N.E.2d 304, 317.  Further, except for exclusions based on race or gender, the 
discretion of a prosecutor to exercise peremptory challenges is broad.  Ballew, 76 
Ohio St.3d at 253, 667 N.E.2d at 378-379.  See, also, State v. Cook (1992), 65 
Ohio St.3d 516, 518, 605 N.E.2d 70, 77. 
 
Goodwin also asserts that the prosecutor made prejudicial remarks during 
voir dire by stating that, “for the purposes of my next question, we’re assuming 
that the State * * * proves that [Goodwin] committed the crimes[,]” or “assuming 
that [Goodwin’s] been found guilty[.]”  These questions were neither misleading 
nor prejudicial.  The questions were properly qualified by the prosecutor and were 
reasonably necessary to determine the ability of the jurors to serve on a panel that 
might consider the death penalty. 
 
Finally, trial counsel for Goodwin were not ineffective in failing to dismiss 
jurors Teisler and Schwartz.  Teisler indicated an aversion to blood, but stated that 
she could review evidence of the crime scene.  Thus, there was no potentially 
prejudicial effect of Teisler’s being seated.  Counsel were not ineffective in 
determining that she was competent to serve.  Nor were trial counsel ineffective 
for failing to exercise a peremptory challenge on juror Schwartz.  Schwartz was 
dissatisfied that a man who had been convicted of a crime against his family had 
not been incarcerated longer, but stated that it would have no adverse effect on his 
ability to serve.  There was no prejudice by this juror’s inclusion on the jury.  
Schwartz stated that he would follow the law.  Although he indicated some 
 
 
17
positive stance towards the death penalty, we cannot conclude that counsel’s 
failure to dismiss him amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.  Decisions on 
the exercise of peremptory challenges are a part of trial strategy, and counsel’s 
decisions here do not meet either part of the Strickland analysis.  Schwartz 
indicated that he could be fair, and counsel accepted this representation.  The 
record does not support a conclusion that counsel’s failure to exercise a 
peremptory challenge constituted ineffective assistance. 
 
For those foregoing reasons, proposition of law seven has no merit. 
V 
Prejudicial Photographs 
 
Goodwin alleges in proposition of law eight that photographs introduced at 
trial were so prejudicial as to deprive him of his constitutional rights.  We 
disagree. 
 
Nonrepetitive photographs, even if gruesome, are admissible if relevant and 
are of probative value as long as the probative value of each photograph 
outweighs the danger of material prejudice to the accused.  State v. Maurer (1984), 
15 Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768, paragraph seven of the syllabus; 
State v. Morales (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 252, 257, 513 N.E.2d 267, 273.  Decisions 
on admissibility are within the discretion of the trial court.  Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d 
at 601, 605 N.E.2d at 923. 
 
Here, a careful review of the record indicates that the trial judge considered 
the photographs, admitting three autopsy photographs and five crime-scene photos 
that can be characterized as gruesome.  Other photographs were excluded by the 
trial judge.  The autopsy photographs illustrate the location and nature of the 
wound and corroborate the testimony of the coroner.  These photographs are not 
repetitive.  The probative value of these photographs is evident, as an illustration 
 
 
18
of where a bullet enters the body and evidence of the resulting wound are 
probative of a purposeful killing.  Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d at 265, 15 OBR at 401-
402, 473 N.E.2d at 792. 
 
The crime scene photographs corroborate the testimony of the detectives, 
and are probative as evidence of a purposeful killing.  In addition, the photographs 
demonstrate the massive quantity of blood involved, thereby gaining additional 
probative value in light of the testimony that Goodwin had blood on his shirt and 
that he subsequently burned his clothes.  Pursuant to the well-established principle 
that a trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, we conclude 
that no abuse of discretion occurred in the admission of these photographs.  Two 
of the photographs of the crime scene are arguably repetitive.  Nevertheless, 
Goodwin’s rights were not affected.  In light of the abundant evidence of 
Goodwin’s guilt, he was not prejudiced. 
 
The photos were limited in number and had substantial probative value.  
Goodwin’s eighth proposition of law lacks merit. 
VI 
Victim Impact Statement 
 
In his ninth proposition of law, Goodwin claims that the trial judge 
improperly considered a request from the family of the victim that Goodwin be 
sentenced to death.  After the jury’s sentencing verdict, the trial judge noted that 
he “want[ed] the family of the victim to know I will hear, prior to sentencing from 
any [family] member * * * who wants to speak regarding * * * Mustafa[.] * * * 
The Court will take that into consideration at sentencing.”  Before sentencing, 
Mustafa’s brother, through the prosecutor, said he “agrees with the [jury’s] 
verdict” and “would ask this Court to follow the recommendation * * * [and 
 
 
19
impose] the death penalty.”  Thereafter, Goodwin’s aunt and Goodwin made 
statements requesting mercy. 
 
By soliciting comments about Mustafa from his family, the trial court did 
not necessarily err.  Payne v. Tennessee (1991), 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 
L.Ed.2d 720, overruled the per se constitutional proscription against victim impact 
evidence in capital offense penalty hearings reflected in Booth v. Maryland 
(1987), 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440.  But Payne reserved 
judgment about opinions from the victim’s family as to the sentence a capital 
defendant should receive.  Payne, 501 U.S. at 830, 111 S.Ct. at 2611, 115 L.Ed.2d 
at 739, fn. 2.  Before the decision in Payne, this court held that opinions from 
witnesses as to the sentence “in a capital case violate the defendant’s 
constitutional right to have the sentencing decision made by the jury and the 
judge.”  State v. Huertas (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 22, 553 N.E.2d 1058, syllabus.  
Accord State v. Fautenberry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 435, 438-439, 650 N.E.2d 878, 
882. 
 
In this case, Goodwin’s death sentence remains constitutionally reliable 
despite this opinion from Mustafa’s brother.  The jury’s recommendation remained 
unaffected, since the jury never heard the opinion.  His brother’s brief opinion, 
expressed by the prosecutor without emotion, elicited no objection.  No plain error 
is present.  See State v. Campbell (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 41, 630 N.E.2d 339, 
345.  Moreover, the trial judge was not soliciting sentence recommendations, per 
se, by simply asking for the family’s views about Mustafa.  Presumably, the trial 
judge remained uninfluenced, since his sentencing decision never referred to the 
brother’s opinion.  Cf. State v. Allard (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 482, 489, 663 N.E.2d 
1277, 1285; See State v. Fautenberry, 72 Ohio St.3d at 439, 650 N.E.2d at 882.  
Moreover, any error is readily cured by this court’s independent sentence review.  
 
 
20
See State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 170, 555 N.E.2d 293, 304. 
Accordingly, Goodwin’s ninth proposition of law has no merit. 
VII 
Sufficiency of Evidence 
 
In proposition of law ten, Goodwin asserts that the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain his conviction of violating R.C. 2903.01(A), which 
provides, in part, “No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and 
design, cause the death of another * * *.”  In reviewing this contention, “[t]he 
relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio 
St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus.  The verdict will not be 
disturbed unless it is determined that reasonable minds could not have reached the 
conclusion reached by the trier of fact.  Id. at 273, 574 N.E.2d at 503. 
 
We have stated previously that it is not possible to establish a “bright-line 
test that emphatically distinguishes between the presence or absence of ‘prior 
calculation and design.’ ”  State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 20, 676 
N.E.2d 82, 89.  There is no single set of factors to be mechanically applied when 
determining whether prior calculation and design is present.  “[E]ach case turns on 
the particular facts and evidence presented at trial.”  Id. 
 
Of necessity, a reviewing court must examine the record before it when 
considering this issue.  There are no hard and fast factors to be applied to each 
case.  Nor is there a precise formula to be used when considering those facts.  
Rather, a case-by-case method must be employed.  In the case sub judice, we find 
that the record before us supports the jury’s finding as well as that of the court of 
appeals.  Appellant planned the aggravated robbery and recruited the others to join 
 
 
21
in the execution of his plan.  Further, he armed himself with a .357 Magnum 
revolver and one of the other participants armed himself with a .45 semi-automatic 
pistol.  Both guns came from appellant’s house. 
 
While appellant contended that the shooting was unplanned and an accident, 
the facts speak to the contrary.  The evidence presented at trial showed that 
appellant placed his .357 Magnum revolver to the forehead of  a cooperative and 
unresisting victim who at that moment was standing with his arms raised above his 
head.  It was precisely at that time that appellant pulled the trigger, causing the 
bullet to enter the left forehead and exit the other side, killing Mustafa Sammour 
instantly.  Appellant did not flee the store after this cold-blooded killing; rather, he 
placed the gun to the head of the other clerk and continued robbing the store.  It is 
quite clear that appellant planned the robbery and the murder was used to further 
his plan.  It was an action that required thought on his part to place the gun at the 
victim’s forehead, and he took additional time to decide to pull the trigger in order 
to carry out a calculated plan to obtain money from the store.  This was not a spur-
of-the-moment accidental shooting on the part of a robber.  Appellant, after 
shooting Mustafa Sammour, proceeded to grab the other clerk, Almohannad 
Sammour, point the gun at his head, and order him to go to the safe.  It is readily 
apparent from these facts that sufficient time, reflection, and acts were involved to 
provide the necessary thought processes that the law requires for a finding of prior 
calculation and design. 
 
In State v. Cotton (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 10 O.O.3d 4, 381 N.E.2d 190, we 
held that “[w]here evidence adduced at trial reveals the presence of sufficient time 
and opportunity for the planning of an act of homicide to constitute prior 
calculation, and the circumstances surrounding the homicide show a scheme 
designed to implement the calculated decision to kill, a finding by the trier of fact 
 
 
22
of prior calculation and design is justified.” Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus.  
In the case at bar, such evidence was clearly adduced at trial.  The tenth 
proposition of law asserted by Goodwin has no merit. 
VIII 
Jury Instructions 
 
In his eleventh proposition of law, Goodwin asserts that the trial court made 
various errors in instructing the jury during the trial and penalty phases. 
 
Goodwin asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction, 
as requested, on murder, as a lesser included offense to the charge of aggravated 
murder with prior calculation and design.  Murder, R.C. 2903.02, is a lesser 
included offense to aggravated murder, R.C. 2903.01(A).  State v. Mason (1998), 
82 Ohio St.3d 144, 161, 694 N.E.2d 932, 951.  The sole difference is that prior 
calculation and design is absent from murder.  Yet, “[e]ven though an offense may 
be statutorily defined as a lesser included offense of another, a charge * * * is 
required only where the evidence presented at trial would reasonably support both 
an acquittal on the crime charged and a conviction upon the lesser included 
offense.”  State v. Thomas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286, paragraph 
two of the syllabus.  Accord State v. Shane (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 632, 590 
N.E.2d 272, 274. 
 
As the court of appeals below stated, not every case requires that the lesser 
charge be given. 
 
“ * * * If the evidence presented at trial meets [the Thomas test] with regard 
to the lesser included offense, the trial court must instruct the jury on the lesser 
offense.  State v. Loudermill (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 79 [31 O.O.2d 60, 206 N.E.2d 
198].  If the test is not met, the lesser included offense charge need not be given.  
State v. Kidder (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 279 [513 N.E.2d 311].  An instruction is not 
 
 
23
required every time some evidence is presented.  There must be sufficient 
evidence admitted at trial to allow the jury to reasonably reject the greater offense 
and find the defendant guilty on the lesser included offense.  State v. Shane 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 630 [590 N.E.2d 272].”  State v. Goodwin (Apr. 17, 1997), 
Cuyahoga App. No. 98531, unreported, at 21, 1997 WL 186770. 
 
As we stated in the prior section, in the case sub judice, there was sufficient 
evidence presented by the state to support the element of prior calculation and 
design.  The jury would not have reasonably rejected the greater offense to find 
appellant guilty of murder.  See State v. Wilson (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 381, 394-
395, 659 N.E.2d 292, 306.  Thus, the court did not err by failing to instruct the 
jury on the lesser included offense of murder. 
 
The remaining issues asserted in proposition of law eleven are governed by 
plain error analysis, as Goodwin either failed to request specific instructions or 
object at trial.  State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 
N.E.2d 1332, syllabus. 
 
Goodwin’s challenge to the statutory reasonable doubt instruction of Ohio is 
summarily rejected.  State v. Nabozny (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 195, 8 O.O.3d 181, 
375 N.E.2d 784, paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Van Gundy (1992), 64 
Ohio St.3d 230, 594 N.E.2d 604. 
 
Goodwin also argues that the trial court erred by including a negligence-
causation instruction that a defendant “is responsible for the natural, logical, and 
foreseeable results that follow  * * * from an unlawful act.”  The court instructed 
further, “[t]he test [for foreseeability] is whether a reasonably prudent person  * * 
* would have anticipated that death was likely to result to anyone from the 
performance of the unlawful act.” 
 
 
24
 
We have stated that the use of such foreseeability language in instructions in 
murder cases is questionable.  State v. Burchfield (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 261, 263, 
611 N.E.2d 819, 821.  However, the use of this language was not plain error.  The 
trial court extensively instructed the jury on the requirement of purpose and intent 
prior to the causation language.  The court further instructed that purpose to kill 
may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon.  Accordingly, despite the 
foreseeability instruction, the instructions as a whole made clear that the jury was 
required to find purpose to kill in order to convict.  See State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio 
St.3d at 100, 656 N.E.2d at 668.  The evidence also established that a gun was 
placed close to the victim’s head, and the victim died as a result of a direct 
gunshot wound to the head.  Therefore, there is no plain error. 
 
Goodwin also argues that the trial court erred by defining the term 
“principal offender” as “the one who personally performs every act constituting 
the offense  * * *; that the defendant is the actor or absolute perpetrator.”  
Goodwin argues that the court should have instructed that the state must prove that 
Goodwin was “the actual killer.”  See State v. Penix (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 369, 
371, 513 N.E.2d 744, 746.  A reading of the language used by the trial court, 
however, demonstrates that no plain error occurred.  If the jury found that 
Goodwin, in the words of the trial court, personally performed every act 
constituting the offense and was the actor or absolute perpetrator of the offenses 
charged, Goodwin was found to be, in fact, the “actual killer.”  Goodwin’s 
contention lacks merit. 
 
Goodwin also raises other speculative claims regarding jury confusion 
whether he was the actual killer.  We find no plain error here.  Goodwin’s eleventh 
proposition of law is meritless. 
 
 
25
 
In his twelfth proposition of law, Goodwin claims that the trial court erred 
in failing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included 
offense to aggravated murder.  Goodwin failed to request such an instruction at 
trial and therefore waived all but plain error.  Underwood at syllabus. 
 
In support of his contention, Goodwin asserts that his statements that he 
“didn’t mean to” shoot Mustafa, that the “gun just went off,” and that he had been 
drinking gin the morning of the robbery warranted an instruction on involuntary 
manslaughter.  We cannot agree.  The evidence clearly establishes that Goodwin 
acted with prior calculation and design in killing Mustafa.  Under any reasonable 
view, the killing was done with purpose.  Goodwin fired a shot at point-blank 
range into Mustafa’s head.  The testimony by the pathologist indicated that death 
was virtually immediate.  The location of this wound would lead any reasonable 
trier of fact, who did not believe the gun discharged accidentally, to conclude that 
Goodwin acted with purpose in causing the death of the victim.  Additionally, 
Mustafa did not resist, cause panic, or cause confusion, nor was there any other 
cause of panic or confusion.  Mustafa had his hands up.  No reasonable juror who 
believed the state’s version of the facts surrounding this shooting could have 
concluded that the killing was not done purposely and with prior calculation and 
design as that culpable mental state has been construed by this court.  See Palmer, 
80 Ohio St.3d at 562-563, 687 N.E.2d at 702-703; State v. Eley (1996), 77 Ohio 
St.3d 174, 180, 672 N.E.2d 640, 647-648. 
 
An instruction on a lesser included offense is required only where the 
evidence presented at trial would reasonably support both an acquittal on the 
crime charged and a conviction upon the lesser included offense.  State v. Thomas 
(1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286, paragraph two of the syllabus.  We 
find that the evidence adduced at trial could not have reasonably supported both 
 
 
26
an acquittal on the crime charged and a conviction on involuntary manslaughter.  
Moreover, the failure to request such an instruction does not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel, as Goodwin contends.  Accordingly, there is no plain error, 
and we reject the twelfth proposition of law asserted by Goodwin. 
 
In his second proposition of law, Goodwin asserts that the trial court 
improperly instructed the jury to weigh aggravating circumstances from separate 
charges against the mitigating factors and that the trial court improperly 
considered more than one aggravating circumstance in each count in its 
independent review.  Goodwin failed to object to these issues at trial.  His failure 
to object “constitutes a waiver  * * *, unless, but for the error, the outcome of the 
trial clearly would have been otherwise.”  Underwood at syllabus. 
 
A preliminary issue is whether the two counts of aggravated murder were 
merged by the trial court, since two aggravated murder counts involving the same 
victim are to be merged for purposes of sentencing.  State v. Lawson (1992), 64 
Ohio St.3d 336, 351, 595 N.E.2d 902, 913.  The trial court arguably merged the 
counts here when it submitted a single verdict form and requested a single jury 
recommendation. 
 
Goodwin contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it 
could consider both of the aggravating circumstances against the mitigation 
evidence.  The essence of this contention is that because the trial judge never 
specifically told the jury that each aggravating circumstance was related to a 
separate count of murder, and because the judge consistently referred to the 
specifications in the plural (“aggravating circumstances”) when instructing the 
jury, the jury improperly considered both aggravating circumstances together in 
each count against the evidence of mitigation.  The judge also stated that the jury 
could consider both the quantity and the quality or importance of the aggravating 
 
 
27
circumstances.  In State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 544 N.E.2d 895, 
paragraph three of the syllabus, we stated that “[o]nly the aggravating 
circumstances related to a given count may be considered in assessing the penalty 
for that count.”  Therefore, Goodwin makes a reasonable argument. 
 
Given that the trial judge appears to have merged the two counts for 
sentencing purposes, both the prosecutor and the trial court erred by referring to 
aggravating circumstances as if two separate aggravating circumstances existed 
instead of a single R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specification in each count.  As noted in 
State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 544 N.E.2d 895, paragraph three of the 
syllabus, “[o]nly the aggravating circumstances related to a given count may be 
considered in assessing the penalty for that count.”  Accord State v. Cook, 65 Ohio 
St.3d at 526, 605 N.E.2d at 82.  Splitting a single aggravating circumstance into 
two aggravating circumstances may unduly “taint the jury’s deliberative process.”  
State v. Penix, 32 Ohio St.3d at 371-372, 513 N.E.2d 744, 747.  See, also, State v. 
Johnson (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 87, 92-94, 24 OBR 282, 286-288, 494 N.E.2d 
1061, 1065-1067. 
 
Yet it was also clear that the language reflected the same aggravating 
circumstance simply repeated in both counts.  Further, the trial court cautioned the 
jury not simply to consider the quantity of factors, but that “the quality or 
importance of the * * * aggravating circumstances must also be considered by 
you[.]” 
 
Finally, this does not rise to the level of plain error.  The aggravating 
circumstance was the same in each charge, an R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specification.  
Thus, there was truly only one aggravating circumstance to weigh against the 
mitigation evidence in each count.  It is unlikely the jury assigned the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) specification double or extra weight simply because the trial judge 
 
 
28
referred to the specification for each count as “aggravating circumstances.”  
Moreover, such an instructional error can be cured by this court’s independent 
review of the record and reweighing of the aggravating circumstances against 
mitigating factors.  Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d at 527, 605 N.E.2d at 83.  We may also 
correct the opinion of the trial court that references two aggravating circumstances 
for each count as part of our independent sentencing review.  State v. Fox (1994), 
69 Ohio St.3d 183, 191, 631 N.E.2d 124, 131.  In light, also, of the lack of 
evidence presented at mitigation, we cannot conclude that plain error exists 
because it is apparent that the outcome would not have been different.  See 
Underwood at syllabus. 
 
Goodwin also asserts that the trial court and jury improperly weighed both 
components of the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specification as separate aggravating 
circumstances.  Under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), a defendant may be sentenced to death 
for committing aggravated murder if the defendant was either the principal 
offender (i.e., the actual killer), or where the defendant was not the principal 
offender, if the defendant committed the murder with prior calculation and design.  
“The language of the statute provides that these are alternatives which are not to 
be charged and proven in the same cause.”  Penix, 32 Ohio St.3d at 371, 513 
N.E.2d at 746. 
 
Our review of the record indicates that there is no merit to this claim.  The 
instructions, as well as the comments made to the jury by the prosecution, 
specifically referred to these components separately, and in the disjunctive.  The 
statutory language was repeated to the jury.  The verdict of the jury tracks the 
statutory language.  As Goodwin did not object or request a more specific 
instruction, his claim is subject to plain error analysis, and plain error does not 
exist here.  Additionally, we find no plain error with regard to Goodwin’s 
 
 
29
complaints about the opinion of the trial court.  According to Goodwin, the trial 
court violated Penix by its references to prior calculation and design.  This 
assertion is unfounded.  The language in the trial court opinion concerning prior 
calculation and design arguably does not discuss the aggravating circumstance, 
but rather whether Goodwin was guilty of the count of aggravated murder 
committed with prior calculation and design with which he was charged.  Again, 
in light of the paucity of mitigating evidence offered, if the trial court did err, the 
outcome would not have been different.  Further, we may correct such an error 
upon independent sentence review. 
 
Accordingly, the second proposition of law asserted by Goodwin lacks 
merit. 
IX 
Settled Issues 
 
In his fourteenth proposition of law, Goodwin contends that imposition of 
the death penalty violates United States treaties and therefore is violative of the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.  We rejected such an 
argument in Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d at 103-104, 656 N.E.2d at 671.  Accordingly, 
this claim has no merit. 
 
In his fifteenth proposition of law, Goodwin attacks the constitutionality of 
the death penalty statute of Ohio.  Having previously examined these issues and 
having determined that the statute is constitutional, we summarily reject this 
proposition of law.  State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 
N.E.2d 264; State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 
768, paragraph six of the syllabus; State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 169, 
694 N.E.2d 932, 957. 
X 
 
 
30
Independent Sentence Assessment 
 
In his thirteenth proposition of law, Goodwin argues that his death sentence 
is excessive, inappropriate, and disproportionate.  We will consider these 
arguments in our independent sentence review. 
 
Pursuant to R.C. 2929.05, we now proceed to independently weigh the 
aggravating circumstance against the mitigating factors, and determine whether 
Goodwin’s sentence is disproportionate to sentences in other cases. 
 
Goodwin presented no evidence before the jury at the penalty hearing.  
Goodwin’s aunt did assert that Goodwin, when born, was “drug-dependent.”  
When Goodwin was nine years old, he was abandoned by his mother, and his aunt 
took him in.  At sentencing, Goodwin apologized to the family of the victim for 
what happened. 
 
We find, after independent assessment, that the evidence proves the 
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.  We further find that the 
nature and circumstance of the crime offer nothing in mitigation for the appellant.  
Goodwin planned the robbery, solicited others to join him, grabbed an unresisting 
Mustafa, and then shot him. 
 
Very little basis exists to find any mitigation in Goodwin’s history, 
character, or background.  Goodwin’s counsel presented no evidence.  The 
statement by his aunt that Goodwin had a difficult childhood and the reference at 
trial suggesting that he has children is entitled to some, but very little, weight in 
mitigation.  The R.C. 2929.04(B)(4) mitigating factor (youth of the offender), 
given Goodwin’s age of nineteen, is entitled to nominal weight.  None of the other 
statutory mitigating factors is applicable.  Considering “other factors” under R.C. 
2929.04(B)(7), Goodwin additionally relied on residual doubt, which is no longer 
a mitigating factor.  McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112, at syllabus.  
 
 
31
That his accomplices did not receive a similar punishment is entitled to no weight, 
as their lesser roles explain their punishment.  Goodwin’s apology to the family of 
Mustafa is entitled to some, but very minimal, weight in mitigation. 
 
We have weighed the aggravating circumstance against the evidence 
presented in mitigation, and find that the aggravating circumstance of R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) in each count outweighs the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The murder of Mustafa Sammour was calculated, tragic, savage, and 
brutal.  The very limited mitigating factors vanish into insignificance when 
weighed against the aggravating circumstance. 
 
Finally, we have reviewed the sentence imposed in this case and compared 
it to those in which we have previously affirmed the death penalty.  We have 
previously upheld the sentence of death in cases involving murder with prior 
calculation and design or felony-murder committed during an aggravated robbery.  
State v. Clemons (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 438, 696 N.E.2d 1009; Palmer; State v. 
Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 676 N.E.2d 82; Eley; State v. Benge (1996), 75 
Ohio St.3d 136, 661 N.E.2d 1019; Wilson; State v. Allen (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 
626, 653 N.E.2d 675; State v. Hill (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 653 N.E.2d 271; 
State v. Mack (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 502, 653 N.E.2d 329; State v. Lewis (1993), 
67 Ohio St.3d 200, 616 N.E.2d 921; State v. Green (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 141, 609 
N.E.2d 1253.  We find that the sentence of death imposed in this case is not 
excessive, inappropriate, or disproportionate in comparison. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions, and affirm the 
sentences, including the sentence of death. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
 
32
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I concur in the 
holding of the majority that affirms the conviction and sentence of death pursuant 
to R.C. 2903.01(B) (felony-murder).  However, I dissent as to the conviction for 
aggravated murder pursuant to R.C. 2903.01(A) (prior calculation and design). 
 
In 1974, the General Assembly explicitly superseded previous court 
decisions that held murder could be deemed premeditated even though the intent 
to kill was conceived and executed on the spur of the moment.  See 134 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 1866, 1900, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511; 1973 Technical Committee 
Comment to Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511 (a Legislative Service Commission summary), 
R.C. 2903.01; State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 19, 676 N.E.2d 82, 88. 
 
R.C. 2903.01 redefined the requisite element of intent for the crime of 
aggravated murder to be “prior calculation and design,” which embodies “the 
classic concept of cold-blooded killing while discarding the notion that only an 
instant’s prior deliberation is necessary.”  1973 Technical Committee Comment, 
supra, R.C. 2903.01; State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d at 19, 676 N.E.2d at 88.  This 
standard is more stringent than the “deliberate and premeditated” standard of the 
former murder statute.  State v. Cotton (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 10 O.O.3d 4, 381 
N.E.2d 190, paragraph one of the syllabus.  In adopting this more stringent 
standard, the General Assembly intended to require more than an instantaneous 
deliberation, and more than a few moments of deliberation.  It intended to require 
a planned scheme designed to implement a calculated decision to kill.  Id., 56 
Ohio St.2d at 11, 10 O.O.3d at 6, 381 N.E.2d at 193; State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio 
St.3d at 19, 676 N.E.2d at 88. 
 
The statute and its purpose are clear.  Nonetheless, a majority of this court 
once again disregards the words and the intent of the General Assembly and of its 
 
 
33
own precedent to extend the application of “prior calculation and design” beyond 
its intended scope.  In doing so, it disregards the explicit rule of construction 
under R.C. 2901.04, which states that “[s]ections of the Revised Code defining 
offenses or penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and liberally 
construed in favor of the accused.” 
 
The majority holds that prior calculation and design was proven in this case 
because “[i]t was an action that required thought on [the defendant’s] part to place 
the gun at the victim’s forehead, and he took additional time to decide to pull the 
trigger in order to carry out a calculated plan to obtain money from the store.  This 
was not a spur-of-the-moment accidental shooting on the part of a robber.   * * *  
The evidence clearly establishes that Goodwin acted with prior calculation and 
design in killing Mustafa.  Under any reasonable view, the killing was done with 
purpose.” 
 
While the majority may be correct that the evidence supports a finding that 
this was a purposeful, non-accidental killing, there is absolutely nothing in the 
record to indicate more than an instantaneous deliberation, or more than an intent 
to kill conceived and executed on the spur of the moment. 
 
The majority opinion equates “purpose” with “prior calculation and design.”  
However, these are two separate elements of aggravated murder.  “Purpose,” 
without prior calculation and design, is sufficient for a conviction of murder under 
R.C. 2903.02, but cannot sustain a finding of guilt for aggravated murder under 
R.C. 2903.01(A).  As these are separate elements, “purpose” cannot be a basis for 
finding “prior calculation and design.” 
 
Aside from the purposeful nature of the killing, the majority, in this case, 
has found prior calculation based solely on the fact that Goodwin raised a gun to 
the victim and pulled the trigger.  This reasoning is wholly inadequate and simply 
 
 
34
restates the fact that Goodwin did shoot Mustafa.  The act of shooting Mustafa, 
however, cannot be the sole basis for a finding of prior calculation and design, as 
it does not distinguish between whether the killing was aggravated murder, 
murder, or voluntary manslaughter.  All of these charges are based on an 
intentional killing that would require the minimal thought process of raising a 
weapon and implementing it to effect a killing.  However, only aggravated murder 
requires an additional element of prior calculation and design.  If the conduct of 
the defendant in this case constitutes prior calculation and design, it is difficult to 
imagine how any non-accidental killing could be anything less.  Such a holding 
runs contrary to the plain meaning of “prior calculation and design,” the explicit 
legislative intent of the statute, and our prior case law.  R.C. 2903.01(A); 134 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 1866, 1900; 1973 Technical Committee Comment, supra, R.C. 
2903.01.  See, also, e.g., State v. Reed (1981), 65 Ohio St.2d 117, 19 O.O.3d 311, 
418 N.E.2d 1359 (when the only evidence of intent, in a murder resulting from an 
alleged attempted robbery, is the shooting itself and a prior statement by the 
defendant that “if a cop got in his way [during a robbery] he would blow him 
away,” the evidence is insufficient to establish prior calculation and design); State 
v. Cotton, at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus (“ ‘prior calculation and 
design’ is a more stringent element than  * * * ‘deliberate and premeditated 
malice’ ”; “[i]nstantaneous deliberation is not sufficient to constitute ‘prior 
calculation and design’ ”).  Under the new test implied in the majority opinion, the 
charges of aggravated murder, murder, and voluntary manslaughter will be 
rendered indistinguishable. 
 
The only other support the majority cites to bolster its position is that 
Goodwin planned the robbery.  This is, as a matter of law, insufficient to prove 
that he planned to murder Mustafa.  The majority holding effectively equates a 
 
 
35
scheme designed to implement a calculated decision to rob, with a scheme 
designed to implement a calculated decision to kill.  Prior calculation and design 
for murder must be based on a calculated decision to kill, not a calculated decision 
to commit robbery or any other felony.  To hold otherwise would render 
superfluous the felony-murder provisions of R.C. 2903.01(B).  This result 
contravenes the general rule of statutory construction codified under R.C. 1.47(B), 
stating that in enacting a statute, “[t]he entire statute is intended to be effective.”  
See Richards v. Market Exchange Bank Co. (1910), 81 Ohio St. 348, 90 N.E. 
1000. 
 
Further, if the robbery plan had involved a preplanned intent to kill, it 
makes no sense that Goodwin would kill Mustafa and not kill the other store clerk 
who was a witness to the robbery and killing.  Though the majority cites the fact 
that after Mustafa was shot, Goodwin grabbed the other clerk and forced him at 
gunpoint to go to the safe, it ignores the fact that this clerk was not injured.  If this 
second clerk had been shot, or even if Mustafa had been shot numerous times, the 
cases cited by the majority might support a finding of prior calculation and design.  
However, without some break in the sequence between when Goodwin conceived 
of shooting Mustafa and when the death was effectuated, the cases cited by the 
majority do not support a finding of prior calculation and design in this case.  See, 
e.g., State v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 687 N.E.2d 685 (defendant 
convicted of killing two victims, each shot twice in the head execution-style, and 
evidence supported a finding that the second victim was killed because he arrived 
at the scene just after the first shooting); State v. Taylor (defendant shot the victim 
several times and followed him as he tried to crawl away and then shot him three 
or four more times); State v. Cotton (defendant shot two police officers who were 
chasing him in connection with a forged check, after stealing the gun from one 
 
 
36
officer and taking the time to shoot each in the back after they were wounded and 
either incapacitated or trying to retreat). 
 
These cases are significantly different from the case at issue.  They all 
involve more than one shooting and a significant period of time passing between 
the first shot and the final shot.  Most involve more than one victim, and all 
involve killing those who were wounded or who witnessed the original shooting.  
None correlate to a case where one victim was killed in a single instant and no 
further injury to that victim or other witnesses occurred. 
 
When the evidence is construed in a light most favorable to the prosecution 
as required under State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, 
paragraph two of the syllabus, there is insufficient evidence to find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that Goodwin calculated, schemed, or planned to kill Mustafa 
before entering the store.  Nor is there any evidence of more than an instantaneous 
deliberation between the time he formed the intent to kill Mustafa, if he even made 
a conscious decision to do so, and the moment he pulled the trigger.  There is no 
evidence that the robbery plan involved a plan to kill.  There is no evidence that 
would explain the killing of Mustafa but not the other clerk, and there is no 
evidence that Goodwin was prevented from killing the other clerk if that had been 
his intention.  In fact, all evidence on the record contradicts these theories.  Thus, 
for all the aforementioned reasons, I dissent from the majority and would affirm 
the conviction and sentence of death pursuant to R.C. 2903.01(B) only, and 
reverse the conviction pursuant to R.C. 2903.01(A). 
 
PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.