Case Title: Hudson v. Town of East Montpelier

Citation: 161 Vt. 168, 638 A.2d 561

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1993-11-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
HUDSON_V_TOWN_OF_EAST_MONTPELIER.91-341; 161 Vt. 168; 638 A.2d 561

[Filed 29-Nov-1993]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-341


 Judith Hudson                                Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Washington Superior Court

 Town of East Montpelier,                     February Term, 1993
 Cooleen Parker, Administratrix
 of the Estate of Robert Parker,
 and Michael Garand


 Alan W. Cheever, J.

 Robert G. Cain and Christopher J. McVeigh of Paul, Frank & Collins, Inc.,
    Burlington, for plaintiff-appellee

 Jeffrey W. White and John Davis Buckley of Theriault & Joslin, P.C.,
    Montpelier, for defendants-appellants



 PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ. and Peck, J. (Ret.),
           Specially Assigned



      JOHNSON, J.   Two employees of the Town of East Montpelier, who were
 sued in their personal capacity for negligently repairing a town road,
 appeal from a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff.  Although defendants claim
 several errors, the principal issue we must decide is whether the superior
 court correctly concluded that the doctrine of qualified official immunity
 did not shield the employees from liability under the circumstances of this
 case.  We affirm the court's decision.

 

      The relevant facts are not in dispute.  In November 1986, at a town
 selectmen's meeting, East Montpelier Road Foreman Robert Parker was
 instructed to place gravel over a ledge protruding from a dirt road within
 the town.  Parker was not told how much gravel to use, how to pack the
 gravel or cover the ledge, or how long to leave warning signs at the site.
 Approximately a week after the meeting, on the morning of November 13,
 Parker dumped two truckloads of gravel in a swath around the exposed ledge
 after placing temporary warning signs at both ends of the work site.  Grader
 Operator Michael Garand then leveled the gravel and packed it by running the
 tires of the grader over it several times.  Parker approved the job, picked
 up the temporary warnings signs, and left.  Two to three hours after Parker
 and Garand left the site, plaintiff lost control of her car when her front
 tires sank into the newly laid gravel.  The car struck a tree, and plaintiff
 suffered multiple injuries.
      Plaintiff filed suit against the Town of East Montpelier, the town's
 two insurance companies, and Parker and Garand.  She elected to pursue the
 suit only against Parker and Garand in their personal capacity after the
 superior court ruled that the town's insurance policies excluded her claims
 from coverage.  Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that
 either the doctrine of official immunity or the town's sovereign immunity
 shielded them from liability.  The court denied the motion, and the case
 proceeded to trial, where the jury assessed total damages at $135,000 and
 apportioned 70% of the fault to Parker, 24% to plaintiff, and 6% to Garand.
      On appeal, defendants argue the court erred in concluding that they
 were not immune from suit.  They also argue that the evidence does not
 support the jury's finding of negligence, and that the court abused its

 

 discretion by (1) refusing to allow the introduction of evidence showing
 that plaintiff was operating an unregistered vehicle, (2) allowing an
 unqualified expert to testify on ultimate conclusions of law, (3) allowing
 testimony of other motorists who had lost control of their cars at the same
 spot that afternoon, and (4) failing to examine the jurors individually,
 after learning that one of them had asked if the jurors could be taken to
 the scene of the accident, to determine whether they had discussed the case
 among themselves before the close of evidence.
                                     I.
                                     A.
      Defendants first argue that Parker's acts were discretionary in nature
 and thus immune under the doctrine of qualified official immunity.  Much of
 their argument is an attack on what they consider to be the superior court's
 flawed "bright-line" test that once a discretionary decision is made, in
 this case by selectmen, all subsequent acts are ministerial as a matter of
 law.  We disagree with their characterization of the court's opinion.  In
 any event, we need not adopt the court's rationale in affirming its
 conclusion.  Gochey v. Bombardier, Inc., 153 Vt. 607, 613, 572 A.2d 921, 925
 (1990) (correct judgment may be affirmed even though grounds stated in
 support of it are erroneous).  Rather than dissect the superior court's
 decision, we need determine only whether it correctly ruled that the
 doctrine of qualified official immunity did not shield defendants from
 liability.  We conclude that the court's ruling was correct.
      In Libercent v. Aldrich, 149 Vt. 76, 81,