Case Title: Commonwealth v. Moffat

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-08733 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SHANE MOFFAT. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     April 3, 2017. - November 6, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, 
& Cypher, JJ.1 
 
 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Evidence, Scientific test, Relevancy and 
materiality.  Practice, Criminal, Postconviction relief, 
Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 17, 2000. 
 
 
The case was tried before Tina S. Page, J., and a 
postconviction motion for deoxyribonucleic acid testing, filed 
on July 8, 2013, was heard by her. 
 
 
 
David A.F. Lewis for the defendant. 
 
Bethany C. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  On October 11, 2001, a Superior Court jury 
convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on 
                                                        
1 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder in the 
shooting death of Malcolm Howard on May 13, 1999.  Since that 
time, the defendant repeatedly has sought postconviction relief, 
while his direct appeal to this court has been stayed. 
 
Shortly after his conviction, the defendant timely filed a 
notice of appeal; his direct appeal thereafter was stayed while 
he pursued a motion for a new trial in the Superior Court.  The 
motion judge, who was also the trial judge, denied that motion 
in March, 2005.  The defendant appealed from the denial of his 
motion for a new trial, and, represented by new counsel, again 
sought a stay of his direct appeal in order to pursue a second 
motion for a new trial.  That motion was allowed.  His motion 
for funds for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing was denied, 
and, on January 6, 2012, the defendant filed an appeal from that 
denial; his January 10, 2012, motion for another stay of appeal 
was allowed.  In July, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for 
postconviction forensic testing pursuant to G. L. c. 278A.  The 
same judge conducted a hearing on the motion for DNA testing of 
four cigarette butts found near the crime scene in October, 
2013, and denied it in December, 2013.  In May, 2014, the 
defendant filed an appeal from the denial of his motion for 
postconviction relief.  We consolidated that appeal with the 
defendant's direct appeal.  In May, 2014, the defendant filed a 
motion to sever his direct appeal from the appeal from the 
3 
 
 
 
denial of his G. L. c. 278A motion and a motion to stay his 
direct appeal.  These motions were allowed. 
 
Thus, at this point, while the defendant's direct appeal 
remains pending, the issues before us are limited to the 
defendant's appeal from the denial of his motion for 
postconviction DNA testing under G. L. c. 278A. 
 
In denying the defendant's motion for testing of four 
cigarette butts collected by investigators near the crime scene, 
the judge found that the defendant had failed to meet his burden 
under G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b), to establish that a reasonably 
effective defense attorney would have sought testing of the 
cigarette butts, and that DNA testing of them had the potential 
to result in evidence material to the identity of the 
perpetrator.  We conclude that the judge did not abuse her 
discretion, and affirm the denial of the defendant's motion for 
postconviction testing of evidence. 
 
1.  Evidence at the G. L. c. 278A evidentiary hearing.  Our 
discussion of the evidence at the hearing on the defendant's 
motion for DNA testing is based on the written findings by the 
motion judge. 
 
In May, 1999, the defendant arranged for the victim to 
purchase $1,300 worth of cocaine from the defendant's 
associates.  To that end, on May 13, the victim, the victim's 
cousin, and the defendant all met.  The defendant refused to 
4 
 
 
 
allow the cousin to accompany them to the purchase, so the 
cousin lent the victim his Toyota Corolla automobile; the 
defendant and the victim dropped the cousin off in Hartford, 
Connecticut, before proceeding.  After stopping briefly at the 
defendant's mother's house in Hartford to check his mail, the 
defendant and the victim drove to Fred Jackson Road in 
Southwick.  The victim was shot in the back of the neck while 
sitting in the driver's seat of the Corolla. 
That evening, the defendant and a friend took a taxicab 
ride to a number of locations in Hartford.  During the drive, 
the friend saw the defendant dispose of the barrel of a shotgun 
in a storm drain.  The defendant also showed his friend a shirt 
with blood on it, and left a bag containing a pair of boots in 
the trunk of the taxicab.  Police later determined that 
bloodstains on the boots matched the victim's DNA profile. 
 
On May 16, 1999, the victim's body was found at the bottom 
of a steep ravine approximately thirty feet from the edge of 
Fred Thompson Road.  He was wearing a watch and jewelry, but 
there was no money in his pockets.  During a general search of 
the environs of the crime scene, State police investigators 
recovered four cigarette butts near the scene.  They were found 
near the edge of the road, north of the victim's body and a 
nearby telephone pole.  The first cigarette butt was in the 
road, approximately 239 feet from the telephone pole, and 
5 
 
 
 
approximately fourteen feet from the edge of the road.  The 
second cigarette butt was 174 feet north of the same telephone 
pole, near the edge of the road.  The third cigarette butt was 
194 feet from the telephone pole, and the fourth was 151 feet 
north of the pole and approximately two feet from the edge of 
the road. 
 
On May 18, 1999, the Corolla was found near an abandoned 
factory in Hartford.  Mail that the defendant had picked up from 
his mother's house on May 13, 1999, was scattered nearby, as was 
a baseball cap that the victim had been wearing.  Detectives 
determined that they wanted to speak with the defendant about 
the shooting, but were unable to find him at the address where 
they believed he had been living.  In November, 1999, they 
located the defendant in Florida; he was using an alias. 
 
The defendant agreed to speak with police in Florida.  He 
denied having killed the victim and provided several 
inconsistent versions of what had occurred on May 13, 1999.2  He 
                                                        
 
2 The defendant first told police that the drug transaction 
did not take place because the defendant, the victim, and the 
cousin had been unable to find the seller, an individual named 
"Ayah."  Thereafter, the defendant said that he led the victim 
to meet two men, "Quentin" and Ayah, in Massachusetts, and then 
that the meeting had occurred in Granby, Connecticut.  The 
defendant told police that Quentin and Ayah entered the Corolla 
in which the victim was sitting, spoke with him, and then shot 
him.  At another point, the defendant said that he, the victim, 
and the cousin met Ayah and Quentin, and followed them to an 
abandoned gasoline station in Granby, and then to Southwick.  
 
6 
 
 
 
also said that the $1,400 he had in his bedroom in Hartford, and 
his disposal of part of a shotgun in a sewer, were unrelated to 
the shooting.  The defendant described himself as a drug dealer 
and said that he had been involved in a planned drug transaction 
between the victim and the defendant's associates.  After he was 
arrested and returned from Florida, the defendant led police to 
the area on Fred Jackson Road where the victim's body previously 
had been found. 
The defense at trial was that the defendant was merely 
present at the scene of the shooting because he had been 
instrumental in arranging the drug transaction, but that he had 
had no part in the shooting.  He testified that the victim and 
the cousin arrived at his house on May 13 to purchase cocaine.  
The defendant, the cousin, and the victim drove to a convenience 
store, where they met two men, "Ayah" and "Quentin," and 
followed them to an abandoned gasoline station in Granby, 
Connecticut, and then on to Fred Jackson Road.  After the two 
vehicles were parked on the side of the road, Ayah and Quentin 
got out of their vehicle and walked toward the rear of the 
driver's side window of the Corolla.  Standing outside the 
Corolla, Quentin shot the victim from behind.  The defendant 
testified that the victim was killed in revenge because the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
There, Quentin stood behind the Corolla and shot the victim from 
behind. 
7 
 
 
 
victim and his cousin had robbed someone in New York during a 
prior drug transaction. 
The defendant's trial counsel was aware that police had 
found four cigarette butts near the crime scene, but did not 
seek to have them tested.  Trial counsel referred to the 
cigarette butts in his closing argument, pointing to them as 
evidence supporting the defendant's trial testimony that he was 
not the only other person present at the scene of the shooting.  
Counsel argued: 
"Did they belong to any of the people there?  We don't know 
that, because the Commonwealth didn't test them.  They 
didn't test the DNA against those cigarette butts to see if 
one belonged to [the victim], one of them belonged to [the 
defendant,] and maybe the DNA would have been as 
unidentifiable as those fingerprints.  But if two of them 
or even one of them belonged to one of them, then maybe the 
others would belong to some people, although the cigarettes 
could have been thrown out at any time by anyone.  It's 
unlikely two or three groups of random people would throw 
cigarette butts out and they landed right next to each 
other." 
 
 
In his initial affidavit in support of DNA testing, the 
defendant asserted his factual innocence.  He did not state that 
anyone at or near the scene of the shooting had been smoking.  
After the hearing on his motion for postconviction testing, the 
defendant filed a supplemental motion and affidavit.  The 
supplemental affidavit stated that, while the defendant had not 
been smoking at the scene, he recalled that "one or more of the 
three people I have identified as being at the crime scene . . . 
8 
 
 
 
were smoking.  I do not recall who was smoking, how much, or 
what brand of cigarettes they were using . . . ." 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Statutory provisions.  In 2012, the 
Legislature enacted G. L. c. 278A, "An Act providing access to 
forensic and scientific evidence."  See St. 2012, c. 38; 
Commonwealth v. Donald, 468 Mass. 37, 38 (2014).  General Laws 
c. 278A allows individuals who have been convicted of a crime to 
seek access to, and postconviction forensic or scientific 
analysis of, evidence or biological material.  See Commonwealth 
v. Wade, 467 Mass. 496, 497 (2014) (Wade II).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Clark, 472 Mass. 120, 121 (2015). 
 
The statute establishes a two-step process under which 
defendants may seek postconviction testing.  The first stage is 
"essentially nonadversarial."  See Wade II, 467 Mass. at 503, 
citing G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (e).  Pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 3, 
a motion judge conducts a threshold inquiry into whether a 
defendant has met the initial burden.  At this preliminary 
stage, the defendant "is not required to 'establish any of the 
[statutory] factors alleged in the § 3 motion.'"  Wade II, supra 
at 503-504, quoting G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (c).  The judge's 
determination whether the motion meets the preliminary 
requirements is based on a review of the information contained 
in the motion and any references to the record, supporting 
documents, or affidavits.  See Wade II, supra at 502, citing 
9 
 
 
 
G. L. c. 278A, § 6 (a).  The judge does not "make credibility 
determinations, or . . . consider the relative weight of the 
evidence or the strength of the case presented against the 
[defendant] at trial."  Wade II, supra at 505-506. 
 
If a defendant meets the minimal threshold under G. L. 
c. 278A, § 3, the proceedings advance to the next stage:  an 
evidentiary hearing.  See G. L. c. 278A, § 6 (a).  At such a 
hearing, the motion judge determines whether the defendant "has 
established by a preponderance of the evidence sufficient facts" 
to meet the criteria outlined in G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (1)-(6).  
Wade II, 467 Mass. at 501, 503.  See Donald, 468 Mass. at 41  
These criteria are: 
 
"(1) that the evidence or biological material exists; 
 
 
"(2) that the evidence or biological material has been 
subject to a chain of custody that is sufficient to 
establish that it has not deteriorated, been substituted, 
tampered with, replaced, handled or altered such that the 
results of the requested analysis would lack any probative 
value; 
 
 
"(3) that the evidence or biological material has not 
been subjected to the requested analysis for any of the 
reasons set forth in clauses (i) to (v), inclusive, of 
paragraph (5) of subsection (b) of [§] 3;[3] 
                                                        
 
3 General Laws c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5), sets forth the 
following reasons: 
 
 
"(i) the requested analysis had not yet been developed 
at the time of the conviction; 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
"(4) that the requested analysis has the potential to 
result in evidence that is material to the moving party's 
identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the 
underlying case; 
 
 
"(5) that the purpose of the motion is not the 
obstruction of justice or delay; and 
 
 
"(6) that the results of the particular type of 
analysis being requested have been found to be admissible 
in courts of the [C]ommonwealth." 
 
G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b).  Having conducted such an evidentiary 
hearing, a motion judge "shall state findings of fact and 
conclusions of law that support the decision to allow or deny 
[the defendant's] motion."  G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (a). 
 
b.  Analysis.  The Commonwealth does not challenge the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
"(ii) the results of the requested analysis were not 
admissible in the courts of the [C]ommonwealth at the time 
of the conviction; 
 
 
"(iii) the moving party and the moving party's 
attorney were not aware of and did not have reason to be 
aware of the existence of the evidence or biological 
material at the time of the underlying case and conviction; 
 
 
"(iv) the moving party's attorney in the underlying 
case was aware at the time of the conviction of the 
existence of the evidence or biological material, the 
results of the requested analysis were admissible as 
evidence in courts of the [C]ommonwealth, a reasonably 
effective attorney would have sought the analysis and 
either the moving party's attorney failed to seek the 
analysis or the judge denied the request; or 
 
"(v) the evidence or biological material was otherwise 
unavailable at the time of the conviction." 
11 
 
 
 
defendant's claim that his motion for postconviction testing met 
the threshold requirements set forth in G. L. c. 278A, § 3.  The 
Commonwealth argues, however, that the defendant failed to 
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his motion 
met the requirements of G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (3) and (4). 
 
i.  Standard of review.  The parties dispute the 
appropriate standard of review when considering the denial of a 
motion pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7.  The defendant contends 
that, because no testimony was introduced at the hearing, we are 
in the same position as the motion judge to conduct a de novo 
review of the record.  The Commonwealth, by contrast, argues 
that the motion judge necessarily weighed the evidence 
introduced at the hearing, and that we therefore should defer to 
her factual findings.  We conclude that, where the motion judge 
was the trial judge, a decision under G. L. c. 278A, § 7, should 
be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
De novo review is appropriate where the claim at issue 
involves statutory interpretation, or where the judge was not 
required "to make credibility determinations, or to consider the 
relative weight of the evidence or the strength of the case 
presented against the moving party at trial."  See Clark, 472 
Mass. at 130, citing Wade II, 467 Mass. at 505-506.  In appeals 
from a denial of a G. L. c. 278A, § 3, motion, de novo review is 
appropriate because review of a moving party's threshold showing 
12 
 
 
 
under G. L. c. 278A, § 3, is limited to consideration of the 
motion and supporting documents.  Thus, in Wade II, supra 
at 501, we reviewed a "question[] of statutory interpretation de 
novo" in a decision "concerned only with the threshold review at 
the first step [mandated by § 3]."  Similarly, in Clark, supra, 
we observed that, where review is wholly "based on documentary 
evidence," an appellate court stands "in the same position as 
the [motion] judge in determining whether the information 
presented in the motion meets the requirements of § 3." 
For second-stage motions under G. L. c. 278A, § 7, where 
the motion judge was not the trial judge, and where the record 
before us is purely documentary, we also review claims of error 
under a de novo standard, because "we regard ourselves in as 
good a position as the motion judge to assess the trial record."  
Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986).  See 
Commonwealth v. Petetabella, 459 Mass. 177, 181 (2011).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Melo, 472 Mass. 278, 293 (2015), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 469 Mass. 531, 539 (2014) ("We review de 
novo any findings of the motion judge that were based entirely 
on the documentary evidence, [such as] the recorded interviews 
of the defendant"). 
Where a motion under G. L. c. 278A, § 7, is considered by 
the trial judge, however, we review the trial judge's findings 
under an abuse of discretion standard.  Commonwealth v. Wade, 
13 
 
 
 
475 Mass. 54, 55 (2016) (Wade III).  See Commonwealth v. 
Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 672 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 (2017) 
(in appeal from trial judge's determination on motion for new 
trial, "we consider whether the judge committed a significant 
error of law or abuse of discretion in allowing the defendant's 
motion").  As we consistently have held, "[a] reviewing court 
extends special deference to the action of a motion judge who 
was also the trial judge."  Grace, 397 Mass. at 307.  This 
deference is warranted because a motion judge who was the trial 
judge conducts a "fact-specific analysis [predicated on] a 
thorough knowledge of trial proceedings."  Commonwealth v. 
DiBenedetto, 475 Mass. 429, 439–440 (2016).  See Commonwealth v. 
Chatman, 466 Mass. 327, 333–334 (2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 840 
(2016) (motion judge who sat as trial judge "entitled to rely on 
her knowledge of what occurred at trial").  This analysis 
involves credibility judgments and other assessments made in 
light of the trial testimony.  See Commonwealth v. Cadet, 473 
Mass. 173, 179 (2015); Commonwealth v. Rosario, 460 Mass. 181, 
195 (2011). 
 
ii.  Whether denial of the G. L. c. 278A, § 7, motion was 
erroneous.  The Commonwealth does not dispute that the defendant 
established by a preponderance of the evidence four of the six 
enumerated requirements under G. L. c. 278A, § 7.  The 
Commonwealth agrees that the defendant has shown that the 
14 
 
 
 
evidence he seeks to test -- the four cigarette butts -- exists, 
see § 7 (b) (1); the chain of custody has been adequate, see 
§ 7 (b) (2); the purpose of the motion was not to obstruct 
justice or delay, see § 7 (b) (5); and the results of the 
proposed testing is admissible in the Commonwealth, see 
§ 7 (b) (6). 
The question we confront is thus whether the defendant 
established, by a preponderance of that evidence, that the DNA 
testing sought has the potential to result in evidence material 
to the defendant's identification as the perpetrator, see 
§ 7 (b) (4); and that a reasonably effective defense attorney 
would have sought testing of the cigarette butts, see 
§ 7 (b) (3). 
 
A.  Material evidence of the identity of the perpetrator.  
The defendant argues that DNA from the four cigarette butts 
could have originated from others who were at the scene, in 
particular the two others who took part in the drug transaction, 
and accordingly could suggest that someone other than he shot 
the victim.  To establish that he has met the requirements of 
this factor, the defendant was required, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4), to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that "the requested analysis has the potential to 
result in evidence that is material to the [defendant's] 
identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the underlying 
15 
 
 
 
case."  We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's 
determination that "the DNA testing sought here is on material 
which is not directly involved with the crime, and therefore 
cannot help identify the perpetrator." 
As discussed, the four cigarette butts were collected from 
a public road after police responded to a report that a body had 
been found at the bottom of an embankment near the road.  The 
cigarette butts were almost 200 feet from the location where the 
victim's body was found (in a range of from 151 to 239 feet).  
Some of them were near a driveway leading off the main road, 
which the defendant suggested was the most natural place in the 
area to turn around and head back in the direction that the 
defendant had testified the others returned after the shooting.  
This, of course, cuts both ways:  by the defendant's own 
statement, an unknown number of others could have stopped at the 
only nearby location wide enough to pull over and smoke a 
cigarette. 
 
Moreover, there was nothing to indicate when the cigarette 
butts might have been deposited on the road, and therefore 
nothing showing a temporal link with the shooting of the victim.   
Because three days had elapsed between the shooting and the date 
when the victim's body was discovered, the cigarette butts could 
have been left on numerous occasions after the shooting, just as 
they could have been discarded days, weeks, or months before the 
16 
 
 
 
evening of the shooting. 
 
Further, in his statements to police, the defendant had not 
indicated that either Ayah, Quentin, or anyone else had smoked 
cigarettes at the scene, either while in a vehicle or on foot.  
Nor did the defendant, who testified at trial, mention cigarette 
smoking on direct or cross-examination. 
 
The Legislature intended G. L. c. 278A to make 
postconviction forensic testing easier and faster than it had 
been for defendants who sought such testing in conjunction with 
motions for new trials pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  See Wade II, 467 Mass. at 
503-504.  While our jurisprudence strongly favors that approach, 
a decision on a motion filed under G. L. c. 278A, § 7, is not 
insulated from any exercise of discretion by the motion judge.  
Here, the judge, acting within this discretion, concluded that 
DNA testing of cigarette butts found at the side of a public 
road in the general vicinity of a crime scene did not have the 
potential to result in evidence material to the identity of the 
perpetrator. 
 
In many instances, a defendant may utilize G. L. c. 278A to 
seek forensic testing of evidence in an effort to establish a 
direct link to the perpetrator's identity.  See, e.g., Clark, 
472 Mass. at 121-122 (kitchen knife wielded by assailant 
warranted testing for potential handler DNA); Wade II, 467 Mass. 
17 
 
 
 
at 497-498 (defendant convicted of rape and murder sought DNA 
testing of vaginal swabs to establish identity of perpetrator); 
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 485, 485-486 (2016) 
(defendant convicted of murder sought DNA testing of hairs found 
clutched in victim's hands to identify perpetrator); 
Commonwealth v. Coutu, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 686, 687, 702 (2015), 
S.C., 90 Mass. App. Ct. 227 (2016) (defendant sought DNA testing 
of finger swabs of victim who testified that she attempted to 
"pull" and "peel" her attacker's fingers off her face). 
 
We do not suggest that postconviction forensic testing 
under G. L. c. 278A is limited to direct evidence of the 
perpetrator's identity.  By its plain language, G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 7 (b) (4), requires a defendant to establish "that the 
requested analysis has the potential to result in evidence that 
is material to the moving party's identification as the 
perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case."  In other 
circumstances, it might be possible, or, indeed, likely, 
depending on the facts of a particular case, that DNA evidence 
could be used in conjunction with other evidence to establish 
the identity of a third party.  Because of the nature of the 
evidence in this case, however, and the facts and circumstances 
of the crime, the defendant failed to meet this legal standard. 
 
B.  Whether a reasonably competent defense attorney would 
have sought DNA testing.  The defendant contends that his trial 
18 
 
 
 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective because counsel did not 
seek DNA testing of the cigarette butts prior to trial.  
Pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (3), a defendant bears the 
burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the item he or she seeks to have tested has not previously 
been subjected to the requested analysis, for any of the reasons 
listed in G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5).4  General Laws c. 278A, 
§ 3 (b) (5) (iv), does not require that a defendant satisfy the 
general ineffective assistance standard under Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96-97 (1974), but, rather, that he or 
she demonstrate "only that 'a' reasonably effective attorney 
would have sought the requested analysis, not that every 
reasonably effective attorney would have done so."  Wade II, 467 
Mass. at 511. 
 
The determination whether a reasonable attorney would have 
sought the testing is an objective one.  Id. at 511-512.  
                                                        
4 The defendant seeks to establish that the below criteria 
referenced in G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (5), is applicable in this 
case: 
 
 
"(iv) the moving party's attorney in the underlying 
case was aware at the time of the conviction of the 
existence of the evidence or biological material, the 
results of the requested analysis were admissible as 
evidence in courts of the commonwealth, a reasonably 
effective attorney would have sought the analysis and 
either the moving party's attorney failed to seek the 
analysis or the judge denied the request." 
 
G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5). 
19 
 
 
 
"[B]ecause the act uses the language of 'a' hypothetical 
reasonably effective attorney, a moving party is not required to 
explain the tactical or strategic reasoning of the party's trial 
counsel in not seeking the requested analysis."  Wade III, 475 
Mass. at 63, citing Coutu, 88 Mass. App. Ct. at 703.  "Thus, 
regardless whether a moving party proceeds under the reasonably 
effective attorney prong or any other prong of [G. L. c. 278A,] 
§ 3 (b) (5), whether his or her trial counsel made a strategic 
decision to forgo such testing is not relevant to that inquiry."  
Wade III, supra. 
Here, the judge determined that a reasonably effective 
attorney would not have sought DNA testing of the cigarette 
butts.  We agree.  As discussed with respect to the question of 
identity, any analysis of the DNA on the cigarette butts would 
have done virtually nothing to identify the perpetrator, and 
thus would not have supported an inference that someone other 
than the defendant killed the victim.  Contrast Clark, 472 Mass. 
at 121-122 (DNA on knife could be material to identifying 
perpetrator); Wade II, 467 Mass. at 497-498 (DNA on vaginal 
swabs potentially could identify perpetrator). 
 
Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion in the 
judge's determination that the defendant's "motion, arguments, 
attached submissions, and the record of the trial and motion 
hearing fall short of meeting even the low threshold for relief 
20 
 
 
 
under G. L. c. 278A." 
3.  Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's G. L. 
c. 278A, § 3, motion is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.