Case Title: Commonwealth v. Samuel S.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12135

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12135 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SAMUEL S., a juvenile. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     November 9, 2016. - February 17, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Youthful Offender Act.  Delinquent 
Child.  Global Positioning System Device.  Juvenile Court, 
Delinquent child, Probation.  Practice, Criminal, Juvenile 
delinquency proceeding, Probation. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Hampden County 
Division of the Juvenile Court Department on August 21, 2014. 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 3, 2014. 
 
 
Motions for relief from conditions of probation were heard 
by Judith J. Phillips, J., and a motion for reconsideration was 
considered by her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Laura Chrismer Edmonds for the juvenile. 
 
Cynthia Cullen Payne, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
2 
 
 
 
 
Ryan M. Schiff & Caroline Alpert, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, for Youth Advocacy Division of the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  The juvenile was adjudicated both a youthful 
offender and a delinquent juvenile as the result of a single 
sexual assault.  A Juvenile Court judge ordered the juvenile to 
register as a sex offender and to submit to global positioning 
system (GPS) monitoring, concluding that both consequences, 
under the relevant statutes, were mandatory.  The juvenile 
argues that this conclusion was error.  He argues first that the 
pertinent section of the sex offender registration statute, 
G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f), required the judge to make an 
individualized determination whether the juvenile must register 
as a sex offender because he was not "sentenced to immediate 
confinement" within the meaning of the statute.  He also argues 
that the GPS monitoring statute, G. L. c. 265, § 47, as 
interpreted by this court in Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 
Mass. 807 (2013), does not require youthful offenders to submit 
to GPS monitoring.  We agree with the juvenile on both points.  
Accordingly, we vacate the judge's decision.1 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Youth Advocacy 
Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
3 
 
 
 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.2  This case stems from a sexual 
assault that occurred in June, 2014.  The juvenile, who was 
seventeen years old at the time, was at home with the victim, 
his five-year-old half-sister.  The victim's father returned 
home and entered the living room.  There, he saw the victim 
being pushed to the ground and noticed that the juvenile sitting 
on the couch "with his drawers and his pants at his ankles."  
The victim was naked from the waist down. 
 
The juvenile initially denied any wrongdoing.  The victim 
later described that the juvenile had touched her genitals and 
chest area, made her touch his genitals, and penetrated her 
labia with his penis in a way that caused her pain. 
 
2.  Prosecution, plea, and sentencing.  Two juvenile 
delinquency complaints issued, charging the juvenile with one 
count of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, 
G. L. c. 265, § 13B, and one count of rape of a child with 
force, G. L. c. 265, § 22A.  Three youthful offender indictments 
also issued, charging the juvenile with one count of rape of a 
child with force, G. L. c. 265, § 22A, and two counts of 
aggravated rape of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 23A. 
 
In January, 2015, all charges were resolved pursuant to a 
plea agreement.  The juvenile admitted to sufficient facts to 
                     
 
2 We accept the underlying facts, which are not in dispute, 
from the juvenile's plea colloquy. 
4 
 
 
 
warrant an adjudication as a youthful offender on the count of 
rape of a child with force and as a delinquent juvenile on the 
count of indecent assault and battery of a child.  The 
Commonwealth filed a nolle prosequi on the remaining three 
charges.  The judge accepted the parties' joint sentencing 
recommendation.  Pursuant to the recommendation, the judge 
sentenced the juvenile on the youthful offender count to a 
combination sentence as described in G. L. c. 119, § 58 (b).  As 
part of that sentence, the juvenile was committed to the 
Department of Youth Services (DYS).  The juvenile was also 
committed to DYS on the juvenile delinquency count. 
 
3.  Registration and GPS monitoring.  After the plea and 
sentencing, the juvenile filed two motions in which he sought 
relief from mandatory sex offender registration under G. L. 
c. 6, § 178E (f), and relief from mandatory GPS monitoring under 
G. L. c. 265, § 47, and this court's opinion in Hanson H., 464 
Mass. 807.  In February, 2015, the judge ruled that she had 
discretion to relieve the juvenile of both the registration and 
the GPS monitoring requirements, and ordered a risk assessment 
evaluation to enable her to determine whether either, or both, 
should apply to the juvenile.  The Commonwealth moved for 
reconsideration, which the juvenile opposed.  The judge then 
issued a revised decision in June, 2015, in which she reversed 
her position, ultimately concluding that the relevant statutes 
5 
 
 
 
permitted her no discretion to relieve the juvenile from sex 
offender registration or GPS monitoring. 
 
4.  Juvenile's appeal.  The juvenile appealed from the 
judge's revised decision.3  We allowed the juvenile's application 
for direct appellate review and transferred the case to this 
court. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Jurisdiction.  The Commonwealth first 
argues that the juvenile's appeal regarding mandatory 
registration is not properly before the court because he has not 
exhausted all administrative remedies or sought relief under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.4  We agree that the juvenile has not followed 
the appropriate procedure to obtain review of this claim.  See 
Commonwealth v. Ronald R., 450 Mass. 262, 266-267 (2007) (no 
automatic right of appeal when juvenile is denied relief from 
registration obligation).  The appropriate procedure would have 
been to file a petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, in 
the county court.  See id. 
                     
 
3 The Juvenile Court judge stayed the juvenile's sex 
offender registration pending the outcome of this appeal.  The 
judge also relieved the juvenile of the obligation to submit to 
global positioning system (GPS) monitoring until he was released 
from a DYS secure treatment facility and placed into the 
community. 
 
 
4 The Commonwealth does not extend its jurisdictional 
argument to the GPS monitoring issue, but in any event, we would 
allow the appeal.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Lapointe, 435 Mass. 455, 
458-459 (2001) (allowing direct review of conditions of 
probation because case had been fully briefed and presented 
issues of public interest). 
6 
 
 
 
 
Nonetheless, it will serve a substantial public interest to 
resolve the questions presented by the juvenile's appeal, these 
questions are likely to arise again, and the case has been fully 
briefed and argued before the court.  Accordingly, we will 
answer the questions in this.  See Hanson H., 464 Mass. at 808 
n.2 (deciding merits of appeal despite mootness, when issue 
raised was of significant public interest, fully briefed, and 
very likely to arise again in similar circumstances, yet evade 
review).  See also Commonwealth v. Doe, 420 Mass. 142, 143 
(1995), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 
Mass. 296 (2014) (exercising discretion to comment on issues 
presented despite fact that report from lower court was not 
properly before court); Cobb v. Cobb, 406 Mass. 21, 24 n.2 
(1989) (citing authority provided by G. L. c. 211, § 3, to 
answer improperly reported questions). 
 
2.  Registration as a sex offender.  The first question 
presented is whether G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f) (§ 178E [f]),5 
                     
 
5 The full text of G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f) (§ 178E [f]), 
provides: 
 
 
"In the case of a sex offender who has been convicted 
of a sex offense or adjudicated as a youthful offender or 
as a delinquent juvenile by reason of a sex offense, on or 
after December 12, 1999, and who has not been sentenced to 
immediate confinement, the court shall, within [fourteen] 
days of sentencing, determine whether the circumstances of 
the offense in conjunction with the offender's criminal 
history indicate that the sex offender does not pose a risk 
of reoffense or a danger to the public.  If the court so 
7 
 
 
 
permitted the judge discretion to relieve the juvenile of the 
requirement to register as a sex offender.  That is a question 
of statutory construction subject to de novo review by this 
court.  See Commonwealth v. Ventura, 465 Mass. 202, 208 (2013). 
 
Section 178E (f) permits a sentencing judge, in certain sex 
offense cases, to conduct an individualized determination of 
whether the sex offender must register as such.  The section 
contemplates three categories of sex offenders:  (1) an adult 
who has been convicted of a sex offense, (2) a juvenile who has 
been adjudicated a youthful offender by reason of a sex offense, 
and (3) a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent by reason 
of a sex offense.  Id.  In any case where the sentencing judge 
has not sentenced such a sex offender "to immediate 
confinement," the judge is to determine, within fourteen days of 
sentencing, "whether the circumstances of the offense in 
conjunction with the offender's criminal history indicate that 
                                                                  
determines, the court shall relieve such sex offender of 
the obligation to register under [§§] 178C to 178P, 
inclusive.  The court may not make such a determination or 
finding if the sex offender has been determined to be a 
sexually violent predator; has been convicted of two or 
more sex offenses defined as sex offenses pursuant to the 
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually 
Violent Offender Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. [§] 14071, 
committed on different occasions; has been convicted of a 
sex offense involving a child or a sexually violent 
offense; or if the sex offender is otherwise subject to 
minimum or lifetime registration requirements as determined 
by the board pursuant to [§] 178D."  (Emphases added.) 
 
8 
 
 
 
the sex offender does not pose a risk of reoffense or a danger 
to the public."  Id.  If the judge so determines, and none of 
the statutory exceptions applies,6 then the judge is to relieve 
the individual from the obligation to register as a sex 
offender.  Id. 
 
Given the language of § 178E (f), the narrow question we 
confront is whether the juvenile in this case, who has been 
committed to DYS both as a youthful offender and as a delinquent 
juvenile, has been "sentenced to immediate confinement" within 
the meaning of § 178E (f). 
 
a.  Meaning of "sentenced to immediate confinement."  We 
begin with the plain meaning of the statutory language.  See 
Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 633 (2013), S.C., 473 
Mass. 164 (2015).  The terms "sentenced," "confinement," and 
"immediate confinement" are not defined within the sex offender 
registration statute.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178C (definitions 
                     
 
6 Several enumerated exceptions in § 178E (f) bar a judge 
from applying its relief provision.  The Commonwealth does not 
argue for, and the record does not support, the application of 
any of those exceptions here.  In particular, there is no 
indication that the juvenile has been "determined to be a 
sexually violent predator" or that he is "otherwise subject to 
minimum or lifetime registration requirements" under § 178D.  
See G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f), third sentence.  Further, having 
been adjudicated a youthful offender and a delinquent juvenile, 
the juvenile has not been "convicted" of any of the exception-
triggering offenses.  See Commonwealth v. Connor C., 432 Mass. 
635, 646 (2000) (reaffirming "long-standing jurisprudence that 
an 'adjudication' that a child has violated a law generally is 
not a 'conviction' of a crime"). 
9 
 
 
 
applicable to §§ 178C to 178P).  As a result, we look to 
dictionary definitions as a guide to a term's plain or ordinary 
meaning.  See, e.g.,  Commonwealth v. Palmer, 464 Mass. 773, 
778-779 (2013). 
 
The term "confinement" is defined, in a legal context, to 
mean "[t]he act of imprisoning or restraining someone; the 
quality, state, or condition of being imprisoned or restrained."  
Black's Law Dictionary, at 362 (10th ed. 2014).  More generally, 
to "confine" means "to hold within bounds"; "restrain from 
exceeding boundaries"; "to keep in narrow quarters"; "imprison"; 
"to prevent free outward passage or motion of"; "secure, 
enclose, fasten"; or "to keep from leaving accustomed quarters 
(as one's room or bed) under pressure of infirmity, childbirth, 
detention, [or] business reasons."  Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 476 (1993). 
 
A "sentence" is "[t]he judgment that a court formally 
pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty" or "the 
punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 1569 (10th ed. 2014).  Similarly, a "sentence" can be 
"a decision or judicial determination of a court or tribunal"; 
"the order by which a court or judge imposes punishment or 
penalty upon a person found guilty"; "to decree, decide, or 
announce judicially"; or "to prescribe the penalty or punishment 
of."  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2068 (1993). 
10 
 
 
 
 
Read together, these definitions indicate that a "sentence" 
to "confinement" ordinarily will involve a court or judge 
imposing, as a consequence of or penalty for an illegal act, a 
form of spatial restraint within defined and obvious physical 
boundaries, including, as one example, incarceration.7 
 
b.  Dispositional options for youthful offenders and 
delinquent juveniles.  To understand whether youthful offenders 
and delinquent juveniles can be "sentenced to immediate 
confinement" within the definitions just discussed requires an 
                     
 
7 This definition accords with our case law interpreting the 
term "confinement," albeit in a different context.  See 
Commonwealth v. Morasse, 446 Mass. 113, 121 (2006) (interpreting 
term "in confinement" to mean "confinement in a jail or prison, 
or confinement in some comparably secure and restrictive 
institutional setting").  It also fits comfortably with the 
Legislature's use of the term in several other contexts.  See, 
e.g., G. L. c. 22C, § 37 ("[certain notification required prior 
to release] of any person confined in a penal or reformatory 
institution of the commonwealth . . . or of any person confined 
in any facility . . . or in the Bridgewater state 
hospital . . ."); G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (a) ("The person named in 
the [sexually dangerous person] petition shall be confined to a 
secure facility for the duration of the trial"); G. L. c. 126, 
§ 5 ("If there are several jails in a county, the sheriff may 
cause the prisoners to be confined in any of them"); G. L. 
c. 127, § 129C ("For the satisfactory conduct of a prisoner 
confined in a prison camp, the commissioner [of the department 
of correction] may grant . . . a further deduction of sentence 
. . . for each month while confined in a prison camp"); G. L. 
c. 176A, § 8A (i) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed 
to require a non-profit hospital service corporation to pay for 
mental health benefits or services:  which are provided to a 
person . . . who is presently incarcerated, confined or 
committed to a jail, house of correction or prison, or custodial 
facility in the department of youth services within the 
commonwealth or one of its political subdivisions").  (Emphases 
added.) 
11 
 
 
 
understanding of the range of dispositional outcomes available 
in those cases.  For a youthful offender, a Juvenile Court judge 
may order one of three consequences:  (1) a sentence provided by 
law (i.e., an adult sentence); (2) a combination sentence (which 
combines a commitment to DYS with a suspended adult sentence); 
or (3) commitment to DYS until the age of twenty-one.  G. L. 
c. 119, § 58, third par.  To select among these options, the 
judge must conduct a sentencing recommendation hearing that 
takes into account a host of case-specific factors.8  G. L. 
c. 119, § 58, fourth par. 
 
With respect to a delinquent juvenile, a Juvenile Court 
judge also has a range of dispositional options, including (1) 
commitment to DYS, (2) placement of the juvenile in the care of 
a probation officer, and (3) placement of the case on file.  
G. L. c. 119, § 58, second par.  The judge has broad discretion 
to select among these options, although the statute does not 
require the same sort of presentence hearing as it does for 
                     
 
8 The sentencing judge is instructed to consider the 
following nonexhaustive list of factors:  "the nature, 
circumstances, and seriousness of the offense; victim impact 
statement; a report by a probation officer concerning the 
history of the youthful offender; the youthful offender's court 
and delinquency records; the success or lack of success of any 
past treatment or delinquency dispositions regarding the 
youthful offender; the nature of services available through the 
juvenile justice system; the youthful offender's age and 
maturity; and the likelihood of avoiding future criminal 
conduct."  G. L. c. 119, § 58, fourth par. 
12 
 
 
 
youthful offenders.  See R.L. Ireland, Juvenile Law § 1.62 (2d 
ed. 2006); G. L. c. 119, § 58, second and fourth pars. 
 
Two additional observations are in order with respect to 
the consequences of a commitment to DYS.  First, a separate 
statute describes the various ways that DYS may treat a person 
committed to its custody.  See G. L. c. 120, § 6.9  Two of them 
explicitly involve "confinement," while three of them do not.  
See id.  The policies of DYS also describe a spectrum of 
placement options for juveniles, ranging from nonresidential, 
community-based placement to "staff secure" facilities to 
"hardware secure" facilities.  Department of Youth Services, 
                     
 
9 General Laws c. 120, § 6, provides: 
 
 
"When a person has been committed to the department of 
youth services, it may after an objective consideration of 
all available information --  
 
 
"(a) Permit him his liberty under supervision and upon 
such conditions as it believes conducive to law-abiding 
conduct; or --  
 
 
"(b) Order his confinement under such conditions as it 
believes best designed for the protection of the public; or 
--  
 
 
"(c) Order reconfinement or renewed release as often 
as conditions indicate to be desirable; or --  
 
 
"(d) Revoke or modify any order, except an order of 
final discharge, as often as conditions indicate to be 
desirable; or --  
 
 
"(e) Discharge him from control with notice to the 
court . . . when it is satisfied that such discharge is 
consistent with the protection of the public." 
13 
 
 
 
Official Policy No. 01.01.04(a) (eff. July 1, 2004).  See 
Commonwealth v. Carrion, 431 Mass. 44, 46 (2000) (discussing 
"wide range of facilities available for placements" of those in 
DYS custody).  See also United States v. Gibbons, 553 F.3d 40, 
45 (1st Cir. 2009) (when Juvenile Court judge commits juvenile 
adjudicated delinquent to DYS custody, "DYS then determines the 
placement appropriate for each offender, which could range from 
parental release to confinement at a secure facility").  Second, 
once a judge commits a youthful offender or a delinquent 
juvenile to DYS, the actual terms of that commitment, as a 
general matter, are wholly within the discretion of DYS, an 
executive agency.10  See G. L. c. 120, § 6.  See also Gibbons, 
supra.  We have located no part of the law, and the parties have 
identified none, giving a judge the power to order DYS to place 
the juvenile in, say, a secure facility as opposed to placing 
him or her on supervised release, or vice versa. 
 
c.  Whether commitment to DYS constitutes being "sentenced 
to immediate confinement."  We now return to the interpretive 
question that is at issue here:  whether a commitment to DYS 
                     
 
10 Adjudications of gun-related charges are treated somewhat 
differently.  See G. L. c. 119, § 58, seventh & eighth pars.  In 
these cases, the seventh and eighth paragraphs of § 58 require 
the sentencing judge to commit the juvenile to DYS, and then 
they require the DYS commissioner to detain the juvenile in a 
facility.  In other words, the detention results from a two-step 
process involving, first, commitment to DYS by the sentencing 
judge and, second, mandatory detention in a facility by the DYS 
commissioner. 
14 
 
 
 
constitutes being "sentenced to immediate confinement" under 
§ 178E (f). 
 
The juvenile argues that a commitment to DYS does not 
constitute being "sentenced to immediate confinement" for 
purposes of § 178E (f).  Under this interpretation, no 
delinquent juvenile can be "sentenced to immediate confinement," 
because a commitment to DYS is the most severe sentence a 
delinquent juvenile can receive.  See G. L. c. 119, § 58, second 
par.  Such a reading is problematic if the inclusion of the 
phrase "or as a delinquent juvenile" in the first sentence of 
§ 178E (f) indicates an understanding by the Legislature that 
some delinquent juveniles would be subject to immediate 
confinement while others would not.11  Moreover, under G. L. c. 
120, § 6, DYS is expressly authorized to order the "confinement" 
and "reconfinement" of those in its custody.  See G. L. c. 120, 
§ 6 (b), (c).  The end result for those juveniles is a sentence 
that includes a period of immediate confinement. 
 
On the other hand, the Commonwealth proposes that a 
commitment to DYS always constitutes "immediate confinement" for 
the purposes of § 178E (f).  This interpretation, too, is 
                     
11 The inclusion of "a youthful offender" in the first 
sentence of § 178E (f) does not present exactly the same issue, 
insofar as a youthful offender may be sentenced like an adult, 
G. L. c. 119, § 58, third par., and if a judge were to do so, 
the judge presumably could choose to sentence the youthful 
offender to "immediate confinement," or not. 
15 
 
 
 
problematic insofar as it conflicts with the plain language and 
structure of G. L. c. 120, § 6, which describes the power of 
DYS, with respect to a juvenile committed to it, to "[p]ermit 
[the juvenile] his liberty under supervision and upon such 
conditions as [DYS] believes conducive to law-abiding conduct."  
G. L. c. 120, § 6 (a).  In other words, the Commonwealth would 
have us treat even those juveniles who are, upon commitment to 
DYS, allowed their "liberty under supervision" as having been 
"sentenced to immediate confinement."  That interpretation also 
makes little sense insofar as it would automatically require 
such a juvenile to register as a sex offender even though § 178E 
(f) expressly directs a judge to determine in the first instance 
whether an adult whom a judge has sentenced to probation -- a 
form of "liberty under supervision" -- shall be required to 
register as a sex offender.  See Commonwealth v. Dalton, 467 
Mass. 555, 558 (2014) ("According to the plain language of 
§ 178E [f], where a judge sentences a defendant to a term of 
probation rather than a sentence of 'immediate confinement,' the 
judge for many defendants has the discretion" permitted by 
§ 178E [f]). 
 
Furthermore, it is not necessarily clear that a commitment 
to DYS constitutes a "sentence" in the conventional sense.  As 
the definitions cited supra indicate, ordinarily a "sentence" 
results from a judge imposing a particular penalty on an 
16 
 
 
 
offender.  But in the case of juveniles committed to DYS, the 
Juvenile Court judge generally has no authority to dictate the 
terms of a juvenile's commitment to DYS, and a commitment to DYS 
can result in a variety of consequences for the juvenile -- some 
that look more like confinement, others less so.  See G. L. 
c. 120, § 6. 
 
What we are left with, then, is a statute whose plain 
language and structure create a vexing choice.  As just 
explained, if we consider a judge's sentence of commitment to 
DYS as a sentence to immediate confinement, we must ignore parts 
of G. L. c. 119, § 58, and G. L. c. 120, § 6; if, on the other 
hand, we do not consider a commitment to be a sentence to 
immediate confinement, our interpretation necessitates ignoring 
other parts of G. L. c. 119, § 58, and G. L. c. 120, § 6, and 
disregarding as well the reality that when a judge commits 
delinquent juveniles and youthful offenders to DYS, the judge 
has essentially no control over the conditions that DYS imposes.  
The parties have not directed us to any legislative history, and 
we have located none, to help resolve this tension between the 
two alternatives. 
 
However, "[u]nder the rule of lenity, 'if we find that the 
statute is ambiguous or are unable to ascertain the intent of 
the Legislature, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of any 
rational doubt.'"  Commonwealth v. Richardson, 469 Mass. 248, 
17 
 
 
 
254 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Constantino, 443 Mass. 521, 
524 (2005).  We have applied the rule of lenity "to sentencing 
as well as substantive provisions."  Richardson, supra at 254, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 (1982), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).  Of particular pertinence here, we 
also have invoked the rule in interpreting § 178E (f).  See 
Ventura, 465 Mass. at 212. 
 
Independent of the rule of lenity, we have said that 
interpreting an ambiguous statute against a juvenile would 
conflict with the statutory command of G. L. c. 119, § 53.  See 
Hanson H., 464 Mass. at 813-814.  Section 53 requires a liberal 
construction of the juvenile justice laws in order to ensure 
that juveniles who commit offenses are "treated, not as 
criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement, and 
guidance."12  Consonant with that command is the principle, woven 
into the fabric of our juvenile justice system, that a Juvenile 
Court judge has broad discretion regarding the disposition of a 
case in order to ensure that the rehabilitative aim of § 53 is 
realized.  See Hanson H., supra at 814, and cases cited.  
Interpreting an ambiguous provision in a statute to require sex 
                     
 
12 Section 53 mandates that this liberal construction shall 
apply to G. L. c. 119, §§ 52–63.  Obviously, G. L. c. 6, § 178E 
(f), does not fall directly within this range of sections.  
However, this case requires us to interpret § 178E (f) in a way 
that necessitates an understanding of the dispositional options 
available under G. L. c. 119, § 58.  Therefore, the command of 
§ 53 applies here. 
18 
 
 
 
offender registration for a juvenile and to foreclose an 
individualized determination by a Juvenile Court judge would 
offend these principles. 
 
These reasons persuade us that it is appropriate to 
construe the ambiguous language in § 178E (f) at issue to mean 
that where a Juvenile Court judge commits a juvenile on a 
delinquency complaint or a youthful offender indictment to DYS 
as a disposition on a sex offense, that is not a "sentence[] to 
immediate confinement" within the meaning of the statute.13  In 
this regard, it is important to emphasize that the availability 
in such cases of an individualized judicial determination under 
§ 178E (f) does not mean every juvenile adjudicated as 
delinquent will be relieved of the obligation to register as a 
sex offender.  It means only that in every case involving a 
delinquent juvenile, the judge is required to conduct an 
individualized determination in order to decide the issue.14  The 
                     
 
13 Because we conclude only that a commitment to DYS does 
not constitute a sentence of immediate confinement for purposes 
of § 178E (f), our ruling does not apply to dispositions that do 
not involve a commitment to DYS. 
 
 
14 Quite apart from the rule of lenity and guiding 
principles of juvenile law that have persuaded us to interpret 
"sentenced to immediate confinement" in the first sentence of 
§ 178E (f) as we do, the language and structure of the first 
sentence of § 178E (f) offer direct textual support for this 
interpretation.  The first sentence begins by identifying the 
universe of sex offenders that it covers:  convicted adult sex 
offenders, adjudicated youthful offender sex offenders, and 
delinquent juvenile sex offenders -- and then narrows this 
19 
 
 
 
conclusion of the judge in this case that § 178E (f) did not 
authorize her to make such a determination was incorrect.15 
 
3.  GPS monitoring.  The juvenile also argues that G. L. 
c. 265, § 47 (§ 47), does not require youthful offenders to 
submit to GPS monitoring upon release from custody.  For 
support, he points to this court's opinion in Hanson H., 464 
Mass. at 808, which held that § 47 does not impose GPS 
monitoring as a mandatory condition of probation for delinquent 
juveniles who have been adjudicated sex offenders.  The 
                                                                  
universe by defining a single characteristic that they must 
exhibit -- not being sentenced to immediate confinement -- as a 
condition precedent to trigger the judge's authority (and 
obligation) to determine whether any such sex offender should be 
required to register.  When the structure of the first sentence 
is considered in this way, the Legislature's inclusion of 
delinquent juvenile sex offenders may be understood as simply a 
reference to the fact that they are part of the universe of sex 
offenders to whom the sex offender registration statute, G. L. 
c. 6, §§ 178C-178P, applies.  That this particular group of sex 
offenders, by definition, may not be subject to immediate 
confinement simply means that they always fit within the 
narrowed universe of offenders for whom the sentencing judge 
will be required to consider individually whether they should be 
required to register, as opposed to having the registration 
requirement imposed automatically. 
 
 
15 It appears from the judge's revised decision that she 
contemplated that the juvenile in this case, upon commitment to 
DYS, would be confined in a secure DYS treatment facility.  
However, for the reasons discussed in the text, the fact that 
DYS ultimately may have sent this particular juvenile to a 
secure facility does not change our conclusion that, for 
purposes of § 178E (f), a commitment to DYS does not constitute 
being "sentenced to immediate confinement."  The analysis hinges 
on the lack of clarity in the law about whether DYS commitments 
writ large can be equated with a judicial sentence of immediate 
confinement -- not whether, in a particular case, a DYS 
commitment actually includes a form of immediate confinement. 
20 
 
 
 
Commonwealth argues that because the law treats youthful 
offenders more like adults than like delinquent juveniles, the 
holding of Hanson H. does not apply here and youthful offenders 
should be subject to the mandatory GPS monitoring called for in 
§ 47. 
 
Again, we review this question of statutory interpretation 
de novo.  See Ventura, 465 Mass. at 208.  We conclude the 
juvenile's reading of the statute is correct. 
 
a.  The holding of the Hanson H. case.  In the Hanson H. 
case, the court observed that neither the plain language of 
§ 4716 nor its legislative history conclusively resolved whether 
the Legislature intended to require mandatory GPS monitoring for 
                     
 
16 The relevant portion of G. L. c. 265, § 47, provides: 
 
 
"Any person who is placed on probation for any offense 
listed within the definition of 'sex offense', a 'sex 
offense involving a child' or a 'sexually violent offense', 
as defined in [G. L. c. 6, § 178C], shall, as a requirement 
of any term of probation, wear a global positioning system 
device, or any comparable device, administered by the 
commissioner of probation, at all times for the length of 
his probation for any such offense.  The commissioner of 
probation, in addition to any other conditions, shall 
establish defined geographic exclusion zones including, but 
not limited to, the areas in and around the victim's 
residence, place of employment and school and other areas 
defined to minimize the probationer's contact with 
children, if applicable. . . .  If the commissioner or the 
probationer's probation officer has probable cause to 
believe that the probationer has violated this term of his 
probation, the commissioner or the probationer's probation 
officer shall arrest the probationer pursuant to [G. L. 
c. 279, § 3].  Otherwise, the commissioner shall cause a 
notice of surrender to be issued to such probationer." 
21 
 
 
 
juvenile probationers.  Hanson H., 464 Mass. at 810-813.  As a 
result, the court looked to G. L. c. 119, § 53, which provides 
that our juvenile justice laws "shall be liberally construed" so 
that, "as far as practicable," juveniles who commit offenses 
"shall be treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of 
aid, encouragement and guidance." See Hanson H. supra at 814.  
Based on that statutory command and in light of the ambiguity of 
§ 47, we held that mandatory GPS monitoring pursuant to § 47 
does not apply to juveniles who have been adjudicated 
delinquent.  Hanson H., supra at 816. 
 
The court in the Hanson H. case specifically limited its 
holding "to juveniles placed on probation as a result of being 
adjudicated delinquent on a complaint."  Id. at 808 n.1.  We 
pointedly did not address whether § 47 applies to juveniles 
placed on probation after being adjudicated a youthful offender.  
Id.  That issue arises in this case. 
 
b.  Application of Hanson H. principles.  We see no 
compelling reason why the principles articulated in the Hanson 
H. case should not apply equally to youthful offenders, and   
therefore reach the same conclusion as the Hanson H. case:  the 
Legislature did not intend to require GPS monitoring on youthful 
offender probationers in the absence of an individualized 
determination by the sentencing judge that such a condition 
would be appropriate. 
22 
 
 
 
 
This conclusion is consonant with the command of § 53 -- 
that, as far as practicable, we must treat juveniles "not as 
criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and 
guidance."  Indeed, § 53 includes both youthful offenders and 
delinquent juveniles within its ambit.  See G. L. c. 119, §§ 53, 
54, 58.  Thus, the force of the command in § 53 is not blunted 
merely because we are now contemplating youthful offenders, as 
opposed to delinquent juveniles.  See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 
461 Mass. 616, 630, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 433 (2012) 
(youthful offenders "not exclude[d] . . . from the dictates of 
§ 53"). 
 
Additionally, at the heart of the youthful offender scheme 
is a "logical continuum" of culpability that spans the gap 
between delinquent juveniles and adult criminals.  Commonwealth 
v. Connor C., 432 Mass. 635, 645-646 (2000), discussing G. L. 
c. 119, § 58.  As discussed above, when a juvenile is 
adjudicated as a youthful offender, the judge, at sentencing, 
can treat the individual more like an adult (a sentence as 
provided by law), more like a delinquent juvenile (commitment to 
DYS), or somewhere in between (a combination sentence), G. L. 
c. 119, § 58, third par., and must conduct a sentencing 
recommendation hearing that takes into account a host of case-
specific factors, G. L. c. 119, § 58, fourth par.  This 
individualized scheme for sentencing youthful offenders is 
23 
 
 
 
inconsistent with an interpretation of § 47 that would uniformly 
mandate GPS monitoring as a condition of probation for all 
youthful offenders.  Instead, as in Hanson H., a Juvenile Court 
judge retains discretion to impose such a condition after 
conducting an individualized determination "that the need for 
GPS monitoring to protect the safety of the victim and 
prospective victims over[rides] the damage that wearing such a 
device may have on the child's rehabilitation."  Hanson H., 464 
Mass. at 816. 
 
The Commonwealth presents, in essence, two arguments to the 
contrary.  We find neither persuasive. 
 
First, the Commonwealth argues that the use of the terms 
"probationer" and "offender" in § 47 supports its reading of the 
law because, under G. L. c. 119, § 58, a youthful offender's 
sentence may include a period of probation supervised by the 
adult probation department, as opposed to the Juvenile Court 
probation department, once the youthful offender attains the age 
of twenty-one.  (Indeed, such a result is contemplated by the 
combination sentence imposed on the juvenile in this case.)  But 
this argument has little force where the youthful offender in 
fact faces no period of adult probation (i.e., when the youthful 
offender is sentenced only to a commitment to DYS).  See G. L. 
c. 119, § 58 (c).  Even if a youthful offender does face a 
period of adult probation, the Commonwealth's argument is 
24 
 
 
 
unavailing for the reasons articulated in Hanson H., where we 
observed that much of § 47 "suggests that the Legislature 
understood that the probationers subject to mandatory GPS 
monitoring would be adults," not juveniles.  Hanson H., 464 
Mass. at 810. 
 
Second, the Commonwealth notes that the Youthful Offender 
Act, St. 1996, c. 200, was passed in response to societal 
concerns about violent crimes committed by juveniles and, 
accordingly, created the youthful offender category of 
adjudications in which some of the protections and privileges 
afforded to delinquent juveniles did not apply.  See 
Commonwealth v. Clint C., 430 Mass. 219, 222–223 (1999).  The 
implication of this development, according to the Commonwealth, 
is that youthful offenders are categorically more threatening to 
public safety than delinquent juveniles, and therefore the 
rationale of Hanson H. should not apply to youthful offenders. 
 
The argument fails.  Although youthful offenders are not 
afforded some of the protections provided to delinquent 
juveniles, nothing in the law has eroded the mandate of § 53 to 
treat, as far as practicable, all juveniles "not as criminals, 
but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance."  
Moreover, our conclusion today, as in Hanson H., leaves intact 
the discretion of Juvenile Court judges to impose GPS monitoring 
as a condition of probation in appropriate cases for youthful 
25 
 
 
 
offenders.  Where the Commonwealth is able to demonstrate that 
the need for GPS monitoring to protect public safety overrides 
the damage that wearing such a device is likely to have on the 
juvenile's rehabilitation, there is nothing to stop a Juvenile 
Court judge from ordering such a condition.  See Hanson H., 464 
Mass. at 816.  We hold today only that the mandatory GPS 
monitoring in § 47 does not apply to youthful offenders. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the Juvenile Court 
judge's decision of June 5, 2015, is vacated.  The case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.