Case Title: Spinney v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 9

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-01-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 9 
Docket: 
Pen-16-175 
Argued: 
December 13, 2016 
Decided: 
January 17, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
JONATHAN M. SPINNEY JR. 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
[¶1]  The State of Maine appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court 
(Penobscot County, Anderson, J.) granting Jonathan M. Spinney Jr.’s petition for 
post-conviction review of his expulsion from Adult Drug Treatment Court 
(“drug court”) and the resultant revocation of his probation.  The court 
concluded that, because the drug court termination hearing was in part a bail 
revocation hearing, it had authority to grant Spinney’s request for 
post-conviction review and that the drug court termination hearing had not 
afforded Spinney due process.  We vacate the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  On June 4, 2007, Jonathan Spinney pleaded guilty to one count of 
robbery (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 651(1)(C) (2006), in the Superior Court 
 
2 
(Penobscot County), for which the court (Brodrick, J.) sentenced him to ten 
years in prison with all but five years suspended and three years of probation.  
Between July of 2011 and May of 2012, the State filed three motions to revoke 
Spinney’s probation.  He admitted to all three violations, but the court 
(A. Murray, J.) issued no sanctions for the first violation and, on July 17, 2012, 
the court (Anderson, J.) ordered that the decision on what sanctions would be 
imposed for the second and third would be continued generally.  On 
September 11, 2012, the State filed its fourth motion alleging that Spinney had 
violated probation, this time by committing a theft and violating bail.  That 
matter—and, apparently, the sanction hearing for the two other pending 
violations—was set for hearing in October of 2012.  The record does not 
indicate what occurred in October but, on December 12, 2012, Spinney’s case 
was transferred to Hancock County.  There, he entered an admission to the 
September 11, 2012, motion alleging that he had violated the conditions of his 
probation, and the court (Cuddy, J.) enrolled him in drug court—a program 
within the criminal court system “in which heightened judicial attention is 
given to defendants” whose criminal actions are driven by their abuse of 
substances.  State v. Jakubowski, 2003 ME 58, ¶ 1, 822 A.2d 1193. 
 
3 
[¶3]  As a condition of his participation in drug court, Spinney agreed to 
the imposition of alternate sentences based upon his performance in the 
program, referred to as “good” and “bad” sentences: if he successfully 
completed drug court, he would receive the “good” sentence—no further 
sanctions and his probation would continue; if he did not successfully 
complete drug court, he would receive the “bad” sentence—a full revocation 
of his probation resulting in Spinney serving the remaining five years of his 
suspended robbery sentence.  A mere sixteen days after he entered the 
program, Spinney failed to appear at drug court and, once again, violated the 
conditions of his probation by committing a new criminal offense—eluding an 
officer (Class C), 29-A M.R.S. § 2414(3) (2011)—by leading police on a 
high-speed chase through downtown Bangor.  Spinney was jailed soon after 
the chase and, while incarcerated, sent a letter to the “drug court team”1 
admitting that he had used bath salts and that he had “[left] the county,”2 but 
asking for yet another chance to “[change his] life.” 
                                         
1  The drug court team is an interdisciplinary body that supervises the participant’s treatment 
plan and progress in the program.  Maine Adult Drug Treatment Court Policy & Procedure Manual 1 
(2013). 
2  One of the conditions Spinney agreed to when he entered drug court was that he would not 
leave Hancock County without permission.  As noted above, the high-speed chase occurred in 
Bangor, which is located in Penobscot County. 
 
4 
[¶4]  On January 18, 2013, the court held a hearing to determine 
whether to expel Spinney from the drug court program.  At the start of that 
hearing, after consulting with his attorney, Spinney admitted that he had 
violated the drug court contract.  The court heard from Spinney, his parents, 
his counsel, and a representative from the District Attorney’s office.  After 
conferring with the drug court team behind closed doors during the hearing, 
the court expelled Spinney from the program and announced that it would 
impose a full revocation of his probation—the “bad sentence” that Spinney 
had agreed to upon entering drug court.  Spinney did not object to any of the 
procedure at the hearing.  That same day, the court revoked Spinney’s 
probation and imposed a sentence of five years, the balance of the previously 
suspended portion of the sentence imposed in 2007 for his robbery 
conviction.  Spinney did not appeal from the revocation of his probation. 
[¶5]  On December 30, 2013, Spinney filed a petition for post-conviction 
review in the Superior Court (Penobscot County).  In his petition, he argued 
that his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection had been 
violated at the drug court termination hearing.  He specifically alleged that he 
had been denied an impartial hearing, the opportunity to present evidence, 
and the opportunity to confront witnesses against him.  The State thereafter 
 
5 
moved to dismiss Spinney’s petition based on lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to 15 M.R.S. §§ 2121, 2124 (2013),3 contending that the 
statute expressly barred post-conviction review of a probation revocation, the 
basis for Spinney’s petition.   
[¶6]  By order dated February 13, 2015, the court (Anderson, J.) denied 
the State’s motion to dismiss Spinney’s petition based on its conclusions that 
the drug court termination hearing had in fact addressed both the revocation 
of Spinney’s post-conviction bail and the revocation of his probation, and that 
Spinney’s failure to appeal those decisions was excusable.  More than two 
years after Spinney had filed his petition, by judgment dated March 15, 2016, 
the court granted Spinney’s petition for post-conviction review, concluding 
that the procedure employed in the drug court termination hearing had not 
met due process requirements.  The State appealed.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶7]  The State argues that the court erred in considering Spinney’s 
petition for post-conviction review because the court lacked jurisdiction to do 
so.  Spinney responds that the court must have authority to consider his 
                                         
3  Sections 2121 and 2124 have since been amended but the amendments do not affect this 
appeal.  See P.L. 2013, ch. 133, § 3 (effective Oct. 9, 2013) (codified at 15 M.R.S. § 2121 (2016)); 
P.L. 2013, ch. 266, §§ 2, 3 (effective Oct. 9, 2013) (codified at 15 M.R.S. § 2124 (2016)). 
 
6 
petition in the interest of justice because he would otherwise have no 
opportunity for review of his expulsion from drug court and the resultant 
revocation of his probation.  
[¶8]  Although participation in drug court may be allowed at virtually 
any stage in a criminal proceeding, Maine Adult Drug Treatment Court Policy 
& Procedure Manual 3 (2013), Spinney entered drug court while he was on 
probation for a felony conviction and after admitting that he had violated the 
terms of that probation on three separate occasions.  Spinney was to remain 
on probation throughout his time in drug court and, as part of his drug court 
contract, he agreed that he would “[f]ollow all terms and conditions of other 
release and probation.”  He also agreed that the court would revoke that 
probation if he failed to successfully complete the drug court program.  
Spinney then violated the conditions of his drug court contract and admitted 
that he had done so, precipitating the drug court termination hearing and the 
resulting revocation of his probation.  The court’s January 18, 2013, hearing 
was thus a hybrid event: a probation revocation sanction hearing 
superimposed upon a drug court termination proceeding.  In Spinney’s case, 
 
7 
however, only the probation revocation resulted in a sentence,4 and the 
record reveals that Spinney failed to avail himself of the opportunity to seek 
review of that sanction through 17-A M.R.S. § 1207 (2012).5   
[¶9]  Title 15 M.R.S. § 2124 sets forth the jurisdictional prerequisites for 
post-conviction review proceedings.  The statute vests the Superior Court6 
with authority to review criminal judgments and “post-sentencing 
proceeding[s] [that are] causing a present restraint or . . . impediment,” 
15 M.R.S. § 2124, but expressly excludes probation revocation proceedings 
from the definition of “post-sentencing proceeding” and, therefore, from the 
jurisdiction of the court, 15 M.R.S. § 2121(2).  Although the process utilized by 
the court in the December 13, 2013, hearing left much to be desired, see State 
v. Power, 2015 ME 40, ¶ 9, 114 A.3d 662 (“Constitutional due process 
protections apply in a probation revocation hearing.”), Spinney could have 
and should have appealed the revocation of his probation pursuant to M.R. 
                                         
4  Because Spinney was on probation during his time in drug court, we need not discuss what 
appellate review process might be available to an individual who enters drug court at another stage 
of criminal proceedings.  
5  Section 1207 has since been repealed and replaced but the enactment does not affect this 
appeal.  See P.L. 2015, ch. 431, § 41 (effective July 29, 2016) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 1207 (2016)). 
6  15 M.R.S. § 2123(1-A) (2016) states that “authorized” judges of the District Court also have 
jurisdiction to conduct post-conviction review proceedings.  With the state-wide implementation of 
the Unified Criminal Docket, all District Court judges who preside over criminal matters “ha[ve] and 
shall exercise all of the powers, duties and authority necessary for exercising the same jurisdiction 
as the Superior Court relative to a post-conviction review proceeding.”  15 M.R.S. § 2123(1-A). 
 
8 
App. P. 19.7  His failure to take advantage of the only avenue of review open to 
him did not imbue the Superior Court with the authority to consider his 
petition for post-conviction review of a probation revocation in contravention 
of 15 M.R.S. §§ 2121(2), 2124.  Moreover, Spinney was represented by counsel 
at the drug court termination proceeding; he agreed that he had violated the 
conditions of his probation by violating the drug court contract and engaging 
in additional criminal conduct; and he had ample notice that such a violation 
would result in a full revocation of his probation.  No injustice is present on 
this record. 
[¶10]  We conclude that, in cases such as this where a drug court 
participant is also on probation and the revocation of his probation is the 
sentence that is imposed upon expulsion from drug court, the proper path to 
obtain review is to file a notice of appeal.8  See 17-A M.R.S. § 1207(1) (2016); 
M.R. App. P. 19.  If we find sufficient cause to issue a certificate of probable 
cause, M.R. App. P. 19(f), we would then review the court’s expulsion of the 
                                         
7  As noted above, Spinney did not object to the procedure used at the December 13, 2013, 
hearing.  Rather, Spinney requested—and the court granted—that he, his parents, and his counsel 
be allowed to address the court on his behalf.   
8  Although Spinney, upon entering drug court, agreed that his probation would be fully revoked 
if he failed to successfully complete the program and he also admitted to violating the conditions of 
his release, he may nonetheless have sought an appeal to challenge any due process violations 
inherent in the probation revocation proceedings.  
 
9 
participant from drug court and the subsequent revocation of the participant’s 
probation for an abuse of discretion as we would review any court order 
revoking probation.  See State v. Kniffin, 604 A.2d 900, 901 (Me. 1992); 
17-A M.R.S. § 1206 (2016).  To the extent our holding in Jakubowski, 2003 ME 
58, 822 A.2d 1193, might suggest that there is no such path for review, we 
clarify that decision. 
[¶11]  Because we understand that Spinney is being held in the 
Penobscot County Jail pursuant to the Superior Court’s grant of his petition for 
post-conviction review and because the remaining five years of his robbery 
sentence, adjusted for good time, see 17-A M.R.S. § 1253 (2016), may have 
otherwise run by now, we take the extraordinary step of noting that—even 
had Spinney properly asked us to review the court’s decision to revoke his 
probation—we could find no abuse of discretion on this record.  Spinney 
entered drug court after admitting to three separate motions to revoke his 
probation and agreeing that, should he fail to successfully complete drug 
court, the sentence imposed for those violations of probation would be five 
years of incarceration.  Within sixteen days after starting what was supposed 
to be a year-long program, Spinney plainly violated his drug court contract 
 
10 
and the conditions of his release.  The court did not abuse its discretion in 
expelling him from drug court and revoking his probation.   
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded with instructions 
to dismiss the petition for post-conviction 
review.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R. Christopher Almy, District Attorney, and Susan J. Pope, Asst. 
Dist. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District V, Bangor, for appellant 
State of Maine 
 
Matthew S. Erickson, Esq. (orally), Brewer, for appellee Jonathan 
M. Spinney Jr. 
 
 
Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2013-4904 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY