Case Title: P. v. Pokovich

Citation: 

Docket Number: S127176

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 8/31/06 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S127176 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C043253 
CHARLES G. POKOVICH, 
) 
 
) 
Shasta County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 02F2465 
___________________________________ ) 
 
May a testifying defendant be impeached at trial with statements made 
before trial to mental health professionals during a court-ordered examination to 
determine the defendant’s mental competency to stand trial?  We conclude that 
such impeachment violates the federal Constitution’s privilege against self-
incrimination.   
I 
 
On March 31, 2002, at approximately 3:00 p.m., bullets hit three moving 
vehicles on Iron Mountain Road near Keswick, Shasta County.  Around the same 
time, bullets hit another car, occupied by Joyce Muse and her fiancé, Lawrence 
Taylor, going down the driveway at the home of Muse’s parents, who lived across 
from defendant Charles G. Pokovich on Iron Mountain Road.  Taylor saw 
defendant standing across the street with a rifle; defendant yelled at Taylor and 
Muse to get off his property. 
 
 
 
 
2
 
After receiving telephone calls reporting the shootings, Shasta County 
Sheriff Deputies set up roadblocks in the area.  Defendant came up to them and 
said he might be the person they were looking for because Joyce Muse appeared to 
believe that he had shot at her.  He consented to a search of his mobile home.  
Found inside were a rifle and ammunition; in addition, five shell casings that 
matched defendant’s rifle were retrieved from an area in front of the home.  A 
bullet fragment recovered from one of the cars hit earlier matched the ammunition 
and the rifle recovered from defendant’s home.   
 
Defendant was charged with four counts of shooting at an occupied vehicle 
(Pen. Code, § 246)1 and eight counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. 
(a)(2)).  It was also alleged that he personally used a firearm.  (§ 12022.5, subd. 
(a).)   
 
On April 22, 2002, one day before the preliminary hearing was to be held, 
defense counsel expressed to the trial court his concern about defendant’s mental 
competence to stand trial (§ 1368, subd. (b)), based on “certain of his conduct 
which would indicate hallucinations, that there’s a certain lack of reality . . . .”  
The court suspended criminal proceedings and appointed two mental health 
professionals—Dr. Aravind K. Pai, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Kent R. Caruso, a 
licensed psychologist—to examine defendant.  (§ 1369.)  Both did so; their written 
reports to the trial court expressed their view that defendant was competent to 
stand trial.  The defense waived the right to a jury trial on the issue (§ 1369) and 
submitted the matter to the court based on the reports of the mental health experts.  
The court ruled that defendant was competent to stand trial. 
                                              
1  
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal 
Code. 
 
 
3
 
Defendant testified at trial.  On direct examination by his attorney, he said 
that around 10:00 o’clock on the morning of the shootings he fired shots from his 
.22-caliber rifle to scare blue jays from the trees on his property.  At 3:00 o’clock 
that afternoon, he went out on his porch because he heard a car come down the 
Muses’ driveway.  Defendant saw Joyce Muse get out of a car; she yelled that she 
was calling the police.  Defendant described Muse as an intimidating person who 
on occasion was loud and obnoxious.   
 
On cross-examination by the prosecutor, defendant denied drinking any 
alcohol the day of the shooting.  During a recess, the trial court discussed a 
statement the prosecutor had made earlier at a bench conference.  In that 
statement, the prosecutor announced an intention to impeach defendant with 
inconsistent statements defendant had made earlier to the two court-appointed 
mental health professionals during the competency evaluations.  The court told the 
prosecutor to provide the court and defense counsel with citations of authority to 
support the claim that defendant could be impeached with the statements in 
question.  The case was continued to the next morning.  At that time, over 
defendant’s objection, the trial court ruled that the prosecution could use the 
statements to impeach defendant. 
 
When the prosecutor resumed the cross-examination, defendant admitted 
that, during the competency examination, he had told Dr. Pai that he drank two 
cans of beer the day of the shootings and that he got along with Joyce Muse and 
his other neighbors; defendant also testified he had not told Dr. Caruso that he was 
shooting at blue jays and rabbits on the day in question.  Dr. Caruso, called as a 
rebuttal witness by the prosecution, then testified that during the competency 
evaluation defendant told him he was aware of multiple shots being fired at cars 
from the direction of his property at the time defendant claimed he was shooting at 
blue jays and rabbits. 
 
 
4
 
The jury convicted defendant of all charges and found true the allegation 
that he personally used a firearm in committing the assaults.  The trial court 
sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 16 years and 4 months in prison.  The 
Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that a testifying defendant may be impeached at 
trial with statements made to mental health professionals during a pretrial 
competency evaluation.  Defendant petitioned this court for review, noting the 
long-standing conflict in decisions of the Courts of Appeal on this issue.  
(Compare People v. Stanfill (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 577, 581 [statements may be 
used to impeach] with People v. Harris (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 943, 949 
[statements may not be used to impeach] and Baqleh v. Superior Court (2002) 100 
Cal.App.4th 478, 499, fn. 5 [citing Harris with approval].)  We granted review. 
II 
 
Defendant contends the trial court violated his constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) when it allowed the 
prosecution to impeach him at trial with statements he had made to the two court-
appointed mental health professionals who were to determine his competency to 
stand trial.  He argues that his statements were legislatively compelled and 
therefore could not be used either as substantive evidence of his guilt or for the 
purpose of impeaching him.  
 
Our Legislature has declared that a “person cannot be tried or adjudged to 
punishment while that person is mentally incompetent.”  (§ 1367, subd. (a); see 
Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 378 [conviction of legally incompetent 
person violates due process]; People v. Perry (1939) 14 Cal.2d 387, 397-399 
[§ 1367 codifies common law rule].)  If the trial court has a doubt about the mental 
competency of a defendant, whether arising from the court’s own observation or 
that of counsel, it must suspend the criminal proceeding and appoint a licensed 
psychiatrist or a licensed psychologist and any other expert the court considers 
 
 
5
appropriate to examine the defendant to determine the nature of the defendant’s 
mental disorder, if any.  (§§ 1368, 1369.) 
 
Thus, competency proceedings are initiated by the trial court, not the 
defendant.  The defendant cannot refuse to undergo a psychiatric examination and 
cannot waive the right to a trial on the issue of competency.  (Centeno v. Superior 
Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 30, 43.)  Because our statutory scheme governing 
competency to stand trial does not give the defendant the right to refuse to submit 
to the competency examination, it implicates a defendant’s federal constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination.  (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) 
 
Pertinent here is the Court of Appeal’s decision in Tarantino v. Superior 
Court (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 465 (Tarantino).  There, the court balanced the state’s 
need for accurate competency evaluations against the need for safeguarding the 
accused’s constitutional right against self-incrimination.  Tarantino judicially 
declared a rule of immunity for statements made by a defendant to a mental health 
professional during a competency examination:  “[N]either the statements of [the 
defendant] to the psychiatrists appointed under section 1369 nor the fruits of such 
statements may be used in trial of the issue of [the defendant’s] guilt, under either 
the plea of not guilty or that of not guilty by reason of insanity.”  (Id. at p. 470.) 
 
Six years later, in Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454 (Estelle), the United 
States Supreme Court held that a “criminal defendant, who neither initiates a 
psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not 
be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him 
at a capital sentencing proceeding” unless the defendant had been informed of and 
waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).  
(Estelle, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 468-469.)  If the defendant invokes his rights and 
refuses to answer questions of the mental health professional conducting the 
competency examination, “the validly ordered competency examination 
 
 
6
nevertheless could . . . proceed[] upon the condition that the results would be 
applied solely for that purpose,” that is, solely for the purpose of the competency 
examination.  (Id. at p. 469.) 
 
The next year, this court in People v. Arcega (1982) 32 Cal.3d 504, 522, 
adopted the immunity rule the Court of Appeal had articulated in Tarantino, 
supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at page 470.  Immunity is necessary, we said, to “ensure that 
an accused is not convicted by use of his own statements made at a court-
compelled examination,” and to foster “honesty and lack of restraint on the 
accused’s part at the examination and thus promote accuracy in the psychiatric 
evaluation.”  (People v. Arcega, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 522; People v. Weaver 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 960.) 
 
Those decisions establish that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination applies to competency examinations, and therefore a defendant’s 
statements made during such an examination may not be used by the prosecution 
to prove its case-in-chief as to either guilt or penalty.  But those decisions do not 
directly answer the question presented here:  May statements a defendant has 
made during a court-initiated mental competency examination later be used to 
impeach the defendant if he or she testifies at trial? 
 
A number of decisions have held that notwithstanding the existence of a 
constitutional or other legal impediment barring the prosecution from introducing 
certain evidence to establish a defendant’s guilt, the evidence may be used to 
impeach a testifying defendant.  (See, e.g., Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 
222, 225 [statements obtained in violation of Miranda]; Walder v. United States 
(1954) 347 U.S. 62, 65 [evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment]; 
People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 315 (May) [statements obtained in violation 
of Miranda]; People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 889 [probationer’s 
 
 
7
testimony at probation revocation hearing]; People v. Crow (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 
440, 452 [statements made during plea negotiations].)   
 
Defendant here distinguishes those cases, asserting that, unlike his case, the 
defendant’s statements in each of those cases were not “legislatively compelled.”  
Statements that are legislatively compelled, defendant argues, implicate the Fifth 
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.  In support, defendant cites the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in New Jersey v. Portash (1979) 440 U.S. 
450 (Portash), and this court’s decisions in May, supra, 44 Cal.3d 309 and People 
v. Macias (1997) 16 Cal.4th 739 (Macias).  We summarize those cases below. 
 
In Portash, the defendant, who was a public employee, testified before a 
New Jersey grand jury.  A New Jersey statute provided that the testimony of a 
public employee before a grand jury “ ‘shall not be used against such public 
employee in a subsequent criminal proceeding . . . .’ ”  (Portash, supra, 440 U.S. 
at p. 452, fn. 1.)  At the defendant’s later trial for extortion, the trial court ruled 
that the prosecution could use the defendant’s grand jury testimony to impeach 
him if he testified at trial.  The defendant chose not to testify.   
 
The United States Supreme Court in Portash said that “[t]estimony given in 
response to a grant of legislative immunity is the essence of coerced testimony.”  
(Portash, supra, 440 U.S. at p. 459.)  Observing that the “witness is told to talk or 
face the government’s coercive sanctions, notably, a conviction for contempt,” the 
court held that the defendant’s statements before the grand jury were compulsory 
and therefore inadmissible for impeachment.  (Ibid.)  The court found a “crucial 
distinction” between statements made in that situation and statements obtained in 
violation of Miranda warnings, explaining that statements taken in violation of 
Miranda are not coerced or involuntary and that judicial decisions allowing their 
use to impeach a defendant’s testimony at trial (Oregon v. Hass (1975) 420 U.S. 
714; Harris v. New York, supra, 401 U.S. 222) were based on balancing the 
 
 
8
competing interests of deterring unlawful police conduct and the need to prevent 
perjury in testimony.  (Portash, supra, 440 U.S. at pp. 458-459.) 
 
With respect to this court’s decision in May, supra, 44 Cal.3d at page 311, 
we there concluded that the California electorate’s passage of Proposition 8, 
through its “Truth-in-Evidence” provision (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d)), 
abrogated our prior decision in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, which 
had held that a defendant’s statements obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 
supra, 384 U.S. 436, were inadmissible for impeachment.  Citing the United States 
Supreme Court’s contrary holding in Harris v. New York, supra, 401 U.S. 222 
(voluntary statements obtained in violation of Miranda are admissible to impeach 
a testifying defendant), we held in May that, in light of Proposition 8, the high 
court’s decision in Harris v. New York must be followed in California.  (May, 
supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 311, 318.)  Thereafter, citing Portash, supra, 440 U.S. 450, 
this court in May observed that “[l]egislatively compelled testimony [cannot] be 
used against the testifier for any purpose under the federal Constitution” (May, 
supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 317).   
 
As to our decision in Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th 739, there a majority of this 
court concluded that a minor defendant’s statements to a probation officer in an 
interview in preparation for a hearing to determine whether the minor should be 
tried as an adult were not compelled and therefore could be used for impeachment, 
as there was no violation of the juvenile’s privilege against self-incrimination.  (Id. 
at p. 756 (plur. opn. of Chin, J.); id. at p. 757 (conc. opn. of Baxter, J.); see also 
People v. Humiston (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 460, 472-476.)  The plurality pointed 
out that no statute required the minor to speak to the probation officer, that the 
minor had alternative methods of providing mitigating evidence to the probation 
officer, that the minor’s statements were generally made with counsel present, and 
that a probation officer is less likely to overreach in a fitness interview than a 
 
 
9
police officer in a custodial setting.  (Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 752, 756.)  
Turning to the high court’s decision in Portash, supra, 440 U.S. 450, the Macias 
plurality observed:  “Portash forbids the use in any criminal trial of involuntary 
statements that a defendant gave following a use immunity grant.  But we do not 
believe Portash prohibits the limited use of statements made to a probation officer 
in preparation for a juvenile fitness hearing to impeach the same minor 
defendant’s voluntary inconsistent trial statements.”  (Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th at 
p. 754.)  The Macias plurality went on to note that the high court itself “has 
recognized that Portash was a unique and limited case” involving coerced 
testimony, because there the witness was ordered to testify or face contempt 
sanctions.  (Id. at pp. 754-755.)  The Macias plurality then cited the high court’s 
decision in South Dakota v. Neville (1983) 459 U.S. 553, 563-564, for the 
proposition that a defendant’s decision whether to take a blood-alcohol test was 
not legislatively compelled unless the defendant “could show that the 
consequences of his decision either to submit or to refuse the request were so 
severe as to remove effectively his free will to choose.”  (Macias, supra, 16 
Cal.4th at p. 755.)  The Macias plurality also cited the high court’s decision in 
Minnesota v. Murphy (1984) 465 U.S. 420, 431-435, which stated that a 
probationary defendant’s obligation to answer questions from his probation officer 
truthfully did not convert the answers into compelled statements.  (Macias, supra, 
16 Cal.4th at p. 755.) 
 
Defendant here is right that compelled statements may not be used by the 
prosecution for any purpose.  (Portash, supra, 440 U.S. at p. 459.)  But defendant 
is wrong insofar as he assumes that whenever a procedure is legislatively required, 
any statements made in that context are compelled and therefore any use of them 
by the prosecution would violate the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination. 
 
 
10
 
Statements a defendant makes during a competency examination under the 
statutory procedure the Legislature established in sections 1368 and 1369 are in 
some respects similar to but in other respects different from those at issue in the 
high court’s decision in Portash, supra, 440 U.S. 450, and in this court’s decision 
in Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th 739, as we explain below. 
 
The statutory procedure at issue here is similar to that involved in Portash, 
supra, 440 U.S. 450, in that both require the defendant to submit to an 
examination, here a mental competency examination and in Portash a grand jury 
examination.  But unlike the New Jersey statute in Portash, which compelled the 
witness to testify before the grand jury (Portash, supra, 440 U.S. at p. 452, fn. 1), 
the statements a defendant makes in a mental competency examination are not 
compelled.  Although under our statutory scheme a defendant must submit to a 
court-initiated competency evaluation, there is no compulsion to make any 
statements.  The parties have not cited, nor has our research disclosed, the 
existence of any legal sanction against a defendant who refuses to speak to, or 
cooperate with, the court-appointed mental health experts.  (See People v. Harris, 
supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at pp. 946-947 [competency trial held after the defendant’s 
refusal to be interviewed by mental health professionals]; Tarantino, supra, 48 
Cal.App.3d at pp. 468, 471 [contempt order for refusing to be examined without 
counsel present permanently stayed].)
2  Thus, under our statutory scheme any 
statement a defendant makes during the mental competency evaluation is not 
compelled, legislatively or otherwise.   
                                              
2  
The threat of any sanction such as contempt against a defendant for 
refusing to answer questions of the mental health experts during a competency 
examination would render the statements made at that examination compelled.  In 
that event, under Portash, supra, 440 U.S. at page 459, the statements could not be 
used for any purpose at trial. 
 
 
11
 
With respect to this court’s decision in Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th 739, 
which concerned statements of a minor to a probation officer in preparation for a 
hearing to determine the minor’s fitness to stand trial as an adult, there, as here, no 
legal sanction attached to a refusal to make any statements during the procedure at 
issue.  But, unlike the interview with the probation officer in Macias, a defendant 
in a court-initiated mental competency evaluation must submit to such an 
examination.  (Centeno v. Superior Court, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 43.) 
 
Our conclusion that a defendant’s statements made at a mental competency 
evaluation are not legislatively or otherwise compelled and therefore not per se 
inadmissible for any purposes under the high court’s decision in Portash, supra, 
440 U.S. 450, does not end the inquiry of whether they may be used to impeach a 
defendant’s testimony at trial.  As mentioned earlier, a defendant’s statements at a 
mental competency examination cannot be used later by the prosecution to prove 
its case-in-chief as to either guilt or penalty.  (Estelle, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 468-
469; People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 959-960.)  Where the United 
States Supreme Court has permitted impeachment of a testifying defendant with 
statements inadmissible to prove guilt, the court has used a test that balances the 
policy supporting the exclusion of such statements to prove guilt against the policy 
not to countenance perjury.  (Portash, supra, 440 U.S. at p. 458 [incremental 
deterrence of police illegality weighed against policy against perjury]; see James 
v. Illinois (1990) 493 U.S. 307, 316-317 [potential chill of truth-seeking process 
by allowing impeachment found to outweigh loss of probative testimony]; United 
States v. Havens (1980) 446 U.S. 620, 627 [competing interests of exclusionary 
rule in discouraging police misconduct and impairment of factfinding goal of trial 
assessed]; Harris v. New York, supra, 401 U.S. at p. 225 [introduction of reliable 
evidence to impeach found to further truth-seeking function of trial, while 
 
 
12
likelihood of encouraging police misconduct considered only speculative 
possibility].) 
 
Here, we must balance the policy interest in deterring and exposing perjury 
against the policy interest in preserving and enhancing the reliability of mental 
competency evaluations. 
 
The policy against countenancing perjury is strong.  (Portash, supra, 440 
U.S. at p. 458.)  Allowing false testimony to go unchallenged impairs the integrity 
of the factfinding objective of a trial (United States v. Havens, supra, 446 U.S. at 
p. 627), because such testimony hinders or blocks the disclosure of the truth to the 
trier of fact (see James v. Illinois, supra, 493 U.S. at p. 321). 
 
Just as strong, however, is the policy against trying persons who are 
mentally incompetent.  In the words of the United States Supreme Court:  
“ ‘Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of 
those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to effective 
assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-examine 
witnesses, and the right to testify on one’s own behalf or to remain silent without 
penalty for doing so.’ ”  (Cooper v. Oklahoma (1996) 517 U.S. 348, 354.) 
 
The policy that a mentally incompetent person not be subjected to a trial 
has its roots in our constitutional, statutory, and common law.  It is thus a policy of 
ancient and venerable origin, founded on the view that to subject the mentally 
incompetent to trial or to punishment is inhumane and cruel.  (Cooper v. 
Oklahoma, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 356; People v. Perry, supra, 14 Cal.2d at pp. 397-
399.)3  The “sole purpose of [competency proceedings] ‘is the humanitarian desire 
                                              
3  
Blackstone’s Commentaries demonstrate the historical underpinnings of the 
policy against subjecting a mentally incompetent person to trial.  “ ‘Indeed, in the 
bloody reign of Henry the Eighth, a statute was made, which enacted that if a 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
13
to assure that one who is mentally unable to defend himself not be tried upon a 
criminal charge.’ ”  (People v. Harris, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at pp. 949-950.) 
 
A mental competency evaluation seeks to ascertain the defendant’s ability 
“to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the 
conduct of a defense in a rational manner.”  (§ 1367, subd. (a).)  It therefore is 
ordered only when there is a legitimate concern that the defendant may be 
substantially mentally impaired. 
 
Unlike those instances where otherwise inadmissible statements are 
allowed to impeach a testifying defendant (e.g., Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th at 
pp. 755-756 [juvenile’s statements during probation officer’s interview in 
preparation for hearing to determine whether the juvenile should be tried as an 
adult]; People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 889 [probationer’s statements at 
probation revocation hearing]; People v. Drews (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1317, 
1325-1326 [defendant’s testimony at pretrial hearing on motion to suppress 
evidence]), during a mental competency examination a defendant does not have 
the benefit of the presence of counsel.  Indeed, unlike situations where the 
presence of counsel may contribute to the purpose of the proceeding, such as the 
inquiry into a juvenile’s behavioral patterns and social history to determine 
whether the juvenile should be tried as an adult (Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th at 
pp. 747, 756), the presence of counsel during a competency examination by 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
person being compos mentis (of sane mind) should commit high treason, and after 
fall into madness, he might be tried in his absence, and should suffer death, as if 
he were of perfect memory.  But this savage and inhuman law was repealed by the 
statute 1 and 2 P. and M., c. 10.’ ”  (People v. Perry, supra, 14 Cal.2d at p. 398, 
quoting 4 Blackstone’s Commentaries 25.)   
 
 
14
mental health professionals may undermine the usefulness of the examination, 
making it more difficult for the expert examining the defendant to determine 
whether the defendant is competent.  (See Estelle, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 470, fn. 14 
[“ ‘an attorney present during the psychiatric interview could contribute little and 
might seriously disrupt the examination’ ”]; Tarantino, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 468 [psychiatrists refused to conduct competency examination with defense 
attorney present].) 
 
Also, determining a defendant’s mental competency requires an assessment 
of the defendant’s ability to understand the nature of the proceedings and to assist 
counsel in conducting a defense.  (§ 1367, subd. (a).)  To make this assessment, 
the mental health expert will want to evaluate the defendant’s ability to discuss the 
facts of the case, even though the defendant’s guilt of the offense charged is not 
relevant to the inquiry.  (See People v. Harris, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at pp. 949-
950; Tarantino, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at p. 469.)  If a defendant’s statements 
during the examination could later be used to impeach the defendant during the 
criminal trial, the defendant would have a strong incentive not to be forthcoming 
during the examination, thus undermining the reliability of the competency 
determination. 
 
A rule allowing a defendant to be impeached at trial with statements made 
during a competency examination would pose a dilemma for defendant’s trial 
attorney.  A competency examination occurs after the right to counsel has 
attached, at a critical stage of the proceeding at which counsel’s participation is 
constitutionally mandated; the examination cannot be conducted without “the 
assistance of [defendant’s] attorneys in making the significant decision of whether 
to submit to the examination and to what end the psychiatrist’s findings could be 
employed.”  (Estelle, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 470-471.)  Counsel would need to 
explain the risk of impeachment to the possibly mentally impaired defendant and, 
 
 
15
if that risk was sufficiently grave, might be ethically bound to advise the defendant 
not to communicate with the court-appointed mental health professionals at all 
during the examination. 
 
The prosecution’s ability to conduct its own mental evaluation would also 
be placed in jeopardy.  A defendant may be compelled to submit to competency 
examinations by prosecution experts (Baqleh v. Superior Court, supra, 100 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 505-506), but only if the defendant’s statements during the 
examination are inadmissible for any purpose at trial (id. at pp. 498-499 & fn. 5, 
502).  If a defendant’s statements during a competency examination could later be 
used against him for impeachment at trial, the trial court could not impose any 
sanctions on a defendant who refused to submit to an examination by prosecution 
experts.  As we have observed (see fn. 2, ante), the threat of sanctions for refusing 
to speak would make the defendant’s statements compelled, and the defendant 
then would have the right to refuse to participate by invoking the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  (Portash, supra, 440 U.S. at 
p. 459 [“defendant’s compelled statements . . . may not be put to any testimonial 
use whatever against him in a criminal trial”]; Estelle, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 469.)  
 
Thus, allowing a defendant’s statements during a competency evaluation to 
be used for impeachment at trial would seriously impair the mental health expert’s 
ability to accurately assess the defendant’s mental competency, because the 
defendant would likely be unwilling to freely discuss the facts of the crime and 
might well refuse to speak at all.  Impairment of the examination process in turn 
would seriously compromise the trial court’s ability to fulfill its constitutional and 
statutory obligation to determine whether a defendant is competent to stand trial. 
 
Against this very substantial impairment of the state’s interest in accurately 
determining whether criminal defendants are mentally competent to stand trial, we 
must weigh the risk to the truth-seeking function if the prosecution is precluded 
 
 
16
from impeaching the defendant at trial with inconsistent statements made during 
competency evaluations.  A mental competency evaluation is concerned with the 
defendant’s ability to understand the proceeding and assist counsel, and not with the 
defendant’s guilt of the offense charged.  Therefore, a defendant’s statements to the 
mental health professional are made for a purpose unrelated to the validity of the 
criminal charge, and in any event those statements may be consistent with the 
defendant’s later testimony at trial.  Moreover, minor inconsistencies may be 
attributed to the defendant’s mental impairments that prompted the competency 
inquiry.  In short, the frequency and utility of impeachment at trial with a 
defendant’s inconsistent statements during a competency examination is speculative. 
 
Having considered and weighed the competing interests, we conclude that 
the impairment of the mental competency evaluation process if impeachment is 
permitted outweighs the speculative risk to the truth-seeking function of the 
criminal trial if impeachment is denied.4  Accordingly, we conclude that the Fifth 
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination prohibits the prosecution from 
using at trial, for the purpose of impeachment, statements a defendant has made 
during a court-ordered mental competency examination.5 
                                              
4  
To the extent it is inconsistent with the views expressed herein, People v. 
Stanfill, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 577, is disapproved. 
 
5  
The concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Werdegar asserts that the 
immunity at issue arises from California statutory law, not federal law.  From this 
premise it argues that our decision here should not be founded upon the federal 
Constitution’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  That view is 
untenable. 
 
The rule of immunity was first judicially declared in Tarantino, supra, 48 
Cal.App.3d at page 469.  As this court observed in People v. Arcega, supra, 32 
Cal.3d at page 522, “the basis for the Tarantino decision was the constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination.”  (See, e.g., People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 
Cal.4th 774, 802-803 [judicially declared immunity and Fifth Amendment 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
17
 
We have considered, but rejected as impractical, an alternate route to 
essentially the same result.  Instead of simply disallowing impeachment at trial 
with a defendant’s statements during a competency examination, we could require 
trial courts to advise the defendant, before the competency examination, of the 
right to counsel and the right to remain silent.  (See Estelle, supra, 451 U.S. at 
p. 468.)  If the defendant invoked those rights, the court could nevertheless order 
the competency examination to proceed, but any statements the defendant made 
during the examination could then be used only for the purpose of determining 
competency.  (Ibid.; see fn. 2, ante.)  Acting on the advice of counsel, defendants 
would, we confidently predict, routinely invoke their rights, and thus the end result 
would be the same—the defendant’s statements during the competency 
examination would be inadmissible for impeachment at trial.  Because we see no 
advantage in these additional procedural steps, we adopt the more direct approach.  
Moreover, we are reluctant to place our trial courts in the awkward position of 
advising defendants of their rights to counsel and to remain silent, and then, after 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
coextensive]; People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 960 [“the rule of immunity 
‘is necessary to ensure that an accused is not convicted by use of his own 
statements made at a court-compelled examination’ ”].)  The concurring and 
dissenting opinion of Justice Werdegar thus errs in asserting that the judicially 
declared immunity rule at issue here is based on statutory law.   
 
That approach may also violate the “Truth-in-Evidence” provision of the 
California Constitution.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d); see Macias, supra, 16 
Cal.4th 739; May, supra, 44 Cal.3d 309; Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 
Cal.3d 802.)  Because defendant does not claim that there is a statutory rule of 
immunity that prohibited the prosecution from using defendant’s statements to a 
mental health professional during an examination to determine his competency to 
stand trial for purposes of impeachment, we need not address this question.   
 
 
 
18
the defendants invoke those rights, ordering the defendants to participate in the 
evaluation and informing them they cannot remain silent. 
 
Our resolution of the issue before us fully protects both a defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel because the use immunity recognized here adequately 
safeguards those rights.  (Baqleh v. Superior Court, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 502-503.)  Accordingly, we need not resolve here the difficult question 
whether counsel would have a right to be present at a court-ordered competency 
examination if a defendant’s statements during such an examination could later be 
used against him.  Nor need we determine here whether statements obtained in 
violation of the right to counsel may be used to impeach a testifying defendant.  
(See United States v. Ortega (9th Cir. 2000) 203 F.3d 675 [statements may be 
used to impeach]; United States v. Brown (2d Cir. 1983) 699 F.2d 585 [statements 
may not be used to impeach]; People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 461 
[statements may be used to impeach]; People v. Harper (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 
843 [statements may not be used to impeach].) 
 
The use of statements that defendant made during his mental competency 
evaluation to impeach his testimony at trial violated defendant’s constitutional 
right not to incriminate himself.  Whether that error prejudiced defendant is 
explored below. 
III 
 
Under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, a violation of a 
criminal defendant’s federal constitutional rights requires reversal of the judgment 
unless the reviewing court determines “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict.”  Applying this standard here, we 
agree with the Court of Appeal that the violation of defendant’s Fifth Amendment 
privilege not to incriminate himself did not prejudice defendant. 
 
 
19
 
The evidence against defendant was overwhelming.  The bullet fragment 
taken from one of the victims’ cars matched not only the shell casings found at 
defendant’s home, but also his rifle.  Also, defendant was seen holding his rifle at 
the time of the car shootings.   
 
The extent of defendant’s impeachment at trial with statements he made at 
his mental health evaluation was minimal.  Whether, as defendant told Dr. Pai, he 
drank one or two cans of beer on the day of the shootings was of little probative 
value at trial.  There was no allegation that alcohol consumption played any part in 
the car shootings, and the jury was aware that there was no alcohol in the sample 
of defendant’s blood drawn two hours after his arrest.  The prosecution’s 
impeachment of defendant with his statement to Dr. Pai, made at the mental 
competency examination, that he usually got along with Joyce Muse was minimal.  
It was undermined by defendant’s trial testimony on redirect examination that 
Muse was intimidating when she was arguing with her parents or with a boyfriend 
but that she was otherwise congenial.  
 
Dr. Caruso’s testimony that defendant told him at the mental competency 
evaluation that he knew the shots fired at the cars came from his property at a time 
when defendant claimed he was shooting at blue jays, is largely cumulative of 
testimony by one of the sheriff’s deputies.  Deputy Sheriff Ronald Smith testified 
that defendant admitted he was the man they were looking for, that Joyce Muse 
thought defendant had been shooting at her, and that he had been shooting at blue 
jays by his house.   
 
In view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the insignificant nature 
of defendant’s mental competence examination statements later used by the 
prosecution to impeach him, we conclude that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
error in allowing such impeachment did not contribute to the verdict.  (Chapman 
v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) 
 
 
20
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY BAXTER, J. 
 
 
I concur in the judgment of affirmance, and in the majority’s conclusion 
that any error in allowing use of defendant’s statements to court-appointed 
competency examiners to impeach his trial testimony was harmless by any 
standard.  But I must dissent from the majority’s determination that error occurred 
when the prosecution was allowed to impeach defendant’s testimony in this 
fashion. 
The majority holds that, even though a defendant is not compelled by 
California law to speak to court-appointed competency examiners, but does so, is 
adjudged competent, later elects to testify in his own behalf at his criminal trial, 
and takes that opportunity to tell the court something different than what he 
previously told the examiners, it is a violation of the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution to use his earlier statements to impeach his testimonial 
credibility.  Moreover, the majority insinuates, the Sixth Amendment may compel 
a similar result to the extent the defendant’s counsel was not permitted to attend 
the competency examination itself.  I cannot agree. 
At the outset, as Justice Werdegar observes, although California’s judicially 
declared “blanket use immunity” for statements made in a court-ordered 
competency examination is designed in part to protect the privilege against self-
incrimination, it is a creature of state, not federal, law.  (Tarantino v. Superior 
Court (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 465, 469-470 (Tarantino); see People v. Arcega 
 
2 
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 504, 521-523 (Arcega); cf. Centeno v. Superior Court (2004) 
117 Cal.App.4th 30, 43-44.)  Tarantino characterized the immunity as one 
“reasonably to be implied from the [statutory] provisions [for determining 
competency]” (Tarantino, supra, at p. 469), and it has never been squarely 
premised on the federal Constitution.  It has survived the Truth-In-Evidence 
provisions of Proposition 8 (see Arcega, supra, at pp. 521-523), presumably under 
that measure’s express preservation of “existing statutory rule[s] of evidence 
relating to privilege” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d); see Evid. Code, § 940; 
Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 807-808 (Ramona R.); see 
also conc. & dis. opn. of Werdegar, J., post, at pp. [2-5], & fns. 3, 4). 
Though I would not do so for reasons discussed below, I therefore assume, 
as Justice Werdegar concludes, that we could now construe this “existing” state-
privilege-related immunity to include protection against use for impeachment.  
(Cf. People v. Macias (1997) 16 Cal.4th 739, 751-753 (Macias).)  In that event, 
reversible prejudice would presumably be measured by the standard applicable to 
errors of state law.  (See People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 487-510; People v. 
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 835.)  However, by rejecting this option, and 
placing its ruling squarely on federal constitutional grounds, the majority locks in 
the more stringent standard of reversibility set forth in Chapman v. California 
(1967) 386 U.S. 18.  The majority’s constitutional ruling is unnecessary and 
incorrect. 
Even where federal constitutional principles preclude substantive use of an 
accused’s statements to prove his criminal guilt, the United States Supreme Court 
has stressed that it has denied impeachment use of such statements in only one 
instance—where the statements were truly involuntary.  (Michigan v. Harvey 
(1989) 494 U.S. 344, 351 (Harvey), citing, as examples, New Jersey v. Portash 
(1979) 440 U.S. 450 (Portash) [grand jury testimony under statutory grant of use 
 
3 
immunity, but subject to threat of contempt for refusal to talk]; Mincey v. Arizona 
(1978) 437 U.S. 385 [statements extracted over protests of seriously wounded 
suspect in hospital intensive care unit].) 
If no true coercion or compulsion is involved, both the high court and the 
courts of this state have held that, even when an accused’s statements in a 
particular context are inadmissible to prove he committed a crime, they are 
available to impeach him if he voluntarily testifies at the trial on criminal charges 
or allegations.  (E.g., Harvey, supra, 494 U.S. 344, 348-354 [voluntary statements 
elicited by police-initiated conversation with custodial defendant who had 
previously invoked Sixth Amendment right to counsel]; Oregon v. Hass (1975) 
420 U.S. 714, 720-724 [voluntary statements obtained in violation of Miranda v. 
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436]; Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 224-226 
(Harris) [same]; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1191-1208 [voluntary 
statements elicited in deliberate violation of Miranda]; People v. Coleman (1975) 
13 Cal.3d 867, 892 [inconsistent statements at probation revocation hearing]; 
People v. Crow (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 440, 449-453 [prior inconsistent statements 
during unsuccessful plea negotiations]; People v. Drews (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 
1317, 1324-1326 [prior inconsistent statements during pretrial suppression 
hearing]; People v. Stanfill (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 577, 581-582 (Stanfill) [prior 
inconsistent statements to court-appointed competency examiners]; Sheila O. v. 
Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 812, 816-817 [juvenile’s testimony at 
fitness hearing]; cf. United States v. Havens (1980) 446 U.S. 620, 624-628 
[physical evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment]; but see Baqleh v. 
Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 478, 499, fn. 5 (Baqleh) [statements to 
competency examiners not available for impeachment]; People v. Harris (1987) 
192 Cal.App.3d 943, 949-950 [same].) 
 
4 
Whether substantive use protection is granted to protect constitutional 
rights, or to encourage the accused to speak the truth in a particular nontrial 
setting, or both, modern California and high court cases have emphasized that 
these considerations do not give the accused a license to commit perjury on the 
witness stand.  In this regard, the United States Supreme Court has noted that 
“[e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse 
to do so.  But . . . [h]aving voluntarily taken the stand, [the accused is] under an 
obligation to [testify] truthfully and accurately,” and by impeaching him with his 
prior inconsistent statements, “the prosecution [does] no more than utilize the 
traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process.”  (Harris, supra, 
401 U.S. 222, 225, italics added.) 
In Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th 739, we considered a question similar to that 
which confronts us here.  Macias addressed California’s long-standing judicial use 
immunity for a juvenile’s statements to a probation officer evaluating whether the 
minor is fit for treatment within the juvenile system or instead must be tried as an 
adult (see Ramona R., supra, 37 Cal.3d 802).  The issue was whether this 
immunity extended to use of such statements to impeach the minor’s testimony at 
his subsequent adult criminal trial.  A majority of this court concluded that the 
answer is “no.” 
Ramona R. had determined that although the minor was not statutorily 
compelled to speak to the probation officer, use immunity was essential to protect 
the juvenile’s California right not to incriminate herself.  Otherwise, Ramona R. 
reasoned, the minor would be forced to choose between cooperating fully with the 
probation officer, thereby obtaining fair treatment at the fitness hearing, or 
remaining silent, thus preserving her privilege against self-incrimination.  As 
Ramona R. observed, the juvenile’s lack of communication could be used against 
her in the fitness determination—especially when, as in the murder case there at 
 
5 
issue, the burden of proving fitness for juvenile treatment was on her—and “the 
certification of a juvenile offender to an adult court has been accurately 
characterized as ‘the worst punishment the juvenile system is empowered to 
inflict.’  [Citation.]”  (Ramona R., supra, 37 Cal.3d 803, 810.)  “Hence, we 
concluded [in Ramona R.] that the consequences of deciding between silence and 
incrimination are so severe that they warrant substantive use immunity for 
statements the minor makes in preparation for a fitness hearing.  [Citation.]”  
(Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th 739, 750.) 
As the plurality opinion in Macias explained, “[t]he purpose of the 
Ramona R. use immunity is to encourage the minor to give the probation officer 
candid and unencumbered evidence to aid the officer’s—and ultimately the 
court’s—determination of the best forum to consider the case.  [Citation.]  The 
grant of immunity also avoids the risk that the prosecution might take unfair 
advantage of an admission or silence by using it against the minor at a subsequent 
trial.  [Citation.]  In other words, substantive use immunity allows juveniles to 
exercise their right to present mitigating evidence to probation officers without 
giving prosecutors in subsequent trials the unfair advantage of using their 
statements as substantive evidence of guilt.  [Citation.]”  (Macias, supra, 
16 Cal.4th 739, 752-753.) 
However, the plurality opinion in Macias concluded, “we can easily 
distinguish the prosecution’s use for impeachment purposes of a juvenile’s 
statements made to a probation officer determining fitness from the use of those 
statements as substantive evidence of guilt. . . .  [N]othing in the state Constitution 
or our judicial decisions protects juveniles from impeachment if their voluntary 
trial testimony is inconsistent with the substantively immunized statements they 
made to their probation officers before their fitness hearings.”  (Macias, supra, 
16 Cal.4th 739, 753, italics added.) 
 
6 
As part of its analysis, the plurality opinion in Macias traced the history of 
California’s pre-Proposition 8 rule which, contrary to United States Supreme 
Court decisions addressing the federal Constitution, had precluded even the 
impeachment use of statements obtained in violation of Miranda.  (See People v. 
Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101; cf. Harris, supra, 401 U.S. 222.)  As the Macias 
plurality opinion explained, we concluded after Proposition 8 that the Truth-in-
Evidence provisions of that initiative measure had abrogated the Disbrow ruling 
and required California’s adherence to Harris.  (People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 
309.)  In this regard, the Macias plurality opinion stressed May’s observation that 
“the ‘federal rule announced in Harris . . . , allowing impeachment by the 
defendant’s prior statements taken in violation of Miranda, may have been based 
on the premise that the privilege against self-incrimination cannot be invoked by 
one who has voluntarily taken the witness stand to testify concerning the subject 
matter of his prior statement.  [Citations.]’ ”  (Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th 739, 752, 
quoting May, supra, 44 Cal.3d 309, 319, italics added; see also Stanfill, supra, 
184 Cal.App.3d 577, 581-582.) 
Macias also expressly distinguished and limited Portash, supra, 440 U.S. 
450, which had held that “legislatively compelled” testimony at a grand jury 
proceeding, given pursuant to a statutory use immunity but under threat of 
contempt for any refusal to testify, could not be used against the witness for any 
criminal purpose, including impeachment.  As Macias explained, “[w]e agree . . . 
that Portash forbids the use in any criminal trial of involuntary statements that a 
defendant gave following a use immunity grant.  But we do not believe Portash 
prohibits the limited use of statements [voluntarily] made to a probation officer in 
preparation for a juvenile fitness hearing to impeach the same minor defendant’s 
voluntary, inconsistent trial statements.  [¶]  The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that Portash was a unique and limited case, demonstrating the essence 
 
7 
of coerced testimony in the ‘classic Fifth Amendment’ sense because a witness 
who had been given use immunity was later ordered to testify or face contempt 
sanctions.  [Citation.]”  (Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th 739, 754-755.)1 
This case cannot be distinguished from Macias in any material way.  In 
each instance, California has recognized a use immunity for statements made by a 
criminal accused in a particular proceeding—one not intended to obtain evidence 
of criminal guilt—in order to encourage the accused to speak, and to do so 
candidly and truthfully, for purposes of the proceeding at issue, without 
compromising the privilege against self-incrimination.  Yet California law does 
not compel the accused to speak in either situation.  Thus, protection of state and 
federal self-incrimination principles does not require that the prohibition on 
substantive use of the accused’s voluntary statements be extended to use for 
impeachment.  Here, as in Macias, when the accused later voluntarily takes the 
stand and changes his story, the prosecution must be permitted to challenge his 
credibility by bringing to light his inconsistent prior statements. 
In its attempt to distinguish Macias, the majority purports to apply a 
balance-of-interests test, concluding that the balance must be struck differently 
                                              
1  
As Macias observed, the high court had declined to apply Portash in two 
later decisions, South Dakota v. Neville (1983) 459 U.S. 553, and Minnesota v. 
Murphy (1984) 465 U.S. 420.  In Neville, the court held that the defendant’s 
decision whether to submit to a blood-alcohol test was not “legislatively 
compelled” in the Portash sense unless he could show that the consequences of his 
decision either to submit or to refuse the request were so severe as to remove 
effectively his free will to choose.  (Neville, supra, at p. 562.)  In Murphy, a 
probationer was under a court order to meet with his probation officer and respond 
truthfully to the officer’s questions.  Nonetheless, the United States Supreme 
Court held that statements he volunteered to the officer were not “compelled,” and 
were thus admissible in his criminal trial, even though the officer did not advise 
him of his privilege against self-incrimination and threatened to revoke probation 
if he lied.  (Murphy, supra, at p. 440.) 
 
8 
here than in Macias.  The majority stresses the importance of the constitutional 
right not to be tried while incompetent, the concomitant need for reliability in the 
competency evaluation, and the resulting strength of the policy that the examinee 
not be discouraged by self-incrimination concerns from responding to the 
examiners’ questions.  The majority observes in particular that, unlike the juvenile 
fitness evaluation procedure at issue in Macias, which “provides . . . alternatives 
. . . for producing any mitigating evidence that would rebut the fitness 
presumption” (Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th 739, 752), a reliable competency 
evaluation requires a direct examination of the accused, in which candid and 
truthful answers to examiners’ questions are crucial.2  Finally, the majority notes 
that, in a juvenile fitness evaluation, the minor’s counsel may be present at any 
interview of the minor by the probation officer, while counsel may be excluded 
from a competency examination. 
But nothing in these suggested distinctions demonstrates that we should 
interpret the Fifth Amendment to preclude use for impeachment of the accused’s 
                                              
2  
Although Macias took passing note that the minor facing a fitness 
evaluation has alternative means of presenting mitigating evidence, the fact 
remains that the use immunity there at issue, like the one here, is heavily premised 
on encouraging the subject to speak, and to do so candidly and truthfully.  In 
Ramona R., supra, 37 Cal.3d 802, which confirmed that the juvenile fitness use 
immunity survived Proposition 8, this court explained the policy behind that 
immunity by quoting heavily from In re Wayne H. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 595, which 
similarly immunized a juvenile’s statements to a probation officer for purposes of 
determining the proper disposition if guilt is established.  As was noted, “ ‘[s]uch 
[dispositional] decisions, courts have uniformly concluded, should be based on the 
most complete knowledge of the defendant’s background that is possible.  His 
description and explanation of the circumstances of the alleged offense, and his 
acknowledgment of guilt and demonstration of remorse, may significantly affect 
decisions about punishment or transfer for adult proceedings.’ ”  (Ramona R., 
supra, at p. 806, quoting Wayne H., supra, at pp. 599-600.) 
  
 
9 
voluntary statements to competency examiners.  As noted above, time and again 
the United States Supreme Court has indicated that this most stringent use 
restriction is limited, for federal constitutional purposes, to statements that were 
truly involuntary when made.  In all other situations, the high court has counseled, 
even if self-incrimination considerations prohibit the substantive criminal use of 
an accused’s statements, the statements are available to impeach the accused’s 
later testimony, because the voluntary decision to take the stand at trial includes 
the obligation to testify truthfully, and the Fifth Amendment is not a license to 
commit perjury.3 
Contrary to the majority’s implication, nothing in Estelle v. Smith (1981) 
451 U.S. 454 (Estelle) compels the majority’s result.  If anything, Estelle supports 
the conclusion that, for purposes of the federal Constitution, an accused’s 
uncompelled statements to competency examiners are available for impeachment.  
The core holding of Estelle—which did not directly involve the impeachment 
issue—is that “[a] criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric 
evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be 
compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him” 
on the issues of guilt or penalty.  (Estelle, supra, at p. 468, italics added; see also 
id. at pp. 462-463.)  Thus “[i]f, upon being adequately warned [that he has the 
right to remain silent, and that he may incriminate himself by speaking], [the 
defendant] . . . indicate[s] that he [will] not answer [the examiner’s] questions, [a] 
validly ordered competency examination nevertheless [may] proceed[ ] upon the 
condition that the results [will] be applied solely for that purpose.”  (Id. at p. 468) 
                                              
3  
I discuss below the Sixth Amendment implications of counsel’s exclusion 
from a competency examination. 
 
10 
Much of Estelle’s analysis focused on the need to withhold incriminatory 
use of statements made by the defendant during a compulsory court-ordered 
competency examination where the defendant was not fully advised of his Fifth 
Amendment rights and given an opportunity to invoke or waive them.  In this 
regard, Estelle drew a direct analogy to Miranda. 
As Estelle indicated, the considerations leading to Miranda’s requirement 
that a suspect undergoing interrogation in the inherently coercive atmosphere of 
police custody receive such warnings “apply with no less force to the pretrial 
psychiatric examination at issue here.”  (Estelle, supra, 451 U.S. 454, 467.)  The 
accused in Estelle was in custody, the court’s opinion explained, and, even though 
the psychiatrist was court-appointed and ostensibly neutral, when he testified 
against Estelle at the latter’s penalty trial, “his role changed and became 
essentially like that of an agent of the State recounting unwarned statements made 
in a postarrest custodial setting.  During the psychiatric evaluation, [the defendant] 
assuredly was ‘faced with a phase of the adversary system’ and was ‘not in the 
presence of [a] perso[n] acting solely in his interest.’  [Citation.]  Yet he was given 
no indication that the compulsory examination would be used to gather evidence 
necessary to decide whether, if convicted, he should be sentenced to death.  He 
was not informed that, accordingly, he had a constitutional right not to answer the 
questions put to him.”  (Ibid.) 
Though “ ‘[v]olunteered statements . . . are not barred by the Fifth 
Amendment,’ ” the court concluded, “under Miranda . . . we must conclude that, 
when faced while in custody with a court-ordered psychiatric inquiry, [the 
defendant’s] statements to [the examiner] were not ‘given freely and voluntarily 
without any compelling influences’ and, as such, could be used as the State did at 
the penalty phase only if [the defendant] had been apprised of his rights and had 
 
11 
knowingly decided to waive them.  [Citation.]”  (Estelle, supra, 451 U.S. 454, 
469.) 
Thus, Estelle likened a custodial accused’s court-ordered competency 
examination to a custodial police interrogation, in which, even if strict coercion is 
not present, the situation has an inherently coercive atmosphere which must be 
ameliorated by advisements of Fifth Amendment rights and an opportunity to 
invoke them.  Of course, statements obtained, without proper advisements, in the 
coercive environment of custody may not be used as substantive proof of the 
accused’s guilt, but they may be used for impeachment unless they were truly 
involuntary.4 
I realize that under California’s judicially declared use immunity, the 
defendant need not be warned he has a Fifth Amendment right not to speak to 
competency examiners.  Indeed, California decisions have suggested that the 
accused cannot invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege as a means of avoiding 
compelled submission to a court-ordered competency examination, because the 
use immunity itself affords all protection the Constitution would provide against 
                                              
4  
Estelle involved a competency examination conducted under Texas law.  In 
federal criminal trials, use of an accused’s statements in a court-ordered 
competency examination is presently governed by rule 12.2(c)(4) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure (18 U.S.C.).  This rule provides that “[a] statement 
made by a defendant in the course of any [such] examination . . . may be 
[introduced] against the defendant in any criminal proceeding” only as it bears on 
a mental condition the defendant himself has placed in issue.  My research 
discloses only one case interpreting this language (formerly contained in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4244) on the narrow issue whether such statements may be used to impeach the 
defendant’s inconsistent trial testimony.  That decision, one which predated 
Estelle,  upheld such use, though noting that the psychiatrist’s challenged 
testimony had merely rebutted the defendant’s testimonial claim that he did not 
recall the circumstances of the offense.  (United States v. Castenada (7th Cir. 
1977) 555 F.2d 605, 609-610.) 
 
 
12 
the criminal use of his statements to the examiners.  (See People v. Weaver (2001) 
26 Cal.4th 876, 959, 961; Arcega, supra, 32 Cal.3d 504, 523, fn. 6; Tarantino, 
supra, 48 Cal.App.3d 465, 470.) 
But a use immunity arising under state law, even if adopted to protect the 
right against self-incrimination, cannot expand the scope of the federal 
Constitution—the basis on which the majority purports to decide this case.  As the 
majority itself makes clear, even if a defendant must face court-appointed 
competency examiners, nothing in California law compels him to speak to them, 
though, in consequence of the use immunity, he cannot invoke federal or state 
constitutional privileges against self-incrimination as a basis for declining to do so.  
If he chooses to speak under such circumstances, it appears the self-incrimination 
provisions of the federal Constitution do not preclude impeachment use of his 
voluntary statements. 
The majority worries that if a defendant’s statements during a court-ordered 
competency examination can be used to impeach his later, inconsistent trial 
testimony, his counsel will warn him not to cooperate, and the purpose of the 
examination will be thwarted.  Of course, to the extent a similar consideration was 
present in Macias, it did not dissuade us from concluding that the statements at 
issue there could be used for impeachment. 
In any event, as competent counsel should understand, it remains in the 
defendant’s interest to cooperate fully in a court-ordered competency examination, 
in order to minimize the chance of an erroneous determination on the issue of 
competence to stand trial.  In return for this cooperation, counsel may advise, the 
defendant receives full substantive immunity from criminal use of his 
statements—the prosecution cannot obtain an unfair advantage by employing the 
statements as affirmative proof of his guilt. 
 
13 
If the defendant’s statements may be used for impeachment, he suffers that 
consequence only if he voluntarily testifies in his own behalf at trial, and, in doing 
so, makes statements at odds with what he told the competency examiners—an 
indication that he has lied in one instance or the other.  A rule forbidding 
impeachment, on the other hand, gives the defendant an unfair advantage—he may 
testify falsely, secure in the knowledge that the fact-finder will not learn of 
contrary statements he has made in the past.  In my view, it does not thwart the 
legitimate purposes of a competency examination for counsel to advise his client 
that, while his statements cannot be used to prove his guilt, they may come back to 
haunt him if he testifies at trial and changes his story.  In effect, such advice 
promotes the proper purposes of both the competency examination and the trial—
to discover the truth. 
Finally, the majority suggests that, under the Sixth Amendment, allowing 
use of a competency examinee’s statements for impeachment might compromise 
the current California practice which allows the defendant’s counsel to be 
excluded from the examination itself.  I am not persuaded.  In the first place, as the 
majority acknowledges, federal decisions are split about whether voluntary 
statements obtained in direct violation of the Sixth Amendment may be used for 
impeachment.  More fundamentally, I seriously question whether the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel includes the unqualified right to the personal 
presence of counsel at a proceeding, such as a competency examination, that is not 
concerned with obtaining evidence of the defendant’s guilt. 
Decades ago this court held that, where the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel had attached, and the defendant was represented by counsel, 
statements obtained at a psychiatric examination in counsel’s unwaived absence 
could be admitted at the guilt trial only if counsel was notified of the examination 
in advance, the defendant placed his mental condition in issue at trial, and the 
 
14 
statements were used solely to support the psychiatrist’s expert opinion.  (In re 
Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400, 409-412; see also In re Cowans (1970) 2 Cal.3d 
733, 737-738; People v. Morse (1969) 70 Cal.2d 711, 738.)  But none of our 
decisions on this subject involved the use of such statements exclusively to 
impeach the defendant’s own trial testimony. 
Moreover, the high court’s more recent decision in Estelle strongly 
suggested that, while the defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to his counsel’s 
help and guidance in connection with a court-ordered psychiatric examination, he 
is not entitled to counsel’s personal presence at the examination itself.  In Estelle, 
after Benjamin Ernest Smith was indicted for murder, and while he was confined 
in jail, he was examined for trial competency by a court-appointed psychiatrist.  
Smith’s appointed counsel were not present at the examination; indeed, it was not 
clear counsel had received notice of the psychiatrist’s appointment, and counsel 
were not advised until afterward that the examination had occurred.  (Estelle, 
supra, 451 U.S. 454, 457-459 & fn. 5, 471, fn. 15.)  Later, at Smith’s sentencing 
trial, the psychiatrist testified that Smith would commit violent criminal acts in the 
future if given the opportunity to do so. 
In its Sixth Amendment discussion, Estelle held that Smith’s right to 
counsel had been violated insofar as “[d]efense counsel . . . were not notified in 
advance that the psychiatric examination would encompass the issue of their 
client’s future dangerousness, and [Smith] was denied the assistance of his 
attorneys in making the significant decision of whether to submit to the 
examination and to what ends the psychiatrist’s findings could be employed.”  
(Estelle, supra, 451 U.S. 454, 470-471, fn. omitted, italics added.) 
The court pointed out that “[b]ecause ‘[a] layman may not be aware of the 
precise scope, the nuances, and the boundaries of his Fifth Amendment privilege,’ 
the assertion of that right ‘often depends upon legal advice from someone who is 
 
15 
trained and skilled in the subject matter.’  [Citation.]”  Given the difficult choices 
to be made in deciding whether to undergo an examination, and how to approach 
it, said the court, “[i]t follows logically . . . that a defendant should not be forced to 
resolve such an important issue without ‘the guiding hand of counsel.’  [Citation.]”  
(Estelle, supra, 451 U.S. 454, 471.) 
Though counsel were given no opportunity to attend the examination in 
Estelle, the high court expressly declined to identify counsel’s absence as a 
violation of Smith’s Sixth Amendment rights.  Estelle merely indicated that 
Smith’s right to the “assistance” of counsel (Estelle, supra, 451 U.S. 454, 471) 
was infringed when he was denied an advance opportunity to consult with his 
attorneys. 
Indeed, in a telling footnote, the Estelle court remarked:  “[Smith] does not 
assert, and the Court of Appeals did not find, any constitutional right to have 
counsel actually present during the examination.  In fact, the Court of Appeals 
recognized that ‘an attorney present during the psychiatric interview could 
contribute little and might seriously disrupt the examination.’  [Citations.]”  
(Estelle, supra, 451 U.S. 454, 470, fn. 14.) 
Given this strong signal from the high court, and notwithstanding our older 
precedents, I am not willing to assume that the Sixth Amendment requires 
counsel’s presence at a California competency examination before the examinee’s 
statements may be used to impeach him when, after consulting with counsel, he 
later voluntarily takes the stand and testifies in a manner inconsistent with his 
statements to the examiners. 
 
16 
For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusions 
that the federal Constitution, or any other principle of law, barred impeachment 
use of defendant’s voluntary statements to his court-appointed competency 
examiners. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
I CONCUR: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
I concur in the judgment of affirmance.  Like the majority and Justices 
Baxter and Corrigan, I agree that any error here was harmless.  In determining 
whether there was error, both the majority and Justice Baxter’s concurrence and 
dissent wrestle with a difficult constitutional problem:  whether the Fifth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits impeaching a defendant with 
statements made, in the absence of counsel and without Miranda warnings 
(Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436), during a competency examination.  
Because this case can be resolved without squarely confronting that issue, I would 
do so.  (See Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino 
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 230; People v. McKay (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 626-627 
(conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.).)  As will appear, the state immunity we have 
previously recognized for statements made during competency examinations, 
properly understood, applies to bar their use for impeachment.   
I 
The Court of Appeal first recognized a state use immunity applicable to 
competency hearings in Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 465 
(Tarantino).  There, the trial court expressed a doubt as to the defendant’s mental 
competence and appointed two psychiatrists to examine him.  (See Pen. Code, 
 
 
2
§ 1368, subd. (a).)1  The defendant refused to proceed without counsel, the 
psychiatrists refused to proceed in the presence of counsel, and the trial court 
attempted to resolve the standoff by holding the defendant in contempt. 
In reversing the contempt order, the Court of Appeal concluded any 
statements made at a competency examination should receive use immunity:  
“[W]e have no hesitancy in declaring that neither the statements of petitioner to 
the psychiatrists appointed under section 1369 nor the fruits of such statements 
may be used in trial of the issue of petitioner’s guilt, under either the plea of not 
guilty or that of not guilty by reason of insanity.”  (Tarantino, supra, 48 
Cal.App.3d at p. 470.)  The court found this immunity implicit in the code 
provisions compelling defendants to submit to competency examinations:  “The 
purpose of such inquiry [into competency] is not to determine guilt or innocence.  
It has no relation to the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.  Rather, the sole 
purpose of these statutes is the humanitarian desire to assure that one who is 
mentally unable to defend himself not be tried upon a criminal charge.[2]  This 
purpose is entirely unrelated to any element of guilt, and there is no indication of 
any legislative intent that any result of this inquiry into a wholly collateral matter 
be used in determining the issue of guilt.  Moreover, the issue of present 
competency, once the trial court’s doubt has been expressed, must be decided 
                                              
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2  
As the majority correctly notes, the humanitarian impulse reflected in 
competency hearings is of constitutional dimension.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12; see 
also Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 378 [“[T]he conviction of an accused 
person while he is legally incompetent violates due process”]; People v. Lawley 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131; People v. Castro (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1419 
[“Due process requires that any doubt regarding the defendant’s competency be 
properly evaluated by experts prior to proceeding with trial”].) 
 
 
3
before any trial of the charged offense.  Both humanitarian and practical 
considerations call for a judicially declared immunity.”  (Tarantino, at p. 469.)  
Thus, the court interpreted section 1367 et seq. as reflecting an intent to compel a 
defendant to submit to a competency examination, but only on the implicit 
understanding that any statements he or she made would not be used for any 
purpose at the subsequent guilt phase of trial. 
We approved this state immunity in People v. Arcega (1982) 32 Cal.3d 504 
(Arcega), there explaining that the immunity “protects both an accused’s privilege 
against self-incrimination and the public policy of not trying persons who are 
mentally incompetent.”  (Id. at p. 522.)  We described Tarantino as recognizing a 
“blanket immunity” against use of competency examination statements, and 
recognized that this immunity was broader than that yet recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court under the federal Constitution.  (Arcega, at p. 523, fn. 6; see 
People v. Centeno (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 30, 42 [“The California rule of judicial 
immunity is broader than the federal rule for compliance with the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments”].)  While under United States Supreme Court precedent the 
voluntary statements of an adequately warned defendant could be used, we held 
Tarantino dispensed with the need for warnings by reading the underlying statutes 
as confining use to the question of competence.  (Arcega, at p. 523, fn. 6; see 
Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 468-469; Tarantino, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 469.) 
Subsequently, we have unanimously reaffirmed the existence of this state 
immunity (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 802-803; People v. Weaver 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 959-963), and neither the majority nor Justice Baxter’s 
concurrence and dissent questions its ongoing validity.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 
5-6; conc. & dis. opn. of Baxter, J., ante, at pp. 1-2.)  As Justice Baxter correctly 
notes (conc. & dis. opn. of Baxter, J., ante, at p. 2), Arcega’s approval of this 
 
 
4
immunity in the months following passage of Proposition 8 (as well as our 
subsequent reaffirmance of the rule in Weaver, at page 960, and Jablonski, at page 
802) indicates the immunity was not invalidated by Proposition 8’s “Truth-in-
Evidence” provisions, which left unaffected “existing statutory rule[s] of evidence 
relating to privilege.”  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d).)3 
While acknowledging the state immunity’s validity, the majority treats it as 
little more than an echo of the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution.  It is 
not.  The state immunity predates the United States Supreme Court’s recognition 
of Fifth Amendment limits on the use of competency examination statements.  
(See Estelle v. Smith, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 468-469; Tarantino, supra, 48 
Cal.App.3d at pp. 469-470.)  Moreover, while the interpretation of our state 
statutes as giving rise to immunity certainly was motivated in part by self-
incrimination considerations, it was equally motivated by an understanding of the 
legislative policy considerations underlying the specific Penal Code provisions 
themselves.  (See People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 960, quoting Arcega, 
supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 522 [“ ‘[T]he rule protects both an accused’s privilege 
against self-incrimination and the public policy of not trying persons who are 
mentally incompetent’ ” (italics added)].)  We have never before treated the state 
                                              
3  
Contrary to the majority’s suggestion that the immunity lacks any such 
statutory foundation (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 16-17, fn. 5), it has its roots in the 
Penal Code’s statutory description of the scope and purpose of competency 
examinations (see §§ 1367-1370), as well as the statutory privilege against self-
incrimination (Evid. Code, § 940).  The immunity arises from Tarantino’s 
interpretation of these statutes in a manner that avoids constitutional problems.  
(See Tarantino, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at p. 469 [“As to the right against self-
incrimination, we find no violation in compelling a defendant to submit to 
examination by court-appointed psychiatrists under section 1367 et seq., at least 
under a judicially declared immunity reasonably to be implied from the code 
provisions” (italics added)].) 
 
 
5
immunity as limited by the Fifth Amendment.  We have rejected the assertion that 
it is less protective than the Fifth Amendment (see People v. Jablonski, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 802 [rejecting claim that the state immunity “inadequately protect[ed] 
a defendant’s Fifth Amendment interest against self-incrimination” and allowed 
use of statements prohibited by the Fifth Amendment]) and have acknowledged 
that it may in some respects operate differently or more broadly (see Arcega, at 
p. 523, fn. 6).4  We thus can decide this case without reaching difficult and 
uncertain federal constitutional questions.  We should do so. 
II 
The question remains whether the state immunity applies to use of 
Pokovich’s statements to impeach him during guilt proceedings.  I conclude that it 
does. 
State law expressly forbids trial of one who is mentally incompetent 
(§ 1367, subd. (a)) and in specified circumstances mandates that the defendant 
undergo a mental competency examination (§§ 1368, 1369).  As the Court of 
Appeal observed in Tarantino, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at pages 469-470, the statutes 
requiring a competency examination implicitly contemplate use of the defendant’s 
statements obtained during the examination only in the competency proceeding 
itself, not in the separate, subsequent guilt proceeding.  The competency 
proceeding is wholly distinct from the criminal trial.  The initiation of a 
competency proceeding requires suspension of criminal proceedings (§§ 1368, 
subd. (c), 1370, subd. (a)(1)), and the competency proceeding is subject to its own 
                                              
4  
To the extent the immunity rests on a broader state conception of the 
privilege against self-incrimination (see Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Evid. Code, 
§ 940) than would be strictly compelled by the Fifth Amendment to the federal 
Constitution, a point on which I express no view, such a broader interpretation is 
permissible.  (See Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 353-355.) 
 
 
6
special rules and procedures (§ 1369, subds. (b)-(f); People v. Lawley, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at p. 131 [“Although it arises in the context of a criminal trial, a 
competency hearing is a special proceeding, governed generally by the rules 
applicable to civil proceedings”]).  The psychiatrists and psychologists appointed 
by the court to examine a defendant are tasked with making a series of 
determinations wholly unrelated to guilt or innocence:  (1) whether the defendant 
has a mental disorder, (2) whether the defendant is able to understand proceedings 
and assist counsel in presentation of a defense, and (3) whether the defendant is 
susceptible to treatment with antipsychotic medication and able to make decisions 
about consenting to medication.  (§ 1369, subd. (a).)  As Tarantino originally 
recognized, “there is no indication of any legislative intent that any result of this 
inquiry into a wholly collateral matter be used in determining the issue of guilt.”  
(Tarantino, at p. 469, italics added.) 
These statutory provisions are intended to vindicate the Legislature’s 
compelling interest in avoiding trial of those who, due to mental illness or 
developmental disability, cannot defend themselves.  Vindication of that interest 
through accurate psychiatric evaluations requires full cooperation on the part of 
defendants compelled to submit to competency examinations, as the facts of 
Tarantino amply demonstrate.  Clearly, however, full cooperation, although 
essential, cannot be anticipated from defendants counseled not to speak for fear 
statements made while in a questionable mental state will subsequently be used to 
impeach their later testimony should they exercise their right to testify at trial. 
We have approved Tarantino’s recognition of “blanket immunity” (Arcega, 
supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 523, fn. 6); a blanket immunity connotes an absolute bar on 
any use of statements from the competency examination in the separate guilt 
proceeding.  Using such statements, even in rebuttal, to prove a defendant’s guilt 
would contravene the Legislature’s intent that a mentally incompetent defendant 
 
 
7
not be tried and that information about the accused’s mental state be gathered 
solely to determine whether he is able to defend himself.  Because satisfaction of 
the Legislature’s compelling interest in trying only the competent depends on the 
defendant’s cooperation, it follows that vindication of that interest requires the 
defendant be granted full immunity.  (Accord, People v. Harris (1987) 192 
Cal.App.3d 943, 950 [competency examination statements may not be used for 
impeachment during guilt proceedings].) 
I note as well that, to the extent the statutory structure might be read to 
permit compelled competency examinations, followed by use of any statements 
obtained therein in guilt proceedings, such an interpretation would raise serious 
constitutional questions.  Whether one concludes such an interpretation would 
countenance a Fifth Amendment violation (as does the majority) or not (as does 
Justice Baxter’s concurrence and dissent), we generally will prefer interpretations 
that avoid grave constitutional doubts.  (People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 
335.) 
Thus, consistent with Tarantino and Arcega, I conclude the statutes 
authorizing competency examinations and proceedings preclude any use of 
statements obtained therein in guilt phase proceedings, and the impeachment use 
of Pokovich’s competency examination statements in his subsequent guilt trial 
violated this state immunity.  Accordingly, I express no opinion as to whether the 
Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution also precludes the use of such 
statements in this case. 
Because on this record any error nevertheless was harmless, I concur in the 
judgment. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Pokovich 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 120 Cal.App.4th 436 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S127176 
Date Filed: August 31, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Shasta 
Judge: William Gallagher 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Hayes H. Gable III, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez, Janet E. 
Neeley, Ruth M. Saavedra and Robert Gezi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Hayes H. Gable III 
428 J Street, Suite 354 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 446-3331 
 
Robert Gezi 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5248