Case Title: State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts.

Citation: 2002-Ohio-1627

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts., 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 2002-Ohio-1627.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. SHEMO ET AL. v. CITY OF MAYFIELD HEIGHTS ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 59.] 
Mandamus sought to compel city of Mayfield Heights et al. to commence 
appropriation proceedings to determine the amount for the city’s 
temporary taking of relator’s property — Writ granted, when. 
(No. 01-1325 — Submitted February 5, 2002 — Decided April 10, 2002.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. Relators, Michael A. Shemo and Larry Goldberg, are co-
owners as trustees of a 22.6-acre parcel of land in respondent city of Mayfield 
Heights.  Relators acquired the parcel in January 1992. 
 
On March 19, 1992, relators filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County 
Court of Common Pleas, naming Mayfield Heights and the Ohio Attorney 
General as defendants.  Relators requested a declaratory judgment that the 
existing 
U-1(1) 
Single-Family 
House 
District 
zoning 
classification 
unconstitutionally restricted the use of the property to single-family residential 
development.  Relators initially wanted the property rezoned to permit mid-rise, 
multifamily development. 
 
In June 1995, relators voluntarily dismissed the declaratory judgment 
action and refiled it.  Relators again requested a judgment declaring that the U-
1(1) zoning classification was unconstitutional as applied to their property.  This 
time, however, relators requested that the property be rezoned to U-4 Local Retail 
and Wholesale District so that retail and warehouse development would be 
permitted.  Relators alleged that the U-1(1) zoning classification denied them an 
economically viable use of the property without substantially advancing a 
legitimate interest in the health, safety, or welfare of Mayfield Heights. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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In December 1995, relators and Mayfield Heights stipulated that the U-
1(1) zoning classification as applied to relators’ property was invalid.  Over 
relators’ objection, the city rezoned the property to U-2-A Planned Unit 
Development District, which restricted the use of the property to attached and 
detached single-family residential dwellings.  Relators then challenged the 
constitutionality of this new classification in their pending declaratory judgment 
action. 
 
In May 1996, following a trial, the common pleas court held that the U-2-
A zoning classification was unconstitutional as applied to relators’ property.  The 
common pleas court found that the U-2-A zoning classification did not 
substantially advance any legitimate health, safety, or welfare concern of 
Mayfield Heights and that the U-2-A zoning rendered the property economically 
nonviable. 
 
In September 1997, on remand from the court of appeals, the common 
pleas court entered a judgment incorporating its May 1996 declaration that the U-
2-A zoning classification was unconstitutional as applied to the property and held 
that relators’ proposed retail use of the property, as described in their site plan, 
was reasonable.  The common pleas court ordered that relators make the 
improvements to Golden Gate Boulevard specified in their site plan, that Mayfield 
Heights take actions to facilitate these road improvements, that the city and 
municipal officers named as defendants be enjoined from interfering with 
relators’ proposed retail use of the property and installation of the road 
improvements, and that the city and the individual defendants allow retail 
development and use consistent with the court’s judgment. 
 
On appeal, the court of appeals vacated the common pleas court judgment 
and remanded the cause for further determination.  On further appeal, we reversed 
the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the September 1997 common 
pleas court judgment.  Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 7, 722 
January Term, 2002 
3 
N.E.2d 1018 (“Shemo I”).  In so holding, we stated that “[s]ince [relators] have 
shown that the city lacks any legitimate governmental health, safety, and welfare 
concerns in support of the U-2-A zoning classification, we find that the trial court 
was correct in declaring the U-2-A zoning ordinance unconstitutional.”  Id. at 13, 
722 N.E.2d at 1024.  We also found that competent, credible evidence supported 
the common pleas court’s conclusions that the property was not suitable for 
residential use and that relators’ proposed commercial use of the property was 
reasonable.  Id. at 12-13, 722 N.E.2d 1018. 
 
In August 2000, Mayfield Heights enacted an ordinance in which it 
claimed ownership of certain unimproved streets located on relators’ property and 
authorized the mayor to sell these “paper streets.”  These streets had been 
dedicated to the city in June 1927, but had never been constructed.  After 
Mayfield Heights accepted the dedication of an adjacent subdivision in 1959, the 
paper streets were blocked from access to actual streets.  The city did not claim 
ownership of the paper streets during the declaratory judgment proceeding even 
though there was testimony and evidence concerning them during that 
proceeding. 
 
Relators subsequently filed a common pleas court action to enjoin the sale 
of the paper streets and to declare that they had been abandoned by the city or, if 
not abandoned, to declare them vacated under R.C. 723.09.  In December 2000, 
the parties resolved that case by consent and agreed that the paper streets were 
vacated and that relators were declared the owners of the property that contained 
the paper streets. 
 
In March 2001, relators applied to respondent Mayfield Heights Planning 
and Zoning Commission for road improvements consistent with the common 
pleas court judgment reinstated by this court in Shemo I.  The development also 
required a modification of an easement by an adjacent property owner for a new 
access drive.  The city council initially disregarded the property owner’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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application for an improvement to modify the easement because it found that 
relators were unable to demonstrate either that they had obtained a wetlands 
permit for the property or that no permit was required.  No city ordinance, 
however, authorized the planning commission or city council to deny building 
permits based upon environmental regulations. 
 
In April 2001, the planning commission approved the application for 
modification of the easement, but it refused to completely approve relators’ road 
improvement plans, instead restricting the use of Maplewood Road, which 
provides access to the proposed retail development, to emergency use.  The city 
council confirmed the decision of the planning commission.  As required by 
Shemo I, the city rezoned relators’ property from U-2-A to U-4 in April 2001. 
 
On May 16, 2001, relators filed a complaint in this court against 
respondents, Mayfield Heights and its mayor, city council, and planning 
commission.  Relators requested a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to 
grant final approval of their road improvement plans, including unrestricted, 
nonemergency access to Maplewood Road, in accordance with the September 
1997 common pleas court judgment reinstated by this court in Shemo I.  Relators 
also requested a writ of mandamus to compel the city to commence appropriation 
proceedings in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division, to 
determine the amount of the city’s alleged regulatory taking of relators’ property. 
 
In July 2001, we dismissed without prejudice relators’ mandamus action 
because they had failed to fully comply with the affidavit requirement of 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B).  State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 
324, 750 N.E.2d 167 (“Shemo II”). 
 
On July 23, 2001, relators refiled their mandamus action, which fully 
complied with S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B).  On relators’ motion, we expedited our 
consideration of relators’ mandamus claim relating to their road improvement 
plans for the proposed retail development.  Upon consideration, we granted a 
January Term, 2002 
5 
peremptory writ of mandamus to compel respondents to approve relators’ road 
improvement plans in connection with the proposed retail development.  This 
included unrestricted access to and from Maplewood Road once the specified 
conditions are met, except for vehicles weighing over ten thousand pounds, and  
granting all other approvals and permits necessary for the retail development of 
the property ordered by the common pleas court’s September 2, 1997 judgment.  
State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 1, 752 N.E.2d 854 
(“Shemo III”).  On August 20, 2001, the city council enacted a resolution 
consistent with Shemo III by removing the emergency-use restriction for 
Maplewood Road. 
 
We subsequently granted an alternative writ and issued a schedule for the 
presentation of evidence and briefs on relators’ remaining mandamus claim.  State 
ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 1431, 755 N.E.2d 354.  
Relators introduced evidence that “[a]s a direct consequence of the City’s 
unlawful enforcement of its U-1(1) and U-2A residential zoning against [the] 
Property and the City’s failure to comply with the Trial Court’s Judgment set 
forth above, [relators] have been deprived of the use of [their] Property from 
March 19, 1992 until August 20, 2001.”  In addition, respondents’ actions delayed 
construction of a store to be built on the property as part of the development plan 
from the summer of 2001 until the spring of 2002. 
 
This cause is now before the court to consider relators’ claim for a writ of 
mandamus to compel appropriation proceedings as well as respondents’ request 
for oral argument. 
Respondents’ Request for Oral Argument 
 
Respondents request oral argument because, among other reasons, it will 
afford the parties the opportunity “to focus upon the significant issues” and will 
“enhance a thorough understanding and appreciation of the case.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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We have resolved comparable takings cases without the necessity of oral 
argument.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Elsass v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2001), 92 
Ohio St.3d 529, 751 N.E.2d 1032; State ex rel. Painesville v. Lake Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 566, 569, 757 N.E.2d 347, 351. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we deny respondents’ request and proceed to the 
merits of relators’ mandamus claim. 
Mandamus—Appropriation—Compensable Taking 
 
Relators request a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to commence 
appropriation proceedings for the city’s temporary taking of their property. 
 
The United States and Ohio Constitutions guarantee that private property 
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.  Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution; Section 19, Article I, Ohio 
Constitution.  Mandamus is the appropriate action to compel public authorities to 
institute appropriation proceedings where an involuntary taking of private 
property is alleged.  State ex rel. Elsass v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 92 Ohio 
St.3d at 533, 751 N.E.2d 1032.  Relators have the burden of proving their 
entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus. Id. 
 
We must first determine whether relators have established a compensable 
taking of their property. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that “application 
of land-use regulations to a particular piece of property is a taking only ‘if the 
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests * * * or denies 
an owner economically viable use of his land.’ ”  See United States v. Riverside 
Bayview Homes, Inc. (1985), 474 U.S. 121, 126, 106 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed.2d 419, 
quoting Agins v. Tiburon (1980), 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 
106; Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis (1987), 480 U.S. 470, 485, 
107 S.Ct. 1232, 94 L.Ed.2d 472. 
January Term, 2002 
7 
 
We have also adopted this test for a taking caused by a zoning law.  See 
Goldberg Cos., Inc. v. Richmond Hts. City Council (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 207, 
211, 690 N.E.2d 510, quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 
106  (“ ‘The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a 
taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests * * 
* or denies an owner economically viable use of his land * * *’ ”). 
 
This test is disjunctive, i.e., a compensable taking can occur either if the 
application of the zoning ordinance to the particular property is constitutionally 
invalid, i.e., it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies 
the landowner all economically viable use of the land.  Although in previous cases 
we have applied the test in a conjunctive fashion, those cases involved merely 
challenges to the constitutionality of these ordinances and did not involve takings 
claims.  See, e.g., Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 223, 638 N.E.2d 
533, syllabus, modified in part in Goldberg, 81 Ohio St.3d 207, 690 N.E.2d 510, 
syllabus.  Similarly, although some of our language in Goldberg could be 
construed to specify that both of the Agins prongs must be met in order to 
constitute a compensable taking, see 81 Ohio St.3d at 211, 213, 690 N.E.2d 510, 
this language is dicta because the landowner in Goldberg did not claim that the 
application of the challenged zoning regulation to its property constituted a 
taking. 
 
We now clarify that satisfaction of either prong of the Agins test 
establishes a taking.  We implicitly recognized this in BSW Dev. Group v. Dayton 
(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 338, 343, 699 N.E.2d 1271, where we noted that “given 
BSW’s failure to properly raise any constitutional issue of whether the Dayton 
historic preservation ordinances substantially advance legitimate state interests * 
* * BSW could only establish entitlement to appropriation proceedings if it 
established that appellees’ denial of the demolition permit denied BSW all 
economically viable use of the Wilcon Building property.”  (Emphasis added.)  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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More important, this clarification comports with the plain language of the Agins 
test.  In other words, “[w]here a regulation places limitations on land that fall 
short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may 
have occurred * * *.”1  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001), 533 U.S. 606, 617, 121 
S.Ct. 2448, 2457, 150 L.Ed.2d 592, 607. 
 
Relators claim that they have established a taking because they have 
satisfied either prong of the Agins disjunctive test.  It is evident that relators have 
satisfied the first prong, i.e., the application of the U-1(1) and U-2-A zoning 
classifications to their property was unconstitutional in that the application of 
these classifications did not substantially advance legitimate state interests.  The 
parties stipulated that the U-1(1) zoning classification as applied to relators’ 
property was unconstitutional, and the common pleas court found, in the 
declaratory judgment reinstated by this court in Shemo I, that the U-2-A zoning 
classification was also unconstitutional because, as applied to relators’ property, it 
did not substantially advance any legitimate health, safety, or welfare concern of 
Mayfield Heights.  Respondents are collaterally estopped from asserting 
otherwise.  See State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 491, 709 N.E.2d 484, 
quoting Thompson v. Wing (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 183, 637 N.E.2d 917 (“ 
‘Collateral estoppel [issue preclusion] prevents parties * * * from relitigating facts 
and issues in a subsequent suit that were fully litigated in a prior suit’ ”). 
 
It is less clear whether relators satisfied the second prong of the Agins test, 
i.e., that the application of the U-1(1) and U-2-A zoning classifications to their 
property denied them all economically viable use of their land.  In this regard, our 
                                                          
 
1. 
For state appellate cases expressing confusion over whether the test is conjunctive or 
disjunctive, see Rumpke Rd. Dev. Corp. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Trustees (1996), 115 Ohio App.3d 
17, 684 N.E.2d 353; MDJ Properties v. Union Twp. Bd. of Trustees (Mar. 27, 2000), Clermont 
App. Nos. CA99-02-013 and CA99-02-019, unreported, 2000 WL 313502; James Place 
Properties, Inc. v. Madison Twp. Bd. of Trustees (Sept. 25, 1998), Lake App. No. 97-L-143, 
unreported, 1998 WL 682347; cf. Wilson v. Union Twp Trustees. (Oct. 26, 1998), Clermont App. 
January Term, 2002 
9 
judgment in Shemo I, which reinstated the common pleas court’s September 1997 
declaratory judgment, did not determine this issue.  Although in Shemo I we 
concluded that relators introduced competent, credible evidence supporting the 
declaration that the property was not suitable for residential use, that does not 
necessarily mean that no economically viable use remained upon the application 
of the unconstitutional zoning classifications.  And even though relators’ evidence 
in this mandamus action states that the U-1(1) and U-2-A residential zoning 
deprived them of  “the use of [their] Property,” it does not specify that it deprived 
them of all economically viable use of their property.  (Emphasis added.)  
Relators therefore did not establish the second prong of the Agins test. 
 
Nevertheless, because relators need to establish only one prong of the 
Agins disjunctive test in order to prove a taking, their satisfaction of the first 
prong is sufficient.  The U-1(1) and U-2-A single-family residential zoning 
classifications were unconstitutionally applied to relators’ property, and the 
property was, in fact, not suitable for this residential use.  Therefore, relators have 
proved a taking of their property. 
Effect of Existence of Contested Zoning at the Time of Acquisition on Takings 
Claim 
 
Respondents contend that there can be no taking because the challenged 
single-family residential zoning existed at the time relators acquired the property 
and respondents did not further restrict the preexisting residential use of the 
property after relators’ acquisition of it. 
 
Respondents’ contention lacks merit.  The United States Supreme Court 
recently rejected a similar argument that a purchaser or a successive title holder is 
deemed to have notice of an earlier-enacted land restriction and is barred from 
claiming that it effects a taking: 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
No. CA98-06-036, unreported, 1998 WL 744089, holding that Goldberg adopted the Agins 
disjunctive test for takings claims. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“The theory underlying the argument that post-enactment purchasers 
cannot challenge a regulation under the Takings Clause seems to run on these 
lines:  Property rights are created by the State.  * * *  So, the argument goes, by 
prospective legislation the State can shape and define property rights and 
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and subsequent owners cannot claim 
any injury from lost value.  After all, they purchased or took title with notice of 
the limitation. 
 
“The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean 
bundle.  The right to improve property, of course, is subject to the reasonable 
exercise of state authority, including the enforcement of valid zoning and land-use 
restrictions.  * * *  The Takings Clause, however, in certain circumstances allows 
a landowner to assert that a particular exercise of the State’s regulatory power is 
so unreasonable or onerous as to compel compensation.  Just as a prospective 
enactment, such as a new zoning ordinance, can limit the value of land without 
effecting a taking because it can be understood as reasonable by all concerned, 
other enactments are unreasonable and do not become less so through passage of 
time or title.  Were we to accept the State’s rule, the post-enactment transfer of 
title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land 
use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable.  A State would be allowed, in effect, 
to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause.  This ought not to be the rule.  
Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the 
use and value of land. 
 
“Nor does the justification of notice take into account the effect on owners 
at the time of [the] enactment, who are prejudiced as well.  * * * The proposed 
rule is, furthermore, capricious in effect.  The young owner contrasted with the 
older owner, the owner with the resources to hold contrasted with the owner with 
the need to sell, would be in different positions.  The Takings Clause is not so 
quixotic.  A blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right 
January Term, 2002 
11 
when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to 
compensate for what is taken.”  (Emphasis added and citations omitted.)  
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626-628, 121 S.Ct. at 2462-2463, 150 L.Ed.2d at 613-614. 
 
Respondents’ reliance on cases like Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. 
v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 452, 613 N.E.2d 580, 
and Singer v. Fairborn (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 809, 598 N.E.2d 806, is 
misplaced.  Community Concerned Citizens  involved a challenge to an 
administrative denial of a conditional-use permit rather than a takings claim 
premised on the unconstitutional application of a zoning ordinance.  And in 
Singer, the landowner challenged a city’s denial of his request for rezoning rather 
than the constitutionality of the ordinance itself.  73 Ohio App.3d at 815, 598 
N.E.2d 806. 
Effect of Invalidation of Challenged Zoning Ordinances on Takings Claim 
 
Respondents next assert that once the zoning ordinances were invalidated 
as applied to relators’ property, the case is terminated and relators are not entitled 
to compensation for the period that the unconstitutional ordinances were applied 
to the property.  Respondents cite our following statement from Goldberg, 81 
Ohio St.3d at 213, 690 N.E.2d 510: 
 
“If the landowner has challenged the constitutionality of zoning and also 
alleged that it constitutes a taking of the property, the case is terminated if the 
zoning is found to be unconstitutional, because the landowner is free of the zoning 
that restricted the use of the land.” 
 
Respondents’ contention is meritless.  The cited dicta did not consider the 
possibility of a claim for temporary taking because the landowner therein did not 
claim a taking.  Id., 81 Ohio St.3d at 213, 690 N.E.2d 510. 
 
More important, the United States Supreme Court has declared that 
temporary takings are compensable: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the government 
retains the whole range of options already available—amendment of the 
regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent 
domain.  Thus we do not, as the Solicitor General suggests, ‘permit a court, at the 
behest of a private person, to require the . . . Government to exercise the power of 
eminent domain . . . .’  * * * We merely hold that where the government’s 
activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent 
action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for 
the period during which the taking was effective.”  (Ellipsis sic.)  First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of Los Angeles (1987), 482 U.S. 
304, 321, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250. 
 
Although First English involved the second prong of the Agins takings test 
rather than the first prong, its holding “still contains nuggets of language helpful 
to resolution of some other inverse condemnation issues not directly addressed.”  
See, generally, 8 Rohan & Reskin, Nichols on Eminent Domain (3 Ed.2001) 14E-
22, Section 14E.04[2].  In other words, “[t]he First English court stated that 
damages from ‘temporary’ takings, that is, resulting from interim ordinances, or 
presumably, from ordinances intended to be permanent but later invalidated by 
the courts as a taking and therefore effectively transformed into an interim 
ordinance, are to be ‘measured by the principles normally governing the taking of 
a right to use property temporarily,’ that is, in the same way as in eminent domain 
actions for temporary use of property.”  (Footnote omitted.)  Id. at 14E-23, 
Section 14E.04[2], quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 318, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 
L.Ed.2d 250. 
 
Therefore, the invalidation of the U-1(1) and U-2-A residential zoning 
ordinances as applied to relators’ property did not relieve respondents of their 
duty to compensate relators for the temporary taking of their property.  When the 
burden on the landowner “results from governmental action that amounted to a 
January Term, 2002 
13 
taking, the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that the 
government pay the landowner for the value of the use of the land during this 
period.  * * * Invalidation of the ordinance or its successor ordinance after this 
period of time, though converting the taking into a ‘temporary’ one, is not a 
sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the Just Compensation Clause.”  First 
English, 482 U.S. at 319, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250. 
Delays in Use; Paper Streets 
 
Respondents claim that relators were not entitled to compensation because 
they were not prepared to make the required access road improvements for retail 
use as authorized by the court until March 2001, when they submitted their road 
improvement plans to Mayfield Heights, and relators did not address a wetlands 
issue concerning their development of property until November 2000. 
 
The United States Supreme Court emphasized in First English that it 
expressed no opinion on “normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in 
zoning ordinances, variances, and the like” in regulatory inverse condemnation 
cases.  482 U.S. at 321, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250. 
 
Respondents 
here, 
however, 
applied 
unconstitutional 
zoning 
classifications to relators’ property for over nine years after relators acquired the 
property.  Any delays by relators did not contribute to respondents’ delay in 
finally rezoning the property to U-4.  In fact, as established by relators, there was 
never a substantive wetlands issue. 
 
Respondents further claim that there is no compensable taking because the 
city owned “paper streets” until the December 2000 consent entry vacating the 
streets and declaring relators the owners of the property.  The evidence, however, 
establishes that Mayfield Heights abandoned the paper streets long before the 
taking of the property here. 
 
The land constituting the paper streets was dedicated to the city in 1927.  
Once land is dedicated, it is held in trust for street or alley purposes and reverts to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
the grantor or those claiming under the grantor when it is abandoned or vacated.  
See, e.g., State ex rel. Bedard v. Lockbourne (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 452, 457, 
590 N.E.2d 1327; Chillicothe Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. Kitchen Collection, Inc. 
(Aug. 15, 1995), Ross App. No. 94CA2066, unreported, 1995 WL 495959.  
Nonuse of the property, i.e., ceasing all acts of enjoyment on the property, must 
occur for at least twenty-one years in order to constitute abandonment.  Nail & 
Iron Co. v. Furnace Co. (1889), 46 Ohio St. 544, 22 N.E. 639, paragraph two of 
the syllabus; Anderson v. Alger (May 14, 1999), Hardin App. No. 6-98-10, 
unreported, 1999 WL 378377.  The city never constructed or used the paper 
streets here. 
 
In fact, when Mayfield Heights accepted the dedication of an adjacent 
subdivision in 1959, access to these never-constructed streets from actual streets 
was blocked.  The city’s 1959 acceptance of this dedication consequently evinced 
its intent to abandon the paper streets, and its nonuse of these streets continued for 
over the requisite twenty-one-year period before the taking here.  See Anderson, 
citing Wyatt v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 1, 5, 621 N.E.2d 
822, regarding the requirement of an intent to abandon.  Therefore, relators owned 
the property consisting of the “paper streets” at the time the temporary taking 
occurred because the city had abandoned the property. 
Res Judicata 
 
Respondents finally argue that res judicata bars relators’ takings claim 
because relators could have raised their takings claim in their declaratory 
judgment action, which was the subject of Shemo I.  Respondents are correct that 
res judicata generally bars litigation of all claims that either were or might have 
been litigated in a first lawsuit.  State ex rel. Carroll v. Corrigan (2001), 91 Ohio 
St.3d 331, 332, 744 N.E.2d 771. 
 
Unlike other judgments, however, and consistent with the persuasive 
weight of authority, a declaratory judgment is not res judicata on an issue or 
January Term, 2002 
15 
claim not determined thereby even though it was known and existing at the time 
of the original action.  See Jamestown Village Condo. Owners Assn. v. Market 
Media Research, Inc. (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 678, 685-687, 645 N.E.2d 1265.  
Thus, a declaratory judgment determines only what it actually decides and does 
not preclude other claims that might have been advanced.  1 Restatement of the 
Law 2d, Judgments (1982) 337, Section 33, Comment c; Ketchel v. Bainbridge 
Twp. (1992), 79 Ohio App.3d 174, 177-178, 607 N.E.2d 22. 
 
Therefore, relators’ failure to raise their takings claim in their previous 
declaratory judgment action does not bar their takings claim in this mandamus 
proceeding. 
Temporary Taking—Duration and Measure of Damages 
 
Relators request compensation for the period from March 19, 1992, when 
they filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the existing U-1(1) zoning 
classification, until August 20, 2001, when the city council enacted a resolution 
removing the emergency-use restriction for one road providing access to the 
proposed retail development. 
 
Under the first prong of the Agins test, relators established a temporary 
taking during the time that the U-1(1) and U-2-A zoning classifications were 
unconstitutionally applied to their property.  These single-family residential 
classifications were applied to their property on March 19, 1992, the date they 
claim as the beginning date of the temporary taking.  But the zoning 
classifications had been invalidated and the requested zoning, U-4, was applied by 
Mayfield Heights to their property in April 2001.  Although the Maplewood Road 
emergency-use restriction was not removed until August 2001, April 2001 is the 
ending date for the temporary taking because the challenged zoning regulations 
no longer applied to relators’ property.  And relators did not establish that they 
were denied all economically viable use for their property under the second prong 
of the Agins test after the rezoning in April 2001. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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For the measure of damages, relators are entitled to the diminution in the 
value of the use of their property during the period of the temporary taking.  See 
Norwood v. Sheen (1933), 126 Ohio St. 482, 494, 186 N.E. 102; First English, 
482 U.S. at 319, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250. 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing, relators have established their entitlement to the 
requested extraordinary relief in mandamus to compel respondents to commence 
appropriation proceedings to determine the amount of the city’s temporary taking 
of relators’ property.  Therefore, we grant the writ. 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur but would also award attorney 
fees. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment. 
__________________ 
 
Sheldon Berns and Benjamin J. Ockner, for relators. 
 
Leonard F. Carr and L. Bryan Carr; Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., 
and Phillip J. Campanella, for respondents. 
__________________