Case Title: State v. Cornwell

Citation: 1999-Ohio-125

Docket Number: 19971390

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-09-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Cornwell, 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 1999-Ohio-125.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CORNWELL, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Cornwell (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 560.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 97-1390 — Submitted June 8, 1999 — Decided September 22, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, No. 96-CR-525. 
 
During the early morning hours of June 11, 1996, defendant-appellant, 
Sidney Cornwell, and some associates who belonged to a neighborhood gang in 
Youngstown drove up to an apartment building on Oak Park Lane with the 
intention of shooting a rival gang member.  When the intended victim was not 
seen, Cornwell opened fire on the occupants of an apartment, killing a three-year-
old child and wounding three adults.  Cornwell was subsequently convicted of 
aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder, and sentenced to death. 
 
On the afternoon of the previous day, Cornwell and other members or 
associates of the “Crips” gang had been involved in a shootout with members of 
the “Bloods” gang on Elm Street at New York Avenue in Youngstown.  One of the 
associates of the Crips, Edward McGaha, was grazed on the head by a bullet 
during the gunfire exchange.  McGaha saw Richard “Boom” Miles, a member of 
the Bloods, and Michael Williams leave the scene, but did not see either of them 
shooting.  During the shootout, McGaha saw Cornwell using a black gun.  Police 
later recovered six 9-mm Luger shell casings from the shooting scene at the corner 
of New York Avenue and Elm Street. 
 
Later that afternoon, McGaha was released from the hospital and went to his 
mother’s home on Elm Street.  While he was standing outside in front of the house 
with several people, including Cornwell, a carload of Bloods jumped out and 
opened fire on them.  According to McGaha, Cornwell returned gunfire with the 
same black semiautomatic weapon he had used at the earlier shootout. 
 
2 
 
Shortly thereafter, McGaha, Cornwell, and others gathered at a New York 
Avenue house where a man named “Heavy” lived.  Also present at Heavy’s house 
were Gary Drayton, Leslie Johnson, Edward Bunkley, and Denicholas Stoutmire.  
The talk among the group centered on retaliation for the earlier shooting of 
McGaha.  The plan of action was to kill Boom Miles.  Although McGaha later 
admitted on cross-examination that he knew that Boom was not the person who 
had shot him, he went along with the plan to seek out and kill Boom. 
 
That night, Bunkley and Stoutmire stole two vehicles, a Buick and a Pontiac 
Bonneville, in order to facilitate the group’s search for Boom.  During this time, 
the rest of the group remained at Heavy’s place, drinking and smoking marijuana.  
When Bunkley and Stoutmire returned to Heavy’s with the stolen cars, the group 
(minus Heavy) went out to search for Boom around Youngstown.  By this time 
Antwan Jones and Damian Williams had joined the group.  The group used a third 
car, a Chevette belonging to a friend. 
 
Stoutmire drove the stolen blue Bonneville while Williams rode with him in 
the front passenger seat.  Johnson sat in the back seat behind Williams, and 
Cornwell sat in the driver side back seat behind Stoutmire.  According to one 
witness, the only people carrying weapons in the Bonneville were Williams, who 
had a .45 automatic pistol, and Cornwell, who had a semiautomatic 9-mm black 
gun.  However, Bunkley testified that the other two passengers in the Bonneville 
also had weapons.  Nevertheless, Bunkley did corroborate several witnesses’ 
testimony that Cornwell was carrying a 9-mm weapon. 
 
After driving around Youngstown for about an hour, the three cars 
proceeded to Oak Park Lane because Stoutmire thought Boom might be there.  
Susan Hamlett lived in Apartment No. 5 in the apartment building at 4 Oak Park 
Lane in Youngstown.  Hamlett’s friend, Marilyn Conrad, and Conrad’s son also 
lived with Hamlett, along with Hamlett’s nephew and two nieces, one of whom 
 
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was three-year-old Jessica Ballew.  Hamlett was familiar with Boom and knew that 
he frequented the Oak Park area.  Earlier that evening, Boom had played with the 
children who lived in Hamlett’s apartment, but Hamlett did not see him after that. 
 
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on June 11, 1996, Hamlett was outside on her 
porch talking to a friend, Donald Meadows.  Jessica Ballew came to the doorway 
on the porch to get a drink of water.  At that time, three cars drove up Oak Park 
Lane.  The first two cars went past the apartment, but the light blue Bonneville 
stopped in front of the apartment, and a voice came from the car asking for Boom.  
According to Damian Williams, who was seated in the Bonneville with Cornwell, 
the voice from the car was Cornwell’s.  Both Hamlett and Meadows responded that 
Boom was not there.  Cornwell asked again where Boom was, and Hamlett said 
that he did not live there.  Cornwell then replied: “Well, tell Boom this.”  A volley 
of shots (more than five, less than ten) was fired at the apartment.  Jessica Ballew 
sustained two gunshot wounds, including a fatal one to her head.  Meadows was 
wounded, as were Conrad and a visiting friend who was inside.  The three vehicles 
fled the scene, and Damian Williams was dropped off because he “didn’t want 
anything to do with a baby getting killed.” 
 
Youngstown police officer Joseph Wess soon received a call regarding the 
shooting at Oak Park Lane.  He then noticed three cars, two of them fitting the 
descriptions he had just received.  He pursued the vehicles and saw the Bonneville 
parked in the driveway of a vacant house.  With his car lights off, Wess pulled up 
behind the Bonneville.  Then Wess turned on his headlights, and all of the 
occupants jumped out of the Bonneville and ran away.  Wess pursued one suspect, 
who he said jumped out of the driver’s door, catching him after a brief foot chase.  
That suspect turned out to be Sidney Cornwell, who was immediately arrested.  
Upon conducting a search of the Bonneville, Wess found, among other items, a 
spent 9-mm shell casing.  However, no gun was found in the Bonneville. 
 
4 
 
On July 26, 1996, a grand jury indicted Cornwell for aggravated murder 
(prior calculation and design) and three counts of attempted aggravated murder.  
Each count also carried a firearm specification.  In addition, a death-penalty 
specification alleged that Cornwell had committed aggravated murder as part of a 
course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of, or attempt to kill, two or 
more persons (R.C. 2929.04[A][5]). 
 
At trial before a jury, Donald Meadows, one of the victims of the Oak Park 
Lane shooting, identified Cornwell as the man who had shot him.  Damian 
Williams, one of Cornwell’s accomplices in the blue Bonneville on the morning of 
June 11, also identified Cornwell as the sole gunman in the fatal shooting at Oak 
Park Lane. 
 
Officer Robert Mauldin testified that he and other officers recovered several 
9-mm shell casings from the area of Elm Street and New York Avenue on June 10, 
1996, and from the area of Oak Park Lane, Apartment No. 5, on the early morning 
of June 11.  Although Mauldin stated that .380 shell casings were also found at the 
scene of the Elm Street and New York Avenue shooting, only 9-mm shell casings 
were recovered from the Oak Park area.  Mauldin also identified two 9-mm shell 
casings that were recovered from the Bonneville that was at the Oak Park shooting. 
 
Michael Roberts, a forensic scientist with the Ohio Bureau of Criminal 
Identification and Investigation, testified that, to a reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty, all ten 9-mm Luger shell casings recovered from both the Elm Street and 
Oak Park Lane shootings came from the same handgun.  The murder weapon was 
never recovered.  After deliberation, the jury found Cornwell guilty as charged. 
 
At the mitigation hearing, nine witnesses testified on Cornwell’s behalf, 
including his mother, three siblings, and other relatives.  Psychologist James 
Eisenberg concluded that Cornwell had grown up in a violent and chaotic family, 
which caused him serious problems of identity and dependency. 
 
5 
 
The jury recommended death, and the trial court imposed the death sentence 
on Cornwell.  The court then sentenced Cornwell to prison on his other 
convictions. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon a direct appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Paul J. Gains, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, and Janice T. 
O’Halloran, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
John B. Juhasz and Mary Jane Stephens, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  Appellant has raised nine propositions of law.  We have 
reviewed each and have determined that none justifies reversal of appellant’s 
convictions for aggravated murder and the other crimes he committed.  Pursuant to 
R.C. 2929.05(A), we have also independently weighed the aggravating 
circumstance against the evidence presented in mitigation and reviewed the death 
penalty for appropriateness and proportionality.  For the reasons that follow, we 
affirm appellant’s convictions and death sentence. 
VOIR DIRE/PRETRIAL ISSUES 
Failure to Excuse Biased Jurors 
 
In his first proposition of law, Cornwell contends that the trial court erred in 
failing to excuse for cause six prospective jurors who expressed views in favor of 
the death penalty.  Cornwell asserts that he was forced to exercise peremptory 
challenges on five of these biased jurors, but that one juror who should have been 
excused, Angela Reichenbach, sat on the jury that  recommended that he receive 
the death penalty. 
 
Trial courts have discretion in determining a juror’s ability to be impartial.  
State v. Williams (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 281, 288, 6 OBR 345, 351, 452 N.E.2d 
1323, 1331.  R.C. 2313.42(J) states that good cause exists for the removal of a 
 
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prospective juror when “he discloses by his answers that he cannot be a fair and 
impartial juror or will not follow the law as given to him by the court.”  A 
prospective juror who has been challenged for cause should be excused “if the 
court has any doubt as to the juror’s being entirely unbiased.”  R.C. 2313.43.  See 
State v. Allard (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 482, 495, 663 N.E.2d 1277, 1289.  However, 
a ruling “will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly arbitrary  * * * so 
as to constitute an abuse of discretion.”  State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 
31, 553 N.E.2d 576, 587.  Accord State v. Williams (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 8, 679 
N.E.2d 646, 654. 
 
While a review of the voir dire examination cited by Cornwell indicates that 
all six jurors favored capital punishment, all of them stated that they would 
consider a lesser sentence and would follow the law as instructed by the trial judge. 
 
Cornwell asserts that he was prejudiced by a less-than-impartial jury because 
he had exhausted his peremptory challenges and juror Angela Reichenbach sat on 
the jury.  During voir dire, Reichenbach stated her belief that the death penalty 
serves as a deterrent and should be imposed if the crime was severe, intentional, 
malicious, or brutal.  Yet Reichenbach also agreed that she could follow the law as 
instructed by the trial judge even if she disagreed with it.  Moreover, she expressed 
the view that the death penalty should not be imposed “in every case where 
someone dies,” and that there are mitigating circumstances in determining who 
should get the death penalty in any murder case. 
 
Here, the trial court considered the defense’s challenge for cause on 
Reichenbach, but determined that her views were not biased in favor of death, 
since she believed that the death penalty should apply only in certain cases if the 
facts would warrant it.  Under these circumstances, no abuse of discretion on the 
part of the trial court is apparent.  “[D]eference must be paid to the trial judge who 
sees and hears the juror.”  Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 426, 105 S.Ct. 
 
7 
844, 853, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 853. 
 
The other five prospective jurors who Cornwell contends should have been 
excused for cause were peremptorily challenged by the defense and thus never sat 
on Cornwell’s jury.  In Ross v. Oklahoma (1988), 487 U.S. 81, 86, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 
2277, 101 L.Ed.2d 80, 88, the United States Supreme Court stated that any claim 
asserting that a jury was not impartial must focus on the jurors who ultimately sat.  
In addition, the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that the loss of a 
peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an 
impartial jury.  Id. at 88, 108 S.Ct. at 2278, 101 L.Ed.2d at 90.  In contrast, 
however, this court has recognized that where the defense exhausts its peremptory 
challenges before the full jury is seated, the erroneous denial of a challenge for 
cause in a criminal case may be prejudicial.  Hartnett v. State (1885), 42 Ohio St. 
568, paragraph four of the syllabus; Tyler, supra, 50 Ohio St.3d at 30-31, 553 
N.E.2d at 586-587; Williams, supra, 79 Ohio St.3d at 8, 679 N.E.2d at 655. 
 
Nevertheless, none of the five peremptorily challenged jurors in issue 
merited an excusal for cause by the trial court, since all appeared to be impartial 
with regard to whether the death penalty should be imposed.  Prospective juror 
Sharlene Bica stated that she could follow the law even if she disagreed with it, 
and could vote for a life sentence.  Although Bica supported the death penalty, she 
stated that she would give meaningful consideration to life-sentencing options and 
would follow the court’s instructions. 
 
Prospective juror James Studacher stated in his questionnaire that he 
believed in the death penalty as “a life for a life” and had “trouble” with murderers 
getting life sentences.  Yet Studacher stated that he would consider life 
imprisonment options and agreed that he would follow the law even if it conflicted 
with his personal beliefs.  He also agreed that the death penalty was not automatic 
and that a life sentence was a severe penalty. 
 
8 
 
Prospective juror Suzanne Murphy favored the death penalty but agreed that 
she could return a verdict recommending a life sentence.  In addition to affirming 
that she would give life-sentencing options meaningful consideration, Murphy 
declared that she would need to see the facts of the case to determine whether 
death or a life sentence would be the more appropriate sentence. 
 
Prospective juror Judith Keefer stated that she believed “the death penalty is 
Biblical.”  Nevertheless, Keefer stated that she would follow the judge’s 
instructions and consider the mitigating circumstances, regardless of her personal 
beliefs.  The trial court’s decision to reject the defense challenge for cause on 
Keefer was not an abuse of discretion, especially in view of the deference that must 
be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.  State v. Wilson (1972), 29 
Ohio St.2d 203, 211, 58 O.O.2d 409, 414, 280 N.E.2d 915, 920. 
 
Prospective juror Sally Smolek also favored the death penalty but indicated 
that she would set aside her personal believes and follow the law, and that she 
could recommend a life sentence. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we reject Cornwell’s first proposition of law. 
Duration of Voir Dire Interrogation 
 
In Proposition of Law II, Cornwell argues that the parties were not given the 
“wide latitude in voir dire questioning” required by R.C. 2945.25(C).  Cornwell 
asserts that the court set an arbitrary time limit on voir dire that disrupted the jury 
selection process and undermined constitutional safeguards.  Cornwell points out 
that the court twice informed defense counsel of the time they had left in 
questioning juror Reichenbach and that the trial court erred by unreasonably failing 
to grant the defense sufficient time to question Reichenbach concerning her death-
penalty views. 
 
“The scope of voir dire is within the trial court’s discretion and varies 
depending on the circumstances of each case.”  State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio 
 
9 
St.3d 122, 129, 529 N.E.2d 913, 920.  No prejudicial error can be assigned to the 
examination of veniremen in qualifying them as fair and impartial jurors unless a 
clear abuse of discretion is shown.  State v. Ellis (1918), 98 Ohio St. 21, 120 N.E. 
218, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Beuke (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 39, 
526 N.E.2d 274, 285.  “[T]he trial court reserves the right and responsibility to 
control the proceedings of a criminal trial pursuant to R.C. 2945.03, and must limit 
the trial to relevant and material matters with a view toward the expeditious and 
effective ascertainment of the truth.”  State v. Durr (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 
568 N.E.2d 674, 678, citing State v. Bridgeman (1977), 51 Ohio App.2d 105, 109-
110, 5 O.O.3d 275, 277, 366 N.E.2d 1378, 1383. 
 
The trial judge allotted each side one-half hour to question each prospective 
juror.  Defense counsel did not object to the court’s time allotment.  Nor did 
counsel request more time to question juror Reichenbach during voir dire.  In fact, 
at the close of Reichenbach’s voir dire, defense counsel stated, “We have no 
further questions at this time.” 
 
Cornwell cites several instances where he claims the trial court unreasonably 
restricted defense counsel’s voir dire of Reichenbach.  Yet Cornwell’s claims in 
this regard do not withstand scrutiny.  The court’s statement to defense counsel 
that he had fourteen minutes left in questioning Reichenbach was in response to 
defense counsel’s inquiry: “May I inquire of the time, Your Honor?”  In addition, 
Cornwell misrepresents the trial court’s actions during Reichenbach’s voir dire 
when the court stated, “[W]e’re getting pretty far afield here  * * *, and let’s move 
on.”  The court did not sustain the prosecutor’s objection as Cornwell states in his 
brief; it overruled it and permitted the particular question objected to.  The trial 
court’s later reminder to defense counsel that it had four minutes left in questioning 
Reichenbach does not appear to be the abrupt, unreasonable interruption that 
Cornwell implies.  Rather, it appears to be more in the nature of a courtesy 
 
10 
reminder, made at the time the court sustained an objection by the prosecutor. 
 
Since no abuse of discretion is apparent, we reject Proposition of Law II. 
TRIAL ISSUES 
Jury Instructions 
 
In Proposition of Law III, Cornwell asserts that the trial court denied him 
due process in instructing the jury on complicity, since it was never pleaded or 
argued that Cornwell was anything but the shooter.  Cornwell contends that the 
complicity instruction essentially invited the jury to find him guilty of something, 
and that it ensured a conviction, since it gave the jurors more theories and verdict 
forms on which to find Cornwell guilty of something. 
 
Cornwell failed to object to the complicity instruction and thus has waived 
all but plain error.  State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 
N.E.2d 1332, syllabus.  Plain error is not present here.  Cornwell is correct in 
pointing out that none of the evidence and arguments proffered by the state 
implicated him otherwise than as the sole gunman.  Yet some testimony regarding 
the gunman’s identity could be construed as conflicting.  Officer Wess identified 
Cornwell as the driver of the Bonneville, whom he chased shortly after the 
shooting, whereas Cornwell’s accomplices generally testified that Cornwell was a 
back-seat passenger.  Also, Meadows at one point testified that he did not 
remember whether the gunman drove the Bonneville or was in the back seat. 
 
Given the fact that some crucial testimony came from Cornwell’s 
accomplices, a reasonable jury could have concluded that the accomplices’ 
testimony was less than reliable or was designed to pin the shooting on Cornwell 
as a scapegoat.  The evidence clearly showed that Cornwell was present at the 
shooting.  Yet the complicity instruction gave the jury the opportunity to convict 
Cornwell as an accomplice, if, for instance, the jury had a reasonable doubt as to 
whether he was the actual shooter. 
 
11 
 
Regardless of whether a complicity instruction was requested, a trial court 
“must give all instructions that are relevant and necessary for the jury to weigh the 
evidence and discharge its duty as the factfinder.”  State v. Joy (1995), 74 Ohio 
St.3d 178, 181, 657 N.E.2d 503, 505, citing State v. Comen (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 
206, 553 N.E.2d 640, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Moreover, as we noted in 
State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 151, 689 N.E.2d 929, 946, under R.C. 
2923.03(F), defendants are “on notice that the jury may be given a complicity 
instruction even though the defendant has been charged as a principal offender.”  
Proposition of Law III is rejected. 
SENTENCING ISSUES 
Sentence Appropriateness 
 
In Proposition of Law VIII, Cornwell argues that there is a reasonable doubt 
as to whether the aggravating circumstance outweighs the aggregate mitigating 
evidence.  Whether Cornwell’s death sentence was appropriate will be discussed in 
our independent sentence evaluation. 
 
Cornwell also contends that the prosecutor’s statement requesting that all 
relevant guilt-phase evidence be admitted during the sentencing phase indicated 
that he was relying on the offense itself as an aggravating circumstance. 
Cornwell’s assertion is incorrect. 
 
The prosecutor stated: “Your Honor, the people of the State move to 
introduce any and all evidence that was introduced at trial that is relevant to the 
aggravating circumstance that the defendant was guilty of committing; namely, 
that the aggravated murder was part of a course of conduct involving the 
purposeful killing or attempt to kill two or more persons.” 
 
Pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(D)(1), the prosecutor may introduce “any evidence 
raised at trial that is relevant to the aggravating circumstances the offender was 
found guilty of committing.”  It is the trial court’s responsibility, not the jury’s, to 
 
12 
determine what evidence is relevant.  State v. Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 
201, 702 N.E.2d 866, 887.  To characterize the prosecutor’s statement as evidence 
that he relied on the offense itself as an additional aggravating circumstance is 
unpersuasive.  Cornwell argues that the jury “relied on the underlying offense with 
all of its emotional baggage” to recommend death, simply because the prosecutor 
did not make a full-blown presentation of the trial evidence.  Yet, as the prosecutor 
noted during his opening statement: “We don’t put it [trial evidence] all back on 
again because it would be repetitive  * * *.”  Proposition of Law VIII is rejected. 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
 
In Proposition of Law IV, Cornwell contends that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel before trial, during voir dire, and when counsel 
failed to object to the instruction on complicity.  In Proposition of Law IX, 
Cornwell asserts that he was denied effective assistance because counsel failed to 
request definite terms of sentence on his three attempted aggravated murder 
convictions. 
 
A claim of ineffective assistance “has two components.  First, the defendant 
must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.   * * *  Second, the defendant 
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense[,] depriv[ing] the 
defendant of a fair trial  * * *.”  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 
687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693.  Accord State v. Bradley (1989), 
42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373.  However, in no instance does Cornwell 
demonstrate prejudice, “a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s 
errors, the result of the trial would have been different.”  Id. at paragraph three of 
the syllabus. 
 
Cornwell first complains that defense counsel never asked five jurors during 
voir dire whether they had a preference for the death penalty.  Yet this court has 
stated that “[t]he conduct of voir dire by defense counsel does not have to take a 
 
13 
particular form, nor do specific questions have to be asked.”  State v. Evans (1992), 
63 Ohio St.3d 231, 247, 586 N.E.2d 1042, 1056.  Examination of the entire voir 
dire testimony of the five jurors in question indicates no deficient performance or 
errors on the part of defense counsel. 
 
Juror Linda Angelot stated that she really did not have “one opinion or 
another about the death penalty.”  She indicated that she would follow the law and 
the judge’s instructions even if she disagreed with them. 
 
Juror Matchette told the court “I don’t know” when asked whether she could 
sign a death verdict.  She also stated that she would follow the law and the court’s 
instructions on whether to return a verdict for a life sentence or the death penalty.  
She indicated that she would put any personal feelings aside and follow the law as 
given by the trial judge in determining a sentencing verdict. 
 
Juror Heather Blake indicated to the court that she could join in a verdict for 
either a life sentence or a death sentence.  She also stated that she would follow the 
law as given by the trial court in rendering a sentencing verdict. 
 
Juror Gertrude Garchar agreed that she could return a verdict for either a 
death sentence or a life sentence.  She told defense counsel she had no opinion on 
the death penalty one way or the other but would follow the court’s instructions.  
She agreed with defense counsel that death may not be the appropriate penalty 
under certain circumstances. 
 
Juror Richard Crnarich indicated that he could sign a verdict for either a life 
sentence or a death sentence and that he really did not have an opinion on the death 
penalty.  He agreed that he would follow the trial judge’s instructions as to the law. 
 
As we noted in State v. Watson (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 1, 13, 572 N.E.2d 97, 
108, defense counsel “need not repeat questions about topics already covered by 
group voir dire, opposing counsel, or the judge.”  Moreover, we will not second-
guess trial strategy decisions such as those made in voir dire.  State v. Mason 
 
14 
(1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 157, 694 N.E.2d 932, 949.  In view of the applicable 
law and the testimony elicited during voir dire from the jurors in question, we 
believe that defense counsel was neither remiss nor ineffective in failing to ask a 
question that was, in essence, already posed to each juror during voir dire by the 
court. 
 
Cornwell next claims ineffective assistance in that defense counsel failed to 
object to the complicity instruction proposed by the trial judge.  However, as 
pointed out earlier, the instruction was not objectionable.  Moreover, counsel’s 
decision not to object to the instruction could be rightly characterized as a trial 
strategy.  Such tactics or strategies are viewed with the presumption that effective 
legal counsel was rendered.  See Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 144, 538 N.E.2d at 381-
382. 
 
Cornwell next contends that counsel were ineffective in failing to file 
pretrial motions challenging the death-penalty law and the constitutionality of the 
death specification.  We have previously rejected the same arguments.  In State v. 
Davis (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 326, 349, 581 N.E.2d 1362, 1381, we found that a 
failure to file a pretrial motion challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s death-
penalty statute “was not critical,” and therefore not ineffective assistance, because 
the statute has been found to be constitutional.  Similarly, counsel’s failure to file a 
pretrial motion challenging the constitutionality of the R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) course-
of-conduct specification was also not critical.  The course-of-conduct specification 
has withstood different constitutional challenges.  See State v. Benner (1988), 40 
Ohio St.3d 301, 533 N.E.2d 701, syllabus (“R.C. 2929.04[A][5] is not void for 
vagueness”).  Accord State v. Brooks (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 155, 661 N.E.2d 
1030, 1037. 
 
Cornwell also alleges that counsel failed to obtain data on the death penalty 
in order to make a record or argue proportionality to the jury.  Counsel’s failure to 
 
15 
obtain data on the death penalty with regard to proportionality analysis was not 
ineffective.  A jury or trial court does not engage in proportionality analysis.  See, 
generally, State v. Roe (1989), 41 Ohio St.3d 18, 25, 535 N.E.2d 1351, 1361.  That 
analysis is conducted by this court alone.  R.C. 2929.05. 
 
Cornwell’s claim of ineffective assistance under Proposition of Law IX is 
also without merit.  Cornwell argues that defense counsel were ineffective for 
failing to request that he be sentenced pursuant to 1995 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 to 
definite terms of imprisonment for his three attempted aggravated murder 
convictions.  Cornwell claims that R.C. 1.58 gives him the benefit of any decrease 
in penalty as of the date of sentencing, even though Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 purports to 
apply only to those felonies committed on or after July 1, 1996. 
 
This court recently resolved precisely this issue in State v. Rush (1998), 83 
Ohio St.3d 53, 697 N.E.2d 634, paragraph two of the syllabus: “Because the 
General Assembly has expressly stated that the amended sentencing provisions of 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 are applicable only to those crimes committed on or after its 
effective date, R.C. 1.58(B) is inapplicable.  The amended sentencing provisions of 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 apply only to those crimes committed on or after July 1, 1996.” 
 
Since Cornwell’s crimes were committed prior to July 1, 1996, he was not 
eligible for any definite terms of imprisonment provided by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2.  
Id.  Thus, counsel were not ineffective for failing to request something that 
Cornwell was ineligible to receive.  Accordingly, we reject Propositions of Law IV 
and IX. 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
 
In Proposition of Law VII, Cornwell asserts that the prosecutor vouched for 
the credibility of three state’s witnesses: McGaha, Jones, and Williams.  Cornwell 
points out that the prosecutor asked leading questions of McGaha and Jones, and 
bolstered the testimony of all three by asking them questions about their plea-
 
16 
bargain agreements with the state.  As to each witness, the prosecutor asked 
whether the plea agreement was made in exchange for “your truthful testimony” or 
“truthful sworn statement.”  The defense never objected when McGaha was asked 
the question.  However, Cornwell’s objections to the questions posed to Jones and 
Williams were overruled.  The issue with respect to McGaha is waived except for 
plain error that would affect the outcome of the trial.  State v. Long (1978), 53 
Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether remarks were improper and, 
if so, whether they prejudicially affected substantial rights of the accused.  State v. 
Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14-15, 14 OBR 317, 318-319, 470 N.E.2d 883, 
885.  The touchstone of analysis “is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of 
the prosecutor.”  Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947, 
71 L.Ed.2d 78, 87. 
 
Even assuming that the prosecutor’s questions constituted error, they did not 
affect Cornwell’s substantive rights.  Cornwell submits that the testimony of these 
witnesses linked him to the crimes and that since no physical evidence linked him 
to the crimes, the cumulative effect of the prosecutorial questions was 
overwhelming.  However, the jury might well have believed all three witnesses’ 
testimony even if the prosecutor had not asked questions concerning the plea 
agreement made in exchange for “truthful testimony.”  Moreover, Donald 
Meadows, one of the victims and someone who did not testify as part of a plea 
agreement, identified Cornwell as the gunman. 
 
Arguably, all three witnesses might have seemed even more credible had the 
jury not been told of the plea-bargain agreements.  Several courts have noted that a 
“truthful testimony” clause in the plea agreement can be a two-edged sword.  
Defense counsel can effectively argue to the jury that such a clause gives the 
witness incentive not to tell the truth but to please the prosecutor.  United States v. 
 
17 
Arroyo-Angulo (C.A.2, 1978), 580 F.2d 1137, 1146-1147.  See, also, People v. 
Manning (1990), 434 Mich. 1, 18, 450 N.W.2d 534, 541.  Prosecutors ordinarily 
elicit information on plea agreements with witnesses during direct examination in 
order to blunt or foreclose unfavorable cross-examination revealing that they 
agreed to testify in exchange for favorable treatment by the prosecutor. 
 
Moreover, courts have split as to whether a truthful-testimony clause in a 
plea agreement invites the jury to rely on the prosecutor’s assessment that the 
witness is testifying truthfully.  Cf. United States v. Roberts (C.A.9, 1980), 618 
F.2d 530, 536 (clause does invite reliance on prosecutor’s assessment) with United 
States v. Isaacs (C.A.7, 1974), 493 F.2d 1124, 1165 (such an argument is 
“fanciful”).  See, also, Williams, supra, 79 Ohio St.3d at 12-13, 679 N.E.2d at 657-
658. 
 
In our view, these prosecutorial questions were not improper and did not 
prejudicially affect substantial rights of Cornwell.  The questions concerning the 
plea bargains were brief, not overly emphasized, and were made at the close of the 
prosecutor’s examination of each witness.  Given the isolated nature of these 
particular questions to these three witnesses, these questions should not be 
misinterpreted, taken out of context, or given their most damaging meaning.  
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974), 416 U.S. 637, 647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 40 
L.Ed.2d 431, 439; State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 204, 661 N.E.2d 1068, 
1078.  In sum, these brief prosecutorial questions did not deprive Cornwell of a fair 
trial.  Therefore, we reject Proposition of Law VII. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
 
In Proposition of Law V, Cornwell argues that Ohio death-penalty laws 
violate both the federal and state Constitutions.  Cornwell concedes that this court 
has repeatedly held the death penalty in Ohio to be constitutional but states that we 
have not addressed some of the arguments he asserts in his brief.  However, 
 
18 
examination of the constitutional arguments raised by Cornwell indicates that all 
have been previously rejected by this court and may be summarily rejected.  State 
v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus.  See, e.g., State v. 
Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264; State v. Maurer 
(1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768; Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 
1, 679 N.E.2d 646; State v. Buell (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 22 OBR 203, 489 
N.E.2d 795; State v. Zuern (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 56, 512 N.E.2d 585; State v. 
Mapes (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 108, 19 OBR 318, 484 N.E.2d 140; State v. Steffen 
(1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383; State v. Green (1993), 
66 Ohio St.3d 141, 609 N.E.2d 1253; State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 
613 N.E.2d 212. 
 
In Proposition of Law VI, Cornwell contends that the voter-approved 
amendments to Sections 2 and 3, Article IV, Ohio Constitution, which eliminate 
court of appeals review in death-penalty cases, deprive him of his federal and state 
constitutional liberties.  We rejected similar arguments in State v. Smith (1997), 80 
Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668, and reject Cornwell’s arguments for the same 
reasons. 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND PROPORTIONALITY 
 
Upon independent assessment, we find that the evidence supports beyond a 
reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance that Cornwell killed Jessica Ballew 
and attempted to kill at least three other people as part of a course of conduct 
involving the purposeful killing or attempt to kill two or more persons.  R.C. 
2929.04(A)(5). 
 
The nature and circumstances of the offense provide no mitigating features.  
The facts of the drive-by shooting indicate that Cornwell and other gang associates 
planned to retaliate against a rival gang member for a shooting that took place 
hours earlier.  Upon arriving at the scene where he intended to exact revenge, 
 
19 
Cornwell indiscriminately committed his crimes in order to “tell Boom this.”  All 
four victims, including Jessica Ballew, were simply in the wrong place at the 
wrong time.  The fact that Cornwell and his associates had planned on killing 
Boom instead is of no consequence.  See, e.g., State v. Richey (1992), 64 Ohio 
St.3d 353, 364, 595 N.E.2d 915, 925. 
 
We find some mitigating features in Cornwell’s history, character, and 
background.  Cornwell’s maternal grandmother described Cornwell as “a lovable 
child” with whom she never had a problem.  Two of Cornwell’s sisters and a 
brother testified that Cornwell’s father, Sidney Cornwell, Sr., was a crack addict 
and an alcoholic who was physically abusive to them and their mother.  Cornwell’s 
mother, Beverly Terry, testified that she bore one child prior to marrying 
Cornwell’s father at age seventeen and that Cornwell was her fourth child.  While 
both of Cornwell’s parents had steady jobs, their marriage was always in a state of 
turmoil.  At one point during Cornwell’s childhood, Beverly removed herself and 
her children to the battered women’s shelter at the local Y.W.C.A. for a short 
period of time. 
 
Eventually, Cornwell’s parents separated and later divorced.  During the 
separation, when Cornwell was approximately eight years old, Mr. Cornwell 
removed the children from Beverly’s home in Youngstown while Beverly was at 
work.  He took them to live with him at his home in nearby Wheatland, 
Pennsylvania.  Thereafter, for approximately five years, Cornwell and his siblings 
lived with their father in Pennsylvania.  During that period, Beverly was ordered to 
pay child support and was allowed to visit her children on weekends.  When 
Cornwell was around thirteen years old, Beverly asked for custody of her children, 
and they then returned to live with her in Youngstown with her present husband. 
 
While growing up, Cornwell was overweight and was subjected to recurring 
criticism and ridicule at school by his classmates.  His mother nicknamed him 
 
20 
“Corky” to discourage his peers from calling him “Porky.”  Cornwell was 
particularly self-conscious of the size of his breasts and, at age thirteen, he 
underwent cosmetic surgery to reduce their size in hopes of reducing the ridicule 
he received. 
 
While attending school in Youngstown, Cornwell was suspended twenty-
four times between 1990 and 1995 for fighting and insubordination, and for being 
verbally vulgar and abusive to teachers and school authorities.  According to his 
mother, Cornwell was also pressured at school by his peers to join a gang. 
 
The pastor of Cornwell’s mother’s church testified on Cornwell’s behalf.  
He stated that after visiting Cornwell, he led him in a prayer of sincerity.  He 
further stated that he sees sincerity in Cornwell, since Cornwell openly confessed 
his sinful life and received Christ into his life. 
 
Psychologist James Eisenberg testified that Cornwell functions in the low 
average to borderline range of intelligence, with a verbal IQ of 83.  Based on 
various tests that he administered to Cornwell, Eisenberg described Cornwell as a 
person who is shy and fairly introverted and as one who lacks self-confidence and 
has low self-esteem.  Eisenberg pointed out that when Cornwell was a child, his 
adult male role model was a crack-smoking father and that Cornwell was 
essentially raised by his older sisters. 
 
According to Eisenberg, no one was around to give Cornwell the discipline, 
structure, support, and affection he needed on a continuing basis to limit his 
dangerous behavior.  Eisenberg thought that the gang gave Cornwell the kind of 
discipline, structure, and support that he did not receive from an effective male role 
model.  Moreover, Cornwell’s mother was often not around when Cornwell was 
suspended from school, and her influence on his conduct was minimal.  Among 
other things, Eisenberg concluded that while Cornwell has no mental disease or 
defect, his intellectual ability is close to that of a thirteen- or fourteen-year-old.  In 
 
21 
essence, Cornwell grew up in a violent and chaotic family, which caused him 
serious problems of identity and dependency. 
 
With regard to the statutory mitigating factors, we afford some weight to 
R.C. 2929.04(B)(4), since Cornwell was nineteen years old at the time of the 
offense.  We also assign weight to Cornwell’s lack of any prior criminal record as 
an adult. 
 
Under factor 7, several facts brought out during the sentencing phase are 
mitigating.  Cornwell’s chaotic family history and background, including coming 
into the world as an unwanted child, and having been abused by his father, a crack 
addict, should be given weight in mitigation.  Also militating against the death 
penalty is the fact that Cornwell has the love and support of his mother, siblings, 
and other family members.  See Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 121, 684 N.E.2d 668, 
696. 
 
However, upon independent weighing, we find that the aggravating 
circumstance outweighs the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
testimony of Meadows identifying Cornwell as the gunman and the corroborating 
testimony of Cornwell’s accomplices leave no reasonable doubt as to Cornwell’s 
guilt in the course-of-conduct murder of a three-year-old child and attempted 
murder of three adults who simply happened to be at the place where gang 
members hoped to find their intended victim.  Cornwell’s murderous conduct 
merits the capital penalty to which he was sentenced. 
 
We find the death sentence imposed in this case to be neither excessive nor 
disproportionate when compared with similar cases of murder as part of a course of 
conduct involving the purposeful killing of two or more persons.  See, e.g., State v. 
Davie (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 686 N.E.2d 245 (nineteen-year-old offender, lack 
of a significant criminal history, conduct disorder); State v. Awkal (1996), 76 Ohio 
St.3d 324, 667 N.E.2d 960 (poor background, did not finish school, physically 
 
22 
abusive father, remorseful, gainfully employed, no prior criminal record); Allard, 
75 Ohio St.3d 482, 663 N.E.2d 1277 (raised in foster homes, sexually abused as a 
child, manic-depressive disorder, remorseful); and State v. Mitts (1998), 81 Ohio 
St.3d 223, 690 N.E.2d 522 (loved by his family and was a devoted father, gainfully 
employed, protective of siblings, honorably served in the Coast Guard, remorseful, 
no prior criminal record).  All four of those capital cases featured as much 
mitigation as is present in the instant case, if not more.  We affirmed the death 
penalty in all four cases. 
 
Based on all the foregoing, we affirm Cornwell’s convictions and sentences, 
including the death sentence. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.