Case Title: Sheikh v. Haji

Citation: 

Docket Number: And-11-115

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2011-11-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2011 ME 117 
Docket: 
And-11-115 
Submitted 
  On Briefs: 
September 27, 2011 
 
Decided: 
November 29, 2011 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
HABIBO SHEIKH 
 
v. 
 
HAJI HAJI 
 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
 
[¶1]  Haji Haji appeals from a judgment of parental rights and 
responsibilities entered in District Court (Lewiston, Lawrence, J.).  Haji contends 
that the court erred in awarding Habibo Sheikh primary residence and final 
decision-making authority for their three minor children and erred in imputing 
income to him for the purpose of establishing a weekly child support order.  We 
affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  Both Habibo Sheikh and Haji Haji were born in Somalia and 
immigrated to the United States in 2004 and 2005, respectively.  They participated 
in a marriage ceremony performed by an Imam, according to Muslim tradition, in 
 
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Hartford, Connecticut in August 2005.  Habibo and Haji are the parents of three 
minor children. 
[¶3]  Habibo filed a complaint for divorce against Haji on September 11, 
2009.  The Court held three days of trial proceedings on September 8, 2010, 
January 5, 2011, and January 7, 2011.  During the September 2010 trial 
proceeding, the court learned for the first time that although Habibo and Haji had 
been married according to their religious tradition in Connecticut, they had at no 
point obtained a legally enforceable marriage license.  The parties and the court 
agreed that the complaint for divorce would be converted into a petition to 
determine parental rights and responsibilities.  On the second day of trial, January 
5, 2011, Haji moved without objection to include the youngest child, who had been 
born after Habibo had filed her September 2009 complaint for divorce, in the 
parental rights determination.  The court issued its Judgment of Parental Rights and 
Responsibilities on February 3, 2011.  The defendant filed a timely M.R. Civ. P. 
52(b) motion for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law on February 11, 
2011.  The court summarily denied the motion on February 16, 2011. See M.R. 
App. P. 2(b)(3).  Haji’s timely appeal followed. 
[¶4]  Throughout the trial proceedings, the court faced a difficult task of 
navigating through language barriers and significant cultural differences among the 
parties and their witnesses.  Habibo and her family are part of and supported by the 
 
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Maay Maay-speaking segment of the Somali community, while Haji is part of and 
supported by the Bantu-speaking segment of the Somali community.  The 
proceedings required the use of no less than three translators to interpret 
testimonial submissions of eleven witnesses into the two dialects for the benefit of 
the parties, and into English for the benefit of counsel and the court. 
[¶5]  The testimony of all the witnesses established that after their August 
2005 marriage ceremony, Habibo and Haji lived together in Hartford, Connecticut 
for nine months until May 2006, when Habibo moved with her parents, Jabril Abdi 
and Khadijo Ali, to Lewiston, Maine. The couple’s first child, Safiya, was born in 
June 2006 shortly after Habibo moved to Lewiston.  Haji left his position at a 
manufacturing plant in Connecticut and followed Habibo to Maine approximately 
nine months later in February 2007.  The couple initially resided with Habibo’s 
parents at a residence on Shawmut Street in Lewiston before Haji was able to 
secure housing at an apartment on Knox Street. 
[¶6] The court found that while Habibo and Haji were living together, Haji 
physically abused Habibo and their oldest daughter, Safiya.  In December 2007, 
after an incident in which he allegedly kicked Habibo in the stomach while she was 
pregnant with the couple’s second daughter, Haji was arrested, charged with 
assault, and prohibited from contact with Habibo and the oldest daughter for a 
 
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period of five months.1  Although the assault charge was later dismissed, Habibo 
testified that the couple’s oldest daughter, Safiya, had witnessed this abuse.   Based 
on Habibo’s testimony, the court also found that Haji had beaten her with an 
electrical cord and had assaulted Safiya on two occasions, although the dates of 
these incidents were unspecified. 
 
[¶7] Haji maintained that while he and Habibo were living together at the 
Knox Street residence, he performed most, if not all, of the child rearing duties. 
Haji testified that Habibo was incapable of caring for the children on her own.  As 
part of what became a pivotal inquiry in the litigation, the court found that Habibo 
suffered from “cognitive issues that at minimum may include a significant learning 
disability.”  This finding was corroborated by Habibo’s own trial testimony, which 
indicated that she could not read or write in Somali or English and had significant 
problems understanding basic math and calculating the ages of her children.  In the 
summer of 2006, Habibo submitted documentation to the Social Security 
Administration that ultimately qualified her to receive Federal Supplemental 
Security Income benefits on account of an “organic mental disorder.”2 
                                         
1  The court found that the kicking incident occurred when Habibo was pregnant with the couple’s 
youngest child, Fortun.  The record demonstrates that Haji allegedly assaulted Habibo when she was 
pregnant with the couple’s younger daughter, Sadiya. 
 
2  Fueling Haji’s arguments in this appeal, Habibo and her mother, Khadijo Ali, represented in certain 
Social Security Administration forms that Habibo was wholly dependent on her mother and other family 
members to perform even the most basic of daily tasks and that she had to be “supervised” while 
 
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[¶8]  In the summer of 2009, taking her two daughters with her, Habibo 
moved back in with her parents.  Shortly before the filing of the complaint for 
divorce, Habibo filed a complaint for protection from abuse (PFA) on August 12, 
2009, and the court granted a consent order on August 28, 2009.  According to the 
terms of an April 2010 amendment to the August 2009 consent order, the two 
daughters were to live with Habibo four days a week and with Haji three days a 
week. 
 
[¶9]  Haji and Habibo both testified at trial that they felt it was important for 
the other parent to have a relationship with the children.  During the time of the 
parties’ separation, following the August 2009 PFA, the parties successfully 
worked together, with the help of their respective support groups in the Somali 
community, to perform their parenting obligations under the amended consent 
order.  By the second day of trial, on January 5, 2011, Haji and Habibo had 
successfully worked together to enroll Safiya in school.  Haji put on evidence, 
largely through his own testimony and the testimony of a Bantu community elder, 
establishing that he was a good father and was able to consistently attend to the 
needs of his children.  The record establishes, and the court found, that Habibo 
                                                                                                                                   
performing virtually any life activity, including the care of Safiya.  At trial, Habibo testified that she was 
able to perform basic daily functions for herself and able to adequately care for all of her children with the 
assistance of friends and family.  When Haji’s counsel confronted Khadijo about the statements she made 
on behalf of Habibo in the Social Security Administration forms, Khadijo categorically denied saying 
anything disparaging about Habibo’s ability to care for herself or the children and re-characterized 
Habibo’s cognitive limitations more blandly as learning disabilities. 
 
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received consistent and substantial support from her family in caring for the 
children. 
 
[¶10]  The District Court’s February 2011 judgment ultimately established 
“parallel, but not fully shared, parental rights and responsibilities.”  The court 
awarded Habibo primary residential care of the children “provided she continues to 
reside . . . in the same apartment building as her parents and siblings,” and awarded 
her “the right to make final binding decisions” to the extent there was disagreement 
between she and Haji.  The court ordered that Haji be kept “fully informed,” in 
advance, as to all significant decisions involving the children and afforded the 
opportunity to comment.  As part of recognizing the significant cultural divide 
among the parties, the court incorporated into its judgment a dispute resolution 
component that embraced the values of both the Maay Maay and Bantu segments 
of the Somali community.  To the extent the parties remained in a deadlock on any 
decision regarding the children, the court ordered Habibo, before exercising final 
decision-making authority, to make an effort to mediate the disagreement with the 
assistance of both Maay Maay and Bantu community elders through Youth 
Alternatives Ingraham Mediation Services.  The court allocated to Haji reasonable 
rights of contact that, at minimum, consisted of caring for the two oldest children 
from Monday morning through Thursday morning of every week. The court also 
 
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established a schedule to incrementally increase Haji’s contact with the couple’s 
infant son. 
[¶11]  Also relevant to this appeal, the court received testimony from Haji in 
which he outlined his prior work history and his efforts to seek employment during 
the time this action was pending.  Intervening on behalf of Habibo on the issue of 
child support, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) advocated 
that Haji be imputed with an income capacity consistent with his employment 
history.  Ultimately, the court found that Haji had an earning capacity of $15,600 
per year—an annual salary consistent with full-time, minimum wage 
employment—and based on that calculation, ordered Haji to make weekly child 
support payments of $87, or $27 per child. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶12]  Haji first contends that the Court abused its discretion in awarding 
primary residence of the children to Habibo.  The trial court is afforded “broad 
discretion in determining the custody of minor children” and we review the “award 
of parental rights and responsibilities for an abuse of discretion.”  Williams v. 
Williams, 1998 ME 32, ¶ 8, 706 A.2d 1038.  In making an award of parental rights 
and responsibilities, the court is required to apply the best interest of the child 
standard.  Id.; 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (2010). 
 
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[¶13]  Haji argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding 
Habibo with primary residence of the children by failing to adequately factor into 
its best interest analysis Habibo’s cognitive limitations.  Beyond the fact that the 
court explicitly recognized Habibo’s “cognitive issues,” an examination of the 
February 2011 judgment demonstrates that the court considered (1) the violence 
that Haji inflicted on Habibo and their daughter when the parties lived together, see 
19-A M.R.S. §§ 1653(3)(L), (M); (2) the motivation and capacity of both Habibo 
and Haji to give their children love and affection, see id. § 1653(3)(F); (3) the 
parties’ mutual agreement that it was important for all of the children to have 
contact with the other parent, see id. § 1653(3)(K); and (4) the consistent support 
Habibo received from her family in caring for the children, see id. § 1653(3)(B). 
[¶14]  The best interest analysis does not superimpose upon the trial court an 
obligation to “robotically address[] every statutory factor . . . so long as it is 
otherwise evident that the court has evaluated the evidence with the best interest 
factors in mind.”  Nadeau v. Nadeau, 2008 ME 147, ¶ 35, 957 A.2d 108.  That 
much was accomplished here.  Faced with what the court aptly described as 
“self-serving and/or vague (both intentional and unintentional) testimony” from the 
parties themselves and their respective supporting witnesses, the task of making 
credibility determinations falls to the trial court in its fact-finding role.  See 
Handrahan v. Malenko, 2011 ME 15, ¶ 13, 12 A.3d 79 (reiterating the rule that 
 
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even where conflicting evidence might support alternative findings, a trial court’s 
factual findings will not be considered clearly erroneous as long as they are 
supported by competent record evidence).  The court’s primary residency 
determination was not based upon clearly erroneous findings and the court did not 
otherwise abuse its discretion in awarding Habibo primary residence of the three 
minor children. 
 
[¶15]  Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding final 
decision-making authority to Habibo in the event the parties disagree about 
significant decisions affecting the children.  The same facts that support the court’s 
primary residency determination similarly support awarding Habibo final 
decision-making authority.  The court’s finding of abuse, coupled with the finding 
that Habibo receives substantial support in caring for the children, is sufficient to 
tip the scales in her favor, and the court did not abuse its discretion by allocating 
final decision-making authority to Habibo.  See Alexander, Maine Appellate 
Practice § 410 at 224 (3d. ed. 2008) (“[T]he appeals court will uphold the ruling of 
the trial court unless it determines . . . that there is no rational basis for the trial 
court’s ruling.”).3 
                                         
3  The court’s February 2011 judgment contains findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to 
appraise Haji “of the reasoning underlying its conclusions” and to enable this Court to provide “effective 
appellate review.”  Dargie v. Dargie, 2001 ME 127, ¶ 2, 778 A.2d 353 (quotation marks omitted).  The 
court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying Haji’s M.R. Civ. P. 52(b) motion for additional 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
 
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[¶16]  Finally, Haji challenges the court’s decision to impute his earning 
capacity for the purpose of establishing a weekly child support order.  The trial 
court is vested with the discretion to impute earning capacity to a parent who 
“voluntarily becomes or remains unemployed or underemployed, if sufficient 
evidence is introduced concerning a party’s current earning capacity.”  19-A 
M.R.S. § 2001(5)(D) (2010); see Koszegi v. Erickson, 2004 ME 113, ¶ 14, 855 
A.2d 1168.  On appeal, the analysis is two-fold.  Whether a party is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed is a question of fact reviewed for clear error.  
Carolan v. Bell, 2007 ME 39, ¶ 19, 916 A.2d 945.  The trial court’s decision to 
impute income is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Id.; accord Nadeau, 
2008 ME 147, ¶ 48, 957 A.2d 108.  The court’s February 2011 judgment provides, 
in relevant part: 
Defendant has resided in the United States since June of 
2004.  Defendant has no formal education and does not 
read or write in English.  Before coming here, Defendant 
taught reading and writing in Somalia.  After coming to 
the United States, he found employment and worked in 
manufacturing in Connecticut for two years earning 
$8.50 per hour.  In Maine, Defendant worked in 
housekeeping at Point Sebago and in production at 
Worcester Wreath, earning $9.00 per hour at both jobs. 
Defendant currently is unemployed and does not have a 
driver’s license.[]  Defendant has no physical disability 
and continues to seek work.  The court pegs Defendant’s 
earning capacity at minimum wage or $15,600.00 
annually. 
 
 
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[¶17]  DHHS argues that the trial court’s finding of voluntary 
underemployment or unemployment is necessarily implicit in the court’s recitation 
and analysis of Haji’s employment history, his level of education, his access to 
transportation, and the absence of any disability that would prevent him from 
holding full time, entry-level employment.  See Wrenn v. Lewis, 2003 ME 29, ¶ 18, 
818 A.2d 1005 (“A person’s earning or income potential is a product of a variety 
of factors, including that person’s qualifications, income history, and the earning or 
income opportunities that are reasonably available to that person.”). 
[¶18]  The evidence readily supports DHHS’s argument.  An implicit finding 
that Haji was “voluntarily underemployed or unemployed,” although not stated 
specifically in the judgment, is additionally bolstered by competent record 
evidence that Haji had not held a job since his release from a seasonal position at 
Worcester Wreath in December 2008, that he did not search or apply for any job 
during the summer of 2010, that he voluntarily limited his search to job 
opportunities in the Lewiston-Auburn area despite a history of employment in 
other geographic locations in Maine requiring him to travel, and that he 
periodically performed custodial work for the Somali-Bantu community in 
exchange for housing assistance.  Moreover, DHHS Agent Raymond Heathco 
provided testimony suggesting that there were entry-level, minimum wage jobs 
available in the surrounding community for people with similar language barriers 
 
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as Haji, who unquestionably had difficulty reading and communicating in English.  
In short, the predicate finding of voluntary underemployment or unemployment is 
implicit in the court’s decision and supported by competent evidence in the record.  
Carolan, 2007 ME 39, ¶ 12, 916 A.2d 945 (quoting Payne v. Payne, 2006 ME 73, 
¶ 7, 899 A.2d 793).  Considering the court’s acknowledgement of Haji’s limited 
efforts to find employment, the decision to impute income based on his earning 
capacity does not reflect an abuse of the court’s discretion. 
[¶19]  Having calculated the weekly child support payment by applying the 
self-support reserve to the imputed earning capacity, the court also properly 
accounted for Haji’s subsistence needs as the non-primary care provider.  See 
Johnson v. Smith, 1999 ME 168, ¶ 7, 740 A.2d 579. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
 
L. Chris L’Hommedieu, Esq., Lewiston, for appellant Haji Haji 
 
Meghan Higgins, Stud. Atty., Thomas Carnes, Stud. Atty., and E. James Burke, 
Esq., Supervising Atty., Cumberland Legal Aid Clinic, Portland, for appellee 
Habibo Sheikh 
 
William J. Schneider, Attorney General, and Carlos Diaz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of Attorney General, Portland, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
Lewiston District Court docket number FM-2009-611 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY