Case Title: Headley v. Selkowitz

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1965-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
171 So. 2d 368 (1965)
Walter C. HEADLEY, Chief of Police, City of Miami, Petitioner,
v.
Emanuel SELKOWITZ, Respondent.
No. 33480.

Supreme Court of Florida.
January 20, 1965.
Rehearing Denied February 26, 1965.
*369 John R. Barrett and S.R. Sterbenz, Miami, for petitioner.
Ephraim Collins, Miami Beach, for respondent.
ERVIN, Justice.
This case is before us upon petition for a writ of certiorari and has been argued upon the questions of jurisdiction and merits.
In this case, the Circuit Court of Dade County in a habeas corpus proceeding held Section 43-10.5 of the City Code of the City of Miami invalid. Said provision reads as follows:
The District Court of Appeal affirmed. See Walter C. Headley v. State ex rel. Selkowitz, Fla.App., 163 So. 2d 13. It said:
It is obvious to us that the decision under review of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, conflicts with language appearing in State ex rel. Green v. Capehart (1939), 138 Fla. 492, 189 So. 708, and City of St. Petersburg v. Calbeck (Fla.App.2d 1959) 114 So. 2d 316, sufficient to invoke our certiorari jurisdiction.
In State ex rel. Green v. Capehart, supra, an ordinance of the City of Hollywood, Florida, defining "disorderly person" and "disorderly conduct" provided, inter alia,
In the Capehart case, three persons were charged in an affidavit with violation of said ordinance, in that they were
In reviewing a decision below in habeas corpus adverse to the defendants, this Court, in the Capehart case, upheld the City of Hollywood ordinance, saying:
In City of St. Petersburg v. Calbeck, supra, the respondents were convicted in the Municipal Court of St. Petersburg on the charge that they:
In that case, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, said:
From the language of the two decisions, there appears to exist a conflict with the instant case which should be reconciled and resolved by this Court.
We agree with the District Court of Appeal, Third District, that the quoted provision from the City of Miami Code is invalid on its face for the reasons assigned by the District Court of Appeal. The ordinance provision because of its broad language is too vague to withstand constitutional tests. It appears to us not to measure up to the standards referred to in the text from which Headnotes 3 and 4 are drawn in City of St. Petersburg v. Calbeck.
It differs from language long ago congealed into our statute law which was drawn from the common law defining vagrants and denouncing vagrancy. When compared and contrasted with our state statute (F.S. Section 856.02, F.S.A.) defining vagrants, the excessive broadness and vagueness of the Miami ordinance becomes readily apparent. Cf. F.S. Section 856.02, F.S.A., which provides, inter alia, that:
Statutes and ordinances containing language of similar import to that quoted from Section 856.02 have usually been upheld. See 55 Am.Jur. (Vagrancy) pages 447 to 450, inclusive. Also see 17 Am.Jur. (Disorderly Conduct) pages 189 and 190.
Such statutes and ordinances should be applied cautiously and sparingly and only in the most obvious and aggravated cases. Persons should not be charged with vagrancy unless it is clear they are vagrants of their own volition and choice. Innocent victims of misfortune ostensibly appearing to be vagrants, but who are not such either by choice or intentional conduct should not be charged with vagrancy. See 55 Am.Jur. (Vagrancy), Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7.
We recede from State ex rel. Green v. Capehart, supra, to the extent only that it conflicts with our opinion and judgment herein.
The writ of certiorari heretofore issued is discharged and the petition is dismissed.
DREW, C.J., and THORNAL, O'CONNELL and CALDWELL, JJ., concur.