Case Title: In re Child of Megan D.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 52

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 52 
Docket: 
Han-18-366 
Submitted 
On Briefs: February 20, 2019 
Decided: 
April 9, 2019 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILD OF MEGAN D. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Megan D. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Ellsworth, 
Roberts, J.) terminating her parental rights to her child pursuant to 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2018).1  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The Department of Health and Human Services filed a child 
protection petition on September 23, 2016, see 22 M.R.S. § 4032 (2018), and 
the court (Mallonee, J.) issued a preliminary protection order the same day, 
placing the child in foster care, see 22 M.R.S. §§ 4034, 4036 (2018).  The mother 
waived her right to a summary preliminary hearing, see 22 M.R.S. § 4034(4), 
and on February 28, 2017, the court (Roberts, J.) entered a jeopardy order by 
agreement, see 22 M.R.S. § 4035 (2018).  The Department filed a petition for 
                                         
1  The child’s father did not appear at the termination hearing and has not appealed from the 
court’s order terminating his parental rights.   
 
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termination of the mother’s parental rights on February 1, 2018.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4052 (2018).  On July 24, 2018, the court held a hearing on the Department’s 
petition for termination of the mother’s parental rights.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4054 
(2018). 
[¶3]  On August 20, 2018, the court granted the Department’s petition to 
terminate the mother’s parental rights.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), 
(b)(i)-(ii).  Based on the testimony presented at the hearing and other 
competent evidence in the record, the court found, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that the mother is unwilling or unable to protect the child from 
jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time that is reasonably 
calculated to meet the child’s needs, and that termination of her parental rights 
is in the best interest of the child.  See id. 
[¶4]  The court based its decision on the following factual findings, which 
are supported by competent evidence in the record. 
[The mother] gave birth to [the child] on September 1, 
2016.  [She] used heroin during her pregnancy resulting in 
[the child] being born drug affected.  [The mother] was given 
the opportunity to enter a residential treatment program 
following [the child’s] birth.  Unfortunately, she soon left the 
program and [the child] was taken into foster care on 
September 23, 2016.  [The child] has not been in [the 
mother’s] care since that date.   
 
. . . .   
 
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. . . [The mother] has not been in contact with the 
[D]epartment consistently; she has not been calling in to see 
if she needs to drug test, and she does not have safe or 
permanent housing.   
 
[The mother] participated in therapy . . . from February 
of 2017 until December 18, 2017.  She was diagnosed with 
[o]piate dependency in early remission.  [She] was just 
beginning to address her trauma history when the services 
stopped due to [the service provider] mistakenly believing 
that the Department’s authorization had ceased. . . .   
 
. . . [The mother] has made substantial connections 
within the recovery community to support her efforts.  
[Several of those connections] are working with [the mother] 
to assist her in finding employment and preparing for 
transition to her own housing.  While her prospects are good 
at this point she remains four to six months away from being 
in a position to care for [the child].   
 
 
[The mother] clearly loves her son very much.  She is 
currently working very hard to alleviate the Department’s 
jeopardy concerns.  Unfortunately, she has run out of time.  
[The child] has been in foster care for 22 of the 23 months of 
his life.  [The mother] may be in a position to care for [the 
child] in a few more months.  She is not in a position at this 
time to protect [the child] from jeopardy.  She is not in a 
position at this time to take responsibility for [the child].  
[The child] needs permanency now.   
 
 
[¶5]  The mother timely appealed from the court’s judgment terminating 
her parental rights.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2018); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).   
 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶6]  The mother contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
court’s determination of parental unfitness and that termination of her parental 
rights is in the best interest of the child.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), 
(b)(i)-(ii).2  We review the court’s factual findings for clear error and review the 
court’s ultimate conclusion that termination of parental rights is in the best 
interest of the child for an abuse of discretion.  In re Child of Portia L., 2018 ME 
51, ¶ 2, 183 A.3d 747.  “Where the court finds multiple bases for unfitness, we 
will affirm if any one of the alternative bases is supported by clear and 
convincing evidence.”  In re Children of Corey W., 2019 ME 4, ¶ 19, 199 A.3d 683 
(quotation marks omitted).   
 
[¶7]  “In reviewing a decision to terminate parental rights, a decision that 
is highly factual, we recognize the unique opportunity of the trial courts to 
assess the evidence . . . .”  In re Michaela C., 2002 ME 159, ¶ 22, 809 A.2d 1245 
(quotation marks omitted); see also Gordon v. Cheskin, 2013 ME 113, ¶ 12, 
82 A.3d 1221 (“We defer to the trial court’s determination of witnesses’ 
                                         
2  Additionally, the mother asserts that she was denied due process when the Department failed 
to adequately provide reunification efforts and rehabilitative services.  However, the mother failed 
to raise this constitutional challenge with the trial court and therefore we do not reach this argument.  
See In re Child of James R., 2018 ME 50, ¶ 16, 182 A.3d 1252; see also In re Doris G., 2006 ME 142, ¶ 17, 
912 A.2d 572. 
 
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credibility and its resolution of conflicts in testimony.”).  Because of the trial 
court’s unique vantage point, “we afford substantial deference to the trial 
court’s determination.”  In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶ 17, 889 A.2d 297. 
 
[¶8]  Contrary to the mother’s contentions, there is competent evidence 
in the record that supports the court’s findings of parental unfitness pursuant 
to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii) and the court’s ultimate conclusion that 
termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the child pursuant to 
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).  As the court noted, the mother has made 
significant strides in her recovery efforts and attempts to alleviate jeopardy.  
However, the child has been in the Department’s custody for twenty-two 
months out of the child’s almost two-year life, and there is competent evidence 
in the record to support the court’s finding that the mother is unable to take 
responsibility for the child within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet 
the child’s needs.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii).  Moreover, there is 
ample evidence in the record to support the court’s finding that termination of 
the mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child.  See In re Child of 
Portia L., 2018 ME 51, ¶ 4, 183 A.3d 747.   
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
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Christopher J. Whalley, Esq., Ellsworth, for appellant mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Ellsworth District Court docket number PC-2016-25 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY