Case Title: Klutznick v. Thulin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Klutznick v. Thulin1991 WY 99814 P.2d 1267Case Number: 91-5Decided: 07/16/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
SAMUEL J. KLUTZNICK, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

WALTER W. THULIN AND M. 
JOAN THULIN, HUSBAND AND WIFE; ROBERT E. WHITE AND CO., A WYOMING GENERAL 
PARTNERSHIP, ROBERT E. WHITE AND BARBARA G. WHITE, GENERAL PARTNERS; ROBERT S. 
CHEEK AND JEAN R. CHEEK, ROBERT S. CHEEK, TRUSTEE FOR JEAN RICK CHEEK, ROBERT S. 
CHEEK, III, AND DEBORAH P. CHEEK, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, TetonCounty, D. Terry Rogers, 
J.

Phelps H. Swift, Jr. 
(argued), Mullikin, Larson & Swift, Jackson, for 
appellant.

Robert B. Ranck (argued), 
Ranck & Schwartz, Jackson, for appellees.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant, Samuel J. 
Klutznick (Klutznick) sought to renovate a garage and workshop which was located 
on his property and to build a new garage. The appellees objected contending 
that Klutznick's plans violated the restrictive covenants and an easement 
agreement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees who 
were the neighbors of Klutznick.

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

ISSUES

[¶3.]     Klutznick raises these 
issues:

"I. Did the District 
Court err in its interpretation of the instruments restricting the use of 
Appellant's real property?

"II. Did the District 
Court err in its denial of Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a 
determination that the width of the easement across Appellant's real property is 
twenty (20) feet?"

[¶4.]     Appellees state these 
issues:

"1. Did the district 
court correctly interpret the 1968 Easement Agreement to create a 60' easement 
within which there ran a 20' roadway?

"2. Did the district 
court correctly interpret the 1986 Easement Agreement to limit the encroachment 
upon the 60' easement to a garage and workshop?"

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
BELOW

[¶5.]     On May 1, 1990, 
appellees sought to enjoin Klutznick from constructing a second garage on his 
property located near Wilson, Wyoming. In their complaint for injunction, 
appellees contended the construction of a second garage violated the terms of 
restrictive covenants that encumbered the property because only one garage was 
permitted per lot. On that same date, the district judge granted appellees a 
temporary restraining order. The parties agreed to continue the temporary 
restraining order until such time as a hearing was 
requested.

[¶6.]     On July 6, 1990, 
Klutznick sought dissolution of the temporary restraining order based on these 
assertions:

"1. The Temporary 
Restraining Order entered herein enjoined [Klutznick] from constructing a second 
garage on his property under Teton County Building Permit No. 90-008. This 
building permit has been abandoned by [Klutznick].

"2. [Klutznick] has 
revised his construction plans to remodel the existing garage into a utility 
building and to construct a new garage on his property. TetonCounty has issued permit No. 90-202 for 
the construction of these improvements.

"3. The new construction 
plans do not violate the restrictive covenants. There will only be one garage on 
[Klutznick's] property which is expressly permitted pursuant to the covenants 
referenced in [appellee's] Complaint for Injunction.

"4. [Klutznick] has 
employed a construction crew to build the improvements. The construction plans 
comply with the Teton County Comprehensive Plan and the private 
covenants."

[¶7.]     The restrictive 
covenant which gave rise to this litigation reads, in pertinent 
part:

"2. No building, 
structure or improvements shall be erected, placed or permitted to remain on 
either subdivided tract of the property except for one single family dwelling, 
one guest house, one garage and accessory or outbuildings common to the 
location."

[¶8.]     On July 13, 1990, 
appellees filed an amended complaint in which they alleged that prior 
agreements, as well as the understanding of the parties, established that the 
garage/workshop on the Klutznick property could not be converted to any other 
use and had to be maintained as a garage/workshop. This allegation was based on 
the language of a 1968 Easement & Maintenance Agreement which established a 
road that meandered throughout the area where the appellees' and Klutznick's 
homes were located. The road is described in detail in a survey, but for 
purposes of this case we are principally concerned with the requirement that the 
road be located on "a strip of land 20 feet in width meandering with various 
courses and distances but within at all times the west 60 feet of the following 
described tract * * *." The tract described is essentially the west 60 feet of 
the Klutznick property. This easement was altered somewhat by a 1986 easement 
agreement which was entered into in recognition that the garage/workshop on 
Klutznick's property (actually the agreement was entered into by Klutznick's 
predecessor in interest) was constructed within the west 60 feet of the property 
and was, thus, within the easement on which the road was located. The agreement 
went on to say:

"1. Acknowledgment of 
Improvements. The Neighbors acknowledge that the garage and workshop do not 
interfere with their use and enjoyment of the Easement. Jonkes [Klutznick's 
predecessor in interest] may remodel, reconstruct or otherwise improve the 
garage and workshop so long as (a) it does not interfere with the Neighbors' use 
of the Easement to provide reasonable access to their respective properties and 
(b) it does not encroach further into the west sixty (60) feet of the Jonke 
property."

[¶9.]     The parties stipulated 
that Klutznick had actual notice of the 1986 easement agreement prior to his 
purchase of the property and that the issue to be decided by the district court 
was whether a preliminary injunction should issue prohibiting Klutznick from 
converting or modifying the existing garage/workshop to a "utility building" or 
any other structure other than a garage/workshop, and then constructing a new 
garage or any other structure that will be used as a 
garage.

[¶10.]  Appellees later filed a second amended 
complaint in which they alleged that Klutznick could not remodel the existing 
garage/workshop into anything other than a garage/workshop and, further, that 
Klutznick had constructed guest quarters underneath the existing garage. This 
guest quarters allegedly violated the covenant quoted above because his property 
could have only one guest quarters, and Klutznick already had one guest 
quarters.

[¶11.]  At the hearing into this matter, some 
appellees testified that their understanding and interpretation of the 1986 
easement agreement was that the old garage/workshop could not be converted to 
another use, but had to remain a garage/workshop.

[¶12.]  On November 26, 1990, the district court 
entered the following order:

"DISCUSSION

"[Appellees] have a 20' 
roadway easement over the west 60' of [Klutznick's property]. While the roadway 
is 20' wide, it meanders at various courses and distances over the west 60' of 
[Klutznick's] property and therefore is a burden on the entire 
60'.

"It was the intent of the 
parties as manifested by the Easement Agreement of 1986 to clarify this 
situation. There would have been no need for the Easement Agreement if 
[appellees] were not entitled to the use of a 20' roadway anywhere on the 60' 
strip of property along the west side of [Klutznick's] 
property.

"[Appellees] are entitled 
to summary judgment for the relief sought in their 
complaint.

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:

"1. [Appellees'] Motion 
for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.

"2. [Klutznick], his 
agents, servants, employees, and persons under his control are hereby 
permanently enjoined from converting or modifying the old garage and workshop to 
a `utility building' or any other structure other than a garage and workshop; 
and constructing the new garage or any other structure which will be used as a 
garage.

"3. [Klutznick] is hereby 
ordered to remove the guest quarters beneath the old garage and to use that 
space only as a garage and workshop."

DISCUSSION

[¶13.]  In analyzing this case, we employ our 
usual test for review of summary judgment. See Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 
Constructions, Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 238 (Wyo. 1991). Klutznick argues in this appeal 
that the 1986 easement agreement is sufficiently clear and unambiguous that it 
should be construed without reference to attendant facts and circumstances or 
extrinsic evidence. He also contends that a construction of that document which 
concludes that the garage/workshop could not be changed to another use is 
strained and incorrect. In addition, he claims that the roadway easement is only 
20 feet wide and not 60 feet wide and, therefore, the 1986 easement agreement is 
essentially meaningless. Finally, Klutznick contends that there is no evidence 
in the record to support a conclusion that he is using the old garage/workshop 
as a guest quarters. The only evidence on this subject is Klutznick's testimony 
that it was not a guest quarters.

[¶14.]  As was recognized by the district court 
in its comments during the hearing into this matter, review of the documents in 
this case must be conducted in the light of established contract law. The 
intention of the parties to a clear and unambiguous written agreement will be 
derived from the entire writing and determined as a matter of law. Kerper v. 
Kerper, 780 P.2d 923, 934 (Wyo. 1989). Extrinsic evidence will not be 
used to contradict the plain meaning of a clear and unambiguous written 
agreement. Id. 
We will not rewrite a clear and unambiguous contract under the guise of 
interpretation. Id. We employ common sense and good faith in 
construing contracts, and the words and acts of the parties must be given effect 
in accordance with the meaning which they would convey to reasonable men at the 
time and place of their use or commission. Wangler v. Federer, 714 P.2d 1209, 
1213 (Wyo. 
1986). Here, it is clear that the neighbors acknowledged that the old 
garage/workshop did not interfere with their use and enjoyment of the roadway 
into which that building encroached. The fact that it did encroach was 
established by the agreement also. The neighbors also agreed that Klutznick 
could remodel, reconstruct or otherwise improve the garage/workshop so long as 
it did not interfere with the use of the roadway and did not encroach further 
into the 60 foot easement. "Remodel" means "to model anew: RECONSTRUCT." "Model" 
means "to plan or form after a pattern: FRAME, SHAPE." Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 1921, 1451 (1981). "Reconstruct" means "to construct 
again: as a(1): to build again: REBUILD." Id. at 1897. "Improve" means "1a: to make 
greater in amount or degree: INCREASE, AUGMENT, ENLARGE, INTENSIFY. * * * 2c: to 
increase the value of (land or property) by bringing under cultivation, 
reclaiming for agriculture or stock raising, erecting buildings or other 
structures * * *." Id. at 1138. In short, when the clear and 
unambiguous language of the 1986 easement agreement is construed in accordance 
with the rules of contract construction outlined above, we can only conclude 
that Klutznick was not prohibited by the 1986 easement agreement from converting 
the old garage/workshop to another use permitted by the covenants and not in 
violation of the restrictions in the 1986 easement agreement, i.e., does not 
interfere with use of the roadway and does not further encroach onto the 60 foot 
easement. Hence, we reverse the summary judgment for appellees and direct the 
entry of summary judgment in favor of Klutznick as to this 
issue.

[¶15.]  It is equally clear that any improvements 
to be made by Klutznick must be in conformance with the restrictive covenants 
contained in his deed. Because the district court disposed of this case on the 
basis of the 1986 easement agreement, it did not address the question of whether 
Klutznick's planned improvements conformed to the restrictive covenants. The 
covenants are equally as clear and unambiguous as was the 1986 easement 
agreement. We conclude that the real question in this case is conformity with 
the covenants and, therefore, it is necessary to remand the case to the district 
court for appropriate fact finding on that issue should the parties find that 
necessary. The improvements, existing and proposed, must be tested only against 
the restrictions contained in those covenants. Except for the waiver of the 
encroachment into the 60 foot easement, the 1986 easement agreement can have no 
effect on enlarging or restricting the meaning of the 
covenants.

[¶16.]  The summary judgment of the district 
court is reversed in its totality, and the matter is remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
concurring with opinion, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, 
joins.

[¶17.]  I concur in the decision and the court's 
opinion. I write further only to make clear, with reversal of the summary 
judgment, that no intimation should follow for any retrial proceeding or 
litigation that may hereafter be instituted that the easement at issue is 
actually sixty foot in width.

[¶18.]  It would first be concluded that the 
easement was created by the agreement of June 10, 1968 and not altered in size 
or location by the easement agreement of September 14, 1986. The latter document 
contained no conveyancing or granting language demonstrating an intent to extend 
the size of any easement that was then in existence.

[¶19.]  This is a simple case with relatively 
direct language. The configuration and location of the prospective roadway and 
anticipated easement is found in the 1968 document and its exhibits G & H 
and states:

3. EASEMENT. Erkins and 
Bert hereby grant, assign and set over to Weisbrod, Cameron and White to use as 
a means of ingress and egress to and from that property owned by Weisbrod, 
Cameron and White as well as to their guests and invitees said road to be a 
private road for the benefit of the Weisbrod, Cameron and White property, the 
following described property, to-wit:

That property described 
on EXHIBITS G and H annexed hereto.

[¶20.]  In exhibits G and H to that agreement, we 
find the description as follows:

Robert Erkins 
Part

To-wit: 
-

A strip of land 20 feet 
in width meandering with various courses and distances but within at all times 
the west 60 feet of the following described tract: [metes and bounds description 
of entire parcel].

EXHIBIT 
G

A.W. Erkins 
Part

To-wit: 
-

A strip of land 20 feet 
in width meandering with various courses and distances but within at all times 
the west 60 feet of the following described lands: [metes and bounds description 
of entire parcel].

 

EXHIBIT 
H

[¶21.]  I find no question about what was 
provided by this explicit description in the document. There was a right to 
build a road within the west sixty feet and, when built and where built, the 
road included a twenty foot easement. This is the plain meaning of clear 
language and, in my persuasion, neither requires nor permits further 
interpretation. Knadler v. Adams, 661 P.2d 1052 (Wyo. 1983); Dawson v. 
Meike, 508 P.2d 15 (Wyo. 1973).

[¶22.]  In this regard, I concur with the trial 
court in its first discussion paragraph of the Order Concerning Motions for 
Summary Judgment and Summary Judgment in recognition of the twenty foot wide 
easement. However, as the parties argue in brief, the second paragraph and 
language thereafter can be considered to provide an erroneous content to 
apparently increase the easement width to sixty feet. The agreement with the 
specific conveyancing language providing for the easement clearly defines an 
easement where the road is now located within the west sixty feet of the 
property to be twenty feet in width. The easement agreement speaks for itself. 
Revelle v. Schultz, 759 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 1988). The written language used leads 
unerringly to the conclusion as it states that the easement is twenty feet and 
should not then be extended by implication to be something different. Kincheloe 
v. Milatzo, 678 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶23.]  In addressing an issue argued by the 
litigants and considered by the trial court, I provide this analysis to avoid 
future misconstruction of the majority's decision.