Case Title: State ex rel. Mobarak v. Brown

Citation: 2024-Ohio-221

Docket Number: 2023-0369

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2024-01-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Mobarak v. Brown, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-221.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-221 
THE STATE EX REL. MOBARAK, APPELLANT, v. BROWN, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Mobarak v. Brown, Slip Opinion No.  
2024-Ohio-221.] 
Mandamus—Petition failed to state a mandamus claim because appellant had 
adequate remedy in ordinary course of law and failed to show that trial 
court had patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over his criminal 
case—Court of appeals’ judgment dismissing petition affirmed. 
(No. 2023-0369—Submitted September 26, 2023—Decided January 25, 2024.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 22AP-482, 2023-Ohio-436. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Soleiman Mobarak, appeals the judgment of the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus against 
appellee, Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Judge Jeffrey M. Brown.  
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Mobarak petitioned the court of appeals to vacate his criminal convictions for lack 
of subject-matter jurisdiction in the trial court.  The court of appeals held that the 
trial court had not lacked jurisdiction over Mobarak’s criminal case and that 
Mobarak had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  We affirm. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 2} In 2012, Mobarak was indicted on charges of engaging in a pattern of 
corrupt activity, aggravated trafficking in drugs, and aggravated possession of 
drugs.  The charges alleged that Mobarak had possessed and sold a controlled-
substance analog commonly known as bath salts.  Following a jury trial, Mobarak 
was found guilty and the trial court sentenced him to 35 years in prison.  On direct 
appeal, the Tenth District reversed Mobarak’s convictions, concluding that 
“possession and trafficking of controlled substance analogs had not yet been 
criminalized as of the time of [Mobarak’s] offenses.”  State v. Mobarak, 10th Dist. 
Franklin No. 14AP-517, 2015-Ohio-3007, ¶ 9 (“Mobarak I”).  This court reversed 
the court of appeals’ judgment based on State v. Shalash, 148 Ohio St.3d 611, 2016-
Ohio-8358, 71 N.E.3d 1089.  State v. Mobarak, 150 Ohio St.3d 26, 2016-Ohio-
8372, 78 N.E.3d 832, ¶ 1 (“Mobarak II”).  In Shalash, this court held that 
“[a]lthough controlled-substance analogs were not specifically proscribed by R.C. 
Title 29 [in October 2011], other provisions of the Revised Code incorporated 
controlled-substance analogs into R.C. Title 29.”  Id. at ¶ 13, citing R.C. 3719.013.  
This court remanded Mobarak’s case to the Tenth District for further proceedings 
consistent with Shalash.  Mobarak II at ¶ 1.  On remand, the court of appeals 
affirmed Mobarak’s convictions.  State v. Mobarak, 2017-Ohio-7999, 98 N.E.3d 
1023, ¶ 37 (10th Dist.) (“Mobarak III”). 
{¶ 3} In August 2022, Mobarak petitioned the Tenth District for a writ of 
mandamus.  His petition asserted that the trial court had lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction over his criminal case because (1) there was no statute prohibiting the 
possession or sale of bath salts at the time his offenses were alleged to have 
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occurred, (2) bath salts were not controlled-substance analogs under Ohio law prior 
to October 2011, (3) his indictment failed to set out all the elements of the charges 
of possession or trafficking, and (4) the controlled-substance-analogs law was 
unconstitutionally vague.  Mobarak asked the court of appeals to order Judge 
Brown to vacate his convictions. 
{¶ 4} Judge Brown filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.  The motion 
argued several reasons for dismissal, including that Mobarak had a plain and 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  A magistrate recommended 
dismissing Mobarak’s petition because he had an adequate legal remedy.  The court 
of appeals adopted the magistrate’s decision and dismissed the petition.  The court 
found that Mobarak’s allegation that the trial court had lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction was an unsupported legal conclusion.  Mobarak appealed to this court 
as of right. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 5} To dismiss a claim pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it must appear beyond 
doubt from the complaint that the relator can prove no set of facts warranting relief, 
after all factual allegations are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are 
made in his favor.  State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., Ohio Conference v. Ohio 
Bur. of Emp. Servs., 83 Ohio St.3d 179, 181, 699 N.E.2d 64 (1998).  This court 
reviews de novo the court of appeals’ dismissal of Mobarak’s petition.  See State 
ex rel. Brown v. Nusbaum, 152 Ohio St.3d 284, 2017-Ohio-9141, 95 N.E.3d 365,  
¶ 10. 
{¶ 6} To obtain a writ of mandamus, a relator must establish by clear and 
convincing evidence (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal 
duty on the part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Love v. O’Donnell, 150 Ohio 
St.3d 378, 2017-Ohio-5659, 81 N.E.3d 1250, ¶ 3.  If the respondent’s lack of 
jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, the relator need not establish the lack of an 
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adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Ford v. Ruehlman, 
149 Ohio St.3d 34, 2016-Ohio-3529, 73 N.E.3d 396, ¶ 62. 
{¶ 7} The court of appeals correctly held that Mobarak’s petition failed to 
state a mandamus claim because he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 
of the law and failed to show that the trial court had patently and unambiguously 
lacked jurisdiction over his criminal case.  The Ohio Constitution provides, “The 
courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction 
over all justiciable matters * * * as may be provided by law.”  Ohio Constitution, 
Article IV, Section 4(B).  This court has held that “the court of common pleas is a 
court of general jurisdiction, with subject-matter jurisdiction that extends to ‘all 
matters at law and in equity that are not denied to it.’ ”  Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 
141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 20, quoting Saxton v. 
Seiberling, 48 Ohio St. 554, 558-559, 29 N.E. 179 (1891).  The “provided by law” 
qualification of Article IV means that there must be a statutory basis for 
jurisdiction.  R.C. 2931.03 provides that basis, granting the courts of common pleas 
“original jurisdiction [over] all crimes and offenses, except in cases of minor 
offenses the exclusive jurisdiction of which is vested in courts inferior to the court 
of common pleas.”  Mobarak was charged with multiple felonies.  Mobarak I, 2015-
Ohio-3007, at ¶ 1 (listing charges).  By virtue of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 
2931.03, the trial court had jurisdiction over Mobarak’s criminal case. 
{¶ 8} This court recently affirmed the dismissal of a similar action.  In State 
ex rel. Boler v. McCarthy, 170 Ohio St.3d 392, 2023-Ohio-500, 213 N.E.3d 690,  
¶ 3, the relator sought writs of mandamus and prohibition to vacate his criminal 
convictions.  Boler argued that the “trial court [had] lacked jurisdiction to * * * 
misconstrue and misapply Ohio’s aggravated-robbery statute.”  Id.  In rejecting this 
argument, this court stated, “[T]he trial court plainly had subject-matter jurisdiction 
over Boler’s criminal case under R.C. 2931.03, which gives common pleas courts 
subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases.  Boler has not identified any statute 
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that removed the trial court’s jurisdiction.”  Id. at ¶ 9, citing Ohio High School 
Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman, 157 Ohio St.3d 296, 2019-Ohio-2845, 136 N.E.3d 436, 
¶ 9 (“when we have found that a court of common pleas patently and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, it is almost always because a statute explicitly 
removed that jurisdiction”).  Like Boler, Mobarak attempts to challenge his 
convictions in jurisdictional terms but fails to point to any authority supporting his 
claim that the trial court had lacked jurisdiction over his criminal case. 
{¶ 9} Moreover, Mobarak argues that because neither bath salts nor control-
substance analogs were criminalized prior to 2012, the trial court had lacked 
jurisdiction over his criminal case.  He similarly argues that R.C. 3719.01 and 
3719.013, 
the 
statutes 
defining 
a 
“controlled-substance 
analog,” 
are 
unconstitutionally vague.  These arguments are substantially similar to those raised 
and rejected in Mobarak’s prior appeals.  See Mobarak II, 150 Ohio St.3d 26, 2016-
Ohio-8372, 78 N.E.3d 832, at ¶ 1 (reversing Mobarak I under the authority of 
Shalash, 148 Ohio St.3d 611, 2016-Ohio-8358, 71 N.E.3d 1089, which found that 
controlled-substance analogs were criminalized as of October 17, 2011); Mobarak 
III, 2017-Ohio-7999, 98 N.E.3d 1023, at ¶ 17 (“we find the ‘controlled substance 
analog’ statute under which [Mobarak] was convicted was not unconstitutionally 
vague on its face or in its application”).  This court has “routinely held that 
extraordinary writs may not be used as a substitute for an otherwise barred second 
appeal or to gain successive appellate reviews of the same issue.”  State ex rel. LTV 
Steel Co. v. Gwin, 64 Ohio St.3d 245, 249, 594 N.E.2d 616 (1992).  “[T]he fact that 
a prior appeal was unsuccessful or even wrongly decided does not mean that it was 
not an adequate remedy.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Peoples v. Johnson, 152 
Ohio St.3d 418, 2017-Ohio-9140, 97 N.E.3d 426, ¶ 11, citing State ex rel. Walker 
v. State, 142 Ohio St.3d 365, 2015-Ohio-1481, 30 N.E.3d 947, ¶ 14, and State ex 
rel. Barr v. Pittman, 127 Ohio St.3d 32, 2010-Ohio-4989, 936 N.E.2d 43, ¶ 1.  The 
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court of appeals correctly dismissed Mobarak’s claim because he had an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 10} We affirm the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ judgment dismissing 
Mobarak’s petition for a writ of mandamus. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, STEWART, and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
DONNELLY, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion. 
BRUNNER, J., not participating. 
_________________ 
DONNELLY, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 11} This case is disturbing.  Soleiman Mobarak filed an original action 
in mandamus in the Tenth District Court of Appeals, alleging that the Franklin 
County Court of Common Pleas had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his 
criminal case.  In support of his claim, he asserted that the conduct for which he 
was convicted—the sale of controlled-substance analogs—was not criminalized 
when he allegedly committed the conduct, thereby depriving the trial court of 
jurisdiction.  The Tenth District dismissed Mobarak’s mandamus petition, finding 
that Mobarak possessed an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and 
that he had presented unsupported legal conclusions in the petition relating to the 
trial court’s purported lack of jurisdiction.  2023-Ohio-436, ¶ 10-11, 13-15.  This 
court now affirms that conclusion.  Because there are procedural bars to Mobarak’s 
seeking equitable relief here, I am compelled to accept this court’s judgment.  But 
my conscience compels me to express my concerns about the issues raised in 
Mobarak’s appeal. 
{¶ 12} To prevail on his mandamus claim, Mobarak must demonstrate by 
clear and convincing evidence (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a 
clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide the relief, and (3) the lack 
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of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Love v. 
O’Donnell, 150 Ohio St.3d 378, 2017-Ohio-5659, 81 N.E.3d 1250, ¶ 3.  But 
Mobarak need not show the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of 
the law if the respondent’s lack of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous.  State ex 
rel. Ford v. Ruehlman, 149 Ohio St.3d 34, 2016-Ohio-3529, 73 N.E.3d 396, ¶ 62.  
The crux of Mobarak’s claim is that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction 
because the conduct for which he was convicted was not criminalized when he 
allegedly committed it.  And I believe there is merit to that claim. 
{¶ 13} Under Ohio’s Constitution, the courts of common pleas are courts of 
general jurisdiction, possessing original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters as 
may be provided by law.  Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 4(B).  This includes 
having “original jurisdiction of all crimes and offenses” that are not otherwise 
entrusted to another tribunal.  R.C. 2931.03.  According to the majority opinion, 
these provisions support the conclusion that the trial court possessed subject-matter 
jurisdiction over Mobarak’s criminal case.  The majority reasons that because 
courts of common pleas have subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases and 
Mobarak was charged with multiple felonies, the Franklin County Court of 
Common Pleas had jurisdiction over Mobarak’s criminal case.  Majority opinion, 
¶ 7.  But this conclusion elides the operative question that Mobarak raises: Was the 
conduct for which he was charged and convicted a felony?  Answering that question 
requires more analysis than the majority opinion provides. 
{¶ 14} Criminal laws should inform the public of which conduct is 
prohibited and which is not.  Ohio achieves this end by making its criminal law a 
creation of statute: “No conduct constitutes a criminal offense against the state 
unless it is defined as an offense in the Revised Code.”  R.C. 2901.03(A).  A 
criminal offense is defined “when one or more sections of the Revised Code state 
a positive prohibition or enjoin a specific duty, and provide a penalty for violation 
of such prohibition or failure to meet such duty.”  R.C. 2901.03(B).  Because 
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criminal offenses are statutory in nature, the elements for determining criminal 
liability must be drawn wholly from the statutory text.  State v. Ford, 128 Ohio 
St.3d 398, 2011-Ohio-765, 945 N.E.2d 498, ¶ 10.  Thus, for the trial court to have 
had jurisdiction over Mobarak’s criminal case, the Revised Code must set out a 
prohibited act, with a corresponding penalty, that Mobarak was accused of 
committing.  Moreover, the elements of the alleged criminal act can come only from 
the statutory text. 
{¶ 15} Mobarak was charged with and convicted of engaging in a pattern of 
corrupt activity, aggravated trafficking in drugs, and aggravated possession of 
drugs, all stemming from his alleged sale and possession of a controlled-substance 
analog known as bath salts.  But at the time of Mobarak’s alleged conduct, the 
statutes that criminalized the sale or possession of drugs referred only to “a 
controlled substance.”  The General Assembly’s amendments to R.C. 2925.03 and 
2925.11 criminalizing the sale or possession of “a controlled substance analog” did 
not become effective until December 20, 2012.  2012 Sub.H.B. No. 334.  Mobarak’s 
alleged conduct occurred from March through July 2012; during that time, nothing 
in R.C. 2925.03 or 2925.11 suggested that the sale or possession of a controlled-
substance analog was a criminal offense, nor did either statute lay out a penalty for 
engaging in that conduct.  In short, while R.C. 2925.03 and 2925.11 prescribed a 
crime for the sale or possession of controlled substances, these statutes did not 
prescribe a crime for Mobarak’s conduct—the sale or possession of controlled-
substance analogs.  Absent a crime having been committed, I am not convinced 
that there was a justiciable matter over which the trial court possessed subject-
matter jurisdiction in Mobarak’s criminal case. 
{¶ 16} Mobarak’s argument on this point originally carried the day, 
resulting in the unanimous reversal of his criminal convictions in the court of 
appeals on direct appeal.  State v. Mobarak, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-517, 
2015-Ohio-3007, ¶ 6-9 (“Mobarak I”).  That decision was then overturned, 
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however, based on our decision in State v. Shalash, 148 Ohio St.3d 611, 2016-Ohio-
8358, 71 N.E.3d 1089.  State v. Mobarak, 150 Ohio St.3d 26, 2016-Ohio-8372, 78 
N.E.3d 832, ¶ 1 (“Mobarak II”).  In Shalash, this court acknowledged that 
controlled-substance analogs were not covered under the elements of R.C. 2925.03 
at the time of Shalash’s alleged criminal conduct.  Shalash at ¶ 7.  Even so, the court 
concluded that the Revised Code had criminalized the sale of controlled-substance 
analogs because R.C. 3719.013—a statute in R.C. Chapter 3719, which generally 
relates to the civil regulation of controlled substances—stated that controlled-
substance analogs “ ‘shall be treated’ ” the same as controlled substances for “ ‘any 
provision of the Revised Code.’ ”  Shalash at ¶ 11, quoting R.C. 3719.013.  While 
Shalash might be dispositive, I don’t find it persuasive. 
{¶ 17} First, the majority opinion in Shalash ignored persuasive arguments 
that undermine its reasoning.  One need only look at the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals’ opinion explaining its judgment reversing Mobarak’s conviction to see 
how paper thin this court’s reasoning in Shalash is.  In its opinion, the Tenth District 
identified several reasons that weighed against incorporating the civil-regulation 
definition of controlled substances (which includes controlled-substance analogs) 
into the statutes criminalizing the sale or possession of controlled substances.  
Mobarak I at ¶ 7, citing State v. Smith, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 14AP-154 and 
14AP-155, 2014-Ohio-5303.  These reasons included the General Assembly’s 
decision to incorporate only some of the definitions of terms in the civil controlled-
substances laws into R.C. 2925.01, which defines terms applicable to drug offenses 
under R.C. Chapter 2925; the express statement in R.C. 3719.01 limiting the use of 
the definitions contained in that statute to R.C. Chapter 3719; and the lack of cross-
references or any other indication in R.C. Chapter 2925 that the definitions relating 
to the classification of controlled substances for civil-regulation purposes apply to 
drug offenses set forth in R.C. Chapter 2925.  Mobarak I at ¶ 7. 
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{¶ 18} None of these concerns were addressed, let alone resolved, by this 
court in Shalash.  Instead, this court relied on R.C. 3719.013, Shalash at ¶ 11, even 
though that civil-regulation statute did not provide any definition that applied to the 
elements of the criminal offenses at issue in that case or in this case.  This court 
also reasoned that R.C. 3719.013 provided adequate notice of prohibited conduct, 
because it was “not a secret provision of the Revised Code” and was found in a 
chapter titled “Controlled Substances.”  Shalash at ¶ 11. 
{¶ 19} I simply don’t buy it.  In my view, the Tenth District’s reasoning is 
more thorough and compelling than that of this court in Shalash.  Further, if the 
General Assembly’s incorporation of R.C. 3719.013 into R.C. Chapter 2925 was as 
obvious as the court in Shalash believed, I am left wondering why the General 
Assembly found it necessary to amend R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and (2) so that the sale 
of controlled-substance analogs satisfied the elements of trafficking in drugs.  2012 
Sub.H.B. No. 334. 
{¶ 20} Second, this court in Shalash disregarded our long-standing 
principles of statutory construction.  Under R.C. 2901.04(A), sections of the 
Revised Code that define criminal offenses or penalties must be strictly construed 
against the state.  This rule of construction has been part of this court’s precedent 
for over 170 years.  See Hall v. State, 20 Ohio 7, 15 (1851) (referencing the long-
settled principle that penal laws are to be strictly construed and not extended by 
implication).  As acknowledged by the court in Shalash, controlled-substance 
analogs were not “specifically proscribed” in R.C. Title 29 at the time of Shalash’s 
arrest and indictment.  Shalash, 148 Ohio St.3d 611, 2016-Ohio-8358, 71 N.E.3d 
1089, at ¶ 13.  (And so too for Mobarak.  See Mobarak I, 2015-Ohio-3007, at ¶ 9.)  
Yet, despite the clear absence of proscription within R.C. Chapter 2925 and the 
requirements of both R.C. 2901.04(A) and our caselaw for the strict construction 
of penal statutes, the court in Shalash went searching for a statutory justification to 
criminalize the conduct that was at issue.  And in doing so, this court, not the 
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General Assembly, created the elements of the crime for which Mobarak was 
convicted. 
{¶ 21} No person, however reprehensible his or her conduct is, should be 
subjected to criminal liability for committing an act that the law does not 
criminalize.  Despite that principle, Soleiman Mobarak is serving 35 years in prison 
for acts that were not criminalized when he committed them.  Ultimately, the issues 
that he raises here were resolved during his direct appeal.  See Mobarak II, 150 
Ohio St.3d 26, 2016-Ohio-8372, 78 N.E.3d 832, at ¶ 1.  And that resolution limits 
the relief that this court may provide when reviewing the court of appeals’ dismissal 
of Mobarak’s petition for mandamus relief.  See State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Gwin, 
64 Ohio St.3d 245, 249, 594 N.E.2d 616 (1992) (“[E]xtraordinary writs may not be 
used as a substitute for an otherwise barred second appeal or to gain successive 
appellate reviews of the same issue”).  While I am not convinced by this court’s 
reasoning supporting its determination that the trial court had jurisdiction over 
Mobarak’s criminal case, I accept that this court has resolved the question Mobarak 
raises and that that resolution is dispositive here.  The law is the law, even if it leads 
to repugnant results.  As a result, I concur in judgment only. 
_________________ 
Soleiman Mobarak, pro se. 
G. Gary Tyack, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nickole K. Iula, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
_________________