Case Title: Commonwealth v. Wardsworth

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11125

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC–11125 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DEMETRIUS WARDSWORTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 8, 2019. - June 19, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Armed Assault with Intent to Murder.  Firearms.  
Evidence, Statement of codefendant, Joint venturer, 
Relevancy and materiality, Hearsay, Inflammatory evidence, 
Expert opinion, Prior misconduct, Identification, 
Voluntariness of statement.  Joint Enterprise.  Witness, 
Expert.  Identification.  Constitutional Law, Confrontation 
of witnesses, Voluntariness of statement, Probable cause.  
Probable Cause.  Search and Seizure, Probable cause.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Confrontation of 
witnesses, Argument by prosecutor, Motion to suppress, 
Voluntariness of statement. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 18, 2008. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Frank 
M. Gaziano, J.; the cases were tried before Stephen E. Neel, J.; 
and a motion for a new trial, filed on November 3, 2014, was 
considered by Linda E. Giles, J. 
 
 
 
Robert F. Shaw, Jr., for the defendant. 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
LENK, J.  On the evening of September 20, 2007, two men 
opened fire at the Academy Homes residential complex, killing 
Urel Duncan and injuring Kevon Grant.  The defendant and Shawn 
Daughtry subsequently were indicted on charges of murder in the 
first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1; armed assault with intent to 
murder, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); and firearm offenses pursuant to 
G. L. c. 265, § 10 (a), (h), and (n), in conjunction with the 
shooting. 
 
The Commonwealth's theory at trial was that the defendant 
was a member of the Walnut Park gang, and that both he and 
Daughtry previously had been shot at by members of the rival 
Academy Homes gang.  The men went together to the Academy Homes 
complex for the purpose of retaliating; they intended to shoot 
the first people they saw.  A Superior Court jury found the 
defendant guilty of all charges.1 
 
Of the claims raised by the defendant on appeal, we 
determine that four constitute error:  (1) Daughtry's statements 
should not have been admitted against the defendant; (2) the 
Commonwealth's gang expert gave improper testimony; (3) police 
witnesses should not have given their opinions as to the 
identity of individuals depicted in surveillance footage; and 
(4) the prosecutor engaged in impermissible argument during 
                     
 
1 In a separate trial, Daughtry was acquitted of all 
charges. 
3 
 
closing.  In light of at least the first three trial errors, we 
conclude that the defendant's convictions must be vacated and 
set aside, and the matter remanded to the Superior Court for a 
new trial.  We determine, however, that there was no error in 
the motion judge's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. 
 
Facts.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving 
additional facts for later discussion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 397 (2003).  Around 9:20 P.M. on September 
20, 2007, two men walked up a street in the Academy Homes 
housing complex in the Roxbury section of Boston.  One wore a 
gray hooded sweatshirt; the other wore a black hooded 
sweatshirt.  Upon seeing four individuals sitting on a porch, 
the two men each pulled out a gun.  Three to four shots were 
fired.2  Duncan was shot in the head and died the next day; Grant 
was shot in the ankle and survived.  The perpetrators fled on 
foot. 
 
Police officers arrived within minutes of the shooting.  
After speaking with witnesses, police began to search for two 
men wearing gray and black hooded sweatshirts.  Police knew that 
                     
 
2 The accounts differed as to which guns were fired.  
Whereas two witnesses reported that flashes came from both guns, 
the Commonwealth's theory at trial was that only Daughtry's gun 
fired, while the defendant's jammed.  This explained the 
presence of a dislodged round of live ammunition on the street 
and the absence of gunshot residue on the defendant's hands. 
4 
 
the Academy Homes housing complex was the territory of the 
Academy Homes gang, and that there were rival gangs in the area.  
Accordingly, officers canvassed the territory of several rival 
gangs, including the Walnut Park area, which was associated with 
a gang known as the Walnut Park Dogs. 
 
Approximately fifty minutes after the shooting, police 
stopped the defendant and Daughtry3 coming out of a building in 
Walnut Park.  The defendant was wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt 
with a large zipper running down the middle, a white T-shirt, 
jeans, and light-colored sneakers.  Daughtry was wearing a black 
hooded sweatshirt, black pants, and black shoes. 
 
Police pat frisked the two men,4 separated them, and 
questioned them.  While each denied involvement in the shooting, 
they gave conflicting statements about where they had been at 
that time.  Daughtry claimed to have met with the defendant and 
a third individual, "Dee," fifteen minutes earlier.  The 
defendant said that he had spent the afternoon with Daughtry, 
and that the two had just come from visiting the defendant's 
"Uncle Mike." 
 
Police learned that the shooting had been captured on 
surveillance footage by an Academy Homes security camera.  The 
                     
 
3 The defendant was then eighteen years old, and Daughtry 
was twenty-seven. 
 
 
4 No guns were found. 
5 
 
men depicted on the security footage wore clothing similar to 
that which the defendant and Daughtry were wearing when they 
were stopped by police, and were of approximately the same 
height and weight.5 
 
The defendant and Daughtry were transported to Boston 
police headquarters, where their hands and clothing were tested 
for gunshot residue.  Daughtry's left hand tested positive; the 
defendant's hands and clothing tested negative.  Both men were 
charged with murder in the first degree, armed assault with 
intent to murder, and firearms offenses.  They were tried 
separately. 
 
The Commonwealth's theory at the defendant's trial in 
November and December of 2009 was that the defendant and 
Daughtry went to the Academy Homes complex to retaliate for 
prior shootings in which they had been the targets.  In February 
2007, the defendant was shot and injured near his home.  Seven 
months later, on September 10, 2007, Daughtry was shot at in the 
"general area" of Walnut Park. 
 
Detective Sixto Merced of the Boston police department 
testified as a gang expert.  He explained that, at the time of 
the shooting, the Walnut Park and Academy Homes gangs had an 
                     
 
5 The defendant is five feet, eleven inches tall and weighed 
approximately 150 pounds at the time; Daughtry is six feet tall 
and weighed approximately 180 pounds. 
6 
 
ongoing rivalry.  Police believed that the defendant was a 
member of the Walnut Park gang, but they did not believe that 
Daughtry was a gang member.  Although the victims were not 
members of any gang, they lived next door to members of the 
Academy Homes gang. 
 
Prior proceedings.  The defendant was convicted of all 
charges.  In November 2014, he filed a motion for a new trial.  
The defendant's appeal from the denial of that motion was 
consolidated with his direct appeal. 
 
On appeal, the defendant points to numerous asserted 
errors.  He argues that (1) Daughtry's statements to police were 
erroneously admitted as evidence against him; (2) the 
Commonwealth's gang expert impermissibly concluded that the 
defendant was a member of a gang, and his descriptions of 
general gang activities were unfairly prejudicial; (3) multiple 
police witnesses improperly opined that the individual depicted 
in security footage was the defendant; (4) the prosecutor 
engaged in impermissible argument in closing; (5) the 
defendant's motion to suppress should have been allowed; 
(6) trial counsel was ineffective because he did not challenge 
certain testimony relating to gunshot residue testing; (7) trial 
counsel did not properly challenge misleading evidence; 
(8) trial counsel should have called a particular witness; and 
(9) the denial of the defendant's postconviction motions for 
7 
 
funds and an evidentiary hearing was error.  With respect to the 
first four categories of error, we agree. 
 
Standard of review.  Where the defendant objected, we 
review to determine whether there was error and, if so, whether 
"there is a reasonable possibility that the error might have 
contributed to the jury's verdict," or whether we can be assured 
that the evidence "did not influence the jury, or had but very 
slight effect" (citations omitted).  See Commonwealth v. 
Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 376 (2017); Commonwealth v. Carriere, 
470 Mass. 1, 7 (2014).  Where the preserved error is 
constitutional, "we evaluate the admission of constitutionally 
proscribed evidence to determine whether it was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt."  See Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 
394 (2008).  Where the defendant did not object, we review for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Carriere, 
supra at 8, citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 
(1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).  "In analyzing a claim under 
the substantial likelihood standard, we review the evidence and 
case as a whole and consider whether any error made in the 
course of the trial was likely to have influenced the jury's 
conclusion."  Commonwealth v. Berry, 457 Mass. 602, 618 (2010), 
S.C., 466 Mass. 763 (2014). 
 
Discussion.  1.  Coventurer statements.  At trial, a number 
of police officers testified to statements made by Daughtry 
8 
 
after the shooting.6  They pointed out inconsistencies between 
Daughtry's statements about his activities near the time of the 
shooting and the defendant's statements.  From this, the 
prosecutor argued that the statements proved the two men were 
lying. 
 
The first statement was made within approximately one hour 
of the shooting, when Daughtry told Sergeant Thomas Teahan of 
the Boston police department that he had been in the area "a 
short time," and had met with the defendant only fifteen minutes 
earlier.  Daughtry said that he and the defendant briefly had 
been at the home of someone named "Dee," and he provided an 
address.  The second statement was given several hours later, at 
Boston police headquarters; at that time, Daughtry told 
Detective Dennis Harris that he had been "smoking a blunt," 
alone, at the time of the shooting.  He heard four or five 
gunshots, walked "out front," and encountered the defendant 
walking down the street with Dee.  According to Daughtry, the 
two men were wearing gray and black hooded sweatshirts, 
respectively.7 
                     
 
6 Daughtry's statements were admitted, over objection, as 
statements of a joint venturer. 
 
7 To the extent that the defendant argues that the judge 
also erred in permitting the jury to learn that Daughtry made 
additional statements to police, the argument is without merit.  
The jury were not privy to the contents of Daughtry's further 
statements, only to the fact that statements had been made. 
9 
 
 
The defendant asserts that Daughtry's statements should 
have been excluded as hearsay, and also that their admission 
violated his rights to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.8 
 
a.  Hearsay.  i.  Joint venturer statements.  Massachusetts 
recognizes a joint venture exemption to the hearsay rule.  See 
Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 Mass. 266, 280 (2014); Mass. G. 
Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E) (2019).9  Just as a defendant's statements 
are admissible against the defendant, so too are certain 
statements made by a defendant's coventurers.  The exemption 
applies only where a defendant's coventurer makes a statement 
both "during the pendency of the cooperative effort" and "in 
furtherance of its goal" (citation omitted).  See Commonwealth 
v. Raposa, 440 Mass. 684, 659 (2004). 
 
The rationale for the exemption is twofold.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 36 (2017).  First, while 
acting "in furtherance of" a "common object," coventurers are 
                     
 
8 We previously have determined that art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is coextensive with the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution with respect 
to questions of hearsay.  See Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 447 
Mass. 56, 57 n.1 (2006). 
 
 
9 Statements admitted under this exemption are entered for 
their truth.  See Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 534 
(2017); Commonwealth v. Veiovis, 477 Mass. 472, 480 n.8 (2017). 
10 
 
considered agents for one another.  See Commonwealth v. Bright, 
463 Mass. 421, 426 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Tivnon, 8 
Gray 375, 381 (1857).  Accordingly, where their interests are 
sufficiently aligned, a statement by a coventurer is "deemed 
equivalent to a statement by the defendant" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Carriere, 470 Mass. at 8.  Second, the 
exemption derives from the policy considerations underpinning 
the prohibition against hearsay.  Whereas courts generally are 
wary of the reliability of out-of-court statements, "[t]he 
community of activities and interests which exists among the 
coventurers during the enterprise tends in some degree to assure 
that their statements about one another will be minimally 
reliable."  Commonwealth v. White, 370 Mass. 703, 712 (1976).  
See Rakes, supra at 37, 41. 
 
To introduce out-of-court statements as a statement of a 
joint venturer, the Commonwealth must show, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that a joint venture existed between the 
declarant and the defendant, and that the statement was made in 
furtherance of the joint venture, while the joint venture was 
ongoing.10  See Rakes, 478 Mass. at 37. 
                     
 
10 We assume, without deciding, that the Commonwealth 
presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the defendant 
and Daughtry were engaged in a joint venture. 
11 
 
 
It is well established that statements made after a joint 
venture has ended are not admissible under the hearsay 
exemption.  See Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass. 517, 522 
(2016); Commonwealth v. Andrews, 403 Mass. 441, 452 (1988).  To 
determine whether a joint venture has ended, our inquiry  
"focuses not on whether the crime has been completed," Carriere, 
470 Mass. at 10, but on whether the coventurers' interests are 
still "closely bound together, tending to ensure the reliability 
of their statements" (citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. 
Mavredakis, 430 Mass. 848, 863 (2000).  When a joint venture 
ends, "there is a dispersion of interests, and motives of self-
preservation, not to speak of malice or spite, may take over."  
Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. 273, 291 (2012), quoting 
White, 370 Mass. at 712. 
 
In some cases, statements made after the commission of a 
crime nonetheless may continue to advance the goals of the joint 
venture.  See Carriere, 470 Mass. at 11.  For example, where 
coventurers meet to align their alibis or plan to evade capture, 
the statements they make to one another may be part of an 
ongoing joint venture.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burton, 450 
Mass. 55, 63 (2007) (meeting to discuss what had happened and 
where murder weapon was hidden).  See also White, 370 Mass. 
at 709 n.8.  Such was not the case here. 
12 
 
 
Daughtry's first statements were made to police officers 
approximately one hour after the shooting.  While Daughtry 
placed himself elsewhere at the time of the shooting, he 
produced no such alibi for the defendant.11  In his second 
statement, Daughtry claimed that, after he heard gunshots, he 
walked around a building and encountered the defendant and a man 
named "Dee" on the street.  At the time of the interview, 
Daughtry already had been informed that police sought two 
suspects for the shooting, one wearing a "gray hoodie," the 
other wearing a "black hoodie."  Daughtry described the 
defendant and Dee as having been dressed in gray and black 
hooded sweatshirts.  In both statements, he insisted that he had 
not been with the men earlier in the evening. 
 
Daughtry's statements reveal that his interests at that 
point were no longer "closely bound together" with those of the 
                     
 
11 We have "expressed skepticism that disclosing the 
circumstances of a crime to a third party can be considered to 
be in furtherance of the crime disclosed."  See Commonwealth v. 
Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 40 (2017), and cases cited.  One exception 
would be cases in which a coventurer sought a third party's 
assistance in covering up the crime or evading capture.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 533, 544 (1990).  
Likewise, where coventurers attempt to silence witnesses after a 
crime, we generally consider those attempts to be a continuation 
of the joint venture.  See, e.g., Rakes, supra at 39; 
Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 Mass. 266, 281 (2014); Commonwealth v. 
Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 436 (2012). 
 
13 
 
defendant (citation omitted).12  Mavredakis, 430 Mass. at 863.  
Daughtry's description inculpated the defendant and Dee in the 
shooting, while attempting to exculpate himself.  As the 
prosecutor urged in closing, "Clearly, . . . Daughtry wanted to 
distance himself from the defendant."  "[N]either the 'pendency' 
nor the 'furtherance' requirement is met" where a coventurer 
shifts the blame to another defendant.  See White, 370 Mass. at 
711 (coventurer explicitly accused defendant of crime).  See 
also Santos, 463 Mass. at 291 (error in admitting statements 
that were intended to exculpate declarant by inculpating 
defendant).  Even if the statements could be said to evince an 
ongoing effort to cover up the crime, the effort "was not a 
'common' one."  See White, supra.  Contrast Raposa, 440 Mass. 
at 690-691 (defendant and coventurer "continued to cooperate" 
where they contacted police together and shared mutual goal of 
silencing witnesses, and coventurer made statements "in an 
attempt to divert [police] attention from himself and the 
                     
12 The Commonwealth makes much of the fact that the 
defendant and Daughtry spoke about their conversations with 
police after Daughtry's first statement and before his second.  
If anything, Daughtry's interests became less aligned with the 
defendant after this encounter; in his second statement, 
Daughtry further implicated the defendant, describing the 
defendant and "Dee" as wearing clothing that matched that of the 
perpetrators. 
14 
 
defendant"); Mavredakis, supra at 863 n.17 (coventurers told 
police defendant was not at scene of crime).13 
 
As Daughtry's statements were not made during and in 
furtherance of a joint venture, the judge erred in allowing them 
to be introduced under the joint venture exemption to the 
hearsay rule.14 
 
ii.  Truth of the matter asserted.  In the alternative, the 
Commonwealth argues that Daughtry's statements were not offered 
for their truth, but, rather, to demonstrate that Daughtry and 
the defendant were lying.  Where no exception applies, the rule 
against hearsay prohibits the admission of out-of-court 
statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  
See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(c)(2) (2019).  Statements offered for a 
                     
 
13 We note that Daughtry had been handcuffed and transported 
to police headquarters prior to making his second statement.  
"[D]eclarations of the usual sort by a coventurer after he has 
been apprehended or arrested, admitting the crime or implicating 
another, while they may be admissible against himself, do not 
fall within the [joint venture] hearsay exception and cannot be 
offered against another coventurer to prove the matters 
asserted."  Commonwealth v. White, 370 Mass. 703, 710 (1976). 
 
 
14 At Daughtry's trial, a Superior Court judge denied the 
Commonwealth's motion to introduce the defendant's statements 
against Daughtry, under a joint venture theory.  That judge 
concluded that the Commonwealth had "not shown that the 
statements were made during the pendency of the joint venture 
nor that the statements were made in an effort to conceal the 
crime."  He also found that "the statements of [the defendant] 
[were] not properly attributable to Daughtry as consciousness of 
guilt evidence." 
15 
 
nontruth purpose are not hearsay.  See Commonwealth v. Keown, 
478 Mass. 232, 245 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1038 (2018). 
 
That Daughtry and the defendant gave conflicting statements 
suggests that one or both men were lying, although it does not 
suggest which.15  If the Commonwealth could have established that 
Daughtry's statements were false, and that they were made in 
coordination with the defendant, the statements might have been 
admissible for the nontruth purpose of showing that the two men 
conspired together, or shared consciousness of guilt.16  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 854 (2011) 
(statement of codefendant admitted for "falsity and for its 
similarity to the defendant's statements"); Commonwealth v. 
Brum, 438 Mass. 103, 116-117 (2002) (coventurer's statement 
admissible to show he had coordinated with defendant to give 
"identically false accounts of the same precise details"). 
                     
 
15 This situation differs from that in which two 
contradictory statements come from a single declarant.  In such 
a case, the declarant must have lied -- either in making the 
earlier statement, or in making the latter.  Where, as here, the 
declarants are two different people, the fact of contradiction 
does not suggest which declarant lied. 
 
 
16 "'Acts of a joint venturer amounting to consciousness of 
guilt may be attributed to another joint venturer if the acts 
occurred during the course of a joint venture and in furtherance 
of it.'  Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 405 Mass. 326, 330–331 (1989).  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 403 Mass. 441, 452 (1988) (if joint 
venture has ended, subsequent actions of joint venturer cannot 
be admitted against another)."  Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 
Mass. 316, 322 (2007). 
16 
 
 
The statements, however, were not admitted for a nontruth 
purpose, and the judge did not instruct the jury that Daughtry's 
statements could not be considered for their truth.17  See 
Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 453 (2011) (defendant 
entitled to limiting instruction where Commonwealth offered out-
of-court statement for nontruth purpose).  See also Commonwealth 
v. Caillot, 454 Mass. 245, 255-256 (2009), cert. denied, 559 
U.S. 948 (2010) (admission of statements without limiting 
instruction was error where statements reasonably might be 
considered for their truth).  To the contrary, the judge 
instructed that the statements could be used against the 
defendant if the Commonwealth established evidence of a joint 
venture.  Accordingly, the jury improperly could have considered 
the statements for their truth. 
 
b.  Confrontation clause.  The defendant maintains that the 
admission of Daughtry's statements also violated the defendant's 
right to confront the witnesses against him.  Where an 
individual does not appear at trial, that individual's 
"testimonial" out-of-court statements are not admissible against 
a criminal defendant absent unavailability and a prior 
                     
 
17 By comparison, where other evidence was admitted "not for 
the truth," the judge instructed the jury to that effect, and 
offered further guidance when the jury required clarification. 
17 
 
opportunity for cross-examination.  See Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
 
Testimonial statements are those made with the primary 
purpose of "creating an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony."  See Commonwealth v. Imbert, 479 Mass. 575, 580 
(2018), quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011).  A 
statement made in response to police questioning is testimonial 
where "the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish 
or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution."  See Commonwealth v. Middlemiss, 465 Mass. 627, 
633 (2013), quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 
(2006).  Compare Commonwealth v. Smith, 460 Mass. 385, 395 
(2011) (statements were not testimonial where primary purpose 
was to aid officers in terminating ongoing emergency).  The test 
is an objective one; we examine "the primary purpose that a 
reasonable person would have ascribed to the statement, taking 
into account all of the surrounding circumstances."18  Imbert, 
supra, quoting Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 84 (2012). 
                     
 
18 Before the United State Supreme Court's decision in 
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011), we applied a two-
part test to determine whether a statement was testimonial.  We 
examined, first, whether a statement was "per se testimonial," 
and, if not, whether "a reasonable person in the declarant's 
position would anticipate his statement being used against the 
accused in investigating and prosecuting a crime."  See 
Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 3 (2005), cert. denied, 
548 U.S. 926 (2006). 
 
18 
 
 
Here, Daughtry made statements to police in response to 
questions regarding his whereabouts, and those of the defendant, 
in relation to a shooting that the officers were investigating.  
The statements were not made to resolve an ongoing emergency or 
to procure medical aid.  Contrast Middlemiss, 465 Mass. at 635-
636 (purpose of 911 call was to intercept armed fugitive and 
procure medical treatment for shooting victim).  The shooting 
had taken place more than one hour earlier, and police were 
investigating the alibis of potential suspects.  In the 
circumstances presented here, the statements were testimonial.19  
                     
 
Following that decision, however, we recognized that the 
"touchstone of the confrontation clause analysis" is the 
"primary purpose" of the statement.  See Commonwealth v. 
Middlemiss, 465 Mass. 627, 634 (2013).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Imbert, 479 Mass. 575, 580 (2018); Commonwealth v. Beatrice, 460 
Mass. 255, 259-264 (2011).  While, on occasion, we continued to 
apply the two-step analysis from Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 3, see, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Celester, 473 Mass. 553, 562-563 (2016); 
Commonwealth v. Cole, 473 Mass. 317, 329–330 (2015); 
Commonwealth v. Cheremond, 461 Mass. 397, 411 (2012), we take 
this opportunity to clarify that the appropriate method of 
analysis is the "primary purpose" test.  Accordingly, statements 
made in response to police interrogation are not "testimonial 
per se," although they will qualify as testimonial in many 
cases, as they do here.  See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 
2181 (2015) (statements to police are more likely to be 
testimonial than statements to other individuals). 
 
 
19 Nor do the statements avoid scrutiny under the Sixth 
Amendment by virtue of having been made by a coventurer.  See 
Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 9 (2014) (statements of 
joint venturer made in furtherance of joint venture generally 
are not testimonial).  As discussed, Daughtry's statements were 
not made in furtherance of a joint venture. 
19 
 
As Daughtry did not testify at the defendant's trial, admission 
of his statements was barred by the Sixth Amendment.20 
 
c.  Prejudicial effect.  The defendant objected to the 
admission of Daughtry's statements as both hearsay and as a 
violation of his right to confrontation.  With respect to 
hearsay, we review for prejudicial error.  See Sullivan, 478 
Mass. at 375-376.  With respect to preserved constitutional 
error, we must vacate the conviction unless we are satisfied 
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 
Nardi, 452 Mass. at 394. 
 
Throughout her closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of Daughtry's statements.  She claimed 
that the jury could made an "identification" of the perpetrators 
through "Daughtry's own statements."  She also urged the jury to 
think about the two men's "completely contradictory" statements, 
and argued that the contradictions proved the defendant's guilt: 
"So, ladies and gentlemen, what are they lying about?  What 
are they covering up?  Why did they give two completely 
false statements?  Why did they give two completely 
contradictory statements?  Ladies and gentlemen, that's not 
a coincidence, that's a cover-up." 
 
                     
 
20 The Sixth Amendment does not bar testimonial statements 
offered for a nontruth purpose.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004).  Even had Daughtry's statements been so 
admitted, however, the inculpatory nature of the statements 
might have posed a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.  
Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 125-126 (1968) 
(codefendant's inculpation of defendant creates substantial risk 
of prejudice, which cannot be overcome by jury instructions). 
20 
 
 
The jury thus were left to choose between believing either 
that Daughtry told the truth21 and the defendant likely had 
committed the crimes with Dee, or that Daughtry was covering up 
his own participation in the crimes and his consciousness of 
guilt could be imputed to the defendant.  In either case, 
Daughtry's statements risked influencing the jury's verdicts.  
Under both our constitutional and nonconstitutional standards of 
review, the error sufficiently prejudiced the defendant so as to 
constitute grounds for a new trial. 
 
2.  Gang expert.  Merced testified as a gang expert.  The 
defendant does not challenge the detective's testimony with 
respect to whether the Walnut Park and Academy Home gangs 
operated in the area, or whether they were rivals.  Rather, the 
defendant claims that the detective's testimony was improper in 
two ways:  (1) his opinion that the defendant was a member of 
the Walnut Park gang lacked proper foundation, and (2) his 
testimony as to a variety of illicit activities conducted by 
gangs was unduly prejudicial. 
                     
 
21 Where, as here, the judge gave no limiting instruction to 
the contrary, we cannot assume that the jury did not consider 
the statement for its truth.  See Commonwealth v. Caillot, 454 
Mass. 245, 255-256 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 948 (2010).  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 251 (2014) ("We 
generally presume that a jury understand and follow limiting 
instructions . . ." [quotation and citation omitted]). 
21 
 
 
a.  Gang affiliation.  The detective was permitted to 
testify, over the defendant's objections, that the defendant was 
a member of the "Walnut Park Dogs."  The defendant contends that 
the detective's conclusion lacked sufficient foundation.  We 
review for prejudicial error.  See Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 375-
376. 
 
We note first that Merced was properly qualified as an 
expert.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 702(a) (2019) (requiring 
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [that] 
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue").  Second, where the Commonwealth 
maintained that the motive for the killing was a gang rivalry, 
the detective's specialized information could help the jury 
understand pertinent facts.  "Expert opinion testimony must rest 
on a proper basis, else inadmissible evidence might enter in the 
guise of expert opinion" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 667 (2017).  Proper 
bases include "facts within the witness's direct personal 
knowledge," facts already introduced in evidence, or "unadmitted 
but independently admissible evidence."  Id., citing Mass. G. 
Evid. § 703 (2017).22  See Department of Youth Servs. v. A 
                     
 
22 The judge grappled with Detective Sixto Merced's lack of 
personal knowledge; he noted that "there has to be some amount 
of evidence that is based on personal observation of the 
22 
 
Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 531 (1986).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Piantedosi, 478 Mass. 536, 543 (2017) (in addition to personal 
knowledge, expert witnesses are permitted to rely upon 
unadmitted but independently admissible evidence, that is, 
evidence that "would be admissible with the proper witness or 
foundation").  In Barbosa, supra at 668, for example, a police 
officer was permitted to opine as to a defendant's gang 
affiliation where he had known the defendant for many years, had 
repeatedly seen the defendant with gang associates "and at the 
address of the gang's headquarters," and had personally 
"observed [him] wearing . . . gang colors and in the presence of 
. . . gang leaders on multiple occasions." 
 
A voir dire hearing was conducted, outside the jury's 
hearing, in order to determine the basis for Merced's 
conclusions regarding the defendant.  Although Merced had known 
the defendant from the time the defendant was eight years old, 
Merced had accumulated relatively little personal knowledge 
connecting the defendant to any gang.  The defendant had never 
self-identified as a member of any gang.23  He did not frequent a 
                     
testifying witness with regard to the defendant, and it's that 
quantum of information that I'm struggling with." 
 
 
23 Although "other gang members" had identified themselves 
to Merced as being affiliated with a particular gang, he was not 
personally familiar with anyone who self-identified as a member 
of the Walnut Park gang. 
23 
 
gang's headquarters, speak with identified gang leaders, or wear 
gang colors.  Merced was aware of graffiti that listed members 
of the Walnut Park gang, but the defendant's name was not among 
those listed.  Nor was Merced able to link the defendant to any 
gang by signs, symbols, street names, or tattoos.  Rather, 
during voir dire, Merced explained that he believed the 
defendant belonged to a gang, in part, because the defendant was 
listed in the Boston regional intelligence center "gang 
database": 
Q.:  "And can you tell us why he would be considered a gang 
member?" 
 
A.:  "I believe in 2005 he was entered into the database as 
a Holworthy associate, and then later on in '07 as Walnut 
Park.  The reason being is that those individuals who 
entered him into the database felt that he fit the criteria 
under the orders." 
 
 
That other officers had formed the opinion that the 
defendant fit the criteria does not constitute proper foundation 
for Merced's opinion; the gang database entry did not provide 
Merced with underlying facts or data to which he could apply his 
own expertise.24  Cf. Commonwealth v. Avila, 454 Mass. 744, 761-
                     
 
24 To the extent that the gang database contained factual 
observations reported by other officers, Merced was not familiar 
with them.  To the extent that the database contained opinions, 
these were not independently admissible.  See Julian v. 
Randazzo, 380 Mass. 391, 393 (1980) (police reports containing 
officer's conclusions or recommendations inadmissible as 
hearsay).  See also Mass. G. Evid. § 803(6)(A) note (2019) 
(business record hearsay exception for police reports "applies 
24 
 
763 (2009) (substitute medical expert may rely on autopsy 
report, not to repeat its conclusions, but to apply expertise to 
"underlying 'facts or data' contained [therein]" [citation 
omitted]).  Ultimately, Merced was unsure as to who had entered 
the defendant's name in the database, or what that officer's 
reasons had been for doing so.  There was no testimony regarding 
how the database is created or maintained, or what criteria 
police use to determine whose names are entered in it.25  Cf. 
Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 377-378 (admission of testimony regarding 
deoxyribonucleic acid [DNA] match in Combined DNA Index System 
database "inadmissible without testimony from those responsible 
for creating and maintaining the database" under Sixth Amendment 
and art. 12). 
                     
only to factual observations and does not permit the admission 
of opinions contained in the report"). 
 
 
25 The judge excluded any mention of a gang "database" from 
testimony.  To the extent that Merced's opinion regarding the 
defendant's gang membership was a reiteration of the gang 
database entry, however, it implicated the defendant's right to 
confront the officers who formed that opinion.  See United 
States v. Ramos-González, 664 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2011), quoting 
United States v. Ayala, 601 F.3d 256, 275 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 562 U.S. 910 (2010) (inquiry is whether "expert is, in 
essence, [giving an independent judgment or] merely acting as a 
transmitter for testimonial hearsay").  See also United States 
v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 197 (2d Cir. 2008) (expert may not 
simply "repeat[] hearsay evidence without applying any expertise 
whatsoever" [citation omitted]); Seaman, Triangulating 
Testimonial Hearsay:  The Constitutional Boundaries of Expert 
Opinion Testimony, 96 Geo. L.J. 827, 880 (2008). 
25 
 
 
Merced did make several personal observations of the 
defendant.  On one occasion, he suspected that he had observed 
the defendant participate in a hand-to-hand drug transaction.  
Police, however, were unable to recover evidence of any drugs, 
and no charges were brought.  Merced was unsure whether the 
individual seen with the defendant was a member of any gang at 
the time.  On another occasion, Merced had seen the defendant 
"in the company of . . . [a named] known gang member" from 
Walnut Park.  The two were neither stopped nor charged with any 
unlawful activity.26  Indeed, to the best of Merced's knowledge, 
the defendant had never been stopped by police while with a 
member of the Walnut Park gang: 
Q.:  "Can you identify, sir, one time, just one time, not 
simply where he was merely observed with someone, but he 
was actually stopped by a member of the Boston Police 
Department, gang or otherwise, that [the defendant] was 
stopped with another gang member from Walnut Park?" 
 
. . . 
 
A.:  "None that I can recall at this time, no." 
 
 
That the defendant was observed in the presence of a 
suspected or actual gang member, even on more than one occasion, 
                     
 
26 Merced also was aware of reports, written by other 
officers, stating that the defendant had twice been seen with a 
man believed to be an associate of the Walnut Park gang.  In one 
instance, the men were observed together.  In the other 
instance, the two were seen in the proximity of an area from 
which a gun was recovered.  Neither man was charged in 
connection with the firearm, nor was the defendant stopped or 
questioned by police in connection with any crime. 
26 
 
does not suffice to support the conclusion that the defendant 
was, himself, a member of a gang.  Contrast Barbosa, 477 Mass. 
at 668 (witness observed defendant speaking with gang leaders, 
visiting gang headquarters, and wearing gang colors); 
Commonwealth v. Cintron, 435 Mass. 509, 521 (2001).  We are wary 
of the "vagaries, circularity, and dangers of trying to prove 
some kind of guilt by association."27  See Commonwealth v. 
Wolcott, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 208 (1990) (opinion that 
defendant was member of gang constituted "unacceptable 
conjecture" where membership "was supported by little more than 
[the defendant's] use of a street name and his association with 
[a member of the gang]").28  Without more, Merced lacked a basis 
in personal knowledge for concluding that the defendant was a 
member of the Walnut Park gang.  Nonetheless, at the conclusion 
                     
 
27 Similarly, the Commonwealth's contention that Merced 
could surmise the defendant's gang membership because shootings 
had occurred in the defendant's neighborhood is unavailing.  One 
need not be a gang member to be present for, or the victim of, a 
shooting.  As the Commonwealth argued at trial, individuals may 
be present during a shooting, "not because of anything they did 
but only because of where they lived." 
 
 
28 Nor is it sufficient that, on one occasion, another 
officer found cocaine in the proximity of the defendant.  The 
presence of "some crack cocaine" in a discarded pair of pants 
does not itself indicate gang membership.  Merced's suggestion 
that possession is "consistent" with gang membership because 
"the distribution of narcotics . . . [could] further the income 
of the gang" is speculative at best. 
27 
 
of the voir dire hearing, he was permitted to testify to that 
effect. 
 
As the prosecutor noted, the Commonwealth's case depended 
upon the jury believing that the defendant was a member of the 
Walnut Park gang.  Since Daughtry was not a gang member, the 
gang rivalry motive could not be established absent evidence of 
the defendant's gang affiliation.  Here, Merced's testimony 
provided the linchpin.  During closing argument, the prosecutor 
repeatedly drew the jury's attention to the defendant's "gang 
ties," arguing that the defendant's "association with a gang" 
implicated him in the crimes, and stating that the "fact" that 
"the defendant is a Walnut Park gang member" is no 
"coincidence." 
"You heard that the defendant is a member of the Walnut 
Park gang.  That the Boston police have classified him as 
such.  That's uncontroverted fact.  What's also 
uncontroverted fact is that this was a particularly violent 
rivalry they had with Academy Homes. . . .  Gang members 
are going to take this personally when there is a shooting 
on their home turf. . . .  There's your motive.  There's 
your alleged association with a gang." 
 
 
We have recognized the dangers of liberally attributing 
gang membership, even in cases where membership in a gang is not 
central to the Commonwealth's case.  See Commonwealth v. Akara, 
465 Mass. 245, 267-268 (2013).29  "Although 'not all gangs are 
                     
 
29 See also See Eisen, Dotson, & Dohi, Probative or 
Prejudicial:  Can Gang Evidence Trump Reasonable Doubt?, 62 UCLA 
L. Rev. Discourse 2, 13-14 (2014) (jurors in study attributed 
28 
 
the same and not all gang affiliations are the same,' community 
attitudes towards gang violence are likely to color [the] 
evidence."  Id., citing Hagedorn & MacLean, Breaking the Frame:  
Responding to Gang Stereotyping in Capital Cases, 42 U. Mem. L. 
Rev. 1027, 1029 (2012).  Accordingly, "[w]e have urged caution 
in admitting gang-related evidence," because "evidence of a 
defendant's gang membership risks prejudice to the defendant in 
that it may suggest a propensity to criminality or violence."  
See Akara, supra at 267, quoting Commonwealth v. Phim, 462 Mass. 
470, 477 (2012).30 
                     
assessment of defendant's guilt to "gang affiliation" or 
"criminal background," even where only evidence of criminal 
activity was fact of gang membership); Eisen, Gomes, Wandry, 
Drachman, Clemente, & Groskopf, Examining the Prejudicial 
Effects of Gang Evidence on Jurors, 13 J. Forensic Psychol. 
Prac. 1, 11-12 (Jan. 2013) (fact that defendant spent time with 
gang members or had gang tattoo significantly increased rate at 
which jurors in study voted to convict). 
 
 
30 To this end, where there is sufficient foundation to 
allow introduction of an opinion on gang affiliation, it is 
appropriate to instruct the jury regarding the admission of such 
evidence for "the limited purpose of showing motive and joint 
venture."  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 Mass. 245, 266 
(2013).  In such cases, we permit the jury to consider the gang 
affiliations of two or more codefendants for the proposition 
"that the defendants therefore shared a common motive," as may 
be the case where codefendants are members of one gang and the 
victim is a member of a rival gang.  See id. at 268.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 450 Mass. 395, 399, cert. denied, 555 
U.S. 893 (2008); Commonwealth v. Swafford, 441 Mass. 329, 332 
(2004); Commonwealth v. Smiley, 431 Mass. 477, 484 (2000).  As 
discussed infra, the instruction in this case was overbroad, 
permitting the jury to consider the evidence for virtually any 
purpose. 
29 
 
 
In this case, we cannot say that the erroneous admission of 
the gang expert's opinion had but a slight effect on the jury.  
Accordingly, the error is itself sufficient to warrant a new 
trial. 
 
b.  Gang activities.  Even if Merced's opinion regarding 
the defendant's gang affiliation were not error, the defendant 
separately argues that Merced's trial testimony regarding the 
gangs' prior criminal activities was unduly prejudicial.  As 
this objection was not raised at trial, we review for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Carriere, 470 Mass. at 8. 
i.  Prior shootings.  Merced testified regarding prior 
shootings that had taken place between the Academy Homes and 
Walnut Park gangs.  While, ordinarily, evidence of prior bad 
acts is inadmissible to show a defendant's propensity to commit 
the crime charged, such evidence may be admitted for another 
purpose, such as to establish motive.  See Commonwealth v. 
Veiovis, 477 Mass. 472, 481-482 (2017).  Where evidence is 
offered for a nonpropensity purpose, as here, it is admissible 
if the prejudicial effect does not outweigh the probative value.  
See Akara, 465 Mass. at 269; Commonwealth v. Anestal, 463 Mass. 
655, 665 (2012).  See also Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b) (2019). 
 
Merced testified that there was a rivalry between the 
Academy Homes and Walnut Park gangs, and that specific members 
30 
 
of the two gangs had been shot, or shot at, in the months 
leading up to the killing.  Evidence of animosity between the 
gangs was admissible for a nonpropensity purpose; namely, to 
establish the defendant's motive for committing the crimes.  See 
Phim, 462 Mass. at 477 (evidence of antagonism between gangs 
relevant).  See also Veiovis, 477 Mass. at 481-482.  "[W]ithout 
this evidence, the homicide would have made no sense to the 
jury."  See Commonwealth v. Leng, 463 Mass. 779, 783 (2012).  
See also Commonwealth v. Smith, 459 Mass. 538, 547 (2011) (no 
evidence of individual antagonism).  There was no clear error of 
judgment in the judge's determination that the risk of unfair 
prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence.  
See Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 649 (2017); 
Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 429 Mass. 502, 504 (1999) ("within 
the discretion of the judge" to admit gang evidence "essential 
to understanding the motivation behind the crimes"). 
 
The judge was required to instruct the jury, however, lest 
the jury "consider [the] evidence without limitation."  See 
Veiovis, 477 Mass. at 487.  In Barbosa, 477 Mass. at 669, we 
noted with approval that, "[e]ach time the [gang-related] 
evidence was introduced, it was accompanied by a thorough 
limiting instruction, which was repeated in the final charge."  
There, the judge "carefully cabined properly admitted testimony 
31 
 
with limiting instructions, voir dire, and exclusion of any 
references to prior acts of gang-related violence."  Id. 
 
Here, by contrast, the judge instructed: 
"Evidence that the defendant may have been a member of a 
gang you may not consider such evidence as evidence that 
this defendant is of bad character or has or had a 
propensity to commit the crimes with which he is charged.  
And such evidence, if you believe it, you may consider only 
on the limited issues of the defendant's state of mind, 
motive, and whether he engaged in aiding and abetting 
another in the commission of the crimes with which he is 
charged." 
 
In permitting the jury to consider gang affiliation for the 
broad purpose of determining "whether [the defendant] engaged in 
aiding and abetting [Daughtry] in the commission of the crimes 
with which he is charged," the judge placed virtually no 
limitation on the use of the evidence.  Indeed, this "limiting" 
instruction appears to permit the jury to use the evidence for 
any purpose relevant to their determination of guilt or 
innocence.31  Contrast Akara, 465 Mass. at 266, 268 (limiting 
gang evidence to "the limited purpose of showing motive and 
joint venture," that is, "that the defendants therefore shared a 
common motive"). 
                     
 
31 Should the judge at retrial again determine that the risk 
of unfair prejudice from the testimony regarding prior shootings 
that had taken place between the two gangs does not outweigh the 
probative value of that evidence, and that it is admissible, the 
judge must instruct the jury carefully and at the appropriate 
times (including in the final charge) on the limited use of such 
evidence. 
32 
 
ii.  Other illicit activity.  Merced's testimony on direct 
examination also strayed into other criminal activity in which 
gangs purportedly were involved.  He testified that gangs, 
generally, were responsible for drug transactions "in 
schoolyards" and "playgrounds."  He attributed to the Walnut 
Park and Academy Homes gangs a range of criminal activity, 
including "shootings, drugs, [and] some prostitution."  Merced 
also stated that the rivalry between Walnut Park and Academy 
Homes was responsible for "unsolved shootings."32  He said that 
"gang members oftentimes have access to guns," sometimes giving 
them to a "non-gang member," "[c]ommonly referred to as a crash 
dummy" or "human holster."  Other times, gang members hide a 
"community gun," which is a "gun where all the gang members in 
that particular jurisdiction will know where that gun may be 
hidden."33 
 
In totality, the gang-related testimony went well beyond 
that which was probative of the facts at issue:  the rivalry 
between the Walnut Park and Academy Homes gangs, which might 
                     
 
32 Merced's basis for this opinion is unclear, as an 
"unsolved" shooting, by definition, cannot be attributed to a 
particular perpetrator.  See Mass. G. Evid. §§ 702(b), 703 
(2019) (requiring sufficient facts and data for expert 
opinions). 
 
 
33 An objection to this definition of a "community gun" was 
sustained, although the testimony was not explicitly struck, nor 
were the jury explicitly instructed to disregard it. 
33 
 
have given the defendant a motive to kill.  Contrast Akara, 465 
Mass. at 267-269 ("The prosecutor did not suggest that the gang 
or its members had a history of violence" and "did not discuss 
any criminal activity"; "rather, the emphasis was on common 
identifying symbols, reflected in graffiti and clothing"); 
Commonwealth v. John, 442 Mass. 329, 338 n.14 (2004) (gang 
testimony sanitized so that "[t]he only evidence of 
[defendant's] violence presented at trial was the murder of 
[victim]").  The judge gave no curative instructions with 
respect to the testimony concerning drug activity, sex 
trafficking, or community guns.  Accordingly, the jury could 
have taken Merced's testimony to mean that the defendant was 
engaged in the drug trade, the sex trade, and numerous 
"unsolved" shootings. 
 
We need not reach what effect, if any, this additional 
gang-related evidence might have had on the jury in the absence 
of Merced's opinion that the defendant was a member of a gang.  
It suffices that, in light of the other prejudicial errors, a 
new trial is required, at which the aforementioned testimony 
will not be admitted. 
 
3.  Video identification.  The defendant argues that the 
testimony of four Boston police officers, who identified him as 
the individual depicted in the surveillance videotape (video), 
was improper and unduly prejudicial.  Where, as here, the issue 
34 
 
was not preserved, we review for a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Carriere, 470 Mass. at 8. 
 
a.  Police testimony.  The jury viewed surveillance footage 
from the night of the shooting that showed two individuals 
walking down the middle of the street, apparently shooting in 
the direction of a house, and then running back the way they had 
come.  The black and white footage is grainy, and both 
individuals have their hoods up.  The Commonwealth elicited 
testimony from four Boston police officers describing what was 
depicted in the surveillance footage, and portions of the 
footage were played multiple times during that testimony. 
 
Before the jury were shown the surveillance video 
recording, Teahan opined that the people shown were dressed 
"similar to the way the two individuals [he] had stopped, [the 
defendant] and . . . Daughtry."  He also described the articles 
of clothing the individuals depicted in the video footage were 
wearing.34  The prosecutor emphasized that the officer had 
watched the recording "four or five times" while looking for 
"similarities in clothing."  The officer testified that it was 
"readily apparent that the clothing descriptions of the 
individuals [he] had stopped and the clothing descriptions 
                     
 
34 At this point, the jury were first shown the surveillance 
footage, which they saw again multiple times during the other 
officers' testimony. 
35 
 
within the video were almost -- looked exact to [him]."  He then 
described the differences in height and stature of the two men, 
and the color of the shoes one was wearing, which the officer 
said matched the shoes the defendant had been wearing when 
stopped.  The prosecutor also introduced photographs of the 
defendant, with arrows pointing to the "points of comparison 
[Teahan] used when looking at the video."  Teahan testified that 
he was "struck by the fact that you could see that same 
similarity." 
 
Detective John Callahan also described the clothing, 
height, and handedness of the individuals depicted in the 
surveillance video footage.  He opined that, upon seeing the 
defendant and Daughtry, "I observed that their attire matched, 
was a definitive match to that of what I saw in the video 
earlier in the evening."  Sergeant John Fitzgerald then 
testified that he watched the video "over and over"; 
"repeated[ly]."  Fitzgerald went to see the defendant and 
Daughtry, to "see if they resemble the two people in the video"; 
he concluded that, with respect to the defendant, he "appeared 
to be the same person from the video," and that the clothing 
worn by Daughtry "appeared to match the person on the video" as 
well.  Lastly, Detective Dennis Harris was asked to make 
comparisons between the appearance of the defendant and Daughtry 
and the individuals depicted in the video footage.  He opined 
36 
 
that "they had identical clothing on."  He then reviewed side-
by-side comparisons of a still image from the surveillance video 
recording and a photograph taken at the police station, and 
noted the similarities between the two. 
 
b.  Improper lay opinion.  "Making a determination of the 
identity of a person from a photograph or video image is an 
expression of an opinion."  Commonwealth v. Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 
429 (2019).  When offered by a lay witness, such an opinion is 
admissible only where "the subject matter to which the testimony 
relates cannot be reproduced or described to the jury precisely 
as it appeared to the witness at the time" (citation omitted).  
See Commonwealth v. Austin, 421 Mass. 357, 366 (1995).  The 
purpose of a lay witness identification is to "assist the jurors 
in making their own independent identification."  Pina, supra.  
See Mass. G. Evid. § 701 (2019).  Lay witness identifications 
are admissible, therefore, "when the witness possesses 
sufficiently relevant familiarity with the defendant that the 
jury cannot also possess."  See Commonwealth v. Vacher, 469 
Mass. 425, 441 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Pleas, 49 Mass. 
App. Ct. 321, 326-327 (2000).  "If the witness lacks such 
familiarity, it is the province of the jury to draw their own 
conclusions regarding the identity of the person depicted 
without the witness's assistance."  Vacher, supra.  Even where a 
witness is familiar with a defendant, his or her testimony is 
37 
 
not admissible where "the witness is no better-suited than the 
jury to make the identification."  See United States v. Jackman, 
48 F.3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 1995).  See also Austin, supra. 
 
Here, the jury were able to view the same surveillance 
footage that the officers watched.  So, too, the jury were able 
to examine the appearance of the defendant on the night of the 
shooting, including the clothing he was wearing.  Photographs of 
the defendant taken that night, as well as the clothing itself, 
were introduced in evidence.  There was no evidence that the 
defendant's appearance had changed substantially between the 
time the video recording was made and the time the photographs 
were taken, on the same evening.  Nor were any of the four 
officers who offered opinions regarding the surveillance footage 
specifically familiar with the defendant, such that they could 
provide special insight into his appearance.35  See Vacher, 469 
Mass. at 442.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 
460 (1978) (defendant had lost twenty-five pounds since 
photograph was taken, and officer had known defendant for long 
time and seen him often). 
 
In short, "[t]he jury were capable of viewing the videotape 
and drawing their own conclusions regarding whether the man in 
                     
 
35 While Merced testified that he had known the defendant 
for several years, he was not one of the officers who opined as 
to the identity of the individual in the video footage. 
38 
 
the videotape was the defendant without the assistance of [the 
witness's] testimony."  See Austin, 421 Mass. at 366.  See also 
United States v. Vázquez-Rivera, 665 F.3d 351, 361 (1st Cir. 
2011) ("Crucially, because the determination of whether 
[defendant] was the man in the [Internet camera] video could 
have been properly reached only by considering evidence 
available to the jury, [officer's] testimony also usurped the 
jury's role instead of being helpful to it").  It was the 
province of the jury, and not the officers, to determine whether 
the defendant "appeared to be the same person from the video," 
or whether "their attire matched, was a definitive match." 
 
We have recognized the "increase[d] potential for 
inappropriate prejudice to the defendant stemming from 
identification testimony from a police officer who is so 
designated" (quotations omitted).  See Vacher, 469 Mass. at 442, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Carr, 464 Mass. 855, 879 (2013).  
Nonetheless, we also have determined that there was no prejudice 
in the admission of improper lay witness identifications where 
the improper testimony was "brief and fleeting" and the 
defendant otherwise admitted having been present at the scene.  
See, e.g., Vacher, supra.  See also Pina, 481 Mass. at 430 (four 
witnesses identified defendant at scene). 
 
The improper identification evidence here was extensive.  
It was elicited not once, but from four individual officers, and 
39 
 
it was supplemented with side-by-side photographs detailing 
points of comparison relied upon by the officers.  Crucially, 
the evidence was not collateral; identification was at the heart 
of the Commonwealth's case.  Indeed, the prosecutor spent much 
of her closing arguing that there was sufficient evidence to 
identify the man in the video footage as the defendant.  Faced 
with the opinions of four officers imbued with the imprimatur of 
authority and privy to repeated viewings of the surveillance 
footage, a juror well might have substituted the officers' 
opinions for his or her own. 
 
c.  Substantially more prejudicial than probative.  Even 
had the officers' testimony constituted proper lay opinions, it 
nonetheless was substantially more prejudicial than it was 
probative.  See Pleas, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 327 (applying 
balancing test even where lay witness identification otherwise 
is admissible); Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2019).  Having established 
that the officers had viewed the surveillance footage, there was 
minimal probative value in their testimony as to what they saw 
depicted therein, which the jury could see for themselves. 
 
The risk of prejudice, by contrast, was great.  As this 
court has recognized, identification testimony from a police 
officer risks bringing with it a "greater imprint of authority."  
Pina, 481 Mass. at 430.  "The usurpation problem that arises 
when a witness testifies to opinions based on evidence that was 
40 
 
also available to the jurors is compounded when the witness is a 
government agent whose testimony -- as here -- is effectively a 
judgment on the question of guilt or innocence."  United States 
v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5, 17 (1st Cir. 2011).  In addition, here 
the prosecutor elicited that the officers had viewed the video 
footage "four or five times," "over and over," and 
"repeated[ly]," suggesting that their opinions concerning its 
contents merited greater weight than that of the jurors.  
Moreover, immediately before the jury were shown the footage for 
the first time, Teahan testified that the figures the jurors 
were about to see in the video recording were dressed similarly 
to the way the defendant and Daughtry had been dressed.  Such 
priming risked creating a cognitive bias before the jurors saw 
the footage for the first time, particularly where the recording 
was of poor quality.36 
 
Because we determine that the introduction of the improper 
and unduly prejudicial identifications was "likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion," a new trial is required.  See 
Berry, 457 Mass. at 618. 
                     
 
36 See Yakren, Removing the Malice from Federal "Malicious 
Prosecution":  What Cognitive Science Can Teach Lawyers About 
Reform, 50 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 359, 382 (Summer 2015).  See 
also Dror & Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. Forensic 
Identification, no. 4, 2006, at 600-616 (discussing effects of 
cognitive bias on forensic analysis). 
41 
 
 
d.  Bowden defense.  On appeal, the Commonwealth argues 
that the foregoing identification by the four police officers 
was offered to rebut a Bowden defense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 486 (1980).  Where a defendant raises a 
Bowden defense, the Commonwealth may offer "testimony about why 
the investigators chose the particular investigative path they 
did," in order to rebut that defense.  See Avila, 454 Mass. at 
755.  That a defendant has called into question the thoroughness 
of a police investigation, however, does not provide carte 
blanche to introduce all conceivable rebuttal evidence.  Rather, 
the scope of permissible rebuttal evidence must be proportionate 
to the defense raised; "the more wide-ranging the defendant's 
attack on the police investigation, the broader the 
Commonwealth's response may be."  Id. at 754–755.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 400, 414 (2011) (before 
allowing admission of Bowden evidence, judge must balance 
probative value against risk of prejudice).  "[D]etermining 
precisely what evidence may be admitted to rebut a Bowden 
defense is a delicate and difficult task."  Avila, supra at 753. 
 
It is not clear from the record that a Bowden defense was 
meaningfully raised.  In any event, the judge did not instruct 
the jury that the officers' identification testimony was 
admissible only for the limited purpose of rebutting a Bowden 
42 
 
argument.37  Contrast Avila, 454 Mass. at 755-756 ("judge 
repeatedly instructed the jury that the investigators' 
testimony . . . was presented to enable the jury to evaluate the 
police").  The jurors had access to the video recording and 
could determine for themselves whether an officer, having 
reviewed it, acted appropriately in pursuing the defendant as 
the target of the investigation.  The officers' opinions that 
the individual in the recording was a "definitive match" to the 
defendant were neither pertinent nor necessary to rebut a Bowden 
defense. 
 
4.  Closing argument.  The defendant contends that the 
prosecutor engaged in improper argument and vouching during her 
closing.  The prosecutor argued, 
"And so, too, when I present this evidence to you, there is 
two years' worth of investigation; that [eighty-four] 
witnesses, the list of names you heard when you were still 
in the jury pool, those [eighty-four] witnesses, I need to 
make judgment calls.  I need to exercise my discretion.  I 
need to decide to present to you what is admissible and 
what is relevant.  And from that you heard from [twenty-
seven] witnesses over eight days and [eighty-nine] 
exhibits.  That's what I'm asking you to focus on, ladies 
and gentlemen." 
 
                     
 
37 During the testimony, the judge gave a limiting 
instruction regarding the use of one of Detective John 
Callahan's answers:  "[Y]ou may consider it . . . only as you 
find it goes to this individual officer's decision to take or 
not to take certain action."  That instruction, however, was in 
response to an earlier portion of Callahan's testimony, and the 
judge ultimately reversed his decision and struck the related 
answer.  The judge did not give a limiting instruction on the 
subsequent testimony regarding video identification. 
43 
 
 
Among several limitations on closing argument, see 30A E.B. 
Cypher, Criminal Practice and Procedure §§ 36:16-36:41 (4th ed. 
2014), it is improper for an attorney to "imply that [he or she] 
knew more about the case than he [or she] had presented in 
court."38  See Commonwealth v. Dinkins, 415 Mass. 715, 725 
(1993).  See also Mass. G. Evid. § 1113(b) (2019).  The 
prosecutor's argument here, that she was aware of up to 
"[eighty-four] witnesses" who would have been useful to proving 
the defendant's guilt, but whom she was unable to call, was a 
clear violation of this principle.  Such argument impermissibly 
asks the jury to "speculate" or "imagine" additional evidence 
not before them.  See Commonwealth v. Corriveau, 396 Mass. 319, 
339 (1985). 
 
Additionally, the prosecutor in effect attributed her 
inability to call missing witnesses to constraints regarding 
"what is admissible and what is relevant."  Counsel may not 
"invite an inference from the exercise of a party's right to 
have evidence excluded."  See Commonwealth v. Burke, 373 Mass. 
569, 575 (1977).  See also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 
87 (1935) (attorney impermissibly argued he had to "play within" 
                     
 
38 Although the judge mentioned eighty-four names of 
potential witnesses to the venire during empanelment, a judge's 
questions during voir dire are not evidence.  "Closing argument 
must be based on the evidence and the fair inferences from the 
evidence."  Mass. G. Evid. § 1113(b) (2019). 
 
44 
 
"rules of the game").  Attorneys are explicitly barred from 
arguing that they would have been able to "parade witness after 
witness" into court, but for evidentiary limitations.39  See 
Commonwealth v. Dirgo, 474 Mass. 1012, 1016 (2016).  See also 
United States v. Walker-Couvertier, 860 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1303 and 138 S. Ct. 1339 (2018) 
(government argued it could have put on "two months" of evidence 
and "boatloads" of evidence); State v. Ranicke, 3 Wash. App. 
892, 897 (1970) (government argued it "could have called 200 
witnesses"). 
 
In some cases, violation of these principles constitutes 
grounds for reversal.  See Dirgo, 474 Mass. at 1016-1017 (new 
trial ordered, notwithstanding lack of objection at trial, where 
judge did not give "strong curative instructions" and evidence 
was not "overwhelming").  See also Burke, 373 Mass. at 575 
(multiple errors in closing argument).  Here, however, the 
improper argument played a relatively minor role in the 
prosecutor's remarks.  We need not determine whether this 
unpreserved error, alone, gave rise to a substantial likelihood 
                     
 
39 "A prosecutor must not suggest that additional 
inculpatory evidence exists that was not presented at trial 
because of legal rules, trial tactics, administrative 
convenience, or defense objections.  Such insinuations invite 
the jury to speculate about such phantom proof, and may be even 
more prejudicial than erroneously admitted specific proof."  
B.L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct § 11:29 (2d ed. Aug. 
2018 update). 
45 
 
of a miscarriage of justice, as we conclude that, in combination 
with the aforementioned errors, a new trial is required.  In any 
event, the prosecutor's argument went beyond that which is 
acceptable, a practice that should not be repeated at any new 
trial.40 
 
5.  Motion to suppress.  Prior to trial, the defendant 
moved to suppress several statements he made to police.  He 
argued that, as to his earlier statements, he was not given 
Miranda warnings and, as to his later statements, the 
Commonwealth lacked probable cause for his arrest.  When 
reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the 
judge's findings of fact absent clear error and "make an 
independent determination of the correctness of the judge's 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found."  
Commonwealth v. Pridgett, 481 Mass. 437, 439 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 205 (2011). 
 
a.  Miranda warnings.  Police first questioned the 
defendant on the street, fifty minutes after the shooting.  They 
                     
 
40 Because of the result we reach, we do not address the 
remainder of the defendant's arguments, except to note that 
several concern asserted ineffective assistance of counsel.  As 
with the defendant's arguments as to the denial of his motion 
for expert funds and motion for an evidentiary hearing, as it 
relates to his motion for a new trial, such claims are now moot.  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. 583, 595 (1983) ("We do not 
anticipate that [these issues] . . . will arise at a new trial 
of this case, and for that reason there is no necessity to 
discuss [them] here"). 
46 
 
did not read Miranda warnings prior to speaking with the 
defendant. 
 
Miranda warnings are required before police conduct a 
custodial interrogation.  See Commonwealth v. Morse, 427 Mass. 
117, 122-123 (1998).  A custodial interrogation is "questioning 
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been 
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way."  Commonwealth v. Jung, 420 Mass. 
675, 688 (1995), quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 
(1966).  The defendant bears the burden of showing that the 
interrogation was custodial.  Commonwealth v. Larkin, 429 Mass. 
426, 432 (1999).  To determine whether an interrogation was 
custodial, we ask whether a reasonable person in the defendant's 
shoes would have perceived the environment as coercive.  See 
Commonwealth v. Kirwan, 448 Mass. 304, 309 (2007). 
 
In making this determination, we consider four factors:  
"(1) the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the officers 
have conveyed to the person being questioned any belief or 
opinion that that person is a suspect; (3) the nature of the 
interrogation, including whether the interview was aggressive 
or, instead, informal and influenced in its contours by the 
person being interviewed; and (4) whether, at the time the 
incriminating statement was made, the person was free to end the 
interview by leaving the locus of the interrogation or by asking 
47 
 
the interrogator to leave, as evidenced by whether the interview 
terminated with an arrest."  Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 
201, 211–212 (2001).  No single factor is dispositive.  See 
Kirwan, 448 Mass. at 309. 
 
The motion judge found that the interrogation took place on 
a public street.  The defendant was not handcuffed, although he 
had been separated from Daughtry.  See Commonwealth v. Cawthron, 
479 Mass. 612, 618-619 (2018) (police separately questioned two 
suspects in public parking lot without physical restraints; we 
determined that atmosphere was not "inherently coercive").  The 
officer conducting the questioning did not accuse the defendant 
of shooting the victim or otherwise suggest that the defendant 
was a suspect.  Compare id. at 620 (officers did not tell 
defendants they were suspects).  See Groome, 435 Mass. 
at 212 n.13. (officer's "unarticulated suspicion[] contribute[d] 
nothing to the objective circumstances of the encounter").  The 
officer's tone was "conversational" and he "did not raise his 
voice" when asking the defendant about the defendant's 
whereabouts.  "[N]othing in the record suggests that [the 
officers] were 'aggressive,' 'persistent,' or 'harsh,' which 
would support a conclusion that the defendant[] had been subject 
48 
 
to a custodial interrogation."  Cawthron, supra at 621, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Coleman, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 155 (2000).41 
 
As to the final Groome factor, however, the defendant was 
questioned for at least twenty minutes, while officers attempted 
to verify his statement and reviewed security footage.  The 
interrogation ended with the defendant being handcuffed and 
transported to police headquarters.  "An arrest after an 
incriminating statement has been obtained, by itself, [does not] 
label[] as custodial the interrogation that precedes the 
incriminating statement" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Cawthron, 479 Mass. at 622.  Rather, we must weigh the factors 
in their totality.  See id. at 622-623. 
 
This case is similar to Cawthron, 479 Mass. at 624, in 
which defendants were "subject to a minimal detention when 
officers asked them to move a few yards; the detectives 
conducted a very preliminary investigation."  On the whole, the 
officer's questioning "was generally of a fact-finding nature, 
intended to verify or dispel a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, for which Miranda warnings are not required."  Compare 
Kirwan, 448 Mass. at 311.  At the point at which the defendant 
                     
 
41 Although they displayed their badges, the officers wore 
plain clothes and approached in an unmarked vehicle.  No 
evidence was presented that the officers displayed their 
weapons. 
49 
 
here made preliminary statements to the officers regarding his 
prior whereabouts, the interrogation was not yet custodial.42 
 
b.  Probable cause.  The defendant also maintains that 
police lacked probable cause to arrest him.  "Probable cause to 
arrest exists when, at the moment of arrest, the facts and 
circumstances within the knowledge of the police are enough to 
warrant a prudent person in believing that the individual 
arrested has committed or was committing an offense" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Pridgett, 481 Mass. at 439.  Probable 
cause requires "more than a suspicion of criminal involvement, 
something definite and substantial, but not a prima facie case 
of the commission of a crime, let alone a case beyond a 
reasonable doubt" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Santaliz, 
413 Mass. 238, 241 (1992). 
 
The defendant argues, essentially, that he was arrested for 
wearing a hooded sweatshirt, as an African-American male, and 
for becoming startled in the presence of a police officer.  See 
Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 535 (2016) (description 
of African-American man wearing "red hoodie" "contribute[d] 
nothing to the officers' ability to distinguish the defendant 
                     
 
42 When the officers discovered additional evidence 
implicating the defendant (i.e., the surveillance video 
recording), they properly ceased questioning.  At that point, 
they placed the defendant in custody and transported him to the 
police station.  There, they read him the Miranda warnings 
before proceeding with a formal interrogation. 
50 
 
from any other black male wearing dark clothes and a hoodie" 
[quotations and citation omitted]).  Cf. id. at 540 ("the 
finding that black males in Boston are disproportionately and 
repeatedly targeted for [field interrogation observation] 
encounters suggests a reason for flight totally unrelated to 
consciousness of guilt").  We do not agree with the defendant, 
however, that these were the bases of his arrest. 
 
Officers found the defendant and Daughtry together.  The 
two men were about one-half mile from the scene of the shooting, 
less than one hour after the shooting.  The clothing of both men 
matched the descriptions given by witnesses and confirmed by 
surveillance video footage.  The men were similar in relative 
height and relative weight to the individuals depicted on the 
surveillance footage.  Moreover, the shooting had occurred in 
one gang's territory, and police found the defendant and 
Daughtry in the territory of a rival gang.  One officer had 
reason to believe that the defendant was a member of that rival 
gang.  Perhaps most importantly, the defendant provided an 
account of where he had been in the afternoon and late evening.  
His account not only contradicted Daughtry's statements, but 
police attempts to verify the defendant's statements were 
unsuccessful.  When police knocked on the door of the apartment 
from which the defendant claimed to have come, the occupant 
51 
 
replied that he had not had any visitors and was not the man the 
defendant claimed him to be. 
 
Taken together, the information known to the police at the 
time was sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest the 
defendant.  Accordingly, there was no error in the denial of the 
defendant's motion to suppress. 
 
Conclusion.  "Where there has been an error in a trial 
resulting in a conviction of murder in the first degree, a new 
trial is called for unless we are substantially confident that, 
if the error had not been made, the jury verdict would have been 
the same" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, 441 (2015).  Because we are not 
"substantially confident" that the jury verdicts would have been 
the same absent these errors, the verdicts are vacated and set 
aside, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for a 
new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.