Case Title: LOZIER v. BLATTLAND INVESTMENTS, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
LOZIER v. BLATTLAND INVESTMENTS, LLC2004 WY 132100 P.3d 380Case Number: 03-243Decided: 11/04/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

IRVIN 
LOZIER,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

BLATTLAND 
INVESTMENTS, LLC, a

Wyoming 
Limited Liability Company,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Mark W. Gifford, Casper, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Gerald R. Mason and Douglas J. Mason of Mason & Mason, P.C., 
Pinedale, Wyoming.

 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a summary judgment granted in an easement contest.  At issue is a road across the appellee's 
lands that the appellant uses to access his ranch.  The district court determined that the 
easement benefited only part of the appellant's ranch and that the right to use 
and the right to assign the easement were limited.  We reverse.

 

ISSUES

 

            
1.         
Did the district court err in granting summary judgment to the appellee 
and in holding that the only lands benefited by the easement are the appellant's 
Section 8 lands?

 

            
2.         
Did the district court err in granting summary judgment to the appellee 
and in holding that only the appellant, his family members, employees, agents, 
guests, visitors, invitees and licensees, but not unrelated third parties, are 
entitled to the use and benefit of the easement?

 

            
3.         
Did the district court err in granting the appellee's motion to strike 
and in denying the appellant's motion to amend concerning the implied easement 
contention?

 

            
4.         
Alternatively, does equity require recognition of an implied 
easement?

 

NATURE 
OF THE CASE

 

[¶2]      The appellant's 
family has owned the Box R Ranch in Sublette County since the 1890s.  The ranch has been operated as a cattle 
business and guest ranch since 1898.  
Historically, the ranch abutted Sublette County Road 120, which provided 
the sole means of access to the ranch.  
A road traversed the ranch from the county road to the ranch home and 
headquarters.

 

[¶3]      In 1965, the 
appellant's family sold to John Welborn the portion of the ranch abutting the 
county road.  The appellant's family 
retained land in Sections 5 and 8, Township 35 North, Range 109 West, 6th P.M., 
and Sections 31 and 32, Township 36 North, Range 109 West, 6th P.M.  After the conveyance, the appellant's 
family and ranch guests continued to use the part of the ranch road that crossed 
the parcel sold to Welborn.  The 
road exits Welborn's property and enters the ranch at Section 8, in which 
section lie the appellant's ranch home and headquarters.

 

[¶4]      In 1988, an 
Easement for Access Purposes from Welborn to the appellant was recorded.  The pertinent portions of that easement 
read as follows:

 

JOHN 
B. WELBORN, grantor, residing in Sublette County, Wyoming, for good and 
sufficient considerations HEREBY GIVES AND GRANTS to IRVIN L. LOZIER, grantee, 
residing in Sublette County, Wyoming, and to his administrators, executors, 
personal representatives, heirs and assigns, the full and free right and 
liberty, option, privilege and authority for him and his family members, 
employees, agents, guests, visitors, invitees and licensees, in common with 
others having the same or similar right, perpetually for all times hereafter to 
freely pass and re-pass on foot, or with animals, vehicles, loads or otherwise, 
upon, over, along and across the established, private ranch road of the grantor 
situated in Sublette County, Wyoming, which said road is located . . 
.

 

. 
. .

 

TO 
HAVE AND TO HOLD forever for the use and benefit of said grantee, his family 
members, employees, agents, guests, visitors, invitees and licensees, in common 
as aforesaid, as a means of ingress and egress to and from Section 8, Township 
35 North, Range 109 West of the 6th P.M., Sublette County, 
Wyoming;

 

The 
grantor hereby expressly consents and agrees that grantee, his administrators, 
executors, personal representatives, heirs, and assigns may, at their own costs 
and expense, maintain, repair and otherwise keep said road in a passable 
condition[.]

 

[¶5]      The appellant's 
family members and ranch guests continued to use the ranch road for several 
years after the easement was recorded.  
In 1999, the appellee purchased the Welborn property.  The following year, when the appellant 
made known his plans to subdivide the Box R Ranch, the appellee responded by 
filing this action.  The appellee's 
first complaint sought a declaratory judgment under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-103 
(LexisNexis 2003).1  Specifically, the appellee asked the 
district court to declare:

 

            
1.         
That access over the easement across the appellee's property is limited 
to the appellant, his family members, employees, agents, guests, visitors, 
invitees and licensees and cannot be used for access by unrelated third parties, 
nor can the appellant transfer any rights to a third party for that 
purpose.

 

            
2.         
That access over the easement across the appellee's property is limited 
to access to the lands of the appellant located in Section 8 only and cannot be 
used by the appellant or anyone claiming through him to access any other 
lands.

 

            
3.         
That access over the easement across appellee's property is limited to 
access the appellant's lands for purposes of operation of the appellant's ranch 
and cannot be used by multiple residential property 
owners.

 

[¶6]      An amended 
complaint added allegations of trespass and negligence, and sought an 
injunction.  The appellant's motion 
for summary judgment, filed before the complaint was amended, was heard after 
the amendment.  The motion was 
denied on the ground that genuine issues of material fact existed that precluded 
summary adjudication.  Subsequently, 
the parties settled the issues that had been added by the amended complaint, 
none of which concerned the easement.

 

[¶7]      After a newly 
appointed district judge took over the case, both parties filed motions for 
summary judgment.  In the memorandum 
filed in support of his motion, the appellant raised for the first time the 
alternative theory of implied easement.  
Prior to the motion hearing, the district court granted the appellee's 
motion to strike the implied easement theory because it had not previously been 
pled or otherwise raised.  The 
summary judgment motions were heard on November 7, 2003, and the resultant order 
granting judgment to the appellee was filed on December 1, 2003.  The pertinent findings and conclusions 
from the order are as follows:

 

1.         
The appellee's summary judgment motion did not address his third listed 
issue, and upon the appellee's motion, that issue is dismissed.2

 

2.         
The district court concurs with both parties' positions that the easement 
language is unambiguous.

 

3.         
From the plain language of the easement, the parties did not intend the 
easement to be an unfettered, unlimited access, but intended specifically to 
limit the persons entitled to the use and benefit of the easement and the lands 
that were to be benefited by the easement.

 

4.         
The use and benefit of the easement is limited to the appellant and his 
family members, employees, agents, guests, visitors, invitees and licensees, and 
not unrelated third parties.

 

5.         
The benefited lands are those lying in Section 8, and not any other lands 
belonging to the appellant.

 

6.         
The appellant's motion to amend his answer to include a counterclaim for 
implied easement is untimely and prejudicial to the appellee and is 
denied.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      Summary judgments 
are governed by W.R.C.P. 56.  Our 
standard of review of such judgments is well known:

 

            
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material 
fact exists and the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter 
of law.  Eklund v. PRI 
Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶ 10, 25 P.3d 511, ¶ 10 (Wyo.2001); see 
also W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A genuine 
issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would 
have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of 
action or defense that has been asserted by the parties.  Williams Gas ProcessingWamsutter Co. 
v. Union Pacific Resources Co., 2001 WY 57, ¶ 11, 25 P.3d 1064, ¶ 11 
(Wyo.2001).  We examine the record 
from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and 
we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be 
drawn from the record.  Id.  We evaluate the propriety of a 
summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials 
as were employed and used by the lower court.  Scherer Constr., LLC v. Hedquist 
Constr., Inc., 2001 WY 23, ¶ 15, 18 P.3d 645, ¶ 15 (Wyo.2001).  We do not accord any deference to the 
district court's decisions on issues of law. Id.

 

Trabing 
v. Kinko's, Inc., 2002 
WY 171, ¶ 8, 57 P.3d 1248, 1252 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶9]      Both the district 
court and this Court apply the following law when construing an 
easement:

 

"When 
construing an easement, we seek to determine the intent of the parties to the 
easement . . . and begin by attempting to glean the meaning of the easement from 
its language."  R.C.R., Inc. v. 
Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 586 (Wyo.1999); see also Restatement 
(Third) Property (Servitudes) § 4.1 (2000).  If the language of the easement is clear 
and unambiguous, we interpret the easement as a matter of law, without resorting 
to the use of extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent.  R.C.R., 978 P.2d  at 586.  If, however, the language is ambiguous, 
then the court looks to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties' 
intent.  Hasvold [v. Park 
County School District No. 6, 2002 WY 65, ¶ 13, 45 P.3d 635, 638 
(Wyo.2002)]; R.C.R., Inc. 978 P.2d  at 586; Edgcomb v. Lower Valley 
Power & Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 855 (Wyo.1996).  . . .  To determine the intent of the parties, 
the context in which the easement was drafted must be 
considered.

 

"The 
language of a contract is to be construed within the context in which it was 
written.  In so doing, the court may 
look to the surrounding circumstances, the subject matter and the purpose of the 
contract.  The purpose of examining 
the context within which the contract was drawn, however, is limited to 
ascertaining the intent of the parties at the time the agreement was made.  The context cannot be invoked to 
contradict the clear meaning of the language used, and those extraneous 
circumstances do not justify a court in proceeding to insert therein a provision 
other than or different from that which the language used clearly indicates, and 
thereby, in effect, make a contract for the parties."

 

Snow 
v. Duxstad, 23 
Wyo. 82, 147 P. 174 (1915).

 

Pokorny 
v. Salas, 2003 
WY 159, ¶ 23, 81 P.3d 171, 177-78 (Wyo. 2003).  The principles of contract construction 
apply to construction of an easement.  
Lamb v. Wyoming Game and Fish 
Com'n, 985 P.2d 433, 437 (Wyo. 1999); 
Salt River Enterprises, Inc. v. Heiner, 
663 P.2d 518, 521 (Wyo. 1983).  One of those principles is that words 
are given the plain meaning and effect that reasonable persons would have given 
them at the time and place of their use.  
Wadi Petroleum, Inc. v. Ultra 
Resources, Inc., 2003 WY 41, ¶ 10, 65 P.3d 703, 708 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting 
Amoco Production Co. v. EM Nominee Partnership Co., 2 P.3d 534, 539-40 (Wyo. 
2000)); 
Klutznick v. Thulin, 814 P.2d 1267, 
1270 (Wyo. 1991).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶10]   We begin our discussion by stating 
that we agree with the parties and the district court both that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact in this case and that the easement at issue is 
unambiguous.  We do not, however, 
agree with the conclusion of the district court as to the easement's limited 
intent.  The language of the 
instrument and the context within which it was drafted do not indicate that it 
was the parties' intention to limit the historically unrestricted use of the 
easement.

 

[¶11]   For twenty-five years after Welborn 
bought the part of the ranch adjacent to the county road, the appellant's family 
continued to use the access road crossing Welborn's parcel.  Shortly before his death, Welborn 
suggested that an easement should be recorded.  The resulting unambiguous easement has 
all the "badges" of an appurtenant access easement:

 

            
The present case has all of the earmarks of an easement appurtenant.  To identify easements appurtenant, this 
Court established certain "badges" of an appurtenance which include:  (1) the easement was created to benefit 
a specific tract of land; (2) the grant was for a perpetual right-of-way for 
ingress and egress; (3) the grantee has the right to inspect and maintain the 
easement; (4) the right is not limited to the possessor personally; (5) the 
grant expressly extends the right to the grantees, their heirs, executors, 
administrators, successors, assigns and legal representatives; and (6) the 
easement document does not contain any limitations on the transferability of the 
easement to future transfers of both the dominant and servient estates.  Hasvold, ¶ 21.

 

Pokorny, 
2003 
WY 159, ¶ 25, 81 P.3d  at 178.  In particular, we have noted many times 
that use of words such as "heirs, successors and assigns" indicates the desire 
to create a perpetual appurtenant access easement.  Id., 2003 WY 159, ¶ 24, 81 P.3d  at 178; Hutchings v. Krachun, 2002 WY 98, ¶ 14, 
49 P.3d 176, 181 (Wyo. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by White v. 
Allen, 2003 WY 39, 65 P.3d 395 (Wyo. 2003); 
Baker v. Pike, 2002 WY 34, ¶ 13, 41 P.3d 537, 542 (Wyo. 2002); 
R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 
978 P.2d 581, 586 (Wyo. 1999).

 

[¶12]   The appellee presents two arguments 
in support of its contention that the easement creates much more limited 
rights.  First, the appellee notes 
that the grant to the grantee "and to his administrators, executors, personal 
representatives, heirs and assigns" is followed by language "limiting" exercise 
of the easement rights to "him and his family members, employees, agents, 
guests, visitors, invitees and licensees . . .."  Second, the appellee points out that the 
right of ingress and egress is "limited" "to and from Section 8."  The combined effect of these provisions, 
according to the appellee, is that the easement's road may only be used by the 
specifically listed persons, and only to reach Section 8.  The appellee's hope, of course, is to 
prevent anyone purchasing a subdivided lot from the appellant from using the 
road as access.

 

[¶13]   We do not accept the appellee's 
interpretation of the instrument because it contradicts the clear language of 
the granting clause, it is contra-indicated by the context in which the easement 
was granted, and it is unreasonable.  
Historicallyboth before and after the easement was grantedthe appellant 
and his family operated a cattle business and a guest ranch on their 
property.  In furtherance of those 
purposes, they used the access road across Welborn's property, and the record 
reveals no restrictions upon that use, either in terms of persons or 
purposes.  And there is simply 
nothing within the easement's language to suggest that such restrictions were 
intended.  To the contrary, the 
language of the easement is very broad in its granting clause, with use of the 
words "administrators, executors, personal representatives, heirs and assigns" 
clearly indicating an unlimited perpetual grant, rather than a personal license 
or other limited right.  
Furthermore, the record contains no contextual evidence that the easement 
was drafted to limit future access.  
To read the language "him and his family members, employees, agents, 
guests, visitors, invitees and licensees" more narrowly simply reads out of the 
instrument the "heirs and assigns" language.  In fact, that additional language 
expands, rather than limits, the scope of the easement most likely in 
recognition of the historic use of the ranch which involved guests, suppliers 
and contractors.

 

[¶14]   The appellant's ranch is made up of 
lands lying within four separate sections, with the main ranch home and 
headquarters located in Section 8.  
The appellee contends that, if this is an appurtenant easement, the 
dominant estate is limited to Section 8, and the grantees may not use the 
easement road to access the other sections of the ranch.  We reject this contention because it is 
simply unreasonable under the circumstances of this case.  The only reasonable purpose for the 
mention of Section 8 in the easement document is the fact that the easement road 
exits the Welborn property and enters the appellant's ranch in Section 8.  It is inconceivable, especially given 
the total lack of any contextual evidence to that effect, that Welborn intended 
to allow the appellant to enter his ranch across Welborn's property, but only if 
the appellant remained within Section 8 once he got on his own property.  Stated conversely, we have been shown no 
reason, and we can imagine none, why Welborn would have intended to prevent the 
appellant from using his ranch lands in the other three 
sections.

 

[¶15]   Easements are presumed to be 
appurtenant, rather than in gross, and we have recognized a strong preference to 
construe easements as being the former, rather than the latter.  Pokorny, 2003 WY 159, ¶ 23, 81 P.3d  at 
177.  Furthermore, the dominant tenement need 
not be described within the instrument, so long as it exists and can be 
identified.  Id., 2003 WY 159, ¶¶ 27-28, 81 P.3d  at 
179.  That is certainly the case 
here, where the sole purpose of the easement was to provide access to the 
appellant's ranch.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶16]   Use of the easement is not limited 
to the appellant, his family members, employees, agents, guests, visitors, 
invitees and licensees, but is available to unrelated third parties who may 
become purchasers of all or part of the dominant estate.  Neither is use limited to those grantees 
intending only to access Section 8.  
Rather, this is an appurtenant access easement, with the dominant 
tenement being the appellant's ranch lands lying in Sections 5 and 8, Township 
35 North, Range 109 West, and Sections 31 and 32, Township 36 North, Range 109 
West, 6th P.M.3  We reverse the summary judgment awarded 
to the appellee and, inasmuch as there are no genuine issues of material fact, 
the instrument is unambiguous, and the appellant also filed a motion for summary 
judgment, we remand for entry of a summary judgment in favor of the 
appellant.

 

[¶17]   The issues involving an implied 
easement are moot.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-103 
states:

 

Any 
person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings 
constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are 
affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a statute, municipal ordinance, 
contract or franchise, may have any question of construction or validity arising 
under the instrument determined and obtain a declaration of rights, status or 
other legal relations.

 

  2The effect of the absence of a 
ruling on this issue has not been raised before this 
Court.

 

  3This case exists, of course, because 
of the appellant's stated intent to subdivide his ranch.  The issues of changing or enlarging the 
use of an easement, in general, and of subdividing, in particular, have been 
peripheral, but have not been directly addressed before this Court.  See Van Raden v. Harper, 891 P.2d 78, 79 
(Wyo. 1995), overruled on other grounds by White v. Allen, 2003 WY 39, 65 P.3d 395 (Wyo. 2003) (dominant owner may not materially 
enlarge use); Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 505 (Wyo. 1994) (subdivision purchasers may use 
appurtenant easement); State v. Homar, 
798 P.2d 824, 826 (Wyo. 1990) (use defined by purpose, not frozen in 
time); and Delgue v. Curutchet, 677 P.2d 208, 214 (Wyo. 1984) (any possessor of dominant estate may use 
appurtenant easement).