Case Title: Com. v. Kalinowski

Citation: 303 Pa. Super. 354, 449 A.2d 725

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1982-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
303 Pa. Superior Ct. 354 (1982) 449 A.2d 725 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Henry W. KALINOWSKI, individually, and Henry W. Kalinowski, Sheriff of Wayne County and Warden of the Wayne County Jail. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued October 6, 1981. Filed August 20, 1982. *356 Marc R. Wolfe, Special Prosecutor, Stroudsburg, for Commonwealth, appellant. Randolph Borden, Hawley, for appellee. Before WICKERSHAM, McEWEN and POPOVICH, JJ. POPOVICH, Judge: This is an appeal by the Commonwealth from an order suppressing certain evidence seized from the appellee, Henry W. Kalinowski, pursuant to a search warrant that was held to have been invalid. Such evidence was directed to be excluded from use at appellee's trial.[1] We affirm. The warrant in question reads as follows: Before addressing the sufficiency of the probable cause section of the aforecited warrant, we need to review the particular statute with which the appellee was charged with violating; that is, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5705(1) (Supp. 1982-83), which provides in relevant part: Section 5706, which is referred to in Section 5705, provides in relevant part: Initially, we observe that the suppression court takes the position that, when the preceding statutes are viewed in concert, "it becomes apparent that possession of this equipment by [appellee] could have been legal only if he derived it through the authorization of the Attorney General, the District Attorney of Wayne County, or their designees." However, the court went on to hold that there was an absence of probable cause in the warrant because, "[t]here [was] no information in the instant Affidavit on the basis of which the District Magistrate could infer either that [appellee] had, or had not, obtained proper authorization." (Lower Court Opinion at 16) What the court is saying, in essence, is that the affidavit section of the warrant must recite that the accused was unauthorized to possess an interception device as a sine qua non to establishment of probable cause justifying issuance of the warrant. We need not rule on the credulity of such a proposition, since we find that the warrant was facially defective on another ground. But see Ignacio v. People of the Territory of Guam, 413 F.2d 513, 519 (9th Cir. 1969). For example, we observe that the named informant told the affiant, on May 16, 1979, "that she, in the course of her duties as Deputy Sheriff, at the Sheriff's [appellee's] office, did observe certain equipment utilized for the interception of telephonic conversation . . . in the office of Henry W. Kalinowski [-appellee], Sheriff of Wayne County." As correctly posited by the appellee, in regard to the preceding, "[w]hen the informant made the statement to the affiant is of little consequence. What is important is when *359 the informant made the observation. That date is unascertainable from the affidavit at issue." (Appellee's Brief at 9) We agree. Interestingly enough, the Commonwealth concedes as much in its brief by stating that the "affiant does not state that McElroy made observations recently . . . ." (Commonwealth's Brief at 16) On the subject of the time-frame within which criminal activity is observed and sufficient to establish probable cause to validate a warrant, we look to the case of Commonwealth v. Conner, 452 Pa. 333, 305 A.2d 341 (1973). In Conner, the Court determined that the lower court erred in not finding a search warrant defective and the evidence (weapon) seized as a result thereof suppressible. In so doing, the Court stated, as some of its grounds for reversal: Here, as in Conner, the magistrate was not informed as to when the informant obtained the information she allegedly had. Was it a day prior to the date of the affidavit, a week, a month? "Any selection of time on our part would be purely conjectural. So too must have been the magistrate's determination." Commonwealth v. Simmons, 450 Pa. 624, 630, 301 A.2d 819, 822 (1973). *361 On this record, we cannot conclude that the affidavit at issue provided a sufficient basis for an independent determination by a neutral judicial officer that probable cause existed. Commonwealth v. Conner, supra. The Commonwealth presents additional arguments in an attempt to establish the propriety of the search warrant; viz.: "The latter portions of the Affidavit, while not putting the information contained therein into a time frame, clearly established that at prior times the [appellee], while Sheriff of Wayne County, engaged in unlawful wiretapping. Thus, a continuing pattern of unlawful activity emerges." (Commonwealth's Brief at 16) The Suppression Court's opinion to this Court adequately and correctly disposed of such contentions, and we need not comment on them any further. Order affirmed. WICKERSHAM, J., notes his dissent. [1] The Commonwealth certified that the prosecution of cases 24, 83, 84, 87 and 90 would be terminated if the Suppression Court's order is not reversed, as the evidence suppressed is the principal incriminating evidence on these charges. However, the Commonwealth concedes that "[t]he Suppression Court's ruling has no effect on cases 85, 86, 88 and 89." (Commonwealth's Brief at 3, n.1) As to the former offenses, we find that the Commonwealth has satisfied its burden justifying an appeal from the grant of a suppression motion. See Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963); Commonwealth v. Kunkel, 254 Pa.Super. 5, 385 A.2d 496 (1978).