Case Title: In re Children of Jessica J.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020 ME 32

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2020-03-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 32 
Docket: 
Aro-19-427 
Submitted 
On Briefs: February 26, 2020 
Decided: 
March 12, 2020 
 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILDREN OF JESSICA J. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  The mother of two children appeals from an order of the District 
Court (Presque Isle, Nelson, J.) denying her post-judgment motions for a new 
trial and for relief from judgment, M.R. Civ. P. 59(a), 60(b)(6), following the 
court’s entry of a judgment terminating her parental rights to her children, see 
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i), (ii) (2018).  The mother argues that the 
court abused its discretion in denying her post-trial motions because the 
Department of Health and Human Services had scheduled a visit between her 
and the children after the court entered its order terminating her parental 
rights.  Assuming without deciding that an appeal from post-judgment 
motions that do not involve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
 
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permitted by 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2018),1 and that the same section permits 
post-judgment motion appeals not attached to orders terminating parental 
rights, see generally In re Kaylianna C., 2017 ME 135, 166 A.3d 976, we 
disagree that the court abused its discretion in denying the mother’s motions 
for a new trial and for relief from judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  In December 2017, the Department filed a petition for a child 
protection order and preliminary protection order for the children, who at 
that time were one and four years old.  The petition alleged, and the 
accompanying affidavit from the Department averred, that the mother was 
abusing drugs, specifically methamphetamine, and that the children had been 
exposed to domestic violence.   
[¶3]  The court (O’Mara, J.) entered an order of preliminary child 
protection and the children were placed in the Department’s custody.  The 
mother waived her opportunity for a summary preliminary hearing, and the 
court entered an order maintaining the Department’s custody of each child.   
                                         
1  We considered the merits of an appeal from a trial court’s denial of a post-judgment motion 
under M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) after entry of an order terminating parental rights in In re M.P., 2015 ME 
138, ¶ 1, 126 A.3d 718.  In that case, the mother’s motion for relief from judgment alleged that her 
trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective.  Id. ¶ 17; see also 22 M.R.S. § 4005(2) (2018) 
(providing that “[p]arents and custodians are entitled to legal counsel in child protection 
proceedings”).  The mother raises no such argument here. 
 
3 
[¶4]  In April 2018, upon agreement of the parties after an informal 
mediation, the court (Soucy, J.) entered a jeopardy order against the parents as 
to both children.  The jeopardy finding as to the mother was based on neglect 
and emotional maltreatment resulting from the mother’s persistent drug 
abuse.  The court ordered the mother to, among other things, attend mental 
health and substance abuse assessments and follow recommendations for 
treatment, consistently attend visitation with the children, participate in 
random drug screening, attend all family team meetings as scheduled, and 
maintain contact with her caseworker.  The permanency plan was for 
reunification of the children with the parents.  Although the children 
remained in the Department’s custody, they were placed in a kinship 
placement.   
[¶5]  In May 2019, the Department petitioned to terminate the mother’s 
parental rights to both children based on her lack of progress toward the 
rehabilitation and reunification goals.  The court (Nelson, J.) held a hearing on 
the petition in August 2019.  After hearing testimony from several witnesses, 
 
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including the mother, the court entered a judgment terminating the mother’s 
parental rights on September 4, 2019.2   
[¶6]  The court made the following factual findings, all of which are 
supported by competent evidence in the record.  See In re Child of Erica H., 
2019 ME 66, ¶ 3, 207 A.3d 1197. 
Mother has a long history of substance abuse that started 
when she was age 13.  She was herself involved in the child 
protective system after having been exposed to substance abuse 
as a teenager in the care of her [sibling].  Her substance abuse 
struggles continued to plague her up through the weeks prior to 
the hearing on the Department’s petition to terminate the 
parental rights of both parents.   
 
. . . . 
 
Early on in the case when discussing the recommendation 
to go to inpatient rehab, she indicated that she would go if DHHS 
wanted her to, with no appreciation for the impact that her 
substance abuse issues were having on her and the children.   
 
In the fall of 2018, mother was serving a 6-month jail 
sentence for drug possession.  Mother acknowledged that upon 
her release from incarceration, she was living in “drug homes” 
that were a challenge to her sobriety.  In February of 2019, 
mother did find employment for a period of time, but did not 
engage in any substance abuse treatment through the end of April, 
2019.  At the end of April, mother referred herself to another 
substance abuse counselor . . . . Mother failed to substantially 
                                         
2  The judgment also terminated the father’s parental rights, but he did not appeal from the 
judgment, so we do not address the court’s decision with regard to him.   
 
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engage in that treatment and was not consistent with her 
appointments.   
 
Mother has been provided referrals for a mental health 
assessment to determine the appropriate course of treatment.  
Mother failed to attend any of those intake appointments.  
Through August 14, 2019, she has failed to participate in any 
mental health services other than a short stay at [a hospital], 
despite this clearly being identified as a significant need for her 
from the outset of this case.   
 
After being served with the termination of parental rights 
petition, mother indicated a desire to continue in services.  Days 
later, she went on a bender and used methamphetamine.  Mother 
indicated that was the only way for her to cope.  An incident 
related to her [older child’s] birthday combined with the petition, 
set her off.   
 
Mother 
was 
actively 
using 
methamphetamine 
and 
struggling with caring for herself when she presented to the 
emergency room . . . with suicidal ideation in the latter part of July, 
2019.  From [the medical center], she was referred to [a hospital] 
in Bangor for what she described as detox and mental health 
treatment.  When mother did go to [the hospital], she informed 
the Department that she wanted to go to [that hospital] because 
father was there and he convinced mother to move to Bangor.  
Mother received some care, but left the program against medical 
advice.   
 
[¶7]  The court determined that the Department had met its burden of 
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the mother is unwilling or 
unable to protect the children from jeopardy and that these circumstances are 
unlikely to change within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the 
children’s needs, and that the mother is unwilling or unable to take 
 
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responsibility for the children within a time which is reasonably calculated to 
meet their needs.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii).   
[¶8]  The court made the following additional findings with respect to 
the best interest determination: 
The children have been living with [their relatives] since 
early on in this case.  The children are thriving in their home.  
Both children are close with one another and it is crucial that they 
remain together.  They are with loving family members which has 
helped to ease their transition into care.  Mother’s inconsistency 
with the visits has caused confusion for the children and an 
increase in behaviors.  This increase in behaviors has been caused 
by that inconsistency rather than by lack of contact with her by 
the children, as mother contends.   
 
[¶9]  The court then determined that termination of the mother’s 
parental rights is in the best interests of the children.  Id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).   
[¶10]  Thereafter, the mother filed motions for a new trial and for relief 
from judgment.  See M.R. Civ. P. 59(a), 60(b)(6).  The mother’s motions alleged 
that the Department had contacted her following entry of the court’s 
judgment to arrange for a visit or visits—it is not clear which—with the 
children.  This, she argued, undermined an essential basis for the order 
terminating her parental rights and entitled her to a new trial or relief from 
the judgment.  The Department opposed the motions, arguing that this last 
visit was nothing more than a “closure visit,” commonly scheduled in 
 
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appropriate cases, and that the visit was planned with the children’s best 
interests in mind after consultation with their therapists and case manager.  
The court denied the mother’s post-judgment motions, concluding that the 
mere scheduling of a post-termination visit by the Department did not 
warrant a new trial or relief from the judgment.   
[¶11]  The mother filed a timely notice of appeal.  See M.R. App. P. 
2B(c)(2).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶12]  The mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the court abused 
its discretion in denying her post-judgment motions.  She contends that, in the 
days following entry of the judgment terminating her parental rights, she was 
contacted by the Department to schedule visits between herself and the 
children.  In her view, this constitutes newly discovered evidence sufficient to 
undermine the court’s determination that termination of her parental rights 
was in the best interests of the children.  The mother argues, based on this 
newly discovered evidence, that the termination of her parental rights was 
“premature,” and that the Department “should have continued the case, giving 
the mother the benefit of reunification services while the visits were carried 
out.”   
 
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[¶13]  “We review the denial of a motion for a new trial deferentially for 
a clear and manifest abuse of discretion.”  In re Child of Erica H., 2019 ME 66, 
¶ 15, 207 A.3d 1197 (quotation marks omitted).  To prevail on a motion for a 
new trial under Rule 59(a) based on newly discovered evidence, the burden is 
on the moving party to prove  
(a) that the new evidence is such that it will probably change the 
result upon a new trial, (b) that it has been discovered since the 
trial, (c) that it could not have been discovered before the trial by 
the exercise of due diligence, (d) that it is material to the issue, 
and (e) that it is not merely cumulative or impeaching.   
 
Id. (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  Similarly, we review the 
denial of a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) for an abuse 
discretion, and “will set aside the trial court’s decision only if the failure to 
grant the relief works a plain and unmistakable injustice against the moving 
party.”  Ezell v. Lawless, 2008 ME 139, ¶ 19, 955 A.2d 202; see also In re 
Danielle B., 685 A.2d 770, 771 (Me. 1996). 
 
[¶14]  In its order denying the mother’s post-judgment motions, the 
court observed that issues concerning the mother’s visitation with the 
children were fully litigated.  After considering all of the evidence presented, 
the court had determined that it was in the children’s best interests not to be 
 
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subjected to the mother’s inconsistency with respect to visitation.3  The court 
stated that this was not a case that “involve[d] the development of facts that 
make the best interest determination of the court a very close call.”  The court 
concluded that the mother’s “performance during reunification was so dismal 
and her instability over such a long period of time so profound, even if the 
court had been presented at trial with the Department’s agent’s opinion that a 
visit after a termination was in the children’s best interest, such evidence 
would not have altered the outcome.”  The court, having previously heard and 
reviewed all of the evidence in reaching its decision to terminate the mother’s 
parental rights, was in the best position to assess whether this purported 
newly discovered evidence would have changed the result.   
 
[¶15]  Based on the court’s factual findings, which were fully supported 
by competent evidence in the record, we have no trouble determining that 
termination of the mother’s parental rights was not “premature,” as she now 
argues on appeal.  The record is clear that she was given the benefit of 
reunification services and visitation throughout this case, and she was unable 
to do what was required of her. 
                                         
3  The court found, based on the evidence presented, that the issue seemed to be the mother’s 
inconsistency with visitation, not necessarily the visits themselves.   
 
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[¶16]  We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that the mother failed to sustain her burden on her 
post-judgment motions for relief from judgment and for a new trial, or in 
denying those motions.  See In re Child of Erica H., 2019 ME 66, ¶ 15, 207 A.3d 
1197; Ezell, 2008 ME 139, ¶ 19, 955 A.2d 202. 
The entry is: 
Order denying mother’s post-judgment motions 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John W. Tebbetts, Esq., Tebbetts Law Office, LLC, Presque Isle, for appellant 
mother 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and 
Human Services 
 
 
Presque Isle District Court docket number PC-2017-31 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY