Case Title: Griess v. Office of the Atty. Gen., Div. of Criminal Investigation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95-314

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Griess v. Office of the Atty. Gen., Div. of Criminal Investigation1997 WY 12932 P.2d 734Case Number: 95-314Decided: 01/24/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

Larry 
GRIESS, Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL, DIVISION OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, 
Appellee (Respondent).

 

 

 

Appeal from District Court, Laramie County, Nicholas 
Kalokathis, J.

 

Rodger McDaniel, of McDaniel 
Law Offices, Cheyenne, for appellant (petitioner).

 

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Lou Piccioni, Assistant Attorney General, for 
appellee (respondent).

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN* and LEHMAN, JJ. 

* Chief Justice at the time 
of conference on this case. 

 

THOMAS, Justice. 

[¶1]      The accuracy of 
the interpretation of a statute by the Division of Criminal Investigation in the 
Office of the Attorney General (Division) is the focal issue in this case. Larry 
Griess (Griess) contends that the Division did not properly apply language in 
WYO. STAT. § 6-8-104 (Supp. 1994) in denying his application for a permit to 
carry a concealed firearm. The particular statutory language reads, "the 
applicant has been or is reasonably likely to be a danger to himself or others, 
or to the community at large as a result of the applicant's mental or 
psychological state, as demonstrated by a past pattern or practice of behavior, 
or participation in incidents involving 
a controlled substance, alcohol abuse, violence or threats of violence as these 
incidents relate to criteria listed in this section." The Division invoked a 
single incident involving a threat of suicide by Griess to deny his application, 
and Griess argues that the statute requires a "pattern or practice of behavior" 
or multiple incidents. He also asserts a collateral issue involving the failure 
of the Division to advise him of its final decision within a twenty-day period 
mandated by the statute. The district court affirmed the denial by the Division 
of Griess' application for a concealed weapons permit, holding that the 
Division's decision was justified by the

single incident. We affirm 
the decision of the district court.

 

[¶2]      In his Brief of 
Appellant, Griess defines the issues as:

 

Argument I:

 

The Division of Criminal Investigation acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously and not in accordance with W.S. 6-8-104(g) in 
denying the permit.

 

Argument II:

 

The denial of the permit by the DCI must be set aside 
for the failure of the Appellee to timely process the Applicant's Petition for 
Reconsideration.

 

[¶3]      The Brief of 
Appellee filed on behalf of the Division suggests a single 
issue:

 

Whether the decision by the Division of Criminal 
Investigation to deny Appellant a concealed firearm permit was arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with WYO. 
STAT. § 6-8-104(g)?

 

[¶4]      In January 1995, 
Griess applied for a concealed firearm permit. As provided by WYO. STAT. § 
6-8-104(e), the application was submitted to the Laramie County Sheriff, who 
forwarded it to the Division along with the written report required by WYO. 
STAT. § 6-8-104(g). The sheriff's report recommended denial of the permit 
application by the Division because of a 1988 suicide threat. On February 20, 
1988, three deputies of the Laramie County Sheriff's Department were summoned to 
the Griess home. They found Griess locked in a room with a firearm and a suicide 
note on the door. The deputies persuaded Griess to surrender his firearm and 
took him to the hospital, where Griess committed himself voluntarily for 
diagnosis and counseling.

 

[¶5]      The letter the 
Division sent to Griess on March 8, 1995, advised him:

 

Your application for a Wyoming concealed firearm 
permit has been denied based upon the recommendation of the Laramie County 
Sheriff. Per Wyoming statute 6-8-104(m)(ii), the division shall deny the 
application based on the grounds that the applicant fails to qualify under the 
criteria listed in this section or upon reasonable grounds for denial specified 
under subsection (g) of this section.  The written report provided by the sheriff, as 
required by subsection (g), provides reasonable grounds that the applicant may 
be a danger to himself based on the suicide threat of February 20, 1988. 
(Laramie County Sheriff's Department case number 88-0580.)

 

Per Wyoming statute 6-8-104(m)(ii), any applicant 
denied a permit has the right to submit, within thirty (30) days, any additional 
documentation relating to the grounds for denial. Upon receiving any additional 
documentation, the division shall reconsider its decision and inform the 
applicant within twenty (20) days of the result of the reconsideration. The 
applicant also has the right to seek review of the denial in the district court 
pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, W.S. 16-3-101 through 
16-3-115.

 

[¶6]      Griess wrote to 
the Division on March 14, 1995, and explained that in 1988 he had suffered from 
depression as a result of heart bypass surgery and early retirement from the 
fire department. He said that the combination of events had precipitated his 
suicide threat, and that he had checked into the hospital voluntarily and had 
been released after two weeks. Griess stated he no longer was a danger to 
himself or anyone else, and he requested reconsideration of the application. The 
Division reconsidered Griess' application, and on April 18, 1995, which was more 
than twenty days after Griess' request for reconsideration, the Division 
informed Griess of its final decision to deny his 
application.

 

[¶7]      Griess appealed 
to the district court. After review, the district court held the Division's 
decision to deny Griess' application for a concealed firearm permit was not 
contrary to WYO. STAT. § 6-8-104, because his threat to use a gun to commit 
suicide provided reasonable grounds for the denial pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 
6-8-104(g) and (m)(ii). Griess appeals from the Order Affirming Respondent's 
Decision Denying Petitioner's Application for a Concealed Firearm Permit entered 
in the district court.

 

[¶8]      Our review of 
administrative action or inaction is confined to the record and is limited by 
WYO. R. APP. P. 12.09(a) to those matters specified in WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) 
(1990) (emphasis added) which provides in pertinent part:

 

(c) * * * the reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of * * * law, interpret * * * statutory provisions, and 
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In 
making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

 

* 
* *

 

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings and conclusions found to be:

 

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law[.]

 

In our review, we afford no 
deference to the decision of the district court. As we said in Casper Iron & 
Metal, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Com'n, 845 P.2d 387, 392 (Wyo. 
1993):

 

We review the agency decision without according any 
special deference to the district court decision. Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. 
Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 802 P.2d 856, 859 (Wyo. 1990). Using the same 
evidence and same review standards as the district court, the review conducted 
by the Wyoming Supreme Court proceeds as if the matter had come directly to us 
from the agency. Southwest Wyoming Rehabilitation Center v. Employment Sec. 
Comm'n, 781 P.2d 918, 920 (Wyo. 1989); Atchison v. Career Serv. Council, 664 P.2d 18, 20 (Wyo.), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 982, 104 S. Ct. 424, 78 L. Ed. 2d 359 
(1983).

 

[¶9]      In this instance, 
we address only the application of the law by the agency. We recently summarized 
our jurisprudential approach to the resolution of such cases in this 
way:

 

The issues on appeal are a matter of law. Pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 12.09, our review of an agency action is in accordance with Wyo. Stat. 
§ 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) (1990) which requires a reviewing court to "[h]old unlawful 
and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be * * * 
[a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law[.]" We accord no special deference to the conclusions of the district 
court, instead reviewing the action as if it came to us directly from the 
agency.  Martinez v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 917 P.2d 619, 621 (Wyo. 1996); Wyoming Steel 
& Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 1994). If the agency's 
conclusions of law are correct, its decision will be affirmed. Martinez, 917 P.2d  at 621; Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 1996). If the agency has 
not invoked and applied the correct rule of law, we correct it. Martinez, 917 P.2d  at 621; Matter of 
Gneiting, 897 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Wyo. 1995).

 

Tenorio v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 237 (Wyo. 1997). The review by 
the district court in this instance was thorough, and we agree with the judge's 
decision affirming the action of the Division.

 

[¶10]   The Division is authorized to issue 
a permit to carry a concealed firearm to a qualified person pursuant to WYO. 
STAT. § 6-8-104 which provides in pertinent part:

 

(g) The sheriff of the applicant's county of 
residence shall submit a written report to the division containing any 
information that he feels may be pertinent to the issuance of a permit to any 
applicant. The written report shall state facts known to the sheriff which 
establish reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant has been or is 
reasonably likely to be a danger to himself or others, or to the community at large as a result of the applicant's 
mental or psychological state, as demonstrated by a past pattern or practice of 
behavior, or participation in incidents involving a controlled substance, 
alcohol abuse, violence or threats of violence as these incidents relate to 
criteria listed in this section. The written report shall be made within thirty 
(30) days after the date the sheriff receives the copy of the application. The 
sheriff of the applicant's county of residence shall notify the chief of police, 
if any, of the applicant's place of 
residence of the application for a concealed firearm permit by the applicant. 
The chief of police shall submit written comments to the division under the 
guidelines prescribed in this section. Submitted comments shall not be 
considered a public record.

 

[¶11]   In arguing his first claim of 
error, Griess contends that to deny a permit on the basis of WYO. STAT. § 
6-8-104(g), the Division must have evidence demonstrating the applicant to be a 
danger to himself or others, based on a past pattern or practice of behavior or 
participation in more than one incident involving violence or threats of 
violence. He asserts the denial of the permit by the Division was arbitrary, 
capricious, and not in accordance with law because it invoked only an isolated 
incident, and manifested an erroneous application of the statutory language. Griess asserts 
that the district court erred in the same way when it affirmed the decision 
because the district court ignored the terms "past pattern or practice of 
behavior" and erroneously found the use of the plural form "incidents" 
indicative of either a singular or plural context.

 

[¶12]   Our systematic approach to 
statutory interpretation was carefully articulated in Parker Land & Cattle 
Co. v. Wyoming Game & Fish Com'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993), where we 
said:

 

[T]he intent [of the lawgiver] is the vital part, and 
the essence of the law * * *. Such intent, however, is that which is embodied 
and expressed in the statute * * * under consideration.

 

Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 128, 50 P. 819, 821 
(1897). Accord, Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 1991); Morrison-Knudson Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 58 
Wyo. 500, 512, 135 P.2d 927, 931 (1943). "[T]he initial step in arriving at a 
correct interpretation * * * is an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of the words employed according 
to their arrangement and connection." Rasmussen, 7 Wyo. at 133, 50 P.  at 823; 
accord Radalj v. Union Savings & Loan Ass'n, 59 Wyo. 140, 176-77, 138 P.2d 984, 996 (1943); and Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834, 837 
(Wyo. 1991). A statute "must be construed as a whole in order to ascertain its 
intent and general purpose and also the meaning of each part." Ross v. Trustees of University of Wyoming, 31 Wyo. 464, 
489, 228 P. 642, 651 (1924); accord City of Laramie v. Facer, 814 P.2d 268, 270 
(Wyo. 1991). "[W]e give effect to every word, clause and sentence and construe 
all components of a statute in pari materia." Facer, 814 P.2d  at 270; accord, 
State ex rel. Albany County Weed & Pest Dist. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 592 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Wyo. 1979).

 

[¶13]   In his brief, Griess states 
succinctly, "[i]f it had been the intent of the legislature to allow for the 
denial of a permit based on a single incident, it would have not only used the 
singular form of the word but would neither have included the requirement that 
such mental state be `demonstrated by a past pattern or practice of behavior.'" 
By his argument, Griess endeavors to connect the word "incidents" to the words 
"practice" and "pattern." To reach his conclusion, that the statute defines 
practice as "repeated or customary actions" and "pattern" as requiring "two or 
more related acts," Griess invokes the plural forms used in the statute. His 
argument, however, is refuted both by 
Wyoming statute and our precedent.

 

[¶14]   In WYO. STAT. § 8-1-103 (1989), a 
statutory construction clearly contrary to his conclusion is set 
forth:

 

(a) The construction of all statutes of this state 
shall be by the following rules, unless that construction is plainly contrary to 
the intent of the legislature:

 

* 
* *

 

(v) Words in the plural form include the singular and 
words in the singular form include the plural[.]

 

In Forest Oil Corp. v. 
Davis, 384 P.2d 716, 718 (Wyo. 1963), we said, "case authority amply supports 
the general rule stated in 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 337, p. 676, to the effect that 
where such construction is necessary to give effect to the legislative intent, 
words in the plural number will be construed to include the singular." If the 
legislature wishes to depart from this general rule, it can afford a specific 
definition to a term as the court explained in Lichty v. Lichty Const. Co., 69 
Wyo. 411, 243 P.2d 151, 159 (1952), where the term "workman" was defined to 
include the singular and plural of both sexes. In this statute, had the 
legislature intended to depart from the general rule, that the plural also 
includes the singular, it could have done so by specific definition. 
Furthermore, Griess' contention is pragmatically refuted by language that 
appears in WYO. STAT. § 6-8-104(m)(ii) where the concept of "reasonable grounds" 
is set forth, but obviously the legislature would not require multiple 
justifications for denial under WYO. STAT. § 6-8-104(g).

 

[¶15]   A more compelling justification for 
affirming the action of the Division is found in the method for statutory 
construction set forth in Parker Land & Cattle Co., where we adopted, by 
quoting from Rasmussen, the proposition, "[T]he initial step in arriving at a 
correct interpretation * * * is an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection." In 
this regard, we focus upon the language found in WYO. STAT. § 6-8-104(g) 
(emphasis added):

 

The written report shall state facts known to the 
sheriff which establish reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant has 
been or is reasonably likely to be a danger to himself or others, or to the 
community at large as a result of the applicant's mental or psychological state, 
as demonstrated by a past pattern or practice of behavior, or participation in 
incidents involving a controlled substance, alcohol abuse, violence or threats 
of violence as these incidents relate to criteria listed in this 
section.

 

[¶16]   In Matter of Voss' Adoption, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976), we had this to say about the word "or" and a clause 
following a disjunction:

 

Webster defines `or' as a function word to indicate 
(1) an alternative between different or unlike things, states or actions; (2) 
choice between alternative things, states or courses. The word `or' is 
ordinarily used as a disjunctive generally corresponding to `either' as `either 
this or that.' People v. Smith, 1955, 44 Cal. 2d 77, 279 P.2d 33. Where two 
clauses or phrases are expressed in the disjunctive, they are coordinate and 
either is applicable to any situation to which its terms relate. Shields v. 
Shields, 1943, 115 Mont. 146, 139 P.2d 528. Generally, use of the disjunctive 
indicates alternatives and requires separate treatment of those alternatives, 
hence a clause following a disjunction is considered inapplicable to the subject 
matter of the preceding clause. Quindlen v. Prudential Insurance Company of 
America, 5 Cir. 1973, 482 F.2d 876, 878.

 

See also, Olsten Staffing 
Services, Inc. v. D.A. Stinger Services, Inc., 921 P.2d 596, (Wyo. 1996). In 
this instance, the word "or" preceding the words "to the community" clearly is a 
function word used in a disjunctive context followed by a modifying clause 
inapplicable to the preceding clause "to himself or to others." The statute 
adequately expresses a legislative intent that the words "past pattern or 
practice of behavior" or multiple "incidents" do not modify the phrase 
"reasonably likely to be a danger to himself or others." A reasonable ground for 
denial of the permit can consist of a single instance in which the applicant 
manifested danger to himself or others. 

 

[¶17]   We hold that the single isolated 
incident of threatening suicide is a reasonable ground for the denial of Griess' 
application under WYO. STAT. § 6-8-104(g) and (m)(ii). The denial of the 
application was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law. The legislative intent to vest in the Division 
discretion to issue a permit to carry a concealed firearm is manifest in the 
statute. There is no indication that the legislature intended to guarantee to 
any applicant the right to a permit. The discretion of the Division was 
appropriately exercised in this instance.

 

[¶18]   The second claim of error in 
Griess' Brief of Appellant is that the denial by the Division of the permit must 
be set aside because it failed to notify Griess of its final decision to deny 
his application within the twenty-day time limit as mandated by WYO. STAT. § 
6-8-104(m)(ii) which provides:

 

(m) The division shall, within sixty (60) days after 
the date of receipt of the items listed in subsection (e) of this section, 
either:

 

(i) Issue the permit; or

 

(ii) Deny the application based on the ground that 
the applicant fails to qualify under the criteria listed in this section or upon 
reasonable grounds for denial specified under subsection (g) of this section. If 
the division denies the application, it shall notify the applicant in writing, 
stating the grounds for denial and informing the applicant of a right to submit, 
within thirty (30) days, any additional 
documentation relating to the grounds of denial. Upon receiving any additional 
documentation, the division shall reconsider its decision and inform the 
applicant within twenty (20) days of the result of the reconsideration. The 
applicant shall further be informed of the right to seek review of the denial in 
the district court pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, W.S. 
16-3-101 through 16-3-115.

 

Griess asserts that the time 
established in the statute for the Division to respond is mandatory and the 
issuance of the permit is an appropriate remedy for the failure of the Division 
to comply with the statute. In responding to this argument, the State 
characterizes it as one of equitable estoppel and argues that this doctrine does 
not apply to such governmental functions.

 

[¶19]   We have previously addressed claims 
of equitable estoppel against state agencies. Our rule was most recently 
summarized in Universal Equipment v. State, 839 P.2d 967, 976 (Wyo. 1992), where 
we said:

 

To support its claim of equitable estoppel against 
the DEQ, Appellant relies upon this Court's statement in Seaman v. Big Horn 
Canal Association, 29 Wyo. 391, 398, 213 P. 938 (1923): "[O]ne who by his acts 
or representations intentionally or through culpable negligence induces another 
to believe certain facts to exist, and the latter, not knowing the facts, acts 
on such belief to his substantial prejudice, the former is, in equity, estopped 
to deny the existence of such fact." In more recent cases, we have said that 
equitable estoppel requires some 
misrepresentation and is generally applied to prevent fraud, either constructive 
or actual. B & W Glass, Inc. v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 829 P.2d 809, 813 
(Wyo. 1992); Squaw Mountain Cattle Company v. Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Wyo. 
1991). Equitable estoppel against a governmental agency requires even more 
egregious conduct.

 

Equitable estoppel should not be invoked against a 
government or public agency functioning in its governmental capacity, except in 
rare and unusual circumstances and may not be invoked where it would serve to 
defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the 
public.

 

Big Piney Oil & Gas Company v. Wyoming Oil and 
Gas Conservation Commission, 715 P.2d 557, 560 (Wyo. 1986), quoted in State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division v. Rivera, 796 P.2d 447, 450 (Wyo. 
1990), and in Sare v. Sheridan County Board of County Commissioners, 784 P.2d 593, 595 (Wyo. 1989).

 

Earlier in State Highway 
Com'n of Wyoming v. Sheridan-Johnson Rural Electrification Ass'n, 784 P.2d 588, 
592 (Wyo. 1989), we stated the proposition in this way:

 

[Equitable] Estoppel does not apply to governmental 
or sovereign functions, especially where it would defeat the public interest. 
Big Piney Oil & Gas v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 715 P.2d 557, 560 (Wyo. 1986). Second, the state may not be estopped for the unauthorized 
acts or errors of its officers or employees. State ex rel. Cartwright v. 
Tidmore, 674 P.2d 14, 17 (Okla. 1983). See also Big Piney Oil & Gas, 715 P.2d  at 560.

 

[¶20]   Griess has not demonstrated any of 
the special facts that might entitle him to claim equitable estoppel. The record 
does not encompass any indication that Griess was induced by the Division to 
believe that certain facts existed or that he acted on that belief to his 
prejudice. Nothing is present to demonstrate misrepresentation or fraud, either 
actual or constructive. There is no egregious conduct nor any rare and unusual 
circumstance that would justify an exception to the rule. Furthermore, equitable 
estoppel, if applied in this instance, 
would defeat the application of a policy adopted to protect the 
public.

 

[¶21]   Griess complains that time limits 
placed on citizens are mandatory while those placed on governmental agencies are 
directive. We agree, however, with the decision in Shaball v. State Compensation 
Ins. Authority, 799 P.2d 399 (Colo.Ct.App. 1990), which held that the state 
personnel board did not lose jurisdiction when the hearing officer failed to 
issue a decision within the 45-days specified by the statute. The court pointed 
out that generally a provision requiring a decision within a definite time has 
been considered directory and that 
absolute time periods for administrative action often are considered guides for 
the conduct of business. Such a provision is to be regarded as directory unless 
time is of the essence or the statute contains negative language denying the 
exercise of authority after the expiration of the statutory 
period.

 

[¶22]   We hold that the twenty-day 
response period found in WYO. STAT. § 6-8-104(m)(ii) is directory and not 
mandatory. The statute does not provide that time is of the essence and contains 
no language that would negate the exercise of authority after the prescribed 
time period. The record contains no evidence serving to demonstrate that the 
delay in rendering the decision on Griess' request for reconsideration 
prejudiced either his personal rights or any public interest. Furthermore, 
although the Division does not so argue, the record is silent as to whether the response was 
uttered within twenty days after the result of the reconsideration. A response 
made within twenty days after the Division's decision on reconsideration would 
comply with the literal language of the statute. Whether or not the Division 
responded within twenty days, Griess is not entitled to the 
permit.

 

[¶23]   The denial by the Division of 
Griess' application for a concealed firearm permit was not "arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 
The single incident involving his threatened suicide with a firearm is a 
reasonable ground to deny the application under WYO. STAT. § 6-8-104(g) and 
(m)(ii). The twenty-day period requiring the Division to inform Griess of its 
final decision to deny the permit is directory and not mandatory. We affirm the 
decision of the district court that affirmed the denial of the permit by the Division.