Case Title: Romeo v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 114, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2011-05-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
COURTLAND ROMEO, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 114, 2010 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
§ 
ID No. 0706001130 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted:  April 4, 2011 
   Decided:  May13, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
This 13th day of May 2011, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Defendant-Below/Appellant, Courtland Romeo, appeals from his 
Superior Court jury convictions for murder first degree and possession of a firearm 
during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”).  Romeo contends that he “is 
entitled to a reversal of his conviction because of an atrocious perjury that was 
committed.”  We find no merit to Romeo’s appeal and affirm. 
(2) 
Late one evening nearly three years ago, Wilmington Police officers 
responded to a 911 call.  When the police officers arrived at the nearby scene, they 
observed between seventy-five and one hundred people in the middle of the city 
street.  The police officers made their way through the crowd and discovered an 
 
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individual who was bleeding from his head.  After one of the police officers 
administered CPR, the injured individual was transported to a hospital and 
pronounced dead shortly thereafter.  It was determined that the individual, Antoine 
Mayo, died from a penetrated gunshot wound to the arm and chest and the injuries 
that resulted. 
(3) 
After an investigation, Romeo was charged by indictment with murder 
first degree, PFDCF, and possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited 
(“PDWBPP”).  Romeo moved to sever the PDWBPP count.  The Superior Court 
granted that motion and the matter proceeded to a trial, where the Superior Court 
ruled on the PDWBPP count and the jury addressed the murder first degree and 
PFDCF counts.  The Superior Court convicted Romeo of PDWBPP, but the jury 
deadlocked on the other two counts. 
(4) 
A retrial was then held over five days.  Several witnesses testified.  
The mother of Mayo’s daughter, Diana King, testified that she and several other 
individuals, including Romeo, had been drinking alcohol all throughout the day 
that Mayo died.  King testified that, later that evening approximately nine hours 
after the group had started drinking, Mayo came to their location to take King’s 
children home.  King testified that she, her children, and Romeo walked into the 
street to meet Mayo.  King also testified that Romeo and Mayo exchanged words 
and that Romeo smirked at Mayo.  King testified that Mayo’s cousin (Ray) and 
 
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several other individuals appeared and that a physical confrontation ensued among 
the members of the group. 
(5) 
Ray also testified at Romeo’s trial.  Ray testified that Romeo fired a 
shot into the ground approximately one foot from Mayo.  Ray then testified that 
“[r]ight after th[at] first shot went off into the ground, the defendant raised his arm, 
pointed the gun at [Mayo], and shot about three more times.”  Ray’s sister also 
testified that she observed Romeo fire a weapon at Mayo. 
(6) 
Christina Thomas also testified at the trial.  Thomas was nine years 
old at the time of Mayo’s death.  Thomas testified that she heard some men 
arguing outside of the house that she was visiting that night.  Thomas testified that 
she looked out of the window of the house and saw several men.  Thomas also 
testified that she saw one of the men drink from a beer bottle, place the beer bottle 
on the steps of the house next door, and then say, “Let’s get it popping.”  Thomas 
testified that the man who drank from the beer bottle was wearing a white t-shirt 
and was involved in the events that night.  Thomas also testified that she observed 
a man in a black t-shirt fire a weapon three or four times that night. 
(7) 
Also at Romeo’s trial, Sergeant Alfred Filippone testified that a 
fingerprint was lifted from the beer bottle that was left on the steps of the house 
adjacent to where Thomas was visiting.  Filippone testified that the fingerprint 
 
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matched Romeo.  The State also presented testimony that established that DNA 
taken from that beer bottle matched Romeo. 
(8) 
Three other exchanges that occurred at Romeo’s second trial are 
relevant to Romeo’s claim on appeal.  First, Thomas’s interview with Wilmington 
Police Detective Eugene Solge was admitted into evidence pursuant to title 11, 
section 3507 of the Delaware Code.  During that interview, the following exchange 
occurred: 
Solge: 
Ok.  Um, the same guy who fired the gun and 
this is very important.  The same guy who fired 
the gun, is he the same person that had the 
bottle of beer?  Could you tell that, or no? 
Thomas:  
(Shaking head no) 
Solge: 
 
No you can’t tell? 
Thomas:  
I can’t tell. 
Solge: 
 
You can’t tell.  Ok.  You’re just not sure? 
Thomas:  
Uh huh. 
Solge: 
 
Ok.  That’s fine. . . . 
The second relevant exchange occurred during the prosecutor’s direct examination 
of Solge: 
Q: 
 . . . Do you recall whether or not Christina 
Thomas was able to tell you whether the same 
person who put the beer bottle down was the 
same person who was the shooter? 
A:  
 
That is correct. 
Q:  
 
Do you recall what she said about that? 
A: 
She said the same person who had the beer 
bottle was the shooter. 
 
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Finally, the third relevant exchange occurred during defense counsel’s cross 
examination of Solge: 
Q: 
And [the prosecutor] showed you a portion of a 
transcript of th[e] statement [Thomas] gave 
you . . . , correct? 
A:  
 
Yes, sir. 
Q: 
And the one question that she pointed out to 
you was a question where you were saying can 
you be sure that the person that put down the 
beer bottle was not the shooter, right? 
A:  
 
Correct. 
Q:  
 
And she said she couldn’t be sure, right? 
A:  
 
Yes, sir. 
(9) 
During closing argument, the prosecutor attempted to discredit 
Thomas’s testimony, stating: “Who had the best vantage point?  Did Christina 
Thomas have the best vantage point from 139 feet away or did Fred Holden, 
[Diana] King, Sheila Mayo, and Ray Mayo have the best vantage point being on 
the street that night.”  The prosecutor also stated: 
[Thomas] certainly saw the defendant put the beer bottle down.  
That was right in front of her face, but use your common sense.  
Is she just confused at this point between what other people told 
her they saw?  She really -- was she really able to get a good 
look?  She was 139 feet away.  She didn’t have her glasses on.  
She couldn’t see anybody’s face when he was eight to 10 feet in 
front of her.  She could describe the clothing at that range, but 
her vision wasn’t good enough . . . . 
 
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(10) The jury ultimately found Romeo guilty of murder first degree and 
PFDCF.  For those convictions, as well as the PDWBPP conviction, the Superior 
Court sentenced Romeo to life plus twenty-eight years in prison. 
(11) This appeal followed.  Defense counsel moved to withdraw and filed 
an opening brief pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c).1  Romeo supplemented 
defense counsel’s position with one argument: his convictions should be reversed 
because Solge committed perjury.  The State moved to affirm.  After reviewing the 
record, we could not conclude that Romeo’s appeal was wholly without merit and 
so totally devoid of any arguably appealable issue that it could be decided without 
an adversarial presentation.  We granted defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and 
appointed substitute counsel to represent Romeo in this appeal. 
(12) Romeo argues that we should reverse his convictions because Solge 
committed perjury.  Romeo did not raise this argument below.  Consequently, we 
review his claim for plain error.2  “Under the plain error standard of review, the 
error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to 
jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”3  “Furthermore, the 
                                          
 
1 Rule 26(c) relevantly provides: “. . . If the trial attorney, after a conscientious examination of 
the record and the law, concludes that an appeal is wholly without merit, the attorney may file a 
motion to withdraw. . . .” 
2 See Supr. Ct. R. 8 (“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for 
review; provided, however, that when the interests of justice so require, the Court may consider 
and determine any question not so presented.”); Turner v. State, 5 A.3d 612, 615 (Del. 2010) 
(quoting Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986)). 
3 Turner, 5 A.3d at 615 (quoting Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100). 
 
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doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the face 
of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and 
which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show 
manifest injustice.”4 
(13) The Delaware Code provides that a person is guilty of perjury when 
he “swears falsely.”5  The Delaware Code also provides that “[a] person ‘swears 
falsely’ when the person intentionally makes a false statement or affirms the truth 
of a false statement previously made, knowing it to be false or not believing it to be 
true, while giving testimony.”6  We have explained that the State’s knowing use of 
false or perjured testimony violates due process.7  We also have explained that 
mere contradictions in a witness’s testimony may not require reversal because 
those contradictions may not constitute knowing use of false or perjured 
testimony.8  Rather, mere contradictions in trial testimony establish a credibility 
question for the jury.9  In the event that the State knowingly uses false or perjured 
testimony to obtain a conviction, the United State Supreme Court has held that the 
                                          
 
4 Id. 
5 11 Del. C. §§ 1221, 1222 & 1223. 
6 11 Del. C. § 1224 (emphasis added). 
7 Jenkins v. State, 305 A.2d 610, 616 (Del. 1973) (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959)). 
8 Id. (citing Zutz v. State, 160 A.2d 727 (Del. 1960)). 
9 Knight v. State, 690 A.2d 929, 932 (Del. 1996) (“It is well-settled that the trier of fact ‘is the 
sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and responsible for resolving conflicts in the 
testimony.’”) (citing Tyre v. State, 412 A.2d 326, 330 (Del. 1980)).  See also Koch v. Puckett, 
907 F.2d 524, 531 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[C]ontradictory trial testimony . . . merely establishes a 
credibility question for the jury.”) (citing Little v. Butler, 848 F.2d 73, 76 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
 
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conviction “must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false 
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.”10 
(14) Here, Romeo has not shown that Solge intentionally made, or the 
State knowingly used, a false statement.  Although Solge’s response on direct 
examination was inaccurate, defense counsel elicited a contrary (and accurate) 
response on cross examination.  To make its factual findings, the jury used, among 
other things, Solge’s contradictory testimony, Thomas’s testimony, Thomas’s 
section 3507 statement, and eye-witness testimony.  Further, in closing argument, 
the prosecutor did not mention Solge’s inaccurate statement, but instead questioned 
Thomas’s ability to identify the shooter.  In these circumstances, we conclude that 
Romeo has not shown plain error. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the Superior 
Court are AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
10 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (citing Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942)).  
See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972) (“A new trial is required if ‘the 
false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the 
jury . . . .’”) (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 271).