Case Title: Dora O. Alvarado and Lenny Gonzales v. Peter Sersch

Citation: 2003 WI 55

Docket Number: 2001AP001715

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 55 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1715 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Dora O. Alvarado and Lenny Gonzales, Jessica 
Gonzales, Billy Gonzales, Roberto Gonzales, by 
their Guardian ad Litem, Donald J. Murphy,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Partners Mutual Insurance,  
 
Subrogated Party-Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
Peter Sersch d/b/a D.P. Painters and Hastings 
Mutual Insurance,  
 
Defendants-Intervenors, 
Oakbrook Corporation, ABC Unidentified Insurance 
Company, Meriter Retirement Services, Inc., and 
OHIC Insurance Company,  
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 227 
Reported at:  257 Wis. 2d 752, 652 N.W.2d 109 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 5, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 18, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Angela B. Bartell   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed)   
PROSSER, J., joins dissent. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: WILCOX, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Daniel W. Hildebrand and DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C., Madison, 
and Donald J. Murphy and Murphy Vaughn & Pressentin LLC, Monona, 
and oral argument by Daniel W. Hildebrand. 
 
 
 
2
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by John A. 
Nelson, Timothy W. Feeley, and von Briesen & Roper, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by John A. Nelson. 
 
 
2003 WI 55 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1715  
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 1545) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Dora O. Alvarado and Lenny Gonzales,  
Jessica Gonzales, Billy Gonzales, Roberto  
Gonzales, by their Guardian ad Litem,  
Donald J. Murphy,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Partners Mutual Insurance,  
 
          Subrogated Party-Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Peter Sersch d/b/a D.P. Painters and  
Hastings Mutual Insurance,  
 
          Defendants-Intervenors, 
 
Oakbrook Corporation, ABC Unidentified  
Insurance Company, Meriter Retirement  
Services, Inc., and OHIC Insurance  
Company,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 5, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
No. 
01-1715   
 
2 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioners, Dora Alvarado 
and her four minor children, seek review of a published court of 
appeals decision affirming a circuit court grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the respondents, Oakbrook Corporation, 
Meriter Retirement Services, Inc., and Meriter's insurer.1  
Alvarado asserts that the court of appeals erred in using public 
policy factors to limit liability before all the facts were 
considered.  Because we conclude that there are genuine issues 
of material fact, we determine that the court of appeals erred 
when it affirmed the grant of summary judgment limiting 
liability based on public policy factors.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals and remand the action to the 
circuit court for further proceedings. 
I 
¶2 
Meriter 
Retirement 
Services, 
Inc. 
(Meriter) 
owns 
student apartments in Madison that are managed by Oakbrook 
Corporation (Oakbrook).  On August 12, 1998, during the busy 
student turnover period, Oakbrook's property manager walked 
through a vacated apartment to inspect the premises.  In his 
deposition he testified that "cabinets" were on his checklist, 
but he did not remember checking them. 
¶3 
On August 13, 1998, a painting crew entered the 
apartment.  One of the painters discovered what he believed to 
be a "candle" in the kitchen cabinet.  Another painter 
                                                 
1  Alvarado v. Sersch, 2002 WI App 227, 257 Wis. 2d 752, 652 
N.W.2d 109 (affirming a judgment of the circuit court for Dane 
County, Angela B. Bartell, Judge). 
No. 
01-1715   
 
3 
 
recognized it as a firework device.  They moved the item out of 
the way and continued working.  No one in the crew informed 
Oakbrook or Meriter about the firework. 
¶4 
On August 14, 1998, Dora Alvarado and Ron Boehm, the 
owner of the janitorial service retained by Oakbrook, entered 
the apartment to clean it.  Alvarado had already completed a 
ten- to eleven-hour shift that day, but had been called back to 
work.  Boehm noticed what he thought to be a candle on the 
windowsill.  He commented to Alvarado that it was a "strange 
looking candle."  It was described as a wax candle with red, 
white, and blue colors, about six inches tall, and an inch in 
diameter.   
¶5 
After 
Boehm 
left 
the 
apartment, 
Alvarado 
began 
cleaning the interior of the gas stove.  She opened the stovetop 
to expose the burner trays for vacuuming.  Alvarado knew it was 
necessary to preserve the flame of the pilot light, which 
occasionally extinguished during the cleaning process.  Because 
she had forgotten to bring matches, she decided to use the 
"candle" to preserve the flame, and lit the device with the 
pilot flame.  The firework exploded as she was setting it down, 
blowing off most of her right hand. 
¶6 
Alvarado and her children filed a complaint in Dane 
County circuit court against Meriter, Oakbrook, the painting 
contractor, and each of their insurers.  The plaintiffs sought 
damages as a result of Alvarado's personal injuries.  
¶7 
 The circuit court granted Oakbrook and Meriter's 
motion for summary judgment.  It concluded that Oakbrook and 
No. 
01-1715   
 
4 
 
Meriter did not have a duty of care to protect Alvarado from a 
potential harm they neither knew nor reasonably could have 
foreseen.  
¶8 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment for Oakbrook and Meriter, but employed 
a different rationale.  Rather than focusing on negligence, the 
court of appeals considered public policy factors that limit a 
defendant's liability.  It concluded that the injury was too 
remote from the negligence, and in retrospect it appeared too 
highly extraordinary that the negligence should have resulted in 
the harm.  Under this analysis, the court of appeals determined 
that public policy barred any imposition of liability, and 
therefore it affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment. 
II 
¶9 
Alvarado seeks a reversal of the court of appeals' 
decision, and a remand for a jury trial.  She argues that it was 
improper for the court of appeals to use public policy 
considerations to limit liability before all the facts had been 
presented to a jury for a determination of negligence.  She 
asserts that the grant of summary judgment was error because 
there remain genuine issues of material fact. 
¶10 Summary judgments are reviewed applying the same 
methodology a circuit court uses under Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  
Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 
816 (1987).  If there are no genuine issues of material fact 
No. 
01-1715   
 
5 
 
then the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment as a 
matter of law.  Id.; Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2001-02). 
¶11 Whether it was proper for the court of appeals to use 
public policy considerations to limit liability before all the 
facts had been presented in a negligence determination is a 
question of law subject to independent appellate review.  
Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, ¶27, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 
N.W.2d 906. 
¶12 In addressing the court of appeals' reliance on public 
policy to affirm the circuit court's grant of summary judgment, 
we first briefly summarize the laws of negligence and liability 
that are relevant to this case.  We then apply the law and 
conclude that the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the 
grant of summary judgment, limiting liability based on public 
policy factors prior to trial. 
III 
¶13  Wisconsin has long followed the minority view of duty 
set forth in the dissent of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad. 
Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 419-20, 541 N.W.2d 742 
(1995). 
 
In 
that 
dissent, 
Judge 
Andrews 
explained 
that 
"[e]veryone owes to the world at large the duty of refraining 
from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of 
others."  Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 
(N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
¶14  Every person has a duty to use ordinary care in all of 
his or her activities, and a person is negligent when that 
person fails to exercise ordinary care.  Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 
No. 
01-1715   
 
6 
 
781, ¶¶20 & 22.  In Wisconsin a duty to use ordinary care is 
established whenever it is foreseeable that a person's act or 
failure to act might cause harm to some other person.  Id., ¶20.  
Under the general framework governing the duty of care, a 
"'person is not using ordinary care and is negligent, if the 
person, without intending to do harm does something (or fails to 
do something) that a reasonable person would recognize as 
creating an unreasonable risk of injury or damage to a person or 
property.'"  Id., ¶22 (quoting Wis JI——Civil 1005). 
¶15  The question of duty is nothing more than an 
"ingredient 
in 
the 
determination 
of 
negligence." 
 
A.E. 
Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, 62 Wis. 2d 479, 484, 214 
N.W.2d 764 (1974).  Once it has been determined that a negligent 
act caused the harm, "the question of duty is irrelevant and a 
finding of nonliability can be made only in terms of public 
policy."  Id. at 485. 
¶16  The "duty" ingredient of negligence should not be 
confused with public policy limitations on liability.2  "[T]he 
                                                 
2 In Gritzner this court aptly noted the confusion as 
follows: 
 
As the defendant notes, some Wisconsin cases have 
examined liability limitations in terms of duty. See 
Estate of Becker v. Olson, 218 Wis. 2d 12, 579 N.W.2d 
810 (Ct. App. 1998); Zelco v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 
190 Wis. 2d 74, 527 N.W.2d 357 (Ct. App. 1994); 
Erickson v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 166 
Wis. 2d 82, 479 N.W.2d 552 (Ct. App. 1991). This 
formulation 
of 
the 
analysis 
is 
incorrect 
under 
Wisconsin law.  In Wisconsin, everyone has a duty to 
act with reasonable care.  Liability for breach of 
that duty is limited on public policy grounds.  See 
No. 
01-1715   
 
7 
 
doctrine of public policy, not the doctrine of duty, limits the 
scope of the defendant's liability."  Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. 
Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 644, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994).  "In 
Wisconsin, one always owes a duty of care to the world at large, 
which is why '[t]he consistent analyses of this court reveal 
that the question of duty is not an element of the court's 
policy 
determination." 
 
Rockweit, 
197 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
433 
(Abrahamson, J. concurring) (quoting A.E. Investment, 62 Wis. 2d 
at 484). 
                                                                                                                                                             
Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 425, 541 N.W.2d 
742 (1995) (explaining that although some cases have 
denied liability on the basis that an actor had no 
"duty" to the injured party, the decision to deny 
liability is essentially one of public policy and not 
duty or causation). See also Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. 
Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 644-45, 517 N.W.2d 432 
(1994)(explaining that in deciding whether to impose 
liability for negligence, Wisconsin courts use a 
public policy formulation rather than a foreseeability 
or duty formulation)(citing Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas 
Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 183, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956)); 
Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 266, 424 
N.W.2d 159 (1988) (Steinmetz, J., concurring)(noting 
that Wisconsin has a distinct approach to negligence 
under 
which liability 
is 
limited 
through 
policy 
considerations 
after 
the 
elements 
of 
duty 
and 
causation have been established); Klassa, 273 Wis. at 
183 ("Whenever a court holds that a certain act does 
not constitute negligence because there was no duty 
owed by the actor to the injured party, although the 
act complained of caused the injury, such court is 
making a policy determination."). 
Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, ¶24 n.4, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 
611 N.W.2d 906.  
 
No. 
01-1715   
 
8 
 
¶17 Thus, negligence and liability are distinct concepts.    
A.E. Investment, 62 Wis. 2d at 484-85.  After negligence has 
been found, a court may nevertheless limit liability for public 
policy reasons.  Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶24; Rockweit, 197 
Wis. 2d at 421; A.E. Investment, 62 Wis. 2d at 484.  The public 
policy considerations that may preclude liability are:   
(1) the injury is too remote from the negligence; (2) 
the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the 
tortfeasor's culpability; (3) in retrospect it appears 
too highly extraordinary that the negligence should 
have resulted in the harm; (4) allowing recovery would 
place too unreasonable a burden on the tortfeasor; (5) 
allowing recovery would be too likely to open the way 
for fraudulent claims; [or] (6) allowing recovery 
would enter a field that has no sensible or just 
stopping point.   
Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶27. 
 
¶18 In most cases, the better practice is to submit the 
case to the jury before determining whether the public policy 
considerations preclude liability.  Only in those cases where 
the facts are simple to ascertain and the public policy 
questions have been fully presented may a court review public 
policy and preclude liability before trial.  Gritzner, 235 
Wis. 2d 781, ¶26; Sawyer v. Midelfort, 227 Wis. 2d 124, 141, 595 
N.W.2d 423 (1999); Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 655; Schuster v. 
Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 241, 424 N.W.2d 159 (1988); Coffey 
v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 542, 247 N.W.2d 132 
(1976). 
¶19 A jury's determination of negligence includes an 
examination 
of 
whether 
the 
defendant's 
exercise 
of 
care 
No. 
01-1715   
 
9 
 
foreseeably created an unreasonable risk of harm to others.  
Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 423.  Public policy factors can also 
implicate the concept of foreseeability.  In a sense, evidence 
regarding foreseeability can play a dual role.  Besides having 
the aid of the jury's opinion when assessing liability, a judge 
will also be aided by the facts that were brought to light 
during the jury trial.  Having examined the law, we next apply 
those principles to the facts in this case.   
IV 
¶20 The court of appeals erred in affirming the summary 
judgment on public policy grounds.  This case requires a full 
factual resolution before application of a public policy 
analysis.  It is not one of those simple cases where public 
policy can be used to limit liability before finding negligence. 
Here, there remain genuine issues of material fact, and public 
policy factors limiting liability should be considered only 
after a full resolution of the facts at trial.  
¶21  It is desirable to have a full trial to precede the 
court's determination because the issues in this case are 
complex and the factual connections attenuated.  Bowen, 183 Wis. 
2d at 655.  A jury will hear testimony about the standard of 
care that a reasonable property manager would exercise in 
inspecting a vacated apartment.  Oakbrook and Meriter claim that 
there was no negligence on their part.  Alvarado, however, 
claims that if Oakbrook had performed a thorough inspection of 
the apartment, as it should have, then the firework would have 
been found.  In his deposition, Alvarado's expert opines that 
No. 
01-1715   
 
10 
 
industry practice is to conduct an adequate inspection before 
allowing employees and contractors onto the premises.  He 
asserts that ordinary care requires a property manager to have a 
safety 
program 
which 
anticipates 
and 
addresses 
potential 
hazards: 
 
Well, they have a big responsibility in their capacity 
of managing residential housing. . . .  There's all 
kinds of things to be considered by a company that —— 
that's in charge of managing property. . . .  I could 
talk about that for hours, but the main idea is that 
you have to anticipate potential hazards and deal with 
them in some way.  And having a hazardous material or 
hazardous item in an apartment is something that 
they're required to anticipate and have a plan and a 
program to deal with.3 
¶22 This case is similar to Coffey, in which this court 
concluded that a full trial should precede a determination that 
policy considerations preclude liability based on a negligent 
inspection.  Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 543.  In that case, a tenant 
suffered losses as the result of a fire at its leased premises.  
The tenant sued a building inspector and the City of Milwaukee 
claiming that they were negligent because the standpipes 
necessary to furnish the water to fight fire at the leased 
premises were defective and had not been properly inspected. 
¶23 In examining whether public policy considerations 
should preclude liability, the Coffey court determined that a 
full factual resolution was necessary for a fair and complete 
evaluation of the policy considerations.  Id.  The court 
                                                 
3 Deposition testimony of Frank Burg, P.E., September 29, 
2000, p. 34. 
No. 
01-1715   
 
11 
 
explained that the case involved the complex issue of municipal 
tort liability arising out of the alleged negligence of a 
building inspector in carrying out fire inspections.  Id.   
¶24 The court concluded that findings as to actual 
negligence, damage, and the causal relationship between them 
would be material and helpful in evaluating the public policy 
considerations.  Id.  Accordingly, it refused to preclude 
liability on public policy grounds prior to a full factual 
resolution. 
¶25 Analogous to Coffey, this case involves facts that are 
not simple to ascertain.  It addresses the tort liability of 
property managers arising out of the alleged negligence of an 
inspector in carrying out apartment inspections.  Like Coffey, a 
sufficient factual basis is not presented here for considering, 
evaluating, and resolving the public policy issues involved.  
Findings as to actual negligence, damages and the causal 
relationship between them would be material and helpful in 
evaluating the public policy considerations. 
¶26  The parties dispute the purpose of Oakbrook's 
inspection.  Alvarado claims part of the inspection's purpose 
was safety, while Oakbrook contends the inspection was only to 
note 
needed 
repairs, 
cleaning, 
and 
security-deposit 
withholdings. 
 
A 
jury 
would 
hear 
testimony 
about 
what 
constitutes 
a 
proper 
inspection, 
and 
whether 
Oakbrook's 
inspection satisfied that obligation.  Ultimately, a jury would 
have determined whether Oakbrook had instituted adequate safety 
measures, and whether Oakbrook was negligent for failing to 
No. 
01-1715   
 
12 
 
instruct contractors about what procedure to follow when a 
dangerous object is found. 
¶27  When the circuit court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Oakbrook and Meriter, it concluded that Oakbrook and 
Meriter did not owe Alvarado a duty to exercise ordinary care.  
However, everyone owes a duty of ordinary care to all persons.  
The effect of the circuit court's summary judgment was to limit 
the imposition of liability.  Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 645; Klassa 
v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 183, 77 N.W.2d 397 
(1956) ("whenever a court holds that a certain act does not 
constitute negligence because there was no duty owed by the 
actor to the injured party, although the act complained of 
caused 
the 
injury, 
such 
court 
is 
making 
a 
policy 
determination").   
¶28 Likewise, albeit with a different rationale, the court 
of appeals limited liability by applying public policy factors.  
Neither the court of appeals nor the circuit court had the 
benefit of a full presentation of facts or a jury's verdict on 
negligence before limiting liability.  Because there remain 
genuine 
issues 
of 
material 
fact, 
summary 
judgment 
was 
erroneously granted.   
¶29 Summary judgment is uncommon in negligence actions, 
"because the court 'must be able to say that no properly 
instructed, reasonable jury could find, based on the facts 
presented, that [the defendants] failed to exercise ordinary 
care.'"  Lambrecht v. Estate of Kaczmarczyk, 2001 WI 25, ¶2, 241 
Wis. 2d 804, 623 N.W.2d 751 (citations omitted).  The concept of 
No. 
01-1715   
 
13 
 
negligence is peculiarly elusive, and requires the trier of fact 
to pass upon the reasonableness of the conduct in light of all 
the circumstances, "'even where historical facts are concededly 
undisputed.'"  Id.  Ordinarily, this is not a decision for the 
court. 
¶30 In sum, we determine that there remain genuine issues 
of material fact.  Here, public policy factors limiting 
liability should be considered only after a full resolution of 
the facts at trial.  The court of appeals erred when it affirmed 
the grant of summary judgment limiting liability based on public 
policy factors.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals 
and remand the action to the circuit court for further 
proceedings. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.  
¶31 JON P. WILCOX, J. did not participate.  
 
 
 
 
 
No.  01-1715.dss 
 
1 
 
 
¶32 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (dissenting).  I respectfully 
dissent.  The majority concludes that "the court of appeals 
erred when it affirmed the grant of summary judgment limiting 
liability based on public policy factors."  Majority op., ¶¶1, 
30.  I disagree.  The court of appeals properly evaluated the 
public policy limitations on liability in this case, and 
properly did so in advance of trial, affirming the circuit 
court's order of summary judgment.    
¶33  As the majority notes, negligence law in Wisconsin is 
based on the dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 
N.E. 99, 101-05 (N.Y. 1928)(Andrews, J., dissenting), in which 
Judge Andrews of the New York Court of Appeals described 
negligence as a breach of the duty shared by all members of 
society to "refrain[] from those acts that may unreasonably 
threaten the safety of others."  Majority op., ¶13; see also 
A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 
483-84, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974)(describing Wisconsin's adoption of 
the Palsgraf dissent).  This is the duty of ordinary care, and 
it is measured by reference to a "reasonable person" standard, 
which is applied to evaluate the nature and foreseeability of 
the risk of harm associated with the conduct in question in 
order to determine whether a defendant was negligent.  Majority 
op., ¶¶14, 19; see also Wis JI——Civil 1005. 
¶34  The duty of ordinary care can be breached (that is, a 
person can be negligent) by either an act or an omission, if a 
reasonable person under similar circumstances would recognize 
No.  01-1715.dss 
 
2 
 
that the act or omission creates an unreasonable risk of injury 
or damage to another.4  The determination of negligence is 
followed by a determination of causation and damages.5  Although 
these are generally factual questions for the jury, there are 
some circumstances, not implicated here, under which the 
determination of negligence involves a mixed question of fact 
and law.  Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 418-19, 541 
N.W.2d 742 (1995). 
¶35  However, it is not always true that negligence + 
causation + damages = liability.  Considerations of public 
policy may preclude the imposition of liability even where the 
facts establish that a negligent act or omission on the part of 
the defendant was a cause of the plaintiff's damages.  This is 
purely a question of law for the court.  Stephenson v. Universal 
                                                 
1  Wisconsin juries are instructed on negligence as follows:  
A person is negligent when [he or she] fails to 
exercise ordinary care.  Ordinary care is the care 
which a reasonable person would use in similar 
circumstances.  A person is not using ordinary care 
and is negligent, if the person, without intending to 
do harm, does something (or fails to do something) 
that a reasonable person would recognize as creating 
an unreasonable risk of injury or damage to a person 
or property.  
Wis JI——Civil 1005.    
5 Causation is determined by reference to a "substantial 
factor" test.  The jury determines whether the defendant's 
negligence was "a cause"——not "the cause"——of injury or damage 
to the plaintiff, because there can be more than one cause of a 
plaintiff's injury or damage.  Wis JI——Civil 1500 (emphasis in 
original).  A defendant's negligence is "a cause" of a 
plaintiff's injury or damage if it was a substantial factor in 
producing the injury or damage. Id.   
No.  01-1715.dss 
 
3 
 
Metrics, Inc., 2002 WI 30, ¶42, 251 Wis. 2d 171, 197, 641 N.W.2d 
158 ("The application of public policy considerations is a 
function of the court."); Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 425 ("A 
finding of nonliability made in terms of public policy is a 
question of law which the court alone decides."). 
¶36  Accordingly, we observed last term that "in Wisconsin, 
common law limitations on liability are determined not by 
reference to the absence of a duty, but as a matter of public 
policy."  Stehlik v. Rhoads, 2002 WI 73, ¶52, 253 Wis. 2d 477, 
645 N.W.2d 889.  This is because "[a]ll members of society are 
'held, at the very least, to a standard of ordinary care in all 
activities.'"  Id. (quoting Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, 
¶22, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 N.W.2d 906).  The public policy 
limitations on liability are as follows:  
When determining whether or not to limit a 
defendant's tort liability on public policy grounds, 
this court has identified a number of factors that 
must be considered.  Recovery against a negligent 
tortfeasor can be denied on the grounds of public 
policy when (1) the injury is too remote from the 
negligence; (2) the injury is too wholly out of 
proportion to the tortfeasor's culpability; (3) in 
retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that 
the negligence should have brought about the harm; (4) 
allowing recovery would place too unreasonable a 
burden on the tortfeasor; (5) allowing recovery would 
be too likely to open the way to fraudulent claims; or 
(6) allowing recovery would have no sensible or just 
stopping point.   
Stephenson, 251 Wis. 2d 171, ¶43 (citing Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d 
at 426). 
 
¶37 
This 
distinction 
between 
the 
determination 
of 
negligence and the imposition of liability is consistent with 
No.  01-1715.dss 
 
4 
 
the Palsgraf dissent: "As was said by Mr. Justice Holmes many 
years ago, '[t]he measure of the defendant's duty in determining 
whether a wrong has been committed is one thing, the measure of 
liability when a wrong has been committed is another.'"  
Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 102 (quoting Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. 
Co., 52 N.E. 747, 748 (Mass. 1899)).     
¶38  The majority recites the public policy limitations on 
liability but refuses to apply them, concluding that "[t]his 
case requires a full factual resolution before application of a 
public policy analysis."  Majority op., ¶¶17, 20.  In this 
regard, the majority asserts that "[i]t is desirable to have a 
full trial to precede the court's determination [of public 
policy] because the issues in this case are complex and the 
factual connections attenuated."  Majority op., ¶21.  I 
disagree. 
¶39  I recognize that we have said it is usually "better 
practice" or "generally better procedure" to await resolution of 
the factual issues in a negligence case before submitting it to 
public policy analysis.  Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶26 (lead 
opinion); 
id., 
¶83 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring)(majority 
opinion on this issue); Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 
Wis. 2d 250, 265, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998).   However, we have also 
said 
that 
"[t]he 
assessment 
of 
public 
policy 
does 
not 
necessarily require a full factual resolution of the cause of 
action by trial."  Stephenson, 251 Wis. 2d 171, ¶42; see also 
Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 265; Hass v. Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co., 
No.  01-1715.dss 
 
5 
 
48 Wis. 2d 321, 326-27, 179 N.W.2d 885 (1970).  More 
specifically: 
The application of public policy considerations 
is solely a function of the court . . . and does not 
in all cases require a full factual resolution of the 
cause of action by trial before policy factors will be 
applied by the court.  There may well be cases, of 
course, where the issues are so complex, or factual 
connections so attenuated, that a full trial must 
precede the court's determination.  Here, however, the 
question of public policy is fully presented by the 
complaint and demurrer.        
Hass, 48 Wis. 2d at 326-27.  As a further example, in our 
seminal case on the tort of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, we held: 
The application of public policy considerations 
is a function solely of the court.  While it is 
generally better procedure to submit negligence and 
cause-in-fact issues to the jury before addressing 
legal cause, that is, public policy issues, . . . the 
circuit court or this court may grant summary judgment 
on public policy grounds before a trial or a court may 
bar liability on public policy considerations after 
trial.  When the pleadings present a question of 
public policy, the court may make its determination on 
public policy grounds before trial.  In contrast, when 
the issues are complex or the factual connections 
attenuated, it may be desirable for a full trial to 
precede the court's determination. 
In this case this court is determining public 
policy considerations before trial because the facts 
presented are simple, and because the question of 
public policy is fully presented by the complaint and 
the motion to dismiss. 
Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 654-55, 517 
N.W.2d 432 (1994)(footnotes and citations omitted). 
¶40  Thus, it is not uncommon for courts to decide on 
summary judgment that negligence liability should be limited 
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based upon considerations of public policy.  Some cases are 
factually uncomplicated and fully conducive to a pre-trial legal 
determination on the applicability of public policy limitations 
on liability.  This is such a case. 
 
¶41  The majority's rejection of pre-trial public policy 
analysis in this case is unwarranted.  To the extent that it 
discourages the lower courts from evaluating public policy 
liability limitations on motions for summary judgment, it will 
produce two divergent effects: 1) there will be an increase in 
unnecessary trials and appeals (where the circuit or appellate 
courts would otherwise have precluded liability pre-trial but 
now consider themselves constrained to do it only post-trial 
because of the majority's decision here); and 2) there will be 
an expansion of liability (where the circuit or appellate courts 
consider themselves constrained against precluding liability on 
public policy grounds because of the presence of a jury verdict 
on negligence). 
 
¶42  While I have no quarrel with the "better practice" 
general rule noted above, I do not agree that the facts of this 
case are so complex that the evaluation of public policy 
limitations 
on 
liability 
must 
await 
a 
jury 
verdict 
on 
negligence, cause-in-fact and damages.  Judicial gate-keeping on 
this potentially dispositive legal issue is extremely important 
given the breadth and potential reach of the definition of 
negligence in this state.  This was an important part of the 
Palsgraf dissent.  What we in Wisconsin refer to as public 
policy limitations on liability, Judge Andrews catalogued as 
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factors that govern the court's determination of legal or 
"proximate cause." 
¶43  Judge Andrews said that the duty of ordinary care is 
owed to all who might be injured as a consequence of an 
unreasonably risky (i.e., negligent) act or omission, but he 
also said "there is one limitation.  The damages must be so 
connected with the negligence that the latter may be said to be 
the proximate cause of the former."  Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103. 
The negligence, he said, might be "[a] cause, but not the 
proximate cause.  What we [] mean by the word 'proximate' is, 
that because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense 
of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of 
events beyond a certain point.  This is not logic.  It is 
practical politics."  Id.  This judicial line-drawing relies 
upon "common sense" and "fair judgment," and "endeavor[s] to 
make a rule in each case that will be practical and in keeping 
with the general understanding of mankind."  Id. at 104. 
¶44  Public policy limitations on liability are decided by 
the court as a matter of law, but the majority nevertheless 
considers the "jury's opinion" to be an "aid" to the court in 
making that decision.  Majority op., ¶19.  In this regard, the 
majority seems to be suggesting that the jury should influence 
the court's assessment of whether public policy requires non-
liability as a matter of law.  Courts decide questions of law 
independently, without deference to the jury.  As a practical 
matter, however, most judges find it difficult to throw out a 
jury verdict. 
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¶45  This case is amenable to a pre-trial application of 
the six-factor public policy analysis.  The case is not complex, 
and the historical facts are undisputed.  We do not need a jury 
verdict on negligence, causation, and damages in order to 
determine whether public policy requires nonliability as a 
matter of law.  I agree with the court of appeals that the first 
public policy factor (remoteness) and the third (extraordinary 
result) preclude liability here, even if a jury were to find 
causal negligence on the part of the apartment owner and 
manager.  I would also conclude that the second factor 
(disproportionality of culpability to injury) is implicated in 
this case. 
¶46  Dora Alvarado's injury was unquestionably tragic and 
devastating.  But the accident that caused it occurred because 
she mistook a firework for a candle, and lit that firework in 
the pilot light of an oven that she was cleaning, in an attempt 
to preserve the pilot light flame in case it went out while she 
was vacuuming the oven's interior.  As a matter of law, such an 
injury is too remote from the alleged negligent inspection by 
the apartment owner and manager, as well as too extraordinary 
and too disproportionate to that alleged negligence.  I would 
affirm the court of appeals. 
¶47 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. 
PROSSER, JR. joins this dissent.   
 
 
 
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