Case Title: Woodfield v. West River

Citation: 395 Md. 377

Docket Number: 3/06

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2006-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
In the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case No. C-2003-89084AA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 3
September Term, 2006
______________________________________
WILLIAM R. WOODFIELD, JR., ET AL.
v.
WEST RIVER IMPROVEMENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
       Cathell, J.,  joins in the judgment only.
______________________________________
Filed:   November 6, 2006
1 Maryland Code, Art. 2B, § 9-101(a) provides that a license may not be issued to a
corporation, partnership, or limited liability company, but only to an individual authorized
to act for such an entity.  Presumably, the actual licensee was therefore Woodfield, acting
for Superior Woodfields.  Because, for purposes of the issues actually before us, the
interests of Woodfield and his company are the same, we shall, for convenience, refer
mostly to the company, Superior Woodfields.
The dispute here is over a Class H (Beer, Wine, Liquor) Music and Sunday license
issued by the Board of License Commissioners for Anne Arundel County to William
Woodfield, Jr., acting for Superior Woodfields, L.L.C. (Superior Woodfields).1 Respondent,
West River Improvement Association, along with many members of the Galesville
community, protested the Superior Woodfields application, contending, among other things,
that one Charles Bassford, who already had an interest in two or more other liquor licenses
in the county, would also have an interest in this one, and that the law prohibited a person
from having an interest in more than one license. 
In announcing the Board’s decision to issue the license, the chairman, at least
inferentially, opined that sufficient evidence had not been produced to establish that Bassford
would have any pecuniary interest in the license.  Upon respondent’s petition for judicial
review, however, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County concluded that “by any
reasonable interpretation of the evidence presented, a trier of fact would conclude that Mr.
Bassford has a direct or indirect interest in this applicant [Superior Woodfields] as well as
two other liquor license holders in Anne Arundel County,” and, on that ground, reversed the
Board’s decision.  A divided Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court judgment.
It agreed that the Board “erroneously ignored mounting and uncontroverted testimony that
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Bassford had an interest in the license at issue and two other liquor licenses” in the county.
See Woodfield v. West River, 165 Md. App. 700, 709, 886 A.2d 944, 950 (2005).  
We granted certiorari to determine (1) whether the circuit and intermediate appellate
courts improperly substituted their judgment for that of the Board on the issue of Bassford’s
status, and (2) whether the Circuit Court lost its authority to make any decision in the matter
once 90 days elapsed from the filing of the administrative record with the court.  We shall
hold that, on the record before us, the Circuit Court did not lose its authority to make a
decision but that it failed to give proper deference to the administrative determination
regarding Bassford, and, on that basis, we shall reverse the judgment of the appellate court
and remand with instructions to direct that the decision of the Board be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
On January 23, 2003, William Woodfield, Jr., on behalf of Superior Woodfields, a
limited liability company of which he was the only member, applied for a Class B (Beer,
Wine, Liquor) Music and Sunday license.  In the application, which was under oath,
Woodfield asserted, among other things, that:
 (1) the location of the desired license would be 4701 Woodfield Road in Galesville;
 (2) the owner of that premises was 3809 Crain Limited Partnership;
 (3) the applicant had a pecuniary interest in the business to be conducted under the
license;
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 (4) the applicant was not pecuniarily interested in any other place of business in any
county or Baltimore City where a license under Art. 2B of the Maryland Code had been
applied for or issued; and
 (5) “[n]o person except the applicant(s) is in any way pecuniarily interested in the
license applied for or in the business to be conducted thereunder during the continuance of
the license, if issued.”  (Emphasis added).
Mr. Bassford also signed the application and attested, as president of 3809 Crain, Inc.,
that 3809 Crain, Inc. was the general partner in 3809 Crain Limited Partnership (Crain LP)
and that Crain LP was the owner of the property named in the application.
The Board conducted an evidentiary hearing on the application on April 8, 2003.
Section 10-202(a)(2)(ii) of Art. 2B requires a county licensing board, before issuing a
license, to consider, among other things, the public need and desire for the license, the
number and location of existing licenses, and the impact that the license would have on the
general health, safety, and welfare of the community, including issues relating to crime,
traffic conditions, parking, or convenience.  Section 10-202(a)(2)(iii) requires that an
application be disapproved and that the license be “refused” if the granting of the license is
not necessary for the accommodation of the public, “the applicant has made a material false
statement in [the] application,” or the operation of the business, if the license is granted, will
unduly disturb the peace of the residents in the neighborhood.  
Most of the evidence presented concerned whether the granting of a Class B license
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was in the public interest or would be detrimental to public safety.  The greatest part of the
considerable opposition to the application, from residents in the Galesville area and from the
respondent improvement association, dealt with the asserted lack of public need for the
license and concerns about traffic congestion and safety.  Those issues are not before us.  At
least two opponents raised the question of whether Mr. Bassford, who allegedly had an
interest in two other restaurants in the county with liquor licenses, also would have an
interest in the license at issue.  Counsel for Superior Woodfields, in an opening statement to
the Board, advised that a crab and seafood restaurant would be operated at the site by
Annapolis Produce, Inc., a tenant of Crain LP, that Woodfield and Superior Woodfields
would be the license holder and would “hold and manage the alcoholic beverage operation
at the facility” pursuant to a management agreement between Superior Woodfields and
Annapolis Produce.  That agreement was not placed into evidence, nor were its terms
described in any detail.  Woodfield, he said, had run an ice and seafood business at the
location for many years, and those operations would continue.  No evidence was offered of
whether, or to what extent, Bassford or any company with which he was or would be
associated would receive any of the revenue or profits from the sale of alcoholic beverages.
The issue of Bassford’s status was not formally raised until near the end of the
proceeding, when a representative of the improvement association noted that the Board of
Directors of the association had voted to oppose the application for several reasons, one
being that Mr. Bassford, “while not the applicant owns Woodfields and also owns two (2)
2 Rogers proffered that he had a Dun & Bradstreet report showing Bassford to be
the president of that company.  An objection on the ground of relevance was sustained by
the Board.  The correctness of that ruling has not been raised as an issue by respondents
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of the other liquor license restaurants.”  Another resident also noted in his testimony that
Bassford “already bought” those two restaurants.  A third resident, Mr. Rogers, who had
attempted to raise the issue earlier, repeated the assertion that Bassford owned the two other
restaurants and contended that Bassford was also “the real applicant here” and that there was
“a silent partner, a silent owner in this establishment.”  When asked by the Board what
evidence he had to support that assertion, Rogers admitted that he had none, other than that,
when Bassford and Woodfield appeared at a meeting with the improvement association,
Bassford did all of the talking.  Rogers claimed, however, that, if he were allowed to conduct
discovery, he could probably decipher the relationship between Mr. Bassford and Mr.
Woodfield.  
At that point, the Board chairman questioned Woodfield directly on that issue,
reminding him that he was under oath.  Woodfield responded that Bassford owned the
property, that Annapolis Produce owned the business, and that he would work for Annapolis
Produce and would be one of the managers of the restaurant.  In response to the question,
“Okay, so what’s Mr. Bassford’s financial interest in this license,” Woodfield said, “None.”
He added that the reason he did not speak at the neighborhood meeting is that no one asked
him any questions.
Rogers then retorted that he believed that Bassford owned Annapolis Produce.2  When
in their brief, and we therefore do not address it.
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asked about that, counsel for Woodfields said that, although he believed that Bassford was
“a principal” in Annapolis Produce, he did not know who actually owned the company or
what Bassford’s share of the business was.  Counsel added later that Bassford was not a
member and held no ownership interest in Superior Woodfields, which was the applicant for
the license.  In response to an objection lodged to testimony from another, unidentified
protestant that Bassford owned two other restaurants and a liquor store, the chairman stated
that “the Board will place whatever weight we think is appropriate in the issue of whether
or not Mr. Bassford is a silent owner or not.” He added that “I haven’t been presented any
evidence indicating that he is a silent owner” and that “[t]he mere fact that he owns the land
and acts as the landlord under our rules does not give him a financial interest as being a
owner of this liquor license.”
In its written decision, the Board did not address directly the issue of Bassford’s
status.  In announcing the decision, however, the chairman noted that one of the issues it
needed to address was whether there were any false representations in the application, and,
in that regard, he declared that “notwithstanding the allegation of a silent partner [] there
hasn’t been any credible evidence that has been produce[d] in rising to the level that this
applicant has made any false . . . material statements or committed fraud in the application.”
Given Woodfield’s assertion in the application that no other person had any pecuniary
interest in the license or in the business to be conducted thereunder and his live testimony
3 As noted, Superior Woodfields had applied for a Class B (Beer, Wine, Liquor)
Music and Sunday license.  The Board denied that request and instead issued a Class H
license.  A Class B license authorizes the holder to sell beer, wine, and liquor for
consumption “on the premises or elsewhere.”  See Art. 2B, § 6-201(a).  A Class H
license, in Anne Arundel County, restricts the sale of such beverages to consumption on
the premises.  See § 6-201(c)(3)(i).  Several witnesses testifying in opposition to the
application expressed special concern about sales for off-site consumption.  Neither
Woodfield nor Superior Woodfields has complained about this, or any other, aspect of the
Board’s decision.
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that Bassford had no interest in the license, coupled with the chairman’s immediately
previous statement that he had seen no evidence indicating that Bassford was a “silent
owner,” we take the chairman’s final statement as a finding that Bassford had no such
interest.3
Respondents filed a petition for judicial review on May 6, 2003.  Two months later,
on July 3, they filed a petition for a temporary restraining order and other injunctive relief,
to preclude Superior Woodfields from using the license.  In support of the petition for
injunctive relief, they attached various documents purporting to establish, among other
things, that Bassford had a direct or indirect interest in at least three other liquor licenses, that
he was president of Annapolis Produce, which would operate the restaurant under the
challenged license to Superior Woodfields, and that his lawyer incorporated Superior
Woodfields.  The petition for temporary restraining order was denied upon a finding of
insufficient evidence of immediate and irreparable harm.  
On July 25, 2003, the Board filed the record of its proceedings with the court.  That
triggered the running of Art. 2B,§ 16-101(e)(3).  Section 16-101(e) deals generally with the
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procedures governing an action for judicial review of a liquor board’s decision.  Subsection
(e)(3) provides that, “[u]nless extended by the court for good cause, the local licensing
board’s decision made under subsection (a) of this section shall be affirmed, modified, or
reversed by the court within 90 days after the record has been filed in the court by the local
licensing board.”  The 90 day period expired October 23, 2003.  
On August 4, 2003, the court’s assignment office scheduled a hearing in the matter
for October 27 – four days beyond the 90-day period provided for in § 16-101(e)(3).  Counsel
for Superior Woodfields promptly wrote to the assignment clerk, pointed out the problem,
and suggested an earlier hearing.  Counsel for the protestants, equally concerned, filed a
motion on September 5, attached to which were two alternative proposed orders.  One
proposed order kept the hearing date at October 27 but declared that, because scheduling
conflicts on the part of the court precluded an earlier date, there was good cause to extend
the hearing and any decision in the appeal beyond the 90-day period.  The alternative
proposed order would have rescheduled the hearing for an earlier date.  Superior Woodfields
opposed the request to find good cause for delay and requested again that the hearing be
scheduled prior to October 23.
On October 20, the judge assigned to hear the case signed the proposed order
maintaining the October 27 hearing date and finding that scheduling conflicts constituted
“good cause to extend this hearing and any decision on this appeal beyond the 90 day period
detailed in Art. 2B, §16-101(e)(3).”  The court, through handwritten interlineation, found as
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additional good cause for the extension that the motion for extension and the opposition to
that motion “were not brought to a Judge in time for consideration, due to clerical error.”  For
whatever reason, the order, though showing on its face that it was dated and signed by the
judge on October 20, was not docketed by the clerk until November 14, 2003.  Also on
October 20, the court denied a motion by the protestants to admit into evidence the
documents attached to their petition for injunctive relief, including the Dun & Bradstreet
report referred to by Mr. Rogers at the Board hearing.
At the commencement of the October 27 hearing, counsel represented to the court that
the extension order it had signed extended only the time for the hearing but not the time for
making a decision in the case and suggested that the order be amended to extend further the
time for a decision.  Counsel for Superior Woodfields – the respondent/defendant in the case
– made clear that he did not believe that the court had lost jurisdiction because of the delay
at the Circuit Court level and pointed out, in that regard, that he had not filed a motion to
dismiss the petition for judicial review.  In an exercise of caution, however, the court
announced that it would amend the order “and indicate that having found that there was
cause to extend beyond the 90 days in order to have the hearing and having found that – or
recognizing that there needs to be some sort of a written decision that the Court will extend
the order, 30 days should be adequate from today so that the 27th of November, in order to
4 As we shall discuss later, it would appear that both counsel and the court gave too
narrow a reading to the October 10 order.  Although the first part of it spoke about the
impracticability of setting a hearing before October 23, the operative part made clear that
scheduling conflicts and the delay in presenting the motion for extension constituted good
cause “to extend this hearing and any decision on this appeal” beyond the 90-day period
provided for in § 16-101(e)(3). (Emphasis added).
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have the hearing and issue a written decision.” 4  No amendatory order was ever filed.
On November 14, 2003, the court filed a memorandum opinion and order reversing
the Board’s decision, solely on the ground that its conclusion that Bassford had no pecuniary
interest in the license was clearly erroneous.  The court recounted evidence before the Board
showing that Bassford was the owner of the property on which the proposed restaurant would
be located, that he also was a principal and shareholder in Annapolis Produce – the tenant
that would operate the restaurant – and that he owned at least two other restaurants in the
Galesville area that held liquor licenses.  
The court quoted the two relevant provisions of Art. 2B, § 9-301.  The first states that,
in Anne Arundel and certain other counties:
“[A] person, partnership, firm, or corporation, except by way of
renewal, may not have an interest in more than one license,
whether held or controlled by direct or indirect ownership, by
stock ownership, interlocking directors or interlocking stock
ownership, or in any other manner, directly or indirectly.  It is
the intention of this section to prohibit any person, firm,
partnership or corporation from having any interest, directly or
indirectly, in more than one license.”
The second provision, contained in § 9-301(3)(i), provides, with respect to Anne
Arundel County in particular and subject to certain exceptions which no one suggests are
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applicable:
“In Anne Arundel County, a person, franchisor, franchisee,
chain store operation, partnership, firm or corporation, except by
way of renewal, may not have any interest in more than one
license, whether held or controlled by direct or indirect
ownership, by franchise operation, by chain store operation, by
stock ownership, interlocking directors or interlocking stock
ownership, or in any other manner directly or indirectly.  It is the
intention of this subsection to prohibit any such persons,
franchisor, franchisee, chain store operation, firm, partnership,
or corporation from having any interest, directly or indirectly, in
more than one license.”  
After quoting those provisions, the court concluded:
“The Court finds that by any reasonable interpretation of the
evidence presented, a trier of fact would conclude that Mr.
Bassford has a direct or indirect interest in this applicant as well
as two other liquor license holders in Anne Arundel County,
which would violate § 9-301.  Mr. Bassford has an ownership
interest in both the landlord and the tenant entities.  The tenant
(Annapolis Produce) will own and operate the restaurant.  There
was no evidence that there is a separation between the sale of
food and liquor at the restaurant, or that Bassford would
somehow only have an interest in the food sales but not the
liquor sales.  Similarly, there is no evidence that all the proceeds
from the liquor sales would go only to Mr. Woodfield and/or
Superior Woodfields.  Without such evidence, logic dictates that
the owner of a restaurant that sells liquor has a direct or indirect
interest in the liquor sales . . . . There is no way a reasonable fact
finder could have come to any conclusion other than that Mr.
Bassford has an interest in the sale of liquor, regardless of how
the application to the liquor license was crafted.”
Because, the court declared, the granting of the license violated § 9-301, the Board’s
decision must be deemed against the public interest and, for that reason, illegal.
Woodfield and Superior Woodfields appealed, complaining that the Circuit Court
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erred (1) by substituting its judgment for that of the Board with respect to Bassford’s status,
and (2) by failing to rule on the agency decision within the 90-day period allowed by § 16-
101(e)(3).  The appellate court found no merit in either complaint.  With respect to the
second argument, the court held, first, that both scheduling conflicts and clerical error
justified the extension granted by the court, and that, in any event, the 90-day period was
“directory” rather than “mandatory.” 
On the issue of Bassford’s status, the Court of Special Appeals not only concurred in
the Circuit Court’s analysis but extended somewhat the trial court’s findings.  Relying on the
Dun & Bradstreet report referenced by Mr. Rogers, which was not admitted into evidence
either by the Board or by the Circuit Court, the appellate court found, first, that Bassford was
president of Annapolis Produce and later that he was the “owner” of that entity.  See
Woodfield v. West River, supra, 165 Md. App. at 709 and 712, 886 A.2d at 949 and 951.  The
court concluded that “Bassford, as owner of Annapolis Produce, was the employer of
Woodfield, the licensee, and ran the restaurant,” that “[i]n his capacity as president of
Annapolis Produce, he had, we assume, the power to determine the amount of alcohol the
restaurant purchased, the type of alcohol it purchased, and the sale price of that alcohol,” and
that “Woodfield, as his employee, had little room to complain.”  Id. at 712, 886 A.2d at 951.
(Emphasis added).
DISCUSSION
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Effect of § 16-101(e)(3)
We shall consider first the issue of whether the Circuit Court lost jurisdiction or
authority to render a decision once the 90-day period specified in § 16-101(e)(3) of Art. 2B
expired.  As an alternative ground for holding that authority was not lost, a majority of the
Court of Special Appeals concluded that the statute was “directory” rather than “mandatory.”
We shall not decide the issue precisely on that basis, because, though certainly traditional,
the mandatory/directory approach to determining the consequences of a failure to comply
with a statutory command is an artificial one that addresses the appropriate question in a
circular fashion.  In Tucker v. State, 89 Md. App. 295, 297-98, 598 A.2d 479, 481 (1991),
which dealt with a somewhat similar matter – the failure of a judicial panel to render a
decision within the time set in a statute – the Court of Special Appeals observed:
“In dealing with statutory commands, including time provisions
such as these, courts often speak in terms of whether they are
‘mandatory’ or merely ‘directory’. . . .  The suggestion implicit
from such an analysis is that, if the command is ‘mandatory,’
some fairly drastic sanction must be imposed upon a finding of
noncompliance, whereas if the command is ‘directory,’
noncompliance will result in some lesser penalty, or perhaps no
penalty at all.  That, indeed, is really the issue.  When a
legislative body commands that something be done, using words
such as ‘shall’ or ‘must,’ rather than ‘may’ or ‘should,’ we must
assume, absent some evidence to the contrary, that it was serious
and that it meant for the thing to be done in the manner it
directed.  In that sense, the obligation to comply with the statute
(or rule) is both mandatory and directory.  The relevant question
in such a case is whether the sanction sought for noncompliance
is an appropriate one.”
See also Thanos v. State, 332 Md. 511, 522, 632 A.2d 768, 773 (1993); State v. Green, 367
5 Rule 1-201(a) provides, in relevant part:
“When a rule, by the word “shall” or otherwise, mandates or
prohibits conduct, the consequences of noncompliance are
those prescribed by these rules or by statute.  If no
consequences are prescribed, the court may compel
compliance with the rule or may determine the consequences
of the noncompliance in light of the totality of the
circumstances and the purpose of the rule.”
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Md. 61, 82, 785 A.2d 1275, 1287 (2001); Gorge v. State, 386 Md. 600, 613, 873 A.2d 1171,
1179 (2005), quoting with approval from Tucker.
The Tucker court noted that this Court had essentially adopted that view, with respect
to commands found in the Maryland Rules, in its promulgation of Maryland Rule 1-201.5
The court observed that, although Rule 1-201(a) applies only to the construction of the
Maryland Rules, the standards espoused in it are equally applicable to statutory commands,
and that “[e]ven when applying a ‘mandatory/directory’ standard, the courts have essentially
looked to the context of the enactment and ultimately to the legislative intent in determining
what, if any, sanction to impose for noncompliance.”  Tucker v. State, supra, 89 Md. App.
at 298, 598 A.2d at 481.  Thus, “[i]f the legislative body has provided a sanction for
noncompliance, its intent is clear, and that sanction, if lawful, i.e., Constitutional, has
ordinarily been applied[,]” but “[i]f no clear sanction has been provided, the court has
attempted to discern the overall purpose of the statute and then determine which, if any,
sanction will best further that purpose.”
6 That the two approaches tend to end up at the same place is well illustrated by
Scherr v. Braun, 211 Md. 553, 128 A.2d 388 (1957), where this Court observed:
“Where the directions of a statute look to the orderly and
prompt conduct of business, including the business of a court,
it is generally regarded as directory unless consequences for
failure to act in accordance with the statute are set out. 
Statutory provisions fixing the time for performance of acts
are held to be directory where there are no negative words
restraining the doing of the act after the time specified and no
penalty is imposed for delay.”
Id. at 561, 128 A.2d at 392.  Striking a bit closer to home, the Court, in McCall’s Ferry
Co. v. Price, 108 Md. 96, 112-14, 69 A. 832, 838-39 (1908), concluded that the
Constitutional mandate (Art. IV, § 15 of the Maryland Constitution) that this Court file a
written opinion in every case within three months after argument or submission of the
case was directory and did not preclude the Court from deciding an appeal and filing an
opinion after the three month period ended.
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Although, because of the way in which the Court has gone about pigeon-holing such
statutory commands, the same result is likely to be achieved by using a mandatory/directory
approach – categorizing such commands as either mandatory or directory – we believe that
the Tucker analysis is the better analytical framework for determining the consequence of
noncompliance with a statutory mandate.6  The analysis undertaken by the Court of Appeals
majority fits well within that framework.  As the majority observed, the predecessor statute
to § 16-101(e)(3), enacted in 1943, provided that “[t]he failure of the court to determine an
appeal within a period of 30 days after the record has been filed in court by the local board
as above provided, shall constitute an automatic affirmance of the local board’s decision,
unless the time has been extended by the court for good cause shown,” quoting from Scherr
v. Braun, supra, 211 Md. at 557, 128 A.2d at 389.  (Emphasis in original).  In Scherr, this
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Court construed that statute as “so interwoven with the special authority granted the court as
to be part of it, a limitation on its powers” and thus held that, if the decision was not rendered
within the allowable period and the time for making the decision had not been extended in
accordance with the statute, “the authority given in the first instance to decide or act in the
case is automatically withdrawn . . . .”  Id. at 566, 128 A.2d at 394.  
In 1991, the Legislature amended the statute to delete the default provision that failure
to determine the appeal within the allowed period would constitute an automatic affirmance
and thereby rendered inapposite the result reached in Scherr.  See 1991 Md. Laws, Ch. 560.
That, coupled with the fact that no other default or sanction was incorporated, is the most
powerful evidence that the Legislature did not intend for noncompliance with the now-90-
day period to produce any automatic result.  Compare Brewer v. Brewer, 386 Md. 183, 872
A.2d 48 (2005).
Even if that were not the case, it is clear that the Circuit Court did timely and validly
extend the time for decision in its order of October 20.  The court was aware, from both
sides, that it needed either to decide the case by October 23 or extend the time for making its
decision, and it entered the order that extended the time for both the hearing, then scheduled
for October 27, and for determining the appeal.  No one has even suggested – nor is there
any basis in this record for a suggestion – that the order was not signed, as it purports to have
been, on October 20.  
That the order was not docketed until November 14 is irrelevant.  Although, by virtue
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of Maryland Rule 2-601, a judgment is not effective until docketed by the clerk, no such
requirement exists with respect to routine procedural orders extending the time for an event
to occur.  Those kinds of orders must, of course, be docketed in due course and as promptly
as possible, but so long as the parties are aware of the order, it is not a nullity and does not
ordinarily lose its efficacy prior to its being docketed.  If the law were otherwise, any mishap
or delay by the clerk could frustrate the court’s decision and significantly prejudice a party.
The parties here were clearly aware when they gathered for the hearing on October 27 that
the order had been signed, and no one suggested that the order was not valid and effective,
at least for the purpose of extending the hearing.  The only concern expressed was that it did
not suffice to extend the time for making a decision in the case, which, on its face, it clearly
did.  
Mr. Bassford’s Status
There was unquestionably injected into this case, at the Board level, a suspicion that
Mr. Bassford had a financial interest in at least two existing restaurants in the county that
sold alcoholic beverages in connection with their operation and that he had some sort of
interest in Annapolis Produce – the company that would own and operate the restaurant at
issue here – as well.  Notwithstanding that suspicion and the assertions that generated it, the
Board, at least implicitly, found as a fact that Bassford would have no financial interest in
the license applied for by Woodfield.  The two lower courts disagreed with that finding and
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held, essentially, that there was no substantial evidence to support it. 
The actual evidence before the Board in support of the protestants’ assertions is very,
very thin.  Additional documentary evidence, casting further suspicion that Bassford was
involved in the formation of companies that operated both existing restaurants operating with
a liquor license and in Annapolis Produce, was offered in the Circuit Court but rejected.
Those documents could have been offered to the Board but were not.  They are not, therefore,
in evidence and may not be relied upon in determining the validity of the Board’s decision.
The Court must deal with the record as it is, not as it could have been, and on the record we
have, we cannot conclude that the Board was clearly erroneous in its finding regarding
Bassford.  Art. 2B, § 16-101(e)(1) sets forth the standard to be applied in judicial review
actions from liquor board decisions.  Though articulated differently, the statutory standard
is consistent with the more general law regarding the review of administrative agency
decisions:
“[T]he action of the local licensing board shall be presumed by
the court to be proper and to best serve the public interest.  The
burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner to show that the
decision complained of was against the public interest and that
the local licensing board’s discretion in rendering its decision
was not honestly and fairly exercised, or that such decision was
arbitrary, or procured by fraud, or unsupported by any
substantial evidence, or was unreasonable, or that such decision
was beyond the powers of the local licensing board, and was
illegal.”
Compare Maryland Code, § 10-222(h) of the State Government Article, setting forth the
standard for judicial review under the State Administrative Procedures Act, and see United
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Parcel v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 577, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994) (court’s role in
judicial review of administrative agency decision “limited to determining if there is
substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and
conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous
conclusion of law.”).
The Board had before it Woodfield’s application, in which, under oath, he averred that
no one, other than he, was “in any way pecuniarily interest[ed] in the license applied for or
in the business to be conducted thereunder during the continuance of the license, if issued.”
Woodfield confirmed that statement, under oath, at the hearing when, in direct response to
the Board chairman’s question, he stated that Bassford had no interest in the applied-for
license.  That constituted evidence – substantial evidence, as it came under oath from the
applicant – that Bassford would have no interest in the license.  The Board was entitled to
credit that evidence.  Aside from unsupported statements by protestants that Bassford had an
interest in two other restaurants, all that stood in opposition to Woodfield’s assertion
regarding the license at issue were (1) Rogers’s unsuccessful attempt to show that a Dun &
Bradstreet report indicated that Bassford was president of Annapolis Produce, and (2) the
statement by Woodfield’s counsel that, while he believed that Bassford was a principal of
some kind in Annapolis Produce, he did not know what interest Bassford actually had in the
company.
It may well be that Bassford does, indeed, have a direct or indirect financial interest
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in one or more other licenses and in the license applied for by Woodfield.  The problem is
that clear and persuasive evidence to that effect was not presented to the Board, which acted,
as it had a right to act, upon what was before it.  The courts erred in reversing the Board’s
decision to issue the license.
JUDGMENT 
OF 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
REVERSE JUDGMENT OF CIRCUIT COURT
FOR 
ANNE 
ARUNDEL 
COUNTY 
AND
REMAND CASE TO THAT COURT WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM DECISION OF
BOARD OF LICENSE COMMISSIONERS OF
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY; COSTS IN THIS
COURT 
AND 
IN 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS.
Judge Cathell joins in the judgment only.