Case Title: In re Eadie

Citation: 

Docket Number: S47751

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  December 6, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
L. BRITTON EADIE,
Accused.	
(OSB 96-80, 97-105, 97-109, 97-114; SC S47751)

	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board. 
	Argued and submitted September 10, 2001.
	L. Britton Eadie, West Linn, argued the cause and filed the
brief in propria persona.
	Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar.  
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
De Muniz, and Balmer.*
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is suspended for three years, effective 60 days
from the date of the filing of this decision.
	*Riggs, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	PER CURIAM
	In this lawyer discipline proceeding, the Oregon State
Bar (Bar) charged the accused with statutory violations and
multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility in
connection with his representation of several clients: 
Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(3) (dishonesty and
misrepresentation); DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct prejudicial to
administration of justice); DR 6-101(A) (incompetence); DR 6-101(B) (neglect of client matter); DR 7-102(A)(5) (false
statement during representation); DR 7-106(C)(1) (alluding to
inadmissible evidence); DR 7-106(C)(7) (intentionally or
habitually violating rules of procedure or evidence); DR 7-110(B)
(ex parte communications); ORS 9.460(2) (misleading statements);
and ORS 9.527(4) (willful deceit or misconduct).  A trial panel
of the Disciplinary Board concluded that the accused had violated
DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 6-101(A), DR 7-102(A)(5), DR
7-106(C)(7), and ORS 9.460(2), and recommended that the accused
be disbarred.  Our review is automatic.  BR 10.1.  On de novo
review, BR 10.6, we find that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 6-101(A), DR 7-102(A)(5), DR 7-106(C)(1), and DR 7-106(C)(7).  We conclude that a three-year
suspension from the practice of law is the appropriate sanction.
I.  FACTS AND TRIAL PANEL FINDINGS
	The Bar has the burden of establishing misconduct by
clear and convincing evidence.  BR 5.2.  "Clear and convincing
evidence" means evidence establishing that the truth of the facts
asserted is highly probable.  In re Johnson, 300 Or 52, 55, 707
P2d 573 (1985).  We find proof of the following facts by clear
and convincing evidence.
A.  Burke Matter
	The accused represented Shon in a dispute with her
neighbor, Burke, regarding an easement.  On January 31, 1995, the
accused filed a complaint seeking to terminate Burke's easement
over Shon's property.  The complaint also sought costs and
disbursements. Burke did not retain a lawyer to represent her,
and the parties thereafter negotiated a settlement agreement. 
The agreement provided that Shon would dismiss the complaint in
return for Burke's promises to execute and return a quitclaim
deed, and to remove structures and debris from the property. 
Burke did not file an answer to the complaint.
	On March 8, 1995, in response to a letter that Burke
had written to the accused about the settlement, the accused wrote a letter to Burke summarizing the terms of the settlement
and concluding:
		"The easement is terminated as indicated in your
letter.  The complaint will be dismissed when the
properly executed quit-claim deed is returned and
recorded, as indicated above."
(Emphasis added.) 
	Burke executed and returned the quitclaim deed, and
fulfilled her other duties under the settlement agreement.  The
accused thereafter submitted a proposed form of judgment to the
trial court, with a copy to Burke, that included an award of
costs to Shon.  In his cover letter, the accused informed the
court that he was seeking a prevailing-party fee.  The trial
court returned the proposed judgment to the accused, explaining
that, unless stipulated, Shon was not a prevailing party and that
she therefore was not eligible to recover costs.  Burke also
wrote a letter to the accused stating that she "d[id] not agree
to pay [Shon's] costs and disbursements.
	The accused thereafter attempted to recover costs by
applying to the trial court for a default judgment against Burke,
alleging that Burke had "failed to answer or appear" and not
mentioning the settlement agreement.  The accused did not serve a
copy of the application on Burke.  The court entered the default
judgment, which included an award of costs.  Burke became aware
of the entry of the default judgment only after the accused
demanded payment under the judgment.
	Burke moved to set aside the default judgment on the
basis of "fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct."  ORCP
71 B(1)(c).  The trial court denied the motion.
	In its cause of complaint relating to the Burke matter,
the Bar charged the accused with violating DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-104(A)(4), and DR 7-110(B), in the Burke matter.  The Bar
maintained that the accused made a misrepresentation and engaged
in prejudicial conduct when he reached an agreement with Burke
that did not mention costs, then later attempted to improve on
the settlement by filing a judgment of dismissal that included an
award of costs.  The Bar also alleged that the accused engaged in
a written communication with the court on the merits of an
adversary proceeding without delivering a copy to the opposing
party when he submitted the proposed default judgment to the
court without serving a copy on Burke.
	The trial panel concluded, apparently on grounds of
issue preclusion, that the trial court's denial of Burke's motion
to set aside the default judgment under ORCP 71 B(1)(c) precluded
the trial panel from finding a disciplinary violation.  The trial
panel also found that, because Burke had not filed an answer to
Shon's complaint, she "had not filed an appearance in the
litigation that would have entitled her to notice" from the
accused regarding the accused's application for a default
judgment.  Accordingly, the trial panel concluded that the
accused had not violated DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), or 7-110(B) as charged.
B.  Collins Matter
	In 1996, the accused represented Collins in a personal
injury action against Harbertson, the driver of a car that
allegedly had struck Collins.  Safeco, Harbertson's insurer,
retained lawyers Brisbee, Mead, and Johnston to represent
Harbertson.
	After the accused had filed a complaint against
Harbertson, the trial judge set pretrial conference and trial
dates.  Harbertson's lawyers thereafter moved to strike portions
of the complaint.  After successfully arguing the motion to
strike, Mead gave the accused a proposed order for submission to
the judge. The accused objected to the proposed order and added:
	"* * * My notes indicate that [the judge] specifically
stated that this matter would be put back on the trial
docket, I think he intended that it would be scheduled
for trial earlier than May 1996? [Question mark in original.]  An order to that effect would be appropriate."
The accused then submitted a proposed order to the judge,
rescheduling the pretrial conference and trial dates.  In a
letter accompanying the proposed order, the accused stated:
		"I believe that this proposed form of order
accurately reflects your findings and rulings on
defendants' motion and your intent as to rescheduling
the pre-trial and trial dates in this case."
(Emphasis added.)  After the judge signed the accused's proposed
order, Brisbee reminded the judge that he had not discussed
changing the pretrial conference and trial dates, and questioned
whether the judge had contemplated doing so.  The judge agreed
with Brisbee and modified the order to delete the date changes
that the accused had submitted to the judge.
	In April 1996, Brisbee scheduled a hearing before a
different judge on a motion to compel production.  The day before
the hearing, the accused, without serving Harbertson's lawyers,
filed a written motion to disqualify that judge. Harbertson's
lawyers did not learn about the accused's motion until they
appeared before the judge, who sent them to a courtroom where a
different judge was presiding.  When they arrived at that
courtroom, however, the accused announced that he planned to file
an affidavit of prejudice against that judge as well.  After a
period of delay, a third judge heard the defense motion to compel
production.
	Several months later, on October 6, 1996, a judge in
the Collins litigation imposed a sanction on the accused for
filing a meritless discovery motion.  Ten days later, on October
16, 1996, the accused served a subpoena duces tecum on a Safeco
employee to produce Safeco's file on the Collins/Harbertson
accident by October 24, 1996.  Brisbee told Johnston to file a
motion to quash the subpoena.  Because the accused's subpoena
required production in only eight days, Johnston acted quickly. 
On October 16, the day that the accused served the subpoena,
Johnston called the accused and left a telephone voice message,
stating that she wanted to discuss her intent to file a motion to
quash and that, if she did not hear from him, she would appear in
court ex parte on October 18, 1996, to request an expedited
hearing on the motion.  Johnston's secretary also telephoned the
accused and told him of Johnston's plan.  In response to that
information, the accused told the secretary, among other things,
"I object," and hung up. Later, Johnston's secretary attempted
to send the accused a facsimile copy of the motion to quash, but
the facsimile would not go through, and no one answered the
telephone at the accused's office. Johnston then told her law
clerk, Morrow, to deliver a copy of the motion to the accused's
office.  Morrow went to the accused's office on the evening of
October 17, 1996.  Morrow saw the accused through a glass door
and told him that he had documents to deliver.  The accused would
not open the door, so Morrow told the accused that he was leaving
the documents and placed them in the door jamb while the accused
watched. (1)
	On October 18, 1996, Johnston appeared in court and
received a date for the hearing on the motion to quash.  The
accused did not appear.  Johnston then sent the accused a
facsimile letter stating the date and time for the hearing.  The
accused responded by writing a letter that accused Brisbee and
Johnston of "judge shopping," and stated that the accused neither
had been served with the motion to quash nor had been advised
that Johnston planned to appear in court to request a hearing
date on the motion.  The accused sent copies of that letter to
two Washington County judges.  At a hearing on October 22, 1996,
the accused told the judge:  "[T]hey didn't even attempt to
confer with me.  There was no one that made any effort to
communicate with me in my office in any way whatsoever."
	The case of Collins v. Harbertson eventually was tried
to a jury, which returned a defense verdict.  The court
thereafter imposed sanctions on the accused for failing to obey
discovery orders.
	In its causes of complaint relating to the Collins
matter, the Bar alleged that the accused had violated DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 7-102(A)(5), ORS 9.460(2), and ORS
9.527(4) by seeking to have the judge change the pretrial
conference and trial dates.  The Bar alleged that the accused had
violated DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 7-102(A)(5), ORS
9.460(2), and ORS 9.527(4) by telling several judges that
opposing counsel had made no effort to notify him of Johnston's
ex parte court appearance.  Finally, the Bar alleged that the
accused had violated DR 7-106(C)(7) and DR 7-110(B) by failing to
serve the written motion to disqualify the trial judge on
Harbertson's lawyers.  According to the Bar, an established rule
of procedure required him to do so.
	The trial panel found that the accused had violated DR
1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), and ORS 9.460 by misrepresenting to
the court its intentions regarding scheduling in Collins v.
Harbertson.  However, the trial panel held that the accused did
not violate ORS 9.527(4) or DR 7-110(B). (2)
	The trial panel also found that it could not determine
whether the accused had received the telephone messages from
Johnston or her secretary, or Johnston's facsimile about the
hearing on scheduling the defense motion to quash.  However, the
trial panel accepted Morrow's testimony that Morrow had delivered
the papers, and it specifically refused to credit the accused's
testimony on that point.  The trial panel found that the accused
violated DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 1-102(A)(4). (3)
C.  Cassady Matter
	The accused represented Cassady against Huber in a
personal injury action in which the sole issue was damages. 
During jury selection in the case, the accused improperly
mentioned Huber's insurance coverage. See OEC 411 (limiting
admissibility of evidence concerning liability insurance);
Johnson v. Hansen, 237 Or 1, 4, 389 P2d 330 (1964) (unnecessary
injection of insurance information prejudicial).  Although the
jury selection proceedings were not transcribed, the judge who
presided over the trial testified at the disciplinary hearing
that, when a potential juror raised the issue of insurance, the
accused responded that there was plenty of insurance to go around
and that the jury should not worry about it.  During trial, the
accused again raised the issue of Huber's insurance coverage,
contrary to the judge's repeated admonitions not to do so. 
	During the course of the trial in Cassady v. Huber, the
accused did not appear to be prepared for trial and was either 
unfamiliar with or unwilling to comply with the rules of
evidence.  For example, during his direct examination of a
physician that the accused had called as an expert on Cassady's
behalf, he handed the witness a stack of medical bills that the
witness had not seen previously and asked him whether the bills
were reasonable and necessary.  It also became evident during the
trial that the accused had failed to order a copy of the
transcript of Cassady's deposition.  Accordingly, he was
unprepared when defense counsel used that deposition transcript
at trial to impeach Cassady. 
	The accused also ignored the trial court's evidentiary
rulings.  For example, the accused repeatedly attempted to
introduce hearsay, despite the trial court's repeated rulings
that those reports and opinions were inadmissible. Moreover,
during his direct examination of Cassady's treating physician,
the accused asked the physician questions about which the
physician had no personal knowledge and then ignored the court's
rulings about those questions.
	The jury began its deliberations in Cassady v. Huber
late on the second day of trial.  According to the trial judge,
the case could have been tried more quickly if the accused had
been prepared and competent.  The jury awarded Cassady
compensatory damages. 
	Huber promptly paid the amount that she owed under the
judgment, and the accused accepted satisfaction of the judgment
on Cassady's behalf.  Thereafter, the accused filed a motion for
a new trial.  Huber opposed the motion, arguing that there was no
legal basis for the motion and requesting sanctions against the
accused for having filed it. See Nickerson and Nickerson, 296 Or
516, 520, 678 P2d 730 (1984) (party cannot accept benefits of
judgment and also pursue course that might overthrow right to
benefits).  The court set a hearing date on the motion for a new
trial and notified the accused of that date.  The accused failed
to appear despite the court's efforts to contact him.  The court
held the accused in contempt and, in its contempt order, noted
that the accused's affidavit accompanying his motion for a new
trial was "full of inaccuracies." (4)  The court also denied
Cassady's motion for a new trial.  Following a subsequent hearing
on the defense motion for sanctions against the accused for
having filed the motion for a new trial, the trial court imposed
sanctions on the accused for filing the baseless motion for a new
trial and for making false statements in the affidavit that
accompanied the motion. (5)
	In its cause of complaint relating to the Cassady
matter, the Bar charged the accused with violating DR 6-101(A),
DR 6-101(B), DR 7-106(C)(1), and DR 7-106(C)(7). (6)
	The trial panel concluded that the accused had failed
to represent Cassady competently, in violation of DR 6-101(A),
and that he intentionally or habitually had violated procedural
and evidentiary rules, in violation of DR 7-106(C)(7).  However,
the trial panel concluded that the Bar had not shown that the
accused had neglected a legal matter in representing Cassady, in
violation of DR 6-101(B), or that he had alluded to inadmissible
evidence, in violation of DR 7-106(C)(1). (7)
D.  Martin Matter
	The accused represented Martin in a personal injury
case for injuries that she received when a kitchen cabinet in her
apartment fell on her. The complaint that the accused filed on
Martin's behalf named many defendants, including various
subcontractors and others, some of whom later provided evidence
that they should not have been named as defendants.
	Several of the defendants named in the complaint filed
motions for summary judgment, and the accused delegated
responsibility for opposing those motions to a new associate in
his office, Gresham.  Gresham had minimal legal experience and
never before had opposed a motion for summary judgment.  The
accused was aware of Gresham's inexperience, but he assigned the
matter to Gresham nonetheless.
	To respond to each defendant's motion for summary
judgment, Gresham needed to submit documents or affidavits on
Martin's behalf that would show the court that there was a
genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial.  ORCP 47 C. 
Rather than doing so, Gresham opposed the motions orally, relying
solely on legal arguments. The trial court granted the defense
motions, then stated: 
		"I will be fairly blunt.  I suspect that at least
half the motions I just granted could have been
overcome by appropriate documents had they been filed. 
Without their being filed, I can't do the right thing. 
I have to do the legally required thing * * *." 
	Thereafter, the trial court imposed sanctions on the
accused for failing to investigate information suggesting that
claims against several of the defendants whom he had named in the
complaint should have been dismissed.  See ORCP 17 C (authorizing
imposition of sanctions against lawyers who file pleadings not
based on lawyer's "reasonable knowledge, information and belief,
formed after the making of such inquiry as is reasonable under
the circumstances").  According to the court, the accused's
conduct was "the most egregious set of circumstances I have ever
seen." 
	In its cause of complaint relating to the Martin
matter, the Bar charged the accused with violating DR 6-101(A)
and DR 6-101(B).  The trial panel concluded that the accused did
not represent Martin competently, in violation of DR 6-101(A). 
However, the trial panel concluded that the Bar had not shown
that the accused had neglected a legal matter entrusted to him,
and it therefore dismissed the charge under DR 6-101(B).
E.  Trial Panel Sanction Determination
	The trial panel concluded that, in view of the prior
disciplinary record and the ethical violations found by the trial
panel arising out of four separate cases, and involving numerous
and factually separate circumstances, "disbarment is the only way
to protect the public and the integrity of the profession." 
II.  ISSUES ON REVIEW
A.  Burke Matter
	1.  DR 1-102(A)(3)
	It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "[e]ngage
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation."  DR 1-102(A)(3).  To violate the rule, an
accused's misrepresentations, whether direct or by omission, must
be knowing, false, and material in the sense that the
misrepresentations would or could significantly influence the
hearer's decision-making process.  See In re Kluge, 332 Or 251,
255, 19 P3d 938 (2001) (so stating).
	As a threshold matter, we address whether the trial
court's denial of Burke's motion to set aside the default
judgment under ORCP 71 B(1)(c) precluded the trial panel from
holding that the accused had violated DR 1-102(A)(3).  Although
there may be circumstances in which the doctrine of issue
preclusion would prevent consideration of a claim that a lawyer
had violated a disciplinary rule, issue preclusion plays no role
here.  Issue preclusion requires, among other things, that the
party sought to be precluded was a party (or was in privity with
a party) to the prior proceeding and that the party sought to be
precluded had a full and fair opportunity to be heard on that
issue.  See Nelson v. Emerald People's Utility Dist., 318 Or 99,
104, 862 P2d 1293 (1993) (setting out elements of issue
preclusion).  The Bar neither was a party nor was in privity with
a party in Shon v. Burke.  Even assuming that the terms "fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct" under ORCP 71 B(1)(c)
mean the same as "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation" under DR 1-102(A)(3), the Bar did not have a
full and fair opportunity to be heard in the hearing on Burke's
motion under ORCP 71 B(1)(c) to set aside the default judgment. 
The trial panel was not constrained by principles of issue
preclusion from finding that the accused intentionally had
misrepresented the question of payment of court costs in his
settlement letter to Burke and that Burke had relied on the
omission to her detriment.
	We turn to the merits on this issue.  The Bar contends
that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 1-102(A)(4) by
making a misrepresentation by omission to Burke in the settlement
agreement and by applying for a default judgment that included
costs after he had told Burke that he would dismiss the complaint
once she had complied with the terms of the settlement agreement. 
The accused contends that his conduct was not unethical.
	We find that the accused intentionally omitted from the
settlement agreement his intent to seek costs.  The complaint
that the accused filed in Shon v. Burke made clear that the
accused sought costs.  However, Burke objected to paying costs. 
Burke's objection indicates that, to her, the matter of costs was
an important element of the settlement.  The settlement agreement
that the accused sent to Burke made no mention of costs, leading
Burke to believe that the settlement did not include them.  The
accused intentionally failed to disclose a material fact -- 
namely, that he intended to seek costs -- to obtain Burke's
acquiescence to settle her dispute with Shon.  The accused
violated DR 1-102(A)(3).
	We turn to the accused's submission of a default
judgment to the court that contained an award of costs to Shon
after the parties had settled the case.  As we have explained,
the accused concealed his intent to recover costs against Burke
by not including them in the settlement agreement.  After Burke
had agreed to the settlement and had complied with its terms, she
was entitled to believe that the matter was resolved and that the
accused would dismiss the action.  The accused did not inform
Burke that he intended to seek a default judgment notwithstanding
the settlement.  The accused's failure to correct a false
impression created by nondisclosure of a material fact -- that
the settlement agreement did not resolve completely the case of
Shon v. Burke -- was a misrepresentation under DR 1-102(A)(3).
		2.  DR 1-102(A)(4)
	It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "[e]ngage
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." 
DR 1-102(A)(4).  To establish a violation of that rule, the Bar
must show:  (1) that the accused lawyer engaged in "conduct" by
doing something that the lawyer should not have done or by
failing to do something that the lawyer was supposed to do; (2)
that the conduct occurred during the course of a judicial
proceeding or another proceeding that has the trappings of a
judicial proceeding; and (3) that the conduct was prejudicial
because it involved several acts that caused some harm to the
administration of justice or because it involved a single act
that caused substantial harm to the administration of justice. 
In re Gustafson, 327 Or 636, 643, 968 P2d 367 (1998).
	The Bar argues that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(4)
by applying for a default judgment for costs against Burke,
contrary to the settlement agreement that called for dismissal of
Shon's action against Burke, and by failing to give Burke notice,
under ORCP 69 A(1), of his intent to apply for a default
judgment.  The Bar contends that Burke's "substantive interests
were substantially and adversely affected by the Accused's
conduct." 
	As we have explained above, to establish a violation of
DR 1-102(A)(4), the Bar must satisfy all three prongs of the test
summarized in Gustafson.  Here, the Bar has not demonstrated that
the accused's conduct in applying for the default judgment was an
act that caused substantial harm to the administration of
justice.  To the extent that the Bar makes an argument regarding
the "prejudice" prong of that test in this matter, it focuses
solely on prejudice to Burke, not on prejudice to the
administration of justice.  The Bar has not met its burden of
proving that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(4).
	3.  DR 7-110(B)
	Unless otherwise authorized by law, it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to communicate in writing on the merits
with a judge or an official before whom the proceeding is pending
unless the lawyer "promptly delivers a copy of the writing to
opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the adverse party is
not represented by a lawyer."  DR 7-110(B)(2).  This court has
construed the term "on the merits" in that rule to include
procedural as well as substantive matters.  In re Schenck, 320 Or
94, 103, 879 P2d 863 (1994).  
	The Bar contends that the accused violated DR 7-110(B)
by failing to notify Burke of his intent to apply for a default
judgment.  The accused responds that he was not required to
provide Burke with notice because he was "authorized by law"
under ORCP 69 A(1) not to do so.
	ORCP 69 A(1) requires a party seeking a default
judgment to provide the opposing party with written notice at
least ten days prior to the entry of the order of default
	"[i]f the party against whom an order of default is
sought has filed an appearance in the action, or has
provided written notice of intent to file an appearance
to the party seeking an order of default[.]"
(Emphasis added.)  It is undisputed that Burke did not file an
answer to Shon's complaint and sought instead to settle the case. 
The Bar contends that, by informing the accused before the
settlement that she objected to paying his costs, Burke triggered
the ten-day notice requirement in ORCP 69 A(1).  The Bar relies
on Morrow Co. Sch. Dist. v. Oreg. Land and Water Co., 78 Or App
296, 300 n 4, 716 P2d 766 (1986), for the proposition that
"almost anything that indicates that a party is interested in the
case will suffice" to trigger the ten-day notice requirement in
ORCP 69 A(1).
	The Bar reads too much into that statement in Morrow. 
By its terms, ORCP 69 A(1) requires notice to an opposing party
only if the party has filed an appearance or provided written
notice of an intent to file an appearance.  The legal meaning of
the word "appearance" is "[a] coming into court as a party" or
"[a] formal proceeding by which a defendant submits himself to
the jurisdiction of the court."  Black's Law Dictionary, 97 (6th
ed 1990).  Burke's letter to the accused stating that she was
opposed to paying costs was not an "appearance" as that term is
used in ORCP 69 A(1).  The accused was not required to serve
Burke with notice that he intended to apply for a default
judgment.  See ORCP 9 A (no service required on parties in
default for failure to appear).  Because an exception to the
general rule requiring notice was "authorized by law," the
accused did not violate DR 7-110(B).
B.  Collins Matter
		1.  DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 7-102(A)(5)
	As we have discussed above, a lawyer commits
professional misconduct by knowingly engaging in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  DR 1-102(A)(3).  The misrepresentation must be material.  Moreover, in
representing a client or the lawyer's own interests, the lawyer
shall not "[k]nowingly make a false statement of law or fact." 
DR 7-102(A)(5).
	The Bar contends that the accused knowingly caused the
trial judge in the Collins matter to sign an order containing a
provision that the judge had not considered regarding the
pretrial and trial dates in Collins v. Harbertson.  The accused
does not respond.
	At the trial panel hearing, the accused testified that
he recalled hearing the judge mention that he wished to change
the pretrial conference and trial dates in Collins v. Harbertson. 
Harberton's lawyers testified that the judge had made no such
statement.  Assessing the witnesses' testimony, which was the
only evidence regarding those charges, we agree with the trial
panel that the accused knowingly misrepresented the judge's
intent regarding the scheduling of Collins v. Harbertson.  The
misrepresentation was material in that it affected the judge's
decision-making process about the scheduling of the trial.  The
accused violated DR-102(A)(3) and DR 7-102(A)(5).
	We agree with the trial panel's finding that the
accused made a knowing misrepresentation to two Washington County
judges when he stated that Johnston and Brisbee had made no
effort to notify him before filing the motion to quash the
accused's subpoena.  Even assuming that the accused did not
receive either Johnston's voice mail message or the facsimile,
the record nonetheless establishes that Johnston and Brisbee
attempted to consult with the accused through Morrow, and that
the accused's contrary assertion was a knowing misrepresentation
in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 7-102(A)(5).
	2.  DR 1-102(A)(4)
	Our finding that the accused made misrepresentations in
violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) establishes that the accused did
something that he was not supposed to do, thus satisfying the
first prong of the three-pronged test for finding a violation of
DR 1-102(A)(4), described earlier in this opinion.  See
Gustafson, 327 Or at 643 (summarizing three-pronged test).  The
accused's conduct occurred during the course of a judicial
proceeding in the case of Collins v. Harbertson, thereby
satisfying the second prong.  The proposed order that the accused
submitted to the judge changing the pretrial and trial dates
contained a misrepresentation that was calculated to induce the
judge to acquiesce to a trial date that the accused preferred. 
Changing the trial date substantially harmed the administration
of justice, satisfying the third -- or prejudice -- prong.  The
accused's misrepresentation made it necessary for the judge to
resolve the dispute that arose as a result of the accused's
misrepresentation and to redraft his order.  See In re Meyer (I),
328 Or 211, 214, 970 P2d 652 (1999) (harm under DR 1-102(A)(4)
can occur when procedural functioning of a case or hearing is
impaired; harm may be actual or potential).  The accused violated
DR 1-102(A)(4).
		3.  DR 7-110(B)
	As previously noted, DR 7-110(B) provides that, unless
otherwise authorized by law, it is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to communicate in writing on the merits with a judge or an
official before whom the proceeding is pending unless the lawyer
"promptly delivers a copy of the writing to opposing counsel or
to the adverse party if the adverse party is not represented by a
lawyer."
	The Bar contends that the accused violated that rule by
failing to serve opposing counsel with his written motion to
disqualify the trial judge.  The motion was "on the merits" in
Collins v. Harbertson.  The accused does not dispute that he
filed a written motion on the merits.  However, he contends that
he filed his motion to disqualify under ORS 14.270 (8) and that
nothing in that statute requires service "upon anyone or any
entity other than the court."  
	The accused's reliance on ORS 14.270 is misplaced.  
That statute provides that, under certain circumstances, notice
to the court may be oral.  The statute creates no exception to
the general rule regarding service of a written motion on
opposing counsel.  See ORCP 9 A (unless excepted by rule, "every
written motion * * * shall be served upon each of the parties").  
The accused violated DR 7-110(B) by failing to serve notice of
the written motion to disqualify on opposing counsel. (9)
C.  The Cassady Matter
		1.  DR 6-101(A)
	A lawyer must provide "competent representation to a
client," which requires "the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."  DR
6-101(A).  This court has held that determining whether a lawyer
acted incompetently, in violation of that rule, is a fact-specific inquiry:
		"The question whether a lawyer has competently
represented a client is, of course, a fact-specific
inquiry.  A review of this court's cases shows that
incompetence often is found where there is a lack of
basic knowledge or preparation, or a combination of
those factors.
		"In contrast, lawyers have been found not guilty
of providing incompetent representation where the
lawyers showed experience and professional ability to
perform work, or where the Bar failed to prove that a
position taken by the lawyer was 'advanced in pretense
or bad faith, or in culpable ignorance.'  In sum,
competence or incompetence can best be measured on a
case-by-case basis using the standard stated in DR
6-101(A) itself."
In re Gastineau, 317 Or 545, 553-54, 857 P2d 136 (1993) (footnote
and citations omitted).
	In its cause of complaint, the Bar alleged that the
accused failed to represent Cassady competently at trial.  The
Bar identifies many deficiencies in the accused's performance,
ranging from repeatedly asking witnesses questions about which
they had no knowledge and asking witnesses to give opinions about
reports that were not in evidence, to his inability to
authenticate or establish proper foundations for evidence.  The
accused responds that Greene "did not offer any specific basis *
* * as to whether the accused had performed his duties in a
competent manner in the Cassady trial."
	Our review of the record substantiates the Bar's
contention that the accused did not represent Cassady competently
at trial.  Several examples demonstrate the accused's lack of
legal knowledge, skill, or preparation.  First, the accused
repeatedly attempted to inject the issue of Huber's insurance at
the trial.  The trial judge admonished the accused many times not
to mention insurance.  Nonetheless, the accused continued to do
so.  The accused persists in his belief that the jury was
entitled to hear evidence about Huber's insurance coverage and
that the evidence would have been admissible had it not been for
the judge's bias against the accused. 
	Second, the accused was not prepared for trial.  Greene
testified that it is "absolutely essential" for a lawyer to have
a copy of the client's deposition transcript at trial so that the
client does not mistakenly make statements inconsistent with the
client's prior testimony.  The accused did not order a copy of
Cassady's deposition transcript for use at trial.  In addition,
the accused failed to show Cassady's medical bills to his own
medical expert before trial, causing the expert to be unprepared
to testify at trial. 
	Third, during the trial, the accused attempted to show
the jury through the testimony of Cassady's treating physician
that Cassady had a good work ethic, even though the physician had
no knowledge of her work ethic.  The accused appeared to be
oblivious to that problem.
	Fourth, the accused repeatedly posed questions to
witnesses seeking hearsay or other incompetent evidence, a
practice that he continued even after the trial judge had ruled
the evidence inadmissible.  Fifth, the accused made multiple
unfounded objections during the trial.  Finally, the accused
moved for a new trial after accepting satisfaction of judgment on
Cassady's behalf, despite the long-established rule that a party
cannot move for a new trial after accepting the benefits of a
judgment in its favor.  See Snipes v. Beezley, 5 Or 420, 422
(1875) (too late to move for new trial after receiving payment on
judgment).  The accused's conduct at Cassady's trial reveals a
lack of understanding of basic legal concepts concerning the
conduct of a trial and the consequences of accepting satisfaction
of a judgment.
	Both the trial judge in the Cassady trial and Greene
testified that the accused had performed incompetently in the
Cassady trial.  According to the judge, "in 14 years, it was the
worst presentation by an attorney I've ever seen."  On de novo
review, we find that the accused performed incompetently in his
representation of Cassady at trial.  The accused violated DR 6-101(A). 
	2.  DR 7-106(C)(1) and DR 7-106(C)(7)
	In appearing in the lawyer's professional capacity
before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not "[s]tate or allude to any
matter that the lawyer has no reasonable basis to believe is
relevant to the case or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence," DR 7-106(C)(1), or "[i]ntentionally or habitually
violate any established rule of procedure or of evidence," DR 7-106(C)(7).
	The Bar contends that, in the Cassady matter, the
accused violated both those rules by referring to Huber's
insurance coverage during voir dire and during the trial itself
after the judge had admonished him not to do so.  The accused
acknowledges that he made several references to insurance but
apparently believes that he was entitled to do so.
	The Bar's expert witness, Greene, testified that the
rules do not allow a lawyer to discuss insurance during voir dire
in a personal injury case and that the accused's repeated
references to Huber's insurance could have caused a mistrial. 
Even without instruction from the court, the accused should have
known that evidence of Huber's insurance was not admissible. 
However, in light of the judge's repeated warnings that the
accused was not to mention insurance coverage, the accused had no
reasonable basis for believing that he was entitled to do so.
	The accused's reference to insurance was intentional. 
The accused had filed a motion in limine to prevent Huber's
witnesses from mentioning any collateral sources of payment that
Cassady might have received.  That motion established that the
accused understood that insurance could be a sensitive subject at
trial.  Although he had sought the trial court's aid in
preventing Huber's witnesses from referring to insurance payments
that Cassady might have received, the accused nonetheless
repeatedly attempted to inform the jury that Huber had insurance
coverage.  The accused violated DR 7-106(C)(1) and DR 7-106(C)(7).
D.  Martin Matter
		1.  DR 6-101(A)
	As discussed above, DR 6-101(A) requires a lawyer to
represent clients competently.  The Bar alleged that the accused
had violated that rule by delegating Martin's response to the
defense motions for summary judgment to Gresham and then failing
to supervise Gresham adequately.  The accused responds that he
provided what he believed to be reasonable supervision of
Gresham, but he faults Gresham for failing to confer with the
accused on important matters. The accused also contends that
Gresham's testimony that the accused did not give him any
guidance in preparing to oppose the summary judgment motions was
biased, that Gresham obviously had been coached by the Bar
regarding his testimony, and that time records should clearly
demonstrate Gresham's failure to confer with the accused on
important matters.
	Before the trial panel, Gresham testified that, when
the accused assigned him to oppose the defense motions for
summary judgment in the Martin case, Gresham had had no
experience in handling such matters and that he had received no
guidance from the accused.  In his deposition, the accused stated
that he had not conferred with Gresham about how to oppose the
motions for summary judgment and that, when the accused learned
that Gresham had not filed the documents required to create
material issues of fact, the accused, like everyone else in his
office with whom he spoke about the matter, was appalled.  Before
the trial panel, by contrast, the accused testified that he
thought he had supervised Gresham adequately.  As noted, the
accused contends before this court that he provided Gresham what
the accused believed to be reasonable supervision in the Martin
case.
	The accused does not dispute that he had supervisory
responsibility for Gresham or that he was Martin's attorney of
record.  We find it highly probable that, consistent with the
accused's deposition testimony, the accused did not supervise
Gresham's opposition to the defense motions for summary judgment
in the Martin matter.  The accused violated DR 6-101(A).  See In
re Spies, 316 Or 530, 538, 852 P2d 831 (1993) (lawyer failed to
act competently, in part, by failing to prepare certified law
student to handle hearing).
		2.  DR 6-101(B)
	DR 6-101(B) provides that a lawyer "shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to the lawyer."  The Bar also alleged
that, by entrusting opposition of the summary judgment motions to
Gresham, the accused violated that rule.  The accused responds
that Gresham had the requisite qualifications to be an effective
advocate for clients in litigation.
	To prove a violation of DR 6-101(B), the Bar must show
a "course" of negligent conduct.  In re Meyer (II), 328 Or 220,
225, 970 P2d 647 (1999).  The Bar has failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the accused has engaged in a
"course" of negligent conduct in violation of DR 6-101(B).
E.  Summary
	In sum, we find that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) in both the Burke and Collins matters; DR 1-102(A)(4),
DR 7-102(A)(5), and DR 7-110(B) in the Collins matter; DR 6-101(A), DR 7-106(C)(1) and DR 7-106(C)(7) in the Cassady matter;
and DR 6-101(A) in the Martin matter.  Those violations fall into
four categories:  misrepresentation and conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice; incompetence; ex parte contact;
and misconduct at trial.  We turn to the appropriate sanction. 
In that regard, the Bar argues that this court should affirm the
trial panel sanction and disbar the accused.  The accused
responds that the complaint should be dismissed.
III.  SANCTION
	In arriving at the appropriate sanction for lawyer
misconduct, this court makes a preliminary determination by
consulting the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards). 
Gustafson, 327 Or at 652.  The ABA Standards direct us to analyze
the accused's misconduct in light of the following factors:  the
duty violated, the accused's mental state at the time of the
misconduct, the actual or potential injury that the accused's
misconduct caused, and the existence of any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.  ABA Standard 3.0.  Finally, we analyze
this court's case law to determine the sanction that should be
imposed in the particular situation.  In re Devers, 328 Or 230,
241, 974 P2d 191 (1999).
	We analyze the factors described above with respect to
each of the categories of misconduct identified in this case: 
misrepresentation and conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice; incompetence; ex parte contact; and misconduct at
trial.
A.  Preliminary Determination
		1.  Misrepresentation and Conduct Prejudicial to        
       Administration of Justice
	The accused's misrepresentations in the Burke and
Collins matters violated his duty to the public to maintain
personal integrity.  ABA Standard 5.1.  The accused violated his
duty to the legal system to refrain from making false statements
and misrepresentations.  ABA Standard 6.1.
	We find that the accused's misrepresentations were
intentional.  That is, the accused acted with a conscious
objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.  ABA
Standards at 7.  In the Burke matter, the accused intentionally
submitted a default judgment for the purpose of being awarded
costs after leading Burke to believe that he would dismiss Shon's
action if Burke agreed to the settlement.  The accused's
dishonesty caused Burke actual injury, because a default judgment
was entered against her. 
	In the Collins matter, the accused wanted the pretrial
and trial dates changed, and he intentionally misrepresented to
the trial judge that the judge had intended to change those
dates.  The accused also intentionally told several judges in the
Collins matter that opposing counsel had made no effort to notify
the accused of the hearing to quash the subpoena that the accused
had issued to the Safeco employee, apparently with the motive to
impugn the integrity of opposing counsel.  The accused's
intentional misrepresentations created the potential for
significant injury.  As noted, the accused's misrepresentations
to the trial judge regarding the "changed" pretrial conference
and trial dates caused substantial harm to the administration of
justice.  The accused's misrepresentations in the Burke and
Collins matters seriously adversely reflect on his fitness to
practice law.
	ABA Standard 5.11(b) makes disbarment the appropriate
sanction when a lawyer engages in intentional, albeit
noncriminal, misconduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects upon the
lawyer's fitness to practice law.  ABA Standard 6.11 generally
makes disbarment the appropriate sanction when a lawyer, with the
intent to deceive the court, makes a false statement and causes
serious or potentially serious injury to a party or causes a
significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the
legal proceeding.  The ABA Standards call for such a harsh
sanction because, as explained in the introduction to ABA
Standard 5.0, "[t]he most fundamental duty which a lawyer owes
the public is the duty to maintain the standards of personal
integrity upon which the community relies."  The ABA Standards
suggest that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for the
accused's misrepresentations.
		2.  Incompetence 
	Having agreed to represent a client, a lawyer must be
competent to perform the services requested.  ABA Standard 4.0. 
It is evident from the record that the accused tenaciously
represented Cassady and believes that he did so competently.
However, tenacity is not the same as competence, and, as our
review of the record has shown, the accused did not represent
either Cassady or Martin competently.  In the Cassady litigation,
the accused's incompetent trial techniques harmed the legal
system and the parties.  In the Martin matter, the accused's
incompetence harmed his client.  Disbarment generally is
appropriate when a lawyer demonstrates a lack of understanding of
the most fundamental legal doctrines or procedures and the client
is actually or potentially injured.  ABA Standard 4.51.  However,
disbarment as a sanction should be imposed only on lawyers "whose
course of conduct demonstrates that they cannot or will not
master the knowledge and skills necessary for minimally competent
practice."  Commentary to ABA Standard 4.51.  Suspension
generally is appropriate when a lawyer engages in an area of
practice in which the lawyer knows that he or she is not
competent and causes injury or potential injury to the client. 
ABA Standard 4.52.  Reprimand generally is appropriate when a
lawyer:  (1) demonstrates failure to understand relevant legal
doctrines or procedures and causes injury or potential injury to
a client; or (2) is negligent in determining whether he or she is
competent to handle a legal matter and causes injury or potential
injury to a client.  ABA Standard 4.53. 
	Our review of the record in this case leads to the
conclusion that disbarment would not be an appropriate sanction
for the accuse's incompetence in the Cassady and Martin matters,
because we are not persuaded that the accused is incapable of
mastering the knowledge and skills necessary for minimally
competent practice.  Neither is it clear to us that the accused
engaged in practice in an area of the law in which he knew he was
not competent.  However, the records of the Cassady and Martin
matters reveal that the accused failed to understand relevant
legal doctrines or procedures, and caused actual injury.  In
light of the significant sanction we impose for all the accused's 
misconduct, discussed below, we need not address what sanction
would be appropriate if this proceeding involved only the
accused's incompetence.
		3.  Ex parte contact
	The accused violated his duties as a lawyer by engaging
in ex parte communications with a judge in the Cassady matter. 
ABA Standard 6.3.  We find the accused's mental state in filing
the written disqualification motion without serving opposing
counsel to be negligent, as he misunderstood his legal obligation
to do so.  In failing to serve opposing counsel with the
disqualification motion, the accused caused actual injury. 
Opposing counsel arrived to argue the motion to compel, only to
discover that the accused had succeeded in disqualifying the
judge who was assigned to hear the motion and delaying the
hearing.  
	ABA Standard 6.33 provides that reprimand generally is
appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in determining whether it
is proper to engage in communication with an individual in the
legal system, and causes injury or potential injury to a party.  
Standing alone, the accused's misconduct regarding his ex parte
contact would merit a reprimand.
		4.  Trial misconduct
	The accused abused the legal process by repeatedly
raising the issue of Huber's insurance to the jury during the
Cassady trial.  ABA Standard 6.2.  As we have explained, we find
that the accused acted intentionally.  Injecting the existence of
Huber's insurance at trial caused potential injury, because the
threat of a mistrial hung over the proceedings after the accused
mentioned insurance.  The trial judge testified that he would
have granted a mistrial if the defense had moved for one.  
	ABA Standard 6.21 provides that disbarment generally is
appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a rule with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes
serious injury or potentially serious injury to a party or causes
serious or potentially serious interference with a legal
proceeding. 
	It appears that, in raising the issue of Huber's
insurance in the Cassady trial, the accused intended to obtain a
benefit for Cassady, namely, assuring the jury that it could
award Cassady damages without harming Huber.  The ABA Standards
indicate that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for the
accused's misconduct in intentionally and persistently attempting
to interject the fact of Huber's insurance at trial.  
	In summary, the ABA Standards point to disbarment as
the appropriate sanction for the accused's intentional
misrepresentations and his trial misconduct.  The ABA Standards
point to a sanction short of disbarment for the accused's
incompetence and his ex parte contact.  We turn to aggravating
and mitigating circumstances.  
B.  Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
	"[A]ggravating circumstances are any considerations, or
factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline
to be imposed."  ABA Standard 9.21.  The first aggravating factor
in this proceeding is that the accused has a prior disciplinary
offense.  ABA Standard 9.22(a).  In 1994, the accused stipulated
to discipline for contacting a represented party without the
permission or presence of that party's counsel, in violation of
DR 7-104(A)(1).  The accused received a public reprimand for that
violation. (10)  
	In weighing the prior offense as an aggravating
circumstance, we consider its relative seriousness and the
resulting sanction; the similarity of the prior offense to the
offense in the present case; the number of prior offenses; the
relative recency of the prior offense; and the timing of the
current offenses in relation to the prior offense and resulting
sanction.  We also consider whether the accused lawyer had been
sanctioned for the prior offense before engaging in the
misconduct at issue in the present case.  In re Jones, 326 Or
195, 200, 951 P2d 149 (1997).  Applying those considerations, we
conclude that the accused's prior offense deserves little weight
as an aggravating factor in this proceeding.  His record of
discipline is limited to one instance of misconduct for which he
received only a public reprimand.  That sanction regarded a
matter that is not similar to the misconduct at issue here, and
the misconduct occurred several years ago.  We turn to other
aggravating circumstances.  
	The accused has engaged in misconduct involving four
different client matters.  In three of those matters, the accused
committed multiple ethical violations.  ABA Standard 9.22(d). 
The accused has failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of any
of his misconduct.  ABA Standard 9.22(g).  The accused has
substantial experience in the practice of law, having been
admitted to the bar in 1987.  ABA Standard  9.22(i). 
	Mitigating circumstances are "any considerations or
factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline
to be imposed."  ABA Standard 9.31.  The only mitigating factor
here is that the accused cooperated with the Bar during its
initial investigation.  ABA Standard 9.32(e). 
C.  Oregon Cases
	In past cases, when this court has found
misrepresentation in addition to other misconduct, the court has
imposed lengthy suspensions or disbarment.  See In re Gallagher,
332 Or 173, 190, 26 P3d 131 (2001) (two-year suspension for two
misrepresentations plus other misconduct); In re Wyllie, 327 Or
175, 184, 957 P2d 1222 (1998) (two-year suspension for submitting
false MCLE forms and failing to cooperate with investigation); In
re Recker, 309 Or 633, 641, 789 P2d 663 (1990) (two-year
suspension for misrepresentation to court plus other disciplinary
rule violations).  However, multiple misrepresentations to
courts, the Bar, or clients, combined with other serious ethical
violations, has led to disbarment.  For example, this court
disbarred a lawyer who notarized false documents and made
misrepresentations to clients in an unlawful living trust scheme. 
In re Morin, 319 Or 547, 566, 878 P2d 393 (1994).  The accused in
that proceeding also failed to respond truthfully to the Bar's
inquiries during its investigation.  Id. at 564.  This court also
disbarred a lawyer who filed a false affidavit with a probate
court, committed a misdemeanor, and violated several other
disciplinary rules.  In re Hawkins, 305 Or 319, 326, 751 P2d 780
(1988).  Further, this court disbarred a lawyer who, among other
things, made multiple misrepresentations to clients and court
staff, represented a client incompetently, and neglected a legal
matter.  Spies, 316 Or at 541.  However, the lawyer's conduct in
that proceeding was part of a downward personal spiral of
"increasingly irresponsible" conduct.  Id. at 540.  Other
situations in which this court has disbarred a lawyer have
involved serious misconduct on the heels of an already lengthy
record of disciplinary violations.  See, e.g., In re Miller, 310
Or 731, 739, 801 P2d 814 (1990) (multiple misrepresentations,
excessive fee, lengthy disciplinary record).
	In this proceeding, the accused not only made
misrepresentations in the Burke and Collins matters, he provided
incompetent representation in the Cassady and Martin matters.  We
note that, in Spies, misrepresentation and incompetence played a
significant role in the decision to disbar the lawyer.  Spies,
316 Or at 540.  However, in the case that is most similar
factually to this case, this court imposed a lengthy suspension 
rather than disbarring the lawyer.  In In re Chambers, 292 Or
670, 642 P2d 286 (1982), the lawyer negligently failed to prepare
and return a proper summons and failed to communicate with his
client.  In a criminal matter, the lawyer was incompetent in
conducting his investigation of exculpatory evidence on behalf of
his client and subsequently trying the case "by the seat of his
pants."  Id. at 678.  In a third matter, the lawyer knowingly
made a false statement of fact when he represented to an accident
victim that he was an insurance agent.  Id. at 680-81.  When
Chambers was decided, the maximum suspension possible short of
disbarment was three years.  See BR 6.1(a)(iii) (three-year
suspension maximum length for proceedings commenced before
January 1, 1996). (11)  This court held that a two-year suspension
was the appropriate sanction.  Chambers, 292 Or at 682.
	In this proceeding, the Bar, like the trial panel,
asserts that disbarment is required to protect the public and the
integrity of the profession.  However, this court's case law does
not support disbarment for the accused's misconduct, although it
does support a lengthy suspension.
	The accused's conduct is more egregious than the
conduct in Chambers.  The accused acted dishonestly in submitting
a default judgment after settling the dispute with Burke.  The
accused intentionally misrepresented to the trial judge that the
judge had ordered a change in the pretrial conference and trial
dates in the Collins matter.  The accused intentionally sought to
impugn the integrity of opposing counsel in the Collins matter
when he claimed that opposing counsel had made no effort to
notify him of a hearing to quash the subpoena that he had served
on a Safeco employee.  The accused deliberately and repeatedly
injected the issue of insurance into a trial to prejudice the
jury in favor of his client, Cassady.  The trial judge found the
accused's representation of Cassady to have been the worst
performance he had seen as a trial judge, resulting in prejudice
to Cassady's interests.  The accused's failure to assure that
evidence was presented to defeat the motions for summary judgment
in the Martin matter also damaged his client.  
	The foregoing examples, taken together, reveal a
disturbing pattern of a lawyer who disrupts the functioning of
the legal system and the interests of parties in that system
through a combination of intentional and negligent misconduct. 
Considering together the ABA Standards, the aggravating factors,
and this court's case law, we conclude that a three-year
suspension from the practice of law is the appropriate sanction. 
Requiring the accused to show the requisite character and fitness
to practice law for readmission under BR 8.1(a)(iv) following
that suspension will protect the public and the integrity of the
profession.
	The accused is suspended for three years, effective 60
days from the date of the filing of this decision.
1. 	The accused admitted that he had heard pounding on his
office door that evening and had seen someone outside, but he
denied that he had seen Morrow deliver anything or that he had
found documents left in the door jamb.

2. 	The trial panel stated that the accused had not
violated DR 7-102(A)(5) when he failed to serve opposing counsel
with the motion to disqualify the trial judge.  However, it is
clear from the trial panel's opinion that it meant to state that
the accused had not violated DR 7-110(B). 
		The trial panel did not address the Bar's allegation
that the accused also had violated DR 7-102(A)(5) by knowingly
making a false statement of law or fact in the Collins matter.

3. 	The trial panel did not address the Bar's allegation
that the accused had violated DR 7-106(C)(7) by intentionally or
habitually violating rules of procedure or evidence in his
handling of the Collins matter, and the Bar has abandoned that
issue on review. 

4. 	The court eventually vacated the contempt order so that
the matter could be heard by another judge.  The record does not
reveal the outcome.

5. 	The court thereafter vacated that order for lack of
jurisdiction, because the accused already had filed an appeal
from the order denying his motion for a new trial.

6. 	Although the Bar's cause of complaint alleged that the
accused had made misleading statements to the court and in
affidavits in connection with a discovery dispute over a
photograph of Cassady's damaged car that fell out of the
accused's file during the trial, the Bar did not charge the
accused with violating DR 7-102(A)(5) or ORS 9.460.  Nonetheless,
as we note below, the trial panel concluded that the accused
violated DR 7-102(A)(5) and ORS 9.460 by making misleading
statements regarding the photograph.  The Bar does not ask this
court to hold that the accused violated any disciplinary rules in
connection with the photograph incident at Cassady's trial.  

7. 	The trial panel also concluded that the accused had
violated DR 7-102(A)(5) and ORS 9.460 in the Cassady matter, even
though the Bar did not charge those violations in its complaint. 
The Bar does not argue those violations on review.  In addition,
on review, the Bar has abandoned its charge of neglect under DR
6-101(B) in the Cassady matter.

8. 	ORS 14.270 provides:
	"An affidavit and motion for change of judge to
hear the motions and demurrers or to try the case shall
be made at the time of the assignment of the case to a
judge for trial or for hearing upon a motion or
demurrer.  Oral notice of the intention to file the
motion and affidavit shall be sufficient compliance
with this section providing that the motion and
affidavit are filed not later than the close of the
next judicial day.  No motion to disqualify a judge to
whom a case has been assigned for trial shall be made
after the judge has ruled upon any petition, demurrer
or motion other than a motion to extend time in the
cause, matter or proceeding; except that when a
presiding judge assigns to the presiding judge any
cause, matter or proceeding in which the presiding
judge has previously ruled upon any such petition,
motion or demurrer, any party or attorney appearing in
the cause, matter or proceeding may move to disqualify
the judge after assignment of the case and prior to any
ruling on any such petition, motion or demurrer heard
after such assignment.  No party or attorney shall be
permitted to make more than two applications in any
action or proceeding under this section."
(Emphasis added.)

9. 	We decline to address the Bar's charges under ORS
9.460(2) and ORS 9.527(4), because they are redundant of its
charges under DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 7-102(A)(5), and the Bar does
not argue that a finding that the accused had violated those
statutes would enhance or otherwise affect the sanction.  See In
re Kimmell, 332 Or 480, 487, 31 P3d 414 (2001) (illustrating
point); In re Lawrence, 332 Or 502, 511, 31 P3d 1078 (2001)
(same).

10. 	The Bar had charged the accused with violating several
disciplinary rules, but the stipulation for discipline involved
only DR 7-104(A)(1).

11. 	Under BR 6.1(a)(iv), the maximum period of suspension
short of disbarment in proceedings commenced after December 31,
1995, is five years.