Case Title: State v. Davis

Citation: 213 Kan. 54, 515 P.2d 802

Docket Number: 46,727

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1973-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
213 Kan. 54 (1973)
515 P.2d 802
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
JOHNNIE B. DAVIS, Appellant.
No. 46,727

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 3, 1973.
Oneil Davis, of Lewis & Davis, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Clifford Bertholf, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Vern Miller, attorney general, Keith Sanborn, district attorney, and Patrick Sirridge, legal intern, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
OWSLEY, J.:
Defendant, Johnnie B. Davis, was convicted on two counts of selling heroin in violation of K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 65-2502 (now K.S.A. 65-4124) and sentenced to two concurrent terms of nine years to life imprisonment.
Defendant did not take the witness stand and the facts leading to his arrest were established by testimony of Henry Mar, Jr., an agent for the attorney general, and William L. Phillips, an informant. They went to the apartment building where defendant lived and observed him enter the building. Mar frisked Phillips and *55 Phillips went into the building. Phillips testified he went to defendant's apartment, gave him $100.00, and waited there a short time while defendant went elsewhere to purchase heroin. Mar, who was outside the apartment building waiting for Phillips, testified he saw defendant leave the building and return a short time later. Defendant returned and shortly thereafter Phillips emerged from the building with a foil-wrapped packet. Both Phillips and Mar initialed the packet for identification and its contents were later identified as heroin. Phillips testified he bought the heroin from defendant. This general procedure was followed on two different occasions  July 4, 1971, and July 10, 1971, and these incidents are the bases of the two counts of selling heroin for which defendant was prosecuted and convicted. After the state presented its evidence against defendant, but before resting, the court allowed the state to recall Phillips, the informant, for the purpose of testifying to previous contacts with defendant. He testified he made two prior purchases of heroin from defendant in 1970. Defendant objected in chambers to the recalling of Phillips on the ground additional testimony was irrelevant and immaterial to prove defendant guilty of the two sales with which he was charged. Defendant argued to the trial court he was not claiming entrapment; therefore, intent and predisposition were not at issue. Defendant further argued the testimony of Phillips as to prior purchases had no corroborative value, added nothing to his credibility, and was highly prejudicial. The court overruled defendant's objections and allowed the testimony of alleged prior contacts and sales to be placed before the jury to show "prior relationships" between witness and defendant. The court later instructed the jury it was evidence limited to their determination of "defendant's intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake or his identity."
Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in admitting Phillips' testimony as to two prior sales of heroin in 1970. The state contends the evidence of prior crimes was relevant and admissible for two reasons: (1) to show defendant's intent and rebut a possible defense of entrapment; and (2) as evidence relevant to the issue of defendant's identity.
We cannot accept the state's first argument, that it was admissible in the state's case in chief to rebut a possible defense of entrapment; to do so would allow the state to anticipate any number of affirmative *56 defenses as an excuse for parading evidence of past crimes before the jury. The issues to which past crimes may be relevant may never arise. In this case, intent was not at issue unless defendant made it so by claiming entrapment.
When events initiated by a solicitation by the police culminate in criminal charges, it normally raises a question of entrapment for the jury. (State v. Reichenberger, 209 Kan. 210, 495 P.2d 919; State v. Farmer, 212 Kan. 163, 510 P.2d 180; State v. Einhorn, 213 Kan. 271, 515 P.2d 1036.) We do not mean that entrapment is automatically at issue because of police solicitation. In view of defendant's denial of any participation in the acts charged, his decision to remain silent, and other assurances by his counsel that entrapment would not be raised as a defense, the evidence of past crimes to disprove entrapment was irrelevant and immaterial.
K.S.A. 60-455 reads as follows:
This statute is not autonomous on the admissibility of evidence of past crimes since it is subject to the provisions of other rules relating to the admission of evidence.
Kansas case law makes it clear the majority of prosecutors and trial courts have read K.S.A. 60-455 as though the exception in the last sentence were the rule, and when the proffered past crimes evidence bore some relevance to motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, the gates of admissibility automatically swung open under the theory proper instruction would correct any error of judicial discretion and would limit the jury's consideration of the evidence to its proper role.
Relevancy as the single test of admissibility is disapproved from the very beginning of the evidence code. K.S.A. 60-407 (f) provides all relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by statute. K.S.A. 60-455 is such an exception generally prohibiting evidence of past crimes and takes precedence over 60-407 (f). K.S.A. 60-455 is subject to several statutory exceptions allowing past crimes evidence to be used to prove traits of character *57 under very limited circumstances as provided by K.S.A. 60-447 and K.S.A. 60-448. Since no character trait is at issue in this case we can disregard them except to note that their provisions dominate those of K.S.A. 60-455. A third exception to the general rule of K.S.A. 60-455, that evidence of other crimes is inadmissible to prove the crime charged, is contained within the provisions of the statute itself: "... but, subject to sections 60-445 and 60-448 such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact...." The more important test of admissibility under that exception to the general prohibition is the phrase, "subject to section[s] 60-445," which takes precedence over "relevant to prove." The evidence must first pass the test of judicial discretion provided in K.S.A. 60-445:
Although K.S.A. 60-445 refers to the exercise of discretion by the trial court when the evidence relates only to "surprise," it is a rule of necessity that the trial court may exclude any evidence which may unfairly prejudice a jury. Judge Gard, in his comments following this statute, states:
In State v. Whiters, 206 Kan. 770, 481 P.2d 992, we stated:
We think it is not amiss to continue the rule of necessity that the trial court has all the established powers inherent in its function to assure a fair trial. These powers include the duty to weigh the prejudicial value of evidence of past crimes against its probative value to prove some material fact.
*58 The delicate balancing which the courts must continually perform has been written about at length. One such treatise will suffice to illustrate the problem:
The duty of the court to protect defendants from unduly prejudicial evidence is well stated in State v. Goebel, 36 Wash. 2d 367, 218 P.2d 300 (1950):
In Vernon's Kansas Statutes Annotated, Rules of Evidence, § 60-455, p. 376, it is stated there are at least three types of prejudice which might result from the use of other crimes as evidence:
A trial judge should always be conscious of these possibilities and vigilant in avoiding such results. In this case, Phillips testified he knew the defendant because he had bought heroin from him on two prior occasions. The record indicates the defendant had prior knowledge that such testimony would be introduced. If so, *59 this eliminates the discretionary power to exclude the evidence on the ground of surprise as referred to in K.S.A. 60-445; however, the other tests hereinbefore discussed must be applied.
Defendant's conviction was based on the testimony of Phillips. He testified he purchased heroin from defendant on the dates charged in the information. Over objection, he also testified to the purchase of heroin on two prior occasions. The reliability of Phillips' testimony cannot be predicated on how many purchases he made. The credibility given his testimony as to purchases charged in the information cannot be enhanced by his testimony as to prior purchases. The probative value of the prior purchases must be tested by the same factors that determine the reliability of his testimony on the crimes charged. What we are saying is that the probative value of the testimony of Phillips as to prior purchases is questionable. The prejudicial result of the testimony is not questionable. It could result in one or all of the possibilities of prejudice we have heretofore outlined. The probative value of the testimony is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will cause undue and unfair prejudice. We conclude the admission of this evidence was reversible error and a new trial should be ordered.
Defendant contends it was error and an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to grant him a continuance to gather evidence with which to rebut Phillips' testimony of prior crimes. Since we have stated error was committed in admitting the testimony we deem it unnecessary to discuss this question.
Defendant specifies another point on appeal which must be dealt with in view of our ordering a new trial. Defendant contends the instructions given by the court did not adequately cover his theory of defense. Defendant's theory of defense, inasmuch as he did not take the stand, must be considered to be that the state did not have adequate evidence to overcome the presumption of his innocence. Upon reading all the instructions, we find instruction No. 2 adequately covers the issue of presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt and burden of proof. Defendant takes exception to the instruction on his failure to testify, claiming it to be inadequate. We assume, from the argument to the court requesting a stronger instruction on failure to testify, that defendant did not object to such an instruction being given, only *60 to its form. We find no error in the court's instructions, and we find no merit in defendant's argument.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
FATZER, C.J., dissenting.