Case Title: Pfeifer v. EI Du Pont De Nemours & Co.

Citation: 258 Neb. 756, 606 N.W.2d 773

Docket Number: 

State: nebraska

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Date: 2000-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
606 N.W.2d 773 (2000) 258 Neb. 756 Ben PFEIFER, Jr., and Donna Pfeifer, husband and wife, appellants, v. E.I. Du PONT De NEMOURS AND COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, appellee. No. S-98-270. Supreme Court of Nebraska. February 11, 2000. *774 George H. Moyer, Jr., of Moyer, Moyer, Egley, Fullner & Warnemunde, Madison, for appellants. Thomas M. Maul, of Grant, Rogers, Maul & Grant, and Ann Marie Hanrahan, Minneapolis, MN of Faegre & Benson LLP, and Raymond Michael Ripple and Donna L. Goodman, of E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company, New Johnsonville, TN, for appellee. HENDRY, C.J., WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, STEPHAN, McCORMACK, and MILLER-LERMAN, JJ. McCORMACK, J. This is a suit brought by appellants Ben Pfeifer, Jr. (Pfeifer), and Donna Pfeifer for breach of express and implied warranties in the sale of Extrazine II DF, a herbicide manufactured by appellee E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company (Du Pont). The trial court granted summary judgment to Du Pont on the sole ground that the Pfeifers' claims were preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (1994). We affirm. The Pfeifers appeal from the granting of summary judgment in favor of Du Pont. The Pfeifers had sued Du Pont for breach of express and implied warranties regarding its herbicide Extrazine. Pfeifer is a third-generation farmer and is certified to apply restricted use pesticides such as Extrazine. Extrazine is a herbicide registered with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as required by FIFRA. The Extrazine label in this case stated: The Pfeifers allege in their amended petition that Pfeifer purchased the Extrazine from the Farmers Co-op Association in Lindsay, Nebraska. The petition alleges that the co-op employee from whom Pfeifer purchased the Extrazine, Gary Jarecki, consulted literature published by Du Pont that described Extrazine as, among other things, suitable for controlling weeds in corn. The petition alleges that this literature was separate and distinct from the labels on the Extrazine bags and that Pfeifer did not receive the actual labels attached to the Extrazine until he took delivery of the product. Jarecki states in an affidavit that he had been informed at sales meetings sponsored by Du Pont representatives that Extrazine was suitable for controlling weeds in corn crops and that he checked his recollection of this information against the Du Pont catalog before making his recommendation to Pfeifer. Jarecki admits in a separate affidavit that the catalog was essentially a collection of product labels, and that both the information received at the sales meetings and that obtained from the catalog were entirely consistent with the information contained in the product label. The Pfeifers allege that Pfeifer purchased Extrazine in reliance on Jarecki's statements and applied Extrazine to 152 acres of his 1992 corn crop as a postemergence treatment. The Pfeifers claim that the product reduced their corn stand from a population of 28,000 plants per acre to 13,000 plants per acre, resulting in lost profits of $22,502.68. The Pfeifers allege that Pfeifer applied the herbicide as directed by the label on the container in which it came. The EPA-approved label of the Extrazine contained directions for use, as well as various warnings and environmental information required by FIFRA. The label also generally described the product as "a selective herbicide for the control of annual grasses and broadleaf weeds in field corn, popcorn, and sweet corn." Du Pont moved for summary judgment on the ground of FIFRA preemption. The trial court granted Du Pont's motion, finding that the Pfeifers' warranty claims were based on the herbicide's labeling and were therefore preempted by FIFRA under Ackles v. Luttrell, 252 Neb. 273, 561 N.W.2d 573 (1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 928, 118 S. Ct. 329, 139 L. Ed. 2d 255. The Pfeifers assign that the trial court erred in granting Du Pont's motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ferguson v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 258 Neb. 78, 601 N.W.2d 907 (1999); Nebraska Popcorn, Inc. v. Wing, 258 Neb. 60, 602 N.W.2d 18 (1999). When reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court's ruling. State ex rel. City of Alma v. Furnas Cty. Farms, 257 Neb. 189, 595 N.W.2d 551 (1999); Holste v. Burlington Northern RR. Co., 256 Neb. 713, 592 N.W.2d 894 (1999). Analysis of FIFRA preemption in Nebraska begins with Ackles v. Luttrell, supra. In Ackles, this court held that failure to warn and labeling-based claims brought under common-law causes of action against manufacturers of pesticides are preempted by FIFRA. This is so because FIFRA mandates that certain information be placed on the labels of pesticides and herbicides. Courts have uniformly found that allowing state causes of action to be based upon language mandated by the federal government would amount to a state law requirement regarding such language. See, e.g., Welchert v. American Cyanamid, Inc., 59 F.3d 69 (8th Cir.1995); Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir.1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 913, 114 S. Ct. 300, 126 L. Ed. 2d 248. FIFRA expressly prohibits states from making such requirements. "Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under [FIFRA]." 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). Ackles v. Luttrell, supra, did not specifically address warranty claims. The holding in Ackles was addressed solely to a claim of insufficient labeling. Nevertheless, the logic behind the holding applies equally to warranty claims if such claims are solely based on federally mandated label statements: Ackles v. Luttrell, 252 Neb. 273, 283, 561 N.W.2d 573, 579 (1997). Applying FIFRA to warranties, we find that manufacturers would be equally between a rock and a hard place if they were forced by the federal government to make statements regarding the use of the manufacturers' products, and the state then treated such statements as warranties and allowed juries to award damages based upon them. Thus, to the extent that the Pfeifers are alleging that the Extrazine label constituted an express or implied warranty, such a cause of action must be preempted by FIFRA. Otherwise, success on such claims would subject *777 Du Pont to warranty liability for statements that it was forced to make in order to legally sell its product. Pfeifer testified that Jarecki told him that Extrazine was suitable for controlling weeds in corn crops. Jarecki's affidavit stated, "I suggested to him that Extrazine II DF would be an appropriate application for his problem." Jarecki testified that the statement he made to Pfeifer was based on the agricultural herbicide labels. Jarecki also testified that he referred to a Du Pont product catalog, which is generally a set of the Du Pont product labels. What Jarecki said to Pfeifer is nothing more than a recitation of what is on the label, and as such, the Pfeifers' claim for a warranty based on what Jarecki said to Pfeifer is preempted under FIFRA. The granting of the motion for summary judgment to Du Pont on this issue was correct and is affirmed. The Pfeifers also allege that Du Pont breached an implied warranty that "the product was suitable and fit for the purposes for which it was sold and intended to be used." The product in this case was a herbicide suitable for controlling weeds in corn. Therefore, the ordinary purpose was the control of weeds in corn. Neb. U.C.C. § 2-315 (Reissue 1992) states: In this case, Pfeifer testified as follows: A. My complaint is that the corn was damaged, the yield was down, and, as far as I'm concerned, their label doesn't *778 say doesn't you know, it says if it turns cold. Well, what's cold, and, you know, how long after is cold. You put it on when it's 80 degrees, that's not cold. The above testimony of Pfeifer shows that his complaints were label based. If the action is label based, it is preempted by FIFRA. See, e.g., Grenier v. Vermont Log Bldgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559 (1st Cir.1996) (favorably cited by this court in Ackles v. Luttrell, 252 Neb. 273, 561 N.W.2d 573 (1997), that because negligence and warranty actions dealt specifically with labeling-based claims, they were preempted by FIFRA); Welchert v. American Cyanamid, Inc., 59 F.3d 69 (8th Cir. 1995) (express warranty claim based on label's statement with regard to herbicide's carryover effect is preempted by FIFRA); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 913, 114 S. Ct. 300, 126 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1993) (to extent implied warranty claim depends upon inadequacies in labeling or packaging, § 136v of FIFRA preempts claim). Therefore, we determine that the Pfeifers' implied warranty is preempted. The Pfeifers' claim for breach of express warranty was preempted by FIFRA. Therefore, the trial court properly granted the motion for summary judgment to Du Pont on this issue. As to the Pfeifers' claim of breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, we determine that this claim is also preempted by FIFRA for the reason that Pfeifer's testimony indicates that the claim is label based. AFFIRMED. GERRARD, J., not participating.