Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. White

Citation: 354 Md. 346

Docket Number: 81ag/97

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case # 24-C-98-880044 OG and 24-C-98-198131 OG
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
September Term, 1997
No. AG 81
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
v.
ELVIRA M. WHITE
September Term, 1998
________________________________________
No. AG 42
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
v.
ELVIRA M. WHITE
________________________________________
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell,
Bloom, Theodore G.
  (retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
                        Bell, C.J. and Eldridge, J. dissent
Filed: June 10, 1999
 Rule 3.4.  Fairness to opposing party and counsel.
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A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully
alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential
evidentiary value.  A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do
any such act . . . .
 Rule 8.4.  Misconduct.
2
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
. . . .
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice
. . . . 
 Rule 3.3.  Candor toward the tribunal.
3
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(continued...)
Bar Counsel, on behalf of the Attorney Grievance Commission, petitioner, filed two
petitions for disciplinary action against respondent, Elvira M. White.  In the first petition,
Number 81, Bar Counsel represented and charged that respondent had violated Rule 3.4
(Fairness to opposing party and counsel),  and Rule 8.4 (Misconduct),  of the Maryland Rules
1
2
of Professional Conduct (Rule or Rules).  In petition Number 42, Bar Counsel represented
and charged that respondent had violated Rule 3.3 (Candor toward the tribunal),  and Rule
3
(...continued)
3
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
. . . .
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.  If a lawyer has
offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall
take reasonable remedial measures.
 
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8.4.  We referred the charges in both petitions to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City,
requesting it to conduct a consolidated hearing and report its findings of facts and proposed
conclusions of law to this Court.
With respect to petition Number 81, the circuit court found by clear and convincing
evidence that respondent violated Rule 3.4(a) and Rule 8.4(c) and (d).  Similarly, with regard
to petition Number 42, the circuit court found that respondent violated Rule 3.3(a)(1) and (4)
and Rule 8.4(b), (c), and (d).  Respondent filed exceptions to the circuit court’s findings and
conclusions.  Bar Counsel did not file any exceptions and recommended that respondent be
disbarred.  We shall overrule respondent’s exceptions and order that she be disbarred.  
I.  Petition Number 81
Respondent was admitted as a member of the Maryland Bar on May 27, 1980.  She
maintained a part-time civil practice from approximately 1981 until July 1990.  Respondent
also was employed as a full-time public defender in Prince George’s County beginning
approximately July 1, 1981.  
In March 1995, respondent filed a civil suit in the United States District Court for the
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District of Maryland against the Public Defender for the State of Maryland alleging
employment discrimination.  The case was tried before a jury, the Honorable Peter J. Messitte
presiding.  The jury could not arrive at a verdict and the judge granted a mistrial.  The Public
Defender filed a renewed Motion for Sanctions, seeking a dismissal of the case with
prejudice.  Judge Messitte granted the motion and entered final judgment in favor of the
defendant Public Defender.  He found specifically:
1.
the [r]espondent engaged in an action of destruction of parts of an
autobiographical manuscript, a substantial portion of which covered events
bearing on her claims before the court;
2.
that she lied in her July, 1996 deposition when she stated that she had
destroyed the entire manuscript;
3.
that she knowingly and wilfully intended to destroy discoverable and
relevant evidence, and that her statements to the contrary were not believable,
and
4.
that her testimony that she did not understand what it was that defense
counsel was asking for was fatuous and not worthy of belief.
Respondent appealed the district court’s decision, but failed to prosecute that appeal in a
timely manner, and it was dismissed.  
Judge Messitte referred the matter of respondent’s actions during the litigation to the
Disciplinary Committee of the United States District Court for possible sanctions. The
Disciplinary Committee determined that a formal disciplinary proceeding should be instituted
against respondent.  A panel of three district court judges was appointed to hear the matter.
When respondent appeared before the panel, she sought to present testimony challenging
Judge Messitte’s findings.  The panel declined to allow this and prevented her from
 Maryland Rule 16-710e.1. states in relevant part that “[a] final adjudication in a
4
disciplinary proceeding by a judicial tribunal or a disciplinary agency appointed by or acting
at the direction of a judicial tribunal that an attorney has been guilty of misconduct is
conclusive proof of the misconduct in the hearing of charges pursuant to this Rule.”
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relitigating the factual issues that had been decided against her by the trial court, stating that
the factual findings “are final and binding on her, and she is now collaterally estopped from
challenging them by witnesses or otherwise.”  The panel noted that the proper process for
her to seek a review of those factual findings would have been to follow through with the
appeal.  The panel found that respondent violated Rules 3.4(a) and 8.4(c) and (d) of the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.  It then recommended to the judges of the full court
that respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law in the United States
District Court.  The full court accepted the recommendation, and respondent was suspended
indefinitely from practice in that court on September 26, 1997.
Based upon the findings, conclusions, and sanctions imposed by the United States
District Court, Bar Counsel filed in this Court a petition for disciplinary action, Number 81,
for reciprocal discipline pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-710e.1.   The circuit court, in its
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Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, noted that respondent again attempted
to present testimony to dispute the factual findings of the federal trial court.  The circuit
court, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-710e.1, declined to permit her to do so.  The circuit
court then made the same findings as to respondent’s conduct before the United States
District Court as described, supra.  The circuit court concluded:
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Based on the rule . . . and the absence of any evidence showing cause why she
should not be disciplined in the reciprocal matter, this court finds that there
was a final adjudication by the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, and that such adjudication is conclusive proof of the misconduct of
the [r]espondent.
Respondent excepts to the circuit court’s findings and proposed conclusions of law,
claiming for the third time that Judge Messitte erred in sanctioning her and that the panel
should not have suspended her.  She argues that “[t]he extraordinary circumstances of this
case warranted that [r]espondent be heard in challenging the wisdom of the United States
District Court in suspending her.”  Respondent further explains:
Instant counsel for the [r]espondent both at the hearing before the United
States District Court and herein attempted to attack this error ridden finding,
but was rebuffed by both tribunals.  Unlike Attorney Grievance v. Richardson,
350 Md. 354 (1998), [r]espondent was never afforded the opportunity to
defend herself against the bully tactics employed in the decision by the federal
court due to the incompetent act of her counsel and the fact that she had not
been notified of her appeal’s dismissal.    
 
We said in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Richardson, 350 Md. 354, 365-68, 712
A.2d 525, 530-32 (1998):
This case is a reciprocal discipline case.  In such cases, “[a] final
adjudication in a disciplinary proceeding by a judicial tribunal . . . that an
attorney has been guilty of misconduct is conclusive proof of the misconduct
in the hearing of charges pursuant to this Rule.”  Rule 16-710(e).  See Attorney
Griev. Comm’n v. Gittens, 346 Md. 316, 324, 697 A.2d 83, 87 (1997);
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Willcher, 340 Md. 217, 221-22, 665 A.2d 1059,
1061 (1995); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Saul, 337 Md. 258, 267-68, 653 A.2d
430, 434 (1995); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Hopp, 330 Md. 177, 185-86, 623
A.2d 193, 197 (1993); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Sparrow, 314 Md. 421,
425-26, 550 A.2d 1150, 1152 (1987); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Parsons,
310 Md. 132, 142-43, 527 A.2d 325, 330 (1987); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v.
Haupt, 306 Md. 612, 614-15, 510 A.2d 590, 591-92 (1986); Attorney Griev.
Comm’n v. Bettis, 305 Md. 452, 455, 505 A.2d 492, 493 (1986); Attorney
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Griev. Comm’n v. Moore, 301 Md. 169, 171, 482 A.2d 497, 498 (1984);
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Rosen, 301 Md. 37, 39, 481 A.2d 799, 800 (1984).
Thus, evidence that the respondent was found, by the Supreme Court of
Florida, to have engaged in misconduct and that that finding was used in the
District of Columbia to adjudicate reciprocal discipline proceedings against
him, is not only admissible in this Court, but such evidence conclusively
establishes that he engaged in that misconduct.  As we have seen, the
respondent was suspended on two occasions pursuant to an order of the
Supreme Court of Florida and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals did
likewise.  The orders of the Florida and District of Columbia courts were
issued only after disciplinary proceedings had been initiated and a hearing had
been held to adjudicate the charges referred.  Thus, the orders suspending the
respondent conclusively establish that the respondent engaged in misconduct,
they being final adjudications by a judicial tribunal in a disciplinary
proceeding.  Gittens, 346 Md. at 325, 697 A.2d at 88; Willcher, 340 Md. at
221-222, 665 A.2d at 1061; Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Sparrow, 314 Md.
421, 550 A.2d 1150 (1987).  See also Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Moore, 301
Md. 169, 482 A.2d 497 (1984).  So too is the fact of the suspensions imposed
by the Florida Supreme Court and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
they too being final adjudications in a disciplinary proceeding.
. . . . 
. . . We have made clear that this provision does not permit the
relitigation of the facts underlying the disciplinary judgment.  Sabghir, 350
Md. at 80-81, 710 A.2d at 932-33.  The respondent admits to wanting to
impeach the Florida judgment.  The hearing court correctly declined to permit
him to do so; the respondent may not revisit, or collaterally attack, either the
findings of fact made by the Florida court or the judgments it rendered.
[Alteration in original.]
We see no further need to explain the principles we so recently stated in Richardson.
Accordingly, we overrule respondent’s exceptions as to petition Number 81 and sustain the
circuit court’s conclusion that respondent violated Rules 3.4(a), and 8.4(c) and (d).
II. Petition Number 42
We first note that this Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney
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disciplinary proceedings.  Md. Rule 16-709b; see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Adams, 349 Md. 86, 93, 706 A.2d 1080, 1083 (1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn,
341 Md. 448, 470, 671 A.2d 463, 473 (1996); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kent, 337 Md.
361, 371, 653 A.2d 909, 914 (1995); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276,
287, 614 A.2d 102, 108 (1992).  Under our independent review of the record, we must
determine whether the findings of the hearing judge are based on clear and convincing
evidence.  The “hearing court’s findings of fact are prima facie correct and will not be
disturbed unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392, 692 A.2d 465, 469 (1997) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 347, 624 A.2d 503, 505 (1993)).  Accordingly, the ultimate
decision as to whether a lawyer has violated the Rules rests with this Court.  Garland, 345
Md. at 392, 692 A.2d at 469; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 599, 667
A.2d 659, 663 (1995).
Bar Counsel contends in petition Number 42 that respondent gave false or misleading
testimony on two separate occasions.  The first alleged occasion took place when respondent
testified as a witness in post conviction proceedings relating to Amy Lynn Smith, whom
respondent represented as an Assistant Public Defender.  The second instance occurred
during a deposition taken in connection with respondent’s federal claim against the Public
Defender in which respondent testified about her private representation, long after the Public
Defender enacted a ban on private practice, of tenants involved in a fire in the District of
Columbia.
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The circuit court made specific findings of fact relating to the charges outlined by Bar
Counsel, which we restate:
In this petition, Bar Counsel alleged that while the [r]espondent was an
Assistant Public Defender, she represented one Amy Lynn Smith in a case of
some notoriety in Prince George’s County.  The Defendant Smith was
convicted of a number of offenses, including conspiracy to commit murder and
attempted murder in which the victims were her own parents.  Subsequently
the Defendant Smith filed a petition for post conviction relief in the Circuit
Court for Prince George’s County, and the [r]espondent was called to testify
in those proceedings in June of 1994.
While testifying under oath, the [r]espondent was questioned about the
extent of her private practice while in the employ of the Public Defender’s
Office.  The [r]espondent testified that as of July, 1990 the private practice of
law was prohibited by the State Office of the Public Defender.  She further
testified that she represented only one client after the prohibition was
instituted, and that representation was with the knowledge and permission of
her supervisor. . . .
. . . Bar Counsel [also] asserts that the [r]espondent represented
plaintiffs for personal injuries in a case arising out of a fire that occurred in the
District of Columbia.  This representation was long after the ban on private
practice had gone into effect. . . .
. . . .
The [r]espondent was called as a witness in the post conviction
proceeding by the attorney for the Defendant Smith.  During those
proceedings, while the [r]espondent was under oath, she was asked:
Q. Did you, [Ms.] White, ever engage in any type of practice
outside of your Public Defender’s Office while being employed
by the Public Defender’s Office?
A. Yes.  I did.
Q. Under what circumstances did you do that?
A. From the time of my full employment from 1980 —
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whenever I was hired, July 1st, when I was hired full time,
1981, until approximately July of 1990.  I had a part-time civil
practice, and at that time Stephen Harris, the new Public
Defender, disbanded the private practice of law.  Allen
Shepherd [, now the Honorable E. Allen Shepherd, Jr., of the
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County,] who was the District
Public Defender here in Prince George’s County, told us to
finish up everything we had.  
Q. Is that what you did?
A. Yes, with the exception of a case I handled for a Judge’s
daughter long after the prohibition was gone.  I did engage in
the private practice of law, I handled a case for Judge Audrey
Melbourne of her daughter’s divorce, which was heard by The
Honorable G. R. Hovey Johnson, and that was against the policy
of the Office of the Public Defender, and when she — at the
time she and I were close, and she asked me to do her a favor,
and as a judge I did her a favor . . . .
. . . .
The [r]espondent testified with regard to the ban that she was told by
Judge Shepherd that she could “finish up” any cases which she had started
prior to the ban.  She understood this to mean that if the client had contacted
her prior to the ban, she could carry through that client’s case to conclusion,
including filing suit on behalf of the client after the ban was in effect.  Judge
Shepherd was asked:
Q.
Concerning cases which were pending in court, where the
representation was being carried out by an Assistant Public
Defender, what was the policy?
A.
The policy was you could finish up, conclude those cases
that were pending.
Q.
What about cases which were, where there was no case
pending in court or before an administrative agency, but you had
a client?
A.
 No.  My understanding was, you could conclude those
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cases for which you had accepted fees and were in the process.
That means in court.  
Judge Shepherd was then asked whether the [r]espondent’s statement that he
had told her she could finish the case of any client who had contacted her prior
to the ban was correct.  He answered:
I don’t believe it is.  You know, she may have misunderstood,
but the point is, the directive was clear, that if you have a
pending case, you conclude your pending case, but you can’t
accept new cases.
When [r]espondent testified, she was asked on cross examination about these
other cases.  In each case, [r]espondent had filed suit or entered her
appearance on behalf of the clients after the ban had gone into effect.  Bar
Counsel attempted to show that there were new matters, while [r]espondent
insisted throughout that she had been “contacted” by the client prior to the
ban. Bar Counsel questioned [r]espondent about these specific cases:
1.
Case of Donna Smith, which involved a complaint for
child custody filed after the ban went into effect.  Respondent
had no documents relating to this file. She testified from
memory that she had been consulted by [Ms.] Smith prior to the
ban;
2.
The Walter case was filed by the [r]espondent in 1992.
Respondent believed that Mr. Walter had talked to her about his
divorce case prior to July 1, 1990.  The complaint filed in 1992
stated that the parties had separated on January 13th, 1989;
3.
Branson v. Branson was an action filed by another
attorney in which the [r]espondent entered her appearance in
March of 1992.  Again, [r]espondent said that she had been
consulted by the original attorney prior to the date of the ban.
Respondent had no documents as to when she had been initially
approached in that case;
4.
The case of Mark C. Saunders, Jr., was one for a limited
divorce filed on August 19th, 1991.  The complaint in this case
averred that the parties had separated on June 15th of 1991.
Respondent testified that she had discussed the case with Mr.
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Saunders well in advance of the filing date;
5.
The case of James T. Butts (also a domestic case) was
filed in May of 1991.  Respondent testified that she had
prepared a legal separation for Mr. Butts at least a year prior to
the filing of the suit.
6.
The case of David Draggs, another domestic case, was
filed in April of 1991.  Respondent testified that she and Mr.
Draggs attended the same church, and that she had talked to him
long before the ban with regard to his domestic matter.
At some point, the Public Defender, Mr. Harris, wrote to the
[r]espondent asking her to explain her involvement in the above cases.  Her
response to Mr. Harris was that she had had a relationship with all of them
prior to the effective date of the private practice ban.  Mr. Harris then
requested that the [r]espondent send him documents showing when she had,
in fact, been contacted by these various clients.  The [r]espondent refused to
send this information to the Public Defender, although she said that such
documents did exist.  Her reason for the refusal was that the attorney who was
winding up her cases and who had custody of the files had invoked the
attorney client privilege.  In her testimony before the court, however,
[r]espondent said that was only one of the reasons:
Q.
What was another reason?
A.
Well, there were actually three reasons.  One was
attorney/client; two, I was involved in litigation with the Office
of the Public Defender, and had been advised by counsel at that
time not to supply them with one.  Three, I did look for the
documents in my basement before I got kicked out of my house,
and four, that was about the time of the break-in, in my house,
that the police investigated, where somebody only stole files.
So, they were the reasons.
The [r]espondent explained that she had no documents relating to these
cases since they had been turned over to the lawyer representing her in Federal
Court in the suit against the Public Defender’s Office.  This court suggested
that because of the seriousness of the matter and its potential impact on the
[r]espondent, that if the parties agreed, the case would be continued and this
court would instruct the lawyer allegedly in possession of the files to be
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present at the second hearing.  Both counsel adopted the court’s suggestion.
The hearing was continued until November 20th, 1998, at which time Erroll
Brown, Esquire appeared.  Mr. Brown had represented the [r]espondent (along
with co-counsel, Maurice Foster).  He had no documents which would show
any contact between the [r]espondent and the clients who had been represented
after the effective date of the ban.  He testified that he had requested that
information from the [r]espondent, but had not received any documents from
her.
. . . .
In [Ms.] White’s Federal Court suit against the Office of the Public
Defender, she was deposed over a number of months.  In December of 1995,
during her deposition testimony, she was asked about claims arising out of a
fire in the District of Columbia.  That fire had occurred on February 22nd,
1992, and several of the tenants had sustained personal injuries as a result of
the alleged negligence of the landlord. [Ms.] White admits that she was
contacted by someone on behalf of the injured parties, and that she went to the
District of Columbia to consult with them.  She had the injured parties sign a
retainer agreement, and prepared a letter of representation to send to the
landlord.  At the hearing before this court, [Ms.] Ruthie Jones, an employee
of the Public Defender’s Office, who was the [r]espondent’s secretary at the
time, testified that she typed letters at the direction of the [r]espondent.  These
letters to the clients enclosed powers of attorney naming [r]espondent as their
counsel.  Ms. Jones also typed a notice letter to the landlord advising him of
[Ms.] White’s representation. [Ms.] Jones testified that the [r]espondent
dictated a letter to a Clayton J. Powell, Jr., Esquire, setting forth the terms of
the referral of the case that she was making to Mr. Powell. [Ms.] Jones
testified that she warned [Ms.] White about being involved in a case with Mr.
Powell, whose wife was a Public Defender Board Member.
The [r]espondent’s explanation was that she was not acting as a lawyer
in the case, but as a law clerk. [Footnotes omitted.] [Citations omitted.]
 
With regard to respondent’s testimony in the post conviction proceeding, the circuit
court found that Bar Counsel clearly showed that “[r]espondent engaged in the private
practice of law in which cases were docketed long after the ban had gone into effect.”  The
circuit court noted that even if it were to give respondent the benefit of the doubt that she
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misunderstood the ban, respondent failed to produce the documents she argued would
support her contention that all of the cases were in progress before the ban went into effect.
The court concluded that the ban on private practice was clear to respondent.  Furthermore,
even assuming respondent genuinely misunderstood the directives of the ban, the court found
by “clear and convincing evidence that the suits were filed after the ban had gone into effect,
and that the [r]espondent had not been retained prior to the date of the prohibition on private
practice.” 
On the issue of respondent’s representation of tenants in the District of Columbia
case, the court found that her testimony was “simply incredible.”  The court explained:  
The [r]espondent obviously could not testify that she had been contacted prior
to the date of the ban.  Therefore, she asks this court to believe that a lawyer
with her years of experience, who had tried any number of serious felony
cases in Prince George’s County, and had done so for a number of years, now
considered herself a “law clerk” for purposes of obtaining this case.  She
further asked this court to believe that the attorney to whom the case was being
referred was going to divide the fee evenly with someone who was acting as
a law clerk in the case.  This court cannot and does not accept such an
explanation.  Based on the [r]espondent’s lack of candor at the post conviction
hearing, this court finds that the . . . [r]espondent has violated Rule 3.3(a)(1)
and (4), and also Rule 8.4(c) and (d) of the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct.  This court further finds that [r]espondent’s testimony that she was
a law clerk was untrue and violated Rule 8.4(b), (c) and (d).  
Respondent filed several exceptions to the circuit court’s findings and proposed
conclusions of law.  She argues that the testimony she gave at the post conviction proceeding
was not false or misleading.  Rather, she asserts, because of her misinterpretation of the ban
on private practice by public defenders and her belief that it did not apply to her
circumstances, her post conviction testimony was not false or misleading.  Respondent
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criticizes the facts found by the circuit court and claims that nothing in the record rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence her interpretation.  Further, respondent attacks Mr.
Brown’s memory and record keeping and then contends that Bar Counsel failed to show by
clear and convincing evidence that she did not receive the cases prior to the ban.
Respondent also excepts to the circuit court’s findings that she violated Rules
3.3(a)(1) and (4) and 8.4(c) and (d) based on her alleged representation of the tenants in the
District of Columbia.  She essentially claims these findings were in error because she could
not practice law in the District of Columbia, she merely referred the case to an attorney who
was licensed to practice in that jurisdiction, and received no fees for the referral.  Respondent
also reiterates the mitigating evidence presented below with regard to her character and
personal circumstances.  Respondent makes no recommendation for sanctions.
We have examined the record and conclude that all of the circuit court’s findings and
proposed conclusions of law are supported by clear and convincing evidence.  We shall
begin first with the misconduct charges arising from the employment discrimination case
respondent filed in the United States District Court.  Bar Counsel alleges that respondent,
during a December 5, 1995, deposition taken in connection with that case, testified under
oath that she had acted as a “law clerk” and had not represented, in her capacity as an
attorney, any tenants associated with a fire in the District of Columbia.  Bar Counsel argued,
and the circuit court found, that this testimony was false and misleading and that she did in
fact represent, as an attorney, individuals associated with the fire.  The circuit court
specifically concluded that this testimony violated Rule 8.4(b), (c), and (d).
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Rule 8.4(b) provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit
a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as
a lawyer in other respects.”  The crime that respondent allegedly committed is perjury
because of her testimony that she acted as a law clerk rather than a lawyer in the District of
Columbia case and therefore did not represent clients after the civil practice ban went into
effect.  The circuit court did not find respondent’s deposition testimony about the extent of
her involvement in the District of Columbia case credible.  We echo the circuit court’s
disbelief in respondent’s explanation, particularly given her experience as a private lawyer
and public defender.  We believe respondent lied in her deposition when she testified that
she did not represent the individuals in the District of Columbia matter.  We note that we are
not aware whether respondent has been charged criminally with perjury.  As this Court has
explained, however, 
a criminal conviction is not required in order to find a violation of Rule 8.4.
All that is required is proof by clear and convincing evidence of conduct that
constitutes a commission of the offense.  Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Proctor,
309 Md. 412, 418, 524 A.2d 773, 776 (1987).  If the evidence presented at the
hearing is sufficient to sustain a finding by clear and convincing evidence that
the conduct occurred, the fact that a criminal conviction did not result from the
conduct or that the judgment was reversed does not preclude a finding of
misconduct.  See Attorney Griev. Comm. v. Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 667 A.2d
659 (1995) (holding that evidence showed a wilful failure to pay taxes and a
violation of Rule 8.4(d) despite fact that there was no criminal prosecution);
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Proctor, 309 Md. 412, 418, 524 A.2d 773, 776
(1987); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Deutsch, 294 Md. 353, 366, 450 A.2d
1265, 1271 (1982). 
Garland, 345 Md. at 394-95, 692 A.2d at 471.  We sustain the circuit court’s conclusion that
respondent violated Rule 8.4(b).
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In connection with the same deposition testimony, respondent excepts to the findings
of the circuit court that she also violated Rule 8.4(c) and (d) and Rule 3.3(a)(1) and (4).
These exceptions are without merit.  Consonant with the circuit court’s conclusion that
respondent committed perjury, respondent clearly violated Rule 8.4(c) because her
testimony, made under oath, was, at the very least, dishonest, deceitful, and misrepresented
the truth about her involvement in the case.  Additionally, we have held that perjury
committed by an attorney admitted to practice in this state constitutes conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice and violates Rule 8.4(d):  “[P]erjury is conduct reeking of moral
turpitude; involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and prejudicial to the
administration of justice.”  State Bar Ass’n v. Rosenberg, 273 Md. 351, 355, 329 A.2d 106,
108.  We have declined to define Rule 8.4(d) narrowly and instead have 
recognized that conduct that impacts on the image or the perception of the
courts or the legal profession and that engenders disrespect for the courts and
for the legal profession may be prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Lawyers are officers of the court and their conduct must be assessed in that
light.  
Richardson, 350 Md. at 368, 712 A.2d at 532 (citation omitted).  Going on in Richardson,
we commented that a lawyer’s act of dishonesty, fraud, or deceit might cause the public to
lose confidence in other lawyers and the judicial system as a whole.  Id. (citing State Bar
Ass’n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 549, 318 A.2d 811, 814 (1974)).  Accordingly, we also deny
respondent’s exceptions and sustain the circuit court with regard to Rule 8.4(c) and (d).
Turning to respondent’s exceptions as to Rule 3.3(a)(1) and (4) and their application
to her conduct during the deposition connected with her suit against the Public Defender, the
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circuit court found, and we believe it abundantly clear, that respondent lied under oath while
providing testimony during that deposition.  We recently held that false or misleading
statements made by a lawyer to a judge violates Rule 3.3(a)(1).  See Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Brown, 353 Md. 271, 292, 725 A.2d 1069, 1079 (1999).  The deposition
testimony was material testimony related to respondent’s suit against her employer,
therefore, in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(4), respondent offered evidence she knew to be false.
Even though she did not represent herself while testifying, candor by a lawyer, in any
capacity, is one of the most important character traits of a member of the Bar.  See generally
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 449, 635 A.2d 1315, 1319 (1994);
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Levitt, 286 Md. 231, 238, 406 A.2d 1296, 1299 (1979).  We
therefore sustain the circuit court with respect to Rule 3.3(a)(1) and (4).
We turn now to the misconduct charges arising from respondent’s testimony in the
post conviction hearing.  As we have discussed, respondent was questioned during that
hearing about allegedly representing private clients after public defenders were prohibited
from doing so.  Respondent claimed these clients contacted her before the ban went into
effect, but had no documents supporting this contention because she had given them to
another attorney, Mr. Brown, to wind up and he refused to turn them over.  Mr. Brown
testified that he had no such documents.  Respondent claims in her exceptions that Mr.
Brown’s memory as to this matter is deficient and that the circuit court “was simply mistaken
when [it] found that Mr. Brown never received any documents which would show that the
contacts with the clients occurred before the ban.” 
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Respondent’s exceptions are without merit.  The circuit court went to great lengths,
by continuing the hearing, to provide respondent with the opportunity to produce the records
supposedly exonerating her of these charges.  Respondent still could not produce the
necessary records.  The circuit court found that Bar Counsel had proved by clear and
convincing evidence that respondent began representing the clients after the 1990 ban went
into effect.  It is clear, then, that respondent gave false and misleading testimony when she
testified as a witness in the post conviction proceedings.  Accordingly, respondent violated
Rule 3.3(a)(1) in providing this testimony.  We overrule her exceptions and sustain the trial
court’s findings and proposed conclusions of law.  
III. Sanction
We have stated repeatedly that the purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to protect
the public and the integrity of this profession, not to punish the individual offender.  Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Awuah, 346 Md. 420, 435, 697 A.2d 446, 454 (1997); Goldsborough,
330 Md. at 364, 624 A.2d at 513.  “[T]he public interest is served when this Court imposes
a sanction which demonstrates to members of the legal profession the type of conduct that
will not be tolerated.”  Myers, 333 Md. at 447, 635 A.2d at 1318.  See also Breschi, 340 Md.
at 601, 667 A.2d at 665.  The severity of the sanction varies with the circumstances of each
case and takes into account mitigating factors.  Glenn, 341 Md. at 484, 671 A.2d at 480;
Powell, 328 Md. at 300, 614 A.2d at 114.  We said in Myers, 333 Md. at 449, 635 A.2d. at
1319, that “[c]andor and truthfulness are two of the most important moral character traits of
a lawyer.”  Tactics involving dishonesty, fraud, or deceit, carry the risk of the ultimate
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sanction by this Court.  In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mandel, 294 Md. 560, 587-88,
451 A.2d 910, 923 (1982) (quoting State Bar Ass’n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 553, 318 A.2d
811, 817 (1974)), we said:
“. . . [T]his Court has consistently adhered to the view, both prior to
1970 (when we reviewed disciplinary actions only on appeal at the instance
of the respondent-attorney), Balliet v. Balto. Co. Bar Ass’n, supra; Fellner v.
Bar Ass’n, [213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957)]; In the Matter of Lombard,
242 Md. 202, 218 A.2d 208 (1966); In Re Williams, 180 Md. 689, 23 A.2d 7
(1941); and since that date (when we assumed original and complete
jurisdiction over these proceedings), Bar Ass’n v. Marshall, [269 Md. 510, 307
A.2d 677 (1973)]; Bar Ass’n v. Cockrell, 270 Md. 686, 313 A.2d 816 (1974);
Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Callanan, 271 Md. 554, 318 A.2d 809 (1974), that
when a member of the bar is shown to be willfully dishonest for personal gain
by means of fraud, deceit, cheating or like conduct, absent the most
compelling extenuating circumstances, not shown to be present here,
disbarment followed as a matter of course.  To do other than disbar the
respondent in this case, therefore, would constitute a travesty of our
responsibility.” [Alterations in original.] 
 
In Myers, 333 Md. 440, 635 A.2d 1315, the attorney lied to a district court judge and earlier
had been suspended for unrelated conduct in which the attorney falsified a letter.  Noting that
the attorney had lied in furtherance of personal gain and in order to hide his misdeeds, this
Court held Myers violated Rule 3.3(a)(1) and Rule 8.4(c), which, under the circumstances
of that case, warranted that he be disbarred.  Id. at 451, 635 A.2d at 1320.
In its Recommendation for Sanctions filed in this Court, Bar Counsel recommends
that respondent be disbarred, noting that “[r]espondent has breached the most fundamental
duty of an officer of the Court” by giving false or misleading testimony in both the post
conviction proceeding and the deposition relating to respondent’s federal suit against her
employer, and by destroying and lying about evidence during her federal claim.
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Respondent already has been sanctioned by the United States District Court, which
we held, supra, was conclusive in this Court as a violation of Rule 3.4(a) and Rule 8.4(c) and
(d).  In addition, we sustain the circuit court’s conclusions that respondent violated Rule
3.3(a)(1) and (4) and Rule 8.4(b), (c), and (d) for her conduct in lying about her
representation of private clients.  Respondent, an officer of the court, gave false testimony
in a series of judicial proceedings and at no time ever admitted the falsity of her testimony
or showed any remorse.  A federal court has found that she destroyed relevant evidence and
lied in a deposition.  She has seemingly developed a pattern of deceit in court proceedings.
We said twenty-five years ago in Rosenberg, 273 Md. at 355, 329 A.2d at 108: “[M]aking
false statements . . . plainly violates the disciplinary rule on misconduct.  Indeed, perjury is
conduct reeking of moral turpitude; involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation;
and prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  While Rosenberg had been convicted of
perjury, we recognized that the giving of false testimony itself constituted attorney
misconduct.  Id.  The serious nature of such misconduct often warrants disbarment.
In the case at bar, respondent has engaged in a continuing pattern of misconduct and
has given false testimony in the federal and state judicial systems. She has exhibited no
remorse nor has she ever admitted to her misconduct.  The very integrity of the judicial
system demands that the attorneys who practice in this state, who represent clients in the
courts, and who interact in judicial matters with the courts do so with absolute honesty and
personal integrity. We cannot permit actions such as those that occurred here, which affect
not only the personal integrity of respondent but the integrity of the courts, to go unpunished.
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We thus order that respondent be disbarred.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL  COSTS AS
TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS
OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-715c,
FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST ELVIRA M.
WHITE.
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge would impose an indefinite suspension.
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Elvira M. White
No. AG 81, September Term, 1997 and No. AG 42, September Term, 1998
HEADNOTE:
Attorney sanctioned in the United States District Court for her
destruction of evidence and giving false testimony in a case before that
court was held to have violated Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct 3.4(a) and 8.4(c) and (d) in a reciprocal sanctions proceeding.
Additionally, the Court held that attorney’s giving false testimony
during a deposition taken in the federal district court proceeding and as
a witness in a Maryland post conviction proceeding about her improper
representation of private clients while an Assistant Public Defender
violated Rule 3.3(a)(1) and (4) and Rule 8.4(b), (c), and (d).  Given the
gravity of the misconduct, the Court held disbarment was the
appropriate sanction.