Case Title: State v. Burnett

Citation: 

Docket Number: 107571

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 107,571 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
RONNELL BURNETT, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
The threshold determination for the admission of evidence in any proceeding is 
relevance. Relevance is established by a material or logical connection between the 
asserted facts and the inference or result they are intended to establish. Relevant 
evidence, as defined in K.S.A. 60-401(b), is evidence having any tendency in reason to 
prove any material fact. Accordingly, relevance contains both a materiality element and a 
probative element. An appellate court reviews a district court's determination of 
materiality de novo and the assessment of probative value under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  
 
2. 
Whether a third party was responsible for the crime a defendant is charged with is 
clearly a material fact related to determining the defendant's guilt or innocence.  
 
3. 
While evidence of the motive of a third party to commit the crime, standing alone, 
is not relevant, such evidence may be relevant if there is other evidence connecting the 
third party to the crime. In other words, without additional evidence showing that a third 
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party could have committed the crime (e.g., presence at the crime scene, the opportunity 
and means to commit the crime), evidence merely suggesting that someone other than the 
defendant had a motive to commit the crime has little probative value and can be properly 
excluded at trial. A district court must evaluate the totality of facts and circumstances in a 
given case to determine whether the defense's proffered evidence effectively connects the 
third party to the crime charged. Because the district court's determination of this 
question contemplates whether the proffered evidence is probative to establishing a third 
party's involvement in the charged crime, the district court's decision is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion.  
 
4. 
The erroneous exclusion of evidence is subject to review under the harmless error 
test of K.S.A. 60-261, which asks whether there is a reasonable probability that the error 
did or will affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record. Factors an appellate 
court can consider in reviewing the erroneous exclusion of evidence for harmless error 
include:  the importance of the witness' testimony, whether the testimony was 
cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the 
testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise 
permitted, and the overall strength of the case. 
 
5. 
 
K.S.A. 22-3401 states that a district court may grant a continuance for good cause 
shown, and its refusal to grant a continuance will not be disturbed on appeal absent a 
showing of an abuse of discretion. 
 
6. 
The felony-murder statute has two primary elements—killing and simultaneously 
engaging in an inherently dangerous felony. The second element can be established 
3 
 
 
 
through proof that the killing occurred while the defendant was committing, attempting to 
commit, or fleeing from an inherently dangerous felony. These are factual circumstances 
in which a material element may be proven. Therefore, this language in the felony-
murder statute does not create alternative means. 
 
7. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable. The Fourth 
Amendment is not implicated, however, unless the person invoking its protection had a 
justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy that was invaded by 
government action.  
 
8. 
Because of their reasonable concern for prison security and inmates' diminished 
expectations of privacy, prison officials do not violate the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution when they read inmates' nonprivileged, outgoing letters. 
Furthermore, once prison officials have a right to examine such messages, no rule 
requires them to close their eyes to what they discover therein.  
 
9. 
 
Generally, a district court's refusal to appoint new counsel is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard. 
 
10. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an indigent 
criminal defendant the right to the assistance of counsel in his or her criminal defense. 
However, such a defendant cannot compel the district court to appoint the counsel of 
defendant's choice. To warrant substitute counsel, a defendant must show "justifiable 
4 
 
 
 
dissatisfaction" with his or her appointed counsel. Justifiable dissatisfaction may be 
demonstrated by showing a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable disagreement, or a 
complete breakdown in communication between counsel and the defendant. As long as 
the district court has a reasonable basis for believing the attorney-client relationship has 
not deteriorated to a point where appointed counsel can no longer give effective aid in the 
fair presentation of a defense, the court is justified in refusing to appoint new counsel. 
 
11. 
 
A claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of fact 
and law requiring de novo review. Consequently, appellate courts review the underlying 
factual findings for support by substantial competent evidence and the legal conclusions 
based on those facts de novo. 
 
12. 
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance in a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is highly deferential and requires consideration of all the evidence before the 
judge or jury. The reviewing court must strongly presume that counsel's conduct fell 
within the broad range of reasonable professional assistance. To establish prejudice, the 
defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  
 
13. 
Cumulative trial errors, when considered collectively, may require reversal of the 
defendant's convictions when the totality of circumstances substantially prejudiced the 
defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. Cumulative error will not be found, 
however, when the record fails to support the errors raised on appeal by the defendant. 
Furthermore, a single error cannot constitute cumulative error.  
5 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; J. DEXTER BURDETTE, judge. Opinion filed July 25, 
2014. Affirmed. 
 
Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellant.  
 
Christopher L. Schneider, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Elizabeth A. Evers, 
assistant district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were 
on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.:  A jury found Ronnell Burnett guilty of felony murder, criminal 
discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, and criminal possession of a firearm. On 
appeal, Burnett argues that the district court erred by (1) excluding evidence of prior and 
subsequent shootings taking place at the same residence where the shooting at issue here 
took place; (2) refusing to grant defense counsel a continuance during trial to edit and 
present a redacted video recording of Burnett's interview with a detective; (3) instructing 
the jury on felony murder; (4) admitting into evidence copies of letters that Burnett had 
placed in the jail's outgoing mail; (5) failing to give a limiting instruction regarding 
evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs committed by Burnett; (6) failing to adequately 
investigate Burnett's request for substitute counsel made between his first and second 
trials; and (7) failing to grant a new trial based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
Burnett also argues that the cumulative effect of these alleged trial errors denied him a 
fair trial. 
 
 
We conclude that the district court erred in preventing Burnett from presenting 
evidence of other shootings taking place at the residence for the limited purpose of cross-
6 
 
 
 
examining investigators who testified about the manner in which the shooting at issue 
here occurred. But, considering the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that this error 
was harmless. Similarly, we conclude that the failure to give a limiting instruction 
regarding Burnett's other crimes or civil wrongs did not constitute clear error. Finding no 
other error on the remaining issues Burnett raises, we affirm Burnett's convictions.  
 
FACTS 
 
Tyrone Ramsey and Simone Dickson were engaged in an intimate relationship that 
resulted in children. At some point, this relationship ended and Dickson began to have a 
relationship with Burnett, which caused tensions to arise between Burnett and Ramsey. 
According to Dickson, Ramsey would call Burnett's phone "all the time making threats 
and stuff." 
 
At around 5 p.m. on July 7, 2008, Dickson and Burnett had a verbal confrontation 
in Dickson's apartment in North Kansas City, Missouri. The confrontation eventually 
moved to the apartment's parking lot where Dickson got into her car and tried to run over 
Burnett. As Dickson was driving away, Burnett threw a bottle of gin and a bottle of 
orange juice through the sunroof of Dickson's car. The plastic orange juice bottle hit 
Dickson in the head but did not injure her. Dickson proceeded to drive to a Target store, 
and Burnett followed her in his work truck—a Frosty Treats ice cream truck. Burnett 
followed Dickson on foot into and out of the store and then followed Dickson in his work 
truck back to her apartment, where he then drove away.  
 
At some point, Dickson and Ramsey spoke over the phone about the bottle-
throwing incident. Ramsey then called Burnett to ask him about throwing a bottle at 
Dickson. According to Ramsey, before he could say anything, Burnett threatened to kill 
him. Ramsey hung up on Burnett, but Burnett continued to call him.  
7 
 
 
 
 
At the time, Ramsey was at his residence in Kansas City, Kansas, with his 
nephew, Willie Claiborne, and Claiborne's friend, Rahi Larks, the victim in this case. 
Eventually, Ramsey's cousin, Steven Allen, came by the residence and picked up 
Ramsey, leaving Claiborne and Larks behind. Ramsey and Allen went to Allen's house 
and drank a few beers. While there, Burnett continued calling Ramsey. Fed up with 
Burnett calling him, Ramsey had Allen drive him to Burnett's location—Dickson's 
mother's residence, also in Kansas City, Kansas, and located near Ramsey's house. 
Ramsey later explained that he wanted to go there to confront Burnett.   
 
When Ramsey arrived at the residence, he started yelling for Burnett to come out 
of the house and fight him. When that failed to entice Burnett outside, Ramsey started 
breaking out the windows of Burnett's work truck, which was parked in the driveway. 
Eventually, Dickson's mother came outside and told Ramsey that she was calling the 
police, prompting Ramsey and Allen to leave. As they were leaving, Ramsey said that he 
saw Burnett standing by his work truck, talking on a cell phone. Ramsey estimated that it 
was around 9:30 p.m. when he left Dickson's mother's residence. It was later confirmed 
that Dickson's mother called 911 at 9:33 p.m. and reported that Ramsey was damaging 
Burnett's work truck. Ramsey and Allen returned to Allen's house.  
 
According to Claiborne, as he and Larks were getting ready to leave Ramsey's 
house sometime after 9 p.m., gunshots were fired into the front room of the house. A 
single bullet hit Larks as he was fleeing into a back bedroom. He died within moments.  
 
Shortly after 11 p.m., law enforcement arrived at the scene and began 
investigating the shooting. Law enforcement developed leads that indicated that they 
should speak to Ramsey and Dickson. One of Larks' family members also contacted 
police and stated that he or she believed Burnett was responsible for the murder.      
8 
 
 
 
 
Detective Bryan Block of the Kansas City, Kansas, Police Department spoke to 
Dickson. At first, Dickson denied knowing anything about the shooting. But after Block 
told Dickson that if she withheld any information about the shooting, her children could 
be taken away from her and that she and her mother could end up in jail, Dickson told 
Block about the altercation she had with Burnett, Ramsey vandalizing Burnett's work 
truck, and Burnett calling her later that night and telling her that he had shot at Ramsey's 
house.  
  
After speaking with Dickson, Block spoke with Ramsey. Ramsey told Block about 
Burnett threatening to kill him over the dispute they were having involving Dickson. 
Ramsey admitted to going over to Dickson's mother's house and breaking out the 
windows of Burnett's work truck.   
 
Block spoke with Burnett on July 11, 2008, at police headquarters. After being 
advised of and waiving his Miranda rights, Burnett told police about his dispute with 
Ramsey, which, according to Block, Burnett downplayed. Burnett told Block that he went 
to Ramsey's house earlier that evening to speak to him, but Ramsey was not home. 
Burnett then went to Dickson's mother's house. While he was there, Ramsey showed up 
and called him outside to fight. Burnett said that as he was going outside, Ramsey left in 
his vehicle.   
 
After Ramsey left, Burnett said that he ran to Ramsey's home and waited for 
Ramsey to arrive. Burnett eventually moved to a nearby park to wait. When Ramsey did 
not return, Burnett left and went back to Dickson's mother's house. While there, Burnett 
said that he heard some "pops" that sounded like fireworks and one loud "boom."  
 
9 
 
 
 
Burnett told Block that he eventually left Dickson's mother's house and filled up 
his truck with gas and went back to his home in Kansas City, Missouri. Police later 
obtained a video of Burnett entering a Conoco station at 11:24 p.m. While viewing the 
video in court, Block said that there was a bulge in Burnett's shirt. On cross-examination, 
Block opined that Burnett, while walking, was holding his arm down like someone who 
was trying to keep a gun from shifting in his pants. 
 
Block also spoke with Harold Murphy, a manager for Frosty Treats. Murphy told 
Block, and later testified at trial, that on July 7, 2008, he was training Burnett on his first 
day as a vendor for Frosty Treats at its place of business in Kansas City, Missouri. While 
Murphy was showing Burnett how to operate the lights of the ice cream truck assigned to 
him that day, Murphy noticed the butt of a semiautomatic handgun under the front seat. 
Murphy told Burnett that having a gun was not allowed. According to Murphy, Burnett 
mumbled something in reply. Murphy informed his supervisor about seeing the gun. 
Burnett eventually left in the ice cream truck.  
 
Murphy said that Burnett did not return his truck by 9:30 p.m. on July 7 as 
required. He said that it was not until 11 a.m. the next day that Burnett returned the truck 
and that the truck had four shattered windows. Burnett did not explain why the windows 
were broken out. As Burnett was walking to his car, Murphy told him that he needed to 
speak to the supervisor. Murphy followed Burnett as he walked into the supervisor's 
office. As Burnett was sitting down and speaking to the supervisor, Murphy noticed a 
"bulge" under Burnett's shirt on the right side of his back near the waistline of his pants. 
Murphy said the bulge looked like the butt of a pistol.  
 
Law enforcement recovered six .40 caliber cartridge cases, two fired bullets (one 
of which was recovered from Larks' body), and one fired bullet jacket fragment and 
submitted them for testing. A firearms and tool mark examiner with the Kansas Bureau of 
10 
 
 
 
Investigation examined the cartridge cases and determined that they were all fired from 
the same gun and that the markings on the cartridge cases were consistent with the 
markings left by a .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun manufactured by Hi-Point 
Firearms. The examiner also concluded that the two fired bullets were fired from the 
same gun—most likely a .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun manufactured by Hi-Point. 
The examiner, however, could not determine conclusively whether the bullet jacket 
fragment was fired from the same gun as the two fired bullets. The gun used in the 
shooting was never located. 
 
While in jail awaiting trial, Burnett wrote two letters to Dickson. The record 
indicates that prior to Dickson receiving these letters, jail personnel opened and 
photocopied the letters and sent copies to the prosecutor's office. Highly summarized, in 
both letters Burnett asked Dickson to testify at trial that she made up the story about him 
calling her and telling her that he had shot up Ramsey's house. Burnett even provided 
Dickson with explanations she could give at trial for her prior statement and told her in 
one letter to "make up something that will help me" if she did not like his proposed 
testimony. Copies of these letters were admitted into evidence. In addition to the letters, 
Dickson said that Burnett called her on the phone and asked her not to testify that he 
admitted to the shooting into Ramsey's house.   
 
Burnett's case proceeded to a jury trial which ended in a mistrial as a result of the 
jury's inability to reach a verdict. A second trial was conducted where the State presented 
the above-mentioned facts.  
 
On cross-examination, Dickson admitted that during her interview with detectives, 
she initially denied knowing anything about the shooting. She said that the detectives did 
not believe her and they told her that if she withheld any information, her children could 
be taken away from her and she and her mother could end up in jail. Dickson said that 
11 
 
 
 
she believed that unless she told the detectives something, they would follow through on 
their threats. She said that in order to avoid those consequences, she told law enforcement 
that Burnett had called her and admitted to shooting into the house. However, even in 
spite of law enforcement's coercive tactics, Dickson denied that she made up the story of 
Burnett calling her and confessing to the shooting. Defense counsel also cross-examined 
Detective Block about threatening Dickson in order to get information from her.   
 
The jury found Burnett guilty of all the charges. The district court sentenced 
Burnett to a hard 20 life sentence for the felony-murder conviction and consecutive 
sentences of 59 months' and 8 months' imprisonment for criminal discharge of a firearm 
at an occupied building and criminal possession of a firearm, respectively. Burnett filed a 
timely notice of appeal.        
 
EVIDENCE OF OTHER SHOOTINGS 
 
Burnett first argues that the district court erred in excluding evidence showing that 
other shootings had taken place at Ramsey's house and that the house was in fact a "drug 
house." Burnett argues that this evidence was essential to his defense of innocence at trial 
because it would have controverted the State's evidence indicating that he was the only 
person who had the motive and means of committing the crime. According to Burnett, if 
he would have been allowed to present evidence that Ramsey's house was a drug house 
and that other shootings had taken place before and after the July 7, 2008, shooting, then 
this evidence would have raised the possibility in the jurors' minds that someone else may 
have shot at the residence on July 7. He also argues that he should have been allowed to 
present evidence of the other shootings in order to question investigators who attributed 
six bullet holes found at the front of Ramsey's house to the July 7 shooting. Each of 
Burnett's arguments will be addressed in turn.    
 
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"The threshold determination for the admission of evidence in any proceeding is 
relevance. [Citation omitted.] Relevance is established by a material or logical connection 
between the asserted facts and the inference or result they are intended to establish. 
[Citation omitted.] Relevant evidence, as defined in K.S.A. 60-401(b), is 'evidence 
having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact.' In State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 
505, 186 P.3d 713 (2008), we explained that this definition of 'relevance' contains both a 
materiality element and a probative element. There, we held that an appellate court 
reviews a district court's determination of materiality de novo and the assessment of 
probative value under an abuse of discretion standard. [Citation omitted.]" State v. 
Ultreras, 296 Kan. 828, 857, 295 P.3d 1020 (2013). 
 
Applicable Facts 
 
Prior to Burnett's first trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent 
Burnett from introducing evidence at trial that other shootings had occurred at Ramsey's 
house. At the hearing on the motion, the prosecutor informed the district court that when 
investigators went to the house to investigate the July 7 shooting, they discovered older 
damage to the home that appeared to have been caused by earlier shootings. The 
prosecutor also informed the court that a subsequent shooting had taken place at the 
house in October 2008. The prosecutor argued that based on the third-party evidence rule, 
evidence of these others shootings should be excluded at trial.  
 
Burnett argued that the evidence of other shootings taking place at the residence 
should be admitted in order to support his defense that someone else committed the July 
7 shooting. Furthermore, he argued that presenting evidence of the prior shootings, 
specifically all the damage the house sustained as result of gunfire, was essential to cross-
examining the crime scene investigators who examined the house and concluded that six 
shots were fired at the front of the house on July 7, 2008. The district court granted the 
State's motion in limine.  
 
13 
 
 
 
Prior to Burnett's second trial, the State resubmitted its motion in limine. Burnett 
asked the district court to reconsider its prior ruling, arguing that he should be able to 
present evidence of prior shootings because he claimed that when crime scene 
investigators examined the house in connection with the July 7 shooting, they found a 
total of 17 bullet holes. The investigators attributed six of those bullet holes to the July 7 
shooting because of the six shell casings found in the street in front of the house. Burnett 
argued that he should be able to mention the other 10 bullet holes in the house in order to 
cross-examine the investigators regarding their conclusions about the manner in which 
the July 7 shooting was carried out.  
 
The district court concluded that admitting the evidence of prior shootings for the 
purpose of challenging the investigators' determination of how the shooting occurred was 
not relevant to Burnett's defense of innocence at trial. 
 
At trial, the State presented the testimonies of police officers Ross Hatfield and 
Alan Jaskinia, members of the crime scene investigation unit who were dispatched to the 
house on July 7 to collect evidence of the shooting. Hatfield took photographs of the 
crime scene. Though the photographs are not part of the record on appeal, the trial 
transcript indicates that one photo showed a window to the left of the front door that had 
a trajectory rod running through it. Hatfield stated that the purpose of the trajectory rod 
was to demonstrate the flight path of a bullet that went through the window. During 
cross-examination regarding the picture, Hatfield admitted that the bullet hole going 
through the window "wouldn't necessarily match up" with a bullet hole found in the wall 
leading into the back bedroom where Larks was shot. 
 
Jaskinia testified about collecting six .40 caliber cartridge cases from the street in 
front of the residence. Because the shell casings were shiny—as compared to casings 
with a dull, tarnished appearance caused by being exposed to the elements—Jaskinia 
14 
 
 
 
concluded that the casings had not been outside for very long. Jaskinia opined that the 
location of the cartridge cases in the street in relation to Ramsey's house was consistent 
with someone standing in the street in front of the house and firing a semiautomatic gun 
multiple times at the house. Detective Block had a similar opinion, testifying "that 
someone stood in the street and fired into the residence through the window."  
 
On cross-examination, Jaskinia conceded that the placement of the shell casings 
on the street did not rule out the possibility that the shell casings were ejected from a gun 
fired from a moving vehicle.  
 
As mentioned above, law enforcement submitted for testing the six .40 caliber 
cartridge cases along with two fired bullets (one of which was recovered from Larks' 
body) and one fired bullet jacket fragment. It was later determined that the cartridge cases 
were all fired from the same gun and that the markings on the cases were consistent with 
the markings left by a .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun manufactured by Hi-Point 
Firearms. It was also determined that the two fired bullets were fired from the same 
gun—likely a .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun manufactured by Hi-Point. Finally, it 
could not be determined conclusively whether the bullet jacket fragment was fired from 
the same gun as the two fired bullets.  
 
After Burnett was convicted of the charges, he filed a motion for new trial in 
which he stated: 
 
 
"The defendant should have been allowed to refer to the fact that the shooting in 
this case was at a drug house and that there were prior bullet holes, firearms and drugs in 
the house at which the victim was found. The State alleged that the house at which the 
victim was found was the home of Tyrone Ramsey. The jury was left with the false 
impression that this house was his home. In fact, it was a barely liveable house containing 
ammunition and drugs.  
15 
 
 
 
 
"That the defendant was precluded from referring to these facts is problematic in 
a couple of areas. First, the defendant was precluded from presenting a defense that 
someone else other than he was responsible for the homicide. Had the defendant been 
allowed to refer to this evidence, perhaps he could have argued that there was a 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt since it was possible that a rival drug dealer or someone 
wishing to rob him or the house of the narcotics and/or weapons was responsible for the 
death of the alleged victim. It is within the common knowledge and experience of the 
jury that drug houses in Kansas City, Kansas are the targets of robberies and shootings. 
 
"Second, the defendant was precluded from arguing that the alleged victim could 
have been shot and killed by one of the weapons in the house. There were several live 
rounds of ammunition found in the house. Since the defendant was not allowed to 
mention the other potential firearms, he was precluded from arguing that perhaps one of 
them caused the death. The defendant was denied the right to present an effective defense 
when he was not allowed to mention the drugs and firearms." 
 
The State responded by arguing that the district court properly excluded the 
evidence based on the third-party evidence rule, stating: 
 
 
"Initially, Defendant endorsed several witnesses, including Detective William 
Michael, who investigated a homicide at the same location on October 3, 2008, 
approximately 3 months after Rahi Larks was killed. Such evidence was, and remains, 
irrelevant to the instant case. In addition, any testimony or evidence that shots had 
previously been fired at 2412 Haskell was irrelevant and amounted to an impermissible 
attempt to blame an unknown third party for the crime. 
"At no time has Defendant identified any evidence that would connect any 
specific third party to this crime. Rather, Defendant merely sought to argue that a 
mythical 'someone else' could have killed Rahi Lark[s]. Defendant based this upon his 
assertion that the location was a drug house, and had been fired upon at some time in the 
past.  
"Such evidence is irrelevant to the charges at issue and any attempt to introduce 
such evidence would serve no purpose other than to impermissibly impugn the character 
of the victim and witnesses." 
16 
 
 
 
 
The district court denied Burnett's motion for a new trial at sentencing. In doing 
so, the court specifically addressed Burnett's argument regarding the exclusion of third-
party evidence: 
 
 
"Certainly, the third party issue was argued at length regarding whether the 
shootings—some shootings had occurred prior, some shootings might have occurred after 
in regard to the house. Certainly, I reviewed the arguments from both sides and made a 
ruling that that was not relevant evidence and would not have given any sort of 
exculpatory emphasis to the defendant and certainly didn't point—there's never been any 
third party identified or even indicated that could have or, in fact, did commit the acts that 
the defendant was convicted of. So I—there was no basis. I think statutory and case law 
support the Court's position in that respect."   
 
Analysis 
 
A. Admitting Evidence of Other Shootings to Show a Third Party's Involvement 
 
Initially, we note that though Burnett may have proffered sufficient evidence to 
show that shootings had taken place at Ramsey's house before and after July 7, 2008, at 
no time did he proffer any evidence to show that Ramsey's house was a "drug house" or 
that police found weapons and ammunition inside the house when they searched it on 
July 7. Accordingly, we find that Burnett has failed to preserve for appeal whether the 
district court erred in excluding this evidence. See State v. Evans, 275 Kan. 95, 99, 62 
P.3d 220 (2003) ("When a motion in limine has been granted, the party being limited by 
the motion has the responsibility of proffering sufficient evidence to the trial court in 
order to preserve the issue for appeal."). 
 
Whether a third party was responsible for the crime a defendant is charged with is 
clearly a material fact related to determining the defendant's guilt or innocence. We have 
17 
 
 
 
previously stated that "[w]hile evidence of the motive of a third party to commit the 
crime, standing alone, is not relevant, such evidence may be relevant if there is other 
evidence connecting the third party to the crime." State v. Brown, 285 Kan. 261, Syl. ¶ 
26, 173 P.3d 612 (2007). In other words, without additional evidence showing that a third 
party could have committed the crime (e.g., presence at the crime scene, the opportunity 
and means to commit the crime), evidence merely suggesting that someone other than the 
defendant had a motive to commit the crime has little probative value and can be properly 
excluded at trial. "A district court judge must evaluate the totality of facts and 
circumstances in a given case to determine whether the defense's proffered evidence 
effectively connects the third party to the crime charged." 285 Kan. 261, Syl. ¶ 27. 
Because the district court's determination of this question contemplates whether the 
proffered evidence is probative to establishing a third party's involvement in the charged 
crime, the district court's decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Ultreras, 
296 Kan. at 857 (An appellate court reviews a district court's assessment of probative 
value under an abuse of discretion standard.); see also State v. Inkelaar, 293 Kan. 414, 
438, 264 P.3d 81 (2011) (A district court's decision under the third-party evidence rule is 
subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review on appeal.). 
 
In State v. Marsh, 278 Kan. 520, 531, 102 P.3d 445 (2004), rev'd on other grounds 
by Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 165 L. Ed. 2d 429 (2006), this court 
clarified that the admission of third-party evidence does not turn on the sometimes hazy 
distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. In that case, Marsh was accused 
of killing a mother and her child, but there was also evidence that a third party—the 
husband and father of the victims—might have been involved in the murders. The Marsh 
court found that Marsh had proffered more than mere evidence of the husband's motive—
the husband's blood and the blood of one of the victims had been found on Marsh's shoes. 
As a result, this court held Marsh's right to a fair trial had been violated by the trial court's 
exclusion of the third-party evidence. 278 Kan. at 533. 
18 
 
 
 
 
In Evans, the defendant tried to admit evidence that another person was seen 
holding the murder weapon immediately after the fatal shot was fired. There was also 
evidence that this person admitted to shooting the victim and later removing his body. In 
holding that the district court erred in not admitting the third-party evidence, this court 
stated:  "Circumstantial evidence that would be admissible and support a conviction if 
introduced by the State cannot be excluded by a court when offered by the defendant to 
prove his or her defense that another killed the victim." Evans, 275 Kan. at 105-06.   
 
In both Marsh and Evans, the defendants, in addition to proffering evidence of a 
third party's motive for committing the crime, proffered evidence showing that the third 
party was present at the crime scene. In contrast, in Inkelaar and State v. Adams, 280 
Kan. 494, 505-07, 124 P.3d 19 (2005), though the defendants in each case had identified 
a third party with a possible motive for committing the crime, neither defendant could 
produce evidence placing the third party at the scene of the crime during the relevant time 
period. Accordingly, in both cases, this court found that the district court had not abused 
its discretion in excluding the proffered third-party evidence. Inkelaar, 293 Kan. at 441; 
Adams, 280 Kan. at 507.   
 
In this case, Burnett proffered evidence establishing that Ramsey's house was the 
target of shootings before and after July 7 and suggested that because the house had been 
the target of other shootings—which he claimed were drug related—it was possible that 
someone else was responsible for the July 7 shooting. Though the evidence tends to show 
that the house attracted criminal activity, it fails to identify or show that someone other 
than Burnett was responsible for the July 7 shooting. Without evidence connecting the 
prior or subsequent shootings to the July 7 shooting (e.g., the same gun was used in all 
the shootings), the evidence of prior or subsequent shootings has little probative value to 
19 
 
 
 
establishing the material fact that someone other than Burnett committed the July 7 
shooting.   
 
Presenting such evidence in this case would be analogous to presenting evidence 
of prior and subsequent robberies of a convenience store when a defendant is charged 
with robbing the store on a specific date—for example, July 7. Without evidence showing 
that the person or persons responsible for the other robberies also committed the July 7 
robbery, such evidence has little probative value in establishing the defendant's innocence 
for the July 7 robbery. In fact, such evidence is less probative to establishing a third 
party's responsibility for the crime charged than the evidence found to be properly 
excluded at trial in Inkelaar and Adams. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in excluding Burnett's proffered evidence at trial for the purpose 
of establishing a third party's responsibility for the crime.     
 
B. Admitting Evidence of Other Shootings for Purpose of Cross-Examining Crime 
Scene Investigators  
 
As mentioned above, the State presented evidence at trial indicating that on July 7, 
2008, someone stood in the street in front of Ramsey's house and fired a .40 caliber 
semiautomatic handgun six times at Ramsey's house. One of the gunshots hit Larks and 
killed him. Burnett proffered evidence that the house had sustained other gunshots 
besides the six that the State was attributing to the July 7 shooting. We agree with 
Burnett's argument that questioning the investigators about these other gunshot holes 
could have impugned the State's theory that the July 7 shooting resulted from a lone 
gunman standing in the street and firing his weapon at the front of Ramsey's house. The 
presence or absence of explanations for why the other gunshot holes were disregarded 
would impact the weight of the State's evidence—its probativeness—rather than its 
materiality. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in denying Burnett's 
20 
 
 
 
request to question the investigators regarding the other gunshot holes to the house. We 
proceed with determining whether this error was harmless. 
 
The erroneous exclusion of evidence is subject to review under the harmless error 
test of K.S.A. 60-261, which asks whether "there is a reasonable probability that the error 
did or will affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record." State v. Ward, 292 
Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). Factors an 
appellate court can consider in reviewing the erroneous exclusion of evidence for 
harmless error include:  "the importance of the witness' testimony, whether the testimony 
was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the 
testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise 
permitted, and the overall strength of the case." Ultreras, 296 Kan. 828, Syl. ¶ 11.  
 
Though questioning the detectives about the other gunshot holes may have aided 
Burnett in challenging the evidence the State presented to show how the shooting 
occurred, we find that such questioning had little importance to Burnett's defense at trial. 
It was undisputed at trial that on July 7, 2008, someone fired multiple gunshots at 
Ramsey's house and that one of these gunshots struck and killed Larks. The main issue at 
trial was the identity of the shooter, and the State presented circumstantial evidence to 
identify Burnett as the culprit. Consequently, the exact manner in which the shooting 
occurred was not essential to the State's case-in-chief and had little bearing on Burnett's 
defense of innocence.   
 
The State presented evidence showing that Burnett and Ramsey had an 
antagonistic relationship that was exacerbated on July 7 when Dickson called Ramsey 
and told him about Burnett hitting her with a juice bottle. When Ramsey called Burnett 
and asked him about the incident, Burnett threatened to kill Ramsey. The State presented 
evidence showing that Burnett possessed a gun on July 7 and that, after Ramsey had 
21 
 
 
 
broken out the windows of Burnett's truck, Burnett had a motive and opportunity for 
firing his gun at Ramsey's house. Finally, Dickson testified at trial that Burnett called her 
later that night and admitted to shooting at Ramsey's house. She also testified about the 
letters she received from Burnett (admitted into evidence at trial) instructing her not to 
testify that he admitted to shooting Ramsey's house. Based on Burnett's statements within 
these letters (e.g., "make up something that will help me" and "[t]hat's da only way I'll 
come home that day if you don't say anything to make me look guilty"), the jury could 
clearly infer that Burnett was wanting Dickson to commit perjury at trial by testifying 
that he did not admit to the shooting at Ramsey's house.  
 
Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude there is not a reasonable 
probability that the trial's outcome would have been different had Burnett been allowed to 
question the investigators regarding the other gunshot holes to the house. Accordingly, 
we conclude that the error was harmless.    
 
DENIAL OF A CONTINUANCE 
 
Next, Burnett argues that the district court should have granted him a continuance 
in order to prepare a redacted version of the video recording of his interview with 
Detective Block. Burnett claims that the recording of the interview was essential to cross-
examining Block and that the district court's denial of his request for a continuance 
essentially denied him his right of confrontation.  
 
K.S.A. 22-3401 states that a district court may grant a continuance "for good cause 
shown," and its refusal to grant a continuance will not be disturbed on appeal absent a 
showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Beaman, 295 Kan. 853, 862, 286 P.3d 876 
(2012).  
 
22 
 
 
 
"Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, 
in other words, if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial 
court; (2) is based on an error of law, in other words, if the discretion is guided by an 
erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, in other words, if 
substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite 
conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based. [Citation omitted.]" State v. 
Warrior, 294 Kan. 484, 505, 277 P.3d 1111 (2012). 
 
Applicable Facts 
 
Detective Block testified at trial about the statements Burnett made during his 
interview. On cross-examination, Block admitted that in testifying about Burnett's 
statements, he was paraphrasing what Burnett had told him and not giving a verbatim 
recitation of Burnett's statements.  
 
At a later point during Block's cross-examination, defense counsel asked to have a 
bench conference. At the bench, the following exchange took place: 
 
 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I'm doing this preemptively, Judge. I'm beginning to 
move to introduce the statement, the video statement of Mr. Burnett that's been 
provided—a copy that's been provided to me. It's three hours long. It's very long. I don't 
necessarily want it published to the jury. 
 
"However, the reason for doing so is because Detective Block is basically saying 
he was paraphrasing. He's reading from his report. The best evidence as to what Mr. 
Burnett actually told him would be the [recorded] statement and I believe that the jury 
should have the best evidence and not just what his recollection is of the—of what the 
statement was and his paraphrasing of it. 
 
"[THE PROSECUTOR]:  Judge, I don't have a particular objection to that, but I 
do want to make a record that as far as I have not redacted it in any way. The defendant 
does make reference to his prior incarceration. I don't think he discusses the nature of it, 
but he does discuss having gone to prison and being on probation, things of that nature, 
other extraneous information. 
23 
 
 
 
 
"Plus, I guess my objections would be it includes references to [Ramsey] being a 
drug dealer, none of which is relevant. So I am concerned about the admission of an 
unredacted statement. Now, if we want to redact it, I have no problem.  
 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  And if I can, Judge, the reason I—it's really kind of 
hard to cross-examine Detective Block on that, on each item that he's paraphrasing. 
 
"THE COURT:  The problem that you have is we're on the last witness of the 
State. What you're suggesting is gonna require more time than this Court can give you to 
do. If you had intended to do this beforehand, you should have prepared it beforehand 
and redacted all of the objectionable material both from the State's side and your client's 
side. You haven't done that. Now you want to do this at the last second. I'm not going to 
let you. 
 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Okay. Well, you know, a lot depends on what the 
witness testifies to. And he's testified twice now and I think that in my mind, there were 
some things that he testified the first trial that are different than what he's testifying to. 
 
"THE COURT:  And if you knew that beforehand, you should have prepared the 
defendant's videotape and finished the statement so that it would be acceptable as an 
exhibit. You didn't do that. And now you've got two alternatives; the one you haven't 
taken care of and the other is your client could testify. Those are the only remedies I 
could see for you at this juncture. 
 
"[THE PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, if I may, I want to be clear for the record, 
at the last trial, the State did not introduce the statement. 
 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  No. 
 
"[THE PROSECUTOR]:  The detective didn't testify about it, period, because it 
never came in. That was a strategic decision the State made and obviously I have altered 
it for this trial. I never intended to introduce the three hour taped statement because 
redacting it was cumbersome and I just didn't think—the way that it would have—would 
have had to have been redacted would have made it very difficult to follow and it would 
have been obvious there was material missing. That's why I didn't do it. 
 
"THE COURT:  (Nodding head up and down.) 
 
"[THE PROSECUTOR]:  And, again, you know, I think this is material that's 
prejudicial to—both to the State and to the defendant that's contained within there. So I 
just wanted to make that clear for the record. 
24 
 
 
 
 
"THE COURT:  I can understand that. All I'm saying is that at the eleventh hour, 
you don't have the time to prepare it for an acceptable exhibit. So I'm not going to let you 
do it, sir."   
 
Subsequently, in Burnett's motion for a new trial, he argued that he was prejudiced 
when the district court denied him the opportunity to play the video recording of his 
statement to the jury. Burnett argued that  
 
"Detective Block's testimony regarding the defendant's statement was extremely vague 
and he was unable to recall many details of the statement other than those that served the 
State. Defense counsel had not prepared a redacted version of the videotaped statement 
and neither had the State. In the previous trial, the State had not presented the defendant's 
statement. Counsel had no way of anticipating that the statement would be presented and 
further that the Detective would testify by loosely paraphrasing and not remembering 
several aspects of defendant's statement."  
 
Accordingly, Burnett argued that district court's decision to not allow defense 
counsel time to prepare an admissible version of the recording prevented him from 
effectively cross-examining Detective Block.  
 
Analysis 
 
In his brief, Burnett argues that the district court's decision harmed his defense at 
trial because, without the video recording, he was unable to impeach Block's testimony 
regarding the interview. However, Burnett does not specify how Block's testimony was 
inconsistent with the statements recorded on the video or even explain how Block's 
testimony could have been impeached by the video.  
 
Without specific references to how the video would have bolstered his defense or 
impeached Block's testimony, Burnett has failed to show that "good cause" supported his 
25 
 
 
 
request for a continuance to prepare a redacted version of the video. See Beaman, 295 
Kan. at 864 (in concluding that district court acted within its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion to continue sentencing hearing, court stated:  "Mere speculation that 
with more time something favorable may happen for the defendant does not constitute 
good cause. [Citation omitted.]"). Consequently, we conclude that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying Burnett's request for a continuance.  
 
ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FELONY MURDER 
 
The jury in this case was instructed that in order to convict Burnett of felony 
murder, the State had to prove that Burnett killed Larks and that this killing occurred 
during the commission, the attempted commission, or flight from the commission of an 
inherently dangerous felony, to wit:  criminal discharge of a firearm into an occupied 
dwelling. Burnett argues that this instruction established alternative means of committing 
felony murder. Based on the super-sufficiency requirement for evidence in an alternative 
means case, see State v. Wright, 290 Kan. 194, 203-06, 224 P.3d 1159 (2010), 
disapproved on other grounds by State v. Brooks, 298 Kan. 672, 317 P.3d 54 (2014), 
Burnett argues that his conviction for felony murder must be reversed because the State 
failed to present sufficient evidence on all the means of committing felony murder that 
the jury was instructed on. Specifically, Burnett contends that no evidence was presented 
at trial showing that Larks was killed during an attempted discharge of a firearm into an 
occupied dwelling or during the flight after the crime was committed.  
 
Recently, this court in State v. Cheffen, 297 Kan. 689, 699-702, 303 P.3d 1261 
(2013), rejected the argument that the phrase "in the commission of, attempt to commit, 
or flight from an inherently dangerous felony" in the felony-murder statute created 
alternative means of committing felony murder. In reaching this conclusion, the Cheffen 
court stated: 
26 
 
 
 
 
"The felony-murder statute has two primary elements—killing and 
simultaneously engaging in an inherently dangerous felony. The second element can be 
established through proof that the killing occurred while the defendant was committing, 
attempting to commit, or fleeing from an inherently dangerous felony. These are simply 
factual circumstances in which a material element may be proven. Therefore, this 
language in the felony-murder statute does not create alternative means . . . ." Cheffen, 
297 Kan. at 702. 
 
Accordingly, Burnett's argument must be rejected. The jury was not instructed on 
alternative means of committing felony murder which obligated the State to prove that 
the killing was done during the commission of, the attempt to commit, and the flight from 
the commission of a criminal discharge of a firearm into an occupied dwelling. The 
record clearly shows, and Burnett does not dispute, that sufficient evidence was presented 
establishing one of the factual circumstances—that Larks was killed during the 
commission of the underlying felony.   
 
THE ADMISSION OF BURNETT'S LETTERS 
 
 
Burnett next challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained by 
law enforcement through their inspection of nonprivileged letters that Burnett sent to 
Dickson while incarcerated in the county jail. The record indicates that prior to Dickson 
receiving the letters, jail personnel opened and photocopied the letters and sent the copies 
to the district attorney's office. Burnett asserts that the opening of these letters constituted 
a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
 
"When reviewing a district court ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, an 
appellate court reviews the factual underpinnings of the decision under a substantial 
competent evidence standard. The ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts is 
reviewed de novo. The appellate court does not reweigh the evidence, assess the 
27 
 
 
 
credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicting evidence." State v. Ransom, 288 Kan. 
697, Syl. ¶ 1, 207 P.3d 208 (2009). 
 
Applicable Facts 
 
Prior to Burnett's first trial, he filed a pro se motion asking the district court to 
suppress copies of the letters he placed in the jail's outgoing mail to Dickson. He alleged 
that the letters were contained in sealed envelopes and that jail personnel opened the 
envelopes, read and copied the letters, and then provided the copies to the prosecutor's 
office. Though Burnett conceded that the detention center "reserves the right to monitor 
incoming/outgoing mail for threats, escape plots, and other security concerns," he argued 
that "the jail cannot act as a liaison for the district attorney's office in the prosecution of 
defendant on his current charge." He argued that because no search warrant was obtained 
allowing jail staff to open his outgoing mail, the contents of his letters should be 
inadmissible at trial.  
 
At a pretrial hearing on the motion, defense counsel conceded that when inmates 
are booked into the jail, they sign a statement putting them on notice that the Wyandotte 
County Sheriff's Department may open and read their mail. He argued, however, that the 
statement was insufficient to put an inmate on notice that a letter could be copied and 
shared with the district attorney's office. Defense counsel argued that because the letters 
did not contain any admissions by Burnett, they lacked probative value.  
 
The State responded by arguing that the letters had probative value because within 
the letters, Burnett was asking Dickson to testify in such a way that would be beneficial 
to his defense while being contrary to what she had already told detectives. With regard 
to whether the letters were obtained illegally, the prosecutor maintained that because 
Burnett was on notice that his nonprivileged mail could be read, the letters could be 
28 
 
 
 
properly introduced into evidence at trial. The district court agreed, concluding that 
Burnett's constitutional rights would not be violated by the State introducing the letters 
into evidence during its case-in-chief. Accordingly, the district court denied Burnett's 
motion to suppress the letters.  
 
At trial, Burnett raised an objection prior to the letters being admitted into 
evidence.   
 
Analysis 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable. See State v. 
Daniel, 291 Kan. 490, 496, 242 P.3d 1186 (2010), cert. denied 563 U.S. __ (2011); see 
also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009). The 
Fourth Amendment is not implicated, however, unless the person invoking its protection 
had a "'justifiable,'" "'reasonable,'" or "'legitimate expectation of privacy'" that was 
invaded by government action. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 
L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 
L. Ed. 2d 842 (2005) ("Official conduct that does not 'compromise any legitimate interest 
in privacy' is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. [Citation omitted.]").  
 
Nearly a century ago, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the examination of prisoners' mail. Stroud v. United States, 
251 U.S. 15, 21-22, 40 S. Ct. 50, 64 L. Ed. 103 (1919). In Stroud, letters written by a 
detainee were later used as evidence at trial. The Supreme Court held that there was no 
constitutional violation because the letters were obtained "under established practice, 
reasonably designed to promote the discipline of the institution." 251 U.S. at 21. "Modern 
cases have limited Stroud to situations in which prison officials have seized outgoing 
29 
 
 
 
letters in the exercise of legitimate government interests. [Citations omitted.] Thus, 
Stroud 'still controls cases in which such seizures are prompted by reasonable 
justification.' [Citation omitted.]" United States v. Whalen, 940 F.2d 1027, 1035 (7th Cir. 
1991).  
 
"[B]ecause of their reasonable concern for prison security and inmates' diminished 
expectations of privacy, prison officials do not violate the constitution when they read 
inmates' outgoing letters." United States v. Brown, 878 F.2d 222, 225 (8th Cir. 1989); see 
also Whalen, 940 F.2d at 1035 ("[I]t is well established that prisons have sound reasons 
for reading the outgoing mail of their inmates."); State v. Brown, 155 Idaho 423, 434, 313 
P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2013) ("Outgoing mail may present less of a security risk than the 
prospect of contraband secreted in a prison cell . . . but inmate mail nevertheless raises 
legitimate security issues. Inmates may use outgoing mail to communicate to persons on 
the outside the inmates' requests, plans, and methods to smuggle contraband into the 
institution; to devise and direct escape strategies; to direct confederates to intimidate 
witnesses inside or outside of the institution; or to indirectly communicate threats, 
harassment, or escape plans to other inmates by using persons outside as a go between. 
Monitoring of inmate mail can curtail these security risks."). State v. Telford, 940 P.2d 
522, 525 (Utah App. 1997) (concluding that jail's policy of inspecting and scanning 
outgoing mail is narrowly tailored and served important government interests by 
promoting discipline and preventing criminal acts). Furthermore, "[o]nce prison officials 
have a right to examine such messages, no rule requires them to close their eyes to what 
they discover therein." State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 661 P.2d 1105 (1983); see also 
State v. McCoy, 270 Or. 340, 347, 527 P.2d 725 (1974) (same). 
 
In State v. Matthews, 217 Kan. 654, 538 P.2d 637 (1975), this court held that a 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when a letter he wrote while in 
jail and awaiting trial was copied by jail personnel and introduced into evidence at his 
30 
 
 
 
trial. The letter, addressed to a woman in Kansas City, Kansas, contained several 
incriminating statements regarding the charges pending against him. The defendant gave 
the letter, contained in an unsealed envelope, to a member of the jail staff so it could be 
mailed. Pursuant to jail policy—which all inmates were made aware of—the letter was 
read prior to being placed in the jail's outgoing mail. After reading the letter, the jail staff 
member showed it to a law enforcement officer who was presumably familiar with the 
defendant's case. The letter was eventually copied and placed in the mail.  
 
In concluding that the Fourth Amendment was not violated by copying the letter 
and admitting it into evidence at the defendant's trial, the Matthews court stated: 
 
"The . . . letter was delivered to the jailer unsealed and unstamped—a circumstance 
which we believe corroborates the state's assertion that defendant knew his outgoing mail 
would be read. There is no evidence that defendant did not know of this procedure. Here 
 . . . no search was involved. . . . . Since the letter was delivered to the jailer unsealed and 
with knowledge that it would be read, defendant has no claim of any invasion of privacy. 
There is no evidence of trickery or deceitful practices. Defendant voluntarily wrote the 
letter knowing it would be read. Under such circumstances it cannot be said that the state 
gained access to the contents of the letter by search and seizure." 217 Kan. at 657-58. 
 
Like Matthews, other courts have looked to the policy of the institution where the 
detainee is held to determine whether the detainee had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his or her nonprivileged, outgoing mail for Fourth Amendment purposes. See 
Whalen, 940 F.2d at 1034-35 (because defendant, pursuant to prison regulations, left his 
outgoing letters unsealed, he had no expectation of privacy with respect to their contents); 
State v. Martin, 77 Conn. App. 778, 799-800, 825 A.2d 835 (2003) (pretrial detainee had 
no reasonable expectation of privacy after being informed mail would be read); State v. 
Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Mo. 1972) (no unreasonable search or seizure occurred 
when letter composed by defendant while in jail and awaiting trial was admitted into 
31 
 
 
 
evidence; defendant knew letter would be read by jailer prior to being mailed); State v. 
Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 603-05, 565 S.E.2d 22 (2002) (no subjective expectation of privacy 
when detainees are aware that their mail will be inspected); Commonwealth v. Moore, 
928 A.2d 1092, 1099 (Pa. Super. 2007) ("Appellee . . . submitted his outgoing non-
privileged correspondence to the mail room in unsealed envelopes, per prison policy. 
Appellee availed himself of a process that exposed his correspondence to the plain view 
of prison officials; therefore, society would not recognize any alleged subjective 
expectation of privacy as reasonable."). 
  
Here, Burnett conceded in his pro se suppression motion that he was aware that 
the jail reserved "the right to monitor incoming/outgoing mail for threats, escape plots, 
and other security concerns," indicating that jail staff had a legitimate purpose in opening 
his sealed letters and that Burnett did not have a reasonable expectation that his letters 
would remain private. By extension, once jail staff read the letters, making them aware 
that Burnett was attempting to influence the testimony of a witness, it was proper for 
them to make copies of the letters and provide them to the prosecutor's office. See Jeffers, 
135 Ariz. at 414; McCoy, 270 Or. at 347. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court 
did not err in denying Burnett's motion to suppress evidence gained through the 
inspection of his outgoing letters.   
 
LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Next, Burnett argues that the district court erred when it did not give a limiting 
instruction to the jury regarding evidence indicating that Burnett had committed crimes 
other than the ones at issue at trial. Specifically, Burnett contends that the district court 
should have given a limiting instruction regarding evidence indicating that he threatened 
to kill Ramsey, that he threw an orange juice bottle at Dickson which hit her on the head, 
and that within 5 years preceding July 7, 2008, he was released from prison for a felony, 
32 
 
 
 
which prohibited him from lawfully possessing a firearm on July 7—a fact that he 
stipulated to and was an essential element of the crime of criminal possession of a firearm 
charged in this case. See K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(3). Burnett contends that all of this evidence 
constituted K.S.A. 60-455 evidence and, accordingly, the district court should have given 
a limiting instruction regarding the evidence pursuant to State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 56-
57, 144 P.3d 647 (2006).   
 
Burnett acknowledges that he did not request that the district court provide a 
limiting instruction regarding the evidence at issue. Furthermore, he did not object to the 
evidence being admitted at trial. Accordingly, review of this issue is controlled by K.S.A. 
22-3414(3) and the stair-step analytical process set out in State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 
Syl. ¶¶ 7, 8, 299 P.3d 292 (2013), and State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 511, 286 P.3d 195 
(2012); see also State v. Breeden, 297 Kan. 567, 582, 304 P.3d 660 (2013) (failure to 
object to the admission of K.S.A. 60-455[b] evidence does not waive the right to raise on 
appeal the issue of whether the failure to give a limiting instruction was clearly 
erroneous).    
 
As Williams articulated, K.S.A. 22-3414(3) creates a procedural hurdle when a 
party does not object to the failure to give an instruction because the statute establishes a 
preservation rule for instruction claims on appeal. It provides, in part, that no party may 
assign as error a district court's giving or failure to give a particular jury instruction, 
including a lesser included offense instruction, unless the giving or failure to give the 
instruction is clearly erroneous. If it is clearly erroneous, appellate review is not 
predicated upon an objection in the district court. 295 Kan. at 512-13. 
 
To establish that the giving or failure to give an instruction was clearly erroneous, 
the reviewing court must determine whether there was any error at all. This requires 
demonstrating that giving the proposed instruction would have been both legally and 
33 
 
 
 
factually appropriate, employing an unlimited review of the entire record. Williams, 295 
Kan. at 515-16. And if error is found on that basis, then the court moves to a reversibility 
inquiry in which it assesses whether it is firmly convinced the jury would have reached a 
different verdict had the instruction been given. The defendant maintains the burden to 
establish the degree of prejudice necessary for reversal. 295 Kan. at 516. 
 
Even if we assume without deciding that it was error not to provide a limiting 
instruction regarding the evidence Burnett complains about, we conclude that such an 
error was not clearly erroneous. Consistent with our above holding—that it was harmless 
error for the district court to prevent Burnett from cross-examining the investigators 
about bullets holes from prior shootings—we are not firmly convinced that the jury, 
based on the evidence presented at trial, would have reached a different verdict had a 
limiting instruction been given.  
 
THE INQUIRY INTO BURNETT'S REQUEST FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL 
 
Following Burnett's first trial, which ended in a hung jury, Burnett filed a "Motion 
for Substitution of Counsel," in which he alleged that "a serious conflict between attorney 
and defendant" existed "and that communication has completely broken down." In 
support of these allegations, Burnett claimed that defense counsel "refused to file 
motions, subpoena witnesses for the defendant, avoided issues that needed to be 
addressed, and he disregarded any request that the defendant had that will help the 
defendant prepare for a fair trial." He also claimed:  
 
"There has been a complete breakdown of communication. Request for visition [sic] only 
generates lies, phone calls are never answer [sic] or letters and he has constantly fail [sic] 
to return calls or respond to defendants [sic] letters which concerns [sic] preparing for a 
fair trial. As a result of [this] lack of communication, defendant has not been able to do 
any type of investigation nor develop a defense strategy to properly prepare for trial."   
34 
 
 
 
 
Finally, Burnett claimed that defense counsel "failed to competently represent 
defendant by [failing to file] important motions, refused to do research on the issues or 
support the motions with case law. [Defense counsel] never visited the scene, he 
demonstrated a lack of thoroughness by doing absolutely no investigation work, and was 
totally unprepared at trial."  
 
A hearing on the motion was conducted where the following exchange occurred: 
 
 
"THE COURT:  We are here for a pro se motion for substitution of counsel. Mr. 
Burnett, you can argue your motion at this time. 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  I would like to remove [defense counsel] due to the fact 
that it wadn't no type of investigation work done on my case. Not only that, throughout 
trials and things that was taking place, that it should have been done by [counsel] instead 
of having my younger brother do investigation work that he should have took care of. 
Wadn't none of my witnesses subpoenaed for trial. So I didn't get to have no witnesses on 
my behalf for trial. 
 
"Not only that, it's things that we discussed that he never brought up throughout 
trial. And then on top of it, we—we had meetings over at the jail to where what we was 
gonna—our strategy was gonna be. It's like he—he misplaced paperwork and stuff like 
that, like he was—he didn't know what—what was going on or nothing like that that we 
just talked about hours before. So I feel that he should be removed from my case because 
he's not being effective. 
 
"THE COURT:  You can be seated now. Now, you've covered everything that 
you think is important and that I should know? 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Yeah. 
 
"THE COURT:  Okay. You can be seated. Yes, sir. 
 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, we—I discussed with Mr. Burnett in 
detail all of the—the State's file. Mr. Burnett had asked that I subpoena a lot of people 
that I thought were probably not going to be productive or would in any way counter the 
State's evidence. Mr. Burnett's defense is not an alibi that he wasn't there. It was that he 
35 
 
 
 
didn't do it. And basically Mr. Burnett thought that everybody listed in the police report 
should have been subpoenaed and most of those people did not have, in my opinion, 
testimony that would be—would tend to disprove the State's contention with regard to the 
allegations against Mr. Burnett. 
 
"I believe that I was able to boil the case down to the basic contentions of the 
State and discuss with Mr. Burnett ways of attacking those because that would be the 
defense as to argue the State had not shown or does not have evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt to convince a jury that Mr. Burnett did the acts alleged. I tried it the 
way I thought it needed to be tried. 
 
"But obviously there was some—there was some times prior to trial that Mr. 
Burnett complained that I wasn't up seeing him enough and for at least the month before 
trial, you know, I was up there on weekends. I was up there on evenings, devoted nothing 
pretty much but to this case about a week or so before trial in final preparation. You 
know, unfortunately, I've got other things I also have to schedule. I thought that I had 
given it sufficient attention. 
 
"Mr. Burnett is—appears to be so shaken in my confidence to try this case a 
second time, I don't know whether I can rehabilitate that. I've tried during the first trial to 
do that and evidently have failed to do that.  
 
"With regard to investigation, you know, I talked to the witnesses that I—I even 
talked to the State's witness—main witness, Simone Dickson before trial. You know, I 
thought I had done everything I could do to prepare for this case. And it appears that if 
the Court were to require me to try it again, that, you know, I think that Mr. Burnett just 
has no absolute—no confidence in my ability to try the case. It's sad that that happens, 
but it does happen. You know, people I get along fine with. Sometimes they come along 
that you don't. But I know it's not a matter of getting along. It's a matter of 
communicating and I thought that I did my best to do that.  
 
"This case is set as a second up trial I believe it's the 13th of October and it's set 
behind a case that I know is gonna go because I'm trying it. That's Mr. Rodriguez's case. 
So, you know, even between now and then, I've got Mr. Rodriguez and the week before, 
I've got a first degree murder in Division 8. I've got a rape trial a week from Monday in 
Division 8. So, you know, I had not planned on spending a lot of time preparing for the 
retrial of Mr. Burnett's case on the 13th 'cause I'm 99.9 percent confident that that case is 
not—this case is not gonna go on that date because of the Rodriguez trial.  
36 
 
 
 
 
"So I—I'll be honest, I haven't seen him since the last trial because I've got other 
things and— 
 
"THE COURT:  Well, I appreciate what the both of you have told me and, in 
fact, I recall this particular case. The first trial resulted in a hung jury and mistrial as I 
recall, which means somebody was doing something right on the defense side. 
Obviously, the defendant was not convicted.  
 
"You know, Mr. Burnett, based upon what your attorney has told me and based 
upon my witnessing the first trial, there's no merit to any of your arguments whatsoever. 
You're not an attorney. You don't have a law degree. I don't know how many first degree 
murder trials you've defended in your past— 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  That don't stop common sense either. 
 
"THE COURT:  I'm sorry, I can't hear you. 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  I said that don't stop common sense either, though. 
 
"THE COURT:  Well, I understand what you're saying, but based upon my 
observation of [defense counsel's] performance in the first trial, based upon what you are 
alleging are his deficiencies, I can't find anything of a specific nature that he hasn't done 
on your behalf that would benefit your case. Just because you think there's something that 
should be done doesn't necessarily mean from a legal standpoint that it needs to be done. 
 
. . . . 
 
"You haven't given me any legal reason to remove him. Now, if you choose not 
to communicate or cooperate with him, I can't make you do that. That's entirely up to 
you. But obviously based upon the results of the first trial, he obviously was doing 
something right because the State obviously was not able to present enough evidence to 
convince twelve reasonable people that you were guilty of the charges you were—you 
were charged with. 
 
"So the investigation argument, not witnesses argument, and the strategy 
argument, frankly, based upon what you've told me and what is in your motion and based 
upon what I've seen and heard during the trial, I—I, frankly, find that you have not met 
the legal threshold to remove [defense counsel] as your counsel in this case and your 
motion for substitution of counsel is denied." 
 
37 
 
 
 
On appeal, Burnett argues that the district court's failure to conduct any further 
inquiry or investigation upon his notice of dissatisfaction with defense counsel violated 
his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Generally a district judge's refusal to appoint new counsel is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. State v. Sappington, 285 Kan. 158, Syl. ¶ 4, 169 P.3d 1096 (2007). 
Judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if the action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or 
unreasonable; (2) is based on an error of law; or (3) is based on an error of fact. State v. 
Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). The 
burden of demonstrating error is on the party alleging the abuse. State v. Hulett, 293 Kan. 
312, 318, 263 P.3d 153 (2011); State v. White, 284 Kan. 333, 342, 161 P.3d 208 (2007). 
 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an indigent criminal defendant the right to the 
assistance of counsel in his or her criminal defense. However, such a defendant cannot 
compel the district court to appoint the counsel of defendant's choice. To warrant 
substitute counsel, a defendant must show "justifiable dissatisfaction" with his or her 
appointed counsel. State v. Bryant, 285 Kan. 970, 986-87, 179 P.3d 1122 (2008); State v. 
Hegwood, 256 Kan. 901, 903, 888 P.2d 856 (1995). Justifiable dissatisfaction may be 
demonstrated by showing a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable disagreement, or a 
complete breakdown in communication between counsel and the defendant. 285 Kan. at 
986. "'"[A]s long as the trial court has a reasonable basis for believing the attorney-client 
relation has not deteriorated to a point where appointed counsel can no longer give 
effective aid in the fair presentation of a defense, the court is justified in refusing to 
appoint new counsel."'" 285 Kan. at 986-87 (quoting State v. Ferguson, 254 Kan. 62, 70, 
864 P.2d 693 [1993]). 
 
Contrary to Burnett's characterization, once the district court was made aware of 
Burnett's complaints of defense counsel, it conducted a hearing and inquired into the 
basis for his allegations that "a serious conflict" existed between him and defense counsel 
38 
 
 
 
and that communications between them had "completely broken down." But Burnett's 
statement at the hearing did not establish either of these two claims. In fact, in Burnett's 
statement to the court, he noted that he had discussed his case with defense counsel, and 
defense counsel noted that he had visited Burnett on numerous occasions prior to trial to 
discuss his case.  
 
Based on Burnett's and defense counsel's statements at the hearing, it appears that 
Burnett's dissatisfaction with defense counsel stemmed from defense counsel's refusal to 
investigate matters or to call witnesses which Burnett deemed important but, in defense 
counsel's professional judgment, would not be beneficial to or advance Burnett's defense 
at trial.   
 
This case is similar to State v. Jasper, 269 Kan. 649, 8 P.3d 708 (2000), where the 
defendant sought the appointment of new counsel due to current counsel being unable to 
find witnesses or experts to testify on her behalf at trial. At a hearing, defense counsel 
stated that he had made inquiries but had been unable to obtain an expert witness that 
would testify favorably for the defendant. In his efforts to obtain an expert witness, 
defense counsel had contacted medical experts and provided them with the medical 
records as well as the testimony given at the preliminary hearing. None of the experts 
were willing to testify within the required degree of medical certainty favorable to the 
defendant. The district court denied the defendant's request for new counsel.  
 
On appeal, this court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the defendant's request for new counsel. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Jasper court stated: 
 
"[The defendant's] letters to the trial court do not allege a conflict of interest or a 
complete breakdown in communications. The essence of [the defendant's] complaint was 
39 
 
 
 
that her court-appointed counsel found no witnesses or doctors to testify in her favor at 
trial. The trial court reviewed the allegation. Counsel explained that he had sought 
experts to testify on [the defendant's] behalf, but could find none. Clearly, [the 
defendant's] dissatisfaction with her appointed counsel was based on counsel's inability to 
produce evidence that would exonerate [the defendant]. It was unfortunate for [the 
defendant], but the evidence she desired could not be produced because counsel could not 
find an expert who would testify on her behalf. 
"Her complaint is not an irreconcilable conflict that could be remedied by the 
appointment of new counsel. Therefore, [the defendant] has failed to demonstrate a 
justifiable dissatisfaction with her court-appointed counsel." Jasper, 269 Kan. at 654-55. 
 
Similarly, Burnett's statement at the hearing concerning defense counsel's actions 
or inactions does not rise to the level of alleging a conflict of interest or a complete 
breakdown in communication requiring the district court to inquire further. His statement 
also did not allege an irreconcilable conflict because there is nothing to indicate that 
Burnett's dissatisfaction would have been alleviated by new counsel. Defense counsel's 
explanation for his actions appears to be sound, and there is nothing to indicate that a new 
attorney would not likewise engage in a similar course of conduct.   
 
Accordingly, we conclude that because Burnett's statement at the hearing 
implicated none of the grounds warranting further inquiry—let alone warranting 
substitute counsel—the district court was under no duty to inquire further and did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint new counsel. See State v. Richardson, 256 Kan. 
69, 81-82, 883 P.2d 1107 (1994) (denial of motion for new counsel during sentencing 
phase not abuse of discretion; defendant had opportunity to explain dissatisfaction; court 
stated reasons why defendant's concerns baseless; communication between defendant, 
counsel not broken down entirely).   
 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL 
 
After the jury found Burnett guilty of the charged crimes, he filed a motion for a 
new trial in which he alleged a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on several 
alleged deficiencies. The district court allowed defense counsel, Zimmerman, to 
withdraw and appointed new counsel for Burnett. Subsequently, new counsel filed a 
memorandum in support of Burnett's motion for a new trial. More than a year after the 
conclusion of the jury trial, a hearing on the motion was conducted where Zimmerman 
testified on behalf of the State. Burnett did not present any evidence in support of his 
motion. After hearing testimony from Zimmerman and arguments from the parties, the 
district court concluded that Burnett had failed to show that Zimmerman's actions in 
representing him were deficient. Accordingly, the district court denied Burnett's motion 
for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel.  
 
On appeal, Burnett contends that the district court erred in concluding that he 
failed to establish ineffective assistance on the part of Zimmerman. Though Burnett 
raised numerous examples of Zimmerman's deficient conduct in filings with the district 
court, on appeal, Burnett claims that Zimmerman rendered ineffective assistance by (1) 
failing to hire an investigator until a few days before the second trial; (2) failing to have 
other people from Frosty Treats testify so as to controvert Murphy's claim that he trained 
Burnett on July 7, 2008; (3) failing to have at trial a copy of Burnett's phone log; and (4) 
failing to have at trial a transcript of Burnett's interview with Detective Block. Each of 
these claims will be addressed in turn.   
 
A claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of fact 
and law requiring de novo review. Consequently, appellate courts review the underlying 
factual findings for support by substantial competent evidence and the legal conclusions 
41 
 
 
 
based on those facts de novo. State v. Cheatham, 296 Kan. 417, 430, 292 P.3d 318 
(2013). 
 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must establish (1) that 
counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, which requires a showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that his or her performance was less than that guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2) that counsel's 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that counsel's 
errors were so severe as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Cheatham, 296 Kan. at 
431.  
 
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance in a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is highly deferential and requires consideration of all the evidence before the 
judge or jury. The reviewing court must strongly presume that counsel's conduct fell 
within the broad range of reasonable professional assistance. Harris v. State, 288 Kan. 
414, 416, 204 P.3d 557 (2009). To establish prejudice, the defendant must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome. Cheatham, 296 Kan. at 431.  
 
Analysis 
 
A. Delay in Hiring an Investigator  
 
Burnett contends that Zimmerman waited to obtain an investigator until just prior 
to the second trial. Burnett claims that this delay caused the investigator to be unable to 
locate a child witness who had provided a description of the shooter to the police. Burnett 
42 
 
 
 
argues that "[a]n investigator with more time to work could have produced a different 
result and obtained service upon the witness." 
 
During Burnett's jury trial, Zimmerman told the court that based on his review of a 
police report, E.M. (d.o.b. 1/15/02) reported hearing five gunshots on July 7 and seeing a 
5'5", skinny, black male running east after the shots were fired. Zimmerman stated that he 
and the State had issued subpoenas for E.M. but neither party had been able to obtain 
service on E.M. Zimmerman said that his investigator had gone to E.M.'s address 
numerous times and no one would answer the door. Zimmerman believed E.M.'s 
description of the person he saw running from the scene was "vital evidence" because 
Burnett did "not meet description of 5'5" and skinny." Accordingly, Zimmerman asked 
the district court to allow him to present the evidence through the testimony of the officer 
who took down E.M.'s statement. The State objected to Zimmerman's request, arguing 
that the evidence constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence. The district court agreed 
with the State and sustained the objection.      
 
In the memorandum filed in support of Burnett's pro se motion for a new trial, 
counsel wrote:  "[Zimmerman] only requested a private investigator a short time prior to 
trial and the witnesses were not able to be located. There was a young boy that described 
the shooter to the police, and this description was completely inconsistent with a 
description of the defendant." 
 
At the hearing on Burnett's motion for a new trial, the prosecutor questioned 
Zimmerman about his efforts to locate E.M.: 
 
"Q. Okay. Now, let's talk about E.M., who was a child witness in this case, 
correct? 
"A. Yes. 
43 
 
 
 
"Q. All right. And did you attempt to locate E.M.? 
"A. I did. 
"Q. Were you able to successfully find him? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Did [the investigator] attempt to locate him? 
"A. I believe he went out and tried to—we had an address and I believe he went 
out to try to locate somebody and was unable to get anybody to answer the door. 
"Q. Okay. And throughout this trial, I assume you had contact—constant contact 
with the prosecutor . . . is that correct? 
"A. I believe so, yes. 
"Q. Okay. And what—what was [the prosecutor]—do you know if she attempted 
to have E.M. testify for the State? 
"A. I don't know. I—she told me that she had made attempts to get him 
subpoenaed and that his mother was uncooperative. 
"Q. Okay. And did E.M. ever testify— 
"A. No. 
"Q.—for the State? 
"A. (Shaking head side to side) 
"Q. Okay. So did you ever find him? 
"A. No. I tried to get his testimony in through another source and that was the 
patrolman that did the canvas of the area that actually wrote the report that—that set out 
what the—what the child had told him with regard to a description. 
"Q. So you tried to do that through another officer? 
"A. Right. 
"Q. And how did the Court rule? 
"A. I can't remember the officer's name, but I had him subpoenaed and he did 
come to court and we had a brief hearing with regard to his ability to testify.  
"Q. And was he—the officer able to testify as to what another witness told him if 
that witness was not gonna be here? 
"A. No. I believe his testimony was limited to the point where he wouldn't be 
able to testify."    
 
44 
 
 
 
No further evidence regarding Zimmerman's efforts to locate E.M. was presented 
at the hearing. 
  
Though E.M.'s testimony may have been beneficial to Burnett's defense, there is 
nothing in the record to suggest that if Zimmerman had secured the services of an 
investigator sooner, that investigator would have been able to obtain service upon E.M. 
and that, in turn, a parent or guardian would have brought E.M. to testify at Burnett's 
trial. The fact that E.M. did not testify at the hearing on Burnett's motion for a new trial—
occurring more than year after the conclusion of his second jury trial—indicates that 
Zimmerman's delay in hiring an investigator had little, if any, effect on whether E.M. 
testified at Burnett's trial. 
 
B. Witnesses from Frosty Treats  
 
Burnett contends that other people who worked at Frosty Treats could have 
controverted Murphy's claim that he trained Burnett on July 7, 2008, which, in turn, 
would have impugned Murphy's claim that he saw a gun underneath the driver's seat of 
Burnett's work truck on July 7. He argues that Burnett rendered deficient performance by 
failing to have these people testify at trial. 
 
However, Burnett did not present any evidence at the hearing to indicate that such 
witnesses existed. We therefore conclude that Burnett failed to establish that Zimmerman 
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel based on this allegation.     
 
C. The Phone Log 
 
Burnett contends that Zimmerman did not have copies at trial of Burnett's phone 
log. Burnett does not explain how failing to have a copy of the phone log hurt 
45 
 
 
 
Zimmerman's representation of him at trial. Consequently, we conclude that Burnett 
failed to establish that Zimmerman rendered ineffective assistance of counsel based on 
this allegation.     
   
D. Transcript of the Interview 
 
With regard to the transcript of the interview, Burnett suggests that having a 
transcript ready at trial would have aided Zimmerman in cross-examining Block. As a 
result of not having the transcript, Burnett alleges that Zimmerman's cross-examination 
of Block was inadequate.  
 
 
At the hearing, Zimmerman stated that he did not have a transcript of Burnett's 
interview with Block at the time of the second hearing. Counsel for Burnett proceeded to 
question Zimmerman about his cross-examination of Block: 
 
 
"Q. Okay. When you were requesting that the Court allow you to play the video, 
was that—was it your concern to play the whole video for the Court—or for the jury or 
simply to be able to cross-examine with specific sentences in there? 
 
"A. I know at the first trial, my intention was to try to get the whole thing played. 
At the second trial, I—it sure would have been just to clarify some of the things that 
Detective Block said, oh, I don't know, I'm not sure, but I think and then began to 
paraphrase. 
 
"Q. Do you recall [Detective Block] making statements that were incorrect as far 
as what was shown in the video? 
 
"A. I wouldn't say incorrect, but maybe not complete. I mean, I make a 
distinction there. I can't say that they were completely opposite of what had been said, but 
perhaps they weren't put the same way or correctly. 
 
"Q. And there clearly weren't direct quotes— 
 
"A. Correct. 
 
"Q.—from Mr. Burnett? 
46 
 
 
 
 
"A. Correct.  
 
"Q. Had you had a transcription of that statement, do you feel that you would 
have been able to more effectively cross-examine Detective Block? 
 
"A. Sure. 
 
. . . . 
 
"Q. And obviously, the defendant's statement, whether it came in—was coming 
in through Detective Block would have been pretty important, correct? 
 
"A. Correct. 
 
"Q. Do you feel that had you been able to more effectively cross-examine 
Detective Block, the outcome may have been different in this trial? 
 
"A. I can't say. And only because the—the—the defense didn't hinge on 
Detective Block because there was nothing he was saying that—there wasn't any 
culpatory statements that he was trying to pin on Mr. Burnett. So I can't tell you what the 
outcome would have been. I mean, I suppose if [the jury] had found some reason to—to 
disbelieve Detective Block, they could have made an inference that perhaps they did lean 
too heavily on [Dickson] and overcome her somehow. But I don't know that—how that 
would have affected it."  
 
Zimmerman's testimony at the hearing indicates that a transcript of the interview 
might have helped on cross-examination to clarify some of Block's testimony regarding 
the statements Burnett made at the interview, but Burnett has failed to show how doing so 
would have changed the outcome of his trial. Like Zimmerman at the hearing, Burnett 
has failed to identify any instances in Block's testimony that were contrary to what was 
said at the interview. Accordingly, even if we assume that Zimmerman was deficient in 
failing to have a transcript of the interview ready to use at trial, Burnett has failed to show 
prejudice, i.e., how questioning Block with the transcript would have hurt Block's 
credibility to such an extent that the jury would have rendered a different verdict.      
 
47 
 
 
 
 
We conclude that Burnett has failed to show that Zimmerman rendered ineffective 
assistance of counsel. As a result, we affirm the district court's decision to deny Burnett's 
motion for a new trial.  
 
CUMULATIVE ERROR 
 
Finally, Burnett asserts that even if the issues that he has raised do not rise to the 
level of reversible error individually, the cumulative effect of these errors operated to 
deny him a fair trial, requiring reversal of his convictions.  
 
Cumulative trial errors, when considered collectively, may require reversal of the 
defendant's convictions when the totality of circumstances substantially prejudiced the 
defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. Thompson v. State, 293 Kan. 704, 721, 
270 P.3d 1089 (2011).  
 
In our analysis of the issues, we have found one error (preventing Burnett from 
questioning investigators about other bullet holes) and assumed without deciding the 
presence of another error (the failure to give a limiting instruction regarding other crimes 
or civil wrongs evidence). But we concluded that these errors, when considered 
individually, were not reversible. Considering the errors collectively, we conclude that 
they did not aggregate so as to deny Burnett a fair trial. We reach this conclusion based 
on the errors being unrelated to each other and the evidence presented at trial, which 
included Dickson's testimony claiming that Burnett admitted to shooting at Ramsey's 
house and the letters Burnett wrote to Dickson, asking her to commit perjury by claiming 
that he never called her and claimed responsibility for the shooting.  
 
In light of the record as a whole, we conclude there is not a reasonable probability 
the combined errors affected the outcome of the trial.  
48 
 
 
 
Affirmed.