Case Title: SHIPPEY v. ROGERS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
SHIPPEY v. ROGERS2003 WY 12577 P.3d 404Case Number: 02-211Decided: 10/01/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

JOHN 
HENRY KIRKPATRICK, Deceased:

 

KAREN 
SHIPPEY,

 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

                                                                                                

RICK 
ROGERS, Co-Administrator of the

Estate 
of John Henry Kirkpatrick, Deceased; and

CAROL 
MARAFIOTI and JEAN LIEN,

 

Appellees(Respondents).

 

 

The 
Honorable David Park, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Kathleen B. Dixon of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, Wyoming; and Loyd E. 
Smith of 
Murane & Bostwick, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellees:

            
Larry R. Clapp of Clapp & Associates, P.C., Casper, Wyoming; and 

Drew 
A. Perkins of Perkins & Powers, P.C., Casper, Wyoming

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

            
KITE, Justice.

[¶1]      Karen Shippey's 
uncle, who was adopted, died intestate, and the district court found his heirs 
included the descendants of both his adoptive and his biological siblings.  Ms. Shippey claims an adopted child's 
biological siblings are no longer his "brother" and "sister" and, thus, they are 
not entitled to inherit from the adopted child's intestate estate.  We agree and 
reverse.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The question 
presented for appeal is whether biological siblings (and their descendants) of 
an adopted decedent may claim rights as heirs in 
intestacy.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The facts in this 
case are not in dispute.  John Henry 
Kirkpatrick was born Gion Rosetti to Joseph and Beatrice Rosetti in 1914.  He had ten siblings.  On January 25, 1927, Edgar and Margaret 
Kirkpatrick adopted Gion and his brother, Leo Rosetti.  The Kirkpatricks changed Gion's name to 
John Henry Kirkpatrick (John Kirkpatrick) and Leo's name to Edward Watson 
Kirkpatrick (Edward Kirkpatrick).  
The other nine birth siblings were either adopted away or remained with 
their birth parents.  John 
Kirkpatrick was married briefly, divorced, and had no children.  Edward Kirkpatrick married and, with his 
wife, raised a daughter, Ms. Shippey.  
John and Edward Kirkpatrick's nine biological siblings produced eight 
children (the cousins).

 

[¶4]      John Kirkpatrick 
died intestate on August 4, 2000, leaving a substantial estate consisting of 
stocks, bonds, real estate, and personal property.  Rick Rogers and Ms.  Shippey were appointed co-personal 
representatives of John Kirkpatrick's  
estate.  The co-personal 
representatives filed a Verified Interim Accounting and Petition for Partial 
Distribution on July 19, 2001, asking the court to determine the proper heirs 
for distribution of the estate.  Ms. 
Shippey, through her attorney, filed a brief asserting that John Kirkpatrick's 
adoption terminated the rights of any biological relative not adopted by his 
adoptive family, thus leaving Ms. Shippey as the sole heir.  The cousins opposed this position, 
contending John Kirkpatrick's adoption had no effect on the biological siblings' 
right to inherit from him; thus, the cousins claimed their per capita 
share of the portion of the estate which would have been distributed to their 
parents.  

 

[¶5]      The district 
court concluded that, in light of the pertinent caselaw and statutes, the 
cousinsthe children of John Kirkpatrick's biological siblingswere entitled to 
the share of the estate that would have been distributed to their parents.  This appeal 
followed.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶6]      The 
interpretation of statutory language is essential to our resolution of this 
case.  The construction and 
interpretation of statutes are questions of law which we review de 
novo.  Powder River Coal 
Company v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 2002 WY 5, ¶6, 38 P.3d 423, 
¶6 (Wyo. 2002); Fosler v. Collins, 13 P.3d 686, 688 (Wyo. 2000).  Our objective is to interpret statutes 
in accordance with the legislature's intent.  Id.  We begin by making an inquiry 
respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to 
their arrangement and connection.  
Jones v. 
State Department of Health, 2001 WY 
28, ¶11, 18 P.3d 1189, ¶11 (Wyo. 2001).   
We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and 
sentence, and we construe all parts of the statute in pari materia.  Wyoming Board of Outfitters and 
Professional Guides v. Clark, 2001 WY 78, ¶12, 30 P.3d 36, ¶12 (Wyo. 2001); 
Fontaine v. Board of County Commissioners of Park County, 4 P.3d 890, 
894-95 (Wyo. 2000); Richards v. Board of County Commissioners of Sweetwater 
County, 6 P.3d 1251, 1253 (Wyo. 2000).  
In ascertaining the meaning of a given law, we consider all statutes 
relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose and construe 
them in harmony.  TOC v. TND 
(In re TLC), 2002 WY 76, ¶20, 46 P.3d 863, ¶20 (Wyo. 2002). 

 

 

[¶7]      When the Court 
determines, as a matter of law, that a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must 
give effect to the plain language of the statute and should not resort to the 
rules of statutory construction.  
Sechrist 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division, 
2001 
WY 45, ¶10, 
23 P.3d 1138, ¶10 (Wyo. 
2001).  If, 
on the other hand, the Court determines that a statute is ambiguous, it may use 
extrinsic aids of statutory interpretation to help it determine the 
legislature's intent.  Steele v. 
Neeman, 6 P.3d 649, 653 (Wyo. 2000); Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. 
Bowen, 979 P.2d 503, 506 (Wyo. 1999).

 

It 
is a basic rule of statutory construction that courts may try to determine 
legislative intent by considering the type of statute being interpreted and what 
the legislature intended by the language used, viewed in light of the objects 
and purposes to be accomplished.  
Furthermore, when we are confronted with two possible but conflicting 
conclusions, we will choose the one most logically designed to cure the mischief 
or inequity that the legislature was attempting to accomplish.  

 

 

Collicott 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division, 
2001 WY 35, ¶9, 20 P.3d 1077, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001) (citation 
omitted).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      This dispute 
presents a clear but completely unsettled question of law.  To answer the question, we must 
reconcile the Wyoming intestacy and adoption statutes as well as related 
caselaw.  

 

[¶9]      The district 
court decided in favor of the cousins, concluding that John Kirkpatrick's   biological nephews and nieces were 
"entitled to the share that would have been distributed to their parents."  In reaching that result, the court 
concluded (1) the adoption statutes which allow an adoptee to inherit from his 
biological parents should be interpreted to create mutuality by allowing the 
biological relatives to inherit from the adoptee; (2) the intestate statute's 
reference to "brother" and "sister" included biological siblings of an adopted 
child; and (3) Randall v. Potter, 506 P.2d 432 (Wyo. 1973), required a 
holding that biological siblings could inherit from adopted siblings and was 
still controlling.  While the 
district court's interpretation of Wyoming statutes and Randall was well 
written and thorough, it failed to consider the effect of substantive amendments 
to the statutes and to give full effect to the legislative intent that adoption 
terminates the parent-child relationship.  
The district court's imposition of mutuality reads language into the 
statute which is not there.  The 
terms "brother" and "sister" in the intestacy statute must be read in light of 
the clear termination in the adoption statutes of the biological family's legal 
relationship with the adopted child.  
The district court's conclusion that "close examination of the pertinent 
statutes in effect when Randall was decided and of those statutes that 
govern this case have little substantive differences" is inaccurate as we will 
discuss more thoroughly below.

A.        
Interrelationship Between the Intestacy Statutes and the Adoption 
Statutes

 

[¶10]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-4-101 and 
2-4-107 (LexisNexis 2003) establish the rules of intestate succession and, 
specifically, those that apply to persons in an adoptive family.  The pertinent parts 
are:

 

 (a) Whenever any 
person having title to any real or personal property having the nature or legal 
character of real estate or personal estate undisposed of, and not otherwise 
limited by marriage settlement, dies intestate, the estate shall descend and be 
distributed in parcenary to his kindred, male and female, subject to the payment 
of his debts, in the following course and manner: 

 

. . . 
.

 

            
(c)  Except in cases above 
enumerated, the estate of any intestate shall descend and be distributed as 
follows:

 

. . . 
.

 

(ii)  If there are 
no children, nor their descendents, then to his father, mother, brothers and 
sisters, and to the descendents of brothers and sisters who are dead, the 
descendents collectively taking the share which their parents would have taken 
if living, in equal parts[.]  

 

Section 
2-4-101.

 

 (a)  If for 
purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child shall be 
established to determine succession by, through or from a person: 

 

(i)  An adopted 
person is the child of an adopting parent and of the natural parents for 
inheritance purposes only. The adoption of a child by the spouse of a 
natural parent has no effect on the relationship between the child and that 
natural parent; 

 

(ii)  An adopted 
person shall inherit from all other relatives of an adoptive parent as though he 
was the natural child of the adoptive parent and the relatives shall inherit 
from the adoptive person's estate as if they were his 
relatives[.] 

 

 

Section 
2-4-107  (emphasis added). 

 

[¶11]   Section 2-4-107(a)(ii) explicitly 
establishes the adopted person inherits the same as any other member of the 
adoptive parent's family and provides mutuality by requiring the "relatives" of 
the adoptive parent shall inherit from the adopted person as well.  In addressing the respective rights of 
the adopted person and the relatives of the adoptive parent, the legislature was 
silent on the inheritance rights of an adopted person's biological 
relatives.  The adoption statutes, 
on the other hand, act to terminate the legal relationship between the 
biological parents and the adopted child.   Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-22-114, 
14-2-317 (LexisNexis 2003).  When 
the legislature adopts a statute, we presume it does so with full knowledge of 
the existing state of the law with reference to the statute's subject 
matter.  Fosler, 13 P.3d  at 
693.  However, where a statute 
enumerates the subjects or things on which it is to operate, or the persons 
affected, we construe it as excluding from its effect all those subjects and 
things not expressly mentioned.  
Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Board of Equalization, 79 Wyo. 262, 
333 P.2d 700 (1958).  Each of these 
statutes is silent on the critical issue in this case.  This gap in the statutory scheme was 
likely unintended.  We are left with 
the difficult task of filling that gap, and, to do so, we read these statutes 
in pari materia.  When read 
together, Wyoming's adoption statutes and intestacy statutes are unambiguous as 
to the question presented in this case.

 

[¶12]   Since adoption was not considered 
at common law, we must strictly construe adoption statutes.  JK ex rel. DK v. MK, 5 P.3d 782 
(Wyo. 2000).  Strict construction of 
Wyoming's adoption statutes suggests that the legislature ultimately intended 
for adoption to sever all rights of the biological family members.  Section 1-22-114 provides that "the 
former parent, guardian or putative father of the child shall have no right . . 
. ." and "[t]he adopting persons shall have all the rights . . . ."  Siblings obtain their inheritance rights 
as a result of their relationship with their parents.  If the former parents have no such 
rights, it logically follows that neither do the siblings because one is only a 
brother and/or a sister as a result of one's relationship to one's parents.  When that parental relationship is 
terminated as a matter of law, so are the rights of biological siblings that 
derived from that relationship.

 

[¶13]   Likewise, the intestacy statutes 
are to be strictly construed.  
Fosler, 13 P.3d  at 692.  
Those statutes create inheritance rights in the decedent's sisters and 
brothers.  Webster's Dictionary 
defines sister as "a female human being having the same parents as another 
person."  Webster's Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary 1102 (1991).  
Similarly, Webster's defines brother as, "a male who has the same parents 
as another, or one parent in common with another."  Id. at 182.   In the case of an adoption, 
siblings, in the legal sense, are those within the adoptive family.  Further, to determine what was intended 
when the legislature used the terms "brother" and "sister" in the intestacy 
statutes, we must first understand "mother" and "father."  The gist of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-501 
(LexisNexis 2003) is this:  a 
mother-child relationship is established by "adoption of the child"; similarly, 
a father-child relationship is also established by "adoption of the child."  Thus, when referring to "mother" and 
"father," § 2-4-101 is plain and unambiguous in the context of adoption.  "Mother" refers to the adoptive 
mother, who is given all rights by § 1-22-114.  "Father" refers to the adoptive 
father, who is also given all rights by § 1-22-114.

 

[¶14]   The only connection statutorily 
preserved between the biological family and the adopted child is the express 
right of the adopted child to inherit from his biological parents.  Section 2-4-107(a)(i).  However, this statute's plain and 
unambiguous language provides the adoptee remains a child of the biological 
parents for inheritance purposes only.  The statute does not say the inheritance 
relationship is a two-way street or the biological parents remain the father and 
mother for inheritance or any other purpose.  To that end, the strictest 
interpretation of § 2-4-107 is therefore unequivocally one-sided and does not 
establish mutuality.  

 

[¶15]   Carol Marafioti and Jean Lien 
contend in their appellees' brief "a brother is a brother, and a sister is a 
sister, even after adoption."  
However, the effect of the adoption decree changes the legal relationship 
between the adopted child and his biological family and between the adopted 
child and his adoptive family.  
Section 1-22-114 provides:

 

(a)  Upon 
the entry of a final decree of adoption the former parent, guardian or putative 
father of the child shall have no right to the control or custody of the 
child.  The adopting persons shall 
have all of the rights and obligations respecting the child as if 
they were natural parents.

 

(b)  Adopted 
persons may assume the surname of the adoptive parent.  They are entitled to the same rights of 
person and property as children and heirs at law of the persons 
who adopted them.

 

(Emphasis 
added).

 

 

[¶16]   The adoption decree severs the 
relationship between the child and his biological parents and creates a new and 
exclusive parent-child relationship between the child and the adoptive 
parents.  This Court has recognized 
the import of the severance from the biological parents and the new unity with 
the adoptive parents:  "A decree of 
adoption tears asunder forever the parent-child relationship and for all legal 
and practical purposes, that child is the same as dead to the parent 
affected.  The parent has lost the 
right to ever again see the child or even know of his whereabouts."  Voss v. Ralston, 550 P.2d 481, 
485 (Wyo. 1976).  A New York case 
extends this view logically:

 

Although 
there is nothing in the adoption law that says that rights between the adopted 
child and his natural brothers and sisters have been terminated or destroyed, 
nevertheless, when the natural parents relinquished their rights, the foundation 
or substructure which joined the blood relatives with the adopted child was 
removed. Therefore, natural blood relatives who must trace their 
relationship through a natural parent may not inherit or take from the 
adopted [child].

In re 
Accounting of Fodor (Estate of Adler), 117 N.Y.S.2d 331, 334 (N.Y. 1952) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).   

 

When a child 
is given up for adoption, his natural parents have, in effect, destroyed the 
mythical cord which nature provided to bind them with the child, and the 
adoption has the effect of excluding the natural parents and all the 
natural kindred and blood relatives of the child from inheriting from the 
adopted child.  

 

Id. 
at 333 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).

 

[¶17]   The preceding cases are consistent 
with settled principles of Wyoming law regarding severing the legal relationship 
between adopted children and their biological parents.  For instance, Rist v. Taylor, 955 P.2d 436 (Wyo. 1998), states that a second adoption severs the child's 
previously existing rights of inheritance from his first adoptive parent.  JS v. FV (Adoption of RDS), 787 P.2d 968, 970 (Wyo. 1990) cut off the adopted child's relationship with his 
natural grandmother because it was "violative of public policy."  Although the facts of Rist and 
RDS differ from those in this case, the principle of an adopted child 
being legally severed from the biological family has remained steadfast 
throughout our jurisprudence.  An 
adopted child cannot live in limbo, nor can his adoptive or biological family, 
after the adoption is finalized.  
Moreover, to say that adoption severs previously existing rights of 
inheritance in some members of the biological family but not others would be 
against public policy.  Adoption 
severs all rights of biological family members, including their right to inherit 
from the adopted child.

 

[¶18]   We have long recognized adopted 
children's rights to inherit equally within their adoptive family.  This Court, prior to any statute 
addressing the subject, found adopted children should be treated the same as 
biological children.  Moralee v. 
Cadwell, 26 Wyo. 412, 186 P. 499 (1920) found that the adoptive brother and 
sister were at a minimum entitled to share equally with the decedent's 
biological sister.  Cadwell 
quoted the Washington Supreme Court: 

 

"One of the 
rights or privileges of a natural child is to inherit from a brother or sister, 
a natural son or daughter of the same parents.  If the adopted child does not have the 
same right, then it is denied a right or privilege which the natural child 
has."

 

Id. at 501 
(quoting McManis v. Lloyd (Masterson's Estate), 183 P. 93, 94 (Wash. 
1919)).  Cadwell noted that 
the Washington court held an adopted sister was entitled to inherit along with 
the biological brothers and sisters of one dying without issue, a husband, a 
wife, a father, or a mother.  
Id.  The quote from 
McManis, however, focuses on children (adopted and biological) within the 
same family.  Both Washington and 
Wyoming, in McManis and Cadwell, take special care to treat 
equally the children within the same family.

 

[¶19]   In the instant case, the children 
are from two different families.  
The Rosettis relinquished their rights as parents to the two boys and 
gave those rights to the Kirkpatricks.  
The adoption terminated the Rosettis' parent/child relationship with John 
and Edward Kirkpatrick.  
Cadwell further illuminates the definition of brother or 
sister.  The specific language, 
"[o]ne of the rights and privileges of a natural child is to inherit from a 
brother or sister, a natural son or daughter of the same parents," explains that 
having the same parents is an inherent part of being a brother or a sister.  Cadwell, 186 P.  at 501.  If that parent/child relationship is 
terminated by adoption and established in new, adoptive parents, the right to 
inherit is derived from the adoptive parents and flows down the family tree to 
the siblings who share the same parents in the eyes of the 
law.

 

[¶20]   Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, we must consider and clarify Randall, 506 P.2d 432.  In that case, Mr. Randall died 
intestate, leaving an adoptive brother and sister and a biological sister.  Id. at 432.  The trial court determined that only the 
biological sister could inherit.  
This Court reversed, relying primarily on the Wyoming adoption statute 
then in place, which provided (as does today's statute) that adopted children 
have the same rights as biological children.  In analyzing Randall, the 
district court in the instant case concluded:  "The distribution statute considered in 
Randall, although renumbered, has not been subsequently amended to a 
degree that would destroy the precedent established by the Wyoming Supreme Court 
in 1973."  However, the court 
overlooked an important detail.  The 
Randall court interpreted the statutes as they existed at the date of 
decedent's death:

 

§ 2-37, 
W.S.1957:

 

". . . the 
estate of any intestate shall descend and be distributed as 
follows:

 

"2.  If there be no children, nor their 
descendants, then to his father, mother, brothers and sisters, and to the 
descendants of brothers and sisters who are dead (the descendants, collectively, 
taking the share which their parents would have taken if living), in equal 
parts;"

 

and § 1-721, 
W.S.1957:

 

"Minor 
children, adopted as aforesaid, shall assume the surname of the persons by whom 
they are adopted, and shall be entitled to the same rights of person and 
property as children or heirs-at-law of the persons thus adopting them, unless 
the rights of property should be excepted in the agreement of 
adoption."

 

Id. 
at 433 
(footnote omitted).

 

[¶21]   Because "rights of inheritance vest 
immediately on the death of intestate and devolutionary rights must be 
determined in relation to the date," id. at 433 n.1, and Mr. Randall died 
in 1966, the Randall court was precluded from considering a 1969 
amendment to § 1-721.  Park 
County ex rel. Park County Welfare Department  v. Blackburn, 394 P.2d 793, 794 
(Wyo. 1964).  The 1969 amendment 
read:  "Provided further that 
adopted persons shall inherit from all other relatives of the adoptive parents 
as though they were the natural children of such parents and the relatives 
shall inherit from the adopted [persons'] estate as if they were their relatives 
in fact."  Randall, 
506 P.2d  at 433 n.2 (emphasis added).1  This statute established inheritance 
mutuality within the adoptive family only.  The legislature chose to say nothing 
about the biological family members' inheritance rights surviving adoption.  Since those rights are purely statutory, 
the legislature's silence must be interpreted as intending to create no such 
rights.  Had Mr. Randall died 
after the 1969 amendment, we believe strict construction of the statutes 
would have mandated a different result.2  Also, the Randall court did not 
directly address the question presented in this case: Whether biological 
siblings outside of the adoptive family are entitled to inherit from an adopted 
sibling.
 

B.        
Other Jurisdictions' Caselaw

 

[¶22]   Statutes vary among the states as 
to adoption and intestacy, and this Court is mindful of that when looking to 
other states for guidance.  That 
said, cases from other jurisdictions support our holding in this case.  Goulart v. Amaral, 35 Cal. Rptr. 465, 475 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (the kindred of an adopted person are its adoptive 
relatives, not its biological ones); Penalver v. Howell (Estate 
of Jones), 
687 So. 2d 1171, 1176 (Miss. 1996) 
(biological 
siblings of an adopted child cannot inherit from the adopted 
child).3

 

[¶23]   Two cases with similar facts 
provide this Court with further support.  
Wright v. Wysowatcky, 363 P.2d 1046 (Colo. 1961), found that, when 
an adopted child dies intestate, an adoptive father has the sole right to 
inherit and the child's biological siblings have no right whatsoever to his 
estate.  Similarly, in Marnell v. 
Koser (Estate of Enyart), 218 N.W. 89 (Neb. 1928), Mr. Enyart, an adopted 
son, died intestate without widow or issue.  His biological father claimed to be his 
sole heir and entitled to inherit.  
However, his adoptive mother also claimed the right to inherit.  Judgment in the trial court favored the 
adoptive mother.  That court 
said:

 

[T]his 
court has heretofore held that the adopted child inherits from the adoptive 
parent.  But the right conferred by 
statute is a reciprocal one, because it depends upon a relation that is created 
by the adoption under our statute. The relation of parent and child having been 
thus created the right of the adoptive parent to inherit is the same as was or 
would have been that of the natural parent. The natural parent consented to the 
establishment of this relation. By his formal act, he consented that another 
should step into his place and, in legal effect, become the parent of his child, 
and thereby consented that such other person should have all the right 
which he, himself, but for the adoption, would have had. By his own voluntary 
act, Koser transferred from himself to Katherine Enyart the right of a parent to 
inherit from the adopted child, Logan Enyart.

 

Id. 
 at 91 (citations omitted).  

 

[¶24]   This Court agrees wholeheartedly 
with Wright and Marnell.  
An adopted child is for all purposes the child of his adopters.4  

 

[¶25]   In a different context, other 
jurisdictions have held statutes granting rights to "brothers and sisters" do 
not include, either by express provision or by construction, biological siblings 
of an adopted child.  In Wasley v. 
Brown, 193 F. Supp. 55 (D.C. Va. 1961), the court held that, 
where a child was lawfully adopted by an order entered by the State of Colorado, 
his biological sibling lost the right to participate in an award after his death 
under the Virginia wrongful death statute because, at the time of the death, the 
biological brother was no longer considered, under Virginia law, the decedent's 
legal "brother."  The Mississippi 
Supreme Court held that only adoptive brothers and sisters could sue, where 
wrongful death and adoption statutes made clear, that adopting parents and 
kindred took over all legal rights of natural family.  McLemore v. Gammon, 468 So. 2d 84 
(Miss. 1985).  

 

 

[¶26]   Public policy supports our 
interpretation of these statutes and caselaw.5  Without complete separation of the 
biological family and the adoptive family, probating an adopted child's estate 
would become rife with problems.  
Moreover, already probated estates could be subject to challenge by 
previously unidentified biological relatives laying claim to the intestate 
estate.  Ultimately, a probate 
involving an adopted person could never be fully closed without full 
identification of the biological relatives.  The only way a probate court could 
ethically fulfill its duties would be to first determine whether an intestate 
decedent was adopted and, if so, obtain a review of the adoption records.  However, adoption records are 
traditionally sealed to insure the confidential and final nature of an 
adoption.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-22-104(d) (LexisNexis 2003) provides a court may order inspection of all or 
part of the confidential file in adoption proceedings only if it appears to the 
court that the welfare and best interests of the child will be served by the 
inspection.  Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-22-203(b) (LexisNexis 2003), only an "adult adoptee, adoptive parent, 
biological sibling or biological grandparent who is eighteen (18) years of age 
or older may file a motion" to have the adoption records investigated "for the 
purpose of determining the whereabouts of the unknown biological relative or 
relatives."  An Iowa law review 
article elaborates on the problems which could be created by allowing an 
adoptee's biological relatives to inherit:

 

Allowing 
adoptees to inherit from birth parents and kindred would breach 
confidentialities created to protect the adoptive parents. Adoption record 
confidentiality furthers "the objective of effecting a complete emotional break" 
between adoptee and birth parents. Even if confidentiality were not a problem, 
locating an adoptee at the time of a birth parent's death would prove very 
difficult. If heirs cannot be located, then estates remain open for a long time, 
which undermines the goal of settling estates quickly.

 

Hallie E. 
Still-Caris, Legislative Reform: Redefining the Parent-Child Relationship in 
Cases of Adoption, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 265, 275 n.89 
(1985).

 

[¶27]   The Wyoming legislative intent as 
to adoption records is obvious.  
They are to be sealed unless the best interest of the child is at stake 
or unless an adoptive or biological family member desires to know the 
whereabouts of unknown biological relative(s).  Inspection is allowed only in the 
strictest of circumstances.  

 

[¶28]   A further policy concern focuses on 
the adopted decedent's likely intent.  
We have recognized the intestacy statutes' general intent is to give 
effect to what a decedent likely intended with regard to his estate.  Fosler, 13 P.3d  at 693.  "The general purpose of intestacy 
statutes is to distribute a decedent's estate upon their death in a pattern that 
would closely represent the distribution the decedent would have chosen had he 
manifested his intent through the use of a will."  Samuel B. Shumway, The Dual 
Generation Dilemma--Wyoming's Interpretation of its 130-Year-Old Intestacy 
Statute, 2 Wyo. L. Rev. 631, 652 n.61 (2002).  It is difficult to conceive that a 
typical adopted child would intend for its biological siblings, and their 
relatives, to inherit from him when those siblings are, in most cases, 
unknown.6  

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶29]   An adopted child's biological 
family members have no right to inherit from the adopted child under Wyoming's 
intestacy statutes.  Therefore, we 
reverse the district court's decision and hold John Kirkpatrick's sole legal 
heir is Karen Shippey.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Now 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-107 (LexisNexis 2003).

 

2A 
review of the record in Randall, which was unavailable to the district 
court herein, discloses that the parties recognized the significance of the 
statutory amendment and the possibility that the result would have been 
different had the amended statute applied.

 

3This is not intended to be an exhaustive review of states that support 
our holding in the instant case.

 

4After this issue was raised in the court system, some state legislatures 
reacted to clarify adoption and intestacy statutes to exclude entirely 
biological relatives.  For instance, 
the California Probate Code was amended in 1955, soon after a decision in direct 
contravention with the amended statute (Oreb v. Pettit (Estate of 
Calhoun), 282 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1955)).  
A case note commented on the significance of the decision to amend:  "providing for a complete substitution, 
the legislature created that system of distribution which is most likely to 
coincide with the intent of adopted children and is most consistent with the 
objective of having an adoption simulate the natural relationship as closely as 
possible."  Allen I. Neiman, Note, 
29 So. Cal. L. Rev. 126, 128 (1955).

 

5Section 2-4-107(a)(i), which preserves the adopted child's right to 
inherit from his biological parents, is an anomaly when viewed in the context of 
the adoption statutes and places Wyoming in the minority on this issue.  We respectfully suggest the legislature 
consider amending § 2-4-107(a)(i) to make it consistent with a complete 
termination of the legal relationship between the biological parents and the 
adopted child, which we perceive was intended by the adoption 
statutes.

 

6While we recognize some adopted persons have a relationship with their 
biological family, as did John Kirkpatrick, many do not, and the biological 
siblings remain unidentified.