Case Title: CONTRERAS v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
CONTRERAS v. STATE2000 WY 1517 P.2d 917Case Number: 98-263Decided: 07/18/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming

RODRIGO 
O. CONTRERAS, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

                                 

 

Appeal from the District Court 
of Uinta County, The Honorable John

D. Troughton, 
Judge.

 

   Representing Appellant: 
Sylvia L. Hackl, State Public Defender, Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel, Diane 
Courselle, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, and Kristen Cogswell, Student 
Intern.

    
Representing Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General, Paul S. 
Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General, D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General, Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Jennifer A. 
Golden, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 

   Before THOMAS, MACY,[fn*] and 
HILL, JJ., and GRANT, D.J., and KAIL, D.J., Ret.

  [fn*] 
Retired June 2, 2000.

 

   
KAIL, District Judge, retired.

 [¶1]         Rodrigo Contreras appeals his 
convictions of two counts of delivery of a controlled substance in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (Michie 1997).1  His primary claim is that the trial 
court abused its discretion in allowing the jury, during its deliberation, to 
listen to audio tape recordings of drug transactions.  Contreras further contends the trial 
court erred when it allowed a deputy sheriff to testify that standard procedures 
intended to ensure the reliability of undercover drug purchases were 
followed.  Finally, he argues that 
the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his convictions.  We find all of Contreras' contentions 
unavailing, and we affirm his convictions and sentences.

 

                                    
ISSUES

 

[¶2]         This Statement of the Issues 
appears in Contreras' appellate brief:

 

                                 
ISSUE I

 

The trial court erred by allowing unintelligible 
cassette tapes into the jury room, establishing for the jury an unreliable and 
misleading reference by which Rodrigo Contreras was convicted of delivery of 
methamphetamine.

 

                                 
ISSUE II

 

The trial court erred by allowing the State's witness 
to testify that the procedures used to implicate Mr. Contreras were the 
procedures always used to implicate drug dealers, distorting the reliability of 
the key witness' testimony and misleading the jury into finding Rodrigo 
Contreras guilty.

 

                                 
ISSUE III

 

All of the evidence presented was not adequate to 
form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by 
a finder of fact.

 

   The State's appellate brief 
includes this Statement of the Issues:

 

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
allowing nontestimonial tapes into the jury room, where those tapes contained 
audible evidence of illegal drug transactions and the State presented other 
evidence of Appellant's guilt.

 

II. Whether the trial court committed plain error 
when it allowed a State witness to describe the standard procedures the State 
used in making two controlled purchases of methamphetamine from Appellant, to 
ensure its informant did not bring drugs into the 
purchase.

 

III. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence 
to support a finding that Appellant was guilty of delivering a controlled 
substance, where the State presented an informant's testimony that he purchased 
methamphetamine from Appellant on two separate occasions.

 

                                    
FACTS

 

[¶3]         On March 27, 1997, Uinta County 
Deputy Sheriff Burchell and another agent met with an informant to arrange a 
controlled purchase of methamphetamine from Contreras. The agents searched the 
informant and his vehicle, and concealed 
a transmitter and miniature cassette recorder in the informant's clothing.  The agents gave the informant cash and 
instructed the informant to drive to Contreras' apartment and attempt to 
purchase the drugs. The agents kept the informant in sight until he entered the 
apartment, and then listened to the drug transaction through the concealed 
transmitter.  The agents watched the 
informant leave Contreras' apartment, and kept him in sight as he drove to a 
prearranged location and turned over one-sixteenth of an ounce of methamphetamine.  The next day, the agents and their 
informant repeated the process, again obtaining one-sixteenth of an ounce of 
methamphetamine.

 

[¶4]         The State charged Contreras with 
two counts of delivery of a controlled substance. At trial, Deputy Burchell 
testified about the procedures used, and the informant testified that Contreras 
was the person who sold him the drugs.  
The tape recordings of the transactions were introduced into evidence, as 
was the methamphetamine.  The trial 
court allowed the jury to take the cassette tapes of the transactions into the 
jury room.  The jury returned guilty 
verdicts on both counts.  Contreras 
filed a timely appeal to this Court.

 

                                  
DISCUSSION

 

   
1. Cassette Tapes

 

[¶5]         In his first issue, Contreras 
contends the trial court erred by allowing the cassette tapes of the drug 
transactions into the jury room during deliberations.  In a factually similar case, this Court 
said that tape recordings of drug transactions are non-testimonial, and "should 
be made available for a jury's review as any other exhibit." Warner v. State, 
897 P.2d 472, 475 (Wyo. 1995).  This 
Court went on to say that

 

a 
trial court's ruling permitting a jury to review the tapes should not be 
disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.  * * * In addition, the exercise of that 
discretion should be upheld so long as the audio recording is otherwise 
admissible, and where the state introduces something more than a minimal amount 
of other evidence of culpability.

 

 Id.

 

[¶6]         We will first address the question 
of whether the cassette tapes were otherwise admissible.  W.R.E. 402 states that "[a]ll relevant 
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute, by these rules, 
or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court."  W.R.E. 401 defines relevant evidence as 
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence."  
While the cassette tapes alone could not prove Contreras' guilt, they do 
show that a drug transaction took place at which the informant was present.  The instructions to the jury specified 
that delivery of a controlled substance to the informant was an element of each 
offense.  Thus, the cassette tapes 
make the existence of an element of the offenses more probable than it would be 
without the cassette tapes.  The 
cassette tapes, therefore, are relevant and admissible. 

 

[¶7]         We next inquire whether the State 
introduced more than a minimal amount of other evidence of Contreras' 
culpability.  In Warner, 897 P.2d  at 
475-76, we held that the test was satisfied when the law enforcement officers 
testified about what they heard while monitoring the informant's concealed 
transmitter; the informant testified about the drug purchase; and the drugs were 
introduced into evidence.  Here, the 
State produced the same type of evidence.  
The agents testified about how they searched the informant before the 
purchase to ensure he had no other drugs; they testified about what they heard 
through the concealed transmitter; the informant testified that he bought the 
drugs from Contreras; and the drugs were introduced into 
evidence.

 

[¶8]         The cassette tapes were admissible 
at trial, and the State introduced more than a minimal amount of other evidence 
of Contreras' guilt.  Therefore, we 
hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the cassette 
tapes into the jury room.

 

   
2. Law Enforcement Testimony

 

[¶9]         Contreras next argues that the 
trial court erred when it allowed Deputy Burchell to explain procedures used to 
ensure the reliability of drug buys, and testify that those procedures were 
followed in this case.  Since 
Contreras' defense counsel did not object to the testimony at trial, we will 
apply our plain error standard of review.  
Plain error will not be assigned unless (1) the record clearly reflects 
the incidents urged as error; (2) appellant is able to demonstrate violation of 
a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (3) it is shown that a substantial 
right of the appellant was materially prejudiced.  Dike v. State, 990 P.2d 1012, 1019 (Wyo. 
1999) (quoting Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Wyo. 1981)).  The first prong of our test is 
satisfied:  the record clearly 
reflects the deputy's testimony.

 

[¶10]      Contreras argues that the second 
prong is satisfied because the testimony improperly bolstered the testimony of 
the deputy and the informant.  He 
further contends that the challenged testimony was admitted in violation of 
W.R.E. 403, which reads:

 

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.

 

The State responds that the 
deputy's testimony did not offer an opinion about the informant's credibility, 
and was probative of how the drugs came into the informant's possession by 
showing that the drugs could not have came from anywhere other than Contreras' 
apartment.

 

 [¶11]    
In support of his argument that Deputy Burchell's testimony improperly 
bolstered his own testimony and that of the informant, Contreras cites decisions 
of this Court holding that a witness may not testify or offer an opinion that 
another witness is telling the truth. Dudley v. State, 951 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Wyo. 
1998); McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 751 (Wyo. 1993), aff'd 83 F.3d 432 (10th 
Cir. 1996); Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1340 (Wyo. 1992); Zabel v. 
State, 765 P.2d 357, 362 (Wyo. 1988).  
He also cites authority from outside this jurisdiction for the 
proposition that law enforcement officers may not give irrelevant testimony 
about law enforcement procedures or opinion testimony that affirms the 
credibility of a prosecution witness.  
People v. Alfonso, 194 A.D.2d 358, 599 N.Y.S.2d 543, 544 (1993); People 
v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431, 418 N.Y.S.2d 371, 391 N.E.2d 1347, 1351 
(1979).

 

 [¶12]    
Although Contreras accurately summarizes our holdings in the cases he 
cites, the facts of this case are distinguishable.  The record reveals that Deputy Burchell 
never offered an opinion about the truthfulness of the informant's 
testimony.  He merely explained 
departmental procedures designed to produce reliable information, which laid a 
proper foundation for the admission of the State's evidence.  The deputy's testimony corroborated some 
elements of the informant's testimony, but admissible testimony that has the 
incidental effect of bolstering or corroborating other testimony is not 
inappropriate. Zabel, 765 P.2d  at 361 (quoting State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 
357 S.E.2d 359, 367 (1987)).

 

 [¶13]    
The facts here are also distinguishable from the New York cases that 
Contreras cites. In Alfonso, 599 N.Y.S.2d  at 544, a police officer testified, in 
detail, over repeated objections, about police tactics.  The officer explained how locations were 
selected for anti-drug operations; described the roles of various members of the 
operation; described the equipment used by officers; and described the modus 
operandi of typical drug dealers.  
He also testified that he observed the defendant commit two uncharged 
offenses.  Id.  A bare majority of the court held that 
the officer's testimony was inappropriate because it "was not essential to fill 
any void in the evidence or to render otherwise incomprehensible testimony more 
understandable to the jurors * * *."  
Id.  Deputy Burchell's 
testimony here was necessary to fill a void in the evidence; without it, the 
jury would have had no assurance that the informant entered Contreras' apartment 
with cash but not drugs, and left with drugs but no cash.

 

  [¶14] 
Ciaccio is similarly distinguishable.  There, an officer testified that a 
hijacking victim's testimony was consistent with the modus operandi of local 
hijackers.  Ciaccio, 391 N.E.2d  at 
1351.  The court held 
that

 

[w]here, as here, the sole reason for questioning the 
"expert" witness is to bolster the testimony of another witness (here the 
victim) by explaining that his version of the events is more believable than the defendant's, the "expert's" 
testimony is equivalent to an opinion that the defendant is guilty, and the 
receipt of such testimony may not be condoned.

 

 Id.  
As previously discussed, Deputy Burchell's testimony was admissible for 
purposes other than bolstering the informant's testimony.  Ciaccio, therefore, is inapplicable 
here.

 

[¶15]      Contreras also asserts that the 
deputy's testimony violated W.R.E. 403 because "its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury * * *."  
He goes on to paraphrase the rule, but offers nothing in the way of 
cogent argument or pertinent authority.  
Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 1.03, this Court need not consider the issue 
further.  Hamburg v. Heilbrun, 891 P.2d 85, 87 (Wyo. 1995).  Contreras 
cannot show that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated; therefore, no 
plain error occurred.

 

   
3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

 

[¶16]      In his final assignment of error, 
Contreras contends the evidence presented was insufficient to support a 
conclusion that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  When reviewing a claim of insufficient 
evidence, this Court assumes that the evidence favoring the prevailing party is 
true, disregards the evidence favoring the unsuccessful party, and gives the 
prevailing party the benefit of every favorable inference that may reasonably be 
drawn from the evidence.  Wentworth 
v. State, 975 P.2d 22, 25 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 49 P.2d 670, 678 
(1935)).

 

[¶17]      Contreras bases his sufficiency 
argument on the informant's admittedly flawed character.  He essentially contends that because the 
informant was the only witness who could identify Contreras as the seller of the 
drugs, the jury could not have reasonably concluded that Contreras was indeed 
the seller.  This Court has made it 
abundantly clear that weighing the credibility of witnesses is the exclusive 
province of the trier of fact, and we will not substitute our judgment for 
theirs.  Vargas v. State, 963 P.2d 984, 989 (Wyo. 1998).  The State's 
evidence, viewed in the most favorable light, shows that the informant purchased 
methamphetamine from Contreras.  We 
hold, therefore, that sufficient evidence supports Contreras' convictions on 
both counts.

 

[¶18]      The Judgment and Sentence of the 
trial court is affirmed in all respects.

  

 

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031 was amended in 1998.  At the time of Contreras' arrest, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031 read, in relevant part:

 

     (a)  Except as authorized by this act, it is 
unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to 
manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.  Any person who violates this subsection 
with respect to:

 

            (i)  A controlled substance classified in 
Schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, is guilty of a crime and upon 
conviction may be imprisoned for not more than twenty (20) years, or fined not 
more than twenty-five thousand dollars, ($25,000.00), or 
both;

 

            (ii)  Any other controlled substance 
classified in Schedule I, II or III, is guilty of a crime and upon conviction 
may be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, fined not more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both[.]