Case Title: Wright v. Delaware

Citation: 

Docket Number: 423, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2014-05-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JERMAINE WRIGHT,  
§ 
 
 
§  
No. 423, 2013 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§  
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
v. 
§ 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
§  
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
No. 91004136DI 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Submitted: February 19, 2014 
Decided: May 19, 2014 
 
 
Before STRINE,* Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED. 
 
 
Herbert W. Mondros, Esquire, Margolis Edelstein, Wilmington, Delaware, and 
Claudia Van Wyk, Esquire (argued), Billy Nolas, Esquire, James Moreno, Esquire, 
and Tracy Ulstad, Esquire, Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. 
 
 
Maria T. Knoll, Esquire (argued) and Gregory E. Smith, Esquire, State of 
Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee. 
 
                                          
 
* Originally sitting by designation pursuant to art. IV, § 12 of the Delaware Constitution and 
Supreme Court Rules 2 and 4 (a) at the time of oral arguments to fill up the quorum as required. 
1 
RIDGELY, Justice: 
Defendant-Below/Appellant Jermaine Wright appeals from a Superior Court 
order denying his fourth motion for postconviction relief and reimposing Wright’s 
conviction and sentence.  In 1992, a jury convicted Wright of Murder in the First 
Degree, Robbery in the First Degree, and related weapons charges in connection 
with the robbery of the Hi-Way Inn liquor store and murder of the liquor store 
clerk, Phillip Seifert.  Wright was then sentenced to death.  
At his 1992 trial, the State did not present any forensic evidence including 
fingerprints, shoe prints, or fibers placing Wright at the scene.  Nor did the State 
present the murder weapon, shell casings, the getaway car, or eyewitnesses to 
identify Wright.  Instead, a jury convicted Wright on his confession to the police 
while under the influence of heroin and the testimony (since recanted) of a prison 
informant who testified that Wright admitted the crime.   
In 2012, the Superior Court vacated Wright’s conviction and sentence 
because it had “no confidence in the outcome of the trial.”  The Superior Court 
found that the State suppressed exculpatory evidence of a similar attempted 
robbery at a nearby liquor store in violation of Brady v. Maryland.2  A Brady 
violation occurs where the State fails to disclose material evidence that is favorable 
                                          
 
2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).   
2 
to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, causing prejudice to 
the defendant.   
The attempted robbery took place at the Brandywine Village Liquor Store 
less than an hour prior to the Hi-Way Inn robbery by suspects matching the same 
description and using a similar weapon.  The Superior Court also found that 
Wright did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights because 
police obtained his confession through defective warnings.  The remaining claims 
were denied.  The State appealed Wright’s Brady and Miranda claims.  A majority 
of this Court reversed, ordering Wright’s conviction and sentence reimposed, 
because the Miranda issue was procedurally barred and that, given his confession, 
the evidence about the Brandywine attempted robbery would not have led to a 
different result.   
After a reinstatement of his conviction and sentence, Wright now appeals the 
remaining claims originally denied by the Superior Court.  He argues that the State 
suppressed additional material Brady evidence prior to his trial.  This evidence 
includes impeachment evidence related to Gerald Samuels, the prison informant 
who testified that Wright confessed to the murder, and exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence related to Kevin Jamison, a witness Wright contended 
committed the murder.   
3 
Wright is not entitled to a perfect trial, but he is entitled to a fair one where 
material exculpatory and impeachment evidence is disclosed and not suppressed.  
“[W]hen the State withholds from a criminal defendant evidence that is material to 
his guilt or punishment, it violates his right to due process of law in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”3  This is exactly what happened here.  The cumulative 
effect of the multiple Brady violations in this case creates a reasonable probability 
that the verdict would have been different if the exculpatory and impeachment 
evidence had been disclosed.  Accordingly, we must reverse Wright’s conviction 
and death sentence and remand for a new trial. 
I. 
Facts4 
On the evening of January 14, 1991, Phillip Seifert was murdered at the Hi-
Way Inn, a tavern and liquor store located on Governor Printz Boulevard near 
Wilmington.  Debra Milner was working at the bar of the Hi-Way Inn while Seifert 
was working in the adjacent liquor store.  At about 9:20 p.m., Milner saw a black 
man in his mid-twenties with a round face wearing a red plaid flannel shirt enter 
the bar, look around, and leave without making a purchase.   
At about 10:20 p.m., the liquor store doorbell rang indicating that someone 
had entered.  Seifert went to wait on the customer, and Milner answered the 
                                          
 
3 Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469 (2009). 
4 The facts and procedural history are derived from Superior Court’s 2012 Supplemental 
Opinion.  State v. Wright, 2012 WL 1400932 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2012). 
4 
telephone.  While she was on the phone, Milner heard the bell ring two more times, 
followed by a noise that she thought sounded like a firecracker.  When Milner 
walked toward the passageway to the liquor store, she saw Seifert slumped across 
the counter.  She heard a gunshot and saw blood around Seifert.  Milner then ran 
and hid.   
Around 10:30 p.m., George Hummell, a customer who stopped at the Hi-
Way Inn on his way to work, saw two men leave the liquor store as he was waiting 
to turn into the parking lot.  Hummell observed one of the men, the shorter of the 
two, return to the store while the other ran across the parking lot.  After a short 
interval, the man who had reentered the liquor store came back outside, ran across 
the road, and entered a black Volkswagen Rabbit parked in a parking lot across the 
street from the Hi-Way Inn.  The other man ran toward Wilmington on Governor 
Printz Boulevard and disappeared.  According to Hummell, the man who returned 
to the store and then left by car was black and about five feet eight inches tall.  The 
other man was also black and roughly six feet tall. 
Upon entering the Hi-Way Inn, Hummell discovered Seifert sitting on a 
stool slumped over on the counter in a pool of blood.  Hummell ran to a pay phone 
in the tavern and called 9-1-1.  While he was on the phone with the 9-1-1 operator, 
Milner ran out from the back.  Hummell then heard Seifert fall off the stool onto 
the floor. 
5 
Sergeant Gary Kresge of the Delaware State Police was the first officer to 
arrive at the scene.  Inside, Sergeant Kresge saw the cash register in disarray and 
Seifert lying on his back, bleeding profusely.  Paramedics arrived shortly thereafter 
to render assistance to Seifert, who was still alive.  Seifert later died at the hospital.  
An autopsy revealed that Seifert had been shot three times with a .22 caliber 
weapon.   
The scene investigation found no shell casings or useable prints belonging to 
the perpetrators.  Without any leads, a State Police detective, the Chief 
Investigative Officer of the Seifert murder, passed out twenty-dollar bills at the 
Kirkwood Community Center in search of informants.  Later, an unknown author 
passed a handwritten note to a Hi-Way Inn clerk indicating that “Marlo” was 
somehow involved in the killing.   
Based on this anonymous tip, police started to consider Wright, whose 
middle name and alias is “Marlow,” as a possible suspect.  Police obtained an 
arrest warrant for Wright and a search warrant for his home based on two separate 
incidents unrelated to the Hi-Way Inn murder in which children in the Riverside 
area were injured by gunfire.  The search warrant did not uncover any physical 
evidence linked to the Hi-Way Inn murder.   
Two weeks after the murder, police arrested Wright based on the Riverside 
warrant just after 6 a.m.  Wilmington Police Detectives started the interrogation of 
6 
Wright by asking questions related to the Riverside shootings.  According to one 
detective, Wright eventually brought up the Hi-Way Inn murder.  Initially, Wright 
told the detectives that the murder involved someone name “Tee,” who was later 
identified as Lorinzo Dixon, and another unnamed person.  Later, Wright admitted 
in an unrecorded interview that he was the second, unnamed person and that he 
was the triggerman.  Throughout this interview, Wright appeared erratic, due in 
part to his usage of heroin during the interrogation that officers failed to discover 
during the initial processing. 
Roughly thirteen hours after his arrest, the Chief Investigative Officer of the 
Seifert murder, who had been listening to the interrogation, decided to record 
Wright’s statements.  On videotape, Wright told the detectives that Dixon had 
scouted the Hi-Way Inn, determining that it would be an easy target.  Wright stated 
that when the two returned, Dixon ordered Wright to shoot the clerk or else Dixon 
would kill Wright.  But many of the facts recited by Wright did not line up with the 
evidence.  For example, Wright explained that the murder weapon was the .38 
caliber handgun that police found at his home even though Seifert was killed by a 
.22 caliber weapon.  The video confession lasted about forty minutes.   
Based on this information, police obtained and executed a search warrant for 
Lorinzo Dixon’s apartment.  Again police failed to uncover any evidence linking 
either Dixon or Wright to the crime.  State Police also showed a photograph of 
7 
Dixon to Milner to determine if Dixon was the man in the plaid shirt that came into 
the tavern before the shooting.  Milner did not recognize the photo of Dixon or a 
photo of Wright.  Nor did Hummell identify Dixon or Wright as one of the men he 
saw leaving the Hi-Way Inn.   
II. Procedural History 
At Wright’s trial, Milner, Hummell, and Sergeant Kresge, the first officer on 
the scene, testified for the State.  The Chief Investigative Officer of the Seifert 
murder and the two Wilmington Detectives also testified regarding the 
investigation and Wright’s interrogation.  Wright’s videotaped confession was 
introduced through the Chief Investigative Officer.  The Deputy Chief Medical 
Examiner testified that Seifert died as a result of gunshot wounds.  Seifert had been 
shot three times, once in the neck and twice in the head.   
The defense presented an alibi for Wright.  Four of Wright’s friends testified 
that they had spent the evening with Wright at a pool house, Georgie Boy’s, from 
approximately 7:30 p.m. until midnight; they then went to a friend’s house where 
they stayed until 2:30 a.m. or 3:00 a.m.  The defense also presented an alibi for 
Dixon.  Catherine Green testified that she was on a date with Dixon that evening 
from about 7:00 p.m. until 2:00 a.m. or 3:00 a.m.  Friends testified that they saw 
Green and Dixon at the movies.  Witnesses also testified that they saw a man 
matching Hummell’s description of the perpetrators acting suspiciously near the 
8 
Hi-Way Inn around the time of the offense, and that the person was neither Wright 
nor Dixon.   
Wright also called Antonio Jones, who testified that his friend, Kevin 
Jamison, and Jamison’s cousin, Norman Curtis, had confessed to murdering 
Seifert.  According to Jones, he and Jamison were at Jamison’s house where Jones 
discovered a black, .22 caliber revolver with a longnose barrel.  When Jones asked 
Jamison about the gun, Jamison recounted robbing a liquor store with Curtis. 
[Jamison] told us that they went into the liquor store, and something 
about they asked to cash a check or something to the man when they 
got in there.  He said, he told the man to get the money up and the 
man reached down, and he didn’t know if he was pushing an alarm or 
getting a gun or something like that.   
And Kevin said, at the time he shot the man.  And the man was 
saying, “Don’t kill me; don’t kill me.”  He shot him twice in the head.  
And Norman grabbed the money and they ran out the store, and they 
left.5  
Wright then called Jamison as a defense witness to show that Jamison and 
Curtis had actually committed the Hi-Way Inn murder.  Jamison admitted that he 
was friends with Jones, but denied any involvement in the murder or talking with 
Jones about a murder or ever having a gun.  When Wright’s counsel questioned 
Jamison on the stand about his relationship to Curtis, Jamison stated that he and 
                                          
 
5 Wright’s 2012 Answering Br. Appendix at B1863–64. 
9 
Curtis were cousins but the two were together “[e]very now and then,” but “[n]ot 
often.”6   
Wright also called Robert Breglio, a former New York City police officer 
and ballistics expert.  Breglio testified that Phillip Seifert was most likely shot by a 
.22 caliber weapon based on the Medical Examiner’s report of the entrance and 
exit wounds.   
Finally, Wright took the stand.  He testified that he was not involved in the 
Hi-Way Inn crime and that he was with his friends at the pool house that evening.  
He also testified that he was high on heroin at the time of his arrest and had barely 
slept in two days.  He further explained that during the interrogation he continued 
to use heroin that was hidden in his pants and not discovered during the search 
incident to his arrest.    
On rebuttal, and without prior notice to Wright, the State introduced the 
testimony of Gerald Samuels, one of Wright’s fellow prisoners.  Samuels testified 
that Wright admitted to him in prison that he shot Seifert.  Wright again took the 
stand and denied Samuels’ version, explaining that he had said he would shoot 
Samuels if he continued asking questions, not that he had shot Seifert.   
Wright was convicted in the Superior Court of Murder in the First Degree 
and related charges and sentenced to death in 1992.  His conviction and sentence of 
                                          
 
6 Id. at B1779.  
10 
death were affirmed by this Court.7  Wright’s sentence of death was subsequently 
vacated as a result of a successful Rule 61 challenge.8  In January 1995, after a 
resentencing hearing, Wright was again sentenced to death.  This Court 
subsequently affirmed.9   
The 1997 Postconviction Proceeding & Federal Habeas Petition 
In 1997, Wright filed his second motion for postconviction relief alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  After an expansion of the record, another 
evidentiary hearing, and full briefing, the Superior Court denied the motion, and 
this Court affirmed.  In 2000, Wright filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.  In 2003, while his 
habeas corpus petition was pending in the District Court, Wright filed a third 
motion for postconviction relief, which the Superior Court stayed pending the 
outcome of the federal case.  In the District Court, the case went through several 
evidentiary hearings and several rounds of briefing. 
The 2009 Postconviction Proceeding 
Wright filed his fourth Rule 61 petition with the Superior Court in December 
2008 and amended the petition in 2009.  Wright also asked the District Court, 
which had not yet ruled on his petition for habeas corpus, to stay the federal 
                                          
 
7 Wright v. State, 633 A.2d 329 (Del. 1993). 
8 State v. Wright, 653 A.2d 288 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994). 
9 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353 (Del. 1996). 
11 
proceedings so that he could exhaust his state law remedies.  The District Court 
granted that request. At his most recent Rule 61 hearing, Wright presented expert 
testimony relating to his addiction to heroin, the effects of that addiction during his 
interrogation, his intellectual status, and his susceptibility to suggestion.  The State 
did not offer contradicting expert testimony. 
Wright also presented exculpatory evidence that he alleged was suppressed 
by the State prior to his trial.  This included evidence of a similar attempted 
robbery at the nearby Brandywine Village Liquor Store (“BVLS”) that occurred 
thirty to forty minutes before the Hi-Way Inn robbery and murder.  The BVLS was 
located one and a half miles away from the Hi-Way Inn.  The BVLS incident 
involved two black males who unsuccessfully attempted to rob the liquor store by 
holding up the clerk, Edward Baxter, with a long-barreled handgun.  Baxter 
wrestled the gun out of his face and chased the two men out of the store.  Baxter 
reported the crime to Wilmington Police, who later obtained video surveillance of 
the suspects.  The report collected by Wilmington Police, who forwarded the 
information to State Police, included descriptions of the suspects matching the 
descriptions provided by Milner and Hummell of the suspects in the Seifert 
murder.  Neither Wright nor Dixon matched the description of the BVLS suspects 
based on video evidence, and Baxter failed to positively identify either Wright or 
Dixon.  State Police considered the connection between the Hi-Way Inn murder 
12 
and the BVLS attempted robbery but ruled out any connection between the two 
crimes.   
Although there were news articles discussing the relationship between the 
BVLS attempted robbery and the Hi-Way Inn murder,10 the record shows, and the 
Superior Court found, that Wright’s counsel was unaware of any facts or relation 
to the BVLS attempted robbery.  Nonpublic information surrounding the BVLS 
attempted robbery was not disclosed to him.  Nor was the prosecutor aware of the 
BVLS attempted robbery connection because the police did not disclose the 
information to him.   
In addition to the BVLS evidence, Wright introduced exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence related to Samuels and Jamison at the postconviction relief 
hearing.  This evidence included a prior plea agreement between Samuels and the 
Attorney General’s Office showing his cooperation with the prosecution in another 
case.  Samuels had agreed to testify against a co-defendant in another case in 
exchange for reduced charges and a favorable sentencing recommendation.  Wright 
also introduced an affidavit of Samuels recanting his testimony against Wright.  
The affidavit stated that Samuels only testified against Wright because he expected 
to obtain leniency on his own charges.  Wright also provided evidence to show that 
                                          
 
10 Phil Milford & Ann Stewart, Clerk Shot In Store Holdup Dies, Del. News Journal, Jan. 16, 
1991, at E1; Ann Stewart, City Man Charged in Clerk’s Slaying, Del. News Journal, Feb. 1, 
1991, at B1.  
13 
the State withheld impeachment evidence against Jamison.  The impeachment 
evidence consisted of criminal records indicating that Jamison was close to Curtis.  
Like the BVLS evidence, Wright’s counsel was unaware of the Samuels and 
Jamison evidence at the time of the trial.  There is also no indication that the trial 
prosecutor was aware of Samuels’ prior plea agreement or Jamison’s prior 
indictment and arrest.  Rather, Wright alleges that the government as a whole 
withheld the exculpatory evidence at the time of his trial.   
Finally, Wright introduced expert testimony about his addiction to heroin, 
the effects of that addiction as manifested during his interrogation, his intellectual 
status, and his susceptibility to suggestion.  The uncontroverted experts 
collectively testified that Wright’s recorded confession reflected a man who was 
sleep deprived, intoxicated, and predisposed to persuasion and who did not 
understand his rights.  This indicated to the experts that Wright’s statements were 
inaccurate, as shown by the numerous inconsistencies in the evidence and the 
statements Wright provided, including being wrong about the weapon, the number 
of shots, and the manner of escape.   
On January 3, 2012, the Superior Court issued a 102-page decision vacating 
Wright’s convictions and his sentences, including the sentence of death.  Based 
upon the totality of the evidence presented to it during the Rule 61 proceedings, the 
14 
Superior Court concluded that it had “no confidence in the outcome of the trial.”11  
The court granted Wright’s postconviction relief on the grounds that his confession 
was given in violation of his Miranda rights12 and that the State failed to disclose 
the exculpatory BVLS attempted robbery in violation of Brady.  The court found 
that the police officers interrogating Wright failed to properly advise him of his 
Miranda rights.  Thus, according to the Superior Court, his confession should not 
have been admitted because Wright did not knowingly and intelligently waive his 
rights.   
The Superior Court denied the remainder of Wright’s claims.  The claims 
denied were that: (1) the jury was improperly instructed on the felony murder rule; 
(2) Wright was innocent under the “actually innocent” exception promulgated by 
the United States Supreme Court; (3) Wright’s confession was involuntary; (4) all 
of Wright’s prior postconviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 
(the court found this claim to have been abandoned by Wright); (5) the jury should 
have been instructed that the aggravating factors must outweigh the mitigating 
factors beyond a reasonable doubt; and (6) Wright’s conviction must be vacated 
because of a Brady violation relating to prison informant Gerald Samuels.13   
                                          
 
11 Wright, 2012 WL 1400932, at *39. 
12 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).  
13 Wright also raised a Brady claim related to Kevin Jamison, but the Superior Court only 
considered this evidence in relation to Wright’s actual innocence claim.   
15 
The State appealed the Superior Court’s order vacating Wright’s conviction 
and sentence.  This Court reversed, finding that the Miranda claim that the 
confession was inadmissible was procedurally barred.  And a majority of this Court 
found that the State’s failure to disclose the BVLS evidence did not amount to a 
Brady violation in light of Wright’s confession.14  The case was remanded to the 
Superior Court. 
On remand, Wright moved to clarify the status of his claims that the 
Superior Court rejected in its 2012 opinion.  In his Motion to Address and Clarify 
Status of Unresolved Claims, Wright asked the Superior Court to: (1) clarify the 
status of the Brady claim regarding Gerald Samuels and (2) reconsider its prior 
ruling that Wright abandoned his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel at his 
second resentencing trial.  The Superior Court denied the motion and reimposed 
Wright’s conviction and death sentence.  This appeal followed.   
III. 
Discussion 
We review the Superior Court’s decision on a motion for postconviction 
relief, including factual determinations, for abuse of discretion.15  Questions of law 
and constitutional claims, such as claims that the State failed to disclose 
                                          
 
14 State v. Wright, 67 A.3d 319, 325 (Del. 2013).   
15 Zebroski v. State, 12 A.3d 1115, 1119 (Del. 2010); Claudio v. State, 958 A.2d 846, 850 (Del. 
2008); Steckel v. State, 795 A.2d 651, 652 (Del. 2002). 
16 
exculpatory evidence, are reviewed de novo.16  The timeliness of an appeal is a 
jurisdictional question that this Court may consider at any time.17   
The Parties’ Contentions 
In this appeal, Wright contends that he is entitled to a new trial based on the 
cumulative error resulting from three different Brady violations.  First, Wright 
claims that the State improperly failed to disclose evidence concerning Gerald 
Samuels, a cooperating witness.  Second, Wright argues that the State failed to 
disclose evidence that could have been used to impeach the testimony of Kevin 
Jamison.  And third, Wright proposes that these two pieces of evidence combined 
with the State’s failure to disclose evidence related to the attempted robbery at the 
Brandywine Village Liquor Store are cumulatively Brady violations that require a 
new trial as a matter of due process.   
Wright also argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it 
denied two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to: (1) trial counsel’s 
investigation of mitigating evidence, and (2) the representation of postconviction 
counsel involving a lack of diligence and a conflict of interest.  Finally, Wright 
contends that his death sentence is unconstitutional because 11 Del. C. 
§ 4209(c)(3) did not require the jury and judge to find that the aggravating factors 
outweighed his mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.   
                                          
 
16 Zebroski, 12 A.3d at 1119. 
17 Koutoufaris v. Dick, 604 A.2d 390, 401 (Del. 1992).   
17 
The State responds that all of Wright’s claims currently on appeal are 
procedurally barred because he failed to cross-appeal these claims in the State’s 
2012 appeal to this Court.  As a result, the State maintains that the Superior Court 
and this Court lack jurisdiction even to consider Wright’s current claims.  The 
State argues that Wright’s Brady claims are procedurally barred by Rule 61 of the 
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure or, in the alternative, are without 
merit.  The State also contends that Wright’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims have either been abandoned or are without merit.  Finally, the State denies 
that the Superior Court’s weighing of Wright’s aggravating and mitigating factors 
in deciding his death sentence violated the United States Constitution.   
Jurisdiction and Cross-Appeal Requirements  
We first address whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider Wright’s 
claims.  The State argues that Wright’s claims are waived because—when the State 
filed an appeal under 10 Del. C. § 9902(d) from the Superior Court’s January 3, 
2012 opinion and order vacating Wright’s sentence and conviction—Wright failed 
to raise the claims in a cross-appeal.  Section 9902(d) provides that: 
The State shall have an absolute right to appeal to an appellate court 
from any order entered in a lower court which grants an accused any 
of the following: a new trial or judgment of acquittal after a verdict; a 
modification of a verdict; an arrest of judgment; relief in any 
postconviction proceeding or in any action collateral attacking a 
criminal judgment; a new punishment hearing in a capital case after 
the court has imposed a sentence of death; or any order or judgment 
18 
declaring any act of the General Assembly, or any portion of any such 
act, to be unconstitutional under either the Constitution of the United 
States or the State of Delaware, inoperative or unenforceable; except 
that no appeal shall lie where otherwise prohibited by the double 
jeopardy clause of the Constitutions of the United States or of this 
State.18   
Wright argues that, under the precedent of this Court, he was not authorized to file 
a cross-appeal under § 9902 and, thus, that his claims have not been waived.   
As we explained in State v. Cooley, “the jurisdiction of this Court in criminal 
appeals is strictly defined by Article IV, Section 11(1)(b) of the Delaware 
Constitution.  Any expansion of our jurisdiction should be clearly indicated by 
statute or constitutional amendment . . . .”19  This Court has held that, under Article 
IV, Section 11(1)(b) of the Delaware Constitution, this Court only has jurisdiction 
over final judgments in criminal cases.20  But Article IV, Section 11(1)(c) provides 
an exception to that general rule by granting this Court jurisdiction over appeals 
filed by the State in criminal cases where there is no final judgment in specific 
                                          
 
18 10 Del. C. § 9902(d). 
19 State v. Cooley, 457 A.2d 352, 356–57 (Del. 1983) (footnote omitted).   
20 See Kostshyn v. State, 856 A.2d 1066, 2004 WL 1874695, at *1 (Del. 2004) (“Under the 
Delaware Constitution, this Court may review only a final judgment in a criminal case.”); Rash 
v. State, 318 A.2d 603, 604 (Del. 1974) (“Under settled Delaware constitutional law only a final 
judgment in a criminal case is reviewable in this Court.”); State v. Roberts, 282 A.2d 603, 605 
(Del. 1971) (“This Court has repeatedly held that, under [Article IV, Section 11(1)(b) of the 
Delaware Constitution] the jurisdiction of this Court in criminal cases is limited of the review of 
final judgments . . . .”); Norman v. State, 177 A.2d 347, 349 (Del. 1962) (“Our general 
jurisdiction to review Superior Court proceedings in criminal cases is conferred by Article IV, 
Section 11, of the Constitution.  This appellate jurisdiction is limited to cases in which a sentence 
of specified severity has been pronounced, i.e., to final judgments.  Our Constitution was 
recently amended to confer upon this Court jurisdiction to entertain appeals from interlocutory 
judgments in the Superior Court in civil cases.  Significantly, the section dealing with appeals in 
criminal causes was not so amended.” (internal citation omitted)). 
19 
enumerated circumstances.21  The General Assembly statutorily implemented the 
jurisdiction conferred by Article IV, Section 11(1)(c) through 10 Del. C. § 9902(d).  
Although the Delaware Constitution and § 9902(d) provide this Court with a clear 
grant of jurisdiction over appeals by the State from orders entered by the Superior 
Court granting a defendant relief in any postconviction proceeding, it is equally 
clear that nothing in those provisions expands the jurisdiction that this Court has to 
hear appeals from defendants.  Thus, this Court has consistently held that it does 
not have jurisdiction to hear cross-appeals by defendants when the State files an 
appeal under § 9902(d).22 
                                          
 
21 Article IV, Section 11(1)(c) of the Delaware Constitution provides that this Court shall have 
jurisdiction: 
[T]o receive appeals from the Superior Court in criminal causes, upon application 
by the State in all causes in which the Superior Court, or any inferior court an 
appeal from which lies to the Superior Court, has granted an accused any of the 
following: a new trial or judgment of acquittal after a verdict, modification of a 
verdict, arrest of judgment, relief in any post-conviction proceeding or in any 
action collaterally attacking a criminal judgment, or a new punishment hearing in 
a capital case after the court has imposed a sentence of death, or any order or 
judgment declaring any act of the General Assembly, or any portion of any such 
act, to be unconstitutional under either the Constitution of the United States or the 
State of Delaware, inoperative or unenforceable, except that no appeal shall lie 
where otherwise prohibited by the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution of 
the United States or of this State.  Notwithstanding anything in this Article to the 
contrary, the General Assembly may by statute implement the jurisdiction herein 
conferred. 
22 See, e.g., State v. Brower, 971 A.2d 102, n.42 (Del. 2009) (finding that the Court lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the defendant’s cross-appeal in an appeal filed by the state under § 9902(d)); 
State v. Maxwell, 620 A.2d 859, 1992 WL 401575, at *1 (Del. 1992) (finding that the Court had 
no authority to hear a cross-appeal by a defendant in a case where the state appealed under § 
9902); State v. Marine, 464 A.2d 872, 874 (Del. 1983) (finding that cross-appeals were not 
permitted by § 9902); Cooley, 457 A.2d at 356 (explaining that Delaware law does not provide 
for cross-appeals under § 9902). 
20 
When the Superior Court entered its order vacating Wright’s conviction and 
sentence on January 3, 2012, he was no longer under a final judgment.  Thus, when 
the State appealed from that order, this Court would not have had jurisdiction over 
any cross-appeal from Wright claiming that the Superior Court should have based 
its order vacating his conviction and sentence not only on his two successful claims 
for postconviction relief, but also on his unsuccessful claims.23  Wright’s ability to 
challenge his remaining claims was not waived when he did not cross-appeal.  
Accordingly, now that Wright is under a final judgment, we have jurisdiction to 
consider this appeal.24  To hold otherwise would leave Wright without a remedy to 
challenge the claims for postconviction relief that the Superior Court denied.   
                                          
 
23 Such a result makes sense because Wright received everything that he was requesting from the 
Superior Court when his conviction and sentence were vacated, and he was granted a new trial.  
See, e.g., Hercules Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 783 A.2d 1275, 1277 (Del. 2000) (“Standing to cross-
appeal, however, like standing to appeal, requires the party seeking relief to have been aggrieved 
by the judgment.” (citing Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 334 (1980))).    
24 Although it might have been preferable, in the interest of judicial economy, for this Court to 
have heard Wright’s claims in a cross-appeal when the State appealed in 2012, this Court’s 
jurisdiction is circumscribed by Article IV, Section 11 of the Delaware Constitution.  Because 
our jurisdiction is fixed by the Delaware Constitution, the policy question of whether the optimal 
balance in terms of judicial economy is struck by the current system—which does not permit a 
defendant who obtained all the relief she sought below to raise claims she did not prevail on 
through a cross-appeal—or a different system that would require a defendant who prevailed and 
had her conviction vacated to cross-appeal on any issue on which she did not prevail below in 
order to preserve that issue as an alternative basis for vacating her conviction is one that must be 
addressed by the General Assembly, not this Court.   
21 
Rule 61 Does Not Bar Wright’s Brady Claim under the Miscarriage of Justice 
Exception 
The State next asserts that Wright’s Brady claim related to Samuels is 
procedurally barred by Rule 61(i) of the Superior Court Criminal Rules of 
Procedure.  This Court must consider Rule 61’s procedural requirements “before 
addressing the merits of claims made in postconviction proceedings.”25  A 
postconviction motion is barred by Rule 61(i) where it is untimely, repetitive, or 
procedurally defaulted.26  Such bars to relief do not apply where there is a 
“colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional 
violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness 
of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.”27   
We consider the Brady claim under Rule 61(i)(5)’s narrow “miscarriage of 
justice” exception.  Wright’s claim was fully considered by the Superior Court.  
And it is well established that a colorable Brady v. Maryland violation falls within 
the miscarriage of justice exception.28 
                                          
 
25 Wright, 67 A.3d at 323 (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990)). 
26 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)–(4). 
27 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 
28 Wright, 67 A.3d at 324 (citing Jackson v. State, 770 A.2d 506, 515–16 (Del. 2001)); see also 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) (“The Brady rule is based on the requirement 
of due process.  Its purpose is not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by 
which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur.”); Jackson, 
770 A.2d at 515–16 (“When the Brady rule is violated, postconviction relief can not be barred by 
Rule 61(i)(3) because a Brady violation undermines the fairness of the proceeding leading to the 
judgment of conviction.  Because Brady violations strike at the core of a fair trial, the 
consequences of a failure to comply with Brady must be examined carefully.”). 
22 
The State argues that we should instead evaluate Wright’s motion under 
Rule 61(i)(4)’s “interest of justice” exception because this Court already 
considered and implicitly rejected the evidence related to Samuels.  In relevant 
part, Rule 61(i)(4) provides that “[a]ny ground for relief that was formerly 
adjudicated . . . in an appeal, [or] in a postconviction proceeding . . . is thereafter 
barred.”29  Rule 61(i)(5)’s miscarriage of justice exception does not apply to the bar 
on formerly adjudicated claims under Rule 61(i)(4).30  Claims barred by Rule 
61(i)(4) may only be overcome in the interest of justice, a distinct standard.31   
The State contends that this Court implicitly rejected on the merits Wright’s 
Brady claim regarding Samuels during the State’s 2012 appeal because Wright 
presented arguments on the claim in his answering brief.  According to the State, 
this written discussion was sufficient to place the issue before this Court, thus 
constituting a previously adjudicated claim.  We disagree. 
Although Wright did discuss the Samuels evidence in his brief during the 
State’s 2012 appeal, we did not reach the merits of that claim.  On the State’s 2012 
                                          
 
29 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 
30 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing that “[t]he bars to relief in paragraphs (1), (2), and 
(3) of this subdivision shall not apply to . . . a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of 
justice because of a constitutional violation”).   
31 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) (providing that formerly adjudicated claims may only be 
considered “in the interest of justice”).  This Court has held that “the terms ‘interest of justice’ 
and ‘miscarriage of justice’ have different and distinct meanings under Rule 61.”  Bailey v. State, 
588 A.2d 1121, 1127 n.6 (Del. 1991).  The “interest of justice” exception requires the defendant 
show that “‘subsequent legal developments have revealed that the trial court lacked the authority 
to convict or punish’ the accused.”  Floyd v. State, 670 A.2d 1337, 1995 WL 622408, at *2 (Del. 
1995) (quoting Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 746 (Del. 1990)).  
23 
appeal, the only issues before this Court were issues related to bail, Wright’s 
confession, and the alleged Brady violation concerning the BVLS robbery.32  
Wright’s cursory reference to Samuels’ testimony in his answering brief does not 
show otherwise.  The State did not brief the issue on appeal.  Nor did this Court 
make any reference to Samuels’ testimony in its decision.  Rule 61(i)(4) does not 
bar Wright’s Brady claim.   
The State’s Cumulative Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence Would Have 
Reasonably Altered the Result of Wright’s Trial, Amounting to a Brady Violation 
Wright contends that the State violated his constitutional right to a fair trial 
by its cumulative failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.  That evidence consists 
of undisclosed exculpatory and impeachment evidence related to witnesses Gerald 
Samuels and Kevin Jamison, plus undisclosed evidence pertaining to the BVLS 
attempted robbery.  Wright argues that these nondisclosures cumulatively amount 
to a Brady violation.  We agree.  
In the State’s appeal in 2012, this Court only considered the suppression of 
the evidence related to the BVLS robbery.  A majority of this Court held that 
although “[t]he BVLS ‘evidence’ was theoretically exculpatory,” such evidence 
“had very little probative value” and did not otherwise create “a reasonable 
probability that the verdict would have been different.”33  The cumulative effect of 
                                          
 
32 Wright, 67 A3d at 322–25. 
33 Id. at 325. 
24 
the failure to disclose that and other exculpatory evidence is now before us for the 
first time.  
According to United States Supreme Court, a Brady violation occurs where 
there is “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . 
[that] violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”34  The 
requirements of Brady are based on the premise that “[s]ociety wins not only when 
the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the 
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”35  Under 
Brady, “the prosecutor’s success [is] measured not merely in terms of winning the 
competition, but winning fairly.”36  The requirement that prosecutors turn over all 
favorable evidence to the accused is illustrative of the prosecutor’s obligation to 
“search for truth in criminal trials.”37  “The prosecutor plays a special role in the 
adversarial system that is not limited to representing the State but also includes the 
responsibility as a minister of justice.”38   
Implicit in this search for truth is the need to protect the innocent.  “The 
justice system must not only strive to convict the guilty but also to acquit the 
                                          
 
34 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.   
35 Id.  
36 Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 685, 708–09 
(2006). 
37 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999). 
38 Kirkley v. State, 41 A.3d 372, 376–77 (Del. 2012) (citing Del. Lawyers’ Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. 1). 
25 
innocent.  If it mistakenly convicts the wrong person, it inflicts a grave injustice 
while leaving the guilty party free to commit more crimes.”39  Compared with 
Fourth Amendment or Miranda violations, a Brady violation is not a technicality in 
which the State oversteps its authority in its pursuit of a guilty perpetrator.40  
Rather, Brady seeks to ensure a fair trial.  
Under Brady and its progeny, the State’s failure to disclose exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence that is material to the case violates a defendant’s due 
process rights.41  The reviewing court may also consider any adverse effect from 
nondisclosure “on the preparation or presentation of the defendant’s case.”42  
“There are three components of a Brady violation: (1) evidence exists that is 
favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that 
evidence is suppressed by the State; and (3) its suppression prejudices the 
defendant.”43  In order for the State to discharge its responsibility under Brady, the 
prosecutor must disclose all relevant information obtained by the police or others 
in the Attorney General’s Office to the defense.44  That entails a duty on the part of 
                                          
 
39 Stephanos Bibas, The Story of Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward 
the Search for Innocence?, in Criminal Procedure Stories 129, 138 (Carol Steiker ed. 2006).  
40 See id. (“Innocence is not a technicality tangential to the criminal process.  It is the main 
touchstone of the criminal process.”).  
41 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676; Brady, 373 U.S. at 88. 
42 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683. 
43 Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82).   
44 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 (1958)). 
26 
the individual prosecutor “to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others 
acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”45 
Whether a “Brady violation” has occurred often turns on the third 
component—materiality.46  Materiality does not require the defendant to show that 
the disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted in an acquittal.47  
Nor is a reviewing court required to order “a new trial whenever ‘a combing of the 
prosecutors’ files after the trial has disclosed evidence possibly useful to the 
defense but not likely to have changed the verdict.’”48  Rather, the defendant must 
show that the State’s evidence creates “a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.”49  A reasonable probability of a different result occurs where the 
government’s evidentiary suppression “undermines confidence in the outcome of 
the trial.”50  Materiality is not limited to the individual effect of each piece of 
exculpatory or impeachment evidence.  Instead, materiality is determined “in the 
context of the entire record.”51  A reviewing court first evaluates the “tendency and 
force of the undisclosed evidence item by item.”52  The court then evaluates the 
                                          
 
45 Kyles, 514 U.S. 437. 
46 Atkinson v. State, 778 A.2d 1058, 1063 (Del. 2001). 
47 Id.  
48 Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (quoting United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1968)).  
49 Starling, 882 A.2d at 756 (emphasis added) (quoting Jackson, 770 A.2d at 516). 
50 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678). 
51 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976). 
52 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 n.10. 
27 
“cumulative effect” of the suppressed evidence separately.53  “Individual items of 
suppressed evidence may not be material on their own, but may, in the aggregate, 
‘undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome of the trial.’”54  The State’s obligation 
under Brady to disclose evidence favorable to the defense “turns on the cumulative 
effect of all such evidence suppressed by the government.”55 
The United States Supreme Court has explained that exculpatory evidence is 
any evidence that is “material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”56  We have explained that impeachment 
evidence is evidence that “the defense can use to impeach a prosecution witness by 
showing bias or interest.”57  Such evidence falls within the Brady rule because it 
can be “favorable to an accused so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it might 
make the difference between conviction and acquittal.”58 
Under the first prong of the Brady analysis, Wright points to exculpatory or 
impeachment evidence that would have been favorable to his defense at trial 
concerning Gerald Samuels, Kevin Jamison, and the BVLS attempted robbery.  
First, Wright explains that the State failed to disclose before trial information about 
Samuels—a prison informant who testified against Wright as a surprise witness.  
                                          
 
53 Id.  
54 Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 129 (3d Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Bagley, 
473 U.S. at 678), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 61 (2013). 
55 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added). 
56 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
57 Jackson, 770 A.2d at 515 (quoting Michael v. State, 529 A.2d 752, 756 (Del. 1987)).  
58 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Michael, 529 A.2d at 756). 
28 
The specific evidence is (among other things) that Samuels agreed to testify 
against a co-defendant in a drug case roughly six months before Wright’s trial.59  
At Wright’s trial, the prosecutor introduced Samuels as a rebuttal witness to 
testify that Wright had admitted to killing Seifert.  Rather than provide Wright’s 
counsel with a copy of Samuels’ criminal record, the prosecutor merely disclosed 
Samuels’ four felony convictions following four guilty pleas.  Wright’s counsel 
never learned the facts of those convictions in time to adequately cross-examine 
Samuels at trial.  One of these convictions was for trafficking in cocaine, 
possession of heroin, and conspiracy second degree.  In connection with this 
conviction, Samuels entered into a plea agreement with the State to testify against 
his co-defendant in exchange for reduced charges and sentence only six months 
before Wright’s trial.  Samuels had been a cooperating witness to advance his self-
interest, and at Wright’s trial he was cooperating again.  
Several state and federal courts have found the prosecution’s failure to 
disclose a witness’s prior cooperation with law enforcement alone amounts to a 
                                          
 
59 Wright also alleges that the State suppressed evidence of Samuels’ subjective expectation of 
leniency in exchange for his testimony against Wright.  Because the Superior Court found, as a 
factual matter, that there was no agreement, either express or implied, between Samuels and the 
State and any subjective expectation of leniency Samuels had was not evidence in possession of 
the State, we defer to that factual finding, which is supported by the record.  Wright, 2012 WL 
1400932, at *37; see also Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 
52, 68–70 (2009) (stressing that the government’s Brady duties only apply to evidence 
suppressed during trial, not evidence the government acquires post-trial).  
29 
Brady violation.60  Samuels’ prior agreement to cooperate with the prosecution 
would have been useful impeachment evidence for Wright at his trial.61  Even 
though Samuels ultimately did not testify against his co-defendant in a different 
trial, his repeated willingness to testify in order to advance his own legal interests, 
given his criminal record, would have been helpful to the jury in weighing the 
credibility of Samuels’ testimony.   
The next item of Brady evidence raised by Wright relates to Kevin Jamison, 
a defense witness at Wright’s trial.  Wright sought to prove that Jamison and his 
cousin, Norman Curtis, were the actual perpetrators of Phillip Seifert’s murder.  
When Wright’s trial counsel asked Jamison about his relationship with Curtis, 
Jamison testified that he only saw Curtis “now and then” but “not often.”62  But the 
State had evidence showing that Jamison’s testimony was false.  One month before 
Wright’s trial, Jamison and Curtis had been charged as co-defendants in a robbery.  
                                          
 
60 See, e.g., Reasonover v. Washington, 60 F. Supp. 2d 937, 975 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (finding a 
Brady violation where a witness “entered into a deal with prosecutors in exchange for favorable 
treatment”); Williams v. State, 831 A.2d 501, 513–15 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (finding a 
Brady violation where the State suppressed the fact that a key witness at defendant’s murder trial 
was a paid police informant), aff’d, 896 A.2d 973 (Md. 2006); Sarber v. State, 2009 WL 
2366097, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2009) (reversing a conviction where the State failed to 
disclose witness’s cooperation discussions).  
61 The agreement itself states that Samuels “agrees to testify truthfully against his co-def[endant] 
Larry Anderson concerning the events occurring on 10/23/91.  [Samuels] agrees not to contest 
the State’s recommendation.”  Wright’s 2012 Answering Br. Appendix at B791.  Samuels signed 
the plea agreement on February 13, 1992.  Id.  Although Samuels later disavowed his testimony 
in a sworn affidavit, Samuels’ decades-later recantation is not part of this Brady analysis because 
such evidence could not have been available at trial or suppressed by the State.   
62 Wright’s 2012 Answering Br. Appendix at B1779. 
30 
Jamison was arrested on August 19, 1992 for that robbery, two days after he 
testified at Wright’s trial.  Wright’s trial was still underway.63  
Both pieces of information about Jamison—the robbery charge with co-
defendant Curtis and the delay in making the arrest—would have provided 
exculpatory and impeaching evidence for Wright.  The co-commission of a crime 
with Curtis would have undermined Jamison’s testimony that he only associated 
with Curtis intermittently.  This information tended to bolster Wright’s claims that 
Jamison and Curtis were the joint perpetrators of Seifert’s murder.  Moreover, the 
fact that Jamison was not arrested until after he testified at Wright’s trial would 
have been material to his credibility.   
Wright’s third item of exculpatory evidence relates to the BVLS attempted 
robbery.  In our earlier decision, we assumed without deciding that the BVLS 
robbery was exculpatory and suppressed because this Court found that the failure 
to disclose this evidence, by itself, did not prejudice the verdict.64  We now 
consider the cumulative effect of this and the other items of undisclosed evidence.65   
The nearby BVLS attempted robbery occurred close in time to the Hi-Way 
Inn robbery.  The two crimes occurred within forty minutes of each other and took 
                                          
 
63 Jamison and Curtis were indicted on July 17, 1992.  Wright’s trial began on August 11, 1992, 
and lasted until August 23, 1992.   
64 Wright, 67 A.3d at 325.  
65 Cf. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 440–41 (reversing a conviction where it was unclear whether the Court 
of Appeals assessed cumulative materiality effect of the Brady evidence or made “a series of 
independent materiality evaluations”).  
31 
place less than two miles apart.  The descriptions of the suspects in the BVLS 
robbery were similar to the descriptions of the two men seen leaving the Hi-Way 
Inn.66  Both crimes involved the use of a firearm.  The BVLS crime was an 
attempted robbery using a handgun, and the Hi-Way Inn murder involved the use 
of a .22 caliber weapon.   
As the Superior Court noted, a plausible argument can be made that the 
unsuccessful perpetrators of the BVLS attempted robbery were the same 
individuals involved in the Hi-Way Inn robbery shortly thereafter.  The court 
explained: 
It should be recalled that Debra Milner (the barmaid at the HiWay 
Inn) told police that prior to the crime a black man wearing a red plaid 
flannel shirt came into the tavern and apparently surveyed the scene.  
(After viewing photos Ms. Milner denied that either Wright or Dixon 
resembled that man.)  No red shirt was ever found at Wright’s or 
                                          
 
66 George Hummell, a Hi-Way Inn customer, described the two men leaving the scene of the 
murder as one black male six feet tall, 170 pounds and a second black male approximately five-
eight to five-ten, weighing 160 pounds.  Deborah Milner, a Hi-Way Inn employee, described a 
man who came in the bar just before the shooting as a black male in his mid-twenties wearing a 
red plaid shirt.  Based on the witness statements from Hummell and Milner, police described the 
two men who robbed the Hi-Way Inn as (1) “a black, male, mid 20’s, wearing possibly a red 
flannel shirt, black knit hat, black waist type jacket, dark loose fitting pants, dark shoes 
approximately 6’0” and weighing 170 lbs.” and (2) “a black, male, mid 20’s, baseball type cap, 
dark clothing . . . approximately 5’8” – 5’10” and weighing 160 lbs.”  State’s 2012 Opening Br. 
Appendix at A1.  Comparatively, the police report of the BLVS robbery described the suspects 
based off of the clerk’s description as:  
In this case Suspect # 1 is described as a black male, 5’11”, 160 lbs., 
slender build, 23 to 24 years old, was wearing all dark clothing except for 
a white baseball cap, he was clean shaven and a thin face and was armed 
with a long barrel blue steel handgun.  
Suspect # 2 is described as a black male, short, stocky built, wearing a tan 
jacket, white or light colored pants and white sneakers . . . . 
Id. at A5. 
32 
Dixon’s home.  But according to a report prepared by the Wilmington 
Police Department, Mr. Baxter described one of the Brandywine 
Village perpetrators as wearing a “red coat”, suggesting of course that 
it was one of the Brandywine Village perpetrators, not Wright or 
Dixon, who cased the HiWay Inn.67 
Police ruled Wright and Dixon out as possible suspects based on Baxter’s witness 
identification.  Such evidence, if presented at trial, would have been exculpatory.68   
Turning to the second prong of the Brady analysis, the record shows that the 
State suppressed exculpatory and impeachment evidence related to Samuels, 
Jamison, and the BVLS attempted robbery.  When the State presented Samuels as a 
witness against Wright, the State disclosed that Samuels had a record of four prior 
felonies.  The first two were the result of a guilty plea and the second two resulted 
from a plea agreement.  Nothing in the record indicates that the State disclosed that 
the plea agreement for the latter charges that occurred just six months before 
Wright’s trial included an agreement to cooperate and testify in exchange for a 
reduced sentence.69  Although Wright’s counsel knew that Samuels had entered 
                                          
 
67 Wright, 2012 WL 1400932, at *38. 
68 Cf. United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1404 (3d Cir. 1991) (concluding that a defendant 
may use other crimes evidence defensively “to negate his guilt of the crime charged against him” 
(quoting State v. Williams, 518 A.2d 234, 238 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986))); Watkins v. 
State, 23 A.3d 151, 157 (Del. 2011) (reversing a conviction where the trial judge excluded 
evidence of a similar robbery that could have been used by the defendant to support his 
misidentification defense).  
69 The State argues that a reasonable investigation into Samuels’ record would have informed 
Wright of the prior plea agreement.  The facts of this case suggest otherwise.  The prosecutor 
announced that Samuels would be a surprise rebuttal witness without prior notice to Wright.  
This was an insufficient amount of time for counsel to adequately prepare in time for trial.  And 
in this time frame, it would have been unfair to require Wright to learn about the existence of all 
documentary evidence related to Samuels.  See Gershman, supra, at 696. 
33 
into a plea agreement, the State did not disclose the details and terms of his 
cooperation under that agreement—information that would have been useful 
impeachment evidence for Wright.  Moreover, the limited disclosure of Samuels’ 
record was insufficient because Wright’s trial counsel could not adequately use the 
information or conduct any meaningful investigation given the State’s timing of 
the addition of Samuels as a witness.70   
The record also shows that the State failed to disclose evidence relating to 
Jamison.  When Jamison testified that he saw his cousin Curtis only intermittently, 
the State was aware that Jamison and Curtis had been jointly indicted on robbery 
and conspiracy charges.  Jamison and Curtis were indicted on July 17, 1992.  
Wright’s trial began on August 11, 1992, and lasted until August 23, 1992.  The 
State’s failure to disclose the indictment against Curtis was a suppression of Brady 
evidence.71  Even if the trial prosecutor was unaware of the charges against 
Jamison and Curtis, and there is nothing in the record to show that he was, the fact 
                                          
 
70 Cf. Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding a Brady violation where the 
government’s disclosure prevented any “opportunity for a responsible lawyer to use the 
information with some degree of calculation and forethought”). 
71 See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153–54 (holding that the prosecutor’s nondisclosure of material 
evidence affecting a witness’s credibility, which goes uncorrected, falls within the requirements 
of Brady); People v. Steadman, 623 N.E.2d 509, 512 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that “the prosecutor’s 
duty extends to correcting mistakes or falsehoods by a witness whose testimony on the subject is 
inaccurate” under Brady). 
34 
that others in the Attorney General’s Office were aware of the indictment at the 
time of trial suffices to make the evidence Brady material.72   
The State argues that the investigation of Jamison would have been readily 
ascertainable to Wright at the time of the trial, and the State had no motive to 
suppress it and no duty to disclose it to Wright.  The State also contends that 
because Jamison was a defense witness, rather than a State’s witness, it was not 
required to turn over impeachment evidence for Wright’s own witness.  In this 
instance, we disagree.  Wright called Jamison to show that he and Curtis had killed 
Seifert at the Hi-Way Inn.  He was likely a hostile, or at least an uncooperative, 
witness, and thus he was not a typical defense witness.  Further, the State’s 
suggestion that Jamison’s indictment would have been available to Wright before 
or during trial is without support in the record.  Even if that was true, the fact that 
the State chose not to arrest Jamison until after his testimony at Wright’s trial 
would not have been a publicly available fact at the time.  Thus, the State failed to 
disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence relating to Jamison that would 
have been useful to Wright.  
                                          
 
72 See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438 (explaining that the prosecutor has the burden “to insure 
communication of all relevant information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it” in 
order “to discharge the government’s Brady responsibility” (quoting Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154)); 
cf. United States v. Burnside, 824 F. Supp. 1215, 1253–54 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (explaining that a 
document received by the U.S. Attorney’s Office “is imputed to the government for purposes of 
Brady”).  
35 
The record further supports the Superior Court’s conclusion that the State 
did not comply with its Brady obligation for the BVLS evidence before and during 
Wright’s trial.  The Superior Court found that the prosecutor was unaware of the 
BVLS investigation.  But the police themselves raised the possibility that the 
suspects of the Hi-Way Inn crime could be the same suspects in the attempted 
robbery at the BVLS.  On the same date, Monday, January 14, 1991, the 
Wilmington Police received a report of an attempted robbery involving two black 
males with a handgun about forty minutes before the Hi-Way Inn 
robbery/homicide.  Although this information was reported in the newspaper 
shortly after the murder, there was no disclosure, publicly or by the police, that 
Wright had been ruled out as a suspect in the BVLS attempted robbery.  Nor was 
Wright aware of the descriptions of the BVLS suspects or the existence of 
videotape and photographic evidence.   
The final consideration in the Brady analysis is the materiality prong of the 
cumulative evidence.  As discussed above, to be material, evidence does not have 
to be so strong that, if admitted, it would have resulted in an acquittal.  Instead, the 
defendant must show only a reasonable probability of a different result.  “[T]he 
touchstone of due process analysis in cases [alleging a Brady violation] . . . is the 
36 
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”73  Our analysis focuses 
on the fairness of Wright’s trial.74  Our inquiry under the materiality prong is 
whether the disclosure of the cumulative exculpatory and impeachment evidence 
withheld by the State creates a reasonable probability of a different outcome.  We 
answer this inquiry in the affirmative.   
In the State’s 2012 appeal, a majority of this Court held that the BVLS 
evidence was exculpatory but “had very little probative value.”75  This decision 
was based on the circumstance that the BVLS evidence did not significantly 
bolster Wright’s alibi defense or “create a reasonable probability that the verdict 
would have been different” in light of his confession.76  Now, multiple Brady 
violations have been shown.  The cumulative effect of these multiple Brady 
violations creates a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been 
different.   
                                          
 
73 Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982); see also United States v. Oruche, 484 F.3d 590, 
597 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[O]ur focus is on the potential impact that the undisclosed evidence might 
have had on the fairness of the proceedings rather than on the overall strength of the 
government’s case.” (quoting United States v. Cuffie, 80 F.3d 514, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1996))). 
74 See Jackson, 770 A.2d at 515–16 (explaining that “a Brady violation undermines the fairness 
of the proceeding leading to the judgment of conviction . . . . strik[ing] at the core of a fair trial, 
the consequences of a failure to comply with Brady must be examined carefully”); State v. 
Mullen, 259 P.3d 158, 165–66 (Wash. 2011) (en banc) (“The animating purpose of Brady is to 
preserve the fairness of criminal trials.” (quoting Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 742 (9th Cir. 
2006))). 
75 Wright, 67 A.3d at 325.  
76 Id.  
37 
This cumulative Brady evidence alters the calculus on Wright’s confession, 
his alibi defense, and the identity of the gunmen at the Hi-Way Inn.  That evidence 
cuts across multiple, substantive bases supporting the jury’s conviction and would 
have permitted Wright to attack the State’s case from every angle.77  Disclosure of 
Samuels’ prior plea agreement could have been used to bolster Wright’s claims 
that his confession was involuntary due to his drug intoxication and that he did not 
otherwise confess while in prison.  Jamison’s prior crimes could have been used to 
show that Jamison was lying on the stand.  This evidence, together with the BVLS 
attempted robbery, could have been used to show that the State arrested the wrong 
suspect and that Jamison and Curtis were the perpetrators.  Further, the revelation 
of the BVLS robbery could have raised doubts about the identity of the shooter and 
bolstered Wright’s alibi defense.  The potential cumulative impact of this evidence 
at the trial is material.  The postconviction evidence led the Superior Court to 
conclude that it had no confidence in the outcome of the trial.  Neither do we.   
The State’s suppression of this Brady evidence was also directly relevant to 
the penalty phase.  Wright was limited in making a residual doubt allocution at the 
penalty phase.  “Residual doubt” is described as “a lingering uncertainty about 
facts, a state of mind that exists somewhere between ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ 
                                          
 
77 Cf. United States v. Sipe, 388 F.3d 471, 491–92 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the cumulative 
Brady evidence would have allowed the defendant to “attack the government’s case from every 
angle”).  
38 
and ‘absolute certainty.’”78  This Court has held that a defendant who wishes to do 
so may discuss or argue in allocution facts supporting a residual doubt argument.79  
The evidence that was suppressed would have bolstered materially a plea by 
Wright for life imprisonment instead of the death penalty.   
Because we find a reversible Brady violation based on the State’s 
cumulative suppression of exculpatory and impeachment evidence, we do not 
reach Wright’s other claims.  Both the State and the defense are entitled to a fair 
trial in this case.  We reverse the judgments of conviction and remand so that the 
Superior Court may conduct one.  
IV. 
Conclusion 
The judgment of the Superior Court is REVERSED and this matter is 
REMANDED for a new trial.  
                                          
 
78 Zebroski v. State, 822 A.2d 1038, 1049 (Del. 2003) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 
164, 188 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).   
79 Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 496 (Del. 2000).  The arguable facts include those from the 
guilt or penalty phase as well as new facts, subject to certain limitations, under Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 32(a)(1)(C) and 11 Del. C. § 4209(c)(2).  Id.