Case Title: RIPP CAUSEY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0145

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-09-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
RIPP CAUSEY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 111Case Number: S-08-0145Decided: 09/04/2009NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
RIPP 
CAUSEY,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Niobrara County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Alden.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny Lynn Craig, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Craig.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Ripp 
Causey challenges his conviction on one count of aggravated assault and 
battery.  We will affirm his 
conviction.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Mr. 
Causey presents these issues:

 
 
                        
1.         
Did the district court properly instruct the jury regarding Mr. Causey's 
right of self-defense?

 
 
2.         
Did the prosecutor improperly comment on Mr. Causey's right to 
silence?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
On 
the afternoon of November 5, 2006, Officer James Frye, of the Lusk Police 
Department, was dispatched to the home of Sandra Serres.  Ms. Serres had called 911 and reported a 
fight.  Upon arriving, Officer Frye 
observed Mr. Causey standing outside the home.  He was bleeding from his head and "was 
holding a machete."  Officer Frye 
then saw David Howard exit the home.  Mr. Howard's hands were bleeding 
profusely.  Around this time, 
Niobrara Sheriff Deputy Randy Stensaas also arrived at the scene.  Deputy Stensaas drew his weapon and 
ordered Mr. Causey to put the machete on the ground.  Mr. Causey complied.  Officer Frye and Deputy Stensaas 
interviewed Mr. Causey, Ms. Serres, and Mr. Howard.  After the interviews, Mr. Causey was 
arrested.  An information was 
subsequently filed charging Mr. Causey with aggravated assault and battery in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005)1 and attempted second-degree murder 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-104 and 6-1-301.

 
 

[¶4]        
The 
trial testimony revealed a contentious history between Mr. Causey and 
Mr. Howard.  Ms. Serres 
testified that she previously dated and lived with Mr. Causey.  In approximately June 2006, she began 
dating Mr. Howard.  She moved out of 
the home she shared with Mr. Causey and, soon after, began living with Mr. 
Howard.  She continued to maintain a 
friendship with Mr. Causey, which added strain to the relationship between 
Mr. Causey and Mr. Howard.  A 
number of verbal confrontations occurred between Mr. Causey and Mr. Howard after 
her break up with Mr. Causey.  On 
one previous occasion, a police officer had been called to serve as a "civil 
standby" to deter a physical confrontation between the two men.  Mr. Howard eventually moved out of the 
home he shared with Ms. Serres, but continued his relationship with 
Ms. Serres.  They were still in 
an exclusive dating relationship on November 5, 2006.

 
 

[¶5]        
On 
that morning, according to Ms. Serres, she and Mr. Howard helped a friend move. 
 Mr. Howard left after arguing with 
the friend, and later, Ms. Serres called Mr. Causey to take her home.  While Ms. Serres and Mr. Causey were at 
her home, she received several calls from Mr. Howard.  According to the testimony of both Ms. 
Serres and Mr. Howard, Mr. Causey made several loud comments and threats while 
Mr. Howard was on the telephone with Ms. Serres, and Mr. Howard could hear 
Mr. Causey's remarks.  Specifically, 
Mr. Howard testified that Mr. Causey said that "I had no balls, called me a 
punk."  According to Ms. Serres, Mr. 
Causey stated "[t]hat he would just kill the punk and to bring it on."  Mr. Causey offered a different version of 
the comments.  He testified that he 
and Ms. Serres were having a normal conversation, and that Mr. Howard happened 
to hear the conclusion of one of Mr. Causey's statements as Ms. Serres answered 
the telephone.

 
 

[¶6]        
In 
any event, despite Ms. Serres's expressed desire that he not do so, 
Mr. Howard traveled to her home.  When Mr. Causey learned that Mr. Howard 
was on his way, he went to his vehicle, retrieved the machete, and returned 
inside.  Ms. Serres called the 
police.  Before the police arrived, 
Mr. Howard and Mr. Causey engaged in a physical altercation.  At trial, conflicting evidence was 
presented regarding details of the fight.  
For example, Ms. Serres and Mr. Howard testified that Mr. Howard 
pulled the screen door open and walked past Ms. Serres without touching her. 
 Mr. Causey, in contrast, testified 
that Mr. Howard "jerked the door out of her hand and shoved her against the wall 
and never even slowed down."  

 
 

[¶7]        
Mr. 
Howard testified that when he entered the residence, he saw "something coming at 
me, and I threw up my hand, and there was a scuffle after that."  Mr. Howard later discovered that the 
"something" coming at him was Mr. Causey's machete.  During the "scuffle," according to Mr. 
Howard, he grabbed Mr. Causey, shoved him, and eventually ran him out the door 
and flung him to the ground.  Mr. 
Howard said that Mr. Causey's head injury occurred when he pounded Mr. 
Causey's head on the ground.  Mr. 
Howard sustained severe cuts to his hands, which required surgery, and he 
testified that he had not recovered full function of his 
hands.

 
 

[¶8]        
Mr. 
Causey's trial testimony about the conflict differed from Mr. Howard's version, 
and also varied in several respects from what he told law enforcement officers 
soon after the incident.  Mr. Causey 
testified that he turned to leave after Ms. Serres left, but 
Mr. Howard

 
 
grabbed 
me by the left arm and the shoulder.  
He spun me and slammed me into the corner of the wall, the kitchen and 
the hallway, and cut my head open.  
He slammed me into the sofa.  
He slammed me into the desk.  
He threw me on the floor, started stomping on me.

 
 
Mr. 
Causey described batting ineffectually at Mr. Howard while being struck and 
kicked, and while Mr. Howard slammed his head down on the floor.  Mr. Causey testified that Mr. Howard 
received his injuries as follows:

 
 
So 
then I was still bent over looking at the floor, and he was slamming me, and I 
was trying to get my arm up so I could take another swing at him to get him away 
from me; and he evidently saw the machete and grabbed it.  I didn't realize all these things until 
later.  I was outside what 
happened.  It happened so fast, I 
didn't realize it at that time; but he grabbed the machete; and I felt him pull 
on it; and he didn't pull it out of my hand.  I don't know how, but I still had a hold 
of it; and he kind of stepped back a little bit; and he had his hand like this; 
and I was still bent over; and I was taking a swing and raised up and just made 
a wild swing at him to back him up; and he raised his arms up a little, and I 
hit him on this forearm. 

 
 
Mr. 
Causey then left.  Officer Frye 
arrived and found him outside.

 
 

[¶9]        
Mr. 
Causey was acquitted of attempted second-degree murder, but found guilty of 
aggravated assault and battery.  The 
district court sentenced Mr. Causey to 7-10 years imprisonment with credit 
for time served.  He 
appealed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
1.         
Jury Instructions

 
 

[¶10]     
Mr. 
Causey defended the charges against him by contending that he acted in 
self-defense.  His position on 
appeal is that the district court did not properly instruct the jury on the law 
regarding self-defense.  His 
challenge is directed only at Instruction 19, but that instruction is better 
understood when put in context with all of the self-defense instructions given 
to the jury:

 
 
Jury 
Instruction No. 15:

 
 
Before 
the defendant may be convicted of Aggravated Assault and Battery or Attempted 
Second Degree Murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not act in self-defense.

 
 
A 
person being assaulted may defend himself if he has reasonable grounds for 
believing and does believe that bodily injury is about to be inflicted upon 
him.  In doing so he may use all 
force which would appear to a reasonable person, in the same or similar 
circumstances, to be necessary to prevent the injury which appears to be 
imminent.

 
 
Jury 
Instruction No. 16:

 
 
The 
Defendant was permitted to act in self-defense if he had reasonable cause to 
believe and did believe that the danger was real and impending and 
immediate.

 
 
It 
is not necessary that the danger actually was real, or that the danger actually 
was impending and immediate, so long as the Defendant had reasonable cause to 
believe and did believe these facts.  
If the Defendant reasonably believed that danger was real and impending 
and immediate, he was permitted to act in self-defense even though the other 
person did not actually intend to harm the Defendant.

 
 
Jury 
Instruction No. 17:

 
 
One 
may arm himself in self-defense only if he has reasonable grounds to 
believe:

 
 

1.            
that 
another will attack him, and 

 
 

2.            
that 
the attack may endanger his life or limb, or cause him serious bodily 
harm.

 
 
If 
the Defendant armed himself in reasonable anticipation of such an attack, that 
fact alone does not make the Defendant the aggressor or deprive the Defendant of 
the right of self-defense.

 
 
Jury 
Instruction No. 18:

 
 
One 
who reasonably believes that he is threatened with an attack that justifies 
self-defense, need not retreat or consider whether he can safely retreat, so 
long as he does not use deadly force.  
He is entitled to stand his ground and use such force, as is reasonably 
necessary under the circumstances to defend himself.  This law applies even though the 
assailed person might have been able to gain safety by flight or by withdrawal 
from the scene.

 
 
Even 
if the Defendant had reasonable ground to believe and actually did believe that 
he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, the Defendant was 
justified in using deadly force to repel the danger only if he retreated as far 
as he safely could before using deadly force.  The law requires a person to retreat 
rather than to take the life of an adversary if there was a convenient mode of 
retreat without increasing his actual or apparent peril.  To excuse a failure to retreat, it is 
necessary that the Defendant's peril would be increased, or that it reasonably 
appeared that it would be increased, by retreat.  If you find that the Defendant could 
have safely retreated but failed to do so, and that the Defendant used deadly 
force, the Defendant cannot rely on the justification of 
self-defense.

 
 
Jury 
Instruction No. 19:

 
 
The 
right of self-defense is not available to one who is the aggressor or provokes 
the conflict.

 
 
Where 
two individuals mutually agree to fight, both are considered aggressors, making 
a self-defense theory unavailable to either of them.

 
 
If 
one provokes a conflict and thereafter withdraws from it in good faith and 
informs his adversary by words or actions that he wants to end the conflict, and 
he is thereafter attacked, he then has the same right of self-defense as any 
other person.

 
 

These 
self-defense instructions closely follow the language of the Wyoming Criminal 
Pattern Jury Instructions.  See W.Cr.P.J.I. 8.05, 8.08-8.11.  Instruction 19, 
the one challenged by Mr. Causey, is nearly a word-for-word recitation of 
W.Cr.P.J.I. 8.04, with the addition of a sentence about mutual combatants drawn 
from Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d 379, 
383 (Wyo. 1979).  

 
 

[¶11]     
Carefully 
analyzed, Mr. Causey's appeal raises two separate objections to Instruction 
19.  First, he claims that the 
instruction should not have been given to the jury because the evidence was 
insufficient to support any finding that he was the aggressor.  Second, he claims that the phrase 
"provoke the conflict" has a specialized meaning in the context of self-defense, 
and that the instruction was inadequate because it did not define the phrase in 
accordance with that specialized meaning.  
We consider each of the two objections in turn.

 
 

[¶12]     
At 
trial, during the instruction conference, the district court gave counsel copies 
of the instructions it planned to give the jury, and asked if there were any 
objections.  Counsel for Mr. Causey 
replied, "One objection.  I want to 
object, to argue that there is not enough proof that Mr. Causey was the 
aggressor to warrant this instruction."  
Though not specifying Instruction 19, the objection in context is fairly 
read as an objection to that particular instruction.  The district court overruled the 
objection, and gave Instruction 19 to the jury.

 
 

[¶13]     
A 
trial court is given wide latitude in instructing the jury, and its decisions 
regarding instructions will be upheld if they are supported by any competent 
evidence.  See Iseli v. State, 2007 WY 102, 
¶¶ 9-10, 160 P.3d 1133, 1135-36 (Wyo. 2007).  Our review of the record discloses 
competent evidence to support the district court's ruling.  Key to this determination is the trial 
testimony of Mr. Howard, excerpted as follows:

 
 
I 
walked in the door, walked past [Ms. Serres] . . . I don't remember if she had 
her hand on the door or not.  I just 
opened the door and walked in and said something to her.  I don't remember exactly what I said. . 
. .  I started to turn around and 
seen something coming at me, and I threw up my hand, and there was a scuffle 
after that. . . .  I did not attack 
[Mr. Causey].

 
 
In 
Mr. Howard's version of this incident, Mr. Causey was the 
aggressor.  It is true that 
Mr. Causey provided an alternative version, in which Mr. Howard was the 
aggressor, but our task is not to weigh the evidence, only to determine whether 
the district court could reasonably conclude that there was competent evidence 
from which the jury might find that Mr. Causey was the aggressor.  If the jury believed Mr. Howard, 
that was enough.  The district court 
did not err in overruling Mr. Causey's objection and giving Instruction 19 
to the jury.

 
 

[¶14]     
 Mr. Causey's second objection, the one 
given most of the attention in his brief, is that Instruction 19 did not provide 
the legal definition of the phrase "provokes the conflict."  In his brief, Mr. Causey asserts 
that provocation "is a term of art describing a narrow class of conduct 
intentionally contrived to manufacture a claim of self-defense."  He initially cites this explanation from 
another jurisdiction:

 
 
The 
rule of law is that if the defendant provoked another to make an attack on him, 
so that the defendant would have a pretext for killing the other under the guise 
of self-defense, the defendant forfeits his right of 
self-defense.

 
 

Smith 
v. State, 
965 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).  He then builds support for his contention 
from Wyoming precedent, beginning with State v. Flory, 276 P. 458, 462-63 (Wyo. 
1929), in which we explained that:

 
 
Not 
every provocation, of course, will deprive a man of his right of 
self-defense.  It must be one 
reasonably calculated to lead to an affray. . . .  If the slayer provoked the combat or 
produced the occasion in order to have a pretext for killing his adversary, or 
doing him great bodily harm, the killing will be murder, no matter to what 
extremity he may have been reduced in the combat.  

 
 
He 
moves on to State v. Radon, 19 P.2d 177, 182 (Wyo. 1933), in which we approved of a jury instruction with this 
language:

 
 
You 
are further instructed that if you believe from the evidence that the defendant 
provoked the difficulty or began the quarrel with the purpose of taking advantage of the 
deceased, and of taking his life, or doing him some great bodily harm, then 
there is no self-defense in the case.

 
 

(Emphasis 
added.)  He moves forward to State v. Bristol, 84 P.2d 757, 765-66 
(Wyo. 1938), then to Cullin v. State, 
565 P.2d 445, 451 (Wyo. 1977), in which we stated that, given the evidence 
adduced at trial, "[I]t became a jury decision to finally determine whether 
defendant's provocation was calculated to 
create an occasion in order to afford her an opportunity to kill or seriously 
injure the deceased."  (Emphasis 
added.)  Based on his position that the phrase 
"provokes the conflict" has this particularized meaning under the law of 
self-defense, Mr. Causey contends that the phrase should have been defined for 
the jury.  

 
 

[¶15]     
The 
State responds that the word "provoke" has a common meaning, and is readily 
understood by jurors.  The State 
invokes the proposition that "[a] court need not give an instruction defining a 
term unless it has a technical legal meaning so different from its ordinary 
meaning that the jury, without further explanation, would misunderstand its 
import in relation to the factual circumstances."  Butz v. State, 2007 WY 152, ¶ 19, 167 P.3d 650, 655 (Wyo. 2007).  On that 
basis, the State argues that the district court did not err in failing to define 
the phrase. 

 
 

[¶16]     
In 
sum, the State's position is that the word provoke should be used in its 
colloquial sense, and it was unnecessary to define this common term for the 
jury.  Mr. Causey's position is 
that the word provoke has a specialized legal meaning, and should have been 
defined for the jury.  Mr. Causey 
admits that he called Mr. Howard names and commented on his anatomy, but 
contends that he did not do so for the purpose of contriving an opportunity to 
injure or kill Mr. Howard.  Further, 
Mr. Causey urges us to hold as a matter of law that "mere verbal insults" cannot 
constitute the provocation necessary to forfeit the right of self-defense.  In contrast to the State, 
Mr. Causey contends that the word "provoke" must be used in a specialized 
legal sense, and that the jury should have been informed of this 
definition.

 
 

[¶17]     
We 
are precluded from resolving this dispute, however, because Mr. Causey did 
not raise these issues before the district court.  W.R.Cr.P. 30(a) provides, in pertinent 
part, that:

 
 
Before 
instructing the jury the court shall . . . afford [counsel] an opportunity to 
offer specific, legal objection to any instruction the court intends to give and 
to offer alternate instructions.  No 
party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless 
that party objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the 
matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the 
objection.

 
 
At 
trial, Mr. Causey objected to Instruction 19, but solely on the basis that 
there was insufficient proof that Mr. Causey was the aggressor.  He made no objection aimed at the phrase 
"provoking the conflict."  He 
presented no argument to the district court that the phrase had a specialized 
legal definition, and he offered no alternate instruction defining the 
phrase.  We have stated repeatedly 
that an objection is not properly preserved on appeal unless the objection was 
made at trial.  E.g. Sanderson v. State, 2007 WY 127, 
¶ 13, 165 P.3d 83, 88 (Wyo. 2007); Bush v. State, 2008 WY 108, ¶ 29, 193 P.3d 203, 210 (Wyo. 2008).  "The 
objector should lay his finger on the particular point intended to be raised so 
that the trial court will have notice and an opportunity to cure the alleged 
error."  Valerio v. State, 429 P.2d 317, 319 
(Wyo. 1967), quoting Murdock v. 
State, 351 P.2d 674, 679 (1960).

 
 

[¶18]     
While 
Mr. Causey did not raise this objection at trial, still "[p]lain errors or 
defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not 
brought to the attention of the trial court."  W.R.A.P. 9.05; W.R.Cr.P. 52(b); see Seaton v. State Highway Comm'n Dist. No. 
1, 784 P.2d 197, 206 (Wyo. 1989).  
"Plain error exists when: 1) the record is clear about the incident 
alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was denied a substantial right which 
materially prejudiced him."  Guy v. State, 2008 WY 56, ¶ 9, 184 P.3d 687, 692 (Wyo. 2008), quoting Talley 
v. State, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 
2007).

 

[¶19]     
In 
his appellate brief, Mr. Causey provides no plain error analysis of the asserted 
error.  On this basis alone, we 
could decline to consider his argument.  
Schultz v. State, 2007 WY 162, 
¶ 18, 169 P.3d 81, 87 (Wyo. 2007).  
If we must supply that analysis, we proceed from the well-established 
precept that plain error will be found "only in exceptional circumstances." 
 Hays v. State, 522 P.2d 1004, 1007 (Wyo. 
1974).  Under the plain error 
standard of review, we reverse a trial court's decision only if it is so plainly 
erroneous that the judge should have noticed and corrected the mistake even 
though the parties failed to raise the issue.  "To charge the trial court with the duty 
of protecting defendant's right[s] . . . , thereby relieving the attorney of 
that obligation, would be an exercise in role-switching which we are not ready 
to condone."  Connolly v. State, 610 P.2d 1008, 1011 
(Wyo. 1980).  "We cannot allow 
defendant or his counsel to place the burden of the defense upon a trial 
judge."  Gallup v. State, 559 P.2d 1024, 1026 
(Wyo. 1977).  "Nor is it proper that 
this court be forced to assume that burden."  Johnson v. State, 562 P.2d 1294, 1299 
(Wyo. 1977).  Accordingly, reversal 
is justified under the plain error standard of review "only in those rare 
circumstances where the rights lost by appellant were too blatant to assume the 
trial judge needed them brought to his attention."  Hatheway v. State, 623 P.2d 741, 748 
(Wyo. 1981) (Raper, J., concurring).  
That is why, in a plain error analysis, the Appellant must demonstrate 
"the existence of a clear and unequivocal rule of law which the particular facts 
transgress in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way."  Hampton v. State, 558 P.2d 504, 507 
(Wyo. 1977).  

 
 

[¶20]     
 The error that Mr. Causey brings to 
our attention was not an obvious transgression of any clear and unequivocal rule 
of law.  He does not cite any 
Wyoming case establishing a clear-cut rule of law that the jury must be 
instructed on a specialized legal definition of provocation.  Instead, he relies on a detailed 
analysis of self-defense cases dating back eighty years.  None of those cases directly raised the 
question of how or whether a jury should be instructed on the definition of 
provocation.  Instead, they dealt 
with related issues such as the duty of an aggressor to retreat, see Flory, 276 P.  at 463, or the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support an instruction on aggression and 
provocation.  See Radon, 19 P.2d  at 182, Bristol, 84 P.2d  at 765-66, and Cullin, 565 P.2d  at 451.  A specialized legal definition of the 
phrase "provokes the conflict" can be derived only through a meticulous 
examination of the subtle discussions contained in these 
cases.

 
 

[¶21]     
If 
the issue were properly before us, we might well agree with Mr. Causey's 
thoughtful analysis of the definition of "provokes the conflict."  But even if we accepted that specialized 
definition now, it would not establish that, during Mr. Causey's trial, the 
failure to define the phrase was so plainly erroneous that the judge should have 
noticed and corrected the mistake even though the parties failed to raise the 
issue.  Similarly, Mr. Causey 
cites no Wyoming case establishing that verbal insults alone cannot constitute 
provocation.  He relies solely on 
cases from other jurisdictions, many of which are cited in State v. Riley, 976 P.2d 624, 629 (Wash. 
1999).  But even if we were to 
follow those other jurisdictions at this point, that ruling would not 
demonstrate that any clear and unequivocal rule of Wyoming law was violated 
during Mr. Causey's trial.  We 
conclude that the self-defense instructions given by the district court were not 
plainly erroneous, and do not require reversal of Mr. Causey's 
conviction.

  

2.         
Prosecutorial Misconduct

 
 

[¶22]     
The 
second issue in this appeal is a claim that the prosecutor improperly commented 
on Mr. Causey's exercise of his right to silence.  The right to remain silent when accused 
of a crime is founded on the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and on Article 1, Section 11 of the Wyoming Constitution, and we have referred 
to it as "one of the most fundamental rights accorded a defendant in our 
criminal justice system."  Williams v. State, 2004 WY 117, 
¶ 18, 99 P.3d 432, 444 (Wyo. 2004).  
We protect this right zealously.  See Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220, 225 
(Wyo. 1984). For example, we have established that a prosecutor's comments on a 
defendant's silence are inherently prejudicial, and entitle the defendant to a 
reversal of his conviction.  Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033, 1048-49 
(Wyo. 1986).  We have explained, 
however, that:

 
 
A 
prosecutor does not "comment" on a defendant's exercise of his right to silence 
where he does not attempt to use the silence to the state's advantage, [or] 
where he does not argue to the jury that the silence was evidence of guilt or an 
admission of guilt.

 
 

Teniente 
v. State, 
2007 WY 165, ¶ 23, 169 P.3d 512, 523 (Wyo. 2007).  To determine if a prosecutor has made an 
improper comment on the right to silence, we review the record as a whole and 
place the prosecutor's questions and statements in the context of the entire 
trial.  Spinner v. State, 2003 WY 106, 
¶ 19, 75 P.3d 1016, 1024 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 

[¶23]     
In 
this case, Mr. Causey voluntarily gave extensive statements to law enforcement 
officers at the scene of the incident.  
His description of the events at that time was substantially different 
from the description he provided later at trial.  The prosecutor highlighted the 
differences through the testimony of the law enforcement officers.  For example, the prosecutor questioned 
one officer as follows:

 
 
Q.        
Officer Frye, let me skip ahead a little bit and ask you if you ever had 
the opportunity while you were there to talk with the defendant, Ripp 
Causey?

 
 
A.        Yes, 
I did. . . .

 
 
Q.        Did 
he ever say at any point in your conversation that he tried to 
leave?

 
 
A.        No, 
he didn't.

 
 
Q.        Did 
he ever say at any point, ever, in your conversation with him that he tried to 
start his truck?

 
 
A.        No, 
not at any time.

 
 
Q.        Did 
he ever tell you or say that he had told Sandra to call the 
police?

 
 
A.        No, 
he never did.

 
 
Q.        Did 
he ever tell you that he tried to get out of the front 
door?

 
 
A.        
No.

 
 
Q.        Did 
he ever say that David Howard attacked him from behind?

 
 
A.        
No.

 
 
Q.        Did 
he ever say that David Howard pulled his hair?

 
 
A.        No, 
not at any time. . . .

 
 
Q.        Did 
he say anything about what his intentions were with the 
machete?

 
 
A.        He 
did state that he was going to try to take [David Howard's] head 
off.

 
 
The 
prosecutor asked similar questions of Deputy Stensaas.  The prosecutor also pointed out 
inconsistencies when cross-examining Mr. Causey:

 
 
Q.        The 
truth of the matter, however, is you never mentioned that [you tried to leave 
but your truck would not start] to the law enforcement officers on November 5, 
2006, did you?

 
 
A.        They 
never asked.

 
 
Q.        Do 
you think it's an important fact?

 
 
A.        I was 
just answering their questions.

 
 
Q.        So 
when they told you you were under arrest, you didn't say, hey, I tried to 
leave.

 
 
A.        Yes, 
I did.

 
 
Q.        Oh, 
you told them you tried to leave in the truck?

 
 
A.        Well, 
no.  Wait.  I didn't say I tried to leave. . . 
.

 
 
Q.        You . 
. . never did tell them you tried to leave, did you?

 
 
A.        They 
never asked.

 
 

[¶24]     
Although 
Mr. Causey offered no objection to these questions at trial, he now contends 
that the prosecutor's questions amounted to improper comment on his right to 
remain silent.  A review of the 
entire record convinces us, however, that the prosecutor was not commenting on 
Mr. Causey's silence, but was instead emphasizing that Mr. Causey's trial 
testimony about the incident was different from what he related to the officers 
just after the incident occurred.  
Comparing inconsistent versions of an occurrence is a reasonable way to 
cast doubt on the credibility of a witness.  

 
 
A 
defendant may not exploit his or her voluntary and informed responses to 
official interrogation without understanding that the door swings both ways, 
affording the prosecution a similar opportunity to make some comment over what 
[he] said or neglected to say.  

 
 

Sturgis 
v. State, 
932 P.2d 199, 205 (Wyo. 1997).  We 
conclude that the prosecutor's questioning amounted to comments on what Mr. 
Causey said or neglected to say rather than comments on the exercise of his 
right to silence.  In comparable 
circumstances, we decided that it was not reversible error for a prosecutor to 
ask a defendant about his "decision to withhold information from the officers" 
after he had "agreed to talk with police."  
Emerson v. State, 988 P.2d 518, 522 (Wyo. 1999) (emphasis omitted).  
In Mr. Causey's case, it was not improper for the prosecutor to 
question the witnesses as a way of highlighting inconsistencies in Mr. Causey's 
different versions of the events.

 
 

[¶25]     
We 
are more troubled by the prosecutor's statement during closing argument about 
those inconsistencies:

 
 
Third 
[inconsistency]  and I have gone over this, and I don't want to belabor it, he 
says he tried to leave.  First 
thing, early on, he never told the police that, either one of the officers.  He never told the police, and what was 
his excuse, "They didn't ask me."  
If you are holding a machete outside and the police show up, and then 
they start to arrest you or something like that, you want to say, well, here is 
what was going on.  You try to 
explain yourself.  I was trying to 
get out of here.  He was after 
me.  I tried to get out of 
here.  I tried to leave. 

 
 
That 
didn't happen.  Never said 
that.  No evidence of 
that.

 
 
The 
remarks drew no objection from Mr. Causey at the time.  

 
 

[¶26]     
In 
isolation, the prosecutor's remark could appear to be an impermissible comment 
on Mr. Causey's post-arrest silence.  
When considered in context, however, we conclude that the prosecutor was 
instead making a permissible argument about the evidence presented at 
trial.  As noted before, statements 
Mr. Causey gave the officers just before and after his arrest differed 
significantly from his trial testimony.  
We have already determined that the prosecutor was entitled to question 
the witnesses about those differences.  
After evidence of the inconsistencies had been admitted, it was 
appropriate for the prosecutor to point out the inconsistencies in closing 
argument.  Placed in context with 
the evidence, the prosecutor's closing argument appears more of an attempt to 
convince the jury that Mr. Causey's trial testimony was not credible, and less 
of an effort to convince the jury that Mr. Causey's silence was evidence of 
his guilt.  We conclude that the 
prosecutor's closing argument was not an attempt to use Mr. Causey's silence to 
the State's advantage, compare Teniente, ¶ 23, 169 P.3d  at 523, 
and was, therefore, not an impermissible comment on the right to silence.  

 
 

[¶27]     
Mr. 
Causey has not demonstrated reversible error based on either of the issues he 
raises on appeal.  We therefore 
affirm the conviction.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1"A 
person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he: . . . Attempts to 
cause, or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a 
deadly weapon."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(ii).