Case Title: Bahn v. Small

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 69

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 69 
Docket: 
Pen-18-427 
Submitted 
On Briefs: April 24, 2019 
Decided: 
May 9, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
JOSEFINE BAHN 
 
v. 
 
MARK SMALL 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
[¶1]  Mark Small appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Houlton, 
Daigle, J.) modifying the terms of his 2016 divorce from Josefine Bahn as to 
parental rights and responsibilities for the parties’ two children.  Small 
contends that the court erroneously determined that the parties agreed to the 
terms of the modified divorce judgment.  We agree and vacate the judgment. 
[¶2]  Josefine Bahn and Mark Small were divorced by an agreed-to 
judgment entered by the court (O’Mara, J.) in 2016.1  Both parties later moved 
to modify the judgment as to parental rights and responsibilities.  On July 23, 
2018—the date set for a hearing on the motions to modify—the parties and the 
                                         
1  The judgment provided for, inter alia, shared parental rights and responsibilities, shared 
primary residence of the children, and roughly equal rights of contact. 
 
2 
guardian ad litem (GAL) instead engaged in a judicial settlement conference 
(Daigle, J.), after which the court stated on the record that an agreement was 
reached on all points.  Without creating any record that would show the terms 
of any such agreement and the parties’ confirmation of it, the court entered a 
judgment dated August 30, 2018, purporting to memorialize that agreement.2   
 
[¶3]  Small moved for relief from the judgment on the ground that it did 
not accurately reflect the parties’ agreement.  See M.R. Civ. P. 60(b).  Based on 
its review of the “notes of the agreement read into the record on July 23, 2018,” 
the court found that “[f]ull agreement was reached by the parties and the 
Guardian ad Litem” during the settlement conference, the GAL agreed to 
incorporate the agreement terms into a proposed order, the parties then had 
an “opportunity to express any disagreement with any of the terms of the 
proposed Order,” Small “filed with the [c]ourt several points of disagreement” 
with the proposed order, and the court considered the points of disagreement 
before issuing the modified judgment.  The court denied the motion for relief 
from judgment, concluding, “[T]he terms of the proposed Order are accurate in 
                                         
2  The modified divorce judgment provided for allocated parental rights and responsibilities in 
which Bahn was allocated all decision making regarding the children’s welfare, including education, 
religion, medical care, travel, child care, and residence.  The court also modified Small’s contact 
schedule with the children, set out a revised holiday contact schedule, established various safety and 
wellness requirements in the care of the children, and imposed a family therapy requirement.   
 
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all respects, and accurately set[] forth all of the several terms agreed by the 
parties and the Guardian at the judicial settlement conference.”  Small appeals, 
arguing that the court erred by modifying the divorce judgment with terms to 
which he did not agree.  
[¶4]  When a judicial settlement conference results in an agreement, a 
“[c]omplete record” of the agreement must be created: “The parties may 
memorialize their mutual assent by signing a written agreement or by placing 
their oral stipulation on the record in open court.”  Dewhurst v. Dewhurst, 
2010 ME 99, ¶¶ 10-11, 5 A.3d 23.  “The creation of such a record assures this 
Court and the trial court that the parties know what they have agreed to and 
that they are satisfied with the result.”3  Id. ¶ 11.  We consider any such 
agreement as a contract, the existence of which is a question of fact that we 
review for clear error.  Id. ¶ 5; see Kilborn v. Carey, 2016 ME 78, ¶ 16, 140 A.3d 
461.    
[¶5]  In Muther v. Broad Cove Shore Association, for example, we affirmed 
a decision based on the parties’ oral commitment of the complete agreement to 
the record: “[T]he transcript of the settlement agreement, without more, 
                                         
3  In family matters, the agreement must also be “fairly made and consistent with public policy” in 
accordance with the best interests of the children.  Dewhurst v. Dewhurst, 2010 ME 99, ¶¶ 5, 10, 5 A.3d 
23; see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (2018). 
 
4 
conclusively establishes the existence of a binding settlement agreement as a 
matter of law, and subsequent disputes that arose while attempting to reduce 
the settlement to a stipulated judgment did not affect the authority of the court 
to enforce the agreement through the entry of a judgment incorporating the 
terms previously stipulated to by the parties.”  2009 ME 37, ¶ 8, 968 A.2d 539; 
see also Toffling v. Toffling, 2008 ME 90, ¶¶ 9, 11, 953 A.2d 375 (affirming the 
entry of a judgment by agreement when one party had orally agreed to the 
opposing party’s recitation of the terms of the agreement in open court); Page 
v. Page, 671 A.2d 956, 957-58 (Me. 1996) (upholding a judgment because “[t]he 
terms of the settlement were discussed at length on the record, and at that time 
all parties agreed to the settlement”); Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. 
Birt, 599 A.2d 65, 65 (Me. 1991) (“The oral stipulation entered on the record 
during the second day of trial was adequate to support the entry of a judgment 
finally disposing of the litigation at that time.”). 
[¶6]  In contrast, in Dewhurst, the terms of the parties’ agreement in a 
divorce matter were captured only by the GAL’s handwritten edits to a 
proposed judgment that previously had been prepared by one party’s attorney.  
2010 ME 99, ¶ 2, 5 A.3d 23.  Although the parties had reviewed the edited draft 
with the court, neither party signed the proposed judgment or made any 
 
5 
statement on the record regarding the terms of the agreement.  Id.  In the 
absence of a signed agreement or oral stipulation, we vacated the divorce 
judgment incorporating the purported agreement based on the insufficiency of 
the record of the agreement.  Id. ¶¶ 8-12.   
 
[¶7]  Here, as in Dewhurst, 2010 ME 99, ¶ 2, 5 A.3d 23, the parties’ 
purported agreement was neither written down and signed by the parties nor 
entered in the record by oral stipulation.  Rather, the court expressly stated at 
the end of the settlement conference that it would not recite on the record the 
terms of the parties’ agreement and would instead rely on the handwritten 
notes taken by the court and by the GAL: 
Full agreement has been reached, which will result in a modified 
order.  We are going to -- not indicate, because we don’t have time 
-- we’re not going to indicate into the record right now what has 
been agreed to.  I have notes indicating what all of those agreed-to 
terms are.  [The GAL] has been good enough to take notes and 
we’ve reviewed as we completed negotiation of each separate 
provision to make sure that we’re all on the same page.   
 
The written record contains what appear to be various pages of handwritten 
notes, but it is not clear who authored those pages or which of those notes were 
intended to reflect the terms of the parties’ actual agreement, and none of those 
pages is signed by the parties.    
 
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[¶8]  In the absence of such a factual record from which to determine 
whether the modified divorce judgment accurately reflects the parties’ 
agreement, the court’s findings that the parties reached a full agreement—and 
its iteration of the substance of the agreement—are clearly erroneous.  See id. 
¶ 5; see also Kilborn, 2016 ME 78, ¶ 16, 140 A.3d 461.  We therefore vacate the 
judgment and remand for a testimonial hearing or for the parties to 
memorialize an agreement on the record.4   
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
4  Although the issue of child support has not been raised by either party, we observe that neither 
the original nor the modified divorce judgment comports with statutory child support requirements.  
The initial divorce judgment, which was entered by agreement, deviated from the presumptive child 
support guidelines by stating only, “No child support is ordered as each party shall provide for the 
children when the children are in their care.”  See 19-A M.R.S. § 2005 (2018).  The modified divorce 
judgment contains no terms regarding child support and does not purport to alter that portion of the 
original divorce judgment.   
  The court’s deviation from the presumptive child support amount established according to the 
child support guidelines—in the absence of any findings regarding child support or a party’s 
proposed written findings that the presumptive amount is “inequitable or unjust”—violates multiple 
requirements of the child support statute.  19-A M.R.S. §§ 2007-2008 (2018); see 19-A M.R.S. 
§§ 2005-2006 (2018); see also Sullivan v. George, 2018 ME 115, ¶¶ 14-17 & n.7, 191 A.3d 1168.  Even 
when the parties agree to the child support provision, such an agreement “must be reviewed by the 
court or hearing officer to determine if the amount stipulated is in substantial compliance with the 
presumptive application of the guidelines and, if a deviation is proposed, whether it is justified and 
appropriate under section 2007.”  19-A M.R.S. § 2008; see 19-A M.R.S. § 2005.  On remand, the court 
must provide for child support in a manner that complies with the child support statute. 
 
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Mark Small, appellant pro se 
Martha Novy-Broderick, Esq., Lincoln, for appellee Josefine Bahn 
 
 
Appealed from Houlton District Court docket number FM-2015-50 
Transferred to Lincoln District Court docket number FM-2018-114 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY