Case Title: In re Kumley

Citation: 

Docket Number: S49372

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed: August 14, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re: Complaint as to the Conduct of
LLOYD S. KUMLEY,
	Accused.
(OSB 01-32; SC S49372)

	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted January 6, 2003.
	Kevin T. Lafky, of Lafky & Lafky, Salem, argued the cause
and filed the brief for the accused.
	Jane E. Angus, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar. 
With her on the brief was Russell Lipetzky, Bar Counsel, Salem.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.*
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is reprimanded.
	*Leeson, J., resigned January 31, 2003, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.
	PER CURIAM
	In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) alleged that the accused, an inactive member of
the Bar, violated two Code of Professional Responsibility
Disciplinary Rules -- DR 1-102(A)(2) and DR 1-102(A)(3) - and one
statute -- ORS 9.160 -- by describing himself as an "attorney" in
forms that he submitted to two state agencies in connection with
his candidacy for a seat in the state legislature.  A trial panel
of the Disciplinary Board determined that the accused had
committed all three charged violations and suspended him from the
practice of law for 12 months.  Because of the length of
suspension, our review of the trial panel's decision is
automatic.  ORS 9.536(2); BR 10.1.  On de novo review, ORS
9.536(3), we conclude that the accused violated both rules and
the statute, but that a reprimand is the appropriate sanction. 
I.  FINDINGS OF FACT

	The Bar proved the following facts by clear and
convincing evidence.  The accused graduated from law school in
1975 and practiced law in California from 1975 to 1984.  In 1984,
the accused moved to Oregon, joined the Bar, and opened a law
practice.  In January 1988, the accused applied to the Bar for a
transfer to inactive membership status, which the Bar granted. 
In doing so, the accused signed a form of application used by the
Bar.  That application (and a later one that the accused also
signed) included the following statement:  "Inactive members [of
the Bar] may not practice law or hold themselves out as attorneys
in the State of Oregon."  (Emphasis added.)  The accused remained
inactive through November 1989 when he sought, and was granted,
reinstatement as an active member.  In 1992, the accused returned
to inactive status.  He has continued as an inactive member of
the Bar since that time. 
In early 2000, the accused took steps toward running
for a seat in the Oregon House of Representatives.  In March
2000, he signed and filed with the Secretary of State a
declaration of candidacy.  That declaration contained certain
information required by ORS 249.031 including, among other
things, "[a] statement of the candidate's occupation, educational
and occupational background and prior governmental experience." (1) 
On that form, under the heading "Occupation (present employment -
paid or unpaid)," the accused stated, "Small Businessman - self-employed property manager; Attorney."  Under the separate heading
"Occupational Background (previous employment - paid or unpaid),"
the accused stated, "Owner/Manager Salem Day Care Centers and
Preschools; Computer Analyst."  He made no mention of any
background or previous employment as an "attorney." 
	Also in March 2000, the accused filed a "Candidate's
Statement for State Voters' Pamphlet" with the Secretary of
State. (2)  That form mirrored the accused's declaration of
candidacy form, i.e., it listed his "Occupation" as "Self-employed Small Businessman and Attorney," but made no mention
under the heading "Occupational Background" that he had been, but
was not at the time of his candidacy, a practicing attorney.  The
accused's statement was included in the voters' pamphlet for the
2000 primary election, which the Secretary of State distributed
to registered voters. 	
	In April 2000, the accused filed a "Candidate's Annual
Verified Statement of Economic Interest" with the Oregon
Government Standards and Practices Commission (GSPC), as required
by ORS 244.050(1)(c).  One section of that form required
candidates to provide specific further information "if you or a
member of your household was an officer or director of a business
* * * during 1999." (3)  The accused responded that he was a "self-employed attorney" for a business called "Lloyd Kumley, Attorney
at Law."  Under the heading "Description of Business," the
accused wrote "attorney/trustee."  However, under another section
of the form dealing with sources of income, the accused did not
identify "Lloyd Kumley, Attorney at Law" as a source of any
income during 1999.  Neither did anything else that the accused
stated in the report suggest that he had received any earnings as
an attorney. 
	The accused obtained his party's nomination for the
House of Representatives and, in August 2000, filed another
"Candidate's Statement for State Voters' Pamphlet" form, this
time for inclusion in the voters' pamphlet for the November
general election.  In that form, the accused again stated his
"occupation" as "Small businessman - Self-employed property
manager; Attorney."  He also again omitted mention of his former
status as a practicing attorney under the heading, "Occupational
Background."
	The accused lost the general election.  Shortly after
that election, the Bar received an ethics complaint and, in due
course, filed the present complaint against the accused.  The
complaint alleged that the accused had represented himself as an
"attorney" in various election and government ethics forms and
that those representations 
"were false and known to be false at the time he made
them.  The accused expressed or implied that he was an
active member of the Bar, authorized to practice law. 
The accused did not disclose that he was an inactive
member and not authorized to practice law or represent
himself as an attorney."
The Bar charged the accused with violating two disciplinary
rules, DR 1-102(A)(2) (criminal act adversely reflecting on
fitness to practice law) and DR 1-102(A)(3) (dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation), and one statute, ORS 9.160 (only
active members of Bar may practice law or represent themselves as
qualified to practice law).
	In his answer, the accused admitted that he had
described himself as an "attorney" in the various forms, but
denied that those statements violated any criminal law or
amounted to knowing falsehoods.  In the trial panel hearing,
however, the accused acknowledged that one of the statements at
issue -- his statement in the Verified Statement of Income that,
in the year 1999, he was a self-employed attorney for a business
named "Lloyd Kumley, Attorney at Law" -- was incorrect.  He
asserted nonetheless that listing "attorney" as one of his
occupations on the other forms was correct.  He also argued that,
in any event, none of the statements was knowingly false.
	As previously noted, the trial panel ultimately
concluded that the accused had committed all three of the charged
violations and imposed a 12-month suspension.  We now examine
each of those charges.  
II.  DR 1-102(A)(3)

	DR 1-102(A)(3) provides:
     "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
     "* * * * *
     "(3) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."
The trial panel concluded that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) by (1) listing "attorney" under the heading
"occupation" in the declaration of candidacy form and the two
voters' pamphlet forms; and (2) describing himself as a "self-employed attorney" working for a firm named "Lloyd Kumley,
Attorney at Law" in his Verified Statement of Economic Interest.
	We consider, first, the accused's statements in the
declaration of candidacy and the two voters' pamphlets listing
"attorney" as one of his present "occupations."  The trial panel
concluded that it was an affirmative misrepresentation for the
accused to describe himself as an "attorney."  For the purposes
of DR 1-102(A)(3), a misrepresentation is a "'false statement of
a material fact or a nondisclosure of a material fact.'"  In re
Dugger, 334 Or 602, 609, 54 P3d 595 (2002) (quoting In re Starr,
326 Or 328, 343, 952 P2d 1017 (1998)).  The rule requires, "at
the least, that a lawyer knowingly engage in a
misrepresentation."  In re Jones, 326 Or 195, 198, 951 P2d 149
(1997) (emphasis in original).  When considering an assertion
that a lawyer has engaged in affirmative misstatement, our
initial focus is on the truth or falsity of the fact asserted. 
In re Huffman, 331 Or 209, 216, 13 P3d 994 (2000).  
We begin with the candidacy and voters' pamphlet forms. 
In that regard, it is true that the term "attorney" conveys the
implication of a present authority to perform legal work on
behalf of another. (4)  That is the most likely way that the public
would understand the use of the term.  However, it also is true
to some degree that the term "attorney," in common parlance,
supports other inferences, including some that do not imply a
present capacity to practice law.  For example, one inference
that reasonably arises from a statement that a person is an
attorney is that the person is a member of a bar. (5)  At the
relevant time, the accused was a member, although inactive, of
the Bar.  Thus, standing alone, the meaning of the term as it was
used on the forms was ambiguous and may not have served as a 
basis for disciplining the accused under DR 1-102(A)(3).
	But the term did not stand alone.  The accused used the
term in three different government forms to describe his present
"occupation."  "Occupation" means "the principal business of
one's life:  a craft, trade, profession or other means of earning
a living:  EMPLOYMENT, VOCATION."  Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary 1560 (unabridged ed 1993).  The Bar asserts that, by
listing "attorney" as his present "occupation" in 2000, the
accused necessarily represented that he was an active attorney at
that time.  We agree:  From his choosing to list "attorney" as
his present occupation at a time when he was inactive, while also
failing to list "attorney" as a previous occupation (where the
accused earlier had actively practiced law), we infer that the
accused knowingly chose to create a false impression that he
presently was a practicing attorney.  Under those circumstances,
the accused's statements were false.
	The trial panel also asserted that, by describing
himself as an attorney without simultaneously mentioning his
inactive status, the accused engaged in "misrepresentation by
nondisclosure."  That may be true in the abstract sense:  Any
affirmative misstatement is a misstatement in part because of the
failure contemporaneously to make other, clarifying statements. 
But that does not mean that any affirmative misstatement may be
made into double violations of the disciplinary rules.  When the
Bar proves an affirmative misstatement, we shall not also find a
separate violation for failure to disclose a fact that would have
kept the affirmative statement from being misleading.  
	Having determined that the three statements in question
were false, we next consider whether the statements were
material.  The statements were aimed, at a minimum, at the voters
in the accused's electoral district.  Indeed, ORS 251.085
requires inclusion of such statements in any voters' pamphlet
statement for the very reason that any candidate's employment is
one of the bases from which voters will assess whether the
candidate has the background and experience to be an effective
legislator.  Here, in representing that he was an "attorney," the
accused was stating that he had the knowledge, abilities, and
ethical standards that the public ordinarily associates with
membership in a bar.  That was accurate, as far as it went. 
However, the accused also was creating the impression that he at
that time could walk out of the chambers of the Oregon House of
Representatives and down the street to the Marion County
Courthouse to try a case on behalf of a client.  That was
inaccurate and, in our view, material.  We believe that many
voters would view the fact that a candidate was an "inactive"
attorney, rather than an "active" attorney, as significant in
choosing for whom to vote.  The accused's statements implied that
he enjoyed the latter status when, in fact, he did not.  We find
by clear and convincing evidence that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) in his statement on his declaration of candidacy form
and in his two voters' pamphlet statements.
	We turn now to the accused's statement in his Verified
Statement of Economic Interest that, in 1999, he was a "self-employed attorney" in a business denominated as "Lloyd Kumley,
Attorney at Law."  We must consider whether, by completing the
Verified Statement in that manner, the accused engaged in conduct
involving dishonesty or misrepresentation. 
	We need not dwell on the question whether the statement
at issue was false.  The accused himself admits that it was
"inaccurate."  The accused argues, however, that the inaccuracy
was unconscious and unintentional.  Before the trial panel, he
explained that the form was confusing and that his statement was
only a clumsy attempt to account for a small amount of money that
he had earned as a trustee.  The trial panel rejected that
explanation, finding that "the accused has not provided a
cred[ible] explanation and is not credible."  We generally give
substantial weight to a trial panel's credibility findings.  In
re Gustafson, 333 Or 468, 470, 41 P3d 1063 (2002).  In keeping
with that practice, we accept the trial panel's rejection of the
accused's explanation and the trial panel's concomitant
conclusion that the accused made the statement knowingly. 
	As we have noted, however, to amount to
misrepresentation under DR 1-102(A)(3), a knowing false statement
also must be material.  Here, we conclude that the Bar has failed
to show that the statement met that standard.  In that regard, we
note that the Verified Statement of Economic Interest serves
principally as a vehicle for tracking possible economic conflicts
of elected officials and candidates for public office.  The Bar
has not shown how the statement was materially false respecting
the accused's sources of income, either actual or potential.  The
form did not in any of its sections indicate that the accused had
obtained any economic benefit from his activities as "Lloyd
Kumley, Attorney at Law" or from any work as a "self-employed
attorney."  Whatever the statement in question might suggest
about the accused's status as a practicing attorney -- an issue
that we have discussed elsewhere -- it is not material with
regard to the accused's economic interests.  We hold that the
accused did not make a material misrepresentation for purposes of
DR 1-102(A)(3) in his Verified Statement of Economic Interest.
	Neither did the accused's statement in the Verified
Statement of Economic Interest amount to or demonstrate
"dishonesty" for purposes of that disciplinary rule.  Dishonesty
is conduct that "indicates a disposition to lie, cheat, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; or a lack of integrity."  In re
Dugger, 334 Or at 609.  We are not persuaded that this single
instance of a nonmaterial falsehood is indicative of any of those
character traits or tendencies.
	To conclude: We hold that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) by stating that he was an "attorney" in his declaration
of candidacy form and the two voters' pamphlet forms, but not by
stating, in his Verified Statement of Economic Interest, that he
was a "self-employed attorney" at a business called "Lloyd
Kumley, Attorney at Law."
		III.  DR 1-102(A)(2)

	DR 1-102(A)(2) provides that it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to "commit a criminal act that reflects
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to
practice law."  In considering an alleged violation of DR 1-102(A)(2), our focus is on whether the lawyer committed a
criminal act.  It does not matter that the lawyer was not
prosecuted for or convicted of any crime.  See, e.g., In re
Kirkman, 313 Or 181, 184, 830 P2d 206 (1992) (concluding that
accused lawyer committed three crimes despite fact that he had
not been convicted of those crimes).         
	The Bar alleged that the accused's statements violated
a number of criminal laws:  ORS 260.715(1) ("[n]o person shall
knowingly make a false statement * * * where a statement * * * is
required under the elections laws"); ORS 244.110 (statements of
economic interest shall contain written declaration that
statement is made under penalties of false swearing and no person
willfully shall return statement containing such declaration that
person does not believe to be true); ORS 162.065 (defining crime
of perjury as making "false sworn statement in regard to a
material issue, knowing it to be false"); and ORS 162.075
(defining crime of false swearing as making "false sworn
statement, knowing it to be false").  The Bar contends that,
because the accused's alleged violations of those statutes
involve making false statements under oath or in documents in
which the truth is required by law, they necessarily reflect
adversely on the accused's honesty and fitness to practice law.
	We consider, first, the Bar's contention that the
accused's statements amounted to criminal acts.  We have held
that the accused made four separate false statements in the
various documents that he submitted in connection with his run
for the House of Representatives in 2000.  As noted, under ORS
260.715(1), it is a crime for a person to "knowingly make a false
statement * * * where a statement * * * is required under the
election laws."  We already have determined that the accused knew
that the statements in question were false in the context in
which he made them.  The only remaining question is whether the
statements were "required" by the election laws, as that term is
used in ORS 260.715(1).
	They were.  The accused could not run for the House
without filing a declaration of candidacy.  ORS 249.016; ORS
249.020(1).  That declaration had to include, inter alia, a
"statement of the candidate's occupation."  ORS 249.031(1)(i). 
The accused was not required to file a candidate's statement in
the voters' pamphlet but, once he elected to do so, he was
required to include in each such statement a "summary" that
included his "[o]ccupation."  ORS 251.085.  Accordingly, we find
that the accused committed three criminal acts in connection with
those statements.
As discussed above, we also have found that the
accused's statement in his Verified Statement of Economic
Interest that, in 1999, he held the title of "self-employed
attorney" for a law practice bearing his name was knowingly
false.  The statement at issue was a "sworn statement" for
purposes of ORS 162.075. (6)  To commit the crime of false swearing,
a person need only "make[] a false sworn statement, knowing it to
be false."  ORS 162.075.  The accused committed the crime of
false swearing, as ORS 162.075 defines that crime.
	The question remains whether the accused's four
criminal acts are ones that "reflect[] adversely on [his]
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law."  They do. 
We have held that criminal acts involving false swearing fall
into that category.  See, e.g., In re Davenport, 334 Or 298, 49
P3d 91 (2002) (violation based on false statements under oath);
In re Staar, 324 Or 283, 924 P2d 308 (1996) (violation based on
false swearing in petition filed in court).  Thus, we conclude
that the accused's four criminal acts with respect to his
declaration of candidacy, his two voters' pamphlet statements,
and his Verified Statement of Economic Interest all reflect to
some extent on the accused's honesty and fitness to practice law
and, therefore, constitute violations of DR 1-102(A)(2).    
	IV.  ORS 9.160

	ORS 9.160 provides:			
"Except for the right reserved to litigants by ORS
9.320 to prosecute or defend a cause in person, no
person shall practice law or represent that person as
qualified to practice law unless that person is an
active member of the Oregon State Bar."
The trial panel concluded that the accused had violated ORS
9.160, but did not explain that conclusion.  We assume that it
accepted the Bar's contention that, by listing "attorney" as a
present occupation on various forms, the accused had
"represent[ed himself] as qualified to practice law" within the
meaning of the statute.     
	We agree.  As we have explained elsewhere, the accused
created the impression by what he stated in his various election
materials that he presently was qualified to practice law.  It is
true that, in describing his present occupation as an "attorney"
in the various documents, the accused does not appear to have
been attempting to ferret out potential clients for a reopened
law practice.  But, as we also have explained elsewhere, he was
clothing himself in the mantle of an active "attorney," a status
that might find favor with voters.  We find by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused violated ORS 9.160.
V.  SANCTION 

	We now must determine the appropriate sanction.  In
making that determination, we employ the methodology prescribed
in the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards) and our own case
law.
A.  Duty Violated  
	Under the ABA Standards, we first consider the duty
violated.  ABA Standard 3.0(a).  In each of his violations, the
accused violated his duty to the public "to maintain the
standards of personal integrity upon which the community relies." 
ABA Standard 5.0.
B.  Mental State
	For reasons discussed elsewhere in this opinion, we
conclude that the accused committed each of the violations
knowingly, that is, with the "conscious awareness of the nature
or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the
conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result."  ABA Standards at 17. 
C.  Actual and Potential Injury
	We next consider the potential and actual injury, if
any, that the accused's misconduct caused.  ABA Standard 3.0(c). 
"Injury," according to the ABA Standards, includes "harm to a
client, the public, the legal system or the profession which
results from a lawyer's conduct."  ABA Standards at 7.  The
accused's misconduct caused potential harm to the voters of the
accused's district, to the extent that it created a false
impression of the accused's qualifications -- a false impression
that some voters might have found relevant to their selection of
a candidate.  
D.  Preliminary Sanction
	The trial panel suggests that the ABA Standards would
support a preliminary sanction of disbarment, because the accused
engaged in "serious criminal conduct a necessary element of which
includes * * * false swearing."  ABA Standard 5.11(a).  Although
we have held that the accused committed false swearing, we do not
find that his conduct was "serious" criminal conduct.  None of
the accused's other acts would justify disbarment under the ABA
Standards.  
	ABA Standard 5.12 provides:
"Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not
contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 and that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice." 
	ABA Standard 5.13 provides:
"Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in any other conduct that involves
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and
that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice law."
	We are persuaded that the first standard is
inapplicable here, because the accused's conduct does not
seriously adversely reflect upon his fitness to practice law. 
And, although the accused's conduct created a potential for harm,
the present record does not permit us either to determine whether
harm actually occurred or, if it did, the nature and extent of
that harm.
	Taking into account the duty violated, the accused's
mental state, and the actual and potential harm, we conclude that
ABA Standard 5.13 most closely fits the misconduct at issue. 
That standard indicates that a public reprimand is the
appropriate sanction.
E. Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
	We find one aggravating circumstances, viz., multiple
offenses.  ABA Standard 9.22(d).  We also find one mitigating
factor -- the fact that the accused has no prior record of
discipline.  ABA Standard 9.32(a).  The two factors essentially
cancel each other out.
F.  Case Law
	The Bar does not contend that the accused's knowing
misstatements respecting his status as an "attorney" would,
standing alone, require a suspension.  However, the Bar points to
a number of our cases as suggesting that a period of suspension
is the proper sanction when a lawyer makes a false statement in a
sworn or verified form.  The Bar relies on In re Wyllie, 327 Or
175, 957 P2d 1222 (1998) (two-year suspension for false statement
on MCLE compliance form); In re Staar, 324 Or at 293 (two-year
suspension for false statements in petition for restraining
order); Davenport, 334 Or at 325 (two-year suspension for false
testimony); and In re Claussen, 322 Or 466, 909 P2d 862 (1996)
(one-year suspension for misrepresentations in bankruptcy
petition).
	The cases that the Bar cites are inapposite.  In all
those cases, the lawyer's false statements either significantly
benefitted the lawyer or significantly injured some other person
and, in all but one of those cases, the lawyer's conduct was
found to be not just knowing, but intentional.  Wyllie, 327 Or at
182; Claussen, 322 Or at 485; Davenport, 334 Or at 319.  The
facts here are far less egregious. 
	In our view, the lawyer discipline case that most
closely resembles this one is In re Flannery, 334 Or 224, 47 P3d
891 (2002).  In Flannery, this court reprimanded a lawyer who
committed the crime of "making a false application for a driver's
license," ORS 807.530.  The court decided that a reprimand was
appropriate, in part, because the lawyer's false statements
resulted in only "trivial" personal gain and did not seriously
adversely reflect on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
Flannery, 334 Or at 232-37.  Much the same could be said of the
present case.
	Our examination of the case law and of aggravating and
mitigating factors confirms the preliminary sanction that we
initially identified as relevant to this proceeding.  We conclude
that a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction.
	The accused is reprimanded.



1. 	The declaration remains on file with the pertinent
elections official -- in this case, the Secretary of State.  ORS
249.035(1).  Once filed, the declaration is "conclusive evidence"
that the elector who filed it is a candidate for the office in
question, ORS 249.042, unless the declaration is withdrawn not
later than the sixty-seventh day before the date of the primary
election (ORS 249.170) or general election (ORS 249.180) in which
the elector seeks to be a candidate.

2. 	ORS 251.065 provides that candidates for any state
office may file a statement with the Secretary of State for
inclusion in the state voters' pamphlet.  ORS 251.085 provides
that a candidate's statement "shall begin with a summary of the
following:  Occupation, educational and occupational background,
and prior governmental experience."  Unlike the declaration of
candidacy, which merely remains on file subject to public
inspection, a candidate's voters' pamphlet statement is designed
specifically for distribution to the voting public.

3. 	In a definitions section, the form defined the term
"business" as "any corporation, partnership, proprietorship,
firm, enterprise, franchise, association, organization, self-employed individual and any other legal entity operated for
economic gain."

4. 	See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 128 (6th ed 1990)
(defining "attorney at law" as "[p]erson admitted to practice law
in his respective state and authorized to perform both civil and
criminal legal functions for clients * * *").	

5. 	In that regard, we note that, for purposes of the State
Bar Act, ORS 9.005 to 9.755, the term "attorney" is defined,
simply, as "a member of the bar."  ORS 9.005(1).

6. 	The statement was required to be, and was, verified by
a written declaration that it was made under the penalties for
false swearing.  Under ORS 244.110(1), "[s]uch declaration shall
be in lieu of any oath otherwise required."