Case Title: STATE v SATHER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 13523

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
N o . 13523 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1977 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- WILLIAM CHRISTOPHER SATHER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Paul B. Smith argued, Missoula, Montana William Boggs argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Robert Deschamps 111, County Attorney, Missoula, Montana Ed McLean, Deputy County Attorney, argued, Missoula, Montana - - Submitted: A p r i l 15, 1977 Decided: JUN - 2 1977 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant William Christopher Sather was convicted of t h e crime of attempted burglary by jury v e r d i c t i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Missoula County. H e was sentenced t o a t e r m of 50 y e a r s i n t h e s t a t e prison a s a p e r s i s t e n t felony offender. De- fendant appeals from t h e sentence imposed. his case comes t o u s on t h e b a s i s of a n agreed s t a t e - ment of t h e proceedings, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f i l e , and a certi- f i e d copy of t h e docket e n t r i e s i n l i e u of a t r a n s c r i p t and ex- h i b i t s pursuant t o s e c t i o n 95-2408, R.C.M. 1947. Defendant Sather and Claude Sylvester McIntosh w e r e a r r e s t e d on September 30, 1975. They w e r e incarcerated i n t h e Missoula County j a i l . O n October 15 they w e r e j o i n t l y charged by d i r e c t information with t h e crimes of attempted burglary and t h e f t . Each entered a p l e a of not g u i l t y t o each charge. O n October 31 a w r i t t e n plea bargain proposal and agree- ment signed by t h e deputy county a t t o r n e y and McIntosh w a s f i l e d with t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . The S t a t e , i n consideration of a plea of g u i l t y t o t h e two charges, agreed t o recommend a sentence of 10 years on t h e charge of attempted burglary and 5 years on t h e charge of t h e f t t o be served concurrently and another 1 0 y e a r s and 5 years on charges i n another case t o be served concurrently i n t h a t case but consecutively with t h e sentence imposed f o r t h e attempted burglary. O n November 4 McIntosh appeared i n c o u r t with counsel, withdrew h i s plea of not g u i l t y t o t h e charges of attempted burglary and t h e f t and entered a p l e a of g u i l t y t o each charge. A presentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n w a s ordered and sentencing set f o r November 20. O n November 20 McIntosh received a sentence i n conformity with t h e p l e a bargain proposal and agreement. McIntosh had pre- viously been convicted of t h r e e f e l o n i e s , two of them within t h e previous f i v e years. I n t h e meantime during t h e week of November 7 t o Nov- ember 1 4 a parole revocation hearing w a s held i n t h e Missoula County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e on defendant S a t h e r ' s parole. Defen- d a n t Sather requested counsel but was n o t represented by counsel a t t h e parole revocation hearing. On November 1 4 defendant Sather w a s transported t o t h e Montana S t a t e Prison i n Deer Lodge. O n December 29 t h e Parole Board a t Montana S t a t e Prison revoked defendant S a t h e r ' s p a r o l e contingent on h i s case being recon- sidered a f t e r d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e pending charges. The charges of attempted burglary and t h e f t a g a i n s t defendant Sather wereset f o r t r i a l i n t h e A p r i l , 1976 jury term. Names of p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s w e r e drawn on February 20. On March 16 t h e prospective jury panel was f i n a l i z e d and s e n t questionnaires by t h e c l e r k of c o u r t . O n March 18 t h e case w a s s e t f o r t r i a l on A p r i l 5 as t h e 9th case. O n March 22 t h e c a s e was reset f o r t r i a l from t h e 9 t h case t o t h e 19th case on April 5. Subsequently t h e c a s e was reset f o r April 1 2 and f i n a l l y f o r April 8. O n April 7 defendant Sather w a s transported from t h e state prison t o t h e Missoula County j a i l . O n t h a t d a t e t h e dep- uty county a t t o r n e y f i l e d and served upon defendant's counsel a n o t i c e of i n t e n t t o seek increased punishment pursuant t o sec- t i o n s 95-1506 and 95-1507, R.C.M. 1947, by reason of defendant's p r i o r conviction of kidnapping. A t t h a t t i m e t h e deputy county a t t o r n e y s t a t e d t h a t he would withdraw t h i s n o t i c e i f defendant plead g u i l t y before t h e case went t o t r i a l and would thereupon recommend a sentence of 10 years. The t r i a l s t a r t e d on April 8. A t t h e conclusion of t h e s t a t e ' s case-in-chief, t h e presiding judge dismissed t h e charge of t h e f t on motion of t h e S t a t e . O n A p r i l 12, t h e jury returned a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y on t h e charge of attempted burglary. O n A p r i l 19 defendant Sather was sentenced t o 50 years imprisonment in the state prison and given credit for 45 days served in the Missoula County jail. No presentence report was made by the State Board of Pardons. On more than one occasion between defendant Sather's arrest and trial the deputy county attorney and defendant's counsel discussed the matter of defendant's plea. The deputy county attorney offered to recommend to the sentencing judge that defendant receive a sentence of 10 years in the state prison if he agreed to plead guilty. At the start of trial and again on the day of sentenc- ing, counsel for defendant objected to the filing of notice to seek increased punishment less than 24 hours before trial con- tending that the filing of such notice under the circumstances was unlawful and unfair. The district court overruled defendant's objection. We were advised upon oral argument that during the pen- dency of this appeal, defendant Sather applied to the Sentence Review Board for reduction of his sentence which was denied. Defendant has appealed from the final judgment. All specifications of error are directed at the sentence imposed. None are directed at his conviction of attempted burglary. Defendant raises three specifications of error: (1) That Montana's statute of increased punishment for prior offenders as applied in this case denies defendant due process of law as required by federal and state constitutional provisions. (2) That the notice of intention to seek increased punish- ment was not timely served. (3) That defendant was not given proper credit for time served prior to conviction against the sentence imposed. Defendant's first specification of error carries us into deep constitutional waters. He claims that realistically he was sentenced t o 10 years f o r attempted burglary and 40 years f o r refusing t o plead g u i l t y and i n s i s t i n g upon a jury t r i a l . The core of h i s argument is simply t h a t t h e prosecutor used plea bargaining procedures and invoked t h e habitual criminal s t a t u t e f o r an improper purpose and when t h a t d i d not work, t h e judge punished him with an excessive sentence f o r refusing t o plead g u i l t y . Defendant a s s e r t s t h a t t h e t o t a l i t y of circumstances demonstrates t h e t r u t h of h i s contentions and s p e c i f i c a l l y points t o these: (1) Knowledge by t h e prosecutor of defendant's p r i o r conviction long before invoking t h e habitual criminal s t a t u t e on t h e eve of t r i a l , ( 2 ) apparent determination by t h e prosecutor t h a t t h e public i n t e r e s t required no g r e a t e r sentence than 1 0 years a s evidenced by t h e prosecutor's o f f e r t o recommend a 10 year sen- tence i f defendant would plead g u i l t y , ( 3 ) a f t e r invoking t h e habitual criminal s t a t u t e less than 24 hours before t r i a l , t h e prosecutor's o f f e r t o withdraw it and recommend a 1 0 year sentence i f defendant would plead g u i l t y before t h e t r i a l s t a r t e d , ( 4 ) t h e f a i l u r e of t h e sentencing judge t o secure and u t i l i z e a presentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n and r e p o r t from t h e S t a t e Board of Pardons i n sen- tencing defendant, and (5) t h e d i s p a r i t y of sentence imposed upon h i s codefendant who plead g u i l t y as compared t o t h e sentence he received. Because of these circumstances, defendant contends he was denied due process i n v i o l a t i o n of f e d e r a l and s t a t e consti- t u t i o n a l requirements. The S t a t e , on t h e o t h e r hand, denies any abuse of d i s - c r e t i o n o r misconduct on t h e p a r t of t h e prosecutor o r sentencing judge. The S t a t e points o u t t h a t t h e p r a c t i c e of plea bargaining between t h e prosecutor and defendant wherein t h e prosecutor o f f e r s t o recommend a l i g h t e r sentence i n exchange f o r a g u i l t y plea i s n e i t h e r coercive i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l sense nor otherwise constitu- t i o n a l l y infirm. The S t a t e argues t h a t where, a s here, t h e r e i s no evidence of bad faith, discrimination or arbitrary use of plea bargaining, it is unobjectionable. The State emphasizes that both the prosecutor and judge acted within the limits of their statutory authority in sentencing defendant under Montana's habitual criminal statute. The State denies any abuse of dis- cretion on the part of the prosecutor or judge. In short, the State denies any "due process" violation under the facts of this case. It is important to note that defendant does not attack plea bargaining per se nor contend that Montana's habitual crim- inal statute is unconstitutional on its face. Defendant's con- stitutional attack is bottomed on the proposition that these procedures were unconstitutionally applied in his case to deny him due process of law. The broad dimensions of the pertinent constitutional re- quirements are quite clear. A person cannot be deprived of his liberty without due process of law. Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution; Art. 11, Section 17, 1972 Montana Constitu- tion. A defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to a jury trial, Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution; Art. 11, Section 26, 1972 Montana Constitution. He also has the right or privilege against self-incrimination. Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution; Art. 11, Section 25, 1972 Montana Constitution. He waives these rights by entering a plea of guilty, but such waiver must be voluntary. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L Ed 2d 747, and cases cited therein. A coerced plea of guilty violates constitutional due process requirements. Rohrer v. Montana, 237 F.Supp. 747 (1965). Imper- missible coercion may exist in a variety of forms arising out of the conduct of the prosecutor or judge acting within statutory authority. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 8 4 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L Ed 2d 656; Hayes v. Cowen, United States Court of Appeals, 6 t h C i r c u i t (No. 76-1409), December 30, 1976. Vindictive, re- t a l i a t o r y o r p u n i t i v e use of otherwise unobjectionable procedures offends c o n s t i t u t i o n a l due process requirements. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 2 1 , 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L Ed 2d 628; North Carolina v. Pearce, supra; Hayes v. Cowen, supra. The record i n t h i s c a s e s t r o n g l y suggests a c o n s t i t u t i o n - a l l y impermissible use of plea bargaining and t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m - i n a l s t a t u t e by t h e prosecutor. Long a f t e r defendant's background and p r i o r conviction w e r e known t o t h e prosecutor and a f t e r p l e a bargaining had f a i l e d , t h e prosecutor invoked t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m - i n a l s t a t u t e t o s u b j e c t defendant t o a p o t e n t i a l sentence of 1 0 0 years a s opposed t o t h e s t a t u t o r y maximum of 1 0 years f o r attempted burglary. See s e c t i o n 95-1507, R.C.M. 1947; s e c t i o n 94-4-103, R.C.M. 1947; s e c t i o n 94-6-204, R.C.M. 1947. After invoking t h e h a b i t u a l criminal s t a t u t e t h e day before t r i a l , t h e prosecutor o f f e r e d t o withdraw t h i s a c t i o n and recommend a sentence of 10 years i f defendant would plead g u i l t y before t h e t r i a l s t a r t e d . The record i s barren of any event o r circumstance t h a t would jus- t i f y such a c t i o n by t h e prosecutor within t h e l e g i t i m a t e object- i v e s of t h e h a b i t u a l criminal s t a t u t e o r t h e criminal j u s t i c e system. Although t h e use of t h e h a b i t u a l criminal s t a t u t e i s d i s c r e t i o n a r y with t h e prosecutor, t h a t d i s c r e t i o n is n o t un- l i m i t e d and cannot be used f o r improper purposes. H e r e t h e prose- c u t o r knew of defendant's p r i o r criminal record and had t h e p a r o l e board's evaluation of defendant before him and had completed h i s information gathering long before invoking t h e h a b i t u a l criminal s t a t u t e . When t h e s e functions w e r e completed, t h e prosecutor was i n a p o s i t i o n t o evaluate whether t h e h a b i t u a l criminal s t a t u t e should be invoked i n t h e public i n t e r e s t o r not. The prosecutor d i d not do s o a t t h a t t i m e b u t waited u n t i l p l e a bargaining had broken down and t r i a l was only 24 hours away and even then o f f e r e d t o withdraw h i s a c t i o n under t h e h a b i t u a l criminal s t a t u t e and recommend a 10 year sentence i f defendant would plead g u i l t y . This a c t i o n is n o t c o n s i s t e n t with a determination t h a t t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t r e q u i r e d increased punishment of defendant under t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e . The o n l y supportable i n f e r e n c e i s t h a t such conduct was used i n an attempt t o coerce defendant i n t o waiving h i s r i g h t t o a jury t r i a l . Subsequent events, while n o t conclusive, lend support t o t h i s inference. R e t a l i a t o r y a c t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e prosecutor f o r t h e e x e r c i s e of procedural r i g h t s by a n accused has been h e l d t o vio- late c o n s i t u t i o n a l due process requirements. Blackledge v. Perry, supra. There t h e United States Supreme Court held t h a t where defendant had appealed h i s conviction of misdemeanor a s s a u l t i n a lower c o u r t and was e n t i t l e d t o a t r i a l d e novo i n s u p e r i o r c o u r t under state law, t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s subsequent a c t i o n i n ob- t a i n i n g a n indictment f o r felony a s s a u l t covering t h e same con- d u c t contravened t h e due process c l a u s e of t h e Fourteenth Amend- ment. The b a s i s f o r t h e r u l i n g was t h a t a defendant pursuing h i s procedural r i g h t s under s t a t e law i s e n t i t l e d t o pursue t h o s e r i g h t s without apprehension t h a t t h e S t a t e w i l l r e t a l i a t e by s u b s t i t u t i n g a more s e r i o u s charge f o r t h e o r i g i n a l one and t h u s s u b j e c t him t o a s i g n i f i c a n t l y increased p o t e n t i a l period of in- c a r c e r a t i o n . S i m i l a r holdings have been handed down by o t h e r f e d e r a l c o u r t s . The f e d e r a l c o u r t of appeals f o r t h e District of Columbia reversed a conviction f o r t h e f i r s t degree murder following t h e defendants securing of a m i s t r i a l on a p r i o r charge of second degree murder. United S t a t e s v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407 (1974). The United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court i n C a l i f o r n i a refused t o allow prosecution of an indictment on more s e r i o u s charges a f t e r de- fendant had a s s e r t e d h i s r i g h t t o a change of venue on a n i n d i c t - ment charging l e s s s e r i o u s offenses. United S t a t e s v. DeMarco, 401 F.Supp. 505 (1975). And i n United S t a t e s v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367 ( 9 t h C i r . 1976) t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t of a p p e a l s f o r t h e 9 t h C i r c u i t held t h a t a defendant cannot be t r i e d on a felony indictment a f t e r he has refused t o plead g u i l t y t o a misdemeanor, i f no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e i n c r e a s e i n s e v e r i t y of t h e charges i s o f f e r e d . W e perceive no d i f f e r e n c e i n p r i n c i p l e between t h e s e c a s e s and t h e i n s t a n t c a s e where t h e charge remains unchanged b u t a s u b s t a n t i a l l y increased p e n a l t y i s sought by invoking t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e . The f e d e r a l c o u r t of appeals f o r t h e 6 t h C i r c u i t has r e c e n t l y held t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s t a c t i c s i n a c a s e involving > p l e a bargaining and a h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e , placed t h e de- fendant i n f e a r of r e t a l i a t o r y a c t i o n f o r i n s i s t i n g upon h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o stand t r i a l and t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l due process was v i o l a t e d . Hayes v. Cowan, supra. c his c a s e i s s i m i - l a r , although not i d e n t i c a l , t o t h e i n s t a n t case on t h e f a c t s . I n Hayes t h e defendant was i n d i c t e d f o r forgery. A f t e r a r r a i g n - ment, a p r e t r i a l conference was held with t h e prosecutor who o f f e r e d t o recommend a 5 year sentence i f defendant would plead g u i l t y . Defendant w a s warned t h a t i f he d i d n o t plead g u i l t y he would be charged under t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e . Defen- d a n t refused t o plead g u i l t y , but i n s i s t e d on r e c e i v i n g a f u l l t r i a l . The prosecutor then obtained a new indictment from t h e grand jury charging defendant under t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e based upon t h e forgery a s a t h i r d offense. Defendant was con- v i c t e d by a jury, and on t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e judge, t h e man- d a t o r y l i f e sentence f o r a t h i r d o f f e n s e h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l was imposed. I n vacating t h e sentence, t h e c o u r t i n Hayes v. Cowan, supra, set f o r t h its reasoning: "The Commonwealth urges t h a t t h e e n t i r e concept of p l e a bargaining w i l l be destroyed i f prose- c u t o r s a r e n o t allowed t o seek convictions on more s e r i o u s charges i f defendants r e f u s e t o plead g u i l t y . W e do n o t agree. Although a prosecutor may i n t h e course of p l e a n e g o t i a t i o n o f f e r a defendant concessions r e l a t i n g t o p o s e u c t i o n under an e x i s t i n g indictment, [ C i t a t i o n s omitted.] he may not t h r e a t e n a defendant with t h e consequence t h a t more severe charges may be brought i f he i n s i s t s on going t o t r i a l . When a prosecutor o b t a i n s an indictment l e s s severe than t h e f a c t s known t o him a t t h e t i m e might permit, he makes a d i s c r e t i o n a r y determination t h a t t h e interests of t h e s t a t e a r e served by not seeking more s e r i o u s charges. [ C i t a t i o n s omitted.] Accordingly, i f a f t e r p l e a negotiations f a i l , he then procures an indictment charging a more s e r i o u s crime, a strong inference is c r e a t e d t h a t t h e only reason f o r t h e more s e r i o u s charge i s vindictiveness. Under t h e s e circumstances, t h e prosecutor should be required t o j u s t i f y h i s a c t i o n . I n t h i s c a s e , a vindic- t i v e motive need n o t be i n f e r r e d . The prosecutor has admitted i t . " The only m a t e r i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between Hayes and t h e c a s e on appeal is t h a t t h e r e t h e prosecutor expressly threatened t h e defendant with mandatory increased punishment under t h e h a b i t u a l criminal s t a t u t e i f he d i d not plead g u i l t y , while here t h e prosecutor ex- pressed no t h r e a t but simply invoked a d i s c r e t i o n a r y and p o t e n t i a l l y g r e a t e r penalty a f t e r plea bargaining had broken down. I n our view, t h e coercive e f f e c t is a s s u r e l y p r e s e n t i n t h e i n s t a n t case a s i n Hayes, d i f f e r i n g only i n degree. For t h e foregoing reasons and based on t h e c i t e d a u t h o r i t y , w e hold t h a t defendant w a s denied due process under f e d e r a l and s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions a s applied t o t h e f a c t s of t h i s case. W e do not hold t h a t t h e plea bargaining process i n i t s e l f i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y infirm nor t h a t Montana's h a b i t u a l criminal s t a t u t e is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l on i t s face. Defendant's second s p e c i f i c a t i o n of e r r o r r e l a t i n g t o t h e t i m e l i n e s s of invoking t h e h a b i t u a l criminal s t a t u t e i s inseparable from t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e . A s t h e timing of i t s i n j e c t i o n i n t o t h e case has been discussed previously and forms a b a s i s f o r our r u l i n g on t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e r a i s e d i n defendant's f i r s t s p e c i f i c a t i o n of e r r o r , f u r t h e r discussion appears unnecessary. I n its b r i e f t h e S t a t e concedes defendant's t h i r d spec- i f i c a t i o n of e r r o r . The S t a t e admits t h a t defendant i s e n t i t l e d t o c r e d i t of 6 months and 22 days a g a i n s t h i s sentence. This represents t h e t i m e a c t u a l l y served by defendant between t h e d a t e of h i s a r r e s t and t h e d a t e of sentence. The 50 year sentence imposed i s vacated. The S t a t e ' s notice of i n t e n t t o seek increased punishment under t h e habitual criminal s t a t u t e i s ordered stricken. The cause is remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t with d i r e c t i o n s t o resentence t h e defendant f o r t h e crime of attempted burglary with appropriate c r e d i t f o r t i m e a c t u a l l y served according t o law. J u s t i c e Chief J u s t i c e (Specially concurring) I concur i n t h e r e s u l t of t h e foregoing decision but not i n t h e e n t i r e r a t i o n a l e of t h e majority opinion.