Case Title: People v. Bloom

Citation: 

Docket Number: S095223

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2022-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ROBERT MAURICE BLOOM, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S095223 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
A801380 
 
 
April 21, 2022 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Groban, Jenkins, and Margulies* concurred. 
 
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
S095223 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
After a federal court vacated his earlier conviction and 
sentence, defendant Robert Maurice Bloom was retried and 
convicted of the first degree murder of his father and the second 
degree murders of his stepmother and stepsister.  The jury on 
retrial also found true a multiple-murder special-circumstance 
finding and various firearm- and weapon-use findings.  (Pen. 
Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(3), 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 
12022, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a).)  Bloom was sentenced to 
death.  This appeal is automatic.  (Id., § 1239, subd. (b).)   
We now affirm the judgment in part and reverse in part.  
At trial, defense counsel conceded Bloom’s responsibility for the 
deaths of all three victims in an effort to pursue a mental 
capacity defense to the murder charges.  Bloom, however, was 
willing to accept responsibility only for the killing of his father 
and expressly objected to admitting responsibility for the deaths 
of the other two victims.  In conceding responsibility for these 
victims against Bloom’s wishes, defense counsel violated 
Bloom’s Sixth Amendment right to choose the fundamental 
objectives of his defense under McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 584 
U.S. ___ [138 S.Ct. 1500].  The error does not affect Bloom’s 
conviction for the murder of his father or the associated firearm-
use finding.  But the error requires us to reverse the rest of the 
judgment, including the second degree murder convictions 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
 
relating to the other two victims, the multiple-murder special-
circumstance finding, and ultimately the judgment of death.  
The People may retry Bloom on the relevant counts and 
associated enhancement and special circumstance allegations if 
they so choose. 
I.  FACTS 
Bloom was charged with and convicted of the murders of 
his father, Robert Bloom, Sr.; his stepmother, Josephine Bloom; 
and his eight-year-old stepsister, Sandra Hughes.  In an earlier 
automatic appeal, we affirmed Bloom’s conviction and death 
sentence.  (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194.)  A federal 
court then granted habeas relief on the ground that Bloom’s trial 
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in the investigation 
and presentation of mental health evidence.  (Bloom v. Calderon 
(9th Cir. 1997) 132 F.3d 1267.)  This case now returns to us 
following Bloom’s retrial for the murders. 
On retrial, Bloom entered alternative pleas of not guilty 
and not guilty by reason of insanity.  The jury found Bloom 
guilty of the first degree murder of his father and an associated 
firearm allegation but reported that it was unable to reach 
verdicts on the remaining counts.  The prosecution then 
dismissed the allegations in support of first degree murder on 
the other two murder counts, and the jury found Bloom guilty of 
second degree murder as to each count.  It also found true 
associated firearm-use and weapon-use allegations and a 
multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation. 
After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the court held a 
sanity trial.  The jury found Bloom sane as to the first degree 
murder but was unable to reach a verdict as to the two second 
degree murders.  Defendant then withdrew his plea of not guilty 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
 
by reason of insanity and proceeded to a penalty trial, at which 
he represented himself.  The jury returned a death verdict and 
the court entered judgment accordingly. 
A. Guilt Phase Evidence 
1.  Prosecution case 
In 1982, Robert Bloom, Sr., his wife, Josephine (whose 
given name was Lucille), and her eight-year-old daughter, 
Sandra Hughes (also known as Sandy), lived in a house on 
Sancola Avenue in Sun Valley.  Bloom, 18 years old at the time, 
stayed at the house off and on.   
The murders occurred during the early morning on April 
22, 1982.  One witness, Dave Hughes, had been asleep with his 
girlfriend in a van parked in the driveway of his parents’ house, 
which was next door to the Bloom residence.  After being 
awakened by the sound of a toilet flushing in his parents’ house, 
Hughes heard two people arguing outside his van.  Looking out 
the van’s rear window, he saw Bloom, Sr., on his front lawn and 
Bloom standing in the street.  Bloom, Sr., was “hollering” at 
Bloom in an “angry[,] pleading” voice to “come back.”  Bloom, 
Sr., then chased after Bloom, who had taken off running down 
the street.  A few minutes later, Bloom, Sr., and Bloom returned 
together.  The two men entered the Bloom residence.   
Hughes tried to go back to sleep but heard more arguing 
outside his van.  Looking out again, he saw Bloom heading off 
in the opposite direction from the one he had previously taken, 
while Bloom, Sr., stood in his yard, again telling Bloom to come 
back.  A minute or two later, Hughes heard a shot that sounded 
like a .22- or .25-caliber gun.  Bloom, Sr., clutched his 
midsection, started jumping up and down and screaming, and 
ran toward his house.  Bloom came running, pointing a rifle at 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
 
Bloom, Sr.  Hughes heard two more gunshots, followed by the 
sound of glass breaking.  Bloom, Sr., fell onto the front porch.  
Bloom approached and pointed a rifle at his father.  Hughes 
heard two more shots.   
Bloom ran into the house and Josephine began screaming.  
After two gunshots, the screaming stopped.  Between 30 seconds 
and a minute later, there was another shot.  Hughes got out of 
the van and entered his parents’ house to call 9-1-1, then went 
back to the van to get his girlfriend.  As he came around the side 
of his parents’ house, he saw Bloom standing in the dining room 
window of the Bloom residence “messing” with his rifle.  Bloom 
put down the gun and stared out the window.  Hughes saw 
Bloom leave the house, put the rifle in Josephine’s car, and drive 
away.  Police arrived within five minutes.   
Another witness, Moises Gameros, was living on Sancola 
Avenue across the street and a few doors up from the Bloom 
residence.  Gameros woke up in the early morning hours on 
April 22 and heard someone repeatedly yelling “Robert.”  
Looking out his window, Gameros saw Bloom, Sr., and Bloom 
walking down Sancola Avenue.  Bloom was holding a rifle.  
Standing outside Gameros’s living room window, Bloom, Sr., 
said, “That’s it, I’m gonna call the cops,” and walked back toward 
his house.  Bloom followed and tried to enter the house after 
him.  It appeared to Gameros that Bloom, Sr., tried to grab the 
rifle from Bloom from within the house.  Bloom then ran from 
the house, with Bloom, Sr., chasing him, past Gameros’s field of 
vision.  Gameros heard a shot and heard Bloom, Sr., screaming.  
Bloom, Sr., turned and ran toward his house; Bloom shot him 
again.  Bloom, Sr., reached the front stairs to his house and fell.  
From his vantage point, Gameros could no longer see Bloom, Sr., 
but he saw Bloom point the rifle downward and shoot once more.  
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
 
Bloom stood in the doorway for about a minute, manipulating 
the rifle, and then entered the house.  Gameros heard nothing 
further.  After about 10 minutes, Bloom emerged from the house 
with the rifle, got into a car, and drove away.   
Sergeant Joseph Dvorak of the Los Angeles Police 
Department was the first to respond to the scene.  He found 
Bloom, Sr., in the front doorway and Josephine in a hallway or 
bedroom.  Both were dead.  Sandra was found in a different 
bedroom, alive but seriously injured.  After an ambulance 
arrived and took the child, Dvorak secured the crime scene.  
Sergeant Michael McKean of the Los Angeles Police Department 
arrived about 4:15 a.m.  Along with two other police cars, he 
drove to the home of Bloom’s girlfriend, accompanied by a 
neighbor who knew its location.  The neighbor saw Bloom 
walking westbound on Nettleton Avenue, two and a half to three 
miles from the Sancola residence, and pointed him out.  Officers 
arrested him.  Later that day, McKean located Josephine’s car 
parked on the street a mile and a half to two miles from where 
Bloom was arrested.   
A later autopsy determined that Bloom, Sr., had died of 
gunshot wounds to the abdomen, neck, and cheek.  Josephine 
suffered three fatal gunshot wounds to the head.  Sandra 
sustained a graze wound to the right shoulder and a gunshot 
wound to the head that led to her death after time spent on a 
respirator.  She also suffered 23 stab and cutting wounds to the 
head, neck, right arm, torso, and back, as well as superficial 
wounds to the inside of her left wrist and forefinger, all inflicted 
by a pointed instrument such as a pair of scissors.  From the 
nature of the stab wounds, it appeared Sandra was moving 
around when they were inflicted; she was shot after being 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
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stabbed and cut.  Toxicology reports on Bloom, Sr., and 
Josephine were both negative for drugs and alcohol.   
Various witnesses testified about events occurring in the 
days preceding the killings.  Martin Medrano, an acquaintance 
of Bloom’s who testified at the first trial, was deceased by the 
time of the retrial; his prior testimony was read to the retrial 
jury.  In April 1982, Bloom said he had a contract to kill someone 
and offered Medrano $1,200 to get him a gun.  Medrano, a drug 
addict who was on parole, said he intended to take Bloom’s 
money but not give him a gun.  Bloom approached Medrano 
several more times.  Medrano asked if he had the money; Bloom 
told Medrano he would get it and that Medrano would read 
about the killing.  At the time Medrano testified, he was in 
custody for armed robbery.  He had seen Bloom in jail and 
reported his earlier dealings with him to a deputy sheriff.  No 
promises were made to Medrano in connection with his 
testimony.   
Ricardo Avila testified that in 1982 he and his then-
girlfriend, Christine Waller, both 14 years old, were friends of 
Bloom’s.  They spent time with Bloom at the homes of Waller’s 
mother and of Bloom, Sr.  According to Avila, Bloom and 
Bloom, Sr., argued frequently about everything Bloom did.  
Bloom never fought back physically.  Two days before the 
killings, Avila was watching television with Waller in her 
family’s living room when he saw Bloom pass by outside the 
window holding a rifle.  Avila heard “five or six pops” and went 
toward the back of the house, where he saw Bloom entering 
through a sliding door, hiding a rifle under his jacket.  The day 
before the killings, Bloom, Sr., came to Waller’s residence 
looking for Bloom, who was not there.  Avila went to Bloom’s 
workplace and told him his father had come looking for him.  
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
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Bloom went to a pay phone, called his father, and said, “You’re 
running my life now, but you won’t be for long.”   
Waller testified at Bloom’s first trial but was unavailable 
for the retrial; her prior testimony was read to the retrial jury.  
In 1982, Waller had had a very close relationship with Bloom, 
who would often come over to her house and sometimes sleep 
there.  On the evening of April 20, 1982, two days before the 
killings, she saw Bloom outside her house carrying a rifle she 
recognized as her brother’s toward a vacant field.  The following 
day, Bloom was again at Waller’s house and was planning to 
spend the night; her mother asked her to wake him up the next 
day at 5:00 a.m.  That evening, Bloom looked pale, quiet, and 
tense, the way he did when he was upset; later, however, 
Waller’s mother, Norma White, thought he looked normal.  On 
the morning of April 22, Waller knocked on the door of the 
bedroom Bloom occupied but received no response.  When she 
opened the door, the light was on and the bed looked like it had 
been slept in, but Bloom was not there.   
Whenever Waller saw Bloom with his father, Bloom, Sr., 
appeared “always angry” at Bloom, who could never seem to 
satisfy him.  Bloom would sometimes cry after confrontations 
with his father.  During visits to the Bloom residence, Waller 
saw Bloom take good care of his stepsister Sandra, playing with 
her and fixing her food to eat.  
White’s son, Raul Rosas, testified he was living in White’s 
house at the time of the killings and knew Bloom.  Rosas owned 
a .22-caliber semiautomatic rifle, which he initially kept 
unloaded in his bedroom but then kept in the trunk of his car 
after some gang members shot at him.  He never showed the gun 
to Bloom.  Rosas was at home on April 21, 1982, the day before 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
 
the killings, and saw Bloom, who appeared normal.  The 
following day, after learning of the shootings, Rosas discovered 
his gun was missing and notified police.   
2.  Defense case 
Bloom had pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of 
insanity to all charges.  At the guilt phase, the defense presented 
evidence to show that Bloom was suffering from severe mental 
impairments that prevented him from forming malice.  The 
defense also presented evidence suggesting that Bloom, Sr., had 
abused Bloom and that the killings were committed in the heat 
of passion.  
Bloom’s mother, Melanie Bostic,1 testified that Bloom, Sr., 
was physically abusive and pushed her down a flight of stairs 
while she was pregnant with Bloom.  Bloom, Sr., began hitting 
and slapping Bloom when he was still a baby.  He would also 
scream at him, use foul language, and deliberately scare him.  
He once ripped apart Bloom’s favorite stuffed animal in front of 
him.  He would proclaim he was God and that he was going to 
kill Bloom.  Melanie left the marriage when Bloom was in the 
first grade.  At the time, he seemed like a normal little boy, but 
he did not have any real friends; he instead had an imaginary 
friend named Tony.   
Robin Bucell was married to Bloom, Sr., for about three 
years after Melanie left the family.  At the start of the marriage, 
Bloom was a small and scrawny 10-year-old and the focus of his 
father’s abuse.  Bloom, Sr., would slap, beat, and belittle him.  
Bloom, Sr., also emotionally manipulated Bloom by telling 
 
1  
To avoid confusion, we will refer to Melanie Bostic and her 
son Byron Bostic by their first names.  No disrespect is intended. 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
 
Bloom that he loved him but his mother did not.  Melanie, 
Bloom’s mother, visited irregularly, and although she was 
affectionate toward Bloom, her visits were marked by hostility 
and physical violence with Bloom, Sr., which upset Bloom.  
Bloom, Sr., would threaten to kill Bucell and members of her 
family, a threat she found credible because he claimed to be a 
Mafia hit man.  Bloom, Sr.’s mother came to live with them for 
about a year, during which time he took her Social Security 
checks and was mean and rude to her.  Bucell had a son, Eric, 
with Bloom, Sr.  Eventually, in fear for their safety, she left with 
Eric and divorced Bloom, Sr.  On cross-examination, Bucell 
testified that while she was married to Bloom, Sr., Bloom 
developed a kidney condition for which he had weekly medical 
appointments, but at no time did a doctor raise suspicions of 
physical abuse.   
Eric Bloom2 testified that his father married Josephine 
when he was five or six years old.  Bloom, Sr., did not physically 
abuse Eric, but he did beat Bloom “all the time,” and Eric heard 
Bloom express fear of their father.  Bloom, Sr., would dunk 
Bloom’s head in the toilet and throw plates at him.  After one 
beating about a month before the killings, Bloom told Eric he 
couldn’t take much more of the pain and didn’t think he would 
live to his next birthday.  When Bloom, Sr., and Josephine 
fought, Bloom would take Eric out of the house.  Bloom would 
also get between Eric and his father when Bloom, Sr., yelled at 
Eric.   
Neuropsychologist Dale G. Watson offered expert 
testimony relating to Bloom’s mental state.  Dr. Watson 
 
2 
Again, to avoid confusion, we will refer to Eric Bloom by 
his first name. 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
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evaluated Bloom in 1993 and again in 1999 and 2000, 
administering comprehensive neuropsychological tests.  In 
neither test administration did Dr. Watson  detect evidence of 
malingering. 
 
The 
1993 
testing 
revealed 
“severe 
neuropsychological impairment” indicative of “very significant 
neuropsychological deficits.”  The impairment was associated 
with both the left and right hemispheres, but primarily the 
right.  Bloom’s deficits affected his ability to read social cues and 
process emotions.  He also exhibited significant impairment in 
problem solving.  Bloom’s verbal IQ was 95 — average being 
100 — but his performance IQ was 67, in the very impaired 
range; the striking disparity between the two scores suggested 
the presence of brain damage or impairment.  The 1999 and 
2000 testing yielded results consistent with the prior testing, 
with a verbal IQ of 112, in the high average range, and a 
performance IQ of 65, in the extremely low range, with right 
hemisphere impairment still evident.  During the evaluation, 
Bloom exhibited or related certain compulsive behaviors and 
“oddities,” such as reciting the entire sequence of English 
monarchs.  His developmental anomalies, such as dysmorphic 
facial features and the presence of two kidneys on one side of his 
body, were consistent with birth defects.  Such defects can be 
related to fetal alcohol syndrome or fetal Dilantin syndrome, a 
consequence of an antiseizure medication now known to affect 
fetal health that Dr. Watson testified Bloom’s mother took while 
pregnant.  Further, according to Dr. Watson, Bloom likely 
suffered brain damage in a drowning incident when he was two 
years old.  Loss of oxygen supply can cause permanent brain 
deficits and personality changes.  Dr. Watson diagnosed Bloom 
as having cognitive disorder not otherwise specified and/or 
severe nonverbal neurocognitive dysfunction.  His report on his 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
 
2000 evaluation opined that at the time of the homicides Bloom 
was, because of a mental defect, unable to comprehend his duty 
to govern his conduct in accordance with the law.  Dr. Watson 
concluded that Bloom was in a dissociative state from the time 
he shot his father until the killings were over.  Dr. Watson was 
uncertain whether Bloom was dissociating when he and his 
father were going up and down the street before the shooting.   
Forensic psychiatrist Mark J. Mills also testified for the 
defense in the guilt phase.  Dr. Mills had become involved in the 
case in 1993 when the judge who was then presiding over 
Bloom’s federal habeas corpus proceedings consulted him 
concerning issues related to Bloom’s mental health.  (The retrial 
jury was not told the precise nature of those proceedings.)  In 
1999, trial counsel retained Dr. Mills and provided him with 
voluminous records he had not seen at the time of the earlier 
consultation.  Review of the additional material led Dr. Mills to 
revise his earlier opinions.  Specifically, he diagnosed Bloom 
with Asperger Syndrome, a developmental disorder on the 
autism spectrum, and concluded Bloom had suffered extreme 
emotional and physical abuse as a child.  Abused children often 
dissociate — that is, they enter a state of partial consciousness 
or partial awareness — as a way of coping with the pain and fear 
engendered by the abuse, and Bloom was more prone to 
dissociation by virtue of the brain dysfunction Dr. Watson had 
identified.  Dr. Mills believed Bloom was in a dissociative state 
around the time of the killings, a conclusion for which he found 
support in the testimony of eyewitnesses Dave Hughes and 
Moises Gameros regarding Bloom’s apparently ambivalent and 
purposeless actions immediately after the shootings.  Bloom was 
also often paranoid and tolerated the administration of 
antipsychotic medication at levels that would sedate an 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
 
ordinary person.  Dr. Mills acknowledged that although in 
general determining a person’s mental state 11 years after the 
fact is very difficult, a diagnosis of Asperger Syndrome can be 
reliably made at a long remove because it is a lifelong 
developmental condition; if it exists currently, it would have 
existed in the past.  Asperger Syndrome impaired Bloom’s social 
and emotional reciprocity and ability to empathize, although he 
retained an intellectual appreciation of the effects of his actions.   
A third mental health expert, psychiatrist William Vicary, 
testified that he had originally been appointed by the trial court 
in May 1984 to assess Bloom’s competence for a hearing in a low-
complexity matter.3  Dr. Vicary talked with Bloom in jail, 
reviewed his jail medical records, and spoke with sheriff’s 
deputies who knew Bloom.  At that time, Bloom was paranoid 
and to some extent out of touch with reality.  Dr. Vicary 
concluded that Bloom understood the nature and purpose of the 
proceeding.  Dr. Vicary also found, though with a lower level of 
confidence, that Bloom could rationally participate in the 
proceeding.   
In 1993, Dr. Vicary reviewed additional records and 
interviewed Bloom again.  After doing so, he reconsidered his 
earlier opinion and concluded Bloom had not been mentally 
competent for most of the prior proceedings.  Dr. Vicary believed 
Bloom suffered from serious mental illness (which he did not 
diagnose specifically) and brain dysfunction.  The combination 
of mental illness and brain dysfunction made Bloom likely to 
 
3  
The retrial jury was not told the earlier hearing was the 
original sentencing proceeding in this case. 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
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“snap” — to suffer a psychotic break or an “emotional explosion,” 
or to dissociate — under stress.   
B. Sanity Phase 
Following Bloom’s convictions in the guilt phase, the jury 
heard the trial of Bloom’s insanity defense. 
Psychiatrist Philip E. Wolfson testified for the defense 
that he had examined Bloom over a total of about 20 hours 
between 1990 and 1992 at the request of Bloom’s then-attorney, 
seeking to understand Bloom’s state of mind at the time of the 
killings.  Bloom had described various versions of events over 
the years since the crimes, and to get from him what Dr. Wolfson 
termed “the closest approximation of the truth,” the psychiatrist 
had to earn his trust and break down his defenses.   
Dr. Wolfson concluded that in the year or so before the 
killings Bloom began to suffer from significant mental illness, 
which he diagnosed as a mixed personality disorder with 
borderline and dependent features.  Borderline personality 
disorder is characterized by a pervasive pattern of instability of 
interpersonal relationships, self-image, moods, and emotions, as 
well as marked impulsivity, beginning by early adulthood.  
Bloom’s interpersonal relationships were poorly developed; he 
tended to either idealize people in his life or put them down.  He 
had an extremely poor and unstable self-image and was often 
the butt of others’ derision.  His moods and feelings were 
variable and unstable.  At times Bloom felt extremely depressed 
and worthless; at other times he was extremely agitated; and in 
some moments he seemed psychotic.  His behavior during his 
time in high school (classmates described him as weird and 
strange) and in the Navy (he failed to follow basic hygiene or 
maintain appropriate comportment), as well as his commission 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
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of an attempted robbery with a BB gun, all revealed his 
impulsivity and lack of control.  Fear of abandonment is 
characteristic of borderline personality disorder and was a 
constant theme in Bloom’s life from his mother’s leaving the 
family, to his father’s disappearances and jail time, until shortly 
before the killings, when Bloom, Sr., was reportedly about to put 
the house up for sale and move, leading Bloom to fear he would 
be left behind.  The abandonment and traumatic punishment 
Bloom experienced contributed to his chronic feelings of 
emptiness.  In the year before the homicides Bloom also 
experienced transient stress-related paranoid ideation and 
dissociative symptoms to a degree that sometimes seemed 
psychotic.   
Bloom also exhibited less fully developed traits of 
dependent personality disorder, which is characterized by a 
pervasive and excessive need to be taken care of that leads to 
submissive and clinging behavior and fears of separation 
beginning by early adulthood.  Dr. Wolfson attributed Bloom’s 
apparent inability to leave his father’s home, despite being 
abused and denigrated, to the effects of this disorder.   
Dr. Wolfson testified that when Bloom was about to 
graduate from high school, his living situation was unstable and 
he lacked consistent support.  He had no real career path and, 
to his distress, was discharged from the Navy as unfit after an 
enlistment of less than a month.  After Bloom’s discharge, as 
Bloom, Sr., was going to jail for fraudulent business activities, 
Bloom stayed briefly at his mother’s house until he himself was 
jailed for the aforementioned robbery with a BB gun.  
Dr. Wolfson related that in connection with that crime, some 
five months before the homicides, Dr. Richard Naham had 
evaluated Bloom and found him to be paranoid and on the verge 
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15 
 
of a nervous collapse.  Dr. Naham wrote in his report at the time 
that without inpatient psychiatric treatment Bloom would 
continue to present a danger to others.   
Dr. Wolfson further testified that, following his release 
from custody, Bloom moved in with Bloom, Sr., who meanwhile 
had married Josephine, but he also spent considerable time in 
the home of his friend Christine Waller.  Bloom idealized 
Waller’s mother, Norma White, as the mother he wished he 
could have had.  Bloom’s relationship with his father continued 
to deteriorate, as Bloom, Sr., took Bloom’s money for his own 
purposes and tried to get Josephine to sign over her rights to 
their house.  Bloom, Sr., had engaged in numerous other scams 
that Bloom recognized and disapproved of.  Bloom’s frustrations 
exacerbated his confusion, impulsivity, and irrationality.  
Bloom’s morality was split, making him both a person with “a 
high moral sense” and someone “who could be a con himself.”   
Dr. Wolfson testified that Bloom had long entertained 
homicidal thoughts toward his father.  Seeing a rifle at White’s 
house catalyzed a feeling that he could actually kill Bloom, Sr.  
Bloom started preparing a fictitious alibi involving intruders 
trying to break into the White residence, but his planning was 
poor and unrealistic.  He was later seen by members of the 
White family practicing with the rifle.  On the night of the 
killings, he took the rifle and returned to his father’s house 
intending to kill Bloom, Sr., but, in Dr. Wolfson’s opinion, he was 
not planning to harm Josephine or Sandra.  At the moment he 
shot Bloom, Sr., Bloom lacked the capacity to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law because he did not view 
shooting his father as unjust.  According to Dr. Wolfson, Bloom’s 
belief that the only way out of his difficult situation was to shoot 
his father, and then his going ahead and doing it, was insane.  
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
 
As Dr. Naham’s evaluation had warned, Bloom’s connection to 
reality had loosened and he had become psychotic.  When Bloom 
shot Josephine and Sandra, he was in an altered state, acting 
without a mental process.   
Dr. Wolfson acknowledged that Bloom had told many lies 
and given different versions of the events at issue over multiple 
interviews, and Dr. Wolfson had had to seek corroboration for 
Bloom’s statements.  In response to the prosecutor’s 
hypothetical question, Dr. Wolfson could think of no situation in 
which it would be sane and rational for a person who had just 
killed his father to murder two eyewitnesses to the killing.  
Dr. Wolfson believed it would be irrational to wear a trench coat 
to hide the fact one is carrying a rifle, as Bloom did in 1981 in 
connection with an incident unrelated to the homicides, the 
previously mentioned attempted robbery with a BB gun.  
Bloom’s planning of the killing of his father and the continuation 
of his goal-directed behavior after the killing similarly, in 
Dr. Wolfson’s view, reflected insanity.  In his fifth interview 
with Dr. Wolfson, Bloom stated:  “If things had gone right, 
[Bloom, Sr.,] would have gotten hit when he was alone.  It’s 
tricky because Josephine and Sandra were just witnesses.  
They’d still be alive.”  The statement did not make sense to 
Dr. Wolfson “given the whole construction of the facts,” and he 
noted Bloom later retracted it.  Dr. Wolfson believed Bloom was 
telling the truth when he later claimed he did not know why he 
killed Josephine and Sandra because it was while making this 
claim, as opposed to the other explanations he had offered in 
recounting their killings, that he had the most profound 
emotional reaction and remorse.   
Dr. Wolfson disagreed with some of the other experts who 
had been consulted in the case.  He did not agree with Dr. Mills 
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17 
 
that Bloom had Asperger Syndrome.  Nor did he agree with 
another doctor who had opined that Bloom was not psychotic, or 
a doctor who had opined that Bloom was sane when he killed his 
father.  Finally, he did not agree with Dr. Watson’s diagnosis of 
severe brain impairment.   
The prosecution presented no evidence at the sanity 
phase. 
C. Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution case 
The prosecution presented victim impact evidence as well 
as evidence of Bloom’s involvement in several prior incidents of 
violence or threatened violence, including:  (1) a November 1981 
robbery in which Bloom pulled a BB gun out of a trench coat, 
grabbed the purse of a woman attending a Bible study group, 
and fled after he was thwarted; (2) a May 1984 incident at the 
law library in Men’s Central Jail, in which Bloom was seen 
holding a knife and running away from another inmate, who 
was bleeding; and (3) Bloom’s February 1982 statement to 
Josephine’s uncle, at Josephine’s wedding to Bloom, Sr., that he 
wanted to kill Josephine and Sandra because they were “in the 
way.”  Bloom added that he had “a half brother that’s in the way 
and I don’t need two more in the way,” and threatened 
Josephine’s uncle that if he got “in the way, I will kill you.”   
2.  Defense case 
Bloom successfully moved to discharge his attorneys and 
represent himself at the penalty phase.  He presented the 
testimony of several inmates and sheriff’s deputies regarding 
his character. 
 
Three female witnesses testified that while incarcerated 
they had met Bloom on the bus transporting inmates from jail 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
 
to court.  Each testified Bloom was polite and respectful.  The 
inmate Bloom had stabbed in the law library testified that 
Bloom explained he “met a girl who apparently read [about his] 
case in the newspaper at the time and [he] wanted to catch a 
case to stay down there.”  Three sheriff’s deputies testified that 
they had interacted with Bloom in the courthouse lockup, the 
courtroom, and the jail, respectively, and that he had behaved 
in a cooperative and respectful manner.   
 
The defense also called Paul Mones, an attorney, author, 
and lecturer who specializes in parricides — that is, cases 
involving children, teens, and adults who kill their parents.  
After studying Bloom’s case, Mones formed the opinion that at 
the root of the homicides was years of abuse Bloom, Sr., 
perpetrated on Bloom.   
Bloom’s half brother Byron Bostic testified that since he 
was eight or nine years old, he had been visiting Bloom at the 
prison, bringing his own family as he grew older.  The visits were 
always peaceful; there were never any problems, and Bloom was 
never violent or threatening.  Anna Maria Dean, age 10 and the 
daughter of Byron’s partner, testified that she had visited Bloom 
at the prison, loved him, and was not afraid of him.   
Melanie 
Bostic, 
Bloom’s 
mother, 
testified 
about 
Bloom, Sr.’s, abusive conduct toward Bloom, first striking him 
when he was a month old, beating him when he was a toddler, 
and eventually threatening to kill him.  Melanie also testified 
about her relationship with Bloom, Sr., which was fraught with 
arguments and violent abuse.  Melanie left her marriage to 
Bloom, Sr., when Bloom was in elementary school.  When Bloom 
visited her after the divorce, Melanie’s boyfriends sometimes 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
 
abused him, and Bloom also witnessed them committing acts of 
violence against her.   
Robin Bucell was married to Bloom, Sr., from August 1974 
to August 1977.  Bloom, Sr., forced her and Bloom to lie for him 
in his fraudulent schemes, threatening them with bodily harm 
if they refused.  She had a child, Eric, with Bloom, Sr.; 
eventually, out of concern for her and Eric’s safety, Bucell left 
Bloom, Sr.   
Superior Court Judge Michael Hoff testified that Bloom’s 
case was assigned to his courtroom from July 1998 to September 
2000.  During that period, Bloom appeared to Judge Hoff to be 
competent.  On multiple occasions, Bloom unsuccessfully sought 
to fire his appointed counsel because he disagreed with the 
psychiatric defense they were planning to present; Bloom once 
attempted to assert his right to represent himself, although he 
later changed his mind.  Judge Hoff did not know whether or not 
Bloom was sincere in his requests.  Some of the things Bloom 
said “made sense” and were “very skillful”; others were 
“somewhat stupid.”   
Finally, Bloom testified on his own behalf and provided his 
account of the crimes and incidents described in the prosecution 
case.  Bloom argued that his father got what he deserved, and 
Bloom’s only regret was not killing him when he was 16 or 17, 
because then his father would never have been involved with 
Josephine and Sandra.  Bloom denied ever asking Medrano for 
a gun, offering him money for a gun, or telling him he was 
planning to kill someone.  Bloom confirmed the account of the 
jailhouse stabbing and claimed he tried to commit the church 
robbery because his father had needed money and told him to 
get him some.   
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
 
Bloom testified it was counsel’s idea, not his, to present a 
mental capacity defense; he denied he was mentally impaired.  
He reviewed the diagnostic criteria for Asperger Syndrome and 
argued he met none of them.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Pretrial Issues and Issues Affecting the Entire 
Trial 
1. Constitutionality of retrial  
The murders in this case occurred in 1982.  Bloom was 
first convicted in late 1983 and sentenced in 1984.  In 1997, a 
federal court granted Bloom relief from his conviction and 
sentence on the ground that his counsel had rendered 
constitutionally ineffective assistance in the investigation, 
preparation, and presentation of mental health evidence at trial.  
(Bloom v. Calderon, supra, 132 F.3d 1267.)  Retrial took place in 
2000, more than 18 years after the crimes.  By that time, the 
two mental health professionals who had examined Bloom 
shortly before and after the offense, Dr. Arthur S. Kling and 
Dr. Richard Naham, had become unavailable.   
Before the retrial, the defense moved to dismiss the 
charges, contending the experts’ unavailability deprived Bloom 
of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.  The 
trial court denied the motion, though it also ruled there could be 
no mention at the retrial of the verdicts from the first trial.  (See 
Pen. Code, § 1180.)  The defense then filed a supplemental 
motion renewing the argument that the murder charges should 
be dismissed or, in the alternative, that the court should 
preclude charges greater than manslaughter, preclude the 
possibility of the death penalty, or provide for other curative 
measures to reduce the prejudice from the passage of time and 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
 
from 
former 
trial 
counsel’s 
constitutionally 
inadequate 
performance.  The court denied the supplemental motion.   
Bloom contends the court’s rulings denied him his rights 
to due process, to present a defense, and to the effective 
assistance of counsel.  He argues that the passage of time before 
retrial, and the consequent unavailability of the two expert 
witnesses, critically undermined his principal defense — 
namely, that he lacked the mental state required for murder.  
The defense was forced to present experts who had not 
personally examined Bloom near the time of the offenses, a point 
the prosecution highlighted in cross-examination and closing 
argument. 
We find no error in the trial court’s decision to allow the 
retrial to take place, notwithstanding the unavailability of 
Drs. Kling and Naham.  Bloom relies on a series of cases 
concerning the constitutional right to a speedy trial, which 
observe that the loss of witnesses and other evidence may be a 
cost of pretrial delay.  (E.g., Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 
532.)  But case law also makes clear that following a reversal of 
a prior conviction, the prosecution is entitled to retry the 
defendant “ ‘in the normal course of events’ ”  (People v. 
McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 413, quoting United States v. 
Ewell (1966) 383 U.S. 116, 121), and no speedy trial inquiry is 
even necessary unless the prosecution engages in undue delay 
in proceeding with retrial (see Barker, at p. 530; McDowell, at 
pp. 414–415).  This is true even where the process of judicial 
review results in substantial delays.  (See McDowell, at pp. 413–
416 [finding no error where penalty retrial took place 15 years 
after initial penalty phase].)  Here, Bloom does not argue that 
the state unnecessarily delayed retrial after the federal court 
granted him habeas relief.  The great bulk of the delay of which 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
 
he complains is instead attributable to the process of appeal and 
postconviction review.  Where, as here, “defendant has 
benefitted from the careful and meticulous process of judicial 
review, he cannot now complain that the process ‘which exists 
to protect him has violated other of his rights.’ ”  (Id. at p. 415.) 
Even so, Bloom contends that the trial court should have 
dismissed the case or taken steps to limit the prejudice caused 
by the unavailability of the two expert witnesses.  He points to 
People v. Sixto (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 374 (Sixto), which, like this 
case, involved a retrial following reversal of a conviction due to 
former 
trial 
counsel’s 
constitutionally 
ineffective 
performance — there, failure to have blood samples properly 
analyzed to support a drug-related diminished capacity defense.  
Also, much as in this case, relevant evidence became 
unavailable before the retrial occurred; the blood sample had not 
been preserved.  The Sixto court addressed the possibility that 
the loss of evidence might require curative measures, though it 
ultimately concluded that the loss of the defendant’s blood 
sample did not require such measures in the defendant’s case.  
(Id. at p. 396; see id. at p. 399 [courts have discretion to 
determine appropriate admonitions or other measures].)  The 
court explained that “retrial counsel were able to bring out 
significant evidence which was not presented at the first trial.  
Thus, the second trial was not rendered a meaningless, futile 
replay of the first proceedings, even absent some sort of curative 
measures by the trial court.”  (Id. at p. 396.) 
Sixto does not help Bloom’s case.  The unavailability of 
Bloom’s original experts did not prevent him from putting on a 
mental state defense at the retrial; indeed, several experts 
testified on his behalf.  Nothing in Sixto or any other case Bloom 
has cited supports the argument that due process nonetheless 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
 
required the extreme step of dismissing or limiting the charges 
against him.  And to the extent Bloom argues that the trial court 
erred in failing to instruct the jury not to consider the passage 
of time in its evaluation of the evidence, neither Sixto nor any 
other cited case supports the argument.  (See Sixto, supra, 17 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 390–392, 401–402 [upholding trial court’s 
refusal to give the defendant’s requested curative instructions].)  
Here, the requested instructions would have hampered the 
jury’s realistic evaluation of the evidence; even defense expert 
Dr. Mark Mills acknowledged that the passage of time affected 
his ability to discern what Bloom was like when the offenses 
were committed (though Dr. Mills still maintained that the 
particular Asperger Syndrome diagnosis he had reached was 
valid regardless of the passage of time).   
Bloom raises various other objections to the conduct of the 
retrial.  Bloom argues that even though the trial court had 
forbidden references to the verdicts from his first trial, the 
prosecution improperly injected the prior trial into the retrial by 
referring to or relying on the prior testimony of witnesses.4  He 
also contends that the prosecution improperly asked questions 
that either obliquely referred to, or solicited responses that 
referred to, Bloom’s prior incarceration.  But contrary to Bloom’s 
arguments, none of these references violated either Penal Code 
section 1180, which forbids references to former verdicts or 
findings, or his due process rights.  None of the references to 
witnesses’ prior testimony directly revealed the verdict reached 
 
4  
We address below, in part II.B.2., Bloom’s contention that 
the unavailability of lay witnesses Christine Waller and Martin 
Medrano at the retrial undermined his defense and prevented a 
fair trial. 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
 
in Bloom’s prior trial.  Nor did they encourage the jury to draw 
inferences that risked “implying prior criminality,” thus 
“prejudic[ing] defendant in the eyes of the jury.”  (People v. 
Kessler (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 187, 192.)  It is true that the 
references would have led jurors to assume Bloom had 
previously been tried and that he had been detained before the 
retrial, but as both sides in the case acknowledged, that 
information was inevitably going to come out and on its own 
raised no unacceptable risk of prejudicing Bloom in the eyes of 
the jury. 
2. Failure to conduct competency proceedings  
Bloom contends the trial court violated his state and 
federal constitutional rights by failing to suspend his trial and 
institute competency proceedings at various points in the 
proceeding as information calling his competence into question 
came to its attention.  Even if no single piece of evidence 
compelled such a response from the trial court, he contends, the 
cumulative weight of the information should have led the court 
to declare a doubt as to Bloom’s competency and institute 
proceedings under Penal Code section 1368.5  We reject the 
argument. 
 
5  
Penal Code section 1368 provides for suspension of the 
criminal proceedings and a hearing on the defendant’s 
competence to stand trial whenever a doubt about competence 
arises in the trial court.  (Pen. Code, § 1368, subds. (a), (b).)  
Proceedings are suspended until competence is determined, but 
the jury remains impaneled and sworn unless the court 
determines undue hardship would result if the jurors remained 
on call.  If the defendant is determined to be incompetent, the 
jury is dismissed.  (Id., subd. (c).) 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
25 
 
a. General principles 
“ ‘Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and state law 
prohibit the state from trying or convicting a criminal defendant 
while he or she is mentally incompetent.’  (People v. Rogers 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 846 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135]; see 
[Pen. Code,] § 1367, subd. (a); Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 
162, 172 [43 L.Ed.2d 103, 95 S.Ct. 896].)  ‘A defendant is 
incompetent to stand trial if [he] is unable to consult with [his] 
attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or 
lacks a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings 
against [him].’ ”  (People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 720–
721.) 
“ ‘The decision whether to order a competency hearing 
rests within the trial court’s discretion, and may be disturbed 
upon appeal “only where a doubt as to [mental competence] may 
be said to appear as a matter of law or where there is an abuse 
of discretion.”  [Citation.]  When the court is presented with 
“substantial evidence of present mental incompetence,” 
however, the defendant is “entitled to a section 1368 hearing as 
a matter of right.”  [Citation.]  On review, our inquiry is focused 
not on the subjective opinion of the trial judge, but rather on 
whether there was substantial evidence raising a reasonable 
doubt concerning the defendant’s competence to stand trial.  
[Citation.] . . . A trial court reversibly errs if it fails to hold a 
competency hearing when one is required under the substantial 
evidence test.’ ”  (People v. Woodruff, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 721.) 
Bloom contends that the trial court should have declared 
a doubt and held a competency hearing at each of the three 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
26 
 
phases of the trial:  guilt, sanity, and penalty.  We address in 
turn Bloom’s competence at the guilt and sanity phases.6 
b. Guilt phase 
Bloom contends that during the guilt phase of the trial, 
various circumstances were made known to the court that 
should have prompted it to suspend proceedings.  As an initial 
matter, when the case was returned to Los Angeles County 
Superior Court for retrial in 1998, the court was aware that the 
1983 proceedings had included a trial pursuant to Penal Code 
section 1368, just before sentencing, in which the jury had found 
Bloom competent.  The federal court had also vacated Bloom’s 
1983 convictions on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel 
for failure to adequately prepare and present a mental disorder 
defense.  (Bloom v. Calderon, supra, 132 F.3d at pp. 1277–1278.)  
In September 1998, soon after Bloom was received in county jail 
pending retrial, the court received notice that Bloom had been 
admitted to a forensic inpatient program under Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 5150 on a finding that he was gravely 
disabled or a danger to himself or others.  Two months later, 
Bloom made a Marsden7 motion seeking substitution of counsel.  
During a hearing on the motion, Bloom complained that his trial 
counsel were insisting on presenting a psychiatric defense 
against his wishes because his federal appellate counsel had 
instructed them to do so.   
Near the beginning of the retrial, in January 1999, Judge 
Hoff — to whom the case was initially assigned for retrial — 
 
6  
We need not address Bloom’s competence during the 
penalty phase because, as discussed post at page 45, the penalty 
verdict must be reversed for other reasons. 
7  
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).   
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
27 
 
ordered an evaluation of Bloom’s competence in connection with 
his motion for self-representation, but Bloom withdrew his 
motion and no evaluation took place.     
Before the start of the retrial — in connection with a 
motion to exclude the prior testimony of Martin Medrano and 
Christine Waller (see pt. II.B.2., post) — the defense presented 
the 1993 declarations of five mental health professionals opining 
that Bloom had been incompetent at his first trial because of 
severe, long-standing mental illness and brain damage.  At the 
hearing on the motion, defense counsel characterized Bloom’s 
present competence as “a fluid issue” that was being assessed 
“day to day.”  The prosecutor, seeking clarity regarding whether 
or when Bloom’s competence would be litigated during the 
retrial, suggested that if he was incompetent at the first trial, 
there was no reason to believe he was competent for retrial.  The 
trial court observed a new physical behavior on Bloom’s part (he 
was “swaying”), but did not suspend proceedings for a 
competence hearing.   
On the day before opening statements, the parties and the 
court discussed Bloom’s desire to represent himself in the 
penalty phase should the case get that far.  The discussion 
returned to the issue of Bloom’s competence.  Defense counsel 
Seymour Applebaum said that in his view “Mr. Bloom has 
always been skirting the edges of incompetence,” particularly as 
to his ability to cooperate with counsel, but pointedly stopped 
short of declaring a doubt as to Bloom’s present competence.  
Alluding to “the voluminous materials in preparation that arose 
out of the various appeals and ultimately the habeas 
proceedings and what the lawyers and the various mental 
health professionals did, our predecessors did,” counsel 
explained that in the posture of this case Bloom’s cooperation in 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
28 
 
the factual aspects of preparation for trial was unnecessary.  
“But as we get closer, he’s again skirting the edges of his ability 
to cooperate with counsel, interference in the trial process due 
to a mental illness, disease or defect, and I think the court needs 
to be aware of this.  [¶]  It’s something that’s concerned me, it’s 
something that’s always troubled me, and if this were a different 
type of case in terms of how it came to us, vis-à-vis the 
preparation that needed to be done, where I needed to confer 
with the client, needed to plan strategy with the client, I would 
have declared a [Penal Code section] 1368 doubt eons ago.  
[¶]  . . .  [¶]  Quite truthfully, if there is interference where he is 
in my view not cooperating with preparation of the case in a 
rational way, where he starts interfering with the tactical 
process, my view is that I will have to declare a doubt and then 
we’ll do what we have to do.”  The retrial proceeded without a 
hearing on competence under section 1368. 
From time to time throughout the retrial proceedings, 
Bloom engaged in odd behaviors, calling mental health expert 
Dr. Sharma “a Christian spy”; suggesting there were poisoned 
ants on cookies provided by the jail; referring to defense counsel 
Tonya Deetz as the “consigliere of the principality of Israel,” the 
last phrase (the principality of Israel) seemingly referring to 
himself; referring to prosecutor Shellie Samuels as “one of [his] 
subjects”; and calling Judge Schempp the “lady of the court.”  
When Bloom learned that Judge Hoff’s son had been in his high 
school class, Bloom sought to question both the judge and his 
son under oath and asked for substitution of counsel for failing 
to seek the judge’s recusal.  At times, Bloom argues, his 
discussions about the anticipated penalty phase raised 
questions about his understanding of the nature of mitigation.  
For example, he expressed glee at the prospect of having Roz 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
29 
 
Kelly, a former actor whom he had met while in jail, testify on 
his behalf.   
Bloom argues that all this information raised a doubt as 
to his competence in the guilt phase.  He acknowledges defense 
counsel’s assertion that Bloom had not yet crossed the threshold 
of incompetence but contends the assertion must be disregarded 
because counsel’s understanding of incompetence was at odds 
with constitutional standards.  That is, he claims, counsel’s 
statement that in another case counsel would have declared a 
doubt “eons ago” was tantamount to saying that Bloom was 
presently incompetent, but in this particular case counsel did 
not need him to be otherwise.  In any event, he contends, 
counsel’s belief did not eliminate the trial court’s independent 
obligation to initiate competency proceedings in the face of 
substantial evidence objectively raising a reasonable doubt 
regarding Bloom’s competence. 
We disagree with Bloom that, on these facts, the trial court 
was required to declare a doubt under Penal Code section 1368 
before or during the guilt phase of the retrial.  “To raise a 
doubt . . . we require more than ‘mere bizarre actions’ or 
statements, or even expert testimony that a defendant is 
psychopathic, homicidal, or a danger to him- or herself and 
others.  [Citations.]  . . .  [Citation.]  Defendant’s trial demeanor 
is relevant to, but not dispositive of, the question whether the 
trial court should have suspended proceedings under section 
1368.”  (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 202.)  Although 
the trial court was aware that Bloom had a history of mental 
illness and although the court observed occasional odd 
behaviors, neither fact, without more, gave rise to a duty to 
suspend proceedings and conduct a formal evaluation of Bloom’s 
ability to understand the proceedings against him and assist 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
30 
 
rationally in his own defense.  (See ibid.; People v. Blair (2005) 
36 Cal.4th 686, 714.)  Nor, contrary to Bloom’s argument, did 
the trial court have a duty to inquire into Bloom’s psychiatric 
medication, at least absent any evidence that defendant’s 
competence hinged on compliance with a medication regimen.  
(Cf. People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 235.)8 
Bloom relies heavily on the expert declarations presented 
in support of the pretrial motion to exclude the Medrano and 
Waller testimony, which opined that Bloom had been 
incompetent at the original trial.  The jury at that trial had 
determined otherwise.  But in any event, the declarations 
opined that Bloom had been incompetent more than a decade 
before the retrial; they did not opine on Bloom’s present ability 
to understand the proceedings against him or consult rationally 
with his attorneys.  Notably, several of these same experts 
examined Bloom again in advance of retrial to assess the 
validity of a possible sanity defense, and none opined that Bloom 
was at that time incompetent to stand trial.  This case is thus 
unlike People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58, in which an expert 
who was “appointed to address defendant’s competence to 
represent himself . . . also addressed, in detail, defendant’s 
competence to stand trial,” declaring him to be incompetent.  (Id. 
at p. 76; see id. at p. 78.)  There, we held that contemporaneous 
 
8  
To the extent Bloom may be understood to suggest that 
Dr. Mills’s testimony diagnosing him with Asperger Syndrome 
obligated the trial court to appoint the director of the regional 
center to evaluate him under Penal Code section 1369, he is 
mistaken; such an obligation arises only when a doubt regarding 
a defendant’s competence exists and the court suspects the 
defendant has a developmental disability.  (Pen. Code, § 1369, 
subd. (a)(3); People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 466.) 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
31 
 
expert 
opinion 
constituted 
substantial 
evidence 
of 
incompetence, such that the court abused its discretion by 
failing to suspend proceedings.  (Id. at p. 88.)  Here, where 
several experts evaluated Bloom before the retrial and none 
concluded that he was incompetent, we cannot say the court 
abused its discretion by failing to suspend proceedings.    
Finally, in multiple discussions of the issue, defense 
counsel declined to raise a doubt about Bloom’s present 
competence, even as counsel acknowledged the issue was close 
and that he might raise such a doubt in the future.  Bloom 
argues that defense counsel may have misunderstood the 
relevant standard, at one point suggesting that a doubt would 
have been declared “eons ago” in a different case.  What counsel 
meant by this statement is, in context, ambiguous.  Certainly, if 
counsel was suggesting that whether to declare a doubt was 
affected by the “type of case” or the nature of the work needed 
for counsel to prepare a defense, the suggestion was incorrect.  
It was Bloom’s ability to assist, not counsel’s need for assistance, 
that mattered.  (See, e.g., People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 
p. 202 [“[T]he focus of the competence inquiry is on a defendant’s 
understanding of the criminal proceedings against him or her 
and the ability to consult with counsel or otherwise assist in his 
or her defense”].)  But counsel did not elaborate on the comment, 
leaving its import unclear.9  Counsel did, however, clearly 
decline to raise a doubt about Bloom’s present incompetence.  
And although counsel raised concerns about the possibility that 
 
9  
We have not been asked to, and do not, evaluate whether 
counsel’s potential misapprehension of the standard constituted 
ineffective assistance; as we have previously noted, such 
questions are best left to resolution on habeas corpus.  (See 
People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 267.)  
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
32 
 
Bloom would not be able to rationally consult with his attorneys 
in the future, counsel also acknowledged those concerns had not 
yet been realized.  Under those circumstances, the court was not 
obligated to suspend proceedings. 
c. Sanity phase 
Bloom next contends the trial court should have 
suspended proceedings during the sanity phase.  Bloom had 
absented himself from the sanity phase proceedings.  On the day 
the jury began to deliberate about whether Bloom was insane at 
the time of the capital crimes, defense counsel Applebaum told 
the court there had been “substantial changes in the last couple 
of days with Mr. Bloom” that led him to declare a doubt 
regarding his competence to stand trial.  At that point, Bloom 
contends, the court had before it other substantial evidence 
raising a doubt regarding his competence, including his decision 
to absent himself from the sanity phase and Dr. Vicary’s guilt 
phase testimony to the effect that Bloom was more likely than a 
normal person to suffer a breakdown or “snap” under stressful 
circumstances such as a criminal trial.  Hearing experts testify 
he was mentally ill — a proposition he adamantly denied — 
might exacerbate the stress.   
In response to counsel’s declaration of doubt, the trial 
court stated that Bloom’s ability to cooperate with counsel was 
unimportant at the time because “[w]e are merely waiting for 
the verdict to come in the sanity phase.”  Bloom contends the 
court’s response was both legally and factually wrong.  Bloom 
argues that as a matter of law, a doubt about competence can 
arise during jury deliberations.  And as a factual matter, Bloom 
argues, his ability to cooperate with counsel would soon become 
crucial when, after seven days of deliberations, the jury was 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
33 
 
unable to reach a sanity verdict on counts 2 and 3, the killings 
of Josephine and Sandra; at that point, his inability to rationally 
consult with counsel led him to irrationally withdraw his plea of 
not guilty by reason of insanity.     
We agree with Bloom that doubt can arise during 
deliberations.  But the alleged harms Bloom identifies occurred 
after deliberations had concluded, at a point when it would have 
been clear to all that his competence did in fact matter.  The 
trial court was under an unquestioned continuing obligation to 
suspend proceedings if it harbored a doubt as to Bloom’s 
competence — an obligation it surely understood — and yet the 
court did not do so.  When a court harbors a doubt about the 
defendant’s competence, Penal Code section 1368 requires the 
court to solicit defense counsel’s opinion on the matter and to 
hold a competency hearing if counsel informs the court the 
defendant may not be competent.  (Pen. Code, § 1368, subds. (a) 
& (b).)  But as we have previously explained, there is no similar 
obligation if the court harbors no such doubt; the court is “under 
no duty to hold a competency hearing based solely on counsel’s 
opinion that defendant might be incompetent.”  (People v. 
Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1112.)   
The court was by this point in the trial quite familiar with 
Bloom, who had addressed the court cogently and at length 
about sanity phase decisions.  Against these opportunities for 
observation, defense counsel Applebaum cited no specific 
aspects of Bloom’s behavior or communications that prompted 
him to declare a doubt, nor did he intimate that in invoking 
Penal Code section 1368 he was relying on any new expert 
evaluations of his client.  Dr. Vicary’s testimony, on which 
Bloom now relies, did not constitute an opinion that Bloom was 
presently incompetent or would necessarily become so.  And to 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
34 
 
the extent Bloom now relies on his subsequent decision to 
withdraw his insanity plea after the sanity phase mistrial, at 
the time Bloom gave a facially rational basis for his decision:  
that a retrial would require the case be transferred to a different 
department, with a different judge.  While the insanity plea and 
trial may have highlighted tensions between Bloom and his 
attorneys, leading to Bloom absenting himself from that phase 
of trial, no competency hearing is required when a “defendant’s 
lack of cooperation” arises from unwillingness rather than 
inability.  (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 526.)  In sum, 
nothing in the sanity phase presented the court with substantial 
evidence of incompetence; in the absence of such evidence, we 
cannot conclude the trial court erred in allowing criminal 
proceedings to continue despite counsel’s stated doubts about 
the recent deterioration of Bloom’s mental state. 
B. Guilt Phase Issues 
1. Sixth Amendment right of autonomy over the 
defense  
Bloom willingly conceded that he killed Bloom, Sr.  But 
before trial, Bloom repeatedly objected to his attorneys’ plan to 
concede Bloom also killed Josephine and Sandra, and to pursue 
a mental capacity defense as to all three killings.  Despite 
Bloom’s objections, at trial defense counsel told the jury that 
Bloom killed the three victims, but argued Bloom’s mental state 
rendered those actions manslaughter, not first degree murder.  
Bloom argues that counsel’s concessions violated his Sixth 
Amendment right of autonomy over the defense under McCoy v. 
Louisiana, supra, 584 U.S. ___ [138 S.Ct. 1500] (McCoy).  We 
agree in part:  counsel’s decision to concede Bloom killed 
Josephine and Sandra, despite Bloom’s insistence to the 
contrary, violated Bloom’s right to determine the objectives of 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
35 
 
the defense and maintain complete innocence as to these counts.  
But we disagree as to the killing of Bloom, Sr., for which Bloom 
consistently accepted responsibility.  Once Bloom agreed to 
admit he killed his father, how best to secure acquittal or 
conviction of a lesser offense was a tactical matter vested with 
counsel. 
Throughout pretrial proceedings, Bloom made known his 
discontent with both of his appointed attorneys, moving to 
substitute or relieve counsel numerous times under Marsden 
and Faretta.10  Bloom’s chief complaint was that he did not want 
to present a mental defense, but he also objected to his 
attorneys’ plan to concede guilt as part of this strategy.  He 
repeatedly told the court that he would admit to fatally shooting 
his father.  But he refused to admit to killing Josephine and 
Sandra.  He took the view that the prosecution’s evidence was 
weak, and he preferred to put the prosecution to its proof.   
Bloom did not succeed in either relieving counsel or 
altering counsel’s strategy.  During opening statement, lead 
defense counsel Applebaum told jurors:  “The evidence . . . is 
going to show you that [Bloom] killed his father, he killed 
Josephine and he killed Sandy.”  Counsel argued that the 
killings were manslaughters because Bloom acted in the heat of 
passion when killing his father, who was “a horrible excuse for 
a human being.”  Bloom then “descended into the depths of 
madness” and killed Josephine and Sandra but was incapable of 
deliberate thought when he did so.  Counsel argued:  “We will 
prove to you [Bloom] committed manslaughters and he should 
be held responsible for what he did.”  Returning to the same 
 
10  
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).  
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
36 
 
theme, counsel told the jurors Bloom should not be convicted of 
murdering Josephine and Sandra because “the mental states 
required for murder are not there.  [¶]  Yes, he should be held 
responsible for killing them.  He did it.  Manslaughter, an 
intentional killing, he did it.”   
During closing argument, defense cocounsel Tonya Deetz 
again referenced Bloom’s responsibility for the killings, telling 
jurors, “You will find him guilty.”  She went on, “You will find 
[Bloom] criminally responsible for three homicides.  That is a 
fact.  [¶]  He killed three people.  It is neither excused nor 
justified.”  Deetz told jurors they could find Bloom “guilty of 
anything [they] want, Josephine and Sand[y] will still be dead.”  
“One issue you don’t have to fool around with is did he do it, 
didn’t he do it,” Deetz argued, because there was “[t]ons of direct 
evidence that he killed these people.”  Applebaum later 
reiterated, “He is guilty and you will find him guilty.  The 
question is what is he guilty of.  Murder or another type of 
homicide?”  He also informed jurors that Bloom was “guilty of 
something,” and noted “in some ways that takes away from the 
presumption of innocence.”  Finally, he urged the jury to 
conclude Bloom “is guilty of involuntary manslaughter as to 
Josephine and Sand[y] because of his mental illness, this 
dissociation.”   
Bloom claims that his attorneys violated his autonomy-
based right to determine the objective of his defense, guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, by 
conceding over his objection that he was responsible for killing 
Josephine and Sandra and by presenting a mental state defense 
to all three charged crimes.  His argument relies on McCoy, 
supra, 138 S.Ct. 1500, which considered “whether it is 
unconstitutional to allow defense counsel to concede guilt over 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
37 
 
the defendant’s intransigent and unambiguous objection” and 
answered that question in the affirmative.  (Id. at p. 1507.) 
In McCoy, the defendant shot and killed his estranged 
wife’s mother, stepfather, and son in their home.  (McCoy, supra, 
138 S.Ct. at pp. 1505–1506.)  McCoy was indicted on three 
counts of first degree murder but maintained he was not 
involved in the killings because he was out of state and the 
victims were instead killed by corrupt police officers following a 
drug deal.  (Id. at p. 1506.)  In light of “overwhelming” evidence 
tying his client to the murders, McCoy’s retained counsel, Larry 
English, decided the best strategy to avoid a death sentence was 
to concede McCoy’s guilt (ibid.) and appeal to the jury’s mercy 
in view of McCoy’s “ ‘serious mental and emotional issues’ ” (id. 
at p. 1507).  McCoy, however, was “ ‘complet[ely] oppos[ed] to 
[his attorney] telling the jury that [he] was guilty of killing the 
three victims.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1506.)  Given English and McCoy’s 
differences concerning what strategy to pursue, McCoy sought 
to substitute counsel two days before trial.  (Ibid.)  The court 
denied that request and instructed English that it was his role 
to “ ‘make the trial decision’ ” about whether to concede his 
client’s guilt.  (Ibid.)  As he had indicated he would, English 
conceded McCoy’s guilt of the three murders during the guilt 
phase opening statement, telling jurors “there was ‘no way 
reasonably possible’ that they could hear the prosecution’s 
evidence and reach ‘any other conclusion than Robert McCoy 
was the cause of these individuals’ death[s].’ ”  (Ibid.)  The jury 
returned three death verdicts, and the Louisiana Supreme 
Court affirmed, concluding defense counsel had authority to 
concede guilt over the defendant’s opposition.  (Id. at p. 1507.) 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding 
English’s concession violated McCoy’s right, grounded in the 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
38 
 
Sixth Amendment, to “decide that the objective of the defense is 
to assert innocence.”  (McCoy, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 1508.)  The 
court distinguished for these purposes between the types of 
decisions that counsel ordinarily may make unilaterally and 
those defendants are entitled to make for themselves.  The court 
explained:  “Trial management is the lawyer’s province:  
Counsel provides his or her assistance by making decisions such 
as ‘what arguments to pursue, what evidentiary objections to 
raise, and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission 
of evidence.’  [Citation.]  Some decisions, however, are reserved 
for the client — notably, whether to plead guilty, waive the right 
to a jury trial, testify in one’s own behalf, and forgo an appeal.”  
(Ibid.)  The court concluded that “[a]utonomy to decide that the 
objective of the defense is to assert innocence belongs in this 
latter category”:  “Just as a defendant may steadfastly refuse to 
plead guilty in the face of overwhelming evidence against 
her, . . . so may she insist on maintaining her innocence at the 
guilt phase of a capital trial.”  (Ibid.)  Put differently:  “When a 
client expressly asserts that the objective of ‘his defence’ is to 
maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts, his lawyer 
must abide by that objective and may not override it by 
conceding guilt.”  (Id. at p. 1509.) 
Bloom argues this case is controlled by McCoy.  We agree 
with respect to the counts arising from the deaths of Josephine 
and Sandra.  Defense counsel conceded, over Bloom’s objection, 
both that Bloom killed Josephine and Sandra and that Bloom 
should be held criminally liable for the killings.  Counsel’s 
decision to concede Bloom’s guilt on these counts cannot be 
squared with a rule that gives the criminal defendant the right 
to “oppos[e] . . . any admission of guilt” (McCoy, supra, 138 S.Ct. 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
39 
 
at p. 1507) and instead “pursue acquittal” as the object of the 
representation (id. at p. 1506). 
It is true that counsel here argued Bloom should be held 
liable only for lesser offenses than the first degree murder 
charges he faced.  Counsel undoubtedly had sound reasons for 
making these concessions; in view of the evidence, counsel may 
well have concluded the best possible outcome of the proceedings 
was one that would reduce the severity of Bloom’s likely 
punishment.  But even so, counsel’s concessions were 
incompatible with Bloom’s objective to instead maintain 
innocence and pursue acquittal.  And as McCoy instructs, the 
decision about what objective to pursue was Bloom’s to make. 
Indeed, the McCoy opinion addressed this very scenario, 
citing with approval a number of state cases holding that 
counsel may not unilaterally pursue a strategy of “concession of 
the defendant’s commission of criminal acts and pursuit of 
diminished capacity, mental illness, or lack of premeditation 
defenses.”  (McCoy, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 1510.)11  These cases, 
as the high court described them, “were not strategic disputes 
about whether to concede an element of a charged offense, 
[citation]; they were intractable disagreements about the 
fundamental objective of the defendant’s representation.”  
(McCoy, at p. 1510.)  This was so because the unavoidable 
 
11  
For example, in People v. Bergerud (Colo. 2010) 223 P.3d 
686, cited with approval by McCoy, supra, 138 S.Ct. at 
page 1510, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether 
defense counsel had, “by focusing on [defendant’s] mental state, 
. . . effectively pled him guilty to lesser homicide crimes against 
his wishes,” conduct that in its view “would have overstepped 
their bounds and appropriated fundamental choices committed 
to the defendant’s decision alone.”  (Bergerud, at p. 697.) 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
40 
 
consequence of counsel’s strategy in those cases was to abandon 
the defendant’s wish to pursue acquittal in favor of a strategy 
that would concede criminal responsibility of a lesser crime in 
order to seek lesser punishment.  In characterizing this choice 
as going to the fundamental objective of the defendant’s 
representation, McCoy makes clear that the decision whether to 
concede the defendant should be found guilty of a crime — even 
a lesser crime than the one the prosecution charged — is a 
decision that necessarily belongs to the defendant.  (See also 
People v. Flores (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 270, 273, 275 [finding 
McCoy error where counsel conceded killing and argued absence 
of premeditation over the defendant’s objection];12 People v. 
Eddy (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 472, 477 [finding McCoy error 
where counsel conceded guilt of manslaughter over client’s 
objection]; State v. Horn (La. 2018) 251 So.3d 1069, 1072–1074 
[finding McCoy error where counsel conceded capital defendant 
was guilty of second degree murder or manslaughter over 
defendant’s objection].)  
The Attorney General does not dispute that McCoy forbids 
counsel from conceding guilt of the charged offense or lesser 
included offenses despite the client’s wish to maintain 
innocence.  He instead argues McCoy is inapplicable because the 
core of Bloom’s objection was not, in fact, a wish to maintain 
innocence, but instead a wish to avoid a mental capacity defense 
and a wish to test gaps in the prosecution’s evidence that he 
killed Josephine and Sandra.  Given the nature of Bloom’s 
 
12  
This case raises no question about the application of the 
Sixth Amendment to other types of concessions falling short of 
a concession of guilt, such as concession of certain elements of a 
charged offense.  (See People v. Flores, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 280–283.)  We express no views on the subject. 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
41 
 
objection, the Attorney General contends that counsel’s decision 
to concede guilt was the sort of strategic judgment that falls 
within counsel’s prerogative under McCoy. 
With regard to Josephine and Sandra, the record belies 
the premise of the argument:  Bloom clearly objected to 
admitting responsibility for the two victims’ deaths.  It is true 
that he was not always adamant on this point; in an initial 
Marsden hearing, for example, he seemed to suggest that he 
ought to be entitled to reduce his convictions from first degree 
murder because he did not premeditate the murders, without 
mentioning that he either believed himself to be innocent or that 
he wished for his counsel to maintain his innocence on retrial.  
But Bloom would later inform the court and counsel, in 
unmistakable terms, that he did not want to admit to killing 
Josephine or Sandra.  He said:  “[Defense counsel], over my 
objection and against my express wishes, is going to concede 
guilt in this case and I find that to be intolerable and 
outrageous.”  Even considering these statements in the broader 
context of Bloom’s opposition to the mental defense strategy, 
there is nothing genuinely ambiguous about his expressed 
desire to maintain innocence in the deaths of Josephine and 
Sandra.13  Counsel nonetheless conceded that Bloom was 
factually responsible for the deaths of Josephine and Sandra, 
 
13 
The Attorney General notes that at the first trial, Bloom 
disputed that he killed Josephine, but did not dispute that he 
killed Sandra.  The Attorney General does not suggest, however, 
that Bloom affirmatively admitted to killing Sandra.  (Cf. People 
v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1207 [Bloom testified at trial 
that he saw Sandra after shooting Bloom, Sr., pulled the trigger 
on the rifle, and “ ‘the next thing that happened’ was that he was 
arrested while walking”].) 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
42 
 
and while he did not commit first degree murder, he should still 
be held criminally liable for their deaths.  This decision was 
certainly understandable as a matter of trial strategy.  But 
under McCoy, Bloom’s clearly expressed objection should have 
controlled. 
We agree with the Attorney General, however, that there 
was no McCoy violation in connection with the Bloom, Sr., 
murder charge, as to which Bloom conceded his responsibility. 
And although Bloom cursorily argues otherwise, counsel’s 
presentation of a mental capacity defense on this count, in the 
absence of a clearly objected-to admission of criminal liability, 
did not give rise to a Sixth Amendment violation.  McCoy 
explained the point as follows:  “If, after consultations with 
English concerning the management of the defense, McCoy 
disagreed with English’s proposal to concede McCoy committed 
three murders, it was not open to English to override McCoy’s 
objection.  English could not interfere with McCoy’s telling the 
jury ‘I was not the murderer,’ although counsel could, if 
consistent with providing effective assistance, focus his own 
collaboration on urging that McCoy’s mental state weighed 
against conviction.”  (McCoy, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 1509.)  Here, 
the case was retried precisely because the Ninth Circuit found 
Bloom’s counsel at his first trial ineffective for failing to 
effectively develop a mental state defense.  (Bloom v. Calderon, 
supra, 132 F.3d at pp. 1271–1278.)  The decision to pursue a 
defense strategy focused on the role Bloom’s mental health 
played in the crimes was strongly indicated, if not outright 
compelled, by the Ninth Circuit’s decision.  So here, where 
Bloom did not contest his responsibility for killing his father, 
Bloom, Sr., at the retrial, counsel did not violate the Sixth 
Amendment by presenting a mental state defense to first degree 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
43 
 
murder, even though Bloom did not wish for counsel to present 
the defense.14 
Having found error as to two of the murder counts, we 
consider the appropriate remedy.  In McCoy, the court reversed 
the judgment without an inquiry into harmlessness.  It 
concluded that the autonomy rights violated by counsel’s 
unilateral decision to concede his client’s guilt of first degree 
murder fell within that category of rights that are “so basic to a 
fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless 
error.”  (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23 
(Chapman).)  The court likened the violation in the case to a 
violation of a defendant’s right of self-representation, explaining 
“ ‘[t]he right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot 
be harmless.’ ”  (McCoy, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 1511.)  Like the 
deprivation of that right, the court concluded counsel’s 
erroneous concession of guilt of first degree murder was a 
“structural” error that could be corrected only by holding a new 
trial.  (Id. at p. 1512.)  Bloom argues that here, too, the error is 
structural and requires us to reverse the judgment in its 
entirety. 
We agree that the McCoy error requires reversal of the 
affected counts and associated allegations but disagree that it 
 
14 
We note that the decision whether to present a mental 
capacity defense differs from the decision whether to present a 
defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.  While a mental 
capacity defense may mitigate criminal culpability, an insanity 
defense could result in indefinite commitment to a mental 
institution.  For this reason, under long-standing California law, 
a presently sane defendant must be permitted to make the 
decision whether to mount an insanity defense.  (People v. Gauze 
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 717–718.) 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
44 
 
requires reversing the judgment in its entirety.  In McCoy, it 
made sense to reverse the judgment on all counts because the 
error affected the entire defense:  McCoy wished to maintain his 
innocence of all three murder counts, and counsel conceded his 
guilt on all three counts.  Here, by contrast, Bloom wished to 
maintain his innocence on only two of the three counts.  As 
noted, throughout the proceedings, Bloom acknowledged that he 
shot his father to death and clearly told the court and counsel 
that he had no objection to saying so.  There is no reasonable 
possibility that counsel’s erroneous concessions with respect to 
the other counts affected the jury’s consideration of the count 
concerning the murder of Bloom, Sr.  There is, therefore, no 
reason why the jury’s verdict with respect to the murder of 
Bloom, Sr., should not stand.  (See, e.g., People v. Reese (2017) 2 
Cal.5th 660, 671.)   
By contrast, counsel’s decision to concede Bloom’s criminal 
responsibility for the deaths of Josephine and Sandra over 
Bloom’s objection is error of the sort that, as McCoy instructs, 
defies harmlessness review.  As the McCoy court explained:  
“Such an admission blocks the defendant’s right to make the 
fundamental choices about his own defense.  And the effects of 
the admission would be immeasurable, because a jury would 
almost certainly be swayed by a lawyer’s concession of his 
client’s guilt.”  (McCoy, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 1511.)  Bloom 
“must therefore be accorded a new trial” on the affected counts 
“without any need first to show prejudice.”  (Ibid.) 
This conclusion requires us to reverse Bloom’s convictions 
on counts 2 and 3, concerning the murders of Josephine and 
Sandra, as well as the associated firearm- and weapon-use 
allegations.  The reversal of two of the three charged murder 
convictions also requires us to reverse the jury’s true finding on 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
45 
 
the only special circumstance alleged here, multiple murder.  
And this, finally, requires us to reverse the death judgment, 
which cannot stand in the absence of a valid special 
circumstance finding.  (See People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 
227, 253.) 
2. Admission of witnesses’ former testimony  
Witnesses Martin Medrano and Christine Waller testified 
at Bloom’s first trial but were unavailable on retrial.  The trial 
court allowed the prosecution to introduce their former 
testimony under Evidence Code section 1291.15  Bloom contends 
this was error that violated both the Evidence Code and his 
federal constitutional rights.  We reject the argument. 
In his testimony as read to the jury on retrial, Medrano 
testified that in April 1982, three or four days before the 
homicides, Bloom asked Medrano to get him a handgun, offering 
 
15  
Evidence Code section 1291 provides:  “(a) Evidence of 
former testimony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule 
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and:  [¶]  (1) The 
former testimony is offered against a person who offered it in 
evidence in his own behalf on the former occasion or against the 
successor in interest of such person; or [¶]  (2) The party against 
whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action 
or proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the 
right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an 
interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing.  
[¶]  (b) The admissibility of former testimony under this section 
is subject to the same limitations and objections as though the 
declarant were testifying at the hearing, except that former 
testimony offered under this section is not subject to:  [¶]  
(1) Objections to the form of the question which were not made 
at the time the former testimony was given.  [¶]  (2) Objections 
based on competency or privilege which did not exist at the time 
the former testimony was given.” 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
46 
 
$1,200 and mentioning he had a contract to kill someone.  A few 
days later,  Bloom told Medrano he would read about the killing, 
but never produced any money to buy a gun.  When Medrano 
heard about the crime, he did not immediately come forward 
because he was in violation of his parole.  At the time of his 
testimony, he was in custody for armed robbery, but testified he 
had not been promised anything for his testimony.   
Waller was 14 years old in April 1982 and 16 when she 
testified at Bloom’s first trial.  At the time of the killings, she 
had known Bloom for about two years.  They had a close 
relationship, and he would often stay overnight at her house.  
Sometime in April, Bloom told her there had been an attempted 
break-in at Waller’s house and that he would stay at the home 
to protect the family.  Two nights before the killings, Bloom told 
her to stay indoors, and she saw him outside the house carrying 
her brother’s rifle.  On the day before the killings, Bloom was 
again staying at her house.  When Waller went to wake him at 
5:00 the next morning, he was not in his room.  Waller also 
testified to Bloom’s antagonistic relationship with his father, 
who was always angry at him, and his caring relationship with 
his stepsister Sandra.   
The defense sought to exclude this testimony from being 
presented in the retrial.  The defense contended that the prior 
testimony was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1291 
because Bloom had not had “the right and opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant[s] with an interest and motive similar to 
that which” he now had at the retrial, as section 1291 requires.  
(Evid. Code, § 1291, subd. (a)(2).)  He contended this was so for 
several reasons:  Because his former counsel missed important 
points in their cross-examination of the two witnesses, failing to 
probe Medrano’s motivations to lie as well as Waller’s 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
47 
 
observations of Bloom’s mental illness and relationships with 
family members; because former counsel had been found 
constitutionally 
ineffective; 
and 
because 
Bloom 
was 
incompetent at the time of the first trial.  To support this last 
point, counsel relied on evidence developed in federal habeas 
corpus proceedings, including a neurological assessment and jail 
records evidencing Bloom’s bizarre behavior, delusions and 
hallucinations, and a suicide attempt, as well as various expert 
reports.  Dr. Hyman Weiland, who had testified at the first trial 
that Bloom was incompetent, reviewed the additional evidence 
and gave a declaration stating he adhered to his previously 
expressed views.  Dr. William Vicary, who had testified at the 
first trial that Bloom was competent, declared he now believed 
Bloom had been incompetent at the first trial based on 
reviewing additional materials and interviewing Bloom again.  
Drs. Julian Kivowitz, David Lisak, and Donald Verin also 
submitted declarations agreeing that Bloom had not been 
competent during his previous trial.  Based on this evidence, 
counsel argued that a retrospective competency hearing was 
needed to determine whether the prior testimony of Medrano 
and Waller was admissible.  (See People v. Lightsey (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 668, 703–711 [discussing nature and feasibility of 
retrospective competency proceedings].) 
The prosecutor opposed the motion.  She noted that when 
the Ninth Circuit found Bloom had received ineffective 
assistance of counsel at his first trial, the court did not fault 
former counsel’s handling of the lay witnesses, instead reserving 
its criticism for his investigation and presentation of the expert 
mental health witnesses.  She also asserted that prior counsel 
may have had tactical reasons for handling the lay witnesses as 
he did, such as to avoid emphasizing that Medrano knew Bloom 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
48 
 
from jail.  Agreeing with the prosecutor, the trial court declined 
to exclude the challenged testimony of Medrano and Waller.   
We affirm the relevant rulings.  The possibility that 
current counsel would have cross-examined a witness 
differently or more searchingly does not, in itself, render the 
prior testimony inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1291.  
(People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 975 [“As long as 
defendant was given the opportunity for effective cross-
examination, the statutory requirements were satisfied; the 
admissibility of this evidence did not depend on whether 
defendant availed himself fully of that opportunity”].) 
It is true that former defense counsel’s ineffective 
assistance can, in some circumstances, be grounds for excluding 
an unavailable witness’s prior testimony on constitutional 
grounds.  In past cases, we have looked to “the circumstances 
surrounding the prior testimony and how it was used in the 
subsequent trial[] to determine whether the evidence at issue is 
attributable to counsel’s ineffective assistance and whether its 
use denied the defendant a fair trial in the subsequent 
proceeding.”  (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 686–687; 
see also Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 57 [for 
purposes of the confrontation clause, former testimony is 
admissible if the defendant had an adequate opportunity to 
examine the witness at the prior hearing], citing, inter alia, 
Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972) 408 U.S. 204, 215 [confrontation 
clause did not bar use of a witness’s prior testimony on retrial 
following reversal of a conviction for ineffective assistance of 
former counsel where the defense proffered no “new and 
significantly material line of cross-examination that was not at 
least touched upon in the first trial”].)   
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
49 
 
Here, however, Bloom makes no persuasive showing that 
the trial court should have excluded the Medrano and Waller 
testimony due to deficiencies in prior counsel’s cross-
examination.  As for Medrano, the prosecutor elicited on direct 
examination the facts of Medrano’s criminal record and heroin 
addiction and that he had been promised nothing for his 
testimony.  Trial counsel then cross-examined him regarding 
the effects of his drug use and the reasons for his delay in 
reporting his encounters with Bloom.  The cross-examination 
gave the jury ample basis to question Medrano’s veracity.  
Bloom’s argument that further cross-examination would have 
provided the jury with additional reasons to doubt his testimony 
is not sufficient reason to bar the introduction of Medrano’s 
testimony on retrial.  (See People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 
1114, 1174 [as long as the defendant was given the opportunity 
for cross-examination, admission of preliminary hearing 
testimony under Evid. Code, § 1291 does not violate the 
confrontation clause “ ‘simply because the defendant did not 
conduct a particular form of cross-examination that in hindsight 
might have been more effective,’ ” quoting People v. Samayoa 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 851].)  As for Waller, defense counsel 
elicited on cross-examination her belief that Bloom, Sr., bullied 
Bloom, her characterization of Bloom’s good relationships with 
Josephine and Sandra, her observations of Bloom, Sr., losing his 
temper at Bloom, and her recollection of Bloom’s demeanor on 
the night of the offenses.  The suggestion that former trial 
counsel, if sufficiently prepared, could have elicited from this 
teenage witness further information significantly bearing on 
Bloom’s mental state at the time of the offenses is speculative at 
best.  While it is always possible to conceive of additional 
questions that could have been asked, former trial counsel’s 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
50 
 
cross-examination of Medrano and Waller was not so deficient 
that fairness required excluding their former testimony at 
Bloom’s retrial. 
As noted, Bloom alternatively sought exclusion of the 
Medrano and Waller testimony based on information developed 
in his federal habeas corpus proceedings that suggested he was 
incompetent during his prior trial.  He contends that because he 
was incompetent, he did not have the adequate opportunity to 
cross-examine the witnesses that the Constitution requires. 
Bloom’s argument relies on Stevenson v. Superior Court 
(1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 925, 929–931.  There, the defendant was 
held to answer following a preliminary hearing.  It was later 
determined that the defendant was incompetent at the time of 
the hearing.  After the defendant was restored to competency, a 
second preliminary hearing was held.  At that hearing, the 
prosecution presented, over defense objection, the prior 
testimony of the now-unavailable victim, and the defendant was 
again held to answer.  (Id. at pp. 927–928.)  The Court of Appeal 
ordered the information set aside for lack of supporting 
evidence.  The court concluded the victim’s prior testimony was 
inadmissible because the defendant lacked an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine the victim by reason of his 
incompetence during the initial preliminary hearing.  (Id. at 
pp. 930–931.)  Although the defendant had been represented by 
counsel at the time, the appellate court nonetheless declined to 
presume the incompetent defendant enjoyed a meaningful 
opportunity for cross-examination.  (Id. at p. 930.) 
The Attorney General urges us not to follow Stevenson, 
contending that Bloom’s asserted incompetence at his first trial 
should not affect admissibility of the prior testimony unless it 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
51 
 
demonstrably impaired the defense cross-examination of the 
witnesses at the first trial.  But we need not decide here whether 
to adopt the reasoning of Stevenson, since the premise of the 
holding in that case is absent:  Unlike the defendant in 
Stevenson, Bloom was never found to be incompetent at the time 
the witnesses were examined at the first trial.  As noted above, 
the issue of Bloom’s competency was raised and litigated at the 
first trial, and Bloom was found competent.  The issue arose 
around the time of sentencing, after he had been granted self-
representation under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806.  While 
preparing for his sentencing, Bloom stabbed a fellow jail inmate.  
The trial court revoked his self-representation status, 
reappointed counsel, and ordered psychiatric evaluations and a 
competency hearing before a jury, which found him competent.  
(People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1217.)  The trial court 
then restored his self-representation status and sentenced him 
to death.  In reversing Bloom’s conviction and sentence, the 
federal court did not address any questions relating to his 
competency.  (See Bloom v. Calderon, supra, 132 F.3d 1267.) 
On appeal, Bloom contends this was error; he maintains 
that the court should have held a retrospective competency 
hearing before ruling on the admissibility of Medrano’s and 
Waller’s former testimony.  We conclude that the trial court did 
not err.  While Bloom did amass additional evidence to support 
his argument that he was incompetent at the first trial, the 
court could reasonably weigh the retrospective opinions of 
medical professionals — rendered some nine years after trial — 
against the contemporaneous opinions of the professionals who 
had taken the view that Bloom was competent.  As our cases 
have explained, there are often substantial obstacles to holding 
retrospective competency hearings — at which the defendant 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
52 
 
bears the burden of proving incompetence — even in cases in 
which competence to stand trial is directly at issue.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Wycoff, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 93–96.)  Here, the trial 
court did not err in declining to hold a retrospective competency 
hearing for the limited purpose of determining whether to admit 
the prior testimony of two witnesses who were, as explained 
above, effectively examined at the first trial.16 
The trial court did not, in short, err in overruling Bloom’s 
evidentiary objection. 
3. Cross-examination of Dr. Watson  
Bloom contends the trial court violated his rights under 
the state and federal Constitutions by allowing cross-
examination 
of 
the 
defense 
neuropsychological 
expert 
concerning Bloom’s behavior and demeanor in the courtroom.  
We are unpersuaded. 
The issue arose in the following context.  Dr. Watson twice 
conducted neuropsychological testing of Bloom, first in 1993 and 
again from 1999 to 2000.  Dr. Watson testified as to what the 
testing revealed about Bloom’s cognitive capacities, deficits, and 
functioning and how they may have affected the commission of 
the crimes.  On cross-examination, over a defense objection, 
Dr. Watson acknowledged that his report stated Bloom 
appeared to meet one of the criteria (Category A) for Asperger 
Syndrome as detailed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders:  “marked impairment in the use of multiple 
nonverbal behaviors such as eye to eye gaze, facial expression, 
 
16  
This is true regardless of whether the trial court was 
bound by, or simply considered, the outcome of the competency 
proceedings at the first trial. 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
53 
 
body postures, and gestures to regulate social interaction.”  The 
prosecutor then asked, “Hypothetically, if the defendant were to 
sit in the courtroom and make good eye contact with his defense 
attorneys and their assistant, and to watch the witnesses 
testify, and to then talk to his attorney, and then go back to 
watching the witness testify, would that tend to not be part of 
the Criteria A?”  Defense counsel objected that the question was 
an improper hypothetical and lacked foundation, but the 
prosecutor said she had been watching and “it is absolutely 
true,” and that her expert had been in the courtroom for three 
days and would testify it was true.  The court noted it had 
“observed 
eye-to-eye 
contact” 
and 
“numerous 
facial 
expressions,” and concluded the question was therefore proper.  
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that comment on 
communication between Bloom and his defense team violated 
the attorney-client privilege.  The court denied the motion.  The 
prosecutor resumed cross-examining Dr. Watson, asking, 
“Hypothetically, if the defendant is sitting next to the . . . 
woman that’s sitting next to him making eye contact, smiling, 
gesturing with his hands, nodding up and down, speaking to her, 
she is speaking back to him, does that tend to tell you that we 
haven’t met” the Asperger criterion?  Dr. Watson conceded, 
“That would tend to argue against that.”   
Bloom contends that his demeanor during the guilt phase 
of trial was legally irrelevant and not a proper subject for cross-
examination, since Dr. Watson had never diagnosed him with 
Asperger Syndrome, and Dr. Mills, who had, did not explicitly 
determine whether the disputed criterion applied.  He contends 
the prosecutor’s questions were improper for the additional 
reason that testimony or comment about the demeanor and 
behavior of Bloom and defense counsel during their courtroom 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
54 
 
interactions invited improper speculation about privileged 
matters. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting 
the questioning.  As a general matter, a nontestifying 
defendant’s courtroom demeanor in the guilt phase of a capital 
trial is legally irrelevant and the prosecutor may not comment 
on it.  (People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 197 [“In 
criminal trials of guilt, prosecutorial references to a 
nontestifying defendant’s demeanor or behavior in the 
courtroom have been held improper” on various grounds, 
including that “[c]onsideration of the defendant’s behavior or 
demeanor while off the stand violates the rule that criminal 
conduct cannot be inferred from bad character”].)  But by 
offering expert opinion on Bloom’s neuropsychiatric condition, 
the defense put in issue aspects of his behavior that shed light 
on the existence of that condition.  (See ibid. [rejecting claim of 
error on the basis that the prosecutor’s references to the 
defendant’s demeanor were made during the penalty phase of a 
trial in which the defendant had placed his own character in 
issue].)  Dr. Watson acknowledged stating in his report that 
Bloom appeared to meet a diagnostic criterion for Asperger 
Syndrome, and the prosecutor could properly probe the basis for 
that opinion.  (People v. Hawthorne (2009) 46 Cal.4th 67, 93–
94.)17  The challenged questioning did not implicate the concerns 
underlying the general rule against using a defendant’s 
courtroom demeanor as impermissible bad character evidence.  
 
17  
In reaching this limited conclusion here, we are not 
suggesting that the prosecution is free to comment on a 
defendant’s courtroom behavior or demeanor anytime the 
defense places a defendant’s mental state in issue. 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
55 
 
Nor, in view of the absence of any revelation of the content of 
communications between Bloom and his defense team, did the 
questioning infringe the attorney-client privilege or violate his 
right to privacy. 
4. Prosecutorial misconduct  
Bloom asserts the prosecutor engaged in several instances 
of improper argument and cross-examination during the guilt 
phase.  He argues these instances of misconduct violated his 
federal and state constitutional rights, as well as Penal Code 
section 
1180, 
and 
require 
reversal 
of 
the 
judgment.  
“Prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal when it ‘so infect[s] 
a trial with unfairness [as to] create a denial of due process.  
[Citations.]  Conduct by a prosecutor that does not reach that 
level nevertheless constitutes misconduct under state law, but 
only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods 
to persuade the court or jury.’ ”  (People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 
Cal.5th 735, 795.)  We find no reversible misconduct here. 
a. Use in opening statement of Bloom’s remarks in 
closing argument at his first trial 
Before trial, the prosecution asked the court to permit it 
to introduce Bloom’s penalty phase closing argument from his 
first trial, in which he described thinking about killing his father 
weeks before the murder occurred.  The defense objected, citing 
Penal Code section 1180, which states that “[t]he granting of a 
new trial places the parties in the same position as if no trial 
had been had,” and “[a]ll the testimony must be produced anew.”  
(Pen. Code, § 1180.)  Notwithstanding the objection, Judge Hoff 
ruled the prosecution could use excerpts from the closing 
argument.  As discussed below, however, the parties dispute 
whether Judge Hoff’s admissibility ruling was limited to use in 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
56 
 
cross-examination of defense experts or included use in the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief.  Prosecutor Samuels had made clear 
her desire to introduce Bloom’s closing argument in the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief, but the rest of the admissibility 
discussion focused on the use of the argument in cross-
examination.  Specifically,  Samuels argued that precluding her 
from using the argument excerpts would hamper her ability to 
“properly cross-examine” experts.  The court agreed, rhetorically 
asking how “a court [could] preclude another party from cross-
examining a witness,” and noting that the impact of having 
Bloom’s prior statement read is “precisely why [the prosecutor] 
wants to use it, . . . and I think the law provides for it,” albeit 
with “some redaction.” 
Judge Hoff later recused himself and Judge Schempp took 
over the case.  At a hearing shortly before trial, defense counsel 
asked Judge Schempp to admonish the prosecution “not to bring 
up in their opening statement any issues that are still 
contested,” including “the penalty argument from the first trial 
by Mr. Bloom.”  The court stated:  “She is certainly not going to 
get into that in the opening statement.”  The prosecutor 
asserted, “It doesn’t matter, it’s not contested; it’s all been ruled 
on.  Everything she’s mentioned has already been ruled on.”  
Defense counsel disagreed as to the scope of Judge Hoff’s prior 
ruling.  The court responded, “I’m not going to hear any more of 
this.  These things have all been ruled on and Ms. Samuels 
knows how to make a proper opening statement on what she 
expects to prove.”   
During her guilt-phase opening statement, the prosecutor 
explained that she would prove that “rather than being mentally 
deficient, the defendant in this case was capable of formulating 
and did formulate a rather sophisticated plan to kill his father.”  
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
57 
 
Without telling the jury the context in which Bloom made the 
statement, the prosecutor then quoted from Bloom’s closing 
penalty phase argument at the first trial, at which he 
represented himself and asked the jury to return a death 
verdict:  “ ‘This man was going to die.  Weeks before this, sure, 
thoughts went through my head, “I’m going to kill the old man,” 
sure.  The difference is putting it into action.  Eventually this 
man was going to die and eventually he was going to die by my 
hand.  He just speeded up the results.’ ”   
Defense counsel did not object at the time.  Six days later, 
however, in a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the 
parties addressed defense objections under Penal Code section 
1180 to the admissibility of other portions of the closing 
argument.  At that hearing, Judge Schempp expressed 
discomfort with the prosecutor’s having introduced Bloom’s 
argument to the jury in the earlier trial as if it were a party 
admission under Evidence Code section 1220.  Judge Schempp 
ruled, however, that the prosecutor could use the argument in 
cross-examining psychiatric experts.    
On appeal, the parties dispute the scope of Judge Hoff’s 
admissibility ruling as it was rendered, and which Judge 
Shempp had declined to reconsider before trial.  Bloom contends 
the ruling allowed use of his prior penalty argument only to 
probe the basis for the defense experts’ opinions when they 
testified, while the Attorney General asserts Judge Hoff’s ruling 
“appeared to contemplate the admission of appellant’s 
statements during the prosecution’s case in chief,” presumably 
as a party admission under Evidence Code section 1220. 
Assuming without deciding that the prosecutor’s use of 
Bloom’s admission in her opening statement was misconduct, 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
58 
 
we perceive no prejudice under any standard.  The quote was 
brief, and the jury was instructed that the remarks of counsel 
are not evidence.  Aside from the use of this quote, the record 
reflects overwhelming evidence that Bloom premeditated the 
killing of his father:  Bloom spent the days leading up to the 
murder obtaining a gun, planning to stay at Waller’s home and 
fabricating a break-in at that home to do so, and telephoning his 
father to tell him, “You’re running my life now, but you won’t be 
for long.” 
b. Cross-examination of defense expert regarding 
informant statements; argument concerning 
their reliability 
Bloom contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct 
when cross-examining defense expert Dr. Mark Mills with the 
testimony of two jailhouse informants and making a related 
argument to the jury.  Dr. Mills testified on direct examination 
that Bloom dissociated during the offenses and suffered from 
brain damage and Asperger Syndrome.  In preparing to testify, 
Dr. Mills had reviewed the 1982 preliminary hearing testimony 
of Rodney Catsiff and Mariano Alatorre to the effect that Bloom 
had told them about the crime, his reasons for committing 
murder, the weapon he used, and the number of times he 
stabbed Sandra.  During federal habeas corpus proceedings, 
however, both these informants had recanted their testimony in 
whole or in part, and the prosecutor noted that her office’s 
policies would not permit her to call Catsiff and Alatorre as 
witnesses in the present trial.  But because their testimony had 
been provided to Dr. Mills, the court ruled he could be 
questioned concerning his reliance on it. 
On cross-examination, Dr. Mills disclaimed reliance on 
the informants’ preliminary hearing testimony because of their 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
59 
 
later recantations.  The prosecutor then asked questions 
apparently aimed at bolstering the credibility of the informants’ 
preliminary hearing testimony.  The prosecutor asked, for 
example, how Catsiff could have known how many times Sandra 
was stabbed unless Bloom had told him, and whether Catsiff’s 
having written notes of his conversation with Bloom suggested 
that he had in fact testified truthfully about it. 
Bloom argues that by engaging in this line of questioning, 
the prosecutor improperly sought to vouch for the truth of the 
later-recanted informant testimony.  Moreover, he contends, the 
prosecutor reinforced these themes in her closing argument 
when she asked the jury rhetorically, “[D]o you think it is 
reasonable that the detective in this case took these jailhouse 
snitches, put them on the stand and they were lying?”  The 
Attorney General, for his part, contends the prosecutor’s 
questions and argument complied with the trial court’s ruling 
that Dr. Mills could be cross-examined on the topic; that the rule 
against vouching was not implicated here because Catsiff and 
Alatorre were not witnesses in the retrial; and that in any event 
no improper vouching occurred because the prosecutor’s 
statements and inferences regarding their testimony were all 
based on matters of record. 
Bloom’s claim as to the prosecutor’s rhetorical question in 
closing is forfeited by his failure to make a contemporaneous 
objection.  (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820.)  But even 
if Bloom’s claims of error were all preserved for appeal, we 
conclude that neither the prosecutor’s questioning nor her 
argument constituted improper vouching.  “The general rule is 
that improper vouching for the strength of the prosecution’s case 
‘ “involves an attempt to bolster a witness by reference to facts 
outside the record,” ’ ” such as the prosecutor’s personal 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
60 
 
experience.  (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 206.)  
Unlike our recent decision in People v. Rodriguez (2020) 9 
Cal.5th 474, 481, in which we concluded that a prosecutor 
impermissibly vouched for testifying officers by asserting they 
“would not lie because each would not put his ‘entire career on 
the line’ or ‘at risk,’ ” here — as the Attorney General correctly 
observes — “[a]ll of the prosecutor’s questions to Dr. Mills were 
based on the record or on reasonable inferences that could be 
drawn from the record.”  Nor do we find the prosecutor’s 
remarks during closing argument constitute improper vouching.  
In context, the rhetorical question about the witnesses lying was 
part of a broader theme — that to accept the defense theory 
about Bloom’s mental state, the jury would have to ignore 
significant evidence, as had the defense expert.  Dr. Mills, the 
prosecutor argued, had “disregard[ed] what doesn’t fit into his 
diagnosis.  Just that simple.  The pile of stuff in this case that 
you have to ignore if you want to believe the defense just keeps 
getting bigger and bigger.”  “It is not . . . misconduct to ask the 
jury to believe the prosecution’s version of events as drawn from 
the evidence.”  (Huggins, at p. 207.) 
c. Cross-examination of defense experts and 
argument regarding mental states (Pen. Code, 
§ 29) 
Bloom contends the prosecutor improperly asked defense 
experts to render an opinion on Bloom’s mental state during the 
crimes. 
Penal Code section 29 provides that “[i]n the guilt phase 
of a criminal action, any expert testifying about a defendant’s 
mental illness, mental disorder, or mental defect shall not 
testify as to whether the defendant had or did not have the 
required mental states . . . for the crimes charged.  The question 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
61 
 
as to whether the defendant had or did not have the required 
mental states shall be decided by the trier of fact.”  “[S]ections 
28 and 29 . . . exclude expert testimony regarding a defendant’s 
capacity to form a required mental state and expert testimony 
stating a conclusion that a defendant did or did not have a 
required mental state.”  (People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 
117.)18  “On the other hand, . . . questions concerning how 
defendant could perform certain acts without intending to do 
them, and whether defendant’s actions indicated that he had 
impaired judgment, [are] not inappropriate.”  (People v. Smithey 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 961.) 
Dr. Watson testified on direct examination concerning the 
results of neuropsychological testing he administered to Bloom, 
which in the expert’s view showed long-standing brain damage 
resulting in “generally severe” impairment affecting his ability 
to process information and emotional reactions, react to new 
situations, and make decisions and judgments in a considered 
manner.   
On cross-examination, the prosecutor probed matters 
Dr. Watson had mentioned in his report to determine whether 
he relied on them and if not, why not.  These matters included 
Bloom’s statement to another expert that, after the crimes, he 
 
18  
Penal Code section 28, subdivision (a), provides:  
“Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder 
shall not be admitted to show or negate the capacity to form any 
mental state, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, 
knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought, 
with which the accused committed the act.  Evidence of mental 
disease, mental defect, or mental disorder is admissible solely 
on the issue of whether or not the accused actually formed a 
required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored 
malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged.” 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
62 
 
attempted “to get rid of the evidence and leave a cold trail,” as 
well as the fact that Josephine had been killed with three 
gunshots to her head and Sandra by multiple stab wounds as 
well as a gunshot to the face.  Of the planning evidence, the 
prosecutor asked Dr. Watson, “Doesn’t that reflect not only his 
ability to make that plan, but the fact that he in fact carried it 
out?”  Of the three shots that killed Josephine, the prosecutor 
asked whether they “show that the defendant knew exactly 
what he was doing when he killed her, that he was intending to 
kill her,” eliciting Dr. Watson’s answer that “I think it probably 
does.”  And of the mode of Sandra’s killing, presented in a 
hypothetical question, the prosecutor asked Dr. Watson, 
“Doctor, is this person trying to kill Sandra Hughes or not?”  The 
prosecutor continued:  “And what I’m asking you is:  If every one 
of his behaviors starting weeks before the murder in the 
planning of the killings — weeks before the killings with 
planning and ending shortly after the murder almost finishing 
the plan, you are saying that the only part of that period where 
his mental impairments kicked in because of the emotional 
components is during that short period of time from when he 
first shot his father until when he finished killing Sandra?”  
Dr. Watson agreed.   
Contrary to Bloom’s arguments, none of this questioning 
violated the restrictions in Penal Code section 29.  The 
prosecutor 
was 
entitled 
to 
test 
on 
cross-examination 
Dr. Watson’s opinion that brain damage precluded Bloom from 
forming and carrying out plans in a disruptive emotional 
situation, including by highlighting possible inconsistencies 
between this opinion and Bloom’s characterization of his own 
conduct in an interview with another expert, which the witness 
admittedly had considered in conducting his evaluation.  
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
63 
 
Moreover, during cross-examination, the prosecutor, without 
objection from defense counsel, gave Dr. Watson latitude to 
articulate what he believed the evidence showed about Bloom’s 
mental state, a line of inquiry the defense followed up on in 
redirect examination, thus minimizing any conceivable 
prejudice from how the prosecutor framed her questions.  Bloom 
has not shown prejudicial misconduct in this regard.19 
d. Asserted Griffin error 
Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 (Griffin) holds 
that the Fifth Amendment “forbids either comment by the 
prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court 
that such silence is evidence of guilt.”  (Id. at p. 615.)  Bloom 
contends the prosecutor improperly commented in various ways 
on his invocation of the right to be silent, resulting in a violation 
of the rule announced in Griffin. 
First, Dr. William Vicary, a defense expert witness who 
testified on direct that Bloom was likely to “snap” under 
 
19  
Defendant also contends the prosecutor’s questioning was 
at times rude, sarcastic, or disparaging, as when she alluded to 
neurological deficits and Asperger Syndrome “rearing their ugly 
heads” or to defendant’s being “too whacked-out to know what 
he was doing.”  Although a prosecutor’s intemperate behavior 
violates the federal Constitution if it infects the trial with such 
unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process 
(People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 841), and 
prosecutorial conduct that does not render a criminal trial 
fundamentally unfair violates state law if it involves the use of 
deceptive or reprehensible methods as a means to persuade the 
court or the jury (People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 149), 
the complained-of comments were mild and too fleeting to have 
adversely affected the fairness of the proceedings.  Nor, for the 
same reason, did they amount to a prejudicial state-law 
violation. 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
64 
 
stressful situations, acknowledged on cross-examination (over 
defense objection) that being on trial for murder and hearing the 
percipient and expert witnesses would be a stressful situation 
for Bloom, suggesting, according to Bloom, “that the jury could 
infer from the absence of conduct communicating appellant’s 
distress in the courtroom that he did not break down in stressful 
situations.”  Bloom contends this questioning thus permitted the 
jury, improperly, “to infer facts about appellant’s mental state 
during the crime from” his lack of assertive courtroom conduct, 
which Bloom would apparently treat as silence for Griffin 
purposes.  But the prosecutor’s question merely invited the 
jurors to make an inference from their observations of Bloom’s 
courtroom demeanor; it did not constitute comment on his 
failure to testify or any other conduct that could reasonably be 
interpreted as a refusal to speak about the charged crimes. 
Next, Bloom contends the prosecutor twice committed 
Griffin error during closing argument.  In describing Bloom’s 
interaction with Bloom, Sr., in front of the Sancola Avenue 
residence, the prosecutor argued, “We will never know what 
they were talking about out there.”  Then, in reviewing the 
evidence concerning Sandra’s murder, the prosecutor suggested 
that after inflicting nonfatal stab wounds on the young girl, 
Bloom retrieved a live round and shot her.  “And that explains 
why he only shot her once and left her breathing because he just 
was having trouble with that gun and he managed to find a live 
round, whether it was in that room or he went into another 
room, but he loaded the gun again and he shot her in the face.  
[¶]  Now, does he go into the kitchen to try to fix the gun so he 
can find another live round to shoot her again?  Is that what he 
was doing at the kitchen window?  We will never know that.  It 
is certainly a reasonable interpretation of what was going on in 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
65 
 
that house that night.”  Defense counsel objected to both sets of 
comments, citing Griffin, and moved for a mistrial.  The court 
overruled the objection and denied the motion.   
We agree with the trial court in part and disagree in part.  
The prosecutor’s comment that “we will never know what 
[Bloom and his father] were talking about out there” in front of 
the Sancola Avenue residence, in a conversation as to which only 
Bloom evidently could have testified, appears impermissible 
under Griffin.  While a prosecutor does not violate the Griffin 
rule by commenting on the absence of certain evidence, a Griffin 
error does occur when the only possible source of such evidence 
would have been the defendant.  (See, e.g., People v. Johnson 
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1229 [prosecutor errs by referring to 
evidence as “ ‘uncontradicted’ ” or “ ‘unrefuted’ ” only when the 
defendant, who elects not to testify, is the only person who could 
have refuted it].)  The comment, however, was brief and did not 
overtly call attention to Bloom’s failure to take the stand at the 
guilt phase to explain what had occurred.  We are satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor’s fleeting remark 
could not have prejudiced Bloom.  (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at 
pp. 25–26.)  By contrast, the prosecutor’s statement that 
Bloom’s entering the kitchen of the Sancola Avenue residence 
during the crimes may have been part of a search for a live round 
to shoot at Sandra constituted fair comment on the evidence.  
The prosecutor cautioned jurors that “we will never know that,” 
while urging that it was “a reasonable interpretation” of the 
evidence.  In context, the prosecutor was not drawing attention 
to the absence of direct testimony on the issue but advising the 
jury it was being asked to make an inference from the facts in 
evidence. 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
66 
 
e. Asserted reliance on facts not in evidence 
In her guilt phase closing argument, the prosecutor sought 
to persuade jurors against returning a voluntary manslaughter 
verdict by reminding them “there is some evidence in this case 
that [Bloom, Sr.,] wasn’t always a tyrant and there is some 
evidence in this case that he loved his son.  You heard the 
telegrams . . . when [Bloom] was in the Navy and they were 
loving.”  As Bloom points out, the telegrams to which the 
prosecutor referred, sent by Bloom, Sr., to Bloom during the 
latter’s brief stint in the Navy, were not admitted into evidence.  
Rather, the prosecutor called Bloom’s mother, Melanie, to testify 
in rebuttal about language in the telegrams that expressed love 
for Bloom, contrary to Melanie’s earlier testimony that she had 
never heard Bloom, Sr., do so.   
The argument may well have been improper.  The court 
allowed the prosecutor to question Melanie about the telegrams 
only in order to impeach her prior testimony that she had never 
heard Bloom, Sr., express love to Bloom, not as positive evidence 
that Bloom, Sr., had expressed love for Bloom.  On the latter 
point, Melanie’s testimony about the telegrams was hearsay for 
which the Attorney General posits no exception.  The 
prosecutor’s misuse of the testimony in argument did not render 
Bloom’s trial unfair but could be characterized as deceptive, or 
at least misleading, conduct.  We see no conceivable prejudice 
from the error, however, whether considered individually or in 
combination with the other asserted instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
67 
 
5. Instructional error  
a. Conduct evidencing guilt  
Bloom contends the trial court erred in instructing the 
jury with CALJIC Nos. 2.06 and 2.52, concerning suppression of 
evidence 
and 
flight, 
respectively, 
as 
demonstrating 
consciousness of guilt.  He argues they were unnecessary, 
misleading, and argumentative, allowed the jury to draw 
irrational inferences against him, and denied him his Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, a fair 
trial, a jury trial, equal protection, and reliable jury 
determinations of guilt and special circumstances. 
As Bloom acknowledges, we have previously rejected these 
contentions (e.g., People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 253–
254 [CALJIC No. 2.52]; People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 
52–53 [CALJIC No. 2.06]), and he advances no persuasive 
reason why we should reconsider our conclusions. 
b. Instructions assertedly undermining 
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt  
Bloom contends the trial court erred in reading the jury a 
series of instructions on the consideration of circumstantial and 
other evidence (CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, and 
8.20), which he contends diluted the reasonable doubt standard.  
Contrary to Bloom’s claims, and as we have previously held, 
CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 2.02 did not direct the jury to convict him 
of murder if he “ ‘reasonably appeared’ ” guilty, even if jurors 
still entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt (People v. 
Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 714), and CALJIC Nos. 2.21.2, 
2.22, 2.27, and 8.20 did not urge the jury to decide material 
issues by determining which side had presented relatively 
stronger evidence (People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 831–
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
68 
 
832).  “Because defendant advances no persuasive reason to 
depart from our precedents, we adhere to them here.”  (Id. at 
p. 831.) 
C.  Sanity Phase Issues 
1. Refusal to allow Bloom to represent himself at the 
sanity phase  
As explained above, Bloom argues that the trial court 
erred in failing to suspend proceedings to adjudicate his 
competency during the sanity phase, an argument we have 
rejected.  (See ante, pt. II.A.2.c.)  Bloom argues in the alternative 
that the court should have permitted him to represent himself 
in that portion of the trial.  We reject that contention as well. 
Bloom advised the court he wished to represent himself for 
the sanity phase after the jury had been instructed and just 
before closing arguments in the guilt phase.  As the reason for 
his request, he referred to the court’s decision to instruct the 
jury on voluntary manslaughter only as to the charge relating 
to Bloom, Sr.  He also mentioned there was an unspecified issue 
relating to penalty that, if resolved as he preferred, would cause 
him to withdraw his request to represent himself in the sanity 
phase.  Bloom acknowledged his lack of familiarity with the 
intricacies of the applicable law while nevertheless expressing 
confidence that he could handle the trial of the sanity phase.  
Referring to prosecutor Samuels’s previous comment that she 
had never conducted a sanity trial, Bloom commented, “So we 
can just do it for the first time together.”  The court declined to 
rule at that time. 
The court revisited the issue five days later during the 
jury’s guilt deliberations.  After confirming that Bloom still 
wished to represent himself, the court denied the request.  
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
69 
 
Preliminarily, the court observed that the request was untimely, 
having been made after the start of trial, and it therefore had 
discretion whether to grant the request.  The court cited two 
bases for denial:  the complexity of the case and the likelihood 
the proceedings would be disrupted by delays, given the 
difficulties Bloom would encounter in trying to schedule 
psychiatric expert witnesses from jail.  That prosecutor Samuels 
had never previously conducted a sanity trial was not, the court 
noted, a good reason for Bloom to represent himself.  The court 
also expressed concern that allowing Bloom to represent himself 
might lead the jury to assume the court believed Bloom 
“competent and competent enough to represent [himself] at a 
very serious stage in the trial.”   
As Bloom acknowledges, People v. Windham (1977) 
19 Cal.3d 121 (Windham) holds that to invoke the unconditional 
Sixth Amendment right to self-representation recognized in 
Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, a defendant must do so “within a 
reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.”  
(Windham, at p. 128.)  Bloom argues that nothing in Faretta 
supports such a limitation, and even a belated request must be 
granted unless it would entail undue delay or interfere with the 
orderly administration of justice.   
The argument is without merit.  Faretta itself recognized 
a constitutional right to self-representation in the context of a 
request made “weeks before trial.”  (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 
p. 835.)  In the years since, this court and others have concluded 
that that right is not absolute if not exercised until the eve of, or 
after the onset of, trial.  (People v. Wright (2021) 12 Cal.5th 419, 
440 [collecting cases]; see, e.g., U.S. v. Tucker (10th Cir. 2006) 
451 F.3d 1176, 1180–1182; U.S. v. Betancourt-Arretuche (1st 
Cir. 1991) 933 F.2d 89, 96; cf. generally Martinez v. Court of 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
70 
 
Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist. (2000) 528 U.S. 152, 162 
[noting that “most courts” require that Faretta rights be 
exercised in a timely manner].)  We adhere to our previously 
expressed view that an untimely Faretta request is a matter 
entrusted to the court’s discretion.  In evaluating an untimely 
motion, a court may consider not only “the potential for delay 
and disruption” but also “whether the potential disruption is 
likely to be aggravated, mitigated, or justified by the 
surrounding circumstances, including the quality of counsel’s 
representation to that point, the reasons the defendant gives for 
the request, and the defendant’s proclivity for substituting 
counsel.”  (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 426.) 
We see no abuse of discretion in the court’s declining to 
permit Bloom to represent himself in the sanity phase.  The 
court properly considered the possibility of unintended delay 
resulting from difficulties Bloom might encounter in attempting 
to schedule his expert witnesses from jail.  Any such delay had 
the obvious potential to negatively affect trial administration, 
as two jurors had commitments that restricted their future 
availability.  Given the complexity of a sanity phase trial in a 
capital case, the trial court could also reasonably find a real risk 
of delay from problems Bloom might have producing and 
organizing the defense evidence.  Nor was the court required to 
spontaneously offer suggestions regarding potential ways to 
mitigate this risk. 
Bloom argues the trial court abused its discretion by not 
“inquir[ing] sua sponte into the specific factors underlying the 
request thereby ensuring a meaningful record in the event that 
appellate review is later required.”  (Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d 
at p. 128.)  But while such an inquiry may be helpful to create 
an adequate record for our review (see ibid.), we conclude the 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
71 
 
record here is sufficient to find the trial court’s denial of Bloom’s 
Faretta request was not an abuse of its discretion.  As noted, one 
of the reasons the court cited — the complexity of the case and 
the attendant risk of delay — finds support in the record and 
affords a sound basis for the court’s exercise of discretion in 
denying Bloom’s Faretta request.  Consequently, we need not 
address the validity of the other reason the court mentioned in 
making its ruling, its concern over inferences the jury might 
draw about the court’s view of Bloom’s competence. 
2. Allowing Bloom to absent himself  
Bloom contends the trial court erred under Penal Code 
sections 977 and 1043, which generally call for the defendant’s 
presence at a trial on felony charges, and violated his state and 
federal constitutional rights to confrontation and due process, 
by allowing him to absent himself during the taking of evidence 
in the sanity phase and failing to ensure that his purported 
waiver of presence was knowing and intelligent.  (U.S. Const., 
5th, 6th, & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15; Johnson 
v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 [waiver standard].)  We find 
no prejudicial error. 
On the first day of the sanity phase, defense counsel 
informed the court that Bloom did not want to be present.  
Outside the presence of the jury, the court informed Bloom he 
had a right to be present and asked him what he wished to do.  
Bloom replied that he did not want to be present to hear the 
testimony in the sanity phase, though he wanted to be present 
for the reading of the verdict.  In Bloom’s absence, the court told 
the jury that “Mr. Bloom has chosen not to be present during 
this second phase of the sanity proceedings which he has a right 
to make that choice.”   
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
72 
 
After evidence was presented and both sides rested in the 
sanity trial, the court asked if Bloom wished to be present; 
defense counsel indicated that Bloom wanted to be present when 
the verdicts were read and also wished to be brought into court 
to address his Faretta motion while the jury was deliberating.  
After the jury had begun deliberating, Bloom was brought into 
the courtroom and was present for the ensuing proceedings.   
Penal Code section 1043 provides in relevant part that the 
defendant need not be present at trial in a felony case if the 
defendant persists in disrupting the trial and in “[a]ny 
prosecution for an offense which is not punishable by death in 
which the defendant is voluntarily absent.”  (Id., subd. (b)(2).)  
We have held that Penal Code sections 977 and 1043, read 
together, preclude a nondisruptive capital defendant from 
waiving his or her presence during the taking of evidence before 
the trier of fact.  (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 967–
968.)  Proceeding with the sanity trial in Bloom’s absence was, 
therefore, error under state law (People v. Young (2005) 
34 Cal.4th 1149, 1214), a point the Attorney General does not 
contest.  Bloom argues this state law error was prejudicial under 
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, because the jury 
deliberated at length before reaching its verdict on sanity on 
count 1 and was deadlocked on counts 2 and 3.  But nothing in 
his argument, or in the record, suggests it is “reasonably 
probable that a result more favorable” (ibid.) to Bloom would 
have occurred had he been present during the presentation of 
sanity-phase evidence (see People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 
856, 902–903 [absence of capital defendant during receipt of 
evidence held harmless under the reasonable probability 
standard]). 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
73 
 
A criminal defendant also has the right, under the Sixth 
Amendment’s confrontation clause and under the due process 
guarantee of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, “to be 
present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to 
its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of 
the procedure.”  (Kentucky v. Stincer (1987) 482 U.S. 730, 745; 
People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1209.)  But a 
defendant may waive his or her federal constitutional right of 
presence, provided the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent.  (Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. at p. 464.) 
Bloom contends the trial court failed to ensure that his 
waiver met the constitutional standard by not adequately 
ensuring he understood the importance of the sanity phase and 
not inquiring into his reasons for absenting himself.  He 
contends the record reflects he based his decision to absent 
himself from the sanity phase on an erroneous understanding of 
the significance of the sanity proceedings with respect to his 
death eligibility. 
We see no constitutional deficiency in the waiver 
procedure employed here.  We have not required that a trial 
court question the defendant regarding why he wishes to absent 
himself or admonish him concerning the importance of his 
decision.  (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 967.)  Here, 
as in Weaver, “[d]efendant was represented by counsel, and he 
himself chose, for his own reasons, to leave the courtroom.”  
(Ibid.)  To the extent Bloom argues the court’s inquiry was 
“minimal” or “perfunctory,” we note that even brief colloquies 
during which the trial court simply confirms a defendant’s wish 
to waive his presence (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 20–
21) or informs him of his right to be present (People v. Young, 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
74 
 
supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1212–1213) have been deemed, as we 
deem this one, constitutionally adequate.    
Bloom contends his choice to absent himself was 
influenced by a mistaken belief that the case would proceed to a 
penalty phase regardless of the outcome of the sanity phase, 
given the court’s affirmative response to his earlier inquiry 
whether “the [guilt] verdicts by this jury trigger a penalty 
phase.”  But when the court responded in this manner, the jury 
had just reached its guilt verdicts and whether there would even 
be a sanity phase was uncertain.  In the ensuing discussion, 
Bloom made clear that although he had not changed his mind 
regarding the dubious validity of the mental defense, the jury’s 
rejection of first degree murder verdicts on counts 2 and 3 had 
convinced him to proceed with the sanity phase.  He told the 
court:  “I am not going to speak to you as a defendant right now, 
I am going to speak to you as a convict, okay?  [¶]  We always 
look for a way out, okay?  And if I got a way out, I am going to 
take it.  [¶]  So let’s go ahead and have the sanity phase, but let’s 
be very clear about something. . . .  [¶]  So me having the sanity 
phase, I am not changing my mind on that.  I am just saying 
that maybe I have a way out so I am going to take it.”  Bloom 
thus seemed to understand that if the jury were to find him not 
guilty by reason of insanity, he would be spared a death 
sentence, and for that reason he chose to go forward with the 
sanity phase.  His decision to absent himself from it was not 
predicated on a mistaken belief that the outcome was of no 
consequence to the penalty he faced. 
We conclude the trial court’s acceptance of Bloom’s 
decision to absent himself did not deprive Bloom of his federal 
constitutional rights. 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
75 
 
D.  Cumulative Error 
As explained above, we conclude that a violation of the 
rule of McCoy, supra, 138 S.Ct. 1500, requires the reversal of 
Bloom’s two second degree murder convictions and associated 
enhancement and special circumstance findings.  Bloom 
contends that even if no other error in his trial was so prejudicial 
that it separately warrants relief, the combined impact of other 
errors requires reversal of the judgment in its entirety.  We have 
found or assumed the prosecutor engaged in misconduct (1) in 
her guilt phase opening statement, when she quoted from 
Bloom’s argument to the jury in the prior trial, and (2) during 
her guilt phase closing argument, when she made comments 
that may have called the jury’s attention to Bloom’s failure to 
testify and that invited the jury to consider for its truth 
testimony that had been admitted for a nonhearsay purpose 
only.  We have also found the trial court erred in permitting 
Bloom to absent himself from the sanity trial.  In each such 
instance, we concluded prejudice was lacking.  Now, considering 
the cumulative effect of all these errors, we reach the same 
conclusion.  We accordingly reject Bloom’s argument that the 
errors, taken together, require us to reverse the judgment in its 
entirety.  
III.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the convictions for second degree murder on 
counts 2 and 3 and the associated firearm-use and weapon-use 
findings, as well as the multiple-murder special-circumstance 
finding and the judgment of death.  We affirm the judgment in 
all other respects. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. BLOOM 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     KRUGER, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
MARGULIES, J.* 
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Bloom 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S095223 
Date Filed:  April 21, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Los Angeles  
Judge:  Darlene E. Schempp 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, Jeannie R. Sternberg, 
Deputy State Public Defender; and William T. Lowe, under 
appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, 
Dane R. Gillette and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Michael 
R. Johnsen and Jaime L. Fuster, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
William T. Lowe 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 871 
El Cerrito, CA 94530 
(510) 230-4285 
 
Michael R. Johnsen 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6090