Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Eric L. Crandall

Citation: 2011 WI 21

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 WI 21 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP570-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Eric L. Crandall, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Eric L. Crandall, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST CRANDALL 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 26, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.     
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
2011 WI 21
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP570-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Eric L. Crandall, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Eric L. Crandall, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 26, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Eric L. Crandall filed an 
appeal from the referee's report and recommendation that his 
license to practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for a period 
of five months and that he be required to pay the full costs of 
this disciplinary proceeding. 
¶2 
This is the second opinion regarding this disciplinary 
proceeding.  The complaint filed by the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR) contained both reciprocal discipline counts 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
2 
 
(Counts 8 and 9) and "standard" counts that related to alleged 
misconduct that was not the subject of discipline in another 
jurisdiction (Counts 1 through 7). 
¶3 
Because of the difference in the procedures applicable 
to those two types of counts, we initially severed the 
reciprocal discipline counts from the "standard" counts.  We 
immediately addressed the reciprocal discipline counts and 
suspended Attorney Crandall's license to practice in Wisconsin 
for 30 days as discipline reciprocal to that imposed by the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Crandall, 2008 WI 112, 314 Wis. 2d 33, 754 N.W.2d 501. 
¶4 
It is the "standard" counts that are the subject of 
this opinion.  We referred those counts to a referee for further 
proceedings according to the standard procedures set forth in 
SCRs 22.15 and 22.16.  Attorney James G. Curtis was appointed as 
referee. 
¶5 
Both parties filed dispositive motions.  The referee 
denied Attorney Crandall's motion to dismiss the complaint 
against him.  He granted the OLR's motion for summary judgment 
in part, concluding that the OLR was entitled to summary 
judgment on Counts 4 and 7 involving Attorney Crandall's failure 
to respond to the OLR's investigations, but also ruling that 
there were questions of material fact that precluded summary 
judgment with respect to Count 5, which involved certifications 
Attorney Crandall had signed regarding his client trust account. 
¶6 
The referee held an evidentiary hearing at which both 
sides were given an opportunity to present evidence.  The OLR 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
3 
 
filed a post-hearing brief, but Attorney Crandall did not do so.  
The referee then issued his report and recommendation.  He 
concluded that the OLR had met its burden of proving misconduct 
by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence with respect to 
Counts 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7, but had failed to meets its burden 
with respect to Counts 3 and 5.  As noted above, the referee 
recommended a five-month license suspension and the assessment 
of the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding, which were 
$9,118.21 as of May 27, 2010. 
¶7 
The first issue we must address is the nature of our 
review.  Attorney Crandall filed a timely notice of appeal from 
the referee's recommendation.  He has not, however, filed a 
brief in this court, despite being granted multiple extensions 
of time to do so. 
¶8 
Attorney Crandall's opening appeal brief was initially 
due on July 6, 2010.  He did not file a brief or file a motion 
for an extension of time by that date. 
¶9 
On August 9, 2010, Attorney Crandall filed a motion 
seeking an extension of time until September 24, 2010, to file 
his opening brief.  The Chief Justice, on behalf of the court, 
issued an order granting him an extension of time until 
September 1, 2010, and stating that no further extensions of 
time would be granted.  Attorney Crandall did not file a brief 
or a further extension motion by the extended due date. 
¶10 On September 7, 2010, Attorney Crandall filed a second 
extension motion, again asking for an extension of time until 
September 24, 2010, to file his opening brief.  Like his initial 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
4 
 
extension motion, his second motion alleged that he needed 
additional time due to the press of other business, especially 
given his status as a solo practitioner.  He acknowledged that 
the court had granted only a part of the extension he had 
originally requested, but he asserted that he simply needed all 
the time identified in his initial motion in order to complete 
and file his brief.   
¶11 The court, through the Chief Justice, granted this 
second extension motion, but the order explicitly stated that 
this was the "final extension" to be granted to Attorney 
Crandall.  This second extension order further expressly 
informed Attorney Crandall that the failure to file a brief by 
the new deadline could be grounds for the dismissal of his 
appeal: 
Respondent-appellant's opening brief shall be served 
and filed on or before September 24, 2010.  This is 
the final briefing extension in this matter.  No 
further extensions of time shall be granted.  If 
respondent-appellant's opening brief is not served and 
filed by September 24, 2010, such repeated failure to 
comply with the court's orders may be considered by 
the court as grounds for (1) the dismissal of 
respondent-appellant's appeal and (2) consideration of 
the report and recommendation of the referee under 
SCR 22.17(2). 
¶12 Despite 
the 
clear 
warning 
of 
the 
potential 
consequences of not filing a timely brief, Attorney Crandall has 
never filed a brief in this matter.  His failure to file a brief 
raises the question of whether there should be a sanction, such 
as the dismissal of his appeal, for his disobedience of the 
court's orders. 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
5 
 
¶13 Appeals 
in 
attorney 
disciplinary 
proceedings 
are 
governed by the rules of appellate procedure that apply to civil 
appeals to this court.  SCR 22.17(3).  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.83(2), the failure of a person to comply with an 
appellate court's order or a requirement of the rules of 
appellate procedure "is grounds for dismissal of the appeal, 
summary reversal, striking of a paper, imposition of a penalty 
or costs on a party or counsel, or other action as the court 
considers appropriate."  This court has construed this statute, 
however, not to authorize dismissal or summary reversal for all 
failures to comply with an appellate rule or order.  Rather, 
noting that dismissal of an appeal with prejudice is a drastic 
sanction, we have held that "[f]or a court to dismiss an appeal 
under § (Rule) 809.83(2), there must be a showing that the party 
or the party's attorney has demonstrated bad faith or egregious 
conduct, or there must be a common sense finding that the appeal 
has been abandoned."  State v. Smythe, 225 Wis. 2d 456, 468-69, 
592 N.W.2d 628 (1999); see also Raz v. Brown, 2003 WI 29, ¶18, 
260 Wis. 2d 614, 660 N.W.2d 647 (applying Smythe standard to 
case where court of appeals summarily reversed portion of 
circuit court ruling because party failed to file a response 
brief to a cross-appeal). 
¶14 We conclude that Attorney Crandall's conduct in this 
court warrants the dismissal of his appeal in this matter.  He 
was given three separate deadlines to file his brief, and he 
ignored each of them.  Although neither of his extension motions 
was filed prior to the expiration of the then-existing deadline, 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
6 
 
this court granted him extensions of time to file his brief.  In 
both of those extension orders, Attorney Crandall was given a 
specific deadline and was told that no further extensions would 
be given.  Indeed, in his second extension motion Attorney 
Crandall stated that he simply needed all of the time he had 
originally requested so that he could file his brief.  Although 
he was ultimately granted the full extension that he sought, he 
never filed any brief, leading to the inference that the 
extension requests were mere ploys for delay.  We conclude that 
his repeated disobedience of this court's briefing orders 
constitutes egregious conduct that warrants the dismissal of his 
appeal.  Alternatively, his unexplained failure to file any 
brief after repeatedly asking for and being granted more time to 
do so constitutes an abandonment of his appeal. 
¶15 Moreover, although the dismissal of an appeal is 
rightly considered a drastic remedy, we note that the impact of 
a dismissal in an attorney disciplinary proceeding is much less 
than in an ordinary civil appeal.  While a dismissal in an 
ordinary appeal terminates the case and leaves the judgment 
against the appellant intact, in attorney disciplinary cases 
this court still reviews the referee's report, although we do it 
as if no appeal had been timely filed under SCR 22.17(2).  We 
still review the referee's report and recommendation because it 
is this court that ultimately determines whether an attorney has 
committed 
professional 
misconduct 
and, 
if 
so, 
what 
the 
appropriate discipline should be. 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
7 
 
¶16 Indeed, we apply the same standard of review to the 
referee's report whether or not an appeal has been filed.  
Specifically, we affirm a referee's findings of fact unless they 
are found to be clearly erroneous, but we review the referee's 
conclusions of law on a de novo basis.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 
740 N.W.2d 125. 
 
We 
determine 
the 
appropriate 
level 
of 
discipline given the particular facts of each case, independent 
of the referee's recommendation, but benefiting from it.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶17 We now turn to the referee's findings of fact with 
respect to Attorney Crandall and the alleged misconduct at issue 
in this proceeding.  Attorney Crandall was admitted to the 
practice of law in this state in September 1991.  He currently 
maintains a law practice in New Richmond. 
¶18 Attorney Crandall has been the subject of professional 
discipline on three previous occasions.  In February 2006 this 
court suspended Attorney Crandall's license for three months as 
discipline reciprocal to that imposed by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crandall, 2006 WI 
6, 287 Wis. 2d 102, 708 N.W.2d 690.  His misconduct involved 
neglect of client matters, failure to communicate with clients, 
failure to appear at court hearings, failure to comply with 
discovery rules, and failure to cooperate with the disciplinary 
investigation. 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
8 
 
¶19 In March 2008 this court publicly reprimanded Attorney 
Crandall for knowingly advancing a claim or defense that was 
unwarranted under existing law, knowingly advancing a factual 
position without a basis to do so, failing to file a client's 
affidavit or a brief in opposition to a summary judgment motion, 
failing to keep his clients reasonably informed about the status 
of their matter, failing to return his clients' file in a timely 
manner, and failing to cooperate with the OLR's grievance 
investigation.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crandall, 
2008 WI 14, 307 Wis. 2d 536, 745 N.W.2d 679. 
¶20 Finally, as noted above, Attorney Crandall's Wisconsin 
license was suspended for 30 days as reciprocal discipline.  The 
misconduct that led to that discipline included failing to act 
with diligence and promptness, failing to communicate with his 
clients, 
engaging 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty 
or 
misrepresentation, and failing to cooperate with the Minnesota 
disciplinary authorities.   In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Crandall, 2008 WI 112, 314 Wis. 2d 33, 754 N.W.2d 501. 
¶21 Counts 1 through 4 of the OLR's current complaint 
relate to Attorney Crandall's representation of client T.H.  
T.H. retained Attorney Crandall in August 2005 to defend him in 
a 
mortgage 
foreclosure 
action 
and 
to 
pursue 
potential 
counterclaims against the lender.  The written fee agreement 
provided that T.H. would make an advance payment of $3,000 to 
Attorney Crandall, that Attorney Crandall's fee would be $300 
per hour, and that Attorney Crandall would receive 25 percent of 
any recovery T.H. received from the lender.   
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
9 
 
¶22 Attorney Crandall placed the $3,000 advance payment he 
received from T.H. into his business account rather than his 
client trust account.  The referee found that as of August 2005 
Attorney Crandall was not aware of the requirement that advance 
payments be placed into a trust account.  According to the 
referee, Attorney Crandall now understands his obligation to 
deposit advance payments into his client trust account and has 
changed his practices to comply with the applicable rules. 
¶23 In November 2005 Attorney Crandall was able to obtain 
an order dismissing T.H. from the action, without prejudice, due 
to the insufficiency of service of process.  On January 20, 
2006, this court issued its decision suspending Attorney 
Crandall's license to practice law in Wisconsin effective 
February 20, 2006.  287 Wis. 2d at 105.  On or about February 4, 
2006, T.H. received his entire case file from Attorney Crandall 
along 
with 
a 
letter 
stating 
that 
Attorney 
Crandall's 
representation was concluded because T.H. had been dismissed as 
a party from the foreclosure action. 
¶24 At the time he declared the representation terminated 
and returned the file to the client, Attorney Crandall had never 
provided an itemization of his fees or an explanation of the 
application of the $3,000 advance payment.  In a subsequent 
telephone conversation that occurred within the next several 
days, Attorney Crandall agreed to return $2,000 of the advance 
payment.  There was no specific agreement as to when that amount 
would be refunded to T.H., but Attorney Crandall stated that he 
would return those funds "as soon as [he] was able." 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
10 
 
¶25 The suspension of Attorney Crandall's license caused 
his cash flow to decrease, and because he had not placed the 
advance payment into a trust account, he therefore did not have 
$2,000 to pay T.H. until the fall of 2006.  By July 27, 2006, 
T.H. had contacted the OLR and had submitted a letter inquiring 
about the failure of Attorney Crandall to repay the money. 
¶26 On September 28, 2006, the OLR requested that Attorney 
Crandall submit a written response to T.H.'s grievance by 
October 23, 2006.  On October 19, 2006, Attorney Crandall 
refunded the $2,000 to T.H. 
¶27 Apparently because it had not received a response to 
the grievance, the OLR sent a second letter to Attorney Crandall 
on 
October 30, 2006, asking for a written response by 
November 9, 2006.  On November 9 T.H. faxed a letter to the OLR 
that stated, "After further review and discussions with Mr. 
Eric L. Crandall I wish to withdraw my complaint."  The same day 
Attorney Crandall faxed a letter to the OLR stating that he 
understood that T.H. had withdrawn his grievance, that he now 
considered the matter closed, and that he did not believe that 
any further submission to the OLR was necessary. 
¶28 The OLR responded to both T.H. and Attorney Crandall 
by a letter dated November 13, 2006.  In that letter, the OLR 
explained that it had a duty to investigate despite T.H.'s 
purported "withdrawal" of his grievance.  The letter notified 
Attorney Crandall that his response to the OLR's request for 
information was overdue and stated that his response needed to 
be postmarked by November 24, 2006.  When Attorney Crandall did 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
11 
 
not submit a written response, the OLR personally served another 
letter on him on December 8, 2006. 
¶29 On December 12, 2006, Attorney Crandall faxed a letter 
to the OLR repeating that he considered the matter closed and 
that he did not believe that the OLR had standing to proceed 
with a disciplinary investigation.  The OLR then filed a motion 
for an order to show cause why Attorney Crandall's license 
should not be temporarily suspended, which order was issued by 
this court on January 11, 2007.  On February 12, 2007, Attorney 
Crandall finally faxed a response to the OLR, which then 
withdrew its temporary suspension motion. 
¶30 When Attorney Crandall was subsequently interviewed by 
the District Committee, he refused to provide a copy of his fee 
agreement with T.H. or any other documents from his file.  He 
later faxed a copy of the fee agreement to the OLR's 
investigator, but refused to submit any other non-public 
documents from the client's file on the ground that the client 
had directed him not to disclose attorney-client matters. 
¶31 Based on these findings of fact, the referee concluded 
that 
Attorney 
Crandall 
had 
committed 
three 
counts 
of 
professional misconduct with respect to the T.H. representation 
and subsequent investigation.  First, he concluded that Attorney 
Crandall's deposit of the $3,000 advance payment into his 
business account rather than his client trust account had 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
12 
 
violated 
former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4).1  Second, the referee 
determined 
that 
Attorney 
Crandall 
had 
violated 
former 
SCR 20:1.16(d)2 by failing to refund the unearned fees of $2,000 
for eight months after he had agreed to do so.  Third, the 
referee found that Attorney Crandall had willfully failed to 
cooperate with the OLR's grievance investigation, in violation 
of SCRs 22.03(2) and (6),3 and 20:8.4(f).4 
                                                 
1 Former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) applied to misconduct committed 
between July 1, 2004, and June 30, 2007.  It provided: "Unearned 
fees and advanced payments of fees shall be held in trust until 
earned by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant to SCR 20:1.15(g).  
Funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for payment of costs 
shall be held in trust until the costs are incurred." 
2 Former SCR 20:1.16(d) applied to misconduct committed 
prior to July 1, 2007.  It provided as follows: 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned or 
incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the 
client to the extent permitted by other law. 
3 SCRs 22.03(2) and (6) state: 
(2) Upon 
commencing 
an 
investigation, 
the 
director shall notify the respondent of the matter 
being investigated unless in the opinion of the 
director the investigation of the matter requires 
otherwise.  The respondent shall fully and fairly 
disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served 
by ordinary mail a request for a written response.  
The director may allow additional time to respond.  
Following receipt of the response, the director may 
conduct further investigation and may compel the 
respondent to answer questions, furnish documents, and 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
13 
 
¶32 The referee further concluded, however, that the OLR 
had failed to prove by clear, satisfactory, and convincing 
evidence that Attorney Crandall's refund of the $2,000 after the 
OLR had requested a written response to the T.H. grievance had 
constituted 
a 
failure 
to 
cooperate 
with 
or 
an 
improper 
interference 
with 
an 
OLR 
investigation, 
in 
violation 
of 
SCRs 21.15(4),5 22.03(6), and 20:8.4(f). 
¶33 Count 5 of the complaint alleged that Attorney 
Crandall had submitted false certifications for fiscal years 
                                                                                                                                                             
present 
any 
information 
deemed 
relevant 
to 
the 
investigation. 
 . . .  
(6) In the course of the investigation, the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance. 
4 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers; . . . ." 
5 SCR 21.15(4) states: 
Every attorney shall cooperate with the office of 
lawyer regulation in the investigation, prosecution 
and disposition of grievances, complaints filed with 
or by the director, and petitions for reinstatement.  
An attorney's wilful failure to cooperate with the 
office of lawyer regulation constitutes violation of 
the rules of professional conduct for attorneys. 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
14 
 
2005 through 20086 regarding having filed with the OLR a trust 
account overdraft notification agreement with the financial 
institution where his client trust account was maintained.   
¶34 Some background is necessary to provide context for 
the referee's factual findings and conclusions of law on this 
topic. 
 
Effective 
January 
1, 
1999, 
this 
court 
created 
SCR 20:1.15(i) to require attorneys to maintain trust accounts 
in only financial institutions that had agreed to provide 
overdraft reports to the Board of Attorneys Professional 
Responsibility (BAPR) or later the OLR.  S. Ct. Order 97-05, 218 
Wis. 2d xiii (1998) (issued June 4, 1998; eff. Jan. 1, 1999).  
The court also created SCR 20:1.15(j), which set forth the 
requirements that a financial institution was required to follow 
for overdraft notifications.  Supreme court rule 20:1.15 also 
continued to require each lawyer to certify on his/her annual 
bar dues statement that the lawyer had complied with each of the 
record-keeping 
requirements 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
relevant 
subsection(s) of the rule.7   
                                                 
6 The fiscal year of the State Bar of Wisconsin begins on 
July 1 of the preceding year.  Thus, for example, the 2005 
fiscal year covered the period from July 1, 2004, through 
June 30, 2005.   
7 Prior to July 1, 2004, the record-keeping requirements 
were contained in subsection (e) of SCR 20:1.15.  After July 1, 
2004, those requirements were set forth in subsections (f) and 
(j)(5).  Also, in addition to signing the certification, the 
lawyer was required to state the account number of any trust or 
fiduciary account and the name of the financial institution 
where the trust account was maintained. 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
15 
 
¶35 Effective July 1, 2004, SCR 20:1.15 was repealed and 
recreated.  S. Ct. Order 02-06, 2004 WI 49, 269 Wis. 2d xiii 
(issued Apr. 30, 2004; eff. July 1, 2004).  The requirement to 
maintain demand trust accounts only in financial institutions 
that agreed to notify the OLR of overdrafts was moved to 
subsection (h)(1).  The certification requirement was moved to 
subsection (i).  Just as the prior version of the rule required 
the lawyer to certify that he/she had complied with the record-
keeping requirements in what was then subsection (e), the 
recreated rule required the lawyer to "explicitly certify on the 
state bar certificate described in sub. (i)(1) that the member 
has complied with each of the record-keeping requirements set 
forth in subs. (f) and (j)(5)."  SCR 20:1.15(i)(2).8  In 
addition, the recreated rule now provided that a lawyer's 
failure to file this certification was grounds for the automatic 
suspension of the lawyer's license, and the filing of a false 
certificate constituted unprofessional conduct and grounds for 
disciplinary action.  SCR 20:1.15(i)(4). 
¶36 The referee found that following the 1999 amendments, 
BAPR had taken the position that the rule required each member 
of the bar not only to have in place an overdraft agreement with 
the financial institution that administered the trust account, 
but also to file the overdraft agreement with BAPR.  The OLR has 
followed 
that 
same 
position 
since 
its 
inception. 
 
The 
                                                 
8 The lawyer was also still required to state the account 
number of the trust account and the name of the financial 
institution. 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
16 
 
certification contained on the annual dues statement for fiscal 
years 2005 through 2008 followed this position and said that the 
lawyer was certifying that he/she had an overdraft agreement on 
file with the OLR. 
¶37 The certification signed by Attorney Crandall on his 
annual bar dues statements for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 
provided as follows: 
I hereby certify that I have trust and/or fiduciary 
accounts, have complied with each of the record-
keeping requirements set forth in SCR 20:1.15(e) and 
have a trust account overdraft agreement on file with 
OLR for each demand-type "Client Account" and/or 
"Trust Account" into which I deposit client or third-
party funds held in connection with a representation 
or in a fiduciary capacity that directly arises in the 
course 
of 
or 
as 
a 
result 
of 
a 
lawyer-client 
relationship.9 
¶38 The certification that Attorney Crandall signed on his 
annual bar dues statements for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 was 
similar, but phrased slightly differently due to the repeal and 
recreation of SCR 20:1.15: 
I hereby certify that I have trust and/or fiduciary 
account(s) and that those accounts are identified 
above and/or attached to this certification in a 
separate list.  I also certify that I have complied 
with each of the record-keeping requirements set forth 
in SCR 20:1.15(f) and/or (j)(5).  I further certify 
that I have a trust account overdraft agreement on 
file with OLR for each demand-type trust account into 
which I deposit client funds or 3rd party funds, and 
that, with respect to each demand-type fiduciary 
                                                 
9 In his report, the referee quoted a slightly different 
version of the certification from an earlier year.  The 
certifications quoted here are taken from the dues statements 
for fiscal years 2005 through 2008 that were admitted without 
objection as exhibits at the disciplinary hearing. 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
17 
 
account, I have an overdraft agreement on file with 
OLR or I am complying with the alternative protection 
procedures of SCR 20:1.15(j)(9)b. and/or (9)c. 
¶39 The referee found that Attorney Crandall, who was also 
licensed in Minnesota, had maintained his client trust account 
at U.S. Bank in White Bear Lake, Minnesota.  He opened the 
account in 1992.  The referee found that at the time of the 
opening of the account Attorney Crandall had signed numerous 
forms.  He also found that Attorney Crandall had relied on the 
bank to submit the necessary forms to the Minnesota and 
Wisconsin authorities. 
¶40 Minnesota also has an overdraft reporting requirement.  
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(k)-(l).  The Minnesota rule requires 
that attorneys licensed in Minnesota may only maintain trust 
accounts in financial institutions that have been approved by 
the Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility 
(MOLPR) because those institutions have filed an agreement with 
the MOLPR that they will report overdrafts to the MOLPR.  It 
appears from the referee's report that he concluded that U.S. 
Bank, where Attorney Crandall maintained his trust account, was 
an approved financial institution in Minnesota.  The referee 
also appears to have credited Attorney Crandall's testimony that 
at some point there were one or two trust account checks issued 
when there were insufficient funds in the account, and U.S. Bank 
did indeed notify the lawyer regulatory authorities in both 
Minnesota and Wisconsin. 
¶41 The referee found, however, that Attorney Crandall did 
not have a trust account overdraft agreement on file with the 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
18 
 
OLR prior to 2008.  In 2007 the OLR asked Attorney Crandall to 
send it a copy of his overdraft notification agreement.  
Attorney Crandall responded that he had asked his bank for 
copies of the trust account documents that had been created when 
the account had been opened in 1992 and that he would forward 
those documents to the OLR when he had received them.  The OLR 
nonetheless sent a blank form overdraft agreement to Attorney 
Crandall.  On January 3, 2008, Attorney Crandall faxed such an 
overdraft agreement to the OLR, but it was incomplete and had 
not been signed by a representative of U.S. Bank.  At some point 
shortly thereafter, Attorney Crandall opened a new trust account 
with the U.S. Bank branch office in Hudson, Wisconsin.  On 
July 28, 2008, Attorney Crandall faxed to the OLR a completed 
overdraft notification agreement that had been signed by both 
Attorney Crandall and a U.S. Bank representative on July 18, 
2008. 
¶42 The referee concluded: 
There is insufficient evidence to the standard of 
clear, 
satisfactory 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
to 
conclude that [Attorney] Crandall violated former 
SCR 20:1.15(i)(4) when he certified on his annual 
State Bar dues statements for fiscal years 2005 
through 2008 that he had a trust account overdraft 
agreement on file with the OLR for his client trust 
account, when he did not. 
The referee believed that Attorney Crandall should not be found 
liable on this count because he concluded that the applicable 
rules did not require a lawyer to certify that he/she had an 
overdraft agreement on file with the OLR, even though BAPR and 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
19 
 
the OLR had taken that position.  The referee stated that the 
applicable rule during the relevant years had only required the 
attorney to have in place an overdraft agreement in which the 
financial institution agreed to notify the OLR of an overdraft.  
The rule did not require that such an agreement be filed with 
the OLR.  The referee pointed to the fact that SCR 20:1.15(h)(8) 
was amended effective January 1, 2010, to specifically require 
that an overdraft notification agreement be filed with the OLR.  
S. Ct. Order 08-03, 2009 WI 62 (issued July 1, 2009; eff. 
Jan. 1, 2010).  The addition of this requirement in 2010 led the 
referee to the conclusion that the filing of such an agreement 
with BAPR or the OLR was not mandated before 2010. 
¶43 In addition, the referee noted that the portion of 
former SCR 20:1.15 that mandated the annual certification after 
the 2004 repeal and recreation, subsection (i)(1), required the 
attorney to certify that he/she had complied with each of the 
record-keeping requirements in subsections (f) and (j)(5).  The 
overdraft notification agreement requirement, however, was not 
set forth in either subsection (f) or (j)(5); it was found in 
subsection (h).10  Thus, the referee concluded that there was no 
obligation under the applicable rule to sign any certification 
regarding overdraft notification agreements. 
                                                 
10 Similarly, prior to July 1, 2004, the applicable version 
of the rule required only that the attorney certify that he/she 
had complied with the record-keeping requirements of subsection 
(e).  Subsection (e), however, did not contain the overdraft 
notification requirement.  That requirement was set forth in 
subsection (i). 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
20 
 
¶44 Although the referee acknowledged that the charge in 
the OLR's complaint was that the certification signed by 
Attorney Crandall was false and the certification indeed was not 
accurate regarding the filing of an overdraft agreement with the 
OLR, 
he 
concluded 
that 
Attorney 
Crandall 
should 
not 
be 
disciplined for falsely certifying something that he was not 
obligated to certify under the applicable rules and that should 
therefore not have been included in the certification.  He 
further stated that even if one would find that Attorney 
Crandall's certifications had been false, this would have been 
"a highly technical and theoretical violation of the rules" for 
which "no disciplinary action is warranted." 
¶45 The referee further specifically noted that Attorney 
Crandall was not charged with failing to have an overdraft 
notification agreement in place.  Even if he had been, the 
referee stated that the evidence was unclear whether the trust 
account that Attorney Crandall maintained in Minnesota prior to 
2008 complied with the applicable Wisconsin rules.  Given the 
requirements of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, the 
account may also have been compliant with Wisconsin's overdraft 
notification requirements. 
¶46 Counts 6 and 7 of the OLR's complaint relate to 
Attorney Crandall's representation of client D.P. in a breach of 
contract action.  During the course of the representation, which 
began on September 3, 2003, D.P. paid a total of $4,000 to 
Attorney Crandall plus an additional $625 for mediation fees. 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
21 
 
¶47 On November 19, 2004, Attorney Crandall sent a letter 
to D.P. enclosing some file documents and stating that the 
representation has been completed.  As of that date, Attorney 
Crandall had never provided D.P. with a billing statement or any 
itemization of the work Attorney Crandall had performed on 
D.P.'s behalf. 
¶48 D.P. made several telephone calls and left messages 
requesting an itemization of Attorney Crandall's fees, but his 
calls were not returned.  At some point, D.P. wrote an undated 
letter stating that he had asked for a detailed billing 
statement but had never received one and requesting that 
Attorney Crandall provide one within two weeks. 
¶49 On June 5, 2006, which was after the date D.P. sent 
Attorney Crandall the undated letter, Attorney Crandall sent a 
letter to D.P. stating that D.P. had paid a total of $4,000 in 
fees to Attorney Crandall plus an additional $625 to the 
mediator.  Attorney Crandall did not provide an itemization of 
his fees nor did he state that D.P. owed him additional fees. 
¶50 D.P. filed a grievance with the OLR in July 2006.  On 
August 7, 2006, the OLR sent a letter to Attorney Crandall 
notifying him of the grievance and requesting a written 
response. 
¶51 On August 26, 2006, Attorney Crandall sent a letter to 
D.P. but he did not also send a copy to the OLR.  The referee 
found that by that date Attorney Crandall had prepared an 
itemized billing statement, which was probably enclosed with the 
August 26, 2006, letter.  The text of the letter stated for the 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
22 
 
first time that Attorney Crandall's total fees for representing 
D.P. were $8,045 and requested that D.P. pay the balance of 
$4,045 by September 11, 2006.  The letter also contained the 
following statement: 
Finally, given these facts & documentation, I find 
your recently filed ethics complaint to be wholly 
without merit.  I demand that you to [sic] withdraw it 
and any others you may have filed immediately, and I 
further demand that you refrain from filing any other 
such merit less [sic] complaints with any other 
administrative or regulatory body.  (Emphasis in 
original.) 
¶52 On that same date Attorney Crandall also sent a 
separate letter to the OLR.  That letter stated that Attorney 
Crandall was submitting a short response to D.P.'s grievance, 
"as I believe that [D.P.] will soon be withdrawing his 
inquiry/grievance." 
¶53 D.P. forwarded the letter he received from Attorney 
Crandall to the OLR with the following comments: 
Mr. Crandall is creating bills now. 
First he calls me [and] tries to intimidate me so that 
I withdraw my complaint and now he all of a sudden 
after he closed his file out nearly two years ago he 
finds out that I owe him more [than] I paid. 
¶54 On November 8, 2006, the OLR requested that Attorney 
Crandall provide his written response to the D.P. grievance by 
December 1, 2006.  Attorney Crandall did not respond.  After a 
subsequent letter from the OLR was personally served on Attorney 
Crandall, he finally submitted a written response.  The 
response, however, provided only partial information and alleged 
that the Wisconsin regulatory authorities lacked jurisdiction 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
23 
 
because the work Attorney Crandall had performed for D.P. had 
occurred in Minnesota. 
¶55 The OLR responded with a letter that contained four 
requests for additional information and gave Attorney Crandall a 
deadline of January 11, 2007, to respond.  On February 14, 2007, 
Attorney Crandall submitted a letter that responded to only two 
of the four requests.  The OLR then sent another letter asking 
for a response to the two other requests by February 23, 2007.  
When Attorney Crandall failed to respond, the OLR filed a motion 
for an order to show cause why a temporary suspension should not 
be imposed.  On that same date, Attorney Crandall finally 
responded in full to the D.P. grievance, which led the OLR to 
withdraw its motion. 
¶56 Based on these findings, the referee concluded that 
Attorney Crandall had failed to cooperate with a grievance 
investigation, in violation of SCRs 21.15(4), 22.03(6), and 
20:8.4(f), by coupling a new and unsupported request for the 
payment of $4,045 in additional fees with a demand that D.P. 
immediately withdraw his grievance.  In connection with this 
count, the referee specifically found not credible Attorney 
Crandall's testimony that D.P. had specifically asked him not to 
send an itemized billing because he was prone to stress and had 
medical issues.  The referee also emphasized that Attorney 
Crandall had not mentioned that D.P. had owed any additional 
fees in his previous letter of June 2006, when he had first 
responded to D.P.'s request for an itemization with a letter 
that merely set forth the amounts that D.P. had paid. 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
24 
 
¶57 On the final count of the complaint, the referee also 
concluded that Attorney Crandall's failure to provide a written 
response to the D.P. grievance and his failure to provide 
complete responses to the OLR's supplemental request for 
information, necessitating the filing of a motion for a 
temporary suspension, had violated SCRs 22.03(2) and (6). 
¶58 With respect to the appropriate level of sanction, the 
referee was most troubled by Attorney Crandall's submission of a 
new $4,045 bill to D.P. in conjunction with a demand that D.P. 
withdraw his grievance.  Given Attorney Crandall's erroneous 
belief that the withdrawal of a grievance would terminate the 
investigation, the referee viewed the August 26, 2006, letter as 
"motivated by a purpose to interfere with the grievance 
investigation, 
and 
to 
strong-arm 
or 
coerce 
[D.P.] 
into 
withdrawing the grievance" and as "an obvious and serious 
interference with the [OLR's] investigation."  The referee was 
also disturbed by Attorney Crandall's consistent failure to 
cooperate——both with the OLR's investigation and with the 
ensuing disciplinary proceeding. 
¶59 The referee also indicated that the cases cited to him 
by the OLR could support a six-month suspension of Attorney 
Crandall's license to practice law in Wisconsin.  He found the 
case of In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arrieh, 174 
Wis. 2d 331, 
496 
N.W.2d 601 
(1993) 
(imposing 
six-month 
suspension) to be the most analogous because Attorney Arrieh, 
like Attorney Crandall, had improperly attempted to pressure a 
client into withdrawing a grievance. 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
25 
 
¶60 Despite 
the 
fact 
that 
he 
believed 
a 
six-month 
suspension could be a reasonable level of discipline here, the 
referee 
recommended 
that 
the 
court 
impose 
a 
five-month 
suspension in this proceeding.  He acknowledged that this was a 
"close call," but felt that a six-month suspension would work 
too harsh of a result because it would require Attorney Crandall 
to complete the formal reinstatement process, which would 
lengthen the amount of time that Attorney Crandall would be 
prohibited from practicing law in Wisconsin.  Moreover, the 
referee believed that the imposition of a suspension of six 
months or more and the accompanying formal reinstatement 
procedure have been reserved for situations where the misconduct 
has been particularly egregious or there was a need for the 
court to take a closer look at the attorney and assure itself 
that the attorney has the necessary moral character to be 
granted the privilege of practicing law in this state.  The 
referee did not believe that this case fell into either 
category.  Although he stated that under the court's policy of 
progressive discipline the suspension should be longer than the 
three-month suspension previously imposed on Attorney Crandall, 
the referee did not believe that the suspension should extend to 
six months.  He therefore recommended that the court impose a 
five-month suspension. 
¶61 We turn first to the referee's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  Since Attorney Crandall did not file a 
brief and since the OLR did not appeal from the referee's 
report, there are no challenges to any of the referee's findings 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
26 
 
of fact.  We also do not find that any of the findings of fact 
are clearly erroneous, and we therefore adopt them. 
¶62 We also agree with the referee's conclusions of law 
with 
respect 
to 
whether 
Attorney 
Crandall 
engaged 
in 
professional misconduct as alleged in the complaint.  There is 
no question that Attorney Crandall improperly deposited an 
advance payment into a business account instead of a client 
trust account, that he unreasonably delayed the repayment of an 
unearned fee after the termination of a representation, and that 
he on multiple occasions failed to respond in a timely and 
complete 
manner 
to 
the 
OLR's 
inquiries 
during 
its 
investigations. 
¶63 We further agree with the referee that Attorney 
Crandall's interactions with D.P. after the termination of the 
representation and after the OLR had notified Attorney Crandall 
of D.P.'s grievance constituted an improper interference with 
the 
OLR's 
investigation, 
in 
violation 
of 
SCRs 
21.15(4), 
22.03(6), and 20:8.4(f).  Attorney Crandall never sent a bill or 
requested the payment of additional funds when he terminated the 
representation in 2004 or when he sent D.P. a letter in 2006 in 
response to D.P.'s request for an itemization of the work 
performed.  Only after Attorney Crandall learned that he was 
being investigated did he notify D.P. that D.P. owned him an 
additional $4,045, which was more than D.P. had previously paid 
him.  Moreover, Attorney Crandall coupled that demand for the 
payment of a substantial sum of additional money with a demand 
that D.P. withdraw his grievance.  Given Attorney Crandall's 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
27 
 
belief at the time that the withdrawal of a grievance would 
terminate an OLR investigation, it is clear that Attorney 
Crandall's August 26, 2006, letter was an improper attempt to 
interfere with the OLR's investigation. 
¶64 As the referee concluded, there was not the same type 
of evidence linking Attorney Crandall's refund of money to T.H. 
with T.H.'s withdrawal of his grievance against Attorney 
Crandall.  Although Attorney Crandall refunded $2,000 to T.H. 
only after he learned that T.H. had filed a grievance against 
him and T.H. then submitted a letter purporting to withdraw his 
grievance, there is no direct evidence that Attorney Crandall 
put pressure on or offered an incentive to T.H. in an attempt to 
persuade T.H. to withdraw the grievance.  When T.H. was deposed, 
he repeatedly stated that he could not recall the substance of 
any conversations with Attorney Crandall regarding the refund of 
the unearned fee payment.  Thus, there simply is not enough 
evidence here to meet the standard of clear, satisfactory, and 
convincing evidence of a violation.  See SCR 22.16(5) ("The 
office of lawyer regulation has the burden of demonstrating by 
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that the respondent 
has engaged in misconduct.")  Accordingly, we uphold the 
referee's determination that the OLR did not meet its burden of 
proof with respect to Count 3.  
¶65 With respect to the certification regarding having a 
trust account overdraft agreement on file with the OLR, we 
conclude that Attorney Crandall should not be disciplined on 
this count.  The referee is correct that this court's rules did 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
28 
 
not require an attorney to certify that he/she had a trust 
account overdraft agreement on file with the OLR during the 
relevant years.  The applicable versions of the rule required an 
attorney to list the name of the financial institution and the 
account number of the client trust account and to certify that 
the attorney had complied with the record-keeping requirements 
of 
either 
SCR 
20:1.15(e) 
(prior 
to 
July 
1, 
2004) 
or 
SCR 20:1.15(f) and (j)(5) (after July 1, 2004).  None of these 
subsections made any mention about a trust account overdraft 
notification agreement or the need to file such an agreement 
with the OLR.  Thus, we conclude that it would not be 
appropriate to sanction an attorney for signing a technically 
inaccurate certificate when the inaccurate information was not 
required to be contained within the certificate.11   
¶66 Turning to the question of the appropriate level of 
discipline, we conclude that a five-month suspension is proper 
in this case.  Like the referee, we are most troubled by 
Attorney Crandall's letter to D.P. demanding payment of an 
additional $4,045 and the withdrawal of D.P.'s grievance.  While 
the letter does not explicitly state that Attorney Crandall 
would forego the $4,045 in fees in exchange for the withdrawal 
of the grievance, given the fact that Attorney Crandall had 
                                                 
11 To avoid any misunderstanding about the rules currently 
in effect, we note that SCR 20:1.15(h)(8) now requires attorneys 
to file with the OLR "an overdraft notification agreement for 
each IOLTA account, each draft-type trust account and each 
draft-type 
fiduciary 
account 
that 
is 
not 
subject 
to 
an 
alternative protection under sub. (j)(9)." 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
29 
 
never before alleged that D.P. owed him additional money, it is 
clear that the claim for an additional $4,045 in fees was 
retaliation for D.P.'s grievance and an incentive for D.P. to 
withdraw that grievance.  Although the investigation would have 
continued even if D.P. had "withdrawn" the grievance, the letter 
is a serious violation of Attorney Crandall's obligation to 
cooperate with the OLR's investigation.12 
¶67 Although we agree with the referee that the situation 
in Arrieh is the most analogous to the present case because both 
involved attempts by attorneys to convince clients to withdraw 
grievances, we conclude that the Arrieh decision and its six-
month suspension are partially distinguishable.  In that case, 
Attorney 
Arrieh 
was 
found 
to 
have 
committed 
additional 
misconduct that is more serious than the other misconduct 
committed by Attorney Crandall.  Most importantly, Attorney 
Arrieh twice made a false statement to BAPR that the client had 
agreed to withdraw the client's grievance, when the client had 
never agreed.  In addition, Attorney Arrieh failed to notify his 
client for years that Attorney Arrieh had received over $1,500 
from the client's insurance company in settlement of a claim, 
                                                 
12 Once the OLR comes into possession of information that 
suggests that an attorney may have committed professional 
misconduct, it has an obligation to investigate the matter, 
regardless of the grievant's subsequent desires.  See SCR 21.12 
(OLR does not represent the complaining person, but rather the 
interests of the supreme court and the public in the integrity 
of the lawyer regulation system).  Thus, a grievant may not 
"withdraw" his/her grievance in the sense of terminating an 
investigation. 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
30 
 
that he had cashed the insurance company's check, and that, 
after deducting his fees and other expenses, he had allegedly 
applied the proceeds to the upkeep of the client's real 
property.  Attorney Arrieh also failed on multiple occasions to 
provide accountings to the client regarding Attorney Arrieh's 
fees and his handling of the client's money and property.   
¶68 Moreover, in addition to the more serious nature of 
Attorney Arrieh's misconduct, we also note that at the time that 
we imposed the six-month suspension on Attorney Arrieh, he was 
already serving a one-year suspension.  Thus, although Attorney 
Crandall has been the subject of professional discipline on 
several 
previous 
occasions, 
Attorney 
Arrieh's 
disciplinary 
history involved a much stronger sanction than has previously 
been imposed on Attorney Crandall. 
¶69 It is important to note that none of the five counts 
of misconduct found in this matter involves Attorney Crandall's 
deficient representation of any client.  In addition, there is 
no finding that either of the two clients involved in this 
matter suffered financial harm because of Attorney Crandall's 
conduct and that he should be required to pay restitution.  The 
OLR also did not charge Attorney Crandall with dishonest 
conduct, even with respect to the additional $4,045 in fees that 
Attorney 
Crandall 
belatedly 
sought 
to 
collect 
from 
D.P.  
Finally, although Attorney Crandall's failure to provide timely 
and adequate responses to the OLR's inquiries is a significant 
violation of the rules that cannot be condoned, we do note that 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
31 
 
Attorney Crandall did ultimately provide responses that allowed 
the OLR to continue its investigations. 
¶70 We wish to point out that our decision on discipline 
is not determined by the fact that a six-month suspension would 
necessarily entail a longer period of suspension while Attorney 
Crandall would go through the formal reinstatement procedure.  
"When the facts have warranted a six-month suspension, we have 
imposed that discipline, regardless of the accompanying need for 
a 
formal 
reinstatement 
proceeding." 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Lister, 2007 WI 55, ¶77, 300 Wis. 2d 326, 
731 N.W.2d 254.  We merely conclude that a six-month suspension 
and a formal reinstatement proceeding are not appropriate for 
the misconduct found in this matter and are not necessary to 
accomplish the goals of lawyer discipline in this case.   
¶71 A five-month suspension is a significant sanction for 
Attorney Crandall to suffer for his serious professional 
misconduct. 
 
It 
comports 
with 
our 
policy 
of 
imposing 
progressively harsher sanctions when an attorney continues to 
engage in similar misconduct.  Moreover, it should be abundantly 
clear to Attorney Crandall that his conduct has not been 
acceptable and that any further misconduct could result in the 
loss of his license to practice in this state for an extended 
period of time and the possibility that he will have to prove 
his fitness to regain the privilege of practicing law in a 
formal reinstatement proceeding.  His efforts should be directed 
toward understanding and complying with his ethical obligations 
No. 
2008AP570-D   
 
32 
 
rather than attempting to minimize the consequences after he 
fails to comply. 
¶72 Finally, we determine that Attorney Crandall should be 
required to pay the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding.  
We note that Attorney Crandall did not object to the statement 
of costs filed by the OLR.  We find no reason to deviate from 
our 
general 
practice 
of 
imposing 
the 
full 
costs 
of 
a 
disciplinary 
proceeding 
on 
the 
attorney 
whose 
conduct 
necessitated the proceeding. 
¶73 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Eric L. Crandall to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of five 
months, effective May 31, 2011. 
¶74 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Eric L. Crandall shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs 
are not paid within the time specified and absent a showing to 
this court of his inability to pay those costs within that time, 
the license of Eric L. Crandall to practice law in Wisconsin 
shall remain suspended until further order of this court. 
¶75 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Eric L. Crandall shall 
comply with the requirements of SCR 22.26 pertaining to the 
duties of a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin 
has been suspended. 
 
No.  2008AP570-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶76 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting in part).  
This is the fourth disciplinary proceeding against Attorney 
Crandall and the third time that his license to practice law in 
Wisconsin has been suspended.  Consistent with this court's 
policy 
of 
imposing 
progressive 
discipline 
against 
repeat 
violators of the Rules of Professional Conduct, see, e.g., In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nussberger, 2006 WI 111, ¶27, 
296 Wis. 2d 47, 719 N.W.2d 501, I would suspend Attorney 
Crandall's license for a period of six months, as the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation requested.  A six-month suspension would 
require 
Attorney 
Crandall 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
formal 
reinstatement procedure set forth in SCRs 22.29-22.33 and to 
demonstrate, 
among 
other 
things, 
that 
he 
has 
a 
proper 
understanding and appreciation of the ethical standards that are 
required of Wisconsin lawyers and will act in conformity with 
those standards.  Because the majority opinion does not impose a 
sufficient 
suspension 
to 
require 
a 
formal 
reinstatement 
proceeding, I respectfully dissent in part as to the appropriate 
level of discipline. 
¶77 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
No.  2008AP570-D.ssa 
 
 
 
1