Case Title: Curtis F. Sample v. State of Indiana

Citation: 

Docket Number: 45S03-1006-CR-338

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Mark A. Bates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Office of the Lake County Public Defender  
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Crown Point, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
J.T. Whitehead 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 45S03-1006-CR-338 
 
CURTIS F. SAMPLE, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Lake Superior Court, Criminal Division, No. 45G02-0602-FA-00010 
The Honorable Clarence D. Murray, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 45A03-0812-CR-585 
_________________________________ 
 
 
June 30, 2010 
 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jun 30 2010, 2:32 pm
 
2 
 
In this opinion we reaffirm that it is error to instruct a jury, over the defendant’s 
objection, that it is bound to return a habitual offender finding provided the State proves the 
predicate felonies.  We also determine the error is not cured by an accompanying instruction that 
renders meaningless the jury’s law and fact determining authority.  
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 
The facts most pertinent to the issue before us are these.  Thirty-four-year-old Charles F. 
Sample, Jr., was convicted of attempted murder, a class A felony; criminal confinement as a 
class B felony; battery as a class C felony; criminal confinement as a class D felony; and battery 
as a class A misdemeanor.  The convictions arose out of Sample’s unprovoked and brutal assault 
on his girlfriend’s fifty-nine-year-old mother.  He was also adjudged a habitual offender. 
 
 
 
At the habitual offender phase of trial, and over Sample’s objection, the trial court 
instructed the jury in relevant part that if it determined that the State proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt the existence of at least two prior unrelated felony convictions, then it “must” find that 
Sample is a habitual offender.1  The jury so found and returned a verdict accordingly.  At the 
                                                 
1 The instruction reads in full: 
 
The State may seek to have a person sentenced as an habitual offender 
for any felony by proving that the person has accumulated two (2) prior 
unrelated felony convictions. 
 
You may find the Defendant to be an habitual offender only if the State 
has proven each of the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
The Defendant  
 
1. committed and was convicted and sentenced for the felony of Criminal 
Recklessness;  
 
2. later committed and was convicted and sentenced for the felonies of 
Robbery and Battery;  
 
3. later committed Count I, Attempted Murder; Count IV, Confinement; 
Count V, Battery; Count VI, Confinement; and Count VII, Battery, of 
which Defendant was convicted in Phase I. 
 
 
3 
subsequent sentencing hearing the trial court vacated the convictions for battery as a class C 
felony and battery as a class A misdemeanor as lesser included offenses of attempted murder; 
and vacated the conviction for criminal confinement as a class D felony as a lesser included 
offense of criminal confinement as a class B felony.  The trial court then sentenced Sample to 
fifteen years for the criminal confinement conviction and fifty years for the attempted murder 
conviction, which was enhanced by thirty years for the habitual offender adjudication.  All of 
which were ordered to run consecutively for a total executed term of ninety-five years.  
 
 
On appeal Sample raised several claims including alleged trial court error in overruling 
his objection to the above mentioned habitual offender jury instruction.  In an unpublished 
memorandum decision the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  Sample v. 
State, No. 45A03-0812-CR-585 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2009).  We now grant transfer to address 
the jury instruction issue.  In all other respects we summarily affirm the decision of the Court of 
Appeals.  See Indiana Appellate Rule 58(A)(2). 
 
Discussion 
 
 
Sample contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury that if it found that the State 
had proved the predicate felonies, it “must” find him to be a habitual offender.  He essentially 
argues that the jury is entitled to make a determination of his habitual offender status as a matter 
of law independent of the jury’s factual determination regarding the predicate felonies.  Over ten 
years ago this Court addressed a nearly identical claim in Parker v. State, 698 N.E.2d 737 (Ind. 
1998).  In that case the trial court overruled the defendant’s objection to instructing the jury that 
if it found the State had proven the prior felonies, then it “should” find the defendant a habitual 
offender.  Id. at 739.  Based on Article I, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution we determined 
that such an instruction “prevented the jury from making an independent and separate decision 
                                                                                                                                                             
If the State failed to prove each of these facts beyond a reasonable doubt, 
you must find the defendant is not an habitual offender. 
 
If the State did prove each of these facts beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant is an habitual offender. 
 
Tr. at 552. 
 
4 
on habitual offender status.”  Id. at 742.2  Vacating the defendant’s habitual offender 
adjudication we concluded that the trial court erred in instructing the jury.  In doing so, this 
Court held the jury has the “independent and separate authority to determine whether the 
defendant is a habitual offender” even if the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant has accumulated two prior unrelated felony convictions.  Id.  See also Seay v. State, 
698 N.E.2d 732, 734 (Ind. 1998) (“[E]ven where the jury finds the facts of the prerequisite prior 
felony convictions to be uncontroverted, the jury still has the unquestioned right to refuse to find 
the defendant to be a habitual offender at law.”).  In this case the mandatory language in the trial 
court’s instruction is even more intrusive on the jury’s independent decision making than the 
language we disapproved in Parker.  The trial court thus erred in instructing the jury that it 
“must” find Sample to be a habitual offender if the jury found that he has two prior unrelated 
felony convictions. 
 
We note that the error in giving such an instruction is not reversible error where it is 
accompanied by another instruction informing the jury that it is the judge of the law and the 
facts.  Parker, 698 N.E.2d at 742 (citing Loftis v. State, 256 Ind. 417, 269 N.E.2d 746, 747-48 
(1971) and Mitchem v. State, 503 N.E.2d 889, 891 (Ind. 1987)).  See also Morgan v. State, 755 
N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (Ind. 2001) (“Art. I, § 19, is not violated when the types of instructions given 
in this case are accompanied by an instruction informing the jury that it is the judge of the law 
and the facts.”).  
 
In this case the trial court gave the following “law and facts” final jury instruction in the 
habitual offender phase of trial:  
 
Under the constitution of Indiana, you are given the right to decide 
both the law and the facts of the case.  In fulfilling this duty, you 
are to apply the law as you actually find it to be and you are not to 
disregard it for any reason.  The final instructions you are now 
receiving are your best source in determining what the law is.  
 
                                                 
2 Article I, Section 19 provides, “In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine 
the law and the facts.” 
 
5 
Tr. at 492.  The use of this instruction in combination with the plainly erroneous habitual 
offender instruction was a deadly combination.  On the one hand the instruction advises the jury 
that it has the right to determine the law as well as the facts.  But on the other, it tells the jury that 
the final instructions are the best source in determining what the law is.  The final instructions 
included advising the jury that it “must” find the defendant to be a habitual offender if the State 
proves the predicate felonies.  Ordinarily, the trial court’s instructions are indeed the best source 
of the law.  But not in this case because the trial court’s instruction is wrong when it says the jury 
“must” find the defendant a habitual offender.  Hence, the “best source of the law” instruction 
which can be curative in many cases is not here and instead exacerbates the problem.  In this 
case the language of this “law and facts” instruction essentially renders meaningless the jury’s 
Article I, Section 19 authority.  “A defendant is entitled to have a proper Section 19 instruction 
presented to the jury in both preliminary and final instructions.”  Bridges v. State, 835 N.E.2d 
482, 483 (Ind. 2005) (emphasis added).  This instruction is improper.3  
 
Because the trial court (a) provided over Sample’s objection an instruction which 
minimized the jury’s power of discretion in making a determination on habitual offender status, 
and (b) provided a “law and facts” instruction that rendered meaningless the jury’s Article I, 
Section 19 authority, the trial court committed reversible error.  Consequently, Sample is entitled 
to have the habitual offender adjudication vacated. 
 
                                                 
3 Compare for example the following instructions given in Parker:  
 
[T]he Court now so instructs you, in this a criminal case, you are the 
judges of both the law and the facts.  If, however, you shall have no well 
defined opinions as to what the law is relating to any particular matter or 
matters in issue in this case, then, in determining the law, you should 
give the instructions of the Court respectful consideration . . . .  
 
You are the exclusive and sole judges of what facts have been proven 
and you may also determine the law for yourselves.  This statement does 
not mean that you have the right to disregard the law or to set it aside and 
make your own law.  You should determine the law as it is enacted by 
the legislature of this state and considered and interpreted by the higher 
courts of record, and in that way you have the right to determine the law 
for yourselves, but not to make your own laws.  
 
Parker, 698 N.E.2d at 742-43 n.11 (internal citations omitted). 
 
6 
Conclusion 
 
 
We affirm Sample’s convictions and sentences for attempted murder and criminal 
confinement.  However, we vacate the habitual offender adjudication and remand this case to the 
trial court for a new habitual offender phase of trial.  
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur.