Case Title: State v. Garcia

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC20-1419

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2022-10-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-1419 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JOHNATHAN DAVID GARCIA, 
Respondent. 
 
October 27, 2022 
 
COURIEL, J. 
 
We took this case to answer questions posed by the Fifth 
District Court of Appeal1 about whether requiring a defendant to 
disclose the passcode to an encrypted smartphone violates his 
constitutional right not to “be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself.”  U.S. Const. amend. V. 
After considering the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, we 
conclude that we must answer a different question first: whether 
the court properly granted certiorari below, in Garcia v. State, 302 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
- 2 - 
 
So. 3d 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020).  See Polk Cnty. v. Sofka, 702 So. 
2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 1997) (declining to address the certified 
question because “the limits of a court’s jurisdiction are of ‘primary 
concern,’ requiring the court to address the issue ‘sua sponte when 
any doubt exists’ ” (quoting Mapoles v. Wilson, 122 So. 2d 249, 251 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1960))). 
We find that it did not.  The order before the Fifth District did 
not cause Garcia irreparable harm—that is, a material injury that 
could not be corrected on postjudgment appeal.  The district court 
therefore did not have certiorari jurisdiction.  Furthermore, even if 
jurisdiction had been established, it could not be shown that the 
circuit court violated a clearly established principle of law.  So we 
quash the Fifth District’s decision to grant the writ and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with our decision. 
I 
 
On March 8, 2018, someone shattered Terrell Collins’s 
bedroom window.  Police investigating the crime scene found a 
Samsung smartphone nearby.  Collins’s girlfriend, Ana Diaz, 
speculated that the culprit was her ex-boyfriend, Johnathan Garcia, 
who she believed was following her.  At the police’s request, Diaz 
- 3 - 
 
called the phone number she had saved in her phone as Garcia’s, 
and the smartphone began to ring.  It displayed Diaz’s name and 
phone number. 
 
About a month later, on April 17, Diaz called police back to 
Collins’s home to show them a GPS tracker she had discovered on 
her car.  The police researched the tracker and learned it could be 
traced by a smartphone application.  The police submitted the 
tracker into evidence under the case number used for Collins’s 
shattered window. 
 
The State charged Garcia with aggravated stalking with a 
credible threat, in violation of section 784.048(3), Florida Statutes 
(2018), and with throwing a deadly missile into a building, in 
violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes.  On January 4, 2019,2 
the State obtained a search warrant to search the smartphone for 
 
2.  Our record in this case does not explain the approximately 
eight-month delay between the authorities’ seizure of the 
smartphone and their application for a search warrant. 
 
- 4 - 
 
evidence related to Garcia’s charges.  The smartphone, however, 
was passcode protected.3 
 
The State filed a motion to compel Garcia to disclose the 
smartphone’s passcode.  Declining to concede ownership of the 
smartphone, Garcia argued that such compelled disclosure would 
violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
The trial court granted the State’s motion. 
 
3.  A smartphone passcode prevents unintended users from 
accessing a smartphone’s contents by encrypting them.  Encrypting 
a smartphone’s contents “translates the data into a format that is 
unintelligible until it is translated back into its original form 
through use of a decoding mechanism,” or passcode.  Lawful 
Access, U.S. Dep’t of Just., (last updated Oct. 30, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/6VJV-2UMH.  “Entering the password decrypts 
the [data on the] device, and decryption permits a user to 
manipulate the files the device contains.”  Orin S. Kerr, Decryption 
Originalism: The Lessons of Burr, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 905, 958 (2021). 
 
“Service providers, device manufacturers, and application 
developers . . . deploy[] products and services with encryption that 
can only be decrypted by the end user or customer.”  Lawful 
Access.  This means that the end user or smartphone owner may 
have sole knowledge of the passcode, or sole biometric access—
using a fingerprint or facial recognition—to the smartphone, so 
without the owner’s permission, its contents are “warrant-proof.”  
Id.  Decryption software needed to bypass a smartphone passcode 
is not universally available; the record before us is silent as to 
whether the authorities in this case have access to it. 
- 5 - 
 
 
Garcia then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Fifth 
District, contesting the trial court’s order to compel.  The Fifth 
District granted the writ and quashed the trial court’s order to 
compel, without discussing whether Garcia had demonstrated that 
the order would cause him irreparable harm. 
 
The State sought discretionary review in this Court. 
II 
 
Although it did not do so below, the State raises subject-
matter jurisdiction here, contending that the Fifth District should 
have denied the writ under our cases governing its narrow scope 
and intended use.  See Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins., 630 So. 
2d 179, 181 (Fla. 1994) (“[T]he defense of subject-matter 
jurisdiction can be raised at any time.”  (citing Fla. R. Civ. P. 
1.140(h)(2))). 
A writ of certiorari to correct a nonfinal order is indeed “an 
extraordinary remedy.”  Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d 
1097, 1098 (Fla. 1987).  In the normal course of proceedings, 
Florida law authorizes interlocutory appeals from only a few types of 
- 6 - 
 
nonfinal orders.  Id. at 1098 n.2 (citing Fla. R. App. P. 9.130).4  
Otherwise, appellate review is generally “postponed until the matter 
is concluded in the trial court” and addressed in a final order.  Id. 
at 1098; see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 (Committee Notes, 1977 
Amendments) (“[I]t is extremely rare that erroneous interlocutory 
rulings can be corrected by resort to common law certiorari. . . .  
[B]ecause the most urgent interlocutory orders are appealable 
under this rule, there will be very few cases in which common law 
certiorari will provide relief.”). 
 
 
4.  Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130 authorizes 
appeals only for specific types of nonfinal orders.  For example: 
 
(3) Appeals to the district courts of appeal of 
nonfinal orders are limited to those that: 
(A) concern venue; 
(B) grant, continue, modify, deny, or dissolve 
injunctions, or refuse to modify or dissolve injunctions; 
(C) determine: 
(i) the jurisdiction of the person; 
(ii) the right to immediate possession of 
property, including but not limited to orders that 
grant, modify, dissolve, or refuse to grant, modify, 
or dissolve writs of replevin, garnishment, or 
attachment; 
 
 
. . . . 
 
Fla. R. App. P. 9.130. 
- 7 - 
 
For a district court to grant a writ of certiorari, the petitioner 
must “demonstrate that the contested order constitutes ‘(1) a 
departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting 
in material injury for the remainder of the case[,] (3) that cannot be 
corrected on postjudgment appeal.’ ”  Bd. of Trs. of Internal 
Improvement Tr. Fund v. Am. Educ. Enters., 99 So. 3d 450, 454 (Fla. 
2012) (quoting Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 
812, 822 (Fla. 2004)).  Courts consider in tandem whether the 
contested order would cause the petitioner material injury and 
whether the petitioner has an adequate remedy on appeal, referring 
to the combined question as whether the petitioner would suffer 
“irreparable harm.”  See Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido 
Ass’n, 104 So. 3d 344, 351 (Fla. 2012) (explaining that the 
threshold inquiry is whether there exists “a material injury that 
cannot be corrected on appeal, otherwise termed as irreparable 
harm”).  And we address the irreparable harm question prior to 
determining whether the contested order departed from the 
essential requirements of the law.  See Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 
1129, 1132-33 (Fla. 2011) (“The last two elements [which constitute 
irreparable harm] are jurisdictional and must be analyzed before 
- 8 - 
 
the court may even consider . . . whether the trial court departed 
from the essential requirements of the law.”). 
Here, the trial court’s order compelling Garcia to produce the 
smartphone’s passcode may very well materially injure his defense 
at trial.  If Garcia knows and discloses the smartphone’s passcode, 
leaving aside the smartphone’s contents, he would be providing 
evidence to support the conclusion that he owns the smartphone.  
And that evidence would be corroborated by the fact that the 
smartphone rings when his ex-girlfriend calls his number.  Further, 
by giving evidence to support his ownership of a smartphone found 
at the crime scene, Garcia’s disclosure of the passcode would also 
tend to prove that he was there at some point—likely at the time of 
the crime, given that the phone was still charged enough to 
function when it was discovered. 
We find, however, that Garcia could adequately remedy these 
potential, admittedly material, injuries on postjudgment appeal of a 
final order.  See State v. Pettis, 520 So. 2d 250, 253 n.2 (Fla. 1988).  
On the record before us now, we cannot know what use of the 
smartphone evidence the State will ultimately propose to make, 
whether such evidence will be admitted by the trial court, or how 
- 9 - 
 
any such use would be rebutted by Garcia.  These considerations 
would shape the questions of law a court would consider on 
appellate review.  It is for precisely this reason that “[g]enerally, 
parties must wait until after a final order is issued before seeking 
appellate review.”  Rodriguez v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 117 So. 3d 400, 
404 (Fla. 2013); see also Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So. 2d 214, 
215 (Fla. 1998) (“The judicial policy in favor of limited certiorari 
review is based on the notion that piecemeal review of nonfinal trial 
court orders will impede the orderly administration of justice and 
serve only to delay and harass.”); Martin-Johnson, Inc., 509 So. 2d 
at 1098 (“[C]ommon law certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and 
should not be used to circumvent the interlocutory appeal rule 
which authorizes appeal from only a few types of non-final orders.”).  
In the absence of irreparable harm incapable of remedy on 
postjudgment appeal, the district court had no jurisdiction to issue 
a writ of certiorari.   
While that conclusion decides this case, we cannot say the 
trial order constitutes a departure from the essential requirements 
of the law—another requirement for a grant of certiorari.  See 
Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93, 96 (Fla. 1983) (stating that district 
- 10 - 
 
courts should find that there is a departure from the essential 
requirements of the law “only when there has been a violation of a 
clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of 
justice” (emphasis added)). 
To the contrary, as the parties demonstrate in their briefing, 
this case may, if and when properly before us, pose questions we 
have not previously answered regarding the scope of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or for which there 
was no clearly established law binding on the trial court.  
Petitioner’s Initial Brief on the Merits at 27-28 (citing Doe v. United 
States, 487 U.S. 201, 215 (1988) to support its argument that 
passcode disclosure is not a “testimonial” communication and 
therefore is not protected by the Fifth Amendment); Petitioner’s 
Reply Brief on the Merits at 4 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 
U.S. 441, 443-48 (1972), and United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 
1419, 1428-29 (11th Cir. 1997), for the proposition that a criminal 
defendant may not invoke the Fifth Amendment before trial because 
the Fifth Amendment only protects a defendant during a “criminal 
case”); Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, and National Association of 
- 11 - 
 
Criminal Defense Lawyers at 14 (citing United States v. Hubbell, 530 
U.S. 27, 44-45 (2000), to demonstrate that Garcia’s passcode is not 
a “foregone conclusion” unprotected by the Fifth Amendment).  The 
district courts of appeal have reasoned to differing conclusions 
about whether disclosure of a smartphone passcode is testimonial.5  
The courts of last resort in several states have disagreed about 
whether the compulsion of such disclosure in circumstances like 
these would violate a defendant’s constitutional right against self-
incrimination.6 
 
 
5.  Prior to the Fifth District’s decision, Florida’s Fourth 
District and Second District Courts of Appeal had directly 
addressed the question and reached opposite conclusions.  In State 
v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), the Second District 
held the Fifth Amendment did not protect a defendant from 
compelled disclosure of his smartphone’s passcode and suggested 
that such disclosure would not be testimonial.  But in G.A.Q.L. v. 
State, 257 So. 3d 1058 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), the Fourth District 
held the Fifth Amendment did protect a defendant from compelled 
disclosure of his smartphone’s passcode and stated that such 
disclosure would be testimonial. 
 
 
6.  Compare State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. 2020) 
(holding the Fifth Amendment does not protect against compelled 
disclosure of a passcode), and Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d 
605 (Mass. 2014) (holding the Fifth Amendment does not protect 
against compelled disclosure of a computer password), with Seo v. 
State, 148 N.E.3d 952 (Ind. 2020) (holding the Fifth Amendment did 
protect against compelled disclosure of a passcode), Commonwealth 
 
- 12 - 
 
Nor have we or the U.S. Supreme Court conclusively 
addressed the scope of Fifth Amendment protections in a pretrial 
context such as this.7  Thus, had Garcia demonstrated irreparable 
harm and thereby required us to decide whether the order to 
compel departed from the essential requirements of the law, we 
would still reject his petition: it remains unsettled whether the Fifth 
Amendment protects a criminal defendant, subject to a duly-issued 
warrant, from being compelled to disclose a passcode to a 
smartphone.  We therefore cannot say on this record that the trial 
court departed from the essential requirements of the law. 
 
v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534 (Pa. 2019) (holding the Fifth Amendment did 
protect against compelled disclosure of a computer password), and 
State v. Pittman, 479 P.3d 1028 (Or. 2021) (holding a state 
constitutional protection against self-incrimination did protect 
against compelled disclosure of a passcode). 
 
 
7.  See Vogt v. City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 
2017) (“The U.S. Supreme Court has not conclusively defined the 
scope of a ‘criminal case’ under the Fifth Amendment.”).  The 
federal circuit courts are split.  Compare Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 
550, 552 (3d Cir. 2003), Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508, 514 (4th 
Cir. 2005), and Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2005), 
with Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 171, 173 (2d Cir. 2007), 
Best v. City of Portland, 554 F.3d 698, 702-03 (7th Cir. 2009), Stoot 
v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 925 (9th Cir. 2009), and Vogt, 844 
F.3d at 1241. 
- 13 -
III 
We quash the Fifth District’s decision to grant a writ of 
certiorari and remand for further proceedings in accordance with 
this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., 
concur. 
GROSSHANS, J., recused. 
FRANCIS, J., did not participate. 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
Certified Great Public Importance/Certified Direct Conflict of 
Decisions 
Fifth District – Case No. 5D19-590 
(Orange County) 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor 
General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, 
and Christopher J. Baum, Senior Deputy Solicitor General, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
for Petitioner 
Robert Wesley, Public Defender, Robert Thompson Adams IV, 
Catherine Conlon, and Marie Taylor, Assistant Public Defenders, 
Ninth Judicial Circuit, Orlando, Florida, 
for Respondent 
- 14 -
Harvey J. Sepler of Alvarez Gonzalez Menezes LLP, Hollywood, 
Florida, 
for Amici Curiae Independence Institute and Due Process 
Institute 
Jackie Perczek and Jeanelle Gomez of Black Srebnick, Miami, 
Florida, and Diana L. Johnson, Jacksonville, Florida, 
for Amici Curiae Florida Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers and Professor Laurent Sacharoff 
Daniel B. Tilley of American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Inc., 
Miami, Florida, and Jo Ann Palchak of The Law Office of Jo Ann 
Palchak, P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, and National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers