Case Title: People v. Pepitone

Citation: 2018 IL 122034

Docket Number: 122034

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2018-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 IL 122034 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
(Docket No. 122034) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.  
MARC A. PEPITONE, Appellee. 
 
 
 
Opinion filed April 5, 2018. 
 
 
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
 
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and 
Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
Section 11-9.4-1(b) of the Criminal Code of 2012 provides, “It is unlawful for a 
sexual predator or a child sex offender to knowingly be present in any public park 
building or on real property comprising any public park.” 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4-1(b) 
(West 2016). The sole issue in this case is whether that statute is facially violative 
of substantive due process. The trial court rejected defendant Marc Pepitone’s due 
 
 
 
 
 
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process claim, but the appellate court majority accepted it and reversed his 
conviction. 2017 IL App (3d) 140627. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the 
judgment of the appellate court and affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
In 1998, the defendant was charged with predatory criminal sexual assault of a 
child, criminal sexual assault, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse. He pleaded 
guilty to predatory criminal sexual assault of a child.1 The trial court sentenced him 
to six years’ imprisonment.  
¶ 4 
 
Fourteen years later, in 2013, Village of Bolingbrook police officer Steven 
Alexander was patrolling a municipal park around 4:30 p.m. when he observed a 
van improperly parked across three spaces. Officer Alexander checked the van’s 
plates and learned that it was registered to the defendant. While Officer Alexander 
was standing near the van, the defendant approached with his dog. The defendant 
asked Officer Alexander if there was a problem with the van. The defendant related 
that he was a child sex offender but that his registration requirement had expired in 
2010. Officer Alexander informed the defendant that, as a child sex offender, he 
was forbidden to be on park property. Though the defendant was unaware of such a 
ban, he was arrested for violating section 11-9.4-1(b). 
¶ 5 
 
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge, arguing that the statute is 
facially unconstitutional under the federal and state due process clauses (U.S. 
Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2) and unconstitutional as applied 
under the federal and state ex post facto clauses (U.S. Const., art. I, § 10; Ill. Const. 
1970, art. I, § 16). The trial court denied that motion, and the case proceeded to a 
                                                 
 
1Section 11-1.40(a)(1) of the Criminal Code sets out the basic offense of predatory criminal 
sexual assault of a child: 
 
“(a) A person commits predatory criminal sexual assault of a child if that person is 17 years 
of age or older, and commits an act of contact, however slight, between the sex organ or anus of 
one person and the part of the body of another for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal 
of the victim or the accused, or an act of sexual penetration, and: 
 
(1) the victim is under 13 years of age[.]” 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2016). 
Predatory criminal sexual assault of a child is a Class X felony, and the sentencing range for that 
offense is 6 to 60 years. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(b)(1) (West 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
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one-day jury trial. The parties stipulated that the defendant is a child sex offender 
under section 11-9.4-1(b). At the close of the State’s evidence, the defendant made 
a motion for a directed verdict, again arguing that the statute was unconstitutional. 
The trial court denied that motion, and the jury found the defendant guilty of 
violating the statute. The trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict and later 
sentenced the defendant to 24 months’ conditional discharge and 100 hours of 
community service and fined him $400. The defendant filed a motion for a new 
trial, asserting that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. The court 
denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial, and he appealed. 
¶ 6 
 
A divided appellate court panel reversed, holding that section 11-9.4-1(b) is 
facially violative of substantive due process. 2017 IL App (3d) 140627. The 
appellate court majority noted that People v. Avila-Briones, 2015 IL App (1st) 
132221, and People v. Pollard, 2016 IL App (5th) 130514, both had rejected 
substantive due process challenges to the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 
150/1 et seq. (West 2012)), the Sex Offender Community Notification Law (730 
ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2012)), and several other sex offender statutes, 
including section 11-9.4-1(b). 2017 IL App (3d) 140627, ¶¶ 12-13. The appellate 
court majority was not persuaded by the analyses in those cases, which it termed 
“incomplete and truncated.” Id. ¶ 14. Instead, the majority chose to follow cases 
from this court in which statutes were invalidated under due process for 
criminalizing innocent conduct. Id. ¶ 15. According to the majority, those cases, 
“while very different in their facts, are significant *** because the statutes at issue, 
like section 11-9.4-1(b), contain no culpable mental state” and “reach countless 
types of innocent conduct.” Id. ¶ 20. The appellate court majority insisted, “Mere 
presence in a public park building or public park, without more, is not unlawful 
conduct.” Id. 
¶ 7 
 
Further, the majority noted that, unlike its repealed predecessor (see 720 ILCS 
5/11-9.4(a) (West 2010)), which “actually attempted to tie the child sex offender’s 
presence to times when children were also present” (2017 IL App (3d) 140627, 
¶ 21), section 11-9.4-1(b) “cannot be reasonably construed as aimed at preventing a 
substantial step toward the commission of a sex offense against a child or any 
offense that would result in an individual qualifying as a sexual predator” 
(emphasis in original) (id. ¶ 20). The current statute was “premised on a vague 
notion that a child or other ‘target’ may be present in a public park building or on 
 
 
 
 
 
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public park property,” and it “makes no attempt to assess the dangerousness of a 
particular individual.” Id. ¶ 22. 
¶ 8 
 
The appellate court majority highlighted the “overly broad sweep” of section 
11-9.4-1(b) and provided an “extensive” list of activities that occur on public park 
property, in which persons like the defendant cannot participate. Id. ¶ 23. The 
majority concluded that the statute violated due process because “it is not 
reasonably related to its goal of protecting the public, especially children,” from 
individuals fitting the definition of a child sex offender and because it is not 
“drafted in such a way as to effect that goal without arbitrarily stripping a wide 
swath of innocent conduct and rights” from such individuals who have already 
“paid the penalty” for their crimes. Id. ¶ 24. 
¶ 9 
 
Justice Carter dissented. He would have followed Avila-Briones and Pollard 
and held that “the means adopted in *** section 11-9.4-1(b) are a reasonable 
method of accomplishing the legislature’s desired objective of protecting the public 
from sex offenders.” Id. ¶ 31 (Carter, J., dissenting). Justice Carter surmised that 
“[b]y keeping sex offenders who have committed sex offenses against children 
away from areas where children are present, the legislature could have rationally 
sought to avoid giving those sex offenders an opportunity to reoffend.” Id. ¶ 32. 
¶ 10 
 
This court allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) 
(eff. Mar. 15, 2016). We also allowed both Illinois Voices for Reform and the 
National Association for Rational Sexual Offense Laws to file amicus curiae briefs 
in support of the defendant. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). 
 
¶ 11 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 12 
 
The analysis in this case is guided by familiar principles. All statutes carry a 
strong presumption of constitutionality. People v. Hollins, 2012 IL 112754, ¶ 13. 
Accordingly, this court will uphold statutes whenever reasonably possible, 
resolving all doubts in favor of their validity. People v. Boeckmann, 238 Ill. 2d 1, 
6-7 (2010). To rebut the presumption, a party challenging a statute must establish 
clearly that it violates the constitution. People v. Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 23. That 
burden is particularly heavy where, as here, the party raises a facial challenge, 
asserting that there is no circumstance in which the statute is valid. Bartlow v. 
 
 
 
 
 
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Costigan, 2014 IL 115152, ¶ 18. On the constitutional issue before us, our review is 
de novo. People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 57. 
¶ 13 
 
The defendant continues to assert that section 11-9.4-1(b) is facially violative 
of substantive due process. The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois 
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2) both provide that no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. There are two 
aspects to that guarantee—procedural and substantive. Procedural due process bars 
governmental action that infringes upon a protected interest when such action is 
arbitrary because it was not preceded by procedural safeguards. Substantive due 
process bars governmental action that infringes upon a protected interest when such 
action is itself arbitrary. See People v. Cardona, 2013 IL 114076, ¶ 17 (“a 
procedural due process claim asserts that the deprivation at issue is constitutionally 
invalid because the process leading up to it was deficient, whereas a substantive 
due process claim asserts that the deprivation at issue is constitutionality invalid in 
and of itself, irrespective of the process leading up to it”); see also Collins v. City of 
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). 
¶ 14 
 
Where a statute is challenged on due process grounds, the initial step of our 
analysis is to determine whether the statute restricts or regulates a liberty interest 
and whether that liberty interest is a fundamental right. In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 
66-67 (2003). Here, section 11-9.4-1(b) affects the freedom to visit public parks. 
The defendant acknowledges that being present in a park is not a fundamental right. 
Thus, the proper gauge for his substantive due process claim is the so-called 
rational basis test. Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 45 (“When legislation does not affect a 
fundamental constitutional right, this court, in a due process analysis, applies the 
rational basis test to determine the legislation’s constitutionality.”). Under that test, 
our inquiry is twofold: “[W]e must determine whether there is a legitimate state 
interest behind the legislation, and if so, whether there is a reasonable relationship 
between that interest and the means the legislature has chosen to pursue it.” People 
v. Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d 573, 584 (2007). 
¶ 15 
 
Johnson states the most common version of the rational basis test, but there is 
another version of it in our case law. The defendant refers to that alternative version 
and insists that it presents a three-part test where the court must determine whether 
 
 
 
 
 
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there is a legitimate state interest, whether there is a reasonable relationship 
between that interest and the statute, and whether “the means adopted are a 
reasonable method of accomplishing the desired objective.” People v. Adams, 144 
Ill. 2d 381, 390 (1991); accord Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 45; Boeckmann, 238 Ill. 2d 
at 7 (citing People v. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d 174, 180 (1989)); People v. Carpenter, 
228 Ill. 2d 250, 267-68 (2008) (citing People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2000)); 
J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 67; see also People v. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62, 66 (1985) (“[T]he 
question of whether a legislative exercise of the police power meets the 
constitutional requirement of due process involves identifying the public interest 
that the statute is intended to protect, examining whether the statute bears a 
reasonable relationship to that interest, and determining whether the method used 
to protect or further that interest is ‘reasonable.’ ” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
¶ 16 
 
Both versions of the rational basis test are essentially the same. If a statute is 
reasonably related to a legitimate state interest, the means or method that the 
legislature has chosen to serve that interest will also be reasonable. See Jacobson v. 
Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 323 (1996) (stating that the rational basis 
test asks “whether the method or means employed in the statute to achieve the 
stated goal or purpose of the legislation is rationally related to that goal”); 
DeGrazio v. Civil Service Comm’n of the City of Chicago, 31 Ill. 2d 482, 485 
(1964) (“A further test of the validity of a law or regulation is whether it is a 
reasonable method to accomplish a certain objective.”); Schuringa v. City of 
Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 504, 509 (1964) (“Equally settled and certain is the concept that 
a police [power] measure, to be beyond the pale of constitutional infirmity, must 
bear a reasonable relation to public health or other purpose sought to be served, the 
means being reasonably necessary and suitable to the accomplishment of such 
purpose ***.”); see also People v. Reed, 148 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1992) (stating that due 
process analysis examines “ ‘whether the statute is reasonably designed to remedy 
the evils which the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public health, 
safety and general welfare’ ” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting People v. 
Bradley, 79 Ill. 2d 410, 417 (1980))).2 
                                                 
 
2The State in its opening brief offers yet another formulation of the rational basis test. 
According to the State, a statute will be upheld “as long as it bears a rational relationship to a 
legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.” In re M.A., 2015 IL 
 
 
 
 
 
- 7 - 
¶ 17 
 
While the rational basis test is not “ ‘toothless’ ” (People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 
569, 596 (2006) (quoting Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976))), it 
remains highly deferential to the findings of the legislature (Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, 
¶ 45 (citing Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d at 585)). “The legislature’s judgments in drafting a 
statute are not subject to judicial fact finding and ‘may be based on rational 
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.’ ” Boeckmann, 238 Ill. 2d 
at 7 (quoting Arangold v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003)). If there is any 
conceivable set of facts to justify the statute, it must be upheld. Rizzo, 2016 IL 
118599, ¶ 45; J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 72 (“If there is any conceivable basis for finding a 
rational relationship, the statute will be upheld.”). This court will not second-guess 
the wisdom of legislative enactments or dictate alternative means to achieve the 
desired result. M.A., 2015 IL 118049, ¶ 55. We turn to the statute at issue. 
¶ 18 
 
To review, section 11-9.4-1(b) provides, “It is unlawful for a sexual predator or 
a child sex offender to knowingly be present in any public park building or on real 
property comprising any public park.” 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4-1(b) (West 2016). 
Section 11-9.4-1(a) adopts the definition of “child sex offender” in section 
11-9.3(d) of the Criminal Code (id. § 11-9.4-1(a)), which includes a person charged 
and convicted under Illinois law with predatory criminal sexual assault of a child 
and various other sex offenses against minors (id. § 11-9.3(d)(1), (d)(2)(i)). The 
statute further adopts the definition of “sexual predator” in the Sex Offender 
Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/2(E) (West 2016)), which includes a person 
convicted of various sex offenses against minors. A “public park” is “a park, forest 
preserve, bikeway, trail, or conservation area under the jurisdiction of the State or a 
unit of local government.” 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4-1(a) (West 2016). The statute, then, 
completely bars sex offenders who have targeted children from public parks. A 
violation of section 11-9.4-1(b) is a Class A misdemeanor. Id. § 11-9.4-1(d). 
                                                 
118049, ¶ 55; accord Hollins, 2012 IL 112754, ¶ 15 (citing People v. Dabbs, 239 Ill. 2d 277, 292 
(2010)); see also Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL 
116023, ¶ 28 (stating that the rational basis test “requires a court to uphold a statute if it bears a 
rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory”). 
The State’s formulation contains two phrasings of the same standard. See Doe v. City of Lafayette, 
377 F.3d 757, 773 (7th Cir. 2004). If a statute is arbitrary, it would obviously bear no rational 
relation to any government interest, except by chance. 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 19 
 
The defendant concedes that the legislature has a legitimate interest in 
protecting patrons of public parks from child sex offenders and sexual predators. 
See People v. Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 37 (“ ‘The prevention of sexual 
exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing 
importance.’ ” (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982))). Thus, the 
only dispute between the parties is whether there is the requisite constitutional 
nexus—a rational relation—between the statute’s aim and its means. 
¶ 20 
 
The State argues that there is a rational relation between protecting the public 
and barring certain sex offenders from public parks. The State offers two links. 
First, the State asserts that “it is not mere conjecture that child sex offenders might 
seek victims in public parks” and quotes a federal appeals court opinion that noted 
“children, some of the most vulnerable members of society, are susceptible to 
abuse in parks.” Doe, 377 F.3d at 773. In support, the State refers to cases where 
parks in Illinois have previously been locations for sexual assaults against minors 
(see, e.g., People v. Garner, 347 Ill. App. 3d 578 (2004); People v. Westbrook, 262 
Ill. App. 3d 836 (1992); People v. Israel, 181 Ill. App. 3d 851 (1989); People v. 
Maxwell, 89 Ill. App. 3d 1101 (1980)) and adults (see, e.g., People v. Foggy, 121 
Ill. 2d 337 (1988); People v. Rodriguez, 364 Ill. App. 3d 304 (2006); People v. 
Kinney, 294 Ill. App. 3d 903 (1998); People v. Westfield, 207 Ill. App. 3d 772 
(1990); People v. Cox, 197 Ill. App. 3d 1028 (1990); People v. Leonhardt, 173 Ill. 
App. 3d 314 (1988); People v. Bell, 132 Ill. App. 3d 354 (1985); People v. Buckner, 
121 Ill. App. 3d 391 (1984)). 
¶ 21 
 
The State also refers to statements by Senator Althoff, one of the sponsors of 
the bill that became section 11-9.4-1(b), who declared, “This legislation is 
necessary to protect users of public parks from child sex offenders and sexual 
predators who use the attributes of a park to their advantage to have access to 
potential victims.” 96th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, Mar. 16, 2010, at 55 
(statements of Senator Althoff). Senator Althoff explained: 
“Public parks offer many opportunities for sexual predators and child sex 
offenders to have easy access to potential victims. Children and lone adults 
frequently use parks for recreational activities. By their nature, parks have 
many obscured views and other distractions *** that offer opportunities for sex 
offenders to access potential victims.” Id. 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 22 
 
Second, the State asserts that sex offenders have high rates of recidivism. Those 
rates have been widely accepted by courts across the country, including the United 
States Supreme Court, which has mentioned “a frightening and high risk of 
recidivism” for convicted sex offenders. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002) 
(plurality opinion); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (highlighting a 
state legislature’s “grave concerns over the high rate of recidivism among 
convicted sex offenders and their dangerousness as a class”). This court has made 
similar statements. See Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 41 (“the legislature is entitled to 
‘conclude that a conviction for a sex offense provides evidence of substantial risk 
of recidivism’ ” (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 103)); People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill. 
2d 107, 138 (2004) (“our legislature has responded again and again to the 
propensity of sex offenders to repeat their crimes”); see also People v. Diestelhorst, 
344 Ill. App. 3d 1172, 1184 (2003) (stating that sex offenders have “a notoriously 
high recidivism rate”); People v. Stork, 305 Ill. App. 3d 714, 721 (1999) (quoting a 
legislative declaration regarding the high recidivism rate of child sex offenders). 
Thus, according to the State, the legislature reasonably could have concluded that 
barring certain sex offenders from public parks would protect the public. 
¶ 23 
 
The defendant responds that “empirical studies” rebut the State’s argument on 
both counts. Regarding recidivism rates, the defendant insists that the McKune 
plurality’s “frightening and high” comment has been debunked. See Does v. 
Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir. 2016) (mentioning “the significant doubt cast 
by recent empirical studies” on statements in Smith and McKune that the risk of 
recidivism is frightening and high); Ira M. Ellman & Tara Ellman, “Frightening 
and High”: The Supreme Court’s Crucial Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 
Const. Comment. 495 (2015). The defendant points to a Human Rights Watch 
article, finding that only 25% of former sex offenders reoffend (see No Easy 
Answers: 
Sex 
Offender 
Laws 
in 
the 
US, 
Human 
Rights 
Watch, 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/09/11/no-easy-answers/sex-offender-laws-us 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2018)) and to a federal Bureau of Justice Statistics publication 
that puts the recidivism rate much lower at 5.3% (see Patrick A. Langan, Erica L. 
Schmitt, & Matthew R. Durose, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Sex 
Offenders Released From Prison in 1994, at 1 (Nov. 2003), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf). Regarding parks as locations for sexual assaults, the 
defendant refers to another Bureau of Justice Statistics publication that indicates 
only a small percentage of sexual assaults occur in parks. See Lawrence A. 
 
 
 
 
 
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Greenfeld, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sex Offenses and Offenders: An Analysis of 
Data on Rape and Sexual Assault (Feb. 1997), https://perma.cc/ZG4B-D9ZP. 
¶ 24 
 
The problem for the defendant is that, regardless of how convincing that social 
science may be,3 “the legislature is in a better position than the judiciary to gather 
and evaluate data bearing on complex problems.” Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 41. 
Simply put, we are not a superlegislature. M.A., 2015 IL 118049, ¶ 70. 
¶ 25 
 
The defendant then shifts his argument to overbreadth. Typically, overbreadth 
is an issue that appears in a first amendment context. See Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, 
¶ 14. The defendant, however, raises a due process claim, not a free speech claim. 
Nevertheless, borrowing from the appellate court majority, the defendant asserts 
that section 11-9.4-1(b) is overbroad and, thus, irrational because it reaches “an 
amazingly vast array of innocent activities.” The defendant relies upon People v. 
Madrigal, 241 Ill. 2d 463 (2011). There, this court addressed the constitutionality 
of an identity theft statute that criminalized the knowing use of another person’s 
identification information without permission to gain access to any of that person’s 
actions, communications, or transactions. In invalidating the statute, we held that 
punishing a significant amount of “wholly innocent conduct not related to the 
statute’s purpose” is not “a rational way of addressing” a problem identified by the 
legislature. Id. at 473. The defendant cites other cases consistent with Madrigal. 
See Carpenter, 228 Ill. 2d at 269 (holding that a statute that “potentially 
criminalizes innocent conduct” is not “a reasonable means of preventing the 
targeted conduct,” in violation of due process); Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 25 (“criminal 
statutes that potentially punish innocent conduct violate due process principles 
because they are not reasonably designed to achieve their purposes”); People v. 
Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (1994) (invalidating a statute that “potentially subjects 
wholly innocent conduct to punishment”); Wick, 107 Ill. 2d at 66 (invalidating a 
                                                 
 
3One of the amicus briefs reminds us that it is “perhaps subjective” whether recidivism rates are 
low or high. Further, as the State observes, “[n]obody knows the true re-offense rate for child sex 
offenders” because only a small percentage of sex offenses are reported and only a small percentage 
of reported offenses result in arrests. However, “researchers widely agree that observed recidivism 
rates are underestimates of the true reoffense rates of sex offenders.” (Emphasis omitted.) Sex 
Offender Management Assessment and Planning Initiative, Chris Lobanov-Rostovsky & Roger 
Przybylski, eds., Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, & 
Tracking 91 (2014), https://smart.gov/SOMAPI/pdfs/SOMAPI_Full%20Report.pdf. 
 
 
 
 
 
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statute that “does not require an unlawful purpose”). According to the defendant, 
section 11-9.4-1(b) punishes innocent conduct—not only dog walking in 
Bolingbrook but also visiting museums in Chicago, attending a sporting event at 
Soldier Field or a cultural event at Grant Park in Chicago, visiting Lincoln Park Zoo 
in Chicago, playing in adult sports leagues or taking adult classes sponsored by the 
Chicago Park District, going to public beaches in Chicago, or visiting any Illinois 
State Park.  
¶ 26 
 
The defendant misapprehends the statute. Section 11-9.4-1(b) does not 
criminalize dog walking or punish any other innocent conduct. It punishes conduct 
by sex offenders. As the State cogently observes, “the conduct being criminalized 
is a convicted child sex offender’s knowing presence in a public park—that 
defendant was walking a dog was merely incidental to that conduct.” Like the 
statute outlawing possession of any firearm or any firearm ammunition by a 
convicted felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2016)), the statute here makes the 
status of the defendant an element of the offense. Consequently, conduct that is 
innocent for most people is not innocent for those who have been convicted of 
certain offenses. Madrigal and its “innocent conduct” predecessors are inapposite. 
¶ 27 
 
The defendant also relies upon the repealed predecessor statute to section 
11-9.4-1(b) as support for his constitutional claim. That statute, formerly section 
11-9.4(a) of the Criminal Code, provided: 
“It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly be present in any public 
park building or on real property comprising any public park when persons 
under the age of 18 are present in the building or on the grounds and to 
approach, contact, or communicate with a child under 18 years of age, unless 
the offender is a parent or guardian of a person under 18 years of age present in 
the building or on the grounds.” 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4(a) (2010) (repealed by Pub. 
Act 96-1551 (eff. July 1, 2011)). 
Section 11-9.3(a-10) of the Criminal Code now contains an almost identical 
prohibition. See 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(a-10) (West 2016). A violation of the former 
section 11-9.4(a) was a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4(e) (West 2010). 
Similarly, a violation of the current section 11-9.3(a-10) is a Class 4 felony. 720 
ILCS 5/11-9.3(f) (West 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 28 
 
Section 11-9.4(a) did not criminalize sex offenders’ mere presence in public 
parks but rather specific conduct by sex offenders—approaching, contacting, or 
communicating with minors. The defendant insists that those “narrowing 
parameters” led the appellate court to uphold that statute against a substantive due 
process challenge. See Diestelhorst, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 1185 (“prohibiting known 
child sex offenders from approaching, contacting, or communicating with a child 
within a public park zone bears a reasonable relationship to protecting children 
from known sex offenders”). The former section 11-9.4(a) and the current section 
11-9.3(a-10), thus, purportedly reflect reasonable attempts by the legislature to 
tailor a prohibition regarding sex offenders in public parks to the goal of protecting 
the public by preventing sexual assaults. 
¶ 29 
 
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the legislature clearly attempted to limit 
the application of section 11-9.4-1(b) and its penalty. Section 11-9.4-1(b) does not 
include in its definition of “child sex offender” persons convicted of “Romeo and 
Juliet” criminal sexual abuse under sections 11-1.50(b) and (c). See 720 ILCS 
5/11-9.4-1(a) (West 2016); 96th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, Mar. 16, 
2010, at 55 (statements of Senator Althoff) (stating that the bill that became section 
11-9.4-1 “excludes those convicted of criminal sexual abuse involving consensual 
sex when the accused is under seventeen and the victim is between nine and sixteen 
years of age and when the victim is thirteen to sixteen years of age and [the] 
accused is less than five years older”). And a violation of section 11-9.4-1(b) is a 
Class A misdemeanor, while a violation of section 11-9.3(a-10) is a Class 4 felony. 
¶ 30 
 
More fundamentally, the rational basis test does not require narrow tailoring; it 
only requires rationality. That is, the means chosen by the legislature need not be 
the best; they need only to be reasonable. See J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 72 (“Whether 
there are better means to achieve this result *** is a matter better left to the 
legislature.”); Moline School District No. 40 Board of Education v. Quinn, 2016 IL 
119704, ¶ 28 (“the fact that a law might be ill-conceived does not, in itself, create a 
constitutional problem for us to fix, for whether a statute is wise and whether it is 
the best means to achieve the desired result are matters for the legislature, not the 
courts”). 
¶ 31 
 
We conclude that there is a rational relation between protecting the public, 
particularly children, from sex offenders and prohibiting sex offenders who have 
 
 
 
 
 
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been convicted of crimes against minors from being present in public parks across 
the state. Avila-Briones and Pollard correctly identified a constitutional nexus. In 
Avila-Briones, 2015 IL App (1st) 132221, ¶ 84, the appellate court stated: “[B]y 
keeping sex offenders who have committed offenses against children away from 
areas where children are present ***, the legislature could have rationally sought to 
avoid giving certain offenders the opportunity to reoffend.” The Avila-Briones 
court added that whether the statutory scheme covering sex offenders is “a finely 
tuned response to the threat of sex offender recidivism is not a question for 
rational-basis review; that is a question for the legislature.” Id. And in Pollard, 
2016 IL App (5th) 130514, ¶ 41, the appellate court concluded, “There is also a 
direct relationship between the *** presence restrictions of sex offenders and the 
protection of children.” See Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 661 S.E.2d 728, 731 
(N.C. 2008) (upholding a municipal ordinance barring registered sex offenders 
from entering town parks and stating that the town “has a legitimate government 
interest in desiring to decrease and eliminate sexual crimes in its parks, and 
prohibiting those most likely to commit criminal sexual acts—persons previously 
convicted of such conduct—from entering the town’s parks is a rational method of 
furthering that goal”). Because section 11-9.4-1(b) is rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest, the appellate court erred in holding that the statute 
is facially unconstitutional under substantive due process. People v. Jackson, 2017 
IL App (3d) 150154, which followed the appellate court’s decision in this case, is 
overruled to the extent that it also found section 11-9.4-1(b) unconstitutional. 
¶ 32 
 
In the conclusion of his response brief, the defendant requests that, if this court 
rejects his facial substantive due process claim, we remand to the appellate court 
for consideration of his as-applied ex post facto clause claim, which that court 
declined to address. See 2015 IL App (3d) 140627, ¶ 25 (declining to address 
defendant’s contention brought under U.S. Const., art. I, § 10 and Ill. Const. 1970, 
art. I, § 16). We agree with the defendant and so remand. 
 
¶ 33 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 34 
 
For the reasons that we have stated, the judgment of the appellate court is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded for consideration of defendant’s claim under 
the ex post facto clause. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 14 - 
¶ 35 
 
Appellate court judgment reversed and remanded.