Case Title: Commonwealth v. Torres-Pagan

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12697

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12697 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MANUEL TORRES-PAGAN. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     September 6, 2019. - January 29, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Stop and frisk, Reasonable 
suspicion.  Search and Seizure, Protective frisk, 
Reasonable suspicion.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to 
suppress. 
 
 
 
 
Complaints received and sworn to in the Springfield 
Division of the District Court Department on May 4 and 12, 2017. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by William 
P. Hadley, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Lowy, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the case was transferred by him 
to the Appeals Court.  After review by that court, the Supreme 
Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Benjamin Shorey, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Claire Alexis Ward for the defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
David Rassoul Rangaviz & Rebecca Kiley for Committee for 
Public Counsel Services. 
 
Christopher DeMayo for Sharon Brockington. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The defendant, Manuel Torres-Pagan, was charged 
with multiple crimes after a warrantless search of his motor 
vehicle.  The defendant filed a motion to suppress, contending 
that the evidence was discovered after the police conducted an 
unlawful patfrisk.  A judge in the Springfield Division of the 
District Court Department granted the defendant's motion, and 
the Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal.  The Appeals 
Court reversed the order of the motion judge in an unpublished 
memorandum and order pursuant to its rule 1:28.  Commonwealth v. 
Torres-Pagan, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 1123 (2018).  We granted the 
defendant's application for further appellate review, and we 
conclude that the patfrisk was improper, as was the search of 
the defendant's motor vehicle, which was based on the results of 
the improper patfrisk.  We therefore affirm the order of the 
motion judge allowing the defendant's motion to suppress.1 
 
Background.  We present the facts as found by the motion 
judge, supplemented by uncontroverted facts from the record that 
have been "explicitly or implicitly credited" by the motion 
judge, reserving certain details for discussion (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 
(2015). 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services and Sharon Brockington. 
3 
 
 
 
While on patrol one early evening in the spring of 2017, 
two officers observed a motor vehicle with a cracked windshield 
and an inspection sticker that had expired.  The officers 
followed the vehicle for a short period of time, then activated 
the blue lights on their cruiser.  After driving a short 
distance, the vehicle, which was being driven by the defendant, 
pulled into a residential driveway. 
 
The officers got out of their cruiser and approached the 
vehicle.  As they did so, the defendant got out of his vehicle 
and stood between the open door and the front seat, facing the 
officers.  He then turned to look inside the vehicle on more 
than one occasion.2  One of the officers ordered the defendant to 
stay where he was; the defendant complied. 
 
The officers placed the defendant in handcuffs and 
conducted a pat frisk of his person.  When a knife was found in 
the defendant's pants pocket, the defendant was asked if he had 
other weapons in his vehicle.  The defendant indicated that he 
                     
2 According to the motion judge's findings, the defendant 
looked into his vehicle after being ordered to stay where he was 
by one of the officers; however, the testifying officer 
indicated that the defendant looked into his vehicle before 
being addressed by the officer.  This point was conceded by the 
Commonwealth at oral argument.  In the absence of any conflict 
in the record, the motion judge's findings regarding this 
portion of the sequence of events is clear error.  See 
Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 121 (1997), citing 
Commonwealth v. Bakoian, 412 Mass. 295, 297 (1992). 
4 
 
 
did, and the officers subsequently seized a firearm from the 
floor in front of the driver's seat. 
 
Discussion.  As an initial matter, we note that, because 
the defendant was driving a vehicle that had a cracked 
windshield and an inspection sticker that had expired, the stop 
was lawful.  Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 207 (1995), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Bacon, 381 Mass. 642, 644 (1980) ("Where 
the police have observed a traffic violation, they are warranted 
in stopping a vehicle").  As the defendant does not contest the 
legality of the stop, and because he appears to have gotten out 
of the vehicle on his own initiative rather than in response to 
an order from the officer, the sole question is whether the 
ensuing patfrisk was permissible. 
 
The Commonwealth contends that, given the circumstances of 
this case, chiefly the fact that the defendant alighted from his 
vehicle without being instructed to do so, the patfrisk of the 
defendant was justified.  We disagree. 
 
1.  Standard.  Both the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights protect against unreasonable searches and seizures.  A 
frisk, or "patfrisk," is a "carefully limited search of the 
outer clothing of [a] person[] . . . to discover weapons" for 
safety purposes.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).  It is a 
"serious intrusion on the sanctity of the person [that] is not 
5 
 
 
to be undertaken lightly."  Commonwealth v. Almeida, 373 Mass. 
266, 270-271 (1977), S.C., 381 Mass. 420 (1980), citing Terry, 
supra at 17. 
 
During a stop for which there is constitutional 
justification, see Commonwealth v. Narcisse, 457 Mass. 1, 6-7 
(2010), a patfrisk is permissible only where an officer has 
reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.3  
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326-327 (2009).  Terry, 392 
U.S. at 27.  The protection provided by the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights is coextensive with that of the United 
States Constitution in this regard.  See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 
                     
 
3 We have used the phrase "reasonable suspicion" 
interchangeably with "reasonable belief" in connection with the 
patfrisk standard.  See Narcisse, 457 Mass. at 9, where we 
stated that "police officers may not escalate a consensual 
encounter into a protective frisk absent a reasonable suspicion 
that an individual has committed, is committing, or is about to 
commit a criminal offense and is armed and dangerous," and that 
"a reasonable belief that an individual has a weapon and appears 
inclined to use it acts to satisfy both prongs of the Terry 
analysis" (emphasis added).  We acknowledge that the two 
standards are interrelated and perhaps even interchangeable.  
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ("there must be a narrowly drawn 
authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the 
protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe 
that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual").  
See also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009) ("To 
justify a patdown of the driver or a passenger during a traffic 
stop, however, just as in the case of a pedestrian reasonably 
suspected of criminal activity, the police must harbor 
reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is 
armed and dangerous").  However, to be consistent, we clarify 
today that "reasonable suspicion" that a suspect is armed and 
dangerous is the preferred patfrisk standard.  See id. at 326-
327. 
6 
 
 
441 Mass. 390, 396 n.6 (2004), citing Commonwealth v. Fraser, 
410 Mass. 541, 543 n.3 (1991). 
 
Our articulation of the patfrisk standard has not always 
been clear.  On occasion we have not been as precise with our 
language as we could have been, specifically when discussing the 
patfrisk standard as it relates to the standard for exit orders.  
For example, we stated in Commonwealth v. Washington, 449 Mass. 
476, 482 (2007), that "under our State Constitution, neither an 
exit order nor a patfrisk can be justified unless a reasonably 
prudent man in the policeman's position would be warranted in 
the belief that the safety of the police or that of other 
persons was in danger" (quotations and citation omitted).  More 
recently, in Commonwealth v. Amado, 474 Mass. 147, 152 (2016), 
we observed that "[w]here an officer has issued an exit order 
based on safety concerns, the officer may conduct a reasonable 
search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest."  
Both are technically correct statements of the law:  it is true 
that a patfrisk is not justified unless an officer has safety 
concerns and that a patfrisk may be conducted in the absence of 
probable cause.  However, in neither of the above cases did we 
specify that, to justify a patfrisk, an officer needs more than 
safety concerns; he or she also must have a reasonable suspicion 
that the suspect is armed and dangerous.  Although an officer's 
concern for his or her safety and the safety of others animates 
7 
 
 
both standards, the officer's safety concern in an exit order 
context may be resolved once the suspect leaves her vehicle.4  
See id. at 151-152; Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 512 
(2009).  Without a more particularized fear that the suspect is 
presently armed and dangerous, the officer cannot take the more 
intrusive step of pat frisking the suspect.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 
24-25. 
Although for the most part we have articulated the patfrisk 
standard correctly, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Villagran, 477 
Mass. 711, 717 (2017), and Narcisse, 457 Mass. at 7, in isolated 
instances we have conflated the standard required to perform a 
patfrisk with the standard required for issuing an exit order.  
For example, we have stated, inaccurately, that the standard for 
a patfrisk is the same as that which is required to justify an 
exit order.  See Commonwealth v. Torres, 433 Mass. 669, 676 
(2001).  In addition, we mistakenly have described a patfrisk as 
being "constitutionally justified when an officer reasonably 
                     
4 If, for example, the officer fears that the suspect may 
use her vehicle as a weapon, the officer may order the suspect 
out of that vehicle.  See Commonwealth v. Papadinis, 23 Mass. 
App. Ct. 570, 571 (1987), S.C., 402 Mass. 73 (1988) (police 
officer killed after being dragged by vehicle during traffic 
stop).  See also Commonwealth v. Douglas, 472 Mass. 439, 442 
(2015) (passenger placed vehicle in drive during traffic stop).  
Once the officer has done so, that safety concern has been 
defused.  The officer's concern that the suspect may use the 
vehicle as a weapon does not necessarily create a concern that 
the suspect is both armed and dangerous. 
8 
 
 
fears for his own safety or the safety of the public . . . or 
when the police officer reasonably believes that the individual 
is armed and dangerous" [emphasis added]).  Commonwealth v. 
Johnson, 454 Mass. 159, 162 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Isaiah I., 450 Mass. 818, 824 (2008).5 
We acknowledge that these differing articulations of the 
patfrisk standard may have caused confusion.  However, we never 
have strayed intentionally from the armed and dangerous standard 
as articulated in Terry.6  Accordingly, we clarify today that an 
exit order is justified during a traffic stop where (1) police 
are warranted in the belief that the safety of the officers or 
others is threatened; (2) police have reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity; or (3) police are conducting a search of the 
vehicle on other grounds.  See Amado, 474 Mass. at 151-152.  
                     
 
5 We are not aware of other instances in which we have 
merged the two standards.  Further, we do not suggest that the 
cases in which we inaccurately stated the patfrisk standard were 
incorrectly decided. 
 
 
6 In Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 666 (1999), 
we acknowledged that "[u]nder Terry, a police officer is 
permitted to pat frisk a person stopped under suspicion of 
criminal activity where the police officer has reason to believe 
he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual."  See 
Gomes, 453 Mass. at 512; Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 
374 (2007); Wilson, 441 Mass. at 394.  A decade later we noted 
that the Supreme Court reaffirmed that standard in Johnson, 555 
U.S. at 326-327.  Narcisse, 457 Mass. at 7, quoting Johnson, 
supra ("to proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police officer 
must reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed and 
dangerous").  See Villagran, 477 Mass. at 717; Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 457 Mass. 14, 19 (2010). 
9 
 
 
Thus, in the absence of reasonable suspicion of a crime or 
justification to search the vehicle on other grounds, an exit 
order is justified during a traffic stop if officers have a 
reasonable suspicion of a threat to safety.  A lawful patfrisk, 
however, requires more; that is, police must have a reasonable 
suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that the suspect 
is armed and dangerous.  See Martin, 457 Mass. at 19. 
Having different standards for exit orders and patfrisks 
makes logical sense.  To be sure, issuing an order to a motorist 
to get out of his or her vehicle during a traffic stop is an 
imposition that cannot be considered minimal.  See Commonwealth 
v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 469 n.16 (2011); Commonwealth v. 
Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 663 (1999).  However, an exit order is 
considerably less intrusive than a patfrisk, which is a "severe 
. . . intrusion upon cherished personal security [that] must 
surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating 
experience."  Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25.  The only legitimate 
reason for an officer to subject a suspect to a patfrisk is to 
determine whether he or she has concealed weapons on his or her 
person.  See Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 407-408 
(1974), quoting Terry, supra at 29.  We therefore do not allow 
such an intrusion absent reasonable suspicion that the suspect 
is dangerous and has a weapon.  Without a basis for such 
10 
 
 
suspicion, there is no justification for the patfrisk.  Terry, 
supra at 27. 
 
2.  Application.  The Commonwealth contends that the 
officers had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed 
and dangerous in the circumstances presented, principally 
because the defendant got out of his vehicle unprompted by 
police; thus, the patfrisk was justified.  We disagree. 
 
As recounted supra, after pulling into a driveway, the 
defendant got out of his vehicle and turned to face the 
approaching officers.  As they neared, the defendant, whose 
hands and body were in full view of the officers, turned to look 
into the front seat area of his vehicle multiple times.  When 
the police told him not to move, he obeyed the order. 
 
We begin by noting that the Commonwealth characterizes the 
defendant's movements as "furtive" even though the motion judge 
rejected this notion in his memorandum of decision allowing the 
motion to suppress.  Furtive is defined as "done by stealth" or 
"secret."  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 924 
(1963).  Here, the defendant faced the two officers, neither of 
whom observed any weapons on his person.  Contrast Fraser, 410 
Mass. at 545 (patfrisk justified by, among other factors, fact 
that "at all critical times the defendant kept his hands in his 
pockets").  He was not secreting anything, nor was he attempting 
to reach for anything.  See Commonwealth v. Goewey, 452 Mass. 
11 
 
 
399, 407 (2008) (patfrisk justified during routine traffic stop 
where, in addition to other factors, defendant appeared to "hide 
or retrieve something"); Commonwealth v. Stampley, 437 Mass. 
323, 327 (2002) (patfrisk justified during routine traffic stop 
where officer "observed the defendant pull his arms into the 
vehicle and lean forward, a motion consistent with reaching to 
the floor or under the seat").  Although furtive movements may 
be considered in analyzing whether a patfrisk is justified, see, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 372 (2007), 
getting out of a motor vehicle in full view of approaching 
officers can hardly be considered "furtive." 
 
Although not furtive, we acknowledge that the police may 
have found the defendant's behavior unexpected.  Nevertheless, 
surprise in response to unexpected behavior is not the same as 
suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous.  Stampley, 437 
Mass. at 326 (defendant's initial behavior during routine 
traffic stop, although "peculiar" and "unusual," was not 
threatening).  Contrast DePeiza, 449 Mass. at 371, 374 (patfrisk 
justified where, among other factors, defendant walked with his 
"right arm held stiff and straight against his body," suggesting 
that he carried firearm).  The degree of police intrusion must 
be proportional to the articulable risk to officer safety.  
Compare Commonwealth v. Edwards, 476 Mass. 341, 348 (2017), with 
Gomes, 453 Mass. at 513-514.  Here, the defendant's actions, 
12 
 
 
without more, did not justify a patfrisk because they did not 
establish reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed and 
dangerous.  See Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 158-159 
(1997) (fact that defendant alighted from vehicle during routine 
traffic stop was "insufficient to support the [defendant's] 
continued detention"); Commonwealth v. Brown, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 
528, 532 (2009) (several innocuous observations together do not 
create reasonable suspicion that suspect is armed and 
dangerous).  Contrast Stampley, supra at 327 (collecting cases 
recognizing that "gestures . . . suggestive of the occupant's 
retrieving or concealing an object . . . raise legitimate safety 
concerns to an officer conducting a traffic stop"). 
 
The fact that the defendant turned to look into the front 
seat of his vehicle more than once after he got out adds little 
if anything to the analysis.7  At most, such action would suggest 
that the defendant had something of interest in his vehicle, not 
that he had a weapon on his person.  See Wilson, 441 Mass. at 
396, citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-30 (patfrisks must be 
                     
 
7 The Commonwealth argued in its initial brief that the 
defendant repeatedly turned back toward the vehicle after he was 
ordered not to move, which suggested that the defendant, having 
ignored the officer's commands, might have attempted to retrieve 
a weapon, to use the vehicle as a weapon, or to flee.  However, 
as mentioned, see note 2, supra, the Commonwealth conceded at 
oral argument that the defendant turned to look into the vehicle 
before being addressed by police.  There was no evidence that 
the defendant failed to comply with police instructions. 
13 
 
 
"confined to what is minimally necessary to learn whether the 
suspect is armed and to disarm him should weapons be 
discovered"). 
 
The Commonwealth also contends that the fact that the 
events rapidly unfolded should factor into the reasonable 
suspicion analysis.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 74 
Mass. App. Ct. 920, 923 (2009) ("During an investigation, 
unfolding events are often interconnected and dynamic, requiring 
facts to be considered in totality when determining reasonable 
suspicion").  However, as we have explained, the defendant's 
actions did not indicate that he was armed and dangerous.  He 
made no furtive movements; he already had gotten out of his 
vehicle and could not use it as a weapon; his body was fully 
visible to the officers; he was fully compliant with all 
commands issued by the officers; and he was outnumbered.  Thus, 
the fact that the events, such as they were, unfolded quickly 
does not create a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was 
armed and dangerous. 
 
Finally, the Commonwealth briefly mentions the 
characteristics of the area in which the stop took place.  At 
the suppression hearing, an officer testified regarding numerous 
reports of shots fired, individuals being shot, and gang 
activity as well as arrests, including for violent crimes, in 
the vicinity of three specific streets in Springfield within a 
14 
 
 
week of the defendant's arrest.  Thus, the motion judge was 
provided with information that had a direct connection with the 
specific location and activity being investigated.  See United 
States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2007) (laying out 
three-factor test for high crime areas requiring nexus between 
crime suspected and type of crime prevalent in area; geographic 
boundaries to high crime area; and temporal proximity between 
crime suspected and heightened criminal activity).  See also 
Ferguson & Bernache, The 'High-Crime Area' Question:  Requiring 
Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment 
Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1587, 1631-1635 
(2008) (arguing that high crime areas should be delineated by 
"set boundaries" and should rely on current rather than historic 
crime rates); Grunwald & Fagan, The End of Intuition-Based High-
Crime Areas, 107 Cal. L. Rev. 345, 350-352, 367-370 (2019) 
(arguing that high crime area factor has invited misuse and 
potential abuse, particularly when defining specific geographic 
boundaries of area). 
 
Based on the information with which the judge was provided, 
he found that the stop and patfrisk occurred in a "high crime 
neighborhood."  Given the other circumstances presented, 
however, the judge ultimately concluded that the "high crime" 
factor did not carry the day with regard to whether the 
defendant was armed and dangerous.  We agree.  See Commonwealth 
15 
 
 
v. Meneus, 476 Mass. 231, 238 (2017) ("we look beyond the term 
'high crime area' to determine whether the inferences fairly 
drawn from that characterization demonstrat[e] the 
reasonableness of the intrusion" [quotations and citation 
omitted]); Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. at 435 ("That one or more 
'crimes' occurred at some point in the past somewhere on a 
particular street does not necessarily render the entire street 
a 'high crime area,' either at that time or in perpetuity"). 
 
Conclusion.  Although the defendant properly was stopped 
for motor vehicle violations, the subsequent patfrisk of his 
person and search of his vehicle were unconstitutional. 
Order allowing motion to 
suppress affirmed.