Case Title: Freeman v. Reeves

Citation: 410 S.W.2d 740

Docket Number: 5-4058

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1967-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
410 S.W.2d 740 (1967) Walter A. FREEMAN and Cobb Funeral Home, Inc., Appellants, v. Lee R. REEVES and Virgie Reeves, Appellees. No. 5-4058. Supreme Court of Arkansas. January 30, 1967. *741 Reid, Burge & Prevallet, Blytheville, for appellants. Gardner & Steinsiek, Blytheville, for appellees. FOGLEMAN, Justice. Appellees, Lee R. and Virgie Reeves, husband and wife, recovered judgments of *742 $6,500.00 and $12,000.00 respectively against Walter A. Freeman and Cobb Funeral Home, Inc., on February 1, 1966 for injuries and damages sustained as a result of a collision between a Blytheville city fire truck and an ambulance driven by Freeman for the owner, Cobb Funeral Home, Inc. The collision took place on January 18, 1963 at the intersection of Kentucky and Second Streets in Blytheville. Appellees were occupants of a station wagon which had stopped on Second Street just north of the intersection at a stop sign shortly before the two vehicles collided in the intersection, after which the fire truck struck the front of the station wagon and overturned on top of it. Appellees brought their suit against appellants, Freeman and Cobb Funeral Home, Inc., alleging negligence on the part of Freeman in the operation of the ambulance as the proximate cause of their personal injuries and damages. Appellants filed their answer denying any fault or liability and, with permission of the court, a third party complaint against Billy Bratton, the driver of the fire truck, alleging that the injuries and damages of appellees resulted from negligence on the part of Bratton, but seeking judgment over against Bratton if judgment should be recovered by appellees against appellants. After hearing all the evidence and the instructions of the court, the jury, in answer to interrogatories propounded by the trial judge, found that Freeman was guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the occurrence but that Bratton was not. Appeal was taken by appellants from the judgment based on that verdict. Both appellants and the fire truck driver sought to excuse their actions by claiming a status as emergency vehicle drivers and resulting exemption from certain traffic laws and ordinances. The principal ground for reversal urged by appellants is based upon the failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury that the ambulance was an emergency vehicle at the time and place of this occurrence, rather than submitting the question to the jury as a question of fact. This contention was based largely on the testimony of George Ford, a police officer for nine years and assistant chief of police at the time of the incident. He testified that, at that time, the police department had a policy of alternating calls for ambulances between two local funeral homes, calling one the first fifteen days of a month, and the other the last fifteen days. These calls were made whenever the police department received a call for an ambulance or when an officer working a wreck said he needed an ambulance. When asked how he classified ambulances, this witness said: "As emergency vehicles". In September, 1965, he (then chief of police) designated all the ambulances as emergency vehicles in writing. The witness had done all administrative work for the department from 1955 up to the time of this collision. His search of the ordinances failed to reveal any designation of ambulances as emergency vehicles. C. W. Short, who served for perhaps ten years, was his predecessor as chief of police. Prior to the written designation, the police treated ambulances owned by these funeral homes as emergency vehicles if they had a patient and were making an emergency run, but they had no policy and didn't know anything was required. James Stovall, an employee of Cobb Funeral Home and a witness called by appellants, stated that the City of Blytheville furnished no ambulance service and that the funeral homes answered ambulance calls from the police department without question and without asking who is going to pay the bill. He testified that the ambulance was operated as a public service for which they collected if they could. Both Freeman and Gerald Thomas Moody, the attendant accompanying him, testified that the call being answered came from a nursing home where they picked up a patient who was having a hard time breathing and required the administration of oxygen by the attendant. On the other hand, it was shown that the patient, after being involved in this wreck, was discharged from the hospital on February 26th. The driver and attendant *743 testified that the siren and red light on the ambulance were turned on. The Arkansas Statute defining authorized emergency vehicles is § 75-402 (d) (Repl.1957) which reads: Our statutes permit an authorized emergency vehicle to be equipped with a siren, whistle or bell of an approved type and require its use when the vehicle is being operated on an emergency call, otherwise the use of a siren is prohibited. Ark.Stat. Ann. § 75-725 (b) (Repl.1957). They also require drivers of authorized emergency vehicles, when responding to emergency calls, to slow down as necessary for safety upon approaching red lights or stop signals, but permit their proceeding cautiously past them. § 75-423 (b). Prima facie speed limitations are not applicable to authorized emergency vehicles when responding to emergency calls and sounding an audible signal, but drivers are not relieved of the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the streets or of the consequences of a reckless disregard of the safety of others. § 75-606. Upon the immediate approach of such a vehicle giving the proper signal, the driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way, drive to a position near the right-hand edge of the highway and stop and remain until the emergency vehicle has passed. § 75-625. Since appellants claimed the status as a defense, the burden was upon them to prove that theirs was entitled to be considered an emergency vehicle. While we think there is substantial evidence on which a jury verdict in favor of appellants might have been sustained, we do not find the evidence to be such that the trial judge committed error in submitting the question to the jury. While we do not hold that the designation or authorization of ambulances by the chief of police must necessarily be in writing, there is certainly a factual question as to whether this designation or authorization had been made by the chief of police. The mere fact that there was a police custom of calling the Cobb ambulance at certain periods and "we" treated such ambulances transporting a patient as emergency vehicles, would not constitute any presumption that these ambulances had been so "designated or authorized", particularly when Ford, administrative officer of the police department at the time the action would have been taken, could find no evidence of such action. It is of some significance that neither Ford nor Stovall testified about any action by the chief of police. The question of constitutionality of the statute for failure to provide standards upon which the designation or authorization might be made was not raised. We are also aware of decisions such as Perrine v. Charles T. Bisch & Son, 346 Ill. App. 321, 105 N.E.2d 543; Champagne v. Employers Liability Insurance Corporation, La.App., 112 So. 2d 118 and Chastant v. Employers Liability Insurance Corporation, La.App., 112 So. 2d 120, which appear to sustain the appellants. The statute applied in the Perrine case and the statute then in effect made all ambulances emergency vehicles. Illinois Revised Statutes, § 99(d), Chapter 95½ (1947). While we do not have the benefit of all the testimony in the Champagne and Chastant cases, it is clear that the chief of police was the witness by whom recognition of ambulances as emergency vehicles was shown. It is also clear that the court found there was no doubt, from the evidence, that the ambulance involved was a "sanctioned and recognized emergency vehicle". We have found no statute in Louisiana providing for designation or authorization of ambulances as emergency vehicles by a chief of police until 1962, some *744 three years after the decision in those cases, even though there were statutes giving certain exemption to ambulances and emergency vehicles. Of course, even if an ambulance is exempt from observing certain traffic regulations and has the right-of-way under appropriate circumstances, it does not follow that this is an exemption from the duty to exercise care commensurate with the circumstances for the safety of other travelers or persons. Proper instructions as to these duties of the drivers of these emergency vehicles were given. We think the evidence was sufficient to justify the submission of the question whether there was negligence on the part of appellants to the jury and to sustain the jury's finding that there was such negligence, when viewed in the light most favorable to appellees as we must do. There was testimony to show the following: This was certainly sufficient to justify the denial of a directed verdict in favor of appellees. Appellants also contend that the failure of the driver of the fire truck to stop at a stop sign at the intersection under existing conditions (contending that the intersection was blind), made him guilty of negligence as a matter of law. We think that, at best, this was evidence of negligence, proper for determination by the jury and resolved by it against the appellants. Another contention of appellants is that the jury verdicts are excessive, without support in the evidence and indicative of passion, prejudice or partiality. Here, again, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to appellees. When we do so, we find no merit in these contentions. *745 If the jury viewed the testimony most favorable to Lee Reeves, it may have based its verdict on the following evidence: As to Virgie Reeves, the jury might have found: We cannot say that these findings do not give substantial support to the jury verdicts. Finally, appellants contend that there was error in the trial judge's instruction permitting the jury to consider the use by Reeves of accumulated sick leave because of these injuries, saying he suffered no loss because his employer paid him. This court has said that an injured party should be entitled to show all the loss he may have sustained as against such a contention, even though the party may have also been compensated to some extent through Workmen's Compensation. Swindle v. Thornton, 229 Ark. 437, 316 S.W.2d 202. Regardless of whether the facts in this case are identical, we see no reason why an injured party should not recover as damages for lost leave (whether accumulated sick time or vacation time) for which he is paid by his employer and which he has earned through his employment, as he certainly cannot later claim this time with pay. To say that the possibility that he may never be sick again renders this speculative is not sufficient to bar recovery for such time. We think that the holding of the United States District Court in Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688, on this point is correct and the Arkansas authorities cited there appropriate. Affirmed. BYRD, J., dissents.