Case Title: STATE v MURDOCK

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1972-08-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
No, 12182 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1972 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - EDWARD R. MURDOCK, Defendant and Appellant, Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Victor H. F a l l , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : William Dee Morris argued, Helena, Montana 59601. For Respondent: Thomas F. Dowling, County Attorney, Helena, Montana 59601. Leif B. Erickson, Deputy County Attorney argued, Helena, Montana 59601. Robert L, Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 59601. J. C. Weingartner, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana, 59601. Submitted: June 19, 1972 M r . Justice Frank I . Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendant was convicted of f i r s t degree arson following a jury t r i a l i n the d i s t r i c t court of Lewis & Clark County, Hon. Victor H. Fall, d i s t r i c t judge. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to ten years i n the Montana State Prison and now appeals from the judgment of conviction. During the month of June 1971, defendant Edward R . Murdock started to build a house on a tract of land i n the Helena valley known as the Sewel 1 tracts. B y about August 1 the two-story house, 40 x 30 feet, was largely completed but the second floor was unfinished. In the latter part of July defendant contacted Schroeder Brothers Company, a Helena insurance brokerage firm, to purchase f i r e insurance on his house. They declined to sell him f i r e insurance a t that time because the house was not completed. On August 3 defendant again contacted Schroeder Brothers for the same purpose after the house was completed. Frank Mihel ish of Schroeder Brothers appraised the house a t $25,000 and suggested defendant purchase a f i r e insurance policy i n this amount. Defendant, however, insisted on a $35,000 policy which Schroeder Brothers wrote and defendant paid for. During defendant's second v i s i t t o Schroeder Brothers he was asked i f there was a mortgage on the house, and he answered i n the negative. On August 6 defendant asked Schroeder Brothers to add the name of S. F. Parker to the policy as mortgagor. On August 10, defendant again appeared a t Schroeder Brothers to check whether his policy was in full force and effect and was advised that i t was. A f i r e occurred on August 19 about 6:30 a.m. when defendant was not a t home. The house was partially destroyed by f i r e . The West Valley Fire Department answered the f i r e alarm. Upon arrival they found the house locked and forced the door to gain entry. During the course of putting out the f i r e and securing the premises, they noted various indications which led them to believe the f i r e was of incendiary origin and that arson might be involved. They so advised the deputy state f i r e marshal, Gary Younker. Younker arrived a t defendant's house about 3:00 p.m. and commenced his investigation. H e inspected the partially burned house, took pictures, and interviewed witnesses. H e gained entry to the unoccupied house by re- moving the boards from the door which the firemen had used, to secure the premises when they l e f t after putting out the f i r e that morning. The investigation by the firemen and deputy state f i r e marshal Younker revealed that the f i r e started in the furnace room on the f i r s t floor. Oil soaked rags were stuffed in the wire and control system of the oil furnace. The rags led t o two plastic containers containing a flammable liquid. The thermostat on the furnace was set a t approximately 75 degrees. When the thermostat clicked on the furnace ignited the rags which i n turn started a blaze i n the furnace room which started burning the ceil ing of the furnace room. Directly over the furnace room on the floor of the second story, various volatile items were stored--2 five gallon cans of gasoline, 1 twenty-five gallon can of propane w i t h gas escaping from i t , some flammable paint, and two rolls of tarpaper. The carpeting i n the house was soaked with oil. The firemen who fought the blaze noted the entire house was permeated with the odor of oil . They a1 so observed that a1 1 of the wall s were paneled and there was no insulation between the paneling and the outside walls. The firemen and deputy state f i r e marshal Younker concluded the f i r e was the result of arson. M r . Val Ketchum, who helped install the furnace, indicated that three weeks after the furnace was instal l ed, defendant cal led him and to1 d him the oil lines were leaking. Ketchum checked and found no such leak. About a week later, defendant again called Ketchum and told him there was "oil running al 1 over the place". Ketchum investigated and found two drops of oil on a f i t - ting. A t this time Ketchum completely checked the furnace and gave i t the seal of approval. The furnace was equipped with various safety devices which imnedi- ately shut off the furnace in the event of a malfunction. Ketchum stated the only way the furnace could s t a r t a f i r e such as the one involved here the f i r e would be i f i t were tampered w i t h . H e investigated the furnace afterland found rags jammed i n the electrical system which damaged the safety mechan- isms, which i n turn resulted i n a continual flow of o i l . H e concluded that the furnace had been manually tempered w i t h causing i t to work im- properly. On the day after the f i r e , defendant appeared a t Schroeder Brothers, inquired i f the f i r e had been reported, and was taken to the insurance ad- juster to discuss settlement. I t later developed that a $40,000 mortgage had been recorded on the property running from defendant t o S. F. Parker, the mortgagor. This mort- gage was given t o secure payment of a promissory note for $40,000 bearing 6% interest and payable a t the rate of $100 per month, including interest. Defendant was both the sole payee and the sole maker on the note. Defendant was charged w i t h f i r s t degree arson by information filed directly i n the d i s t r i c t court. H e entered a plea of "not guilty". Prior to t r i a l he moved for the suppression of certain objects and things, alleged- ly taken from his house as a result of an unlawful search and seizure, and his motion was granted. Trial by jury commenced on November 8, 1971. Basically defendant's defense was (1) failure of the state to prove the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) a1 i b i . Defendant did not testify. During the course of t r i a l the state was permitted to examine Jack Parker, husband of the alleged mortgagor S. F. Parker, as an adverse w i t - ness. Counsel for defendant also represented Parker a t the t r i a l . De- fendant claimed such adverse witness ruling and examination was improper, that the district court ruled Parker a defense witness, and that defendant was denied the right of cross-examination. Subsequently, defendant attempted to establ ish his defense of a1 i bi by testimony that he had gone t o Harlowton, Montana, the day before the fire; stayed i n a motel there that night; left the motel the next morning; and did not return to his home in the Helena valley until the day after the fire. Defendant called the motel owner and attempted to secure admission in evidence of a motel registration card on which his name was printed. The motel owner could not identify defendant as the person w h o stayed a t the motel. The proferred motel registration card was denied admission in evidence. Defendant was convicted of f i r s t degree arson as charged. H e was sen- tenced to ten years imprisonment in the state prison where he now remains. Following denial of various post-trial motions by defendant, he n o w appeals from the judgment of conviction. Defendant assigns ten issues for review upon appeal which can be summarized in this manner: (1) W a s there probable cause to support the filing of a direct in- formation? (2) W a s evidence secured as the result of an unlawful search and seizure used a t the trial to procure defendant's conviction? (3) W a s evidence relating to insurance and credit improperly ad- mitted a t the trial? (4) Did the district court err in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal? (5) W a s the motel registration of defendant improperly denied ad- mission in evidence? (6) W a s there error in jury instructions? (7) W a s there a fatal variance between the crime charged and the proof? (8) Insufficiency of the evidence to overcome the presumption of innocence? (9) Did the d i s t r i c t court erroneously apply the law of arson in i t s pretrial, t r i a l , and post-trial rulings? (10) Did the district court err i n declaring witness Jack Parker an adverse witness, in requiring the defendant to accept this witness as a defense witness, and i n openly quarrelling w i t h defendant's counsel in the presence of the jury over this issue? Directing our attention to the first issue, w e hold there was prob- able cause to support the filing of a direct information. Deputy state f i r e marshal Younker testified under oath i n open court i n support of the state's motion for leave to f i l e the information direct. A complete tran- script of his testimony is included i n the court f i l e . From his testimony the following facts are established: (1 ) The smell of petroleum products permeated the house. (2) Oil soaked rags had been placed i n the f i r e chamber of the furnace. ( 3 ) These rags ran down into two containers of fuel o i l . (4) The thermostat on the furnace had been s e t for approximately 75 degrees on a summer day i n August. (5) The house was over-insured. (6) Defendant owed b i l l s a l l over town for construction materials. (7) The house was mortgaged for $40,000. (8) The monthly payments on the mortgage would cover only half the interest accrued during the f i r s t year and less than that i n subsequent years. (9) The carpeting i n the house was soaked with fuel o i l . (10) There were substantial amounts of gas01 ine, propane, flammable paint and tarpaper l ocated directly above the furnace room. (1 1 ) The house was locked and defendant had the only keys. (12) The f i r e was the result of arson. (13) The f i r e was arranged to occur during the early morning hours when defendant was absent. (14) The mortgage and promissory note were questionable. These facts are abundantly sufficient to establish probable cause for filing a direct information charging defendant w i t h f i r s t degree arson. See State v. Dunn, 155 Mont. 319, 472 P.2d 288; State v. Johnson, 149 Mont. 173, 424 P.2d 728; State v. Peters, 146 Mont. 188, 405 P.2d 642; and section 95-1301, R.C.M. 1947, for the procedural and substantive re- quirements for establishing probable cause. the Onlsecond issue, defendant claims that Gary Younker, the deputy state f i r e marshal, entered defendant's house without a search warrant for the purpose of securing evidence t o establish arson and while there he took pictures and removed certain items of physical evidence. Defendant contends the use of such evidence a t the t r i a l , despite the court's previous ruling to suppress this evidence, constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of Article 111, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution . A t the outset w e observe that Montana statutes grant the deputy state f i r e marshal the right to do what he did here. H e has the authority to inspect all fires. Section 82-1209, R.C.M. 1947. H e i s granted the power" to inspect and examine all buildings where a f i r e has occurred. Section 82- 1217, R.C.M. 1947. Section 95-701(d), R.C.M. 1947, provides that a search is lawful i f done within the scope of a right of lawful inspection granted by law. The items of physical evidence he secured from the premises were suppressed and not used a t the t r i a l . The pictures he took and his testimony concerning his inspection and examination of the premises were admitted in evidence. Thus i t i s clear that the deputy state f i r e marshal was not re- quired to secure a search warrant to do this under the foregoing statutes, and that the evidence was admissible pursuant to such statutory authority. The real question here, however, is whether this satisfied state and federal constitutional requirements of a search warrant and the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. W e hold that the better reason- ing supports the view that what occurred i n the instant case does not violate such constitutional requirements. Younker's testimony as to what he saw and discovered a t the time of his inspection i s admissible under the "open fields" doctrine. State v. Perkins, 153 Mont. 361, 457 P.2d 465; Romero v. Superior Court, 72 Cal.Rptr. 430, 266 C.A.2d 714. Furthermore, the constitutional prohibi- tions are designed t o protect a person's right to privacy; i t can hardly be contended that the right to privacy in a partially burned dwelling after a fire i s paramount t o the right of the public to a reasonable in- spection of premises damaged by f i r e in the interests of pub1 ic safety and detection of incendiary fires. B u t perhaps the most compelling reason of all i s simply that probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant could seldom be establ ished if access to f ire-damaged premises is denied without a search warrant. The third issue i s whether evidence relating to insurance and credit was properly admitted. Testimony was permitted a t the trial tending to prove that defendant was indebted to several businesses for construction materials and supplies, that liens had been filed, that f i r e insurance in excess of the value of the house had been procured, that a questionable mortgage and note had been executed relating to the premises, and like matters. This evi- dence is admissible to show defendant's motive for the crime charged. Al- though motive i s not an element of the crime, motive or lack of motive i s a circumstance tending to establish guilt or innocence. State v. Hollowell, 79 Mont. 343, 256 P. 380; State v. Simpson, 109 Mont. 198, 95 P.2d 761. The jury was so instructed by court's instruction No. 16. There was no error here. Defendant's fourth issue for review i s whether defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal a t the conclusion of the state's case-in- chief should have been granted. Defendant contends the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt three essential elements of the crime of f i r s t degree arson: (1) that the f i r e was of human incendiary origin; (2) that defendant set the fire, and (3) that defendant was actuated by malice. From what has been reviewed heretofore, i t i s beyond cavil that the f i r e was of human incendiary origin. I t i s equally clear there is substantial evidence that defendant caused the house t o be burned. This i s equivalent to setting the fire under Montana's f i r s t degree arson statute, section 94-502, R.C.M. 1947, which reads i n pertinent part: "Any person who willfully, feloniously and maliciously sets f i r e to or burns or causes to be burned or w h o aids, counsels or procures the burning of any dwelling house * * * shall be guilty of arson in the f i r s t degree * * * * ' I To be sure the evidence is circumstantial, as in most arson cases. Nobody saw defendant s t a r t the f i r e or saw him prepare the premises for the f i r e that resulted. B u t the evidence does show that: defendant was the sole occupant of the house; he had the only keys to the house; there were no signs of forced entry into the house; the house was prepared for a f i r e by jamming the safety devices and electrical circuit in the furnace w i t h oily rags leading t o containers f i l l ed with volatile 1 iquids; gas01 ine, propane, and other flammable materials were placed on the floor directly above the furnace; the thermostat was set to f i r e the furnace i n the early morning hours when the temperature on the inside of the house fell below 75 degrees; the rugs i n the house were soaked w i t h oil; the furnace had manually been tampered w i t h to cause i t to malfunction and emit a continuous flow of oil when i t turned on; and defendant, to the exclusion of anyone else, had both the motive and opportunity t o burn the house down. Such circumstantial evi- dence i s sufficient to establish that defendant caused the fire. That defendant set the f i r e maliciously i s also established beyond a reasonable doubt by the foregoing circumstantial evidence. Malice in law may be either express or implied and consists of willful and wanton destruc- tion of the house by fire. The foregoing circumstantial evidence i s suffi- cient to establ ish imp1 ied m a 1 ice beyond a reasonable doubt i f be1 ieved by the jury, which precludes a directed verdict of an acquittal. This Court previously held in State v. Yoss, 146 Mont. 508, 514, "A directed verdict in a criminal case in this juris- diction is given only where the State fails to prove its case and there is no evidence upon which a jury could base its verdict." Here, the evidence in the state's case-in-chief meets this test, Accordingly the district court's denial of defendant's mot.ion for a directed verdict of acquittal was correct. Defendant's fifth issue is that the trial court erred in refusing the motel registration slip in evidence. This evidence was offered through Mabel Blaquire, the operator of the Troy Motel in Harlowton, Montana, who was called as a defense witness to establish the presence of defendant there during the night of August 19, when his house in the Helena valley was burned. It was denied admission in evidence on the grounds of improper foundation and irrelevance. Mrs. Blaquire testified that she could not identify the defendant as the person who signed the motel registration or occupied the motel room. The registration contained no written signature, but did contain the printed name of defendant. It also contained a truck license number and description that was not connected up with defendant. Although the motel registration was undoubtedly a business record, it did not tend to prove or disprove any issue in the case. The identity of defendant as the person who printed the name on the motel registration was never established. Even if it be assumed that defendant was that person, his physical presence there would not tend to establish an a 1 ibi under the cir- cumstances in which the fire started in this case. It does not tend to prove or disprove any issue in the case. As such it is entirely irrelevant, in addition to lack of proper foundation for its admission. The district court was correct in denying its admission in evidence. The sixth issue raised by defendant pertains to jury instructions. Neither his brief nor oral argument discloses either what instructions given were incorrect or what proposed instructions should have been given. K Under such circumstances any objection to jury instructions i s waived, and there is nothing for us t o decide. Defendant's seventh issue concerns whether there i s a fatal variance between the crime charged and the proof a t the t r i a l . H e argues that the crime charged i s f i r s t degree arson and the proof a t the trial was directed a t proving the burning of a building to defraud an insurer, a separate and distinct crime. From what has been said heretofore, the elements of the crime of f i r s t degree arson were established as a jury question by the state's proof. The fact that the same proof might also tend to establish a different crime, i .e. burning a building to defraud an insurer, in no way establishes a var- the iance betweenlcrime charged and the proof. The insurance feature of this case tends to establish a motive for the crime of f i r s t degree arson with which defendant was charged. A s defendant was neither charged nor convicted of burning a building t o defraud an insurer, no variance i s established. Issue eight questions the sufficiency of the evidence to overcome the presumption of innocence w i t h which defendant i s clothed throughout the t r i a l . The circumstantial evidence previously discussed and held t o be sufficient to convict rebuts any such presumption of innocence that might otherwise prevai 1 . T h i s contention i s totally devoid of substance and merits no further discussion. Defendant's issue nine contends that the district court erroneously applied the law of arson i n i t s rulings on pretrial, t r i a l , and post-trial motions of defendant. If w e properly understand defendant ' s argument, he con- tends that the admission of inadmissible, irrelevant and prejudicial evidence unrelated to the elements of the crime of f i r s t degree arson prevented him from having a f a i r trial. Defendant refers to the admission of photographs taken by the deputy state f i r e marshal on his inspection of the house after the fire, to evidence of defendant Is indebtedness for construction materials , and to the procuring of f i r e insurance on the house. Heretofore, w e have held the photographs properly admissible. W e have also held that evidence relating to defendant's indebtedness and the f i r e insurance on his house was properly admitted to show motive for the crime charged. These holdings render the present contention of defendant to be without foundation. The tenth and final issue for review concerns the witness, Jack Parker. Defendant contends the district court comitted prejudicial error in declaring Parker an adverse witness, i n requiring the defendant to accept Parker as a defense witness, and i n openly quarrelling with defendant's counsel i n the presence of the jury over this issue. I t must be noted that defendant's attorney was also the attorney for witness Parker. Defense counsel drew the mortgage i n question and advised witness Parker relative to his privilege against self-incrimination a t the t r i a l . Prior to the trial the state secured an order from the court re- quiring Parker to submit to a deposition. The record shows that Parker was very hesitant to testify and the state had considerable difficulty in getting him to answer questions relative to the circumstances leading to the $40,000 note and mortgage and the consideration for i t s execution. Parker was subpoenaed as a witness for the state a t the t r i a l . W h e n he was called by the state to the witness stand a t the t r i a l , the transcript indicates he was called as an adverse witness. Prior to the state's exarn- ination, Parker was advised by defense counsel to refuse to answer any ques- tions on the grounds of possible self-incrimination. H e claimed this r i g h t several times during the course of the state's examination. W h e n the state concluded i t s examination and witness Parker was turned over to defense counsel for questioning, the fol 1 owing coll oquy occurred between defense counsel and the court: "DIRECT EXAMINATION "By Mr. Morris: "Q. Mr. Parker, prior to the time this fire occurred, you came down to see me about the insurance on the mortgage? A. Yes. "Q. And we found out that Murdock had been charged with a crime. By the way, may the record show that the fact I honor this examination with c ross-examination , doesn ' t mean I accept i t, Your Honor. "THE COURT: What is that? "MR. MORRIS: Object to it, but I will still cross-examine because I have the right to and I think a duty to. "THE COURT: I don't follow you. This is your witness. "MR. MORRIS: He is not my witness. The state called him. "THE COURT: As an adverse witness. You said you represented him. Now you are on direct examination at this time. You don't cross-examine cross- examination. "MR. MORRIS: May we have an offer of proof, Your Honor, in this matter? "THE COURT: Yes, you may later on. "MR. MORRIS: Before I cross-examine? "THE COURT: Before you cross-examine? "MR. MORRIS: Yes, "THE COURT: You can ' t cross-examine cross-examination. "MR. MORRIS: I want to make an offer of proof. "THE COURT: You may make one at recess. If you examine this witness, it's direct examination on your part. I have established that he is an adverse witness to the State, and if you examine him now, it's direct exam- ination and you are bound by his answers. "MR. MORRIS: May the record show an objection to that rul ing? "THE COURT: Sudy. I' On this basis defendant claims prejudicial error. W e consider this entire matter a tempest in a teapot. Assuming arguendo that the adverse witness rule i s not applicable to criminal pro- ceedings, only harmless error not affecting the substantial rights of the defendant is involved; such harmless error i s not grounds for reversal. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L ed 2d 705; State v. Langan, 151 Mont. 558, 445 P.2d 565. Witness Parker was not examined by the state by use of leading ques- tions. Whether the state was bound by his answers i s irrelevant here, be- cause the witness gave no testimony unfavorable to the state. Defendant was denied the right of cross-examination of this witness under the adverse witness rule and was compClled by the rul ing of the trial judge to examine the witness on direct examination as his o w n witness. B u t what prejudice resulted t o defendant? W e find none under the circumstances disclosed here. Defendant was accorded the full right of examination of this witness unfettered by the confines of the state's examination. Defend- ant's examination of the witness in this manner was broader than his exam- ination rights under cross-examination to which he contends he was entitled. During this examination the defendant brought out circumstances attending the execution of the note and mortgage which, i f believed by the jury, were favorable t o defendant. Nor do w e see how the colloquy between the court and counsel over the adverse witness rule and defendant's rights of examination of witness Parker prejudiced defendant i n the eyes of the jury. In any event a colloquy cannot be carried on by the trial judge alone, and where defendant's counsel participates therein he can hardly be said to be an innocent bystander. W e fail to see how defendant has a meritorious cause for complaint on this score. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Associate Justice \ Associate Justices