Case Title: Commonwealth v. Kolenovic

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-08047 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ENEZ KOLENOVIC. 
 
 
 
Hampshire.     April 7, 2017. - October 18, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, Public 
trial, Confrontation of witnesses.  Practice, Criminal, 
Assistance of counsel, Argument by counsel, Instructions to 
jury, Admissions and confessions, Argument by prosecutor, 
Public trial, Confrontation of witnesses, Mistrial, Jury 
and jurors, Verdict, Capital case.  Evidence, Blood alcohol 
test, Blood sample, Expert opinion, Intoxication.  Jury and 
Jurors.  Intoxication.  Mental Impairment. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 24, 1996. 
 
 
The case was tried before Mary-Lou Rup, J.; a posttrial 
motion for reduction of the verdict, filed on March 18, 2003, 
was heard by her; and, following review by this court, 471 Mass. 
664 (2015), a motion for reconsideration was heard by her. 
 
 
 
Michael R. Schneider for the defendant. 
 
Thomas H. Townsend, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The defendant, Enez Kolenovic, was convicted of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or 
2 
 
 
cruelty in the death of David Walker.  On appeal, the defendant 
argues error in several areas, including error committed by his 
trial counsel, the trial judge, and the prosecutor, creating a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  He also 
asks this court either to remand his case to the Superior Court 
for renewed consideration of his motion to reduce the verdict, 
or to grant him relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We affirm the 
defendant's conviction and the denial of his motion for a 
reduced verdict, and decline to grant extraordinary relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  The evidence presented in the defendant's 
trial and the postconviction evidence introduced in his motion 
for a new trial hearing is summarized in Commonwealth v. 
Kolenovic (Kolenovic I), 471 Mass. 664 (2015).  We provide a 
condensed version of events as the jury could have found them, 
reserving some details for discussion. 
 
1.  The homicide.  The defendant spent much of the day on 
September 15, 1996, drinking alcohol.  Around 9:30 P.M. he went 
to a bar, which was connected to a restaurant that his family 
operated.  At the bar, the defendant continued to drink, along 
with Melissa Radigan and John McCrystal. 
 
Near 11 P.M., the defendant had a dispute with another 
patron, David Walker, the victim, which culminated in the two 
going outside, where, chest-to-chest, they "bumped" and yelled 
3 
 
 
at each other.  Police happened upon the scene, and tempers 
quickly cooled.  The defendant and the victim returned to the 
bar; the defendant bought the victim a drink. 
 
At approximately 1 A.M., the defendant, McCrystal, Radigan, 
and the victim made their way to McCrystal's vehicle with plans 
to drive to the defendant's apartment.  The defendant asked 
Radigan to sit with him in the back seat, ensuring that the 
victim sat in the front passenger seat, with the defendant 
directly behind the victim. 
 
Minutes later, as the vehicle approached the defendant's 
apartment, McCrystal, who was driving, noticed the defendant 
move forward in his seat and put his arm around the victim.  The 
defendant had slit the victim's throat with a knife.1  McCrystal 
stopped the vehicle; the defendant got out, pulled the victim 
from the vehicle onto the ground, and continued to stab him.  In 
total, the victim suffered nine knife wounds, the fatal one 
extending from the middle of the victim's neck to behind his 
ear.  The lack of defensive wounds on the victim suggests that 
he did not anticipate the initial and fatal attack in the 
                     
 
1 John McCrystal saw the white handle of the knife, which 
reminded him of the type used at the defendant's family 
restaurant.  Earlier in the evening, when the defendant was at 
the bar, he was observed entering his family's attached 
restaurant for five minutes.  While the prosecution alleged that 
that is when he got the knife, there was no direct evidence of 
him doing so presented at trial.  The knife was never recovered. 
4 
 
 
vehicle. 
 
After McCrystal pulled the defendant off the victim, the 
defendant stated to McCrystal, "You've got to be with me on 
this."  When McCrystal refused, the defendant got in the vehicle 
and drove away. 
 
After an approximately twenty-minute, high-speed police 
chase, the defendant was apprehended.  At the time of the 
killing, the defendant's blood alcohol content level was 
estimated to be between 0.26 and 0.3. 
 
2.  The trial.  In September, 1996, a grand jury indicted 
the defendant for the victim's murder.  The prosecution pursued 
a charge of murder in the first degree on the theories of 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty in an 
eleven-day trial in early 1999.  The jury ultimately convicted 
the defendant of murder in the first degree on the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
 
3.  Procedural history.  As his direct appeal to this court 
was pending, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial and 
requested a reduction of the verdict pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 25 (b) (2), as amended, 420 Mass. 1502 (1995).  We stayed the 
direct appeal and remanded the motions to the Superior Court.  
The motion judge, who was the trial judge, denied the rule 
25 (b) (2) motion; however, she granted the defendant's motion 
for a new trial.  The Commonwealth appealed, and we reversed the 
5 
 
 
order for a new trial.  See Kolenovic I, 471 Mass. at 665.  The 
defendant then sought a remand to allow the judge to reconsider 
her denial of the rule 25 (b) (2) motion.  A single justice 
remanded the matter to the trial judge, who denied the motion to 
reconsider.  The defendant's appeal from that denial has been 
consolidated with his renewed direct appeal. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The 
defendant contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance because his closing argument rebutted only the 
prosecution's theory of deliberate premeditation.  This, he 
argues, left the defendant exposed to the prosecution's other, 
and ultimately successful, theory:  extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
In the review of cases involving murder in the first 
degree, 
"[r]ather than evaluating an ineffective assistance claim 
under the traditional standard of Commonwealth v. Saferian, 
366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974),[2] . . . we apply the standard of 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to determine whether there was a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681-682 (1992), 
S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).  See Commonwealth v. LaCava, 
438 Mass. 708, 712-713 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Harbin, 435 Mass. 654, 656 (2002).  More particularly, we 
determine whether there was an error in the course of the 
trial by defense counsel (or the prosecutor or the judge) 
                     
2 Under Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974), 
the standard for ineffective assistance is whether an attorney's 
performance fell measurably below that which might be expected 
from an ordinary fallible lawyer and, if so, whether such 
ineffectiveness has likely deprived the defendant of an 
otherwise available substantial defense. 
6 
 
 
'and, if there was, whether that error was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion.'  Wright, supra at 682." 
 
Commonwealth v. Gulla, 476 Mass. 743, 745–746 (2017).  We find 
no error. 
Defense counsel portrayed the prosecution's extreme 
atrocity or cruelty theory as a "fallback" theory and asserted 
that the prosecution's "true" position was that the defendant 
was guilty of deliberately premeditated murder.  He then set 
about arguing that the Commonwealth had not proved deliberate 
premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Counsel's emphasis on premeditation in his closing was a 
tactical decision.  "When counsel focuses on some issues to the 
exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he did 
so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect."  
Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). 
Selecting which arguments to address in closing "is a core 
exercise of defense counsel's discretion."  Yarborough, 540 U.S. 
at 8.  "In deciding what to highlight during closing argument, 
counsel inevitably [has] to make strategic choices with regard 
to emphasis and importance, all in the context of the time 
allotted to such argument."  Commonwealth v. Dinkins, 440 Mass. 
715, 722 (2004).  Here, trial counsel chose to apportion his 
allotted time between refuting the Commonwealth's theory of 
deliberate premeditation and mounting an intoxication defense. 
7 
 
 
In reviewing whether an attorney's tactical decision was an 
error, we consider if that decision, when made, was "manifestly 
unreasonable."  Commonwealth v. Degro, 432 Mass. 319, 332 
(2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 427 Mass. 816, 822 
(1998).  Counsel's decision to focus on the deliberate 
premeditation theory in his closing made sense at the time, 
given that the majority of the evidence introduced at trial was 
aimed at proving deliberate premeditation.3  See Yarborough, 540 
U.S. at 9 ("Counsel plainly put to the jury the centerpiece of 
his case . . ."); Degro, supra at 333 (reasonable for closing 
argument to focus on theory on which "the defendant had tried 
the case"). 
Trial counsel also focused, more generally, on an 
intoxication defense, which, had it been successful, would have 
removed the case from the realm of murder altogether.  Counsel 
repeatedly argued that the defendant's higher-order thinking was 
impaired, that the defendant did not have the ability to "think 
clearly" or "reflect," and that he was incapable of forming the 
specific intent necessary for malice.4 
                     
 
3 It is worth noting that counsel was successful insofar as 
the jury did not convict the defendant on this theory. 
 
 
4 The defendant argues that his trial counsel failed to 
explain how the defendant's intoxication negated malice.  This 
claim is meritless.  While counsel did not use the word 
"malice," he repeatedly asserted that the defendant could not 
 
8 
 
 
Further, counsel's use of the intoxication defense did 
challenge the prosecution's extreme atrocity or cruelty theory, 
albeit in an indirect fashion, as a defendant's impaired mental 
capacity is an additional factor that the jury can consider in 
determining whether the murder was committed with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  See Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 
216, 228 (1983), citing Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672 
(1980).  As discussed infra, the judge so instructed the jury.  
Contrast Commonwealth v. Street, 388 Mass. 281, 287 (1983) (in 
conceding that defendant could not be found to lack criminal 
responsibility, counsel also destroyed defendant's impairment 
defense).  Counsel told the jury that, in order to convict under 
either theory of murder in the first degree, they had to find 
that "[the defendant] had the ability to know what [he was] 
doing; [he] had the ability to think about what [he was] doing 
is wrong; and then [he] thought about it and [he] carried it 
through."  Counsel concluded, "That's not what happened here."  
This assertion, coming at the end of a closing argument that 
largely focused on the defendant's intoxication throughout the 
entirety of the crime, amounts to a defense against the theory 
                                                                  
form specific intent, which undercuts the viability of first and 
second prong malice.  Although counsel did less to address third 
prong malice, his focus on how the defendant's intoxication 
impaired the defendant's state of mind and knowledge certainly 
drew into doubt whether the defendant met the criteria for third 
prong malice. 
9 
 
 
of extreme atrocity or cruelty.5  See Gould, supra at 686 & n.16 
(when defendant is impaired, whether he "appreciate[d] the 
consequences of his choices" is relevant to extreme atrocity or 
cruelty). 
 
In addition, although he did not necessarily focus on the 
extreme atrocity or cruelty theory during his closing, trial 
counsel undercut that theory during the cross-examination of the 
medical examiner.  He established that some of the knife wounds 
were superficial, that none of the torso wounds touched a major 
                     
 
5 The defendant's contention that his counsel inadequately 
connected the defendant's intoxication to the brutality of the 
killing is unavailing.  Although not as explicit, the thrust of 
counsel's closing was the same as that in Commonwealth v. Urrea, 
443 Mass. 530, 541-542 (2005), in which we found no error.  
Urrea's counsel stated that the defendant was not aware of the 
extent of the harm he was inflicting, which is similar to the 
instant case, where counsel asserted that the defendant did not 
know what he was doing.  Id. 
 
Additionally, the defendant argues that counsel's failure 
to raise a specific defense -- that the savagery of the attack 
indicated the defendant's impairment -- was manifestly 
unreasonable.  We disagree.  "A claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel made on the trial record alone, as here, 'is the 
weakest form of such a challenge because it is bereft of any 
explanation by trial counsel for his actions.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Niemic, 472 Mass. 665, 670 n.2 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Peloquin, 437 Mass. 204, 210 n.5 (2002).  Because the defendant 
did not raise this issue in his motion for a new trial, we have 
no explanation from counsel as to why counsel did not argue that 
the atrocious attack was probative of the defendant's 
impairment.  We can easily imagine reasonable justifications for 
counsel's choice.  Perhaps counsel thought that the brutal, and 
in some ways skillful, attack undermined his intoxication 
defense.  We do not hold counsel to a standard of performance 
elevated by the benefit of hindsight.  Niemic, supra, quoting 
Peloquin, supra. 
10 
 
 
organ or penetrated the chest wall, that the victim would have 
lost consciousness within "minutes" of the initial neck wound, 
and that the medical examiner could not be certain of the size 
of the knife.  This evidence challenged the presence of some of 
the factors that guide the jury in assessing extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.  See Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227.6  Counsel's decision to 
omit points already made on cross-examination from his closing 
does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.  See 
Commonwealth v. Denis, 442 Mass. 617, 628 (2004) ("suggesting 
ways in which counsel's closing argument might have been 
stronger does not make out a claim of ineffective assistance"). 
"[T]he guaranty of the right to counsel is not an assurance 
to defendants of brilliant representation or one free of 
mistakes."  Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 364 Mass. 1, 13-14 (1973).  
Although trial counsel's closing did not ultimately succeed, it 
was not manifestly unreasonable and was not ineffective 
                     
6 "We have delineated a number of factors which a jury can 
consider in deciding whether a murder was committed with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  These include indifference to or taking 
pleasure in the victim's suffering, consciousness and degree of 
suffering of the victim, extent of physical injuries, number of 
blows, manner and force with which delivered, instrument 
employed, and disproportion between the means needed to cause 
death and those employed."  Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 
216, 227 (1983).  See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 46-49 
(2013). 
 
11 
 
 
assistance.7 
2.  Jury instructions.  a.  Instructions on extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  Despite acknowledging that the judge's 
instructions on extreme atrocity or cruelty reflect current case 
law, the defendant nevertheless asserts that they violated his 
right to due process.  We disagree. 
 
The defendant asserts that the judge failed to provide 
sufficient guidance to the jury in assessing extreme atrocity or 
cruelty given evidence of the defendant's intoxication.  The 
judge repeatedly instructed that the jury should consider 
intoxication when making this determination.8  This instruction 
                     
 
7 The sufficiency of counsel's performance becomes apparent 
when the challenged closing is compared to others that we have 
held constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.  For 
example, in Commonwealth v. Westmoreland, 388 Mass. 269, 272, 
274 (1983), despite evidence at trial that would have supported 
insanity or mental impairment, counsel conceded in his closing 
the former and did not assert the latter.  Instead, counsel 
merely stated that the defendant was "out of control" and made 
an ill-defined case for manslaughter.  Id. at 274.  In contrast, 
here, counsel's intoxication defense forcefully contested the 
most serious charge of murder in the first degree.  Counsel was 
more direct in his attack of deliberate premeditation, but his 
assertions with regard to the defendant's mental state 
questioned whether the defendant could have committed the 
killing with extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
 
 
8 In giving the jury a framework for thinking about 
intoxication prior to instructing on the elements of murder, the 
judge stated:  "[I]ntoxication from alcohol is not, standing by 
itself, an excuse or justification for the commission of a 
crime. . . .  The issue of the effect of [the defendant's] 
consumption of alcohol on the day in question is relevant on 
certain of the elements of murder, and you may and should 
 
12 
 
 
gave the defendant an advantage:  we have held only that a jury 
may, not must, take a defendant's intoxication into account when 
evaluating extreme atrocity or cruelty.  See Commonwealth v. 
Szlachta, 463 Mass. 37, 49 (2012) ("judge properly instructed 
the jury that they could consider evidence of mental impairment 
in determining whether the defendant acted with extreme atrocity 
or cruelty in causing the victim's death"); Commonwealth v. 
Oliveira, 445 Mass. 837, 845-846, 848-849 (2006); Gould, 380 
Mass. at 685–686.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 
721, 750 (2014) (extreme atrocity or cruelty instructions that 
                                                                  
consider any credible evidence of [the defendant's] consumption 
of alcohol when you determine whether the prosecution has proved 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt."  She went on to 
describe intoxication as relevant to "whether [the defendant] 
acted in an extremely atrocious or cruel manner causing the 
death of [the victim]." 
 
Further, when the judge listed the Cunneen factors, she 
specifically instructed the jury:  "When you consider those 
seven factors, you should also consider any evidence of the 
effect on [the defendant] of his consumption of alcohol at the 
time in question in order to determine whether he committed the 
killing with extreme atrocity or cruelty." 
 
 
Last, during their deliberations, the jury inquired, "Is 
the Defendant's intent or his purpose/objective a consideration 
we should use to evaluate each of the seven factors of extreme 
atrocity?"  The judge responded in part that "certain of the 
factors do . . . take into account [the defendant's] . . . state 
of mind. . . .  But . . . others . . . do not . . . ."  This 
response may have done little to clarify the jury's confusion, 
but the judge added to her explanation all that was required of 
her by stating, "in considering those seven factors you may and 
should consider the effect on [the defendant] of his consumption 
of alcohol at the time in question." 
13 
 
 
only relate impairment to defendant's intent or knowledge but 
not to whether killing occurred with extreme atrocity or cruelty 
constitute error); Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 410, 421-
422 (2014) (same).  Certainly, the judge's instructions made 
clear that intoxication was an appropriate consideration in 
determining whether the defendant committed the killing with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, in accordance with our prior case 
law. 
 
The defendant notes that members of this court have raised 
questions in the past as to whether a jury should be able to 
find that a defendant, whether impaired or not, committed a 
murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty without a finding that 
the defendant "appreciate[d] the consequences of his choices."  
Gould, 380 Mass. at 686 n.16.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Riley, 
467 Mass. 799, 828-829 (2014) (Duffly, J., concurring); 
Commonwealth v. Berry, 466 Mass. 763, 777-778 (2014) (Gants, J., 
concurring).  However, the court has not reformulated our 
homicide jurisprudence in this area.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Boucher, 474 Mass. 1, 2-3 (2016); Szlachta, 463 Mass. at 48-49; 
Oliveira, 445 Mass. at 848-849; Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227; 
Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 165 Mass. 45, 58-59 (1895). 
The defendant's arguments that the instructions provided to 
the jury failed to narrow the class of homicides committed with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, and that the instruction did not 
14 
 
 
allow the jury to weigh mitigating factors against aggravating 
factors,9 are interrelated and misapprehend the nature of the 
Cunneen factors.  Rather than being sentence enhancers, the 
Cunneen factors are "evidentiary considerations" that guide the 
jury's determination as to whether the Commonwealth has proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt the element of a killing with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  Commonwealth v. Noeun Sok, 439 Mass. 428, 
438 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Moses, 436 Mass. 598, 606 
(2002).  The Cunneen factors are not, as the defendant 
characterizes them, aggravating factors to be weighed against 
mitigating factors.  See Noeun Sok, supra. 
Thus, there was no error in the judge's instructions on 
extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
 
b.  Humane practice instruction.  The defendant contends 
that he was entitled to a humane practice instruction.  At 
trial, witnesses testified that the defendant made incriminating 
statements after pulling the victim from the vehicle onto the 
driveway of his apartment complex.  The first statement was a 
response to McCrystal's exhortation, "Billy, get off of him, 
                     
 
9 Analogizing to death penalty cases, the defendant contends 
that the Cunneen factors are aggravating factors that increase 
the punishment for a defendant, and therefore should serve to 
narrow the class of offenders eligible for a life without parole 
sentence so as to avoid an "arbitrary and capricious" 
application of that penalty.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 188 (1976).  As discussed infra, this analogy is inapt. 
15 
 
 
you're going to kill him."  The defendant replied, "I think it's 
too late for that."  The second and third statements, made soon 
thereafter, were the defendant's entreaties to McCrystal:  
"You've got to be with me on this," and, "Come on, we're 
family."  The defendant alleges his trial counsel erred in 
failing to request a humane practice instruction with respect to 
those statements, and that the trial judge similarly erred by 
failing to provide, sua sponte, such instruction.  We disagree. 
 
Only voluntary confessions or admissions are admissible 
regardless of whether they are made to police or civilians.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 449 Mass. 747, 765 (2007), citing 
Commonwealth v. Sheriff, 425 Mass. 186, 192 (1997).  If the 
voluntariness of a confession or admission is a live issue at 
trial, our "humane practice" rule requires, even absent a 
request from defense counsel, that the judge instruct the jury 
on the issue.10  See Brown, supra at 765; Commonwealth v. Benoit, 
410 Mass. 506, 512 (1991); Commonwealth v. Parham, 390 Mass. 
833, 841 (1984).  However, we have never applied the humane 
practice rule to statements made during the "criminal episode."  
See Commonwealth v. Boateng, 438 Mass. 498, 501, 504 & n.3 
(2003) (statements made by defendant after attacking victim but 
                     
 
10 The humane practice instruction conveys to the jury that 
the prosecution must prove the voluntariness of the statements 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Sheriff, 425 
Mass. 186, 193 (1997). 
16 
 
 
before he prevented witness from seeking help not covered by 
humane practice rule). 
 
Here, the defendant's first statement was made while he was 
still on top of the victim.  The second and third statements 
came once the defendant had been pulled away from the victim.    
All of the statements were made after the victim suffered the 
fatal knife wound, but before the defendant led the police on a 
high-speed chase.  Because the defendant's statements occurred 
during the criminal episode, he was not entitled to a humane 
practice instruction.  There was no error on the part of either 
defense counsel or the trial judge. 
 
3.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant 
challenges three statements in the prosecutor's closing argument 
as improper.  "In determining whether an argument was improper 
we examine the remarks 'in the context of the entire argument, 
and in light of the judge's instructions to the jury and the 
evidence at trial.'"  Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 Mass. 245, 273 
(2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412 Mass. 
224, 231 (1992).  We take each challenged statement in turn. 
 
a.  The defendant contends the prosecutor improperly 
focused on the gruesome nature of the killing by addressing the 
severity of the throat wound, recounting how the defendant 
repeatedly stabbed the victim after pulling him out of the 
vehicle, and by noting that the victim was conscious for three 
17 
 
 
to five minutes following the initial and ultimately fatal 
throat wound.  The prosecutor's description of the gruesome 
nature of the killing was not improper. 
 
The Commonwealth charged the defendant with murder in the 
first degree on the theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty as 
well as deliberate premeditation.  The way the victim died is 
relevant to whether the killing was committed with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  See Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227 (listing 
factors jury may consider in determining extreme atrocity or 
cruelty).  See also Commonwealth v. Mejia, 463 Mass. 243, 254 
(2012) ("because the violent nature of the murder was relevant 
to whether it was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty, 
the remarks were not improper"). 
 
b.  The defendant also argues that the prosecutor 
improperly stated in his closing argument that the defendant 
showed "indifference or even pleasure . . . in the way he 
executed [the victim], cutting his throat, dragging him out and 
repeatedly stabbing him and saying simply to the pleas of 'stop' 
from the other witnesses, 'It's too late for that.'"  We 
disagree. 
 
In closing argument, a prosecutor may suggest that the jury 
draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.  Commonwealth v. 
Grimshaw, 412 Mass. 505, 509 (1992).  The victim's nine knife 
wounds, several of which the medical examiner testified were 
18 
 
 
suffered after the fatal wound, were sufficient to justify the 
inference that the defendant was indifferent to the victim's 
suffering.  Commonwealth v. Coleman, 389 Mass. 667, 674 (1983) 
("[t]he defendant's persistence in seeking to inflict additional 
wounds demonstrated an indifference to the victim's suffering"). 
 
Although there was less evidence that the defendant took 
pleasure in the victim's suffering, the evidence presented was 
nevertheless sufficient to support that inference.  The 
defendant's statement, "I think it's too late for that," in 
response to pleas for the defendant to stop, appears to be a 
declaration of fact rather than one of "pleasure."  However, 
McCrystal also testified that it was difficult to pull the 
defendant off of the victim.  This evidence could support an 
inference that the defendant wanted to remain atop the victim 
because he took pleasure in "pounding" away at the victim.  
Distinguishing proper inferences from improper speculation can 
be difficult.  Commonwealth v. Bois, 476 Mass. 15, 33 (2016).  
However, "we must and do recognize that closing argument is 
identified as argument," and that the jury understand the 
instructions from the judge that the closing argument is not 
evidence.  Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 517 (1987).  
Although close, the challenged statement "did not cross the line 
between fair and improper argument."  Commonwealth v. Sanna, 424 
Mass. 92, 107 (1997). 
19 
 
 
 
c.  Finally, at the beginning of his closing argument, the 
prosecutor held up the victim's photograph and asked, "What did 
he do that night to deserve to be sliced and stabbed to death?"  
The defendant contends that this rhetorical question improperly 
appealed to the jurors' sympathy.  We agree. 
 
A prosecutor may "humanize the proceedings" but may not do 
so in a way that plays on the jury's sympathy and emotions.  
Mejia, 463 Mass. at 253, quoting Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 
Mass. 491, 495 (1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39, 
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998).  See Kozec, 399 Mass. at 
516-517.  The prosecutor's rhetorical question did not pertain 
to whether the defendant was guilty but instead sought to 
persuade the jury to convict on the basis of the brutal nature 
of the killing.  See Commonwealth v. Gentile, 437 Mass. 569, 580 
(2002) (prosecutor's statement that victim "didn't deserve to 
die this way" was improper). 
 
The rhetorical question was improper, yet the defendant did 
not object to this portion, or indeed any part, of the closing 
at trial.  Thus, we consider, "in the context of the arguments 
and the case as a whole," whether the improper statement created 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Maynard, 436 Mass. 558, 570 (2002).  See Gaynor, 
443 Mass. at 273, citing Commonwealth v. Allison, 434 Mass. 670, 
686 (2001).  We conclude that it did not. 
20 
 
 
 
First, although it inappropriately appealed to jurors' 
sympathies, the improper statement did not go to the heart of 
the defense strategy -- that the defendant was too intoxicated 
to form the necessary intent for murder in the first degree 
under either a theory of deliberate premeditation or extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. 
583, 591, 594 (1983) (improper statements of prosecutor "struck 
at the heart of [the] defense," contributing to reversible 
error). 
 
Further, the judge instructed that closing arguments are 
not evidence and that the jury should not be swayed "by 
prejudice or by sympathy."  We presume that the jury follow the 
judge's instructions and have held that even such general 
instructions can diminish prejudice suffered by the defendant.  
See Bois, 476 Mass. at 35-36, citing Commonwealth v. Camacho, 
472 Mass. 587, 609 (2015); Gentile, 437 Mass. at 580. 
 
Finally, given the abundance of evidence introduced on the 
brutal nature of the killing, it is "unlikely that the 
prosecutor's argument had an inflammatory effect on the jury 
beyond that which naturally would result from the evidence 
presented."  Bois, 476 Mass. at 35, citing Commonwealth v. 
Kater, 432 Mass. 404, 423 (2000).  The improper statement was 
isolated, and "it was not a principal focus of what otherwise 
21 
 
 
was a proper closing argument."11  Gaynor, 443 Mass. at 274.  See 
Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 435 Mass. 569, 579 (2002). 
 
There was no reversible error in the prosecutor's closing 
argument. 
 
4.  Court room closure.  The defendant claims that the 
trial judge erred by improperly closing the court room during 
jury selection.  The right to a public trial is guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
extends to jury empanelment.  See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 
209, 213-215 (2010) (per curiam); Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 
Mass. 728, 735 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 1026 (2012).  
Although under certain circumstances a trial judge may determine 
that it is necessary to close the court room to the public, he 
or she must make findings on the record to justify the closure.  
See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45, 48 (1984), citing Press-
                     
 
11 The defendant also asserts that the fact that the 
prosecutor put the improper rhetorical question to the jury at 
the beginning of the closing argument, coupled with the fact 
that he simultaneously held the victim's photograph in his hand 
in a "dramatic" way, was particularly prejudicial.  The 
defendant does not cite any decision that suggests the 
positioning of an improper statement at the outset of a closing 
argument is sufficient to produce a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Further, we cannot imagine that the 
prosecutor's actions were any more dramatic than kicking a trash 
can or making stabbing motions with a ruler during closing 
argument, neither of which was found to be prejudicial enough to 
warrant a new trial.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 425 Mass. 
609, 611–612 (1997); Commonwealth v. Barros, 425 Mass. 572, 581 
(1997). 
22 
 
 
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 511-512 
(1984).  See also Commonwealth v. Weaver, 474 Mass. 787, 814 
(2016), aff'd, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1909-1910, 1912 (2017).  "[I]t 
is a well-settled principle that a properly preserved violation 
of that right is structural error requiring reversal."  
Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 357 (2016). 
 
The defendant asserts that his family was excluded from the 
court room for a portion of jury empanelment due to space 
constraints, and that the trial judge made insufficient findings 
to warrant the closure.  He argues that this court room closure 
requires a new trial.  The parties disagree about when, the 
extent to which, and the circumstances under which the court 
room was closed.  Because we conclude that the defendant has not 
made a sufficient showing to warrant a new trial, we assume 
without deciding that there was an improper closure during a 
portion of the empanelment process.12 
 
In Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1912, the United States Supreme 
                     
 
12 The defendant has moved to expand the record and remand 
the issue to the Superior Court.  Indeed, claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel are best raised in motions for a new 
trial, so that an adequate factual record for appellate review 
can be developed.  See Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807, 
808-809 & n.2 (2006) ("The occasions when a court can resolve an 
ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal are exceptional, 
and our case law strongly disfavors raising ineffective 
assistance claims on direct appeal").  Because we conclude that 
the defendant did not suffer prejudice warranting a new trial 
even if he were to prove the facts he alleges, there is no need 
for a remand to determine those facts. 
23 
 
 
Court distinguished sharply between preserved and unpreserved 
errors on appeal.13  Where, as here, the defendant did not object 
to the closure at trial,14 and raises the issue on appeal as an 
                     
 
13 Throughout its opinion in Weaver, the United States 
Supreme Court emphasized "the difference between a public-trial 
violation preserved and then raised on direct review and a 
public-trial violation raised as an ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim."  Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1912 
(2007).  In making this distinction, the Supreme Court explained 
that direct review of preserved error means that the trial judge 
had an opportunity to correct the error and make findings on the 
record, whereas an ineffective assistance claim raised in 
postconviction proceedings raises the costs and uncertainties of 
a new trial.  Id.  Based on the Supreme Court's reasoning, we 
infer that the important distinction is not whether the claim 
was made in the direct appeal or in the motion for new trial, 
but rather whether the court room closure issue was preserved at 
trial. 
 
 
14 At one point during empanelment, trial counsel had a 
brief exchange with the judge, about the family entering the 
court room, and acquiesced when the judge responded that there 
was not enough room for the entire family at that time: 
 
 
Defense counsel:  "Judge, before those jurors come out, is 
the Court going to call each -- the number of people in each 
panel from Friday and go through it in that fashion?  The reason 
I'm asking --" 
 
 
The judge:  "We're going to keep them out of the courtroom 
until -- they are just going to be brought in the courtroom 
individually." 
 
 
Defense counsel:  "My client's family had wanted to come in 
and sit down." 
 
 
The judge:  "They can certainly do that during jury 
[e]mpanelment, the individual jury [e]mpanelment.  Not right 
now, we don't have room in the courtroom." 
 
 
Defense counsel:  "That's what I wanted to know." 
 
 
24 
 
 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim,15 he bears "the burden 
. . . to show either a reasonable probability of a different 
outcome in his or her case or . . . to show that the particular 
public-trial violation was so serious as to render his or her 
trial fundamentally unfair."  Id. at 1911.  See Weaver, 474 
Mass. at 814, 815, citing Commonwealth v. LaChance, 469 Mass. 
854, 856 (2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 317 (2015) (defendant 
must "demonstrate[] . . . facts that would support a finding 
                                                                  
 
The clerk:  "We are bringing them in all together 
right now?" 
 
 
The judge:  "Right.  [Defense counsel], if your 
client's parents want to come into the courtroom during 
this portion, they are welcome.  I know there are a large 
number of people." 
 
 
Defense counsel:  "There are.  I think they would all 
prefer to come in together.  It will probably make it 
easier." 
 
 
The judge:  "That's up to you.  Okay." 
 
 
This exchange did not rise to the level of an objection.  
See Commonwealth v. Torres, 420 Mass. 479, 482-484 (1995), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. 557, 564 (1987) ("It 
is a fundamental rule of practice that where a party alleges 
error . . . he must bring the alleged error to the attention of 
the judge in specific terms in order to give the judge an 
opportunity to rectify the error, if any" [emphasis added]). 
 
 
15 As "the statutory standard of [G. L. c. 278, § 33E,] is 
more favorable to a defendant than is the constitutional 
standard for determining the ineffectiveness of counsel," a 
defendant convicted of murder in the first degree must show for 
either a direct or a collateral attack on an unpreserved issue 
that any error caused a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice.  Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681-682 
(1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
25 
 
 
that the closure subjected him to a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice").  In Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1913, the 
Supreme Court determined that the defendant had not made such a 
showing where 
"petitioner's trial was not conducted in secret or in 
a remote place. . . .  The closure was limited to the 
jury voir dire; the courtroom remained open during the 
evidentiary phase of the trial; the closure decision 
apparently was made by court officers rather than the 
judge; there were many members of the venire who did 
not become jurors but who did observe the proceedings; 
and there was a record made of the proceedings that 
does not indicate any basis for concern, other than 
the closure itself. 
 
 
"There has been no showing, furthermore, that the 
potential harms flowing from a courtroom closure came 
to pass in this case.  For example, there is no 
suggestion that any juror lied during voir dire; no 
suggestion of misbehavior by the prosecutor, judge, or 
any other party; and no suggestion that any of the 
participants failed to approach their duties with the 
neutrality and serious purpose that our system 
demands."  (Citation omitted.) 
 
 
Similarly, here, the defendant has made no showing of 
prejudice.  He has not argued that the closure had any effect on 
the proceedings, nor has he pointed to any misbehavior by any 
prospective juror, the judge, or the parties.  Thus, there was 
no reversible error. 
 
5.  Evidentiary rulings. The defendant claims that the 
trial judge also erred with regard to two evidentiary rulings. 
26 
 
 
a.  Serologist's testimony.16  At trial, a State police 
crime laboratory supervisor testified without objection 
regarding the testing and comparison of a sample of the victim's 
blood to eleven bloodstains from the vehicle where the victim 
was killed.  The defendant claims that the witness was not the 
serologist who performed the relevant tests, and that, 
therefore, the admission of her testimony violated his rights to 
confrontation and due process.  There was no error. 
 
The right of a defendant to confront witnesses who testify 
against him or her is protected by the Sixth Amendment and art. 
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Contrary to the 
defendant's assertions, the testifying serologist was involved 
in the majority of the blood testing to which she testified, as 
either the main tester, double reader, or supervisor.17  Facts 
within an expert's personal knowledge include tests that the 
expert either performed or supervised.  See Commonwealth v. 
Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 390 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. Hill, 
54 Mass. App. Ct. 690, 697 (2002).  Contrast Commonwealth v. 
                     
 
16 We now allow the Commonwealth's motion to expand the 
record to include serology paperwork regarding the testing of 
eleven bloodstains from the vehicle in which the victim was 
killed. 
 
 
17 A series of tests for six particular characteristics were 
performed on several blood samples taken from the motor vehicle.  
The serologist who testified to the cumulative serology chart at 
trial was consistently involved in tests for four of the six 
blood characteristics for the samples. 
27 
 
 
Tassone, 468 Mass. 391, 402 (2014) (confrontation clause 
violation where deoxyribonucleic acid [DNA] results offered in 
evidence without testimony of any analyst from laboratory that 
tested crime scene DNA sample).  Consequently, there was no 
confrontation clause violation. 
 
As to the specific tests with which the defendant suggests 
the serologist was not involved, their role in her testimony was 
either cumulative or irrelevant.  One of the tests related to  
characteristics that were indistinguishable between the 
defendant and the victim.18  The other test did show a 
distinction between the defendant and victim, but was only one 
of three tests that showed such a distinction.19  Thus, even if 
                     
 
18 The serologists additionally tested the blood of 
McCrystal and Radigan.  McCrystal did not match any of the 
samples taken from the motor vehicle, and Radigan was excluded 
as a source from all of the samples from the vehicle except for 
the sample from the right front fender.  The laboratory 
supervisor testified that the sample from the right front fender 
had only been tested for three of the six blood characteristics, 
which she said was why the sample could not be distinguished 
between Radigan and the victim. 
 
 
19 The defendant and the victim shared three of six blood 
characteristics.  The serologist did not participate in the 
testing for all six characteristics for each of the eleven 
samples.  The record indicates that she participated in some but 
not all of the testing for two of the characteristics; only one 
of these would allow for distinction between the defendant's and 
the victim's blood.  However, for each of the bloodstain 
samples, the serologist participated in all of the testing for 
two of the three differentiating characteristics.  Thus, there 
were two other values used to distinguish whether the blood was 
consistent with the victim's or the defendant's profile.  As a 
 
28 
 
 
testimony regarding results of this blood test was hearsay, it 
did not cause a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Commonwealth v. DePina, 476 Mass. 614, 623-624 
(2017), citing Commonwealth v. Spray, 467 Mass. 456, 471 (2014), 
and Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87, 92 (2013). 
 
b.  Evidence regarding defendant's blood alcohol content.  
The defendant argues that the judge improperly prevented him 
from presenting a frame of reference regarding the defendant's 
level of intoxication, i.e., that his blood alcohol content 
(BAC) was three times the legal limit established by G. L. 
c. 90, § 24 (operation of motor vehicle while under influence 
[OUI] statute), thereby violating his right to present a defense 
and to due process of law.  We disagree. 
 
Prior to trial, the prosecution brought a motion in limine 
to exclude any reference to the BAC level for OUI.  The 
defendant's counsel opposed this motion, and the trial judge 
deferred ruling on the matter.  At trial, defense counsel never 
sought to offer in evidence the BAC, or the fact that the 
defendant's BAC was three times the legal limit under § 24.  
Instead, defense counsel invited the defense expert to explain 
the effects of intoxication by reference to alcohol's impact on 
driving.  After the prosecutor's objection to this question was 
                                                                  
result, the tests in which the serologist did not participate 
were cumulative of the other results. 
29 
 
 
sustained, defense counsel then invited the defense expert to 
explain the effects of intoxication by reference to alcohol's 
impact on the use of a dangerous piece of equipment, such as a 
chain saw, for which there was no objection.  There was no 
error. 
 
6.  Motion for mistrial.  During cross-examination of the 
defendant's substance abuse expert, the prosecutor asked a 
question that implied that the defendant had concealed a knife 
in his jacket before getting in the vehicle with the victim, 
thereby suggesting premeditation, even though no such evidence 
had been introduced.20  After the judge sustained the defendant's 
objection, the prosecutor asked a hypothetical question once 
again related to using the jacket to conceal the knife.  The 
judge sustained the defendant's objection a second time, but 
denied the defendant's subsequent motion for a mistrial.  
Instead, the judge instructed jurors not to consider the 
                     
 
20 The prosecutor's two questions were the following: 
 
"And you became aware, didn't you, that the allegation is 
he had a knife in the pocket of that jacket, you became 
aware of that, didn't you?" 
 
"Would it be relevant to you, in forming your opinion about 
someone's state of mind if you were to learn that within an 
hour of the incident, that person put on a jacket and 
concealed a knife?" 
 
 
Defense counsel's objections were sustained because no 
evidence had been introduced that suggested the defendant had a 
knife in the pocket of his jacket. 
30 
 
 
questions. 
 
Assuming that the prosecutor's questions were improper, 
"[i]t is well within the trial judge's discretion to deny a 
mistrial . . . and to rely on appropriate curative 
instructions."  Commonwealth v. Woods, 414 Mass. 343, 357, cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 815 (1993), citing Commonwealth v. Charles, 397 
Mass. 1, 12 (1986).  Here, the prosecutor's questions about 
concealing a knife with the jacket went to the question of 
premeditation.  As the jury did not convict on this basis, we 
conclude that the improper questions were appropriately handled 
by the trial judge.  There was no abuse of discretion. 
 
7.  Failure to dismiss juror.  The defendant contends that 
the judge erred in failing to dismiss a juror exposed to 
extrinsic and inaccurate evidence.  Over the weekend, just after 
the trial had begun, a juror's former husband told the juror 
that he had heard that the defendant stabbed the victim over 200 
times.  The juror told the former husband not to say any more 
about the case and notified a court officer about the exchange 
when she returned to court on Monday.  During the resulting voir 
dire hearing, the juror stated that she did not believe the 
extraneous information and would consider only the evidence 
introduced at trial.  After inquiring of the juror further to 
the satisfaction of both counsel, the judge found that the juror 
remained indifferent, objective, and impartial.  Counsel did not 
31 
 
 
object.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge's 
failure to dismiss the juror caused a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice.  We disagree. 
 
"The trial judge has 'discretion in addressing issues of 
extraneous influence on jurors discovered during trial.'"  
Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 429 Mass. 502, 506 (1999), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Trapp, 423 Mass. 356, 362, cert. denied, 519 
U.S. 1045 (1996).  Here the judge's careful examination of the 
juror, including asking further questions to satisfy both 
parties, shows there was no abuse of discretion.  See Trapp, 
supra at 362-363.  The juror's answers indicated that she 
remained impartial.  Further, she indicated that she would 
follow the judge's admonitions to consider only the evidence 
introduced at trial and not share the information with any other 
jurors.  See id.  See also Commonwealth v. Roberts, 433 Mass. 
45, 53 (2000) ("jury are presumed to follow the instructions of 
the judge").  We also note that the juror did not take part in 
the deliberations because she was selected as an alternate.  As 
a result, it is hard to imagine how allowing the juror to remain 
could have caused a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Gonzalez, 469 Mass. at 417 (no substantial 
likelihood of miscarriage of justice where court was 
"substantially confident that . . . the jury verdict would have 
been the same"). 
32 
 
 
 
"In coming forward the juror did exactly what [s]he was 
supposed to do," Trapp, 423 Mass. at 362, so the judge could 
evaluate the situation.  There was no error. 
 
8.  Reduction of the verdict.  The trial judge declined to 
reconsider the denial of the defendant's rule 25 (b) (2) motion 
to reduce the defendant's degree of guilt.  The defendant asks 
this court to remand his case to the Superior Court for review, 
with instructions to the judge that she consider evidence that 
was not introduced at trial.  In the alternative, he asks us to 
grant him a new trial or reduce the degree of guilt pursuant to 
our powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We discern no reason to 
pursue either course. 
 
a.  Rule 25 (b) (2).  After the jury returned the guilty 
verdict, the defendant renewed his rule 25 (b) (2) motion, 
requesting that the judge reduce the degree of guilt to 
manslaughter or murder in the second degree due to the 
defendant's extreme intoxication.  The judge denied this motion.  
Nearly eleven and one-half years later,21 the defendant, by 
                     
 
21 The defendant's motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), was 
filed at the same time as his motion for a reduced verdict 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), as amended, 420 Mass. 
1502 (1995).  While the judge denied the latter motion 
relatively quickly, the motion for a new trial took years to 
resolve.  The judge eventually allowed the motion for a new 
trial, but this court reversed that decision in Commonwealth v. 
Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664 (2015), and denied the defendant's 
 
33 
 
 
motion, requested that the judge reconsider her ruling, but this 
time he relied primarily on a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) -- a diagnosis of which trial counsel was aware, 
but chose not to pursue for strategic reasons.  See generally 
Kolenovic I, 471 Mass. at 669-671.  The judge once again denied 
the motion, noting that "evidence outside the trial record has 
no bearing on whether the verdict should be reduced."  The judge 
was correct. 
 
"[A] judge is not to second guess the determination of the 
jury, nor to reduce a verdict, based on extraneous factors, 
where such a verdict would be inconsistent with the weight of 
the evidence."  Commonwealth v. Reavis, 465 Mass. 875, 893 
(2013).  The defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Pagan, 471 
Mass. 537, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 548 (2015), to argue that 
Reavis should not apply to his situation, is misplaced.  In 
Pagan, supra at 541, 543, although the judge took into account 
evidence not presented at trial in deciding the rule 25 (b) (2) 
motion, the new evidence related to the evidence presented at 
trial and the defense's theory of the case.  Here, however, the 
defendant sought to have the judge consider evidence and a 
defense that were not introduced at all.  Thus, the judge 
                                                                  
petition for rehearing.  A single justice of this court allowed 
the defendant's motion to remand the case to the Superior Court 
for reconsideration of his motion to reduce the verdict. 
34 
 
 
correctly declined to consider evidence that was not introduced 
at trial and did not abuse her discretion in determining that 
the weight of the evidence at trial supported a conviction of 
murder in the first degree that was consonant with justice. 
 
b.  G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant also seeks a new 
trial or a reduction in the degree of guilt pursuant to our 
power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  In his view, the killing was 
driven by severe intoxication compounded by PTSD and other 
psychiatric disorders.22  The scope of our review under § 33E 
review is greater than that of a trial judge considering a 
motion for a new trial, because, unlike the trial judge, we may 
consider the entirety of the appellate record, which might 
include evidence that was not introduced at trial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Coyne, 420 Mass. 33, 35 (1995), citing 
Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 416 Mass. 258, 267 (1993).  Having 
considered the entirety of that record, we conclude that the 
defendant has failed to show that his conviction was not 
consonant with justice. 
 
While a defendant may, in some circumstances, demonstrate 
that mental impairment, whether caused by a diagnosable disorder 
                     
 
22 The defendant also asks us to exercise our powers under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, in light of what he considers to be 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  For the reasons explained in 
part 1 of the discussion, supra, there was no error by counsel.  
Thus, the performance of the defendant's trial counsel has 
little bearing on our § 33E analysis. 
35 
 
 
or by severe intoxication, may justify a reduction of the 
verdict, "the fact of a mental illness by itself does not 
generally warrant reduction of a conviction of murder in the 
first degree."  Berry, 466 Mass. at 771-772 (noting 
extraordinary effect of tumor on cerebellum combined with 
bipolar or schizoaffective disorder, and that defendant's 
aggression and impulsive conduct improved substantially once 
tumor was removed).  We note that the degree of intoxication was 
heavily litigated at trial, such that the jury had the 
opportunity to consider whether the defendant could form the 
requisite intent.  See Reavis, 465 Mass. at 893-894 (court did 
not exercise § 33E power where jury had opportunity to consider 
not only evidence of quantity of alcohol consumed but also 
testimony from witnesses regarding defendant's conduct and 
perceived level of intoxication).  See also Coleman, 389 Mass. 
at 674 ("[I]ntoxication is only a single factor.  In the present 
case, it simply did not detract from the vicious manner in which 
the crime was carried out"). 
 
In addition, while the defendant argues that extraneous 
evidence regarding his mental disorders shows that he was unable 
to understand what was happening, his actions on the night of 
the killing demonstrate otherwise.  There was a significant 
amount of time between the defendant and the victim's dispute 
around 11 P.M. and the killing in the vehicle, which happened 
36 
 
 
shortly after 1 A.M.  Contrast Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 
501, 506-507 (1978).  Further, there was evidence from which the 
jury could have found that the defendant carefully arranged the 
position of the passengers so that the victim was sitting in 
front of him.  Finally, the violence against the victim did not 
cease when McCrystal stopped driving; instead, the defendant 
pulled the victim out of the vehicle and continued to stab him.  
Once McCrystal got the defendant off the victim, the defendant 
asked for McCrystal's loyalty.  When McCrystal refused, the 
defendant drove off, leaving the victim to die and beginning a 
high-speed chase with the police.  The weight of this evidence 
would tend to show that, contrary to what the defendant asserts 
is shown by the posttrial evidence, the defendant knew what was 
happening around him and what he was doing that night.  As a 
result, the defendant has failed to show that the weight of the 
evidence was against a finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty 
such that a lesser degree of guilt or a new trial would be more 
consonant with justice. 
 
Thus, after a thorough review of the entire record, we 
decline to set aside or reduce the defendant's conviction.  See 
Boucher, 474 Mass. at 9. 
 
Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion for a 
reduced verdict, on reconsideration, is affirmed.  The 
defendant's conviction is affirmed. 
37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.