Case Title: Brown v. State

Citation: 378 Md. 355

Docket Number: 140/02

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
In the Circuit Court for Harford County
Case No. 12-K-01-000502
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 140
September Term, 2002
______________________________________
ROGER BROWN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J. 
                         Raker, J., concurs;
Bell, C.J. and  Eldridge, J., dissent
                           
______________________________________
Filed:   November 19, 2003
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
Based largely on evidence found by police officers in his motel room, appellant was
convicted in the Circuit Court for Harford County of possession with intent to distribute
cocaine and sentenced to prison for ten years, all but five years suspended.  His sole
complaint in this appeal is that his consent to allow the police officers to enter and search the
motel room was involuntary and that, as a result, the contraband they discovered should have
been suppressed as evidence.  We find no merit in that complaint and shall affirm.
BACKGROUND
With two exceptions, one of which appellant claims is critical, this case mirrors what
occurred in Scott v. State, 366 Md. 121, 782 A.2d 862 (2001).  We dealt there, for the first
time, with a police technique known as “knock and talk.”  That technique, we noted, had
become a popular one with police agencies, particularly in drug enforcement activities.  We
described the procedure as follows:
“[P]olice officers, lacking a warrant or other legal justification
for entering or searching a dwelling place, approach the
dwelling, knock on the door, identify themselves as law
enforcement officers, request entry in order to ask questions
concerning unlawful activity in the area, and, upon entry,
eventually ask permission to search the premises.  Permission is
often given, and, if the police then find contraband or other
evidence of illegal activity, the issue is raised of whether the
procedure has in some way contravened the occupant’s Fourth
Amendment rights.”
Id. at 129, 782 A.2d at 867.
We made three holdings in Scott.  The knock on the motel door in that case occurred
at night – around 11:37 p.m.  That is one of the distinctions between Scott and this case.
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Scott argued that the very act of the police knocking on one’s door late at night, without
probable cause or even reasonable articulable suspicion, constitutes a “seizure” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Based on the Supreme Court’s declaration in Florida
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L. Ed.2d 389, 398 (1991) that “a
seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a
few questions,”and our own conclusion in Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 374-75, 735 A.2d
491, 500-01 (1999) that “[t]his is so even if the police lack any suspicion, reasonable or
otherwise, that an individual has committed a crime or is involved in criminal activity,” and
in conformance with the view of most of the courts that had addressed the “knock and talk”
issue in the context of the Fourth Amendment, we rejected that claim and held that a
nighttime “knock and talk” does not constitute a seizure. 
Scott also contended that, even if a “knock and talk” operation does not constitute a
seizure, it necessarily vitiates any actual consent given to enter and search the room, at least
in the absence of affirmative advice by the police that the occupant may refuse entry, may
refuse consent to a search, and may terminate any consent that is given at any time.
Consistently with the prevailing view of other courts that had addressed the issue in the
context of the Fourth Amendment, we rejected that argument as well.  Our second holding
was that the proper test for determining the validity of any consent given to enter and search
was that stated by the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,  93 S. Ct.
2041, 36 L. Ed.2d 854 (1973) and later confirmed in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 117 S.
-3-
Ct. 417, 136 L. Ed.2d 347 (1996):
“[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody and the State
attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate
that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result
of duress or coercion, express or implied.  Voluntariness is a
question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances,
and while the subject’s knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor
to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to
demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a
voluntary consent.”
Scott v. State, at 141-42, 782 A.2d at 874, quoting from Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
at 248-49, 93 S. Ct. at 2059, 36 L. Ed.2d at 875 (emphasis added in Scott).
Finally, applying the Schneckloth test to the facts in Scott, we affirmed the trial court’s
ruling that the consent given was valid.
In this case, Maryland State Trooper George Wooden, who had been assigned to work
with a Drug Enforcement Administration interdiction group, received anonymous
information on January 31, 2001, about possible drug activity in Room 109 at the Super Eight
Motel in Aberdeen.  There is no claim by the State that the quality or quantity of that
information rose to the level of probable cause or even reasonable articulable suspicion.  At
around 10:00 that morning, accompanied by two other officers, Wooden went to the motel
and knocked on the door to Room 109.   When appellant, one of the two occupants of the
room, asked who was there, Wooden responded “maintenance” and asked to come in to
check the thermostat.  Appellant opened the door.  As soon as the door was opened, Wooden,
who was in plain clothes, displayed his police badge, identified himself as a police officer,
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and asked if he could come in and talk with appellant.  Wooden also said that, upon the
opening of the door, he detected the odor of burnt marijuana, but he did not enter the room
based on that information.  Appellant orally agreed to let Wooden in and backed away from
the door in order to allow Wooden and one of his colleagues to enter.  The third officer
remained outside.
As Wooden entered, the smell of marijuana became stronger.  The second occupant
was in one of the two beds in the room, and appellant proceeded to lie down on the other one.
Wooden observed a burnt marijuana cigarette sitting in an ashtray on the night table between
the two beds.  Appellant grabbed the cigarette and put it in his mouth, as if to swallow it.
Wooden said that he had already seen the cigarette, whereupon appellant took it out of his
mouth and placed it back in the ashtray.  When appellant acknowledged that he had rented
the room, Wooden asked if the officers could search the room and, according to Wooden,
appellant consented.  Wooden said that appellant was cooperative and that no force or
coercion was used.  Under a shirt lying on the dresser, Wooden found a digital scale with
white powder on it, and in a dresser drawer he discovered a cache of cocaine.  In the night
table the police found $926 in cash.  Upon discovery of the cocaine, appellant and his
roommate were placed under arrest. 
This information came out at a hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence
found in the motel room.  Appellant also testified at that hearing.  He acknowledged that
Wooden had identified himself as a police officer before asking permission to enter, but
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appellant expressed the belief that he had no right to prevent the officers from entering, so,
to avoid a confrontation, he backed away from the door.  He said that he felt “apprehended”
once Wooden observed the marijuana cigarette in the ashtray, which was after he had entered
the room.
The suppression hearing occurred in September, 2001, before our opinion in Scott was
filed.  Nonetheless, declaring the testimony of Trooper Wooden to be more credible than that
of appellant, the court found that there was “an express consent to enter, an express consent
to search” and, on that basis, denied the motion to suppress.
Appellant does not ask us to overrule Scott.  He focuses, instead, on the deception
employed by Trooper Wooden that induced him to open the door, and, borrowing language
from Perkins v. State, 83 Md. App. 341, 350, 574 A.2d 356, 360 (1990), argues that “[t]he
use of deception to obtain the opening of a door erodes the consensual quality of that
opening.”
DISCUSSION
As appellant relies heavily on Perkins, we shall begin, and end, with that case. Around
1:00 in the morning, Perkins and a number of friends checked into a motel.  The desk clerk
apparently called the police, and, when an officer responded, she said that she thought that
Perkins might be “wanted,” because another officer had been inquiring about him a few days
1 It appears that the clerk had been told by another clerk that Perkins was wanted and
to call the police if he appeared.  See appellant’s brief filed in S.T. 1989, No. 1541, at 2.
-6-
earlier.1  A computer check revealed no outstanding warrants.  Concerned that there might
be a recently issued warrant not yet in the computer, however, the officer decided to
investigate.  He obtained a passkey for the room and, at about 2:30 a.m., went to the room
with another officer.  They listened at the door for a few minutes and heard only two males
talking quietly.  The officer banged on the door with his metal flashlight, and, when someone
inside asked who was present, he announced “Howard County Police, open the door.”  The
Court of Special Appeals quite correctly viewed that as a command, not a request, and in
response to that command, Perkins opened the door.
There was some disagreement as what occurred next.  Perkins said that, when he
opened the door, the officer asked for identification and that, when he turned to get it, the
officer walked into the room, uninvited.  The officer’s police report corroborated that
statement – “[a] black male opened the door and this officer entered telling the subject he
was there to investigate a noise complaint.”  The officer’s testimony was different.  He
acknowledged telling Perkins that he was there to investigate a noise complaint but said that
he merely asked if he could enter and that Perkins consented.  The inconsistent statement in
the initial report, coupled with the fact that the officer had obtained a passkey, led the Court
of Special Appeals to question the officer’s testimony that any consent had been requested,
but, when added to the affirmative misstatement about wanting to discuss a non-existent
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noise complaint, the court concluded that, if consent had been given, it was not knowing and
voluntary.  Noting cases holding that a warrantless doorway arrest was invalid when the
police used deception to cause the arrestee to open the door, the court held that, “[b]y parity
of reasoning, the use of deception to obtain entry into a residence following the opening of
a door would also erode the consensual quality of that entry.”  Id. at 350, 574 A.2d at 360
(emphasis added).
The correctness of the decision in Perkins is not before us.  We would concur,
however, with the notion that, if the police, lacking any lawful basis to enter a residence
without consent, obtain consent to enter based on a material deception or misrepresentation,
that may, indeed, “erode the consensual quality of that entry.”  It does not, of itself, preclude
a finding that the consent is valid, but simply is a factor, albeit an important one, that must
be considered in determining the reality and voluntariness of the consent. The ultimate test
remains that enunciated in Schneckloth and confirmed in Ohio v. Robinette – the totality of
the circumstances.
Appellant seems to believe that the use of deception or ruses by the police to obtain
access to a residential area is something new, startling, and untested.  That is not the case.
The Supreme Court has long and consistently recognized that deception is a proper tool in
crime detection, and that its use to obtain entry into Fourth Amendment-protected areas for
the purpose of observation does not necessarily contravene any Fourth Amendment rights.
In Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42, 53 S. Ct. 210, 212, 77 L. Ed. 413, 416-17
-8-
(1932), the Court held that “[a]rtifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged
in criminal enterprises” and that “[t]he appropriate object of this permitted activity,
frequently essential to the enforcement of the law, is to reveal the criminal design; to expose
the illicit traffic, the prohibited publication, the fraudulent use of the mails, the illegal
conspiracy, or other offenses, and thus to disclose the would-be violators of the law.” 
In Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 87 S. Ct. 424, 17 L. Ed.2d 312 (1966),
rehearing denied, 386 U.S. 939, 87 S. Ct. 951, 17 L. Ed.2d 811 (1967), the Court, in an
Opinion by Chief Justice Warren, found no Fourth Amendment violation in an undercover
agent gaining entry into defendant’s home by misrepresenting himself as a drug buyer and
actually making a controlled purchase of drugs.  Citing Sorrells, the Court recognized that,
“in the detection of many types of crime, the Government is entitled to use decoys and to
conceal the identity of its agents.”  Id. 385 U.S. at 208-09, 87 S. Ct. at 426, 17 L. Ed.2d at
315.  See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749-50, 91 S. Ct. 1122, 1125, 28 L. Ed.2d
453, 457 (1971), rehearing denied, 402 U.S. 990, 91 S. Ct. 1643, 29 L. Ed.2d 156 (1971)
(confirming holding of Lewis that no warrant is required when Government sends to
defendant’s home a secret agent who conceals his identity and makes purchase of narcotics
from accused).  Compare Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 20 L.
Ed.2d 797 (1968) (finding mere acquiescence, rather than consent, where the police gained
entry by announcing that they had a search warrant).
Most of the Federal and State courts that have addressed the issue in the context of
-9-
the Fourth Amendment have refused to suppress evidence seen in plain view or discovered
pursuant to a consensual search after officers gained entry into motel rooms or other
residential areas by various modes of deception – pretending to be persons other than police
officers or concealing their purpose.  See United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143, 145 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941, 94 S. Ct. 1945, 40 L. Ed.2d 292 (1974):
 “[A]n officer may legitimately obtain an invitation into a house
by misrepresenting his identity. . . If he is invited inside. . . he
does not need a warrant, and, quite obviously, he does not need
to announce his authority and purpose.  Once inside the house,
he cannot exceed the scope of his invitation by ransacking the
house generally, but he may seize anything in plain view.”
See also United States v. Wright, 641 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021,
101 S. Ct. 3014, 69 L. Ed.2d 394 (1981) (no Fourth Amendment violation in undercover
officers knocking on motel room door, pretending to seek assistance in fixing car trouble,
seeing suspected contraband when door was opened, and obtaining warrant based on that
observation); United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Raines,
536 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925, 97 S. Ct. 327, 50 L. Ed.2d 293
(1976); United States v. Bullock, 590 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Guidry, 534
F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Ressler, 536 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Scherer, 673 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1120, 102 S. Ct. 2935,
73 L. Ed.2d 1334 (1982); United States v. Miglietta, 507 F.Supp. 353 (M.D.Fla. 1980);
Guidry v. State, 671 P.2d 1277 (Alaska 1983); State v. Poland, 645 P.2d 784 (Ariz. 1982);
People v. Ewen, 551 N.E.2d 426 (Ill. App. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 854, 111 S. Ct. 149,
-10-
112 L. Ed.2d 115 (1990); State v. McCommons, 398 So.2d 1100 (La. 1981); State v. Carey,
417 A.2d 979 (Me. 1980); People v. Catania, 398 N.W.2d 343 (Mich. 1986); People v.
Taormina, 343 N.W.2d 236 (Mich.App. 1983); State v. Anglada, 365 A.2d 720 (N.J. 1976);
Commonwealth v. Morrison, 418 A.2d 1378 (Pa. Super. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080,
101 S. Ct. 863, 66 L. Ed.2d 804 (1981); State v. Hastings, 830 P.2d 658 (Wash. 1992).  See,
in general, Officer’s Ruse to Gain Entry as Affecting Admissibility of Plain-View Evidence
– Modern Cases, 47 A.L.R.4th 425 (1986).
Some State courts have limited the use of deception to gain actual entry into areas
protected by the Fourth Amendment to those situations in which the police had a previous
and reasonable belief that criminal activity was afoot, sometimes invoking their own State
law to justify that limitation. See State v. Ahart, 324 N.W.2d 317 (Iowa 1982); State v.
Hashman, 729 P.2d 651(Wash. App. 1986); State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 134 (Kan. 1993);
People v. Ramirez, 747 N.Y.S.2d 711(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2002).  See also United States v.
Montoya, 760 F. Supp. 37 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).  Placing that kind of generic limitation or pre-
condition on the use of deception may or may not be good public policy, but it is inconsistent
with the holding in Schneckloth that the validity, under the Fourth Amendment, of a search
or seizure based on consent is to be determined by looking at all of the circumstances bearing
on the consent. Indeed, the Washington Supreme Court later disavowed the ruling of the
intermediate appellate court in Hashman as “an unnecessary limitation on undercover police
investigations” and as “serv[ing] no valid purpose.”  State v. Hastings, supra, 830 P.2d at
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660.
As we indicated, we think that the Court of Special Appeals was correct in Perkins
in noting that, when deception or ruse directly induces consent for the police to enter an area
in which the defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the “quality” of that consent
may be regarded as “eroded” – not necessarily destroyed or eliminated, but eroded.  That is
not an issue here, however.  The principal, and decisive, distinction between this case and
Perkins lies in the fact that the deception practiced by Trooper Wooden in this case –
representing himself as a maintenance person desirous of checking the thermostat – induced
nothing more than the opening of the door.  Appellant concededly knew before he allowed
Wooden and his colleague to enter that they were police officers. Wooden asked for
permission to enter and talk; after having identified himself prior to entry, he never
misrepresented his purpose for requesting permission to enter.  The entry that led to the
observation in plain view of the marijuana cigarette and, upon appellant’s ensuing consent,
discovery of the scale, the cocaine, and the cash was not induced by deception, either as to
Wooden’s identity or purpose.  The earlier deception that induced appellant to open the door
had no erosive effect on the consent to enter or the consent to search.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
In the Circuit Court for Harford County
Case No. 12-K-01-000502
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 140
September Term, 2002
______________________________________
ROGER BROWN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
_____________________________________
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
______________________________________
Concurring Opinion by Raker, J.
______________________________________
          Filed:   November 19, 2003
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and
conference of this case while an active member of this 
Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution
Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision
and adoption of this opinion.
Raker, J., Concurring:
Scott v. State, 366 Md. 121, 782 A.2d 862 (2001), a 4-3 decision, blessed the police technique
of “knock and talk.”  I dissented in Scott, and but for the principle of stare decisis, I would dissent
and urge the Court to overrule that case.  Scott is nonetheless the controlling law in this State, and
thus, based on Scott, I join the opinion of the Court.  Continuing to dissent would serve no valid
purpose.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 140
September Term, 2002
______________________________________________
ROGER BROWN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________________
   Bell, C.J.
 *Eldridge
   Raker
   Wilner
   Cathell
   Harrell
   Battaglia,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J.,
in which Eldridge, J. joins
  
   
  Filed:   November 19, 2003
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference
of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution,
Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
   
   
1It is well settled that a motel room can be protected against unreasonable search and
seizure as much as a home or an office.  Williams v. State, 372 Md. 386, 402, 813 A.2d 231,
240 (2002).   This is because, for the period of its use and occupancy, a hotel or motel room
is, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the equivalent of the occupant's home. United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 59, (1951).  See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S.
74, 69 S. Ct. 1372, 93 L. Ed. 1819 (1949). 
-1-
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J.:
In this case, the police, without probable cause or even reasonable articulable suspicion,
approached the petitioner’s motel room and, using deception, was able to get him to open the door.
 Immediately thereafter, they identified themselves and requested permission to enter and talk to the
petitioner, why or about what, he was not told, and, the trial court found, the petitioner consented.
 The petitioner challenges  the finding of consent, contending that it was not voluntarily given. 
Rejecting that challenge, the majority holds that “[t]he earlier deception that induced appellant to
open the door had no erosive effect on the consent to enter or the consent to search.” ___ Md. ___,
___, ___ A. 2d ___, ___ (2003) [slip op. at 11].  I do not agree.  This holding broadens an already
suspect policy of “knock and talk,” see Scott v. State, 366 Md. 121, 782 A. 2d 862 (2001), to the
point where a police officer, at his or her own discretion, is allowed to circumvent, without a
warrant, probable cause or even a reasonable articulable suspicion, the expectation of privacy in his
or her residence1 that an individual is guaranteed by  the Fourth Amendment.  This gives too much
2The “knock and talk” encounter in Scott v. State, 366 Md. 121, 782 A. 2d 862 (2001),
occurred late at night and was preceded by the police not only knocking, but pounding on the
defendant’s door.   Id. at 126 n. 1, 782 A. 2d at 865 n. 1.    Therefore, I believed then, and
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discretion to police officers and, more important, invites its selective, vague and disproportional
misuse, to the detriment of the citizens of Maryland.  I dissent.
I.
There was no deception in Scott.  Under the “knock and talk” technique this Court endorsed
in Scott, police officers, having no basis for suspecting that criminal activity is occurring, are
permitted to “approach the  dwelling, knock on the door, identify themselves as law enforcement
officers, request entry in order to ask questions concerning unlawful activity in the area and, upon
entry, eventually ask permission to search the premises.”  366 Md. at 129, 782 A. 2d at 867.  
Affirming the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized in that case by use of
the technique, the majority held that there was no seizure - that a police officer merely approaches
someone and asks a few questions does not a seizure make, id. at 138, 782 A. 2d at 872,  citing
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 434, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 398 (1991) and
Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 374-75, 735 A. 2d 491, 500-01 (1999), and that actual consent could
be found to have been given even when the defendant is not advised of the right to refuse entry.  Id.
at 141, 782 A. 2d at 874.  Thus, at all times, the defendant in Scott knew with whom he was dealing.
  Not to denigrate the notion that a seizure could have, and did occur, under the circumstances in
Scott,2 but it is clear that there is a significant difference between knowing from the beginning of
believe now, what Judge Raker wrote in dissent:
“I do not believe that a reasonable person in the shoes of appellant, given the
place, time, and circumstances of the encounter, would terminate the encounter
at the door and feel free to decline the officers' request to search his motel
room. There was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to support any
seizure and, therefore, the seizure was unlawful. Given that the initial seizure
of appellant's person by the  police was unlawful, in order for any consent
given by appellant to be voluntary, rather than a mere acquiescence to a show
of authority, such consent would be valid only if the court found it to be
sufficiently purged of the primary taint of the illegal seizure.”
Id. at 147, 782 A. 2d at 877-78.
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an encounter that the police are involved and having that fact sprung upon you in the middle of the
encounter, there is a difference - and it makes the latter scenario much worse than the former -
between knowingly deciding to open the door for the police and opening the door believing that the
person asking for entry is a maintenance man.  That difference is not simply worthy of note, but it
is critical and  worthy of being given some, perhaps dispositive, weight.
The case upon which the petitioner relies,  Perkins v. State, 83 Md. App. 341, 350, 574 A.2d
356, 360 (1990), is like Scott in one respect and like this case in another.   Like Scott,  deception
was not used by the police, during this early morning encounter, to obtain the opening of the
3The encounter occurred at 2:30 A.M. and was initiated by the police rapping on the
defendant’s motel room door “not with his knuckles but with a metal flashlight.”  Perkins v.
State, 83 Md. App. 341, 348, 574 A.2d 356, 359-360 (1990).   As to the latter fact, the
intermediate appellate court commented, appropriately, I think, “There is at least a flavor of
peremptoriness in the choice of instrumentality.”   Id. at 348, 574 A. 2d at 359.
That was confirmed by what followed: “When a male voice from the inside inquired, ‘Who
is it?,’ the response was, according to the consensus recollection ...’Howard County  Police,
open the door.’”   Id. at 348, 574 A. 2d at 359-360. 
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defendant’s motel room door; the police identified themselves as “police,” even as they “pounded”
on the door.  Id. at  348, 574 A. 2d at 359-360.3    Perkins is like the present case in that the police
used deception, albeit to enter the room, the door having already been opened.   The officer testified
that he told the defendant that he was there to investigate a noise complaint,  although there had not
been one, and asked to come in to talk about it, to which, the court found,  the defendant consented.
  The Court of Special Appeals noted the skepticism to which that use of deception gave rise: “If
consent to  entry was obtained pursuant to a deliberate misstatement, it does call into question the
knowing and voluntary quality of the consent.” Id. at 349-50, 574 A. 2d at 360, citing  Smith v.
State, 72 Md. App. 450, 466-467, 531 A.2d 302 (1987), dealing with the related subject of
warrantless doorway arrests.   Noting that, in those cases, “[t]he use of deception to obtain the
opening of a door erodes the consensual quality of that opening,” the intermediate appellate court
concluded: “By parity of reasoning, the use of deception to obtain entry into a residence following
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the opening of a door would also erode the consensual quality of that entry.”  Id. at 350, 574 A. 2d
at 360.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the defendant’s convictions due to the Fourth
Amendment violations.  Its reasoning is instructive as to the proper disposition of the case sub
judice.  Of course, it started with the proposition that the State has the burden of proof as to the
voluntariness of the consent, to establish that it was “freely and voluntarily” given.  Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1792, 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 802 (1968).   See Hof v. State,
337 Md. 581, 655 A2d 370 (1995).  Applying the Schneckloth test, “examining all the surrounding
circumstances to determine if in fact the consent to search was coerced,” 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct.
at 2048, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 864,  the court was sensitive to the fact, and clear,  that “[t]o approve
[consent] searches without the most careful scrutiny would sanction the possibility of official
coercion, ” Perkins, 83 Md. App. at 345, 574 A.2d. at 358, and that “[i]n assessing voluntariness,
it is necessary to be alert not only to heavy-handed and overtly coercive investigative techniques but
also to ‘subtly coercive police questions’ and to ‘the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the
person   who consented.’” Id. at 345, 574 A.2d. at 358, quoting Schnechloth,  412 U.S. at 229, 93
S.Ct. at 2048, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 864.  Finally, while extending “great  deference to the fact finding of
the suppression hearing judge with respect to determining the credibilities of contradicting witnesses
and to weighing and determining first-level facts,” it made its “own independent, reflective
constitutional judgment” with respect to the ultimate, conclusionary fact of whether the act of
consent was truly voluntary.  Id. at 345,  574 A. 2d at 359.   This is consistent with our cases.   See
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White v. State, 374 Md. 232, 241, 821 A.2d, 459, 464 (2003); Carter v. State, 367 Md. 447, 457, 788
A.2d 646, 651 (2002); Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 569, 774 A.2d 420, 429 (2001); Stokes v State,
362 Md. 407, 414, 765 A.2d 612, 615 (2001) ; In re Tariq A-R-Y, 347 Md. 484, 489, 701 A.2d 691,
693 (1997); Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183, 571 A.2d 1239, 1240-1241 (1990).
In determining the question of the voluntariness of the defendant’s consent, the intermediate
appellate court considered all of the surrounding circumstances.   These included how the police
came to focus on the defendant, id. at 347-48, 574 A. 2d at 359, the nature and circumstances of the
initial approach, id. at 348, 574 A. 2d at 359-360, and how the initial encounter developed and
expanded.   Of interest in that regard is the court’s consideration of the rationality of the reason for
the initial approach, its focus on the officers’ preparation for the encounter - getting a passkey,
perhaps just in case, id. at 348, 574 A. 2d at 359 -  and its continuing concern about the rationality
of what occurred following the defendant’s opening of the door. Id. at 348-49, 574 A. 2d at 360. 
 Thus, although the court drew a sharp distinction between the opening of the door and the entry into
the room, see id. at 349, 574 A.2d at 360, it never lost sight of the need to consider all of the
circumstances as a whole, rather than just some in isolation.  
 
Although aware of the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in Perkins and its
admonishment that, 
“The use of deception to obtain the opening of a door erodes the consensual quality
of that opening. By parity of reasoning, the use of deception to obtain entry into a
residence following the opening of a door would also erode the consensual quality of
that entry[,]”
83 Md. App. at 350, 574 A. 2d at 360, the majority merely observes that  that decision, the
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correctness of which is not at issue in this case, “pre-dated our opinion in Scott and, in any case, it
is not inconsistent with [the] conclusion in this case that the search was lawful.” ___ Md. at ___, ___
A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 7].    The latter conclusion is based on parsing, in an unnatural and
unrealistic manner, a single event, an unwarranted entry, effected by deception, into two, consisting
of (1) the opening of the door, admittedly obtained by use of deception, and (2) the entry into the
room, ostensibly the product of the petitioner’s consent.  The majority purports to apply the totality
of the circumstances test, enunciated in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 117 S. Ct. 417, 136 L. Ed.
2d 347 (1996) and  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 246, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2057, 36 L. Ed.
2d 854 (1973); in truth, it does nothing more than pay lip service to that test, asserting simply that
“[t]he deception practiced by Trooper Wooden in this case - representing himself as a maintenance
person desirous of checking the thermostat– induced nothing more than the opening of the door.”
___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 11].    Reading the majority opinion one gets the
impression that the opening of the door and the entry into the petitioner’s motel room were two
separate and distinct events, that the first, admittedly the product of deception, ended abruptly with
the opening of the door, and the second began, as a completely separate matter, immediately
thereafter.   I do not agree.  
It is well settled that “‘a search is a functional, not merely a physical process’ ... [which]
begins with the planning of the invasion, and continues ‘until the effective appropriation’ of the
fruits of the search ‘for subsequent proof of an offense.’” United States v. Davis, 482 F. 2d 893,
896-97 (9th Cir. 1973), quoting  Lustig v.United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78, 69 S. Ct. 1372, 1374, 93
-8-
L. Ed. 1819, 1823 (1949).  The trooper  misrepresented his identity as a part of that process and
expressly to advance his, and his fellow officers,’ plan to enter the petitioner’s residence.   Thus, in
this case, the deceptive act is an inseparable part  of the entire event.  Moreover, the quality of the
consent of a person who opens his or her door in response to a deceptive representation, in this case,
believing the person at the door to be a maintenance person, must be considered; the confusion and
surprise that necessarily surrounds the realization that one has been duped can not be disregarded,
and that taints, and undermines the voluntariness of what follows.   That is particularly the case
where, as here, the smell of burning marijuana was apparent to the officers immediately upon the
door being opened, a fact that must also have been apparent to the petitioner as well.  It is highly
unlikely that a person would open the door with such a potent and obvious smell of marijuana
present, if he or she knew the person at the door was a police officer.   In short, and therefore, the
trooper’s use of trickery, which first revealed and starkly so - the smell of the burning marijuana as
soon as the door was opened - , can not be confined simply to the opening of the door.   The totality
of the circumstances, to include the erosive effect of such trickery on the petitioner’s consent must
be considered.   In my view, that cuts against a finding of the consent being voluntary.  Thus, I
would hold that this situation falls squarely within Perkins.
II.
The majority correctly points out  that the “use of deception or ruses by the police to obtain
access to a residential area is [not] something new, startling, and untested.” ___ Md. at ___ , ___
-9-
A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 7].    It notes  that “[t]he Supreme Court has long and consistently recognized
that deception is a proper tool in crime detection, and that its use to obtain entry into Fourth
Amendment-protected areas for the purpose of observation does not necessarily contravene any
Fourth Amendment rights.”  Id. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 8].  Pointing to Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42, 53 S. Ct. 210, 212, 77  L. Ed. 2d 413, 416-17 (1932), the
majority emphasizes that “[t]he appropriate object of this permitted activity, frequently essential to
the enforcement of the law, is to reveal the criminal design; to expose the illicit traffic, the
prohibited publication, the fraudulent use of the mails, the illegal conspiracy, or other offenses, and
thus to disclose the would-be violators of the law.”  Id.  The majority reasons further:
“‘[A]n officer may legitimately obtain an invitation into a house by misrepresenting
his  identity ..  If he is invited inside ... he does not need a warrant, and, quite
obviously, he does not need to announce his authority and purpose.  Once inside the
house, he cannot exceed the scope of his invitation by ransacking the house generally,
but he may seize anything in plain view.’”
Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 9], quoting United States v. Glassel, 488 F. 2d 143, 145 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U, S. 941, 94 S. Ct. 1945, 40 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1974).  
I agree that the use of deception is not a new phenomenon and has been endorsed, even by
this Court, see, e.g. Lewis v. State,  285 Md 705, 721-22, 404 A. 2d 1073, 1082 (1979); Kier v.
State, 213 Md. 556, 562, 132 A.2d 494, 498 (1957).    I agree as well that where probable cause, or,
at least,  articulable suspicion exists, it may well be appropriate; it would certainly further the above
identified objective.    In the case sub judice,  the officers had no basis whatever - not even an
4It is conceded that, although Trooper Wooden received anonymous information about
possible drug activity in the petitioner’s room, there is no claim by the State that the quality
or quantity of that information approached probable cause or even reasonable articulable
suspicion. 
5 Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides:
“That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search
suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous
and oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected
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articulable suspicion4 - for believing that the petitioner, the sanctity of whose motel room the officer
sought to invade, was engaged in crime.
  “The Fourth Amendment provides that ‘the right of the people to be secured in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.’”  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2041, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94, 100
(2001), quoting the Fourth Amendment.   Courts have been less tolerant of, or deferential to,
governmental discretion when what is at issue is the search of a person’s dwelling, noting that  “at
the very core of Fourth Amendment, ‘stands the right of a [person] to retreat into [her] own home
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’” Id. , quoting Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S. Ct. 679, 683, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734, 739 (1961). 
There is a real tension between the use of deception and the Fourth Amendment’s provision
and this State’s comparable provision, Article 26 of the Declaration of Rights,5 at the core of both
places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or
describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, and
ought not to be granted.”
6Because some criminals cannot be caught, or convicted, unless the police are
permitted to resort to deception, the question that ultimately must be posed, and answered,
is: is the cost to society and the personal liberty rights of its citizens worth it?   One answer,
in my view, a most appropriate and well considered one, is the following:
“The problem of defining the limits to be set on the use of police deception is
one of the most difficult problems of the criminal law. It may well be that
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of which are the fundamental tenets that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or
her residence and “that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable.’” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 586, 100 S. Ct.  1371,1380, 63  . Ed. 2d 639,
650-651 (1980 ).  See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-475, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L.
Ed. 2d 588 (1971) (“a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per
se unreasonable, unless the police can show . . . the presence of ‘exigent circumstances’”).   See also
Dunnuck v. State, 367 Md 198, 204-205, 786 A2d 695, 698-699 (2001); State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178,
191, 638 A.2d 107, 114 (1994); Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 397, 545 A.2d 1281, 1287-1288
(1988).   The problem, and a difficult one it is, is  defining the limits to be set on the use of police
deception,   Commonwealth v. Morrison, 418 A.2d 1378, 1386 (Pa. Super. 1980) (Spaeth, J.
Concurring), striking the proper balance.6   
certain sorts of criminals cannot be convicted unless the police are permitted
to resort to deception. The question is then presented: Is it worth convicting
them? For when the police are permitted to resort to deception, there are losses
as well as gains. The gains may be considerable-for example, the detection and
elimination of a carefully organized traffic in drugs. But the losses may also
be considerable. The law of search and seizure is not concerned with
protecting the criminal's right of privacy but the honest citizen's right. If we are
to be able to enjoy liberty and pursue happiness, we must know what part of
our world is real and what part is illusion-that our home is our castle, and not
a broadcasting center for hidden police transmission devices; that a repairman
is a repairman, a business associate a business associate, and not a police
agent. Permit the police to make our world illusion, and no one, neither
criminal nor honest citizen, will be free. Thus in every case involving police
deception the court must balance the gains and losses incident to permitting the
deception. Given the difficulty and importance of striking the proper balance,
the court should bend every effort to decide each case only on its facts, never
going further than it must, and never indulging in broad language that may be
misunderstood and so encourage unwholesome practices.”  
Commonwealth v. Morrison, 418 A.2d 1378, 1386-87 (Pa. Super. 1980) (Spaeth, J.
-12-
Concurring) (footnote omitted).
-13-
To aid in trying to strike this balance, some courts have routinely required some showing of
probable cause or, at the very least, reasonable suspicion, before permitting the police to use
deception to breach the sanctity of  an individual’s residence.   E.g. Ahart v. State,  324 N.W. 2d.
317, 319 (Iowa 1982) (“consent given to a warrantless entry to a private home is invalid if the
police, absent a show of cause, obtain entry by ruse.”); Kansas v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 134, 140 (Kan.
1993) (“A prerequisite to a valid ruse entry is that officers must have a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity at the residence. If an officer has a justifiable and reasonable basis to suspect
criminal activity in a residence, a ruse entry is permissible. This permission is to be construed
narrowly.”); People v. Ramirez, 747 N.Y.S.2d 711, 716 (S. Ct. NY 2002) (“It cannot be doubted that
the police may not arbitrarily ask a person to open the door of his residence any more than they
could ask someone chosen randomly to open up the sealed packages he is carrying on the street in
the hope of finding stolen goods. That they could lawfully use a subterfuge to trick him into opening
the door of his residence when they did not have an articulable reason to intrude upon his privacy
is an even more startling proposition”); United States v. Tibbs, 49 F. Supp. 2d 47, 52  (D. Mass.
1999); United States v. Montoya, 760 F. Supp. 37, 39 (E. D. N. Y. 1991) (“It seems clear that when
the officers do not have at least reasonable suspicion that the occupants are engaged in crime, there
can be no justification for resorting to false statements to get into a dwelling”); United States v.
Garcia, 655 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (D. Puerto Rico 1987) ( “Officers cannot use a ruse to gain access
unless they have more than mere conjecture that criminal activity is underway. To hold otherwise
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would be to give police a blanket license to enter homes randomly in the hope of uncovering
incriminating evidence and information.”).  
In Ahart, two officers stopped their car in front of the defendant's home and pretended to
have engine problems.  One officer knocked on the defendant's door and told the person who opened
the door that his car had broken down and that he needed to make a call.  The officer was allowed
to enter and he pretended to place a call.  While using the phone the officer saw marijuana in plain
view.  Without taking any action on the drugs, the officer returned to the car, got it started, and left
the area and, based on the officer’s observations, obtained a search warrant.  The defendant's motion
to suppress the marijuana seized pursuant to the warrant was denied.  The Iowa Supreme Court
reversed.  It explained, 324 N. W. 2d at 319,:
While we recognize that a warrantless entry effected by ruse must often be allowed
if the government is to ferret out “those organized criminal activities that are
characterized by covert dealings,” Lewis [v. United States], 385 U.S.[206,] 210-11,
87 S. Ct. [424,] 427, 17 L. Ed. 2d [312,] 316 [(1966)], we are equally cognizant that
the security of one's home against arbitrary intrusion by the police is at the core of the
fourth amendment and basic to our society. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.
Ct. 1873, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 [(1967)]; 68 Am. Jur. 2d Search and Seizure §§ 2 (1973)
and cases therein cited. Consequently, not all warrantless entries gained by ruse are
valid. Certainly, such an entry is not allowable if it is arbitrary.
It is our conclusion that consent given to a warrantless entry to a private home is
invalid if the police, absent a show of cause, obtain entry by ruse. As noted
previously, this cause may be based on the officer's participation with the consentor
in an illegal transaction or it may be grounded on a reasonable belief that criminal
activity is afoot. The consent  is clearly invalid, however, when there is no reason
shown for selecting a particular home to enter. We hold that a search is patently
unreasonable as an arbitrary intrusion when it is based upon consent obtained by
deception unless there is a justifiable and reasonable basis for the deception.
In this case, however, we are unable to determine whether the police had any reason
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whatsoever to believe that criminal activity was afoot in the Ahart home. The officers
failed to articulate any cause for the ruse and the record is devoid of any indicia of
logical connection between the ruse and legitimate law enforcement. We are forced
to conclude that the intrusion was based on mere conjecture or idle curiosity. Police
intrusion into a home based on mere conjecture suggests that officers are entering
homes randomly in hope of discovering incriminating evidence. The officers' actions
violate both the United States and the Iowa Constitutions which have as a purpose the
prevention of such unreasonable intrusion. Thus, we hold that the warrantless entry
into the Ahart home violates both the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 8, of the Iowa Constitution.   Since the subsequent
warrant was obtained by the use of this illegal search, the evidence seized as a result
of the warranted search must also be suppressed. 
 More  recently,  in Ramirez, the police gained entry to the defendants' hotel room by
identifying themselves as  "housekeeping," after knocking on the door. 747 N.Y.S.2d. at  712.
Rejecting, as not credible,  their testimony that they smelled heroin outside the closed door, the court
concluded that there was no evidence presented, and therefore the police had no basis, to induce the
defendants to open the door of their room under a false representation.  Id. at 714.  The court held
that “in every aspect of Fourth Amendment law the police are required to show  some predicate
before they can intrude upon a person's privacy” and, thus, may not use a “a ruse to gain access
unless they have more than mere conjecture that criminal activity is underway.”  Id. at 715.
 I agree with these decisions, both the result they reach and the rationale by which they do
so.  In ruling against the petitioner, this court leaves the citizens of Maryland susceptible  to the
often selective, vague and disproportionate actions by the police.  It sanctions actions that
undermine their expectation of privacy and, indeed, their right to be secure in their home.  I would
hold, therefore, that when a person opens the door under these circumstances, as a result of a
deception practiced by the police, when they have neither probable cause or reasonable suspicion
-16-
to focus on that person as a wrong-doer, the quality of that person’s consent is eroded.  The
petitioner’s convictions ought to be reversed.
Judge Eldridge has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissent.