Case Title: State v. Hopkins

Citation: 

Docket Number: 35,052

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
This decision was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of non-precedential dispositions. Please also note that this electronic decision may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Supreme Court. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 Filing Date: May 26, 2016 2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 3 Plaintiff-Appellee, 4 v. NO. S-1-SC-35052 5 TELYITH KADEEM FONTAYNE 6 HOPKINS, 7 Defendant-Appellant. 8 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 9 Brett R. Loveless, District Judge 10 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 11 Jane A. Bernstein, Assistant Attorney General 12 Santa Fe, NM 13 for Appellee 14 Robert E. Tangora, L.L.C. 15 Robert E. Tangora 16 Santa Fe, NM 17 for Appellant 18 DECISION 1 MAES, Justice. 2 {1} Telyith Kadeem Fontayne Hopkins (Defendant) pleaded guilty to murdering 3 Ramona Montoya-Leon and Arthur Garcia. At the time Defendant committed these 4 murders he was twenty-one years old. The district court sentenced Defendant to two 5 life sentences, to be served consecutively. Defendant filed a motion to modify his 6 sentence pursuant to Rule 5-801 NMRA (2009) on the ground that the consecutive 7 sentences violate state and federal due process guarantees and prohibitions against 8 cruel and unusual punishment in light of Defendant’s young age and mental health 9 issues. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; id. amend. XIV, § 1; N.M. Const. art. II, §§ 13, 10 18. The district court denied Defendant’s motion. 11 {2} In his direct appeal to this Court, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) 12 whether sentencing him to two consecutive life sentences is tantamount to a life 13 sentence without parole and is cruel and unusual punishment; (2) whether felony 14 murder is unconstitutional when applied to the severely mentally ill; and (3) whether 15 due process demands heightened protections for the mentally ill. We affirm the 16 2 district court’s sentence and denial of Defendant’s motion. Because Defendant raises 1 no questions of law that New Mexico precedent does not already sufficiently address, 2 we issue this nonprecedential decision pursuant to Rule 12-405(B)(1) NMRA. 3 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 4 A. Defendant’s Competency 5 {3} Concerned about Defendant’s need for twenty-four-hour surveillance at the 6 Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), his inability to understand the charges against 7 him, and his incoherent, irrational and possibly delusional behavior, defense counsel 8 filed a motion to determine competency before trial. Dr. Susan Cave, an expert 9 Defendant retained, performed an evaluation and concluded that Defendant was 10 incompetent to stand trial. On July 9, 2012, the district court found Defendant 11 incompetent to stand trial, stayed the proceedings against Defendant, and committed 12 Defendant to the New Mexico Behavioral Health Institute at Las Vegas, NM 13 (NMBHI) for treatment. Defendant was treated and based upon an April 2013, report 14 from NMBHI, the district court found Defendant competent to stand trial. 15 {4} On August 1, 2013, when the district court lifted the order staying the 16 proceedings, Defendant expressed a desire to enter a guilty plea. Soon after that, 17 however, Dr. J. Hamilton, Defendant’s treating physician, informed defense counsel 18 3 that he believed Defendant could not enter a voluntary plea in light of his ongoing 1 psychosis and reported delusional status. Subsequently, Dr. Cave, Defendant’s 2 original psychiatrist, consulted with Dr. Hamilton. Defense counsel and Dr. Cave also 3 met extensively with Defendant, and discussed the proposed plea agreement at great 4 length. In a November 6, 2013, letter to the district court, Dr. Cave indicated her 5 opinion that Defendant was in fact competent to enter a plea, based in part on her 6 consultation with Dr. Hamilton. The district court accepted that evidence and 7 permitted Defendant to plead guilty. Thereafter, Defendant entered into a plea and 8 disposition agreement. 9 B. Defendant’s Plea Agreement and Sentence 10 {5} In the plea agreement, Defendant agreed to plead guilty to the first-degree 11 felony murder of Ramona Montoya-Leon and the first-degree willful and deliberate 12 murder of Arthur Garcia. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of the 13 indictment. The plea and disposition agreement contained “no agreements as to 14 sentencing” and stated the maximum penalty for each count of murder in the first 15 degree to be life imprisonment. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant expressly 16 waived “all motions, defenses, objections, or requests” with respect to the district 17 court’s entry of a judgment and the right to appeal imposition of a sentence consistent 18 4 with the plea agreement. The plea agreement also provided that “Defendant 1 withdraws any challenge to his competency to stand trial, and Defendant is competent 2 to enter this plea. Defendant . . . acknowledge[s] that he is giving up any rights 3 asserted in those [previously filed] motions, . . . and acknowledges his waiver of any 4 and all defenses.” 5 {6} At the plea hearing, the district court advised Defendant of the consequences 6 of his plea, confirmed Defendant’s understanding that there was no agreement as to 7 sentencing and that Defendant was giving up his constitutional rights and waiving 8 defenses, including the pending motion to suppress. Defense counsel stated his belief 9 that the plea was in Defendant’s best interest. The district court found Defendant 10 competent to enter the plea based on the reports from NMBHI and Dr. Cave, that 11 Defendant’s guilty plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary and accepted his guilty 12 plea, and adjudged him guilty. 13 {7} At the sentencing hearing, the district court again reviewed the evidence and 14 took account of Defendant’s age and his mental illness. The district court concluded 15 that when Defendant committed these murders he was aware that his actions were 16 wrong because he took efforts to conceal his crimes, he lied to the police, he hid 17 evidence, and he destroyed his clothing in an attempt to prevent apprehension. The 18 5 district court further found that Defendant posed a danger to society, based on the 1 “extremely brutal” nature of the crimes. The district court sentenced Defendant to two 2 consecutive life sentences, so that Defendant would serve a “total of Sixty (60) years 3 in prison before” becoming eligible for parole. 4 C. Defendant’s Motion to Modify the Sentence 5 {8} After sentencing, Defendant filed a motion to modify sentence pursuant to Rule 6 5-801 NMRA (2009), claiming that the consecutive sentences imposed violated state 7 and federal due process guarantees and prohibitions against cruel and unusual 8 punishment in light of Defendant’s mental illness and young age at the time of the 9 crime. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; id. amend. XIV, § 1; N.M. Const. art. II, §§ 13, 10 18. At a subsequent hearing, Defendant argued that modification of his sentence was 11 appropriate because at the time he committed these crimes he may not “have had the 12 capacity to form the specific intent to commit first-degree murder.” Dr. Cave, who 13 had one year earlier assured the district court that Defendant was competent to plead 14 guilty, suggested that Defendant may not have been able to control himself when he 15 committed the two murders and did not fully appreciate the meaning of consecutive 16 life sentences. Nonetheless, Dr. Cave explained, it was “fairly certain” Defendant 17 would have additional psychotic episodes in the future and would require medication. 18 6 Defendant also argued that he effectively received a life sentence without the 1 possibility of parole, since he will be eighty-one years old before becoming eligible 2 for parole. The consecutive sentences, Defendant argued, were cruel and unusual 3 punishment because, he claimed, he had been unable to fully appreciate what he had 4 done, almost as if he was a child or a mentally retarded person. Defendant further 5 argued that the felony murder statutes, as applied to the mentally ill, were 6 unconstitutional and that due process required heightened protections for mentally ill 7 persons like himself. 8 {9} In response, the State argued that Defendant had waived any challenge to 9 specific intent based on age or mental health in the plea agreement and that leniency 10 was not otherwise warranted since Defendant was an adult and was found to be 11 competent. The State also argued that Defendant would have a high risk of 12 reoffending upon release if his sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 13 {10} The district court held that the Eighth Amendment cases were not applicable 14 because Defendant was not a juvenile, was competent, and had waived any claim of 15 insanity. The district court concluded that the consecutive life sentences were 16 appropriate and denied Defendant’s motion. 17 {11} Defendant appeals his sentence and the district court’s denial of his motion to 18 7 modify his sentence to this Court on direct appeal. This Court exercises appellate 1 jurisdiction where life imprisonment has been imposed. See N.M. Const. art. VI, § 2; 2 see also Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA (providing a right to direct appeal when a sentence 3 of life imprisonment has been imposed). 4 {12} Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether sentencing Defendant to two 5 consecutive life sentences is tantamount to a life sentence without parole and is 6 therefore cruel and unusual punishment; (2) whether felony murder is unconstitutional 7 when applied to the severely mentally ill; and (3) whether due process demands 8 heightened protections for the mentally ill. The State responds that Defendant’s 9 sentence is proportional to the crimes committed, and does not violate the prohibition 10 against cruel and unusual punishment. 11 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 12 {13} Constitutional questions, such as cruel and unusual punishment, are reviewed 13 de novo. See State v. DeGraff, 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 6, 139 N.M. 211, 131 P.3d 61 14 (citation omitted). Sentencing is “reviewed for abuse of discretion.” State v. Bonilla, 15 2000-NMSC-037, ¶ 6, 130 N.M. 1, 15 P.3d 491 (citations omitted). 16 III. DISCUSSION 17 {14} Before we reach the merits of Defendant’s arguments we first address the 18 8 State’s argument that Defendant waived his right to an appeal. We have held that a 1 defendant’s plea agreement “does not waive an appeal on the grounds that the district 2 court was without authority to impose an illegal sentence.” State v. Tafoya, 2010- 3 NMSC-019, ¶ 7, 148 N.M. 391, 237 P.3d 693. For this reason we proceed to consider 4 Defendant’s appeal. 5 A. Defendant Fails to Establish a Claim of Cruel and Unusual Punishment 6 {15} Defendant argues that his two consecutive life sentences are excessive because 7 they are tantamount to a sentence of life imprisonment without parole or a death 8 sentence since he will not be eligible for parole until he turns eighty-one years old. 9 Defendant’s position is that like juveniles and the mentally retarded, he lacked the 10 mens rea to commit the crimes and thus sentencing him to life imprisonment violates 11 state and federal prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. 12 1. Defendant was Properly Sentenced Notwithstanding His Mental Illness 13 and Age 14 {16} Defendant has not challenged the final competency determination. See State 15 v. Herrera, 2001-NMCA-073, ¶ 31, 131 N.M. 22, 33 P.3d 22 (“The standard to 16 determine competency to enter a guilty plea is the same as the standard to determine 17 competency to stand trial.” (citation omitted)). Defendant also has not challenged the 18 validity of the guilty plea. Nor has Defendant claimed that the district court did not 19 9 otherwise comply with the rules of criminal procedure in accepting Defendant’s guilty 1 plea. Nevertheless, Defendant argues that two cases from the United States Supreme 2 Court compel us to conclude that the sentence to which he agreed is cruel and unusual: 3 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 4 {17} First, Defendant argues that we should extend Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, in which 5 the Supreme Court held that execution of a person who is mentally retarded is cruel 6 and unusual punishment, to include people who are mentally ill, though not mentally 7 retarded, and have been sentenced to life imprisonment and not death. In New 8 Mexico, mental retardation is defined as “significantly subaverage general intellectual 9 functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior.” NMSA 1978, 10 § 31-9-1.6(E) (1999). A mental disorder is defined as the “substantial disorder of a 11 person’s emotional processes, thought or cognition that grossly impairs judgment, 12 behavior or capacity to recognize reality, but does not mean developmental 13 disabilit[ies]”. NMSA 1978, § 43-1-3(O) (2013). In State v. Trujillo, 14 2009-NMSC-012, ¶¶ 35-39, 146 N.M. 14, 206 P.3d 125, we discussed the difference 15 between mental retardation and mental illness. We observed that “[m]ental retardation 16 is not a mental illness.” Id. ¶ 35 (citation omitted). “While [m]entally ill people 17 encounter disturbances in their thought processes and emotions[,] mentally retarded 18 10 people have limited abilities to learn.” Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation 1 marks and citation omitted). “Another distinction is that mental retardation is largely 2 immutable while mental illness is often episodic.” Id. (citation omitted). “The 3 practical significance of the permanence of mental retardation is that defendants 4 incompetent due to mental retardation are less likely to be treated to competency than 5 those incompetent due to mental illness, though there are cases where those with mild 6 mental retardation may be treated to competency.” Id. 7 {18} What psychiatrists may consider a mental illness for the purpose of a clinical 8 diagnosis or treatment is not the same as mental retardation for determining criminal 9 responsibility. We reject Defendant’s attempt to conflate the two. See, e.g., State v. 10 Neely I, 1991-NMSC-087, ¶¶ 24-26, 112 N.M. 702, 819 P.2d 249 (holding that 11 despite a mental illness, it is not cruel and unusual to impose a life sentence for first- 12 degree murder on a criminally responsible defendant under either state or federal 13 constitutional analysis); State v. Escamilla, 1988-NMSC-066, ¶ 12, 107 N.M. 510, 14 760 P.2d 1276 (holding that mandatory life sentence upon a conviction of first- degree 15 murder was not disproportionate or cruel and unusual punishment). 16 {19} Similarly, an inmate’s need for extraordinary medical treatment does not, by 17 itself, mean that incarceration constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., 18 11 State v. Mabry, 1981-NMSC-067, ¶¶ 21-22, 96 N.M. 317, 630 P.2d 269 (holding that 1 mandatory life sentence for a conviction of first-degree murder was not cruel and 2 unusual punishment merely because the defendant was seriously mentally ill); State 3 v. Vasquez, 2010-NMCA-041, ¶¶ 40-41,148 N.M. 202, 232 P.3d 438 (holding that the 4 defendant’s sentence was not “unjust and unwarranted” despite her need for specific 5 treatment for battered spouse syndrome); State v. Augustus, 1981-NMCA-118, ¶¶ 8- 6 11, 97 N.M. 100, 637 P.2d 50 (holding that sentence was not cruel and unusual 7 punishment despite the defendant’s need for specialized medical treatment). 8 {20} In this case, Defendant has never claimed that he is mentally retarded; nor could 9 he on this record. Defendant’s prior incompetence and current mental illness are not 10 the equivalent of mental retardation and therefore do not entitle him to a modification 11 of his sentence. Compare § 31-9-1.6(B), (D) (“If the court finds . . . that the defendant 12 has mental retardation and that there is not a substantial probability that the defendant 13 will become competent to proceed . . . [t]he criminal charges shall be dismissed 14 without prejudice.”), with NMSA 1978, § 31-9-1.2(B) (1999) (“[T]he district court 15 may commit the [incompetent and dangerous] defendant . . . for treatment to attain 16 competency to proceed in a criminal case.”). Even if Defendant’s mental illness might 17 require ongoing treatment, this does not, by itself, mean that incarcerating him for two 18 12 consecutive life sentences constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 1 {21} Defendant’s second position is that like juveniles, he lacked the mens rea to 2 commit the crimes and thus sentencing him to life imprisonment is in violation of 3 prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. He argues that we should extend 4 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568, in which the Supreme Court held that it is cruel and unusual 5 punishment to execute criminal defendants who were under eighteen years old when 6 they committed the crime, to include young adults sentenced to life imprisonment. 7 The holding in Roper explicitly applied to juveniles under eighteen. See Roper, 543 8 U.S. at 568 (“A majority of States have rejected the imposition of the death penalty 9 on juvenile offenders under 18, and we now hold this is required by the Eighth 10 Amendment.”). In the same way Defendant asks us to compare him to a juvenile 11 offender, the Supreme Court compared juvenile offenders between sixteen and 12 eighteen years of age, who at the time were eligible for the death penalty. See id. at 13 570. The Supreme Court extended the Eighth Amendment prohibitions to offenders 14 between the ages of sixteen and eighteen because of common characteristics between 15 the two groups evidencing “diminished culpability.” Id. at 570-1. For example, the 16 Court stated “[i]n recognition of the comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of 17 juveniles, almost every State prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting, 18 13 serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent.” Id. at 569 (citations 1 omitted). 2 {22} We see no reason to extend Roper to Defendant’s case. Defendant was twenty- 3 one years old at the time he committed these murders and certainly not within the 4 parameters established by Roper. Because Defendant was a legal adult, we cannot 5 categorically treat him as a juvenile offender under Roper. Nor can we agree that his 6 consecutive life sentence should be equated with a death sentence and therefore afford 7 Defendant the same protections afforded to the narrow category of death row 8 defendants. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (“Because the death penalty is the most severe 9 punishment, the Eighth Amendment applies to it with special force.” (citation 10 omitted)). Accordingly, we decline to grant relief on this basis. 11 {23} While acknowledging that he neither meets the standards for mental retardation 12 nor is of an age young enough to receive heightened protection in New Mexico, 13 Defendant seems to ask us to find that he is close enough, and should receive some, 14 if not all, of the protections afforded to these vulnerable groups. Because mental 15 retardation and mental illness are distinct, Defendant’s sentence is not cruel and 16 unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment as stated in Atkins on the 17 basis of Defendant’s mental illness. 18 14 2. Defendant’s Sentence Is Proportional to His Crimes 1 {24} The State argues that Defendant’s sentence is proportional to the crimes he 2 committed. See generally Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (stating that the 3 Eighth Amendment prohibits “sentences that are disproportionate to the crime 4 committed”). Ordinarily, the “length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a 5 matter of legislative prerogative,” unless the statutory sentence is “grossly 6 disproportionate to the crime.” State v. Archibeque, 1981-NMSC-010, ¶ 4, 95 N.M. 7 411, 622 P.2d 1031 (citation omitted); see also State v. Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 8 29, 140 N.M. 644, 146 P.3d 289 (“[W]e generally defer to the judgment of the 9 legislature regarding the appropriate length of sentences.” (citation omitted)). 10 {25} “[I]t is within the province of the judiciary to review whether a sentence 11 constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.” State v. Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-005, ¶ 65, 12 131 N.M. 709, 42 P.3d 814 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And “[i]t 13 is rare that a term of incarceration, which has been authorized by the Legislature, will 14 be found to be excessively long or inherently cruel.” Id. ¶ 66 (internal quotation 15 marks and citation omitted); see also State v. Rueda, 1999-NMCA-033, ¶ 14, 126 16 N.M. 738, 975 P.2d 351 (“Federal and state jurisprudence recognize that successful 17 challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences are, nonetheless, exceedingly 18 15 rare.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 1 {26} In fact, this Court has specifically declined to find a life sentence cruel and 2 unusual for first-degree murder. See, e.g., Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 65-66 3 (concluding that thirty-year life sentence statutorily authorized and imposed on a 4 serious youthful offender for the crime of first-degree murder was not cruel and 5 unusual); Escamilla, 1988-NMSC-066, ¶ 12 (“We find no disproportionality. 6 Intentional murder warrants the harshest of penalties, and thirty years is mandated 7 uniformly in first-degree murder cases where death is not imposed. . . . It is 8 uncontested that this mandatory sentence is not disproportionately harsh when 9 compared to those in other states.” (citation omitted)); State v. Padilla, 10 1973-NMSC-049, ¶¶ 12-17, 85 N.M. 140, 509 P.2d 1335 (holding that two 11 consecutive life sentences for murder and for act of carnal knowledge of child, plus 12 imprisonment for up to twenty years for kidnapping, were not excessively long or 13 inherently cruel and therefore did not violate the state or federal constitutions). 14 {27} Defendant has offered no compelling reason for why this Court should depart 15 from a long-standing policy of judicial deference to legislative pronouncements of 16 punishment. See Archibeque, 1981-NMSC-010, ¶ 5 (“Absent a compelling 17 reason . . . the judiciary should not impose its own views concerning the appropriate 18 16 punishment for crimes.” (citations omitted)). Nor do we have any evidence 1 suggesting Defendant’s case is of the exceedingly rare kind that requires a departure 2 from precedent. Therefore, we agree with the State that Defendant’s punishment is 3 proportionate. 4 {28} We will not treat the life sentences in this case as categorically the same as a life 5 sentence without the possibility of release or parole, a sentence which the district court 6 had the ability to impose but did not. Nor will we categorically treat Defendant as 7 someone who is mentally retarded or a juvenile, or was sentenced to death. 8 Defendant’s sentence is not otherwise excessive or disproportionate simply because 9 it may or may not extend beyond his natural life expectancy. Accordingly, 10 Defendant’s sentence does not violate prohibitions against cruel and unusual 11 punishment. 12 B. Defendant Fails to Establish that New Mexico’s Felony Murder Statute is 13 Unconstitutional When Applied to the Severely Mentally Ill 14 {29} Defendant first argues generally that the felony murder statute in New Mexico, 15 NMSA 1978, § 30-2-l(A)(2) (1994), at least as it pertains to the severely mentally ill, 16 is unconstitutional. Defendant offers no authority to support his theory that the 17 severely mentally ill are entitled to additional protections “because they cannot 18 understand or appreciate the magnitude, nature and consequences of risks.” We 19 17 therefore assume there is none. See, e.g., State v. Torrez, 2013-NMSC-034, ¶ 34, 305 1 P.3d 944 (declining to consider defendant’s argument that the same jury instructions 2 in the first trial must be given in a retrial because defendant did not cite to any case 3 law supporting his argument); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, 4 ¶ 70, 309 P.3d 53 (“It is of no benefit either to the parties or to future litigants for this 5 Court to promulgate case law based on our own speculation rather than the parties’ 6 carefully considered arguments.”). 7 {30} Defendant further argues that the felony murder doctrine is an “unsupportable 8 legal fiction” and “a form of strict liability”, and therefore unconstitutional, relying 9 on State v. Harrison, 1977-NMSC-038, ¶ 12, 90 N.M. 439, 564 P.2d 1321. 10 Defendant’s argument fails to consider that since Harrison, “[i]n concert with the 11 general trend in America of limiting its reach, New Mexico has placed five limitations 12 on felony murder.” Campos v. Bravo, 2007-NMSC-021, ¶ 9, 141 N.M. 801, 161 P.3d 13 846 (citation omitted). One limitation is a mens rea requirement that the defendant 14 must possess at least the intent required for second degree murder. See State v. 15 Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084, ¶ 25, 112 N.M. 554, 817 P.2d 1196 (“Second degree 16 murder, in other words, may be elevated to first-degree murder when it occurs in 17 circumstances that the legislature has determined are so serious as to merit increased 18 18 punishment; but both types of killing—felony (first degree) murder and second degree 1 murder—necessitate a culpable state of mind, ordinarily described in legal parlance 2 as a mens rea.”). 3 {31} New Mexico’s felony murder doctrine is based on the idea that a “killing in the 4 commission or attempted commission of a felony is deserving of more serious 5 punishment than other killings in which the killer’s mental state might be similar but 6 the circumstances of the killing are not as grave.” Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084, ¶ 33; see 7 also State v. Daugherty, No. 32,829, dec. ¶ 11 (N.M. Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 2013) (non- 8 precedential) (citing Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084, ¶ 33). Specifically, in Ortega we 9 stated that “felony murder does have a mens rea element, which cannot be presumed 10 simply from the commission or attempted commission of a felony.” 1991-NMSC- 11 084, ¶ 21 (emphasis in original). And “felony murder is not such a strict-liability 12 crime.” Id. ¶ 34. We interpreted the requisite intent to kill to include conduct that is 13 “greatly dangerous to the lives of others or with knowledge that the act creates a 14 strong probability of death or great bodily harm.” Id. ¶ 35. As we stated, the “felony- 15 murder statute . . . is a valid exercise of the legislature’s authority to prescribe serious 16 punishment for killings committed with the requisite criminal intent” during the 17 commission of a first-degree or inherently dangerous felony. Id. 18 19 {32} In this case, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of felony murder, for 1 murdering a victim that he also raped. Defendant does not challenge the validity of 2 the guilty plea or evidence of his intent to kill. Nor does the record before us support 3 such a claim. See Herrera, 2001-NMCA-073, ¶ 31 (“The standard to determine 4 competency to enter a guilty plea is the same as the standard to determine competency 5 to stand trial.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, the imposition of two consecutive life 6 sentences for two convictions of first -degree murder in this case is constitutional. 7 C. Defendant Received the Heightened Due Process Protections to Which He 8 Was Due 9 {33} Defendant asserts generally that federal and state due process guarantees 10 provide greater protections to the mentally ill, but fails to develop any argument or to 11 cite any specific examples of the additional protections he required. Defendant is 12 correct that New Mexico law provides additional protections for incompetent and 13 mentally retarded defendants. See § 31-9-1.2 (allowing the trial court to treat mentally 14 ill defendants differently); § 31-9-1.6 (allowing the trial court to impose a civil rather 15 than criminal sentence for a person meeting the definition of mentally retarded). And 16 Defendant in fact benefited from New Mexico’s heightened protections: the 17 proceedings in his case were stayed for him to be treated to competency. And while 18 he had “adjusted to th[e] environment” of the general population at the prison in Santa 19 20 Rosa, the inpatient psychiatric unit at the prison in Los Lunas is capable of caring for 1 him should the need arise. To argue for even further protections, Defendant had to 2 “assert at trial that the state constitution should be interpreted more broadly and 3 provide reasons for the requested departure.” State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 4 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 11, 130 N.M. 386, 25 P.3d 225 (citation omitted). Because he did 5 not do so and because he does not argue on appeal how the New Mexico Constitution 6 is different from the United States Constitution, we will not consider his argument. 7 See State v. Ortega, 2014-NMSC-017, ¶ 59, 327 P.3d 1076 (citing In re Adoption of 8 Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 (“Issues raised in appellate 9 briefs which are unsupported by cited authority will not be reviewed by us on appeal.” 10 (citation omitted))); Elane Photography, LLC, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70. 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12 {34} The district court’s imposition of two consecutive life sentences did not violate 13 the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The felony murder statute is 14 constitutional when applied to the mentally ill. Accordingly, we affirm the district 15 court’s judgment and sentence, as well as its order denying modification of sentence. 16 {35} IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 ______________________________ 18 21 PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice 1 WE CONCUR: 2 ___________________________________ 3 CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice 4 ___________________________________ 5 EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justice 6 ___________________________________ 7 BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice 8 ___________________________________ 9 JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice 10