Case Title: Parker v. Artery

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-02-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Parker v. Artery1995 WY 10889 P.2d 520Case Number: 93-243Decided: 02/09/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Patricia J. PARKER and William R. Parker, Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

Susan D. ARTERY, Personal Representative of the 
Estate of J. Doyle Pounder, Deceased, Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal 
from District Court, Platte County, Keith G. Kautz, J.

Bruce B. Waters and John E. 
Stanfield of Smith, Stanfield & Scott, Laramie, for appellants.

Gary R. Scott of Hirst & 
Applegate, Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* 
MACY and TAYLOR, JJ.

* Retired July 6, 
1994.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The injured 
parties in a tort action bring this appeal. A jury trial resulted in a verdict 
and a substantial award of compensatory damages in favor of the injured parties. 
However, the injured parties contend pretrial rulings of the district court and 
a variety of procedural errors unfairly restricted the presentation of facts to 
the jury. The injured parties also claim they were denied the full measure of 
their damages.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Among the issues 
on appeal, the injured parties insist they should have been permitted to inform 
the jury that an intoxicated tortfeasor ran a stop sign and caused a severe 
collision. The injured parties also argue the jury should have been permitted to 
consider awarding punitive damages, despite the death of the tortfeasor before 
trial. Furthermore, the injured parties assert that the jury should have been 
instructed that liability insurance coverage existed to pay the damage 
award.

[¶4]      The personal 
representative of the tortfeasor responds that liability for the collision was 
admitted, so the fact that the tortfeasor was legally intoxicated at the time of 
the collision was irrelevant. The personal representative maintains that Wyoming 
should continue to follow the rule that recovery of punitive damages is not 
allowed from a tortfeasor's estate. Finally, the personal representative 
declares that there was no reason to instruct the jury of the existence of 
liability insurance coverage.

II. 
FACTS

[¶5]      On June 23, 1990, 
Patricia J. Parker (Parker) drove her van west on Palmer Canyon Road just 
outside Wheatland, Wyoming. As Parker approached the intersection with Grange 
Road, a vehicle driven by J. Doyle Pounder (Pounder) failed to stop at the stop 
sign controlling north and south bound traffic. Parker's van collided with 
Pounder's vehicle. Following the impact, Parker's van veered to the right, hit a 
ditch, jumped over a cement culvert and came to rest at a fence. Parker's 
injuries included a number of cuts and bruises, a broken fibula and a fractured 
vertebra.

[¶6]      Pounder was 
arrested at the scene of the accident and charged with driving while under the 
influence. A test revealed that the alcohol content of Pounder's blood was in 
excess of the legal limit. On February 1, 1992, Pounder died in Washington of 
causes unrelated to the collision.

[¶7]      On June 23, 1992, 
Parker and her husband (collectively, the Parkers) filed a personal injury 
action against Pounder's estate (estate) demanding compensatory and punitive 
damages. Susan D. Artery agreed to serve as personal representative of the 
estate (personal representative) for the purposes of this 
action.

[¶8]      Before trial, the 
personal representative admitted that Pounder's negligence was the sole cause of 
the collision. Additionally, the district court dismissed, with prejudice, the 
Parkers' claim for punitive damages. When the action went to trial, only three 
narrow issues remained undecided: the extent of compensatory damages to Parker; 
the extent, if any, of loss of consortium damages to Mr. Parker; and the extent 
of the damage to the van.

[¶9]      The jury awarded 
a total of $110,000.00 in damages, including: $92,000.00 to Parker for her 
injuries and for her pain and suffering; $7,000.00 to Mr. Parker for loss of 
consortium; and, $11,000.00 for damage to the Parkers' van. Following entry of 
the judgment, the district court allowed the personal representative to deposit 
the judgment amount with the district court, which agreed to hold the funds in 
an interest bearing account. The Parkers objected to this procedure. After a 
hearing, the district court ordered that the $110,000.00 be deposited in an 
interest bearing account or interest bearing instrument as selected by the 
Parkers. The district court also ordered the Parkers to be responsible for 
paying income tax on any interest earned while the funds were deposited with the 
district court.

[¶10]   One day after the judgment was 
entered, the Parkers filed a motion for a new trial. The district court denied 
the motion. The Parkers then filed a timely notice of 
appeal.

III. 
DISCUSSION

A. 
EVIDENCE OF INTOXICATION

[¶11]   The Parkers claim that they should 
have been allowed to present the jury with evidence regarding Pounder's 
intoxication at the time of the collision. The district court ruled this 
evidence was inadmissible because it was irrelevant to the determination of the 
extent of the compensatory damages suffered by the Parkers. We agree with the 
district court.

[¶12]   We review a district court's ruling 
on admissibility of the evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Furman 
v. Rural Elec. Co., 869 P.2d 136, 140 (Wyo. 1994); L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of 
County Com'rs of County of Hot Springs, 790 P.2d 663, 673 (Wyo. 1990). "Abuse of 
discretion occurs when a court exceeds the bounds of reason or commits an error 
of law." Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶13]   Before trial, the personal 
representative stipulated that Pounder's negligence was the sole proximate cause 
of the collision. Exercising its discretion, the district court determined that 
evidence proving or disproving the extent of the compensatory damages the 
Parkers suffered was the only relevant evidence before the jury. The district 
court granted a motion in limine which excluded statements or questions during 
the trial regarding Pounder's intoxication.

[¶14]   The Parkers maintain that they had 
a right to present their entire case to the jury, including the fact that 
Pounder was intoxicated at the time of the collision. The Parkers assert the 
jury was entitled to weigh this evidence to determine the proper amount of 
damages. If the jury had been permitted to hear this evidence, the Parkers argue 
that public policy against drunken driving would have 
benefitted.

[¶15]   The admissibility of evidence is 
governed by W.R.E. 401, 402 and 403. W.R.E. 401 defines what is "relevant 
evidence" during a trial:

"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence.

W.R.E. 402 states that 
generally, all relevant evidence is admissible; irrelevant evidence is 
inadmissible. W.R.E. 403 provides a balancing test for the exclusion of relevant 
evidence:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.

[¶16]   The district court correctly ruled 
that evidence of Pounder's intoxication at the time of the collision was 
inadmissible. W.R.E. 402. The questions before the jury concerned the extent of 
the damages suffered by the Parkers. The cause of those damages, Pounder's 
failure to stop at an intersection while impaired, was no longer at issue. The 
personal representative had stipulated to Pounder's legal responsibility for the 
injuries to the Parkers. The jury was informed that Pounder had failed to stop 
at the stop sign and caused a collision. The only relevant evidence, therefore, 
was evidence which would have had a tendency to make more probable the proof of 
the extent of the compensatory damages suffered by the Parkers. W.R.E. 
401.

[¶17]   The Parkers rely upon Furman, 869 P.2d 136, as additional authority for their argument that the district court 
should have admitted evidence of Pounder's intoxication. In Furman, this court 
permitted the introduction of evidence of drug use prior to an accident. Id. at 
140-41. The evidence of drug use in Furman was admitted during the liability 
phase of the trial and was relevant. Id. However, Pounder's liability for the 
injuries to the Parkers was admitted. The evidence of Pounder's intoxication, 
therefore, was irrelevant to the determination of compensatory 
damages.

[¶18]   The Parkers argue that black letter 
law recognizes a party is not required to accept the judicial admission of an 
adversary; but, instead, may insist on proving the fact. See, e.g., Barnes v. 
State, 858 P.2d 522, 528 (Wyo. 1993) and Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86, 88 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 824, 79 S. Ct. 40, 3 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1958). This rule of law, however, is subject to 
the balancing test of W.R.E. 403. See, e.g., Barnes, 858 P.2d  at 529 and United 
States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 1004 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899, 101 S. Ct. 267, 66 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1980).

[¶19]   The probative value of the evidence 
of Pounder's intoxication to the damages issues before the jury was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. W.R.E. 403. The jury 
was being asked a series of narrow questions regarding the extent of the 
compensatory damages suffered by the Parkers. Compensatory damages are limited 
to the general and special damages which compensate for the total harm 
proximately caused by the breach of a duty owed to the injured party. Martinez 
v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 959 (Wyo. 1990); Black's Law Dictionary 390 
(6th ed. 1990). The introduction of evidence of intoxication would have unfairly 
prejudiced the jury to enhance the compensatory damages as a means of punishing 
Pounder. Despite society's revulsion at drunken driving, our system of justice 
reserves such civil punishment to awards of punitive damages. Squaw Mountain 
Cattle Co. v. Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292, 1298 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶20]   The effect of trial practice rules 
may seem unduly harsh in circumstances such as these; however, the jury reached 
a fair verdict and the Parkers received a substantial damage award to compensate 
them for the injuries they suffered. Improper emotional pleas to the jury, based 
upon irrelevant or prejudicial evidence, were avoided by a carefully controlled 
trial proceeding.

[¶21]   We hold the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in ruling the evidence of intoxication was inadmissible to 
establish the extent of the compensatory damages suffered by the 
Parkers.

B. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

[¶22]   Pounder died before this action was 
filed. Nevertheless, the Parkers insist they should have been allowed to pursue 
their claim for punitive damages against the estate. The decision to award 
punitive damages is within the discretion of the district court and will not be 
reversed on appeal without a finding of a clear abuse of that discretion. 
Sheridan Commercial Park, Inc. v. Briggs, 848 P.2d 811, 818 (Wyo. 1993); Squaw 
Mountain Cattle Co., 804 P.2d  at 1298.

[¶23]   Wyoming follows the general rule 
that punitive damages may not be recovered from the estate of a deceased 
tortfeasor. 1 J.D. Lee & Barry A. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law § 21.35 (Rev.Ed. 
1994); 1 James D. Ghiardi & John J. Kircher, Punitive Damages Law & 
Practice § 9.10 (1987 & Cum. Supp. 1993); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 125(3) (1966). 
In Marcante v. Hein, 51 Wyo. 389, 406, 67 P.2d 196, 202 (1937), we held that 
"executors of an estate cannot be held liable for exemplary damages in 
consequence of a tort committed by their testator[.]" The terms "punitive 
damages" and "exemplary damages" have an identical meaning. Squaw Mountain 
Cattle Co., 804 P.2d  at 1298.

[¶24]   The Parkers argue that the 
deterrent value of punitive damages should serve as a basis for reversing the 
"archaic" rule of Marcante. The Parkers refer specifically to our comments in 
Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1369-70 (Wyo. 1986) and Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1123 (Wyo. 1981). In Weaver, 715 P.2d  at 1370, we noted the 
importance of public condemnation of "some notorious action or inaction on the 
part of the defendant." In Campen, 635 P.2d  at 1123, we stated that "[t]he 
design of punitive damages is deterrence through public condemnation and the 
damages awarded should be narrowly tailored toward that end." These cases, 
however, did not involve a deceased tortfeasor.

[¶25]   Public policy is not served by 
permitting the recovery of punitive damages against the estate of a deceased 
tortfeasor. The purpose of punitive damages is to punish the tortfeasor and 
deter that person from repeating the 
wrongful act in the future; however, the reason for awarding punitive damages 
ceases to exist with the death of the tortfeasor. Marcante, 67 P.2d  at 202 
(quoting Evans v. Gibson, 220 Cal. 476, 31 P.2d 389, 395 (1934)). The Supreme 
Court of New Mexico accurately summarized: "When the tortfeasor cannot be 
punished for his culpable behavior, punitive damages no longer have the desired 
effect and, therefore, the victim loses the legal entitlement to recover those 
damages." Jaramillo v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 117 N.M. 337, 871 P.2d 1343, 1351 (1994).

[¶26]   We hold the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by dismissing the Parkers' claim for punitive 
damages.

C. JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS

[¶27]   The Parkers also contend that the 
district court erroneously failed to respond to a message from the jury 
requesting additional instruction and information. During their deliberations, 
the jury submitted four questions to the court:

1. Did the Parkers have health 
insurance?

2. Can we consider any reimbursement by an insurance 
company to be deducted from the compensation? In the 
future?

3. Should we consider attorney fees as part of the 
settlement?

4. Did Parkers receive any compensation from any 
insurance company for their van?

Despite objections from the 
Parkers, the district court refused to answer the questions from the jury. The 
district court informed the jurors that they were required to complete the 
verdict form on the basis of the evidence presented and the instructions 
previously given.

[¶28]   Jury instructions are reviewed as a 
whole to determine if the jury instructions adequately and clearly advised the 
jury of the applicable law. Kemper Architects, P.C. v. McFall, Konkel, & 
Kimball Consulting Engineers, Inc., 843 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Wyo. 1992). Reversible 
error is found only if substantial rights were prejudiced. Condict v. Whitehead, 
Zunker, Gage, Davidson & Shotwell, P.C., 743 P.2d 880, 885 (Wyo. 1987). 
Prejudice occurs when an instruction misleads or confuses the jury regarding the 
applicable law. L.U. Sheep Co., 790 P.2d  at 672. 

[¶29]   The Parkers contend that the 
district court's response "hid the truth" and denied the jury's right to know 
about the role of insurance in an action for damages. The Parkers argue that the 
questions from the jury reflected thoughtful deliberation which deserved a 
complete answer. We disagree.

[¶30]   The district court correctly 
refused to answer the questions from the jury. First, the jury asked for 
additional instruction on irrelevant issues of law, including attorney fees. 
Second, the jury inquired about facts which were not in evidence, specifically 
evidence of insurance coverage. See DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 187 (Wyo. 
1986) (affirming jury's verdict despite refusal of district court to answer 
jury's request for additional information not introduced in 
evidence).

[¶31]   Knowledge of insurance coverage 
would have tainted the findings of the jury and constituted reversible error. 
The introduction of evidence of liability insurance is prohibited in certain 
circumstances:

Evidence 
that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon 
the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of 
evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such 
as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a 
witness.

W.R.E. 411 (emphasis added). 
The purpose of this rule is to prevent the deliberate introduction of evidence 
of liability insurance coverage in tort actions premised on negligence. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 829 (Wyo. 1994); Carlson v. 
BMW Indus. Service, Inc., 744 P.2d 1383, 1388 (Wyo. 1987). The Parkers have 
completely failed to show prejudice from the district court's temperate response 
to the jury's questions. L.U. Sheep Co., 790 P.2d  at 672.

[¶32]   We hold the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by refusing to answer the request from the jury for 
additional instruction and information. Taken as a whole, the jury instructions 
adequately informed the jury of the law which was to be applied to the evidence. 
Kemper Architects, P.C., 843 P.2d  at 1182.

D. 
PROCEDURAL ISSUES

[¶33]   Finally, the Parkers offer a series 
of procedural challenges. First, the Parkers contend the district court erred 
when it permitted the personal representative to sit at the defense counsel 
table because the real party in interest was Pounder's insurer. This argument is 
without merit. The personal representative of a deceased is the party authorized 
by law to defend an action against the estate. Wyo. Stat. § 2-7-104 (1980). See also, Wyo.R.Prof.Cond. 1.7 (noting 
that counsel may be paid by a third party without creating a conflict of 
interest if the client is informed and consents to the 
arrangement).

[¶34]   Next, the Parkers contend that the 
district court improperly ordered their counsel to refrain from any "unit of 
time" argument. During rebuttal, the Parkers' counsel referred to Mrs. Parker's 
anticipated life span and calculated damages: "that's 31 years at a thousand 
dollars a year * * *." The personal representative objected and the district 
court ordered counsel for the Parkers to refrain from unit of time arguments. 
The Parkers contend that this court should eliminate restraints on this type of 
argument. We disagree.

[¶35]   Unit of time arguments assume an 
arbitrary figure for pain and suffering and multiply that figure by some unit of 
time over which it is assumed the injured person will suffer. Combined Ins. Co. 
of America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034, 1050 (Wyo. 1978). In Henman v. Klinger, 
409 P.2d 631, 632-34 (Wyo. 1966), we carefully considered the propriety of unit 
of time arguments. We concluded that arguments based on a unit of time mislead 
the jury and "clothe with an aura of reasonableness the often fantastic claims" 
made on behalf of such calculations. Id. at 634. As a result, Wyoming has 
prohibited unit of time arguments. We see no reason to reverse that position. 
Furthermore, the Parkers have failed to make a showing of prejudice from the 
district court's ruling. 

[¶36]   Finally, the Parkers contend that a 
procedural error occurred when the personal representative was allowed to 
deposit the judgment amount with the district court. We do not find an abuse of 
discretion in the procedure used by the district court.

[¶37]   On August 30, 1993, the district 
court entered a judgment in favor of the Parkers. Statutory interest on the 
judgment amount began to accrue as of that date. Wyo. Stat. § 1-16-102(a) 
(Cum.Supp. 1994). However, on August 31, 1993, the Parkers challenged the 
judgment by filing a motion for a new trial. Two days later, the personal 
representative filed a motion for leave to deposit the judgment amount with the 
district court. The personal representative stated that the Parkers' counsel had 
refused to accept payment of the judgment amount pending the disposition of 
post-trial motions and a possible appeal. On September 7, 1993, the district 
court permitted the personal representative to deposit the judgment amount with 
the district court.

[¶38]   The Parkers protest that the 
personal representative's deposit of the judgment amount with the district court 
should not toll the accrual of statutory interest. The Parkers also maintain it 
is unfair that they bear the tax consequences of any interest earned on the 
judgment amount. These arguments are based upon mistaken 
assumptions.

[¶39]   In Wyoming, statutory interest 
begins to accrue when a judgment is entered. See Gose v. Hess, 822 P.2d 846, 849 
(Wyo. 1991). Wyo. Stat. § 1-16-102(a) directs, in pertinent 
part:

[A]ll decrees and judgments for the payment of money 
shall bear interest at ten percent (10%) per year from the date of rendition 
until paid.

[¶40]   Our Rules of Civil Procedure permit 
the deposit of a sum of money to satisfy a judgment with the 
court:

In an action in which any part of the relief sought 
is a judgment for a sum of money or the disposition of a sum of money or the 
disposition of any other thing capable of delivery, a party, upon notice to 
every other party, and by leave of court, may deposit with the court all or any 
part of such sum or thing, whether or not that party claims all or any part of 
the sum or thing. Money paid into court under this rule shall be held by the 
clerk of the court subject to withdrawal in whole or in part at any time 
thereafter upon order of the court or written stipulation of the parties. The 
fund shall be deposited in an interest-bearing account or invested in an 
interest-bearing instrument approved by the court.

W.R.C.P. 67. The purpose of 
W.R.C.P. 67 is to relieve the depositor of the responsibility for the funds and, 
in some circumstances, to stop the accrual of interest by authorizing a payment 
into the court. 12 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 
And Procedure: Civil § 2991 at 50-51 (1973).

[¶41]   Statutory interest under Wyo. Stat. 
§ 1-16-102(a) accrues from the time of the entry of the judgment "until paid." 
The Parkers argue for a construction of this language that requires payment to 
the prevailing party to toll the accrual of interest. However, this construction 
exceeds the requirements of the statutory language and would create the 
inequitable result which W.R.C.P. 67 is designed to 
prevent.

[¶42]   The phrase "until paid" as used in 
Wyo. Stat. § 1-16-102(a) is not defined. Therefore, this court inquires into the 
ordinary and obvious meaning of the statutory language to determine the 
legislative intent. Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 
845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶43]   "Until" is a word of limitation 
which is used to fix a point in time or establish a point at which a precedent 
status ceases to exist upon the happening of a condition. Jones v. Jones, 402 P.2d 272, 274 (Okla. 1965); Black's Law Dictionary 1540 (6th ed. 1990). "Paid" 
is the past participle of "pay." The plain meaning of "pay" includes the 
discharge of a debt by a tender of payment due. Black's Law Dictionary 1128 (6th 
ed. 1990). "Tender" is an unconditional offer to perform coupled with the 
ability to carry out the offer and the production of the subject matter of the 
tender. Black's Law Dictionary 1467 (6th ed. 1990). See Radalj v. Union Savings 
& Loan Ass'n, 59 Wyo. 140, 184, 138 P.2d 984, 999 (1943). The plain language 
of Wyo. Stat. § 1-16-102(a) does not require the payment of a judgment amount to 
be made and accepted by the prevailing party to toll the accrual of statutory 
interest. When the legislature omits language from a statute, we must consider 
the omission intentional. Carroll By and Through Miller v. Wyoming Production 
Credit Ass'n, 755 P.2d 869, 873 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶44]   The personal representative made a 
payment into the district court of the judgment amount as authorized by W.R.C.P. 
67. At that time, the personal representative surrendered control of the funds 
to the court. Therefore, the personal representative caused the precedent 
status, the accrual of statutory interest, to cease to exist and "paid" the 
judgment amount by tendering the payment of the sum necessary to discharge a 
debt. Wyo. Stat. § 1-16-102(a); W.R.C.P. 67.

[¶45]   The procedure stated in W.R.C.P. 67 
prevents the inequity that would otherwise result from circumstances where the 
prevailing party appeals a judgment or refuses to accept a judgment amount. The 
Parkers prevailed and were awarded a significant judgment amount which they 
refused to accept. Instead, the Parkers chose to file a motion for a new trial 
and, subsequently, to appeal to this court. If statutory interest had continued 
to accrue during this time, the personal representative would have been unfairly 
burdened. W.R.C.P. 67 provides the means to pay the judgment amount into the 
district court and toll the accrual of statutory interest. Wyo. Stat. § 
1-16-102(a). The procedure in W.R.C.P. 67 assured the Parkers that interest 
income would continue to accrue based upon the investment instrument that was 
selected.

[¶46]   While this court has not previously 
addressed the intent of W.R.C.P. 67, the federal courts have recognized that a 
payment into the court under the substantially similar provisions of F.R.C.P. 67 
tolls the accrual of interest or penalties. In Kotsopoulos v. Asturia Shipping 
Co., 467 F.2d 91, 94 (2nd Cir. 1972), the court recognized that payment of a 
judgment amount into the court during the pendency of an appeal would toll the 
accrual of statutory interest. In Mateo v. M/S KISO, 805 F. Supp. 761, 784 
(N.D.Cal. 1991), the court permitted a ship owner to deposit into the court an 
amount equal to the plaintiff's wage claim. The deposit tolled the penalty 
provisions of a federal law dealing with unpaid wages.

[¶47]   The Parkers also assert that they 
should not have to assume any income tax liability for the interest accrued 
while the judgment amount remains on deposit with the court. This argument is 
without merit. The party ultimately entitled to the judgment amount is also 
entitled to the accrued interest. Hansen v. Smith, 395 P.2d 944, 946 (Wyo. 
1964). Equity favors assigning the burden for any income taxes to the party who 
will enjoy the benefit.

[¶48]   We hold the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in granting leave for the personal representative to make a 
payment into the court of the judgment amount. W.R.C.P. 
67.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶49]   The issues at trial were carefully 
focused. Liability was admitted and the jury was being asked to determine the 
amount of damages which would compensate the Parkers for their injuries. This 
inquiry required the jury to consider only relevant facts. Irrelevant evidence, 
such as Pounder's level of intoxication, or the existence of insurance coverage, 
would have potentially prejudiced the jury's findings. The trial process is 
controlled by rules of evidence and procedure to assure justice for all 
parties.

[¶50]   Affirmed.

CARDINE, 
Justice, Retired, specially concurring.

[¶51]   I specially concur in the opinion 
of the court only to add to and clarify two issues in the 
case.

[¶52]   First, with respect to the unit of 
time argument, the prohibition against this argument, as stated by the court, is 
that plaintiff may not "assume an arbitrary figure for pain and suffering and 
multiply that figure against some unit of time * * *." But that is precisely 
what plaintiff has done in the prayer of his complaint when he asks for, say, 
$200,000 - or any other figure - for pain and suffering. It is an arbitrary 
figure. Plaintiff has always been entitled to inform the jury of the amount he 
is asking for in the prayer of his complaint. The jury should be first informed 
of this amount on voir dire for there may be jurors who, because of personal 
makeup, bias or prejudice, would not return a large verdict, or any verdict, no 
matter what the evidence. The jury is informed of the amount of the prayer on 
voir dire, in opening statement, in instructions to the jury and in argument. If 
it were otherwise, how would the jury know the amount of the verdict they could 
return if they found for plaintiff?

[¶53]   It is helpful that we now state 
clearly what is permitted and proper in final argument in a case. Assuming 
plaintiff seeks to recover $200,000 for pain and suffering, there will be proof 
that plaintiff has a life expectancy of 25 years and that plaintiff will endure 
pain and suffering for the rest of his life. The prayer of plaintiff's complaint 
is for $200,000. An argument based upon evidence and the prayer of the complaint 
would permit the jury to be informed that plaintiff will be in pain and will 
suffer for 25 years and that plaintiff is asking the jury to award $200,000. 
That argument might be as follows:

Plaintiff will endure pain and suffering each year 
for 25 separate years. How much should plaintiff be awarded for each year is for 
you to decide. No witness has testified to the amount you should award. I 
suggest to you that $200,000, the amount prayed for, for 25 years of pain and 
suffering is fair. Perhaps that is not enough, but that is for you to 
decide.

Surely a party can also say 
to the jury that $200,000 for 25 years is $8,000 per year. That is a simple 
mathematical calculation that is proper whether the argument relates to damages 
or anything else. But if the court says it is improper, I suggest that the party 
arguing might state to the jury:

I 
am not permitted by the court to divide 25 years into $200,000 to ascertain the 
amount of damages that would be awarded for each year of plaintiff's life - so 
you, the jury, make the calculation.

[¶54]   A party, plaintiff or defendant, 
can argue what amount the jury should award. If deemed necessary, an expert 
witness can testify that there are 12 months in a year, 52 weeks in a year. 
Since plaintiff can inform the jury of the amount sought to be recovered for 
pain and suffering and the years of life expectancy, it is absurd to hold that 
neither party can tell the jury how much in money that is per year, month or 
week.

[¶55]   The objection to the unit of time 
argument has always been to blackboarding the figures and to breaking the years 
of life expectancy into minutes and seconds. I would limit the objection, if at 
all, only to blackboarding and breaking the time into minutes and seconds, 
although that restriction makes little sense from a practical 
standpoint.

[¶56]   With respect to punitive damages, I 
would hold that the primary purpose of punitive damages is to punish the 
tortfeasor; a secondary purpose is to deter the tortfeasor and others who might 
be inclined toward the same type of activity. An award of punitive damages in 
this case would neither punish nor deter the deceased tortfeasor. Its deterrent 
effect to others, certainly a consideration, is not in and of itself sufficient 
to justify sustaining an award of punitive damages.