Case Title: In re N.G.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 303A19

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 303A19  
Filed 17 July 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: N.G. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from order entered on 15 May 
2019 by Judge J.H. Corpening II in District Court, New Hanover County. This matter 
was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 19 June 2020 but determined 
on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North 
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Karen F. Richards for petitioner-appellee New Hanover County Department of 
Social Services. 
 
N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts, Guardian ad Litem Division, by 
Michelle FormyDuval Lynch, Staff Attorney, for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Sydney Batch for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
Jeffrey L. Miller for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
HUDSON, Justice. 
 
Respondents appeal from the trial court’s order terminating their parental 
rights to N.G. (Natasha).1 After careful review, we affirm. 
 
 
                                            
1 The minor child N.G. will be referred to throughout this opinion as “Natasha,” which 
is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of the child and for ease of reading.  
IN RE N.G. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Factual and Procedural Background 
On 15 February 2017, the New Hanover County Department of Social Services 
(DSS) filed a juvenile petition alleging that Natasha was a neglected and dependent 
juvenile. DSS claimed that respondent-mother was “chronically homeless” and 
suffered from untreated mental health conditions. DSS asserted that respondent-
mother’s homelessness had contributed to Natasha being “excessively” tardy and 
absent from school and that it was affecting Natasha’s school performance. DSS 
further alleged that respondent-father had provided care for Natasha in the past but 
was currently prevented from doing so due to respondent-mother’s actions. DSS 
obtained nonsecure custody of Natasha and placed her with respondent-father.  
On 20 February 2017, the trial court held a second seven-day custody hearing. 
At that time, DSS advised the trial court that (1) respondent-father had misled DSS 
as to his correct name and date of birth, and (2) respondent-father was a party in an 
active termination of parental rights case that was on appeal. The trial court removed 
Natasha from her placement with respondent-father and placed her in foster care.  
On 13 April 2017 and 25 May 2017, DSS filed amended juvenile petitions that 
added additional allegations concerning respondent-father. DSS claimed that 
respondent-father was not suitable for placement because he had mental health 
issues and had his parental rights terminated as to another child. DSS alleged that 
his diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder prevented him from providing a safe 
IN RE N.G. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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home for Natasha. DSS again alleged that respondent-father had actively misled DSS 
as to his identity prior to the filing of the original juvenile petition.  
On 31 July 2017, the trial court adjudicated Natasha a dependent juvenile 
after respondents stipulated to the allegations in the juvenile petition. DSS 
voluntarily dismissed the allegation of neglect. The trial court determined that 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-901(c)(2), reunification efforts with respondent-father 
were not required because he previously had his parental rights to another child 
involuntarily terminated. The trial court ordered that custody of Natasha would 
remain with DSS and that the permanent plan should be reunification with 
respondent-mother. The trial court further ordered respondent-mother to complete a 
case plan that required her to establish stable housing and income and complete a 
mental health assessment and follow all recommendations. Both respondents were 
granted visitation.  
The trial court held a review hearing on 13 September 2017. At the review 
hearing, respondent-father requested temporary placement of Natasha and expanded 
visitation. Respondent-father testified, however, that he did not want legal custody 
of Natasha because he wanted respondent-mother to have legal custody. The trial 
court found as a fact that respondent-father had bought Natasha clothes and school 
supplies and furnished her with a telephone. The trial court made no changes in 
custody and ordered that the permanent plan for Natasha should continue to be 
reunification with respondent-mother.  
IN RE N.G. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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A permanency planning review hearing was held on 7 February 2018. In an 
order entered on 15 March 2018, the trial court found that respondent-father had not 
been forthcoming with identifying information and had failed to acknowledge 
previous concerns regarding DSS involvement. Respondent-father requested that the 
trial court consider ordering DSS to work toward reunification efforts with him. He 
stated that he was willing to pay for another evaluation from Dr. Len Lecci who 
performed a psychological evaluation of respondent-father in his other termination of 
parental rights case involving a sibling of Natasha’s in 2014. Further, he requested 
additional visitation with Natasha. The trial court found, however, that respondent-
father was not making progress towards a plan of reunification and had not provided 
evidence that he had engaged in necessary services on his own. The trial court 
ordered that a concurrent plan of adoption be added for Natasha.  
Following a subsequent permanency planning hearing held on 30 August 2018, 
the trial court modified the permanent plan for Natasha to adoption with a 
concurrent plan of reunification. The trial court found that respondent-father had 
presented no evidence that he had engaged in services to address his untreated 
mental health issues and had consistently failed to acknowledge the concerns his 
mental health issues would raise regarding his ability to care for Natasha. The trial 
court found as a fact that there was a poor prognosis for change based on respondent-
father’s psychological evaluation. The trial court further found that respondent-
mother had failed to attend individual therapy as recommended and that a 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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psychological evaluation revealed that she exhibited a personality pattern profile 
associated with paranoid and narcissistic personality disorders. It was noted that 
individuals with diagnoses such as respondent-mother’s are often resistant to 
treatment and have difficulty forming therapeutic relationships. Additionally, the 
trial court found that respondent-mother had failed to secure permanent stable 
housing and was participating in her case plan to a minimal degree.  
A subsequent permanency planning hearing was held on 7 February 2019. In 
an order entered on 18 March 2019, the trial court found that neither parent was 
making adequate progress toward reunification and that adoption should be pursued. 
The trial court ordered DSS to pursue termination of respondents’ parental rights.  
On 14 December 2018, DSS filed a petition to terminate respondents’ parental 
rights. DSS alleged grounds to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights to 
Natasha based on neglect, willful failure to make reasonable progress, and 
dependency. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (6) (2019). DSS alleged grounds to 
terminate respondent-father’s parental rights to Natasha based on neglect, willful 
failure to make reasonable progress, failure to legitimize, willful abandonment, and 
the fact that his parental rights with respect to another child had been terminated 
involuntarily and he lacked the ability or willingness to establish a safe home. See 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (5), (7), and (9).  
On 15 May 2019, the trial court entered an order concluding that grounds 
existed to terminate respondents’ parental rights. The trial court found that grounds 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2) to terminate both respondents’ 
parental rights, and that additional grounds existed to terminate respondent-father’s 
parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5), (7), and (9). The trial court 
dismissed the allegation of dependency as to respondent-mother. The trial court 
further concluded that termination of respondents’ parental rights was in Natasha’s 
best interests. Accordingly, the trial court terminated their parental rights. 
Respondents appealed.  
Analysis 
A termination of parental rights proceeding consists of an adjudicatory stage 
and a dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019); In re Montgomery, 311 
N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner 
bears the burden of proving by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” the existence 
of one or more grounds for termination under subsection 7B-1111(a) of our General 
Statutes. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f). We review a trial court’s adjudication “to determine 
whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the 
findings support the conclusions of law.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 111, 316 
S.E.2d at 253 (citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404, 293 S.E.2d 127, 133 (1982)). If 
the petitioner meets its burden during the adjudicatory stage, “the court proceeds to 
the dispositional stage, at which the court must consider whether it is in the best 
interests of the juvenile to terminate parental rights.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 
IN RE N.G. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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842, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016) (citing In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 
612, 614–15 (1997); N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110). 
I. 
Respondent-Father 
Respondent-father challenges the multiple grounds found by the trial court to 
terminate his parental rights. We first consider respondent-father’s argument that 
the trial court erred by concluding that grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(9) to terminate his parental rights. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9) provides for 
termination of parental rights where “[t]he parental rights of the parent with respect 
to another child of the parent have been terminated involuntarily by a court of 
competent jurisdiction and the parent lacks the ability or willingness to establish a 
safe home.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9). “A ‘safe home’ is defined by the Juvenile Code 
as one ‘in which the juvenile is not at substantial risk of physical or emotional abuse 
or neglect.’ ” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 412, 831 S.E.2d 54, 61 (2019) (quoting 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(19) (2017)). 
Here, the trial court made the following findings of fact relevant to its 
adjudication of grounds to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9):  
11. 
That Ms. Sullivan spoke to Respondent-Father 
about the concerns with Respondent-Mother’s care for the 
Juvenile and Respondent-Father did not intervene. 
Respondent-Mother 
had 
placed 
the 
Juvenile 
with 
Respondent-Father prior to [DSS’s] involvement and 
allowed the Respondent-Mother to take the Juvenile back 
into her care prior to [DSS’s] involvement. 
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12. 
That when the Juvenile came into care, Respondent-
Father was explored for placement. Respondent-Father 
provided [DSS] with a different last name and birth date 
than his own and that fictitious information was used for 
system checks to determine if he was a proper placement. 
Based on the fictitious information, the Juvenile was 
placed with Respondent-Father. At the initial seven-day 
hearing, concerns about Respondent-Father’s identity were 
expressed and [DSS] learned Respondent-Father’s correct 
name and date of birth. The appropriate record checks 
were completed and revealed that he had a prior Child 
Protective Services history with [DSS] and his rights to 
another of his children were involuntarily terminated. The 
Juvenile was removed from his placement after one night 
with Respondent-Father and placed in the same foster 
home as her sibling. Respondent-Father admits that he 
was untruthful with [DSS], and went along with it while 
knowing he was doing wrong. 
 
. . . . 
 
15. 
That [DSS] did not enter into a case plan with 
Respondent-Father. All efforts towards reunification with 
him were ceased at the Adjudication and Disposition 
Hearing on June 26, 2017. The Respondent-Father 
stipulated, in part, that his parental rights were 
terminated to another child. 
 
16. 
That Respondent-Father had a case plan in New 
Hanover County Case Number 14 JA 84, and his rights to 
that child were terminated in New Hanover County Case 
Number 14 JT 84, In the Matter of [I.S.D.], entered 
February 3, 2016. . . .  
 
. . . .  
 
23. 
That 
Dr. 
Len 
Lecci 
previously 
evaluated 
Respondent-Father for his 2014 case involving a sibling to 
this Juvenile. [DSS] moved to introduce into evidence as 
Petitioner’s Exhibit “4”, Dr. Lecci’s CV, and Petitioner’s 
IN RE N.G. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Exhibit “5”, Respondent-Father’s Psychological Evaluation 
dated November 5, 2014 with addendum dated January 7, 
2015. No party present objected and said exhibits were 
received into evidence. It was stipulated by all parties that 
Dr. Lecci was qualified as an expert in clinical psychology 
and parental competency. 
 
24. 
That Dr. Lecci diagnosed Respondent-Father with 
Antisocial Personality Disorder. This diagnosis came from 
a compilation of Respondent-Father’s clinical interview, 
diagnostic/standardized tests, and collateral information. 
Most of the tests have built in measures to determine lying 
and defensiveness. Respondent-Father was elevated on all 
measures which is text book grossly underreporting. While 
Respondent-Father does not have cognitive issues to 
parent, his had the highest elevation on the L scale which 
is for lying. He was elevated for the defensiveness score as 
well as his superlative score. Elevations of these scores are 
problematic as the client may be aware that he is lying and 
providing “Pollyanna” responses. A client with these scores 
may have no sense of other people’s distress or grossly 
underreporting about a situation. Initially, Dr. Lecci’s 
diagnosis was limited due to Respondent-Father’s extreme 
defensiveness, but Dr. Lecci did include Cannabis abuse, in 
partial remission, and Antisocial Personality Disorder 
remains to be ruled out but could be confirmed with some 
collateral information. Dr. Lecci opined that if an 
Antisocial Personality Disorder was an accurate diagnosis, 
then continued and longstanding dishonesty would be 
expected, and any adaptive change in the near future is 
unlikely. Short term interactions with a person with 
Antisocial Personality Disorder would have that person 
presenting favorably, be likeable and consistent with 
Respondent-Father’s 
presentation. 
Underneath, 
that 
person would not be truthful, give complex inaccuracies 
with a self-serving nature, are hedonistic, impulsive, 
inpatient, irresponsible and have assaultive behavior. 
After collecting and reviewing collateral information, Dr. 
Lecci gave a formal diagnosis of Antisocial Personality 
Disorder to Respondent-Father. Antisocial Personality 
Disorder is marked by extensive lying and a complete 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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disregard for social or moral standards. As a result, 
Respondent-Father’s self-report should be taken with 
extreme caution and should be verified by external sources 
whenever possible. A person with Antisocial Personality 
Disorder is hard to treat as this is a longstanding behavior 
and the person does not realize that a change in behavior 
is needed, and therefore will not seek assistance. Antisocial 
Personality Disorder is part of who that person is and does 
not bode well for parenting. The person would place self-
interests over the best interests of the child. Adaptive 
change is unlikely in those with Antisocial Personality 
Disorder, and treatment is therefore not recommended at 
this time. 
 
25. 
That Dr. Lecci has not evaluated Respondent-Father 
since 2014 and cannot give a current diagnosis but a 
change would be unusual due to Respondent-Father’s lack 
of interest in treatment or change. 
 
26. 
That Mr. Joseph Rengifo evaluated Respondent-
Father on March 25, 2019. Attorney Oring moved to 
introduce into evidence as Respondent-Father’s Exhibit “1”, 
Respondent-Father’s Treatment Report dated March 25, 
2018. No party present objected and said exhibits were 
received into evidence. Mr. Rengifo was qualified as an 
expert in clinical psychology and counseling.  
 
27. 
That Mr. Rengifo diagnosed Respondent-Father 
with Adjustment Disorder, unspecified, and Personal 
History of Spouse or Partner Violence, Physical. This 
diagnosis came from Respondent-Father’s self-report and 
diagnostic/standardized 
tests. 
Respondent-Father 
provided Mr. Rengifo with maybe four pages of Dr. Lecci’s 
report, less than fifteen minutes worth of reading, and 
without the addendum in which Dr. Lecci’s confirmed 
Respondent-Father’s diagnosis. Mr. Rengifo was not aware 
that Dr. Lecci had confirmed his diagnosis of Antisocial 
Personality Disorder for Respondent-Father, of the 
physical abuse allegations made by the child to whom his 
rights were terminated, of the physical allegation made by 
a former girlfriend, of the extent of physical violence and 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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use of weapons, that Respondent-Father was not a victim 
as he reported, or of Respondent-Father’s drug use. Mr. 
Rengifo is a counselor and does not prepare a psychological 
evaluation but believes he needed this information to 
complete a proper diagnosis and treatment plan. 
 
28. 
That Mr. Rengifo met with Respondent-Father four 
times. The first meeting was for screening, the second and 
third were evaluations, and the fourth was for information 
gathering and developing a treatment plan. Based on the 
information that Respondent-Father provided, Mr. Rengifo 
opined that Respondent-Father currently suffers from 
anger issues but he has not seen Respondent-Father 
enough to determine a complete diagnosis. Mr. Rengifo 
uses weekly meetings to work a treatment plan and the 
length of that treatment is dependent on the information 
provided by the client and that client’s individual progress. 
A treatment plan has not [been] discussed with 
Respondent-Father 
because 
Respondent-Father 
has 
cancelled 
his 
appointments 
since 
the 
information 
gathering meeting. 
 
. . . .  
 
36. 
That there are still concerns with the lack of efforts 
by Respondent-Father, as well as his anger management, 
prior termination of parental rights, and lack of mental 
health treatment. 
 
. . . .  
 
42. 
That parental rights of Respondent-Father to 
[I.S.D.] were terminated by this [c]ourt on February 3, 2016 
in New Hanover County Case Number 14 JT 84, In the 
Matter of [I.S.D.].  
 
. . . . 
 
53. 
The Court took judicial notice of the underlying 17 
JA 400 file as the North Carolina Court of Appeals allows 
including all attachments to the Petition for Termination 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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of Parental Rights consisting of orders and the birth 
certificate of the child. The Court notes that the child has 
been in the legal custody of [DSS] since April 13, 2017 and 
is placed in a pre-adoptive foster home.  
 
“Findings of fact not challenged by respondent are deemed supported by competent 
evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407, 831 S.E.2d at 58 
(citation omitted). 
 
Respondent-father asserts that findings of fact 12, 15–16, 23–28, 31–32, 36–
37, 39–40, 42, 44, 47–48, and 53 are not supported by sufficient evidence. We 
disagree.  
We initially note that in reviewing the findings, we limit our review to those 
challenged findings that are necessary to support the trial court’s determination that 
respondent-father’s parental rights should be terminated pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(9). In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407, 831 S.E.2d at 58–59 (citing In re Moore, 306 
N.C. at 404, 293 S.E.2d at 133). Here, findings of fact 31–32, 37, 39–40, and 47 pertain 
to the trial court’s conclusions that grounds existed to terminate respondent-father’s 
parental rights for neglect, failure to make reasonable progress, or failure to 
legitimize Natasha. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (5). Findings of fact 44 and 48 
do not concern grounds for termination, but instead pertain to the trial court’s 
determination that termination of respondents’ parental rights would be in Natasha’s 
best interests. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). We note that respondent-father does not 
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challenge the trial court’s conclusion that termination of his parental rights would be 
in Natasha’s best interests. Thus, we decline to review these findings of fact.  
 
Addressing respondent-father’s challenges to the findings of fact relevant to 
the trial court’s determination that grounds existed to terminate his parental rights 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9), we conclude that the evidence supports the 
challenged findings of fact. First, we address finding of fact 12, which summarizes 
both respondent-father’s misrepresentation to DSS and the fact that his rights were 
terminated as to another child. Respondent-Father stipulated at the adjudicatory 
hearing on the initial juvenile petition that his parental rights to another child had 
been involuntarily terminated, and that his mental health concerns did not allow him 
to provide a safe home for Natasha. Additionally, a social worker testified at the 
termination hearing that there was initial confusion regarding respondent-father’s 
identity because he provided a fictitious name. Furthermore, respondent-father 
admitted at the termination hearing that he provided DSS with a false name. This 
finding is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of record.  
 
Second, we address findings of fact 15, 16, and 42 regarding the termination of 
respondent-father’s parental rights as to another child. As stated previously herein, 
respondent-father stipulated that his parental rights to another child had been 
involuntarily terminated. Furthermore, in that case the Court of Appeals held that 
respondent-father had not made sufficient progress on his case plan and affirmed the 
order terminating his parental rights to the other child. In re I.S.D., 797 S.E.2d 384, 
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2017 WL 1056327 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (unpublished). These findings are properly 
supported by the record evidence. 
 
Third, findings of fact 23 through 25 address (1) Dr. Lecci’s qualification as an 
expert, (2) the admission of Dr. Lecci’s curriculum vitae and evaluation of respondent-
father, (3) respondent-father’s diagnosis and testing, and (4) Dr. Lecci’s opinion that 
a change in respondent-father would be unusual due to his lack of interest in 
treatment or change. Dr. Lecci’s evaluation of respondent-father and his curriculum 
vitae were introduced into evidence without objection and were part of the record at 
the termination hearing. Respondent-father’s diagnosis of antisocial personality 
disorder, his cognitive issues, and his behavioral issues were outlined in Dr. Lecci’s 
evaluation. Dr. Lecci also testified regarding these issues at the termination hearing. 
These findings are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of record. 
 
Fourth, we address findings of fact 26 through 28 regarding Mr. Rengifo’s 
evaluation, diagnosis, and proposed treatment of respondent-father. Mr. Rengifo was 
qualified as an expert in clinical psychology and counseling, and his report was part 
of the record at the termination hearing. Mr. Rengifo’s evaluation contains his 
diagnoses of respondent-father and the process by which he evaluated respondent-
father. Mr. Rengifo testified that respondent-father did not provide him with the 
addendum to Dr. Lecci’s report and thus had not provided him with all the 
information necessary for him to make a proper diagnosis. Mr. Rengifo also testified 
that he did not believe respondent-father had anger issues, but he also stated that he 
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did not see respondent-father enough to make a proper diagnosis. Thus, the trial 
court’s portion of finding of fact 28 that states that Mr. Rengifo opined that 
respondent-father had anger issues is not supported by the evidence and is 
disregarded. The remainder of these findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, 
and convincing evidence.  
 
Fifth, in finding of fact 36, the trial court stated that there were still ongoing 
concerns regarding respondent-father’s “lack of efforts . . . as well as his anger 
management, prior termination of parental rights, and lack of mental health 
treatment.” This finding of fact is supported by the testimony provided by a social 
worker at the termination hearing. The social worker testified that prior to 
reunification, respondent-father needed to address several issues, including anger 
management, mental health, and other concerns that had arisen in connection with 
this prior termination of parental rights case. The social worker also testified that 
the only efforts made by respondent-father to access DSS services did not occur until 
February 2019 or later—which was after DSS filed the petition to terminate 
respondent-father’s parental rights and after Natasha had been in DSS custody for 
almost two years.  
 
Lastly, finding of fact 53 concerns the trial court taking judicial notice of the 
underlying case file, the date when DSS was granted custody of Natasha, and 
Natasha’s foster home placement. These facts are supported by the record. The trial 
court took judicial notice of the underlying case file at the termination hearing 
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without objection. Furthermore, the record demonstrates that Natasha was placed in 
DSS custody no later than March 2017 and was placed in a pre-adoptive foster home.  
 
Respondent-father next contends that there were insufficient findings of fact 
with supporting evidence to lead to the conclusion that at the time of the termination 
hearing he lacked the ability or willingness to establish a safe home for Natasha. We 
are not persuaded.  
 The trial court’s findings of fact establish that Dr. Lecci evaluated respondent-
father in 2014 and made an addendum to his report in 2015. Dr. Lecci diagnosed 
respondent-father with antisocial personality disorder. This disorder is “marked by 
extensive lying and a complete disregard for social or moral standards.” The trial 
court found as a fact that a person with antisocial personality disorder is difficult to 
treat because it is “part of who that person is.” The trial court also found that 
respondent-father’s disorder “does not bode well for parenting” and that “[t]he person 
would place self-interests over the best interests of the child.”   
Additionally, the trial court found that a person with antisocial personality 
disorder was unlikely to change and that change would be “unusual” in respondent-
father’s case due to his “lack of interest in treatment or change.” Respondent-father’s 
later conduct, which was consistent with Dr. Lecci’s diagnosis, only served to confirm 
that respondent-father still suffered from antisocial personality disorder. Specifically, 
after DSS filed the juvenile petition alleging that Natasha was neglected and 
dependent, respondent-father lied to DSS by providing a false name and date of birth 
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in order to have Natasha placed with him. Furthermore, when respondent-father was 
evaluated by Mr. Rengifo in 2019, he provided Mr. Rengifo with only part of Dr. 
Lecci’s report. Conspicuously absent from the portion of Dr. Lecci’s report that 
respondent-father provided to Mr. Rengifo was Dr. Lecci’s diagnosis of antisocial 
personality disorder. This exemplifies Dr. Lecci’s opinion that because of respondent-
father’s disorder, “continued and longstanding dishonesty would be expected.” 
Respondent-father’s failure to provide Mr. Rengifo with a full and accurate report is 
also consistent with another feature of antisocial personality disorder, which is lying 
in order to present oneself favorably.  
Finally, we note the trial court’s finding of fact that Mr. Rengifo was unable to 
discuss a treatment plan with respondent-father because respondent-father cancelled 
his appointments. These findings of fact are all supported by clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence of record, and they fully support the trial court’s conclusion that 
respondent-father lacked the ability or willingness to establish a safe home for 
Natasha, and that his argument that this conclusion is not supported by the evidence 
and the findings of fact is without merit. 
Respondent-father further argues that the trial court relied solely on an 
outdated 2014 psychological report to determine that he had antisocial personality 
disorder and that he could not effectively raise Natasha, and he argues that there 
was insufficient evidence that he lacked the ability or willingness to provide a safe 
home for Natasha at the time of the termination hearing. However, even assuming 
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arguendo that the diagnosis was stale, the trial court’s findings of fact detailed above 
support its conclusion that respondent-father was unable to provide a safe home for 
Natasha at the time of the termination hearing. The evidence and findings of fact 
discussed above demonstrate: (1) the fact that change in respondent-father would be 
unexpected; (2) his apparent lack of interest in treatment or change; (3) his more 
recent incidents of deception and dishonesty, which were consistent with his 
diagnosis; and (4) that his cancellation of appointments resulted in Mr. Rengifo being 
unable to discuss a treatment plan with him. Therefore, respondent-father’s 
argument that the record evidence and the trial court’s findings fail to establish that 
he lacked the ability to provide Natasha with a safe home at the time of the 
termination hearing is without merit.  
Respondent-father concedes in his brief, and there are numerous supported 
findings of fact in the record, that his parental rights with respect to another child 
have been terminated involuntarily by a court of competent jurisdiction. For the 
reasons discussed above, we further conclude that the record evidence and findings 
of fact support the trial court’s determination that respondent-father lacked the 
willingness or ability to establish a safe home for Natasha. Accordingly, we hold that 
the trial court did not err by concluding that grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(9) to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights.  
The trial court’s conclusion that a ground for termination existed pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9) is sufficient in and of itself to support termination of 
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respondent-father’s parental rights. In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 413, 831 S.E.2d at 62. 
As such, we need not address respondent-father’s arguments regarding N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (5). Furthermore, respondent-father does not challenge the 
trial court’s conclusion that termination of his parental rights was in Natasha’s best 
interests. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order 
terminating respondent-father’s parental rights. 
II. 
Respondent-Mother 
Respondent-mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it determined that termination of her parental rights was in 
Natasha’s best interests. We disagree. 
If the trial court finds a ground to terminate parental rights under N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a), it proceeds to the dispositional stage where it must “determine whether 
terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest” based on the 
following factors:  
(1) 
The age of the juvenile. 
 
(2) 
The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. 
 
(3) 
Whether the termination of parental rights will aid 
in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the 
juvenile. 
 
(4) 
The bond between the juvenile and the parent. 
 
(5) 
The quality of the relationship between the juvenile 
and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, 
custodian, or other permanent placement. 
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(6) 
Any relevant consideration. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). The trial court’s assessment of a juvenile’s best interest at the 
dispositional stage is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 
842, 788 S.E.2d at 167; In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 171, 752 S.E.2d 453, 457 (2013). 
“Abuse of discretion results where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by 
reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” 
State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988). 
 
Here, in its termination order, the trial court found as fact: 
44. 
That there is a bond between Respondent-Parents 
and the Juvenile. 
 
45. 
That the child is strongly bonded with her foster 
parents who [have] been addressing her medical, 
emotional, educational and daily needs. Her school 
attendance has improved as have her grades. She is in the 
girl scouts and attends church on a weekly basis. She is in 
the same foster [home] as her sister, who was removed 
from Respondent-Mother’s care at the same time. She is 
thriving and improving by leaps and bounds. 
 
46. 
That the foster parents are eager to adopt this minor 
child. 
 
. . . . 
 
48. 
That the conduct of Respondent-Parents . . . has 
been such as to demonstrate that they will not promote the 
minor child’s health, physical and emotional wellbeing and 
there is a foreseeable likelihood of repetition of neglect of 
this child. It is in the best interests of [Natasha] that the 
parental rights of Respondent-Parents and Unknown 
Father are terminated. 
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49. 
That Attorney Advocate Morey Everett moved to 
introduce into evidence as Guardian ad Litem’s Exhibit “1”, 
a detailed report for the Court dated April 8, 2019, 
prepared by Peter Maloff, Volunteer Guardian ad Litem. 
Ms. Maloff was present at the time of the entry of Guardian 
ad Litem’s Exhibit “1”. No objection was made and said 
report was received into evidence and considered by the 
Court on the issue of best interest. 
 
50.  
That [Natasha] is ten years old. She is bonded with 
her foster parents, who are eager to adopt her. She is 
making progress in her current home, which is providing 
her with a safe and stable environment in which to thrive. 
The termination of parental rights of the Respondent-
Parents and Unknown Father will aid in establishment of 
the permanent plan of adoption, as this is the only obstacle 
to adoption at this time. 
 
51. 
That taking into consideration all of the factors 
detailed above, that the best interests of [Natasha] would 
be served by the termination of the parental rights of 
[respondents], and that those rights are terminated so that 
the child can be afforded an opportunity for adoption and 
permanence. After twenty-six (26) months in [DSS’s] care, 
the child is no closer to returning home. She is currently in 
a foster home that is meeting all of her needs with foster 
parents that are eager to adopt her. Additionally, the child 
is young, there needs to be a permanent plan for the child, 
and this family can provide it. Termination of Respondent-
Parents’ . . . parental rights would help achieve the 
permanent plan of adoption and provide the permanence 
this child deserves. 
 
Dispositional findings not challenged by respondent-mother are binding on 
appeal. In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432, 437, 831 S.E.2d 62, 65 (2019) (citation omitted). 
Here, respondent-mother challenges finding of fact 51. However, evidence in the 
record supports the trial court’s finding of fact. The evidence demonstrates that 
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Natasha was removed from respondent-mother’s care in February 2017 and the 
termination hearing was held in March and April of 2019. Therefore, Natasha was 
not in respondent-mother’s care for a span of twenty-six months. Respondent-mother 
does not contest the trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed to terminate her 
parental rights, and we have determined that grounds existed to terminate 
respondent-father’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9).  
In further support of finding of fact 51, regarding Natasha’s foster home, a 
social worker testified that (1) Natasha had been in the foster home for almost two 
years, (2) her foster mom “attends to all of [Natasha’s] medical needs,” (3) her 
attendance and grades at school were “right back where [they] should be,” and (4) 
“she participate[d] in Girl Scouts.” Additionally, the guardian ad litem’s report to the 
trial court indicated that Natasha’s foster parents were interested in adopting her. 
The social worker further testified that (1) the foster home was a stable environment 
for Natasha, (2) the only remaining obstacle to adoption was termination of 
respondents’ parental rights, and (3) it was in Natasha’s best interests that Natasha 
be adopted by the foster parents. This evidence supports the challenged finding of 
fact. 
The remaining portion of finding of fact 51 contains the trial court’s ultimate 
finding that Natasha’s best interests would be served by termination of respondents’ 
parental rights. “[A]n ‘ultimate finding is a conclusion of law or at least a 
determination of a mixed question of law and fact’ and should ‘be distinguished from 
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the findings of primary, evidentiary, or circumstantial facts.’ ” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 
71, 76, 833 S.E.2d 768, 773 (2019) (quoting Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 
481, 491, 57 S. Ct. 569, 574, 81 L. Ed. 755, 762 (1937)). This Court reviews 
termination orders “to determine whether the trial court made sufficient factual 
findings to support its ultimate findings of fact and conclusions of law, regardless of 
how they are classified in the order.” In re Z.A.M., 839 S.E.2d 792, 798 (N.C. 2020).  
 
We initially note that the trial court properly considered the statutory factors 
set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) when determining Natasha’s best interests. The 
trial court made uncontested findings of fact that (1) Natasha had a strong bond with 
her foster parents, (2) the foster parents were providing for Natasha’s needs, (3) 
Natasha was thriving in their care, and (4) termination of respondents’ parental 
rights would aid in the permanent plan of adoption.  
 
The bulk of respondent-mother’s argument concerns her claims that the trial 
court failed to consider: (1) the importance of preserving family integrity; (2) the 
“devastating affect” that termination of respondents’ parental rights would have on 
Natasha; and (3) the fact that respondent-father was “perfectly capable of providing 
a stable and loving home for Natasha.” We disagree.  
  
While the stated policy of the Juvenile Code is to prevent “the unnecessary or 
inappropriate separation of juveniles from their parents,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-100(4) 
(2019), “the best interests of the juvenile are of paramount consideration by the court 
and . . . when it is not in the juvenile’s best interest to be returned home, the juvenile 
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will be placed in a safe, permanent home within a reasonable amount of time.” 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-100(5) (emphasis added); see also In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 109, 
316 S.E.2d at 251 (“[T]he fundamental principle underlying North Carolina’s 
approach to controversies involving child neglect and custody [is] that the best 
interest of the child is the polar star.”). Thus, while preserving family integrity is an 
appropriate consideration in the dispositional phase of the termination hearing, the 
best interests of the juvenile remain paramount.  
Here, the trial court also found that respondents’ conduct demonstrated that 
they would not promote Natasha’s health, physical, and mental well-being. The trial 
court further found, after consideration of all the statutory factors, that Natasha was 
no closer to returning home than she was on the day she entered into DSS’s care. 
Meanwhile, a family who was meeting all of her needs was willing to adopt her and 
provide her with permanence. Thus, the trial court could properly conclude based on 
its dispositional findings of fact that preserving family integrity was not in Natasha’s 
best interests.  
 
The remainder of respondent-mother’s arguments are contingent on 
respondent-father’s retention of his parental rights. However, because we have 
already determined that the trial court properly terminated respondent-father’s 
parental rights, these arguments lack merit. We therefore hold that the trial court’s 
conclusion that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in Natasha’s 
best interests did not constitute an abuse of discretion.  
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Conclusion 
We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that grounds existed 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9) to terminate respondent-father’s parental 
rights. We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
determining that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in 
Natasha’s best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating 
respondents’ parental rights. 
AFFIRMED.