Case Title: Langendorf v. City of Urbana

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90635

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90635-Agenda 30-May 2001.
MICHAEL C. LANGENDORF, Appellee, v. THE CITY OF 
 								URBANA, Appellant.
Opinion filed July 26, 2001.
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	Section 7-1-46 of the Illinois Municipal Code (the Code)
provides for a one-year statute of limitations for actions that
"directly or indirectly" contest an annexation. 65 ILCS 5/7-1-46
(West 1998). The plaintiff, Michael C. Langendorf, filed this
declaratory judgment action against the defendant, the City of
Urbana (the City), challenging the zoning of two parcels of
property that were rezoned by the City pursuant to annexation
agreements between the City and the owners of those parcels. The
plaintiff does not challenge the zoning of his own property. The
circuit court of Champaign County granted the City's motion to
dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint, finding that his cause
of action was barred because it was filed beyond the limitations
period set forth in section 7-1-46 of the Code. The appellate court
reversed. No. 4-99-0449 (unpublished order under Supreme Court
Rule 23). We allowed the City's petition for leave to appeal (177
Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and now reverse the judgment of the appellate
court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND
	The plaintiff filed his initial complaint on August 14, 1998,
more than one year after the annexations and rezoning of the
properties in question. The circuit court dismissed that complaint
pursuant to the City's motion filed under section 2-615 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1998)).
	Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Count I
of the plaintiff's amended complaint concerns the annexation of
a parcel of property known as Stone Creek Commons. The parcel
adjoins the plaintiff's property on the south side and is owned by
Clinton T. Atkins. On February 17, 1997, the City approved an
agreement with Atkins for the annexation of Stone Creek
Commons, which provided that the northern 25 acres-42% of the
tract-would be converted from county to city zoning and rezoned
as "B-3 General Business District" and that the southern 35
acres-58% of the tract-would be rezoned as "R-4 Medium Density
Multiple-Family Residential District." On July 7, 1998, the City
passed an ordinance implementing the zoning. The plaintiff
alleged that the rezoning was inconsistent with 1993 amendments
to the City's comprehensive plan, which provided that the
northwest corner of Stone Creek Commons-approximately 12%
of the tract-be used for "commercial purposes," while the
remaining portion be used for "residential purposes."
	Count II of the plaintiff's complaint challenged the zoning
with respect to a tract of land immediately to the north of Stone
Creek Commons known as the Meijer Tract. On January 3, 1995,
the City entered into a similar annexation agreement with Atkins
and the three other owners of the Meijer Tract. The agreement
provided for rezoning of the entire Meijer Tract to "B-3 General
Business District." On June 19, 1995, the City passed an ordinance
rezoning the property to "B-3 General Business District." The
plaintiff's amended complaint further alleged that the rezoning
was inconsistent with 1993 amendments to the City's
comprehensive plan that designated the western half of the tract
for "commercial purposes" and the eastern half for "residential
purposes."
	Both counts of the amended complaint alleged that (1) the
rezoning of the properties would materially impair the fair market
value of the real estate owned by the plaintiff and others similarly
situated, (2) the application of the zoning ordinance to allow a
movie theater and a Meijer superstore would adversely affect the
property values of the plaintiff and others similarly situated, and
(3) the application of the zoning ordinance would be contrary to
the stated goals, objectives and principles of the 1993 amendments
to the City's comprehensive plan.
	The trial court granted the City's motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's amended complaint based on the statute of limitations
contained in section 7-1-46 of the Code. That section provides in
relevant part:
			"Neither the People of the State of Illinois nor any
person, firm or corporation, public or private, nor any
association of persons shall commence an action
contesting either directly or indirectly the annexation of
any territory to a municipality unless initiated within one
year after the date such annexation becomes final ***."
(Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/7-1-46 (West 1998).
The trial court found that the plaintiff's amended complaint and
the exhibits attached thereto showed that the zoning provisions
contained in the annexation agreements were an integral part of
the agreements and were accomplished by the City on July 7,
1997. The court noted that while the plaintiff may be challenging
ostensibly only the City's zoning actions, an attack on the zoning
actions is, in reality, an attack on the annexation agreements
themselves. This is because the zoning actions were an integral
part of the annexation agreements, which the City would fail to
fulfill without effecting the rezoning. Therefore, the court
concluded, the plaintiff's cause of action was governed by the one-year statute of limitations in section 7-1-46 applicable to
challenges mounted against annexation agreements. In reaching its
conclusion, the trial court followed the decisions of the Appellate
Court, Second District, in Echo Lake Concerned Citizens
Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Village of Lake Zurich, 68 Ill. App. 3d
219 (1979), and People ex rel. Foreman v. Village of Round Lake
Park, 171 Ill. App. 3d 443 (1988), which are directly on point.
	On appeal, the appellate court reversed, and declined to
follow the rationale of Echo Lake and Foreman. No. 4-99-0449
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Instead, the
appellate court stated that "[a]nnexation and zoning are, in the
abstract, distinct concepts." The court further stated that "[e]ven
where the two are undertaken as part of a single integrated
agreement, challenge to the one does not necessarily entail
challenge to the other." The appellate court also questioned
whether the legislature could properly enact a period of limitations
for a constitutionally grounded cause of action such as a zoning
challenge.

ANALYSIS
	On appeal to this court, the City argues that the appellate court
erred in concluding, in essence, that the plaintiff could
successfully attack the zoning of the annexed properties without
at least indirectly contesting the annexations. The City contends
that, in viewing the full statutory scheme in relation to the
annexation agreements in this case, it is apparent that the zoning
of the parcels cannot be separated from their annexation. Thus, an
attack of the zoning is an indirect attack on the annexations, and,
therefore, the limitations period set forth in section 7-1-46 applies
to the plaintiff's cause of action.
	We agree. In 1963, the legislature amended the Code by
adding a statutory scheme authorizing annexation agreements and
specifically providing that a change in zoning of property subject
to an annexation agreement could be a valid and binding part of
such an agreement for a limited period. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 24,
pars. 11-15.1-1, 11-15.1-2; see also Meegan v. Village of Tinley
Park, 52 Ill. 2d 354, 357 (1972) (zoning is a permissible subject
of an annexation agreement and to the extent the legislature limits
the enforcement of such agreements it is exercising its police
power).
	The purpose of a statutory scheme allowing for annexation
agreements with enforceable zoning provisions is to ensure the
predictability necessary for orderly growth and development. See
R. Cope, Annexation Agreements-Boundary Agreements: Walking
a Fine Line into the Future-A Map of the Dangers to the Unwary
Land Use Traveler, 17 N.I.U. L. Rev. 377, 378 (1977). To that
end, the current version of section 11-15.1-1 of the Code provides
in relevant part that "the corporate authorities of any municipality
may enter into an annexation agreement with one or more of the
owners of record of land in unincorporated territory" and that the
"agreement shall be valid and binding for a period of not to exceed
20 years from the date of its execution." 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-1
(West 1998). Section 11-15.1-2(b) states that an annexation
agreement may provide for "[t]he continuation in effect, or
amendment, or continuation in effect as amended, of any
ordinance relating to *** zoning *** provided, however, that any
public hearing required by law to be held before adoption of any
ordinance amendment provided in such agreement shall be held
prior to execution of the agreement, and all ordinance amendments
provided in such agreement shall be enacted according to law." 65
ILCS 5/11-15.1-2(b) (West 1998). Section 11-15.1-2 further
provides that after the expiration of the annexation agreement, the
provisions therein related to zoning "shall remain in effect unless
modified in accordance with law." 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-2 (West
1998).
	Section 11-15.1-3 of the Code establishes the procedure
necessary to create a valid and binding annexation agreement. It
sets forth significant hurdles to validity, i.e., notice, public hearing
and a two-thirds majority vote of the corporate authorities for
passage. 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-3 (West 1998). Section 11-15.1-5 of
the Code states that any annexation agreement which is executed
with a two-thirds majority vote and contains provisions not
inconsistent with section 11-15.1-2 is "valid and enforceable as
to such provisions for the effective period of such agreement, or
for 20 years from the date of execution thereof, whichever is
shorter." (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-5 (West 1998).
	In the present case, the provisions of the annexation
agreements make it clear that the rezoning of the properties was an
integral part of and was in fact the essential condition of and
consideration for the agreements. In that regard, the agreements
provide that upon annexation, the tracts will be converted from
county zoning to city zoning as described in exhibits to the
agreements, that the zoning will remain in effect for a 20-year
term, and that the corporate authorities will not rezone the
properties for the life of the agreements. As the statutory scheme
makes clear, the zoning provisions of an annexation agreement are
enforceable for the effective period of the agreement up to 20
years. See 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-5 (West 1998). Under the
circumstances, we do not believe that the plaintiff could challenge
the rezoning of the property without at least indirectly contesting
the annexation agreements themselves.
	We agree with the rationale expressed by the majority in Echo
Lake. There, the village entered into an annexation agreement with
a property owner to rezone his land from a single-family to a
multiple-dwelling district. Four years after the rezoning and
annexation became final, an association of nearby property owners
filed an action against the village, alleging that the defendants had
not followed the proper procedures in passing the annexation and
rezoning ordinances and that the multiple-family zoning of the
property was unconstitutional. The appellate court considered and
rejected the merits of the plaintiff's procedural claim, but found
that the plaintiff's constitutional challenge to the validity of the
zoning ordinance was barred by the one-year limitations period of
section 7-1-46 of the Code. Echo Lake, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 222-24.
The court noted that the plain language of section 7-1-46
prohibits the plaintiffs from " 'directly or indirectly' " challenging
the annexation unless the action is commenced within one-year
from the date the annexation becomes final. Echo Lake, 68 Ill.
App. 3d at 222, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 24, par. 7-1-46.
The court pointed out that several parts of the annexation
agreement, including the preamble, emphasized that rezoning of
the property was a prerequisite to annexation. Echo Lake, 68 Ill.
App. 3d at 222-23. The court concluded that if the annexation
agreement is to be given any legal force, a successful attack on the
rezoning could lead to a suit by the owners to declare the
annexation void. Echo Lake, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 223. Accordingly,
the plaintiffs could not successfully attack the rezoning without at
least indirectly contesting the annexation and, therefore, the
limitation of section 7-1-46 was applicable. Echo Lake, 68 Ill.
App. 3d at 222-23.
	The appellate court in the instant case, however, relied upon
the specially concurring opinion of Justice Seidenfeld in Echo
Lake. The special concurrence found that the plaintiff's cause of
action was barred by laches, but disagreed with the majority's
interpretation of section 7-1-46. Echo Lake, 68 Ill. App. 3d at
225-26 (Seidenfeld, J., specially concurring). In finding that an
attack on the zoning is not necessarily an attack on the annexation,
Justice Seidenfeld stated the following:
		"A court in determining the constitutionality of zoning or
its procedural aspects need not inquire into the validity of
the annexation.
			*** [I]f a trial court were to find that the challenged
zoning was null and void from its inception because of
some substantial procedural defect, then it appears that the
landowners would have a cause of action against the
village for breach of contract. [Citation.] The landowners,
arguably, could sue for money damages; or, arguably, the
landowners would be entitled to disconnection. [Citation.]
The prospect of a law suit by the landowners against the
village, however, does not give this court warrant to
import a statute of limitations, which deals only with
annexation ordinances, into an area of law where it has no
application." Echo Lake, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 226
(Seidenfeld, J., specially concurring).
	While we do not find the rationale of the specially concurring
opinion in Echo Lake and the appellate court in this case to be
totally lacking in merit, we find the reasoning of the majority in
Echo Lake to be more persuasive. In interpreting a statute, the
primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and
meaning of the legislature evidenced by the language used. Kraft,
Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). A statute should be
construed so that no word or phrase is rendered meaningless or
superfluous. Kraft, Inc., 138 Ill. 2d  at 189. When the terms of a
statute are not specifically defined, the words must be given their
popularly understood meanings construed with reference to the
purposes and objectives of the statute. Niven v. Siqueira, 109 Ill. 2d 357, 366 (1985).
	The appellate court's and the plaintiff's interpretation of the
statute in this case would render the word "indirectly" meaningless
and would effectively read it out of the statute. It would also
ignore the statutory scheme which has the obvious intent of
shielding the zoning provisions of annexation agreements from
attack after the passage of the one-year limitation period and then
for the duration of the shorter of the 20-year statutory period or the
term listed in the agreement. In this case, there are no allegations
as to any procedural defects in the City's passage of the annexation
and zoning ordinances. The plaintiff does not allege lack of notice
or lack of opportunity to be heard at the required hearings. Nor
does the plaintiff claim that the ordinances were not passed by a
two-thirds vote of the corporate authorities. Instead, the plaintiff
now claims, more than one year after the annexations and rezoning
were accomplished, that the rezoning is inconsistent with the
City's comprehensive plan and diminishes his property values.
The limitations period set forth in section 7-1-46 precludes the
kind of belated indirect attack on the annexation that the plaintiff
makes at this stage.
	The plaintiff argues that application of section 7-1-46 to this
case would have the effect of creating a statute of limitations for
a limited class of zoning actions. He argues that it would be
impermissible for the state to place a limitation on a cause of
action to enforce a federal constitutional right such as would be
involved in a zoning challenge.
	The plaintiff's argument fails for two reasons. First, the
plaintiff's amended complaint does not raise a federal
constitutional claim. He made allegations of a federal
constitutional violation in his original complaint but chose to
delete those allegations from his amended complaint. Second,
there is no merit to the plaintiff's contention that a statute of
limitations cannot be applied to an action involving the
enforcement of a constitutional right. For example, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) specifically provides that only
claims involving questions of federal or state constitutional rights
may be raised in a proceeding under the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-1
(West 1998). Nonetheless, the statute places a three-year statute of
limitations on the filing of such claims. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c)
(West 1998); People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1999) (holding
that section 122-1 of the Act with its "culpable negligence"
standard is a statute of limitations). Thus, our courts have applied
a statute of limitations of our state to bar federal constitutional
claims in another context.
	A statute of limitations is by definition an arbitrary period
after which all claims will be cut off. Chase Securities Corp. v.
Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, 89 L. Ed. 1628, 1635, 65 S. Ct. 1137, 1142 (1945). However, the need to encourage claimants to
investigate and pursue causes of action in order to discourage
delay, in time, outweighs the right to litigate a claim. Golla v.
General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353, 369-70 (1995).
	Here, the plaintiff does not argue that he filed this lawsuit
within the one-year statute of limitations. Furthermore, he cites no
case holding that a state statute of limitations cannot be applied to
a zoning challenge, or even more generally to a case involving the
enforcement of a constitutional right. However, in Horn v. City of
Chicago, 403 Ill. 2d 549 (1949), this court considered a plaintiff's
contention that the five-year statute of limitations in section 15 of
the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, ch. 83, par. 16) could not
bar his state constitutional claim against the city. The plaintiff
alleged that the city's construction of a viaduct near the plaintiff's
property constituted the taking and damaging of his property
without the payment of just compensation and without due process
of law. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim that the statute of
limitations could not be applied because the right of action arose
under a constitutional provision, this court stated:
		"The legislature may, without violating constitutional
guarantees, enact statutes which limit the time within
which actions may be brought ***. [Citation.] Even a
substantive right created by a State constitution is
governed and controlled in its enforcement and
administration by regulatory and procedural legislation
enacted by the General Assembly, which legislative
enactments may include a limitation as to the period
within which action may be taken to enforce the
substantive right." Horn, 403 Ill.  at 560.
Thus, Horn supports the conclusion that a limitations period may
be applied to a constitutional claim.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the limitations period
of section 7-1-46 applies to the plaintiff's suit under the facts of
this case. Because the cause of action was filed beyond the one-year time limit, it was properly dismissed by the circuit court.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and
affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Champaign County.



Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.