Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. John H. Peiss

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016AP000663-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-05-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 49 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP663-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John H. Peiss, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
John H. Peiss, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PEISS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 11, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 49
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP663-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John H. Peiss, Attorney at Law: 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
John H. Peiss, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 11, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
revoked.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report of Referee John B. 
Murphy recommending that Attorney John H. Peiss's license to 
practice law in Wisconsin should be revoked, as discipline 
reciprocal to that imposed by the Supreme Court of Illinois.  
Upon careful review of the matter, we accept the referee's 
recommendation.  We also assess the costs of the proceeding, 
which are $2,026.90 as of December 28, 2016, against Attorney 
Peiss.   
No. 
2016AP663-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Attorney Peiss was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1982.  He was also admitted to practice law in 
Illinois on March 6, 1992.  Attorney Peiss's license to practice 
law in Wisconsin was suspended in 1999 for failure to comply 
with continuing legal education requirements and failure to pay 
state bar dues.  In 2010, Attorney Peiss's Wisconsin law license 
was suspended for one year as discipline reciprocal to that 
imposed by the Supreme Court of Illinois.  Attorney Peiss's 
misconduct 
in 
Illinois 
consisted 
of 
conversion 
and 
the 
unauthorized 
practice 
of 
law. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Peiss, 2010 WI 115, 329 Wis. 2d 325, 788 
N.W.2d 636.  His Wisconsin license remains suspended. 
¶3 
On September 21, 2015, the Supreme Court of Illinois 
entered an order disbarring Attorney Peiss in that state.  The 
disbarment was based on four counts of misconduct:  (1) 
practicing law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the 
regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction by 
practicing law in Illinois while suspended; (2) committing a 
criminal act that reflects adversely on the attorney's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects by 
committing the criminal offense of theft; (3) engaging in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation; and (4) engaging in conduct prejudicial to 
the administration of justice.   
¶4 
Attorney Peiss did not notify the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR) of the Illinois disbarment within 20 days of 
its effective date.   
No. 
2016AP663-D   
 
3 
 
¶5 
On April 1, 2016, the OLR filed a complaint against 
Attorney Peiss alleging the following counts of misconduct: 
Count One:  By virtue of the Illinois disciplinary 
disbarment, Attorney Peiss is subject to reciprocal 
discipline in Wisconsin pursuant to SCR 22.22.1 
Count Two:  By failing to notify the OLR of his 
disbarment in Illinois for professional misconduct 
within 
20 
days 
of 
the 
effective 
date 
of 
its 
imposition, Attorney Peiss violated SCR 22.22(1). 
¶6 
Attorney Peiss filed an answer to the OLR's complaint 
on July 12, 2016.  He filed an amended answer on September 9, 
2016.  The amended answer raised three affirmative defenses:  
(1) that the hearing in Illinois was conducted without notice 
to, or service of process on Attorney Peiss; (2) that Attorney 
Peiss had no opportunity to be heard in the Illinois action; and 
(3) that there was no proof of any misconduct in Illinois. 
¶7 
The 
OLR 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
summary 
judgment.  
Following briefing, the referee granted the summary judgment 
motion.  The referee noted that under SCR 22.22(3), this court 
shall impose the identical discipline imposed in another 
jurisdiction unless one or more of three exceptions apply.  
                                                 
1 SCR 22.22 provides:  Reciprocal Discipline. 
(1) 
An 
attorney 
on 
whom 
public 
discipline 
for 
misconduct 
or 
a 
license 
suspension 
for 
medical 
incapacity has been imposed by another jurisdiction 
shall promptly notify the director of the matter. 
Failure to furnish the notice within 20 days of the 
effective date of the order or judgment of the other 
jurisdiction constitutes misconduct. 
 
No. 
2016AP663-D   
 
4 
 
Attorney 
Peiss 
argued 
that 
"the 
procedure 
in 
the 
other 
jurisdiction was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard 
as to constitute a deprivation of due process."  See SCR 
22.22(3)(a).  Attorney Peiss claimed that the failure of the 
Illinois disciplinary authorities to personally serve him with 
either of the two complaints filed in the Illinois action was 
fatal to the Illinois court's prosecution of the disciplinary 
case against him.  The referee disagreed.  
¶8 
The referee noted that the pertinent Illinois rule, 
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) Rule 
214(b) provides that an attorney may be served either by 
personal service or, if a person authorized to make personal 
service files an affidavit that the respondent resides out of 
state, has left the state, on due inquiry cannot be found, or is 
concealed within the state so that process cannot be served upon 
him, the respondent may be served by ordinary mail. 
¶9 
The referee said a review of the Illinois ARDC record 
and statements of Attorney Peiss confirm that he was not 
personally served.  However, the referee said the Illinois 
record makes clear that at the time the ARDC's original 
complaint was filed, Attorney Peiss was in contact with the ARDC 
and was aware as early as June of 2013 that a disciplinary 
inquiry was under way.  In addition, the referee said following 
the filing of the first complaint, Attorney Peiss was in contact 
with an investigator from the ARDC and was aware the ARDC wanted 
to personally serve the complaint on him.  According to the 
Illinois record, Attorney Peiss told an ARDC investigator that 
No. 
2016AP663-D   
 
5 
 
he would return to Chicago to accept service of the complaint on 
August 6, 2013.  Attorney Peiss never made contact with the ARDC 
to accept service.  ARDC later hired a process server to attempt 
service on Attorney Peiss in Madison, Wisconsin, where he was 
taking care of his mother who had suffered a stroke.  This 
attempt at personal service was also unsuccessful and substitute 
service was made by mail.  Attorney Peiss did not answer the 
complaint. 
¶10 The referee went on to note that the ARDC subsequently 
filed an amended complaint on December 10, 2013.  This complaint 
was mailed to Attorney Peiss, and the record indicates that he 
received the complaint but failed to file an answer.  The 
Illinois matter came on for a hearing before the Board of 
Illinois 
Attorney 
Registration 
and 
Disciplinary 
Commission 
(Board) on June 16, 2014.  Attorney Peiss appeared at the 
hearing and was represented by counsel.  The referee noted that 
because the substantive accusations of the amended complaint had 
been deemed admitted by Attorney Peiss's failure to file an 
answer, the hearing dealt with the disciplinary recommendation.  
However, the referee said it appeared from the report and 
recommendation in the Illinois case that the Board did allow 
Attorney Peiss to make some due process arguments pertaining to 
the alleged lack of personal service, but the Board was not 
persuaded by his claims.  The chair of the Board specifically 
said that "after listening to respondent's testimony and 
observing his demeanor at the hearing, we did not find him 
credible." 
No. 
2016AP663-D   
 
6 
 
¶11 The referee said:  
[I]t [is] impossible to believe that the respondent 
was in any way deprived of due process in the Illinois 
proceedings against him.  Any problems in service were 
the direct result of the respondent's own misbehavior 
and not the result of any failure on the part of the 
ARDC.  Further, the due process issue was considered 
by the Illinois authorities at the June 2015 [sic] 
hearing 
and 
respondent's 
arguments 
were 
properly 
rejected by that tribunal. 
¶12 The referee went on to point out that Attorney Peiss 
"undertook the same sort of behavior" when attempts were made to 
serve the complaint in the instant action.  The referee noted 
that according to an affidavit of the process server, numerous 
attempts at personal service were made without success and when 
the process server finally made telephone contact with Attorney 
Peiss to discuss meeting to accept service, Attorney Peiss's 
response was, "ah no," whereupon he hung up on the process 
server, after which the complaint had to be served by mail. 
¶13 The referee rejected Attorney Peiss's argument that 
reciprocal discipline was unwarranted because he was denied due 
process in the Illinois proceeding.  The referee granted the 
OLR's motion for summary judgment and recommended that this 
court impose discipline reciprocal to that imposed by the 
Supreme Court of Illinois, i.e. the revocation of Attorney 
Peiss's license to practice law in Wisconsin.  The referee also 
recommended that Attorney Peiss be assessed the full costs of 
this proceeding. 
¶14 Attorney Peiss has not appealed the referee's report 
and recommendation.  Accordingly, this court reviews the matter 
No. 
2016AP663-D   
 
7 
 
pursuant to SCR 22.17(2), which provides that if no appeal is 
timely filed, the court shall review the referee's report; 
adopt, reject or modify the referee's findings and conclusions 
or remand the matter to the referee for additional findings; and 
determine and impose appropriate discipline. 
¶15 Upon careful review of the matter, we adopt the 
referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We agree 
with the referee that Attorney Peiss failed to demonstrate that 
he 
was 
denied 
due 
process 
in 
the 
Illinois 
proceeding.  
Accordingly, we approve the referee's recommendation and impose 
the identical discipline imposed by the Supreme Court of 
Illinois, namely the revocation of Attorney Peiss's license to 
practice law in Wisconsin.  We also assess the full costs of the 
proceeding against Attorney Peiss. 
¶16 IT IS ORDERED that the license of John H. Peiss to 
practice law in Wisconsin is revoked, effective the date of this 
order. 
¶17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to the extent he has not 
already done so, John H. Peiss shall comply with the provisions 
of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose license to 
practice law in Wisconsin has been revoked. 
¶18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, John H. Peiss shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
¶19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See SCR 
22.28(3). 
No.  2016AP663-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶20 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring)  This is a 
reciprocal discipline case.1  It raises the question of what is 
"identical discipline" in a reciprocal discipline matter.2  
¶21 The Office of Lawyer Regulation seeks revocation of 
Attorney Peiss's Wisconsin license in the instant case, while 
the Illinois discipline was "disbarment."  The documents filed 
by the OLR in the instant case, like the documents filed in 
other reciprocal discipline cases, do not explain the extent to 
which the other state's discipline (here disbarment) is or is 
not identical to the Wisconsin discipline of revocation.   
¶22 This failure on the part of the OLR hampers the work 
of this court.  The per curiam opinion is defective in not 
equating disbarment and revocation.   
¶23 I 
conclude 
that 
the 
OLR 
should 
improve 
its 
presentation in reciprocal discipline cases by comparing the 
Wisconsin discipline to be imposed with the discipline imposed 
in the other state.   
¶24 For example, my research of Illinois law indicates 
that disbarment in Illinois amounts to a five-year revocation of 
the license before the attorney may seek reinstatement.  See 
                                                 
1 In my dissent in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Buzawa, No. 2016AP2351-D, unpublished order (Wis. S. Ct. Apr. 
10, 2017; separate writing May 11, 2017), I compared what I view 
as the correct procedure used in the instant case with what I 
considered a flawed procedure used in Buzawa to gauge a lawyer's 
challenge to another state's discipline proceeding.  The Buzawa 
order is attached as Attachment A. 
2 See SCR 22.22(3). 
No.  2016AP663-D.ssa 
 
2 
 
Illinois Rule 767.  Thus, disbarment in Illinois appears to be 
identical to license revocation in Wisconsin.  SCR 22.29(2). 
¶25 The OLR has an advantage over a justice or a Supreme 
Court commissioner in determining Illinois law.  In contrast 
with a justice or court staff——who may not engage in ex parte 
communications——the OLR may do its own research on other states' 
laws, may seek assistance from officials in other states, and 
may submit proof regarding the nature of the other state's 
discipline.  A lawyer challenging the proposed Wisconsin 
discipline may submit his or her own documentation regarding the 
imposition of identical discipline. 
¶26 If this case were initially a Wisconsin matter, the 
court in all probability would order restitution to the 
attorney's victims.  The Illinois proceeding did not order 
restitution.  Should Wisconsin nevertheless seek restitution 
before the Wisconsin license is reinstated? 
¶27 The 
instant 
case, 
as 
well 
as 
other 
reciprocal 
discipline cases, raise the question of what is identical 
discipline.  I suggest that the OLR Procedure Review Committee 
(Professor Marsha Mansfield, University of Wisconsin Law School, 
Reporter), appointed by the court in June 2016, should consider 
reviewing and revising the Supreme Court Rules governing 
reciprocal discipline when a lawyer licensed in Wisconsin is 
disciplined in another state. 
¶28 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
No.  2016AP663-D.ssa 
 
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