Case Title: L.G. v. S.L.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 18S-AD-32

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2018-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
 
John S. Terry 
Stephenie K. Gookins 
Cate, Terry & Gookins, LLC 
Carmel, Indiana  
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 
 
Charles P. Rice 
Murphy Rice, LLP 
South Bend, Indiana  
 
Bryan H. Babb 
Bose McKinney & Evans LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE, 
STATE OF INDIANA 
 
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.  
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Thomas M. Fisher  
Solicitor General of Indiana 
 
Elizabeth M. Littlejohn 
Matthew R. Elliott  
Deputy Attorneys General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
No. 18S-AD-32 
L.G., 
Appellant (Respondent below), 
v. 
S.L., et al., 
Appellee (Petitioners below). 
Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court, No. 29D01-1511-AD-1454 
The Honorable Steven R. Nation, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 29A04-1607-AD-1756 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jan 19 2018, 12:02 pm
2 
January 19, 2018 
Corrected 
 
 
David, Justice. 
 
In this disputed adoption case, we grant transfer for the limited purpose of vacating the section 
of the Court of Appeals opinion addressing whether the trial court judge should recuse himself on 
remand. We hold that a trial court judge is not required to recuse himself from a case solely because 
counsel for one of the parties served as a professional reference and wrote a recommendation letter in 
support of a judge’s application for another judicial role.  We further hold that under the facts and 
circumstances of this case, the trial court judge is not required to recuse himself on remand.  We 
summarily affirm the remainder of the Court of Appeals opinion and remand for further proceedings. 
See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).  
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
This matter arises out of a contested adoption.  In November 2015, S.L. and W.L. 
(Adoptive Parents) filed a petition for adoption.  Putative father, L.G. (Father), had previously 
filed a paternity action which was consolidated with the adoption proceeding. Father filed several 
dispositive and other motions and a discovery dispute between the Adoptive Parents and Father 
ensued.  
 
Of particular interest to this Court is Father’s February 16, 2016 Motion for Recusal of 
Judge.  In this motion, Father requested recusal of the Honorable Steven R. Nation because Judge 
Nation had applied for appointment to the Indiana Supreme Court, and counsel for Adoptive 
Parents, Charles Rice, was listed as a professional reference on Judge Nation’s application.   
Indeed, as part of his application, Judge Nation was required to provide the names of three 
attorneys who had been professional adversaries in the course of his practice or who had litigated 
substantial cases in his court and “who would be in positions to comment on [his] qualifications 
for appointment to the Indiana Supreme Court.” (Appellant's Supp. App. Vol. II at 8.) Accordingly, 
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Judge Nation designated Adoptive Parents' counsel, Rice, as one of his three references. 
Additionally, during the pendency of this adoption case, Rice wrote a letter to the Judicial 
Nominating Commission in which he endorsed Judge Nation's application and described him as 
“the greatest jurist” he had encountered in his “state-wide” litigation practice. (Appellant's Supp. 
App. Vol. II at 2.)  Rice previously submitted this same letter to the Judicial Nominating 
Commission in 2012 when Judge Nation also applied to fill a vacancy on the Indiana Supreme 
Court.   
 
Father alleged that listing Rice as a reference in the 2016 application gave the appearance 
of impropriety, necessitating Judge Nation’s recusal. Judge Nation denied Father’s Motion for 
Recusal. Thereafter, the case proceeded and the trial court dismissed Father’s motion to contest 
the adoption as a discovery sanction and entered a decree of adoption.   
 
Father appealed, challenging the dismissal of his motion to contest the adoption.  He did 
not raise the recusal issue.  Our Court of Appeals addressed the issues raised by Father related to 
the dismissal and also addressed, sua sponte, whether Judge Nation should recuse himself on 
remand.  It concluded that: 1) Judge Nation should have granted Father’s Motion to Recuse 
because Rice’s recommendation created the appearance of impropriety; and 2) Judge Nation 
should recuse himself on remand because the trial court’s findings and conclusions “demonstrate 
the court’s negative assessment of Father’s credibility and character.”  L.G. v. S.L., 76 N.E.3d 157, 
176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).  The Court of Appeals had “significant concern” that Judge Nation or 
any trial judge would be able to set aside these prior findings and conclusions.  Id. at 177.  
 
We disagree with the Court of Appeals on the recusal issues and grant transfer to address 
them.  In every other respect, we affirm the Court of Appeals opinion and remand to the trial court 
for further proceedings.   
 
 
 
 
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Standard of Review 
 
A judge’s decision about whether to recuse is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Cheek 
v. State, 79 N.E.3d 388, 390 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).  An abuse of discretion occurs when the judge’s 
decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.  Id.   
 
Discussion 
 
I. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Father’s Motion to 
Recuse Judge. 
 
With regard to disqualification or recusal of a judge, Indiana Trial Rule 79(C) provides:  
 
A judge shall disqualify and recuse whenever the judge, the judge's 
spouse, a person within the third degree of relationship to either of 
them, the spouse of such a person, or a person residing in the judge's 
household: 
(1) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director or 
trustee of a party; 
(2) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(3) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be 
substantially affected by the proceeding; or 
(4) is associated with the pending litigation in such fashion 
as to require disqualification under the Code of Judicial 
Conduct or otherwise. 
 
Rule 1.2 of the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “a judge shall act at all times in a 
manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the 
judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”  Rule 2.11 further 
provides that a “judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”  Rule 2.11 lists several specific instances requiring 
recusal, none of which are applicable here.  However, comment 1 to Rule 2.11 provides that under 
the rule, “a judge is disqualified whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, 
regardless of whether any of the specific provisions [of the rule] apply.” IN ST CJC Rule 2.11, 
cmt. 1.   
 
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Our Court of Appeals has held that the mere appearance of bias and partiality may require 
recusal if an objective person, knowledgeable of all the circumstances, would have a rational basis 
for doubting the judge's impartiality. Bloomington Magazine, Inc. v. Kiang, 961 N.E.2d 61, 64 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012).   In Bloomington Magazine, the court found that because one of the attorneys 
served as chairman of the judge’s recent election campaign, there was the appearance of 
impropriety and as such, the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to recuse. Id. at 
66-67.  More recently, in Abney v. State, 79 N.E.3d 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) and Cheek, 79 N.E.3d 
at 388, the Court of Appeals addressed what level of involvement by an attorney in a judge’s 
judicial campaign requires a judge to recuse from a case where that attorney is involved.  In these 
parallel appeals, the court found that recusal was not required when the elected prosecutor was a 
member of the judge’s advisory committee for his election campaign, but had not yet performed 
any election committee activities on behalf of the judge.  Abney, 79 N.E.3d at 953; Cheek, 79 
N.E.3d at 392.    
 
The facts of this case are a bit different than those in Bloomington Magazine, Abney and 
Cheek because, here, Judge Nation is not running in a partisan election and Rice is not part of his 
campaign, as chair or otherwise.  Instead, Judge Nation submitted his name for consideration as 
part of a merit selection process, and as part of his application, he was required to list six 
professional references, including “three attorneys who have been your professional adversaries 
in your practice or who have litigated substantial cases in your court and who would be in positions 
to comment on your qualifications for appointment. . . . ” (Appellant's Supp. App. Vol. II at 8.)  
Judge Nation listed Rice as one of the attorneys who appeared before him, along with two other 
attorneys. Additionally, Rice submitted a letter of recommendation on Judge Nation’s behalf.  As 
one would expect from a recommendation letter,  Rice spoke very highly of Judge Nation in that 
letter, even calling him “the greatest jurist” he had encountered. 
   
Although it is not precedent, we find Justice Massa’s Order in Indiana Gas Co. v. Indiana 
Fin. Auth., 992 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. 2013) instructive.  There, the movant argued that Justice Massa 
should recuse himself due to his personal friendship with the project manager for one of the parties.  
Justice Massa declined to do so.  He noted that it would be “disabling to this Court if we were 
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required to recuse every time a ‘friend’ came before us as a lawyer for a party or worked as an 
employee of, or consultant to, a party.” Id. at 680.  This is because all of the Justices on the Court 
have many friends who are lawyers, several Justices came from law firms that appear before the 
Court and it is not unusual for the court to hear cases argued by lawyers that previously served the 
Court as judicial law clerks. Id. at 680-81.  Finally, while the movant pointed to how the project 
manager spoke at Justice Massa’s investiture ceremony as evidence of the appearance of 
impropriety, Justice Massa noted how saying “flattering things” happens on “such occasions.” Id. 
at 680.  
 
Similarly, although Rice said kind things about Judge Nation in a recommendation letter 
and served as a reference for him, this alone is not enough to require recusal.  If it were, then Judge 
Nation (and any trial judge who submitted an application for an appellate judge position) would 
have to recuse himself in each case where one of the attorneys listed on his application and/or who 
wrote letters for him appeared.  This would be disabling to courts, particularly in small Indiana 
counties where only a handful of attorneys practice in front of the trial court judge.   
 
Further, recusal in this instance would not be based on the circumstances of the case, but 
rather on speculation that a judge could not be unbiased towards counsel who has tendered a 
reference letter or agreed to serve as a professional reference.  An objective person with knowledge 
of all the circumstances of this case would be aware of the fact that in order to complete his 
application for an appellate judge position, Judge Nation was required to list references who have 
appeared in his court as well as solicit recommendation letters.  Recommendation letters by their 
nature are enthusiastic and flattering.  This is not unusual and there is nothing about Rice’s letter 
that indicates any sort of special relationship beyond a professional one.  Just as “friendship” alone 
may not be enough to require recusal (in some cases, it could be), neither does professional 
admiration always demand recusal. We trust our judges’ ability to remain unbiased when a 
reference represents a client in that judge’s court.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion when 
denying Father’s Motion to Recuse.  
 
 
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II. 
The trial court judge is not required to recuse himself on remand because he 
previously ruled against Father. 
 
Adverse rulings and findings by a trial judge are not sufficient reason to believe the judge 
has a personal bias or prejudice. Thomas v. State, 486 N.E.2d 531, 533 (Ind. 1985). Further, 
Indiana courts credit judges with the ability to remain objective notwithstanding their having been 
exposed to information which might tend to prejudice lay persons. Carter v. Knox Cty. Office of 
Family & Children, 761 N.E.2d 431, 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The law presumes that a judge is 
unbiased and unprejudiced. Id. To overcome this presumption, the moving party must establish 
that the judge has personal prejudice for or against a party. Id. Such bias or prejudice exists only 
where there is an undisputed claim or the judge has expressed an opinion on the merits of the 
controversy before him. Id. 
 
Here, Father argues, and the Court of Appeals found that because the trial court order noted 
that Father was not a credible witness and otherwise negatively characterized his actions 
throughout the discovery process in its order, Judge Nation should recuse himself from the matter 
on remand due to concerns that he may not be impartial.  However, we disagree.  It is the fact-
finder’s province to assess the credibility of witnesses.  This is particularly true in domestic 
relations cases due to the court’s “unique, direct interactions with the parties face-to-face, often 
over an extended period of time.” Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011).   Our trial judges 
are “enabled to assess credibility and character through both factual testimony and intuitive 
discernment” and “are in a superior position to ascertain information and apply common sense, 
particularly in the determination of the best interests of the involved children.”  Id.  Thus, there is 
nothing unusual or inappropriate about the trial court finding that Father was not a credible witness.  
As mentioned above, adverse findings are not sufficient reason to believe the judge has a personal 
bias or prejudice. Thomas, 486 N.E.2d at 533.  
 
Although some of the language used in the order is strong, e.g., characterizing Father’s 
motions as “frivolous” and Father’s behavior as “contumacious,” this in and of itself is not enough 
to presume bias or prejudice because the trial court did not express an opinion on the merits of the 
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controversy before it.  Instead, Father’s motion to contest the adoption was dismissed due to a 
discovery dispute and the court’s findings were related to the parties’ conduct during that dispute.  
 
 In Carter, Mother argued that the trial judge who previously approved a permanency plan 
supporting termination of her parental rights should not be trier of fact in the subsequent 
termination proceeding because that judge was biased.  761 N.E.2d at 435. The Court of Appeals 
found the trial judge was not biased or prejudiced against Mother at the termination hearing.  Id. 
at 436.  It noted that the mere fact that a judge had gained knowledge of the Mother by participating 
in other actions does not establish the existence of bias or prejudice, and that while the judge had 
previously approved a plan in which termination of Mother’s rights was in the best interest of the 
child, this did not mean that the judge was prejudiced as to Mother’s parenting abilities and would 
necessarily terminate Mother’s rights at a subsequent hearing.  Id. at 435-36.   
 
The same logic applies to this case. Here, the trial court dismissed Father’s motion to 
contest the adoption as a discovery sanction.  It cannot be presumed that, just because Judge Nation 
presided over the previous adoption proceedings and has knowledge of the parties, he is biased or 
prejudiced against Father.  Judge Nation’s order made no findings about the merits of Father’s 
motion to contest the adoption or Father’s ability to be a suitable parent.  Accordingly, we see no 
need for Judge Nation to recuse himself on remand.  
 
Conclusion 
 
We hold that Judge Nation was not required to recuse himself from this case solely because 
counsel for one of the parties served as a professional reference and wrote a recommendation letter 
on his behalf.  We further hold that while Judge Nation is familiar with the parties and has 
previously made findings against Father, because he did not express an opinion on the merits of 
the adoption proceeding, he is not required to recuse himself on remand.  We summarily affirm 
the remainder of the Court of Appeals opinion and remand for further proceedings.  
 
Rush, C.J., and Massa and Goff, JJ., concur. 
Slaughter, J., not participating.