Case Title: Barnes v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland

Citation: 2008-Ohio-3344

Docket Number: 20070140

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Barnes v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, 119 Ohio St.3d 173, 2008-Ohio-3344.] 
 
 
BARNES, EXR., APPELLEE, v. UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS OF CLEVELAND; 
MEDLINK OF OHIO, INC. ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Barnes v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, 
 119 Ohio St.3d 173, 2008-Ohio-3344.] 
R.C. 2701.10 — Private judges — Retired judge who was never elected but served 
only pursuant to appointment may serve as private judge — Punitive 
damages — Standard of review — Court reviewing award of punitive 
damages must independently analyze degree of reprehensibility, ratio of 
award to actual harm suffered, and sanctions for comparable conduct. 
(No. 2007-0140 – Submitted February 5, 2008 – Decided July 9, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
Nos. 87247, 87285, 87710, 87903, and 87946, 2006-Ohio-6266. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  A retired judge who was never elected but who served as a judge by 
appointment of the governor is eligible to receive civil referrals and serve 
as a private judge pursuant to R.C. 2701.10. 
2.  A court reviewing an award of punitive damages for excessiveness must 
independently analyze (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the party’s 
conduct, (2) the ratio of the punitive damages to the actual harm inflicted 
by the party, and (3) sanctions for comparable conduct. (BMW of N. Am., 
Inc. v. Gore (1996), 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809, 
applied.) 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This discretionary appeal was accepted on the issues of whether a 
retired judge who was never elected to the bench, but who served as a judge by 
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appointment, is eligible to act as a private judge and whether the trial court is 
required to analyze the jury’s punitive damage award under BMW of N. Am., Inc. 
v. Gore (1996), 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809.  We answer yes 
to  both. 
Background 
{¶ 2} This case involves an action for medical malpractice and wrongful 
death against University Hospitals of Cleveland and appellants, MedLink of Ohio, 
Inc., and The MedLink Group (collectively, “MedLink”), on behalf of Natalie 
Barnes, who on October 19, 2000, had a coronary embolism and eventually died 
after her catheter was dislodged during kidney dialysis. 
{¶ 3} Natalie, 24 years old, suffered from both mental retardation and 
epilepsy.  She had developed kidney disease and began regular hemodialysis 
treatment at University Hospitals early in 2000.  To facilitate her hemodialysis 
treatment, Natalie required a device called a “perma cath,” a catheter that is 
surgically inserted through the skin into a vein down to the heart and implanted in 
the chest.  The skin grows over a cuff at the end of the catheter to hold the device 
in place.  The catheter has two external ports that are opened for access to the 
patient’s blood during dialysis: after dialysis, the two ports are capped. 
{¶ 4} Andrea Barnes transported her daughter Natalie to dialysis and 
stayed with her during the treatment. Noticing that Natalie had a tendency to pull 
at her catheter, Barnes contacted the Cuyahoga County Board of Mental 
Retardation and Developmental Disabilities (“MRDD”) and asked for the services 
of a medical aide to sit with Natalie on the days she could not go with her to 
dialysis. MRDD in turn contacted MedLink, a provider of home healthcare 
services. 
{¶ 5} On September 1, 2000, representatives from MedLink and MRDD 
met with Andrea Barnes.  She instructed them to make sure that the MedLink aide 
did not leave Natalie’s side during dialysis and warned them of Natalie’s 
January Term, 2008 
3 
propensity to pull at her catheter.  Accordingly, MedLink was hired to prevent 
Natalie from removing her catheter. 
{¶ 6} The first aide provided by MedLink, who was able to keep 
Natalie’s hands away from the catheter without incident, accompanied her on only 
a few occasions.  Endia Hill was selected to replace the original aide.  Hill was 
advised that Natalie had attempted to pull at her catheter in the past and that she 
needed to be closely monitored.  Hill, however, was not qualified under 
MedLink’s criteria for healthcare aides because she did not have a high school 
diploma and she had a felony conviction on her record.  Hill did disclose the 
felony conviction on her employment application but did not disclose her lack of 
a high school diploma.  Although a diploma was a minimum requirement for 
employment with MedLink, MedLink did not follow up Hill’s lack of information 
about high school in the blank provided on the employment application form. 
{¶ 7} On October 19, 2000, Hill took Natalie to dialysis.  Once Natalie’s 
catheter was attached, Hill left the dialysis unit, went to the hospital cafeteria, and 
then walked around the hospital for several hours.  Dialysis technician Larry 
Lawrence was attending Natalie and three other patients that day.  Lawrence 
testified that while he was engaged in another task, he turned and saw that 
Natalie’s catheter was detached and lying on the floor.  Lawrence initiated CPR, 
and an emergency code was called.  Natalie’s medical chart indicated that she had 
suffered an air embolism, which caused cardiac arrest.  Afterwards, Natalie was 
severely brain damaged and unable to eat or breathe without life support.  
Eventually, after being taken off life support, Natalie died. 
{¶ 8} Andrea Barnes, individually and as executor of Natalie’s estate,1 
then filed a complaint alleging that MedLink and University Hospitals had 
violated the applicable standards of care owed to her daughter.  After proceeding 
                                                 
1.  Appellee Robert Barnes was later substituted as executor of Natalie’s estate. 
 
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with discovery, the parties chose to submit the dispute to a private judge for a jury 
trial pursuant to R.C. 2701.10, the statute allowing for “private judging.” The 
parties signed a written agreement to that effect, which was approved by the judge 
originally assigned to the case.  Before opening arguments, the parties confirmed 
on the record that they had consented to the private judge’s authority and that they 
were forgoing any rights to challenge that authority on appeal. 
{¶ 9} The trial began on April 25, 2005, and concluded on May 3, 2005.  
After deliberations, the jury awarded judgment to Andrea Barnes, finding 
MedLink 90 percent liable and University Hospitals ten percent liable for 
Natalie’s death. The jury awarded Barnes $100,000 on the survivorship claim and 
$3,000,000 on the wrongful death claim.  The jury also awarded Barnes 
$3,000,000 in punitive damages. Later, the trial court assessed attorney fees and 
expenses and entered a final judgment against MedLink totaling $6,803,460.2 
 
{¶ 10} After trial and after attorney fees and expenses had been assessed, 
MedLink filed motions with the private judge seeking reduction or vacation of the 
punitive damage award and requesting a hearing on those motions.  The judge 
denied the motions without an evidentiary hearing and filed an opinion.  In his 
opinion, he held that the jury’s punitive damages award was not “grossly 
excessive” under the standard announced by the United States Supreme Court in 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003), 538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 
155 L.Ed.2d 585. 
{¶ 11} On March 7, 2006, MedLink filed an original action in prohibition 
with this court, arguing that the judge who had presided over the case—- the 
retired judge selected to function as the private judge—- lacked the proper 
qualifications to preside over the trial, because he had been appointed to a 
                                                 
2.  University Hospitals is no longer a party in this case.   
 
January Term, 2008 
5 
judgeship twice by Governor Taft, instead of being elected to the judiciary.  
MedLink, however, abandoned its action for prohibition before this court could 
rule.  MedLink Group, Inc. v. Glickman, 109 Ohio St.3d 1448, 2006-Ohio-2192, 
846 N.E.2d 876 (granting MedLink’s application for dismissal). 
{¶ 12} MedLink then appealed the trial court’s judgment, asserting among 
other claims that the presiding judge had failed to review the punitive-damages 
award according to the three specific guideposts set forth in the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 
809.  MedLink also argued that the jury’s verdict was void because the judge who 
presided over the trial did not meet the qualifications to serve as a private judge 
under R.C. 2701.10, having never been elected to the bench. 
{¶ 13} In affirming the trial court’s judgment, the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals upheld the punitive damages award without discussing or applying the 
standards enunciated in Gore.  The appellate court also upheld the presiding 
judge’s eligibility to hear the case, holding that R.C. 2701.10 clearly does not 
differentiate between retired judges who were elected to their seats and those who 
were appointed. 
{¶ 14} MedLink appealed the decision, asserting five propositions of law, 
of which we accepted two.  The first one states, “In reviewing an award of 
punitive damages, the trial court must independently analyze the three guideposts 
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. 
Gore (1996), 517 U.S.559 [116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809].”  The second 
proposition asks us to review whether a judge who has never been elected to a 
judgeship in Ohio may serve as a private judge under R.C. 2701.10.  We address 
those issues in reverse order. 
The Retired Judge’s Eligibility to Receive Civil Referrals 
{¶ 15} The first issue as set forth in proposition three concerns whether a 
retired judge who has never been elected to a judgeship in Ohio may, pursuant to 
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R.C. 2701.10, properly receive civil referrals, or as is commonly stated, act as a 
private judge.  MedLink argues that, pursuant to R.C. 2701.10, only elected 
judges may serve as private judges, and because the private judge presiding over 
the case had been appointed rather than elected, he did not have jurisdiction to 
hear the case.  In response, Barnes counters that MedLink had the duty to timely 
object to the judge’s authority in the trial court to preserve the error for appeal. 
{¶ 16} The statute that establishes private judging, R.C. 2701.10, 
provides:   
{¶ 17} “(A) Any voluntarily retired judge, or any judge who is retired 
under Section 6 of Article IV, Ohio Constitution, may register with the clerk of 
any court of common pleas, municipal court, or county court for the purpose of 
receiving referrals for adjudication of civil actions or proceedings, and 
submissions for determination of specific issues or questions of fact or law in any 
civil action or proceeding, pending in the court. There is no limitation upon the 
number, type, or location of courts with which a retired judge may register under 
this division. Upon registration with the clerk of any court under this division, the 
retired judge is eligible to receive referrals and submissions from that court, in 
accordance with this section. Each court of common pleas, municipal court, and 
county court shall maintain an index of all retired judges who have registered with 
the clerk of that court pursuant to this division and shall make the index available 
to any person, upon request.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 18} The text of R.C. 2701.10 clearly does not differentiate between 
appointed judges and elected judges concerning eligibility for private judging. 
Either a “voluntarily retired judge” or “any judge who is retired under Section 6 
of Article IV, Ohio Constitution” (emphasis added) may be eligible to serve as a 
private judge. 
{¶ 19} MedLink contends that the Supreme Court Rules for the 
Government of the Judiciary exclude the judge in this case from service as a 
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7 
private judge through the rules’ definition of a “voluntarily retired judge.”  
Gov.Jud.R. VI(1)(C)(2)  states: 
{¶ 20} “As used in this rule, ‘voluntarily retired judge’ means any person 
who was elected to and served on an Ohio court without being defeated in an 
election for new or continued service on that court. ‘Voluntarily retired judge’ 
does not include either of the following: 
{¶ 21} “(a) A judge who has been removed or suspended without 
reinstatement from service on any Ohio court pursuant to the Supreme Court 
Rules for the Government of the Judiciary or who has resigned or retired from 
service while a complaint was pending under those rules; 
{¶ 22} “(b) A judge who has resigned from office between the date of 
defeat in an election for further service on that court and the end of his or her 
term.” 
{¶ 23} The rule seems to limit the term “voluntarily retired judge” to one 
who has been “elected to” an Ohio court.  The omission of appointed judges from 
the definition overlooks the alternative method by which judges take office. For 
this reason, the definition appears to be underinclusive in its scope.  The 
definition in Gov.Jud.R. VI(1)(C) of “voluntarily retired judge” improperly 
restricts eligibility to elected judges when there is no evidence that the legislature 
had any such restriction in mind in drafting R.C. 2701.10.  Thus, the definition 
violates the principle that rules for implementing a statute may not add to or 
restrict the terms of the statute. 
{¶ 24} The Ohio Rules for the Government of the Judiciary were 
promulgated pursuant to this court’s authority granted by Section 5(B), Article IV 
of the Ohio Constitution.  The category of “voluntarily retired judge” is but one of 
two categories specified by R.C. 2701.10 as eligible for civil referrals. The other 
is “any judge who is retired under Section 6 of Article IV, Ohio Constitution.” 
The Ohio Constitution recognizes the two methods of judicial selection, in that 
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Section 6, Article IV provides for mandatory judicial retirement, by prohibiting 
election or appointment if the judge will be 70 years old at the time his or her 
term begins.3   Because the statute refers to the constitutional provision which 
recognizes the two methods of judicial selection, the statute may be read to 
include both elected and appointed judges, thereby harmonizing the rule and the 
statute. 
{¶ 25} Thus, the statute itself is not ambiguous and neither it nor the rule 
excludes nonelected retired judges from accepting civil referrals. Accordingly, we 
hold that a retired judge who has never been elected but who has been appointed 
to the position of judge is eligible to receive civil referrals and serve as a private 
judge pursuant to R.C. 2701.10. 
{¶ 26} Furthermore, before the trial began, all parties to the litigation 
signed a court-approved agreement with respect to the presiding judge’s authority 
to hear the case.  On the day of trial, all parties stated on the record before 
opening arguments that they consented to the presiding judge’s authority  and 
waived any rights to contest that issue on the appeal.  Only after an adverse 
decision did MedLink seek to disqualify the judge. 
{¶ 27} Although it signed a waiver, MedLink argues that the presiding 
judge did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case and that MedLink 
cannot now be estopped from contesting the judge’s authority because subject 
matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.  We addressed a similar argument and held 
                                                 
3.  {¶ a} Section 6(C), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution provides: 
     {¶ b} “No person shall be elected or appointed to any judicial office if on or before the day 
when he shall assume the office and enter upon the discharge of its duties he shall have attained 
the age of seventy years. Any voluntarily retired judge, or any judge who is retired under this 
section, may be assigned with his consent, by the chief justice or acting chief justice of the 
supreme court to active duty as a judge and while so serving shall receive the established 
compensation for such office, computed upon a per diem basis, in addition to any retirement 
benefits to which he may be entitled. Laws may be passed providing retirement benefits for 
judges.” 
 
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9 
that this objection concerns a procedural irregularity rather than jurisdiction. In re 
J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205, 2006-Ohio-5484, 855 N.E.2d 851. Comparing subject 
matter jurisdiction with jurisdiction over the particular case, we concluded in J.J. 
that a party alleging a lack of jurisdiction has a duty to object in the trial court and 
timely preserve the error for appeal.  Id. at ¶ 15.  When a court possesses subject 
matter jurisdiction, “procedural irregularities in the transfer of a case to a visiting 
judge affect the court's jurisdiction over the particular case,” not its subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Id.  Clearly, the common pleas court in this case has jurisdiction 
over tort actions such as the instant case.  Therefore, MedLink had a duty to 
object in the trial court to the presiding judge’s authority to preserve the alleged 
error for appeal.  Since MedLink did not object, the error, if any, has been waived. 
{¶ 28} In light of the foregoing, by signing an agreement allowing the 
retired judge to preside over the trial and waiving its rights to appeal in open 
court, MedLink lost its right to challenge his authority. 
{¶ 29} We note that the dissent would have us find a conflict between this 
case and State ex rel. Russo v. McDonnell, 110 Ohio St.3d 144, 2006-Ohio-3459, 
852 N.E.2d 145.  First, this case was tried before we released our opinion in 
Russo.  Second, in Russo, we held that R.C. 2701.10 and Gov.Jud.R. VI authorize 
only bench trials.  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  In so holding, the majority 
stated that “R.C. 2701.10, in accordance with Section 4(B), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution, confers subject-matter jurisdiction on certain retired judges to decide 
civil actions pending in common pleas and other courts.”  Id. at ¶23.  However, in 
light of our discussion above about subject-matter jurisdiction, we have no choice 
but to declare the statement in Russo incorrect because subject-matter jurisdiction 
is conferred on courts, rather than on judges.  We therefore hold that the presiding 
judge had proper jurisdiction to preside over the trial, because there is no 
requirement in the statute or in the Ohio Constitution that a retired judge is 
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eligible for civil referrals pursuant to R.C. 2701.10 only if he or she was elected 
rather than appointed. 
Punitive Damages 
{¶ 30} In its first proposition of law, appellant MedLink argues essentially 
that the punitive damages imposed by the jury were grossly excessive and 
therefore unconstitutional.  MedLink asks us to adopt the standard for reviewing 
punitive damages set forth in Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 
809. 
{¶ 31} Since at least 1991, the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a 
limit on the size of punitive damage awards.  Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip 
(1991), 499 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1.  See also Honda Motor Co. v. 
Oberg (1994), 512 U.S. 415, 420, 114 S.Ct. 2331, 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (citing TXO 
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. (1993), 509 U.S. 443, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 
125 L.Ed.2d 366).  The determination of whether a punitive damage award is 
unconstitutionally excessive is rooted in the Due Process Clause.  Cooper 
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. (2001), 532 U.S. 424, 433-434, 
121 S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674.  An award of punitive damages violates due 
process when it can be categorized as “grossly excessive” in relation to the state's 
legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.  
Gore, 517 U.S. at 568, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809. 
{¶ 32} A line of cases announced by the United States Supreme Court, 
starting with Gore, guides us in reviewing punitive damage awards alleged to be 
unconstitutionally excessive.  In Gore, the court instructed that elementary 
notions of fairness “dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the 
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty 
that a State may impose.”  517 U.S. at 574, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809.  
The court set forth three guideposts to use in evaluating whether a lack of notice 
January Term, 2008 
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renders a punitive damage award grossly excessive and therefore unconstitutional:  
(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct, (2) the disparity 
between the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive-
damages award, and (3) the difference between the award and the civil penalties 
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.  Id. at 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 
L.Ed.2d 809. 
{¶ 33} The first guidepost, the degree of reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct, is “the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a 
punitive damages award.”  Id.  A review of reprehensibility includes 
consideration of whether  (1) “the harm caused was physical as opposed to 
economic,” (2) “the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless 
disregard of the health or safety of others,” (3) “the target of the conduct had 
financial vulnerability,” (4) “the conduct involved repeated actions or was an 
isolated incident,” and (5) “the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, 
or deceit, or mere accident.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 
L.Ed.2d 585.  The harm in this case was physical rather than economic.  Both the 
jury and the appellate court concluded that there was evidence that MedLink acted 
at least recklessly when it hired Endia Hill, who did not meet even the minimum 
educational requirements and had previously been convicted of a felony. 
{¶ 34} The second guidepost and the “most commonly cited indicium of 
an unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award is its ratio to the actual 
harm inflicted on the plaintiff.”  Gore, 517 U.S. at 580, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 
L.Ed.2d 809.  But the United States Supreme Court, like this court, has 
consistently rejected the notion of a bright-line mathematical formula for 
assessing the reasonableness of punitive damage awards. The court recognized 
that “low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio 
than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly egregious act has 
resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.” Id. at 582, 116 S.Ct. 
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1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809.  This court has allowed a 6,250-to-one damages ratio to 
stand, but we have also invalidated a 20-to-one ratio.  See Wightman v. Consol. 
Rail Corp. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 431, 715 N.E.2d 546;  Dardinger v. Anthem 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 98 Ohio St.3d 77, 2002-Ohio-7113, 781 N.E.2d 121 
(invalidating the award under Ohio’s Due Process Clause) .  The court in Gore 
referred to the 500-to-one ratio in that case as “breathtaking.”  517 U.S. at 583, 
116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809. 
{¶ 35} In the instant case, the parties disagree over which amounts to 
compare for purposes of assessing reasonableness if a court applies the second 
Gore guidepost.  The jury had awarded Barnes $100,000 on her survivorship 
claim and $3,000,000 on the wrongful death claim.  The numbers composing the 
ratio of actual damages to punitive damages is a determination to be made by the 
trial court in the first instance, subject to appellate review. 
{¶ 36} The third indicium of excessiveness set forth in Gore involves 
“[c]omparing the punitive damages award and the civil or criminal penalties that 
could be imposed for comparable misconduct.” 517 U.S. at 583, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 
134 L.Ed.2d 809.  In announcing this guidepost, the court stated that a “reviewing 
court engaged in determining whether an award of punitive damages is excessive 
should ‘accord “substantial deference” to legislative judgment concerning 
appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue.’ ”  Id. at 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 
L.Ed.2d 809, quoting Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco 
Disposal, Inc. (1989), 492 U.S. 257, 301, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  In Gore, the maximum 
statutory fine available for a similar infraction was $2,000, a very small amount 
compared to the $2 million verdict.  Here the trial court, subject to appellate 
review, must compare other sanctions available under Ohio law for the wrong 
done in determining whether the punitive damage award was excessive. 
January Term, 2008 
13 
{¶ 37} The importance of the three guideposts was reiterated in Cooper 
Industries, 532 U.S. 424, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674.  There, the court 
instructed federal appellate courts to conduct a de novo review of a trial court’s 
determination of the constitutionality of punitive damage awards to ensure that 
the award is based upon an “ ‘application of law, rather than a decisionmaker’s 
caprice.’ ”  Id. at 436, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674, quoting Gore, 517 U.S. 
at 587, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809. 
{¶ 38} In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 
S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585, the court reversed the Utah Supreme Court’s 
reinstatement of a $145 million punitive damage award, holding that “[w]hile 
States enjoy considerable discretion in deducing when punitive damages are 
warranted, each award must comport with the principles set forth in Gore.”  State 
Farm at 427, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585.  Thus, while Gore advised that 
states apply the guideposts, State Farm turned the advisory into an edict. 
{¶ 39} We have already applied the Gore guideposts ourselves, although 
we have never explicitly held that a lower court must apply them. See Dardinger, 
98 Ohio St.3d 77, 2002-Ohio-7113, 781 N.E.2d 121 (holding that a punitive 
damage award was not grossly excessive under the federal Constitution after 
considering the award in light of the three Gore guideposts); Wightman, 86 Ohio 
St.3d 431, 715 N.E.2d 546 (analyzing a punitive damage award for adequate 
notice of the possible sanction using the Gore guideposts). 
{¶ 40} Thus, a court reviewing an award of punitive damages for 
excessiveness must independently analyze (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the 
party’s conduct, (2) the ratio of the punitive damages to the actual harm inflicted, 
and (3) sanctions for comparable conduct.  The principles set forth in Gore must 
be implemented with care to ensure both reasonableness and proportionality.  
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 428, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585.  The court of 
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appeals erred in failing to consider these factors in assessing the award in this 
case. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 41} Based on the foregoing, we affirm in part and reverse it in part.  
We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals on the eligibility of the presiding 
judge in this case.  A retired judge who was never elected but who served as a 
judge by appointment of the governor is eligible to receive civil referrals and 
serve  as a private judge pursuant to R.C. 2701.10.  However, we reverse that 
portion of the appellate court’s judgment pertaining to the award of punitive 
damages and   remand the case to the court of appeals for review of the award in 
light of the three Gore guideposts. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
 and reversed in part, 
and cause remanded. 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  
{¶ 42} I concur in paragraph one of the syllabus and in the bulk of the 
majority opinion.  I write separately solely because I would not remand the cause 
to the court of appeals. 
{¶ 43} Paragraph two of the syllabus purports to require courts of appeals 
to consider the guideposts set forth in BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore (1996), 517 
U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809.  But courts of appeals need no such 
direction from us.  Gore itself so instructs them.  The judges sitting on the various 
courts of appeals in Ohio are well aware of Gore and are responsible for adhering 
January Term, 2008 
15 
to it and all other due process interpretations emanating from this court or the 
United States Supreme Court. 
{¶ 44} The appellants in the court of appeals extensively briefed the Gore 
guideposts.  The court of appeals stated, “Following a thorough review of the 
record, the briefs, and the arguments of all parties, we find no merit in any of the 
assignments of error * * *.”  Barnes v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, Cuyahoga App. 
Nos. 87247, 87285, 87710, 87903, and 87946, 2006-Ohio-6266, ¶ 84.  Instead of 
assuming that the court of appeals ignored the Gore guideposts, we should 
presume that the court did what it says it did:  it considered all relevant 
constitutional standards.  Thus, there is simply no reason to remand this cause so 
that the court of appeals can repeat its review of the Gore guideposts.  
Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶45} I respectfully dissent. 
{¶46} The majority’s resolution of this case is in conflict with our 
decision in State ex rel. Russo v. McDonnell, 110 Ohio St.3d 144, 2006-Ohio-
3459, 852 N.E.2d 145, where in paragraph one of our syllabus, we stated:  “R.C. 
2701.10 and Gov.Jud.R. VI require bench trials in referrals of civil actions or 
submission of issues or questions, pursuant to the statute and the rule, which both 
specify that cases referred and issues submitted to a retired judge pursuant to 
these provisions must be tried and determined by a judge.” 
{¶47} The jurisdiction of a retired judge emanates from R.C. 2701.10, not 
from the authority or agreement of the parties to the action.  The proper analysis 
here is to consider the plain language of the statute, as we did in Russo.  There, we 
stated, “R.C. 2701.10(B)(1) provides that the parties and retired judge must 
expressly agree that the action referred shall be ‘tried, determined, and 
adjudicated by that retired judge.’ ”  Russo at ¶38.  Additionally, R.C. 2701.10(D) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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specifies that  “[a] retired judge to whom a referral is made under this section 
shall try all of the issues on the action or proceeding, shall prepare relevant 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and shall enter a judgment in the action or 
proceeding in the same manner as if he were an active judge of the court.”  See 
also Russo at ¶ 38.  The plain language of the statute permits courts to transfer 
cases to retired judges for conduct of bench trials only.  Thus, the outcome of this 
analysis dictates that in this instance, the retired judge proceeded to conduct a jury 
trial without authority. 
{¶48} This court has held that “parties may not confer jurisdiction upon a 
court by mutual consent, where none would otherwise exist * * *.”  Beatrice 
Foods Co. v. Porterfield (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 50, 59 O.O.2d 76, 282 N.E.2d 
355, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Therefore, the parties here could not agree to 
confer jurisdiction upon the retired judge to conduct a jury trial. 
{¶49} This court recently acknowledged that when a judge disregards 
what the law clearly commands, the judge acts without authority.  State v. 
Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 21.  We 
stated:  “If a judge imposes a sentence that is unauthorized by law, the sentence is 
unlawful.  ‘If an act is unlawful it is not erroneous or voidable, but it is wholly 
unauthorized and void.’ (Emphasis sic.)”  Id., quoting State ex rel. Kudrick v. 
Meredith (1922), 24 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 120, 124, 1922 WL 2015, *3. 
{¶50} Here, a retired judge conducted a jury trial in contravention of R.C. 
2701.10, which authorizes only bench trials.  These actions were unauthorized, 
unlawful, and therefore void. 
{¶51} Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  I would reverse the judgment 
of the court of appeals, vacate the verdict, and remand this case to the trial court 
for further proceedings.  If the parties request a jury trial, then those proceedings 
should be conducted by a judge elected or appointed in accordance with law. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
January Term, 2008 
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__________________ 
Bashein & Bashein Co., L.P.A., and W. Craig Bashein; Becker & 
Mishkind Co., L.P.A., and Michael F. Becker; and Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., 
and Paul W. Flowers, for appellee. 
Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, L.L.P., James M. Roper, J. Stephen 
Teetor, and Jessica K. Philemond, for appellant MedLink. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., and Anne Marie Sferra, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys.   
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