Case Title: State ex rel. Powell v. C.R. O'Neil & Co.

Citation: 2007-Ohio-5504

Docket Number: 20061572

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Powell v. C.R. O’Neil & Co., 116 Ohio St.3d 22, 2007-Ohio-5504.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. POWELL, APPELLANT, v. C.R. O’NEIL & COMPANY; 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Powell v. C.R. O’Neil & Co., 116 Ohio St.3d 22, 2007-
Ohio-5504.] 
Workers’ compensation — Discretion of Industrial Commission to reject evidence 
submitted after hearing. 
(No. 2006-1572 –Submitted August 14, 2007 – Decided October 23, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 05AP-916, 2006-Ohio-3555. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} At issue are the calculated amounts of appellant Delbert Gene 
Powell’s full weekly wage and average weekly wage.  Powell was injured on the 
job on September 30, 2000.  After his workers’ compensation claim was allowed, 
Powell moved appellee, Industrial Commission of Ohio, to set his full weekly 
wage at $848.26 and his average weekly wage at $869.18.  In support, Powell 
submitted his IRS 1099 forms for 1999 and 2000. 
{¶ 2} A district hearing officer set Powell’s average weekly wage at 
$224.12.  The hearing officer declined to consider the 1099 forms because a letter 
from Powell’s employer, C.R. O’Neil & Company, specified that the amounts on 
the 1099 represented payments to both Powell and his labor crew.  The order did 
not set a full weekly wage. 
{¶ 3} Powell’s appeal was heard by a staff hearing officer on February 4, 
2002.  The hearing officer considered portions of Powell’s federal Schedule C 
forms showing the amount of income that Powell made as a self-employed 
carpenter in 1998 and 1999.  The portions submitted, however, showed only the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
figures for “gross receipts and sales.”  Later that day, Powell’s counsel faxed to 
the staff hearing officer a complete copy of the 1999 Schedule C  that showed 
expenses and gross income as well as the larger amount of gross receipts.  
Counsel also faxed Powell’s 2000 Schedule C the following day. On this same 
date, February 5, 2002, the staff hearing officer affirmed the district hearing 
officer’s calculation of average weekly wage and set the full weekly wage at 
$178.71.  The order stated that “the amounts shown on the claimant’s 1998 and 
1999 Schedule C Form excerpts regarding ‘gross receipts and sales’ ” were 
unpersuasive.  Those forms and the figures they contained were thus excluded 
from the calculation. 
{¶ 4} Approximately three and a half years later, Powell filed a 
complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, alleging that 
the commission had abused its discretion in not considering his self-employment 
income.  The court of appeals denied the writ, finding that the commission had 
not abused its discretion in refusing to consider evidence submitted after the 
hearing. 
 
{¶ 5} This cause is now before this court on an appeal as of right. 
{¶ 6} The primary issue before us is  whether the commission abused its 
discretion in excluding Powell’s self-employment income when calculating 
Powell’s average weekly wage and full weekly wage.  Because Powell does not 
contest the commission’s rejection of his IRS 1099 forms, our analysis focuses 
solely on the IRS Schedule C forms. 
Average weekly wage 
{¶ 7} There is no dispute that evidence of Powell’s self-employment 
income for the relevant periods of 1999 and 2000 was not considered.  There is 
also no dispute that the evidence is material, since R.C. 4123.61 bases the average 
weekly wage on earnings for the year prior to injury.  The commission, however, 
has authority to accept or reject evidence submitted after hearing.  State ex rel. 
January Term, 2007 
3 
Cordray v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 99, 101, 561 N.E.2d 917 (because 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-09(C)(5) gives the commission the discretion to grant or 
deny additional time for hearing preparation, “the commission must also have the 
discretion to accept or reject evidence submitted thereafter”). The question here is 
whether the commission abused its discretion in refusing to consider the 1999 and 
2000 schedule C forms. 
{¶ 8} Powell submitted his 2000 Schedule C form the day after the 
hearing.  Under Cordray, the staff hearing officer’s decision to exclude that 
document is not an abuse of discretion. 
{¶ 9} The 1999 Schedule C, however, is a different matter. At least part 
of the 1999 document pertaining to “gross receipts and sales” was submitted at 
the hearing, and  Powell’s counsel submitted the entire form later that day to 
clarify the amount of self-employment income declared that year. Because it was 
not an entirely new evidentiary submission akin to that in Cordray, we hold that 
the commission abused its discretion in refusing to consider the 1999 Schedule C 
for purposes of determining Powell’s average weekly wage. 
Full weekly wage 
{¶ 10} Turning to the commission’s calculation of full weekly wage, we 
note that, unlike “average weekly wage,” which R.C. 4123.61 specifies as a one-
year average, the phrase “full weekly wage” has no statutory definition.  The 
commission and the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation have instead relied on 
Joint Resolution R80-7-48 (effective June 4, 1980), which specifies that for 
employees such as Powell, the full weekly wage shall be based on the higher of 
(1) gross wages (including overtime) earned in the six weeks preceding injury or 
(2) gross wages (excluding overtime) earned in the seven days prior to injury. 
{¶ 11} Powell was injured on September 30, 2000.  We have already 
determined that the commission did not abuse its discretion in excluding Powell’s 
2000 Schedule C, the document relevant to his inquiry.  Because Powell’s 1999 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
Schedule C precedes the target time period, he cannot establish that the 
commission’s calculation of his full weekly wage was an abuse of discretion. 
{¶ 12} The 
commission 
argues 
unpersuasively 
that 
laches 
bars 
consideration of Powell’s entire argument.  Laches requires, among other things, 
that the party asserting the defense establish that it will be prejudiced by the 
opponent’s delay in asserting the contested issue.  Smith v. Smith (1959), 168 
Ohio St. 447, 7 O.O.2d 276, 156 N.E.2d 113, paragraph three of the syllabus. The 
only prejudice alleged here, however, is to the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, 
which is not a party to this litigation. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 13} The judgment of the court of appeals is hereby reversed in part and 
affirmed in part.  That portion of the judgment that upholds the commission’s 
computation of the full weekly wage is affirmed. We reverse the court of appeals’ 
disposition of the issue of average weekly wage and order the commission to 
recalculate Powell’s average weekly wage using relevant earnings from the 1999 
Schedule C. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, 
and writ granted. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
David Lancione, L.L.C., and David Lancione, for appellant. 
 
Marc Dann, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
______________________