Case Title: Houlton Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016 ME 168

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2016-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME  
168 
Docket: 
PUC-14-470 
Argued: 
March 2, 2016 
Decided: 
November 17, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
HOULTON WATER COMPANY et al. 
 
v. 
 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION et al. 
 
 
HJELM, J.  
[¶1]  We are called on for the second time to consider a decision of the 
Maine Public Utilities Commission approving a petition for reorganization 
filed by Bangor Hydro-Electric (BHE) and Maine Public Service Company 
(MPS), which were regulated utilities engaged in the transmission and 
distribution of electricity, and, during the pendency of this proceeding, 
merged to become Emera Maine.  Under the proposed reorganization, Emera 
Maine’s parent company, Emera, Inc., would increase its ownership interest in 
Algonquin Power & Utilities Corporation (APUC), which is a publicly-traded 
company that is in the electricity generation business with generation 
facilities located in Maine.  Because of the relationship that would result 
 
2 
between Emera Maine, as a transmission and distribution entity, and APUC, a 
generator, the petition is subject to approval by the Commission.   
[¶2]  In the first appeal, we vacated the Commission’s order approving 
the petition1 because the Commission misconstrued the governing statute in 
the Electric Industry Restructuring Act, 35-A M.R.S. §§ 3201-3217 (2015).  See 
Houlton Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n (Houlton I), 2014 ME 38, ¶¶ 35-38, 
87 A.3d 749.  On remand, the Commission again approved the petition.  On 
this second appeal, filed by Houlton Water Company and the Industrial Energy 
Consumer Group (collectively, the intervenors), we conclude that the 
Commission acted outside of its authority when, in an effort to control the 
statutorily harmful effects of the transaction, it imposed conditions that would 
regulate APUC beyond what the Restructuring Act allows.  We therefore 
vacate the Commission’s order and remand with instructions to deny the 
petition. 
I.  STATUTORY OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
[¶3]  As we discussed in Houlton I, when the Legislature enacted the 
Restructuring Act, one of its objectives was to encourage “competition and 
                                         
1  Also at issue in the first appeal was a separate reorganization petition that would have allowed 
Emera to become involved in a wind power venture.  Houlton Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n 
(Houlton I), 2014 ME 38, ¶ 1, 87 A.3d 749.  As we discuss in this opinion, Emera has withdrawn 
from that venture, and it is no longer at issue. 
 
3 
innovation in the generation of electrical power.”  Id. ¶ 3; 35-A M.R.S. § 3204; 
see also Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2014 ME 56, ¶ 2, 
90 A.3d 451.  To promote that goal, the Legislature separated the generation 
of electricity from the transmission and distribution of electricity (T&D); and 
“greatly reduced” the Commission’s regulatory authority over producers and 
generators of electricity to the extent that the parties to this proceeding “refer 
to power generation as ‘unregulated’ in Maine”; but preserved the 
Commission’s authority to highly regulate T&D entities.  Houlton I, 2014 ME 
38, ¶¶ 4-5, 87 A.3d 749.   
[T]he Act mandated that companies holding both generation and 
T&D assets divest themselves of the generation assets and 
generation-related activities . . . .  Following divestiture, the 
Commission continues to regulate and oversee T&D utilities, 
which hold monopolistic rights to the limited T&D resources in 
Maine. 
 
Because 
the 
Restructuring 
Act 
allowed 
the 
investor-owned electric utilities to keep their transmission and 
distribution assets, the former electricity providers were 
transformed into transmission and distribution utilities fully 
regulated by the Commission. 
 
Id. ¶ 4 (citation and quotation marks omitted).  As an element of the 
Commission’s extensive regulation of T&D utilities, proposed reorganizations 
of T&D utilities are subject to the Commission’s approval.  Id. ¶ 6; 35-A M.R.S. 
§§ 708(2), 3204(5) (2015). 
 
4 
[¶4]  In April 2011, BHE and MPS petitioned the Commission pursuant 
to 35-A M.R.S. § 708(2),2 which applies to the reorganization of utilities, to 
authorize their parent company, Emera, to increase its ownership position in 
APUC to 25% from roughly 8%.3  As we described the proposed affiliate 
structure in Houlton I, “the proposed transactions would allow Maine’s 
regulated T&D utilities—Bangor Hydro and MPS [now Emera Maine]—to be 
held in common ownership with companies engaged in electricity generation 
in Maine.”  2014 ME 38, ¶ 9, 87 A.3d 749.  The parties agree that this would 
result in an “affiliated interest” between Emera Maine and APUC within the 
meaning of 35-A M.R.S. § 707(1)(A) (2015).  See Houlton I, 2014 ME 38, ¶¶ 9, 
25, 87 A.3d 749.   
[¶5]  Additionally, in a separate petition, Northeast Wind Holdings, LLC, 
which was owned by Emera, filed a reorganization petition that would 
                                         
2  Title 35-A M.R.S. § 708 has been amended, see P.L. 2011, ch. 623, §§ A-13, A-14 (effective 
Aug. 30, 2012) (codified at 35-A M.R.S. § 708 (2015)), but the amended subsection is not the 
subsection under which BHE and MPS petitioned the Commission. 
3  The term reorganization encompasses  
any creation, organization, extension, consolidation, merger, transfer of ownership 
or control, liquidation, dissolution or termination, direct or indirect, in whole or in 
part, of an affiliated interest as defined in section 707 accomplished by the issue, 
sale, acquisition, lease, exchange, distribution or transfer of voting securities or 
property.   
 
35-A M.R.S. § 708(1)(A).  Here, the APUC transaction would create an “affiliated interest” as defined 
in section 707, see infra ¶ 6 n.4, and is thus subject to the Commission’s oversight under section 
708. 
 
5 
authorize Emera to engage in a joint venture with a wind energy development 
company to create a new wind power generation company.  The Commission 
consolidated the two petitions and held a hearing in late 2011 and early 2012.   
[¶6]  After the hearing was completed, in April 2012 the Commission 
issued an order approving the two proposed transactions,4 concluding, as to 
the APUC transaction, that Emera Maine had met its burden of showing that 
ratepayers would not suffer a net harm pursuant to section 708, which 
provides in part that the Commission may approve utility reorganizations, 
including the creation of affiliates, if the reorganization “is consistent with the 
interests of the utility’s ratepayers and investors.”  35-A M.R.S. § 708(2)(A).   
[¶7]  In approving the petitions, the Commission interpreted section 
3204(5)5 as foreclosing a T&D utility from having a financial interest in a 
generation asset only if the T&D utility controlled the generator.  With respect 
to the APUC transaction, the Commission determined that pursuant to that 
test, the proposed transaction did not violate the Restructuring Act because 
                                         
4  Because of changes in collateral transactions involving APUC while the matter was pending 
before the Commission, Emera’s ownership share of APUC as approved by the Commission was 
reduced to 20% from the originally proposed 25%.  Because an affiliated interest is defined as one 
of at least 10%, see 35-A M.R.S. § 707(1)(A) (2015), the reduction in Emera’s position in APUC did 
not affect the statutory analysis. 
5  Section 3204(5) provides, “[e]xcept as otherwise permitted under this chapter, on or after 
March 1, 2000, an investor-owned transmission and distribution utility may not own, have a 
financial interest in or otherwise control generation or generation-related assets.”  35-A M.R.S. 
§ 3204(5) (2015). 
 
6 
Emera Maine, as the T&D entity, would not have an equity interest or voting 
position in APUC—in other words, because Emera Maine would not control 
APUC.   
[¶8]  The Commission also considered whether the transactions would 
compromise competition in the energy market.  The Commission found, 
These affiliations raise significant concerns regarding the possible 
exercise of preferential treatment by a utility to its competitive 
affiliates.  This preferential treatment could include allowing an 
affiliated generator . . . to gain access to non-public, strategically 
important information or through favorable treatment in terms of 
construction of or access to transmission facilities or services.  
The consequences could appear in two somewhat different 
respects: (1) harm to ratepayers of BHE and MPS in the form of 
higher T&D rates; and (2) harm to the [competitiveness] of the 
market (and competitors in the market) from preferential 
treatment of affiliates which lead ultimately to higher electricity 
supply prices for consumers. 
 
Although the Commission found these risks of preferential treatment arising 
from the wind power venture to be “both real and significant,” it also 
determined that those concerns were of “lesser importance” in the APUC 
transaction but that the financial risks generated by that reorganization would 
be eliminated if conditions were imposed.   
[¶9]  The Commission conditioned its approval of both petitions on 
compliance by the parties and other affected entities with more than fifty 
conditions.  Some of those conditions relate exclusively to the APUC 
 
7 
transaction, others to the wind power transaction, and the remainder to both.  
The conditions address issues such as structural separation, financial risk, 
codes of conduct, and divestiture; and the conditions contain extensive 
requirements of external audits, service restrictions, and the maintenance of 
separate credit facilities, among other things.   
[¶10]  Significant for purposes of this appeal, in approving the 
reorganization petition, the Commission imposed conditions on electricity 
generators, including APUC itself.  As the conditions apply to APUC, they 
include a requirement that APUC not permit Emera to participate in 
decision-making regarding APUC’s generation of power in Maine; that, to the 
extent that the Commission determines that APUC’s operations relate to BHE 
and MPS operations in Maine, APUC provide the Commission with access to its 
books and records, respond to discovery requests and participate in 
Commission proceedings without being allowed to object on the basis that the 
Commission does not have jurisdiction; and that the Commission have 
authority to order APUC to divest itself of certain power generation units.  The 
Commission also required, as a condition to approval of the petitions, that 
APUC submit a letter accepting the Commission’s authority to enforce the 
order against it.   
 
8 
[¶11]  Houlton Water, the Office of the Public Advocate, and the 
Industrial Energy Consumer Group appealed the Commission’s order as 
intervenors.  We concluded that the Commission’s interpretation of section 
3204(5) was erroneously narrow and held that even if a T&D entity would not 
ultimately obtain actual control of the electricity generator, that statute 
nonetheless prohibits the T&D from becoming affiliated with an electricity 
generator if the affiliation will become “likely to produce [in the T&D] 
incentives for favoritism that would undermine the purpose of the 
[Restructuring] Act.”  Houlton I, 2014 ME 38, ¶¶ 35, 37, 87 A.3d 749.  We 
vacated the Commission’s order and remanded the matter for the Commission 
to reconsider the petition under the clarified statutory standard.  Id. ¶¶ 2, 38.   
[¶12]  On remand, choosing to proceed on the existing record, the 
Commission entered an order in October 2014 approving the petitions by a 
two-to-one vote.  As to the APUC transaction, the Commission concluded that 
“the reorganization[] result[s] in Emera Maine having a ‘financial interest’ in 
generation merely as a result of its affiliation with Northeast Wind 
Partners . . . and [APUC] through common ownership by the parent company, 
Emera.”  The Commission determined, however, “that the [p]roposed 
[t]ransactions, when subject to the substantial conditions imposed pursuant to 
 
9 
our 35-A M.R.S. § 708 authority . . . do not violate the provisions of 
[section] 3204(5) as interpreted by the Law Court [in Houlton I].”  (Emphasis 
added.)  In other words, the Commission took the view that although Emera 
Maine would have a financial interest in generation that would be likely to 
create favoritism, that interest would be “adequately addressed through § 708 
conditions,” thus falling short of creating any unlawful incentives.  The 
Commission imposed the same conditions contained in its April 2012 order in 
which it had originally approved the petitions.  The intervenors again 
appealed.6  See 35-A M.R.S. § 1320 (2015).   
[¶13]  While the appeal was pending, Emera Maine notified the 
Commission that Emera had agreed to sell its interest in the wind power 
venture to its partner in that proposed transaction.  In January 2015, the 
Commission issued an order determining that its approval was not required 
for Emera to withdraw from the joint venture.  Within several days after that 
order was issued, Emera formally withdrew from the venture.  The 
Commission then moved that we stay this appeal so that the Commission 
could consider the effect of that development on the October 2014 
consolidated order in which it had approved both the Northeast Wind and 
                                         
6  The Office of the Public Advocate, which previously appeared as an intervenor, has not 
participated in this appeal. 
 
10 
APUC transactions.  We denied the motion and ordered that the appeal 
proceed in the normal course.   
[¶14]  Following the issuance of our order, the Commission allowed the 
parties an opportunity to be heard on the effect of the rescinded wind power 
transaction on the October 2014 order, part of which addressed Emera’s 
now-withdrawn involvement in the wind energy project.  Rejecting the 
intervenors’ argument to the contrary, the Commission determined that the 
pendency of this appeal did not deprive the Commission of authority to 
proceed.  The Commission then issued an order in August 2015, which 
addressed the effect of Emera’s withdrawal from the wind power venture on 
the October 2014 order by eliminating thirteen of the conditions attached to 
the earlier order authorizing the reorganizations, and modifying eight others.  
The conditions applicable to APUC noted above, see supra ¶ 10, remained 
unchanged.   
[¶15]  The intervenors appealed from that order and moved to 
consolidate their appeals and permit supplemental briefing.  We granted the 
motion, and the parties filed supplemental briefs to address the issues raised 
by the new appeal.   
 
11 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶16]  We first consider whether the pendency of this appeal affected 
the Commission’s authority to modify the October 2014 order as a result of 
Emera’s decision not to proceed with the joint wind power venture.  After 
identifying the operative Commission decision, we address the intervenors’ 
challenges to that decision.   
A. 
The Commission’s Authority to Modify the October 2014 Decision 
[¶17]  The intervenors argue that because the appeal of the 
Commission’s October 2014 decision was pending when the Commission 
modified that decision in August 2015, the modification is void.   
[¶18]  This issue reveals a conflict between two statutes governing the 
procedure for appeals from Commission decisions.  One of the statutes, 
35-A M.R.S. § 1320(3) (2015), is framed in broad terms and provides 
generally that the rules of appellate process apply to appeals from 
Commission decisions: where rules regulating civil appeals from the Superior 
Court “use[] the term[] ‘the court,’ . . . they shall for purposes of an appeal 
from the commission mean ‘the commission.’”  See also 35-A M.R.S. § 1320(1) 
(2015) (“An appeal from a final decision of the commission may be taken to 
the Law Court on questions of law in the same manner as an appeal taken 
 
12 
from a judgment of the Superior Court in a civil action.”); M.R. App. P. 22 
(effectively implementing section 1320).   
[¶19]  As one ostensible effect of section 1320, Maine Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 3(b) would apply here.  That rule, subject to specific exceptions 
that are inapplicable in this case, prohibits a trial court—and therefore, 
pursuant to section 1320, the Commission—from taking any action affecting a 
case that is on appeal.  Viewed in isolation, Rule 3(b) therefore would 
preclude the Commission from revising its October 2014 order while an 
appeal from that order was pending.  
[¶20]  In contrast, a different statute, 35-A M.R.S. § 1321 (2015), 
provides that “[t]he commission may at any time rescind, alter or amend any 
order it has made.”  (Emphasis added).  As applied here, section 1321 affects a 
narrow aspect of appellate procedure by preserving the Commission’s 
authority to alter or amend any order, at any time—even while an appeal is 
pending.  In this way, section 1321 is inconsistent with the broadly framed 
provisions of section 1320 that subject appeals from Commission decisions to 
the constraints of Rule 3(b).  
[¶21]  As a familiar principle of statutory construction, specific statutes 
prevail over general ones when the two are inconsistent.  Fleet Nat'l Bank v. 
 
13 
Liberty, 2004 ME 36, ¶ 10, 845 A.2d 1183; see also 2B Singer & Singer, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51:2 at 215 (7th ed. 2012) (“If an 
irreconcilable conflict does exist between two statutes, the more specific 
statute controls over the more general one . . . .”).  Applying this principle to 
resolve the conflict between sections 1320 and 1321, we conclude that the 
more general provisions of section 1320, which covers many aspects of 
appellate procedure in an undifferentiated way, yield to the more specific 
terms of section 1321.  As a result, notwithstanding Rule 3(b), section 1321 
preserved to the Commission the authority to issue the amended order in 
August 2015, even though that administrative action revised an order that 
was the subject of a pending appeal.   
[¶22]  We now consider the merits of intervenors’ challenges to that 
order. 
B. 
Commission Approval of APUC Transaction 
[¶23]  The central issue raised by the intervenors on this appeal focuses 
on the limitations of the Commission’s authority to impose certain conditions 
as a predicate to its approval of the APUC transaction.   
[¶24]  Pursuant to section 3204(5), a T&D entity is prohibited from 
“own[ing], hav[ing] a financial interest in or otherwise control[ling] 
 
14 
generation or generation-related assets,” subject to certain exceptions not 
applicable here.  35-A M.R.S. § 3204(5).  In Houlton I, we addressed the nature 
of the “financial interest” that is barred when a reorganization results in a 
regulated affiliate interest: “if the relationship among the entities results in 
the T&D utility having a financial interest that would provide an incentive to 
favor certain generators over others, the proposed corporate restructuring is 
prohibited pursuant to section 3204(5).”  2014 ME 38, ¶ 36, 87 A.3d 749.  
[¶25]  In this proceeding, the Commission determined that the 
proposed affiliation would give Emera—an owner of a company possessing 
T&D assets—a financial interest in APUC’s electricity generation assets, which, 
without intervention, would be likely to create an incentive for Emera to favor 
APUC over other generators.  Seeking to eliminate this consequence of the 
proposed transaction, the Commission invoked its authority pursuant to 
section 
708, 
which 
requires 
the 
Commission, 
when 
approving 
a 
reorganization of public utilities such as is proposed here, to “impose such 
terms, conditions or requirements as, in its judgment, are necessary to protect 
the interests of ratepayers.”  35-A M.R.S. § 708(2)(A).   
[¶26]  In its October 2014 order, the Commission determined that 
imposition of many specific conditions pursuant to section 708 would negate 
 
15 
an “incentive for favoritism . . . that would require [the Commission] to 
disallow those transactions under [s]ection 3204(5).”  The intervenors 
contend that once the Commission made the initial finding that the 
reorganization would give Emera incentives of favoritism toward some 
generators, the Commission erred by resorting to section 708 and imposing 
conditions in an effort to ameliorate that resulting favoritism.  The 
intervenors go on to argue that because the Commission may not use its 
authority under section 708 to transform a reorganization that violates 
section 3204(5) into one that satisfies the requirements of that statute, the 
Commission erred by approving the APUC transaction.  Emera Maine and the 
Commission argue, on the other hand, that the Commission acted properly 
when it took those conditions into account before finally determining that 
Emera’s financial interest would not likely create an incentive for favoritism 
toward APUC.   
[¶27]  “We review decisions of the Commission with great 
deference[,] . . . disturb[ing] a decision only when the Commission abuses the 
discretion entrusted to it, or fails to follow the mandate of the legislature, or to 
be bound by the prohibitions of the constitution.”  Taylor v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 
2016 ME 71, ¶ 5, 138 A.3d 1214 (citation and quotation marks omitted).   
 
16 
 
[¶28]  The procedural history of this case demonstrates that the 
conditions set out in the most recent order, issued in August 2015, relate only 
to the proposed APUC transaction and are intended to satisfy the 
requirements of section 3204(5).  The Commission first formulated conditions 
applicable to both the APUC and wind power transactions in its April 2012 
order, where the Commission concluded that the transactions “raise 
significant concerns regarding the possible exercise of preferential treatment 
by a utility to its competitive affiliates”—precisely the type of “financial 
interest” that we later determined in Houlton I is prohibited by section 
3204(5).  The nature of the preferential treatment that concerned the 
Commission included the potential for sharing of “non-public, strategically 
important information,” and “favorable treatment in terms of construction of 
or access to transmission facilities or services.”  On remand, the Commission 
framed its analysis based on the construction of section 3204(5) that we 
prescribed in Houlton I and made clear that the purpose of the conditions it 
formulated was still to prevent any “incentive for favoritism . . . that would 
require us to disallow those transactions under Section 3204(5).”  Although in 
its August 2015 order the Commission modified the set of conditions it had 
 
17 
previously imposed to account for Emera’s withdrawal from the wind power 
venture, the purpose of those conditions did not change.   
[¶29]  Given this history, we must view the entire body of the conditions 
contained in its most recent order to represent the Commission’s view of what 
is necessary for the APUC transaction to meet, in the least restrictive way, the 
requirements of section 3204(5)—that a T&D entity may not have a financial 
interest in an electricity generator that is likely to produce incentives for 
favoritism—and not for some reason unrelated to the requirements of that 
statute.   
 
[¶30]  As discussed above, the Restructuring Act is “intended to 
effectuate the Legislature’s goal of encouraging competition and innovation in 
the generation of electrical power.”  Houlton I, 2014 ME 38, ¶ 3, 87 A.3d 749.  
An essential ingredient to achieve that result is to largely deregulate 
electricity generation.  Indeed, as we pointed out in Houlton I, the parties 
themselves  
refer to power generation as “unregulated” in Maine, although the 
generators are subject to some restrictions and must be licensed.  
See generally 35-A M.R.S. § 3202 (deregulating retail access to 
generation services); id. § 3203 (authorizing the Commission to 
license competitive electricity providers).   
 
Id. ¶ 5.  
 
18 
 
[¶31]  Here, the conditions crafted by the Commission that are directed 
toward APUC constitute forms of agency oversight and control that are 
contrary to both the letter and purpose of the Restructuring Act.  That the 
Commission even saw the need to explicitly articulate particular controls over 
APUC as a condition to approving an increase in Emera’s stock ownership of 
APUC is itself a demonstration that most or all of those conditions do not exist 
by operation of statute or otherwise.7 
[¶32]  Beyond this, the Legislature has conferred general grants of 
authority to the Commission in several statutes.  In 35-A M.R.S. § 104 (2015), 
for example, the Commission is deemed to have “all implied and inherent 
powers . . . necessary and proper to execute faithfully its express powers and 
functions specified in this Title [35-A].”  Additionally pursuant to section 708, 
the Commission, when approving a reorganization, has the authority to 
“impose such terms, conditions or requirements as, in its judgment, are 
necessary to protect the interests of ratepayers.”  35-A M.R.S. § 708(2)(A). 
 
[¶33]  The extent of the Commission’s authority as created by these 
statutes is circumscribed by the principle that the agency’s action must not be 
                                         
7  One of the conditions that the Commission imposed on APUC would require APUC to allow the 
Commission access to its books and records.  In contrast to the other conditions addressed in the 
text, this form of agency intervention into matters of an affiliated generator appears to be 
statutorily authorized.  See 35-A M.R.S. § 708(2)(A)(1). 
 
19 
inconsistent with—in this case—the foundational legislative framework that 
gives electricity generators the freedom to operate with only minimal 
regulatory constraint.  See Houlton I, 2014 ME 38, ¶ 5, 87 A.3d 749.  Here, as 
an integral part of its approval of the APUC transaction, the Commission has 
attempted to materially expand the scope of its regulatory authority over an 
electricity generator beyond what the Restructuring Act will allow—for 
example, by requiring APUC to exclude Emera, which would own a significant 
ownership stake in APUC, from participating in certain decisions regarding 
power generation; by requiring APUC to authorize the Commission to direct 
that it divest itself of power generation facilities; and by requiring APUC to 
participate in Commission proceedings without the right to object on the 
ground that the Commission is without jurisdiction.  The scope and depth of 
the Commission’s regulatory weight affecting APUC as a generator is 
contravened by the Restructuring Act.8  Cf. Town of Eagle Lake v. Comm’r, Dep’t 
of Educ., 2003 ME 37, ¶ 7, 818 A.2d 1034 (stating that statutes are to be 
construed to achieve legislative purpose).   
                                         
8  In its April 2012 and October 2014 orders, the Commission also imposed regulatory conditions 
on First Wind, which is the wind power producer that was associated with the joint venture from 
which Emera withdrew.  The Commission abrogated the conditions specific to the wind power 
venture in its August 2015 order and, for the reasons discussed supra at ¶¶ 14-16, those conditions 
are no longer at issue. 
 
20 
[¶34]  In Houlton I, we did not hold that section 3204(5) prohibits a 
T&D entity from acquiring any financial interest in an electricity generator.  
Rather, we concluded that section 3204(5) bars the creation of a financial 
interest that would likely produce incentives for favoritism that would 
undermine the purpose of the Restructuring Act.  Houlton I, 2014 ME 38, ¶ 36, 
87 A.3d 749.  To adjudicate the issue presented on this appeal, we need not 
decide whether as a general matter section 708 authorizes the Commission to 
impose conditions that would negate an otherwise proscribed financial 
interest when T&D and generation entities become affiliated.  Rather, we need 
hold only that the Commission acted outside of its authority when it imposed 
conditions on an electricity generator such as APUC, where those conditions 
contravene the legislative framework of allowing generators to operate with 
very little regulatory governance.  Because those conditions constitute a 
material portion of the underlying framework that the Commission viewed as 
necessary to approve the APUC transaction, we must vacate the Commission’s 
decision and remand with instructions to deny the reorganization petition. 
The entry is: 
Order of the Public Utilities Commission 
vacated.  Remanded to the Commission with 
instructions to deny the petition.  
 
 
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Alan G. Stone, Esq., and Benjamin J. Smith, Esq., Skelton, 
Taintor & Abbott, Auburn, for appellant Houlton Water 
Company  
 
Anthony Buxton, Esq., Andrew Landry, Esq., and Robert 
Borowski, Esq., Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, Augusta, 
for appellant Industrial Energy Consumer Group 
 
William S. Harwood, Esq., and Rachel M. Wertheimer, Esq., 
Verrill Dana LLP, Portland, for appellee Emera Maine 
 
Charles Cohen, Esq., and Leslie Raber, Esq., Maine Public 
Utilities Commission, Augusta, for appellee Maine Public 
Utilities Commission 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Benjamin J. Smith, Esq., for appellant Houlton Water 
Company 
 
Charles Cohen, Esq., for appellee Maine Public Utilities 
Commission 
 
William S. Harwood, Esq., for appellee Emera Maine 
 
 
 
 
Public Utilities Commission docket number 2011-170 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY