Case Title: Martin v. Moore

Citation: 

Docket Number: 011980

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
 
MILTON R. MARTIN, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 011980 
 
MICHAEL TODD MOORE, ET AL. 
                                          OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
MICHAEL TODD MOORE, ET AL.              April 19, 2002 
 
v.  Record No. 012016 
 
MILTON R. MARTIN, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY 
Dennis J. Smith, Judge Designate 
 
 
In these two appeals arising from a single chancery suit, 
we consider issues relating to prescriptive easements, 
nuisances, and damage to realty. 
 
In May 1999, plaintiffs Michael Todd Moore, Jeffrey Lee 
Moore, Joey Herbert Moore, and F. L. Moore & Sons, Inc. filed a 
bill of complaint against defendants Milton R. Martin and 
Shirley J. Martin.  The plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendants 
from interfering with plaintiffs' use of an entrance road or 
driveway leading from U.S. Route 460 in Campbell County to 
plaintiffs' property where they operate a trucking business.  
The plaintiffs also sought a declaration that they had a right 
to such use by virtue of an easement. 
 
In an answer, defendants denied plaintiffs were entitled to 
the relief sought.  Defendants "affirmatively alleged that the 
Entrance Road is virtually completely on the property of the 
Defendants," and that the plaintiffs had been granted "a 
permissive license to use the Entrance Road." 
 
In a cross-bill, defendants claimed plaintiffs were guilty 
of trespass, both as the result of use of the driveway and as 
the result of contamination of a lake situated on property owned 
by defendants adjacent to plaintiffs' property.  Also, 
defendants alleged plaintiffs' activities constituted a private 
nuisance. 
 
The defendants sought to enjoin plaintiffs from use of the 
entrance road "for any purpose whatsoever" and "from operating a 
trucking business on the Property."  Additionally, defendants 
asked that plaintiffs "be assessed with monetary damages to 
defer the costs of removing silt" from their lake. 
 
Following a March 2000 ore tenus hearing, during which the 
chancellor inspected the property in question, the court 
determined that the plaintiffs had established a right to use a 
portion of the driveway by virtue of a prescriptive easement.  
Ruling on the cross-bill, the court decided defendants had not 
proved that the trucking operation constituted a private 
nuisance. However, the court determined defendants' evidence 
established that their property rights in the lake had been 
 
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"substantially impaired" by siltation, and "that a repair to the 
siltation could be done for approximately" $26,000. 
 
In a June 2001 final decree, the trial court memorialized 
the foregoing rulings, which included entry of judgment in favor 
of the defendants for $26,000.  We awarded separate appeals to 
the plaintiffs and the defendants. 
 
On appeal, addressing the issue raised by the bill of 
complaint, the defendants contend the trial court erred in 
ruling that the plaintiffs established an easement by 
prescription giving them a right to use a portion of the 
entrance road owned by defendants. 
 
Employing settled principles of appellate review, we shall 
recite the facts pertinent to this issue, including the 
legitimate inferences flowing from those facts, in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs, who prevailed below. 
 
Route 460 at the location in question extends in a 
generally east-west direction.  Formerly, the defendants owned a 
50.15-acre tract of land lying adjacent to and south of the 
highway.  From this tract, the defendants conveyed three 
separate parcels to the Bryants, the plaintiffs' immediate 
predecessors in interest. 
 
First, in 1969 the defendants conveyed a one-acre parcel 
abutting the highway right-of-way.  Bryant built a home upon 
this parcel and began operating a trucking business there.  
 
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Second, in 1973 defendants conveyed a one-half acre parcel lying 
immediately to the south of the one-acre parcel to enable Bryant 
to expand his trucking business.  Finally, in 1976 they conveyed 
a 5.75-acre parcel adjoining the one-half acre parcel to the 
south because Bryant "needed it" for his trucking operations. 
 
When the one-acre parcel was conveyed, an entrance and an 
"old road," extending south down a hill and west into the 
defendants' property, were the sole means of access from Route 
460 to the 50.15-acre tract.  The Bryant deed to the one-acre 
parcel included a portion of the entrance.  A pin located in the 
middle of the joint entrance marked the boundary line between 
the defendant Martins' land and the Bryants' one-acre parcel.  
According to Mr. Martin, "I sold him half the driveway at the 
top of the hill so he would have entrance to his house." 
 
The plaintiffs purchased the three Bryant parcels in 1997, 
and have been operating a trucking business on the premises 
since that time. 
 
The entrance and the "old road" were located in the same 
place as the present entrance and roadway now being used by the 
plaintiffs and the defendants for access to and from Route 460 
for their respective properties.  The plaintiffs claimed they 
were entitled to a right of way over only a small portion of the 
roadway.  The portion partially crosses over the boundary line 
between the plaintiffs' and defendants' land, and extends from 
 
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the Route 460 entrance south down the existing road to the area 
in front of an "old shop" located on the one-acre parcel.  The 
final decree granted the plaintiffs an easement to use this 
portion of the road. 
 
The law applicable to establishment of prescriptive 
easements is settled.  In order to establish a private right of 
way by prescription over property of another, the claimant must 
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the claimant's use 
of the roadway in question was adverse, under a claim of right, 
exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted, and with the knowledge and 
acquiescence of the owner of the land over which it passes, and 
that the use has continued for at least 20 years.  Ward v. 
Harper, 234 Va. 68, 70, 360 S.E.2d 179, 181 (1987); Pettus v. 
Keeling, 232 Va. 483, 485, 486-87, 352 S.E.2d 321, 323-24 
(1987).  Accord Nelson v. Davis, 262 Va. 230, 235, 546 S.E.2d 
712, 715 (2001). 
 
When there has been open, visible, continuous, and 
unmolested use of a road across the property of another for the 
prescriptive period, the use will be presumed to be under a 
claim of right, and places upon the owner of the servient estate 
the burden to rebut this presumption by showing that the use was 
permissive and not under a claim of right.  Ward, 234 Va. at 70-
71, 360 S.E.2d at 181; Pettus, 232 Va. at 485, 352 S.E.2d at 
323-24.  Accord Nelson, 262 Va. at 235, 546 S.E.2d at 715.  This 
 
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presumption of a grant or adverse right is prima facie only and 
may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary.  Chaney v. Haynes, 
250 Va. 155, 159, 458 S.E.2d 451, 453 (1995). 
 
The standard of appellate review applicable here is clear.  
The findings of a chancellor, who heard the evidence ore tenus, 
carry the weight of a jury verdict.  Tauber v. Commonwealth, 255 
Va. 445, 452, 499 S.E.2d 839, 843, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 965 
(1998).  A judgment based upon such findings will not be 
reversed on appeal "unless it appears from the evidence that 
such judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support 
it."  Code § 8.01-680. 
 
We hold that the trial court correctly determined the 
plaintiffs presented facts sufficient to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence the basic elements of an easement by 
prescription.  The use of the joint entrance and the portion of 
the joint driveway serving the one-acre parcel began by the 
Bryants in 1969.  The use of the portion of the driveway serving 
the one-half acre parcel began by the Bryants in 1973.  The use 
of the entrance and length of the driveway for access to the 
5.75-acre parcel began in 1976. 
 
The foregoing use was continuous by the Bryants, and then 
by the plaintiffs, as each conducted a trucking business on the 
three parcels.  The use was uninterrupted until May 3, 1999, 
when defendants wrote plaintiffs contesting their use of the 
 
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driveway and entrance.  Five days later, defendants blocked the 
entrance road, which act precipitated this lawsuit.  Therefore, 
the use was in excess of 20 years. 
 
Moreover, there is no dispute the parties knew that a 
portion of the joint entrance and joint driveway was on the 
defendants' side of the property line.  Clearly, the use of the 
entrance and the driveway by the Bryants, and then by the 
plaintiffs, for their trucking operations was open and obvious, 
and known to the defendants.  Also, the evidence shows that the 
defendants did nothing to stop or protest the Bryants', and then 
the plaintiffs', use of the entrance and driveway until the May 
1999 letter. 
 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs were entitled to the rebuttable 
presumption that their use, and that of their predecessors in 
title, was adverse.  The question then becomes whether the 
defendants proved that the use by the Bryants and the plaintiffs 
was permissive, and not adverse. 
 
Circumstantial evidence may not be used to establish 
permissive use in cases involving joint driveways.  "There must 
be a positive showing that an agreement existed."  Causey v. 
Lanigan, 208 Va. 587, 593, 159 S.E.2d 655, 660 (1968). 
 
The evidence established that the defendants acquiesced in 
the Bryants' and the plaintiffs' use of the joint entrance and 
joint driveway.  But the evidence failed to rebut the 
 
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presumption enjoyed by the plaintiffs that the prior use was 
adverse. 
 
The chancellor found:  "While Martin and Bryant did discuss 
maintenance of the roadway, and Bryant did get permission before 
he paved the driveway, there was never any discussion between 
Martin and Bryant regarding Bryant's use of the portion of the 
road on Martin property, therefore there was no agreement which 
would rebut the presumption that the use was adverse."  These 
factual findings of no oral or written permission clearly are 
supported by the evidence. 
 
It is true, as defendants point out, that Mr. Martin and 
Mr. Bryant each testified that Martin gave Bryant "permission" 
to use the entrance road.  However, the chancellor, as trier of 
fact, properly could conclude from all the evidence that what 
the parties meant was that both knew that a portion of the 
driveway and entrance was on the Martins' side of the property 
line, and that the defendants never prevented the Bryants from 
using the road.  Bryant agreed that what he meant by "getting 
permission" was that Martin "didn't object" to the use. 
 
In sum, there was no "positive showing" sufficient to 
establish permissive use, and the trial court correctly so held.∗
                     
 
∗ The trial court also ruled that plaintiffs had established 
an easement by implication.  Because we have determined the 
court properly found that an easement by prescription had been 
 
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Next, addressing issues raised by the cross-bill, 
defendants contend that the trial court "erred in concluding 
that the [plaintiffs'] operation of their trucking business did 
not constitute an actionable nuisance."  The defendants argue 
that "the trial court, in concluding that no evidence supported 
the [defendants'] nuisance claim, arbitrarily disregarded 
uncontradicted testimony, of unimpeached witnesses, which was 
neither inherently incredible nor without support in the 
record." 
 
We disagree with the defendants.  In the first place, the 
chancellor did not conclude there was "no evidence" supporting 
the nuisance claim.  Rather, the court determined the evidence 
failed to show that operation of the plaintiffs' trucking 
business caused "substantial harm" to the defendants' use and 
enjoyment of their property.  In the second place, the testimony 
touching this issue was neither uncontradicted nor unimpeached. 
 
When a business enterprise, even though lawful, becomes 
obnoxious to occupants of neighboring dwellings and renders 
enjoyment of the structures uncomfortable by virtue of, for 
example, noise, dust, or offensive odors, the operation of such 
business is a private nuisance.  Nat'l Energy Corp. v. O'Quinn, 
223 Va. 83, 85, 286 S.E.2d 181, 182 (1982).  Even though the 
                                                                  
proved, we do not reach the question whether there is an 
easement by implication. 
 
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term "nuisance" includes everything that endangers life or 
health, or obstructs the reasonable and comfortable use of 
property, not every trifling or imaginary annoyance that may 
offend the sensibilities of a fastidious person is actionable.  
Id.
 
We broadly construe an occupant's right to the use and 
enjoyment of land.  In this context, the phrase "use and 
enjoyment of land" contemplates the pleasure and comfort one 
normally derives from the occupancy of land. Bowers v. Westvaco 
Corp., 244 Va. 139, 145, 419 S.E.2d 661, 665 (1982).  Freedom 
from discomfort and annoyance while using land, which involves 
an element of personal tastes and sensibilities, is often as 
important to an individual as freedom from physical interruption 
in the use of the land.  Id.  However, the discomfort and 
annoyance must cause substantial harm to the individual, causing 
a material disturbance or annoyance in use of the realty.  Nat'l 
Energy Corp., 223 Va. at 85, 286 S.E.2d at 182; Smith v. The 
Pittston Co., 203 Va. 711, 717-18, 127 S.E.2d 79, 84 (1962). 
 
In the present case, defendants claim the plaintiffs' 
trucking operation is a private nuisance because the evidence 
presented at trial established "that the total sum of the 
[plaintiffs'] activities would affect the sensibilities of an 
ordinary person."  They say they proved that the trucking 
operation was excessively noisy; created odor, dust, and 
 
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excessive traffic on the driveway; and caused dangerous and 
unsafe blockages of the entrance road.  The defendants also 
claim that the use of the property by the plaintiffs overburdens 
any easement that has been acquired. 
 
The defendants occupy a dwelling they built in 1993 on the 
remainder of the original 50.15-acre tract.  The home, built 
about four years before the plaintiffs acquired their land, is 
approximately 1000 feet west of the plaintiffs' property.  
Access to the home from Route 460 is over the full length of the 
entrance road. 
 
The evidence on the nuisance issue was in material 
conflict.  A brief summary of the evidence offered by the 
opposing parties, rather than a detailed recitation, will be 
sufficient here. 
 
Defendants' witnesses testified that, after plaintiffs 
purchased their property in 1997 and began their trucking 
operation, noise and traffic problems on the driveway escalated.  
Testimony offered by defendants showed that Bryant's trucking 
business was on a smaller scale than the plaintiffs', with no 
discernable noise associated with the Bryant operation but 
constant noise generated by the plaintiffs' business. 
 
Mr. Martin testified that the noise from plaintiffs' 
property was "extremely loud all day, and it goes on into the 
night, all night."  He stated the noise prevented him from 
 
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sleeping and otherwise affected him "emotionally."  One witness 
for defendants described the noise:  "It sounds like steel . . . 
being moved and banging and screeching."  Mrs. Martin testified 
that the noise had been "very disturbing," and that there was 
"constant coming and going" on the driveway from "tractor-
trailers, pickup trucks, cars" using plaintiffs' land. 
 
The plaintiffs presented testimony directly contradicting 
defendants' evidence about the alleged noise level.  For 
example, plaintiffs' witnesses stated that the trucking 
operation was not unduly noisy and that traffic on Route 460 at 
the location in question made more noise than did plaintiffs' 
vehicles.  According to one of the plaintiffs, their trucks 
"meet every standard in the industry to eliminate noise." 
 
Traffic congestion at the entrance to the driveway, 
according to plaintiffs, was caused in part by the design of the 
entrance.  They supported Virginia Department of Transportation 
plans for improvement but defendant Martin refused to agree to 
the proposed modifications.  According to the plaintiffs, Martin 
was more interested in putting them out of business by denying 
them access to their property than in improving the entrance.  
Martin testified:  "I would love to see them shut down, yes." 
 
The plaintiffs' evidence, comparing the scope of the 
Bryants' trucking operation (about which defendants did not 
complain) with the scope of plaintiffs' business, conflicted 
 
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with evidence on that subject offered by defendants.  The 
plaintiffs' evidence showed the businesses were similar.  
According to plaintiffs, Bryant initially was a "local short-
haul" business, with frequent traffic in and out of the 
driveway; it then expanded to some interstate operations.  The 
plaintiffs' business primarily is "a road operation" as a "long-
distance carrier," with fewer trucks than Bryants' using the 
driveway on a daily basis, according to plaintiffs. 
 
Based upon the conflicting evidence, we cannot say that the 
trial court erred in finding the defendants failed to prove the 
plaintiffs' activities created a private nuisance.  The 
chancellor heard the evidence, viewed the premises, and was 
entitled to assess the credibility, including the bias, of the 
respective witnesses.  Indeed, the chancellor stated on the 
record he recognized that the Moores and the Martins were "angry 
and dislike each other and each has motivation to be less than 
totally honest and candid because each has an interest in the 
suit."  As the plaintiffs note, the defendants never complained 
to the plaintiffs about noise until the cross-bill was filed, no 
mention of the subject having been made in the threatening 
letter of May 3, 1999.  This and other factors obviously caused 
the chancellor to give more weight to the plaintiffs' evidence 
than to defendants'. 
 
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The decision in Bowers, supra, heavily relied upon by the 
defendants, is clearly distinguishable from this case.  The 
procedural posture of Bowers on appeal was different.  There, we 
affirmed the trial court's judgment finding that the acts of the 
defendants constituted an actionable private nuisance.  Here, we 
are being asked to annul factual findings declaring that no 
nuisance had been proved.  Unlike the Bowers, the Martins are 
not armed with the trial court's finding in their favor. 
 
Furthermore, the acts complained of in Bowers were more 
egregious and severe than was the alleged conduct of the 
plaintiffs here, even if all the defendants' evidence is 
accepted.  For example, a truck staging operation was located 
about 25 feet from the Bowers' living room window.  Vibrations 
created by moving trucks cracked the concrete pad on the rear 
porch of the Bowers' home.  Mrs. Bowers incurred medical 
expenses because she became distraught, depressed, and very 
nervous as the result of conditions caused by the truck staging 
operation.  The Bowers' children experienced adjustment 
disorders associated with these conditions.  244 Va. at 142-44, 
419 S.E.2d at 664-65. 
 
In sum, the court's ruling on this issue is not plainly 
wrong or without evidence to support it. 
 
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And, contrary to defendants' contention, the trial court 
correctly ruled that the plaintiffs have not overburdened the 
easement. 
 
"When, as here, an easement by prescription has been 
established, the width of the way and the extent of the 
servitude is limited to the character of the use during the 
prescriptive period."  Willis v. Magette, 254 Va. 198, 204, 491 
S.E.2d 735, 738 (1997); Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Lowman, 126 
Va. 424, 430, 101 S.E. 326, 328 (1919).  However, "a reasonable 
increase in the degree of use may be permissible in such an 
easement."  Willis, 254 Va. at 204, 491 S.E.2d at 738. 
 
The following determination by the chancellor is fully 
supported by the evidence:  "The Bryants used the Moores' 
property in a similar fashion, and while the degree of use may 
have increased somewhat, the court finds that it has not been 
such a substantial increase that it places an additional burden 
on the Martin property." 
 
Finally, still addressing the cross-bill, we consider 
whether the trial court erred in entry of a money judgment in 
favor of the Martins for damage to realty. 
 
The Martins alleged that the Moores have trespassed by 
conducting "land disturbing activities" on the 5.75-acre parcel 
near a stream which feeds the Martins' "large man-made lake on 
their property" to the west of the parcel.  These activities, 
 
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which included daily washing of trucks, caused soil to run off 
into the stream resulting in deposit of silt in the lake. 
 
Based upon the evidence, the chancellor found "that in 
altering their property the Moores adversely impacted the stream 
flows and therefore the property rights of the Martins as [to] 
the lake [have] been substantially impaired for ordinary 
recreational purposes."  The court found "that a repair to the 
situation could be done for approximately" $26,000, and entered 
judgment in that sum. 
 
On appeal, the Moores do not contest the chancellor's 
findings of trespass.  Instead, they attack the money judgment 
on two grounds.  First, they dispute the correctness of the 
measure of damages applied by the court.  They say the court 
based its judgment upon the mere cost of repair to the lake 
without any evidence of diminution in the market value of the 
real estate.  Second, the Moores contend "the evidence did not 
establish with reasonable certainty the quantum of damages 
actually suffered by the Martins." 
 
We will assume, without deciding, that the cost of repair 
was the proper measure of damages to be applied here.  We hold, 
however, that the Martins failed to establish the cost of repair 
to the lake and therefore did not meet their burden to prove the 
amount of damages with reasonable certainty. 
 
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The burden to establish the amount of damages with 
reasonable certainty does not require proof with mathematical 
precision; at a minimum, however, the claimant must present 
sufficient evidence to permit an intelligent and probable 
estimate of the amount.  Dillingham v. Hall, 235 Va. 1, 3-4, 365 
S.E.2d 738, 739 (1988).  This the Martins failed to do. 
 
The Martins merely presented evidence that it would cost 
$26,000 to remove 2,000 cubic yards of silt from the lake.  
There was no evidence, such as data or test results, regarding 
cubic yards of silt actually in the lake.  There was no evidence 
of any measurements or observations to determine the depth of 
the silt, or whether the condition spread over the entire lake 
bed or was limited to the area of the creek entrance.  At most, 
the Martins' evidence showed only that silt was present and that 
the Moores had been washing trucks nearby. 
 
Therefore, because the trial court erred in entering the 
money judgment, that portion of the final decree awarding the 
Martins $26,000 against the Moores will be reversed and final 
judgment will be entered here in favor of the Moores on the 
trespass claim.  The remainder of the final decree will be 
affirmed. 
Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, 
and final judgment.
 
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