Case Title: Jerry Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians

Citation: 2003 WI 118

Docket Number: 2001AP001256

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 118 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1256 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Jerry Teague,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of 
Chippewa Indians,  
 
Defendant-Appellant, 
First Financial Bank,  
 
Garnishee. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 17, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 7, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ashland   
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas J. Gallagher   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BABLITCH, BRADLEY, and SYKES, JJ., join 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Henry M. 
Buffalo, Jr., John E. Jacobson, Peter G. Griffin, and Jacobson, 
Buffalo, Schoessler & Magnuson Ltd., St. Paul, Minnesota, and 
oral argument by John E. Jacobson. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Beth E. 
Hanan, Andrew W. Erlandson, and Reinhart, Boerner, Van Deuren, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Beth E. Hanan and Andrew 
W. Erlandson. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Paul Stenzel and 
Stockbridge-Munsee Legal Office, Bowler; Kris Goodwill and Lac 
Courte Oreilles Legal Department, Hayward; Carol J. Brown and 
 
 
2
Brown & LaCounte, LLP, Madison; and Jennifer L. Nutt Carleton 
and Oneida Law Office, Oneida, on behalf of the Stockbridge-
Munsee Community, Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin, Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake 
Superior Chippewa Indians, and Oneida Tribe of Indians of 
Wisconsin. 
 
 
2003 WI 118 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1256  
(L.C. No. 
95-CV-130) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jerry Teague,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of  
Chippewa Indians,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
     and 
 
First Financial Bank,  
 
          Garnishee. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 17, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order denying a motion to reopen the 
judgment of the circuit court for Ashland County, Honorable 
Thomas J. Gallagher presiding.  Reversed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  This case is before the court 
on certification from the Court of Appeals, District III, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (1999-2000).1  The parties 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
01-1256   
 
2 
 
dispute whether a default judgment on the merits from the Bad 
River Band Tribal Court should be granted full faith and credit 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.245 when the same matter has also 
resulted in a judgment and orders from a Wisconsin circuit 
court.  This case was certified by the court of appeals in order 
to resolve the issue of full faith and credit left unresolved in 
Teague v. Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa 
Indians, 2000 WI 79, 236 Wis. 2d 384, 612 N.W.2d 709 (Teague 
II). 
¶2 
I would hold that the circuit court was required by 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245 to give full faith and credit to the tribal 
court judgment declaring the employment contracts at issue void 
and, thus, unenforceable.  Accordingly, I would reverse the 
order denying a motion to reopen the judgment of the circuit 
court, which awarded damages to Jerry Teague (Teague), and 
remand 
for 
dismissal 
of 
the 
complaint, 
along 
with 
the 
garnishment action brought on behalf of Teague.  Since my 
holding would resolve the underlying dispute, I need not address 
the Band's other claims of error.2  
                                                 
2 The Band also asserts that the circuit court erred by: (1) 
estopping the Band from arguing as an affirmative defense that 
the employment contracts had not received federal approval as 
required by the Band's corporate charter; (2) excluding all Band 
tribal members from the jury pool; (3) excluding exhibits 
submitted 
by 
the 
Band; 
and 
(4) 
refusing 
to 
give 
jury 
instructions requested by the Band. Since my determination 
regarding the full faith and credit issues resolves this case, I 
will not review these other claims of error. 
No. 
01-1256   
 
3 
 
¶3 
Teague commenced this action in the Ashland County 
Circuit Court against the Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe 
of Chippewa Indians (Band) for breach of employment contracts.  
While this action was pending, the Band brought a declaratory 
judgment action in tribal court seeking a declaration that the 
contracts were invalid.  Although Teague participated in 
discovery and was given proper notice of the proceedings, he 
refused to participate further in the tribal court proceedings.3  
On July 25, 1997, the tribal court held a hearing, reviewed the 
deposition transcripts and other discovery, which had been 
assembled in both cases, and granted the Band's motion for a 
default judgment.  The Bad River Tribal Court found that both 
the 1993 and 1995 employment agreements between Teague and the 
Band were void.  See Bad River Tribal Court Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order for Default Judgment (R. 103:51-
55). 
¶4 Though both the circuit court and tribal court were 
aware of suits in the other court, each continued with its 
proceedings. The tribal court proceeded to a hearing on the 
breach of contract claims and was the first to grant judgment. 
                                                 
3 While Teague acknowledged service of the Band's second 
amended complaint in this action, he failed to file an answer or 
responsive pleading or otherwise appear or participate in the 
proceedings. 
No. 
01-1256   
 
4 
 
The tribal court entered a default judgment against Teague.4  In 
the circuit court, Teague commenced a garnishment action after 
the circuit court had rendered its judgment awarding damages to 
Teague.  The Band unsuccessfully asked the circuit court to 
dismiss the garnishment action.  Teague v. Bad River Band of the 
Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 229 Wis. 2d 581, 599 
N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1999) (Teague I).  The Band then appealed 
the circuit court's judgment awarding Teague damages for breach 
of contract and, with leave of the court of appeals, appealed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
refusal 
to 
dismiss 
the 
garnishment 
proceeding. The court of appeals reversed the judgment and order 
on the grounds that the circuit court was required to give full 
faith 
and 
credit 
to 
the 
tribal 
court's 
judgment 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245.  Id.  The court of appeals did not reach 
other issues raised on appeal, because the finding regarding 
full faith and credit disposed of the case.  Id. at 584. 
¶5 
Pursuant to our comments in Teague II, and comments by 
the court of appeals, the circuit courts in the 10th Judicial 
Administrative 
District 
and 
the 
Chippewa 
tribal 
courts 
                                                 
4 In the tribal court proceedings the Band's counsel filed 
an affidavit that recited a telephone conversation that the 
Band's counsel had with Teague's counsel.  The affidavit states 
that on the 12th of May 1997 Attorney Joseph Halloran spoke by 
telephone with Michael Erhard, Teague's attorney, and Erhard 
informed Halloran that Teague did not intend to appear in these 
proceedings or participate in any fashion although he did 
acknowledge the service of process.  Written Tr. of Proceeding, 
Bad River Tribal Court (R. 103:56-67). 
No. 
01-1256   
 
5 
 
successfully drafted and agreed to protocols.5  It is important 
to note that at the time of the comity conference regarding 
jurisdiction, only the Draft Protocol was in existence.  The 
Final Protocol had yet to be adopted.  Although the Final 
Protocol retains much of the Draft Protocol, it specifies 
additional considerations in determining the allocation of 
jurisdiction 
(see 
Tribal/State 
Protocol 
for 
the 
Judicial 
Allocation of Jurisdiction Between the Four Chippewa Tribes of 
Northern Wisconsin and the Tenth Judicial District of Wisconsin,  
§ 7, 
Bad 
River's 
Appendix 
000225-000227 
(2001)). 
 
More 
importantly, the Final Protocol contains a mechanism for 
resolving deadlocks, such as the deadlock that occurred at the 
comity conference between the circuit court and the tribal court 
in this case (see Final Protocol, § 6(c)).6 Finally, it is 
                                                 
5 See Tribal/State Protocol for the Judicial Allocation of 
Jurisdiction Between the Four Chippewa Tribes of Northern 
Wisconsin and the Tenth Judicial District of Wisconsin (2001) 
(available 
online 
at 
http://www.wicourts.gov/media/pdf/tribal%20agree.pdf). 
6 Final Draft Protocol § 6(c) states:   
If the judges are unable to allocate jurisdiction 
at their conference as provided for in section 6(b), 
above, a third judge will be selected.  The judge will 
be selected from a standing pool of judges, composed 
of four circuit judges and four tribal judges.  
Circuit Judges shall be appointed to the pool by the 
Chief Judge of the Tenth Judicial Administrative 
District.  The Chief Tribal Judge of each Tribal Court 
which has approved this Protocol, or his or her 
designee, shall serve on the pool.  If fewer than four 
Tribal Courts approve this Protocol, then the Chief 
Judges of the Tribal Courts which do approve this 
Protocol shall jointly select a sufficient number of 
judges to bring the number of Tribal Judges in the 
No. 
01-1256   
 
6 
 
important to note that, at this time, the Final Protocol has 
application only to the tribes located within the 10th Judicial 
Administrative District.  The Final Protocol does not apply to 
all tribes and circuit judges throughout the State of Wisconsin.   
¶6 
As noted above, on remand the circuit court and the 
tribal court were unable, at a jurisdictional allocation 
conference, to resolve the central conflict in this case. The 
circuit court denied the Band's motion under Wis. Stat. § 806.07 
for relief from the judgment.  Both the tribal court and the 
circuit court refused to withdraw their earlier judgments.  The 
Band appealed the circuit court's decision to the court of 
appeals.  The Court of Appeals, District III, certified this 
case to resolve the full faith and credit issue left undecided 
in Teague II. 
                                                                                                                                                             
pool up to four.  All judges appointed to the standing 
pool shall remain in the pool until replaced.  In the 
event a case is referred to the pool, any judge who is 
a member of the pool and who is a judge of the Tribal 
Court or Circuit Court from which the referral arises 
shall be removed from the pool for purposes of that 
referral.  The parties shall then be given the 
opportunity to mutually decide on the judge.  If the 
parties cannot agree on a judge, each party shall be 
allowed to preemptorily strike one judge from the 
pool, and of those remaining one judge shall be drawn 
at random.  That judge shall join the two judges from 
the courts where the actions are pending, and a 
hearing de novo before all three judges will be 
scheduled.  At the close of the hearing, the judges 
shall deliberate and decide as set forth in section 
6(b), above. 
No. 
01-1256   
 
7 
 
I. FACTS 
¶7 
The relevant facts are not in dispute and were 
adequately set forth in detail in Teague II, 2000 WI 79, and 
are, therefore, set forth in a more summary fashion here.  
¶8 
The Band is a federally recognized Indian tribe, which 
possesses inherent powers of self-government over its members 
and its territory pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934 (IRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1983).  As a government, the 
Band is governed by two documents: the Bad River Band of the 
Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians Constitution adopted 
under Section 16 of the IRA, and a corporate charter issued by 
the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Interior pursuant to 
Section 17 of the IRA.  See 25 U.S.C. §§ 476 & 477 (1983). 
¶9 
The Band operates a tribal enterprise, the Bad River 
Casino, on its reservation in accordance with the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701.  Teague was hired in April 
1993 to manage the casino. He served as the casino general 
manager from April 1993 to July 1995. 
¶10 Teague's employment as gaming general manager was 
formalized in contracts drafted in 1993 and again in 1995. The 
1993 contract was for a three-year employment period and was 
signed by the tribal chairperson, Donald Moore, Sr.  The 1995 
contract was signed by Teague and Moore's successor, then tribal 
chairperson Elizabeth Drake, and provided for an increase in 
severance and bonus benefits.  While the tribal chair signed the 
1995 contract, the tribal council failed to ratify this 
agreement.  The Bureau of Indian Affairs did not approve either 
No. 
01-1256   
 
8 
 
contract.  Both contracts contained a clause that provided for 
disputes over termination of the agreement to be handled by 
arbitration, pursuant to Chapter 788 of the Wisconsin statutes.   
¶11 In the summer of 1995 Teague left employment with the 
Band and filed a suit in circuit court to compel arbitration on 
the 1993 and 1995 documents.7 
¶12 Teague commenced his action in the Ashland County 
Circuit Court, the Honorable Thomas J. Gallagher presiding, 
against the Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa 
Indians alleging breach of employment contracts.  In September 
1996 the Band made a motion to dismiss the case on sovereign 
immunity grounds, which the circuit court denied. Teague I.  The 
circuit court determined that the arbitration clause in the 
documents along with the "sue or be sued" clause in the Band's 
corporate charter, waived the Band's sovereign immunity.8  The 
Band did not appeal this ruling.  One month later, in October 
1996, the Band amended its answer to include an affirmative 
                                                 
7 The parties dispute whether Teague quit or was fired from 
his position as casino general manager.  However, this issue is 
not relevant to the resolution of the central issue in this 
case, 
regarding 
full 
faith 
and 
credit 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245. 
8 The circuit court found that the Band operated its casino, 
an economic enterprise, under its corporate charter not under 
its constitution. Since the corporate charter contained a "sue 
or be sued" clause, the Band could not invoke sovereign immunity 
in regard to its casino operations. Additionally, the circuit 
court found that even if the Band was acting in the capacity of 
a government, it implicitly waived its sovereign immunity by 
agreeing to an arbitration clause in both agreements, given that 
a dispute could not be arbitrated without this waiver. 
No. 
01-1256   
 
9 
 
defense, alleging that the employment agreements were invalid 
because they did not comply with the requirements of the Band's 
corporate charter.9  No objections were made to the Band's 
amended answer. 
¶13 In December 1996, while the circuit court case was 
pending, the Band filed a complaint in the Bad River Tribal 
Court seeking a ruling on the validity of the 1995 agreement, 
but subsequently amended the complaint to include the 1993 
agreement also.  In January 1997 the Band sought a stay in the 
circuit court proceedings contending that the validity of the 
contracts raised fundamental questions of tribal law.  The Band 
claimed that notions of comity and the tribal exhaustion 
doctrine necessitated that the Band have the first opportunity 
                                                 
9 The Band claimed, as an affirmative defense, that section 
5(f) of the federal corporate charter requires that contracts 
over $1,000 in any one year be approved by the United States 
Department of Interior before they can be binding on the Band, 
and that the agreements here were never submitted and never 
received approval. The Band also asserted that the corporate 
charter requires tribal council approval, which was not granted 
in regard to the 1995 employment agreement.  Apparently, there 
was also an issue raised, at least in the tribal court, over 
whether the 1993 agreement approved by the tribal council was 
different than the one executed by the tribal chairman. 
No. 
01-1256   
 
10 
 
to resolve the matter.10  The circuit court denied the Band's 
motion for a stay in February 1997. 
¶14 In March 1997 the Band filed a second amended 
complaint, which addressed the formation of the agreements, as 
well as the actual and apparent authority of the tribal chair to 
act on behalf of the tribal council.11  Teague acknowledged 
personal service of the Band's complaint and participated in 
discovery, but refused to participate further in the tribal 
court 
proceedings. 
 
Accordingly, 
Teague 
failed 
to 
plead 
responsively in the tribal court, failed to seek a stay of the 
tribal court proceedings, and failed to appear before the tribal 
                                                 
10 In general, the notion of comity refers to "the respect a 
court of one state or jurisdiction shows to another state or 
jurisdiction in giving effect to the other's laws and judicial 
decisions."  Black's Law Dictionary 262 (7th Ed. 1999). For 
example, 
in 
family 
law 
and 
child 
custody 
matters, 
Wis. Stat. § 822.06(3), requires a Wisconsin state court to stay 
its proceedings and communicate with a court of another state 
when the same action is pending in both courts. In regard to a 
tribal court, comity refers to the principle of allowing a 
tribal court to determine its own jurisdiction in the first 
instance.  See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 
(1987).  It is this principle that we discussed in Teague II and 
prompted the establishment of the Tribal/State Protocol for the 
Judicial Allocation of Jurisdiction Between the Four Chippewa 
Tribes 
of 
Northern 
Wisconsin 
and 
the 
Tenth 
Judicial 
Administrative District of Wisconsin. The doctrine of tribal 
exhaustion was established as a matter of comity. Teague II., 
236 Wis. 2d at 384.  This doctrine requires exhaustion of all 
tribal court remedies before a claim may be entertained by a 
federal court. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow 
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, (1985).  
11 Teague v. Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of 
Chippewa Indians, 229 Wis. 2d 581, 586, 599 N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 
1999) (Teague I). 
No. 
01-1256   
 
11 
 
court in order to challenge its personal or subject matter 
jurisdiction.  After due notice to Teague the Band filed for, 
and obtained, a default judgment in tribal court which declared 
the 1993 and the 1995 agreements void.12  While the circuit court 
was aware of the tribal court proceedings, it proceeded to grant 
a judgment to Teague after the tribal court had already granted 
its judgment.  Teague then sought to enforce the circuit court 
judgment through garnishment. 
¶15 The Band appealed both the circuit court's judgment, 
and its refusal to dismiss the garnishment action, to the court 
of appeals. That court reversed in 1999, concluding that the 
circuit court was required, based on Wis. Stat. § 806.245, to 
give full faith and credit to the tribal court's default 
judgment, which had concluded that the contracts were void and 
not binding on the Band. 
¶16 This court reversed the court of appeals' decision 
concluding that the issues of full faith and credit could not be 
considered 
until 
the 
issue 
of 
judicial 
allocation 
of 
jurisdiction pursuant to principles of comity was addressed.  
See Teague II, 2000 WI 79, ¶37.  As a result, the case was 
remanded for a jurisdictional allocation conference to apply the 
principles of comity.  This court ordered the circuit court and 
the 
tribal 
court 
to 
"confer 
for 
purposes 
of 
allocating 
                                                 
12  See Bad River Tribal Court Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order for Default Judgment (R. 103:51-55). 
 
No. 
01-1256   
 
12 
 
jurisdiction between the two sovereigns."  Id.  As noted 
previously, the circuit court and the tribal court met, but no 
agreement was reached. After the jurisdictional allocation 
conference, both the circuit court and the tribal court refused 
to reopen their respective judgments. 
¶17 The Band appealed the circuit court's decision to the 
court of appeals. The court of appeals, District III, certified 
the case to this court to resolve issues left undecided in 
Teague v. Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa 
Indians, 2000 WI 79, 236 Wis. 2d 384, 612 N.W.2d 709, (Teague 
II). 
II. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT——WIS. STAT. § 806.245 
¶18 The Band contends that this case should be dismissed 
because the circuit court failed to give full faith and credit 
to the tribal court's decision.13   
¶19 Teague, however, disagrees and argues that the circuit 
court properly exercised discretion to reaffirm denial of the 
Band's request for Wis. Stat. § 806.245 recognition of the 
tribal 
court 
judgment. 
See 
Pl.-Resp't 
Br. 
at 
25-40.  
Accordingly, Teague maintains that the circuit court's exercise 
of discretion should be affirmed because that court examined the 
                                                 
13 As noted previously in footnote 2, the Band raises other 
arguments.  We address the full faith and credit issue raised by 
the Band, which disposes of the case; therefore, the other 
arguments need not be addressed. 
No. 
01-1256   
 
13 
 
relevant facts, applied the proper standard of law, and reached 
a conclusion a reasonable court could reach.14 
¶20 In support of his argument Teague argues that the 
circuit court considered and applied the principles of comity 
established in Teague II and the various draft protocols in 
reaching its decision.15  He has also argued that the action was 
filed first in state court; therefore, the decision in that 
court controls.  As a result, Teague maintains that the circuit 
court duly followed the instructions of this court and applied 
principles of comity to the facts presented. To further support 
his position Teague maintains that statutory factors, under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245, 
do 
not 
prevent 
affirmance 
because 
resolution of this case does not depend on a question of full 
faith and credit under the statute.  Instead, Teague argues that 
given the unique nature and history of the parties' dispute, 
comity and jurisdictional allocation control, because the Teague 
II opinion did not address the statutory factors. 
¶21 I disagree with Teague's analysis of the statute.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 806.245 is titled, "Indian tribal documents: 
full faith and credit" and clearly applies in this case because 
                                                 
14 Teague argues that the circuit court convened the 
conference as directed by this court, observed mutuality and 
respect, solicited the views of the tribal court, and expressly 
found that the parties had contracted for a state forum and that 
the Band had no contract law. 
15 See the Tribal/State Protocol for the Judicial Allocation 
of Jurisdiction Between the Four Chippewa Tribes of Northern 
Wisconsin and the 10th Judicial Administrative District of 
Wisconsin. 
No. 
01-1256   
 
14 
 
the 
tribal 
court 
judgment 
meets 
all 
of 
the 
statutory 
requirements.  It appears that Teague does not dispute that the 
requirements of the statute are met; instead, he claims that the 
express terms of the statute no longer control this case. 
Teague's argument, however, misinterprets our opinion in Teague 
II. 
¶22 In Teague II this court directed the circuit court and 
the 
tribal 
court 
to 
consider 
comity 
and 
jurisdictional 
allocation issues.  We directed that comity issues be considered 
to resolve this matter before we would apply the statute.  While 
this effort was successful in helping to foster the process 
resulting in the adoption of protocols, and in encouraging 
communication between the tribal court and circuit court, it was 
unsuccessful in resolving these matters.16 We must, therefore, 
now apply Wis. Stat. § 806.245. 
¶23 This case requires the interpretation and application 
of the full faith and credit statute, Wis. Stat. § 806.245, to 
the facts.  This case, thus, presents a question of law that we 
review de novo.  Teague v. Bad River Band of the Lake Superior 
                                                 
16 Section 806.245 and the Final Protocol adopted in the 
Tenth Judicial Administrative District do not conflict with each 
other.  The desired result of the Final Protocol is that the 
allocation of jurisdiction is to be decided prior to a court 
rendering a judgment.  As a result, § 806.245 would only be 
triggered when both a tribal court and a circuit court have 
jurisdiction and one court has rendered a judgment, as in this 
case.  Jurisdictional disputes are addressed by the Final 
Protocol since it is anticipated that neither court would have 
yet rendered a judgment. (See Final Protocol, § 4 (all parties 
who commence an action in a circuit court or a tribal court must 
disclose whether there is any related action in another court)). 
No. 
01-1256   
 
15 
 
Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 2000 WI 79, 236 Wis. 2d 384, 612 
N.W.2d 709 (Teague II).  The goal of statutory interpretation is 
to discern and give effect to the intent of the legislature. 
County 
of 
Jefferson 
v. 
Renz, 
231 
Wis. 2d 293, 
301, 
603 
N.W.2d 541 (1999).  This court must first look to the plain 
language to discern intent.  Id. at 301-02.  If the language of 
the statute is plain and unambiguous, this court need not look 
beyond it to determine the meaning of the statute.  City of 
Muskego v. Godec, 167 Wis. 2d 536, 545, 482 N.W.2d 79 (1992). If 
the statute is ambiguous or unclear, this court may look to the 
legislative history and other extrinsic evidence to discern 
legislative intent.  Renz, 231 Wis. 2d at 302. In this case, I 
conclude that Wis. Stat. § 806.245 is clear and unambiguous.  I, 
therefore, 
apply 
the 
clear 
statutory 
provisions 
to 
the 
undisputed facts of the case. 
¶24 Wisconsin Statute § 806.245(1) provides: 
806.245. Indian tribal documents: full faith and 
credit. 
(1) The judicial records, orders and judgments of an 
Indian tribal court in Wisconsin and acts of an Indian 
tribal legislative body shall have the same full faith 
and credit in the courts of this state as do the acts, 
records, 
orders 
and 
judgments 
of 
any 
other 
governmental 
entity, 
if 
all 
of 
the 
following 
conditions are met: 
(a) The tribe which creates the tribal court and 
tribal legislative body is organized under 25 USC 461 
to 479. 
(b) The tribal documents are authenticated under sub. 
(2). 
(c) The tribal court is a court of record. 
No. 
01-1256   
 
16 
 
(d) The tribal court judgment offered in evidence is a 
valid judgment. 
(e) The tribal court certifies that it grants full 
faith and credit to the judicial records, orders and 
judgments of the courts of this state and to the acts 
of other governmental entities in this state. 
The 
statute 
reflects 
the 
belief 
that 
Indian 
tribes 
are 
considered 
"domestic 
dependent 
nations" 
and, 
therefore, 
"exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and 
territories." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi 
Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991). Under federal law, 
Indian tribes are separate sovereigns.  California v. Cabazon 
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, (1987).  According to the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 86, when courts of separate 
sovereigns both have jurisdiction over the same matter, the 
court first rendering judgment is commonly entitled to have its 
judgment 
receive 
full 
faith 
and 
credit 
by 
the 
other 
jurisdiction. 
¶25 While Teague has argued that this may result in a rush 
to judgment, and, therefore, that the "first to file" rule17 as 
established in Syver v. Hahn, 6 Wis. 2d 154, 95 N.W.2d 161 
(1959), should be implemented, adoption of that rule would be 
inconsistent with Wis. Stat. § 806.245 and was rejected by this 
court in Teague II. The statute is a declaration by the 
Wisconsin Legislature that state courts are required, if the 
                                                 
17 As adopted in Syver, the first to file rule states that 
when more than one circuit court of this state may have 
jurisdiction over a matter, the court in which the action is 
first filed retains jurisdiction.  Syver v. Hahn, 6 Wis. 2d 154, 
95 N.W.2d 161 (1959). 
No. 
01-1256   
 
17 
 
statutory conditions are met, to give tribal court judgments 
full faith and credit.  If a tribal court judgment, therefore, 
meets all of the statutory requirements, full faith and credit 
must be accorded to it.  As noted above, Teague has argued that 
the Syver "first to file" rule should apply in this case.  As we 
stated in Teague II this argument fails because unlike circuit 
courts within the state, which possess concurrent jurisdiction, 
tribal courts are courts of separate sovereign entities. State 
circuit courts, therefore, have no authority to limit, modify or 
control the power of the tribal court or vice versa. In this 
case the tribal court issued its judgment first; therefore, the 
question before this court is whether or not that judgment is 
valid and, therefore, entitled to full faith and credit under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245. 
¶26 In considering the statutory requirements contained in 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245(1)(a)-(e), I would find that all have been 
met in this case.  Wisconsin Stat. § 806.245(1) states that 
judgments of an Indian tribal court in Wisconsin "shall have the 
same full faith and credit in the courts of this state as do the 
acts, records, orders and judgments of any other governmental 
entity . . ." if certain conditions are met. (Emphasis added.)18  
In the lower courts questions were raised by Teague regarding 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245(1)(d), 
concerning 
the 
validity 
of 
the 
tribal court judgment in this case. 
                                                 
18 The 
conditions 
are 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245(1)(a) to (e).  
No. 
01-1256   
 
18 
 
¶27 In order to determine if a tribal court judgment is 
valid, I look to Wis. Stat. § 806.245(4), which includes six 
statutory requirements that must be met before the tribal court 
judgment 
will 
be 
considered 
valid 
as 
required 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245(1)(d).  
¶28 However, before applying the statutory requirements, 
it is important to discuss what occurred at the tribal court 
hearing.  Pursuant to the Band's motion for default judgment, 
notice was given of the motion for default judgment which was 
heard on July 25, 1997, at the Bad River Tribal Court, the 
Honorable Alton Smart, presiding.   A written transcript of the 
proceeding was made available on August 18, 1997.  Written Tr. 
of Proceeding, Bad River Tribal Court (R. 103:56-67). 
¶29 At the tribal court hearing, John Jacobson, an 
attorney in the firm Jacobson, Buffalo, Schoessler & Magnuson, 
represented the Bad River Tribal Council.  Jacobson presented 
the tribal court with a brief or memorandum in support of the 
Band's motion for default judgment and five exhibits.  He also 
presented proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
order for default judgment to the tribal court. 
¶30 The first exhibit presented by Jacobson was the 
acknowledgment of service of the second amended complaint in the 
matter, signed on March 25, 1997, by Michael Erhard, attorney 
for Teague. 
¶31 The second exhibit presented was an affidavit from 
Joseph F. Halloran, also an attorney in the Jacobson law firm.  
The affidavit stated that on the 12th of May 1997 Halloran spoke 
No. 
01-1256   
 
19 
 
by telephone with Michael Erhard, Teague's attorney, and Erhard 
informed Halloran that Teague did not intend to appear in these 
proceedings or participate in any fashion.  He did acknowledge, 
however, the service of process.  Apparently, it was Teague's 
view that his case in the circuit court against the Band might 
be jeopardized if he did participate.  
¶32 The third, fourth, and fifth exhibits presented were 
the transcripts of the depositions of Donald Moore, Elizabeth 
Drake, and Jerry Teague. 
¶33 Based 
on 
the 
information 
presented 
Judge 
Smart 
determined that the tribal court had jurisdiction, that Teague 
was served with a summons and a second amended complaint, that 
he failed to appear in the action, and that, he was, therefore, 
in default.  Written Tr. of Proceeding, Bad River Tribal Court 
(R. 103:56-67).  See also Bad River Tribal Court Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Default Judgment (R. 
103:51-55).  Upon reaching the conclusion that Teague was in 
default, Judge Smart stated on the record: 
I will approve that motion [Motion for Default 
Judgment] there to, with the Findings of Fact that 
have already been presented here, I have read through 
them already, looked at them already, they pertain to 
what the proceedings are here today.  Unfortunately, 
that Mr. Teague failed to respond to, to his right to 
be able to express his thoughts on these particular 
issues here at the Court at this time.  Court does 
find him in a Default Judgment. 
(R. 103:56-67) 
¶34 Having considered the tribal court hearing and that 
court's granting of a default judgment, I now turn to the 
No. 
01-1256   
 
20 
 
statutory requirements that must be met for the tribal court 
judgment to be considered valid in accord with Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.245. 
 
Teague 
has 
claimed, 
specifically, 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245(4)(c) and (d) were not satisfied in this 
case in that the judgment was not on the merits, and that it was 
procured by fraud and coercion.  I would review all of the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 806.245(4), which provides: 
806.245(4) In determining whether a tribal court 
judgment is a valid judgment, the circuit court on its 
own motion, or on the motion of a party, may examine 
the tribal court record to assure that: 
(a) The tribal court had jurisdiction of the 
subject matter and over the person named in the 
judgment. 
(b) The judgment is final under the laws of the 
rendering court. 
(c) The judgment is on the merits. 
(d) The judgment was procured without fraud, 
duress or coercion. 
(e) The judgment was procured in compliance with 
procedures required by the rendering court. 
(f) The proceedings of the tribal court comply 
with the Indian civil rights act of 1968 under 25 USC 
1301 to 1341. 
¶35 As noted above, in determining whether a tribal court 
judgment 
is 
valid, 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245(4)(a) 
requires 
the 
circuit court to determine that "[t]he tribal court had 
jurisdiction of the subject matter and over the person named in 
the judgment."  Generally, the minimum contacts analysis, which 
applies to an assertion by a state court of jurisdiction over 
No. 
01-1256   
 
21 
 
citizens of another state, established in Int'l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), has also been used when courts 
have considered the power of a tribal court to exercise 
jurisdiction over persons who are not members of the tribe.  See 
Hinshaw v. Mahler, 42 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1994). 
¶36 Here, I am satisfied that the tribal court had both 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction.  The case concerned 
purported contracts, which were signed on the Bad River 
Reservation for services to be performed on the reservation.  
For more than two years, Teague was in charge of the Band's 
biggest 
business.19 
 
He 
worked 
daily 
on 
the 
Bad 
River 
Reservation.  His employment contracts were signed on the 
reservation. 
 
Jurisdiction 
over 
such 
matters 
clearly 
is 
consistent with the minimum contacts requirement of Int'l Shoe, 
and with the Bad River Band Tribal Court Code.  Moreover, 
personal jurisdiction over Teague seems conceded by virtue of 
his counsel's acknowledgement of service of process of the 
Band's amended complaint. 
¶37 In addition, after service of the second amended 
complaint, Teague failed to file any responsive pleading, 
                                                 
19 Section 5(f) of the Charter provides that any contract 
involving payment of tribal corporate monies in excess of 
$1,000.00 in any one (1) year must be approved by the Secretary 
of the United States Department of Interior or his duly 
authorized representative.  In November 1993 the Defendant 
negotiated an employment contract (the 1993 Contract) with the 
Band to act as Gaming Manager at the Band's Casino.  See 
Findings of Fact numbers 7 and 14.  Bad River Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order for Default Judgment (R. 103:51-
55). 
No. 
01-1256   
 
22 
 
including one contesting jurisdiction.20  This seems inconsistent 
with the exhaustion requirements set forth in Iowa Mutual 
Insurance Company v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987), in that Teague 
failed, in any form, to contest the tribal court's jurisdiction 
over him or over the agreements at issue. 
¶38 Teague's contacts with the Band, the provisions of the 
tribal code, and his acceptance of service of process, gave the 
tribal court personal jurisdiction over him.  See Montana v. 
United States, 450 U.S. 544, (1981). 
¶39 With respect to subject matter jurisdiction, section 
106.1 of the tribal court code——the jurisdictional section 
invoked by the Band——gives the tribal court jurisdiction over 
"all actions arising out of events or occurrences on the Bad 
River Reservation". Resp't Br. of Band in Teague II, at 23 
(citing App. 0202).  It seems clear, based on undisputed facts, 
that there was subject matter jurisdiction in the tribal court.  
Section 112.2 of the Band's Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that upon failure of a defendant to appear at the time stated in 
the summons, the plaintiff may proceed to offer evidence 
                                                 
20  In the Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order 
for Default Judgment, Judge Smart concluded that: 
1.  The Defendant was served with a Summons and the Second 
Amended Complaint on March 25, 1997; and 
2.  The Defendant failed to appear at the time stated in 
the Summons, thus warranting the entry of default judgment 
pursuant to Rule 112.2 of the Band's Rules of Civil Procedure.  
Bad River Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for 
Default Judgment (R. 103:51-55). 
No. 
01-1256   
 
23 
 
including proof that the defendant was served with a summons and 
complaint and the court may render a judgment granting such 
relief as requested in the complaint that the evidence warrants.  
See Bad River Tribal Court Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order for Default Judgment (Finding of Fact number 2) (R. 
103:51-55). 
¶40 The 
next 
statutory 
requirement, 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245(4)(b), states that the circuit court may 
examine the tribal record to assure that "[t]he judgment is 
final under the laws of the rendering court."  Judge Smart's 
Findings, Conclusions, and Order, which were filed on August 18, 
1997, clearly seem to reflect a final decision of the case 
before him.21  Since no appeal was filed by September 17, 1997, 
the deadline for filing an appeal, the judgment of the tribal 
court is final for purposes of tribal court appellate practice 
as well. 
¶41 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.245(4)(c) 
states 
that 
the 
circuit court may examine the tribal court record to determine 
if "[t]he judgment is on the merits."  Here, the tribal court's 
judgment is valid on the merits notwithstanding the fact that 
Teague chose not to participate.  Under Wisconsin law a default 
judgment is considered to be a judgment on the merits, as to 
                                                 
21 See Finding of Fact of the Bad River Tribal Court 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Default 
Judgment (Finding of Fact number 3) (R. 103:51-55). 
No. 
01-1256   
 
24 
 
matters which were pleaded in the complaint.22  This court has 
held that the preclusive effect of a default judgment extends to 
"the material issuable facts, which are well pleaded in the 
declaration or complaint."  Klaus v. Vander Heyden, 106 
Wis. 2d 353, 359-60, 316 N.W.2d 664 (1982).  The specific 
matters pleaded in the amended complaint before the tribal court 
were: (1) that the purported contracts, executed by the tribal 
chairpersons, which Teague seeks to enforce were void because 
they had not been approved by the Bad River Tribal Council nor 
by the United States Department of Interior; and (2) that 
neither of the persons who signed the purported contracts could 
bind the Band based on the tribal constitution and corporate 
charter.  Judge Smart made specific findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on each of those points pursuant to Rule 
112.1 of the Band's Rules of Civil Procedure.  Those findings 
and conclusions were on the merits of the action before him.  
Teague's claim that since the circuit court was reserving for 
its 
determination 
issues 
covering 
the 
validity 
and 
enforceability of the contracts, the tribal court could not 
reach the merits of those issues, is without legal support.  The 
statute does not authorize a circuit court to deprive a tribal 
court of the right to decide such issues where the tribal court 
has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter involved. 
                                                 
22 When Teague was served with the tribal court's process, 
he had legal remedies available to avoid the effects of a 
default judgment.  He could have filed an answer, moved for a 
stay, moved to dismiss, or litigated the merits.  See Ness v. 
Digital Dial Communications, Inc., 227 Wis. 2d 592, 596 N.W.2d 
365 (1999). 
No. 
01-1256   
 
25 
 
¶42 Next, Wis. Stat. § 806.245(4)(d) permits the circuit 
court to examine the tribal court record to ascertain that 
"[t]he judgment was procured without fraud, duress or coercion."  
In his brief in Teague II, Teague advanced several theories to 
support his argument that "fraud" and "coercion" tainted the 
tribal court proceedings, so as to bar a grant of full faith and 
credit to the tribal court judgment.  First, Teague argued that 
the circuit court "believed that if the Band intended to expand 
its Tribal Court action, it should have first returned to state 
court."  Resp't Br., Teague II, at 38 (citing Pet'r's Br., 
Teague II, at 42).  Second, Teague maintained that "the Band's 
counsel failed to fully appraise the Tribal Court of the status 
of the state court proceedings."  Id.  He also maintained that 
he faced a dilemma as to whether to participate and litigate in 
two courts, and that this amounted to coercion. 
¶43 The Band submits that the extensive record in the 
tribal court is without any support for these claims.  I agree.  
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the circuit 
court directed the Band to return to state court before amending 
its pleadings in the tribal court.  In addition, the Band's 
counsel explicitly informed the circuit court that "I wouldn't 
want to be precluded . . . we'll have to consider whether or not 
we'll amend the complaint in Tribal Court," to which the Circuit 
Court simply said "Okay."  Resp't Br. of Bad River Band in 
Teague II at 38.  If Teague believed that the Band somehow 
improperly ignored the circuit court, it was incumbent upon him 
to inform either the circuit court or the tribal court or both. 
No. 
01-1256   
 
26 
 
¶44 Teague was represented by counsel throughout all of 
his court proceedings, including during the three depositions 
which were submitted to the tribal court.  Through counsel, 
Teague expressly declined to participate further in the tribal 
court proceedings.  At no time did he file any objection to the 
judge appointed to hear his case, or to the procedure in the 
tribal court, or any other aspect of the tribal court process.  
The Band's counsel sent Teague's counsel a copy of Judge Smart's 
August 18, 1997 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
for Default Judgment, and again no allegation of fraud, duress, 
or coercion was raised as to that record. 
¶45 Furthermore, as noted previously, in the tribal court 
proceedings, the Band's counsel filed an affidavit that recited 
a telephone conversation that the Band's counsel had with 
Teague's counsel.  The affidavit stated that Erhard, Teague's 
attorney, informed Attorney Halloran that Teague did not intend 
to appear in these proceedings or participate in any fashion, 
although he did acknowledge the service of process.  See Resp't 
Br. of Bad River Band in Teague II at 39.  During the motion for 
default judgment hearing, the Band's counsel pointed out to the 
tribal court that Teague did not file an answer or motions, and, 
therefore, he was in default.  The Band's counsel also indicated 
that while Teague had litigation pending in a different court 
that should have had no influence over Teague's decision not to 
participate in the tribal court proceedings.  Id. at 39. 
¶46 As a result of the affidavit and the presentation made 
to the tribal court, it is clear that the tribal court was 
No. 
01-1256   
 
27 
 
informed of the existence and nature of the circuit court 
proceedings.  There is nothing in the record to indicate that 
the tribal court was misled about the status of the circuit 
court action or that fraud was practiced upon it in any manner.  
Teague could have sought comity from the tribal court for the 
circuit court's actions, but he failed to do so.  If Teague 
thought that the tribal court was not "fully appraised," he 
could have done so, but did not.  Teague's claim that he was in 
a dilemma over whether to participate in the tribal court 
proceedings, and thus to have to litigate his claim in two 
courts, does not amount to coercion.   
¶47 The 
next 
statutory 
requirement, 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245(4)(e), authorizes the circuit court to 
examine whether a tribal court judgment "was procured in 
compliance with procedures required by the rendering court."  In 
this case, all of the pleadings, motions, service of process, 
notices and hearings appear to comply with those portions of the 
tribal court code that are referred to in the record before us.  
There is nothing to indicate anything out of the ordinary or 
irregular with regard to the record of the tribal court. 
¶48 Finally, Wis. Stat. § 806.245(4)(f) provides that the 
circuit court may examine the tribal court record to determine 
if "[t]he proceedings of the tribal court comply with the Indian 
civil rights act of 1968 under 25 USC 1301 to 1341."  The Indian 
Civil Rights Act imposes most of the requirements of the Bill of 
Rights on Indian tribal governments.  The affidavit of the 
tribal court clerk, Robin F. Powless, states that the Bad River 
No. 
01-1256   
 
28 
 
Band Tribal Court applies, and complies, with that Act and the 
record seems to reflect the same.  There is no suggestion that 
Teague was denied due process or equal protection.  It appears 
that he was afforded all of the rights required by the tribal 
court code.  The tribal court made reasoned findings and 
conclusions based on the record which was established, among 
other things, on depositions that Teague participated in, and 
during which he was represented by counsel.  
¶49 If the above statutory requirements are met, then full 
faith and credit is available under the statute.  Based on the 
tribal court record and the analysis reflected in the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Judgment, it seems 
clear 
that 
all 
of 
the 
statutory 
requirements 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245(4)(a)-(f) have been satisfied, and that the 
judgment rendered by the tribal court is a valid one. 
¶50 Teague argues that if he had gone to tribal court, he 
may not have received a fair hearing.  He justifies denying full 
faith and credit to the tribal court judgment on the absence of 
a jury system, lack of separation of powers, and no contract law 
for the Band. Nevertheless, neither the circuit court, nor 
Teague, has cited anything in the actual record of the tribal 
court proceedings that support the contention that full faith 
and credit should be denied on that basis. The Wisconsin 
Legislature has incorporated protections for a non-tribal member 
in Wis. Stat. § 806.245, while also respecting tribal court 
systems.  It is clear that the statute allows state courts to 
examine the tribal court record, but not to question the tribal 
No. 
01-1256   
 
29 
 
court structure beyond those conditions contained in the plain 
language 
of 
the 
statute.23 
 
The 
requirements 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245 are stated in mandatory, not discretionary, 
terms and require that full faith and credit be given to the 
tribal court judgment rendered here.  Wis. Stat. § 806.245(1) 
states, "The judicial records, orders and judgments of an Indian 
tribal court in Wisconsin . . . shall have the same full faith 
and credit in the courts of this state . . . ." (Emphasis 
added.)  Since the conditions required by Wis. Stat. § 806.245 
have been met, according full faith and credit to the tribal 
court's judgment is required. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶51 I would hold that Wis. Stat. § 806.245 requires the 
circuit court to give full faith and credit to the Bad River 
tribal court judgment declaring the employment agreements void 
and, thus, unenforceable.  As a result, I would reverse the 
order denying the motion to reopen the judgment of the circuit 
                                                 
23 As discussed earlier, Wis. Stat. § 806.245 requires that 
the tribe which creates the tribal court must be organized under 
25 U.S.C. 461 to 497, and be a court of record, for a tribal 
court judgment to be valid. In order for a tribal court judgment 
to be valid, the tribal court must have personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction, the judgment must be final, on the merits, 
procured without fraud, duress or coercion, in compliance with 
tribal court procedures, and the tribal court must comply with 
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 to 1341.  
Nowhere in this statute does it require or give the state court 
authority to inquire further into the structure or rules of the 
tribal court.  This statute ensures that a tribal court 
structure is in place, while recognizing tribal authority in 
these matters. 
No. 
01-1256   
 
30 
 
court, and we remand for dismissal of the complaint, along with 
the garnishment action brought on behalf of Teague. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded. 
No.  01-1256.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶52 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring). 
Like Justice Crooks (author of the lead opinion), I would 
reverse the order denying the motion to reopen the judgment of 
the Circuit Court for Ashland County and remand the cause for 
dismissal of the complaint, along with the garnishment action 
brought on behalf of Teague.  I reach the same result as Justice 
Crooks does in the lead opinion, but I use a different path to 
get there.24   
¶53 This is a case in which both a state court and a 
tribal court have exercised jurisdiction over the same dispute 
between Teague and the Bad River Band about termination of 
Teague's employment with the tribe.  Teague first commenced an 
action in the circuit court for Ashland County.  A second action 
was begun by the Bad River Band in tribal court one year later.  
Both courts had personal and subject matter jurisdiction.  
Though each court knew about the lawsuit pending in the other 
court, neither court communicated with the other.  Either court 
could have followed the judicial doctrine of abstention and 
deferred to the other court but neither did. 
¶54 The tribal court reached judgment first and the Bad 
River Tribe sought a stay of the proceedings in the circuit 
court.  The circuit court refused to stay its proceedings or 
enforce the tribal court judgment.  Instead, the circuit court 
also proceeded to judgment. 
                                                 
24 Justices William A. Bablitch, Ann Walsh Bradley, and 
Diane S. Sykes join this opinion.  This opinion is the majority 
opinion. 
No.  01-1256.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶55 The two courts reached opposite results.  Each party 
now wants this court to give effect to the judgment in its 
favor.  The Bad River Band wants us to enforce the tribal 
court's judgment in its favor.  Teague wants us to enforce the 
circuit court's judgment in his favor.  Tensions abound when 
jurisdiction is concurrent.25    
¶56 This is the second time we have been asked to resolve 
the dispute between Teague and the Bad River Band by deciding 
what effect should be given to each judgment.  The first opinion 
proposed that principles of comity must guide both the circuit 
court and tribal court when they are faced with the dilemma of 
concurrent jurisdiction.  The lead opinion concludes, in 
contrast, that the first court to reach judgment will be granted 
full faith and credit.   
¶57 In our first decision, Teague II, the court froze the 
action when both the circuit and tribal courts were exercising 
jurisdiction and before either court had reached a judgment.26  
At that moment, this court refused to apply the "prior action 
pending rule" from Syver v. Hahn, 6 Wis. 2d 154, 94 N.W.2d 161 
(1959), otherwise referred to as the race-to-the-courthouse 
rule.  That is, we refused to hold that the first court in which 
the action was filed (here, the circuit court) should be the 
                                                 
25 For a discussion of these tensions, see Judith Resnik, 
Multiple Sovereignties: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal 
Government, 79 Judicature 118 (Nov./Dec. 1995). 
26 Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of 
Chippewa Indians, 2000 WI 79, 236 Wis. 2d 384, 612 N.W.2d 709 
(Teague II). 
No.  01-1256.ssa 
 
3 
 
prevailing court by virtue of this timing alone.  When both 
courts were exercising concurrent jurisdiction, this court also 
refused to hold that the first court to reach judgment (here, 
the tribal court) should prevail.27  
¶58 In Teague II this court concluded, as I read the 
opinion, that when a state court and a tribal court exercise 
concurrent jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter and 
each 
court 
knows 
of 
the 
other's 
proceedings, 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245 is not yet applicable.28  Rather, each court 
should stop its proceedings, consult with the other, and as a 
matter 
of 
comity 
decide 
which 
court 
should 
proceed.  
Consequently, in Teague II we sent the case back for the two 
courts to get together and decide retrospectively as a matter of 
comity which court's proceedings should have gone forward. 
¶59 Unfortunately each court refused to give way and the 
case is back in this court. 
¶60 To resolve this deadlock, the lead opinion now freezes 
the action at a later point in time, when the tribal court has 
already reached judgment and the circuit court is still in the 
midst of conducting its proceedings.  Viewed at this moment, the 
lead opinion concludes that Wis. Stat. § 806.245 does apply.  
                                                 
27 Teague II, 236 Wis. 2d 384, ¶33 ("We are faced, then, 
with the unfortunate choice of ratifying either a "race to the 
courthouse" or a "race to judgment," a situation the legislature 
appears 
not 
to 
have 
contemplated 
in 
the 
enactment 
of 
Wis. Stat. s. 806.245.  Either choice would produce undesirable 
and unreasonable results, which we presume the legislature did 
not intend to encourage by the adoption of the tribal full faith 
and credit statute."). 
28 Teague II, 236 Wis. 2d 384, ¶¶37-39. 
No.  01-1256.ssa 
 
4 
 
According to the lead opinion, when both courts can exercise 
jurisdiction and  "one court has rendered a judgment,"29 the only 
remaining issue is whether that judgment, filed first, is 
entitled to full faith and credit under Wis. Stat. § 806.245.30  
¶61 By shifting to this later point in the proceedings, 
the lead opinion effectively undermines the decision in Teague 
II.  In Teague II we criticized first-to-judgment as a governing 
principle and decided that comity should be our guide;31 the lead 
opinion now adopts the first-to-judgment principle, giving 
effect to the tribal court judgment merely because it came 
first.  The lead opinion ignores the fact that the circuit court 
also reached a judgment arguably entitled to full faith and 
credit, just later. 
¶62 The lead opinion in the present incarnation of this 
case is unsupportable.  First, the statute says nothing about 
what a state court should do when an action is instituted in 
both a tribal court and state court and the tribal court reaches 
judgment while the case is still pending in the state court.  
The lead opinion rewrites Wis. Stat. § 806.245 when it concludes 
that the statute directs the state court to halt its proceedings 
and apply full faith and credit to the tribal court judgment.  
¶63 Second, the lead opinion has eliminated any incentive 
for tribal courts and state courts to cooperate with each other 
in cases of concurrent jurisdiction.  The lead opinion suggests 
                                                 
29 Lead op., ¶22 n.16. 
30 Lead op., ¶25. 
31 Teague II, 236 Wis. 2d 384, ¶33. 
No.  01-1256.ssa 
 
5 
 
that its interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 806.245 and the Final 
Protocol adopted in the Tenth Judicial District are not in 
conflict as the former applies only when one court has already 
reached judgment and the latter applies before either court has 
reached judgment.  Under the lead opinion's first-to-judgment 
principle, however, if either court disagrees with the decision 
reached under the protocol, or no protocol exists, each court 
can unilaterally take precedence by proceeding to judgment 
faster than the other court.  The lead opinion in the present 
case undercuts the Teague II decision and renders it a nullity.   
¶64 Third, 
the 
lead 
opinion's 
approach 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245 leads to a potentially absurd result.  That 
is, should a state court and a tribal court reach valid 
judgments at the same time, or both proceed to judgment unaware 
of the other's proceedings, the state court must give effect to 
the tribal court judgment and the tribal court must give effect 
to the state court judgment.32  Each courts' judgment has no 
effect in its own jurisdiction but is entitled to full faith and 
credit in the other court's jurisdiction.33  This result cannot 
be right.        
                                                 
32 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.245 provides that for a tribal 
court judgment to be given full faith and credit in state court, 
the tribal court must give full faith and credit to state court 
judgments. 
33 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.245(1)(e) provides that full faith 
and credit will be accorded to the laws and judgments of a 
tribal legal system only if the tribal legal system accords full 
faith and credit to the laws and judgments of the state. 
No.  01-1256.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶65 The issue here is which court properly proceeded to 
reach a judgment in this case despite its awareness that 
proceedings on the exact same dispute were taking place in the 
other court.  Consequently, our focus must return to that point 
in the proceedings, pre-judgment, when both courts became aware 
of the other's concurrent exercise of jurisdiction.   
¶66 I 
conclude, 
consistent 
with 
Teague 
II, 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245 does not apply at that moment in time.  
Rather, general principles of comity, including principles of 
abstention, must be used to resolve the jurisdictional dispute 
presented to us. 
¶67 As the lead opinion concedes, Wis. Stat. § 806.245 
does not address the situation of parallel proceedings in both a 
tribal court and a state court.34  The statute addresses the 
situation where a court, whether a state or tribal court, holds 
proceedings and enters judgment, and a party goes to a court of 
the other jurisdiction to enforce the judgment.  That situation 
is not this case.   
¶68 Moreover, as discussed above, if the state court 
interprets Wis. Stat. § 806.245 as a first-to-judgment rule, the 
result will be a race to judgment and state courts and tribal 
courts will have no incentive to work together in respect and 
cooperation to further the dignity of each court system and the 
orderly 
administration 
of 
justice 
when 
both 
courts 
have 
concurrent jurisdiction.  The lead opinion's application of 
§ 806.245 in such situations fosters competition rather than 
                                                 
34 See lead op., ¶22 n.16. 
No.  01-1256.ssa 
 
7 
 
cooperation between state and tribal courts; the lead opinion 
creates no room to use protocols to foster allocation of 
jurisdiction. 
¶69 Thus, this case must be governed by principles of 
comity, not Wis. Stat. § 806.245.  Comity is based on respect 
for the proceedings of another system of government and a spirit 
of cooperation.  Comity endorses the principle of mutual respect 
between legal systems, recognizing the sovereignty and sovereign 
interests of each governmental system and the unique features of 
each legal system.  It is a doctrine that recognizes, accepts, 
and respects differences in process.  The doctrine of comity "is 
neither a matter of absolute obligation nor of mere courtesy and 
good will, but is recognition which one state allows within its 
territory to legislative, executive, or judicial acts of 
another, having due regard to duty and convenience and to rights 
of its own citizens."35  Comity is discretionary, highly fact 
specific, and reviewable on appeal for erroneous exercise of 
discretion.   
¶70 In the context of state-tribal relations, principles 
of comity must be applied with an understanding that the federal 
government is, and the state courts should be, fostering tribal 
self-government 
and 
tribal 
self-determination. 
 
Through 
principles of comity, federal and state governments can develop 
an increased understanding of tribal sovereignty, encourage 
deference to and support for tribal courts, and advance 
                                                 
35 In 
re 
Steffke's 
Estate, 
65 
Wis. 2d 199, 
203, 
222 
N.W.2d 628 (1974) (quoting Hughes v. Fetter, 257 Wis. 35, 39, 42 
N.W.2d 452, 454 (1950), rev'd, 341 U.S. 609 (1951)). 
No.  01-1256.ssa 
 
8 
 
cooperation, 
communication, 
respect 
and 
understanding 
in 
interacting with tribal courts.36  "Central to tribal sovereignty 
is the capacity for self-government through tribal justice 
mechanisms. . . . [T]ribal justice systems are 'essential to the 
maintenance of the culture and identity of Indian tribes.'"37 
¶71 Against this backdrop, courts and 
scholars 
have 
developed a number of factors to help state and tribal courts 
determine, in the spirit of cooperation, not competition, which 
of two courts should proceed to judgment and which court should 
abstain and cede its jurisdiction.  Though the weight to be 
given each factor will vary from case to case, the factors to be 
considered include the following:38 
1. 
Where the action was first filed and the extent 
to which the case has proceeded in the first court.  
                                                 
36 The cooperative protocol adopted by the 10th Judicial 
District 
and 
tribes 
is 
an 
important 
advance 
in 
this 
jurisdictional dilemma.  See also Stanley G. Feldman & David L. 
Withey, 
Resolving 
State-Tribal 
Jurisdictional 
Dilemmas, 
79 
Judicature 154 (Nov./Dec. 1995). 
37 Janet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice 
Systems, 79 Judicature 113, 113-14 (Nov./Dec. 1995)(quoting 
Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25 U.S.C. 3601); see also Douglas 
B.L. Endreson, The Challenges Facing Tribal Courts Today, 79 
Judicature 142 (Nov./Dec. 1995); Raymond L. Niblock & William C. 
Plouffe, Federal Courts, Tribal Courts, and Comity: Developing 
Tribal Judiciaries and Forum Selection, 19 U. Ark. Little Rock 
L. Rev. 219, 227 (1997).  
38 I have compiled these factors from a number of sources 
discussing comity, allocation of jurisdiction, and enforcement 
of judgments.  See, e.g., Niblock & Plouffe, supra note 37, at 
237-39; Tribal/State Protocol for the Judicial Allocation of 
Jurisdiction Between the Four Chippewa Tribes of Northern 
Wisconsin and the Tenth Judicial District of Wisconsin (2001) 
(available 
online 
at 
http://www.wicourts.gov/media/pdf/tribal%20agree.pdf). 
No.  01-1256.ssa 
 
9 
 
2. 
The parties' and courts' expenditures of time and 
resources in each court and the extent to which the 
parties have complied with any applicable provisions 
of either court's scheduling orders. 
3. 
The relative burdens on the parties, including 
cost, access to and admissibility of evidence and 
matters of process, practice, and procedure, including 
whether the action will be decided most expeditiously 
in tribal or state court.  
4. 
Whether the nature of the action implicates 
tribal sovereignty, including but not limited to the 
following: 
a. 
The subject matter of the litigation. 
b. 
The identities and potential immunities of 
the parties. 
5. 
Whether 
the 
issues 
in 
the 
case 
require 
application and interpretation of a tribe's law or 
state law.   
6. 
Whether the case involves traditional or cultural 
matters of the tribe. 
7. 
Whether the location of material events giving 
rise to the litigation is on tribal or state land.   
8. 
The 
relative 
institutional 
or 
administrative 
interests of each court. 
9. 
The tribal membership status of the parties.   
10. The parties' choice by contract, if any, of a 
forum in the event of dispute. 
11. The parties' choice by contract, if any, of the 
law to be applied in the event of a dispute. 
12. Whether each court has jurisdiction over the 
dispute and the parties and has determined its own 
jurisdiction. 
13. Whether either jurisdiction has entered a final 
judgment that conflicts with another judgment that is 
entitled to recognition.  
No.  01-1256.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶72 In this case, principles of comity have been discussed 
but never properly applied.  The circuit court attempted to 
apply principles of comity when the Bad River Band sought a stay 
of the state court proceedings in January 1997.  The state court 
denied the Band's motion for a stay based on its belief that the 
case could not be resolved in its entirety by the tribal court, 
and on the grounds that the action was in state court first and 
was subject to Wisconsin state contract law.   
¶73 Moreover, on remand from Teague II, the circuit court 
and tribal court attempted to cooperate and select between their 
competing judgments through principles of comity.  Unable to do 
so, the circuit court again exercised its discretion in its 
March 27, 2001, order, concluding that "comity does not require 
that jurisdiction in this particular case be allocated to the 
tribal court." 
¶74 The circuit court's March 27, 2001, order concluding 
that maintaining jurisdiction in state court is appropriate 
identified and discussed several of the above factors.  The 
circuit court noted that the action was first filed in state 
court, that state court proceedings were relatively advanced by 
the time a jurisdictional allocation conference should have 
originally 
been 
held, 
that 
the 
law 
to 
be 
applied 
was 
predominately Wisconsin law, and that the parties' contractual 
choice of forum was state court.  While it appears that the 
contract 
had 
actually 
selected 
a 
choice 
of 
law 
(state 
arbitration law), not a choice of forum, the plaintiff selected 
the state court forum when he brought his action in the circuit 
No.  01-1256.ssa 
 
11 
 
court for Ashland County.  The plaintiff's decision about where 
to bring the action is properly entitled to great weight.   
¶75 I agree that these are appropriate factors for 
consideration and that, as identified by the state court, they 
favor state court jurisdiction in the present case.  
¶76 The state court's order, however, identified and 
discussed only those factors that weighed in favor of state 
court jurisdiction.  The state court never considered those 
factors that weigh in favor of tribal court jurisdiction, and 
the circuit court's failure to identify and balance those 
factors supporting tribal jurisdiction in the present case 
against the factors favoring state court jurisdiction was an 
erroneous exercise of discretion. 
¶77 In the present case, balanced against the factors 
identified by the circuit court, are the following factors that 
favor the circuit court ceding jurisdiction to the tribal court:  
(a) The nature of the action implicates tribal 
sovereignty.  The subject matter of the litigation is 
the power of the tribe to enter into a contract, as 
well as the potential immunity of the tribe.  
(b) The case also requires interpretation of tribal 
law.   
(c) The material events relating to the litigation 
occurred on tribal land.  
(d) The tribal court has an institutional interest in 
determining the validity of contracts between Indians 
and non-Indians, especially those involving contracts 
in which the tribe is a party and which relate to 
tribal business; here the contract was between the 
tribe and a non-Indian relating to gaming run by the 
tribe.   
No.  01-1256.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶78 Clearly, the decision in this case is difficult.  
There 
are 
factors 
that 
favor 
each 
court's 
exercise 
of 
jurisdiction.  Yet in the end, I must conclude that the 
principles of comity favor the circuit court ceding jurisdiction 
to the tribal court in the present case.   
¶79 The principles of comity applicable to state court-
tribal court relations are built upon the goal of fostering 
tribal self-government through recognition of tribal justice 
mechanisms.  Consequently, the significance of the plaintiff's 
choice of a forum and the application and interpretation of 
state law are outweighed by the fact that the litigation 
involves tribal sovereignty and the interpretation of tribal 
law, and that the material events occurred on tribal land.  
Moreover, the fact that the circuit court had conducted 
significant proceedings before the tribal court even began to 
hear the case is outweighed by the tribal court's institutional 
interest in determining the validity of contracts made with the 
tribe.    
¶80 Because the circuit court should not have proceeded to 
judgment, we now have only the tribal court judgment, and the 
issue is whether this judgment should be given effect under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245.  The lead opinion concludes that the 
tribal court judgment is entitled to full faith and credit under 
§ 806.245 by formalistically applying the enumerated factors 
under § 806.245(1).   
¶81 I am concerned, however, with this approach.  Although 
titled and incorporating the phrase "full faith and credit," and 
No.  01-1256.ssa 
 
13 
 
recognizing the sovereignty of tribes, the statute seems to be a 
blend of elements of constitutional full faith and credit, 
statutory full faith and credit, and comity. 
¶82 Indeed the statute has been described as being more 
akin 
to 
international 
comity 
standards 
than 
to 
federal 
constitutional 
or 
state 
statutory 
full 
faith 
and 
credit 
standards for state court judgments.39  As this court noted in 
                                                 
39 See David S. Clark, State Court Recognition of Tribal 
Court Judgments: Securing the Blessings of Civilization, 23 
Okla. City U. L. Rev. 353 (1998):  
Wisconsin and Wyoming enacted what they call full 
faith and credit statutes to recognize the judgments 
of their own state tribes, but in actuality these 
statutes function according to a comity standard.  
These states require that the tribes maintain an 
impartial court system according to an idiosyncratic 
list of four elements and that the tribal court in the 
case at hand correctly apply its own procedural law 
(which can be examined sua sponte by the court in 
Wisconsin). 
id. at 368-369 (citations omitted); Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-
Jurisdictional Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A 
Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. Rev. 311 (2000):  
Although many states dignify their policy with a "full 
faith and credit" title, most are more akin to 
international comity standards.  
 . . . . 
Wisconsin's legislature also inappropriately labeled 
its tribal court recognition statute "full faith and 
credit," when the statute more accurately embodies 
principles of comity.  The Wisconsin statute mirrors 
the Wyoming statute . . . .   
id. at 341, 344; Carol Tebben, Trifederalism in the Aftermath of 
Teague: The Interaction of State and Tribal Courts in Wisconsin, 
26 Am. Indian L. Rev. 177 (2001-02):  
No.  01-1256.ssa 
 
14 
 
Teague II, "Several commentators have indicated that the 
Wisconsin 
tribal 
full 
faith 
and 
credit 
statute 
is 
more 
accurately characterized as a codification of principles of 
comity rather than the statutory equivalent of constitutional 
full faith and credit."40  Persuasive authority characterizes 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245 as a comity statute that gives greater 
flexibility to both state and tribal courts in giving effect to 
the other's judgments than does the constitutional doctrine of 
full faith and credit.41   
¶83 Nevertheless, Wis. Stat. § 806.245 may not be a pure 
comity statute. The statute lists specific criteria under which 
a tribal court judgment would not be given "full faith and 
credit."  The criteria are broad, including the requirement that 
the tribal court proceedings comply with the Indian Civil Rights 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wisconsin's tribal full faith and credit statute 
encourages state court judges to honor decisions made 
in tribal courts, but allows state judges to evaluate 
tribal courts . . . and to grant full faith and credit 
on a discretionary basis.  In this sense, the statute 
is not written in the words of a full faith and credit 
requirement. 
id. at 184 (citations omitted).    
40 See Teague II, 236 Wis. 2d 284, ¶28 (citing Darby L. 
Hoggatt, The Wyoming Tribal Full Faith and Credit Act: Enforcing 
Tribal Judgments and Protecting Tribal Sovereignty, 30 Land & 
Water L. Rev. 531, 552-56 (1995); Recognition of Tribal Orders 
in Wisconsin: An Overview of State and Federal Law, Indian Law 
News (State Bar of Wisconsin, Spring 1999)). 
41 See William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law 173 (2d 
ed. 1988); Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 385 
(1982); Fred L. Ragsdale, Jr., Problems in the Application of 
Full Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7 N.M. L. Rev. 133 
(1977). 
No.  01-1256.ssa 
 
15 
 
Act, which requires the guarantees of equal protection and due 
process.42  It is not entirely clear, however, whether these 
statutory grounds are exclusive and thus limit a state court's 
discretion in applying the discretionary doctrine of comity. 
¶84 Despite these problems with the interpretation of the 
statute, I conclude that the principles of full faith and credit 
and 
comity 
stated 
explicitly 
in 
or 
embedded 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245 require us to enforce the tribal court 
judgment in the present case. 
¶85 For the reasons set forth above, I would reverse the 
order denying the motion to reopen the judgment of the Circuit 
Court for Ashland County and remand the cause for dismissal of 
the complaint, along with the garnishment action brought on 
behalf of Teague.       
¶86 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH, ANN WALSH BRADLEY, and DIANE S. SYKES join this 
opinion. 
 
                                                 
42 See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8). 
No.  01-1256.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶87 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  I believe that 
principles of comity constitute the proper approach in this 
case, and I believe the circuit court's discretionary decision 
based on those principles should be upheld.  For these reasons, 
I respectfully dissent. 
¶88 I agree with the characterization of the procedural 
status of the case in the majority opinion, and that, consistent 
with our holding in Teague II, the deadlock in this case should 
be broken by application of the principles of comity.  Majority 
op., ¶¶53-59, 65-69.  Unlike the majority, however, I conclude 
that the outcome resulting from application of those principles 
favors enforcement of the circuit court's judgment. 
¶89 The case now arises before the court for review of the 
circuit court's denial of the motion by the Bad River Band of 
the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians (the Band) to reopen 
the circuit court judgment.  The circuit court's determination 
whether or not to open a judgment under Wis. Stat. § 806.07 
(1999-2000) is discretionary and we will not overturn such a 
ruling unless we find an erroneous exercise of discretion.  
Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Krist, 104 Wis. 2d 381, 394, 311 
N.W.2d 624 (1981).  In our first decision in this case, Teague 
v. Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa 
Indians, 2000 WI 79, ¶35, 236 Wis. 2d 384, 612 N.W.2d 709 
(hereinafter Teague II), we held that comity "rests upon the 
exercise 
of 
sound 
judicial 
discretion." 
 
The 
majority 
acknowledges this standard as well, stating:  "Comity is 
discretionary, highly fact specific, and reviewable on appeal 
No.  01-1256.jpw 
 
2 
 
for erroneous exercise of discretion."  Majority op., ¶69.  
Thus, I believe it is appropriate that Judge Gallagher's 
application of and ruling upon the principles of comity receive 
deference.   
¶90 In Teague II, we found it objectionable to endorse 
either a "race to the courthouse" or a "race to judgment," and 
asserted that "[e]ither choice would produce undesirable and 
unreasonable results, which we presume the legislature did not 
intend to encourage by the adoption of the tribal full faith and 
credit statute."  Teague II, 236 Wis. 2d 384, ¶33.  Rather than 
endorsing either of these options, we held that the question in 
the case was "not a question of full faith and credit under the 
statute but of judicial allocation of jurisdiction pursuant to 
principles of comity."  Id., ¶34.   
¶91 On March 8, 2001, as a result of this court's decision 
in Teague II, the state court and the tribal court, along with 
the parties, gathered for a conference in an attempt to use the 
principles of comity to determine which judgment should be 
enforced.  After an extensive discussion, the circuit court 
denied the motion to reopen.  I believe this decision is 
supported by the facts of record and should be affirmed.   
¶92 I agree with the majority's assessment that this is a 
difficult case with factors cutting both ways.  Majority op., 
¶78.  Even accepting the factors for consideration listed by the 
majority in ¶71, I believe that the circuit court's ruling 
should be upheld.  I believe all of the relevant circumstances 
were discussed at the conference, and because we are reviewing 
No.  01-1256.jpw 
 
3 
 
an exercise of discretion, we should not second-guess the weight 
given to the factors.  Judge Alton Smart of the Bad River Band 
Tribal Court and Judge Gallagher, with full participation of the 
parties, discussed all aspects of the case, including the 
concerns of both courts relating to jurisdiction.  Based on this 
extensive discussion, the ruling by this court in Teague II, and 
the draft protocol provisions and associated materials available 
at the time, Judge Gallagher denied the motion to reopen, 
essentially affirming that the circuit court's assertion of 
jurisdiction was appropriate.   
¶93 Comity is grounded in the idea of mutual respect 
between courts; that does not mean that state courts must always 
concede jurisdiction to the tribal courts.  In Teague II, 236 
Wis. 2d 384, ¶35, this court stated: 
Until then [when protocols are developed], we must 
rely upon the traditional doctrine of comity, pursuant 
to which courts will as a matter of discretion rather 
than obligation defer to the assertion of jurisdiction 
or give effect to the judgments of other states or 
sovereigns out of mutual respect, and for the purpose 
of furthering the orderly administration of justice.  
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
This 
court 
has 
accepted 
the 
orderly 
administration of justice as a purpose underlying the comity 
doctrine.  If that purpose is to be given meaningful effect, 
state court jurisdiction should be found appropriate under the 
facts presented.  Here, the action in state court was filed 
first and proceeded for over a year before the Bad River Band 
even brought suit in tribal court.  Motions were ruled upon and 
extensive discovery had taken place in the circuit court action 
long before the action in tribal court began.  In fact, in 
No.  01-1256.jpw 
 
4 
 
ruling to deny the motion to reopen, the circuit court noted 
that it had ruled upon the waiver of sovereign immunity issue 
before the tribal court proceedings began.  At the conference, 
the judges and parties discussed the issue of the validity of 
the contracts.  Following the discussion, Judge Gallagher 
decided the contract predominantly dealt with state contract law 
and also found that the choice of forum clause in the contracts 
favored state jurisdiction. 
¶94 The finding of state court jurisdiction is in no way a 
statement regarding the ability of tribal courts to address 
cases such as this.  Judge Gallagher openly conceded that 
jurisdiction was concurrent.  Rather, the question is which 
judgment to enforce when both courts went ahead, cognizant of 
the other's proceedings.  I believe Judge Gallagher could 
appropriately 
find 
that, 
under the 
specific 
circumstances 
presented, the extent of the state court proceedings and the 
nature of action itself outweighed the factors favoring tribal 
court jurisdiction.  While members of this court may reach a 
different conclusion, our review is whether there is basis for 
the circuit court's decision.  Because I believe such a basis 
exists, I respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  01-1256.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶95 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
This 
case 
presents a wide array of delicate legal issues.  The issue on 
which the case turns is the applicability and interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245.  It is vital to place this issue in a 
factual context.43 
¶96 Jerry Teague was employed by the Bad River Band of 
Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians as its gaming manager 
from April 1993 to July 1995.  According to the statement of 
facts in Teague's briefs, Teague, a non-Indian, began work under 
the supervision of Tribal Chair Donald Moore.  Moore was pleased 
with Teague's performance and, after Teague had gone through a 
probationary period, Moore offered him an employment contract.  
Moore was apprehensive about his re-election prospects in the 
fall of 1993, and he wanted to assure continuity in the Band's 
gaming operation.  Moore believed that a contract providing 
Teague with severance pay would prevent Teague's arbitrary 
termination.  
¶97 In October 1993 Teague met with Moore and the Band's 
attorney, David Siegler, to discuss the terms of a contract.  
Teague insisted that the Band include an arbitration clause to 
avoid having disputes resolved in the Bad River Tribal Court.  
Moore and Siegler later drafted a document reflecting the 
parties' discussions.  
¶98 On November 2, 1993, Moore was defeated for re-
election.  The following day, the Tribal Council authorized 
                                                 
43 For an excellent statement of the facts in this matter, 
see Teague v. Bad River Band of Chippewa Indians, 2000 WI 79, 
¶¶4-16, 236 Wis. 2d 384, 612 N.W.2d 709 (Teague II). 
No.  01-1256.dtp 
 
2 
 
Moore to sign the Teague agreement with minor changes.  On 
November 5 Teague and Moore signed the 1993 contract——a three-
year agreement with an arbitration clause.  
¶99 Teague signed a second contract on March 15, 1995.  
The contract was co-signed by Elizabeth Drake, Moore's successor 
as Tribal Chair.  Teague and Drake worked well together, and the 
new chair agreed to renegotiate Teague's 1993 contract.  The new 
contract also had an arbitration clause. 
¶100 The Bad River Band disputes some of these facts.  For 
instance, the narrative in its brief indicates that one version 
of the 1993 agreement was approved by the Tribal Council but its 
terms were altered before it was signed by Moore.  The Band 
claims that this signed agreement was not reconsidered by the 
Tribal Council, and that the 1995 contract was never voted on by 
the Tribal Council.  
¶101 There 
is 
no 
dispute 
that 
neither 
contract 
was 
submitted to or approved by the Secretary of the United States 
Department of Interior or the Secretary's duly authorized 
representative.  The Band asserts that such approval was 
essential to the validity of the contracts. 
¶102 Teague was terminated by Tribal Chair Elizabeth Drake 
on July 18, 1995.  He brought suit on November 17, 1995, in 
Ashland County Circuit Court to compel arbitration under the 
1995 contract or, in the alternative, secure damages for breach 
of contract.  The Bad River Band was the named defendant in this 
suit.  The Band actively participated in the litigation, 
No.  01-1256.dtp 
 
3 
 
answering the complaint, asserting sovereign immunity, and 
resisting Teague's claim. 
¶103 In December 1996, 
approximately 13 
months 
after 
commencement of Teague's suit, the Band sued Teague in the Bad 
River Tribal Court alleging that the two contracts were invalid.  
It twice amended its complaint in that court.  Teague did not 
answer 
the 
complaints 
or 
participate 
in 
tribal 
court 
proceedings.  On July 25, 1997, the tribal court, Alton Smart, 
Judge, entered an order against Teague, holding the 1993 and 
1995 contracts "void and of no effect."  Teague was granted 20 
days from this order to request, in writing, that the matter be 
reopened.  On August 18, 1997, the tribal court issued written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in a default judgment, 
formalizing its July 25 decision.44  This was 21 months after 
Teague began his suit in Ashland County Circuit Court. 
                                                 
44 In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for 
Default Judgment, the Bad River Tribal Court found: 
 
Section 5(f) of the Charter provides that any 
contract involving payment of tribal corporate monies 
in excess of $1,000.00 in any one (1) year must be 
approved by the Secretary of the United States 
Department 
of 
Interior 
or 
his 
duly 
authorized 
representative; 
 
. . . .  
 
The 1995 Contract was never submitted to the 
United States 
Department 
of 
Interior, 
and 
never 
received approval from that Department . . . . 
The tribal court concluded that: "Because the 1995 Contract was 
not submitted to or approved by the Secretary of the United 
States Department of Interior or his representative, the 
Contract is void and not binding on the Bad River Band." 
 
No.  01-1256.dtp 
 
4 
 
¶104 On 
February 
12, 
1998, 
an 
Ashland 
County 
jury 
determined that the 1995 contract was enforceable.  The circuit 
court ordered arbitration, and on June 22, 1998, an arbitrator 
awarded Teague $390,199.42.  The circuit court subsequently 
confirmed and entered judgment upon this award in the amount of 
$395,343.12.  
¶105 This statement of facts is not complete in the sense 
that it does not record every argument, every motion, and all 
the skirmishes between the parties.  Nor is it totally 
consistent with the statement of facts in Teague II.  See n.1, 
infra.  If there were no tribal court judgment, the accuracy of 
the facts would be critical and we would be focusing our 
attention on legal arguments about the contracts, the evidence, 
the verdict, and the circuit court's judgment.  However, because 
of the tribal court's judgment, the focus shifts to Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.245. 
¶106 Section 806.245(1) provides that "The . . . judgments 
of an Indian tribal court in Wisconsin . . . shall have the same 
full faith and credit in the courts of this state as do 
the . . . judgments of any other governmental entity, if all the 
following conditions are met:" The issue presented, assuming all 
the conditions in the statute are met, is whether the statute 
required the Ashland County Circuit Court to give full faith and 
credit to the Bad River Tribal Court's default judgment, even 
though that judgment came 21 months after suit on the same 
subject matter was filed in the circuit court.  If the statute 
required the circuit court to extend full faith and credit to 
No.  01-1256.dtp 
 
5 
 
the tribal court judgment in late 1997, it presumably would have 
precluded the circuit court from conducting a jury trial in 1998 
regarding Teague's alleged contracts.  If the statute now 
requires the circuit court to extend full faith and credit to 
the tribal court judgment, it nullifies Teague's jury verdict, 
his arbitration award, and the subsequent judgment. 
¶107 The lead opinion by Justice Crooks gives § 806.245 a 
literal interpretation.  It finds the statute clear and 
unambiguous.  Lead op., ¶25.  It concludes that the statute 
"clearly applies in this case, because the tribal court judgment 
meets all of the statutory requirements."  Id., ¶21.  The lead 
opinion states: 
The 
statute 
is 
a 
declaration 
by 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature, that state courts are required, if the 
statutory conditions are met, to give tribal court 
judgments full faith and credit.  If a tribal court 
judgment . . . meets 
all 
of 
the 
statutory 
requirements, full faith and credit must be accorded 
to it. 
Id., ¶25. 
¶108 Chief Justice Abrahamson's majority opinion provides a 
different interpretation.  The majority opinion states: "In 
Teague II this court concluded . . . that when a state court and 
a tribal court exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the parties 
and subject matter and each court knows of the other's 
proceedings, Wis. Stat. § 806.245 is not applicable."  Majority 
op., ¶58. 
¶109 The majority opinion asserts that the lead opinion 
"rewrites 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245 
when 
it 
concludes 
that the 
statute directs the state court to halt its proceedings and 
No.  01-1256.dtp 
 
6 
 
apply full faith and credit to the tribal court judgment."  Id., 
¶62. 
 
"I 
conclude, 
consistent 
with 
Teague 
II, 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245 does not apply at that moment in time [when 
both courts became aware of the other's concurrent exercise of 
jurisdiction].  Rather, general principles of comity, including 
principles 
of 
abstention, 
must 
be 
used 
to 
resolve 
the 
jurisdictional dispute presented to us."  Id., ¶66.  The 
majority opinion then devises a list of 13 factors to consider 
in determining which court should proceed to judgment.   
¶110 The 
majority 
opinion 
offers 
persuasive, 
logical 
reasons why § 806.245 does not apply to this case, and it 
provides a solid justification for examining the legislative 
history of the statute.  In Teague II, the court cited some of 
the statute's legislative history but did not give a full 
picture.  See Teague II, 236 Wis. 2d 384, ¶¶26-27. 
¶111 Section 806.245 became part of the Wisconsin Statutes 
in May 1982.  Representative Sharon Metz of Green Bay authored 
1981 Assembly Bill 825, which ultimately became Chapter 369, 
Laws of 1981.  The bill is marked as "LRB-3605/4," meaning that 
it was the 3605th bill request of the 1981 legislative session 
and that the fourth draft of the bill was the one introduced. 
¶112 The bill evolved in the drafting and amendment process 
from a draft applying to the judgments of all tribes to a bill 
applying only to the judgments of the Menominee Indian Tribe of 
Wisconsin.  After its introduction on October 6, 1981, the bill 
was successfully amended four times.  The amendments limited the 
No.  01-1256.dtp 
 
7 
 
bill's application to the Menominee Tribe,45 required that the 
full faith and credit in the bill be reciprocal,46 beefed up 
subsection (3) to require a determination by the circuit court 
that the tribal court is a court of record, and added paragraph 
(f) to subsection (4) to require tribal court compliance with 
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. 
¶113 1981 Assembly Bill 825 was not a product of the 
Legislative Council.  In the Assembly, it was referred to the 
Committee on Criminal Justice and Public Safety, not the 
Judiciary Committee.  The bill spent only one day in the 
Senate's Judiciary and Consumer Affairs Committee near the end 
                                                 
45 According to a memo from Shaun Haas, Senior Staff 
Attorney of the Wisconsin Legislative Council, to Representative 
David Travis, Chair of the Assembly Committee on Criminal 
Justice and Public Safety, the amendment limiting the bill to 
the Menominee Tribe was supported by the Wisconsin Department of 
Justice, 
represented 
by 
Assistant 
Attorney 
General 
John 
Niemisto.  Haas wrote: 
Assembly Amendment 1 makes the Bill applicable 
only to the Menominee Indian Tribe.  The Amendment 
responds to criticism that only the Menominee Tribe 
presently has the judicial capacity to implement the 
full faith and credit provisions of the Bill and that 
the Bill should apply to other tribes only when their 
judicial branches have reached a similar advanced 
stage of development. 
Wisconsin Legislative Council Staff Memorandum from Shaun Haas 
to Representative David Travis dated February 11, 1982, of 
Legislative Council file on 1981 A.B. 825. 
46 See 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245(1)(e). 
 
This 
language 
was 
requested 
by 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Justice. 
 
See 
Legislative Reference Bureau drafting file on chapter 369, Laws 
of 1981. 
No.  01-1256.dtp 
 
8 
 
of the legislative session and then passed the Senate on a voice 
vote.   
¶114 In 
the 
1989 
session, 
the 
Legislative 
Council 
established an Advisory Committee on Tribal Courts.  The 
Advisory Committee and the American Indian Study Committee 
produced a draft leading to 1989 Assembly Bill 454, introduced 
by the Legislative Council.  This bill had an extensive 
Prefatory Note, which included the following statements: 
 
Current s. 806.245, stats., requires Wisconsin 
courts to give full faith and credit to proceedings of 
the Menominee tribal court and acts of the Menominee 
tribal legislature.  The doctrine of full faith and 
credit requires a court to give the same force and 
effect to the judgments of another jurisdiction as it 
does to its own judgments.  Most often, full faith and 
credit applies to the use of judgments in a collateral 
proceeding, such as when a decree of divorce in one 
state's court is taken into another state's court to 
obtain the division of property located in the 2nd 
state. 
. . . .  
The purpose of this bill is to extend the 
application of the current statute to all tribes in 
Wisconsin which have established a tribal court. 
The bill clarifies the language of the statute 
and repeals 4 of the conditions which are imposed in 
present 
s. 
806.245(4), 
stats., 
on 
state 
court 
recognition of the proceedings of a tribal court.  The 
4 repealed conditions relate to: whether the judgment 
is on the merits; the absence of fraud, duress or 
coercion; compliance with tribal court procedures; and 
compliance with the Indian civil rights act.  Although 
the current statute refers to full faith and credit, 
these conditions are not consistent with the doctrine 
of full faith and credit.  Full faith and credit 
obliges one court to accept the judgments of another 
court, and these 4 conditions permit the state court 
to undertake a substantial review of the grounds for 
No.  01-1256.dtp 
 
9 
 
the tribal court judgment and the procedures followed 
by the tribal court. 
Prefatory Note to 1989 A.B. 454, 1-2 (emphasis added). 
 
¶115 The Assembly approved 1989 Assembly Bill 454 after 
defeating an amendment to delete the repeal of paragraphs (c) 
through (f) of subsection (4), but the bill was never given a 
hearing or taken up by the Senate. 
¶116 In 1991 the Legislative Council introduced a new bill, 
1991 Assembly Bill 260.  This bill abandoned the effort to 
repeal the paragraphs in subsection (4) and was passed without 
amendment to become 1991 Wisconsin Act 43.   
¶117 I draw several conclusions from this history.  First, 
the legislature did not intend that § 806.245 replicate Article 
IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution.47  The 
legislature rejected the principle of constitutional full faith 
and credit when it added conditions for full faith and credit to 
1981 Assembly Bill 825 in 1982 and when it declined to pass 1989 
Assembly Bill 454 in 1990. 
¶118 Second, 
the 
legislature 
reserves 
the 
right 
to 
determine whose tribal judgments, if any, will be recognized and 
the conditions under which they will be recognized.  The 
legislature declined to apply the bill to all tribal courts.  In 
the beginning, it extended "full faith and credit" only to the 
Menominee Tribe; later it extended "full faith and credit" only 
                                                 
47 Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution 
reads as follows: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each 
state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of 
every other state.  And the Congress may by general laws 
prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings 
shall be proved, and the effect thereof." 
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10 
 
to the judgments of other tribes and bands in Wisconsin.  The 
legislature's 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
in 
recognizing 
the 
judgments of particular tribes stands in sharp contrast to the 
State's constitutional obligation to extend full faith and 
credit to the judgments of other states. 
¶119 Third, the Bad River Band would be hard pressed to 
prove that the Wisconsin legislature ever contemplated a 
situation 
involving 
concurrent 
jurisdiction 
and 
competing 
judgments.  Our court has already acknowledged as much.  Teague 
II, 236 Wis. 2d 384, ¶33. 
¶120 The Bad River Band seeks a "full faith and credit" 
equivalent to the full faith and credit between two states.  It 
is in effect asking this court to hold that the Wisconsin 
legislature intended to accord judgments of the Bad River Tribal 
Court on any subject the same status as judgments of courts in, 
say, Michigan and Minnesota.  The reasonableness of this 
proposition may be judged by looking at the evidence presented 
to the legislature by the Advisory Committee on Tribal Courts. 
¶121 The Advisory Committee conducted a survey of Wisconsin 
tribal courts in 1988.  Four of the state's tribes and bands 
indicated that they did not have a tribal court.48 
¶122 The Bad River Band answered several of the survey 
questions as follows: 
Under what authority is the tribal court established? 
                                                 
48 The four tribes were listed as "Forest County Potawatomi, 
Oneida, 
Stockbridge-Munsee, 
Winnebago 
[now 
Ho-Chunk]."  
Wisconsin Legislative Council, Report No. 8 to the 1989 
Legislature, p. 17. 
No.  01-1256.dtp 
 
11 
 
 
 
Constitution and bylaws 
When was the tribal court first established? 
 
1979 (also operated previously) 
. . . .  
What subjects are within the jurisdiction of the 
tribal court? 
Natural resources, water and sewer, 
bingo, 
land 
leases, 
name 
changes, 
marriages 
What subjects are not within the jurisdiction of the 
tribal court? 
 
 
Criminal, traffic 
How many judges does the tribal court have? 
 
Two 
Is there a chief judge? 
 
 
Yes 
Does the tribal court have reserve judges? 
 
 
No 
Are the tribal judges employed full-time or part-time? 
 
 
Part-time 
Are the tribal judges elected or appointed to their 
positions? 
 
 
Appointed 
If 
tribal 
judges 
are 
appointed, 
who 
makes 
the 
appointment? 
 
Tribal Council 
For what period of time is a tribal judge elected or 
appointed? 
 
 
Two years 
No.  01-1256.dtp 
 
12 
 
Is there any limitation on the number of terms a 
tribal judge may serve? 
 
 
None 
What qualifications must a tribal judge have? 
 
 
25 years old, general knowledge of Bad
 
River laws 
How many of the current tribal judges are lawyers? 
 
None 
What kind of training do the tribal judges participate 
in either before or during their tenure as tribal 
judge? 
Various other training programs [not 
National Judicial College, Reno, NE, or 
National 
Indian 
Justice 
Center, 
Petalima, CA, or American Indian Lawyer 
Training Program] 
. . . .  
Does the tribal court have written rules of procedure? 
 
Yes 
Are final judgments of the tribal court reviewable by 
a higher court or other appellate review? 
 
 
Yes 
If so, describe the nature of the review. 
Three-judge panel appointed by Tribal 
Council 
Wisconsin Legislative Council, Report No. 8 to the 1989 
Legislature, 18-21, 23. 
 
¶123 Today, Wisconsin tribal courts are more mature and 
sophisticated than they once were.  Even so, given the structure 
of some tribes and bands, there are lingering concerns about 
judicial independence.  In truth, there is little evidence that 
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13 
 
the Wisconsin legislature understood in 1991 the possible 
ramifications 
of 
§ 806.245 
for 
this 
state's 
courts 
and 
sovereignty. 
¶124 This court needs to consider questions that it has 
never faced before.  For instance, are there any circumstances 
in which a Wisconsin circuit court may refuse to give full faith 
and credit to a tribal court judgment if all the conditions in 
§ 806.245 are met and there is no competing circuit court action 
or judgment?  The majority opinion does not answer this 
question, while the lead opinion appears to say "no." 
 
¶125 Suppose, for example, a tribal member suffers injury 
and damages on account of the negligence of a Wisconsin local 
government employee acting in an official capacity on tribal 
land.  May the tribal member sue the local government employee 
in tribal court?  If the answer is yes, suppose the tribal court 
refuses 
to 
apply 
the 
limitations 
on 
liability 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80.  Would the circuit court be bound by 
§ 806.245 to give full faith and credit to the tribal court 
judgment? 
 
¶126 The circuit court might look to § 806.245(4)(a) to 
determine whether the tribal court had jurisdiction of the 
subject matter and over the person named in the judgment.  Even 
under constitutional full faith and credit, the court of one 
state may examine whether the other state had jurisdiction to 
decide the case.  See Underwriters Nat'l Assurance v. North 
Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 
691, 704-05 (1982).  Our hypothetical assumes, however, that all 
No.  01-1256.dtp 
 
14 
 
the conditions in the statute have been satisfied, including 
jurisdiction.  It should be noted, parenthetically, that each 
tribe or band determines the jurisdiction of its own court, so 
long as that jurisdiction conforms to any limitations imposed by 
federal law. 
 
¶127 The bottom line is this: If a Wisconsin court were to 
extend full faith and credit to the judgment of the tribal court 
in this hypothetical circumstance, it would treat one of our 
citizens differently from the way it would treat the rest of our 
citizens, and it would disregard the conditions the legislature 
has set on tort suits against our own local governments.  In my 
view, the text of § 806.245 does not provide the answer to how a 
Wisconsin court should proceed. 
 
¶128 Wisconsin has been given concurrent jurisdiction over 
civil causes of action to which Indians are parties that arise 
in the areas of Indian Country in Wisconsin.  See Public Law 
280, as codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a).  In my view, § 806.245 
does not require Wisconsin courts to yield this jurisdiction and 
extend full faith and credit to a tribal court judgment in every 
circumstance.  Our legislature would not expect or intend that 
Wisconsin courts subordinate Wisconsin laws and policies or 
undercut Wisconsin courts if a tribal court judgment intruded 
too deeply into an area of fundamental concern.  See Ruth B. 
Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The 
Last-In-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 
798, 832 (1969).   
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15 
 
¶129 The legislature probably did not consider the present 
situation, but that does not necessarily mean that the statute 
does not apply.  The court should apply the statute, giving it a 
reasonable construction. 
 
¶130 The statute provides that "judgments of an Indian 
tribal court in Wisconsin . . . shall have the same full faith 
and credit in the courts of this state as . . . the judgments of 
any other governmental entity."  (Emphasis added).  What does 
the phrase "judgments of any other governmental entity" mean?  
We have already established that "judgments of any other 
governmental entity" does not mean the judgments of another 
state, for § 806.245 does not require a circuit court to treat 
judgments of a Wisconsin tribal court the same as judgments of 
another state.  Quebec, Canada, and Chiapas, Mexico, are 
governmental entities, but Wisconsin courts are not required to 
give full faith and credit to the judgments of these foreign 
governmental entities.  The Navajo Tribe and the San Carlos 
Apache Tribe are governmental entities, but § 806.245 does not 
require that circuit courts accord full faith and credit to the 
judgments of these out-of-state tribes.49  A Wisconsin municipal 
court is a governmental entity, but the judgments of a municipal 
court 
are 
often 
subject 
to 
a 
de 
novo 
trial. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4).  Clearly, the phrase "judgments of any 
other governmental entity" needs construction. 
                                                 
49 By contrast, Wis. Stat. § 806.245(1) appears to state 
that the acts of any Indian tribal legislative body shall have 
the same full faith and credit in the courts of this state as do 
the acts of any other governmental entity. 
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16 
 
¶131 In my view, until the legislature clarifies its 
intent, judgments of a Wisconsin tribal court should be treated 
the same as judgments of a Wisconsin circuit court.  Under this 
theory, the Ashland County Circuit Court's invocation of Syver 
v. Hahn, 6 Wis. 2d 154, 94 N.W.2d 161 (1959), which embodies the 
"prior action pending rule," makes perfect sense and should have 
been affirmed, leaving only legal issues about the merits of the 
circuit court's judgment. 
¶132 In Teague II, we held otherwise, stating that "the 
prior action pending rule of Syver does not apply to these 
circumstances because an Indian tribal court is a court of an 
independent sovereign."  Teague II, 236 Wis. 2d 384, ¶2.  Teague 
II provided the following analysis: 
 
The 
statute 
is 
notably 
silent 
as 
to 
the 
jurisdictional validity of a tribal judgment that is 
rendered while an earlier-filed state court action 
regarding the same subject matter is pending.  Teague 
argues for the application of the general rule 
governing jurisdictional tug-of-wars between courts of 
concurrent jurisdiction within the state.  It is well-
established in Wisconsin that when two courts possess 
jurisdiction over a particular subject matter and one 
of 
the 
courts 
has 
assumed 
jurisdiction, 
it 
is 
reversible 
error 
for 
the 
other 
to 
also 
assume 
jurisdiction.  Syver, 6 Wis. 2d at 154.; State ex rel. 
White v. District Court, 262 Wis. 139, 143, 54 
N.W.2d 189 (1952); Kusick v. Kusick, 243 Wis. 135, 
138, 9 N.W.2d 607 (1943). 
 
Teague contends that this "prior action pending" 
rule should apply to the tribal court in this case 
because the tribal court is a court of concurrent 
jurisdiction under Public Law 280.  True, there is 
concurrent subject matter jurisdiction in state and 
tribal court by virtue of Public Law 280.  But it does 
not follow from the fact of concurrent subject matter 
jurisdiction that the prior action pending rule of 
Syver should apply. 
No.  01-1256.dtp 
 
17 
 
 
The 
cases 
Teague 
cites 
are 
distinguishable 
because they involve jurisdictional conflicts between 
Wisconsin courts of concurrent jurisdiction. . . .  
Here, although the tribal court is located within the 
geographic boundaries of the state, it is not a 
Wisconsin court; it is the court of an independent 
sovereign.  Although full faith and credit here is 
statutory and conditional rather than constitutional 
and presumed, it would be incorrect, given the tribe's 
sovereign status, to apply a state court common law 
rule to find an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction 
by the tribal court. 
 
In addition, applying the prior action pending 
rule to deprive tribal court judgments of full faith 
and credit under Wis. Stat. § 806.245 would distort 
the purposes of Public Law 280.  Public Law 280 was 
not designed to deprive tribal courts of jurisdiction 
where they properly have it. . . .  
 
Accordingly, we decline to extend the prior 
action pending rule of Syver to these circumstances. 
Teague II, 236 Wis. 2d at ¶¶29-33. 
 
¶133 In retrospect, this analysis misses the point.  The 
fact that a Wisconsin Indian tribe is "an independent sovereign" 
does not dictate the applicable law.  The intent of the 
Wisconsin 
legislature 
dictates 
the 
applicable 
law. 
 
The 
legislature intended to treat the judgments of a Wisconsin 
tribal court the "same" as the judgments of a Wisconsin circuit 
court, not superior to a Wisconsin circuit court.  Section 
806.245 should not be construed to deprive Wisconsin courts of 
jurisdiction that has been expressly given to them by Congress. 
¶134 Whether Jerry Teague is entitled to his circuit court 
judgment is dependent upon the favorable resolution of several 
outstanding legal issues not addressed by this court.  But he 
should not lose his judgment because of a misconstruction of 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245. 
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