Case Title: Panda Energy International v. E. Leon Jacobs, Jr.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC01-284

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC01-284
____________
PANDA ENERGY INTERNATIONAL,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
vs.
E. LEON JACOBS, JR., et al. as the FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION,
Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
[February 21, 2002]
PER CURIAM
We have on appeal a decision of the Florida Public Service Commission
("PSC") relating to its order granting a determination of need to Florida Power
Corporation ("FPC") for the construction of a 530-megawatt electrical power plant. 
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the PSC's order.
BACKGROUND 
Panda Energy International, Inc. ("Panda") challenges the PSC's order
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granting a determination of need for a 530-megawatt electrical power plant that FPC
proposes to build in Polk County, Florida, referred to as the "Hines 2" power
plant.  Panda raises the following issues before this Court:  (1) whether the PSC
abused its discretion in limiting Panda's opportunity to conduct discovery and in
denying Panda's motion for a continuance after the PSC granted Panda intervenor
status; (2) whether the PSC applied an incorrect standard in determining the need
for the Hines 2 power plant based on this Court's decision in Tampa Electric Co. v.
Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 2000); and (3) whether the PSC's finding that FPC's
bidding process complied with Florida Administrative Code Rule 25-22.082 is
supported by competent substantial evidence.
 
Before seeking regulatory approval to build Hines 2, FPC engaged in an
analysis of its need, and determined that the Hines 2 power plant presented the
most cost-effective option.  After completing this internal review, FPC issued a
request for proposals ("RFP"), inviting independent power producers and others to
offer superior alternatives to Hines 2.  Ultimately, thirteen bidders (not including
FPC) gave notice of their intent to submit a bid.  However, when the time came to
actually submit a bid, only two bidders--including Panda--submitted bids on the
project.  
FPC ultimately rejected Panda's proposal based on its determination that
1.  As found by the PSC:  "Panda's initial offering was for 250 MW
[("megawatts")] for two years, with options to extend for one year periods for up
to three additional years.  Panda supplemented its initial offering with an additional
250 MW block of power following meetings with FPC.  This was done at FPC's
request to match FPC's needed capacity.  Panda's second 250 MW block of
power was more costly than the initial 250 MW offering."
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both bids submitted in the RFP process were inferior to FPC's proposed
alternative that it could build itself (the "self-build" alternative).1  Although Panda's
proposal was the next most cost-effective proposal to FPC's self-build alternative,
FPC concluded that Panda's proposal would have cost FPC's ratepayers over $60
million more than its Hines 2 plant, even accepting the most favorable assumptions
regarding what generating resources FPC could hope to obtain when the Panda
contract expired.  
On August 7, 2000, FPC filed its petition for determination of need with the
PSC, pursuant to section 403.519, Florida Statutes (2000), seeking approval to
build Hines 2.  The PSC rendered its final order granting FPC's determination of
need on January 5, 2001.  The PSC found "that Florida Power Corporation has a
need for additional capacity to maintain the reliability and integrity of its system." 
The PSC also found the "Hines Unit 2 to be the most cost-effective alternative over
the 25 years during which FPC's ratepayers will be obligated for the costs of the
unit."  The PSC recognized that "the entire Hines 2 plant will count toward FPC's
2.  Sections 403.501-.518, Florida Statutes (2000), entitled the Florida
Electrical Power Plant Siting Act ("Siting Act"), together with the implementing
rules adopted by the PSC, prescribe time limits by which the PSC must conduct a
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reserve margin" and that the parties had stipulated that the unit "will be fully
committed to helping FPC meet its obligation to provide reliable electric service to
ratepayers at a reasonable cost."  Moreover, the PSC found that FPC fully
complied with the PSC's bid rule. 
DISCUSSION
1.   Limitation on Discovery and Denial of Continuance
In Panda's first claim on appeal, it asserts that the PSC denied it due process
as an intervenor by limiting its opportunity to participate in discovery and by
denying its request for a continuance in FPC's need determination proceeding. 
Limitations on discovery and denials of continuances are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.  See MCR Funding v. CMG Funding Corp., 771 So. 2d 32, 36 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2000); Thompson v. Deane, 703 So. 2d 1215, 1216 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997);
Manasota-88, Inc. v. Agrico Chem. Co., 576 So. 2d 781, 782-83 (Fla. 2d DCA
1991) (holding no abuse of discretion in denying intervenor a continuance).    
On August 7, 2000, FPC filed its petition for determination of need for the
Hines 2 power plant.  The PSC appointed a prehearing officer who, in turn, issued
a scheduling order on August 30, 2000.2  The order set the case for final hearing on
hearing on a petition for a determination of need and provide its final decision and
recommendation to the Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP").  See 
§ 403.507(2)(a)2, Fla. Stat. (2000); Fla. Admin. Code R. 25-22.080.  Specifically,
the PSC implementing rules require that the PSC conduct a hearing within 90 days
from the date the need petition is filed.  See Fla. Admin. Code R. 25-22.080(2). 
The PSC must make a decision on the need petition within 135 days of the date the
petition is filed to provide its final recommendation to DEP.  See § 403.507(2)(a)2,
Fla. Stat. (2000); Fla. Admin. Code R. 25-22.080(2).
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October 26-27, 2000.  The order further provided that any intervenors had until
September 11, 2000, to file their prefiled testimony, the PSC staff had until
September 18, 2000, to file their prefiled testimony, and FPC then had until
September 25, 2000, to file any rebuttal testimony.  The order required all parties to
file prehearing statements by October 4, 2000, and the prehearing officer to
conduct a prehearing conference on October 11, 2000.  The order set October 19,
2000, as the cutoff date for all discovery.
Pursuant to this schedule, the PSC staff served interrogatories and document
requests upon FPC and conducted depositions.  The PSC staff filed prefiled
testimony and FPC filed rebuttal testimony.  FPC requested and obtained
discovery of the PSC staff, including the deposition of an expert sponsored by the
PSC staff.  The deadline for filing testimony expired without anyone filing a motion
to intervene.  Moreover, both FPC and the PSC staff filed their prehearing
statements without anyone seeking leave to intervene. 
3.  FPC opposed Panda's motion to intervene, claiming that it lacked
standing as an intervenor because Panda's plan "could not legally be sited as an
alternative to Hines 2" pursuant to this Court's decision in Tampa Electric.  Both
the PSC prehearing officer and the full PSC on reconsideration rejected FPC's
argument because it found that Panda "need not show that it would prevail in order
to intervene."
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Although Panda attended the prehearing conference on October 11, 2000, it
did so as a spectator because it had not filed a motion for leave to intervene.  The
following day, Panda sought leave to intervene in the need determination.3  Panda
filed the motion to intervene two weeks before the final hearing.  Panda asserted
that it delayed intervening in the need proceeding because it was waiting for this
Court to decide the pending motions for reconsideration in Tampa Electric, which
motions the Court denied in light of a revised opinion on September 28, 2000. 
Panda claimed that because the Tampa Electric decision potentially affected
Panda's ability to sell power in Florida, it made the business decision to wait until
the Court denied rehearing in Tampa Electric before intervening. 
The PSC granted Panda leave to intervene and extended the discovery cutoff
through noon of the day before the final hearing in order to permit Panda to take
depositions that Panda's counsel stated she wanted.  Moreover, FPC allowed
Panda to take the deposition of FPC's consultant during the afternoon before the
final hearing commenced and provided Panda discovery materials.  The prehearing
4.  In this respect, rule 25-22.039 is similar to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.230, which provides: "Anyone claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any
time be permitted to assert a right by intervention, but the intervention shall be in
subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding,
unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion."  Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.230.  See
Coast Cities Coaches, Inc. v. Dade County, 178 So. 2d 703, 706 (Fla. 1965) ("It is
settled law, however, that an intervening defendant is bound by the record made at
the time that he intervenes and must take the suit as he finds it unless the court, in
its discretion, otherwise orders."). 
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officer also ordered FPC to provide Panda with confidential documents before the
hearing, and FPC complied with this order.
Under the facts in this case, we conclude that the PSC did not abuse its
discretion in limiting Panda's opportunity to participate in discovery.  Florida
Administrative Code Rule 25-22.039, which provides for intervention in PSC
proceedings, states, "Intervenors take the case as they find it."4  As noted above,
Panda filed its motion to intervene on October 12, 2000, which was seven days
before the discovery cutoff, and two weeks before the final hearing.  Although
Panda contends that it delayed intervening in the PSC proceeding until after the
Court's decision of whether to grant rehearing in Tampa Electric, in fact, Panda
waited two weeks until after this Court denied rehearing in Tampa Electric before
filing the motion to intervene.  Moreover, despite this late-filed motion to intervene,
the prehearing officer extended the discovery cutoff date by one day, allowed
Panda to take the depositions it requested, and required FPC to provide Panda with
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immediate access to all confidential information.  Therefore, under these
circumstances, we conclude that the PSC did not abuse its discretion in limiting
Panda's opportunity to participate in discovery.  
Panda also asserts that the PSC abused its discretion in denying Panda's
request for a one-month continuance.  We disagree.  On October 25, 2000, one
day after the PSC granted Panda intervention, Panda moved for a one-month
continuance.  The PSC denied Panda's motion, finding that Panda did not show
"good cause" for granting the continuance pursuant to Florida Administrative Code
Rule 28-106.210, which provides:
The presiding officer may grant a continuance of a hearing for good
cause shown.  Except in cases of emergency, requests for continuance
must be made at least five days prior to the date noticed for the
hearing. 
 
(Emphasis supplied.)
We conclude that the PSC did not abuse its discretion in denying Panda's
motion for a continuance.  First, Panda filed its motion for a continuance two days
before the hearing, thereby violating the five-day requirement of rule 28-106.210. 
Second, in order to obtain a continuance, Panda had to procure a waiver from the
PSC's rule implementing the statutory deadlines for need proceedings.  See 
§ 120.542(2), (5), Fla. Stat. (2000); Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-104.002.  Under
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section 120.542(2), the PSC shall grant a waiver when
the person subject to the rule demonstrates that the purpose of the
underlying statute will be or has been achieved by other means by the
person and when application of a rule would create a substantial
hardship or would violate principles of fairness.  For purposes of this
section "substantial hardship" means a demonstrated economic,
technological, legal, or other type of hardship to the person requesting
the variance or waiver.  For purposes of this section, "principles of
fairness" are violated when a literal application of a rule affects a
particular person in a manner significantly different from the way it
affects other similarly situated persons who are subject to the rule.  
Because the limited amount of time for preparing for this case was a direct result of
Panda's decision to delay intervening, Panda has demonstrated neither a
"substantial hardship" nor a violation of "principles of fairness."  Therefore, we
conclude that the PSC did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a
continuance. 
2.  Need Determination
In Panda's second claim, it asserts that the PSC applied an incorrect
standard in conducting its needs analysis for the Hines 2 power plant. 
"Commission orders come to this Court 'clothed with the statutory presumption
that they have been made within the [PSC's] jurisdiction and powers, and that they
are reasonable and just and such as ought to have been made.'"  Gulf Coast Elec.
Coop., Inc. v. Johnson, 727 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 1999).
5.  The PSC and FPC entered into this stipulation between October 11,
2000--the date of the prehearing conference--and October 24, 2000--the date of the
prehearing order.  This occurred before the PSC granted Panda intervention.
6.  The reserve margin is the ratio of total "firm" generating capacity that a
power utility can rely on in times of need in relation to the utility's "firm" load,
comprising those customers who have not agreed to accept occasional
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Section 403.519, Florida Statutes (2000), sets forth the criteria the PSC must
consider in conducting its needs analysis.  Section 403.519 provides, in pertinent
part:
In making its determination, the commission shall take into
account the need for electric system reliability and integrity, the need
for adequate electricity at a reasonable cost, and whether the proposed
plant is the most cost-effective alternative available.  The commission
shall also expressly consider the conservation measures taken by or
reasonably available to the applicant or its members which might
mitigate the need for the proposed plant and other matters within its
jurisdiction which it deems relevant. 
In the PSC's final order, the PSC explained that the PSC and FPC stipulated
that "the proposed Hines 2 Unit will be fully committed to helping FPC meet its
obligation to provide reliable electric services to ratepayers at a reasonable rate."5 
Furthermore, the PSC's order stated: 
We find that Florida Power Corporation has a need for
additional capacity to maintain the reliability and integrity of its system,
as contemplated by Section 403.519, Florida Statutes.
The record shows that FPC has demonstrated a need for
additional capacity to meet its 20 percent minimum reserve margin
criteria.[6]  We conclude, however, that the decision to construct Hines
interruptions in service in exchange for reduced rates.  Fla. Admin. Code R. 25-
6.035(1).  On December 22, 1999, the three largest investor-owned utilities in
Florida--FPC, Florida Power & Light, and Tampa Electric Company--agreed to
increase their reserve margin planning criteria on a voluntary basis to a minimum of
20 percent, commencing no later than summer 2004. 
7.  The residential load management program is a program in which FPC
made agreements with customers to accept interruption in service and other
conservation efforts instead of adding actual generating capacity to its system.
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2 in the time frame sought is driven primarily by economics, including
its equipment arrangements, and the use of the existing Hines Energy
Complex as discussed below relating to cost-effectiveness.  FPC is
projected to grow into the capacity to be provided by Hines 2,
particularly given the projected attrition in FPC's residential load
management program.[7] 
. . . . 
We find that FPC has demonstrated that the cost of the
electricity to be provided by Hines 2 is reasonable, based on cost-
effectiveness.  
FPC has demonstrated . . . that Hines 2 will improve projected
reserve margins such that FPC will exceed its minimum reserve margin
criteria . . . .  If Hines 2 is not brought into service, winter reserve
margins for the years 2004-2010, will fall below the 20 percent
minimum criterion.  Thus, the addition of Hines 2 will contribute to the
provision of adequate electricity to FPC's system.
 
The PSC's grant of a determination of need for a proposed power plant
creates a presumption of public need.  See § 403.519, Fla. Stat. (2001).  Panda
concedes that in certifying the "need" for all 530 megawatts of Hines 2 capacity in
2003, the PSC has acted consistently with the applicable statutory criteria, its own
8.  See, e.g., Fla. Admin. Code R. 25-22.081(3) ("If a determination is
sought on some basis in addition to or in lieu of capacity needs . . . then detailed
analysis and supporting documentation of the costs and benefits is required."); In
re Petition for Determination of Need for the Osprey Energy Center in Polk County
by Seminole Electric Cooperative and Calpine Construction Finance Company,
L.P., 01 F.P.S.C. 2:443, 446 (2001) (PSC certified a 529-megawatt combined cycle
exempt wholesale generation plant in 2003 when only 350 megawatts was
contractually committed to provide 88 megawatts of the retail needs of Seminole
Electric Cooperative in 2004); In re Petition to Determine Need for Proposed
Electrical Power Plant in St. Marks, Wakulla County, by City of Tallahassee, No.
961512EM (June 9, 1997) (order no. PSC-97-0659-FOF-EM)  (explaining that the
PSC has previously recognized that "it is not unusual for a utility to grow into the
capacity of a large generating unit"); In re Petition to Determine Need for Proposed
Capital Expansion Project of the Dade County Resources Recovery Facility, an
Existing Solid Waste Facility, by Metropolitan Dade County, 93 F.P.S.C. 11:375,
381 (1993) ("Although the expanded facility will not contribute to the reliability and
integrity of the state's electric system, the energy is cost-effective and will displace
fossil fuels."); In re JEA/FPL's Application of Need for St. John's River Power
Park Units 1 and 2 and Related Facilities, 81 F.P.S.C. 6:220, 221-22 (1981) ("We
construe the 'need for power' issue to encompass several aspects of need . . . the
electrical need for additional capacity . . . the economic need of providing this bulk
power and energy at the lowest possible cost . . . the socioeconomic need of
reducing the consumption of imported oil in the State . . . ."); In re Petition for
Certification of Need for Orlando Utilities Commission, Curtis H. Stanton Energy
Center Unit 1, and Related Facilities, 81 F.P.S.C. 10:18 (1981) (PSC approved
415-megawatt coal plant that was not needed for reliability purposes by any utility
involved in the application until 1991, which was five years after the in-service date
of the plant).
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rules, and a multitude of previous need determination decisions.8  Panda contends,
however, that this Court clarified this "need" standard set forth in section 403.519
in Tampa Electric by requiring the utility to demonstrate an actual present in-service
9.  Panda relies on the following statement from Tampa Electric:  "A
determination of need is presently available only to an applicant that has
demonstrated that a utility or utilities serving retail customers has specific
committed need for all of the electrical power to be generated at a proposed plant." 
767 So. 2d at 434.  
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need for all the electrical power to be generated at the proposed plant.9   
We reject Panda's argument that our decision in Tampa Electric altered the
requirements for the PSC in granting a certificate of need to a Florida regulated
utility.  Instead, Tampa Electric addressed whether the PSC had the statutory
authority under the Siting Act to grant a determination of need to an entity other
than a Florida retail utility regulated by the PSC whose petition was based upon a
specified demonstrated need of Florida retail utilities for serving Florida power
customers.  
In Tampa Electric, a Florida municipal electric company filed a joint
determination of need with an out-of-state wholesale generator who was not subject
to regulation by the PSC as a public utility.  767 So. 2d at 430.  The PSC granted
the companies' determination of need, and this Court reversed.  See id. at 436. 
Based upon our interpretation of the statutes governing the PSC, we concluded that
the Legislature had not intended to extend jurisdiction to the PSC to grant a
determination of need to an applicant who was a non-regulated out-of-state
10.  We likewise decline the PSC's invitation to revisit and recede from
Tampa Electric.  We based our decision in Tampa Electric on our reading of the
statute regarding legislative intent as to the scope of the PSC's authority over out-
of-state power wholesalers.  Thus, the solution for the PSC or other interested
entities if they desire to expand the PSC's authority is to seek an amendment to the
statute.  As we clearly stated:
[W]e find that the Legislature must enact express statutory criteria if it
intends such authority for the PSC.  Pursuant only to such legislative
action will the PSC be authorized to consider the advent of the
competitive market in wholesale power promoted by recent federal
initiatives.   Such statutory criteria are necessary if the Florida
regulatory procedures are intended to cover this evolution in the
electric power industry.
Id. at 435.
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wholesale power company where only thirty megawatts of the proposed 514-
megawatt capacity had been committed by contract to be sold to a Florida utility. 
See id. at 436.  Therefore, contrary to Panda's assertion, the Court did not address,
let alone change, the need determination standards pertinent to Florida retail utilities
such as FPC.  Consequently, we conclude that the PSC properly applied the
criteria contained in section 403.519 in conducting its needs analysis in this case.10 
The PSC appropriately considered the economic benefit to the ratepayers, the
integrity and reliability of the system in FPC's willingness to maintain a 20% reserve
margin and to replace demand-site management with more firm assets, and that
FPC was expected to grow into the capacity provided by Hines 2.  All of the
11.  Rule 25-22.082(4) provides:
(4)  Each utility's RFP shall include, at a minimum:
(a)  A detailed technical description of the utility's next planned
generating unit or units on which the RFP is based, as well as the
financial assumptions and parameters associated with it, including, at a
minimum, the following information:
1.  a description of the utility's next planned generating
unit(s) and its proposed location(s);
2.  the MW size;
3.  the estimated in-service date;
4.  the primary and secondary fuel type;
5.  an estimate of the total direct cost;
6.  an estimate of the annual revenue requirements;
7.  an estimate of the annual economic value of deferring
construction;
8.  an estimate of the fixed and variable operation and
maintenance expense;
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power generated will be available for the present and future needs of FPC's
customers.  Accordingly, competent substantial evidence supports the PSC's
determination of need.
3.   FPC's Bidding Process
Finally, Panda asserts that the PSC's finding that FPC's bidding process
complied with Florida Administrative Code Rule 25-22.082 is not supported by
competent substantial evidence.  We disagree.
In its order, the PSC concluded that FPC's RFP complied with rule 25-
22.082, which sets forth what must be included in a RFP.11  The PSC found:
9.  an estimate of the fuel cost;
10.  an estimate of the planned and forced outage rates,
heat rate, minimum load and ramp rates, and other technical details;
11.  a description and estimate of the costs required for
associated facilities such as gas laterals and transmission
interconnection;
12.  a discussion of the actions necessary to comply with
environmental requirements; and
13.  a summary of all major assumptions used in
developing the above estimates;
(b)  a schedule of critical dates for solicitation, evaluation,
screening of proposals and subsequent contract negotiations;
(c)  a description of the price and non-price attributes to be
addressed by each alternative generating proposal including, but not
limited to:
1.  technical and financial viability;
2.  dispatchability;
3.  deliverability (interconnection and transmission);
4.  fuel supply;
5.  water supply;
6.  environmental compliance;
7.  performance criteria;
8.  pricing structure; and
(d)  a detailed description of the methodology to be used to
evaluate alternative generating proposals on the basis of price and non-
price attributes.  
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FPC witness Crisp testified that on January 26, 2000, FPC
issued an RFP to solicit proposals for alternatives to Hines 2.  As
contained in the Need Study, Exhibit 5, FPC met the requirements of
Rule 25-22.082(3), Florida Administrative Code, by providing notice
and disseminating the RFP to the electric industry at large.  The RFP
provided a detailed description of Hines 2, including the data and
information required by Rule 25-22.082(4)(a), Florida Administrative
Code.  The RFP also included the schedule of critical dates for
solicitation, evaluation, screening of proposals and any subsequent
contract negotiations pursuant to Rule 25-22.082(4)(b), Florida
12.  PROVIEW is a PWRR computer program.
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Administrative Code.
FPC's RFP also listed the price and non-price attributes that
would be evaluated, and offered that other non-price attributes not
listed were encouraged.  The RFP also included a description of
FPC's evaluation methodology for each proposal.
Panda asserts that FPC's RFP was flawed in various ways.  First, Panda
contends that although the RFP listed price and non-price attributes to be
considered in evaluating received bids, the RFP did not provide information
regarding the weight to be given to either price or non-price attributes.  Second,
Panda contends that the RFP was deficient because it did not specifically state
what type of production costing models FPC would employ.  Third, Panda
maintains that FPC did not develop a short list after it conducted a screening, and
instead unilaterally terminated discussions with both Panda and the other bidder on
May 30, 2000.  Panda asserts that had FPC developed a short list, FPC would have
negotiated with the short list bidders, and this negotiation necessarily would have
developed a final proposal different from that originally proposed.  Finally, Panda
claims that although FPC's rejection of Panda's bid was largely based upon the
present worth revenue requirements ("PWRR") analyses it performed, Hagler
Bailly, Inc., the firm hired to perform an independent review, made no attempt to
replicate the PROVIEW PWRR model runs.12  Panda notes that the Hagler Bailly
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consultant did not testify to the correctness of any of the data associated with the
Hines 2 Unit in the RFP, the data which provided the input into the PROVIEW
PWRR model runs.  Therefore, Panda argues that to the extent that the data
actually entered by FPC in the computer models is incorrect, the results may be
erroneous. 
As FPC explains, in every RFP there will be a trade-off between too much
information and not enough information, and that if too much detail is included in
an RFP, it may become too onerous or off-putting to potential bidders.  Moreover,
FPC claims that it patterned its RFP on the only available template actually
approved by the PSC under its new bid rule--an RFP developed by Gulf Power for
its recent power plant proposal.
With regard to the failure to assign specific weights to various factors, the
undisputed testimony at the final hearing indicated that FPC did not assign weights
to various factors in advance because FPC wanted to stimulate, rather than limit,
creativity in the proposals in order to "bring more value to [the] ratepayers."  The
unchallenged testimony also explained that in order to allow bidders to give the
utility their "best shot" in their proposals, the utility had to retain discretion to
exercise subjective judgment about all aspects of the proposals, once the utility had
the benefit of evaluating the entire packages.  
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Concerning the failure to specify the production costing model FPC would
employ, the PSC found:
Panda also contends in its brief that the RFP did not specifically
state the models that would be used to evaluate proposals submitted. 
While Panda is correct, the universe of models used in the industry to
evaluate production cost is small.  We believe that omitting explicit
reference to models in the RFP is not violative of the bid rule. 
Furthermore, the undisputed evidence at the final hearing was that the models FPC
used were industry standards.
Panda's assertion that FPC should have created a "short list" and then
proceeded to enter into detailed contract negotiations with bidders on that list is
without merit.  The undisputed evidence shows that FPC received only two bids,
and that it afforded both bidders full and fair consideration.  Moreover, the
undisputed evidence demonstrates that FPC did engage in some negotiations with
both bidders, and that the pricing of Panda's proposal increased during the course
of these discussions.   
Finally, we reject Panda's argument that there was no objective review of
FPC's PWRR modeling results.  First, Panda cites to no authority for the
proposition that an objective review of FPC's modeling results must be conducted,
and we have found no authority to support this assertion.  Second, the consultant
from Hagler Bailly did conduct an independent modeling and analysis, and testified
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at the final hearing that FPC's work was fair, reasonable, and appropriate. 
Therefore, we hold that the PSC's conclusion that the RFP was proper is
supported by competent substantial evidence.
In conclusion, we approve the PSC's order granting a determination of need
to FPC to build a 530-megawatt electrical power plant.  
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
A Notice of Appeal from the Public Service Commission, 
and A Notice of Cross-Appeal from the Florida Power Corporation
Suzanne Brownless, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant/Cross-Appellee
Harold McLean, General Counsel, and Richard C. Bellak, Associate General Counsel,
Florida Public Service Commission, Tallahassee, Florida; and Robert A. Glenn,
Director, Regulatory Group Counsel, Florida Power Corporation, St. Petersburg,
Florida, and Gary L. Sasso, James Michael Walls, and Jill H. Bowman of Carlton
Fields, St. Petersburg, Florida,
for Appellees/Cross-Appellants