Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Wallace

Citation: 368 Md. 27

Docket Number: 6ag/01

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Brian L. Wallace
AG No. 6, September Term, 2001
Headnote:
Attorney’s lack of diligence, lack of preparation, failure to communicate
with clients, charge of unreasonable fees, failure to account for and return
monies, misrepresentations, and failure to comply with Bar Counsel’s
requests all lead to the most severe sanction of disbarment.
Circuit Court for Anne A rundel Co unty
Case # C-2001-71334 OC
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG
No. 6
September Term, 2001
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND
v.
BRIAN L. WALLACE
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed: March 7, 2002
1 The relevant MRPC state:
“Rule 1.1. Competence.
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.  Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
Rule 1.3. Diligence.
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.
Rule 1.4.  Communication.
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of
a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
Rule 1.5. Fees.
(a) A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable.  The factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
(continued...)
On April 12, 2001, the Attorney Grievance Commission, petitioner, by Bar Counsel
and Deputy Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary Action against Brian L. Wallace,
respondent.  The petition, based on six complaints filed against respondent, alleged that
respondent had violated Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)
and (b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a) and (b), 1.16(a)(2) and (d), 3.2, 8.1(b), and 8.4(c) and (d). 1 
1(...continued)
performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Rule 1.15. Safekeeping property.
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a
lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the
lawyer’s own property.  Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained
pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules.  Other property shall
be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded.  Complete records of such
account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be
preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation.
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third
person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person.
Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement
with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any
funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and,
upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full
accounting regarding such property.
Rule 1.16. Declining or terminating representation.
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a
client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the
representation of a client if:
.     .     .
(2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs the
lawyer’s ability to represent the client . . . .
.     .     .
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel,
surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.  The lawyer may retain
papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.
(continued...)
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1(...continued)
Rule 3.2. Expediting litigation.
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent
with the interests of the client.
Rule 8.1. Bar admission and disciplinary matters.
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a
disciplinary matter, shall not:
.     .     .
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known
by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a
lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority,
except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6.
Rule 8.4. Misconduct.
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
.     .     .
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice
. . . .”
2 Maryland Rule 16-752 states, in relevant part:
“Rule 16-752. Order designating judge.
(a) Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any
circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the
record.  The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation
(continued...)
-3-
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752,2 we transmitted the matter to Judge Nancy Davis-Loomis
2(...continued)
with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the
extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing of
motions, and hearing.”
3 Maryland Rule 16-754 states:
“Rule 16-754. Answer.
(a) Timing; contents.  Within 15 days after being served with the
petition, unless a different time is ordered, the respondent shall file with the
designated clerk an answer to the petition and serve a copy on the petitioner.
Sections (c) and (e) of Rule 2-323 apply to the answer.  Defenses and
objections to the petition, including insufficiency of service, shall be stated in
the answer and not by preliminary motion.
.     .     .
(continued...)
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of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County for her to conduct a hearing and to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
On July 31, 2001, an evidentiary hearing was held before the hearing judge.  Neither
respondent nor a representative of respondent appeared at the hearing.  On October 4, 2001,
Judge Davis-Loomis filed her Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.  The record was
then transferred from the hearing judge to our Court for oral argument.
I.  Facts
Respondent was admitted to the Bar of Maryland on December 8, 1987.  The Petition
for Disciplinary Action filed in this case was based on six complaints.  Respondent was
served with the Petition, Interrogatories, and a Request for Admission of Facts and
Genuineness of Documents.  Respondent failed to answer all three.3  Respondent also did
3(...continued)
(c) Failure to answer. If the time for filing an answer has expired and
the respondent has failed to file an answer in accordance with section (a) of
this Rule, the court shall treat the failure as a default and the provisions of
Rule 2-613 shall apply.”
Maryland Rule 2-613 provides for a default judgment to be entered by the court, which was
done in this case by the hearing judge.  Maryland Rule 2-323 provides the procedure for
filing an answer to the petition.  A failure to file an answer is covered in Maryland Rule 2-
323(e), which states:
“Rule 2-323. Answer.
.     .     .
(e) Effect of failure to deny.  Averments in a pleading to which a
responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damages,
are admitted unless denied in the responsive pleading or covered by a general
denial.  Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required
or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.  When appropriate, a party
may claim the inability to admit, deny, or explain an averment on the ground
that to do so would tend to incriminate the party, and such statement shall not
amount to an admission of the averment.”
Respondent’s failure to respond to petitioner’s Request for Admission of Facts and
Genuineness of Documents would also lead to facts and documents being admitted.
Maryland Rule 2-424 states, in relevant part:
“Rule 2-424. Admission of facts and genuineness of documents.
.     .     .
(b) Response. Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request or within
15 days after the date on which that party’s initial pleading or motion is
required, whichever is later, the party to whom the request is directed serves
a response signed by the party or the party’s attorney.  As to each matter of
(continued...)
-5-
3(...continued)
which an admission is requested, the response shall specify an objection, or
shall admit or deny the matter, or shall set forth in detail the reason why the
respondent cannot truthfully admit or deny it.  The reasons for any objection
shall be stated.  A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested
admission, and when good faith requires that a party qualify an answer or deny
only a part of the matter of which an admission is requested, the party shall
specify so much of it as is true and deny or qualify the remainder.  A
respondent may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for
failure to admit or deny unless the respondent states that after reasonable
inquiry the information known or readily obtainable by the respondent is
insufficient to enable the respondent to admit or deny.  A party who considers
that a matter of which an admission is requested presents a genuine issue for
trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request but the party may,
subject to the provisions of section (e) of this Rule, deny the matter or set forth
reasons for not being able to admit or deny it.” 
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not appear for the evidentiary hearing before the hearing judge and for oral argument before
this Court.
BC Docket No. 2000-428-4-2
Complaint of Herbert Miller, Esquire
Mr. Miller represented a client in a case involving a party being represented by
respondent.  Mr. Miller sent a letter to respondent with allegations that respondent, or
respondent’s client, was engaged in delaying tactics and deceitful conduct in an attempt to
prejudice Mr. Miller’s client.  Respondent failed to respond to Mr. Miller’s letter and also
failed, on several occasions, to respond to petitioner’s investigator about the allegation.
The hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s failure
to respond to petitioner was a violation of MRPC 8.1(b).
BC Docket No. 2001-132-4-2
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Complaint of Ida M. Oxford
Ms. Oxford was the personal representative of the estate of Ralph Clayton Smith, Jr.,
and she had retained respondent in February of 2000 as the estate’s attorney.  In the course
of his representation of the estate, respondent, after already obtaining a time extension, failed
to file a timely administration account or to seek a further time extension within which to
submit the administration account.  Respondent also failed to take any further substantive
action with respect to the estate and to respond to Ms. Oxford’s requests for information.
Ms. Oxford repeatedly tried to obtain her file from respondent and, despite his
obligation to release the file, respondent failed to respond to Ms. Oxford’s requests.  It was
not until after an Inquiry Panel hearing was held regarding Ms. Oxford’s complaint that
respondent released her file.  Respondent also failed to respond to petitioner’s requests for
information concerning Ms. Oxford’s complaint.  At the inquiry panel hearing, respondent
indicated that he was unable to properly represent Ms. Oxford because he was suffering from
personal and psychological problems.
The hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent had
violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.16(a)(2) and (d), and 8.1(b).  Specifically, she made
the following findings in support of the violation: respondent did not have the legal
knowledge or skill to represent Ms. Oxford, respondent did not exercise the requisite
thoroughness or preparation in his representation, respondent failed to act with reasonable
diligence in representing Ms. Oxford, respondent failed to keep Ms. Oxford informed about
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the status of her case or to reply to her phone calls and written correspondence, respondent
failed to properly explain the proceedings in her case to Ms. Oxford in a manner that would
allow her to make informed decisions about her case, respondent failed to withdraw from his
representation when he realized that his personal problems were interfering with his ability
to represent Ms. Oxford, respondent failed to reasonably attempt to protect Ms. Oxford’s
interests and to provide Ms. Oxford with her file when it was requested, and respondent
failed to respond to inquiries from petitioner.
BC Docket No. 2001-86-4-2
Complaint of Jacqueline O. Uzzell
Ms. Uzzell was the personal representative of the estate of Mamie L. Gibson and she
retained respondent at the end of 1997 as the estate’s attorney.  In February of 1998 Ms.
Uzzell paid respondent $790.00 and in March of 1999 she paid him an additional $1,000.00.
The only asset of the estate was a house with an appraised value of $49,000.00.
In the course of his representation of Ms. Uzzell, respondent failed to timely file
appraisals, an inventory of the estate, and accountings.  He also failed to respond to
delinquency notices issued by the Register of Wills for Baltimore City.  Respondent also
made misrepresentations to Ms. Uzzell about the work he was allegedly completing on her
case and, when he was not making misrepresentations, he failed to respond to a majority of
Ms. Uzzell’s phone calls.  Respondent failed to respond to petitioner’s inquiries concerning
Ms. Uzzell’s complaint.
The hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that in the course of his
4 We note that in the Petition for Disciplinary Action, petitioner stated that respondent
had violated MRPC 8.4(c).  In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the hearing
judge stated that petitioner had charged MRPC 8.4(d).  Nevertheless, the hearing judge made
a finding of fact and a conclusion of law to support a violation of MRPC 8.4(c).  We agree
with her finding of a violation of MRPC 8.4(c). 
-9-
representation of the estate respondent had violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 8.1(b),
and 8.4(c).4  Specifically, she made the following findings in support of the violations:
respondent did not have the legal knowledge to represent Ms. Uzzell, respondent did not
exercise the proper preparation and thoroughness in the course of his representation,
respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence as evidenced by the filing of delinquent
notices by the Register of Wills for Baltimore City, respondent failed to keep Ms. Uzzell
informed about the status of her case, respondent made misrepresentations to Ms. Uzzell
about the status of her case, his misrepresentations and failure to adequately explain the
status of her case left Ms. Uzzell unable to make informed decisions about her case, and
respondent failed to respond when petitioner requested information about Ms. Uzzell’s
complaint.
BC Docket No. 2001-133-4-2
Complaint of Diane Kent
Ms. Kent hired respondent to represent her in an employment discrimination case.
She paid the respondent $1,000.00; respondent stated that he placed these funds in his trust
account.  Respondent filed suit on behalf of Ms. Kent in the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland.  Prior to filing suit, respondent did not obtain any information about
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the case as he failed to make any contact with the defendant, its employees, agents, or
attorneys.
After filing the complaint respondent failed to take any substantive action on Ms.
Kent’s behalf.  The defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and respondent failed to file a
response.  The motion was granted and on February 17, 2000 Ms. Kent’s case was dismissed
with prejudice.  Respondent failed to notify Ms. Kent that her case had been dismissed.  She
learned of the dismissal in April of 2000 when she personally reviewed her file at the
courthouse.  Respondent had not returned Ms. Kent’s repeated telephone calls both before
and after her case was dismissed.
In September of 2000 respondent promised to return $500.00 of his fee to Ms. Kent,
but he failed to keep his promise.  Respondent failed to account for the money he received
from Ms. Kent and he was unable to determine how much of the $1,000.00 he received from
Ms. Kent should be returned to her.  This was caused by the respondent’s failure to keep
accurate time records with respect to his representation of Ms. Kent.
Respondent failed to respond to petitioner’s requests for information concerning the
complaint of Ms. Kent and he also failed to comply with a subpoena issued by the Inquiry
Panel in its investigation of Ms. Kent’s complaint.
The hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent had
violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.15(a) and (b), and 8.1(b).  Specifically, the hearing
judge made the following findings in support of the violations: respondent does not have the
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legal knowledge required to represent a client in this type of case, respondent failed to
exercise the requisite thoroughness and preparation in the course of his representation,
respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence by not investigating the case and by his
failure to respond to the Motion to Dismiss, respondent did not return repeated phone calls
from Ms. Kent, respondent did not keep Ms. Kent adequately informed about the status of
her case, respondent failed to advise Ms. Kent of the Motion to Dismiss so she could make
an informed decision regarding the representation and her case, respondent failed to keep
accurate accounting records for the funds paid to him by Ms. Kent, respondent failed to keep
adequate time records with respect to his representation of Ms. Kent, respondent failed to
promptly return funds to Ms. Kent that she was entitled to receive, and respondent failed to
respond to petitioner’s request for information about Ms. Kent’s complaint and failed to
respond to a subpoena issued by the Inquiry Panel.
BC Docket No. 2000-382-4-2
Complaint of Leon Johnson
In November of 1998, M r. Johnson retained respondent to represent him in a race
discrimination action against Three Lower Counties Community Services, Inc. (TLCCS).
Mr. Johnson paid respondent a fee of $2,000.00, which respondent deposited into his escrow
account.  In December of 1998 respondent transferred $1,000.00 of Mr. Johnson’s payment
from the escrow account as a fee.
Respondent filed suit on behalf of Mr. Johnson in the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland on November 19, 1998.  After filing suit, respondent failed to take
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any further action on Mr. Johnson’s case, including failing to have TLCCS served with Mr.
Johnson’s complaint.  In June of 1999, Mr. Johnson’s case was dismissed for want of
prosecution.  Respondent did not inform Mr. Johnson that his case had been dismissed.
During the course of his representation, respondent failed to reply to Mr. Johnson’s
written requests for an update on his case and he also failed to provide Mr. Johnson with an
accounting of the funds he had paid to respondent.  Respondent also failed, despite Mr.
Johnson’s repeated requests, to refund any of the $2,000.00 that respondent had collected
from Mr. Johnson.
On March 13, 2000, Mr. Johnson filed a complaint with petitioner.  On the day of the
Inquiry Panel hearing in this case, respondent informed Mr. Johnson that he had decided
against pursuing Mr. Johnson’s case because he felt the case had little or no merit.  During
petitioner’s investigation of this complaint, respondent failed to reply to petitioner’s requests
for information.
The hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent had
violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 1.15(b), 1.16(d), 3.2, and 8.1(b).  Specifically,
the hearing judge made the following findings in support of the violations: respondent did
not have the legal knowledge or skill reasonably necessary to represent Mr. Johnson,
respondent failed to act with the requisite thoroughness and preparation in the course of his
representation, respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence in his pursuit of Mr.
Johnson’s claim, respondent failed to keep Mr. Johnson appraised of the status of his case,
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respondent failed to properly explain Mr. Johnson’s case to him so that Mr. Johnson could
make informed decisions about his case, respondent advised Mr. Johnson over two years
after accepting his case that he thought Mr. Johnson’s case had little or no merit, respondent
did not charge a reasonable fee, he failed to provide Mr. Johnson with an accounting of his
funds, respondent failed to provide Mr. Johnson with a refund, respondent failed to make
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with Mr. Johnson’s interests, and
respondent failed to provide petitioner with information concerning this complaint.
BC Docket No. 2000-515-4-2
Complaint of Christopher Smoke
Mr. Smoke retained respondent to represent him in a personal injury case arising out
of an incident on September 21, 1995, when Mr. Smoke sustained burn injuries at an Exxon
service station.  On September 21, 1998, respondent filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County against Exxon Corporation and Calverton Exxon.  Exxon Corporation filed
a Motion for Production of Documents, which respondent failed to respond to and which
failure resulted in the claim against Exxon Corporation being dismissed.  The other defendant
was an entity that had no legal existence.  Respondent’s failure to correct this mistake and
obtain service on the second defendant in a correct name resulted in the claim against the
second defendant also being dismissed on October 26, 1999.
Throughout his representation of Mr. Smoke, respondent failed to communicate with
Mr. Smoke as to the status of his claim and respondent also failed to inform Mr. Smoke that
the claim had been dismissed.  Respondent also failed to respond to petitioner’s inquiries
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about this complaint.
The hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent had
violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 3.2, 8.1(b), and 8.4(d).  Specifically, the hearing
judge made the following findings in support of the violations: respondent did not have the
legal knowledge or skill to handle Mr. Smoke’s claim, respondent did not exercise the
requisite thoroughness and preparation in his handling of the claim, respondent failed to
exercise reasonable diligence in responding to Exxon Corporation’s Motion for Production
of Documents and correcting the co-defendants name and obtaining service of process,
respondent failed to keep Mr. Smoke reasonably informed about the status of his case,
respondent’s failure to communicate with Mr. Smoke did not allow Mr. Smoke to make
informed decisions about respondent’s representation, respondent did not make reasonable
efforts to expedite litigation consistent with Mr. Smoke’s interests, respondent failed to
answer a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority, respondent failed to
appear at a hearing of a disciplinary authority, and respondent engaged in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.
II. Discussion
Respondent filed no exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact or conclusions
of law.  The “hearing court’s findings of fact are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed
unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garland, 345
Md. 383, 392, 692 A.2d 465, 469 (1997) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
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Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 347, 624 A.2d 503, 505 (1993)).  After a review of the record,
we hold that the findings of fact of the hearing judge are not clearly erroneous.  We hold that
the hearing judge’s conclusions of law are supported by the facts.
We examined the purpose behind the attorney grievance procedure and the appropriate
sanction for an attorney in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Franz, 355 Md. 752, 760-61,
736 A.2d 339, 343-44 (1999), when we stated:
“It is well-settled that the purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to
protect the public rather than to punish the erring attorney.  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n of Maryland v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 446-47, 635 A.2d 1315, 1318
(1994); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 364, 624
A.2d 503, 513 [(1993)]; Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Protokowicz, 329 Md.
252, 262-63, 619 A.2d 100, 105 (1993); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Myers,
302 Md. 571, 580, 490 A.2d 231, 236 (1985); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v.
Velasquez, 301 Md. 450, 459, 483 A.2d 354, 359 (1984); Attorney Griev.
Comm’n v. Montgomery, 296 Md. 113, 119, 460 A.2d 597, 600 (1983).  The
public interest is served when this Court imposes a sanction which
demonstrates to members of the legal profession the type of conduct that will
not be tolerated.  Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Kerpelman, 288 Md. 341, 382,
420 A.2d 940, 959 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970, 101 S. Ct. 1492, 67 L.
Ed. 2d 621 (1981).  By imposing such a sanction, this Court fulfills its
responsibility ‘to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of the Bar and to
prevent the transgression of an individual lawyer from bringing its image into
disrepute.’  Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 549, 318 A.2d
811, 814 (1974).  Therefore, the public interest is served when sanctions
designed to effect general and specific deterrence are imposed on an attorney
who violates the disciplinary rules.  See Protokowicz, 329 Md. at 262-63, 619
A.2d at 105; Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 355, 587
A.2d 511, 521 (1991); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Alison, 317 Md. 523, 540-
41, 565 A.2d 660, 668 (1989).  Of course, what the appropriate sanction for
the particular misconduct is, in the public interest, generally depends upon the
facts and circumstances of the case.  Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Babbitt, 300
Md. 637, 642, 479 A.2d 1372, 1375 (1984) (the facts and circumstances of a
case will determine how severe the sanction should be); Montgomery, 296 Md.
at 120, 460 A.2d at 600; Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Pollack, 289 Md. 603,
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609, 425 A.2d 1352, 1355 (1981).  The attorney’s prior grievance history, as
well as facts in mitigation, constitutes part of those facts and circumstances.
Maryland State Bar Ass’n v. Phoebus, 276 Md. 353, 362, 347 A.2d 556, 561
(1975).”
Petitioner contends that the appropriate sanction in the case sub judice is for
respondent to be disbarred.  Petitioner states that respondent’s actions were marked by a total
lack of diligence and an indifference to his legal obligations.  Respondent failed to return
monies that his clients were entitled to receive.  In every case, respondent refused to
cooperate with Bar Counsel.  Petitioner states that the cumulative effect of the six
complaints, combined with the severity of the violations in those complaints, result in the
appropriate sanction being disbarment.
We have disbarred attorneys for neglecting their clients and ignoring Bar Counsel
when the attorney had already received a previous reprimand or suspension.  See Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Singleton, 315 Md. 1, 553 A.2d 222 (1989); Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Sinclair, 305 Md. 430, 505 A.2d 106 (1986); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Stewart, 285 Md. 251, 401 A.2d 1026 (1979); Maryland State Bar Ass’n v. Phoebus, 276
Md. 353, 347 A.2d 556 (1975).  We have also held that neglectful conduct, without receiving
a previous sanction to serve as a warning, can result in disbarment.  In Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Manning, 318 Md. 697, 569 A.2d 1250 (1990), we held that disbarment was
the appropriate sanction for an attorney who had neglected his clients’ cases, had failed to
communicate with his clients, and failed to cooperate in the disciplinary proceedings.  In a
previous preceding that included four complaints of neglect, Philip Manning had received
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an indefinite suspension with the right to apply for reinstatement within ninety days.  The
second proceeding also involved four complaints that occurred at the same time as the
previous complaints.  In reviewing the appropriate sanction for the second proceeding, we
stated:
“In determining the proper course to follow when confronted with an
attorney who has neglected the needs of his clients and failed to communicate
with them, we have ‘consistently regarded neglect and inattentiveness to a
client’s interests to be a violation of the Canons of Ethics warranting the
imposition of some disciplinary sanction.’  Attorney Grievance Commission
v. Gallagher, 306 Md. 107, 115, 507 A.2d 625, 629 (1986); Attorney
Grievance Commission v. Finnesey, 283 Md. 541, 547, 391 A.2d 434, 436
(1978); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Pollack, 279 Md. 225, 237, 369
A.2d 61, 68 (1977). . . .
“In Gallagher we determined that the proper sanction for the neglect
evidenced in that case was a forty-five day suspension.  We pointed out,
however, that our ‘action . . . should in no respect be viewed as an indication
that the neglect of clients’ affairs, no matter how gross, [would] never lead to
disbarment.’  Gallagher, 306 Md. at 116, 507 A.2d at 629.
.     .     .
“It is clear then that willful and flagrant neglect of a client’s affairs is,
in and of itself, the kind of misconduct by an attorney which can lead to
disbarment.  As is obvious, the nature and persistence of this kind of
inattention may and does vary. . . . 
“In recent years, however, we have noticed too many instances when
lawyers have agreed to represent clients and accepted fees, in part or in whole,
only to completely neglect these same legal problems, causing the same clients
emotional distress, financial loss, or other varying kinds of inconvenience.
More often that not, these situations have been exacerbated by the lack of
respect and attention extended to the courts as evidenced by the failure to file
timely pleadings or to make appearances as scheduled before the court to
enable proceedings to be conducted.  It seems to us that this kind of persistent
conduct is evidence of a lawyer’s disregard of his obligation.
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“The instant case is a clear example of such attitude.  Respondent is
presently under suspension for acts of neglect which occurred in the same time
period as the instant complaints.  Although the suspension he is presently
serving could not have had a deterrent effect on the previously committed
violations, the large number of similar complaints over a more than two-year
span demonstrates a disturbing pattern.
“Additionally, Respondent has shown the same disregard towards both
of these proceedings as he has shown toward his clients.  He has failed to
respond to letters, notices, and Petitions for Disciplinary Action from Bar
Counsel just as he failed to respond to communications from clients.
Respondent also failed to appear at the two hearings before Judge Chasanow.
He did appear before us in the prior proceedings.  In the instant proceeding, he
did not appear before this Court despite the fact that Bar Counsel indicated that
he was seeking disbarment.  His conduct demonstrates insensitivity to the
seriousness of these charges.  As we see it, disbarment is the proper sanction
under all of these circumstances.”
Id. at 703-05, 569 A.2d at 1253-54 (alteration in original).
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Sherman, 297 Md. 318, 465 A.2d 1161 (1983),
we accepted the findings of the hearing judge, which found that Sherman’s conduct
“encompassed not only neglect, intentional failure to seek the lawful objectives of his clients
and prejudice, but also the making of misrepresentations both to his clients and to others.”
Id. at 327, 465 A.2d at 1166.  We found disbarment to be the appropriate sanction.  At the
time of the case, Sherman was suspended from the practice of law as a result of a previous
sanction from this Court.  The conduct that led to the previous sanction had occurred at the
same time as the conduct that led to this second proceeding.  In finding disbarment to be the
appropriate sanction we stated:
“After carefully considering the matter, we accept the findings of Judge
Hammerman and conclude, in the circumstances, that disbarment is the
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appropriate sanction.  In so determining, we note that the time period involved
in the present case encompasses the same period of time which was involved
in the earlier disciplinary matter.  We think it evident that Sherman’s
misconduct over a long period of time is reflective of an utter disregard fo the
interests of his clients and is further aggravated by the numerous
misrepresentations made to his clients.  We think Sherman’s misconduct
clearly demonstrates that he is unfit to continue as a member of the Bar of this
State.”
Id. at 327-28, 465 A.2d 1166.
The record in the case at bar does not indicate that respondent has received any
previous reprimands or sanctions from this Court; nevertheless, the volume and severity of
the complaints against respondent lead us to conclude that the appropriate sanction against
respondent is disbarment.  Respondent has engaged in a pattern of conduct that only the most
sever sanction of disbarment will provide the protection to the public that this procedure is
supposed to provide.  Respondent’s lack of diligence, his lack of preparation, his failure to
communicate with his clients, his charging of unreasonable fees, his failure to account for
and return monies, his misrepresentations, and his failure to comply with Bar Counsel’s
requests all lead to the most severe sanction of disbarment. 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE
CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING
THE COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS,
PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-
761(b), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY
G R I E V A N C E  
C O M M I S S I O N  
O F
MARYLAND 
AGAINST 
BRIAN 
L.
WALLACE.