Case Title: Condict v. Whitehead, Zunker, Gage, Davidson & Shotwell, P.C.,

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1987-10-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Condict v. Whitehead, Zunker, Gage, Davidson & Shotwell, P.C.,1987 WY 138743 P.2d 880Case Number: 87-2Decided: 10/09/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
Win 
CONDICT and Elsie Condict, Appellants (Defendants)

 
 
v.

 
 
WHITEHEAD, 
ZUNKER, GAGE, DAVIDSON & SHOTWELL, P.C., a Wyoming corporation, Appellee 
(Plaintiff)

 
 
Rex E. 
Johnson of Sherard, Sherard & Johnson, for Appellants.

 
 
Paul J. 
Hickey of Rooney, Bagley, Hickey, Evans & Statkus, for 
Appellee.

 
 
Brown, 
C.J., Thomas, Cardine, and Macy, JJ., and Raper, J., Ret.

 
 
RAPER, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     A jury returned a 
verdict of $ 130,938 as the amount of unpaid attorney's fees and costs owing 
appellee for legal services provided to appellants. In this appeal, appellants 
raise questions alleging error with respect to some of the jury instructions 
given by the trial judge and claims of error for the trial judge's failure to 
give some jury instructions offered by appellants. Appellants also object to the 
form of verdict given for the jurors' consideration. There is a further issue as 
to the withdrawal of an exhibit after it had been received and the failure of 
the trial judge to instruct the jury to disregard the exhibit. Finally, 
appellants complain that appellee increased previously agreed on hourly rates 
without informing appellants of such increase.

 
 

[¶2.]     We affirm the judgment 
appealed from, even though we cannot approve the form of some instructions given 
to the jury. We hold that there was no prejudice to appellants as a result of 
the instructions.

 
 
I.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellants assert that 
Instruction No. 31 covering appellee's contentions 
hampered  their argument, 
overemphasized the facts, was misleading, and misstated the 
evidence.

 
 

[¶4.]     It should be noted 
that, in Instruction No. 3, supra note 1, there are several sentences not 
preceded by a statement that they are contentions of appellee. While we are 
convinced that the jury was not misled into believing that the court was 
instructing them that such statements had been proven as true, nonetheless, 
there should have been, somewhere in the instruction offered, a general 
reference stating that the entire instruction was merely a statement of 
appellee's contentions and that it was not to be considered as evidence by the 
jury -- it is the duty of the jury to determine the facts from the testimony and 
exhibits produced in court.

 
 

[¶5.]     In this case, other 
instructions clarified that the trial judge, by Instruction No. 3, was not 
instructing the jury as to his view of what the facts were or were not. There is 
no error when the matter complained of is covered in another instruction or by 
taking the instruction as a whole. Cates v. 
Eddy, Wyo., 
669 P.2d 912 (1983).

 
 

[¶6.]     In this instance, 
Instruction No. 1 pointed out that it was the "exclusive province of the jury * 
* * * to determine the issues of fact in this case." By Instruction No. 2, the 
trial judge advised the jury that:

 
 
"If in 
these instructions any rule, direction, or idea be stated in varying ways, no 
emphasis thereon is intended by me, and none must be inferred by you. For that 
reason you are not to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or 
instruction and ignore the others, but you are to consider all of the 
instructions together and regard each in the light of all the others. The order 
in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative 
importance."

 
 

[¶7.]     A general instruction, 
which would have eliminated any problem with the question of misconception by 
the jury, was offered by appellee but not used by the trial judge; it was to 
have followed the contentions instruction:

 
 
"I have 
not by these instructions or by any ruling made or by any act done or by 
anything said during the trial intended or attempted to give any intimation or 
opinion as to what the facts are or what are not the facts, what the proof is or 
what it is not, which witnesses are worthy of belief and which are not, or what 
your verdict should be."

 
 
This 
instruction strongly preserves the supremacy of the jury in their role as fact 
finder.

 
 

[¶8.]     There is no question 
but that Instruction No. 3 was argumentative. There is really only one basic 
contention by appellee; it was hired by appellants to do legal work and had not 
been paid in full for services rendered and costs advanced. It is the contention 
of appellants that, while they do owe fees, those claimed by appellee were 
excessive and that they should not be required to pay some costs which were 
advanced. A single instruction in about so many words, along with the cautions 
before mentioned, would have been sufficient to tell the jury their job in this 
particular case.

 
 

[¶9.]     A party is entitled to 
have the jury instructed with reference to that party's theory of the case when 
it is supported by the evidence. Langdon v. 
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation, 
Wyo., 494 P.2d 537 (1972). Appellee apparently believed that all the facts set out in 
Instruction No. 3 were an essential part of its theory. They were from evidence 
which the jury had heard. The court's only duty was to state the issue for the 
jury, not to review the evidence supporting appellee's 
theory.

 
 

[¶10.]  While the instruction is not a good 
instruction, an argumentative instruction is not necessarily reversible error. 
MacManus v. Getter Trucking 
Company, Wyo., 384 P.2d 974 
(1963).

 
 

[¶11.]  We conclude with respect to Instruction 
No. 3 that, while it was deficient in form, it was not prejudicial. "A party is 
not prejudiced by a particular instruction when the  matter complained of is covered by other 
instructions or by taking the instructions as a whole." Cates v. Eddy, 669 P.2d  at 917. The other instructions have a curative 
effect.

 
 
II.

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellants assert that Instruction No. 
82 amounted to a directed 
verdict.

 
 

[¶13.]  Appellants spend considerable time 
arguing about the word "legally" just preceding the word "obligated" which 
appeared in the instruction as originally submitted by appellee. We see no 
difference in this case between being "obligated" or being "legally obligated." 
In any event, the only issue in the trial was how much was owed, after proper 
credits, at the time of trial. The instruction clearly leaves it up to the jury 
to decide "how much."

 
 

[¶14.]  It should be pointed out that the trial 
judge had, at a time prior to trial, granted a partial summary judgment holding 
that:

 
 
"[Appellee] 
is entitled to compensation for the services rendered by it and its predecessor 
firm on behalf of [appellants] in Condict v. Condict [Second Judicial 
District, State of Wyoming, No. 82C-219] together with actual costs incurred in 
behalf of [appellants] in the cited litigation."

 
 

[¶15.]  The court in effect held that there was 
liability but that a jury must decide the dollar amount of such liability. 
Instruction No. 8 so advised the jury and properly determined that there was 
liability, but it did not direct the amount. That question was the only one left 
for the jury.

 
 
III.

 
 

[¶16.]  Appellants assert there was error in 
Instruction No. 9.3 They contend that the court took 
the factual question away from the jury and told them appellants received the 
letter in question.

 
 

[¶17.]  The problem rests in the last paragraph 
where it is said that "the denial by [appellants] of receipt of an item of 
mailing does not overcome the presumption of mailing." Appellee insists that 
this is in accordance with Employment Security Commission of Wyoming v. 
Young, Wyo., 713 P.2d 198 (1986). We disagree. 
What that case said was:

 
 
"Appellee's 
unsupported and uncorroborated statement of nonreceipt is some evidence toward 
establishing a finding contrary to the presumption, but the necessity for a 
factual determination of the question still exists.

 
 
"'* * * 
* For example, in the case of the presumption of receipt of a letter, referred 
to above, the defendant may destroy the presumption by denying receipt. 
Nevertheless, a jury question is presented, not because of the presumption, but 
because of the natural inference flowing from the plaintiff's showing that he 
had mailed a properly addressed letter that was not returned.' McCormick on 
Evidence § 345, p. 821 (2nd Ed. 1972)." Id. at 201.

 
 

[¶18.]  The denial does not destroy the 
presumption nor can it be disregarded. When that happens, there is still left a 
burden of proof  by appellants that 
they did not receive the letter under the preponderance of the evidence 
instruction.

 
 

[¶19.]  The law is found in Rule 301(a), 
W.R.E.:

 
 
"In all 
civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by statute or by these 
rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden 
of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its 
existence."4

 
 
We are 
convinced that, while the instruction was erroneous in stating that "the denial 
of receipt does not overcome the presumption," the denial of receipt was at 
least part of appellants' evidence to carry their burden of establishing 
non-receipt. The third paragraph of Instruction No. 9 clearly places on 
appellants the burden of proving non-receipt as do the words "its receipt 
remains for you to determine." We would suggest that appellee's homework was 
deficient in preparation of this instruction. When read as a whole, however, the 
jury instruction is cured by the emphasis on receipt or non-receipt being a 
question for the jury.

 
 

[¶20.]  While appellants objected to the 
instruction, we cannot find in the record a correct form offered by appellants. 
An objection to an instruction is not complete without a correct typewritten 
form being handed to the court for its use. Parties have not only the right but 
the duty to offer instructions. In the absence of submission of a proper written 
instruction, any claimed error is deemed to have been waived. Texas Gulf Sulphur Company v. Robles, Wyo., 511 P.2d 963 (1973). It is 
insufficient merely to state that the instruction is not complete or an accurate 
statement of the law. Runnion v. Kitts, 
Wyo., 531 P.2d 1307 (1975). See also 
Logan v. Pacific Intermountain Express 
Company, Wyo., 400 P.2d 488 (1965), and Rule 51, 
W.R.C.P.

 
 

[¶21.]  We have discussed Instruction No. 9, 
supra note 3, only in the hope that it never again will be used as a form in 
some future case.

 
 
IV.

 
 

[¶22.]  Appellants assert that there was plain 
error in the form of the verdict presented for use of the jury,5 the complaint being directed to the 
words "as a result of [appellants'] refusal to pay." Appellants did not object 
to the form at the time of trial, so they must rely on plain error. In that 
regard, appellants only make the bare statements that those words were 
"prejudicial"  and "unfair" without 
any support for such position or contention. We will not consider any alleged 
error which is supported by only perfunctory argument and which is without 
authority. Goggins v. Harwood, Wyo., 
704 P.2d 1282 (1985). At the most, the words considered 
offensive were surplusage.

 
 
V.

 
 

[¶23.]  It may be well to set out under what 
circumstances an improper instruction will be considered reversible error. In 
order to hold an improper instruction reversible, the record must show that 
substantial rights were affected. Rule 7.04, W.R.A.P. For an error to be 
harmful, there must be a reasonable possibility that, in the absence of error, 
the verdict might have been more favorable to a party, and the burden is on the 
appellant to show where the error is prejudicial. ABC Builders,   Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 
632 P.2d 925 (1981). Merely showing an error occurred does not 
create a presumption of prejudice as injury to an appellant. Anderson v. Bauer, Wyo., 
681 P.2d 1316 (1984).

 
 

[¶24.]  California is a leader in preparation and use 
of pattern jury instructions. In 1 California Forms of Jury Instruction, 
Procedures and Instructions § 1.13[3] (1987),  there are set out various ways to 
determine the presence of prejudice arising from an erroneous or defective 
instruction:

 
 
"If it 
appears that giving or refusing to give an instruction was likely to mislead the 
jury and become a factor in its verdict, then the instructional error is 
prejudicial and a court should not speculate on what may have been the basis for 
the jury's verdict. Although no exact formula exists for measuring the degree of 
error that will be found prejudicial, a number of factors can be considered: (1) 
the extent to which there is conflict in the evidence on critical issues; (2) 
whether or not the respondent's argument to the jury may have contributed to the 
instruction's misleading effect; (3) whether or not the jury requested a 
rereading of the erroneous instruction or of related evidence; (4) the closeness 
of the jury's verdict; and (5) the effect of other instructions in curing the 
error." (Footnotes omitted.)

 
 

[¶25.]  We are unable to see where corrected 
instructions would have resulted in any different verdict or that the jury on 
the whole were misled. While appellants claimed that the fees charged exceeded 
an agreement for a fixed rate per hour during the entire period of employment, 
there is no dispute that appellee was employed and that it was to be paid for 
services rendered. The letter, Exhibit 4, which appellants claim never to have 
received, is not before us so we are unable, in its absence, to adequately 
determine how critical it may have been. It is appellants' burden to bring a 
complete record upon which we may make a decision. In re Estate of Manning, Wyo., 646 P.2d 175 (1982); Rule 4.02, 
W.R.A.P.

 
 

[¶26.]  The evidence of appellee was voluminous 
as to the time spent in preparing for and trying the Condict versus Condict case 
and included the testimony of two experienced lawyers that the fees charged were 
reasonable under the circumstances. Appellants cling to the idea that an hourly 
charge mentioned by one of appellee's lawyers was an agreement that the charge 
would not be increased. The testimony nowhere else bears this out. We are 
convinced that appellants are simply arguing that the jury must believe their 
testimony and not that of appellee. On review, we apply the following standard. 
We assume that the evidence of the prevailing party is true and leave out of 
consideration the evidence presented by the unsuccessful party. City of Rock Springs v. 
Police Protection Association, Wyo., 610 P.2d 975 
(1980). We find nothing in the evidence to disclose that the jury were 
misled by any of the imperfect instructions given by the district 
court.

 
 

[¶27.]  Since we have not been favored with a 
transcript of closing arguments, we cannot see how appellee's argument may have 
contributed to an instruction's misleading effect or how appellants may have 
been hampered in their closing argument to the jury.

 
 

[¶28.]  The jury did not request any explanation 
of or have any questions with respect to any of the complained of instructions 
or related evidence.

 
 

[¶29.]  We have no way of telling how close the 
jury's verdict was, other than that it was unanimous. Appellants asked that the 
jury be polled. Each member of the jury responded that the verdict was his or 
hers. We can add that the jury went out at 11:43 a.m. and returned at 2:44 p.m. 
with their verdict, a period of about three hours, so it would appear that they 
had few problems reaching their decision.

 
 

[¶30.]  Overall, we would say that the curative 
effects of other instructions did their work. The jury understood their function 
to arrive at a figure for attorney's fees and costs advanced. The record 
discloses they were justified in their verdict.

 
 
VI.

 
 

[¶31.]  We have touched somewhat on appellants' 
claims that appellee had agreed to perform legal services at a continuing rate 
fixed at the time of employment and that other express agreements were made. 
Appellants asked that certain instructions lettered  A, B, and C,6 which they offered, be 
given.

 
 

[¶32.]  In view of the court's granting partial 
summary judgment for appellee on the matter of liability for attorney's fees and 
costs expended, there was no need for the jury to determine anew the presence of 
an express or any other obligation to pay attorney's fees other than the amount. 
Since no appeal was taken from the summary judgment, we need not consider its 
validity. We must assume that it was proper.

 
 

[¶33.]  The offered Instruction A was unnecessary 
as to its elements 1, 2 and 3. Those elements were decided by the court in its 
summary judgment adjudging liability. Elements 4 and 5 were covered by the 
court's given Instruction No. 8, supra note 2.

 
 

[¶34.]  Offered Instruction B was unnecessary for 
the same reason.

 
 

[¶35.]  Offered Instruction C was improper 
because its form was too restrictive. As stated in the preamble of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law:

 
 
"[7] A 
lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the 
legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. * * * 
*

 
 
"[8] In 
the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are 
encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict 
between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the 
lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person while earning a 
satisfactory living."

 
 
Difficult 
issues of professional discretion may arise within an ethical framework 
concerning an attorney's duty as an officer of the court to honor the court's 
orders and his duty to competently represent his client. Application of this 
concept, if given the correct circumstances, may prompt an attorney to act 
within the court's wishes while also indirectly promoting his client's best 
interests prior to obtaining consent or authority of his 
client.

 
 

[¶36.]  We note from Instruction No. 3 that 
appellee asked the jury to return a verdict of $ 139,874; the jury returned a 
verdict for $ 130,938. We will not speculate as to the reason for the 
difference. The point is that the jury gave some credit to appellants. Obviously 
appellants were not prejudiced by failure of the trial court to give the 
instructions requested. The only means available to discover what a verdict 
embraces is a request for a special verdict form providing a breakdown as to 
attorney's fees and costs. Appellants did not  request or offer a special verdict 
form.  They did not object to a 
general verdict form, so they cannot now be heard to complain. Rule 49, 
W.R.C.P.

 
 

[¶37.]  Appellee's complaint which was filed to 
initiate this action was one to recover the reasonable value of services 
rendered and monies advanced for costs associated with the litigation. This was 
an action for quantum meruit. In an action upon quantum meruit, the plaintiff 
establishes his case to recover when he introduces evidence of the reasonable 
value of the services performed. If a defendant contends that an express 
contract was made fixing the value, he must plead and prove that fact. Miracle v. Barker, 59 
Wyo. 92, 136 P.2d 678 (1943).

 
 

[¶38.]  Appellants answered appellee's complaint 
and entered an affirmative defense stating that an agreement between the parties 
stipulated that "attorney's fees would be paid primarily by transferring real 
property to" counsel. The contentions of appellants/defendants were submitted to 
the court in the form of an instruction,7 which was given by the court. The 
contentions basically set up an express agreement, which became an affirmative 
defense. It was then appellants' burden to prove such agreement by a 
preponderance of the evidence, which the jury decided was not 
done.

 
 

[¶39.]  By Instruction No. 6, the court 
instructed the jury that appellee had "the burden of proof to discharge by a 
preponderance of the evidence as to what, if anything, is owed by" appellants to 
appellee.

 
 

[¶40.]  There should have been an instruction 
placing the burden on appellants to prove an express contract. Appellants had 
the burden to establish a contract, not appellee. Appellee, by pleading, 
contentions, and proof, was not relying on express contract, but on quantum 
meruit. Working for an hourly rate is only a measure of worth and does not 
require an express contract with a client.

 
 
VII.

 
 

[¶41.]  Finally, appellants assert as error that 
an exhibit was mishandled by the court, stating that, after the exhibit was 
introduced into evidence at appellee's request and the jury was made aware of 
its contents, the court then ordered the exhibit withdrawn from evidence before 
appellants could cross-examine with respect to its contents. An issue is not 
raised for our consideration because appellants neglected to bring the letter to 
us as a part of the record. As we have noted previously, it is the 
responsibility of appellants on appeal to assure the presence of any part of the 
record necessary for consideration.  
We cannot and will not consider any matter on which the record is silent. 
Mentock v. Mentock, Wyo., 
638 P.2d 156 (1981). We observe further that appellants failed 
to make an offer of proof concerning what would have been developed by the 
cross-examination. Such failure forecloses this court from considering the 
consequences. Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration 
Corporation, Wyo., 665 P.2d 452 
(1983).

 
 

[¶42.]  We can find no reversible error in the 
trial of this case.

 
 

[¶43.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Jury Instruction No. 3 reads as 
follows:

 
 
"[Appellee's] position in this case is 
that the firm of Urbigkit, Whitehead, Zunker, Gage, Davidson & Shotwell was 
hired to represent Win and Elsie Condict in their long-standing dispute with 
family members over ownership and accounting of their ranching interests in 
Carbon and AlbanyCounties.

 
 
"[Appellee] contends that [it was] hired 
after [appellants] had hired and subsequently fired at least eight other law 
firms who had undertaken [appellants'] representation in the case of Condict 
v. Condict, Second Judicial District, State of Wyoming, 82C-219. [Appellee] 
committed to [appellants] that [it] would see [that appellants'] case was 
finally brought to trial and concluded. There is no dispute between the parties 
to this suit that [appellee] did in fact perform its promise to [appellants] to 
see that they had their day in court. In fact, [appellee] represented 
[appellants] in two separate trials in 1985, the second of which lasted 
approximately eight weeks and was one of the longest trials ever held in this 
Judicial District[.]

 
 
"[Appellee] contends that [it was] to be 
paid hourly for the legal services performed by [it] and that [it] billed 
[appellants] on a monthly basis for legal services rendered by members of the 
law firm.

 
 
"[Appellee] further contends that [it] 
accepted a deed to 40 acres of land from [appellants] as a retainer for [its] 
services, which was in addition to a $ 10,000 cash retainer. [Appellee] contends 
that the land was also security for the payment of legal services and that the 
parties agreed its value was $ 1,000 per acre. Further, [appellee] contends that 
it was understood between [appellee] and [appellants] that [appellants] could 
[reacquire] the 40 acres conveyed by payment of the agreed value of $ 40,000. 
[Appellants] have not paid [appellee] for this and [appellee] has given credit 
for it to [appellants] on the amount claimed as due and owing for the legal 
services rendered.

 
 
"[Appellee] further contends that [it] 
advanced $ 55,000 out-of-pocket costs for [appellants] during the Condict v. 
Condict litigation. These costs include payments ordered by the Court for a 
receiver, who was to operate the Condict ranches during the lawsuit and for a 
survey of the ranches. These two bills which [appellee] paid for [appellants] 
exceed $ 30,000.

 
 
"Over the course of the year that 
[appellee] represented [appellants], several lawyers in [appellee's] firm were 
assigned to the Condicts['] file. Three lawyers individually performed hundreds 
of hours of work on [appellants'] behalf, they were Walter C. Urbigkit, Carole 
Shotwell and George A. Zunker. Mr. Urbigkit worked on this case until the day 
before he was sworn in as a Justice of the Wyoming Supreme Court. Following Mr. 
Urbigkit's appointment to the Supreme Court, [appellants'] case was handled to 
conclusion by Ms. Shotwell and Mr. Zunker.

 
 
"During the course of the year that 
[appellee] represented [appellants], [appellants] made partial payments to 
[appellee] for legal services and costs, but did not pay their bill to 
[appellee] in full.

 
 
"[Appellee] contends that requests for 
payment in full for legal services rendered and actual costs advanced [have] 
been made to [appellants] but [appellants] refuse to pay.  "[Appellee] contends that there is now 
due and owing to [it], after credit for partial payments and the 40 acres are 
given, the sum of $ 139,874.

 
 
"[Appellee] asks of you in this trial 
that you award [it] the $ 139,874 which [it] contend[s] is due. [Appellee] 
contends that the $ 139,874 is the amount [appellants] had agreed to pay and 
that it is the reasonable value of the services performed for 
[appellants]."

 
 

2Instruction No. 8 reads as 
follows:

 
 
"[Appellants] hired the firm of 
Urbigkit, Whitehead, Zunker & Davidson to represent their interests in the 
case of Condict v. Condict, Second Judicial District, State of Wyoming, 
82C-219.

"Therefore, [appellants], by hiring the 
firm of Urbigkit, Whitehead, Zunker & Davidson, obligated themselves to pay 
for the legal services provided them and the actual out-of-pocket costs 
advanced.

"You must then determine how much is 
presently owed to [appellee] for the legal services provided [appellants], plus 
amounts owed for actual costs advanced by [appellee] in behalf of [appellants] 
in Condict v. Condict, Second Judicial District, State of Wyoming, 
82C-219."

 
 

3Instruction No. 9 reads as 
follows:

 
 
"A rebuttable presumption exists that 
delivery of mail occurs when it is properly addressed, stamped and 
mailed.

"A presumption of delivery is based upon 
the probability that the postal service performs its duty in transmitting and 
delivering mail.

"In order to rebut the presumption of 
delivery, [appellants] must establish that the item of mail was not 
delivered.

"The denial by [appellants] of receipt 
of an item of mailing does not overcome the presumption of mailing and its 
receipt remains for you to determine."

 
 

4See Mueller, "Instructing the Jury Upon 
Presumptions in Civil Cases: Comparing the Federal Rule 301 With Uniform Rule 
301," XIILand & Water L. Rev. 
219 (1977). Wyoming has adopted Uniform Rule 
301.

 
 

5The verdict form included the 
following:

 
 
"What amount, if any, do you find is 
owing [appellee] as a result of [appellants'] refusal to pay for legal services 
and costs provided them by [appellee]?

$          
."

 
 

6Instruction A reads as 
follows:

 
 
"In this action, [appellee] has the 
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the 
following:

"1. [Appellee] and [appellants] entered 
into an agreement whereby [appellee] was to represent 
[appellants].

"2. The terms of the agreement entered 
into.

"3. That [appellants] breached the 
agreement entered into between the parties.

"4. That the legal services rendered 
were necessary, reasonable and proper under the 
circumstances.

"5. The amount of money owed to 
[appellee] by [appellants].

"In determining whether an issue has 
been proved by preponderance of the evidence, you should consider all of the 
evidence bearing upon that issue, regardless of who produced 
it."

 
 
Instruction B reads as 
follows:

 
 
"An express contract for services may be 
written or oral. An oral contract for services is as legally binding as a 
written contract for services.

"In order to find that [appellee] and 
[appellants] had entered into an express contract you must find the 
following:

"1. That [appellee] offered to render 
services to [appellants] based upon an hourly 
rate[.]

"2. That [appellants] accepted 
[appellee's] offer to render such services at such hourly 
rate.

"In the event that you determine that 
[appellee] and [appellants] had entered into an express contract, then you must 
find and set the amount of damages sustained by 
[appellee].

"In the event that you determine that no 
contract existed between [appellee] and [appellants], then you must find and set 
the amount due and owing to [appellee] from [appellants]. This amount would be 
the value of the services rendered as determined by you subtracting payments 
made to [appellee] by [appellants]."

 
 
Instruction C reads as 
follows:

 
 
"The court instructs the jury that 
[appellee's] law firm may not recover from [appellants] money paid by it to 
third persons, which money was paid without the consent or authority of 
[appellants]."

 
 

7Instruction No. 3A reads as 
follows:

 
 
"[Appellants] state that [appellee] was 
hired for the purpose of representing them in the case of Condict v. Condict. 
However, [appellants] deny that they owe the amount of attorney's fees and costs 
as alleged by [appellee]. [Appellants] assert that an agreement was entered into 
with [appellee] concerning the payment of attorney's fees and that [appellee] 
has breached that agreement. [Appellants] assert that [appellee] paid certain 
costs of litigation which were not proper, and should not have been paid. And 
further, such payments were the bills of third persons. That hourly rates were 
increased without their knowledge and agreement. [Appellants] contend that it 
was the agreement between the parties that [appellee] would take land in 
exchange for attorney's fees if the attorney's fees exceeded the value of land 
already transferred to [appellee]. Finally, [appellants] contend that the bills 
submitted by [appellee] were incorrect."