Case Title: Spencer v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Spencer v. State1996 WY 142925 P.2d 994Case Number: 95-224Decided: 10/22/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jimmie Lee SPENCER,

Appellant 
(Defendant)

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Sylvia L. Hackl, 
State Public Defender; Deb Cornia, Appellate Counsel; Gerald M. Gallivan, 
Director of the Defender Aid Program; and Walter E. Deacon and Walter Eggers, 
Student Interns for the Defender Aid Program, for Appellant.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kimberly A. Baker, Assistant Attorney 
General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director of the Prosecution Assistance Program; and 
Anjanette C. Wayman, Student Intern for the Prosecution Assistance Program, 
for Appellee.

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Jimmie 
Spencer appeals from the trial court's amended judgment and sentence which 
sentenced him to serve a term in the state penitentiary of not less than two 
years nor more than three years after a jury found him guilty of delivering 
cocaine.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant 
requests our review of the following issues:

ARGUMENT I

Applying [the] plain 
error standard of review, was [Appellant] denied a fair trial when the trial 
court repeatedly allowed the introduction of evidence concerning his character 
and prior bad acts in violation of Wyoming Rules of Evidence 404(b)?

ARGUMENT II

Was Appellant denied a 
fair trial as guaranteed by the due process clauses of the United States and 
Wyoming constitutions because of prosecutorial misconduct?

FACTS

[¶4]      Through the use 
of informants, Laramie County Sheriff's Department detectives discovered in 
early June 1994 that several individuals were largely responsible for the crack 
cocaine sales in the Cheyenne area. At about the same time, the detectives 
learned that an individual (the informant) was using crack cocaine. The 
detectives told the informant that she faced potential criminal charges for 
aiding and abetting in the delivery of a controlled substance. She, 
consequently, entered into an agreement with the detectives which provided that, 
in exchange for her becoming a confidential informant, the detectives would 
recommend to the district attorney's office that she not be prosecuted for her 
drug use and would also try to get her boyfriend out of jail.

[¶5]      The detectives 
asked the informant to make a "shopping list" of the names of those individuals 
from whom she thought she could buy crack cocaine. She did not include 
Appellant's name on the original list. When the informant later saw his picture 
on the wall of a briefing room, she indicated that she knew the man in the 
picture and that she might be able to buy crack cocaine from him.

[¶6]      The informant 
participated in three controlled buys during the next two weeks. On August 10, 
1994, she and the detectives planned a controlled buy from Appellant. Before the 
informant attempted to make the buy, the detectives searched her to ensure that 
she did not have any crack cocaine in her possession. The detectives gave the 
informant $50 in "buy" money and furnished her with a wireless 
transmitter.

[¶7]      The informant 
unsuccessfully attempted to make three controlled buys before she got to 
Appellant's residence. When the informant got to Appellant's home, she entered 
the house and purchased one "rock" of crack cocaine for $50. After the informant 
left Appellant's house, the detectives searched her again. At that time, they 
found one "rock" which was wrapped in the small corner of a plastic baggie, and 
the informant did not possess the buy money. The informant later attempted to 
make a second controlled buy from Appellant, but she was not 
successful.

[¶8]      Appellant was 
arrested for unlawfully distributing crack cocaine. A jury found him guilty of 
the charged offense, and he appeals to this Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Other Bad 
Acts Evidence

[¶9]      Appellant claims 
that, under the plain error standard of review, he was denied a fair trial when 
the trial court allowed evidence about his character and other bad acts to be 
introduced in violation of W.R.E. 404(b). Appellant urges this Court to analyze 
the five factors established in Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601, 609-10 (Wyo. 1993), 
in determining whether the trial court's admission of the evidence in question 
was plain error. The State argues that Appellant has failed to show that the 
admission of the evidence amounted to plain error.

[¶10]   W.R.E. 404(b) governs the 
admissibility of other bad acts evidence:

(b) Other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts. - Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident.

[¶11]   In Appellant's first claim of 
error, he contends that the testimony of two detectives as well as of the 
informant served no purpose but to inflame the jury and prejudice Appellant.1 Specifically, Appellant disapproves 
of the following testimony from one of the detectives:

Q.        Okay. And 
then over the period of your investigation, did you develop other 
informants?

A.        Maybe we 
had two more develop by then.

Q.        Did these 
informants - . . . through other intelligence, were you able to pinpoint an area 
of Cheyenne that was largely responsible for the crack cocaine sale.

A.        
Yes.

Q.        And where 
was that?

A.        The 1000 
block of East 8th Street.

Q.        And was 
there more than one dealer in that area, according to the information that you 
had?

A.        Yes, there 
was.

. . . .

Q.        And during 
the course of the investigation, did those dealers come under 
investigation?

A.        Yes, they 
did. 

Q.        Was 
[Appellant] one of them?

A.        
Yes.

. . . .

Q.        During the 
course of your investigation, did you come across [the informant]?

A.        
Yes.

Q.        Okay. And 
how did that occur?

A.        We had 
another informant that was associating with [the informant] . . ., and we were 
trying to get - corroborate information about East 8th Street. This informant 
was not directly set to purchase narcotics, . . . only just to associate and 
find out if, in fact, drugs were coming from the East 8th Street 
address.

We followed [the 
informants] down to East 8th Street - I believe it was two times previous to 
contacting [the informants] - where people were coming in and out of 1012 
[Appellant's residence], and speaking with, I believe, [the informant] and other 
informants.

Q.        What 
information did you gather about [the informant] with regard to her involvement 
in the crack cocaine community?

A.        Was a user, 
more or less.

Appellant did 
not make an objection to this testimony or a request for a limiting instruction. 
He also criticizes the following testimony which was given by another 
detective:

Q.        In the 
early stages of the investigation, did you obtain the name of 
[Appellant]?

A.        
Yes.

Q.        Was that 
prior to your contact with [the informant]?

A.        Yes, I 
believe so.

Q.        
Specifically, what information did you have about [Appellant] with regard 
to crack cocaine?

A.        I received 
information that [Appellant] was receiving his crack cocaine from a friend of 
his in Denver.

Q.        And was he 
then dispersing it in Cheyenne?

A.        
Yes.

Again, Appellant 
failed to object to this testimony or request a limiting instruction. Finally, 
although his citation to the record does not seem to be correct, Appellant 
appears to be complaining about the following testimony which came from the 
informant:

Q.        How much 
were you buying from [Appellant] at that time?

A.        A 
fifty.

Q.        A 
fifty?

A.        
Yes.

Q.        And how 
often were you doing that?

A.        I only did 
it in June. I did it about four or five times in June.

Here again, 
Appellant did not object to the testimony or offer a limiting 
instruction.

[¶12]   We cannot consider the five-factor 
analysis which we adopted in Dean and modified in Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 
355 (Wyo. Oct. 11, 1996), in determining whether admitting the above-referenced 
testimony into evidence constituted plain error as that analysis is a trial 
level analysis. It is not our role to analyze these factors when we are 
reviewing an argument that other bad acts testimony which was admitted into 
evidence without objection should have been excluded. Our function is to 
determine whether the admission of such evidence amounted to plain 
error:

"`A three-part test has 
been established for determining whether an error may achieve the status of 
plain error. First, the record must be clear as to the incident which is alleged 
as error. Second, the party claiming that the error amounted to plain error must 
demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that 
party must prove that a substantial right has been denied him and as a result he 
has been materially prejudiced.'"

Vigil, at 357 
(quoting Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 739 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting Bradley v. 
State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1163-64 (Wyo. 1981))).

[¶13]   The second prong of the plain error 
analysis is pertinent in this case. The purpose of the first detective's 
testimony was to convey the basis for the detectives' suspicion of Appellant 
which was the foundation of their investigation. The testimony from the second 
detective illustrated the detectives' gradual accumulation of information about 
Appellant and the general timing of their awareness that a transaction between 
Appellant and an informant might be fruitful. The informant's testimony showed 
that she was familiar with Appellant and that she might be able to make a buy 
from him so that he could be identified. The evidence was admissible under 
W.R.E. 404(b) because it was relevant to prove the identity of Appellant as well 
as to establish that the detectives knew that Appellant might be engaging in 
illegal activities. We hold that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was not 
violated and that admitting the evidence was not plain error.

B. Disclosure 
of Evidence

[¶14]   Appellant contends that the 
prosecution violated its duty to disclose material and exculpatory evidence and 
that his right to have a fair trial was violated. The State counters that 
Appellant has not made any effort to prove that the evidence in question would 
have been favorable to him or that he was prejudiced by the prosecution's 
alleged failure to disclose it and that, in any event, the prosecution did 
properly disclose the evidence.

[¶15]   The United States Supreme Court has 
held that "`suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused 
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt 
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.'" Wheeler v. State, 691 P.2d 599, 602 (Wyo. 1984) (quoting Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)). To 
establish a Brady violation, Appellant must prove (1) that the prosecution 
suppressed evidence; (2) that the evidence would have been favorable to him; and 
(3) that the evidence was material. Relish v. State, 860 P.2d 455, 459-60 (Wyo. 
1993). The United States Supreme Court has also held that "`evidence is material 
only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed 
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
"reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome.'" Relish, 860 P.2d  at 460 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985)). There is "`no 
constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed 
accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work.'" Relish, 860 P.2d  
at 459 (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795, 92 S. Ct. 2562, 2568, 33 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1972)).

[¶16]   This Court has declared that the 
prosecution does not have "a duty to disclose evidence which is only 
speculatively helpful to a defendant or which merely exhibits a potential for 
leading to Brady material." Roderick v. State, 858 P.2d 538, 544 (Wyo. 1993). We 
have also noted that the failure to provide a defendant with evidence which is 
merely favorable or useful to him but not likely to change the outcome of his 
trial does not justify reversal under Brady. Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062, 1074 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶17]   Appellant initially contends that 
the prosecution failed to disclose two pieces of evidence. The first piece of 
evidence which Appellant is concerned about is the corner of the plastic baggie 
in which the crack cocaine "rock" was packaged. He claims that, had the defense 
known of the plastic baggie, it would have had it tested for fingerprints and 
that it would have altered the way the defense presented its case.

[¶18]   Appellant called the Division of 
Criminal Investigation's fingerprint expert as a witness. The expert testified 
that he did test the baggie for fingerprints and that he was not able to find 
any identifiable fingerprints on the baggie. He stated that the baggie was very 
small and that any kind of handling of it after it had been initially touched 
could have destroyed any fingerprints. He also opined that, since the baggie was 
with another object in a larger plastic bag, the movement between the outer bag, 
the small baggie, and the other object could have destroyed any identifiable 
fingerprints.

[¶19]   Since the fingerprint expert 
testified that he was not able to find any identifiable fingerprints on the 
baggie - Appellant's or anyone else's - we cannot see how Appellant was 
prejudiced by not having the baggie tested himself. Furthermore, Appellant 
called the fingerprint expert as his witness, and the defense fully explored any 
potentially exculpatory evidence with regard to the fingerprints on the corner 
of the baggie.

[¶20]   The second piece of evidence which 
Appellant claims that the prosecution failed to disclose is a copy of the "buy" 
money from the August 10, 1994, drug transaction. Prior to the trial, the 
prosecution informed Appellant that a copy of the "buy" money did not exist. The 
prosecution subsequently discovered that a copy did exist, and, on the day 
before the trial began, the prosecution made it available to 
Appellant.

[¶21]   Appellant asserts that, had the 
prosecution disclosed this evidence within a reasonable time prior to the trial, 
the defense could have altered the strategy of the case and that a reasonable 
probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been different. We 
cannot discern how the evidence would have been favorable to Appellant or how 
its existence was material, and Appellant fails to enlighten us. We, therefore, 
cannot resolve this issue in Appellant's favor.

[¶22]   Appellant next claims, without 
detailing how, that the prosecution engaged in prosecutorial misconduct which 
prejudiced Appellant's ability to receive a fair trial by withholding the 
following information:

(1) an alleged statement 
Appellant gave to [a nontestifying informant] while Appellant was in jail was 
not disclosed to defense counsel until the day before trial;

(2) at least one 
statement Appellant allegedly made to [a detective] when Appellant was 
arrested;

(3) the State's chief 
informant[']s . . . agreement to work as an informant for the [Laramie County 
Sheriff's Department] was not disclosed until the middle of the State's 
presentation of its case;

(4) [a witness's] 
statements implicating [Appellant] of selling cocaine prior to the alleged 
August 10, 1994 transaction; and

(5) The state's failure 
to comply with Appellant's demand for notice of all [W.R.E.] 404(b) evidence 
which the State intended to use at trial.

Our standard for 
reviewing prosecutorial misconduct claims is as follows:

Our rule is that we must 
examine the entire record to determine whether the conduct asserted as 
prosecutorial misconduct resulted in substantial prejudice to the defendant 
amounting to the denial of a fair trial. The burden of establishing prejudice is 
assigned to the defendant when prosecutorial misconduct is asserted.

Tennant v. 
State, 786 P.2d 339, 346 (Wyo. 1990) (citation omitted).

[¶23]   W.R.Cr.P. 16 provides in pertinent 
part:

(a) Disclosure of 
Evidence by the State.

(1) Information Subject 
to Disclosure.

(A) Statement of 
Defendant.

(i) Upon written demand 
of a defendant the state shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or 
photograph:

1. Any relevant written 
or recorded statements made by the defendant, or copies thereof, within the 
possession, custody or control of the state, the existence of which is known, or 
by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the 
state;

2. The substance of any 
oral statement which the state intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by 
the defendant whether before or after arrest . . .

. . .

(C) Documents and 
Tangible Objects. - Upon written demand of the defendant, the state shall permit 
the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, 
photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions 
thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of the state, and 
which are material to the preparation of the defendant's defense or are intended 
for use by the state as evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or 
belong to the defendant.

. . .

(2) Information Not 
Subject to Disclosure. - Except as provided in subparagraphs (1)(A), (1)(B), and 
(1)(D), this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, 
memoranda, or other internal state documents made by the attorney for the state 
or other state agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the 
case, or of statements made by state witnesses or prospective state witnesses 
except as provided in Rule 26.2.

[¶24]   W.R.Cr.P. 26.2 provides in 
pertinent part:

(a) Order for 
production. - Upon order of the court, the attorney for the state or the 
defendant and the defendant's attorney shall produce for the examination and use 
of the other party, any written or recorded statement of a witness other than 
the defendant in their possession or which they may reasonably obtain and which 
relates to the subject matter about which the witness has testified or will 
testify and:

(1) Upon demand of the 
other party, the court shall order the statement to be produced after a witness 
has testified; and

(2) Upon motion of a 
party or upon its own motion, the court may require the statement to be produced 
at any time before trial.

. . . .

(f) Definition. - 
As used in this rule, a "statement" of a witness means:

(1) A written statement 
that is signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the witness or an oral 
statement made by the witness and contained in a stenographic, mechanical, 
electrical, or other recording, or a transcript thereof; or

(2) A substantially 
verbatim recital of an oral statement made by the witness that is recorded 
contemporaneously with the making of the oral statement and that is contained in 
a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording or a transcription 
thereof . . .

[¶25]   The State informs us that the 
prosecution never intended to offer any of Appellant's oral statements into 
evidence. The prosecution was, therefore, not required under W.R.Cr.P. 
16(a)(1)(A)(i)(2) to disclose them to Appellant.

[¶26]   With regard to the informant's 
agreement to work as an informant for the detectives, less than one week prior 
to the trial, Appellant requested the informant's confidential file. The 
prosecution filed a motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum. At the hearing, 
the defense informed the trial court that it was interested in seeing some 
letters which were written to the trial court as a part of the informant's 
presentence report so that it could verify whether any of those letters 
contained prior inconsistent statements. The trial court ruled that the defense 
was entitled to have access to any such letters.

[¶27]   During the trial, Appellant moved 
for a mistrial, complaining that the informant's agreement had not been produced 
until after lunch on the first day of the trial. The State argues that, after 
the prosecution filed the motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum, it told the 
defense that it would provide the defense with a copy of the type of agreement 
which was used and that the agreement would have the date on it. The State 
claims that this was all that the defense requested until the first day of the 
trial when it asked for a copy of the original agreement.

[¶28]   Although Appellant did not have the 
informant's agreement until the first day of the trial, he did have all the 
relevant information which the agreement contained. Without having the benefit 
of an explanation from Appellant, we cannot perceive how Appellant was 
prejudiced by not receiving the original agreement earlier.

[¶29]   Appellant next complains about some 
statements made by one of the witnesses to the prosecution which implicated 
Appellant in the selling of cocaine prior to the August 10, 1994, transaction. 
The prosecution did not call the witness because she apparently changed her 
story before the trial. Although she initially told the prosecution that she 
could testify that Appellant had been selling crack cocaine and that she had 
told him how to package it and how much to charge for it, she told the 
prosecution on the morning of the trial that she did not know anything about 
Appellant selling crack cocaine. She instead testified for the defense that she 
never knew Appellant to sell crack cocaine. Some discussion occurred as to the 
possibility that this witness might have been tape recorded when she gave her 
original statement to the prosecution. The prosecution, however, said that it 
did not know of, nor did it have in its possession, any such tape. The 
prosecution, consequently, was not under any obligation to produce a statement 
which it did not have. W.R.Cr.P. 26.2(a), (f).

[¶30]   Appellant lastly argues that the 
prosecution failed to comply with Appellant's demand for notice of all W.R.E. 
404(b) evidence which the prosecution intended to use at the trial. Once again, 
Appellant makes this bare assertion without detailing how he was prejudiced. 
Since the burden of establishing prejudice is on Appellant, we cannot rule in 
his favor on this issue.

[¶31]   Appellant has failed to demonstrate 
how any of the evidence which he argues should have been provided to him would 
have been exculpatory or how failure to receive the evidence prejudiced him in 
such a way that would undermine our confidence in the fairness of his trial. 
Mere assertions that evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial or 
that the failure to receive evidence was prejudicial without explanations as to 
how and why are of no help to us in determining these types of issues. We 
conclude that Appellant's right to have a fair trial was not 
compromised.

CONCLUSION

[¶32]   The trial court did not commit any 
reversible errors in the issues presented in this case. Appellant's conviction 
is

[¶33]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTE

1 Appellant also argues 
that the State impermissibly referred to Appellant's character and other bad 
acts during its opening and closing statements. Since Appellant does not 
identify which comments he is concerned about, we will assume that he is 
concerned about the statements on the subject matter dealt with in the 
referenced portions of testimony. Our discussion with regard to the testimony at 
issue, therefore, will encompass our views on the comments which the prosecutor 
made during her opening and closing statements.