Case Title: In Re: Justin D and Joshua R.

Citation: 357 Md. 431

Docket Number: 61/99

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2000-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Justin D.; In re Joshua R.
No. 61, Sept. Term, 1999
Custody and visitation orders — degree of specificity required.
Sixth District Court of Maryland,
Montgomery County, Sitting as a Juvenile Court
Case Nos. 05954 and 05955
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 61
September Term, 1999
______________________________________
IN RE: JUSTIN D.
______________________________________
IN RE: JOSHUA R.
_______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed:    February 8, 2000
These two appeals, which we consolidated, are from orders of the District Court of
Maryland, sitting as the juvenile court in Montgomery County.  In each case, the child —
Justin D. and Joshua R., respectively — had been declared a child in need of assistance
(CINA) and committed to the custody of the Department of Social Services (DSS).  The
appeals arise from orders entered in subsequent review hearings that effectively continued
a previous placement arrangement and provided that visitation between the child and his
mother would be “under the direction of” DSS.  The mothers, appellants here, complain that
such an order constitutes “an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power.”  Although the
record indicates that the court’s intent and announced decision did not amount to such a
delegation, the actual written orders entered by the court were too broad, and we shall
remand for the entry of more specific orders.
BACKGROUND
Justin D.
Justin first came to the attention of DSS in January, 1993, when the agency received
a report that the child, then 10 years old, had been sexually abused by his 14-year-old
brother, Imari, approximately a year earlier, in December, 1991.  Justin reported the event
to a school official, who, in turn, contacted DSS.  Following an investigation, DSS devised
a safety plan calling for Imari’s temporary removal from the home, individual family
counseling, and further monitoring.  Imari returned home after three days and no further
incidents of that nature were reported.  Imari has consistently denied having abused his
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brother, and the allegation has never been independently confirmed, notwithstanding that in
some subsequent psychiatric or social service reports, it seems to have been assumed.
Indeed, the uncertainty surrounding the allegation has been one of the root problems in
dealing with Justin.  Justin’s parents never accepted that the event described by Justin
occurred, which, in part, contributed to depression and other disorders on Justin’s part and
to concern on the part of DSS, some of Justin’s therapists, and the court as to the ability or
willingness of the parents to deal with Justin’s problems.
A second incident occurred in March, 1993, when Justin, while at school, took an
overdose of antibiotic medication.  His father was called and was, at first, reluctant to go to
the school, stating that Justin was simply “having a pity party.”  He did go, however, and,
while he and Justin were in the lavatory, the father slapped Justin, in the process scratching
his face and causing Justin to bleed.  There were no serious physical injuries, but Justin was
taken to the hospital for evaluation and eventually placed, temporarily, with his adult half-
sister, Danielle.
On April 7, 1993, the juvenile court declared Justin a CINA, committed him to DSS
with permission for him to return home under the general direction and guidance of DSS and
subject to the conditions that the family participate in a counseling program under the
direction of DSS and that Justin was not to have any unsupervised contact with Imari.  Justin
returned home that day.  Psychiatric reports prepared on Justin and Imari showed that Justin
was a morbidly or pre-morbidly obese child who was in a significant amount of emotional
distress arising from his earlier complaint of sexual abuse, which no one seemed to believe.
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There was a substantial degree of sibling rivalry between Justin and Imari.
In a dispositional order entered in June, 1993, the court continued the existing
arrangement.  By December, however, there was concern that Justin’s emotional problems
were not being adequately addressed.  He had been truant from school 75% of the time; he
had continued to gain weight — at 11 years of age, he weighed 200 pounds; he had trouble
sleeping; and the parents had not fully cooperated with recommended therapy.  Due to “the
difficulty in motivating the . . . family to implement behavioral changes which would reduce
the risk of further abuse towards Justin and attend to the significant issues regarding his
health and education,” DSS recommended a comprehensive evaluation by the Regional
Institute for Children and Adolescents (RICA).  On December 1, the court ordered that Justin
be removed from the home and sent to RICA for evaluation.
The child was returned to his parents on March 23, 1994, under a joint commitment
to DSS, the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene, and the Montgomery County Public
Schools, with a continued placement in the RICA day program.  A year later, due largely to
his continued truancy, obesity, and borderline hypertension, the court, on recommendation
of RICA, continued the commitment to DSS but ordered placement at a RICA residential unit
and directed the parents to cooperate with RICA.  There was considerable concern about his
obesity; Justin had gained 35 pounds and, at age 12 ½, was five feet tall and weighed 243
pounds.  He was diagnosed as having major depression, an eating disorder, obesity, and
borderline hypertension.
Justin remained at RICA for 20 months, eventually with weekend passes at home.
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During that period, his half-sister, Danielle, attended every family therapy session and served
as significant support.  The parents, on the other hand, though maintaining consistent
telephone contact with Justin and his therapist, frequently canceled or showed up late for
therapy sessions; the mother missed two out of the four sessions, and, although the father
attended three, he was 20 minutes late for each of them.  In August, 1995, Justin’s other half-
sister, Andrea, expressed concern that Justin was unsafe in his parents’ home due to their use
of illegal substances.  Those allegations were supported by Justin.  As a result, the court, in
August, 1995, limited the parents’ contact to supervised visitation at RICA but permitted
weekend visits with Danielle.  The court noted that the continued placement was made
“despite reasonable efforts having been made to have said child [returned to his] home.”
Following that order, Justin’s father ceased visits altogether.  Eventually, the parents
separated, and the mother, it appears, moved in with Danielle.  The mother made an effort
to be more available to Justin but continued either to cancel visits or arrive late for them.  A
progress report in November indicated that Justin was angry and disappointed about her
inconsistency and remained doubtful “that she will ever be a reliable and reassuring figure
in his life.”  The mother began substance abuse treatment in September but discontinued it
in early October, giving as a reason her impending move from Danielle’s home into a home
of her own.  The therapist also expressed concern about the mother’s intent to bring Imari
into her home.  Imari was also a chronic truant who had recently been arrested for stealing
a car.  In November, 1996, the court continued the commitment to DSS and the Secretary of
Health and Mental Hygiene, designated Danielle as his primary guardian, and provided for
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placement in her home.  This was based, in part, we assume on the therapist’s note that
Danielle had been “an enormous support to Justin throughout his residential treatment.” The
court noted in its order that Justin’s parents “will not solve issues of imminent danger and
[Justin] continues to need the services of the Court.”  As a condition of the placement, the
court ordered that Justin was to have “no contact whatsoever with the homes of father or
mother.”
A DSS status report prepared in anticipation of a review hearing in May, 1997 showed
that Justin had progressed well in his sister’s care, that the father essentially had disappeared,
that the mother was inconsistent in attending family therapy, and that Justin remained “very
angry and confused about his parents’ lack of participation in his treatment.”  DSS
recommended a continuation of the existing arrangement but noted that its permanency plan
for Justin was “long term foster care relative placement with his sister.”  The RICA staff
concurred in the DSS recommendation that the existing arrangement be continued.  It added
that Justin should “continue to have only supervised visits with his parents and that [the
parents] be required to participate in Family Therapy as a condition of visitation.”  With
these recommendations, the court, in May, 1997, continued the existing arrangement.  The
order stated, in relevant part, that Justin was to remain with Danielle under the jurisdiction
of the court and the supervision of DSS.  Visitation with the parents was to be “under the
direction” of DSS and Danielle.
 A similar order was entered in May, 1998, as well.  A DSS status report noted that
Danielle was “the only consistent family member in [Justin’s] life” and that Justin remained
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“very frustrated regarding his parents’ lack of involvement in his treatment at RICA.”  A
court-appointed special advocate for Justin concurred in RICA’s recommendation that the
existing arrangement be continued.  The court order directed that the parents participate in
family counseling at RICA, that there were to be no overnight visits without Danielle’s
permission, and that all visits with the parents were to be under the direction of DSS.
The event that spawned this appeal was the review hearing held in January, 1999.  A
status report prepared by RICA confirmed Justin’s progress and contained the same
recommendations made earlier — continued commitment to DSS, placement with Danielle,
only supervised visits with the parents and no overnight visits.  DSS concurred but
recommended that Justin, then 16, participate in an independent living program, to plan for
the time when he will live independently.  At the review hearing, the mother, apparently for
the first time, objected to the condition that there be no overnight visits and to the
requirement that visitation be under the direction of DSS.  Through counsel, she noted that
Justin was 16 and urged that there was no danger to him from unsupervised overnight visits.
She pointed out that, as Imari was then incarcerated, he was not in the home.  She also stated
that she agreed to go to monthly therapy “as best she can,” considering her current health
problems, which were unspecified.  Counsel argued that the mother “ought to have the
opportunity to question the Department when it makes decisions about overnights,” and that,
if DSS decided not to allow overnight visitation, to have the court listen to the facts and make
the decision.  Citing Shapiro v. Shapiro, 54 Md. App. 477, 458 A.2d 1257, cert. denied, 296
Md. 655 (1983), she contended that the court needed to decide whether there will be
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overnight visitation and that it could not delegate that decision to DSS.  She asked that the
court allow overnight visitation and not have it under the direction of DSS.
The court found Shapiro distinguishable in that it did not involve a CINA but was
instead a battle between two parents.  It noted the concern raised by the mother, however,
and attempted to address it.  It advised the mother, through her attorney, that, if she felt that
DSS was withholding visitation improperly, she should first attempt to resolve the dispute
with the Department and Justin’s attorney.  If the problem was with the particular social
worker, the mother could go to the supervisory level or to the county attorney, and, if that
failed to resolve the problem, the court would resolve it.  It said, “if I think the Department’s
being not just injudicious but somehow irrational about it, I wouldn’t hesitate to enter the
appropriate order.”  After considering the various recommendations before it, only one of
which — the one dealing with visitation — was objected to, the court entered an order
continuing its jurisdiction, the commitment to DSS, and Justin’s placement with Danielle,
and, as it had consistently in the past, provided that “[v]isitation between Justin and his
mother to be under the direction of [DSS].”  As before, the parents were ordered to
participate in family counseling at RICA.
The mother’s appeal is from that order.  At oral argument, we were advised that, in
July, 1999, following a regularly scheduled review hearing, the court entered a similar order,
from which no appeal was taken.
Joshua R.
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Joshua and his two older brothers were declared CINA in February, 1989, when
Joshua was only two.  The basis for the finding was the disappearance of the children’s
father, “their mother’s continued drug use,” and her inability “to protect them from the drug
activity that surrounds them.”  Evidence was presented that the mother used her available
funds on drugs and left the children with no food or supervision.  Joshua was committed to
DSS and placed in foster care.  The mother was given “reasonable visitation under the
direction of [DSS].”
Similar orders were entered following periodic review hearings in 1990 and 1991.
During that two-year period, Joshua resided in three different foster homes.  That, coupled
with the initial neglect, led to the development of serious emotional and behavioral problems.
As early as September, 1989, he was extremely hyperactive and aggressive.  Reunification
was apparently considered in 1990 but was deferred because the mother was again pregnant
— the father being unknown — and there was concern over her ability to care for Joshua.
Although a DSS status report in July, 1991 found Joshua doing well with his then-current
foster family, in September, 1991, it sought an emergency hearing and requested that Joshua
be hospitalized “because of his serious emotional and behavioral problems.”  On that
petition, the court committed Joshua to the Walter P. Carter Center for treatment.  In
December, 1991, the court permitted Joshua to return to his mother’s care.  She had just
completed a drug rehabilitation program.  At some point in 1994, Joshua was transferred to
the RICA school “because of severe hyperactivity, aggressive behavior and an inability to
learn in a regular classroom.”
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Although  DSS workers initially believed that Joshua’s mother had overcome her
dependence on drugs, they learned on September 14, 1994, that they were mistaken.  A DSS
worker arrived at the mother’s home, at about 8:45 a.m., and found that Joshua, then age 7,
and his 3-year-old brother had been left home alone overnight.  Joshua reported that his
mother had left the night before with a man.  The house was in disarray.  There was no food
available for the children; dirty dishes and pans were in the sink; a bag of trash and empty
beer bottles were on the floor; and a broken window, with jagged pieces of glass, was within
the children’s reach.  The mother had resumed her substance abuse and eventually told the
DSS worker that she left the children unattended because her judgment had been impaired
from alcohol and cocaine.
As a result of that episode, which was treated as a relapse, the court removed the
children from the home and placed them in foster care.  The court recommended that the
mother enter long-term inpatient drug rehabilitation, which, it appears, she did.  Weekly
visitation was ordered, under the direction of DSS.  The foster care and visitation
arrangement was confirmed after review hearings in 1995, 1996, and 1997.  In May, 1997,
the court approved long-term foster care as the permanency plan and appointed a guardian
for Joshua for educational and medical purposes.  The guardianship apparently resulted from
concern expressed by RICA that his mother was not giving Joshua his psychotropic
medication during visits.
In January, 1998, following Joshua’s admission to University of Maryland Hospital
 In a status report prepared in May, 1998, RICA recounted an escalation of aggressive and
1
inappropriate behavior, culminating in an incident when Joshua climbed out of a second story window
in his foster home, ran into the street, and was nearly hit by a truck.  He was also involved in two
shoplifting incidents that day.  The report noted that Joshua “expressed suicidal and homicidal
thoughts and demonstrated incoherent thinking which [led] to a hospitalization at the University of
Maryland from October 20, 1997 through November 5, 1997.”
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due to his acting in an “unsafe manner,” the court placed the child in a group home.1
Visitation under the direction of DSS was continued.  In May, 1998, a RICA status report
noted that “[a] decision was made to stop overnight weekend visits because [the mother] was
not giving medications as prescribed and not scheduling visits in a predictable manner.”
RICA recommended that Joshua continue in long-term foster care “and continue to have
visits with his mother as deemed appropriate by circumstances in the household and with
input from [the mother] and Joshua.”  The court continued to allow visitation “under the
direction of [DSS].”
In October, 1998, the court reaffirmed that arrangement but added to its order a
statement that “[m]other and the department are encouraged to work together regarding
overnight visits.”  In a status report prepared in January, 1999, the group home noted that
Joshua had recently been allowed to have overnight weekend visits with his mother — an
expansion from the 3-hour Saturday visits he previously had.  Joshua’s therapist at RICA
noted a problem with the increased visits, however, stemming from Joshua’s desire to return
home.  A status report prepared by the RICA therapist stated that “for Joshua increased
contact with his mother seems to undermine his progress and success.  Each time [the
mother] pushes for reunification Joshua’s progress gets disrupted and he becomes negative
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about his need for RICA or his medication.”  The therapist concluded that “[t]here is no
doubt that Joshua is attached to his mother and family and needs to remain in contact with
them, but the frequency and duration of his contact will need continual monitoring to protect
his needs.”  She advised that “[r]egular, predictable weekend afternoon visits and a once a
month overnight can be supported unless this schedule proves too disruptive for Joshua’s
success.”  DSS commended the mother for her continuing recovery from drug addiction and
for maintaining employment.  It noted that there had been two weekend visits that went well
and that, being drug-free, the mother wanted Joshua returned.  DSS reported, however, that
it was the consensus of the treatment team that continued residence at the group home was
necessary in order not to jeopardize the gains Joshua made during the year.
These reports were considered at a review hearing in January, 1999.  At the hearing,
appellant expressed dissatisfaction with the recommendation that Joshua’s overnight visits
be limited to once a month.  She stated, through counsel, that she had made progress working
towards reunification with her son and that, in his recent overnight visits, she provided him
with his medication and “no unusual incidents were reported.”  Appellant told the court that
“she’s frustrated by the fact that all of this progress has been made and the recommendations
are to distance her from her son despite the progress.”  At that point, the court informed
appellant that, contrary to her perception, it did not view the recommendations as restrictive.
Nevertheless, for the first time, appellant voiced concern about leaving visits subject to the
direction of the Department because “under the direction leads to all kinds of restrictions that
aren’t discussed during the status, during the review hearing and occur without any input
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from the client making significant changes.”  She objected “to just leaving it all up to the
Department not even knowing what the Department would plan to do and just come in on
. . . a review at my request and who knows how many months that would be down the road.”
While the court agreed with appellant that greater visitation should occur, it was
reluctant to set a specific schedule.  It urged DSS to “go along with a little bit more visitation
and see if the end result produces anything negative in [Joshua] and if it does then scale it
back,” but it noted “[t]hat’s why I don’t want to be ordering specific amounts of visitation.
Because there’s a dynamic that happens in every case that I just can’t be there to observe and
react to.  And if I have a structured kind of visitation we can’t adapt.”  With that, the court
continued the existing arrangement, including the condition that visitation be under the
direction of DSS.  Joshua’s mother appealed from that order.  As in Justin’s case, a new
order, similar in character, was entered in July, 1999, following a scheduled review hearing.
DISCUSSION
As noted, appellants treat the court’s orders as a complete denial of visitation, except
as determined by DSS, which, they aver, amounts to an unlawful delegation of judicial
authority, not only to an executive agency, but to a party in the case.  They have not
complained in this appeal, specifically, that the court did not grant them the extended
unsupervised visitation that they requested, so we shall not consider the merits of that issue;
their complaint, rather, is that the court failed to decide that issue but left it to the unfettered
discretion of DSS.
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The State, preliminarily, contends that appellants have waived their right to complain
about the respective orders by failing to appeal either from the several previous orders
containing the same broad language or from subsequent orders, entered in July, 1999
following another review hearing, which also contained that language.  We find no basis for
a waiver — on a theory of acquiescence — from the failure to challenge the earlier orders.
The circumstances under which those orders were entered, though similar in many respects
to those underlying the orders appealed from, were not identical; the children are older and
the separation has been longer.  Acquiescence in a limited visitation at one point does not,
of itself, constitute acquiescence in a limited visitation at another point.
The subsequent orders present a different, and more troublesome, issue.
Notwithstanding appellants’ assertion to the contrary at oral argument, we do not have some
sort of inherent authority to vacate separate, independent orders or judgments from which
no appeal has been taken.  Appeals could have been filed from the later orders, which would
have brought their validity before us.  In the absence of such appeals, there is really no
effective relief that we can grant with respect to the orders that are before us.  They have
been superseded and are no longer in effect; vacating them will provide no relief whatever
to appellants.  The appeals are clearly moot and, ordinarily, would be dismissed on that
ground.
 It is clear from the record, however, and the parties have agreed, that it is common
practice for the juvenile court in Montgomery County to enter orders of this kind, so the
issue presented by appellants is a recurring and important one.  With periodic six-month
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reviews, orders of this kind  that are appealed will almost always be replaced by subsequent
orders before this Court will have the opportunity to review them.  We have recognized a
very limited exception to the mootness doctrine in this kind of situation and have held that
“if the public interest clearly will be hurt if the question is not
immediately decided, if the matter involved is likely to recur
frequently, and its recurrence will involve a relationship
between government and its citizens, or a duty of government,
and upon any recurrence, the same difficulty which prevented
the appeal at hand from being heard in time is likely again to
prevent a decision, then the Court may find justification for
deciding the issues raised by a question which has become
moot, particularly if all these factors concur with sufficient
weight.”
Lloyd v. Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 43, 111 A.2d 379, 382 (1954). 
We have applied that exception very sparingly (see In re Riddlemoser, 317 Md. 496,
564 A.2d 812 (1989); Reyes v. Prince George’s County, 281 Md. 279, 380 A.2d 12 (1977);
Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 306 Md. 556, 510 A.2d 562 (1986)), but this is a case in which we
find it appropriate to do so.
As we indicated initially, the orders, on their face and without any reference to the
colloquy between the court and counsel that led to them, could be read as a comprehensive
authority for DSS to determine whether there was to be visitation and, if so, when, where,
and how it was to occur.  As we have also indicated, however, that was not what was
intended and that is not how the orders are being implemented.  Under the very language that
appellants now complain of, they have, in fact, enjoyed visitation with their respective
children, on a regular basis.  Because it is the written order that constitutes the judgment of
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the court, however, the order itself must be clear and must express the court’s decision.  In
Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 46 n.7, 566 A.2d 767, 776 n.7 (1989), we noted that
“[t]he extemporaneous recitation of multiple or complex rulings from the bench may be fine
for letting the parties and their attorneys know what the court’s decision is in the case, but
as it is the actual judgment that will govern the conduct, fortunes, and affairs of the parties,
the court must be especially careful that the judgment itself is clear, complete, and precise.”
See also In Interest of Teela H., 529 N.W.2d 134 (Neb. 1995).  The orders before us do not
have that quality.
At oral argument, the State essentially conceded that the orders were facially deficient
and needed to include more detail.  It urged, however, that what the court intended, and
effectively did, was to deny the respective requests for unsupervised overnight visitation and
continue the existing visitation arrangements subject to an expansion of visitation either upon
agreement of the parties or upon further order of the court.  Taking into account the court’s
comments, the State contends that the court properly exercised its authority and discretion
and did not delegate any judicial authority to DSS.  For the guidance of the court, we shall
address the question of how far the court can go in allowing DSS to control the nature and
extent of visitation.
Citing Shapiro v. Shapiro, supra, 54 Md. App. 477, 485 A.2d 1257, and a number of
out-of-state cases, appellants begin, and essentially end, their argument with the
unchallenged notions that a court may not delegate judicial authority to a non-judicial agency
or person and that the vesting of “complete discretion in decisions regarding visitation to the
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custodial parent” amounts to an improper delegation.  Shapiro makes those points well.  It
was a divorce case that included a particularly nasty custody battle.  The child, around 11
years old at the time, had developed an intense antipathy toward his father and had informed
the court that he did not want even to see him, must less to visit.  The child was in
psychotherapy with a Dr. Lehman, who had recommended therapy for the parents as well.
In its judgment, the court ordered that the father would have no visitation with the child until
such time that Dr. Lehman recommended it and, even then, the visitation would be on the
terms, guidelines, and places recommended by the doctor.
The Court of Special Appeals found two problems with that order.  First, it constituted
a complete suspension of all visitation privileges, which should be ordered only in the
exceptional case.  The appellate court did not find Shapiro to be that kind of exceptional
case.  Second, and more to the point here, the court noted that jurisdiction over custody and
visitation was vested in the equity courts and that “[t]here is no authority for the delegation
of any portion of such jurisdiction to someone outside the court.”  Id. at 484, 458 A.2d at
1262.  The court is entitled to rely on expert opinion in making a decision, but the decision
must be that of the court, not the expert.  The appellate court’s ultimate conclusion was that
“absent some circumstances not evident in the record before us, provision for limited,
structured visitation should be made and, if deemed necessary, that visitation be under
supervision of a therapist or someone else designated by the chancellor,” and that any order
for visitation “would necessarily contemplate periodic modification as circumstances warrant
or require.” Id. at 485, 458 A.2d at 1262 (footnote omitted).
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Shapiro sets the proper framework.   See, to the same effect, Hamel v. Hamel, 489
A.2d 471 (D.C. 1985) (not improper to require mother to meet with court-appointed
psychiatrist so that trial court could receive recommendation for appropriate visitation
schedule); Lewis v. Lewis, 637 A.2d 70 (D.C. 1994) (improper to delegate full discretion over
whether and when visitation is to occur to custodial parent); Jones v. Jones, 931 S.W.2d 767
(Ark. 1996) (improper to authorize therapist, on her own, to modify court-ordered visitation
if therapist found it detrimental to child).  Subject to the preclusion of that kind of delegation
of authority, there is a great deal of flexibility permitted in visitation orders.  They run a
gamut — a proper gamut.  In the divorce, or post-divorce, setting, they may simply provide
for “reasonable,” but otherwise unspecified, visitation, or they may set out a rather detailed
schedule with respect to times, places, and conditions, or they may be somewhere between
those poles, depending on the circumstances and the ability of the parties to agree to a
mutually acceptable arrangement.  See Leary v. Leary, 97 Md. App. 26, 54-55, 627 A.2d 30,
43-44 (1993).
In those settings, absent some evidence of past or potential abuse or neglect, there is
usually no real concern about the child’s safety; the determination of custody and visitation,
if not agreed to by the parties, arises from an application of the general “best interest of the
child” standard to the situation at hand.  Absent some express provision in the order to the
contrary, the parties are usually free to depart from the ordained visitation schedule, even if
it is detailed and specific, if they find it mutually convenient to do so, without seeking a
modification of the order.  Indeed, as the children grow older and circumstances change, it
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is not uncommon for the parents to make their own adjustments without further court
involvement.  The court is ordinarily happy to defer to the agreement of the parties; it
exercises its equity jurisdiction and makes the determination only when the parties are unable
or unwilling to do so, and it enforces that determination only when one party, in the absence
of an agreement and over the objection of the other, acts in derogation of it.  In that
traditional setting, the court is essentially deciding a case — resolving a dispute within its
jurisdiction — not acting in any specific way as a guardian or protector of the child; the
order itself lasts indefinitely — until the child is emancipated or reaches majority or until,
on someone’s petition, it is modified.
When there is evidence that the child has been abused or neglected, or is in some
danger of abuse or neglect, however, the court’s role is necessarily more pro-active.
Together with other agencies, it does then have a greater responsibility to assure the child’s
safety and well-being and is not concerned merely with deciding a dispute between the
parties.  See, for example, Maryland Code, § 9-101 of the Family Law Article, precluding
the court from awarding custody or visitation to a person who has a history of abuse unless
the court makes an affirmative finding that further abuse is not likely.  That is especially the
case when the custody or visitation issue arises in the context of a CINA proceeding.  The
court there is dealing with a child who already has been found to need the assistance of the
court because (1) the child is mentally handicapped or is not receiving ordinary and proper
care and attention, or (2) the child’s parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling
to give proper care and attention to the child and the child’s problems.  See Md. Code, § 3-
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801(e) of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article, defining a child in need of assistance.  The court, in
such a setting, is obliged, among other things, to “provide for the care, protection, and
wholesome mental and physical development” of the child and to hold the parents
responsible “for remedying the circumstances that required the court’s intervention.”  § 3-
802(a)(3) and (4).  If the child has been removed from the home, it is only because the court
found the removal “necessary for his welfare or in the interest of public safety.”  § 3-
802(a)(5).
It is evident that, in a CINA case, where the child has been removed from the home
under the standards just noted, the parents and DSS do not stand in the same parity as parents
ordinarily do vis a vis each other in the divorce or post-divorce setting.  The court is
authorized to commit the child to the custody or guardianship of DSS “on terms that the court
considers appropriate to meet the priorities set forth in § 3-802.”  § 3-820 (c)(ii).  Although
it has its own statutory mission, DSS acts, in many respects, as the court’s agent in
attempting to remedy the problems that led to the CINA finding and removal of the child in
the first instance.  Unlike in the normal divorce setting, the court has a clear and continuous
supervisory role to play.  It is usually dealing with a more volatile situation — a child at risk,
a troubled child with special needs — that requires much closer monitoring than does a
routine custody dispute between two parents.  DSS (or the other chosen guardian or
custodian) is held to a greater and more direct level of accountability to the court, and it
needs to be given sufficient authority and flexibility to carry out its function.
Even in this setting, however, the court may not delegate its responsibility to
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determine the minimal level of appropriate contact between the child and his or her parent
or other guardian, and, except to respond to a true and immediate emergency, it may not
permit DSS to curtail, or make more onerous, the visitation allowed in the court order.  See
In Interest of Teela H., supra, 529 N.W.2d 134; In Re Donnovan J., 58 Cal. App. 4  1474
th
(1997).  It must determine, and set forth in its order, at least the minimal amount of visitation
that is appropriate and that DSS must provide, as well as any basic conditions that it believes,
as a minimum, should be imposed.  Beyond that, it is not inappropriate for the court to
permit DSS, with the concurrence of the parent, to determine whether additional visitation
or less restrictive conditions on visitation are in order.  Understanding that it likely will not
have an opportunity to review the matter for at least six months and that, with ongoing efforts
to deal with the conditions that led to the removal of the child circumstances may change
during that period, the court may properly leave to DSS the ability to afford a parent greater
or less restrictive access than the order directs.
The record in these two cases demonstrates that this is what the court intended to do.
The only error is that the court’s intention was not properly reflected in its orders.
ORDERS ENTERED JANUARY 19, 1999, VACATED;
MONTGOMERY COUNTY TO PAY THE COSTS.