Case Title: IN THE INTEREST OF DRT, A Minor, JET, v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0057

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE INTEREST OF DRT, A Minor, JET,  v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES 2010 WY 137241 P.3d 489Case Number: No. S-10-0057Decided: 10/21/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
IN 
THE INTEREST OF DRT, A Minor,

 
 
JET,

Appellant 
(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES,

Appellee 
(Petitioner).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

John 
M. Burman, Faculty Supervisor, and Joshua S. Toy, Student Intern, U.W. Legal 
Services Program, Laramie, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Toy.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Jill E. Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Sue Chatfield, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Chatfield.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the juvenile court's denial of the appellant's motion to withdraw her 
admission of neglect of her child, and from the disposition order placing the 
child in the custody of the Department of Family Services.  Finding no error, we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The appellant 
presents a somewhat convoluted statement of the issues that is not consonant 
with her Notice of Appeal.  The 
first stated issue in her appellate brief is whether the juvenile court erred in 
accepting her admission of neglect, yet she did not appeal from the order 
accepting that admission and adjudicating the issue of neglect.  She then commingles that issue with the 
question of whether the juvenile court erred in entering an order denying her 
motion to withdraw the admission of neglect, from which order she did 
appeal.  Finally, her Notice of 
Appeal indicates that she is appealing from the disposition order entered in the 
case, yet she raises no factual or legal issues concerning any part of that 
order.

 
 
[¶3]      We believe that 
the issues actually presented to this Court can best be formulated as 
follows:  Did the juvenile court 
abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's motion to withdraw her admission 
of neglect because (1) the juvenile court failed to advise the appellant at the 
initial hearing that a termination of her parental rights may be initiated upon 
an adjudication of neglect; (2) the juvenile court accepted the admission of 
neglect notwithstanding the evidence that the appellant suffered from a mental 
illness; and (3) the juvenile court's acceptance of the appellant's admission of 
neglect sets a dangerous precedent that will deter persons in her position from 
seeking assistance from governmental agencies?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      The appellant is 
a twenty-year-old single mother of one child.  Prior to the child's birth, the 
appellant moved from a homeless shelter in Texas to Rawlins, Wyoming, where she 
moved in with her former fiancé's parents and two other adults.  When that living arrangement was not 
successful, the appellant moved into a low-income housing apartment.  During her pregnancy, the appellant 
worked with both a public health nurse and social worker, and with a counseling 
center therapist.

 
 
[¶5]      The child was 
born on November 20, 2009.  At about 
2:00 a.m., on November 26, 2009, the appellant telephoned the public health 
social worker and told her something to the effect that she needed some help 
with the child because she knew she had a temper, or that she was afraid she was 
going to hurt the child.  The social 
worker called the police department, and a police officer in turn called a 
Department of Family Services caseworker.  Both the police officer and the 
caseworker went to the appellant's home, where the officer took the child into 
protective custody.  In an affidavit 
attached to the neglect petition filed a few days later, the caseworker stated 
that when she arrived at the appellant's house, the appellant was visibly upset 
and crying, and said that "she is afraid that she might hurt [the child] because 
at night when [the child] starts crying she finds herself screaming at [the 
child]."

 
 
[¶6]      The juvenile 
court held a combined shelter care hearing and initial appearance on December 1, 
2009.1  Because this appeal revolves around what 
occurred at that hearing, we will quote at length from the 
transcript:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Okay.  [The appellant], are you under the 
influence of alcohol, narcotics or medication?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  No, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Are you suffering from any 
mental problems that make it difficult for you to understand these 
proceedings?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  Yes, sir, bipolar 
and ADHD as well as panic attacks and anxiety attacks.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  And when were you diagnosed 
with bipolar?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  When I was a 
child.  I'm not sure of the age, but 
I know that I have been medicated from elementary school 
up.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  On psychotropic 
medication?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  Yes, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Do you happen to know what 
medication?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  Too many to 
name.  I have been on almost every 
single one they could put me on.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Are you medicated right 
now?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  No, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Are you clearheaded?  Do you understand why you're 
here?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  Yes, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Have you been served with a 
copy of this petition?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  Yes, 
sir.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
THE 
COURT:  You understand that the 
State is alleging that you have neglected [the child] by failing to provide 
adequate care.  Have you read the 
affidavit of [the caseworker] that was attached to the 
petition?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  Yes, sir.  And I note some things that weren't 
entirely as it was supposed to be.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Okay.  Let's  we will talk about that in a 
minute if we need to, but for now I want to make sure that you understand what's 
brought you here.

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  Yes, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Okay.  I want to talk to you about your rights 
in this proceeding.  This is 
juvenile court.  We are not here to 
punish anyone.  We are not here to 
accuse anyone of misconduct.  We are 
here to protect [the child] and to make sure that [the child] is in a healthy 
and safe environment.

 
 
            
You, on the other hand, have certain rights guaranteed to you by laws in 
this state, and they include the fact that you have the right to remain silent; 
anything you say may be used against you.  
You have the right to be represented by a lawyer; and if you cannot 
afford one, the Court will appoint one to represent you.

 
 
            
Upon your denial of these allegations, you have the right to force the 
State of Wyoming to prove them by a preponderance of the evidence at an 
adjudicatory hearing.  That's just a 
long word for a trial.  You have the 
right to be present at your trial either before a judge of this court or before 
a jury of six persons.  If you want 
a jury of six persons, you have to make that demand in writing within 10 days 
from today.  You have a right to be 
present at that hearing with your attorney to hear and cross-examine the State's 
witnesses, to produce witnesses in your own behalf using the subpoena powers of 
this Court.  And if an adjudication 
of neglect is entered, you have the right to appeal any mistakes that may have 
been made to the Wyoming Supreme Court in Cheyenne.

 
 
            
Do you understand all of that?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  
Okay.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Unless you agree that the 
child ought to remain in foster care, then the State has to prove here today by 
clear and convincing evidence that the child shouldn't be returned to you.  Or you can postpone that hearing and 
leave the child in shelter care, we call it, until you have had a chance to talk 
to your lawyer.

 
 
            
This Court from today forward may place your child someplace where we all 
believe the child will be safe, including the custody of DFS for placement in 
foster care.  The Court may impose 
terms and conditions necessary to assure your appearance and protect [the child] 
from any harm.  That includes foster 
care or some facility outside the home.  
You will be subject to orders, demands, requirements, limitations, 
restrictions or conditions necessary; first, to assure your appearance and, 
secondly, to assure the fact that [the child] has been protected from 
harm.

 
 
            
If [the child] is placed outside your home for 15 of the next 22 
continuous months, the State may file a petition to terminate your parental 
rights.  I don't tell you that to 
scare you, but you have a right to know what could happen down the 
road.

 
 
            
You could be ordered to pay child support or to pay for all or any part 
of the services that the State of Wyoming may provide to your 
child.

 
 
            
Do you understand all of that?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  Yes, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Okay.  Do you think [the child] is, as we sit 
here, in a healthy and safe place?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  Yes, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Do you think [the child] 
ought to stay there until we get to the bottom of what's going 
on?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  Yes, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Okay.  Do you want to talk to a 
lawyer?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  No, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Are you sure of 
that?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  
(Nodded.)

 
 
THE 
COURT:  You know you have an 
absolute right to talk to a lawyer at no expense to you.  And in a moment, if you don't want to 
talk to a lawyer, then I'm going to ask you if you admit or deny these 
allegations.  And if you admit the 
majority of them, if you admit the gist of what the State is claiming, then I'm 
going to take jurisdiction over you and your child and we are going to see what 
kind of treatment we can provide to you so that you can take care of [the 
child].

 
 
            
The goal of this court now and for the foreseeable future in this case is 
to reunify you with your child.  We 
want to put [the child] back into your home, but we have got to make sure that 
your home is a healthy and safe place before we can do that.  And I can tell you right now we are 
going to have to start off with some psychiatric evaluations.  We are going to have to figure out  if 
you are, in fact, bipolar already  what kind of meds you ought to be 
on.

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  I understand, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Okay.  So you understand all of 
that?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  Yes, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  I will ask you again if you 
want to talk to a lawyer?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  No, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Okay.  Has anybody threatened you or forced you 
to make that decision?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  No, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Has anybody made you any 
promises or agreements as to what might happen if you waive your right to a 
lawyer?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  No, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Okay.  Do you admit or deny these 
allegations?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  The allegations are 
true, sir.

 
 
[¶7]      Following this 
colloquy, the judge and the appellant engaged in a lengthy discussion of the 
appellant's current living arrangements, her previous living arrangements, how 
she came to be in Rawlins, Wyoming, and about her pregnancy and the person she 
believed to be the father of the child.  At the end of that discussion, this 
additional colloquy occurred:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  All right.  [The appellant], do you have any 
questions?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  No sir, but I would 
like to ask some questions as to  let's see  on here it was stating that I was 
schizophrenic, which is untrue.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Just 
bipolar?

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  I have never been 
diagnosed with schizophrenia or as schizophrenic.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  But you have been diagnosed 
as bipolar.

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  Bipolar and ADHD, 
panic attacks and anxiety attacks.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  All right.  Then I will strike the reference to 
schizophrenia, and we will have a psychiatric evaluation.

 
 
THE 
MINOR'S MOTHER:  All 
right.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      Neither party 
identifies with much particularity the standard this Court should apply in 
reviewing the denial of a motion to withdraw an admission of neglect in a 
juvenile proceeding.  The appellant 
presents her argument mainly in terms of due process because of the 
constitutionally protected right to the parent-child relationship.  The State compares this situation to the 
denial of a motion to withdraw a plea in a criminal case, but it also recognizes 
the constitutional implications.  We 
find that a motion to withdraw an admission in juvenile court is similar to a 
motion to withdraw a plea in a criminal case, and we hereby apply the standard 
of review set forth in Demeulenaere v. 
State, 2008 WY 147, ¶ 13, 197 P.3d 1238, 1240-41 (Wyo. 2008), which we 
summarize and re-state as follows:  
(1) a parent does not have an absolute right to withdraw an admission of 
neglect in a juvenile proceeding; (2) the juvenile court is vested with 
discretion to determine whether to grant or to deny a motion to withdraw an 
admission; (3) the denial of such a motion is within the sound discretion of the 
juvenile court where the admission was voluntary and where the procedural 
requirements of the applicable statutes were met at the time the admission was 
accepted.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did 
the juvenile court abuse its discretion bydenying the appellant's motion to 
withdraw her admission of neglect because the juvenile court did not, before 
accepting that admission, advise the appellant that a termination of parental 
rights may be initiated upon an adjudication of 
neglect?

 
 
[¶9]      In the instant 
case, the child was taken into temporary protective custody without a court 
order.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-409(a) (LexisNexis 2009) requires that, in such case,

  
 
 
a 
petition in statutory form be filed and that an informal shelter care hearing be 
set as soon as possible.  Subsection 
(b) of the same statute directs the court to give certain advisements at that 
hearing:

 
 
(b)    At the commencement of the 
hearing the judge shall advise the child and his parents, guardian or custodian 
of:

 
 
(i)       The 
contents of the petition and the nature of the allegations contained 
therein;

 
 
(ii)      Their right to 
counsel as provided in W.S. 14-3-422;

 
 
(iii)     The right to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses or to present witnesses and evidence in their own 
behalf and the right to issuance of process by the court to compel the 
appearance of witnesses and the production of evidence;

 
 
(iv)     The right to a jury 
trial as provided in W.S. 14-3-423;

 
 
(v)      The right to 
appeal as provided in W.S. 14-3-432; and

 
 
(vi)     The state's obligation, 
pursuant to W.S. 14-3-431(d), to file a petition to terminate parental rights 
when a child has been placed in foster care under the responsibility of the 
state for fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months unless 
the court finds that one (1) of the exceptions listed in W.S. 14-3-431(m) 
applies.

 
 
[¶10]   In addition to these advisements, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-426(a) (LexisNexis 2009) requires the juvenile court to 
give the following advisements at the initial hearing:

 
 
(a)    At their initial hearing, 
which may be held after a shelter care hearing or a transfer hearing, the child 
and his parents, guardians or custodian shall be advised by the court of their 
rights under law and as provided in this act.  They shall also be advised of the 
specific allegations in the petition

and 
given an opportunity to admit or deny them.  They shall also be advised of the 
possible liability for costs of treatment or services pursuant to this act. . . 
. 

 
 
[¶11]   The appellant does not contend that 
the juvenile court failed to give any of these advisements at the hearing, and 
the portions of the hearing transcript quoted above reveal compliance with the 
statutes.  See supra ¶ 6.  The appellant argues, however, that the 
juvenile court violated her right to the due process of law by failing to advise 
her, in addition, of the existence of other statutory bases for the possible 
termination of her parental rights.  
Specifically, the appellant claims that the juvenile court should have 
advised her that a termination of her parental rights "could occur following an 
adjudication of neglect without any minimal time frame during which 
reunification efforts must first take place."

 
 
[¶12]   The appellant's brief contains a 
lengthy argument identifying the parent-child relationship as a constitutionally 
protected interest with which the State may not interfere in the absence of 
procedural and substantive due process.  
Without citation to compelling authority, the appellant then concludes 
that the alleged notice failure mentioned above violated both.  We concur with the first proposition, 
but not the second.  The neglect 
petition in the instant case was brought pursuant to the Child Protection Act 
found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-401 et. 
seq. (LexisNexis 2009).  At a 
hearing under the Child Protection Act, the State has the burden of proving an 
allegation of neglect by a preponderance of the evidence.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-425.  When a child has been adjudged to be 
neglected under the Act, the juvenile court is obligated to "ensure that 
reasonable efforts were made by the department of family services to prevent or 
eliminate the need for removal of the child from the child's home or to make it 
possible for the child to return to the child's home."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-429(a)(iv).  The Child Protection Act then also 
provides that, if a child has been placed in foster care under the Act for 15 of 
the most recent 22 months, "the state shall file a petition to terminate 
parental rights . . . ."  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-3-431(m).

 
 
[¶13]   It is notice of this potential for 
termination of parental rights that is required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-409(b)(vi).  The appellant 
argues that her right to due process was violated, however, even though this 
advisement was given, because she was not also advised that, under the 
Termination of Parental Rights Act, a finding of neglect could result in 
termination of her parental rights "without any minimal time frame during which 
reunification efforts must first take place."  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2009).  We believe that 
the appellant's position in this regard has already been rejected by this Court 
in MN v. State Department of Family 
Services, 2003 WY 135, ¶¶ 36-37, 78 P.3d 232, 240 (Wyo. 
2003):

 
 
Mother 
asserts that the court violated her right to counsel at the initial juvenile 
proceeding hearing and, thus, the district court was divested of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Specifically, Mother 
espouses that the failure to appoint counsel during the initial hearing is of 
such a serious nature that it undermines the State's entire termination 
case.  The State primarily argues 
that a neglect action is not a prerequisite to a termination of parental rights 
proceeding, and the two are separate and distinct.  The State further argues that there has 
been no showing that Mother's rights were prejudiced, or even impacted, and 
therefore the court's action must be characterized as 
harmless.

 
 
Initially 
this court recognizes that termination proceedings are entirely separate and 
distinct from neglect proceedings, deriving their respective genesis from 
separate statutes and requiring different burdens of proof.  In particular, a neglect action is not a 
mandatory prerequisite to termination of parental rights.  Moreover, Mother has failed to show how 
the failure to appoint her counsel within the juvenile proceeding violated her 
due process rights regarding the termination proceedings.  Indeed, Mother's admission of neglect in 
the juvenile proceeding did not relieve the State from proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that Mother's parental rights should be terminated.  To the contrary, the State could not 
simply utilize Mother's admission of neglect in the juvenile proceeding but was 
required to show at trial that Mother neglected [her 
child].

 
 
[¶14]   The lesson of MN is that the failure to appoint 
counsel in a juvenile neglect proceeding did not prejudice the parent in a 
subsequent termination proceeding based upon neglect, because the two are 
entirely separate, with neither being dependent upon the other.  That logic leads to the conclusion that, 
in a juvenile neglect proceeding such as that now before the Court, the juvenile 
court is not obligated to advise the parent of the potential filing of a 
termination petition under a different legislative act.  The portion of the hearing transcript 
quoted above shows that the juvenile court in this case carefully advised the 
appellant of her rights in these proceedings, and of the consequences that could 
result from an admission or a finding of neglect.  See supra ¶ 6.  That is as far as the juvenile court was 
required to go.2  Consequently, the juvenile court did not 
abuse its discretion by denying the appellant's motion to withdraw her admission 
of neglect on the basis of the advisements given at the initial 
hearing.

 
 
Did 
the juvenile court abuse its discretion by denying the appellant's motion to 
withdraw her admission of neglect because the juvenile court accepted the 
admission of neglect notwithstanding the evidence that the appellant suffered 
from a mental illness?

 
 
[¶15]   The appellant relies upon Hayes v. State, 599 P.2d 558, 563 (Wyo. 
1979) for the proposition that the determination of whether an "accused" is 
mentally fit to proceed is a threshold issue that must be resolved to prevent a 
violation of due process.  Although 
Hayes involved the mental capacity of 
a criminal defendant to stand trial, we will assume arguendo that its underlying principle 
applies to determination of the mental capacity of a parent to waive the right 
to counsel and to enter an admission of neglect in a juvenile proceeding.3  Citing other cases from the criminal 
context, we note first that there is no absolute right to withdraw a plea, and 
we note second that we consider the record as a whole in determining whether 
there was a voluntary relinquishment of the right to counsel and a voluntary 
entry of a plea.  Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo. 
2000); Haddock v. State, 909 P.2d 974, 976 (Wyo. 1996); Mehring v. 
State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1106 (Wyo. 1993).

 
 
[¶16]   The right to counsel in a criminal 
case has its genesis in the Sixth Amendment.  Bolin v. State, 2006 WY 77, ¶¶ 29-30, 
137 P.3d 136, 146 (Wyo. 2006).  The 
right to withdraw a plea in a criminal case is governed by W.R.Cr.P. 32(d).  While the parties have cited cases 
interpreting these rights, they agree that we ultimately are guided by "due 
process" in these circumstances, which we have defined as 
follows:

 
 
"For 
all its consequence, due process' has never been, and perhaps can never be, 
precisely defined.  [U]nlike some 
legal rules,' this Court has said, due process is not a technical conception 
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.'  Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743[, 1748, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230 (1961)].  Rather, the phrase expresses the 
requirement of fundamental fairness,' a requirement whose meaning can be as 
opaque as its importance is lofty.  
Applying the Due Process Clause is therefore an uncertain enterprise 
which must discover what fundamental fairness' consists of in a particular 
situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the 
several interests that are at stake."

 
 

Matter 
of GP, 
679 P.2d 976, 993 (Wyo. 1984) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2158, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640 
(1981)).

 
 
[¶17]   We begin our review of the juvenile 
court's denial of the appellant's motion to withdraw her admission of neglect by 
noting again the colloquy between the appellant and the court during the initial 
hearing quoted at length above.  See supra ¶ 6.  Two things are readily apparent:  the juvenile court's meticulous 
recitation of the appellant's rights and the nature of the hearing, and the 
juvenile court's careful investigation of the appellant's mental capacity.  Other than the appellant's 
self-identified prior diagnoses, there is nothing within the transcript of that 
hearing that suggests any inability on her part to understand fully what was 
being said.  "[A] diagnosis of a 
recognized mental illness [does not] automatically render[] a person incompetent 
to enter a guilty plea."  Koenig v. State, 2005 WY 135, ¶ 11, 121 P.3d 780, 782 (Wyo. 2005) (bipolar disorder).

 
 
[¶18]   It is also telling that, at the 
hearing upon the appellant's motion to withdraw her admission, the appellant, 
now represented by counsel, presented no evidence, and almost no argument 
suggesting mental incapacity.  Her 
argument consisted largely of this single sentence:  "It is also troubling that she mentioned 
she had a bipolar disorder and it was of enough concern that a psychiatric 
evaluation was also ordered."  
Perhaps even more telling is the fact that the evaluation had taken place 
prior to the hearing, with the report indicating that, although she did indeed 
suffer from bipolar disorder and a "mixed personality disorder," the appellant 
showed no evidence of disorganized thought processes, did not suffer from ADHD, 
and had a "high average intellectual functioning."  In short, there is absolutely nothing in 
the record suggesting that the due process of law required that the appellant be 
allowed to withdraw her admission of neglect based upon her mental condition, 
because there is nothing in the record suggesting that her mental condition had 
any effect upon the voluntariness of that admission.

 
 
Did 
the juvenile court abuse its discretion by denying the appellant's motion to 
withdraw her admission of neglect because acceptance of the admission sets a 
dangerous precedent that will deter persons in her position from seeking 
assistance from governmental agencies?

 
 
[¶19]   We will not consider this final 
issue because it is not supported by cogent argument, because it is not 
supported by citation to relevant authority, because it is based upon policy 
considerations more properly brought before a legislative body, and because it 
is entirely speculative.  Moreover, 
implementation of such a policy would render application of the Child Protection 
Act impossible where the neglect is made known to authorities by voluntary 
action of a parent.  Once the 
appellant sought assistance, there was little choice but to take the child into 
protective custody.  And once that 
occurred, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-409 required that a petition be filed and that 
a shelter care hearing be set, and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-426 required an 
initial hearing on the petition.  
Short of immediately returning the child to the appellant, an option the 
appellant did not even seek, the only appropriate procedure was to obtain an 
admission or denial from the appellant.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶20]   The juvenile court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying the appellant's motion to withdraw her admission of 
neglect.  The appellant's waiver of 
counsel was voluntary, the admission was voluntary, and the juvenile court 
followed all appropriate procedures at the hearing.  Therefore, we 
affirm.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1See 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-3-409 and 14-3-426 (LexisNexis 2009). 

 
 

2This 
situation is similar to Valle v. 
State, 2006 WY 43, ¶ 9, 132 P.3d 181, 184 (Wyo. 2006), where we held in a 
criminal case that, at arraignment, the court is required to advise the 
defendant only of the direct consequences of a plea, and not of speculative or 
collateral consequences, such as possible deportation.

 
 

3The 
right to counsel may be waived in a criminal case.  See, e.g., Bolin v. State, 2006 WY 77, ¶¶ 30-31, 
137 P.3d 136, 146 (Wyo. 2006).