Case Title: Brook Grzelak v. Daniel Bertrand

Citation: 2003 WI 102

Docket Number: 2002AP000678

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 102 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-0678 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel Brook Grezelak,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Daniel Bertrand, Warden,  
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2003 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 28, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Mark A. Warpinski   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
SYKES, J., joins dissent. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Jennifer S. Mirus, Amy S. Dixon, and Boardman, Suhr, Curry & 
Field LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Jennifer S. Mirus. 
 
For the respondent-respondent the cause was argued by John 
J. Glinski, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 102 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-0678  
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 819) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel Brook Grzelak,  
 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Daniel Bertrand, Warden,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case is before the court on a 
petition for review filed by petitioner-appellant Brook Grzelak.  
Grzelak seeks review of an unpublished opinion of the court of 
appeals, State ex rel. Grzelak v. Bertrand, No. 02-0678, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2002), summarily 
affirming a judgment by the Brown County Circuit Court, Mark A. 
Warpinski, Judge, which denied certiorari relief from penalties 
imposed pursuant to prison conduct reports filed against 
petitioner.  The issue is whether Grzelak's naming of Warden 
Bertrand in his petition for certiorari review of disciplinary 
No. 
02-0678 
 
2 
 
conduct reports was sufficient to establish jurisdiction for the 
circuit court to reach the merits of the petition.  For the 
reasons stated below, we find that under the facts and 
circumstances of this case and the applicable law, at the time 
Grzelak filed his petition, Grzelak's naming of Warden Bertrand 
was sufficient.  We therefore reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
  The 
facts 
of 
this 
dispute 
are 
relatively 
straightforward and undisputed.  While Grzelak was an inmate at 
Green Bay Correctional Institute, he was disciplined pursuant to 
five conduct reports filed between January 28, 2000 and March 6, 
2000.  On June 30, 2000, Grzelak, acting pro se, filed a 
petition with the Brown County Circuit Court, seeking a writ of 
certiorari to obtain relief from the prison discipline.  
¶3 
On November 2, 2000, the circuit court refused to 
issue a writ of certiorari for two of the five reports.  The 
circuit court found that Grzelak had failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies with respect to one of the reports and 
had thus abandoned any challenge to it.  The court also found 
that Grzelak's substantive challenge to another report had no 
merit.  The circuit court then issued a writ of certiorari for 
the remaining three reports.  The subject of this appeal is 
Grzelak's petition pertaining to these three remaining reports.  
With respect to these three reports, Grzelak alleged procedural 
errors, including lack of notice, inability to compel attendance 
of witnesses, and untimely or inadequate service of complaints.  
No. 
02-0678 
 
3 
 
There is no dispute as to whether Grzelak exhausted his 
administrative remedies within the Inmate Complaint Review 
System (ICRS) in relation to these three reports.1 
¶4 
On February 28, 2002, the circuit court dismissed the 
writ of certiorari, concluding that it did not have proper 
jurisdiction because Grzelak named Warden Daniel Bertrand (the 
warden) as the respondent, rather than the Secretary of the 
Department of Corrections (the secretary).  The circuit court 
reasoned that because each of the reports culminated in the 
secretary determining that the discipline should stand and 
because on certiorari a petitioner is entitled to a review of a 
final agency determination, what Grzelak was seeking was a 
review of the secretary’s decision.  Relying on State ex rel. 
Kulike v. Town Clerk, 132 Wis. 103, 105, 111 N.W. 1129 (1907), 
the 
court 
concluded 
that 
it 
lacked 
jurisdiction 
because 
Grzelak's writ was misdirected, as the secretary should have 
been named as the respondent instead of the warden.   
¶5 
Grzelak then appealed the denial of certiorari relief 
to the court of appeals.  The court of appeals summarily 
affirmed the circuit court’s judgment relating to all five 
reports.  Grzelak has not further appealed the court of appeals' 
determinations that the substantive challenge to one report 
lacked 
merit 
and 
that 
he 
had 
failed 
to 
exhaust 
his 
                                                 
1 In its order of February 28, 2002, the circuit court noted 
that Grzelak "doggedly and exhaustively pursued his right of 
review."  The administrative review of these reports concluded 
when the secretary decided that the reports were valid and that 
the discipline should stand. 
No. 
02-0678 
 
4 
 
administrative remedies with respect to the other.  The court of 
appeals agreed with the circuit court that Grzelak’s failure to 
name the secretary as the respondent in his petition deprived 
the court of jurisdiction, as it pertained to the three reports 
at issue here.  Relying on State ex rel. Smith v. McCaughtry, 
222 Wis. 2d 68, 74, 586 N.W.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1998), abrogated in 
part by State ex re. Hensley v. Endicott, 2001 WI 105, 245 
Wis. 2d 607, 629 N.W.2d 686, the court concluded that the 
secretary is the final administrative authority on procedural 
matters, not the warden.  Further, the court of appeals found 
that based on Kulike, because Grzelak had misdirected his 
petition to the warden, the court was without jurisdiction to 
decide the petition's merits.  Grzelak then appealed the 
jurisdictional issue relating to the three reports and we 
granted the petition for review on December 3, 2002.  
II.  ISSUE 
¶6 
The issue presented to this court is whether a court 
has jurisdiction to hear a petition for a writ of certiorari 
seeking 
review 
of 
procedural 
issues 
relating 
to 
prison 
discipline when the petitioner mistakenly names the warden of 
the correctional institution as the respondent in the petition 
instead of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections.  We 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals for the following 
reasons.  First, we find the statutes and case law regarding the 
proper party to serve at the time Grzelak filed his petition to 
be ambiguous.   Second, we find that Grzelak's naming of the 
warden was reasonable under the facts and circumstances of this 
No. 
02-0678 
 
5 
 
case, such that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the 
merits of his petition.   
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶7 
We 
are 
asked 
to 
review 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
determination that Grzelak's naming of the warden in his 
petition was insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the 
circuit court.  When a party alleges a writ of certiorari is 
misdirected, it is challenging the sufficiency of the petition.  
See State ex rel. Christie v. Husz, 217 Wis. 2d 593, 598, 579 
N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1998).  The legal sufficiency of the 
petition is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.  
See Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, ¶17, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 
611 N.W.2d 906.   
IV.  ANALYIS 
¶8 
In order to determine the proper party to be named as 
respondent in this petition for writ of certiorari, it will be 
helpful to review the administrative code provisions, statutes, 
and case law that Grzelak was required to follow to appeal the 
disciplinary action taken pursuant to the conduct reports.  
Prisoner conduct reports are created pursuant to Wis. Admin. 
Code § DOC 303.66 (June 1994).  The security director at the 
institution then reviews the conduct reports.  Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DOC 303.67 (June 1994).  An inmate may then seek a due process 
hearing for major violations pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 
303.76 (June 1994) in front of the adjustment committee.  This 
decision may then be appealed to the superintendent (warden) of 
the institution.  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.76(7).  For minor 
No. 
02-0678 
 
6 
 
violations, an inmate may seek a less formal hearing, in front 
of a hearing officer, whose decision may also be appealed to the 
warden.  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.75 (June 1994). 
¶9 
At the time petitioner Grzelak filed his petition, in 
June of 2000, Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.76(7)(d) (June 1994) 
provided that "[t]he superintendent's decision is final."  As of 
December 2000, this section was changed to read as follows:  
"The warden's decision is final regarding the sufficiency of the 
evidence.  An inmate may appeal procedural errors as provided 
under s. DOC 310.08(3)."  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.76(7)(d) 
(May 2003).  This reference to Wis. Admin. Code § DOC ch. 310 
(Apr. 1998) did not exist at the time Grzelak filed his 
petition.  Section DOC 303.76(7)(d) (June 1994) was changed to 
reflect the court of appeals' ruling in Smith, which explained 
that the decision of a warden with respect to procedural matters 
is not final and must be reviewed through the ICRS process.  
Smith, 222 Wis.2d at 74-75.   
¶10 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DOC ch. 310 (Apr. 1998), 
entitled "Complaint Procedures," establishes the ICRS and the 
procedures governing its operation.  Section DOC 310.08(3) 
provides that "[a]fter exhausting the appeal in s. DOC . . . 
303.76, an inmate may use the ICRS to challenge the procedure 
used by the adjustment committee or hearing officer, by a 
program review committee, or by any decisionmaker acting on a 
request for authorized leave."  The multi-step ICRS process is 
outlined in Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.06.  The process begins 
with the filing of a complaint by the inmate under Wis. Admin. 
No. 
02-0678 
 
7 
 
Code § DOC 310.09.  Next, Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.11 
describes the options the institution complaint examiner (ICE) 
has for dealing with the complaint.  The ICE's decision is then 
reviewed by the "appropriate reviewing authority" under Wis. 
Admin. Code § DOC 310.12.  A dissatisfied inmate may then appeal 
the decision of the appropriate reviewing authority to the 
corrections complaint examiner (CCE).  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 
310.13.  The final step in the process is a review of the CCE's 
decision by the Secretary of the Department of Corrections under 
Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.14.  These internal agency procedures 
for appealing prison disciplinary actions are not at issue in 
this case.  The issue in this case is the proper procedure for 
getting into court after the administrative process has been 
exhausted.2   
¶11 Notably, unlike every other step in the review 
process, 
there 
are 
no 
code 
provisions 
that 
outline 
the 
procedures an inmate must follow to seek certiorari review of 
the secretary's decision (for procedural issues) or the warden's 
decision 
(for 
substantive 
issues). 
 
Only 
two 
statutory 
provisions provide any guidance to an inmate as to how the 
certiorari process operates.  Wisconsin's Prisoner Litigation 
Reform Act, Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(b) (1999-2000)3 instructs an 
                                                 
2 See 
L'Minggio 
v. 
Gamble, 
2003 
WI 
82, 
¶14, 
__Wis. 2d __,__N.W.2d __ (Wilcox, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the exhaustion of remedies process within the DOC is specific 
and clear). 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
02-0678 
 
8 
 
inmate that he must exhaust his administrative remedies before 
petitioning for a writ of certiorari; further, § 893.735(2) 
provides that a prisoner must commence an action seeking a 
remedy available by certiorari within 45 days after the cause of 
action accrues.   
¶12 Because there is 
no 
administrative 
or 
statutory 
direction as to whom to name in a certiorari petition, an inmate 
must refer to Wisconsin common law.  Wisconsin case law provides 
that certiorari is available only for the purpose of reviewing a 
final determination.  State ex rel. Czapiewski v. Milwaukee City 
Serv. Comm'n, 54 Wis. 2d 535, 539, 196 N.W.2d 742 (1972) (citing 
State ex rel. McKenzie v. Brown, 174 Wis. 498, 182 N.W. 602 
(1921); State ex rel. Meissner v. O'Brien, 208 Wis. 502, 243 
N.W. 314 (1932); State ex rel. St. Mary's Hosp. v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 250 Wis. 516, 27 N.W.2d 478 (1947)).  Thus, to perfect 
jurisdiction, "the writ of certiorari . . . must go to the board 
or body whose acts are sought to be reviewed . . . ."  Kulike, 
132 Wis. at 105.  
¶13 As noted earlier, Wis. Admin Code § DOC 303.76(7)(d) 
(June 1994), as it existed when Grzelak filed his certiorari 
petition, provided that with respect to appealed conduct reports 
"[t]he superintendent's decision is final."  The 1998 Smith 
decision explained that the warden's decision was not final as 
to matters that could be further appealed through the ICRS, 
i.e., procedural matters.  222 Wis. 2d at 74-76.  However, there 
is no case that provides a precise explanation of whom to name 
No. 
02-0678 
 
9 
 
as respondent in a certiorari petition when challenging either 
procedural or substantive issues.   
¶14 To find an answer, we must refer back to the relevant 
administrative code provisions.  Under the ICRS procedures 
listed in Wis. Admin. Code § DOC ch. 310 (Apr. 1998), review by 
the secretary is the last step in the appeals process, although 
markedly absent is any provision in § DOC ch. 310 explicitly 
stating that the secretary's decision is "final," or that the 
secretary is the proper party to serve in a certiorari petition 
seeking review of procedural issues.  Thus, because review by 
the secretary is the last step in the ICRS process and 
certiorari review is only available for final decisions, the 
secretary's decision is, in fact, final.  Therefore, the 
secretary is implicitly the proper respondent in a petition for 
certiorari review of procedural errors relating to conduct 
reports.4  
¶15 Having determined that the secretary was the proper 
party to be named as respondent in Grzelak's certiorari petition 
as it related to procedural issues, we must now determine 
whether his failure to name the secretary defeats jurisdiction.  
In Kulike, 132 Wis. 103, the petitioner, seeking review of an 
action of the town supervisors of Lebanon, directed a writ of 
certiorari to the town clerk instead of the supervisors because 
                                                 
4 However, Grzelak was still required to name the warden 
because the warden's decision is final regarding substantive 
issues and Grzelak was initially raising both procedural and 
substantive issues.   
No. 
02-0678 
 
10 
 
the clerk had legal custody and control of the records.  The 
court ruled: 
Except where specially provided by statute or in 
particular cases of necessity, as where the board or 
body whose acts are sought to be reviewed is not 
continuing or has ceased to exist, the writ of 
certiorari cannot properly run to a mere ministerial 
officer simply because he is the custodian of the 
records, but must go to the board or body whose acts 
are sought to be reviewed, otherwise the court cannot 
obtain jurisdiction either of the subject matter or of 
the persons composing such board or body.  
Id. at 105.  The court concluded that the writ must be "directed 
to the person who, in legal contemplation, has the custody of 
the record . . . [,]" not a mere subordinate officer, who, 
although having actual possession of the record, is merely the 
agent of the decision-making body.  Id. at 105-106.   
¶16 The warden urges us to apply Kulike, noting that none 
of the exceptions to the rule in Kulike apply, and pursuant to 
Smith, Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.76(7)(d) (June 1994), and Wis. 
Admin. Code § DOC 310.08(3) (Apr. 1998), the warden is a mere 
ministerial officer, subordinate to the secretary, who is the 
final decision maker regarding procedural challenges to prison 
disciplinary matters.  (Resp't Br. at 6-8).   
¶17 Grzelak first argues that Kulike is not applicable to 
this case.  Noting that a prisoner must often follow a 
"serpentine . . . labyrinth of administrative rules, statutes 
and case law to appeal a finding of guilt for violating a prison 
rule[,]" (Pet'r Br. at 6), Grzelak refers us to our policy of 
liberally judging the sufficiency of pleadings by pro se inmates 
No. 
02-0678 
 
11 
 
to reach the merits of their case, citing State ex rel. 
McMillian v. Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 279, 392 N.W.2d 453 (Ct. 
App. 1986).  Grzelak avers that because the liberal pleading 
standards did not apply in Kulike, that case should not apply 
here.  (Pet'r Br. at 8.)  He further suggested at oral argument 
that we adopt a specific rule whereby Kulike would not apply to 
petitions from pro se inmates——who do not have the resources of 
private litigants——such that service on either the warden or 
secretary would be deemed sufficient to perfect jurisdiction in 
a petition for certiorari.  While we are sympathetic to the 
plight of pro se litigants and note that there is some merit to 
the characterization of Grzelak's appellate process as a 
"serpentine labyrinth" in this case, we decline to carve out a 
special exception to the rule in Kulike for pro se inmates. 
¶18 Next, Grzelak argues that Kulike is distinguishable 
because the warden is not a mere ministerial subordinate to the 
proper respondent because, unlike the town clerk in Kulike, the 
warden played an integral role in reviewing the conduct reports 
and is the final authority with respect to non-procedural 
matters.  (Pet'r Br. at 8.)  The warden counters that were we to 
accept this argument, an inmate would be able to name any entity 
that played a role in the process of reviewing conduct reports, 
without naming either the secretary or the warden in a 
certiorari petition.  (Resp't Br. at 5.)  However, we need not 
rule in favor of Grzelak on this basis, as we find his third 
argument persuasive.   
No. 
02-0678 
 
12 
 
¶19 Grzelak's third argument with respect to Kulike is 
that it does not apply to this case because a further applicable 
exception to its rule exists in our case law.  Grzelak directs 
us to a series of cases holding that when a combination of 
statutes, administrative rules, and case law are ambiguous as to 
proper certiorari procedure, the petitioner should have his 
complaint heard on the merits if the law can reasonably be 
construed to support the petitioner's interpretation (Pet'r Br. 
at 9-12, 14) (citing Weber v. Dodge County Planning and Dev. 
Dep't, 231 Wis. 2d 222, 604 N.W.2d 297 (Ct. App. 1999); DOT v. 
Peterson, 218 Wis. 2d 473, 581 N.W.2d 539 (Ct. App. 1998), aff'd 
by DOT v. Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d 623, 594 N.W.2d 765 (1999) 
(hereinafter Peterson II); McDonough v. DWD, 227 Wis. 2d 271, 
595 N.W.2d 686 (1999)).   
¶20 The exception Grzelak refers to emanates from our 
decision in Kyncl v. Kenosha County, 37 Wis. 2d 547, 155 
N.W.2d 583 (1968), where, in the context of an appeal from a 
condemnation award pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(11) (1967), we 
ruled: 
In the absence of a specific direction in the statute 
as to who is to be designated the condemnor [sic] for 
service of notice to contest the award, an ambiguity 
exists.  Procedural statutes are to be liberally 
construed so as to permit a determination upon the 
merits of the controversy if such construction is 
possible. 
Kyncl, 37 Wis. 2d at 555-56. 
¶21 The issue in Kyncl was whether the circuit court had 
jurisdiction to hear respondent's appeal from a condemnation 
No. 
02-0678 
 
13 
 
award when the Kenosha County Highway Committee condemned 
plaintiff's land and Kenosha County took title to the land.  Id. 
at 549-50.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(11) (1967), plaintiff 
initiated an appeal in Kenosha County Circuit Court, naming 
Kenosha 
County 
as 
the 
defendant. 
 
Id. 
at 
549.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(11) 
expressly 
provided 
that 
the 
condemner be made the defendant in the action.  Id. at 554.  
However, 
Wis. Stat. § 84.09(3) 
(1967) 
did 
not 
expressly 
designate which entity was the condemner.  Id. at 554.  Although 
we concluded that the county highway commission was the 
condemner of the plaintiff's land, we held that service on 
Kenosha County was sufficient for the circuit court to acquire 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 556.   We reasoned:  
Serving the notice of appeal upon the subdivision of 
the state . . . that was designated as the new owner 
when the statute does not specify which municipality, 
commission or committee should be served as condemnor 
[sic] does not seem illogical.  Nor does it seem at 
all probable that notice to the county would not be 
notice to the county highway committee or the state 
highway commission. 
Id. at 555. 
¶22 In Peterson, 218 Wis. 2d 473, another condemnation 
appeal, the court of appeals found that service on the Attorney 
General rather than the Department of Transportation (the actual 
condemner) was sufficient under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(9) (1995-96) 
for the merits of the appeal to be heard.  Id. at 475.  Relying 
on Kyncl, the court of appeals stated that "where the statute is 
ambiguous as to whom to serve, and the statute and circumstances 
No. 
02-0678 
 
14 
 
can, 
as 
here, 
be 
reasonably 
construed 
to 
support 
the 
[plaintiff's] interpretation, [the plaintiff is] entitled to a 
determination of their appeal on the merits."  Id. at 484-85.  
The court of appeals found it was reasonable for the respondents 
to serve the State itself in light of the fact that the statute 
did not clearly provide whether the state entity actually 
receiving the award or the State itself should be served and  
"State of Wisconsin" was listed on the damage award.  Id. at 
484-85.  
¶23 In Peterson II, this court affirmed the court of 
appeals' decision, stating:  "We have long adhered to the rule 
that 'strict compliance with procedural statutes is necessary to 
obtain jurisdiction to review administrative agency decisions.' 
However . . . 'the 
statutes 
must 
clearly 
set 
forth 
the 
procedural requirements' necessary to pursue such review."  
Peterson II, 226 Wis. 2d at 633 (quoting Trojan v. Bd. of 
Regents, 
104 
Wis. 2d 277, 
283-84, 
311 
N.W.2d 586 (1981)).  
Further, we noted that "where a procedural statute lacks 
'specific direction' clearly indicating who is to be served with 
notice, 'an ambiguity exists[, such that the statute must be] 
liberally construed so as to permit a determination upon the 
merits of the controversy if such construction is possible.'"  
Id. (quoting Kyncl, 37 Wis. 2d at 555-56).   
¶24 We went on to instruct agencies that "[i]t is a better 
practice to have the notification of an agency's decision 
accompanied by an explanation of the procedures that must be 
No. 
02-0678 
 
15 
 
followed in order to appeal that decision."  Id. at 634.  
Further, we stated: 
We acknowledge . . . that it is important that 
citizens 
not 
be 
defeated 
in 
their 
redress 
of 
grievances by the maze of governmental entities.  A 
person aggrieved by an administrative decision should 
not have to guess which governmental entity to name 
and serve as the respondent in proceedings for 
judicial review. 
Id. at 635 (quoting Sunnyview Village, Inc. v. DOA, 104 
Wis. 2d 396, 412, 311 N.W.2d 632 (1981)).  
¶25 This "statutory ambiguity" rule was expanded in Weber, 
231 Wis. 2d 222.  In Weber, the plaintiffs petitioned for a writ 
of certiorari to review an action of the Dodge County Planning 
and Development Committee, but named the county's Planning and 
Development Department, rather than the Committee, in their 
petition.  Id. at 223.  As in the case before us, the circuit 
court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because 
the writ was misdirected.  Id.  The issue before the court of 
appeals was "whether service on the Department may be considered 
compliance with Kulike under the applicable law and the facts of 
[the] case."   Id. at 225.  The court of appeals, relying on the 
language in Kyncl, Peterson, and Peterson II, held: 
We think the same rule should apply where an ambiguity 
in 
service 
requirements 
is 
created 
through 
the 
interaction of the applicable statutes, case law and 
the specific circumstances of the case——as here, with 
the pervasive use of the Department's personnel and 
stationery in the conduct of the Committee's business 
vis-à-vis Weber's petition, and the absence of any 
ascertainable independent identity on the part of the 
Committee . . . .  In these circumstances, we think 
Weber could reasonably believe that his appeal of the 
No. 
02-0678 
 
16 
 
decision 
was 
properly 
prosecuted 
against 
the 
Department, whether on its own behalf or as the 
Committee's agent.  
Id. at 227-28 (emphasis added).  Properly understood, this line 
of cases stands for the proposition that when the applicable law 
relating to proper certiorari procedure is ambiguous, service on 
the agent of the decision-making body is sufficient for a court 
to acquire jurisdiction, if such service was reasonable under 
the circumstances.  
¶26 The warden contended at oral argument that these cases 
are inapposite because they all dealt with statutory certiorari, 
not common law certiorari as is at issue here.  First, we note 
that Weber specifically involved the application of the Kulike 
rule.  Second, we find the language in Weber referring to the 
"interaction of the applicable statutes, case law and the 
specific circumstances of the case" particularly germane to our 
decision in the case at hand.  Weber, 231 Wis. 2d at 227-28. 
¶27 After exhausting administrative remedies, either by 
appealing substantive issues to the warden or procedural issues 
to the secretary, the inmate simply receives a decision.  This 
decision lacks any notice to the inmate of how to proceed if he 
then wishes to appeal this decision to a court.  In order to 
determine whom to name as respondent in his certiorari petition, 
Grzelak had to first look to case law to determine that "the 
writ of certiorari . . . must go to the board or body whose acts 
are sought to be reviewed[,]" Kulike, 132 Wis. at 105, and that 
certiorari is available only to appeal a final determination by 
an agency.  Czapiewski, 54 Wis. 2d at 539.  Next, Grzelak had to 
No. 
02-0678 
 
17 
 
refer to Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.76(7)(d) (June 1994), which 
at the 
time 
he 
filed his 
petition, 
stated 
that 
"[t]he 
superintendent's decision is final."  However, Grzelak then had 
to go back to case law to determine that the decision of the 
warden is not final with respect to procedural matters, Smith, 
222 Wis. 2d at 74-75, the implication being that for non-
procedural matters, some other decision maker is final.  This 
analytical patchwork can in no form be considered "specific 
direction."   
¶28 Contrary to the warden's assertions, Smith itself does 
not provide a clear answer to the question of whom to serve in 
this 
circumstance. 
 
Smith 
merely 
explained 
that 
"[t]he 
superintendent's decision is not final if the inmate can seek 
further review through the ICRS. . . .  [P]rocedural errors are 
within the scope of the ICRS, and as to those type of errors the 
warden's decision is no longer final."  Id. at 74.  The 
implication here is that the secretary's decision is final with 
regard to procedural matters, as the secretary is the last step 
in the ICRS process.  However, Smith does not specifically 
provide that the secretary's decision is final, nor does Wis. 
Admin. Code §  DOC ch. 310 (April 1998).  Thus, while Smith is 
certainly good law, it represents only one step in the mélange 
of code provisions, statutes, and common law that must be 
deciphered in order to determine that the secretary is the 
proper party to name when appealing procedural errors.5   
                                                 
5 Thus, 
we 
respectfully 
disagree 
with 
the 
dissent's 
assertion that Smith provides a clear answer in this case. 
No. 
02-0678 
 
18 
 
¶29 We find the procedural rules governing proper service 
in this case to be ambiguous for the following reasons:  (1) the 
lack of a clear statement in any previous decision, statute, or 
administrative regulation providing that when raising procedural 
issues, in order to properly file a petition for writ of 
certiorari an inmate must name the Secretary of the Department 
of 
Corrections 
as 
the 
respondent; 
(2) 
the 
labyrinth 
of 
administrative regulations and case law regarding who is the 
proper party to serve; and (3) the fact that Grzelak was 
initially pursuing both procedural and substantive claims.6  
Thus, following Kyncl and its progeny, we will apply the 
relevant procedural rules liberally, and allow the merits of 
Grzelak's petition to be heard if his interpretation regarding 
whom to serve was reasonable.  In other words, if Grzelak's 
service on the warden was reasonable under the facts and 
circumstances of this case, such service was sufficient for the 
                                                 
6 The dissent urges us to apply the rationale of Hagen v. 
City of Milwaukee, 2003 WI 56, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 
where this court held that a process server's mistake of serving 
the wrong government entity defeated personal jurisdiction.  The 
majority has no dispute with the holding in Hagen.  However, 
Hagen is inapplicable because the single statute prescribing the 
method of service, Wis. Stat. § 801.11(4), was unambiguous.  
Unlike Hagen, the case before us involves a patchwork of 
incomplete case law and regulations.  Hagen was a case in which 
service on the wrong entity was attributable to a misdirected 
process server.  In the case before us, we have no single 
statute that clearly provides the proper method of service.  The 
"mistake" by Grzelak was the result of ambiguous case law and 
regulations 
regarding 
the 
proper 
party 
to 
serve, 
not 
misdirection by a third party.  
No. 
02-0678 
 
19 
 
circuit court to acquire jurisdiction and hear the merits of his 
complaint.  
¶30 As previously noted, Grzelak was initially appealing 
both procedural and substantive issues relating to the conduct 
reports.  With respect to the alleged non-procedural or 
substantive errors, the warden's decision is final, and ICRS 
review is not required to exhaust administrative remedies.  
Thus, regarding his substantive claims, naming the warden was 
necessary.  However, even with respect to the procedural issues, 
the ICRS process is merely a review of the record of the 
institutional hearing procedures under Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 
303.76.  See Wis. Admin. Code §§ DOC 310.11-.14 (Apr. 1998).  
The conduct reports at issue were generated pursuant to Wis. 
Admin. Code, § DOC ch. 303 (June 1994), "Discipline."  According 
to § DOC 303.76(7)(d), at the time of Grzelak's petition, "the 
decision of the warden is final."  When filing a complaint under 
the ICRS, an inmate is challenging the decision of the warden.  
In light of the fact that the ICRS process is simply a review of 
the record, it would be reasonable for an inmate to conclude 
that when filing a certiorari petition he is still challenging 
the warden's decision.  Thus, Grzelak's decision to name the 
warden in his petition does not strike us as illogical.   
¶31 Given these circumstances and the aforementioned legal 
complexities of determining whom to serve, we find that it was 
reasonable for Grzelak to serve the warden in relation to his 
procedural claims.  Thus, we hold that under the facts and 
circumstances of this case and applicable law, as it existed at 
No. 
02-0678 
 
20 
 
the time Grzelak filed his petition, Grzelak's naming of the 
warden was sufficient, with respect to the procedural issues in 
the three conduct reports, for the circuit court to acquire 
jurisdiction to hear his petition for certiorari on the merits.  
We note that this holding is limited to the facts of this case.  
We do not determine whether we would reach a similar conclusion 
if an inmate filed his petition after Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 
303.76(7)(d) (June 1994) was amended and/or appealed only 
procedural issues at the outset.    
¶32 Finally, as we stated in Peterson II, 226 Wis. 2d at 
634, we believe "[i]t is a better practice to have the 
notification 
of 
an 
agency's 
decision 
accompanied 
by 
an 
explanation of the procedures that must be followed in order to 
appeal that decision."  Once an inmate has exhausted his 
administrative remedies, having followed the extensive and 
detailed administrative review procedures described in Wis. 
Admin. Code § DOC chs. 303 (June 1994) & 310 (Apr. 1998), he 
should not have to guess whom to serve to initiate the next step 
in the process and have his grievances heard in a court of law.  
Thus, we strongly recommend to the Department of Corrections 
that when one of its agents renders a final decision, it 
specifically and clearly give written notice to an inmate and 
indicate who is the appropriate party to name as respondent and 
serve in a petition for certiorari.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
 
No. 
02-0678.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶33 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  (dissenting).  For the reasons 
set forth below, I respectfully dissent. 
¶34 The majority opinion fails to follow the clear 
dictates of State ex rel. Kulike v. Town Clerk, 132 Wis. 103, 
111 N.W. 1129 (1907), in this case.  Given Kulike's specific 
instructions, I find that Kulike provides sufficient guidance 
regarding the appropriate party to be served in a common law 
writ of certiorari action, such as is the case here.  The Kulike 
court held: 
Except where specifically provided by statute or in 
particular cases of necessity, as where the board or 
body whose acts are sought to be reviewed is not 
continuing or has ceased to exist, the writ of 
certiorari cannot properly run to a mere ministerial 
officer simply because he is the custodian of the 
records, but must go to the board or body whose acts 
are sought to be reviewed, otherwise the court cannot 
obtain jurisdiction either of the subject matter or of 
the persons composing such board or body. 
Id. at 105.  According to Kulike, the person served with the 
writ of certiorari must be the person "whose acts are sought to 
be reviewed."  Id.  If the incorrect person or entity is served, 
the court lacks personal jurisdiction to review the case.   
¶35 Further, State ex rel. Smith v. McCaughtry, 222 
Wis. 2d 68, 586 N.W.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1998) (abrogated in part as 
to futility exception to exhaustion requirement by State ex rel. 
Hensley v. Endicott, 2001 WI 105, ¶13, 245 Wis. 2d 607, 621, 629 
N.W.2d 686), clarifies the law as to the party to whom service 
is appropriately directed in disciplinary cases involving claims 
of procedural error.  Smith states that the warden's or 
No. 
02-0678.npc 
 
2 
 
superintendent's "decision is not final if the inmate can seek 
further review through the ICRS."  Id. at 74.  Smith further 
explains that:  
[T]he number and specificity of the changes in the 
current version of WIS. ADM. CODE ch. DOC 310 leave no 
ambiguity about the Department's intent.  The intent 
is that procedural errors are within the scope of the 
ICRS, and as to those types of errors the warden's 
decision is no longer final.   
Id.  The majority indicates that Smith does not provide 
sufficient guidance regarding whom to serve, and, therefore, 
ambiguity exists.  See majority op., ¶28 and ¶29.  I disagree 
that Smith, Kulike, and the administrative code sections are 
ambiguous.  Based on the holding in Smith, Grzelak was required 
to serve the secretary of the Department of Corrections.  It is 
not unreasonable to expect Grzelak to comply with these 
procedural rules.  Because Grzelak incorrectly served the 
warden, Daniel Bertrand, instead of serving the secretary of the 
Department of Corrections, the circuit court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over the secretary and, therefore, the circuit 
court could not review the issues presented.   
¶36 Moreover, I disagree with the majority opinion's 
strong reliance on three condemnation cases, all dealing with 
statutory certiorari, to provide an exception to Kulike, which 
involved common law certiorari.  Although the majority concedes 
that 
Smith is correct, 
see 
majority 
op., 
¶28, it 
uses 
condemnation cases to attempt to carve out an exception for 
Grzelak, despite the lack of jurisdiction.  Because I find that 
Smith and Kulike are controlling authorities here, the use of 
No. 
02-0678.npc 
 
3 
 
condemnation cases in an effort to provide a means for Grzelak 
to have his issues reviewed, despite serving the wrong person, 
is unpersuasive. 
¶37 Earlier this term this court had the occasion to 
resolve another personal jurisdiction issue.  In Hagen v. City 
of Milwaukee, 2003 WI 56, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __, this 
court refused to find personal jurisdiction when the plaintiff 
served the summons and complaint on a nonparty located in the 
same building as the defendant, but not on the defendant.  This 
occurred allegedly at the direction of a person in the 
defendant's office.  Id., ¶25.  In Hagen, the plaintiff's 
process server went to the Milwaukee Employes' Retirement 
System/Annuity and Pension Board (MERS) office, but was told 
that process should be served at the city clerk's office.  Id., 
¶8.  As a result, the process server went to the clerk's office, 
and a clerk's office employee accepted service. Id.  MERS 
asserted that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over it as 
a result of the process server’s failure to achieve service on 
it.  Id., ¶6.  This court agreed and we affirmed the court of 
appeals, and held that the circuit court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over MERS due to the improper service of process.  
Id., ¶26.   
¶38 In Hagen, this court correctly decided that mistake 
was not an excuse, warranting the extension of personal 
jurisdiction over a party.  This reasoning clearly applies to 
the facts of this case.  Because Grzelak chose service on the 
warden, and not on the secretary, the circuit court lacked 
No. 
02-0678.npc 
 
4 
 
personal jurisdiction.  Any attempt to read ambiguity into the 
statutes, administrative code, and case law does not change 
Hagen's holding.  A mistake in the service of process, whereby 
the wrong person or entity is served, does not provide the 
plaintiff with an excuse for the lack of personal jurisdiction. 
¶39 I agree with the court of appeals' analysis of this 
case.  The court of appeals stated: 
Grzelak's 
procedural 
challenges 
include 
lack 
of 
notice, 
inability 
to 
compel 
the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses 
and 
untimely 
or inadequate 
service of 
complaints on him.  He named the prison warden, Daniel 
Bertrand, the respondent in this certiorari action.  
The secretary of the Department of Corrections, not 
the warden, is the final administrative authority on 
procedural matters.  See State ex rel. Smith v. 
McCaughtry, 222 Wis. 2d 68, 74, 586 N.W.2d 63 (Ct. 
App. 1998).  Because Grzelak seeks review of the 
secretary's decision, his failure to direct the writ 
to the secretary deprives the court of subject matter 
and personal jurisdiction to review those issues.  See 
State ex rel. Kulike v. Town Clerk, 132 Wis. 103, 105, 
111 N.W. 1129 (1907). 
State ex rel. Grzelak v. Bertrand, No. 02-0678, unpublished 
order (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2002).  Because I find that 
Kulike, Smith, and Hagen are applicable to this case, we should 
not find personal jurisdiction where none exists.   
¶40 For the reasons discussed, I respectfully dissent. 
¶41 I am authorized to state that Justice DIANE S. SYKES 
joins this dissent. 
 
No. 
02-0678.npc 
 
 
 
1