Case Title: Passley v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Thomas Roy PASSLEY, Jr. a/k/a Douglas Lee
Bolkema v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 95-903                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 5, 1996


1.   Appeal & error -- motion for a directed verdict is a challenge
     to the sufficiency of the evidence -- challenge to sufficiency
     of the evidence must be reviewed prior to a review of trial
     errors. -- A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to
     the sufficiency of the evidence; preservation of an
     appellant's right to freedom from double jeopardy requires a
     review of the sufficiency of the evidence prior to a review of
     trial errors.

2.   Evidence -- challenge to sufficiency -- substantial evidence
     discussed. -- Where reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
     on appeal, the court does not weigh the evidence but simply
     determines whether the evidence in support of the verdict is
     substantial; substantial evidence is that which is forceful
     enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other and pass
     beyond mere suspicion and conjecture; in determining whether
     there is substantial evidence, evidence is reviewed in the
     light most favorable to the appellee, and it is permissible to
     consider only that evidence which supports the guilty verdict;
     further, circumstantial evidence may constitute substantial
     evidence when every other reasonable hypothesis consistent
     with innocence is excluded; whether a reasonable hypothesis
     exists is for the trier of fact to resolve. 

3.   Criminal law -- accomplice liability statute discussed --
     criminal liability makes no distinction between principals and
     accomplices. -- Arkansas Code Annotated  5-2-403(a) (Repl.
     1993) provides that a person is an accomplice of another
     person in the commission of an offense if, with the requisite
     intent, he aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other
     person in commission of the offense; under the accomplice
     liability statute, a defendant may properly be found guilty
     not only of his own conduct, but also by that conduct of his
     accomplice; when two or more persons assist one another in the
     commission of a crime, each is an accomplice and criminally
     liable for the conduct of both; finally, there is no
     distinction between principals on the one hand and accomplices
     on the other, insofar as criminal liability is concerned.

4.   Criminal law -- accomplice liability -- relevant facts
     considered. -- Stolen goods recovered from a dwelling shared
     by an accomplice is not sufficient corroboration standing
     alone; however, possession of stolen property by the accused
     is a proper circumstance to consider in determining whether
     there was evidence tending to connect him with the crimes of
     burglary and grand larceny; the presence of an accused in the
     proximity of a crime, opportunity, and association with a
     person involved in the crime in a manner suggestive of joint
     participation are relevant facts in determining the connection
     of an accomplice with the crime; a person's flight to avoid
     arrest may be considered as corroboration of evidence tending
     to establish his guilt. 

5.   Evidence -- proof sufficient to establish the joint nature of
     appellant's activities with the co-defendants -- state not
     required to prove appellant physically entered their home with
     the requisite intent. -- Where the proof at trial was amply
     sufficient to establish the joint nature of appellant's
     criminal activities with the co-defendants, the State was not
     required to prove that the appellant physically entered the
     home of each victim with the intent to deprive them of their
     property.

6.   Criminal procedure -- severance -- granting or refusing
     discretionary with the trial court. --  Granting or refusing
     a severance is a matter within the discretion of the trial
     court; a defendant has an absolute right to a severance of
     offenses joined solely on the ground that they are of same or
     similar character.

7.   Criminal procedure -- denial of severance proper -- proximity
     in time and place provided an ample basis for denial of
     severance. -- The appellant's contention that there was no
     evidence that the March 15 and March 16 burglaries were a part
     of a single plan or scheme was without merit where six
     burglaries occurred during the day on March 15 and five
     burglaries occurred prior to 2:00 p.m. on March 16; the
     burglaries occurred in the same locale and during the day,
     they were all residential burglaries, and in each case a door
     was forced open; the appellant's wife provided evidence of a
     scheme or plan when she testified at trial that the burglaries
     were committed to raise money so that "we can go to Florida
     and pick up my kids"; thus, the proximity in time and place
     and evidence of a single scheme or plan provided an ample
     basis for the denial of severance. 

8.   Evidence -- when trial court will exclude relevant evidence --
     trial court's decision reversed only upon a showing of
     manifest abuse of discretion. -- Rule 403 of the Arkansas
     Rules of Evidence allows a trial court to exclude relevant
     evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
     the danger of unfair prejudice, this weighing is a matter left
     to the trial court's sound discretion and will not be reversed
     absent a showing of manifest abuse.

9.   Evidence -- 911 call allowed into evidence by trial court --
     no abuse of discretion found. -- The appellant's argument that
     the trial court improperly denied his motion in limine to
     suppress the 911 tape was without merit where even though the
     State had clear proof that someone entered the caller's home
     without resorting to the "911" call, the call served to
     explain why the police were in the area searching for a blue
     Thunderbird; further, the appellant offered no authority for
     how the caller's alleged "frantic voice" inflamed the jury;
     the appellant failed to establish that the trial court abused
     its discretion.

     Appeal from Washington Circuit Court; Kim Smith, Judge;
affirmed.
     Kent McLemore, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Kent G. Holt, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.
     Andree Layton Roaf, Justice.February 5, 1996   *ADVREP8*










THOMAS ROY PASSLEY JR. A/K/A
DOUGLAS LEE BOLKEMA
                    APPELLANT,

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
                    APPELLEE,







CR95-903



APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CR94-452,
HON. KIM SMITH, JUDGE,



AFFIRMED.


                   Andree Layton Roaf, Justice

     Appellant Thomas Roy Passley, Jr., was convicted of eleven
counts of residential burglary and nine counts of theft of property
for crimes committed over a two day period.  He was sentenced as an
habitual offender to eighty years imprisonment.  On appeal, Passley
asserts that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in failing
to sever the March 15, 1994, burglaries from the March 16, 1994,
burglaries, (2) abused its discretion by allowing the introduction
of a tape of a "911" call in violation of A.R.E. Rule 403, and (3)
erred in failing to grant Passley's motions for directed verdict. 
We affirm.
     Ms. Peggy Swingel testified that at approximately 1:50 p.m. on
March 16, 1994, someone began ringing her doorbell, but she did not
answer the door.  Subsequently, someone began kicking the back
door.  She entered her living room in order to reach a cordless
telephone, and she could see that someone was in her kitchen.  She
called "911," and the intruders left her home.  She reported that
two men just left her home in a gray or blue-gray car, possibly a
Thunderbird.  Jovey Marshall of the Washington County Sheriff's
Office testified that he received the "911" call at approximately
1:50 p.m. and a Thunderbird was stopped at approximately 1:54 p.m.
     Morton Marshall, Farmington Chief of Police, was dispatched in
response to the call and he encountered a blue Thunderbird.  Chief
Marshall pursued the vehicle and observed that there were two women
and two men in the vehicle.  After the vehicle stopped, the two men
escaped.  Co-defendants Michelle Vincent and Tammy Johnson a/k/a
Lisa Faye Bradish were apprehended in the Thunderbird.  The two
men, the appellant and Warren (Morn) Franklin Passley III, were
captured approximately ten minutes later.
     The appellant a/k/a Douglas Lee Bolkema and the three co-
defendants were charged by felony information with thirteen counts
of burglary and twelve counts of theft of property.  The crimes
were allegedly committed on February 7, 1994, March 4, 1994, March
15, 1994, and March 16, 1994.  The information alleged that the
defendants entered homes on February 7 and March 4 and took
property valued in excess of $2,500.00.  The information provided
that on March 15 the defendants burglarized six homes and on March
16 the defendants burglarized four homes.  Further, the information
alleged that the defendants took property valued in excess of
$2,500.00 from five of the homes; property valued in excess of
$200.00 from three of the homes; and property valued at less than
$200.00 from two of the homes.  Finally, the information charged
the defendants with burglary for entering the home of Peggy Swingel
on March 16.
     The Thunderbird in which the defendants were riding was owned
by Tammy Johnson, the appellant's wife.  A number of items from the
burglaries committed on March 15 and March 16 were found either in
pillow cases in the trunk of the car or in the possession of the
defendants.  A ring, watch, and knife were found on the appellant
when he was apprehended.  The ring was identified as one taken in
a March 16th burglary, and the knife and watch were identified as
taken in a March 15th burglary.  Property taken on those dates from
seven other homes was also recovered from either the Thunderbird or
the co-defendants.
     Mrs. Marjie Million testified that Tammy Johnson is her niece. 
Mrs. Million further testified that Tammy Johnson, Thomas Roy
Passley, Jr., Warren Franklin Passley III, and Michelle Vincent
stayed in her home on March 15 and March 16, 1994.  A Ford Mustang
owned by Warren Passley was recovered from the Million residence. 
Property belonging to victims of both the March 15 and March 16
burglaries was recovered from either the Mustang or the Million's
residence.
     Ms. Swingel identified Tammy Johnson's Thunderbird as the
vehicle that she observed the day her home was burglarized.  She
further testified that she could identify Warren Passley as one of
the intruders, but she did not get a good look at the second
person.  Deputy Sheriff Charles Rexford testified that the tread
patterns on the appellant's shoes were similar to the print
observed on the door of Ms. Swingel's residence.
     The jury found the appellant not guilty of the crimes
allegedly committed on February 7 and March 4.  Further, the trial
court refused to instruct the jury regarding the theft of property
charge arising out of the burglary of Kirk Cunningham's residence. 
The jury, however, found the appellant guilty on the twenty
remaining charges.
                 1. Sufficiency of the evidence
     A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence.  Williams v. State, 321 Ark. 635, 906 S.W.2d 677 (1995).  Preservation of an appellant's right to freedom
from double jeopardy requires a review of the sufficiency of the
evidence prior to a review of trial errors.  Davis v. State, 319
Ark. 460,