Case Title: Higgins v. Mills

Citation: 181 N.W.2d 726

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1970-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
181 N.W.2d 726 (1970) William A. HIGGINS, Milton K. Higgins, and Morton County, a Public Corporation, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. William R. MILLS et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. No. 8683. Supreme Court of North Dakota. December 4, 1970. *727 William R. Mills, Bismarck, for defendants and respondents. Higgins & Higgins, Bismarck, for plaintiffs and appellants. ERICKSTAD, Judge. The plaintiffs brought an action in 1966 under Chapter 32-17, N.D.C.C., to determine adverse claims to real property. The defendants moved for a dismissal of the action on the grounds that the district court of Morton County had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, contending that the land in question was situated in Burleigh County. After due hearing thereon, the district court of Morton County concluded that the land, title to which was in dispute, was in Burleigh County, and therefore the district court of Morton County had no jurisdiction. It did so after determining that Section 28-04-01, N.D.C.C., required that this action be brought in the county in which the land was situated and that this was jurisdictional. Accordingly, the district court of Morton County dismissed the action as of October 17, 1968. Notice of entry of the order of dismissal and retaxation of costs was served upon the plaintiffs by mail on October 23, 1968. A judgment dated May 21, 1969, filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of Morton County on May 29, 1969, notice of the entry of which was served upon the plaintiffs on May 28, 1969, by mail, is in three parts. The first part determines that the land described in the complaint is located in Burleigh County. The second part determines that the district court of Morton County has no jurisdiction of the subject matter. The third part reads: The plaintiffs asserted during oral argument on the motion for dismissal of the appeal in our court that because the judgment stated that it was being rendered on motion of Richard P. Rausch, counsel for one of the answering defendants, when there were numerous other defendants and other counsel affected, the plaintiffs deemed it essential to have another identical judgment executed and entered by the clerk of court on their own motion. The latter judgment, for which no new order was obtained from the district court, is dated November 21, 1969. Service of the notice of the entry of the latter judgment was made by mail upon the defendants on November 27, 1969. In an attempt to appeal to this court, the plaintiffs filed and served upon the defendants as of November 28, 1969, a notice of appeal, the pertinent part of which reads: The plaintiffs conceded in oral argument before this court that they did not gain any additional time within which to appeal by securing the second judgment. They, however, assert that the judgment of May 21, 1969, is defective because it does not contain findings of fact or conclusions of law, required under the provisions of Rule 52 (a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs' return to the motion for a dismissal of the action reads: Since the 1969 amendment, Section 28-27-04, N.D.C.C., reads: In discussing the effect of Section 14 of Chapter 131 of the North Dakota Session Laws of 1913, which reduced the time within which an appeal could be taken from a judgment, this court said: Syllabus No. 4 in Wilson reads: Section 28-27-05 provides for the manner in which an appeal from a judgment of a district court must be taken. Applying the rule in Wilson, unless the plaintiffs are correct in their contention that the judgment is defective under Rule 52(a), they have lost their right to appeal by not taking an appeal from that judgment within ninety days of July 1, 1969, the effective date of the amendment, service of the notice of the entry of the May 21, 1969, judgment having been made upon them prior to July 1, 1969. The judgment roll in this case contains a twenty-one-page memorandum decision of the district court, in which the court determined the facts and the law relative to the motion for dismissal of this action. We conclude, therefore, that Rule 52(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure has been complied with. Said Rule reads: Since the memorandum decision, or as the Rule describes it, the memorandum of decision, clearly contains findings of fact and conclusions of law, it was not necessary that such findings of fact and conclusions of law be set forth in the judgment to comply with Rule 52(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion for a dismissal of the plaintiffs' appeal is therefore granted. TEIGEN, C. J., and PAULSON, KNUDSON and STRUTZ, JJ., concur.