Case Title: New England Power Generators Ass’n v. Department of Environmental Protection

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12477

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-09-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12477 
 
NEW ENGLAND POWER GENERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., & others1  vs.  
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION & another.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 8, 2018. - September 4, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Department of Environmental Protection.  Environment, Air 
pollution.  Regulation.  Administrative Law, Regulations.  
Electricity. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 11, 2017. 
 
 
Following transfer to the Supreme Judicial Court for the 
county of Suffolk, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 4A, the case was 
reported by Budd, J. 
 
 
 
Seth D. Jaffe (Stephen L. Bartlett also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
Seth Schofield, Assistant Attorney General (Turner H. 
Smith, Shannon S. Beale, & Joseph F. Dorfler, Assistant 
Attorneys General, also present) for the defendants. 
                                                 
 
1 GenOn Energy, Inc.; and Footprint Power Salem Harbor 
Development LP and Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric 
Company, interveners. 
 
 
2 Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs. 
2 
 
 
John A. DeTore, for Footprint Power Salem Harbor 
Development LP, was present but did not argue. 
 
Nicholas J. Scobbo, Jr., Ann Ryan Small, & Sherry L. 
Vaughn, for Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company, 
submitted a brief. 
 
David K. Ismay, for Conservation Law Foundation, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  Its name bespeaks its ambitions.  The Global 
Warming Solutions Act, St. 2008, c. 298 (act), was passed to 
address the grave threats that climate change poses to the 
health, economy, and natural resources of the Commonwealth.  See  
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 
521-522 (2007); Kain v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 474 
Mass. 278, 281-282 (2016).  The act is designed to make 
Massachusetts a national, and even international, leader in the 
efforts to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions that cause 
climate change.  Id. at 281.  It thus establishes significant, 
"ambitious," legally binding, short- and long-term restrictions 
on those emissions.  G. L. c. 21N, §§ 3, 4.  See Executive Order 
No. 569 (Sept. 16, 2016). 
 
The plaintiffs, New England Power Generators Association, 
Inc., and GenOn Energy, Inc., contend that a key provision, 
G. L. c. 21N, § 3 (d) (§ 3 [d]), which directs the Department of 
Environmental Protection (department) to promulgate regulations 
establishing declining annual aggregate emission limits for 
sources that emit greenhouse gas emissions, does not apply to 
3 
 
the electric sector, because that sector is specifically 
regulated by a separate provision, G. L. c. 21N, § 3 (c) 
(§ 3 [c]).  Consequently, the plaintiffs assert that the 
department and the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental 
Affairs (executive office) (collectively, agencies) exceeded 
their authority in promulgating 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.74 
(2017) (Cap Regulation),3 which imposes declining greenhouse gas 
emissions limits on the in-State electric sector through 2050.  
Furthermore, the plaintiffs allege that the Cap Regulation will 
increase, rather than decrease, Statewide emissions.  Lastly, 
the plaintiffs argue that, even if the Cap Regulation is valid, 
the "sunset provision" of the act prohibits additional § 3 (d) 
regulations after December 31, 2020.  We conclude that none of 
these arguments is meritorious and, accordingly, uphold the Cap 
Regulation.4 
 
1.  Background.  "The act was developed against the 
backdrop of an emerging consensus shared by a majority of the 
scientific community that climate change is attributable to 
increased [greenhouse gas] emissions, as well as perceptions in 
the Commonwealth that national and international efforts to 
                                                 
 
3 In August, 2018, the Department of Environmental 
Protection (department) amended 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.74 (Cap 
Regulation).  Those amendments do not affect the present case. 
 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Conservation 
Law Foundation. 
4 
 
reduce those emissions are inadequate."  Kain, 474 Mass. at 281.5  
"The act established a comprehensive framework to address the 
effects of climate change in the Commonwealth by reducing 
emissions to levels that scientific evidence had suggested were 
needed to avoid the most damaging impacts of climate change."  
Id. at 281-282. 
 
The act's sequenced and specific design sets out interim 
benchmarks to map out the course toward meeting the 2050 
Statewide emissions limit goal.  First, the act directs the 
department to determine the calendar year 1990 Statewide 
greenhouse gas emissions level and then to project the "2020 
business as usual" level -- "the statewide greenhouse gas 
emissions level . . . if no measures are imposed to lower 
emissions."  G. L. c. 21N, § 3 (a).6  Second, the act requires 
that the Commonwealth reduce its Statewide greenhouse gas 
                                                 
 
5 The Global Warming Solutions Act (act) defines "greenhouse 
gas" as "any chemical or physical substance that is emitted into 
the air and that the department may reasonably anticipate will 
cause or contribute to climate change including, but not limited 
to, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, 
perfluorocarbons and sulfur hexafluoride."  G. L. c. 21N, § 1. 
 
 
6 The 1990 baseline was determined to be 94 million metric 
tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, of which 25.6 million was 
associated with electric generation.  See Department of 
Environmental Protection, Statewide Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Level:  1990 Baseline and 2020 Business as Usual Projection, at 
4 (July 1, 2009), https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016 
/08/or/1990-2020-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/CN6Y-HGGX].  The 
2020 "business as usual" projection was also estimated to be 94 
million metric tons of carbon dioxide.  Id. at 5. 
5 
 
emissions by at least eighty per cent below the 1990 level by 
2050.7  G. L. c. 21N, § 3 (b).  The act also mandates that 
interim Statewide emissions limits for 2020, 2030, and 2040 be 
adopted and accompanied by plans for implementation.  Id.  
Third, the act requires that the executive office update its 
implementation plans and publish interim progress reports every 
five years.  G. L. c. 21N, §§ 4 (h), 5.  Fourth, the act directs 
the department to adopt regulations to require the reporting and 
verification of Statewide greenhouse gas emissions and to 
triennially publish an inventory estimating the past three 
years' Statewide emissions.  G. L. c. 21N, § 2 (a)-(c). 
 
The act defines "Statewide greenhouse gas emissions" as 
"the total annual emissions of greenhouse gases in the 
[C]ommonwealth," including "all emissions of greenhouse gases 
from the generation of electricity delivered to and consumed in 
the [C]ommonwealth," even if that electricity is produced 
elsewhere.  G. L. c. 21N, § 1.  Massachusetts is served by a 
regional electric power grid that includes six States and is 
interconnected with the regional grids of New York and two 
Canadian provinces. 
 
Most relevant to the instant case, the act also empowers 
the department, in consultation with the executive office and 
                                                 
 
7 The 2050 Statewide emissions limit would thus be under 19 
million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent. 
6 
 
the Department of Energy Resources, to set "[e]missions levels 
and limits associated with the electric sector, . . . based on 
consumption and purchases of electricity from the regional 
electric grid, taking into account the regional greenhouse gas 
initiative and the renewable portfolio standard"8 and directs the 
department to promulgate regulations establishing "declining 
annual aggregate emission limits for sources or categories of 
                                                 
 
8 The regional greenhouse gas initiative (RGGI) is the 
nation's first mandatory market-based program to reduce 
emissions of carbon dioxide.  Participating States have 
established a regional cap on carbon dioxide emissions from the 
electric sector and require their respective in-State power 
plants to possess a tradable carbon dioxide allowance for each 
ton of carbon dioxide they emit.  The RGGI cap declines 2.5 per 
cent each year from 2017 to 2020. 
 
 
The RGGI is related to but distinct from the Cap 
Regulation.  The RGGI controls greenhouse gas emissions across 
the nine States that participate in the RGGI, but does not 
restrict emissions in any particular State.  See The Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Elements of RGGI, https://www.rggi 
.org/program-overview-and-design/elements [https://perma.cc 
/M59X-JV25].  The Cap Regulation controls emissions of 
electricity-generating facilities in Massachusetts, but not in 
other States.  See Department of Environmental Protection, Fact 
Sheet:  Electricity Sector Regulations, http://www.massdep.org 
/BAW/air/3dfs-electricity.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVD2-ESAU]. 
 
 
Predating the RGGI, the renewable energy portfolio standard 
(RPS) was established in 1997.  See G. L. c. 25A, § 11F, 
inserted by St. 1997, c. 164, § 50; 225 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 14.00, 15.00 (2016).  The RPS requires that retail suppliers 
of electricity deliver a certain percentage of the electricity 
generated from renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, and 
hydroelectric.  Renewable energy produced by generators that 
qualify for the RPS counts toward compliance with 310 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 7.75 (2017) (Clean Energy Standard Regulation), 
discussed infra.  See Department of Environmental Protection, 
Fact Sheet:  Electricity Sector Regulations, supra. 
7 
 
sources that emit greenhouse gas emissions."  G. L. c. 21N, 
§ 3 (c), (d).9 
 
Prior to our decision in Kain, the department relied 
significantly on the Commonwealth's membership and efforts 
through the regional greenhouse gas initiative (RGGI), 
particularly its "cap and trade program for electricity-
generating facilities," to satisfy the requirements of § 3 (d).  
See Kain, 474 Mass. at 296-297.  As a participant of the RGGI, 
the Commonwealth "established the carbon dioxide budget trading 
program, which incorporat[ed] the RGGI scheme into its 
regulations and contain[ed] a schedule of the Commonwealth's 
annual 'base budget' . . . of carbon dioxide."  Id. at 296. 
 
In Kain, 474 Mass. at 280, we concluded that the department 
had not fulfilled its statutory mandate under § 3 (d).  With 
respect to the electric sector, we reasoned that "although the 
RGGI program . . . [was] very important to the over-all regional 
scheme," it was established under a statute entirely separate 
from the act.  Id. at 296.  Furthermore, emission reductions 
from the RGGI regulation were already accounted for in the 
eighteen per cent reduction in emissions anticipated under the 
2020 "business as usual" level.  Id. at 296-297.  Additionally, 
                                                 
 
9 Relatedly, the act also directs that the Commonwealth and 
its agencies promulgate regulations that "encourage renewable 
sources of energy in the sectors of energy generation, buildings 
and transportation."  G. L. c. 21N, § 6. 
8 
 
given that in-State power plants could purchase carbon dioxide 
allowances from generators in other RGGI-participating States, 
there was no way to ensure mass-based reductions in carbon 
dioxide emissions.  Id. at 297-298.  Accordingly, we ordered the 
department to "promulgate regulations that establish volumetric 
limits on multiple greenhouse gas emissions sources, expressed 
in carbon dioxide equivalents, and . . . such limits must 
decline on an annual basis."  Id. at 280. 
 
On September 16, 2016, approximately four months after Kain 
was decided, the Governor issued Executive Order No. 569, titled 
"Establishing an Integrated Climate Change Strategy for the 
Commonwealth."  The order, in part, directed the department to 
promulgate final regulations by August 11, 2017, that satisfy 
§ 3 (d) and that ensure that the Commonwealth meets the 2020 
Statewide emissions limit mandated by the act.  Twelve days 
later, on September 28, 2016, the department began seeking input 
on proposed regulations of emission sources from stakeholders, 
including scheduling technical meetings for electricity sector 
stakeholders.  During these meetings, the department considered 
establishing a declining greenhouse gas emissions cap for 
Massachusetts power plants, effective from 2018 through 2050, 
later proposed as 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.74, the Cap 
Regulation.  The department also weighed establishing a clean 
energy standard, which would require an increasing percentage of 
9 
 
new clean energy to Massachusetts from retail suppliers; this 
standard was later proposed as 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.75 (CES 
Regulation). 
 
On August 11, 2017, after consultation with the Department 
of Energy Resources, the agencies published the final Cap 
Regulation pursuant to §§ 3 (c), (d); the final CES Regulation 
pursuant to § 3 (c); and four additional complementary 
regulations, pursuant to § 3 (d).  Starting from a 2018 
aggregate carbon dioxide emissions limit of 9,149,979 metric 
tons, the Cap Regulation mandated that in-State fossil-fueled 
power plants decrease their emissions by 223,876 metric tons 
each year until the emissions reach 8,507,299 metric tons in 
2020 and 1,791,019 metric tons in 2050.  310 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 7.74(5)(a).  Complementing the Cap Regulation's reduction on 
emissions, the CES Regulation established an increasing level of 
clean nonemitting electricity that retail sellers must purchase 
annually.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.75(4).  In 2018, the 
requirement was sixteen per cent.  Id.  By 2050, a minimum of 
eighty per cent of retail electricity sold to Massachusetts 
customers will be from clean energy sources.  Id. 
 
On September 11, 2017, the plaintiffs filed their complaint 
in the Superior Court for judicial review of the agencies' 
10 
 
rulemaking, pursuant to G. L. c. 30A.10  The plaintiffs' key 
contention was that the agencies acted unlawfully in 
promulgating the Cap Regulation.  While the case was pending in 
the Superior Court, on January 31, 2018, a single justice of 
this court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 4A, transferred the case 
to the county court.  On February 9, 2018, the single justice 
reserved and reported the case to the full court for 
determination. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Statutory authority to regulate 
greenhouse gas emission levels and limits associated with 
electric sector.  As previously stated, § 3 (d) of the act 
provides that "[t]he department shall promulgate regulations 
establishing a desired level of declining annual aggregate 
emission limits for sources or categories of sources that emit 
greenhouse gas emissions."  The preceding section, § 3 (c), 
provides that "[e]missions levels and limits associated with the 
electric sector shall be established by the executive office and 
the department, in consultation with the department of energy 
resources, based on consumption and purchases of electricity 
                                                 
 
10 Subsequently, Footprint Power Salem Harbor Development LP 
and Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company 
successfully moved to intervene as plaintiffs.  In addition to 
the plaintiffs in the present case, Calpine Corporation also 
filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking review of the 
Cap Regulation, and that case was consolidated with this one.  
Calpine Corporation's case was thereafter resolved in the 
Superior Court and is not before us in this appeal. 
11 
 
from the regional electric grid, taking into account the 
regional greenhouse gas initiative and the renewable portfolio 
standard."  At issue in the instant case is the Cap Regulation, 
which establishes annually declining aggregate carbon dioxide 
emissions limits on electricity generating facilities located in 
the Commonwealth, pursuant to § 3 (d).  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 7.74(1). 
The plaintiffs argue that the agencies may not impose an 
emissions cap on electricity generators under § 3 (d), because 
§ 3 (c) specifically and separately regulates the electric 
sector.  The agencies counter that although § 3 (c) sets out 
specific procedures and requirements for regulation of the 
electric sector, it does not prohibit the department from 
imposing a declining emissions cap on that sector pursuant to 
§ 3 (d), as long as the limits satisfy the requirements of 
§ 3 (c).  We conclude that § 3 (c) and § 3 (d) complement each 
other, and that the electric sector is one of the multiple 
categories of sources of emissions that may be regulated under 
§ 3 (d).  Furthermore, the department's determination that it 
must impose decreasing emissions limits on the electric sector 
in order to accomplish its essential statutory purpose is amply 
supported. 
 
"In assessing the legality of an administrative agency's 
properly promulgated regulations, we employ sequentially two 
12 
 
well-defined principles.  First, we determine, using 
conventional tools of statutory interpretation, whether the 
Legislature has spoken with certainty on the topic in question, 
and if we conclude that the statute is unambiguous, we give 
effect to the Legislature's intent" (footnoted omitted).  
Goldberg v. Board of Health of Granby, 444 Mass. 627, 632-633 
(2005).  "Second, if the Legislature has not addressed directly 
the pertinent issue, we determine whether the agency's 
resolution of that issue may 'be reconciled with the governing 
legislation.'"  Id. at 633, quoting Nuclear Metals, Inc. v. Low–
Level Radioactive Waste Mgt. Bd., 421 Mass. 196, 211 (1995).  At 
the second stage, we afford "substantial deference" to agency 
expertise, and will uphold a challenged regulation "unless a 
statute unambiguously bars the agency's approach."  Goldberg, 
supra, quoting Briggs v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 241, 253 
(1999). 
 
Taking these considerations together, we conclude that the 
agencies have the authority to promulgate regulations under 
§ 3 (d) to establish emission limits on the electric sector, 
and, as detailed below, our interpretation is consistent with 
the act's fundamental purpose of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, and combatting climate change, in Massachusetts.  
Kain, 474 Mass. at 300.  Furthermore, to the extent, if any, 
that the act is ambiguous, we conclude that the agencies' 
13 
 
interpretation is reasonable and entitled to deference.11  The 
act certainly does not "unambiguously bar[] the agenc[ies'] 
approach."  Goldberg, 444 Mass. at 633. 
 
The electric sector's transition away from fossil fuels is 
critical to reaching the sustainable future that the act 
envisions.  Presently, the electric sector accounts for 
approximately twenty per cent of Statewide greenhouse gas 
emissions.  See MA GHG Emissions Trends, MA GHG by Sector, 
https://www.mass.gov/service-details/ma-ghg-emission-trends 
[https://perma.cc/2F4B-M5RE].  Given that the electric sector is 
one of the largest in-State greenhouse gas emission sources, it 
would make little to no sense for the Legislature to have 
excluded it from the critical emission reduction requirements 
set out in § 3 (d).  There is also no express exclusion of the 
electric sector from § 3 (d).  Furthermore, in order to achieve 
its goal of reducing emissions by at least eighty per cent by 
                                                 
 
11 The plaintiffs' argument that the agencies' 
interpretation of the act is not entitled to deference because 
the act is outside their sphere of expertise is unavailing.  See 
Kain v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 474 Mass. 278, 286, 292 
(2016) ("the department and the [S]ecretary [of Energy and 
Environmental Affairs (secretary)] have considerable expertise 
in addressing the challenges that climate change poses to the 
Commonwealth").  See also St. 2008, c. 298, §§ 3, 4 (directing 
department and secretary to implement act); Dowling v. Registrar 
of Motor Vehicles, 425 Mass. 523, 525 (1997), quoting 
Massachusetts Medical Soc'y v. Commissioner of Ins., 402 Mass. 
44, 62 (1988) ("an administrative agency's interpretation of a 
statute within its charge is accorded weight and deference"). 
14 
 
2050, "the Commonwealth must achieve a significant reduction in 
[greenhouse gas] emissions from transportation, the heating of 
buildings, and the electric sector.  Because a significant 
percentage of vehicles and building systems must be electrified 
as a way to reduce [greenhouse gas] emissions," cutting 
emissions from the electric sector is a crucial initial step to 
achieving long-term progress in combatting climate change.  See 
Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs & 
Department of Environmental Protection, Response to Comment on:  
310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.74, at 13 (Aug. 2017). 
 
The importance of decreasing greenhouse gases from the 
electric sector is particularly apparent when the act's 
fundamental purpose to "attain actual, measurable, and permanent 
emissions reductions in the Commonwealth" is considered in the 
context of § 3 (c), including § 3 (c)'s emissions limits and 
consideration of trade allowances.  Kain, 474 Mass. at 300.  See 
Commonwealth v. Diggs, 475 Mass. 79, 83 (2016) (rejecting 
interpretation that would thwart statute's intended purpose).  
As we recognized in Kain, supra at 297-298, "there is no way to 
ensure mass-based reductions in carbon dioxide emissions from 
power plants in the Commonwealth that participate in the RGGI," 
because they can purchase emission allowances from out-of-State 
generators.  Id. at 297-298.  Additionally, "reductions from the 
RGGI regulation were [already] accounted for in the eighteen per 
15 
 
cent reduction in emissions anticipated under the 'business as 
usual' projection calculated prior to the application of 
regulations under § 3 (d)."  Id. at 297.  The RGGI regulatory 
regime regarding the electric sector is therefore not alone 
sufficient to satisfy the purposes of the act.  The act is 
designed to go well beyond business as usual in terms of 
reducing emissions:  to upend, rather than to uphold, the status 
quo.  The electric sector is no exception. 
 
Section 3 (d) places no restriction on the categories of 
emissions sources that the department may regulate.  Kain, 474 
Mass. at 284 n.9, 290-291.  In Kain, we did observe that "the 
Legislature intended to treat emission reductions associated 
with the electric sector differently from reductions in other 
sectors of the economy."  Id. at 297.  This is because there are 
considerations specific to the electric industry to take into 
account, particularly the regional grid, the RGGI framework, and 
the renewable energy portfolio standard (RPS); additionally, the 
department, in regulating the electric sector, must consult with 
the Department of Energy Resources and the executive office.  
G. L. c. 21N, § 3 (c).  Differential treatment of the electric 
sector, however, does not indicate its exclusion from § 3 (d).  
"Specific statutory authority to act in a particular respect 
does not bar consistent action under general statutory 
authority."  Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Department of Pub. 
16 
 
Health, 379 Mass. 70, 76 (1979).  See Pepin v. Division of 
Fisheries & Wildlife, 467 Mass. 210, 224-226 (2014) (statute 
creating requirements for certain types of endangered species' 
habitats did not preclude agency from promulgating regulations 
to further general goal of protecting endangered species). 
 
The department promulgated the Cap Regulation pursuant to 
§ 3 (c)'s requirements; the department consulted with the 
executive office and the Department of Energy Resources, 
considered energy consumption from the regional grid, and 
analyzed how the Cap Regulation would interact with RGGI and the 
RPS.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.74(1) (Cap Regulation 
promulgated by department and executive office "following 
consultation with the Department of Energy Resources and based 
on the considerations specified in . . . § 3 [c]").  The Cap 
Regulation properly takes into account the specific 
considerations of the electric sector identified in section 
§ 3 (c), while including this large emitter of greenhouse gases 
in the ambitious emissions reduction regime of § 3 (d), which is 
central to accomplishing the act's overarching purpose.  The two 
statutory provisions work together and complement each other.  
They are not mutually exclusive. 
 
In sum, we conclude that § 3 (d) does not contain a 
regulatory exclusion for the electric or any sector, and we 
decline to read one in.  "If that was the legislative intent, 
17 
 
the wording of the statute could have easily reflected it.  It 
does not" (footnote omitted).  Rowley v. Massachusetts Elec. 
Co., 438 Mass. 798, 802 (2003).  The agencies' interpretation of 
how § 3 (c) and (d) may be construed together, is also 
reasonable, and therefore, entitled to deference.  See Dowling 
v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 425 Mass. 523, 525 (1997).  See 
also Pepin, 467 Mass. at 222, quoting Entergy Nuclear Generation 
Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 459 Mass. 319, 331 
(2011) ("[A] regulation . . . need not necessarily find support 
in a particular section of [the enabling statute]; it is enough 
if it carries out the scheme or design of the chapter and is 
thus consistent with it").  Because the Cap Regulation satisfies 
the requirements of both § 3 (c) and § 3 (d), the plaintiffs' 
argument that the regulation is ultra vires must fail. 
 
b.  Validity of 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.74.  The 
plaintiffs contend that, even if the agencies are permitted to 
regulate the electric sector under § 3 (d), the projected 
effects of the Cap Regulation render it arbitrary and capricious 
and inconsistent with the statutory purpose of reducing 
emissions.  A properly promulgated regulation "has the force of 
law . . . and must be accorded all the deference due to a 
statute."  Borden, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 388 
Mass. 707, 723, cert. denied sub nom. Formaldehyde Inst., Inc. 
v. Frechette, 464 U.S. 936 (1983).  A party challenging the 
18 
 
validity of a regulation must prove "that the regulation is 
illegal, arbitrary, or capricious."  Id. at 722.  Such a 
plaintiff must establish "the absence of any conceivable grounds 
upon which [the rule] may be upheld."  Purity Supreme, Inc. v. 
Attorney Gen., 380 Mass. 762, 776 (1980), quoting Colella v. 
State Racing Comm'n, 360 Mass. 152, 156 (1971).  "That burden 
cannot be carried 'by arguing that the record does not 
affirmatively show facts which support the regulation.'"  Dowell 
v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, 424 Mass. 610, 612 
(1997), quoting Purity Supreme, Inc., supra.  Rather, "we must 
apply all rational presumptions in favor of the validity of the 
administrative action and not declare it void unless its 
provisions cannot by any reasonable construction be interpreted 
in harmony with the legislative mandate."  Consolidated Cigar 
Corp. v. Department of Pub. Health, 372 Mass. 844, 855 (1977).  
However, "a regulation that is irreconcilable with an agency's 
enabling legislation cannot stand."  Quincy v. Massachusetts 
Water Resources Auth., 421 Mass. 463, 468 (1995). 
 
Here, the plaintiffs build their case around the 
possibility that the Cap Regulation may cause modest emissions 
leakage.  "Leakage," as defined in G. L. c. 21N, § 1, is "the 
offset of a reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases within 
the [C]ommonwealth by an increase in emissions of greenhouse 
gases outside the [C]ommonwealth."  The plaintiffs contend that 
19 
 
generators within Massachusetts will produce less electricity in 
response to costs imposed by the Cap Regulation; as a result, 
Massachusetts will import more electricity from higher-emitting 
generators outside the State.  Because the act directs the 
agencies to reduce Statewide emissions -- which includes 
greenhouse gases associated with the out-of-State production of 
electricity consumed in the Commonwealth -- the plaintiffs argue 
that this leakage runs contrary to the act's purpose.  See G. L. 
c. 21N, § 1. 
 
There are, however, multiple conceivable bases to support 
the rule.  See Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO v. 
Board of Educ., 436 Mass. 763, 772 (2002).  First, the Cap 
Regulation seeks to reduce emissions generated within the 
Commonwealth.  As a recent baseline, in 2014, approximately 
14,900,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions was 
associated with the electric sector.  The Cap Regulation sets 
forth a declining emissions limit from 9,149,979 metric tons of 
carbon dioxide in 2018 to 8,507,299 metric tons of carbon 
dioxide in 2020.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.74(5)(a).  For 
the purposes of long-term planning and forecasting, the Cap 
Regulation also sets forth the long-term goal for emissions 
generated within the Commonwealth of 1,791,019 metric tons of 
20 
 
carbon dioxide in 2050.12 
 
Additionally, as the agencies contend, the Cap Regulation's 
impact cannot be analyzed in a vacuum.  Indeed, it was 
promulgated in concert with the CES Regulation, and the two 
rules were expressly "designed to work together to maximize the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions."13  See Summary of 
Regulations:  310 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 7.74, 7.75 (attachment to 
filing entry form for final regulation).  The CES Regulation 
requires retail electricity providers to procure an increasing 
percentage of electricity from clean energy sources each year.  
See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.75(4).  Because of the emissions 
reductions that will occur as a result of the CES Regulation, 
the agencies predict that the Cap Regulation's limit on 
greenhouse gases will be met without any decrease in production 
                                                 
 
12 Additionally, with the statutory scheme imposing lower 
emission limits over time, the Legislature was aware that some 
leakage was inevitable; indeed, the regulations must be 
evaluated to determine whether they minimize leakage.  See G. L. 
c. 21N, § 5 (vii).  Here, even if the plaintiff's modeling is 
taken at face value, the most severe leakage projection would 
constitute less than one per cent of total New England 
greenhouse gas emissions in the one year, 2025, modeled.  Some 
doubts as to whether leakage may occur need not prevent the 
department from acting to ensure that the electric sector is 
working towards the act's purpose.  See Borden, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Pub. Health, 388 Mass. 707, 734 (1983). 
 
 
13 The plaintiffs, notably, do not take a position or 
contest the agencies' position that the Cap Regulation and 310 
Code Mass. Regs. § 7.75, working together, would reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
21 
 
by Massachusetts fossil fuel generators.  They predict that, as 
a result, little or no leakage will occur, because it will be 
unnecessary to shift to out-of-State producers in order to 
comply with the Cap Regulation. 
 
Furthermore, even if the Cap Regulation does result in an 
increase in electricity imports, the agencies project that an 
increasing percentage of those imports will be derived from 
zero-emission sources, in part due to the CES Regulation's  
mandate that the Commonwealth consume greater percentages of 
clean energy each year.14  Finally, far from causing increased 
greenhouse gas emissions from out-of-State generators, according 
to the agencies, the two regulations together will send a market 
signal that Massachusetts' neighbors should invest in clean 
energy development in order to satisfy the Commonwealth's 
increasing demand for renewable energy.  To the extent that the 
agencies' projections rely on their own interpretations of these 
                                                 
 
14 Additionally, because renewable resources have virtually 
no operating costs and generators can submit very low bids into 
the hourly wholesale electricity markets, clean energy resources 
will be dispatched first.  Even if the Cap Regulation imposes a 
constraint on in-State power plants, it is mere speculation that 
out-of-State electric suppliers will necessarily generate higher 
rates of greenhouse gas emissions, especially given that other 
States have similarly committed to ambitious targets for 
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions.  See, e.g., Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 22a-200a (eighty per cent reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions below 2001 level by 2050); R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-6.2-2 
(eighty per cent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions below 
1990 levels by 2050). 
22 
 
regulations, they are entitled to deference.  Biogen IDEC MA, 
Inc. v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 454 Mass. 174, 184 (2009).  
In sum, the plaintiffs are far from showing "the absence of any 
conceivable grounds upon which [the rule] may be upheld."  
Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO, 436 Mass. at 772, 
quoting Purity, Supreme, Inc., 380 Mass. at 776. 
 
c.  Regulations promulgated under G. L. c. 21N, § 3 (d), 
beyond December 31, 2020.  Section 16 of the act provides that 
"[t]he department . . . shall promulgate regulations pursuant to 
[§ 3 (d)] not later than January 1, 2012, which regulations 
shall take effect on January 1, 2013, and shall expire on 
December 31, 2020."  The plaintiffs contend that § 16 of the act 
clearly and unambiguously invalidates any emission limits beyond 
December 31, 2020, because the provision contains an 
"unambiguous sunset date" for § 3 (d).  We disagree.  The most 
sensible reading of § 16 is that, after December 31, 2020, only 
the current regulations promulgated under § 3 (d) expire.  The 
Department's authority and obligation to promulgate new 
regulations under § 3 (d) after December 31, 2020, is 
undisturbed.  See Kain, 474 Mass. at 289 n.14 ("sunset provision 
exists because after 2020, new annual limitations on emissions 
would have to be issued to ensure that Statewide limit for 2030, 
which has yet to be established, will be met"). 
 
"The court does not determine the plain meaning of a 
23 
 
statute in isolation" but rather in "consideration of the 
surrounding text, structure, and purpose of the Massachusetts 
act" from which this subsection is derived (citation omitted).  
ENGIE Gas & LNG LLC v. Department of Pub. Utils., 475 Mass. 191, 
199 (2016).  "Moreover, our interpretation of statutes is not 
restricted to determining only their 'simple, literal or strict 
verbal meaning' but also considers their 'development, their 
progression through the legislative body, the history of the 
times, prior legislation, contemporary customs and conditions 
and the system of positive law of which they are part . . . ."  
Kain, 474 Mass. at 286, quoting Oxford v. Oxford Water Co., 391 
Mass. 581, 588 (1984). 
 
First, § 16 of the act's surrounding text and structure is 
instructive.  Nestled within §§ 10-18, this section is focused 
on implementation deadlines, not termination.  Kain, 474 Mass. 
at 283, citing St. 2008, c. 298, §§ 10-18 ("The design of the 
act is synergistic, imposing numerous directives and timelines 
on the [S]ecretary [of Energy and Environmental Affairs] and the 
department to perform certain duties, subject to deadlines.").  
Second, the act's purpose is of crucial importance.  The long-
term goal of the act is to ensure that the Commonwealth meets 
the 2050 Statewide emission limit of at least eighty per cent 
below the 1990 level.  See G. L. c. 21N, § 3 (b).  But to set 
the Commonwealth on a course to meet this limit, the year 2020, 
24 
 
as the first and nearest short-term goal, is of special 
importance.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 21N, §§ 3 (a), (b), 4; 
Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs, Massachusetts 
Clean Energy and Climate Plan for 2020, at 12 (updated Dec. 31, 
2015), https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2017/12/06/Clean%20 
Energy%20and%20Climate%20Plan%20for%202020.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/VWG2-PKQP].  It is a crucial step along the way, but not a 
termination point in any sense.  The existing regulations will 
sunset but will be replaced by new regulations taking into 
account updated information.  To hold that the ability to set 
declining annual aggregate emission limits under § 3 (d) 
permanently expires would create an absurd result:  a long-term 
2050 Statewide emissions goal without, after December 31, 2020, 
any tools to reach it.  See Flemings v. Contributory Retirement 
Appeal Bd., 431 Mass. 374, 375-376 (2000) ("If a sensible 
construction is available, we shall not construe a statute to 
make a nullity of pertinent provisions or to produce absurd 
results"). 
 
We conclude that the Legislature did not intend to render 
§ 3 (d) meaningless after December 31, 2020.  Rather, the 
department was expected and required to promulgate new 
regulations at that time, based on updated information, to 
ensure that the future Statewide limits for 2030, 2040, and 2050 
will be met.  See Kain, 474 Mass. at 289 n.14 ("after 2020, new 
25 
 
annual limitations on emissions would have to be issued"). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed, we conclude 
that the department has the authority to promulgate regulations 
under § 3 (d) to establish emission limits on the electric 
sector.  We also conclude that the Cap Regulation was properly 
promulgated, has the force of law, and must be accorded all the 
deference due to a statute.  Finally, we conclude that § 3 (d) 
remains in effect after December 31, 2020, and that the 
department shall promulgate new regulations to ensure that the 
interim and 2050 Statewide limits will be met. 
 
We remand the matter to the single justice of the county 
court, where an order of remand to the Superior Court shall 
issue for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.