Case Title: Lounge Management, Ltd. v. Town of Trenton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP001853

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1853 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Lounge Management, Ltd., 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Town of Trenton,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 18, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
December 3, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Pierce 
 
JUDGE: 
ROBERT W. WING 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Steinmetz, J., opinion filed 
 
 
Wilcox, J., joins 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by 
Matthew A. Biegert and Doar, Drill & Skow, S.C., New Richmond and 
Randall D.B. Tigue and Randall Tigue Law Offices, P.A., 
Minneapolis, MN and oral argument by Randall D.B. Tigue. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by 
Catherine R. Quiggle and Rodli, Beskar, Boles & Krueger, S.C., 
River Falls and oral argument by Catherine R. Quiggle.  
 
No.  96-1853 
 
1
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1853 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Lounge Management, Ltd., 
 
  
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Town of Trenton, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 18, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Pierce 
County, Robert W. Wing, Judge.  Reversed. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.    This case is before the court 
on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.61 (1995-96).1  The plaintiff, Lounge Management, 
Ltd. ("Lounge Management"), appeals from a circuit court order2 
denying injunctive relief and from a declaratory judgment 
upholding 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
an 
anti-public 
nudity 
ordinance.  Lounge Management contends that the disputed 
ordinance is facially overbroad as well as unconstitutional as 
applied.  Because we find the anti-public nudity ordinance to be 
overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment to the United 
                     
1 Unless otherwise noted, all future statutory references 
are to the 1995-96 volumes.   
2 Circuit court for Pierce County, Robert W. Wing, Judge.  
No.  96-1853 
 
2
States Constitution, we reverse the judgment of the circuit 
court.  
¶2 
Lounge Management operates a nightclub in rural Town 
of Trenton (the "Town"), in Pierce County, pursuant to a Class B 
liquor license.  On the date Lounge Management obtained its 
liquor license, the Town maintained an existing ordinance 
banning 
public 
nudity 
in 
"licensed 
establishments," 
(the 
"Ordinance").3  Five days after the Town Board approved Lounge 
                     
3 Town of Trenton Ordinance No. 10 states: 
AUTHORITY:  This ordinance is enacted pursuant to 
power granted by virtue of present Wisconsin Statutes, 
including Section 125.10. 
 
RESTRICTIONS:  There shall be no public nudity at 
a public licensed establishment. 
 
DEFINITION: Nudity means the showing or exposing 
of the human male or female genitals, pubic area or 
buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or of 
the female breast with less than a fully opaque 
covering of any portion thereof below the top of the 
nipple. 
 
Public means any 
place 
of 
accommodation or 
amusement, which shall be interpreted broadly to 
include, but not be limited to, places of business or 
recreation, 
hotels, 
motels, 
resorts, 
restaurants, 
taverns and any place where accommodations, amusement, 
goods or services are available either free or for a 
consideration.  Campgrounds are also included.  
 
Exceptions. 
A.  This ordinance is not to be interpreted as 
restricting the proper use of a bathroom facility by a 
male or female in an enclosed area where the person is 
of the same sex designated for such room, and is not 
engaged in for any sexual or exhibitionist purpose to 
or in front of or adjacent to other persons. 
No.  96-1853 
 
3
Management's liquor license, Lounge Management decided to offer 
nude and semi-nude dancing at its facility.  It filed suit 
requesting temporary and permanent injunctions against the Town, 
prohibiting the Town from enforcing the Ordinance.  Lounge 
Management also sought a judgment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(1994) declaring the Ordinance void under the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, and Art. I, § 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.4 
 
The 
Town 
answered 
by 
asserting 
the 
constitutionality of the Ordinance, and later amended its answer 
to allege that Lounge Management's suit was brought in violation 
of the notice of claim requirements of Wis. Stat. § 893.80. 
¶3 
The circuit court denied Lounge Management's request 
for a preliminary injunction, finding it probable that the 
Ordinance would be declared a constitutional exercise of the 
                                                                  
 
B.  This ordinance is not to be interpreted to 
prevent activities in rooms privately rented in a 
hotel, motel, resort, or camper if at a campground, if 
the person(s) involved rented such private facility or 
owns it and has not invited or allowed members of the 
public, who are not immediate family members, to be at 
such location. 
 
VIOLATION.  Each violation of this ordinance 
shall result in a forfeiture . . . . [V]iolation 
constitutes sufficient grounds for board consideration 
of license suspension, revocation, or nonrenewal where 
such violation occurred in conjunction with or related 
to the activity licensed for. 
 
4 Lounge Management also claimed that the Ordinance was void 
for vagueness.  The circuit court denied the claim and Lounge 
Management does not appeal that portion of the circuit court's 
ruling.  
No.  96-1853 
 
4
Town's power to regulate nude dancing as part of the liquor 
licensing process.  In doing so, the circuit court relied upon 
Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 195 Wis. 2d 554, 536 N.W.2d 192 
(Ct. 
App. 
1995)(holding 
municipal 
ordinance 
banning 
nude 
performances valid because state's delegation of power to 
regulate sale of alcohol under Twenty-first Amendment included 
the lesser power to ban sale of liquor in establishments with 
nude dancing) and City of Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92 
(1986)(same).  Also anticipating an overbreadth challenge, the 
circuit court followed State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 515 
N.W.2d 847 (1994), and narrowly construed the disputed Ordinance 
to apply only to establishments with liquor licenses.  The Town 
then filed a motion to dismiss.5 
¶4 
The circuit court denied the Town's motion to dismiss, 
ruling that while the notice of claim provisions present in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80 applied to Lounge Management's suit, "[f]ailure 
to comply with the notice requirements of Wis. Stat. § 893.80 is 
a defense related to personal jurisdiction and is deemed waived 
by the defendant's failure to raise it in its original answer." 
 The circuit court also entered a declaratory judgment on the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
Ordinance 
and 
reaffirmed 
its 
preliminary holding that the Ordinance, as construed, was 
constitutional.  
                     
5 The Town's motion to dismiss was supported with material 
beyond the four corners of the complaint.  Accordingly, while we 
use the terms in the record, the motion is more properly 
classified as one for summary judgment.  
No.  96-1853 
 
5
¶5 
Lounge 
Management 
appealed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
decision.  Faced with what it viewed as conflicting precedent 
concerning 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
anti-public 
nudity 
ordinances, Fond du Lac County v. Mentzel, 195 Wis. 2d 313, 536 
N.W.2d 160 (Ct. App. 1995)(finding county ordinance prohibiting 
nudity of entertainers during performances constitutional as 
applied, but facially unconstitutional due to overbreadth) and 
Schultz, the court of appeals certified the case to this court.  
¶6 
Having accepted certification on all issues before the 
court of appeals, we must first consider the Town's claim that 
this suit should be dismissed due to Lounge Management's failure 
to file a notice of claim against the Town pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80.6  We note that the plaintiff challenges the 
Ordinance both under the federal constitution pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. 
§ 1983 
and 
the 
state 
constitution. 
 
Federal 
constitutional challenges brought under § 1983 cannot be barred 
                     
6 Wis. Stat. 893.80 states:  
(1) . . . [N]o action may be brought or 
maintained against any . . . governmental subdivision 
. . . or agency thereof . . . unless: 
 
(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the 
event giving rise to the claim, written notice of the 
circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent 
or attorney is served on the . . . governmental 
subdivision . . . .  Failure to give the requisite 
notice shall not bar action on the claim if the . . . 
subdivision or agency had actual notice of the claim 
and the claimant shows to the satisfaction of the 
court that the delay or failure to give the requisite 
notice has not been prejudicial to the defendant . . . 
subdivision or agency . . . . 
 
No.  96-1853 
 
6
by Wisconsin's notice of claim requirement.  See Felder v. 
Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988)(holding application of state notice 
of claim provision preempted by federal civil rights claim).  
Accordingly, 
we 
proceed 
to 
consider 
Lounge 
Management's 
constitutional challenge to the Ordinance under the First 
Amendment.7   
¶7 
The substantive questions presented then are whether 
the 
Ordinance 
is 
unconstitutional 
on 
its 
face, 
due 
to 
overbreadth, or unconstitutional as specifically applied to 
Lounge Management.  Both inquiries implicate the First Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution. 
 
Such 
constitutional 
challenges are questions of law which we review de novo.  See 
Association of State Prosecutors v. Milwaukee County, 199 Wis. 
2d 549, 557, 544 N.W.2d 888 (1996). 
¶8 
Statutes and ordinances normally are the beneficiaries 
of a presumption of constitutionality which the attacker must 
refute.  See State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 41, 315 N.W.2d 703 
(1982).  However, where an ordinance regulates the exercise of 
First Amendment rights, the burden shifts to the government to 
defend the constitutionality of that regulation beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Heffron v. International Society for 
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 658 (1981);  Thiel, 183 
                     
7 Because 
we 
find 
the 
Ordinance 
unconstitutional 
as 
violative 
of 
the 
First 
Amendment 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, we need not address Lounge Management's failure to 
file a notice of claim on the state constitutional challenge.  
No.  96-1853 
 
7
Wis. 2d at 523; City of Madison v. Baumann, 162 Wis. 2d 660, 
669, 470 N.W.2d 296 (1991). 
¶9 
Nude dancing has been acknowledged to include an 
expressive element, and accordingly is entitled to at least some 
degree of constitutional protection.  See Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991); Id. at 581 (Souter, J., 
concurring); Id. at 587 (White, J., dissenting).  However, it is 
also a recognized constitutional principle that "when 'speech' 
and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of 
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in 
regulating 
the 
nonspeech 
element 
can 
justify 
incidental 
limitations on First Amendment freedoms."  United States v. 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).   
¶10 In such instances, the government may infringe upon 
First Amendment freedoms to regulate conduct so long as: (1) the 
targeted conduct falls within the domain of state regulatory 
power; 
(2) 
the 
statutory 
scheme 
advances 
important 
or 
substantial government interests; (3) the state's regulatory 
efforts are unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and 
(4) the regulations are narrowly tailored.  See O'Brien, 391 
U.S. at 376-77.  The United States Supreme Court has splintered, 
however, over the permissible manner in which the government may 
reasonably regulate the protected expression inherent in nude 
dancing.   
¶11 In Barnes, a plurality of the court applied the 
O'Brien test, but disagreed among themselves over the requisite 
important or substantial interest that the state needed to show 
No.  96-1853 
 
8
under O'Brien when infringing on First Amendment expression.  
Three Justices, lead by Chief Justice Rehnquist, believed that 
the state could regulate expressive conduct to promote "public 
morality" based on its police powers.  See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 
568.  Justice Souter, in concurrence, disagreed, but concluded 
that the state could regulate conduct implicating expression to 
combat the "secondary effects" that shadow establishments where 
public nudity occurs, such as prostitution, sexual assault, and 
other criminal activity.  See id. at 582-83 (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
¶12 Lounge Management's primary argument is that the 
Ordinance is so overbroad that it applies to conduct which the 
state is not entitled to regulate.  In order to establish the 
framework of our overbreadth analysis of the Ordinance, we first 
must distill the holding of the Court in Barnes.  If Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's view is the holding, we must evaluate the 
reach of the Ordinance in promoting public morality.  If Justice 
Souter's concurrence is the holding, we must question whether 
the Ordinance is narrowly tailored to address only the secondary 
effects 
associated 
with 
public 
nudity 
in 
licensed 
establishments.   
¶13 Recognizing 
the 
potential 
precedential 
problems 
inherent in fractured opinions, the United States Supreme Court 
held in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), that 
when the Court issues a splintered plurality decision, courts 
interpreting that decision should regard the opinion of the 
Justice concurring on the "narrowest grounds" as the Court's 
No.  96-1853 
 
9
ultimate holding.  Applying this rule to the Barnes case, we 
agree with the court of appeals in Mentzel that Justice Souter's 
concurring opinion constitutes the holding of the United States 
Supreme Court in Barnes.  See Mentzel, 195 Wis. 2d at 326; see 
also Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129, 134 
(6th Cir. 1994).  Accordingly, we move to an overbreadth 
examination of the Town of Trenton Ordinance.  
¶14 The First Amendment is accorded special protection in 
our federal constitutional framework.  See, e.g., Dombrowski v. 
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965), quoted in Osborne v. Ohio, 
495 U.S. 103, 137 n.12 (1990).  Where an otherwise appropriate 
content-neutral regulation is promulgated in an overly expansive 
fashion, 
it 
may 
have 
the 
collateral 
effect 
of 
chilling 
constitutionally protected expression or allowing selective 
enforcement that may discriminate against certain classes of 
people. 
 
Those 
unintended 
results 
are 
constitutionally 
intolerable.  See id.; Richard R. Fallon, Making Sense of 
Overbreadth, 100 Yale L. J. 853, 867 (1991). 
¶15 In such cases, the overbreadth doctrine serves to 
protect third parties' First Amendment rights.  See Bachowski v. 
Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 411, 407 N.W.2d 533 (1987).  The 
overbreadth 
doctrine 
operates 
to 
render 
facially 
unconstitutional statutes or ordinances that "threaten[] others 
not before the court—those who desire to engage in legally 
protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather 
than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared . . 
. invalid." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 
No.  96-1853 
 
10 
(1985); see also City of Milwaukee v. Wroten, 160 Wis. 2d 207, 
226, 466 N.W.2d 861 (1991).   
¶16 Under this doctrine, a party whose own speech or 
conduct may be legitimately regulated by a statute or ordinance, 
or whose speech is not subject to constitutional protections, 
may assert a facial challenge to an ordinance that on its face 
encompasses protected speech or conduct of third parties. See 
Wroten, 160 Wis. 2d at 227; see also City of Milwaukee v. 
Nelson, 149 Wis. 2d 434, 451-52, 439 N.W.2d 562 (1989).  The 
overbreadth doctrine "establishes an exception to the general 
rule that 'a person to whom a statute may be constitutionally 
applied cannot challenge the statute on the ground that it may 
be unconstitutionally applied to others.'"  Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 
at 520 (quoting Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 
(1989)). 
¶17 In assessing this challenge, the court may consider 
hypothetical situations in which the statute or ordinance might 
reach too far.  See Brandmiller v. Arreola, 199 Wis. 2d 528, 
547, 544 N.W.2d 894 (1996).  However, the court must be 
cognizant of the fact that application of the overbreadth 
doctrine is "strong medicine," to be used only where the alleged 
overbreadth of the statute or ordinance is not only real, but 
substantial, and "then 'only as a last resort.'"  See New York 
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769-70 (1982)(quoting Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 615 (1973)); see also Thiel, 183 
Wis. 2d at 520; City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 145 Wis. 2d 24, 40, 
426 N.W.2d 329 (1988). 
No.  96-1853 
 
11 
¶18 Accordingly, courts must apply a limiting construction 
to a statute, if available, that will eliminate the statute's 
overreach, 
while 
still 
"maintain[ing] 
the 
legislation's 
constitutional integrity."  Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d at 521; see 
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.  Alternatively, a court may sever 
that portion of the statute which leads to overbreadth, leaving 
the statute as modified in full effect.  See Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 
at 520. 
¶19 Because we determine that Justice Souter's concurrence 
in Barnes is the holding of the Court, we conduct our 
overbreadth analysis by inquiring whether the Ordinance is 
drafted in a manner that addresses the secondary effects of 
adult entertainment, such as prostitution, sexual assault, and 
other 
criminal 
activity, 
without 
also 
suffocating 
other 
protected expression in a real and substantial manner.  We first 
examine the language of the Ordinance on its face.  If we 
determine that it is overbroad, we then consider possible 
constructions of the Ordinance that may save it.  After 
conducting this inquiry, we find that the anti-public nudity 
Ordinance 
encompasses 
expressive 
activities 
that 
do 
not 
No.  96-1853 
 
12 
implicate the "secondary effects" that the Town may legitimately 
seek to regulate.8 
¶20 As the language of the Ordinance indicates, and as 
defense counsel was forced to concede at oral argument, several 
hypothetical situations exist in which the Ordinance would 
impinge on protected expression involving public nudity.  Such 
examples include public exhibition of artwork or artifacts 
depicting nudity, public display of a television program 
including brief nudity, and any form of expressive live nudity 
that occurs in a "public licensed establishment."  Such 
establishments 
include 
private 
hotel 
rooms, 
campgrounds, 
taverns, theaters, or any other place of business, recreation, 
accommodation, or amusement. 
¶21 Such 
overbreadth 
is 
largely 
the 
result 
of 
the 
generalized terminology used by the Town when drafting the 
Ordinance and its specific command that portions of the 
Ordinance be "interpreted broadly."  The Ordinance does not 
prohibit nude dancing—it prohibits all public nudity.  The 
Ordinance does not limit its application to establishments 
                     
8 We find the Town's reliance upon the court of appeals 
decision in Schultz misplaced.  Schultz determined that Barnes 
was "not dispositive" because it "was not a Twenty-first 
Amendment case." Schultz v. Village of Cumberland, 195 Wis. 2d 
554, 566, 536 N.W.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1995).  While this 
distinction may have deserved some weight in the past, see City 
of Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92 (1986), the United States 
Supreme Court has recently held that "the Twenty-first Amendment 
does not qualify the constitutional prohibition against laws 
abridging 
the 
freedom 
of 
speech 
embodied 
in 
the 
First 
Amendment."  44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 
516 (1996).  
No.  96-1853 
 
13 
licensed to sell alcohol—it applies to all publicly licensed 
establishments.9  The Ordinance does not limit itself to live 
nudity—it apparently applies to all forms of nude depiction.10  
Accordingly, 
the 
Ordinance 
regulates 
expressive 
conduct 
protected 
by 
the 
First 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution that has no connection to the potential harmful 
secondary effects arising from nude dancing in liquor licensed 
establishments and it does so in a real and substantial manner. 
¶22 Despite these infirmities, we are cognizant of our 
obligation to apply a limiting construction to the Ordinance if 
such a construction is available.  The Town argues that the 
circuit court's narrow construction of the Ordinance to apply 
only to nude dancing in establishments licensed to sell liquor 
is sufficient to save the Ordinance from an overbreadth 
challenge.  Alternatively, following the dissent in Wroten, the 
                     
9 "Public licensed establishment" is an otherwise undefined 
term that when interpreted in the context of campgrounds, 
hotels, and restaurants raises a host of possible licensing 
requirements.    
10 The dissent asserts that we construe the Ordinance "to 
encompass both public and private nudity and to proscribe both 
animate nudity and the displaying or exhibiting of inanimate 
nudes, either in pictures or sculptures."  Dissent at 4.  The 
dissent then asserts that "[t]he majority's broad construction 
of Ordinance 10 contravenes the common sense understanding of 
'public nudity.'"  Id.  As counsel for the Town conceded at oral 
argument, 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
the 
ordinance 
could 
be 
interpreted in just such a manner to apply to inanimate nudity. 
 Moreover, the dissent's statement confuses the order of 
overbreadth analysis.  We first examine the Ordinance as it is 
written and only then attempt to construe the Ordinance to save 
it.  
No.  96-1853 
 
14 
dissent would have this court rewrite the Ordinance by striking 
a significant portion of it and construing it "to prohibit only 
animate public nudity at establishments licensed by the Town of 
Trenton to sell alcohol."  Dissent at 5.   
¶23 We disagree that either construction is sufficient to 
save the Ordinance.  Due to the existing structure and wording 
of the Ordinance, we are unable to cure the overbreadth by 
either 
striking 
enough 
of 
the 
Ordinance 
or 
providing 
a 
sufficiently narrow construction that is not flatly inconsistent 
with the expressed intent as set forth in its existing terms.  
We cannot apply a limiting construction which contravenes the 
expressed intent of the Ordinance.  See Wroten, 160 Wis. 2d at 
227. 
¶24 In its attempt to save the Ordinance, the dissent 
engages in legal and semantic convolutions.  The futility of the 
dissent's attempts to save the Ordinance is particularly 
emphasized when it negates the plain language of the Ordinance 
and attempts to explain that the word "showing" does not mean 
"displaying" or "exhibiting."  Dissent at 5-6.  Such an 
assertion defies common definition, common usage, and common 
sense.  Yet, such an assertion is necessary for the dissent to 
arrive at its tortured conclusion that "showing" means "only 
those live acts performed by a person . . . ."  Dissent at 6. 
 
¶25 Similarly futile is the dissent's attempts to explain 
away the Ordinance's prohibition on nudity between non-family-
member consenting adults in a privately rented hotel room.  An 
No.  96-1853 
 
15 
exception to the Ordinance's prohibition against "public nudity 
at a public licensed establishment" provides in relevant part: 
 
This ordinance is not to be interpreted to prevent 
activities in rooms privately rented in a hotel . . . 
if the person(s) involved . . . has not invited or 
allowed members of the public, who are not immediate 
family members, to be at such location. 
As long as you are an "immediate family member" this Ordinance 
does not apply to prevent activities in rooms privately rented 
in a hotel.  The dissent rewrites the clause, and adds a 
qualification that contravenes the express language of the 
Ordinance, indicating that "'public nudity' does not include the 
private conduct of consenting adults in private rooms where the 
general public is not invited to attend or to participate in 
such conduct."  Dissent at 7.   
 
¶26  The dissent also construes the Ordinance to apply 
only to establishments licensed to sell liquor.  Endorsing such 
a construction requires the dissent to strike and construe so 
much of the definition that little of the original definition of 
"public" as in "public licensed establishment," remains: 
 
Public means any place of accommodation or amusement, 
which shall be interpreted broadly to include, but not 
be limited to, places of business or recreation, 
hotels, 
motels, 
resorts, 
restaurants, 
taverns 
[licensed to serve alcohol] and any place where 
accommodations, 
amusement, 
goods 
or 
services 
are 
available 
either 
free 
or 
for 
a 
consideration.  
Campgrounds are also included. 
Even assuming that a presumption of severability applied to an 
ordinance drafted by a Town Board, see Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 
U.S. 641, 653 (1984), the plain language of the Ordinance 
No.  96-1853 
 
16 
indicates an intent by the Town Board to apply the Ordinance in 
a far broader manner than acknowledged by the construed and 
severed interpretation of the dissent.  Accordingly, severance 
is also improper.  See Brockett, 472 U.S. at 506. 
¶27 As the discussion above indicates, the proffered 
constructions of the Ordinance are inconsistent with the broadly 
drafted terms and purpose of the Ordinance.  Such construction 
raises the specter of "judicial legislation."  Wroten, 160 Wis. 
2d at 234.  We decline the invitation to engage in such 
legislation and leave the task of writing a constitutionally 
permissible Ordinance to that branch of government where such 
power properly lies—the Town Board.  See id. 
¶28 Moreover, even if the acts of construing the Ordinance 
and striking out such a substantive portion of the Ordinance 
were an acceptable use of our powers to conform the Ordinance 
with the Constitution, such a construction must still eliminate 
the 
constitutional 
infirmity 
of 
the 
original 
Ordinance.  
However, the ultimate narrowing construction offered by the 
dissent retains the same basic constitutional infirmity that 
plagues the Ordinance as drafted.   
¶29 Even 
as 
narrowly 
construed 
by 
the 
dissent 
the 
Ordinance continues to bar protected expression involving nudity 
that does not implicate the secondary effects associated with 
barroom erotic nude dancing that the Town alleges was its 
primary objective in creating the Ordinance.  Examples of 
artistic expression barred by the Ordinance range from the 
presentation of a play involving the briefest moment of a woman 
No.  96-1853 
 
17 
exposing one breast as part of the script of the production to 
the hypothetical productions of "Hair" and "Equus" cited by 
Justice Souter in Barnes, or the even more revealing production 
"L'apres midi d' un faune" discussed by Judge Posner in Miller 
v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1090 (7th Cir. 
1990)(Posner, J. concurring), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).  Thus, examples of 
infringement upon protected expression by the Ordinance range 
across the artistic gamut. 
¶30 While acknowledging that the Ordinance as construed 
would still bar this  protected artistic expression, the dissent 
continues to attack our finding of overbreadth by asserting that 
infringement of the First Amendment in this case would not be 
"real and substantial."  In the dissent's view the Ordinance is 
not a "real and substantial" constraint since a revealing 
production is only one hypothetical and since there are no 
dinner theaters or other artistic venues in which such a 
performance could occur in the rural Town of Trenton. 
¶31 In making these arguments, the dissent fails to 
acknowledge that, as noted above, the Ordinance as construed by 
the 
dissent 
and 
the 
circuit 
court 
continues 
to 
target 
constitutionally protected activity and continues to bar all 
artistic expression involving nudity in all establishments 
licensed to sell liquor.  The dissent's attempt to categorize 
and then generalize away the real-life examples highlighted by 
this and other courts is not only short-sighted, it allows a 
No.  96-1853 
 
18 
court 
to 
reject 
a 
valid 
overbreadth 
challenge 
by 
only 
considering the single type of expression affected. 
¶32 While the construction offered by the dissent may 
narrow the overbreadth of the Ordinance, we believe the 
Ordinance 
as 
construed, 
barring 
all 
artistic 
expression 
involving nudity at licensed establishments, continues to target 
and infringe upon activities entitled to First Amendment 
protections in a "real and substantial" manner.  This is not a 
case where the Ordinance's "legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably 
impermissible 
application," 
but 
rather 
a 
case 
where 
its 
impermissible application dwarfs the Ordinance's legitimate 
reach.  Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773.  This conclusion is consistent 
with our decisions in City of Milwaukee v. K.F., City of 
Milwaukee v. Nelson, and Brandmiller v. Arreola. 
¶33 Moreover, the dissent implicitly argues that because 
the Town of Trenton is a rural community, the effects of the 
Ordinance on nude artistic expression cannot seriously be taken 
as an infringement of First Amendment speech.  Such a contention 
misses two important points.  First, and most importantly, the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution applies 
universally to all communities within our borders.  A violation 
of the First Amendment is as troubling in a small rural 
community as it is in a metropolitan area.  Second, the primary 
purpose of the overbreadth doctrine is to prevent the "chilling" 
of First Amendment speech.  As such, the doctrine protects the 
rights of third parties who, in the face of restrictive 
legislation, might refrain from exercising their First Amendment 
No.  96-1853 
 
19 
rights for fear of criminal prosecution.  See Village of 
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 
634 (1980); Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612.  Thus, the business 
demographics of the Town of Trenton, as they currently exist, 
are irrelevant for purposes of our inquiry. 
¶34 The Constitution of the United States guarantees 
certain freedoms and this court is bound to ensure the proper 
application of those freedoms.  While Justices may differ on the 
application of the law, the court's analysis of the Ordinance at 
issue is not and cannot be dependent upon a personal view of the 
propriety 
or 
morality 
of 
the 
activities 
offered 
at 
the 
plaintiff's establishment. 
¶35 To provide a construction sufficiently remedial to 
cure the Ordinance's overbreadth, this court would essentially 
be required to rewrite the Ordinance in its entirety.  We 
decline to legislate in this manner and leave it to the Town 
Board to enact an Ordinance that both means what it says and 
comports with federal constitutional principles.  The Town has 
failed to meet its burden in defending beyond a reasonable doubt 
the constitutionality of the Ordinance.  Accordingly, we 
determine that the Ordinance is overbroad, in violation of the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and we 
reverse the judgment of the circuit court.11 
                     
11  Having determined that the Ordinance is facially 
overbroad, we need not address the question of whether the 
Ordinance is constitutional as applied.   
No.  96-1853 
 
20 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
reversed. 
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
1 
 
 ¶36 DONALD 
W. 
STEINMETZ, 
J. 
(Dissenting).  The 
majority strikes down as facially unconstitutional the Town of 
Trenton's Ordinance 10, which proscribes "public nudity at a 
public licensed establishment."  In so doing, the majority 
misapplies 
well-established 
principles 
of 
constitutional 
adjudication.  Because I disagree with the majority's analysis 
and conclusion, I dissent. 
¶37 As the majority has shown, Ordinance 10 is, at first 
glance, overbroad.  Unfortunately, this is where the  majority’s 
analysis effectively ends, and where its error begins.  The 
majority concludes that Ordinance 10 is unconstitutionally 
overbroad because it "encompasses expressive activities that do 
not implicate the 'secondary effects' that the town may 
legitimately seek to regulate."  Majority op. at 11-12.  
Arriving at this legal conclusion, the majority makes two 
fundamental errors.  First, the majority refuses to accept an 
available, limiting construction of Ordinance 10 which would 
cure any substantial overbreadth.  See State v. Thiel, 183 
Wis. 2d 505, 522, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994); see also Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).  Second, despite controlling 
case law to the contrary, the majority concludes that the 
Ordinance’s overbreadth is both real and substantial after 
conceiving of a single impermissible application of that 
ordinance.  See City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 145 Wis. 2d 24, 40-
41, 426 N.W.2d 329 (1988); see also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-
16; City of Milwaukee v. Wroten, 160 Wis. 2d 207, 226-27, 466 
N.W.2d 861 (1991). 
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
2 
¶38 The 
First 
Amendment 
doctrine 
of 
substantial 
overbreadth 
is 
a 
judicially-created, 
largely 
prophylactic 
doctrine designed to prevent the chilling of constitutionally 
protected expression. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense 
of Overbreadth, 100 Yale L. J. 853, 855 (1991).  As the majority 
notes, the overbreadth doctrine is a limited exception to the 
traditional rule of third-party standing that "a person to whom 
a statute may be constitutionally applied will not be heard to 
challenge the statute on the ground that it may conceivably be 
applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not 
before the court."  Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610-11; see also 
Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, 482 
U.S. 569, 574 (1987); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 
U.S. 491, 503-04 (1985); Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d at 520.  This 
traditional rule of third-party standing reflects the conviction 
that "under our constitutional system courts are not roving 
commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the 
Nation's laws."  Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610-11 (citing Younger 
v. Harris 401 U.S. 37, 52 (1971)).  Courts therefore recognize 
exceptions to this rule only when there exists "weighty 
countervailing policies." Id. at 611 (quoting United States v. 
Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1960)). 
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
3 
¶39 Because of the wide-ranging effects of the overbreadth 
doctrine,12 
a 
reviewing court 
must 
view the 
doctrine as 
"manifestly strong medicine" that should be employed only 
"sparingly, and only as a last resort."  Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 
613; see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982); Thiel, 
183 Wis. 2d at 521; City of Milwaukee v. Nelson, 149 Wis. 2d 
434, 452, 439 N.W.2d 562 (1989).  Courts, in consequence, have 
established two specific limitations to applying the overbreadth 
doctrine.  First, a facial challenge to an ordinance will not 
succeed when a limiting construction is available to maintain 
the legislation's constitutional integrity.  See Thiel, 183 
Wis. 2d at 521 (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613); see also 
Fallon, 100 Yale L. J. at 863.  Second, where conduct and not 
merely speech is involved, courts including this one have 
uniformly stated that "the overbreadth of a statute or ordinance 
must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in 
relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep."  Broadrick, 
413 U.S. at 615 (emphasis added); see also Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d at 
521; Wroten, 160 Wis. 2d at 226; K.F., 145 Wis. 2d at 40-41; 
                     
12  As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the 
consequence of our departing from traditional rules of standing 
in the First Amendment area is that any enforcement of a 
challenged statute may be totally forbidden, "not because [the 
litigants'] own rights of free expression are violated, but 
because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the 
statute's very existence may cause others not before the court 
to 
refrain 
from 
constitutionally 
protected 
speech 
or 
expression." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). 
   
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
4 
Fallon, 100 Yale L. J. at 863.  The majority here briefly lists, 
but essentially jettisons, these well-established limitations on 
the overbreadth doctrine. 
¶40 First, not only does the majority refuse to provide a 
narrowing construction of the Ordinance, it accepts the broadest 
possible construction of that ordinance.  This court has a duty 
to interpret an ordinance, as it would a statute, by applying a 
limiting construction to that ordinance, if one is available, to 
preserve its constitutionality.  See K.F., 145 Wis. 2d at 47.  
"A statute challenged as unconstitutionally overbroad can be 
'cured' by means of judicial interpretation, which provides for 
a narrowing and validating construction of the law."  Thiel, 183 
Wis. 2d at 522.  While the majority states that it is 
"cognizant" of its obligations, it concludes that no narrowing 
construction is available because to provide one it "would 
essentially be required to rewrite the Ordinance in its 
entirety."  Majority op. at 19. 
¶41 Contrary to the majority's suggestion, the language of 
Ordinance 
10 
can 
easily 
be 
construed 
to 
preserve 
its 
constitutionality, without having to rewrite the ordinance in 
its entirety.  The effective language of Ordinance 10 provides 
that "[t]here shall be no public nudity at a public licensed 
establishment."  The majority construes this language to 
encompass both public and private nudity and to proscribe both 
animate nudity and the displaying or exhibiting of inanimate 
nudes, either in pictures or sculptures.  The majority's broad 
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
5 
construction of Ordinance 10 contravenes the common sense 
understanding of "public nudity."   
¶42 A closer "examination of the verbiage" of Ordinance 10 
shows that such a broad construction is neither necessary nor 
warranted.  Wroten, 160 Wis. 2d at 227.  Based on "the common 
sense meaning and purpose of the words employed" in the 
Ordinance, Ann M.M. v. Rob S., 176 Wis. 2d 673, 679, 500 N.W.2d 
649 (1993),13 the court could reasonably construe the Ordinance 
to prohibit only animate public nudity at establishments 
licensed by the Town of Trenton to sell alcohol.  
¶43 First, Ordinance 10 can be read to prohibit only 
animate nudity.  The Ordinance defines the word "nudity" as "the 
showing or exposing" of certain parts or areas of the human 
anatomy "with less than a full opaque covering."  Not expressly 
included in this definition are the acts of displaying, 
exhibiting, televising, sculpting, or drawing inanimate nudes.  
Had the Town of Trenton wished to proscribe such conduct it 
could have added the appropriate language to the definition of 
"nudity."  It did not do so, and neither should we. 
¶44 Although the words "showing" and "exposing" may be 
general and somewhat imprecise, they need not be construed to 
include the displaying or exhibiting of pictures or sculptures. 
                     
13 The court's task in this case is no different than in 
construing any statute; the court must apply the ordinary and 
approved definitions of the language used by the Town "to find 
the common sense meaning and purpose of the words employed" in 
Ordinance 10.  Ann M.M. v. Rob S., 176 Wis. 2d 673, 679, 500 
N.W.2d 649 (1993).  
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
6 
 As used in the context of Ordinance 10, the word "show" is 
commonly defined as "to reveal (oneself) as in one's behavior or 
condition," The American Heritage Dictionary 1671 (3d ed. 1992), 
and the word "expose" as "to make visible" or "to make known."  
Id. at 646.14  Applying the ordinary and accepted definitions of 
the words "show" and "expose," the court could reasonably 
construe the word "nudity," as defined by the Ordinance, as 
including only those live acts performed by a person to reveal 
or make visible certain parts of his or her anatomy.  Under this 
definition, "nudity" does 
not include 
inanimate 
displays, 
exhibits, or programs including nude persons. 
¶45 Second, Ordinance 10 does not prohibit nudity in all 
forms; it prohibits only "public nudity."  The majority 
construes the Ordinance as prohibiting both public and private 
nudity, including the situation where consenting adults are nude 
in 
a 
private 
hotel 
room. 
 
This 
broad 
construction 
is 
inconsistent with a reasonable reading of the express language 
in Ordinance 10.   
                     
14 In the absence of statutory definitions, this court 
construes all words "according to their common and approved 
usage[,]" which may be established by dictionary definitions.  
See Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 61, 531 N.W.2d 45 
(1995)(quoting State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d 371, 377-78, 340 
N.W.2d 511 (1983)).   
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
7 
¶46 Although the word "public," as used in the context of 
"public nudity", is not defined by the Ordinance,15 the word is 
commonly understood to mean "to reveal to the public a 
previously 
unknown 
or 
secret 
piece 
of 
information" 
or 
"participated in or attended by the people or community."  Id. 
at 1464 (emphasis added).  Applying either definition of 
"public" to the other defined language of the Ordinance, the 
phrase "public nudity" can reasonably be construed to include 
only a person's act or acts which reveal to the members of the 
general public his or her nude body, or specified parts or areas 
thereof.  Under this available construction, "public nudity" 
does not include the private conduct of consenting adults in 
private rooms where the general public is not invited or allowed 
to attend or participate in such conduct. 
¶47 This construction of "public nudity" is supported by 
the language found in both Exceptions A and B of the Ordinance. 
 Under the direction of Exception A, a court is precluded from 
construing Ordinance 10 to restrict the proper use of a public 
bathroom 
unless 
that 
room 
is 
used 
for 
"any 
sexual 
or 
exhibitionist purpose to or in front of or adjacent to other 
                     
15 The Ordinance does define the word "public" in the 
context of a "public licensed establishment."  The definition 
offered, however, could not reasonably apply to the phrase 
"public nudity."  Since it is a basic rule of statutory 
construction that courts give effect to every word of a statute 
so that no portion of the statute is rendered superfluous, see 
Lake City v. City of Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 155, 162, 558 N.W.2d 
100 (1997), this court must give effect to the word "public" as 
used in the context of "public nudity."   
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
8 
persons." 
 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
Similarly, 
Exception 
B 
specifically directs that the Ordinance is not to be interpreted 
to prevent activities in a privately owned or rented room if the 
person owning or renting that room "has not invited or allowed 
members of the public, who are not immediate family members, to 
be at such location."  Although not perfectly drafted,16 the 
language of Exceptions A and B of the Ordinance evince the 
Town's intent not to prohibit private conduct by consenting 
adults in private rooms unless members of the public are invited 
or allowed to attend or participate in such conduct. 
¶48 Third, Ordinance 10 does not reach all animate public 
nudity; it prohibits such nudity only at "public licensed 
establishments."  The majority is correct in stating that the 
Ordinance does not specifically limit such establishments to 
places of accommodation or amusement licensed to sell alcohol.  
To be consistent with the language and purpose of Ordinance 10, 
however, the court should construe Ordinance 10 to reach only 
establishments licensed to sell alcohol. 
                     
16  As counsel for the Respondent conceded at oral argument 
before this court, the language "who are not immediate family 
members" in Exception B adds some ambiguity to the scope of the 
Ordinance.  Read in the specific context of Exception B, 
however, the purpose of this language is clear.  The language 
qualifies only the field of persons considered "members of the 
public."  Simply because immediate family members are not 
considered members of the public under the Ordinance, the court 
should not construe this language to also mean that all persons 
who are not immediate family members are necessarily members of 
the public.  Under the language of Exception B, a person's 
fiancee, for example, need not be considered a "member of the 
public" simply because he or she is not an immediate family 
member. 
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
9 
¶49 Ordinance 
10 
applies 
only 
to 
a 
"licensed 
establishment."  The only license to which the Ordinance 
specifically refers is the license to sell alcohol, which the 
Town is authorized to issue and regulate under Wis. Stat. 
§ 125.10.   The record does not describe any other type of 
establishment licensed by the Town of Trenton.  In addition, the 
Town concedes that the purpose of enacting Ordinance 10 was not 
to protect its community from the secondary effects usually 
associated with adult entertainment establishments; the purpose 
was to protect against such secondary effects only as they are 
enhanced by the sale and consumption of alcohol.  That this is 
the limited purpose of Ordinance 10 is supported by the facts in 
this case.  During this litigation, the Town has continued to 
allow the Petitioner to offer at its public establishment nude 
and semi-nude dancing, as long as the Petitioner does not also 
serve or sell alcoholic beverages at that establishment.   In 
light of the language, purpose, and the Town's enforcement of 
Ordinance 10, the court could reasonably construe the Ordinance 
to reach only establishments licensed to sell alcohol. 
¶50 In short, the court can and should construe Ordinance 
10 as prohibiting only animate public nudity at establishments 
licensed by the Town to sell alcohol.  Adopting this narrow 
construction would eliminate most of the concerns raised in the 
hypothetical situations posed by the majority and by individual 
justices during oral arguments.  Under this construction, 
Ordinance 10 would not prohibit two non-related adults from 
being nude in the privacy of an art studio, a hotel room, or any 
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
10
other private room; nor would it prevent "Joe's Tap" from 
hanging a picture of a playmate on its wall; nor would it 
prohibit 
the 
"public 
exhibition 
of 
artwork 
or 
artifacts 
depicting nudity" or the "public display of a television program 
including brief nudity."  Majority op. at 12. 
¶51 I recognize that the construction offered in this 
dissent is not the only possible construction of the language in 
Ordinance 10.  It is, however, an available common sense reading 
of that language.  It is not the duty of this court to point out 
technical flaws in an ordinance or to strike an ordinance due to 
its imprecise language.  Rather, this court has a duty to 
provide a narrowing construction of an ordinance if one is 
available. See Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d at 521.  In this case one is 
available. 
¶52 To bolster its broad reading of Ordinance 10, and to 
attack a more narrow reading, the majority, rather than 
analyzing the specific language of Ordinance 10, lobs empty 
assertions of "futility," "semantic convolutions," and "tortured 
conclusions."  Majority op. at 14.  In so doing the majority 
misconstrues the language of the Ordinance and mischaracterizes 
the arguments in this dissent.  To clarify this dissent, it is 
necessary to address three such assertions cast by the majority. 
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
11
¶53 The majority asserts that the Ordinance is overbroad 
largely because of its generalized terminology17 and "its 
specific command that portions of the Ordinance be 'interpreted 
broadly.'"  Majority op. at 12.  The majority's use of the 
Ordinance's "specific command" is inaccurate and misleading.  
The clear import of the majority's reference to this specific 
command is to establish the Town's legislative intent that the 
Ordinance be interpreted broadly.18  The Ordinance, however, does 
not direct courts to interpret all its language and provisions 
broadly.  The Ordinance directs courts to interpret broadly only 
those establishments considered "place[s] of accommodation or 
                     
17 The majority avoids any mention or analysis of the 
specific terms in the Ordinance that it considers so general as 
to cause the Ordinance to be overbroad.  By refusing to focus on 
the specific language of the Ordinance, the majority evades the 
analysis that would uncover the flaw in its conclusion.  The 
analysis the majority goes out of its way to avoid is really 
quite simple.  Ordinance 10 prohibits "public nudity at a public 
licensed establishment."  In finding the language of Ordinance 
10 overbroad, the majority construes "nudity" to include the 
display and exhibit of artwork and artifacts; it construes 
"public nudity" to include private nudity; and it construes 
"licensed establishments" to include establishments other than 
those licensed to sell alcohol.  Although I agree that the 
Ordinance could be construed this way, I do not accept the 
majority's position that a more narrow construction is somehow 
"tortured." 
18 See majority op. at 14 (stating "[w]e cannot apply a 
limiting construction of which contravenes the expressed intent 
of the Ordinance."); Id. at 15-16 (stating "the plain language 
of the Ordinance indicates an intent by the Town Board to apply 
the Ordinance in a far broader manner than acknowledged by the 
construed and severed interpretation of the dissent."); Id. at 
16 (stating "the proffered constructions of the Ordinance are 
inconsistent with the broadly drafted terms and the purpose of 
the Ordinance."). 
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
12
amusement."  The Ordinance does not direct courts to interpret 
broadly 
the 
definition 
of 
"public 
nudity" 
or 
"licensed 
establishment."  Despite the majority's assertion, the Ordinance 
does not contain a legislative "command" that its language be 
construed to prohibit nudity in all forms and in all public 
establishments. 
¶54 The majority next states that this dissent "negates 
the plain language of the Ordinance and attempts to explain that 
the word 'showing' does not mean 'displaying' or 'exhibiting.'" 
 Majority op. at 14.  Again, the majority's statement is 
inaccurate and misleading.  This dissent nowhere states or 
implies that the word "showing" cannot be construed broadly to 
include "displaying" or "exhibiting."  On the contrary, it 
recognizes that a number of possible constructions of Ordinance 
10 exist.  One available dictionary definition of "showing," 
however, is provided which limits the definition of "nudity" to 
include only animate nudity.  The apparent "futility" of this 
argument is at least matched by the majority avoidance of the 
issue.  The majority fails to show, as it must to support its 
reading of Ordinance 10, that the word "showing" can only be 
construed to include "displaying" and "exhibiting." 
¶55 The 
majority 
then 
asserts 
that 
to 
limit 
the 
Ordinance's scope to establishments licensed to sell alcohol, 
the dissent must "strike and construe so much of the definition 
that little of the original definition of 'public' as used in 
'public licensed establishment,' remains."  Majority op. at 15. 
 The majority then proceeds through an exercise of striking and 
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
13
inserting language into the Ordinance's definition of the term 
"public."  The majority's creation and immediate destruction of 
this straw man argument is inaccurate and misleading.  Despite 
the majority's assertion, this dissent does not suggest that 
Ordinance 
10 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
all 
"public 
licensed 
establishments."  Rather, it argues only that the term "licensed 
establishments" 
can 
be 
construed 
to 
include 
all 
"public 
establishments," as defined by the Ordinance, that are licensed 
to sell alcohol.  This dissent does not attempt to limit 
"public" 
establishments 
to 
"hotels, 
motels, 
resorts, 
restaurants, taverns, [licensed to serve alcohol]."  Majority 
op. at 15. 
¶56 Given 
this 
court’s 
duty 
to 
find 
an 
ordinance 
constitutional if at all possible, it is unfortunate that the 
majority rests on an analysis as superficial as its reading of 
the Ordinance.  Before admonishing the Town of Trenton to enact 
an ordinance that "means what it says," the majority should 
first read what it said. 
¶57 Second, the majority, after 
conceiving 
a 
single 
impermissible application of the Ordinance, concludes that the 
overbreadth of the Ordinance is both real and substantial.  This 
court has traditionally held that only a statute that is 
substantially overbroad may be invalidated on its face.  See 
Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d at 521; Wroten, 160 Wis. 2d at 226; Nelson, 
149 Wis. 2d at 451; K.F., 145 Wis. 2d at 40-41; State v. 
Princess Cinema of Milwaukee, 96 Wis. 2d 646, 656, 292 N.W.2d 
807 (1980).  Although this court has not defined the term 
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
14
"substantially overbroad," it has instructed that in a facial 
challenge to a law, the court’s first task is "to determine 
whether 
the 
enactment 
reaches 
a 
substantial 
amount 
of 
constitutionally protected conduct." K.F., 145 Wis. 2d at 41 
(quoting Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987))(emphasis added). 
 Similarly, the court has explained that although a court may 
consider hypothetical applications of a challenged ordinance, 
the court "will not deem a[n] . . . ordinance invalid because in 
some conceivable, but limited, circumstances the regulation 
might be improperly applied."  Id. at 40; see also Nelson, 149 
Wis. 2d at 452; Brandmiller v. Arreola, 199 Wis. 2d 528, 546-47, 
544 N.W.2d 894 (1996). 
¶58 This requirement of substantial overbreadth is derived 
directly from the purpose and nature of the doctrine.  See 
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 772.  "[W]ithout a substantial overbreadth 
limitation, review for overbreadth would be draconian indeed.  
It is difficult to think of a law that is utterly devoid of 
potential 
for 
unconstitutionality 
in 
some 
conceivable 
application."  Id. at 772 n.27 (quoting Note, The First 
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844, 859 and 
n.61 (1970)).   
¶59 In Ferber, the United States Supreme Court upheld one 
section of New York’s criminal statutes prohibiting persons from 
"knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the 
age 
of 
16 
by 
distributing 
material 
which 
depicts 
such 
performances."  Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749.  The Court upheld the 
regulation even though some protected expression, ranging from 
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
15
medical textbooks to pictorials in The National Geographic, 
"would fall prey to the statute."  Id. at 773.  The Court 
concluded that the impermissible applications of the statute 
would not amount to "more than a tiny fraction of the materials 
within the statute’s reach."  Id.  Under these circumstances, 
the Court held that the regulation was "not substantially 
overbroad and . . . whatever overbreadth may exist should be 
cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to 
which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied."  Id. at 
773-74 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16). 
¶60 Similarly, in Broadrick, the Court upheld a section of 
an Oklahoma law restricting the political activities of the 
state's 
civil 
servants. 
 
The 
Court 
recognized 
that 
the 
challenged law would prohibit covered employees from wearing 
political buttons and from displaying political bumper stickers 
on their vehicles.  See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 618.  Although it 
acknowledged that such restrictions were impermissible, the 
Court concluded that the law need not be "discarded in toto 
because some person’s arguably protected conduct may or may not 
be caught or chilled by the statute."  Id. 
¶61 A regulation, therefore, should not be invalidated in 
toto for overbreadth unless it reaches "a substantial number of 
impermissible applications . . . ."  Ferber, 458 U.S. at 771 
(emphasis added).  Simply conceiving of a single impermissible 
application of an ordinance is not sufficient to succeed on an 
overbreadth claim.  See K.F., 145 Wis. 2d at 41 (quoting Hill, 
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
16
482 U.S. 451); see also City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers 
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984). 
¶62 For the purposes of this analysis, this dissent 
assumes, as does the majority, that the Town of Trenton has a 
legitimate, substantial interest in protecting its community 
from the harmful secondary effects associated with adult 
entertainment establishments.  See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 
501 U.S. 560, 581-84 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring); see also 
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).  
In its overbreadth analysis, the court must therefore accept 
that the Town of Trenton can legitimately proscribe public 
nudity at adult entertainment establishments.  See Barnes, 501 
U.S. at 572 (1990); Id. at 580-81 (Scalia, J., concurring); Id. 
at 587 (Souter, J., concurring).  Accordingly, whether the 
overbreadth of Ordinance 10 is substantial as well as real must 
be judged in relation to the "plainly legitimate sweep" upheld 
in Barnes.  Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615; see also Wroten, 160 
Wis. 2d at 226; K.F., 145 Wis. 2d at 40-41. 
¶63 As explained above, a narrow construction of Ordinance 
10 would eliminate a number of hypothetical examples listed by 
the majority.  If Ordinance 10 is construed to prohibit only 
animate public nudity, it would not chill the public exhibition 
of artwork or artifacts depicting nudity, or the public display 
of a television program including brief nudity.  See majority 
op. 
at 
12. 
 
Stripped 
of 
these 
arguably 
illegitimate 
applications, the majority is left with just one hypothetical 
situation 
upon 
which 
to 
conclude 
that 
Ordinance 
10 
is 
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
17
substantially overbroad.  The majority argues that even under a 
narrow construction the Ordinance could be used to prohibit live 
artistic performances that do not implicate the secondary 
effects associated with barroom erotic nude dancing.  Majority 
op. at 16.  As this dissent has shown, simply conceiving of this 
single impermissible application of Ordinance 10 is not a 
sufficient basis upon which to invalidate the Ordinance.  See 
K.F., 145 Wis. 2d at 41; see also Brandmiller, 199 Wis. 2d at 
546-47; Nelson, 149 Wis. 2d at 452.19 
                     
19 To avoid the controlling authority of City of Milwaukee 
v. K.F., 145 Wis. 2d 24, 40-41, 426 N.W.2d 329 (1988); City of 
Milwaukee v. Nelson, 149 Wis. 2d 434, 452, 439 N.W.2d 562 
(1989); and Brandmiller v. Arreola, 199 Wis. 2d 528, 546-47, 544 
N.W.2d 894 (1996), the majority counts each play, musical, and 
ballet to which the Ordinance someday may be applied as a 
separate impermissible application of that Ordinance.  If this 
is the proper test under the substantial overbreadth doctrine, 
the United States Supreme Court clearly erred in Broadrick, 413 
U.S. 601, by upholding the Oklahoma statute without first 
counting each political button, bumper sticker, and souvenir 
potentially affected by that statute.  Similarly, it must have 
been an oversight that the Court in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747, 769 (1982), upheld the New York statute without first 
counting each magazine, pictorial, and textbook that could fall 
prey to that statute.  The majority would have us believe that a 
town like Trenton cannot proscribe live nude dancing in its 
taverns if the performers also recite Shakespeare, play the 
trombone, or pirouette as they show their breasts, genitals, and 
buttocks to the audience.  Such performances would certainly 
fall within the majority's "artistic gamut."  Rather than strike 
the Ordinance in its entirety, the court should consider the 
application of the Ordinance to such performances on a case-by-
case basis.  No matter how creatively the majority counts, the 
application of the Ordinance to live nude performances at 
establishments licensed to sell alcohol yields but a single 
hypothetical application of that Ordinance. 
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
18
¶64 Even if the court decides here for the first time that 
one hypothetical application of an ordinance can result in 
substantial overbreadth, the majority's analysis fails.  The 
last hypothetical situation posed by the majority is far from 
substantial.  In effect, the majority invalidates Ordinance 10 
in toto because a ballet troupe or other group someday may offer 
in the Town of Trenton Diaghilev’s L’apres midi d’un faune 
(1912) or a similar performance including nudity.  See majority 
op. at 17.  In concluding that this single hypothetical is both 
real and substantial, the majority ignores the very limited 
reach of the Ordinance. 
¶65 The deterrent effect and any overbreadth of Ordinance 
10 is necessarily limited to its reach.  "While a sweeping 
statute, or one incapable of limitation, has the potential to 
repeatedly chill the exercise of expressive activity by many 
individuals, the extent of deterrence of protected speech can be 
expected 
to 
decrease 
with 
the 
declining 
reach 
of 
the 
regulation."  Ferber, 458 U.S. at 772.  Ordinance 10 does not 
deny absolutely the right of Trenton residents to attend, or the 
right of artists to offer, artistic performances involving live 
nudity.  Ordinance 10 only prohibits a performer from appearing 
in a state of "nudity," as defined in the Ordinance, during an 
artistic performance at an establishment licensed by the Town of 
Trenton to sell alcohol.  The Ordinance, therefore, does not bar 
performances involving nudity at theaters, performing arts 
centers, auditoriums, or other establishments as long as those 
establishments do not serve or sell alcohol.  Perhaps I am wrong 
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
19
in my estimation of how often a ballet troupe or other group 
will perform in the nude at a tavern in the Town of Trenton, but 
I think it is fair to say that the legitimate scope of Ordinance 
10 vastly exceeds the illegitimate. 
¶66 Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, any real 
and substantial overbreadth in Ordinance 10 can be cured by 
means of a narrowing judicial construction of its language.  See 
Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d at 522.  Whatever overbreadth remains after 
this narrowing construction "should be addressed through case-
by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, 
assertedly, may be applied."  Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16.  
The majority has here employed the doctrine of substantial 
overbreadth 
superficially 
rather 
than 
sparingly 
and 
has 
swallowed it as an easy fix rather than as manifestly strong 
medicine.  I therefore dissent. 
¶67 As to the issue of overbreadth, I would affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court for Pierce County.20   
                     
20 By striking as facially overbroad the Town of Trenton's 
Ordinance 10, the majority has avoided, either by design or 
convenience, the tougher question presented by the case at bar: 
whether and to what extent the First Amendment protects nude and 
semi-nude, non-obscene dancing.  I believe the court should have 
reached this issue.  
No. 96-1853.dws 
 
20
¶68 I am authorized to state that Justice Jon P. Wilcox 
joins this dissenting opinion.   
   
 
No. 17129.rtf 
 
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