Case Title: Young v. Achenbauch

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC12-988

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2014-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-988 
____________ 
 
PATRICIA YOUNG, et al.,  
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
NORVA L. ACHENBAUCH, et al.,  
Respondents. 
 
[March 27, 2014] 
 
 
POLSTON, C.J. 
 
Petitioners, Patricia Young, Alani Blissard, and the Flight Attendant Medical 
Research Institute (FAMRI), argue that the Third District Court of Appeal in Broin 
v. Phillip Morris Cos., Inc., 84 So. 3d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), erred in quashing 
the trial court’s order disqualifying several attorneys, including Steven Hunter and 
Philip Gerson, from representing a group of flight attendants in a suit against 
FAMRI.  Specifically, the petitioners claim that the Third District failed to apply 
the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct in determining whether the trial court 
 
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abused its discretion by disqualifying the attorneys in the underlying case.1  For the 
reasons that follow, we quash the Third District’s decision in Broin and reinstate 
the trial court’s disqualification order.2
 
In 1991, flight attendants, who were suffering from diseases caused by 
exposure to second-hand smoke in airline cabins, initiated a class action suit 
against several tobacco companies.  See Ramos v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 743 So. 
2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), rev. dismissed, 743 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1999); Broin v. 
Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).  The class action 
resulted in a settlement agreement, whereby the class members agreed to waive 
their intentional tort and punitive damages claims but retained the right to 
individually pursue claims for compensatory damages against the tobacco 
companies.  See Ramos, 743 So. 2d at 27.  In return, the tobacco companies agreed 
  Additionally, with this opinion, we ask 
The Florida Bar to investigate whether any Florida Rules of Professional Conduct 
were violated during the underlying proceedings or during the presentation of this 
case to this Court. 
 I.  BACKGROUND 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction based on express and direct conflict.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
2.  The trial court’s order actually disqualified all seven attorneys for the 
petitioners in the suit against FAMRI.  However, only attorneys Hunter and Gerson 
challenged their disqualification in the Third District.  Therefore, this opinion will 
only address the disqualification of Hunter and Gerson. 
 
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to waive the statute of limitations defense and to establish a $300 million 
settlement fund to be used solely to establish a foundation which would be charged 
with sponsoring scientific research for the early detection and cure of diseases 
associated with cigarette smoking.  Id. at 27, 31-32.  The settlement agreement 
provided that if the settlement is modified in any way by the court “then this 
[s]ettlement [a]greement shall be canceled and terminated, and shall become null 
and void, and the parties shall be restored to their original positions.”  The Third 
District affirmed the trial court’s approval of the settlement without modification in 
Ramos.  See Philip Morris v. French, 897 So. 2d 480, 482-83 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) 
(explaining that the trial court approved the class action settlement agreement 
“without modification” and that the Third District affirmed the trial court’s 
decision in Ramos), rev. denied, 918 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2005).  Subsequently, 
FAMRI was formed, and several of the flight attendants who were part of the 
Broin class action became members of FAMRI’s board, including two of the 
petitioners in this case, Young and Blissard.  Additionally, pursuant to the 
settlement agreement, the Broin class action was dismissed with prejudice in 1998. 
 
Thereafter, many of the flight attendants who had been part of the class 
action filed their individual suits as contemplated by the settlement agreement for 
compensatory damages against the tobacco companies, including Young and 
Blissard.  Steven Hunter and Philip Gerson were among the group of attorneys 
 
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who represented some of the flight attendants in their individual progeny suits.  
According to Hunter and Gerson, while representing their flight attendant clients in 
the individual suits, Hunter and Gerson became concerned that FAMRI’s activities 
were not being supervised by the trial court and attempted to have FAMRI produce 
an accounting, but FAMRI was allegedly unresponsive.  And, in December 2010, a 
group of attorneys, including Gerson and Hunter, filed a petition against FAMRI, 
on behalf of a handful of the flight attendants who were part of the original Broin 
class, seeking an accounting of FAMRI’s funds, an injunction against further 
expenditures, and requesting that the settlement funds be dispersed directly to their 
clients.   
 
Young and Blissard, who both remain board members of FAMRI, as well as 
FAMRI, moved to disqualify counsel for the petitioners in the action against 
FAMRI on the ground of conflict of interest.  In support of this motion, they 
submitted several sworn affidavits setting forth their objections, which will be 
discussed in turn below.   
Specifically, Blissard averred in her affidavit that she was a former class 
representative in the Broin class action and is a current member of FAMRI’s 
board, and that Steven Hunter represented her in her individual progeny suit for ten 
years.  Blissard further explained that during that time she attended numerous 
meetings with the various flight attendants’ counsel, including Hunter and Gerson, 
 
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and that the flight attendants’ counsel worked as a team in the pursuit of the 
individual flight attendants’ claims, and that she trusted the group of attorneys as 
her legal team.  Further, Blissard stated that during this time she shared many 
confidences about herself and FAMRI and that Hunter “always stressed the united 
team effort of his colleagues.”  Additionally, Blissard stated that Hunter had asked 
her to request funds from FAMRI’s board to help cover the litigation costs and 
judgments in the individual flight attendant cases, but FAMRI denied the request 
after consulting with its counsel because it could not legally authorize such 
expenditures.  Upon learning of the petition against FAMRI, Blissard explained 
that she contacted Hunter and objected to the petition and that Hunter subsequently 
withdrew as her counsel in her individual suit after representing her for a decade. 
Similarly, Young submitted an affidavit in which she explained that she was 
a former class representative in the Broin class action and is also a member of 
FAMRI’s board.  Like Blissard, Young averred that over the years she frequently 
met with the group of attorneys representing the flight attendants in their individual 
progeny suits, including Hunter and Gerson, and that she considered all of the 
attorneys in the group to be her counsel, but admitted that neither Hunter nor 
Gerson was her individual counsel of record.  Young also stated that she shared 
confidential information regarding FAMRI with Hunter and Gerson and that they 
“asked [her] many questions about the criteria FAMRI used to fund research, the 
 
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peer-review process, and whether their experts could bypass peer review.”  In fact, 
similar to Blissard, Young also stated that Gerson and Hunter asked her to request 
funds from FAMRI to cover the litigation costs in the individual flight attendant 
cases, a request which she conveyed to FAMRI’s board, but the board denied the 
request because it could not legally authorize such an expenditure. 
Additionally, two other affidavits were submitted from Hunter and Gerson’s 
clients in support of disqualification.  An affidavit from Olivia Chambers 
explained that Hunter was her attorney in her individual progeny suit, and that in 
February 2011 (after the petition against FAMRI had already been filed) she 
received a letter from Hunter asking her to authorize him to proceed on her behalf 
in the suit against FAMRI.  Chambers stated that she objected to the action against 
FAMRI and, as a result, Hunter withdrew as her counsel in her individual suit.  
Likewise, an affidavit submitted by Raiti Waerness, one of Gerson’s clients, 
explained that she learned of the petition against FAMRI and wrote Gerson 
objecting to any action against FAMRI, and that Gerson subsequently withdrew as 
her counsel in her individual suit in 2011.  The petitioners also submitted an 
exhibit in the form of an e-mail from Peggy Spurgeon in which she wrote to 
Gerson in April 2010 stating that she also opposed his pursuit of the suit against 
FAMRI. 
 
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In addition to the affidavits from Hunter and Gerson’s clients in support of 
disqualification, one of the attorneys who was a part of the group of attorneys 
working on the flight attendants’ progeny cases submitted an affidavit stating that 
all of the flight attendants’ counsel employed a team approach to the progeny 
lawsuits—“work[ing] on the cases jointly, sharing information, discovery, and trial 
strategy,” and freely exchanged information about each case among the group.  
This attorney also averred that Young and Blissard met frequently with the group 
and “freely provided information and confided in us about FARMI [sic] and their 
work with FAMRI.”  The attorney also stated that during this time he had 
permitted one of the attorneys who joined with Gerson and Hunter in filing the 
petition against FAMRI to review all of his flight attendant case files.   
In response to the motion to disqualify, Hunter and Gerson submitted 
affidavits in which they denied the existence of any conflict.  Specifically, Hunter 
admitted that he had been Blissard and Chamber’s counsel in their individual 
progeny suits, but that there was no conflict in his representing the petitioners 
against FAMRI because he had promptly withdrawn as Blissard and Chamber’s 
counsel upon learning of their objections to the suit.  Additionally, Hunter denied 
ever representing Young or possessing any confidential information about Young 
or Blissard’s dealings with FAMRI.   
 
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Similarly, Gerson denied that an attorney-client relationship existed with 
Blissard or Young, stating that they never disclosed any information about 
themselves, their cases, the operations of FAMRI, or their roles in FAMRI to him.  
He further denied ever asking Young about the possibility of FAMRI funding the 
individual litigation cost, and stated that “there never was any information not 
publicly available about FAMRI or its board members activities that was ever 
provided to [him].”  Finally, Gerson admitted that he had filed Raiti Waerness’ 
individual suit for her, but only at the request of the Broin class counsel because 
the statute of limitations was due to expire, that he had never met her, and had not 
heard from her until he received the letter in which she objected to any action 
against FAMRI.  And Gerson explained that upon learning of her objections, he 
filed a motion to withdraw as her counsel and officially set the hearing on that 
motion when he learned that she had filed an affidavit in support of his 
disqualification.  Gerson further averred that he “never received any information 
about [Waerness] during the time [he] was attorney of record.”  With regard to 
Peggy Spurgeon, Gerson averred that, although he filed an action on her behalf, he 
did so only as a courtesy to Broin class counsel.  He explained that an attorney-
client relationship never existed, that he never met her, that he did not possess any 
information about her, that she never completed the retainer agreement he sent her, 
and that her case was dismissed for lack of prosecution in 2008.   
 
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In June 2011, a hearing was held on the motion to disqualify, and the trial 
court offered the parties the opportunity to proffer evidence and give testimony, 
but neither party presented any witnesses.  After reviewing all of the affidavits, 
arguments, and exhibits, the trial court entered an order disqualifying all of the 
attorneys for the petitioners in the action against FAMRI.  The trial court found 
that the attorneys had violated Florida’s Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.7, 
governing conflicts with current clients, and Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.9, 
governing conflicts with former clients.  The trial court explained that withdrawing 
from the representation of Young, Blissard, and Waerness appeared to be an 
attempt to “drop one client ‘like a hot potato’ in order to treat it as though it were a 
former client for the purpose of resolving a conflict of interest dispute.” (quoting 
ValuePart, Inc. v. Clements, No. 06C2709, 2006 WL 2252541, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 2, 2006)).   
On certiorari review, the Third District quashed the trial court’s 
disqualification order.  Broin, 84 So. 3d at 1108.  The Third District noted that “[a] 
common dilemma arises when class counsel endeavor to reach a settlement which 
is fair to all members, and some of the members object to the proposed 
settlement.”  Id. at 1111.  Then, the Third District went on to state that “[t]his case 
demonstrates why Florida’s Rules of Professional Conduct alone are inadequate to 
resolve conflict of interest problems typical to class action cases[:]”   
 
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Here, two class members, who object to a course of action approved 
by a significant number of their co-class members, demand the 
disqualification of counsel selected by the latter to represent them.  
The sole basis for disqualification is the alleged team effort of all 
plaintiffs’ counsel in the original action.   
 
Id. at 1112.    
The Third District ultimately concluded that the federal approach, which 
“balances a party’s right to select his or her own counsel against a client’s right to 
the undivided loyalty of his or her counsel,” “affords a better method for 
determining when to disqualify an attorney for conflict of interest in the context of 
a class action.”  Id.  Therefore, the Third District held that “before disqualifying a 
class member’s attorney on the motion of another class member, the court should 
balance the actual prejudice to the objector with his or her opponent’s interest in 
continued representation by experienced counsel.”  Id. 
Based on this balancing test, the Third District found that the other class 
members’ right to be represented by Gerson and Hunter was outweighed by any 
prejudice to the objectors.  Id.  The Third District explained that Gerson and 
Hunter are familiar with the litigation history and, because they were not lead 
counsel in the original class action, they would have had “little access to 
confidential information.”  Id.  Furthermore, the Third District stated that, 
“although arising from the prior litigation, the present action involves a different 
issue.”  Id.  Accordingly, the Third District held that “the trial court departed from 
 
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the essential requirements of law in disqualifying petitioners’ counsel” and 
quashed the disqualification order and remanded for further proceedings.  Id. at 
1112-13.   
As explained below, we quash the Third District’s decision because it failed 
to apply the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct to determine whether 
disqualification was warranted.  We also reinstate the trial court’s disqualification 
order.3
 
We have previously explained that the Florida Rules of Professional 
Conduct provide the standard for determining whether counsel should be 
disqualified in a given case.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. K.A.W., 575 So. 2d 
630, 633 (Fla. 1991); see also Estright v. Bay Point Improvement Ass’n, Inc., 921 
So. 2d 810, 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“An order involving the disqualification of 
counsel must be tested against the standards imposed by the [Florida] Rules of 
Professional Conduct.”) (quoting Morse v. Clark, 890 So. 2d 496, 497 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2004)).  In this case, the Third District’s review below should have been 
limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the 
disqualification motion.  See Applied Digital Solutions, Inc. v. Vasa, 941 So. 2d 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
                                          
 
 
3.  This case involves the interpretation and application of this Court’s Rules 
of Professional Conduct, which is a pure legal issue subject to de novo review.  See 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. K.A.W., 575 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1991). 
 
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404, 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“The standard of review for orders entered on 
motions to disqualify counsel is that of an abuse of discretion.  While the trial 
court’s discretion is limited by the applicable legal principles, the appellate court 
will not substitute its judgment for the trial court’s express or implied findings of 
fact which are supported by competent substantial evidence.”) (citation omitted).  
However, instead of just applying the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct to 
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying the 
attorneys, the Third District adopted a different test, namely a balancing test used 
by the federal courts.  Broin, 84 So. 3d at 1112.  However, as explained above, this 
is not the proper test for motions to disqualify counsel as set forth by this Court, 
and the Third District lacked the constitutional authority to adopt a new test.  Art. 
V, § 15, Fla. Const. 
Furthermore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when 
ruling that counsel violated Florida Rules of Professional Conduct 4-1.7 and 4-1.9.  
Rule 4-1.7 concerns conflicts of interests with current clients and provides that a 
lawyer shall not represent a client if: 
(1) the representation of 1 client will be directly adverse to 
another client; or  
(2) there is a substantial risk that the representation of 1 or more 
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to 
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal 
interest of the lawyer. 
 
 
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R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(a).  However, notwithstanding a conflict under rule 4-
1.7(a), a lawyer might still be able to represent the clients provided that the 
representation is not prohibited by law, the lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not adversely affect his responsibilities to the other client, and 
the other client consents after consultation.  See generally id. 4-1.7(b).   
The commentary to rule 4-1.7 further explains that  
[a]n impermissible conflict of interest may exist before representation 
is undertaken, in which event the representation should be declined.  
If such a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the 
lawyer should withdraw from the representation.  Where more than 1 
client is involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises 
after representation, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any 
of the clients is determined by rule 4-1.9. 
 
Comment to R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7.  “[L]oyalty to a client prohibits 
undertaking representation directly adverse to that client’s or another client’s 
interests without the affected client’s consent.”  Id.  And, “[o]rdinarily, a lawyer 
may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, 
even if the other matter is wholly unrelated.”  Id.  
Accordingly, the comment to rule 4-1.7 clearly explains that counsel may 
withdraw from the representation when “a conflict arises after representation has 
been undertaken[,]” but that counsel has the duty to decline representation if the 
conflict “exist[s] before representation is undertaken.”  Id.  (Emphasis added.)  
Attorneys may not avoid this rule by taking on representation in which a conflict of 
 
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interest already exists and then convert a current client into a former client by 
withdrawing from the client’s case.  See Clements, 2006 WL 2252541, at *2 
(explaining that a lawyer or law firm “may not simply [choose] to drop one client 
‘like a hot potato’ in order to treat it as though it were a former client for the 
purpose of resolving a conflict of interest dispute”); Unified Sewerage Agency v. 
Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1345 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that, if the duty of 
loyalty did not prevent this practice, “the challenged attorney could always convert 
a present client into a ‘former client’ by choosing when to cease to represent the 
disfavored client”).  In fact, we have previously held that “[a]n attorney engages in 
unethical conduct when he undertakes a representation when he either knows or 
should know of a conflict of interest prohibiting the representation.”  The Fla. Bar 
v. Scott, 39 So. 3d 309, 316 (Fla. 2010).   
The conflict of interest in this case existed long before Gerson and Hunter 
undertook the litigation against FAMRI and should have been apparent to both 
Gerson and Hunter.  Specifically, with regard to Hunter, the conflict should have 
been evident the moment the idea of suing FAMRI was first raised, because he had 
represented Blissard, who is a member of FAMRI’s board, for ten years, and the 
petition against FAMRI accuses the board (including Blissard) of misusing funds.  
Simply put, the action against FAMRI’s board is “directly adverse” to the interests 
of Blissard, and the commentary to rule 4-1.7 clearly explains that “loyalty to a 
 
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client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client’s or 
another client’s interests without the affected client’s consent.”  Comment to R. 
Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7.  In fact, the record establishes that Hunter did not even 
seek out Blissard’s consent; rather, she independently learned of the plan to file a 
petition against FAMRI and contacted Hunter directly to express her objections.  
Therefore, because the conflict of interest existed before the litigation against 
FAMRI was undertaken, Hunter had a duty under rule 4-1.7 to decline to pursue 
the petition against FAMRI, and his withdrawal as Blissard’s counsel after the fact 
did not resolve this conflict or preclude the application of rule 4-1.7 to determine 
whether he should have been disqualified as counsel in the action against FAMRI.   
 
Likewise, with regard to Gerson, the impermissible conflict of interest 
should have been apparent to him when he received notification from his clients, 
Raiti Waerness and Peggy Spurgeon, that they objected to the action against 
FAMRI.  And, like Hunter, his subsequent withdrawal as Waerness’ counsel did 
not resolve the conflict of interest or evade the applicability of rule 4-1.7.  
Additionally, even though Gerson may not have been direct counsel to 
Young or Blissard, and Hunter may not have been direct counsel to Young, given 
the team approach to representation by the flight attendants’ counsel in the progeny 
litigation and the sharing of information and confidences that occurred, the conflict 
of interest in pursuing the action against FAMRI should have been evident.  See 
 
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Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., PLC., 508 So. 2d 437, 440 n.3 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1987) (explaining that where groups of attorneys and clients work together 
and pool or share litigation information, “for the limited purpose of the ‘pooled 
information’ situation, the attorney for one becomes the attorney for the other”); 
see also Mansur v. Podhurst Orseck, P.A., 994 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2008) (explaining that the test for whether there is an attorney-client relationship is 
whether the client has a “reasonable” belief that she or he is represented by the 
attorney) (quoting The Fla. Bar v. Beach, 675 So. 2d 106, 109 (Fla. 1996)).   
Additionally, we conclude that disqualification was also warranted under 
rule 4-1.9.  Rule 4-1.9 concerns conflicts of interest with former clients and 
provides the following:   
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall 
not thereafter: 
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially 
related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse 
to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives 
informed consent; 
(b) use information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the former client except as these rules would permit 
or require with respect to a client or when the information has become 
generally known; or 
(c) reveal information relating to the representation except as 
these rules would permit or require with respect to a client. 
 
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.9(a)-(c).  “Matters are ‘substantially related’ for 
purposes of this rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute, or if the 
current matter would involve the lawyer attacking work that the lawyer performed 
 
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for the former client.”  Comment to R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.9.  A party seeking 
disqualification under rule 4-1.9 does not have to demonstrate actual prejudice to 
the former client as a result of the subsequent representation because the existence 
of an attorney-client relationship “giv[es] rise to an irrefutable presumption that 
confidences were disclosed.”  K.A.W., 575 So. 2d at 633-34.   
 
In this case, as the trial court found, the petition against FAMRI, the 
individual progeny suits, and the original class action are substantially related 
because they involve the same transaction or legal dispute.  Specifically, the 
original class action resulted in the underlying settlement agreement that 
established FAMRI, set limitations on the use of FAMRI’s funds (which the 
current petition seeks to distribute), and contemplated the individual progeny suits 
by the flight attendants against the tobacco companies.  Gerson and Hunter 
represented many of the flight attendants in their individual suits.  Now, Gerson 
and Hunter have accused FAMRI of not living up to the settlement’s mandate, 
assert that FAMRI’s alleged lack of research is “a substantial reason for the 
disappointing outcomes of [the] individual lawsuits,” and seek to have the funds 
given to FAMRI as part of the settlement agreement dispersed to only a handful of 
the former class members.  Consequently, we find that the individual litigation and 
the action against FAMRI are substantially related as that term is defined in rule 4-
1.9.  And, it is clear that the interests of the individuals participating in the action 
 
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against FAMRI are materially adverse to the interests of Hunter and Gerson’s 
former clients who objected to the petition against FAMRI and did not give their 
informed consent.  Therefore, we agree with the trial court’s determination that 
rule 4-1.9(a) was violated.     
Accordingly, we find that disqualification was warranted in this case. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained above, we quash the Third District’s decision 
below and reinstate the trial court’s disqualification order. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
Third District - Case No. 3D11-2129  
 
(Miami-Dade County)  
 
Christian Dietrich Searcy of Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, P.A., 
West Palm Beach, Florida; David Joseph Sales, Jupiter, Florida; John Wesley 
Kozyak, Thomas A. Tucker Ronzetti, Rachel Sullivan, and Jessica E. Elliott of 
Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, P.A., Coral Gables, Florida; John Stewart Mills, 
Andrew Manko, and Courtney Rebecca Brewer of The Mills Firm, P.A., 
Tallahassee, Florida; Miles Ambrose McGrane, III of The McGrane Law Firm, 
Miami, Florida; and Roderick Norman Petrey, Coral Gables, Florida,   
 
for Petitioners 
 
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Steven Kent Hunter and Christopher J. Lynch of Hunter, Williams & Lynch, P.A., 
Miami, Florida; Philip Maurice Gerson and Edward Steven Schwartz of Gerson & 
Schwartz, P.A., Miami, Florida; Stanley M. Rosenblatt and Susan Rosenblatt of 
Stanley M. Rosenblatt, P.A., Miami, Florida; Marvin Weinstein of Grover & 
Weinstein P.A., Miami Beach, Florida; Mark Jurgen Heise and Antonio C. Castro 
of Boies, Schiller & Flexner, Miami, Florida; Kelly Anne Luther of Kasowitz 
Benson, Miami, Florida; Edward A. Moss and Kenneth James Reilly of Shook 
Hardy & Bacon, LLP, Miami, Florida; David Ross of Green Traurig, LLP, Miami, 
Florida; Douglas Chumbley and Benjamin Reid of Carlton Fields, Miami, Florida; 
and Stephanie Ethel Parker, John F. Yarber, and John M. Walker of Jones Day, 
Atlanta, Georgia,  
 
for Respondents