Case Title: STEVEN R. BURNETT V. ROSEANNE L. STEELEY, f/k/a ROSEANNE L. BURNETT

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0225

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
STEVEN R. BURNETT V. ROSEANNE L. STEELEY, f/k/a ROSEANNE L. BURNETT2008 WY 94190 P.3d 132Case Number: S-07-0225, S-08-0051Decided: 08/14/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 

STEVEN 
R. BURNETT,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.ROSEANNE L. 
STEELEY, f/k/a ROSEANNE L. BURNETT,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofPlatteCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Jared 
S. Crecelius of Bailey, Stock & Harmon P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.  

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

William 
L. Hiser of Brown & Hiser LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ., and PERRY, D.J.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Following divorce proceedings, the 
district court entered a judgment requiring the husband, Steven R. Burnett, to 
pay the wife, Roseanne L. Steeley, the amount of "$417,609 in cash or property 
by April 1, 2006" to equalize the marital property division.  Mr. Burnett did not pay or make any 
effort to pay the judgment by April 1, 2006.  Nearly a year and a half later, the 
district court entered another order requiring Mr. Burnett to pay the amount 
owed to Ms. Steeley in cash.  
Subsequently, the district court entered an order awarding Ms. Steeley 
attorney's fees of $42,501.00 and costs of $2,823.86.

 
 
[¶2]  In his first appeal, Mr. Burnett claims 
the district court improperly modified the original judgment by requiring 
payment in cash when the requirements of the applicable rules authorizing 
modification of a judgment were not met.  
He also claims the district court improperly ordered him to pay interest 
on the judgment after Ms. Steeley rejected his offer to convey property by 
warranty deed.  In a subsequent 
appeal, Mr. Burnett claims the district court erred in awarding Ms. Steeley 
attorney's fees.  We consolidated 
the appeals and affirm.     

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]  The parties each present their own 
statement of the issues for this Court's review.  We re-phrase the determinative issues as 
follows:

 
 

1.      
Whether 
the district court properly ordered Mr. Burnett to pay the unsatisfied amount of 
the judgment in cash 18 months after the April 1, 2006, deadline for payment of 
the judgment in full had passed.

 
 

2.      
Whether 
the district court properly ordered Mr. Burnett to pay interest on the judgment 
from April 1, 2006, until the judgment is paid in full.      

 
 

3.      
Whether 
the district court properly awarded Ms. Steeley attorney's 
fees.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]  The parties were married on July 25, 
1971.  They separated on June 15, 
2003, after nearly 32 years of marriage.  
They were divorced by decree entered on October 3, 2005.  

 
 
[¶5]  During their marriage, Ms. Steeley 
worked at a bank in Wheatland, Wyoming, and ultimately became bank 
manager.  Mr. Burnett worked at 
various jobs in Wheatland until approximately 1985 when he quit his job and 
began working full time on the Burnett family ranch, which his family had owned 
for four generations.  In 1986, Mr. 
Burnett entered into the Burnett Ranches Partnership with his mother and 
brother.  

 
 
[¶6]  At the time the district court entered 
the divorce decree, issues remained concerning the division of the marital 
assets and debts the parties incurred during the marriage.  The most significant issue involved the 
ranch land owned by the partnership.  Following a hearing to determine how the 
marital property should be divided between the parties, the district court 
issued a decision letter finding in pertinent part that:  Mr. Burnett owned 53% of the Burnett 
Ranches Partnership; his ability to leave his job in the mid-1980s and work on 
the family ranch thereafter was due to Ms. Steeley's employment at the bank; all 
of Ms. Steeley's income from the bank was spent to support the family; the ranch 
appreciated in value between 1986 (the approximate date Mr. Burnett began 
working full-time at the ranch) and June of 2003 (when the parties separated); 
the appreciation was due in part to Ms. Steeley's efforts; and, Mr. Burnett's 
partnership interest was a marital asset.  

 
 
[¶7]  The district court held that Ms. Steeley 
was entitled to an approximately equal share of the marital estate.  Based upon the parties' evidence, the 
district court concluded the total value of the marital estate, including Mr. 
Burnett's partnership interest and the parties' non-ranch assets, was 
$1,408,705.  Dividing that figure in 
half, the district court concluded each party's share in the marital estate was 
$704,353.  The district court 
subtracted the value of Ms. Steeley's non-ranch assets, which she had already 
received, to arrive at a figure of $417,609 owing to Ms. Steeley.  The district court ordered the 
partnership assets belonging to Mr. Burnett be set over to him as his sole and 
separate property and ordered him to pay the sum of $417,609 in cash or property 
to Ms. Steeley by April 1, 2006.  
The district court entered an order and judgment consistent with its 
decision letter on February 23, 2006 (the February 2006 judgment).     

 
 
[¶8]  Mr. Burnett did not pay any of the 
judgment by April 1, 2006.  After 
that date, he filed notices of deposit of quitclaim deeds to convey ranch 
property to Ms. Steeley in satisfaction of the order and judgment.  It appears to be undisputed that Mr. 
Burnett did not have clear title to the property at the time he deposited the 
deeds.1  

 
 

[¶9]  On June 20, 2006, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 17-21-504 (LexisNexis 2007), Ms. Steeley filed an application for 
charging order and appointment of receiver in which she alleged that Mr. Burnett 
had not paid the February 2006 judgment.  
She sought an order charging Mr. Burnett's share of any 
partnership 
distributions due or to become due in satisfaction of the judgment and 
appointing a receiver to take possession of those distributions to facilitate 
payment to her.  She also requested an order requiring 
Mr. Burnett to pay the amount owed plus interest at the statutory rate of ten 
percent.  The district court 
convened a hearing on the application and, on September 12, 2006, entered a 
charging order and an order appointing a receiver.  

 
 
[¶10]  In its order, the district court found 
that Mr. Burnett had not satisfied the February 2006 judgment; the judgment 
amount was subject to statutory interest at the rate of ten percent per annum 
from the date entered until paid; the quitclaim deeds Mr. Burnett filed were not 
effective to satisfy the judgment; and, if Mr. Burnett chose to satisfy the 
February 2006 judgment by transferring property to Ms. Steeley, he had the 
burden of establishing the value of the property and that he had clear title to 
the property and paying the cost of transferring the property by warranty 
deed.  The district court also found 
that Mr. Burnett had actual control over the Burnett Ranches Partnership, its 
assets and activities; Ms. Steeley was entitled to a charging order against Mr. 
Burnett's transferable partnership interest; and Ms. Steeley was entitled to the 
appointment of a receiver to facilitate payment of Mr. Burnett's transferable 
interest to her.  In addition, the 
district court ordered Mr. Burnett to pay the receiver's costs, refrain from 
transferring any interest in his property or property of the Burnett Ranches 
Partnership without court approval until he had satisfied the February 2006 
judgment and provide to the receiver all partnership documents reflecting his 
partnership interest, draws and distributions.  

 
 
[¶11]  The day after the district court entered 
its order, Mr. Burnett filed a motion to compel satisfaction of judgment.  By memorandum attached to the motion, he 
asserted that he had made good faith efforts to satisfy the February 2006 
judgment by, first, depositing the quitclaim deeds and, subsequently, delivering 
a warranty deed to Ms. Steeley's attorney.  He claimed that he had clear title to the 
property he had attempted to transfer and its value was more than sufficient to 
satisfy the judgment.  He asked the 
district court to order Ms. Steeley to accept the property in payment of the 
judgment and file a release of claim.

 
 
[¶12]  The district court scheduled a hearing 
for September 29, 2006.  After the 
hearing, the district court issued an order requiring the parties to select an 
appraiser within 20 days to appraise the Burnett Ranches Partnership 
property.  The order provided that 
upon completion of the appraisal, the cost of which the parties were to share 
equally, the district court would order Mr. Burnett to transfer property to Ms. 
Steeley along with sufficient cash to satisfy the February 2006 judgment.  The district court stayed the 
enforcement proceedings in the meantime.

 
 
[¶13]  Ms. Steeley filed a written objection to 
the district court's order.  The 
thrust of her objection was that if the district court ordered a new appraisal 
of the partnership real property it also needed to reconsider the amount of the 
original February 2006 judgment.  
She argued that, if the new appraisal indicated the property value had 
appreciated since the judgment and the court did not reconsider the judgment 
amount, she would not receive the approximately equal share of the marital 
estate the district court held she was entitled to receive.  Ms. Steeley also objected to the 
district court's order requiring her to pay one-half of the appraisal costs, 
presumably because she had already paid for an appraisal in preparation for the 
property division hearing and because the district court had previously ordered 
that Mr. Burnett would bear the costs if he chose to satisfy the judgment by 
transferring property.  

 
 
[¶14]   After Ms. Steeley's October 2006 
objection to the district court's order, nothing further appears in the record 
until June 4, 2007, when Mr. Burnett filed a request for a hearing on a motion 
to compel satisfaction of judgment.  The district court scheduled a hearing 
for July 31, 2007.  Prior to the 
hearing, Ms. Steeley filed a motion to lift the stay on execution and allow 
enforcement of the February 2006 judgment.  
Based upon statements Mr. Burnett previously made indicating that the 
partnership had dissolved, Ms. Steeley alleged that he was now the sole owner of 
the property formerly owned by the partnership.  She further informed the court that 
after the November 2006 order, she and Mr. Burnett had agreed to the sale of two 
properties and application of the proceeds, $66,232.03 and $59,414.09, to the 
February 2006 judgment, leaving a balance of $348,962.37.  She asked the district court to allow 
her to proceed to collect the outstanding amount.  By separate motion, Ms. Steeley also 
requested an award of attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the February 2006 
judgment.

 
 
[¶15]  Following the July 31, 2007, hearing, 
the district court entered an order finding in pertinent part that:  Mr. Burnett still owed Ms. Steeley 
$348,962.37 on the February 2006 judgment; since the February 2006 judgment, the 
property value had appreciated to Mr. Burnett's benefit; it would be inequitable 
to allow Mr. Burnett to reap the benefit of the appreciation which Ms. Steeley 
would have received if the property had been deeded to her by April 1, 2006, as 
the judgment required; Mr. Burnett was doing "extraordinarily well financially" 
as reflected by his attempts to negotiate a $3,000,000 loan to expand his 
business interests;  therefore, Mr. 
Burnett had the financial ability to pay and should pay Ms. Steeley in cash the 
outstanding amount plus statutory interest at the rate of ten percent.  The district court granted Ms. Steeley's 
motion to lift the stay and allow her to enforce the judgment.  By subsequent order, the district court 
awarded Ms. Steeley $42,501.00 in attorney's fees and $2,823.86 in costs.  Mr. Burnett appealed from the order 
lifting the stay and allowing enforcement of the judgment and from the order 
awarding attorney's fees.     

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶16]  The orders appealed from in this matter 
decided post-judgment motions filed by a judgment creditor and a judgment 
debtor.  Post-judgment enforcement 
and execution proceedings are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.  Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, 2004 WY 61, 
¶ 19, 90 P.3d 724, 731 (Wyo. 2004).  

         

DISCUSSION

 
 

1.                  
The 
District Court Had the Authority to Order Mr. Burnett in August 2007 to Pay the 
February 2006 Judgment in Cash.

 
 
[¶17]  Mr. Burnett claims that Ms. Steeley's 
motion to lift the stay of execution, filed 18 months after the February 2006 
judgment, was in effect a motion to alter or amend the judgment.  He asserts that the district court was 
constrained by W.R.C.P. 59(e) and 60(b) from ordering him in August of 2007 to 
pay Ms. Steeley in cash when the February 2006 judgment allowed him to pay her 
in cash or property.  He argues that 
the district court could alter the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) only upon a 
party's motion filed no later than ten days after its entry.  Here, no party filed a motion within ten 
days of the February 2006 judgment; therefore, he asserts, Rule 59(e) provides 
no authority for the district court to order him 18 months later to pay Ms. 
Steeley in cash.  

 
 
[¶18]  Mr. Burnett also argues the district 
court could, upon a party's motion within a reasonable time, order relief from 
the February 2006 judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) upon a showing of one of the 
factors enumerated in the rule.2  Because no motion was filed and no 
showing was made of any of the factors identified in Rule 60(b), Mr. Burnett 
argues the district court exceeded its authority in altering the February 2006 
judgment in August 2007 to require him to pay Ms. Steeley in cash.  Mr. Burnett also reiterates the 
arguments he presented in the district court to the effect that he attempted in 
good faith to pay the judgment by transferring property; Ms. Steeley rejected 
his efforts; he had clear title to the property and its value exceeded the 
judgment amount; and the appropriate resolution of the dispute was to order Ms. 
Steeley to accept the transfer of property.

 
 
[¶19]  Ms. Steeley responds that W.R.C.P. 59(e) 
and 60(b) are not applicable to the proceedings giving rise to this appeal.  She asserts that when Mr. Burnett did 
not satisfy the February 2006 judgment by the date required, she was entitled to 
pursue enforcement proceedings and the district court had the discretion to 
enforce the judgment in the manner it did.  
Given Mr. Burnett's failure to pay the judgment as ordered and his 
efforts to delay payment and thwart the district court's ruling that she receive 
an equal share of the marital property, Ms. Steeley contends that he cannot be 
heard to complain now about the manner in which the district court enforced the 
judgment.  

 
 
[¶20]  We agree that the issue before us does 
not concern a modification of a property division, but rather an enforcement 
proceeding brought after the judgment dividing the property became final and 
remained unsatisfied.  The record in 
this case clearly reflects that the district court entered judgment requiring 
Mr. Burnett to pay $417,609 in cash or property by April 1, 2006.  Mr. Burnett did not pay the judgment in 
cash or property by the date the court ordered, nor did he appeal the 
judgment.  Consequently, the 
judgment became final and enforcement proceedings were the next appropriate 
step. 

 
 
[¶21]  On June 20, 2006, Ms. Steeley sought to 
enforce the judgment.  Among the 
enforcement avenues available to her, she elected to proceed under § 17-21-504, 
which allows a judgment creditor to reach a judgment debtor's share of 
partnership distributions in satisfaction of the judgment.  In accordance with that provision, she 
asked the district court to issue an order charging Mr. Burnett's share of any 
partnership distributions due or to become due and appointing a receiver to take 
possession of them.  The district 
court granted her request and entered an order to that effect.  

 
 
[¶22]  When the judgment still remained 
unsatisfied by July of 2007, Ms. Steeley again sought enforcement.  She filed a motion to lift the stay and 
for an order allowing her to proceed under Wyo. Stat. Ann., Title 1, Chapter 17, 
(LexisNexis 2007) to execute on the judgment, meaning the property would be sold 
at auction and the proceeds would be used to pay the outstanding judgment 
amount.  The district court convened 
another hearing during which Mr. Burnett testified that:  

 
 

-                      
he 
had conducted partnership business as usual, including the sale of partnership 
property without court approval, in direct contravention of the court's order to 
refrain from doing so until he satisfied the February 2006 judgment; 

 
 

-                      
with 
the exception of the two parcels he sold in partial satisfaction of the 
judgment, none of the proceeds from the unauthorized sales of partnership 
property was used to satisfy the judgment; 

 
 

-                      
not 
all of the partnership property was included in the court ordered appraisal; 

 
 

-                      
he 
was, at the time of the hearing, in the process of borrowing $3,000,000.00, 
which he planned to use to further his business interests.  

 
 
[¶23]  In addition to Mr. Burnett's testimony, 
the district court also heard Ms. Steeley's testimony that she was unable to 
work due to high levels of anxiety resulting from emotional and physical abuse 
she suffered during the last six years of her marriage.  As a consequence, she used her 
retirement funds (incurring a penalty and income tax) and obtained a home equity 
loan to pay her living expenses, and borrowed money on a credit card to pay her 
attorney's fees.  Ms. Steeley also 
testified that she did not accept the property Mr. Burnett offered in 
satisfaction of the judgment because she could not afford the cost of the 
appraisal required to sell the property and because the proposed transfer 
involved land subject to covenants that required the owner to fence out Mr. 
Burnett's cattle, which graze on the adjoining property where he holds the 
grazing right in perpetuity.  She 
testified that she could not afford the fencing costs, did not live in 
Wyoming to 
maintain the fences and could not afford the cost of marketing and selling the 
property from out of state.  Ms. 
Steeley also testified that Mr. Burnett's last offer to transfer property to her 
required her to first pay him $43,000, money which she did not have.  She further testified that Mr. Burnett 
did not own the property he attempted to convey to her earlier by quitclaim 
deed; rather, the Burnett Ranches Partnership owned the property and it was 
subject to a $600,000 lien and a joint venture agreement.        

 
 
[¶24]  This Court has 
said:

 
 
Courts 
have inherent power to enforce their own judgments and should see to it that 
such judgments are enforced when they are called upon to do so.  To deprive a court of power to execute 
its judgments is to impair its jurisdiction, and the general rule is that every 
court having jurisdiction to render a particular judgment has inherent power and 
authority to enforce it and to exercise equitable control over such 
enforcement.  Thus, a court of 
equity has inherent power to enforce its decrees.  A court of equity retains and possesses 
the power to control the manner of the execution of its decree, and has the 
inherent right to modify, by a subsequent order, the manner in which it shall be 
enforced. 

 

Hurd 
v. Nelson, 
714 P.2d 767, 771 (Wyo. 1986).   Applying these principles in Ahearn v. Ahearn, 993 P.2d 942, 947 
(Wyo. 1999), this Court held that a district court had the authority to order 
father to refund money to his children's bank accounts after withdrawing the 
funds without mother's consent in violation of the court's order.  Citing Hurd, 714 P.2d  at 771, the Court held 
that when father violated its order, the district court was well within its 
powers in ordering him to refund the money.  Although Hurd and Ahearn involve substantially different 
facts than those presented in this case, the principles relied upon in those 
cases are equally applicable here.       

 
 
[¶25]  The judgment in this case was to be paid 
by April 1, 2006.  It was not paid 
and Mr. Burnett's initial offer to transfer property in satisfaction of the 
judgment involved parcels of property to which he did not have clear title. 
 Mr. Burnett's subsequent offers of 
property appear to have included provisions or complications making acceptance 
by Ms. Steeley impossible or at least difficult in light of her financial 
situation and her residence out-of-state.  
Once the February 2006 judgment became final, Ms. Steeley had the legal 
right to proceed with enforcement.  
The fact that those proceedings did not result ultimately in sale of the 
property at auction and distribution of the proceeds to Ms. Steeley as provided 
by the enforcement statutes does not require reversal.  Under the circumstances, the district 
court had the discretion to determine the manner in which to enforce the 
judgment, including the discretion to order Mr. Burnett to pay the unsatisfied 
judgment amount in cash.  

 
 
2.         
The District Court Properly Ordered Mr. Burnett to Pay Interest on the 
Judgment from the Date of the February 2006 Judgment Until He Pays the Judgment 
in Full.

 
 
[¶26]  Mr. Burnett also claims the district 
court erred in ordering him to pay interest on the February 2006 judgment amount 
after May 1, 2007, the date when he offered to convey property by warranty deed 
to Ms. Steeley in satisfaction of the judgment.  He contends that her rejection of his 
offer cannot be the basis for imposing additional interest payments on him.  He cites Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-102(a) 
(LexisNexis 2007) which provides that interest accrues from the time judgment is 
entered "until paid."  Citing Parker v. Artery, 889 P.2d 520, 527 
(Wyo. 1995), 
he argues that the phrase "until paid" includes the tender of a payment due; it 
does not require the tender to be accepted.  On that basis he contends that Ms. 
Steeley's rejection of his May 1, 2007, offer to transfer property by warranty 
deed tolled the accrual of statutory interest.

 
 
[¶27]  In Parker, judgment was entered against the 
defendant and statutory interest began to accrue as of that date.  The defendant filed a motion for leave 
to deposit the judgment amount in court.  
In the motion, the defendant asserted that the plaintiffs had refused to 
accept payment of the judgment pending a ruling on their post-trial motions and 
a possible appeal.  Id. at 527.  The district court allowed the defendant 
to deposit the judgment amount and tolled the accrual of statutory interest as 
of the deposit date.   

 
 
[¶28]  On appeal, this Court held that the 
words "until paid" as used in § 1-16-102(a) do not require the payment of a 
judgment amount to be made and accepted by the prevailing party to toll the 
accrual of statutory interest.  
Id. at 528.  By paying the judgment amount to the 
district court, i.e. surrendering control to the court of the sum necessary to 
discharge the debt, the defendant "paid" the judgment amount and stopped the 
accrual of statutory interest.

 
 
[¶29] 
Unlike the situation in Parker, Mr. 
Burnett did not pay the judgment amount to the district court.  Depositing quitclaim deeds for property 
to which he did not have clear title did not constitute "payment" to the 
district court of the judgment amount such as would stop the accrual of 
statutory interest, nor did his offer to convey property by warranty deed upon 
receipt of $43,000 from the judgment creditor.  Neither of these acts constituted 
surrendering control to the court of the sum necessary to discharge the 
debt.  Id.    

 
 
[¶30]  The other difficulty with Mr. Burnett's 
argument is that, unlike the situation in Parker where the judgment debtor 
deposited the judgment amount with the district court, the record here does not 
establish that any of Mr. Burnett's efforts involved payment of the judgment 
amount.  Mr. Burnett presented no 
evidence to support the conclusion that the quitclaim deeds he deposited with 
the court conveyed property valued at a price equal to the judgment amount.  As for his subsequent offer to convey 
property by warranty deed, Ms. Steeley was under no obligation to accept it 
given that it came over a year after the judgment became final, came after she 
had begun enforcement proceedings, and included a contingency (the payment to 
him of $43,000) that Ms. Steeley testified she could not meet.  Under the circumstances, Mr. Burnett's 
offer did not stop the accrual of statutory interest.   

 
 
3.         
The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion in Awarding 
Attorney's Fees.      

 
 
[¶31]  In Mr. Burnett's consolidated appeal, he 
challenges the district court's order awarding attorney's fees that Ms. Steeley 
expended in her efforts to enforce the February 2006 judgment.  He claims first that the district court 
lacked authority to award attorney's fees because this Court has interpreted 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-111 (LexisNexis 2007) as allowing such an award only for 
fees expended during a divorce proceeding or in an action to enforce a divorce 
decree.  He claims the fees awarded 
here were not expended during the divorce action or in an action to enforce a 
divorce decree but instead were incurred by Ms. Steeley in her efforts to modify 
the final property division judgment. 

 
 
[¶32]  Section 20-2-111 
provides:

 
 
In 
every action brought for divorce, the court may require either party to pay any 
sum necessary to enable the other to carry on or defend the action and for 
support and the support of the children of the parties during its pendency.  The court may decree costs against 
either party and award execution for the costs, or it may direct costs to be 
paid out of any property sequestered, in the power of the court, or in the hands 
of a receiver.  The court may also 
direct payment to either party for such purpose of any sum due and owing from 
any person.

 
 
[¶33]  There is no question that this provision 
allows a party to obtain reimbursement of attorney's fees incurred in original 
divorce actions as well as proceedings to modify or enforce divorce 
decrees.  Roberts v. Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293, 1298 
(Wyo. 1991); Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119, 1129 
(Wyo. 
1985).  In Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 2006 WY 
48, 132 P.3d 189 (Wyo. 2006), we considered an award of attorney's fees and 
costs that the wife incurred in attempting to enforce the district court's 
judgment against the husband.  
Concluding that the wife's efforts were occasioned by husband's continued 
failure to comply with the judgment, we upheld the award.  

 
 
[¶34]  We concluded earlier in this opinion 
that this appeal arose from Ms. Steeley's efforts to enforce the February 2006 
judgment.  As in Breitenstine, her efforts were 
occasioned by her former husband's failure to comply with the judgment.  Mr. Burnett's argument that the award 
was not authorized by § 20-2-111 is without merit.

 
 
[¶35]  Mr. Burnett argues next that, even if 
the district court had the authority to award attorney's fees, the evidence did 
not support the award in this case.  
He claims there was no showing that Ms. Steeley needed reimbursement of 
attorney's fees in order to proceed in the case or protect her interests.  He contends that his payment to her of 
$125,646.12 in the spring of 2007 allowed her to proceed and protect her 
interests.

 
 
[¶36]  On appeal of an award of attorney's 
fees, the burden is on the party attacking the district court's ruling to show 
an abuse of discretion, and the ultimate issue is whether the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did.  Breitenstine, ¶ 19, 132 P.3d  at 
195.  In support of the motion for 
attorney's fees, Ms. Steeley's attorney submitted affidavits and itemized 
billing statements reflecting that as of October 31, 2007, he had billed Ms. 
Steeley the sum of $42,501.00 in attorney's fees and incurred costs in the 
amount of $2,823.86.  Ms. Steeley 
also submitted her own affidavit in which she averred that:  she received no property and no income 
from the marital businesses after the parties separated and prior to the 
divorce; in the divorce, she received very little cash other than her retirement 
funds; she used her retirement funds to establish a home and pay living expenses 
and attorney's fees incurred in obtaining the divorce and collecting the 
judgment; use of her retirement benefits resulted in withdrawal penalties and 
tax liabilities; she used the money she received in partial satisfaction of the 
judgment to pay off debts; and she had no savings or other funds with which to 
pay her attorney's fees.  

 
 
[¶37]  At the district court's request, Ms. 
Steeley also presented the affidavit of David Erickson, attorney at law, 
averring that he had reviewed her attorney's files and in his opinion the fees, 
costs and expenses incurred were reasonable and necessary for the legal work 
performed in attempting to collect and enforce the February 2006 judgment.  Upon consideration of these motions and 
affidavits and the arguments of counsel, the district court entered an order 
granting Ms. Steeley's attorney's fees motion.  Given the evidence presented, Mr. 
Burnett has not met his burden of showing an abuse of discretion.  The district court reasonably concluded 
that Ms. Steeley was entitled to the attorney's fees award.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶38]  After Mr. Burnett failed to satisfy the 
February 2006 judgment, the district court had the authority to enforce it by 
ordering Mr. Burnett to pay the unsatisfied amount in cash.  The district court also properly ordered 
Mr. Burnett to pay statutory interest on the amount owing from the date it 
entered the judgment until it is paid, either by depositing the amount owed with 
the district court or paying Ms. Steeley directly.  Finally, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it awarded attorney's fees that Ms. Steeley incurred 
in enforcing the February 2006 judgment. 

 
 
[¶39]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Mr. 
Burnett's attorney acknowledged the title problems at the July 31, 2007, hearing 
when, in questioning Ms. Steeley, he stated: "There were problems with the 
title" and asked her about discussions she had with Mr. Burnett concerning what 
could be done to clear the title.

 
 

2W.R.C.P. 
60(b) allows relief from a judgment upon a showing of one of the following:  (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could 
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 
fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged or 
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; 
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment.