Case Title: TITLE OFFICE INC V ALLEGAN CO TREASURER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Michigan Supreme Court  
Lansing, Michigan 48909  
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MARCH 9, 2004 
THE TITLE OFFICE, INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
Nos. 121077, 121078 
VAN BUREN COUNTY TREASURER, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
ALLEGAN COUNTY TREASURER, BRANCH
COUNTY TREASURER, HILLSDALE
COUNTY TREASURER, IONIA COUNTY
TREASURER, JACKSON COUNTY
TREASURER, KALAMAZOO COUNTY
TREASURER, AND LIVINGSTON COUNTY
TREASURER, 
Defendants. 
_______________________________ 
THE TITLE OFFICE, INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
Nos. 121177, 121178 
ALLEGAN COUNTY TREASURER, BRANCH
COUNTY TREASURER, HILLSDALE
COUNTY TREASURER, IONIA COUNTY
TREASURER, JACKSON COUNTY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
  
 
TREASURER, KALAMAZOO COUNTY
TREASURER, AND LIVINGSTON COUNTY
TREASURER, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
VAN BUREN COUNTY TREASURER, 
Defendant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CAVANAGH, J. 
We granted leave to appeal in this case to determine 
whether the fees for copies of property tax records 
requested from a county treasurer are computed according to 
the fee schedule provided in the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq., or that provided in the 
transcripts and abstracts of records act (TARA), MCL 
48.101. The unambiguous language of both statutes leads us 
to conclude that the fees are to be computed according to 
the fee schedule provided in TARA. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
On February 27, 1998, plaintiff, The Title Office, 
Inc., requested an electronic copy of Van Buren County’s 
property tax records and delinquent tax records for 1996 
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and 1997.1  Defendant, Van Buren County Treasurer, used the 
TARA fee schedule, MCL 48.101, to calculate the fee for 
providing the copies and provided an estimate of $26,700. 
Plaintiff filed mandamus actions in several counties 
asking the courts to direct the counties to compute the fee 
under FOIA, rather than TARA. 
The cases against eight 
county treasurers were consolidated in Livingston County. 
The circuit court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary 
disposition. 
Defendants filed two appeals with the Court of 
Appeals, which that Court consolidated.2
 Because it was 
bound by Oakland Co Treasurer v Title Office, Inc, 245 Mich 
App 196; 627 NW2d 317 (2001), the Court of Appeals 
affirmed. 
Title Office, Inc v Van Buren County Treasurer, 
249 Mich App 322; 643 NW2d 244 (2002). 
The Court of 
Appeals panel requested that the Chief Judge convene a 
special conflict panel to address the issue, but the 
request was denied. 
249 Mich App 805 (2002). 
Defendant, 
Van Buren County Treasurer, filed a timely application for 
leave to appeal. 
The remaining defendants filed a delayed 
1 At the same time, plaintiff made similar requests in
the counties of Allegan, Branch, Hillsdale, Ionia, Jackson,
Kalamazoo, and Livingston. 
2 The Van Buren County Treasurer filed one appeal and
the remaining county treasurers filed the other.
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application for leave to appeal. 
We consolidated the 
applications and granted leave.3 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary 
disposition on the basis of its interpretation of FOIA and 
TARA. 
This Court reviews de novo the grant or denial of 
summary disposition. 
American Federation of State, Co and 
Municipal Employees v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 398; 662 NW2d 
695 
(2003). 
Similarly, 
questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation are reviewed de novo. 
Omelenchuk v City of 
Warren, 466 Mich 524, 527; 647 NW2d 493 (2002). 
III. DISCUSSION 
The 
issue 
in 
this 
case 
is 
one 
of 
statutory 
construction. 
We must determine whether the fees for 
copies of property tax records are to be computed according 
to the fee schedule in FOIA or TARA. “The primary goal of 
statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of 
the Legislature.” 
In re MCI, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 
The order granting leave directed the parties to
address 
the meaning, at the time of enactment, of 
“transcript” in 1895 PA 161 as amended, MCL 
48.101, and whether by use of “transcript of any
paper 
or 
record 
on 
file” 
the 
Legislature
originally intended the act to cover subsequently
developed means of document reproduction. [468
Mich 881 (2003).] 
4  
3 
 
 
 
 
164 (1999). 
To discern the legislative intent, this Court 
must first examine the language of the statute itself. 
If 
the statute is unambiguous it must be enforced as written. 
Id. 
Section 4 of FOIA sets forth the fees a municipality 
may charge a party requesting public records: 
(1) 
A public body may charge a fee for a
public record search, the necessary copying of a
public record for inspection, or for providing a
copy of the record. 
Subject to subsections (3)
and (4), the fee shall be limited to the actual
mailing costs, and to the actual incremental 
costs of duplication or publication including 
labor, the cost of search, examination, review,
and the deletion and separation of exempt from 
nonexempt information as provided in Section 14.
[MCL 15.244.] 
A search for a public record may
be conducted or copies of the public record may
be furnished without charge or a reduced charge
if the public body determines that a waiver or
reduction of the fee is in the public interest
because searching for or furnishing copies of the
public record can be considered as primarily
benefiting the general public. 
A public record
search shall be made and a copy of public records
shall be furnished without charge for the first
$20 of the fee for each request to an individual
who is entitled to information under this act and 
who submits an affidavit stating the individual
is then receiving public assistance or if not
receiving 
public 
assistance, 
stating 
facts 
showing inability to pay the cost because of
indigency. 
* 
* 
* 
(3) In 
calculating 
the 
cost 
of 
labor 
incurred in duplication and mailing and the cost
of examination, review, separation, and deletion
under subsection (1), a public body may not 
charge more than the hourly wage of the lowest
paid public body employee capable of retrieving
the information necessary to comply with the 
request under this act. 
Fees shall be uniform 
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and shall not be dependent upon the identity of
the requesting person. 
A public body shall 
utilize the most economical means available for 
making copies of public records. A fee shall not 
be 
charged 
for 
the 
cost 
of 
the 
search,
examination, 
review, 
and 
the 
deletion 
and 
separation of exempt from nonexempt information
as provided in Section 14 unless failure to 
charge a fee would result in unreasonably high 
cost to the public body because of the nature of
the request in the particular interest and the 
public body specifically identifies the nature of
these unreasonably high costs. 
A public body
shall 
establish 
and 
publish 
procedures 
and 
guidelines to implement this subsection. [MCL
15.234.] 
Subsection 4 excludes certain records: 
This section does not apply to public
records 
prepared 
under 
an 
act 
or 
statute 
specifically authorizing the sale of those public
records to the public, or if the amount of the
fee for providing a copy of the public record is
otherwise specifically provided by an act or 
statute. [MCL 15.234(4).] 
Thus, FOIA makes it clear that if TARA is “an act or 
statute specifically authorizing the sale” of public 
records or if TARA specifically provides the amount of the 
fee for providing a copy of the public record, the FOIA fee 
provisions do not apply. MCL 15.234(4). 
It is clear from the text of TARA that it specifically 
provides the amount of the fee for providing a copy of “any 
paper or record on file in the treasurer’s office.” 
MCL 
48.101(1). TARA provides: 
(1) A county treasurer shall make upon
request a transcript of any paper or record on 
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file in the treasurer’s office for the following
fees: 
(a) 
For 
an 
abstract 
of 
taxes 
on 
any
description of land, 25 cents for each year
covered in the abstract. 
(b) For an abstract with statement of name 
and residence of taxpayers, 25 cents per year for
each description of land covered by the abstract. 
(c) For list of state tax lands or state 
bids, 25 cents for each description of land on
the list. 
(d) For 1 copy of any paper or document at
the rate of 25 cents per 100 words. 
(e) For each certificate, 25 cents. [MCL
48.101.] 
Because TARA specifically provides the amount of the 
fee for providing a copy of a public record it falls within 
MCL 15.234(4), and the FOIA fee provisions do not apply. 
But plaintiff argues that each electronic copy it requested 
is not a “transcript” of the property tax records and, 
therefore, TARA is not applicable and the FOIA fee 
provisions should govern. 
We disagree. 
TARA does not 
define “transcript.” 
Accordingly, we are required to give 
the term its plain and ordinary meaning. 
When determining 
the 
common, 
ordinary 
meaning 
of 
a 
word 
or 
phrase, 
consulting a dictionary is appropriate. 
Stanton v Battle 
Creek, 466 Mich 611, 617; 647 NW2d 508 (2002). 
At the time of the enactment of TARA in 1895, the term 
“transcript” was defined in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (New 
ed by Rawle, 1897), as “[a] copy of an original writing or 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
deed.” 
Likewise, 
Webster’s 
International 
Dictionary 
(1890), defined “transcript” as: 
1. That which has been transcribed: a 
writing composition consisting of the same words
as the original a written copy. 
2.  A copy of any kind; an imitation. 
We believe the Legislature intended this ordinary meaning 
of “transcript” at the time of the enactment of TARA to 
apply, rather than the strained definition plaintiff urges. 
Plaintiff’s argument is based on its assertion that 
TARA governs only written or paper copies. 
Plaintiff 
attempts to draw a line at some point during the twentieth 
century by excluding all technological advances postdating 
the copy machine from the definition of “transcript.” 
Plaintiff argues that photocopies are transcripts, but 
electronic copies are not. 
This argument disregards many 
of the technological advances made in the last century and 
ignores the fact that TARA does not contain the term 
“written,” nor does it refer to “paper copies.” We decline 
to adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in Oakland 
Co Treasurer v Title Office, Inc, 245 Mich App 196; 627 
NW2d 317 (2001), and we decline to confine TARA to paper or 
written copies. “Transcript,” as used in the statute, is a 
much broader term, intended to apply to any reproduction of 
a record on file in the treasurer’s office. 
An electronic 
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copy of property tax records qualifies as a “transcript” 
for purposes of TARA. 
Plaintiff has clearly requested a 
“transcript” of records on file in the treasurer’s office. 
Because Oakland Co Treasurer conflicts with this 
holding, it is overruled. 
Rather than examining the plain 
meaning of “transcript,” the panel in Oakland Co Treasurer 
based its holding on the notion that the 1895 Legislature 
did not contemplate electronic copies when enacting TARA. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We hold that electronic copies of property tax records 
are “transcripts” within the meaning of TARA and, thus, the 
fees for their reproduction are those delineated in TARA, 
not FOIA. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
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