Case Title: Rondack Construction Services, Inc. v. Kaatsbaan International Dance Center, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 137  
Rondack Construction Services, 
Inc.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Kaatsbaan International Dance 
Center, Inc.,
            Respondent, 
TBays, LLC,
            Nonparty Appellant.
Richard I. Cantor, for nonparty-appellant.
Malcolm S. Taub, for respondent Kaatsbaan International
Dance Center, Inc.
GRAFFEO, J.:
In this case, we reaffirm Tiffany v St. John (65 NY 314
[1875]) and hold that a judgment debtor's tender to the sheriff
before its property is auctioned at a judicial sale automatically
discharges the execution lien, terminating the sheriff's
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authority to sell the property.
In early 2006, plaintiff Rondack Construction Services,
Inc. obtained a default judgment against defendant Kaatsbaan
International Dance Center, Inc. for $105,631.05 based on
Kaatsbaan's failure to pay a promissory note.  When Kaatsbaan did
not satisfy the judgment, Rondack delivered an execution
directing the Dutchess County Sheriff to sell a 53-acre parcel
owned by Kaatsbaan.  The Sheriff scheduled a judicial auction and
sale of the property for 11:00 A.M. on September 6, 2006.
The auction commenced as planned.  Before bidding
began, Kaatsbaan's Executive Director asked the lieutenant from
the Sheriff's department whether the sale could be prevented by
satisfying the judgment with a check.  The lieutenant phoned the
County Attorney's office for legal advice and, while awaiting its
response, Kaatsbaan's agent offered him a cashier's check for
$116,754.15, an amount sufficient to satisfy the judgment,
together with interest, poundage and other related fees.  After
receiving instructions from the County Attorney's office, the
lieutenant refused the tender and proceeded with the sale.  A bid
of $118,000 made on behalf of TBays, LLC was accepted as the
highest bid.
On September 13th, Kaatsbaan moved to vacate the sale
and compel the Sheriff to accept its check in full satisfaction
of the judgment.  TBays cross-moved to direct the Sheriff to
execute and deliver the deed and related documents.
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No. 137
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Supreme Court denied Kaatsbaan's motion and granted
TBays' cross motion.  The Appellate Division reversed, thereby
granting Kaatsbaan's motion to vacate the sale and compel the
Sheriff to accept the check (54 AD3d 924 [2d Dept 2008]). 
Relying on Tiffany, the court held that Kaatsbaan's pre-sale
tender discharged the execution lien, and therefore, the Sheriff
lacked capacity to sell the parcel.
In granting leave to appeal, the Appellate Division
certified the following question: "Was the decision and order of
this court dated September 23, 2008, properly made?"  We now
answer the question in the affirmative.
In Tiffany, the sheriff levied on a judgment debtor's
boat pursuant to an execution and proceeded to sell it at a
public auction.  Before bidding began, the judgment debtor
tendered to the sheriff an amount sufficient to satisfy the
judgment and all associated costs.  The sheriff refused the
tender and sold the boat to the highest bidder.  Analogizing to
the common-law equity of redemption in the mortgage foreclosure
context, this Court held more than a century ago that, under
these circumstances, the tender was the equivalent of payment and
had the "instantaneous effect" of discharging the lien created by
the execution (65 NY at 318).  Consequently, the sheriff lost the
authority to sell the property, resulting in an improper
conveyance.
TBays acknowledges that Tiffany compels an affirmance
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No. 137
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if it remains good law.  It urges, however, that the CPLR article
52 procedures relating to the enforcement of money judgments --
and CPLR 5236 and 5240 in particular -- abrogated the common-law
rule articulated by Tiffany.  We disagree.
CPLR 5236 delineates the procedures applicable to a
sheriff's sale of a judgment debtor's real property.  In Guardian
Loan Co. v Early (47 NY2d 515 [1979]), we noted that CPLR 5236
abolished the debtor's statutory right (codified in the former
Civil Practice Act) to redeem property after it had been sold at
auction.  The enactment of CPLR 5236, however, did not alter a
debtor's right to recover property before a judicial sale.  In
fact, CPLR 5236 (a) preserves "a kind of 'redemption' period"
because it requires at least an eight-week time frame between the
posting of notice and the sale itself (10th Ann Rep of NY Jud
Conf, at 123).  We believe that Tiffany, which effectively
permits a judgment debtor to redeem by tendering full payment to
the sheriff before the property is sold at auction, is fully
compatible with CPLR 5236 and remains an accurate statement of
New York law.
TBays' reliance on CPLR 5240 is similarly misplaced. 
CPLR 5240 allows a court to issue a protective order "denying,
limiting, conditioning, regulating, extending or modifying the
use of any enforcement procedure."  We have observed that this
provision "grants the courts broad discretionary power to control
and regulate the enforcement of a money judgment under article 52
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to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment,
disadvantage, or other prejudice to any person or the courts"
(Guardian, 47 NY2d at 519 [internal quotation marks and citation
omitted]).  But nothing in CPLR 5240 explicitly or implicitly
supplants Tiffany.  A property owner who desires to tender the
appropriate amount before the actual sale is free to do so
without the need to move under CPLR 5240.  Stated differently,
property owners possess a common-law right under Tiffany to
redeem their property before sale without judicial intervention.
Here, as in Tiffany, Kaatsbaan timely tendered an
amount sufficient to satisfy the judgment and all fees and
expenses.  Kaatsbaan's tender extinguished the lien and
foreclosed the sale of the property.  The Appellate Division
therefore properly granted Kaatsbaan's motion to set aside the
sale and compel the Sheriff to accept its check in full
satisfaction of the judgment.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed, without costs, and the certified question answered
in the affirmative.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed, without costs, and certified question answered in
the affirmative.  Opinion by Judge Graffeo.  Chief Judge Lippman
and Judges Ciparick, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided December 15, 2009