Case Title: In re Lira

Citation: 

Docket Number: S204582

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2014-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 2/3/14 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
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In re JOHNNY LIRA 
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S204582 
 
 
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                on Habeas Corpus. 
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Ct.App. 6 H036162 
 
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Santa Clara County 
 
 
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Super. Ct. No. 76836 
 
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A life inmate is found suitable for parole and given a parole date by the 
Board of Parole Hearings (the Board).  The Governor reverses the grant of parole, 
the inmate challenges the reversal by petition for writ of habeas corpus, and while 
the petition is pending the Board again finds the inmate suitable and sets another 
parole date.  The Governor does not review the second decision, and the inmate is 
released from prison, subject to a maximum five-year parole term under the 
applicable statute.  If the court subsequently grants relief on the inmate’s habeas 
corpus petition and overturns the Governor’s earlier reversal for want of 
supporting evidence, is the inmate entitled to credit against his parole term for the 
time he spent in prison between the erroneous reversal and his eventual release?  
We conclude he is not. 
 
2 
 
I.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Because the circumstances of the underlying offense are not relevant to the 
issue before us, we summarize them only briefly.  Lira was convicted of second 
degree murder for the 1980 shooting death of his estranged wife.  He was 
sentenced in 1981 to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in prison, 
consecutive to a two-year firearm use enhancement, and was subject to a parole 
term not to exceed five years upon his release.  (Pen. Code, former §§ 3000, subd. 
(b), 3001, subd. (b); Stats. 1978, ch. 582, §§ 1, 2, pp. 2003, 2004.1)   
In December 2005, the Board denied Lira parole for the ninth time, a denial 
Lira successfully challenged by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 
superior court.  The superior court, in an order affirmed on appeal, ordered a new 
parole hearing, which the Board conducted in November 2008.  At the new 
hearing the Board found Lira suitable for parole, a decision then-Governor 
Schwarzenegger reversed in April 2009.  Lira challenged the Governor’s reversal 
by filing a second habeas corpus petition in superior court.  While that petition 
was pending, at a regularly scheduled parole hearing on November 3, 2009, the 
Board again found Lira suitable for parole, a decision the Governor declined to 
review.  Lira was paroled on April 8, 2010.   
Lira then filed a supplemental habeas corpus petition, arguing that his 
release did not moot the pending petition challenging the Governor’s reversal of 
the Board’s 2008 finding of suitability, and seeking credit against his parole term 
for all the time he spent in prison after the Board’s deficient 2005 unsuitability 
finding.  The superior court granted relief, finding the Board and the Governor had 
each acted unlawfully in denying Lira parole and ordering that he receive credit 
against his parole term for the period spanning the date on which a favorable 2005 
                                              
1  
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.  
 
3 
 
parole decision by the Board would have been effective to the date of Lira’s actual 
release from prison.  The Attorney General, on behalf of respondent, appealed.   
The Court of Appeal rejected Lira’s argument that he was entitled to credit 
for the entire period he spent in prison following the Board’s deficient 2005 
suitability finding, but affirmed the superior court’s conclusion that the 
Governor’s reversal of the Board’s 2008 parole grant was not supported by “some 
evidence” as required by law.  (See In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1220-
1221; In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 677.)  The court modified the 
order granting relief to provide credit only for the yearlong period between the 
Governor’s 2009 reversal and Lira’s actual 2010 release on parole.   
We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review, which raised only 
the credit issue.2 
II.   DISCUSSION 
No statute governing sentence credit specifically authorizes credit against a 
parole term under the present set of facts, but Lira argues sections 2900 and 
2900.5 together provide the foundation for his claim.  Section 2900, subdivision 
(c), provides that all time served in custody is to be credited as service of the term 
of imprisonment, which in turn is defined in section 2900.5, subdivision (c), to 
include any period of imprisonment and parole.  Lira argues his confinement 
beyond the date on which the Board’s suitability decision would have become 
                                              
2  
The Attorney General does not challenge the Court of Appeal’s 
determination that the Governor’s April 2009 reversal of the Board’s parole 
decision violated applicable law because it was unsupported by some evidence.  
We therefore do not address that determination. 
 
4 
 
effective, but for the Governor’s reversal, was unlawful and, as such, should be 
credited not against his term of imprisonment but against his term of parole.3   
The Attorney General contends there was nothing unlawful about Lira’s 
confinement, and that all of the time he spent in custody was properly credited to 
his life term of imprisonment.  The Attorney General argues, as well, that 
recognition of a credit against Lira’s parole period would conflict with former 
section 3001, subdivision (b), which she contends should be read as providing that 
the period of parole begins only after release from prison and not on some 
theoretical retrospective date, such as the date the Board’s decision would have 
taken effect.   
We first summarize the statutes that are most relevant to the issues presented 
in this case.   
Sections 3000 and 3001, in the Penal Code chapter entitled “Length of Term 
of Imprisonment and Paroles,” set forth the general requirement of a period of 
parole and its length, respectively.  At the time of Lira’s crime and thus as 
applicable here, section 3000 provided in pertinent part:  “The Legislature finds 
and declares that the period immediately following incarceration is critical to 
successful reintegration of the offender into society and to positive citizenship.  It 
is in the interest of public safety for the state to provide for the supervision of and 
surveillance of parolees and to provide educational, vocational, family and 
personal counseling necessary to assist parolees in the transition between 
imprisonment and discharge.  A sentence pursuant to Section 1168 [providing for 
indeterminate sentencing] . . . shall include a period of parole, unless waived, as 
                                              
3  
A decision of the Board finding an inmate suitable for parole becomes final 
as to the Board within 120 days of the date of the hearing.  (§ 3041, subd. (b).)  
The Governor then has 30 days within which to review the Board’s decision.  
(§ 3041.2, subd. (a); see In re Tokhmanian (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1270.) 
5 
 
provided in this section.”4  Subdivision (b) of the statute provided for a maximum 
parole period of five years for an inmate, like Lira, who was imprisoned for 
second degree murder committed before 1983.  (Stats. 1978, ch. 582, § 1, p. 2003.)   
Section 3001, subdivision (b), at the time of Lira’s crime and as relevant 
here, provided:  “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when any person 
referred to in subdivision (b) of Section 3000 has been released on parole from the 
state prison, and has been on parole continuously for three years since release from 
confinement, the board shall, within 30 days, discharge such person from parole, 
unless the board, for good cause, determines that such person will be retained on 
parole.”  (Stats. 1978, ch. 582, § 2, p. 2004.)  Thus, although the maximum period 
of parole under the version of section 3000 applicable here is five years, a parolee 
will be discharged after service of three years’ continuous parole unless the Board 
makes the requisite good-cause finding.5  (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2535 et 
seq. [timing of and criteria to be employed in Board’s parole discharge review]; 
see generally In re Carr (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 209.)   
Sections 2900 and 2900.5, comprising part of article 1, “Commencement of 
Term,” in the chapter entitled “Execution of Sentences of Imprisonment,” require 
that time served in custody be credited against the sentence fixed by the judgment 
in a criminal action.  Subdivision (c) of section 2900 states that, with exceptions 
                                              
4  
The final sentence of section 3000, subdivision (a)(1) currently provides:  
“A sentence resulting in imprisonment in the state prison pursuant to Section 1168 
or 1170 shall include a period of parole supervision or postrelease community 
supervision, unless waived, or as otherwise provided in this article.”   
 
5  
Section 3000.1 now provides for a possible lifetime period of parole for a 
person convicted of second degree murder, with discharge after five continuous 
years on parole unless the Board, for good cause, decides to retain the person on 
parole.  (§ 3000.1, subds. (a)(1), (b).)  The requirement of a lifetime parole term is 
not retroactive and thus does not apply to this case.  (In re Carabes (1983) 144 
Cal.App.3d 927, 930, fn. 1.) 
6 
 
not relevant here, “all time served in an institution designated by the Director of 
Corrections shall be credited as service of the term of imprisonment.”  Section 
2900.5, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part:  “In all felony . . . convictions, 
. . . when the defendant has been in custody, including, but not limited to, any time 
spent in a . . . prison . . . , all days of custody of the defendant . . . shall be credited 
upon his or her term of imprisonment . . . .”  Subdivision (c) of section 2900.5 in 
turn provides:  “For the purposes of this section, ‘term of imprisonment’ includes 
any period of imprisonment imposed as a condition of probation or otherwise 
ordered by a court in imposing or suspending the imposition of any sentence, and 
also includes any term of imprisonment, including any period of imprisonment 
prior to release on parole and any period of imprisonment and parole, prior to 
discharge . . . .” 
Lira contends the Court of Appeal correctly concluded that his term of 
imprisonment properly ended on the date when he would have been released 
pursuant to the Board’s 2009 parole grant but for the Governor’s unsupported 
reversal, that the days he spent in custody between that date and the date of his 
eventual release constituted unlawful imprisonment, and that this period of 
assertedly unlawful imprisonment must be credited against his parole term under 
sections 2900 and 2900.5.  In support, he cites In re Bush (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 
133 (Bush), but that case does not assist him.   
In Bush, a life prisoner claimed he was entitled to have his parole period 
reduced by time he spent in custody in excess of the base term ultimately set by 
the Board.  In rejecting the claim, the court observed that the California Code of 
Regulations provides that a prisoner who has served more time in custody than the 
base term is entitled to immediate release, but is silent regarding any credit against 
the inmate’s parole term.  (Bush, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 142, citing Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2289.)  Contrary to the prisoner’s argument, the court held 
7 
 
that California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2345, providing that “ ‘[i]f 
any custody credit remains after deducting it from the offense to which it applies, 
the remaining credit shall be deducted from the parole period,’ ” did not dictate 
recognition of such credit in the case of a life prisoner.  That section, the court 
reasoned, applies to determinate-term prisoners whose presentence custody credit 
exceeds the sentence imposed, and results not only in the prisoners’ not having to 
serve any prison time but in reduction of the parole period.  (Bush, supra, at p. 
143.)  For life prisoners, the court noted, preprison credits are taken into account 
when the Board sets the base term, being applied to the base term itself to reduce 
its length.  (Ibid., citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2289.)   
The Bush court further rejected the prisoner’s contention that section 2900.5, 
subdivision (c)’s definition of “term of imprisonment,” relating to the term against 
which custody must be credited, should be understood as limited to the base term 
ultimately set by the Board.  The court construed section 2900.5, subdivision (c) to 
mean “ ‘any period of imprisonment lawfully served,’ ” including the time a 
prisoner “lawfully spends in prison custody awaiting a determination of suitability 
for parole, a construction of the statute that is consistent with the statutory scheme 
and promotes public policy.”  (Bush, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 143.)  True, as 
Lira argues, the superior court in Bush had ordered that the prisoner receive credit 
against his parole period for time spent in prison custody after the last date he 
could have been lawfully held (the date his suitability determination became final), 
a four-month period attributable to the Governor’s belated and ineffective request 
for en banc review of the Board’s suitability determination.  (Id. at pp. 139, 143, 
fn. 4.)  But because the Attorney General did not challenge that order, the Court of 
Appeal had no occasion to address its propriety; Bush therefore is not authority for 
the proposition that a parolee is entitled to credit against his or her parole term for 
excess time in custody. 
8 
 
Lira nevertheless focuses on the Bush court’s reference to the time a prisoner 
lawfully spends in prison custody as being credited against the prisoner’s term of 
imprisonment, inferring that time unlawfully spent in custody must be credited 
against the parole period.  He contends the period at issue in the present case was 
time unlawfully spent in custody because a court later determined the Governor’s 
reversal was unsupported. 
Lira’s argument overlooks the significance of the Governor’s independent 
constitutional authority to review parole suitability determinations.  (Cal. Const., 
art. V, § 8, subd. (b); see § 3041.2.)  “The Governor has the authority to weigh 
suitability factors differently from the Board:  ‘Although “the Governor’s decision 
must be based upon the same factors that restrict the Board in rendering its parole 
decision” [citation], the Governor undertakes an independent, de novo review of 
the inmate’s suitability for parole.  [Citation.]  Accordingly, the Governor has 
discretion to be “more stringent or cautious” in determining whether a defendant 
poses an unreasonable risk to public safety.’  [Citation.]”  (In re Prather (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 238, 257, fn. 12 (Prather).)  The Governor’s suitability review process 
takes time and, like other official duties, is presumed to be correctly carried out 
unless the contrary is established in appropriate proceedings.  (Evid. Code, § 664.)  
The normal functioning of the Board’s periodic parole hearing process likewise 
takes time.  Moreover, even when a court determines that a gubernatorial reversal 
of a parole decision is unsupported, the remedy is not an order for the inmate’s 
immediate release; rather, the court vacates the Governor’s reversal, reinstates the 
Board’s grant of parole, and directs the Board to conduct its usual proceedings for 
a release on parole.  This allows the Board to account for any recent developments 
reflecting on the inmate’s suitability for parole, and to rescind its grant if 
appropriate.  (In re Twinn (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 447, 473-474; cf. Prather, 
supra, at p. 258.)  There is, thus, little room for Lira to argue that the Governor’s 
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reversal, later judicially determined to be unsupported, somehow retroactively 
rendered unlawful the period of his continued incarceration during the pendency 
of these processes.   
We therefore agree with the Attorney General that Lira was lawfully 
imprisoned during this period until the day he was released, and that he received 
credit against his term of life imprisonment for all such days and is not entitled to 
any credit against his parole term. 
Lira relies on certain decisions in which courts ordered that credits be applied 
to shorten the inmate’s parole term.  Those cases are distinguishable as involving 
ministerial application of various types of sentence credits earned by determinate-
term prisoners, not discretionary decisions by the executive branch regarding 
parole of life prisoners.  (E.g., In re Randolph (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 
[credits for time out-to-court]; In re Anderson (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 472, 476 
[presentence custody and conduct credits]; In re Ballard (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 
647, 650 [same]; In re Carter (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 271, 273 [worktime credits]; 
In re Reina (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 638, 642 [day-for-day custody credits].)  The 
considerations informing the sentence credit decisions Lira cites are inapplicable 
here.  For the reasons previously discussed (see ante, at pp. 7-8), Lira’s reliance on 
Bush, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at page 143, footnote 4, is likewise misplaced.   
Lira’s effort to shorten his parole term based on the asserted unlawfulness of 
the portion of his term of imprisonment that followed the Governor’s 2009 
reversal also runs afoul of the rule that a parole term begins only after release from 
prison.  In In re Chaudhary (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 32, a life prisoner sentenced 
after 1983 was subject under section 3000.1 to a lifetime parole term, with 
eligibility for discharge “ ‘when [he] has been released on parole from the state 
prison, and has been on parole continuously for . . . five years . . . since release 
from confinement . . . .’ ”  (In re Chaudhary, supra, at p. 37, quoting 
10 
 
§ 3000.1, subd. (b).)  As in this case, the prisoner’s release was delayed while the 
Governor’s reversal of the parole grant was being litigated; the reversal was 
eventually set aside on appeal, leading to the prisoner’s release on parole.  The 
prisoner claimed credit against his parole term for the period between when his 
parole grant would have taken effect and his actual release date.  The Court of 
Appeal rejected the claim, noting that “[s]ection 3000.1’s five-year parole 
discharge eligibility requirement is expressly limited to the period of time after the 
parolee ‘has been released on parole’ and requires that the parolee serve five 
continuous years on parole ‘since [the parolee’s] release from confinement.’ ”  (In 
re Chaudhary, supra, at p. 37.)  The court added:  “By placing these explicit 
limitations on the parole discharge eligibility requirement, the Legislature made 
unmistakably clear that a parolee must first have ‘been released on parole’ and 
must then complete five continuous years on parole after the parolee’s ‘release 
from confinement.’  This intent explicitly precludes the application of any time 
spent in custody prior to release to satisfy any part of section 3000.1’s five-year 
parole discharge eligibility requirement.”  (Ibid.; see also In re Gomez (2010) 190 
Cal.App.4th 1291, 1310.) 
Although this case does not involve section 3000.1’s five-year minimum 
parole discharge eligibility requirement in the context of a potential lifetime parole 
period, the language of the portion of former section 3001, subdivision (b) 
pertinent to this case is similar, and the Chaudhary court’s analysis is therefore 
relevant and persuasive.  In our view, Lira’s argument (that a court’s subsequent 
decision that the Governor’s reversal was unsupported by some evidence rendered 
unlawful his custody during the intervening period, retroactively necessitating a 
credit against his parole term) would undermine the Legislature’s intent in 
requiring the service of three continuous years of parole after release from 
confinement and therefore must be rejected.  (Former § 3001, subd. (b).) 
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Lira also overlooks the significant separation of powers issues the rule he 
asks us to adopt would raise.  “ ‘The separation of powers principle is embodied in 
the California Constitution, which provides as follows in article III, section 3:  
“The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial.  Persons 
charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others 
except as permitted by this Constitution.”  “ ‘The separation of powers doctrine 
limits the authority of one of the three branches of government to arrogate to itself 
the core functions of another branch.  [Citations.]’  [Citation.]”  [Citation.]  
Although the doctrine is not intended to prohibit one branch from taking action 
that might affect those of another branch, the doctrine is violated when the actions 
of one branch “defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another 
branch.”  [Citation.]  [Citation.]  Intrusions by the judiciary into the executive 
branch’s realm of parole matters may violate the separation of powers.’ ”  
(Prather, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 254-255.)   
As the applicable statutes make clear, whether a period of parole is to be 
required and, if so, its duration and conditions are matters for the Board.  
(§§ 3000, 3001, subd. (b); see also People v. McMillion (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 
1363, 1368-1369.)  The Legislature has decreed that “the period immediately 
following incarceration is critical to successful reintegration of the offender into 
society and to positive citizenship.”  (§ 3000, subd. (a)(1).)  This remains true even 
when the Governor’s reversal of a Board decision is unsupported and delays the 
prisoner’s release from prison.  Such circumstances, while unfortunate, do not 
diminish the Board’s responsibility to decide, based on the factors it has identified 
as relevant, whether to retain a parolee on parole for as long as the law permits.  
(See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2535, subd. (d) [retention criteria include nature of 
commitment offense, institutional adjustment, parole adjustment, whether the 
parolee has been returned to custody for controlled substance or psychiatric 
12 
 
treatment, and special need for continued supervision for the safety of the parolee 
or the public].)  A court’s general authority, on habeas corpus, to craft a remedy 
“ ‘as the justice of the case may require’ ” (In re Crow (1971) 4 Cal.3d 613, 619, 
quoting § 1484) cannot license it to interfere with the Board’s control over the 
length of a prisoner’s parole term in the absence of specific statutory authorization 
not present here. 
Lira contends he is entitled to the credit he seeks as a matter of fundamental 
fairness, founded in substantive due process.  He points to language in In re 
Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th 1181, and In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616, 
acknowledging that, in light of the constitutional liberty interest at stake, a court’s 
review of parole suitability decisions encompasses more than “a purely procedural 
standard of review,” and is “sufficiently robust to reveal and remedy any evident 
deprivation of constitutional rights.”  (In re Lawrence, supra, at p. 1211, citing In 
re Rosenkrantz, supra, at p. 664.)  In that context, we held that, “when a court 
reviews a decision of the Board or the Governor, the relevant inquiry is whether 
some evidence supports the decision of the Board or the Governor that the inmate 
constitutes a current threat to public safety, and not merely whether some evidence 
confirms the existence of certain factual findings.”  (In re Lawrence, supra, at p. 
1212, italics omitted.)  But nothing in our disavowal of a purely formal or 
procedural standard of review of executive parole suitability decisions can be 
extrapolated to the present context to support a remedy that would effectively 
impose judicial control over the length of a parole term based on a parolee’s claim 
that a suitability decision later judicially determined to be unsupported somehow 
rendered his confinement retroactively unlawful. 
As the Attorney General correctly observes, the United States Supreme 
Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence “forbids the government to infringe 
certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, 
13 
 
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”  
(Reno v. Flores (1993) 507 U.S. 292, 302.)  Substantive due process analysis 
begins with a “ ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”  
(Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) 521 U.S. 702, 721.)  This “careful description” 
must be concrete and particularized, rather than abstract and general.  (Dawn D. v. 
Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 932, 940.)   
Lira fails to propose such a description of the interest he asserts here.  A life 
prisoner “ ‘ “has no ‘vested right’ to have his sentence fixed at the term first 
prescribed by the [parole authority] ‘or any other period less than the maximum 
sentence provided by statute.’ ” ’ ”  (In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 
1097; see Swarthout v. Cooke (2011) 562 U.S. ___ [178 L.Ed.2d 732, 736, 131 
S.Ct. 859, 862] [there is no right under the federal Const. to conditional release 
before the expiration of a valid sentence]; Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates 
(1979) 442 U.S. 1, 7.)  While a life prisoner like Lira surely has a right to parole 
proceedings that comply with procedural due process, to a factually supported 
suitability decision, and to timely release from imprisonment upon a final 
determination of suitability, Lira fails to show he has a fundamental right to credit 
against a legislatively prescribed period of parole supervision as a judicial remedy 
for a temporary infringement of his right to a factually supported suitability 
decision by the executive branch.  (Cf. § 3000.1, subd. (a)(1) [life parole period 
for persons convicted of first or second degree murder]; In re Chaudhary, supra, 
172 Cal.App.4th at p. 38 [“There is no way to apply ‘credits’ to a lifetime parole 
period.”].)6 
                                              
6  
We reject any suggestion that Lira is entitled to credit against his parole 
term based on his assertion that the Governor, in reversing the Board’s 2008 
decision finding him suitable for parole, violated or ignored prior court rulings in 
his case.  The assertion finds no support in the record.   
 
14 
 
 
III.   DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded to that court with directions to order the superior court to vacate its 
judgment, discharge the order to show cause, and deny the petition for habeas 
corpus.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Lira 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 207 Cal.App.4th 531 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S204582 
Date Filed: February 3, 2014 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: Risë Jones Pichon 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Steve M. Defilippis, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner Johnny Lira. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Susan Duncan Lee, Acting State Solicitor General, Donald E. de Nicola, Deputy State 
Solicitor General, Julie L. Garland and Jennifer A. Neill, Assistant Attorneys General, Anya M. Binsacca, 
Jessica N. Blonen, Phillip J. Lindsay and Brian C. Kinney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent The 
People. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Steve M. Defilippis 
Picone & Defillipis 
625 N. First Street 
San Jose, CA  95112 
(408) 292-0441 
 
Phillip J. Lindsay 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5255