Case Title: In re Babson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2012-041

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2014-08-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Babson (2012-041)
 
2014 VT 105
 
[Filed 29-Aug-2014]
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject
to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before
publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the
Reporter of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@state.vt.us or by mail at: Vermont
Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors
in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
2014 VT 105
 
No. 2012-041
 
In re Barry Babson
Supreme Court
 
 
 
On Appeal from
 
Superior Court, Bennington Unit,
 
Civil Division
 
 
 
October Term, 2013
 
 
 
 
Katherine
  A. Hayes, J.
 
Lamar Enzor, Rutland, for Petitioner-Appellant.
 
Christina Rainville, Chief Deputy State's Attorney,
Bennington, for Respondent-Appellee.
 
 
PRESENT:   Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund and Robinson, JJ.,
and Crawford, Supr. J., 
                     Specially Assigned[1]
 
 
¶ 1.            
DOOLEY, J.   By filing this second postconviction relief (PCR)
petition, petitioner sought to reinstate the appeal from his first PCR on the
ground that his court-appointed counsel failed to file a timely notice of
appeal.  The trial court dismissed petitioner's request, concluding petitioner
had no constitutional right to counsel in his PCR.  On appeal, the State supports
petitioner's request to reverse the trial court and reinstate the first appeal.[2] 
Because this case presents an egregious example of injustice, we reverse the
dismissal and remand the case to the superior court with directions that
petitioner's initial PCR be reinstated with a renewed opportunity for
petitioner to file a notice of appeal.  
¶
2.            
The record reveals that petitioner's state-appointed counsel filed an
untimely notice of appeal from the trial court's denial of petitioner's first
PCR petition.  A notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of entry of
judgment, V.R.A.P. 4(a)(1), and the timely filing of a notice of appeal is a
jurisdictional requirement.  In re Lund, 2004 VT 55, ¶ 4, 177 Vt.
465, 857 A.2d 279 (mem.).  It is uncontested that by failing to timely file a
notice of appeal counsel performed well below any recognized standard of care. 
This Court has held that where counsel negligently fails to perfect an appeal
and the defendant has not knowingly and intelligently waived the appeal "there
is per se ineffective counsel."  In re Savo, 139 Vt. 527, 529, 431 A.2d 482, 484 (1981) (per curiam).  
¶
3.            
The question is whether petitioner has a remedy for his counsel's
failure to perfect his PCR appeal.  Petitioner argues that his first PCR should
be reinstated because the statutory right to PCR counsel includes a minimal
level of competence, which was plainly violated in this case.[3] 
We need not, however, reach the question of whether petitioner is entitled to
relief based on a statutory or constitutional right because we conclude that
the facts are so glaring as to warrant reinstatement of petitioner's right of
appeal from his first PCR pursuant to this Court's authority to issue "orders
that may be necessary to the furtherance of justice."  4 V.S.A. § 2(b). 
We have used this authority on other occasions to protect or create a right of
appeal that would otherwise have been lost.  See In re A.D.T., 174 Vt.
369, 375, 817 A.2d 20, 25 (2002) (reaching substance of mother's untimely
appeal of termination decision as " necessary to the furtherance of
justice' " (quoting 4 V.S.A. § 2(b))); In re J.C., 169 Vt.
139, 145, 730 A.2d 588, 592 (1999) (concluding that although time had expired
for filing appeal, cause could be transferred for such appeal to avoid
injustice); see also In re Estate of Johnson, 158 Vt. 557, 560, 613 A.2d 703, 705 (1992) (directing that to avoid injustice case should be transferred
to superior court for appeal to that court where appeal was improperly filed in
Supreme Court).  
¶ 4.            
Other states have adopted a similar remedy when faced with facts similar
to these.  See Whitney v. State, 976 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Ark. 1998) (per
curiam) (granting request for belated appeal from denial of postconviction
relief where appellant's attorney accepted full responsibility for untimely
filing); Rosado v. State, 864 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(allowing out-of-time appeal where indigent defendant requested that attorney
appeal denial of postconviction relief and attorney refused because defendant
did not forward filing fee, which indigents were not required to pay); Brown
v. State, 101 P.3d 1201, 1203-04 (Kan. 2004) (granting belated appeal from
order denying postconviction relief where appointed counsel failed to notify defendant
of counsel's appointment, date of evidentiary hearing, denial of motion, and
right to appeal); Walton v. State, 2008-CP-00369-COA (¶ 7), 16 So. 3d 66
(Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (exercising discretion and suspending thirty-day filing
deadline to allow for prisoner's untimely PCR appeal); Austin v. State,
409 S.E.2d 395, 396 (S.C. 1991) (per curiam) (remanding for evidentiary hearing
to determine whether defendant requested and was denied opportunity to seek
appellate review of order denying postconviction relief).
¶ 5.            
Individualized relief of the kind we have granted previously and other
states have granted in these circumstances is particularly appropriate here
where the State has essentially joined petitioner in seeking the limited remedy
of restoration of petitioner's appeal right from the first PCR judgment.  We do
not do so lightly, but, as we outline below, the facts of this case require a
remedy that is "necessary to the furtherance of justice."  4 V.S.A. § 2(b).
¶ 6.            
We stress that we are summarizing only the main points that cause us to
conclude that this case meets the standard of 4 V.S.A. § 2(b).  The first point
is that this and the underlying case have been plagued by extraordinary delay. 
Petitioner filed his original pro se PCR petition in December 2007.  The
decision on the PCR petition was issued in February 2011.  This second petition
was filed in July 2011 and while it was resolved expeditiously in the superior
court, it languished on our docket because of inaction by appointed counsel.
¶ 7.            
The second point is that the record alone shows that the error of
statutorily appointed counsel was inexcusable.  The notice of appeal was not
timely filed because it was mailed at the last moment to a post office box
address no longer used by the court.  Counsel's error was particularly glaring
because earlier he had filed a post-judgment memorandum of law by mailing it to
the same wrong address, causing it to be late, and the court had pointed out
the bad address in its decision.  
¶ 8.            
The third point is that although petitioner was represented in his
initial PCR by  counsel selected and paid for by the Defender General, and that
counsel's error caused the appeal period to expire before the notice of appeal
was filed, petitioner received no help in regaining his appeal right.  He filed
this second PCR pro se and sought appointed counsel, but the Defender General
refused to provide counsel in the superior court and an attorney from the
Defender General's Office appeared and filed a memorandum of law arguing that
no counsel should be appointed because the case was frivolous.  As a result, none
of the law discussed in this decision was presented to the superior court.  The
attorney represented to the superior court that his office would assist
petitioner in filing a Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion in the
first PCR case to attempt to reopen the appeal, but there is no indication in
the record that such a motion was filed.  
¶ 9.            
Petitioner's assistance in this Court was only marginally better.  For
reasons that are unclear, although the Defender General opposed appointment of
counsel in the trial court, the Defender General decided to fund appointed
counsel in this Court.  Again, little of the law relevant to this decision from
Vermont or other jurisdictions was uncovered, and there was extraordinary delay
in filing a brief.  
¶
10.        
The failure here is not simply of the assigned PCR counsel to timely
file a notice of appeal but of the whole system thereafter to protect
petitioner's rights.  This circumstance puts additional responsibility on this
Court to look for possible avenues of relief and to analyze them thoroughly,
especially given the State's position that relief from the default should be
available.  
¶
11.        
The State contends that we should remand for a factual determination of
whether petitioner played any role in the delayed filing, and the right to
appeal should be reinstated only if the late filing was entirely the fault of
petitioner's appointed counsel.  While we agree with the State that petitioner
should not obtain relief if his own negligence was a cause of the loss of the
appeal, we conclude that there is no need to remand for findings because the
facts indicate that the untimely filing was due to counsel's actions.  
¶
12.        
We emphasize that this is not a case where no notice of appeal was filed
such that we have to speculate as to whether petitioner wished to appeal.  Nor
is it a case where delay in deciding whether to appeal was the cause of the
missed deadline.  Here, petitioner obviously timely requested that his counsel
file a notice of appeal since such a notice was sent within the appeal
periodthe date of the letter demonstrates that the notice would have been
timely if mailed to the court's correct address or hand-delivered.  
¶
13.        
Nor is there anything in the record to indicate that petitioner would
have known his counsel's notice was untimely or that, even if he had known, would
have had time to attempt to rectify the untimely filing by requesting an
extension of time to file the notice himself.  See V.R.A.P. 4 (allowing filing
of motion to extend appeal period for "excusable neglect" within thirty days
after the expiration of appeal period).  In making this determination, it is
important to note that petitioner was incarcerated out of state and his letters
routinely took over seven days to reach the court.  The critical dates are
March 25, 2011the date that the appeal period expired; March 28, 2011the date
on which counsel's notice of appeal reached the trial court; April 22, 2011the
date on which this Court dismissed the appeal as untimely filed; and April 25,
2011the date by which a motion to extend the appeal period could be filed.  The
letter from counsel transmitting the notice of appeal is dated March 24, 2011
and bears no indication that it was sent to petitioner.  If it was, the date is
within the appeal period so there was no reason for petitioner to know that it
was not timely filed.  Petitioner's first indication that the appeal was
untimely would have been this Court's entry order dismissing the appeal.  This
Court sent the order to petitioner's counsel and not directly to petitioner so
he would have received the order only through his counsel after counsel
received it.  It would have been impossible for petitioner to receive this
notice and file a timely motion for extension of time within the two days or so
remaining.[4] 
Under those circumstances, no further factual development is needed.  We conclude that petitioner is entitled to reinstatement
of his first PCR with a renewed appeal period.  
Reversed and remanded with
directions to reinstate petitioner's PCR in Docket No. 471-12-07 Bncr and grant
petitioner thirty days to appeal from the day the docket is reinstated.
 
 
 
 
FOR THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate
  Justice
 

[1] 
Judge Crawford was present for oral argument, but did not participate in this
decision.
 
[2]
 To be clear, the State's support for petitioner is only with respect to the
loss of his right to appeal; the State strongly defends the first PCR court's
merits decision on the ineffective-assistance claim.  In addition, the State's
support is conditional because it argues that we should remand for the PCR
court to determine if petitioner could have avoided the default by his personal
actions and grant relief only if the loss of appeal can be attributed solely to
counsel's actions.
 
[3] 
Other states have explicitly held that the statutory right to counsel includes
a right to competent counsel.  See Lozada v. Warden, 613 A.2d 818, 821
(Conn. 1992) ("It would be absurd to have the right to have appointed counsel
who is not required to be competent."); see also Stovall v. State, 800 A.2d 31, 38 (Md. Ct. App. 2002) (collecting cases); Ard v. State, 191 S.W.3d 342, 346 n.3 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (collecting cases).  
[4] 
Of course, counsel had an opportunity to file a motion and his failure to do so
was a second instance of counsel's failure to meet a minimum level of competent
practice.