Case Title: Campbell County School Dist. v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Campbell County School Dist. v. State1995 WY 184907 P.2d 1238Case Number: 94-136, 94-138, 94-137, 94-140Decided: 11/08/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
 

CAMPBELL COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, State of Wyoming; et 
al., 

Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

STATE of Wyoming: Diana J. Ohman, State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction; et al.,

 Appellees 
(Defendants),

and

Big 
Horn County School District No. One, State of Wyoming, et al., 

Appellees (Intervening 
Defendants).

STATE of Wyoming: Diana Ohman, Superintendent of 
Public Instruction; Dave Ferrari, State Auditor; Nedolyn Testolin, Michael 
Glode, Karen Moulton, Lynn Dickey, Lynn Messenger, Elizabeth Field, Judy 
Campbell, Charlotte Levendosky, Jack Iversen, Wayne Mortensen, and John 
Andrikopoulos, Members of the Wyoming State Board of Education, 

Appellants (Defendants),

v.

CAMPBELL COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, State of Wyoming, et 
al., 

Appellees (Plaintiffs),

and

Laramie County School District No. One, et al., and 
Wyoming Education Association, 

Appellees (Intervening 
Plaintiffs).

LARAMIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, State of 
Wyoming,

 Appellant (Intervening 
Plaintiff),

v. 

Diana OHMAN, Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
State of Wyoming, et al., 

Appellees (Defendants),

and

Big 
Horn County School District No. One, State of Wyoming, et al., 

Appellees (Intervening 
Defendants).

WYOMING EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, 

Appellant (Intervening 
Plaintiff),

v. 

Diana OHMAN, Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
State of Wyoming, et al., 

Appellees (Defendants),

and

Big 
Horn County School District No. One, State of Wyoming, et 
al.,

 Appellees (Intervening 
Defendants).

BIG 
HORN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ONE, State of Wyoming, et al., 

Appellants (Intervening 
Defendants),

v.

 CAMPBELL COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, State of 
Wyoming, et al., 

Appellees (Plaintiffs),

and

Laramie County School District No. One, et al., and 
Wyoming Education Association, 

Appellees (Intervening Plaintiffs). 

Appeal from The District Court, Laramie County, 
Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Ford T. Bussart, Marvin L. Tyler of Bussart, 
West, Rossetti, Piaia & Tyler, Rock Springs, for Campbell County School 
District, State of Wyoming, et al.

Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General, Rowena L. 
Heckert, Sr. Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, for State of Wyoming, 
Diana J. Ohman, et al.

Timothy J. Kirven of Kirven & Kirven, 
P.C., Buffalo, Gerald R. Mason of Mason & Graham, P.C., Pinedale, for Big 
Horn County School District No. One, et al.

Paul J. Hickey, Mark R. Stewart, Richard D. 
Bush of Hickey & Evans, Cheyenne, for Laramie County School District No. 
One.

Patrick E. Hacker, Cheyenne, for Wyoming 
Education Association.

Gerald L. Goulding, Afton, for Lincoln 
County School District No. Two as amicus curiae.

Dan Pauli of the Legislative Service Office, 
Cheyenne, for Wyoming Legislature and Management Council as amicus 
curiae.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Chief Justice.

[¶1]      The 
question before us is the constitutionality of Wyoming's public school finance 
system. Four Wyoming school districts (Campbell County School District No. One, 
Uinta County School District No. One, Sweetwater County School Districts Nos. 
One and Two) brought suit in January 1992, against the State of Wyoming, the 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the State Board of Education and 
others1 seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief against the state by claiming certain components of the Wyoming public 
school finance system were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Section 
of the Wyoming Constitution (Art. 1, § 34) and the Education Article of the 
Wyoming Constitution (Art. 7, §§ 1-23). After the state defendants answered with 
a denial that the identified components of the finance system were 
constitutionally infirm, a coalition of twenty-three school districts2 intervened as defendants aligned with the state 
defendants. Later, Laramie County School District No. One and the Wyoming 
Education Association intervened as plaintiffs and aligned with the initial 
challengers of the school finance system. These intervenors identified other 
components of the school finance system which were allegedly unconstitutional. 
Thus, as the issues were joined, the challengers attacked five components of the 
school finance system: the divisor feature, the municipal divisor feature, the 
recapture feature, the optional mills feature, and the capital construction 
feature.

[¶2]      Following 
a three-week trial in October 1993, the District Court, First Judicial District, 
Laramie County, declared three components of the school finance system - the 
municipal divisor feature, the recapture feature, and the optional mills feature 
- unconstitutional. The state defenders have appealed that decision. With 
respect to the divisor and capital construction features of the school finance 
system, the district court declared them to be constitutional. The challengers 
have appealed that decision.

[¶3]      We affirm 
the district court's decision that the municipal divisor, recapture and optional 
mills features of the school finance system are unconstitutional. We reverse the 
district court's decision that the divisor and capital construction features are 
constitutional. In other words, we hold Wyoming's public school finance system 
is unconstitutional.

ISSUES

[¶4]      In their 
various briefs, the parties have stated many issues. We believe those issues may 
be succinctly summarized as follows:

1. Whether the 
court's exercise of its judicial power to declare school finance system statutes 
unconstitutional violates the doctrine of separation of 
powers?

2. Whether the 
court must apply a rational basis or strict scrutiny standard of review to 
determine the constitutionality of the school finance system 
statutes?

3. Applying the 
appropriate standard of review to the challenged components of the school 
finance system, whether these components are constitutional?3

 

[¶5]      In 
addressing these issues, we are cognizant of several factors, including: our 
prior decision in Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 
(Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980), in 
which we declared public education is a fundamental right under our state 
constitution and struck down the then-existing school finance system under the 
equal protection provision of our constitution; the post-Washakie reform 
measures; the workings of the challenged financing system as a whole; the filing 
of the present action and the procedural manner in which the district court 
managed this action; the district court's decision; and the language of the 
education provisions of our constitution and the education system implemented 
under those constitutional provisions. Each of these will be considered 
below.

BACKGROUND

Washakie

Before 1980, local ad valorem taxes 
generated a substantial portion of the funding to the state's elementary and 
secondary public schools. Over the years, the development of in-place mineral 
wealth created disparity in those local resources so great as to engender a 
challenge to the school finance system. In Washakie, we declared public 
education a fundamental right under the state constitution and we held the 
then-existing school finance system unconstitutional because it failed to afford 
equal protection, in violation of the Wyoming Constitution. In so holding, we 
isolated no particular statute, but instead examined "the entire system from 
organization of school districts through tax bases and levies and distribution 
of foundation funds, all of which have a bearing upon the disparity which 
exists." Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 335.

[¶6]      This 
court, in Washakie, expressed its understanding "that there are special problems 
and amounts may be distributed in a mode similar to the foundation fund which 
takes into consideration various balancing factors." Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 336. 
We remarked that "[a] state formula can be devised which will weight the 
calculation to compensate for special needs - educational cost differentials," 
id., and indicated our awareness

that the formula 
that will provide equality will be quite complex. More money may be needed in 
one school district to achieve quality education than in another because of, 
e.g., transportation costs, building maintenance costs, construction costs, 
logistic considerations, number of pupils with special problems, et cetera. 
However, it is not a problem that cannot be solved, challenging though it might 
be.

Id. at 315, n. 3.

[¶7]      This 
court clearly expressed its view that "until equality of financing is achieved, 
there is no practicable method of achieving equality of quality." Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 334. This equality, we concluded, extends to the financing of physical 
facilities with which to carry on the process of quality education, which 
financing we found was "tarred with the same brush of disparate tax resources." 
Id. at 337. We commented that "statewide availability from total state resources 
for building construction or contribution to school buildings on a parity for 
all school districts is required just as for other elements of the educational 
process." Id.

[¶8]      In 
Washakie, this court, having examined the "entire system," emphasized the 
legislature's goal "is to arrive at financial parity." Id. We had confidence the 
legislature would meet the challenge of fulfilling its constitutional duties to 
"provide for the establishment and maintenance of a complete and uniform system 
of public instruction," WYO. CONST. ART. 7, § 1, and "make such further 
provisions by taxation or otherwise, as with the income arising from the general 
school fund will create and maintain a thorough and efficient system of public 
schools, adequate to the proper instruction of all [school age] youth of the 
state. . . ." WYO. CONST. ART. 7, § 9.

Post-Washakie: School Finance Reform 
Measures

[¶9]      As 
explained in Washakie, Wyoming apportions funds to the school districts from the 
Foundation Program. Several revenue sources either fund the program or reduce 
the amount of foundation support received by the school districts. Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 322. Following our decision, a select committee of the Wyoming 
legislature assembled for the purpose of recommending modifications of the 
finance formula to the entire legislature. The committee addressed those 
infirmities identified by this court and, ultimately, the legislature enacted 
statutes to redesign financing, including a mandated local twenty-five mill 
levy,4 a state twelve mill levy and a 
county six mill levy.5 In response to 
Washakie's holding that school funding must depend upon state wealth and not 
local wealth, the select committee proposed solutions to redistribute some local 
wealth to other districts. Those solutions culminated in an amendment to the 
state constitution authorizing the legislature to "recapture" revenues generated 
by the local twenty-five mill school levy which exceeded an amount determined by 
formula. Local wealth remained a factor in the system, however, when the 
optional mill levy was made available to the school districts according them the 
option of levying another six mills for their own use.

[¶10]   In 1983, legislation 
implemented financing's redesign. The legislature declared, however, the 
redesigned system was only transitional and ultimately would be succeeded by a 
new system designed to more accurately measure costs of education. The 1983 
legislature stated its reasons in the preamble of the 
legislation:

The Wyoming 
legislature in enacting this act is cognizant of the Wyoming supreme court 
decision of Washakie County School District v. Herschler (1980) and has received 
reports, projections of revenue and recommendations relative to this act from a 
select legislative committee assisted by an advisory commission. The Wyoming 
legislature recognizes and acknowledges its responsibility in providing for a 
complete, uniform, thorough and efficient system of public schools. The Wyoming 
legislature following public hearings, debate and deliberation leading to the 
adoption of this act makes the following findings:

1. The issues of 
equitable funding of public education in Wyoming involve more than measurements 
of differences in funding per student between school districts and a 
corresponding attempt to lessen the disparity unless consideration is given to 
factors such as increased costs of education in rural districts, equality of 
programs in rural districts, extraordinary requirements for funds in impacted 
school districts due to an influx of students and special needs of special 
students.

2. Massive 
transfers in revenue from certain districts to other districts to achieve 
equality of funding have the potential to impair the quality of education in 
districts from which funds will be taken which dictates that transfers of 
revenue should be undertaken over a period of time to allow adjustment to 
decreased revenues in those districts.

3. The Wyoming 
legislature is committed to reducing the disparity in funding education among 
school districts. Studies involving costs of education indices and methods of 
providing program equity will be completed by the state department of education 
and school districts for consideration by the 1984 legislature. In the absence 
of absolute guidelines in recapturing revenue from certain districts and 
distributing revenues to meet the above concerns, this act, for the time being, 
provides for varying rates of recapture among districts subject to recapture and 
a phase-in period, and for a new system of divisors to convert the number of 
students in a district to classroom units giving a greater weighting to rural 
schools to allow for a reasonable and rational transition to a new system 
designed to more accurately measure costs of education.

1983 WYO.SESSION LAWS, Ch. 136, p. 
399-400.

[¶11]   The legislature never 
studied, enacted, or implemented a new cost-based system and the 1983 interim 
system became permanent. Former state superintendents of public instruction, 
legislators, and challenger school district superintendents testified at the 
trial of this case that their numerous attempts to persuade the legislature to 
reflect cost differentials in the system were 
unsuccessful.

Overview of the School Finance 
System

[¶12]   Before discussing the 
evidence presented at trial, we find it useful to sketch the general contours of 
the challenged statutory scheme for raising and distributing funding for 
Wyoming's public elementary and secondary schools.

[¶13]   The Wyoming statutes 
reflect the complexity of the education financing scheme. Borrowing from what 
has been said elsewhere, "[i]f lack of clarity alone were sufficient to strike 
these statutes down, this case would be less difficult. We are fortunate, 
however, that the parties share a common understanding of how [Wyoming's] public 
schools are financed." Roosevelt Elem. School Dist. v. Bishop, 179 Ariz. 233, 
236-37, 877 P.2d 806, 809-10 (1994). We are also fortunate one of the exhibits 
at trial was a booklet entitled THE WYOMING SCHOOL FOUNDATION PROGRAM - A BRIEF 
LOOK AT OPERATIONS AND FUNDING (1990-91 Edition), prepared by Barry W. Nimmo of 
the State Department of Education, who was a witness called by both sides at 
trial. Fifty-five pages in length, this booklet provides a helpful overview of 
the financing scheme and is the primary source for the following sketch of the 
financing scheme.

[¶14]   Public education funding 
in Wyoming is shared by the local school district and the state through the 
State Foundation Program. Under the present statutory scheme, the level of 
education funding which can be raised is primarily a function of a mixture of 
state and local property taxation along with certain fines and fees. To 
calculate its level of funding, a school district must use a statutory formula 
defined by the legislature.

[¶15]   Employing the statutory 
formula, each school district computes the amount of funding to which it is 
entitled called the foundation guarantee. The school district then computes the 
amount of funding it will generate through local taxes, fines, and fees.6 When local revenues are less than the guarantee, 
that difference is paid to the school district as a foundation entitlement. When 
local revenues exceed the guarantee, then the school district does not receive a 
state entitlement. In some cases, excessive local revenues result in the school 
district's rebating a certain amount to the state. That amount is known as 
foundation recapture and is rebated to the foundation fund for eventual 
redistribution to the rest of the school districts. In addition to a foundation 
guarantee based upon enrollment, past expenditures for "add-ons"7 are also calculated to determine the total amount 
of the foundation guarantee. Under the statutes, school districts are reimbursed 
for 75% of their transportation expenditures and 85% of their special education 
expenditures.

[¶16]   Presently, the legislature 
bases the allocation of funding to school districts on school district 
enrollment and additional expenditures such as transportation, special education 
and vocational education. Although a foundation program can allocate on a per 
pupil basis, the Wyoming legislature has designed a formula which assigns 
classroom units (CRU) to school districts based upon a school district's average 
daily membership (ADM). ADM is a more precise determination of the number of 
students actually in attendance on average. The number of CRUs assigned to each 
school district is based on a schedule of divisors that specifies the number of 
CRUs for particular ADM levels and is also dependent upon whether the particular 
school is an elementary, junior high, or high school.8 Once the number of CRUs for each school district 
is calculated, that number is multiplied by the legislatively determined 
classroom value for the state guarantee amount.9 In 1992, the classroom unit value was $92,331.00. 
The classroom value is set by the legislature based upon assumption and is not 
based on any cost study or analysis. The schedule of divisors set by statute is 
also the product of legislative assumptions and is not based on any cost study 
or analysis.

[¶17]   As the formula described 
above demonstrates, the divisor is a critical element in determining the number 
of classroom units for each school district and, consequently, the amount of 
revenue a school district will receive. A higher divisor lowers funding. Another 
critical element which can limit a school district's funds is the municipal 
divisor feature which treats all schools as one school when within an 
incorporated city or town or within five miles of an incorporated city or town. 
In effect, the various populations of schools within a single municipality are 
aggregated, thus resulting in a higher assigned divisor. Finally, the formula 
permits recalculation for school districts which actually have higher student 
populations than estimated.

[¶18]   Local school districts may 
also generate funds through the optional mill levy. Optional mill levy funds are 
outside of the Foundation Program and will not reduce a school district's state 
entitlement.10 A school district can levy 
three mills to fund operations and three mills to fund maintenance. Four of 
these six mills cannot be levied without voter approval. The amount of funding 
these mills generate is completely dependent upon assessed local property values 
and wealthy districts can thus raise more money per mill. To assist poorer 
districts where a mill raises less than the state average assessed property 
valuation, the state "power equalizes" one voter-approved mill in each category. 
Power equalization generates funding based upon the state average rather than 
the local district's assessed property valuation, resulting in greater funding 
for the school district should the voters approve the mill 
levy.

[¶19]   Funding for capital construction is also 
distinct from the Foundation Program. Under a separate statutory scheme, school 
districts generally fund their new building needs and building renovation and 
repair needs by issuing bonds for capital construction. The constitutional debt 
limit for bonding is 10% of assessed valuation.11 WYO. CONST. ART. 16, § 5. Entitlements 
were available to those districts exceeding their bonding capacity, but in 1988, 
the legislature began diverting those funds to school operations. Statute 
authorizes the state to partially supplement low valuation districts up to the 
state average assessed valuation, but the supplement does not benefit districts 
exceeding bonding capacity. Additionally, the supplement is inadequately funded 
and does not satisfy current district demands and is, therefore, prorated. The 
legislature has established a capital facilities loan and grant program and 
appropriated $5 million statewide. In emergencies, the legislature grants 
funding on a case-by-case basis.

The Present Action and Procedural Background

[¶20]   In the decade since Washakie, the 
legislature has changed, modified and adjusted different components of the 
finance system at different times; no legislative study, however, has ever been 
conducted to determine whether these changes reduced, eliminated or increased 
funding disparity per pupil in violation of Washakie. In 1992, certain school 
districts again challenged the finance system and presented evidence that over 
the last decade the changes to the finance system had increased and exacerbated 
the funding disparity identified in Washakie. Those school districts, 
representing 35% of Wyoming's students,12 sought a declaratory judgment that the 
present finance system is unconstitutional under Washakie, claiming 
unjustifiable disparity and denial of equal educational opportunity.

[¶21]   The challengers claimed wealth-driven 
disparities and irrational, arbitrary spending disparities were created by the 
present system's methods for collecting and distributing revenue and funding 
capital construction. Statutes challenged for causing wealth-driven disparities 
were those authorizing the optional mill levy, the 109% recapture level, and 
capital construction funding. The specific statutes challenged for causing 
irrational, arbitrary spending disparities were those authorizing the divisor, 
the municipal divisor, and recalculation. Alleging these statutes caused funding 
disparities unjustified by cost differentials, the challengers asserted that 
funding disparities which were wealth-based or not cost-justified were 
unconstitutional under Washakie's requirement of equality of financing in order 
to achieve equality of quality education.

[¶22]   In response, the defenders asserted the 
challengers had the burden of proving funding disparities existed and those 
disparities were wealth-based or not based upon cost differentials. According to 
the defenders, only disparities proved unjustified by cost or wealth-driven 
disparities were unconstitutional. Additionally, the defenders asserted the 
challengers must prove clearly and exactly beyond any reasonable doubt that the 
challenged features significantly deprived, infringed upon, or interfered with 
their educational rights. As an affirmative defense, the defenders further 
asserted that disparities which were necessary in order to achieve program 
equity between school districts were not unconstitutional.

[¶23]   Before trial, the district court ruled 
that funding disparities which were not wealth-driven, but instead were the 
result of the legislative distribution formula, did not invoke strict scrutiny 
analysis. The district court ruled the challengers bore the burden of proof that 
these disparities were not cost-justified. The district court ruled the 
challengers would meet their burden by proving the following three elements:

1. A funding mechanism resulting 
in a disparity of funds per pupil, not justified by cost differences;

2. That such unjustified 
disparity exists by virtue of an irrational feature in the formula adopted by 
the legislature;

3. That such formula results in 
a persistent and intractable condition of disparity not justified by costs.

[¶24]   The district court determined, pursuant 
to the logic of Washakie, the challengers were not required to demonstrate that 
unjustified disparity caused harm to educational opportunity; harm was presumed. 
Although before trial the district court made clear that strict scrutiny 
analysis would not apply to funding disparities which were not wealth-based, the 
district court after trial reconsidered what level of scrutiny would be applied 
to the various challenged statutes. Upon reconsideration the district court 
ruled that strict scrutiny would be applied to the recapture feature, to the 
optional six mills levy, and to the capital construction feature and that a form 
of rational basis scrutiny in the nature of equitable distribution would be 
applied to the distribution formula components. The district court determined 
that the equitable distribution/rational basis test described in its pre-trial 
decision letter left room for more judicial scrutiny than that embodied by the 
broadest form of the rational basis test. That heightened standard derived from 
Art. 7, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution which the district court determined 
required a distribution formula which provided for "equitable allocation."

Trial

[¶25]   As party litigants, the school districts 
divided by size; large districts positioned as plaintiffs and small districts 
intervened on behalf of the state as defendants. The large districts insisted 
the suit was necessary because the quality of education was sacrificed by 
failure to fund their actual operating costs for basic education, resulting in a 
failure to afford their students an equal opportunity to a quality education. 
Additionally, the large districts identified a number of problem areas which 
require special programs or efforts and add to their costs. Because funding 
distribution was not based upon costs and because funding was further limited by 
the interaction of the funding components, these efforts were adversely 
affected. The small districts, fearing this lawsuit would result in 
redistribution of the current funding in order to alleviate the severe 
shortfalls suffered by the large school districts suing as plaintiffs, presented 
evidence that while the smaller districts are unable to offer the enriched 
educational program provided by the large districts, the current method of 
funding is properly weighted in their favor and permits them sufficient 
operating revenue for the most minimal educational program.

1. 
Distribution Formula Evidence

a. 
Divisor System

[¶26]   The challengers alleged, the defenders 
did not dispute and the district court accepted that the divisor system produced 
wide disparities in funding on a per student basis,13 between schools14 and between school districts.15 At trial, the challengers presented a 
cost of education study (Harvey study) as evidence that the per pupil funding 
disparities were not based on cost differentials. This evidence was unpersuasive 
to the district court on this point. The district court found the study did not 
account for cost differentials incurred because of small school districts' 
support of multiple learning centers dispersed throughout that district.16 That study failed to reflect the 
obvious cost problems associated with maintaining multiple learning centers. 
Further, the study did not extend any assurance to the smaller districts that 
their students would not suffer disproportionate adverse consequences, such as 
the closing of "necessarily small schools."17

[¶27]   As evidence the funding disparities 
created by the divisor system resulted in disparities in educational 
opportunities between districts, the challengers also presented a paired 
district study (Van Mueller study) comparing programs. The district court found 
this study failed to establish differential access to revenue created 
disparities in educational opportunity in Wyoming.

[¶28]   The challengers did not rely exclusively 
on studies, but presented evidence demonstrating the divisor system failed to 
adjust for actual educational costs in violation of Washakie. Witnesses for both 
sides testified that factors associated with each school district caused some to 
have higher utility costs, higher transportation costs, concentration of 
special-needs, higher costs of classified and certified personnel, et cetera. 
The distribution formula made no adjustment for the actual differences which 
exist between districts. Witnesses also agreed the cost of education varies 
according to student characteristics, but the distribution formula made no 
adjustment on the basis of such factors.

[¶29]   The superintendents of the challenger 
districts provided evidence that their actual costs exceed the operating revenue 
provided through the divisor system because the system makes no adjustment for 
varying educational costs. They also provided evidence of deficiencies caused by 
less than full reimbursement of transportation and special education 
expenditures. The deficiencies are made up from the revenue meant for education 
of the general student population. The divisor system makes multiple adjustments 
between student populations of 0 and 500, while making no adjustments in 
divisors beyond a level of 500 students. Many junior high and high schools in 
the challenger districts have student populations over 1000 students. The 
challengers contended that increased costs are associated with these large 
numbers but are not funded. These combined deficiencies result in insufficient 
revenue which can be devoted to average students who comprise the majority of 
students. The actual number of classrooms and staff and the amount of support 
needed to educate those students are inadequate.

[¶30]   Relying on a rational basis test, the 
defenders claimed the statutory distribution scheme was fairly weighted in favor 
of small schools and designed to take advantage of the large schools' economies 
of scale. Testimony by superintendents from the challenger districts revealed 
the present system's design to provide enhanced support for schools in small 
communities caused funding disparities for them. That design has the inverse 
effect of penalizing large urban districts which attempt to keep small 
neighborhood schools and lower class size. The district court found economy of 
scale was only an assumption which had never been measured or quantified. 
Experts for both sides testified that at student populations over 500, school 
districts were in fact experiencing diseconomies of scale. The district court 
found the divisor system failed to recognize this.

[¶31]   School superintendents from the 
challenger school districts testified about educational program impact caused by 
the arbitrariness of the divisor system. The district court determined that 
while Washakie cautions against an approach which focuses upon differences in 
educational opportunity, it does not necessarily preclude the use of 
circumstantial evidence demonstrating inequities in the distribution formula. 
Specifically, the large districts testified that in addition to suffering 
deficient funding caused by the divisor system's failure to fund their actual 
costs, they suffered from cost pressures generated by school population growth 
and student characteristics.

[¶32]   Educators from both parties identified 
individual attention to each student as a key component of a quality education. 
Educators believe increased school and class size adversely affect individual 
attention and have devoted efforts to mitigating the damage. Although educators 
recognize large class sizes diminish a school's ability to provide the proper 
individualized attention for all students, the harm is greatest for those 
students whose socio-economic circumstances place them at risk of poor 
performance. Educators classify those students as "at-risk." A failure to 
provide proper individualized attention to those students has long-term impact 
for all of society.18

[¶33]   The district court found that the divisor 
system accepts the principle that every 500 students should be supported by a 
particular ratio of teachers, counselors, nurses, and administrative personnel. 
However, in practice, the present system prevents appropriate funding of its own 
underlying precept. At most only an extra teacher or two can be added as student 
populations swell. Because of growth, increased student populations cause 
several junior high and high schools throughout the state to operate at well 
above 1000 students, although the schools were built for fewer students. Schools 
accommodate the overflow with temporary structures and additions. Classes are 
large, schools are insufficiently staffed, and facilities are so overcrowded 
that all efforts by the school districts to change the delivery of education in 
order to improve student performance are directly countered and frustrated.19 Under the current capital construction 
funding scheme, districts such as Laramie County School District No. One (LCSD # 
1) cannot build needed, additional schools. Instead, the district has abandoned 
the neighborhood school concept and now buses elementary school students 
throughout the city to available space and is increasing school size beyond 
efficiently manageable limits at the secondary level. Enrollment is expected to 
increase at all grade levels.

[¶34]   While the divisor system limits the 
options of large schools, the role of education in reducing social problems 
pressures those same schools to respond. Recognizing that dropouts usually 
result in increased social costs because a large percentage end up incarcerated 
or on public assistance, school districts operate alternative high schools. 
Alternative high schools address the most serious at-risk students. Alternative 
high schools are costly, but successful because of their low enrollment, lower 
student/teacher and student/counselor ratios. In LCSD # 1, the alternative 
school's actual costs in 1992 were $1,218,110 or about $8500 per student to 
operate; but because a municipal divisor feature in the present finance system 
applies, the school only received $613,400. Without the municipal divisor, the 
school would receive only $855,845; better, but still insufficient to meet its 
actual costs. The other challenger districts testified to similar funding 
deficiencies at their alternative high schools due to features of the present 
finance system.

[¶35]   In addition to deficient funding for the 
alternative high school, funding is also deficient for the services required for 
at-risk students in the main schools. The challenger school districts are 
currently faced with large numbers of at-risk students due to various social 
pressures.20 School districts, under pressure from 
the state and local community, attempt to equip these students with the 
knowledge and skills requisite for success after graduation. Primarily, school 
districts attempt to deal with at-risk students by lowering student/teacher, 
student/guidance counselor ratios. Funding, however, does not support efforts to 
lower ratios or class sizes and the challengers contended this inhibits student 
success.

[¶36]   The parties testified that the divisor 
system's interaction with the other finance components constrained them from 
appropriately responding to student needs through properly sized schools and 
classes. Challenger districts determined that their education systems were not 
providing an equal education opportunity to students.

b. Municipal Divisor, 
Recalculation

[¶37]   Despite the accepted belief that smaller 
schools are costlier, the effect of the municipal divisor is to assign a higher 
divisor when small schools are located in cities or towns. The defenders claimed 
the municipal divisor was necessary to prevent school districts from building 
unnecessarily small schools in order to generate additional funding. The 
challengers provided evidence the municipal divisor so limited their funding for 
their small schools without regard for the actual cost of running a school that 
at least one school district was functionally bankrupt and other school 
districts face that same prospect.

[¶38]   Their evidence regarding the 
recalculation formula was intended to demonstrate it was arbitrary since a large 
district could increase enrollment by as much as 297 students and not receive 
additional funding while a small district could receive additional funding with 
as few as three new students.

2. 
Recapture

[¶39]   Statute sets the retention level for 
recapture districts at 109%. Recapture districts21 
testified that this figure was set without any cost study as a basis and was 
therefore arbitrary. Defenders asserted that the legislature could have based 
this figure upon the additional costs recapture districts face because of the 
very mineral extraction industries which make them wealthy.

3. Optional Mills

[¶40]   Challengers presented evidence that 
districts with low assessed property valuation and which receive lower per ADM 
foundation revenue operate on a deficit or near-deficit level. These districts 
are forced to levy most or all of their optional mills to provide a basic 
education program. Other property-poor districts with sufficient foundation 
funding to meet operating expenses do not levy optional mills for an enhanced 
program because the levy of a mill raises so little money. Districts with high 
assessed property valuation do not levy these mills to operate a basic program, 
but instead use them either to generate large cash reserves or to enhance their 
education program beyond that funded through the foundation program. Defenders 
asserted that optional mill levies provided for local control.

4. Capital Construction Finance

[¶41]   Evidence at trial revealed that an 
independent study (MGT study) reported the state schools' need for new 
construction and renovation and repair totaled $275 million. At the time of 
trial, only $5 million was designated as capital funding. The state has 
statutory authorization to partially supplement low valuation districts up to 
the state average assessed valuation; however, supplements have been 
inadequately funded by the legislature. The legislature responds to emergencies 
of school districts on a case-by-case basis, but limited funding is available 
for non-emergency needs.

[¶42]   The primary source of revenue for major 
capital facilities renovation and construction is the sale of bonds paid for out 
of mills levied against a school district's assessed valuation. The constitution 
prohibits a school district from bonding beyond 10% of the assessed value of the 
school district. WYO. CONST. ART. 16, § 5. Because of low assessed valuation, 
five Wyoming school districts currently exceed 100% of legal bonded 
indebtedness. Additionally, the evidence showed less wealthy districts cannot 
rely on bonds to finance needed capital construction. In LCSD # 1, total bonding 
capacity is only $26 million. A needed new high school would cost $30 million to 
build. Unable to raise capital construction funding of this magnitude, LCSD # 1 
increases school size and class size.

[¶43]   At trial, testimony considered the 
contribution of physical facilities towards educational quality. Educational 
research reports a relationship between the condition of buildings and quality 
of education. As the building deteriorates and becomes more crowded, test scores 
go down. This testimony was disputed by a witness legislator who expressed the 
view that the result of the MGT study was a "wish list".

[¶44]   The trial testimony discussed the current 
overcrowding situations in the junior high and high schools of large districts. 
In Green River, the high school was built for 600 students but has 1130 
students, creating student management problems. In LCSD # 1, increased numbers 
of students, mostly on the north side of Cheyenne, require, at the least, a new 
middle school for sixth and seventh graders and a new high school. However, a 
bonding capacity of only $26 million makes building an unlikely prospect. 
Cheyenne buses elementary students instead of building a new middle school and 
is increasing the numbers of students at its two high schools, already over 1400 
students each. The busing of elementary school students is in spite of a 
neighborhood school policy which cannot currently be honored. Schools attempt to 
contain class sizes in core curriculum courses but the divisor system prevents 
sufficient funding to hire additional teachers. As an alternative, the schools 
employ innovations such as block scheduling and team teaching which should 
increase the time teachers can spend with students. These innovations, however, 
lose their effectiveness as class sizes continue to increase.

[¶45]   Capital construction funding as currently 
financed is not limited to physical facilities. In Sweetwater County School 
District No. Two, voters approved bonding only after receiving the school 
district's promise to purchase computers. The local community was concerned that 
graduates be technologically efficient and extracted the promise; however, in 
LCSD # 1, computer laboratories do not exist in some schools and their 
quantities are insufficient in others.

[¶46]   In summary, the school districts' 
evidence at trial portrayed recognition by the local educators and communities 
that the educational system required change to ensure students' successful 
transition from school to lives as productive, informed citizens. Through solely 
local effort, the educational system was attempting to change and meet those 
requirements. Those efforts were effectively nullified because of funding 
unrelated to actual costs and because the legislature did not participate in the 
substantive aspects of the educational system. Consequently, the local effort 
directed at improving the quality of education varied throughout the state, 
yielding divergent educational opportunity dependent upon the progressiveness 
and wealth of the local school district and community. Further, because the 
legislative method of funding was unrelated to the developed local programs, 
funding disparities and deficiencies resulted, jeopardizing what marginal 
success such a disjointed system was likely to produce for improving student 
performance.

The Trial Court Decision

[¶47]   As stated earlier, the district court 
applied a strict scrutiny analysis for the recapture, optional mills, and 
capital construction features of the funding system. The district court made 
findings of fact that the recapture feature and the optional mill levy feature 
created disparities based upon local wealth and declared those statutes 
unconstitutional. In its findings of fact concerning the capital construction 
funding scheme, the district court discussed the several means available to 
school districts to finance their needs. The district court found wide 
variations in the funding amounts available to a school district based on the 
part of the scheme relying on local wealth but also found the scheme had a 
mechanism for the state to fund emergency needs of a school district. Despite 
the findings of wealth-driven disparity, the district court held the evidence 
failed to establish proof of harm to a constitutionally protected right and 
declared the current system of capital construction funding constitutional.

[¶48]   Also as noted earlier, the district court 
applied its equitable distribution/rational basis analysis to those statutes 
comprising the distribution formula (divisor and municipal divisor). The 
district court accepted that the challengers had proved the existence of funding 
disparities which resulted in a genuine funding disadvantage to each student of 
the larger districts. It further accepted that the divisor system, which set a 
classroom unit value based upon political decision rather than determined 
variable costs and which distributed funding by such arbitrarily determined 
classroom units and divisors, caused funding disparities which presented a 
genuine potential difference in educational opportunity.

[¶49]   The district court's post-trial decision 
letter22 stated that the court had "serious 
doubts about the fairness of the funding formula" and explained several reasons 
for those doubts. As the district court found, the evidence demonstrated the 
divisor system has never attempted to quantify cost differences among the 
districts but only captures the historic relationship between school size and 
class size. Economies of scale was but an incident rather than a goal of the 
divisor system. The district court explained further the evidence presented a 
complex picture of school finance shortcomings which raised serious questions 
about the fairness of the divisor system. The doubts were raised by evidence 
that the divisor system, in operation, permitted the small districts to maintain 
small schools and classes and funded a large percentage of small districts' 
variable costs. The district court found that for those districts locked into a 
divisor of 23, the divisor system, in fact, defies the laws of economics.

[¶50]   Genuinely convinced the arbitrariness of 
the distribution funding formula had been demonstrated, the district court 
believed, however, the record evidenced an impasse because the challengers had 
not measured the level of classroom unit funding available to meet variable cost 
demands nor had they shown what percentage of district-wide expenditures went to 
meet variable cost demands. Without these measurements, the level and impact of 
the disparities were unknown and, in the district court's view, the challengers 
had failed to carry their burden of proof of the magnitude and character of the 
asserted injury to the constitutional right.

[¶51]   Although in its pre-trial decision letter 
the district court had ruled that under Washakie the challengers did not have to 
prove educational harm, the district court found that the evidence failed to 
disclose any widespread and/or significant disparity of educational quality or 
educational opportunity caused by the divisor system. The district court held 
the challengers had failed to carry their burden of proving a clear and exact 
constitutional violation existed in the challenged divisor system and held it 
constitutional.

[¶52]   The district court found, however, that 
the municipal divisor was not rationally justified by cost differences and did 
not satisfy the equitable distribution test. It held the municipal divisor 
unconstitutional. The district court made no ruling on issues concerning the 
recalculation feature of the distribution formula. 

Constitution's Education Provisions and the Statutory 
Education System

[¶53]   The fundamental right of education 
expressly recognized by the Wyoming Constitution is declared in Art. 1, § 
23:

Education.

The right of the citizens to 
opportunities for education should have practical recognition. The legislature 
shall suitably encourage means and agencies calculated to advance the sciences 
and liberal arts.

WYO. CONST. ART. 1, § 23.

[¶54]   The responsibilities and requirements of 
the education system are addressed in depth by the Wyoming Constitution in Art. 
7, §§ 1-14. Those sections were intended to remedy the shortcomings of the 
schools during the territorial years23 
by providing for an education system established, maintained, and supervised at 
the state level. To that end, a state superintendent was provided for24 and school lands and taxation were 
secured to supply state support.25 As is evident from 
the treatment of education in the constitution, the constitutional framers 
accorded great regard for education at the 1889 constitutional convention. That 
great regard reflected Wyoming's progressiveness on educational issues while 
still a territory. In 1873, after territorial status was achieved, the Wyoming 
legislature established a compulsory education system, provided for a 
decentralized network of public school districts, began a comprehensive system 
of high schools, and established a state university as well as schools for the 
handicapped.26

[¶55]   By establishing education first as a 
right in the Declaration of Rights article and then detailing specific 
requirements in a separate Education article in the state constitution, the 
framers and ratifiers ensured, protected and defined a long cherished principle. 
Washakie established that the right to education correlated to a duty of the 
legislature, holding Art. 7, § 1 obligated the legislature to affirmatively act 
to establish and support a comprehensive system of public education. Washakie, 
606 P.2d  at 320. Sections 1 and 9 of Art. 7 contain education clauses addressing 
the type of system to be established and maintained. Those sections state in 
relevant part:

The legislature shall provide 
for the establishment and maintenance of a complete and uniform system of public 
instruction, embracing free elementary schools of every needed kind and grade, a 
university with such technical and professional departments as the public good 
may require and the means of the state allow, and such other institutions as may 
be necessary.

WYO. CONST. ART. 7, § 1.

The legislature shall make such 
further provision by taxation or otherwise, as with the income arising from the 
general school fund will create and maintain a thorough and efficient system of 
public schools, adequate to the proper instruction of all youth of the state, 
between the ages of six and twenty-one years, . . . .

WYO. CONST. ART. 7, § 9.

[¶56]   In the case of a constitution, it must be 
presumed the people have intended whatever has been plainly expressed and that 
intent must be given effect and enforced. Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 128, 
50 P. 819, 821 (1897). Although the text of the constitutional provision in 
question must be given the common and ordinary meaning understood by the 
majority of voters which ratified it, id., we must be mindful our state 
constitution is, "in a sense, a living thing, designed to meet the needs of 
progressive society, amid all the detail changes to which such society is 
subject." Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Hall, 46 Wyo. 380, 391, 26 P.2d 1071, 
1073 (1933). Recognizing educational philosophy and needs change constantly, we 
believe the language of those education article provisions requiring "a complete 
and uniform system of public instruction" (Art. 7, § 1) and "a thorough and 
efficient system of public schools, adequate to the proper instruction of all 
youth of the state" (Art. 7, § 9), must not be narrowly construed. Indeed, since 
this court has held the right to a quality education under our state 
constitution is a fundamental right, that right must be construed broadly.

[¶57]   At the time of 
ratification, the words of these clauses carried these definitions:
complete: having no deficiency; 
wanting no part or element; perfect; whole; entire; full;

uniform: having always the same 
form;

system: any combination or 
assemblage of thing adjusted as a regular and connected whole;

instruction: the act of 
instructing or teaching; communication of knowledge; education; 
enlightenment;

thorough: fully executed; having 
no deficiencies; hence, complete in all respects; unqualified; perfect;

efficient: acting or able to act 
with due effect; adequate in performance; bringing to bear the requisite 
knowledge, skill, and industry; capable, competent;

adequate: equal to requirement 
or occasion; commensurate; fully sufficient, suitable or fit;

proper: fit; suitable; 
appropriate;

education:27 education in a broad sense, with 
reference to man, comprehends all that disciplines and enlightens the 
understanding, corrects the temper, cultivates the taste, and forms the manners 
and habits; in a narrower sense, it is the special course of training pursued, 
as by parents or teachers, to secure any one or all of these ends.

THE CENTURY DICTIONARY (1889).

[¶58]   Today, we see little difference in the 
contemporary definitions. Only the definition of efficient is more precise:

complete: having all necessary 
parts, elements, or steps;

uniform: having always the same 
form, manner, or degree; not varying or variable; of the same form with others; 
conforming to one rule or made; presenting an unvaried appearance of surface, 
pattern;

system: a regularly interacting 
or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole; a group of artificial 
objects or an organization forming a network especially for distributing 
something or serving a common purpose;

instruction: the action, 
practice, or profession of teaching;

thorough: marked by full detail, 
painstaking;

efficient: productive without 
waste;

adequate: sufficient for a 
specific requirement;

proper: marked by suitability, 
rightness or appropriateness; fit;

educate: to develop mentally, 
morally, or aesthetically especially by instruction.

WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 10TH ED. (1994).

[¶59]   In synthesizing these definitions, we can 
define "a complete and uniform system of public instruction" as

an organization forming a 
network for serving a common purpose of instructing/educating the public which 
organization has all the necessary parts or elements and has always the same 
form;

and we can define "a thorough and efficient system of 
public schools adequate to the proper instruction of the state's youth" as

an organization forming a 
network for serving the common purpose of public schools which organization is 
marked by full detail or complete in all respects and productive without waste 
and is reasonably sufficient for the appropriate or suitable 
teaching/education/learning of the state's school age children.

[¶60]   We can ascertain the further intent of 
these words by considering the purpose which the framers believed education 
served. At the time these clauses were used in the wording of the education 
article at Wyoming's constitutional convention in 1889, similar education 
provisions were found in every state constitution, reflecting the contemporary 
sentiment that education was a vital and legitimate state concern, not as an end 
in itself, but because an educated populace was viewed as a means of survival 
for the democratic principles of the state. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
400, 43 S. Ct. 625, 627, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923); see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 238-39, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1545-46, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972) (J. White concurring). 
These sentiments were articulated in addresses by Wyoming's Territorial 
Governors:

In laying the foundation of a 
new State, [education] should be the corner stone, for without it no durable 
political fabric can be erected. It matters little how great our material 
prosperity may be, if our moral and intellectual growth does not keep pace with 
it. It is a duty we owe not only to ourselves and to our posterity, but to all 
mankind. In the diffusion of knowledge among the people rests our only hope for 
the preservation of our free institutions. . . . Now, in the infancy of our 
territory, let the fostering aid and encouragement of the government be given to 
every scheme for the advancement of education, and to establish as the corner 
stone of our embryo state the principle of universal, free, common school 
education.

Governor J.A. Campbell's Address to the First Legislative 
Assembly of Wyoming Territory (Oct. 13, 1869), in WYOMING TERRITORY, MESSAGES OF 
THE GOVERNORS: 1869-1890, at 14. (n.p., n.d.)

Without the intelligence of its 
people no community may hope to maintain a free government. It augurs well for 
the future of this commonwealth that at the very beginning broad foundations 
were laid in the interest of education.

Governor John W. Hoyt's Message to the Sixth Legislative 
Assembly of Wyoming Territory (Nov. 6, 1878), in WYOMING TERRITORY, MESSAGES OF 
THE GOVERNORS: 1869-1890, at 21. (n.p., n.d.)

[¶61]   From this history, we can conclude the 
framers intended the education article as a mandate to the state legislature to 
provide an education system of a character which provides Wyoming students with 
a uniform opportunity to become equipped for their future roles as citizens, 
participants in the political system, and competitors both economically and 
intellectually. See Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis.2d 469, 436 N.W.2d 568, 589-90 
(1989) (citing cases which have held similar constitutional provisions' 
histories require this definition). The constitution directs the creation of two 
systems to deliver education. The purpose of the systems so created and 
maintained is to deliver a "proper" education to the state's youth. The 
legislature, in fulfilling its constitutional duty, must define and specify what 
a "proper education" is for a Wyoming child.

[¶62]   The legislature has enacted statutes 
which set a framework for defining a proper education at the state level. 
Presently, the legislature imposes these duties upon the state superintendent 
relevant to the quality of elementary and secondary education system:

§ 21-2-202. Duties of the state 
superintendent.

(a) In addition to any other 
duties assigned by law, the state superintendent shall:

(i) Make rules and regulations, 
consistent with this code, as may be necessary or desirable for the proper and 
effective administration of the state educational system. . . .

(ii) Consult with and advise the 
state board, local school boards, local school administrators, teachers and 
interested citizens, and seek in every way to develop public support for a 
complete and uniform system of education for the citizens of this state; . . . 

(viii) Prepare and maintain a 
list of accredited schools in Wyoming; . . .

(xiv) Have authority to collect 
student educational assessment data from school districts, community colleges 
and the University of Wyoming. . . .

(xvii) Include in the agency's 
budget request:

(A) Recommendations to the 
governor for appropriations from the school foundation program account and for 
appropriations to the account necessary to fund payments to school districts as 
required by law;

(B) Recommendations to the 
governor for appropriations from the foundation program for special programs; 
and

(C) Recommendations to the 
governor for school capital construction related appropriations under W.S. 
21-15-105 and 21-15-106.

(xviii) In accordance with W.S. 
21-2-501 and 21-2-701(a)(ii), promulgate rules to assure that each child with 
disabilities receives a free and appropriate education in accordance with his 
capabilities, . . .

(c) In addition to subsection 
(a) of this section, the state superintendent may take appropriate 
administrative action with the state board as necessary to withhold funds from 
any school district or state institution failing to comply with any applicable 
law or with the minimum standards prescribed by the state board.

WYO. STAT. § 21-2-202 (Supp. 1995).

[¶63]   The legislature imposes these duties on 
the state board of education relevant to the quality of elementary and secondary 
education system:

§ 21-2-304. Duties of the state 
board of education.

(a) The state board of education 
shall establish policies for public education in this state consistent with the 
Wyoming Constitution and statutes. . . .

(b) In addition to any other 
duties assigned to it by law, the state board shall:

(i) Prescribe minimum standards 
with which public schools and other educational institutions receiving money 
from any state fund, . . . must comply. The standards shall relate to and 
include:

(A) General education programs; 
. . .

(C) The evaluation and 
accreditation of the public schools.

(ii) Enforce the rules and 
regulations adopted . . . by taking appropriate administrative action with the 
state superintendent or withhold state funds from any school district or 
institution failing to comply with any applicable law or with the minimum 
standards prescribed by the state board; . . .

(v) Initiate or facilitate 
discussions regarding the needs of and means for improving education; . . .

(xiv) Establish improvement 
goals for public schools for assessment of student progress based upon the 
national assessment of educational progress testing program;

(xv) Promulgate rules and 
regulations for the development, assessment and approval of school district 
teacher performance evaluations systems. Rules and regulations adopted under 
this paragraph shall allow each district flexibility in developing an evaluation 
system which meets the individual needs of the district; . . .

(e) In addition to subsection 
(b) of this section, the state board shall establish statewide goals for Wyoming 
public education.

WYO. STAT. § 21-2-304 (Supp. 1995).

[¶64]   The legislature imposes these duties on 
local school boards relevant to the quality of the elementary and secondary 
education system:

§ 21-3-110. Duties of boards of 
trustees.

(a) The board of trustees in 
each school district shall:

(i) Prescribe and enforce rules, 
regulations and policies for its own government and for the government of the 
schools under its jurisdiction. Rules and regulations shall be consistent with 
the laws of the state and rules and regulations of the state board and the state 
superintendent and shall be open to public inspection; . . .

(xv) Provide, in each district 
maintaining a high school, a course of study adequate to prepare pupils of the 
district for admission to the University of Wyoming28 
and the various community colleges of Wyoming; . . .

(xvii) Require the performance 
of each initial contract teacher to be evaluated in writing at least twice 
annually. The teacher shall receive a copy of each evaluation of his 
performance;

(xviii) Establish a teacher 
performance evaluation system and require the performance of each continuing 
contract teacher to be evaluated . . .

(xix) Performance evaluations 
required shall serve as a basis for improvement of instruction, enhancement of 
curriculum program implementation, measurement of both individual teacher 
performance and professional growth and development and the performance level of 
all teachers within the school district, . . .

WYO. STAT. § 21-3-110 (Supp. 1995).

[¶65]   The legislature specifies the local 
school boards are to comply with the education program established for the 
entire state:

§ 21-9-101. Schools to adhere to 
minimum standards promulgated by state board of education.

The board of trustees of each 
school district within the state shall cause the schools under its jurisdiction 
to adhere to the minimum standards relating to educational programs promulgated 
by the state board of education.

WYO. STAT. § 21-9-101 (1992).

[¶66]   Additionally, the legislature has 
mandated curriculum29 in one area. That 
mandate includes a specified subject area, a specified content, a specified 
standard, and a specified type of assessment:

§ 21-9-102. Instruction in state 
and federal constitutions required; satisfactory examination a prerequisite to 
graduation.

All schools and colleges in this 
state that are supported in any manner by public funds shall give instruction in 
the essentials of the United States constitution and the constitution of the 
state of Wyoming, including the study of and devotion to American institution 
and ideals, and no student shall receive a high school diploma, associate degree 
or baccalaureate degree without previously passing a satisfactory examination on 
the principles of the constitution of the United States and the state of 
Wyoming. The instruction shall be given for at least three (3) years in the 
elementary grades and for one (1) year each in the secondary and college 
grades.

WYO. STAT. § 21-9-102 (1992).

[¶67]   This statute is enforced in WYO. STAT. § 
21-9-103 (1992) which provides:

§ 21-9-103. Penalty for failure 
to carry out requirements of W.S. 21-9-102.

Willful failure on the part of 
any school or college administrator or instructor to carry out the requirements 
of W.S. 21-9-102 shall be sufficient cause for the removal of such person from 
his position.

[¶68]   In reviewing these various statutes which 
implement the constitutional provisions, we have identified a shortcoming. 
Despite the legislature's requirement that the state board of education 
prescribe minimum standards, that board's promulgated rules permit the local 
school districts to establish those minimum standards and then evaluate for 
themselves whether they have met those standards. Wyoming State Board of 
Education Rules and Regulations, Chapter VI, School Accreditation (1993).

[¶69]   Chapter VI of the State Board's 
promulgated rules govern school accreditation. In order to achieve and maintain 
state school accreditation, the state board of education requires public school 
students shall meet the student performance standards at 
the level set by the school and district:

Section 7. Common Core of Knowledge. All public school students 
shall meet the student performance standards at the level set by the school and 
district in the following areas of knowledge:30 . . .

Section 8. Common Core of Skills. All public school students shall 
meet student performance standards at the level set by the school and district 
in the following skills:31. . . .

[¶70]   The rules further require districts and 
schools meet district and school performance standards and list the areas 
requiring action. No level of performance is prescribed.

Section 9. District Performance Standards.

(a) The district shall involve 
parents, community, and professional staff in developing student performance 
standards in the common core of knowledge and skills and in implementing 
programs which will improve student results.

(b) The district shall address 
student performance standards in an officially adopted planning process 
reinforced by board of education policies. This process must show, and its 
implementation demonstrate, how student performance standards have affected 
planning for facilities and annual budget priorities.

(c) The district shall have a 
board-approved process in which student performance results are identified, 
monitored, and reported. The process shall include an annual report card 
disseminated widely to patrons of the district.

(d) The district shall 
demonstrate that staff development relates to student performance.

(e) The administration shall 
monitor building operations to assure all legal requirements, federal, state, 
and local, are met in each school.

Section 10. School Performance Standards.

(a) Each school shall adopt 
district student performance standards and site-specific student performance 
standards.

(b) Each school shall have staff 
development plan based upon district and school student performance goals.

(c) Each school shall have 
procedures for involving affected personnel in decision making. 

(d) Each school shall have 
planned strategies and procedures to measure student performance.

(e) Each school shall adopt 
procedures for changing strategies on the basis of the degree of success in 
accomplishing adopted student performance goals. Particular attention will be 
given to addressing needs of gender, ethnic, or socioeconomic group for which 
results are below either school or district performance levels.

(f) Each school shall involve 
parents, and students when appropriate, in processes leading to improved student 
results.

(g) Each school shall adopt a 
procedure for assessing school climate.

Section 11. At Risk Students. The district shall have policies and 
procedures for every school in the district to identify and intervene with 
at-risk students. In addition, all schools shall provide instruction as 
appropriate through the school curriculum directed at the prevention of at-risk 
behavior.

[¶71]   Finally, these rules permit graduation 
upon mastery of the common core of knowledge and skills at the levels set by the 
district and the schools. This graduation requirement is set despite WYO. STAT. 
§ 21-3-110(a)(xv) (Supp. 1995) which requires the district to provide a course 
adequate to prepare students for college admission:

Section 12. Graduation Requirements.

(a) A student shall master the 
student performance standards within the common cores of knowledge and skills at 
the levels set by the district and the schools, including alternative 
schools.

Wyoming State Board of Education Rules and Regulations, 
Chapter VI, School Accreditation (1993).

[¶72]   Each school district is thus permitted to 
separately determine and define an education system for their students, 
potentially creating forty-nine autonomous education systems.

DISCUSSION

[¶73]   As seen in the recitation of the facts, 
the challengers allege that the scope of the Washakie decision encompasses both 
revenue raising and revenue distribution unjustified disparities and the 
presence of either kind of unjustified disparity violates the fundamental right 
to education. In Washakie, the evil was disparate spending, caused in part by 
local assessed valuation but also in whole by the entire system. In the present 
case, the challengers allege the evil is still disparate spending, caused by the 
arbitrary and irrational devices employed in distribution: the divisor, the 
municipal divisor and the classroom unit value (CRU). They allege these devices 
have no relation to educational costs and allocation of educational dollars must 
be based on need related to quality of education.

[¶74]   Washakie declared that our state 
constitution guarantees an equal opportunity for a quality education. Washakie 
held this fundamental right could not be denied by unequal funding. Washakie, 
however, did not define "equal opportunity for a quality education," although it 
said that until financial equality was reached, there was no hope of achieving 
"equality of quality." Washakie required the legislature to reform the 
educational system in conformity with the "sense of this decision." Washakie, 
606 P.2d  at 337. The sense of Washakie was to require the legislature to examine 
the entire education system, including its funding, and reform it in order to 
provide an "equal opportunity for a quality education."

[¶75]   Washakie identified Wyoming's 
constitutional design of educational responsibility and recited the several 
pertinent constitutional provisions contained in Art. 7 of the state 
constitution. As those provisions make clear, "the legislature has complete 
control of the state's school system in every respect, including division of the 
state into school districts and providing for their financing." Id. at 320.

[¶76]   We find the true focus of this case to be 
whether the legislature has complied with its constitutional duty to provide an 
equal opportunity for a quality education by structuring both school financing 
and the education system in a manner, and at a level, that maintains "a complete 
and uniform system of public instruction" and a "thorough and efficient system 
of public schools, adequate to the proper instruction of all youth of the 
state." WYO. CONST. ART. 7, §§ 1 and 9. This language identifies three "duties" 
borne by the legislature in order to meet its constitutional responsibility to 
provide this equal opportunity:

1. The "system of public 
instruction" must be "complete and uniform";

2. The "system of public 
schools" must be "thorough and efficient"; and

3. The thorough and efficient 
system of public schools must be "adequate to the proper instruction" of the 
state's youth.

[¶77]   Constitutional provisions imposing an 
affirmative mandatory duty upon the legislature are judicially enforceable in 
protecting individual rights, such as educational rights. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 
1 of King Cty. v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71, 86-87 (1978). Although this 
court has said the judiciary will not encroach into the legislative field of 
policy making, as the final authority on constitutional questions the judiciary 
has the constitutional duty to declare unconstitutional that which transgresses 
the state constitution. Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 319; Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale 
Jewelry Co. of Cheyenne, 371 P.2d 409, 419 (Wyo. 1962). When the legislature's 
transgression is a failure to act, our duty to protect individual rights 
includes compelling legislative action required by the constitution.

[¶78]   In school reform litigation32, defenders of the funding scheme 
routinely advance the argument that the judiciary's determination of the nature 
and extent of the constitutional right to a quality education violates the 
separation of powers doctrine. That argument was aptly answered by the Kentucky 
Supreme Court:

The judiciary has the ultimate 
power, and the duty, to apply, interpret, define, construe all words, phrases, 
sentences and sections of the Kentucky Constitution as necessitated by the 
controversies before it. It is solely the function of the judiciary to so do. 
This duty must be exercised even when such action serves as a check on the 
activities of another branch of government or when the court's view of the 
constitution is contrary to that of other branches, or even that of the 
public.

Rose v. Council For Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 
(Ky. 1989). Our proper role is interpreting the meaning of the language of §§ 1 
and 9 of Art. 7 in order to determine the duties those provisions impose upon 
the legislature.

Standard of Review

1. 
        Findings of 
Fact

[¶79]   In this appeal, the defenders of the 
present system do not challenge the district court's findings of fact. 
Appellant-Plaintiff Campbell County School District does challenge certain of 
the district court's background findings concerning the post-Washakie 
legislation. On appeal, a district court's findings of fact will not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous. Cottonwood Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Roberts, 874 P.2d 897, 899 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶80]   The district court stated in its finding 
of fact number three that the sums generated by the local twenty-five mill levy 
were diverted into the State Foundation Program. Appellant Campbell County 
School District correctly points out WYO. STAT. § 21-13-310(a)(ii)(A) (1992) 
directs revenues from the twenty-five mill levy be mandatory and be computed as 
a local resource. WYO. STAT. § 21-13-311(a) (1992) directs that the foundation 
program amount be determined by subtracting local resources (including 
twenty-five mill levy revenues) from the computed amount of the guarantee to 
which the district is entitled. The money stays in the local district and lowers 
the amount of State Foundation Program funds the local district will receive. 
Appellant Campbell County School District also correctly points out the trial 
court failed to note the existence of the mandatory six mill county levy in its 
findings of fact numbers four and five. According to WYO. STAT. § 21-13-201 
(1992), a six mill county levy must be levied on the assessed valuation of the 
property. Those tax revenues are then distributed to the school districts within 
the county by the county treasurer. These errors in the district court's 
background findings of fact did not contribute to substantive determinations and 
we need not consider them further as they had no impact on the district court's 
conclusions of law.

2. 
        Conclusions 
of Law

[¶81]   As the recitation of facts indicates, a 
critical question was whether the district court should test the challenged 
post-Washakie reforms by the rational basis test or the strict scrutiny 
test.33 The district court applied both tests 
depending on whether the reform feature was on the revenue raising side or the 
revenue distribution side. The application of different scrutiny levels resulted 
from pre-trial resolution of the defenders' assertion that a distinction existed 
between a fundamental right to education and education funding distribution. In 
their view, a different standard applied to non-wealth based funding disparities 
and they urged the proper constitutional standard was proof this type of funding 
disparity caused harm to the quality of education. The district court disagreed 
with defenders and, before trial, ruled, correctly in our view, Washakie did not 
require the challengers to prove harm to the quality of education. Nevertheless, 
the district court ruled, incorrectly in our view, Washakie did not speak to 
distribution and, therefore, rational scrutiny applied, requiring the 
challengers to bear the burden of proof that the disparities were unjustified. 
Following trial, the district court determined the constitutional language of 
"equitable allocation" required a somewhat heightened scrutiny.

[¶82]   The ruling's effect manifested itself 
when the district court determined the evidence at trial was in equipoise. In 
this situation, the party with the burden of proof must necessarily lose. Since 
the district court ruled the rational basis test applied, the challengers could 
not prevail. However, under strict scrutiny the defenders would lose since 
clearly they had not come forward with cost justifications to the extent 
required by Washakie. At best, defenders presented generalizations concerning 
costs. Dr. Andersen, who authored the divisor system, and school officials Lynn 
Simons and Barry Nimmo, who oversaw the divisor system, all testified the system 
was not intended to reflect costs. Defenders estimated about one-third of the 
CRU value of $92,331 was devoted to teacher salaries and benefits and some 
support services and the remaining two-thirds adequately covered all other 
education expenses. Defenders' reliance upon gross estimates failed to provide 
any specificity in identifying costs. Additionally defenders' assertions that 
small schools cost more and required higher funding while large schools required 
less funding because of economies of scale were revealed as assumptions without 
basis in study or empirical data. Washakie contemplated a complex formula to 
fund cost differentials caused by student need differences and school 
demographic differences.34 The divisor 
system used is not the sophisticated one which Washakie foresaw would be 
necessary to achieve equality of financing. Had the district court applied a 
strict scrutiny standard, defenders would have failed in their burden of 
proof.

[¶83]   On appeal, the defenders view the 
"equitable allocation" language of WYO. CONST. ART. 7, § 8 as an improper 
standard to apply for any distribution beyond school land income funding.35 They continue to assert the correct 
standard is whether the legislature has provided a "complete and uniform . . . 
thorough and efficient system of public schools." In their view, the challengers 
must clearly prove a constitutional violation to the quality of education before 
the legislative finance system may be struck down as unconstitutional. 
Additionally, the defenders assert that decisions from other jurisdictions 
support applying a different level of scrutiny to the distribution side of 
school finance.

[¶84]   We hold the district court erred in 
applying equitable allocation/rational scrutiny. Among other valuable lessons, 
Washakie teaches that this court will review any legislative school financing 
reform with strict scrutiny to determine whether the evil of financial 
disparity, from whatever unjustifiable cause, has been exorcized from the 
Wyoming educational system. Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 335. The triggering issue in 
Washakie was wealth-based disparities; however, we now extend that decision 
beyond a wealth-based disparity to other types of causes of disparities.

[¶85]   Because the right to an equal opportunity 
to a proper public education is constitutionally recognized in Wyoming, any 
state action interfering with that right must be closely examined before it can 
be said to pass constitutional muster. Such state action will not be entitled to 
the usual presumption of validity; rather, the state must establish its 
interference with that right is forced by some compelling state interest and its 
interference is the least onerous means of accomplishing that objective. Miller 
v. City of Laramie, 880 P.2d 594, 597 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶86]   The level of scrutiny to be applied was 
decided in 1980 in Washakie. The evidence of this trial concerning the 
interaction of the various finance components revealed the necessity that the 
system as a whole be reviewed under one level of scrutiny. The essence of the 
necessity was best described by the School Foundation Program booklet when it 
said:

The School Foundation Program is 
deceptively simple in concept, but devilishly complex and convoluted in actual 
operation. Subtle linkages between and among the various Foundation Program 
elements mean that a change in one element will usually produce some kind of 
aberration or misalignment in another. . . . Seemingly minor modifications and 
adjustments can have altogether unexpected and unintended results. It's a little 
like trying to bundle a small child into a snowsuit - pushing on one part 
invariably causes some other part to pop out.

THE WYOMING SCHOOL FOUNDATION PROGRAM - A BRIEF LOOK AT 
OPERATIONS AND FUNDING 8 (1990-91 Edition).

[¶87]   The defenders' reliance upon the standard 
applied in other jurisdictions is unpersuasive. They mainly rely upon Skeen v. 
Minnesota, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); however, this reliance is misplaced. A 
careful reading of that decision reveals the four-justice majority determined a 
fundamental right to the state-provided basic level of funding needed to achieve 
a general and uniform education system exists. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d  at 315. The 
majority would apply a strict scrutiny test to a challenge of that right. Id. at 
315. It was only to a challenge of the local school district's funding of 
education beyond what is necessary to provide an 
adequate level of education that the majority would apply the rational basis 
test. Id. at 316. In Skeen, the challenged legislation permitted local school 
districts to augment the state-funded basic education program. Id. at 303, 306, 
316.

[¶88]   Three justices believed the strict 
scrutiny test applied to either type of challenge, i.e., the basic level of 
funding and the augmented funding. Id. at 320-22 (Tomljanovich, J., concurring 
specially; Page and Gardebring, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in the 
judgment). In our judgment, Justice Page's view is the correct one and in 
keeping with our view in Washakie that the strict scrutiny test applies to 
legislative action which affects a child's right to a proper education:

The court goes to great lengths 
to distinguish the fundamental right to an education from education funding, but 
there is no meaningful distinction between the two. Nothing in the Education 
Clause of our constitution suggests that the fundamental right to an education 
applies only to the education itself, not to the money needed to fund that 
education. Education does not occur in a vacuum; it is achieved as the result of 
public expenditures. Any system which provides greater expenditures for some 
children over others should undergo the most exacting scrutiny.

Skeen, 505 N.W.2d  at 322.

[¶89]   Against this above and foregoing 
extensive backdrop, we turn now to a discussion of the parties' constitutional 
arguments. We first consider the funding disparities which the district court 
considered to be wealth-based.

Wealth-Based Funding Disparities. (Recapture, Optional 
Mills and Capital Construction Finance)

1.         
Recapture

[¶90]   As explained earlier, in some school 
districts, property taxes produce more local revenue than the state average. In 
response to Washakie's holding that the financing of public education must be a 
function of state and not local wealth, the legislature moved to redistribute 
some local wealth to other school districts. The constitution was amended to 
permit the legislature to collect and redistribute to other school districts up 
to but no more than 75% of the revenue in excess of the state average yield. 
WYO. CONST. ART. 15, § 17. In 1992, the legislature permitted school districts 
to keep only 9% of local revenue which exceeded the foundation guarantee.36 WYO. STAT. § 21-13-102(b) (1992). The 
effect of this constitutional amendment and implementing statute is that the 
state "recaptures" 75% of the excess and redistributes it to other school 
districts, while those school districts subject to recapture retain a portion of 
the excess which amounts to 109% of their guarantee. All parties agree that 
under this formula the constitution's 75% limitation will not be violated.

[¶91]   The challengers attack as arbitrary the 
constitutionality of the statute permitting them to retain only 109% of their 
guarantee. Among themselves they held differing views concerning recapture, but 
those challenging the statute were the wealthier districts with sufficient local 
revenue to be impacted by the recapture level. Their specific challenge is that 
the statutorily set level is arbitrarily set without regard for district costs 
in violation of Washakie. The school districts characterized the 109% level set 
by the legislature as arbitrary since the legislature gave no reason for that 
level and they contend their costs justify a higher retention level.

[¶92]   Plaintiff school districts Campbell 
County and Uinta County are both recapture districts. The school superintendents 
of those districts testified that after returning money to the state, Uinta 
ranked 49th out of 49 school districts in terms of the per student state support 
and Campbell, 44th. In their view, the arbitrariness of the recapture level as 
it interacts with the rest of the system causes funding disparity in their 
districts. The Wyoming Education Association, one of the challengers, took the 
position the legislature should require these districts to give the state all of 
the excess funding retained now (the 9%) since the districts, due to their 
wealth, are still able to accumulate substantial funds outside the finance 
system. Nonwealthy districts do not have this advantage. It would appear the 
challengers' respective positions are not inconsistent since both do agree the 
effect of the recapture statute is to allow local wealth-driven funding 
disparities. The issue is whether the state has constitutionally justified those 
disparities.

[¶93]   The defenders of the system contend the 
recapture statute complied with the constitutional amendment and, in statutorily 
setting the retention amount, the legislature recognized the mineral extraction 
industry which contributed to the greater wealth of these school districts also 
caused greater social costs. The defenders contend the legislative purpose of 
compensating for those greater social costs does not violate Washakie. The 
district court found that, although retention of excess funds is available for 
districts because they endure greater social costs due to the effect of the 
mineral extraction industry on their community, the experience of the recapture 
districts is not different from the experiences of other non-recapture school 
districts which incur greater costs due to school population growth. The 
district court also found the state failed to carry its burden to demonstrate a 
compelling state interest which would justify the retention of these funds. The 
recapture statute, therefore, violated the Wyoming Constitution.

[¶94]   Because recapture is authorized in the 
Wyoming Constitution, some challengers complain the district court found the 
constitution unconstitutional; however, the district court's ruling was faithful 
to the mandate of Washakie and can be reconciled with the recapture amendment. 
The recapture portion of the constitutional amendment states:

The legislature may also provide 
for the distribution among one or more school districts of not more than 
three-fourths of any revenue from the special school district property tax in 
excess of a state average yield, which shall be calculated each year, per 
average daily membership.

WYO. CONST. ART. 15, § 17.

[¶95]   Recapture affords the legislature a 
mechanism to redistribute revenue and allows districts to retain local wealth. 
It is entirely permissible for the legislature to compensate for greater social 
costs; however, the district court correctly determined only cost-justified 
funding variations are permitted. Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 336. The legislature is 
mandated to take into consideration various balancing factors and devise a state 
formula which will weight the calculation to compensate for special needs and 
educational cost differentials. Id. The challenged recapture statute, however, 
is not based upon a formula. No evidence produced at trial revealed the 109% 
retention level was the product of any calculation; instead, it is an 
arbitrarily derived amount in violation of Washakie. The district court also 
correctly determined one district's increased costs may not be compensated while 
another's are ignored. Washakie requires allowances for variances in 
individuals, groups and local conditions. Id. This post-Washakie legislative 
change has not met that requirement.

2. 
        Optional Mill 
Levies

a. Background

[¶96]   Property taxes, levied against assessed 
property valuation, generate different amounts of revenue for each school 
district since the assessed property valuation of each school district varies. 
For example, in Campbell County School District No. One (CCSD # 1), assessed 
property valuation was $1.3 billion. A mill levy (1/10 of a cent) in CCSD # 1 
would generate $1.3 million. In LCSD # 1, assessed property valuation was about 
$269 million, meaning a mill would generate only about $269,000. CCSD # 1 had 
about 8000 students. LCSD # 1 had about 13,500 students. CCSD # 1's valuation 
per mill was over $162 per student while LCSD # 1's valuation per mill was about 
$19 per student. The average state assessed valuation was $64.55 per 
student.

[¶97]   As explained earlier, the local option to 
levy another six mills available to a school district generates revenue which is 
outside the foundation program and will not lower the amount of state aid to a 
school district. These six mills include two distinct categories: three mills 
for operations and three mills for maintenance. WYO. STAT. § 
21-13-102(a)(i)(B)-(C); (ii)(B), (D) (Supp. 1995). The first mill within each 
category may be levied by the district school board without voter approval. WYO. 
STAT. § 21-13-102(a)(i)(B)(I), (C)(I); (ii)(B)(I), (D)(I) (Supp. 1995). The 
final 2 mills within these two categories need voter approval. WYO. STAT. § 
21-13-102(a)(i)(B)(II), (C)(II); (ii)(B)(II), (D)(II) (Supp. 1995).

[¶98]   As the system is presently configured, 
the legislature assists poor school districts by "power equalizing" one 
operational mill and one maintenance mill. Only the second mill is subject to 
"power equalization," meaning if the local voters decide to exercise the option 
and levy the second mill, the state will supplement that levy based upon a 
formula which raises the amount to assessed state valuation per ADM (per 
student). For example, the second operational mill in LCSD # 1 would be worth 
the state average of $64.55 per student, rather than the $19.14 per student of 
the other two operational mills. Likewise, the second maintenance mill would be 
worth $64.55 per student rather than the $19.14 per student of the other two 
maintenance mills.

[¶99]   The challengers contend the optional mill 
levy creates wealth-based funding and spending disparities causing inequitable 
educational opportunities. The district court's findings of fact support these 
contentions. That court found the most frequent use of optional mills in those 
districts with the greatest wealth as measured by assessed valuation. The amount 
of money raised by local optional mills is totally dependent upon the local 
wealth of individual school districts. One mill in LCSD # 1 raises $19.14 per 
student and, if power equalized, is worth $64.55 per student. One mill in CCSD # 
1 is worth $162.22.

[¶100] The district court found optional mill revenues are 
relied upon in some districts to reduce the disparity resulting from the current 
system of distribution of funds from the foundation program. The amount of money 
raised by local optional mills is totally dependent upon the local wealth of 
individual school districts. The presence of such wealth bears no relationship 
to the expense of educating students in any particular community. In some of the 
districts optional mills have become a necessary source of funding to maintain a 
basic educational program. Other less wealthy districts deem the use of optional 
mills as futile because the levy of a mill raises so little money. The 
defenders' justification for the current optional mill process is local control. 
The district court found the availability of other alternatives permitting local 
discretion without permitting wide variations in revenue demonstrated local 
control was not a compelling state interest. The district court concluded the 
optional mill feature is wealth-driven in violation of equal protection.

[¶101] We affirm that legal conclusion based once again 
upon Washakie. This particular finance system component creates wealth-driven 
disparity in opportunity for quality education in violation of Washakie. The 
district court accepted that local control provided a compelling reason for this 
disparity had it been accomplished in a less onerous way. Washakie determined 
the plain meaning of our state constitution's Education Article left no doubt 
the legislature completely controlled the state's school system in every 
respect, and the matter of providing a school system as a whole and financing it 
is a responsibility of the legislature. Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 320. In view of 
this determination that an education system is a function of state control, it 
would be paradoxical to permit disparity because of local control. Although the 
parties recognize this, they suggest local control is a constitutionally 
recognized interest and therefore a compelling state interest.

[¶102] This contention puzzles us since under Washakie 
there cannot be both state and local control in establishing a constitutional 
education system. The parties do not define local control or explain what they 
mean when they use the term local control. Legal commentators have noted local 
control is generally treated as a self-evident concept and there often is a 
failure to address its meaning or the values it is intended to serve.37 Still, the parties' contentions 
indicate their belief that some local role exists. Our previous examination of 
the present statutory framework which the legislature has enacted clearly 
demonstrates state control and so we examined constitutional history to see if 
local control is a constitutionally recognized interest. Historical analysis 
reveals local control is not a constitutionally recognized interest and cannot 
be the basis for disparity in equal educational opportunity.

b. History of Local Control

[¶103] The constitution devotes almost an entire article to 
education. WYO. CONST. ART. 7, §§ 1-14. The fourteen sections very specifically 
describe the intended school system and the methods for financing that system. 
The reasons for and the constitutional framers' intent behind such devotion to 
detail concerning education are clarified when the historical education 
struggles during territorial days are examined.

[¶104] The history of education during territorial days 
reveals Wyoming citizens' strong commitment to education for a particular 
purpose. As we noted earlier, various territorial governors described this 
purpose as preserving our free institutions by diffusion of knowledge among the 
people. Governor J.A. Campbell's Address to the First Legislative Assembly of 
Wyoming Territory (Oct. 13, 1869) in WYOMING TERRITORY, MESSAGES OF THE 
GOVERNORS: 1869-1890, at 14 (n.p., n.d.). Fromong, supra note 23, at 24.

[¶105] Under the Organic Act, the territorial legislature 
did not have the power to create or establish schools but could dictate a 
framework for management of the schools. Fromong, supra 
note 23, at 23. Between 1867 and 1873, agitation arose at the local level 
for the establishment of effective public schools. Id. at 39-44. The 1873 
Governor's message to the territorial legislature urged it to secure a uniform 
system of education throughout the territory. Id. at 54.

We cannot, in this age of the 
world, hope to gain, as permanent residents of our Territory, that class of 
population who have "given hostages to fortune," and have the greatest interest 
in the preservation of our institutions, unless our educational advantages are 
equal to those in the most favored State. It is doubtful whether these 
advantages can be secured under any system of education that is not uniform 
throughout the Territory, and I trust that the school law will undergo such 
revision by you as the public interests appear to demand.

Id. at 54-55.

[¶106] The Governor's critics agreed with him on the school 
question and further elucidated:

Our educational advantages are 
not equal to the most favored state, nor can they reasonably be expected to be; 
they ought to be similar, but they are not equal nor expected to be equal to 
those in the favored States. In the new settlements of our territory - none of 
which are more than six years old - the majority of school buildings are 
inferior ones; the contrivances to give the juveniles that attend them a correct 
or partly correct idea of what is being taught is rude; and the convenience and 
comforts that surround both teacher and pupils in the States are often here 
wholly wanting. The system of education should be as near as practicably 
uniform, but those "equal advantages" the governor speaks of, will come slowly 
and by degrees, just as they did in the favored states he alluded to.

The public schools are for the 
young, and to prepare them to become useful and honest citizens, and we would 
like to see such laws enacted as will require competent teachers to be placed 
over them. . . .

Id. at 56.

[¶107] In response the territorial legislature began 
enacting laws yearly, culminating in the comprehensive school code of 1873 which 
addressed many of these problems. Further, that legislation mandated local 
property taxation for the support of schools. 1873 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 58, § 
51; Fromong, supra note 23, at 67-69. During the 
Territorial period, the only source of revenue for schools was from county and 
district taxation. Fromong, supra note 23 at 121. The ability of counties to 
support education varied as did their willingness. Id. at 122. Control of the 
system of education was vested in county superintendents and local school 
boards. These officials often made educational decisions without regard for the 
needs of students, such as hiring unqualified teachers and purchasing textbooks 
without regard for the appropriate curriculum. As a result, the 1873 legislation 
required the development of the Territorial Institute to train teachers, devise 
curriculum, set policies, and select textbooks. Id. at 133-152.

[¶108] By 1889, some counties were reporting the state of 
their education system, with some boasting of excellent facilities with 
libraries, modern methods for delivering education, and the best teachers money 
could buy. Id. at 97-99. Other counties failed to report, and research reveals 
little commitment to education with consequent inadequacies in all areas. Id. at 
258. Further, by the time of the constitutional convention, the Territorial 
Institute no longer operated. Id. at 257-58.

[¶109] Thus we see that at the time of the constitutional 
convention, educational issues were not limited to the problem of establishing 
schools but included those problems inherent to local control which caused 
variations rather than "equal advantages" between the schools of the districts 
and "equal advantages" in comparison to the rest of the country. The framers' 
devotion of an entire constitutional article addressing education in such detail 
makes clear that the education article was drafted in response to a perceived 
need for a certain type of educational system. By the time of the constitutional 
convention, the importance of education was established. The framers protected 
the cherished right in Art. 1, § 23 which declared the right to education. Also 
by the time of the constitutional convention, however, the shortcomings and 
inadequacies of local control were obvious. The framers addressed this by 
settling that education was a state concern to be addressed at the state 
level.38 The framers vested the legislature 
with the responsibility to establish and maintain a complete and uniform system 
of public instruction and to provide sufficient revenue to create and maintain a 
thorough and efficient system of public schools which would deliver proper 
instruction to the state's school-age children.

[¶110] The framers left in place the means for the 
legislature to fund education by local property taxes. We find nothing 
indicating this signified local control. Given the interest in education at the 
local level, the sensible explanation is the framers believed interest would be 
sustained if the communities continued to assist in paying for education. At the 
time of drafting, the framers were unaware of the vast natural resource wealth 
in parts of this state which would lead to a school finance system which 
discriminated against property-poor school districts and the Washakie 
litigation. The framers certainly did not intend such a system. Indeed, by the 
Education Article's plain requirements concerning the education system and 
funding, it is clear the framers contemplated two things: 1) all funds were 
educational resources for all of the state's youth and 2) a mandate that the 
state, not local boards, through the legislature, control the system of 
education.

[¶111] It must also be accepted, however, that the framers 
did not prohibit a local role but left the nature 
and scope of that local role to the discretion of the legislature. The problems 
associated with local control were known to the 
framers, and they addressed them by vesting authority, responsibility, and 
control in the state legislature, effectively ensuring the state would establish 
the education system. So long as the constitutional mandates of a complete and 
uniform public instruction system and a thorough and efficient public school 
system which delivers proper instruction are met, nothing would appear to 
prohibit the legislature from delegating to local boards the authority of 
implementing that legislatively created and maintained system.

[¶112] Further scrutiny of the Education Article indicates 
one section might be a possible locus of local control. WYO. CONST. ART. 7, § 
11. That provision states:

Sec. 11. Neither the legislature 
nor the superintendent of public instruction shall have power to prescribe text 
books to be used in the public schools.

At 
the constitutional convention, Mr. Charles N. Potter39 explained:

It won't do to let the territory 
nor the superintendent of public instruction prescribe text books. I venture to 
say there is not more corruption than that which is caused where the prescribing 
of text books is left to the legislature.

Proceedings and Debates (Sept. 1889) in JOURNALS AND 
DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, WYOMING at 737 (The Daily Sun 
1893).

[¶113] Shortly after ratification, the corruption of which 
he spoke was explained by Potter during his service as attorney general. He 
said:

The evident purpose and object 
of this Constitutional provision was to prevent a monopoly in the sale of text 
books to the pupils in the public schools. It was undoubtedly intended to 
prohibit the adoption of any series of text books for any period of time, which 
would tend to reduce competition among the publishers of books, and impeding the 
progress of the schools of the State, by preventing them from changing from time 
to time to such newer or better text books as might be published and come on to 
the market, and be more advantageous for use in the public schools.

Letter from C.N. Potter to Hon. S.T. Farwell (Aug. 31, 
1892) in 1889-1906 WYO.REPORTS AND OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL at 
108-09 (n.p., n.d.); and in 1890-1918 WYO.REPORTS OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC 
INSTRUCTION at 33-34 (The S.A. Bristol Co., 1894).

[¶114] Attorney General Potter's elucidation of this 
provision was prompted by a concern of the State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction about a territorial law which required all county superintendents to 
meet and select textbooks for the entire state. The constitution required 
compliance with territorial laws. Since this territorial law appeared to 
conflict with the constitutional provision, the Attorney General's advice was 
solicited. Potter's clarification determined the provision was meant to prevent 
the evil of textbook monopoly. Accepting this interpretation, we see the end 
result permits local determination of the actual textbooks to be purchased by a 
school district only to avoid the evil of textbook monopoly, but the provision 
cannot be said to sanction or authorize local control beyond that specific task 
into broader areas such as determination of subject areas to be taught to 
students, course content and other education program policies. Limited to the 
prevention of the evil of textbook monopoly, that provision cannot be said also 
to mean the state cannot set standards with which textbooks purchased must 
comply. Otherwise interpreted, this provision would effectively limit the 
constitutional mandate for a quality education stated in §§ 1 and 9. This 
provision was not intended to designate local control.

[¶115] One of the parties suggests that perhaps local 
control is recognized in WYO. CONST. ART. 3, § 27. It states:

§ 27. Special and local laws 
prohibited.

The legislature shall not pass 
local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: 
For granting divorces; laying out, opening, altering or working roads or 
highways; vacating roads, town plats, streets, alleys or public grounds; 
locating or changing county seats; regulating county or township affairs; 
incorporation of cities, towns or villages; or changing or amending the charters 
of any cities, towns or villages; regulating the practice in courts of justice; 
regulating the jurisdiction and duties of justice of the peace, police 
magistrates or constables; changing the rules of evidence in any trial or 
inquiry; providing for changes of venue in civil or criminal cases; declaring 
any person of age; for limitation of civil actions; giving effect to any 
informal or invalid deeds; summoning or impaneling grand or petit juries; 
providing for the management of common schools; regulating the rate of interest 
on money; the opening or conducting of any election or designating the place of 
voting; the sale or mortgage of real estate belonging to minors or others under 
disability; chartering or licensing ferries or bridges or toll roads; chartering 
banks, insurance companies and loan and trust companies; remitting fines, 
penalties or forfeitures; creating, increasing, or decreasing fees, percentages 
or allowances of public officers; changing the law of descent; granting to any 
corporation, association or individual, the right to lay down railroad tracks, 
or any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever, or 
amending existing charter for such purpose; for punishment of crimes; changing 
the names of persons or places; for the assessment or collection of taxes; 
affecting estates of deceased persons, minors or others under legal 
disabilities; extending the time for the collection of taxes; refunding money 
paid into the state treasury, relinquishing or extinguishing, in whole or part, 
the indebtedness, liabilities or obligation of any corporation or person to this 
state or to any municipal corporation therein; exempting property from taxation; 
restoring to citizenship persons convicted of infamous crimes; authorizing the 
creation, extension or impairing of liens; creating offices or prescribing the 
powers or duties of officers in counties, cities, townships or school districts; 
or authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children. In all other cases 
where a general law can be made applicable no special law shall be enacted. 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶116] Our decisions interpreting Art. 3, § 27 have viewed 
this provision as enlarging upon the equal protection guarantees of Art. 1, § 
34. Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821, 826 (Wyo. 1980). This section 
means only that the legislature is to pass general rather than special laws so a 
statute operates alike upon all persons in the same circumstances. Meyer v. 
Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1240 (Wyo. 1982); Simons v. Laramie County School Dist. 
No. One, 741 P.2d 1116, 1124-25 (Wyo. 1987). The purpose served by the 
identification in the provision of some thirty-seven instances where general, 
not local, laws must be enacted, is to ensure careful consideration by the 
legislature as to the interests affected by enacted laws. KEITER AND NEWCOMB, supra note 26, at 96. Its purpose is not to give 
constitutional recognition to an interest. See Simons, 741 P.2d  at 1125 
(declaring violation of Art. 3, § 27 although state argued offending statute's 
intent was to equalize education funding in compliance with Washakie 
decision).

[¶117] The provision's enumeration of school management 
means only that if the legislature passes a law concerning management of common 
schools, it must be a general one applicable to all schools, not a special law. 
The section's prohibition in this area must be read as a legislative 
restriction, not as constitutional recognition of an interest.

c. The 
Constitutional Local Level Role

[¶118] As the district court found, the evil of the 
optional mill levy was its impact upon "basic" equal educational opportunity. In 
view of the constitutional requirement that the state provide a uniform, 
"proper" education program, the question arises whether the legislature can 
permit optional mill levies so the local school district can raise funds outside 
of the state foundation program in order to enrich its students' educational 
opportunities beyond those offered elsewhere in the state.

[¶119] The constitution requires the legislature to create 
and maintain a system providing an equal opportunity to a quality education. 
That system must be a function of state wealth. Once the legislature achieves 
the constitutional mandate of a cost-based, state-financed proper education, 
then assuming the legislature has a compelling reason for providing a mechanism 
by which local districts may tax themselves in order to enhance their programs 
in an equitable manner,40 that appears to 
be constitutionally permissible. However, we inject two notes of caution. First, 
in Skeen, the two dissenting state supreme court justices did not believe strict 
scrutiny permits a local enhancement mechanism. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d  at 322 (Page, 
Gardebring, JJ, dissenting). Second, local enhancement may also result in 
substantive innovations which should be available to all school districts as 
part of a proper education. The definition of a proper education is not static 
and necessarily will change. Should that change occur as a result of local 
innovation, all students are entitled to the benefit of that change as part of a 
cost-based, state-financed proper education.

3. Capital Construction Financing

[¶120] School districts generally fund their new building 
needs and building renovation and repair needs by issuing bonds for capital 
construction. The constitutional debt limit for bonding is 10% of assessed 
valuation.

[¶121] The legislature directed the State Department of 
Education to conduct a statewide assessment of school capital construction needs 
and establish state priorities based upon need. An independent firm, MGT of 
America, Inc. (MGT), studied and reported the needs for facility renovation and 
repair totaled $268.7 million with a new construction need of $7.1 million for 
replacement, totaling just over $275 million in needed capital facility 
expenditures. Despite this reported need, the legislature routinely transfers 
capital funds designated for facilities to the foundation program to meet 
operational expenses. The district court found that since Washakie the 
legislature has provided approximately $46 million in loans and grants and 
approximately an additional $10 million in "emergency" grants. At the time of 
trial, only about $5 million was designated as capital funding.

[¶122] Despite this, the district court found the 
challengers had not proved constitutional harm by this evidence and held the 
capital construction funding scheme constitutional. We reverse. In Washakie, 
with respect to capital construction, we said "the question of finances for the 
physical facilities with which to carry on the process of education" is "tarred 
with the same brush of disparate tax resources." Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 337. 
Post-Washakie legislative changes, in actual operation, have not removed the tar 
from this vital part of the total educational package. As we survey the 
evidence, our requirement of "statewide availability from total state resources 
for building construction or contribution to school buildings on a parity for 
all school districts" has been virtually ignored. Id. at 337. Capital 
construction financing is unavailable for many. Safe and efficient physical 
facilities with which to carry on the process of education are a necessary 
element of the total educational process. State funds must be readily available 
for those needs. It simply will not do to set up a legislative scheme to raise 
funds for that purpose and then turn around and allow the diversion of those 
funds to another purpose. All educational purposes must be appropriately and 
responsibly funded to comply with the constitutional mandates of a complete and 
uniform system of public instruction and a thorough and efficient system of 
public schools adequate for the proper education of the state's school age 
children.

[¶123] We hold deficient physical facilities deprive 
students of an equal educational opportunity and any financing system that 
allows such deficient facilities to exist is unconstitutional. The present 
capital construction scheme is infirm and fails to pass muster.

[¶124] We now consider the funding disparities which the 
district court considered to be caused by the distribution formula and were not 
wealth-based.

Distribution Formula Funding Disparities

1. Distribution Formula

[¶125] As explained earlier, to distribute the collected 
revenue, the state, through the Foundation Program, determines, by formula, the 
amount of funding each school district will require for the year's operating 
expenses. This amount is called the state guaranteed entitlement. The school 
district reports its expected local revenue and if a school district's local 
resources generate less revenue than its guaranteed entitlement, the state pays 
the difference. The main component of the formula which determines a school's 
funding amount is the classroom unit. In theory, a school funding amount can be 
determined either on a per student basis or by classroom unit. Wyoming utilizes 
the classroom unit method and each year the legislature assigns a classroom unit 
value. In the 1992-93 school year, the classroom unit value was $92,331. That 
figure is not set by Wyoming school districts calculating the actual cost of 
providing education for students; rather, it is a legislatively determined 
figure.

[¶126] Based on another formula, the divisor system, a 
school district calculates how many classroom units it has and multiplies that 
number by $92,331 to determine the amount of its operating revenue.41 School districts receive add-on 
revenue consisting of state reimbursements to the school districts for 75% of 
their busing costs and 85% of their costs for special education. A feature of 
the divisor system is the recalculation formula which may permit additional 
revenue during the school year if enrollment actually is higher than 
anticipated. A municipal divisor rule causes all schools within an incorporated 
municipality to receive the largest divisor regardless of size. The challengers 
attacked the divisor system, the municipal divisor, and the recalculation 
formula.

[¶127] The district court found the disparities challenged 
are the result of factors relating to a desire to preserve small schools in 
rural areas, an assumption it costs more to preserve smallness, an assumption of 
economies of scale in larger (urban) schools, and an assumption diseconomies of 
scale do not occur regardless of how large a school may grow. Washakie 
emphasized that only cost-justified disparities are constitutional. The district 
court's post-trial decision letter accurately captured the essence of the school 
districts' concerns:

The Wyoming system of school 
funding attempts to preserve history by recognizing that funds should be made 
available to those districts which have maintained smaller schools in order to 
continue to service all students within the district, however remote they might 
be from a larger population center. This often entails maintaining several high 
schools of much less than optimal size in order to accommodate the educational 
needs of those students without busing them to centers of greater population 
located some distance away. . . .

The other end of the scale 
involves the larger districts and the system through its divisors imposes 
economies of scale. . . . [The divisor] system provided no incentive to lower 
class size and in fact provided a disincentive to those districts which 
attempted to do so. So it was that the legislature made a choice between 
maintaining those smaller schools, realizing that they were operating well under 
optimal capacity, while at the same time imposing upon the larger municipalities 
the discipline of economies of scale. It is interesting to note that these two 
forces are virtually mutually exclusive. If one were to uniformly impose 
economies of scale upon all districts, it would necessarily mean the demise of 
the smaller schools. Yet, at the same time, by imposing economies of scale on 
the larger schools, such schools are precluded from enjoying the perceived 
advantages of smaller classes.

The effect of the legislative 
choice is not particularly hard to discern. There was much evidence showing that 
the choice resulted in more money per student available to the smaller districts 
than to the larger districts. In the main, this disparity in funding created a 
disparity in the class size. The larger districts were forced to offer larger 
classes than the smaller districts. On the other hand, the larger districts were 
able to offer more courses, including more advanced courses, than the smaller 
districts. Also there was some evidence adduced that the students from larger 
districts did not score as well as students from the smaller districts as first 
year students at the University of Wyoming.

[¶128] Here, the defenders attempt to justify a size-driven 
funding disparity based upon unproven assumptions of cost and economies of 
scale. Applying Washakie, we hold any justification which is not demonstrably 
cost-based is constitutionally infirm.

[¶129] The district court accepted that the distribution 
formula caused funding disparities and found the classroom unit and divisor 
system to be deficient, irrational and causing a genuine funding disadvantage to 
each student of the larger districts. The court, however, upheld the entire 
distribution system since, in the district court's opinion, the challengers 
failed to meet their burden of proof when they did not measure all costs. The 
district court also found the distribution system caused no significant 
disparity of educational quality or educational opportunity, only a genuine 
potential for disparity. We reverse.

[¶130] To reiterate, we apply strict scrutiny to the 
distribution component of the school finance system. Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 
334-35. The state bears the burden of proving funding disparities are 
cost-justified or a compelling reason justifies disparity. Where the evidence 
establishes funding and spending disparities unjustified by educational cost 
differentials, the challengers are not burdened with proving disparity of 
educational quality or educational opportunity; those disparities are presumed. 
Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 334. A review of the district court's findings of fact 
reveals that the disparities caused by the distribution formula are not 
cost-based.

2. Findings of Fact

a. CRU

[¶131]   A review of the district court's 
findings of fact reveals the evidence did not demonstrate the necessary 
cost-based justifications. As originally conceived in the 1950's, the CRU 
captured the size of classrooms within various sized schools. By determining the 
amount needed to operate a classroom in various sized schools, smaller schools 
were assured sufficient funding. In the district court's view, the reality of 
funding the actual number of classrooms in the state has been lost. The CRU 
today is merely a unit for distributing dollars and does not reflect the actual 
number of classrooms which are maintained within a particular district.

[¶132] The district court quoted Barry Nimmo's Department 
of Education publication which states "the method of computing the classroom 
unit does not involve any `objectively determined external criteria - such as 
actual costs of education, or demonstrated need for major facility repairs - but 
a legislatively mandated formula based almost entirely on prior year enrollment 
and operations' and it is `likely that the guarantee in some cases provides too 
little or too much funding to particular school districts in particular years.'" 
The district court agreed it could not tell what each CRU buys.

b. 
Divisors

[¶133] Originally, the concept behind divisors was to 
assure CRUs were weighted in favor of smaller schools, generally believed to be 
costlier than large schools. A smaller divisor will generate more CRUs than will 
a larger divisor applied to the same number of students. Low enrollment schools 
receive the smaller divisors and more funding per student while all schools 
having a student population over 500 are assigned the largest divisor of 23 and 
receive less funding per student. The concept views this as fair since larger 
schools and school districts enjoy "economies of scale" allowing efficient 
educating of students for the same dollars per classroom unit as districts with 
smaller numbers of students.

[¶134] The district court found a state study failed to 
investigate the actual costs needed to provide a basic education package to each 
student and whether the differences in funding per student were justified by 
differences in cost. Dr. Andersen, developer of the present day divisor system, 
testified the system's purpose was not cost-related. We know further the state 
legislature did not study costs as promised in the preamble of its 1983 
transitional legislation. Former state superintendent Lynn Simons and former 
State Board of Education member Jack Iversen both testified the divisor system 
was not cost-based. The district court determined the divisor system, in fact, 
defies the law of economics, once a school becomes locked into the 23 divisor. 
At certain sizes, schools can no longer take advantage of economies of scale and 
in fact diseconomies of scale, meaning costs increase, begin to occur as a 
school moves beyond the optimum size. The divisor system fails to recognize 
this. The weight of this evidence is that the distribution formula is not based 
upon costs.

[¶135] The district court found the divisor system caused 
funding disparities. Since those funding disparities are not based upon actual 
cost differentials, they are unjustified and, therefore, unconstitutional. The 
district court found "to the extent of such differences, there exists a genuine 
potential difference in educational opportunity." Washakie presumes funding 
disparity results in educational opportunity disparity.

c. 
Municipal Divisor

[¶136] As explained earlier, another critical element which 
can limit a school district's funds is the municipal divisor feature which 
assigns a higher divisor to any school within an incorporated city or town or 
within five miles of an incorporated city or town, regardless of size. In 
effect, all schools of a particular type within a single municipality are 
treated as a single school.

[¶137] Despite the accepted belief smaller schools are 
costlier, the effect of the municipal divisor is such that a school of 150 
students which is in a town or city will be assigned a higher divisor, and 
consequently less money, than the same size school in a smaller community. The 
district court found the record showed no provable difference in the cost of 
running these two schools. By accident of location, however, one school receives 
one-third more funding. 

[¶138] The district court declared the municipal divisor 
unconstitutional. The district court found the state's only reason to assign the 
higher divisor to any school within a city or town was to prevent towns from 
building unnecessarily small schools which would receive a low divisor and 
generate more funding. No proof was offered that this was or had been a problem. 
School superintendents testified it is nonsensical to believe millions would be 
spent to build an unneeded school in order to receive a limited amount of 
funding. The district court concluded this made no sense and was not equitable. 
We affirm the district court's ruling that the municipal divisor statute is 
unconstitutional.

d. 
Recalculation Formula

[¶139] The challengers alleged the recalculation formula 
resulted in inequity for large districts because those districts on the low end 
of the divisor scale will receive an additional CRU if a single family with two 
or three children move into the community. However, in a large district with a 
23 divisor, should there be an increase of 297 students (99 elementary students, 
99 junior high students and 99 high school students), there would not be any 
additional CRUs. The district court did not address this issue in its final 
order, but the weight of the evidence is convincing that increased student 
population increased education costs. Funding increased costs in a different 
manner based on school size and location is arbitrary and causes unjustified 
funding disparities. The formula causing unjustified funding variations is 
unconstitutional.

3. Cost 
Differentials

[¶140] Whether this trial would result in redistribution of 
the funding pie was the primary concern of the defenders:

Q. Isn't it also true that if 
the funding were reallocated so that you felt yours was adequate, and everyone 
involved believed that it was a rational basis for the way it was allocated, 
that someone would still be below average and someone would still be in last 
place, some district?

The response of Jack Iversen, superintendent of Laramie 
County School District, precisely comprehends the constitutional mandate:

A. I would hope that through a 
cost of education foundation to the whole distribution system that we would not 
have inadequate opportunities for children, inadequate systems. To answer your 
question as directly as I can, there doesn't have to be losers in the system. I 
think if the distribution system is based on how much it costs to educate a 
child, then we're ensuring the children get educated, . . . .

[¶141] "There doesn't have to be losers in the system" is 
definitive of the meaning of equal educational opportunity to a proper 
education. The definition of a proper education is not static, but will change. 
As revealed by trial testimony from all parties and the rules of the state board 
of education, a proper education today requires that broad categories of 
students' needs must be addressed with appropriate education programs. Today's 
educators recognize a proper education requires appropriate curriculum in core 
curriculum, core skills, advanced placement courses and rapidly changing 
computer technology, small schools, and small class size. These and other 
indicia of educational opportunity must be afforded regardless of school size or 
location.

[¶142] An equal opportunity for a proper education 
necessarily contemplates the playing field will be leveled so each child has an 
equal chance for educational success. See Kukor, 436 N.W.2d  at 588 (Bablitch, 
J., dissenting). Educational success must be defined as graduating from high 
school equipped for a role as a citizen, participant in the political system and 
competitor both intellectually and economically. Our children's readiness to 
learn is impacted by social ills, learning deficiencies and a system itself 
which forces them into large classes or large schools.

[¶143] Children with an impaired readiness to learn do not 
have the same equal opportunity for a quality education as do those children not 
impacted by personal or social ills simply because they do not have the same 
starting point in learning. A legislatively created finance system which 
distributes dollars without regard for the need to level the playing field does 
not provide an equal opportunity for a quality education. Having no losers in 
the system requires there be no shrinking pie but a pie of the size needed. Once 
education need is determined, the pie must be large enough to fund that 
need.

[¶144] The provisions of Article 7 of the Wyoming 
Constitution are a guide to the legislature for planning, administering and 
financing an education system. The responsibility for transforming guidelines 
into a constitutionally acceptable education system rests upon the legislature. 
Substantively, the constitution uses terms commanding the legislature to provide 
and fund an education system which is of a quality "appropriate for the times." 
No other reasonable conclusion can be drawn except the obvious one that the 
specific directives of §§ 1 and 9 are well beyond simply allowing the 
legislature to dispense a minimal level of elementary and secondary education 
and then fund it as best it can amidst other competing priorities. Supporting an 
opportunity for a complete, proper, quality education is the legislature's 
paramount priority; competing priorities not of constitutional magnitude are 
secondary, and the legislature may not yield to them until constitutionally 
sufficient provision is made for elementary and secondary education.

[¶145] As nearly as possible, and making allowances for 
local conditions, special needs and problems, and educational cost 
differentials, the education system must achieve financial parity. A cost of 
education study42 and analysis must 
be conducted and the results must inform the creation of a new funding system. 
To fulfill the constitutional command of "equality of financing will achieve 
equality of quality," the legislature must state and describe what a "proper 
education" is for a Wyoming child. The constitution requires it be the best that we can do. The legislature, in fulfilling its 
constitutional duty, must define and specify what that is. Trial testimony 
indicated aspects of a quality education will include:

1. Small schools43, small class size, low student/teacher 
ratios, textbooks, low student/personal computer ratios.

2. Integrated, substantially 
uniform substantive curriculum decided by the legislature through the State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction and the State Board of Education with input 
from local school boards.

3. Ample, appropriate provision 
for at-risk students, special problem students, talented students.

4. Setting of meaningful 
standards for course content and knowledge attainment intended to achieve the 
legislative goal of equipping all students for entry to the University of 
Wyoming and Wyoming Community Colleges or which will achieve the other purposes 
of education.

5. Timely and meaningful 
assessment of all students' progress in core curriculum and core skills 
regardless of whether those students intend to pursue college or vocational 
training.

[¶146] To summarize, considering all of these various 
factors, the legislature must first design the best educational system by 
identifying the "proper" educational package each Wyoming student is entitled to 
have whether she lives in Laramie or in Sundance. The cost of that educational 
package must then be determined and the legislature must then take the necessary 
action to fund that package. Because education is one of the state's most 
important functions, lack of financial resources will not be an acceptable 
reason for failure to provide the best educational system. All other financial 
considerations must yield until education is funded.

[¶147] The state financed basket of quality educational 
goods and services available to all school-age youth must be nearly identical 
from district to district. If a local district then wants to enhance the content 
of that basket, the legislature can provide a mechanism by which it can be done. 
But first, before all else, the constitutional basket must be filled.

CONCLUSION

[¶148] Nothing in this decision shall be construed to 
interfere with, impair, or adversely affect existing bond obligations of the 
various school districts throughout the state. We realize the legislature must 
be afforded ample time for adequate study, drafting of appropriate reform 
legislation, and debate on and passage of that legislation. Consequently, as we 
did in Washakie, we shall provide a reasonable period of time for the 
legislature to achieve constitutional compliance. We order that the legislature 
shall achieve that compliance not later than July 1, 1997.

[¶149] We remand to the district court with directions to 
enter judgment consistent with this opinion and retain jurisdiction until a 
constitutional body of legislation is enacted and in effect, taking such action 
as may be necessary to assure conformity.

THOMAS, J., files a specially concurring opinion.   

THOMAS, Justice, concurring.

[¶150] I concur in all the majority has said in this case. 
As the only member of the current court who participated in Washakie County Sch. 
Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Hot 
Springs County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washakie, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980), I must express my disappointment at legislative shortfall. 
Washakie should have been sufficient to explain the failure to satisfy the 
constitutional requirements. The legislature has not done what it promised in 
its preamble to the 1983 legislation redesigning the school financing structure. 
Instead of reducing disparity in funding education, that disparity has been 
exacerbated. Whether the State Department of Education's efforts were stymied by 
lack of funding or executive shortfall may be debatable. In any event, what was 
intended to happen never occurred.

[¶151] I am reminded of a remote broadcast of an Army-Navy 
football game in the early 1950s. During an exciting moment of play in the 
fourth quarter, the announcer, a person who enjoys renown in his field, 
described the action on the field in this way: "Look, there's a fumble rolling 
around in the air!"

[¶152] While I do not claim any expertise in educational 
funding, it is my impression a formula can be developed that will begin with an 
appropriate baseline for equal funding, whether on a classroom basis or on an 
individual student basis. Appropriately, that baseline will be adjusted to 
account for disparities representing actual cost differentials from district to 
district and supported by empirical data. I believe the financial records of the 
several school districts, in the hands of a competent cost accountant, will 
provide the facts essential to those adjustments. Obviously the measurable 
factors impacting the costs of education from place to place are not total 
mysteries and can be factually demonstrated rather than assumed. This is the 
sort of system the Washakie court envisioned. It was never the vision of the 
Washakie court that the constitutional mandates could be satisfied by expert 
opinion and arbitrary advisors. Certainly, that approach is unconscionable when 
facts are available.

[¶153] As the majority suggests, it may be essential to "a 
complete and uniform system of public education" to depart from the traditional 
tax methodology for school financing and simply implement a statewide levy that 
will be adequate to satisfy the constitutional mandates. That would readily 
avoid the wealth-based complications represented by the local mill levies and 
the recapture provisions. Equitable division of that sort of education fund 
would be far better than the current method with its propensities for catering 
to local demands and issues.

ORDER 
DENYING REHEARING AND RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATION

GOLDEN, Chief Justice.

[¶154] The court after examination and study of the 
petition for rehearing concludes: 

1. The opinion and decision of 
the court was implicit in its language that it was prospective in operation and 
not intended to disturb present statutory provisions for financing of school 
operations, including bonded indebtedness.

2. Other than clarifying the 
prospective operation of the opinion, all other questions raised by the petition 
for rehearing have already been considered and resolved within the court's 
opinion.

            
It is therefore

[¶155] ORDERED that the relief granted and direction of the 
court's opinion handed down on November 8, 1995, are prospective.

[¶156] FURTHER ORDERED that the school finance system of 
the state of Wyoming continue under existing statutes, and the validity and 
enforceability of past and future acts, bonded indebtedness and obligations 
incurred under applicable statutes, as long as they remain in force and effect, 
are assured.

[¶157] FURTHER ORDERED that the judgment of the district 
court, made and entered on the mandate, be consistent with this order.

[¶158] FINALLY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing be 
and is denied, except as otherwise in this order provided.

[¶159] DATED this 5th day of December, 1995.

Footnotes

1 Defendants later dismissed from the suit were the Governor 
and State Treasurer.

2 The following school districts intervened:

Big Horn County No. 1, 
Big Horn County No. 4, Carbon County No. 2, Crook County No. 1, Fremont County 
No. 9, Fremont County No. 14, Fremont County No. 24, Fremont County No. 38, Hot 
Springs County No. 1, Johnson County No. 1, Laramie County No. 2, Niobrara 
County No. 1, Park County No. 16, Platte County No. 1, Platte County No. 2, 
Sheridan County No. 1, Sheridan County No. 3, Sublette County No. 1, Sublette 
County No. 9, Uinta County No. 4, Washakie County No. 2, Weston County No. 1, 
Weston County No. 7.

3 In Case 

No. 94-136, the brief of 
Appellant-Plaintiffs, Campbell County School District, State of Wyoming, et al., 
presents these issues:

A. Whether the trial 
court erred in determining that the several components of the school finance 
system can be isolated and subjected to differing standards of judicial 
scrutiny?

B. Whether the trial 
court erred in holding that the strict scrutiny standard of review does not 
apply to the distribution side of the finance system.

C. Whether the trial 
court erred in holding that the recapture aspect of the school finance system is 
unconstitutional.

D. Whether by any 
standard of scrutiny, the court's conclusions are contrary to its factual 
findings and the evidence?

The brief of 
Appellee-Defendant State of Wyoming, et al., presents these issues for Case 

Nos. 94-136, 94-138, and 
94-139:

Does the evidence support 
the findings and conclusions of the trial court which upheld the 
constitutionality of the Wyoming school finance system?

The brief of 
Appellee-Intervening Defendant School Districts Big Horn County School District 
No. One, et al., in Case Nos. 94-136, 94-138, and 94-139 states the issues 
as:

I. Did the district court 
properly refuse to apply a strict scrutiny test to the method of distributing 
school finances when the adequacy of school funding has not been challenged?

II. Did the district 
court properly determine that the current divisor system provides an equitable 
allocation of school monies as required by Washakie?

In Case No. 94-137, 
Appellant-Defendant State of Wyoming presents these issues:

I. Does the separation of 
powers requirement prevent judicial modification of the school funding system 
when the public schools are meeting the constitutional standards?

II. What is plaintiffs' 
burden of proof in a challenge to the constitutionality of the school funding 
system?

III. What is the 
constitutional standard by which the public school system must be measured?

IV. May any parts of the 
school funding system be invalidated without proof of educational harm to any 
student?

Appellee-Intervening 
Plaintiff Wyoming Education Association presents these issues in reply for Case 
Nos. 94-137 and 94-140:

I. Is the exercise of 
authority by the court to declare statutes unconstitutional in violation of the 
doctrine of the separation of powers?

II. Did the district 
court err in applying the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection to the 
optional mills and recapture provisions of the school finance system?

III. What is the proper 
criteria for demonstrating constitutional harm in a school finance case?

IV. Whether the optional 
mills, recapture and municipal divisor features of the finance system are 
constitutional under any standard of review?

Appellee-Plaintiff 
Campbell County School District, State of Wyoming, et al., in Case Nos. 94-137 
and 94-140 address the issues presented by Appellant-Defendant State, 
Intervening Defendants, and the Amicus Curiae brief of the Wyoming 
Legislature.

Appellee-Intervening 
Plaintiff Laramie County School District No. One, in reply to 
Appellant-Defendant State of Wyoming and Appellant-Intervening Defendant Big 
Horn School District, in Case Nos. 94-137, 94-140 states this issue:

Are the recapture, 
optional mills, and municipal divisor provisions of the State of Wyoming school 
finance scheme subject to strict scrutiny?

The Amicus Curiae Brief 
of Wyoming Legislature and Management Council in Case No. 94-137 presents this 
issue:

I. Whether the decision 
of the district court violates the Wyoming Constitution by usurping the 
authority of the Wyoming legislature.

In Case No. 94-138, 
Appellant-Intervening Plaintiff Laramie County School District No. One presents 
these issues:

A. Did the district court 
err in failing to apply the strict scrutiny standard to the entire system of 
funding public education in Wyoming?

(i) Did the district 
court err by failing to apply the strict scrutiny standard to the distribution 
of funds for public education in Wyoming?

(ii) Did the district 
court err when it imposed the burden of proof on the plaintiffs to establish 
that there was "an immediate and grave threat to the constitutional guarantee of 
a quality education" in the present system for funding capital construction 
projects for schools?

In Case No. 94-139, 
Appellant-Intervening Plaintiff Wyoming Education Association presents these 
issues:

1. Was sufficient 
"constitutional harm" shown to permit the court to rule on the constitutionality 
of the capital construction finance system?

2. Is the system of 
capital construction financing constitutional?

3. Does the strict 
scrutiny standard of equal protection apply to the distribution as well as the 
collection of educational funds?

4. Under any standard of 
equal protection or other constitutional provisions, is the current system of 
distribution constitutional?

Amicus Curiae Lincoln 
County School District No. Two presents this issue for Case No. 94-139:

(1) Assuming, as the 
District Court found, that the capital construction provisions of the Wyoming 
Statutes require strict scrutiny, did the intervening plaintiff, the Wyoming 
Education Association ("WEA"), fail to establish proof of harm to a 
constitutionally protected right so that the District Court was correct in 
finding that there was no basis for declaring the capital construction 
provisions unconstitutional?

(2) Assuming the absence 
of proof at trial of the "specific nature of the harm and its immediacy" 
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order, Appendix B, p. 24), is 
the statutory structure governing capital construction financing now so 
inherently defective that the Supreme Court should declare it unconstitutional 
for the benefit of the school children of the state and to avoid further 
expensive litigation of questionable value?

In Case No. 94-140, 
Appellant-Intervening Defendant Big Horn County School District No. One, State 
of Wyoming, et al., state these issues:

A. Should the district 
court have applied a "strict scrutiny" standard of review to determine the 
constitutionality of the optional mills provisions in Wyoming Statute § 
21-13-102(a)?

B. Should the district 
court have applied a "strict scrutiny" standard of review to determine the 
constitutionality of the recapture provisions in Wyoming Statute § 
21-13-102(b)?

4 The local twenty-five mill levy had been optional. The 
change to mandatory levy was accomplished by legislation without the necessity 
of a constitutional amendment. WYO. STAT. § 21-13-102(a)(i)(A) (1983) (amended 
Supp. 1995). The revenue generated from this levy is computed as a local 
resource.

5 Prior to Washakie, the local districts were empowered to 
levy up to twelve mills if they so desired. The state was authorized to levy up 
to six mills for educational purposes. The committee recommended these mill levy 
amounts be reversed, placing the six mill option with the local districts and 
mandating an additional twelve mills which the state would levy for purposes of 
supporting the State Foundation Program. This suggestion was approved by voters 
when presented as a constitutional amendment. WYO. STAT. § 21-13-102(a)(i)(B) 
(1983) (amended Supp. 1995). Thus, a twelve mill levy became a state resource, 
WYO. STAT. § 21-13-303(a) (1983) (amended 1987), and directed to the State 
Foundation Program, and a six mill county levy became a local resource reducing 
the amount of foundation funds available to a school district. WYO. STAT. § 
21-13-201(a) (1983).

6 Local resources available to generate revenue include the 
six mill county mill levy, the twenty-five mill local district levy, school land 
income, fines and forfeitures, forest reserve/Taylor grazing fees, motor vehicle 
fees, and tuition.

7 Add-ons include transportation operation and maintenance, 
transportation capital outlay (buses and other vehicles), tuition paid, costs of 
isolation/homebound students, special education, one-teacher schools, and 
vocational education.

8 As an example, the statute's divisor schedule for 
elementary schools provides:

Elementary School Divisor Schedule:

Average Daily 
            Divisor 
                
            Minimum Classroom Membership         
                
                
                
            Units

Less than 10 
                
          8     
                
                
      1.00 10 but less than 27 
                
8                 
                
          1.20 27 
but less than 44         
      12         
                
                
  3.25 44 but less than 76     
          14     
                
                
      3.60 76 but less than 151 
            16     
                
                
      5.36 151 but less than 
            
     19         
                
            
      9.38 301 301 but less than         
          22     
                
                
    15.79 501 501 and over         
                23 
                
                
         22.73

WYOMING SCHOOL FOUNDATION 
PROGRAM, at 49, quoting WYO. STAT. § 21-13-308(c).

9 Under the statutory formula, the portion of the guarantee 
based upon enrollment is calculated as:

No. of Students 
(ADM)       
X      Statutory 
Classroom      =      State 
Guarantee Statutory 
Divisor                                
Unit Value

10 Funds outside of the program are also available for gifted 
and talented grants and compensatory education grants. These grants are capped 
respectively at $350,000 and $1,000,000 statewide.

11 In Washakie, we said there is no constitutional 
requirement that school buildings (physical facilities) must be built by 
creation of debt. Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 337.

12 Total Number of Wyoming Students: 98,951

Plaintiff School 
Districts:

Uinta # 1 
                
                
                
    3,708 Sweetwater # 1 
                
                
        6,006 Sweetwater 
# 2                 
                
        3,924 Laramie # 1 
(Intervenor)             
            13,517 Campbell # 1 7,983         
                
                
                
        _______             
                
                
                
        35,138

Defender School 
Districts: 15,128 students.

13 In Washakie, the difference in general fund revenue per 
student (ADM) was $2,360. Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 338-39. For the 1991-92 school 
year, that difference was $13,016.

14 The district court gave two examples. In the first 
example, an elementary school of 150 students subject to the municipal divisor 
would receive 6.5 CRUs. An elementary school of 150 students not subject to the 
municipal divisor would receive 9.4 CRUs. The court found no evidence one cost 
one third more to operate than the other. In the second example, a junior high 
school and high school combined to achieve economy of scale received separate, 
lower divisors resulting in one third more funding than did schools with similar 
enrollment subjected to a higher divisor because of their location.

15 Example of disparity between school districts is:

    
                
                
                
                
    # of students             
         $/student

Fremont Cty # 24, 
Shoshoni             
                318 
                
                
    9,741 Platte Cty # 2, Guernsey 
                
                
    319             
                
        7,068

At trial, the only 
explanation suggested for a $2700 difference for having one additional student 
was optional mill levies.

16 The example used by the district court was Laramie County 
School District Number Two which supports high schools at Burns, Albin, and Pine 
Bluffs.

17 The district court did not define this term. Testimony at 
trial indicated that a number of factors are considered to determine whether a 
school is a necessarily small school or can be consolidated with another.

18 A 1989 Wyoming Education and Economics Task Force 
determined those citizens with the most limited basic skills include 68% of all 
those arrested, 85% of unwed mothers, 79% of welfare dependents, 85% of high 
school dropouts, and 72% of the unemployed. EDUCATION AND ECONOMICS TASK FORCE, 
REPORT TO THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION/STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC 
INSTRUCTION. GREATER EXPECTATIONS: RAISING STANDARDS, FORMING PARTNERSHIPS, AND 
ACCOUNTING FOR STUDENT LEARNING, at 5-6 (Nov. 1989). Currently, Wyoming's State 
Board of Education requires all schools to address the needs of at-risk 
students. Wyoming State Board of Education Rules and Regulations, Ch. VI, § 11 
(1993).

19 School districts from both parties testified that in the 
face of budget shortfalls, their highest priority is maintaining a low class 
size. Initial budget cuts are aimed at textbook purchases, computer purchases, 
computer maintenance and training, electives, extracurricular activities and 
support staff personnel. Only when these cuts prove insufficient will the number 
of teachers be cut since this directly causes increases in class sizes.

20 Among those are poverty and parental absence or neglect. 
That poverty is a growing concern can be seen in the increasing percentages of 
students in school districts whose families receive welfare assistance or 
qualify for free and reduced price lunches. In LCSD # 1, ten of its twenty 
elementary schools have been designated as Chapter One schools because 49% of 
the student population qualify for free and reduced price lunches and score less 
than the 29th percentile in reading and math. A Chapter One school designation 
qualifies the school to receive federal funding as part of a national 
recognition that poverty is linked to decreased student success. Despite this 
additional funding, the budget manager for LCSD # 1 testified the increased 
costs associated with at-risk students has left the district functionally 
bankrupt from the constant deficits the school district has experienced. Most 
Wyoming schools must deal with these increased costs without federal 
funding.

21 At the time 
of trial, recapture districts were Campbell County School District No. One, 
Sublette County School District Nos. One and Nine, Park County School District 
No. Sixteen, and Lincoln County School District No. One.

22 The Court's 
pre-trial and post-trial decision letters were incorporated into its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.

 23 Terence D. 
Fromong, The Development of Public Elementary and Secondary Education in 
Wyoming: 1869-1917, 153-157 (1962) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Wyoming (Laramie)). See also John A. Bartholow, The Development of Public 
Elementary Education in Wyoming: 1917-1945 (1969) (unpublished dissertation, 
University of Wyoming (Laramie)); George J. Bale, A History of the Development 
of Territorial Public Education in the State of Wyoming, 1869-1890 (1938) 
(unpublished dissertation, University of Colorado (Boulder)).

 

24 WYO. CONST. ART. 7, § 14.

25 WYO. CONST. ART. 7, §§ 2, 3, 5, AND 9.

26 ROBERT B. KEITER AND TIM NEWCOMB, THE WYOMING STATE 
CONSTITUTION, A REFERENCE GUIDE 3 (1993). See also Fromong, supra note 23.

27 Because Art. 7 
uses the word "instruction" while Art. 1, § 23 uses the word "education," we 
also study its definition. 

28 For admission 
to the 1995 fall semester, the University of Wyoming required:

1. Graduates of Wyoming high schools need cumulative high 
school grade point averages of 2.75 or above. . . .

2. [C]omplete at least 13 high school units in the 
following pre-college curriculum (one unit = one year):

Four units of English/communication/language arts are 
required, with at least three units containing a substantial writing component. 
Speech and other communication-based courses with substantial writing components 
may meet this requirement.

You may also complete three units in 
English/communication/language arts plus two units of the same foreign language 
for this requirement.

[T]hree units of mathematics including the concepts of a 
college preparatory algebra I, algebra II, and geometry sequence. . . . 
Recommend . . . algebra II, geometry, or a higher-level math course during your 
senior year. Three units of science are required. At least one unit must be from 
the physical sciences: physics, chemistry, or a college preparatory physical 
science course. The other two units may be from any combination of biological, 
life, physical, or earth/space sciences.

[T]hree cultural context units selected from the behavioral 
or social sciences, visual or performing arts, humanities, or foreign 
languages.

Univ. of Wyoming, Freshman Viewbook, 1994-95.

29 Several 
decisions indicate the meaning of "uniform" includes a standardized school 
curriculum. Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 577-78; Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 
809-10, 537 P.2d 635, 651-52 (1975); Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. v. Evans, 123 
Idaho 573, 579-580, 850 P.2d 724, 730-731 (1993). A standardized statewide 
curriculum is not a foreign concept for Wyoming. In 1896, the State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction informed the legislature a uniform, 
standardized, integrated curriculum was needed. Fromong, supra note 23 at 
260-62. That office published a suggested course of study and through the 
efforts of educators the state progressed towards uniformity. Id. at 263-66. The 
1913 State Legislature mandated the state superintendent develop a course of 
study for the elementary schools of the state: reading, spelling, writing, 
United States history, language and grammar, numbers and arithmetic, history and 
civil government of Wyoming, humane treatment of animals, nature study and 
geography, physiology and hygiene, with special instruction of the effects of 
alcoholic drinks and narcotics, and agriculture. Id. at 272.

 30 The rules list 
the areas of a common core of knowledge as language arts, social studies, 
mathematics, science, fine arts and performing arts, physical education, health 
and safety, humanities, career options, foreign cultures including language, and 
applied technology.

 

31 Problem solving, interpersonal communications, keyboarding 
and computer applications, critical thinking, creativity, life skills, including 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training.

32 The presence 
of education in state constitutions has generated challenges based upon equal 
protection claims and challenges based upon the various education provisions. 
The variations in state constitutions have produced diverse holdings. Those 
states holding their finance systems unconstitutional are:

    Roosevelt Elem. School Dist. v. Bishop, 
179 Ariz. 233, 877 P.2d 806 (1994); Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 
340, 651     S.W.2d 90 (1983); Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 
135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929 (1976) (Serrano II), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 
        907, 97 S. Ct. 2951, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1079 
(1977); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Rose v. Council 
for Better         Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 
1989); McDuffy v. Secretary of Exec. Off. of Educ., 415 Mass. 545, 615 N.E.2d 516 (1993); Helena         Elementary Sch. Dist. 
No. 1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684 (1989); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 
473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973),         cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 976, 94 S. Ct. 292, 38 L. Ed. 2d 219 (1973) (Robinson I); Abbott v. Burke, 
119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990);     Tennessee Small School 
Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Kirby, 777 S.W.2d         391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle 
Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).

Those states holding their finance systems constitutional 
are:

    Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 
649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156 
(1981);         Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 
793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); People ex rel. Jones v. Adams, 40 Ill. App.3d 189, 350 N.E.2d 767         (1976); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 
229 v. Kansas, 256 Kan. 232, 885 P.2d 1170 (1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
115 S. Ct. 2582,         132 L. Ed. 2d 832 (1995); 
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983); 
Milliken v. Green, 390         Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973); Skeen v. Minnesota, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); Gould v. 
Orr, 244 Neb. 163, 506 N.W.2d     349 (1993); Bd. of Educ. 
Levittown v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359 (1982), 
appeal dismissed, 459         U.S. 1138, 1139, 103 S. Ct. 775, 74 L. Ed. 2d 986 (1993); Bismarck Public School Dist. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994)         (although three of 
the court's five justices found the system unconstitutional, a super-majority of 
four votes is necessary to declare     a statute 
unconstitutional); Bd. of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.     1015, 100 S. Ct. 665, 62 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1980); Fair Sch. Finance Council of Okla. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v.         State, 
276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976); Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 399 A.2d 360 
(1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 294         
S.C. 346, 364 S.E.2d 470 (1988); Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis.2d 469, 436 N.W.2d 568 
(1989). 

33 The following 
school reform cases have applied strict scrutiny:

    Roosevelt Elem. School Dist. v. Bishop, 
179 Ariz. 233, 877 P.2d 806 (1994) (two justices in the plurality decision would 
have             applied strict 
scrutiny); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Pauley v. 
Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859     (1979); Serrano v. 
Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907, 97 S. Ct. 2951, 53         L.Ed.2d 1079 
(1977).

North Dakota applied an intermediate level of scrutiny. 
Bismarck Public School Dist. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994).

The following cases applied rational scrutiny:

    Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 
649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982) (two justices in the plurality would have applied 
rational             
    scrutiny); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156 
(1981); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 
        458 A.2d 758 (1983); Bd. of Educ., 
Levittown v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359 (1982), 
appeal             
    dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138, 1139, 103 S. Ct. 775, 74 L. Ed. 2d 986 
(1983); Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of Cincinnati v. 
        Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 
(1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015, 100 S. Ct. 665, 62 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1980).

34 Washakie 
said:

We are well aware that the formula that will provide 
equality will be quite complex. More money may be needed in one school district 
to achieve quality education than in another because of, e.g., transportation 
costs, building maintenance costs, construction costs, logistic considerations, 
number of pupils with special problems, et cetera. However, it is not problem 
that cannot be solved, challenging though it might be. Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 315 
n. 3. 

35 That relevant 
portion of the provision states:

Provision shall be made by general law for the equitable 
allocation of such income among all school districts in the state. . . .

WYO. CONST. ART. 7, § 8.

36 Example:

Foundation Guarantee:     $100,000 Local 
Resources:              
110,000 109% of 
Guarantee:           
109,000                                       
________ Recapture 
Amt:                   
1,000

The provided example does not indicate the state average 
yield, however, both parties state the recapture amount has never exceeded the 
75% limitation imposed by the constitutional amendment.

37 Richard 
Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 CONN.L.REV. 
773 (1992). 

38 The 
legislature was slow to recognize the framers' intent. In 1917, Governor 
Kendrick in his address to the Fourteenth State Legislature advised them to 
adopt the proposals of a State School Code Committee. That committee had 
carefully surveyed all aspects of the education system then in place, including 
physical facilities, teacher and administrator competence, curriculum, and 
finances. Its report caused Governor Kendrick to remark:

[P]ublic education is a state responsibility, and should 
not be left to the accidental judgment of local boards, which is often 
excellent, but is just as often exactly the reverse.

The legislature adopted the school code. Fromong, supra 
note 23, at 310-323.

39 Charles N. 
Potter served thirty-two years on the Wyoming Supreme Court, from 1895-1927.

 

40 A possible method was recommended by the defenders' expert 
at trial who recommended that all optional mills be power equalized.

41 In 1991-1992, 
Wyoming school districts spent $548.5 million in general fund expenditures or 
$5,543 per pupil for 98,951 students. Forty-five districts received $224.8 
million in state aid, while $13.6 million was recaptured from four school 
districts. Since only a portion of excess may be recaptured, districts retained 
$4.3 million of revenue generated beyond what was needed for their expenses. The 
total amount paid out through the state foundation program was $498.5 million. 
The other $50 million in expenditures were paid for primarily through a revenue 
source which is outside the foundation program, i.e., the local optional mill 
levy. 

42 The district 
court and all parties determined that the Harvey study is ill-suited as a tool 
for actual distribution.

 

43 Urban schools must be able to realize the concept of 
"smallness" either through the neighborhood school concept or the schools within 
a school concept just as rural schools struggle to defend their smallness.