Case Title: Anderson v. State, Dept. of Highways

Citation: 

Docket Number: 3439

State: alaska

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Date: 1978-09-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Anderson v. State, Dept. of Highways  584 P.2d 537 (1978) Oris O. ANDERSON and Aiko K. Anderson, husband and wife, Appellants, v. STATE of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, Appellee. STATE of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, Cross-Appellant, v. Oris O. ANDERSON and Aiko K. Anderson, husband and wife, Cross-Appellees. Nos. 3439, 3481. Supreme Court of Alaska. September 15, 1978. Ernest Z. Rehbock and Robert A. Rehbock, Anchorage, for appellants and cross-appellees. Abigail G. Dodge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anchorage and Avrum M. Gross, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellees and cross-appellants. Before BOOCHEVER, Chief Justice, RABINOWITZ, CONNOR, BURKE and MATTHEWS, Justices. OPINION RABINOWITZ, Justice. This appeal arises out of the superior court's grant of summary judgment for the state in the Andersons' action to set aside a prior judgment of the superior court which declared the width of the state's existing right-of-way as 50 feet from the center line *538 of Muldoon Road.[1] The state cross-appeals from the superior court's denial of attorney's fees. The relevant factual background is as follows. The Andersons own a parcel of land which was originally leased and subsequently conveyed to their predecessor pursuant to the Small Tract Act, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 682a-682e (repealed 1976) and Small Tract Classification No. 11. Personnel from the Department of Highways contacted Anderson in February 1975 and offered him $17,550 for the 17-foot strip of land bordering Muldoon Road. Anderson did not accept the offer. The state later served upon the Andersons a "Notice of Filing Complaint" and a "Complaint for Condemnation." The "Notice" contained the following first paragraph: Take notice that a complaint has been filed in the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Alaska, copy attached, to fix the width of the State's existing right-of-way comprising Muldoon Road, Anchorage, Alaska, at 100 feet, 50 feet each side of the center line thereof abutting the property described below, or in the alternative and if determined by the Court to be less than 50 feet from center line abutting the property described below, to condemn for public use a permanent easement 50 feet wide each side of center line thereof for highway purposes... .[2] The "Complaint for Condemnation" declared that the State of Alaska "is the undisputed, lawful owner and holder of a permanent highway easement comprising the right-of-way for Muldoon Road" and that the existing right-of-way abutting the Andersons' property extends 50 feet from the center line of Muldoon Road. The "Complaint" continued: This is an action by the State of Alaska to fix the width of the existing right-of-way for Muldoon Road, Anchorage, Alaska, at 100 feet, 50 feet along each side of the center line thereof, or if determined by the Court to be less than 50 feet wide each side of the center line, for taking private property under the power of eminent domain for public use and awarding just compensation to the parties in interest. This action is instituted by the State to avoid possible conflict with the legislative mandate in AS 34.60.120(8) because the whereabouts is not known of the records definitively showing the right-of-way width prior to original construction of the road by the United States. Counsel for the Andersons entered their appearance of record on November 21, 1975; neither the Andersons nor their attorney appeared at the hearing in the superior court on December 2, 1975. Accordingly, the hearing was rescheduled for December 29, 1975, and a second notice of hearing was sent to the Andersons and their counsel. Again, neither the Andersons nor their attorney appeared at the December 29 proceedings. On this date the superior court conducted a hearing and concluded that Public Land Order 601 had established Muldoon Road as a local road with a 100 foot right-of-way prior to acquisition of vested rights by the Andersons' predecessor. The superior court further determined that the right-of-way owned by the state extended 50 feet from the center line of the road, and judgment was entered for the state in Civil Action No. 75-7660C. *539 Subsequently, the Andersons filed their "Complaint for Relief from Judgment" (Civil Action No. 76-7221), alleging that the prior judgment should be set aside because of jurisdictional defects, improper pleading and fraud allegedly perpetrated by the state. The Andersons also sought to reopen the merits of Civil Action No. 75-7660C. The superior court denied the Andersons' motion for summary judgment, granted summary judgment in favor of the state but denied the state's motion for attorney's fees.[3] In this appeal, the Andersons argue that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to enter declaratory relief against them because no summons was served as required by Civil Rule 4(d). They contend that the "Complaint for Condemnation" was adequate only for a condemnation proceeding with its more restricted scope of inquiry; accordingly, the absence of a proper summons makes the superior court's judgment in Civil Action No. 75-7660C void. The Andersons also argue that their counsel's filing of an appearance does not waive any jurisdictional defect. In addition, the Andersons contend that the superior court's judgment in Civil Action No. 75-7660C should have been set aside under Civil Rule 60(b)(1), (3) or (6) because the state had committed fraud or deception through the conduct of its right-of-way agents combined with the misleading caption of the complaint, the absence of a citation to State, Department of Highways v. Crosby, 410 P.2d 724 (Alaska 1966), and the failure to comply with Civil Rule 55.[4] The state argues that disposition of the Andersons' Rule 60(b) contentions made unnecessary the superior court's consideration of the inverse condemnation question because the prior declaratory judgment was res judicata with respect to the state's 50 foot right-of-way.[5] The appeal in the case at bar does not arise directly from denial of a Civil Rule 60(b) motion. Instead, the Andersons filed an independent action which alleges jurisdictional flaws, fraud and Rule 60(b) matters. Rule 60(b) expressly provides in part, that: This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment . . or to grant relief to a defendant not personally served, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. This saving clause preserves the trial court's power to entertain an independent action in equity to obtain relief from a *540 judgment. This independent action is available "only under unusual and exceptional circumstances" and is not intended to permit relitigation of issues finally determined in another action between the same parties.[6] In our view, the availability of such an independent action in the case at bar depends on the existence of facts demonstrating "fraud" on the part of the state.[7] Accordingly, whether the Andersons' complaint is viewed as a Civil Rule 60(b)(3) motion or as an independent action in equity, the availability of relief is dependent upon the same factors.[8] It follows that the primary questions raised by the Andersons' specifications of error are whether the record demonstrates fraud for the purposes of either Civil Rule 60(b)(3) or an independent action, and whether the original declaratory judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction.[9] The merits of the superior court's declaratory judgment in Civil Action No. 75-7660C are not properly before us in this appeal.[10] This court has emphasized that a Rule 60(b) motion is not a substitute for the usual appellate mechanism.[11] We turn first to the question of fraud. The Alaska cases relied upon by the Andersons[12] offer little support for their contention that the state's conduct amounted to fraud. The only specific misconduct or misrepresentations suggested by the Andersons are the inaccurate caption on the complaint and the use of the "Notice" instead of a summons; the failure to give a notice of default as required by Civil Rule 55; and "indoctrination" by state right-of-way *541 agents that compensation would follow taking. The state correctly notes that no default was entered in this case; accordingly, Civil Rule 55(c)(1) does not apply.[13] None of the materials submitted by appellants demonstrates any misleading content in the communications between the state and the Andersons except to the extent that they reinforced the erroneous caption of the complaint. In our opinion, the Andersons failed to demonstrate that the complaint and notice were so misleading, in the entire factual context of the case, that they could properly be viewed as "fraud ..., misrepresentation, or other misconduct."[14] In regard to the question of notice, we think it relevant that in Aguchak v. Montgomery Ward Co., Inc., 520 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1974), it was held that a summons served upon defendant debtors was constitutionally defective when the Alaska Constitution's due process clause was applied "to the unique relation between bush and metropolitan areas in Alaska."[15] In that case, we observed that "deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication [must] be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."[16] There we also adopted the following standard: An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections... . The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information ...[17] Aguchak is readily distinguishable on its facts. The Notice of Complaint served in the case at bar contained each of the elements required by Civil Rule 4(b). In fact, the Notice actually contained more information than would have been required by Rule 4(b).[18] Courts have frequently explained that the purpose of serving a summons is to provide the defendant with notice of the proceeding against him.[19] Although *542 relevant federal cases are not numerous,[20] there is authority for upholding in personam jurisdiction where the documents served give the defendant adequate notice even where the summons contained errors.[21] As to the significance of the complaint's caption, Professors Wright and Miller offer the following: Although helpful to the court, the caption usually is not considered a part of the pleader's statement of claim or response and is not determinative as to the parties to the action or the court's jurisdiction.[22] (footnotes omitted) Numerous courts construing a variety of pleading rules have concluded that the content of a pleading, rather than its title or caption, determines its character.[23] Application of these principles to the record in the instant case has led us to the conclusion that the notice and complaint substantially complied with the requirements of Civil Rule 4(b). We thus conclude that the Andersons have failed to persuade us that the superior court erred in rejecting their jurisdictional attack on the underlying declaratory judgment.[24] Since we have determined that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Andersons' *543 Civil Rule 60(b) motion, we affirm the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the state.[25] As was indicated earlier, the superior court denied the state's motion for attorney's fees in conjunction with its grant of summary judgment. In its cross-appeal, the state argues that the litigation from which the appeal was taken by the Andersons involved no questions of genuine public interest. Given the absence of genuine public interest questions, the state asserts that the superior court's denial of attorney's fees was "manifestly unreasonable." In its memorandum decision, the superior court rejected the Andersons' attack on the superior court's jurisdiction in the declaratory judgment action and also rejected the Andersons' fraud contentions. The superior court noted that such determinations made unnecessary a reconsideration of the merits in Civil Action No. 75-7660C: For the reasons stated above I find that Plaintiffs would not be entitled to summary judgment even if the judgment in No. 75-7660 was to be set aside. Since Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief from judgment, the issues raised as to inverse condemnation are res judicata and the State of Alaska is entitled to summary judgment.[26] The standard of review for attorney's fees awards "is limited to determining whether the trial court has exceeded the bounds of wide discretion vested in it."[27] We "will only overturn an award if it is manifestly unreasonable."[28] On the basis of our study of the record, we are unable to determine the reasons for the superior court's denial of any award of attorney's fees to the state. The state was the prevailing party in this suit by the Andersons to set aside the prior judgment of the superior court.[29] Thus, we *544 have determined that this aspect of the appeal and cross-appeal is to be remanded to the superior court for the purposes of affording the trial court the opportunity of setting forth its reasons for not awarding attorney's fees to the state. Affirmed in part, Remanded in part.