Case Title: Cirrincione v. Johnson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1998-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cirrincione v. Johnson, Nos. 83233, 83284 (10/1/98) 
                              Docket Nos. 83233, 83284 cons.--Agenda 32--May 1998. 
           SAL CIRRINCIONE, Appellee, v. GIL JOHNSON (Michael 
                              Johnson, Appellant). 
           Opinion filed October 1, 1998. 
 
             JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: 
             The issue before us is whether technical deficiencies are 
           sufficient to invalidate a lien under the Physicians Lien Act. 770 
           ILCS 80/1 (West 1996). The circuit court of Cook County held 
           valid a lien missing information required by statute, and 
           awarded plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages. The 
           appellate court affirmed the validity of the lien, but reversed the 
           punitive damages award. 287 Ill. App. 3d 683. We affirm the 
           appellate court's judgment as to the validity of the lien, but 
           reinstate the jury's award of punitive damages. 
 
                     BACKGROUND 
             In December 1985 Gil Johnson was injured in an 
           automobile accident and was treated by plaintiff, Sal 
           Cirrincione, a chiropractor. Plaintiff filed a physician's lien with 
           Johnson's attorney, Lawrence Fox. The lien, signed by Johnson, 
           authorized Fox to pay plaintiff out of any settlement or 
           judgment proceeds from Johnson's personal injury suit against 
           the driver of the other vehicle in the accident, and also required 
           that any new attorney retained by Johnson honor the lien. 
           Shortly thereafter, Fox was appointed to the bench, and Johnson 
           retained defendant, attorney Michael Johnson (no relation). Both 
           Fox and plaintiff discussed plaintiff's lien with defendant. 
           Plaintiff asserts that defendant assured him that the lien was 
           acceptable, while defendant contends that he told plaintiff the 
           lien was faulty and advised him to complete a new lien. 
             In August 1988 plaintiff submitted reports and 
           documentation regarding his treatment of Johnson to Country 
           Mutual Insurance Company. The insurance company sent a 
           medical payment check to defendant in the amount of $3,744. 
           Defendant did not pay plaintiff with these funds; rather, he 
           released the money to Johnson after deducting his fee. 
           Defendant maintains, however, that the insurance company 
           stopped payment on the check and that neither he nor Johnson 
           received any money. Several months later, plaintiff contacted 
           defendant and discovered that the case had been settled for 
           $50,000. When plaintiff demanded payment pursuant to the lien, 
           defendant refused, responding that Johnson had told him that he 
           had already paid plaintiff. 
             In 1990 plaintiff filed this action against defendant. The 
           relevant allegations in plaintiff's complaint assert that defendant 
           violated the Physicians Lien Act; that he exercised unauthorized 
           control over funds belonging to plaintiff; and that defendant's 
           actions constituted willful and wanton misconduct justifying 
           punitive damages. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the 
           court ruled as a matter of law that the lien was a valid 
           physician's lien. The jury awarded plaintiff $3,700 in 
           compensatory damages plus $12,100 in punitive damages. The 
           appellate court affirmed the compensatory award, agreeing that 
           the lien was valid; but reversed the punitive damages award, 
           holding that such damages were unavailable in this case. 287 Ill. 
           App. 3d 683. The appellate court's decision to uphold the 
           validity of the lien despite its deficiencies conflicted with 
           another appellate case, Meier v. Olivero, 279 Ill. App. 3d 630 
           (1996). Defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal and 
           plaintiff filed a cross-petition. This court consolidated and 
           allowed the petitions. 166 Ill. 2d R. 315. 
 
                      ANALYSIS 
             The Physicians Lien Act provides in pertinent part: 
               "Every licensed physician practicing in this State who 
                        renders services by way of treatment to injured persons *** 
                        shall have a lien upon all claims and causes of action for 
                        the amount of his reasonable charges up to the date of 
                        payment of such damages. 
               *** [T]he lien shall *** include a notice in writing 
                        containing the name and address of the injured person, the 
                        date of the injury, the name and address of the licensed 
                        physician practicing in this State, and the name of the party 
                        alleged to be liable to make compensation to such injured 
                        person for the injuries received, which notice shall be 
                        served on both the injured person and the party against 
                        whom such claim or right of action exists." 770 ILCS 80/1 
                        (West 1996). 
             It is undisputed that plaintiff's lien did not comply with the 
           statute in the following respects: (1) it did not contain Johnson's 
           address; (2) it did not give the date of Johnson's injury; (3) it 
           did not list the name of the party or parties liable to make 
           compensation for Johnson's injuries; (4) it failed to give the 
           name of the tort defendant, that is, the other driver in the 
           automobile accident; (5) no attempt was made to serve the tort 
           defendant or his insurance carrier. 
             Are these deficiencies sufficient to defeat the lien? 
           Defendant argues that the lien is a creation of statute, and that 
           it must therefore strictly conform to the statute's requirements. 
           This court has emphasized, however, that technical deficiencies 
           should not be allowed to overwhelm the purpose of a lien 
           statute: 
             "The doctrine of strict construction was never meant to be 
                        applied as a pitfall to the unwary, in good faith pursuing the 
                        path marked by the statute, nor as an ambuscade from 
                        which an adversary can overwhelm him for an immaterial 
                        misstep. Its function is to preserve the substantial rights of 
                        those against whom the remedy offered by the statute is 
                        directed, and it is never employed otherwise." United Cork 
                        Cos. v. Volland, 365 Ill. 564, 572 (1937). 
              In this case, the rights of the parties have not been 
           prejudiced by the technical deficiencies in the lien. Both 
           defendant and Johnson had actual notice, and those not served 
           with the lien are not parties to this action. Furthermore, any 
           missing information was already known by defendant. In short, 
           the errors were not material. To invalidate the lien due to the 
           instant technicalities would serve no purpose and would worship 
           form over substance. It would also be contrary to the purpose of 
           the lien, which is to lessen the financial burden on those who 
           treat nonpaying accident victims. See In re Estate of Cooper, 
           125 Ill. 2d 363, 368-69 (1988) (Hospital Lien Act and similar 
           statutes are enacted to promote the health and well-being of the 
           community by allowing assistance to people without regard to 
           ability to pay). Accordingly, the lien is valid and should be 
           enforced. 
             Despite its holding that plaintiff's lien was valid, the 
           appellate court reversed the punitive damage award, holding that 
           such damages were not available pursuant to either the 
           Physicians Lien Act or a "breach of contract claim, which is the 
           best interpretation of plaintiff's alternative cause of action." 287 
           Ill. App. 3d at 689. Plaintiff, however, contends that he never 
           asserted a breach of contract claim, but rather asserted a 
           conversion claim that alleged that defendant converted funds 
           from both the medical payment check and the settlement. The 
           dispute is important because while punitive damages are 
           generally not available under a contract theory, they are 
           available in conversion. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,  74 Ill. 2d 172 , 
           187 (1978) (traditionally, actions for breach of contract have not 
           given rise to punitive damages; however, punitive damages are 
           awarded when the cause of action is premised on a tort). 
             To prove conversion, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he 
           has a right to the property; (2) he has an absolute and 
           unconditional right to the immediate possession of the property; 
           (3) he made a demand for possession; and (4) the defendant 
           wrongfully and without authorization assumed control, 
           dominion, or ownership over the property. Western States 
           Insurance Co. v. Louis E. Olivero & Associates, 283 Ill. App. 
           3d 307, 310 (1996). Count III of plaintiff's third-amended 
           complaint states in relevant part: 
             "At the time Defendant Michael Johnson obtained the 
                        medical payment check in the amount of $3,744 referenced 
                        above, plaintiff had a right to control said funds to the 
                        extent of his aforesaid Physicians' Lien and Defendant 
                        Michael Johnson exercised unauthorized control over said 
                        funds to the detriment of plaintiff through his failure to 
                        remit and satisfy plaintiff's aforesaid Physicians' Lien." 
           Count IV of plaintiff's third-amended compliant repeats the 
           above allegations in regards to the $50,000 settlement. 
           Consistent with a conversion claim, the language of these counts 
           states that plaintiff had a right to property by lien, and that 
           defendant exercised unauthorized control over that property. 
           Furthermore, at trial plaintiff argued a conversion claim, 
           presenting evidence that demonstrated (1) the existence of a 
           lien, which established his right to a portion of the settlement 
           proceeds; (2) that defendant assumed control of the settlement 
           funds and the medical payment; (3) that plaintiff demanded 
           payment; and (4) defendant's refusal to turn over the funds. 
           After hearing this evidence, the jury was instructed on the 
           elements of conversion. Plaintiff never argued a breach of 
           contract claim or asked the jury to be instructed on one, and 
           indeed, there was no contract between plaintiff and defendant to 
           be breached. Plaintiff properly set forth a claim of conversion, 
           and the jury's decision that the conversion occurred is not 
           contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, and will 
           therefore not be disturbed. See Midland Hotel Corp. v. Rueben 
           H. Donnelley Corp.,  118 Ill. 2d 306 , 312-13 (1987) (an appellate 
           court should not substitute its judgment unless the jury's 
           determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence). 
             Punitive damages are awarded "when torts are committed 
           with fraud, actual malice, *** or when the defendant acts 
           willfully, or with such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton 
           disregard of the rights of others." Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,  74 Ill. 2d 172 , 186 (1978). While the question of whether punitive 
           damages can be awarded for a particular cause of action is a 
           matter of law (Loitz v. Remington Arms Co.,  138 Ill. 2d 404 , 
           414 (1990)), the question of whether a defendant's conduct was 
           sufficiently willful or wanton to justify the imposition of 
           punitive damages is for the jury to decide (Smith v. Hill,  12 Ill. 2d 588 , 595 (1958)). The evidence in this case as to defendant's 
           behavior was conflicting. Defendant maintained that his failure 
           to honor the lien was justified, that he urged plaintiff to file 
           another lien, that Johnson told him that he had paid plaintiff, 
           and that he never received money from the insurance company's 
           medical payment. Plaintiff, however, asserted otherwise, 
           contending that defendant assured him the lien was adequate and 
           would be honored, and then with full knowledge of the lien 
           refused to pay plaintiff from the medical payment or the 
           settlement. The jury chose to believe plaintiff's version of 
           events, and found that it demonstrated willful and wanton 
           behavior by defendant. We will not disturb that determination, 
           as it is the province of the jury to resolve conflicts in the 
           evidence, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, and to 
           decide what weight to give to a witness' testimony. Maple v. 
           Gustafson,  151 Ill. 2d 445 , 452 (1992). Furthermore, this 
           decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
             We therefore affirm the judgment of the appellate court as 
           to the validity of plaintiff's lien, and reinstate the jury's award 
           of punitive damages. The judgment of the appellate court is 
           affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the judgment of the 
           circuit court is affirmed. 
 
           Appellate court judgment affirmed in part 
                              and reversed in part; 
                     circuit court judgment affirmed.