Case Title: Beaudoin v. Kibbie

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-93

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-10-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Beaudoin v. Kibbie1995 WY 178905 P.2d 939Case Number: 94-93Decided: 10/27/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
 

Pearle BEAUDOIN, a/k/a 
Larene Taylor Sims, Individually 

and as Trustee for the 
1990 Reeb Family Trust, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Michael KIBBIE; Hi-Line 
Equipment Company, a Utah Partnership;

 C.W. "Bill" Jepson and Gayla Jepson, 
Husband and Wife, 

Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Lincoln County, D. Terry Rogers, J.

Pearle Beaudoin, 
pro se.

E. Frank Hess 
and Steven D. Olmstead, Jackson, for appellees.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

TAYLOR, Justice.

[¶1]      The validity of 
an easement by reservation and an easement by implication are addressed in this 
appeal. The parties claiming the easements sought to quiet title to them and to 
enjoin appellant from hindering their use of the easements. The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of appellees.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant, Pearle 
Beaudoin (Beaudoin),1 raises these issues:

The basic issue in this 
appeal proceeding can be simply stated: Whether the Court below was correct in 
granting a summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs below. However, arriving 
at the proper legal conclusions will involve a vastly more complex process 
including clarification of the actual effect of prior Court decisions involving 
the control, possession, ownership, and use of this one particular area of land 
located in the Star Valley of Lincoln County, Wyoming.

The primary Issue on 
appeal is whether or not the Order of the District Court granting a Summary 
Judgment and Permanent Injunction to Plaintiffs in Civil # 9057 was proper or in 
compliance with the requirements of the Wyoming Statutes, Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and applicable case Law and the Constitutions of both the United 
[S]tates and the State of Wyoming?

[¶4]      Appellees in this 
appeal are identified as Michael Kibbie (Kibbie), who is also the managing 
partner of Hi-Line Equipment Company (Hi-Line), a Utah partnership, and C.W. 
"Bill" and Gayla Jepson (collectively the Jepsons). Kibbie and Hi-Line claimed 
an easement by reservation and the Jepsons claimed an easement by implication 
across lands which were leased to Beaudoin. Kibbie and the Jepsons state these 
issues:

I. Whether the trial 
court was correct in finding there were no genuine issues of material fact, and 
as a matter of law, a summary judgment was proper in favor of appellees (Michael 
Kibbie and Hi Line Equipment Company) on the issue quieting title of an easement 
or right-of-way.

II. Whether the trial 
court was correct in finding there were no genuine issues of material fact, and 
as a matter of law, a summary judgment was proper in favor of appellees 
(Jepsons) on the issue of an easement by implication.

III. Has appellant framed 
a cogent argument with pertinent authorities for the appellate court to 
review?

II. 
FACTS

[¶5]      Hi-Line, through 
Kibbie, claims an easement by reservation across Beaudoin's property. The 
Jepsons claim an easement by implication across the same property. We will refer 
to the easement at issue as the Kibbie Parkway easement. Kibbie, Hi-Line and the 
Jepsons (collectively the appellees) sought to quiet title in the easement. 
Beaudoin opposed their efforts. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. 
The district court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment and ruled that 
Kibbie and Hi-Line held an easement by reservation and that the Jepsons held an 
easement by implication.

[¶6]      A chronological 
review of significant events will simplify our analysis. In the 1960's, Hi-Line 
purchased certain property located in Lincoln County, Wyoming. A road, known as 
the Kibbie Parkway, was extended to provide access to this property. In 1971, 
the property was sold to Alpine Retreat, Inc. (Alpine). Beaudoin was a principal 
in Alpine and she and her brother signed the installment contract under which 
Hi-Line sold Alpine the property. Warranty deeds were recorded in 1973 deeding 
certain parcels of the property to Alpine. Those warranty deeds contained 
language reserving an easement across the Kibbie Parkway, "for so long as 
William H. Kibbie, Elizabeth E. Kibbie or Hi-Line Equipment Company, a 
partnership, own or hold any interest * * *" in land leased from the state. 
Hi-Line is currently a viable partnership and continues to lease the state lands 
referenced in the warranty deeds.

[¶7]      In 1973, Alpine 
sold one of the deeded parcels to Robert A. Fowler Associated Architects, Inc., 
a Utah corporation, subject to "existing easements, and rights-of-way of 
record." That parcel, subject to existing easements and rights-of-way, was sold 
to the Jepsons in 1991. Beaudoin holds a long term lease on one of the parcels 
deeded to Alpine in 1973. That parcel encompasses an area in which a public road 
joins the Kibbie Parkway easement. Beaudoin, for various reasons, dug trenches 
and began erecting gates across the easement.

[¶8]      Hi-Line and the 
Jepsons sought to quiet title to the Kibbie Parkway easement. After granting the 
motion for summary judgment, the district court ruled that Hi-Line held an 
easement by reservation and that the Jepsons held a non-exclusive easement by 
implication. Beaudoin was enjoined from interfering with use of the easement. 
Beaudoin filed a timely appeal, pro se.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶9]      Summary judgment 
is proper when questions of law are raised and there are no material facts at 
issue. Hill v. Mayall, 886 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Wyo. 1994). Where summary judgment 
is otherwise proper, that process may not be frustrated by semantic gymnastics 
which attempt to create disputed facts where, in reality, none exist. Id. 

[¶10]   Beaudoin suggests that the district 
court did not have jurisdiction over those whose property rights were adversely 
affected by the Judgment and Permanent Injunction. In that regard, the Judgment 
and Permanent Injunction provided:

The Defendants herein, 
their employees, agents, officers, directors, beneficiaries, and trustees, and 
all persons claiming under or through them are permanently enjoined and forever 
barred, precluded and restrained under penalty of contempt of court from 
claiming or asserting any estate, right, title or interest in the lands and 
right of ways of Plaintiffs, which shall include but not be limited to blocking, 
hindering, or impeding the easements in any way whatsoever.

Beaudoin 
misapprehends the purport of that language; but, more importantly, she has 
failed to demonstrate, by citation of pertinent authority or presentation of 
cogent argument, any error by the district court and we will not further 
consider her contentions in this regard. Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219 
(Wyo. 1994). We note that the record demonstrates that the district court did 
have plenary jurisdiction.

[¶11]   In only the most general sense, 
Beaudoin asserts that the proceedings in the district court were not conducted 
or resolved in a manner consistent with W.R.C.P. 56. This argument is not 
supported by pertinent authority or cogent argument and is belied by the 
record.

[¶12]   Beaudoin claims she was deprived of 
her constitutional right to defend her property rights because she was not 
permitted a full presentation of the issues and facts at a trial. W.R.C.P. 56 is 
designed to avoid the necessity of trial when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Here, 
appellees presented prima facie cases which established their rights of access. 
Beaudoin failed to counter those prima facie cases with affidavits, or other 
relevant evidence, which raise a genuine issue of material fact. McClellan v. 
Britain, 826 P.2d 245, 247 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶13]   To the extent Beaudoin brought 
evidentiary material to the attention of the district court, she failed to 
demonstrate how that material served to rebut appellees' prima facie cases. 
Material which is speculative or conclusory is insufficient to demonstrate the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact and the district court is not 
under a duty to anticipate possible proof. TZ Land & Cattle Co. v. Condict, 
795 P.2d 1204, 1208-09 (Wyo. 1990); Hyatt v. Big Horn School Dist. No. 4, 636 P.2d 525, 528-30 (Wyo. 1981); McClure v. Watson, 490 P.2d 1059, 1061-62 (Wyo. 
1971). Most of Beaudoin's claims were generated by her "actual knowledge." In 
some circumstances, such personal knowledge may serve to demonstrate a genuine 
issue of material fact. However, Beaudoin sought to contradict deeds and other 
authenticated documents with her opinions as to what they meant or should have 
meant.

[¶14]   In addition, she sought to prove 
that Hi-Line was a defunct partnership by giving her opinion about the meaning 
of a Utah statute relating to dissolution of partnerships, even though it had no 
apparent relevance to the issues before the district court. Suffice it to say, 
Beaudoin failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material 
fact. Under such circumstances, "[i]t is a trial court's obligation, nay duty, 
to render summary judgment * * *." Samuel Mares Post No. 8 American Legion, 
Dept. of Wyoming v. Board of County Com'rs of Converse County, 697 P.2d 1040, 
1041 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶15]   Beaudoin asserts that the district 
court was incorrect in finding that a previous civil action determined some of 
the property rights which were at issue in the instant case and that those 
matters were res judicata. Beaudoin does not present pertinent authority or 
cogent argument to support this assertion.

[¶16]   Hi-Line demonstrated that it had an 
easement by reservation across Beaudoin's lands. The district court was correct 
in granting summary judgment for Kibbie and Hi-Line. The Jepsons demonstrated by 
affidavit, documentation and expert testimony that they were entitled to an 
implied easement for access to their land. The Jepsons demonstrated: (1) Common 
ownership followed by a conveyance separating the unified ownership; (2) before 
severance, the common owner used part of the property for the benefit of the 
other part, a use that was apparent, obvious, and continuous; and (3) the 
claimed easement is necessary and beneficial to the enjoyment of the parcel 
previously benefitted. See Mann-Hoff v. Boyer, 413 Pa. Super. 1, 604 A.2d 703, 
707 (1992) (listing factors to be considered in determining whether an implied 
easement exists). Beaudoin presented no evidence in conflict, other than her 
opinions. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor 
of the Jepsons. Likewise, the district court properly enjoined Beaudoin from 
interfering with appellees' access to their respective lands.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶17]   The judgment of the district court 
is affirmed in all respects.

Footnotes

1 Beaudoin 
purports to represent both herself and the Reeb Family Trust. Since the record 
generally supports a conclusion that Beaudoin and the Reeb Family Trust are "one 
and the same" (Beaudoin was unable to locate any documentation of the "trust"), 
we will so treat the matter. It has not been raised as an issue, but Beaudoin's 
purported representation of a trust (even if she is the trustee as well) 
violates the bounds of permissible pro se representation and may well violate 
the statute prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law. Wyo. Stat. § 33-5-117 
(1987); and see E.C. Cates Agency, Inc. v. Barbe, 764 P.2d 274, 276-77 (Wyo. 
1988) and Back Acres Pure Trust v. Fahnlander, 233 Neb. 28, 443 N.W.2d 604, 604-05 (1989).