Case Title: CAIN v STEVENSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-034

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1985-09-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 8 5 - 0 3 4 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 5 HARRY CAIN, d / b / a CAIN ELECTRIC, P l a i n t i f f and R - e s p o n d e n t , CLEATUS G. STEVENSON, d / b / a STEVENSON a n d SONS CONSTRUCTION, D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e S i x t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and for t h e C o u n t y of R o s e b u d , T h e H o n o r a b l e A l f r e d B. C o a t e , Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: F o r A p p e l l a n t : H e r n d o n , H a r p e r & M u n r o ; R o d n e y T. H a r t m a n , B i l l i n g s , M o n t a n a F o r R e s p o n d e n t : C l a r e n c e B e l u e , H a r d i n , M o n t a n a Submitted on briefs: J u l y 11, 1 9 8 5 D e c i d e d : S e p t e m b e r 1 9 , 1985 Filed: str i ~4 f985 M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr. d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Harry Cain (respondent) f i l e d t h i s a c t i o n on September 9, 1983, i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e S i x t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , seeking damages f o r i n j u r i e s he received while working a s an e l e c t r i c a 1 s u b c o n t r a c t o r f o r C l e a t u s Stevenson ( a p p e l l a n t ) . The j u r y awarded respondent $107,999.77. T h i s appea 1 followed. Respondent was t h e e l e c t r i c a l s u b c o n t r a c t o r on a six-plex apartment b u i l d i n g under c o n s t r u c t i o n i n Ashland, Montana. Appellant was t h e owner o f t h e b u i l d i n g and t h e g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r . Respondent was h i r e d t o complete t h e "rough-in" e l e c t r i c a l work. H e furnished h i s own t o o l s and worked under h i s own t i m e schedule. By December 15, 1982, t h e day o f t h e a c c i d e n t , respon- d e n t had been working a t t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n site f o r approximately t h r e e days. On t h a t day he came t o work with h i s employee, J i m M i l l e r . The weather was v e r y cold and t h e r e was snow and ice on t h e ground. The s p l i t - l e v e l b u i l d i n g under c o n s t r u c t i o n d i d n o t have s t e p s from t h e ground l e v e l t o t h e second f l o o r where re- spondent was working. The second f l o o r e n t r a n c e was approximately 3 t o 4 f e e t above t h e ground s o respondent propped h i s own 4-foot l a d d e r a g a i n s t t h e w a l l . Respondent used t h e l a d d e r t o e n t e r and e x i t t h e b u i l d i n g s e v e r a l t i m e s t h a t morning. A t about 10:OO a.m., he attempted t o e x i t t h e b u i l d i n g b u t found h i s l a d d e r t o be missing. There was a c o n c r e t e c i n d e r block placed below t h e e n t r a n c e which some o f t h e workers used a s a s t e p . Respondent stepped down on t h e c i n d e r block. The block was covered w i t h i c e , c a u s i n g h i s f o o t t o s l i p . H e f e l l , h i t t i n g h i s b u t t o c k s on t h e block. Pain i n h i s lower back and b u t t o c k s r e s u l t e d . The p a i n d i d n o t s u b s i d e and he was forced t o l e a v e work e a r l y . The pain continued f o r t h r e e weeks, a t which t i m e respondent saw a d o c t o r who r e f e r r e d him t o an o r t h o p e d i c s p e c i a l i s t . Two days a f t e r c o n s u l t i n g t h e s p e c i a l i s t , s u r g e r y was performed f o r what respondent understood t o be an e x c i s i o n o f a ruptured d i s c . T h i s a c t i o n followed. O n December 6 , 1 9 8 4 , a jury v e r d i c t was rendered f i n d i n g a p p e l l a n t 82 p e r c e n t n e g l i g e n t and respondent 18 p e r c e n t n e g l i g e n t . Respondent was awarded $107,999.77. The D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d judgment on t h e v e r d i c t . Appellant r a i s e s t h e following i s s u e s : 1. Whether t h e District Court was i n e r r o r i n r u l i n g t h a t t h e s a f e p l a c e t o work s t a t u t e s , 55 50-71-201 and 50-71-202, MCA, c r e a t e a d u t y running from a g e n e r a l contractor/owner t o a s u b c o n t r a c t o r when t h e s u b c o n t r a c t o r r e t a i n s s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r o l over h i s means o f a c c e s s t o t h e b u i l d i n g where he works. 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court was i n e r r o r i n r u l i n g t h a t respondent d i d n o t have t h e burden o f proving damages by medical e x p e r t testimony. 3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court was i n e r r o r i n n o t reducing t h e j u r y ' s award o f damages by t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g o f comparative negligence on t h e p a r t o f respondent. SAFE PLACE T O WORK It i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d i n Montana t h a t an employer must provide employees w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. S e c t i o n 50-71-201, MCA. T h i s o b l i g a t i o n h a s been extended from genera 1 c o n t r a c t o r s t o employees o f s u b c o n t r a c t o r s when t h e g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r c o n t r o l s job s a f e t y o r has a non-delegable duty o f s a f e t y a r i s i n g o u t o f c o n t r a c t . Stepanek v. Kober Construction (Mont. 1981), 625 P.2d 51, 38 St.Rep. 385. Shannon v. Howard S. Wright Const. Co. (1979), 181 Mont. 269, 593 P.2d 438. However, a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t t h i s o b l i g a t i o n does n o t extend from g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r s t o s u b c o n t r a c t o r s because s u b c o n t r a c t o r s a r e a b l e t o c o n t r o l and i n f l u e n c e t h e s a f e t y o f t h e i r work p l a c e . The D i s t r i c t Court i n s t r u c t e d on t h e s a f e p l a c e t o work law found i n §§ 50-71-201 and 50-71-202, MCA: 50-71-201. Employer t o f u r n i s h and r e q u i r e s a f e t y d e v i c e s and p r a c t i c e s . ~ v ; r ~ employe; s h a l l f u r n i s h d p l a c e o f em~lovment which i s s a f e f o r e m ~ l o v e e s 4 .. - - - * t h e r e i n and s h a l l f u r n i s h and u s e and r e q u i r e t h e use o f such s a f e t y d e v i c e s and safeguards and s h a l l adopt and use such p r a c t i c e s , means, methods, opera- t i o n s , and p r o c e s s e s a s a r e reasonably adequate t o r e n d e r t h e p l a c e o f employ- ment s a f e and s h a l l do every o t h e r t h i n g reasonably necessary t o p r o t e c t t h e l i f e and s a f e t y o f employees. [emphasis added] 50-71-202. Employer t o provide and maintain s a f e p l a c e o f employment. (1) An employer who is t h e owner o r lessee of any r e a l p r o p e r t y i n t h i s s t a t e s h a l l n o t c o n s t r u c t o r cause t o b e c o n s t r u c t e d o r maintained any p l a c e o f employment t h a t is unsafe. (2) Every employer who i s t h e owner of a p l a c e o f employment o r lessee t h e r e o f s h a l l r e p a i r and maintain t h e same a s t o render it s a f e . Appellant argues t h a t t h e s e s a f e p l a c e t o work s t a t u t e s only apply t o s i t u a t i o n s where t h e claim presented i s brought by an employee o f a s u b c o n t r a c t o r and t h e g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r has c o n t r o l over s a f e t y . Respondent was n o t i n a n employer-employee s i t u a t i o n because he was a s u b c o n t r a c t o r . Therefore, t h e s a f e p l a c e t o work i n s t r u c t i o n s should n o t have been given. W e must determine i f t h e language o f § 50-71-201, MCA, "a p l a c e o f employment which i s s a f e f o r employees," i n c l u d e s s u b c o n t r a c t o r s i n t h e c a t e g o r y o f empl-oyees. W e b e l i e v e it does. It was t h e i n t e n t of t h e L e g i s l a t u r e t o i n c l u d e contrac- t o r s i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of "employee." S e c t i o n 92-411, R.C.M. (1947). W e have a l r e a d y determined t h a t $ S 50-71-201 and 50-71-202, MCA, w e r e intended t o cover employees o f s u b c o n t r a c t o r s . Stepanek, supra. I f a s u b c o n t r a c t o r is incorporated then t h e s u b c o n t r a c t o r indivj-dually i s an employee o f t h e c o r p o r a t i o n and i s covered. However, under a p p e l l a n t ' s r a t i o n a l e , i f t h e s u b c o n t r a c t o r i s n o t i n c o r p o r a t e d then he i s n o t an employee and i s n o t covered. W e cannot b e l i e v e t h i s was t h e i n t e n t o f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e . S e c t i o n 50-71-202, MCA, makes no mention o f "employees," b u t simply r e q u i r e s employers t o provide a s a f e p l a c e o f employment. Likewise, t h e emphasis i n S 50-71-201, MCA, i s on t h e "place o f employment" r a t h e r t h a n t h e s t a t u s o f t h e worker. Respondent, a s a s u b c o n t r a c t o r , was e n t i t l e d t o a s a f e p l a c e t o work. The District Court d i d n o t err by i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury on S$ 50-71-201 and 50-71-202, MCA. MEDICAL EXPERT TESTIMONY Appellant argues t h a t respondent was r e q u i r e d t o prove damages by e x p e r t medical testimony. Respondent d i d n o t produce a medical e x p e r t a t t r i a l , and a p p e l l a n t made a motion f o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t . The t r i a l c o u r t denied t h e motion. Appellant maintains t h i s was e r r o r . The t r i a l c o u r t c o r r e c t l y denied t h e motion f o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t . A claimant i s competent t o t e s t i f y a s t o h i s p a s t and p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n . Respondent's testimony was s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e jury t o determine whether t h e r e was an i n j u r y . However, respondent's testimony, s t a n d i n g a l o n e , i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o prove permanency where d i s p u t e d and where n o t apparent from t h e i n j u r y i t s e l f . Likewise, l a y testimony i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h cause f o r t h o s e a s p e c t s o f an i n j u r y n o t a p p a r e n t l y r e l a t e d t o t h e a c c i d e n t i n q u e s t i o n . In Zegman v. S t a t e (N.Y. 1 9 7 9 ) , 416 N.Y.S.2d 505, t h i s r u l e was s t a t e d a s follows: . . . claimant was c l e a r l y competent t o t e s t i f y t o h e r p a s t and p r e s e n t condi- t i o n . (Vincent-Wilday, I n c . v. S t r a i t , 273 App.Div. 1054, 79 N.Y.S.2d 811.) The Court does n o t however c o n s t r u e such testimony a s s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h e i t h e r t h e permanency o f t h e i n j u r y o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f f u t u r e pain. [ c i t a - t i o n s omitted] Zegman, 416 N.Y.S.2d a t 506. Not a l l i n j u r i e s r e q u i r e medical e x p e r t testimony t o prove permanency o r c a u s a t i o n . It h a s been held t h a t medical testimony i s n o t necessary t o prove permanent i n j u r i e s o r t h e i r cause where t h e n a t u r e o f t h e i n j u r y i s such t h a t laymen can p l a i n l y see, o r i n f e r from t h e i n j u r y , i t s cause and t h a t it w i l l be permanent, such a s l o s s o f a limb. Respondent's back i n j u r y was n o t such an i n j u r y . C o r y e l l v. Conn ( W i s . 1979), 276 N.W.2d 723, a d d r e s s e s t h e i s s u e o f permanency o f i n j u r i e s a s follows: Where, a s h e r e , an i n j u r y i s s u b j e c t i v e and a layman cannot know i f it w i l l continue, e x p e r t medical testimony i s necessary w i t h regard t o permanency and f u t u r e p a i n and s u f f e r i n g . D i e m e l v. Weirich, 264 W i s . 265, 268, 58 N.W.2d 651 (1953). '. . . Only a medical e x p e r t i s q u a l i f i e d t o e x p r e s s an opinion t o a medical cer- t a i n t y , o r based on medical p r o b a b i l i t i e s ( n o t mere p o s s i b i l i t i e s ) , a s t o whether t h e p a i n w i l l continue i n t h e f u t u r e , and, i f s o , f o r how long a period it w i l l SO continue. . . .' I d . a t 268, 58 N.W.2d a t 652-653. Corye 11, I n t h e s i m i l a r c a s e o f C l i f f o r d v. Opdyke ( N . J . 1978), 383 A.2d 749, t h e c o u r t found t h a t p r e s e n t i n g t h e i s s u e o f permanent i n j u r y t o t h e jury was p r e j u d i c i a l l y erroneous: The q u e s t i o n o f t h e prognosis o f an i n j u r y and probable permanent d i s a b i l i t y is one n e c e s s a r i l y w i t h i n t h e ambit o f e x p e r t medica 1 opinion (except f o r disabilities which are apparent to a layman, such as an amputated body member). And the burden of proving such permanency by competent medical testimony rests of course with plaintiff. Clifford, 383 A.2d at 752. The trial court presented to the jury the issue of permanent injury in instruction number 26. Appellant object- ed. Because of inadequate proof to support the instruction, it was error to give it. There must be a new trial, but only on the issue of damages. Finally, respondent was found to be 18 percent negligent, however, the trial judge failed to reduce his award by this amount. The new damage award shall be reduced by 18 percent, pursuant to S 27-1-702, MCA. The judgment is vacated and the cause remanded for a new trial on damages only. We concur: n