Case Title: State v. Ramos

Citation: 363 N.C. 352

Docket Number: 535A08

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2009-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court
Slip Opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 535A08 
FILED: 18 JUNE 2009
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
GERALDINE LEWIS RAMOS
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the
decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C.
App. ___, 668 S.E.2d 357 (2008), finding prejudicial error in a
trial that resulted in a judgment entered on 14 December 2006 by
Judge Narley L. Cashwell in Superior Court, Wake County, and
ordering a new trial for defendant.  Heard in the Supreme Court
30 March 2009.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Catherine F. Jordan,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
Peter Wood for defendant-appellee.
HUDSON, Justice.
In this case, we consider whether the trial court prejudiced
defendant Geraldine Lewis Ramos when it omitted the element of
willfulness from jury instructions.  Defendant was convicted of
damaging a computer system at her workplace in violation of
N.C.G.S. § 14-455, after being fired from her position at the
Latin American Resource Center (“LARC”) in Raleigh.  Because we
conclude that the jury could reasonably have reached a different
result but for this omission, we hold that the error was
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prejudicial, and we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals
granting defendant a new trial.
Defendant pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor violation of
section 14-455 in District Court, Wake County.  On 3 November
2005, she was sentenced to a term of forty-five days, suspended
subject to supervised probation for twelve months.  Defendant
then appealed to superior court, where on 14 December 2006, a
jury convicted her on the same charge.  Judge Narley L. Cashwell
sentenced defendant to a forty-five day term, but suspended the
sentence subject to eighteen months of supervised probation.
Defendant appealed, and, in a divided opinion filed on 18
November 2008, the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial after
concluding that there was a reasonable possibility that the
verdict might have been different if the jury had been properly
instructed.  State v. Ramos, __ N.C. App. __, __, 668 S.E.2d 357,
359 (2008).  The entire panel agreed that the trial court failed
to instruct on the element of willfulness, that the terms
“willfully” and “without authorization” in the statute are not
interchangeable, and that the proper standard of review is
whether the instruction error prejudiced defendant.  Id. at __,
668 S.E.2d at 362-63.  However, the dissenter would find no
prejudice because the evidence “unequivocally show[s] defendant’s
actions in duplicating and removing the files was willful.”  Id.
at __, 668 S.E.2d at 366 (Tyson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).  This Court allowed the State’s motion for
temporary stay and its petition for writ of supersedeas. 
-3-
The evidence tended to show that defendant had worked as a
community outreach coordinator at LARC since May 2005, supervised
by Aura Camacho-Maas.  One of defendant’s duties was writing
grant proposals.  In August 2005 Camacho-Maas informed defendant
that she was being terminated after failing to timely complete
two proposals.  Camacho-Maas testified that defendant was enraged
and crying and threatened to “destroy [Camacho-Maas] in the
agency.”  Defendant also refused to return her office key until
she was paid.  After terminating defendant, Camacho-Maas escorted
defendant from LARC’s office and instructed the receptionist not
to allow her back onto the premises.  Shortly thereafter,
Camacho-Maas found defendant and the receptionist removing
defendant’s personal items from defendant’s LARC office, but said
nothing.  Later the same day, Camacho-Maas saw defendant and the
receptionist again leaving defendant’s former office, and she
became concerned.  When Camacho-Maas checked defendant’s office
computer, she discovered that certain important teacher
apprenticeship program (“TAP”) files were missing from LARC’s
server.  Camacho-Maas testified that she knew the files had been
on the server earlier that day before defendant’s termination and
that only LARC employees could access the files.  Camacho-Maas
called the police, who investigated and confirmed that many LARC
files had been deleted or overwritten.
On 16 August 2005, defendant returned to LARC, and
Camacho-Maas called police to the office.  Defendant admitted
that she had copied certain files onto her flash drive.  At
trial, defendant testified that she had told Camacho-Maas that
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she was going to delete various curriculum and grant proposal
files and that Camacho-Maas had said she didn’t care whether
defendant did so or not because defendant’s work was not good. 
Defendant denied having deleted any TAP files.
In pertinent part, section 14-455(a) states that “[i]t is
unlawful to willfully and without authorization alter, damage, or
destroy a computer, computer program, computer system, computer
network, or any part thereof.”  N.C.G.S. § 14-455(a) (2007)
(emphasis added).  Defendant requested an instruction that
included the term “willfully” and its legal definition, but the
trial court denied the request and instructed the jury as
follows:
For you to find the defendant guilty of this
offense, the State must prove two things:
First, that the defendant damaged a computer
system or computer network or any part
thereof by deleting a file or files from the
computer system or computer network.
Second, that the defendant did so without
authorization.  A person is without
authorization when although the person has
the consent or permission of owner [sic] to
access a computer system or computer network
the person does so in a manner which exceeds
the consent or permission.
If you find from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that on or about August the
15th, 2005 the defendant, without
authorization, damaged a computer system or
computer network, it would appeal [sic] your
duty to return a verdict of guilty.
“[A] trial court must instruct the jury on every essential
element of an offense . . . .”  State v. Hunt, 339 N.C. 622, 649,
457 S.E.2d 276, 292 (1995).  Section 14-455 requires that the
alteration or damage to a computer be done “willfully.” 
-5-
“Willful” is defined as “the wrongful doing of an act without
justification or excuse, or the commission of an act purposely
and deliberately in violation of law.”  State v. Arnold, 264 N.C.
348, 349, 141 S.E.2d 473, 474 (1965) (per curiam) (citations
omitted).  “Willfully” means “something more than an intention to
commit the offense.”  State v. Stephenson, 218 N.C. 258, 264, 10
S.E.2d 819, 823 (1940).  Willfulness is an essential element
which the fact-finder must determine, often by inference. 
Arnold, 264 N.C. at 349, 141 S.E.2d at 474.  
As noted in both the majority opinion and the dissent at the
Court of Appeals, failure to instruct on willfulness is subject
to harmless error review.  Ramos, __ N.C. App. at __, __, 668
S.E.2d at 362, 364; see Arnold, 264 N.C. at 349, 141 S.E.2d at
474; State v. Rose, 53 N.C. App. 608, 611, 281 S.E.2d 404, 406
(1981); State v. Maxwell, 47 N.C. App. 658, 660, 267 S.E.2d 582,
584, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 301 N.C. 102, 273
S.E.2d 307 (1980).  In such cases, we consider whether “there is
a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been
committed, a different result would have been reached at the
trial out of which the appeal arises.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a)
(2007).  For example, in Rose, the Court of Appeals held that
there could be no prejudice in convicting a defendant of
felonious escape, an offense which includes the element of
willfulness, when “nothing in the record in any way indicates
that defendant’s escape was anything other than ‘willful.’” Rose,
53 N.C. App. at 611, 281 S.E.2d at 406 (emphasis added). 
-6-
Here, defendant testified that she believed Camacho-Maas had
authorized her to delete certain computer files which she had
created at work.  Defendant testified that Camacho-Maas told her
that she could delete these files because “the work was not good,
and it was [sic] no consequence.”  Defendant further testified
that Camacho-Maas came into defendant’s office while she was
deleting these very files and “didn’t say anything, but [Camacho-
Maas] knew what I was doing.”  Defendant also testified that she
intentionally deleted only a few curriculum- and grant-related
files that she considered personal and repeatedly stated that she
did not delete any TAP files.  Defendant also testified that,
because the TAP files were located on LARC’s server, she did not
believe she could access them while Camacho-Maas had them open
and did not think it was possible for her to have deleted the TAP
files after her termination.
This is not a case with “nothing in the record” to support a
conclusion of anything other than willfulness.  Rose, 53 N.C.
App. at 611, 281 S.E.2d at 406.  Evaluating the credibility of
defendant’s testimony in light of the other evidence was properly
for the jury and the trial court’s instructional error prevented
the jury from considering the willfulness of defendant’s actions. 
Based on defendant’s testimony, we conclude that there was a
reasonable possibility that the jury could have found that
defendant believed she had Camacho-Maas’ permission to delete all
of the files that she intentionally deleted and that any deletion
of the TAP files was accidental, not willful.  Thus, the trial
court’s failure to instruct on willfulness was not harmless.  The
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Court of Appeals majority correctly granted defendant a new trial
and we affirm.  
AFFIRMED.
Chief Justice PARKER concurs in the result only.
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No. 535A08 - State v. Ramos
Justice NEWBY dissenting.
The issue in this appeal is whether the evidence presented
at trial could have supported a jury finding that there was
reasonable doubt that defendant willfully deleted Teacher
Apprenticeship Program (“TAP”) files from her employer’s computer
network.  Because the evidence weighs overwhelmingly in favor of
finding that defendant deleted the TAP files knowingly and with
unlawful intent, the only reasonable conclusion is that defendant
acted willfully in deleting the TAP files.  I would reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals majority and respectfully
dissent.
Because there was no dispute among the Court of Appeals
panel that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury
that the State was required to prove defendant deleted the TAP
files willfully, this Court must determine whether the lack of
such an instruction was prejudicial to defendant.  “A defendant
is prejudiced by errors relating to rights arising other than
under the Constitution of the United States when there is a
reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been
committed, a different result would have been reached at the
trial out of which the appeal arises.  The burden of showing such
prejudice under this subsection is upon the defendant.”  N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1443(a) (2007) (emphasis added).  To show prejudice in the
instant case, defendant must demonstrate on appeal that the
totality of the evidence presented at trial admits a reasonable
possibility that, had the trial court instructed the jury on
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willfulness, the jury would have found defendant not guilty of
damaging a computer or computer network in violation of N.C.G.S.
§ 14-455(a).
Section 14-455(a) provides in pertinent part:  “It is
unlawful to willfully and without authorization alter, damage, or
destroy a computer, computer program, computer system, computer
network, or any part thereof.”  Id. § 14-455(a) (2007).  One
definition of “willful” as it is used in criminal statutes is
“the wrongful doing of an act without justification or excuse.” 
State v. Arnold, 264 N.C. 348, 349, 141 S.E.2d 473, 474 (1965)
(per curiam) (citation omitted).  More simply stated, “the word
willful means not only designedly, but also with a ‘bad
purpose.’”  State v. Clifton, 152 N.C. 765, 766-67, 152 N.C. 800,
802, 67 S.E. 751, 752 (1910) (citations omitted).  To show she
was prejudiced by the lack of a jury instruction on willfulness,
defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the jury
would have found that the State failed to prove at least one of
the components of willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt.
The majority seems to assert the jury could have found
reasonable doubt with respect to the “bad purpose” component in
defendant’s testimony that she believed she was authorized to
delete files from Latin American Resource Center (“LARC”)
computers.  While it is true defendant presented evidence that
she believed she had permission to delete some files from LARC’s
network, it is undisputed that defendant was not authorized to
delete TAP files in particular, and defendant never testified
that she even thought she was authorized to delete TAP files. 
-10-
Defendant testified that, after her termination from LARC,
defendant said to Aura Camacho-Maas, “[S]ince my work is no good
I guess you won’t mind if I take my work off computer [sic],” and
that Camacho-Maas responded, “[T]his was no consequence to her,
that the work was not good, and it was no consequence.”  This
testimony shows defendant may have been authorized to remove her
own work product from LARC’s network, but it does not reflect any
belief by defendant that she was authorized to delete the TAP
files that are the basis of her conviction.
The majority also argues the jury could have found
reasonable doubt regarding the “designedly” component of
willfulness based on a theory that defendant’s deletion of TAP
files was accidental.  At no point, however, did defendant
explicitly testify that any deletion of TAP files was done by
accident or that she did not intend to delete TAP files.  Indeed,
defendant testified that she did not delete the TAP files at all
and that she was not even able to access those files at the time
of her termination, stating:
I deleted part of the grant which was the grant that I
had written.  I think that was about three, three
files, but it was not the TAP file.
TAP file was in the server.  It was a server and,
in order for, to go into the server.  She had already
worked in the server, so I could not to go into the TAP
file.
I would have go into the server.  Server couldn’t
be but one person going into it at the time, so I don’t
know.  [sic]
Moreover, in attempting to carry her burden on appeal of showing
a reasonable possibility of a different result but for the
instructional error, defendant addresses the “designedly”
component of willfulness by stating simply, “Defendant may have
-11-
deleted some files accidentally.”  Defendant fails to expound on
this argument, instead supporting it with only a single reference
to her trial testimony:  asked whether she deleted a certain
file, defendant responded, “I’m not sure whether I deleted that
file or not.”  A contextual reading of this testimony, however,
reveals that defendant was not responding to a question about the
TAP files at issue here, but rather a file captioned
“Organizational Information” that provided details about LARC
itself.  It would be unreasonable for a jury to infer from this
minimal testimony that defendant deleted the TAP files
accidentally, especially given the opposing testimony presented
by the State.
In determining whether defendant has borne her burden of
showing a reasonable likelihood of acquittal had the willfulness
instruction been given, our lodestar must be reasonableness under
the circumstances.  For a finding of prejudice to be made under
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a), the possibility of a different outcome
but for the error in question must be “reasonable.”  N.C.G.S. §
15A-1443(a).  Thus, a mere scintilla of evidence tending to
support defendant’s claim that she did not act willfully does not
establish prejudice per se.  We must consider and balance the
totality of the evidence presented at trial.  The majority’s
weighing of the evidence, however, focuses exclusively on
inferences that might favor defendant and fails to address the
overwhelming evidence presented by the State to prove that
defendant deleted the TAP files knowingly and with unlawful
intent.
-12-
The State’s evidence tended to show that when defendant was
terminated on 15 August 2005, she “became enraged” and “[h]er
words and her body language were . . . very violent.”  Defendant
stated she was going to “destroy [Camacho-Maas] in the agency.” 
Defendant also refused to surrender her keys to the LARC offices
before receiving her last paycheck.  Camacho-Maas explained that
defendant would be paid at the end of the month as usual. 
Defendant returned to the LARC offices the next day, and Camacho-
Maas, having noticed by then that the TAP files had been deleted
from LARC’s server, called the police.  Defendant admitted to the
police that she had copied files from LARC’s server onto a flash
drive and removed them from the LARC computer.  Detective James
Neville of the Raleigh Police Department’s cybercrimes unit
testified that he found approximately 304 LARC files on
defendant’s flash drive, about 80% of which were TAP files that
had been “either deleted or deleted and overwritten” on LARC’s
server.  Neville also found a letter on defendant’s flash drive
stating, “When I am paid in full you may have what I downloaded.” 
Defendant acknowledged that letter at trial and also admitted
that she had told Detective B.R. Williams that “she would give
Miss Camacho-Maas’ files back when she got her paycheck.”
In short, the evidence demonstrates beyond doubt that
defendant acted knowingly and with unlawful intent.  Hundreds of
the files found on defendant’s flash drive, constituting the vast
majority of the LARC files that defendant copied, were TAP files,
a fact that weighs heavily against finding that defendant
accessed and deleted TAP files by accident.  Defendant’s attempt
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to use her copies of the erased TAP files as a bargaining chip in
seeking her paycheck likewise shows that defendant was well aware
that she deleted those files from LARC’s server.  Defendant knew
her copies of the TAP files had value to LARC because she knew
those files were missing from LARC’s server.  Defendant’s effort
to use the TAP files to extract her paycheck also strongly
demonstrates her bad purpose in copying the TAP files and then
deleting them from LARC’s server.  Meanwhile, as discussed above,
defendant presented no evidence that she thought she was
authorized to delete TAP files and never testified that any
deletion of TAP files was done by accident.
Considering the totality of the evidence, which weighs
prohibitively against finding defendant acted accidentally or
without a bad purpose in deleting the TAP files, defendant has
failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that a properly
instructed jury would have found reasonable doubt as to the
willfulness element of N.C.G.S. § 14-455(a).  Therefore, under
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a), defendant was not prejudiced by the lack
of an instruction on willfulness, and her conviction should be
left undisturbed.  I respectfully dissent.
Justices EDMUNDS and BRADY join in this dissenting opinion.