Case Title: City of St. Louis v. Hughes

Citation: 950 S.W.2d 850

Docket Number: 79514

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 1997-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
950 S.W.2d 850 (1997)
CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Respondent,
v.
Joseph HUGHES, Appellant.
No. 79514.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
August 19, 1997.
Rehearing Denied September 30, 1997.
Henry W. Cummings, St. Charles, for Appellant.
*851 Tyrone A. Taborn, City Counselor, Steven R. Wild, Assistant City Counselor, Patricia A. Hageman, St. Louis, for Respondent.
PRICE, Judge.
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, has transferred this case to the Supreme Court for ruling pursuant to Rule 83.02. Hughes admits in his brief that the orders he seeks to appeal are not judgments within the meaning of Rule 74.01(a). We dismiss the appeal.
The City of St. Louis (the city) sued defendant to enjoin a public nuisance at property known as the Alcorn Hotel located at 4165 Washington in St. Louis, Missouri. The city's petition included allegations that the hotel was being used for prostitution and illegal drug activity. During the litigation of the matter, four documents were signed by the judge. Hughes seeks to appeal from these four documents. The first document, dated March 17, 1995, states:
The second document, dated April 28, 1995, states:
On May 24, 1995, the trial court signed the third document which states:
The fourth document was signed by the trial court on June 16, 1995, and states:
*852 2. Defendants may rent rooms at the Alcorn Hotel on a daily (overnight) basis until such time as any person on the premises or within 50 feet thereof (RD) is arrested on any charge relating to prostitution or drug possession or sale; upon service by plaintiff to defendants or a notice of the fact of any such arrest, the terms of this paragraph 2 are suspended without further order, and defendants shall forthwith comply with paragraph 1.
In November 1995, plaintiff filed a Motion for Contempt of the June 16, 1995, court order. The motion alleged that Hughes was arrested on October 17, 1995, for allowing the premises at 4165 Washington to be used for prostitution. A fifth document was signed by the court on November 29, 1995, and states:
Defendant does not challenge this fifth order. Defendant filed his notice of appeal on December 4, 1995. In the space provided on that notice designated "Judgment or Order Appealed From:", Hughes states "Attached." He attached only the four documents dated March 17, April 28, May 24, and June 16.
The right of appeal is statutory. The applicable statutory provision is § 512.020, RSMo 1994, which provides as follows:
Absent one of the exceptions expressly set out in § 512.020, RSMo 1994, "[a] prerequisite to appellate review is that there be a final judgment. If the order of the trial court was not a final judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed. An appealable judgment disposes of all issues in a case, leaving nothing for future determination." Boley v. Knowles, 905 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo. banc 1995) (citations *853 omitted). The legislature has defined a "judgment" as "the final determination of the right of the parties in an action." § 511.020, RSMo 1994.
The Constitution of the State of Missouri empowers this Court to "establish rules relating to practice, procedure and pleading for all courts ... which shall have the force and effect of law." Mo. Const. art. V, § 5 (1945). Pursuant to article V, § 5, this Court has adopted rules of civil procedure. Rule 74.01(a), which was recently amended in 1995, defines what constitutes a judgment. The new rule states:
Rule 74.01(a) (emphasis added).
As a preliminary matter, the city contends that this case should not turn on whether the memoranda are final appealable judgments within the meaning of Rule 74.01(a) because the Supreme Court rules cannot expand or shrink jurisdiction. Under old Rule 74.01(a), it was unclear when a pronouncement or judgment was a final judgment for purposes of appeal. The new rule clarifies that ambiguity by imposing an express requirement that the document or docket notation be "denominated `judgment'." Rule 74.01(a) does not expand or shrink jurisdiction, the right to appeal, or any other substantive right. It merely clarifies what constitutes a "judgment."
The requirement that a trial court must "denominate" its final ruling as a "judgment" is not a mere formality. It establishes a "bright line" test as to when a writing is a judgment. The rule is an attempt to assist the litigants and the appellate courts by clearly distinguishing between when orders and rulings of the trial court are intended to be final and appealable and when the trial court seeks to retain jurisdiction over the issue.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "denominate" as "to give a name to: to call by a name." The American Heritage Dictionary, Second Edition defines "denominate" as "to give a name to; designate." Thus, the written judgment must be signed by the judge and must be designated a "judgment." Whether the designation "judgment" appears as a heading at the top of the writing, within the body of the writing in some other manner, or in the entry on the docket sheet, it must be clear from the writing that the document or entry is being "called" a "judgment" by the trial court. Depending upon the text, mere use of the word "judgment" in the body of the writing or docket entry may not suffice.
Hughes concedes in his brief:
He thereby abandons this issue for purposes of his appeal, State v. Hurtt, 509 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo. banc 1974), and we are without jurisdiction.
The appeal is dismissed.
BENTON, C.J., LIMBAUGH, ROBERTSON, COVINGTON and HOLSTEIN, JJ., and HANNA, Special Judge, concur.
WHITE, J., not sitting.