Case Title: STATE v HART

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80-101

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
N o . 80-101 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1980 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, SHIRLEY BUSBY H A R T a/k/a SHIRLEY A N N E CHITTENDEN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of t h e S i x t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f Custer. Honorable Alfred B. Coate, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Morrison Law O f f i c e s , Missoula, Montana W i l l i a m Rossbach argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely,Attorney General, Helena, Montana Keith D. Haker, County Attorney, M i l e s C i t y , Montana J. Dennis Corbin argued, Deputy County Attorney, M i l e s C i t y , Montana Submitted: November 17, 1980 Decided: ~~~ 3 0 1381 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant appeals a Custer County D i s t r i c t Court convic- t i o n , by a jury, of t h e f t by accountability, f o r which she received a five-year sentence and was ordered t o make p a r t i a l r e s t i t u t i o n . Three women entered Mann Credit Jewelers i n M i l e s City, Montana, on the afternoon of May 24, 1979. The only employee i n the s t o r e a t t h e t i m e w a s a c l e r k , June Carranza. Carranza t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e t h r e e women came i n t o t h e s t o r e a t about t h e same t i m e b u t then separated. Two of t h e women, who associated openly and were c l e a r l y together, asked t h e c l e r k t o show them some r i n g s i n a d i s p l a y cabinet. The t h i r d woman, i d e n t i f i e d by Carranza a s defendant Shirley Hart, browsed throughout t h e s t o r e . She asked t o look a t some wineglasses, which Carranza handed t o her. (Fingerprints on t h e wineglasses were l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d i n c o u r t a s those of S h i r l e y Chittenden, a l s o known a s Shirley Hart.) From the wineglasses, defendant went t o t h e cuckoo clocks and asked t h e c l e r k a series of questions about them, discovering t h a t t h e key and a box f o r t h e clock she was i n t e r e s t e d i n w e r e downstairs. H a r t t o l d t h e c l e r k t h a t she would need the box because she wanted t o mail it. Carranza t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h a t p o i n t defendant engaged i n a s h o r t , inaudible conversation with one of the two women, although from t h e time the t h r e e women entered the s t o r e , Hart had shown no s i g n of a s s o c i a t i o n with the o t h e r two women. After t h i s b r i e f conversation, no f u r t h e r c o n t a c t was made between Hart and the o t h e r women. A s Carranza and defendant discussed t h e clock, the o t h e r women l e f t t h e s t o r e and looked through the s t o r e window a t t h e i t e m s displayed. Carranza then went down i n t o the basement t o seach f o r t h e key t o the clock and a box i n which t o m a i l it. Once downstairs, Carranza heard the sounds of running f e e t from t h e s t o r e above and t h e sound of what seemed t o be t h e bumping of glass. She abandoned her search f o r t h e key and box and ran back u p s t a i r s t o f i n d defendant waiting a t t h e top of t h e s t a i r s . Testimony given by the owner of the s t o r e indicated t h a t t h e area i n which Hart was standing w a s t h e only a r e a i n t h e e n t i r e s t o r e where t h e s t a i r s t o t h e basement could be watched. Hart was on t h e main f l o o r of t h e s t o r e during t h e disturbance which brought June Carranza rushing back u p s t a i r s , b u t made no mention t o her of any i r r e g u l a r i t i e s . Carranza informed defendant t h a t she could not f i n d t h e box f o r the clock b u t t h a t her boss would be back a t 3:30 p.m. and he could c e r t a i n l y help her. H a r t t o l d the c l e r k t h a t she had some shopping t o do a t Penney's and t h a t she would return. When defendant l e f t t h e s t o r e it w a s minutes before 3:20. The t h e f t was reported a t 3:25. Carranza had informed Hart t h a t her employer would be back within ten minutes, y e t defendant chose t o leave and n o t r e t u r n . The c l e r k f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant hurried away a f t e r leaving the s t o r e . Carranza then went t o clean t h e d i s p l a y cases and discovered t h a t two d i s p l a y t r a y s of r i n g s w e r e missing from t h e f r o n t window where t h e two women had j u s t been examining t h e rings. When p o l i c e arrived, she gave a description of t h e t h r e e women and described what had transpired. Latent f i n g e r p r i n t s were taken from the d i s p l a y case and from t h e wineglasses. The p r i n t s on the d i s p l a y case were those of Donna Standley (a/k/a Donna Harris) and Mary Gunsch; those on the wineglasses were t h e f i n g e r p r i n t s of Shirley Chittenden (a/k/a Shirley H a r t ) , the defendant. Two of t h e S t a t e ' s witnesses t e s t i f i e d t o defendant's e i t h e r p r i o r o r subsequent association with t h e other two women seen i n Mann Credit Jewelers on May 2 4 , 1979. The exact d a t e of t h e meeting between these t h r e e women was n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y established by any witness, b u t the S t a t e ' s witnesses placed a l l t h r e e i n the home of Dixie S t r i d on o r near t h e d a t e of the t h e f t . S h i r l e y Hart presents four i s s u e s f o r our review: 1. Did she receive a f a i r t r i a l ? 2. Did the prosecution adduce s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o prove the elements of the charge, thereby j u s t i f y i n g the D i s t r i c t Courtt s decision t o deny her motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t and the submission of the case t o t h e jury? 3 . Were her c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s violated by her absence during t h e peremptory challenge s t a g e of jury selec- tion? 4. Was t h e jury properly instructed? FAIR TRIAL Hart a s s e r t s t h a t she d i d n o t receive a f a i r t r i a l and t h a t her due process r i g h t s w e r e v i o l a t e d by the conduct of t h e prosecutor and t h e e r r o r s of t h e t r i a l court. Defendant f i r s t argues t h a t t h e prosecution d e l i b e r a t e l y introduced the testimony of Maryona Johnson, knowing t h a t t h e testimony w a s l i k e l y t o be perjured. To show t h e associ- a t i o n of defendant and t h e two o t h e r women, t h e S t a t e c a l l e d Johnson t o t e s t i f y t h a t i n l a t e May o r June she saw Shirley Hart a t Dixie S t r i d ' s house with two women whom she d i d n o t know and t o whom she was n o t introduced. Johnson was h o s t i l e and uncooperative throughout her testimony. She was evasive a s t o t h e d a t e of t h e encounter a t S t r i d ' s house. Hart contends t h a t Johnson's testimony was more preju- d i c i a l than probative and served t o deny h e r r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l . According t o Hart, t h e manner i n which Johnson's testimony was d e l i v e r e d was so confusing and evasive t h a t it gave t h e appearance t h a t she was attempting t o p r o t e c t someone. Defendant submits t h a t t h e prosecutor r e a l i z e d t h e p r e j u d i c i a l impact of t h e testimony, i n s o f a r a s it implied t h a t Johnson w a s t r y i n g t o p r o t e c t defendant, and w i l l f u l l y continued h i s examination t o strengthen t h a t impression. This Court recognizes t h a t due process r e q u i r e s t h a t t r i a l s be conducted with " d i g n i t y , order, and decorum." I l l i n o i s v. Allen (1970), 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353. The prosecutor has a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o see t h a t t h e prosecution of a criminal case i s f a i r and j u s t ; he must be i n t e r e s t e d i n j u s t i c e , n o t j u s t convictions. Berger v. United S t a t e s (1935), 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314. See a l s o t h e Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-13. Misconduct by t h e prosecutor may form t h e b a s i s of a new t r i a l where t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s a c t i o n s have deprived a defendant of a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l . S t a t e v. Bain (1978), 176 Mont. 23, 575 P.2d 919. During h i s opening statement, t h e prosecutor t o l d t h e jury t h a t he would prove t h a t defendant w a s i n M i l e s C i t y on o r near t h e d a t e of t h e t h e f t . H e s a i d he would e s t a b l i s h t h a t f a c t by t h e testimony of two of her f r i e n d s , one of which w a s Maryona Johnson. A t t h e o u t s e t Johnson was evasive and uncooperative. She admitted t h a t she had seen defendant i n t h e company of two women a t S t r i d ' s house i n May o r June of 1979. Defendant objected t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s attempt t o elicit a more cogent testimony on the grounds that the prosecutor was attempting to impeach his own witness. he trial judge properly overruled the objection since under the rules of evidence an attorney can impeach any witness. Rule 607, Mont.R.Evid. A party does not vouch for his or her witnesses, except for expert and character wit- nesses, because a party's witnesses are not chosen but are those persons who happen to be present and see the events which give rise to the case. Commission Comment to Rule 607 Mont.R.Evid. Under the facts as they exist before us, we can determine no prosecutorial misconduct or prejudicial error to defendant with respect to Johnson's testimony. Defendant claims secondly that the prosecutor deliber- ately introduced testimony to impeach a defense witness on matters which were known to him to be improper, incompetent, and collateral. In the trial court, Hart originally gave notice that she planned to call certain alibi witnesses. Hart's counsel withdrew that defense and moved the court for an order limiting the prosecutor from inquiring into any matters concerning that defense. The court ruled that the prosecutor would not be allowed to exceed the scope of direct examination. Defense called Sandy Karst to testify about defendant's physical condition during the spring of 1979. On cross-examination the prosecutor asked Karst whether she had previously made any statement that she was with defendant at defendant's home in ~illings on May 24, 1979. Over objection, Karst replied that she had. ~efen- dant deems this an improper attempt to impeach a witness and violative of the court's order to stay within the scope of direct examination. The State counters that defendant made her physical condition at the time of the theft an issue. On cross- examination, the prosecution attempted to determine if the witness's testimony related to defendant's condition on the day of the theft. To this extent the cross-examination was properly within the bounds of the court order. Since our decision in Kipp v. Silverman (1901), 25 Mont. 296, 64 P. 884, we have consistently determined that cross-examination should be allowed an extended range rather than a limited one. Further, the latitudes of cross-examination are deter- mined by the trial court. It is not within the authority of this Court to disturb the District Court's ruling unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. State v. Gallaher (1978), 177 Mont. 150, 580 P.2d 930, 35 St.Rep. 848. See also State v. Babella (1978), 177 Mont. 275, 581 P.2d 838, 35 St.Rep. 985. We respect the District Court's judgment in the conduct of the trial and do not find that its discre- tionary powers were abused. Defendant further argues on appeal that the court erred in its decision to call Bob Lucas, president of the First Security Bank in Miles City, to the stand to clarify the testimony of Maryona Johnson. Hart claims that Lucas' testimony was completely collateral and wrongfully prejudiced her case. The court, however, felt compelled to call Lucas to verify Johnson's testimony once her credibility had been called into question, especially in view of the fact that Johnson was a major witness for the State on the issue of association. Rule 614(a), Mont.R.Evid., allows the court to call witnesses and entitles all parties to examine those witnesses. The reason for this prerogative is the usual tendency to a s s o c i a t e an undesirable witness with one p a r t y o r t h e o t h e r . œ his problem i s m e t by having t h e bench c a l l t h e witness t o o b t a i n h i s o r her knowledge of t h e r e l e v a n t f a c t s . Commission Comment t o Rule 6 1 4 ( a ) , Mont. R.Evid. Because t h e a u t h o r i t y t o c a l l witnesses i s expressly granted t h e D i s t r i c t Court by t h e r u l e s of evidence, and t h a t au- t h o r i t y i s l a r g e l y d i s c r e t i o n a r y , w e w i l l n o t d i s t u r b t h e c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n without a showing of abused d i s c r e t i o n o r manifest prejudice, n e i t h e r of which a r e p r e s e n t here. Accord, United S t a t e s v. L e s l i e ( 5 t h C i r . 1976), 542 F.2d 285 (applying Rule 6 1 4 ( a ) , Fed.R.Evid., which is i d e n t i c a l t o t h e Montana r u l e ) . Defendant Hart concludes her appeal on t h e f a i r t r i a l i s s u e by d i r e c t i n g our a t t e n t i o n t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s c l o s i n g statement t o t h e jury. I n t h a t statement, H a r t argues, t h e prosecutor improperly commented on her r e f u s a l t o t e s t i f y during t r i a l . The prosecutor argued t o t h e jury: "The d a t e s . I ask you t o r e j e c t those d a t e s . You know what t h e d a t e was. June [Carranza] knows what t h e d a t e was and t h e defendant knows what t h e d a t e was." Defendant asks t h i s Court t o conclude t h a t t h i s statement drew t h e f a c t of her r e f u s a l t o t e s t i f y before t h e jury, thereby c r e a t i n g i n t h e minds of t h e jury t h a t she was n o t t e s t i f y i n g because of her g u i l t . W e do n o t f i n d her argument persuasive. Read i n t h e context of t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s e n t i r e c l o s i n g statement, w e do n o t believe t h a t t h e r e f e r e n c e t o t h e d a t e s i s properly characterized as a comment on defendant's f a i l u r e t o t e s t i f y on her own behalf. I t merely s t r e s s e d t h a t t h e f a c t of t h e t h e f t and t h e f a c t of defendant's presence i n t h e s t o r e on t h e day of t h e t h e f t had been proven. I t i s c e r t a i n l y improper f o r a prosecutor t o comment on a defen- dant's refusal to take the stand (Griffin v . California (1965), 380 U . S . 609, 85 S-Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106), but this reference to defendant's knowledge is simply too remote an inference to be prejudicial error. Moreover, the District Court instructed the jury on defendant's consti- tutionally protected right to remain silent. Any possible error or taint caused by the prosecutor's comment was clearly made harmless by the proper instruction of the jury. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE -- Defendant's second contention is that the evidence adduced was insufficient to sustain her conviction of theft by accountability and that the District Court committed reversible error in submitting the case to the jury. In support of this point she argues (1) that the State failed to prove that she intended to promote or facilitate the theft; (2) that the State's proof of her association with the two principals was flawed and insufficient to prove intent; (3) that the State failed to prove that the two women seen at Dixie Strid's house were indeed the principals in the crime; (4) that the State failed to prove that Hart's fingerprints were the same as those found at the scene of the theft; and (5) that there is not sufficient evidence generally to uphold defendant's conviction. Every defendant in a criminal action is innocent until proven guilty, and it is the burden of the State to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Proctor (1969), 153 Mont. 90, 454 P.2d 616. But, it is the jury's purpose and duty to decide if the State has proved its case against the defendant by rendering a verdict on the facts presented. State v. Espelin (1937), 106 Mont. 231, 76 P.2d 629. his Court on appeal i s guided by t h e sound and well-reasoned r u l e t h a t t h e determination of disputed questions of f a c t and t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of witnesses i s t h e s o l e province of t h e jury. S t a t e v. Bubnash (1963), 142 Mont. 377, 382 P.2d 830; S t a t e v. Messerly (1952), 126 Mont. 62, 244 P.2d 1054; S t a t e v. Robinson (1939), 109 Mont. 322, 96 P.2d 265; S t a t e v. Espelin, supra. With r e s p e c t t o t h e i s s u e of i n t e n t , w e note t h a t t h e jury w a s i n s t r u c t e d on every element of t h e c r i m e and note with p a r t i c u l a r i t y t h e c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 4 : "An a c t i s done 'knowingly' i f done v o l u n t a r i l y and i n t e n t i o n a l l y , and n o t because of mistake o r accident o r o t h e r innocent reason . . ." Reviewing the evidence most s t r o n g l y i n favor of t h e S t a t e , w e conclude t h a t t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t evidence f o r t h e jury t o f i n d t h a t S h i r l e y Hart i n t e n t i o n a l l y com- mitted t h e crime of t h e f t by accountability. Both a f i n g e r p r i n t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and an eyewitness i d e n t i f i c a t i o n placed Hart i n Mann C r e d i t Jewelers. June Carranza t e s t i f i e d t h a t she w a s i n t h e s t o r e a t t h e same time a s the women l a t e r a r r e s t e d a s p r i n c i p a l s i n t h e t h e f t . The evidence a l s o shows t h a t Hart d i d n o t a s s o c i a t e with t h e o t h e r women, except f o r t h e b r i e f and inaudible exchange a few minutes before t h e t h e f t . This lack of a s s o c i a t i o n i s i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e testimony of Maryona Johnson and ~ i x i e S t r i d t h a t t h e t h r e e women w e r e a l l together on o r near t h e d a t e of t h e t h e f t . The S t a t e proved t h a t defendant s e n t t h e c l e r k i n t o t h e basement f o r a key and a box f o r a clock t h a t defendant intended t o mail, thereby c r e a t i n g a s i t u a t i o n where no one was l e f t on t h e main f l o o r of t h e s t o r e . The evidence showed t h a t defendant positioned h e r s e l f i n the only area i n t h e e n t i r e s t o r e where t h e s t a i r s t o t h e basement could be watched; t h e only l o g i c a l a r e a i n which a "lookout" would stand t o make s u r e t h a t t h e thieves would have n o t i c e of t h e c l e r k ' s r e t u r n from t h e basement. The evidence showed t h a t defendant was i n t h e s t o r e during t h e t h e f t . I t f u r t h e r showed t h a t defendant s a i d nothing t o t h e c l e r k of anything unusual happening even though the c l e r k , while i n t h e base- ment, heard t h e sounds of running f e e t and t h e bumping of g l a s s . Carranza f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t , even i n view of t h e fact t h a t defendant appeared so i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e purchase of t h e clock t h a t she wanted a box f o r it, she l e f t without returning. Moreover, although Carranza's employer would be r e t u r n i n g i n a matter of minutes a t which t i m e t h e s a l e of t h e clock could be made, complete with box and key, defen- d a n t hurried away from t h e s t o r e and never returned. H a r t ' s a c t i o n s w e r e n o t c o n s i s t e n t with those of a genuinely i n t e r - e s t e d shopper. They were c o n s i s t e n t with t h e a c t i o n s of a "lookout," whose p a r t i n t h e t h e f t was t o g e t t h e lone c l e r k o f f t h e f l o o r of t h e s t o r e and then watch t h e s t a i r s while her p a r t n e r s i n t h e crime committed t h e a c t u a l t h e f t . W e are n o t required t o determine H a r t ' s g u i l t from t h e above f a c t s . When s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evidence i s a s s a i l e d , it i s t h e province of t h i s Court t o view evidence which tends t o support t h e v e r d i c t and n o t second-guess t h e jury o r concern ourselves with what w e may have done a s j u r o r s . S t a t e v. McKenzie (1976), 171 Mont. 278, 557 ~ . 2 d 1023, vacated 433 U.S. 905, 97 S.Ct. 2968, 53 ~ . E d , 2 d 1089, on remand 581 P.2d 1205, vacated 99 S.Ct. 3094, c e r t . denied 99 S.Ct. 3103. See a l s o M i l e s v. Commonwealth (1964), 205 V a . 462, 138 S.E.2d 22. The jury was f u l l y i n s t r u c t e d on i t s duty and responsi- b i l i t y i n evaluating t h e evidence of i n t e n t . I t i s reason- a b l e t o assume t h a t t h e r e e x i s t e d m a t e r i a l questions of f a c t regarding defendant's i n t e n t t o a i d i n t h e t h e f t which, i n our system of criminal j u s t i c e , a r e decided by twelve jurors. F i n a l l y , t h e d e c i s i o n t o submit a case t o t h e jury and deny a motion f o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t l i e s within t h e ambit of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s broad d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers and should n o t be disturbed by t h i s Court on appeal i n t h e absence of a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . S t a t e v. Armstrong (1967), 149 Mont. 470, 428 P.2d 611. The District Court d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n t h i s case. Hart argues t h a t t h e S t a t e introduced no evidence a t t r i a l t h a t t h e women seen a t Dixie S t r i d ' s house were Gunsch and Harris, t h e p r i n c i p a l s of t h e crime. The connective l i n k , Hart argues, was t h e taking of j u d i c i a l n o t i c e by t h e c o u r t of t h e S t a t e ' s pleadings a g a i n s t t h e two women. This, submits defendant, i s a f a i l u r e t o prove an element of t h e crime, i.e. a s s o c i a t i o n , and i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . W e disagree. F i r s t of a l l , from t h e testimony of Dixie S t r i d : "Q. N o w t h e s e four women, r e f e r r i n g t o S h i r l e y Hart, Maryona Johnson and Mary Gunsch and Donna H a r r i s , how d i d they a r r i v e a t your house? A. Donna and Mary went t o m y house with m e from m y bar. "Q. D o you know how S h i r l e y Hart g o t there? A. She drove m y c a r o r E r n e s t ' s c a r . "Q. Could you t e l l m e who l e f t f i r s t , S h i r l e y H a r t o r Maryona Johnson? A. I d o n ' t remember f o r sure, W e had s e v e r a l drinks." From t h i s testimony and t h a t of Maryona Johnson, w e can f i n d ample evidence t o show t h a t S h i r l e y H a r t and t h e two p r i n c i p a l s , H a r r i s and Gunsch, were indeed a s s o c i a t e s , a t some p o i n t near t h e d a t e of t h e t h e f t . Hart's argument on appeal, however, a s s i g n s e r r o r t o the D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o take j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of t h e pleadings a g a i n s t t h e two women, charging them with t h e a c t u a l t h e f t a t t h e jewelry s t o r e on May 24, 1979. I n essence t h i s means t h a t while t h e S t a t e may have proven t h e a s s o c i a t i o n of t h e t h r e e women, it d i d n o t prove t h a t H a r r i s and Gunsch w e r e t h e p r i n c i p a l a c t o r s i n t h e t h e f t . The taking of j u d i c i a l n o t i c e i s governed by t h e provi- s i o n s of Rule 201, Mont.R.Evid.: " J u d i c i a l n o t i c e - of f a c t s . " ( a ) Scope of r u l e . This r u l e governs j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of a l l f a c t s . " ( b ) Kinds of f a c t s . A f a c t t o be j u d i c i a l l y noticed must be one n o t s u b j e c t t o reasonable d i s p u t e i n t h a t it is e i t h e r (1) g e n e r a l l y known within t h e t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r (2) capable of a c c u r a t e and ready determination by r e s o r t t o sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned. " ( c ) When d i s c r e t i o n a r y . A c o u r t may take judi- c i a l notice, whether requested o r not. " (d) When mandatory. A c o u r t s h a l l take judi- cial n o t i c e i f requested by a p a r t y and supplied with t h e necessary information. " (e) Opportunity t o be heard. A p a r t y i s en- t i t l e d upon timely r e q u e s t t o an opportunity t o be heard a s t o t h e p r o p r i e t y of taking j u d i c i a l n o t i c e and t h e tenor of t h e matter noticed. I n t h e absence of p r i o r n o t i f i c a t i o n , t h e request may be made a f t e r j u d i c i a l n o t i c e has been taken. " ( f ) Time of taking notice. J u d i c i a l n o t i c e may be taken a t any s t a g e of the proceeding. " ( g ) I n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury. I n a c i v i l a c t i o n o r proceeding, t h e c o u r t s h a l l i n s t r u c t t h e jury t o accept a s conclusive any f a c t j u d i c i a l l y noticed. I n a criminal case, t h e c o u r t s h a l l i n s t r u c t t h e jury t h a t it may, b u t i s n o t required t o , accept a s conclusive any f a c t j u d i c i a l l y noticed." W e can f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court's d e c i s i o n t o take j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of t h e f a c t of t h e pleadings a g a i n s t H a r r i s and Gunsch, e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t of t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c - t i o n on j u d i c i a l n o t i c e . W e consider i n i t i a l l y j u s t what was j u d i c i a l l y noticed--the charges a g a i n s t Harris and Gunsch. he f a c t of t h e charges a g a i n s t t h e s e women was n o t " s u b j e c t t o reasonable dispute" and, moreover, the f a c t of t h e charges was capable of "accurate and ready determination by r e s o r t t o sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questionedv--namely, t h e D i s t r i c t Court f i l e s which contained t h e o r i g i n a l copies of t h e charges a g a i n s t t h e two p r i n c i p a l s . I t i s important t o note t h a t we a r e d i s c u s s i n g t h e f a c t of t h e charges here and n o t t h e i r v a l i d i t y . Even i f t h e taking of j u d i c i a l n o t i c e i n any way t a i n t e d t h e f a i r n e s s of defendant's t r i a l , any t a i n t would be elimi- nated by t h e i n s t r u c t i o n given t o t h e jury. The D i s t r i c t Court i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury t h a t it was allowed t o accept a s conclusive any f a c t j u d i c i a l l y noticed b u t t h a t it was n o t required t o do so. See Rule 201 (g) , Mont. R. Evid. Having drawn the j u r y ' s a t t e n t i o n t o t h e pleadings which had been j u d i c i a l l y noticed, t h e c o u r t made it c l e a r t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n was n o t binding on the jury and t h a t they could disregard t h e f a c t of t h e pleadings a g a i n s t Harris and Gunsch. I t was then t h e j u r y ' s prerogative t o accept o r r e j e c t t h e j u d i c i a l l y noticed f a c t s a s evidence, and w e w i l l n o t d i s t u r b its decision. S t a t e v. McKenzie, supra; S t a t e v. Stoddard (1966), 147 Mont. 402, 4 1 2 P.2d 827. A s t o Hart's a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t proof t h a t t h e f i n g e r p r i n t s found a t Mann c r e d i t Jewelers w e r e h e r s , we f i n d her argument more specious than r e a l . The g i s t of t h e claim i s t h a t the ~ i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n taking j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of defendant's a l i a s e s , thereby explaining why t h e name on t h e f i n g e r p r i n t card was " ~ h i r l e y chittenden" while t h e f i n g e r p r i n t s were those of defendant, "~hirley Hart." The State relied on the testimony of finger- print expert, Herbert Bruning. He testified that the finger- prints removed from the glass in Mann Credit Jewelers were those of Shirley Busby Hart a/k/a Chittenden. When defendant married, she changed only her name, not her fingerprints. Referring again to Rule 201, Mont.R.Evid., we can determine that the fact of defendant's other used names is not subject to reasonable dispute in that they would be "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably ques- tioned," i.e., her birth certificate, marriage certificate, baptismal records, etc. We recognize that there are facts which, "from motives of policy, the law requires a court to judicially notice, or have knowledge of, but of which, in reality, it is ignorant." Holtz v. Babcock (1963), 143 Mont. 341, 390 P.2d 801. When facts are not subject to reasonable dispute, such as in this case, the District Court saves time and money for all parties by taking judicial notice of those facts. See Commission Comment, Rule 201, Mont.R.Evid. Any merit this argument may have is further diminished when considered in the light of June Carranza's eyewitness identification of defendant as the third woman in the store. The fingerprints were taken from the wineglasses Carranza had shown defendant. When these two pieces of evidence are considered together, we can see very little merit to the claim that the judge should not have taken judicial notice of the fact of defendant's aliases, thereby explaining the discrepancies between the name on the fingerprint card and the current name of defendant. F i n a l l y , defendant claims g e n e r a l l y t h a t t h e r e w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o uphold her conviction. A f t e r a review of the evidence i n favor of t h e v e r d i c t and a review of a p p l i c a b l e law, w e f i n d f u l l y s u f f i c i e n t evidence f o r t h e jury t o decide t h a t defendant's a c t i o n s on May 2 4 , 1979, were i n c o n s i s t e n t with a hypothesis of innocence. Mere presence a t t h e scene of t h e t h e f t , o r even f a i l u r e t o i n t e r f e r e with a t h e f t which someone is aware is taking p l a c e , i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o hold one accountable a s a prin- c i p a l t o t h e crime. People v. Durham (1969), 74 Cal.Rptr. 262, 449 P.2d 198. Further, t h e a c t o r need n o t take p a r t i n t h e o v e r t a c t of the t h e f t , o r t h e a c t u a l taking, t o be found g u i l t y . People v. Cole (1977), 50 Ill.App.3d 133, 7 I11.Dec. 848, 365 N.E.2d 133. Although mere presence a t t h e scene of t h e crime and t h e f a i l u r e t o disapprove o r oppose t h e crime do n o t make a person l i a b l e , t h e s e f a c t o r s may be considered by t h e jury, along with o t h e r circumstances which may i n d i c a t e whether t h e person i n some way aided i n t h e commission of t h e crime. See People v. Nugara (1968), 39 I11.2d 482, 236 N.E.2d 693, c e r t . denied, 393 U.S. 925, 89 S.Ct. 257, 21 L.Ed.2d 261; People v. Crutcher (1979), 72 Ill.App.3d 239, 28 I11.Dec. 404, 390 N.E.2d 571. Where t h e evidence d i s c l o s e s , a s it does i n t h i s case, t h a t t h e defendant had an a f f i l i a t i o n with t h e p r i n c i p a l s of t h e crime (People v. Cole, supra; People v. Crutcher, s u p r a ) , t h a t t h e defendant's conduct a f t e r t h e t h e f t i s compatible with t h e view t h a t she was f l e e i n g t h e scene (People v. Pendleton (1966), 75 Ill.App.2d 314, 2 2 1 N.E.2d 1 1 2 ) r t h a t t h e defendant d i v e r t e d t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e c l e r k a t t h e e x a c t t i m e t h e t h e f t took place (Snyder v. ~ommonwealth (1961), 202 Va. 1009, 121 S.E.2d 452), and t h a t t h e fiefen- d a n t made no e f f o r t t o a p p r i s e t h e c l e r k o r t h e a u t h o r i t i e s of t h e f a c t of t h e t h e f t which had occurred within a few f e e t of her (People v. Crutcher, s u p r a ) , we become convinced t h a t t h e jury had more than ample evidence of the defendant's g u i l t . The chain of evidence i s a s e r i e s of circumstances: presence, diversion, s i l e n c e , a s s o c i a t i o n and f l i g h t . These elements of t h e S t a t e ' s proof p r e s e n t a formidable and unbroken chain of f a c t s and events. The evidence w a s s u f f i c i e n t , and t h e case properly submitted t o t h e jury. PRESENCE DURING PEREMPTORY C H A L L E N G E Hart claims t h a t her absence during t h e f i n a l s t a g e of jury s e l e c t i o n v i o l a t e d her due process r i g h t s and confronta- t i o n r i g h t s under t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y , she contends t h a t she had a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y guaranteed r i g h t t o be p r e s e n t during t h e peremptory challenges of t h e jury. I n making t h i s argument, Hart cites Snyder v. Massa- c h u s e t t s (1934), 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674, f o r t h e proposition t h a t a defendant has a r i g h t t o be p r e s e n t a t a l l s t a g e s of t h e proceedings where fundamental f a i r n e s s might be thwarted by her absence. See S t a t e v. P e t e r s (1965), 146 Mont. 188, 405 P.2d 642. This Court has held t h a t a defendant's r i g h t s are n o t v i o l a t e d when t h e m a t t e r s handled during h i s o r her absence were purely l e g a l . S t a t e v. P e t e r s , supra. Hart argues, however, t h a t t h e peremptory challenges s t a g e of p r e t r i a l proceedings i s n o t a purely l e g a l exercise. She c i t e s an Idaho decision as persuasive a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e r u l e t h a t v o i r d i r e jury s e l e c - t i o n process i s a v i t a l s t a g e of t h e proceedings a t which defendant's presence i s e s s e n t i a l . Idaho v. Carver (1972), 94 Idaho 677, 496 P.2d 676. F i n a l l y , defendant a l s o con- tends that her failure to object or protest her absence did not result in a waiver of the right. (See State v . Reed (1922), 65 Mont. 51, 210 P. 756, wherein we held that the right to be present at all crucial stages of the proceedings is a nonwaivable right.) We are of the opinion, however, that the act of peremptorily challenging the jury is a wholly legal exercise and defendant's absence from that stage of the proceedings is in no way violative of defendant's rights. Idaho v. Carver, supra, is not properly relied on by defendant. In that case, defendant was not present at any time during the selection of the jury that ultimately tried him. In this case, however, the record reflects that Hart was absent only during the peremp- tory challenges. Although defendant's presence may be crucial during the voir dire questioning of the jury, the act of the peremptory challenge of jurors is a pro - forma execution of the decisions formulated during questioning. The absence of defendant was not injurious to either her right of due process or her right of confrontation. JURY INSTRUCTION Defendant's final assignment of error is directed at the District Court's refusal of her proposed Instruction No. 9, regarding the credibility of witness identification testimony. That proposed instruction is set forth below: "Identification testimony is an expression of belief of impression by the witness. Its value depends on the opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at the time of the offense and to make reliable identification later. "In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider the following: "(1) Are you convinced that the witness had a capacity and adequate opportunity to observe the offender? "Whether t h e witness had an adequate opportunity t o observe t h e offender a t the t i m e of the of- fense w i l l be a f f e c t e d by such matters a s how long o r s h o r t a t i m e was available, how f a r o r c l o s e the witness was, how good w e r e l i g h t i n g conditions, whether the witness had occasion t o see o r know the person i n the past. " ( 2 ) A r e you s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n made by t h e witness subsequent t o t h e offense was a product of h i s own r e c o l l e c t i o n ? You may take i n t o account both the s t r e n g t h of the iden- t i f i c a t i o n , and t h e circumstances under which t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n was made. " I f t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n by t h e witness may have been influenced by circumstances under which t h e defendant was presented t o him f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n you should s c r u t i n i z e t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with g r e a t care. You may a l s o consider t h e length of t i m e t h a t elapsed between t h e occurrence of t h e crime and t h e next opportunity of t h e witness t o see the defendant, a s a f a c t o r bearing on the r e l i a b i l i t y of the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . " The S t a t e objected t o t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n because it had been offered without any authority. O n appeal defendant does not argue t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i s a c o r r e c t statement of the law b u t only t h a t she was e n t i t l e d t o an i n s t r u c t i o n on the c r e d i b i l i t y of a w i t n e s s ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the of fender. Two p o i n t s s u s t a i n our finding t h a t t h e r e was no rever- s i b l e e r r o r i n the r e f u s a l of t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o give H a r t ' s jury I n s t r u c t i o n No. 9. F i r s t of a l l , the record shows t h a t the jury was t o l d by the judge i n I n s t r u c t i o n No. "You a r e t h e s o l e judges of t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of a l l t h e witnesses who have t e s t i f i e d i n t h i s case, and of t h e weight t o be given t h e i r t e s t i - mony. A witness i s presumed t o speak t h e t r u t h ; b u t this presumption may be repelled by the manner i n which he t e s t i f i e s , by t h e nature of h i s testimony, o r by evidence a f f e c t i n g h i s char- a c t e r f o r t r u t h , honesty o r i n t e g r i t y , o r h i s motives, o r by contradictory evidence; and i n determining the weight t o be given t o t h e t e s t i - mony of any witness, you have a r i g h t t o consider t h e appearance of each witness on t h e stand, h i s manner of t e s t i f y i n g , h i s apparent candor o r lack of candor, h i s apparent f a i r n e s s o r lack of f a i r - ness, his apparent intelligence or lack of intel- ligence, his knowledge and-means of knowledge on - - the subject upon which he testifies, together with all the other circumstances appearing in evidence on the trial." (Emphasis added.) We are persuaded that the jury was properly and ade- quately instructed on the credibility of all witnesses, including that of the eyewitness, June Carranza. We also feel that the circumstances do not dictate the giving of Hart's proposed instruction. Such an instruction may be proper, if not mandatory, in certain cases. The necessity of this type of instruction is especially clear when there is only a single eyewitness's unsubstantiated testimony which identifies the offender. United States v. Masterson (9th Cir. 1976), 529 F.2d 30. But in the case before us, June Carranza's testimony was corroborated by the presence of defendant's fingerprints on the wineglasses. Although the fingerprints are not without dispute, we find that even given that dispute as valid, they are sufficiently supportive of Carranza's testimony to amply justify the refusal of defendant's proposed Instruction No. 9. We conclude, therefore, that the conviction of Shirley Hart should be affirmed. $his cause was submitted prior to January 5, 1981. V Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea will file a separate opinion later. -20-