Case Title: The People v. John Lingle; The People v. John Parisi; The People v. Dominque Murrell; The People v. John Prendergast; The People v. Manual Rodriquez ;The People v. Darryl Sharlow

Citation: 

Docket Number: Case No. 65

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2011-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
=================================================================
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
No. 65  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
John Lingle,
            Appellant.
-----------------------
No. 66  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
John Parisi,
            Appellant.
-----------------------
No. 67  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Dominique Murrell,
            Appellant.
-----------------------
No. 68  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
John Prendergast,
            Appellant.
-----------------------
No. 86  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Manuel Rodriguez,
            Appellant.
-----------------------
No. 87  
The People &c.,
            Appellant,
        v.
Darryl Sharlow,
            Respondent.
Case No. 65:
Jonathan M. Kirshbaum, for appellant.
Vincent Rivellese, for respondent.
Case No. 66:
Kirk R. Brandt, for appellant.
Michael J. Brennan, for respondent.
Case No. 67:
Joseph M. Nursey, for appellant.
Timothy C. Stone, for respondent.
Case No. 68:
Warren S. Landau, for appellant.
Anastasia Spanakos, for respondent.
Case No. 86:
Claudia S. Trupp, for appellant.
Richard Nahas, for respondent.
Case No. 87:
Solomon Neubort, for appellant.
Steven J. Miraglia, for respondent.
READ, J.:
In People v Sparber (10 NY3d 457 [2008]), we held that
defendants subject to postrelease supervision (PRS) have a
statutory right under CPL 380.20 and 380.40 for a judge to
pronounce the PRS sentence in their presence in open court, and
that the remedy when a judge neglects to do this is resentencing
to correct the error.  Although the facts in these six cases
vary, they share two essential features: the judges who sentenced
defendants did not pronounce PRS (i.e., they committed a Sparber
- 1 -
- 2 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
error), and defendants were resentenced to PRS before completion
of their originally-imposed sentences of imprisonment. 
Specifically, defendants John Lingle, John Parisi, Dominique
Murrell, John Prendergast and Manuel Rodriguez were still
incarcerated when resentenced; defendant Darryl Sharlow was
conditionally released from prison after having served six-
sevenths of his originally-imposed sentence.
Defendants Lingle, Parisi, Murrell, Prendergast,
Rodriguez and Sharlow seek upon resentencing to be relieved of
their statutory obligation to serve PRS on grounds of double
jeopardy and/or due process.  Alternatively, defendants Lingle,
Prendergast and Rodriguez maintain that resentencing courts have
discretion to reconsider the propriety of their sentences as a
whole (i.e., both the incarceratory and the PRS components). 
Defendants Lingle and Rodriguez contend, in addition, that the
Appellate Division possesses plenary power to modify their
sentences after resentencing in the interest of justice.  We
reject all these arguments, and thus affirm in Lingle, Parisi,
Murrell, Prendergast and Rodriguez, and reverse in Sharlow.
Double Jeopardy 
Defendants contend that because they served
"significant" or "substantial" portions of their originally-
imposed sentences before resentencing, they acquired a legitimate
expectation of finality, and, as a result, their cases are not
comparable to those where the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar
- 2 -
- 3 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
a greater sentence (see, e.g., Bozza v United States, 330 US 160
[1947] [defendant resentenced five hours after original sentence
imposed]; Williams v Travis, 143 F3d 98 [2d Cir 1998] [one week];
People v Williams, 87 NY2d 1014 [1996] [one week]).  In order to
avoid a double jeopardy violation, they continue, resentencing
courts may only impose PRS by reducing the incarceratory portion
of their sentences such that the incarceratory and PRS components
of the resentences, when added together, do not exceed the length
of their originally-imposed sentences of imprisonment.
Our decision in People v Williams (14 NY3d 198 [2010],
cert denied 131 S Ct 125, 178 L Ed2d 242 [2010]) defeats
defendants' double jeopardy argument.  We pointed out in Williams
that defendants are "presumed to be aware that a determinate
prison sentence without a term of PRS is illegal" and subject to
correction, and therefore "cannot claim a legitimate expectation
that the originally-imposed, improper sentence is final for all
purposes" (id. at 217).  Nonetheless, "there must be a temporal
limitation on a court's ability to resentence a defendant since
criminal courts do not have perpetual jurisdiction over all
persons who were once sentenced for criminal acts" (id.).  Citing
federal precedent that we found to be persuasive, we held in
Williams that an expectation of finality arises for purposes of
double jeopardy when a defendant completes the lawful portion of
an illegal sentence and exhausts any appeal taken (id. ["[T]here
is a legitimate expectation of finality once the initial sentence
- 3 -
- 4 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
has been served and the direct appeal has been completed (or the
time to appeal has expired)"]; see also id. at 227
[characterizing majority's "holding" as requiring two conditions
for a legitimate expectation of finality to "attach": "the
completion of the initial sentence and the completion of the
direct appeal or time to appeal"] [Pigott, J. dissenting]
[internal quotation marks omitted]).  The defendants in Williams
and the cases decided along with it had all completed their
sentences (including any discharge on conditional release) before
being resentenced.  By contrast, the six defendants in these
cases had not yet completed their originally-imposed sentences of
imprisonment when they were resentenced to add PRS.1
 
To counter Williams, defendants highlight the Second
Circuit's decision in Stewart v Scully (925 F2d 58 [2d Cir
1991]).  Focusing on the "substantial portion" of the originally-
imposed indeterminate sentence already served, the court in
Stewart decided that the defendant possessed a "legitimate
expectation in the finality of his sentence, thus violating the
protection against multiple punishments guaranteed by the double
jeopardy clause."  But Stewart pleaded guilty in exchange for a
1The dissent opines that once Sharlow was conditionally
released, he was "entitl[ed] . . . to a 'legitimate expectation'
that his sentence was final for all purposes" (dissenting op at
4).  But someone released conditionally knows, almost by
definition, that he has not yet paid his full debt to society,
whereas someone whose sentence has expired can legitimately think
of his punishment as in the past.
- 4 -
- 5 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
maximum sentencing exposure of 20 years.  Upon subsequently
learning that the minimum sentence had to be one-third (as
opposed to one-half) the maximum, the sentencing court increased
Stewart's maximum sentence to 24 years.  By contrast, these
defendants were not caught unaware when a sentencing agreement
was changed: defendants Lingle, Parisi, Murrell, Prendergast and
Rodriguez were sentenced after trials; defendant Sharlow was
"sentenced, as promised, to seven years" (dissenting op at 1
[emphasis added]).
Importantly, defendants' suggested rule -- that
resentencing to PRS should be precluded when a "significant" or
"substantial" portion of the originally-imposed sentence of
imprisonment has been served -- supplies no meaningful standard
by which to measure a reasonable expectation of finality.  Given
the thousands of resentencings -- past and future -- brought
about by Sparber errors, our rule in Williams, by contrast,
promotes clarity, certainty and fairness.
Finally, defendants offer no principled basis for us to
go beyond our recent decision in Williams and interpret the State
Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause more broadly than its
federal counterpart, particularly in light of our other recent
decision in Matter of Suarez v Byrne (10 NY3d 523, 534 [2008]). 
True, the Legislature has enacted certain statutes affording
broader double jeopardy protection than the Federal Constitution
requires, but these laws have nothing to do with sentencing. 
- 5 -
- 6 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
Indeed, after we handed down Sparber the Legislature promptly
adopted legislation to allow resentencing as many defendants as
possible to sentences that include PRS (see L 2008, ch 141).
Due Process
Defendants also argue that substantive due process bars
their resentencing to PRS.  To support a due process claim, they
rely principally on the decisions of the First and Fourth
Circuits in Breest v Helgemoe (579 F2d 95 [1st Cir 1978], United
States v Lundien (769 F2d 981 [4th Cir 1985]), and DeWitt v
Ventetoulo (6 F3d 32 [1st Cir 1993]).  These decisions generally
apply a multi-factor test to determine when a defendant's
expectation that his sentence will remain unchanged has
"crystallized" such that resentencing would offend substantive
due process (see Lundien, 769 F2d at 987).  But subsequent
decisions by the very same courts have largely abandoned the
multi-factor test in favor of a "shocks the conscience" standard
(see Gonzalez-Fuentes v Molina, 607 F3d 864, 882 [1st Cir 2010]
[applying the "shock the conscience" standard to evaluate
substantive due process claims]; Espinoza v Sabol, 558 F3d 83, 87
[1st Cir 2009] [describing DeWitt as an "extreme case" that is
"the very rare exception to the general rule that courts can,
after sentence, revise sentences upward to correct errors"]; and
Hawkins v Freeman, 195 F3d 732, 749 [4th Cir 1999] [holding that
Ludien's pronouncements on due process were merely dicta and that
the court had failed to engage in the "rigorous historical
- 6 -
- 7 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
inquiry" mandated in Washington v Glucksberg 521 US 702, 720-721
(1997)]).
  
The proper substantive due process analysis thus
requires a determination, first, as to whether the right at issue
is so deeply rooted in this Nation's history and traditions as to
be considered fundamental, and, if so, whether the government's
action is "so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be
said to shock the contemporary conscience" (Gonzalez-Fuentes, 607
F3d at 880 [internal citation omitted]).  Negligence alone is
insufficient to "shock the conscience," and in successful due
process challenges, there is generally an extreme lack of
proportionality inspired by malice or sadism rather than
carelessness or excess of zeal (id. at 881 [citations omitted]).
Even assuming a defendant possesses a fundamental right
not to have an illegal sentence revised upward to correct an
error, these defendants cannot establish that the government's
conduct shocks the conscience.  The resentencings merely imposed
statutorily-required sentences.  The State was not acting out of
malice or sadism, but out of a desire to see that legislatively
determined mandatory sentences were actually served.  And the
State's action was not subjectively or standardlessly directed at
particular individuals; rather, it was aimed at an entire
category of defendants whose sentences were improperly
pronounced.  In sum, judged by the "shock the conscience"
standard defendants cannot make out a substantive due process
- 7 -
- 8 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
violation.
While defendants fare marginally better under the
DeWitt standard, they still fall short.  DeWitt calls for a court
to consider multiple factors, including the length of time
between the mistake and its attempted correction and whether the
defendant contributed to the mistake; the reasonableness of the
defendant's intervening expectations; the prejudice resulting
from the change; and the government's diligence in seeking the
change (6 F3d at 35).
In some of these cases, the lapse of time between the
Sparber error and its correction at resentencing was several
years; in no case did defendants contribute to the mistake. 
Still, defendants could not have developed a reasonable
expectation in a prison sentence without PRS.  PRS is statutorily
mandated, and defendants are charged with knowledge of the law. 
They were represented by presumably competent counsel who should
have informed them of their exposure to PRS.  The Department of
Correctional Services informs defendants of the PRS component of
their sentences upon their entry into the correctional system
(see e.g. Correction Law § 803 [6]).  Significantly, defendants
do not protest that they were actually unaware that PRS would be
a component of their sentences.
In short, there is every reason to believe that
defendants did, in fact, know that they were subject to PRS long
before efforts to resentence them were undertaken.  Because
- 8 -
- 9 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
defendants are merely being required to serve a part of their
sentences of which they were always cognizant, any prejudice
resulting from resentencing is de minimis.  Moreover, the
government has acted diligently to correct Sparber errors. 
Finally, defendants suggest no reason for us to interpret
substantive due process more broadly in these circumstances as a
matter of state constitutional law.
Whether a Resentencing Court May Reconsider a
Defendant's Sentence at a Resentencing to Correct a
Sparber Error
Defendants read Sparber to direct or empower judges to
revisit the propriety of a defendant's sentence as a whole --
both the incarceratory and PRS components -- when resentencing to
correct a Sparber error.  While there is, at least arguably,
isolated language in Sparber which lends itself to this
interpretation (principally, our single use of the word "vacate"
in the body of the opinion), this is clearly not what we meant. 
If it had, in fact, been what we intended, we surely would have
expressed an unambiguous holding to this effect rather than risk
creating a situation where thousands of Sparber resentencings
might have to be repeated.
We start with the proposition that a Sparber error
"amounts only to a procedural error, akin to a misstatement or
clerical error, which the sentencing court [can] easily remedy"
(Sparber, 10 NY3d at 472 [emphasis added]).  In support of this
statement, we cited People v DeValle (94 NY2d 870 [2000]), People
- 9 -
- 10 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
v Wright (56 NY2d 613, 614 [1982]) and People v Minaya (54 NY2d
360 [1981]).  We did not suggest in these cases that the
sentencing judge was supposed to do anything at resentencing
other than correct the discrete error prompting the resentencing
in the first place (see also People v Yannicelli, 40 NY2d 598,
602 [1976] [it was error for the trial court to revisit the
defendant's entire sentence when a procedural mistake in imposing
a fine was the sole defect in the original sentencing and thus
"the only reason why resentencing was ordered"]; People v
Harrington, 21 NY2d 61 [1967] [although the order, in form, was
vacated by reason of a ministerial error, the reason for the
remand was merely to correct this mistake and therefore the net
sentence should not have been changed]).
In Sparber, the defendants urged us to fix the
pronouncement mistake, the only harm they alleged, by striking
PRS from their sentences.  We rejected this proposed remedy,
deciding instead to remit their cases to Supreme Court "for
resentencing and the proper judicial pronouncement of the
relevant PRS terms" (Sparber, 10 NY3d at 465 [emphasis added]). 
Accordingly, we declared that "[t]he sole remedy for a procedural
error such as this is to vacate the sentence and remit for a
resentencing hearing so that the trial judge can make the
required pronouncement" (id. at 471 [emphasis added]).  In the
decretal paragraph itself, we directed that "the order of the
Appellate Division should be modified by remitting to Supreme
- 10 -
- 11 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
Court for a resentencing hearing that will include the proper
pronouncement of the relevant PRS term (id. at 473 [emphasis
added]).
By contrast, we have explained the required corrective
action in far more general language when remitting for a
resentencing requiring the exercise of discretion.  For example,
in People v Yancy (86 NY2d 239, 247 [1995]) the sentencing court
mistakenly believed that the defendant was a predicate felon. 
Accordingly, in the decretal paragraph we modified the Appellate
Division's order by "vacating defendant's sentence, and . . .
remitt[ing the case] to Supreme Court, New York County, for
resentencing."  Because the sentencing court in Yancy considered
inappropriate factors in fashioning the sentence, resentencing
logically entailed general, plenary proceedings.  But in Sparber,
the sentencing court merely failed to articulate properly the
altogether appropriate sentence that it intended to impose.  As a
result, resentencing is limited to remedying this specific
procedural error -- i.e., to "mak[ing] the required
pronouncement" (10 NY3d at 471).  Put another way, resentencing
to set right the flawed imposition of PRS at the original
sentencing is not a plenary proceeding.
Whether the Appellate Division May Reduce a Defendant's
Sentence on Appeal from a Resentencing to Correct a
Sparber Error
Because a trial court lacks discretion to reconsider
the incarceratory component of a defendant's sentence at a
- 11 -
- 12 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
resentencing to correct a Sparber error, the Appellate Division
may not reduce the prison sentence on appeal in the interest of
justice.  The defendant's right to appeal is limited to the
correction of errors or the abuse of discretion at the
resentencing proceeding (see CPL 470.15 [1], 470.20).  Since the
resentencing court is not authorized to lower the prison sentence
at a Sparber resentencing, appellate courts are likewise
unauthorized to do this -- i.e., the resentencing court's failure
to consider a lesser sentence was not "an error or defect"
subject to reversal or modification (CPL 470.20).2 
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed in each case addressed in this opinion except People
v Sharlow, where the Appellate Division's order should be
reversed and the resentence imposed by Supreme Court reinstated.
2The dissenting judges are hard-pressed to explain why they
would reverse in Rodriguez, but not in Lingle.  Both Rodriguez
and Lingle contend that the Appellate Division has the power to
reduce their sentences in the interest of justice, and the
dissenting judges agree.  Similarly, both Lingle and Prendergast
take the position, also espoused by Rodriguez and endorsed by the
dissenting judges, that resentencing courts are authorized to
reconsider the incarceratory portion of a defendant's sentence at
a Sparber resentencing.
- 12 -
People v John Lingle
People v John Parisi
People v Dominque Murrell
People v John Prendergast
People v Manuel Rodriguez
People v Darryl Sharlow
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
CIPARICK, J. (dissenting in Sharlow and Rodriguez):
I join the majority opinion in only four of these
cases, dissenting in People v Sharlow and People v Rodriguez.
People v Sharlow
On October 31, 2000, Sharlow pleaded guilty to one
count of burglary in the second Degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [1])
and one count of petit larceny (Penal Law § 155.25).  Sharlow
entered this guilty plea with the understanding that, if he
successfully completed a drug treatment program in the ensuing 18
to 24 months, the burglary charge against him would be dismissed
and that Supreme Court would sentence him to a conditional
discharge on the petit larceny count.  Supreme Court advised
Sharlow, however, that if he failed to complete the drug
treatment program or was rearrested during this period, the court
would impose a seven year determinate term of imprisonment. 
Supreme Court made no mention of the mandatory five-year term of
postrelease supervision (PRS).
Sharlow did not complete the drug treatment program. 
Consequently, on November 1, 2002, Supreme Court sentenced
- 1 -
- 2 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
defendant, as promised, to seven years.  The court did not impose
PRS at sentencing.
On May 14, 2008, after Sharlow became eligible for
release from prison having served six-sevenths of his term of
imprisonment, the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS)
conditionally released him pursuant to Correction Law § 803 (1). 
At that time, Sharlow began to serve a purported term of PRS that
had been administratively imposed unlawfully by DOCS while he was
in custody.  Unfortunately, Sharlow violated the terms of his
release and was reincarcerated on July 11, 2008.  On July 31,
2008, DOCS notified Supreme Court that Sharlow was a "designated
person," meaning that the original sentencing court had not
properly imposed PRS (see Correction Law § 601-d [1]).  As a
result, Sharlow was brought back to court on September 17, 2008. 
Over Sharlow's objection, Supreme Court resentenced him by adding
five years PRS to the original term of imprisonment.  Sharlow
appealed.
Citing our holding in People v Williams (14 NY3d 198
[2010]), the Appellate Division reversed and vacated the term of
PRS.  The court concluded that Sharlow's "release from prison
erected a bar under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United
States Constitution to the addition thereafter of a period of
PRS" (People v Sharlow, 75 AD3d 568, 569 [2d Dept 2010]).  A
Judge of this Court granted the People leave to appeal (15 NY3d
924 [2010]).  The majority now reverses the order of the
- 2 -
- 3 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
Appellate Division and I respectfully dissent.
In Williams, we recognized that despite a court's
"inherent authority to correct illegal sentences, . . . there
must be a temporal limitation on a court's ability to resentence
a defendant" (14 NY3d at 217).  Thus, we held "that the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits a court from resentencing [a] defendant
to the mandatory term of PRS after [a] defendant has served the
determinate term of imprisonment and has been released from
confinement by DOCS" (id.).  This is so because "once a defendant
[has been] released from custody and returns to the community
after serving the period of incarceration that was ordered by the
sentencing court . . . there is a legitimate expectation that the
sentence, although illegal under the Penal Law, is final" (id. at
219 [emphasis added]).  In adopting this rule, we cited federal
authority standing for the proposition that "the resentencing of
a defendant who has been released from confinement would be
unconstitutional" (id. at 216, citing DeWitt v Ventetoulo, 6 F3d
32, 35-36 [1st Cir 1993], cert denied 511 US 1032 [1994]; United
States v Lundien, 769 F2d 981, 986-987 [4th Cir 1985], cert
denied 474 US 1064 [1986]; Breest v Helgemoe, 579 F2d 95, 101
[1st Cir 1978], cert denied 439 US 933 [1978]).
Here, Sharlow's release from confinement clearly bars
resentencing under our holding in Williams.  Sharlow duly served
the period of incarceration ordered by the sentencing court (cf.
Williams, 14 NY3d at 219 n 3 ["(t)his analysis has no application
- 3 -
- 4 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
to a person who, for example, is erroneously released early by
DOCS"]).  Moreover, once DOCS calculated Sharlow's precise
release date by operation of statute (see Correction Law § 803
[1] [a], [c]), he was discharged and returned to the community
(see id.).  These factors, as discussed in Williams, entitle
Sharlow to a "legitimate expectation" that he will no longer be
subject to additional punishment, thereby making his sentence 
final for all purposes.   
Nonetheless, the majority construes our holding in
Williams differently and now finds "that an expectation of
finality arises for purposes of double jeopardy when a defendant
completes the lawful portion of an illegal sentence" (majority op
at 4 [emphasis in original]).  Thus, under the majority's
rationale, Sharlow's release from custody into the community is
of no moment because Sharlow was still subject to DOCS
supervision for the remaining one-seventh of his prison term.  In
my view, this goes beyond what we held in Williams.  Indeed, we
did not create a rule that, upon a defendant's proper release
from custody into the community, as here, a legitimate
expectation of finality would not arise until such defendant was
no longer subject to DOCS supervision.  In fact, we never
considered the maximum expiration date of a sentence in Williams,
but rather focused our entire discussion on an inmate's release
from confinement.  Notably, we observed that "[s]ome [federal]
courts have held that a reasonable expectation of finality arises
- 4 -
- 5 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
upon completion of the imposed sentence, resulting in the
attachment of jeopardy precluding resentencing" (14 NY3d at 216
[citations omitted]).  Ultimately, however, we rejected this
reasoning in favor of a rule, adopted by other federal courts,
that Double Jeopardy bars resentencing once a defendant has been
duly released from custody (see id. at 217).
Furthermore, other departments of the Appellate
Division, in applying Williams, have also held that the
conditional release of a defendant from prison bars the
imposition of PRS on double jeopardy grounds (see e.g. People v
Velez, 79 AD3d 542, 542 [1st Dept 2010] ["When a person serving a
determinate sentence is conditionally released, the determinate
sentence is still in effect, but the person has clearly been
released from imprisonment within the meaning of Williams."];
People v Peterkin, 71 AD3d 1402, 1402 [4th Dept 2010] [although
defendant returned to DOCS custody for violating the terms of his
release, "County Court erred in resentencing him to a period of
(PRS) after he had been conditionally released from the
previously imposed determinate sentence of incarceration"]).
The Appellate Division in this case properly applied
our holding in Williams and held that, following Sharlow's
conditional release from custody into the community Double
Jeopardy barred the imposition of PRS at a resentencing
proceeding.  That this resentencing occurred before the maximum
expiration date of the original sentence does not change the
- 5 -
- 6 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
proper understanding and application of Williams by the Appellate
Division here, which drew the Double Jeopardy line at Sharlow's
release from custody.  Accordingly, I would vote to affirm.
People v Rodriguez  
On June 17, 2002, a jury convicted Rodriguez of gang
assault in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.07).  Supreme Court
sentenced Rodriguez to a determinate prison term of 25 years. 
Although the court sheet initialed by the trial judge and the
commitment sheet prepared by the court clerk indicated a five-
year period of PRS, Supreme Court made no mention of PRS during
the sentencing proceeding.  
Rodriguez pursued his direct appeal.  The Appellate
Division affirmed the judgment of his conviction and sentence
(People v Rodriguez, 33 AD3d 543 [1st Dept 2006]).  On appeal to
this Court, Rodriguez argued that the PRS component to his case
was unlawful because Supreme Court failed to pronounce it orally
at sentencing.  A Judge of this Court granted Rodriguez leave to
appeal (9 NY3d 881 [2007]).  We consolidated his case with People
v Sparber (10 NY3d 457 [2008]) wherein we agreed with Rodriguez
that his PRS had been unlawfully imposed and remitted his case to
Supreme Court for resentencing.
Upon remittal to Supreme Court, Rodriguez requested a
reduction of his 25-year prison term.  Supreme Court denied the
request and resentenced defendant to the originally imposed 25
- 6 -
- 7 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
years followed by three years PRS.  Initially, on May 18, 2010,
the Appellate Division modified the judgment of resentence, as a
matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by reducing the
sentence to a term of 20 years, and, as so modified, affirmed
(see People v Rodriguez, 73 AD3d 541, 541 [1st Dept 2010]).  The
court concluded that a Sparber resentencing was not a plenary
proceeding that "present[ed] the sentencing court with an
occasion to revisit the original prison sentence" (id.). 
Nonetheless, finding the prison term to be excessive, the court
exercised its interest of justice discretion to modify the
sentence as noted (see id. at 542).  
The People moved for reargument at the Appellate
Division.  While that application remained pending, a Judge of
this Court granted both Rodriguez and the People leave to appeal
(15 NY3d 885 [2010]).  Subsequently, on March 3, 2011, the
Appellate Division granted the People's reargument motion and
recalled its May 18, 2010 decision.  Although the court adhered
to its prior conclusion that a Sparber resentencing is not a
plenary proceeding that gives "occasion to revisit the original
prison sentence," the court now held that it was "without
authority" to reduce Rodriguez's term of imprisonment "as a
matter of discretion in the interest of justice" (People v
Rodriguez, 82 AD3d 418 [1st Dept 2011]).  In light of the
Appellate Division's holding, the People's appeal to this Court
became moot.  However, a Judge of this Court once again granted
- 7 -
- 8 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
Rodriguez leave to appeal (__ NY3d __ [2011]).  The majority now
affirms the order of the Appellate Division and I respectfully
dissent.
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that,
pursuant to our holding in Sparber, a resentencing court is not
empowered to revisit the incarceratory component of a defendant's
sentence (see majority op at 9-11).  In Sparber, we found that
the lower courts "intended to impose a sentence . . . that
consisted of a determinate sentence and a period of PRS" (10 NY3d
at 472).  Absent any evidence to the contrary, we held the error
in failing to pronounce PRS in those cases was "a procedural
error, akin to a misstatement or clerical error" (id.).  However,
in concluding that vacatur of a defendant's sentence was the
appropriate remedy in these cases, we never sought to limit the
trial court's inherent power to revisit the incarceratory period
of a sentence, if warranted.1  The majority's assertion that a
holding which allows a resentencing court to reconsider the
incarceratory component of a defendant's sentence would "creat[e]
a situation where thousands of Sparber resentencings might have
to be repeated" (majority op at 9) is purely speculative and
assumes that resentencing courts, following our decision in
1 In that regard, we observed that a defendant is also free
to make a motion pursuant to CPL 440.20 at any time alleging that
the original sentencing court failed to consider PRS when
determining the appropriate term of imprisonment (see Sparber, 10
NY3d at 471 n 6).
- 8 -
- 9 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
Sparber, did not believe they had such authority in the first
instance.   
I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that the
Appellate Division is without authority to modify a defendant's
resentence upon appeal to that court (see majority op at 12).  It
is axiomatic that "an appeal to an intermediate appellate court
may be taken as of right by [a] defendant from" a judgment of
sentencing (CPL 450.10 [2]).  "An appeal from a sentence . . .
means an appeal from either the sentence originally imposed or
from a resentence following an order vacating the original
sentence" (CPL 450.30 [3] [emphasis added]).  The appeal from a
sentence "may be based upon the ground that such sentence either
was (a) invalid as a matter of law, or (b) harsh or excessive"
(CPL 450.30 [1]).
Here, Rodriguez does not assert that the sentence
imposed by Supreme Court at the resentencing proceeding was
invalid as a matter of law.  Rather, he maintains that the
Appellate Division may consider whether the sentence imposed by
the lower court at resentencing was unduly "harsh or excessive"
in its interest of justice discretion.  I agree.
Indeed, CPL 470.15 (3) (c) specifically permits the
Appellate Division to modify a sentence "[a]s a matter of
discretion in the interest of justice."  Moreover, CPL 470.15 (6)
(b) defines "[t]he kinds of . . . modification[s] deemed to be
made as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice" to
- 9 -
- 10 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
include a modification of "a sentence [that], though legal, was
unduly harsh or severe."  Thus, contrary to the conclusion drawn
by the majority, the Appellate Division's authority to modify a
judgment of resentence is not limited to a resentencing where it
has been established than an "error or defect" has occurred (see
People v Delgado, 80 NY2d 780, 783 [1992] [even though a sentence
may be lawful, "[a]n intermediate appellate court has broad,
plenary power to modify a sentence that is unduly harsh or
severe"]). 
The majority decision here has the effect of stripping
the Appellate Division of its broad discretionary authority it
enjoys to reduce a sentence in the interest of justice upon an
appeal from a resentencing to that court as a matter of right. 
Thus, I would reverse the order of the Appellate Division and
remit the case to that court for the exercise of its interest of
justice discretion.2  
2 The majority opines that my position in Rodriguez is
inconsistent with my decision to affirm in Lingle and Prendergast
(see majority op at 12 n 2).  I disagree.  In Lingle, the
Appellate Division considered whether Lingle's request for a
reduction in the incarceratory portion of his sentence should be
granted "as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice"
but found such request to be "without merit" (People v Lingle, 66
AD3d 582, 583 [1st Dept 2009]).  By contrast, the Appellate
Division in Rodriguez held that it had no interest of justice
discretion to modify a sentence imposed in a Sparber
resentencing.  
Moreover, unlike Rodriguez, Lingle and Prendergast do not
stand for the proposition that a resentencing court is precluded
from revisiting the incarceratory component of a defendant's
prison sentence.  
- 10 -
- 11 -
Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 86 & 87
Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the Appellate
Division in People v Sharlow and reverse in People v Rodriguez.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
For Case Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68: Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge
Read.  Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Smith,
Pigott and Jones concur.
For Case No. 86:  Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Read.  Judges
Graffeo, Smith and Pigott concur.  Judge Ciparick dissents and
votes to reverse in an opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman and
Judge Jones concur.
For Case No. 87:  Order reversed and resentence imposed by
Supreme Court, Kings County, reinstated.  Opinion by Judge Read. 
Judges Graffeo, Smith and Pigott concur.  Judge Ciparick dissents
and votes to affirm in an opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman
and Judge Jones concur.
Decided April 28, 2011
 
- 11 -