Case Title: State v. Braden

Citation: 2003-Ohio-1325

Docket Number: 19991452

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354, 2003-Ohio-1325.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BRADEN, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354, 2003-Ohio-1325.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murders — No objection to presence of alternate 
jurors during deliberations — No plain error — Death penalty upheld. 
(No. 1999-1452 — Submitted January 7, 2003 — Decided April 2, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, No. 98 CR-08-
4601. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶1} 
In this appeal, defendant-appellant, David L. Braden, raises 15 
propositions of law.  Finding none meritorious, we affirm his convictions.  We 
have independently weighed the aggravating circumstance in each count against 
the mitigating factors and compared his sentence to those imposed in similar 
cases, as R.C. 2929.05(A) requires.  As a result, we affirm defendant’s 
convictions and sentence of death. 
{¶2} 
David L. Braden was distraught that his relationship with Denise 
Roberts might be ending.  Roberts resided with her father, 83-year-old Ralph 
Heimlich, at his Columbus home.  Heimlich thought that Braden was a 
“scumbag” and wanted Roberts to end her relationship with Braden. 
{¶3} 
On August 3, 1998, Braden showed up at Roberts’s workplace and 
argued with her in the parking lot.  They continued to argue following dinner that 
evening, and Braden damaged Heimlich’s car.  Later that evening, Braden armed 
himself and went to Roberts’s home.  There, he shot Roberts once in the head, and 
he repeatedly shot Heimlich, killing them both.  Braden was convicted of the 
aggravated murders of Roberts and Heimlich and sentenced to death. 
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{¶4} 
The evidence against Braden included testimony and videotape 
showing Braden arguing with Roberts at her place of employment, testimony that 
Braden brandished a pistol prior to the murders, Roberts’s complaint filed with 
police an hour before the murders that Braden had “keyed” her father’s car, 
testimony identifying Braden as the person leaving the crime scene, evidence that 
Braden did not return to his home until 45 minutes after the murders, and forensic 
testimony that bullets removed from the victims’ bodies were similar to bullets 
found at Braden’s home. 
State’s Case 
{¶5} 
Shortly after 6:00 p.m. on August 3, 1998, Denise Roberts talked 
to Victoria Hauser, a co-worker at Merck-Medco in Columbus, about her personal 
life.  According to Hauser, conflict between Braden and Roberts’s father was 
ongoing.  Roberts expressed her love for Braden, but Heimlich thought he was a 
“scumbag.”  After their conversation, Hauser “demanded that [Roberts] walk out 
with [her] and that [they] stop and talk with security on the way out” of the 
building. 
{¶6} 
Braden was waiting at Merck-Medco to meet Roberts as she left 
work.  Braden had arrived at Merck-Medco’s entrance, had told the security guard 
he “was here to pick his girlfriend up,” and had signed his name as “Joe Bob, 
visitor” on the visitor’s log.  Braden waited for a few minutes and then went 
outside. 
{¶7} 
Roberts had spotted Braden’s van in the Merck-Medco parking lot 
before she left the building, and she asked a security guard to “keep an eye on her 
as they walked out to their car because she didn’t * * * know why her boyfriend 
was on the property.”  Roberts declined the security guard’s offer for an escort to 
her car because “she was fearful that that would make [Braden] angry.”  
However, parking lot surveillance cameras were directed on Braden’s van, and a 
security vehicle followed Roberts and Hauser while they walked to Roberts’s car. 
January Term, 2003 
3 
{¶8} 
Braden pulled up his van to block Roberts and Hauser while they 
were walking towards the parking lot.  Braden said, “Hi baby,” and told Roberts 
that he wanted to talk to her.  Roberts was “terrified.”  She told Braden that 
Hauser “was walking [her] to her car because Roberts had something in her car 
that she wanted to give Hauser.”  Braden told Roberts that “he would follow her 
to the car,” and told Hauser to “get the fuck out of here, I want to talk to my 
girlfriend * * *.” 
{¶9} 
The guard in the security vehicle approached Braden after 
observing him talk to the two women.  Upon being approached, Braden said, 
“What is this?  What do I look like?  I’m her boyfriend.  Do I look like a 
murderer?”  Roberts agreed that Braden was her boyfriend, and the security guard 
resumed driving around the parking lot to make sure there was no physical 
violence. 
{¶10} Roberts drove Hauser back to the front of the building, and Hauser 
returned to work.  Before leaving, Hauser told Roberts, “[P]lease come to my 
house, don’t go home, don’t get out of your car, don’t talk to him, he’s going to 
kill you.”  Surveillance footage shows that Braden and Roberts got out of their 
cars, had an “intense” conversation, and then returned to their vehicles and left the 
parking lot. 
{¶11} At approximately 7:30 p.m., Roberts was at Braden’s home on 
Acton Road in Columbus.  Shawn Craddock was visiting his mother, Braden’s 
next-door neighbor, and heard Roberts and Braden arguing.  Craddock overheard 
Braden say, “[T]his was bullshit,” although he did not hear what else they said.  
Roberts was later heard getting into her car and pulling out of Braden’s driveway. 
{¶12} Sometime between 8:00 p.m. and 9:30 p.m., Roberts went to a 
police substation and reported that Braden had damaged her car.  Officer Michael 
Tucker described her as “kind of hysterical” and said, “I could tell she had been 
crying because some of her makeup was running down her face a little bit.”  
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Roberts reported that “she had just gotten in an argument with her boyfriend and 
that he had keyed up her car.”  Roberts recounted events leading up to this 
incident, saying “that [Braden] had showed up at her work and that they had 
talked a little bit, and he had talked her into going to dinner.  She * * * went back 
to his house, and they got into another argument.  She said she got in her car, he 
wanted to get inside the car and couldn’t, and that is when he scratched the car 
up.” 
{¶13} Officer Tucker did not take an incident report since the car was in 
her father’s name.  Roberts was advised to have her father call the police station 
and have a report taken then.  After they had finished talking, Tucker viewed the 
damage, which “appeared to be scratch marks from * * * a key or something like 
that on the hood and on the side of the door and on top of the car.”  Roberts then 
returned home, and Officer Tucker drove “towards [Braden’s] house, to see if [he] 
could either see him outside or * * *, maybe talk to him about it.” 
{¶14} Between 9:30 and 9:45 p.m., Craddock was backing his car out of 
his mother’s driveway and saw Braden “standing in the center window * * * and 
it appeared * * * that he was pointing a gun at” Craddock.  Craddock drove to the 
nearest pay phone and called the police.  At around 10:00 p.m., Craddock called 
his mother, who said, “[H]e’s just now leaving.” 
{¶15} After calling the police, Craddock pulled his van behind Officer 
Tucker’s police cruiser as it was parked on Acton Road.  Craddock reported that 
Braden had just pointed a firearm at him.  He also reported that “he had trouble 
with [Braden] in the past, * * * [and] every time he gets into it with his girlfriend, 
he basically goes crazy.” 
{¶16} At 9:53 p.m., Roberts called Marion Orr, a police dispatcher, 
requesting that the police come to her home to take a report on Braden’s “keying” 
of her father’s car.  Since this was not a high priority incident, the police did not 
immediately dispatch a cruiser to Heimlich’s residence. 
January Term, 2003 
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{¶17} Roberts and Heimlich lived on Barthel Road in east Columbus.  
Shortly after 10:00 p.m., Irvin Ringler II, who lived across the street, heard “five 
pops” sequenced as “three quick ones followed by a pause, and then another one, 
a pause, and then another pop.”  Ringler went outside and saw a man wearing a 
red shirt and blue jeans walking across a lawn.  At the same time, Judith Gall, 
Heimlich’s next door neighbor, heard noises that “sounded like a hammer hitting 
an aluminum garage door.” 
{¶18} At about the same time, Patricia Cooper, who also lived on Barthel 
Road, was picking up her dog at her mother’s nearby home when she heard 
“popping sounds.”  As Cooper approached her house, she saw a man with a 
reddish shirt walking down Heimlich’s driveway, and “his left hand was shielding 
his face with his face facing down to the ground.” 
{¶19} Charlotte Proctor, who lived across from Heimlich, also heard 
noise outside and went to investigate.  Proctor noticed that all of Heimlich’s 
exterior lights were on.  After a few minutes, Proctor saw a man in a red tee-shirt 
and with a ponytail walk from the back of Heimlich’s home, open and close the 
gate, walk down the street to a parked van, and drive away. 
{¶20} Proctor and Gall discovered Roberts’s and Heimlich’s bodies after 
entering Heimlich’s home through an open front door.  Columbus police officers 
arrived at the scene after Proctor and Gall called 911. 
{¶21} Police officers found Roberts’s body lying towards the back of 
Heimlich’s house near a box of spilled kitty litter.  Heimlich’s body was lying in 
the kitchen.  The police found no sign of forced entry or evidence of theft in the 
house.  Police found an expended .38 caliber nyclad-coated bullet on the living 
room floor and found a similar .38 caliber bullet lying on the kitchen floor near 
Heimlich’s body.  A nyclad-coated bullet is a lead bullet with a nylon coating 
over the lead surface.  A firearms expert noted that out of 150 to 200 sets of 
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bullets he examines in a given year, “no more than * * * five to ten” are nyclad-
coated bullets. 
{¶22} A telephone answering machine tape that was recovered from the 
crime scene revealed this message: “Denise, call me, please call me now, please 
call me now, please!  This is David, please call me now!”  Phone records showed 
that at 9:35 p.m. on August 3, 1998, a phone call was made from Braden’s home 
phone to Roberts’s home phone. 
{¶23} Examination of Heimlich’s car showed fresh scratches on the 
hood, roof, trunk, and passenger side of the vehicle.  Police found fingerprints of 
Braden’s left middle and left ring fingers on the right windshield pillar of the car. 
{¶24} Neighbors provided the police with the suspect’s description and 
identification of his blue van.  Meanwhile, Orr heard reports on the police radio 
about the shooting deaths of two people on Barthel Road, and upon remembering 
the earlier call from that address, provided police with Braden’s name and 
address. 
{¶25} Sometime after 10:30 p.m., a police helicopter flew over Braden’s 
home looking for his blue van.  The officer did not spot his blue van, and the 
helicopter continued to fly over Braden’s house every fifteen minutes.  At 11:31 
p.m., the officer spotted the blue van parked outside Braden’s home. 
{¶26} At approximately 11:30 p.m., officers from the Columbus special 
weapons and tactics (“SWAT”) team went to Braden’s home.  Braden’s van was 
parked at the house, and the hood was warm, indicating that it had been running 
recently.  Braden was spotted through a bathroom window in the back of the 
house toweling off after a shower. 
{¶27} SWAT members took Braden into custody, but Braden did not act 
surprised when the police arrived.  He appeared “very casual, very nonchalant,” 
and he had wet hair.  Braden’s mother was in the house along with two dogs.  
Police secured the scene and began collecting evidence from Braden’s home. 
January Term, 2003 
7 
{¶28} Police found Braden’s red shirt inside the washing machine.  No 
firearms were found at either Heimlich’s or Braden’s home.  However, police 
found a box containing 44 nyclad-coated .38 caliber bullets in Braden’s bedroom 
desk.  Six shells were missing from the box of 50 bullets. 
{¶29} The police recovered white particles that appeared to be kitty litter 
from the driver’s seat of Braden’s van.  However, no lab analysis was conducted 
to confirm that these particles were kitty litter. 
{¶30} At approximately 2:30 a.m. on August 4, 1998, Proctor was 
escorted to Braden’s home, where she identified Braden as the man she observed 
leaving Heimlich’s residence.  However, Proctor told police that “[s]he had a 
problem with his hairstyle viewing him on Acton.  She stated that the individual 
she saw leaving Barthel had a ponytail at the time, and when she viewed the 
defendant at the Acton address, his hair was down, it was not in a ponytail.” 
{¶31} Dr. Keith Norton, a Franklin County Deputy Coroner, found that 
Roberts had died from a single gunshot to the head.  Bullet fragments removed 
from Roberts’s head were from a nyclad-coated .38 caliber bullet.  According to 
Norton, Heimlich died from gunshot wounds to the chest, eye, and neck.  
Altogether, Heimlich was shot four times, and a fifth bullet may have grazed his 
shoulder.  Heimlich had also been shot with nyclad-coated .38 caliber bullets. 
Defense Case 
{¶32} The defense introduced hiking boots and shoes taken from 
Braden’s home on August 3, 1998.  Additionally, stipulated expert testimony and 
a lab report were introduced showing that no blood was found on the hiking 
boots, shoes, socks, undershorts, pants, and shirt seized from Braden’s residence. 
Trial Result 
{¶33} A grand jury indicted Braden on two counts of aggravated murder.  
Count I charged Braden with the aggravated murder of Denise Roberts with prior 
calculation and design.  Count II charged Braden with the aggravated murder of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Ralph Heimlich with prior calculation and design.  Both counts included a 
“course of conduct” death penalty specification pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) 
and a firearms specification.  The jury convicted Braden as charged and 
recommended the death penalty on each count.  The trial court sentenced Braden 
to death on each count, three years’ confinement on the firearms specifications, 
and a $50,000 fine. 
{¶34} This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
Pretrial Issues 
{¶35} Jury challenges.  In proposition of law XV, Braden argues that the 
trial court erred by overruling his challenge for cause against three prospective 
jurors who expressed strong views in favor of the death penalty.  Braden 
complains that he was forced to use peremptory challenges against the three jurors 
and was thus unable to peremptorily excuse other jurors. 
{¶36} A capital defendant may challenge for cause any prospective juror 
who, regardless of the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and 
in disregard of the jury instructions, will automatically vote for the death penalty.  
See Morgan v. Illinois (1992), 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 
492; State v. Williams (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 5-6, 679 N.E.2d 646; and State v. 
Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174, 17 OBR 414, 478 N.E.2d 984, paragraph three 
of the syllabus.  “A trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly arbitrary and unsupported by 
substantial testimony, so as to constitute an abuse of discretion.”  Williams, 79 
Ohio St.3d at 8, 679 N.E.2d 646; State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 31, 553 
N.E.2d 576. 
{¶37} First, Braden argues that prospective juror Michael Wallery, a 
parole officer, should have been excused for cause after telling the court that “if 
someone takes a life and it is a premeditated act, * * * they should pay with their 
life.”  The fact that Wallery was a parole officer did not disqualify him from 
January Term, 2003 
9 
sitting as a juror, and his other answers showed that he was open-minded and 
would fairly consider the evidence.  See State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 
516, 527, 747 N.E.2d 765 (police officer, who was not biased, permitted to sit as a 
capital juror).  Wallery expressed his willingness to weigh the aggravating 
circumstances against mitigating factors, consider sentences other than death, and 
follow the law even though it might differ from his personal views.  Given these 
answers, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the challenge for 
cause against Wallery. 
{¶38} Second, Braden claims that prospective juror Sounia Ray, whose 
brother, the defense asserts, was a homicide victim, should have been excused 
after providing the following response to a question about life sentences: “It is not 
good enough.  I mean, no.  Why should he be able to live when he has taken two 
other people’s lives?” 
{¶39} The totality of Ray’s answers during voir dire showed that she 
would be a fair-minded juror.  She told the court that she would follow the law, 
that she would not automatically vote for the death penalty, and that she would 
weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating factors.  Ray 
disclosed that her brother was killed but that the assailant was found not guilty of 
murder at trial, and Ray was not disqualified.  Ray assured the court that she 
could “put that aside,” listen to the facts, and be a fair and impartial juror.  See 
State v. Allen (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 626, 629, 653 N.E.2d 675 (prospective juror 
whose brother was a homicide victim permitted to sit as capital juror after 
assuring the court she could set that aside and remain unbiased).  We find that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the challenge to Ray for cause. 
{¶40} Finally, Braden asserts that prospective juror Robert Dumas should 
have been excused after providing an affirmative response to the question, “Do 
you believe that [a death sentence] is the sentence that you would jump to 
automatically upon finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?”  However, 
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Dumas’s other answers about the death penalty showed his commitment to being 
a fair-minded juror.  During voir dire, Dumas agreed that he “would have to hear 
all the facts” before making a decision in the case, that he would “consider the 
alternatives,” and that he would weigh the mitigating factors before reaching a 
sentence. 
{¶41} The trial court also had the benefit of observing Dumas’s 
demeanor and body language.  The United States Supreme Court has reiterated 
that “deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.”  
Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 426, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.  
Here, the trial court determined that Dumas could follow the law and be fair and 
impartial and stated, when overruling the challenge for cause, that “my view is 
this juror is one of the more thoughtful individuals that we have spoken with.  I 
felt he followed the discussion better than most of the folks we have talked to.”  
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the challenge for 
cause against Dumas. 
{¶42} Moreover, the trial court was sensitive to this issue and granted 
other defense challenges pursuant to Morgan, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 
L.Ed.2d 492.  Based upon our review of the record, we find that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying Braden’s challenges for cause.  We overrule 
proposition XV. 
Trial Issues 
{¶43} Alternate jurors in deliberations.  In proposition of law III, 
Braden argues that the trial court erred by permitting alternate jurors to remain in 
the jury room during both trial- and penalty-phase deliberations. 
{¶44} Former Crim.R. 24(F), which was in effect at the time of Braden’s 
trial, provided that “[a]n alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror shall 
January Term, 2003 
11 
be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict.”1  See former Crim.R. 
24(F), 34 Ohio St.2d lxvii.  Despite the clear language of former Crim.R. 24(F), 
the trial court sent the alternate jurors into the deliberation room during both 
phases of the trial. 
{¶45} Prior to the guilt-phase deliberations, the trial court strictly 
commanded that the alternates “listen to the deliberations but * * * not participate 
under any circumstances in the deliberation unless and until, if ever, they are 
called upon to serve as a regular juror.”  Later, the trial court instructed the 
alternates, “[Y]ou really have to sit mute. * * * [The regular jurors] can’t ask you 
about your recollection or the testimony or anything.  They can ask you, but you 
can’t answer.  You can’t indicate by body language or anything.  I want you to 
really sit.” 
{¶46} Prior to the penalty-phase deliberations, the trial court instructed 
the alternates to “listen to the deliberations but * * * not, again, participate in any 
way.”  Later, the trial court stated that “the alternates really must sit mute.  No 
verbal expressions to show agreement, no head nods, no nothing.” 
{¶47} The trial court “clearly erred” by “allowing the alternate jurors to 
remain present during deliberations.”  State v. Jackson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 
439, 751 N.E.2d 946.  See, also, Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d at 531, 747 N.E.2d 765.  
Braden contends that the court should presume prejudice, but this court has 
previously refused to presume prejudice when alternates have been allowed to 
remain present during jury deliberations in capital cases.  See Jackson, 92 Ohio 
St.3d at 439, 751 N.E.2d 946. 
{¶48} The instant case is distinguishable from State v. Gross, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061.  In Gross, one or more alternate 
jurors inserted themselves into the actual deliberations through intrusive verbal 
participation, while other “alternates [were] throwing pens and thing[s]” during 
                                                          
 
1. 
Crim.R. 24(F) was amended effective July 1, 2002.  96 Ohio St.3d XCIV-XCV. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the deliberations.  Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, 
at ¶ 169.  Moreover, Gross’s trial counsel objected to the presence of the 
alternates during the sentencing deliberations.  Under these circumstances, a 
plurality found reversible error because there was “specific evidence of active 
disruption of the deliberative process that [posed] a significant risk of affecting 
jury functions * * *.”  Id. at ¶ 137.  Further, the trial court accepted the jury’s 
verdict in Gross regarding the death sentence without making any attempt to cure 
the apparent error. 
{¶49} Here, the defense did not object to the alternates’ presence during 
either phase of the jury’s deliberations and thus waived all but plain error.  United 
States v. Olano (1993), 507 U.S. 725, 741, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 
(error in permitting alternate jurors to attend deliberations was not reversible error 
under the federal “plain error” standard). 
{¶50} Applying the test for plain error, the record does not show that, 
“but for the [trial court’s] error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been 
otherwise.”  (Emphasis added.)  State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 
178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Neither the conviction nor 
the death penalty resulted from the presence of the alternates.  Nothing in the 
record suggests that the alternate jurors said anything or participated in any form 
during the jury’s deliberations.  Moreover, there is no indication from the record 
that the alternates in any way disobeyed the judge’s instructions or that their 
presence chilled the deliberative process.  Thus, although it was improper for the 
trial court to allow the alternate jurors to remain present during deliberations, 
plain error is absent. 
{¶51} As an alternative argument, Braden claims that his counsel were 
ineffective by failing to object to the presence of alternate jurors in the jury room 
during deliberations.  Reversal of convictions on ineffective assistance of counsel 
requires that the defendant show, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient 
January Term, 2003 
13 
and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial.  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Accord State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 
136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶52} The record does not disclose why counsel did not object, and 
Braden has failed to demonstrate deficient performance.  Moreover, Braden has 
failed to show prejudice, as Strickland requires.  Thus, his counsel were not 
ineffective by failing to object to the presence of alternates in the jury room 
during deliberations.  See Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d at 540, 747 N.E.2d 765 (counsel 
not ineffective for failing to object to the alternates’ presence in deliberations).  
For the foregoing reasons, we overrule proposition III. 
{¶53} Weight of the evidence.  In proposition of law VI, Braden 
challenges his convictions for aggravated murder as against the manifest weight 
of the evidence. 
{¶54} In considering a manifest-weight claim, “ ‘[t]he court, reviewing 
the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the 
credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the 
evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of 
justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.  The 
discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the 
exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ “  
State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting State 
v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 20 OBR 215, 485 N.E.2d 717.  See, 
also, State v. Lindsey (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 479, 483, 721 N.E.2d 995. 
{¶55} Both direct and circumstantial evidence established Braden’s guilt.  
On the day of the murders, testimony and videotape evidence showed Braden 
arguing with Roberts in the parking lot of her place of employment.  Later that 
evening, Braden argued with Roberts at his house, and he damaged Heimlich’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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car.  Shortly before the murders, Braden was seen brandishing a pistol.  After 
neighbors heard shots, witnesses saw Braden leave the crime scene and drive 
away in his van.  Shortly thereafter, police in a surveillance helicopter observed 
Braden’s van parked outside his home, and he was arrested.  Braden’s motive for 
the murders resulted from Braden’s breakup with Roberts and his ongoing 
conflict with Heimlich, who thought that Braden was a “scumbag.” 
{¶56} Despite this evidence, Braden contends that none of the state’s 
witnesses could identify him as the person walking away from the murder scene.  
However, several of the victims’ neighbors heard gunshots and observed a man 
matching Braden’s description (man with a pony tail and wearing a red tee-shirt) 
leave the victims’s home, walk down the street, and drive away in a van.  Around 
2:30 a.m. on August 4, just four hours after the murder, Proctor identified Braden 
as the man she saw leaving Heimlich’s residence.  Thus, contrary to Braden’s 
assertions, eyewitness testimony identified him leaving the crime scene. 
{¶57} Braden also argues that the murder weapon was never found, and 
no physical evidence seized from the crime scene linked him to the murders.  
Admittedly, the murder weapon was never found, but the two victims were shot 
with six nyclad-coated .38 caliber bullets.  A box containing 44 nyclad-coated .38 
caliber bullets seized from Braden’s bedroom desk provided a direct link between 
Braden and the murder victims.  Six shells were missing from the box of 50 
bullets, and this matched the number of shots fired at the victims.  Additionally, 
Roberts’s telephone answering machine tape contained an urgent message from 
Braden to Roberts pleading with her to “call me now.”  Phone records showed 
that Braden called Roberts’s home phone shortly before the murders. 
{¶58} Finally, Braden contends that there was no evidence seized from 
his home or his person directly linking him to the murders.  There was, however, 
evidence linking him to the scene.  This evidence included the box of nyclad-
coated bullets and Braden’s red shirt, which matched the description of the shirt 
January Term, 2003 
15 
the murderer was wearing.  The police also recovered white particles that 
appeared to be kitty litter from the driver’s seat of Braden’s van.  Roberts’s body 
was found next to spilled kitty litter similar to the white particles found in 
Braden’s van. 
{¶59} Given the strength of both direct and circumstantial evidence, this 
case does not fall into the category of the “ ‘exceptional case in which the 
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ “  Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 
380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541.  We find that the jury neither lost its way nor created a 
manifest miscarriage of justice in convicting Braden of aggravated murder.  We 
reject proposition VI. 
{¶60} Prior calculation and design.  In proposition of law VII, Braden 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the prior calculation and 
design charged in Counts I and II. 
{¶61} There is no bright-line test to determine whether prior calculation 
and design are present.  Rather, each case must be decided on a case-by-case 
basis.  State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 18-20, 676 N.E.2d 82.  This court 
has held, “Where evidence adduced at trial reveals the presence of sufficient time 
and opportunity for the planning of an act of homicide to constitute prior 
calculation, and the circumstances surrounding the homicide show a scheme 
designed to implement the calculated decision to kill, a finding by the trier of fact 
of prior calculation and design is justified.”  State v. Cotton (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 
8, 10 O.O.3d 4, 381 N.E.2d 190, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶62} Braden contends that under Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d at 19, 676 
N.E.2d 82, citing State v. Jenkins (1976), 48 Ohio App.2d 99, 102, 2 O.O.3d 73, 
355 N.E.2d 825, three inquiries must be made before upholding findings that he 
killed Roberts and Heimlich with prior calculation and design: (1) whether the 
accused and victim knew each other, and, if so, whether their relationship was 
strained, (2)  whether the accused gave thought or preparation to choosing a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
murder weapon or murder site, and (3) whether the act was drawn out as opposed 
to being an almost instantaneous eruption of events.  A finding that these 
circumstances existed supports the conclusion that the crimes were committed 
with prior calculation and design.  Braden acknowledges that these circumstances 
were established but still contends that prior calculation and design were not 
proven. 
{¶63} First, Braden knew the victims well.  Further, Roberts was ending 
her relationship with Braden, Braden was upset about it, and they had two 
arguments a few hours prior to the murders.  Braden and Heimlich were hostile to 
each other.  Heimlich thought Braden was a “scumbag,” and Braden had “keyed” 
Heimlich’s car a couple of hours before the murders. 
{¶64} Second, the evidence shows Braden’s deliberation and planning.  
During Braden and Roberts’s parking-lot confrontation, Braden told the security 
guard, “I’m her boyfriend.  Do I look like a murderer?”  These comments made 
four hours before the murders eerily foretold Braden’s murderous plans.  
Following the final argument, Braden took his loaded pistol, drove to Heimlich’s 
residence, and parked his van a block or so from Heimlich’s home to avoid notice.  
He then walked a short distance, entered Heimlich’s residence, and shot the two 
victims.  Clearly, the sufficiency of time and Braden’s reflection and activity 
evidence that the crimes were committed with prior calculation and design.  See 
Jackson, 92 Ohio St.3d at 441, 751 N.E.2d 946. 
{¶65} Finally, these were not impulsive shootings.  Braden fired five 
shots at Heimlich and killed Roberts with a single shot to the back of her head.  
See, e.g., State v. Campbell (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 330, 738 N.E.2d 1178 
(firing shots into a victim’s head at close range showed prior calculation and 
design).  See, also, State v. Goodwin (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 343-345, 703 
N.E.2d 1251.  Thus, we find sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s 
determination of prior calculation and design, and we reject proposition VII. 
January Term, 2003 
17 
{¶66} Guilt-phase instructions.  In proposition of law II, Braden claims 
that the trial court erred by refusing Braden’s request for an instruction on 
voluntary manslaughter.  Braden argues that he was entitled to this instruction 
because Roberts’s desire to end their relationship, coupled with his fragile mental 
health, provoked the killings. 
{¶67} R.C. 2903.03(A), which defines “voluntary manslaughter,” 
provides, “No person, while under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden 
fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the 
victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using deadly force, 
shall knowingly cause the death of another * * *.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶68} Voluntary manslaughter is considered an inferior degree of 
aggravated murder, since “ ‘its elements are * * * contained within the indicted 
offense, except for one or more additional mitigating elements.’ “ State v. Benge 
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 136, 140, 661 N.E.2d 1019, quoting State v. Deem (1988), 
40 Ohio St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Before giving 
an instruction on voluntary manslaughter in a murder case, the trial court must 
determine “whether evidence of reasonably sufficient provocation occasioned by 
the victim has been presented to warrant such an instruction.”  State v. Shane 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 590 N.E.2d 272, paragraph one of the syllabus.  The 
initial inquiry requires an objective standard: “For provocation to be reasonably 
sufficient, it must be sufficient to arouse the passions of an ordinary person 
beyond the power of his or her control.”  Id. at 635, 590 N.E.2d 272. 
{¶69} Braden argues that Roberts provoked him when she ended their 
relationship.  However, Roberts’s breakup with Braden was not sufficient 
provocation to warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.  Rejecting a 
similar argument in Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d at 638, 590 N.E.2d 272, we held that 
the defendant was not sufficiently provoked to act under the influence of sudden 
passion or in a sudden fit of rage by his fiancee’s words informing him of her 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
sexual infidelity.  We concluded that the victim did very little to provoke Shane 
and that “words alone” will not constitute sufficient provocation to incite the use 
of deadly force in most situations.  Id., paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶70} In the instant case, the facts show that Roberts did nothing to 
provoke Braden.  Rather, Braden confronted Roberts in the parking lot, damaged 
Heimlich’s car, called Roberts at home, and then drove to the victims’ house and 
killed them.  Moreover, Braden’s act of killing his victims by shooting Heimlich 
five times and shooting Roberts in the back of the head demonstrate purposeful 
killing.  See State v. Carter (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 602, 734 N.E.2d 345 
(voluntary manslaughter instruction denied where the victim was stabbed 18 
times). 
{¶71} Braden argues that lesser provocation should be deemed sufficient 
to warrant a voluntary manslaughter instruction because he does not possess or 
use the rational thought processes of most people.  Braden contends that he has 
suffered numerous life-long mental health problems, the loss of countless jobs, 
the recent denial of welfare and educational benefits, and the stress of caring for 
an elderly mother.  Regardless, because the defense presented evidence about 
these problems only during the penalty phase of the trial, that evidence cannot be 
considered on this issue. 
{¶72} Even assuming that Braden subjectively could be easily provoked 
to act under the influence of a sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, there still 
must be serious provocation occasioned by the victim.  We reject this argument 
because nothing that Roberts did constituted “serious provocation.”  See Shane, 
63 Ohio St.3d at 630, 638, 590 N.E.2d 272 (psychologist’s testimony about 
defendant’s propensity to be provoked insufficient to warrant instruction on 
voluntary manslaughter). 
{¶73} Finally, Braden claims that Roberts provoked him after he 
damaged her car (i.e., made him angrier, upset that she might call the police, and 
January Term, 2003 
19 
worried she would not re-establish their relationship).  We reject such a 
speculative argument. 
{¶74} Alternatively, Braden claims that his counsel were ineffective by 
failing to introduce any evidence at the trial phase that could have bolstered a jury 
charge of voluntary manslaughter.  Specifically, Braden claims that Dr. Burch’s 
testimony about his mental health problems should have been presented to 
support his request for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.  However, that 
testimony was not sufficient evidence of provocation warranting an instruction on 
voluntary manslaughter.  We find that Braden’s counsel were not deficient.  See 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  
For the foregoing reasons, we overrule proposition II. 
{¶75} In proposition of law VIII, Braden contends that the trial court’s 
instructions improperly defined causation in terms of foreseeability in violation of 
State v. Burchfield (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 261, 263, 611 N.E.2d 819.  However, 
Braden failed to object to this instruction at trial and waived all but plain error.  
Crim.R. 30(A); Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, 
paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. 
{¶76} We have recognized that the use of foreseeability language in 
instructions in murder cases is legally perilous.  Burchfield, 66 Ohio St.3d at 263, 
611 N.E.2d 819; Goodwin, 84 Ohio St.3d at 346, 703 N.E.2d 1251.  However, 
“[t]he use of that [language] * * * does not require reversal where the instructions 
as a whole make clear that the jury must find purpose to kill in order to convict.”  
State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 100, 656 N.E.2d 643.  Here, the trial 
court’s instructions did make that clear.  No plain error occurred, and we reject 
proposition VIII. 
{¶77} In proposition of law XIV, Braden challenges the constitutionality 
of the instructions on reasonable doubt.  Because Braden failed to object to these 
instructions at trial, he waived all but plain error.  Crim.R. 30(A); Long, 53 Ohio 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.  
The trial court’s reasonable doubt instruction quoted the language in R.C. 
2901.05(D).  We have repeatedly affirmed the constitutionality of the statutory 
definition of reasonable doubt.  See State v. Jones (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 347, 
744 N.E.2d 1163; State v. Hessler (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 108, 115, 734 N.E.2d 
1237; State v. Van Gundy (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 230, 232, 594 N.E.2d 604.  Thus, 
we reject proposition XIV. 
Penalty-Phase Issues 
{¶78} Penalty- phase instructions.  In proposition of law IX, Braden 
claims that the trial court’s instructions called for a unanimous vote for a life 
sentence, thereby violating State v. Brooks (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 661 N.E.2d 
1030.  Braden objects to the following instruction:  “You shall sentence the 
defendant to death only if you unanimously find by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors.  If you 
do not so find, you shall consider either a sentence of life without parole 
eligibility, after serving twenty-five (25) full years of imprisonment, or a life 
sentence with parole eligibility after serving thirty (30) full years of 
imprisonment, or a sentence without parole eligibility.”  However, Braden did not 
object to these instructions at trial and waived all but plain error.  State v. 
Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph 
one of the syllabus, death sentence vacated on other grounds, Williams v. Ohio 
(1978), 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3137, 57 L.Ed.2d 1156. 
{¶79} In Brooks, the trial court charged the jury: “ ‘You are now required 
to determine unanimously that the death penalty is inappropriate before you can 
consider a life sentence.’ “  (Emphasis added.)  Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d at 159, 661 
N.E.2d 1030.  Brooks found error because the trial court’s instructions conflicted 
with R.C. 2929.03(D)(2).  Id at 160, 661 N.E.2d 1030. 
January Term, 2003 
21 
{¶80} Here, the trial court’s instructions and the defense counsel’s 
closing argument ensured that there was no Brooks error.  The defense counsel 
advised the jury during his summation, “[Y]ou are not required to determine 
unanimously that the death sentence is inappropriate before you consider the life 
sentences.  I will say that again.  That is an instruction you will receive by the 
court.  You are not required to determine unanimously that the death sentence is 
inappropriate before you consider the life sentences.”  The trial court’s voting 
instructions then advised the jury, “You are not required to determine 
unanimously that the death sentence is inappropriate before you can consider the 
life sentences.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶81} Contrary to Braden’s contentions, the jurors were not misled by 
instructions that a life sentence must be unanimous, since there were no such 
instructions.  Rather, the trial court’s instructions emphasized juror unanimity 
before returning a death verdict. 
{¶82} Finally, Braden argues that the trial court erred by failing to give a 
“lone-juror” instruction.  However, Braden did not request a lone-juror instruction 
at trial and thus waived all but plain error.  Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 
98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Here, the court’s instructions 
implicitly advised the jury that a single juror could prevent the death penalty.  We 
find that the trial court’s failure to give this instruction was not plain error, and we 
reject proposition IX. 
{¶83} Prosecutorial misconduct.  In proposition of law XI, Braden 
claims that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during penalty-
phase closing arguments.  The test for prejudice in closing arguments is “ 
‘whether the remarks were improper, and, if so, whether they prejudicially 
affected substantial rights of the defendant.’ “  State v. Hessler, 90 Ohio St.3d 
108, 125, 734 N.E.2d 1237, quoting State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 
14 OBR 317, 470 N.E.2d 883.  However, Braden failed to object at trial to the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
arguments he now complains of and thus waived all but plain error.  State v. Wade 
(1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 182, 7 O.O.3d 362, 373 N.E.2d 1244, paragraph one of the 
syllabus, death penalty vacated on other grounds, Wade v. Ohio (1978), 438 U.S. 
911, 98 S.Ct. 3138, 57 L.Ed.2d 1157. 
{¶84} First, Braden complains that the prosecutor misbehaved by 
comparing him to mass murderers and serial killers as follows:  “But then let’s 
draw this out a little more.  Let’s suppose he killed three people.  Would that be 
significant?  Would the mental problems be significant?  Four, five, six people, 
when does it stop being significant?  A whole stadium full of people, a whole 
school full of people, when does this stop being significant?  Or should we draw 
the line at any people and say, look, you know, if you have got a problem, we 
have got people who deal with your problem.” 
{¶85} The prosecutor’s mass-murder comparison was improper.  It did 
not properly rebut any mitigating evidence or previous defense arguments.  The 
case did not involve mass murders, and the comparison lacked relevance.  
However, the prosecutor’s improper argument made no difference in the outcome 
of the trial in view of the proven aggravating circumstance and the lack of 
significant mitigating evidence.  Cf. State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 
344, 360, 662 N.E.2d 311.  Although error, we find that the prosecutor’s brief 
remarks do not rise to the level of outcome-determinative plain error. 
{¶86} Second, Braden argues that the prosecutor emphasized the nature 
and circumstances of the offense as if they were aggravating circumstances.  
Braden complains, for example, that the prosecutor’s argument improperly 
emphasized that he committed this double homicide while the victims were in 
their home. 
{¶87} This court has held, “It is improper for prosecutors in the penalty 
phase of a capital trial to make any comment before a  jury that the nature and 
circumstances of the offense are ‘aggravating circumstances.’ “ Wogenstahl, 75 
January Term, 2003 
23 
Ohio St.3d 344, 662 N.E.2d 311, paragraph two of the syllabus.  However, the 
prosecutor never asserted that the location of the crime was an aggravating factor, 
and the trial court correctly instructed the jury as to the precise aggravating 
circumstance.  Furthermore, the court advised, “You may not consider the nature 
and circumstances of the crime as an aggravating circumstance.”  See State v. Hill 
(1996), 75 Ohio St. 3d 195, 202, 661 N.E.2d 1068.  The instruction was clear, and 
we can assume that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions.  Wogenstahl, 
75 Ohio St.3d at 360, 662 N.E.2d 311.  Thus, we reject this complaint. 
{¶88} Finally, Braden complains that the prosecutor improperly argued 
that Braden’s sanity should be treated as an aggravating circumstance by stating:  
“You’re weighing two things.  You’re weighing mitigating circumstances versus 
or mitigating factors versus aggravating circumstances.  Aggravating, if a person 
has got a problem and he’s not—you know, he’s not insane.” 
{¶89} Review of the state’s argument in its entirety shows that the 
prosecutor was not arguing that Braden’s sanity was an aggravating circumstance.  
Rather, the prosecutor was simply arguing that the psychologist’s testimony 
should be given little weight in mitigation.  Thus, the prosecutor’s remark was an 
isolated misstatement that did not convey the improper meaning that Braden 
suggests.  State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 436, 588 N.E.2d 819.  
Moreover, isolated comments by a prosecutor are not to be taken out of context 
and given their most damaging meaning.  Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974), 416 
U.S. 637, 646-647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431.  Again, the court’s instructions 
clearly described the aggravating circumstance that the jury was to consider 
during deliberations.  We find that the prosecutor’s comments did not result in 
plain error, and we reject this complaint. 
{¶90} In summary, we find no prosecutorial misconduct justifying 
reversal, and we overrule proposition XI. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
{¶91} 
In propositions V and X, Braden argues that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Reversal of a conviction for ineffective 
assistance of counsel “requires that the defendant show, first, that counsel’s 
performance was deficient and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.”  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Accord State v. 
Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶92} 
Improper argument on penalty-phase voting procedures.  
Braden complains that his counsel improperly argued that the jury must first 
decide whether to impose the death penalty before considering life-sentence 
options in violation of Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d at 148, 661 N.E.2d 1030.  Contrary 
to Braden’s contentions, the record does not reflect that counsel made such an 
argument.  After discussing life-sentencing options, counsel told the jury, “You 
are not required to determine unanimously that the death sentence is inappropriate 
before you consider the life sentences.”  This was a proper argument, and 
Braden’s counsel was not deficient. 
{¶93} 
Failure to object to trial-phase voting instructions.  Braden 
argues that his counsel were ineffective by failing to object to voting instructions 
requiring the jury to unanimously find him not guilty of aggravated murder before 
considering the lesser included offense of murder.  That claim lacks any merit.  
As to Count I, the trial court correctly instructed the jury, “If you find that the 
state failed to prove prior calculation and design beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant not guilty of aggravated murder and consider the lesser 
offense of murder.”  The same instruction was given to the jury on Count II.  See 
State v. Stallings (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 731 N.E.2d 159. 
{¶94} 
No improper “acquittal first” instructions were given.  The court 
never instructed the jury that it must unanimously find Braden not guilty of 
aggravated murder before considering the lesser included offense of murder.  See 
January Term, 2003 
25 
State v. Thomas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286, paragraph three of 
the syllabus.  We find that Braden’s counsel were not deficient by failing to object 
to these instructions. 
{¶95} 
Failure to object to penalty-phase instructions.  Braden also 
argues that his counsel were ineffective for failing to object to an instruction that 
advised the jury to collectively weigh aggravating circumstances against the 
mitigating factors.  Braden’s argument lacks merit.  The trial court charged the 
jury:  “You are to weigh the aggravating circumstances which you have already 
found against any mitigating factors which you may find to exist.  The penalty for 
each individual count may be assessed separately.  Only the aggravating 
circumstance related to a given count may be considered in assessing a penalty for 
that count.  The aggravated murders themselves are not aggravating 
circumstances.” 
{¶96} 
In a capital case, the jury is obligated to separately consider each 
count and separately weigh the aggravating circumstances or circumstance 
applicable to each count.  See State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 544 
N.E.2d 895, paragraph three of the syllabus.  Although the trial court’s 
instructions here initially referred to aggravating “circumstances,” the court later 
clarified that there is only “one aggravating circumstance with each count.”  
Moreover, the aggravating circumstance (i.e., multiple murder) was the same for 
each count.  See State v. Keith (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 532, 684 N.E.2d 47.  
Thus, it was clear that the same aggravating circumstance was simply repeated in 
both counts.  See State v. Goodwin, 84 Ohio St.3d at 348, 703 N.E.2d 1251. 
{¶97} 
Taken as a whole, these jury instructions were not misleading 
and correctly set forth the standard.  See State v. Jackson, 92 Ohio St.3d at 446-
447, 751 N.E.2d 946.  Thus, counsel were not deficient by failing to object to 
these instructions. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
{¶98} 
Reintroduction of trial-phase evidence.  Braden next argues that 
his counsel were ineffective by failing to object to the reintroduction of trial-phase 
evidence during the penalty phase.  In fact, the record shows that Braden’s 
counsel did object to the state’s motion to reintroduce such evidence during the 
penalty phase.  We summarily reject this complaint. 
{¶99} 
Failure to object to hearsay.  Braden also argues that his counsel 
were ineffective by failing to object to hearsay testimony.  First, Braden claims 
that counsel erred by not objecting to testimony that Roberts was afraid of him.  
On August 3, 1998, Hauser accompanied Roberts to her car because Braden was 
waiting for her in the parking lot.  When asked if Roberts was happy to see 
Braden, Hauser testified that Roberts was “terrified.”  During later testimony, 
Hauser repeated that Roberts was “afraid of him.” 
{¶100} Hauser’s testimony that Roberts was “terrified” or “afraid” was 
not hearsay, as the witness was stating her own impression of Roberts’s emotions 
at the time.  However, even if the witness had been relating Roberts’s words, the 
statements would have been admissible as statements of the declarant’s then-
existing state of mind under Evid.R. 803(3).  State v. Apanovitch (1987), 33 Ohio 
St.3d 19, 21-22, 514 N.E.2d 394.  Thus, counsel were not ineffective by failing to 
object to Hauser’s testimony. 
{¶101} Second, Braden claims that his counsel were ineffective by 
failing to object to Officer Tucker’s testimony that Roberts reported that Braden 
had “keyed” her car.  On August 3, between 8:00 p.m. and 9:30 p.m., Roberts 
reported at a police substation that Braden had damaged her car.  According to 
Officer Tucker, Roberts was “hysterical” and told him “that she had just gotten in 
an argument with her boyfriend and that he had keyed up her car.”  Contrary to 
Braden’s assertions, his trial counsel did object to Tucker’s testimony.  Thus, this 
complaint lacks merit. 
January Term, 2003 
27 
{¶102} As an alternative argument, Braden claims that the trial court 
erred by failing to sustain the defense objection to Roberts’s hearsay statement.  
However, Roberts’s statement was admissible as an excited utterance under 
Evid.R. 803(2). 
{¶103} To be admissible under Evid.R. 803(2), a statement must concern 
“ ‘some occurrence startling enough to produce a nervous excitement in the 
declarant,’ which occurrence the declarant had an opportunity to observe, and 
must be made ‘before there had been time for such nervous excitement to lose a 
domination over his reflective faculties.’ “  State v. Huertas (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 
22, 31, 553 N.E.2d 1058, quoting Potter v. Baker (1955), 162 Ohio St. 488, 55 
O.O. 389, 124 N.E.2d 140, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Here, Roberts observed 
Braden damaging her father’s car, and she was still in an agitated state over the 
incident when she spoke to Officer Tucker.  Thus, there was ample evidence to 
support the trial court’s finding that the statement was admissible as an excited 
utterance. 
{¶104} Finally, Braden argues that his counsel were ineffective by 
failing to object to parts of Officer Tucker’s testimony.  Tucker testified that after 
talking to Roberts about Braden’s “keying” her father’s car, Tucker drove towards 
Braden’s house to talk with him.  The testimony further recounted that Tucker had 
parked his cruiser a short distance from Braden’s home, and Craddock pulled his 
van behind the cruiser.  Craddock was “upset, saying that his next-door neighbor 
had pointed a firearm at him.”  In further talking to Tucker, Craddock “stated that 
he had trouble with his next-door neighbor in the past, and stated that every time 
he gets into it with his girlfriend, he basically goes crazy.” 
{¶105} Craddock’s statement that Braden pointed a firearm at him was 
admissible as an excited utterance under Evid.R. 803(2).  Here, Craddock was 
reporting a startling event that had just occurred, and he was visibly upset when 
reporting the incident to Tucker.  However, Craddock’s comments about his past 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
problems with Braden were not admissible under Evid.R. 803(2) because these 
comments appear to be the result of reflective thought.  See State v. Taylor (1993), 
66 Ohio St.3d 295, 303, 612 N.E.2d 316 (declarant’s reflection on an event and 
giving a narrative account was the result of reflective thought and not an excited 
utterance). 
{¶106} Even assuming that counsel erred, Braden does not show any 
reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s actions, the outcome of his case 
would have been different.  Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 143, 538 N.E.2d 373.  
Craddock testified as a prosecution witness that Braden had pointed a gun at him 
on the evening of August 3 and that he had seen Braden previously with a firearm 
“eight or nine times, ten times.” Other evidence of Braden’s erratic behavior 
during his arguments with Roberts negated any possibility that Craddock’s 
comments affected the outcome of this case.  Moreover, we find that compelling 
evidence of Braden’s guilt eliminated any possible influence of Craddock’s 
comments on the case’s outcome.  Therefore, we reject this claim of ineffective 
assistance. 
{¶107} Failure to conduct voir dire about the death penalty.  Braden 
also argues that his counsel were deficient by failing to fully question certain 
prospective jurors about their views on the death penalty or challenge them for 
cause. 
{¶108} This court has recognized that “ ‘[t]he conduct of voir dire by 
defense counsel does not have to take a particular form, nor do specific questions 
have to be asked.’ “  State v. Cornwell (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 568, 715 
N.E.2d 1144, quoting State v. Evans (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 247, 586 N.E.2d 
1042.  Moreover, “counsel is in the best position to determine whether any 
potential juror should be questioned and to what extent.”  Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 
at 539, 747 N.E.2d 765. 
January Term, 2003 
29 
{¶109} Braden complains that his counsel failed to probe deeper into 
Juror Joe Hess’s views after Hess had expressed support for the death penalty for 
religious reasons.  Hess indicated that his views favoring the death penalty 
originally came from his religious background.  However, Hess emphasized that 
he did not “have any particular religious belief from that standpoint.”  In answer 
to defense counsel’s followup questions, Hess stated that he would be fair and 
impartial, would fairly evaluate defense psychological testimony as a matter in 
mitigation, and could consider lesser forms of punishment.  Thus, counsel were 
not ineffective in questioning Hess. 
{¶110} Similarly, Braden contends that since Juror Donald Fogle 
expressed strong views in favor of the death penalty, his counsel were deficient by 
asking Fogle questions limited to a page and a half of the transcript.  The 
effectiveness of voir dire examination is not governed by its duration.  Here, Fogle 
told defense counsel that he would be fair and impartial, would consider all of the 
evidence before making a determination on the sentence, and would not 
automatically leap to voting for death.  Again, counsel’s voir dire was not 
ineffective. 
{¶111} Next, Braden complains that his counsel were deficient by asking 
no questions of Juror Terry Shiley despite Shiley’s alleged predisposition to return 
a death verdict.  Contrary to Braden’s assertions, the record shows that his defense 
counsel asked Shiley numerous questions about his death-penalty views.  Shiley 
told the defense counsel that he would consider mitigating factors in the case, that 
he would consider expert psychological testimony as possible mitigation, and that 
he would not automatically vote for the death penalty.  We also reject this 
complaint. 
{¶112} Prospective juror David Weisgerber was a Columbus police 
officer.  Braden argues that his counsel was deficient by failing to review the 
witness list with Weisgerber to determine whether he was acquainted with any of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
the police officers who were scheduled to testify.  We summarily overrule this 
complaint because the record shows that Weisgerber was questioned about the 
Columbus police officers on the witness list.  Braden further argues that the 
prospective juror should have been challenged for cause.  However, Weisgerber 
said that he could fairly consider all of the sentencing options.  His occupation 
does not disqualify him from jury duty.  Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d at 527, 747 
N.E.2d 765. 
{¶113} Failure to raise competency.  Braden argues that his counsel 
were deficient by failing to raise his competency to stand trial as an issue after the 
trial had begun.  According to Braden, his counsel should have requested a 
competency hearing because Dr. Burch testified that Braden believed that he 
would not be tried because God would deliver him and noted that he was 
becoming more distrustful and dismissive of his lawyers. 
{¶114} A 
defendant 
is 
legally 
incompetent 
if 
“incapable 
of 
understanding the nature and objective of the proceedings against the defendant or 
of assisting in the defendant’s defense.”  R.C. 2945.37(G).  Due process principles 
forbid subjecting a legally incompetent criminal defendant to trial.  State v. Berry 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433. 
{¶115} Braden’s defense counsel were alert to the possibility of Braden’s 
incompetence.  At the beginning of the trial, Braden’s counsel notified the trial 
court that “we felt there might be some mental deterioration * * * [and] requested 
Dr. Kate Burch, our psychologist * * * to inquire” into his competency.  
Consequently, Dr. Burch examined Braden on three different occasions (February 
12, March 12, and April 19, 1999) to ensure his competence and concluded after 
conducting each evaluation that Braden was competent. 
{¶116} Dr. Burch diagnosed Braden as suffering from paranoid 
schizophrenia, but this diagnosis is not synonymous with incompetence to stand 
trial.  “A defendant may be emotionally disturbed or even psychotic and still be 
January Term, 2003 
31 
capable of understanding the charges against him and of assisting his counsel.”  
State v. Bock (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 110, 28 OBR 207, 502 N.E.2d 1016. 
{¶117} Moreover, the record reflects no behavior by Braden during trial 
that would suggest the lack of legal competency.  During trial, Braden answered 
the trial court’s questions about visits from Dr. Burch, expressed satisfaction with 
his counsel, told the judge he understood his appellate rights, said he did not want 
a presentence investigation and informed the court that he did not wish to make a 
statement prior to sentencing.  See State v. Tibbetts (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 
164, 749 N.E.2d 226 (counsel’s failure to raise competency is not evidence of 
deficient performance when neither psychologist nor psychiatrist found that the 
defendant lacked competence, and nothing in the defendant’s behavior at trial 
suggested the lack of competence).  Thus, we find that the defense counsel were 
not deficient by failing to request a competency hearing after the trial had begun. 
{¶118} Failure to develop expert testimony during mitigation.  Braden 
claims that his counsel were deficient by failing to develop Dr. Burch’s testimony 
to show that his paranoid schizophrenia qualified as an R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) 
mitigating factor.  According to Braden, his counsel also erred by eliciting 
testimony that Braden was sane at the time of the offenses while failing to explain 
the difference between legal insanity and the R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) mitigating 
factor.  Braden argues that his counsel, by not developing this distinction, allowed 
the jury to conclude that Dr. Burch’s testimony was irrelevant as a (B)(3) 
mitigating factor. 
{¶119} The R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) mitigating factor applies where “at the 
time of committing the offense, the offender, because of a mental disease or 
defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of the offender’s 
conduct or to conform the offender’s conduct to the requirements of the law.” 
{¶120} Dr. Burch testified that Braden suffered from paranoid 
schizophrenia, was under great stress at the time of the offenses, and may have 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
violently reacted to the stress he was under by committing these offenses.  
Subsequently, Braden’s counsel argued that the R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) mitigating 
factor applied, and the trial court instructed the jurors that they could consider 
evidence of Braden’s mental illness a mitigating factor under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3).  
Thus, Braden’s counsel succeeded in obtaining an R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) instruction 
for the jury’s consideration. 
{¶121} However, Braden argues that his counsel were ineffective by 
failing to elicit testimony from Dr. Burch that he lacked the substantial capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct and thus failed to trigger the language of 
R.C. 2929.04(B)(3).  Because it is highly speculative whether Dr. Burch could 
have so testified, Braden’s counsel were not ineffective for failing to pursue this 
line of questioning.  Compare State v. Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 299, 
754 N.E.2d 1150 (counsel not ineffective by failing to introduce DNA evidence 
because the results of the DNA examination may not have been favorable for the 
defense). 
{¶122} Finally, we reject Braden’s argument that the jury was misled by 
Dr. Burch’s testimony about his sanity because Dr. Burch did not testify that 
Braden was sane at the time of the offenses. 
{¶123} Cumulative error.  Braden argues that even if his counsel’s 
errors, by themselves, did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
the cumulative effect of those errors necessitates reversal.  Nevertheless, we find 
that Braden received a fair trial and any error was nonprejudicial.  Moreover, 
“errors cannot become prejudicial by sheer weight of numbers.”  State v. Hill, 75 
Ohio St.3d at 212, 661 N.E.2d 1068.  Thus, we also reject this claim. 
{¶124} In summary, we find that none of the allegations of ineffective 
assistance, even if true, resulted in prejudicial error depriving Braden of a fair 
trial.  Accordingly, we overrule propositions V and X. 
Constitutional Issues 
January Term, 2003 
33 
{¶125} In propositions of law I and XII, Braden argues that Ohio’s death 
penalty statute violates the federal and Ohio Constitutions.  We reject these 
claims.  See State v. Carter, 89 Ohio St.3d at 607, 734 N.E.2d 345; State v. 
Clemons (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 438, 454, 696 N.E.2d 1009; State v. Jenkins 
(1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 168, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264. 
{¶126} In proposition of law IV, Braden challenges the constitutionality 
of 1994 amendments of the Ohio Constitution that provide for the direct appeal of 
capital cases from common pleas courts to the Supreme Court of Ohio.  However, 
his claim is without merit.  See State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 
N.E.2d 668, paragraph one of the syllabus; Clemons, 82 Ohio St.3d at 454, 696 
N.E.2d 1009. 
{¶127} In proposition of law XIII, Braden argues that Ohio’s death 
penalty violates international agreements to which the United States is a party.  
We find that this claim also lacks merit.  State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 
502, 709 N.E.2d 484; Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d at 103-104, 656 N.E.2d 643. 
Independent Sentence Evaluation 
{¶128} Aggravating circumstance.  The evidence established that 
Braden was properly convicted of the aggravated murders of both Roberts and 
Heimlich with prior calculation and design and of the “course of conduct” death 
penalty specification pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(5). 
{¶129} Mitigation evidence.  Braden called five mitigation witnesses 
and submitted documentary evidence for the jury’s consideration. 
{¶130} John Pancake, the defendant’s older brother, testified that Braden 
had a “pretty tough childhood.”  When Braden was three years old, their father 
left the family.  Before Braden was born, an older sister had been killed by a car.  
The father “kind of had a nervous breakdown over it and proceeded to drink and * 
* * left us, * * * he couldn’t deal with us.”  Their mother raised the family after 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
their father left.  She went to work and left Pancake and Braden with babysitters.  
Braden’s mother is still alive but suffers from dementia. 
{¶131} Braden did not graduate from high school but later earned a 
GED.  Braden joined the Navy and was discharged in September 1978.  Pancake 
noticed a difference in Braden’s behavior following his return to Columbus.  “He 
would get very agitated about things very easily.”  Braden often stated that people 
were out to get him, and he had difficulty holding a job because of problems in 
dealing with people at work. 
{¶132} Braden lived with his mother and was her sole caretaker at the 
time of the murders.  Eventually, Pancake became unwelcome at Braden’s home.  
Braden felt that his brother was “plotting against him.”  Because Pancake had 
received a power of attorney from his mother, Braden thought that Pancake was 
taking money from her.  Subsequently, Braden got a power of attorney from his 
mother and opened new accounts. 
{¶133} Pancake and Braden had “some really good conversations” after 
he started receiving “good medication” in jail.  However, Braden’s medication 
was altered, and he “seemed to change again.”  Braden is also very religious and 
thinks he is “a prophet of God.” 
{¶134} Kimberly Pancake, the defendant’s sister-in-law and John 
Pancake’s wife, described Braden as a “very paranoid person.”  For example, 
Braden would call the Pancakes and accuse them of being “out to get him, trying 
to set him up.” 
{¶135} Karen Bader, a counselor with the Bureau of Vocational 
Rehabilitation, met with Braden during December 1997 to help him find gainful 
employment.  Braden disclosed that he had a brain injury when he was in the 
Navy and had been diagnosed with personality disorders and other depressive-
type disorders.  Braden had had 49 jobs over the last 20 years, and was then 
unemployed. 
January Term, 2003 
35 
{¶136} Bader met Braden and Roberts in March 1998 to discuss 
Braden’s employment and job-training options.  Braden said it was very stressful 
taking care of his mother and that “at times she was verbally abusive to him.”  
Braden was interested in a training program to be a network administrator for 
computers, and he visited a computer school.  An instructor in the program felt 
that he would be successful and was impressed that Braden had taught himself 
computer skills at home. 
{¶137} In May or June 1998, Braden was referred for counseling.  
Braden mentioned that “he had angry outbursts, difficulty controlling his temper, 
difficulty getting along with people.”  Braden’s behavior fluctuated.  According to 
Bader, Braden had “difficulty concentrating, difficulty keeping jobs, difficulty 
with people, and had felt like he had been in social isolation for so long, and he 
knew that things were bad.” 
{¶138} Before June 24, 1998, Braden was approved to take a program at 
a computer training center and was “very anxious to get to work.”  In July 1998, 
Braden’s application for Social Security benefits was denied, adding to his 
problems because he needed income while training. 
{¶139} Judith English, a case manager for a state program that provides 
home-care services for the low-income elderly, met with Braden, his mother, and 
Roberts at Braden’s home on April 17, 1998.  The home was “generally 
unkempt.”  Braden wanted to move out of the home, wanted his mother taken care 
of, and said that “he and Denise would be moving to their own place.”  On April 
27, 1998, a determination was made that Braden’s mother would require 24-hour 
supervision and should not be alone.  Two days later, Braden told English that 
Roberts had moved into his home. 
{¶140} On May 22, 1998, Braden told English that he was considering 
placing his mother in a nursing home.  Braden said that “he was beginning school, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
and that Denise was looking for employment, and they didn’t feel they could 
properly provide the 24-hour supervision.” 
{¶141} On July 21, 1998, English conducted her second in-home visit at 
Braden’s residence.  The home’s appearance was “much improved.”  Braden 
stated that Roberts was living in the home with him two to three days a week.  
Because Braden was going to attend computer training school, he planned to drop 
his mother off in the morning at an adult daycare program and then pick her up at 
the end of the day. 
{¶142} Dr. Kathleen Burch, a clinical psychologist, interviewed Braden, 
administered psychological testing, and reviewed Braden’s records.  Braden’s 
father was an alcoholic and abandoned the family when Braden was three.  
Thereafter, Braden’s mother struggled to take care of the family. 
{¶143} Braden had a “very difficult experience in school” that Dr. Burch 
“attributed largely to racial tensions, living in a poor neighborhood, going to 
school that was primarily black, and being one of the few white students in the 
school.”  Braden “left home at a fairly early age and went to Texas and worked 
for a carnival type of operation.” 
{¶144} Braden returned to Ohio and joined the Navy.  Braden had a head 
injury in the Navy and claimed that this injury caused him a lot of difficulty in 
coping. Braden was discharged from the Navy before completing his term of 
enlistment and received a general discharge under honorable conditions.  Braden 
was married when he was 23, but this marriage ended in divorce. 
{¶145} Results of neuropsychological testing were equivocal, and there 
was inconsistent evidence of a brain injury.  Burch concluded that Braden did not 
have any “neuro-psychological or cognitive impairments that would substantially 
impair his day-to-day functioning.” 
{¶146} Braden’s Rorschach inkblot test and clinical interview suggested 
that Braden had a “paranoid personality disorder and major depression.”  Further 
January Term, 2003 
37 
psychological testing, including projective drawings and a thematic apperception 
test, made it clear that Braden was “beginning to express some paranoid 
delusions.”  Braden’s delusions included his belief that he was a “prophet of 
God,” and that “there were certain natural phenomenas [sic] such as weather-
related phenomena, storms and so forth that were caused by God as a sign that 
God was going to help him in his case.”  Consequently, Burch conducted 
competency examinations but concluded that Braden was competent. 
{¶147} In talking with Braden’s family, Burch learned that Braden had 
had problems for many years.  She also learned that Braden’s father was “much 
more abusive than Mr. Braden had admitted * * *.”  According to Braden’s sister-
in-law, Braden’s mother “told her that one day she came home and the father had 
done something so horrible to the boys that she filed for divorce the next day.”  
Braden was also very suspicious of his neighbors and thought they were “trying to 
poison him, that they [were] spying on him, that they were harassing him and 
causing him trouble.” 
{¶148} Braden consistently said that he did not “really remember” the 
offenses.  Braden “maintained that he remembered talking with [Roberts] that day 
and then going home and falling asleep, and the next thing he knew * * * he was 
on the TV.” 
{¶149} Burch examined numerous documents in evaluating Braden.  In 
October 1995, the Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”) had determined that 
Braden’s psychiatric illness was not service-connected.  However, the VA 
medical examination found “current evidence of recurrent major depression with 
psychotic features and dysthymia.”  Braden’s Navy medical records showed that 
in 1978, he had suffered a head laceration that was treated with antiseptic and two 
sutures, but he suffered no loss of consciousness or dizziness as a result.  
According to Burch, the medical records contradicted Braden’s claim that he 
suffered a much more significant injury. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
{¶150} Braden was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.  
Burch also testified that when “a person like that is under great stress, there is a 
potential for violence.”  Roberts’s decision to end their relationship and the denial 
of benefits were very stressful events for Braden and may have played a role in 
these crimes. 
{¶151} Braden feels that he does not have a mental illness and believes 
that his problems are the result of his Navy injury.  However, according to Burch, 
Braden did not suffer an organic brain injury from the Navy accident, and his 
problems keeping a job and sustaining a relationship have nothing to do with this 
injury. 
{¶152} During cross-examination, Burch mentioned that Braden “felt 
terrible that Denise was dead.”  Braden had told Burch that “Denise was a very 
good person, that he couldn’t believe that this had happened, and was very 
sorrowful that she was gone.”  Burch did not conduct a sanity evaluation because 
“[Braden] hasn’t talked about the offense, and there is no way for [her] to really 
tell that.”  However, Braden has “average intelligence.” 
Sentence Evaluation 
{¶153} We find nothing in the nature and circumstances of these 
offenses to be mitigating.  As the trial court stated, Braden’s murders of Roberts 
and Heimlich were the “calculated and selfish acts of a jilted lover.”  On August 
3, 1998, Braden confronted his girlfriend in the parking lot at her job, continued 
to argue with her at his home, and damaged her father’s car.  Later that evening, 
Braden took a pistol that he kept in his bedroom, drove his van over to Roberts’s 
home, and parked around the corner from Roberts’s home where he would not be 
easily seen.  Braden then entered Roberts’s home, shot Heimlich five times, and 
shot Roberts once in the back of the head.  The facts establish two senseless, 
horrific murders that lack any mitigating features. 
January Term, 2003 
39 
{¶154} Braden’s history, background, and character provide only modest 
mitigating value.  Braden’s father drank heavily after Braden’s five-year-old sister 
was killed in an accident, and he eventually abandoned the family.  Braden was 
raised by his mother, and she struggled to take care of her children.  Braden 
dropped out of school, joined the Navy, suffered a head injury, and was 
discharged after two years of service.  After returning from the military, Braden 
was unable to maintain steady employment. 
{¶155} Braden blamed his head injury from the Navy accident as the 
source of his problems in maintaining steady employment and sustaining 
relationships.  However, Dr. Burch testified that Braden’s head injury did not 
cause organic brain damage and was not related to his problems in keeping a job 
and getting along with people. 
{¶156} The statutory mitigating factors are generally inapplicable, 
including R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement); (B)(2) (duress, coercion, or 
strong provocation); (B)(4) (youth of the offender—Braden was 38 at the time of 
the offense); or (B)(6) (accomplice only). 
{¶157} The R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) mitigating factor, lack of a significant 
criminal record, is entitled to some weight because Braden has no “significant 
history of prior criminal convictions and delinquency adjudications.” 
{¶158} Braden’s mental illness does not qualify as an R.C. 
2929.04(B)(3) mitigating factor because there was no evidence that Braden’s 
condition caused him to lack the “substantial capacity to appreciate the 
criminality” of his conduct.  See State v. Williams (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 153, 174, 
652 N.E.2d 721 (paranoid schizophrenia not an R.C. 2929.04[B][3] factor absent 
testimony that the defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 148, 538 N.E.2d 
373 (chronic paranoid schizophrenia not an R.C. 2929.04[B][3] factor where no 
data supported a connection between the mental illness and the crimes). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
{¶159} However, Braden’s paranoid schizophrenia undoubtedly played a 
role in his crimes.  Thus, we give some weight to Braden’s lifelong mental illness 
as a mitigating “other factor” under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  See State v. Seiber 
(1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 4, 9, 564 N.E.2d 408 (lifelong mental illness involving 
psychotic lapses and paranoid ideation was a mitigating “other factor”). 
{¶160} Braden’s military service and his care of his mother for several 
years prior to these murders are additional R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) mitigating factors 
entitled to some weight.  See State v. Lawrence (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 24, 33, 541 
N.E.2d 451. 
{¶161} However, we find that the aggravating circumstance in each 
count outweighs the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  Undoubtedly, 
Braden’s mental illness and the absence of a criminal record are entitled to 
significant weight in mitigation.  When compared with the “course of conduct” 
aggravating circumstance, though, Braden’s mitigating evidence pales in 
significance.  Therefore, we find that the death sentence in this case is 
appropriate. 
{¶162} Finally, we find that the death penalty imposed for the 
aggravated murders of Roberts and Heimlich is appropriate and proportionate 
when compared with other “course of conduct” murders.  See Tibbetts, 92 Ohio 
St.3d at 174, 749 N.E.2d 226; State v. Hessler, 90 Ohio St.3d at 131, 734 N.E.2d 
1237; Cornwell, 86 Ohio St.3d at 574, 715 N.E.2d 1144; Clemons, 82 Ohio St.3d 
at 456, 696 N.E.2d 1009; State v. Awkal (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 324, 339-340, 667 
N.E.2d 960; and State v. Combs (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 278, 294, 581 N.E.2d 
1071. 
{¶163} Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence 
of death. 
Judgment affirmed. 
January Term, 2003 
41 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, DONOFRIO and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
 
GENE DONOFRIO, J., of the Seventh Appellate District, sitting for COOK, J. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶164} I continue to believe that “allowing the alternate jurors to be 
present during jury deliberations violate[s] the sanctity of the jury process.”  State 
v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 564, 747 N.E.2d 765 (Pfeifer, J., 
dissenting), citing United States v. Virginia Erection Corp. (C.A.4, 1964), 335 
F.2d 868, 872; see, also, Koch v. Rist (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 250, 252, 730 N.E.2d 
963, and State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 
144 (Pfeifer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
{¶165} As the majority states, the presence of alternate jurors during 
deliberations also violates Crim.R. 24(F).  Unlike the majority, I do not believe 
we are constrained by the plain-error standard set forth in United States v. Olano 
(1993), 507 U.S. 725, 741, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508.  Olano was decided 
based on the United States Supreme Court’s analysis of the federal analogue to 
Crim.R. 24(F).  We are free to analyze Crim.R. 24(F) independently. 
{¶166} Like the civil trial in Koch, this case “involves extraordinary 
misconduct where a stranger to the jury entered the jury room and remained there 
throughout the entire deliberative process.”  Koch, 89 Ohio St.3d at 251, 730 
N.E.2d 963.  The four factors we identified in Koch (the presence of a stranger to 
the jury, the duration of the presence, the possibility of nonverbal communication, 
and the difficulty of determining whether the jury was prejudiced) are present in 
this case, but the stakes are higher, since this case involves a sentence of death.  
Id. at 252, 730 N.E.2d 963.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
{¶167} I am unwilling to consider “errors that call into question the 
integrity of the jury’s deliberations” harmless or subject them to plain-error 
analysis.  See Olano, 507 U.S. at 743, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting).  The jury in a death-penalty case must be free from any perception 
that its fairness and integrity have been compromised.  Here it is clear that 
nonjurors were allowed into the jury deliberations during both the guilt phase and 
the penalty phase.  Their presence violated the sanctity of the jury’s deliberations 
and therefore tainted the entire trial. 
{¶168} Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.  I 
dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, Joyce Anderson and 
Scott M. Forchand, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
W. Joseph Edwards and Brian J. Rigg, for appellant. 
__________________