Case Title: Monroe v. Chase

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019AP001918

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 WI 66 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1918 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Cheyne Monroe, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Chad Chase, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 22, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 3, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Valerie Bailey-Rihn   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Richard J. Auerbach and Auerbach & Porter, S.C., Middleton. There 
was an oral argument by Richard J. Auerbach. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Christopher J. Dodge and Fuhrman & Dodge, S.C., Middleton. There 
was an oral argument by Jeanne M. Armstrong. 
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 66 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP1918 
(L.C. No. 
2019CV790) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Cheyne Monroe, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Chad Chase, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
JUN 22, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, 
Valerie Bailey-Rihn, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   This case is about the tort of 
malicious prosecution.  Our focus is on the third element of a 
malicious-prosecution action, the "favorable termination" element, 
wherein a malicious-prosecution plaintiff must prove that the 
prior proceeding was terminated in his or her favor.  Our task is 
to decide whether Cheyne Monroe's complaint can survive a motion 
to dismiss when her complaint relies upon Chad Chase's withdrawal 
No. 
2019AP1918   
 
2 
 
of the prior proceeding to satisfy the favorable-termination 
element.1   
¶2 
The circuit court dismissed Monroe's complaint for 
failure to state a claim, concluding that the complaint failed to 
establish that the prior proceeding was terminated in her favor.2  
Relying on Pronger v. O'Dell, 127 Wis. 2d 292, 379 N.W.2d 330 (Ct. 
App. 1985), the circuit court ruled that when a party brings a 
lawsuit and then withdraws it——prior to an adjudication of the 
merits——that 
withdrawal 
can 
never 
satisfy 
the 
favorable-
termination element of a malicious-prosecution action.  The court 
of appeals certified the appeal to this court, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.61, and posed the question as "whether the 
malicious prosecution defendant's [withdrawal] of a prior 
proceeding can ever satisfy the third element of a malicious 
                                                 
1 The term "favorable termination" describes the favorable 
conclusion of a case, regardless of which party initiated that 
termination or in what manner.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 674 cmt. j (1977) describes four types of "termination":  
(1) favorable adjudication; (2) withdrawal; (3) dismissal of 
proceedings because of failure to prosecute; and (4) abandonment.  
The facts in this case present us with the second type of 
termination, a withdrawal.  Therefore, we will refer to Chase's 
unilateral, voluntary dismissal of the prior proceeding against 
Monroe as a withdrawal.  However, we will use the word "dismissal" 
when discussing criminal cases, because that term is consistent 
both with our cases and the Wisconsin statutes.  See, e.g., Wis. 
Stat. §§ 971.31(6)-(8), 971.315 (2019-20).  All subsequent 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version 
unless otherwise indicated. 
2 The Honorable Valerie Bailey-Rihn of the Dane County Circuit 
Court presided. 
No. 
2019AP1918   
 
3 
 
prosecution claim——that the prior proceeding terminated in the 
malicious prosecution plaintiff's favor."   
¶3 
We reverse the order of the circuit court because a 
withdrawal of a prior proceeding may satisfy the favorable-
termination element of a malicious-prosecution action.  We also 
adopt the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674 cmt. 
j (1977), which is consistent with our cases and focuses on the 
circumstances of the termination to determine whether it was 
favorable.  We remand this case to the circuit court to apply the 
analysis set forth in this opinion.  
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
This case is the third of three lawsuits in which Monroe 
and Chase are opposing parties.  The first lawsuit was their 
divorce, which occurred in Minnesota in 2013.  As a result of that 
divorce, the court issued a custody and placement order granting 
primary placement of the parties' minor child to Chase and periods 
of non-primary placement to Monroe.  In 2016, after Monroe filed 
a motion to establish a regular placement schedule for herself 
with the child, the court accepted a stipulation which set forth 
an interim placement schedule and transferred jurisdiction of the 
case to the Dane County Circuit Court.   
¶5 
Chase then filed the second lawsuit——a termination of 
parental rights (TPR) action against Monroe——in the Dane County 
Circuit Court, alleging abandonment.  In the second lawsuit, 
Chase's allegation of abandonment was based on claims that Monroe 
failed to have contact with their child in person or by telephone 
calls or letters for approximately three years.  While the second 
No. 
2019AP1918   
 
4 
 
lawsuit was pending, the court in the first lawsuit stayed the 
proceedings for approximately nine months.  During that nine-month 
stay, as Monroe's complaint in the instant action alleges, she 
incurred legal fees, suffered emotional distress, and most 
significantly, was unable to visit with her child.  On March 28, 
2017, Chase withdrew the second lawsuit.  
¶6 
In March 2019, Monroe filed the third lawsuit——the 
instant malicious-prosecution action——against Chase, alleging that 
Chase initiated the second lawsuit with malice and on false 
grounds.  According to Monroe's complaint, Chase made the 
abandonment allegation in the second lawsuit knowing it to be 
false, because Chase was aware that Monroe had cared for their 
child at home for roughly 17 months after the child's birth and 
that Monroe and Chase had exercised equal placement for a period 
of time after their separation.  Monroe's complaint further stated 
that Chase's abandonment allegation contradicted both his sworn 
affidavit and the existing stipulation of shared placement in the 
first lawsuit.  Despite Monroe's requests and the guardian ad 
litem's recommendation that Chase dismiss the second lawsuit, he 
refused to do so until right before a court-scheduled hearing.3  
¶7 
In the instant case——the third lawsuit——Chase filed a 
motion to dismiss, arguing that Monroe's complaint failed to 
satisfy two of the six elements of malicious prosecution:  (1) the 
                                                 
3 The amount of time between Chase's withdrawal of his 
complaint in the second lawsuit and the court-scheduled hearing is 
absent from the record.  Monroe's complaint in the instant case 
alleges that the withdrawal took place "on the cusp of" that 
hearing——that is to say, at the 11th hour.  
No. 
2019AP1918   
 
5 
 
termination of the prior proceeding in favor of the malicious-
prosecution plaintiff; and (2) injury or damage resulting to that 
plaintiff from the prior proceeding.  After a hearing, the circuit 
court granted Chase's motion, reasoning that a withdrawal that 
prevents a court from "adjudicat[ing] the merits" could not 
constitute a favorable termination of the preceding case.4  
Pronger, 127 Wis. 2d 292, 296 n.2.   
¶8 
Monroe appealed the circuit court's order.  The court of 
appeals certified the appeal to this court, and we accepted 
certification.  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the 
complaint.  Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, 
¶26, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35.  For purposes of this court's 
review, we treat all allegations in the complaint as true.  Id.  
We then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint could 
state a viable cause of action, a legal question we review de novo.  
Id.  
III. ANALYSIS 
¶10 The narrow question presented to us is whether a 
withdrawal can satisfy the favorable-termination element of a 
malicious-prosecution action.  We begin our analysis with a brief 
overview of the tort of malicious prosecution and survey the 
                                                 
4 After ruling that Monroe's pleadings were insufficient with 
respect to the favorable-termination element, the circuit court 
stated that, had that element been met, the court would have denied 
Chase's motion to dismiss with respect to the damages element. 
No. 
2019AP1918   
 
6 
 
relevant Wisconsin cases that address the disputed element.  We 
then adopt the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674 
cmt. j, which is consistent with our cases.  Last, we remand the 
case to the circuit court to apply the analysis set forth in this 
opinion. 
A. The Tort of Malicious Prosecution 
¶11 A malicious-prosecution plaintiff must prove each of the 
following six elements: 
1. There 
must 
have 
been 
a 
prior 
institution 
or 
continuation of judicial proceedings against the 
plaintiff; 
2. Such former proceedings must have been by, or at the 
instance of the defendant; 
3. The former proceedings must have terminated in favor 
of the plaintiff; 
4. There must have been malice in instituting the former 
proceedings; 
5. There must have been want of probable cause for the 
institution of the former proceedings; and 
6. There must have been injury or damage resulting to 
the plaintiff from the former proceedings.  
Elmer v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 257 Wis. 228, 231, 43 N.W.2d 244 
(1950).  It is only the third——the favorable-termination element—
—that is at issue here.  We are to determine whether the withdrawal 
of the prior proceeding can satisfy that element.  To do so, we 
must first analyze and then clarify Wisconsin law regarding 
favorable terminations.  
¶12 We 
begin 
our 
analysis 
by 
examining 
Wisconsin's 
foundational favorable-termination case, Lechner v. Ebenreiter, 
No. 
2019AP1918   
 
7 
 
235 Wis. 244, 292 N.W. 913 (1940).  In that case, the district 
attorney moved to dismiss larceny charges against Lechner, who 
agreed to turn over the disputed property to a third party.  Id. 
at 253.  Later, when Lechner sued the district attorney for 
malicious prosecution, the circuit court determined that a 
dismissal in a criminal case could serve as a favorable termination 
in a malicious-prosecution action, except when the original 
proceeding had been terminated:  (1) "without regard to its 
merits . . . by agreement or settlement of the parties"; or 
(2) "solely by the procurement of the accused as a matter of favor, 
or as a result of some act, trick, or device preventing action and 
consideration by the court."5  Id. at 252 (quoted source omitted).  
The basis for this rule is that a termination resulting from a 
settlement or agreement between parties signifies that the 
malicious-prosecution plaintiff made an "admission that there was 
probable cause" to initiate the action that he or she cannot later 
retract.  Id.   
                                                 
5 In addition to contesting whether a withdrawal can be a 
favorable termination, Chase also contends that his withdrawal 
constitutes an "act . . . preventing action and consideration by 
the 
court." 
 
Lechner 
v. 
Ebenreiter, 
235 Wis. 244, 
252, 
292 N.W. 913 (1940).  This argument ignores the fact that, like 
the exception for terminations obtained "as a matter of favor," 
the exception for terminations "as a result of some act, trick, or 
device" is likewise applicable where such terminations are 
obtained "solely by the procurement of the accused."  Id.  This 
exception would be applicable in the instant case if Monroe had 
obtained the withdrawal through an "act, trick, or device," but it 
is unavailable here, where the withdrawal was obtained by Chase, 
the complainant in the prior proceeding.  
No. 
2019AP1918   
 
8 
 
¶13 In Lechner, we concluded that Lechner's agreement to 
turn over the disputed property did not bar his malicious-
prosecution action because the agreement was solely an admission 
that he had no right to possess the property, rather than an 
admission to the crime of larceny.  Id. at 254-55.  Said 
differently, even though Lechner turned over the property, he never 
conceded that the prosecutor had probable cause to charge him in 
the first place.  As a result, he was not barred from filing a 
malicious-prosecution action against the district attorney.   
¶14 We were presented with a similar issue in Bristol v. 
Eckhardt, 254 Wis. 297, 299, 36 N.W.2d 56 (1949), in which Bristol, 
who had defaulted on a tractor loan, moved that tractor to the 
state of Oregon in order to avoid its repossession.  The district 
attorney dismissed the complaint at the request of Bristol's 
attorney, so that upon Bristol's release from custody he might 
refinance the tractor and settle with the bank.  Id. at 300.  
Consistent with Lechner, we held that the termination of the 
proceedings against Bristol was not favorable to him for two 
reasons.  First, the dismissal was obtained "at [Bristol's] 
procurement."  Id. at 301.  Second, the circumstances demonstrated 
that the district attorney's dismissal was based not on a lack of 
probable cause for initiating the proceedings, but on his desire 
to avoid the expense of extraditing Bristol from Oregon to 
Wisconsin.  Id. at 301-02.  The district attorney still believed 
the criminal charge against Bristol to be "sustainable."  Id.   
¶15 The following year, we decided Elmer which, like Lechner 
and Bristol, was a criminal case.  In Elmer, 257 Wis. at 233-34, 
No. 
2019AP1918   
 
9 
 
the district attorney filed a complaint against Elmer for stealing 
railroad rails and later dismissed the charges due to insufficient 
evidence.  Elmer then sued the district attorney for malicious 
prosecution.  Id. at 231-32.  In Elmer, we reiterated the Lechner 
rule:  "The discharge by an examining magistrate, or a [dismissal] 
by the district attorney except under circumstances . . . relating 
to compromises[], is a sufficient termination of the action to 
support an action for malicious prosecution."  Id. at 234 (quoted 
source omitted).  We remanded the case for a fact-finder to assess 
the circumstances of the dismissal to determine whether the 
district attorney's dismissal was a favorable termination.  Id.   
¶16 Later, in Thompson v. Beecham, 72 Wis. 2d 356, 241 N.W.2d 
163 (1976), we were presented with another malicious-prosecution 
action that ended in a compromise and settlement.  Applying 
Lechner, we reiterated that "[a] voluntary compromise . . . is not 
a favorable termination" because "[e]ach party gave up a claim, 
and each party received a benefit."  Id. at 360-61.  
¶17 The court of appeals subsequently applied the Lechner 
rule in Tower Special Facilities, Inc. v. Investment Club, Inc., 
104 Wis. 2d 221, 228, 311 N.W.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1981), in which the 
parties terminated the prior proceeding by entering into a 
stipulation for dismissal with prejudice and without costs.  
Because the case was dismissed pursuant to the stipulation, the 
court of appeals held that the proceeding was not terminated in 
favor of the malicious-prosecution plaintiff.  Id.  Reiterating 
our holding in Lechner, the court of appeals concluded that the 
stipulated dismissal could not satisfy the favorable-termination 
No. 
2019AP1918   
 
10 
 
element because the stipulation constituted "an admission that 
there was probable cause that the plaintiff [could not] afterwards 
retract . . . and try the question, which by settling he waived."  
Id. (quoted source omitted). 
¶18 After Tower Special Facilities, the court of appeals 
analyzed the favorable-termination element in another case 
involving a withdrawal, Pronger, 127 Wis. 2d 292.  In that case, 
Pronger filed a sexual-harassment suit in state court, and the 
defendant, O'Dell, counterclaimed for malicious prosecution.  Id. 
at 294.  Pronger then withdrew her complaint in order to proceed 
with an identical action in federal court.  Id.  The court of 
appeals held that O'Dell prematurely filed the malicious-
prosecution action since he instituted it as a counterclaim, before 
the sexual-harassment action had terminated in any way——favorable 
or unfavorable.  Id. at 296.  In reaching its decision, the court 
of appeals did not analyze the circumstances surrounding Pronger's 
withdrawal.  In a footnote, the court stated, "[i]n addition, we 
note that a [withdrawal] that does not adjudicate the merits of 
the claim does not constitute a favorable judicial termination of 
an action sufficient to support a claim for malicious prosecution."  
Id. at 296 n.2.   
¶19 In the present case, the circuit court relied on the 
Pronger footnote, deciding that Pronger mandated the dismissal of 
Monroe's complaint.  The circuit court read Pronger as barring any 
malicious-prosecution 
action 
where 
the 
underlying 
action 
terminated in a withdrawal that did not "adjudicate the merits of 
the claim."  Id.  The circuit court reached this conclusion despite 
No. 
2019AP1918   
 
11 
 
our consistent line of cases permitting, with only a few 
explicitly-delineated exceptions, a malicious-prosecution action 
based on the withdrawal of the prior proceeding.  Read in context, 
the Pronger footnote does not mandate a result that is inconsistent 
with our cases.  The Pronger court's holding was narrow and only 
addressed situations in which the previous case was still pending—
—not terminated.   
B. Adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Torts Approach 
¶20 Having surveyed the relevant cases, we next look to the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674 cmt. j, which is consistent 
with our cases, and which we now adopt.  Several courts in other 
jurisdictions have also adopted the Restatement's approach.6   
¶21 The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674 cmt. j, provides 
as follows: 
Termination in favor of the person against whom civil 
proceedings are brought.  Civil proceedings may be 
terminated in favor of the person against whom they are 
brought . . . by (1) the favorable adjudication of the 
claim by a competent tribunal, or (2) the withdrawal of 
the proceedings by the person bringing them, or (3) the 
dismissal of the proceedings because of his [or her] 
failure to prosecute them. . . . Whether a withdrawal or 
abandonment constitutes a final termination of the case 
in favor of the person against whom the proceedings are 
brought, and whether the withdrawal is evidence of a 
lack of probable cause for their initiation, depends 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 660 P.2d 1361, 1363-65 (Kan. 
1983); Frey v. Stoneman, 722 P.2d 274, 279 n.7 (Ariz. 1986); 
Barrett Mobile Home Transp., Inc. v. McGugin, 530 So.2d 730, 735-
36 (Ala. 1988); Christian v. Lapidus, 833 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Tenn. 
1992); Cult Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology, Intern., 
685 N.E.2d 1347, 1355 (Ill. 1997).  
No. 
2019AP1918   
 
12 
 
upon the circumstances under which the proceedings are 
withdrawn.[7]   
¶22 According to both our cases and the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 674 cmt. j, whether a withdrawal constitutes a favorable 
termination depends upon the circumstances of the withdrawal.  In 
this case, it is undisputed that Chase's withdrawal was a final 
termination of the second lawsuit.  Whether it was favorable to 
Monroe, however, depends upon the circumstances of the withdrawal.   
¶23 Having adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674 
cmt. j, we next address Chase's arguments disfavoring the 
Restatement's approach.  Chase urges us to join the minority of 
jurisdictions, reject the Restatement's approach, and adopt a 
blanket rule that a withdrawal can never serve as a favorable 
termination underlying a malicious-prosecution action.  He 
maintains that a contrary holding would hinder free access to the 
courts and have a "chilling effect" on plaintiffs who wish to 
withdraw their actions when appropriate.  He raises the specter of 
plaintiffs pushing on with litigation despite a lack of resources 
or change of heart, for fear of being subject to a malicious-
prosecution action if they withdraw.  We are unpersuaded by these 
arguments.   
¶24 We 
do 
not 
agree 
with 
Chase 
that 
adopting 
the 
Restatement's approach lowers the bar for malicious-prosecution 
                                                 
7 A separate subsection of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
§ 672(1), enumerates a different set of elements to be proven by 
a malicious-prosecution plaintiff when the underlying action is 
criminal in nature.  Because the prior proceeding before us is a 
civil action, and neither party has argued that we adopt § 672(1), 
we do not address that section here. 
No. 
2019AP1918   
 
13 
 
actions.  The Restatement's approach balances free access to the 
courts with an individual's right not to be haled into court 
without reason, and prevents bona fide malicious-prosecution 
defendants from escaping responsibility simply by withdrawing at 
the last moment.   
¶25 Further, the remaining five elements of a malicious-
prosecution action provide an additional safeguard against the 
pursuit of baseless actions.  A successful malicious-prosecution 
plaintiff must still satisfy, among others, the requirements that 
the prior proceeding was brought with malice and without probable 
cause for its initiation, i.e., the fourth and fifth elements of 
a malicious-prosecution action.  If the prior proceeding is truly 
valid but a party withdraws the claim due to a lack of funds, 
change of heart, or some other innocuous reason, a malicious-
prosecution plaintiff will be likewise unable to satisfy those 
elements.   
C. Remand to the Circuit Court 
¶26 Having adopted the Restatement's approach and concluded 
that a withdrawal of a prior proceeding may satisfy the favorable-
termination element of a malicious-prosecution action, our inquiry 
stops.  The record before us is devoid of any evidence as to why 
Chase withdrew the second lawsuit.  Monroe's complaint alleges 
that Chase falsely claimed in the second lawsuit that Monroe had 
not contacted their child for approximately three years, while 
admitting contact and communication between Monroe and the child 
in an affidavit filed in the first lawsuit.  Whether or not Chase's 
withdrawal of the second lawsuit constitutes a favorable 
No. 
2019AP1918   
 
14 
 
termination remains a question for a fact-finder.  For that reason, 
we reverse the order of the circuit court and remand the case to 
apply the analysis set forth in this opinion.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶27 We reverse the order of the circuit court because a 
withdrawal of a prior proceeding may satisfy the favorable-
termination element of a malicious-prosecution action.  We also 
adopt the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674 cmt. 
j, which is consistent with our cases and focuses on the 
circumstances of the termination to determine whether it was 
favorable.  We remand this case to the circuit court to apply the 
analysis set forth in this opinion.  
By the Court.——The order of the circuit court is reversed and 
the cause is remanded. 
 
 
No. 
2019AP1918   
 
 
 
1