Case Title: Commonwealth v. Petit-Homme

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12636

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12636 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DENVER PETIT-HOMME. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 1, 2019. - August 7, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Plea.  Alien. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Dorchester Division 
of the Boston Municipal Court Department on August 26, 2016. 
 
 
A motion to withdraw a plea was heard by Lisa Ann Grant, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Edward Crane for the defendant. 
 
Erin D. Knight, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Emma Winger, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The defendant, Denver Petit-Homme, currently 
faces deportation based in part upon an admission to sufficient 
facts for a finding of guilty on two counts of assault by means 
2 
 
 
 
of a dangerous weapon.  During the plea colloquy conducted in 
connection with that admission, the judge warned the defendant 
about certain "practically inevitable" immigration consequences 
that would arise if the defendant did not have United States 
citizenship and "if . . . the crime admitted to is one that 
presumptively mandates removal from the United States" (emphasis 
added), as required by Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (3) (A) (iii) 
(b), as appearing in 470 Mass. 1501 (2015).  The judge 
neglected, however, to recite the following, more general words 
of warning prescribed by G. L. c. 278, § 29D: 
"If you are not a citizen of the United States, you are 
hereby advised that the acceptance by this court of your 
plea of guilty, plea of nolo contendere, or admission to 
sufficient facts may have consequences of deportation, 
exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of 
naturalization, pursuant to the laws of the United States." 
 
The same statute requiring oral delivery of this warning at all 
criminal plea colloquies further provides: 
"If the court fails so to advise the defendant, and he 
later at any time shows that his plea and conviction may 
have or has had one of the enumerated consequences, . . . 
the court, on the defendant's motion, shall vacate the 
judgment, and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of 
guilty, plea of nolo contendere, or admission of sufficient 
facts, and enter a plea of not guilty." 
 
Id.  Approximately one and one-half years after the plea 
colloquy, following the commencement of deportation proceedings, 
the defendant unsuccessfully moved to withdraw the admission 
3 
 
 
 
based on the contention that the judge failed to provide the 
statutory warning. 
The defendant appealed, and we granted his subsequent 
application for direct appellate review to consider whether the 
immigration consequences warning articulated by the plea judge 
during the colloquy sufficed "so to advise" the defendant, as 
required by G. L. c. 278, § 29D.  The defendant argues that it 
did not, and that reversal is thus required where the challenged 
admission led to the pending removal proceedings.  We agree.  
Given the complexity of Federal immigration law, the offense-
specific warning provided to the defendant in the instant case 
is confusing, and it is neither equivalent to, nor an adequate 
substitute for, the more general advisory that G. L. c. 278, 
§ 29D, entitles every criminal defendant to receive.  The order 
denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea is therefore 
reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.1 
 
Facts and procedural history.  On August 26, 2016, a 
criminal complaint issued from the Dorchester Division of the 
Boston Municipal Court Department, charging the defendant with 
two counts of assault by means of a dangerous weapon and two 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief in support of the 
defendant submitted by the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services. 
4 
 
 
 
counts of making a threat to commit a crime.  The charges 
stemmed from an incident that occurred on August 6, 2016, in 
which the defendant approached two men, called their attention 
to a gun in the waistband of the defendant's pants, and 
threatened to shoot them. 
 
On January 10, 2017, the defendant tendered an admission to 
sufficient facts for a finding of guilty on all charges 
(admission).  During the oral colloquy that the judge conducted 
prior to accepting the defendant's admission, the judge stated, 
substantially as required by Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (3) (A) 
(iii) (b): 
"[I]f you are not a citizen of the United States and the 
crime admitted to is one that presumptively mandates 
removal from the United States, and the federal officials 
decide to seek removal, acceptance by this Court of your 
admission will make it practically inevitable that this 
admission will result in deportation, exclusion from 
admission or denial of naturalization under the laws of the 
United States." 
 
The judge then asked whether the defendant understood the 
warning, and the defendant replied, "Yes."  When asked by the 
court, defense counsel confirmed that "the charges, the elements 
that need to be proven, maximum penalties, possible defenses, 
options other than admitting to sufficient facts, as well as 
potential consequences including, but not limited to, the 
immigration consequence" had been explained to the defendant by 
counsel.  The judge found a factual basis for the defendant's 
5 
 
 
 
admission and pronounced it "made freely and voluntarily with 
full knowledge of the consequences."  After accepting the 
admission, the court continued the case without a finding for 
three years and imposed a coterminous program of supervised 
probation.2 
 
On June 13, 2017, following an evidentiary hearing, the 
same judge who had accepted the defendant's admission found that 
the defendant had committed new criminal offenses in violation 
of applicable probation terms.  Accordingly, the court revoked 
the continuance without a finding, entered a finding of guilty 
as to all charges, and sentenced the defendant to serve two 
years in a house of correction. 
 
Approximately thirteen months later, the defendant filed a 
motion to withdraw his admission and vacate the court's finding 
of sufficient facts, arguing that the plea judge "failed to 
provide the immigration warning required by [G. L. c. 278, 
§ 29D], and the defendant now faces deportation as a result."  
In support of the motion, among other things, the defendant 
filed a "Notice to Appear" in removal proceedings, dated 
April 13, 2017, and issued to the defendant by the United States 
Department of Homeland Security (removal notice).  Among the 
                     
 
2 Near the beginning of the plea colloquy, when asked 
whether English was his native language, the defendant 
volunteered, "I was born here, so English is my native 
language."  This was false.  The defendant was born in Haiti. 
6 
 
 
 
factual allegations in support of deportation asserted in the 
removal notice, the government included the defendant's January 
10, 2017, admission on the charge of assault by means of a 
dangerous weapon.3 
 
On August 15, 2018, the plea judge presided at a hearing on 
the motion.4  At the outset of the hearing, the plea judge 
questioned the "need to be giving every defendant two warnings 
which essentially is saying the same thing."  Despite defense 
counsel's attempt to distinguish the more general statutory 
language from the narrower, offense-specific warning required by 
procedural rule, the court's subsequent questions suggest that 
confusion persisted.5  Following argument from both defense 
                     
 
3 This was alleged, along with a 2013 conviction of assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, to be one of two 
convictions of "crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out 
of a single scheme of criminal misconduct," which form a basis 
for deportation under the Federal Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952, as amended.  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  The 
removal notice also listed a 2013 conviction for violation of an 
abuse prevention order as a separate, additional ground for 
deportation.  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). 
 
 
4 Although the plea judge did not conduct an evidentiary 
hearing, the removal notice and other documentary evidence filed 
with the motion and as exhibits to the supporting memorandum of 
law were before the court at the time of the hearing.  These 
documents included a transcript of the plea hearing, the "green 
sheet" tendered in the case, and a personal affidavit of the 
defendant. 
 
 
5 It appears that the plea judge believed that the 2015 
addition of Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (3) (A) (iii) (b) replaced 
the "old" warning:  "[W]hy did the new warning come out if -- I 
7 
 
 
 
counsel and the Commonwealth, the plea judge took the matter 
under advisement.  On September 21, 2018, the court denied the 
defendant's motion in a margin endorsement order, without 
explanation. 
 
Discussion.  While the immigration consequences of a 
criminal conviction or guilty plea are not themselves criminal 
sanctions, they may weigh even more heavily on noncitizen 
defendants than incarceration.  Accordingly, judges in 
Massachusetts are instructed to provide immigration warnings to 
criminal defendants during plea colloquies by both statute and 
court rule. 
General Laws c. 278, § 29D, entitles every criminal 
defendant proffering a plea of guilty, a plea of nolo 
contendere, or an admission to sufficient facts to receive prior 
verbal warning from a judge.  Specifically, 
"If you are not a citizen of the United States, you are 
hereby advised that the acceptance by this court of your 
plea of guilty, plea of nolo contendere, or admission to 
sufficient facts may have consequences of deportation, 
exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of 
naturalization, pursuant to the laws of the United States." 
 
                     
don't understand.  If the old warning, meaning the statutory 
warning, was more all encompassing . . . , why wouldn't we just 
continue to be giving . . . that warning, as opposed to the one 
that came out through the rule?"  Even after defense counsel's 
argument, the court apparently remained doubtful:  "So, I should 
tell the Defendant, 'you may have immigration consequences.  And 
you will likely have immigration consequences'; is that what I'm 
expected to tell a defendant?" 
8 
 
 
 
Id.  This statute is unusual in that "[t]he Legislature set 
forth in the statute the precise language of the warning that 
the judge was to give a defendant before accepting a plea."  
Commonwealth v. Valdez, 475 Mass. 178, 183 (2016).  This 
carefully scripted advisory (§ 29D warning) is set off by 
quotation marks within the statute's text.  "The purpose of this 
requirement is to ensure that defendants entering pleas are made 
aware of the potential for adverse immigration consequences."  
Commonwealth v. Berthold, 441 Mass. 183, 184 (2004).  See 
Commonwealth v. Hilaire, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 818, 821 (2001), 
S.C., 437 Mass. 809 (2002) (statute's purpose is to "ensure 
that, while the noncitizen who pleads guilty does so at his own 
peril, he should not do so without fair warning [of the 
potential immigration consequences]"). 
Rule 12 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
which governs the form and content of plea colloquies, also 
requires a judge to inform the defendant of "potential 
immigration consequences of the plea."  Mass R. Crim. P. 
12 (c) (3) (A) (iii) & 12 (d) (3) (A) (iii), as appearing in 470 
Mass. 1501 (2015).  The first advisory required by rule 12 is, 
essentially, an abbreviated version of the § 29D warning and 
serves the same purpose: 
9 
 
 
 
"that, if the defendant is not a citizen of the United 
States, the guilty plea, plea of nolo contendere, or 
admission may have the consequence of deportation, 
exclusion of admission, or denial of naturalization." 
 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (3) (A) (iii) (a) & 12 (d) (3) (A) 
(iii) (a) (rule [a] warning).6 
                     
 
6 This requirement was first added to the rule effective 
September 7, 2004, at which time the statutory text of G. L. 
c. 278, § 29D, provided, in relevant part, that defendants must 
be informed that "conviction of the offense for which you have 
been charged may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion 
from admission to the United States, or denial of 
naturalization" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 278, § 29D, inserted 
by St. 1978, c. 383.  The amendment to rule 12 was prompted by 
an earlier decision of this court in Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 
437 Mass. 797, 803 (2002), holding the contemporary § 29D 
warning language to be both "inadequate" and "even potentially 
misleading," due to changes in Federal law.  Amendments to the 
Federal Immigration and Nationality Act had expanded that law's 
definition of "conviction" to encompass an admission to 
sufficient facts.  Id. at 802-803.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(48)(A).  Although the § 29D warning then in effect was 
thus inadequate, in Villalobos this court affirmed the denial of 
§ 29D relief where the judge gave the quoted statutory warning 
without "substantive deviation or omission," even though it 
failed to convey that an admission to sufficient facts was 
considered a "conviction" under Federal law and might trigger 
immigration consequences.  Villalobos, supra at 798 n.1.  
Because the judge provided the § 29D warning then in effect, 
there was no "fail[ure] so to advise the defendant" as required 
to trigger § 29D relief.  G. L. c. 278, § 29D.  The 2004 
addition to the rule 12 colloquy was thus intended to clarify 
that either an admission to sufficient facts (even where 
followed by a dismissal) or a guilty plea could give rise to 
adverse immigration consequences -- a point not then conveyed by 
the statutory warning about the consequences of a "conviction."  
Reporters' Notes (Revised, 2004) to Rule 12 (c) (3) (C), Mass. 
Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1572 
(LexisNexis 2019).  Effective October 27, 2004, the Legislature 
amended G. L. c. 278, § 29D, to make the same clarification, so 
the rule (a) warning and the § 29D warning now have equal scope.  
See G. L. c. 278, § 29D, as appearing in St. 2004, c. 225. 
10 
 
 
 
The second immigration consequences advisory required as 
part of a rule 12 plea colloquy is 
"that, if the offense to which the defendant is pleading 
guilty, nolo contendere, or admitting to sufficient facts 
is under federal law one that presumptively mandates 
removal from the United States and federal officials decide 
to seek removal, it is practically inevitable that this 
conviction would result in deportation, exclusion from 
admission, or denial of naturalization under the laws of 
the United States." 
 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (3) (A) (iii) (b) & 12 (d) (3) (A) 
(iii) (b) (rule [b] warning).  This second warning is both more 
definitive ("practically inevitable" consequences as opposed to 
"may have" consequences), and more targeted (it applies only to 
a limited subset of noncitizen defendants, depending on how 
Federal law treats the subject crime of a plea or admission).  
It was added to the rule 12 colloquy in 2015, to recognize that 
"under federal immigration law there are a substantial number of 
crimes . . . the conviction for which make 'deportation 
practically inevitable' if federal officials seek the 
defendant's removal," and to warn those noncitizen defendants 
pleading or admitting to such a "removable offense" with more 
urgency (citation omitted).  Reporters' Notes to 
Rule 12 (c) (3) (A) (iii) (b), Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1579 (LexisNexis 2019).  
Apparently, it also was intended to remind defense counsel of 
their duty to provide advice about the immigration consequences 
11 
 
 
 
of the specific plea or admission for the particular defendant.7  
Id. at 1580. 
                     
 
7 The language of the rule (b) warning can be traced back to 
the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).  In that case, the Court held 
that a defendant's right to "effective assistance of competent 
counsel" under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution includes the right to accurate advice about the 
deportation risks of entering a criminal plea (citation 
omitted).  Id. at 364, 374.  More specifically, the Court found 
that constitutionally competent defense counsel would have 
advised that pleading guilty to the drug distribution offense 
charged would subject the defendant to automatic deportation:  
"The consequences of Padilla's plea could easily be determined 
from reading the removal statute"; "his deportation was 
presumptively mandatory" and also "practically inevitable but 
for the possible exercise of . . . equitable discretion vested 
in the Attorney General to cancel removal [in limited cases]."  
Id. at 364, 369.  Under the rule of Padilla, where the 
immigration law is "succinct, clear, and explicit" in defining 
the immigration consequences of a criminal disposition, defense 
counsel's "duty to give correct advice is equally clear."  Id. 
at 368-369.  The Supreme Court "did not formulate the precise 
language that would satisfy [this Sixth Amendment] obligation, 
and understood that the content of the advice would depend on 
the circumstances."  Commonwealth v. Dejesus, 468 Mass. 174, 179 
(2014).  Justice Alito wrote a separate concurrence in Padilla 
to emphasize that the Court's approach "is particularly 
problematic because providing advice on whether a conviction for 
a particular offense will make an alien removable is often quite 
complex."  Padilla, supra at 377 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 
 
In 2014, this court applied the rule of Padilla to hold 
defense counsel constitutionally ineffective for advising a 
lawful permanent resident charged with possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine that a guilty plea would make him "eligible 
for deportation."  Dejesus, 468 Mass. at 175-176.  We more 
specifically held that, under Padilla, 
 
"[c]ounsel . . . was obligated to provide to his client, in 
language that the client could comprehend, the information 
that presumptively mandatory deportation would have been 
the legal consequence of pleading guilty.  Stated 
12 
 
 
 
Whereas rule 12 provides for no specific relief in the 
event that a judge fails to provide the requisite immigration 
consequences warnings during the colloquy, the Legislature 
provided for an express remedy in the event that the statutory 
§ 29D warning is not given as prescribed: 
"If the court fails so to advise the defendant, and he 
later at any time shows that his plea and conviction may 
have or has had one of the enumerated consequences, even if 
the defendant has already been deported from the United 
States, the court, on the defendant's motion, shall vacate 
the judgment, and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea 
of guilty, plea of nolo contendere, or admission of 
sufficient facts, and enter a plea of not guilty" (emphasis 
added).8 
                     
differently, counsel needed to convey that, if Federal 
authorities apprehended the defendant, deportation would be 
practically inevitable." 
 
Id. at 181.  Although the rule (b) warning takes its language 
almost directly from this holding, "[t]his noncitizen warning is 
not meant to displace the critical role of counsel in providing 
more particular advice concerning the immigration consequences 
of a particular plea.  Quite to the contrary, the warning is 
meant to trigger that advice . . . ."  Reporters' Notes to Rule 
12 (c) (3) (A) (iii) (b), supra at 1580. 
 
 
8 "By including the words, 'at any time,' the Legislature 
made clear that there was no limitation in time to bringing a 
motion to vacate the plea, even though the passage of time might 
mean that the tape recording, transcript, and other records of 
the plea colloquy are no longer available through no fault of 
the Commonwealth, and that no one may recall what was said."  
Commonwealth v. Valdez, 475 Mass. 178, 183 (2016).  Not only is 
there no limit on the amount of time that may pass between 
acceptance of a plea and a motion for § 29D relief, but in the 
event that no record of the hearing exists, the statute also 
implements a presumption in favor of the defendant that warnings 
were not given (in contrast to the "presumption of regularity" 
that applies in favor of the Commonwealth where records are 
unavailable but the motion is brought under Mass. R. Crim. P. 
13 
 
 
 
 
G. L. c. 278, § 29D. 
 
Recognizing the specificity and "unique purpose" of this 
legislative mandate to deliver defined spoken warnings or else 
administer postconviction relief, Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 
437 Mass. 797, 800 (2002), our interpretative approach has been 
relatively literal and strict.  In Hilaire, we held that "[t]o 
comply with the statute, the judge must give the alien warning, 
preferably by reading the single quoted sentence directly from 
the statute."  Hilaire, 437 Mass. at 819.  Delivery of the 
warnings must be made by the judge "orally as part of the 
colloquy, and, where the warnings given during that colloquy 
fail to meet the statutory requirements, the defendant's 
signature on the court's standard [written] form containing the 
warnings does not suffice to avoid the consequences mandated by 
the statute."  Id. at 810. 
                     
30 [b], as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 [2001]).  Id.  See G. L. 
c. 278, § 29D ("Absent an official record or a contemporaneously 
written record kept in the court file that the court provided 
the advisement as prescribed in this section . . . the defendant 
shall be presumed not to have received advisement").  These 
additional features of the statute provide further evidence of 
how much importance the Legislature placed upon timely delivery 
of the § 29D warning.  See Commonwealth v. Jones, 417 Mass. 661, 
664 (1994) (regardless of how much time has passed between 
conviction and motion to withdraw, "explicit language of the 
statute unambiguously manifests a legislative intent to place on 
the Commonwealth the burden of proving that the requirements of 
G. L. c. 278, § 29D, have been satisfied"). 
14 
 
 
 
The Legislature's specific direction concerns only what the 
judge must say to the defendant and not "[t]he defendant's 
subjective understanding of immigration law in effect at the 
time of the guilty plea."9  Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 70 Mass. 
App. Ct. 721, 722 n.1 (2007).  Accordingly, the defendant need 
not demonstrate lack of previous understanding in order to 
secure § 29D relief, and, where the defendant has not been 
warned about the immigration consequence that he or she later 
seeks to avoid through § 29D relief, evidence of the defendant's 
actual knowledge of that consequence at the time of the plea 
will not prevent § 29D relief. 
In Berthold, we expressly adopted a somewhat narrower 
interpretation of the scope of the statute's remedy provision, 
clarifying that § 29D relief is not automatic upon receipt of a 
defective warning.  Berthold, 441 Mass. at 185.  The judge had 
advised the defendant, "[T]his conviction could affect your 
status as a resident alien.  You could be deported or if you 
applied for citizenship, it could affect that application."  Id. 
                     
 
9 Here, it appears very likely that the defendant understood 
the immigration consequences of the admission he made:  during 
the colloquy, not only did defense counsel confirm having 
explained them to the defendant, but the defendant personally 
(and fictitiously) volunteered that he "was born here." In the 
sworn affidavit submitted with the motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas, the defendant explained that he made this statement 
"because [he] was afraid of being deported and assumed that it 
would be better to hide the fact that [he] was not a United 
States citizen." 
15 
 
 
 
at 184.  Because the defendant sought § 29D relief to avoid 
deportation, we upheld the denial of his motion: 
"Although the immigration warning that the judge gave did 
not cover all of the immigration consequences enumerated in 
§ 29D, we do not construe the statute to impose the 
extraordinary remedy that it provides in circumstances 
where the inadequacy complained of is immaterial to the 
harm for which the remedy is sought.  A defendant who has 
been warned under the statute of the very consequence with 
which he must subsequently contend is not entitled to 
withdraw his plea, even if he was not warned of other 
enumerated consequences that have not materialized."  
(Emphasis added; citation omitted.) 
 
Id. at 185-186.  Even where a warning is incomplete or otherwise 
defective, § 29D relief is not warranted where a "defendant was 
warned of the precise immigration consequence that he 
subsequently faced."  Id. at 186-187.  Although we have thus 
affirmed orders denying § 29D relief in cases of incomplete 
warnings, the practice conforms to the commonsense proposition 
that a defendant seeking extraordinary relief to avoid 
deportation should not be afforded additional process because 
the plea judge omitted a warning about another consequence 
(viz., denial of naturalization or exclusion from admission) 
that is irrelevant to that defendant's personal circumstances. 
 
In sum, we have construed the statutory conditions for 
relief to be (1) that the noncitizen defendant "actually faces 
the prospect of [an immigration consequence enumerated in the 
statute] occurring" as a result of the challenged plea, 
Berthold, 441 Mass. at 185; and (2) that the defendant was not 
16 
 
 
 
verbally warned about that particular adverse consequence during 
the colloquy as required by the statute, Hilaire, 437 Mass. at 
814.  If these two requirements are met, the defendant is 
entitled to relief.10  No additional showing of prejudice is 
required.11 
 
As the Commonwealth concedes here, the commencement of 
removal proceedings against the defendant in connection with the 
challenged admission precludes dispute whether there has been a 
showing that the defendant "may" suffer deportation.  See 
Valdez, 475 Mass. at 184 (discussing necessary showing under 
§ 29D where immigration consequence at issue is deportation, and 
citing cases).  See also Hilaire, 437 Mass. at 813-814 (adequacy 
of defendant's showing based on removal notice conceded).  To 
determine whether the defendant is entitled to § 29D relief, 
                     
 
10 We have held that where the statutory prerequisites are 
met, "the judge has no discretion" and relief must be granted.  
Commonwealth v. Mahadeo, 397 Mass. 314, 318 n.5 (1986).  The 
requisite determinations are factual, and the standard 
relatively mechanical when compared with the discretionary 
standard applicable to a typical motion to withdraw a plea, 
which may only be granted "if it appears that justice may not 
have been done" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Furr, 454 
Mass. 101, 106 (2009).  See Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 387 Mass. 
481, 486 (1982). 
 
 
11 "A defendant [seeking § 29D relief] need not show . . . 
that he would have pleaded differently to the criminal charges 
against him, had he received the statutory warning" as though 
the motion to withdraw the plea or admission were based upon 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to provide 
accurate advice regarding immigration consequences.  Mahadeo, 
397 Mass. at 318. 
17 
 
 
 
then, we need only determine whether the spoken warning provided 
at the colloquy fulfilled the statutory mandate, or whether the 
plea judge "fail[ed] so to advise the defendant" in a manner 
material to the basis asserted for seeking § 29D relief (viz., 
deportation).  G. L. c. 278, § 29D. 
 
The oral warning issued to the defendant during the 
colloquy substantially tracked the language of the rule (b) 
warning.  We emphasize that the rule (b) warning never was 
intended to stand alone as a substitute for the § 29D warning 
(an abbreviated version of which appears as the rule [a] 
warning).  Rather, it was intended to be given in addition to 
the statutory warning.  The Reporters' notes to this subsection 
of the rule, which was added in 2015, characterize it as an 
"additional" and "enhanced" warning intended to recognize that 
"under federal immigration law there are a substantial number of 
crimes . . . the conviction for which make 'deportation 
practically inevitable' if federal officials seek the 
defendant's removal."  Reporters' Notes to Rule 12 (c) (3) (A) 
(iii) (b), supra at 1579.  Alerting defendants to the practical 
inevitability of deportation upon pleading or admitting to these 
particular offenses was deemed important enough to merit a 
separate, targeted advisory, but was not intended to replace the 
statutory warning or to suffice without the accompanying 
rule (a) warning (paraphrasing the statutory language). 
18 
 
 
 
Apart from approximating only one-half of the immigration 
advisory language required by rule 12, the warning given to the 
defendant here does not equate to a plain statement of three 
specific immigration consequences that "may" occur, as the 
Legislature prescribed.  Instead, the defendant was told that 
certain crimes "presumptively mandate[] removal" and would make 
immigration consequences "practically inevitable" -- but without 
receiving any indication whether the defendant's own offenses 
(assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and threat 
to commit a crime) constitute that type of crime. 
Indeed, defining the crimes that "presumptively mandate 
removal" is often a highly complex undertaking.  Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 377 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).  
Although certain of the grounds for deportability listed in 8 
U.S.C. § 1227 are comprised solely of a noncitizen's conviction, 
see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (conviction of any crime 
involving controlled substance with one exception), many other 
offense-based grounds of deportability, including certain 
aggravated felonies, call for additional information, such as 
how long a defendant has been in the country, whether there has 
been a past conviction of a certain type of crime, or the length 
of the sentence imposed.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (two or more crimes involving moral 
turpitude, not arising out of single scheme of criminal 
19 
 
 
 
misconduct); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(43)(F) (crime of violence for which 
sentence of at least one year is imposed, whether suspended or 
committed).  Furthermore, not every offense that "presumptively 
mandates removal" also renders a noncitizen ineligible for 
discretionary relief such that any of the enumerated immigration 
consequences is "practically inevitable." 
To comprehend whether either part of the rule (b) warning 
applies to a particular defendant therefore requires both a 
thorough, nuanced understanding of Federal immigration law and 
often a significant quantity of personal information about the 
particular defendant (including immigration history and status, 
criminal record, and the nature and circumstances of the pending 
charges).  As cogently set forth in the amicus brief submitted 
by the Committee for Public Counsel Services in support of the 
defendant, the complexity of determining whether a particular 
offense "presumptively mandates removal" and makes any of the 
three enumerated consequences "practically inevitable" is 
evidenced by the specifics of the instant case.12 
                     
 
12 The defendant admitted to sufficient facts for a finding 
of guilt on the charge of assault by means of a dangerous 
weapon.  The relevant statutory definition (G. L. c. 265, § 15B) 
establishes that the offense qualifies as both a "crime 
involving moral turpitude" (CIMT) and a "crime of violence" for 
immigration purposes.  See Commonwealth v. Cano, 87 Mass. App. 
Ct. 238, 245–246 (2015); United States v. Whindleton, 797 F.3d 
105, 111-116 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 179 
(2016); Matter of J, 4 I. & N. Dec. 512 (B.I.A. 1951) (finding 
20 
 
 
 
In sum, a determination whether the rule 12 warning applies 
to an admission or guilty plea to a particular offense requires 
a careful, thorough review of Federal immigration law and often 
the criminal and immigration history of the particular 
defendant.  Without the general statutory warning, the rule (b) 
warning is therefore too technical, legalistic, and complex in 
                     
Massachusetts offense of assault by means of dangerous weapon to 
be CIMT).  To identify whether this crime "presumptively 
mandates removal," or will inevitably result in deportation, 
however, it is necessary to know much more information.  The 
defendant's prior criminal record and date of admission are 
needed to determine (1) whether this CIMT was committed within 
ten years of arrival (the defendant arrived in 1997, so it was 
not); or (2) whether the defendant had another conviction of a 
CIMT not arising out of the same scheme of criminal misconduct 
(he did, so the offense constituted one presumptively mandating 
removal).  Additional information from the record in the pending 
case might also have determined whether either of the 
complaining witnesses was protected under domestic violence 
laws, rendering the offense a crime of domestic violence 
presumptively mandating removal under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (while unlikely, that remains unconfirmed).  
Whether a sentence of one year or longer would be imposed 
(either suspended or committed) would dictate whether the 
offense was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(F), both mandating removal and barring the 
defendant from eligibility for discretionary cancellation of 
removal, making deportation practically inevitable.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(a).  Notably, at the time of the plea the defendant 
remained eligible for a discretionary defense to deportation 
given that he had been a lawful permanent resident for over 
seven years at that time, see id., and so removal may not have 
been practically inevitable (although it became so upon 
imposition of the committed sentence following the probation 
violation hearing -- a civil proceeding, where no immigration 
warnings are required).  At the time of the colloquy, the plea 
judge did not have enough of this information to determine 
whether the rule (b) warning applied to the defendant, and was 
prohibited from asking about the defendant's immigration status 
under G. L. c. 278, § 29D. 
21 
 
 
 
its application to be particularly informative.  Given the 
specificity of the legislative mandate that a more general and 
comprehensible warning be given, we conclude that the defendant 
is entitled to the legislative remedy.  "[W]e are not free to 
ignore or tamper with that clear expression of legislative 
intent."  Hilaire, 437 Mass at 819, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Jones, 417 Mass. 661, 664 (1994). 
We also conclude that the warning given was not analogous 
to the one provided in Berthold, 441 Mass. at 184, which we 
deemed deficient, but not so deficient as to require § 29D 
relief.  In that case, the defendant was given those parts of 
the general and comprehensible statutory warning applicable to 
the defendant and the harm he sought § 29D relief to avoid.  Id.  
Here, the defendant was not.  The warning given to the defendant 
was presented only in complex, legal terminology.  This highly 
technical warning, given alone, without the general, easily 
comprehensible words the Legislature prescribed, was therefore 
not sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements. 
Finally, we recognize that the rule (b) warning merits 
reconsideration.13  Although well intentioned and designed to put 
defendants on higher alert regarding certain inevitable 
                     
 
13 We note that the Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
as amicus curiae, strongly recommends eliminating the rule (b) 
warning from the criminal plea colloquy altogether. 
22 
 
 
 
immigration consequences before deciding to enter a guilty plea 
or admission to certain crimes, the warning may not 
appropriately or at least fully take into account the 
complexities of Federal immigration law, and not serve its 
intended purposes, even when combined with the more general 
warning.  At a minimum the relationship between the two warnings 
may need to be better explained.  We therefore ask this court's 
standing advisory committee on the rules of criminal procedure 
to review and reconsider the 2015 amendment, to determine 
whether it is appropriate to further amend or dispense with the 
amendment altogether.  In the interim, we urge judges to ensure 
that both the statutory immigration warning, preferably read 
precisely as quoted in G. L. c. 278, § 29D, and the rule (b) 
warning are delivered at every colloquy, as expressly directed 
by both rule and statute. 
Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion to 
withdraw his plea is reversed, and the matter is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.