Case Title: State v. Jonathan Mercedes

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2018-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Jonathan Mercedes  a_6_7_17.opn.html Original Wordprocessor Version (NOTE: The status of this decision is Unpublished .) SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. Jonathan Mercedes (A-6-17) (079995) State v. Hassan Travis (A-7-17) (080020)Argued November 29, 2017 -- Decided May 1, 2018RABNER, C.J., writing for the Court. These consolidated appeals raise questions that relate to the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26, including a rule the Court adopted under its rulemaking authority and what constitutes a “pending charge” at the time of a detention hearing. Defendant Hassan Travis was charged with robbery, aggravated assault, and weapons offenses. Travis’s Public Safety Assessment (PSA) rated him 1 out of 6—the lowest level—for risk of failure to appear and assigned the same score for risk of new criminal activity. Based on the robbery charge, the PSA recommended that Travis not be released. The State moved for pretrial detention, and the trial court found that Travis should be detained. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court directly certified the matter. 230 N.J. 587 (2017). The case against defendant Jonathan Mercedes involves two separate sets of allegations: a road-rage incident that resulted in a shooting (Complaint-Warrant 4353); and the possession of heroin (Complaint-Warrant 4838). In the first matter, the police responded to a report of a shooting in Camden. On July 12, 2017, Mercedes was charged in Complaint-Warrant 4353 with aggravated assault and weapons offenses. Three weeks later, an anonymous source who had provided reliable information in the past told law enforcement that he or she had seen Mercedes “drop off the resupply of narcotics to [a] drug distribution set” in Camden. Law enforcement officials spotted Mercedes driving and arrested him on the outstanding warrant. A canine alerted to the presence of narcotics. A search of the car, based on a search warrant, recovered 349 bags of heroin and $3458 in cash. On August 8, 2017, Mercedes was charged in a separate, second Complaint-Warrant, No. 4838, with drug offenses. Pretrial Services prepared two PSAs. For the first set of charges, the PSA rated Mercedes 4 out of 6 for risk of failure to appear and the same for risk of new criminal activity and recommended that Mercedes not be released. The second PSA, for No. 4838, rated Mercedes 5 out of 6 for risk of failure to appear and 6 for risk of new criminal activity. The PSA repeated Mercedes’s history and added that he had a “pending charge at the time of the offense”—the four charges arising out of the shooting incident. This PSA also recommended against release. The State moved for pretrial detention. The trial court did not detain Mercedes. In a brief order, the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court granted leave to appeal and stayed Mercedes’s release pending appeal. 230 N.J. 586 (2017).HELD: The Court now revises Rule 3:4A(b)(5) to make clear that a recommendation against a defendant’s pretrial release that is based only on the type of offense charged cannot justify detention by itself unless the recommendation is based on one of two presumptions in the statute. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b). A pending charge is a charge that has a future pre-disposition related court date or is pending presentation to the grand jury, or has not been disposed of due to the defendant’s failure to appear pending trial or sentencing, or that is in some form of deferred status.1. The State may seek to detain a defendant who is charged with one of the offenses set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(a), or has been convicted of multiple serious crimes under section 19(a)(3). A rebuttable presumption of detention exists in only two circumstances: when the court finds probable cause to believe that a defendant has committed murder,N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3, or a crime that carries a sentence of life imprisonment, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b)(1) to (2). In all other cases, a presumption of release applies. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(b). To determine whether detention is warranted, “the court may take into account information” about the nature and circumstances of the offense, the weight of the evidence, the defendant’s history and characteristics, the nature of the risk of danger and obstruction the defendant poses, and “[t]he release recommendation of the pretrial services program.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(a) to (f). After an eligible defendant is arrested, a pretrial services officer prepares a PSA, which recommends whether the defendant should be 1 released. There are two components to the recommendation: measuring and managing the risk a defendant presents. The risk management component, referred to as the Decision Making Framework (DMF), is primarily driven by the defendant’s charges. Certain charges result in a recommendation against release regardless of the PSA score: escape, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, first-degree robbery, carjacking, and seven weapons offenses. Recommendations based on the PSA and the DMF do not replace judicial discretion. Trial judges make the ultimate decision on release after they consider other relevant details. When a court does not follow a recommendation, it must provide an explanation. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-23(a)(2). (pp. 13-17)2. Rule 3:4A(b)(5)’s second paragraph provides that “[t]he court may consider as prima facie evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of release a recommendation . . . that the defendant’s release is not recommended . . . . Although such recommendation by the Pretrial Services Program may constitute sufficient evidence upon which the court may order pretrial detention, nothing herein shall preclude the court from considering other relevant information . . . .” Defendant Travis argues that Rule 3:4A(b)(5) operates in a way that violates the CJRA. (pp. 18-19)3. After oral argument, Travis pled guilty to second-degree robbery, and the arguments presented in his case are now moot. The validity of Rule 3:4A(b)(5) and its application at pretrial detention hearings raise issues of considerable public importance, and the Court therefore addresses the Rule at this time. A recommendation against release by itself cannot justify detention if it is based only on the type of offense charged—unless that charge is encompassed by section 19(b). A charge of escape, manslaughter, sexual assault, first-degree robbery, carjacking, or the weapons offenses listed in the DMF—any of which will generate a recommendation against release under the DMF—cannot alone satisfy the State’s burden to prove detention. To make the rule more clear, then, its text should point to the additional factors judges consider when they decide whether to detain a person. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20. The Court revises the second paragraph of Rule 3:4A(b)(5). The Court applies the revised version of Rule 3:4A(b)(5) to all pending and future motions for pretrial detention. In addition, any defendant now held in pretrial detention may ask to reopen his or her detention hearing if (1) the order of detention relied solely on a recommendation against release by the pretrial services program, (2) that recommendation was based only on the type of offense charged, and (3) that recommendation was not based on an offense described in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b). (pp. 23-29)4. In defendant Mercedes’s case, the trial court did not rely on the recommendations against release in the PSAs or on Rule 3:4A(b)(5). Mercedes’s appeal raises other issues that the Court addresses in turn. (A) Mercedes’s detention hearing involved two sets of charges. The trial judge corrected a mistake in the PSA when he reevaluated whether the charges in the shooting case should be treated as “pending charges.” One of the nine risk factors that form the basis of the risk-assessment tool is whether a defendant had a “pending charge” at the time of offense. The charges for the shooting incident did not meet any of the conditions in the definition of “pending charge.” The definition of “pending charge” does not turn on whether a defendant was aware of an outstanding charge. (B) The trial court also treated two separate prior convictions for drug offenses as a single conviction because Mercedes was sentenced in both cases on the same date. Without knowing more, the convictions should not have been considered as one for purposes of the court’s overall analysis. (C) The PSA lists nine instances in which Mercedes failed to appear in court. It appears that the court gave little weight to Mercedes’s extended history of not showing up for court. Although eight of his failures to appear were 3.5 to 7 years old at the time of the hearing, they reveal a troublesome pattern that raises serious questions about whether he will appear in court if released. (D) Finally, the trial court discounted the weight of the evidence in both sets of charges. As to the drug charges, the trial court found “significant issues with respect to the weight of the evidence” and noted concerns about the reliability of the informant. The court on its own raised the question about the informant’s reliability; that issue would not ordinarily surface until a motion to suppress. It was not appropriate to discount the weight of the evidence based on the informant’s reliability. Because the Court cannot tell how the above issues affected the trial court’s findings and ruling, it remands the matter and leaves in place the order staying Mercedes’s release. (pp. 29-38) Travis’s appeal is DISMISSED AS MOOT, Mercedes’s appeal is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, and Rule 3:4A(b)(5) is revised effective today. JUSTICE ALBIN, CONCURRING, joins the majority’s opinion and expresses the hope that the Court, through its administrative process, will soon address the seeming incongruity between the CJRA and the DMF. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a concurring opinion. 2 Rule 3:4A(b)(5) Presumption of release. Except when a presumption of detention is required pursuant to paragraph (b)(4), when a motion for pretrial detention is filed pursuant to paragraph (a), there shall be a rebuttable presumption that some amount of monetary bail, non-monetary conditions of pretrial release or combination of monetary bail and conditions would reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, and that the defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process. The standard of proof for the rebuttal of the presumption of pretrial release shall be by clear and convincing evidence. To determine whether a motion for pretrial detention should be granted, the court may take into account information about the factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 6 September Term 2017 A- 7 September Term 2017 079995 and 080020STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.JONATHAN MERCEDES, Defendant-Respondent.STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.HASSAN TRAVIS, Defendant-Appellant. Argued November 29, 2017 – Decided May 1, 2018 State of New Jersey v. Jonathan Mercedes (A-6-17): On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. State of New Jersey v. Hassan Travis (A-7-17): On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Kevin J. Hein, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant in State of New Jersey v. Jonathan Mercedes (A-6-17) (Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney; Kevin J. Hein, of counsel and on the briefs). Robin Kay Lord argued the cause for respondent in State of New Jersey v. Jonathan Mercedes (A-6-17) (Law Offices of 1 Robin Kay Lord, attorneys; Robin Kay Lord on the brief).Sarah C. Hunt, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey in State of New Jersey v. Jonathan Mercedes (A-6-17) (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah C. Hunt, of counsel and on the brief).Alexander R. Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey in State of New Jersey v. Jonathan Mercedes (A-6-17) and State of New Jersey v. Hassan Travis (A-7-17) (Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director, attorney; Alexander R. Shalom, Edward L. Barocas, and Jeanne M. LoCicero, on the briefs).Elizabeth C. Jarit, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant in State of New Jersey v. Hassan Travis (A-7-17) (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Elizabeth C. Jarit and Scott M. Welfel, Assistant Deputy Public Defenders, of counsel and on the briefs).Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent in State of New Jersey v. Hassan Travis (A-7-17) (Robert D. Laurino, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, of counsel and on the brief).Sarah Lichter, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey in State of New Jersey v. Hassan Travis (A-7-17) (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah Lichter, of counsel and on the brief).John McNamara, Jr., Supervising Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for amicus curiae County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey in State of New Jersey v. Hassan Travis (A-7-17) (Richard T. Burke, 2 President, attorney; John McNamara, Jr., of counsel and on the brief). CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court. These consolidated appeals raise questions that relate tothe Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to-26. After the law was enacted, the Court adopted various rulesunder its rulemaking authority. We now revise one of those rules -- Rule 3:4A(b)(5) -- tomake clear that a recommendation against a defendant’s pretrialrelease that is based only on the type of offense charged cannotjustify detention by itself unless the recommendation is basedon one of two presumptions in the statute. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b). We also consider other aspects of the CJRA includingwhat constitutes a “pending charge” at the time of a detentionhearing. I. In the first of the consolidated cases, defendant HassanTravis challenges an order of pretrial detention. In thesecond, the State challenges an order releasing defendantJonathan Mercedes. To recount the factual allegations in bothcases, we rely on the record established at the respectivedetention hearings. 3 A. State v. Travis At about 1:00 a.m. on November 6, 2016, police officersresponded to a report of a shooting in Newark. At the scene,multiple individuals relayed that “two young black males” hadrobbed them. One victim reported that he had been robbed of $25and shot at three times. No one was injured. After the victim told police that the suspects had touchedhis car, investigators processed the car and developed two setsof fingerprints. One set matched defendant Travis. Threemonths later, the victim identified Travis from a photo array asthe person who robbed and shot at him. Travis was charged in a complaint on February 16, 2017 withthe following offenses: first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1); second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawfulpurpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1); second-degree unlawfulpossession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); and conspiracyto commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1). Several months later,on June 12, 2017, Travis turned himself in to the police. Travis’s Public Safety Assessment (PSA) rated him 1 out of6 -- the lowest level -- for risk of failure to appear andassigned the same score for risk of new criminal activity.According to the PSA, Travis had no prior convictions, nopending charges at the time of the offense, and no record of 4 failures to appear in court. Based on the robbery charge, thePSA recommended that Travis not be released. The State moved for pretrial detention. At a hearing onJune 15, 2017, Travis did not dispute probable cause. Thehearing instead focused on the issue of detention. The Statestressed the violent nature of the offense, the fingerprints andidentification, the threat Travis posed to the victim, and therecommendation in the PSA. Travis highlighted that he hadturned himself in. He asserted that he had no knowledge of theincident until a family member told him about it, and he deniedhaving anything to do with the crime. Travis also emphasizedthat he had no prior record, was employed, and had strong tiesto the community. The trial court found that Travis should be detained. Thejudge relied on multiple factors: (1) the nature andcircumstances of the offense, that is, the “extraordinarilyserious” charges that involved a shooting and a robbery; (2) theweight of the evidence, which included forensic evidence and anidentification; (3) Travis’s history and characteristics,namely, his lifelong residence in Essex County (for twenty-threeyears), five months at his current job, a lack of “familyobligation[s] to keep him here,” and a minimal criminal history;(4) the fact “that a prima facie case has been presented insofaras . . . Pre-Trial Services recommend[ed] [against] release,” 5 see R. 3:4A(b)(5);1 (5) Travis’s “great motive to flee” based onthe seriousness of the charges; and (6) the danger to thecommunity “based on the sheer violence of the offense.” SeeN.J.S.A. 2A:162-20. Travis appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed theorder of detention. The panel noted that the trial courtfollowed the PSA’s recommendation, which overcame thepresumption in favor of release; considered relevant informationand provided sufficient reasons; and did not abuse itsdiscretion. We directly certified the matter under Rule 2:12-1.230 N.J. 587 (2017). B. State v. Mercedes The case against defendant Mercedes involves two separatesets of allegations: a road-rage incident that resulted in ashooting (Complaint-Warrant 4353); and the possession of heroin(Complaint-Warrant 4838). In the first matter, the police responded to a report of ashooting in Camden on July 2, 2017. According to the victim, ashe attempted to merge onto Route 676, he got into an altercationwith the driver of the car behind him. The second car followed1 In its original form, Rule 3:4A(b)(5) provided in part as follows: “The court may consider as prima facie evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of release a recommendation by the Pretrial Services Program . . . that the defendant’s release is not recommended . . . . [S]uch recommendation by the Pretrial Services Program may constitute sufficient evidence upon which the court may order pretrial detention. . . .” 6 him onto the highway, got off at the same exit, and drove to thearea of Eighth and York Streets. After the victim parked andbegan to walk away, the other driver fired two shots, and onestruck the victim in the left thigh. The second car then droveoff. Based on surveillance cameras in the area, the police wereable to identify the suspect’s car, a 2008 black Nissan, and usethe registration to connect the car to a particular address inCamden. Ten days after the incident, the police located andstopped the car in that area. According to the affidavit ofprobable cause, the driver, Breana Hughes, said that her child’sfather used the car. She identified him as Jonathan Mercedes.The police later prepared a photo array that included Mercedes’spicture, and the victim identified Mercedes as the person whoshot him. On July 12, 2017, Mercedes was charged in Complaint-Warrant4353 with second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawfulpurpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1); second-degree unlawfulpossession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); and second-degree possession of a firearm after having been convicted of anoffense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). Three weeks later, an anonymous source who had providedreliable information in the past told law enforcement that he or 7 she had seen Mercedes “drop off the resupply of narcotics to [a]drug distribution set” in Camden. The source added that he orshe believed the car Mercedes used, a white Honda Accord, had ahidden compartment in the front interior. The source had seenMercedes operate the Honda on August 4, 2017, and observed ahandgun and narcotics in the car. Later that same day, law enforcement officials spottedMercedes driving the Honda and arrested him on the outstandingwarrant. A canine team conducted “an exterior sniff” of thecar, and the dog alerted to the presence of narcotics. A searchof the car, based on a search warrant, recovered 349 bags ofheroin and $3458 in cash. On August 8, 2017, Mercedes was charged in a separate,second Complaint-Warrant, No. 4838, with third-degree unlawfulpossession of a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); second-degree possession of a controlled dangeroussubstance with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2); andthird-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substancewithin 1000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a). Pretrial Services prepared two PSAs. For the first set ofcharges, No. 4353, the PSA rated Mercedes 4 out of 6 for risk offailure to appear and the same for risk of new criminalactivity. There was also a flag for new violent criminalactivity, which denoted an elevated risk of violence. According 8 to the PSA, Mercedes had one prior violent conviction for simpleassault, two prior indictable convictions for drug distribution,and two prior disorderly persons convictions. He had failed toappear in court once in the past two years and eight times from2010 to 2014. The PSA recommended that Mercedes not bereleased. The second PSA, for No. 4838, rated Mercedes 5 out of 6 forrisk of failure to appear and 6 for risk of new criminalactivity. There was no flag for new violent criminal activity.The PSA repeated Mercedes’s history and added that he had a“pending charge at the time of the offense” -- the four chargesarising out of the shooting incident. This PSA also recommendedagainst release. The State moved for pretrial detention, and the court heardargument on both matters at a hearing on August 18, 2017. Thecourt found probable cause for both complaints; our focus now ison the State’s application to detain Mercedes. As to the first set of charges relating to the shooting,after the State presented various documents, counsel forMercedes offered eight still photos from the surveillance videosand represented that the videos did not reveal the car’s licenseplate number. Counsel also asserted that the victim could notdescribe the car’s color and claimed no one was in the cardespite a passenger depicted in the video. In addition, counsel 9 argued that Ms. Hughes had told the police that her boyfriendhad not driven the car in a while and that, aside from him, herbrother, other family members, and friends drove the car aswell. Counsel raised those arguments as to both probable causeand the weight of the evidence. Counsel also addressedMercedes’s criminal record and ties to the community. The State contended that the still frames did not counterthe evidence outlined in the affidavit: the police were able toobserve the license plate and trace it back to Mercedes, whomthe victim identified from a photo array. The State underscoredthe serious nature of the charges, Mercedes’s nine failures toappear, and his criminal record. The trial court did not detain Mercedes. It explained thatthe decision-making framework, and not the PSA scores, generatedthe recommendation against release, and declined to rely on Rule3:4A(b)(5). “[T]he most significant factor . . . is the weightof the evidence in this case,” the court noted, “with some . . .very significant issues with respect to the identification ofthis defendant.” The court added that Mercedes’s family andcommunity ties, including the fact that he was the father of ayoung child, weighed in his favor as well. As to Mercedes’s prior record, the trial judge treated twoseparate cases for drug distribution sentenced on the same dateas a single conviction. The court also noted that Mercedes’s 10 “failure-to-appear history involves a recent failure to appearin a municipal case” and assumed the case was dismissed becauseit did not appear as a conviction. The hearing then turned to the second set of charges -- thedrug offenses. After the State’s initial presentation, counselfor Mercedes stressed the case relied on constructive possessionof drugs that were hidden from view in a car “used by a lot ofpeople in the neighborhood.” Mercedes did not own the car,counsel submitted, and no forensic evidence linked him to thedrugs. Counsel also argued that the PSA numbers were “almostlike double-dipping” because Mercedes had no idea that theshooting case was pending. The State countered that some of those arguments would be“better served at a trial.” It explained that people ordinarilydo not drive around with drugs in plain view and that forensicevidence is not generally available early after an arrest. TheState also pointed to the recommendation against release,Mercedes’s history of drug distribution, his “violenttendencies,” his record of failing to appear, and thesubstantial potential sentence he faced. The court denied the State’s motion. It noted that thehigh PSA scores were “generated in significant measure” by theexistence of a “pending charge” from the shooting offense. Yet,although the charges had been lodged against Mercedes, the court 11 observed, “it’s not as if he . . . had been arrested and was outon release and then got rearrested on some separate charge.”The court “look[ed] behind the numbers” and commented that “ifthat risk factor were removed,” release would have beenrecommended. The trial judge thus concluded it was notappropriate to rely on the PSA’s recommendation against releaseor Rule 3:4A(b)(5). The court also found that there were “significant issueswith respect to the weight of the evidence in this case.” Inparticular, the court noted “there are certainly issues . . .with the reliability of the confidential informant whoseinformation led to the suspicion that there [were] narcotics anda firearm in the vehicle. To my understanding, there was nofirearm recovered.” The court added that there were “seriousquestions about whether the defendant was aware of what was inthere.” The court ordered Mercedes released on level 3 pretrialmonitoring on both sets of charges and directed that he have nocontact with the victim in the shooting case. Level 3monitoring includes both in-person and phone contact withpretrial services on alternating weeks. Pretrial ReleaseRecommendation Decision Making Framework (DMF) (Pretrial Release(DMF)) 3 (Mar. 2018), https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/assets/criminal/decmakframwork.pdf. 12 The court stayed the order of release pending appeal. In abrief order, the Appellate Division affirmed. It explained thatthe trial “court’s decision was not an abuse of its considerablediscretion and comported with the applicable legal principles.” We granted leave to appeal and stayed Mercedes’s releasepending appeal. 230 N.J. 586 (2017). In both matters, wegranted the Attorney General and the American Civil LibertiesUnion of New Jersey (ACLU) leave to appear as amicus curiae. Wealso granted amicus status to the County Prosecutors Associationof New Jersey (CPANJ) in Travis’s appeal. II. The Court reviewed the history of criminal justice reformin State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 52-56 (2017), and analyzeddifferent parts of the CJRA in several recent cases, see Statev. Dickerson, 232 N.J. 2 (2018); State v. S.N., 231 N.J. 497(2018); State v. Ingram, 230 N.J. 190 (2017); Robinson, 229 N.J. 44. We begin with a brief overview of some relevant principlesrelated to the new law and the court rules. A. The CJRA is to be “liberally construed” in favor of“primarily relying upon pretrial release by non-monetary means.”N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15. A judge can detain a defendant pretrial,after a hearing, only “if the State proves by clear andconvincing evidence that no release conditions would reasonably 13 assure the defendant’s appearance in court, the safety of thecommunity, or the integrity of the criminal justice process.”Ingram, 230 N.J. at 200-01 (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)). The State may seek to detain a defendant who is chargedwith one of the serious offenses set forth in section 19(a), orhas been convicted of multiple serious crimes under section19(a)(3). A rebuttable presumption of detention exists in onlytwo circumstances: when the court finds probable cause tobelieve that a defendant has committed murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3,or a crime that carries a sentence of life imprisonment,N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b)(1) to (2). In all other cases, apresumption of release applies. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(b). At the detention hearing, unless a grand jury has alreadyreturned an indictment, the prosecutor must establish probablecause that the defendant committed the charged offenses.N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(2). Next, to determine whether detention is warranted -- thatis, whether any combination of conditions will reasonablyprotect against the risk of flight, danger, or obstruction, seeN.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(c) -- “the court may take into accountinformation” about the nature and circumstances of the offense,the weight of the evidence, the defendant’s history andcharacteristics, the nature of the risk of danger andobstruction the defendant poses, and “[t]he release 14 recommendation of the pretrial services program obtained using arisk assessment instrument.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(a) to (f). The statute specifically provides for the creation of astatewide Pretrial Services Program to implement the Act.N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25(a). After an eligible defendant is arrested,a pretrial services officer prepares a PSA, which recommendswhether the defendant should be released. There are twocomponents to the recommendation: measuring and managing therisk a defendant presents. Criminal Justice Reform Report tothe Governor and Legislature 4 (Dec. 2016), https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2016cjrannual.pdf?cacheID=a3GBpjl. The risk assessment component relies on an approvedinstrument that is “objective, standardized, and [has been]developed based on [an] analysis of empirical data and riskfactors.” See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25(c)(1). The New JerseyJudiciary worked with the Laura and John Arnold Foundation todevelop a risk-assessment tool. Robinson, 229 N.J. at 62. Thetool measures whether a defendant will fail to appear in courtand whether he or she will engage in new criminal activity whileon release. Ibid. As we explained in Robinson, the toolconsiders nine factors including the defendant’s age, whetherthe offense is violent, and whether the defendant has anyadditional pending charges at the time of the offense, as wellas prior convictions, failures to appear within the past two 15 years, and prior jail sentences of at least fourteen days.Ibid. The risk management component, referred to as the DecisionMaking Framework (DMF), “is primarily driven by the defendant’scharges and the risk that the criminal justice system is willingto tolerate concerning defendants who are charged with certaintypes of crimes.” Criminal Justice Reform Report to theGovernor and the Legislature for Calendar Year 2017 (2017Report) 2, https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/assets/criminal/2017cjrannual.pdf. This Court approved the DMF afterconsultation with the Administrative Office of the Courts andDr. Marie VanNostrand, Ph.D., a recognized expert in the area ofpretrial release. The DMF follows a multi-step matrix. The PSA is completedfirst, and it generates scores for failure to appear and newcriminal activity; it also determines whether a flag for newviolent criminal activity applies. Pretrial Release (DMF) 1(Step 1). The DMF then considers additional factors with aparticular emphasis on the current charge. As part of thatprocess, certain charges result in a recommendation againstrelease regardless of the PSA score: escape, aggravatedmanslaughter, manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault, sexualassault, first-degree robbery, carjacking, and seven weaponsoffenses. Ibid. (Step 5). 16 In addition, if a defendant is charged with an offenseunder the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, for a crimeother than one referred to in Step 5, the DMF increases therecommendation for pretrial monitoring by one level. Id. at 2(Step 8). A recommendation for level 2 monitoring, for example,which requires monthly in-person contact with a pretrialservices officer, is elevated to level 3, which calls for weeklycontact. Id. at 3 (Table 1). Defendants charged with certainother firearms offenses also receive a recommended increase inthe level of monitoring. Id. at 2 (Step 9). The DMF also generates a recommendation against releasewhen a defendant who was previously arrested on two separateoccasions is charged with a new offense while the other matterswere still pending. Ibid. (Step 6). Critical to this appeal, because defendant Travis wascharged with first-degree robbery, the DMF resulted in arecommendation against his release. Recommendations based on the PSA and the DMF, though, donot replace judicial discretion. Trial judges make the ultimatedecision on release after they consider other relevant details.Robinson, 229 N.J. at 62 (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20). When acourt does not follow a recommendation, it must provide anexplanation. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-23(a)(2). 17 B. The Court asked the Committee on Criminal Practice torecommend court rules to implement the CJRA. To save judicialresources and avoid lengthy detention hearings, a majority ofthe Committee favored expanding the list of crimes in the CJRAfor which there would be a presumption of detention. See Reportof the Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Practice onRecommended Court Rules to Implement the Bail Reform Law, Part 2(Pretrial Detention and Speedy Trial) 2 (May 12, 2016), https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/supreme/reports/2016/bailreformlaw2016.pdf (suggesting amendment to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b)). The Committee, however, did not propose a court rule toaccomplish what the statute did not. Ibid. Instead, a majorityrecommended Rule 3:4A(b)(5), over the objection of the PublicDefender, the ACLU, and others. See id. at 9-18, 170-71. TheCourt later adopted the rule under its rulemaking authority.See N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3; Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 245 (1950). The Rule’s second paragraph, which is pivotal to thisappeal, provides as follows: The standard of proof for the rebuttal of the presumption of pretrial release shall be by clear and convincing evidence. The court may consider as prima facie evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of release a recommendation by the Pretrial 18 Services Program established pursuant toN.J.S.A. 2A:162-25 that the defendant’s release is not recommended (i.e., a determination that “release not recommended or if released, maximum conditions”). Although such recommendation by the Pretrial Services Program may constitute sufficient evidence upon which the court may order pretrial detention, nothing herein shall preclude the court from considering other relevant information presented by the prosecutor or the defendant in determining whether no amount of monetary bail, non- monetary bail conditions of pretrial release or combination of monetary bail and conditions would reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, and that the defendant will not obstruct the criminal justice process. [R. 3:4A(b)(5) (emphases added).] C. State v. S.N. settled another important aspect of the lawrelating to pretrial detention. 231 N.J. at 500. Itestablished the standard of review for a pretrial detentionorder: “whether the trial court abused its discretion byrelying on an impermissible basis, by relying upon irrelevant orinappropriate factors, by failing to consider all relevantfactors, or by making a clear error in judgment.” Ibid. III. A. Defendant Travis argues that Rule 3:4A(b)(5) operates in away that violates both the CJRA and his right to due process. 19 He claims that the Rule strips him of the presumption of releaseguaranteed in the statute and creates a presumption ofdetention. According to Travis, the Rule allows for detentionbased solely on the crime charged -- in this case, first-degreerobbery, which does not carry a presumption of detention underthe CJRA. Travis also contends that the State failed to carry itsburden of proof at the detention hearing. He maintains that theevidence proffered was insufficient to prove that he presented arisk of flight, danger, or obstruction, and that the trial courtcould have released him on conditions. The ACLU echoes Travis’s argument about Rule 3:4A(b)(5) andcontends that it impermissibly relieves the State of its burdento prove the need for detention. The ACLU also challenges thetrial court’s consideration of other factors. The State maintains that the trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion in detaining Travis and properly based its decisionon a number of statutory factors. According to the State, thecourt did not rely solely on Rule 3:4A(b)(5). The State alsosubmits that the Rule is valid and was properly adopted throughthe Court’s rulemaking process. In addition, the State arguesthat the Rule does not create a presumption; it instead presentsa procedural option. In the event the Court is inclined tochange the Rule, the State argues that normal rulemaking 20 channels should be followed; alternatively, any new rule shouldbe applied prospectively. The Attorney General and the CPANJ likewise support Rule3:4A(b)(5). They contend that the prima facie standard in theRule does not create a presumption of detention. B. The State maintains that the trial court abused itsdiscretion when it declined to detain defendant Mercedes. TheState focuses on several issues: the court’s failure to rely onRule 3:4A(b)(5) under the circumstances of this case; thejudge’s “recalculati[on]” of the second PSA score because therewas no evidence that Mercedes knew about the prior charge; thecourt’s improper weighing of the relevant evidence; and itsfailure to consider appropriately Mercedes’s extensive historyof not appearing in court. Mercedes contends that the trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion by ordering that he be released on conditions.Mercedes argues that the State did not satisfy its burden toovercome the presumption of release. As he did at the detentionhearing, Mercedes contends that the weight of the evidenceagainst him is weak. He maintains that the court properly foundissues relating to identification in the first case, andconstructive possession in the second. Mercedes also submitsthat the court properly considered and weighed other factors 21 about his past record and “old” failures to appear in municipalcourt. The Attorney General echoes a number of the State’sarguments. The Attorney General contends that the trial courtabused its discretion when it discounted the no-releaserecommendations and PSA scores because of their origin. TheAttorney General also claims the court erred by finding that theweight of the evidence in each case cut against detention.Finally, the Attorney General argues that the court made anerror in judgment in its overall balancing of the evidence whenit “ignored” Mercedes’s record of nine failures to appear andimproperly considered his two prior drug convictions as one. The ACLU contends that a trial court does not abuse itsdiscretion when it reasonably concludes that the State’s proofsare weak and gives that fact significant weight in denying theState’s motion for detention. The ACLU also submits that it isnot an abuse of discretion to give less or more weight tofactors considered in a PSA based on the circumstancessurrounding those factors. Among other points, the ACLUhighlights the court’s assessment that the shooting case shouldnot have been treated as a pending charge in the drug case inlight of the facts here. 22 IV. We note that, after oral argument, defendant Travis pledguilty to second-degree robbery. Because he was releasedsubject to conditions pending sentencing, the argumentspresented in his case are now moot. They are also “capable ofrepetition” in countless detention hearings yet may evade reviewif other defendants plead guilty before similar challenges canbe resolved. See State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 147 (2017). The validity of Rule 3:4A(b)(5) and its application atpretrial detention hearings raise issues of considerable publicimportance, particularly in the early days of the CJRA. Seeibid. We therefore address the Rule at this time. We declineto evaluate whether the trial court abused its discretion whenit ordered Travis detained, however. V. The CJRA went into effect on January 1, 2017. In the firsttwelve months, complaint-warrants were issued against 44,319defendants. 2 017 Report at 4. Prosecutors filed motions forpretrial detention in 19,366 cases. Ibid. 5350 motions werewithdrawn or dismissed, and courts conducted hearings in theremaining 14,016 cases. Id. at 14. Judges granted 8043 motions(57.4 percent) and denied 5973 (42.6 percent). Ibid. When we approved new court rules in August 2016, we hopedthey would foster a fair and efficient process for criminal 23 justice reform. Today, the experience from thousands of actualdetention hearings helps inform our thinking. With that inmind, we return to the language of Rule 3:4A(b)(5) and concludethat parts of the Rule should be revised. As noted above, the CJRA calls for the release ofdefendants pretrial unless the State can demonstrate by clearand convincing evidence that detention is warranted. SeeN.J.S.A. 2A:162-15; N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a). Once again, apresumption of detention, subject to rebuttal, applies in onlytwo situations: when a court finds probable cause that adefendant has committed murder or an offense that carries apotential sentence of life imprisonment. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b),(e)(2). Travis and the ACLU argue that parts of Rule 3:4A(b)(5)can be read in a way that is at odds with those principles. Consider the third sentence of the Rule’s second paragraph,which states, “such recommendation [against release] by thePretrial Services Program may constitute sufficient evidenceupon which the court may order pretrial detention . . . .” Thequoted language suggests a court can order detention basedsolely on a recommendation against release. To be sure, the Rule is permissive, not mandatory. And thestatute invites judges to consider an array of factors to decidea motion for pretrial release. They include the nature andcircumstances of the offense, the weight of the evidence, the 24 defendant’s history and characteristics, the risk of danger andobstruction, and the release recommendation by the pretrialservices program. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(a) to (f). But a recommendation against release by itself cannotjustify detention if it is based only on the type of offensecharged -- unless that charge is encompassed by section 19(b).Otherwise, an offense that does not give rise to a presumptionof detention under section 19(b), but is covered by the DMF,could result in detention based solely on the crime charged.That would run counter to the language of the statute. As aresult, a charge of escape, manslaughter, sexual assault, first-degree robbery, carjacking, or the weapons offenses listed inthe DMF -- any of which will generate a recommendation againstrelease under the DMF -- cannot alone satisfy the State’s burdento prove detention. The State does not disagree. It acknowledges that evenwhen a PSA recommends against release, based on a charge otherthan murder or a crime that exposes a defendant to life inprison, the State must still present clear and convincingevidence to overcome the presumption of release and justifydetention. To make the rule more clear, then, its text shouldpoint to the additional factors judges consider when they decidewhether to detain a person. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20. 25 The second sentence of the rule’s second paragraph raises arelated concern. It reads, “The court may consider as primafacie evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of releasea recommendation by the Pretrial Services Program . . . that thedefendant’s release is not recommended . . . .” R. 3:4A(b)(5).Once again, a recommendation against release, based on the typeof charge alone, cannot justify detention unless it is based ona statutory presumption of detention. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b). The State still needs to establish the need fordetention -- to protect against the risk of flight, danger, orobstruction -- by clear and convincing evidence. The State represents that it routinely relies on evidencebeyond a recommendation against release to meet its burden. Wealso recognize that individual detention hearings have notrequired an extended amount of court time. As both of theseappeals demonstrate, the parties and the trial court haveadjusted to the new law. Judges adeptly marshal the facts andarguments, and make sufficient findings in a reasonable periodof time, without heavy reliance on the prima facie standard. The Rule’s reference to “prima facie evidence sufficient toovercome the presumption of release” thus accomplishes little inpractice and can be misinterpreted. With more than a thousanddetention motions filed each month, we elect to clarify the Rule 26 now rather than refer it back to the Committee. We do so toavoid confusion and any tension with the statute. For all of those reasons, we revise the second paragraph ofRule 3:4A(b)(5) as follows: The standard of proof for the rebuttal of the presumption of pretrial release shall be by clear and convincing evidence. To determine whether a motion for pretrial detention should be granted, the court may take into account information about the factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20. As the statute makes clear, trial judges must consider arecommendation against release, see N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(b), andmay rely heavily on it as part of the court’s overall analysis,see N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(f). In fact, if a court declines tofollow a recommendation, it is required to explain itsreasoning. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-23(a)(2). Just the same, judges mayrely heavily on the seriousness of a pending charge. SeeN.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(a). The more serious the crime, the greaterthe weight it may be given. And the conduct underlying thecrime can of course be considered. In some cases, that evidencemay be weighty; in others, the proofs may suggest the case isweak. All of those factors are appropriate to consider. The State and the CPANJ note that certain higher PSA scoresas well as other circumstances can generate a recommendationagainst release. See Pretrial Release (DMF) at 4. They suggest 27 that the prima facie standard can survive in those cases. ThePublic Defender and the ACLU disagree. We decline to adopt a hybrid rule. Without deciding thedispute, we note that clear rules that are easy to apply betterserve our system of justice. An approach that would allow aprima facie standard in some situations but not others, with arecommendation against release in both, could well lead toconfusion and mistakes. Moreover, trial judges will readily seeand be able to assess high PSA scores, which are prominentlydisplayed at the beginning of each PSA. And, as noted above,judges can certainly examine and rely on the underlying factsthat generated a high PSA score. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(a),(c). Having done so, courts may give more or less weight tothose and other relevant factors. VI. We apply the revised version of Rule 3:4A(b)(5) to allpending and future motions for pretrial detention. See State v.Earls, 214 N.J. 564, 569, 590-91 (2013) (discussingretroactivity factors). In addition, any defendant now held inpretrial detention may ask to reopen his or her detentionhearing if (1) the order of detention relied solely on arecommendation against release by the pretrial services program,(2) that recommendation was based only on the type of offensecharged, and (3) that recommendation was not based on an offense 28 described in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b). To be clear, if a courtordered detention based on a recommendation against release aswell as some other reason, the order of detention will remain ineffect, and no further proceeding will be held. In defendant Travis’s case, the trial court ordereddetention for multiple reasons. It noted that “a prima faciecase ha[d] been presented” based on the recommendation againstrelease -- which was driven by the first-degree robbery chargeand the DMF. But the court made a number of other findings aswell relating to the “extraordinarily serious” nature of theshooting and robbery, the eyewitness identification and forensicevidence, Travis’s history and characteristics, and his motiveto flee. The case presented a close call, with a number of factorsthat favored release and others that pointed toward detention.Because Travis has entered a plea and is no longer detained,though, we do not assess the trial court’s ruling. VII. In defendant Mercedes’s case, the trial court did not relyon the recommendations against release in the PSAs or on Rule3:4A(b)(5). Mercedes’s appeal raises other issues that weaddress in turn. 29 A. As noted earlier, Mercedes’s detention hearing involved twosets of charges: the shooting case, in which the PSA rated him4 out of 6 for risk of failure to appear and the same for riskof new criminal activity; and the drug case, in which the PSArated the risk levels at 5 and 6, respectively. Mercedes appeared in court for the first time in thismatter on both sets of charges. The parties dispute whether itwas appropriate for the trial court to “look[] behind thenumbers” when it evaluated the PSA on the second set of charges.The court explained that “[t]here’s no information that[Mercedes] was aware . . . that he had been charged with” theearlier shooting offense. “[I]f that risk factor were removed,”the court observed, “it would be a release recommended case.” The trial judge corrected a mistake in the PSA when he ineffect reevaluated whether the charges in the shooting caseshould be treated as “pending charges.” As noted earlier, oneof the nine risk factors that form the basis of the risk-assessment tool is whether a defendant had a “pending charge” atthe time of offense. That term is defined as follows: A pending charge is a charge that has a future pre-disposition related court date or is pending presentation to the grand jury, or has not been disposed of due to the defendant’s failure to appear pending trial or sentencing, or that is in some form of deferred status (e.g., conditional discharge, conditional dismissal, pretrial 30 intervention program). Charges include any Indictable or Disorderly Persons offense. A pre-disposition court appearance is any court appearance after arrest and prior to and including sentencing. The pending charge must have been pending at the time of the alleged offense for the current arrest while the defendant was on some form of pretrial release pending case disposition. If the current arrest includes a bench warrant for failure to appear for a pre-disposition related court appearance, the underlying charge for the failure to appear is counted as a pending charge. If the defendant had an Indictable or Disorderly Persons charge pending at the time the current offense allegedly occurred, the answer to this risk factor is yes. Otherwise, the answer is no. [Public Safety Assessment, New Jersey Risk Factor Definitions 2 (Mar. 2018), www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/assets/ criminal/psariskfactor.pdf.2] Defendant Mercedes was arrested on August 4, 2017, for thecharges related to (1) the shooting on July 2, 2017, and (2) thedrug investigation on August 4, 2017. At that time, the chargesfor the shooting incident did not meet any of the conditions inthe definition of “pending charge.” Specifically, there was no“future pre-disposition related court date” for the offensesrelating to the shooting. See ibid. Even without the2 The Attorney General attached an earlier version of this document, effective March 1, 2017, to its brief. The definition for “pending charge” in both versions is substantively the same. It is not clear, though, that the parties or the judge had the definition before them at the time of Mercedes’s detention hearing. To facilitate access to the document, the Administrative Office of the Courts has posted it on the Judiciary’s website. See ibid. 31 definition in hand, the trial judge correctly questioned whethera charge for which Mercedes had not been previously arrested andplaced on some form of release, and for which he had not failedto appear, should factor into the PSA’s recommendation as a“pending charge.” The above definition of “pending charge” does not turn onwhether a defendant was aware of an outstanding charge. Thatsaid, if in a case like this the record revealed that adefendant knew he was wanted on prior charges, for which nocourt dates had yet been set, the trial court could properlyconsider that fact as part of its overall evaluation of the riskthe defendant posed. In this matter, a possible source of the error in the PSAmay have been an innocent mistake in the Complaint-Warrant forthe drug offenses. That document mistakenly recorded the dateof arrest as August 8, 2017 -- not August 4, 2017. Had Mercedesbeen arrested and released four days earlier on the shootingcharges, they would have properly been considered “pendingcharges” at the time of a later drug arrest. B. The trial court also treated two separate prior convictionsfor drug offenses as a single conviction because Mercedes wassentenced in both cases on the same date. According to the PSA,the first conviction was for distribution of a controlled 32 dangerous substance on or near school property on March 15,2010, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. The second charge, forthe same offense, occurred on April 10, 2010. The issue is somewhat complicated. To calculate the PSAscore, multiple violent convictions are considered, but only onenon-violent indictable conviction is counted. Laura and JohnArnold Foundation, Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors andFormula 3, http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/PSA-Risk-Factors-and-Formula.pdf. Yet as a matter of fact,Mercedes has two prior drug convictions. We cannot tell from the PSA whether the offenses were partof a single event -- which seems unlikely given the timing -- ora related course of conduct. Without knowing more, theconvictions should not have been considered as one for purposesof the court’s overall analysis. Indeed, the fact that adefendant has two seemingly unrelated prior convictions for drugdistribution, which took place one month apart, may be relevantto a court’s assessment of the risk he presents. That said, itwas not improper for the trial court here to consider the age ofthe previous drug offenses. C. The PSA lists nine instances in which Mercedes failed toappear in court. One occurred within two years of the detentionhearing. The others took place from 2010 to 2014. At the 33 hearing, the court commented, “His failure-to-appear historyinvolves a recent failure to appear in a municipal case, whichI’m . . . assuming . . . was dismissed because it doesn’t showup as a prior disorderly persons conviction.” According to the State, the court’s reasoning improperlysuggests that failures to appear in municipal court are lessserious than in Superior Court. We do not agree. Both areserious, and the court’s comments did not suggest otherwise. Of greater concern, it appears that the court gave littleweight to Mercedes’s extended history of not showing up forcourt. Although eight of his failures to appear were 3.5 to 7years old at the time of the hearing, they reveal a troublesomepattern that raises serious questions about whether he willappear in court if released. D. Finally, the trial court discounted the weight of theevidence in both sets of charges. For the shooting case, thecourt observed there were “very significant issues with respectto the identification of this defendant.” The State made astraightforward presentation that linked the car captured oncamera to the mother of Mercedes’s child and ultimately toMercedes himself; the victim then identified Mercedes from aphoto array as the person who shot him. Defense counselattempted to poke holes in that evidence and argued, from eight 34 still photos, that the license plate could not be identified.Counsel also challenged the victim’s statements and emphasizedthat others drove the car. To allow for a review of the trialcourt’s thinking, the court should have placed its concernsabout the identification briefly on the record. As to the drug charges, the trial court found “significantissues with respect to the weight of the evidence” and notedconcerns about constructive possession and the reliability ofthe informant. At the detention hearing, the State presented an affidavitin support of a search warrant for the car, among othermaterials. The affidavit, signed by a detective with the CamdenCounty Prosecutor’s Office, revealed the following details aboutthe anonymous source: (1) law enforcement officials had usedthe source in the past, and the person’s information “resultedin the apprehension of wanted individuals”; (2) on August 4,2017, the source “utilized” by the United States MarshalsService said he or she “had observed Mr. Mercedes arrive in thearea of 5th and Grant Streets operating a white older modelHonda Accord with tinted windows”; (3) the source also advisedthat he or she had observed Mercedes come to that area onseveral occasions “to drop off the resupply of narcotics to thedrug distribution set located” there; (4) the source “believedthat there is a hidden compartment located in the front inside 35 area of the vehicle”; and (5) on August 4, 2017, the source “hadobserved a hand gun and narcotics inside the white Honda,” whileMercedes operated the car. Following up on that information,the affidavit noted that law enforcement located and followedthe car, identified Mercedes as the driver, and arrested himafter stopping the car. Pursuant to the search warrant,officers found 349 bags of heroin and $3458 in cash. At the hearing, defense counsel stressed that Mercedes didnot own the car and that “a lot of people in the neighborhood”used it. The court then made the following findings: While the affidavit was found sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant for the vehicle, there are certainly issues with respect to . . . the reliability of the confidential informant whose information led to the suspicion that there [were] narcotics and a firearm in the vehicle. To my understanding, there was no firearm recovered. There [were] narcotics recovered and cash recovered in a secreted location. There are, based on [the] proffer from the defense, serious questions about whether the defendant was aware of what was in there. The confidential informant alleges that the defendant is involved in drug trafficking. But there are weight of the evidence issues in this case. The court’s analysis addressed two separate issues:whether the informant was reliable, which could affect thevalidity of the search warrant, and whether the defendant --charged with drug possession and distribution -- knew about thecontents of the hidden compartment. 36 The court on its own raised the question about theinformant’s reliability; that issue would not ordinarily surfaceuntil a motion to suppress. At that time, the reliability of aninformant’s tip would be analyzed under the totality of thecircumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983);State v. Keyes, 184 N.J. 541, 555 (2005); State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 92 (1998); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 121-23(1987). Two factors would help inform that analysis: veracity andbasis of knowledge. Smith, 155 N.J. at 93 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). We do not rule on the validity of the searchwarrant now. But we note that it supports the informant’sveracity by pointing to past instances of reliability, andexpressly details what the informant knew of the criminalactivity from personal observation. The fact that no gun wasrecovered does not undermine the source’s prior history orreliability. It was therefore not appropriate to discount the weight ofthe evidence based on the informant’s reliability. VIII. Like the appeal in the Travis matter, the factors inMercedes’s case present a difficult question. We note that anumber of those factors distinctly favor detention. We are alsomindful of the deferential standard of review -- abuse of 37 discretion -- which does not permit appellate courts tosubstitute their judgment for the trial court’s. See S.N., 231 N.J. at 500. Because we cannot tell how the above issues affected thetrial court’s findings and ruling, we remand the matter for thecourt to reevaluate the State’s motion for detention with theabove guidance in mind. Until then, we leave in place the orderstaying Mercedes’s release. IX. For the reasons stated above, we revise Rule 3:4A(b)(5)effective today and dismiss Travis’s appeal as moot. We remandMercedes’s appeal for further proceedings consistent with thisopinion. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a concurring opinion. 38 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 6 September Term 2017 A- 7 September Term 2017 079995 and 080020STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.JONATHAN MERCEDES, Defendant-Respondent.STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.HASSAN TRAVIS, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE ALBIN, concurring. I gladly join the Court’s opinion, which realigns our courtrule with the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), N.J.S.A.2A:162-15 to -26, in cases involving determinations aboutpretrial detention. I write separately in the hope that theCourt, through its administrative process, will soon address anissue indirectly raised in these appeals. The CJRA imposes a presumption against detention for allcrimes other than murder and those offenses exposing a defendantto a term of life imprisonment. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(b); N.J.S.A. 1 2A:162-19(b)(1) to (2). The Court’s decision-making framework(DMF) requires pretrial service officers to recommend detentionsolely based on crimes, such as first-degree robbery, for whichthere is a presumption in favor of pretrial release under theCJRA. The conflict between the Court’s DMF (recommendingdetention for first-degree robbery) and the CJRA (requiring arebuttable presumption favoring pretrial release for thatoffense) came into sharp focus in this case through our now-defunct court rule. That rule stated that the trial court “mayconsider as prima facie evidence sufficient to overcome thepresumption of release a recommendation by the Pretrial ServicesProgram.” R. 3:4A(b)(5). The pretrial services recommendation,through the court rule, could have operated to undermine therebuttable presumption favoring pretrial release. Thereformatted rule now instructs our trial courts that they “maytake into account information about the factors listed inN.J.S.A. 2A:162-20” in determining whether the State hasrebutted the presumption in favor of pretrial release. Ante at___ (slip op. at 27). That is a great improvement because itplaces on our trial courts the ultimate responsibility of makingindividualized risk-based assessments. However, raised indirectly in defendant Travis’s argumentsand more directly by amicus curiae the ACLU is the issue of thevalidity and wisdom of the current DMF. As the ACLU puts it, 2 “the DMF recommend[s] detention, solely based on the chargedoffense, even when the Legislature has determined that thecharged offense is due a presumption of release.” The ACLUcontinues, “[t]he Judiciary acts properly in makingrecommendations about conditions of release, as long as thosesuggestions do not create de facto presumptions of detention.”The rule change removes the arguable de facto presumption ofdetention that concerned defendant and the ACLU. Nevertheless,the DMF still has a lingering effect. Our trial courts muststill “provide an explanation . . . that authorizes the eligibledefendant’s release” when a pretrial services officer recommendsdetention based solely on the type of offense for which the CJRAgives the benefit of a rebuttable presumption in favor ofpretrial release. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-23(a)(2). I hope that the seeming incongruity between the CJRA andthe DMF gives cause for an administrative reconsideration of thecurrent version of the DMF. Importantly, today’s thoughtful andwell-reasoned decision brings into balance the CJRA and ourcourt rule. 3 This archive is a service of Rutgers School of Law.