Case Title: Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11883

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11883 
 
OPINION OF THE JUSTICES TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 
 
 
General Court.  Constitutional Law, General Court, Appropriation 
of money, Taxation.  Statute, Appropriation of money, 
Amendment.  Taxation. 
 
 
 
On June 15, 2015, the Justices submitted the following 
response to questions propounded to them by the House of 
Representatives. 
 
 
 
To the Honorable the House of Representatives of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts: 
 
The undersigned Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court 
respectfully submit this response to the questions set forth in 
an order adopted by the House of Representatives on May 22, 
2015, and transmitted to us on that date.  The order poses five 
questions concerning the State budget legislation for fiscal 
year 2016.  All of the questions involve Part II, c. 1, § 3, 
art. 7, of the Massachusetts Constitution, which we will refer 
to as the origination article.1  They ask, among other things, 
                     
 
1 Part II, c. 1, § 3, art. 7, of the Massachusetts 
Constitution provides:  "All money bills shall originate in the 
2 
 
whether certain provisions in the House budget bill rendered it 
a "money bill" within the meaning of the origination article, 
and whether the Senate improperly "originated" a money bill in 
violation of this article. 
As explained below, we are of the view that the House bill 
was a money bill, and that the Senate did not improperly 
originate a money bill.2 
 
Bills and amendments at issue.  We begin by summarizing the 
history of the various bills and amendments that give rise to 
the questions, and by describing generally the provisions that 
are at issue, reserving for later a more detailed analysis of 
the legal effect of those provisions. 
On March 4, 2015, acting pursuant to art. 63, § 2, of the 
Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by 
art. 107 of the Amendments, and pursuant to G. L. c. 29, 
§ 7H, the Governor filed with the House his recommended budget 
for fiscal year 2016, which, as is customary, was designated 
House No. 1.  Among its many provisions was section 27, entitled 
                                                                  
house of representatives; but the senate may propose or concur 
with amendments, as on other bills." 
 
2 We invited interested individuals and organizations to 
file amicus briefs on or before June 5, 2015.  We acknowledge 
the receipt of briefs from the House of Representatives; the 
Senate; Senators Bruce Tarr, Robert Hedlund, Richard Ross, 
Donald Humason, Viriato de Macedo, and Ryan Fattman, comprising 
the Senate Republican caucus; and attorney Peter Vickery. 
3 
 
"Delay FAS 109 Deduction,"3 which provided:  "Subsection (2) of 
section 95 of chapter 173 of the acts of 2008 is hereby amended 
by striking out the figure '2016', inserted by section 189 of 
chapter 165 of the acts of 2014, and inserting in place thereof 
the following figure:- 2017."  The Governor's submission 
described section 27 as follows:  "This section delays until tax 
year 2017 the start of the deduction allowed to certain 
publicly-traded companies to offset increases in their net 
deferred tax liability that resulted from the commonwealth's 
implementation of combined reporting."4 
                     
 
3 We understand the reference to "FAS 109" as meaning 
Financial Accounting Standard 109 ("Accounting for Income 
Taxes") of the Financial Accounting Standards Board. 
 
4 It suffices to say that G. L. c. 63, § 32B, as amended by 
St. 2008, c. 173, § 48, requires certain corporations engaged 
with other, affiliated corporations in a "unitary business" to 
report their income on a combined basis.  At the same time it 
rewrote G. L. c. 63, § 32B, to create this requirement, the 
Legislature also provided a deduction for such corporations 
designed to offset any increases in their net deferred tax 
liability that would result from the combined reporting.  See 
St. 2008, c. 173, § 95 (2).  The deduction was to be spread over 
a seven-year period "beginning with the combined group's taxable 
year that begins in 2012."  Id.  In each of the annual budget 
acts beginning with fiscal year 2012, however, the Legislature 
postponed the start date of the deduction by one year.  So, for 
example, the budget act for fiscal year 2012 postponed the 
deduction until tax year 2013 (see St. 2011, c. 68, § 136), the 
budget act for fiscal year 2013 postponed it until 2014 (see 
St. 2012, c. 139, § 140), and so on.  The Governor's recommended 
budget for fiscal year 2016 would have postponed the start date 
of the deduction for an additional year, until tax year 2017. 
4 
 
 
House No. 1 was referred to the House committee on ways and 
means on March 5, 2015.  The committee filed its version of the 
budget on April 15, 2015, as House No. 3400.  Among its numerous 
outside sections, House No. 3400 contained section 48, the 
language of which was identical to section 27 of House No. 1, 
i.e., the delay of the so-called FAS 109 deduction for 
corporations reporting on a combined basis.  The House 
thereafter engaged in extensive debate on House No. 3400, during 
which it considered in excess of 1,000 amendments, including one 
that is particularly important to the questions that are now 
before us, amendment 685, entitled "For Expansion of the 
Conservation Land Tax Credit Program."  The amendment, which was 
adopted, provides that "Section 38AA (h) of Chapter 63 of the 
General Laws is hereby amended by deleting '$2,000,000' and 
replacing it with '$5,000,000'."5,6 
 
House No. 3400, as amended, was passed to be engrossed by 
the House on April 30, 2015, in the form of House No. 3401.  The 
                     
 
5 General Laws c. 63, § 38AA, authorizes a tax credit for a 
"qualified donation" of "certified land" to a "public or private 
conservation agency" as defined in the statute.  Section 
38AA (h) currently provides in relevant part that "[t]he total 
cumulative value of the tax credits authorized pursuant to this 
section and [G. L. c. 62, § 6 (p),] shall not exceed $2,000,000 
annually." 
 
6 As originally introduced, amendment 685 contained no 
express effective date.  The amendment was changed before being 
adopted to indicate that the amendment to G. L. c. 63, § 38AA, 
would take effect on January 1, 2016. 
5 
 
delay of the so-called FAS 109 deduction, proposed by the 
Governor and adopted by the House, appears as section 48 of 
House No. 3401.  The proposed increase in the amount of the tax 
credit for qualified donations of land to conservation agencies 
appears in sections 76 (the substance of the provision) and 77 
(its effective date).  For convenience, we shall refer to 
section 48 of House No. 3401 as the delayed FAS 109 deduction 
provision, and to sections 76 and 77 as the conservation land 
credit provision. 
 
House No. 3401 was transmitted to the Senate, and referred 
by the clerk of the Senate to the Senate committee on ways and 
means, on May 7, 2015.  The committee immediately set out to 
establish its version of the budget, which it completed and 
reported to the Senate on May 12, 2015.  The bill reported from 
the committee, Senate No. 3, in section 54 contained language 
identical to the delayed FAS 109 deduction provision in House 
No. 3401.  It had no language comparable to the House's 
conservation land credit provision, however. 
 
The Senate, like the House, then engaged in extensive 
debate and considered numerous possible amendments.  The final 
Senate bill, like the final House bill, has many outside 
sections.  Among other things, section 54 continues to contain 
the delayed FAS 109 deduction provision.  Two other sections are 
also relevant to the questions that are put to us.  First, the 
6 
 
Senate adopted amendment 6, entitled "Expand Earned Income Tax 
Credit and Increase Personal Exemptions," which, among other 
things, added a new outside section to the Senate bill, section 
31D, that would amend G. L. c. 62, § 4, by striking out the 
current § 4 (b)7 and replacing it with the following:  "Part B 
taxable income shall be taxed at a rate of 5.15 per cent for tax 
years beginning on or after January 1, 2016."8  Amendment 6 added 
a further provision, section 107A, stating that the new section 
31D would take effect on January 1, 2016.  We will refer to 
sections 31D and 107A as the Part B income tax provision. 
                     
 
7 General Laws c. 62, § 4, sets the rates at which 
Massachusetts residents (and nonresidents in certain 
circumstances) are taxed on their taxable income.  Section 4 (b) 
governs so-called Part B taxable income, which includes wages, 
salaries, tips, and other employee compensation earned in 
Massachusetts.  As currently written, § 4 (b) sets a rate of 5.3 
per cent for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2002, 
and establishes a formula by which the rate will decrease by .05 
per cent in years when the State achieves certain revenue growth 
benchmarks.  So, for example, the rate applicable to Part B 
taxable income was 5.25 per cent for the tax year beginning on 
January 1, 2013, and 5.2 per cent for the tax year beginning on 
January 1, 2014, and is 5.15 per cent for the tax year beginning 
on January 1, 2015.  Section 4 (b), as currently written, 
further provides that "Part B taxable income shall be taxed at a 
rate of not less than 5 per cent." 
 
8 Amendment 6 also added three sections to the bill 
(sections 31A, 31B, and 31C) that would increase the dollar 
amount of personal income tax exemptions under G. L. c. 62, § 3, 
part B, subsections (b) (1), (b) (1A), and (b) (2), for 
individuals, heads of household, and spouses filing jointly; and 
one section (section 31E) that would increase the earned income 
credit for qualifying taxpayers under G. L. c. 62, § 6 (h). 
7 
 
 
Second, the Senate adopted amendment 836, entitled 
"Reducing youth consumption of flavored cigars," which added 
section 34A to the Senate bill.  Section 34A, which we will 
refer to as the flavored cigar excise provision, would, among 
other things, amend G. L. c. 64C, § 7B (b),9 by adding a new 
second paragraph to the statute, providing as follows: 
 
"In addition to the excise imposed by the preceding 
paragraph, an excise shall be imposed on fruit-flavored or 
other nontobacco-flavored cigars and smoking tobacco held 
in the commonwealth at the rate of 170 per cent of the 
wholesale price of such products.  This excise shall be 
imposed on cigar distributors at the time the fruit-
flavored or other nontobacco-flavored cigars or smoking 
tobacco are manufactured, purchased, imported, received or 
acquired in the commonwealth.  The excise shall not be 
imposed on any such cigars or smoking tobacco that:  (i) 
are exported from the commonwealth; or (ii) are not subject 
to taxation by the commonwealth pursuant to any federal 
law."10 
 
 
On May 21, 2015, Senate No. 3, as amended, was passed to be 
engrossed by the Senate, in the form of Senate No. 1930.  The 
Part B income tax provision, which appeared in sections 31D and 
                     
 
9 General Laws c. 64C, § 7B (b), currently provides an 
excise on "cigars" and "smoking tobacco," as defined in the 
statute, consisting of forty per cent of the wholesale price of 
such products.  The statute presently makes no mention of 
"fruit-flavored" or "other nontobacco-flavored" cigars or 
smoking tobacco. 
 
10 Amendment 836 also added section 105A to the Senate bill, 
stating:  "The comptroller shall transfer the revenues received 
under the second paragraph of section 7B of chapter 64C of the 
General Laws during fiscal year 2016, in an amount not to exceed 
$4,000,000, to item 4590-0300 for smoking prevention and 
cessation programs."  Line item 4590-0300 is within the 
appropriation for the Department of Public Health. 
8 
 
107A of Senate No. 3, appears in sections 31F and 109 of Senate 
No. 1930.  The flavored cigar excise provision, which appeared 
in section 34A of Senate No. 3, now appears in section 34A of 
Senate No. 1930.  Other than the section numbers, the provisions 
are essentially identical. 
 
It is against this backdrop that the budget bills were sent 
to a conference committee of the House and Senate.  We are aware 
that the work of the committee has begun and is in progress. 
 
By its order dated May 22, 2015, the House has posed the 
following five questions to us: 
 
"1.  Does an amendment to an existing session law 
postponing the effective date of a previously enacted tax 
expenditure, as set forth in section 48 of House No. 3401, 
render House No. 3401 a 'money bill' pursuant to Part II, 
c. 1, § 3, art. 7, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth? 
 
 
"2.  Does an amendment to an existing General Law 
increasing the expenditure of tax credits as set forth in 
section 76 of House No. 3401, render House No. 3401 a 
'money bill' pursuant to Part II, c. 1, § 3, art. 7, of the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth? 
 
 
"3.  If the answers to question 1 and question 2 are 
in the negative, would it be violative of Part II, c. 1, 
§ 3, art. 7, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth for 
the Senate to 'transfer money or property from the people 
to the State' by initiating the repeal of the current 
statutory mechanism requiring the tax rate on personal 
income be set at 5% upon satisfaction of certain fiscal 
requirements and replacing that reduction mechanism with a 
permanently fixed tax rate on personal income of 5.15% as 
set forth in section 31D of Senate No. 3? 
 
 
"4.  If the answers to question 1 and question 2 are 
in the negative, would it be violative of Part II, c. 1, 
§ 3, art. 7, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth for 
the Senate to 'transfer money or property from the people 
9 
 
to the State' by initiating a new tax on certain tobacco 
products as set forth in section 34A of Senate No. 3? 
 
 
"5.  If the answer to question 1 or question 2 is in 
the affirmative, does the substitution by the Senate of the 
text of Senate No. 3 for the text of House No. 3401 result 
in the Senate originating a money bill in violation of 
Part II, c. 1, § 3, art. 7, of the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth?" 
 
 
The House order expresses grave doubt as to whether its 
budget bill, House No. 3401, as engrossed and transmitted to the 
Senate, was a "money bill" for purposes of the origination 
article; as to whether the Senate had the authority to insert 
its tax-related provisions into the bill that originated in the 
House; and as to the constitutionality of the Part B income tax 
provision and the flavored cigar excise provision in the Senate 
bill if enacted into law.11,12 
 
Use of the advisory opinion process.  We next consider 
whether the House's questions can properly be answered in an 
advisory opinion.  We are of the view that they can in these 
circumstances. 
                     
 
11 Because the House's questions refer to Senate No. 3, we 
will do the same in our analysis.  As stated above, we 
understand that Senate No. 3 has been reprinted as amended and 
now appears as Senate No. 1930. 
 
12 In the interest of hewing closely to the questions that 
have been posed, we have limited this summary to the provisions 
cited in the House's order.  We have not undertaken to identify 
other provisions of the House and Senate bills that may pertain 
to taxes or, in a broader sense, revenue.  Nor have we 
undertaken to identify the areas on which the House and Senate 
bills are in agreement. 
10 
 
 
The advisory process is rooted in Part II, c. 3, art. 2, of 
the Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by art. 85 of the 
Amendments.  This article authorizes the Governor, the Executive 
Council, and each branch of the Legislature to call on the 
Justices for "opinions . . . upon important questions of law, 
and upon solemn occasions."13  The Constitution requires the 
Justices to respond to such questions when properly put, but the 
Constitution simultaneously imposes on us an obligation not to 
respond unless we are first satisfied that the elements of 
Part II, c. 3, art. 2 -- namely, an important question of law 
and a solemn occasion -- exist.  See Opinion of the Justices, 
430 Mass. 1205, 1207 (2000); Answer of the Justices, 319 Mass. 
731, 733-734 (1946); Answer of the Justices, 150 Mass. 598, 601 
(1890).14 
                     
 
13 When presented with a request for an advisory opinion, 
the Justices do not sit in their usual role, as a court, 
adjudicating a case or controversy.  Advisory opinions are given 
by the Justices as individuals in their capacity as 
constitutional advisers to the other branches of Government.  
Opinion of the Justices, 341 Mass. 738, 748 (1960), citing 
Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 400 (1931), cert. 
denied, 284 U.S. 684 (1932). 
 
14 The elements of Part II, c. 3, art. 2, have been 
described as "jurisdictional boundaries," Answer of the 
Justices, 444 Mass. 1201, 1204 (2005), that "cannot be crossed."  
Answer of the Justices, 362 Mass. 914, 917 (1973).  "The 
Justices must adhere strictly" to these boundaries "in order to 
safeguard the separation of powers embodied in art. 30 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights."  Answer of the Justices, 
444 Mass. at 1204.  Article 30 "acts as an inhibition upon the 
Justices giving opinions as to the duties of either the 
11 
 
 
There is no doubt that the questions presented by the House 
are "important questions of law."  All of the questions concern 
a provision, the origination article, that has been in the 
Massachusetts Constitution for 235 years; was a model for the 
cognate Federal constitutional provision and for similar 
provisions in the Constitutions of other States; articulates a 
significant distinction between the powers of the two branches 
of the Legislature; yet has generated remarkably little 
discussion in the decided cases and the advisory opinions of the 
Justices in Massachusetts (or elsewhere).  It also appears that 
this provision has been interpreted and applied differently by 
different Senate presidents and senators.  In short, the 
questions are important, unresolved, and challenging to answer. 
 
We are somewhat more concerned with the requirement that an 
advisory opinion only be given on a "solemn occasion."  In an 
often-repeated formulation, the Justices said more than a 
century ago that a solemn occasion "means some serious and 
unusual exigency," such as when "either branch of the 
Legislature, having some action in view, has serious doubts as 
to their power and authority to take such action, under the 
                                                                  
executive or legislative department except under the 
Constitution."  Id. at 1205, quoting Answer of the Justices, 214 
Mass. 602, 604 (1913).  See Answer of the Justices, 373 Mass. 
898, 901 (1977); Opinion of the Justices, 314 Mass. 767, 770 
(1943); Answer of the Justices, 150 Mass. 598, 601 (1890). 
12 
 
Constitution, or under existing statutes."  Answer of the 
Justices, 148 Mass. 623, 625-626 (1889).  The Justices have 
consistently construed this language strictly, as meaning "that 
opinions are required 'only respecting pending matters in order 
that assistance may be gained in the performance of a present 
duty.'"  Answer of the Justices, 444 Mass. 1201, 1202 (2005), 
quoting Answer of the Justices, 211 Mass. 630, 631 (1912).  See 
Answer of the Justices, 426 Mass. 1201, 1203 (1997).15 
 
Here the House's questions inquire as to the effect of two 
bills -- House No. 3401 and Senate No. 3 -- that have already 
been passed.  If, on the one hand, we read the questions 
literally, they do not ask about a "pending matter," but only 
about action that has already been taken.  By contrast, when we 
are asked for our views on the constitutionality of a bill that 
is pending and not yet passed, it is easier to see that there is 
a "pending matter" and a "present duty."  If, on the other hand, 
we read the House's questions more broadly in light of the 
stated concern in its order about the constitutionality of 
Senate No. 3 if enacted into law, then the questions would 
appear to be asking about an "abstract" or "hypothetical" 
                     
 
15 A further, but related, limitation on our duty to respond 
is that we are not constitutionally permitted to respond to 
"abstract" or "hypothetical" questions.  See Answer of the 
Justices, 426 Mass. 1201, 1204-1205 (1997), and authorities 
cited. 
13 
 
situation only; this is so because we do not know at this 
juncture whether the specific language in Senate No. 3 with 
which the House is concerned -- the Part B income tax provision 
and the flavored cigar excise provision -- will even survive the 
conference committee and go before the House and Senate for a 
full and final vote.16 
 
That said, we conclude that we are presented with a "solemn 
occasion."  We reach this conclusion because we are aware that 
the entire fiscal year 2016 budget legislation remains "pending" 
and is currently being considered by the conference committee, 
where the appointed members are attempting to reconcile the 
differences between the House and Senate bills.  The "present 
duty" of the House, through its appointees to the conference, is 
to negotiate a final bill.  Mindful that the conference process 
is first and foremost a political process in which the Justices 
properly have no role, we accept that there is a significant, 
unresolved legal question of constitutional dimension looming in 
the present circumstances and a dearth of Massachusetts case law 
                     
 
16 In other words, if the questions are read literally then 
they come too late, and if they are read broadly then they come 
too early.  There would be no such concerns about the existence 
of a "solemn occasion" if -- after the conference process was 
complete, and if the Senate provisions were included in the 
final bill -- the questions were put to us before a final vote 
in the full House and Senate.  Then, unlike the present 
situation, we would be faced with a known bill that has yet to 
be voted on. 
14 
 
(and only a few advisory opinions) to which the House might look 
for guidance.  We are satisfied in these circumstances that the 
House order is a proper attempt to obtain our advisory views on 
the constitutionality of its options in conference, and we 
expect that our answers to these questions will therefore assist 
the members of the committee as they go about their present 
conference duties. 
 
Questions 1 and 2.  The first and second questions 
submitted to us ask whether the delayed FAS 109 deduction 
provision and the conservation land credit provision, 
respectively, render House No. 3401 a "money bill."  For the 
reasons we describe, we conclude that House No. 3401 is, indeed, 
a money bill. 
 
The origination article has provided since the inception of 
our Constitution that "[a]ll money bills shall originate in the 
house of representatives; but the senate may propose or concur 
with amendments, as on other bills."  Part II, c. 1, § 3, art. 
7, of the Massachusetts Constitution.  This provision grew out 
of the ancient English tradition regarding taxation, that "all 
grants in Parliament of subsidies to the King must begin in the 
House of Commons" and not in the unelected House of Lords.  See  
Opinion of the Justices, 126 Mass. 557, 567 (1878).17  Comparable 
                     
 
17 As early as 1781, the Justices of this court observed 
that the rationale underlying the English tradition does not 
15 
 
provisions have been adopted by approximately twenty States.  
See Medina, The Origination Clause in the American Constitution:  
A Comparative Survey, 23 Tulsa L.J. 165, 166 (1987).  The United 
States Constitution, too, contains an "origination clause," 
art. I, § 7, cl. 1, of the United States Constitution,18 which 
was modeled on our own.  See Opinion of the Justices, 126 Mass. 
at 593-594.  Although the Federal courts' decisions interpreting 
the Federal origination clause do not bind us, we have given 
careful consideration to those decisions when construing our own 
origination article, given that the two provisions are similarly 
worded and were adopted almost contemporaneously.  See Opinion 
of the Justices, 337 Mass. 800, 810 (1958) (noting, in light of 
"close similarity" of Massachusetts and Federal provisions and 
"almost contemporaneous[]" adoption of both, that Justices were 
"disposed to construe our provision in like manner"); Opinion of 
the Justices, 126 Mass. at 593-594. 
 
The Justices of this court have discussed the meaning of 
the term "money bill" on three prior occasions.  In our earliest 
                                                                  
transfer readily to post-Revolution Massachusetts, in which 
"[t]he Senate . . . are as much the immediate choice of the 
people, as the members of the House of Representatives."  
Opinions of the Justices, 126 Mass. 547, 552 (1781). 
 
18 The Federal origination clause states:  "All bills for 
raising revenue shall originate in the house of representatives; 
but the senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other 
bills."  Art. I, § 7, cl. 1, of the United States Constitution. 
16 
 
reported advisory opinions, the Justices stated that an 
examination of valuation reports prepared by the towns and 
plantations of the Commonwealth was not a money bill and, 
therefore, not subject to the origination article.  See Opinions 
of the Justices, 126 Mass. 547 (1781).  One century later, the 
Justices opined that the origination article does not apply to 
"bills that appropriate money from the Treasury of the 
Commonwealth to particular uses of the government, or bestow it 
upon individuals or corporations," Opinion of the Justices, 126 
Mass. at 601; rather, it is "limited to bills that transfer 
money or property from the people to the State."  Id. 
 
The Justices analyzed the scope of the origination article 
most recently in 1958, providing an advisory opinion to the 
Senate concerning a bill designed to permit the Commonwealth to 
maintain railroad passenger services on a segment of the former 
Old Colony lines.  See Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. at 
801-803.  The funding for costs entailed by that bill was to be 
raised by local property taxes and by assessments on certain 
cities and towns.  See id. at 803, 808-809.  The Justices noted 
that the Federal origination clause "has not been understood to 
extend to bills for other purposes which incidentally create 
revenue."  Id. at 809, quoting United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 
17 
 
566, 569 (1875).19,20  Reasoning that "[s]uch taxes as are imposed 
locally [by the bill] to reimburse the Commonwealth for 
expenditures made by it are purely incidental to the main 
objects of the bill," the Justices concluded that the 
origination article did not apply.  See Opinion of the Justices, 
337 Mass. at 810. 
 
With this background in mind, we come to the view that 
House No. 3401 is a money bill subject to the origination 
article.  For one, the delayed FAS 109 deduction provision 
effectively increases the amount of tax revenue that the 
Commonwealth will realize from certain corporations in fiscal 
year 2016, by making those corporations ineligible for a tax 
deduction in that year.  See note 4, supra.21  By dint of this 
                     
 
19 It was in this context, distinguishing money bills from 
"bills for other purposes which incidentally create revenue," 
Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. 800, 809 (1958), that the 
Justices quoted additional language from United States v. 
Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569 (1875), according to which the 
origination requirement applies to "bills to levy taxes in the 
strict sense of the words." 
 
20 The courts of other States have generally maintained 
likewise that bills that create revenue "incidentally" only are 
not subject to those States' origination provisions.  See, e.g., 
Thomas v. Alabama Mun. Elec. Auth., 432 So. 2d 470, 479 (Ala. 
1983); Colorado Nat'l Life Assur. Co. v. Clayton, 54 Colo. 256, 
259 (1913); Baines v. New Hampshire Senate President, 152 N.H. 
124, 136 (2005); Wallace v. Gassaway, 148 Okla. 265, 268 (1931); 
Mikell v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 359 Pa. 113, 118 (1948); 
Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 265 (1974). 
 
21 According to House No. 3401, section 1, the delayed FAS 
109 deduction provision will generate $45.8 million in revenue 
18 
 
provision, House No. 3401 is a money bill within the narrow 
meaning that the Justices have ascribed to this term in the 
past:  it "transfer[s] money or property from the people to the 
State."  Opinion of the Justices, 126 Mass. at 601.22 
 
The conservation land credit provision also affects the 
amount of tax money that will be transferred from the people to 
the Commonwealth.  That provision reduces the Commonwealth's 
                                                                  
for the Commonwealth in fiscal year 2016.  The fact that this 
provision also is anticipated to reduce the amount of revenue 
that will be realized by the Commonwealth in a future year is 
too attenuated to affect our analysis, primarily in view of the 
difficulty of predicting whether revenue foregone in the future 
will equal or exceed in value the revenue gained in 2016. 
 
22 We recognize that there are certain lines of similarity 
between tax deductions and appropriations of money from the 
treasury of the Commonwealth.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 29, §§ 1, 5B 
(Commissioner of Revenue is required to prepare annual estimates 
of Commonwealth's "tax expenditures," defined in part as "tax 
revenue foregone as a direct result of . . . exemptions, 
deferrals, deductions from or credits against taxes"); Opinion 
of the Justices, 401 Mass. 1201, 1203-1204 (1987) 
(permissibility of statute granting tax deduction for 
educational expenses must be tested under "'anti-aid' 
amendment," art. 46, § 2, of Amendments to Massachusetts 
Constitution, because "tax subsidies or tax expenditures of this 
sort are the practical equivalent of direct government grants").  
Still, "[t]he act of taking less money from a taxpayer because 
of the grant of a tax credit or a tax deduction is not an 
appropriation of funds from the State treasury or from anywhere 
else."  Tax Equity Alliance For Mass., Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, 401 Mass. 310, 316 (1987).  A bill that makes a tax 
deduction unavailable in a given year is even farther removed 
from the category of "bills that appropriate money from the 
Treasury of the Commonwealth to particular uses of the 
government, or bestow it upon individuals or corporations," 
which are not subject to the origination article.  See Opinion 
of the Justices, 126 Mass. 557, 601 (1878). 
19 
 
expected tax revenue, by raising the maximum tax credit that may 
be claimed by taxpayers donating certain land to conservation 
agencies.  See note 5, supra.  The question thus arises whether 
a bill concerning the "transfer [of] money or property from the 
people to the State," Opinion of the Justices, 126 Mass. at 601, 
is a money bill even where it causes the amount of revenue being 
transferred to the State to be less than it would have been 
under the preexisting legislative scheme.23  We note that the 
United States Supreme Court has not addressed this issue under 
the Federal origination clause.  The majority of United States 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that "all legislation 
relating to taxes (and not just bills raising taxes) must be 
initiated in the House."  Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d 
1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1985), citing Wardell v. United States, 757 
F.2d 203, 205 (8th Cir. 1985), Heitman v. United States, 753 
F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir. 1984), and Rowe v. United States, 583 F. 
Supp. 1516, 1519 (D. Del.), aff'd, 749 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1984).  
                     
 
23 Our attention has been directed to a "drafting manual" 
prepared by the House and Senate Counsel in 2010.  That manual 
defines "money bills" as bills "that affect state tax revenue 
for general purposes," and states that "[a] 'money bill' may 
either reduce general state tax revenue or increase state tax 
revenue."  Massachusetts Gen. Ct., Legislative Research and 
Drafting Manual, pt. 5, § F (5th ed. 2010) (General Court 
Drafting Manual). 
20 
 
But see Bertelsen v. White, 65 F.2d 719, 722 (1st Cir. 1933).24  
Given that the delayed FAS 109 deduction provision increases the 
Commonwealth's anticipated tax revenue for the upcoming fiscal 
year and thereby renders House No. 3401 a money bill, we do not 
express a view on this issue under our own origination article. 
 
 As previously mentioned, a bill devoted to another purpose 
or purposes that "incidentally create[s] revenue" is not a money 
bill.  See Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. at 809, quoting 
United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. at 569.  For two reasons, we do 
not view House No. 3401 as such a bill.  First, the types of 
bills that we and the United States Supreme Court have situated 
in this category of bills have been devoted to specific, well-
defined programs and goals.  See Opinion of the Justices, 337 
Mass. at 801-803 (railroad passenger services on former Old 
Colony lines); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 397 
(1990) (fund for programs that compensate and assist crime 
victims); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 436 (1906) (railroad 
projects in District of Columbia); Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 
                     
 
24 The State courts to have addressed this issue have 
disagreed as to whether a bill that decreases revenue is subject 
to those States' origination provisions.  Compare, e.g., Perry 
County v. Selma, Marion & Memphis R.R., 58 Ala. 546, 557 (1877) 
(bill exempting certain railroad property from taxation "in one 
sense, reduced the taxes," but "was, nevertheless, a bill to 
raise revenue"), with In re Paton's Estate, 114 N.J. Eq. (13 
Backes) 324, 327-328 (Prerogative Ct. 1933) (bill exempting 
certain transfers from inheritance transfer tax would decrease 
revenue and was therefore not "bill for raising revenue"). 
21 
 
167 U.S. 196, 202-203 (1897) (introduction of national 
currency).25  House No. 3401, by contrast, serves a multitude of 
purposes.  As the House's version of the "general appropriation 
bill," required annually by art. 63, § 3, of the Amendments to 
the Massachusetts Constitution,26 House No. 3401 contains three 
detailed sections concerned with the Commonwealth's 
appropriations for the upcoming year; but it also features more 
than one hundred outside sections, devoted to topics ranging 
from the registration of "home infusion pharmacies" 
(sections 39A and 39B, proposing amendments to G. L. c. 112, 
§ 39C) to the timeframe for certain proceedings before the Sex 
Offender Registry Board (section 109, proposing an amendment to 
G. L. c. 30A, § 14).  A bill designed to implement so broad an 
array of legislative goals cannot soundly be said to have one or 
                     
 
25 The General Court Drafting Manual, supra, states that 
"the Senate could originate a bill raising the following kinds 
of revenue:  Non-tax revenue, such as fees or fines.  Local 
taxes, including property taxes or assessments.  State tax 
revenue specifically earmarked for a particular program."  
(Citations omitted.) 
 
26 We interpret art. 63, § 3, of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution "in harmony with the other parts of 
the Constitution so as to make the whole a consistent frame of 
government."  Opinion of the Justices, 237 Mass. 598, 608 
(1921).  For this reason, and consistent with the phrasing of 
questions 1 and 2, we assume that, when the General Court passes 
general appropriation bills, it is required do so subject to the 
constraints of the origination article. 
22 
 
more "main objects," see Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. at 
810, to which revenue creation is incidental. 
 
Second, we would not consider House No. 3401 to be a bill 
that creates revenue "incidentally" even if we were to assume 
that the bill's single most prominent purpose is, as its title 
suggests, to "mak[e] appropriations."27  General appropriation 
bills are required by our constitution to be "based upon the 
budget" recommended by the Governor.28  See art. 63, § 3, of the 
Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.  The Governor's 
budget must "contain a statement of all proposed expenditures of 
the commonwealth for the fiscal year . . . and of all taxes, 
revenues, loans and other means by which such expenditures shall 
be defrayed."  Art. 63, § 2, of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution.  That is to say, the universe of 
                     
 
27 The full title of House No. 3401 is "An act making 
appropriations for the fiscal year two thousand sixteen for the 
maintenance of the departments, boards, commissions, 
institutions and certain activities of the commonwealth, for 
interest, sinking fund and serial bond requirements and for 
certain permanent improvements." 
 
28 The Governor's recommendation, like other recommendations 
made to the Legislature, as well as public debates, lobbying 
efforts, or other acts predating the passing of a bill in one of 
the branches of the Legislature, is not a part of the 
legislative process governed by the origination article.  "[T]he 
clause in the Constitution, that 'money bills shall originate in 
the House of Representatives,' . . . respects acts of 
legislation only."  Opinions of the Justices, 126 Mass. at 551.  
The first piece of proposed legislation in the budget process is 
House No. 1, which "originate[s] in the house of 
representatives" within the meaning of the origination article. 
23 
 
appropriations brought together in a general appropriation 
bill -- those necessary to conduct the general business of the 
Commonwealth in the coming year -- is by nature intertwined with 
measures designed to ensure that the necessary funds are 
available in the Commonwealth's coffers.  In this sense, the 
revenue provisions at issue here in the general appropriation 
bill for fiscal year 2016 are not "incidental" to a particular 
purpose (except in the sense that all tax legislation is 
intended to support the Commonwealth's expenditures); rather, 
these provisions "raise[] revenue to support Government 
generally."  United States v. Munoz-Florez, 495 U.S. at 398. 
 
Our response to questions 1 and 2 is therefore that House 
No. 3401 is a "money bill" by virtue of the delayed FAS 109 
deduction provision, irrespective of whether the conservation 
land credit provision also would render the bill a money bill. 
 
Questions 3 and 4.  Given that questions 3 and 4 are 
contingent on negative answers to both questions 1 and 2, and we 
have not given negative answers to those questions, we need not 
answer questions 3 and 4. 
 
Question 5.  We read the final question essentially as 
follows.  Even if House No. 3401 is a money bill -- as we have 
said, supra, that it is -- did the manner in which the Senate 
adopted Senate No. 3 amount to "origination" of a new money 
bill, in violation of the origination article?  We conclude that 
24 
 
it did not; namely, that Senate No. 3 remains a money bill that 
originated, as required, in the House of Representatives.29 
 
This final question assumes, as do we, that Senate No. 3 
made comprehensive revisions to House No. 3401.  In our view, 
these revisions did not amount to the origination of a new bill.  
The origination article provides that, when a money bill has 
originated in the House, "the senate may propose or concur with 
amendments, as on other bills."  Part II, c. 1, § 3, art. 7, of 
the Massachusetts Constitution.  An examination of the journals 
of the House and the Senate reveals that it is commonplace for 
one branch of the Legislature to "amend" a bill passed in the 
other branch by "striking out all after the enacting clause and 
inserting in place thereof" a different text.30  The same 
practice is prevalent in other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Mayes 
v. Daniel, 186 Ga. 345, 358 (1938) ("As is universally admitted 
in parliamentary procedure, substitute is merely one method of 
amending in legislative proceedings").  The Senate's power to 
                     
 
29 For purposes of this question as well, we assume that the 
origination article applies to annual appropriation bills.  See 
note 26, supra. 
 
30 See, e.g., 2014 House Doc. No. 4242 (conference committee 
recommendation on general appropriation bill for fiscal year 
2015).  See also 2013 Senate Doc. Nos. 1766, 1777, 1811, 1812, 
1813, 1829, 1830, 1835, 1841, 1890, 1899; 2014 Senate Doc. 
Nos. 1975, 1982, 1988, 2010, 2018, 1052, 2055, 2072, 2073; 2013 
House Doc. Nos. 3580, 3581, 3727, 3759; 2014 House Doc. 
Nos. 4036, 4307, 4308, 4366, 4374, 4375, 4376, 4377, 4516. 
25 
 
propose amendments to money bills "as on other bills" thus 
encompasses even far-reaching alterations. 
 
The Federal courts have so held in interpreting the phrase 
(identical to that in our origination article), "the senate may 
propose or concur with amendments as on other bills."  Art. I, 
§ 7, cl. 1, of the United States Constitution.  Flint v. Stone 
Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 143 (1911), abrogated on other grounds 
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 
(1985), concerned a law that, as introduced in the United States 
House of Representatives, would have created an inheritance tax; 
the United States Senate amended the bill by enacting a 
corporate tax instead.  The United States Supreme Court rejected 
an origination clause challenge to the law, stating that 
 
"[t]he bill having properly originated in the House, 
we perceive no reason in the constitutional provision 
relied upon why it may not be amended in the Senate in the 
manner which it was in this case.  The amendment was 
germane to the subject-matter of the bill, and not beyond 
the power of the Senate to propose." 
 
Id. 
 
Also instructive are decisions of the United States Circuit 
Courts of Appeals concerning the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), P.L. 97–248, 96 Stat. 324 
(1982).  The version of that law introduced in the United States 
House of Representatives would have reduced total tax revenues 
by $1 billion between 1982 and 1986.  The United States Senate 
26 
 
"replaced the entire text of the House bill except for its 
enacting clause, and the Senate version . . . increased total 
revenues by about [$100 billion] between 1983 and 1985."  
Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d 1378, 1380-1381 (9th Cir. 
1985) (citations omitted).  The Circuit Courts of Appeals relied 
on Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. in holding that, permissibly, "[t]he 
bill that ultimately became TEFRA 'originated' in the House as 
revenue legislation."  Armstrong v. United States, supra at 
1382, and cases cited.  See generally Kysar, The 'Shell Bill' 
Game:  Avoidance and the Origination Clause, 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 
659, 690 (2014).  Recently, the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, P.L. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), has 
been upheld on similar grounds.  See Sissel v. United States 
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 951 F. Supp. 2d 159, 169-174 
(D.D.C. 2013), aff'd, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 
We need not express a view as to whether an amendment to a 
money bill might conceivably be so radically "non-germane" to 
the original bill as to represent a newly originated bill.  Even 
if we were to assume, for purposes of our discussion, that such 
situations might in principle arise, we would not consider the 
current circumstances to be one.  As we have said, we accept the 
premise that Senate No. 3 revises House No. 3401 quite 
comprehensively.  Still, much of the original substance remains; 
as but one illustration, we have already noted that Senate No. 3 
27 
 
continues to include the delayed FAS 109 deduction provision 
introduced by the House.  Here, too, the amendment made by the 
Senate was sufficiently "germane to the subject-matter [or 
multiple subject-matters] of the bill, and not beyond the power 
of the Senate to propose."  Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 
at 143. 
 
Our answer to question 5 is that the manner in which Senate 
No. 3 was passed did not amount to the Senate originating a 
money bill in violation of the origination article. 
 
Conclusion.  In response to questions 1 and 2, we state 
that House No. 3401 was a money bill.  We do not answer 
questions 3 and 4.  In response to question 5, we state that the 
Senate did not originate a money bill. 
 
 
The foregoing answers are submitted by the Chief Justice 
and the Associate Justices subscribing hereto on the 15th day of 
June, 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RALPH D. GANTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FRANCIS X. SPINA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROBERT J. CORDY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MARGOT BOTSFORD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FERNANDE R.V. DUFFLY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BARBARA A. LENK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GERALDINE S. HINES