Case Title: Conlin v. Dakota Fire Insurance Company

Citation: 126 N.W.2d 421

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1964-02-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
126 N.W.2d 421 (1964) Edward J. CONLIN, Jr., and Joanne D. Conlin, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. DAKOTA FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a domestic corporation, Defendant and Appellant. No. 8111. Supreme Court of North Dakota. February 13, 1964. *422 Breidenbach & Milhollan, Bismarck, for plaintiffs and respondents. Conmy & Conmy, Bismarck, for defendant and appellant. ERICKSTAD, Judge. This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the District Court of Burleigh County, obtained by the plaintiffs in the sum of $877.43. A trial de novo is requested. The case was tried by the court without a jury on facts stipulated as follows: "I. "II. "III. "IV. "V. "VI. "VII. "VIII. The pertinent parts of the aforementioned insurance policy, incorporated in the stipulation as Exhibit "A," will be referred to as they are discussed in this opinion. The first question we must answer is: does the loss of luggage which was checked with the airline constitute such a "mysterious disappearance" as to be covered by the extended theft provisions of an insurance policy on a dwelling, which policy covered losses of unscheduled personal property away from the premises? The Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana seems to be the only court to date which has interpreted a "mysterious disappearance" clause such as presented here. In the case of Englehart v. Assurance Company of America, 139 So. 2d 108 (La.Ct. App.1961), the Louisiana court first held, in effect, that the facts and circumstances must *424 show a reasonable possibility that the disappearance was due to theft, for the loss to be covered under the "mysterious disappearance" clause of the insurance policy. On rehearing, the court reversed its position and required only that the disappearance be under unknown, puzzling and baffling circumstances which arouse wonder, curiosity, or speculation, or under circumstances which are difficult to understand or explain. The first decision followed the decisions of Loop v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co., 63 So. 2d 247 (La.Ct.App. 1953), and Deckler v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 94 So. 2d 55 (La.Ct.App.1957), which involved interpretations of policies containing the provision that mysterious disappearances of any insured property should be presumed to be due to theft. As the policy in the Englehart case did not include the words "presumed to be due to theft," the court found it unnecessary to show that the loss was either "possibly or probably" theft. In the instant case, certain parts of the policy seem pertinent to a determination of our question. "COVERAGE CUNSCHEDULED PERSONAL PROPERTY * * * * * * "EXTENDED THEFT COVERAGE `Theft, meaning any act of stealing or attempt thereat' is amended to to read: If the amendment to include "mysterious disappearance" were intended to apply only to disappearances where theft was shown to be possible or probable, the exception of mysterious disappearance of a precious or semiprecious stone from its setting would be unnecessary. "11. Theft * * * It should be noted that although the appellant, in drafting its contract, recognized that unclassified personal property off the insured premises could mysteriously disappear, it excluded from coverage only property left with businesses such as laundries and did not, under either the original contract or the extended coverage endorsement, exclude property left unattended in a public conveyance. Section 9-07-19 of the North Dakota Century Code reads as follows: In the instant case, the ambiguity, if any exists, must be construed in favor of the insured. Accepting the view of the Louisiana Court of Appeal in Englehart v. Assurance Company of America, supra, that "mysterious disappearance" requires only that the disappearance be under unknown, puzzling, and baffling circumstances which arouse wonder, curiosity, or speculation, or under circumstances which are difficult to understand or explain; and, in light of our statutory rule of construction that an ambiguity, if any exists, must be construed against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist, we conclude that the disappearance of the luggage checked with the airline by the respondents, in connection with their travel, was a "mysterious disappearance" covered by the extended theft provisions of an insurance policy on their dwelling, which policy covered losses of unscheduled personal property away from the premises. The second question with which we are confronted involves the effect of the failure of the respondents to notify the police of the loss of their luggage. The pertinent provision of the policy reads as follows: "11. Theft * * * This requirement is that notice of the loss be given as soon as practicable. We may conclude from the stipulated facts that timely notice was given the insurance company. The company was then in a position to notify whomever it deemed necessary. Where, as in this case, neither the place nor time of the disappearance could be ascertained, notice to the police would be entirely fruitless and, therefore, impracticable. The third question is: where the respondents have failed to declare the full value of their luggage to the airline, are they estopped from recovering from the insurance company with which their luggage was insured more than the maximum amount payable by the airline, under the provisions of the official tariff governing passenger fares, in the event of loss of checked luggage? We think not. On the contrary, they should recover the full value of the luggage from their insurer. It should be noted that there was no provision for subrogation in the insurance policy. As the policy provides that the *426 property covered is insured to the extent of the actual cash value of the property at the time of the loss, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the stipulated value of the property. The trial court therefore was in error in reducing the amount of the judgment by the amount of the airline's payment. Our statute on estoppel reads as follows: This statute obviously does not apply. For the reasons stated herein, it is ordered that the case be remanded to the district court, so that the judgment may be modified to permit the respondents to recover the full value of the luggage, plus interest and costs. MORRIS, C. J., and STRUTZ, TEIGEN and BURKE, JJ., concur.