Case Title: State ex rel. Vance v. Marikis

Citation: 1999-Ohio-104

Docket Number: 19960018

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-09-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Vance v. Marikis, 86 Ohio St.3d 305, 1999-Ohio-104.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. VANCE, APPELLANT, v. MARIKIS; INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Vance v. Marikis (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 305.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission does not abuse its discretion in 
terminating temporary total disability compensation when its decision is 
supported by “some evidence” — Appropriate date on which to terminate 
disputed temporary total disability compensation on the basis of maximum 
medical improvement. 
(Nos. 96-18 and 96-472 — Submitted July 28, 1999 — Decided September 1, 
1999.) 
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APD12-1784. 
 
Appellant-claimant Renotta Vance’s 1988 workers’ compensation claim was 
originally allowed for “pulled tendons-muscles in entire back, chip[ped] bone side 
of right foot.”  She began receiving temporary total disability compensation 
(“TTD”) shortly thereafter. 
 
In 1991, Dr. Kenneth H. Doolittle II diagnosed “chronic back pain 
syndrome.”  He felt that an MRI was in order, and stated that if the MRI was 
indeed normal, claimant was capable of returning to her former position of 
employment. 
 
On September 17, 1992, Dr. S.S. Purewal examined claimant.  Regarding 
claimant’s complaints, he reported: 
 
“Currently she complains of intermittent soreness between her shoulder 
blades which she states is worse in the morning when she wakes up.  Occasionally 
she has lower back pain.  There is no pain in her upper extremities or her lower 
extremities.  Occasionally she feels some aching at the right foot in cold, damp 
weather, but there is no instability or giving out of the right ankle and foot.  * * *  
 
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When questioned about her ability to return to work as a secretary and why she has 
not done so over the last three years, she stated that she is willing to try, but her 
physician, Dr. [William C.] Manthey, has stated that she is not ready.  She was 
unable to explain that statement or explain and justify why she could not return to 
work as a secretary.” 
 
Dr. Purewal’s examination revealed normal findings and no objective 
symptomology.  He concluded: 
 
“This patient has mild subjective complaints of pain in the thoracic spine 
region with minimal degenerative changes in her discs as evidenced by the MRI.  
There is no reason why she cannot or could not have returned to her job as a 
secretary almost a couple of years ago[,] and the only explanation she has given to 
me is that her doctor stated that she was not ready. 
 
“In my opinion, she is able to return to her former position of employment as 
a secretary or any other employment of that nature.  She has reached maximum 
medical recovery and is not temporarily and totally impaired. 
 
“She has received clearly excessive physical therapy treatments without 
justification and, in my opinion, no specific treatment is indicated other than her 
taking anti-inflammatory medications if and when needed based strictly on her 
subjective complaints.” 
 
That 
December, 
claimant 
moved 
appellee 
Bureau 
of 
Workers’ 
Compensation for the additional allowance of several conditions.  She also sought 
a home whirlpool, heated mattress pad and orthopedic mattress, as well as “back 
pay for TTD compensation not received from 12-19-88 to present.” 
 
On November 17, 1993, appellee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation denied 
further TTD as of that date, based on a finding of maximum medical improvement 
(“MMI”).  Claimant’s appeal to a commission district hearing officer (“DHO”) 
resulted in the additional allowance of “thoracic sprain [and] myofa[s]cial pain 
 
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syndrome.”  The DHO vacated the bureau’s termination of TTD and issued her 
own order to the same effect, again terminating TTD as of November 17, 1993, 
based on MMI: 
 
“This finding is based on the 9/17/92 state specialist report of Dr. Purewal.  
[The] District Hearing Officer further finds that the additional allowances made 
herein do not change the status of claimant’s disability as Dr. Purewal included 
claimant’s thoracic area in his exam, and as the diagnosis of myofa[s]cial pain 
syndrome appears consistent with his conclusion that claimant’s pain complaints 
are subjective in nature.” 
 
A staff hearing officer affirmed, writing: 
 
“The newly allowed conditions of myofascial pain syndrome and thoracic 
sprain do not change the claimant’s condition of permanency and maximum 
medical improvement.  His [sic] condition is still permanent and [s]he has received 
maximum medical improvement according to the medical evidence from Dr. 
Purewal’s report.  This claim has been previously allowed for the ‘entire back’ and 
the treatment up to the current time has included these additionally allowed 
conditions.” 
 
Reconsideration was denied. 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in 
terminating TTD.  The court disagreed, after finding the commission’s decision to 
be supported by “some evidence.”  Although the Industrial Commission had 
terminated TTD as of November 17, 1993, the court also stated that the 
commission “was within its discretion to terminate the temporary total disability 
compensation effective the date of Dr. Purewal’s examination and to declare an 
overpayment for the funds received thereafter.”  Accordingly, the writ was denied.  
The court issued a judgment entry and a later corrected judgment entry.  Claimant 
 
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appealed from both, and the appeals have been consolidated. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A., and William R. Thomas, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Dennis L. Hufstader and William 
A. Thorman III, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees. 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio AFL-CIO. 
 
Scott, Scriven & Wahoff, William J. Wahoff, Richard Goldberg and Timothy 
E. Cowans, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Council of Retail 
Merchants. 
 
Bricker & Eckler and Charles D. Smith, urging affirmance for amici curiae, 
Ohio Chapter of the National Federation of Independent Business and Ohio Farm 
Bureau Federation. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Robert A. Minor and Robin R. Obetz, urging 
affirmance for amici curiae, Ohio Manufacturers’ Association and Ohio Self-
Insurers’ Association. 
 
Millisor & Nobil and Preston J. Garvin, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae, Ohio Chamber of Commerce. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Two issues are presented:  (1)  Does “some evidence” support 
TTD termination? and (2) What is the proper date of termination? As to the former, 
we find that Dr. Purewal’s report is “some evidence.”  Claimant attacks the report, 
asserting that it was invalidated by the later allowance of “thoracic sprain and 
myofascial pain syndrome.”  Dr. Purewal, however, examined claimant’s entire 
back, including the thoracic region, and commented on the complaints of pain that 
presumably prompted claimant to seek recognition of thoracic sprain and 
 
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myofascial pain syndrome.  This distinguishes this case from State ex rel. 
Richardson v. Quarto Mining Co. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 358, 652 N.E.2d 1027. 
 
In Richardson, the examining physician considered only the allowed 
condition of “lumbosacral strain” in assessing MMI.  His examination did not 
encompass the other more serious allowed condition of “central disc herniation at 
L4-5 and L5-S1,” causing us to declare that his report was not “some evidence” 
supporting TTD denial.  In this case, claimant’s additional conditions were thoracic 
sprain and myofascial pain syndrome, the manifestation of which was covered by 
Dr. Purewal’s examination.  Given the nature of claimant’s additionally allowed 
conditions, we find that the commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that 
Dr. Purewal in effect considered all allowed conditions. 
 
Turning to the remaining question, we find that it has already been answered 
by State ex rel. Russell v. Indus. Comm. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 516, 696 N.E.2d 
1069, at syllabus: 
 
“The appropriate date on which to terminate disputed temporary total 
disability compensation on the basis of maximum medical improvement is the date 
of the termination hearing, and the commission may not declare an overpayment 
for payments received by the claimant before that date.” 
 
Accordingly, we affirm that part of the court of appeals’ judgment that finds 
“some evidence” supporting the commission’s termination of TTD.  The balance 
of the judgment is reversed. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., dissents and would reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals