Case Title: City of Batesville v. Grace

Citation: 534 S.W.2d 224

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1976-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
534 S.W.2d 224 (1976) CITY OF BATESVILLE and Dr. Bob Smith, et al., Appellants, v. Preston W. GRACE et al., Appellees. No. 75-184. Supreme Court of Arkansas. March 15, 1976. *225 Pickens, Boyce, McLarty & Watson by James A. McLarty, Newport, for appellants. Highsmith, Tatum, Highsmith, Gregg & Hart by Samuel C. Highsmith, Murphy & Blair by W. D. Murphy, Jr., Batesville, for appellees. HARRIS, Chief Justice. This appeal relates to the rezoning of two tracts of land located on Highway 167 in Batesville; the tracts are contiguous, one belonging to appellee Preston Grace (hereafter referred to as the "Ball tract"), and the other belonging to Grace and appellees Highsmith and Rogers (hereafter called the "Highsmith tract"). Appellants, the City of Batesville, and 23 homeowners living near the tracts (who intervened), contend that the chancellor erred in finding that the action of the City of Batesville in denying the C-1A classification to the subject tracts was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Ball tract, 381 ft. of frontage on Highway 167, was purchased by Grace in October of 1971 for the sum of $69,000, the property being zoned residential at the time; likewise, the Highsmith tract was zoned residential. The unusual nature of the court's decree necessitates a step-by-step review of the events that occurred. After an extended trial, the chancellor entered a thirty-one page opinion containing the court's findings, and at the same time an interlocutory order embracing the findings was entered and it was stated that the "summary of specific findings of the court and mandatory requirements for rezoning... is hereby made the court's interlocutory order regarding this case." Further, "that a final order in this cause will be entered by the court pending the resolution of the procedures as laid down in this interlocutory order." The chancellor commented that the greatest fear of the residents, whose properties lie west and southwest of the land sought to be rezoned, was an increased traffic flow resulting from commercial development, but he noted that this detriment would be nominal if traffic could only enter the tracts from the highway. During the trial, testimony was offered indicating that the Independence Savings and Loan Association's new office building would be placed on the Ball tract.[1] Plans were offered relative to the Savings and Loan office which the court termed "acceptable." The following findings were then made: Appellees were then directed to submit to the City Planning Commission and City Council a general outline of plans for the use and development of the property within six weeks; the Council was given two weeks to accept, reject, or modify such proposals, but the action of the Council would be subject to review by the court. The Council was ordered to report to the court within sixty days from the date of the order unless the court should extend the time. Further findings were then made: On July 22, 1974, the appellees presented to the Planning Commission their plan in compliance with the court order, details of which (under the view we take) are unnecessary to this opinion. It is significant, however, that the report announced that Independence Savings and Loan Association could not contract to build its new office on the Ball tract because of rising construction costs and changed economic conditions,[2] and that a binding commitment from anyone to develop the tracts could not be obtained until the proposed rezoning became final. The report did offer to exclude ten specific types of businesses from the property. On September 19, the Commission voted 5 to 2 to recommend that the property remain residential, notwithstanding the chancellor's statement to the Chairman of the Commission that he had already rezoned the property in the June 10 order. However, on the basis of the fact that the property was being rezoned, the Commission offered certain suggestions as proposed by the court as to restrictions and recommendations and this report, along with the minutes of the meeting, was sent to the City Council. The Council voted 5 to 3 to adopt the recommendation *228 that the property remain residential rather than becoming commercial, but alternatively, approved the suggestions and restrictions recommended by the Planning Commission. Thereafter, these recommendations were filed with the court, in compliance with its order, and subsequently, the chancellor entered his "Supplementary Findings and Opinion," in which he set out that the Commission and the Council had "voted to accept the Court's plan for a rezoning of the land" and a decree was entered wherein part of the suggestions were accepted, part rejected, and additional restrictions were entered on the court's own motion. The following provisions inter alia are found in the decree: It is apparent from the portions of the decree(s) set out herein that this is a classic example of judicial rezoning, and thus cannot stand. Let it be remembered that this is not an ordinary equity case, but rather involves only the chancellor's function in determining whether the City's action in granting, or denying, rezoning was or was not arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. *229 In City of Little Rock v. Parker, 241 Ark. 381, 407 S.W.2d 921, this court said: Likewise, in Tate v. City of Malvern, 246 Ark. 316, 438 S.W.2d 52, we stated: This court has ruled that judicial intrusion upon this legislative prerogative violates the constitutional requirement of separation of powers. Wenderoth v. City of Fort Smith, 251 Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74. In Wenderoth, the court held unconstitutional a statute that purported to give landowners the right of de novo trial in circuit court, as a mode of appeal from municipal building and zoning decisions. The court's holding in Wenderoth is relevant to this appeal: Thus, a dissatisfied landowner is not entitled to a de novo review in chancery of the city zoning action. Wenderoth v. Freeze, Mayor, 248 Ark. 469, 452 S.W.2d 328. *230 In the instant case the chancellor committed two errors in his review of the city zoning decision. First, his opinion of June 10 clearly shows that he focused on the question of the arbitrariness of the mayor's veto, instead of the action by the city the refusal to override the veto. Second, as previously stated, the trial court exceeded the permissible bounds of judicial review of a zoning decision. The decrees entered in this case amply evidence that the chancellor tried the zoning question de novo and substituted his decision for that of the city Council, even to the extent of specifically modifying the city zoning ordinance by placing building restrictions on the tracts in question, along with the type of fencing, etc. No decision of this court has ever sanctioned any procedure whereby the trial court originates and imposes such specific restrictions in a rezoning case, though the court has upheld rezoning in cases when the developer had committed himself to restrictions for a definite project for the use of the land. Metropolitan Trust Co. v. North Little Rock, 252 Ark. 1140, 482 S.W.2d 613; Little Rock v. Hocott, 220 Ark. 421, 247 S.W.2d 1012. In the instant case, however, the impetus for the restrictions came from the trial court itself in its June 10 opinion and several of the restrictions finally imposed in the decree of November 4, 1974, apparently originated with the court. Of course, the very fact that the chancellor found it necessary to place numerous limitations upon the rezoning, is probably the best evidence that the Council did not act arbitrarily. In accordance with what has been said, it appearing that the action of the Council in refusing to rezone the property to C-1A was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, the decree[3] should be, and hereby is, reversed. It is so ordered. BYRD, J., not participating. [1] Grace is a stockholder of the Savings and Loan company and Guy Mosely, Chairman of the Board of the company, likewise testified relative to the plans for the new office. There was never any specific proposal offered relative to the use that would be made of the Highsmith tract. [2] The proposed construction of this building appears to have carried considerable weight with the court. [3] Both cases were included in the same decree.