Case Title: Cullen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

Citation: 2013-Ohio-4733

Docket Number: 2012-0535

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cullen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4733.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-Ohio-4733 
CULLEN, APPELLEE, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Cullen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4733.] 
Class actions—Civ.R. 23—Certification issues overlapping with issues on merits 
of claims—Burden of proof for certification—Declaratory judgments. 
(No. 2012-0535—Submitted February 26, 2013—Decided November 5, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 95925, 2011-Ohio-6621. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  A trial court must conduct a rigorous analysis when determining whether to 
certify a class pursuant to Civ.R. 23 and may grant certification only after 
finding that all of the requirements of the rule are satisfied; the analysis 
requires the court to resolve factual disputes relative to each requirement 
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and to find, based upon those determinations, other relevant facts, and the 
applicable legal standard, that the requirement is met. 
2.  In resolving a factual dispute when a requirement of Civ.R. 23 for class 
certification and a merit issue overlap, a trial court is permitted to examine 
the underlying merits of the claim as part of its rigorous analysis, but only 
to the extent necessary to determine whether the requirement of the rule is 
satisfied.  (Ojalvo v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 12 Ohio St.3d 
230, 466 N.E.2d 875 (1984), clarified.) 
3.  A party seeking certification pursuant to Civ.R. 23 bears the burden of 
demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed class 
meets each of the requirements set forth in the rule. 
4.  Claims for declaratory relief that merely lay a foundation for subsequent 
determinations regarding liability or that facilitate an award of damages do 
not meet the requirement for certification set forth in Civ.R. 23(B)(2). 
___________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company appeals from a 
judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirming class certification of 
claims brought by Michael Cullen alleging that State Farm failed to disclose all 
benefits available to policyholders who made claims for damaged windshields.  
This case clarifies the standards to apply when an appellate court reviews 
certification of a class action pursuant to Civ.R. 23. 
{¶ 2} A class action is an exception to the general rule that litigation is 
conducted by and on behalf of the named parties only, and therefore, to justify a 
departure from this rule, the representative of the putative class is required to 
affirmatively demonstrate that each requirement of Civ.R. 23 has been satisfied.  
When determining whether to certify a class, a trial court must conduct a rigorous 
analysis, and it may grant certification only after resolving all relevant factual 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
disputes and finding that sufficient evidence proves that all requirements of 
Civ.R. 23 have been satisfied. 
{¶ 3} Here, the appellate court affirmed certification of the class 
pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(2) and (3).  However, because the declaratory relief at 
issue here is incidental to an individualized claim for monetary damages, Cullen 
has not met the requirement for certification set forth in Civ.R. 23(B)(2).  In 
addition, because individual questions predominate over the questions common to 
the proposed class, Cullen has not proven that this action satisfies Civ.R. 
23(B)(3).  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 4} In 2003, Michael Cullen contacted his automobile insurance 
carrier, State Farm, to report damage to the windshield of his car.  After speaking 
with his agent, Cullen spoke to a representative from Lynx Services, L.L.C., a 
company that began handling windshield claims for State Farm in 1996.  As a 
result of that conversation, Twinsburg Glass & Mirror repaired his windshield. 
{¶ 5} In 2005, Cullen sued State Farm, requesting class certification and 
a declaratory judgment that State Farm’s practices were illegal and violated 
obligations owed by fiduciaries pursuant to Ohio law.  In addition, Cullen asserted 
claims for breach of contract, bad faith, and breach of fiduciary duty and sought 
compensatory and punitive damages.  The complaint defined the class to include 
all State Farm policyholders on or after February 18, 1990, and alleged that State 
Farm had denied them full payment on windshield claims because, instead of 
replacing windshields, it repaired some windshields with a chemical compound 
that it knew or should have known was “only temporary, not entirely translucent, 
and incapable of restoring the windshield to its preaccident condition” and that 
State Farm was not “paying the insured to replace the glass,” less any deductible.  
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As a result of State Farm’s alleged breach, Cullen and the class demanded 
“damages in an amount to be determined at trial under principles of Ohio 
common law” or that State Farm be ordered to “tender benefits sufficient to 
replace the windshields in accordance with policy requirements.” 
{¶ 6} The trial court held a hearing on the certification issue.  Although 
Cullen could not remember speaking to a representative of Lynx or whether he 
had been offered the choice of replacing his windshield or receiving the cash 
value of a new windshield, less his deductible, he asserted that State Farm agents 
and representatives failed to disclose to policyholders making “glass-only” claims 
that the policies contained a benefit referred to as the “cash-out” option.  
According to Cullen, although the State Farm policy promised its insureds the 
option of receiving a cash payment of the replacement cost of the windshield, less 
any deductible, it prepared a script for representatives to induce policyholders to 
repair their windshields without disclosing the cash-out option.  State Farm 
referred to the outline it provided to its agents and representatives handling glass-
only claims as a “word track,” arguing that it gave them discretion to respond to 
questions asked by insureds. 
{¶ 7} The trial court concluded that Cullen and the class satisfied the 
requirements of Civ.R. 23(A) and (B)(2) and (3), specifically finding that the 
class satisfied Civ.R. 23(B)(2) because “it appear[ed] that the same practices 
which the Named Plaintiff experienced [were] still ongoing” and it further 
determined that a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief were “potential 
available remedies which can be issued on a class wide [sic] basis in the event 
that [Cullen] prevails upon the merits of his claim.”  In finding that Cullen and the 
class met the requirements for certification pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(3), the trial 
court explained: 
 
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The Court is sufficiently convinced that Plaintiffs’ claims for relief 
are founded squarely upon standardized policies and practices 
which had been adopted and employed by State Farm throughout 
Ohio on a systematic basis during the Class Period.  Given that the 
maximum individual recoveries will be relatively modest, separate 
lawsuits are not realistic.  And it is doubtful that the Ohio judicial 
system could afford full and fair relief to thousands of aggrieved 
insureds on a case-by-case basis.  A class action is thus the most 
preferable and superior method for adjudicating the common 
questions of law and fact, which the Court concludes, predominate 
over any individual questions which may exist. 
 
{¶ 8} The trial court defined the class as follows: 
 
All persons and business entities covered under an Ohio 
motor vehicle insurance policy issued by [State Farm] who made a 
“Glass Only” physical damage comprehensive coverage claim on 
or after January 1, 1991 for cracked, chipped or damaged 
windshields and received a chemical filler or patch repair, or 
payment thereof, instead of a higher amount for actual cash value 
or replacement cost of the windshield.  The lesser of the amount of 
the actual cash value or the replacement cost of the windshield for 
each claim must exceed the insured’s applicable deductible. 
 
The trial court further divided the class into two subclasses: those insureds who 
had their claims administered by Lynx and those who did not. 
{¶ 9} State Farm appealed, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals 
affirmed the order certifying the class pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(2) and (3), but it 
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reversed that portion of the decision defining the class and remanded with 
instructions to the trial court to redefine it.  The court of appeals explained: 
 
For claims handled using a common script or word track, 
the trial court did not err in certifying the class in this case. 
Individual questions do not predominate because the script used by 
Lynx and developed by State Farm establishes class-wide 
treatment under Cullen’s theory that State Farm breached its 
contracts with insureds by dissuading individuals from replacing 
their windshields and not informing them of their option to receive 
a check for the value of the windshield less their deductible.  For 
claims made prior to the use of a common script, Cullen argues 
that the policy language simplifies the case to a showing that the 
policy in question required State Farm to restore vehicles to their 
preloss condition and that a windshield repair cannot do so.  The 
theory, while dubious, does provide a means to resolve the case on 
a class-wide basis for these members.  Therefore, the trial court did 
not err in certifying this class.  However, the class definition must 
be restricted to exclude those who had their windshields replaced 
after repair. 
 
2011-Ohio-6621 at ¶ 56. 
{¶ 10} We accepted State Farm’s discretionary appeal regarding the class 
certification and the standards that apply to a review of an order certifying a class 
pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(2) and (B)(3). 
Class Actions 
{¶ 11} A class action is “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is 
conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only,” Califano v. 
January Term, 2013 
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Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-701, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979), and 
“[t]o come within the exception, a party seeking to maintain a class action ‘must 
affirmatively demonstrate his compliance’ with Rule 23,” Comcast Corp. v. 
Behrend, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1432, 185 L.Ed.2d 515 (2013), quoting 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. ___,131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551–2552, 180 
L.Ed.2d 374 (2011). 
{¶ 12} Civ.R. 23 provides seven requirements for maintaining a class 
action:  
 
“(1) an identifiable class must exist and the definition of the class 
must be unambiguous; (2) the named representatives must be 
members of the class; (3) the class must be so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable; (4) there must be 
questions of law or fact common to the class; (5) the claims or 
defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the claims 
or defenses of the class; (6) the representative parties must fairly 
and adequately protect the interests of the class; and (7) one of the 
three Civ.R. 23(B) requirements must be met.” 
 
Stammco, L.L.C. v. United Tel. Co. of Ohio, 125 Ohio St.3d 91, 2010-Ohio-1042, 
926 N.E.2d 292, at ¶ 6, quoting Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 82 Ohio St.3d 67, 
71, 694 N.E.2d 442 (1998), citing Civ.R. 23(A) and (B) and Warner v. Waste 
Mgt., 36 Ohio St.3d 91, 521 N.E.2d 1091 (1988). 
{¶ 13} This appeal does not challenge the determination of the trial court 
that Cullen and the class met the requirements of Civ.R. 23(A), but rather focuses 
on whether the class met the requirements of Civ.R. 23(B)(2) and (3), which 
allow a class action in either of the following situations: 
 
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(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act 
on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making 
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory 
relief with respect to the class as a whole; or  
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common 
to the members of the class predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy.  The matters pertinent to the 
findings include: (a) the interest of members of the class in 
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate 
actions; (b) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 
controversy already commenced by or against members of the 
class; (c) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (d) the difficulties 
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. 
 
{¶ 14} Because Civ.R. 23 is virtually identical to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, we 
have recognized that “federal authority is an appropriate aid to interpretation of 
the Ohio rule.”  Marks v. C.P. Chem. Co., Inc., 31 Ohio St.3d 200, 201, 509 
N.E.2d 1249 (1987).  In Marks, we reviewed certification of a class action against 
the manufacturer, distributor, and installers of foamed-in-place insulation which 
allegedly emitted dangerous levels of formaldehyde.  In the complaint, the class 
representative sought injunctive and declaratory relief ordering future diagnostic 
testing for every class member.  The trial court denied certification pursuant to 
Civ.R. 23(B)(2) and (B)(3), and the court of appeals reversed.  We reinstated the 
trial court’s decision that Civ.R. 23(B)(2) did not permit class certification, 
relying on decisions of federal circuit courts construing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) and 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
holding that “this provision is inapplicable where the primary relief requested is 
damages.”  Marks at 203, citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d 
Cir.1968), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 214, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 
(1974), and School Dist. of Lancaster v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 789 F.2d 
996 (3d Cir.1986).  We also reversed the appellate court’s determination that the 
class action could proceed pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(3), because individual 
questions—such as the products used, the manner of their storage and installation, 
and defects in the structures where installed, which affected the emission of 
formaldehyde—predominated over common ones. 
The Rigorous Analysis of the Trial Court 
{¶ 15} In Comcast, 133 S.Ct. at 1432, 185 L.Ed.2d 515, quoting Wal–
Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551–2552, 180 L.Ed.2d 374, the court stated that Civ.R. 23 
“ ‘does not set forth a mere pleading standard.’ * * * Rather, a party must not only 
‘be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common 
questions of law or fact,’ typicality of claims or defenses, and adequacy of 
representation, as required by Rule 23(a). * * * The party must also satisfy 
through evidentiary proof at least one of the provisions of Rule 23(b).” And this 
court has held that a party seeking certification pursuant to Civ.R. 23 bears the 
burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed 
class meets each of the requirements set forth in the rule.  Warner v. Waste Mgt., 
36 Ohio St.3d at 94, 521 N.E.2d 1091; see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 614, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). 
{¶ 16} Moreover, a trial court must conduct a rigorous analysis when 
determining whether to certify a class pursuant to Civ.R. 23 and may grant 
certification only after finding that all of the requirements of the rule are satisfied; 
the analysis requires the court to resolve factual disputes relative to each 
requirement and to find, based upon those determinations, other relevant facts, 
and the applicable legal standard, that the requirement is met.  State ex rel. Davis 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 111 Ohio St.3d 118, 2006-Ohio-5339, 855 N.E.2d 
444, at ¶ 20, citing Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 82 Ohio St.3d 67, 70, 694 N.E.2d 
442 (1998); see also Comcast, 133 S.Ct. at 1432, 185 L.Ed.2d 515, Wal-Mart, 
131 S.Ct. at 2551, 180 L.Ed.2d 374, and Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litigation, 471 
F.3d 24, 50-51 (2d Cir.2006) (“In re IPO”). 
{¶ 17} In Ojalvo v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 12 Ohio St.3d 
230, 233, 466 N.E.2d 875 (1984), we stated, “Class action certification does not 
go to the merits of the action.”  (Emphasis sic.)  However, deciding whether a 
claimant meets the burden for class certification pursuant to Civ.R. 23 requires the 
court to consider what will have to be proved at trial and whether those matters 
can be presented by common proof.  7AA Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, Section 1785 (3d Ed.2005).  Thus, Wal-Mart instructs 
that in resolving a factual dispute when a requirement of Civ.R. 23 for class 
certification and a merit issue overlap, a trial court is permitted to examine the 
underlying merits of the claim as part of its rigorous analysis, but only to the 
extent necessary to determine whether the requirement of the rule is satisfied.  
Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551-2552, 180 L.Ed.2d 374; Ellis v. Costco Wholesale 
Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 981 (9th Cir.2011). 
{¶ 18} In Comcast, the Supreme Court reiterated that “it ‘may be 
necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the 
certification question,’ and that certification is proper only if ‘the trial court is 
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been 
satisfied.’ ”  Comcast, 133 S.Ct. at 1432, 185 L.Ed.2d 515, quoting Wal-Mart, 
131 S.Ct. at 2541, quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 
147, 160-161, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982).  The court noted that “[t]he 
same analytical principles govern Rule 23(b)” and explained that “[s]uch an 
analysis will frequently entail ‘overlap’ with the merits of the plaintiff’s 
underlying 
claim” 
because 
“ ‘ “class 
determination 
generally 
involves 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the 
plaintiff’s cause of action.” ’ ”  Comcast, 133 S.Ct. at 1432, quoting Gen. Tel. Co. 
of the Southwest at 160. 
Standard of Review 
{¶ 19} “A trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether a class 
action may be maintained and that determination will not be disturbed absent a 
showing of an abuse of discretion.”  Marks, 31 Ohio St.3d 200, 509 N.E.2d 1249, 
syllabus; see also Howland v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 104 Ohio St.3d 584, 2004-
Ohio-6552, 821 N.E.2d 141, at ¶ 17.  A trial court, however, abuses its discretion 
when its decision is “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.”  Wilson v. 
Brush Wellman, Inc., 103 Ohio St.3d 538, 2004-Ohio-5847, 817 N.E.2d 59, at 
¶ 30.  This standard applies to the ultimate decision of the trial court, Marks, 
syllabus, as well as to its determination regarding each requirement of the rule.  
See In re IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 50-51. 
{¶ 20} However, as we clarified in Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 
328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, “[i]n a civil case, in which the burden of 
persuasion is only by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than beyond a 
reasonable doubt, evidence must still exist on each element (sufficiency) and the 
evidence on each element must satisfy the burden of persuasion (weight).”  Id. at 
¶ 19. 
Certification of the Class 
Civ.R. 23(B)(2) 
{¶ 21} Civ.R. 23(B)(2) provides that  class treatment may be maintained 
when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.”  
Claims for individualized relief are not compatible with Civ.R. 23(B)(2), because 
the  relief sought must affect the entire class at once.  Wal-Mart, 1131 S.Ct. at 
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2557-2558, 180 L.Ed.2d  374.  Thus, the Supreme Court clarified in Wal-Mart 
that Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) 
 
applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment 
would provide relief to each member of the class.  It does not 
authorize class certification when each individual class member 
would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment 
against the defendant.  Similarly, it does not authorize class 
certification when each class member would be entitled to an 
individualized award of monetary damages. 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  131 S.Ct. at 2557. 
{¶ 22} For these reasons, certification depends on “what type of relief is 
primarily sought, so where the injunctive relief is merely incidental to the primary 
claim for money damages, Civ.R. 23(B)(2) certification is inappropriate.”  Wilson 
v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 103 Ohio St.3d 538, 2004-Ohio-5847, 817 N.E.2d 59, at 
¶ 17. 
{¶ 23} In the instant case, the court of appeals appears to have relied on 
our decision in Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 82 Ohio St.3d 67, 694 N.E.2d 442 
(1998), which it viewed as holding that when the Civ.R. 23(A) prerequisites have 
been met and injunctive or declaratory relief has been requested, the action should 
be allowed to proceed pursuant to subdivision (B)(2), without the need for 
conducting a rigorous analysis.  However, Hamilton does not allow a court to 
dispense with the more rigorous analysis of whether a class should be certified.  
Instead, Hamilton directs that “[t]he trial court is required to carefully apply the 
class action requirements and conduct a rigorous analysis into whether the 
prerequisites of Civ.R. 23 have been satisfied.”  Id. at 70.  We did not create an 
exception to this requirement for actions brought pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(2), but 
January Term, 2013 
13 
 
rather we emphasized that certification of a class is not permitted by Civ.R. 
23(B)(2) when the primary relief sought is damages, not injunctive or declaratory 
relief. 
{¶ 24} Furthermore, Hamilton is distinguishable from this case on its 
facts.  There, the class sought to enjoin the practice of overcharging interest and 
misamortizing loans.  We concluded that without injunctive or declaratory relief, 
the class would not be able to recover for ongoing injuries caused to each class 
member by continuing practices.  In contrast, the proposed Cullen class seeks a 
declaration “establishing that State Farm’s practices as herein described are illegal 
and/or violative of the terms of the standard policies and the obligations owed by 
fiduciaries under Ohio law,” as well as one “establishing the damages and 
remedies that are due to them.”  This does not allege that any ongoing practice 
continues to injure all class members, some of whom, like Cullen himself, are no 
longer State Farm policyholders and could not be injured by future actions taken 
by State Farm.  And for any current policyholders to be harmed by this practice, 
they necessarily would have to suffer another damaged windshield that State 
Farm repaired rather than replaced. 
{¶ 25} As the Supreme Court explained in Walmart, “The key to the 
(b)(2) class is ‘the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy 
warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared 
unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.’ ” (Emphasis 
added.) 131 S.Ct. at 2557, 180 L.Ed.2d 374, quoting Nagareda, Class 
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 97, 132 (2009).  In 
this case, claimants have not demonstrated that all class members would benefit 
from the declaratory relief sought because, for example, some of the class 
members are not currently policyholders. 
{¶ 26} The appellate court also relied on Allison v. Citgo Petroleum 
Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir.1998), for the proposition that certification of a class 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(2) is permissible when “the relief sought includes 
money damages that require individualized analyses as to the proper amount, but 
that relief flows from the declaratory judgment sought.”  Cullen, 2011-Ohio-6621, 
at ¶ 50.  But in Wal-Mart, the court questioned the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that 
the federal analogue to Civ.R. 23(B)(2) permits certification when the monetary 
damages sought are “incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief.”  131 
S.Ct. 2560, 180 L.Ed.2d 374. 
{¶ 27} Even if Civ.R. 23(B)(2) did allow certification when the monetary 
damages are only incidental to the declaratory relief, the damages in this case are 
not merely incidental to the declaratory relief but, rather, are the primary relief 
sought.  The effect of a declaration on members of the proposed class could 
establish liability, thereby allowing an individualized award of monetary damages 
to each class member.  However, claims for declaratory relief that merely lay a 
foundation for subsequent determinations regarding liability or that facilitate an 
award of damages do not meet the requirement for certification as set forth in 
Civ.R. 23(B)(2).  Kartman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 893 
(7th Cir.2011) (“this case is unsuitable for class certification: An injunction would 
not provide ‘final’ relief as required by Rule 23(b)(2).  An injunction is not a final 
remedy if it would merely lay an evidentiary foundation for subsequent 
determinations of liability”); Richards v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 453 F.3d 525, 530 
(D.C.Cir.2006). 
{¶ 28} Accordingly, Cullen’s action seeking a declaration that State 
Farm’s practices are illegal and violated fiduciary obligations merely lays a 
foundation for a subsequent individual determination of liability and does not 
satisfy the requirements for class certification pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(2). 
Civ.R. 23(B)(3) 
{¶ 29} Certification pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(3) requires the trial court to 
make two findings: first, “that the questions of law or fact common to the 
January Term, 2013 
15 
 
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members” and, second, “that a class action is superior to other available methods 
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”  This inquiry requires a 
court to balance questions common among class members with any dissimilarities 
between them, and if the court is satisfied that common questions predominate, it 
then should “consider whether any alternative methods exist for resolving the 
controversy and whether the class action method is in fact superior.”  Ealy v. 
Pinkerton Govt. Servs., Inc., 4th Cir. No. 12-1252, 2013 WL 980035, *7 (Mar. 14, 
2013). 
{¶ 30} “For common questions of law or fact to predominate, it is not 
sufficient that such questions merely exist; rather, they must present a significant 
aspect of the case.  Furthermore, they must be capable of resolution for all 
members in a single adjudication.”  Marks, 31 Ohio St.3d at 204, 509 N.E.2d 
1249.  “ ‘To meet the predominance requirement, a plaintiff must establish that 
issues subject to generalized proof and applicable to the class as a whole 
predominate over those issues that are subject to only individualized proof.’ ”  
Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 544 (6th Cir.2012), quoting 
Randleman v. Fidelity Natl. Title Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 347, 352-353 (6th Cir.2011), 
citing Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 564 (6th Cir.2007). 
{¶ 31} Rather than determining that Cullen proved compliance with the 
Civ.R. 23(B)(3) by a preponderance of the evidence, the appellate court 
hypothesized that “if Cullen’s theory of the case is believed, the use of a common 
plan to steer claimants to opt for repair rather than replacement or disclosure of a 
cash payment for the value of the glass, less deductible, is a significant class-wide 
issue.” (Emphasis added.)   2011-Ohio-6621 at ¶ 21.  Thus, in reviewing the 
question of whether State Farm violated a duty to fully disclose all pertinent 
benefits and coverages pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 3901–1–54(E)(1), the court 
did not evaluate the evidence presented to the trial court but noted only that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“Cullen argues that this was not done.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 22.  And 
although the appellate court recognized that these issues were “hotly contested by 
the parties,”  it concluded that “none of these issues need be decided at this time 
because class certification is not akin to a motion for summary judgment.”  Id. at 
¶  24. 
{¶ 32} Similarly, when deciding whether the pre-1997 policies obligated 
State Farm to restore the claimant’s vehicle to preloss condition and whether 
expert testimony could establish that repair of a windshield will never return it to 
preloss condition, the appellate court declined to consider the merits of the 
claim—even though the court described this theory of recovery as “dubious”—but 
presumed that this theory “provide[s] a means to resolve the case on a class-wide 
basis for these members.”  Id. at ¶ 56. 
{¶ 33} Most importantly, the crux of Cullen’s class action is that the 
insurance policies at issue provided policyholders with the option of a cash 
payment in lieu of repair or replacement of the windshield, but the appellate court 
did not determine whether the policies provided any such benefit, deciding that 
“[t]his goes to the heart of the merits of the case and is inappropriate at this point. 
Class certification does not address the merits of the claim.”  2011-Ohio-6621 at 
¶ 55.  The appellate court further noted, “The trial court examined these issues 
and determined that Cullen has raised a colorable claim sufficient to satisfy the 
Civ.R. 23 standards.  That was not an abuse of discretion.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Id. at ¶ 26. 
{¶ 34} A colorable claim does not satisfy the requirements of Civ.R. 23.  
Nor can compliance with the rule be presumed from allegations in a complaint.  
Rather, in this instance, Cullen had to demonstrate, and the trial court had to find, 
that questions common to the class in fact predominate over individual ones, and 
proof of predominance necessarily overlaps with proof of the merits in this case.  
Because the appellate court rejected any consideration of the underlying merits, it 
January Term, 2013 
17 
 
did not review whether the trial court conducted a rigorous analysis or whether 
sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s findings. 
{¶ 35} Further, the appellate court did not even consider whether any of 
State Farm’s defenses to liability raise individualized issues not susceptible of 
generalized proof.  For example, State Farm asserts that it is not liable if an 
individual class member knowingly chose windshield repair—but individual 
consent and knowledge cannot be proven with common evidence.  And if a 
windshield repair could return a vehicle to preloss condition—a question that 
neither the trial nor the appellate court resolved—State Farm’s liability would be 
subject to individual examinations of each vehicle, not common questions. 
{¶ 36} Rather than remand this matter to the court of appeals to consider 
these issues, our review of the record reveals that individual issues overwhelm the 
questions common to the class, and the trial court therefore abused its discretion 
in certifying the class action. 
{¶ 37} First, this putative class action is premised on State Farm’s alleged 
failure to disclose policy benefits through Lynx by using a script to steer insureds 
toward windshield repair.  However, the class includes claims made beginning in 
1991, even though Lynx began administering claims in 1997, and prior to that 
time individual State Farm agents handled windshield claims.  But even after 
Lynx began to administer claims, policyholders had various individual, unscripted 
conversations with Lynx representatives, insurance agents, and repair-shop 
personnel, and there is no common proof of what any individual policyholder 
knew when consenting to windshield repair.  Determining whether State Farm 
breached any obligations to insureds necessarily entails an individualized inquiry 
into each of these communications. 
{¶ 38} Second, different versions of the policy covered putative class 
members on claims that span a period greater than 20 years.  The policy in effect 
from 1991 to March 31, 1998, stated that State Farm would “pay for loss” to the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
policyholder’s vehicle and that it had the right to settle the loss by paying the 
actual cash value of the property at the time of the loss, as determined by 
agreement or appraisal. State Farm could also pay to repair or replace the 
damaged property, and the policy limited its liability to the lower of the actual 
cash value or the costs to repair or replace the property.  But even if, as Cullen 
contends, this language allowed class members to elect to receive the actual cash 
value of the windshield, the policy provides that “[a]ctual cash value is 
determined by the market value, age and condition at the time the loss occurred. 
Any deductible amount that applies is then subtracted.”   Significant individual 
questions therefore exist concerning the market value, age, and condition of a 
particular windshield, the costs of repairing or replacing it, and the amount of the 
deductible in establishing State Farm’s liability to any given class member. 
{¶ 39} Policies issued between April 1, 1998, and August 31, 2005, 
contained the same language as the prior policies, but they also stated: “If we 
offer to pay for repair of the damaged windshield glass instead of replacement of 
the windshield and you agree to have such repair made, we will pay the full cost 
of repairing the windshield regardless of your deductible.”  Thus, in addition to 
the individual questions regarding the actual cash value of the windshield 
compared to the costs of its repair or replacement, this version of the policy 
introduces new individualized questions concerning whether the policyholder 
knowingly chose and consented to repair in exchange for State Farm’s waiver of 
the deductible. 
{¶ 40} State Farm later removed the deductible waiver for windshield 
repairs from subsequent policies, but individual questions regarding the actual 
cash value of a particular windshield and the costs to repair or replace it remain 
under this third variation of the policy. 
{¶ 41} Third, the covered automobile, and therefore the value of the 
windshield compared to the cost of repairing or replacing it, varied.  Multiple 
January Term, 2013 
19 
 
replacement windshields were available to glass shops over the decades-long 
period that the proposed class spans, and the costs of these windshields and the 
materials and labor needed to install them differed.  State Farm adjusted the price 
it would pay based on the “market designation” assigned to each county, and 
these designations changed over time.  The features of the covered windshield, 
such as tinting and rain sensors, also affected value and replacement cost.  Thus, 
the costs to repair or replace a particular windshield varied by make, model, and 
year of the covered vehicle and by time and place of repair. 
{¶ 42} Fourth, expert testimony presented in this case does not provide 
common proof that repairs failed to return all windshields to preloss condition.  
Cullen proffered the opinion of Craig Carmody that “[w]indshield repair fails to 
restore the windshield glass to an acceptable condition in terms of appearance and 
functionality in all cases.”   But Carmody claimed to have examined only 17 to 22 
repaired windshields, and it does not appear that his theories on glass repair have 
been thoroughly tested, peer-reviewed, evaluated for rate of error (including 
sampling error), or generally accepted in the scientific community.  See generally 
Terry v. Caputo, 115 Ohio St.3d 351, 2007-Ohio-5023, 875 N.E.2d 72, ¶ 24-25, 
citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), 509 U.S. 579, 113 
S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469.  However, even if the trial court found Carmody 
qualified as an expert witness and his theories scientifically reliable, his opinion 
that a repair fails to restore the windshield to preloss condition does not establish 
that common questions predominate. 
{¶ 43} Although Carmody testified that a repaired windshield will 
eventually fail, he could not say whether that failure would occur during the life 
of the vehicle or even during a ten-year period.  Although he asserted that 
repaired windshields were more prone to failure, Carmody agreed that “you’d 
have to look at each of those windshields” to determine whether the PVB 
interlayer of laminated glass had been compromised and affected the function of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
the glass, causing it to fail.  He also knew of no report of or statistics regarding 
windshield repairs causing delamination and spalling of glass, and he admitted 
that there is “no strong data” showing that the strength of repaired glass does not 
equal the original strength of laminated glass; moreover, he understood that one 
study found Ultra Bond resin to be as strong as glass and that the type of resin 
used in the repair “has some effect on the quality of the repair in addition to the 
other variables.” 
{¶ 44} Thus, Carmody acknowledged “the huge variation that occurs in 
any repair, even in controlled conditions.” And notably, in examining Cullen’s 
windshield with a microscope, Carmody could not determine that the repair had 
failed or that the crack had spread, and his assertions that a repaired windshield 
could delaminate and spall did not apply to Cullen’s windshield, because the one-
tenth-inch chip in it had not penetrated the PVB interlayer. 
{¶ 45} Carmody also criticized a repaired windshield as not being as 
transparent as new glass.  But he acknowledged that the transparency of repaired 
glass could “depend on the repair” and could be affected by real-world conditions, 
such as windshield-wiper abrasion and exposure to UV light and chemicals in the 
air.  He also agreed that repair can restore transparency to windshield damage, 
and he did not know whether tests had shown that repairs can restore windshields 
to the transparency required by safety standards. 
{¶ 46} Cullen’s other proffered expert, Gary Derian, admitted that he had 
no expertise in windshield repair and relied on Camrody’s glass analysis in 
forming his opinion that repairing a windshield failed to restore it to preloss 
condition, both aesthetically and from a safety standpoint.  But he acknowledged 
that determining whether the resin in a repaired windshield had degraded and 
failed required individually examining that windshield and that performance 
varied based on the type of resin used and conditions such as “temperature, 
humidity, cleanliness, preparation.”  When asked “whether or not the color of a 
January Term, 2013 
21 
 
resin changes over time,” Derian indicated that a change could not be assumed: 
“One would want to inspect and determine how much in cases of that, that 
particular [resin].” And when asked how he would decide whether a repaired 
windshield violated established standards, Derian responded, “[I]t would have to 
be done on a car by car basis with an automobile engineer present at each repair.” 
{¶ 47} Both Carmody and Derian asserted that the repair could not restore 
a windshield to preloss condition, but neither had sufficient evidentiary 
foundation for those opinions.  Derian relied on Carmody’s report, and Carmody 
in turn based his opinion on an unscientific sample of at most 22 vehicles in 
addition to a single study questioning whether resin should be used to repair 
longer cracks. Neither Carmody nor Derian performed any tests on repaired 
windshields to quantify the strength, durability, and transparency of repairs, and 
neither knew of any tests or studies that proved their opinions and methods. 
{¶ 48} Thus, this expert testimony raises more individual questions than it 
resolves, and deciding whether State Farm breached any duty to restore 
policyholders’ windshields to preloss condition will require an individual 
inspection of each class member’s windshield to determine the preloss and 
postrepair conditions, and these individualized issues necessarily predominate 
over any questions common to the class. 
{¶ 49} Our analysis conforms with Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 216 Ill.2d 100, 138, 835 N.E.2d 801 (2005), where the Supreme Court of 
Illinois considered a claim for breach of contract that depended on restoring an 
automobile to its preloss condition, and held that “[a] necessary first step in 
making this showing would be to examine each class member’s vehicle to 
determine its preloss condition.”  It further explained that “the determination of 
the preloss condition of each subclass member’s vehicle would require the 
individual examination of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of vehicles. 
Undoubtedly, these examinations would overwhelm any question common to the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
subclass, rendering it impossible for such questions to predominate.”  Id.  For this 
reason, the court concluded, “a claim for breach of the preloss condition promise 
cannot be maintained as a class action.”  Id. 
{¶ 50} In sum, the determination of preloss and postrepair condition, the 
preloss value and the costs to repair or replace a particular windshield, and the 
individual knowledge and consent of each class claimant entail inspection of tens 
of thousands of automobiles and an individualized assessment of the damages 
each class member sustained, if any.  For these reasons, this action does not 
satisfy the predominance requirement of Civ.R. 23(B)(3). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 51} Review of the certification of a class action requires the appellate 
court to determine whether the trial court conducted a rigorous analysis that 
resolved all relevant factual disputes and found by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the requirements of Civ.R. 23 have been satisfied.  In making this 
determination, some consideration of the underlying merits of the cause of action 
may be necessary. 
{¶ 52} Here, this action does not satisfy the requirements for class 
certification pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(2), because the declaratory relief sought is 
at best only incidental to an award of monetary damages, and the trial court 
abused its discretion in granting class certification pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(3), 
because a rigorous analysis of the evidence presented by the parties demonstrates 
that individual questions predominate over issues common to the class. 
{¶ 53} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and  
remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY and MCFARLAND, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2013 
23 
 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in paragraph three of the syllabus and in the 
judgment. 
 
PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
 
MATTHEW W. MCFARLAND, J., of the Fourth Appellate District, sitting for 
FRENCH, J. 
__________________ 
 
O’NEILL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 54} This is not a difficult class to define, and this case represents a 
perfect opportunity to breathe life into class actions in Ohio.  Class actions 
promote judicial economy and allow resolution of issues that are economically 
unsolvable via individual actions. It goes without saying that one lawsuit that 
resolves one question is preferable to one thousand lawsuits on the same question. 
For the following reasons, I must respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 55} The majority’s analysis fails to differentiate between the factual 
showing that plaintiffs must make to be entitled to class certification and the 
factual showing that plaintiffs must make to survive a motion for summary 
judgment.  While it may be difficult to separate them in some cases, here it is not. 
Civ.R. 23(B)(3) requires that “the questions of law or fact common to the 
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair 
and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” The theory justifying certification 
of the class in this case is twofold. First, it is alleged that State Farm had an 
obligation to disclose to its policyholders that it would pay the actual cash value 
or replacement cost of a windshield, less the policy deductible, in the same 
circumstances in which it would pay for the cheaper and less reliable repair of a 
windshield. In addition, it is alleged that State Farm and its subcontractor Lynx 
Services used a common plan, including failure to disclose other options, to steer 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
policyholders away from replacement toward the less costly and less reliable 
repair option. 
{¶ 56} Insofar as the plaintiffs have limited their class definition to those 
policyholders who were damaged by these two actions, they have formulated a 
class definition that satisfies Civ.R. 23, and their case should be permitted to 
proceed in accordance with the appellate court’s decision. And given the fact that 
State Farm had already lost a motion for summary judgment before class 
certification was even addressed, the argument that the manageability of the class 
was not explored by the trial court is not supported by the record. Perhaps it is this 
unusual process that inspires the majority to shoehorn the merits of the case into 
its review of the class certification, under the guise of the “rigorous analysis” a 
trial court is required to undertake prior to certifying a class. But in so doing, the 
majority fails to accord the trial court the deference to which it is entitled. 
{¶ 57} The majority first faults the appellate court for failing to determine 
whether the policies in fact provided the option of a cash payout in lieu of repair 
or replacement of the windshield, and then faults the trial court for its decision 
that “ ‘Cullen has raised a colorable claim sufficient to satisfy the Civ.R. 23 
standards.’ (Emphasis added.)” Majority opinion at ¶ 33, quoting the court of 
appeals, 2011-Ohio-6621 at ¶ 26.  The majority boldly asserts that “Cullen had to 
demonstrate, and the trial court had to find, that questions common to the class in 
fact predominate over individual ones * * *.” Majority opinion at ¶ 34. This 
holding is irreconcilable with our prior cases, most notably Ojalvo v. Bd. of 
Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 12 Ohio St.3d 230, 466 N.E.2d 875 (1984), syllabus, 
in which we held, “A court abuses its discretion in denying certification of a class 
action * * * when it requires a certainty that a common issue of fact ‘probably 
exists’ based on the merits of the class claim * * *.” The majority has not 
“clarified” Ojalvo, majority opinion at paragraph two of the syllabus, so much as 
it has overruled it. 
January Term, 2013 
25 
 
{¶ 58} And ironically, the appellate court noted that the trial court had 
gone too far into the facts of the case at the certification stage by finding that “a 
cash-payout option was available and that State Farm failed to disclose that 
option.” 2011-Ohio-6621 at ¶ 55. In its rush to end this litigation, the majority 
faults the appellate court for failing to do something that it had no duty to do 
under our prior cases, and something that the trial court did in fact do, at State 
Farm’s request. The majority has reached the opposite conclusion on this factual 
issue from the trial court, but the different perspectives are readily explained. The 
majority of this court did not have the benefit of the ten-hour certification hearing 
that the trial court did. That is precisely why we generally defer to the findings of 
trial courts. 
{¶ 59} Our review in these matters is for an abuse of discretion. Such an 
abuse does not exist in this case. The class certification of the trial court was not 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. It should be upheld. Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Bashien & Bashein Co., L.P.A., W. Craig Bashein, and John P. Hurst; and 
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, for appellee. 
Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., Mark A. Johnson, Joseph E. Ezzie, Robert J. 
Tucker, and Michael K. Farrell, for appellant. 
Carpenter, Lipps & Leland, L.L.P., Michael H. Carpenter, and Katheryn 
M. Lloyd, urging reversal for amici curiae Nationwide Property and Casualty 
Insurance Company, Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Company, Nationwide Insurance Company of America, 
Nationwide Assurance Company, and Nationwide General Insurance Company. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
Thompson Hine, L.L.P., and Stephen J. Butler; and Severson & Werson 
and Jan T. Chilton, pro hac vice, urging reversal for amicus curiae American 
Financial Services Association. 
Thompson Hine, L.L.P., Elizabeth B. Wright, Brian A. Troyer, and 
Stephanie M. Chmiel, urging reversal for amici curiae Washington Legal 
Foundation and Ohio Chemistry Technology Council. 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Philip F. Downey, Robert N. 
Webner, and Robert J. Krummen, urging reversal for amici curiae Grange 
Indemnity Insurance Company and Grange Mutual Casualty Company. 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Thomas E. Szykowny, and 
Michael Thomas, urging reversal for amicus curiae National Association of 
Mutual Insurance Companies and Ohio Insurance Institute. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Kurtis A. Tunnell, and Anne Marie Sferra; and 
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, pro hac 
vice, and Cary Silverman, pro hac vice, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio 
Alliance for Civil Justice. 
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, pro 
hac vice, and Cary Silverman, pro hac vice, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio 
Chamber of Commerce, Ohio Alliance for Civil Justice, Chamber of Commerce 
of the United States of America, and American Tort Reform Association. 
______________________