Case Title: Williamsburg Peking Corp. v. Kong

Citation: 

Docket Number: 042265

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
WILLIAMSBURG PEKING CORPORATION 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 042265   SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
 
September 16, 2005 
XIANCHIN KONG 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY 
N. Prentis Smiley, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, Williamsburg Peking Corporation (Peking) 
contends that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's 
motion for a nonsuit.  Specifically, Peking complains that the 
trial court "failed to consider and rule upon [its] pending 
motion for sanctions against [the plaintiff] at the time the 
nonsuit order was granted and/or before the nonsuit order became 
final under Rule 1:1 . . . and/or to limit the nonsuit order to 
permit it to do so, thereby precluding [its] claim under [Code]  
§ 8.01-271.1." 
I 
 
On February 13, 2003, Xianchin Kong, a pro se plaintiff, 
filed a lawsuit against Peking, alleging that Peking had 
improperly terminated her employment as a waitress at Peking's 
restaurant because she had made safety complaints under various 
federal and state laws.  Thereafter, Kong filed numerous 
discovery requests and motions.  Peking contended that these 
filings were "inordinately voluminous" and "redundant" and filed 
a motion for sanctions under Code § 8.01-271.1.  When Kong was 
 
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confronted with the motion for sanctions, she retained counsel 
and moved for a nonsuit.  Over Peking's objections, the trial 
court granted the nonsuit and refused to consider the pending 
motion for sanctions, concluding that it no longer had 
jurisdiction over the motion for sanctions. 
II 
 
For purposes of this appeal, we will consider as true the 
allegations set forth in Peking's motion for sanctions.  Kong, 
approximately one year after instituting her suit, filed her 
first set of interrogatories, which exceeded the limits of Rule 
4:8(g).  During the following 45-day period, Kong served Peking 
with requests for production of documents, requests for 
admissions, and three additional sets of interrogatories, all to 
which Peking responded in good faith.  According to Peking, 
however, 
the discovery process was made unduly burdensome, 
excessively expensive, overly annoying, unnecessarily 
repetitive, and unreasonably cumbersome by virtue of 
the filing within a forty-five (45) day period of a 
total of eight sets of redundant discovery requests, 
coupled with four, 3-7 page letters indiscriminately 
objecting to virtually every answer [Peking] made to 
[Kong's] discovery requests.  This abuse of the 
discovery process required the detailed preparation, 
review, research, authentication, and filing of 
responses that caused [Peking] to incur inordinate 
expenditures of its own time and resources, as well as 
the expense required for its attorney to respond. 
 
Due to the burdens imposed by Kong's discovery filings, 
Peking filed a motion for a protective order.  Following a 
 
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hearing on Peking's motion, the trial court found that the 
pleadings and other documents filed on behalf of Kong had been 
prepared by another who "was not a lawyer and was not licensed 
to practice law in the Commonwealth."  The trial court further 
found that "the pleadings and other documents filed by [Kong] 
were tainted or poisoned with the unlawful practice of law." 
 
Peking alleged that the illegal conduct, and Kong's 
complicity therein, 
has required [Peking] to incur over $15,000.00 in 
attorneys fees and expenses in defending and 
responding to the pleadings and discovery requests in 
this lawsuit, and has further diverted the valuable 
time and resources of [Peking] and its employees in 
responding to the inordinately voluminous and 
inappropriate requests and filings in this groundless 
lawsuit. 
 
Consequently, by its motion for sanctions, Peking sought an 
award against Kong and the preparer of the pleadings and 
documents, jointly and severally, of $16,383.75 in attorney's 
fees and $186.98 in out-of-pocket expenses.  Peking also sought 
$10,000 in additional sanctions to deter such conduct in the 
future. 
III 
 
We perceive the issue in this appeal to be two-fold:  
First, whether the nonsuit order is subject to the provisions of 
 
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Rule 1:1∗ and, second, whether the nonsuit order precluded the 
trial court from considering the pending motion for sanctions.  
In the present case, the trial court had scheduled Peking's 
motion for sanctions for a hearing on July 9, 2004.  Immediately 
upon the trial court's convening of the July 9 hearing, Kong 
moved for a nonsuit.  The trial court granted the motion, and, 
when counsel for Peking stated that he "assume[d] that the 
motion for sanctions remain[ed] for consideration," the trial 
court ruled that it no longer had jurisdiction over the motion 
for sanctions.  The order granting the nonsuit was entered on 
the same day. 
 
We first consider whether the nonsuit order is subject to 
the provisions of Rule 1:1.  This inquiry is answered by our 
recent decision in James v. James, 263 Va. 474, 562 S.E.2d 133 
(2002).  In James, we noted that a nonsuit order "is 
sufficiently imbued with the attributes of finality to satisfy 
the requirements of Rule 1:1."  Therefore, we opined that, "from 
its very nature, an order granting a nonsuit should be subject 
to the provisions of Rule 1:1."  Id. at 481, 562 S.E.2d at 137.  
Thus, the nonsuit order in the present case, like all final 
                     
 
∗ Rule 1:1 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ll final 
judgments, orders, and decrees . . . shall remain under the 
control of the trial court and subject to be modified, vacated, 
or suspended for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and no 
longer." 
 
 
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judgments, remained under the control and jurisdiction of the 
trial court for 21 days after the date of entry. 
 
We next consider whether the nonsuit order precluded the 
trial court from considering the previously pending motion for 
sanctions.  Code § 8.01-380 gives a plaintiff an absolute right 
to one nonsuit.  Upon the entry of a nonsuit order, "the case 
becomes 'concluded as to all claims and parties,' and 'nothing 
remain[s] to be done.' "  Id., quoting Dalloul v. Agbey, 255 Va. 
511, 515, 499 S.E.2d 279, 282 (1998). 
 
In the present case, the trial court ruled that, because 
the nonsuit order was final as to all claims and parties, the 
court was without jurisdiction to rule upon the pending motion 
for sanctions.  We do not agree. 
A motion for sanctions is an application made to a court 
for the imposition of a penalty for alleged misconduct of a 
party or lawyer or for alleged abuse of the system.  The motion 
has no bearing on the facts giving rise to a right to seek 
judicial remedy.  Thus, the entry of a nonsuit order does not 
conclude a case as to any pending motion for sanctions. 
Additionally, the trial court's ruling undermines the 
public policy expressed by the General Assembly in Code § 8.01-
271.1.  In enacting that Code section, the General Assembly 
sought to prevent a litigant from filing pleadings and other 
papers that are "interposed for any improper purpose, such as to 
 
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harass or to cause . . . needless increase in the cost of 
litigation."  Manifestly, the General Assembly never intended 
that a nonsuit order could exonerate a litigant's misconduct.  
We agree with Peking's assertion that, "[i]f, upon grant of a 
nonsuit, jurisdiction over pending sanctions motions were to 
evaporate, litigants would be left to abuse of process without 
remedy, effectively nullifying the purposes of the statute." 
IV 
 
We conclude, therefore, that where, as here, a motion for 
sanctions pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1 is pending when a 
plaintiff moves for a first nonsuit, the trial court is 
empowered to consider the sanctions motion either before the 
entry of the nonsuit order or within 21 days after the entry of 
the nonsuit order.  In failing to consider the pending motion 
for sanctions in the present case, the trial court erred.  
Therefore, we will reverse the trial court's ruling, set aside 
and vacate the nonsuit order, and remand the case to the trial 
court with directions that it consider and decide the motion for 
sanctions and thereafter enter an order granting Kong's motion 
for a nonsuit. 
Reversed and remanded.