Case Title: People v. Jones

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90282

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90282-Agenda 40-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 						ROBERT D. JONES, Appellant.
Opinion filed September 20, 2001.
	 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	This appeal arises from the second trial of defendant, Robert
Jones, for the murder of Dr. Henry Dickerman. The State charged
that defendant murdered Dr. Dickerman in August 1992.
Following an initial jury trial and guilty verdict, defendant
appealed, arguing that the trial court admitted statements made
during plea negotiations that should have been excluded pursuant
to Supreme Court Rule 402(f) (177 Ill. 2d R. 402(f)). The
appellate court agreed and remanded for a new trial. People v.
Jones, 4-96-0855 (1998) (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23).
	On remand, the jury again found defendant guilty of first
degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2000)) and defendant
appealed. With one justice dissenting, the appellate court affirmed.
315 Ill. App. 3d 500. Defendant now appeals to this court, arguing
that (1) the trial court improperly ruled on a motion for
substitution of judge; (2) the trial court failed to bar additional
statements made during the course of plea negotiations; (3) the
trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary
manslaughter; (4) the State failed to prove a material element of
the crime; (5) the trial court improperly allowed the State to amend
the charges against him; and (6) his conviction should be
overturned pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). We reverse and remand
with respect to the first issue and therefore we need not address the
others.



I. BACKGROUND
	In July 1992, Dr. Dickerman hired defendant to repair and
paint his house. Work on Dr. Dickerman's house continued into
August. On August 12, 1992, when Dr. Dickerman failed to attend
his weekly bridge game, his friends went to his house to check on
him. Dr. Dickerman was not home. His friends noticed nothing
unusual in the house except that his car was missing from the
garage. The next day, they returned with Dr. Dickerman's cousin.
Again, they searched the house to no avail. Police similarly
searched the house and found no signs of forced entry or foul play.
	Dr. Dickerman remained missing. Police eventually learned
that several checks were missing from the doctor's checkbook. An
ensuing investigation indicated that defendant had deposited
several checks against Dr. Dickerman's account, including one for
$4,200.
	On September 5, 1992, hikers found Dr. Dickerman's
partially decomposed body at the bottom of a cliff in Missouri. Dr.
Dickerman's car was later located in St. Louis at the Lambert
Airport's long-term parking lot.
	Investigators searched for defendant and finally located him
in October 1992. During the course of their investigation, law
enforcement officers interviewed defendant a number of times,
including on October 6, 1992, July 12, 1993, July 27, 1994,
August 3, 1994, August 15, 1994, and August 16, 1994.
	Defendant was eventually charged with forgery. He pleaded
guilty and was imprisoned. The investigation into Dr. Dickerman's
death continued.
	In August 1994, the State charged defendant with murder. In
August 1996, following an initial jury trial and guilty verdict,
Judge Leo J. Zappa sentenced defendant to 85 years in prison. On
appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred in
admitting his August 15, 1994, statements into evidence because
it was made during the course of plea negotiations and therefore
violated Supreme Court Rule 402(f) (177 Ill. 2d R. 402(f)).
Defendant's August 15, 1994, statements stemmed from the July
27, 1994, interview, when defendant asked the detectives to
inform the State's Attorney that he would plead guilty to
involuntary manslaughter in return for a 10-year sentence. When
detectives returned to meet with defendant on August 15, 1994,
they asked defendant to write out exactly what deal he would be
willing to accept. Defendant wrote out a two-page statement
setting forth the deal he would accept, and that statement was
ultimately read into evidence at trial. Although the investigators
told defendant they could not negotiate a guilty plea, they
indicated that they would relay the information to the State's
Attorney's office. The appellate court concluded that defendant's
two-page, handwritten, August 15, 1994, statement clearly
demonstrated his willingness to plead guilty in exchange for
concessions and was a plea-related statement inadmissible
pursuant to Rule 402(f). People v. Jones, No. 4-96-0855 (1998)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). That decision
is not at issue here.
	On March 27, 1998, the State filed a notice of new trial before
Judge Zappa. On March 30, 1998, defendant submitted a motion
for automatic substitution of judge pursuant to section 114-5(a) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS
5/114-5(a) (West 1998)). Judge Zappa denied this motion as
untimely. On April 8, 2001, defendant filed a motion for
substitution for cause pursuant to section 114-5(d) of the Code
(725 ILCS 5/114-5(d) (West 1998)), alleging in part that Judge
Zappa displayed hostility toward him at the close of his initial
trial. Rather than transferring defendant's motion to another judge,
Judge Zappa denied it as untimely.
	Defendant also filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the
July 27, 1994, and August 16, 1994, interviews were inadmissible
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402(f). The trial court denied
defendant's motion, finding that defendant's failure to challenge
the July 27, 1994, and August 16, 1994, interviews during his first
appeal precluded a subsequent challenge on remand.
	In June 1998, a jury again convicted defendant of first degree
murder. The trial court sentenced him to 85 years in prison. The
appellate court affirmed. 315 Ill. App. 3d 500.



II. ANALYSIS 
	We first consider whether the trial court improperly ruled on
a motion for substitution of judge for cause pursuant to section
114-5(d) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/114-5(d) (West 2000)), rather
than allowing another judge to rule on the motion. Indeed, as noted
previously, Judge Zappa presided over defendant's first and
second trials and was named in defendant's motion for
substitution. Judge Zappa refused to transfer defendant's motion
to another judge and denied it as untimely. We find that
defendant's motion was timely, and therefore the trial court erred
in not transferring it to another judge.
	Section 114-5(d) provides in pertinent part that a "defendant
may move at any time for substitution of judge for cause,
supported by affidavit. Upon the filing of such motion a hearing
shall be conducted as soon as possible after its filing by a judge
not named in the motion ***." 725 ILCS 5/114-5(d) (West 2000).
This court has repeatedly held that a motion for substitution
pursuant to section 114-5(d) of the Code must be made at the
earliest practical moment after discovery of any potential
prejudice. People v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d 508, 518 (1984); People v.
King, 54 Ill. 2d 291, 297 (1973); People v. Lawrence, 29 Ill. 2d 426, 428 (1963); People v. Chambers, 9 Ill. 2d 83, 89 (1956). The
substitution statute should be liberally "construed to promote
rather than to defeat an application for a change of venue,
particularly where prejudice on the part of the judge is charged."
People v. Smith, 28 Ill. 2d 445, 447 (1963).
	Here, defendant filed his substitution motion before any
substantive rulings had been made in his second trial. The State
agreed that defendant was entitled to have his motion heard by
another judge. Citing People v. Maxwell, 272 Ill. App. 3d 57
(1995), and People v. Emerson, 122 Ill. 2d 411 (1987), Judge
Zappa disagreed and deemed defendant's motion untimely. The
appellate court affirmed with no analysis and without identifying
the motion as one for cause, merely stating that "defendant did not
have a right to automatic substitution of judge from the judge who
presided at the first trial." 315 Ill. App. 3d at 508.
	In Maxwell, the appellate court found that defendant filed his
motion for substitution after the trial started and after the trial
judge ruled on numerous substantive motions. The court therefore
concluded that his motion was untimely and the trial judge was not
required to schedule a hearing before a different judge. Maxwell,
272 Ill. App. 3d at 60. We have similarly deemed motions for
substitution untimely when they were made after the trial judge
ruled on a number of substantive issues. See Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d  at
518. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with the trial court's
application of Maxwell to this case.
	In Emerson, defendant's conviction was reversed on appeal.
Emerson's second trial was assigned to the same judge. Less than
10 days after remand from the appellate court, defendant filed a
motion for automatic substitution pursuant to section 114-5(a) of
the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986 Supp., ch. 38, par. 114-5(a), now
725 ILCS 5/114-5(a) (West 2000)). Emerson argued that the trial
judge was prejudiced because he had been reversed on appeal.
This court noted that a request for automatic substitution must be
made before the trial judge rules on a substantive matter. Emerson,
122 Ill. 2d  at 424. For purposes of section 114-5(a)'s automatic
substitution provision, we held that remand is considered a
continuation of the original proceedings. Thus, substantive rulings
made in Emerson's first trial served as substantive rulings in his
second trial and made a subsequent motion on remand for
automatic substitution untimely. See Emerson, 122 Ill. 2d  at 424.
	In the instant case, defendant based his motion in large part on
"Judge Zappa['s] display[ of] hostility toward defendant when he
asserted *** that several detectives perjured themselves during
trial and that the [S]tate had condoned their perjury." Specifically,
defendant points to a colloquy at his sentencing hearing when the
trial judge stated as follows:
		"And as far as your smack of [the assistant State's
Attorney] and the police officers, I'm outraged. Your
rights are preserved by the Appellate Court. If you did not
get a proper trial, the Appellate Court will be your
safeguard and ensure that you are given another trial, but
to sit here and say the police officers-it's like an O.J.
cover-up, everybody was here to get Robbie Jones and I
think that's basically how you led your life. Everybody
does wrong except Robbie Jones."
	In denying defendant's motion, the trial judge essentially
focused on two facts: (1) he had issued substantive rulings in the
first trial; and (2) defendant submitted his substitution motion
during his second trial. The trial court then read Emerson and
Maxwell together and concluded that the second trial was a
continuation of the first. On that basis, the trial court ruled that
defendant's motion on remand was untimely because it came after
substantive motions entered during his first trial.
	We disagree with the trial court's analysis for two reasons.
First, we find that Emerson is not dispositive here. In that case, we
considered whether defendant's motion for automatic substitution
under section 114-5(a) was timely. For purposes of the automatic
substitution provision, we held that substantive rulings in an initial
trial effectively bar automatic substitution motions on remand. We
made no ruling as to whether the same applies in a substitution for
cause situation. We now hold that it does not.
	We conclude that a substitution for cause motion is
sufficiently different from an automatic substitution motion to
warrant a different approach from that taken in Emerson. As a
practical matter, defendants often seek an automatic substitution
in the hope that they may receive more lenient treatment from a
different judge. 5 L. Pieczynski, Illinois Practice §19.80, at 612
(1989). In contrast, a defendant generally brings a successful
substitution for cause motion only when he or she can prove actual
prejudice. 5 L. Pieczynski, Illinois Practice §19.82, at 614 (1989).
In a situation where a defendant alleges actual prejudice on the
part of a judge, he or she invokes the right to a fair and impartial
hearing, a fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence. Therefore, for
purposes of section 114-5(d), a substantive ruling in an initial trial
does not by itself preclude a defendant from filing a cause motion
for substitution on remand.
	The plain language of the substitution of judge provisions
support our position that section 114-5(d)'s timing requirements
are more flexible than those of section 114-5(a). For example,
section 114-5(d) contains less restrictive language than section
114-5(a). In contrast to section 114-5(a)'s requirements, a
substitution motion under section 114-5(d) does not have to be
filed within 10 days of the trial judge's call. That is not to say that
a substitution for cause motion is an easy hurdle. Our legislature
has placed a heavy burden on a defendant to justify a substitution
for cause. For example, a substitution for cause petition must be
supported by an affidavit. 725 ILCS 5/114-5(d) (West 2000).
Allegations must also be specific and not conclusory in nature.
People v. Hoga, 109 Ill. App. 3d 258, 260 (1982). Nevertheless,
the substitution for cause provision acts as a necessary fail-safe
measure to preserve a defendant's right to a fair trial in situations
where a defendant can show a judge's actual bias. Construing
section 114-5(d) liberally to protect defendant's right to a fair and
impartial hearing (see Smith, 28 Ill. 2d at 447), we find that the
trial judge erred by failing to transfer defendant's substitution
motion to another judge, as the statute requires.
	The second reason that we disagree with the result below is
that this is not a case of a defendant's dilatory conduct in failing
to submit a substitution motion until after the trial court made
substantive rulings. Instead, the exact basis for defendant's motion
arose after the trial court made substantive rulings in the first trial
and before it made substantive rulings in the second trial. It is true
that in Taylor we held that a motion for substitution for cause must
be timely. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d  at 518. The appellate court in
Maxwell similarly noted the timeliness requirement. Maxwell, 272
Ill. App. 3d at 60. We will, however, not require defendant to file
a substitution motion before the trial court issues a substantive
ruling when it would have been impossible. Any other requirement
completely circumvents the safeguard to a fair hearing under
section 114-5(d).
	Our rationale is consistent with People v. McWilliams, 350 Ill. 628 (1932), involving a similar situation under section 114-5's
predecessor, section 25 of the Change of Venue Act (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1931, ch. 146, par. 25). In that case, we had vacated defendant's
sentence and remanded to the same judge for resentencing. People
v. McWilliams, 348 Ill. 333 (1932). Defendant then sought
substitution, essentially arguing that our reversal prompted the trial
court to harbor prejudice toward defendant. The trial court denied
defendant's substitution motion, deeming it untimely. We
reversed, noting in part that "[t]he facts upon which the
application was based arose largely after the reversal of the circuit
court's first judgment and the remandment of the cause to that
court" and that "[t]he application, based upon the facts alleged in
the petition, could not have been made at an earlier [time]."
McWilliams, 350 Ill.  at 633. Therefore, the court concluded that
the trial judge should have granted the petition.
	While McWilliams was decided in part under an earlier
version of the substitution statute, the point remains that defendant
in this case could not have submitted his motion for substitution
prior to substantive rulings because the alleged cause did not
develop until after the trial court issued such rulings. As noted
previously, this court has long held that a motion for substitution
pursuant to section 114-5(d) of the Code must be made at the
earliest practical moment after any potential prejudice is
discovered. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d  at 518. We cannot require a
defendant to file a motion for substitution for cause prior to the
alleged bias.
	We note that we do not depart from our long-standing rule
announced in Taylor that a motion for substitution must be timely.
Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d  at 518. This rule remains necessary to prevent
defendants " 'from first ascertaining the attitude of the trial judge
on a hearing relating to some of the issues of the cause, and then,
if the court's judgment is not in harmony with counsel's theory, to
assert the prejudice of the court.' " Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d  at 518,
quoting People v. Chambers, 9 Ill. 2d 83, 89 (1956). The judge in
this case expressed no indication, through his rulings or his
comments, as to his thoughts on the merits of defendant's case on
remand. Thus, defendant's motion was not made in response to an
adverse ruling on an issue. Emerson, 122 Ill. 2d  at 424. There is
also no indication in this case that defendant filed his motion as a
delay tactic or in an effort to avoid a trial. See People v. Stewart,
20 Ill. 2d 387 (1960). We simply hold that substantive rulings
entered in an initial trial do not necessarily bar a motion for
substitution for cause under section 114-5(d) on remand. We
further hold that a section 114-5(d) substitution for cause motion
is not per se untimely when it is made following a substantive
ruling when the alleged cause arises after the substantive ruling.
If defendant had submitted a motion for substitution for cause after
the trial court issued a substantive ruling on remand, and after the
alleged cause developed, the rule in Taylor would apply.
	Based on our determination on this issue, we need not address
defendant's remaining arguments.



III. CONCLUSION 
	The trial court erred by deeming defendant's motion for
substitution untimely and by failing to assign it to another judge.
We find that a substantive ruling made in an initial trial does not
by itself bar a subsequent substitution for cause motion on remand.
We further find that a substitution for cause motion is not per se
untimely when a trial court issues substantive rulings and adequate
grounds for substitution for cause subsequently arise. We therefore
remand this cause to the circuit court for a hearing on defendant's
motion for substitution to be heard by a new trial judge. We retain
jurisdiction over this cause and direct that the circuit court report
its findings after hearing the defendant's substitution motion to the
clerk of this court within 90 days of the issuance of the mandate in
this case.
Jurisdiction retained;
 cause remanded with directions.
 
	JUSTICE GARMAN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.