Case Title: Daniel W. Wright, individually and on behalf of others similarly ( 256 ) situated v. Robert L. Childree, in his official capacity as Comptroller of the State of Alabama

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1050164

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:12/22/06WrightvChildree
REL:5/18/07Asmodifiedondenialofrehearing
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1050164
_________________________
Daniel W. Wright, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated
v.
Robert L. Childree, in his official capacity as comptroller
of the State of Alabama
_________________________
1050208
_________________________
Robert L. Childree, in his official capacity as comptroller
of the State of Alabama
v.
Daniel W. Wright, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated
Although the indigent defendants in the cases to which
1
this opinion is directed are criminal defendants, we note that
in civil proceedings that provide for the appointment of
counsel –- for example, whether as an attorney or a guardian
ad litem, as in a civil-commitment case (§ 22-52-14, Ala. Code
1975), or as an attorney in a case involving a waiver of
parental consent to an abortion (§ 26-21-4, Ala. Code 1975) –-
the statutes governing such civil proceedings provide that
attorneys appointed in those proceedings shall also be
compensated under § 15-12-21, Ala. Code 1975.
2
Appeals from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-05-1544)
BOLIN, Justice.
These consolidated appeals concern payment by the State
of office-overhead expenses to lawyers who accept appointments
to represent indigent clients before the courts of this state.
Facts and Procedural History
Daniel W. Wright is a lawyer practicing in Alabama who
accepts indigent defendants as 
clients 
pursuant 
to 
§ 15-12-21,
Ala. Code 1975.  Before February 1, 2005, Wright and all other
1
attorneys representing such indigent clients were paid an
hourly rate, under Ala. Code 1975, § 15-12-21, and were
reimbursed for office-overhead expenses at a rate to be
preapproved by the trial court.
On February 1, 2005, the attorney general issued Op.
Att'y Gen., No. 2005-063, concluding that the comptroller did
1050164; 1050208
Wright attached several documents to his complaint,
2
including the Talladega Circuit Court's standing order pre-
approving an hourly rate for office-overhead expenses, Op.
Att'y Gen., No. 2005-063, and the Covington Circuit Court's
order in Christensen v. Childree, no. CV-2002-50. 
3
not have to pay overhead under § 15-12-21(d), Ala. Code 1975,
because such expenses were not "expenses reasonably incurred"
in defense of one's client as that term is used in § 15-12-
21(d). Thus, the comptroller began withholding payment of
office-overhead expenses on February 1, 2005.
Wright sued Robert L. Childree, the comptroller for the
State of Alabama, for withholding office-overhead payments,
alleging, among other things, breach of contract.  Wright
2
sought a judgment declaring that the comptroller's denial of
payment was improper, and he sought injunctive relief
requiring the comptroller to resume paying office-overhead
expenses and to reimburse attorneys for back payments. Wright
also sought certification of a class consisting of all Alabama
lawyers 
who 
were appointed 
to 
represent any indigent defendant
in Alabama as of February 1, 2005, and who had been improperly
denied payment of office-overhead expenses for indigent-
defense work after February 1, 2005, but excluding lawyers who
are "contract counsel" under Ala. Code 1975, § 15-12-26, or
1050164; 1050208
4
public defenders under § 15-12-41. Wright also sought costs
and expenses together with a reasonable attorney fee. Wright
alleged that the doctrine of res judicata or collateral
estoppel now barred the comptroller from avoiding payment of
office-overhead 
expenses 
based 
on 
the 
comptroller's 
failure 
to
appeal from 
the 
Covington 
Circuit Court's order in Christensen
v. Childree, No. CV-2002-50. In Christensen v. Childree, the
Covington 
Circuit 
Court 
held 
that 
office-overhead 
expenses 
are
encompassed 
in 
the term 
"expenses reasonably 
incurred" as that
phrase is used in § 15-12-21(d). After the comptroller
submitted his answer, Wright submitted a "Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment
on the Issue of Liability with Class Issues Reserved." In this
motion, Wright clarified what he called liability as, "that
the [comptroller] must resume overhead payments on indigent
defense cases." In this motion, Wright also requested, "that
the Court reserve class issues pending admissions by Mr.
Childree of the necessary class certification prerequisites."
Wright apparently sent the circuit court a proposed
order, which is not included in the record before this Court,
requesting the payment of interest on the withheld payments.
1050164; 1050208
Wright's notice of appeal acknowledges that he did not
3
request interest in the original complaint but states that he
did request interest in motions filed in the trial court. 
5
Evidently, 
in 
this proposed order, 
Wright included the payment
of interest on any amounts he was due, because in his response
to the proposed order the comptroller argues against paying
interest. The record before this Court indicates that Wright
did not request interest, nor did he mention interest until he
filed his proposed order.3
On September 28, 2005, the trial court entered its order,
directing the comptroller to "resume statewide payments of
overhead hours on all indigent defense fee declarations which
are otherwise properly completed, approved by a judge, and
submitted to him for payment" and "to pay all overhead
payments withheld from any lawyer in reliance on Op. Atty.
Gen. No. 2005-063 (February 1, 2005) to all such lawyers
statewide."  The trial court stated in its order that the
parties agreed that the comptroller would abide on a
statewide basis by the court's resolution of the dispute, and
that, therefore, their agreement pretermitted any need to
address class certification.  The trial court "decline[d] to
address the other issues raised by [Wright] and decline[d] to
1050164; 1050208
6
award 
attorney 
fees" 
and did not 
specifically address 
interest
in its order.  The court certified the judgment as final,
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.   
After filing an unsuccessful motion to alter or amend the
order, Wright filed his notice of appeal on October 28, 2005.
In the notice of appeal, Wright alleged that the trial court
did not grant complete relief because the court refused to
award interest on the office-overhead-expense payments
previously withheld, to award attorney fees, to direct the
comptroller to provide the information necessary for class
certification, and to allow Wright additional time to submit
a fee application.  
On November 8, 2005, the comptroller filed his cross-
appeal, alleging that, based on Ala. Code 1975, § 15-12-21,
and the 2005 attorney general's opinion, the trial court's
decision was incorrect.
History of the Payment of Office-Overhead Expenses
Originally, the statute in question, § 15-12-21(d), Ala.
Code 1975, set out hourly rates and limits on total fees for
attorneys 
representing 
indigent 
defendants 
and 
also
established that "[c]ounsel shall also be entitled to be
1050164; 1050208
7
reimbursed for any expenses reasonably incurred in such
defense to be approved in advance by the trial court."
In 1993, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in May v.
State, 672 So. 2d 1307, 1308 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993), held that
"office overhead expenses are by law encompassed in the term
'expenses reasonably incurred' as that term is used in § 15-
12-21(d)."  This Court quashed as improvidently granted the
petition for a writ of certiorari filed in May v. State, 672
So. 2d 1310 (Ala. 1995).  The Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex
parte Barksdale, 680 So. 2d 1029, 1030 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996),
cited the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding in May for the
proposition that "office overhead fell into the category of
expenses reasonably incurred in the defense of a defendant."
On April 19, 1996, the then attorney general issued
identical opinions in responses to inquiries from the
comptroller and the finance director, who asked whether the
trial court was required to approve office-overhead expenses
in advance of the actual occurrence of those expenses.  The
attorney general concluded that office-overhead expenses
claimed under § 15-12-21(d) must be approved by the trial
court in advance of being incurred before the comptroller may
1050164; 1050208
8
reimburse such expenses.  In other words, the comptroller may
not reimburse appointed counsel for office-overhead expenses
incurred before the date the trial court approved the
expenses.  (Op. Att'y Gen., No. 1996-191, and No. 1996-192.)
This Court, in Ex parte Smith, 698 So. 2d 219, 224-25
(Ala. 1997), discussed the Court of Criminal Appeals'
decisions in May and Barksdale.  Explicitly adopting the
holding of May, this Court stated, "[w]e agree with the Court
of Criminal Appeals' holding in May that § 15-12-21 authorizes
payment to a court-appointed attorney for overhead expenses
reasonably incurred in defense of an indigent defendant."  698
So. 2d at 224.  
In 1999, the legislature enacted Act No. 99-427, which
amended § 15-12-21(d).  In that amendment, the legislature
increased the hourly rates for attorneys appointed to
represent indigent defendants.  In addition, the legislature
changed the sentence that provided that counsel be reimbursed
for "expenses reasonably incurred in such defense" to  read
that counsel would be reimbursed for "expenses reasonably
incurred in the defense of his or her client."  (Emphasis
added.)
1050164; 1050208
The original opinion, issued on November 30, 2001, was
4
withdrawn when the March 15, 2002, opinion was issued.
9
The attorney general issued an opinion in 2001,
addressing the issue of office-overhead expenses.  Op. Att'y
Gen., No. 2002-022 (Oct. 15, 2001).  He stated that based on
May, Barksdale, and the language of § 15-12-21 (even after the
1999 
amendment), 
an 
attorney who 
represents indigent
defendants could be reimbursed for office-overhead expenses,
even if the attorney worked out of his or her home.
On March 15, 2002, this Court issued an opinion on
application for rehearing in Lyons v. Norris, 829 So. 2d 748
(Ala. 2002).   In Lyons, the finance director and the
4
comptroller denied reimbursement for office-overhead expenses
of several attorneys who had represented indigent criminal
defendants.  Those attorneys filed a declaratory- judgment
action and a petition for a writ of mandamus in Montgomery
County.  One attorney also sued the comptroller, alleging
negligence and wantonness, while another attorney sought
certification of a class action.  The trial court consolidated
these related cases.  Following a hearing, the trial court
denied class certification.  The trial court issued a writ of
mandamus instructing the State officials to approve all
1050164; 1050208
10
attorney-fee declarations that include orders approving
office-overhead expenses filed prior to or contemporaneously
with the attorney-fee declarations.  The State officials
appealed.  The dispute in Lyons turned on the meaning
attributed to the phrase "approved in advance by the trial
court" in  § 15-12-21(d).  In a footnote, the main opinion
addressed office-overhead expenses:   
   "In June 1999, the Alabama Legislature passed the
'Investment in Justice Act of 1999.'  Act No. 99-
427, 1999 Ala. Acts. In pertinent part, Act No. 99-
427 substantively amended § 15-12-21 to increase
attorney fees for appointed work at the trial level.
Under the Act, the rate of compensation for
attorneys representing indigent criminal defendants
was increased to $40 per hour for out-of-court time
and $60 per hour for in-court time. The fee limits,
which have been increased substantially, are now
based on the severity of the crime, and there is no
limit on the total fee that can be paid to an
attorney representing a defendant charged with a
capital offense or with an offense that carries a
possible sentence of life imprisonment without
parole.  Section 15-12-21, as amended, also
specifies that 'the court for good cause shown may
approve an attorney's fee in excess of the maximum
amount allowed.'  Section 15-12-21 now provides that
to be reimbursable, any expenses incurred must be
incurred, specifically, 'in the defense of his or
her client.'  Here, the attorneys seek reimbursement
for office-overhead expenses, including but not
limited to: professional license fees; malpractice,
casualty, health, general-liability, and workers'
compensation insurance; office salaries; ad valorem
taxes; office supplies; 
postage and 
express-delivery
charges; depreciation for office equipment and
1050164; 1050208
11
furniture; 
local 
and 
long-distance 
telephone
charges; 'CLE expenses, including travel and lodging
for out-of-town seminars (incurred one or more times
per year)'; utilities; various bank fees and
interest on business loans; and other professional
fees. Although whether these fees are actually
incurred 'in the defense of [an attorney's] client'
is highly questionable, that issue is not presently
before this Court.  Neither does this Court have
before it the question of the applicability of Act
No. 99-427 to office-overhead expenses.  However,
the change in language in Act No. 99-427 from 'any
expenses reasonably incurred in such defense' to
'any expenses reasonably incurred in the defense of
his or her client,' prohibits reimbursement of
office-overhead expenses based on calculations of
the pro rata cost of an attorney's criminal practice
compared to his overall practice.  At the same time,
it 
precludes advance 
calculations of office-overhead
expenses for a specific criminal defendant.  The
increase in fees, together with the ability of the
courts to approve fees in excess of the mandated
maximum 'for good cause shown,' further indicates
the Legislature's intent to eliminate reimbursement
for 
'office-overhead 
expenses' 
under 
Act 
No. 
99-427."
829 So. 2d at 751 n. 1.  Justices Brown and Stuart concurred
in the main opinion, which was authored by Chief Justice
Moore.  Justice Harwood concurred specially, writing that the
office-overhead-expenses discussion in footnote 1 of the main
opinion was not necessary and that the issue of office-
overhead expenses was not properly before the Court.  He was
joined in that opinion by Justices Houston, Lyons, and
Woodall.  Justice Johnstone concurred in part and dissented in
1050164; 1050208
12
part, dissenting as to that part of the main opinion regarding
the preapproval of expenses, and concurring in overruling the
application for rehearing because the applicant was not
properly before the Court.  Justice See joined the concurring
portion of Justice Johnstone's special writing.
As the trial court states in its order in this case, the
decision in Lyons triggered two reactions.  The first was
Christensen v. Childree, CV-2002-50, an action in Covington
County against the comptroller.  At oral argument, Wright's
counsel stated that the comptroller briefly stopped paying
office-overhead expenses in 2002 pursuant to an executive
order and that that was the basis for the Covington County
action.  The Covington Circuit Court held that office-
overhead expenses were to continue under § 15-12-21, even
though the statute had been amended.  The comptroller did not
appeal that decision, and he continues to pay office-overhead
expenses in Covington County, even though he ceased paying
office-overhead expenses in the rest of the state for a second
time on February 1, 2005.  The second reaction of the decision
in Lyons was Act No. 2002-129, Ala. Acts 2002, a joint
1050164; 1050208
13
resolution by the legislature.  This joint resolution
provided: 
"That it was and continues to be the intent of this
Legislature pursuant to the enactment of Act 99-427,
H. 53 of the 1999 Regular Session, the Investment In
Justice Act of 1999, that overhead expenses shall be
paid in addition to in-court and out-of court fees
to 
attorneys 
appointed 
to 
represent 
indigent
persons."
In 2005, the comptroller requested an opinion from the
attorney general asking whether an attorney representing an
indigent defendant may claim both office-overhead expenses at
a rate approved in advance by the trial court and expenses
under the Uniform Guidelines for Attorney Fee Declarations.
On February 1, 2005, the attorney general issued an opinion
concluding, "Act 99-427 amended section 15-12-21(d) of the
Code of Alabama to eliminate overhead as an expense for which
an appointed attorney can be reimbursed.  An attorney can only
be reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses that are approved by
the trial court in advance of being incurred."  Op. Att'y
Gen., No. 2005-063 (February 1, 2005).  The attorney general
based his opinion on the language in the main opinion in Lyons
and argued that Act No. 2002-129, the legislative joint
resolution, was not controlling.  The attorney general's
1050164; 1050208
14
opinion did not mention the earlier attorney general's
opinions from 1996 or 2001, nor did it mention Christensen v.
Childree. 
Based on the 2005 attorney general opinion, the
comptroller ceased payments of office-overhead expenses to
lawyers appointed to represent indigent defendants under Ala.
Code 1975, § 15-12-21.
Analysis
As a threshold matter, we address Wright's argument that
the comptroller's cross-appeal should be dismissed based on a
"concession" made in the trial court by a lawyer for the
comptroller to the effect that the State is obligated under §
15-12-21(d) to pay office-overhead expenses.  Wright refers to
the following emphasized statements by the lawyer representing
the comptroller at the trial court's hearing on Wright's
"Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative,
for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability with Class
Issues Reserved":
"[Attorney]: Your Honor, I think there is --
from the standpoint of the comptroller, he requested
the AG opinion.  The AG's office delivered the
opinion on February 1, and he has relied on that
1050164; 1050208
15
opinion to direct him, to advise him in how he
should act in his official capacity.
"I think that we are here in the proper way to
be here to contest that, which is a declaratory
judgment action, and I don't have any great words to
say other than exactly what Mr. Douglas [Wright's
lawyer] said is that we look to this Court to
provide some direction for the comptroller in light
of what previous caselaw has said, the Lyons [v.
Norris, 829 So. 2d 748 (Ala. 2002)] opinion
included, and what the Attorney General's office --
the opinion that they rendered or issued to the
comptroller.
"....
"[Attorney]: It has -- some of this about the
Christensen [v. Childree] case, and I will you --
well, I don't want to say that.  The Christensen
case was determined in consultation with other
assistant –- with the Attorney General's office to
be the law there and not be applicable anywhere else
in the state.
"This is why –- that's essentially why the
comptroller is acting that way or acting that way
for 
fee 
declarations 
that 
come 
out 
of 
that
particular circuit.
"THE COURT: There is something disturbing about
that.  That makes absolutely no sense whatsoever, I
mean, basically discriminating against everybody
else in every other judicial circuit but Covington
County.  That is not right.
"[Attorney]: 
Well, 
I 
cannot 
necessarily 
disagree
with that. 
1050164; 1050208
16
"THE COURT: I know you can't.  What is your take
on the resolution from the legislature?
"[Attorney]: My take on that resolution is that
it was an attempt to clarify –- it was the
legislature's shot at clarifying what was intended
in 15-12-21, the amended 15-12-21.  It was in
response to what was said in a footnote in the
Lyons opinion, which that footnote formed the basis,
I think, of the Attorney General's opinion, I think
the footnote by [Chief] Justice Moore.
"I also note that in the legislation that did
arise -- I think it was during the special session
when the legislature was trying to amend that code
section further, I did note that the language in
that resolution was going to be inserted into that
order to make it very clear.
"....
"[Attorney]: So, I mean, I don't -- I don't
necessarily have a disagreement with Mr. Douglas on
this.  I don't think the comptroller necessarily
does.  I think the comptroller necessarily does.  I
think the comptroller just wants to make sure that
his position is he was advised on a course of
action, and that is what he has been doing."
 
Although the comptroller admits that the lawyer's
arguments could have been more forceful, he contends that his
position has been made clear throughout the filings and
proceedings in the trial court: 1) that office-overhead
expenses are not reimbursable under § 15-12-21(d) as amended;
1050164; 1050208
17
2) that the attorney general's 2005 opinion, upon which the
comptroller relies, draws support from Lyons v. Norris, 829
So. 2d 748; 3) that the Covington Circuit Court's decision is
Christensen v. Childree is binding only in that judicial
circuit; 4) that the doctrine of res judicata and other
related doctrines do not preclude the comptroller's positions;
and 5) that Wright is not entitled to attorney fees or
prejudgment interest.  We agree that based on the foregoing,
the comptroller did not concede liability in its argument.
Simply because the lawyer for the comptroller chose to
acknowledge the confusion regarding the interpretation of §
15-12-21, without a more explicit concession of these
arguments his statements do not amount to a waiver of the
issues squarely before the trial court.    
In the present case, Wright filed a "Motion for a
Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment on the Issue of Liability with Class Issues
Reserved."   Wright attached matters outside the pleadings to
his complaint.  Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that a
motion for a judgment on the pleadings be treated as one for
a summary judgment in accordance with Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ.
1050164; 1050208
18
P., whenever matters outside the pleadings are presented to
and not excluded by the court.  Not all matters outside the
pleadings, however, convert a motion to a summary-judgment
motion.  See Donoghue v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 838 So. 2d
1032 (Ala. 2002)(insurance contract attached to a motion to
dismiss did not convert that motion into a summary-judgment
motion because the complaint specifically referenced the
policy, which was the foundation for the underlying claims).
However, we need not resolve this issue because our decision
in this case depends upon the resolution of a question of law
–- how § 15-12-21(d) should be interpreted.  This Court
accords the trial court's ruling no presumption of correctness
as to a question of law.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Brown, 894 So. 2d 643 (Ala. 2004).  We now turn to the main
issue -- whether § 15-12-21(d), as amended in 1999, provides
for the payment of office-overhead expenses to lawyers
appointed to represent indigent defendants.  As noted earlier
in this opinion, § 15-12-21(d) originally set out hourly rates
and limits on total fees for attorneys representing indigent
defendants and established that "[c]ounsel shall also be
entitled 
to 
be 
reimbursed 
for 
any 
expenses 
reasonably 
incurred
in such defense to be approved in advance by the trial court."
1050164; 1050208
19
In 1999, the legislature amended § 15-12-21(d) to increase the
hourly rates.  In addition, the legislature changed the
sentence that provided that counsel be reimbursed for
"expenses 
reasonably 
incurred 
in 
such 
defense" 
to 
provide 
that
counsel 
be 
reimbursed for 
"expenses reasonably 
incurred 
in 
the
defense of his or her client."    
"It is an ingrained principle of statutory construction
that '[t]he Legislature is presumed to be aware of existing
law and judicial interpretation when it adopts a statute.  Ex
parte Louisville & N.R.R., 398 So. 2d 291, 296 (Ala. 1981).'"
Ex parte Fontaine Trailer Co., 854 So. 2d 71, 83 (Ala.
2003)(quoting Carson v. City of Prichard, 709 So. 2d 1199,
1206 (Ala. 1998)). In adopting statutes and amendments thereto
"'"the Legislature is presumed to have known the fixed
judicial construction preexisting statutes had received, and
the substantial re-enactment of such statutes is a legislative
adoption of that construction."'" Ex parte Fontaine Trailer
Co., 854 So. 2d at 83 (quoting Wood-Dickerson Supply Co. v.
Cocciola, 153 Ala. 555, 557, 45 So. 192, 192 (1907), quoting
in turn Morrison v. Stevenson, 69 Ala. 448, 450 (1881)).
"[W]here  a  statute  is  reenacted  without  material
1050164; 1050208
20
change, 'it must be assumed that the Legislature was familiar
with its interpretation by this court and was satisfied
therewith.'" Jones v. Conradi, 673 So. 2d 389, 392 (Ala.
1995)(quoting Nolen v. Clark, 238 Ala. 320, 321, 191 So. 342,
343 (1939)).
In Hexcel Decatur, Inc. v. Vickers, 908 So. 2d 237 (Ala.
2005), the employee sued his employer, alleging that he was
terminated in violation of § 25-5-11.1, Ala. Code 1975, in
retaliation for making a claim for workers' compensation
benefits.  The employer argued that the plain meaning of § 25-
5-11.1 requires the commencement of a civil action as a
prerequisite to a retaliatory-discharge claim. The employer
asked this Court to revisit its earlier decision in  McClain
v. Birmingham Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 578 So. 2d 1299 (Ala.
1991), interpreting § 25-5-11.1.  McClain was released in
1991, and the legislature enacted major revisions to the
workers' compensation law in 1992.  The legislature also made
further changes to the workers' compensation law in 1993,
1995, and 1996.  However, the legislature did not amend § 25-
5-11.1 to correct the interpretation given that section in
McClain.  This Court held:
1050164; 1050208
21
"Overruling 
McClain 
in 
the 
face 
of 
this
legislative history would violate the rule that
'[t]he Legislature, when it enacts legislation, is
presumed to have knowledge of existing law and of
the judicial construction of existing statutes.'
Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Hodgen, 884 So. 2d
801, 814 (Ala. 2003).  See also Ex parte Drummond
Co., 837 So. 2d 831, 835 n. 9 (Ala. 2002)('In 1968,
this Court adopted the Bell[ v. Driskill, 282 Ala.
640, 213 So. 2d 806 (1968)] test. The Legislature
has had more than 30 years to overrule or modify
that decision; it has chosen not to do so.
Moreover, in those 30 years, the Legislature has
amended the Workers' Compensation Act. "'[W]hen the
legislature readopts a code section, or incorporates
it into a subsequent Code, prior decisions of this
court permeate the statute, and it is presumed that
the legislature deliberately adopted the statute
with 
knowledge 
of this court's interpretation
thereof.'"' (quoting Jones v. Conradi, 673 So. 2d
389, 392 (Ala. 1995), quoting in turn Edgehill Corp.
v. Hutchens, 282 Ala. 492, 495-96, 213 So.2d 225,
227-28 (1968))); Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., 851 So.
2d 33, 41-42 (Ala. 2002)('Presumably, when the
Legislature reenacts or amends a statute without
altering 
language 
that 
has 
been 
judicially
interpreted, 
it 
adopts 
a 
particular 
judicial
construction.').  Had the Legislature disagreed with
the interpretation of § 25-5-11.1 given by this
Court in McClain, it could have easily amended § 25-
5-11.1 in 1992, 1993, 1995, or 1996 when it changed,
added, or repealed no less than 90 other sections of
the Workers' Compensation Act.  The Legislature has
acquiesced in the holding of McClain, and to
overrule that case now would be to disregard the
doctrine of stare decisis."
908 So. 2d at 240-41.
In 1999, when the legislature amended § 15-12-21(d), it
was aware of the decisions of the appellate courts in May v.
1050164; 1050208
22
State, 672 So. 2d 1307, Barksdale v. State, 680 So. 2d 1029,
and Ex parte Smith, 698 So. 2d 219.  In 1993, the Court of
Criminal Appeals in May and Barksdale held that office-
overhead expenses are "expenses reasonably incurred" as that
phrase is used in § 15-12-21(d).  In 1997, this Court
discussed the Court of Criminal Appeals' decisions in May and
Barksdale and explicitly adopted the holding that § 15-12-21
authorizes the payment to a court-appointed attorney for
office-overhead expenses reasonably incurred in the defense of
an indigent defendant.  Had the legislature intended to make
such a broad sweeping change in contradiction to the earlier
caselaw, it could have easily done so.  The subtle change in
the 1999 amendment to § 15-12-21(d) did not change the
operative phrase "expenses reasonably incurred" addressed in
May and Barksdale, but only the prepositional phrase following
those words, and did not rise to the level of making a broad
sweeping change that contradicted existing caselaw.  
We recognize that a fundamental principle of statutory
construction is that it is presumed that the legislature did
not do a futile thing in enacting a statute.  Ex parte Watley,
708 So. 2d 890 (Ala. 1997).  This rule operates to aid in
1050164; 1050208
23
determining the intent of the legislature.  Smitherman v.
Marshall County Comm'n, 746 So. 2d 1001 (Ala. 1999).  However,
the rule "has no place here, where the legislature has merely
recodified a provision that has an established construction."
Jones v. Conradi, 673 So. 2d at 394 n. 14.
As stated earlier, the trial court made note of the
legislature's 2002 joint resolution expressing its intent that
Act No. 99-427 not affect the payment of office-overhead
expenses.  Although we agree with the comptroller that this
joint resolution is not binding law, we do note that it was
adopted by the same quadrennially elected legislative body
that enacted Act No. 99-427.  This Court has clearly stated,
however, that "[a] resolution is not a law but merely the form
in which the legislature expresses an opinion.  The
Legislature has no power to make laws by resolution."  Gunter
v. Beasley, 414 So. 2d 41, 43 (Ala. 1982).  Therefore, even
though Act No. 2002-129 set out the legislature's intent post-
enactment, it is not controlling in deciding the issue before
us.
The comptroller argues that the 1999 amendment clarified
an ambiguity regarding the 
payment 
of 
office-overhead
1050164; 1050208
24
expenses.  (State comptroller's brief at 22-24.) However,
given the judicial interpretation of § 15-12-21 before the
1999 amendment to the effect that office-overhead expenses
were embraced in that section, there was no ambiguity in the
phrase "expenses reasonably incurred" regarding the prior
payment of office-overhead expenses.  Therefore, there was at
that time no ambiguity, but assuming that there was ambiguity,
the legislature could have plainly stated that office-
overhead expenses were nonreimbursable.  Rather, it was the
subtle change in the 1999 amendment to § 15-12-21(d) adding
the language "in the defense of his or her client" that
obviously created confusion, because after the amendment,
there were opposing attorney general opinions in 2001 and
2005, a footnote in an opinion by this Court in 2002 stating
in dicta that office-overhead expenses were not payable, and
a circuit court case upholding the payment of office-overhead
expenses in 2002.  Accordingly, the comptroller's argument
that the 1999 amendment to § 15-12-21(d) resolved an ambiguity
regarding the payment of office-overhead expenses and made it
clear that office-overhead expenses were not reimbursable is
not well taken.  
1050164; 1050208
25
Although there is no meaningful difference in the phrases
"in such defense" and "in the defense of his or her client,"
it is important that we recognize that it was a footnote in an
opinion of this Court that has brought us here today.  Indeed,
the comptroller paid office-overhead expenses from 1999 to
2002.  In 2001, the then attorney general issued an opinion
addressing office-overhead expenses and concluded that based
on the language of § 15-12-21(d), even after the 1999
amendment, an attorney appointed to represent an indigent
defendant could be reimbursed for office-overhead expenses
even if the attorney worked out of his or her home.   
The footnote in the opinion in Lyons and the 2005
attorney general opinion, which relied heavily on Lyons, stand
alone in concluding that the 1999 amendment to § 15-12-21(d)
abolished the payment of office-overhead expenses.  That
conclusion cannot be inferred, as the State contends, from the
"dramatic" increase in the hourly rates effected by the 1999
amendment and the change in the phrase from "such defense" to
the more specific phrase "in defense of his or her client."
The raise in the hourly rates in the 1999 amendment to § 15-
12-21(d), without the payment of office-overhead expenses, is
1050164; 1050208
26
less than the pre-1999 hourly rates plus office-overhead
expenses.  Furthermore, the relevant language upon which the
payment of office-overhead expenses was originally based in
May was the phrase "expenses reasonably incurred."  The
legislature did not amend that phrase in 1999, thus reflecting
the legislature's intent that lawyers appointed to represent
indigent clients were still entitled to the payment of office-
overhead expenses, the intent reflected by the nonbinding
joint resolution of the legislature.   
The parties raise the issue whether the Covington Circuit
Court's decision in Christensen v. Childree is binding on the
comptroller.  In light of our resolution regarding the
interpretation of § 15-12-21(d), as amended, it is not
necessary to address this issue.
As noted previously, this appeal and cross-appeal arise
out of the trial court's order entered in response to Wright's
"Motion for a Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability
with Class Issues Reserved."  The trial court certified its
order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  As a
practical matter, what the trial court did was to rule on 
1050164; 1050208
[substituted p. 27]
Wright's claim that § 15-12-21(d), as amended, required the
comptroller to pay office-overhead expenses to lawyers
appointed to represent indigent defendants. In affirming that
order today, we do not reach the other issues Wright asks us
to address on appeal; those issues remain pending before the
trial court.
Conclusion
Section 15-12-21(d), as amended in 1999, provides for the
payment of office-overhead expenses to lawyers appointed to
represent indigent defendants in Alabama.  Accordingly, the
trial court's judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Nabers, C.J., and See, Lyons, Harwood, Woodall,* Stuart,
Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.
*Although Justice Woodall was not present at oral
argument, he has viewed the videotape of that oral argument.