Case Title: Micks v. State

Citation: 230 N.E.2d 298, 249 Ind. 278

Docket Number: 30,766

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1967-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
249 Ind. 278 (1967)
230 N.E.2d 298
MICKS
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,766.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed October 18, 1967.
Rehearing denied December 21, 1967.
*279 Ferdinand Samper and Forrest Bowman, Jr., of Indianapolis, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Wilma T. Leach, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
LEWIS, J.
The appellant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to 10-to-25 years in the Indiana State Reformatory. The trial was by jury. The defendant appellant filed a motion for a new trial alleging:
Appellant's counsel thereafter filed a petition for permission to file a belated motion for a new trial. Permission was granted and the belated motion incorporated the specifications contained in the original motion for a new trial and added specification 3 through 10 inclusive. The belated motion for a new trial was overruled and this appeal then prosecuted.
The appellant urges specifications 1, 2, 5, 7, 8 and 10 of his belated motion for a new trial. Specifications 5, 7, 8 and 10 are as follows:
Specification 5, supra, indicates that the Court pre-emptorily shut off cross-examination of witness Owen. We conclude that the record fails to disclose that it was manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the Trial Court that resulted in injury to the appellant.
Specification 7, supra, is alleged error at law which occurred at the trial when the Court read to the jury the substance of State's Exhibit Number 3. Exhibit Number 3 was a certificate from the office of the Secretary of State of the State of Indiana showing the corporate existence of United Oil Service, Inc., a corporation. The Court not only commented to the jury concerning the exhibit, but also interpreted the instrument. We emphasize here the rule laid down by this Court in Wilson v. State (1943), 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E.2d 848, which is as follows:
We also re-emphasize the holding of this Court in the early case of Aszman v. The State (1889), 123 Ind. 347, 24 N.E. 123, in which this Court said, in substance, that judges are not permitted to comment upon the weight and value of evidence. This Court said, in substance, in Reinhold v. The State (1891), 130 Ind. 467, 30 N.E. 306, that the Court may not make statements in excess of what was proper ... and certainly no statement could be made that could be calculated to influence the minds of the jury to the prejudice of the accused. Here, however, we are not at all convinced that the interpretation of an instrument by the Court in any way prejudiced the accused. We do not condone this practice and think the safer presentation to the jury would be to follow the practice of having counsel read the exhibit word for word to the jury leaving the interpretation to the jury or, in lieu thereof, to pass the exhibit to the jury and let the jury, member by member, read the exhibit and let each juror, for himself, make his own interpretation. The Court's departure from the normal and accepted practice here, however, is not reversible error; particularly since counsel did not object; did not move for an instruction asking the Court to tell the jury that the Court entertains no opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of the defendant and that the Court did not have any opinion concerning the probative value of Exhibit Number 3; and, counsel did not move for a mistrial.
We remind counsel that it is his duty, if he desires to save a question for appeal, to make proper objections and to request proper remedies from the Trial Court. This is just as true when the alleged errors are committed by the Court as when erroneous and improper questions are propounded by opposing counsel.
*283 This Court made the following statement in Dull v. State (1962), 242 Ind. 633, 180 N.E.2d 523:
And, we believe the directions set out in Gamble v. Lewis, supra, are particularly useful here: prompt objection, if reasonably required; a request for limiting instructions stating why the harm done could not be cured, as well as a motion for mistrial, are required.
Specification 8, supra, alleges error on the part of the Trial Court in permitting the prosecuting attorney to elicit from a police officer certain acts purportedly committed by one Mothershead at the time the police officer arrested Mothershead and the appellant. Mothershead and the appellant were indicted as principals for the crime covered by this affidavit, and they were tried separately. The substance of the evidence offensive to appellant in his specification of error is substantially as follows:
At the time of the arrest of appellant the officer testified that as he entered the premises where appellant and Mothershead were arrested, Mothershead rushed through the house and attempted to flush some money down a toilet. The officer at this time arrested Mothershead and appellant. At the time of the objection to the evidence the Court properly stated that it was limiting the answer to what, if anything, the officer said and did at the time of the arrest of the appellant. Everything *284 that occurred that is objected to by appellant occurred in his presence and all acts were committed by his co-defendant. The appellant did not make any comment, nor did he participate in the acts of Mothershead; and, therefore, we fail to see where appellant was harmed and in what manner this testimony prejudiced the substantial rights of appellant.
Furthermore, if appellant felt aggrieved by the testimony, he would have completed his record by moving to strike; moving for a corrective instruction; or, finally moving for a mistrial. In each of the foregoing affirmative actions, appellant would have found it necessary to point out to the Court the prejudice and harm that he had suffered.
Specification 10, supra, complains of error because of incompetency of counsel. The appellant complains that trial counsel failed to propound a question which had it been properly answered, a motion to suppress the evidence found by Officer Duckworth at the time of the arrest of appellant would have been sustained. Much has been written on the question of this Court's duty when competency of counsel is questioned.
In Arnold v. State (1959), 239 Ind. 592, 159 N.E.2d 278, this Court, in quoting from Hendrickson v. State of Indiana, supra, said:
During the argument of this case, appellant suggested that perhaps trial counsel was timid in making objections to the conduct of the Court and perhaps the timidity of counsel was because he was a pauper attorney appointed by the Court trying this cause. We realize that there may be influence on a pauper attorney, because of the source of his employment, to be less bold in making objections to the conduct of the Trial Court; however, we believe that attorneys, realizing their duties to the client, take very seriously their obligations to that client, and disregard the source of payment of their services. The record on this case indicates that trial counsel was laboring with a very difficult set of facts. In hindsight we may all make a judgment concerning the professional strategy of one of our colleagues, but our judgment should not be in hindsight because we are not in a position to sit and see the reaction of the various jurors to repeated objections. We are not in a position to know the over-all strategy that had been planned by trial counsel. We emphasize here again what *286 this Court said in Wilson v. State, supra, which reads as follows:
If a situation should come before this Court where the evidence is clear that a trial judge has been able to extract from his appointed pauper attorney the intestinal fortitude of that attorney, it will be the duty of the Court to reverse. This situation would compel the proper authorities to provide a new system for the appointment of public defenders.
There was substantial evidence of probative value sufficient to prove each of the material allegations of the affidavit here. The verdict of the jury, therefore, is sustained by sufficient evidence and the verdict is not contrary to law.
The judgment is affirmed.
Hunter, C.J., Arterburn and Mote, JJ., concur.
Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 230 N.E.2d 298.