Case Title: State v. Rhodes

Citation: 2011 WI 73

Docket Number: 2009AP000025-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 WI 73 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP25-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Olu A. Rhodes, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 329 Wis. 2d 268, 789 N.W. 2d 753 
(Ct. App. 2010 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 14, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 3, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Patricia D. McMahon 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J. joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument 
by 
John 
J. 
Grau, 
Grau 
Law 
Office, 
Waukesha.
 
 
2011 WI 73
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP25-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2006CF1848) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Olu A. Rhodes, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 14, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals.  State v. Rhodes, 
No. 2009AP25, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 7, 2010).  
The court of appeals reversed a judgment of conviction entered 
on a jury verdict finding Olu A. Rhodes (Rhodes) guilty of 
first-degree intentional homicide and first-degree recklessly 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
2 
 
endangering safety, both as party to a crime, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(1)(a) and 941.30(1).1 
¶2 
On appeal, Rhodes claimed that the circuit court erred 
when it cut off his cross-examination of a prosecution witness——
his sister, Nari Rhodes (Nari).  His cross-examination sought to 
cast doubt on the State's theory of motive in the case, that 
Rhodes had killed the victim because the victim was responsible 
for Nari being beaten the day before the shooting.  Rhodes 
argued that by cutting short his cross-examination, the circuit 
court violated his constitutional right to confront a witness, 
and the error was not harmless. 
¶3 
We conclude that the circuit court did not violate the 
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment when it exercised 
its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of Nari Rhodes.  
The court reasonably limited the defendant's cross-examination 
of his sister about incidents of domestic abuse against her by 
the victim of the homicide to avoid confusing the issues and 
misleading the jury.  This limitation did not prevent the 
defendant from presenting evidence to rebut the State's theory 
of the defendant's motive for the crime, and to make that 
argument in closing. 
¶4 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the case to the court of appeals for 
consideration of the other grounds presented by the defendant. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
3 
 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
Olu Rhodes and his brother, Jelani Saleem (Saleem), 
were tried together for the murder of Robert Davis (Davis) and 
the shooting injury of Jonte Watt (Watt) in an incident that 
occurred on April 4, 2006.  Davis was shot seven or eight times 
and died from the gunshot wounds.  Watt was shot in the thigh in 
the same incident.   
¶6 
The State's theory of the case was that Rhodes and 
Saleem killed Davis in retribution for a beating the day before 
of their sister, Nari, for which they believed Davis was 
ultimately responsible.  Nari and Davis had previously had a 
tempestuous romantic relationship, and Davis fathered Nari's 
child. 
¶7 
The defense theory was simply that Olu Rhodes and 
Jelani Saleem were not involved in the shooting.  The defense 
sought to rebut the State's motive evidence by showing that 
Rhodes and Saleem had not avenged other, prior injuries 
inflicted on Nari by Davis.  The trial court cut the cross-
examination of Nari short on grounds that the previous injuries 
were extraneous "other acts" evidence and might confuse the 
issues.   
¶8 
During the course of the trial, the jury heard 
testimony 
from 
multiple 
witnesses 
including 
Jonte 
Watt, 
Dominique Walker, Nari Rhodes, Detective David Salazar, and Olu 
Rhodes.  Jelani Saleem did not take the stand.  Watt testified 
that around noon on April 4, 2006, Watt, Davis, and Dominique 
Walker were driving around in Watt's car when they noticed 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
4 
 
Rhodes following them in his red Buick Riviera.  Watt did not 
testify that he recognized anyone in the car other than Rhodes.  
Watt stopped on 1st Street in Milwaukee to speak with a friend, 
then continued driving, at which point Watt no longer saw Rhodes 
following them.  Watt drove to his grandmother's house and 
parked the car in front of the house. 
¶9 
As Watt and Davis were waiting on the porch of the 
grandmother's house, Rhodes came around the corner in his car. 
Watt noticed Saleem in the passenger's seat.  As Watt continued 
to knock on his grandmother's door, Saleem and Davis ran toward 
them with handguns.  Watt testified that he heard three shots as 
he and Davis fled from the porch. Watt was shot in the thigh.    
During the course of the shooting, Davis fell and Watt heard 
additional shots.  Watt looked back and saw Saleem standing over 
Davis. 
¶10 Walker corroborated Watt's testimony and added that 
she yelled to Watt that Rhodes was approaching.  She testified 
that she saw Rhodes and Saleem running toward the porch and saw, 
after Davis fell, that both Saleem and Rhodes stood over him and 
fired additional shots, after which they ran away. 
¶11 Nari Rhodes was called as a prosecution witness to 
support the State's theory of motive for the shooting.  She 
testified that she had a tense argument with Davis on April 3, 
2006, the day before the murder.  Nari testified that Davis 
swore at her, damaged her car window, took her cell phone, and 
attempted to pull their child from the car.  Later that same 
day, Davis flagged Nari down in her car and they resumed 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
5 
 
talking.  While they were talking, Davis's then current 
girlfriend, Nancy Segura, came up to the car and started arguing 
with Nari. Davis walked away as the argument escalated, and 
thereafter Segura beat Nari with the help of Tammy Bell.  Nari 
was punched, pulled from the car, and rendered unconscious after 
hitting her head on the concrete.  She had to be taken to a 
hospital. 
¶12 Nari testified that after she returned from the 
hospital, she told Rhodes and Saleem about the beating from 
Segura and Bell, but explained that her brothers did not react 
with anger.  Rather, they were upset with Nari for putting 
herself in the position to be beaten by the two women.  
¶13 Midway through her testimony, Nari alluded to previous 
domestic violence problems with Davis.   
¶14 On cross-examination, Nari testified that she wanted 
to get back at Segura and Bell personally.  When defense counsel 
asked Nari about the injuries she previously received from 
Davis, she explained that the orbital bone by her eye had been 
broken.  At that point, the prosecution objected and a sidebar 
ensued.  Although the initial sidebar was not on the record, 
Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Patricia McMahon later summarized 
for the record what happened during the sidebar.  Judge McMahon 
explained that she did not want the defense to go "into each 
instance of alleged violence from Mr. Davis" because there had 
already been "an opportunity for fair response," but the defense 
was "going into an incident by incident which really gets into 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
6 
 
other acts" evidence.  Accordingly, Judge McMahon told defense 
counsel to move on.2  
¶15 Detective Salazar testified that on the day of the 
shooting, he interviewed Letitia Dotson (Dotson), the mother of 
Rhodes' daughter, about conversations that she and Rhodes had 
shortly after the shooting.  He testified that Dotson told him 
that Rhodes called her at 2:44 p.m. on April 4, 2006, just 
minutes after the shooting.  During a second call at 3:04 p.m., 
Rhodes explained that he had shot Davis six times and that he 
did not "stick around to find out" whether Davis was dead.   
¶16 At trial, Dotson denied making those statements to 
Detective Salazar.  Salazar's account of the interview was 
corroborated, 
however, 
by 
the 
testimony 
of 
his 
partner, 
                                                 
2 Judge McMahon summarized the sidebar: 
What happened at sidebar was there was questioning 
gone into the witness as to the injuries that she 
sustained as a result of Mr. Davis and there was an 
objection. 
 
The Court had permitted previously reference to 
the fact there had been other incidents of domestic 
violence between her and Mr. Davis and . . . there 
were other issues involved, but I did stop you from 
going into each instance of alleged violence from Mr. 
Davis. 
 
I felt that . . .  We talked about this before on 
the record and I thought that there was an opportunity 
for fair response to raising it and——and it was 
raised.  We were going to avoid it altogether, but it 
was raised, and I gave opportunity for fair response, 
but what you were doing was going into a[n] incident 
by incident which really gets into other acts and 
things that were not——there was no motion and there 
was no order to admit that.   
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
7 
 
Detective Willie Huerta, who had participated in the interview.  
It also was corroborated by a report Huerta prepared the day of 
the interview.  Furthermore, the State presented two witnesses 
who testified about the use of a cell phone belonging to Saleem.    
An employee of Sprint Nextel presented cell phone records that 
documented the calls made from Saleem's phone.  In addition, a 
criminal intelligence analyst from the Department of Justice 
took the call location and time information provided by Sprint 
and plotted it on a map to show Rhodes had been in the vicinity 
of the location of the shooting.  
¶17 Rhodes chose to take the stand and testified that he 
did not shoot Davis or Watt.  He explained that, while it was 
true he drove a Buick Riviera, on the day of the shooting he had 
been driving around trying to buy marijuana.  He stated that he 
was aware for at least a year prior to the shooting that Robert 
Davis was physically abusing Nari.  Rhodes testified that when 
he first found out about the abuse, he had a physical 
confrontation with Davis in which he and his cousins threw Davis 
out of the house.  He said he had no further physical 
confrontations with Davis, that he eventually "left it alone" 
because he saw that his sister kept going back to Davis after 
Davis had physically abused her.  
¶18 The jury found Rhodes guilty of the respective charges 
of first-degree intentional homicide and first-degree recklessly 
endangering safety in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1)(a) and 
939.05, but it acquitted Saleem.  
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
8 
 
¶19 Rhodes appealed his conviction on four grounds.  
Rhodes argued that the trial court denied him his right to 
confrontation when it limited his cross-examination of Nari 
Rhodes; the Department of Justice analyst was not qualified to 
give expert testimony about the operation of cell phone towers; 
the prosecutor impermissibly argued in his closing argument that 
phone records placed Rhodes at the scene of the crime; and the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it 
determined that one of Watt's prior convictions would be 
excluded from the number of convictions that would be counted 
for impeachment purposes.  The court of appeals reversed both of 
Rhodes' convictions on the first ground, concluding that the 
trial court erred when it limited Rhodes' cross-examination of 
Nari.  It did not address the other grounds raised.      
¶20 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on September 24, 2010. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶21 The State's appeal requires us to determine whether 
the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in limiting 
Rhodes' cross-examination of Nari.   
¶22 Limiting 
cross-examination 
is 
limiting 
the 
introduction of evidence.  A circuit court's decision to admit 
or exclude evidence will be viewed as a proper discretionary 
determination so long as it was made "in accordance with 
accepted legal standards and in accordance with the facts of 
record."  State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 
(1983) (citing State v. Wollman, 86 Wis. 2d 459, 464, 273 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
9 
 
N.W.2d 225 (1979)).  To this end, we consider whether the 
circuit court "reviewed the relevant facts; applied a proper 
standard of law; and using a rational process, reached a 
reasonable conclusion."  State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶53, 236 
Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606 (citing State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 
2d 768, 780-81, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998)). 
¶23 In the context of a constitutional challenge to 
limitations on cross-examination, the United States Supreme 
Court has observed, "[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar 
as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose limits on 
cross-examination."  Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 
(1986).  In keeping with this holding, we review such decisions 
for an erroneous exercise of discretion.  See State v. Jackson, 
216 Wis. 2d 646, 655, 575 N.W.2d 475 (1998); State v. McCall, 
202 Wis. 2d 29, 41-42, 549 N.W.2d 418 (1996); State v. Echols, 
175 Wis. 2d 653, 677, 499 N.W.2d 631 (1993); Rogers v. State, 93 
Wis. 2d 682, 689, 287 N.W.2d 774 (1980). 
¶24 The court has, on occasion, articulated the standard 
of review somewhat differently.  In State v. Williams, the court 
stated, "Although a circuit court's decision to admit evidence 
is ordinarily a matter for the court's discretion, whether the 
admission 
of 
evidence 
violates 
a 
defendant's 
right 
to 
confrontation is a question of law subject to independent 
appellate review."  State v. Williams, 2002 WI 58, ¶7, 253 
Wis. 2d 99, 644 N.W.2d 919. 
¶25 The 
standard 
described 
in 
Williams, 
although 
articulated differently from the standard in Van Arsdall, 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
10 
 
results in the same analysis set forth in McCall——that is, a 
reviewing 
court 
should 
reverse 
the 
circuit 
court 
if 
it 
determines that the discretionary decision to limit cross-
examination did not rely on the appropriate and applicable law.  
McCall, 202 Wis. 2d at 36 & n.5 (citing Hartung v. Hartung, 102 
Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981)).  The appropriate and 
applicable law in this context is, of course, the constitutional 
right accorded under the confrontation clause.  Whether the 
circuit court relied on the appropriate and applicable law is, 
by definition, a question of law that we review de novo.  See 
City of Madison v. Wis. DWD, 2003 WI 76, ¶10, 262 Wis. 2d 652, 
664 N.W.2d 584.  
[A] trial court in an exercise of its discretion may 
reasonably reach a conclusion which another judge or 
another court may not reach, but it must be a decision 
which a reasonable judge or court could arrive at by 
the consideration of the relevant law, the facts, and 
a process of logical reasoning. 
Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d at 66 (emphasis added). 
¶26 A reviewing court may not substitute its discretion 
for that of the circuit court.  McCall, 202 Wis. 2d at 42.  An 
appellate court may, however, review the record independently to 
determine whether there is any reasonable basis for the circuit 
court's discretionary decision.  Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶53. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶27 To address the issues presented, we consider first the 
history 
of 
the 
confrontation 
clause, 
the 
scope 
of 
its 
application, and its development in the context of cross-
examination.  We next review a circuit court's discretion to 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
11 
 
exclude relevant evidence under Wis. Stat. § 904.03,3 including 
testimonial evidence in the context of cross-examination and the 
confrontation clause.  We then apply these principles of law to 
the facts of this case. 
A. 
Confrontation Clause 
¶28 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in part that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him." This right has been applied to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Pointer v. Texas, 380 
U.S. 400, 406 (1965).  The Wisconsin Constitution similarly 
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face."  Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 7.  We have observed that these provisions are 
"generally" coterminous, and thus we apply United States Supreme 
Court precedent in our analysis of these clauses.  State v. 
Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶43, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637.    
¶29 The Supreme Court has held that the "main and 
essential purpose" of the confrontation clause is to give the 
accused an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against 
him.  Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (quoting 5 J. 
Wigmore, Evidence § 1395, p. 123 (3d ed. 1940)).  The right to 
cross-examine is often implicated in the context of an accused's 
attempt to test the credibility of an adversary witness.  See 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
12 
 
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678-79; Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-17.  At 
the most fundamental level, the right to confrontation through 
cross-examination allows the accused to test the "believability 
of a witness and the truth of his testimony."  Davis, 415 U.S. 
at 316.  See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) 
(the confrontation clause is intended to allow the reliability 
of testimony to be assessed "by testing in the crucible of 
cross-examination"). 
¶30 In Davis the Supreme Court considered a case in which 
the trial court allowed some cross-examination of a prosecution 
witness, but did not allow defense counsel to question the 
witness on his probation status at the time of the events to 
which he was testifying.  Id. at 313-14.  The Supreme Court held 
that the defendant's right to confrontation was violated when he 
was prevented from cross-examination that might "expose to the 
jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and 
credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the 
reliability of the witness."  Id. at 318.   
¶31 Similarly, in Van Arsdall, the Supreme Court concluded 
that the circuit court improperly curtailed all inquiry into the 
dismissal of a pending public drunkenness charge against one of 
the prosecution's witnesses.  Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679.  The 
Court rejected the State's suggestion that a defendant must show 
"'outcome 
determinative' 
prejudice," 
id., 
to 
present 
a 
confrontation clause violation, holding instead that: 
[T]he 
focus 
of 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause 
is 
on 
individual witnesses.  Accordingly, the focus of the 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
13 
 
prejudice 
inquiry 
in 
determining 
whether 
the 
confrontation right has been violated must be on the 
particular witness, not on the outcome of the entire 
trial. . . .  We think that a criminal defendant 
states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by 
showing that he was prohibited from engaging in 
otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to 
show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the 
witness. 
Id. at 680. 
¶32 The 
right 
to 
cross-examination, 
and 
thereby 
confrontation, is not, however, absolute.  Id.  The Van Arsdall 
Court rejected the suggestion that any confrontation clause 
violation must result in automatic reversal.  Id.  Instead, the 
Court reaffirmed and applied the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18 (1967), harmless error standard to confrontation clause 
cases, and remanded the case to the Delaware Supreme Court for a 
determination of prejudice.  Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680, 684.   
¶33 The harmless error test, as the Court explained, is 
focused on "whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the 
cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might 
nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  Id. at 684.  The factors to be considered in such an 
analysis include the importance of the witness's testimony, 
whether the testimony was cumulative, whether other evidence 
corroborated or contradicted the witness's testimony, the extent 
of the cross-examination allowed, and the overall strength of 
the prosecution's case against the defendant.  Id.; see also 
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 250 (1969) (holding that 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
14 
 
the defendant's inability to cross-examine his co-defendants who 
chose not to take the stand was harmless error).  
¶34 Because 
the 
right 
to 
cross-examination 
is 
not 
absolute, the right to confrontation may be limited where 
necessary to further an important public policy, so long as 
there are means to assure the reliability of the witness's 
testimony.  Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990). 
¶35 In Craig, the important public policy concern was the 
protection of the "physical and psychological well-being" of 
children.  Id. at 852-56.  The defendant in Craig was charged 
with sexually assaulting a six-year-old girl.  Id. at 840.  The 
trial court, on motion by the state, limited receipt of the 
child's testimony to one-way closed circuit television, outside 
the physical presence of the defendant.  Id.  The Supreme Court 
concluded that if it is "the presence of the defendant that 
causes the [courtroom] trauma," a court may properly deny a 
defendant the right to face-to-face confrontation.  Id. at 856. 
¶36 Similarly, courts have upheld limitations on cross-
examination by a pro se defendant of a child witness in a sexual 
abuse case, Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1034-37 (4th Cir. 
1995); limitation on cross-examination about a witness's history 
of mental illness when the accused had been permitted to explore 
the issue outside the presence of the jury and was allowed to 
cross-examine the witness on his drug and alcohol history, U.S. 
v. Jones, 213 F.3d 1253, 1261 (10th Cir. 2000); and use of 
strongly corroborated testimony from the defendant's first 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
15 
 
trial, instead of presenting live testimony at the second trial, 
Lowery v. Anderson, 225 F.3d 833, 839-41 (7th Cir. 2000). 
¶37 The Supreme Court also has recognized that the 
confrontation clause does not guarantee cross-examination "that 
is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the 
defense might wish."  Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 
(1985).  Although the witness in Fensterer could not recall the 
particular basis upon which he had made his expert opinion, the 
confrontation clause was satisfied because the defense was given 
a full opportunity to expose his forgetfulness.  Id. at 21-22.  
That the defense might have preferred that the expert "embrace a 
particular theory, which it [was] prepared to refute with 
special vigor, is irrelevant." Id. at 19.  The confrontation 
clause 
guarantees 
only 
the 
opportunity 
to 
cross-examine 
witnesses.  Id. at 20.   
¶38 In addition, the right to cross-examination extends 
only to evidence that is relevant.  We have long recognized that 
a defendant has no right, "constitutional or otherwise," to 
present evidence on cross-examination that is not relevant.  See 
State v. Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d 315, 332, 431 N.W.2d 165 (1988); 
State v. Bolstad, 124 Wis. 2d 576, 584, 370 N.W.2d 257 (1985); 
see also State v. Droste, 115 Wis. 2d 48, 58, 339 N.W.2d 578 
(1983).  The test of relevancy on cross-examination "is not 
whether the answer will elucidate any of the main issues in the 
case but whether it will be useful to the trier of fact in 
appraising the credibility of the witness and evaluating the 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
16 
 
probative value of the direct testimony."  Rogers, 93 Wis. 2d at 
689. 
¶39 As the Supreme Court explained in Van Arsdall, the 
right of cross-examination does not mean 
that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on 
defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a 
prosecution witness.  On the contrary, trial judges 
retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation 
Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on 
such cross-examination based on concerns about, among 
other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is 
repetitive or only marginally relevant. 
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. 
¶40 Accordingly, we have upheld limitations on cross-
examination when the circuit court properly exercises its 
discretion 
to 
preclude 
evidence 
that 
is 
"irrelevant 
or 
immaterial," "designed to confuse the issues in the instant 
case, and interject undue prejudice into the jury's decision 
making process."  McCall, 202 Wis. 2d at 44-45. 
B. 
Exclusion Of Evidence Under Wis. Stat. § 904.03 
¶41 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.03 provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
¶42 "Relevant evidence" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 904.01 
as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
17 
 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence."  Evidence need not bear directly on one of the 
elements of the crime in order to be admissible, but may bear on 
another "fact that is of consequence" to the determination of 
the action.  Holmes v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 259, 268, 251 N.W.2d 56 
(1977).   
¶43 In Holmes, the factor of consequence was motive.  Id.  
The defendant was charged with armed robbery, to which he 
pleaded guilty, and attempted murder, to which he pleaded not 
guilty.  Id. at 262.  The two charges stemmed from the same 
incident.  Id.  The prosecution sought and was allowed to 
present evidence regarding the armed robbery to show the 
defendant's motive for running away from police and firing shots 
at the officer.  Id. at 264.  On appeal, the defendant argued, 
among other things, that the evidence was irrelevant and 
inadmissible.  Id. at 266.  This court disagreed, holding: 
"There can be no question that evidence relating to the armed 
robbery was relevant to the issue of the attempted murder 
charge, in that it provided the motive for the shooting."  Id. 
at 267.  The circuit court properly exercised its discretion 
under § 904.03 because it engaged in a balancing of the 
probative value against the chance of undue prejudice to the 
defendant.  Id. at 270. 
¶44 We apply the same analysis to discretionary decisions 
when the defendant's right to cross-examination under the 
confrontation clause may be implicated.   
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
18 
 
¶45 For example, in McCall, the defendant claimed his 
constitutional right to confront his accusers was violated when 
the circuit court limited his cross-examination of the victim.  
McCall, 202 Wis. 2d at 32.  The circuit court refused to allow 
cross-examination of the victim regarding the dismissal of three 
criminal charges that had been pending prior to the victim's 
testimony.  Id.  We reiterated that the extent and scope of 
cross-examination is committed to the sound discretion of the 
circuit court, and that reversal is proper only where there has 
been a "prejudicial abuse of discretion."  Id. at 35.   
¶46 We then concluded that the court of appeals erred when 
it substituted its discretion for that of the circuit court.  
Id. at 42.  We specifically noted that the circuit court, prior 
to its decision to restrict the scope of cross-examination, 
heard arguments from both counsel and demonstrated a logical 
reasoning process when it balanced the relevancy of the evidence 
against the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the 
issues.  Id. at 39.   
¶47 We also found significant the fact that the record 
indicated the defendant was able to present other evidence to 
give the jury reason to discredit the victim's testimony.  Id. 
at 41.  We concluded that, "[a]lthough a defendant is entitled 
to significant latitude" in cross-examination, the circuit court 
has a duty to place limits on such examination when it would 
"divert the trial to extraneous matters or confuse the jury by 
placing undue emphasis on collateral issues."  Id. at 41-42.  
Because the testimony sought was not relevant, the defendant's 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
19 
 
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not implicated.  Id. 
at 43. 
¶48 In sum, we have consistently balanced a defendant's 
right 
to 
cross-examination under the confrontation clause 
against the circuit court's discretionary authority to exclude 
evidence that may lead to confusion of the issues or confusion 
of the jury.  See State v. Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶¶42-43, 236 
Wis. 2d 686, 613 N.W.2d 629; Echols, 175 Wis. 2d at 677; Rogers, 
93 Wis. 2d at 689, 692. 
C. 
Rhodes' Appeal 
¶49 Rhodes' chief argument is that he should have been 
allowed to cross-examine Nari to rebut the State's theory of 
motive——namely, that Rhodes and Saleem gunned down Davis, and in 
the process also shot Watts, in an attempt to avenge the beating 
Nari had incurred at Davis's alleged direction.  Rhodes argues 
that to effectively rebut the State's theory, he should have 
been allowed to cross-examine Nari regarding the previous 
incidents of domestic violence at Davis's hand that the brothers 
had not avenged.  To be denied this opportunity, he contends, 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination. 
¶50 "The exposure of a witness's motivation in testifying 
represents 
'a 
proper 
and 
important 
function 
of 
the 
constitutionally 
protected 
right 
of 
cross-examination.'"  
McCall, 202 Wis. 2d  at 45 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-17).   
¶51 Here, however, Rhodes is attempting to use a State 
witness 
to 
rebut 
the 
State's 
theory 
of 
the 
defendant's 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
20 
 
motivation, even though Nari had provided little support for the 
State's theory in her testimony.  If Rhodes had attempted to 
challenge the motivation or credibility of Nari through cross-
examination, we might have a different case. 
¶52 On direct examination, Nari detailed her beating on 
April 3 by Segura and Bell.  She insisted that Rhodes and Saleem 
did not become angry at Davis, but instead took her beating 
calmly, and were "mad" at her for putting herself "in the 
predicament to be beaten."   
¶53 In response to a question from the assistant district 
attorney about her relationship with Davis after the birth of 
their son, Nari blurted out that "we had a lot of domestic 
violence problems."  The prosecution did not pursue this answer, 
but Rhodes' defense counsel seized upon it in cross-examination.  
Rhodes' attorney asked:  
Q: 
You did tell us . . . on direct examination that 
there had been domestic violence or violence between 
yourself and Davis before, right? 
A: 
Yes. 
Q: 
Before that date? 
A: 
Yes. 
Q: 
In fact, Mr. Davis had attacked you previous to 
April 3, 2006; is that right? 
A: 
Yes. 
 
. . . .  
Q: 
[I]n your conflict with Mr. Davis, have there 
been other times when you've been injured? 
A: 
Yes. 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
21 
 
Q: 
And what injuries had you received? 
A: 
One side——My orbital bone in my eye was broken 
and it was like really bad.  (Emphasis added.)   
¶54 This is where the State objected and the court called 
a sidebar.  The court blocked further questions on the subject.  
In the subsequent comment about the sidebar, defense counsel 
said: 
I asked Nari Rhodes about a particular incident.  
She said her orbital bone had been broken.  That's a 
fairly serious injury.  My next question would have 
been, well, what's your orbital bone?  The question——
She would have described as something around her eye.4 
 
After that I would have asked her did she make 
her brothers aware of that injury and who would have 
inflicted it and she would have said yes.5  There was 
no response from her brothers. 
 
That was proper for me to try and rebut this 
motive information that the State has come forward 
with. 
¶55 The State objected that it did not have notice of that 
particular incident and said it had expressed concern before any 
evidence was introduced that the defense would make "a history 
of domestic abuse" by Davis an issue. 
¶56 Judge McMahon stated that this possibility had been a 
concern from the beginning, which is why the court had made an 
initial "ruling that we not get into evidence——extraneous 
                                                 
4 Nari Rhodes had already linked the "orbital bone" to her 
eye in her testimony. 
5 Nari Rhodes had already testified that Olu Rhodes had 
lived with his mother and sister for a number of years, which 
would have included the time when Nari sustained the orbital 
bone injury. 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
22 
 
evidence that would mislead the jury on other issues in a trial 
within a trial which is the concern."  
¶57 Motive is not an element of either first-degree 
intentional homicide or first-degree recklessly endangering 
safety, the charges brought by the State against Rhodes and 
Saleem.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(1)(a) and 941.30(1) (2005-06).  
The State made motive a fact of consequence, however, when it 
asserted that there was "bad blood" between Davis and Rhodes 
because of Davis's abuse of Nari.     
¶58 The testimony Rhodes sought to elicit by cross-
examining Nari went to rebut motive, which was made a fact of 
consequence by the State.  Therefore, the testimony sought by 
Rhodes would have been relevant under Wis. Stat. § 904.01. 
¶59 Nonetheless, the circuit court permissively exercised 
its discretion in curtailing a full inquiry into prior incidents 
between Davis and Nari.  Wis. Stat. § 904.03. 
¶60 As discussed above, one of the grounds for exclusion 
of relevant evidence under § 904.03 is the danger of "confusion 
of the issues."  Another is the risk of "misleading the jury."  
Id.  Judge McMahon referenced both in her decision at sidebar to 
limit Nari's testimony on cross-examination.6  
                                                 
6 Rhodes' brief spends much time arguing that Nari's 
testimony should not have been excluded as "other acts evidence" 
under State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 771-73, 576 N.W. 2d 30 
(1988).  While counsel argued during the sidebar on the record 
about whether or not a Sullivan analysis should apply to any 
prior assaults on Nari by Davis, Judge McMahon did not pin her 
ruling to limit cross-examination on "other acts" evidence.  
Instead, she emphasized the factors listed in Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.03.   
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
23 
 
¶61 Judge McMahon's concerns were not without reasonable 
basis.  This case already involved two defendants, only one of 
whom testified.  Over the course of the four-day trial, 
testimony was taken from sixteen witnesses, including Watts, the 
surviving victim of the crime.  The jury was already presented 
with 
the 
difficult 
task 
of 
taking 
the 
often-conflicting 
testimony it heard and weighing it on two charges against two 
separate defendants.   
¶62 Judge McMahon was concerned that the jury would be 
misled into an improper focus on questions about motive and the 
alleged history of abuse between the victim and Nari.  There was 
also the possibility that if Rhodes were allowed to emphasize 
his rebuttal theory he would not have retaliated against Davis 
for the April 3 incident because he had not retaliated against 
him before, he would have confused the issues.  First, such 
testimony would, in effect, have put Davis——the deceased victim—
—on trial for alleged prior incidents of domestic violence.7  
Second, it would have required the jury to speculate as to 
whether a lack of retaliation for Davis's prior assaults on Nari 
magnified Rhodes' motive in this instance.  Both were legitimate 
concerns. 
¶63 At the same time, Judge McMahon was clearly mindful of 
the importance of allowing Rhodes to rebut the State's theory of 
motive.  Both Nari and Rhodes were allowed to present their side 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.03 lists "unfair prejudice" and 
"misleading the jury" as two of the factors justifying the 
exclusion of evidence. 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
24 
 
of the story to rebut the State's theory of motive.  The jury 
could reasonably have viewed their testimony as contradicting 
the State's theory.   
¶64 If anything, Nari's testimony seemed to refute the 
State's theory of motive, because she testified that she and 
Davis had a friendly relationship, and that Davis repeatedly 
warned her to leave the scene when Segura arrived and became 
angry.  Nothing in her testimony suggested that she believed 
Davis orchestrated the beating she received at the hands of 
Segura and Bell.  According to her testimony, Nari told her 
brothers that the two women were responsible, not Davis, and 
that the brothers took the news calmly.  Counter to the State's 
theory that Rhodes and Saleem believed Davis was responsible, 
Nari testified that her brothers were upset that she had put 
herself in the situation because of the bad blood between Nari 
and Segura, not between Nari and Davis.   
¶65 Rhodes, in turn, testified that he was aware of the 
history of domestic violence by Davis against Nari, and that 
when he initially discovered the abuse, he threw Davis out of 
the house.  He then proceeded to explain that as time went on, 
he saw that Nari continued to return to Davis despite the abuse, 
and he "just left it alone."  As he observed, "She is grown up, 
so I couldn't tell her what to do."   
¶66 Both Rhodes and Nari were allowed to present their 
side of the story.  There is no indication that this story would 
have been more persuasive if Nari had been allowed to testify 
that there was no retaliation after the incident when Davis 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
25 
 
assaulted her and broke her orbital bone.  Rhodes, in fact, 
testified that he had done no more on any occasion than throw 
Davis out of the house.  In the end, the jury was required to 
make a determination of credibility as to the testimony 
presented.  If the jury did not accept Rhodes' and Nari's 
explanation that her brothers had given up in frustration when 
she continued to return to her abuser——an argument made by 
defense counsel in his closing——the additional statement that 
they did not seek revenge after the orbital bone incident was 
not likely to persuade them otherwise. 
¶67 The circuit court was faced with a difficult dilemma, 
one 
that 
required 
a 
delicate 
balance 
between 
Rhodes' 
constitutional rights on one hand and the dangers of confusion 
of the issues and misleading the jury on the other.  The 
statements of record show that the court considered arguments by 
all counsel, and then proceeded to demonstrate a logical 
reasoning process when it applied the Wis. Stat. § 904.03 
balancing test, just as the court did in McCall, 202 Wis. 2d at 
39.  There is no evidence of an erroneous exercise of 
discretion. 
¶68 As we have already discussed, the right to cross-
examination under the confrontation clause is not absolute.  See 
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679.  Whether they are faced with the 
danger of undue prejudice or the specter of psychological trauma 
to victims, circuit courts can weigh the probative value of the 
evidence proffered with the dangers it brings.  The United 
States Supreme Court and our case law provide examples of when 
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
26 
 
the right to confrontation must bow to other considerations.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 904.03 provides circuit courts guidance on how 
to balance these competing concerns.  At the end of our 
analysis, the question is not whether we would have drawn the 
line the same as the circuit court did, but whether the circuit 
court's 
line-drawing 
was 
a 
reasonable 
exercise 
of 
its 
discretion.   
¶69 In this instance, the record supports the conclusion 
that Judge McMahon's decision was the product of a logical 
process of reasoning, applying the correct standard of law to 
the facts of the case.  Rhodes' right to cross-examination under 
the confrontation clause was not violated when the court limited 
his cross-examination of his sister, Nari.8 
¶70 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the case to the court of appeals for its 
consideration of the other grounds presented by the defendant. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶71 The record shows that Judge McMahon applied a proper 
standard of law in the exercise of her discretion, and it is not 
our place to substitute our judgment for hers.  We hold that 
Rhodes' constitutional right to cross-examination under the 
confrontation clause was not violated when the court limited 
                                                 
8 Because we conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
limiting the cross-examination of Nari's testimony regarding her 
prior incidents of abuse, we do not reach the question of 
harmless error.   
No. 
  2009AP25-CR 
27 
 
Nari's testimony.  The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2009AP25-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶72 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
A 
criminal defendant's fundamental right to confront witnesses is 
a central tenet of our system of justice, our process of 
truthfinding, and our concepts of fair trial. 
¶73 Although the circuit court has wide latitude in 
excluding 
evidence, 
the 
criminal 
defendant's 
fundamental 
constitutional right in the present case to confront a witness 
through cross-examination was unconstitutionally truncated.   
¶74 The State emphasized a retaliation motive theory 
throughout the prosecution of this case.  In opening argument, 
throughout testimony, and in closing argument, the State's story 
of the case was that these brothers hunted down the victim in 
retaliation for their sister's beating of the day before.  The 
State called Nari Rhodes to testify against the defendant for 
the purpose of establishing this motive theory.   
¶75 The defendant had a fundamental constitutional right 
to confront this witness and test the probative value of the 
testimony through cross-examination. 
¶76 I agree with Judge Fine, writing for the court of 
appeals, who balanced the circuit court's latitude in excluding 
evidence and the defendant's constitutional right as follows: 
Here, although we acknowledge the trial court's "wide 
latitude," Rhodes's constitutional right to cross-
examine was cut off too soon.  As we have seen, the 
State emphasized the defendant's motive to avenge his 
sister's beating in its opening, during the testimony, 
and in its closing.  The argument was that when Rhodes 
found out Davis had his sister beaten, he "hunted 
Davis down" and killed him.  The trial court truncated 
Olu A. Rhodes's lack-of-motive defense when it stopped 
No.  2009AP25-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
him from proving he did not react violently when Davis 
had earlier hurt his sister.  Although, as the State 
argues, the jury could have concluded that the beating 
that the State contends gave Olu A. Rhodes the motive 
to kill Davis in this case was the last straw and that 
the earlier incidents contributed to what the State 
asserted was Olu A. Rhodes's and Saleem's rage, the 
jury could have also reached the conclusion advanced 
by Olu A. Rhodes's lawyer.  This was, therefore, a 
matter that the jury had to resolve, and it needed to 
have a full picture of the dynamics that roiled the 
relationships in this case.  By cutting off the cross-
examination of Nari Rhodes when Olu A. Rhodes's lawyer 
was trying to rebut the State's motive theory, the 
trial 
court 
deprived 
Olu 
A. 
Rhodes 
of 
his 
constitutional right to a fair trial. 
State v. Rhodes, No 2009AP25, unpublished slip op., ¶10 (Wis. 
Ct. App. July 7, 2010) (emphasis in original). 
¶77 The majority presents numerous examples of situations 
in which it has been determined that it was reasonable to limit 
a defendant's ability to confront or cross-examine a witness.  
Majority op., ¶¶35-40. 
¶78 I agree that the defendant's fundamental right to 
cross-examine a witness is not absolute or unlimited.  A circuit 
court may impose reasonable limitations on a defendant's cross-
examination when necessary, balancing competing interests.         
¶79 The majority states that the appropriate analysis in 
reviewing the circuit court's determination regarding whether a 
limitation of the defendant's fundamental constitutional right 
was reasonable and necessary is the same analysis that is 
applied in reviewing any discretionary evidentiary decision of 
the circuit court.  Majority op., ¶44.  The majority analogizes 
the appropriate discretionary determination for limiting the 
defendant's fundamental constitutional right to confront a 
No.  2009AP25-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
witness to the balancing of the probative value against the 
chance of undue prejudice to the defendant that the circuit 
court 
must 
perform 
in 
determining 
whether 
to 
allow 
the 
prosecution to present evidence.  Majority op., ¶¶43-44.   
¶80 A defendant's fundamental constitutional right of 
confrontation surely affords the defendant more protection and 
leeway in cross-examining a witness than the standard analysis 
used in discretionary evidentiary decisions when a fundamental 
constitutional right is not implicated.  Indeed, in State v. St. 
George, 2002 WI 50, ¶38, 252 Wis. 2d 499, 643 N.W.2d 777, in 
which the defendant argued that his constitutional right to 
present a defense was violated through the exclusion of an 
expert witness, the court ruled:  "One, the circuit court must 
adhere to the evidentiary rules applicable to expert witnesses, 
and two, because the defendant asserted that the exclusion of 
the evidence would violate his constitutional right to present a 
defense, the circuit court must consider the constitutional law 
principles in making its evidentiary ruling."   
¶81 A similar two-fold legal analysis is applicable in the 
present case, in which the defendant asserts that the exclusion 
of evidence in cross-examination violates his constitutional 
right to confrontation.   
¶82 In the present case, I conclude that the circuit 
court's limitation was not reasonable or necessary in light of 
the defendant's offer of proof, the competing interests examined 
by 
the 
circuit 
court, 
and 
the 
defendant's 
fundamental 
constitutional right.   
No.  2009AP25-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶83 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶84 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion.       
  
 
 
No.  2009AP25-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1