Case Title: State v. Shirey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020 ME 136

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 136 
Docket: 
Pen-20-45 
Argued: 
September 16, 2020 
Decided: 
December 15, 2020 
 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD V. SHIREY 
 
 
HORTON, J. 
[¶1]  Richard V. Shirey appeals from an interlocutory order of the 
Superior Court (Penobscot County, Anderson, J.) denying his motion to dismiss 
on double jeopardy grounds a superseding indictment against him.  Shirey 
argues that the dismissal of the original indictment against him after the jury 
was empaneled and sworn bars the State from charging him again with the 
same offense.  We affirm the judgment, taking this opportunity to clarify the 
implications of a defective indictment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy 
Clauses of the Maine and United States Constitutions.  U.S. Const. amends. V, 
XIV; Me. Const. art. I, § 8. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
[¶2]  In September 2018, a grand jury indicted Shirey on one count of 
possession of a firearm by a prohibited person (Class C), 15 M.R.S. 
§ 393(1)(A-1)(3) (2020).  Shirey proceeded to trial on this indictment on 
August 21, 2019.  The indictment charged, in relevant part, 
 
On or about August 11, 2017, in Burlington, Penobscot 
County, Maine, RICHARD SHIREY, did own, possess or control a 
firearm, having been convicted of or found not criminally 
responsible by reason of mental disease or defect of committing a 
crime under the laws of Pennsylvania punishable by imprisonment 
for one year or more. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  However, the criminal statute defining the firearm 
possession offense charged provides, 
A person may not own, possess or have under that person’s control 
a firearm, unless that person has obtained a permit under this 
section, if that person . . . [h]as been convicted of committing or 
found not criminally responsible by reason of insanity of 
committing . . . [a] crime under the laws of any other state that, in 
accordance with the laws of that jurisdiction, is punishable by a 
term of imprisonment exceeding one year. 
 
15 M.R.S. § 393(1)(A-1)(3) (emphasis added).  Immediately after the jury was 
sworn, Shirey moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to state an offense 
under Maine law.  See M.R.U. Crim. P. 12(b)(2). 
[¶3]  The court granted Shirey’s motion, concluding that the indictment 
failed to allege a crime due to the incorrect recitation of the prior conviction 
 
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element of the offense.  The court reasoned that the indictment would allow 
Shirey to be convicted upon proof that he had previously been convicted of a 
crime that is punishable by a term of imprisonment of precisely one year, even 
though the firearm possession statute defines the offense to require proof of a 
prior conviction for a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding 
one year.  15 M.R.S. § 393(1)(A-1)(3). 
[¶4]  The State soon thereafter convened a second grand jury, which 
indicted Shirey on the instant charges.1  Shirey moved to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 
of the superseding indictment on double jeopardy grounds.  The court denied 
the motion, concluding that Shirey was never placed in jeopardy at the trial on 
the original indictment because (1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over the original indictment and (2) jeopardy cannot attach “until a proceeding 
begins before a trier [of fact] having jurisdiction to try the question of guilt or 
innocence of the accused.”  Shirey timely appealed the order denying his motion 
to dismiss.  See 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2020); M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1); State v. Jandreau, 
                                               
 
1  Counts 1 and 2 of the superseding indictment charge Shirey with possession of a firearm by a 
prohibited person (Class C).  15 M.R.S. § 393(1)(A-1)(3)-(4) (2020).  Count 1 charges a violation of 
the same provision of section 393 as was charged in the original indictment.  See 15 M.R.S. 
§ 393(1)(A-1)(3).  Count 2 charges Shirey with a violation of a different provision within section 393, 
15 M.R.S. § 393(1)(A-1)(4).  The State does not challenge Shirey’s assertion that both of the new 
charges allege the same offense as that alleged in the original indictment.  See Brown v. Ohio, 
432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977); Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975); Blockburger v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 
 
4 
2017 ME 44, ¶ 6 n.3, 157 A.3d 239 (stating that the denial of a motion to dismiss 
based on double jeopardy is immediately appealable). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶5]  The United States and Maine Constitutions prohibit a defendant 
from being “twice put in jeopardy of life or limb” for the same offense.2  
U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Me. Const. art. I, § 8; see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 
784, 794 (1969).  The Double Jeopardy Clause of each constitution applies if 
(1) jeopardy has attached in a criminal trial, (2) jeopardy has terminated, and 
(3) the defendant is placed in jeopardy again for the same offense.  See United 
States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993); Richardson v. United States, 
468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977); Serfass v. 
United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975); Blockburger v. United States, 
284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); State v. Johnson, 2014 ME 68, ¶ 10, 92 A.3d 351. 
[¶6]  “The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a second prosecution 
for the same offense after acquittal.  It protects against a second prosecution for 
the same offense after conviction.  And it protects against multiple punishments 
                                               
 
2  We have interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Maine and United States Constitutions 
as coterminous.  State v. Pineo, 2002 ME 93, ¶ 10, 798 A.2d 1093 (“the Maine and United States 
Constitutions provide identical protections against double jeopardy”).  Federal authority again 
provides a “helpful guide[] regarding the scope of the protection against double jeopardy afforded by 
the Maine Constitution” in the context of a defective indictment as is presented here.  State v. Howes, 
432 A.2d 419, 423 (Me. 1981). 
 
5 
for the same offense.”  Brown, 432 U.S. at 165 (quotation marks omitted).  These 
protections arise only after jeopardy has “attached,” meaning that the 
defendant was materially at risk of conviction.  Martinez v. Illinois, 572 U.S. 833, 
834 (2014).  If jeopardy has attached, the question becomes whether it has 
terminated so as to bar a retrial for the same offense.  See id. at 841.  Thus, this 
case raises two questions.  First, did jeopardy attach to Shirey during the trial 
on the original indictment?  If so, did jeopardy terminate in a way that bars a 
trial on the superseding indictment?  The trial court answered both questions 
in the negative.  “We review the trial court’s double jeopardy determination 
de novo.”  State v. Martinelli, 2017 ME 217, ¶ 5, 175 A.3d 636. 
A. 
Attachment of Jeopardy 
 
[¶7]  Pursuant to both the United States and Maine Double Jeopardy 
Clauses, jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is sworn and in a bench 
trial when the first witness is sworn.  Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 37 n.15, 38 
(1978); State v. Linscott, 416 A.2d 255, 258 (Me 1980); State v. Harriman, 
259 A.2d 752, 754 (Me. 1969).  There remain, however, “limited exceptions to 
this rule—e.g., where the trial court lacks jurisdiction or where a defendant 
obtains an acquittal by fraud or corruption.”  Martinez, 572 U.S. at 840 n.3. 
 
6 
[¶8]  Jeopardy cannot attach if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, 
i.e., the authority to adjudicate the type of criminal offense charged.  See United 
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896); accord, e.g., Hall v. McKenzie, 
575 F.2d 481, 484 (4th Cir. 1978) (“[I]t is settled that an accused cannot be 
placed in jeopardy by a court lacking jurisdiction to decide his case.”); see also 
United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction 
defines the court’s authority to hear a given type of case . . . .”); accord Perkins 
v. State, 614 S.E.2d 92, 93 (Ga. 2005) (holding that jeopardy did not attach 
where the defendant was tried for a criminal offense in a probate court lacking 
criminal jurisdiction). 
[¶9]  On the other hand, if the court has subject matter jurisdiction over 
the type of charge brought, “defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of 
its power to adjudicate a case.”  United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 629-31 
(2002).3  The Supreme Court has explained the distinction between subject 
matter jurisdiction and the issues raised by a defective indictment: 
                                               
 
3  We have said that “[t]he sufficiency of an indictment is jurisdictional.”  State v. Weese, 
662 A.2d 213, 214 (Me. 1995).  However, “our opinions sometimes use the term ‘jurisdiction’ and 
even ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ when referring to a claim-processing requirement or a defective 
pleading rather than the authority of the court to act in a particular class of cases.”  Landmark Realty 
v. Leasure, 2004 ME 85, ¶ 7, 853 A.2d 749 (emphasis added).  “Resorting to the heavy hand of 
jurisdiction . . . is unnecessary because, by rule, the failure of a charging instrument to charge an 
offense can be noticed and acted upon by a court at any time during the proceeding.”  Id. at ¶ 7 n.1.  
Rather than divesting the court of its subject matter jurisdiction, a defective indictment fails to invoke 
 
7 
An acquittal before a court having no jurisdiction is, of course, like 
all the proceedings in the case, absolutely void, and therefore no 
bar to subsequent indictment and trial in a court which has 
jurisdiction of the offense.  But although the indictment was fatally 
defective, yet, if the court had jurisdiction of the cause and of the 
party, its judgment is not void, but only voidable by writ of error; 
and, until so avoided, cannot be collaterally impeached. . . .  If the 
judgment is upon an acquittal, the defendant, indeed, will not seek 
to have it reversed; and the government cannot. 
 
Ball, 163 U.S. at 669-70 (citations omitted); accord Benton, 395 U.S. at 797. 
[¶10]  Because a defective indictment does not affect a court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction, if a trial on a defective indictment is allowed to proceed to 
the point of an acquittal, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a retrial.  See Ball, 
163 U.S. at 670. 
 
[¶11]  For these reasons, a defective indictment brought to trial in a court 
that has jurisdiction places the defendant in jeopardy of conviction if the trial 
proceeds past the point at which jeopardy attaches.  See Hoffler v. Bezio, 
726 F.3d 144, 156-61 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding that jeopardy attached to a 
defendant at his trial for murder because the court had (1) subject matter 
jurisdiction to try felony offenses allegedly occurring in the state’s territorial 
boundaries and (2) personal jurisdiction over the defendant); People v. Sup. Ct. 
of Los Angeles Cty., 820 P.2d 613, 617, 626 (Cal. 1991) (concluding that jeopardy 
                                               
 
the court’s subject matter jurisdiction in the manner required by statute or rule and is therefore 
subject to dismissal.  See id. ¶ 7 & n.1. 
 
8 
attached notwithstanding that the court’s proceedings were defective for 
failing to hold a competency hearing); State v. Corrado, 915 P.2d 1121, 1128-33 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that, despite the absence of any charging 
instrument, jeopardy attached where the trial court “had jurisdiction over the 
type of offense, over the person, and over the place where the offense allegedly 
occurred” (emphasis added)). 
[¶12]  Because the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
the indictment and over Shirey—and because the jury was sworn before the 
court dismissed the indictment—we conclude that jeopardy attached in 
Shirey’s trial. 
[¶13]  With the first question answered in the affirmative, we must next 
determine “whether the jeopardy ended in such a manner that the defendant 
may not be retried.”  Martinez, 572 U.S. at 841. 
B. 
Termination of Jeopardy 
 
[¶14]  Jeopardy terminates so as to bar a retrial in three circumstances: 
(1) when the defendant is acquitted, see Richardson, 468 U.S. at 325; (2) when 
the defendant’s conviction has become final, see United States v. Wilson, 
420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975); or (3) when the court ends the trial after jeopardy 
has attached but before verdict or judgment without either the defendant’s 
 
9 
consent or any manifest necessity, see Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 
(1957); State v. Friel, 500 A.2d 631, 634 (Me. 1985). 
 
[¶15]  The second and third enumerated methods by which jeopardy 
terminates are inapplicable here—Shirey was not convicted, and the 
indictment was dismissed at his request.  Shirey’s double jeopardy argument 
rests on the first method; he contends that the trial court’s dismissal of the 
indictment was the equivalent of an acquittal.  We disagree. 
[¶16]  An acquittal “encompass[es] any ruling that the prosecution’s 
proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense.”  Evans v. 
Michigan, 568 U.S. 313, 318 (2013).  Thus, an acquittal requires some 
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction.  See State 
v. Paquin, 2020 ME 53, ¶ 43, 230 A.3d 17; United States v. Martin Linen Supply 
Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) (characterizing an acquittal as “the ruling of the 
judge, whatever its label, [which] actually represents a resolution, correct or 
not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged”).  The 
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence required to terminate jeopardy 
may take the form of the jury’s verdict, the trial court’s grant of a judgment, or 
even an appellate court’s decision vacating a conviction.4 
                                               
 
4  Typically, when a person is convicted of a criminal offense and the conviction is vacated on 
appeal, jeopardy does not terminate and the defendant can be retried.  See Burks v. United States, 
 
10 
[¶17]  The Supreme Court has said that the reason a trial terminates 
before verdict or judgment may be either procedural or substantive.5  See 
Evans, 568 U.S. at 319.  The distinction lies in whether the reason for ending the 
trial is related to “factual guilt or innocence.”  Id.  (quotation marks omitted).  
Thus, an acquittal, however it comes about, is always based on some 
substantive evaluation of the evidence.  See id.  If the dismissal occurs without 
any consideration of factual guilt or innocence, it is procedural.  Id.  Among this 
brand of dismissals is “an error with the indictment.”  Id. 
[¶18]  Shirey argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial on 
Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment because the court’s dismissal of the first 
indictment was based on its conclusion that, even if the State were to prove the 
allegations in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury would be 
compelled to find Shirey not guilty on the merits.  Essentially, he argues that the 
dismissal was on substantive grounds.  See id.  His argument ignores the 
undisputed point that the court did not evaluate the evidence; rather, the court 
                                               
 
437 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978).  However, if the conviction is vacated based on the appellate court’s 
determination that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, the result is the functional 
equivalent of an acquittal.  See id. at 18 (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial if the 
underlying conviction is vacated on appeal due to insufficient evidence). 
 
5  The Supreme Court defines a substantive dismissal as “a ruling by the court that the evidence is 
insufficient to convict, a factual finding that necessarily establishes the criminal defendant’s lack of 
criminal culpability, and any other ruling which relates to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence.”  
Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313, 319 (2013) (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
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simply assumed that, even if the State proved all of the allegations in the 
indictment, it would not necessarily have proved that Shirey committed any 
crime. 
[¶19]  Because the trial court did not evaluate the evidence, we conclude 
that the error in the original indictment is procedural.  Thus, the dismissal does 
not function as an acquittal and does not bar retrial.  The dismissal of an invalid 
indictment after jeopardy has attached is “treated as the functional equivalent[] 
of [a] mistrial[], and [is] governed by the same double jeopardy principles.”  
6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 25.2(f) (3d ed. 2007); see Lee v. 
United States, 432 U.S. 23, 26, 31 (1977) (“[T]he order [dismissing the 
Government’s faulty information] entered by the District Court was 
functionally indistinguishable from a declaration of mistrial.”); see also United 
States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609-11 (1976) (holding that there is generally no 
bar to retrial when the court grants a mistrial at the defendant’s request); 
Johnson, 2014 ME 68, ¶ 10, 92 A.3d 351 (“once the jury is sworn and jeopardy 
attaches, a defendant ‘will not be required to stand trial a second time unless 
he consents to a mistrial or unless under all the circumstances, the mistrial was 
mandated by manifest necessity.’” (alterations omitted) (quoting State v. Rowe, 
480 A.2d 778, 781 (Me. 1984) (alteration omitted)). 
 
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[¶20]  Shirey moved for the dismissal of the original indictment due to its 
failure to charge a crime under Maine law.  He made this motion immediately 
after the jury was sworn in, before any opening statement, and before any 
presentation of evidence in the form of sworn testimony or exhibits.6  His 
motion was based entirely on the defective indictment and did not seek any 
evaluation of the sufficiency of the State’s evidence.  In fact, because the State 
had not presented any evidence or made any offer of proof, Shirey’s motion 
could not have been based on insufficiency of the evidence.  Without any 
consideration, much less any determination, of Shirey’s guilt or innocence in 
light of the evidence, the court dismissed the case based solely on the deficiency 
in the charging instrument.  Such a defect is precisely the kind of error that the 
Supreme Court has deemed procedural and thus insufficient to terminate 
jeopardy.  See Evans, 568 U.S. at 319. 
[¶21]  Shirey nevertheless insists that he cannot be retried because the 
jury would have been compelled to acquit him even if the State proved all 
allegations contained in the first indictment.  This argument assumes, without 
                                               
 
6  The decision in Evans promulgates no bright line rule delineating the quantity or extent of 
evidence that has to be presented or considered before a dismissal can be classified as substantive.  
We need not consider that question today because the record is clear that the dismissal of the initial 
indictment against Shirey was not based on the presentation or consideration of any evidence. 
 
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support in the record, that the State could not have presented evidence that 
Shirey has a prior conviction punishable by a sentence of more than one year.  
Separately, from a legal standpoint, Shirey’s argument is foreclosed by Lee, 
432 U.S. at 32-34, and Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 468-71 (1973).  In both 
cases, the Supreme Court concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not 
bar retrial after dismissal of charging instruments that did not allege all 
elements of the offenses charged.  Lee, 432 U.S. at 32-34; Somerville, 410 U.S. at 
468-71. 
[¶22]  We therefore conclude that neither the United States Double 
Jeopardy Clause nor its counterpart in the Maine Constitution bars the State 
from retrying Shirey on the superseding indictment. 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hunter J. Tzovarras, Esq. (orally), Bangor, for appellant Richard V. Shirey 
 
Marianne Lynch, District Attorney, and Mark A. Rucci, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), 
Prosecutorial District V, Bangor, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2019-2973 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY