Case Title: Leger v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Leger v. State1993 WY 94855 P.2d 359Case Number: 92-190Decided: 06/30/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
William 
R. LEGER, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

STATE 
of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Bill 
Rice, Sundance, for appellant.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara Boyer, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program, 
Steven W. Holland, Student Intern, for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The dispositive 
issue raised by this appeal is whether the trial court erred by imposing an 
illegal sentence requiring restitution in an indeterminate amount. The 
appellant, William Leger (Leger), also asserts error occurred when the trial 
court imposed restitution without making a specific finding that he had the 
ability to pay the restitution. We hold that the trial court did not err in 
failing to incorporate a specific finding Leger had the ability to pay 
restitution, but that a sentence requiring restitution as a condition of 
probation must "fix a reasonable amount as restitution owed to each victim for 
actual pecuniary damage * * * as a special finding in the judgment of conviction 
or in the order placing the defendant on probation under W.S. 7-13-301." Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-9-103(a) (Supp. 1992).1 The judgment and sentence is 
reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for the purpose of fixing 
a reasonable amount as restitution owed to the victim for actual pecuniary 
damage and for a special finding to that effect to be incorporated in the 
judgment and sentence.

[¶2]      Leger, in his 
Brief of Appellant, states this issue for review:

1. 
Whether the trial court erred in ordering the defendant, as a term and condition 
of probation, to pay for additional counseling that may be required in the 
future by the victim as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct in that the 
trial court ordered the defendant to pay restitution to the victim without 
considering the factors which are required to be considered either by W.S. 
7-9-103 or W.S. 7-9-114.

The 
State of Wyoming, in its Brief of Appellee, sets forth these issues:

I. 
Should this appeal be dismissed because appellant failed to comply with the 
Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure, and because appellant failed to submit the 
issue of an allegedly illegal sentence to the district court before taking this 
appeal?

II. 
Did the district court fail to determine or find that appellant had or would 
have, or a reasonable probability existed that appellant would have, the ability 
to pay restitution?

III. 
Did the district court fail to fix a reasonable amount as restitution owed to 
the victim of appellant's sexual conduct?

[¶3]      Leger was 
charged, on December 6, 1991, with the crime of taking immodest, immoral or 
indecent liberties with a minor. The victim was Leger's stepdaughter. On March 
20, 1992, Leger entered his plea of guilty to the crimes charged, and a report 
of the pre-sentence investigation that was ordered by the court was filed on 
April 28, 1992. Included in the information set forth in the pre-sentence 
investigation was an outline of Leger's financial condition. The report included 
a list of assets and liabilities. It also indicated that Leger suffers from a 
seizure disorder for which he receives monthly disability payments in the amount 
of $1,400.

[¶4]      After considering 
the pre-sentence investigation report, the judgment and sentence was entered by 
the district court. Leger was sentenced to serve a term of one and one-half to 
two and one-half years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. In addition, he was 
fined $1,000. The court then suspended the execution of the prison sentence; 
placed Leger on supervised probation for three years; and ordered him to "[p]ay 
for additional counseling that may be required by the victim as a result of the 
defendant's conduct as alleged in this matter."

[¶5]      In his appeal, 
Leger challenges the condition of probation requiring him to pay for additional 
counseling in an indeterminate amount. He contends this part of the judgment and 
sentence must be vacated because of the district court's failure to make a 
specific finding that he had the ability to pay the restitution, and because the 
amount of the restitution was not fixed, as required by § 
7-9-103(a).

[¶6]      Leger's initial 
contention is that § 7-9-103(a) imposes a requirement upon the sentencing court 
to make a specific finding that the defendant has the ability to pay restitution 
prior to ordering any such payments. Leger supports this argument by citing the 
first sentence of WYO. STAT. § 7-9-103(a) (Supp. 1992), which reads:

The 
court shall require restitution by a defendant if it determines [or] finds that 
the defendant has or will have an ability to pay or that a reasonable 
probability exists that the defendant will have an ability to pay.

In 
Shongutsie v. State, 827 P.2d 361 (Wyo. 1992), in an advisory mode, we 
interpreted this statute to require a specific finding of fact with respect to 
the defendant's present or prospective ability to pay restitution. This 
construction was adopted in Leach v. State, 836 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶7]      Since then, we 
have re-examined the holdings of Shongutsie and Leach in Murray v. State, 855 P.2d 350 (Wyo. 1993). In Murray, we noted the inconsistency between WYO. STAT. § 
7-9-102 (Supp. 1992)2 and § 7-9-103(a) regarding the 
requirement of a finding with respect to ability to pay. In re-examining these 
provisions, we concluded that § 7-9-102 should be regarded as the controlling 
provision with respect to the finding of ability to pay required to order 
payment of restitution. We held that, following the language of § 7-9-102, a 
trial court is required to order restitution unless it specifically finds an 
inability to pay.

[¶8]      The effect of the 
Murray holding is that a silent record, one containing no specific finding of 
ability to pay nor any finding of inability to pay, supports an order requiring 
the payment of restitution. That is the nature of the record in this case. The 
district court did not find that Leger had the present or prospective ability to 
make restitution payments; however, the record is replete with facts from which 
the ability to pay could have been inferred. Furthermore, the court made no 
finding with respect to an inability to pay, and in the absence of such a 
finding supported by the record, the district court was required by § 7-9-102 to 
order restitution. We hold no error can be found in the failure of the court to 
articulate a specific finding of Leger's ability to pay the ordered 
restitution.

[¶9]      Leger goes on to 
challenge the district court's imposition of restitution in an indeterminate 
amount. The requirements for establishing the amount of restitution are set 
forth in Wyo. Stat. § 7-9-103(a), which reads, in pertinent part:

If 
restitution is ordered, or at the time the defendant is placed on probation, the 
court shall fix a reasonable amount as restitution owed to each victim for 
actual pecuniary damage resulting from the defendant's criminal activity, and 
shall include its determination of the pecuniary damage as a special finding in 
the judgment of conviction or in the order placing the defendant on probation 
under W.S. 7-13-301.

In 
Keller v. State, 771 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1989), we interpreted the predecessor of 
this provision that contained nearly identical language. We there held that the 
statutory language did not permit the trial court to order restitution in an 
amount to be determined at some later date.

[¶10]   We agree with Leger that § 
7-9-103(a) requires that the trial court fix a specific amount for restitution. 
In this case, the order of the district court to pay for the future counseling 
of the victim, without specifying an actual amount to be paid, does not satisfy 
the requirement of § 7-9-103(a) that the court order restitution in a fixed, 
reasonable amount. Therefore, the case must be remanded to the district court 
for a determination of the specific amount of restitution to be paid by 
Leger.

[¶11]   We turn then to the State's 
argument that this appeal ought to be dismissed because of Leger's failure to 
comply with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure, and also because Leger did 
not first present the matter to the district court for corrective action. We 
agree with the State that Leger was remiss in his failure to prepare a brief 
that complies with our Rules of Appellate Procedure. We do not choose to dismiss 
the appeal for that reason, however. Leger clearly failed to comply with the 
Rule of Appellate Procedure that requires his brief contain separate sections 
briefly describing the nature of the case and the course of proceedings. See 
WYO.R.APP.P. 5.01(3), now 7.01(e)(1). Furthermore, Leger failed to include page 
references to the record in his statement of the facts. See WYO.R.APP.P. 
5.01(3), now 7.01(e)(2).

[¶12]   On a number of occasions we have 
warned members of our bar that we may dismiss an appeal for failure to comply 
with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Wyoming Game and Fish Comm'n 
v. Thornock, 851 P.2d 1300 (Wyo. 1993); Coones v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 848 P.2d 783 (Wyo. 1993); Inter-Mountain Threading v. Baker Hughes Tubular Serv., 
Inc., 812 P.2d 555 (Wyo. 1991); Jung-Leonczynska v. Steup, 782 P.2d 578 (Wyo. 
1989), appeal after remand, 803 P.2d 1358 (Wyo. 1990); V-1 Oil Co. v. Ranck, 767 P.2d 612 (Wyo. 1989). We do not retreat from that admonition, but the sanction 
of dismissal must be reserved primarily for civil cases. The dismissal of a 
criminal case simply confronts the court with a further claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel. Since the record in this case is not long, and 
the relevant portions of the record to permit review of the issues presented are 
easily found, our review has not been hampered by Leger's failure to comply with 
the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Steup. Since we cannot impose the sanction 
of dismissal upon an appellant in a criminal case without creating further 
problems, we now serve notice to members of the bar, representing appellants in 
criminal cases, that sanctions will be addressed to counsel personally, and we 
propose to do that on the next like occurrence.

[¶13]   Similarly, we will not dismiss this 
appeal because of the failure of Leger to request a correction of his sentence 
pursuant to WYO.R.CRIM.P. 35(a). In Price v. State, 716 P.2d 324 (Wyo. 1986), we 
held that a motion for correction of sentence under WYO.R.CRIM.P. 35(a) should 
be presented to the sentencing court in the first instance. Nevertheless, in the 
interest of judicial economy, we considered Price's appeal. This case is 
distinguishable from Price because here, unlike in Price, Leger took his appeal 
from the judgment and sentence. Price appealed from an order that was entered a 
year after his conviction became final. The rule articulated in Price is that, 
after a judgment and sentence achieves finality, relief under WYO. R.CRIM.P. 35 
should first be addressed to the sentencing court. A claim of an unlawful 
sentence, however, can be raised in a direct appeal, which is what Leger has 
done.

[¶14]   The judgment and sentence is 
reversed and remanded for the court to make an appropriate determination and 
finding with respect to a reasonable amount that may be ordered as restitution 
to the victim for actual pecuniary damage resulting from Leger's criminal 
activity. No error is found in any other aspect of the judgment and 
sentence.

FOOTNOTES

1 
WYO. STAT. § 7-9-103(a) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added) provides:

The 
court shall require restitution by a defendant if it determines [or] finds that 
the defendant has or will have an ability to pay or that a reasonable 
probability exists that the defendant will have an ability to pay. If 
restitution is ordered, or at the time the defendant is placed on probation, the 
court shall fix a reasonable amount as restitution owed to each victim for 
actual pecuniary damage resulting from the defendant's criminal activity, and 
shall include its determination of the pecuniary damage as a special finding in 
the judgment of conviction or in the order placing the defendant on probation 
under W.S. 7-13-301. In determining the amount of restitution, the court shall 
consider and include as a special finding, each victim's reasonably foreseeable 
actual pecuniary damage that will result in the future as a result of the 
defendant's criminal activity. A long-term physical health care restitution 
order shall be entered as provided in W.S. 7-9-113 through 7-9-115.

2 
In contrast with WYO. STAT. § 7-9-103(a) (Supp. 1992), WYO. STAT. 7-9-102 (Supp. 
1992) reads:

In 
addition to any other punishment prescribed by law the court shall, upon 
conviction for any misdemeanor or felony, order a defendant to pay restitution 
to each victim as determined under W.S. 7-9-103 and 7-9-114 unless the court 
specifically finds that the defendant has no ability to pay and that no 
reasonable probability exists that the defendant will have an ability to 
pay.