Case Title: Rock Springs Mesquite II Owners' Ass'n v. Raridan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 64227

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
136 Nev, Advance Opinion 2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ROCK SPRINGS MESQUITE 11 No. 77085
OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, A NEVADA

DOMESTIC NONPROFIT

CORPORATION,

Appellant, FILED
vs.

STEPHEN J. RARIDAN AND JUDITH WAY 28 azo

A. RARIDAN, HUSBAND AND WIFE, cubic pegurninie Cobar
Respondents. wpe

Appeal from a district court order granting a motion to dismiss

 

in a declaratory relief action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;
‘Timothy C. Williams, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.

Boyack Orme & Anthony and Edward D. Boyack, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Bingham Snow & Caldwell and Jedediah Bo Bingham and Clifford D.

Gravett, Mesquite,
for Respondents.

BEFORE GIBBONS, STIGLICH and SILVER, JJ.

OPINION
By the Court, STIGLICH, J.:
Claim preclusion prevents a party from suing based on a claim

that was or could have been brought in a prior lawsuit against the same

20-2003

 
party or its privies. In this appeal, appellant Rock Springs Mesquite II
Owners’ Association challenges a district court order granting respondents
Stephen and Judith Raridan's motion to dismiss on the basis of claim
preclusion. Rock Springs claimed in a prior lawsuit that its neighbor
wrongfully damaged its retaining wall (Case 1). Rock Springs seeks in this
lawsuit a judicial declaration that it can remove its retaining wall even
though doing so may cause the Raridans’ adjacent masonry wall to collapse
(Case 2). Because Rock Springs did not raise a declaratory relief action in
Case 1 simply by proposing a jury instruction clarifying lateral support
obligations, we hold that Rock Springs’ declaratory relief action in Case 2
was not brought in Case 1, Because Rock Springs’ action in Case 2 is not
based on the same facts or alleged wrongful conduct as its claims in Case 1,
we conclude that Rock Springs’ action in Case 2 could not have been brought
in Case 1. We therefore hold that Rock Springs’ action in Case 2 is not
precluded and accordingly reverse the district court order.
BACKGROUND

Rock Springs shared a property border with Floyd and Gayle
Olsen. The Olsens’ property was significantly higher in elevation than Rock
Springs’ property. There are two walls involved in this action. One is a
‘complex retaining wall along the border of the two properties that is owned
exclusively by Rock Springs. The other is an adjacent masonry wall owned
by the Olsens.
Case 1

In Case 1, Rock Springs sued the Olsens for trespass, nuisance,
encroachment, and negligence, claiming that the Olsens’ masonry wall and

other property improvements such as palm trees and a swimming pool were

 

 
compromising Rock Springs’ retaining wall. Rock Springs sought only
monetary damages.

During a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, Rock
Springs explained that it could not repair its retaining wall without causing
the Olsens’ masonry wall to collapse. Prior to trial, Rock Springs submitted
a proposed jury instruction regarding the duty of lateral support: “(Rock
Springs] is under no duty or obligation to provide lateral support for
Defendants’ wall or property to counteract the force resulting ftom
Defendants’ actions.” The district court rejected this proposed jury
instruction, although its basis for that decision is unknown. At trial, the
jury rendered a verdict in favor of the Olsens, finding them not liable for
damages to Rock Springs’ retaining wall.
Case 2

 

‘The Olsens subsequently sold their property to respondents
‘Stephen and Judith Raridan. As Rock Springs’ retaining wall continued to
deteriorate, Rock Springs alleged that it might collapse. Accordingly, Rock
Springs sought to repair or remove its retaining wall, but determined that
doing so might cause the Raridans’ masonry wall to collapse.

Rock Springs filed a declaratory relief action seeking a judicial
declaration that it had the right to remove its own retaining wall, even if
doing so would impact the structural integrity of the Raridans’ masonry
wall. The Raridans moved to dismiss on the basis of claim preclusion,
arguing that Rock Springs’ action regarding its retaining wall was or could
have been brought in Case 1. In the alternative, the Raridans moved for

summary judgment on the merits.
‘The district court granted the Raridans’ motion to dismiss. It
found that the Raridans are the Olsens’ privies and that the judgment in

 

 
Case 1 is a final judgment. It then found that when Rock Springs submitted
its proposed jury instruction about the duty of lateral support in Case 1, it
raised “essentially the same claim it is raising now,
has no obligation to provide support to Defendants’ property.” The district
court also found that the issue of lateral support could have been raised in
Case 1, as demonstrated by Rock Springs’ proposed jury instruction. The
district court therefore concluded that Rock Springs’ declaratory relief
action was barred by claim preclusion. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
In this appeal, we consider whether the district court erred in

.e. an assertion that it

 

dismissing Rock Springs’ declaratory relief action in Case 2 on the basis of
claim preclusion. In doing so, we evaluate whether Rock Springs’
declaratory relief action in Case 2 was or could have been brought in Case
1, We review conclusions of law in an order granting a motion to dismiss de
novo. Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 227-28, 181
P.3d 670, 672 (2008). “Whether claim preclusion is available is a question
of law reviewed de novo.” G.C, Wallace, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
127 Nev. 701, 705, 262 P.3d 1135, 1137 (2011).

“Claim preclusion makes a valid final judgment conclusive on
the parties and ordinarily bars a later action based on the claims that were

or could have been asserted in the first case.” Boca Park Marketplace
‘Syndications Grp., LLC v. Higco, Inc., 133 Nev. 923, 924-25, 407 P.3d 761,
763 (2017). A policy-driven doctrine, claim preclusion is “designed to
promote finality of judgments and judicial efficiency by requiring a party to
bring all related claims against its adversary in a single suit, on penalty of
forfeiture.” Id. at 925, 407 P.3d at 763. We have adopted a three-part test
for determining whether claim preclusion applies: “(1) the parties or their

 

 
privies are the same, (2) the final judgment is valid, and (3) the subsequent
action is based on the same claims or any part of them that were or could
have been brought in the first case.” Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124
Nev. 1048, 1054, 194 P.3d 709, 713 (2008) (internal footnote omitted).

In this case, the parties do not dispute that the Raridans are
the Olsens’ privies and there is a final valid judgment in Case 1. We must
therefore only evaluate whether Rock Springs’ action in Case 2 is based on
the same claims or any part of them that (1) were brought or (2) could have
been brought in Case 1.

Rock Springs’ declaratory relief action in Case 2 was not brought in Case 1

We first determine whether Rock Springs’ declaratory relief
action in Case 2 was previously brought in Case 1. The district court
concluded that by proposing a jury instruction on the duty of lateral support
in Case 1, Rock Springs already raised essentially the same claim as it
asserted in Case 2. We disagree.

Jury instructions are used only to instruct the jury on the law
of the case. See NRS 16.110(1); see also Nevada Jury Instructions—Civil,
2011 Edition Disclaimer and Information, at iii (“These recommended jury
instructions are intended to summarize the contours of the law that a jury
will apply to the facts.”). They are not used to obtain actions for declaratory
relief. See NRS 16.110(1); see also NRS 30.030 (providing the scope of
declaratory relief when “a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for”
(emphasis added))

Rock Springs’ proposed jury instruction explaining that it had
no lateral support obligation did not add a cause of action to its lawsuit for
trespass, nuisance, encroachment, and negligence. Had the district court

given Rock Springs’ proposed jury instruction, the instruction would have

 

 
presented the relevant law and enabled the jury to make a finding on these
claims under these facts. For example, as Rock Springs argued, the
instruction might have helped ensure that the jury reached its conclusions
using the elements of the alleged torts and not based on a theory of lateral
support. The instruction would not, however, have become a binding
judicial declaration on the parties’ lateral support obligations. ‘There is
little in the record indicating the extent to which the parties litigated the
jury instruction, and we do not know why the district court rejected it.
Regardless, Rock Springs did not raise a declaratory relief action in Case 1
simply by proposing a jury instruction. We therefore conclude that Rock
‘Springs’ action in Case 2 was not brought in Case 1.

Rock Springs’ declaratory relief action in Case 2 could not have been brought
in Case 1

We next determine whether Rock Springs’ declaratory relief
action in Case 2 could have been brought in Case 1. The district court found
that Rock Springs’ proposed jury instruction and the district court's
rejection of it in Case 1 demonstrate that the issue of lateral support could
have been raised in Case 1. We disagree.

“(AI claims based on the same facts and alleged wrongful
conduct that were or could have been brought in the first proceeding are
subject to claim preclusion.” G.C, Wallace, 127 Nev. at 707, 262 P.3d at
1139 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
TechnoMarine SA v. Giftports, Inc., 758 F.3d 493, 499 (24 Cir. 2014)
(Whether a claim that was not raised in the previous action could have
been raised therein depends in part on whether the same transaction or

connected series of transactions is at issue, whether the same evidence is
needed to support both claims, and whether the facts essential to the second
‘were present in the first.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Tahoe-Sierra

 

 
oe

 

Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1078 (9th
Cir, 2003) (“[Identity of claims exists when two suits arise from the same
transactional nucleus of facts.” (internal quotation marks omitted). For
example, in G.C. Wallace, we held that a tenant's default gave rise to both
a landlord's summary eviction action as well as the landlord's later damages
action for breaching the lease because the two actions were “based upon an
identical set of facts and could have been brought simultaneously.” 127
Nev. at 707, 262 P.3d at 1139. Claim preclusion generally applies to all
grounds of recovery, regardless of the nature or category of damages
requested. See Five Star, 124 Nev. at 1058, 194 P.3d at 715.

We determine that Rock Springs’ declaratory relief action in
Case 2 could not have been brought in Case 1. First, the action in Case 2 is
based on different facts than the claims in Case 1. In Case 1, the alleged

 

facts involved whether the Olsens’ masonry wall and other property
improvements damaged Rock Springs’ retaining wall. In Case 2, the alleged
facts involve a damaged retaining wall located along the property border
that must be repaired or removed, but doing so may negatively impact the
Raridans’ masonry wall. It is true that the retaining wall’s damage
contributed to Rock Springs’ decision to repair or remove the wall and to
seek a judicial determination on its lateral support obligation in the process.

1While we held in Boca Park Marketplace Syndications Grp., LLC v.
Higco, Inc., that a declaratory relief action brought first categorically does
not preclude later related claims for damages, 133 Nev. at 928-29, 407 P.3d
at 765-66, we have not evaluated whether a declaratory relief action
brought after a claim for damages is exempt from claim preclusion and
decline to do so here. In this appeal, we apply only ordinary claim-
preclusion analysis to determine that Rock Springs’ declaratory relief action
in Case 2 is not precluded because it was not and could not have been
brought in Case 1. See Five Star, 124 Nev. at 1054, 194 P.3d at 713.

 
We determine, however, that Rock Springs’ declaratory relief action arising
after its tort claims is not precluded just because it is premised on some
facts representing a continuance of the same course of conduct as Case 1.
See TechnoMarine, 758 F.3d at 499 (reasoning that a subsequent action
“premised on facts representing a continuance of the same course of
conduct” as the initial case need not necessarily be precluded (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The essential facts are different.

Second, unlike in Case 1 where the alleged wrongful conduct
‘was trespass, nuisance, encroachment, and negligence, in Case 2 there is no
alleged wrongful conduct. We remain steadfast in our precedent that claim
preclusion applies to all grounds of recovery, regardless of the nature or
category of damages requested. See Five Star, 124 Nev. at 1058, 194 P.3d
at 715. However, because Case 2 does not allege wrongdoing, it cannot be
based on the same alleged wrongful conduct as in Case 1.

Additionally, Rock Springs’ declaratory relief action in Case 2
could not have been brought simultaneously with the claims in Case 1. At
the time of Case 1, there was no need to determine lateral support
obligations. Despite Rock Springs arguing in Case 1 that it could not repair
its retaining wall without causing the Olsens’ masonry wall to collapse,
Rock Springs was not seeking to resolve how to adequately repair or remove
its wall in Case 1, nor had it then determined that it needed to repair or
remove the wall. Furthermore, had Case 1 been decided in Rock Springs’
favor, the issue of lateral support obligations would have changed or even
become irrelevant because the Olsens would have been responsible for the
wall's repair. Moreover, Rock Springs alleged that the wall continued to
degrade since the conclusion of Case 1, further illustrating that the
circumstances that led to Rock Springs’ declaratory relief action arose after

 

 
om 

 

Case 1 concluded. We are unwilling to extend claim preclusion to an action
that a party was aware might arise in the future, when such an action was
based on different facts than those of the initial case.

We also note that precluding Rock Springs’ action in Case 2
would be inconsistent with the policy of claim preclusion. See Higco, 133
Nev. at 925, 407 P.3d at 763 (reasoning that claim preclusion promotes the
finality of judgments and judicial efficiency). A judicial declaration in Case
2 will not undermine the finality of the jury's verdict in Claim 1, that the
Olsens were not liable for damages to Rock Springs’ retaining wall.
Moreover, without a judicial declaration, Rock Springs will be unable to
ascertain the risk involved in repairing or removing its wall, and there
would be an increased likelihood of additional expense and litigation later.

‘The district court erred in concluding that Rock Springs’
proposed jury instruction and the district court's rejection of such
instruction demonstrated that Rock Springs’ declaratory relief action could
have been brought in Case 1. Rock Springs had a legitimate reason to
propose that instruction in Case 1: to ensure the jury reached its conclusions
using elements of the alleged torts. It had no need, however, to seek a
judicial declaration on lateral support rights. We are unwilling to suppress
parties from proposing jury instructions that may help clarify the law for
the jury out of fear that doing so would preclude future claims. The legal
determination sought in Case 2 is different from the question of whether
the Olsens committed torts in Case 1, and it arises from a different set of
facts. We therefore determine that Rock Springs’ declaratory relief action
could not have been brought in Case 1.

 
CONCLUSION

‘Having concluded that Rock Springs did not raise a declaratory
relief action in Case 1 simply by proposing a jury instruction, we hold that
Rock Springs’ declaratory relief action in Case 2 was not brought in Case 1.
Furthermore, having concluded that Rock Springs’ declaratory relief action
in Case 2 is not based on the same facts or alleged wrongful conduct as its
claims in Case 1, we determine that Rock Springs’ action in Case 2 could
not have been brought in Case 1. Accordingly, we hold that Rock Springs’
action in Case 2 is not precluded and reverse the district court order

granting the Raridans’ motion to dismiss. The case is remanded for further

 

proceedings.

 

 
SILVER, J., dissenting:

I would affirm the district court's grant of the Raridans’ motion
to dismiss pursuant to Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 194
P.34 709 (2008), because Rock Springs could have requested a declaration
that it did not owe a duty of support to the adjacent property in the same
faction that it sought money damages for its failing retaining wall.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

Rock Springs’ complaint in Case 1 alleged that the Olsens’ wall,
adjacent to Rock Springs’ retaining wall, was “moving towards and causing
damage” to its retaining wall because of earth movement and other factors.
Further, Rock Springs alleged the cost to repair its retaining wall was
$94,000. And, in its encroachment claim, Rock Springs alleged that it was
“entitled to an order requiring (the Olsens] to cease the encroachment and
remove the encroaching materials, to wit: the (Olsens') wall.” (Emphases
added.) Next, in its prayer for relief, Rock Springs requested not only
monetary damages in excess of $10,000, but also “an order directing {the
Olsens} to cease trespassing upon [Rock Springs’) property and to remove
all items, including the [Olsens'] wall, which are trespassing upon [Rock
Springs'] property.” (Emphases added.)

 

It is clear that, whether Rock Springs won or lost at the first
trial, Rock Springs acknowledged that its failing retaining wall had to be
repaired and removed. Rock Springs literally stated as much when it filed
its complaint against the Olsens. Even the majority concedes that the
Olsens’ property (now the Raridans’) was significantly higher in elevation
in relation to the retaining wall owned by Rock Springs, and the photos
attached to the summary judgment motion, including the photos below,

 

 
show that any attempt by Rock Springs to repair its retaining wall would
likely cause damage to the Raridans’ wall (formerly the Olsens’).

Based on the foregoing, I believe that when Rock Springs
initiated Case 1, it understood that when it “repaired” or “removed” its
retaining wall there would be an adverse effect on the adjacent property by
mere virtue of the nature of the retaining wall holding up the higher
elevated property. This is obvious from the record when Rock Springs
recognized during summary judgment that it could not repair its retaining
wall without causing damage to the Olsens’ wall. Why? Because that is the
nature of a retaining wall. Despite its argument to the district court, Rock
Springs never sought to add a claim for declaratory relief in Case 1 that it
had no obligation to provide lateral support for the adjacent walll or property
in order to protect itself from liability for the possible damages resulting
from the repairs Rock Springs asserted it needed to make. It was not until
after the close of the evidence that Rock Springs proposed its own
declaration in the form of a jury instruction stating, “(Rock Springs] is under
no duty or obligation to provide lateral support for [the Olsens’) wall or
property to counteract the force resulting from [the Olsens’) actions.”
Although I would not view the requested jury instruction as Rock Springs
requesting declaratory relief in Case 1, this proposed jury instruction is
significant: it reflects that Rock Springs was aware of its potential liability
by repairing the retaining wall in Case 1.1

1And Rock Springs’ appeal in Case 1 further demonstrates that it
‘could have raised the declaratory relief issue in that case, as it asserted that
the district court's rejection of its jury instruction regarding the duty of
lateral support warranted reversal. See Rock Springs Mesquite 2 Owners’
Ass'n v. Olsen, Docket No. 64227 (Notice of Appeal, Oct. 15, 2013); Mack v.

 

 
After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Olsens, Rock
Springs filed a second action requesting what it should have requested
during litigation in Case 1—a declaration that it owes no duty of lateral
support—because it knew that repairing the retaining wall would cause
damage to the adjoining property, now owned by the Raridans. Stated
another way, Rock Springs sought a judicial declaration that when it
repaired its failing wall, it would not be liable for any resulting damages.
This would necessarily include damage to the adjacent wall Rock Springs
acknowledged would be damaged in Case 1.

I agree with respondents that filing Case 2 is just a second
attempt by Rock Springs to avoid paying the costs involved in repairing its
retaining wall. Simply put, this “declaration” could have been sought in
Case 1 because the record shows that Rock Springs was aware of this issue
because of the nature of retaining walls and what is involved in repairing
and removing them. Itis disingenuous to say that this could not be brought
in Case 1. See G.C. Wallace, Inc. v. Kighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev.
701, 707, 262 P.3d 1135, 1139 (2011) (“IAIIl claims based on the same facts
and alleged wrongful conduct that were or could have been brought in the
first proceeding are subject to claim preclusion.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 US. 222, 234 (1998)
(seeing “no reason” why claim preclusion would not apply in cases merely
because the type of relief sought in the second case differs from that sought
in the first case, so long as the other claim preclusion factors are met); Boca
Park Marketplace Syndications Grp., LLC v. Higeo, Inc., 183 Nev. 923, 923,
407 P.3d 761, 762 (2017) (“[A] party may join claims for declaratory relief

Estate of Mack, 125 Nev. 80, 91-92, 206 P.3d 98, 106 (2009) (recognizing
that this court can take judicial notice of court records in related cases).

 

 
and damages in a single suit. . ..”). Case 2's request for a declaration
negating liability for Rock Springs’ repair or removal of its retaining wall
was based on the same facts and alleged wrongful conduct raised in Case 1.
See G.C. Wallace, 127 Nev. at 707, 262 P.3d at 1139. Accordingly, I would

affirm the district court's order of dismissal under these particular facts.

 

 

 
5 
6 
7