Case Title: JOHN KENNETH LOPEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOHN KENNETH LOPEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 97139 P.3d 445Case Number: 05-106Decided: 08/04/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
JOHN 
KENNETH LOPEZ,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and 
Marion Yoder, 
Senior Assistant Public Defender.  
Argument by Ms. Yoder.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Causey.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, John 
Kenneth Lopez (Lopez), was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and of being an 
habitual criminal.  He was sentenced 
to a term of 10 to 15 years of imprisonment, with credit for all time 
served.  Lopez contends that there 
was insufficient proof of each element of the offense of voluntary 
manslaughter,  that the jury was not 
properly instructed on the elements of voluntary manslaughter, and that the 
State's introduction of an habitual criminal charge, in this retrial after 
reversal of Lopez's original conviction, was improper and vindictive and that 
the State failed to satisfactorily prove the habitual criminal charge beyond a 
reasonable doubt in any event.  We 
will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Lopez raises 
these issues:

 
 
            
I.          
Whether each element of the offense charged was properly 
established.

 
 
            
II.          
Whether the jury was properly instructed on the elements of voluntary 
manslaughter.

 
 
            
III.         
Whether the State properly sought and proved the habitual criminal 
allegation.

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issues only slightly:

 
 
            
I.          
Did sufficient evidence exist to convict [Lopez] of voluntary 
manslaughter?

 
 
            
II.          
Did the district court properly instruct the jury on the elements of 
voluntary manslaughter?

 
 
            
III.         
Was [Lopez] subjected to vindictive prosecution, and was the habitual 
criminal allegation properly proven?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      The event which 
led to the criminal charges against Lopez occurred on December 18, 1999.  A jury found him guilty of second degree 
murder on November 15, 2000.  A 
sentence of 20 to 40 years of imprisonment was imposed on February 8, 2001.  A notice of appeal was filed on March 2, 
2001.

 
 
[¶4]      In an opinion 
issued by this Court on March 24, 2004, we concluded, inter alia, that there was insufficient 
evidence that Lopez acted maliciously in striking the victim of his crime, 
Robert Herman (victim), and that Lopez's trial counsel was ineffective in 
defending his client.  Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 28, 86 P.3d 851 
(Wyo. 2004).  Although we will, of 
course, focus solely on the facts proved at his second trial in resolving the 
issues raised in the instant appeal, we set out below the facts from Lopez's 
first appeal to provide background for what follows.  As we analyze the issues in this appeal, 
we will focus our attention on any variations on the evidence adduced at the 
first trial with the evidence adduced at the second trial.  We take note at this juncture that the 
principal difference between the evidence at the first trial, and that of the 
second, is that three expert witnesses testified as to the cause(s) of the 
victim's death, whereas at the first trial, Lopez did not have the benefit of 
expert testimony on that issue.  

 
 
After 
getting off work, Lopez began drinking heavily at the Albuquerque Apartments in 
Casper with a 
number of friends sometime after 3:00 a.m. on the morning of December 18, 
1999.  Lopez and the victim, Robert 
Herman, were good friends, and Lopez was aware that Herman suffered from chronic 
alcoholism.  According to defense 
theory, Lopez became upset that Herman was drinking whiskey and told him to stop 
drinking before he killed himself.  
Herman pushed Lopez, and Lopez slapped Herman on his head with an open 
hand and pushed him back down onto a couch.  Which hand Lopez used to strike Herman 
was hotly disputed at trial, and witnesses' testimony about which hand was used 
was conflicting.

 
 
The slap 
was inflicted about 11:00 a.m. on December 18, 1999.  After receiving the slap, Herman went to 
the post office with a friend, but complained of a headache and returned to his 
apartment at about 12:30 p.m. Herman's girlfriend and at least one friend 
entered the apartment through an open backdoor during the afternoon.  Late that evening, Herman had locked all 
doors, and his friends tried to rouse him to answer either the telephone or the 
door but were unable to do so.  By 
9:00 p.m., the friends were sufficiently worried to break into the 
apartment.  They found Herman, face 
down on the floor by his bed, unconscious, and bleeding from the nose and 
mouth.

 
 
            
Herman was rushed to the hospital but died the next evening, December 19, 
at about 9:30 p.m., almost thirty-four hours after Lopez struck him.  After emergency room medical staff 
observed trauma to the left side of Herman's head, the police were notified and 
began an investigation about midnight on the 19th.  Police investigators learned of an 
altercation, and an eyewitness testified that Lopez had struck Herman once with 
his open left hand on the right side of Herman's head earlier that morning.  Another witness testified that he heard 
a smacking sound and then saw Herman falling back onto the couch and Lopez had 
his left hand up.  The witness 
assumed that Lopez had "open-handed" Herman to the "right side of the 
head."   Police encountered 
Lopez at Herman's apartment complex, and Lopez admitted striking Herman during 
an argument.  Police then asked 
Lopez to go to the police station for an interview.  During a recorded portion of the police 
interview, Lopez admitted to delivering a stiff arm to Herman's face.  Police officer Malone testified that, 
during an unrecorded portion of the police interview, Lopez admitted to hitting 
Herman once on the right side of his face;  
however, Lopez demonstrated how he hit Herman and, during that 
demonstration, Lopez indicated that he had struck Herman once with his right 
stiff arm to the left side of Herman's face.  Lopez' motion to suppress his statements 
to police was denied.

 
 
            
The same night that police were receiving statements from Lopez and 
witnesses that Lopez had struck Herman hours earlier, evidence technicians 
notified police investigators that Herman had marks on his body that appeared to 
be boot marks;  however, police 
uncovered no evidence that Lopez had kicked Herman.  Dr. Thorpen, the coroner, prepared an 
autopsy report stating that Herman died from "assaultive trauma to head" that 
was caused after "subject struck on head by hand of known assailant."   The autopsy was conducted on 
December 21, 1999, two days after death and after police had interviewed 
Lopez.  Dr. Thorpen testified that 
Lopez was the "known assailant" listed as the cause of death and also testified 
that his conclusions as to how the death had occurred were based on police 
reports.  Lopez was charged with 
second degree murder on January 3, 2000, and arrested the next 
day.

 
 
            
At trial, Dr. Thorpen testified as the State's last witness.  He testified that the cause of death was 
a blood clot on the right side of the brain that resulted from a blow 
administered to the left temple [FN. 1:  
According to testimony at the evidentiary hearing by defense expert Dr. 
Larkin, this injury is known as a countercoup blow.].  Dr. Thorpen stated that Herman had 
numerous health problems that made him susceptible to death by the slap and had 
previously been treated for dilated veins caused by chronic alcoholism and a 
previous head injury.  Dr. Thorpen 
conceded that Herman was found on the floor, had a blood alcohol content of 
.215, and had veins so fragile they could easily rupture from sudden 
movement.  However, Dr. Thorpen 
would not concede that it was possible that a fall had caused Herman's fatal 
injury because Herman had been found on a padded carpeted 
surface.

 
 
            
No evidence at trial indicated that Lopez was aware that Herman possessed 
these physical weaknesses.  Lopez 
contended that he had pushed Herman in self-defense and the slap was not the 
fatal blow.  Lopez also contended 
that, between the time that he struck Herman and the death hours later, the 
fatal blow was caused by an intruder/robber who kicked him with boots.  Lopez contended that some of Herman's 
possessions were missing.  In both 
opening statement and closing argument, the State conceded that Lopez had no 
intent to kill Herman by slapping him but, by striking the single blow in anger, 
had committed second degree murder.  
The verdict form included a charge of voluntary 
manslaughter.

 
 
            
Defense counsel had requested that the public defender pay for an expert 
but, before trial, had withdrawn the motion to further research the law, did not 
renew the motion, and, ultimately, no defense expert testified.  Lopez was convicted of second degree 
murder, his motion for new trial was denied, and his appeal followed.  After the public defender was 
substituted for retained counsel on appeal, it was contended that trial defense 
counsel had been ineffective for failing to present expert testimony on the 
issue of causation.  This Court 
granted a partial remand for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel.

 
 
            
At that hearing, Lopez presented an expert witness, Dr. Larkin, a 
forensic pathologist from North 
Carolina.  
Dr. Larkin testified that because Lopez' slap had not caused immediate 
bruising and swelling, it was not the fatal blow.  Those injuries were apparent later that 
evening, and it was Dr. Larkin's opinion that the injuries that Dr. Thorpen 
concluded were caused by a slap were actually caused by a 
fall.

 
 
            
Before the evidentiary hearing, the State had objected to Dr. Larkin's 
testimony primarily because he had not reviewed the microscopic tissue slides 
from the autopsy.  Because of time 
and financial constraints of the public defender and the poor health of Dr. 
Larkin, the defense had arranged for Dr. Larkin to testify by telephone.  The State also objected to receiving Dr. 
Larkin's testimony by telephone;  
however, the district court allowed it.  Dr. Thorpen, the coroner who had 
testified at trial, also testified at the evidentiary hearing, and he, too, 
contended that Dr. Larkin's conclusions were suspect because Dr. Larkin had not 
reviewed the microscopic slides from the autopsy.  Upon inquiry, the record shows that Dr. 
Thorpen and the district attorney had decided that Dr. Thorpen would not provide 
those slides to Dr. Larkin for his review and, despite Dr. Larkin's several 
requests for the tissue slides, he was not provided with 
them.

 
 
            
Upon cross-examination, Dr. Larkin stated that examination of the 
microscopic tissue slides was very important to rendering an opinion.  Because Dr. Larkin had been denied 
access to those slides, his opinion was a "provisional or a limited" opinion. 
 Dr. Larkin, however, believed that 
the slides would confirm that Herman's fatal head injury was caused by a 
fall.

 
 
            
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that 
Lopez had failed in his burden of proof and had not been denied effective 
assistance of counsel.  Our 
discussion of the evidentiary hearing sets out further details.  Briefing on the ineffectiveness decision 
was then filed, and this appeal resumed.

 
 

Lopez, 
¶¶ 4-14, 86 P.3d 855-57.  
Ultimately, we concluded that Lopez's conviction for the crime of second 
degree murder had to be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to 
prove that Lopez acted maliciously, as required by the elements of second degree 
murder, as well as because defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 
present expert evidence at trial on the issue of causation.  Id., at 
¶ 42, 86 P.3d 862-63.

 
 
[¶5]      On April 22, 
2004, an amended information was filed in the district court charging Lopez with 
voluntary manslaughter.  On May 4, 
2004, the State filed an amended information also charging Lopez as an habitual 
offender.  On September 27, 2004, 
Lopez's second trial got underway.  
On September 30, 2004, the jury reached its verdict finding Lopez guilty 
of voluntary manslaughter, and on October 1, 2004, the jury found him to be an 
habitual criminal.  Judgment and 
Sentence were entered on January 31, 2005, and a notice of appeal was filed on 
February 7, 2005.  This matter was 
argued to the Court on March 15, 2006, and, thereafter, taken under 
advisement.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶6]      In addressing a 
claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether any rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  When considering 
a claim of the sufficiency of the evidence, we review that evidence with the 
assumption that the evidence of the prevailing party is true, disregard the 
evidence favoring the unsuccessful party, and give the prevailing party the 
benefit of every favorable inference that we may reasonably draw from the 
evidence.  We will not re-weigh the 
evidence nor will we re-examine the credibility of the witnesses.  Perritt v. State, 2005 WY 121, ¶ 9, 
120 P.3d 181, 186 (Wyo. 2005); Lopez, 
¶ 16, 86 P.3d  at 857.

 
 
[¶7]      Lopez was tried 
for the crime of voluntary manslaughter, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105(a)(i) 
(Lexis 1999) (the language of that statute is the same in the 2005 version of 
Wyoming Statutes Annotated):

 
 
§ 
6-2-105.  Manslaughter; 
penalty.

            
(a)  A person is guilty of manslaughter if he unlawfully kills 
any human being without malice, expressed or implied, 
either:

                        
(i)  Voluntarily, upon a sudden heat of passion;  or

                        
(ii)  Involuntarily, but recklessly except under circumstances 
constituting a violation of W.S. 6-2-106(b).

            
(b)  Manslaughter is a felony punishable by imprisonment in the 
penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years.

 
 
[¶8]      The jury was 
given this elements instruction:

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 7

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Voluntary Manslaughter, as charged in this 
case, are:

            
1.  On or about the 
18th day of December, 1999

            
2.  In Natrona County, Wyoming

            
3.  The Defendant, John K. 
Lopez

            
4.  
Voluntarily

            
5.  Upon a sudden heat of 
passion

            
6.  Killed another person, 
Robert J. Herman.

 
 
            
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of 
these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find 
the Defendant guilty.

            
If, one [sic] the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the 
evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you should find the Defendant not guilty.

 
 
[¶9]      This issue turns 
upon which of the witnesses the jury decided were the most believable.  Although the room in which these events 
occurred was small and there were several persons present, surprisingly there 
really were only two "eye-witnesses," Lopez and William Chapin.  All of the witnesses, as well as the 
victim, had been drinking  some more than others.  Lopez asserted that the victim was 
drunk.  Lopez characterized what he 
did to the victim like this:  "When 
he comes up and pushes me again, I shoved him off underneath the chin to sit him 
back on the couch, and I told him to stay there."  Lopez also characterized his actions as 
a "touch," a "shove," and a "grab," and he conceded that he was angry with the 
victim when he did so.  Although our 
further recitation of the evidence will demonstrate that Lopez's actions were 
described as a "stiff-arm"1 delivered with some considerable 
force, Lopez specifically denied that, but then later conceded that he had 
described it that way himself.

 
 
[¶10]   Although his testimony at the 
retrial differed in some respects from his testimony at the first trial, James 
W. Thorpen, M.D. (pathologist and Natrona County Coroner) testified that the 
cause of the victim's death was the blow delivered by Lopez.  Michael J. Dobersen, M.D. (forensic 
pathologist), who is the Medical Examiner for Arapahoe County, Colorado, 
testified as a rebuttal witness for the State and concurred with the conclusion 
reached by Dr. Thorpen and disagreed with the opinions given by the expert who 
testified during Lopez's presentation of his evidence.  Daniel Spitz, M.D. (pathologist and 
Chief Medical Examiner for Macomb 
County, Michigan), 
testified as an expert for the defense.  
It was his opinion that the victim died as the result of an accidental 
fall (which is common among alcoholics) and that the fall occurred only a few 
hours before his death.

 
 
[¶11]   William Chapin testified that he 
heard an argument and went to see what was going on.  Chapin related that Lopez and the victim 
were, "having words.  And then 
there was a swing from [Lopez] to [the victim]."  Chapin related that the blow hit the 
victim on the right side of his face (whereas the experts and some other 
witnesses testified that the fatal blow was delivered to the left side of the 
victim's head).  Still angry, Lopez 
asked the victim to return a watch he had given to him.  Lopez proceeded to stomp on that watch 
and then threw it back to the victim.  
Later in his testimony, Chapin described and demonstrated the force with 
which the stiff-arm blow was delivered and the record reflects that it was 
delivered with some considerable force.  
When interviewed by the Casper Police Department, Lopez told (and 
demonstrated on the wall of the interview room) Casper police officer Chris Malone the nature 
of the blow he delivered to the victim.  
Officer Malone provided this testimony at trial:  "It was a stiff-arm maneuver like this, 
the palm  heel palm strike.  And, 
you know, it is definitely a different kind of wall.2  It was a sheet rock wall, and it 
literally vibrated the wall in the interview room.  So it was sufficient force, and he told 
us it was sufficient to knock him down."

 
 
[¶12]   Perhaps of central importance in 
this retrial was the testimony of three expert witnesses.  The State's theory of the case was that 
the victim died as a direct result of the stiff-arm blow delivered by 
Lopez.  That blow was delivered 
seven or eight hours before the victim was found collapsed in his apartment and 
34 hours before his death.  Lopez 
contended that it was much more likely that the victim died from injuries he 
suffered in an unobserved fall that occurred only a few hours before friends 
found him on the floor in his apartment.   Natrona County Coroner, James W. 
Thorpen, M.D., agreed that an accidental fall could not be ruled out, but he 
concluded that the cause of death in light of all the facts available to him was 
blunt force trauma to the head.

 
 
[¶13]   The essence of Lopez's argument in 
this appeal, as well as to the jury below, is that the victim was his best 
friend and that he did not act "voluntarily, upon a sudden heat of 
passion."  Indeed, Lopez contended 
that it was the victim who was drunk and angry, and Lopez confronted him only 
out of concern for his health, i.e., because he was drinking whiskey when he 
knew he should not because of his compromised physical condition resulting from 
his chronic alcoholism.  
Furthermore, it was Lopez's contention that although he did "touch" the 
victim in some manner, that it was not that action that caused the victim's 
death, i.e., the exact cause of the victim's death is not known but the most 
likely cause was a fall that occurred many hours after the confrontation 
described above.

 
 
[¶14]   In addition to the elements 
instruction recited above, the jury was instructed as to the meaning of 
"voluntarily," and "heat of passion:"

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 8

 
 
            
"Voluntarily" means that the act which caused death was done 
intentionally.  It does not require 
that the act was done with the intention of killing.

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 9

 
 
            
As used in instruction number 7, voluntarily does mean 
intentionally.  It denotes the 
condition of the mind at the time of the homicide and distinguishes a 
"voluntary" act from one which occurs by accident.  In this respect, the function of the 
phrase "voluntarily, but upon a sudden heat of passion" is similar to 
"purposely."

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 10

 
 
            
"Heat of passion" means such passion as naturally would be aroused in the 
mind of an ordinarily reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances as 
those in question which would cause him to act rashly, without reflection or 
deliberation, and from passion rather than from judgment.  The heat of passion must be aroused 
suddenly, and the act resulting in death must occur while the defendant was 
acting under the direct and immediate influence of such heat of passion, and 
before sufficient time has elapsed to permit the heat of passion to 
cool.

 
 
[¶15]   In addition to those instructions 
set out above, the jury was also instructed that it could consider the lesser 
included offense of criminally negligent homicide.  Criminally negligent homicide is defined 
in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-107 (Lexis 1999):

 
 
§ 
6-2-107. Criminally negligent homicide.

            
(a)  Except under circumstances constituting a violation of 
W.S. 6-2-106, a person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide if he causes 
the death of another person by conduct amounting to criminal 
negligence.

            
(b)  Criminally negligent homicide is a misdemeanor punishable 
by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than two 
thousand dollars ($2,000.00), or both.

 
 
[¶16]   It is our conclusion that there was 
evidence from which the jury could find each of the elements of voluntary 
manslaughter, and that they did so in light of the lesser included offense 
instruction.  Although Lopez's 
theory is certainly a plausible one, the governing standard of review leads us 
to the ineluctable conclusion that the jury could properly conclude that he was 
guilty.

 
 
Adequacy 
of the Instructions

 
 
[¶17]   Our perception is that Lopez's 
contentions with respect to the adequacy of the instructions are closely 
intertwined with his contention that the evidence was insufficient, i.e., that 
the instructions did not fully comprehend the nuances of this unique crime.   Nonetheless, the standard of 
review generally applicable to this issue is well known:

 
 
The 
applicable standard of review is well-established:  Jury instructions should inform the 
jurors concerning the applicable law so that they can apply that law to their 
findings with respect to the material facts;  instructions should be written with the 
particular facts and legal theories of each case in mind and often differ from 
case to case since any one of several instructional options may be legally 
correct;  a failure to give an 
instruction on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental error, 
as is a confusing or misleading instruction;  and the test of whether a jury has been 
properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the 
instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be 
found to have been committed.  Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2001).  

 
 

Burkhardt 
v. State, 2005 
WY 96, ¶ 12, 117 P.3d 1219, 1223 (Wyo. 2005); also see Siler v. State, 2005 WY 73, 
¶¶ 44-45, 115 P.3d 14, 35-36 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶18]   Lopez made no objection to the 
instructions given below, indeed his requests for instructions were largely 
honored.  Thus we review this 
assertion of error under the plain error standard ("First, the record must 
clearly present the incident alleged to be error.  Second, appellant must demonstrate that 
a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not 
merely arguable, way.  Last, the 
appellant must prove that he was denied a substantial right resulting in 
material prejudice to him.").  Siler at ¶ 45, 15 P.3d 36 (quoting 
Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, 
¶ 9, 34 P.3d 271, 274 (Wyo. 201)).

 
 
[¶19]   We have carefully examined Lopez's 
general argument in this regard, and in particular the cases, United States v. Serawop, 410 F.3d 656, 
660-66 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that to 
convict a defendant of the federal crime of voluntary manslaughter, government 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted in the heat of passion with 
either a general intent to kill, intent to do serious bodily injury, or depraved 
heart indifference; and that federal homicide statutes fail to articulate 
expressly what mental states are required for each of the various offenses), and 
Stice v. State, 799 P.2d 1204, 1209 
(Wyo. 1990) (affirming district court's acceptance of guilty plea in a case 
involving attempted voluntary manslaughter).  Neither case is pertinent to the case at 
hand.

 
 
[¶20]   Our task is fairly narrow with 
respect to this issue, and we conclude that Lopez has failed to demonstrate 
plain error with respect to the instructions given to the 
jury.

 
 
Habitual 
Criminal  Vindictive Prosecution

 
 
[¶21]   The applicable standard of review 
has been summarized in many cases:

 
 
In 
reviewing claims of vindictive prosecution, we have adopted this 
method:

 
 
      A defendant has 
the burden of proof and must establish either (1) actual vindictiveness, or (2) 
a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness which will give rise to a presumption 
of vindictiveness.  Thereafter, the 
burden shifts to the prosecution to justify its decision with legitimate, 
articulable, objective reasons.  If 
the defendant does not meet his burden of proof, however, the district court 
need not reach the government justification issue.

 
 

Whiteplume 
v. State, 874 P.2d 893, 896 (Wyo.1994) (quoting 
United 
States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1040 (10th 
Cir.1991)).

 
 
            
We have discussed the concept of vindictive prosecutions in other cases, 
and in one involving a conspiracy prosecution after a conviction for the actual 
offense was reversed for lack of a speedy trial, we said:

 
 
      Where a defendant 
has exercised a legal right and the government responds in a way that punishes 
him for taking such action, an improper vindictive motive is presumed.  United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 
373-74, 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2488-89, 73 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1982).  The presumption arises when the 
government acts by imposing increased charges, such as changing a charge from a 
misdemeanor to a felony or subjecting him to the possibility of greater sentence 
or in some other way "upping the ante."  
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28, 94 S. Ct. 2098, 
2102-03, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1974);  
North 
Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969).

 
 
      A decision to 
prosecute for other crimes committed does not necessarily result in a finding of 
vindictiveness.  Here, the 
conspiracy charges did not result in a greater imposition of a penalty than 
Phillips received at the earlier trial on separate charges.  See Blackledge, 417 U.S.  at 28, 94 S. Ct.  at 2103.  Cf. Lane v. Lord, 815 F.2d 876, 879 (2nd 
Cir.1987) (adding a conspiracy charge in new trial after declaration of a 
mistrial not vindictive).  The 
conspiracy and the substantive charges were two separate components in a 
continuing criminal episode.  We 
have held that requiring the actor to take responsibility for each criminal act 
in the episode following successful appeal does not constitute vindictive 
prosecution even when consecutive life sentences result.  Osborn v. State, 806 P.2d 259, 264-65 
(Wyo.1991).

 
 
      Charging 
decisions rest within the discretion of the prosecutor.  Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 417 
(Wyo.1990).  A charging decision is 
not improper unless it results solely from the defendant's exercise of a 
protected legal right, rather than the prosecutor's normal assessment of the 
societal interest in prosecution.  
Goodwin, 457 U.S.  at 380, n. 11, 102 S. Ct.  at 
2492, n. 11.  The public's demand 
for prosecution for the additional crimes may figure into the prosecutor's 
assessment without it resulting in vindictiveness.  Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 301 
(5th Cir.1977).  We cannot conclude 
nor can we allow the presumption that prosecutorial vindictiveness was involved 
in the decision to bring and prosecute conspiracy charges against 
Phillips.

 
 

Phillips 
v. State, 835 P.2d 1062, 1070 (Wyo.1992).

 
 

Merchant 
v. State, 4 P.3d 184, 192-93 (Wyo. 2000); also see Swanson 
v. State, 981 P.2d 475, 477-79 (Wyo. 1999); 
Crozier v. State, 882 P.2d 1230, 
1233-35 (Wyo. 
1994); and see generally 1 Robert W. Cipes, Criminal Defense Techniques, § 6A.05[6] 
Prosecutorial Vindictiveness (2004).

 
 
[¶22]   As we read the record, this issue 
was clearly joined in the trial court, and the presiding judge at least tacitly 
indicated that the burden had shifted to the prosecution to negate a presumption 
of vindictiveness.  The prosecutor 
responded that the charge was not more serious than the original offense.  The potential penalty under the original 
charge was 20 years to life, and the potential penalty in the new circumstances 
was less than that.  The State's 
action merely required Lopez to take responsibility for each criminal act in the 
episode that resulted in the original appeal, i.e., "requiring the defendant to 
take responsibility for his criminal past does not also constitute vindictive 
prosecution."  Moreover, the 
prosecutor argued that charging Lopez as an habitual criminal in the original 
proceeding would have been moot, as there would have been no purpose in 
enhancing a life sentence.  Finally, 
had the original charge been voluntary manslaughter, there is no certainty that 
the prosecutor might not have pursued an enhanced sentence because of the 
seriousness of Lopez's actions in this case and the seriousness of his past 
record.

 
 
[¶23]   Following this detailed 
consideration of the circumstances presented by this case, the district court 
determined that the State had met its burden.  We conclude that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion or otherwise err as a matter of law in not disallowing 
the amendment to the information.

 
 
Habitual 
Criminal  Sufficiency of the Evidence

 
 
[¶24]   Lopez also contends that the 
evidence that supported the jury's conclusion that he was an habitual criminal 
is not sufficient.  We apply the 
same standard of review as that which we applied to analyze the sufficiency of 
the evidence of the substantive charge of voluntary manslaughter.  However, we see little need for detailed 
analysis.  The documentation the 
prosecution relied upon may not have been of the highest and best possible 
certainty.  The admission or 
exclusion of evidence is in the discretion of the district court, and the 
defendant bears the burden of establishing that the district court abused its 
discretion.  KP v. State, 2004 WY 165, ¶ 12, 102 P.3d 217, 221 (Wyo. 2004).  Lopez's 
arguments as to the level of authenticity of the documents applied only to the 
weight to be given those documents, a matter to be argued to the jury.  We conclude that the district court did 
not err in admitting the evidence of Lopez's prior convictions and that that 
evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's finding of 
guilt.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶25]   The evidence presented at trial was 
sufficient to sustain both the finding of guilt of voluntary manslaughter and 
Lopez's status as an habitual offender.  
The jury was properly instructed as to the elements of voluntary 
manslaughter.  The amendment of the 
information to include an habitual criminal charge did not constitute vindictive 
prosecution.  The judgment and 
sentence of the district court are affirmed in all 
respects.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The word 
"stiff-arm" was not defined for the jury, although the record ably demonstrates 
that the action taken by Lopez against the victim was demonstrated at least 
twice for the jury.  "Stiff-arm" 
(synonymous with "straight-arm") is found in the dictionary and is defined 
thus:  "an act or instance of 
warding off a football tackler with the arm fully extended from the shoulder, 
elbow locked, and the palm of the hand placed firmly against any part of his 
body  called also stiff-arm."  Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 
1155, 1161 (10th ed. 1999); Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary, 2254 ("to ward off (an opponent) with or as if with a 
straight-arm.") (1986); and see www.m-w.com/dictionary/stiff-arm.

 

2Officer 
Malone did a repeat demonstration of Lopez's demonstration in the courtroom, 
hence the "different kind of wall" comment.