Case Title: STUART HALL GREENE V. CAROLYN MORSE FINN, Personal Representative of the Estate of (Defendant) Jacquelyn K. Greene

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
STUART HALL GREENE V. CAROLYN MORSE FINN, Personal Representative of the Estate of (Defendant) Jacquelyn K. Greene2007 WY 47153 P.3d 945Case Number: 05-274Decided: 03/16/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
STUART 
HALL GREENE,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff/Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
CAROLYN 
MORSE FINN, Personal Representative of the Estate of (Defendant) Jacquelyn K. 
Greene,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant/Petitioner).

 
 
Appeal from theDistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

John M. 
Kuker and Matthew H. Romsa of Romsa & Kuker, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Mark A. 
Bishop and Melinda D. Oldaker of Bishop & Oldaker, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ, and JAMES, 
DJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Husband appeals 
from an order finding him in contempt of court for failing to abide by the terms 
of a property settlement agreement and divorce decree.  We affirm in part and reverse in 
part.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The parties 
identified numerous issues, but we will address only twothe first because it is 
jurisdictional, and the second because it is dispositive under the appropriate 
standard of review:

 
 
           
1.   Whether this appeal 
should be dismissed because Husband failed to file a supersedeas bond as ordered 
by the district court?

 
 
           
2.   Whether the district 
court committed a clear and grave abuse of discretion, committed a serious 
procedural error, or violated a principle of law in holding Husband in contempt 
of court for failing to comply with certain provisions of the divorce 
decree?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The parties were 
married in 1981.  Husband filed for 
divorce in 2002.  He and Wife 
entered into a property settlement agreement that was incorporated into their 
divorce decree, which was entered on April 1, 2002.  Wife died on February 18, 2003.  On December 19, 2003, the personal 
representative of her estate filed a motion for order to show cause why Husband 
should not be held in contempt of court for failure to abide by the terms of the 
agreement and decree.  Specific 
allegations included:

 
 
           
1.   Failure to turn over 
personal property items awarded to Wife.

 
 
           
2.   Failure to pay taxes 
and association fees for two parcels of property in Colorado.

 
 
           
3.   Failure to pay debts 
assigned to Husband.

 
 
           
4.   Failure to cooperate 
with the Estate in determining the apportionment of certain credit card debts 
and determining whether Husband had removed Wife's name from certain credit 
cards.

 
 
           
5.   Failure, as Wife's 
employer, to withhold income for taxes during 2001, and failure to cooperate 
with the Estate to determine whether Wife paid more than her share of the 
taxes.

 
 
           
6.   Failure to cooperate 
with the Estate in determining whether Husband had paid all alimony amounts due, 
and failure to pay a lump sum amount termed "alimony" in the agreement and 
decree, but actually meant to equalize distribution of 
assets.

 
 
[¶4]      An order to show 
cause was issued, and the matter was heard by the district court on January 25, 
2005.  The court issued its decision 
letter on May 9, 2005.  That 
detailed decision letter, which is five pages in length, was incorporated into 
the order of judgment and contempt.  
The pertinent portions, wherein Husband is found to be in contempt of 
court, read as follows:

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
Violations 
of the Decree:

 
 
            
The Court considered the statements of [Husband] as related to each of 
the property or financial matters for which he has not met his 
responsibility.  Unfortunately, the 
responses to virtually all of these questions at the time of trial was either 
that he admitted that he had not paid them or turned over the property, or in 
the alternative gave several different versions of a defense that he doesn't owe 
certain monies because he had "taken care of" other matters and in fact supplied 
money to [Wife] directly.  The proof 
in that regard was lacking, however, and after consideration of all the evidence 
the Court must find that he has violated the Court order.  As to each of the matters below for 
which the Court finds sufficient evidence, there will be a finding of contempt 
and associated remedy.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
Artwork:

 
 
            
The Court finds that it is equitable under the circumstances to order 
return of one-half of the identifiable artwork, or in the alternative suffer 
judgment in the amount of $2500.  
Those four (4) lithographs entitled "The Green, Green Grass of Home", 
"The Riders Return", "Enchanted Mesa", and "Summer Dusk 1 and 2 State 2", are to 
be apportioned in their value (or identified for purposes of return to the 
estate) in accordance with [the Estate's] Exhibit 3 and its attachment, the 
appraisal by American Design Limited.

 
 
Lichvar 
Furniture:

 
 
            
Part of this Court's order will be to direct return into the possession 
of the estate the Lichvar furniture which [Husband] identified and admitted 
continued in his control.  The Court 
rejects [Husband's] assertion that he had "traded" money or other valuable items 
in the post divorce environment as he submitted no proof, nor could he recall 
with any particularity what such a trade might have been.

 
 
Blazer:

 
 

            
The 
Court must also reject [Husband's] assertion that he somehow needed a death 
certificate in order to fully execute his duties under the decree.  The evidence and exhibits established 
that he knew, on a repeated basis, from lawyers, and otherwise, that there was 
no need for the death certificate to come independently from the representative 
of the estate, and that a vague offer he may have made at the time of the 
funeral was not a good faith attempt to comply with the divorce decree.  The vehicle is to be returned along with 
its keys and the title executed into the name of the 
estate.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
Taxes 
Due:

 
 
            
Again [Husband] admits owing taxes and should suffer judgment in favor of 
the estate in the amount of $1489.70 for the [Rabbit Ears] property taxes and 
for $2671.71 for the Smole property.  
The Court is not ordering interest on those amounts.  While the Court again heard from 
[Husband] that the taxes may have been owed but he thought he had exchanged 
other things of value that relieved him of his responsibility, the vagueness of 
the evidence in this regard convinces the Court that no additional penalty by 
way of prejudgment interest should apply.

 
 
Proof of 
Alimony Payments:

 
 

            
There 
was no evidence presented that [Husband] paid alimony for the six months in the 
years 2002 and 2003.  [Husband] will 
be required as a part of this order to pay to the estate $1200 per month for the 
six (6) months involved, so that tax returns can be filed and the money can be 
accounted for, or in the alternative, produce specific documentation ([alluded] 
to by [Husband]) of those alimony payments.  That is, if documentation of alimony 
payments for two (2) months is provided to [the Estate's] counsel, then the 
amount owed by [Husband] to the estate would be $1200 per month for four (4) 
months, etc.

 
 
American 
Express:

 
 

            
The 
evidence in the exhibits presented regarding this matter gave the Court the most 
difficulty.  Because the Property 
Settlement Agreement and resulting decree appear on their face to give 
responsibility for the American Express "Blue" and "Platinum" accounts to both 
parties, an apparent ambiguity occurred.  
For purposes of a contempt action, however, this Court need only 
determine if [Husband] has violated the terms of the Decree itself.  A fair reading of the Decree, including 
its equal division of the "miles earned" for each of the credit cards, convinces 
this Court that [Husband] would be in contempt only to the extent that he has 
not paid one-half of the total of the two (2) accounts.  It is clear from the evidence that he 
has not.  That evidence includes 
both pre- and post-separation charges to the accounts.  The Court is also cognizant of 
[Husband's] statement that a business was run in part off of one of those 
accounts and many of the charges may have related to that business.  The Court can find here, and does, that 
while the relationship may have continued both at work and outside work in the 
post-divorce era, the Decree has in fact been violated by [Husband's] refusal to 
pay these amounts.  The Court will 
order as a sanction for contempt that [Husband] pay to the [] estate $13,098.98 
on the "Blue" account and $8,845.12 on the "Platinum" account, to which will be 
added any interest or attorney fees on behalf of American Express added to that 
debt up to and including the date of this order.

 
 
            
The Court recognizes again that [Husband's] defense was one of 
interpretation, to which the Court has responded above.  In addition [Husband] argues that he had 
given money outside that which he was obligated to provide to [Wife] 
post-divorce.  That may be the case, 
but there was, even within his testimony, a glaring omission of any evidence or 
details that would support that claim being considered in the current action. 
 The Court listened closely and 
reviewed the evidence in this matter to determine where any equitable credit 
could be given [Wife].  Other than 
the allowance on some matters for not requiring prejudgment interest, the Court 
finds it difficult to grant any credit.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      Under our 
established standard for the review of contempt orders in domestic relations 
cases, we will not disturb the decision of the district court absent a serious 
procedural error, a violation of a principle of law, or a clear and grave abuse 
of discretion.  We review questions 
of law de novo, according no 
deference to the district court's decision.  Crites v. Alston, 837 P.2d 1061, 1066 
(Wyo. 
1992).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      Before we discuss 
the dispositive issue in this case, we must consider the Estate's argument that 
this appeal should be dismissed because Husband has not filed the supersedeas 
bond that was ordered by the district court.  Some background, both factual and legal, 
is required.  On the same day that 
he filed his notice of appeal, Husband filed a document entitled "Motion for 
Stay of Proceedings to Enforce Judgment and to Determine Amount of Supersedeas 
Bond."  On October 3, 2005, the 
district court entered an order granting the motion in part, and denying it in 
part.  That order contained two 
provisions pertinent to the issue now raised by the 
Estate:

 
 
IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that there shall be no stay of the Judgment relating to all 
personal property which [Husband] was ordered to surrender to [the 
Estate].

 
 
IT IS 
THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a supersedeas bond shall be posted 
by [Husband] in the amount of Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00), to be 
presented to the Court within ten (10) days of the issuance of this 
Order.

 
 
[¶7]      It is uncontested 
that Husband never posted the supersedeas bond.  It is that failure that the Estate now 
argues should result in dismissal of this appeal.  We are unwilling to take that step, 
however, because the Estate's argument is not well grounded in the appellate 
rules, or in the substantive law governing supersedeas bonds.  The Estate relies upon W.R.A.P. 1.03 and 
4.01.  W.R.A.P. 1.03 provides as 
follows:

 
 
The 
timely filing of a notice of appeal, which complies with Rule 2.07(a), is 
jurisdictional.  The 
failure to comply with any other 
rule of appellate procedure, or any 
order of court, does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is 
ground only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, including 
but not limited to:  refusal 
to consider the offending party's contentions, assessment of costs; dismissal; and 
affirmance.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  In turn, W.R.A.P. 4.01 
provides as follows:

 
 

Whenever 
a bond for costs on appeal is 
required by law, the bond shall be filed or equivalent security shall be 
deposited in the trial court with the notice of appeal.

 
 
[¶8]      There are two 
interrelated problems with this argument, both of which evolve from the fact 
that W.R.A.P. 4.01 governs bonds required to cover appellate costs, not 
supersedeas bonds offered to prevent action on a judgment.  Supersedeas bonds are governed by 
W.R.A.P 4.02:

 
 
(a)     Whenever an appellant 
so entitled desires a stay on appeal, appellant may present to the trial court a 
supersedeas bond in such amount as shall be fixed by the trial court and with 
surety or sureties to be approved by the court or by the clerk of court.  The bond shall be conditioned for the 
satisfaction of the judgment in full together with costs, interest, and damages 
for delay, if for any reason the appeal is not perfected or is dismissed, or if 
the judgment is affirmed, and to satisfy in full such modification of the 
judgment and such costs, interest, and damages as the appellate court may 
adjudge and award.

 
 
(b)     When the judgment is 
for the recovery of money not otherwise secured, the amount of the bond shall be 
fixed at such sum as will cover the whole amount of the judgment remaining and 
unsatisfied, costs on appeal, and interest, unless the court, after notice and 
hearing and for good cause shown, fixes a different amount or orders security 
other than the bond.  When the 
judgment determines the disposition of the property in controversy, as in real 
actions, replevin, and actions to foreclose mortgages, or when such property is 
in the custody of the sheriff, or when the proceeds of such property or a bond 
for its value is in the custody or control of the court, the amount of the 
supersedeas bond shall be fixed at the sum as will secure the amount recovered 
for the use and detention of the property, the costs of the action, costs on 
appeal, interest, and damages for delay.  
When appellant has already filed a surety bond in the trial court, a 
separate supersedeas bond need not be given, except for the difference in amount 
as determined by the trial court to be attributable to the 
appeal.

 
 
(c)     When the judgment 
directs the execution, assignment or delivery of a conveyance or other 
instrument, appellant may execute, assign or deliver the conveyance or other 
instrument, leaving same in the custody of the clerk of the trial court in which 
the judgment was rendered, there to remain and abide the judgment of the 
appellate court, and in such case appellant shall give bond only for costs on 
appeal and damages for delay.

 
 
(d)     Executors, 
administrators and guardians shall be required to give a supersedeas 
bond.

 
 
[¶9]      It must be 
remembered that the bond in this case was not required by law or requested by 
the Estate to ensure recovery of appellate costs.  Rather, the supersedeas bond in this 
case was requested by the Husband, no doubt to prevent enforcement of the 
judgment pendente lite.  That comports with the general 
definition and effect of a supersedeas bond:

 
 
A 
supersedeas is a suspension of the power of a court from which an appeal has 
been taken to issue an execution on the judgment or decree appealed from.  If a writ of execution has issued, 
supersedeas is a prohibition against execution of the writ.  Supersedeas preserves the status quo of 
the case.  It does not, however, set 
aside or annul the trial court's judgment.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
5 Am. 
Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 436 (1995) 
(internal footnotes omitted).  See also V-1 Oil Co. v. People, 799 P.2d 1199, 1202-03 (Wyo. 1990).  The following general rules also 
apply:

 
 
A party 
need not obtain a stay of judgment, nor file a supersedeas bond, in order to 
take or prosecute an appeal.  
Failure to file such a bond is not grounds for dismissal of an appeal, 
but simply removes the supersedeas aspect of the appeal and leaves the party who 
obtained the judgment free to execute on the judgment.

 
 
5 Am. 
Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 442 (1995) 
(internal footnotes omitted).  The 
Estate's remedy, upon Husband's failure to file the supersedeas bond he, 
himself, requested, was to proceed to execute on the judgment, rather than to 
seek dismissal of the appeal.  
Beyond that, by the terms of the district court's order, the supersedeas 
did not stay the effect of the judgment in regard to the personal property, so 
the Estate could have pursued any available remedies to obtain the artwork, the 
Lichvar furniture, and the Blazer.

 
 
[¶10]   Having concluded that dismissal is 
inappropriate, we will proceed to consider the merits of this appeal.  The issue can be reduced to a series of 
fairly simple questions:  (1) What 
was Husband found in contempt of court for failing to do; (2) was Husband 
clearly ordered to do that which he was found to have failed to do; (3) did the 
district court abuse its discretion, make a serious procedural error, or violate 
some principle of law in determining that Husband failed to comply with the 
provisions of the decree?

 
 
[¶11]   The first question has already been 
answered hereinabove.  The district 
court found that Husband did not turn over one-half of the couple's artwork, 
that he did not deliver possession of the Lichvar furniture, that he did not 
deliver possession of the Blazer, that he did not pay certain taxes, that he did 
not pay alimony, and that he did not pay one-half of the amounts due under the 
couple's "Blue" and "Platinum" American Express credit 
cards.

 
 
[¶12]   A review of the divorce decree 
answers the second question.  Pursuant to the decree, Wife was to 
receive one-half of the artwork, most of the Lichvar furniture, and the 
Blazer.  In addition, Husband was to 
pay real property taxes on the "Hilltop" property until that property sold, 
taxes and association fees on the "Rabbit Ears" and "Smole" properties as due on 
January 1, 2002, "941" taxes, and his prorata share of any 2001 federal income 
tax.  As to alimony, the decree 
provided that Husband would pay Wife as "temporary alimony," $1,200 per month 
for six months, plus alimony of $10,000 at a rate of $100 per month for 60 
months (July 2002 to July 2007), with a final lump-sum payout on the latter 
date.1  Finally, the decree ordered Husband to 
pay the "American Express, Platinum and Blue," while it ordered Wife to pay the 
"AmexBlue/Platinum."

 
 
[¶13]   The third question is whether the 
district court abused its discretion, made a serious procedural error, or 
violated some principle of law in determining that Husband had violated the 
decree.  This analysis logically 
begins with a review of the evidence that was presented as to each finding.  The evidence supportive of the district 
court's conclusions can be summarized as follows:  Husband admitted under cross-examination 
that he continued to possess all of the artwork, the Lichvar furniture, and the 
Blazer; the Estate's personal representative testified that, upon Husband's 
failure to pay $1,489.70 property taxes on the "Rabbit Ears" property and 
$2,671.61 on the "Smole" property, the Estate was forced to make those payments; 
and, as noted by the district court, there was no direct proof that Husband had 
made any alimony payments.  In all 
of these instances, the evidence was clearly sufficient to establish Husband's 
violation of the decree, and we affirm the determinations of the district court 
in regard thereto.

 
 
[¶14]   No doubt because of the ambiguity 
in the property settlement agreement and decree as to which party was to pay the 
American Express credit card debt, an ambiguity expressly recognized by the 
district court in its decision letter, much of the testimony, and many of the 
exhibits, focused on those accounts.  In finding Husband in contempt of court, 
the district court "got around" this ambiguity by concluding that, because the 
"miles earned" on the American Express cards were equally divided between the 
parties in the decree, the intent must also have been to divide the debt on the 
cards equally between the parties.  
We do not believe that this implication is sufficient to be the basis of 
a finding of contempt.  One of the 
controlling principles of law in contempt jurisprudence is that ambiguities in 
court orders "redound to the benefit of the person charged with contempt."  Bard Ranch Co. v. Weber, 557 P.2d 722, 
733 (Wyo. 
1976) (quoting Ford v. Kammerer, 450 F.2d 279, 280 (3d. Cir. 1971)).  We 
adhered to that principle in Crites, 
837 P.2d  at 1069-70, where we said the following:

 
 
            
The father draws our attention to numerous cases from other jurisdictions 
standing for the proposition that before there can be a "willful violation" of a 
court decree, there must first exist a valid court order which is "clear, 
specific and unambiguous."  We find 
support for the father's argument in several cases referenced in his appellate 
brief.  For example, in Cunningham v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of 
State of Nev., In and For Clark County, 102 Nev. 551, 729 P.2d 1328, 1333-34 
(1986), the Nevada Supreme Court stated:

 
 
            
An order on which a judgment of contempt is based must be clear and 
unambiguous, and must spell out the details of compliance in clear, specific and 
unambiguous terms so that the person will readily know exactly what duties or 
obligations are imposed on him.

 
 
Similarly, 
in Southwest Gas Corp. v. Flint-kote 
Co.  U.S. Lime Div., 99 
Nev. 127, 659 P.2d 861, 864 (1983) (quoting Ex Parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43, 44 
(Tex. 1967)), 
the same court stated:

 
 
            
Generally, an order for civil contempt must be grounded upon one's 
disobedience of an order that spells out "the details of compliance in clear, 
specific and unambiguous terms so that such person will readily know exactly 
what duties or obligations are imposed on him."

 
 
[¶15]   The district court violated this 
fundamental principle in finding Husband to be in contempt of court for not 
paying one-half of the American Express credit card debt because the decree 
simply did not make it clear that he was obligated to do so.2

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶16]   The divorce decree clearly ordered 
Husband to deliver to Wife one-half of the artwork, the Lichvar furniture, and 
the Blazer.  It also clearly ordered 
him to pay the property taxes on the "Rabbit Ears" and "Smole" properties, and 
to pay Wife alimony in the amount of $1200 per month for six months.  He did none of those things, and the 
district court did not err in finding him in contempt of court for those 
failures, or in ordering delivery of the property and in entering judgment for 
amounts owed.  The decree did not, 
however, clearly order Husband to pay one-half of the American Express credit 
card debt, and the district court did err in finding him in contempt for that 
alleged failure.

 
 
[¶17]   The judgment of the district court 
is affirmed as to the artwork, the Lichvar furniture, the Blazer, the property 
taxes, and the alimony.  It is 
reversed as to the American Express credit card debt.  This matter is remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent herewith.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
temporary alimony provision had a complicating "reservation."  In the event that Wife's medical 
prescription bills totaled less than $500 in any given month, the alimony due 
the following month would be reduced by that amount.  For example, if Wife's medical 
prescriptions cost only $400 one month, Husband would only owe $1100 the 
following month.

 
 

2That 
conclusion does not answer the question of what the decree actually intended in 
that regard.  That question remains 
open for resolution in some other proceeding.  Furthermore, although the quoted 
materials refer to "willful" violations, we are not herein basing our 
determinations upon whether or not Husband's actions were "willful," or what 
that term's definition might be under the circumstances, or whether willfulness 
is even an element of civil contempt.  
Compare Pittman v. Pittman, 
999 P.2d 638, 641 (Wyo. 2000) and Crites, 837 P.2d  at 1066, with 17 Am. 
Jur. 2d Contempt §§ 27-28 
(2004).  Husband's defense to the 
allegations was not a lack of willfulness; his defense was that, in equity, his 
obligations under the decree were cancelled by other post-decree payments he 
made to or for Wife.