Case Title: Sarazin v. Vermont Board of Bar Examiners

Citation: 161 Vt. 364, 639 A.2d 71

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-02-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
SARAZIN_V_VT_BOARD_OF_BAR_EXAMINERS.93-176; 161 Vt. 364; 639 A.2d 71

[Filed 18-Feb-1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 93-176


 Mary Levin Sarazin                           Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Board of Bar Examiners

 Vermont Board of Bar Examiners               January Term, 1994




 Mary Levin Sarazin, pro se, Vershire, and William A. Loftus and Melissa A.
   Martin of Nighswander, Martin & Mitchell, P.A., Lebanon, New Hampshire,
   for plaintiff-appellant

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Geoffrey A. Yudien, Assistant
   Attorney General, Montpelier, for defendant-appellee

 James M. Dingley, Burlington, and Robert A. Gensburg, St. Johnsbury, for
   amicus curiae ACLU


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      GIBSON, J.    Applicant Mary Levin Sarazin appeals from a decision of
 the Vermont Board of Bar Examiners holding that the rule requiring four-year
 clerkship applicants for the Vermont bar (FN1) to pursue their clerkships only 
 at firms located in Vermont is a "bright line" rule that may not be waived. We

 

 hold that the in-state requirement is waivable and remand for further con-
 sideration of Ms. Sarazin's application.
      We have original jurisdiction over appeals from the Board of Bar
 Examiners.  Rules of Admission to the Bar of the Vermont Supreme Court
 (V.R.A.B.) { 14(b).  The Board contends that applicant's appeal was not
 timely and should be dismissed, but since we are being asked to construe our
 own rule and since applicant could follow a dismissal with another applica-
 tion for a four-year clerkship, we shall assume jurisdiction in the
 interests of judicial economy.
      Applicant is a legal assistant at the firm of Nighswander, Martin &
 Mitchell in Lebanon, New Hampshire.  She was hired in October 1992, after
 having completed part of her four-year clerkship at the Vermont Attorney
 General's office.  She took the Nighswander position with the understanding
 that William Loftus, a partner in the firm and a licensed Vermont attorney
 with an active Vermont practice, would be her supervising attorney.
      When applicant notified the Board that she had commenced study at the
 Nighswander firm, the Board informed her that she would have to petition for
 approval if she wished to continue her clerkship under the supervision of
 Mr. Loftus.  This was because V.R.A.B. { 6(g)(1) requires four-year clerk-
 ships to be performed "within this state."
      Applicant requested a waiver of the in-state requirement, stating that
 the Nighswander office was located within three miles of the Vermont border
 and that, aside from the geographical location of the office, she was other-
 wise in compliance with the requirements of the rules.(FN2) After review, the

 

 Board notified applicant that "it does not find anything in your letter
 which would compel it to recommend a waiver of Rule {6(g)(1) to the Supreme
 Court," and "that in your case where your job responsibilities will not
 necessarily be restricted to Vermont matters or to work on behalf of Vermont
 attorneys, it will be very difficult to monitor or maintain this to any
 degree over the very long period of time which you have remaining in your
 clerkship."
      Applicant requested a reconsideration of this ruling.  The Board
 replied that { 6(g)(1) "creates a 'bright line' test," and that it did not
 believe a waiver would ever be appropriate except perhaps in "extraordinary
 circumstances and even then, where only a minor portion of the clerkship
 would take place outside of the State of Vermont."
      On appeal, applicant argues that the "bright line" test articulated by
 the Board is an arbitrary and unreasonable application of Rule { 6(g)(1).
 She also contends that the Board's decision deprives her of various consti-
 tutional rights, including the right to liberty, due process, and the equal
 protection of the laws under the Vermont and United States constitutions.
      The Board's position is essentially as stated in its correspondence to
 Ms. Sarazin.  It contends that the rule is clear on its face and the plain
 meaning should govern, and that if there is any ambiguity, this Court should
 give deference to the interpretation of the Board.  In addition, the Board
 argues that the constitutional claims are without merit because the need for
 oversight and supervisory efficiency supplies a rational basis for the in-
 state requirement of { 6(g)(1).  See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,