Case Title: Wightman v. Consolidated Rail Corp.

Citation: 1999-Ohio-119

Docket Number: 19972342

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-09-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Wightman v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 86 Ohio St.3d 431, 1999-Ohio-119.] 
 
 
 
 
 
WIGHTMAN ET AL., APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES, v. CONSOLIDATED RAIL 
CORPORATION, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Wightman v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 431.] 
Torts — Negligence — Damages — Plaintiff who accepts a remittitur may appeal 
trial court’s determination of damage issue, when — If reviewing court finds 
no error in determination of damages, plaintiff’s prior acceptance of 
judgment for reduced amount will be affirmed unless result of principal 
appeal requires otherwise. 
A plaintiff who accepts a remittitur may appeal the trial court’s determination of 
the damage issue if the opposing party appeals any issue.  If the  reviewing 
court finds no error as to the determination of damages, the plaintiff’s prior 
acceptance of judgment for the reduced amount will be affirmed unless the 
result of the principal appeal requires otherwise. 
(No. 97-2342 — Submitted November 10, 1998 — Decided September 15, 1999.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Erie County, No. E-97-
001. 
 
On February 18, 1989, a Consolidated Rail Corporation (“Conrail”) freight 
train collided with a car driven by Michelle Wightman, killing her and her 
passenger, Karrie Wieber.  Michelle’s mother, Darlene M. Wightman, owned the 
car.  Darlene Wightman sued Conrail as administrator of her daughter’s estate for 
wrongful death and on her own behalf for the destruction of her automobile. 
 
The collision occurred as Michelle Wightman attempted to negotiate a 
railroad crossing on Remington Avenue in Sandusky.  A Conrail train, SEEL-7, 
had experienced mechanical difficulty and sat stopped on the track approximately 
two hundred eight feet from the grade crossing at Remington Avenue.  Due to its 
position when it stopped, SEEL-7 activated the crossing’s flashing lights and gates. 
 
2 
 
Witnesses differed on how long SEEL-7 was stopped prior to the crash.  One 
witness estimated that he first observed the stopped train at about 10:30 p.m., about 
ninety minutes prior to the crash.  The train’s crew estimated that the train had 
stopped somewhere between 11:00 p.m. and 11:30 p.m.  SEEL-7’s conductor, 
Terry Warner, and its head brakeman, Leroy Powell, saw that the gate arms were 
down at the crossing and that traffic was nonetheless proceeding.  They recognized 
that a dangerous situation existed at the crossing.  However, they decided not to 
post a flagman at the crossing, and instead the two walked the length of the train to 
find and repair the mechanical problem.  Warner described their decision as “our 
only option.” 
 
The engineer in SEEL-7’s lead engine also saw the heavy Saturday evening 
traffic moving over the crossing.  He saw no one attempting to turn around and 
avoid the crossing.  While SEEL 7 was stopped, another train, TVLA, went over 
the crossing without incident, traveling at about seventy miles per hour.  Radio 
communications alerted the SEEL-7 crew that another train, TV-9, was 
approaching the crossing.  TV-9 would ultimately smash into the car driven by 
Michelle Wightman. 
 
About twenty minutes prior to the crash, a Sandusky police officer, Lonnie 
Newell, came upon the scene.  Officer Newell saw that SEEL-7 created a 
dangerous obstruction and requested his dispatcher to advise Conrail of the 
situation.  Satisfied that Conrail had been notified, Officer Newell left the crossing 
to undertake a traffic stop and issue a verbal warning to a driver who had driven 
around the gates. 
 
Shortly after Officer Newell left the scene, sixteen-year-old Michelle 
Wightman approached the crossing.  Several cars in front of the Wightman car 
successfully proceeded over the crossing.  Michelle Wightman slowly followed.  
But, as one witness said, “They didn’t have a chance * * *.”  Before the Wightman 
 
3 
car cleared the crossing, the TV-9 train emerged at a speed of almost sixty miles 
per hour and struck the car broadside, instantly killing both occupants. 
 
On October 30, 1990, a jury awarded the estate of Michelle Wightman 
$1,000,000 in compensatory damages, allocating sixty percent of the causal 
negligence to Conrail and forty percent to Michelle Wightman.  The jury also 
found Conrail liable for the damage to Darlene Wightman’s property and 
determined that Conrail should pay punitive damages on Darlene Wightman’s 
claim. 
 
At the time of the trial, former R.C. 2315.21(C)(2) provided for bench 
proceedings to determine the amount of punitive damages.  The trial judge held 
that no punitive damages should be awarded. 
 
The Sixth District Court of Appeals upheld the compensatory award to the 
estate, but reversed the trial court’s failure to award punitive damages on Darlene 
Wightman’s claim.  The appellate court found “that there was clear and convincing 
evidence to support the jury’s finding of actual malice on the part of appellant 
[Conrail].” 94 Ohio App.3d 389, 408, 640 N.E.2d 1160, 1173.  The appellate court 
remanded the matter to the trial court “for determination as to the amount of 
punitive damages to which appellee, Darlene Wightman, is entitled in accordance 
with this opinion.” Id. at 409, 640 N.E.2d at 1173.  On September 14, 1994, this 
court declined to hear Conrail’s appeal. 70 Ohio St.3d 1442, 638 N.E.2d 1044. 
 
After the case was remanded to the trial court, but before the trial court 
entered an amount of punitive damages, this court declared R.C. 2315.21(C)(2) 
unconstitutional as a violation of the right to trial by jury. Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. 
Co. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 552, 644 N.E.2d 397, paragraph two of the syllabus.  
Therefore, the amount of punitive damages to assess against Conrail became a jury 
issue. 
 
4 
 
A second jury was convened to determine that issue, and that trial began on 
May 20, 1996.  On that same date, the trial court granted the motion to intervene of 
the Michelle Wightman Charitable Foundation, to which Darlene Wightman had 
apparently assigned not less than one-half of any punitive damages award.  The 
foundation was not permitted to participate in the trial, however. 
 
At the trial, the plaintiffs presented evidence of the events surrounding the 
collision, and that evidence generally mirrored the evidence that had been 
presented in the first trial.  The jury heard testimony from plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. 
William D. Berg, a civil engineer with a special interest in grade-crossing safety.  
According to Dr. Berg, the railroad industry has known for decades that when 
gates at a crossing are allowed to remain down for an unusual length of time, 
drivers will proceed over the crossing.  He testified that the danger of a crash is 
particularly great when there is an obstruction on the track.  Dr. Berg testified that 
a large number of the collisions that occur every year at grade crossings happen 
under conditions “substantially similar” to those which existed at Remington 
Avenue. 
 
Dr. Berg testified that Conrail could have easily prevented the collision by 
placing a flagman at the crossing to stop traffic when a train was approaching, 
slowing the speed of the TV-9, or blocking the crossing with the SEEL-7 engine 
when a train was approaching. 
 
The trial court prohibited Conrail from introducing evidence it had 
introduced at the first trial regarding certain circumstances surrounding the 
accident, which focused for the most part on the contributory negligence of 
Michelle Wightman.  The court granted plaintiffs’ motions in limine regarding 
evidence of Michelle Wightman’s .039 percent blood-alcohol level at the time of 
the accident, and evidence that her mother may have provided her with some 
alcohol.  The court also granted plaintiffs’ motion in limine regarding the 
 
5 
testimony from a Conrail expert regarding the effect that alcohol and a driver’s age 
might have in a railroad-crossing collision.  The court found that the negligence of 
Michelle Wightman was not a part of the punitive damages case. 
 
The court also granted plaintiffs’ motions in limine regarding the first trial 
judge’s decision to award no punitive damages and references that the first jury 
had found Michelle forty percent contributorily negligent.  The court also 
prohibited references to the fact that Conrail had paid $1,000,000 in compensatory 
damages for the wrongful death of Michelle Wightman. 
 
On May 23, 1996, the jury awarded Darlene Wightman $25,000,000 in 
punitive damages against Conrail.  On June 7, 1996, Conrail filed a motion for 
remittitur or, in the alternative, for a new trial.  The railroad’s motion also sought 
relief from post-judgment interest on the punitive damages award. 
 
The court granted a remittitur of $10,000,000, finding that a $15,000,000 
punitive damages award would “sufficiently punish Conrail and create a positive 
inducement to change its practices, rather than continue to challenge the findings 
of the earlier jury and the Court of Appeals.” 
 
The trial court also granted Conrail relief from post-judgment interest, 
despite finding “no conclusive authority in support of Conrail’s request.”  The trial 
court reasoned that since punitive damages are not compensatory, interest on the 
amount to compensate for delay in payment may not be necessary. 
 
Darlene Wightman consented to the remittitur, but both parties appealed 
aspects of the trial court’s ruling.  Conrail appealed the jury award as grossly 
excessive, and also appealed the trial court’s aforementioned evidentiary rulings.  
Conrail also claimed that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Berg’s testimony. 
 
Darlene Wightman cross-appealed, challenging the remittitur.  Darlene 
Wightman also appealed the trial court’s grant of relief from post-judgment interest 
on the punitive damages award. 
 
6 
 
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court in all regards.  The court found 
the remittitur not appealable pursuant to this court’s decision in Scioto Mem. Hosp. 
Assn. v. Price Waterhouse (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 474, 479, 659 N.E.2d 1268, 1273.  
Plaintiffs had urged the court to adopt the “Wisconsin rule” regarding the 
appealability of remittiturs, whereby a plaintiff may appeal a remittitur to which it 
consents if the defendant first initiates an appeal.  The appellate court declined to 
adopt the Wisconsin rule.  Both parties have appealed to this court. 
 
The cause is before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal 
and cross-appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Murray & Murray Co., L.P.A., Thomas J. Murray and Mary O’Neill, for 
appellant and cross-appellee Darlene M. Wightman. 
 
Cavitch, Familo, Durkin & Frutkin, Harvey L. Frutkin and Kerin Lyn 
Kaminski, for appellant and cross-appellee Michelle Wightman Charitable 
Foundation. 
 
Ralph G. Wellington, pro hac vice, Nancy Winkleman, pro hac vice, and 
Arlin M. Adams, pro hac vice; Vogelgesang, Howes, Lindamood & Brunn, Philip 
E. Howes and Thomas R. Himmelspach, for appellee and cross-appellant 
Consolidated Rail Corporation. 
 
David E. Neumeister, pro hac vice, James K. Horstman, Richard Hodyl and 
Lloyd E. Williams, Jr., urging reversal on cross-appeal for amici curiae, National 
Association of Independent Insurers and Alliance of American Insurers. 
 
Stanton G. Darling II, urging reversal on cross-appeal for amici curiae, 
Product Liability Advisory Counsel and National Association of Manufacturers. 
 
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, L.L.P., and Scott A. Richardson, 
urging reversal on cross-appeal for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Civil Trial 
Attorneys. 
 
7 
 
Allen Schulman & Assocs. Co., L.P.A., and Allen Schulman, Jr.; Clark, 
Perdue, Roberts & Scott Co., L.P.A., and Paul O. Scott, urging reversal on appeal 
for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey and Charles F. Clarke, urging reversal on 
cross-appeal for amicus curiae, Association of American Railroads. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  We affirm the lower court decisions on the evidentiary matters 
in this case.  We find that the punitive damages award with remittitur is not 
excessive and is constitutional.  We reverse the lower court on the issue of 
appealability of a remittitur and adopt the “Wisconsin rule” on that issue.  We find 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a remittitur.  Finally, we 
reverse the lower court on the issue of relief from post-judgment interest on a 
punitive damages award. 
Evidentiary Issues 
 
We find that the trial court acted within its discretion in granting the motions 
in limine that plaintiffs sought.  Despite its claims to the contrary, Conrail was not 
precluded from mounting a defense. 
 
The purpose of the latest incarnation of this case was to determine how 
much Conrail should pay in punitive damages.  Liability and actual malice on the 
part of Conrail had already been determined at an earlier trial.  This court held in 
Schellhouse v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 520, 524-525, 575 
N.E.2d 453, 456, that “[a]cts committed with actual malice constitute behavior 
qualitatively different from that which may be characterized as merely negligent” 
and, therefore, contributory negligence is not available as a defense where conduct 
in conscious disregard has been established.  Thus, since contributory negligence 
was not a part of this case, the trial court properly prevented the introduction of 
evidence that Michelle Wightman had consumed a small amount of alcohol prior 
 
8 
to the collision, and that the alcohol may have been provided to her by her mother.  
The testimony of Dr. Herbert Moskowitz was based on the effects Michelle 
Wightman’s youth and drinking might have had on the accident, and was also 
properly excluded. 
 
Conrail also sought to have introduced to the jury certain findings from the 
first trial, including the compensatory damages paid to the estate and the trial 
judge’s decision to award no punitive damages.  We find that the trial court 
properly granted plaintiffs’ motions in limine on those issues.  The amount of 
compensatory damages awarded in the first trial to the estate is irrelevant to the 
punitive damages claim of Mrs. Wightman.  Finally, the fact that the first trial 
judge abused his discretion and failed to award punitive damages is also irrelevant 
to the later punitive damages trial. 
 
Conrail also contends that the trial court erred in admitting certain testimony 
of plaintiff’s expert, Dr. William Berg.  Conrail objects to Dr. Berg’s statement 
that, based on the statistics he has maintained for over twenty years, there are “in 
the order of 1,000 vehicle train collisions that were of magnitude that occurred at 
crossings that didn’t have automatic warning devices, including gates per year.”  
Dr. Berg also testified that “a large number of these collisions are occurring in 
situations that are substantially similar.  And when I say substantially similar, what 
I’m saying is where you have got a loss of credibility because the signals are 
operative for an extended period of time and when you’ve got the obstructions.” 
 
Conrail argues that Dr. Berg’s testimony failed to meet the requirements of 
Evid.R. 703 and 705.  Evid.R. 703 provides as follows: 
 
“The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an 
opinion or inference may be those perceived by him or admitted in evidence at the 
hearing.” 
 
Evid.R. 705 states: 
 
9 
 
“The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons 
therefor after disclosure of the underlying facts or data.  The disclosure may be in 
response to a hypothetical question or otherwise.” 
 
Conrail asserts that Dr. Berg’s testimony violated Evid.R. 703 because he 
had no personal knowledge of the statistics he cited, and the statistics had not been 
introduced into evidence.  With respect to Evid.R. 705, Conrail asserts that Dr. 
Berg did not identify the person or organization that maintains those statistics and 
did not disclose where the statistics are published. 
 
The decision of whether or not to admit evidence rests in the sound 
discretion of the court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.  
Peters v. Ohio State Lottery Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 296, 299, 587 N.E.2d 
290, 292. 
 
We find that the trial court did not err in allowing Dr. Berg’s testimony.  
There are certain things that an expert, by reason of his expertise, knows.  Conrail 
does not claim that Dr. Berg did not qualify as an expert under Evid.R. 702.  When 
providing background information, and not opining as to causation, we cannot 
expect an expert to footnote every statement with a recitation of his direct 
observation of the phenomenon, or a bibliography explaining how he knows his 
statement to be true. 
 
Dr. Berg was merely testifying as to facts in his area of expertise.  A 
distinction can be made between background information and an opinion about 
causation.  A doctor testifying in a medical malpractice case regarding a failed 
heart surgery, for instance, need not set forth the underlying facts regarding his 
knowledge of the basic makeup of the thoracic cavity.  He does, however, have to 
set forth the facts underlying his opinion as to what caused the procedure to fail. 
 
10 
 
Dr. Berg was setting forth background information so that the jury could 
draw its own conclusion.  When testifying as to broad patterns rather than specific 
opinions, the same level of foundation is not required. 
 
Dr. Berg was open to aggressive cross-examination if Conrail thought his 
statistics were skewed or inaccurate.  He was also open to rebuttal from Conrail 
witnesses.  The trial court acted within its discretion in allowing the testimony of 
Dr. Berg. 
 
We therefore affirm the court of appeals on all of the evidentiary issues. 
Excessiveness of Punitive Damages Award 
 
Conrail argues that the punitive damages award of $15,000,000 was grossly 
excessive and violated both Ohio law and the Due Process Clause of the United 
States Constitution.  Conrail bases much of its argument regarding Ohio law on the 
ratio between the compensatory damage award and the punitive damages award.  
Mrs. Wightman’s property loss was $2,400, and upon that loss was based the 
$15,000,000 punitive damages award, an amount 6,250 times greater than the 
compensatory award. 
 
In its brief, Conrail provides a survey of Ohio cases from October 1, 1986 to 
“the beginning of 1997” in which punitive damages were awarded, concluding that 
the greatest disparity between punitive and compensatory damages was 600 to 1.  
(Conrail conveniently ends its survey in “the beginning of 1997” before the award 
of a $6,000,00 punitive damages award on a $100 property damage claim, a 60,000 
to 1 ratio, in Garrett v. Consolidated Rail Corp. [1997], 120 Ohio App.3d 378, 697 
N.E.2d 1109, discretionary appeals not allowed in 80 Ohio St.3d 1444, 686 N.E.2d 
273.)  Conrail thus seems to indicate that if Michelle Wightman had been driving a 
car worth $25,000, a 600 to 1 ratio, the punitive damages award in this case would 
have been acceptable.  Conrail’s attempted use of ratios exemplifies why the 
determination of punitive damages is not a mathematical process. 
 
11 
 
This court has stated that simply a large disparity between actual and 
punitive damages is not enough to set aside a jury’s punitive damages award: 
 
“Low compensatory damages and high punitive damages assessed by a jury 
are not in and of themselves cause to reverse the judgment or to grant a remittitur, 
since it is the function of the jury to assess the damages and, generally, it is not for 
the trial or appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact.  A 
large disparity, standing alone, is insufficient to justify a court’s interference with 
the province of the jury.” Villella v. Waikem Motors, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 36, 
40, 543 N.E.2d 464, 469. 
 
A large disparity is allowable because a punitive damages award is more 
about a defendant’s behavior than the plaintiff’s loss.  “The purpose of punitive 
damages is not to compensate a plaintiff, but to punish and deter certain conduct.” 
Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 638, 651, 635 N.E.2d 331, 
343.  The value of the car Michelle Wightman was driving has little to do with how 
a jury might effectively and fairly punish and deter Conrail’s conduct regarding the 
operation of its crossings.  Tellingly, Conrail makes no argument that the punitive 
damages award was disproportionate as to its own income or net worth, but only 
that it was disproportionate to the value of the Wightman car. 
 
The trial judge in this case did an in-depth analysis of the appropriateness of 
the jury’s award.  He found an award of $15,000,000 to be appropriate.  We have 
held that “the trial judge is in the best position to determine whether an award is so 
excessive as to be deemed a product of passion or prejudice.” Villella, 45 Ohio 
St.3d at 40, 543 N.E.2d at 469.  The trial judge believed a deterrent effect was 
necessary for Conrail because it was unwilling to accept responsibility for the 
collision.  The trial judge found that Conrail’s trial strategy “reflects a corporate 
attitude which clearly fails to recognize that the extremely dangerous practice 
which produced this catastrophic collision needs to be changed.” 
 
12 
 
A substantial harm, a continuing risk, a deterrent effect, and an economically 
viable company are factors that make a significant punitive damages award 
appropriate in this case.  We find that the punitive damages award was not 
excessive and did not violate Conrail’s rights under Ohio law. 
 
Conrail also claims that the punitive damages award violates Conrail’s due 
process rights under the United States Constitution.  The United States Supreme 
Court has held that an award violates due process when it can be categorized as 
“grossly excessive” in relation to the state’s legitimate interests in punishing 
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance 
Resources Corp. (1993), 509 U.S. 443, 456, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 2719, 125 L.Ed.2d 
366, 378. 
 
In BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore (1996), 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 
L.Ed.2d 809, the court held that elemental notions of fairness “dictate that a person 
receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment but 
also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.” 517 U.S. at 574, 116 
S.Ct. at 1598, 134 L.Ed.2d at 826.  The court discussed three guideposts that 
indicate whether a defendant has received adequate notice of the possible sanction.  
A lack of fair notice may render a sanction “grossly excessive.” 
 
The guideposts set forth in BMW include the degree of reprehensibility of 
the defendant’s conduct, the disparity between the harm suffered by the plaintiff 
and the amount of the punitive damages award, and the difference between the 
punitive damages award and civil or criminal penalties authorized or imposed in 
similar cases.  517 U.S. at 574-575, 116 S.Ct. at 1598-1599, 134 L.Ed.2d at 826.  
In BMW, the defendant sold a car to the plaintiff without disclosing that it had been 
damaged during shipping and had been repainted.  Defendant, the national 
distributor of BMW automobiles, had a company policy of repainting cars that 
suffered minor, predelivery damage.  The defendant notified neither its dealers nor 
 
13 
its customers of the damage.  The policy affected about one thousand automobiles.  
The trial jury awarded plaintiff $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4,000,000 
in punitive damages.  On appeal the Alabama Supreme Court ordered a remittitur 
in the amount of $2,000,000. 
 
The court in BMW described the degree of reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct as “[p]erhaps the most important indicium of the 
reasonableness of a punitive damages award.” 517 U.S. at 575, 116 S.Ct. at 1599, 
134 L.Ed.2d at 826.  In overturning the punitive damages award in BMW, the court 
made special note that the harm inflicted on the plaintiff was purely economic in 
nature.  The court stated that “BMW’s conduct evinced no indifference to or 
reckless disregard for the health and safety of others.” 517 U.S. at 576, 116 S.Ct. at 
1599, 134 L.Ed.2d at 827. 
 
It is with this guidepost, the most important one, that this case distinguishes 
itself the most from BMW.  Ineffective gates at a railroad crossing are of a 
completely different character than a painted-over scratch on a luxury automobile.  
Literally and figuratively, we are dealing with the difference between a scratch and 
a cataclysm — the difference between a practice that might affect the value of an 
automobile by ten percent, and a practice that could result in massive property 
damage, physical injuries, and untold psychological pain.  Conrail  evinced a 
disregard of the danger it posed to the health and safety of motorists. 
 
In this case, Conrail employees did nothing to warn drivers of oncoming 
trains, despite the fact that they saw vehicles crossing the track by driving around 
the gates.  Even after a phone call from police, Conrail did not take preventative 
measures to avert an accident. According to the trial judge, this tragic case has 
done little to persuade Conrail to change, citing Conrail’s “corporate attitude which 
clearly fails to recognize that the extremely dangerous practice which produced the 
catastrophic collision needs to be changed.” 
 
14 
 
We find that Conrail’s conduct reaches the level of reprehensibility 
sufficient to warrant the substantial punitive damages award the jury imposed in 
this case. 
 
The “second * * * indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive 
damages award is its ratio to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff.” 517 U.S. at 
580, 116 S.Ct. at 1601,  134 L.Ed.2d at 829.  The Supreme Court has stated that 
the harm can include the harm likely to result from the defendant’s conduct as well 
as the harm that actually has occurred. 517 U.S. at 581, 116 S.Ct. at 1602, 134 
L.Ed.2d at 830.  But the court, like this court, has consistently rejected the notion 
of a bright-line mathematical formula for the computation of the reasonableness of 
punitive damages awards.  The court recognizes that “low awards of compensatory 
damages may properly support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, 
for example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of 
economic damages.”  517 U.S. at 582, 116 S.Ct. at 1602, 134 L.Ed.2d at 831. 
 
We see the ratio between the compensatory and punitive damages as less 
relevant here because of the egregiousness of the act.  The injury here was 
catastrophic and could have been financially more so.  We are not persuaded that if 
Michelle Wightman had been driving a $40,000 BMW that would make a more 
acceptable ratio.  An expensive car does not make the award more legitimate.  The 
award stands on its own.  This case offers one of those particular instances where a 
particularly egregious act has resulted in a small amount of economic damages. 
 
The third guidepost set forth in the BMW case is comparing the punitive 
damages award and the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for 
comparable misconduct.  In BMW, the court looked to the plaintiff’s home state’s 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, which had a maximum penalty of $2,000.  The 
court reasoned that that amount would not provide an out-of-state distributor with 
 
15 
fair notice that a violation might subject an offender to a multimillion-dollar 
penalty. Id. at 584, 116 S.Ct. at 1603, 134 L.Ed.2d at 832. 
 
Conrail claims to have violated no Ohio statutes on the night of the accident.  
Conrail argues that even if it had not fully complied with all laws, the maximum 
federal penalty for the willful failure to comply with an order to remedy a violation 
of signal-system safety regulations that creates an imminent danger of death or 
injury is $22,000 per violation. Section 209.409, Title 49, C.F.R. 
 
But the BMW case and its civil penalties are a world away from this case.  
BMW requires that the penalties imposed be for comparable misconduct.  In BMW, 
the $2,000 fine actually applied to the specific conduct of the defendant that was at 
issue.  The $22,000 fine Conrail refers to does not apply to the specific conduct 
involved in this case.  The $22,000 fine applies to the failure to comply with an 
order to remedy a violation of signal-system safety regulations.  An order has to 
have been made and disregarded by the railroad company for the fine to be 
imposed.  It is not a fine for causing a death. 
 
The far more relevant civil “penalty” in cases like these is the potential civil 
damage award in a lawsuit.  We agree with the trial court that Conrail could expect 
extraordinary civil damages from collisions it causes.  Multiple passenger 
accidents where severe injuries occur could yield civil damage awards in the 
millions of dollars.  Conrail could see this coming. 
 
There are no comparable statutory fines in this case to compare how the state 
deals with similar malfeasance.  The trial court felt that criminal sanctions may 
have been in order in this case.  The judge opined that “had the appropriate 
prosecuting authorities been made aware of all the facts and circumstances 
surrounding this tragic and unnecessary collision, those authorities would have 
been compelled to consider criminal prosecution, possibly for involuntary 
manslaughter.” 
 
16 
 
Thus, we conclude that the applicable criminal and civil penalties available 
were comparable to the punitive damages award. 
 
In considering the three guideposts set forth by the court in BMW, we find 
that Conrail had fair notice of the conduct that would subject it to punishment as 
well as the severity of the possible punishment.  The award in this case was not 
grossly excessive and did not violate Conrail’s due process rights. 
 
We therefore affirm the lower court on this issue. 
Appealability of Remittitur by Plaintiffs 
 
Plaintiffs sought appellate review of the trial court’s remittitur, arguing that 
since the court failed to find that the jury’s award was excessive, remittitur was 
unavailable.  Plaintiffs’ first hurdle in that regard is the issue of the appealability of 
a remittitur.  In Scioto Mem. Hosp. Assn. v. Price Waterhouse (1996), 74 Ohio 
St.3d 474, 479, 659 N.E.2d 1268, 1273, this court stated that “where a party 
voluntarily chooses to accept a remittitur, rather than a new trial, it cannot 
challenge that remittitur on appeal.  Iron RR. Co. v. Mowery (1881), 36 Ohio St. 
418, paragraph three of the syllabus.”  This court found the rule against appeal of 
remittiturs to be “fundamentally fair, as it simply binds a party to its election.” Id. 
 
The different circumstances that this case presents have caused us to 
reconsider our endorsement in Scioto of Iron RR.  There are issues of fairness and 
judicial economy surrounding this remittitur that were not a part of the case in 
Scioto.  And certainly now judicial economy plays a more important role in our 
justice system than in did when Iron RR. was decided in 1881. 
 
Here, the trial court ordered the remittitur; in Scioto, it was the appellate 
court.  The benefits to judicial economy are greater with a trial-level remittitur.  
Secondly, in this case the appropriateness of the punitive damages award was at 
the center of the defendant’s appeal.  We question the fairness of allowing one 
 
17 
party to challenge the award without also allowing the other party to voice her own 
argument. 
 
This case has given us an opportunity to consider the value of remittitur and 
to contemplate the policy that best and most fairly supports its purposes. 
 
Overall, this case presents a compelling example of the worth of remittitur.  
The trial court’s rationale in ordering remittitur was well intentioned.  The court 
wrote in its opinion: 
 
“This Court is concerned that if it simply overrules Conrail’s motion lengthy 
appeals will ensue with potentially grave consequences for the safety of motorists 
using Conrail grade crossings.  The Court, therefore, feels compelled, as a matter 
of public safety, to do everything in its power to [e]nsure that the purpose of 
punitive damages is promptly effectuated and that Conrail promptly changes the 
practice which produced this unnecessary tragedy.  After much reflection, this 
Court has concluded that the most effective way to deter Conrail from continuing 
this practice is to remit the jury’s verdict to an amount which would sufficiently 
punish Conrail and create a positive inducement to change its practices, rather than 
to challenge the findings of the earlier jury and the Court of Appeals.” 
 
Remittitur plays an important role in judicial economy by encouraging an 
end to litigation rather than a new trial.  The trial court sets forth persuasively the 
great value of a conclusion.  There are times when an end has its own value, with 
justice delivered, and not further delayed.  A final judgment brings closure, 
certainty, and possibly a commitment to changed future behavior. These are 
societal benefits as well as benefits to the parties.  Wrongs are righted through 
judgments.  Our justice system does not work without finality.  Until then, the 
system’s great value is in limbo.  We take little from it, but we continually feed it 
with our energies, intellect, and emotions. 
 
18 
 
The judge and both parties play a role in ending litigation.  The law 
surrounding remittitur should reflect that.  Under Scioto, defendants seek remittitur 
and benefit from it, but then can extend the litigation risk-free by appealing the 
remitted judgment. While remittitur is an effective tool at bringing about closure, it 
loses its vitality when it fails that important role.  The plaintiff should not have to 
bear the brunt of its failure. 
 
Thus, for reasons of fairness and judicial economy, we adopt what has 
become known as the “Wisconsin rule.”  Pursuant to the Wisconsin rule, first 
enunciated in Plesko v. Milwaukee (1963), 19 Wis.2d 210, 220-221, 120 N.W.2d 
130, 135, a plaintiff who accepts a remittitur may appeal the trial court’s 
determination of the damage issue if the opposing party appeals any issue.  If the 
reviewing court finds no error as to the determination of damages, the plaintiff’s 
prior acceptance of judgment for the reduced amount will be affirmed unless the 
result of the principal appeal requires otherwise. 
 
The court’s reasoning in Plesko mirrors our own concerns about fairness and 
judicial economy.  The court wrote: 
 
“The objective underlying the recommended procedure for granting an 
option to accept judgment for a reduced amount of damages in lieu of having a 
new trial, where the damages awarded by the jury are determined by the trial court 
to be excessive, is to avoid the delay and expense of an appeal or a new trial.  In 
most situations, it is likely that the party will accept judgment for such reduced 
damages rather than undergo the expense, delay, and uncertainty of result of an 
appeal or new trial.  Nevertheless, if a party found liable to pay damages appeals 
the judgment resulting from the other party’s accepting such reduced damages, this 
objective has been negatived.  When plaintiff is forced to undergo an appeal by the 
action of an opposing party, after plaintiff has accepted judgment for such reduced 
damages, it seems unfair to prevent his having a review of the trial court’s 
 
19 
determination leading to the reduction in damages, especially if the plaintiff has 
accepted same only to avoid the delay and expense attending an appeal.  
Furthermore, the new rule herein announced may to some extent discourage 
appeals by the party held liable because of the possibility that the party who has 
accepted judgment for the reduced damages may prevail on his motion for review 
and have the jury’s verdict reinstated.” 19 Wis.2d at 221, 120 N.W.2d at 135. 
 
Remittitur works best where no appeal follows.  A plaintiff accepts 
remittitur in lieu of a new trial.  An appeal reopens the possibility of new trial, 
leaving the plaintiff with a reduced award that she cannot appeal.  Defendants, as 
in this case, are able to attack that jury award on appeal.  The goal of judicial 
economy is thwarted, and a defendant receives an unfair advantage as to what is 
appealable. 
 
We do not know whether the threat of appealability of the remittitur will 
persuade defendants not to appeal cases.  However, if remittitur’s benefit to 
judicial economy is thwarted by an appeal, the system operates more fairly under 
the Wisconsin rule. 
 
We therefore reverse the court of appeals on this issue. 
The Remittitur in this Case 
 
A court has the inherent authority to remit an excessive award, assuming it is 
not tainted with passion or prejudice, to an amount supported by the weight of the 
evidence.  In Chester Park v. Schulte (1929), 120 Ohio St. 273, 166 N.E. 186, 
paragraph three of the syllabus, this court set forth the specific criteria that must be 
met before a court may grant a remittitur: (1) unliquidated damages are assessed by 
a jury, (2) the verdict is not influenced by passion or prejudice, (3) the award is 
excessive, and (4) the plaintiff agrees to the reduction in damages. 
 
20 
 
The trial court in this case did state at one point in its opinion on remittitur 
that it was “not prepared to say that a verdict of $25,000,000 is excessive under 
Ohio law.” 
 
The trial court was obviously not concerned with “magic words.”  But the 
court throughout its opinion did keep in mind the twin goals of punitive damages 
— punishment and deterrence.  The court found that the award as remitted will 
“sufficiently punish Conrail and create a positive inducement to change its 
practices.”  The court reduced the award to an amount sufficient to promptly 
effectuate the purpose of punitive damages.  Damages allowed beyond that 
sufficiency would have been excessive. 
 
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a 
$15 million punitive damages award was sufficient to achieve the purpose of 
punishment and deterrence. 
Post-Judgment Interest Relief 
 
The trial court granted Conrail relief from paying post-judgment interest on 
the punitive damages award.  The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s 
decision.  We find that the trial court’s decision to relieve Conrail from paying 
interest on the punitive damages award was contrary to law. 
 
R.C. 1343.03(B), Ohio’s interest statute, provides in relevant part: 
 
“[I]nterest on a judgment, decree, or order for the payment of money 
rendered in a civil action based on tortious conduct shall be computed from the 
date the judgment, decree, or order is rendered to the date on which the money is 
paid.” 
 
The statute is direct and mandatory.  The $15 million punitive damages 
award was a “judgment * * * for the payment of money rendered in a civil action 
based on tortious conduct.”  As such, the interest “shall be” computed from the 
date the judgment is rendered. 
 
21 
 
The statute provides no wiggle room, and renders pointless any discussion 
about the philosophical underpinnings of punitive damages.  The statute applies to 
judgments.  This was a judgment.  The statute applies and the interest clock ran 
from the date of the judgment. 
 
We therefore reverse the court of appeals on this issue. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I concur with 
the judgment of the majority and with the reasoning in the majority opinion, except 
on the remittitur issue (Issue IV).  I write separately because we are not required to 
reach the issue of whether a remittitur is generally appealable by the plaintiff.  
Therefore this is an inappropriate case for defining a new standard of law for Ohio. 
 
I would hold that where, as in the case before us, a trial court deems a jury 
award not to be excessive, the trial court lacks authority to offer a remittitur, and 
that it is an abuse of discretion to grant a new trial or offer a remittitur to reduce 
damages. 
 
Because the trial court here expressly determined that the jury did not award 
excessive punitive damages under Ohio law in returning a verdict of $25,000,000, 
the trial court had no authority to remit the jury award to $15,000,000.  It therefore 
becomes necessary to reevaluate the appropriateness of the punitive damages 
award. 
 
22 
 
The majority correctly states that, in lieu of ordering a new trial, a court has 
the inherent authority to remit an excessive award not tainted by passion or 
prejudice, if the plaintiff agrees to the remittitur.  See, e.g., Larrissey v. Norwalk 
Truck Lines, Inc. (1951), 155 Ohio St. 207, 44 O.O. 238, 98 N.E.2d 419, paragraph 
five of the syllabus; Pendleton Street RR. Co. v. Rahmann (1872), 22 Ohio St. 446. 
 
However, “[i]t is the function of the jury to assess the damages, and 
generally, it is not for a trial or appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of 
the trier of fact.”  Villella v. Waikem Motors, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 36, 40, 
543 N.E.2d 464, 469.  The trial court has only limited authority to offer remittitur.  
The concept of remittitur was developed to provide the trial court with an alternate 
remedy, in the interest of judicial economy, by which it could correct an award that 
was legally excessive, thereby avoiding another trial. 
 
In Chester Park Co. v. Schulte (1929), 120 Ohio St. 273, 166 N.E. 186, 
paragraph three of the syllabus, this court set forth the specific criteria that control 
the determination of a trial court to grant remittitur.  One of these criteria is that the 
original jury award is found to be excessive.  The majority cites this criterion, 
admits that the trial court did not meet it, and yet, accepts the trial court’s order of 
remittitur. 
 
I have found no support for allowing a trial court to offer remittitur absent a 
finding that a jury’s verdict of damages was excessive.  To allow a court to offer 
remittitur simply because the trial court, as in this case, believes that a lesser award 
might help the defendant accept the verdict without challenge, would be to infringe 
improperly upon the plaintiff’s right to a jury determination and could be viewed 
as encouraging defendants to threaten appeals and delay payment of verdicts. 
 
The trial court, in this case, originally filed a judgment entry ordering the 
defendant to pay the plaintiff the entire $25,000,000 in punitive damages that had 
been awarded by the jury.  Following this judgment entry, the defendant moved for 
 
23 
remittitur to an amount less than $1,200,000 on the grounds that the verdict was 
excessive and in violation of due process, or in the alternative, for a new trial on 
the grounds that the verdict was tainted with passion and prejudice.  The court 
granted the motion for remittitur and denied the motion for a new trial.  In doing 
so, the trial court cited Chester Park, including the criterion that the trial court find 
the damages award to be excessive.  The trial court then specifically found that the 
damages awarded by the jury were not excessive under Ohio law and 
unconditionally denied the motion for a new trial.  It nonetheless asked the plaintiff 
to agree to a remittitur. 
 
It is true that we must defer to the trial court’s discretion, absent an abuse of 
discretion, when it determines a verdict to be legally excessive. See Thompson v. 
Titus (1959), 169 Ohio St. 203, 8 O.O.2d 166, 158 N.E.2d 357; Larrissey at 219-
220, 44 O.O. at 243-244, 98 N.E.2d at 426.  However, we cannot defer to a 
judgment that the trial court had no authority pursuant to statutory or common law 
to make. 
 
I would remand this case to the court of appeals to determine whether the 
trial court erred in concluding that the punitive damages award was not excessive. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I concur in the 
decision to affirm the judgment of the court of appeals on the issues raised by 
Conrail on cross-appeal. 
 
I dissent, however, from the decision of the majority to depart from the 
precedent ratified just three years ago in Scioto Mem. Hosp. Assn. v. Price 
Waterhouse (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 474, 479, 659 N.E.2d 1268, 1273, that binds a 
party to its acceptance of a remittitur.  The majority decision to overrule this recent 
case rests on “[t]he different circumstances that this case presents,” and to me that 
 
24 
reasoning departs from the precept that a court’s “judgment should be a declaration 
of legal principles rather than a determination of facts and circumstances.”  Lamb 
v. Lehmann (1924), 110 Ohio St. 59, 80, 143 N.E. 276, 282. Certainly a court 
should be vigilant in reviewing prior holdings for error and should retreat from 
erroneously decided precedent when justified.  But “different circumstances” is not 
a reason that comports with the goals of neutrality and predictability. 
 
Because I would not overrule Scioto, I would affirm the court of appeals’ 
decision that the remittitur is not appealable.  I also would affirm the related 
determination of the court of appeals that because the remittitur judgment denied 
post-judgment interest, plaintiff may not appeal that aspect of the remittitur either. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I 
concur with the majority on the third (Appealability of Remittitur by Plaintiffs) and 
fifth issues (Post-Judgment Interest Relief), but respectfully dissent on the first 
(Evidentiary Issues), second (Excessiveness of Punitive Damages Award), and 
fourth issues (The Remittitur in this Case). 
Excessiveness of Punitive Damages 
and 
The Remittitur in this Case 
 
I believe that the damages award in this case is, in essence, an award based 
on a wrongful death — the fact that Michelle Wightman was killed in this accident.  
Under Ohio law, punitive damages are not permitted in wrongful death cases.  See 
Rubeck v. Huffman (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 20, 23, 8 O.O.3d 11, 13, 374 N.E.2d 411, 
413; Schaefer v. D & J Produce, Inc. (1978), 62 Ohio App.2d 53, 57, 16 O.O.3d 
108, 111, 403 N.E.2d 1015, 1018-1019.  The majority avoids addressing this issue, 
carefully referring only to the property damage of $2,400 as the point of 
comparison.  Yet, the majority frequently refers to the “harm” created by the 
 
25 
accident, such as referring to Conrail’s actions as “a practice that could result in 
massive property damages, physical injuries, and untold psychological pain.”  By 
distinguishing this case from BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore (1996), 517 U.S. 559, 
116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809, on the basis of health and safety issues, the 
majority implicitly sanctions the punitive damages award for the wrongful death, 
not the comparatively minor property loss. 
 
By affirming an award of punitive damages that is 6,250 times the property 
damage award (even after remittitur), this court may encourage plaintiffs in 
wrongful death cases to include a property damage claim, no matter its value, to 
use as a basis to recover exorbitant punitive damages.  The result is, in essence, a 
judicially endorsed negation of Ohio’s wrongful death statute.  This court has now 
implicitly sanctioned punitive damages for wrongful death, despite the fact that a 
wrongful death claim exists only by statute and does not provide for punitive 
damages. 
 
Since the majority does not directly address this issue, presumably, the 
principle of law still stands that punitive damages cannot be awarded in a wrongful 
death claim.  To the extent that the majority intended otherwise, I dissent. 
Evidentiary Issues 
 
I believe that Conrail was wrongfully denied due process when it was not 
allowed to present a full defense in the remand trial.  The Ohio Constitution 
mandates that due process be afforded to all litigants.  “The fundamental requisite 
of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”  Grannis v. Ordean (1914), 
234 U.S. 385, 394, 34 S.Ct. 779, 783, 58 L.Ed. 1363, 1369.  See, also, Mathews v. 
Eldridge (1976), 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 32 (“The 
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ”); Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc. 
(1987), 481 U.S. 252, 261, 107 S.Ct. 1740, 1747, 95 L.Ed.2d 239, 250. 
 
26 
 
For over a century, the law in Ohio has been that when awarding punitive 
damages, a jury should consider all evidence, both aggravating and mitigating.  
Schneider v. Hosier (1871), 21 Ohio St. 98, 113-114.  Due process and 
fundamental fairness require that the jury be informed of all of the circumstances 
in order to fully evaluate the defendant’s conduct.  Yet Conrail was prevented from 
presenting an effective defense because the trial judge in the retrial on the punitive 
damages issues excluded much of the testimony from the original trial.  The 
second jury, in essence, heard only plaintiff’s version of the events. 
 
I agree that to some degree an award of punitive damages may have been 
proper in the case.  The majority clearly set forth the shortcomings of Conrail in 
this matter.  But Michelle Wightman was not without fault.  There was testimony 
in the original case that had Wightman exercised caution, she could have avoided 
this accident.  Yet this jury heard none of this evidence. 
 
In fact, the original jury found that Wightman was forty percent responsible 
for the accident.  That jury heard evidence that Wightman was a young, 
inexperienced driver, having had her license for only six months.  That jury heard 
how she had drunk two cans of beer and three wine coolers, supplied by her 
mother, before the accident.  They also heard from another expert, Dr. Herbert 
Moskowitz, that this combination of factors increased Wightman’s risk of accident 
by five hundred percent.  That jury also had a vehicle dynamics event analysis 
from expert Deane H. Ellsworth that an unimpaired driver proceeding at her speed 
would have had time to see and avoid the oncoming train.  The jury on remand was 
entitled to know that another jury had earlier found Wightman to be forty percent 
contributorily negligent. 
 
We do not know if the jury on remand, had it heard all of this evidence on 
remand, would have awarded the same amount of punitive damages.  But we do 
know that the first trial judge, who did hear this evidence, refused to award any 
 
27 
punitive damages at all — a sharp contrast to the second verdict of $25 million.  
That alone creates a very strong presumption of prejudice.  By hearing Dr. William 
Berg’s testimony only and no contradicting opinion on whether the accident was 
avoidable, the jury had no opportunity to judge the credibility of that testimony.  
Only by hearing all of the testimony could the jury on remand have effectively 
evaluated (1) whether to award any punitive damages, and (2) if so, how 
reprehensible Conrail’s conduct was in light of the evidence adduced at the 
original trial that Wightman could have avoided the accident.  Evidence of 
Wightman’s contributory negligence was not sufficient to excuse Conrail from 
compensatory liability, but it may well have been sufficient to excuse Conrail from 
a punitive damages award.  This grossly one-sided presentation denied Conrail any 
due process or fundamental fairness in this trial. 
 
For the reasons above, I believe that the verdict was sorely tainted.  I would 
reverse and remand on the evidentiary and excessiveness issues for a full and fair 
retrial.