Case Title: Johnson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC10-2008

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2012-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC10-2008 
_____________ 
 
 
EMANUEL JOHNSON, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[November 8, 2012] 
 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Emanuel Johnson appeals the ruling of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court 
denying his motion to vacate his sentence of death, filed under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.850.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  
For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the circuit court’s order. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Between April and June 1991, Johnson was tried, convicted, and sentenced 
for several crimes committed between January and October 1988 against four 
separate victims.  Two of the victims—Iris White and Jackie McCahon—were 
 
 
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murdered, while two—Kate Cornell and Lawanda Giddens—were not.  Johnson’s 
convictions in the noncapital cases were used as aggravators in both capital cases, 
and each capital conviction was used as an aggravator in the other capital case.  
This appeal stems from Johnson’s first-degree murder conviction and 
accompanying death sentence for stabbing Iris White to death inside her home.  In 
addition to the murder conviction, Johnson was convicted of armed burglary of 
White’s home. 
On direct appeal, this Court set out the following facts summarizing 
Johnson’s crimes against White: 
On October 4, 1988, police found the body of 73-year-old Iris 
White.  She was naked from the waist down and had suffered twenty-
four stab wounds, one incised wound, and blunt trauma to the back of 
the head.  A variety of fatal wounds penetrated the lungs and heart.  
The body also showed evidence of defensive wounds and abrasions 
near the vagina and anus most likely caused by a forceful opening by 
hand or fingernails. 
Police found a screen in the living room had been cut and the 
lower window raised.  The fingerprints of Emanuel Johnson were 
recovered from the window sill.  Police also found two pubic hairs 
that showed the same microscopic characteristics as Johnson’s, 
though an expert stated that an exact identification was not possible.  
Johnson had done yard work for White some years earlier. 
After a lengthy interrogation on October 12, 1988, Johnson 
gave a taped confession to police.  He stated that he knocked on 
White’s door to talk about lawn maintenance.  When she opened the 
door, he then grabbed her, choked her to unconsciousness, and then 
stabbed her several times.  Johnson said he then left the house, locking 
the door behind himself, but forgot to take White’s wallet.  Twenty 
minutes later he cut open the window screen, climbed in, took the 
wallet, and left.  Johnson said he later threw the wallet in an area 
where a road surveyor later found it. 
 
 
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Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 637, 641 (Fla. 1995).  For the capital offense, the jury 
recommended by a vote of eight to four that Johnson be put to death.  In sentencing 
Johnson to death, the trial court found three aggravating factors—prior violent 
felony, commission of a murder for financial gain, and heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
(HAC)—along with fifteen mitigating factors, including that Johnson suffered 
mental pressure not reaching the level of statutory mitigation.  The trial court then 
found that each aggravating factor alone outweighed all of the mitigating factors 
and sentenced Johnson to death.  Johnson, 660 So. 2d at 641. 
 
Johnson raised ten claims on direct appeal:  (1) his confession was 
involuntary and should have been suppressed; (2) the search warrant and 
accompanying affidavit were improper and the resulting evidence should have 
been suppressed; (3) the trial court erred in denying a voir dire challenge for cause; 
(4) this Court should consider the arguments raised in Johnson’s appeal from his 
conviction of the McCahon murder; (5) the trial court improperly limited the 
presentation of mitigating evidence; (6) Johnson was prejudiced by the State’s 
eliciting of improper testimony and improper closing argument; (7) the trial court 
improperly rejected the extreme mental disturbance mitigating factor; (8) the trial 
court committed various errors when instructing the jury; (9) the felony-murder 
aggravator is an unconstitutional “automatic” aggravator; and (10) the standard 
jury instruction given on the HAC aggravator was constitutionally infirm.  Id. at 
 
 
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641-48.  This Court denied each of Johnson’s claims, found the death penalty to be 
proportionally warranted, and affirmed Johnson’s convictions and sentences.  Id. at 
648. 
II.  MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
A.  Procedural Background 
In March 1997, Johnson filed a shell motion for postconviction relief 
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  After several rulings from 
both the postconviction court and this Court tolling the time for Johnson to file an 
amended postconviction motion,1 as well as multiple amended motions for 
postconviction relief filed by Johnson with leave to further amend, Johnson’s 
postconviction claims moved forward on an amended motion for postconviction 
relief filed in September 2003 and an addendum filed in December 2003. 
Johnson raised the following claims before the postconviction court:  (1) 
defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by mishandling mental health 
                                         
 
1.  See, e.g., Johnson v. State, No. SC78,336 (Fla. order filed Jun. 4, 1997) 
(unpublished order tolling time for filing of Johnson’s amended motion due to 
financial condition of Office of the Capital Collateral Representative); In re 
Amendments to Fla. Rule Crim. Pro. 3.852, 700 So. 2d 680, 681 (Fla. 1997) 
(tolling time for filing Johnson’s postconviction motion for ninety days to allow 
collateral counsel to transition from a single office to three regional offices); 
Amendments to Fla. Rules Crim. Pro. 3.851 & 3.850, 719 So. 2d 869, 871-72 (Fla. 
1998) (tolling time for Johnson to file motion under rule 3.850 or 3.851 until 
October 1, 1998, based on insufficient funding of collateral counsel); and State v. 
Johnson, Nos. 88 CF 3200, et al. (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. order filed Feb. 13, 2002) 
(extending date for filing of Johnson’s amended motion to March 4, 2002). 
 
 
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experts; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by manipulating the trial 
schedule of Johnson’s four trials and failing to make timely disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 
rendering defense counsel ineffective in conducting Johnson’s defense; (3) the 
State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by offering evidence of sperm after an 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report stated that none had been found, and 
defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the State’s misconduct; (4) 
defense counsel was ineffective in failing to call a competent mental health expert 
at Johnson’s penalty phase trial; (5) the prior violent felony aggravator was based 
on invalid convictions; (6) Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4) 
unconstitutionally prevented Johnson, through his counsel, from interviewing 
jurors and thereby also rendered defense counsel’s assistance ineffective; (7) as 
applied, the Florida death sentencing statute is unconstitutional; (8) the trial court 
denied Johnson due process of law by preventing him from informing the jury 
about his ineligibility for parole and the possible sentences he would likely receive 
in other pending criminal cases; (9) Johnson’s death sentence is unconstitutional 
because the penalty phase jury instructions improperly shifted the burden of proof 
to Johnson, and defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the improper 
jury instructions; (10) Florida’s method of execution by lethal injection constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment; (11) Johnson’s convictions are materially unreliable 
 
 
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based on the cumulative effect of the errors during his guilt and penalty phase 
trials; (12) Johnson’s death sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 
because Johnson may be incompetent at the time of execution; (13) the State 
engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by arguing facts not in evidence, and defense 
counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the State’s improper argument; (14) 
the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by presenting false evidence at the 
suppression hearing, and defense counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the 
State’s misconduct; (15) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by 
presenting inconsistent theories, and defense counsel was ineffective in failing to 
challenge the State’s misconduct; (16) defense counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to introduce evidence of Johnson’s actual innocence; (17) the 
State’s use of illegally obtained rolled fingerprints was unconstitutional; (18) the 
State violated due process by destroying potentially useful evidence in bad faith; 
(19) Johnson’s arrest, search, and seizure were all based on a defective affidavit 
that contained false statements, and defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 
present these facts at the suppression hearing; and (20) the search warrants were 
not issued by a neutral magistrate, and defense counsel was ineffective in failing to 
discover and present this claim. 
 
All but four of Johnson’s postconviction claims raised in this case correlated 
with substantially similar claims raised in his parallel postconviction motion 
 
 
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challenging his convictions and sentences for the McCahon murder.  See Johnson 
v. State, No. SC10-2219, slip op. at 5-6 (Fla. Nov. 8, 2012).  Because of the 
significant interrelation between Johnson’s postconviction motion in this case and 
his postconviction motion regarding the McCahon murder, the postconviction 
court held a consolidated hearing on both motions pursuant to Huff v. State, 495 
So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1986), on September 21, 2005.  Following the Huff hearing, the 
postconviction court entered a single order granting an evidentiary hearing on the 
first four of Johnson’s postconviction claims in this case—which were 
substantially indistinguishable from Johnson’s first four claims in the McCahon 
murder postconviction proceeding—and summarily denying the remainder of 
Johnson’s postconviction claims relating to White’s murder.  State v. Johnson, 
Nos. CF 88-3198, et al. (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. order filed Mar. 1, 2007). 
Before the evidentiary hearing was held, Johnson filed several pro se 
pleadings seeking to discharge collateral counsel and raising additional claims that 
he believed were not adequately addressed by collateral counsel.  Ultimately, 
Johnson withdrew his attempts to discharge counsel, and collateral counsel adopted 
six of Johnson’s pro se claims.  The additional claims alleged that the search 
warrant, the affidavit in support of the warrant, and the inventory list of items 
obtained pursuant to the warrant were false in that each document was backdated 
and signed after the search of his premises had been completed.  Specifically, 
 
 
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Johnson argued that:  (21) the State had the duty to disclose the false documents 
because they constituted impeachment evidence; (22) the State had a duty to 
disclose that the false documents had been filed; (23) the State committed a 
fundamentally unfair act by fabricating, filing, and relying on the false documents; 
(24) the judge who backdated and signed the false documents was not neutral and 
detached; (25) the State committed per se reversible error by using and failing to 
advise the defense about the false documents; and (26) Johnson’s claims regarding 
the false documents are not procedurally barred because he was deprived of 
substantive due process.  The postconviction court issued a single order and 
summarily denied each of Johnson’s additional claims, holding that the conclusory 
allegations contained therein were insufficient to require an evidentiary hearing, 
that the claims should have been raised on appeal, and that Johnson had previously 
argued the issues during the Huff hearing.  State v. Johnson, Nos. 88 CF 3198, et 
al. (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. order filed Apr. 28, 2009). 
B.  Evidentiary Hearing Testimony 
At an evidentiary hearing held on August 3 and 4, 2009, the postconviction 
court heard testimony from Johnson’s three trial attorneys—Adam Tebrugge, 
Tobey Hockett, and Eliot Metcalfe—regarding the defense’s pretrial management 
of four experts—Dr. Walter Afield, Dr. Michael Maher, Dr. Richard Ofshe, and 
Dr. John Brigham.  Attorney Tebrugge, who was Johnson’s primary attorney for 
 
 
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the penalty phase of the trials regarding both the White and McCahon murders, 
testified regarding Dr. Afield, who was appointed by the trial court pursuant to 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.216 in order to determine whether Johnson 
was competent to stand trial and whether Johnson may have been insane at the 
time he committed the murders.  Tebrugge testified that throughout the preparation 
for Johnson’s trials, he had developed concerns with Dr. Afield’s potential 
testimony and ultimately was convinced that Dr. Afield would not be a helpful 
witness to the defense.  Tebrugge further testified that the decision not to use Dr. 
Afield as a witness during either Johnson’s guilt or penalty phase trials was based 
on the defense’s feeling that Dr. Afield would not be a helpful witness.  Tebrugge 
testified that the decision was not based on any threat by the State to present 
contradicting expert testimony if the defense called Dr. Afield as a witness. 
Attorney Metcalfe, who at the time of Johnson’s trials was the Public 
Defender for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, testified to similar effect.  Metcalfe 
testified that the defense could not get a straight answer from Dr. Afield regarding 
whether a valid basis existed on which to rest an insanity defense and that, as a 
result, he believed that Dr. Afield’s testimony would undermine any attempted 
insanity defense.  Metcalfe testified that for this reason, he was nervous about 
calling Dr. Afield as a witness and that he ultimately became uncomfortable with 
using Dr. Afield for any purpose whatsoever.  Metcalfe testified that Johnson’s 
 
 
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trial team had conducted strategy sessions regarding whether to use Dr. Afield as a 
witness and that the attorneys had ultimately decided against using Dr. Afield at 
trial. 
Regarding the decision to make Dr. Afield available for a deposition, 
Attorney Hockett, who worked primarily on the pretrial aspects of Johnson’s trials, 
testified that the defense had originally listed Dr. Afield as a potential witness, 
which allowed the State to depose him.  Hockett testified that when, during the 
deposition, the State asked Dr. Afield to disclose confidential information 
regarding his conversations with Johnson, Hockett objected to the State’s question 
but did not feel that he could do anything else to prevent Dr. Afield from 
answering the question. 
Dr. Afield also testified at the evidentiary hearing.  Dr. Afield testified that 
he had evaluated Johnson on October 27, 1988, while Johnson was incarcerated.  
Dr. Afield recalled his impression that Johnson was chronically retarded and 
schizophrenic and that Johnson had been attempting to control his psychosis with 
prescription medication and cocaine, both of which made the psychosis worse.  Dr. 
Afield testified that he had discussed the possibility of an insanity defense with 
Johnson’s trial counsel and had informed them that such a defense might be 
possible but that he would need more information to be certain.  However, Dr. 
Afield testified that after he was deposed in September 1990, he did not hear from 
 
 
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counsel again regarding the possibility of pursuing an insanity defense.  Thus, in 
April 1991, he submitted a report advising trial counsel that he did not believe 
there was a basis for an insanity defense.  On cross-examination, Dr. Afield 
testified that he did not believe that Johnson could have been faking insanity by 
pretending to be delusional.  In Dr. Afield’s opinion, Johnson was too mentally 
retarded to pretend to be insane.  On redirect, Dr. Afield admitted that Johnson’s 
IQ was roughly 100, which is normal, although Dr. Afield stated that other tests 
were indicative of brain dysfunction.  Dr. Afield also recalled that, during his 
evaluation, Johnson made admissions regarding the crimes with which he was 
charged. 
Regarding Dr. Maher, attorney Tebrugge testified that based on his 
dissatisfaction with Dr. Afield, he decided to employ Dr. Maher, a psychiatrist who 
specialized in the areas of substance abuse and cocaine psychosis.  Tebrugge 
testified that after the defense listed Dr. Maher as a potential witness, Dr. Maher 
was deposed by the State, during which he made several statements regarding 
admissions made by Johnson.  Tebrugge testified that based on Dr. Maher’s 
deposition, he decided not to call Dr. Maher as a witness after discussing the issue 
with Johnson.  Tebrugge also testified that the State had threatened to call Dr. 
Maher as a State’s witness based on the information he revealed during his 
deposition.  Tebrugge objected to the State’s threat on the grounds that any 
 
 
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admissions made by Johnson to Dr. Maher were privileged and could not be 
introduced at trial.  Tebrugge testified that it was his belief that although listing Dr. 
Maher as a potential witness allowed the State to depose him and waived any 
attorney-client privilege attached to Dr. Maher, such waiver could be revoked by 
removing Dr. Maher as a potential witness. 
 
Regarding Dr. Ofshe, an expert in coerced confessions, attorney Hockett 
testified that the defense saw Dr. Ofshe as its best chance to suppress Johnson’s 
confession because Dr. Ofshe believed that the confession had been coerced and 
because Dr. Ofshe had intentionally avoided asking Johnson any questions that 
could lead to admissions regarding the crimes.  Hockett testified that the defense 
had presented Dr. Ofshe’s testimony at the motion to suppress hearing but that, 
after the court denied the defense’s motion, the defense never considered using Dr. 
Ofshe as a guilt phase witness.  Hockett testified that the defense decided it would 
not be helpful to present Dr. Ofshe as a witness at trial because it had already 
preserved the issue at the suppression hearing and because repeating a week’s 
worth of testimony would not have aided the defense. 
 
Regarding Johnson’s claim that the State’s manipulation of Johnson’s four 
trial dates had rendered Johnson’s counsel ineffective, attorney Hockett recalled 
that the defense had worked on securing Dr. Brigham, an expert in eyewitness 
identification, as an expert in the case regarding victim Cornell.  Hockett testified 
 
 
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that the defense had made multiple attempts to continue Johnson’s trial schedule in 
order that Dr. Brigham could have time to adequately prepare for the trial 
regarding victim Cornell but that the trial court had denied the defense’s motions 
for continuance.  Attorney Metcalfe similarly testified that the defense had 
discussed using Dr. Brigham as an expert in eyewitness identification in the trial 
regarding victim Cornell and possibly also the trial regarding victim Giddens. 
Dr. Brigham also testified at the evidentiary hearing.  Dr. Brigham testified 
that he had been contacted in the late spring of 1991 by attorney Hockett about the 
possibility of testifying as an expert witness in the trial regarding victim Cornell.  
After reviewing some materials from the case, Dr. Brigham replied that he would 
not have the chance to fully review the necessary materials before trial but that, if 
the trial were to be postponed, he would be interested in participating.  Dr. 
Brigham acknowledged that he had sent Hockett a letter on April 18, 1991, stating 
that his testimony would be most useful regarding the effect that exposure to 
several prior photo lineups would have had on a witness’s ability to correctly 
identify a perpetrator from a subsequent lineup.  Dr. Brigham claimed that—had he 
been able to testify at trial—he would have assisted Johnson’s trial attorneys in 
cross-examining any eyewitness.  On cross-examination, Dr. Brigham admitted 
that he would have testified at trial only regarding general principles of eyewitness 
identification.  Dr. Brigham also admitted that he had not performed an actual 
 
 
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study on Cornell’s identification.  On redirect, Dr. Brigham clarified that had he 
been employed as an expert by the defense, he would have conducted a thorough 
study of all relevant records and reached an expert opinion regarding Cornell’s 
eyewitness identification of Johnson. 
 
The postconviction court also heard the testimony of Marjorie Hammock, a 
professor of social work who was tendered by collateral counsel as a mitigation 
specialist based on her expertise in biopsychosocial assessments—a tool for 
explaining how individuals came to be in a particular situation in their lives.  Ms. 
Hammock performed a biopsychosocial assessment of Johnson, reviewed the 
Department of Corrections’ records for Johnson, examined his health, mental 
health, and school records (grades one through six), and read interviews with 
several of Johnson’s family members and other individuals involved in the case.  
Ms. Hammock also personally interviewed several of Johnson’s family members 
and interviewed Johnson himself three times.  Based on these sources, Ms. 
Hammock testified that poverty and abandonment were key patterns in Johnson’s 
life.  Ms. Hammock also testified that Johnson felt oppressed by the white 
community and that Johnson had been ridiculed by the teachers and children at his 
school.  Ms. Hammock stated that Johnson had attempted to commit suicide 
twice—once as a young teenager by taking his mother’s antidepressant pills and 
later by attempting to slit his wrists while incarcerated—and that Johnson used 
 
 
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crack cocaine extensively by the time of the murders.  Ms. Hammock then testified 
regarding the miscarriage of Johnson’s first child and the effect it had on him, 
including that he carried a picture of the dead child with him and showed it to 
everyone.  Ms. Hammock concluded that Johnson had been in psychological 
distress for most of his life and that he was unable to deal with the issues that 
confronted him. 
 
On cross-examination, Ms. Hammock testified regarding Beverly 
Ackerman, an investigator employed by Johnson’s trial counsel for the purpose of 
gathering mitigation evidence.  Ms. Hammock agreed that she and Ms. Ackerman 
had interviewed many of the same people and read many of the same records.  Ms. 
Hammock admitted that Ms. Ackerman had interviewed some people and reviewed 
some records that Ms. Hammock had not.  Ms. Hammock claimed, however, that 
although much of her investigation overlapped with Ms. Ackerman’s investigation, 
the information that she gathered from the records and interviews was not 
necessarily the same as that gathered by Ms. Ackerman.  Attorney Metcalfe also 
testified regarding Ms. Ackerman, recalling that his strategy was to gather as much 
information about Johnson as possible.  To this effect, Metcalfe had sent Ms. 
Ackerman to Johnson’s hometown in Mississippi because he felt that as a black 
female, Ms. Ackerman would have the best chance of connecting with and getting 
information from Johnson’s family and community. 
 
 
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C.  Postconviction Court’s Ruling 
 
Following the evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court issued an order 
denying Johnson’s remaining postconviction claims.  Regarding Johnson’s first 
claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by mishandling the 
defense’s mental health expert witnesses, the postconviction court held that 
counsel was not ineffective in failing to call Dr. Afield as a witness because (1) it 
was clear that the decision was a tactical one based on the fact that Dr. Afield’s 
testimony would have been more harmful than helpful to the defense; and (2) 
Johnson had not established prejudice in light of this Court’s ruling on direct 
appeal that the evidence of Johnson’s mental disturbance—as presented in full at 
the suppression hearing at which Dr. Afield testified—did not rise to the level of a 
statutory mitigator.  Johnson, 660 So. 2d at 646-47.  Similarly, regarding counsel’s 
decision not to call either Dr. Maher or Dr. Ofshe at trial, the postconviction court 
concluded that counsel’s performance was not deficient, but was strategic based on 
the content of both doctors’ potential testimony and that Johnson was not 
prejudiced by the lack of testimony.  Furthermore, the court ruled that Johnson was 
not prejudiced by his counsel’s decision to allow each of the doctors to be deposed 
because none of counsel’s decisions regarding the doctors were influenced by the 
State’s threat to call Dr. Maher at trial. 
 
 
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The postconviction court also denied the portion of Johnson’s second claim 
alleging that defense counsel mishandled Dr. Brigham during the trial relating to 
victim Cornell and that Johnson was prejudiced by counsel’s deficiency because 
his conviction in that case was used as an aggravator in the capital cases.  The 
court found that counsel was not deficient because the requests for continuance in 
order to accommodate Dr. Brigham’s schedule were denied and that Johnson had 
suffered no prejudice because Dr. Brigham’s testimony was by no means certain to 
be admitted at trial.  The court also found that even in Dr. Brigham’s absence, 
Johnson’s trial counsel intensely challenged Ms. Cornell’s identification of 
Johnson. 
 
Finally, the postconviction court denied Johnson’s claim that his counsel 
was ineffective in failing to hire a mitigation expert to investigate and testify at 
Johnson’s penalty phase trial.  The court determined that counsel was not deficient 
because mitigation had been a central focus of the defense, as evidenced by Ms. 
Ackerman’s investigation.  The court found that Ms. Hammock would have 
performed substantially the same in investigating and reporting mitigating 
evidence as did Ms. Ackerman.  The court concluded that Johnson’s argument that 
an expert such as Ms. Hammock would have presented the evidence more 
articulately or credibly was nothing more than second-guessing his trial counsel’s 
strategic decisions.  The court further concluded that Johnson had failed to 
 
 
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establish prejudice because much of the information testified to by Ms. Hammock 
was expressed clearly, articulately, and credibly by Johnson’s family members 
during his penalty phase trial. 
 
The postconviction court made no ruling regarding Johnson’s allegations in 
his second claim that the State had failed to timely disclose exculpatory evidence.  
The postconviction court also failed to address Johnson’s third claim alleging 
prosecutorial misconduct relating to evidence of sperm found at the crime scene.  
However, shortly after its order following the evidentiary hearing, the 
postconviction court sua sponte issued another order clarifying that it also denied 
the remainder of Johnson’s second claim as well as Johnson’s third claim 
regarding the sperm evidence. 
 
Accordingly, the court denied Johnson’s postconviction motion in its 
entirety.  Johnson now appeals the court’s rulings regarding several of his 
postconviction claims.  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the circuit 
court’s denial of Johnson’s motion for postconviction relief. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Johnson first raises three claims challenging the postconviction 
court’s denial of his claims on which an evidentiary hearing was held.  Johnson 
then raises nine claims challenging the postconviction court’s summary denial of 
 
 
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his other postconviction claims, including some claims originally raised pro se and 
later adopted by collateral counsel. 
A.  Claims Denied After Evidentiary Hearing 
Johnson argues that the postconviction court erred in denying three 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims:  (1) counsel was ineffective in 
mishandling multiple mental health expert witnesses before trial and failing to 
present a mental health expert during trial; (2) counsel’s deficiency in failing to 
effectively pursue Dr. Brigham as an expert witness in the trial regarding victim 
Cornell prejudiced Johnson when his conviction from the noncapital case was used 
to establish an aggravating factor regarding the White murder; and (3) counsel was 
ineffective in failing to present a mitigation expert at trial and in failing to properly 
authenticate medical records. 
In order to gain relief on his ineffective assistance claims, Johnson “must 
show that his attorney’s performance was deficient and that the deficient 
performance prejudiced his defense.”  Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771 (Fla. 
2004) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  To establish 
deficient performance, Johnson must show that his counsel’s representation “fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness” by committing errors “so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth 
Amendment.”  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88).  To establish 
 
 
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prejudice, Johnson must show that counsel’s errors “were so serious as to deprive 
[him] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”  Id. (alteration in original) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  In the context of the penalty phase, “the 
question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the 
sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances did not warrant death.”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695); see also Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 455-56 
(2009) (holding that a defendant is not required to show that “counsel’s deficient 
conduct more likely than not altered the outcome” of his penalty phase trial, but 
rather to establish “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in [that] 
outcome”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94).  
We review de novo the postconviction court’s rulings on the Strickland 
performance and prejudice prongs, but defer to that court’s findings of fact as long 
as such findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record.  
Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 923 (Fla. 2001) (“We recognize and honor the 
[postconviction] court’s superior vantage point in assessing the credibility of 
witnesses and in making findings of fact.”); see also Sochor, 883 So. 2d at 771 
(noting that “we apply [this] mixed standard of review because both the 
performance and the prejudice prongs of the Strickland test present mixed 
questions of law and fact”). 
 
 
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Johnson first claims that the postconviction court erred in denying his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the trial counsel’s mishandling of 
multiple expert witnesses and failure to present a mental health expert during 
Johnson’s penalty phase trial.  Specifically, Johnson argues that counsel erred in 
allowing Dr. Afield and Dr. Maher to be deposed and further erred when, during 
the depositions, counsel failed to prevent the doctors from revealing privileged 
information regarding White’s murder.  Johnson alleges that the State thereafter 
used their knowledge of the privileged information to preclude the defense from 
using any mental health expert, including Dr. Ofshe, at his penalty phase trial. 
 
Regarding this claim, the postconviction court found that defense counsel’s 
decisions not to use Dr. Afield, Dr. Maher, and Dr. Ofshe as witnesses at Johnson’s 
trial were strategic.  This finding is supported by competent, substantial evidence 
in the record.  Both attorney Tebrugge and attorney Metcalfe testified at the 
evidentiary hearing that they had developed concerns regarding Dr. Afield’s 
potential testimony and had ultimately decided that he would not be a helpful 
witness at either the guilt or penalty phase trial.  Tebrugge also testified that he had 
made the decision not to call Dr. Maher as a witness after consulting with Johnson 
because it became clear that Dr. Maher’s testimony would be damaging based on 
the admissions that Johnson had made to him.  Moreover, attorney Hockett 
testified that the decision not to call Dr. Ofshe at trial was a strategic choice 
 
 
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predicated on the fact that the defense had sufficiently preserved a challenge to the 
admission of Johnson’s confession through Dr. Ofshe’s testimony at the 
suppression hearing and that the defense felt that repeating a week’s worth of 
detailed testimony on that issue would not be helpful at trial.  Additionally, the 
record shows that Dr. Ofshe’s testimony would have contained information 
detrimental to Johnson’s defense, such as Johnson’s admission to Dr. Ofhse that 
Johnson had manipulated other experts and doctors in an attempt to establish 
mental incapacity.  Finally, all three attorneys testified that their decisions 
regarding the expert witnesses were strategic trial tactics that were in no way 
influenced by the State’s threat to call Dr. Maher as a witness. 
 
Accepting the postconviction court’s findings, we now review de novo 
counsel’s actions under both prongs of the Strickland test.  See Porter, 788 So. 2d 
at 923.  We conclude that Johnson’s trial counsel was not deficient in its handling 
of Drs. Afield, Maher, and Ofshe. 
“This Court has ‘consistently held that a trial counsel’s decision to not call 
certain witnesses to testify at trial can be reasonable trial strategy.’”  Johnston v. 
State, 63 So. 3d 730, 741 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Everett v. State, 54 So. 3d 464, 474 
(Fla. 2010)).  “It is reasonable for trial counsel to forego evidence that, if presented 
in mitigation, could damage a defendant’s chances with the jury.”  Id. (quoting 
Nelson v. State, 43 So. 3d 20, 32 (Fla. 2010)); see also Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 
 
 
- 23 - 
415, 437 (Fla. 2004) (“An ineffective assistance claim does not arise from the 
failure to present mitigation evidence where that evidence presents a double-edged 
sword.”).  Thus, “[t]rial counsel will not be held to be deficient when she makes a 
reasonable strategic decision to not present mental mitigation testimony during the 
penalty phase because it could open the door to other damaging testimony.”  
Gaskin v. State, 822 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla. 2002). 
Here, calling either Dr. Afield or Dr. Maher to testify would have opened the 
door to damaging testimony.  Both Dr. Afield and Dr. Maher testified at their 
depositions that Johnson had made admissions to them regarding White’s murder. 
Dr. Afield testified that Johnson had admitted that he killed two people in “January 
or March or something, and . . . [o]ne was a lady [he] knew, and [he] went into a 
rage.”  Dr. Maher similarly testified regarding statements made by Johnson 
implicating him in the White and McCahon murders.  Had the defense chosen to 
present the testimony of either doctor during either phase of Johnson’s trial, 
Johnson’s defense stood to be severely damaged by cross-examination of the 
doctors.  Accordingly, counsel was not deficient in failing to call Dr. Afield or Dr. 
Maher at trial.  See  Johnston, 63 So. 3d at 741. 
 
For the same reason, counsel was not deficient in failing to call Dr. Ofshe as 
a witness.  At the suppression hearing, Dr. Ofshe testified that Johnson had tried to 
manipulate him during their interview and that Johnson had admitted to 
 
 
- 24 - 
“malingering” and giving false information to doctors who examined him in order 
to support an insanity defense.  Dr. Ofshe also testified that Johnson had admitted 
to performing a half-hearted suicide attempt in an effort to convince doctors that he 
was mentally unstable.  Presenting Dr. Ofshe as a witness would therefore have 
opened the door to harmful testimony.  Moreover, as attorney Hockett testified at 
the evidentiary hearing, the trial court had already ruled on the admissibility of 
Johnson’s confession during the suppression hearing, and the defense had taken the 
necessary steps at that hearing to preserve the issue for appeal.  Johnson may not 
now use an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to merely second guess the 
legitimate strategic trial decisions of his counsel.  Wright v. State, 581 So. 2d 882, 
883 (Fla. 1991) (holding that alleged errors that “are strategic in nature” do not 
establish deficient performance because “this Court will not second guess trial 
strategy employed by trial counsel”). 
 
We also reject Johnson’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in 
allowing Dr. Afield and Dr. Maher to be deposed and to answer questions 
concerning privileged information.  Dr. Afield was a confidential advisor 
appointed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.216(a) to aid the 
defense in determining whether Johnson was either incompetent to stand trial or 
had been insane at the time of the offense.  On September 14, 1989, the defense 
notified the State and the trial court of its intent to rely on the insanity defense and 
 
 
- 25 - 
listed Dr. Afield as a witness to that effect.  Thereafter, on September 21, 1990, Dr. 
Afield was deposed by the State.  It was not until April 30, 1991, that the defense 
withdrew its intent to rely on the insanity defense. 
We have previously held that under rule 3.216(a), “where an expert is hired 
solely to assist the defense and will not be called as a witness, the State may not 
depose the expert or call him as a witness.”  Sanders v. State, 707 So. 2d 664, 669 
(Fla. 1998).  Here, however, the rule barring depositions does not apply because 
Dr. Afield was listed as a witness at the time he was deposed.  Johnson has 
therefore not demonstrated that his counsel erred in allowing Dr. Afield to be 
deposed.  See Sanders, 707 So. 2d at 669.  For the same reason, counsel was not 
deficient in allowing Dr. Maher to be deposed.  Dr. Maher was listed as a defense 
witness at the time of his deposition. 
 
Nor was Johnson’s trial counsel deficient in failing to prevent Dr. Afield or 
Dr. Maher from divulging privileged information during their respective 
depositions.  We have previously recognized that rule 3.216(a) is a codification of 
the Third District Court of Appeal’s holding in Pouncy v. State, 353 So. 2d 640 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1977).  See Sanders, 707 So. 2d at 669.  In Pouncy, the Third 
District held that the trial court’s ruling allowing the State to depose psychiatrists 
hired by the defendant to aid in the preparation of the defense “violated the 
attorney-client privilege by permitting the State to (1) depose the doctors and (2) 
 
 
- 26 - 
use them as State’s witnesses when appellant had no intention to utilize the 
psychiatrists as defense witnesses.”  Id. at 642.  The Third District explicitly noted, 
however, that “[s]aid privilege would have, of course, been waived, had appellant 
utilized his psychiatrists as witnesses.”  Id.  Thus, under Pouncy—as codified in 
rule 3.216—a defendant waives the attorney-client privilege as it attaches to a 
confidential rule 3.216(a) expert witness when the defense notifies the State and 
the trial court of its intent to utilize the expert as a witness at trial. 
Here, because Dr. Afield was listed as a defense witness at the time of his 
deposition, Johnson had waived the privilege attached to Dr. Afield.  Johnson’s 
counsel was therefore not deficient in failing to prevent Dr. Afield from answering 
questions regarding communications between Johnson and himself.  Johnson 
similarly waived any privilege attached to Dr. Maher by notifying the State and the 
trial court of his intent to rely on Dr. Maher as a witness at trial.  Although Dr. 
Maher was not appointed as a confidential advisor pursuant to rule 3.216(a), which 
provides that the trial court shall only “appoint [one] expert to examine the 
defendant in order to assist counsel in the preparation of the defense,” the same 
reasoning applies.  Where a defendant notifies the court of his intent to use an 
expert as a witness at trial, any privilege attached to that expert is waived insofar as 
such notification remains in effect.  See Sanders, 707 So. 2d at 669; Pouncy, 353 
So. 2d at 641-42. 
 
 
- 27 - 
 
As his second issue, Johnson argues that the postconviction court erred in 
denying his ineffective assistance claim based on his trial counsel’s handling of Dr. 
Brigham, the eyewitness identification expert.  Johnson claims that his counsel—
who was the same for both of his capital cases as well as the noncapital cases—
was deficient in failing to effectively pursue Dr. Brigham as an expert witness in 
the noncapital case regarding victim Cornell.  Because Johnson’s conviction in that 
case was used to find the prior violent felony aggravating factor in this case, 
Johnson claims that counsel’s deficiency in that case caused him prejudice in this 
case.  We reject Johnson’s argument.  Johnson’s claim is analogous to the claim 
addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 
578, 583-90 (1988), which granted postconviction relief on a defendant’s claim 
that the sentencing court’s finding of the prior violent felony aggravator based on a 
reversed conviction was unconstitutional.  We have previously held that a Johnson 
claim is not cognizable as long as the conviction underlying the aggravating factor 
is still a valid conviction.  See Lukehart v. State, 70 So. 3d 503, 513 (Fla. 2011).  
Here, Johnson has not succeeded in vacating his conviction in the noncapital case 
based on counsel’s handling of Dr. Brigham or on any other basis.  Because 
Johnson’s conviction in the noncapital case is still a valid conviction, we conclude 
that the postconviction court properly denied Johnson’s claim relating to Dr. 
Brigham. 
 
 
- 28 - 
 
Third, Johnson challenges the postconviction court’s ruling denying his 
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a mitigation expert 
during his penalty phase trial.  Regarding the mitigation issue, the postconviction 
court found that mitigation had been a focus of Johnson’s trial counsel and that 
counsel had sent Ms. Ackerman to Johnson’s hometown in an effort to gather as 
much mitigation evidence as possible.  The court also found that although Ms. 
Hammock spoke with many of Johnson’s family members and reviewed many of 
his records in forming her conclusion regarding what testimony a mitigation expert 
would have offered at trial, Ms. Ackerman interviewed many of the same people 
and reviewed many of the same records prior to Johnson’s trials.  Additionally, the 
court found that Ms. Ackerman had reviewed numerous reports that Ms. Hammock 
did not review.  The court further found that much of the information that Ms. 
Hammock or a similar mitigation expert would have testified to at trial had been 
testified to by family members, who expressed the information in a clear, 
articulate, and credible manner. 
The record supports the postconviction court’s findings.  Ms. Hammock 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that she had reviewed substantially the same 
information and interviewed the same witnesses as Ms. Ackerman, such that much 
if not most of her investigation was included in the report that Ms. Ackerman had 
put together in preparation for trial.  Ms. Hammock also admitted that Ms. 
 
 
- 29 - 
Ackerman had reviewed some records that she had not reviewed herself.  
Moreover, the record shows that much of the same information testified to by Ms. 
Hammock during the evidentiary hearing was presented at trial through the 
testimony of several of Johnson’s family members and friends—including 
testimony regarding the impoverished conditions and familial discord Johnson 
endured as a child and the effect that the miscarriage of his child had on Johnson 
during his adult years.  We therefore defer to the postconviction court’s findings 
regarding this issue. 
 
We conclude that Johnson has not established that his trial counsel was 
deficient for failing to present the testimony of a mitigation expert during his 
penalty phase trial.  A conclusory claim that defense counsel was deficient for 
failing to hire a mitigation expert is without merit.  Hoskins v. State, 75 So. 3d 250, 
256 (Fla. 2011).  Johnson argues that a mitigation expert would have been more 
articulate, forthcoming, and credible than the lay witnesses presented by the 
defense.  Yet Johnson has failed to show why an expert such as Ms. Hammock 
would have been a more effective mitigation witness than the dozen lay witnesses 
who knew Johnson personally and testified at his penalty phase trial—many of 
whom Ms. Hammock interviewed when compiling her mitigation report.  See id. 
(“Failure to use an ‘expert’ in mitigation investigation does not per se constitute 
ineffective assistance.”).  Moreover, the conclusions testified to by Ms. Hammock 
 
 
- 30 - 
at the evidentiary hearing correlated with the substance of the lay testimony 
presented at Johnson’s penalty phase trial.  “We have repeatedly held that counsel 
is not ineffective for failing to present cumulative evidence.”  Jones v. State, 998 
So. 2d 573, 586 (Fla. 2008).  Accordingly, we deny Johnson’s claim as it relates to 
trial counsel’s decision not to use a mitigation expert for purposes of compiling 
and presenting mitigation evidence. 
Johnson also argues that the testimony of a mitigation expert would have 
enabled trial counsel to introduce “medical records about various psychological 
problems [Johnson] had over many years, including [two] suicide attempts and 
treatment by medication.”  Johnson, 660 So. 2d at 645.  The trial court refused to 
admit the records because Johnson’s counsel had not authenticated them and 
because the trial court “found that the records were not complete in themselves and 
required interpretation to be understood by the jury.”  Id.  Johnson now claims that 
the testimony of a mitigation expert would have served as the predicate necessary 
to support the records and also would have provided the interpretation required for 
the records to be understood by the jury. 
We conclude that Johnson suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel’s 
failure to introduce the medical records through a mitigation expert or otherwise.  
Johnson has not established “a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the 
sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating 
 
 
- 31 - 
circumstances did not warrant death.”  Sochor, 883 So. 2d at 771 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). 
During Johnson’s penalty phase trial, the jury heard testimony from 
Johnson’s mother regarding one of Johnson’s suicide attempts, which occurred 
when Johnson was thirteen.  Although the jury did not hear evidence regarding 
Johnson’s attempt on his life after he had been arrested for White’s murder, any 
evidence of that attempt that was introduced to establish mental mitigation would 
have opened the door to harmful testimony.  As stated above, Dr. Ofshe testified at 
the suppression hearing that Johnson had admitted that his post-incarceration 
suicide attempt was a half-hearted effort to convince doctors that he was mentally 
ill.  Johnson has not shown any plausible reason why the State could not have 
simply called Dr. Ofshe in rebuttal if the defense had introduced medical records 
of Johnson’s second suicide attempt.  Thus, because the jury heard evidence of 
Johnson’s first attempt and because evidence of Johnson’s second attempt could 
have opened the door to harmful testimony, Johnson has not established a 
reasonable probability that the jury would have voted against death if the records 
had been introduced. 
For the same reasons, Johnson has not established a reasonable probability 
that the trial court would have sentenced Johnson differently in light of the 
evidence contained in the records.  Moreover, in sentencing Johnson to death for 
 
 
- 32 - 
White’s murder, the trial court found three aggravating factors—prior violent 
felony, commission of a murder for financial gain, and HAC—and fifteen 
mitigating factors.  Johnson, 660 So. 2d at 641.  Included in the mitigating factors 
was that Johnson “suffered mental pressure not reaching the level of statutory 
mitigation.”  Id.  The trial court “then found that each aggravating factor alone 
outweighed all the mitigating factors.”  Id.  Johnson has not shown a reasonable 
probability that—based on the medical records—the trial court would have found 
that Johnson’s mental state reached the level of statutory mitigation.  Nor has 
Johnson shown that, even if the trial court had found the statutory mental mitigator, 
it would have concluded that the weight of the mitigators overcame the weight of 
all three aggravating circumstances.  Johnson’s allegations of deficiency therefore 
do not undermine our confidence in the outcome of his penalty phase proceeding.  
Accordingly, we deny Johnson’s claim. 
B.  Summarily Denied Claims 
 
Johnson also challenges the postconviction court’s summary denial of 
several of his postconviction claims.  A postconviction court may deny a 
defendant’s claim asserted in a rule 3.850 motion if “(1) the motion, files, and 
records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, or (2) 
the motion or particular claim is legally insufficient.”  Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d 
 
 
- 33 - 
82, 95 (Fla. 2011).2  Legally insufficient claims include those that are procedurally 
barred.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1063-72 (Fla. 2000) (applying 
same two-part standard as Franqui and holding that several of defendant’s rule 
3.850 claims were procedurally barred and therefore properly summarily denied).  
Claims that should have been raised on direct appeal are procedurally barred from 
being raised in collateral proceedings.  Id. at 1063.  Moreover, in establishing a 
prima facie case based on a legally valid claim, “mere conclusory allegations are 
insufficient.”  Franqui, 59 So. 3d at 96.  Reviewing the postconviction court’s 
summary denial of Johnson’s claims, we accept Johnson’s factual allegations as 
true “to the extent they are not refuted by the record.”  Id. at 95.  We now address 
Johnson’s specific challenges to the postconviction court’s summary denial of his 
claims.  
As his fourth issue on appeal, Johnson claims that the postconviction court 
erred in summarily denying his claim that the trial court’s finding of the prior 
violent felony aggravator is based on an invalid conviction in violation of Johnson 
v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988).  As we stated above, a Johnson claim is not 
cognizable as long as the conviction underlying the aggravating factor is still a 
                                         
 
2.  Johnson’s amended rule 3.850 motion is governed by the requirements 
applicable to rule 3.850, rather than Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, 
because his amended motion relates back to his original motion, which was filed 
before October 1, 2001, the effective date of rule 3.851.  See Franqui, 59 So. 3d at 
95 n.13. 
 
 
- 34 - 
valid conviction.  See Lukehart, 70 So. 3d at 513.  Here, the trial court based its 
finding of the prior violent felony aggravator on Johnson’s convictions in the three 
other cases.  Because Johnson’s convictions in those cases are still valid, Johnson’s 
claim is legally insufficient.  The postconviction court therefore did not err in 
summarily denying Johnson’s claim. 
Fifth, Johnson challenges the postconviction court’s summary denial of his 
claim that Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4) is unconstitutional to the 
extent it precludes Johnson’s collateral counsel from interviewing the jurors who 
convicted him and recommended that he be put to death.  We conclude that the 
postconviction court did not err in denying Johnson’s claim without an evidentiary 
hearing.  Johnson’s claim is both procedurally barred and without merit.  See 
Kilgore v. State, 55 So. 3d 487, 511 (Fla. 2010) (holding a challenge to the 
constitutionality of rule 4-3.5(d)(4) procedurally barred in postconviction 
proceedings and noting moreover that “this Court has repeatedly rejected claims 
that Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4) is unconstitutional”). 
As his sixth claim, Johnson argues that Florida’s death sentencing statute, as 
applied, is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  The 
motions and record in this case conclusively establish that Johnson is not entitled 
to relief on this claim.  Johnson’s direct appeal of this case was final in 1995, and 
Ring—which was decided by the Supreme Court in 2002—does not apply 
 
 
- 35 - 
retroactively to cases already final on direct review.  See Schriro v. Summerlin, 
542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004).  Moreover, the prior violent felony aggravator was 
found in this case, and “[t]his Court has repeatedly relied on the presence of the 
prior violent felony aggravating circumstance in denying Ring claims.”  Frances v. 
State, 970 So. 2d 806, 822 (Fla. 2007).  Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction 
court’s summary denial of this claim. 
Seventh, Johnson challenges the postconviction court’s summary denial of 
his Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), claim that the trial court 
erred in preventing Johnson from informing the jury about his ineligibility for 
parole and the possible sentences he would likely receive in the other three cases.  
This Court previously denied this claim when Johnson raised it on direct appeal.  
Johnson, 660 So. 2d at 645.  Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court’s 
summary denial of this claim as procedurally barred.  See Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 
1067 (“This claim was raised on direct appeal; therefore, it is procedurally barred 
and was properly summarily denied.”). 
For the same reason, we deny Johnson’s eighth claim—that the penalty 
phase jury instructions unconstitutionally shifted the burden to Johnson to prove 
that death was an inappropriate sentence.  On direct appeal, this Court denied 
Johnson’s claim “that the standard [penalty phase jury] instructions impermissibly 
place the burden of proof on the defendant to prove a case for mitigation once 
 
 
- 36 - 
aggravating circumstances have been established by the State.”  Johnson, 660 So. 
2d at 647.  Accordingly, the postconviction court did not err in summarily denying 
this claim as procedurally barred.  See Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1067. 
As his ninth claim, Johnson argues that Florida’s method of execution by 
lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Florida 
and United States Constitutions.  Because this claim was not raised on direct 
appeal, it is procedurally barred.  See Kilgore, 55 So. 3d at 511-12 (holding that a 
defendant’s postconviction challenge to Florida’s method of execution was 
procedurally barred because it was not raised on direct appeal).  Moreover, this 
Court has recently upheld the constitutionality of Florida’s current lethal injection 
procedure.  See Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 541 (Fla.) (holding that Valle failed 
to satisfy the heavy burden of proving that Florida’s current lethal injection 
procedure is constitutionally defective), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1 (2011).  Because 
Johnson has not made any additional allegations that would call into question the 
State’s current method of execution, his claim is conclusively refuted by the 
record.  The postconviction court therefore properly denied Johnson’s claim 
without an evidentiary hearing. 
Tenth, Johnson claims that his conviction and sentence for the White murder 
are materially unreliable due to the cumulative effect of the errors alleged in his 
postconviction motion.  “Where multiple errors are found, even if deemed 
 
 
- 37 - 
harmless individually, ‘the cumulative effect of such errors’ may ‘deny to 
defendant the fair and impartial trial that is the inalienable right of all litigants.’”  
Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 1015 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Brooks v. State, 918 So. 
2d 181, 202 (Fla. 2005)); see also Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181, 189 (Fla. 
1991).  Johnson, however, has failed to identify multiple instances of error.  And 
because multiple errors did not occur in this case, Johnson’s claim of cumulative 
error must fail. 
We also deny Johnson’s eleventh claim, in which Johnson alleges that his 
Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment may be violated 
because—at the time of his execution—Johnson might be incompetent to be 
executed.  Considering that no death warrant has been signed in this case, the 
postconviction court’s summary denial of Johnson’s claim was proper.  See, e.g., 
Sexton v. State, 997 So. 2d 1073, 1089 (Fla. 2008) (holding that claim of 
incompetency to be executed raised in initial postconviction motion was not ripe 
because prisoner was not under death warrant). 
Finally, as his twelfth appellate issue, Johnson challenges the postconviction 
court’s ruling summarily denying various claims initially raised pro se but 
subsequently adopted by collateral counsel.  These claims include:  (a) the 
prosecutor engaged in misconduct by arguing facts not in evidence, and defense 
counsel was ineffective in failing to object to that misconduct; (b) the prosecutor 
 
 
- 38 - 
engaged in misconduct by presenting false evidence at the suppression hearing, 
and defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to that misconduct; (c) the 
prosecutor engaged in misconduct by presenting inconsistent theories, and defense 
counsel was ineffective in failing to object to that misconduct; (d) defense counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to introduce evidence of Johnson’s actual 
innocence; (e) the State used illegally obtained rolled fingerprints; and (f) 
Johnson’s arrest, search, and seizure were based on an affidavit that was both 
unsworn and contained false information, and defense counsel was ineffective in 
failing to present this fact at the suppression hearing. 
We agree with the postconviction court that insofar as these claims raise 
issues concerning prosecutorial misconduct and evidence introduced at trial, the 
claims should have been challenged on direct appeal and are therefore procedurally 
barred.  Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d 52, 60-61 (Fla. 2003) (postconviction court 
properly concluded that claims alleging prosecutorial misconduct were 
procedurally barred because each of the alleged violations appeared on the trial 
record and could have been raised on direct appeal).  Thus, the underlying issues in 
claims (a), (b), (c), and (f) are procedurally barred, as is the entirety of claim (e).  
Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claims contained in claims (a), (b), 
(c), (d), and (f), we conclude that Johnson’s claims are refuted by the record.  
Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court’s summary denial of the claims. 
 
 
- 39 - 
In claim (a), Johnson argues that his counsel was deficient in failing to 
object to the State’s argument that Johnson had sexually battered White.  Johnson 
contends that the State’s argument was based on hair and fiber evidence that was 
not introduced at trial and on inflammatory photographs of White’s anal and 
vaginal region.  The record establishes, however, that although the actual hairs and 
fibers relied on by the State in closing argument were not introduced as evidence,3 
both federal and state investigators testified that hairs and fibers found on White’s 
body were consistent with those belonging to Johnson.  The State is permitted to 
argue at closing based on the evidence presented at trial, including the testimony of 
witnesses.  See Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243, 1254-55 (Fla. 2006) (holding that 
an attorney is allowed to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence and to 
argue credibility of witnesses).  Johnson’s trial counsel was not deficient for failing 
to object to proper argument.  See id. at 1255.  Moreover, counsel did object when 
the “inflammatory” photographs of White were introduced at trial, but the trial 
court overruled counsel’s objection.  Counsel was therefore neither deficient in 
                                         
 
3.  To the extent Johnson argues that his counsel should have objected to 
testimony based on hairs and fibers never introduced as evidence, Johnson’s claim 
fails.  Those individuals testifying regarding the hair and fiber evidence were 
expert witnesses and were therefore permitted to rely on facts that were not 
admitted at trial as long as such facts are “of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the subject to support the opinion expressed.”  Linn v. Fossum, 946 So. 
2d 1032, 1036 (Fla. 2006) (quoting § 90.704, Fla. Stat. (2005)). 
 
 
- 40 - 
failing to object to the photographs nor deficient in failing to object to the State’s 
reference to the photographs during closing argument.  See id. 
Claim (b) also concerns hair evidence retrieved from White’s body.  Johnson 
argues that his counsel was deficient for failing to object when—at the suppression 
hearing—the State argued that two of the hairs were identified as Johnson’s based 
on a report from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), even 
though the State was aware that a report from the FBI concluded that the same 
hairs did not belong to Johnson.  Johnson fails to recognize, however, that the 
State’s argument at the suppression hearing was intended to demonstrate that 
probable cause had existed at the time the arrest and search warrants were issued.  
The FBI analysis was not completed until after the warrants were issued.  The State 
was not incorrect in arguing that the FDLE report—which was completed prior to 
the warrants being issued—was relevant to establish probable cause while omitting 
any reference to the subsequently released FBI report.  Johnson’s trial counsel was 
therefore not deficient for failing to object to the State’s argument.  See Owen v. 
State, 986 So. 2d 534, 551 (Fla. 2008) (holding counsel is not ineffective for 
failing to object to comments that are not improper). 
For the same reason, Johnson has not established deficient performance in 
claim (c), which asserts that the State presented inconsistent arguments regarding 
the conflicting FDLE and FBI reports.  Johnson argues that his counsel was 
 
 
- 41 - 
ineffective in failing to object when, at trial, the State argued that the conflicting 
evidence contained in the FDLE and FBI reports did not conclusively establish or 
exclude Johnson as White’s murderer, despite having relied on the FDLE results 
during the suppression hearing.  Because the State’s argument at the suppression 
hearing was not directed at establishing Johnson’s guilt, any argument by the State 
at trial regarding the weight of the contradictory analyses does not constitute a 
theory of prosecution inconsistent with the State’s suppression hearing argument.  
Johnson’s trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to argument that was 
not improper.  See id. 
We also reject Johnson’s ineffective assistance claim in claim (d), in which 
Johnson claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to introduce 
evidence of his “actual innocence” of the White murder.  Appellant’s Initial Brief 
at 95.  Specifically, Johnson argues that counsel was deficient for not presenting 
evidence of the fact that Johnson was a chronic nail biter.  Johnson contends that 
such evidence would have conclusively proven his innocence in light of the State’s 
evidence that White’s murderer had caused injuries to White’s anal and vaginal 
regions with his fingernails.  The record, however, establishes that the medical 
examiner could not completely exclude the possibility that the injuries to White’s 
anal and vaginal regions were caused by something other than the murderer’s 
fingernails.  Because the record refutes Johnson’s claim that this evidence 
 
 
- 42 - 
conclusively established Johnson’s “actual innocence,” the postconviction court 
properly summarily denied Johnson’s claim.  Moreover, in light of the abundance 
of evidence of Johnson’s guilt, including a valid taped confession and Johnson’s 
fingerprints recovered from the crime scene, Johnson’s conclusory assertion that 
“the result of the trial would have been different,” Appellant’s Initial Brief at 96, 
absent trial counsel’s alleged error does not satisfy the prejudice prong of 
Strickland.  Jones, 998 So. 2d at 584 (“A mere conclusory allegation that the 
outcome would have been different is insufficient to state a claim of prejudice 
under Strickland; the defendant must demonstrate how, if counsel had acted 
otherwise, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been 
different.”). 
Finally, we deny Johnson’s ineffective assistance claim presented in claim 
(f), in which Johnson argues that a key piece of evidence supporting the search 
warrant—an affidavit by Virgina Casey, the technician who positively matched 
fingerprints taken from the White crime scene to Johnson’s prints on record—was 
unsworn and contained false information.  Specifically, Johnson argues that Casey 
testified that she did not swear to her affidavit and that, although Casey’s affidavit 
stated that technician Madelyn Luzier had verified the results of Casey’s 
fingerprint comparison, Luzier testified that she had no involvement with the 
fingerprints after she collected them.  Because Casey’s affidavit was incorporated 
 
 
- 43 - 
into the affidavit accompanying the search warrant, Johnson claims that the search 
warrant was invalid.  Johnson argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing 
to raise this argument at the suppression hearing and that, but for counsel’s error, 
the trial court would have suppressed the evidence obtained pursuant to the search 
warrant.  Johnson’s claim is without merit. 
Insofar as Johnson claims that the search warrant was invalid because 
Casey’s affidavit was unsworn, Johnson’s claim fails.  Casey’s affidavit did not 
accompany the search warrant.  Instead, the accompanying affidavit briefly 
recounted the facts surrounding Casey’s identification of the prints found on 
White’s window sill as belonging to Johnson.  The accompanying affidavit does 
not claim to incorporate sworn statements from Casey’s affidavit, and Johnson 
does not allege that the accompanying affidavit was unsworn. 
Moreover, to the extent Johnson alleges that information contained in the 
accompanying affidavit was false, his claim is refuted by the record.  In summarily 
denying this claim, the postconviction court included the transcript from a 
deposition in which Luzier testified that she looked at and agreed with Casey’s 
print comparison.  Although Luzier testified that she did not personally perform the 
comparison, the record confirms the accompanying affidavit’s claim that Luzier 
verified the result of Casey’s comparison.  Because counsel cannot be deemed 
deficient for failing to pursue a meritless claim, Johnson has not shown that his 
 
 
- 44 - 
counsel was deficient in failing to challenge the search warrant on these grounds.  
See Lukehart, 70 So. 3d at 513.  And because counsel’s alleged error does not 
undermine confidence in the outcome of the suppression hearing, Johnson cannot 
establish that he was prejudiced by such error.  See Porter, 130 S.Ct. at 455. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Johnson is not entitled to 
postconviction relief from his conviction and sentence for the first-degree murder 
of Iris White.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Johnson’s 
motion for postconviction relief. 
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Sarasota County,  
Andrew Douglas Owens, Judge 
Case Nos. 1988-CF-003198-NC and 1988-CF-003199-NC 
 
John W. Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Mark S. Gruber and Maria 
Perinetti, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, 
Florida,  
 
for Appellant 
 
 
 
 
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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Katherine Vickers 
Blanco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Appellee