Case Title: N.E., Alleged to be CHINS; N.L. v. IDCS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49S02-0906-JV-270

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2010-01-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 
Steven J. Halbert  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert J. Henke 
Carmel, Indiana  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
Deborah S. Burke 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marion, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S02-0906-JV-270 
 
IN THE MATTER OF N.E., A CHILD IN NEED OF  
SERVICES, 
N.L. (FATHER), 
 
Appellant (Respondent below), 
 
v. 
 
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, 
 
Appellee (Petitioner below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, Juvenile Division, No. 49D09-0712-JC-53883-886 
The Honorable Geoffrey Gaither, Magistrate 
The Honorable Marilyn A. Moores, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-0806-JV-522 
_________________________________ 
 
January 6, 2010 
 
Sullivan, Justice. 
 
The trial court adjudicated a child to be a “Child in Need of Services” (“CHINS”) with-
out specifically alleging that the child was a CHINS with respect to the child’s father.  The father 
contends that the CHINS adjudication does not apply to him.  The question in a CHINS adjudi-
cation is not parental fault, but whether the child needs services.  Because a CHINS determina-
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jan 06 2010, 10:11 am
 
2 
tion regards the status of the child, the juvenile court is not required to determine whether a child 
is a CHINS as to each parent, only whether the statutory elements have been established. 
 
Background 
 
N.E. was born on January 24, 2004, the daughter of a mother (“Mother”) of three other 
children, each of the four having a separate father.  In December, 2007, the Department of Child 
Services (“State”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Division of the Marion Superior Court alleging 
that all four of Mother’s children were CHINS.  The State typically files such a petition when it 
believes a child has been the victim of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.   
 
The court filing recited that Mother was unable to protect her children from domestic vi-
olence.  Because the State believed that none of the fathers had established paternity (and had not 
come forward to demonstrate the ability to parent their children appropriately), it removed the 
children from Mother’s home.  N.E. was not at Mother’s home when the State removed the 
children.  The State located N.E. at the home of her paternal grandmother (“Grandmother”) and 
placed her into foster care with her siblings. 
 
The juvenile court subsequently held a hearing at which the State conceded that N.E. 
spent a great deal of time at the home of Grandmother, where N.L. (“Father”) also lived.  The 
court ordered Mother and Father to undergo DNA testing to determine the paternity of N.E.  The 
court established Father’s paternity and placed N.E. in the custody of Father and Grandmother.  
About a week later, however, the State filed a motion to remove N.E. from Father and Grand-
mother, setting forth several reasons: (1) Father had a prior conviction for domestic battery; (2) 
N.E.’s paternal grandfather lived in the house; (3) N.E.’s paternal grandfather was addicted to 
cocaine; and (4) the paternal grandfather had an outstanding warrant for his arrest due to a proba-
tion violation.  On February 1, 2008, the court returned N.E. to foster care with her siblings.   
 
On February 12, 2008, Mother admitted that her children were CHINS; Father did not.  
He requested a fact finding hearing.  During the fact finding hearing the parties presented con-
flicting evidence as to where N.E. spent most of her time.  Father testified that N.E. lived three 
 
3 
years and eight months out of her first four years with Father and Grandmother.  Grandmother 
testified that she and Father took care of N.E. 95% of the time.  Mother testified that N.E. lived 
with her most of the time.  
 
The Guardian ad Litem stated that: 
 
There are varying [accounts] as to how much time [N.E.] has lived with 
her father in the home of the [paternal1] grandmother; however, there is no doubt 
that it was extensive and went back to an early age for [N.E.].  There is also no 
doubt that [N.E.] was appropriately cared for while in the home, whether there a 
majority of the time or for only three to four days a week.   
 
(Appellant’s App. 154.) 
 
At the close of evidence, the court found that N.E. was a CHINS; N.E. remained in foster 
care.  On May 30, 2008, the court held a dispositional hearing and found the children to be wards 
of the State.  The trial court made no specific findings as to Father or its reasons for not placing 
N.E. with Father. 
 
Father appealed.  A divided Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the State had not 
alleged, and the juvenile court had not determined, N.E. to be a CHINS with respect to Father.  
In re N.E., 903 N.E.2d 80, 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).  Judge Vaidik dissented.  She was of the 
view that “a CHINS determination regards the status of the child,” and that once properly deter-
mined, it was applicable to both parents.  Id. at 89-90.  However, both the majority of the Court 
of Appeals and Judge Vaidik concluded that the juvenile court’s dispositional decree was defi-
cient in not articulating reasons for not placing N.E. with Father. 
 
The State sought, and we granted, transfer.  Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).2 
                                                 
1 The Guardian ad Litem said “maternal” grandmother but the context clearly shows that he meant “pater-
nal” grandmother.  
 
2 In addition to Father’s contentions concerning N.E.’s adjudication as a CHINS and the content of the 
dispositional order, Father also argued that the court held the fact finding hearing outside the time permit-
ted by statute.  We summarily affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding the timeliness of the 
hearing.  App. R. 58(A)(2).   
 
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Discussion 
 
I 
 
Because a CHINS proceeding is a civil action, the State must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.  Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3.  
Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 through 11 specify the elements of the CHINS definition that 
the State must prove: 
 
(1) the child is under the age of 18; 
 
(2) one or more particular set or sets of circumstances set forth in the sta-
tute exists; and 
 
(3) the care, treatment, or rehabilitation needed to address those circums-
tances is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive in-
tervention of the court. 
 
For example, to establish that a child is a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, 
the State must prove the following set of circumstances: “the child’s physical or mental condition 
is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the 
child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, 
medical care, education, or supervision . . . .”  Similarly, under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-2, 
the State must prove that “the child’s physical or mental health is seriously endangered due to 
injury by the act or omission of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian . . . .” 
 
A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child.  As the examples in the pre-
ceding paragraph illustrate, the acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates 
the need for court intervention.  A CHINS adjudication can also come about through no wrong-
doing on the part of either parent, e.g., where a child substantially endangers the child’s own 
health or the health of another individual, I.C. § 31-34-1-6; or when a child is adjudicated a 
CHINS because the parents lack the financial ability to meet the child’s extraordinary medical 
needs.  See Lake County Div. of Family & Children Servs. v. Charlton, 631 N.E.2d 526 (Ind. Ct. 
 
5 
App. 1994) (declaring a 14-year-old boy born with respiratory and heart defects a CHINS be-
cause his medical insurance lapsed when claims exceeded coverage limits). 
 
While we acknowledge a certain implication of parental fault in many CHINS adjudica-
tions, the truth of the matter is that a CHINS adjudication is simply that – a determination that a 
child is in need of services.  Standing alone, a CHINS adjudication does not establish culpability 
on the part of a particular parent.  Only when the State moves to terminate a particular parent’s 
rights does an allegation of fault attach.  We have previously made it clear that CHINS proceed-
ings are “distinct from” involuntary termination proceedings.  State ex rel. Gosnell v. Cass Cir-
cuit Court, 577 N.E.2d 957, 958 (Ind. 1991).  The termination of the parent-child relationship is 
not merely a continuing stage of the CHINS proceeding.  Id.  In fact, a CHINS intervention in no 
way challenges the general competency of a parent to continue a relationship with the child.  Id.   
 
In this case, the Court of Appeals majority opinion said that, “[n]ormally, a juvenile court 
would determine that a child is either a CHINS or is not a CHINS when presented with a CHINS 
petition.”  In re N.E., 903 N.E.2d at 87.  As such, the Court of Appeals said that the CHINS sta-
tutory scheme does not require the juvenile court to determine whether a child is a CHINS as to 
each parent.  But the Court of Appeals went on to hold that “certain principles and considerations 
may make such a split analysis appropriate in some instances.”  Id.  (citing In re C.S., 863 
N.E.2d 413, 418 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (determining that where the child had been found a CHINS 
with respect to his mother, the child was not a CHINS with respect to his father because there 
was neither an allegation nor evidence that the father was responsible for the circumstance which 
led to the CHINS determination), trans. denied). 
 
We disagree with our colleagues and hold that a CHINS determination establishes the 
status of a child alone.  Because a CHINS determination regards the status of the child, a sepa-
rate analysis as to each parent is not required in the CHINS determination stage.  As Judge Vai-
dik points out in her dissent, the conduct of one parent can be enough for a child to be adjudi-
cated a CHINS.  Id. at 89-90.  Indeed, to adjudicate culpability on the part of each individual 
parent in a CHINS proceeding would be at variance with the purpose of the CHINS inquiry: de-
termining whether a child’s circumstances necessitate services that are unlikely to be provided 
 
6 
without the coercive intervention of the court.  See I.C. §§ 31-34-1-1 & -2.  Said differently, the 
purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not punish parents.  In re A.I., 825 
N.E.2d 798, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.  The resolution of a juvenile proceeding fo-
cuses on the best interests of the child, rather than guilt or innocence as in a criminal proceeding.  
Baker v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 810 N.E.2d 1035, 1039 (Ind. 2004).   
 
In this case, the domestic violence in Mother’s home served as the basis of the CHINS 
petition.  Specifically, the State alleged that Mother failed to protect N.E. and her siblings from 
ongoing domestic violence between herself and the alleged father of her youngest child and that 
there had been several incidents of domestic violence against Mother in the presence of her 
children.  In these circumstances, it was not necessary for the CHINS petition to make any alle-
gations with respect to Father.  We conclude that the trial court property adjudicated N.E. a 
CHINS.   
 
II 
 
Once CHINS status has been determined, the juvenile court holds a hearing to consider 
alternatives for the child’s care, treatment, placement, or rehabilitation; the participation of the 
parent, guardian or custodian; and the financial responsibility for the services provided.  I.C. § 
31-34-19-1.  The juvenile court then fashions a dispositional decree setting forth the care, treat-
ment, or rehabilitation necessary to address the child’s needs.  In this regard, Indiana Code sec-
tion 31-34-19-10 provides: 
 
(a) The juvenile court shall accompany the court’s dispositional decree 
with written findings and conclusions upon the record concerning the fol-
lowing: 
(1) The needs of the child for care, treatment, rehabilitation, or  
placement. 
(2) The need for participation by the parent, guardian, or custodian 
in the plan of care for the child. 
(3) Efforts made, if the child is a child in need of services, to: 
(A) prevent the child’s removal from; or 
(B) reunite the child with; 
the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian in accordance with federal 
law. 
 
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(4) Family services that were offered and provided to: 
(A) a child in need of services; or 
(B) the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian; 
in accordance with federal law. 
(5) The court’s reasons for the disposition. 
(b) The juvenile court may incorporate a finding or conclusion from a pre-
dispositional report as a written finding or conclusion upon the record in 
the court’s dispositional decree. 
 
In this case, the court was presented with a pre-dispositional report that stated in part: 
 
[The State] determined that these children [are] children in need of services be-
cause their mother and sole legal custodian [] has failed to protect her children 
from ongoing domestic violence between herself and the alleged father of [her 
youngest child].  There have been several incidents of violence cases pending 
against [the father of her youngest child] as a result.  [Mother] has continuously 
failed to cooperate in the prosecution of those domestic violence cases and has 
exhibited a lack of cooperation with [the State] to ensure the safety of her child-
ren.  Based upon [Mother’s] failure to protect her children and her lack of cooper-
ation, the children are in serious danger in the care of their mother. 
 
(Appellant’s App. 122.)   
 
As described under Background, supra, the State had been unaware that N.E. spent a sub-
stantial portion of her time with Father.  The allegations in the CHINS petition neither pertained 
to Father nor contended that he knew of the acts or omissions by Mother that resulted in the 
CHINS proceeding.  The State presented no evidence at the hearing that N.E. was in danger in 
Father’s care.3  The Guardian ad Litem stated that “[t]here is . . . no doubt that [N.E.] was appro-
priately cared for while in [Grandmother’s] home . . . .”  (Appellant’s App. 154.)   
 
The court’s dispositional orders read, in relevant part, with regard to Mother, all four of 
the children, and all four of the fathers:  
 
The Court finds that reasonable efforts have been offered and available to 
prevent or eliminate the need for removal from the home.  After reviewing the re-
ports and information from the Office of Family and Children, service providers 
                                                 
3 Even though the State had originally expressed concerns about conditions present in Father’s home, the 
juvenile court’s findings did not address these concerns.   
 
8 
and other sources, which the Court now incorporates into this order (see Court 
file), the Court also finds that the services offered and available have either not 
been effective or been completed that would allow the return home of the children 
without Court intervention. 
 
The Court finds that it is contrary to the health and welfare of the children 
to be returned home and that reasonable efforts have been made to finalize a per-
manency plan for the children[.] 
 
(Appellant’s App. 63.)   
 
We find, as did the Court of Appeals (the majority and Judge Vaidik), these findings de-
ficient with respect to N.E. and to Father.  As set forth above, Indiana Code section 31-34-19-
10(a)(5) requires the trial court to accompany the court’s dispositional decree with written find-
ings and conclusions concerning “[t]he court’s reasons for the disposition.”  The juvenile court 
concluded that N.E. was a ward of the State based on Mother’s failure to protect her children and 
cooperate with the State.  Considering that the dispositional decree in this case covered four fa-
thers and multiple children, the court’s reasons for its disposition regarding N.E. do not seem to 
have taken into account the time she spent in Father’s (and Grandmother’s) care – or anything 
else regarding the suitability of placing N.E. with Father. 
 
We find such omission of consequence for two related reasons. 
 
First, when a juvenile court makes decisions during a CHINS hearing as to whether the 
child will become a ward of the State or orders services, this has the potential to interfere with 
the rights of parents in the upbringing of their children.  Therefore:  
 
procedural irregularities, like an absence of clear findings of fact, in a CHINS 
proceeding may be of such import that they deprive a parent of procedural due 
process with respect to a potential subsequent termination of parental rights.  Our 
legislature’s enactment of an interlocking statutory scheme governing CHINS and 
involuntary termination of parental rights compels this court to make sure that 
each procedure is conducted in accordance with the law.  Both statutes aim to pro-
tect the rights of parents in the upbringing of their children, as well as give effect 
to the State’s legitimate interest in protecting children from harm.  We conclude 
that in order to properly balance these two interests, the trial court needs to care-
 
9 
fully follow the language and logic laid out by our legislature in these separate 
statutes. 
 
In re J.Q., 836 N.E.2d 961, 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted). 
 
Second, Indiana Code section 31-34-19-6(1)(A) requires the juvenile court to enter a dis-
positional decree that is “the least restrictive (most family like) . . . .”  If an out-of-home place-
ment is required, the court shall consider whether the child should be placed with a blood relative 
before considering other out-of-home placements.  See I.C. § 31-34-19-7.  “[U]nder the policy 
pronouncements inherent in the entire scheme of CHINS procedures, a primary purpose and 
function of the [State] is to encourage and support the integrity and stability of an existing family 
environment and relationship.”  Jackson v. Madison County Dep’t of Family & Children, 690 
N.E.2d 792, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied.   
 
Because the court’s dispositional decree did not address its reasons for not placing N.E. 
with Father, we believe it may well have interfered with Father’s rights in the upbringing of N.E. 
and violated the “least restrictive (most family like)” placement mandate of Indiana Code section 
31-34-19-6(1)(A). 
 
Conclusion 
 
We vacate that part of the juvenile court’s judgment pertaining to N.E. and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.