Case Title: Owens v. Carman Ford, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 40, 2012

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2012-08-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KARL OWENS,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 40, 2012 
 
Appellant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court   
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and  
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
CARMAN FORD, INC.,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee Below,  
 
§ 
C.A. No. N11A-02-004 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  June 8, 2012 
Decided:  August 24, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 24th day of August 2012, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs 
and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Karl Owens, was employed by the appellee, 
Carman Ford, Inc., from June 2008 until October 2010.  Owens quit work 
following his refusal to reimburse Carman for damage to a customer’s car.  
This appeal arises from Owens’ unsuccessful claim for unemployment 
benefits. 
(2) 
Under Delaware law, an employee is disqualified from 
receiving unemployment benefits if the employee voluntarily ends 
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employment without good cause.1  We have held that “good cause is 
established where: (i) an employee voluntarily leaves employment for 
reasons attributable to issues within the employer’s control and under 
circumstances in which no reasonably prudent employee would have 
remained employed; and (ii) the employee first exhausts all reasonable 
alternatives to resolve the issues before voluntarily terminating his or her 
employment.”2  
(3) 
In this case, a Claims Deputy determined, after reviewing 
evidence submitted by Owens and Carman, that Owens was ineligible for 
unemployment benefits because he voluntarily left his employment without 
good cause.  Owens appealed the Claims Deputy’s determination to an 
Appeals Referee. 
(4) 
Owens and John Henry, Carman’s Parts and Service Director, 
testified at a hearing before the Appeals Referee.  By decision dated 
December 10, 2010, the Appeals Referee affirmed the Claims Deputy’s 
decision.  The Appeals Referee found that: 
Although [Owens] made a decision not to 
sign the agreement [to reimburse Carman] that was 
presented to him by [Henry], [Owens] still needed 
to fully exhaust his administrative remedies to 
remain gainfully employed.  If [Owens] felt that 
                                            
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 3314(1) (2005 & Supp. 2010). 
2 Thompson v. Christiana Care Health Sys., 25 A.3d 778, 783 (Del. 2011). 
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the situation could not be resolved by a discussion 
with [Henry], [Owens] had a duty to approach the 
owner of the business in order to resolve the 
situation.  Consequently . . . this tribunal must find 
that [Owens] voluntarily left his employment 
without good cause. 
 
(5) 
Owens appealed the Appeals Referee’s decision to the 
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (“the Board”).  After a hearing 
before the Board, where Owens and Henry again testified, the Board issued 
a decision dated February 8, 2011 affirming the Appeals Referee’s decision. 
(6) 
Owens then appealed the Board’s decision to the Superior 
Court, where the parties submitted briefs.  By memorandum opinion dated 
January 3, 2012, the Superior Court affirmed the Board’s decision.  This 
appeal followed. 
(7) 
“[T]he sole function of the reviewing courts on appeal from an 
administrative board ‘is to determine whether or not there was substantial 
competent evidence to support the finding of the Board.’”3  The credibility 
of witnesses, the weight to be given the testimony and any reasonable 
inferences, are for the Board to determine.4  The Board’s factual findings, if 
                                            
3 Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Div. of Unemployment Ins., 803 A.2d 931, 936 (Del. 
2002). 
4 Clements v. Diamond State Port Corp., 831 A.2d 870, 878 (Del. 2003) (citing Coleman 
v. Dep’t of Labor, 288 A.2d 285, 287 (Del. Super. 1972)).   
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supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the 
reviewing court is confined to questions of law.5   
(8) 
In this case, the Board decided that Owens lacked good cause 
for ending his employment at Carman because he failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies before walking off the job.  After careful review of 
the record, including the transcripts of the hearings before the Appeals 
Referee and the Board, and the written decisions of the Claims Deputy, the 
Appeals Referee, the Board, and the Superior Court, and after careful 
consideration of the parties’ positions, we conclude, as did the Superior 
Court, that the Board’s decision is supported by substantial record evidence 
and is free from legal error.  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                            
5 Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Div. of Unemployment Ins., 803 A.2d at 936.