Case Title: Stubbs v. State

Citation: 441 So. 2d 1386

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1983-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
441 So. 2d 1386 (1983) Patricia Karen STUBBS v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 54016. Supreme Court of Mississippi. December 21, 1983. Rehearing Denied January 11, 1984. *1387 Charles R. Holladay, Picayune, for appellant. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Carolyn B. Mills, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, C.J., and HAWKINS and ROBERTSON, JJ. PATTERSON, Chief Justice, for the Court: Patricia Karen Stubbs was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to serve ten (10) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections by the Circuit Court of Pearl River County. On September 9, 1981, Patricia and her husband, Larry Stubbs, were estranged. Desiring to speak to her husband, Patricia went to his home in Picayune and waited until her husband arrived from his work. Although she endeavored to speak with him, Larry ignored her and went into the house and latched the door. Larry's mother told him that Patricia wanted to speak with him, but he responded that he didn't want to talk to her. On hearing that, Patricia said, "You bad M.F., stay here till I get back. I am going to show all of y'all something." Thereafter Larry went into the yard of his home and with his brother began working on a disabled van. As they were working, Patricia appeared, drew a pistol and fired three times. Larry was struck in the right shoulder and his brother, Grayson, was struck in the foot. Evidently the third shot went astray. Patricia Stubbs appeals and assigns as error: 1. The trial court erred in compelling the defendant's husband to testify against her when he was unwilling to do so; 2. The trial court should have granted an instruction for a lesser offense; and 3. An oral statement of the trial judge to the jury may have improperly influenced their verdict inasmuch as the jury was led to believe their recommendation of leniency would be taken into consideration. We first consider whether the court erred in compelling Larry Stubbs to testify against his wife when he was unwilling to do so. Mississippi Code Annotated, § 13-1-5 (Supp. 1983), provides: We first observe the statute provides (1) either spouse may introduce the other as a witness in all cases between them; (2) either spouse is a competent witness to testify against the other for a criminal act against a child; (3) in all other instances *1388 where either is a party litigant the other spouse shall not be competent as a witness. We next note that Larry Stubbs objected to testifying against his wife and based his objection upon Mississippi Code Annotated, § 13-1-5 (Supp. 1983). The objection was overruled and Larry was compelled to testify against his wife, the court being of the opinion the crime charged was against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi and was not a domestic difficulty between the defendant and the witness. The posture of this case does not conform to either of the categories of Section 13-1-5 making one spouse a competent witness in that Larry was introduced as a witness not by his spouse but rather by the State of Mississippi, and neither did the charge concern a criminal act against a child. It is therefore urged that the third category of the section controls. It provides that in all other instances where either spouse is a party litigant the other shall not be competent as a witness against the other. Doubtless the statute makes no provision for a case in the posture of this one and since this is so, we need turn to the common law for guidance. In Turner v. State, 60 Miss. 351, 353-54 (1882), it is held: See also, McRae v. State, 104 Miss. 861, 870, 61 So. 977, 978 (1913); Merritt v. State, 339 So. 2d 1366 (Miss. 1966); and McQueen v. State, 139 Miss. 457, 104 So. 168 (1925). We conclude there was no error in compelling Larry Stubbs to testify against his wife even though this was against his wishes. We think his individual desire was overcome by the paramount interest of the state in preserving its criminal laws. For the foregoing reasons, we think there is no merit in the suggestion that Larry Stubbs' rights under the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and those under Article III, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution were violated when he was required to testify against his wife. *1389 It is next urged that the trial court should have been instructed to consider a verdict of simple assault. Of course, such an instruction is proper when the element of intent is absent from the assault. Markham v. State, 209 Miss. 135, 136, 46 So. 2d 88, 89 (1950). However, the refusal to grant such an instruction is not error where there is no testimony of simple assault, as here where the victim was shot with a deadly weapon. In Grace v. State, 375 So. 2d 419, 421 (Miss. 1979), a similar case, we held, "We have concluded that this is not a case in which, upon the evidence, the jury could rationally have found Grace guilty of simple assault and not guilty of the crime charged. The trial court properly declined to submit the issue of simple assault to the jury." We are of the opinion this assignment of error is not persuasive to a reversal. Through the final assignment of error it is contended the oral comments of the judge to the jury were the equivalent of an instruction which may have influenced the jury to change its verdict inasmuch as they were led to believe that a recommendation of leniency would be taken into consideration by the trial court. The provisions that a judge should not make unnecessary comments to the jury during its deliberations are undoubtedly strong. Pearson v. State, 254 Miss. 275, 291, 179 So. 2d 792, 799 (1965). The rationale for this is stated in Martin v. State, 415 So. 2d 706, 708 (Miss. 1982). It states in part, Persuaded, the court in Martin reversed and remanded because there was testimony that two members of the jury had agreed they would not change their vote, "unless they can plead for a sentence." 415 So. 2d at 707. It was thus apparent that the jury had not reached a verdict and could not reach a verdict unless they could "plead for a sentence." A quid pro quo situation was thereby established. Under this circumstance we held the court's statement to the jury that it could include a recommendation of mercy with its verdict could reasonably be interpreted by the jury as an invitation for a guilty verdict by the court in exchange for which mercy would be extended to the defendant. It was for this reason that the case was reversed. In this case the dialogue between the trial judge and the jury was entirely different, primarily in that the colloquy between the trial judge and certain jurors occurred after the verdict of guilty was read in open court. The jury was asked if that was their verdict and the jury nodded their heads in the affirmative. Following this, a request was made that the jury be polled whereupon, after some opening remarks, the trial court asked, Following this the jury was again polled and each juror responded that the guilty verdict was their verdict. From this circumstance, which differs from that in Martin, it is apparent that there was no quid pro quo situation as in that case. Presently the jury was correctly instructed that their verdict could not be qualified but that they could recommend mercy if they desired. The first verdict of guilty was without a recommendation of leniency. The second verdict was with a recommendation of leniency but both were guilty verdicts absent any qualification in our opinion. Although *1392 not an issue we observe a midway term of ten years, not the maximum sentence, was imposed on the defendant. The record reflects unequivocally that the defendant shot her husband for little, if any, reason. There being no errors of law or judgment, the verdict and sentence must be affirmed. AFFIRMED. WALKER and BROOM, P.JJ., and ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING, HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur.