Case Title: PSI Energy Inc. v. William Lee Roberts, Jr. and Beverly Roberts

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 
Robert K. Stanley 
 
 
 
 
 
Linda George 
Kevin M. Toner  
 
 
 
 
 
W. Russell Sipes  
 
 
 
Kathy L. Osborn  
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Meg A. Gallmeyer 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
Eric M. Cavanaugh 
Plainfield, Indiana 
 
AMICUS CURIAE 
INDIANA MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION 
Knight S. Anderson 
Keith J. Hays 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
AMICUS CURIAE 
O’MALIA FOOD MARKETS, INC. 
Jason L. Kennedy 
Chicago, Illinois 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S02-0405-CV-217 
 
 PSI ENERGY, INC., 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM LEE ROBERTS, JR., AND 
BEVERLY ROBERTS, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellees (Plaintiffs below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49D02-9601-MI-0001-687 
The Honorable Kenneth H. Johnson, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-0210-CV-883 
_________________________________ 
 
June 28, 2005 
 
 
Boehm, Justice. 
 
William Roberts contracted mesothelioma as a result of his work with asbestos-
containing insulation as an employee of Armstrong Contracting and Supply Company (ACandS).  
Much of his work over a thirty-nine year career was at power generation facilities of PSI Energy, 
Inc.  Roberts sued PSI and others on both vicarious liability and premises liability theories.  A 
jury found PSI thirteen percent at fault without specifying which theory supported that result.   
We hold that PSI is not vicariously liable for the negligence of its independent contractor 
ACandS.  We also hold that as a general proposition a landowner or other possessor of real estate 
harboring a potentially dangerous condition is not liable to an independent contractor or its 
employees for injuries sustained by reason of the condition the contractor is employed to 
address.  Under the circumstances of this case, however, there was sufficient evidence to support 
the jury’s verdict in favor of Roberts and his wife under the premises liability instructions. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
Roberts worked for ACandS as an insulator for most of his life.  He started part-time in 
1956, and worked full-time from 1957 through 1986 and from 1989 through 1991.  He retired 
from full-time employment in 1992, but continued to work part-time until 1997.  ACandS was 
the nation’s largest insulation contractor over this period.  Roberts worked with insulation 
containing asbestos from the time he started working in 1956 until his employer stopped using it 
in the early 1980s.        
ACandS supplied its insulation services to a variety of industrial and other customers and 
assigned employees, including Roberts, to install and service insulation at a number of facilities.  
Roberts routinely installed, handled, removed, and otherwise worked directly with insulation 
containing asbestos.  He knew that he was working with asbestos insulation and could recognize 
asbestos on sight.  He estimated that over the course of his career he spent fifteen to eighteen 
years at various generating stations owned by PSI, the electric utility servicing a large part of 
Indiana.     
In the late 1960s and into the 1970s, Roberts often worked at PSI’s Dresser generating 
station.  According to Roberts, the asbestos insulation at this station was in very poor condition, 
 
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“torn up,” and “raggy.”  In performing his own work, Roberts was often exposed to asbestos, and 
he was also exposed to the material as the result of activities of PSI employees and other PSI 
contractors.  Roberts and others who worked with him often had no protective clothing, masks, 
or respirators.  PSI’s corporate representative testified that he frequently saw ACandS’s 
insulators working with asbestos at PSI plants in the 1960s and 1970s, but never saw them take 
any precautions to protect themselves from breathing asbestos dust.    
 
A link between asbestos exposure and mesothelioma was established as early as the 
1940s and 1950s.  The evidence presented at trial indicated that ACandS was or should have 
been aware of asbestos-related health problems at least by the early 1960s.  Roberts was a 
member of the Local 18 of Heat and Frost Insulators International and received its publications 
beginning in 1958.  Articles in the union’s magazines urged asbestos workers to use safety 
equipment, and “green sheets” included with the magazines from 1969 through 1976 discussed 
asbestos-related health problems.  Roberts testified that he did not learn the true dangers of 
asbestos until the 1980s and that ACandS did not supply masks for the employees until the 
1970s.  He asserted that sometime in the 1970s, he noticed that asbestos products were being 
phased out, but no one told him it was for safety reasons.   
Roberts was diagnosed with peritoneal mesothelioma in 2001.1  In August of that year, 
he and his wife sued for Roberts’s injury and for Mrs. Roberts’s loss of consortium.  They sought 
damages from PSI and sixty other defendants, including both manufacturers of asbestos and 
other landowners.  As to the landowners, the complaint asserted both a premises liability theory 
and also that the Roberts’s claims fell under exceptions to the general rule that a principal is not 
vicariously liable for the acts of ACandS, its independent contractor.   
The case was tried to a jury on both counts.  PSI objected to the trial court’s instructions 
on the Roberts’s theories of liability, and also moved for judgment on the evidence at the close of 
the Roberts’s case and again at the close of all of the evidence.  The trial court denied both 
motions and submitted the case to the jury.  By this point in the trial, most defendants had settled 
                                             
 
1 The National Cancer Institute explains: “malignant mesothelioma, a rare form of cancer, is a disease in 
which cancer cells are found in the sac lining the chest, the lining of the abdominal cavity, or the lining 
around the heart.”  Most people with malignant mesothelioma contracted the disease while working in 
environments where they breathed asbestos fibers.  Nat’l Cancer Institute, Mesothelioma, at  
http://www.mesotheliomaweb.org/mesothelioma.htm (last visited June 23, 2005). 
 
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and the only remaining defendants were PSI and three other premises owners, Eli Lilly, a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer, Central Soya, a food processor, and Kroger, a retail grocery chain.  
The jury returned a general verdict, finding compensatory damages of $2,800,000 for Roberts, 
who died after trial began, and $1,000,000 for Mrs. Roberts.  The jury rejected the plaintiffs’ 
claim for punitive damages.  The jury allocated fault thirteen percent to PSI, twelve percent to 
Roberts, and none to the other three defendants.  The remaining seventy-five percent was 
allocated to sixteen nonparties including thirty-six percent to ACandS.  The trial court then 
entered judgment against PSI for $364,000 to Roberts and $130,000 to his wife.  PSI appealed 
and the Court of Appeals held that PSI could be held liable as a premises defendant, and 
therefore affirmed the judgment based on a general judgment.  PSI Energy, Inc., v. Roberts, 802 
N.E.2d 468, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).  This Court granted transfer.  PSI v. Roberts, 812 N.E.2d 
806 (Ind. 2004). 
Standard of Review 
PSI challenges the denial of its motion for judgment on the evidence under Indiana Trial 
Rule 50 and the denial of its motion to correct error under Indiana Trial Rule 59.  In reviewing a 
trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment on the evidence, the appellate court is to consider 
only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the non-moving party.  Clark v. 
Wiegand, 617 N.E.2d 916, 918 (Ind. 1993).  In considering a motion to correct error based on a 
claim of insufficient evidence, if the trial court determines that there is a total absence of 
evidence supporting a necessary element of the plaintiff’s case the court should enter judgment 
for the defendant.  State v. Emry, 753 N.E.2d 19, 21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).  On the other hand, if 
there is some evidence to support the jury’s verdict, the trial court must determine whether the 
jury’s verdict is supported by sufficient evidence without weighing the evidence or judging the 
credibility of the witnesses.  Id.  Both rules mandate that the motion be granted when there is 
insufficient evidence under the law to support a verdict.  Huff v. Travelers Indem. Co., 363 
N.E.2d 985, 990 (Ind. 1977).   
The jury returned a general verdict.  PSI challenges the verdict arguing that the evidence 
is not sufficient to support it, but does not challenge the jury instructions on appeal.  In this 
procedural posture, “a general verdict will be sustained if the evidence is sufficient to sustain any 
 
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theory of liability.”  Picadilly, Inc. v. Colvin, 519 N.E.2d 1217, 1221 (Ind. 1988) (citing In re 
Estate of Fanning, 263 Ind. 414, 417, 333 N.E.2d 80, 82 (1975); City of Indianapolis v. Pollard, 
241 Ind. 66, 72, 169 N.E.2d 405, 408 (1960)). 
I. Vicarious Liability for Acts of ACandS 
The parties agree that ACandS provided its services to PSI as an independent contractor.  
“The long-standing general rule has been that a principal is not liable for the negligence of an 
independent contractor.”  Carie v. PSI Energy, Inc., 715 N.E.2d 853, 855 (Ind. 1999).  Indiana 
law recognizes five exceptions to this general rule, based on public policy concerns, which 
militate against permitting a principal to absolve itself of responsibility for some activities by 
conducting them through an independent contractor.  Id.  Roberts contended in the trial court that 
two of these exceptions applied here: (1) the “intrinsically dangerous” exception—“where the 
contract requires the performance of intrinsically dangerous work,” and (2) the “due precaution” 
exception—“where the act will probably cause injury to others unless due precaution is taken.”  
As is explained below, the trial court instructed on both theories.  As Carie pointed out, the 
principal’s liability in these exceptional situations is based on the idea that the principal “is in the 
best position to identify, minimize, and administer the risks involved in the contractor’s 
activities.”  Id.  Here, however, PSI contends with considerable force that it and the other owners 
of facilities containing asbestos were in no better position than ACandS to evaluate the risks 
inherent in working with insulation containing asbestos. 
A. Liability of the Principal to the Independent Contractor or its Employees  
The term used to describe these exceptions—“nondelegable duty”—has historically been 
developed in the context of claims that the negligence of an independent contractor should be 
attributed to the principal.  Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 337, at 921-23 (2001).  In that 
context, the Court of Appeals, following precedent in the majority of other states, had concluded 
in a number of cases that employees of the independent contractor could not invoke these 
exceptions to assert liability of the principal for acts of their employer as an independent 
contractor of the principal.  Louisville Cement Co. v. Mumaw, 448 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1983); Johns v. New York Blower Co., 442 N.E.2d 382, 386 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Hale v. 
Peabody Coal Co., 168 Ind. App. 336, 344, 343 N.E.2d 316, 324 (1976).  If that doctrine is 
 
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followed in Indiana, it would preclude Roberts’s claim against PSI to the extent it is based on 
negligence of ACandS in failing to provide adequate safeguards or because ACandS employees 
were thought to be engaged in inherently dangerous activities. 
Roberts cites Bagley v. Insight Communications, Co., 658 N.E.2d 584, 587-88 (Ind. 
1995), for the proposition that an employee of an independent contractor may recover from the 
principal for negligence of the contractor or a fellow employee of the contractor.  Richard Bagley 
was an employee of Sam Friend, a subcontractor for a cable installer, Steve Crawford.  
Crawford, in turn, was acting as a subcontractor for Insight Communications, a central Indiana 
cable television company.  Bagley was injured in the course of his work for Friend and brought 
suit against Insight, Friend, and Crawford arguing, among other things, that Insight and 
Crawford were negligent in hiring Friend as their subcontractor.  This Court stated the issue 
before it as “may an independent contractor’s employee, injured on the job as a result of the 
contractor’s conduct, recover damages from a party who negligently hired the contractor, 
notwithstanding the general rule that one who uses an independent contractor will not be liable 
for the acts of that contractor?”  Id. at 584.  Negligent hiring focuses on the negligence of the 
principal in selecting the contractor.  In contrast, the previously defined exceptions to the general 
rule of nonliability for negligence of an independent contractor had found the principal liable not 
for its own negligence, but for negligence of its contractor in carrying out a “nondelegable duty” 
of the principal.  Bagley summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals in rejecting the claim that 
Insight or Crawford “had breached a duty to provide proper safety procedures” but went on to 
address “the negligent hiring issue.”  Id. at 586.   
After acknowledging that some states and the Restatement (Second) of Torts  § 411 
(1965) permitted a claim for negligent hiring, the Court did not adopt that general doctrine under 
Indiana law.  Rather, it held that liability for negligent selection of a contractor could be imposed 
under the same circumstances that were recognized as exceptions to the rule of nonliability for 
negligence of the contractor.  Bagley, 658 N.E.2d at 587.  This permitted a claim for “failure to 
exercise reasonable care to employ a competent and careful contractor” if the activity to be 
conducted fell within one of the five exceptions.  Id.  We thus have Indiana law under Bagley 
recognizing claims for failure to exercise care in the selection of a contractor under the same 
 
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circumstances as the law imposes potential liability for the actions of the contractor, even if 
carefully selected.   
The Court then considered whether the negligent hiring claim could be asserted by an 
employee of the contractor.  The Court noted the earlier line of decisions by the Court of Appeals 
that held that these five exceptions permitted only third parties, not the contractor or its 
employees, to assert the principal’s liability for acts of the contractor.2  Acknowledging these 
cases, the Bagley court held “such restriction of the exceptions to exclude injured workers is 
contrary to the purpose of the exceptions and is not compelled by their underlying policy 
concerns.”  Id. at 588.  The Court stated, “our objective is no less to protect workers who may be 
exposed to such risks than it is to protect non-employee third parties. . . . Where a contractor’s 
employer is responsible for a non-delegable duty, the contractor’s injured worker should not 
discriminately be deprived of access to full compensatory damages but should have recourse 
equal to that of an injured bystander.”  Id.  The Court found Bagley’s negligent hiring claim to fit 
the exception for acts to be performed by the independent contractor that will probably cause 
injury to others unless “due precaution” is taken.  So viewed, Bagley’s claim failed because 
Bagley was injured when a fellow employee slipped and fell on him from a ladder while he was 
driving a stake in the ground.  There was no probability that injury would occur from his work, 
which consisted of simply driving a stake into the ground and no customary precautions were 
                                             
 
2 For example, Hale involved an employee of a subcontractor hired to construct coal-handling facilities at 
the principal’s coal mine who fell from a broken scaffolding.  168 Ind. App. at 337, 343 N.E.2d at 319.  
The employee claimed that the coal mine was liable because working with scaffolding is intrinsically 
dangerous.  The court held that the work was not intrinsically dangerous, but also noted in a footnote that 
“there is a significant body of case law from other states holding this exception inapplicable to servants of 
independent contractors.”  Id. at 343, 322 n.1.  Although the Hale footnote was dicta, it was soon 
followed as the basis of decision.  In Louisville Cement Co., an employee of an independent contractor 
was injured while using an oxygen propane-cutting torch to cut pipes that the general contractor, a cement 
company, had prepared for the work.  448 N.E.2d at 1220.  The pipes had contained diesel fuel and had 
been drained by the cement company.  Among other things, the employee argued that the cement 
company should be liable because it failed to repair the latent defect in the pipes that caused his injury 
and that this was a nondelegable duty.  The court reasoned that the only exception that could apply to this 
situation was the exception for acts that will probably cause injury to others unless due precaution is 
taken.  Id. at 1222.  Citing Hale, the court held that the exception did not apply because “injury to others” 
does not embrace injuries to employees of the independent contractor.  Id.  In Johns, an employee of an 
independent contractor working as an ironworker fell from a steel beam that had no safety net.  442 
N.E.2d at 383.  The court held that the work was not intrinsically dangerous but also expressed the view 
that “the liability of a contractee/owner under the inherently dangerous work exception does not extend to 
employees of the independent contractor performing the work.” Id. at 386. 
 
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omitted.  Accordingly, the requirements of this exception were not met.  It was therefore 
unnecessary for Bagley to address whether the other defendants were negligent in selecting 
Bagley’s employer.   
Because it addressed a negligent hiring claim, Bagley did not directly address the 
question whether an employee of an independent contractor may recover from the principal for 
the negligence of the contractor without any negligence of the principal in selecting the 
contractor.  The language in Bagley, though directly addressing only negligent hiring requiring 
negligence of the principal, may fairly be read to apply to liability for acts of the contractor under 
the five exceptions.  However, Bagley did not face the issue of a claim by a worker injured by 
the very condition the worker’s employer was contracted to address.  That is essentially what 
Roberts asserts here.     
Hiring of independent contractors to do work that may be described as “probable” to 
cause injury unless “due precautions” are taken occurs frequently in a technologically advanced 
society.  If the principal has knowledge of some undisclosed risk factor not known to the 
contractor, there may be liability for failure to alert the contractor.  See Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, § 343.  Similarly, as Bagley held, at least under some circumstances, negligent selection of 
a contractor may expose a principal to liability.  But if the law imposed on the principal liability 
for failure to supervise or monitor the contractor’s activities, the result is added cost for minimal 
benefit.  We think that to the extent an independent contractor is employed to redress or correct a 
problem for the principal, even if the contractor’s activity may be viewed as either intrinsically 
dangerous or may require precautions, employees of the contractor have no claim against the 
principal based solely on either acts of the contractor or the condition to be remedied, or some 
combination of both.  The contractor is presumably best equipped to evaluate the necessary 
precautions and determine the standard of ordinary care.  See Peone v. Regulus Stud Mills, 744 
P.2d 102, 107 (Idaho 1987) (logging contractor is in a better position than a sawmill operator to 
assess the risks of falling trees); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413, cmt. b.  Employees of the 
contractor should have no claim against a principal for their own or the contractor’s failure to use 
ordinary care in carrying out the contractor’s assignment.  Nor should a principal be liable to a 
contractor or its employees simply by reason of employing the contractor to engage in inherently 
dangerous activity.  We hold therefore that in the absence of negligent selection of the 
 
8
contractor, an employee of the contractor has no claim against the principal based solely on the 
five exceptions to the general rule of nonliability for acts of the contractor. 
 
B. Liability for “Intrinsically Dangerous” Activities 
 
We also agree with PSI that recovery under the inherently dangerous exception was not 
supported by the evidence.  The jury was instructed that:  
the law imposes a duty on a landowner3 if the work to be performed is 
intrinsically dangerous.  Work is “intrinsically dangerous” if the danger exists in 
the doing of the activity regardless of the method used.  The work is intrinsically 
dangerous if the risk of injury cannot be eliminated or significantly reduced by 
taking proper precautions. 
Roberts argues that when he worked at PSI, he performed intrinsically dangerous work that is not 
delegable to an independent contractor.  PSI does not challenge this instruction as an accurate 
statement of the law.  Rather, PSI contends the evidence does not support the verdict.   
For the reasons given in Part D below, Roberts is not estopped from arguing that working 
with asbestos was intrinsically dangerous despite his simultaneous contention that PSI is liable 
for failure of ACandS to take due precautions to avoid the injury.  We conclude, however, that 
the evidence does not support recovery on this theory.  “The term ‘inherently or intrinsically 
dangerous’ has been defined as work necessarily attended with danger, no matter how skillfully 
or carefully it is performed.”  41 Am. Jur. 2d Independent Contractors § 54 (1995); see Shell Oil 
Co. v. Meyer, 705 N.E.2d 962, 978 (Ind. 1998) (work is intrinsically dangerous if the danger 
exists in the doing of the activity regardless of the method used).  Unlike the other four 
exceptions to the nonliability of the principal, the “inherently dangerous” exception is normally 
associated with strict liability and does not require negligence on the part of the contractor.  
Dobbs, supra § 337, at 921.  It imposes liability for activities that are dangerous by nature, not 
merely because they are carried out in a risky manner.  For example, if the enterprise hires an 
independent contractor to dust crops with poison, it is liable for damage to neighbors’ crops 
without regard to negligence.  Id.   
                                             
 
3Although this instruction is phrased in terms of the duty of a “landowner” it was given as an instruction 
on a principal’s liability for acts of an independent contractor.  The principals in this case, including PSI, 
happened to be landowners who employed ACandS, and therefore Roberts, on their premises. 
 
9
Roberts asserts that asbestos itself is intrinsically dangerous and “any work that causes 
inherently dangerous fibers to enter the breathing space of humans is intrinsically dangerous 
work.”  He points to Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 382 (Ind. 1989), in which this 
Court described asbestos fibers as “an inherently dangerous substance . . .  a toxic foreign 
substance . . . an inherently dangerous product . . . and a hazardous foreign substance.” Id. at 
384-86.  Roberts asserts that there is nothing that can make asbestos fibers safe.  PSI responds 
that although asbestos may be an inherently dangerous substance, it does not follow that working 
with material containing asbestos is intrinsically dangerous work.  PSI asserts that the evidence 
at trial demonstrates that the dangers of working with asbestos could have been minimized if 
Roberts had taken proper precautions.  Roberts himself asserted liability based on the failure to 
use “due precautions” exception discussed in Part I.C.  This assumes that injury can be 
significantly reduced and, as PSI points out, is inconsistent with the claim that the work is 
inherently dangerous.  Dr. Michael Ellenbecker, an industrial hygiene expert called by Roberts, 
testified to the methods available at the time Roberts was exposed to asbestos that could have 
been employed to reduce his exposure.  He described the possibility of substituting other 
insulation materials for asbestos, the practice of isolating the asbestos fibers, and other control 
and prevention measures.  Dr. Ellenbecker testified “it’s possible to perform an installation 
where the hazards are minimized, but when we’re talking about mesothelioma, I think it’s 
difficult to do any activities with asbestos where you completely eliminate the hazard.”  Roberts 
argues that this testimony shows that performing asbestos work is an intrinsically dangerous 
activity because mesothelioma can be caused by very small exposures to asbestos.  He reasons 
that because asbestos-related diseases are often terminal and can be caused by very small 
exposures, it follows that working with asbestos is intrinsically dangerous.   
We agree that working with asbestos can be perilous, but that is not enough to render it 
intrinsically dangerous as that term is used to establish liability for actions of an independent 
contractor.  For example in McDaniel v. Business Investment Group, Ltd., 709 N.E.2d 17 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1999) trans. denied, an employee working on a sewer line in a 9 foot deep trench was 
killed when the sides of the trench caved in.  The Indiana Court of Appeals held that trenching is 
not intrinsically dangerous work because “although it can be dangerous, the use of proper 
procedures . . . renders the work relatively safe.”  Id. at 21.  Roberts asserts that whether the 
danger from asbestos work could have been significantly reduced is itself a question of fact for 
 
10
the jury.  If proper precautions can minimize the risk of injury, then the activity is not 
intrinsically dangerous.  See Carie v. PSI Energy, Inc., 694 N.E.2d 729, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1998), affirmed in part and vacated in part by, Carie v. PSI Energy, Inc., 715 N.E.2d 853 (Ind. 
1999) (quoting Denneau v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co, 150 Ind. App. 615, 620, 277 N.E.2d 8, 12 
(1971)).  Here, it seems agreed by all that precautions could have minimized Roberts’s exposure 
to asbestos.  Indeed, as explained below, this was the premise of one of Roberts’s principal 
theories of liability.  Therefore, we conclude that working with asbestos is not intrinsically 
dangerous such that anyone hiring a contractor to address it incurs strict liability for injuries 
sustained from exposure to it.  For this second and independent reason, Roberts’s claim fails 
under the independent contractor liability theory. We also recognize, as the dissent points out, 
that the consequences of mesothelioma can be horrific.  But that does not render asbestos 
intrinsically dangerous.  The same is true of electricity and a number of other substances that, if 
mishandled, can be dangerous.   
C. Due Precaution 
Roberts contends that PSI could have been found liable for his injuries under the “due 
precaution” exception to the general rule of non-liability for acts of independent contractors.  
Sometimes referred to as the “peculiar risk” doctrine, this exception imposes liability on a 
principal where the act to be performed will “probably” cause injury to others unless due 
precaution is taken.  Carie, 715 N.E.2d at 856; Bagley, 658 N.E.2d at 586.  This exception 
requires that, at the time of engaging the contractor, the principal should have foreseen that the 
performance of the work or the conditions under which it was to be performed would, absent 
precautionary measures, probably cause injury.  Carie, 715 N.E.2d at 856; McDaniel, 709 N.E.2d 
at 22.  Application of this exception therefore depends on the probability of injury from the risk 
and its foreseeability by the principal.  This doctrine does not render the principal liable for the 
contractor’s failure to take normal precautions incident to the activity to be carried out.  Thus, a 
homeowner has no liability for an electrician’s failure to take the normal precaution of breaking 
a circuit before touching the wiring.  The McDaniel court explained, “the exception applies only 
when the risk involved is something more than the routine and predictable hazards generally 
associated with a given occupation:  it must be a risk unique to the circumstances of a given job.”  
709 N.E.2d at 22.  “It is not concerned with taking routine precautions, of a kind which any 
 
11
careful contractor could reasonably be expected to take, against all of the ordinary and customary 
dangers which may arise in the course of the contemplated work.  Such precautions are the 
responsibility of the contractor.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 413 cmt. b. 
The trial court instructed,  
the law imposes a duty on a landowner [read “principal”] if the work to be 
performed will probably cause injury to others unless due precautions are taken to 
avoid harm.  The essence of this exception is the foreseeability of both the 
peculiar risk involved in the work and the need for special precautions.  For 
purposes of this exception, the phrase ‘peculiar risk’ refers to the risk of a 
particularized harm specific to the work being performed or the conditions under 
which it is performed.  Moreover, the exception applies only when the risk 
involved is something more than the routine and predictable hazards generally 
associated with a given occupation:  it must be a risk unique to the circumstances 
of a given job.  
PSI argues that exposure to asbestos materials at PSI job sites did not present a “peculiar 
risk” to an asbestos worker who worked with and around asbestos materials on a daily basis in 
the normal course of his trade.  PSI points out that mesothelioma and other asbestos-related 
diseases are much more common in asbestos workers than in the general population.  PSI 
contends these disorders are therefore “routine and predictable” hazards of asbestos insulation 
work.  Roberts counters that mesothelioma has a very long latency period and Roberts did not 
know the danger at the time, so the danger in working with asbestos was neither routine nor 
predictable.  Roberts’s claim thus seeks to embrace the unforeseeability of the risk and at the 
same time attribute to PSI liability for failing to foresee it.  We think that absent unusual 
circumstances at a given workplace, industry standards are applicable measures of the “routine 
precautions” that are the responsibility of the contractor, and injuries or disorders that are usual 
to a given occupation are not within the “due precaution” exception.  McDaniel, 709 N.E.2d at 
23.  
Roberts argues that even if unusual risk is required, PSI meets that test because his 
exposure to asbestos was more severe at PSI sites than at other jobsites and therefore working at 
PSI created a peculiar risk.  PSI counters that there is no evidence that working at PSI involved 
risks unique or distinguishable from the general risk Roberts faced on a daily basis in the normal 
course of his profession.  Roberts did the majority of his work on PSI property.  He points to the 
 
12
duration, intensity, and volume of asbestos at PSI as unique, and argues that the high heat at PSI 
caused him not to wear a mask.  He also points to evidence that PSI’s workers kicked up dust, 
and that the asbestos insulation at PSI was in worse condition than that at other locations.  
We do not believe these facts establish that PSI created unusual risks as applied to an 
insulator.  They establish at most a higher incidence of qualitatively identical hazards.  And it is 
clear that working with any level of asbestos can be associated with mesothelioma.  As we 
recently observed “the normal, expected use of asbestos products entails contact with its 
migrating and potentially harmful residue.”  Stegemoller v. ACandS, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 974, 976 
(Ind. 2002).  In sum, the record is undisputed that wherever Roberts may have worked as an 
insulation contractor, the risk was the same—that of breathing asbestos fibers and contracting 
mesothelioma.  At most, PSI created a quantitatively higher risk, but not a risk unique to PSI, 
and not a risk requiring qualitatively different precautions from those generally associated with 
asbestos. 
D. Judicial Estoppel 
PSI asserts that because Roberts argued at trial that his illness could have been prevented 
with the use of available safety precautions, he is now judicially estopped from arguing that 
asbestos work is intrinsically dangerous.  “Judicial estoppel ‘prevents a party from asserting a 
position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted.’”  Meridian Ins. Co. v 
Zepeda, 734 N.E.2d 1126, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Wabash Grain, Inc. v. Smith, 700 
N.E.2d 234, 237 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied.  A party may properly plead alternative and 
contradictory theories, but judicial estoppel precludes a party from repudiating assertions in the 
party’s own pleadings.  Marquez v. Mayer, 727 N.E.2d 768, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. 
denied.  Because application of the intrinsically dangerous exception requires a showing that the 
risk created by the work could not be prevented or minimized, PSI says, “having prevailed on the 
theory that Roberts’s illness could have been prevented through the use of available industrial 
hygiene techniques, Roberts is estopped from arguing on appeal that his illness was not 
preventable.”  Roberts counters that he argued that his disease could have been prevented by 
substitution of non-hazardous insulation for asbestos insulation.  If this had been done, Roberts 
argues that he would not have been engaged in intrinsically dangerous work because he would 
 
13
not have been working with asbestos.  We agree that Roberts is not precluded from arguing that 
working with asbestos is intrinsically dangerous and that his disease could have been prevented 
by substitution of another insulating material.  PSI did not argue in the trial court that Roberts 
was judicially estopped from presenting this theory and does not object on appeal to the 
instructions to the jury on the intrinsically dangerous exception.  PSI argued in objecting to the 
jury instructions on “intrinsically dangerous” that “it is the entire theory of plaintiffs’ case that 
plaintiffs’ disease could have been prevented.”  We think the trial court could fairly take this as 
an objection that the instruction is not supported by the evidence. 
E. Conclusion as to Liability for Actions of an Independent Contractor 
In sum, Roberts has no claim against PSI for activities of ACandS as PSI’s independent 
contractor because (a) the injuries he suffered came from a situation he was employed to address, 
(b) asbestos is not “inherently dangerous” as that term is used in the exception to nonliability for 
acts of independent contractors, and (c) the injuries he sustained are common among workers in 
his industry and the necessary precautions he identified are the responsibility of his employer, 
not PSI. 
II. Premises Liability 
Roberts argues that PSI can be held liable for his injuries because Roberts was PSI’s 
business invitee and PSI breached its duty of care as a landowner.  As a general rule, a property 
owner has no duty to furnish the employees of an independent contractor a safe place to work, at 
least as that duty is imposed on employers.  Merrill v. Knauf Fiber Glass, GmbH, 771 N.E.2d 
1258, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.  The property owner must however maintain the 
property in reasonably safe condition for business invitees including independent contractors and 
their employees.  Indiana has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts formulation of 
landowners’ liability to workers on the premises.  Douglass v. Irvin, 549 N.E.2d 368, 370 (Ind. 
1990).  As the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains:  
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees 
by a condition on the land if, but only if, he 
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and 
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and 
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to 
 
14
protect themselves against it, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343.  Further, section 343A(1), which is meant to be read in 
conjunction with section 343, provides, “a possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for 
physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or 
obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or 
obviousness.”  For the reasons given below, we conclude that the jury could have found that PSI 
failed to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition. 
In the vast majority of premises liability cases, the plaintiff is either a guest or a customer 
of the possessor of the premises.  There are a few reported cases where the plaintiff is an 
employee of an independent contractor, but in every one of those, the “condition” or “activity” 
that gives rise to liability is a condition not created or addressed by the contractor (a preexisting 
hole in the roof) or an activity conducted by somebody other than the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s 
employer (demolition work by another contractor).  Here, liability is premised on the condition 
(asbestos on the site) or activity (removing or installing asbestos) that was the reason for the 
plaintiff’s presence on the property.  The early cases on landowner liability recognized that a 
dangerous condition did not give rise to liability to the person hired to “repair” it.  Annotation, 
Duty of Owner of Premises to Furnish Independent Contractor or His Employee a Safe Place to 
Work, Where Contract is for Repairs, 31 A.L.R. 2d 1375 (1953).  Premises liability to insulators 
based solely on their exposure to insulation on the premises thus would present an extension of 
existing case law in this jurisdiction, and so far as we can determine, everywhere else as well.  
PSI and amici posit that this extension would affect a large number of landowners who find 
themselves with asbestos on site that either has required or will require services of professional 
installers or removers.   
Roberts correctly points out that the Restatement, if taken literally, supports his claim.  
He asserts injury from a “condition” (asbestos) on PSI’s land which at least at some point PSI 
“should realize” constitutes an “unreasonable risk” if no precautions are taken.  There was 
evidence that PSI was aware that ACandS workers took no precautions.  However, we do not 
believe the language of the Restatement was framed in contemplation of claims by those 
conducting the dangerous activity or addressing the “condition.”  All of the Restatement’s 
 
15
illustrations address fact situations in which the claimant is a guest or customer, not a person on 
the premises to remedy the “condition.”  A Restatement is just that, an attempt to formulate what 
decisional law is or ought to be.  It is not a statute whose precise wording is entitled to deference 
as an act of an equal branch of government.  Harold G. Maier, The Utilitarian Role of a 
Restatement of Conflicts in a Common Law System: How Much Judicial Deference Is Due to the 
Restaters or “Who are these guys, anyway?”, 75 Ind. L.J. 541, 548 (2000).  In interpreting and 
applying a Restatement, it is often necessary to consider the illustrations and cases applying it 
and the theories underlying them.   
This case is an example of the intersection of two theories of common law liability.  PSI 
employed ACandS as an independent contractor to deal with asbestos insulation installed on 
PSI’s power generating structures.  The plaintiffs assert that PSI incurred liability to Roberts 
both as the entity in possession of the premises and as a principal liable for the acts of its 
independent contractor.  In considering landowner liability to an independent contractor or its 
employees, the considerations limiting the principal’s liability for acts of the contractor are also 
relevant to the principal’s liability as a landowner.  For the reasons given in Part I, the 
appropriateness of safeguards by employees of a contractor is reasonably left to the contractors.  
Viewed through that lens, we do not believe the law supports Roberts’s claim to the extent it is 
based on PSI’s knowledge of asbestos on the property and awareness that ACandS was not 
requiring safeguards.   
A. Knowledge of the Dangers 
PSI challenges the jury verdict based on subsection (b) of section 343 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.  As this subsection makes clear, PSI is liable for Roberts’s injuries only if PSI 
should have foreseen that Roberts would fail to protect himself.  Davis v. Hoosier Energy Rural 
Elec. Coop., Inc., 19 F.3d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1994).  In analyzing whether a landowner should 
have expected an injury and therefore breached its duty to an invitee, a court will consider the 
purpose and intent of the invitation and the relative knowledge of the parties.  Merrill, 771 
N.E.2d at 1265.  “The determination of whether a breach of duty occurred is a factual question 
requiring an evaluation of the landowner’s conduct with respect to the requisite standard of care.  
In this factual assessment the issue of the landowner’s and the invitee’s comparative knowledge 
 
16
becomes relevant.”  Douglass, 549 N.E.2d at 369-70.  “Facts showing only that a landowner 
knows of a condition involving a risk of harm to an invitee, but could reasonably expect the 
invitee to discover, realize, and avoid such risk, may be insufficient to prove breach of the duty.”  
Id. at 370.  We think a landowner who employs a contractor to perform specialized work such as 
insulation installation or removal is entitled to rely on the contractor to comply with appropriate 
safety standards.  Indeed, as PSI points out, the contractor is obligated by law to “furnish 
employment that is safe,” “furnish and use safety devices, safeguards, methods, and processes 
reasonably adequate to render employment and place of employment safe,” and “do every other 
thing reasonably necessary to protect the safety of the employee.”  Ind. Code § 22-1-1-10 (2004). 
The Court of Appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to 
conclude that PSI breached its duty, finding “that (1) the danger was not known or obvious to 
Roberts; and (2) PSI should have anticipated the harm.”  PSI Energy, Inc. v. Roberts, 802 N.E.2d 
468, 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).  This formulation compares the knowledge of the landowner (PSI) 
to that of the employee (Roberts) of the independent contractor, rather than that of the 
independent contractor (ACandS).  We think this element of liability turns on the knowledge of 
the independent contractor, not the contractor’s employee.  In Merrill, Knauf hired Ellerman 
Roofing to repair its roof.  Merrill, an Ellerman employee, was injured when he fell through a 
skylight in Knauf’s roof.  771 N.E.2d at 1262.  The court reasoned that Knauf would be liable for 
Merrill’s injuries only if it should have anticipated that Merrill would fail to protect himself 
despite his knowledge of the danger and if, despite this anticipation, Knauf failed to exercise 
reasonable care to protect Merrill.  Id. at 1265.  The court pointed out that Ellerman was a 
professional roofing company and was in control of the manner in which the roof was to be 
prepared.  Id.  Because Knauf had warned the independent contractor of the danger of the 
skylight, the court held that Knauf could not be held liable.  Id.  The court reasoned, “the 
warnings to Merrill’s superiors were warnings to Merrill, ‘the employment relation permitting a 
reasonable assumption that such notice will be communicated in the ordinary course to all 
employees on the work.’”  Id. (quoting Howard v. H.J. Ricks Constr. Co., 509 N.E.2d 201, 205-
06 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)).  Just as the warnings to Merrill’s supervisors constituted warnings to 
Merrill, ACandS’s knowledge of the dangers of asbestos can be imputed to Roberts.  See Moloso 
v. State, 644 P.2d 205, 220 (Alaska 1982).  If the individual knowledge of each employee were 
the test, landowners would be required to monitor the performance of independent contractors 
 
17
working on their property.  Once again we are faced with a theory that would impose an 
additional cost on every project to little benefit because the contractor is presumably in the best 
position to evaluate what precautions are necessary.  It would also diffuse the contractor’s 
responsibility over an area in which the contractor is presumably the expert.  We conclude that 
ACandS was employed to work with PSI’s insulation.  Its knowledge is the relevant benchmark 
here, not Roberts’s.   
Unless the landowner has unique knowledge not imparted to the independent contractor, 
the owner should have no liability to employees of the independent contractor based on a claim 
that the project is unusually risky or dangerous.  Landowners often hire independent contractors 
to take advantage of the special skill or knowledge the contractor possesses.  In assessing the 
comparative knowledge of the parties involved, the focus of the inquiry is upon whether the 
landowner had superior knowledge with regard to any danger on the premises.  Armstrong v. 
Cerestar USA, Inc., 775 N.E.2d 360, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.  Although the 
record shows awareness on the part of PSI, ACandS, and Roberts himself of the dangers in 
handling asbestos, there is no evidence that PSI possessed superior knowledge to ACandS in this 
respect. 
B. Restatement section 343A 
The Restatement states that a landowner “is not liable . . . unless” it should anticipate 
harm.  Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343A.  Even though an independent contractor who is 
an invitee may have equal or superior knowledge of the dangers on the premises, this language 
from the Restatement can be read to imply that a possessor of land may be liable to his invitees 
for physical harm caused to them if “the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such 
knowledge or obviousness.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343A.  Comment f to this section 
explains that when the landowner should anticipate that the dangerous condition would cause 
physical harm to the invitee notwithstanding its known or obvious danger, the possessor is not 
relieved of the duty of reasonable care which he owes to the invitee.  Id. cmt f.  “This duty may 
require him to warn the invitee, or to take other reasonable steps to protect him, against the 
known or obvious condition or activity, if the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee will 
nevertheless suffer physical harm.”  Id.   
 
18
PSI’s corporate representative testified that he frequently saw ACandS’s insulators 
performing work at the PSI plants in the 1960s and 1970s and never saw the employees taking 
any precautions to protect themselves from breathing the asbestos insulation.  There was 
testimony that senior members of PSI’s management were present while contractors from 
ACandS worked on insulation.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that “PSI cannot continue to rely 
on what might have been a reasonable expectation at the outset where activities inconsistent with 
that expectation continued for a number of years.” PSI Energy, Inc., 802 N.E.2d at 477.  PSI 
responds that it was entitled to assume from the fact that ACandS workers wore no masks that 
these “skilled tradesmen” had determined that masks were not necessary.  We agree that 
landowners often hire independent contractors with the understanding that those contractors 
possess better tools and skills to perform the work than the landowner and therefore the 
landowner may rely on those skills.  This is one of the basic principles underlying the general 
rule of non-liability and applies in most instances involving a principal who hires an independent 
contractor.   
As we observed in Carie with respect to the “due precaution” exception to the general 
rule of nonliability for acts of independent contractors, the principal’s liability is predicated on 
the principal’s superior familiarity with the risks.  A principal who hires an independent 
contractor to address a problem on the principal’s premises is no different from one who engages 
a contractor for work elsewhere and should have no broader exposure to liability for the 
contractor’s acts.  As applied to impose liability on a landowner for a contractor’s omission, 
imposition of liability for something equally known as the contractor amounts to a backdoor 
expansion of liability for the contractor’s actions.  No case has found the duty to take 
“reasonable steps” to impose on the landlord an obligation to see that a contractor uses 
appropriate safety equipment.4  We think that “reasonable steps” do not extend to, in effect, 
                                             
 
4 The closest we find to an exception is Martin v. Chicago Housing Authority, 637 N.E.2d 506 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1994).  An elevator repairman was injured while performing emergency maintenance on the elevator 
in one of the Housing Authority’s buildings.  He was instructed that the elevator was “down” and that he 
should get it operating.  Id. at 509.  In the course of his repair work, the repairman had to stand on the 
roof of the elevator and direct its movements using control switches on the top of the elevator.  Id.  These 
controls malfunctioned, causing his injuries.  Id. at 510.  Citing Illinois Supreme Court cases holding that 
landowners are not liable to police officers or firemen for injuries normally associated with their jobs, the 
Housing Authority argued that any risks posed by conditions which bring a worker onto a landowner’s 
premises are risks which are inherent in the worker’s job, and as such are not unreasonable risks imposing 
 
19
supervision of the independent contractor’s activities.  Accordingly, failure to take that action is 
not a breach of the landowner’s standard of care.  For that reason, we hold that a landowner 
ordinarily has no liability to an independent contractor or the contractor’s employees for injuries 
sustained while addressing a condition as to which the landowner has no superior knowledge.   
C. The Jury Instructions in this Case 
In this case, the jury was instructed that:  
A landowner has a common law duty to exercise due care to keep its 
property in a reasonably safe condition for employees of independent contractors.  
The landowner in such case has an affirmative duty to exercise ordinary care to 
keep its property in a reasonably safe condition consistent with the purpose of the 
landowner’s invitation to the independent contractor. 
In this case, a landowner would be liable for physical harm caused to Mr. 
Roberts, by a condition on its property, if Plaintiffs prove each of the following: 
(a) The landowner knew or by the exercise of reasonable care should have 
discovered the condition, and should have realized that it involved an 
unreasonable risk of harm to Mr. Roberts; 
(b) The landowner should have expected that Mr. Roberts would not 
discover or realize the danger, or would fail to protect himself against it; 
(c) The landowner failed to exercise reasonable care to protect Mr. 
Roberts against the danger; and 
(d) The Landowners’ breach proximately caused Mr. Roberts’s disease.   
PSI appeals solely on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support liability.  
As the foregoing discussion makes apparent, this instruction is not an accurate statement of the 
law in that it allows liability to an independent contractor’s employee to be imposed upon a 
landowner when the employee is addressing a condition as to which the landowner has no 
superior knowledge.  It also would permit liability for failure to correct the contractor’s 
omissions in safety precautions.   
This instruction is, with immaterial editorial changes, taken from the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 343 (1965), which was expressly approved by this Court in Burrell v. Meads, 
569 N.E.2d 637, 643 (1991).  PSI and every other defendant understandably did not challenge 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
a duty upon the landowner.  Id. at 518.  The court disagreed and held that Martin was injured as a result of 
the unreasonably dangerous condition of the elevator brought about by the Housing Authority’s failure to 
adequately inspect and maintain it.  Id.  However, in Martin the plaintiff was hired to repair the elevator 
itself, not the control switches which were the cause of his injury. 
 
20
this instruction at trial and PSI raises no issue as to it on appeal.  Nor does PSI raise an issue as 
to a rejected instruction.  Even erroneous instructions require affirmance if there is no objection 
at trial and the facts support recovery under the instructions.  Piccadilly, Inc. v. Colvin, 519 
N.E.2d 1217, 1221 (Ind. 1988); Ind. Trial Rule 51(C).  The record includes evidence that at least 
by the 1970s hazards from asbestos exposure were identified and known to PSI.  ACandS 
employees were nevertheless unproctected on the site.  On this record, the jury could find that 
PSI met all of the conditions:  PSI had knowledge of the hazard, knew ACandS employees were 
taking no action to protect themselves, and did nothing.  These facts would be sufficient under 
these instructions to sustain the jury’s verdict.  Indeed, these unusual facts may well be reflected 
in the jury’s verdict in which the other three defendant landowners were found without fault.   
Conclusion 
 
Because the jury returned a general verdict, and the evidence most favorable to the 
verdict supported one of the two counts, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
 
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, J. concur. 
Dickson, J., concurs in result and dissents with separate opinion in which Rucker, J., concurs. 
 
21
Dickson, Justice, concurring in result and dissenting. 
 
 
I concur with the majority's affirmance of the trial court judgment.  But I dissent from the 
majority's general discussion regarding the responsibility of a principal or landowner for injuries 
suffered by workers employed by an independent contractor hired by the landowner or principal.  
In an apparent effort to provide protection for landowners and other entities that employ 
independent contractors to eliminate or ameliorate dangerous conditions, the Court's opinion, in 
my judgment, goes too far and represents a significant departure from important principles of 
Indiana construction safety law.    
  
 
 
The majority opinion for the Court is divided into two parts, with part I referring to PSI's 
vicarious liability for the acts of ACandS, and part II addressing PSI's direct liability as possessor 
of the premises for the conditions that caused Roberts's injuries.   
 
 
In part I, the Court addresses the vicarious liability of PSI for the acts of ACandS.  In this 
part the Court notes that there are five exceptions to the general rule of nonliability for injuries 
resulting from actions of independent contractors, but focuses upon the two raised by Roberts: 
(1) the "intrinsically dangerous" exception, and (2) the "due precaution" exception.   
 
 
In part I-A, the Court acknowledges the reasoning and holding in Bagley v. Insight 
Communications Co., 658 N.E.2d 584, 587-88 (Ind. 1995), which stated:  
Our objective is no less to protect workers who may be exposed to such risks than it is to 
protect non-employee third parties. . . . Where a contractor's employer is responsible for a 
non-delegable duty, the contractor's injured worker should not discriminately be deprived 
of access to full compensatory damages but should have recourse equal to that of an 
injured bystander.   
Id. at 588.  And the Court correctly observes that this language "may fairly be read to apply to 
liability for acts of the contractor under the five exceptions."  Slip op. at 8.   
 
But the Court then proceeds to hold the opposite, broadly declaring that "in the absence 
of negligent selection of the contractor, an employee of the contractor has no claim against the 
principal based solely on the five exceptions to the general rule of nonliability for acts of the 
 
22
contractor."  Id. at 8-9.  I disagree and believe our precedent in Bagley should control.  I 
understand the Court's focus today to be generally that of shielding principals from liability for 
the actions of independent contractors employed to eliminate or ameliorate hazardous conditions.  
Discarding Bagley, however, is an unnecessarily broad stroke to accomplish this objective, 
which I believe to be generally attainable under existing law.   
 
 
In part I-B, the Court concludes that "working with asbestos is not intrinsically dangerous 
such that anyone hiring a contractor to address it incurs strict liability for injuries sustained from 
exposure to it."  Id. at 11.  I strongly disagree with this assertion, believing that asbestos is 
precisely the sort of danger to which the intrinsically dangerous exception should apply. 
 
 
This principle is expressed in Restatement of Torts, Second § 427 A: "One who employs 
an independent contractor to do work which the employer knows or has reason to know to 
involve an abnormally dangerous activity, is subject to liability to the same extent as the 
contractor for physical harm to others caused by the activity."  The underlying purpose of this 
rule is that:  
[O]ne who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer knows or 
has reason to know to involve an abnormally dangerous activity cannot be permitted to 
escape the responsibility for the abnormal danger created by the activity which he has set 
in motion, and so cannot delegate the responsibility for harm resulting to others to the 
contractor.   
Comment b to § 427 A.  The illustrations following § 427 refer to injuries resulting from the 
non-negligent escape of lions and urban blasting operations as examples of abnormally 
dangerous activities.   
 
As acknowledged by the Court, we have previously described asbestos fibers as "an 
inherently dangerous substance . . . a toxic foreign substance . . . an inherently dangerous product 
. . . and a hazardous foreign substance."  Slip op. at 10, quoting Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 
543 N.E.2d 382, 384-86 (Ind. 1989).  We have likewise noted that "[t]he normal, expected use of 
asbestos products entails contact with its migrating and potentially harmful residue."  
Stegemoller v. ACandS, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 2003) (allowing action as a products liability 
act "bystander" by spouse contracting disease as result of contact with asbestos fibers brought 
home on the person and clothing of husband, a union insulator).  
 
23
 
 
Dr. David Mares, who diagnosed the plaintiff's peritoneal mesothelioma, stated that, 
without a doubt, "it was caused by asbestos exposure."  Trans. at 1208.  Dr. Mares also provided 
vivid testimony describing the disease's deadly nature.  He declared that malignant mesothelioma 
is a fatal disease process.  "It is not curable."  Trans. at 1196.  The time from the date of 
diagnosis to the date of death in a person with malignant peritoneal mesothelioma is usually "a 
year or less."  Trans. at 1206.  Dr. Mares explained:   
 
There are several possible ways that Mr. Roberts can be involved with this disease 
process.  The first being recurrent accumulation of fluid in the abdomen that needs to be 
taken off with this [tapping] procedure . . . That can be, of course, painful and limiting to 
one's life, to have to be tied to the hospital . . . That's kind of the early progress of the 
disease . . . Another way could be that . . . the tumor itself tends to form less fluid and 
would instead progress by growing within the abdomen, causing pain by growth into any 
of the vital structures, such as the umbilical pain . . . It can grow into the muscle layers.  
It can grow into the bones of the back . . . [or] into the vital organs.  This causes a 
tremendous amount of pain.  The kind of pain that would require continuous infusion of 
medicines to control . . . [T]he third possibility would be that the intestines become 
enveloped and, in a sense, strangulated by the tumor such that he would be unable to eat, 
unable to even swallow anything, and the body's own natural secretions would build up in 
the body.  It would be the bowel obstruction pattern, where he would continuously vomit, 
require tubes to drain his stomach contents and his stomach's own secretions . . . And 
that, I feel, in combination with the pain is the most horrible way one can die of 
mesothelioma. 
 
Trans. at 1203-05.  Dr. Mares pointed out that Mr. Roberts's pain will be "uncontrollable" and 
"unbearable" and that the "best medications will not provide pain relief."  Trans. at 1220.   
 
Describing the nature of mesothelioma, pathologist Arnold R. Brody, Ph.D., explained: 
"Our peritoneal cavity is where some of our organs are, like the stomach and the liver and the 
spleen sit in the peritoneal cavity.  And that is lined by a single layer of cells, the mesothelium . . 
. And when there is cancer of those cells, those mesothelial cells, it is mesothelioma."  Trans. at 
1383.  Professor Brody stated, "[A]ll of the asbestos fiber types can cause mesothelioma . . . they 
all are perfectly good carcinogens."  Trans. at 1384.  He observed that no safe level of asbestos 
exposure has ever been established and that "[t]here is no level below which we know it to be 
absolutely safe and will not cause mesothelioma."  Trans. at 1429.   
 
 
24
One of the more insidious aspects of this fatal disease is the fact that its symptoms 
suddenly appear often decades after a worker is exposed to asbestos.  Regarding this latency 
period between the exposure to asbestos and the first appearance of symptoms of malignant 
mesotheliomas, Dr. Brody testified that the probability for the latency period to be less than 10 
years is about zero; for latency periods of 10 to 14 years about 0.5%; for 15 to 19 years, still just 
about 3%; and for 20 years or more, 96%.  Dr. Brody agreed with an estimate that the average 
period in these cases from initial exposure to death is about 32 years.  Trans. at 1480-82.   
 
The Court specifically notes the testimony of Dr. Michael Ellenbecker emphasizing that 
"when we're talking about mesothelioma, I think it's difficult to do any activities with asbestos 
where you completely eliminate the hazard."  Slip op. at 10, quoting Tr. at 2538.  Asked whether 
there is any safe level of exposure to asbestos in the context of the risk of developing 
mesothelioma, Dr. Eugene Mark answered, "I don't think there is any safe level."  Tr. at 2021.  
Likewise, Dr. Edwin Holstein testified that there is no recognized safe level of exposure to 
asbestos insulation such that no mesothelioma would occur in insulation workers.  He explained, 
"There may be such a level at very, very, very low levels, but we don't know what it is.  What we 
do know is that even very small exposures have caused mesothelioma in some people."  Tr. at 
1559.  In fact, the Court itself acknowledges that "it is clear that working with any level of 
asbestos can be associated with mesothelioma."  Slip op. at 13.   
 
Thus we see that asbestos workers are extraordinarily susceptible to this insidious and 
virulent disease that will usually go undetected for decades but then suddenly erupt with 
devastating and almost inevitably fatal consequences.  Elimination of this enormous risk is 
virtually impossible because it requires preventing every possibility of asbestos workers inhaling 
any asbestos fibers.       
 
Conceding that working with asbestos can be perilous, the Court nevertheless concludes 
that the work does not qualify for the intrinsically dangerous exception to the rule of 
subcontractor nonliability because, although dangerous, "proper precautions can minimize the 
risk of injury."  Id. at 11.  As authority for this conclusion, the Court cites Carie v. PSI Energy, 
Inc., 694 N.E.2d 729, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).  Carie found the intrinsically dangerous 
 
25
exception inapplicable, noting that "[t]here is nothing intrinsically dangerous about generating 
station maintenance in and of itself," that the accident was caused by the collateral negligence of 
others, and that "proper precautions were not taken during the cover removal process."  Id. at 
734.  Elaborating on the last point, and citing earlier opinions of the Court of Appeals, the court 
declared that "[a]n instrumentality or undertaking is not intrinsically dangerous if the 'risk of 
injury involved in its use can be eliminated or significantly reduced by taking proper 
precautions,'"  and explained that "[t]he proper inquiry is whether the taking of proper 
precautions would significantly reduce or eliminate the risk of injury."  Id. at 735 (emphasis 
added). 1  The emphasized words, in my opinion, are of crucial importance.  Otherwise this 
"proper precautions" rationale would conflate the "intrinsically dangerous" exception with the 
"due precautions" exception and thus eviscerate the "intrinsically dangerous" exception 
altogether.   
 
 
An intrinsically dangerous activity, also referred to as an "abnormally dangerous activity" 
in the Restatement of Torts, Second § 520, is therein explained as follows: 
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to 
be considered: 
     (a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of 
others; 
     (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; 
     (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 
     (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 
     (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and 
     (f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous  
attributes.   
This analysis requires the full inability to eliminate the risk, not merely to significantly reduce it.  
In my view, this is preferable to the prevailing Indiana appellate view that the intrinsically 
dangerous exception does not apply to risks that cannot be "significantly reduced."   
 
Even applying the view that the intrinsically dangerous exception is applicable where 
risks either cannot be eliminated, or significantly reduced by due precaution, it appears clear that 
the risk of contracting mesothelioma demands that working with asbestos still be deemed 
                                             
 
1 We granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals Carie opinion, Carie v. PSI Energy, Inc., 715 N.E.2d 
853, 858 (Ind. 1999), but “summarily affirmed” by footnote as to the intrinsically dangerous exception 
issue. 
 
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intrinsically dangerous.  As noted above, the Restatement cites the escape of lions and urban 
blasting as examples of abnormally dangerous activities.  Obviously, such risks can be somewhat 
reduced with due precaution, but they cannot be eliminated or even significantly reduced.  So it 
is with asbestos.   
 
The Court today asserts only that "precautions could have minimized Roberts's exposure 
to asbestos" to justify its conclusion that "working with asbestos is not intrinsically dangerous."  
Slip op. at 11.  But minimizing is not enough.  Not only must due precautions have "minimized" 
the risk; they must have been able to eliminate or significantly reduce it.  The risk of asbestos 
workers contracting mesothelioma cannot be eliminated nor significantly reduced.  It is the 
quintessential example of an intrinsically dangerous activity.   
 
 
Summarizing its conclusions, the Court concludes part I in part by stating that "Roberts 
has no claim against PSI for activities of ACandS as PSI's independent contractor because (a) the 
injuries he suffered came from a situation he was employed to address, (b) asbestos is not 
'inherently dangerous' as that term is used in the exception to nonliability for acts of independent 
contractors, . . . " Id. at 14.  It is my view that rationale (a) disregards precedent.  Moreover, it is 
too broad and may be misapplied to any and all claims of injury to employees of subcontractors 
even when any one of the five recognized exceptions are clearly applicable.  As to rationale (b), I 
strongly believe it fails to recognize the fact that working with asbestos is an intrinsically 
dangerous activity, the responsibility for which the principal may not delegate to a subcontractor.  
 
 
In part II, the Court acknowledges the duty of a property owner to "maintain the property 
in reasonably safe condition for business invitees including independent contractors and their 
employees."  Id. at 14.  However, emphasizing that asbestos removal was the reason Roberts was 
on the PSI premises, the majority opines that the law does not support Roberts's claim "to the 
extent it is based on PSI's knowledge of asbestos on the property and awareness that ACandS 
was not requiring safeguards."  Id. at 16.  In a significant amplification of premises liability 
jurisprudence, the Court today announces that, henceforth, where the invitee is the employee of 
an independent contractor employed to remedy a dangerous condition, the occupant/owner's 
knowledge should be compared with that of the independent contractor, not merely the 
 
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knowledge of its employee.  This new rule alone should significantly provide the protection 
sought by the majority for the use of independent remediation contractors without the additional 
measures taken by the majority that I believe generally assault and undermine important 
principles of owner/principal liability and its resulting enhancement of construction worker 
safety.   
 
 
I believe, however, that this innovation is detrimental to more important and established 
principles of responsibility and accountability in tort.  The Restatement of Torts (Second), § 343 
recognizes that a "possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees 
by a condition on the land" only if the possessor knows or should discover and realize that it 
"involves an unreasonable risk of harm," should expect that "they will not discover or realize the 
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it," and then fails to exercise reasonable care to 
protect the invitees from the danger.  The word "they" refers to the injured invitee, not the 
invitee's employer.  This obligation is qualified by Section 343 A(1), which states that the 
possessor is "not liable to his invitees" for injuries caused "by an activity or condition on the land 
whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm 
despite such knowledge or obviousness."  (emphasis added).  Section 343 A(1) thus allows 
accommodation for the very concern that permeates the majority opinion.  Where a possessor 
employs an independent contractor with respect to activities or conditions on the land known or 
obvious to persons thereby coming onto the land, the possessor will have no liability except in 
those extraordinary circumstances where the possessor should anticipate harm notwithstanding 
the obviousness of the risk.  The Restatement is clear, however, that in the latter situation, the 
possessor remains accountable.  These principles have long been recognized.  Professor Prosser 
explains: 
[W]here a condition is one . . . which cannot be negotiated with reasonable safety even 
though the invitee is fully aware of it . . . the jury may be permitted to find that 
obviousness, warning or even knowledge is not enough.  It is generally agreed that the 
obligation as to the condition of the premises is of such importance that it cannot be 
delegated, and that the occupier will be liable for the negligence of an independent 
contractor to whom  
he entrusts maintenance and repair. 
William L. Prosser, Law of Torts § 61, p. 394-95 (1971).  I am opposed to the majority's new 
rule, permitting a landowner to abandon to independent contractors all responsibility for the risk 
 
28
of harm to invitees from extremely dangerous conditions on the land, thus undermining the 
foregoing well-established principles of responsibility and accountability under tort law.    
 
 
Even with the majority's modification of the rule to provide special protection to 
principals employing certain independent contractors, it must be recognized that there is a limit 
to the landowner's reasonable reliance on the contractor.  Pursuant to § 343 A of the 
Restatement, other courts have held that a landowner may be liable for an independent 
contractor's injury by dangers from known or obvious conditions if the landowner should have 
realized the risk that the contractor would not protect itself or its employees despite the obvious 
nature of the danger.  For example, in Miller v. Zep Manufacturing Co., 815 P.2d 506 (Kan. 
1991), an employee was injured when he fell into a concrete pit on the landowner's property.  
The court affirmed a jury finding in favor of the employee, reasoning that the evidence was 
sufficient for the jury to find that the landowner should have anticipated and prevented the risk.  
Id. at 515.  In Watkins v. Mt. Carmel Public Utility Co.,  519 N.E.2d 10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), the 
plaintiff worked processing crude oil stored in two large tanks constructed near an uninsulated 
power line.  He was injured when an aluminum pole he was carrying while walking on a catwalk 
above the tanks touched the power line.  Id. at 11-12.  The trial court dismissed the complaint, 
but the Illinois Court of Appeals reversed, holding that it is a jury question whether the defendant 
should have anticipated the risk of injury despite the obviousness of the danger.  Id. at 13.  In 
Boatwright v. Sunlight Foods, Inc., 592 So.2d 261, 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), an employee 
of an independent contractor was fatally injured in a fall from a negligently designed vinegar 
tank.  Based on evidence that the owner designed the tank and knew of the danger, but refused to 
install a guardrail, the court reasoned that the jury could find the owner negligent.  Id.    
 
 
I respectfully contend that the Court today employs unnecessary draconian 
methodologies to provide protection for landowners and other entities that employ independent 
contractors to eliminate or ameliorate dangerous conditions.  Except for genuine intrinsically 
dangerous activities, such interests already receive significant protection under the "due 
precautions" exception and Restatement § 343 A(1).  More significant, I submit, is the constraint 
intrinsic to the comparative fault allocation system itself.  In the present case, for example, the 
jury allocated thirteen percent fault to PSI, twelve percent fault to Roberts, thirty-six percent 
 
29
fault to nonparty ACandS, and the remaining fault to other nonparties.  This shows clear 
recognition of the significant role of the independent contractor, ACandS.  And apart from this 
case, where the landowner was shown to have independently contributed to substantially 
increase the risk to the worker, other cases will very likely result in an even greater allocation of 
fault to the independent remediation contractor.  Justice is better served by trusting the sound 
judgment of civil juries than by erecting protective judicial doctrines. 
 
 
Notwithstanding my disagreements with much of the Court's discussion today regarding 
liability for injuries to employees of independent contractors, I concur with its conclusion that 
the evidence in this case was sufficient under the instructions to sustain the jury's verdict and the 
trial court's judgment.  For these reasons, I concur in result.   
 
Rucker, J., concurs.  
  
 
 
 
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