Case Title: Wallace v. Magie

Citation: 214 Kan. 481, 522 P.2d 989

Docket Number: 47,244

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1974-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
214 Kan. 481 (1974)
522 P.2d 989
CHARLES AGUSTUS WALLACE, MARY CHRISTINA WALLACE PHILLIPS, EDITH CATHERINE WALLACE LEE, MARGARET ALICE WALLACE PENTZER, SADIE MORRIS WALLACE SETTLES, CARRIE GOLDINA WALLACE THOMSON, ROBERT WILLIAM WALLACE, GLEN ELDER WALLACE, RUTH MAY WALLACE ALLEN, VERNON D. WALLACE, and VERA AGNES WALLACE STUBBLEFIELD, Appellants,
v.
C.H. MAGIE and LOURENA MAGIE, Appellees,
v.
THE HEALY COOPERATIVE ELEVATOR COMPANY, Appellee.
No. 47,244

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 6, 1974.
Everett L. Baker, of Lyons, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellants.
Douglas C. Spencer, of Oakley, argued the cause, and Corwin C. Spencer *482 and James A. Spencer, also of Oakley, were with him on the brief for the appellees, C.H. Magie and Lourena Magie.
Gary R. Hathaway and K. Mike Kimball, of Hathaway & Kimball, of Ulysses, were on the brief for the appellee, the Healy Cooperative Elevator Company.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
OWSLEY, J.:
William R. Wallace, owner of the record title to the real property involved in this action, died on November 22, 1916, a resident of the State of Oregon. His will was admitted to probate and record in Lane County, Kansas, on June 28, 1919. He was survived by his wife, Della, who died in 1966, and twelve children, eleven of whom survive and are the appellants and plaintiffs in this action. They claim title to the property as remaindermen under the will of William R. Wallace.
Della, who subsequently married Henry Schweitzer, became indebted to the third party defendant, Healy Cooperative Elevator Company. Healy, through attachment and execution, acquired title to the subject property in 1939. In 1943, Healy conveyed the property by general warranty deed to the defendants, C.H. Magie and Lourena Magie, who remain in possession.
We must first decide the interest in the property devised to Della Wallace by the will of William R. Wallace. If we decide she acquired a fee title in the property in line with the holding of the trial court this case should be affirmed and title quieted in the Magies. If we conclude Della acquired only a life estate, the trial court's judgment cannot be affirmed unless we find the Magies have acquired title by open, exclusive and continuous possession either under a claim knowingly adverse or under a belief of ownership for a period of fifteen years. (K.S.A. 60-503.)
The case was submitted to the trial court on the pleadings and a stipulation of facts. The following parts of the stipulation are pertinent to this appeal:
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Joint Exhibit 1, being the last will and testament of William R. Wallace, reads as follows:
"The minor children and minor heirs are as follows.
"Vera Agnes Wallace age 2.
"/s/ William R. Wallace (Seal)"
As stated, the trial court found the will created a fee title in Della Wallace. The basic rule of construction applicable to wills is found in In re Estate of Freshour, 185 Kan. 434, 345 P.2d 689. We stated:
Although the will is not expertly drawn and there are provisions thereof which might be considered ambiguous, we find no ambiguity in connection with the issue we must decide. Applying the foregoing rule of construction we have no hesitancy in concluding the will created a life estate in Della Wallace with a power of disposition. Many cases could be cited from which an analogy could be drawn in support of this position. Nothing would be added to the law of this state to do so, but reference is made to an article entitled "Expressions of Intent to Create Fees, Life Estates and Powers of Disposition in Kansas," by William R. Scott, 3 Washburn Law Journal 5. On page 7 thereof, the author sets forth samples of limitations which have been construed to create a life estate despite prior language which, if considered alone, might be broad enough to create a fee. In this will, after devising the property to Della Wallace, the testator limited the estate by providing she was to hold the property in her own name and right during her natural life and then divide it among the named heirs as she saw fit. He also provided for the right to sell the property with consent of a son. Both of these provisions are contrary to an intention to devise a fee title.
Defendant Healy proceeded to attach and sell the land as though *486 Della Wallace (Schweitzer) owned a fee title. K.S.A. 60-2416 provides that an attaching creditor acquires only the interest of its debtor in the property attached. (Also, see Howard v. Howard, 149 Kan. 223, 86 P.2d 510.) Since we have determined Della Wallace (Schweitzer) owned only a life estate in the property, a life estate is all Healy could acquire, so limiting the interest conveyed to C.H. Magie and Lourena Magie. The Magies, however, claim they and their predecessors in interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the real estate for more fifteen years under claim of title and belief of ownership. The effectiveness of their claim involves a construction of K.S.A. 60-503.
K.S.A. 60-503, which amended G.S. 1949, 60-304 Fourth, became effective January 1, 1964, and we first considered its effect in Stark v. Stanhope, 206 Kan. 428, 480 P.2d 72. This case pointed out that the former statute required the possession to be notorious and hostile while the new statute eliminated the element of hostility as essential to adverse possession. The case also recognized that in lieu of an adverse holding the claim may be based on "belief of ownership." The ramifications created by this phrase were not at issue in Stark, but our confrontation therewith was inevitable and emerged in Armstrong v. Cities Service Gas Co., 210 Kan. 298, 502 P.2d 672. We will not restate the facts in Armstrong in view of their complexity and their availability in our reports; however, reference will be made to them in connection with the original rules of law developed therein. One of the primary problems in Armstrong was to harmonize the "belief of ownership" concept with K.S.A. 58-2222, which charges the owner of land with constructive notice of facts disclosed by public records. We concluded constructive notice did not prevent a possessor of land from claiming in good faith under "belief of ownership." It was recognized that if the rule were otherwise the concept of "belief of ownership" would be obliterated. If an owner was charged with searching the records and found a defect, he no longer could claim under a "belief of ownership," but would be required to hold by adverse possession. If he searched and found no defects in his title, he would have no need to assert "belief of ownership." We held that the concept of possession under "belief of ownership" could not be judicially nullified.
In Armstrong, the remaindermen had knowledge of the existence of the easements for more than fifteen years prior to the filing of the *487 action. We held a cause of action accrued in the remaindermen on discovery of the easements and the action was barred. The foundation for the conclusion is found in K.S.A. 60-507, which provides:
In the instant case there are no facts relating to knowledge in the remaindermen as to the use of the property by those in possession. K.S.A. 60-503 is directed to a justified state of mind in the possessor of the property. If the possessor satisfies the provisions of the statute, ownership may be confirmed without regard to facts known to the remaindermen.
Since open, continuous and exclusive possession is stipulated (see No. 26 above) the remaining issue in this case is whether the Magies had a good faith belief of ownership and whether under the facts and circumstances such a belief was justified. The record reveals the Magies purchased the subject property in 1943 and received a general warranty deed conveying a fee title without exceptions. The price is questioned by plaintiffs as being more in line with the value of a life estate therein, but no evidence was introduced to support this contention. The Magies were in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the property from 1943 to 1971 when this action was filed. Through the years, Magies engaged in the following acts:
1. In 1944, Magies granted a perpetual easement and right-of-way to Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Company, Inc., which conveyance was filed of record May 11, 1944.
2. In 1946, Magies sold the house located on the real estate.
3. In 1949, Magies granted a real estate mortgage on the premises to Kellogg Sales Company, which mortgage was filed of record April 4, 1949.
4. In 1951, 1954, and 1962 Magies granted oil and gas leases on the premises, which leases were filed of record on April 4, 1951, December 1, 1954, and October 11, 1962, respectively.
5. In 1965, Magies sold rock taken from the premises.
6. Magies made improvements on the property at a cost of $750.00.
The manner in which Magies purchased the property, and the facts and circumstances following the purchase, justified their right *488 to a continuous and uninterrupted belief they owned the whole of title to the property.
We agree with the results of the trial court's judgment, but for a different reason. In City of Wichita v. Boles, 156 Kan. 619, 135 P.2d 542, we held:
The cited case is also authority for the rule that when the facts are stipulated an appellate court can determine what is shown by the facts as readily and as fully as the trial court. We are required under these circumstances to affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
SCHROEDER, J., dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Armstrong v. Cities Service Gas Co., 210 Kan. 298, 314, 502 P.2d 672.
The facts of this case present a stronger argument for reversal of the trial court's judgment than in Armstrong because here the remainderman who acquired title, after the termination of the life estate of Della Wallace in 1966, had no knowledge as to the prior use of the property by those in possession as the remaindermen did in Armstrong.
Furthermore, here Della Wallace had a life estate with a power of disposition. This court has held that where by the terms of a will the power and discretion to terminate a life estate is vested in a beneficiary, this power is personal; and it is not property which may be subjected to forced sale on execution. (Ryan v. Cullen, 96 Kan. 284, 150 Pac. 597, Syl. 3.)
It is respectfully submitted the judgment of the lower court should be reversed.