Case Title: Outdoor Media Dimensions v. Dept. of Transportation

Citation: 

Docket Number: S50458

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  March 23, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
OUTDOOR MEDIA DIMENSIONS, INC.,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent on Review.
OUTDOOR MEDIA DIMENSIONS, INC.,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent on Review.
OUTDOOR MEDIA DIMENSIONS, INC.,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
DRIVER AND MOTOR VEHICLE SERVICES BRANCH (DMV),
Respondent on Review.
OUTDOOR MEDIA DIMENSIONS, INC.,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
DRIVER AND MOTOR VEHICLE SERVICES BRANCH (DMV),
Respondent on Review.
OUTDOOR MEDIA DIMENSIONS, INC.,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
DRIVER AND MOTOR VEHICLE SERVICES BRANCH (DMV),
Respondent on Review.
(ODOT 88691, 89838, 90587, 90588, 90589, 91564;
ODOT 79817, 85185; DMV 66981, 68677, 70642, 74573, 74889;
DMV 58118; DMV 61907, 63047; CA A116814; CA A113875 (control),
A114027; CA A106450; CA A102328; CA A100658 (control),
A100659; SC S50458, SC S49978, SC S50007, SC S50003, SC S50044)
(Consolidated for argument and opinion)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 10, 2004.
Alan R. Herson, Jacksonville, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for petitioner on review. 
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review.  With
her on the briefs were Kelly Knivila, Assistant Attorney General,
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor
General.
Russell L. Baldwin, Lincoln City, argued the cause and filed
the brief for amicus curiae Ray Drayton.
Michael T. Garone, of Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, P.C.,
Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Outdoor
Advertising Association.  With him on the brief were Donald Joe
Willis and Jill S. Gelineau.
Margarita Molina, of Davis Wright Tremaine, Portland, filed
the brief for amicus curiae ACLU Foundation of Oregon.  With her
on the brief was Patricia McGuire.
Before Carson, Chief Justice,** and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz,*** and Balmer, Justices.****
BALMER, J.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals and the orders of the
Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Branch and the Department of
Transportation are reversed.  Case numbers S50003, S50007, and
S50044 are remanded to the Driver and Motor Vehicle Services
Branch for further proceedings, and case numbers S49978 and
S50458 are remanded to the Department of Transportation for
further proceedings. 
Riggs, J., concurred in part and dissented in part and filed
an opinion. 
*Appeal from orders of the Driver and Motor Vehicle Services
Branch and the Department of Transportation.
Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. ODOT, 187 Or App 503, 68
P3d 274 (2003);
Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. ODOT, 185 Or App 161, 57
P3d 970 (2002);
Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. DMV, 184 Or App 502, 59
P3d 935 (2002);
Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. DMV, 184 Or App 501, 56
P3d 522 (2002);
Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. DMV, 184 Or App 495, 56
P3d 935 (2002).
** Chief Justice when case was argued.
*** Chief Justice when decision was rendered.
**** Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
BALMER, J.
Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution
provides, in part, that "[n]o law shall be passed restraining the
free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak,
write, or print freely on any subject whatever[.]"  In these five
consolidated cases, we consider the relationship between that
provision and the state's regulation of signs along highways
under the Oregon Motorist Information Act, ORS 377.700 to 377.840
and 377.992 (1999) (OMIA). (1)  For the reasons that we discuss
below, we conclude that (1) many of the OMIA's restrictions on
highway signs, including the imposition of certain permit and fee
requirements, are reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
that are unrelated to the substance of any particular message and
therefore do not violate Article I, section 8; but (2) the OMIA
unconstitutionally restricts the "subject" of expression in
violation of Article I, section 8, by requiring a permit for a
sign whose message does not relate to the premises on which the
sign is located while providing an exemption for a sign whose
message does relate to the premises on which the sign is located.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner, Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc., is an
outdoor advertising company that owns signs visible from state
highways.  In each of these cases, the state cited petitioner for
displaying one or more of its outdoor advertising signs without a
permit in violation of the OMIA and ordered the removal of the
signs. (2)  The state issued one of those citations under the
1999 version of the OMIA and the other citations under earlier
versions. (3)  Petitioner challenged each citation on several
state and federal constitutional grounds, and, in each case, the
agency upheld the citation and ordered petitioner to remove the
signs.  On judicial review, the Court of Appeals affirmed each
agency decision.  Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. ODOT, 187 Or
App 503, 68 P3d 274 (2003); Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v.
ODOT, 185 Or App 161, 57 P3d 970 (2002); Outdoor Media
Dimensions, Inc. v. DMV, 184 Or App 502, 56 P3d 935 (2002);
Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. DMV, 184 Or App 501, 56 P3d 522
(2002); Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. DMV, 184 Or App 495, 56
P3d 935 (2002).  Petitioner petitioned for review of each
decision in this court, and we allowed those petitions.
We begin with an overview of the OMIA.  As this court
explained in an earlier case brought by petitioner, Outdoor Media
Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon, 331 Or 634, 20 P3d 180 (2001)
(Outdoor Media I), the legislature enacted the OMIA in 1971 to
comply with the federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965 (HBA),
23 USC § 131.  The HBA established federal standards for erecting
and maintaining advertising signs along interstate and federally
aided primary highways.  The HBA requires each state to provide
"effective control" of outdoor advertising signs.  23 USC
§ 131(b), (c).  If a state fails to do so, then it may lose 10
percent of its federal highway funds.  23 USC § 131(b). 
"Effective control" essentially requires states to prohibit all
outdoor advertising signs that are visible from an interstate or
primary highway, unless a particular sign meets one of five
statutory exceptions or is located in an industrial or commercial
zone.  Outdoor Media I, 331 Or at 637.  Those exceptions include
"on-premises" signs that advertise "activities conducted on the
property on which they are located," "directional and official
signs and notices," and "signs * * * advertising the sale or
lease of property upon which they are located."  23 USC § 131(c). The OMIA comprehensively regulates signs visible from
public highways for the purposes of "promot[ing] the public
safety," "preserv[ing] the recreational value of public travel on
the state's highways," and "preserv[ing] the natural beauty and
aesthetic features of such highways."  ORS 377.705.  It does so
by prohibiting some kinds of signs, setting size and other
limitations on signs that are not prohibited, and establishing a
permit requirement for certain signs.  The OMIA, for example,
prohibits signs that prevent a driver from having a clear and
unobstructed view of approaching or merging traffic, ORS
377.720(2); that include flashing or moving lights, ORS
377.720(3); that are not maintained "in a neat, clean and
attractive condition and in good repair," ORS 377.720(8); or that
are on a vehicle or trailer, unless the vehicle or trailer is
used for transportation by the owner or person in control of the
property on which it is located, ORS 377.720(10).  The OMIA
requires certain minimum spacing between "outdoor advertising
signs," ORS 377.750, and provides that those signs may not exceed
a length of 48 feet and a height, excluding foundation and
supports, of 14 feet.  ORS 377.745(1).  
Of particular relevance to these cases, the OMIA
establishes a permit requirement for outdoor advertising
signs, (4) regulates the permissible location of those signs,
ORS 377.765(1), and effectively caps the number of permits at the
number of outdoor advertising signs located in commercial or
industrial zones as of June 12, 1975.  See Outdoor Media I, 331
Or at 638 (citing ORS 377.712).  In contrast, "on-premises" signs
specifically are exempted from the permit requirement, ORS
377.735(1)(c), (5) although they are subject to certain other
parts of the OMIA described above, such as the prohibition on
flashing lights and the requirement that they be maintained in a
neat and clean condition.  The permits required for outdoor
advertising signs may be transferred as of right by notifying the
state, ORS 377.725(2), and the message on any such sign may be
changed without a new permit and without state approval.  ORS
377.725(8).  The permit fee is set at a level to recover the cost
to the state of administering the regulatory program.  ORS
377.729 (2001).
The OMIA's definitions of "on-premises sign" and
"outdoor advertising sign" are central to the Article I, section
8, issues in this case.  The legislature defined those terms in
ORS 377.710:
"(22) 'On-premises sign' means a sign designed,
intended or used to advertise, inform or attract the
attention of the public as to:
"(a) Activities conducted on the premises on which
the sign is located; or
"(b) The sale or lease of the premises on which
the sign is located.
"(23) 'Outdoor advertising sign' means a sign
designed, intended or used to advertise, inform or
attract the attention of the public as to:
"(a) Goods, products or services which are not
sold, manufactured or distributed on or from the
premises on which the sign is located;
"(b) Facilities not located on the premises on
which the sign is located; or
"(c) Activities not conducted on the premises on
which the sign is located."
As a result of the definitions just quoted and the
substantive provisions of the OMIA that we outlined previously, a
person who wants to erect an on-premises sign need not obtain a
permit from the state, while a person who wants to erect an
outdoor advertising sign must obtain one of the limited number of
available permits. (6)
II.  PROCEEDINGS BELOW AND PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS
With that summary of the OMIA's key provisions in mind,
we return to petitioner's cases.  Before the Court of Appeals,
petitioner did not challenge any finding of fact in the agency
orders, but it raised a number of constitutional arguments. 
Petitioner argued, among other things, that the administrative
procedure that led to the final agency orders violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution; that the OMIA permit and fee requirements are prior
restraints in violation of Article I, section 8, and the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution; that the OMIA
violates the First Amendment by giving greater protection to
commercial than to noncommercial speech; that the OMIA regulates
speech, both generally and on the basis of content, in violation
of Article I, section 8; that the OMIA violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and that the OMIA
violates Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution. (7) 

The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's claims in
each case, holding that the claims either had been resolved
against petitioner's position in earlier cases or did not merit
discussion.  See, e.g., Outdoor Media Dimensions, 184 Or App at
496 (illustrative holding).  Judge Landau wrote a concurring
opinion in one of those cases.  He agreed with the majority that
Court of Appeals precedent compelled affirmance of the agency
orders, but he questioned whether those precedents -- which
rejected petitioner's Article I, section 8, challenge to the
OMIA's distinction between off-premises signs and on-premises
signs -- were valid in light of this court's opinion in Fidanque
v. Oregon Govt. Standards and Practices, 328 Or 1, 969 P2d 376
(1998).  Outdoor Media Dimensions, 184 Or App at 496-98 (Landau,
J., concurring).
In this court, petitioner reiterates the arguments that
it made before the Court of Appeals.  Petitioner asserts that
various provisions of the OMIA, on their face, violate the
federal and state constitutions and that, to the extent that
those provisions are not facially unconstitutional, they are
unconstitutional as the state has applied them to petitioner in
these cases.  As the discussion below will make clear, however,
petitioner's claims are, by and large, facial challenges to the
OMIA's regulatory scheme, and only in a few instances is it
useful to discuss the application of the OMIA to petitioner in
particular.
In our view, two constitutional issues are at the heart
of this case:  First, whether the state may regulate highway
signs by imposing content-neutral restrictions on those signs,
including permit and fee requirements, as it does under the OMIA;
and second, whether the OMIA's distinction between outdoor
advertising signs, sometimes referred to as "off-premises" signs,
and on-premises signs, for purposes of the permit and fee
requirements, violates Article I, section 8.  We now turn to
those issues.
III.  THE OMIA'S RESTRICTIONS ON SIGNS,
INCLUDING PERMIT AND FEE REQUIREMENTS
Petitioner first argues that the OMIA's permit and fee
requirements violate Article I, section 8, because they are
impermissible prior restraints.  Petitioner further asserts that
those requirements, as well as the OMIA's other restrictions on
signs, violate Article I, section 8, because they improperly
restrict petitioner's right to erect the kind of sign that it
wishes where it wishes. 
A.  Petitioner's Prior Restraint Argument
Petitioner argues that, because the OMIA requires a
person to obtain a permit before an outdoor advertising sign
lawfully may be erected, it is an unconstitutional prior
restraint.  Petitioner claims that "Article I, section 8,
mandates that speech can be displayed without a permit," and
that, under that provision, the state "may take action only after
the speech is displayed."  The state first responds that
petitioner cannot sustain a prior restraint claim because no
prior restraint occurred in these cases:  Petitioner did
"display" his "speech" without a permit, and the state took
action only after petitioner did so.  The state argues that, as
in Outdoor Media I, petitioner never applied for or obtained
permits for the erection or maintenance of its signs and
therefore was not subject to any prior restraint.  In that case,
this court rejected petitioner's "prior restraint" claim, holding
that, "respecting prior restraint, none occurred under the facts
of this case."  331 Or at 654 n 11.  The state argues that this
case is in the same procedural posture and that, as in Outdoor
Media I, we should decline to consider petitioner's argument that
the permit requirement is an unconstitutional prior restraint.  
The state is mistaken.  The prior restraint issue in
Outdoor Media I involved petitioner's claim for damages under 42
USC section 1983, and this court concluded that, because
petitioner had erected and maintained its signs without permits
notwithstanding the OMIA's permit and fee requirements, he could
not prove that those requirements had caused his alleged damage. 
Id. at 654-55.  Here, in contrast, petitioner does not seek
monetary damages but instead argues that the permit and fee
requirements that are the basis for the orders requiring removal
of its signs are themselves unconstitutional prior restraints. 
The parties agree that those requirements, on their face, apply
to petitioner, so the only question is whether they are
constitutionally permissible.  In those circumstances, we
perceive no reason to require petitioner to seek permits for its
signs before raising its constitutional challenges.
We turn to the merits of petitioner's prior restraint
argument.  As noted, petitioner argues that the requirement that
it pay a fee and obtain a permit before erecting an outdoor
advertising sign constitutes a prior restraint that is barred by
Article I, section 8.  The state counters that the permit and fee
requirements are not impermissible prior restraints because they
are content neutral and have adequate standards to guide official
discretion in the issuance of permits.  The gravamen of a
prohibited prior restraint, according to the state, is the
prospect of government censorship of speech; the OMIA's content-neutral permit and fee requirements do not raise that prospect
and thus are not unconstitutional prior restraints.  
In City of Portland v. Welch, 229 Or 308, 367 P2d 403
(1961), this court considered a city ordinance that required
persons wishing to exhibit movies to the public to obtain a
license from a government censor.  It held the ordinance
unconstitutional under Article I, section 8, because it was a
prior restraint, stating that "[c]ensorship by licensing is, of
course, a prior restraint," 229 Or at 320, and "the draftsmen of
Oregon's basic charter wanted no censorship in Oregon."  Id. 
Similarly, this court more recently held that a provision of the
Oregon Uniform Trade Secrets Act was an unconstitutional prior
restraint because it allowed a court to order a person "not to
disclose an alleged trade secret without prior court approval." 
State ex rel Sports Management News v. Nachtigal, 324 Or 80, 88,
921 P2d 1304 (1996) (quoting ORS 646.469).  This court described
that statute as authorizing a "classic" prior restraint, because
it permitted a judge to require a third-party publisher who had
not committed a crime in obtaining its information "to submit its
speech for court approval before publication."  Id.
Welch and Sports Management News illustrate the purpose
of the prohibition on prior restraints:  to bar the state from
deciding in advance what expression it will permit.  See Welch,
229 Or at 319-20 (describing reasons for ban on prior restraint).
The OMIA's permit and fee scheme, with the exception of the
statutory off-premises/on-premises distinction that we discuss
below, does not allow the state to ban certain expression in
advance.  The owner of a sign that existed on June 12, 1975, and
that was located in a commercial or industrial zone on that date,
"is entitled to the issuance" of a permit, ORS 377.712(1), and
the messages on permitted signs may be changed without state
approval.  ORS 377.725(8).  The license requirement in Welch and
the judicial prior approval of speech at issue in Sports
Management News gave the government the authority to decide, in
advance, what movie scenes or magazine content would be
permitted.  From all that appears in this record, the OMIA's
permit and fee requirements are focused on covering the cost of a
content-neutral permit scheme and are implemented in a content-neutral and nonarbitrary manner.  For that reason, the permit and
fee requirements pose no danger of official censorship and,
therefore, do not constitute impermissible prior restraints on
expression in violation of Article I, section 8.
B.  Petitioner's "No Regulation" Argument
Petitioner raises several objections to the OMIA in
addition to the prior restraint argument, which we have rejected
above, and the permit exemption for on-premises signs, which we
discuss below.  Those include its arguments that the fee
requirement violates Article I, section 8, because it
"necessarily deters Oregonians from expressing themselves freely
on any subject" and that any "regulation of the placement of
speech on otherwise lawful structures violates Article I, section
8 * * *."  Moreover, implicit in petitioner's state
constitutional arguments is the assumption that Article I,
section 8, prohibits any time, place, and manner regulations --
such as the OMIA's location, size, permit, and fee provisions. 
Petitioner also asserts that those regulations are to be examined
using the test for restrictions on the content of speech that
this court articulated in State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 649 P2d
569 (1982), and recently reaffirmed in State v. Ciancanelli, 339
Or 282, 121 P3d 613 (2005).  
Amicus Oregon Outdoor Advertising Association (OOAA)
takes a similar position, arguing that, under Article I, section
8, "a law that does not favor or disfavor a particular viewpoint
is nonetheless content based if it burdens, in any manner,
protected speech."  OOAA appears to view Article I, section 8, as
barring any "burden" on "protected speech," regardless of the
extent of the burden or its content neutrality or viewpoint
neutrality. (8) 
The state responds that, while most of this court's
Article I, section 8, decisions over the last two decades have
focused on laws that restrict certain speech because of its
content, and thus have relied on the framework for analyzing
content-based restrictions set out in Robertson, this court never
has held that Article I, section 8, bars all regulation of
speech, including content-neutral regulations imposed for reasons
of public safety, aesthetics, or other important public purposes. 
The state therefore argues that the OMIA's permit and fee
requirements and its geographic and size limits on signs are
permissible time, place, and manner restrictions (9) that do
not violate Article I, section 8.
The parties correctly view Robertson as establishing
the framework "that this court traditionally has employed in
evaluating Article I, section 8, challenges."  Fidanque, 328 Or
at 5.  Robertson distinguished "between laws that focus on the
content of speech or writing and laws that focus on proscribing
the pursuit or accomplishment of forbidden results," holding that
the former violate Article I, section 8, unless the prohibition
comes within a well-established historical exception.  State v.
Plowman, 314 Or 157, 163, 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den, 508 US
974 (1993) (summarizing holding of Robertson; emphasis in
Plowman).  Robertson further divided the latter type of laws,
those that focus on forbidden results, into two categories: 
those laws that prohibit expression used to achieve those
prohibited effects and those laws that focus on the forbidden
effects without referring to expression at all.  Plowman, 314 Or
at 164 (citing Robertson, 293 Or at 417-18).  Because content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions focus on the
accomplishment of "forbidden results," but do so by restricting
expression, such restrictions appear to come within the second of
the three Robertson categories.  Yet Robertson itself did not
elaborate on the appropriate analysis of content-neutral
government regulation of the time, place, and manner of speech,
and, surprisingly, this court rarely has had occasion to consider
the validity of such regulations.  
In employing the Robertson framework, however, this
court consistently has stated that there is room for "regulations
imposed for reasons other than the substance of [a] particular
message."  City of Portland v. Tidyman, 306 Or 174, 182, 759 P2d
242 (1988).  In Tidyman, for example, this court considered a
city ordinance that prohibited "adult bookstores" in certain
specified locations.  The court held the ordinance
unconstitutional because it was "flatly directed against one
disfavored type of pictorial or verbal communication," 306 Or at
184, and because the city had failed to demonstrate that the
specific type of communication in question caused invidious
effects that would justify its restriction.  Id. at 184-86.  Yet
the opinion in Tidyman took pains to point out that "regulation
is not always unconstitutional [under Article I, section 8,]
because it restricts one's choice of a place or time for self-expression * * *."  Id. at 182.  The court stated:
"Even structures and activities unquestionably devoted
to constitutionally privileged purposes such as * * *
free expression are not immune from regulations imposed
for reasons other than the substance of their
particular message."
Id.  Similarly, in City of Hillsboro v. Purcell, 306 Or 547, 761
P2d 510 (1988), this court struck down as overbroad a city
ordinance that banned door-to-door solicitation but pointed out
that the city could adopt regulations "that do not foreclose
expression entirely but regulate when and how it can occur."  Id.
at 554.  This court emphasized that Article I, section 8, did not
prohibit "reasonable limitations on door-to-door solicitations"
that "regulate[d], rather than totally proscribe[d]" the
practice.  Id. at 556.      
Thus, while this court struck down the ban on door-to-door solicitation in Purcell because it arguably prohibited all
door-to-door solicitation and the ban on adult bookstores in
Tidyman because it was based on the content of the expression at
issue, those cases also stand for the proposition that Article I,
section 8, does not bar every content-neutral regulation of the
time, place, and manner of speech.  See also State v. Henry, 302
Or 510, 525, 732 P2d 9 (1987) (holding that expression cannot be
outlawed solely on ground that it is obscene, but "not rul[ing]
out * * * reasonable time, place and manner regulations of the
nuisance aspect of [obscene] material or laws to protect the
unwilling viewer or children"); accord City of Nyssa v.
Dufloth/Smith, 339 Or 330, 338-39, 121 P3d 639 (2005) (ordinance
purporting only to restrict "manner" of expression by requiring
nude dancers to remain at least four feet from their patrons was
unconstitutional restriction on expression because it "applied
only to one disfavored type of communication * * *").  In our
view, the OMIA's regulation of highway signs, including its
permit and fee requirements, except as discussed below, are
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions that are
unrelated to the substance of any particular message.  
The provisions quoted earlier show that the OMIA permit
scheme, which on its face is neutral as to the content of speech,
is not, in application, a means for the state to permit some
speech and prohibit other speech based on content.  Moreover,
with the exception of the distinction between on-premises and
off-premises signs, petitioner has not identified any instances
in which the state has used its enforcement authority against
petitioner or others to permit certain signs and prohibit others
based on content.  Put differently, because the permit scheme on
its face (and, so far as this record demonstrates, also in
practice) does not discriminate on the basis of the subject or
content of speech, the OMIA does not effectuate government
censorship of speech.  
Notwithstanding the facial validity and content
neutrality of the OMIA (other than the on-premises/off-premises
distinction), petitioner argues that the fee requirement, as
applied, is invalid because it "deters" speech.  Of course, even
a minimal fee or tax, at the margin, tends to reduce the level of
the activity to which it applies.  The real question, however, is
whether the fee requirement suppresses speech in such a way that
it "restrains" the free expression of opinion or "restricts" the
right to speak freely on any subject, as protected by Article I,
section 8.  Fidanque held that the lobbyist registration fee at
issue there was impermissible because "the statute on its face
does not tie the fee to the costs associated with registering
lobbyists."  328 Or at 9.   However, this court assumed "that a
fee may be charged for the expenses that the government incurs as
the result of a particular communicative activity, such as the
expense of providing added police protection for a parade."  Id.
at 8.  Here, as noted, ORS 377.729 expressly ties the fee to the
cost of the regulatory program, and petitioner does not argue
that the fee is unreasonable or exceeds the cost of the
program. (10)  On this record, we cannot conclude that the fee
requirement is an impermissible restriction on speech.
Finally, petitioner argues that the OMIA's permit
requirement, as applied, so burdens protected expression that it
violates Article I, section 8.  In that aspect of its case,
petitioner relies on Purcell and City of Eugene v. Miller, 318 Or
480, 871 P2d 454 (1994), both of which involved ordinances that
effectively prohibited certain forms of speech.  In Purcell, the
ordinance banned all door-to-door solicitation, while, in Miller,
the ordinance permitted the sale of some products on city
sidewalks but banned all sales of expressive material.  In this
case, it is apparent that, by limiting the number of outdoor
advertising sign permits to the number of signs that existed in
commercial and industrial zones in 1975, the OMIA was intended
to, and does, cap the number of those signs that are visible from
public highways.  Petitioner appears to assert that the fact that
it must obtain a permit lawfully to display its signs and that
the number of permits is limited means that the OMIA necessarily
violates Article I, section 8.     
We disagree.  Outdoor advertising signs, like other
forms of expression, may have characteristics that make them
uniquely suited to conveying certain messages to certain
audiences.  If the state were to prohibit billboards -- or some
other form of expression -- entirely, then perhaps there would be
reason to consider whether the effect of such a ban "restrain[ed]
the free expression of opinion" or "restrict[ed] the right to
speak, write, or print freely" under Article I, section 8.  Cf.
Miller, 318 Or at 487 (complete ban on sale and distribution of
all expressive material, although content neutral, likely would
violate Article I, section 8, "because it would restrict too
greatly 'the free expression of opinion' and 'the right to speak,
write, or print freely on any subject whatever'").  But the OMIA
differs fundamentally from the complete ban on door-to-door
solicitation in Purcell and the blanket exclusion of sellers of
books and magazines from the sidewalk marketplace in Miller.  The
OMIA allows as many outdoor advertising signs (off-premises
signs) as existed on June 12, 1975, as well as potentially
thousands of on-premises signs.  Petitioner has ample avenues to
communicate its messages, both on highway signs and by other
means.  On this record, the permit and fee requirements do not
unconstitutionally restrain the free expression of opinion or
restrict the right to speak, write, or print freely on any
subject whatsoever.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the OMIA's
provisions regarding the erection and maintenance of signs
visible from public highways, including the permit and fee
requirements –- again with the exception of the statute's
different treatment of on-premises and off-premises signs, as
discussed below –- are content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions that do not violate Article I, section 8.
IV.  ON-PREMISES AND OFF-PREMISES SIGNS
We now turn to petitioner's contention that the OMIA
violates Article I, section 8, on its face by exempting on-premises signs from the permit and fee requirements.  Petitioner
argues that, under this court's decision in Robertson, the
legislature may not enact restrictions that focus on the content
or subject matter of expression unless the scope of the restraint
is wholly confined within a "recognized historical constitutional
exception."  By requiring permits for off-premises signs, but not
for on-premises signs, petitioner asserts, the OMIA restricts
expression on the basis of "content" or "subject."  Thus,
petitioner argues that, under the OMIA, a sign above a gas
station visible from a highway may, without a permit, carry the
message "Gas for Sale," but it may not carry the message "Eat at
Joe's:  10 Miles Ahead."  Petitioner also argues that no
"historical exception" permits the state to restrict off-premises
signs in circumstances where it does not restrict on-premises
signs.  
Before turning to the state's response, we note that
the scope of the issue here is not as broad as petitioner
suggests.  Petitioner's brief uses, as additional examples of
signs that it contends are prohibited by the OMIA, signs that in
fact might not be prohibited by that law.  Petitioner asserts
that signs expressing the message "Pray for Peace" or the message
"Keep Abortion Legal" always would require permits because they
necessarily would be "outdoor advertising signs" rather than on-premises signs.  Arguably, however, if the first message were
displayed on the property of a church or the second message on
the property of a facility offering abortion services, those
signs would inform the public about "activities conducted on the
premises on which the sign is located," ORS 377.710(22), and thus
be considered on-premises signs not subject to the OMIA's permit
requirement.  Moreover, a plausible argument can be made that a
sign with the message "Pray for Peace" on a residential lot is
about activity on the premises, namely that the owner of the
residence prays for peace and exhorts others to do the same.  As
we noted previously, ___ Or at ___ n 5 (slip op at 5 n 5), none
of the present cases requires us to interpret the scope of the
phrase "activities conducted [or not conducted] on the premises
on which the sign is located" in the statutory definitions of
"on-premises sign" and "outdoor advertising sign."  See ORS
377.710(22), (23) (defining "on-premises sign" and "outdoor
advertising sign").  However, the example in the previous
paragraph (describing the signs "Gas for Sale" and "Eat at Joes:  
10 Miles Ahead") is sufficient to demonstrate that, in many
circumstances, the OMIA will permit one message on a highway sign
while prohibiting a different message, and that difference
squarely presents petitioner's constitutional claim.
The state responds that the on-premises/off-premises
distinction is a content-neutral time, place, and manner
regulation.  The state first asserts that Article I, section 8,
does not bar the state from imposing reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions on expression.  It then argues that the on-premises/off-premises distinction is not a restriction on the
content or subject of expression, such as the restrictions that
this court considered –- and rejected -– in Robertson, Tidyman,
and similar cases. (11)  The state's primary point is
straightforward:  "Any message can be an on-premises one, and any
message can be an off-premises one."  Therefore, in the state's
view, the OMIA suppresses no message and no viewpoint.  
The state contrasts this case with other cases in which
an apparently neutral regulation had the effect of restricting
certain categories of speech.  In Fidanque, for example, a law
that required registration fees for lobbyists was held to violate
Article I, section 8, because it focused on only one category of
speech -– "political speech."  328 Or at 8 n 4.  Here, however,
the state asserts that, unlike recognized categories of speech
such as "political speech" or "commercial speech," the
distinction between "on-premises" and "off-premises" speech has
no meaning in terms of the content of the speech; the only
distinction is the relationship between the message on the sign
and its location.  The state argues:  "Simply put, a distinction
between categories of speech cannot be truly 'content-based' if
any speech could fit into either category depending on its
location only."  (Emphasis in original.)
We agree, as we have explained above, with the state's
view that Article I, section 8, does not prohibit reasonable
time, place, and manner regulation of speech imposed for reasons
apart from the message of the speech.  We also understand that
the state is asserting that there is a constitutionally
meaningful difference between the OMIA and laws that focus
directly on categories of speech that are familiar from First
Amendment cases, such as obscenity, political speech, and
commercial speech.  However, unlike the dissent, we do not find
the state's argument persuasive.  As noted, the OMIA would allow
a sign with the message "Buy Gas Here," but prohibit the same
sign from carrying the message "Eat at Joe's:  10 Miles Ahead." 
As we explain at greater length below, such a restriction, on its
face, prohibits certain speech based on its content.  The OMIA's
different treatment of on-premises and off-premises speech
therefore violates Article I, section 8.
Although we recognize the differences between the OMIA
and the statutes that we have considered in prior cases, our
analysis is similar.  As we have described above, for more than
two decades, this court's consideration of challenges under
Article I, section 8, to statutes that restrict speech has been
guided by the framework laid out in Robertson, in which this
court considered a statute criminalizing coercion.  This court
there held that Article I, section 8, "prohibits lawmakers from
enacting restrictions that focus on the content of speech or
writing, either because that content itself is deemed socially
undesirable or offensive, or because it is thought to have
adverse consequences."  293 Or at 416.  This court followed
Robertson in a series of cases holding unconstitutional
legislative restrictions on certain categories of speech.  In
Henry, 302 Or 510, the court held that a statute prohibiting the
possession of obscene materials violated the free expression
guarantee of Article I, section 8, because it was directed, by
its terms, at a category of expression.  In Tidyman, the court
struck down a city ordinance that restricted certain expressive
activity -- the sale of "adult" books -- because of the content
of the speech in question.  This court also has held invalid a
statute that prohibited the use of automatic telemarketing
devices to solicit the purchase of realty, goods, or services,
but not when used to solicit funds for charitable or political
organizations.  Moser v. Frohnmayer, 315 Or 372, 845 P2d 1284
(1993).  That statute "restrict[ed] expression because it [was]
directed at a specific subject of communication, excluding some
speech based on the content of the message," and therefore
violated Article I, section 8.  Id. at 376.
In each of those cases, this court applied the
framework established in Robertson and considered whether the
statute or ordinance restricted the "content" of speech because
that speech was "deemed socially undesirable or offensive, or
because it [was] thought to have adverse consequences." 
Robertson, 293 Or at 416.  The state argues that the on-premises/off-premises distinction does not focus on the content
of speech that the government seeks to restrict because that
speech is undesirable, offensive, or may have adverse
consequences.  Rather, in the state's view, the on-premises/off-premises distinction is a content- and viewpoint-neutral
regulation that focuses instead on "secondary effects" in an
effort to advance the state's interests as set out in the OMIA,
including promoting highway safety and preserving the "natural
beauty and aesthetic features of [state] highways and adjacent
areas."  See ORS 377.705 (statement of purpose of OMIA).  The
state also points out that the OMIA is designed to ensure
compliance with federal highway statutes, particularly the HBA. 
See, e.g., ORS 377.715 (prohibiting erection or maintenance of
signs that fail to comply with federal requirements).
The state's argument suffers from two related flaws. 
First, it is not accurate to say that the on-premises/off-premises distinction is content neutral.  That distinction allows
a sign owner without a permit to display one narrowly defined
category of message -- a message related to activity conducted on
the premises where the sign is located -- but not to display any
message respecting any other subject.  The OMIA thus treats signs
differently on the basis of the content of their message. (12) 
Second, the state's reliance on the legitimate safety and
aesthetic goals of the OMIA does not justify a prohibition of
speech based on its content.  This court faced a similar issue in
Moser, where the legislature sought to prevent the harmful
effects of automatic telephone solicitation, but prohibited only
commercial solicitation, while allowing charitable and political
solicitation.  This court rejected that effort because the
restriction was "directed at speech itself, not towards the
prevention of an identified actual effect or harm."  Moser, 315
Or at 379.  The state may prohibit signs and other structures
that interfere with safe driving, and it may limit the total
number of signs or structures for the purpose of preserving views
and scenery.  However, this court's opinions demonstrate that the
state may not, consistently with Article I, section 8, prohibit
some expression, while permitting other expression simply because
the latter concerns a different subject.  On-premises signs,
which do not require a permit, and off-premises signs, which do
require a permit, can pose the same risk to safety and have the
same adverse effect on scenic beauty.  The legislature's decision
to limit one of those types of expression more stringently than
the other because of its content is an impermissible restriction
on the "subject" of expression under Article I, section 8. 
As to the state's effort to comply with the HBA through
enactment and enforcement of the OMIA, we are sympathetic to the
state's arguments, recognizing the possibility that the failure
to enforce restrictions such as those in the OMIA might result in
a reduction in federal highway funds.  See 23 USC § 131(b), (c) 
(HBA allows exemption for on-premises signs; state's failure to
provide "effective control" of outdoor advertising signs may
cause state to lose 10 percent of federal highway funds). 
Nevertheless, this court's Article I, section 8, cases
consistently have held that the state may not enact restrictions
that focus on the content of speech, and this restriction does
just that.
We also find unpersuasive the state's arguments that
are based on cases from other jurisdictions.  Some courts and
commentators have concluded that the distinction between on-premises and off-premises signs is not "content-based," e.g.,
Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F3d 1043, 1067 (3d Cir. 1994), or,
if "technically content-based," is not worthy of constitutional
protection because "it is very unlikely that the government would
use it to control speech or that it would distort public debate." 
Mark Cordes, Sign Regulation After Ladue: Examining the Evolving
Limits of First Amendment Protection, 74 Neb L Rev 36, 77 & n 257
(1995); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the
First Amendment, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev 189 (1983) (analyzing policy
reasons for prohibiting content-based restrictions).  Whatever
the merits of those conclusions as matters of appropriate policy
towards expression or as interpretations of the First Amendment,
however, they offer little guidance in interpreting the Oregon
Constitution.  The words of Article I, section 8, and this
court's consistent interpretation of those words expressly forbid
the enactment of laws that restrict otherwise permissible speech
because of its "subject."  See Bank of Oregon v. Independent
News, 298 Or 434, 439, 693 P2d 35, cert den, 474 US 826 (1985)
("There is no basis under the Oregon Constitution to provide more
protection to certain non-abusive communication based upon the
content of the communication.").   
In Ciancanelli, this court reassessed and reaffirmed
its Article I, section 8, jurisprudence.  Examining the text of
that constitutional provision, this court stated:
"Turning our focus to the first clause of Article
I, section 8, one is struck by its sweeping terms, both
with respect to the legislative power ("[n]o" law shall
be passed restraining * * * or restricting) (emphasis
added) and the kinds of expression protected ("* * *
the free expression of opinion, or * * * the right to
speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever") 
(emphasis added).  In fact, the words are so clear and
sweeping that we think that we would not be keeping
faith with the framers who wrote them if we were to
qualify or water them down[.]"
339 Or at 311 (emphases and omissions in Ciancanelli).  
The broad sweep of Article I, section 8, compels us to
conclude that the provision was not intended only to prevent
content-based restrictions that are motivated by an intent to
censor offensive, disruptive, or potentially harmful speech. 
Although the dissent appears to accept that limited reading of
Article I, section 8, in our view, Article I, section 8,
prohibits laws that distinguish among messages because of what
they say, even if some may view the basis for the distinction as
benign.  The OMIA does distinguish between messages on the basis
of what they say:  It permits a sign owner to display one
message, but not to display a different message solely because of
the content of the message.  For that reason, we conclude that
the OMIA's different treatment of on-premises and off-premises
signs is a restriction on the content of speech for purposes of
Article I, section 8. (13)
The Robertson framework next asks whether the scope of
the content-based restraint "is wholly confined within some
historical exception," in which case it may be permitted
notwithstanding Article I, section 8.  Robertson, 293 Or at 412. 
In this context, that aspect of Robertson would require the state
to demonstrate that restrictions on sign messages that
distinguished between messages related to activities occurring on
the property where the sign is located and messages related to
activities elsewhere "were well established when 'the first
American guarantees of freedoms of expression were adopted.'" 
Moser, 315 Or at 378 (quoting Robertson, 293 Or at 412).  The
state has offered no argument as to any such historical
exception, and we are aware of none.  See Moser, 315 Or at 378
(state failed to show that "restrictions on advertising or
commercial solicitations" came within historical exception).
For the forgoing reasons, we conclude that the OMIA's
on-premises/off-premises distinction -– more particularly, the
exemption from the OMIA's permit and fee requirements for on-premises signs, ORS 377.735(1)(c) –- is, on its face, an
impermissible restriction on the content of speech.  
V.  REMEDY
We now turn to the consequences of our holding for the
remaining parts of the OMIA.  Throughout this litigation,
petitioner has argued that this court should invalidate the
entire OMIA, and we now consider that issue in light of our
resolution of petitioner's constitutional challenges.
This court has held that when part of a statute is
found to be unconstitutional, the whole statute need not be
invalidated if the unconstitutional part is severable from the
remainder of the statute.  See City University v. Oregon Office
of Educ. Policy, 320 Or 422, 425, 885 P2d 701 (1994) (so
stating).  Ordinarily, when one part of a statute is found
unconstitutional, this court's practice (and the legislature's
stated preference) is to sever the offending part and save the
remainder of the statute, unless the legislature has directed
otherwise, unless the parts of the statute are so interconnected
that it appears likely that the remaining parts would not have
been enacted without the unconstitutional part, or unless the
remaining parts are incomplete and cannot be executed in
accordance with legislative intent.  Id. at 426 (discussing ORS
174.040). 
In the context of statutes that violate Article I,
section 8, this court held in Robertson that the remedy will
depend on the particular constitutional defect.  If part of the
statute is unconstitutional on its face because it is "written in
terms directed to the substance of any 'opinion' or any 'subject'
of communication," then that part is simply invalid.  Robertson,
293 Or at 412; Miller, 318 Or at 488.  If, however, the statute
is unconstitutional because it is "overbroad" and prohibits
constitutionally privileged expression as well as expression that
the legislation lawfully may punish or prohibit, then the court
examines the statute to determine whether a "narrowing
construction" of the statute is possible, Robertson, 293 Or at
412, or whether the "needed narrowing cannot be accomplished by
judicial interpretation," id. at 436, and the legislature instead
must undertake it, id. at 437.  Finally, if the law violates
Article I, section 8, because, even though focused on forbidden
effects rather than expression, it nevertheless, as applied,
restricts protected expression, then the statute itself
ordinarily is not unconstitutional, but the person to whom it was
applied successfully may defend against that application.  See
Robertson, 293 Or at 417 (discussing as-applied challenges to
statutes that focus on forbidden effects but may implicate
expression).
In this case, we have agreed only with petitioner's
argument that the OMIA violates Article I, section 8, by imposing
greater restrictions on some signs than others based on the
subject of the message on the sign.  That difference in treatment
comes within the first Robertson category of facially invalid
restrictions on the content of expression, and the parts of the
OMIA that effectuate that difference are invalid.  We therefore
consider whether those parts are severable from the rest of the
OMIA.  As described above, the OMIA includes many restrictions on
highway signs that we do not find unconstitutional, including
restrictions on sign size, spacing, location, and lighting. 
Those restrictions, in general, apply equally to on-premises and
off-premises signs, and we think that the legislature would have
wanted them to remain in effect, notwithstanding the
unconstitutionality of the on-premises/off-premises distinction. 
Accordingly, we hold that the OMIA is not unconstitutional in its
entirety.
Our conclusion that the OMIA's different treatment of
on-premises and off-premises signs is unconstitutional presents a
more difficult problem.  We can end that infirmity either by
striking from the OMIA the exemption from the permit requirement
for on-premises signs, ORS 377.735(1)(c), or by striking the
permit requirement itself, ORS 377.725(1), as it applies to
outdoor advertising signs (off-premises signs). (14)  In
choosing between those alternatives, we are mindful of the
legislature's policy statement in ORS 377.705 that the purposes
of the OMIA include "promot[ing] public safety," "preserv[ing]
the natural beauty and aesthetic features" of state highways, and
"prohibit[ing] the indiscriminate use of * * * outdoor
advertising."  However, we also are aware from the record that
the number of existing on-premises signs, which do not require
OMIA permits or fees, far exceeds the number of outdoor
advertising signs, which do require permits and fees.  We thus
find ourselves faced with the same two unpalatable choices that
the legislature would face:  permitting sign owners to display
"off-premises" (outdoor advertising) signs without obtaining the
permits required by the OMIA, or imposing new permit and fee
requirements on thousands of individuals and businesses that now
have on-premises signs.  We think that, faced with that choice,
the legislature would not have been willing to extend the OMIA's
permit and fee requirements to the large category of new and
existing on-premises signs.  Accordingly, we conclude that the
appropriate remedy in light of our holding is to strike from the
OMIA the permit and fee requirements for outdoor advertising
signs, ORS 377.725(1).
As we have accepted one of petitioner's legal arguments
and rejected others, we reverse the agency orders requiring the
removal of petitioner's signs and remand the cases to the
respective agencies for further proceedings.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals and the orders of
the Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Branch and the Department
of Transportation are reversed.  Case numbers S50003, S50007, and
S50044 are remanded to the Driver and Motor Vehicle Services
Branch for further proceedings, and case numbers S49978 and
S50458 are remanded to the Department of Transportation for
further proceedings. 
RIGGS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority in every respect except that
part of its opinion holding that the OMIA's exemption from the
permit and fee requirements for on-premises signs violates
Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution.  The majority
incorrectly concludes that the OMIA impermissibly regulates the
content of speech.  I conclude that the OMIA is constitutional
under Article I, section 8.
This court's framework for analyzing claims under
Article I, section 8, was set out in State v. Robertson, 293 Or
402, 649 P2d 569 (1982).  This court has summarized that
framework as follows:
"In State v. Robertson, * * * this court
established a framework for evaluating whether a law
violates Article I, section 8.  First, the court
recognized a distinction between laws that focus on the
content of speech or writing and laws that focus on the
pursuit or accomplishment of forbidden results.  The
court reasoned that a law of the former type, a law
'written in terms directed to the substance of any
"opinion"' or any "subject" of communication,' violates
Article I, section 8,
"'unless the scope of the restraint is wholly
confined within some historical exception that was
well established when the first American
guarantees of freedom of expression were adopted
and that the guarantees then or in 1859
demonstrably were not intended to reach.'
"Laws of the latter type, which focus on forbidden
results, can be divided further into two categories. 
The first category focuses on forbidden effects, but
expressly prohibits expression used to achieve those
effects.  The coercion law at issue in Robertson was of
that category.  Such laws are analyzed for overbreadth:
"'When the proscribed means include speech or
writing, however, even a law written to focus on a
forbidden effect * * * must be scrutinized to
determine whether it appears to reach privileged
communication or whether it can be interpreted to
avoid such "overbreadth."'
"The second kind of law also focuses on forbidden
effects, but without referring to expression at all. 
Of that category, this court wrote:
"'If [a] statute [is] directed only against
causing the forbidden effects, a person accused of
causing such effects by language or gestures would
be left to assert (apart from a vagueness claim)
that the statute could not constitutionally be
applied to his particular words or other
expression, not that it was drawn and enacted
contrary to article I, section 8.'"
State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 163-64, 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert
den, 508 US 974 (1993) (quoting Robertson; internal citations and
footnote omitted; alterations and emphasis in Plowman).
The majority correctly begins its analysis of the OMIA
by considering whether the OMIA "focus[es] on the content of
speech or writing" or whether it "focus[es] on proscribing the
pursuit or accomplishment of forbidden results."  See Plowman,
314 Or at 164 (emphasis deleted; setting out analysis).  The
majority errs, however, when it concludes that the OMIA
unconstitutionally focuses on the content of speech or writing,
the first class of laws identified in Robertson.
By laws that focus on the content of speech, this court
in Robertson  meant laws that restrict or prohibit a particular
message or subject of communication, such as obscenity, "either
because that content itself is deemed socially undesirable or
offensive, or because it is thought to have adverse
consequences."  Robertson, 293 Or at 416; see also State v.
Ciancanelli, 339 Or 282, 318, 121 P3d 613 (2005) (such laws
purport to protect against "any supposed harm that the message
itself might be presumed to cause to the hearer or to society"
(emphasis added)); City of Hillsboro v. Purcell, 306 Or 547, 554
n 4, 761 P2d 510 (1988) (distinguishing between "the offensive
form of some communication," which may be regulated, and "the
offensive character of an idea," which cannot be regulated
(emphasis added; internal quotation marks and citation omitted));
City of Portland v. Tidyman, 306 Or 174, 182, 759 P2d 242 (1988)
(speech "not immune from regulations imposed for reasons other
than the substance of their particular message" (emphasis
added)).
This court's cases reflect the understanding that laws
focus on the content of speech when they attack a particular,
identifiable subject of communication.  The cases relied on by
the majority, plus others, struck down limits on just such
particular subjects of communication.  In State v. Henry, 302 Or
510, 732 P2d 9 (1987), for example, the challenged statute
criminalized the distribution of obscene material.  In Tidyman,
the zoning ordinance at issue restricted the location of "adult
bookstores"; this court noted that the ordinance was "flatly
directed against one disfavored type of pictorial or verbal
communication."  306 Or at 184.  In Moser v. Frohnmayer, 315 Or
372, 845 P2d 1284 (1993), the challenged statute prohibited
telemarketers from using automatic message machines to sell
realty, goods, or services; the court noted that the statute
"restricts expression because it is directed at a specific
subject of communication[.]"  Id. at 376.  And, in Fidanque v.
Oregon Govt. Standards and Practices, 328 Or 1, 969 P2d 376
(1998), the statute at issue required lobbyists to pay a
licensing fee; the court noted that the statute "turns out not to
be content-neutral at all.  Its focus is political speech."  Id.
at 8 n 4.  Even this court's most recent decisions involved the
same sort of restrictions.  See, e.g., City of Nyssa v.
Dufloth/Smith, 339 Or 330, 339, 121 P3d 639 (2005) ("the
ordinance applies only to one disfavored type of communication
(nude performances) in one disfavored type of establishment (one
that regularly features that type of entertainment)"). (15)
But the OMIA does not prohibit any particular subject
of speech for being "socially undesirable or offensive" or for
"hav[ing] adverse consequences."  Nor does it favor one subject
of speech over another one. (16)  Indeed, the OMIA is not about
the subject of the message at all.  The majority nicely
summarizes the state's argument:
"[T]he distinction between 'on-premises' and 'off-premises' speech has no meaning in terms of the content
of the speech; the only distinction is the relationship
between the message on the sign and its location."
___ Or at ___ (slip op at 25) (emphasis in original).  "Any
message can be an on-premises one, and any message can be an off-premises one," as the state argues.  It all depends on what the
property owner does where the sign is located -- and the property
owner controls that, not the government.
The OMIA does not prohibit any identifiable message.  
It does not restrict speech as speech.  It is not in the first
class of laws described by Robertson, and the majority errs in
concluding otherwise.
Instead, the OMIA falls within the second class of laws
described by Robertson:  It "focuses on forbidden effects, but
expressly prohibits expression used to achieve those effects." 
Plowman, 314 Or at 164.  The OMIA merely restricts one manner in
which messages may be communicated -- by billboard.  It seeks to
prevent the effects of speech carried on in that way --
distracting drivers, blocking views of traffic hazards, blocking
scenic views, etc.  See, e.g., ORS 377.705 (OMIA intended, among
other things, to "promote the public safety; to preserve the
recreational value of public travel on the state's highways; to
preserve the natural beauty and aesthetic features of such
highways and adjacent areas"); ORS 377.720(2) (prohibiting signs
that block view of traffic signs or approaching traffic). 
Although the OMIA focuses on harmful effects, it expressly
prohibit expression that is used to achieve those effects.
Because the OMIA falls within the second class of laws
described in Robertson, we should consider whether the OMIA is
overbroad.  See, e.g., Plowman, 314 Or at 164 (so noting).  A
statute is overbroad when it prohibits a party from engaging in
constitutionally protected conduct (here, free expression under
Article 1, section 8) in at least some situations:
"Unlike with other facial challenges, a challenger
raising an overbreadth challenge need not demonstrate
that the statute at issue is unconstitutional under the
particular circumstances at hand.  Rather, the
challenger will prevail in his or her facial challenge
if the court concludes that the statute in question
prohibits constitutionally protected conduct of any
kind."
State v. Hirsch/Friend, 338 Or 622, 628, 114 P3d 1104 (2005)
(citation omitted).
The majority's analysis here shows why the OMIA is not
unconstitutionally overbroad.  Only the limits on "outdoor
advertising sign[s]" bar any manner of speech, so only those
limits could render the OMIA unconstitutionally overbroad.  (The
exception for on-premises signs is beside the point, because that
exception does not prohibit any constitutionally protected
messages.  It does not prohibit any messages at all -- it allows
them, and without discriminating in favor of any particular
subject of communication.)  As the majority explains, the
"outdoor advertising sign" limits are constitutional as a
reasonable manner restriction, and I agree.  Because the off-premises advertising sign restrictions are constitutional, the
OMIA is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
The OMIA is concerned with "the medium, not the
message, as when park regulations ban fireworks even for a Fourth
of July celebration."  Tidyman, 306 Or at 182-83.  It is
constitutional under Article I, section 8.  Although I concur
with much of the majority's reasoning, I respectfully dissent on
that point. 
1. Unless otherwise indicated, we refer in this opinion to
the 1999 version of the OMIA.
2. The Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Branch issued
three of the citations, and the Department of Transportation
issued the two other citations.  For convenience, we refer to
those state agencies collectively as the "state" or the "agency."
3. The legislature has amended the OMIA many times.  In
1999, the legislature made a number of changes to the OMIA,
including adding a definition of "on-premises sign" and changing
the exemptions to the OMIA's permit requirement.  See Or Laws
1999, ch 877, §§ 2, 7.  The state does not rely on or seek to
enforce provisions of the OMIA that no longer are in effect.
Because the earlier versions of the OMIA are not relevant to the
relief that petitioner seeks –- reversal of the agency orders
requiring removal of its signs –- we do not address petitioner's
arguments that relate to provisions of the OMIA that have been
changed. 
4. ORS 377.725(1) provides, "Unless an annual permit has
been issued therefor, an outdoor advertising sign or a
directional sign shall not be erected, maintained or replaced by
any person."  See also ORS 377.715 ("A person may not erect or
maintain an outdoor advertising, on-premises or directional sign
visible to the traveling public from a state highway * * * unless
it complies with [the OMIA and federal requirements].").
5. The 1999 amendments to the OMIA eliminated a long list
of exemptions from the permit requirement, leaving only the
exemptions for government signs, certain temporary signs, and on-premises signs.  ORS 377.735(1); Or Laws 1999, ch 877, § 7.  As
previously noted, because those former exemptions have no place
in the present regulatory scheme and have no impact on the
enforcement actions against petitioner or the relief that
petitioner seeks, we do not consider them.  As to the remaining
exemptions, petitioner has offered fully developed arguments as
to the on-premises exemption only, and we consider those
arguments later in this opinion. 
6. As we discuss in greater detail below, the statutory
definitions of "on-premises sign" and "outdoor advertising sign"
raise a number of interpretive issues that we do not address in
this opinion, including the meaning of the phrase "activities
conducted [or not conducted] on the premises on which the sign is
located."  It is sufficient for purposes of this opinion that the
OMIA classifies some otherwise identical signs as on-premises
signs if their message advertises activities conducted on-premises (e.g., "Buy Gas Here"), but as outdoor advertising signs
if their message advertises goods not sold on the premises (e.g.,
"Gas for Sale:  10 Miles Ahead").
7. Petitioner did not make all of those arguments in each
case.
8. In general, the term "content neutral" means that a
particular restriction on expression applies to all expression,
regardless of its subject or content.  For example, a law or
other government action that prohibits all signs that interfere
with drivers' lines of sight near an intersection is "content
neutral," while a law that permits noncommercial (for example,
political) signs but prohibits commercial signs is not content
neutral.  See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U Chi L Rev 46 (1987) (analyzing First Amendment
cases involving content-neutral restrictions on speech).  The
term "viewpoint neutral" means that the government action,
although restricting some expression and permitting other
expression, is neutral as to the particular views that it allows
to be expressed.  Under the First Amendment, for example, a
state-run television network is permitted to decide which
candidates may participate in a televised debate and to exclude
minor candidates, as long as the exclusion is not based on the
viewpoints of the excluded candidates.  See, e.g., Arkansas Educ.
Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 US 666, 118 S Ct 1633, 140 L Ed
2d 875 (1998) (exclusion of independent candidate with little
public support from debate televised by state network was
"viewpoint neutral" and did not violate First Amendment).  This
court has not had occasion to determine the extent to which
Article I, section 8, might require "viewpoint neutrality."
9. The phrase "time, place, and manner restrictions"
originated in First Amendment cases and generally refers to
government limitations on speech, including license and permit
requirements, that are imposed without reference to the content
of the regulations.  See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 US 640, 647-48, 101 S Ct 2559, 69 L Ed 2d 298
(1981) (describing concept and cases applying it).  We use that
phrase here to describe the OMIA's content-neutral regulation of
highway signs, including -- to the extent that they are content
neutral -- the permit and fee requirements.  This case does not
require us to define precisely the kinds of restrictions that may
be permissible under Article I, section 8, or the extent to which
those restrictions are similar to or different from permissible
time, place, and manner restrictions under the First Amendment.
10. The current version of ORS 377.729, which ties the fee
to the cost of the regulatory program, was not enacted until
2001.  However, neither party suggests that the state has any
intention of seeking to collect from petitioner any fee based on 
earlier versions of the statute, and we therefore do not consider
the validity of the fee-setting provisions of earlier versions of
ORS 377.729.
11. This case was submitted before this court had issued
its decision in State v. Ciancanelli, 339 Or 282, 121 P3d 613
(2005).  In Ciancanelli, as here, the state urged us to
reconsider and abandon the framework for analyzing Article I,
section 8, that this court articulated in Robertson and
subsequent cases.  In Ciancanelli, this court reconsidered
Robertson and its progeny and examined Article I, section 8, in
detail before concluding that it would retain the Robertson
framework.  Ciancanelli, 339 Or at 314-15.  There is no need to
repeat that discussion here. 
12. This is the focal point of the dissent's disagreement
with this opinion.  The dissent states that the OMIA does not
"favor one subject of speech over another one."  ___ Or at ___
(slip op at 5) (Riggs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).  With respect, the OMIA does exactly that:  it
unquestionably "favors" on-premises signs over off-premises sign. 
The dissent apparently believes that that distinction is not
constitutionally relevant because, in the dissent's view, it is
not based on the "socially undesirable or offensive" nature of
off-premises signs.  However, as we discuss in the text, Article
I, section 8, prohibits restrictions on the "subject" of speech,
and in the OMIA the legislature restricted some signs, but not
others, based on the subject of their message.
13. Because we conclude that the OMIA establishes a
content-based restriction on expression, in our analysis the OMIA
falls within the first class of laws described in Robertson.  See
___ Or at ___ (slip op at 15-16) (discussing Robertson
framework).  The dissent, in contrast, claims that the OMIA
simply restricts one "manner" of expression and therefore falls
within the second class of laws described in Robertson.  See ___
Or at ___ (slip op at 5-6) (Riggs, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
14. The OMIA requires permits for signs other than outdoor
advertising signs and contains exceptions to the permit
requirement for signs other than on-premises signs.  The validity
of the permit scheme, as applied to other kinds of signs, such as
"directional signs" and "motorist informational signs," is not at
issue in this case and may involve different considerations than
those that we have discussed in this opinion.  Accordingly, we
express no view as to the constitutionality of the OMIA's permit
requirements as applied to those other kinds of signs.
15. The majority itself essentially relies on the same
distinction elsewhere in its opinion.  The majority rejects
petitioner's "prior restraint" argument because "the purpose of
the prohibition on prior restraints" is "to bar the state from
deciding in advance what expression it will permit."  ___ Or at
___ (slip op at 12).  The majority also concludes that the permit
scheme is constitutional because it "does not effectuate
government censorship of speech."  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 19).
The same purpose underlies the distinction between
laws that focus on speech as speech and laws that focus on
preventing harmful results.  Yet, the majority refuses to
recognize it here.
16. In particular, let me reaffirm one other statement by the
majority.  The statute does not, contrary to petitioner's
arguments, favor commercial speech over political speech.  "Pray
for Peace," for example, would qualify as an on-premises sign for
a church.  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 23).