Case Title: Poeple v. Becerrada

Citation: 

Docket Number: S170957

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 4/17/17 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S170957 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
   
RUBEN BECERRADA, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. LA033909 
 
____________________________________) 
 
A jury convicted defendant, Ruben Becerrada, of the first degree murder of 
Maria Arevalo with the special circumstances of killing a witness, murder in the 
commission of kidnapping, and lying in wait.  As to the murder, it found true a 
weapon enhancement allegation.  It also found defendant guilty of rape, forcibly 
dissuading a witness, and kidnapping.  After a penalty trial, the jury returned a 
verdict of death.  The court denied the automatic motion to modify the verdict and 
imposed a judgment of death.  This appeal is automatic.  We reverse the lying-in-
wait special-circumstance finding for insufficient evidence, but otherwise affirm 
the judgment. 
I.  THE FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Overview 
The prosecution‟s theory of the case was that in August 1999, defendant 
raped the victim, Maria Arevalo, with whom he had been living.  When she 
 
2 
pressed charges, he tried to dissuade her from testifying.  In March 2000, after she 
refused to drop the rape charge, she drove to his neighborhood and parked near his 
home, apparently intending to visit him.  Defendant attacked her shortly thereafter.  
In front of witnesses, he beat her, kicked her, and hit her on the head with a beer 
bottle.  He then forced her into her own car and drove her to another location.  
There, he strangled her both manually and with a ligature and stabbed her multiple 
times, killing her.  Finally, he put her body in the trunk of her car, which he 
abandoned at another location. 
In its opening statement and closing argument, the defense admitted 
defendant killed the victim, but it denied that the killing was premeditated and 
denied he committed the other charged crimes of rape, dissuading a witness, and 
kidnapping.  The defense also denied the truth of the special circumstance 
allegations of killing a witness, murder in the commission of kidnapping, and 
lying in wait. 
2.  The Evidence 
Maria Arevalo married Juan Arevalo in 1996, when she was 19 years old.  
They separated about one and a half years later but remained friends.  She worked 
at a Sav-On drug store in Arleta and later at a Manpower employment agency in 
Sherman Oaks.  After she and Juan separated, she began a troubled relationship 
with defendant, who was about 34 years old. 
During the months leading to August 1999, Juan and others often observed 
bruises on Maria‟s arms, legs, and neck.  She told Juan that defendant abused her.  
Juan urged her to end the relationship, but she was afraid to do so.  Juan decided to 
speak with defendant.  In a conversation Juan described as “civil,” conducted at 
defendant‟s home on Dorrington Avenue in Arleta in the San Fernando Valley, 
 
3 
defendant denied causing any bruising and said Maria was lying.  Defendant also 
told Juan he was a gang member and showed him his gang tattoos. 
Later, Maria told Juan that she had moved in with defendant.  She 
continued to tell him that defendant abused her.  She also said defendant had 
threatened her.  She told him “she was afraid about her, her family, and” Juan 
himself.  She did not leave defendant because she was “afraid for her family.”  She 
also expressed the hope that defendant might change. 
Around 6:00 or 6:30 a.m., on August 8, 1999, Maria called Juan on the 
telephone.  She sounded scared and was “almost crying.”  He met with her soon 
after that.  Juan observed bruises on her neck, legs, and wrist.  She looked scared 
and was shaking and crying.  She told Juan that defendant had raped her.  She said 
what brought it on was that “she wanted to leave.”  She said defendant choked her 
to the point that she was “fading out,” meaning “losing consciousness.”  At that 
point, “she just stopped fighting.”  Defendant tied her up on the bed and forced her 
to have sex against her will.  She later managed to get away.  Before she left, 
defendant told her not to tell anyone what had happened.  He said he knew where 
her family lived and threatened to kill her parents. 
Gerilind Taylor, Maria‟s supervisor at Manpower, testified that on one 
occasion in August 1999, she was so concerned about Maria‟s bruises that she 
reported them to her corporate office.  She saw dark bruising and fingerprints on 
Maria‟s neck.  When she asked Maria about it, “[a]t first she was very 
apprehensive, and then she just broke down.”  “She said she was scared, and she 
started crying.”  Maria told her that because she had refused to do a “threesome” 
with defendant and another girl, defendant raped her and tied her up for several 
hours.  She got the bruising on her neck when defendant pulled her up by the neck.  
Maria said that defendant told her, “ „I could easily kill you.‟ ”  She was afraid that 
defendant might kill her sometime in the next seven or eight months. 
 
4 
Chris Eck, Maria‟s coworker at Manpower, testified that he met defendant, 
introduced as Maria‟s boyfriend, one time at the office.  In Maria‟s presence, 
defendant began talking to him about his criminal past.  Defendant told Eck “that 
he had been incarcerated as a juvenile for homicide and later as an adult for a 
double attempted homicide.”  He said “he was a hit man for the Mexican Mafia,” 
and that “he had killed people in the past, he‟d gotten away with it.”  Later, on a 
Monday in early August 1999, Maria failed to appear at work, which was unusual.  
The next day, when Eck asked her about her nonappearance, she told him that 
defendant “had taken her and tied her up and had repeatedly raped her.  She 
managed to escape, and she was beaten up.”  She was afraid of defendant.  Eck 
observed “fingerprints around her neck, the bruising from it.”  When Eck advised 
her to report it to the police, she said she was afraid to do so “because Ruben 
would come after her.” 
Juan also advised Maria to report the rape to the police and took her to the 
local police department.  She did not actually go inside the first time.  She was 
crying and said she was afraid of what defendant might do if she reported it, so 
Juan took her back home.  The next day, Juan called defendant on the telephone 
and told him he would take Maria to the police station to report the rape.  
Defendant told him “that I had a family and I should be careful.”  He added that he 
knew where Juan and his family lived and what kind of car he drove.  Juan 
considered it a threat.  Defendant also called Maria a liar. 
On August 11, 1999, Juan and members of Maria‟s family took her back to 
the police station.  This time, she reported the rape.  The police photographed her 
bruises and gave her a restraining order against defendant.  On August 16, 1999, 
the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office filed charges against defendant 
of rape and dissuading a witness.  A warrant for his arrest was issued, but he was 
 
5 
never arrested on the warrant.  As the alleged victim, Maria was to be the main 
witness against defendant. 
The morning after Maria reported the rape, when Juan left to take Maria to 
her job at Manpower, defendant was standing at the front door.  Maria started 
screaming to defendant to “get out of there” and showed him the restraining order.  
Juan said he was going to call the police and grabbed his telephone, at which point 
defendant left.  Within a day or so of this event, two men, apparent gang members, 
came to the back gate of the house.  They told Juan to drop the charges.  
Concerned about these threats, Juan and Maria moved to another home.  Maria 
also quit her job and began working at Washington Mutual Bank in Northridge.  
She moved to her mother‟s house in October 1999.  During this time, Maria told 
Juan about other threats defendant had made to her.  She said defendant “knew 
how to find out things” and showed that he knew where she was living.  He told 
her “he had shot somebody before and got away with it.”  He also told her that if 
he were taken into custody, “he wouldn‟t go alone,” which she understood as a 
threat to her family and Juan.  She did not want to tell the police where defendant 
was living because she was afraid for her family. 
Gerilind Taylor testified that after Maria reported the rape, she told her that 
defendant had threatened her.  He also told her that he would give a “sex video” to 
her parents.  She said that she was afraid because defendant was so angry, but she 
also loved him and thought she could change him. 
Chris Eck testified that Maria continued to work at Manpower for a couple 
of weeks after she reported the rape.  During this time, Maria said defendant told 
her “something along the line if I‟m going down for this, then I‟m going to take 
you with [sic].  This was a third strike.”  Partly because of his criminal past, Maria 
was afraid that defendant would kill her.  Defendant had also threatened to send a 
sex video to her family if she did not withdraw the rape charge.  She was also 
 
6 
afraid that defendant would retaliate against Juan.  Sometimes, however, she 
would make excuses for the bruises and said she wanted to help defendant. 
A coworker at Washington Mutual Bank, where Maria began to work after 
reporting the rape, testified that Maria was “always scared” of her previous 
boyfriend.  The coworker observed bruises on Maria “all the time.”  Another 
coworker at the bank testified that in December and January, 1999-2000, she 
observed bruising on Maria that Maria said defendant had caused.  Maria said that 
defendant had raped her and she had reported it.  She said defendant had told her 
to drop the case “or he would kill her.”  He had also threatened her family.  Maria 
did not tell the police where defendant lived because she was afraid of him.  At 
one point, Maria told the coworker that defendant had sent a sex video to her 
family to intimidate her and try to get her to drop the charges. 
A friend of Maria‟s who often worked out with her at a local gym testified 
that Maria told her defendant had raped her and later threatened to kill her and to 
hurt her family if she did not withdraw the rape charge. 
Maria Eugenia Herrera, Maria‟s sister, accompanied Maria when she 
reported the rape to the police.  Maria told her about the rape and defendant‟s 
threats, and she observed Maria‟s bruises.  Maria told her that defendant put his 
hands on her neck and lifted her until she fainted.  She also said defendant told her 
“that he knew how the system worked, and that he could make believe that he was 
crazy and that way get away with it.”  Sometime after Maria reported the rape, 
Herrera received a video in the mail sent to her address.  The video was given to 
the police.  It had a return address of “Guess Who” and showed defendant and 
Maria having sex. 
Isabel Mejia, Maria‟s mother, and Laura Patricia “Patti” Arreguin, her 
cousin, testified that in March 2000, Maria was living with her family in Arleta.  
Maria and Patti shared a bedroom.  Maria told Patti that defendant had raped and 
 
7 
choked her.  Maria was working at Washington Mutual Bank at the time.  On the 
days she worked, she would leave home at 4:40 a.m.  On those days, the telephone 
regularly rang before Maria left.  Maria told Patti the caller was defendant.  Isabel 
told Maria to tell defendant not to call anymore, but the calling continued.  Maria 
told Patti that the detective investigating the rape case often asked her where 
defendant was living.  Although she knew, she did not tell the detective because 
she feared defendant.  In fact, after her meetings with the detective, she would call 
defendant to assure him that she had not told the detective where he lived.  She 
would say this to defendant “to try to keep him at bay or pacified.” 
Naomi Hernandez, who knew defendant well, testified that at some point, 
defendant told her that Maria had filed a rape charge.  He asked her, “ „How can 
she claim rape when we‟re living together?‟ ”  He said he expected to be arrested 
on the rape charge and threatened to kill Maria if he was.  He said, “ „I‟m going to 
kill‟ or „get that bitch, because I‟m not going back to jail.‟ ”  “He kept on referring 
to a rape.”  He also told her that Maria had promised to drop the charge, and he 
believed she would meet with the district attorney to do so. 
On March 3, 2000, Maria met with the deputy district attorney assigned to 
her rape case.  During the meeting, Maria‟s telephone or beeper went off.  Maria 
looked at it, made a comment, and became afraid.  After the meeting, the case 
remained open and was awaiting defendant‟s arrest. 
The next day, March 4, Maria was scheduled to work at the bank beginning 
at 4:55 a.m.  She never arrived.  Her sister testified that the telephone at their 
home rang as usual that morning around 4:00 a.m.  Then she heard Maria leave the 
house as usual.  Witnesses and business records established that around 4:45 a.m. 
that morning, Maria entered the Sav-On drug store in Arleta, where she used to 
work, and purchased a pack of Marlboro cigarettes, the brand that defendant 
 
8 
smoked regularly.  Maria did not smoke.  The two store employees who saw her 
testified that she seemed to be in a hurry and was in the store only a short time. 
Vanessa F., 11 years old at the time of these events, was among those living 
with defendant at the Dorrington Avenue residence in Arleta.  Early in the 
morning of March 4, 2000, while she was still in bed, she heard knocking on her 
bedroom window.  It was defendant.  She went to the kitchen to open the back 
door.  She saw defendant alone outside wearing a gray beanie.  She did not know 
what time it was, but it was light outside. 
The Gonzalez family, including teenage sisters M. and L. and their mother, 
lived just down Dorrington Avenue from defendant.  Around 4:45, on March 4, 
2000, the sounds of a woman screaming woke them up.  The screaming 
commenced by an alley in the back, then moved along the side of their house to 
the front.  The three women went out the front door and observed a man hitting 
and kicking a woman, who was in the backseat of a car parked in front.  The 
woman was screaming for help.  Somehow the woman got out of the car and 
looked at the Gonzalez family.  Defendant continued to beat and kick her, 
appearing not to notice the family.  He also hit her on the back or head repeatedly 
with a bottle like a Corona beer bottle.  The family called for the woman to come 
to them, but she seemed to freeze.  Suddenly, the woman stopped resisting.  The 
man grabbed her, put her in the backseat of the car, and drove away. 
M. Gonzalez called 911, and the police arrived quickly, but not before the 
man had sped away with the woman in the back. 
Later that morning, police, responding to a report of an abandoned vehicle, 
found a bluish gray Nissan Altima in the parking lot of an apartment complex on 
Van Nuys Boulevard, where defendant used to live.  Juan had purchased the car 
for Maria.  Maria‟s body, with a ligature around the neck, was in the trunk.  Her 
clothing was saturated with blood.  The car contained blood both outside and 
 
9 
inside, especially in the rear passenger area.  The outside blood was smeared, as if 
it had been wiped with a cloth. 
A witness testified that sometime earlier that morning, she saw a man 
wiping the car with a rag.  The man wore a beanie like one later found in 
defendant‟s bedroom. 
The autopsy revealed that Maria died of three separate injuries:  “The main 
injury is strangulation at the throat caused by a hard ligature, . . . like a shoe 
string . . . tightly wrapped around the throat.  The second injury is a stab wound 
into the jugular vein on the left side of the neck and throat, most probably 
wounding the vein beneath the ligature cord that was wrapped tightly around the 
neck.  And the third injury which is a potentially lethal injury is a blunt-force 
traumatic injury to the left side back of the head which caused bleeding under the 
scalp and also small amount of bleeding on top of her brain.”  In addition to the 
ligature, there was evidence of manual strangulation. 
The ligature was wrapped tightly three times around Maria‟s neck and tied 
with a bow or slip knot.  Maria‟s fingernails had been painted with a red acrylic 
paint.  Her right hand was missing three fingernails.  Her neck contained abrasions 
that were probably caused by the victim‟s fingernails trying to pull the ligature 
away.  A broken piece of a knife remained in her neck beneath the ligature.  
According to the pathologist, it appeared that “the knife was stabbed into the neck 
while the ligature was wrapped tightly around the neck and throat.  It went 
downward from top to bottom and beneath the ligature into the vein, through the 
vein and hit the hard bone of the neck.”  Her body contained other sharp-force 
wounds, including defensive wounds on the hands.  In the pathologist‟s opinion, 
the victim was still alive at the time of the strangulation and the knife wound to the 
neck. 
 
10 
The blunt-force head wound was consistent with being hit by a bottle and 
could have caused unconsciousness or severe stunning.  The pathologist testified 
that the likely order of the main injuries were, first, the blunt injury to the head, 
then the ligature, then the knife wound into the jugular vein.  “[T]he most 
immediately lethal wound is the strangulation.” 
Because of the absence of evidence of a struggle at the Van Nuys 
Boulevard apartment complex where the car was abandoned, it appeared Maria 
was not killed there but at an unknown location.  Her body was then placed in the 
trunk and driven to the Van Nuys location.  The trunk contained very little blood. 
In the area where the Gonzalez family observed the assault, police found 
fingernails painted with red acrylic paint that forensic testing established were 
consistent in all respects with the fingernails that remained on Maria‟s body.  In 
the same area, police also found Corona beer bottles, one broken. 
Defendant was arrested the evening after Maria‟s body was found, but 
initially only on the rape charge.  He had fresh scratches and other injuries, some 
of which could have been inflicted by Maria‟s fingernails.  Even though no one 
mentioned the murder to him, he told the police that he did not kill anyone.  He 
asked one police officer “why he was arrested for 187,” an apparent reference to 
section 187 of California‟s Penal Code, which defines murder.  He told the same 
officer something like “he didn‟t want to be a part of his ex-girlfriend‟s craziness 
and her having problems with her ex-husband, who he wouldn‟t be surprised if he 
went off and killed her.”  Witnesses testified that after his arrest, defendant faked 
having seizures, for which he was taken to the hospital. 
At the time of his arrest, defendant was living with his mother and several 
others, including Rosa Marquez, on Dorrington Avenue in Arleta.  Police searched 
his bedroom pursuant to a search warrant.  They found a gray knit watch cap or 
beanie, and a blood smeared pack of Marlboro cigarettes identical to those Maria 
 
11 
had purchased the morning of her death.  They also found an address book that 
had belonged to Maria.  It contained Maria‟s handwriting but also various 
notations, some gang related, in a different handwriting.  The different 
handwriting included matters pertaining to Maria, such as her mother‟s name, and 
her family‟s address and telephone number.  Police also found an envelope 
addressed to defendant‟s brother containing a photograph of Maria and defendant.  
On the back was written, “This is the bitch, Ruben, JKS.”  JKS stands for the 
Jokers, a clique of the Venice 13 street gang.  Defendant bore tattoos consistent 
with his membership in the Jokers. 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis revealed that the blood on the pack 
of Marlboro cigarettes found in defendant‟s bedroom, the blood found on the 
street on Dorrington, and the blood from Maria‟s car could not have come from 
defendant but was consistent with Maria‟s blood.  One analyst testified that the 
profile of the samples she tested would occur in about one person in 330 billion 
among unrelated individuals in the Hispanic population and even less often in 
other population groups. 
The distance from Maria‟s home to the Sav-On drug store was a little over 
two miles.  The distance from there to the two Dorrington Avenue addresses was a 
little under one mile.  The distance from the Dorrington Avenue addresses to the 
apartment complex on Van Nuys Boulevard where the car was abandoned was 
about one mile. 
At the preliminary hearing in August 2004, an investigating officer escorted 
Rosa Marquez to the courtroom where she was to testify.  While doing so, he 
observed defendant make a hand sign to Rosa that signified the Venice 13 street 
gang. 
Sandra Baca testified as an expert on “intimate partner violence,” which 
used to be called “battered women‟s syndrome,” to help explain Maria‟s behavior. 
 
12 
Defense counsel cross-examined prosecution witnesses, but defendant 
presented no witnesses of his own. 
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution Evidence 
A friend of Maria‟s, her parents, her brother, a sister, a cousin, and two 
uncles testified about Maria and the impact her death had on them and her family. 
The prosecution presented evidence of defendant‟s prior criminal behavior 
involving force or violence. 
In August 1980, when defendant was 16 years old and a member of the 
Venice 13 gang, he was involved in the gang-related murder of a rival gang 
member.  The victim was fatally shot in the head, apparently while riding a 
bicycle.  Defendant was not the actual shooter and apparently was not present at 
the shooting.  He was present at a meeting in which the shooting was planned, and 
he provided a screwdriver to help another gang member steal a car to use in the 
shooting. 
In the 1980‟s defendant physically abused his then girlfriend. 
In March 1984, defendant shot two persons, for which he was convicted of 
one count of assault with a deadly weapon. 
Defendant also had two prior burglary convictions, one conviction of petty 
theft with a prior theft-related conviction, and one conviction of possession of 
cocaine. 
The prosecution also presented evidence of many instances of defendant‟s 
criminal behavior in the county jail between 2001 and 2004, after his arrest in this 
case, which involved force or violence or the threat of force or violence.  On 
numerous occasions, defendant possessed razor blades or shanks that could be 
used as weapons; he assaulted fellow inmates and jail staff, sometimes inflicting 
 
13 
serious injuries; and he possessed urine and feces, which he often used to “gas” 
jail staff, that is, to spray them with the urine and feces.  In addition to actual 
incidents of gassing, defendant often threatened to gas or otherwise assault staff. 
2.  Defense Evidence 
Defendant‟s mother, sister, stepfather, and uncle testified about his unhappy 
and difficult childhood.  His mother was Hispanic and his natural father “Afro-
Cuban.”  Because of the interracial aspect, when they married, the mother‟s family 
“didn‟t like it at all.”  His father abused him and his mother.  Eventually, the 
marriage ended, and defendant‟s father left, leaving the family with no money.  
After that, defendant‟s mother often beat him with a belt or shoe.  Defendant‟s 
uncle sometimes took care of him, even though he was a heroin addict and often 
injected heroin in front of defendant.  The uncle testified that partly because of 
this, defendant became a heroin addict himself.  When defendant was 13 or 14 
years old, the uncle had him help in a robbery to get money to support the uncle‟s 
heroin addiction. 
Defendant‟s mother remarried, but the stepfather also was involved in 
criminal conduct.  At one point, both defendant‟s uncle and his stepfather were in 
the same prison, and defendant sometimes visited them there.  The stepfather 
introduced defendant to other inmates, including members of the Mexican Mafia.  
Defendant was also affected by racial tension in his neighborhood.  As a result of 
these and other factors, he became involved in gang activity and criminal conduct 
at a young age. 
Two Los Angeles County deputy sheriffs testified that during the 
approximately two-year period before the trial, beginning around January 2007, 
defendant had behaved well in jail and often volunteered for work assignments. 
 
14 
Dr. Roger Light, a neuropsychologist, testified about defendant‟s mental 
condition.  In his opinion, defendant “reflect[ed] deficits in several aspects of both 
neuropsychological functioning and cognitive intellectual functioning.” 
3.  Rebuttal and Surrebuttal 
Dr. Robert Brook, a clinical psychologist specializing in neuropsychology, 
testified for the prosecution on rebuttal about defendant‟s mental condition.  He 
disagreed with some of Dr. Light‟s opinions.  Dr. Light then testified on 
surrebuttal, reiterating his opinion. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Guilt Issues 
1.  Admission of Photographs of Defendant’s Tattoos 
Before the opening statements, defendant objected to the prosecution‟s 
showing the jury pictures of his gang tattoos on the basis that they were more 
prejudicial than probative.  The photographs also showed the scratches on 
defendant‟s body when he was arrested.  Defense counsel argued “they‟re full 
body depictions of the tattoos.  That issue is not going to be at issue.  We‟re going 
to be agreeing that he has gang tattoos on his body.”  She argued the “full 
panorama of tattoos is [not] necessary to depict” the scratches. 
The court overruled the objection:  “You can‟t, by saying there is no issue 
on it, take away the strength of the prosecution‟s evidence, because they still have 
to prove it, even if you‟re not going to contest it.”  It found no prejudice.  It 
explained that the pictures “show scratches on his neck and his right shoulder, the 
back of his right shoulder, but I would think given what I‟ve heard of the evidence 
in this case, that the tattoos themselves are significant.  They tend to be somewhat 
overpowering to the extent that they do show the gang Venice Jokers on the back 
and have some interesting perhaps frightening images, which may have to do with 
 
15 
the fact that the victim in the case did not, Maria did not report the, or was 
reluctant to report the violation and/or was more compliant with any demands that 
were made.  But anyway, there is no prejudice involved at all.  The objection to 
the tattoos is overruled.  It‟s much better to show the tattoos than have him display 
these during the trial anyway.” 
During the trial, the photographs were used to show the scratches on 
defendant‟s body and as evidence of his membership in the Jokers clique of the 
Venice 13 gang.  The investigating officer testified that one tattoo was “the largest 
one I‟ve ever seen with a [Venice 13] gang member.” 
At the end of the prosecution‟s case-in-chief, defendant renewed his 
objection to the pictures of his tattoos.  The court overruled the objection.  It noted 
that the photographs “obviously show the wounds that [defendant] did sustain at 
some point, and the question is how they got there.  But it was well stated that 
you‟re talking about the intimidation and those tattoos, and to some extent the 
caricatures are significant as well.  I couldn‟t see all of them, but there‟s a tattoo of 
a woman on his lower back, in the center lower back that is suggestive of his 
attitude about women, which is consistent with our — this recent witness.”  This 
latter statement clearly refers to the final prosecution witness, the expert who 
testified about intimate partner violence. 
Defendant contends the court erred in admitting the photographs.  He 
argues they were more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 
352.  We disagree.  The court acted within its discretion in concluding that the 
evidence was more probative than prejudicial.  (People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 
346, 373.)  “[E]vidence of gang membership is potentially prejudicial and should 
not be admitted if its probative value is minimal.  [Citation.]  But evidence of gang 
membership is often relevant to, and admissible regarding, the charged offense.  
Evidence of the defendant‟s gang affiliation — including evidence of the gang‟s 
 
16 
territory, membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal enterprises, 
rivalries, and the like — can help prove identity, motive, modus operandi, specific 
intent, means of applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the 
charged crime.”  (People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049.) 
Defendant‟s gang membership permeated the entire case.  It was defendant, 
not the prosecution, who first interjected it into the case.  He flaunted his gang 
membership and criminal past as a major part of his campaign of intimidation and 
his efforts to dissuade Maria from testifying against him.  When Juan Arevalo 
confronted defendant about Maria‟s bruises and her statements that defendant was 
abusing her, defendant said she was lying.  He also told Juan he was a gang 
member and showed him the gang tattoos depicted in the photographs.  During 
this same time period, defendant also told Maria‟s coworker, Chris Eck, about his 
criminal past and gang connections.  Additionally, the jury could reasonably infer 
from the evidence that shortly after Maria reported the rape, defendant sent two of 
his fellow gang members to try to intimidate Juan and, through him, Maria.  The 
address book found in his bedroom contained gang notations.  On the picture of 
Maria in the envelope addressed to defendant‟s brother was written, “This is the 
bitch, Ruben, JKS.” 
As the trial court noted in overruling the objection, the fact defendant said 
he would agree there were gang tattoos on his body did not make the evidence 
irrelevant or unduly prejudicial.  Defendant pleaded not guilty, which forced the 
prosecution to prove its case.  It was entitled to do so.  (People v. Bryant, Smith 
and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 407.)  Additionally, given the evidence and 
defendant‟s statement that he agreed he had the tattoos, it was inevitable the jury 
would learn of his gang membership.  Under the circumstances, the court had 
good reason to find the photographs would be probative and not unduly 
prejudicial.  It acted within its discretion in admitting them. 
 
17 
One of the tattoos, which defendant describes as depicting “a woman in a 
sexually submissive pose,” was not itself clearly gang related.  The trial court 
specifically referred to it and overruled defendant‟s objection under Evidence 
Code section 352.  We see no abuse of discretion in this ruling either. 
2.  Admission of Evidence that Defendant Made a Gang Hand Sign 
The investigating officer testified that when he brought Rosa Marquez into 
the courtroom to testify, he observed defendant make a hand sign to her that 
signified the Venice 13 street gang.  Defendant objected to the testimony “as more 
prejudicial than probative.”  The court sustained the objection “on foundation.”  
After the prosecutor asked further questions to lay a foundation, defendant again 
objected and asked for a ruling on the testimony‟s relevance and probative value.  
The court stated that lack of foundation was the only ground on which it had 
sustained the objection, and it otherwise overruled the objection.  When defendant 
asked the court to note his continuing objection to the “prejudicial information,” 
the court responded, “You asked for the foundation, you‟re getting the foundation.  
If you don‟t like it, don‟t ask for it.  Overruled.”  The witness then testified about 
the hand sign and why he, an expert regarding gangs, believed it signified the 
Venice 13 street gang. 
During a break in the testimony, and outside the jury‟s presence, the court 
acknowledged it had not understood that defendant‟s objection was based on the 
ground that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative.  It again overruled 
that objection.  It continued to find no prejudice from the evidence:  “You still 
haven‟t identified any prejudice.  I don‟t see any prejudice in it.  Normally the 
prejudice of gang membership is great in the abstract. . . .  We don‟t bring it in 
when it‟s unnecessary, but in this case it‟s going to be — it‟s contained 
throughout, not only on the outsized letters on the defendant‟s back, but when he, 
 
18 
for instance, wrote his brother and has — and signs it with his name and then JKS, 
he‟s still indicating gang activity, and it comes in in front of the jury, that‟s very 
significant as to his attitude about the victim in the case.  I see no prejudice at all.” 
We see no abuse of discretion for essentially the same reasons the court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs showing defendant‟s tattoos.  
Defendant‟s gang affiliation permeated the case.  The prosecution did not present 
extensive evidence regarding the Venice 13 gang‟s criminal activities.  But the 
limited evidence the court permitted was permissible. 
3.  Admission of Gang Notations in an Address Book 
An address book that the evidence showed had belonged to the victim was 
found in defendant‟s bedroom after he killed her.  It contained the victim‟s writing 
but also writing in what appeared to be a different hand, which contained gang 
notations and information concerning the victim.  When the investigating officer 
began to testify about the notations, defendant objected on hearsay grounds.  The 
court overruled the objection.  After the officer further testified about gang 
nicknames, or monikers, contained in the book, defendant also objected under 
Evidence Code section 352 that the testimony was more prejudicial than probative.  
The court overruled the objection but added, “I‟m not sure where we‟re going with 
this.  I‟m concerned about relevance.”  The prosecutor commented, “I was just 
pointing out various things, given some of the evidence in this case.”  From that 
point on, the prosecutor asked no further questions regarding gang notations or 
monikers. 
Defendant contends the court erred on two grounds.  First, he argues the 
testimony was inadmissible hearsay.  The Attorney General argues the testimony 
was offered for a nonhearsay purpose.  Defendant disagrees.  We need not decide 
the point, for the court had discretion to overrule the hearsay objection even if the 
 
19 
testimony was offered for the truth of the matter asserted.  The obvious exception 
to the hearsay rule that applies here is the one for statements of a party.  (Evid. 
Code, § 1220.)  The testimony regarding the address book was based on the belief 
that defendant wrote the notations.  If so, no hearsay problem exists, for defendant 
was a party, and the testimony was offered against him.  (People v. Horning 
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 898.)  Defendant argues the prosecution presented no 
foundational evidence, such as handwriting comparison testimony, establishing 
that he did, indeed, make the notations.  However, under the circumstances, the 
court and, ultimately, the jury could readily find that defendant did write the 
notations.  The victim and defendant had been living together, the address book 
was found in defendant‟s bedroom, the notations were consistent with other things 
defendant had said and written (such as the letter to his brother, also found in the 
bedroom), and the notations contained information about the victim.  Indeed, it is 
hard to imagine who, other than defendant, might have made the notations.  The 
trial court acted within its discretion in overruling the hearsay objection. 
Defendant also argues the testimony about the gang notations was more 
prejudicial than probative.  But, again, the court had discretion to conclude 
otherwise and to permit the bit of testimony that had already occurred while 
expressing concern about possible further testimony.  This testimony also showed 
that defendant‟s gang membership was important to him, that he flaunted it, and 
that it played a significant role in his campaign of intimidation. 
4.  Admission of a Statement by Defendant 
Chris Eck, the victim‟s coworker at Manpower, testified that one time, 
before the rape, he met defendant at the office.  In Maria‟s presence, defendant 
said “that he had been incarcerated as a juvenile for homicide and later as an adult 
 
20 
for a double attempted homicide,” that “he was a hit man for the Mexican Mafia,” 
and that “he had killed people in the past, he‟d gotten away with it.” 
After the opening statements to the jury, but before the guilt phase 
testimony, defendant objected to this testimony on relevance grounds.  The court 
found the testimony “clearly relevant to the issue that you [defense counsel] had 
addressed in your opening statement as to whether there was a rape or not, if it 
was a figment of her imagination or just false statement, but the answer to that is if 
there was a real rape and she‟s terrified of a possible Mexican Mafia hit man, she‟s 
going to keep her mouth shut and figure, well, it was bad enough, I‟m not going to 
make it worse.  It‟s clearly relevant.  The only issue would be whether it‟s so 
prejudicial, whether there is some — one of the problems would be that it‟s being 
a braggart, he‟s making up stories to terrify people, but it still has the effect of 
terrifying the victim, so whether it‟s true or not, it‟s admissible.” 
The prosecutor indicated that there was some factual support for the 
statement, which would be presented at the penalty phase.  The court invited 
defendant to renew the objection “if you get something new that you want to . . . 
be heard about on that issue,” but otherwise, “based on what‟s been offered here,” 
it found the evidence relevant.  Defense counsel agreed that there was factual 
support for “some” of the statement, but added that he was not aware of any 
evidence that would support “the idea that he was a Mexican Mafia hit man,” and 
that that part of the statement was “braggadocio.”  The court responded, “That 
could be.  And, in fact, that‟s a fair part of an argument, but it still has the effect of 
even more so of terrifying the victim in the case.”  The court offered to give a 
special limiting instruction if defendant wanted one.  Defendant did not request a 
limiting instruction, and the court did not give one. 
Defendant contends the court erred in admitting the testimony.  However, 
the court had discretion to admit the evidence for the reasons it stated.  Whether or 
 
21 
not the statements were true, that defendant made them in the victim‟s hearing was 
another relevant piece of evidence showing that he was intimidating and, as the 
court put it, “terrifying” her.  This was relevant both to help explain the victim‟s 
apparent reluctance to report the rape and to whether the rape actually occurred.  
As defendant notes, Eck testified on cross-examination that, because he considered 
the conversation to be “casual,” he, Eck, did not think defendant was trying to 
intimidate him.  But this cross-examination did not establish that the court abused 
its discretion in its earlier ruling, which was based on the offer of proof.  
Defendant did not renew his objection.  In any event, it was not the impact of the 
statement on the witness that mattered, but the impact on the victim.  The victim 
was not able to testify herself as to the statement‟s impact, but the court could 
reasonably admit the evidence and permit the jury to judge its significance for 
itself in light of all of the evidence. 
Citing People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, where the Court of 
Appeal found reversible error in admitting substantial gang evidence, defendant 
argues the court should have excluded the evidence as too prejudicial under 
Evidence Code section 352.  The Albarran court found that, although some of the 
gang evidence admitted in that case was relevant, the trial court also permitted 
much evidence that “was irrelevant, cumulative and presented a substantial risk of 
undue prejudice.”  (Albarran, at p. 228.)  Here, by contrast, relatively little gang 
evidence was presented, and the trial court scrutinized all of it.  We see no abuse 
of discretion. 
5.  Admission of a Statement by the Victim 
Maria‟s sister testified that when she accompanied Maria to the police 
station to report the rape, Maria said that defendant had told her “that he knew 
how the system worked, and that he could make believe that he was crazy and that 
 
22 
way get away with it.”  At that point, defendant asked that the statement “be 
limited to state of mind.”  The prosecutor argued that the statement was admissible 
as a spontaneous statement under Evidence Code section 1240.  The court 
questioned whether it should be limited to state of mind.  Defendant agreed the 
statement could be viewed as a threat and, as such, was admissible to show 
Maria‟s state of mind.  But he argued that “with respect to anything else, I believe 
it‟s simply double hearsay and unreliable.”  Ultimately, the court agreed with the 
prosecutor that the statement was a spontaneous statement and overruled the 
objection. 
Defendant contends the court erred in not limiting the statement to Maria‟s 
state of mind.  He argues the statement does not come within the exception to the 
hearsay rule for spontaneous statements.  Evidence Code section 1240 makes a 
statement that describes something the declarant perceived an exception to the 
hearsay rule if that statement “[w]as made spontaneously while the declarant was 
under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.”  To qualify for this 
exception, (1) there must have been a startling occurrence that produced nervous 
excitement, thus making the statement spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the 
statement must have been made before there was time to contrive and 
misrepresent; and (3) the statement must relate to the occurrence preceding it.  
(People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 64.) 
We need not decide whether the court properly admitted the statement as a 
spontaneous statement, for any error was harmless.  As defendant recognized at 
trial, the statement was at least admissible for the limited purpose of showing the 
victim‟s state of mind.  Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (a) permits 
“evidence of a statement of the declarant‟s then existing state of mind [or] 
emotion,” when “(1)  The evidence is offered to prove the declarant‟s state of 
mind [or] emotion . . . when it is itself an issue in the action; or [¶] (2) The 
 
23 
evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant.”  The 
statement was admissible to show Maria‟s state of mind, that is, that she perceived 
defendant‟s statement as a threat and was therefore afraid of him.  Maria‟s fear of 
defendant, and her conduct in light of that fear, was at issue in the action. 
Any error in allowing the jury to consider the statement for its truth — to 
show that defendant actually said he knew how the system worked and could “get 
away with it” by pretending to be crazy — was harmless.  The evidence was 
presented very briefly and never exploited.  The prosecutor did not mention the 
statement in her arguments to the jury.  Defendant contends the evidence was 
especially prejudicial at the penalty phase.  We disagree.  This point, never 
exploited, was minor in light of the case as a whole.  We see no reasonable 
possibility any error contributed to the penalty verdict.  (People v. Gonzalez 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 960-961.) 
6.  Claims of Instructional Error 
Defendant reiterates two instructional claims we have repeatedly rejected.  
We see no reason to reconsider our previous rulings.  The court did not err in 
instructing the jury on first degree murder even though the information simply 
charged murder under Penal Code section 187 without specifying the degree.  
(People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 967-969.)  A series of standard 
instructions the court gave — CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.21.1, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, 2.51, 
8.20, 8.83 — did not undermine the reasonable doubt standard.  (People v. Whalen 
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 70-71; People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 53-55.) 
7.  Validity of the Lying-in-wait Special-circumstance Finding 
Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the lying-in-wait 
special-circumstance finding.  We agree. 
 
24 
To determine whether the evidence supports a special-circumstance finding, 
we must review “ „the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to 
determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid  
value such that a reasonable jury could find‟ ” the special circumstance allegation 
true “ „beyond a reasonable doubt.‟ ”  (People v. Johnson (2015) 60 Cal.4th 966, 
988.) 
“At the time of defendant‟s crime, the special circumstance required that 
the murder be committed „while lying in wait.‟  ([Pen. Code] § 190.2, former 
subd. (a)(15) . . . .)”  (People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 246, fn. omitted.)  
This “special circumstance required an intentional killing, committed under 
circumstances that included a physical concealment or concealment of purpose; a 
substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act; and, 
immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position 
of advantage.”  (People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 201.) 
The prosecution‟s theory to support the lying-in-wait special circumstance 
was that when defendant learned that Maria had not dropped the rape charge when 
she met with the prosecutor on March 3, 2000, he lured her, unsuspecting, to his 
home the next morning, intending to kill her; then, after watching and waiting for 
the opportune time to act, he attacked her from a position of advantage and 
intentionally killed her.  If substantial evidence had supported this theory, it would 
have been sufficient to establish the special circumstance. 
The evidence showed that defendant expected Maria to drop the charges 
and supported a finding that he intended to kill her if she did not do so.  It also 
showed that he called Maria early the morning of March 4, 2000, as he often did, 
and that, rather than go straight to work, she drove to defendant‟s neighborhood 
and parked near his home, stopping at a store on the way to buy a pack of 
defendant‟s favorite cigarettes.  At some point after she arrived, defendant began 
 
25 
to attack her, an attack that culminated in his hitting, stabbing, and strangling her.  
This evidence supports a finding that defendant intended to kill her if and when he 
learned that she had not dropped the charges, and that he did kill her when he 
learned that the charges were still pending. 
Missing, however, is any evidence that defendant learned before her fatal 
trip to his home that Maria had not dropped the charges.  It appears that Maria was 
hoping to appease defendant by bringing him a pack of his favorite cigarettes.  But 
no evidence exists whether she did so because she had already told him she was 
not dropping the charges, or because she intended to tell him when she met him.  
There was no evidence regarding the content of the telephone conversation 
between Maria and defendant early that fatal morning or any other evidence 
supporting a finding that defendant knew she had not dropped the charges before 
she arrived at his home. 
The evidence strongly supports a jury finding that defendant killed Maria 
premeditatedly when he learned that she had not dropped the charges, but it does 
not support a finding that he had lured her to his home intending to kill her.  Thus, 
there is no evidence of a substantial period of watching and waiting for an 
opportune time to act.  Accordingly, we conclude the evidence does not support 
the lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding; therefore, we reverse that finding. 
B.  Penalty Issues 
1.  Claims of Evidentiary Error 
Defendant contends that two sheriff‟s deputies who testified about his 
misconduct in jail gave impermissible hearsay and opinion testimony. 
a.  Factual Background 
Deputy David Florence testified that he had been a deputy sheriff for 21 
years, much of that time working in the county jail.  During this time, he got to 
 
26 
know defendant very well.  He testified about one occasion when five razor blades 
altered for use as weapons were found in a latex glove secreted in defendant‟s 
buttocks. 
When asked whether defendant often acted aggressively towards the jail 
deputies, Deputy Florence responded, “That was commonplace behavior for Mr. 
Becerrada.  It was his way of getting attention or trying to manipulate the situation 
wherever it was, whether it was, . . . it didn‟t really matter where it was as long as 
he was getting the attention and got what he wanted.”  Defendant objected to the 
testimony as “an opinion and conclusion,” and asked that it be struck from the 
record.  The court sustained the objection.  The prosecutor asked, “Did you also 
observe situations where the defendant would act aggressively or violent[ly] 
towards deputies in order to get whatever it was that he wanted?” The court again 
sustained defendant‟s objection that the question asked for an opinion and 
conclusion.  The prosecutor then asked whether defendant “would ask for things, 
and when refused, he would act in an aggressive or violent manner?”  Deputy 
Florence responded that yes, such behavior was common for defendant.  He also 
testified that in general “some inmates will attempt to manipulate the system by 
causing problems within the jail facility to get what they want.” 
Deputy Florence testified that during his career working in the jail, he had 
been in contact with “thousands” of inmates.  The prosecutor asked “in terms of 
the defendant and your experiences with him,” how he compared with other 
inmates in terms of difficulty or violence.  Defendant objected on the ground the 
question called for a conclusion or opinion.  The court overruled the objection, and 
the witness responded, “I‟d say out of my time dealing with individuals who are 
either arrested and incarcerated, he probably rates in the top five of people that are 
able to manipulate any given situation however he wants the outcome to come for 
him.” 
 
27 
The prosecutor also asked Deputy Florence, “Would it be a common 
occurrence within what you personally observed of the defendant that he would 
challenge deputies within the facility to fight?”  He responded,  “Yes.”  The 
prosecutor asked,  “In other words, if the defendant said to a deputy, take this 
waist chain off and let‟s go one on one, was that something that was a common 
occurrence with the defendant in this case.”  Defendant objected on the basis of 
hearsay, which the court overruled.  The prosecutor added, “That you‟re aware 
of.”  The witness responded, “Yes.  Mr. Becerrada oftentimes would do different 
things to get the attention of others and take the attention off of him, and 
oftentimes it had to do when he was either being moved to and fro, whether it was 
coming back to court or work pass or whatever.”  Defendant objected regarding 
his “intention, that‟s an opinion.”  He asked that it be struck from the record.  The 
court sustained the objection. 
The prosecutor questioned Deputy Florence about the importance in a jail 
setting of paying attention “not only to what an inmate might say to you, but also 
to, like you said, what their conduct is, what their behavior indicates.”  He said, 
“Sure,” and added, “It‟s especially important in working in a high power area.  All 
of the individuals that are there fall in that category, extremely dangerous.”  After 
the court sustained defendant‟s objection to another question, the prosecutor 
asked, “Did the defendant, based on your observations, present a danger to the 
deputies working within the [jail] module?”  Defendant objected on the basis that 
the question called for an opinion or conclusion.  The court overruled the 
objection, and the witness responded, “Yes.”  He also testified that defendant also 
presented a danger to other inmates and custodial staff. 
The prosecutor asked Deputy Florence, “Did the defendant ever act in a 
manner, in your opinion, from what you observed, where he was seen to be afraid 
of any other inmates?”  Defendant objected that it called for a conclusion, which 
 
28 
the court overruled.  The witness responded, “No.  I believe that his actions 
oftentimes was to show the other inmates that he wasn‟t afraid.”  The prosecutor 
asked, “And how would an inmate tend to show other inmates that you‟re not 
afraid, either of the deputies or of other inmates?”  The witness responded, “By 
their intentional disregard for the rules, disobeying instructions, orders, provoking 
fights with other inmates, fights with deputies, assaulting deputies, slashing 
deputies.  Whatever it takes to get the attention that they‟re to be accepted.”  The 
prosecutor followed up with this question:  “And would those behaviors, the type 
of conduct that you just described, would that be the type of behavior that would 
gain the inmate respect from other inmates by being aggressive or violent or 
disobedient with deputies?”  Defendant objected on the basis the question “calls 
for speculation.”  The court overruled the objection, and the witness responded, 
“Yes.” 
Deputy Mike Davis had worked at the central county jail for about six 
years.  He testified about numerous incidents of defendant‟s possession of hidden 
weapons, such as razors, and of gassing jail staff.  On cross-examination, 
defendant elicited Deputy Davis‟s testimony, based on his experience, that 
sometimes jail inmates would try to be transferred away from the section of the 
jail where defendant was housed because they were afraid of other inmates.  On 
redirect examination, the prosecutor asked, “Did the defendant ever seem to you to 
be an inmate who was afraid for his safety?”  Defendant objected on the basis that 
the question called for a conclusion or opinion.  The court overruled the objection, 
and the witness responded, “I don‟t think he was afraid for his safety.  I think there 
were some people maybe he wasn‟t getting along with, and I think he was more 
than a willing participant to do to them what they did to him, and I think that‟s 
why he was bringing the razors in for that reason, too.” 
 
29 
b.  Analysis 
Defendant contends Deputy Florence‟s testimony that defendant was 
among the “top five” inmates in manipulating a situation was impermissible 
opinion testimony.  We disagree. 
It is not clear from the record whether the evidence was offered and 
admitted as expert opinion — based on the witness‟s expertise as a correctional 
officer — or as lay opinion.  We will assume the evidence was offered as lay 
opinion.  As such, it was admissible.  “A lay witness may testify to an opinion if it 
is rationally based on the witness‟s perception and if it is helpful to a clear 
understanding of his testimony.  (Evid. Code, § 800.)”  (People v. Farnam (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 107, 153; accord, People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1310-
1311.)  Here, the witness knew defendant well and had had contact with 
“thousands” of inmates.  “On this record, we cannot say that [the witness‟s] 
testimony lacked a rational basis, or that it failed to clarify his testimony.”  
(Farnam, at p. 153.)  The testimony certainly came “within the experience of a 
correctional” officer like Deputy Florence, with several “years of security 
experience” in a jail setting.  (Ibid.) 
Defendant argues that the opinion “did not relate to any particular incident 
offered in aggravation and therefore was not necessary for his testimony”; and that 
“it did not assist the jurors in reaching their ultimate decision under the statutory 
framework and therefore was an improper opinion.”  However, “ „[v]iolent 
“criminal activity” presented in aggravation may be shown in context, so that the 
jury has full opportunity, in deciding the appropriate penalty, to determine its 
seriousness.‟ ”  (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 759, quoting People v. 
Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 757.)  Deputy Florence‟s opinion helped the jury to 
determine how serious defendant‟s criminal behavior in jail was.  (Welch, at p. 
759.)  It “merely placed in context other admissible incidents in aggravation at the 
 
30 
penalty phase.  The evidence tended to show the gravity of [the defendant‟s] 
violent and threatening criminal conduct behind bars . . . .”  (People v. Lewis and 
Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1054.)  Accordingly, the “court acted well within its 
discretion in permitting the lay opinion testimony.”  (People v. Farnam, supra, 28 
Cal.4th at pp. 153-154.) 
Next, defendant contends Deputy Florence‟s testimony that it was common 
for defendant to say to a deputy, “take this waist chain off and let‟s go one on 
one,” was inadmissible hearsay.  In context, however, the testimony was clearly 
based on what the witness had personally observed rather than on what he had 
heard from others.  The immediately preceding question was whether it was 
common “within what you personally observed of the defendant that he would 
challenge deputies within the facility to fight.”  (Italics added.)  In his reply brief, 
defendant argues the testimony was too general to be admissible hearsay even it if 
was based on the deputy‟s personal observations.  Because he did not object on 
that basis at trial, he cannot make the argument on appeal.  (People v. Kennedy 
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 612.)  Moreover, defendant cites, and we are aware of, no 
authority making that a valid basis on which to exclude the testimony.  The court 
acted within its discretion in admitting the testimony.  (People v. Jones, supra, 57 
Cal.4th at p. 956.) 
Next, defendant contends that Deputy Florence‟s testimony that defendant 
presented a danger in jail was also inadmissible opinion testimony.  However, for 
reasons similar to the reasons we rejected defendant‟s earlier argument regarding 
opinion testimony, we find the trial court acted within its discretion in permitting 
this testimony.  It was based on Deputy Florence‟s own perceptions and helped 
illuminate the incidents that he testified to.  By providing context for the evidence 
of defendant‟s specific criminal behavior in jail, it helped the jury understand the 
testimony. 
 
31 
Next, defendant contends Deputy Florence “improperly speculated that 
[defendant] committed misconduct in order to gain respect from other inmates.”  
However, this testimony was not mere speculation; it was also based on the 
witness‟s perceptions, drawn from his extensive experience with jail inmates in 
general, and with defendant in particular.  Again, we see no abuse of discretion. 
Finally, defendant contends Deputy Davis‟s testimony that he did not 
believe defendant was afraid for his own safety was also inadmissible opinion 
testimony.  The prosecutor elicited the opinion on redirect examination after 
defendant had elicited the opinion from the same witness that some inmates tried 
to transfer into another jail unit out of fear.  It was, accordingly, a relevant 
response to the cross-examination.  Moreover, the testimony was also based on the 
witness‟s perceptions drawn from years of experience, including much with 
defendant personally.  Again, we see no abuse of discretion. 
2.  Claim of Instructional Error 
Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b), directs the jury to consider “[t]he 
presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use 
or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force 
or violence.” 
Regarding this factor, the court instructed as follows:  “Evidence has been 
introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant has committed the 
following criminal acts:  murder, conspiracy to commit murder, attempted murder, 
assault, battery, battery by gassing of a custodial or peace officer, attempted 
battery by gassing of a custodial or peace officer, assault with force likely to cause 
great bodily injury, possession or manufacture of a weapon while confined in a 
penal institution or county jail, and obstructing or resisting a peace officer, which 
involved the express or implied use of force or violence or the threat of force or 
 
32 
violence.  Before a juror may consider any criminal act as an aggravating 
circumstance in this case, a juror must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant did, in fact, commit the criminal act.  A juror may not consider 
any evidence of any other criminal acts as an aggravating circumstance.” 
The court also instructed that as to any unadjudicated criminal acts, “the 
defendant is presumed to be innocent, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether 
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he‟s entitled to be found not guilty.”  It defined 
reasonable doubt.  (See CALJIC No. 8.87.) 
When the court and parties had previously discussed these instructions 
outside the jury‟s presence, defense counsel stated that, “after conferring,” 
defendant did not want the court to instruct the jury on the elements of the 
unadjudicated offenses. 
Defendant now contends this instruction “improperly directed [the jurors] 
to find that certain acts were committed with force and violence and permitted 
them to consider acts that were not committed with force and violence as 
aggravating circumstances under [Penal Code section 190.3,] factor (b).”  With 
one possible exception, all of the crimes on which the court instructed inherently 
involved force or violence or the threat of force or violence.  (See People v. 
Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 719-720 [possession of a weapon in jail 
constitutes implied threat of violence].)  The court left it to the jury to determine 
whether defendant committed any of those crimes.  “ . . . CALJIC No. 8.87 is not 
invalid for failing to submit to the jury the issue whether the defendant‟s acts 
involved the use, attempted use, or threat of force or violence.  (People v. Ochoa 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 453.)  The question whether the acts occurred is certainly a 
factual matter for the jury, but the characterization of those acts as involving an 
express or implied use of force or violence, or the threat thereof, would be a legal 
 
33 
matter properly decided by the court.”  (People v. Nakahara, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 
p. 720.) 
Defendant notes, correctly, that some of the acts the various witnesses 
described in recounting his criminal behavior, considered in isolation, either did 
not amount to a crime or did not involve force or violence.  That is generally the 
case.  Not every action a person takes in committing a crime is, by itself, criminal.  
But when a continuous course of criminal activity involves force or violence, the 
jury may consider the entire course of conduct.  Penal Code “[s]ection 190.3, 
factor (b), refers to „criminal activity,‟ not specific crimes. . . .   [¶]   . . . 
[C]ontinuous criminal activity is not segmented into portions, with those portions 
not themselves involving violence excised. . . .  [A]ll crimes committed during a 
continuous course of criminal activity which includes force or violence may be 
considered in aggravation even if some portions thereof, in isolation, may be 
nonviolent.”  (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 840-841.)  The trial court 
should not, however, instruct the jury regarding any nonviolent crime.  (Id. at p. 
841.)  With one possible exception, the court did not do so.  Moreover, the court 
specifically prohibited the jury from considering in aggravation any criminal act 
not listed. 
To the extent defendant argues the court should have instructed the jury on 
the elements of the crimes it listed, his attorneys specifically stated they did not 
want such instructions.  No sua sponte duty exists to instruct on the elements of 
crimes presented in aggravation at the penalty phase.  (People v. Lewis and Oliver, 
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1054.)  Good reason exists for not imposing such a duty.  
“[T]he rule absolving the court of a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of 
crimes introduced under [Penal Code section 190.3,] factor (b), „ “is based in part 
on a recognition that, as [a] tactical matter, the defendant „may not want the 
penalty phase instructions overloaded with a series of lengthy instructions on the 
 
34 
elements of alleged other crimes because he may fear that such instructions could 
lead the jury to place undue emphasis on the crimes rather than on the central 
question of whether he should live or die.‟  [Citations.]” ‟ ”  (People v. Anderson 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 588.)  Here, substantial evidence existed that the elements 
of the various crimes the court listed were satisfied.  “Under these circumstances, 
counsel could reasonably wish to avoid focusing the sentencer‟s attention on the 
ample evidence that the elements of those offenses were satisfied.”  (Ibid.) 
To the extent defendant argues the court should have listed every specific 
crime involving force or violence that the evidence supported — for example, 
every instance of gassing that the witnesses testified about — we find no sua 
sponte duty to do so, largely for the same reasons no sua sponte duty exists to 
instruct on the elements of the crimes.  A defendant would generally not want the 
jury reminded of every crime the evidence showed, especially when, as here, the 
crimes were numerous.  Defendant certainly would not have benefited from the 
court‟s listing of every single act of gassing or assault in jail that the evidence 
showed. 
Regarding the possible exception we have mentioned, defendant argues that 
the court‟s including obstructing or resisting a peace officer in the list of crimes 
the jury could consider allowed it to consider criminal acts that did not involve 
force or violence.  “Acts or words,” he argues, “that delayed an officer, diverted an 
officer‟s attention from his or her duties, or otherwise forced an officer to deal 
with [defendant] rather than focus on other duties would have been enough for the 
jurors to find that [defendant] obstructed an officer.”  The meaning of the 
instruction in this regard is not entirely clear.  The instruction told the jury to 
consider the listed offenses, including “obstructing or resisting a peace officer, 
which involved the express or implied use of force or violence or the threat of 
force or violence.”  This language might be construed as permitting the jury to 
 
35 
consider evidence of obstructing or resisting an officer only if it involved force or 
violence.  But it might also be construed as telling the jury that all of the listed 
crimes involved force or violence. 
We need not resolve this ambiguity.  Even if we assume the jury would 
interpret the instruction as telling it to consider all crimes of obstructing or 
resisting a peace officer, whether or not they involved force or violence, the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The jury received extensive evidence of 
defendant‟s very violent criminal conduct in jail.  Any nonviolent obstructing or 
resisting a peace officer was trivial by comparison.  Moreover, “the jury properly 
heard all the evidence” regarding defendant‟s continuous courses of criminal 
activity, including any nonviolent crimes he committed during those courses of 
conduct.  (People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 841.)  Instructing on “the 
nonviolent crimes added little, if anything, to the impact of the evidence and the 
instructions on the far more serious violent crimes.”  (Ibid.) 
Contrary to defendant‟s argument, the line of cases from the United States 
Supreme Court commencing with Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 
does not affect these rules.  (People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 453-454; 
People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 589-590, fn. 14.)  The court did not 
prejudicially misinstruct the jury regarding Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b). 
3.  Cumulative Prejudice and the Effect of Reversing One Special-
circumstance Finding 
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of the asserted errors requires 
reversal.  We have reversed the lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding.  
Defendant argues that reversal also requires reversal of the death judgment.  We 
disagree. 
Two valid special-circumstance findings remain:  killing a witness and 
murder in the commission of kidnapping.  Moreover, “the jury was statutorily 
 
36 
permitted to consider all of the facts and circumstances underlying [Maria‟s] 
murder.”  (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1186.)  The jury would 
have viewed that murder almost the same way had it not found true the lying-in-
wait special circumstance allegation.  (People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 
423.)  “Even if the jury had concluded there was insufficient evidence of watching 
and waiting to find the lying-in-wait special circumstance true, that conclusion 
would have done little to alter the highly aggravated nature of [defendant‟s] 
murder of [Maria] . . . .  Nor would it have changed the jury‟s assessment of the 
other aggravating evidence introduced.  We conclude there is no reasonable 
possibility that the error affected the penalty phase verdict.”  (Ibid.) 
Defendant argues that, in this case, the invalid special-circumstance finding 
did significantly alter the jury‟s view of the murder, thus requiring reversal of the 
death verdict.  He argues that “[t]here is a significant difference in moral 
culpability between [defendant‟s] murdering the victim while lying in wait and 
spontaneously erupting in anger when confronted with Maria‟s resolve to pursue 
the rape charges.”  But finding the special circumstance invalid does not 
additionally mean the jury had to find that defendant simply erupted in anger.  The 
jury clearly found — on good, solid evidence — that defendant intended to kill the 
victim if and when he learned that she would not drop the rape charge.  It clearly, 
and reasonably, rejected any eruption in anger claim.  The only question on which 
the evidence was insufficient was whether defendant learned Maria would not 
drop the charges when he spoke with her on the telephone early that morning, or 
not until she came to his home with a peace offering about an hour later.  This 
insufficiency of the evidence regarding the timing was fatal to the special-
circumstance finding, but, in this case, it did not significantly affect defendant‟s 
culpability for the murder that, the jury clearly found, he had long intended to 
commit if Maria did not drop the charge.  We see no reasonable possibility that 
 
37 
uncertainty about when, exactly, defendant learned she would not drop the charge 
affected the penalty determination. 
We have also assumed the possibility of two additional minor errors:  (1) 
permitting the jury to consider for its truth Maria‟s statement that defendant had 
told her that he knew how to manipulate the system, and (2) permitting the jury to 
consider in aggravation nonviolent acts of obstructing or resisting a peace officer.  
These possible errors, even considered cumulatively, were not prejudicial. 
4.  Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Law 
“Defendant reiterates several contentions we have repeatedly rejected.  We 
see no reason to reconsider our previous decisions. 
“Penal Code sections 190.2 and 190.3 are not impermissibly broad, and 
factor (a) of Penal Code section 190.3 does not make imposition of the death 
penalty arbitrary and capricious.  [Citation.]  „Except for evidence of other crimes 
and prior convictions, jurors need not find aggravating factors true beyond a 
reasonable doubt; no instruction on burden of proof is needed; the jury need not 
achieve unanimity except for the verdict itself; and written findings are not 
required.‟  [Citation.]  „CALJIC No. 8.88‟s use of the words “so substantial,” its 
use of the word “warrants” instead of “appropriate,” its failure to instruct the jury 
that a sentence of life is mandatory if mitigation outweighs aggravation, and its 
failure to instruct the jury on a “presumption of life” does not render the 
instruction invalid.‟  [Citation.]  „The trial court was not required to instruct the 
jury that there is no burden of proof at the penalty phase, and that the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard and requirement of jury unanimity do not apply to 
mitigating factors.‟  [Citations.]  Penal Code „[s]ection 190.3‟s use of adjectives 
such as “extreme” and “substantial” in describing mitigating circumstances does 
not impermissibly limit the jury‟s consideration of mitigating factors.‟  [Citation.]  
 
38 
„The court need not delete inapplicable sentencing factors or instruct that statutory 
mitigating factors are relevant solely in mitigation.‟  [Citation.]  Intercase 
proportionality review is not required.  [Citation.]  California‟s death penalty law 
does not violate equal protection by treating capital and noncapital defendants 
differently.  [Citation.]  California‟s use of the death penalty does not violate 
international law.”  (People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 487-488, fn. 
omitted.) 
Defendant also argues that the recent high court decision of Hurst v. 
Florida (2016) 577 U.S. __ [136 S.Ct. 616], which invalidated Florida‟s 
sentencing scheme, also invalidates California‟s.  It does not.  (People v. Rangel 
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235 & fn. 16.)  “The California sentencing scheme is 
materially different from that in Florida.”  (Id. at p. 1235, fn. 16.) 
 
39 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We reverse the lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding and otherwise 
affirm the judgment. 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Becerrada 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S170957 
Date Filed: April 17, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: William R. Pounders 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders, under appointments by the Supreme 
Court, and Arnold Erickson, Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster, David Zarmi and Kimara A. 
Aarons, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Arnold Erickson 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, Suite 1000 
Oakland, CA  94607 
(510) 267-3300 
 
Kimara A. Aarons 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2270