Case Title: Wright v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 430, 2000

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
RONALD WRIGHT,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 430, 2000
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN99-11-0680, -0681,
§  -0683 thru -0690, -1708, -1709,
§  -1716, and –0411
Submitted: March 28, 2001
  Decided:
April 25, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices.
O R D E R
This 25th day of April 2001, upon consideration of the appellant's
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the
State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Ronald Wright, was convicted by a
Superior Court jury of four counts of second degree burglary, two counts of
attempted second degree burglary, one count of second degree assault, four
counts of theft or attempted theft, two counts of criminal mischief, and one
weapon charge.  The charges against Wright stemmed from eight different
burglaries or attempted burglaries that had occurred between October 23 and
October 27, 1999.  Wright was convicted of the charges relating to six of the
burglaries but was acquitted of charges related to the other two burglaries.
The Superior Court sentenced Wright to a total of nine years at Level V
incarceration followed by eight years of decreasing levels of probation and
five years of concurrent probation.  This is Wright’s direct appeal.
(2)
Wright's counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Wright's counsel asserts that, based upon a
complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably
appealable issues.  By letter, Wright's attorney informed him of the
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided Wright with a copy of the motion to
withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Wright also was informed of his
right to supplement his attorney's presentation.  Wright filed a handwritten
letter challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at
trial.  The State has responded to Wright’s letter as well as the position taken
by Wright's counsel and has moved to affirm the Superior Court's decision.
(3)
The standard and scope of review applicable to the
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and
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determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1
(4)
The evidence presented at trial reflected that Wright walked
into a police station on October 27, 1999 and spontaneously confessed to
having committed a burglary.  Wright later showed police officers the
location of his confessed crime, which was the home of Lolita Jackson in
New Castle, Delaware.  Jackson testified at trial that her home had been
burglarized on October 25, 1999.  She later discovered some of her missing
property outside her house, but the police recovered no fingerprints from the
crime scene.
As a result of Wright’s confession to the Jackson burglary, police
compared Wright’s fingerprints to latent fingerprints recovered from five
other burglaries committed close in time and location to the Jackson
burglary.  Wright’s fingerprints were positively identified at each of those
five burglary scenes.
Deborah Moody testified at trial that an unknown assailant attacked
her while she slept during the early morning hours of October 24, 1999.  The
                                                
1Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
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assailant struck Moody repeatedly in the head.  Although she could not
identify her assailant or his weapon, Moody testified that she was certain she
had been struck with an object and not by the assailant’s fists.  Moody
received 28 stitches to her head as a result of the attack.  The police located a
fingerprint on a bathroom windowsill of Moody’s house, which appeared to
be the assailant’s point of entry.  The fingerprint was positively identified as
Wright’s.  Moody also testified that a brand new radio was stolen from her
home.
George Moody, Deborah’s husband, also testified at trial.  He stated
that he was awakened in the early morning hours of October 24, 1999 when
he heard his wife moaning in the living room.  When he went to investigate,
he saw a stranger standing over his wife.  The stranger backed out of the
residence and eventually fled after unsuccessfully attempting to get back
into the house.  Moody identified a rock that was later recovered by police as
appearing to be a rock that had been removed from the garden in front of his
house.  Moody described an imprint in his garden from where it appeared a
rock had been taken.  The police had recovered the rock, which was stained
with a substance that appeared to be blood, from a neighbor’s backyard.  No
laboratory testing was performed on the rock.  Deborah and George Moody
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both testified that they did not know Wright, and neither could positively
identify him as the assailant.
Bernette Dickerson also testified at trial.  She stated that she
discovered property missing from her home on October 24, 1999.  Dickerson
located some of the property, kitchen canisters, outside her home.  The
police identified Wright’s fingerprints on the canisters.  Dickerson testified
that she did not know Wright.
Stefanie Ford testified that she called police on the night of October
24, 1999 because she heard noises in her backyard.  In the morning, Ford
discovered a window opened in her house.  A security lock had prevented
the window from being completely opened.  No property was reported
missing, although the window screen was damaged.  The police identified
Wright’s fingerprints on the damaged screen.  Ford did not know Wright.
Valerie Townsend testified that on October 27, 1999 she discovered
three separate windows in her home had been opened without her
knowledge.  Security locks had prevented the windows from being
completely opened.  Nothing was taken from the home.  Police identified
Wright’s fingerprint on the rear window of Townsend’s home.  Townsend
did not know Wright.
-6-
Finally, Dorothy Weeks testified that she awoke at 5:00 a.m. on
October 27, 1999 to discover her wallet, keys, and knickknacks had been
stolen from her home.  The police identified Wright’s fingerprint on the
front window ledge of Weeks’ home, which appeared to be the burglar’s
point of entry.  Weeks’ car also was stolen.  It was recovered later, but
police were unable to obtain any fingerprints on the car.  Weeks testified she
did not know Wright.
At the close of the State’s evidence, defense counsel made a general
motion for a judgment of acquittal, which the Superior Court denied.
Wright did not testify in his own defense or present any other evidence.
(5)
On appeal, Wright raises several issues, which all relate to the
alleged insufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial.  Wright
complains that no eyewitnesses could identify him as the perpetrator of the
alleged crimes, and the only fingerprint evidence presented was recovered
from outside of the homes in question.  He also complains about the State’s
failure to test the rock that allegedly was used to assault Mrs. Moody.
Wright intimates that, not only was there no physical evidence to link him to
alleged weapon, there was no physical evidence to link the alleged weapon
to the assault on Mrs. Moody.
-7-
(6)
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this Court’s
standard of review is to determine whether any rational trier of fact, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.2  Direct evidence is not necessary to
establish guilt; circumstantial evidence is sufficient.3  Furthermore,
fingerprint evidence may be sufficient to sustain a conviction “where the
circumstances surrounding a defendant’s fingerprints create a strong
inference that the defendant was the perpetrator.”4
(7)
In this case, despite the absence of Wright’s fingerprints inside
the burglarized homes, we find the identification of Wright’s fingerprints on
or near private homes to which Wright had no special access along with the
presence of his fingerprints on items recently stolen from those homes,
coupled with Wright’s spontaneous confession to committing the Jackson
burglary, to be sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that Wright had committed each burglary or
attempted burglary.5
                                                
2 Seward v. State, Del. Supr., 723 A.2d 365 (1999).
3 Id. at 369.
4 Monroe v. State, Del. Supr., 652 A.2d 560, 564 (1995).
5 See id.
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We also find the evidence was sufficient to prove Wright guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of assault and possession of a deadly weapon.
Although Wright complains that the State failed to conduct laboratory
testing on the rock that allegedly was used to assault Mrs. Moody, we find,
under the circumstances of this case, that the State had no obligation to
conduct such testing.6  Furthermore, the record reflects that Wright did not
request the opportunity to conduct such testing himself, nor did he object to
the admission of the rock into evidence at trial.
Given the Moodys’ testimony about the nature and extent of Mrs.
Moody’s injuries, along with Mr. Moody’s testimony about their missing
rock and the police recovery of a similar rock nearby with red stains on it,
we find that the evidence, albeit circumstantial, was sufficient for the jury to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Wright used the rock as a bludgeon
to assault and injure Mrs. Moody.7
(8)
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded
that Wright’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Wright's counsel has made a
                                                
6 Seward v. State, 723 A.2d at 369-70.
7 See id. at 370.
-9-
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly
determined that Wright could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
The motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice