Case Title: Garber v. Wagonhound Livestock & Land Company, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0006

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
VIC AND JANE GARBER; SANDRA LANGE, Trustee of the Sandra K. Lange trust; FRED AND WENDY LARSON; FRED SMITH; MICHAEL AND NITA WERNER; ROSS AND BIFF GORMAN; DR. KIRBY KIRKLAND; and DAVE AND GLYNDA EDWARDS v. WAGONHOUND LAND & LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC; VENJOHN OIL, INC., and STEVEN M. VENJOHN  2012 WY 89Case Number: S-11-0006This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
VIC 
AND JANE GARBER; SANDRA LANGE, Trustee of the Sandra K. Lange Trust; FRED AND 
WENDY LARSON; FRED SMITH; MICHAEL AND NITA WERNER; ROSS AND BIFF GORMAN; DR. 
KIRBY KIRKLAND; and DAVE AND GLYNDA 
EDWARDS,Appellants(Petitioners),v.WAGONHOUND LAND 
& LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC; VENJOHN OIL, INC., and STEVEN M. 
VENJOHN,Appellees(Respondents).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Converse County
The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellants:
Harriet 
M. Hageman and Kara Brighton of Hageman & Brighton, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Hageman.
 
Representing 
Appellee Wagonhound Land & Livestock Company, LLC:
Robert 
G. Berger and Mistee L. Godwin of Lonabaugh and Riggs, LLP, Sheridan, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Godwin.
 
Representing 
Appellees VenJohn Oil, Inc. and Steven M. VenJohn:  
            
No appearance.
 
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and BURKE, JJ., and STEBNER, D.J., 
Retired.
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 
[¶1]      Wagonhound Land 
and Livestock Company, LLC (Wagonhound), VenJohn Oil, Inc., and Steven M. 
VenJohn (VenJohn) (collectively Applicants) filed a petition with the Wyoming 
State Board of Control (Board) seeking to change the place of use, point of 
diversion and means of conveyance for water appropriations attached to 174.8 
acres.  VenJohn owned the 
appropriations from the North Platte River and requested that the point of 
diversion and place of use of the rights be moved upstream to Wagonhound’s 
land.  Vic and Jane Garber, et al. 
(Objectors), who were intervening water right holders, objected to the petition, 
and the Board held a contested case hearing.  The Board granted the Applicants’ 
petition but reduced the transferred rights to 152.5 acres. 

 
[¶2]      The Objectors 
petitioned the district court for review of the Board’s decision, and that court 
affirmed.  They then appealed to 
this Court.  We conclude that the 
Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is consistent with the 
law; consequently, we affirm.  

 
ISSUES
 
[¶3]      The Objectors 
present the following issues on appeal:
 
1.         
Whether the final decision of the Board of Control was supported by 
substantial evidence in the record.
2.         
Whether the final decision of the Board of Control was in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. § 41-3-104.
3.         
Whether the final decision of the Board of Control was in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. § 41-3-114.
 
The 
Applicants articulate a single issue:
 
I.              
Whether 
the decision of the Board of Control to grant in part and deny in part the 
Petition was supported by substantial evidence, and was not arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or contrary to law, in accordance with Wyo. 
Stat. § 16-3-114(c).
 
FACTS
 
[¶4]      On October 4, 
2007, Wagonhound and VenJohn filed a petition with the Board seeking to change 
the place of use, point of diversion and means of conveyance of water 
appropriations attached to 174.8 acres.  
The petition requested the transfer of VenJohn’s water rights 
approximately thirty miles upstream from his land near Orin Junction to lands 
owned by Wagonhound northwest of Douglas, Wyoming.  The Applicants proposed that additional 
water rights owned by Wagonhound be combined with the VenJohn rights to fill out 
acreage to be irrigated under three center pivot sprinklers on Wagonhound’s 
land.  
 
[¶5]      The Objectors 
contested the petition on the ground that it violated the statutes governing 
changes in place of use, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-104 (LexisNexis 2011), and 
changes in point of diversion and means of conveyance, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
41-3-114 (LexisNexis 2011).  They 
argued the petition was defective on its face because, with respect to the 
change of point of diversion and means of conveyance, the petition did not fully 
identify ownership of the appropriation or correctly state whether VenJohn was 
the sole owner of the facilities involved or had obtained the consent of other 
owners, as required by § 41-3-114.  
With respect to the change in place of use, Objectors contended that 
granting the petition would violate § 41-3-104 and injure them because the 
transferred water right would exceed the quantity of water historically diverted 
under the existing use; exceed the historic rate of diversion; increase the 
historic amount consumptively used; and decrease the historic amount of return 
flow.
 
[¶6]      The Objectors 
further contended that granting the petition would decrease flows available to 
them because the new diversion point was upstream, whereas the historic 
diversion point was downstream and had contributions from intervening 
tributaries.  Objectors maintained 
that the transferred water right should be decreased by 7.6% to account for the 
tributary contributions that would no longer be available to supply the 
transferred water right.  

 
[¶7]      The Board held a 
contested case hearing on April 17-18, 2008, and at its August 18, 2008, meeting 
voted to grant the petition in part and deny it in part.  Specifically, the Board allowed the 
transfer of water rights attached to 152.5 of the requested 174.8 acres.  The reduction consisted of 6.4 acres to 
account for a four percent (4%) loss of tributary inflows and 15.9 acres to 
account for lands VenJohn had historically irrigated with contract reservoir 
water rather than natural flow water rights.  The Board conditioned its approval on 
the Applicants’ submission of amended petition maps, showing, among several 
changes, the acreage reductions by the Board.    
 
[¶8]      After receiving 
the amended maps, the Board issued its written findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and order.  The Board concluded 
that, with the reductions it made to the requested water right transfer, the 
petitioned change of place of use “will not allow a quantity of water to be 
transferred which exceeds the amount historically diverted under existing uses, 
exceeds the historic rate of diversion, increases the historic amount 
consumptively used, decreases the historic amount of return flow or in any 
manner injures other existing lawful appropriators within the meaning of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 41-3-104.”  The Board 
further concluded that the change in point of diversion and means of conveyance 
for the petitioned water right “will not injuriously affect the rights of other 
appropriators within the meaning of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-114(f).”2  

 
[¶9]      The Objectors 
petitioned the district court for review of the Board’s order, and that court 
upheld the Board’s decision.  The 
Objectors then appealed to this Court.    
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶10]   The Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act governs our review of agency action and provides in pertinent 
part:
 
To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:
. 
. . .
 (ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings and conclusions found to be:
 
         
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;
 
         
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;
 
         
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or 
lacking statutory right;
 
         
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or
 
         
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the 
record of an agency hearing provided by statute.
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2011).
 
[¶11]   In accordance with § 16-3-114(c), 
we review the agency’s factual determinations by applying the substantial evidence standard, meaning we 
determine whether there is relevant evidence in the entire record which a 
reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency’s conclusions.  Dale 
v. S & S Builders, LLC, 
2008 WY 84, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d 554, 561 (Wyo. 2008). 
 Our review of any particular 
decision turns not on whether we agree with the outcome, but on whether the 
agency could reasonably conclude as it did based upon all of the evidence 
presented.  Id.  This 
Court has recognized that the Board of Control has a particular knowledge and 
expertise in the area of water use and nonuse, and we accord deference to that 
knowledge and expertise in our review of the Board’s factual findings.  Basin Elec. Power Co-op v. State Bd. of 
Control, 578 P.2d 557, 568 (Wyo. 1978).  We review an 
agency’s conclusions of law de novo, and will affirm an agency’s legal 
conclusion only if it is in accordance with the law.  Dale, 
¶ 26, 188 P.3d  at 562.
 
DISCUSSION
 
            
Statutory Factors
 
[¶12]   Changes in place of use of water 
rights are governed by § 41-3-104:
 
            
(a) When an owner of a water right wishes to change a water right from 
its present use to another use, or from the place of use under the existing 
right to a new place of use, he shall file a petition requesting permission to 
make such a change. The petition shall set forth all pertinent facts about the 
existing use and the proposed change in use, or, where a change in place of use 
is requested, all pertinent information about the existing place of use and the 
proposed place of use. The board may require that an advertised public hearing 
or hearings be held at the petitioner's expense. The petitioner shall provide a 
transcript of the public hearing to the board. The change in use, or change in place of 
use, may be allowed, provided that the quantity of water transferred by the 
granting of the petition shall not exceed the amount of water historically 
diverted under the existing use, nor exceed the historic rate of diversion under 
the existing use, nor increase the historic amount consumptively used under the 
existing use, nor decrease the historic amount of return flow, nor in any manner 
injure other existing lawful appropriators. The board of control shall 
consider all facts it believes pertinent to the transfer which may include the 
following:
 
            
(i) The economic loss to the community and the state if the use from 
which the right is transferred is discontinued;
 
            
(ii) The extent to which such economic loss will be offset by the new 
use;
 
            
(iii) Whether other sources of water are available for the new 
use.
 
(emphasis 
added).  A change in place of use 
obviously also necessitates changes in point of diversion and means of 
conveyance which are governed by § 41-3-114.  Section 41-3-114(f) states that “[n]o 
petition shall be granted if the right of other appropriators will be 
injuriously affected.”  

 
[¶13]   Starting with the first two § 
41-3-104 factors, the quantity of water historically used and the historic rate 
of diversion, the Objectors noted that the diversion rate of the allowed 1 cubic 
foot per second (cfs) per 70 acres for 174.8 acres would allow diversion of 
approximately 2.5 cfs.  They then 
argued that, if Wagonhound diverted at that rate for the entire irrigation 
season (which they quantified at 153 days), it could divert as much as 750 acre 
feet of water.  Because the evidence 
demonstrated that the historical diversion average for the VenJohn property was 
422 acre-feet for the eleven preceding years, Wagonhound could potentially 
divert significantly more water under the transferred right than VenJohn had 
historically diverted.  The 
Objectors’ expert, Gordon Fassett, opined:
 
            
Q.        And 
what is the potential amount that could be diverted at the new point of 
diversion if this transfer were allowed?
            
A.        Well, 
at maximum, for the full irrigation season from May 1 through September 30, if 
you do the math of 2.5 cfs each and every day throughout that whole period, it’s 
about 750 acre-foot for the 1-to-70 amount.  And, of course, they would be entitled 
to surplus of water as well, which could potentially double 
that.
            
Q.        
Double that to 1,500 acre-feet for an irrigation 
season?
            
A.        For 
the full season.  That would be 
correct.3 
 
[¶14]   The Objectors’ argument depends on 
the transferred water right being diverted at the maximum rate every single day 
of the irrigation season.  The 
argument falters because the diversion of water at the maximum rate every day 
during a hypothetical 153-day irrigation season is an unlikely, if not 
impossible, scenario.  Mr. Fassett 
himself testified that he is not aware of any irrigators in the county that 
divert at their full rate of diversion every day of the irrigation season.    
 
[¶15]   Dustin Ewing, Wagonhound’s business 
manager, testified regarding the Objectors’ concern that Wagonhound would divert 
water at the maximum rate:
 
            
Q.        Is it 
the intent of Wagonhound to use those water rights to irrigate any more acres 
than Mr. VenJohn is irrigating?
            
A.        
No.
            
Q.        Is it 
the intent of Wagonhound to divert water from the river at any greater rate than 
Mr. VenJohn is?
            
A.        I see 
no reason for it.
            
Q.        Do 
you know of any reason why Wagonhound would use a greater quantity of water for 
irrigation than Mr. VenJohn is using?
            
A.        No, 
 . . . they’re the exact same 
pivots.  In fact, it’s our goal to 
bring up the same pivots used at the VenJohn to use on the Wagonhound property. 

 
[¶16]   Doyl Fritz, Applicants’ expert who 
reviewed the historic operations at both the VenJohn and Wagonhound properties, 
testified there would be no reason for such an increase in 
diversion:
 
I’m 
looking at [Wagonhound’s] system out there, and they’ve got a good system.  They operate it very well, and they show 
what those historic diversions are.  
While they could pump more water just because they could, it doesn't make 
sense.  It costs money, doesn’t 
increase crop yields, and there would be no reason to do that.   
 
[¶17]   In determining the amount of 
VenJohn’s historical use available to transfer to Wagonhound, the Board relied 
upon evidence of the amount of acreage historically irrigated and the statutory 
diversion rate of 1 cfs per 70 acres.  See generally, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
41-4-317 (LexisNexis 2011).  The 
evidence included the pump diversion records, the State’s five year base maps 
showing actual irrigated acreage from 2002 through 2006, aerial infrared 
photographs showing evidence of irrigation on VenJohn’s land, VenJohn property 
water usage records for 2007, and testimony by Mr. VenJohn and Greg Richendifer, 
Wagonhound’s farm manager, confirming irrigation activities from 1998 through 
2007 on the VenJohn property.   
 
[¶18]   Mr. VenJohn stated he grew crops on 
his land each year, including typical harvests of over 5 tons of alfalfa per 
acre.  He testified that he flood 
irrigated “150-plus acres” of his property from the time he purchased it in 1998 
until he installed pivot sprinklers in 2003.  After the sprinklers were installed, he 
irrigated the full 174.8 acres each year from 2003 through 2006.  Mr. VenJohn used his water rights each 
year from the end of April until late August or September, applying the 
appropriate amount of water to fit the crops’ needs, including the double 
appropriation when it was available.  
Mr. Richendifer oversaw the irrigation of the VenJohn property in 2007 
and testified that the entire acreage was irrigated.4    
 
 
[¶19]   Mr. Fritz testified that the actual 
amounts diverted under any water right in different seasons will vary depending 
on amounts of precipitation, other climate conditions, crop choice and 
application methods.  In fact, the 
evidence showed that, over a ten year period from 1997 through 2007, VenJohn 
diverted significantly different amounts of water, ranging from a low of 178 
acre feet in 1998 to a high of 717 acre feet in 2006.  Even though the diverted amounts changed 
from year to year, the water was still applied to the acreage 
annually.
 
[¶20]   The Board’s decision to consider 
the historical use question from the standpoint of acreage historically 
irrigated, rather than a total volume of water which could be diverted if 
exercised at the maximum amount for the entire irrigation season, is consistent 
with the concept of the “duty of water” which was discussed in Basin Electric, 578 P.2d 557.  The duty of water is described generally 
as
 
“that 
measure of water, which, by careful management and use, without wastage, is 
reasonably required to be applied to any given tract of land for such period of 
time as may be adequate to produce therefrom a maximum amount of such crops as 
ordinarily are grown thereon. It is not a hard and fast unit of measurement, but 
is variable according to conditions.”
 
Id. 
at 
564, quoting Farmers Highline Canal & 
Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629, 234-35 (Colo. 1954).  
 
[¶21]   Using the actual amount of acres 
irrigated as the means of measuring historic use, the Board reduced the 
transferred amount by 15.9 acres to account for acreage not historically 
irrigated by VenJohn using its natural flow rights.  The evidence established that, in all 
but one year, the 15.9 acres had been irrigated with contract reservoir 
water.  The Board’s denial of a 
transfer of those acres, together with the 6.4 acre reduction for loss of 
tributary inflows (discussed infra), 
resulted in a reduction of the allowed diversion rate from 2.5 cfs to 2.18 cfs 
(152.5 acres divided by 70 to account for the 1 cfs per 70 acre statutory 
diversion rate).  Deferring to the 
Board’s expertise in matters of water use and non-use, we see no error in its 
decision to use actual acreage irrigated rather than the average amount of water 
diverted as the means for determining VenJohn’s historic use.  Thus, the evidence of VenJohn’s historic 
use of its water right and Wagonhound’s typical irrigation procedures provided 
substantial evidence in support of the Board’s decision that, as reduced, the 
transferred water right will not “exceed the amount 
of water historically diverted under the existing use, nor exceed the historic 
rate of diversion under the existing use.”  
Section 41-3-104.    
 
[¶22]   The third factor identified in § 
41-3-104 is consumptive use.  Under 
the statute, the transfer shall not “increase the 
historic amount consumptively used under the existing use.”  Id.  
In Basin Electric, 578 P.2d  at 567, we recognized that “the 
concept of consumptive use has been consistently limited to the amount of water, 
less other contributing sources of water, which will result in the successful 
growing of a crop.”  The proposed 
change in place of use would take water used for irrigation of crops under pivot 
sprinklers at the VenJohn property and transfer it to irrigation of crops under 
pivot sprinklers at the Wagonhound property.  Mr. Fritz investigated the consumptive 
uses at both the VenJohn and Wagonhound locations and concluded that consumptive 
use at both properties was the same for crop irrigation, noting similarities in 
latitude, elevation, crops, application methods, and soil types.    
 
[¶23]   The Objectors do not dispute this, 
but instead argue that Wagonhound has a complex irrigation system that will 
allow it to divert continuously at the maximum rate “with no effort being made 
to ensure that the VenJohn water is actually applied to the land to which it is 
attached.”  
 
In 
other words, Wagonhound does not care whether the “VenJohn” water is applied to 
the lands they have identified as receiving that water.  Wagonhound will instead apply that water 
to any one of the fields that are fed with the sprawling center pivots that make 
up the [Wagonhound property].
 
[¶24]   The evidence does not support the 
Objectors’ argument.  Greg 
Richendifer, Wagonhound’s farm manager, testified:
 
            
Q.        Ms. 
Hageman asked you to help her calculate the amount of water that could be pumped 
through the VenJohn sprinklers if they’re moved to the [Wagonhound property] -- 

            
A.        Uh – 
huh.
            
Q.        -- 
and if operated for the entire irrigation season.  And I believe you and she came up with a 
number of approximately 750 acre-feet that could be pumped through those 
sprinklers at the [Wagonhound property]; is that right?
            
A.        
Yes.
            
Q.        Would 
that be the same amount that could be pumped through those sprinklers at the 
VenJohn property?
            
A.        
Yes.
            
Q.        Would 
it be your plan to pump through those sprinklers every single day season- round 
without a break?
            
A.        
No.  You have to stop to 
harvest, dry up the soil.
            
Q.        Would 
it be your plan to use those sprinklers consistent with the way you use 
sprinklers that are currently on the [Wagonhound 
property]?
            
A.        It 
would be managed exactly the same way.
            
Q.        Now, 
you were asked a little bit about controlling the flow and quantity of water 
through the pivot system.  If you 
have one pivot circuit that has a right that’s in priority and one that has a 
right that’s not in priority -- in other words, that water’s not available for 
you -- can you control whether the water goes to the one that’s in priority or 
the one that's not in priority?
            
A.        Yes, 
we can.
            
Q.        If 
you needed to decrease the flow of water to these pivots, can you do that with 
your system?
            
A.        Yes, 
we can.
            
Q.        If 
you needed to control the total quantity of water that goes to a particular area 
of land under a pivot, do you have the capability of doing 
that?
            
A.        Yes, 
we do.  
 
[¶25]   The Objectors’ argument that 
Wagonhound will improperly apply the transferred water is speculative and 
suggests that the water use authorities would allow misuse of water 
resources.  We decline to accept 
their premise.  Considering the type 
of land, climate and other on-the-ground factors, the evidence supports the 
Board’s conclusion that the transfer will not result in any greater consumption 
of water by Wagonhound than VenJohn’s operations did.  
 
[¶26]   The next § 41-3-104 factor requires 
that the transfer not decrease the 
historic amount of return 
flow.  Return flow is related 
to the concept of consumptive use because the water that is not consumed returns 
to the river.  The Objectors contend 
the transfer of the VenJohn water right may reduce the return flows to the river 
because Wagonhound diverts water into lined ponds, whereas VenJohn did not use 
lined ponds.  They allege that the 
possible reduction in return flows may in turn decrease the amount of natural 
flow at the Orin gauge, which may in turn increase the chances that Objectors’ 
water rights could be subjected to regulation.    
 
[¶27]   The Objectors’ allegations 
regarding the loss of return flow are not supported by the record.  VenJohn and Richendifer both testified 
that, while the VenJohn irrigation system was not as complex as the Wagonhound 
system, it was an efficient system that allowed very little runoff or return 
flow.  Thus, the evidence showed 
there was very little return flow under either the VenJohn or Wagonhound 
operation.  The Board’s 
determinations that the transfer would not result in greater consumptive use or 
decrease the return flows are supported by relevant evidence which a reasonable 
mind might accept in support of its conclusions.    
 
[¶28]   Finally, § 41-3-104 states that a 
change in place of use will not be allowed if it would in any manner injure other existing lawful appropriators and § 
41-3-114 states that a change of point of diversion and means of conveyance 
shall not be granted “if the right of other appropriators will be injuriously 
affected.”  The Objectors argue that 
they will be injured by a transfer of VenJohn’s water rights to Wagonhound 
because:
 
[a]ny 
increase in diversions, any increase in water use, any increase in consumptive 
use, and any decrease in return flows will ricochet through the system, 
potentially resulting in negative natural flow, administration of the cumulative 
irrigation diversions in the area upstream of Guernsey, the declaration of an 
allocation year, and the regulation of the [Objectors].
 
[¶29]   On the question of injury to other 
appropriators, the Board noted the testimony of Applicants’ expert Doyl 
Fritz:
 
[Applicants’] 
witness Doyl Fritz, a civil engineer with Western Water Consultants and 
extensive experience in petitions for change of use and place of use, outlined 
his investigation of the changes proposed in the Petition, and gave his 
assessment of its potential effects.  
Mr. Fritz testified that the proposed changes would not increase the 
likelihood of “regulation” (that is, situations where junior appropriators are 
required by the State Engineer’s Office to temporarily discontinue their use in 
order to protect the rights of senior appropriators in times of water 
scarcity).  At the conclusion of his 
direct testimony, Mr. Fritz gave his opinion that the proposed changes would not 
result in changes in the flows of the North Platte River that would be 
measurable or even noticeable by anyone.
 
[¶30]   The Objectors’ assertion that they 
would be injured by the transfer depends upon findings in their favor on the 
other § 41-3-104 factors.  Given our 
conclusion that substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that the 
petition meets the other requirements of the statute and the specific evidence 
that the proposed changes would not result in any measurable changes in the 
North Platte River flow, we also conclude the record contains substantial 
evidence to support the Board’s conclusion that the Objectors will not be 
injured by the transfer.    
 
 
            
Tributary Inflows
 
[¶31]   The Board made a 4% reduction in 
the transferred water right to account for contributions from the two main 
tributaries above the historic diversion point, Wagonhound and LaBonte creeks, 
that will not be available to supply the transferred water right at the new 
point of diversion. The Board made the following findings in support of its 
reduction:
 
            
28.       
THAT upon his consideration of the USGS data, Mr. Fassett estimated that 
7.6% of the annual historic flow available from the North Platte River at 
Petitioner VenJohn’s record diversion point, located near the North Platte River 
at Orin g[u]age, is contributed by LaBonte and Wagonhound 
Creeks.
 
            
29.       
THAT the [Applicants]’ consulting expert, Mr. Doyl Fritz, reviewed 
available data pertaining to relevant flows and testified that it is difficult 
to make an estimate of the percentage contribution of Wagonhound and LaBonte 
Creeks, since the g[u]aging history for both ends in 1969, and there is not a 
lot of coincident period of record.  
He testified that the data and records do show that, for both creeks in 
August and September, there were periods of “zero flow.”  He also testified that using an average, 
as opposed to a median, flow rate is not a valid method of comparison.  It was his view that determining the 
normal tributary inflows from Wagonhound and LaBonte Creeks (by “averaging” 
their flows for an entire year) is statistically misleading.  Mr. Fritz offered his opinion that the 
use of “median or some other measure” would be a more applicable method (to 
determine tributary contributions).  
He testified that, “You can have nine years of zero flow and one year of 
10,000 and your average would be 1,000 acre-feet per year but in nine years you 
have nothing.”
 
            
30.       
THAT Mr. Fassett acknowledged that there is a difference between 
“average” and “median” flows on cross-examination, but indicated that he 
preferred to use “long-term averages” to “avoid any single-year 
bias.”
 
            
31.       
THAT [Objectors’] Exhibit 36 averages the tributary inflows for 
Wagonhound Creek and LaBonte Creek by day for selective years.  [Objectors’] Exhibit 114 uses the daily 
average derived from [Objectors’] Exhibit 36 to produce a calculated average 
monthly flow rate for Wagonhound Creek and LaBonte Creek.  [Objectors’] Exhibit 114 compares the 
long-term monthly averages derived from selective years included in these 
tributary data to the average monthly natural flows of the North Platte River 
between 1997 and 2007.  None of the 
years, 1997 through 2007, included within these tributary data in [Objectors’] 
Exhibit 114 are included within the USGS data.  
 
            
32.       
THAT having considered the competing evidence and views expressed by the 
parties’ expert witnesses, its own files relating to this matter, and drawing 
upon its practical experience with similar petitions for change of use and/or 
place of use with associated change of point of diversion, the Board determined 
that a 4% tributary inflow from LaBonte and Wagonhound Creeks to the North 
Platte River is a reasonable estimate of the supply contributed by the principal 
intervening tributaries during the irrigation season for use at the existing 
point of diversion, which is downstream of these two (2) previously-g[u]agued 
creeks.  The new points of diversion 
will be above both creeks.  
Accordingly, the Board determined that, if it decided to approve the 
change of point of diversion, it should assess a reduction of 6.4 irrigated 
acres (that is, the 174.8 acres sought less the 15.9 acres discussed in Findings 
of Fact Nos. 33 and 34, below, for a total of 158.9 acres multiplied by a factor 
of 4%).  The Board considers a 4% 
reduction in acres, to account for tributary inflow, a reasonable estimate of 
the supply which will not be available at the new point of diversion as a result 
of moving the point of diversion upstream of those tributaries, as requested by 
[Applicants].
 
[¶32]   The Objectors had requested a 7.6% 
reduction in accordance with Mr. Fassett’s testimony and on appeal challenge the 
Board’s 4% reduction.  However, Mr. 
Fassett acknowledged that the 7.6% figure was an estimate based on average 
tributary contributions that are higher early in the irrigation season and “very 
modest” late in the season.  
Additionally, the years from which the data was extracted for that 
average were selected years before 1969.  
  
 
[¶33]   The Applicants, on the other hand, 
presented evidence that measurements of the flow of the North Platte River above 
and below the tributaries indicate they did not contribute in any material 
fashion to the total flow of the river.  
There was also evidence presented at the hearing indicating that the flow 
of Wagonhound Creek during the preceding five years was insufficient to fulfill 
even the permitted appropriations on the creek.  Given the conflicting evidence and the 
difficulty in calculating the tributary contributions with any degree of 
precision, the Board’s decision to rely on its own expertise and apply a 4% 
reduction to account for the tributary inflows was appropriate.  See generally, Basin Electric, 578 P.2d  at 568.  
 
            
Defects in Petition to Change Point of 
Diversion
 
[¶34]   The Objectors contend the 
Applicants’ petition to change the point of diversion was defective because it 
did not fully identify ownership of the appropriation or state whether VenJohn 
was the sole owner of the facilities involved or had obtained the consent of 
other owners, as required by § 41-3-114.  
Specifically, the petition did not identify the ownership interests of 
Michael Long, David Sea, and Christopher Cox.  Nevertheless, the three landowners did 
have notice of the proceeding and Mr. Long and Mr. Cox both appeared and 
testified at the hearing.  

 
[¶35]   The Board acknowledged the defects 
in the petition and directed the Applicants to correct the petition and submit 
amended petition maps to reflect the ownership interests of the omitted 
landowners.  The Applicants 
submitted the amended petition maps prior to entry of the Board’s order.  
 
[¶36]   Although the Objectors claim the 
defects in the original petition require reversal of the Board’s decision, they 
do not sufficiently explain why the amendment process was inappropriate or how 
it violated statute or board rules.  
They also do not demonstrate how the other landowners were injured by the 
petition or the process employed by the Board.  Without further explanation, we cannot 
accept the Objectors’ argument.  

 
[¶37]   Affirmed.   
FOOTNOTES
1The Applicants argued in the district court that the Objectors did not 
have standing to appeal the Board’s decision because their alleged injuries from 
the requests in the petition were speculative.  The Applicants, however, do not squarely 
present that argument on appeal to this Court.  At any rate, we conclude that the 
Objectors have standing to appeal under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(a) as they were “aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a 
final decision of an agency in a contested case.”  Stated simply, the Objectors’ interest 
is clearly shown by the fact that the Board accepted, to some extent, their 
argument that the intervening water right owners would be injured by a full 
transfer of VenJohn’s water rights to Wagonhound.  The Objectors’ claim that the Board 
should have ordered additional reductions of the transferred water right 
confirms that they were adversely affected by its decision.     

2Although not raised as a separate issue on appeal, the Objectors assert 
that the Board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are not sufficiently 
detailed to comply with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110 (LexisNexis 
2011) states:  “A final decision . . 
. in a contested case shall be in writing . . . .  The final decision shall include findings 
of fact and conclusions of law separately stated.  Findings of fact if set forth in 
statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of 
the underlying facts supporting the findings.”  We agree that the findings of fact in 
this case are quite general and a more detailed recitation of the facts would 
have assisted our review of the case under the relevant statutory factors.  However, the findings are not so 
deficient as to prevent us from determining the grounds upon which the Board 
reached its conclusions.  Compare, Billings v. Wyoming State Bd. of 
Outfitters and Prof’l Guides, 837 P.2d 84, 86 (Wyo. 
1992).
3The reference to the “double” appropriation is to surplus water rights 
allowed under Wyoming statutes when the natural flow of the stream exceeds the 
existing appropriations.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 41-4-317 through 324 (LexisNexis 2011). 
4The Objectors assert that prior to 2007 VenJohn was only legally entitled 
to irrigate 148.7 of the 174.8 acres, and the Applicants could not, therefore, 
establish historical irrigation of the 26.1 acres that were not properly 
included in VenJohn’s appropriation.  
This assertion is based upon the Board’s approval in 2007 of VenJohn’s 
2006 petition to change the place of use to recognize the area actually 
irrigated by pivots installed in 2003.  
The Board took administrative notice of the 2006 proceeding in the 
present action.  The Objectors’ 
argument regarding this matter seems to be, in part, a collateral attack on that 
earlier proceeding; however, they do not explain the legal basis for such an 
attack.  Therefore, we will not 
further address it.  Ultimately, the 
Applicants established that the entire 174. 8 acres had been irrigated since 
2003 and the Board had authorized that use through its approval of VenJohn’s 
2006 petition.