Case Title: State v. Cook

Citation: 

Docket Number: S47104

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2001-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  October 18, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Respondent on Review,
	v.
JEFFREY DALE COOK,
	Petitioner on Review.
(CC 1396-08502; CA A99394; SC S47104)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted March 6, 2001.
	Dan Maloney, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the briefs was
David E. Groom, Public Defender.
	Jennifer Scott Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for respondent on review.  With her on the
brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham,
Leeson, Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.**
	DE MUNIZ, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Lane County Circuit Court, Lyle C. Velure, Judge. 163 Or App 24, 986 P2d 1228 (1999).
	**Kulongoski, J., resigned June 14, 2001, and did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case. 
Balmer, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
DE MUNIZ, J.
This is a criminal case in which defendant was 
convicted of possession of methamphetamine, ORS 475.992(4)(b)
(1995), which the police found during a warrantless search of
some clothing and a duffel bag.  The Court of Appeals held that
"defendant had a privacy and possessory interest in the bag and
its contents before the bag was searched," but that suppression
of the evidence was not required, because "defendant had
abandoned his interests * * * in the bag before the search
occurred."  State v. Cook, 163 Or App 24, 31, 34, 986 P2d 1228
(1999).  We allowed defendant's petition for review and now
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The parties agree with the Court of Appeals'
recitation of the facts, which we set out below:
"During the hearing on the motion to suppress,
Officers Petermen and Reynolds testified that on
September 8, 1996, at 1:30 a.m., they went to an
apartment complex after they were advised through a
radio dispatch of two persons possibly trying to
commit thefts from vehicles.  The officers testified
that they did not know the name of the caller who had
informed the police department of the two suspects
and did not recall descriptions of the suspects. 
Both officers began looking for the suspects in the
parking area of the complex.  Although Officer
Petermen saw no broken glass, he testified that
windows are not always broken when items are stolen
from cars.  Subsequently, for approximately two
minutes, Officer Petermen observed defendant, who was
bent down next to a garbage dumpster adjacent to the
parking area in the process of sorting clothing into
a duffel bag.  Defendant's back was toward the
officer.  The dumpster was in a semi-enclosed area. 
Officer Petermen testified that, based on defendant's
behavior, 'it seemed reasonable to believe that the
actions that he was doing would be something
consistent with somebody who had committed a theft
from a vehicle.'  Consequently, Officer Petermen
testified that he 'contacted [defendant] in the
doorway [to the area containing the dumpster], asked
[defendant] to step out, [and they] backed down the
hallway.'  Defendant complied, after leaving the bag
and clothing on the ground.
"Officer Petermen testified:
	"'A. Initially I asked [defendant]
what it was he was doing.  He told me he
had been out for a walk when he discovered
a pile of clothing there and he thought he
may be able to use some of the clothing and
so he was going through the clothing to
find items which he may be able [to] use.
	"'Q. Did he say whether the clothing
or the bag or anything in there was his?
	"'A. He said none of the items that he
had been handling were his except a green
army jacket also in there lying down.'
	"Officer Reynolds also recalled that defendant
originally 'denied that any of the property in there
was his and that he had just found all the stuff
inside and was going through it to see what he wanted
to take home.'
"Subsequently, Officer Petermen returned to the
enclosure where the dumpster was located.  During
that time, defendant remained outside with Officer
Reynolds.  When Officer Petermen searched the bag, he 
	"'found clothing, [a] magazine and a
syringe with a kitchen-type knife bound together
with string as well as two silver spoons, one
contained a white powder substance with a small
piece of white colored wadding along with a
second silver spoon, clear plastic baggie and a
Snickers candy bar.'
	"Officer Petermen also found the name, 'Doreen Cook,'
written on the inside of the bag.  Thereafter, the
officer returned to defendant, who again denied that
the bag was his.  After Officer Petermen ascertained
that the name of defendant's wife was Doreen Cook and
indicated to defendant that that name was on the bag,
defendant admitted that the bag was his."
State v. Cook, 163 Or App at 26-27.  
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the
evidence, arguing that the seizure and search of the bag and
clothing violated his privacy and possessory interests under
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.  The trial
court denied defendant's motion, ruling that:  "[T]he officer
had probable cause to suspect that a crime had been committed
and that the search of the duffel bag was reasonable under the
totality of the circumstances, particularly since the defendant
initially denied ownership of the bag prior to the search[.]" 
The trial court added that "it was completely appropriate for
the officers to determine ownership of the bag, not only to
return the bag to the appropriate owner but [also] to determine
if [defendant's possession of] the bag had indeed been [the]
result of some type of [theft]." (1)
The Court of Appeals held that "it is clear that
defendant had a privacy and possessory interest in the bag and
its contents before the bag was searched."  163 Or App at 31. 
The court also noted that "[i]t is uncontroverted that the bag
belonged to [defendant] or to his wife."  Id.  That court
framed the issue as "whether defendant's disclaimer of
ownership should be held to be an abandonment of his protected
interests in the bag," a question that the court stated "turns
on whether defendant intended to forego exercising his
possessory and privacy interests in the bag."  Id. at 32.  The
Court of Appeals held that, under the circumstances, defendant
evidenced an intent to abandon his interest in the bag and
clothing before the search took place, and sustained the ruling
of the trial court on that ground.  Id. at 34.  On review,
defendant argues that his "disclaimer of ownership" did not
constitute an abandonment of his constitutionally protected
possessory and privacy interest in the property.
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, 
provides that
"No law shall violate the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized."
The state agrees that the duffel bag and the clothing that
defendant sorted into the bag were effects protected from
unreasonable search and seizure under Article I, section 9. 
The state also agrees that defendant had a possessory and
privacy interest in the bag and the clothing before the bag was
seized and searched.  See State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 206, 729
P2d 524 (1986) (Article I, section 9, protects privacy and
possessory interests).  The state contends, however, that
defendant "relinquished any possessory or privacy interest in
the bag and its contents, by leaving the items on the ground
when he agreed to talk to the officer, walking away from them
and repeatedly denying that the items were his."  
In State v. Morton, 326 Or 466, 470, 953 P2d 374
(1998), this court recognized that individual privacy rights
can be "lost if, for example, the facts showed that the
defendant had abandoned the container before the police seized
it."  In Morton, however, this court rejected the state's
abandonment argument because the defendant had dropped the
container (containing methamphetamine) as she was being seized
under an invalid arrest warrant.  Under the circumstances, to
have allowed the evidence to be used against the defendant
would have permitted the police to exploit an illegal arrest. 
Id.  Although Morton is the most recent case in which this
court considered the abandonment of property and its potential
impact on individual possessory and privacy interests under
Article I, section 9, this court previously dealt with this
issue in a number of cases.  
For example, in State v. Purvis, 249 Or 404, 411, 438
P2d 1002 (1968), a case decided under both the Fourth Amendment
and Article I, section 9, (2) the defendant sought to suppress
evidence that police had obtained from hotel maids who had
removed the evidence from ash trays and waste baskets of a
hotel room that the defendant had occupied.  This court
rejected the defendant's privacy arguments, stating:
	"Defendant's claim to privacy terminated with respect
to items discarded by him and which he impliedly
authorized to be hauled away. * * *   
* * * * *
"The objects which defendant deposited in the
ash trays and waste baskets can be regarded as
abandoned property."  
249 Or at 410-11. 
In State v. Belcher, 306 Or 343, 759 P2d 1096 (1988),
the defendant engaged in a fight at a tavern and ran from the
scene before the police arrived, leaving behind a backpack. 
After reciting the trial court's findings that the defendant
had "[left] the pack behind; [with] no indication when if ever
he decided to return for it," this court agreed with the
state's argument that the defendant had abandoned the backpack
and that a police search for identification in the backpack did
not violate Article I, section 9, or the Fourth Amendment.  Id.
at 345-46.
State v. Pidcock, 306 Or 335, 759 P2d 1092 (1988),
involved a briefcase that was found along the side of a road
and turned over to the police, who searched it for
identification.  Although this court concluded that the police
search for identification did not violate the defendant's
privacy rights under Article I, section 9, the court rejected
the state's argument "that [the] defendant 'abandoned the
property in a constitutional sense,'" holding:
	"Defendant did not 'abandon' the briefcase until
after the deputies had opened the briefcase and
opened the envelopes [found within the briefcase] and
tested their contents without a warrant.  When the
deputies opened the briefcase and tested the
contents, defendant was still actively attempting to
recover that property."
306 Or at 339.
Three important points emerge from the cases
discussed above.  First, the determination whether a defendant
has relinquished a constitutionally protected interest in an
article of property involves both factual and legal questions,
which this court reviews in the same manner that it reviews
other search or seizure questions arising under Article I,
section 9.  See State v. Bea, 318 Or 220, 230, 864 P2d 854
(1993) (court will not disturb trial court's findings of
historical fact if evidence supports them; however, court not
bound by trial court's ultimate holding on voluntariness of
consent to search, but assesses anew whether facts suffice to
meet constitutional standards).
Second, because Article I, section 9, protects both
possessory and privacy interests in effects, property law
concepts of ownership and possession are relevant, though not
always conclusive, in the factual and legal determination
whether a defendant relinquished all constitutionally protected
interests in an article of property.  
Finally, for constitutional purposes, the question to
be resolved in the present case is whether the defendant's
statements and conduct demonstrated that he relinquished all
constitutionally protected interests in the articles of
property, so that both the warrantless seizure of the property
and the resultant search by the police were reasonable under
Article I, section 9.  We now answer that question in this
case.
Because the police did not have a warrant to seize
and search the items, the state had the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the seizure and search were
reasonable under Article I, section 9.  ORS 133.693 (4); see
State v. Tucker, 330 Or 85, 997 P2d 182 (2000) (state failed to
prove by preponderance of evidence that defendant lacked
protected interest in camera case left in automobile in which
defendant had been passenger).
Here, as noted earlier, the state agrees that
defendant had a possessory and privacy interest in the bag and
the clothing before they were seized and searched.  The state
argues, however, that defendant lost or relinquished his
constitutionally protected interests in the bag and clothing
because he left those items on the ground when he agreed to
talk to the officer, he walked away from the items, and he
repeatedly denied ownership of the items.  For the following
reasons, we reject the state's argument.  
Defendant's only statements before the seizure and
search occurred were that he discovered the pile of clothing,
that the items, with the exception of an army jacked, were not
his, and that he was going through the clothing to find items
that he might have been able to use.  The statements were
responsive to Officer Petermen's inquiry as to what defendant
was doing with the bag and clothes, and permitted the officers
reasonably to conclude that defendant did not own the bag and
clothing.
The fact that defendant told the officers that he did
not own the bag and clothes did not, however, permit the
officers to conclude that defendant intended to relinquish all
his constitutionally protected interests in those items. 
Although defendant had relinquished his immediate physical
possession of the bag and clothing by leaving them on the
ground, undisputedly he did so only after Officer Petermen
instructed him to "step out" of the area near the dumpster
where defendant was sorting the clothes into the bag.  Leaving
the items on the ground in compliance with the officer's
request to "step out" is not conduct demonstrating an intent
permanently to relinquish possession of the items or the
privacy interests that accompanied the right to possess them. 
Under those circumstances, the officers could not have
reasonably concluded that defendant intended to relinquish his
possessory and privacy interests in the clothing and the bag. 
Thus, the seizure of the clothing and bag followed by the
immediate search of those items violated defendant's possessory
and accompanying privacy interests protected by Article I,
section 9.  See Owens, 302 Or at 207 ("The seizure of an
article by the police and the retention of it (even
temporarily) is a significant intrusion into a person's
possessory interest in that 'effect.'").  Because the
warrantless seizure and search of the bag and clothing was
unlawful, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion
to suppress.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.



1. 	On review, the state does not argue that the officers
had probable cause to seize and search items for evidence of a
crime, or that the officers legally were entitled to seize and
search the items to determine their ownership.

2. 	The only reference in Purvis to the Oregon Constitution
is the phrase, "a seizure of the property would violate the
Fourth Amendment and its counterpart in our own constitution." 
249 Or at 409.