Case Title: Ex parte David G. Clark. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: David G. Clark v. Michelle C. Clark)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1071628

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel 03/27/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1071628
_________________________
Ex parte David G. Clark
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
 TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  David G. Clark
v.
Michelle C. Clark)
(Baldwin Circuit Court, DR-06-724;
 Court of Civil Appeals, 2070264)
COBB, Chief Justice.
1071628
2
On October 8, 2008, this Court granted the petition for
a writ of certiorari filed by David G. Clark to review the no-
opinion affirmance by the Court of Civil Appeals of the trial
court's final order in this divorce case.  Clark v. Clark (No.
2070264, June 27, 2008), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App.
2008)(table).  The trial court's judgment of divorce  awarded
sole physical custody of the parties' minor daughter to
Michelle C. Clark, the mother; divided the marital property;
and ordered David G. Clark, the father, to pay child support
and periodic alimony. For the reasons stated herein, we
reverse and remand the case for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
A.  Facts
I. The Parties
The father and the mother married on March 16, 1991.  The
daughter was born on September 9, 1998; the parties have no
other children.  On June 30, 2006, the father filed a
complaint in the Baldwin Circuit Court seeking a divorce and
custody of the daughter.  On August 3, 2006, the mother filed
an answer and a counterclaim for divorce and seeking custody
1071628
Pursuant to a pendente lite order entered by the trial
1
court, the daughter remained with the mother and the father
had visitation privileges during the time the parties' divorce
case was pending in the trial court.
3
of the daughter.  The case was tried on June 11-12 and August
9-11, 2007.1
Generally, 
the 
witnesses 
who 
testified 
at 
trial,
including 
Dr. 
Alice 
Frederick, 
the 
parties' 
marriage
counselor, described the father as a "rational," "stable," and
"responsible" man who was an appropriate role model for the
daughter and who could provide appropriate parental guidance
and discipline.  Although Dr. Frederick was not asked her
opinion as to whether it would be appropriate to place the
daughter in the physical custody of the mother, Dr. Frederick
testified as follows regarding the possibility of the
daughter's being placed in the primary physical custody of the
father:
"[Father's counsel]: Hypothetically speaking, if
[the father] were to be awarded primary residential
custody of [the daughter] do you have an opinion
whether 
[she] 
would 
grow 
up 
in 
a 
nurturing
environment 
that 
was 
safe, 
secure, 
stable,
progressive ...?
"....
"[Dr. Alice Frederick]:  Yes. [The father] is a very
stable and a very involved father and would do
1071628
4
whatever he thought was in [the daughter]'s best
interests.
"[Father's counsel]: Would it in fact please you to
see [the daughter] grow up under [the father]'s
primary residential care? ... I'm not asking you to
choose one over the other. I was just asking you.
"[Dr. Alice Frederick]: Yes, I would like to see
[the father] -- I would like to see [the daughter]
with [the father]. [The daughter] reacts well with
to [the father] and is very calm with [the father]."
The 
mother 
and 
her 
mother, 
the 
daughter's 
maternal
grandmother,  testified, however, that the father was "cold
and calculating" and that he would "push [the mother's]
buttons" -- implying that he would deliberately cause the
mother to lose her temper.
The father is a general manager for a hotel on the Gulf
Coast.  His work schedule is flexible, but at times requires
him to work more than eight hours during a day and at night
and on weekends.  The mother is a partner in an antique
business.  When the daughter is in her custody, the mother is
able to take the daughter with her to work and to have her
come to the antique shop after school.
The evidence before the trial court indicated that the
mother was a person who had difficulty controlling her anger.
Patricia Babb and the mother both described their relationship
1071628
5
as "best friends."   Babb, who had known the mother for 19
years, testified that the mother was prone to outbursts and
fits of rage and that those fits of rage had grown more
frequent in the "last couple of years" before the trial.  Babb
stated that she had recommended to the mother several times
over the years, and more frequently in the year leading up to
the trial, that the mother seek therapy to learn how to manage
her anger.  According to Babb, the mother did not like this
suggestion and would not agree she needed anger-management
therapy.  Babb stated that the mother was most prone to fits
of anger toward her immediate family, including the father.
Babb characterized the mother as a "good mother" and explained
that the mother was involved in the daughter's school
activities.  Babb testified that the mother disciplined the
daughter at times by yelling at her.  Babb expressed her
concern that some of the mother's yelling at the daughter was
inappropriate.  In addition, Babb testified that the mother
had expressed resentment of the daughter and the attention the
daughter received from the father; however, the mother denied
that she had told Babb that she resented her daughter.
1071628
6
George Bates, who resides across the street from the
parties' marital home, described the mother as follows:
"[The mother] has a rage about her that she has an
anger problem, but I have also seen a soft side of
her, too. But the rage will just come right out on
a dime. Um, I mean, I have always liked [the
mother]. I felt sorry for her because of, I felt
like she had a rage and anger problem but, um, I
really -- I just don't, ah, you know, understand the
anger and the rage. I, I -- because it comes out and
she gets mad at the world. And I mean mad."
The mother's first cousin, Patricia Fagan, testified that
she had "fairly often" seen the mother lose control of her
emotions, both in private and in public.  Fagan testified that
on several occasions she attempted to discuss with the mother
the concept of anger management and the mother's temper but
that those discussions only infuriated the mother more.  Fagan
testified that the mother had seemed to be a good mother up
until two years before the trial, which was when she last had
contact with the mother.  Fagan did not know about the quality
of the mother's parenting skills since that time because the
mother and Fagan had not spoken in that time.  Fagan testified
that the mother had "a lot of resentment since [the daughter]
was born," but she also testified that she had not seen the
mother discipline the daughter inappropriately.
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7
Chris Solberg, the wife of one of the executives at the
hotel where the father worked, testified that she saw the
mother lose her temper with the daughter in 2004 when some of
the families of hotel employees evacuated to a motel in
Prattville in anticipation of a hurricane hitting the Gulf
Coast.  Solberg described the incident as follows:
"[Solberg]: We all tried to go to breakfast
together.... My daughter actually had gone to the
restaurant with [the mother] and [the daughter] and
I was coming behind them. And the hotel was full,
the restaurant was full, people were -- they had a
buffet set up so people were coming and going. And
I was putting my stuff, my things down to sit down
to eat breakfast. And I noticed [the daughter] was
trying to get her mother's attention.  And, um, she
kept saying, 'Mommy, Mommy.' She was trying to tell
her something.  And [the mother] was very uptight at
that point, and said, grabbed [the daughter] and
said, 'Shut up.' And grabbed her and shook her and
said, 'Just shut up. Shut up. What do you want?'
And [the daughter] just was, she was devastated. She
started crying. My daughter was upset.
"[Father's counsel]: How loud did she holler?
"[Solberg]: It was loud so the entire restaurant
could hear. Because later people who were sitting on
the other end of the restaurant made comments to me
about it."
However, when confronted with Solberg's account of the
incident at the motel in Prattville, the mother testified that
she did "not remember shaking [her] daughter ever."
1071628
Dr. France Frederick is the daughter of Dr. Alice
2
Frederick, the parties' marriage counselor.
8
Other witnesses testified that they had seen the mother
drunk in public but that they had not seen the father drunk in
public.  In addition, several witnesses testified that they
had seen the mother in a rage at the father and had heard her
at the father's workplace in the presence of other employees
loudly referring to him as "stupid" and as an "idiot" who did
not know how to manage the hotel.  The mother denied that
those incidents occurred.  She also testified that, when the
father had the daughter in his custody for visitation during
the separation before the divorce, he would often arrange
babysitters for the daughter because of his work schedule and
that he fed the daughter "an awful lot of fast food."
II. Initial Testimony of Dr. France Frederick
On June 11, 2007, Dr. France Frederick,  a clinical
2
psychologist specializing in child and family psychology,
testified that she had had counseling sessions with the
daughter seven times beginning November 16, 2006.  At the time
of Dr. France Frederick's initial testimony, the daughter's
most recent counseling session with Dr. Frederick had been on
June 4, 2007.  Dr. Frederick testified that, at the outset of
1071628
The mother was not present at the daughter's first two
3
counseling sessions with Dr. France Frederick.  The father was
the parent who initially took the daughter to Dr. France
Frederick for counseling.  Subsequently, both the mother and
the father cooperated in continuing to obtain Dr. France
Frederick's services for the daughter. 
9
the therapy, the daughter "was extremely reserved and
uncomfortable and very reticent to move away from her
father[ ] ... physically."  Dr. Frederick testified that 
3
"[the daughter's] extreme reserve and lack of
willingness to interact with another person is not
what I normally see in a kid her age.  Her
withdrawal and shyness and discomfort, not that it's
particularly abnormal but ... that's not what you
expect, especially when she gets comfortable how
quickly she sort of changes that demeanor and goes
back and forth. So that's notable."
However, 
Dr. 
France 
Frederick 
characterized 
the
daughter's progress in therapy as follows:
"My professional opinion is that she has come a very
long way.  Her progress is notable.  Her social
skills are much more adequate.  She expresses her
emotional 
experiences, her feelings much more
clearly.  She, um, is much more outspoken about her
needs rather than being as reserved and deferring to
her parents."
Dr. France Frederick characterized both the father and
the mother as "fantastic parents." She described the daughter
as "a fantastically brilliant kid," who has no disciplinary
problems in school, who makes good grades, and who "does very
1071628
10
well in an academic structure, in the classroom, with friends,
with her teacher."  However, Dr. Frederick did not think that
the daughter's excellent performance in school was an
indication that the daughter would benefit by continuing in
the sole physical custody of the mother with visitation by the
father as had been the status quo during the parties'
separation while the divorce action was proceeding.  According
to Dr. Frederick, the daughter was "doing excellent in school
but part of that is her obsessive nature, that she would
obsessively work very, very hard to be perfect to keep the
tensions low."  Dr. Frederick pointed out that her first
counseling session with the daughter occurred during the
school year and while the daughter was in the sole physical
custody of her mother, and Dr. Frederick noted that "[t]he
child I saw had serious issues when I first started therapy
with her."  The mother, however, testified at trial that the
daughter had no behavioral or developmental problems.
 Based on research with which Dr. France Frederick was
familiar, as well as her familiarity with the daughter and the
Clark family's financial situation, Dr. Frederick strongly
recommended that the father and the mother share joint
1071628
11
physical custody of the daughter, with the daughter spending
equal time in the physical custody of each parent.  When asked
if the daughter would be better off "waking up in the same
home" she had been in for the last eight years of her life,
Dr. Frederick testified:
"That would absolutely go against what I just
recommended so absolutely  I think she should share
both parents.  I do not think she is a kid who would
function very well with just one of her parents.  I
think that would be very, very hard for her."
On cross-examination by the mother's counsel, Dr. France
Frederick 
was 
further 
questioned 
about 
her 
custody
recommendation: 
"[Mother's counsel]: But [the daughter's] access [to
her parents] doesn't have to be equal.  And that's
not -- equal access is really not in the best
interest of the child, is it?
"[Dr. France Frederick]: In some children it is not.
For [the daughter] she functions much better when
she has access to both parents.
"[Mother's counsel]: But that's not equal access.
For example, she's functioning well now, isn't she?
"....
"[Dr. France Frederick]:  When she is solely with
her mother it is very hard for her to open her mouth
and express any emotions whatsoever.
"....
1071628
12
"[Mother's counsel]:  I'm not saying it solves all
problems. All this is cumulative. But at this point
it would not be in the child's best interest that
she be required to move from the home. Do you agree
with that?"
"[Dr. France Frederick]: I'm saying it's in her best
interest to live half of the time in her mother's
home and half the time in her father's.
"....
"[Mother's counsel]: Do you think it's important for
that child to have structure and routine during the
school year?
"[Dr. France Frederick]: I think it's important that
she have structure and routine. I think that ....
"[Mother's counsel]: And isn't it true that, that
child is most likely to have structure and routine
if she wakes up in the same bed every morning and
goes to bed in the same bed every night during the
school year and while school is in session?
"[Dr. France Frederick]: I think it is most
disruptive if she has severe psychopathology because
she withdraws into a very strange inner world in
order to not deal with being separate from one or
the other of her parents."
Dr. France Frederick further testified that the daughter
would suffer adverse consequences if the court did not follow
her custody recommendation.  Her testimony in this regard was
as follows:
"[Dr. France Frederick]:  This child is easily --
she has a lot of trouble.  When I first saw her, she
had so little permission to be with her father. And
1071628
13
she was -- she acted very, very strangely. When she
is comfortable with permission to be with either
parent I have a different kind of kid that I work
with.  And [the daughter] is very clear about what
a big deal that is to her. In spite of tension
between her parents that she cannot stand, she
chooses to still work with me because she has said,
'I know you really like both of my parents.'  And
she likes that negotiation.  And she knows that I
like both of them and think they both really care
about her, despite their issues. So I think --
"[Father's counsel]: You're very -- you are almost
on the verge of being emotional about this, aren't
you?
"[Dr. France Frederick]: I'm professional about it.
"[Father's counsel]: I understand but you are very
--
"[Dr. France Frederick]:  Yes. I am very adamant.
"[Father's counsel]: -- fervently committed to this
recommendation; are you not?
"[Dr. France Frederick]:  I wouldn't have made it if
I weren't. Yes.
"[Father's counsel]:  All right. And do I understand
that there would be adverse consequences not -- in
your professional opinion -- not to follow your
recommendation?
"[Dr. France Frederick]: Or some real close form of
it?
"[Father's counsel]: Mm-hmm.
"[Dr. France Frederick]: There will be issues. ...
And I think that [the daughter] will absolutely pay
that price.
1071628
14
"[Father's counsel]: It's not about winning or
losing in court, is it?
"[Dr. France Frederick]: If it is, [the daughter] is
going to be the one that loses and I am really,
really clear about this."
III.  The Trial Court's Refusal to Permit Recall of Dr. France
Frederick for Further Testimony
On July 27, 2007, several weeks after Dr. France
Frederick's initial court appearance in June, while the trial
was continued, an incident occurred during a visitation
exchange that caused Dr. Frederick to change her professional
opinion about whether shared physical custody was in the
daughter's best interest.  The incident was videotaped by a
neighbor.  The videotape was entered into evidence, and the
mother, the father, and another witness described the incident
at trial.  The incident occurred when the father went to the
mother's house to pick the daughter up for scheduled
visitation.  He attempted to retrieve the daughter's clothing
and luggage and place them in his car while the mother
screamed at him and at another man present during the incident
continuously, demanding money.
Numerous 
times 
during 
the 
exchange, 
the 
daughter
attempted to stand between her parents, and she held her hands
1071628
The mother testified regarding the incident:
4
"[Father's counsel]: Visitation exchange, how long
would it take, without any argument, for [the
father] to come pick up [the daughter] and her
overnight bag and clothes?
"[Mother]: As fast as he could write a check.
"[Father's counsel]: Without any argument about the
check how long would it take?
"[Mother]: A minute or two.
"[Father's counsel]: How long did this scene take in
front of [the daughter]?
15
up between their faces.  Each time, the mother pushed the
daughter's hands out of the way and continued screaming at the
father, often positioning her face in close proximity to his.
The father and another man present during the incident each
physically removed the daughter from the middle of the
argument, but the daughter returned and again placed herself
between her parents and put her hands up between their faces.
The father was calm during the incident, though he clearly
voiced disagreement with the mother.  The mother did not allow
the father to have the daughter's clothing and luggage until
the father wrote the mother a check.  The trial court
described the July 27, 2007, incident as follows: "[T]he
[mother] admitted that she yelled.[ ]  And I don't think it's
4
1071628
"[Mother]: Well, that day it took him twenty minutes
to write the check.
"[Father's counsel]: And were you screaming at him
in front of [the daughter]?
"[Mother]: Yes, I was.
"....
"[Father's counsel]: Was it in the best interest of
your daughter to be exposed to you yelling at [the
father]?
"[Mother]: I would not be yelling at [the father] if
he could just do what the Judge told him to do in
status quo, which was pay the bills.
"[Father's counsel]: And he says he paid you an
extra thousand dollars already, didn't he?
"[Mother]: Didn't I explain that already?  He gave
me 400 extra dollars.
"[Father's counsel]: Well, there is a dispute
between you and [the father]. Does [the daughter]
need to be brought into a dispute, ma'am?
"[Mother]: I don't know how else to get money from
him because he will not discuss it over the phone.
He hangs up on me."
(Emphasis added.)
16
a good thing to hold the child hostage for money, but, you
know, there is no doubt in my mind that's what she did.  So
let's move on and get onto something else."  
1071628
17
When the trial resumed in August 2007, the father sought
to recall Dr. France Frederick to verify that the daughter had
suffered "a relapse" as a result of the mother's conduct
during the July 27, 2007, visitation exchange.  The trial
court denied the father's request to recall Dr. France
Frederick on grounds that "the witness had already testified
and that if the trial had not been interrupted the testimony
wouldn't have come in."  The father submitted an August 8,
2007, letter from Dr. France Frederick as an offer of proof
regarding the anticipated substance of her testimony.  The
letter stated:
"Judge Partin, I have been working with [the
daughter] since November 2006. At our last regularly
scheduled session on 31 July 2007 there was a
dramatic and disturbing change in [the daughter]'s
demeanor and behavior. She behaved much the way she
did in the first sessions in a manner that
demonstrated 
severe 
withdrawal 
and 
lack 
of
developmentally appropriate 
communication. 
These 
are
symptoms often seen in children with pervasive
developmental disorder, or children that have been
subjected 
to 
devastation 
and 
to 
trauma
(post-traumatic stress disorder). I was extremely
concerned and alarmed. I have not seen any of these
behaviors in quite some time. And this regression
was alarming.
"[The daughter]'s father brought her to this
session. I called her father into the session to try
to help [the daughter] discuss what may have
occurred. I asked her father had there been any
1071628
18
conflict in [the daughter]'s presence? Her father
told me that the recent visitation exchange went
poorly. This visitation exchange occurred on Friday,
July 27, 2007, which occurred between the date of my
previous testimony at the prior hearing in June and
the recommencement of that hearing this week.  The
exchange happened on the 27th of July and I saw [the
daughter] on the 31st of July.
"When [the daughter] began therapy I had a very
straightforward discussion with [the father and the
mother] about the dynamics of [the daughter]'s
psychological functioning and the presence of some
disturbing symptoms that were notably exacerbated
when [the daughter] was subjected to any tension
between 
her 
parents, 
yet 
seemed 
to 
abate
dramatically when [the daughter] felt less stressed.
I 
emphatically 
warned 
these 
parents 
against
subjecting this child to any outbursts, tension, or
conflicts they may deal with between themselves. I
have since implored [the mother] to refrain from
this kind of behavior.
"At the time of the conclusion of [the daughter]'s
session I inquired about this last visitation
exchange. [The father] told me that he had a
videotape of the exchange. I requested to view this
videotape. The behaviors to which [the mother]
blatantly 
subjected 
[the 
daughter] 
are 
very
dangerous to this child. These behaviors are exactly
the behaviors and violent displays of outrage that
I explained could be devastating to [the daughter].
"I have stated [my] bias toward a joint legal and
physical custodial relationship, but the safety of
this child must be considered first and foremost. My
professional recommendation is that [the daughter]
be in the primary custody of her father ... and that
parent/child exchanges be structured without any
communications between parents.
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19
"Sincerely, 
France 
Frederick, 
PhD. 
Clinical
Psychologist."
IV.  The Divorce Judgment and Subsequent Appellate Proceedings
On September 4, 2007, the trial court entered an order
granting 
the 
parties 
a 
divorce 
on 
the 
ground 
of
incompatibility of temperament.  Further, the trial court
awarded the mother sole physical custody of the daughter,
divided the marital property, and ordered the father to pay
alimony, child support, and other related expenses.  On
November 13, 2007, after the parties filed posttrial motions,
the trial court entered an order modifying the September 4,
2007, order in several ways, including reducing the father's
periodic-alimony obligation from $2,000 per month to $1,700
per month.
On December 26, 2007, the father filed a notice of appeal
to the Court of Civil Appeals.  On June 27, 2008, the Court of
Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court,
without an opinion.  The father then petitioned for
certiorari review of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision, and
this Court granted his petition.  We now turn to the merits of
this appeal.
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20
B.  Analysis
I.  Whether the Trial Court Erred in its Custody Determination
and in Refusing to Permit Recall of Dr. France Frederick  
The father argues that the trial court's order awarding
the mother sole physical custody of the daughter must be
reversed because, according to the father, the trial court
erred in refusing to allow Dr. France Frederick to testify
regarding an incident that occurred during a continuance in
the trial and after her initial testimony in the case.  In
addition, the father argues that the trial court's custody
determination was erroneous because it was so unsupported by
the evidence as to be plainly and palpably wrong.  Before we
begin our analysis of the father's arguments, we first
consider the applicable standards of review. 
"Alabama law gives neither parent priority in an initial
custody determination. Ex parte Couch, 521 So. 2d 987 (Ala.
1988). The controlling consideration in such a case is the
best interest of the child."  Ex parte Byars, 794 So. 2d 345,
347 (Ala. 2001).  See also Graham v. Graham, 640 So. 2d 963,
964 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) ("In an action between parents
seeking an initial award of custody, the parties stand on
equal footing and no presumption inures to either parent.
1071628
21
Hall v. Hall, 571 So. 2d 1176 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).  The
trial court's overriding consideration is the children's best
interests and welfare. Santmier v. Santmier, 494 So. 2d 95
(Ala. Civ. App. 1986).").  When an appellate court reviews a
trial court's child-custody determination that was based upon
evidence presented ore tenus, the trial court's decision is
presumed to be correct and will be reversed only if the
evidence so fails to support the custody determination that it
is plainly and palpably wrong.  Ex parte Fann, 810 So. 2d 631,
633 (Ala. 2001).
However, a trial court's ruling on the admission of
evidence is reviewed for an excess of discretion.  Mock v.
Allen, 783 So. 2d 828, 835 (Ala. 2000).  A trial judge has
wide discretion in determining whether to exclude or admit
evidence.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Thompson, 726 So. 2d 651,
655 (Ala. 1998).  Moreover, a trial court's judgment will not
be reversed for an error in admitting or excluding evidence
unless the appellant demonstrates that "the error complained
of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the
parties."  Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P.; Atkins v. Lee, 603 So. 2d
937, 946 (Ala. 1992).
1071628
The mother cites Hagler v. Hagler, 50 Ala. App. 266, 269,
5
278 So. 2d 715, 718 (Ala. Civ. App. 1973), for the proposition
that a court does not err in refusing to recall  a previously
examined witness when the anticipated area of inquiry on
recall has been covered in the witness's earlier testimony.
As the mother points out, the area of inquiry upon recall of
Dr. France Frederick would technically have been the same
"area of inquiry" covered in her initial testimony because her
custody recommendation for the daughter would have been the
subject of her testimony on both occasions. However, we find
Hagler distinguishable because, in this case, the father
sought to recall Dr. France Frederick to testify regarding
events that occurred during a continuance in the trial and
after her initial testimony and because of the need to modify
her custody recommendation in light of those events and their
impact on the daughter's well-being.  Hagler did not involve
an attempt to recall a witness to give testimony that was not
available when the witness first testified.
22
"In deciding whether to allow particular testimony, the
court should focus on whether the testimony 'tends to shed
light on the main inquiry' or draws attention from it."  Mason
& Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Byrd, 601 So. 2d 68, 72 (Ala. 1992)
(quoting Ryan v. Acuff, 435 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Ala. 1983)).5
In matters of child custody, "[t]he best interests of the
child are always of paramount importance." Tims v. Tims, 519
So. 2d 558, 559 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987).  "'It is the court's
duty to protect the interest of the children with scrupulous
care.'"  Howard v. Howard, 608 So. 2d 753, 755 (Ala. Civ. App.
1992) (quoting Vaughn v. Vaughn, 473 So. 2d 1090, 1091 (Ala.
1071628
23
Civ. App. 1985)); see also Ex parte Barnard, 581 So. 2d 489,
490 (Ala. 1991).
The father's offer of proof established that the purpose
of his attempt to recall Dr. France Frederick was to provide
evidence that was not available when Dr. Frederick  testified
initially.  Further, the offer of proof demonstrated that,
upon recall, Dr. France Frederick would have testified that,
in her opinion, placing the daughter in the physical custody
of 
the 
mother 
(even 
under 
a 
joint-physical-custody
arrangement) was not in the daughter's best interest and, in
fact, 
would 
seriously 
psychologically 
and 
developmentally 
harm
the daughter by unduly exposing her to the mother's
inappropriate behavior and fits of rage.  See Graham, 640 So.
2d at 964 (noting factors for consideration in a custody
determination 
include 
the 
"'character, 
stability, 
[and] 
mental
and physical health'" of the parents and "'the interpersonal
relationship between [the] child and each parent'"(quoting Ex
parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696-97 (Ala. 1981))); Tims v.
Tims, 519 So. 2d at 559 (noting that a parent's ability to
provide for a child's emotional and social needs is a factor
in determining custody of the child).  Thus, Dr. Frederick's
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testimony upon recall would shed light upon the paramount
inquiry before the court in this custody determination -- what
is in the daughter's best interest?  Moreover, there is no
basis for a conclusion that her testimony would have been
cumulative or that it would have otherwise detracted from that
inquiry.  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred
by refusing to allow the father to recall Dr. France Frederick
to testify regarding a change in her custody recommendation in
light of events that occurred and information gained after she
first took the witness stand.
The trial court awarded the mother sole physical custody
after erroneously refusing to allow the father to present
testimony from Dr. France Frederick that would have had direct
relevance to the propriety of placing the daughter in the
mother's sole physical custody.  Under the circumstances, the
father has met his burden of demonstrating that the trial
court's error in refusing to allow Dr. Frederick to be
recalled as a witness prejudiced his rights.  It follows that
the Court of Civil Appeals' decision to affirm trial court's
order granting the mother sole physical custody of the
daughter is due to be reversed.  In light of this holding, we
1071628
The mother argues that $1,000 of her monthly income is
6
"imputed income."  However, she testified at trial that she
could make $1,000 per month or more in her antique business,
and she receives $200 per month from a one-half interest in a
rental house.
25
need not further address the father's argument that the Court
of Civil Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's custody
determination because that determination was unsupported by
the evidence.  On remand, the trial court is to reconsider the
custody award in light of all admissible evidence relevant to
the best interests of the daughter.
II.  Whether the Trial Court Erred in Ordering the Father to
Pay the Mother $1,700 per Month in Alimony
The father argues that the trial court erred in ordering
him to pay the mother $1,700 per month in alimony. The father
makes $11,631.45 per month.  After taxes and payment of
expenses the trial court ordered him to pay (such as alimony,
insurance, the note for the mother's vehicle, the mortgage on
the marital home, child support, etc.), the father is left
with $2,039 per month.  The mother makes $1,200 per month.6
After receiving alimony in the amount of $1,700 per month, she
will have an income of approximately $2,900 per month.  This
amount is $742 in excess of the figure she submitted to the
court as her monthly expenses (not including the sum the
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26
mother listed as monthly living expenses attributed to the
daughter, which are more than exceeded by the $992 per month
the father was ordered to pay in child support and the $320
per month in private-school tuition he was also ordered to
pay).  In addition, the mother was awarded both of the family
cars, with the father to make all remaining car payments on
the mother's car; the ability to live in the marital home
until she remarries or until the daughter reaches the age of
majority, whichever occurs first, while the father was ordered
to pay the $1,400 monthly mortgage payment and to pay for any
repairs on the house exceeding $200; one-half the equity in
the house existing at the time of the divorce; one-half the
value of the father's retirement accounts at the time of the
divorce (with the exception of a relatively small sum the
father acquired before the marriage); the couple's undivided
one-half interest in a rental house; one-half the value of
certain bank accounts; and $8,500 in attorney fees.
We are mindful that we "'must consider the issues of
property division and alimony together when reviewing the
decision of the trial court.'"  Ex parte Drummond, 785 So. 2d
358, 361 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Bushnell v. Bushnell, 713 So. 2d
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27
962, 965 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)).  It is clear from the trial
court's order that at least some of the division of property
was based on the trial court's decision to award the mother
full physical custody of the daughter.  For example, the trial
court awarded the mother the right to live in the marital home
until she marries or until the daughter reaches the age of
majority, while the father was ordered to make the $1,400
monthly mortgage payment and to pay for any repairs to the
house exceeding $200.  We recognize that, under the facts of
this case, the trial court's further review of the custody
issue has the potential of requiring changes in the award of
child support, the distribution of the marital estate, and the
alimony award. 
Therefore, because we reverse the decision of the Court
of Civil Appeals affirming the custody award, the award of
alimony is due to be vacated.  Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals insofar as it affirmed
the trial court's award of alimony, and we remand the case to
the Court of Civil Appeals with instructions to remand the
case for the trial court to vacate the award of alimony.  On
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remand, the trial court may reconsider alimony, child support,
and property division to the extent that its review of the
custody issue warrants further action on those issues.
C.  Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the decision of
the Court of Civil Appeals affirming the trial court's award
of physical custody of the daughter to the mother, and we
remand the case to that court to, in turn, remand the case to
the trial court.  On remand, the trial court is to reconsider
the custody award in light of all admissible evidence relevant
to the best interests of the daughter, including the evidence
discussed in this opinion.
Further, we reverse the decision of the Court of Civil
Appeals affirming the alimony award, and we remand this cause
to the Court of Civil Appeals with instructions to remand the
case for the trial court to vacate the alimony award.  On
remand, the trial court also may reconsider alimony, child
support, and property division in the course of revisiting the
custody issue.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, Murdock,
and Shaw, JJ., concur.