Case Title: Cambio v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cambio v. State1990 WY 103800 P.2d 482Case Number: 89-169Decided: 10/05/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
ELMER CAMBIO, 

APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Natrona County, Harry E. Leimback, J.

Ann M. Rochelle 
of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Paul S. Rehurek, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Elmer Cambio, 
convicted of battery in violation of W.S. 6-2-501(b) (June 1983 Repl.), raises 
issues identical to those raised in Moon v. State, No. 88-304 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 
1990), and identical to the three major issues raised in State v. Lowry, No. 
88-312 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990) and its companion cases, Vigil v. State, No. 88-310 
(Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); McIver v. State, No. 88-311 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); Magarahan 
v. State, No. 89-4 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); and Billis v. State, No. 88-250 (Wyo. 
Oct. 5, 1990) [800 P.2d 401]. These major issues were also raised in Mollman v. 
State, No. 89-21, [800 P.2d 466] (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); Hudson v. State, No. 
89-83, [800 P.2d 471] (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); and Heggen v. State, No. 89-84, [800 P.2d 475] (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990). The major issues in all of these cases involved 
the constitutionality of W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.) ("new 
301").

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      On April 30, 
1988, Mr. Cambio was weeding a garden using a pitchfork. Several children, 
including the eleven-year old victim, who was sitting on a corral fence, were 
playing in the general area. After several of the other children went into a 
house, leaving the victim sitting on the fence, Mr. Cambio talked to the victim 
about, among other things, not being allowed to sit on the fence. Mr. Cambio 
jabbed the victim's upper right thigh with the pitchfork, causing a contusion 
with three "partial-thickness" puncture wounds.

[¶4]      The state charged 
Mr. Cambio with one count of child abuse under W.S. 6-2-503(a) (Cum.Supp. 1987). 
At arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the charge. Later, he appeared in court 
to enter a change of plea. Under a plea agreement, in return for Mr. Cambio's 
plea of guilty to the misdemeanor of battery under W.S. 6-2-501(b) (Cum. Supp. 
1987), the state agreed to dismiss a charge of aggravated assault in a related 
case and reduce the child abuse charge to the battery charge. The parties had no 
agreement about sentencing. The district court judge accepted Mr. Cambio's 
guilty plea and ordered a presentence investigation report. At the sentencing 
proceeding, Mr. Cambio requested that the court consider placing him under "new 
301" probation. The prosecutor stated that the state did not consent to that 
probation because of the gravity of Mr. Cambio's conduct and the serious injury 
to the eleven-year old victim. The court sentenced Mr. Cambio to six months 
supervised probation, a $100 fine, restitution, and payment of $50 to the 
victims' compensation account. The court declined Mr. Cambio's invitation to 
disclose how the court would have ruled on "new 301" probation had the state 
consented to that treatment. This appeal followed.

[¶5]      Mr. Cambio raises 
issues identical to those raised in Moon v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo. 1990), 
namely:

1. Whether W.S. 7-13-301 
(June 1987 Repl.), requiring the state's consent to the court's deferring 
further proceedings and placing a defendant on probation without entry of a 
judgment of conviction, infringes on the judicial department's sentencing power 
in violation of the principle of separation of powers explicitly stated in Wyo. 
Const. art. 2, § 1.

2. Whether 1987 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws, ch. 157, § 3, enacting W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.), was enacted 
in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20, which proscribes altering or amending 
a bill during its passage through the legislature so as to change the bill's 
original purpose.

3. Whether 1987 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws, ch. 157, § 3, enacting W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.), was enacted 
in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24, which mandates the passage of a bill 
containing only one subject which must be clearly expressed in the bill's 
title.

4. Whether the 
prosecutor's refusal to consent to sentencing under § 7-13-301 was arbitrary and 
an abuse of discretion and therefore violated Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 2 and 
7.

[¶6]      Although the 
state asserts that Mr. Cambio has not preserved these issues since he failed 
properly to raise them below, we have chosen to consider them for the reason 
explained in Lowry and its companion cases.

[¶7]      Our decisions in 
Lowry and its companion cases, especially Moon, are dispositive here. Applying 
those decisions, we hold that "new 301" is constitutional in terms of the issues 
raised here, that the prosecutor's refusal to consent to "new 301" treatment in 
Mr. Cambio's case did not violate his rights to due process, and that the 
prosecutor's refusal to consent to "new 301" treatment in Mr. Cambio's case was 
neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 1, 
§§ 2 and 7. Accordingly, we affirm.

URBIGKIT, C.J., files a 
dissenting opinion in which MACY, J., joins.

MACY, J., files a dissenting 
opinion in which URBIGKIT, C.J., joins.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
dissenting, with whom MACY, Justice, joins.

[¶8]      Elmer Cambio 
presents for appeal a misdemeanor battery plea agreement conviction case which 
consequently does not come encumbered with the felony conviction prosecutorial 
attribute. Elmer Cambio, age fifty-seven, was weeding a garden on his landlord's 
property with a "pitchfork," which was either a dull pitchfork or a spading 
fork. While engaged, he asked young Mr. Kirk Lewis to get off of the property 
fence and, when answered by the question from the youth, "why should he," Cambio 
poked the fence sitter with the spading fork. The young man was not upset at 
that time, but his parents certainly were later which resulted in the 
institution of a criminal felony charge of infliction of injury on a child as 
aggravated child abuse because of the age difference.

[¶9]      The five year 
felony criminal offense, W.S. 6-2-503, was pled down to battery, W.S. 
6-2-501(b), a six month, $750 fine offense. Cambio had one prior charge - a 
speeding offense and a $25 fine. In the plea bargain, there was no "sentencing 
agreement" for the plea. In the post plea bargain sentencing session before the 
trial court, Cambio's plea was taken:

THE COURT: Do you 
understand that as amended that charge would allege that on or about the 30th of 
April, 1988, in Natrona County, Wyoming, you did unlawfully touch another in a 
rude, insolent or angry manner or did intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
cause bodily injury to another?

THE DEFENDANT: 
Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Cambio, 
how do you plead to that charge?

THE DEFENDANT: 
Guilty.

THE COURT: If you 
maintain your plea of guilty you are admitting all of the essential facts of the 
charge, the State will not have to prove any case against you, and the only 
issue will be the sentence. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: 
Yes.

THE COURT: Have you been 
induced or threatened by anyone to enter this plea?

THE DEFENDANT: No, 
sir.

THE COURT: Is the plea 
made voluntarily and of your own volition?

THE DEFENDANT: 
Yes.

THE COURT: Are you making 
your plea after consultation with your attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: 
Yes.

* * * * * 
*

THE COURT: The Court 
finds the defendant is alert and not under any influence which would adversely 
affect his ability to understand these proceedings, that he is competent to 
enter a plea, and that the plea is knowingly and voluntarily made, without any 
improper inducement or conditions, free of coercion, and with an understanding 
of the charge and the consequences. The Court further finds the plea was made 
after consultation with competent counsel, and that there is a factual basis for 
the plea. Therefore, the Court accepts the plea of guilty. I presume we should 
have a presentence report in the case.

[¶10]   Defense counsel, at the scheduled 
sentencing session, extensively argued for W.S. 7-13-301 treatment which could 
only serve upon successful completion of any probationary term to vacate this 
rather insignificant conviction of battery. The prosecutor asked for jail time, 
which he did not get in the sentence actually entered of six months supervised 
probation. He specifically denied usage of the vacation of plea and sentence 
provision as a sentencing opportunity available to the trial court under the 
provisions of W.S. 7-13-301.

[¶11]   I dissent for the same reasons 
stated in the other cases presently before this court, but for the life of me I 
cannot discern why exercise of the prosecutorial veto provides any rational 
justification for exercised conduct except to acquire the feeling of sitting on 
the bench with the trial judge during sentencing. Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401 
(Wyo. 1990) (

[¶12]   Nos. 88-250, 304, 310, 311, 312 and 
89-4, 10/5/90), Urbigkit, Chief Justice, dissenting. To make a significant 
difference for misdemeanor cases, the veto, if exercised after entry of the 
plea, could realistically only have a practical effect in cases where there is a 
cumulative offense aggregation possibility, which would be the case with driving 
while under the influence offenses.

[¶13]   In practical realism within the rap 
sheet computer society within which we presently live, the difference provided 
by the vacation of the entered plea following successful probation becomes de 
minimis. What we have is introduction of a felony issue into misdemeanor 
sentencing to aggregate prosecutorial power.

[¶14]   Consequently, I dissent from this 
transfer of judicial power to the advocate in the executive branch of 
government.

MACY, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, joins.

[¶15]   I dissent. I am convinced that "new 
301" violates the separation of powers doctrine for the reasons articulated in 
my dissent to Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo. Nos. 88-250, 88-304, 88-310, 
88-311, 88-312, and 89-4 decided October 5, 1990).