Case Title: State v. White

Citation: 246 Neb. 346, 518 N.W.2d 923

Docket Number: 

State: nebraska

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Date: 1994-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
518 N.W.2d 923 (1994) 246 Neb. 346 STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Frederick WHITE, Appellant. No. S-92-1061. Supreme Court of Nebraska. July 15, 1994. *924 Toney J. Redman, Lincoln, for appellant. Don Stenberg, Atty. Gen., and Delores Coe-Barbee, Lincoln, for appellee. Kenneth N. Thompson, Beach, ND, amicus curiae. HASTINGS, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, WHITE, CAPORALE, LANPHIER and WRIGHT, JJ. PER CURIAM. Defendant, Frederick White, appeals from the order of the district court denying his motion for postconviction relief. The single assignment of error is that the district court found that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel when he was not given the opportunity to testify at his trial. This case has been transferred to the docket of the Supreme Court under our authority to regulate the caseloads of the appellate courts. We affirm. Defendant was charged with the August 17, 1979, felony offense of escape from official detention, a violation of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-912 *925 (Reissue 1989). His first trial, to a jury, commenced March 4, 1980, and resulted in a conviction, but the conviction was set aside and defendant was granted a new trial because of an erroneous instruction. The second trial began April 16, 1980, and again resulted in a conviction. Defendant was represented by the Lancaster County Public Defender, Dennis Keefe, at both trials. On appeal to this court, defendant having cited grounds for error other than ineffective assistance of counsel, his conviction was affirmed. See State v. White, 209 Neb. 218, 306 N.W.2d 906 (1981). Defendant's amended motion for postconviction relief was filed by his court-appointed attorney, Toney J. Redman, which motion alleged ineffective assistance of counsel by defendant's lawyer at the second trial. It is beyond dispute that to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as a violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that such deficient performance prejudiced the defense. The standard for determining the propriety of the claim is whether the attorney, in representing the defendant, performed at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law in the area. Further, the defendant must make a showing of how the defendant was prejudiced in the defense of his case as a result of his attorney's actions or inactions. State v. Nielsen, 243 Neb. 202, 498 N.W.2d 527 (1993). The bases of defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel were counsel's failure to pursue the legality of defendant's arrest and to appeal the issue, failure to appeal the issue of the constitutionality of § 28-912, failure to object to or appeal the issue of improper closing statements by the prosecution, and failure to advise defendant of his right to testify in the second jury trial. The postconviction trial court, in a well-reasoned and detailed order, denied each of defendant's specific complaints with a full explanation of each. The only complaint which defendant argues on appeal is counsel's failure to advise defendant of his right to testify. Therefore, we confine our analysis to that issue. On August 17, 1979, an Officer Spanel of the Lincoln Police Department was investigating a series of sexual assaults in a Lincoln neighborhood. The officer was in plain clothes and in an unmarked car. He walked up to defendant and one Julius Nivens to show them a composite sketch of the sexual assault suspect. As defendant reached out his right hand to take the sketch, the officer noted a series of distinctive scars on defendant's right forearm. Aside from the fact that the suspect was a black male, which defendant was, the suspect was reported to have scars on his left forearm. According to Spanel, he told defendant that defendant was coming downtown with him. Spanel reached into his car to radio in to headquarters, and defendant struck him and ran. Defendant contends that the officer never identified himself and never placed defendant under arrest. Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with escape. The first trial commenced March 4, 1980, and the following appears of record after the close of the State's evidence: The second trial commenced April 16, 1980, and the record of that trial does not disclose any similar statement made by defense counsel or defendant. Defendant was not called as a witness. It is counsel's failure to call defendant as a witness or obtain a waiver from defendant that defendant now claims was error on trial counsel's part. Just before the beginning of the second trial, defendant, his counsel, and counsel for *926 the State appeared before the court in response to a motion by the State to endorse an additional witness. The following exchange took place: The case proceeded to trial, at which Nivens testified but defendant did not. Nothing appears of record which indicates whether defendant was to testify or whether he would waive his right to testify. At the postconviction hearing and on appeal to this court, defendant argues simply that he was not given the opportunity to testify, that he wanted to testify, and that under U.S. v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir.1992), a criminal defendant has a fundamental constitutional right to testify in his or her own behalf, which right is personal to the defendant and cannot be waived either by the trial court or by defense counsel. In the present case, counsel for defendant, in addressing the trial court before the taking of evidence in the postconviction proceedings, stated: Teague holds that defense counsel bears the primary responsibility for advising a defendant of his or her right to testify or not to testify, of the strategic implications of each choice, and that the choice is ultimately for the defendant to make. Teague relies on Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), in deciding the case: The first prong of this test requires that defendant show that counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. Where the defendant claims a violation of his right to testify by defense counsel, the essence of the claim is that the action or inaction of the attorney deprived the defendant *927 of the ability to choose whether or not to testify in his own behalf. In other words, by not protecting the defendant's right to testify, defense counsel's performance fell below the constitutional minimum, thereby violating the first prong of the Strickland test. For example, if defense counsel refused to accept the defendant's decision to testify and would not call him to the stand, counsel would have acted unethically to prevent the defendant from exercising his fundamental constitutional right to testify. Alternatively, if defense counsel never informed the defendant of the right to testify, and that the ultimate decision belongs to the defendant, counsel would have neglected the vital professional responsibility of ensuring that the defendant's right to testify is protected and that any waiver of that right is knowing and voluntary. Under such circumstances, defense counsel has not acted "`within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,'" and the defendant clearly has not received reasonably effective assistance of counsel. [Citations omitted.] U.S. v. Teague, 953 F.2d at 1534-35. The factual situation at the first trial as presented here by defendant is simply not correct. The record does not disclose that defendant was advised by his trial counsel not to testify because the State was going to offer evidence of his prior escape. Defendant's trial counsel, Keefe, when questioned by defendant's postconviction counsel, Redman, was asked: According to the presentence investigation report, defendant was sentenced on December 29, 1976, to prison terms of 2 to 5 years on the escape conviction and 15 to 30 months for a burglary conviction. In his testimony, defendant admitted the two prior felony convictions. The two felony convictions quite obviously are the ones about which defendant's trial counsel was concerned. When asked about the proceedings which occurred immediately before the commencement of the second trial, Keefe testified that "[m]y recollection of this hearing was that the prosecutor had filed a motion to endorse [an] additional witness and informed the court that that witness was going to testify to what could be termed prior similar act[s] *928 evidence. Specifically, I believe it was a prior escape." Keefe went on to testify: Keefe's testimony is summed up in the following: At the postconviction hearing, defendant testified regarding the first trial that "it was my understanding that if I testified, then Mr. Keefe explained to me that if I were to testify, the prosecuting attorney could come into court and say to the jury, Fred White has done this before; this, being escape." Of course, according to Keefe, no mention of the attempted use of a prior similar act was discussed until the second trial. Defendant also testified that it was after the second trial had concluded and the defense had rested that he said to Keefe, "Hey, I thought I was going to testify and we discussed it." This was completely contrary to the earlier testimony by Keefe that he had never refused to allow a client to testify who wanted to do so. After discussing in its order the issue of defendant's contention that he was not allowed to testify, the postconviction trial court stated: It is quite apparent that the postconviction trial court determined from the record that the facts were as related by trial counsel, Keefe, and not according to the story that defendant came up with for the first time some 10 or more years after the fact. "In an appeal from a denial of a motion for postconviction relief, the lower court's findings will be upheld unless clearly erroneous. State v. Sanders, 241 Neb. 687, 490 N.W.2d 211 (1992)." State v. Victor, 242 Neb. 306, 309, 494 N.W.2d 565, 568 (1993). The judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. FAHRNBRUCH, J., not participating.