Case Title: Goedert v. Newcastle Equipment Co., Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-68

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-12-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Goedert v. Newcastle Equipment Co., Inc.1990 WY 134802 P.2d 157Case Number: 89-68Decided: 12/05/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
Nicholas GOEDERT, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

NEWCASTLE EQUIPMENT 
COMPANY, INC., 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Campbell County, Timothy J. Judson, J.

Glenn E. Smith 
of Glenn E. Smith & Associates, Cheyenne, and Jon J. LaFleur of LaFleur, 
LaFleur & LaFleur, Rapid City, S.D., for appellant; argument by Mr. 
LaFleur.

Stanley S. 
Sheehan, Gillette, for appellee; argument by Stanley S. 
Sheehan.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J.*, and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1]            
Appellant Nicholas Goedert, the driver of a truck involved in a 
one-vehicle accident, sued Newcastle Equipment Company, Inc. alleging negligence 
in repair of the truck brakes. Trial was to a jury. At the close of plaintiff's 
case, the trial court directed a verdict for defendant Newcastle. Goedert 
appeals, presenting a number of issues for review.

[¶2]      We reverse. 

[¶3]            
Because our reversal rests upon an incorrect denial of benefit of the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and, therefore, an improperly granted directed 
verdict, we do not consider the other issues raised by Goedert.

[¶4]      When reviewing 
the propriety of a directed verdict, we apply the same standard as the trial 
court, giving no deference to that court's decision. Carey v. Jackson, 603 P.2d 868, 877 (Wyo. 1979). We consider all of the evidence favorable to the 
non-moving party and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that 
evidence. Sims v. General Motors Corp., 751 P.2d 357, 361 (Wyo. 1988). We do not 
weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. 751 P.2d  at 361. 
The directed verdict will be sustained if the evidence and inferences drawn 
therefrom inescapably lead reasonable men to conclude that the verdict must be 
against the non-moving party. 751 P.2d  at 361.

Evidence 
Favoring Goedert

[¶5]            
Goedert experienced problems with the brakes on the truck unit of a 
tractor-trailer rig. The truck was taken to Newcastle Equipment Company for 
repair of the brakes. One of Newcastle's employees worked on the brakes. Goedert 
picked up the truck at defendant's repair shop and drove it to a location where 
the trailer was loaded with wood. The first time he started to descend a grade 
with the loaded truck, he attempted to actuate the brakes, but the truck did not 
slow down. He steered into an embankment to stop the truck from being a runaway 
and suffered injury as a result.

[¶6]            
Goedert contends that defendant was negligent in repairing the brakes and 
that the failure of the brakes caused this accident and his injuries. To 
establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show that defendant had a duty to 
the plaintiff, defendant breached his duty, and the breach of duty proximately 
caused injury to plaintiff. Pickle v. Board of County Comm'rs, 764 P.2d 262, 264 
(Wyo. 1988). Therefore, Goedert must establish that Newcastle had a duty to 
repair the brakes to operate properly, that Newcastle failed, that Newcastle 
breached its duty of repair resulting in the brakes not operating properly and 
causing the accident and injury suffered by appellant.

[¶7]      The evidence 
established that Goedert was injured as a result of the truck's brake failure. 
The trial court directed a verdict against Goedert because there was no direct 
evidence of the cause of the brake failure or direct evidence of negligence on 
the part of defendant. Goedert attempted to compensate for this lack of direct 
evidence by invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. If applicable, res ipsa 
loquitur would allow Goedert to substitute an inference that defendant was 
negligent for direct evidence of negligence. This permissive inference is not 
binding on the jury but is sufficient to prevent a directed verdict against a 
plaintiff. The trial court ruled that res ipsa loquitur was not applicable 
because Newcastle did not have "exclusive control" of the truck brakes at the 
time of the failure.

[¶8]      The doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur is a recognition that in some cases it is reasonable to infer 
negligence from circumstantial evidence. Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 238, 
33 S. Ct. 416, 417-18, 57 L. Ed. 815 (1913). The Latin label of "res ipsa 
loquitur," meaning "the thing itself speaks," is attributed to a comment made by 
Chief Baron Pollock in Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng.Rep. 299 
(1863). In that case, a barrel of flour fell from defendant's window and struck 
plaintiff causing injury. Plaintiff sued but was unable to present any 
affirmative evidence of negligent acts by defendant. Defendant argued that 
negligence can never be presumed from the mere occurrence of the event. Chief 
Baron Pollock disagreed, saying that when a man passing in front of the premises 
of a flour dealer is hit by a falling barrel of flour, it is

"apparent that the barrel 
was in the custody of the defendant who occupied the premises, and who is 
responsible for the acts of his servants who had the controul of it; and in my 
opinion the fact of its falling is prima facie evidence of negligence, and the 
plaintiff who was injured by it is not bound to shew that it could not fall 
without negligence, but if there are any facts inconsistent with negligence it 
is for the defendant to prove them." 2 H. & C. at 728.

The comment 
which was to provide the label for a wide variety of subsequent cases was a 
characterization of these facts: "There are certain cases of which it may be 
said res ipsa loquitur, and this seems one of them." 2 H. & C. at 725. The 
subsequent development of a res ipsa loquitur doctrine is chronicled by attempts 
to identify those "certain cases" of which it may be said "the thing itself 
speaks."

[¶9]      In the ensuing 
years the idea that the circumstances of an injury could sometimes be evidence 
of negligence filtered across the Atlantic. Some fifty years later it was 
sufficiently widespread in America for Professor Wigmore to include a discussion 
in the first edition of his treatise on evidence. 4 Wigmore on Evidence § 2509 
(1st ed. 1905). This discussion constitutes one of the bases for the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur in Wyoming. Wigmore discussed res ipsa loquitur in terms of 
shifting to the defendant "the duty of producing evidence."1 4 Wigmore § 2509 at 3557. The 
asserted reason for this shift is that defendant has access to evidence of the 
true cause of the occurrence and plaintiff does not. The logic of this 
assumption is clearer when considered in the original context. Wigmore was 
discussing injuries caused by "powerful machinery, harmless in normal operation, 
but capable of serious human injury if not constructed or managed in a specific 
mode" and the defendant was assumed to be "the owner or manager of the 
apparatus." Id. at 3556. Thus, those who constructed, operated or maintained an 
apparatus were assumed to be in the best position to produce evidence regarding 
the construction, operation and maintenance.

[¶10]            
Wigmore proposed three limits on the application of the 
presumption:

"(1) The apparatus must 
be such that in the ordinary instance no injurious operation is to be expected 
unless from a careless construction, inspection, or user;

"(2) Both inspection and 
user must have been at the time of the injury in the control of the party 
charged;

"(3) The injurious 
occurrence or condition must have happened irrespective of any voluntary action 
at the time by the party injured." 4 Wigmore § 2509, p. 3557.

These three 
considerations became the framework for Wyoming's res ipsa loquitur doctrine. 
The seminal Wyoming case is Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Bunce, 51 Wyo. 1, 62 P.2d 1297 (1936). Justice Riner authored the majority opinion, which quoted 
several different expositions of the doctrine. The first was taken from Justice 
Willis Van Devanter's opinion in San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 
224 U.S. 89, 98, 32 S. Ct. 399, 401, 56 L. Ed. 680 (1912):

"[W]hen a thing which 
causes injury, without fault of the injured person, is shown to be under the 
exclusive control of the defendant, and the injury is such as, in the ordinary 
course of things, does not occur if the one having such control uses proper 
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation, that the 
injury arose from the defendant's want of care."

This language, 
which is adopted from 2 Cooley on Torts § 1424 (3rd ed. 1906), is the source of 
the "exclusive control" language that was combined with Wigmore's three elements 
to determine the outcome of the Stanolind case. The majority found that the 
defendant did not have "exclusive control" because the plaintiff was using the 
device in question, a gas water heater, when it exploded.

[¶11]            
Justice Blume dissented:

"I am not prepared to 
hold that a person injured by an apparatus, which he used in the ordinary way 
with care and for the purpose for which it was intended, cannot, in any case, 
have the benefit of the rule, on the theory that such use leaves the defendant 
without exclusive control of user * * *." 51 Wyo. at 39, 62 P.2d  at 
1309.

Justice Blume 
took the view that defendant had undertaken to provide hot water by use of the 
heater and was, therefore, in control of the heater to the extent contemplated 
by Wigmore. 51 Wyo. at 40, 62 P.2d  at 1309. He argued that the "control" element 
was more important as a means of determining who was in the best position to 
explain the accident rather than as a strict prerequisite for application of res 
ipsa loquitur. Id. When Wigmore next revised his treatise, he agreed, calling 
the Stanolind case, "the leading one to date" on the subject of res ipsa 
loquitur, adding that "the qualification noted by Blume, J., as to exceptional 
modifications of the phrasing of the second above element, should receive 
acceptance." 9 Wigmore on Evidence § 2509, n. 2 at p. 289 (3rd ed. 1940). The 
United States Supreme Court later interpreted the "exclusive control" language 
from San Juan Light & Transit in much the same manner. Jesionowski v. Boston 
& M.R.R., 329 U.S. 452, 456-57, 67 S. Ct. 401, 403-04, 91 L. Ed. 416, 169 
A.L.R. 947 (1947).

[¶12]   This court later explicitly adopted 
Justice Blume's position in Rafferty v. Northern Util. Co., 73 Wyo. 287, 306-07, 
278 P.2d 605, 612 (1955). Rafferty involved a warehouse fire caused by gas 
heaters. Defendant's employee had repaired and adjusted the heaters 
approximately two hours before a fire broke out. There was no evidence that 
anyone else had touched the heaters in the interval between the repair and the 
fire. 73 Wyo. at 296-97, 278 P.2d  at 607. Under these circumstances, 
the

"evidence warranted the 
further implied finding that the unit, even though installed in plaintiff's 
building, still remained within the exclusive control of the defendant by virtue 
of the qualification of the control requirement as heretofore expressed by this 
court and as approved by Wigmore." 73 Wyo. at 307-08, 278 P.2d  at 
612.

The qualified 
nature of the "exclusive control" language was again based on superior knowledge 
rather than actual physical control at the exact moment of the 
injury.

[¶13]   This premise was stated more 
clearly in Hall v. Cody Gas Co., 477 P.2d 585, 586 (Wyo. 1970), where we said 
that:

"The doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur is predicated upon plaintiff's inability to specify the act of 
negligence which caused his injury; he is therefore permitted to rely on the 
doctrine as a substitute for specific proof.

* * * * * *

"* * * if the 
circumstances do not show or suggest that defendant should have superior 
knowledge, or if the plaintiff himself possesses equal or superior means of 
explaining the occurrence, the rule may not properly be invoked."

Conversely, res 
ipsa loquitur may properly be invoked when circumstances do show or suggest that 
defendant has superior knowledge or means of explaining the 
occurrence.

[¶14]   The circumstances of this case are 
similar to those in Rafferty. In both cases, repair work was performed by 
defendant on an apparatus which appeared to function normally for a period of 
time before malfunctioning and causing an injury. In both cases there was no 
evidence of any tampering or interference with the apparatus between the time of 
repair and the time of failure. In both cases the defendant was in a superior 
position to explain what was physically done to the apparatus at the time of 
repair.

[¶15]            
Newcastle argues that the truck had been operated for approximately 13 
hours before the brake failure, and the successful application of the brakes 
during that period precludes any inference that the brakes were negligently 
repaired. The evidence, however, was that the brakes failed on their first 
application after the truck was loaded, and evidence was presented that the 
weight of a load would affect the ability of the truck to stop. While we 
recognize that the potential for intervening factors increases with increasing 
time and distance, we are unwilling to say in this case that the time between 
the repair and the failure is so long that it precludes an inference that the 
two events are related.

[¶16]   We have held that a motion for a 
directed verdict should be cautiously and sparingly granted because it deprives 
the parties of a determination of the facts by a jury. See, e.g., Cody v. 
Atkins, 658 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo. 1983). The question presented here is whether it 
is reasonable to infer negligence in repair when a mechanism fails shortly after 
it has ostensibly been repaired. In this case res ipsa loquitur applies. A 
reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence favorable to the plaintiff 
that defendant was negligent in repairing the brakes. When we consider that 
inference together with the evidence in this case, a directed verdict for 
defendant is precluded.

[¶17]            
Reversed and remanded.

THOMAS, 
J., 
filed a dissenting opinion.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶18]   I must dissent from the application 
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur by the majority in this case. Rather 
than applying that rule of law, the majority clearly extends it beyond the realm 
of justification. It is my perception that the majority would permit the jury to 
presume negligence from the happening of the accident and invoke conjecture as 
the basis of liability. That approach contravenes a well established principle 
found in the decisions of this court. DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986); 
Mellor v. Ten Sleep Cattle Company, 550 P.2d 500 (Wyo. 1976); Apperson v. Kay, 
546 P.2d 995 (Wyo. 1976); Jivelekas v. City of Worland, 546 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 
1976); Elite Cleaners & Tailors, Inc. v. Gentry, 510 P.2d 784 (Wyo. 
1973).

[¶19]   The reliance by the majority on 
Rafferty v. Northern Utilities Company, 73 Wyo. 287, 278 P.2d 605 (1955), is 
misplaced when one recognizes the clear limitation upon the operative facts of 
that case as described by this language:

"The same may be said in 
this case, for this plaintiff was shown to have done absolutely nothing to 
interfere in any way with the functioning of the unit after it was placed in 
automatic operation by the defendant's employee." Rafferty, 73 Wyo. at 308, 278 P.2d  at 612.

This quoted 
language follows immediately after a statement by the court that the plaintiff's 
conduct had no more legal significance than that of an innocent bystander. The 
distinction of the facts, and the involvement of the plaintiff, in Rafferty from 
the facts, and the involvement of Goedert, in this case is apparent to any 
casual reader. Goedert, and not Newcastle Equipment Co., Inc., had exclusive 
control over the tractor trailer for at least thirteen hours immediately prior 
to the accident.

[¶20]   The majority also finds support for 
its holding in the separate opinion of Justice Blume in Stanolind Oil & Gas 
Company v. Bunce, 51 Wyo. 1, 62 P.2d 1297 (1936). My interpretation of Justice 
Blume's opinion in that case is that he would have invoked a theory of strict 
liability to justify the reliance by the jury on res ipsa loquitur in finding 
for the plaintiff. However visionary Justice Blume's approach may be perceived, 
his view is not the law in Stanolind and it does not fit Goedert's theory in 
this case.

[¶21]   In Stanolind, the majority adopted 
the statement of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur from 5 D. Wigmore, Wigmore on 
Evidence § 2509 (2d ed. 1923):

"`(1) The apparatus must 
be such that in the ordinary instance no injurious operation is to be expected 
unless from a careless construction, inspection, or user; (2) Both inspection 
and user must have been at the time of the injury in the control of the party 
charged; (3) The injurious occurrence or condition must have happened 
irrespective of any voluntary action at the time by the party injured.'" 
Stanolind, 51 Wyo. at 21, 62 P.2d  at 1301-02.

The majority 
opinion then held that the circumstances did not fit either the second or third 
requirements of the rule as stated. The second requirement has been maintained 
in the law of this state up until this decision. Wood v. Geis Trucking Company, 
639 P.2d 903 (Wyo. 1982); Langdon v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation, 494 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 1972); Hall v. Cody Gas Company, 477 P.2d 585 (Wyo. 1970); Sayre v. 
Allemand, 418 P.2d 1006 (Wyo. 1966); North Central Gas Company v. Bloem, 376 P.2d 382 (1962).

[¶22]   I close by noting from the majority 
opinion that the justification offered by Wigmore for shifting the duty of 
producing evidence is that the defendant has access to evidence of the true 
cause of the occurrence and the plaintiff does not. In the majority opinion, it 
is explained that Wigmore assumed the defendant to be the owner or manager of 
the apparatus. Later, the majority alludes to the assertion by Justice Blume 
that the "control" element is more important as a means of determining who was 
in the best position to explain the accident rather than as a requirement to 
invoke the doctrine. The utility of these justifications for the doctrine in a 
situation in which the plaintiff was operating the apparatus at the time of the 
injury and it was in fact owned by someone other than the defendant somehow 
escapes me. Goedert had equivalent, if not better, access to evidence of the 
cause of the occurrence as did Newcastle Equipment Co., Inc. In such an 
instance, the control requirement should not be overlooked simply to shift to a 
defendant the burden of proving he was not negligent rather than maintaining the 
burden of the plaintiff to establish his claim.

[¶23]   I would affirm the order of the 
district court granting the directed verdict.

 FOOTNOTES

1 While Wigmore originally 
used the word "presumption," in Wyoming the effect of applying res ipsa loquitur 
is to raise a permissible inference rather than a legal presumption. Stanolind 
Oil & Gas Co. v. Bunce, 51 Wyo. 1, 37, 62 P.2d 1297, 1308 (1936) (Kimball, 
C.J., concurring).