Case Title: Dailey v. State

Citation: 470 S.W.2d 608

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1971-09-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
470 S.W.2d 608 (1971) Gary William DAILEY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Tennessee, Respondent. Supreme Court of Tennessee. September 7, 1971. Edward C. Freeman, Knoxville, for petitioner. David M. Pack, Atty. Gen., Lance D. Evans, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Heiskell H. Winstead, Dist. Atty. Gen., Rogersville, for respondent. DYER, Chief Justice. This case presents the issue of whether Chapter 475, Section 1, Public Acts of 1970, amending T.C.A. § 27-111, operates retrospectively. This statute which became effective February 20, 1970, reads as follows: Petitioner, while represented by retained counsel, was convicted of malicious shooting. The motion for a new trial was overruled on April 22, 1969, and ninety days allowed to prepare and file the bill of exceptions. On July 14, 1969, after a hearing, the trial court found petitioner to be indigent and in accord with such finding appointed counsel to represent petitioner on appeal and directed the bill of exceptions to be prepared at the expense of the State. The bill of exceptions was prepared and promptly authenticated and filed on July 22, 1969, one day past the ninety days allowed for such filing. The Court of Criminal Appeals held the bill of exceptions having been filed late could not be considered, and examining only the technical record affirmed the judgment. On the issue of a statute operating retrospectively, this Court in Collins v. East Tenn., Va. & Ga. Railroad Co., 56 Tenn. 841 (1872), said: In Dowlen v. Fitch, 196 Tenn. 206, 264 S.W.2d 824, 266 S.W.2d 357 (1954), the Court on this issue cited with approval the language from 50 Am.Jur., § 482, as follows: In Brandon v. Warmath, 198 Tenn. 38, 277 S.W.2d 408 (1955), this Court held a statute remedial in nature applied to an action pending at the time the statute was enacted. Under T.C.A. § 27-111, prior to this 1970 amendment, this Court had consistently held a bill of exceptions not filed within the time limitations set out in the statute was, in effect, a nullity and could not be considered on appeal. This 1970 amendment, applicable only to criminal cases, simply empowers the appellate courts to order the filing of a bill of exceptions without regard to time limitations. As stated in Collins v. East Tenn., Va. & Ga. Railroad Co., supra, the effect of such amendment is to "remove an impediment in the way of judicial proceedings." In the case at bar an impediment is the right of full appellate review. The statute in no way creates any new rights nor does it take away any vested rights. The factual situation existing prior to and at the time of the enactment of this 1970 amendment is indicative of the legislative intent that this amending statute operate as remedial legislation. The United States Supreme Court, in opinions released prior to this 1970 amendment *610 to T.C.A. § 27-111, held that any time a defendant was denied full appellate review due to "state action" such was error requiring a new trial. The failure to timely file bills of exceptions in cases involving indigent defendants, denying such defendants a full appellate review, was deemed to be the result of "state action." This generally resulted in the indigent defendant so denied his full appellate review filing a post-conviction proceeding to have the judgment against him declared void and being successful the State was required to again put him to trial. This resulted in three separate proceedings when, in most cases, one should have been sufficient, which not only put the State to extra expense, but further clogged the already clogged appellate and trial court dockets. These were substantially the facts when the Legislature enacted this 1970 amendment, and it is obvious such was intended to remedy this situation. A remedial statute should be liberally construed in furtherance of its purpose. Bryant v. Mulder, 163 Tenn. 600, 45 S.W.2d 48 (1932). We hold this 1970 amendment to T.C.A. § 27-111 is remedial legislation operating retrospectively. The statute empowers the appellate courts, exercising their discretion, to order the filing of a late bill of exceptions for good cause shown on motion of the defendant or the State, and in the interest of justice by the court on its own motion. In the case at bar we order the bill of exceptions filed to give the appellate court jurisdiction. The case was not considered by the Court of Criminal Appeals on its merits and for this purpose the cause is remanded to the Court of Criminal Appeals. CRESON and McCANLESS, JJ., and McAMIS and JENKINS, Special Justices, concur.