Case Title: State ex rel. Pizza v. Rezcallah

Citation: 1998-Ohio-313

Docket Number: 19961894

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. PIZZA, PROS. ATTY., APPELLANT, v. REZCALLAH, APPELLEE. 
THE STATE EX REL. PIZZA, PROS. ATTY., APPELLANT, V. TERRELL, APPELLEE. 
THE STATE EX REL. PIZZA, PROS. ATTY., APPELLANT, V. GONZALES, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Pizza v. Rezcallah (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 116.] 
Torts — Nuisances — R.C. 3767.02, construed — R.C. 3767.06(A) violates 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause of the United States Constitution and Section 19, Article I of the 
Ohio Constitution, when. 
1. 
R.C. 3767.02 does not require proof of knowledge of, acquiescence to, or 
participation in the creation or perpetuation of a nuisance in order to find an 
owner of a nuisance guilty of the civil offense of “maintaining a nuisance.” 
2. 
To the extent that R.C. 3767.06(A) requires a trial court, upon a finding of a 
nuisance, to issue an injunction closing property against its use for any 
purpose for one year, and to the extent that it allows release from such 
injunction only through the filing or renewal of a bond in the full value of 
the property, the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause and the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause of the United States 
Constitution, and Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, when 
applied to an owner who did not negligently or knowingly acquiesce to, and 
did not participate in the creation or perpetuation of the nuisance.  (Lindsay 
v. Cincinnati [1961], 172 Ohio St. 137, 15 O.O.2d 278, 174 N.E.2d 96, 
overruled.) 
(Nos. 96-1894, 96-1895 and 96-1897 — Submitted October 8, 1997 — Decided 
December 9, 1998.) 
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, Nos. L-95-298, L-95-362 
and L-95-363. 
 
2
 
Three cases have been consolidated in this matter.  The facts of each case 
are as follows: 
Case No. 96-1894 
 
Defendant-appellee Mary Rezcallah owns a residence at 1137½ N. Erie 
Street in Toledo.  She rented this residence to Heather Anderson during all times 
relevant to the case. 
 
The Toledo police began surveillance on the property in September 1995.  
The investigation culminated in the purchase of $20 of suspected crack cocaine 
(through the use of a confidential informant).  A subsequent search on October 2, 
1995 resulted in the seizure of $726, plastic baggies tied together, a scale, and 
razor blades. 
 
The following day, police mailed a letter to Rezcallah, informing her of the 
illegal drug activities at the residence.  Rezcallah did not receive this letter until 
October 13, 1995.  However, in the meantime, a neighbor told Rezcallah that 
police had been to the house.  Rezcallah went to the premises to discuss the matter 
with Anderson, who told Rezcallah that the police had found “nothing” during the 
search. 
 
Rezcallah contacted the police October 4, 1995, and was informed that no 
arrests were made but that some might be forthcoming.  Rezcallah also twice 
attempted to obtain a copy of the police report pertaining to the premises.  She was 
told the report was not ready or could not be found. 
 
Police again conducted surveillance on the residence, and on October 10, 
1995 purchased $20 worth of suspected cocaine at the residence.  On October 13, 
Rezcallah received the police report the police had sent regarding the first 
investigation.  On the same day, Rezcallah met with her attorney and prepared 
 
3
eviction papers.  The eviction notice was served on Anderson on October 16 with 
a required departure date of October 19. 
 
On the 19th, the day Anderson was required to vacate the premises, the 
police executed a second search warrant, seizing 23.17 grams of crack cocaine, 
$316, plastic baggies, razor blades, a phony pop can, and an Ameritech caller 
identification instrument.  On the same day, the state filed a Complaint to Abate a 
Nuisance against Rezcallah, and the trial court issued a temporary restraining 
order allowing the premises to be padlocked by the police.1 
 
The state requested preliminary and permanent injunctions.  On October 31, 
1995, the court entered judgment in favor of Rezcallah on the injunctions and 
dismissed the complaint in its entirety.  In so doing, the court held that in order to 
obtain an abatement order pursuant to R.C. 3719.10 and 3767.02, it is necessary 
for the state to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the owner had 
knowledge of and either acquiesced to or participated in the nuisance.  The Sixth 
District Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Case No. 96-1895 
 
Defendant-appellee Gilbert Terrell owns the property at 1315 Ironwood 
Avenue in Toledo.  At all times relevant to this case, Julius Jones was an occupant 
and uninvited user of that residence. 
 
Terrell invited Jones to live at his residence in August 1994.  After one 
month, however, Terrell took his house key from Jones and asked him to leave.  
Jones did leave but kept returning to the house and breaking in when Terrell was 
not there.  Terrell continuously filed criminal charges against Jones for breaking 
into his residence, installed an alarm system (which was stolen following the first 
police search), and reported Jones’s illegal activities in an attempt to get him 
removed from the premises. 
 
4
 
Terrell was not able to permanently remove Jones from the premises and 
prior to the first police search had abandoned the residence, leaving it to Jones. 
 
In February 1995, Toledo Police Detective Jerry Gears received a complaint 
from an anonymous caller who informed him that drug sales were occurring at the 
Ironwood residence.  Terrell had also reported Jones’s illegal activities to the 
police both in person and over the phone.  Based on these tips, the police had 
confidential informants purchase crack cocaine from the house on February 20 and 
March 7, 1995.  The Toledo police executed a search warrant at the residence on 
March 12, 1995.  The evidence they seized included forty-eight pieces of crack 
cocaine, one automatic revolver, cash, an Ohio driver’s license, five shotgun 
shells, five or six .38 caliber shells, and two digital scales. 
 
Jones was arrested at the scene and was charged with aggravated trafficking, 
though he was never convicted.  Terrell was not present at the residence when the 
search warrant was executed. 
 
Following this arrest Jones’s illegal activities continued and Terrell again 
reported Jones to the Toledo police.  Based upon the information supplied by 
Terrell, the police, using an informant, purchased $20 of crack cocaine from the 
residence.  Based upon that purchase, the Toledo police executed a second search 
warrant on the premises on May 22, 1995.  They seized crack cocaine weighing 
2.2 grams.  Jones again was present, and was arrested and charged with third-
degree felony drug abuse.  He was never convicted.  Terrell was not present at the 
residence at the time of the search. 
 
It is undisputed that Terrell assisted police in their investigation of the 
illegal activity at the residence.  He contacted the police both in person and by 
telephone to inform them that drug activities were occurring at the residence. 
 
5
 
The trial court issued a temporary injunction, finding the residence to be a 
nuisance.  The police padlocked the premises. 
 
Following a hearing on the issuance of a permanent injunction, the trial 
court entered judgment dissolving the preliminary injunction, ordering removal of 
the padlock, and denying the state’s motion for permanent injunction.  The trial 
court found that Terrell had fully cooperated with the police in abating the 
nuisance, and that he had not acquiesced to or participated in felony drug sales on 
the property.  The Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial 
court. 
Case No. 96-1897 
 
Defendant-appellee Teresa Gonzales (now Boardman) owns the property at 
953 Butler Street in Toledo.  Her brother, John Kochanski, was the occupant of 
that residence at all times relevant to this case. 
 
Toledo police executed a search warrant on the residence on April 15, 1994, 
after a telephone complaint about drug sales, surveillance, and a purchase of $20 
of crack cocaine from the residence by a confidential informant.  The police seized 
marijuana, two crack pipes and another item of drug paraphernalia, and a 
telephone bill.  Kochanski, at the time of the search, was arrested on charges of 
drug abuse and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
 
On September 10, 1994, following another complaint by neighbors and 
further surveillance, an undercover officer made two purchases of crack cocaine 
from the residence.  Kochanski was present at, and orchestrated, both sales.  Based 
upon the sales, Kochanski was arrested on two counts of aggravated trafficking.  
Two of Kochanski’s cohorts, Keith Douglas and Tammy Holder, were also 
arrested, and a third, Regina Williams, was indicted, all on charges of aggravated 
trafficking.  Gonzales was never present for any drug sales. 
 
6
 
Detective Delaney sent a letter dated April 22, 1994 to the residence, 
addressed to Gonzales, to notify her that drug sales were occurring on her property 
and what the consequences would be should the activities continue.  Gonzales 
testified that she never saw the letter, and that she did not learn of the execution of 
the search warrant until June 1994.  At that time she warned Kochanski that she 
would evict him if there was another incident.  Gonzales also testified that she did 
not know of the September 1994 arrests, and that she never visited the residence 
after the execution of the search warrant on April 15, 1994.  Detective Delaney 
testified that the residence had the reputation of being a crack house. 
 
The state subsequently filed a Complaint to Abate a Nuisance pursuant to 
R.C. Chapter 3767.  The trial court entered judgment in favor of Gonzales.  The 
Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. 
 
The cases are before this court upon the allowance of discretionary appeals. 
__________________ 
 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, Steven J. Papadimos 
and Bertrand R. Puligandla, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. 
 
Barkan & Robon and Cynthia G. Tesznar, for appellee Mary Rezcallah. 
 
Gilbert Terrell, pro se. 
 
Wesley M. Miller, Jr., for appellee Teresa Gonzales. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, 
and Simon B. Karas, Assistant Attorney General, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae, Ohio Attorney General. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J.  In each of the three cases before us a non-owner resident was 
arrested for conduct that violated felony drug laws while occupying residential 
property owned by one of the appellees herein.  In all three cases, it is undisputed 
 
7
that the appellee property owners neither acquiesced to nor participated in the drug 
activities that took place on their property. Further, the record indicates that all 
three owners acted in good faith, taking affirmative action to investigate 
allegations and to remove the offending residents upon discovering the illegal 
activity.  The state nonetheless filed a Complaint to Abate a Nuisance, pursuant to 
R.C. Chapter 3767, against each owner. 
 
Two questions are presented.  First, we must determine whether R.C. 
3767.02 requires a finding of acquiescence to or participation in the establishment 
or perpetuation of a nuisance as a necessary element in a civil action against a 
property owner for maintaining a nuisance.  Second, we must determine whether, 
in the absence of such a requirement, the enforcement of the nuisance abatement 
statutes of R.C. Chapter 3767 against an innocent property owner is constitutional. 
 
In answering the first question, we hold that R.C. 3767.02 does not require a 
finding of acquiescence to or participation in the creation or perpetuation of a 
nuisance on an owner’s property in order to find an owner guilty of maintaining a 
nuisance.  As to the second question, we hold that to the extent that R.C. 
3767.06(A) requires a trial court, upon a finding of a nuisance, to issue an 
injunction closing property against its use for any purpose for one year, and to the 
extent that it allows release from such injunction only through the filing or 
renewal of a bond in the full value of the property, the statute violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause of the United States Constitution, and Section 19, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution, when applied to an owner who did not negligently or knowingly 
acquiesce to, and did not participate in the creation or perpetuation of the 
nuisance. 
I 
 
8
Statutory Scheme 
 
R.C. 3767.02 provides that “[a]ny person who uses, occupies, establishes, or 
conducts a nuisance * * *, and the owner * * * of any interest in such nuisance * * 
* is guilty of maintaining a nuisance and shall be enjoined as provided in sections 
3767.03 to 3767.06, inclusive, of the Revised Code.”  (Emphasis added.)  A 
nuisance can be proven either by admission or establishment in a civil action as 
provided for in R.C. 3767.03, or by a finding of guilt in a criminal action that 
establishes a nuisance.  R.C. 3767.06; 3767.11. 
 
Further, R.C. 3719.10 provides that “[p]remises or real estate, including 
vacant land, on which a felony violation of Chapter 2925. [criminal drug offenses] 
or 3719. [Uniform Controlled Substances Act] of the Revised Code occurs 
constitute a nuisance subject to abatement pursuant to Chapter 3767. of the 
Revised Code.” 
 
Whenever a nuisance is thought to exist, an action may be brought under 
R.C. 3767.03 “to abate the nuisance and to perpetually enjoin the person 
maintaining the nuisance from further maintaining it.”  At the same time, the 
complainant may file an application for a temporary injunction pursuant to R.C. 
3767.04.  If, following a hearing, the judge is satisfied that the allegations of the 
complaint are sustained, and unless the owner or person in control of the nuisance 
has satisfied the court that the nuisance has been abated or that the owner acted 
immediately to enforce his or her rights under R.C. 3767.10,2 the court shall issue 
an order closing the place against its use for any purpose of “lewdness, 
assignation, prostitution, or other prohibited conduct” until a final decision has 
been reached on the complaint.  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 3767.04(B)(3). 
 
The scope of this temporary closure order is limited to the prevention of 
prohibited activity and does not authorize the court to order an “effectual closing * 
 
9
* * against its use for any purpose” (R.C. 3767.06[A] ) via padlocking or 
otherwise.  Even if the conditions for issuance of a temporary closure order have 
been met, the court may refrain from entering a closure order or may discharge an 
order already entered if the owner posts a bond for the full value of the property 
and fulfills the other requirements listed in R.C. 3767.04(C). 
 
Thereafter, the existence of a nuisance is to be determined “upon the trial of 
[a] civil action,” and, if the existence of a nuisance is admitted or established in 
that civil action, the court “shall” enter judgment that “perpetually enjoins the 
defendant and any other person from further maintaining the nuisance at the place 
complained of and the defendant from maintaining the nuisance elsewhere.”  R.C. 
3767.05(D).  R.C. 3767.06(A) also requires that “an order of abatement shall be 
included in the judgment entry.”  Because both R.C. 3767.05(D) and 3767.06(A) 
use the imperative word “shall,” these provisions are deemed mandatory. 
 
Pursuant to R.C. 3767.06(A), where the owner has not provided a bond 
prior to the trial on the merits, and where no prior closure order was issued against 
use of the property, the order also “shall” direct closure of the real property against 
use for any purpose for one year.  R.C. 3767.06(A) reads in part:  “The order also 
shall require the renewal for one year of any bond furnished by the owner of the 
real property under section 3767.04 of the Revised Code; if a bond was not so 
furnished, shall continue for one year any closing order issued at the time of 
granting the temporary injunction; or, if a closing order was not then issued, shall 
include an order directing the effectual closing of the place where the nuisance is 
found to exist against its use for any purpose and keeping it closed for a period of 
one year unless sooner released.” 
 
Whenever a permanent injunction issues against an owner of real property 
for maintaining a nuisance, a three hundred dollar tax shall also be imposed.  R.C. 
 
10
3767.08.  The tax, however, may not be imposed if at the time the permanent 
injunction is issued, the owner satisfies the court that the nuisance complained of 
has been permanently abated.  R.C. 3767.08. 
II 
Statutory Interpretation 
 
R.C. 3767.02, which defines the offense of maintaining a nuisance, is clear 
and unambiguous and does not include a requirement of knowledge, acquiescence, 
or participation on the part of an owner of the property deemed to be a nuisance.  
We thus hold that R.C. 3767.02 does not require proof of acquiescence to or 
participation in the creation of a nuisance or the conduct constituting a nuisance in 
order to find an owner of a nuisance guilty of the civil offense of  “maintaining a 
nuisance.” 
 
Proof of an owner’s knowledge, acquiescence, or participation is relevant, 
however, in determining which statutory remedies may be imposed once the owner 
is found guilty of maintaining a nuisance.  Because R.C. Chapter 3767 provides 
exceptions to the imposition of a temporary closing order at the preliminary 
injunction stage, and prevents imposition of a tax against property owners who 
have abated the nuisance prior to the completion of the civil action, these remedies 
may not be applied against an innocent owner who has acted in good faith and has 
abated the nuisance prior to the commencement of the civil action. 
 
To the contrary, the provisions of R.C. 3767.06 provide no exceptions by 
which a good-faith owner of real property may avoid an order of abatement, a 
permanent injunction against further maintaining the nuisance, or either the 
continuance of a closure order already in effect or a mandatory one-year “effectual 
closing” of property against all uses where no bond was previously provided by 
the owner and no prior closure order was issued.  Under the statutory scheme these 
 
11
orders must issue irrespective of whether a defendant property owner acquiesced 
to or participated in the creation or perpetuation of the nuisance and irrespective of 
whether the nuisance has been abated. 
 
We have previously held that “it would be inappropriate to balance the 
equities or require the [state] to do equity in [a statutory] * * * injunction action 
because * * * injunctions which authorize a governmental agent to sue to enjoin 
activities deemed harmful by the General Assembly are not designed primarily to 
do justice to the parties but to prevent harm to the general public.”  Ackerman v. 
Tri-City Geriatric & Health Care (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 51, 57, 9 O.O.3d 62, 66, 
378 N.E.2d 145, 149.  Ackerman clearly states that “statutory injunctions should 
issue if the statutory requirements are fulfilled.”  Id. at 57, 9 O.O.3d at 66, 378 
N.E.2d at 149. 
 
Accordingly, the trial courts in the cases before us erred in dismissing the 
complaints alleging maintenance of a nuisance on the grounds that the state was 
unable to prove that the owners had knowledge of, acquiesced to, or participated 
in a nuisance on their property.  The General Assembly has provided that if a 
nuisance, as defined in R.C. 3719.10 or 3767.01(C), was admitted or established 
under R.C. 3767.11 or 3767.03, the courts were statutorily required to enter a 
judgment entry, including an order of abatement and a permanent injunction 
against the owners irrespective of their degree of culpability in the creation or 
perpetuation of the nuisance. 
 
As discussed below, however, we hold that the imposition of a mandatory 
closure order pursuant to R.C. 3767.06(A) would be unconstitutional as applied to 
these defendants. 
III 
Constitutionality of R.C. Chapter 3767 — Federal Constitution 
 
12
 
We find no constitutional infirmity in those portions of R.C. Chapter 3767 
that grant the court discretion in the imposition of various remedies.  We further 
find that there is no constitutional bar to the mandatory imposition of an abatement 
order or a permanent injunction barring the defendant from “further maintaining 
the nuisance at the place complained of” pursuant to R.C. 3767.05(D) and 
3767.06.  However, to the extent that R.C. 3767.06(A) mandates the imposition of 
a closure order directing the effectual closing of the place where a nuisance is 
found to exist against its use for any purpose for a period of one year, or requires 
the filing or renewal of a bond in lieu of such a closure order, when the owner of 
the property bears no culpable responsibility in the nature of acquiescence to or 
participation in the creation or perpetuation of the nuisance, the statute violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause of the United States Constitution, and Section 19, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
 
It bears emphasis that R.C. 3767.06(A) mandates the issuance of an order 
directing the closure of property upon which a nuisance has been maintained 
against its use for any purpose.  The statute does not allow for judicial discretion 
in the imposition of the order, nor does it require proof of any knowledge or 
culpability on the part of the property owner before it may be imposed.  Release 
from the closure order may be obtained only where the owner files a bond for the 
full value of the property, and pays all costs, and the owner immediately abates the 
nuisance, and if the court is satisfied of the owner’s good faith. R.C. 3767.04(C). 
 
A forfeiture is “a divestiture of specific property without compensation; it 
imposes a loss by the taking away of some preexisting valid right without 
compensation.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 650.  An order to close 
property “against its use for any purpose,” as mandated by R.C. 3767.06(A), 
 
13
renders the owner’s property economically idle for a year.  In Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council (1992), 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2895, 120 
L.Ed.2d 798, 815, the court noted that “when the owner of real property has been 
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the 
common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a 
taking.”  (Emphasis in original.)  The fact that the order is of limited duration does 
not change this conclusion.  It is well established that the Constitution protects 
against temporary takings just as it does against permanent takings.  First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of Los Angeles (1987), 482 U.S. 
304, 318, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2388, 96 L.Ed.2d 250, 266. 
 
Nor is the closure-order provision saved from constitutional infirmity by the 
availability of judicial release through the filing of a bond in the full value of the 
property.  Deprivation of the use of resources equal to the value of the property is 
as much a taking as is deprivation of the use of the property itself.  Further, as 
argued by appellee Rezcallah, an innocent owner defendant may often be 
financially incapable of filing such a bond.  Accordingly, we hold that padlocking 
an owner’s property, effectively closing it against all uses for a year, is a taking, 
albeit temporary in nature.  The constitutional analysis therefore is the same for 
seizures resulting in a temporary closure order as it is for those resulting in a 
permanent forfeiture.  See id. 
 
We acknowledge that not all forfeitures or temporary takings without 
compensation are constitutionally infirm.  The United States Supreme Court has 
held in a long line of cases that a state may use its police power to enjoin a 
property owner from activities akin to public nuisances without offending either 
the Due Process or Takings Clause.  This court has also upheld the validity of 
forfeitures and closure orders resulting from nuisance abatement actions.  
 
14
However, we find these Ohio cases to be of limited usefulness in determining the 
issues now before us. 
 
In Gabriel Bldg. Co.  v. State ex rel. Birrell (1932), 125 Ohio St. 642, 186 
N.E. 5, we upheld similar closure provisions against federal constitutional 
challenges.  Gabriel, however, is not controlling here because there is no 
indication that Gabriel involved a padlock order imposed against an innocent or 
good-faith owner of property.  Similarly, State ex rel. Miller v. Anthony (1995), 72 
Ohio St.3d 132, 647 N.E.2d 1368, is not controlling because the owner in that case 
created the nuisance by selling drugs from his own residence. 
 
In Lindsay v. Cincinnati  (1961), 172 Ohio St. 137, 15 O.O.2d 278, 174 
N.E.2d 96, we decided a case which did involve the forfeiture of an innocent 
owner’s property.  However, upon reviewing that decision, we now reject its 
reasoning, and overrule it. 
 
In Lindsay, the court relied on a misinterpretation of the earlier United 
States Supreme Court decision in Grosfield v. United States  (1928), 276 U.S. 494, 
48 S.Ct. 329, 72 L.Ed. 670.  In Lindsay, the court incorrectly determined that 
“[t]he constitutionality of such statutory provisions has been upheld by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Grosfield v. United States * * * which was 
followed in Gabriel * * *.”  Lindsay at 141, 15 O.O.2d at 280, 174 N.E.2d at 99. 
 
We reject this rationale for two reasons.  First, Grosfield was based on an 
assumption that the padlocking order affecting the property was not imposed upon 
an “innocent” owner.  Second, the court in Grosfield did not decide the 
constitutionality of the federal statute before it. 
 
The court in Grosfield specifically stated that “[t]he only question for our 
consideration is whether the evidence submitted to the district court is sufficient to 
justify the [padlock order].”  Grosfield, 276 U.S. at 496, 48 S.Ct. at 330, 72 L.Ed. 
 
15
at 671.  The court repeatedly emphasized that its decision was limited to the facts 
before it, and based its holding on a determination that there was sufficient 
evidence to support a finding of knowledge and acquiescence on the part of the 
property owner, and that the owner failed to take prompt action to abate the 
nuisance.  Grosfield at 498-499, 48 S.Ct. at 331, 72 L.Ed. at 672. 
 
Moreover, even under those facts, the Grosfield court limited its affirmance 
of the padlock order to situations where “the evidence furnish[es] reasonable 
ground for apprehending a repetition of such use.”  Grosfield at 498, 48 S.Ct. at 
331, 72 L.Ed. at 672.  Thus, Lindsay’s reliance on Grosfield in upholding the 
constitutionality of a forfeiture imposed against an innocent owner is misplaced.  
Consequently, we overrule Lindsay and look directly to precedent established by 
the United States Supreme Court. 
 
The law regarding seizures and forfeitures of property has received growing 
judicial attention in recent years, based, at least in part, on its increased 
governmental use.  Though the federal courts have upheld forfeiture statutes even 
as applied to innocent owners in a variety of contexts, they have also consistently 
recognized in dicta or by express reservation of comment that there are factual 
situations in which forfeitures exercised against innocent owners will be held to 
violate constitutional standards.  We believe that the three cases before us present 
such facts, and the application of the “effectual closing” provision of R.C. 
3767.06(A) under these circumstances would constitute an unconstitutional 
seizure and forfeiture of property in violation of the federal Takings Clause and 
Due Process Clause. 
 
One of the questions that has been continually reserved in recent cases is 
whether it would be constitutionally permissible to seize property when the owner 
is without fault and did not consent to any use of the property by the offending 
 
16
third party.  Though the question has not been addressed by recent cases, the 
United States Supreme Court held in Peisch v. Ware (1808), 8 U.S. 347 (4 Cranch 
347), 2 L.Ed. 643, that trespassers’ acts cannot serve as  the basis for a valid 
forfeiture of goods “[i]f, by private theft, or open robbery, without any fault on his 
[owner’s] part, his property should be invaded * * *.”  Id. at 364, 2 L.Ed. at 648.  
This principle has been reinforced in dicta in more recent forfeiture cases.  See, 
e.g., Austin v. United States (1993), 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 
488. 
 
We follow the dictates of Peisch and hold that it is dispositive in one of the 
three cases before us.  In case No. 96-1895, State ex rel. Pizza v. Gilbert Terrell, a 
criminal trespasser invaded the defendant’s property and used that property to 
conduct illegal activities.  The owner was without fault and did not consent to any 
use of his property by the third-party trespasser. 
 
While Peisch is dispositive in Terrell’s case, we must look further to 
determine the constitutionality of applying R.C. 3767.06(A) to Gonzales and 
Rezcallah.  Both Gonzales and Rezcallah consented to some use of their property 
by the offending third party, though they did not acquiesce to or participate in the 
specific use that created the nuisance. 
 
In all three cases, the state relied on Bennis v. Michigan  (1996), 516 U.S. 
442, 116 S.Ct. 994, 134 L.Ed.2d 68, a recently decided United States Supreme 
Court decision, in support of its contention that all provisions of R.C. Chapter 
3767 are constitutional even as applied to innocent or good-faith property owners.  
In Bennis, the court upheld the forfeiture of a vehicle owned by John Bennis and 
his wife.  The vehicle had been used as the site of lewd activities between Bennis 
and a prostitute.  Mrs. Bennis, a wholly innocent party, and co-owner of the 
vehicle, challenged the constitutionality of the taking of her interest in the 
 
17
property by the state of Michigan without compensation.  The court held that the 
Michigan abatement statute, which commanded the forfeiture of vehicles deemed 
to constitute a nuisance regardless of the owner’s knowledge of or acquiescence in 
the conduct creating  the nuisance, did not violate the due process provisions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, nor did not it constitute a taking of private property 
for public use without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
 
Our analysis of the decision in Bennis causes us to conclude that it is not 
controlling in the cases before us, for the following reasons: 
 
1. 
Mrs. Bennis conceded that the car she owned with her husband was 
subject to forfeiture.  She argued only that she should be compensated for her 
interest.  Thus, the court was not required to evaluate the propriety of the 
forfeiture itself.  See Bennis at  453, 116 S.Ct. at 1001, 134 L.Ed.2d at 79 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 
2. 
In Bennis, the court emphasized that the Michigan nuisance 
abatement proceedings were equitable in nature, and that the trial court had 
discretion to implement, or refuse to implement a forfeiture in any given case.  Id. 
at 452, 116 S.Ct. at 1000, 134 L.Ed.2d at 78; see, also, Bennis at 457-458, 116 
S.Ct. at 1003, 134 L.Ed.2d at 82 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)  (“[T]he [Michigan] 
Supreme Court stands ready to police exorbitant applications of the statute.  * * * 
Michigan, in short, has not embarked on an experiment to punish innocent third 
parties.  Nor do we condone any such experiment.”  [Citations omitted.]). 
 
R.C. 3767.03 describes the nuisance abatement proceedings authorized by 
R.C. Chapter 3767 as being equitable in nature, as did the Michigan statute at 
issue in Bennis.  However, unlike Michigan law, Ohio law leaves a trial court no 
discretion in imposing closure orders upon finding the existence of a nuisance.  As 
discussed, supra, we have previously held that statutory injunctions should issue 
 
18
without regard to traditional equitable considerations if statutory requirements are 
fulfilled.  See Ackerman v. Tri-City Geriatric & Health Care, 55 Ohio St.2d at 57, 
9 O.O.3d at 66, 378 N.E.2d at 149.  Thus, in Ohio, although R.C. 3767.03 
authorizes the filing of an “action in equity,” R.C. 3767.06(A) makes the padlock 
order a mandatory part of any abatement order, and a trial court has no discretion 
to curtail exorbitant applications of the statute on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Because the existence of judicial discretion to determine whether a 
forfeiture was justified was important to the majority in Bennis, and because the 
Ohio statutory framework before us allows for no similar exercise of discretion, 
Bennis does not compel a holding that Ohio’s R.C. 3767.06 is constitutional. 
 
3. 
Mrs. Bennis made no showing that she took any affirmative actions to 
prevent the use of her vehicle for illegal purposes, or to abate illegal uses.  In 
contrast, there is evidence to suggest that Rezcallah, Gonzales, and Terrell all took 
affirmative actions to determine whether illegal activity was occurring, to notify 
and/or cooperate with police in investigating and terminating the illegal activities, 
and to use legal means available to them to remove the offenders from the property 
and abate the nuisance in a timely fashion. 
 
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. (1974), 416 U.S. 663, 689, 
94 S.Ct. 2080, 2094-2095, 40 L.Ed.2d 452, 471, the court stated that “it would be 
difficult to reject the constitutional claim of * * * an owner who proved not only 
that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he 
had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his 
property.”  Where there is “no intentional wrongdoing, no departure from any 
prescribed or known standard of action, and no reckless conduct” and where the 
owner was not entirely “free to act or not, as it chose” because of legal and 
practical considerations, such as requirements of eviction law and the limits on 
 
19
self-help potentials in evicting a criminal trespasser, infliction of a penalty is “so 
plainly arbitrary and oppressive as to be nothing short of a taking of [his/her] 
property without due process of law.”  Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher 
(1915), 238 U.S. 482, 490-491, 35 S.Ct. 886, 888, 59 L.Ed. 1419, 1422. 
 
The records in these cases support a finding that each of the three 
defendants not only remained uninvolved in and originally unaware of the 
wrongful activity, but took reasonable measures to stop the proscribed use of his 
or her property upon discovering it.  In fact, it is difficult to conceive of additional 
measures the defendants could have legally and safely taken which could have 
prevented or more quickly put an end to the illegal activities. 
 
4. 
The remedial purposes purportedly served by the forfeiture in Bennis 
are not served by an order padlocking the real property of an innocent owner 
against all purposes for a year. 
 
The Bennis court recognized the  “considerable appeal” of the argument that 
application of a forfeiture statute against an innocent owner is unfair.  It 
concluded, however, that the force of that argument was reduced by the remedial 
effect of the Michigan forfeiture law.  Bennis, 516 U.S. at 453, 116 S.Ct. at 1001, 
134 L.Ed.2d at 79.  Justice Thomas noted that sale proceeds from the forfeited car 
served the remedial goal of paying the state’s costs in the matter.  Bennis at 456, 
116 S.Ct. at 1002-1003, 134 L.Ed.2d at 81, fn.  (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 
In contrast, a closure order issued pursuant to R.C. 3767.06(A), generates 
no revenue or compensation for state costs.  Where forfeiture does not compensate 
the government for a loss, the forfeiture does not serve a remedial purpose. United 
States v. Bajakajian (1998), 524 U.S. 321, ___, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 2034, 141 L.Ed.2d 
314, 326 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary [6 Ed.1990] 1293, and One Lot Emerald 
Cut Stones v. United States [1972], 409 U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438).  
 
20
Thus, the remedial goals served by the forfeiture in Bennis simply do not exist in 
the cases at hand where the mandatory one-year closure order established by R.C. 
3767.06(A) would be imposed against an innocent owner who has already abated 
the nuisance. 
 
Having determined that Bennis is not controlling here, we must 
independently analyze the question under the general principles of forfeiture law. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has held in a long line of cases that the 
state may use its police power to enjoin a property owner from activities akin to 
public nuisances without offending either the Due Process Clause or Takings 
Clause.  These cases were reviewed and clarified in Lucas.  “ ‘[L]and use 
regulation does not effect a taking [under the federal Constitution] if it 
“substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests” * * *.’ ”  Lucas at 1024, 112 
S.Ct. at 2897, 120 L.Ed.2d at 818 (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm. 
[1987], 483 U.S. 825, 834, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3147, 97 L.Ed.2d 677, 687). 
 
The state argues that the mandatory closure and bonding provisions of R.C. 
3767.06(A) advance the state’s interest in protecting the public from illegal drug 
activity by providing incentive to a property owners to actively monitor their 
property, and to prevent the recurrence of felony drug transactions on their 
property.  There is no question that the prevention of illegal drug activity is a 
legitimate state interest.  We hold, however, that the mandatory closure provisions 
of R.C. 3767.06(A) do not substantially advance this interest when imposed 
against property owners who have not acquiesced to or participated in the illegal 
activity, and who have promptly abated the nuisance upon its discovery. 
 
Even if a landlord did undertake to monitor his or her property, the mere act 
of surveillance is unlikely to generate any information that would provide 
sufficient grounds for eviction.  Landlords are limited in the actions they may take 
 
21
against tenants engaged in illegal activities both by law and practical 
considerations.  They are statutorily prohibited from entering leased residential 
property unannounced.  See R.C. 1923.02 and 5321.03.  While R.C. 3767.10 
purports to authorize an owner to immediately enter leased premises without 
process of law where the premises are used for “purposes of lewdness, assignation 
or prostitution,” the General Assembly has not authorized immediate entry when 
the premises are being used to conduct  illegal drug activities.  Even if the statute 
did contain such an authorization, and assuming a landlord was able to gather 
enough evidence to prove his or her  suspicions, it is unrealistic to expect a 
landlord to subject himself or herself to the risk of possible injury inherent in an 
attempt to unilaterally dispossess tenants who may be under the influence of drugs 
and may be armed. 
 
Landlords have no authority  to conduct regular drug searches, nor may they 
break a lease based solely on unsubstantiated suspicions that the tenant is 
conducting illegal activities.  Moreover, landlords have no reliable way of 
predicting which, if any, prospective tenants  may later become involved in illegal 
drug activities on the landlord’s property.  Appellee Rezcallah persuasively argues 
that even without these legal restrictions, her limited resources for investigating or 
acting upon any suspicion of drug activity on her property make her “no match for 
the illegal drug trade.” 
 
It is unclear what action the landlord could or should take to avoid 
forfeiture.  The state is apparently not satisfied if the owner informs the police of 
the illegal activity or files criminal charges against the resident, as defendant 
Terrell had done.  It apparently is not enough to initiate eviction proceedings, as 
defendant  Rezcallah had done.  Nor was the state satisfied with defendant 
Gonzales’s attempt to investigate allegations of drug activity on her own.  Once 
 
22
the state had information that illegal drug activities had taken place on the 
property, it had without regard to the owners’ efforts at investigation, reporting, or 
abatement, attempted to padlock their property.  Hence, if owners report a tenant 
to the police and cooperate with them in investigating and prosecuting the tenant, 
thereby ending the illegal activity through appropriate and legal means, they have 
effectively admitted that the property is a nuisance and subjected themselves to the 
mandatory padlocking provisions of R.C. 3767.06(A).  Rather than substantially 
advancing the goal of encouraging property owners to monitor their property and 
take all legal steps to abate illegal activities thereon,  this provision may actually 
discourage owners from reporting illegal activity. 
 
An additional effect of padlocking the property is that the owner is 
precluded from maintaining or repairing the property after the offending party has 
left the premises.  This creates an increased risk that the property will further 
deteriorate and again become a nuisance.  These effects and considerations 
undercut the state’s argument that the mandatory closure provision of R.C. 
3767.06(A) substantially furthers the goal of prevention and speedy abatement of 
nuisances.  We conclude that the imposition of a closure order pursuant to R.C. 
3767.06(A) effectively closing  real property against its use for any purpose for a 
period of one year does not advance a legitimate state interest when enforced 
against an innocent owner and that the state’s interest does not outweigh the 
owner’s interest in the economic use of his or her property.  Therefore, the 
mandatory closure order provisions of R.C. 3767.06(A) violate the Takings Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution when imposed against 
an innocent owner. 
 
Further, we hold that because there is no intentional wrongdoing, no 
departure from any prescribed standard of action, and no reckless conduct, and 
 
23
because landowners are not completely free to act as they choose due to landlord-
tenant laws and other limitations on self-help evictions, forfeiture under these 
circumstances is so arbitrary and oppressive as to be a taking without due process 
of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
IV 
Ohio Constitution 
 
We hold as a separate and independent basis for our decision that the 
mandatory closure-order provision of R.C. 3767.06(A) is unconstitutional as 
applied to these defendants under Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, 
which provides that “[p]rivate property shall ever be held inviolate, but 
subservient to the public welfare.” 
 
We begin our state-law analysis by reaffirming the premise that the law does 
not favor forfeiture.  See, e.g., State v. Lilliock (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 23, 25-26, 24 
O.O.3d 64, 65-66, 434 N.E.2d 723, 725.  “The law requires that we favor 
individual property rights when interpreting forfeiture statutes.”  Ohio Dept. of 
Liquor Control v. Sons of Italy Lodge 0917 (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 532, 534, 605 
N.E.2d 368, 369. 
 
Private property rights may be limited through the state’s exercise of its 
police power when restrictions are necessary for the public welfare.  Just as private 
property rights are not absolute, however, neither is the state’s ability to restrict 
those rights.  Before the police power can be exercised to limit an owner’s control 
of private property, it must appear that the interests of the general public require 
its exercise and the means of restriction must not be unduly oppressive upon 
individuals.  Froelich v. Cleveland (1919), 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212.  
Further, the free use of property guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution can be 
 
24
invaded by an exercise of the police power only “when the restriction thereof bears 
a substantial relationship to the public health, morals and safety.”  State ex rel. 
Kahler-Ellis Co. v. Cline (C.P.1954), 69 Ohio Law Abs. 305, 309, 125 N.E.2d 
222, 225. 
 
The mandatory closure provision of R.C. 3767.06(A) fails these 
requirements.  We have already explained in the context of the United States 
Constitution that the restrictions imposed by this statute do not substantially 
advance the state’s interest in preventing and abating illegal activities and that 
they may even serve to produce the opposite effect.  For the same reasons, we now 
hold that the mandatory closure-order provision in R.C. 3767.06(A), closing the 
property against any use, including maintenance by the owner or any other legal 
use, bears no substantial relationship to the public health, morals, and safety. 
 
The closure provisions also fail for being unduly oppressive against an 
individual owner.  Where an owner is subject to closure of property against all 
purposes for a year solely on the basis of the illegal acts of a third party over 
whom the owner has no legal means of control, the closure order is unduly 
oppressive.  This is especially true where that owner has taken affirmative actions 
to proceed by reasonable means to prevent the third party from continuing the 
illegal acts.  Therefore, the mandatory closure-order provision of R.C. 3767.06(A) 
is an improper exercise of police power under Section 19, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution when it is imposed and enforced against a property owner who lacks 
any culpability in the creation or perpetuation of a nuisance on the property. 
V 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgments of the court of appeals 
and remand these causes to the trial courts for disposition  consistent with this 
opinion.  The trial courts are to determine whether, without regard to the 
 
25
knowledge, acquiescence, or participation of the defendant owners, the owners are 
guilty of maintaining a nuisance as defined in R.C. 3767.02.  If any owner is found 
guilty of maintaining a nuisance, as per the statute, the trial court shall impose an 
abatement order and permanent injunction in accordance with R.C. 3767.06.  
However, if, despite a finding of guilt, the court determines that a defendant owner 
acted in good faith, was innocent of any acquiescence to or participation in the 
conduct establishing the nuisance, and took prompt action to abate the nuisance, 
no closure order shall be issued under R.C. 3767.06(A) and no tax shall be 
imposed pursuant to R.C. 3767.09. 
Judgments reversed 
and causes remanded. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
FORD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents. 
 
DONALD R. FORD, J., of the Eleventh Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, 
J. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
The record indicates that the trial court issued a temporary restraining order 
allowing the police to padlock Rezcallah’s property prior to any hearing on either 
the preliminary or permanent injunction.  Though the issue was not directly raised 
on appeal, we note our concern with any prehearing padlocking of premises absent 
a showing of exigent circumstances.  The United States Supreme Court has held 
that seizure of real property based on illegal drug activity is not an extraordinary 
circumstance justifying postponement of notice and hearing.  “Unless exigent 
circumstances are present, the Due Process Clause requires the Government to 
 
26
afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before seizing real property 
subject to civil forfeiture.”  United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property 
(1993), 510 U.S. 43, 62, 114 S.Ct. 492, 505, 126 L.Ed.2d 490, 508-509. 
2. 
R.C. 3767.10 voids any lease or other title held by a tenant or occupant 
when the property is used for “purposes of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution.”  
This statute does not create an automatic right of eviction when a tenant or 
occupant uses the property to conduct drug activities.  Thus, a landlord is bound 
under the law to follow normal eviction proceedings as outlined in R.C. 1923.02 
and R.C. 5321.03. 
__________________ 
 
FORD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  Although I concur 
with the well-reasoned rationale of the majority opinion with respect to the second 
paragraph of the syllabus, I must respectfully dissent with regard to the analysis 
and conclusion of the first paragraph of the syllabus.  Therefore, I would affirm 
the judgments of the court of appeals holding that, pursuant to R.C. 3767.05(A), 
knowledge of and either acquiescence or participation in the nuisance on the part 
of an absentee landowner is required to find one guilty of maintaining a nuisance 
under R.C. 3767.02. 
 
In dictum in State ex rel. Miller v. Anthony (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 132, 139, 
647 N.E.2d 1368, 1374, quoting State ex rel. Freeman v. Pierce (1991), 61 Ohio 
App.3d 663, 671, 573 N.E.2d 747, 752, this court unanimously stated: 
 
“ ‘[I]n order to obtain an abatement order pursuant to R.C. 3719.10 and 
3767.02 et seq., it is necessary for the relator to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant had knowledge of and either acquiesced to or 
participated in a felony violation of R.C. Chapter 2925 or 3719 on the property.’ ” 
 
Moreover, in interpreting R.C. 3767.05(A), the Freeman court explained: 
 
27
 
“Clearly, there would be no reason for including evidentiary presumptions 
in the statute unless it were necessary that the [state] prove these elements.  
Therefore, the [state] must show that the defendant knew of the drug offenses, and 
either participated in them, or acquiesced in their occurrence.  * * * Without such 
a requirement, the statute would seem to authorize any resident of the county to 
trespass on an innocent landowner’s property, commit a drug offense there, and 
then commence proceedings to have the property declared a nuisance.  Such an 
absurd result could not have been intended by the legislature.”  (Emphasis and 
footnote deleted.)  Freeman, 61 Ohio App.3d at 670-671, 573 N.E.2d at 752. 
 
In the present cases, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of 
each appellee on the basis that in order to obtain an order of abatement against 
these appellees, the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that each 
owner had knowledge of and either acquiesced to or participated in (creating or 
maintaining) the nuisance.  Parenthetically, this writer concludes that without a 
predicate of such evidence of knowledge, acquiescence, or participation on the 
part of parties, such as these appellees, there is no statutory ground upon which to 
impose the sanctions set forth in various relevant sections in R.C. Chapter 3767.  
Further, the reversals mandated by the majority amount to somewhat of a 
redundancy because it appears that the trial courts in these appeals have already 
determined that appellees were not guilty of maintaining the respective nuisances.  
Thus, I would affirm the decisions of the court of appeals. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  The majority holds 
that R.C. 3767.06(A) violates the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions when applied to 
property owners who are unaware of an illegal use of their property, and who 
make reasonable attempts to abate that use once discovered.  In its opinion, the 
 
28
majority overrules a prior decision of this court and distinguishes a recent U.S. 
Supreme Court case reaching a contrary conclusion.  I believe the majority’s 
approach disregards binding federal precedent and fails to accord the necessary 
presumption of constitutionality to the statute.  For these reasons, I dissent from 
Parts III and IV of the majority’s opinion. 
I. 
Presumption of Constitutionality 
 
It is important to emphasize that appellees carry a heavy burden in arguing 
that R.C. 3767.06(A) is unconstitutional.  It is settled beyond argument that 
statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality.  State v. Collier (1991), 62 
Ohio St.3d 267, 269, 581 N.E.2d 552, 553.  To prevail on their claims, appellees 
must show that the statute is unconstitutional beyond any reasonable doubt.  State 
ex rel. Richard v. Bd. of Trustees of Police & Firemen’s Disability & Pension 
Fund (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 409, 413, 632 N.E.2d 1292, 1296.  I believe, as 
indicated in the discussion that follows, that the appellees have failed to clear this 
high bar. 
II. 
Federal Case History 
 
A long line of federal cases supports the conclusion that property owners 
who are unaware that their property is being used for illegal purposes, and who 
have not in any way participated in that use, may still be required to forfeit their 
property despite their apparent innocence.  This conclusion has typically been 
reached on either one of two theories.  The first theory is that the property itself 
has committed the offense.  The second is that the owner necessarily bears some 
responsibility for entrusting the property to someone who would use it illegally.  
See Austin v. United States (1993), 509 U.S. 602, 615, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2808, 125 
L.Ed.2d 488, 501.  Regardless of the theory used, federal courts have concluded 
that the law of forfeiture is “too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial 
 
29
jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced.”  Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United 
States (1921), 254 U.S. 505, 511, 41 S.Ct. 189, 191, 65 L.Ed. 376, 379.  See, also, 
Bennis v. Michigan (1996), 516 U.S. 442, 453, 116 S.Ct. 994, 1001, 134 L.Ed.2d 
68, 79. 
 
In Dobbins’s Distillery v. United States (1877), 96 U.S. 395, 24 L.Ed. 637, 
the U.S. Supreme Court considered a case where a party leased both real and 
personal property in order to operate a distillery.  In conducting that business, the 
lessee was found to have kept false books and to have defrauded the federal 
government of taxes.  As a result, the government seized the leased business 
property and forfeited it.  The owner fought the forfeiture on grounds that he had 
no knowledge of the possessor’s illegal activities.  The court upheld the forfeiture, 
stating: 
 
“Cases often arise where the property of the owner is forfeited on account of 
the fraud, neglect, or misconduct of those intrusted with its possession, care, and 
custody, even when the owner is otherwise without fault * * * and it has always 
been held * * * that the acts of [the possessor] bind the interest of the owner * * *, 
whether he be innocent or guilty, and that * * * [the owner] impliedly submits to 
whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to the [property] by means of 
[the possessor’s] unlawful or wanton misconduct.”  Id. at 401, 24 L.Ed. at 639. 
 
Forty-four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the case of 
Goldsmith-Grant Co.  In that case, an auto dealer retained title to a sold vehicle as 
security for the purchase price.  The purchaser thereafter used the vehicle to 
transport and conceal goods with intent to evade taxes.  The violated statute 
provided for forfeiture of the car.  The innocent dealer argued the forfeiture 
violated his constitutional right to due process.  When faced with this 
constitutional challenge, the court conceded there was strength in the argument.  
 
30
Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States (1921), 254 U.S. 505, 510, 41 S.Ct. 189,  
190, 65 L.Ed. 376, 378.  It noted, however, that there were “other and militating 
considerations,”  such as “the necessities of the Government, its revenues and 
policies” and “the necessity of making provision against their violation or 
evasion.”  Id. at 510, 41 S.Ct. at 190-191, 65 L.Ed. at 378. 
 
The Supreme Court considered the plight of another innocent owner in Van 
Oster v. Kansas (1926), 272 U.S. 465, 47 S.Ct. 133, 71 L.Ed. 354.  In that case, 
the court again upheld the forfeiture, stating: 
 
“It is not unknown, or indeed uncommon, for the law to visit upon the 
owner of property the unpleasant consequences of the unauthorized action of one 
to whom he has entrusted it.  * * *  [C]ertain uses of property may be regarded as 
so undesirable that the owner surrenders his control at his peril.”  Id. at 467, 47 
S.Ct. at 134, 71 L.Ed. at 358. 
 
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. (1974), 416 U.S. 663, 94 
S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452, the Supreme Court again dealt with facts similar to 
those in the prior cases and the cases at bar.  In Calero-Toledo, the court reviewed 
the cases cited above, noting that “the innocence of the owner of property subject 
to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense.”  Id. at 683, 94 S.Ct. 
at 2092, 40 L.Ed.2d at 468.  Citing the “legitimate governmental interests” served 
by the statute, the court concluded that the assertions of unconstitutionality 
“squarely collide[d]” with “the long line of this Court’s decisions” finding such 
actions constitutional.  Id. at 688, 94 S.Ct. at 2094, 40 L.Ed.2d at 471.  Once 
again, the court upheld the forfeiture. 
 
Finally, as recently as 1996, the Supreme Court arrived at the same 
conclusion in Bennis v. Michigan (1996), 516 U.S. 442, 116 S.Ct. 994, 134 
L.Ed.2d 68.  In that case, Mrs. Bennis jointly owned a vehicle with her husband 
 
31
who, without her knowledge, used it to solicit prostitution.  A Michigan court 
ordered the vehicle forfeited as a public nuisance, notwithstanding Mrs. Bennis’s 
part ownership of it and her lack of knowledge regarding her husband’s activities.  
The Bennis court found that the forfeiture violated neither the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution.  The majority in the cases at bar declines to follow Bennis, 
however, seeking to distinguish it on four points. 
 
The majority first attempts to distinguish Bennis by pointing out that Mrs. 
Bennis conceded her car was subject to forfeiture and merely sought compensation 
for her loss; thus, no analysis of the propriety of the forfeiture was necessary.  But 
the Supreme Court “granted certiorari in order to determine whether Michigan’s 
abatement scheme ha[d] deprived [Mrs. Bennis] of her interest in the forfeited car 
without due process * * * or ha[d] taken her interest for public use without 
compensation.”  Bennis, 516 U.S. at 446, 116 S.Ct. at 998, 134 L.Ed.2d at 74.  It 
then launched a lengthy historical analysis, citing the cases summarized supra in 
support of the theory that an innocent owner may constitutionally have property 
forfeited due to the illegal acts of its user.  It appears, then, that although the court 
did acknowledge Mrs. Bennis’s acquiescence to the forfeiture, that fact made little 
or no difference in its analysis.  There is nothing in the opinion to suggest that, had 
this factor been otherwise, the court would have ruled contrary to long-existing 
federal precedent.  Therefore, I do not find this a valid reason for distinguishing 
Bennis. 
 
The majority next distinguishes Bennis on the fact that the Michigan court 
had discretion in ordering the forfeiture, whereas Ohio courts do not.  Though the 
U.S. Supreme Court found some significance in this fact, it noted the discretion 
primarily to emphasize the equitable nature of the action.  Id. at 452, 116 S.Ct. at 
 
32
1000, 134 L.Ed.2d at 78.  Likewise, these actions are equitable.  In R.C. 3767.03, 
the Ohio legislature specifically identified nuisance abatement proceedings as 
equitable, and this court agreed with that characterization in State ex rel. Miller v. 
Anthony (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 132, 136, 647 N.E.2d 1368, 1371-1372.  Therefore, 
because the point the Bennis court found significant was the equitable nature of 
the action, and because these actions are also equitable, the level of discretion 
allowed the lower court seems an unpersuasive point on which to dismiss the 
authority of that case. 
 
The third point on which the majority distinguishes Bennis is that, in that 
case, no showing was ever made that Mrs. Bennis took any affirmative action to 
prevent or abate the illegal use of her vehicle.  The majority goes to great lengths 
to explain the impossibility of owners’ exerting foolproof control over leased or 
loaned property, and the difficulties involved in abating illegal uses once 
discovered.  One must wonder what the majority would suggest Mrs. Bennis have 
done to anticipate the use to which her husband would put their vehicle.  One must 
also ask if there would not be even greater difficulty in abating the illegal use of 
property where the wrongdoer actually owns a half interest in that property?  
Requiring Mrs. Bennis to discover and abate the nuisance in her case seems an 
even less reasonable expectation than requiring appellees in these cases to do so.  
Yet the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture in Bennis, finding that it was not 
violative of the U.S. Constitution. 
 
In making this third distinction, the majority also cites language from 
Calero-Toledo, which states, “it would be difficult to reject the constitutional 
claim of * * * an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and 
unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably 
could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property.”  Calero-Toledo, 
 
33
416 U.S. at 689, 94 S.Ct. at 2094-2095, 40 L.Ed.2d at 471.  The majority believes 
this language supports its conclusion that appellees should not be forced to forfeit 
their property in these cases.  However, Mrs. Bennis cited this very same language 
and the Bennis court rejected it, stating, “this comment was obiter dictum, and ‘[i]t 
is to the holdings of our cases, rather than their dicta, that we must attend.’ ”  
Bennis, 516 U.S. at 450, 116 S.Ct. at 999, 134 L.Ed.2d at 77, quoting Kokkonen v. 
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. (1994), 511 U.S. 375, 379, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1676, 
128 L.Ed.2d 391, 396. 
 
The fourth point on which the majority distinguishes Bennis is that the 
forfeiture of the vehicle in that case served a remedial purpose.  Proceeds from the 
sale of the vehicle helped to pay the state’s costs in prosecuting the action.  
Bennis, 516 U.S. at 456, 116 S.Ct. at 1002, 134 L.Ed.2d at 81 (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  The majority in these cases concludes that the force of Mrs. Bennis’s 
constitutional challenges was diminished in light of this remedial effect, and that 
padlocking appellees’ houses for a year cannot possibly serve such a purpose. 
 
But padlocking appellees’ houses in these cases serves purposes beyond 
mere punishment.  In fact, this court has found such orders to be preventive rather 
than punitive.  Miller, 72 Ohio St.3d 132, 647 N.E.2d 1368, at paragraph two of 
the syllabus.  In Miller, we stated that “the provision requiring the imposition of 
the closing order acts to restore safety in the area where the drug nuisance is 
located.  The purpose of this provision is to ensure the abatement through non-use 
of the property for one year.”  Id. at 138, 647 N.E.2d at 1373.  Also, such orders 
“may have the desirable effect of inducing [owners] to exercise greater care in 
transferring possession of their property.”  Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688, 94 
S.Ct. at 2094, 40 L.Ed.2d at 471.  If, as the majority suggests, the Bennis court 
found the remedial effect of selling a $600 car to help defray the state’s costs 
 
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sufficient reason to weaken Mrs. Bennis’s constitutional arguments, then the 
preventive purposes served by the padlocking order in these cases seem an even 
greater justification for finding the statute constitutional. 
 
The majority painstakingly attempts to distinguish the precedent set by 
Bennis.  I do not believe the distinctions noted are sufficient to overcome that 
authority, particularly in light of the federal precedent discussed above and the 
presumption of constitutionality afforded all statutes.  I believe Bennis is 
controlling here, and that the majority errs in dismissing its influence. 
III. 
Case No. 96-1895 
 
The majority finds the case of appellee Terrell a special situation and easily 
disposes of it on grounds different from that of the cases of appellees Rezcallah 
and Gonzales.  I believe, however, that Bennis controls all three cases.  The 
majority paints a picture of all three appellees as innocent owners, Terrell being 
the least culpable of all.  The court likens Terrell’s situation to one in which 
property is stolen from an owner, rather than leased or borrowed, and it cites one-
hundred-ninety-year-old language stating, “If, by private theft, or open robbery, 
without any fault on [the owner’s] part, his property should be invaded, * * * the 
law cannot be understood to punish him with the forfeiture of that property.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Peisch v. Ware (1808), 8 U.S. 347 (4 Cranch 347), 364, 2 
L.Ed. 643, 648. 
 
Even assuming the quoted language in Peisch represents good law and 
constitutes a valid exception to all the above cited cases, I do not believe it 
sufficient to dispose of Terrell’s case, as I do not believe Terrell is “without fault.”  
The facts cited by the majority disclose that Terrell’s property was not stolen.  
Terrell invited a guest, Julius Jones, to live with him.  Eventually, he asked Jones 
to leave.  Jones did leave, but continually returned without Terrell’s consent.  
 
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Finally, as the majority puts it, Terrell “abandoned the residence, leaving it to 
Jones.” 
 
Federal courts have not clearly carved out any exception to forfeiture law 
for owners whose property is taken and used illegally without any fault or 
knowledge on their part.  If, in fact, there is a valid exception, Terrell does not fit 
the bill.  The fact that Terrell sought to have Jones permanently removed from his 
property may place him on the same level as a landlord who attempts an eviction, 
but not on the same level as one who had no knowledge his property had been 
taken.  For this reason, I believe Terrell is subject to the same law as Rezcallah 
and Gonzales and must stand or fall on the same ground.  Because I believe this 
ground was elucidated in Bennis, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s 
determination that Terrell’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment have been violated. 
IV. 
Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution 
 
The majority also concludes that R.C. 3767.06(A) violates Section 19, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  Again, I respectfully disagree. 
 
Although the language differs, the Takings Clauses of both the U.S. and 
Ohio Constitutions essentially provide that no private property shall be taken for 
public use without just compensation.  “[W]here the provisions are similar and no 
persuasive reason for a differing interpretation is presented, this court has 
determined that protections afforded by Ohio’s Constitution are coextensive with 
those provided by the United States Constitution.”  State v. Robinette (1997), 80 
Ohio St.3d 234, 238, 685 N.E.2d 762, 766.  Therefore, because the U.S. Supreme 
Court has found that innocent owners may be forced to forfeit their property for 
the acts of those to whom they have entrusted it, I see no persuasive reason for 
interpreting the Ohio provision differently. 
 
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Even in analyzing the Ohio Constitution independently, however, I would 
arrive at the same conclusion.  First, these cases do not present the typical takings 
situation.  The majority uses the terms “forfeiture” and “takings” interchangeably.  
I believe this is error.  While the padlocking order is not a forfeiture to the extent 
that it is preventive rather than punitive, see Miller, 72 Ohio St.3d at 138, 647 
N.E.2d at 1372, there is still some culpable conduct necessary to trigger it.  
Takings, on the other hand, have traditionally been understood to mean a 
government action triggered strictly by some public need, where no culpability is 
involved. 
 
Here, the government was prompted to take action due to the illegal 
activities of individuals using the appellees’ properties.  The necessity arose as a 
result of someone’s culpable conduct rather than some governmentally imposed 
goal; therefore, the situation in these cases is not a typical taking. 
 
Additionally, these cases do not present the typical takings scenario 
because, unlike other takings cases, here the owner has the option of posting bond 
to avoid the lost use of the property.  R.C. 3767.06(A) provides that an owner 
whose property is subject to a one-year padlock order may post bond in the 
amount of “the full value of the real property” to prevent the closure from carrying 
forth.  R.C. 3767.04(C).  The majority dismisses this option as a taking equivalent 
to the taking of the property because the value is the same and some owners 
cannot afford to post such a bond.  But the cost of posting a bond is only a 
percentage of the full value of the property.  Therefore, the value actually 
surrendered by the owner is far less than the full value of the property, making this 
a much more realistic option than the majority would allow. 
 
Once again, in light of the presumption of constitutionality afforded all 
statutes, appellees bear the heavy burden of demonstrating that R.C. 3767.06(A) is 
 
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unconstitutional beyond all reasonable doubt.  Given this fact and the above 
discussion, I do not believe appellees have proven that the statute violates the 
Takings Clause of the Ohio Constitution.  I therefore disagree with the majority’s 
finding in this regard. 
V. 
Lindsay v. Cincinnati 
 
In arriving at its conclusion that R.C. 3767.06(A) violates the U.S. and Ohio 
Constitutions, the majority also wishes to overrule the prior decision of this court 
in Lindsay v. Cincinnati (1961), 172 Ohio St. 137, 15 O.O.2d 278, 174 N.E.2d 96.  
The facts in that case are very similar to those in the current cases and the federal 
cases summarized above.  In Lindsay, the owner of an automobile loaned the car 
to someone who, without the owner’s knowledge or participation, used it for 
illegal purposes.  Consistent with the cases discussed supra, Lindsay concluded 
there was no constitutional violation. 
 
In overruling the Lindsay decision, the majority points out that the court in 
that case misconstrued the holding in Grosfield v. United States (1928), 276 U.S. 
494, 48 S.Ct. 329, 72 L.Ed. 670.  Lindsay relied on Grosfield to support the 
conclusion that it was constitutional to subject an innocent owner’s property to 
forfeiture.  Lindsay, 172 Ohio St. at 141, 15 O.O.2d at 280, 174 N.E.2d at 99.  I 
agree that Grosfield does not stand for this proposition, as the owner in that case 
was found to bear some culpability.  Grosfield, 276 U.S. at 498, 48 S.Ct. at 331, 
72 L.Ed. at 672.  To this extent, the cite in Lindsay to Grosfield is error.  But 
Grosfield was not the only authority Lindsay cited.  In arriving at its conclusion, 
the Lindsay court also relied on Goldsmith-Grant and Dobbins’s Distillery, both 
discussed above, along with other U.S. Supreme Court decisions.  Lindsay, 172 
Ohio St. at 139-140, 15 O.O.2d at 280, 174 N.E.2d at 99.  Such reliance was 
 
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proper in that case, just as it is in these cases, and the ultimate conclusion in 
Lindsay was correct under the precedent available both then and now. 
 
It is interesting to note that in Lindsay, this court repeatedly emphasized the 
role of the legislature in determining issues of forfeiture.  That case recognized the 
legislature’s “large discretion” in determining “not only what the interests of the 
public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such 
interests.”  Id. at 139, 15 O.O.2d at 279, 174 N.E.2d at 98.  The court noted that 
forfeiture, as applied to an innocent owner, is a “question of public policy which 
must be decided by the appropriate legislative authority and is not within the 
province of this court to decide.”  Id. at 140, 15 O.O.2d at 280, 174 N.E.2d at 99.  
I conclude that the same is still true.  I believe Lindsay represents good law, with 
the exception of one sentence which misconstrues Grosfield, and that it should be 
followed in these cases. 
VI. 
Conclusion 
 
The legislature has set forth a statutory framework that serves a legitimate, 
preventive purpose.  That framework cannot be avoided without a showing that it 
is unconstitutional beyond any reasonable doubt.  Appellees have failed to make 
that showing here.  For this reason, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s 
conclusion that the statute is violative of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and 
Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.