Case Title: J & M Investments v. Davis

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-10-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
J & M Investments v. Davis1986 WY 181726 P.2d 96Case Number: 86-121Decided: 10/08/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
J 
& M INVESTMENTS, a partnership, and James P. Castberg, Appellants 
(Defendants), George E. Cooke, (Defendant),

v.

George A. DAVIS and Peggy 
J. Aman, Trustees of the George A. Davis 1978 Trust, Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).

Appeal from District Court,ParkCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

James P. 
Castberg, Powell, for 
appellants.

Ross D. 
Copenhaver of Copenhaver, Kahl & Kath, Powell, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Extrapolated from other 
land purchase agreement default complexities, this appeal raises collectibility 
of a separately executed promissory note for which summary judgment was granted 
and is now affirmed.

[¶2.]     Defendant J & M 
Investments, a partnership, and defendants James P. Castberg, and George E. 
Cooke, the partners, entered into an installment purchase agreement dated July 
10, 1979, amended August 26, 1982, for the purchase of residential lots in 
Park County, Wyoming.1 

[¶3.]     The only attribute of 
that agreement and course of business raised on appeal is a $10,000 promissory 
note dated December 31, 1982, unpaid but contested for "want of consideration 
and unjust enrichment." The basic documents in the transaction, including the 
initial agreement, subsequent amendment, escrow instructions, and promissory 
note, were apparently prepared by Castberg who is an experienced practicing 
attorney in the community.

[¶4.]     Although Castberg, 
individually and for the partnership, submits that summary judgment was improper 
because of issues of fact, and appellee characterizes the case as presenting an 
argument about lack of consideration and unjust enrichment, the case actually 
involves construction of the sales agreement as to a subsequently deeded lot, 
and whether a separate payment upon conveyance was required as evidenced by the 
execution of a promissory note for the purchase amount.2

[¶5.]     Appellant contends that 
the specific lot for which the note was given as payment should have been 
carried by the initial contract down payment so that a further payment upon 
conveyance as evidenced by note was unnecessary. Appellant then contends that 
the note was executed without consideration, constitutes unjust enrichment, and 
consequently is not collectible from appellant as the maker when given to secure 
the deed to the involved lot.

[¶6.]     Since this is a 
documentary case, we find it has a Category 5 summary judgment status under 
Cordova v. Gosar, Wyo., 719 P.2d 625 (1986), wherein the evidence submitted to 
the court creates an issue of law for interpretation of written 
agreements.

[¶7.]     On July 10, 1979, the 
partnership entered into an agreement with appellee (Davis) to buy 15 
residential dwelling lots in Park County, for a total purchase price of 
$150,000, with $15,000 to be paid upon execution, and the balance, with ten per 
cent interest, to be paid in full by January 1, 1980, and,

"BUYER does hereby agree 
to pay to SELLER the sum of $10,000 upon the sale of each of the above described 
lots, and upon receipt thereof SELLER does hereby authorize and direct the 
escrow agent * * * to deliver one (1) deed, to be specified by BUYER to 
BUYER."

Consequently, 
this was an installment contract arrangement for delivery of separate lot deeds 
upon payment of the pro-rata purchase price.

[¶8.]     Forfeiture included 
interest to date of forfeiture, and retention of the initial payment as 
designated damages. That agreement was supplemented on August 26, 1982, after 
the original agreement was obviously in default, with a further agreement which 
gave a moratorium on the interest, and with pro-rated payment additions to the 
individual lot deed release requirement of $10,000, and provided as to Lot 9, 
which is the subject matter of this controversy,

"6. It [is] agreed by 
both parties hereto that in addition to the sums provided in paragraph 2 above, 
SELLER shall also receive from the sale of any lot by SELLERS from and after 
July 10, 1982 and until July 10, 1984 any additional consideration received by 
SELLERS to be applied upon the interest due to SELLER up to the date of this 
agreement and until the payment of the sum of $10,000.00 due on this contract 
for the sale of Lot nine (9), which sum shall be applied to the principal 
balance due on this contract. From and after the payment of all interest due 
upon this contract and the payment of the $10,000.00 as aforesaid, SELLERS shall 
be entitled to receive the proceeds from the sale of any lot after paying the 
sums provided in paragraph 2 above."

 

[¶9.]     Pursuant to all of 
this, the contested note was executed on December 31, 1982, including the 
notation "Sale of Lot # 9 - not paid for - as per agreement," as prepared and 
signed by Castberg.

[¶10.]  The ultimate judgment of $32,133.84 
included $10,000 for the December 31, 1982 note, and three additional items with 
interest and attorney's fees. Determination of liability as entered by trial 
court summary judgment comes here on the argument of appellant that the included 
$10,000 was improper by attack on the underlying note for that 
amount.

[¶11.]  We cannot find any legal basis from the 
documentation or facts of this case to justify the disinclination of appellant 
to pay the amount of the note given for consideration for the deed to Lot 9 
which he received, or any evidence of lack of consideration or unjust 
enrichment.

[¶12.]  Summary judgment is appropriate when no 
genuine question of material fact exists and when the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law (Category 5 of summary judgment, see Cordova v. 
Gosar, supra). Greaser v. Williams, Wyo., 703 P.2d 327 (1985); Hurst v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1130 
(1985); Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P. The decision is justified when the issue to be 
decided involves construction of a written agreement clearly expressing the 
terms of the agreement between the parties as raising a question of law and not 
an issue of fact. Wyoming Game and Fish 
Commission v. Mills Co., Wyo., 701 P.2d 819 
(1985); Kuehne v. Samedan Oil Corp., Wyo., 626 P.2d 1035 
(1981).

[¶13.]  No interpretation different than the 
decision of the trial court can be derived from the agreements whereby the 
initial payment on the contract could be attributed for the benefit of the buyer 
to any separate lot conveyances. The supplementary agreement confirmed the 
separate lot payment requirement specifically related to Lot 9. Finally, when appellant, as an attorney, prepared 
and signed the note in issue, it could be assumed that he understood the 
obligation created in relation to his receipt of a deed to Lot 9.

[¶14.]  Finding no reasonable cause for this 
appeal, costs as enumerated in Rule 10.05, W.R.A.P., and attorney's fees of 
$1,220 are taxed against appellant.

[¶15.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 George E. Cooke is not 
an appellant, and cross-claims between Cooke and Castberg were severed and 
consequently are not involved here.

2 Compliance by appellant 
with Rule 5.01(2), W.R.A.P., "A statement of the issues presented for review," 
is hardly satisfied by his statement: "Genuine issues of fact or facts exist 
which preclude the granting of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs," 
since the area of dispute of contended factual issues or legal questions is not 
defined. More time was required in trying to determine the issue from 
appellant's brief than from attribution of the issue to the record and its 
facts.