Case Title: Smith v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 133, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
HAROLD SMITH,1 
 
 
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No.133, 2003 
        
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Respondents Below,  
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Court Below: Superior Court  
Appellants,  
 
'     of the State of Delaware in  
 
 
 
 
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and for Kent County 
        
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v. 
 
 
 
        
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STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
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Petitioners Below,  
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Appellees.  
 
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Submitted:  November 12, 2003 
Decided:     December 9, 2003 
 
Before BERGER, and STEELE and JACOBS, Justices.  
 
 
ORDER 
 
This 9th day of December 2003, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s answering brief, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Harold Smith, was convicted by a Superior 
Court jury of two counts each, of Delivery of Cocaine, Maintaining a 
Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances, and Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia.  On February 24, 2003, Smith was sentenced to a 30 a thirty 
                                                 
1   In this case the defendant has testified and the State agrees that he worked as a confidential informant for 
the State Police.  The Court sua sponte is using a pseudonym to identify the defendant in this order. 
 
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years’ minimum mandatory prison sentence, followed by probation.  Smith 
appeals from the judgment of convictions and the sentence. 
 
(2) 
On appeal, Smith argues four separate grounds for reversal, 
namely, that: (i) the trial court erred by not concluding State breached its 
plea bargain wherein the State agreed not to prosecute Smith on four charges 
in return for Smith’s assisting the police in another drug case; (ii) the trial 
court erred by admitting into evidence Smith’s Department of Motor 
Vehicles photograph at the trial; (iii) the trial court abused its discretion by 
not requiring the State to reveal the identity of a confidential informant; and 
(iv) the trial court gave an erroneous Allen charge to the jury. None of these 
claims has merit. 
 
(3) 
Smith’s first claim of error was the subject of a motion to 
dismiss that the trial court denied after an evidentiary hearing.  That claim -- 
that Smith and the police reached an agreement (which the State later 
breached) in which Smith would cooperate with the State and the criminal 
charges against him would be dropped – involves a mixed question of law 
and fact.  To the extent the claim challenges the trial court’s legal 
determinations, this Court will review that claim de novo;2 and to the extent 
                                                 
2  Wilmington  Country Club v. Cowee, 747 A.2d 1087, 1091 (Del. 2000). 
 
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the appellant attacks the trial court’s findings of fact, those findings will be 
upheld if they are not clearly erroneous.3 
 
(4) 
In its Opinion of October 11, 2002, the trial court denied 
Smith’s motion to dismiss on the ground that even if Smith’s version of the 
plea agreement was factually true, the agreement was unenforceable because 
only the Attorney General or her Deputy are authorized to make such 
agreements, and that in this case there was no evidence that the agreement 
had been authorized by the Attorney General or her Deputy.  That ruling is 
correct as a matter of law.4 
 
(5) 
Smith’s second claim of error is that the trial court improperly 
admitted into evidence the photograph of Smith that had been supplied by 
the Division of Motor Vehicles.  Because Smith did not object to the 
admission of the photograph, this claim is reviewable only for plain error.5 
As a result, the issue is deemed waived unless Smith can demonstrate that 
the error was “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the 
                                                 
3  DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1191 (Del. 1995). 
4 See, e.g., Hunter v. United States, 405 F.2d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 1969) (Federal agents 
held to lack statutory authority to provide defendant a grant of immunity in exchange for 
cooperation); State v. Caswell, 828 P.2d 830, 833 (Idaho 1992) (unauthorized agreement 
not to prosecute by a narcotics officer in exchange for cooperation held not enforceable); 
People v. Gallego, 424 N.W.2d 470, 472-76 (Mich. 1988) (refusing to enforce written 
nonprosecution agreement by DEA agents and state detectives that was not authorized by 
prosecutors). 
5 Del. Supr. Ct. Rule 8; D.R.E. 103 (d); Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 653 (Del. 2001). 
 
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fairness and integrity of the trial process.”6  Smith has not met this burden.  
He asserts that the photograph affected the fairness of the trial, because the 
jury never was told why the police had his photograph even before they 
conducted the undercover drug purchase that led to his arrest.  But, Smith’s 
defense counsel had an opportunity to cross examine the police officer 
witness who testified that the photograph was the basis for his identification 
of Smith as the seller of the drugs.  Yet, Smith’s counsel chose not to cross 
examine on that point.  Accordingly, Smith has not shown plain error in the 
admission of the photograph. 
 
(6) 
The third claim of error is that the trial court improperly denied 
Smith’s motion to require the State to reveal the identity of a confidential 
informant after conducting an evidentiary hearing in camera.  That claim is 
reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.7 
(7) 
The basis for the trial court’s ruling was that it did not “appear 
to the Court that the confidential informant may be able to give testimony 
which would materially aid the defendant.”8  Smith argues that the 
confidential informant directly participated in the first undercover drug 
transaction and, hence, was integral to the identification of Smith as the 
                                                 
6 Capano, 781 A.2d at 653; Brown v. State, 729 A.2d 259, 265 (Del. 1999). 
7 See Davis v. State, 1998 WL 666713 (Del. 1988 ORDER). 
8 A-14. 
 
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seller.  That argument, however, defeats Smith’s claim, because it 
demonstrates that Smith knew who the confidential informant was.  Apart 
from Smith and the undercover Detective, the only other participant in the 
drug sale was the driver of the automobile that transported Smith to the 
transaction site.  Indeed, and in his opening brief Smith contends that the 
confidential informant was the driver.9  Yet Smith did not  --  although he 
could have --  called the driver as a defense witness at the trial.  If, in fact, 
the informant had information helpful to Smith (as Smith urges), it must be 
supposed that his counsel would have called the driver as a witness. The 
decision not to call the driver as a witness supports the trial court’s ruling 
that the confidential informant had no testimony to give that would have 
helped Smith. 
(8)   Moreover, although Smith argues that he was improperly denied 
the opportunity to propound questions to the informant at the in camera 
hearing, Smith did not identify what those questions would have been, nor 
what responses would have aided the defense.  Smith’s speculative 
assertions that the confidential informant would offer helpful evidence, are 
insufficient to satisfy his burden of proof.  In short, Smith has not shown that 
                                                 
9 Appellant’s Op. Br. at 24. 
 
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the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to compel 
disclosure of the confidential informant’s identity. 
(9) 
Smith’s final claim is that the trial court’s pattern charge under 
Allen v. United States10 was erroneous as a matter of law, because it 
suggested that the jury was free to disregard the trial court’s jury instruction.  
The language that forms the basis of this claim was the final sentence 
(italicized below) in one of the concluding paragraphs of the charge, where 
the trial judge stated: 
You are not partisans.  You are judges.  Judges of the facts. 
Your sole purpose is to ascertain the truth from the evidence 
before you.  You are the sole and exclusive judges of the 
credibility of all of the witnesses and of the weight and effect 
of all the evidence, and in the performance of this high duty, 
you are at liberty to disregard the comments of both the Court 
and counsel, including, of course, the remarks I’m now 
making.11 
 
In response to defense counsel’s objections, the trial judge ruled: “Well, it’s 
part of the standard Allen charge.  I don’t think it instructs [the jury] that 
they’re free to disregard the Court’s instructions.  It refers to comments of 
the Court and counsel.”12 
 
(10) For Smith’s claim to have plausibility, the single sentence that 
forms the basis of that claim must be viewed out of context and in isolation. 
                                                 
10 164 U.S. 492 (1896). 
11 A-65 (italics added). 
12 A-66 (italics added). 
 
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But, the propriety of the concluding portion of the trial court’s Allen charge 
cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be examined in its entire context.  
When that is done, it becomes manifest that the concluding portion of the 
italicized sentence was not misleadingly instructing the jury that it was free 
to disregard all of the Court’s prior instructions.  All the jury was being told 
was that as part of its duty to assess the credibility of all witnesses, it could 
disregard comments of counsel (or even the Court) that, in the process of 
weighing the evidence, it found were not credible.  There is no evidence that 
the jury was confused about its function or role, and the trial court 
committed no error in giving the standard Allen charge to the jury. 
 
AND NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of 
the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice