Case Title: R. Scott McCormick v. Richard A. Schubring

Citation: 2003 WI 149

Docket Number: 2002AP001004

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 149 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1004 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
R. Scott McCormick, Robert L. McCormick  
and Shane McCormick,  
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Richard A. Schubring,  
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 26, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 11, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Langlade   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert A. Kennedy   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: Wilcox, J., did not participate   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs (in the court 
of appeals) by 
John H. 
Priebe and Priebe 
Law Offices, 
Rhinelander, and 
John J. 
Hogan and Hogan 
& 
Melms 
LLP, 
Rhinelander, and oral argument by John J. Hogan. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief (in the 
court of appeals) by John B. Rhode and Sommer, Olk, Schroeder & 
Payant, Antigo, and oral argument by John B. Rhode. 
 
 
2003 WI 149 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-1004  
(L.C. No. 
01CV83) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
R. Scott McCormick, Robert L. McCormick  
and Shane McCormick,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard A. Schubring,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 26, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Langlade 
County, Robert A. Kennedy, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J.   Richard A. Schubring 
appeals a Langlade County Circuit Court judgment that granted R. 
Scott McCormick, Robert McCormick and Shane McCormick (the 
"McCormicks") an easement of necessity across Schubring's land.  
This case is before us on certification of two questions: 
(1)  Whether, when the elements required for an 
easement of necessity are established, the easement 
arises by operation of law or whether its creation is 
subject to the discretion of the circuit court; and 
(2)  Whether an easement of necessity may be 
afforded to a grantor of real estate who formerly had 
No. 
02-1004   
 
2 
 
access to a public way, but after the severance of a 
portion of his property retains a landlocked parcel. 
We also answer a third question:   If the easement is a matter 
of discretion, whether the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion when it granted the McCormicks an easement of 
necessity. 
¶2 
We conclude that an easement of necessity generally 
does not arise as a matter of law, but rather, through the 
exercise of a circuit court's discretion.  We also conclude that 
one who stands in the shoes of a grantor who formerly had access 
to a public highway but after the severance of a portion of his 
land retained a landlocked parcel, may obtain an easement of 
necessity.  And finally, the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in granting the McCormicks the easement.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
At one time, Merritt Olk owned three contiguous 40-
acre parcels of undeveloped land in Langlade County.  In 1946, 
Langlade County took the eastern most 40-acre parcel by tax 
deed.  As the 40 acres the county took provided the only highway 
access, Olk's remaining 80 acres became landlocked.  However, a 
dirt and gravel road cuts diagonally through the 40-acre parcel 
and connects the landlocked parcel to a public road.  Olk used 
this road for access to the 80-acre parcel both before and after 
it became landlocked. 
¶4 
In 1955, George Gresch purchased the 40-acre parcel 
from the county, and in 1983, he sold it to Richard Schubring.  
No. 
02-1004   
 
3 
 
Prior to his purchase, Schubring did not see the dirt road.  He 
inquired "by word of mouth" and tried, unsuccessfully, to find 
public records relating to the property.  He concluded that the 
40-acre parcel was not subject to an easement. 
¶5 
In 1996, the McCormicks purchased the remaining 80 
acres 
from 
the 
testamentary 
beneficiaries 
of 
Olk. 
 
The 
McCormicks use the property for hunting.  Prior to purchase, 
they were aware of and had used the dirt road across Schubring's 
property 
for 
ingress 
and 
egress. 
 
After 
purchase, 
with 
Schubring's permission, the McCormicks used the road to remove 
timber from their land.  Schubring requested that they leave the 
road in as good a condition as they found it.  The McCormicks 
did so, 
spending 
$2,000 
to 
$3,000 
to make 
repairs and 
improvements to the road. 
¶6 
Schubring's property is presently maintained under a 
Wisconsin managed forest program that requires public foot 
access across the entire parcel, including the dirt and gravel 
road.  See Wis. Stat. § 77.83(2)(a) (2001-02).  Although the 
McCormicks initially used the road for vehicle access, Schubring 
now has prevented them from doing so, and when Schubring decides 
to remove his land from the forest management program, foot 
access could be extinguished as well.  The McCormicks tried to 
negotiate the purchase of an easement from Schubring, but were 
unsuccessful.  They then filed this lawsuit, wherein the circuit 
court granted them an easement of necessity; Schubring appealed 
and 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
certified 
the 
above-referenced 
questions to us.   
No. 
02-1004   
 
4 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
¶7 
Whether an easement of necessity arises as a matter of 
law or may be left to the discretion of the circuit court, and 
whether one who is landlocked but stands in the shoes of a 
grantor may obtain an easement of necessity are questions of law 
that we decide de novo.  See State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶32, 
237 Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477.  We review a circuit court's 
exercise of discretion to determine whether the exercise was 
erroneous.  City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage 
Dist., 171 Wis. 2d 400, 423, 491 N.W.2d 484 (1992). 
B. 
Easement of Necessity Principles 
¶8 
An easement is an interest that encumbers the land of 
another.  See Ludke v. Egan, 87 Wis. 2d 221, 227, 274 N.W.2d 641 
(1979).  It is a "liberty, privilege, or advantage in lands, 
without profit, and existing distinct from the ownership of the 
land."  Schwab v. Timmons, 224 Wis. 2d 27, 35-36, 589 N.W.2d 1 
(1999) (citation omitted).  The creation of an easement gives 
rise to two distinct property interests:  the dominant estate, 
that has the right to use the land of another, and the servient 
estate, that permits the exercise of that use.  Id. at 36.   
¶9 
Easements may be provided by express grant of the 
owner of the servient estate or through court action when there 
is a dispute about the rights of each party.  See Baurer v. 
Sokoloff, 254 Wis. 273, 276, 36 N.W.2d 61 (1949).  An easement 
of necessity, the type of easement at issue here, is often 
sought when an owner of landlocked property wants public highway 
No. 
02-1004   
 
5 
 
access and has been unable to obtain it from an adjoining 
landowner.  See Ludke, 87 Wis. 2d at 226.  
¶10 When deciding on a claim for an easement of necessity, 
courts employ land use principles similar to those employed in 
interpretations of conveyances of land.  28A C.J.S. Easements 
§ 91 (1996).  Therefore, interpretations relating to land that 
render any property useless are disfavored.  See Sampson Invs. 
v. Jondex Corp., 176 Wis. 2d 55, 62, 499 N.W.2d 177 (1993) 
(concluding that "'[a]lienations of land are, or ought to be, 
grave and deliberate transactions'" (quoting Frank C. Schilling 
Co. v. Detry, 203 Wis. 109, 116, 233 N.W. 635 (1930)).  One 
treatise has explained that: 
[a] conveyance that would otherwise deprive the land 
conveyed to the grantee, or land retained by the 
grantor, of rights necessary to reasonable enjoyment 
of the land implies the creation of a servitude 
granting or reserving such rights, unless the language 
or circumstances of the conveyance clearly indicate 
that the parties intended to deprive the property of 
those rights. 
Restatement (Third) of Prop.:  Creation of Servitudes § 2.15 
(2000).  Those rights "necessary to reasonable enjoyment of the 
land" generally have included foot and vehicular access, 
although access for utilities is becoming increasingly common.  
Id. at cmt. a; see also Richards v. Land Star Group, Inc., 224 
Wis. 2d 829, 838-39, 593 N.W.2d 103 (Ct. App. 1999). 
C. 
First Certified Question 
¶11 In Wisconsin, an easement of necessity may arise in 
favor of a property owner if he can prove the following required 
No. 
02-1004   
 
6 
 
elements: (1) common ownership of the proposed servient and 
dominant estates at the time of the severance that created the 
landlocked condition; and (2) the landlocked parcel had no 
access to a public roadway after it was severed and such lack of 
access continues.  Schwab, 224 Wis. 2d at 38; see also Jon W. 
Bruce and James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses 
in Land § 4:6 (2001).  However, while the elements set out above 
are required preliminarily before an easement of necessity may 
arise, they may not be sufficient to support an easement of 
necessity in every case.   
¶12 We have not been asked previously to address whether 
an easement of necessity arises as a matter of law or whether 
its creation is subject to judicial discretion.  There appears 
to be some dispute in other courts about this question.  See 
Richards, 
224 
Wis. 2d 
at 
852 
(Hoover, 
J., 
concurring).  
Therefore, we review relevant precedent to determine if our 
opinions require clarification. 
¶13 In Bino v. City of Hurley, 14 Wis. 2d 101, 105-06, 109 
N.W.2d 544 (1961), we explained that when a landowner severs a 
parcel of real estate that has no access to a public highway, an 
easement to permit ingress and egress from the landlocked parcel 
"would be implied to have passed to the grantee . . . because 
such right of way was one of necessity" (citing Sicchio v. 
Alvey, 10 Wis. 2d 528, 538, 103 N.W.2d 544 (1960), and Bullis v. 
Schmidt, 
5 
Wis. 2d 
457, 
461, 
93 
N.W.2d 
476 
(1958)).  
Additionally, in Ludke, where we reviewed a circuit court's 
decision to grant an easement of necessity to a landlocked 
No. 
02-1004   
 
7 
 
grantee, we reasoned that a way of necessity was properly 
granted because "[a] way is implied over the land retained by 
the grantor, [when the grantee has no other highway access over 
his own land]."  Ludke, 87 Wis. 2d at 230.  As we explained, 
"The Ludke property was originally part of the Micke farm and 
when it was sold as a landlocked parcel of real estate, a way of 
necessity thereby came into being."  Id. at 231.  And most 
recently, we explained that where the factual predicate required 
for an easement of necessity has been proved, "an easement by 
necessity will be implied over the land retained by the 
grantor."  Schwab, 224 Wis. 2d at 38.   
¶14 In each case cited above, we appear to have concluded, 
as a matter of law, that a grantor who severs property that has 
no other access to a public highway except through the grantor's 
property is deemed to have transferred an easement of necessity 
for ingress and egress to the property of the landlocked 
grantee.  However, we also note that the judicial creation of an 
easement is inherently equitable in nature.  Richards, 224 
Wis. 2d 
at 
848.1 
 
Equitable 
decisions 
are 
generally 
discretionary.  See Wynhoff v. Vogt, 2000 WI App 57, ¶13, 233 
Wis. 2d 673, 608 N.W.2d 400.  Notwithstanding that maxim, when 
the exercise of discretion will permit only one outcome under 
the legal standard that must be applied to the facts found, the 
                                                 
1 See also Restatement (Third) of Prop.:  Creation of 
Servitudes 
§ 2.15 
(2000); 
Michael 
J. 
Geraghty, 
Equitable 
Remedies in Property Disputes:  A Primer on Partition, Quieting 
Title and Enjoining Nuisances, 204 N.J. Law. 28 (Aug. 2000). 
No. 
02-1004   
 
8 
 
question about whether to grant the easement becomes one of law.  
See Vocational, Technical & Adult Educ., Dist. 13 v. DILHR, 76 
Wis. 2d 230, 240, 251 N.W.2d 41 (1977).  Therefore, although the 
easements reviewed in Bino and Ludke appear to arise without the 
exercise of circuit court discretion, they are also consistent 
with discretionary decision-making. 
¶15 Accordingly, our decisions in regard to easements of 
necessity should not be read to imply that an easement of 
necessity always arises as a matter of law whenever the two 
required elements are proved because the equities that drive the 
creation and the scope of an easement may vary, requiring the 
circuit court to weigh the burdens and benefits the easement 
would create.  For example, when the landlocked party is the 
grantor, his participation in causing the landlocked condition 
may be assessed.  "[T]he petitioners' current ownership of 
landlocked property resulted not from a grant of property to 
them but by their own acts in conveying away their highway 
access."  Schwab, 224 Wis. 2d at 40.  The location of the 
requested easement is also a factor courts consider.  As we 
explained in Schwab, we have never granted a way of necessity 
across the properties of unrelated third parties who had no 
common ownership when the petitioner's landlocked parcel was 
created, which was the relief requested by the Schwabs.  Id. at 
40-41.  
¶16 Furthermore, a bona fide purchaser in the chain of 
title of a grantor who created a landlocked parcel may have a 
defense to an easement of necessity if he can show he had no 
No. 
02-1004   
 
9 
 
knowledge or notice, actual or constructive, of either the way 
of access maintained across his property or the landlocked 
condition of the severed parcel.  See Ludke, 87 Wis. 2d at 229 
(citing Schmidt v. Hilty-Forster Lumber Co., 239 Wis. 514, 1 
N.W.2d 154 (1942), and Taggart v. Warner, 83 Wis. 1, 53 N.W. 33 
(1892)); see also Backhausen v. Mayer, 204 Wis. 286, 290-91, 234 
N.W. 904 (1931).2  Therefore, the combination of factors 
presented by each case may require a circuit court to weigh and 
balance them before arriving at a decision.  Richards, 224 
Wis. 2d at 848-49.  This shows the exercise of discretion in a 
typical fashion.  Id.  Accordingly, we review the circuit 
court's decision to determine whether it properly exercised its 
discretion.  City of Brookfield, 171 Wis. 2d at 423. 
D. 
Second Certified Question 
¶17 Schubring argues that Schwab sets forth the law of 
easements of necessity in this state for a grantor whose 
severance of the property caused the landlocked condition to 
occur.  He contends that Schwab directs that only grantees of 
landlocked property are eligible for easements.  The McCormicks, 
on the other hand, rely on the court of appeals decision in 
Richards, where the court initially determined whether the 
required elements of an easement of necessity were met and then 
balanced the burdens and benefits to each party to determine 
                                                 
2 Although Schubring did say he did not know of the easement 
and had not seen the roadway prior to his purchase, he did not 
raise the defense of a bona fide purchaser without knowledge or 
notice in the circuit court or before us.  Therefore, we do not 
address that defense further.  
No. 
02-1004   
 
10 
 
whether an easement should be granted and, if so, its scope.  
Richards, 224 Wis. 2d at 848.   
¶18 We are not persuaded that Schwab is dispositive of the 
issues presented by the controversy before us because the 
Schwabs failed to establish the preliminary elements that are 
always required for an easement of necessity.  They did not 
prove common ownership of their parcel at the time their parcel 
became landlocked with the parcels over which they sought an 
easement.  Schwab, 224 Wis. 2d at 40.  Instead, they requested 
an easement over lands held by third parties who were not 
successors in title from one who was a common grantor when the 
Schwabs' landlocked condition arose.  Id. at 40-41.  As we 
explained, "[I]t would be contrary to this state's policy 
against encumbrances for this court to award an easement to the 
petitioners over parcels of unrelated third parties  . . . ."  
Id.  Therefore, we did not decide whether an easement of 
necessity could be afforded to a grantor who was landlocked and 
had proved all the preliminary elements required.  Accordingly, 
our statement in Schwab that, "An easement by necessity only 
exists where an owner sells a landlocked parcel to another, in 
which case the law will recognize a way of necessity in the 
grantee over the land retained by the grantor," Schwab, 224 
Wis. 2d at 40 (emphasis in the original), should be read to 
further explain that an easement of necessity may traverse 
property that is or was held by the grantor who created the 
landlocked condition, but cannot traverse property of an 
unrelated third party.  And, it should not be read to conclude 
No. 
02-1004   
 
11 
 
that only a grantee may obtain an easement of necessity for 
landlocked property.  This explanation is also in accord with 
legal treatises that have concluded that both grantees and 
grantors may seek an easement of necessity, Restatement (Third) 
of Prop.:  Creation of Servitudes § 2.15, and the long-standing 
public policy of this state that favors utilization of land.  
Dillman v. Hoffman, 38 Wis. 559, 574 (1875).3  
E. 
Third Question 
¶19 Here, in contrast to the Schwabs, the McCormicks have 
established all the preliminary elements necessary to their 
claim for relief.  First, Olk owned both the parcel now owned by 
Schubring (the proposed servient estate) and the parcel owned by 
the 
McCormicks 
(the 
proposed 
dominant 
estate) 
when 
the 
McCormicks' parcel became landlocked.  Second, the McCormicks' 
parcel continues to have no access to a public highway.  
¶20 We 
now 
turn 
to 
the 
additional 
relevant 
facts 
considered by the circuit court as it exercised its discretion.  
In favor of the McCormicks' claim, the court considered that:  
(1) extremely limited use can be made of the landlocked property 
without the requested vehicular access; (2) this is very wild 
land, used by both parties solely for hunting; (3) while the 
McCormicks stand in the shoes of a grantor, the creation of the 
                                                 
3 Easements of necessity are "supported by a public policy 
favoring the full and productive utilization of land."  Hunter 
C. Carroll, Property——Easements by Necessity:  What Level of 
Necessity is Required?, 19 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 475 (Fall 1995); 
See also 28A C.J.S. Easements § 91 (1996) ("land should not be 
landlocked and rendered useless").   
No. 
02-1004   
 
12 
 
landlocked circumstances was due to Langlade County's seizure of 
Olk's property for delinquent taxes, not to a voluntary act of 
the grantor;4 (4) after the direct access to a highway was taken 
by the county, Olk continued to reach the landlocked parcel by 
using the dirt road through the 40 acres now owned by Schubring; 
(5) when the county sold the 40-acre parcel to Gresch, Olk 
continued to use the dirt road for access; and (6) when the 
McCormicks purchased the property from Olk, they knew of the 
road and used it to access the property, even improving the road 
with Schubring's consent.5  In Schubring's favor, the court 
considered that: (1) when the McCormicks bought the property, 
they knew they had no legally enforceable right to use the road 
and that without permission to use it, the parcel they were 
buying would be landlocked; (2)  before Schubring purchased the 
property, he did not see the dirt road;6 (3) he checked for an 
                                                 
4 In this regard, the McCormicks' claim is distinguishable 
from grantors who knowingly convey the part of their properties 
that includes highway access, as occurred in Rock Lake Estates 
Unit Owners Ass'n v. Township of Lake Mills, 195 Wis. 2d 348, 
373, 536 N.W.2d 415 (Ct. App. 1995), and in Schwab v. Timmons, 
224 Wis. 2d 27, 589 N.W.2d 1 (1999).  Here, Olk, the common 
grantor, did not have the opportunity to reserve access for the 
parcel now owned by the McCormicks. 
5 There is no claim here, nor could there be, that Olk's and 
the McCormicks' continued use of the road establishes an 
easement by prescription.  Since their use of the road was with 
Schubring's (and the prior owners') permission, the elements for 
a prescriptive easement cannot be established.  Ludke v. Egan, 
87 Wis. 2d 221, 231-32, 274 N.W.2d 641 (1979).   
6 We also note that if Schubring had known of the easement 
prior to his purchase or its use was so open, obvious and 
notorious that he must have known of it, those facts would have 
favored the McCormicks' request.  See Ludke, 87 Wis. 2d at 228. 
No. 
02-1004   
 
13 
 
easement "by word of mouth," and by asking the town and county 
clerks if they had documents pertaining to the property.  He 
found no documents, and no one with whom he spoke told him the 
property was subject to an easement; (4) he was concerned that 
if he chose to construct a building on the property, he would be 
unable to do so because the land is most suitable for building 
in the area of the road; and (5) his property is less valuable 
with a legally enforceable easement across it.  
¶21 The circuit court then balanced the benefits and 
burdens created by those facts.  It noted that while the 
McCormicks presently have pedestrian access across Schubring's 
property because the property is under a Wisconsin managed-
forest program, all access could be extinguished, when and if 
Schubring decides to remove the property from the program.  
Further, the circuit court noted that this is very remote, wild 
land and that to limit access to foot traffic would involve the 
McCormicks traversing Schubring's property for more than a 
quarter of a mile over very rough terrain.  The court also 
concluded that vehicular access to property is more important 
than in the past, and that the easement of necessity should 
include vehicular access.  The court found the burden to 
Schubring's property is minimal, as the road is already in 
existence and has been used by vehicles in the past.  It also 
found that continued use of the road would not prevent the 
construction of a building on Schubring's property at some time 
in the future.  Accordingly, because the McCormicks proved the 
elements preliminarily required for an easement of necessity and 
No. 
02-1004   
 
14 
 
the circuit court weighed the burdens and benefits to each 
party's property from the proposed easement, we cannot conclude 
that it erroneously exercised its discretion in granting the 
easement.  See City of Brookfield, 171 Wis. 2d at 423.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶22 We conclude that an easement of necessity generally 
does not arise as a matter of law, but rather, through the 
exercise of a circuit court's discretion.  We also conclude that 
one who stands in the shoes of a grantor who formerly had access 
to a public highway but after the severance of a portion of his 
land retained a landlocked parcel, may obtain an easement of 
necessity.  And finally, the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in granting the McCormicks the easement.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
¶23 JON P. WILCOX, J., did not participate. 
No. 
02-1004   
 
 
 
1