Case Title: PITTSFIELD CHARTER TWP V WASHTENAW COUNTY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 119590

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 9, 2003  
PITTSFIELD CHARTER TOWNSHIP,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 119590  
WASHTENAW COUNTY,  
Defendant-Appellant,  
and  
CITY OF ANN ARBOR,  
Defendant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE COURT  
TAYLOR, J.  
The question presented is whether defendant Washtenaw  
County 
must 
comply 
with 
plaintiff 
Pittsfield 
Charter  
Township’s zoning ordinance in the locating of the county’s  
proposed homeless shelter. We hold that the county does not  
need to comply with the township’s zoning ordinance and,  
therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and  
reinstate the summary-disposition order entered by the trial  
court.  
I  
Washtenaw County owns property in Pittsfield Charter  
Township that the township’s zoning ordinance has designated  
as 
I-1 
(limited 
industrial).  With the financial participation  
of the city of Ann Arbor, the county advertised a proposal to  
construct a new homeless shelter, which it would own, on the  
property.  The I-1 district ordinance neither expressly nor  
conditionally permits such a use.  
Pittsfield Township took the position that the proposed  
use violated its zoning ordinance and thus was impermissible  
because the Township Zoning Act (TZA), MCL 125.271 et seq.,  
and 
specifically 
MCL 
125.271(1),1 
gives 
its  
1MCL 125.271(1) reads:  
The township board of an organized township in 
this state may provide by zoning ordinance for the 
regulation 
of 
land 
development 
and 
the  
establishment of districts in the portions of the 
township outside the limits of cities and villages 
which regulate the use of land and structures; to 
meet the needs of the state's citizens for food, 
fiber, energy, and other natural resources, places 
of residence, recreation, industry, trade, service, 
and other uses of land; to insure that use of the 
land shall be situated in appropriate locations and 
relationships; 
to 
limit 
the 
inappropriate 
overcrowding of land and congestion of population, 
transportation 
systems, 
and 
other 
public 
facilities; to facilitate adequate and efficient 
provision 
for 
transportation 
systems, 
sewage 
(continued...)  
2  
 
1(...continued) 
disposal, water, energy, education, recreation, and 
other public service and facility requirements; and 
to promote public health, safety, and welfare. For 
these purposes, the township board may divide the 
township into districts of such number, shape, and 
area as it considers best suited to carry out this 
act. The township board of an organized township 
may use this act to provide by ordinance for the 
regulation 
of 
land 
development 
and 
the  
establishment of districts which apply only to land 
areas and activities which are involved in a  
special program to achieve specific land management 
objectives and avert or solve specific land use 
problems, 
including 
the 
regulation 
of 
land  
development and the establishment of districts in 
areas subject to damage from flooding or beach 
erosion, and for that purpose may divide the 
township into districts of a number, shape, and 
area considered best suited to accomplish those 
objectives. Ordinances regulating land development 
may also be adopted designating or limiting the 
location, the height, number of stories, and size 
of dwellings, buildings, and structures that may be 
erected or altered, including tents and trailer 
coaches, and the specific uses for which dwellings, 
buildings, and structures, including tents and 
trailer coaches, may be erected or altered; the 
area of yards, courts, and other open spaces, and 
the sanitary, safety, and protective measures that 
shall be required for the dwellings, buildings, and 
structures, including tents and trailer coaches; 
and the maximum number of families which may be 
housed in buildings, dwellings, and structures, 
including tents and trailer coaches, erected or 
altered. The provisions shall be uniform for each 
class 
of 
land 
or 
buildings, 
dwellings, 
and  
structures, including tents and trailer coaches, 
throughout each district, but the provisions in 1 
district may differ from those in other districts. 
A township board shall not regulate or control the 
drilling, completion, or operation of oil or gas 
wells, or other wells drilled for oil or gas 
exploration 
purposes 
and 
shall 
not 
have  
jurisdiction with reference to the issuance of 
(continued...)  
3 
 
 
zoning priority that the county cannot ignore.  The county,  
however, asserted that, pursuant to the county commissioners  
act (CCA), MCL 46.1 et seq., specifically MCL 46.11, county  
boards of commissioners are not subject to the township zoning  
ordinances when determining the site of, or prescribing the  
time and manner of erecting, county buildings.  MCL 46.11(b),  
(d).2 
 The township filed a complaint in the Washtenaw Circuit  
Court seeking a declaration that the county must comply with  
the township’s zoning ordinance, and seeking to enjoin the  
county from disregarding the zoning ordinance and proceeding  
with the construction of the proposed homeless shelter. The  
1(...continued) 
permits for the location, drilling, completion, 
operation, or abandonment of those wells. The  
jurisdiction relative to wells shall be vested 
exclusively in the supervisor of wells of this 
state, as provided in part 615 (Supervisor of 
wells) of the natural resources and environmental 
protection act, [MCL 324.61501 to 324.61527.]  
2MCL 46.11 provides in pertinent parts that a county 
board of commissioners may:  
(b) 
Determine 
the 
site 
of, 
remove, 
or  
designate a new site for a county building.  The  
exercise 
of 
the 
authority 
granted 
by 
this  
subdivision is subject to any requirement of law 
that the building be located at the county seat.  
* * *  
(d) Erect the necessary buildings for jails, 
clerks’ offices, and other county buildings, and 
prescribe the time and manner of erecting them.  
4  
complaint also named the city of Ann Arbor as a codefendant.3  
The county filed a motion for summary disposition under  
MCR 2.116(C)(8), asserting that, as a matter of law, it was  
immune from the zoning requirements of the township.4  The  
township filed a similar motion asserting the converse, that  
the TZA gave it priority and that, accordingly, the county was  
not immune. The circuit court, while denying the township’s  
motion, granted the county’s motion on the basis that MCL  
46.11 granted the county plenary authority to choose sites for  
buildings and that the county was exempt from Pittsfield  
Township’s zoning ordinances.  
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.5  The Court  
outlined that the tests for determining exemptions from the  
requirements of a township zoning ordinance were set out in  
Dearden v Detroit, 403 Mich 257; 269 NW2d 139 (1978), Burt  
Twp v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 459 Mich 659, 669; 593 NW2d  
3At the same time, the township obtained an order to show 
cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue.  On June  
16, 1998, a stipulation and order was entered whereby the 
parties agreed that preliminary injunctive relief was not 
required.  
Two 
subsequent orders extended the defendants’ time 
to respond to the complaint.  
4The city of Ann Arbor concurred with the county’s motion 
to the extent it requested confirmation of the county’s 
authority to use the property in question for a homeless 
shelter.  Accordingly, we refer only to Washtenaw County as 
defendant in our discussion.  
5246 Mich App 356; 633 NW2d 10 (2001).  
5 
 
534 (1999), and Byrne v Michigan, 463 Mich 652; 624 NW2d 906  
(2001).  It then characterized this case law as holding that,  
to be exempt from the zoning ordinances, the statute granting  
the county authority to site buildings must explicitly state  
that it supersedes the zoning ordinance.  As the Court  
described it:  
If the Legislature meant to say that the 
county’s power to site and use its property is 
plenary (not subject to, but exempt from, any legal 
restrictions), the Legislature could have easily 
and expressly said so.  It did not, and we conclude 
that it is neither permissible nor appropriate for 
us to graft such a plenary gloss on this statutory 
provision. [246 Mich App 362.]  
The county appealed from this ruling and we granted leave to  
appeal. 466 Mich 859 (2002).  
II  
This case is before us on a matter of statutory  
interpretation. Because this is a matter of law, our review  
is de novo. Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732,  
739; 641 NW2d 567 (2002).  
III  
We are called on to examine the two acts that are the  
sources of township and county authority, the TZA and the CCA.  
The TZA vests townships with broad authority to enact zoning  
ordinances to regulate land development and to “insure that  
the use of land shall be situated in appropriate locations and  
6  
relationships . . . .”  MCL 125.271(1).6
 The TZA further  
directs townships to define zones “to meet the needs of the  
state’s residents for . . . places of residence, recreation,  
industry, trade, service, and other uses of land . . . .”  
Id.; MCL 125.273.7  This authority given to the townships,  
however, does not extend to the regulation or control of oil  
or other wells that are under the jurisdiction of the  
6The statute is set out in n 1.  
7MCL 125.273 reads:  
The zoning ordinance shall be based upon a 
plan designed to promote the public health, safety, 
and general welfare; to encourage the use of lands 
in 
accordance 
with 
their 
character 
and  
adaptability, and to limit the improper use of 
land; to conserve natural resources and energy; to 
meet the needs of the state’s residents for food, 
fiber, and other natural resources, places of 
residence, recreation, industry, trade, service, 
and other uses of land; to insure that uses of the 
land shall be situated in appropriate locations and 
relationships; 
to 
avoid 
the 
overcrowding 
of  
population; to provide adequate light and air; to 
lessen congestion on the public roads and streets; 
to reduce hazards to life and property; to  
facilitate adequate provision for a system of 
transportation, sewage disposal, safe and adequate 
water supply, education, recreation, and other 
public 
requirements; 
and 
to 
conserve 
the  
expenditure of funds for public improvements and 
services to conform with the most advantageous uses 
of land, resources, and properties.  The zoning 
ordinance 
shall 
be 
made 
with 
reasonable  
consideration, among other things, to the character 
of each district; its peculiar suitability for 
particular uses; the conservation of property 
values and natural resources; and the general and 
appropriate trend and character of land, building, 
and population development.  
7  
 
supervisor of wells pursuant to the Natural Resources and  
Environmental 
Protection 
Act, 
MCL 
324.101 
et 
seq.,  
particularly MCL 324.61501 et seq., or power lines that are  
subject to the Electric Transmission Line Certification Act,  
MCL 460.561 et seq.  
The CCA, upon which the county relies, states at MCL  
46.118 that counties can determine site selection and the time  
and manner of erecting county buildings.  However, there is  
one limitation on this power.  It is found in the second  
sentence of MCL 46.11(b) and it limits the site-selection  
authority by directing that the county cannot disregard any  
requirement of law holding that a county building be located  
at the county seat. 
These provisions are, of course,  
potentially in tension with each other in their grants of  
authority.
 It is our undertaking to establish the proper  
priority between them.  
IV  
In adjudicating this matter, the Court of Appeals found  
a conflict between the authority given to the townships and  
the counties under the TZA and the CCA.  It then resolved this  
conflict by construing our holdings in Dearden, Burt Twp, and  
Byrne to mean that there must be express indications in the  
statute granting the county immunity from the township’s  
8The statute is set out, in part, in n 2.  
8  
 
 
 
zoning power before the county could be immune.  
This Court articulated in Dearden, supra at 264, that in  
resolving a conflict between units of government the  
legislative intent, “where it can be discerned,” controls the  
question whether a governmental unit is subject to the  
provisions of another’s zoning ordinances.  
In Burt Twp, supra at 669, we reiterated this approach  
and cautioned that there are no “talismanic words” that convey  
the 
Legislature’s 
intent to create immunity from local zoning.  
Rather, the Legislature “need only use terms that convey its  
clear intention that the grant of jurisdiction given is, in  
fact, exclusive.” Id.  
This Court has also conceded that discerning the  
legislative intent regarding whether a government unit is  
immune from the provisions of local zoning ordinances has  
“proven difficult to apply.”  Id. at 664 n 3.  The insight of  
this observation is made apparent when one looks at the  
difficulties the Court of Appeals discussed here9 and which  
eventuated in what is best described as an almost mechanistic  
approach 
for 
determining priority.  The panel essentially held  
9The Court of Appeals has obviously mellowed a bit on the 
difficulties of discerning this intent.  In an earlier opinion  
on this topic, it described this undertaking as akin to 
engaging in “a Hegelian dialectic.”  Capital Region Airport  
Auth v DeWitt Charter Twp, 236 Mich App 576, 583; 601 NW2d 141 
(1999).  
9  
 
 
  
that if the county’s authority is not addressed explicitly by  
the Legislature, the township ordinances prevail.  As we have  
attempted in the past to explain, the test is not this simple.  
The analysis requires more than merely searching for words of  
exclusion. 
Recently in Burt Twp we gave guidance to courts  
searching for this intent, stating that the Legislature need  
not “use any particular talismanic words to indicate its  
intent.” Id. at 669.  This may not, as we had hoped it would,  
make the task easier, but, at least, it must mean that there  
are no special words, the absence of which engenders a  
specific outcome.  
Nevertheless, whether easy or not, the question remains:  
Where do we look to find the intent?  The answer is that we  
must look for guidance to the statutes themselves to see if  
there are any textual indications that would convey the  
Legislature’s intent on the issue of priority.  
We believe that, closely read, the statutes here at issue  
indicate that the higher priority is with the county.  We draw  
this first from the fact that in the CCA the Legislature  
expressly stated only one limitation on the authority of the  
county to site buildings.  That limitation is that the county  
cannot use the power that was given in MCL 46.11 to site  
buildings if there is any other requirement of law that county  
buildings be located at the county seat.  This language became  
10  
part of the act in 1998, when the Legislature amended the  
CCA.10  We believe this shows that the Legislature, by  
explicitly turning its attention to limits on the county  
siting power and deciding on only one limitation, must have  
considered the issue of limits and intended no other  
limitation. This conclusion is analogous to the discernment  
of intent undertaken by this Court in Dearden. There we held  
that the authority given to the state to site prisons gave  
priority over local zoning ordinances on the basis of the  
authorizing statute, MCL 791.204, which said that “the  
department shall have exclusive jurisdiction over . . . penal  
institutions . . . .”  Dearden, supra at 265. From this we  
found the intent of the Legislature, stating that we read this  
language as “a clear expression of the Legislature’s intent to  
vest the department with complete jurisdiction over the  
101998 PA 97.  Before the amendment of MCL 46.11, the 
act’s similar subsections read:  
(c) Determine the site of a county building.  
* * *  
(e) Remove or designate a new site for a 
county building required to be at the county seat, 
if the new site is not outside the limits of the  
village or city in which the county seat is 
situated, and remove or designate a new site for a 
county infirmary or medical care facility.  
These subsections were replaced by MCL 46.11(b), set out in n 
2.  
11  
 
state’s 
penal 
institutions, 
subject 
only 
to 
the 
constitutional  
powers of the executive and the judiciary, and not subject in  
any way to any other legislative act, such as the zoning  
enabling act.” Id.  
In response to this argument, which is properly  
characterized as applying the doctrine of expressio unius est  
exclusio alterius, the expression of one thing suggests the  
exclusion of all others,11 the township counters that the same  
approach applied to the TZA yields an outcome that gives the  
township an equal claim to priority. It argues that the TZA  
itself has two exemptions from township zoning power, certain  
wells and electric transmission lines, and that this must mean  
that, except for these, nothing else should be held to be  
exempt from township zoning power.  The township’s position  
has some appeal certainly, but we believe that a thorough  
analysis of the application of the doctrine to each statute  
makes the township’s position less defensible than the  
county’s.  
While it is correct that the TZA does have exemptions to  
disallow township zoning regulation or control of the  
activities surrounding the siting of oil and gas wells or  
electric transmission lines, in our view, the Legislature, in  
11Hoste v Shanty Creek Mgt, Inc, 459 Mich 561, 572 n 8; 
592 NW2d 360 (1999).  
12  
 
 
creating these exemptions, was not concerned with the issue of  
limits on township zoning power, but was merely engaged in  
efforts to coordinate the later enacted Electric Transmission  
Line Certification Act, even as the Legislature in 1943 had  
attempted to reconcile the then new TZA12 with the power  
created four years earlier for the supervisor of wells.13  
Confirmation that mere coordination was the Legislature’s  
goal, at least in 1995, can be discerned from the fact that  
the Legislature expressly stated in the latest substantive  
amendment of the TZA, 1995 PA 35,14 that unless the Electric  
Transmission Line Certification Act was enacted that the  
amendment to the TZA would not be effective.  
Further, even if expressio unius est exclusio alterius  
applied equally to benefit each party’s arguments, the  
township’s argument, that each has a statute giving priority  
over the other, would yield to the doctrine of last enactment.  
Old Orchard by the Bay Assoc v Hamilton Mut Ins Co, 434 Mich  
244, 257; 454 NW2d 73 (1990).  That doctrine presumes that the  
Legislature is aware of the existence of the law in effect at  
121943 PA 184.  
131939 PA 61.  
14The 
TZA 
was 
most 
recently 
amended, 
albeit  
nonsubstantively, by 1996 PA 47, which merely updated the 
statute number of the Natural Resources and Environmental  
Protection Act.  
13  
the time of its enactments and recognizes that, since one  
Legislature cannot bind the power of its successor, existing  
statutory language cannot be a bar to further exceptions set  
forth in subsequent, substantive enactments.  See Malcolm v  
East Detroit, 437 Mich 132; 139; 468 NW2d 479 (1991).  In  
relation to this case, the CCA was substantively amended in  
1998, whereas the TZA has not been substantively amended  
regarding this issue any time since then. Therefore, in the  
effort to establish priority, the CCA, as the most recent  
statement of the Legislature, prevails over the TZA.  
Further, and perhaps most compellingly, the township’s  
argument, that it also has an equally valid claim to  
application of the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio  
alterius, is flawed because this approach would cause MCL  
46.11(b) to be mere surplusage.  The reason is that, as argued  
by the township, MCL 46.11 would only give authority to the  
county to site buildings as it desired as long as the  
placement was in harmony with the township’s existing zoning  
plan.  Yet this very power was one the county, as well as any  
other land user, already had before the enactment of MCL  
46.11(b).  To aver that MCL 46.11(b) simply reiterates a power  
already possessed is to rob it of any meaning, that is, to  
make it surplusage.  This violates “the fundamental rule of  
[statutory] construction that every word of a statute should  
14  
 
  
be given meaning and no word should be treated as surplusage  
or rendered nugatory if at all possible.”  Feld v Robert &  
Charles Beauty Salon, 435 Mich 352, 364; 459 NW2d 279 (1990).  
The county’s position has no defect of this sort.  Its  
argument causes no portion of the TZA to be surplusage.  
Accordingly, we decline for these reasons also to adopt the  
township’s analysis of these statutes.  
Moreover, it is significant to us that the language of  
the TZA, on which the township relied, is less specific to the  
particular matter at hand than was the language relied on in  
Burt Twp, in which we determined that the Department of  
Natural Resources’ boat-launch sites were subject to local  
zoning. Burt Twp, supra at 671. In Burt Twp, we noted that  
the TZA authorized a township to regulate land development to  
facilitate “recreation” and that zoning plans were to be  
designed to “conserve natural resources.”  Id. at 665.  
Further, we noted that under the township planning act, MCL  
125.321 
et 
seq., 
the 
township 
plan 
was 
to 
include  
recommendations for, inter alia, “‘waterways and waterfront  
developments.’” Id. at 666, quoting MCL 125.327(2)(b).  These  
topics—recreation, 
natural 
resources, 
waterways, 
and  
waterfront development—suggested to us in Burt Twp that there  
had been legislative consideration of the priority issue in  
the area of recreational water access and usage and  
15  
 
 
accordingly led us to the conclusion that the township  
authority was meant to have priority. 
In the present case,  
however, when one reviews the mandates of the TZA, as relevant  
to siting county buildings, the TZA yields only highly  
generalized references to “places of residence,” “other uses  
of land,” and “other public requirements . . . .”  MCL  
125.273.  These seem to suggest no conclusion by the  
Legislature that the location of county buildings of any kind  
should be controlled by township zoning.  
Therefore, when  
these TZA provisions are viewed alongside the structure of the  
county power in MCL 46.11, the lack of focus on county  
buildings in the TZA reinforces our view that the Legislature  
in this circumstance intended that priority be given to the  
county in siting its buildings.  
We note also that the Court of Appeals made reference to  
the County Zoning Act, MCL 125.201 et seq., and attempted, by  
dovetailing it with the TZA, specifically MCL 125.298, to  
buttress its analysis.  This approach is less helpful than the  
Court thought, however, because it failed to fully consider  
that we are not dealing here with a decision taken pursuant to  
the county’s zoning authority and thus the effort to analyze  
this matter as implicating “a comprehensive statutory scheme”  
is unpersuasive. 246 Mich App 367.  
Finally, we also are mindful of the Dearden Court’s  
16  
policy analysis, which, while undoubtedly less implicated  
here, still has relevance. The Dearden Court said:  
[T]he zoning enabling act does not indicate 
whether or not the Legislature intended to subject 
the department to local zoning ordinances. We can  
find no expression of a legislative intent in the 
language of that act to subject the department’s 
exclusive jurisdiction over the state’s penal 
institutions, and its duty to coordinate and adjust 
those institutions as an integral part of a  
unified, general correctional system, to the many 
and varied municipal zoning ordinances throughout 
the state.  If the department were subject to those 
ordinances, the underlying policies of the general 
correctional system could be effectively thwarted 
by community after community prohibiting the  
placement 
of 
certain 
penal 
institutions 
in  
appropriate locations.  A careful reading of the 
statute establishing the department evidences a 
contrary legislative intent. [Id. at 266-267.]  
For these reasons, we reverse the decision of the Court  
of Appeals and reinstate the circuit court’s order of summary  
disposition.  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
17  
 
 
____________________________________ 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PITTSFIELD CHARTER TOWNSHIP,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 119590  
WASHTENAW COUNTY,  
Defendant-Appellant,  
and  
CITY OF ANN ARBOR,  
Defendant.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring).  
I concur with the majority’s result, but find its  
reliance on a small host of statutory-construction tools  
unhelpful and unnecessary.  The majority’s use of these tools  
to search for “textual indications” to resolve the conflict  
between the statutes at issue is remarkable in its failure to  
analyze the text of the statutes.  In my view, the plain text  
of the county commissioners act (CCA) clearly conveys the  
Legislature’s intent to grant county boards of commissioners  
exclusive 
jurisdiction 
over 
site 
selection 
for 
and  
 
 
construction of county buildings.1  
MCL 46.11 of the CCA provides in pertinent part that  
county boards of commissioners may:  
(b) 
Determine 
the 
site 
of, 
remove, 
or  
designate a new site for a county building.  
* * *  
(d) Erect the necessary buildings for jails, 
clerks’ offices, and other county buildings, and 
prescribe the time and manner of erecting them.  
On the other hand, the Township Zoning Act (TZA), MCL 125.271  
et seq., vests townships with broad authority to enact zoning  
ordinances to regulate land development and “to insure that  
the use of land shall be situated in appropriate locations and  
relationships . . . .”  MCL 125.271(1), cf. MCL 125.273.  
Anticipated or not by the Legislature, county-commission  
authority over site selection for, and the time and manner of  
erecting, county buildings as stated by MCL 46.11 conflicts  
with the township’s statutory authority over both the process  
and substance of township zoning.  
Three powers vested by the Legislature in county  
1As this Court held in Dearden v Detroit, 403 Mich 257, 
264; 269 NW2d 139 (1978), the legislative intent, “where it 
can 
be 
discerned,” 
controls 
the 
question 
whether 
a  
governmental unit is subject to the provisions of another’s 
zoning ordinances. In Burt Twp v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 
459 Mich 659, 669; 593 NW2d 534 (1999), we held that the 
Legislature “need only use terms that convey its clear 
intention that the grant of jurisdiction given is, in fact, 
exclusive.”  
2  
  
  
 
commissions through MCL 46.11 are relevant to and decisive of  
this case.
 MCL 46.11 provides that county boards may  
“determine the site of,” “prescribe the time . . . of  
erecting,” and “prescribe the . . . manner of erecting” county  
buildings. Because county commissions have had this express  
statutory authority over site selection and the time and  
manner of erecting county buildings since the CCA was first  
enacted in 1851, the majority’s application of the last­
enactment doctrine is unpersuasive.2  
“Determine” and “prescribe” convey the scope of county­
commission authority over the development of county buildings  
(i.e., 
site 
selection 
and 
the 
time 
and 
manner 
of  
construction).  To “determine” is to “set limits to; bound;  
define” 
or 
to 
“settle 
(a 
dispute, 
question, 
etc.)  
conclusively; decide.” 
Webster’s New World Dictionary (3d  
College ed).  To “prescribe” is “to write beforehand . . . to  
set down as a rule or direction; order; ordain; direct.” Id.  
2The majority suggests that MCL 46.11 was “substantively 
amended in 1998,” ante at 15, but fails to explain how the 
1998 
amendments 
were 
relevant to the powers county commissions 
have held since 1851.  Further, the doctrine of last enactment  
seems an odd choice in resolving this case because the 
doctrine is most often argued to support the implied repeal of 
one law by a later enacted law.  Not even the county argues 
that the CCA repealed any portion of the TZA.  Perhaps that is 
because repeals by implication are not favored. Washtenaw Co  
Rd Comm’rs v Pub Service Comm, 349 Mich 663, 680; 85 NW2d 134 
(1957).  
3  
 
While the CCA does not include the words “exclusive  
jurisdiction” 
in 
reference 
to 
county-commission 
authority 
over  
site selection for and construction of county buildings, this  
Court has emphasized that such “talismanic words” are  
unnecessary to convey the Legislature’s intent to create  
immunity from local zoning. Burt, supra at 669.  
Where, as here, a county board seeks to site a county  
building in a township zoning district where the commission’s  
intended use for the building is not permitted, the  
commission’s power to “determine the site of” a county  
building conflicts with the township’s authority to create  
zoning districts that exclude defined land uses. MCL 46.11,  
125.271(1).  Moreover, the authority to “prescribe the time  
. . . of erecting” county buildings affects the township’s  
process for reviewing site plans.  More critically, in my  
view, the authority to “prescribe the . . . manner of  
erecting” county buildings overrides a township’s control  
through the enactment of ordinances of the physical details of  
erecting buildings.3  
3MCL 125.271(1) provides that “[o]rdinances regulating 
land development may also be adopted designating or limiting 
the location, height, number of stories, and size of  
dwellings, buildings, and structures [that] may be erected or 
altered; the area of yards, courts, and other open spaces, and 
sanitary, safety, and protective measures that shall be 
required for the dwellings, buildings, and structures . . . 
erected or altered.”  
4  
 
 
 
  
In circumstances such as those presented, the county  
commission’s site-selection authority and its authority to  
prescribe the time and manner of erecting county buildings is  
diminished if the county board must comply with a township’s  
zoning 
districts 
just as the township’s authority to establish  
zoning districts is diminished if the county commission need  
not comply with township zoning districts when determining a  
site for a county building.  In light of the conflict, either  
the township or the county must relinquish some statutory  
authority.4  In this dispute, I would hold that the combined  
effect of the power to “determine the site” and the powers to  
“prescribe the time and manner of erecting” county buildings  
conveys a clear legislative intent to convey exclusive  
jurisdiction over the siting and construction of county  
buildings to county commissions.5  
4Therefore, the surplusage argument that the majority 
finds so compelling is of small assistance in determining 
which party prevails.  
5The authority of county boards pursuant to MCL 46.11 is 
distinguishable from that of the Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) as expressed in the Natural Resources and 
Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), MCL 324.101 et seq. The  
NREPA vests the DNR with the authority to construct public 
boat launches.  In Burt Twp, supra, this Court concluded that  
while the NREPA gave the DNR the “‘power and jurisdiction’ to 
manage land within its control,” such authority was “not the 
same as granting it exclusive jurisdiction,” id. at 669-670  
(emphasis in original), reasoning that “the fact that the DNR 
is mandated to create recreational facilities on public land 
it manages and controls does not indicate a legislative intent 
(continued...)  
5  
  
    
Further, the majority reads more than can be justified  
into the 1998 amendments of MCL 46.11 regarding a limitation  
of county-commission authority over buildings required by law  
to be at a county seat. Any modification of the county-seat  
limitation on a county board’s site-selection authority does  
not, as suggested by the majority, show that the Legislature  
“must have considered the issue of limits [on commission  
authority over county buildings] and intended no other  
limitation.” Ante at 12. Such reasoning is sheer speculation  
and especially unconvincing because a county-seat limitation  
on site selection for certain county buildings appears  
consistently to have been included in the CCA.6  
The Court of Appeals panel suggested this conclusion and  
interpretation of MCL 46.11 would impermissibly “graft . . .  
plenary gloss on this statutory provision,” 246 Mich App 356,  
5(...continued) 
that the DNR may do so in contravention of local zoning 
ordinances.” Id. at 670.  
6As noted by the majority, before 1998, MCL 46.11(e) 
provided: “Remove or designate a new site for a county 
building required to be at the county seat, if the new site is  
not outside the limits of the village or city in which the  
county seat is situated . . . .”
 (Emphasis added.) 
Similarly, 1851 PA 156, § 11, ¶ 5, provided that the county 
commission may “remove or designate a new site for any county 
buildings required to be at the county seats, when such  
removal shall not exceed the limits of the village or city at  
which the county seat is situated as previously located.” 
(Emphasis added.)  The actual text of these incarnations of  
the county-seat limitation do not appear significantly 
different from the limitation as it is currently drafted.  
6  
 
 
362; 633 NW2d 10 (2001).  I disagree by noting that the powers  
vested in county commissions over county buildings are  
conveyed in terms analogous to those by which the Legislature  
vested control over the state’s penal system in the Department  
of Corrections.7  In Dearden, the Department of Corrections’  
enabling statute expressed the Legislature’s “intent to vest  
the [Department of Corrections] with complete jurisdiction  
over the state’s penal institutions . . . .” Dearden, supra  
at 265.  The language of the department’s enabling statute  
vested the department with “‘exclusive jurisdiction over . . .  
penal institutions . . . .’”  Id., quoting MCL 791.204.  
Moreover, the Legislature expressly authorized the department  
to provide for the “‘unified development’” of penal  
institutions “‘so that each shall form an integral part of a  
general system.’”  Id. at 266, quoting MCL 791.202.  
For these reasons, I concur in the result of the majority  
opinion.  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
7It is worth noting that, contrary to the majority’s 
suggestion, the majority’s construction of the county seat 
site selection limitation is in no way “analogous to the 
discernment of intent undertaken by this Court in Dearden.”  
Ante at 12. 
Dearden focused on the text of the statute to  
discern the Legislature’s intent; the majority fails to 
consider the text of the statute.  
7