Case Title: Illinois v. Carter

Citation: 2015 IL 117709

Docket Number: 117709

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2015-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
People v. Carter, 2015 IL 117709 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
KELVIN CARTER, Appellee. 
 
 
Docket No. 
 
117709 
 
 
Filed 
 
 
December 3, 2015 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that 
court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. 
Kevin M. Sheehan, Judge, presiding. 
 
Judgment 
Appellate court judgment reversed. 
Circuit court judgment affirmed. 
 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, 
State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz, 
Annette Collins, Michelle Grimaldi-Stein, and Brian K. Hodes, 
Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People. 
 
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg, 
Deputy Defender, and Jennifer L. Bontrager, Assistant Appellate 
Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, 
for appellee. 
 
Justices 
JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Burke, 
and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
 
Digitally signed by 
Reporter of Decisions 
Reason: I attest to 
the accuracy and 
integrity of this 
document 
Date: 2016.01.08 
09:49:23 -06'00'
 
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OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
This case comes before the court from an appellate court decision holding that remand is 
required “because the circuit judge’s sua sponte dismissal of [defendant-petitioner’s] petition 
for relief from judgment on the merits was premature given that the petition was not properly 
served on the State.” 2014 IL App (1st) 122613, ¶ 1. For the following reasons, we reverse 
the judgment of the appellate court. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Kelvin Carter, 
was found guilty of the 2002 murder of Edmond Allen. Identification evidence was supplied 
by four occurrence witnesses. The circuit court ultimately imposed a 20-year prison sentence 
in addition to a 25-year enhancement, which was statutorily mandated because of the court’s 
determination that defendant had personally discharged a firearm during the commission of 
the crime. The court had initially sentenced defendant to a 30-year term of imprisonment but 
immediately amended its determination, imposing the 20-year minimum instead after 
realizing that defendant was subject to the enhancement. The appellate court affirmed 
defendant’s conviction and sentence in 2006 (People v. Carter, No. 1-04-1385 (2006) 
(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23)) and this court denied leave to 
appeal (People v. Carter, 221 Ill. 2d 647 (2006) (table)). 
¶ 4 
 
Thereafter, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging, inter alia, that he 
was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel and that the State had engaged in multiple 
instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant’s petition was summarily dismissed, the 
circuit court finding it frivolous and patently without merit. The appellate court affirmed 
(People v. Carter, No. 1-07-2160 (2009) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court 
Rule 23)), and this court denied leave to appeal (People v. Carter, 233 Ill. 2d 570 (2009) 
(table)). 
¶ 5 
 
On May 9, 2012, defendant mailed a “Motion to Vacate Judgment” in which he argued 
that the 25-year firearm enhancement to his sentence was void because the trial court only 
found him guilty of murder. Defendant also argued that the trial court was bound by its initial 
statement of 30 years’ imprisonment regardless of the statutorily required enhancement. 
Defendant attached a “Proof/Certificate of Service” to his pleading, alleging that he placed it 
in the “institutional mail” at the Menard Correctional Center. He listed as addressees the 
“Clerk of Court” and “State’s Atty. Office,” both of “2650 S. California Avenue,” Chicago, 
Illinois. The record shows a copy of defendant’s pleading was stamped “received” by the 
circuit clerk on May 15, 2012. It was docketed on May 29, 2012, to be called on June 5, 
2012. 
¶ 6 
 
The circuit court called the matter on June 5, 2012, but the record of proceedings 
indicates that only the judge and court reporter were present. A docket entry on that date 
evinces the circuit court’s quizzical assumption that defendant intended the pleading as a 
petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 
2012)). The docket and transcript for that date show that the case was scheduled for “court 
review” on July 10. On July 10, the court dismissed the petition on the merits. The cover 
 
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page of the transcript of proceedings indicates that an assistant State’s Attorney was present 
in the courtroom when the court announced that defendant’s “2-1401 petition is dismissed,” 
but the transcript does not show that the assistant State’s Attorney took any action. In a 
written order entered July 10, the circuit court recited the law applicable to section 2-1401 
proceedings and concluded with this observation and finding: 
“[P]etitioner contends that his firearm enhancement is void because the court did not 
find him guilty of personally discharging the firearm but only found him guilty of 
first degree murder. However, petitioner was found guilty of count two of his 
indictment which states that Kelvin Carter, without lawful justification shot and killed 
Edmond Allen while armed with a firearm, knowing that such an act created a strong 
probability of death or great bodily harm to Edmond Allen.” (Emphasis in original.) 
Neither party filed a postjudgment motion in the circuit court; thus, issues of sufficiency of 
service and notice to the State were never addressed. 
¶ 7 
 
In the words of the appellate court, on appeal, defendant-petitioner argued “that this court 
must remand this case to the circuit court because the court’s sua sponte dismissal of his 
section 2-1401 petition on the merits was premature, given that the petition was not properly 
served on the State.” 2014 IL App (1st) 122613, ¶ 8. The appellate court observed: 
“According to the proof of service attached to the section 2-1401 petition, defendant mailed 
his petition on May 9, 2012, and attempted to serve the State by placing the documents in the 
institutional mail at the Menard Correctional Center ‘properly addressed to the parties listed 
above for mailing through the United States Postal Service.’ ” Id. 
¶ 8 
 
The appellate court noted that the State’s response was two-fold. First, because an 
assistant State’s Attorney was in court at the time that the petition was dismissed, and thus 
had actual knowledge of the petition, the State waived improper service by not objecting to 
it. As such, the petition was ripe for adjudication when it was dismissed for failure to state a 
cause of action more than 30 days after it was received by the court. Id. ¶¶ 9, 16. Second, 
alternatively, the State suggested, “it is not clear from the record on appeal that defendant’s 
service did not comply with the requirements of Rule 105(b).” Id. ¶ 13. 
¶ 9 
 
The appellate court rejected the latter suggestion, stating: “the record clearly shows” that 
petitioner’s proof of service indicated “he attempted to serve the State by placing the 
documents in the institutional mail at the Menard Correctional Center *** for mailing 
through the United States Postal Service.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The appellate 
court continued, in a conclusive and dispositional vein: “There is nothing in the record that 
contradicts this information, nor does either party offer anything ***.” Id. ¶ 14. 
¶ 10 
 
Then, without speaking to the merits of defendant’s petition—which defendant 
apparently never argued—or the substance of the circuit court’s ruling thereon, the appellate 
court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred in 
prematurely dismissing petitioner’s section 2-1401 petition sua sponte before the petition had 
been properly served on the State. Id. ¶ 25. The court reasoned that result was dictated by our 
decisions in People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1 (2007), and People v. Laugharn, 233 Ill. 2d 318 
(2009): 
“Because Laugharn and Vincent demand that we base our determination as to 
whether the circuit court prematurely sua sponte dismissed a section 2-1401 petition 
by looking at the date of service, it necessarily follows that proper dismissal, either 
 
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with or without prejudice, cannot be achieved without service ***. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 
105(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1989); Laugharn, 233 Ill. 2d at 323-24; Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 5.” 
2014 IL App (1st) 122613, ¶ 25. 
¶ 11 
 
Having rejected the State’s arguments in opposition to reversal, the appellate court 
determined that the appropriate disposition was to vacate the judgment of the circuit 
court—which had found defendant’s petition lacked merit—and remand for further 
proceedings (id. ¶ 26). 
 
¶ 12 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 13 
 
We review de novo the dismissal of a section 2-1401 petition (Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 18), 
the interpretation of court rules (In re Thomas, 2012 IL 113035, ¶ 56), and questions of law 
generally (People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 368-69 (1999)). 
¶ 14 
 
At the outset, we note that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 106 governs the methods of 
notice to be used for petitions filed pursuant to section 2-1401, providing that “[n]otice of the 
filing of a petition under section 2–1401 *** shall be given by the same methods provided in 
Rule 105.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 106 (eff. Aug. 1, 1985). Rule 105(b) states that notice may be served, 
inter alia, by certified or registered mail. Ill. S. Ct. R. 105(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1989). Once notice 
has been served, the responding party has 30 days to file an answer or otherwise appear. Ill. 
S. Ct. R. 105(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1989). 
¶ 15 
 
As appellate panels have aptly noted, the notice requirements of Rule 105 are designed to 
prevent a litigant from obtaining new or additional relief without first giving the defaulted 
party a renewed opportunity to appear and defend. People v. Saterfield, 2015 IL App (1st) 
132355, ¶ 20. “ ‘The object of process is to notify a party of pending litigation in order to 
secure his appearance.’ ” People v. Kuhn, 2014 IL App (3d) 130092, ¶ 11 (quoting 
Professional Therapy Services, Inc. v. Signature Corp., 223 Ill. App. 3d 902, 910 (1992)). 
Some courts in this context have suggested, in construing the sufficiency of the notice, that 
courts should focus on whether the object and intent of the law were substantially attained 
rather than the formal and technical requirements. See id.; People v. Ocon, 2014 IL App (1st) 
120912, ¶ 23. 
¶ 16 
 
In Vincent—where neither proper service on the State nor actual notice were at 
issue—this court held that sua sponte dismissals of section 2-1401 petitions are proper, on 
the merits, where the State does not answer or otherwise plead within the applicable 30-day 
period. In Vincent, we stated that the State’s failure to answer the petition “constituted an 
admission of all well-pleaded facts *** and rendered Vincent’s petition ripe for 
adjudication.” Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 9-10. 
¶ 17 
 
Subsequently, in Laugharn—where neither proper service on the State nor actual notice 
were at issue—we held that petitioner’s section 2-1401 petition was not “ripe for 
adjudication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Laugharn, 233 Ill. 2d at 323. Noting that 
“[o]nly seven days had passed since [the petition’s] filing,” this court found that “[t]he circuit 
court’s dismissal short-circuited the proceedings and deprived the State of the time it was 
entitled to answer or otherwise plead.” Id. In short, this court acknowledged that the 30-day 
period for response, specified in Rule 105, was for the State’s benefit, and that the circuit 
court’s sua sponte ruling on the petition before the State had an opportunity to respond 
 
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constituted the deprivation of an entitlement inuring to the respondent-State—not the 
defendant-petitioner. 
¶ 18 
 
In this case, the defendant’s argument in the appellate court, and the appellate court’s 
disposition, were premised upon the assumption that defendant’s service on the State was 
deficient for failure to strictly comply with Rule 105, and that defendant’s error in that regard 
rendered the circuit court’s dismissal of defendant’s petition premature. We have examined 
the record and now conclude it does not affirmatively demonstrate there was deficient 
service. 
¶ 19 
 
This court has long recognized that to support a claim of error, the appellant—in this case 
the defendant in the appellate court—has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record 
such that the court of review may determine whether there was the error claimed by the 
appellant. In re Marriage of Gulla, 234 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2009). Without an adequate record 
preserving the claimed error, the court of review must presume the circuit court’s order 
conforms with the law. Id.; see also In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 72 (“This court 
presumes that a trial judge knows and follows the law unless the record affirmatively 
indicates otherwise.”); People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 420 (1996) (same). “Any doubts 
which may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the 
appellant.” Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984). 
¶ 20 
 
In this case, the claimed error, which is premised on allegedly deficient service, was not 
addressed at all in the circuit court, by either party. The issue was first raised by defendant on 
appeal as a means to obtain remand after his petition was dismissed by the circuit court on 
the merits. Thus, there is no meaningful record from the circuit court to be reviewed. What 
scant record there is consists of a statement in the proof of service defendant attached to his 
petition: “I have placed the documents listed below in the institutional mail at Menard 
Correctional Center, properly addressed to the parties listed above for mailing through the 
United States Postal Service.” To serve as a basis for defendant’s contention of error, that 
statement must affirmatively establish that defendant mailed his petition via some means 
other than certified or registered mail. However, all it establishes is where defendant mailed 
his petition—“the institutional mail”—and the medium through which it was to be 
transmitted: “the United States Postal Service.” The appellate court’s assumption that the 
language of the proof of service affirmatively established transmittal by regular mail, and 
thus deficient service (see 2014 IL App (1st) 122613, ¶ 14), is unwarranted on this record.1 
¶ 21 
 
In their briefs, the parties debate the significance of what defendant sees as shifting 
positions the State has taken in the course of the appellate process with respect to whether 
defendant’s service was or was not deficient. Defendant, of course, readily concedes 
deficient service on the State. Since his position is premised on deficient service, it is 
obviously in his interest to do so. As we have noted, the State’s arguments in the appellate 
                                                 
 
1Defendant suggests that “[a]s an indigent, pro se petitioner incarcerated at a state correctional 
facility, [he] lacks the access to the methods of service required by Rule 105(b),” “an obstacle this 
Court recognized in its amendment to Rule 12, allowing proof of service by affidavit or certification of 
deposit in the institutional mail.” Defendant acknowledges, however, that “[t]he proof of service 
addressed by Rule 12 is distinct from the method of service, which is addressed in Rule 105(b).” 
(Emphases added.) We note that the record in this case is inadequate to demonstrate that inmates in 
correctional facilities lack the means to comply with the service requirements of Rule 105(b). 
 
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court were in the alternative. First, because an assistant State’s Attorney was in court at the 
time that the petition was dismissed, and thus had actual knowledge of the petition, the State 
waived improper service by not objecting to it. Id. ¶¶ 9, 16. Second, the State suggested “it is 
not clear from the record on appeal that defendant’s service did not comply with the 
requirements of Rule 105(b).” Id. ¶ 13. We see no impropriety in the State’s arguments in the 
alternative. The State has taken a similar approach in argument before this court. Defendant 
insists that the State conceded in its petition for leave to appeal that there was improper 
service in this case. As defendant points out, there is a statement in the body of the petition 
wherein the State arguably concedes that the defendant served the State via regular mail, 
though the State claims there was no concession, that the State “simply referenced the fact 
that the appellate court so held by citing to the appellate court’s own conclusions.” 
¶ 22 
 
We mention this debate only to acknowledge that we have considered the point raised by 
defendant. Irrespective of the parties’ arguments, the record is what it is, and, in our view, it 
is insufficient to demonstrate the service deficiency that defendant must establish in order to 
advance his argument. As far as any arguable concession is concerned, it is well established 
that we, as a court of review, are not bound by a party’s concession. Beacham v. Walker, 231 
Ill. 2d 51, 60-61 (2008). 
¶ 23 
 
As noted, without an adequate record preserving the claimed error, we, as a court of 
review, must presume the circuit court’s order conforms with the law. In re Gulla, 234 Ill. 2d 
at 422. Applying that principle in this case, we cannot assume that defendant’s service upon 
the State was deficient. Though the regular return receipt for certified mail—for example—is 
sufficient proof of service by certified mail (see In re Dar C., 2011 IL 111083, ¶ 63 (citing 
705 ILCS 405/2-16(1) (West 2006))), the absence of such a receipt in the record does not 
affirmatively establish that service by certified mail was not accomplished, as it is up to the 
sender to file the receipt or not. In this case, the matter of service—adequate or 
deficient—was simply not addressed by the parties in the circuit court. 
¶ 24 
 
What we can discern from the record is that well over 30 days had passed since the filing 
of defendant’s petition when the circuit court dismissed defendant’s petition, sua sponte, on 
the merits. Defendant’s pleading was stamped received by the circuit clerk on May 15, 2012; 
docketed on May 29, 2012; and dismissed on July 10, 2012. An assistant State’s Attorney 
was in attendance and voiced no objection when the circuit court announced, in open court, 
that defendant’s “2-1401 petition is dismissed.” A written order was then prepared and filed 
that same day, outlining the court’s reasoning for the dismissal. No party filed a posttrial 
motion. A notice of appeal was timely filed by defendant listing, on the notice of appeal, the 
Cook County State’s Attorney as a recipient thereof. In sum, nothing in this record 
affirmatively establishes that the State was not given proper notice or that the circuit court’s 
sua sponte dismissal was premature. It was defendant’s burden, as the appellant below, to so 
show. On this record, we must presume the circuit court’s order was rendered in accordance 
with the applicable law. 
¶ 25 
 
To be sure, we encourage circuit courts to ascertain and note of record the date the State 
was properly served and to time any sua sponte rulings on pending petitions accordingly. 
That said, however, any section 2-1401 petitioner who seeks to use, on appeal, his own error, 
by way of allegedly defective service, in an effort to gain reversal of a circuit court’s sua 
 
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sponte dismissal of his or her petition on the merits, must affirmatively demonstrate the error 
via proceedings of record in the circuit court. 
¶ 26 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the 
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
¶ 27 
 
Appellate court judgment reversed. 
¶ 28 
 
Circuit court judgment affirmed.