Case Title: Matter of Farman

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-11-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Farman1992 WY 146841 P.2d 99Case Number: 92-115Decided: 11/12/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the 
Matter of the Workers' Compensation Claim of Dade R. FARMAN, an Employee of 
Farman Construction, Inc. Dade R. FARMAN, Appellant 
(Employee-Claimant),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE of 
Wyoming, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee (Objector-Defendant).

 
 
Appeal from 
District Court, SheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

 
 
James P. 
Castberg, Sheridan, for 
appellant.

 
 
Gerald W. 
Laska, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Kenneth E. Spurrier, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 

* Chief 
Justice at time of conference.

 
 

MACY, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Dade R. 
Farman appeals from the district court's order affirming the hearing examiner's 
decision to deny any worker's compensation benefits to Appellant. The hearing 
examiner denied all benefits because Appellant failed to prove that his untimely 
claim did not prejudice the Workers' Compensation Division and, alternatively, 
because sufficient evidence did not exist to show that Appellant's injuries 
arose out of his employment.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant presents the 
following issues for our review:

 
 
The 
district court judge erred in his findings

 
 
I. In 
denying the Appellant's Motion For Change of Judge.

 
 
II. That 
the evidence produced by the Appellant was not sufficient to overcome the 
presumption that the Division's investigation was prejudiced by the Appellant's 
late filing of his claim.

 
 
III. That 
the record reveals substantial evidence to support the finding that the 
Appellant was not headed towards a construction job at the time of the 
accident.

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant was an 
employee and an officer of Farman Construction, Inc., a small family-run 
corporation whose business consisted primarily of remodeling residential homes. 
Appellant claims that he was injured while traveling to one of the corporation's 
construction sites. On November 28, 1989, Appellant was driving his pickup truck 
north on Coffeen 
Avenue in Sheridan, Wyoming, when an oncoming vehicle crossed the 
center line and struck the left front corner of Appellant's truck. As a result 
of the collision, Appellant suffered numbness, lower back pain, and headaches 
which impaired his ability to perform construction work. Appellant started 
receiving medical treatment for his ailments approximately one week after his 
accident occurred, and he continued to be treated by several doctors over a 
period of many months.

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellant waited until 
July 10, 1990, almost seven and one-half months after the accident happened, to 
file a claim for worker's compensation benefits. In conjunction with his claim, 
Appellant submitted a letter explaining that the delay in filing a claim was due 
to his assumption that State Farm Insurance Companies (the insurer for the car 
which struck him) would pay for his lost wages and medical expenses. The 
Workers' Compensation Division initially awarded temporary total disability 
benefits to Appellant for his accident-related injuries but subsequently ceased 
making payments after determining that his injuries did not arise out of and in 
the course of his employment. Following a hearing on July 16, 1991, the hearing 
examiner denied all claims. The hearing examiner offered two alternative grounds 
to support his decision: (1) Appellant failed to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that his late claim did not prejudice the Workers' Compensation 
Division; and (2) he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
injuries arose in the course of his employment. The district court found that 
substantial evidence existed to support the hearing examiner's decision, and 
Appellant filed a timely appeal with this Court.

 
 

[¶6.]     In his first issue, 
Appellant claims that the district judge erred by not recusing himself from 
Appellant's worker's compensation appeal. Appellant's dissatisfaction stemmed 
from a statement the judge allegedly made relating to a separate civil action 
which Appellant had brought against the driver of the other car. In an affidavit 
attached to his motion for a change of judge, Appellant 
stated:

 
 
4. 
Following the trial [against the driver of the other car] it has been reported 
to me by sources I consider to be reliable, that Judge Wolfe had stated that he 
would have given me only the amount of my bill with Dr. 
Smith.

 
 
5. Based on 
the foregoing, I do[] not feel that I can obtain a fair and impartial hearing on 
my Appeal herein.

 
 
The 
judgment in the suit against the other driver was for $24,000, which was 
considerably more than the amount of Dr. Smith's bill.

 
 

[¶7.]     In considering 
Appellant's motion to disqualify him, the district judge was governed by 
W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(2)1 and Canons 2 and 3 of the Wyoming 
Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 2 requires a judge to act at all times in a 
manner which promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary. Canon 3E applies more specifically to the issue at hand, stating in 
part:

 
 
(1) A judge 
shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to 
instances where:

 
 
(a) the 
judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, 
or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding[.]

 
 
W.R.C.P. 
40.1(b)(2) provided in relevant part:

 
 
(2) 
Disqualification for Cause. - Whenever the grounds for such motion become known, 
any party may move for a change of district judge on the ground that the 
presiding judge . . . (E) is biased or prejudiced against the party or his 
counsel. The motion shall be supported by an affidavit or affidavits of any 
person or persons, stating sufficient facts to show the existence of such 
grounds.

 
 

[¶8.]     This Court has 
previously said that, without a valid reason to recuse himself, a judge is bound 
to hear the case.

 
 
"`Recusal 
and reassignment is not a matter to be lightly undertaken by a district judge. 
While, in proper cases, we have a duty to recuse ourselves, in cases such as the 
one before us, we have [a] concomitant obligation not to recuse ourselves; 
absent a valid reason for recusal, there remains what has sometimes been termed 
a "duty to sit[."] [Citations.]' Simonson v. General Motors Corporation, 
U.S.D.C.Pa., 425 F. Supp. 574, 578 (1976)."

 
 
TZ Land 
& Cattle Co. v. Condict, 795 P.2d 1204, 1211 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 729 
(Wyo. 
1979)).

 
 

[¶9.]     Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
40.1(b)(2), Appellant was required to submit an affidavit stating "sufficient 
facts" to show the existence of bias or prejudice against him. The judge would 
then be obligated to recuse himself if a reasonable person, assuming the facts 
in the affidavit were true, could infer that the judge had a bias or prejudice 
which would prevent him from dealing fairly with Appellant. Zoline v. Telluride 
Lodge Association, 732 P.2d 635, 639 (Colo. 1987). See Hopkinson v. State, 679 P.2d 1008 (Wyo.), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S. Ct. 228, 83 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1984) (interpreting 
W.R.Cr.P. 23(d)). We do not think a reasonable person could infer from the 
affidavit that the judge was biased or prejudiced against 
Appellant.

 
 

[¶10.]  Appellant's affidavit consisted entirely 
of hearsay. An affidavit in support of a motion to disqualify a judge is 
generally insufficient when it is supported merely by hearsay. Banks v. State, 
265 Ind. 71, 351 N.E.2d 4, 14 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1077, 97 S. Ct. 821, 50 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1977); Brown v. American Finance Co., 432 S.W.2d 564, 
567-68 (Tex.Civ.App. 1968). See also Willner v. University of Kansas, 848 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
488 U.S. 1031, 109 S. Ct. 840, 
102 L. Ed. 2d 972 (1989), and United 
States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1095, 106 S. Ct. 1490, 89 L. Ed. 2d 892 (1986). This case aptly demonstrates some of the inherent weaknesses of such 
an affidavit. We do not know the names of any of the alleged sources upon which 
Appellant relied or if they even exist; whether the sources were consistent in 
what they told Appellant; whether each source attributed the comment to the 
judge; whether each source personally heard the comment or acquired the 
information through some third party as idle gossip or rumor; and, finally, when 
and where the comment was made. Appellant's complete lack of corroborating 
information leads us to believe that the affidavit was insufficient and that the 
judge acted properly in not recusing himself. By finding the affidavit in this 
case was insufficient, we do not mean to imply that an affidavit in support of a 
motion to disqualify a judge can never rely upon hearsay. However, an affidavit 
which relies upon hearsay must have some indicia of reliability. If a naked 
allegation made on the basis of hearsay were sufficient, any party could reject 
a judge at will. Hodgson v. Liquor Salesmen's Union Local No. 2 of State of New 
York, Distillery, Rectifying, Wine & Allied Workers' International Union of 
America, AFL-CIO, 444 F.2d 1344, 1349 (2d Cir. 1971).

 
 

[¶11.]  The next issue we must consider is 
whether sufficient evidence existed to support the hearing examiner's 
determination that Appellant failed to prove his injuries arose in the course of 
his employment. To resolve this issue:

 
 
"`We 
examine the entire record to determine if there is substantial evidence to 
support an agency's findings. If the agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency, and must uphold the findings on appeal. Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusions of 
the agency.'"

 
 
Dougherty 
v. J.W. Williams, Inc., 820 P.2d 553, 555 (Wyo. 
1991) (quoting Trout v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 721 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Wyo. 1986) (citation 
omitted)).

 
 
Baros v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division, 834 P.2d 1143, 1145 (Wyo. 1992).

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellant had the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his injuries arose out of and during the 
course of his employment. Hohnholt v. Basin Electric Power Co-op, 784 P.2d 233 
(Wyo. 
1989).

 
 
We stated 
in State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. Van Buskirk, Wyo., 
721 P.2d 570, 571 (1986), quoting from Western Power Service & Construction 
v. Van Matre, Wyo., 657 P.2d 815, 816 (1983), that:

 
 
"`Whether 
an injury arises out of and in the course of employment is a question for the 
trier of fact in a worker's compensation case. The burden is on the worker to 
prove that his injury arose in the course of employment. There must be some 
substantial competent evidence to warrant the trier of fact drawing such an 
inference.'"

 
 
Bagshaw v. 
Circle H Oilfield Service, 753 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Wyo. 1988).

 
 

[¶13.]  Appellant claims that, on the morning of 
the accident, he was at home calculating the bid on a prospective job. His 
son-in-law, who was the corporation's only other employee at the time, 
telephoned Appellant requesting that Appellant bring some finishing trowels to 
the Mydland home so that he could complete the sheetrock work. According to 
Appellant, he loaded the tools into his truck and was driving toward the Mydland 
house when his truck was struck by the oncoming car.

 
 

[¶14.]  The hearing examiner found several 
problems with Appellant's version of the accident. Appellant's son-in-law 
initially corroborated Appellant's description of the events, but, on his 
son-in-law's cross-examination, the following discussion took 
place:

 
 
Q. Sir, did 
you discuss your testimony here with [Appellant] at all?

 
 
A. No, 
sir.

 
 
Q. So you 
had no discussion with him regarding what happened that 
day?

 
 
A. 
No.

 
 
Q. Do you 
recall this morning I walked out of the meeting room this morning, and do you 
recall [Appellant] came over and sat next to you at that 
time?

 
 
A. 
Yes.

 
 
Q. And do 
you recall him saying words to you to the effect of, "Remember, I called you for 
you to come[,"] or, "You called me to bring you some 
tools"?

 
 
Do you 
remember that happening, and you said, "No, I just don't remember that[,"] and 
he said, "Well, just remember that[,"] and you said okay.

 
 
Do you 
remember words to that [effect], as I was walking by?

 
 
A. 
Yes.

 
 
Because the 
foregoing conversation cast considerable doubt upon the credibility of Appellant 
and his son-in-law, the hearing examiner looked to the testimony of the only 
disinterested witness, Elmer Mydland. Mr. Mydland testified that Appellant came 
to his house on the day of the accident. This testimony was inconsistent with 
Appellant's deposition testimony in which he claimed that he telephoned Mr. 
Mydland to tell him he would not be there that day. Other inconsistencies 
included a letter to the Workers' Compensation Division sent by Appellant 
approximately one month after he filed his claim, which stated that, at the time 
of his accident, Appellant's truck was loaded with tools and he was headed for 
"Larry Brown's house on Big Goose 
Road." At different times in his testimony, Appellant 
explained the letter's erroneous description of his destination as a mistake and 
a lapse in memory; however, the hearing examiner found such an innocuous 
explanation difficult to accept in light of the other 
inconsistencies.

 
 

[¶15.]  The hearing examiner summarized the bulk 
of the evidence as being "contradictory, confusing, inconsistent and generally 
unreliable." In our view, the inconsistencies in testimony and lapses of memory 
made it virtually impossible for the hearing examiner to determine whether 
Appellant's activities on the morning of the accident arose in the course of his 
employment. Accordingly, we hold that Appellant failed to meet his burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his injuries arose out of his 
employment.

 
 

[¶16.]  Appellant's final claim is that he 
introduced clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that the Workers' 
Compensation Division was not prejudiced by his sevenmonth delay in filing a 
claim. See Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-502(c) (1991). Appellant's 
failure to prove that the Workers' Compensation Division was not prejudiced was 
an alternative ground supporting the hearing examiner's decision. We do not need 
to address the issue in light of our holding that sufficient evidence existed to 
support the hearing examiner's finding that Appellant failed to prove his 
injuries arose out of his employment.

 
 

[¶17.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Revised effective 
March 24, 1992.