Case Title: GLEASON v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
GLEASON v. STATE2002 WY 16157 P.3d 332Case Number: 00-299Decided: 10/24/2002
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                                                   

MICHAEL 
ALEXANDER GLEASON,

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, 
Appellate Counsel; and Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 
            
    

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy 
Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Richard 
Manning, Jr., Intern.

 
 
          
          
       

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

*  Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

 
      

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      On November 4, 
1999, Michael Alexander Gleason (Gleason) was charged with two counts of taking 
indecent liberties with a minor.  A 
jury found him guilty of both counts and he was sentenced to concurrent terms of 
imprisonment for five to ten years.  
In this appeal, 
Gleason alleges that the trial court erred in admitting uncharged misconduct 
evidence, that prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel.

 
            
         
     

[¶2]      We affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 

            
1.         
Was it error to admit evidence of various uncharged acts of sexual 
misconduct by Gleason with minors?

            
2.         
Did the fact or manner of the prosecutor's argument in regard to the 
uncharged misconduct evidence constitute prosecutorial 
misconduct?

            
3.         
Did 
Gleason's trial counsel render ineffective assistance by informing the trial 
judge that Gleason did not wish to be present in chambers during the peremptory 
challenge portion of voir dire?

 
         
               
     

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On June 16, 1996, 
Gleason married Monica French (Monica).  
The two already had a daughter, A.G., who was born on November 29, 
1994.  Gleason had two older 
children from a previous marriagea son whose name and age do not appear in the 
record and a daughter, whose date of birth does not appear in the record.  Monica had three older children from a 
prior marriagetwin daughters M.F. and A.F., born October 28, 1988, and a son 
P.F., born November 9, 1990.  M.F. 
was the victim of the crimes for which Gleason was convicted.  Another minor female, M.W., who was born on 
October 1, 1983, lived with the Gleason family for a period of time in 
1997-1998.

 
       
               

[¶4]      The incident upon 
which the two criminal charges were based occurred sometime in May 1999, while 
the family was living with Gleason's parents in an apartment in Sundance.  Because of the crowded quarters, the 
children slept on a foldout couch in the living room.  M.F. testified that one night she was 
awakened by Gleason and Monica returning to the apartment.  She fell back asleep, but was later 
awakened by Gleason, who was touching her vaginal area through her shorts.  M.F. testified that she grabbed 
Gleason's hand and sat up, after which Gleason touched her again, this time 
under her clothing.  M.F. got up and 
went into the bathroom.  When she returned, Gleason was still there 
and he once again touched her in a similar manner.

 
  
              

DISCUSSION

 

            
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence

 

[¶5]      Gleason contends 
that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of certain uncharged 
misconduct.1  W.R.E. 404(b) governs the admissibility 
of uncharged misconduct evidence, which is a specialized rule within the general 
rule of W.R.E. 404.  The entire rule reads as follows:

 
   
  

            
(a)       
Character evidence generally.    
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except:

            
(1)       
Character of Accused.    Evidence of a pertinent trait of his 
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same;

            
(2)       
Character of Victim.    Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the 
prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness 
of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence 
that the victim was the first aggressor;

            
(3)       
Character of Witness.    Evidence of the character of a witness, 
as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.

            
(b)       
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.    
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith.  It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.

 
    
           
         

[¶6]      Gleason had filed 
a pretrial demand for notice of the State's intent to offer uncharged misconduct 
evidence, and he had filed a motion in limine directed at a particular 
prior act.  The trial court heard 
that motion and made some preliminary observations about relevancy, but left the 
matter undetermined.  Subsequently, 
the State filed a formal response to the demand, in which it listed five 
witnesses, outlined their expected uncharged misconduct testimony, and 
identified the purposes for which the testimony was being offered.  Those witnesses were M.F., A.F., P.F., 
M.W., and Stuart Sklut (Sklut), a Deputy Attorney General from the State of 
Delaware.  Gleason countered with 
his Objections:  Proposed 404(b) 
Evidence, in which he argued that the evidence was not relevant, that the 
evidence was more prejudicial than probative, and that "Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 
are as all-encompassing as the Wyoming skies[.]"

 
  
             
             
      

[¶7]      On May 22, 2000, 
the trial court entered an Order Allowing 404(b) Evidence.  While once again deferring a decision as 
to the testimony of M.F., A.F., and P.F., the trial court did allow the 
uncharged misconduct testimony of M.W. and Mr. Sklut, as it had been set forth 
in the State's notice.  
Specifically, M.W. would be permitted to 
testify

 
      

that while she lived in Hulett that [Gleason] tried to 
french kiss her in front of Monica when he came home from the bar with Monica 
one night; about [Gleason's] verbal and physical abuse to the children; about 
[Gleason] telling her before her fourteenth birthday that he was going to get 
her a little [dildo]; about [Gleason] talking about having pornographic videos; 
about [Gleason] taking the doorknob off their room so they could not shut the 
door; about [A.G.] taking off her clothes and playing with herself; and about 
how [Gleason] favored his biological daughter.

 
 
               
              
            
              
          
               
            
 

In 
its notice, the State had offered this evidence as proof of motive, intent (why 
Gleason was touching M.F.), knowledge (that Gleason knew what he was doing), and 
course of conduct.  The trial court found the evidence to be 
relevant, as it tended to show motive, knowledge, intent, and lack of accident 
or mistake, and also found it to be more probative than prejudicial.

 
   
             
               
 

[¶8]      Pursuant to the 
trial court's Order Allowing 404(b) Evidence, Mr. Sklut, the Deputy Attorney 
General from Delaware, would be permitted to testify as follows concerning 
charges that had been brought against Gleason in Delaware in 
1992:

       
     [T]he ten criminal sexual assault charges 
made
 
      against [Gleason] for sexually 
assaulting his [oldest] daughter, [Gleason] admitting in writing that "he 
[Gleason] had sexual intercourse with [his oldest daughter] on at least five 
occasions on the dates specified in the Information . . .;" that [Gleason] may 
have no contact with [his oldest daughter], [his oldest daughter's] mother and 
[his oldest daughter's] brother; and that he witnessed [Gleason] sign the 
admission.  . . .  He may testify about the Attorney General's 
probation and what it entailed and what [Gleason] did while on 
probation.

 
      
            

This 
evidence had been offered by the State to prove motive, intent, knowledge, and 
identity.  The trial court found the evidence relevant 
to motive, knowledge, intent, and lack of accident or mistake, and found it more 
probative than prejudicial.

 
     
            
      

[¶9]      Prior to voir 
dire on the first day of trial, the trial court held yet another hearing in 
chambers concerning the State's proposed uncharged misconduct evidence.  The trial court reiterated its decision 
that the Delaware probation was admissible, but required the State to redact the 
documents to reflect only the five counts that had been admitted.  The admissibility of M.W.'s testimony 
was not reconsidered.  As to M.F., 
A.F., and P.F., the trial court ruled that they could testify about what Gleason 
had done to them and to A.G. that was of a sexual nature, finding such to be 
relevant and more probative than prejudicial, but not about general mistreatment 
or physical abuse by Gleason.  Once again, the specific purpose for which 
the testimony was allowed was to prove motive, intent, knowledge, and lack of 
mistake or accident.

 
 
             
        

[¶10]   M.F. testified at trial.  In addition to the incident upon which 
the charges were based, M.F. also testified that Gleason pinched her and A.F.'s 
buttocks, tickled her in the chest area, lifted up her towel after she had 
showered and commented that she was "getting hairier," stuck his fingers down 
the front of A.G.'s pants, and came into the bathroom while M.F. was naked.  Gleason argues that this testimony was more prejudicial than probative, 
that it was not relevant, and that it had never actually been subjected to an 
appropriate pretrial analysis.

 
      
              
       

[¶11]   Gleason next complains about the 
testimony of A.F., M.F.'s twin sister.  
A.F. was listed as a witness in the State's notice of uncharged 
misconduct evidence.  The notice 
contained a detailed description of her proposed testimony and identified the 
purposes for its introduction as proof of motive, intent, plan or course of 
conduct, knowledge, absence of mistake, and absence of accident.  The trial court's pretrial analysis of this 
evidence generally mirrored its analysis of M.F.'s proposed 
testimony.

 
      
         

[¶12]   At trial, in answer to the 
prosecutor's question whether Gleason had ever touched her in an inappropriate 
manner, and in response to several follow-up questions, A.F. testified that 
Gleason would pinch her and M.F.'s buttocks and sometimes whistle, that he would 
lift up her towel and look at her backside, that he would "swipe across my 
chest" while they were playing, that he would enter the bathroom without 
knocking, that he would enter her bedroom without knocking when she was 
undressed, that he had put his hand down A.G.'s pants, that he told A.F. she was 
growing "in the upper area," that she had seen Gleason's "private areas" while 
he was sitting in a chair, and that he had placed his hand on her knee and moved 
it closer and closer to her "private area."  Gleason's objections to this testimony were overruled.

 
     
 

[¶13]   M.W., another witness listed in the 
State's notice of uncharged misconduct evidence, also testified at trial.  M.W. was thirteen and fourteen years old 
when she lived with the Gleason family for a period of time in 1997-1998.  As mentioned earlier herein, the trial 
court's pretrial order permitted M.W. to testify to certain uncharged misconduct 
by Gleason, as outlined in the State's notice.  Defense counsel objected to the 
testimony, but the objection was overruled.  M.W. testified that Gleason had kissed 
her, had attempted to "french kiss" her, and had told her that he would buy her 
a dildo for her birthday.  This 
testimony was part of the testimony deemed admissible by the trial court in its 
pretrial analysis.  In 
its Order Allowing 404(b) Evidence, the trial court specifically concluded that 
the fact that Gleason had made sexual overtures to M.W. while she was of a 
similar age to M.F. was relevant to motive, knowledge, intent, and lack of 
accident or mistake, and that it was more probative than prejudicial.

 
   
           
                
             
       

[¶14]   One more witness from the State's 
notice of uncharged misconduct evidence testified at trial.  Mr. Sklut, the Deputy Attorney General 
from Delaware, identified Gleason as the person he had prosecuted in Delaware in 
1992 for repeatedly having sexual intercourse with his three-year-old 
daughter.  He also laid the 
foundation for admission as an exhibit of a probation document signed by Gleason 
admitting five such charges.  
Gleason's trial objections to this evidence were overruled.  On appeal, Gleason contends that Mr. 
Sklut's testimony is "the most egregious instance of impermissible 404(b) 
evidence . . .."  After suggesting 
that he was coerced into signing the Delaware admission in order to get out of 
jail, Gleason's appellate brief characterizes this evidence as "the crassest 
sort of irrelevant hogwash . . .."  
His 
argument is that proof of sexual intercourse with his three-year-old daughter 
does not tend to prove that, seven years later, he fondled his eleven-year-old 
step-daughter.

 
           
             
 

[¶15]   Finally, Gleason argues that he was 
prejudiced by the testimony of the victim's maternal grandmother, Wanda 
McIntyre.  Mrs. 
McIntyre testified that, during the spring and summer of 1999, M.F. appeared 
withdrawn and angrier than usual.  Then, in mid-August of that year, M.F. had 
come to her and told her that Gleason was touching her inappropriately.  She testified that, 
upon hearing this from M.F., she had called A.F. into the room, and A.F., who 
was even angrier than M.F., told her that Gleason was also touching her 
inappropriately.  
There was no objection at trial to this testimony.

 
        

[¶16]   The structure of W.R.E. 404 is 
significant in the analysis of the admissibility of uncharged misconduct 
evidence.  
First, subsection (a) forbids use of evidence of a person's character to 
prove that he acted in conformity with that character at a particular time.  For instance, in a 
prosecution for battery, the prosecutor cannot introduce evidence that the 
defendant has a violent temper for the purpose of proving that, given his 
violent temper, the defendant must have committed the battery.  W.R.E. 404(a) goes 
on to provide, however, that there are circumstances in which evidence of a 
person's character may be admitted to prove that he acted in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion.  In the specific situations enumerated, 
character evidence is admissible in direct contravention of the general 
principle that character evidence is not admissible to prove conduct.

 

[¶17]   The pattern of W.R.E. 404(b) is not the 
same.  The 
general principle that character evidence may not be admitted to prove conduct 
remains intact in the first sentence.  But "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts," which logically may or may not be character evidence, is admissible to 
prove things other than character.  Consequently, the exceptions to the rule 
found in subsection (a) are not of the same nature as those found in subsection 
(b).  The 
former allow evidence of character to prove conduct; the latter allow evidence 
of specific instances of conduct to prove "consequential facts" such as intent 
or knowledge.  
Virgilio v State, 834 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Wyo. 
1992); Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 808 (Wyo. 
1980).  Under neither subsection is evidence 
admissible if the thrust of the evidence is only to demonstrate that the 
defendant has a disposition to commit crimes.  Daniel v. State, 
923 P.2d 728, 733 (Wyo. 
1996) (quoting Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601, 606 (Wyo. 
1993), abrogated and modified on other grounds by Vigil 
v. State, 926 P.2d 351 (Wyo. 
1996)).

 

[¶18]   Admissibility under W.R.E. 404(b) is 
not limited to the purposes set forth in the rule, and we have adopted a liberal 
approach toward admitting uncharged misconduct evidence.  Mitchell v. State, 865 P.2d 591, 596 (Wyo. 
1993); Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 245 (Wyo. 
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1219 (1985), abrogated on other grounds by 
Vigil, 926 P.2d  at 356-57.  The listed exceptions are illustrative rather 
than exclusive.  
Gezzi v. State, 780 P.2d 972, 974 (Wyo. 
1989).  Nevertheless, because uncharged misconduct 
evidence carries an inherent danger for prejudice, we have also adopted a 
mandatory procedure for testing its admissibility:  (1) the evidence 
must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be relevant; (3) the 
probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its 
potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) upon request, the trial court must 
instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for 
the proper purpose for which it was admitted.  Vigil, 926 P.2d  
at 357 (quoting United States v. Herndon, 982 F.2d 1411, 1414 (10th Cir. 
1992)).  We do not apply this test on appeal; rather, 
it is intended to be conducted by the trial court.2  Beintema v. State, 936 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Wyo. 
1997).  Our role is to determine whether admission of 
the evidence was error.  Id.; Spencer v. State, 925 P.2d 994, 997 (Wyo. 
1996).  Generally, the standard for review of rulings 
under W.R.E. 404(b) is abuse of discretion.  Johnson v. State, 
936 P.2d 458, 462 (Wyo. 
1997) (quoting Sturgis v. State, 932 P.2d 199, 201 (Wyo. 
1997)).  However, where no trial objection occurred, 
the plain error standard applies.  Beintema, 936 P.2d  at 1224; Spencer, 925 P.2d  at 
997.  To prove plain error, an appellant must 
demonstrate that the record clearly shows an error that has transgressed a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law and has adversely affected a substantial right of 
the appellant.  
Weidt v. State, 2002 WY 74, ¶ 8, 46 P.3d 846, 851 (Wyo. 
2002).

 

[¶19]   The trial court's determination that 
evidence of similar sexual misconduct is admissible in a child sexual abuse case 
to prove such purposes as motive and intent, where a defendant denies any 
wrongdoing, is certainly not unprecedented.  See, for example, 
Brower v. State, 1 P.3d 1210, 1214 (Wyo. 2000) (in trial for indecent liberties with a minor, 
testimony of victim's sister as to similar misconduct by defendant with her 
admissible to prove motive); Rigler v. State, 941 P.2d 734, 738 (Wyo. 1997) (in child sexual abuse case, evidence of 
similar previous misconduct with different victim admissible to prove modus operandi, preparation, plan, intent, and 
credibility of victim); Daniel, 923 P.2d at 
734-35 (in prosecution for indecent liberties, 
testimony of six other children about sexual activities with defendant 
admissible to prove course of conduct); Jackson v. 
State, 891 P.2d 70, 75-76 (Wyo. 
1995) (victim's testimony of prior sexual acts by 
defendant step-father admissible in indecent liberties case as proof of motive, 
course of conduct, and credibility of victim); Johnson 
v. State, 872 P.2d 93, 95-98 (Wyo. 
1994) (in indecent liberties case, testimony of 
social worker that defendant had admitted previous sexual molestation of a 
ten-year-old girl admissible to prove motive, intent, and identity); Mitchell, 865 P.2d at 598-99 (in trial for second-degree sexual assault of 
a ten-year-old girl, defendant's admission of sexual arousal during prior sexual 
activity with a three-year-old niece, for which the defendant was convicted, 
admissible to prove motive); Gezzi, 780 P.2d at 
977-78 (in prosecution for indecent liberties with 
daughter, testimony of older daughter as to similar misconduct with her 
admissible to prove defendant's motive and victim's credibility); Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Wyo. 
1987) (in prosecution for incest, testimony by 
victim and her half-sister implicating defendant in prior sexual abuse 
admissible because aberrant sexual behavior is probative of motive); and Elliott v. State, 600 P.2d 1044, 1048-49 
(Wyo. 1979) (in trial for second-degree sexual assault, 
testimony of victim's older sister as to similar misconduct by defendant with 
her admissible to prove motive based on pedophilia).3  The evidence of 
uncharged misconduct alleged in the instant case is similar to that admitted in 
these many cases.

 

[¶20]   With one exception, the uncharged 
misconduct evidence admitted in this case was subjected to an appropriate Vigil analysis.  M.F.'s testimony, for instance, was 
substantially as it had been outlined in the State's notice of uncharged 
misconduct evidence and as it had been described during the first motion 
hearing.  The 
trial court and counsel discussed and debated the testimony in the context of 
W.R.E. 404(b) and the Vigil test, and during the 
final hearing, the trial court made the necessary Vigil findings.  Gleason has not shown an abuse of discretion 
by the trial court in admitting M.F.'s testimony.  To the contrary, the record reflects the 
trial court's careful pretrial attention to this issue.  The trial court's 
analysis included the consideration of prejudice required by W.R.E. 403 and Vigil.  The trial court articulated a consistent and 
legitimate basis for its rulings, in which case we do not reverse.  Johnson, 936 P.2d  at 462 (quoting Sturgis, 932 P.2d at 201).  And finally, the trial court gave an 
appropriate instruction, limiting the jury's consideration of the uncharged 
misconduct evidence to the proper purposes for which it had been 
offered.

 

[¶21]   As with M.F.'s testimony, we find that 
A.F.'s testimony was substantially as it had been outlined in the State's notice 
of uncharged misconduct evidence and as it had been described during the first 
motion hearing.  
It was likewise discussed and debated by the trial court and counsel, and 
was subjected pretrial to W.R.E. 404(b) analysis under Vigil.  Like M.F.'s testimony, A.F.'s testimony was 
relevant, it was introduced for proper purposes, especially proof of motive, and 
the trial court determined it to be more probative than prejudicial.  The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting A.F.'s testimony.

 

[¶22]   Similarly, M.W.'s testimony was "as 
advertised."  
In fact, her testimony was more limited than had been approved in the 
trial court's pretrial rulings.  The trial court reviewed the testimony as 
required by Vigil, and Gleason has not shown that he 
was prejudiced by its admission.  We cannot find an abuse of discretion in the 
admission of M.W.'s testimony.  Evidence of contemporaneous misconduct of a 
similar nature to that with the victim was relevant and probative of 
motive.

 

[¶23]   While perhaps not as clear cut, because 
of the age difference of the victim and the time passed, the same can be said of 
the testimony of Mr. Sklut concerning Gleason's prior sexual abuse of his 
daughter in Delaware.  
Because the trial court subjected Mr. Sklut's evidence to the appropriate 
Vigil analysis, and because Wyoming case law 
establishes the admissibility of prior sexual misconduct with a child as 
evidence of proper W.R.E. 404(b) purposes, such as motive, we do not find that 
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Mr. Sklut's 
testimony.

 

[¶24]   Finally, Gleason contends that 
admission of Mrs. McIntyre's testimony about A.F.'s statements to her 
constituted plain error because (1) the record clearly shows that Mrs. McIntyre 
was not listed in the State's notice of uncharged misconduct evidence; (2) the 
failure to give Gleason notice of her testimony violated the trial court's 
pretrial order; and (3) Gleason was prejudiced by this contribution to the 
"extensive 404(b) evidence" that he feels denied his right to a fair trial on 
the merits.  
However, we do not find plain error.  Mrs. McIntyre's testimony about A.F.'s 
statements was part of her description of how the charged crimes came to be 
reported.  Mrs. 
McIntyre was listed in the State's pretrial memorandum as a witness for that 
purpose, so Gleason was not surprised by the testimony.  Beyond that, her 
testimony was brief, and she did not reveal anything the jury did not learn from 
M.F. and A.F.  
Gleason has not shown that he was prejudiced.

 

[¶25]   In summary, we conclude that the 
uncharged misconduct evidence admitted in this case was admitted for one or more 
proper purpose under W.R.E. 404(b), that the trial court performed the pretrial 
analysis required by Vigil to determine the 
relevance of the evidence, and that the trial court properly balanced the 
probative nature of the evidence against its potential for unfair 
prejudice.  The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.

 

[¶26]   Despite the resolution of this issue, 
we feel compelled to address in more detail the difficulties encountered in the 
appellate review of the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence under W.R.E. 
404(b).  The 
primary step in propounding uncharged misconduct evidence is identification of a 
proper purpose for its admission.  In that regard, we have previously held that 
the State need not pinpoint but one purpose for admission of such evidence.  Sturgis, 932 P.2d  at 203.  Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon the 
proponent to identify such purpose or purposes with specificity because, without 
such specificity, the balance of the Vigil test 
cannot be applied.  
For evidence to be relevant, we must know the fact question to which it 
is relevant.  
For evidence to be probative, we must know what it is meant to 
prove.

 

[¶27]   For proper appellate review of the 
admissibility of evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), the record must reflect that the 
trial court required the State not only to identify the proper purpose for which 
uncharged misconduct evidence is being offered, but also to explain how or why 
it is probative, and why it is more probative than prejudicial.  In that regard, we 
have twice set out in a footnote the process that should be followed by the 
trial court in making that analysis.  To make sure there is no doubt in the future 
that this is a required process, we will repeat it now, in the body of this 
opinion:

 

            
In determining the probative value of prior bad acts evidence, the trial 
court should consider the following factors:

1.         How 
clear is it that the defendant committed the prior bad act?

2.         
Does the defendant dispute the issue on which the state is offering the 
prior bad acts evidence?

3.         Is 
other evidence available?

4.         Is 
the evidence unnecessarily cumulative?

5.         How 
much time has elapsed between the charged crime and the prior bad act?

            
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it tempts the jury to decide the case 
on an improper basis.  
In balancing against its probative value the unfair prejudice created by 
the evidence, the trial court should consider the extent to which the evidence 
distracts the jury from the central question whether the defendant committed the 
charged crime.  
The trial court should weigh these additional factors against the 
probative value of the evidence:

1.         The 
reprehensible nature of the prior bad act.  The more reprehensible the act, the more 
likely the jury will be tempted to punish the defendant for the prior act.

2.         The 
sympathetic character of the alleged victim of the prior bad act.  Again, the jury 
will be tempted to punish the defendant for the prior act if the victim was 
especially vulnerable.

3.         The 
similarity between the charged crime and the prior bad act.  The more similar 
the acts, the greater is the likelihood that the jury will draw the improper 
inference that if the defendant did it once, he probably did it again.

4.         The 
comparative enormity of the charged crime and the prior bad act.  When the prior act 
is a more serious offense than the charged crime, the introduction of that act 
will tend to place the defendant in a different and unfavorable light.

5.         The 
comparable relevance of the prior bad act to the proper and forbidden 
inferences.  
Evidence of the prior bad act may be much more probative of bad character 
than it is of any legitimate inference permitted by Rule 404(b).

6.         
Whether the prior act resulted in a conviction.  The jury may be 
tempted to punish the defendant if they believe he escaped punishment for the 
prior bad act.

Rigler, 941 P.2d  at 737 n.1 (citing Dean, 865 P.2d  at 609-10 n.2).4

 

[¶28]   In Rigler, 
941 P.2d  at 737-38, we held that, so long as the record revealed that the 
trial court had subjected proposed uncharged misconduct evidence to the 
appropriate test of its probative value and prejudicial effect, the trial court 
need not make express findings on the record on each of these factors.  Since that opinion 
was published, however, we have repeatedly been called upon to assess a trial 
court's exercise of discretion on such rulings, and we now remind the trial 
courts that, while express findings on each factor are not necessary, abuse of discretion, 
or the lack thereof, cannot be determined by reviewing a record that contains no 
information as to how that discretion was exercised.

 

[¶29]   We have a well-established standard for 
analyzing claims for abuse of discretion:

We have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as 
reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice.  Griswold v. State, 2001 WY 14, ¶ 7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶ 7 
(Wyo.2001).  
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  Id.  "In the absence of 
an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's 
determination."  
Id.  The burden is on the defendant to establish 
such abuse.  Trujillo [v. State], 2 P.3d [567] at 571 
[(Wyo.2000)].

 

Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 
102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 766 (Wyo. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1554 
(2002).  In applying that standard, we cannot 
determine whether conclusions were drawn from objective criteria if we do not 
know what criteria were applied.  We cannot determine whether sound judgment 
was exercised under the circumstances if we do not know what circumstances were 
considered.  We 
cannot determine whether the trial court acted arbitrarily or capriciously if we 
do not know what the trial court did in reaching its decision.

 

[¶30]   In future cases involving the 
admissibility of evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), the record shall reflect the 
trial court's identification of the purpose or purposes for admission of the 
evidence, the findings and conclusions establishing relevance and probative 
value, and the factors considered in balancing probative value against the 
potential for unfair prejudice.  The "shotgun approach" of listing every 
conceivable purpose for admissibility, followed by a bald statement that 
probative value outweighs prejudicial effect will no longer be sufficient.  While the trial 
court need not make an express finding on every factor from Dean and Rigler, the record 
must contain sufficient findings to support the trial court's conclusions.  The burden, of 
course, will be upon the proponent of the evidence to supply the foundation for 
its admission.

 

[¶31]   The question of what must be shown to 
prove relevancy is not now directly before this Court.  Nevertheless, 
because we intend by this opinion to "tighten up" the procedures for the 
admission of uncharged misconduct evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), we will address 
the point.  
Often, for example, the prosecutor simply states that evidence of prior 
sexual misconduct is relevant to prove motive or intent, and the trial court 
simply agrees, with nothing in the record substantiating either the prosecutor's 
declaration or the trial court's conclusion.  In Brown, 736 P.2d  at 1111-14, and Elliott, 600 P.2d  at 
1047-48, we approved of this approach, largely on the ground of 
precedent in other states:

 

            
We note that in cases involving sexual assaults, such as incest, and 
statutory rape with family members as the victims, the courts in recent years 
have almost uniformly admitted such testimony.

Elliott, 600 P.2d  at 1048.  We made the further statement in Elliott that "[o]ne who is a paraphiliac, whose 
preference or addiction for unusual sexual practices occurs in the form of 
pedophilia, could well be recognized as having a motive to commit the acts 
complained of by the victim."  Id. at 1049.  Similarly, in Brown, 736 P.2d  at 1113, we opined that "[i]f the accused had a predilection to 
deviant sexual practices with young female relatives, it would not be 
unreasonable for the trier of fact to determine that he had a motive to commit 
the acts complained of by the victim in this case."

 

[¶32]   The question is whether the inference 
of such a motive is something that can be drawn by the jury, without some level 
of evidence that would suggest the inference is appropriate.  An illustrative 
case may be helpful.  
In Arizona, the courts have recognized a special exception to the general 
rule of inadmissibility whereby prior acts involving "sexual aberration" are 
admissible to prove the defendant's propensity to commit a similar crime.  State v. Roscoe, 184 Ariz. 484, 910 P.2d 635, 642, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 854 (1996).  The admission of such evidence, however, 
requires sufficient foundation:

 

            
The admissibility of the prior act depends initially upon its relevancy, 
which involves complicated questions of sexual deviancy in a sophisticated area 
of medical and scientific knowledge.  [We are] not prepared to resolve such 
questions in the absence of such expert knowledge.

State v. Treadaway, 116 Ariz. 163, 568 P.2d 1061, 1065 (1977).  In other words, it is not appropriate to draw 
an inference without adequate basis.5  It would seem that 
this would apply to any inference, not just the inference of 
propensity.

 

[¶33]   Not all inferences, needless to say, 
will require proof by expert testimony.  The inference of identity that may follow 
from evidence of a signature crime, for instance, is something that can be drawn 
without expert help.  
The point remains, however, that, for purposes of appellate review, the 
record should contain such information as was relied upon by the trial court in 
determining to allow the jury to draw an inference from the evidence admitted 
under W.R.E. 404(b).

 

            
Prosecutorial Misconduct

 

[¶34]   Gleason's contention is that the 
"prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument, by arguing the 404(b) 
evidence, wrongfully allowed by the trial court, as reason to convict Mr. 
Gleason."  
While our holding that the questioned evidence was rightfully admitted 
would seem to make this issue moot, Gleason's argument must still be addressed 
because it raises not just the fact that the prosecutor brought up the uncharged 
misconduct evidence in closing, but the manner in which it was argued.

 

[¶35]   Our standard of review for claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument is well established:

            
In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, the 
court looks at the entire record to determine whether the defendant's case was 
so prejudiced by the improper comments as to result in the denial of a fair 
trial.  Capshaw v. State, 10 P.3d 560, 567 
(Wyo.2000); Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 910 
(Wyo.2000).  
The challenged comments are judged in the context of the prosecutor's 
entire argument, considering the context of the statements and comparing them 
with the evidence produced at the trial.  Helm v. State, 1 P.3d 635, 639 (Wyo.2000).

            
. . .  
When an objection is launched to a statement made in closing argument, we 
defer to the trial court's ruling in the absence of a clear or patent abuse of 
discretion.  Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 
(Wyo.1998).  
Even then, reversal is not warranted unless a reasonable probability 
exists, absent the error, that the appellant may have enjoyed a more favorable 
verdict.  Gayler, at 860.  See also Metzger, 
4 P.3d  at 910.  
. . .

            
[When the defendant did not object at trial], we review his claims by 
applying the plain error standard.  Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1064 (Wyo.2000).  To demonstrate plain error, [the appellant] 
"must show that the record clearly shows an error that transgressed a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law which adversely affected a substantial right."  Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, ¶ 16, 17 P.3d 715, ¶ 16 
(Wyo.2001).  
Reversal of a conviction on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct, which 
was not challenged in the trial court, is appropriate only when there is "a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice."  Capshaw, 10 P.3d  
at 567 (quoting Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 384 
(Wyo.1992)).

Burton v. State, 2002 WY 
71, ¶¶ 11-13, 46 P.3d 309, 313-14 (Wyo. 2002).  There was no trial objection in the instant 
case, so plain error analysis is appropriate.

 

[¶36]   Gleason objects to three separate 
passages from the prosecutor's closing argument, the first of which occurred 
toward the end of the primary argument when the prosecutor said the 
following:

            
Mr. Gleason admitted in a document  and you heard from the attorney from 
the state of Delaware, Mr. Sklut.  He admitted to that on that document.  He knew full well 
what it was.  
He was advised by an attorney.  He had an attorney in that case.  He knew what it was 
and he admitted to it.  I contend to you that that is one thing that 
is important in this case.

            
[M.W.] came in.  13 years old at the time.  Lived with Mr. 
Gleason at the time.  
She said what happened to her.  That's a fact.  It's an uncontested, uncontroverted fact in 
this case.

            
Why he did it, I don't know.  But he did it and that's what the facts 
reveal.

            
So did he have a motive to do what he did when he did it there?

            
He certainly did.  Because that's what he does.

 

[¶37]   The second statement Gleason finds 
objectionable occurred during the rebuttal closing, when the prosecutor said, 
"[t]he evidence clearly shows that he's admitted to having sex with one 
child."  
Finally, Gleason finds prosecutorial misconduct in this passage, also 
from the prosecutor's rebuttal closing:

            
Now, when you get back to the jury room you are going to look at the 
information, and you've looked at all the information with regard to  well, you 
haven't looked at it, but you will get it  with regard to the admission that 
Mr. Gleason signed that when the gentleman came out, the Delaware Attorneys 
General office that prosecuted him out there, and you will look at that.  And that's an 
admission.  
Just as if he would have told you and I out on the street, yeah, I had 
sexual intercourse with my kid.  Or I did this or I did that.

            
He knew what the ramifications were.  He was advised by an attorney and he knew 
whether or not he had to go to court that day.  He knew what kind of case he had against 
him.  He knew 
all these things.  
And I contend when you look at that, you will know what motivated him to 
do the things that he did.

 

[¶38]   Gleason contends on appeal that, 
although the prosecutor "threw out" the word "motive" during these portions of 
his argument, he made no attempt to explain how the Delaware incident or M.W.'s 
testimony were probative of motive to do the acts alleged in the instant 
case.  
Specifically, Gleason states that neither proof that he had sexual 
intercourse with his three-year-old daughter nor proof that he kissed a thirteen 
or fourteen-year-old girl and mentioned buying her a dildo, was proof that he 
had a motive to touch an eleven-year-old girl.

 

[¶39]   We find this argument unpersuasive, 
especially under plain error analysis.  To begin with, it is simply a restatement of 
Gleason's opposition to the trial court's admission of the evidence as proof of 
motive.  
Second, while the record is clear as to what was said during closing 
argument, we cannot say that the argument transgressed a clear and unequivocal 
rule of law.  
At most, the prosecutor's argument as to the proof of motive was 
ineffectual.  
Neither do we find that these rather unspecific and isolated comments, in 
the context of about twenty transcript pages of the prosecutor's closing, in 
which he analyzed the elements of the crime and the evidence related to those 
elements, adversely affected Gleason's right to a fair trial.  There was no 
substantial miscarriage of justice.6

 

[¶40]   Finally, Gleason argues that, inasmuch 
as neither Gleason nor his Delaware public defender testified, it was "pure 
conjecture" for the prosecutor to argue that Gleason "knew all these things" 
when he entered his pleas in Delaware.  Gleason characterizes the prosecutor's 
conduct as arguing facts not in evidence.  We find, to the contrary, that the prosecutor 
was merely arguing a reasonable inference that the jury could make from the 
facts that were in evidence.  During Mr. Sklut's testimony, some question 
arose as to whether Gleason understood the ramifications of the charges against 
him in Delaware, whether he had been advised by counsel in that regard, and 
whether he had signed the probation documents in jail or in the courtroom.  Through 
cross-examination, defense counsel suggested that Gleason signed the documents 
containing the admissions only in order to get out of jail.  The prosecutor's 
argument in closing that Gleason "knew all these things" was based on Mr. 
Sklut's testimony about the charges, Gleason's arraignment on the charges, the 
presence of Gleason's attorney at arraignment and later when the probation 
document was signed in the courtroom.  The prosecutor's argument was not 
misconduct.

 

            
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 

[¶41]   Gleason was represented by private 
counsel in the trial court.  At his request, an assistant public defender 
was appointed to represent him on appeal.  The latter attorney obtained a partial remand 
of the case for the purpose of allowing the trial court to hear Gleason's claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Gleason's specific allegation was that his 
lawyer erroneously had informed the trial court that Gleason did not wish to be 
present during final jury selection in chambers.  Gleason contends that his absence during that 
portion of jury selection (the exercise of peremptory challenges) deprived him 
of statutory and constitutional rights, and that he was prejudiced because he 
was unable to instruct his attorney to challenge particular jurors.7

 

[¶42]   The trial court heard Gleason's motion 
on March 21, 2001.  
Gleason's trial attorney testified about his pretrial and trial jury 
selection process, and he described how and when he reviewed that process with 
Gleason.  
Specifically, he testified that he twice told Gleason he could be present 
during the peremptory challenge process, but that Gleason declined the 
opportunity.  
The attorney also filed an affidavit to the same effect.

 

[¶43]   Gleason also testified at the 
hearing.  He 
contradicted his attorney's assertion that he declined the chance to go into 
chambers for final jury selection.  His recollection of their conversation was 
that his lawyer told him to go outside and have a cigarette while the lawyer 
spoke to the judge and the prosecutor for a few minutes.  Gleason testified 
further that, had he been present in chambers, he would have instructed his 
attorney to challenge two particular jurorsa man with whom he had been involved 
in a "road rage" incident and a woman who had given him the "evil eye" in the 
courtroom.  
Both ended up on the jury.

 

[¶44]   We apply the following standard of 
review to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel:

 

            
When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
paramount determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial 
counsel's acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance.  
. . .  
The reviewing court should indulge a strong presumption that counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise 
of reasonable professional judgment.  . . .

            
Under the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)] and Frias [v. 
State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 
(Wyo.1986)], an appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance was deficient and that 
prejudice resulted.  
. . .  
In other words, to warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that his counsel failed to "render 
such assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney" 
and that "counsel's deficiency prejudiced the defense of [the] case."  Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 
(Wyo.1990).  
"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result."  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2064.

 

Jackson v. State, 902 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶45]   The issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel may be waived if it is not raised on direct appeal.  But, where the 
issue was not raised below, the facts generally have not been sufficiently 
developed for resolution of the issue by this Court.  Consequently, we 
have created a process whereby cases are remanded to the trial court for factual 
development and an initial decision.  See Calene v. 
State, 846 P.2d 679, 683-84 (Wyo. 
1993).  That is the process that has occurred in this 
case.  After 
the remand hearing, the trial court issued an order reflecting its conclusion 
that counsel had not been ineffective.  The gist of the findings in that order is 
that Gleason was well aware that final jury selection was to occur in chambers, 
that he was specifically so advised by his attorney, and that he voluntarily 
absented himself.

 

[¶46]   It seems clear that, if things happened 
as trial counsel testified, he was not ineffective.  Counsel's testimony 
detailed his office's fairly sophisticated pretrial jury evaluation process, a 
process that included input from Gleason and Gleason's family members.  In addition, 
Gleason was present in court during voir dire and appeared to participate in 
that process.  
Gleason was present when the trial judge told counsel that peremptory 
challenges would be handled in chambers.  And he was present in open court when the 
trial judge asked, "Anything further before we recess to chambers to finalize 
the jury that will hear this case?"  An accused may waive his right to be present 
at a proceeding, but such waiver, to be effective, must be knowingly and 
voluntarily made.  
Maupin v. State, 694 P.2d 720, 722 (Wyo. 
1985).  Under 
appropriate circumstances, the waiver may be obtained from defense counsel 
rather than from the defendant.  Campbell v. 
State, 999 P.2d 649, 661-62 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

[¶47]   The remand hearing became what was, in 
effect, a credibility contest between Gleason and his former attorney.  The trial court's 
findings and conclusions obviously came from its determination that the attorney 
was the more credible of the two.  The evidence adduced during the hearing, as 
well as the facts set forth above, substantiates this determination.  Furthermore, the 
colloquy between the trial judge and trial counsel at the outset of the 
peremptory challenge procedure corroborates this conclusion:

 

            
THE COURT:  
Court is in session.  We're in chambers with Counsel.

[Defense Counsel], does the defendant not want to be 
here?

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  That is correct, Your Honor.

            
THE COURT:  
All right.  
As long as he knows he can be here.  I'm not excluding him.  In fact, he's more 
than welcome to be here.  Normally defendants are, but I guess he can 
be excluded.

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I explained the option to him.

 

(Emphasis added.)

 

[¶48]   With or without the strong presumption 
that counsel rendered effective assistance, it is nigh on to inconceivable that 
counsel would have lied outright to the judge during this exchange.  The record is 
devoid of any suggestion or reason for trial counsel having wanted to keep 
Gleason out of chambers while the final jury was chosen.  To the contrary, 
the record reflects that counsel systematically included Gleason in the jury 
evaluation and selection process.

 

[¶49]   We agree with the trial court's 
conclusion that Gleason voluntarily waived his right to be present in chambers 
during the peremptory challenge process and with its further conclusion that 
counsel was not ineffective in concurring with such waiver.  The record shows 
that Gleason had ample opportunity to be present in chambers.  Nevertheless, we 
remind the trial courts that an explicit waiver by the defendant, on the record, 
would do much to prevent this issue from arising on appeal.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶50]   Admission of the uncharged misconduct 
evidence in this case was not error, and the prosecutor did not commit 
misconduct by his references to that evidence in closing argument.  Further, defense 
counsel was not ineffective in allowing Gleason to absent himself from the 
peremptory challenge portion of jury selection.

 

[¶51]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  
1The parties generally refer to this evidence as 
"404(b) evidence."  
We prefer the appellation "uncharged misconduct evidence."  See Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 21 n.2, 42 P.3d 483, 490 n.2 (Wyo. 
2002).

  
2Recently, we modified the Vigil test to establish a firm preference for the pretrial determination of 
issues concerning uncharged misconduct evidence.  Howard, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 23, 42 P.3d  
at 491.

  
3Consonant with the reasoning of these cases, 
three new rulesF.R.E. 413, 414, and 415have been added to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence specifically authorizing the admissibility of similar crimes evidence 
in both civil and criminal sexual assault and child molestation cases.

  
4While the five-part "Dean test" has been replaced by the four-part "Vigil test," the balancing of probative value against 
prejudicial effect is still required.

  
5A refined version of this concept appears in State v. Varela, 178 Ariz. 319, 873 P.2d 657, 661 (1993):

When a prior sexual act is near in time and reasonably 
similar, the act speaks for itself and provides the basis for the exercise of a 
judge's discretion in determining relevancy.  However, with the passage of time or where 
the acts are dissimilar, the predictive value of the prior act diminishes and 
the need for the "expert medical testimony" of Treadaway applies.

  
6At the same time, however, we caution proponents 
of uncharged misconduct evidence to be careful to limit their arguments to the 
proper purpose for which the evidence was admitted.  Here, only because 
the prosecutor related the evidence to proof of motive, we do not find his 
additional statement"[b]ecause that's what he does"harmful error requiring 
reversal.  Out 
of context, the additional statement would look suspiciously like using 
character to prove conduct.

  
7The Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution guarantee an accused the right to be present 
during critical stages of criminal proceedings.  Seeley v. State, 
959 P.2d 170, 177 (Wyo. 
1998).  In addition, both Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 
and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-202 (LexisNexis 2001) provide an accused the right to 
defend in person.