Case Title: State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Smith

Citation: 

Docket Number: S51293

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2005-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  February 17, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of Robert James Jon Smith,
a Minor Child.
STATE ex rel DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent on Review,
v.
DIANA MARIE SMITH,
Petitioner on Review.
In the Matter of Jon Bow Robert Michael Lea Smith,
a Minor Child.
STATE ex rel DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent on Review,
v.
DIANA MARIE SMITH,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 01J0049, 02J0938; CA A119798, A121395;
SC S51293, S51339)
(Consolidated for Argument and Opinion)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 3, 2004.
Maryhelen Sherrett, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
petitions for petitioner on review.
Laura S. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent on review.
GILLETTE, J.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals are reversed.  The
judgments of the circuit court are reversed, and the cases are
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
Riggs, J., dissented and filed an opinion.
*Appeals from Marion County Circuit Court, Thomas M. Hart, Judge (CA A119798); Joseph C. Guimond, Judge (CA A121395). 190 Or App 570, 79 P3d 374 (2003); 191 Or App 137, 80 P3d 522 (2003). 
GILLETTE, J.
These two parental rights termination cases, which we
have consolidated for opinion, test the bounds of a state
agency's authority to exact a parent's compliance with various
conditions in order to secure the return of her child.  In the
present cases, we hold that the agency exceeded those bounds.  
The trial court terminated mother's parental rights to
her first son, whom the state had removed from mother's care at
birth.  The court's order recited the statutory criteria for
termination upon a finding of unfitness, but it did not
elaborate.  In a brief, per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals,
sitting en banc, affirmed that ruling.  State ex rel Dept. of
Human Services v. Smith, 190 Or App 570, 79 P3d 374 (2003) (Smith
I).  Three judges dissented in that case on the ground that, in
their view, the facts of the case did not meet the standard
necessary to justify termination of mother's parental rights to
the child.  Id. at 571 (Schuman, J., joined by Landau and
Armstrong, JJ., dissenting).  Less than six months after
terminating mother's parental rights to her first son, the trial
court terminated mother's parental rights to her second son, whom
the state also had removed from mother's care at birth.  The
Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling in a per curiam opinion
that cited its earlier decision with respect to the first son. 
State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Smith, 191 Or App 137, 80
P3d 522 (2003) (Smith II).  Two judges concurred, stating that,
in their view, the state had failed to establish the requirements
for termination by clear and convincing evidence, but that they
were constrained by the court's decision in the earlier case. 
Id. at 138 (Landau, J., joined by Armstrong, J., concurring).  We
allowed review in both cases.  For the reasons that follow, we
reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals. 
In reviewing a decision of the Court of Appeals in a
parental rights termination case, this court may review the
decision de novo, or it may limit its review to issues of law. 
ORS 19.415(4); See State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or 135,
138, 36 P3d 490 (2001) (explaining rule).  Because neither the
trial court nor the Court of Appeals made findings of fact in the
first of these cases, and because the outcome in the second case
largely depended on the trial court's ruling in the first, we
elect to view the record de novo.  We find the facts relied on in
this opinion based on our de novo review of the record.
At the time of the events leading up to the first
parental rights termination hearing, mother was a 28-year old
woman with an IQ of about 80, which put her in the "low average"
range.  She was a high school graduate, and she had earned As and
Bs in school.  Mother had held various jobs since graduating from
high school, including working for a janitorial service,
providing childcare for several other families, and helping her
mother manage a nearby apartment complex.  She usually earned
between $800 to $1,200 per month.  
Neither mother nor anyone in her parents' household
used drugs or alcohol or, apparently, ever had been convicted of
any crime.  No one in the household ever had committed domestic
abuse or assaulted anyone in the family.  
Until the Department of Human Services (DHS) became
involved in her case, mother lived in an apartment in her
parents' house.  The family was extremely close-knit.  Mother's
parents had been married for more than 32 years.  Mother never
had lived on her own, and her two adult brothers lived in a
camper in the backyard.  The entire family ate dinner together
every night, and mother frequently cooked the family meal. 
Mother relied heavily on her family for support and social
interaction.  
Mother first learned that she was pregnant with her
first child in November 2000, when, accompanied by her mother,
she went to a hospital complaining of stomach distension.  She
was seven months pregnant at the time.  Both women vehemently
challenged the doctor's diagnosis of pregnancy because, they
said, mother had continued to menstruate monthly and mother did
not believe that, strictly speaking, she ever had had sexual
intercourse. (1)  They went so far as to seek a second opinion,
which confirmed the diagnosis.  Eventually, on January 22, 2001,
mother, again accompanied by her own mother, went to Salem
Hospital to deliver her child.  She initially denied to the
nurses that she was pregnant and continued to insist that she was
a virgin.  Then, she claimed that she must have become pregnant
by taking a bath or a shower in the same bath or shower in which
either her 14-year-old foster brother or other men that her
parents had permitted to shower at their house earlier had
masturbated. (2)  She also initially gave hospital personnel
her mother's name as her own, asserted that the child was her
mother's and not hers, and asserted that the baby was her brother
and not her son.  Those outlandish claims led hospital workers to
suspect that mother might be mentally ill.  They called the
Department of Human Services (DHS).  
A DHS supervisor, Hunter, visited mother in the
hospital shortly after her son was born.  Hunter insisted on
speaking to mother outside the presence of her family members or
her pastor.  During that conversation, mother repeated and
elaborated on the conception by masturbation story, this time
implicating only the two men who had showered at her parents'
house on the day she supposedly conceived.  In addition, mother
told Hunter, untruthfully, that she had tried to obtain prenatal
care after learning of the pregnancy, but had been denied care by
six different doctors.  Mother also told Hunter that she was
going to name the child Jon Allen Ruston, after a family friend
(not the father of the child).  Hunter knew that Ruston was a
convicted sex offender who lived in mother's neighborhood. 
Mother denied having known that Ruston was a sex offender,
although she knew that he was not allowed in the house unless her
father was present. (3) 
Hunter told mother that DHS would be placing the baby
in protective custody.  Hunter explained that she was concerned
about the people in and around mother's home, about the decisions
that the family was making, about mother's mental health and her
ability to care for a baby, and about the fact that mother had
had no prenatal care.    
The next day, on January 23, 2001, a DHS caseworker,
Bradley, visited mother in the hospital and conducted a shelter
hearing with the court via telephone conference.  During that
hearing, mother acknowledged that she had had sexual contact and
identified the person whom she believed to be the baby's father. 
She explained that one of the reasons that she had lied about the
baby's conception was that she was ashamed of the pregnancy and
wanted to keep it from her parents.  She also stated that she had
changed the baby's name on learning that the man for whom she had
named him was a sex offender.  Nonetheless, DHS proceeded with
the hearing to place the child in protective custody.  
Bradley explained to the court and to mother that
protective custody was necessary because mother had told a
bizarre story about the child's conception, because the state was
concerned that the foster brother might be the father of the
child, (4) because mother failed to obtain prenatal care,
because mother had denied the pregnancy, because mother initially
named the baby after a sex offender, because there was a risk
that a sex offender would have access to the home, and because
there was a picture of the sex offender on the wall of mother's
home, between two pictures of Jesus.  
The court ordered that the child be placed in
protective custody and ordered visitation for mother.  The
parties discussed "expectations" for mother, including that she
maintain appropriate housing and a verifiable source of income. 
The court also ordered that mother be evaluated by a
psychologist.  
About two weeks later, a psychologist, Dr. Stolzfus,
evaluated mother.  Based on his observations and testing,
Stolzfus opined that mother had a low average IQ and that she
appeared to be depressed, probably because of the loss of her
child and her shame over the pregnancy.  He also stated that 
"[mother] functions fairly well in a well structured
environment with clear expectations.  In ambiguous and
confusing situations, she quickly decompensates into
depressive episodes, feeling overwhelmed and has
difficulty making sense of her environment.  In a
complex environment she has difficulty translating
information accurately, the quality of her processing
is unsophisticated, though she is highly motivated and
makes considerable effort."
Stolzfus concluded that mother
"does not appear to pose a risk physically or
emotionally to her son, despite her earlier denial of
the pregnancy and unusual explanation of how the
pregnancy occurred. * * * Testing indicates that she
does not do well in an unplanned, complex environment,
which will obviously pose some difficulty in caring for
an infant.  Within the structure of her parents' home,
she is deemed well able to care for her infant.  To her
benefit, she apparently has considerable experience in
providing childcare for young children."  
In the end, Stolzfus "[s]trongly recommend[ed] immediate return
of [the child] to the care of his mother and his grandparents to
avoid disruption of the natural mother and child bond."  
DHS ignored Stolzfus's recommendation.  Instead, the
agency initiated twice weekly home visits with the child. (5)
After a few weeks, those visits were discontinued, however,
apparently because the DHS worker assigned to supervise the
visits, Sanders, did not feel that mother was interacting
sufficiently with the baby, preferring to walk around with him
rather than play with toys, and because mother's mother,
grandmother, was agitated and hostile during the home visits.  
The visits were moved to a DHS facility, where mother
and the child were placed in a large room with eight other
mothers and their babies.  Mother arrived on time, even early,
for every visit.  However, DHS was unsatisfied with mother's
effort.  Sanders noted that, during the visits, mother did not
seem to accept suggestions for caring for the child.  As another
DHS social service assistant later testified, mother did not make
the visits "enjoyable" for the child and he seemed bored.  For
example, she did not offer him a wide array of toys to play with,
she did not make what Sanders considered to be proper eye contact
with him, and she tickled the child too much.  In addition,
Sanders complained, mother tried to divert attention to herself
from Sanders and from the other parents in the room, and the
other parents found her annoying.  
In May 2001, DHS conducted a "family unity" meeting, at
which many of mother's family members were present, including the
child's grandparents and mother's brothers.  The family was
extremely hostile toward and distrustful of the agency.  The
family accused the agency of falsifying records and insisted on
having the meeting tape-recorded for later verification.  They
maintained that DHS had had no right to remove the child and that
the agency had not followed proper procedure in removing
him. The family was very disrespectful of DHS staff, at times
yelling at the case workers, cutting them off, and targeting
them, especially Sanders, with derogatory remarks.  Sanders later
testified that she felt intimidated and very frightened by the
family.  
Earlier, in April 2001, the court at DHS's request had
ordered mother to submit to another psychological evaluation by a
different psychologist, Dr. Sweet.  Three days after the
contentious "family unity" meeting in May, DHS sent a 12-page
letter to Sweet to provide him with certain "background
information."  Among other things, the letter recounted the
outlandish stories that mother had told about her virginity and
the conception, the initial suspicions about the foster brother
being the father of the child, and Ruston's visits to the family
home. (6)  The letter summarized various other lies and
exaggerations mother had told before and after the birth of the
child. (7)  Further, the letter explained that DHS had had two
earlier referrals concerning the family, one of which concerned
an allegation that the foster child had been permitted to have
contact with Ruston, and the other concerning a report that a
neighbor had seen grandmother "switching" her 30-year-old son in
the back yard.  The letter then described the May 15 "family
unity" meeting.  Additionally, it described in detail
grandmother's history of having been raped three times as a
teenager, as well as the agency's involvement with other family
members living outside the household.  The letter did not include
any positive information about mother or her family.  For
example, it did not note that mother's parents had been married
for over 32 years, that they had successfully raised four
children of their own, or that no one in the household apparently
ever had used drugs or alcohol or been convicted of any crime.  
Sweet evaluated mother a week later.  He did not
interview any family members or observe mother with the child. 
Instead, he relied on his interview with mother, her test
results, Stolzfus's report, and the agency's visitation notes. 
Sweet concluded, as did Stolzfus, that mother is of low-average
intelligence and that she appeared to be depressed.  Unlike
Stolzfus, Sweet suspected that mother suffered from Dependent
Personality Disorder, but he could not make that diagnosis
conclusively based on the information available.  Like Stolzfus,
Sweet found that mother operates on a concrete level and knows
very little about the world around her.  Further, he opined that
mother's experience as a childcare provider would not suffice in
determining whether she could parent her own child and that she
showed "poor judgment and perhaps diminished capacity" in
becoming pregnant in the first place.  Sweet concluded by
stating:
"[O]ne obviously unknown factor in this case has to do
with her parents and how they will contribute to
rearing this child and monitoring [mother].  I suspect
there are some concerns about [mother's] mother, who
seemed to have been supporting the conception by
masturbation explanation.  I would assume that you will
closely examine the [family's] home to determine if
this will be a safe environment for [the child].  I
assume that since [the foster child] is out of the home
that concern has been addressed.  However it is not
clear what happened with Mr. Ruston and what kind of
involvement he has with the family.  When these issues
are resolved, then you can be more sure about whether
[the child] could be returned to that home."  
The court held another hearing on the matter in June
2001.  At the conclusion of that hearing, the court ordered
mother, among other things, to obtain an "independent living
situation."  It appears from the record that the court's reason
for imposing that requirement was that it was the agency's view
that mother depended too heavily on her family and that the
family was extremely hostile to the agency and refused to concede
that DHS had had the right to take the child from them. (8)  A
later report reflected that the agency also did not view the
grandparents' home as an appropriate place for the child because
grandmother initially supported the conception story, the
grandparents had allowed a sex offender to be in their home, and
grandmother "ha[d] been receiving public assistance
fraudulently."  
From then on, the agency's primary focus appears to
have been to require mother to become more independent from her
family.  In service agreement after service agreement, the agency
tried to have mother agree to move out of her parent's home. 
Beginning in July 2001, the service agreements specifically
required mother to agree to
"[s]eek and obtain independent stable housing by [a
particular date], with the understanding I can not live
in the apartments next to my parent's home."
(Emphasis and boldface type in original.)  Mother refused to sign
the agreements. (9)  A DHS permanency worker, Holmes, later
testified that mother "was real clear that she had no intentions
of getting independent living.  In fact, she had told me on
several occasions that she had no plan to get independent living,
that she was close to her family and that nobody could make her
move out."  
The service agreements also began requiring mother,
among other things, to "[s]uccessfully complete a counseling
program for myself regarding my mental health issues as outlined
in Dr. Sweet's evaluation."  (Emphasis in original).  In
response, in September 2001, mother sought therapy for her
depression from a private counselor, MacKendrick. 
In a report that MacKendrick made to one of mother's
lawyers in an effort to assist her with her case, MacKendrick
stated that mother had numerous strengths that should be weighed
against her known deficits and that she had shown herself capable
of being a productive person, a "good student, good worker, [a]
caring person, [leading a] clean and sober lifestyle, and
responsible person."  MacKendrick went on to express utter
incredulity that the state had taken the child at birth and
refused to return him to her care.  He questioned why it would
not have been preferable to permit mother to take the child home
and provide further support there if needed.  He went on to
write, 
"[t]he issue of dependency of [mother] upon her parents
has been brought up in sessions and we have had the
occasion to discuss their understanding of this case as
well.  In our meeting with [grandparents] we found them
to be appropriate and fluent regarding their concerns
and involvement with their daughter.  We cannot fully
comprehend why the state purportedly requires removal
to a separate domicile as it is our understanding that
[mother] has her own apartment and lives independently
of her parents.
"Indeed, to have additional support of grandparents
following the birth of a child appears to have merit
widespread in our society and is viewed as desirable."  
DHS also directed mother to ride the bus to the
visitations rather than accept rides from various family members. 
According to DHS, that condition was necessary for mother to
prove her independence.  Mother refused to abide by that
condition, stating that she did not understand the agency's
position and offering that her lawyer had told her that she was
within her rights to have her family drive her.  The agency
responded by reminding mother that her son had been in foster
care for many months and it was important for mother to ride the
bus in order to ger her son back.  
Over the next several months, in the eyes of the case
workers, mother made negligible progress in improving her
parenting skills.  Ultimately, the agency changed its goal from
unification of parent and child to the goal of freeing the child
for adoption.  The agency filed a petition to terminate mother's
parental rights, and the court scheduled a permanency hearing.  
The permanency hearing took place in April 2002.  By
that time, mother had moved out of her parent's home and into an
apartment of her own. (10)  She was consistently attending a
computer training school and had nearly completed the program.
Nonetheless, the agency was unsatisfied.  DHS worker Holmes
characterized mother's apartment as "low income housing" and
described the apartment complex where mother rented her apartment
as "trashy looking and [the landlord] rents to sex offenders and
criminals, people with criminal histories."  Holmes also
discounted the fact that mother was doing well in a computer
training program, admitting that she had not checked mother's
school records because it "wasn't an issue with [Holmes], whether
[mother] went to school or not."
Among other evidence adduced at the permanency hearing,
several witnesses testified that the putative father had died in
June 2001 and that the foster brother was no longer living in the
grandparent's home.  Despite the fact that the putative father
was no longer in the picture, the state presented evidence that
the putative father had had a criminal record, including
convictions for possession of a controlled substance, giving
false information, sex abuse, and manslaughter, and that the
putative father's adult son, who lives out of state, had been
ordered to participate in sex offender treatment.  The state also
presented evidence that grandmother's brother, who frequently
participated in the family meetings, had a criminal record for
assaulting a girlfriend.  Prior to the permanency hearing,
however, mother had accused grandmother's brother of stalking her
and had obtained a restraining order against him. 
Among other witnesses, mother introduced the testimony
of several women for whom she successfully had provided childcare
over the previous ten years.  At the time mother provided the
childcare, the children ranged in age from infants to teenagers. 
All the women reported that mother was completely appropriate
with the children, cooked for them, kept them well fed, clean,
and safe, and put them to bed and occasionally stayed with them
overnight.  They also all reported that their children loved
mother and that none of their children ever had suffered any
injury or harm of any sort while in mother's care.  
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that
DHS, "above the standard required, ha[d] made active efforts on
behalf of the mother and child in order to reunify parent and
child."  The court also found that mother had made insufficient
progress to make it possible to return the child safely to her,
that further effort would not make it possible to return the
child safely to her within a reasonable time, and that the
appropriate permanent plan for the child was adoption.  The court
stated that DHS no longer was obligated to provide mother with
services and ordered the case to proceed toward adoption.  
In August 2002, the parties went to trial on the
state's petition to terminate mother's parental rights.  At that
trial, the parties agreed to admit into evidence all the
testimony and evidence presented at the April permanency hearing.
The state first presented several witnesses who
testified about mother's failure to "bond" with the child during
group visitations.  Those witnesses explained that mother refused
to read the parenting materials given to her and that she did not
often read books to the child or play with him with more than a
couple of the wide assortment of educational toys available to
them.  They testified that the child went to mother willingly,
but did not appear animated.  The child laughed when mother took
his picture and clung to her when he felt frightened or insecure,
but mother did not "focus" on the child's needs.  When the child
did something mother did not like, she merely scolded him mildly
rather than redirecting him.  One witness testified that "[t]here
is no light in his eyes.  There is no joy on the face you would
think you would see from a child that hasn't seen his mother in a
week."  By contrast, when the child was with his foster parents,
he was "bubbly and giggly."  All the state's witnesses testified
that they saw virtually no improvement in mother's parenting
prior to the termination trial. 
Those witnesses also complained that mother continually
used the door designated for foster parents, rather than the door
designated for birth parents, when entering and leaving the
building, which made the foster parents uncomfortable.  They also
testified that mother annoyed other parents during the group
visitations by seeking attention for herself and that she allowed
the child to interfere with other families' attempts to bond
during those meetings, despite being cautioned repeatedly not to
do so.  
Finally, all the state's witnesses testified at length
that mother routinely told outrageous stories, lies even, about
all manner of improbable things.  For example, she insisted that
she was a "licensed day care provider" when, although she was, in
fact, paid by the state to provide day care for other families,
she was not actually "licensed."  She claimed that she was
allergic to city water and bathed daily in bottled water.  She
claimed to be hypoglycemic, although her medical records revealed
no such thing.  She denied that Ruston's picture ever hung on the
wall of her parents' home between two pictures of Jesus, although
several DHS workers saw it there. 
It also was apparent at the termination trial that
mother was pregnant again.  Again, she had not sought prenatal
care up to that point. (11)  During mother's testimony, the
court questioned mother at length about, among other things, the
paternity of the second child, openly doubting her assertion that
she became pregnant after a single sexual encounter.  
Mother's case consisted primarily of her own testimony. 
Mother testified about, among other things, her babysitting
experience with other children and the fact that she had had no
complaints in that regard; the fact that she did not smoke,
drink, or use drugs; and that she goes to church every Sunday and
would take her children to church with her as well.  She
concluded, in answer to a question from the state about what the
child needed from a parent, with the following:  
"A loving, caring parent that would treat him right,
treat him like he's respectable, and raise him right,
the way I was raised by my parents, to respect one
another, get proper education, feed him and clothe him. 
Which I know I can do, but nobody has given me a chance
to.  Outside of the building nobody has ever given me a
chance to, not even have home visits unsupervised." 
In September 2002, the trial court terminated mother's
parental rights.  In a letter informing the parties of the
ruling, the court stated that it had found "by clear and
convincing evidence that it is in the child's best interests that
he be freed for adoption and that the parental rights of [mother]
be terminated."  The court stated that
"[t]he court further finds that mother possesses an
emotional illness and mental deficiency of such nature
and duration as to render her incapable of providing
proper care for the child for extended periods of time. 
This is not just a case of I.Q.  Since the child was
taken into care nearly 20 months ago, mother has made
negligible progress in adjusting her condition and
circumstances and it appears reasonable that no lasting
adjustment can be effected."
The court then issued an order that contained no specific
findings of fact but that recited the statutory criteria for
termination of parental rights under ORS 419B.504, including the
finding that "mother is unfit by reason of conduct or condition
seriously detrimental to the child and integration of the child
into the mother's home is improbable within a reasonable time due
to conduct or conditions not likely to change."  
In October 2002, mother gave birth to her second child,
another son.  DHS immediately sought and obtained a court order
placing the child in protective custody, and mother was not
permitted to take the child home with her from the hospital. 
Mother's family again was extremely distrustful of the agency. 
Mother's lawyer unsuccessfully attempted to intervene to prevent
DHS from taking the child and from contacting mother or her
family.  In addition, because he and the family thought that
mother had been treated unfairly with respect to the first child,
mother's lawyer advised mother not to participate in agency-supervised visitations until he could arrange to have a neutral
observer present.  She accepted that advice and did not see the
child for about six weeks after his birth.
In November 2002, the state petitioned to terminate
mother's parental rights to the second child. (12)  The
petition alleged that the court should terminate mother's
parental rights on two separate grounds.  First, the petition
alleged that mother is unfit by reason of extreme conduct toward
another child, based on the earlier termination of her rights as
to the first child.  Second, the petition alleged that mother is
unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to
the child, based on her failure to learn parenting skills for the
first child, her emotional illness, mental illness or mental
deficiency rendering her incapable of providing care for the
child, and her lack of effort to adjust her circumstances to make
return of the child possible.  The court conducted a termination
trial in February 2003.  
At the second termination trial, the parties stipulated
to the admission of all the evidence and testimony that the court
had admitted at the first trial six months earlier.  The state
again called Sweet, who had not seen mother in the two years
since his first examination of her, to testify, from a
psychological perspective, about mother's ability to parent her
child, and called several DHS witnesses to testify about mother's
lack of improvement in her parenting skills.  
Sweet testified that he did not view the main problem
with mother as hinging on her ability to provide shelter and food
to the child, in light of the fact that she would have the
support of her family.  Rather, his continuing concern was
whether
"on a day-to-day basis, if she could meet even some of,
you know - is she going to give the correct formula to
an infant?  Is she going to give adequate nutrition? 
Again, it was not - there is not a real clear out-in-your-face problem.  It's just that I couldn't get
enough from her to have her demonstrate that she had a
clear understanding of how to handle things on a daily
basis on her own, if that makes sense."
The DHS witnesses had observed mother's visits with both her
first child and her second child and testified at the second
termination trial that mother was not making any progress at all
in developing parenting skills.  Their observations concerning
mother's ability to bond with the second child were very similar
to those with respect to the first child.  One witness, Sanders,
testified, for example, that mother did not interact with the
child or respond to his cues.  When questioned about her
visitation notes reflecting that mother frequently wanted to hug
and cuddle the child, Sanders answered that that was not what she
meant by "interactions."  She testified, "Well, to me,
interaction is if she would make eye contact, talk with the baby,
try to get him to smile, try to get him to respond to her."  
Mother's case consisted principally of the testimony of
Stolzfus, who had evaluated her again a week before the trial,
and of mother herself.  Stolzfus testified that, given the facts
that mother had moved out on her own and had nearly completed the
computer course, mother seemed to be functioning at a higher
level.  He agreed that mother continued to be somewhat dependent
on her extended family, but testified that there is nothing
inherently dysfunctional, inappropriate, or harmful to children
in a situation where the parent is so enmeshed with her family;
indeed, his view was that children were best served in an
extended family setting.  He stood by his opinion that mother
would be able to parent her child successfully with the help of
her family.  
Mother testified about her day-to-day life at the time.
She testified that she continued to provide care for her aging
grandmother and to babysit for other women's children.  She
testified that she would soon be graduating from the computer
training course and that she was confident about her job
prospects.  She testified that she had a two-bedroom apartment
across the alley from her parent's house, but that she only saw
grandmother when she worked with her.  
Among other things, mother also testified that she
sought prenatal care in Stayton, Oregon, not in Salem where she
lives, because she does not trust the doctors in Salem after her
"really bad experience" with them.  In response to questioning,
she stated that if the baby broke his leg, she would take him to
the hospital in Stayton, even though it was farther away, but if
he suffered from a life-threatening condition, she would take him
to the closest hospital in Salem.  
Finally, mother maintained at the termination trial
that DHS had had no reason to get involved with the first child
at his birth, despite the bizarre stories about his conception,
because, she said, there are many people with worse problems than
hers, such as drug addicts with children, that deserve the
state's attention.  
In March 2003, the trial court sent a letter to the
parties explaining that it had decided to terminate mother's
parental rights to the second child as well.  The court began by 
acknowledging that, because mother does not have an alcohol or
substance abuse problem, has no criminal record, and was
finishing a course of schooling that should enable her to be
gainfully employed, this was a difficult case, lacking the
aggravated or extreme circumstances often seen in other
termination cases.  The court also prefaced its ruling by noting
that it declined to proceed under ORS 419B.502, which permits
termination on the ground of "extreme conduct," notwithstanding
that having had one's parental rights terminated previously
constitutes extreme conduct under the statute, because the
earlier case was then on appeal.  
Instead, the court stated, it based its decision on ORS
419B.504, which provides, in part:
"The rights of the parent or parents may be
terminated as provided in ORS 419B.500 if the court
finds that the parent or parents are unfit by reason of
conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child
* * * and integration of the child * * * into the home
of the parent or parents is improbable within a
reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely
to change. In determining such conduct and conditions,
the court shall consider but is not limited to the
following:
"(1) Emotional illness, mental illness or mental
deficiency of the parent of such nature and duration as
to render the parent incapable of providing proper care
for the child * * * for extended periods of time."
The court found that the state failed to prove that mother
suffered from an emotional or mental illness, but "[t]he question
of whether mother suffers from a 'mental deficiency' is another
matter."  The court stated that, although mother had received
virtually all the services and assistance the state has to offer,
she either could not or would not accept "'suggestions' by DHS
staff on how to better interact with her child."  Moreover,
"[a]lthough mother seems to be able to function adequately on a
daily basis, there appears to be something 'missing' from her
makeup." 
The court, accordingly, found that mother did suffer
from a "mental deficiency."  The court reached that conclusion
based on three excerpts from her testimony, which the court
conceded otherwise was, for the most part, "quite appropriate." 
Those three instances were (1) that mother continued to believe
that DHS was wrong to take her first child away from her, in
light of the outrageous story she told about the child's
conception; (2) that mother testified that she would take her son
to a certain hospital outside of Salem, unless it were a life-threatening emergency, because she trusts the doctors there
more; (13) and (3) that mother did not demonstrate the level of
emotion or sadness that the court expected of her when she
testified that, on her lawyer's advice, she had not seen her
second son for the first six weeks of his life.  
Based on the foregoing, the court found that the state
had established, by clear and convincing evidence, that mother
was unfit by reason of her mental deficiency and that mother's
parental rights should be terminated.  Three weeks later, the
court entered a judgment terminating mother's parental rights to
the second child. (14) 
Mother appealed to the Court of Appeals both trial
court rulings terminating her parental rights.  As noted, in the
first case, a divided en banc Court of Appeals affirmed the
termination in a brief, per curiam opinion.  The majority
concluded that the law is well established, neither party had
argued that the trial court misstated the law, and further
discussion would not benefit anyone.  Smith I.  The dissenting
judges agreed that the case involved the application of well-established legal principles to unique facts, but did not agree
that the facts met the standard necessary to terminate mother's
parental rights to child.  Id., 190 Or App at 571.  The Court of
Appeals later affirmed the second termination in a per curiam
opinion citing its earlier decision with respect to the first
child.  Smith II.  Judges Landau and Armstrong concurred, stating
that, in their view, the state failed to establish the
requirements for termination by clear and convincing evidence,
but that they were bound by the court's earlier decision in Smith
I.  Id., 191 Or App at 138. 
The parties agree that, because the facts of the two
cases are so intimately intertwined, our decision with respect to
the first child largely will dictate the outcome of the second
case.  That is, if we decide that the evidence is insufficient to
support termination of mother's parental rights as to the first
child, then the trial court's ruling with respect to the second
child also cannot stand.  Accordingly, we focus our analysis and
review on the trial court's ruling regarding mother's parental
rights to the first child.  
We begin by reviewing the role of the court in these
matters and the standard of review that the statute directs us to
employ.  ORS 419B.500 authorizes a court to terminate a parent's
parental rights for the purpose of freeing a child for adoption
if the court finds that that is in the child's best interest. 
However, as this court stated in State ex rel Juv. Dept. v.
Geist, 310 Or 176, 189 n 15, 796 P2d 1193 (1990), "[e]ven if a
court determines that a child's best interest will be served by a
termination of parental rights, it may not be ordered unless the
statutory grounds for termination have been established by clear
and convincing evidence."  (Emphasis in original.)  That "clear
and convincing" evidence standard is set out in ORS 419B.521,
which provides that "[t]he facts on the basis of which the rights
of the parents are terminated, unless admitted, must be
established by clear and convincing evidence."  Under that
standard, the court must find that the evidence establishes that
the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.  See In re
Kluge, 335 Or 326, 342 n 12, 66 P3d 492 (2003); In re Cohen, 316
Or 657, 659, 853 P2d 286 (1993); Zockert v. Fanning, 310 Or 514,
526, 800 P2d 773 (1990) (all discussing meaning of standard).  
The statutory grounds for terminating parental rights
include a finding that the parent is unfit by reason of a single
or recurrent incident of extreme conduct toward any child, ORS
419B.502; that the parent is unfit by reason of conduct or a 
condition seriously detrimental to the child and integration of
the child into the parent's home is improbable within a
reasonable period of time due to conduct or condition unlikely to
change, ORS 419B.504; that the parent neglected the child, ORS
419B.506; or that the parent abandoned the child, ORS 419B.508.  
In Smith I, the state contended that termination of
mother's parental rights as to the first child was appropriate
under ORS 419B.504, which provides, in part:
"The rights of the parent or parents may be
terminated as provided in ORS 419B.500 if the court
finds that the parent or parents are unfit by reason of
conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child
* * * and integration of the child * * * into the home
of the parent or parents is improbable within a
reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely
to change.  In determining such conduct and conditions,
the court shall consider but is not limited to the
following:
"(1) Emotional illness, mental illness or mental
deficiency of the parent of such nature and duration as
to render the parent incapable of providing proper care
for the child * * * for extended periods of time.
"* * * * *
"(5) Lack of effort of the parent to adjust the
circumstances of the parent, conduct, or conditions to
make it possible for the child * * * to safely return
home within a reasonable time or failure of the parent
to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts
by available social agencies for such extended duration
of time that it appears reasonable that no lasting
adjustment can be effected."
As this court observed in Stillman, 333 Or at 145, 
"ORS 419B.504 sets out a two-part test for
determining whether to terminate parental rights, both
parts of which must be met before the court orders
termination.  First, the court must address a parent's
fitness:  The court must find that the parent is 'unfit
by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental
to the child.'  That, in turn, requires a two-part
inquiry:  The court must find that:  (1) the parent has
engaged in some conduct or is characterized by some
condition;  and (2) the conduct or condition is
'seriously detrimental' to the child.  Second -- and
only if the parent has met the foregoing criteria --
the court also must find that the 'integration of the
child into the home of the parent or parents is
improbable within a reasonable time due to conduct or
conditions not likely to change.'"
The court in Stillman also looked at the statements of
legislative policy in the statute and concluded that the focus of
both parts of the test for termination in ORS 419B.504 "is on the
detrimental effect of the parent's conduct or condition on the
child, not just the seriousness of the parent's conduct or
condition in the abstract.  Thus, the court first must identify
the parent's conduct or condition, and then measure the degree to
which that conduct or condition has had a seriously detrimental
effect on the child."  Id. at 146.  
The petition to terminate mother's parental rights to
the first child alleged the following "conduct or conditions"
justifying termination:  
"a) Lack of effort or failure to obtain and maintain a
suitable or stable living situation for the child so
that return of the child to the parent is possible.
"b) Failure to present a viable plan for the return of
the child to the parent's care and custody.
"c) Failure to learn or assume parenting skills
sufficient to provide for the safe and proper raising
of the child.
"d) An emotional illness, mental illness, or mental
deficiency of such nature and duration as to render the
parent incapable of providing care for extended periods
of time.
"e) Lack of effort to adjust the parent's
circumstances, conduct or conditions to make return of
the child to the parent possible."
The state's evidence in support of those allegations
can be summarized as follows:  mother refused to comply with
DHS's demand that she find "suitable" housing independent of her
family; mother was mentally "deficient," insofar as she was of
low-average IQ, she lied and told outrageous stories, she was
unusually dependent on her extended family, and she refused to
concede that the state acted properly in taking the child away
from her; and, finally, mother made no progress in developing
parenting skills and never learned to interact with the child in
any of the ways that the agency's personnel thought necessary.  
We accept for purposes of this opinion that the
foregoing evidence, if established, might provide, either
individually or collectively, a basis for finding the existence
of a "condition" of the kind that may justify termination of
parental rights under ORS 419B.504.  The question becomes
whether, to the extent that the alleged circumstances truly
exist, they demonstrate clearly and convincingly that mother's
condition was "seriously detrimental" to the child so as to
warrant a finding of unfitness.  
We turn first to mother's unwillingness to find
"suitable" housing independent of her parents' home.  As noted
above, the chief complaints of DHS about the grandparents from
the beginning of the case until the termination hearing were that
the grandparents from time to time had permitted sex offenders
into their home; that they were the foster parents of a 14-year-old boy who had had a history of acting out sexually with younger
children; and that they were hostile, aggressive, and
disrespectful toward agency employees and refused to acknowledge
that the agency was correct to interfere with the family. (15) 
The primary complaint about the apartment that mother eventually
rented, apart from the fact that it was too close to the
grandparents' home, was that it was "trashy looking" and "low
income" and that sex offenders lived in the neighborhood.  None
of those facts establishes that it is highly probable that the
grandparents' home or mother's new living situation nearby would
be seriously detrimental to the child.
The fact that sex offenders live in the neighborhood,
or even that they have visited the grandparents' home on
occasion, is not, without more, evidence of a condition seriously
detrimental to the child.  The state presented no evidence
whatsoever that any child ever had been harmed in the
grandparent's household.  Nor did the state present any evidence
that would suggest that mother's child would not be safe in the
grandparents' home in the future because sex offenders previously
had visited them.
Moreover, and even if we were to agree that the mere
fact that one or more sex offenders had visited mother's or
grandparents' home on occasion in the past would constitute a
"condition seriously detrimental to the child," the fact remains
that, to support termination under ORS 419B.504, the condition
had to render the parent unfit at the time of the termination
hearing.  Stillman, 333 Or at 148.  The evidence at the first
termination hearing was undisputed that both men that DHS was
concerned about had died long before that time.  In addition, the
foster son long since had moved out.  There simply is no evidence
in the record that the family's earlier relationship with two sex
offenders, or the foster child for that matter, would be
seriously detrimental to the child.  
DHS criticized the family for being hostile to the
agency because of a continuing disagreement over the propriety of
removing the child from mother's care and for fostering that
attitude in mother.  DHS asserted that grandmother was verbally
abusive to DHS workers during meetings and witnesses claimed that
she frequently glared at the foster family in ways that made them
feel uncomfortable and threatened.  DHS further asserted that
grandfather was angry and disengaged toward DHS during
visitations.  Mother's brothers repeatedly stated that they could
not understand why mother was not allowed to have the child. 
According to DHS, mother herself was more aggressive when her
parents were present and repeatedly waited for her rides in front
of a store near the agency facility where the foster family would
have to see her.  The family generally was distrustful of the
agency and accused social workers of changing and misconstruing
court orders.  
Clearly, the family's challenges to DHS's authority to
retain custody of the child engendered a hostility between the
agency and the family that permeated the case.  However, we
cannot permit that hostility to divert us from the proper focus
of the case, viz., the child's safety and welfare.  DHS, for its
part, appears to have adopted, and retained throughout the
proceeding, the view that the family's and mother's attitude
demonstrated a lack of insight justifying the state's continued
retention of the child, and, ultimately justified termination of
mother's parental rights.  Our problem with that line of
reasoning is that, however difficult mother and her family were
for DHS to work with because of their hostility to the agency,
the existence of that hostility did not, without more, constitute
evidence of a condition seriously detrimental to the child. 
Although many DHS witnesses characterized the family's
demeanor as "threatening," the witnesses appear to be
characterizing the family's attitude toward them, not the child. 
The state presented no evidence that the grandparent's home was
an abusive environment or would be dangerous for the child.  By
the time of the termination hearing, the grandparents had been
married for about 35 years and had raised four children, and no
one in their household ever had come to harm.  We also note that
all members of the household continuously had been gainfully
employed, and none apparently ever had been convicted of any
crime.  In addition, the state had certified the grandparents as
foster parents for a 14-year-old neighbor boy.
Nor are we prepared to say that the fact that the
apartment complex where mother eventually rented her apartment
was "trashy looking" or "low income" rendered her living
situation seriously detrimental to the child.  The record
reflects that the inside of mother's apartment was clean,
comfortable looking, and appropriately furnished.  Moreover,
mother's monthly income was between $800 and $1,200.  She could
hardly be expected to be able to afford an apartment that was not
"low income" at that level.  And, of course, mother would not
have had to move out of her parent's larger house at all if not
for the agency's unreasonable demands. 
As is evident from the foregoing, the state's objection
to the child living with the mother in or near the grandparents'
home was central to its case.  But that is a disagreement over
lifestyle, not safety.  Nothing in the state's evidence
demonstrated that living in or near the grandparents' home would
be "seriously detrimental" to the child.  Having failed to
establish those facts, it follows that the state failed to meet
its statutory burden.  Put differently, mother's failure to
"adjust her circumstances" by finding "suitable housing" more
independent of her parents was not clear and convincing evidence
of a "condition seriously detrimental to the child" under ORS
419B.504. 
The state also contended that mother was unfit because
of an emotional or mental illness or mental deficiency that
rendered her incapable of caring for the child.  Neither
psychologist who evaluated mother conclusively diagnosed her with
either an emotional or mental illness.  Instead, the state
presented evidence that mother suffered from a "mental
deficiency" manifested by her low-average IQ, her lies and
outlandish stories, her dependence on her family, and her failure
to concede that the state acted properly in taking the child away
from her.  The evidence with respect to all the foregoing was
overwhelming.  However, the state presented no evidence that
mother's mental deficiency, as so manifested in certain
situations, was seriously detrimental to the child.  
We already have discussed the fact that mother's
failure to acknowledge the propriety of the agency's actions was
not a condition seriously detrimental to the child.  We also
think that mother's attitude was not entirely unreasonable,
particularly in light of the fact that that view was shared by
the first psychologist who evaluated mother and by mother's
counselor.  Furthermore, both psychologists who evaluated mother
for DHS acknowledged that mother's low-average IQ, in itself, was
not necessarily a condition seriously detrimental to the child.  
In addition, this court has stated that evidence of a
mother's evasive or untrue answers to questions during a
termination proceeding is insufficient to permit the court
permanently to sever the ties between parent and child.  See
State v. Easley (Hull), 228 Or 472, 473, 365 P2d 293 (1961)
(stating principle); Cutts v. Cutts, 229 Or 33, 43, 366 P2d 179
(1961) (fact that father willfully worked fraud upon court by
failing to reveal all pertinent facts to lawyer during divorce
case was collateral misconduct that was not "sufficient ground to
constitute the kind of depravity required to invoke the
provisions [of the termination statute]").  In this case, the
state has not pointed to any untruthfulness on mother's part that
concerns matters that are central, or even related, to her
ability to care for the child.  In the circumstances, the state
has not presented clear and convincing evidence that mother's
tendency to lie or tell outrageous stories is a condition
seriously detrimental to the child. 
Finally, the state has not proved by clear and
convincing evidence that mother's dependence on her family is a
condition seriously detrimental to the child.  At the outset we
observe that there is no statutory requirement that a parent be
able to care for the child "independently."  All that ORS
419B.504 requires is that the parent's inability to parent the
child independently not work to the detriment of the child.  See
Stillman, 333 Or at 152 (state failed to show by clear and
convincing evidence that father's condition of incarceration on
drug offense was seriously detrimental to children so as to
warrant finding of unfitness, where strong family support
prevented children from suffering serious detriment from father's
inability to parent children during that time).  Here, there is
nothing in the record to suggest that mother will be unable to
obtain any assistance she needs in raising her child from her
family.  And given our earlier conclusion that none of the
state's objections to mother's family demonstrate that mother's
family would pose a threat to the child, we cannot conclude, on
this record, that mother's dependence on her family amounts to a
condition seriously detrimental to the child under ORS 419B.504. 
 The final, and perhaps the most serious, charge
relating to mother's fitness is that she made virtually no
progress in developing parenting skills and never learned to
interact with the child in any of the ways that the agency
thought necessary or appropriate. 
That argument arises from the specific observations of
DHS workers during visits by mother with the child.  The
principal criticism of mother pertaining to her visits with the
child was that mother did not interact "appropriately" with the
child.  She did not make the visits enjoyable for the child, the
child seemed bored rather than animated, mother did not make
proper eye contact with the child, and she did not respond
appropriately to his "cues."  In addition, mother refused to read
the parenting books provided to her and lacked "insight" as to
the importance of the various skills that had been taught to her
in parenting programs.  
We agree that evidence of mother's conduct during
visitations did not flatter her.  Certainly, we also agree with
the state that mother did not interact with the child at a level
that would ensure that the child necessarily will experience
maximum emotional development.  However, the deficiencies
perceived here are not so severe as to implicate the standard
that the statute sets out for the termination of parental rights
and likely are no worse than those of thousands of Oregonians who
ultimately succeed, without state intervention, in raising their
children safely.  
Given mother's limitations, perfection in parenting is
not attainable (if it is for anyone), but neither is it required. 
For more than two years, despite her recognized intellectual and
social skills deficits, mother participated regularly in programs
required by DHS and religiously attended weekly visits with the
child.  The testimony of DHS workers observing the visits
confirmed that mother played with the child with toys, although
she did not offer him a variety from among the wide assortment of
educational toys available, and that the child went to mother
willingly, laughed when mother took his picture, and clung to her
when he felt frightened.  The child never was injured or in any
danger during her visits.  And, the evidence was undisputed that
mother had provided childcare for many children over the years
with no complaints.  In contending that, notwithstanding the
foregoing, mother is so inadequate as a parent that her condition
is seriously detrimental to the child, DHS has attempted to
impose a standard on mother that the statute does not
contemplate.  See State v. McMaster, 259 Or 291, 302-03, 486 P2d
567 (1971) (under previous version of statute, when legislature
used phrase "seriously detrimental to the child" it had "in mind
a more serious and uncommon detriment" than that caused by the
parents' inability "to furnish surroundings that would enable
child to grow up as we would desire all children to do").
Based on our foregoing review of the record in the
Smith I case, we hold that the state has failed to show, even
when its evidence is considered and weighed collectively, that
any conduct or condition of mothers is seriously detrimental to
the child.  In the absence of such evidence, the state has failed
to establish that mother is unfit under ORS 419B.504.  It follows
that the trial court order terminating mother's parental rights
to her first child was error.  
As noted, the complete record of the first termination
proceeding was admitted at the second termination proceeding. 
The testimony and exhibits entered into evidence at the second
trial were similar in tone and content to that of the first. 
Based on that evidence, the trial court terminated mother's
parental rights as to the second child as well.  
Our review of the record in the second case discloses
that the state presented no different evidence that mother's
condition was seriously detrimental to the second child.  We also
observe that none of the factors that the trial court cited in
the second case in its letter explaining its ruling, whether
taken separately or together, constitute clear and convincing
evidence supporting that court's conclusion that mother is unfit. 
We already have discussed at length the fact that mother's
continuing disagreement with the removal of the first child by
DHS does not demonstrate her unfitness.  Likewise, mother's
testimony that she trusts doctors in Stayton more than in Salem
and would therefore take her injured baby to a hospital there
unless the injury were life-threatening seems understandable, and
certainly is not clear and convincing evidence of her unfitness. 
The trial court's perception that mother did not display a
sufficient level of emotion over the fact that, on her lawyer's
recommendation, she did not see her child for the first six weeks
of his life does not clearly and convincingly establish any
condition "seriously detrimental" to the child.  Finally, we
reject the trial court's conclusion that mother suffers from a
"mental deficiency."  There was no expert testimony to that
effect.  Instead, the trial judge appears to have drawn his
conclusion from mother's responses to his questions at the
hearing.  That is not an appropriate way to make such a
determination.  It follows that the trial court's action
terminating mother's parental rights to the second child in Smith
II also was error.  
The decisions of the Court of Appeals are reversed. 
The judgments of the circuit court are reversed, and the cases
are remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
RIGGS, J., dissenting.
These cases present a twofold problem.  The first is
the competency of mother to parent -- to nurture and protect her
children.  The second is whether, lacking that ability, mother
reasonably can rely on external support, in this case the
extended family, to provide all that she is unable to provide. 
Because I believe that mother lacks the ability to parent, and
because I also believe that the extended family appears hostile
to almost any level of outside supervision, I cannot join an
opinion that has the potential of returning these children to
that environment.  I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
We allowed review in these cases and, as we have the
authority to do, have chosen to base our review on a de novo
consideration of the facts.  However, I believe that the
majority's findings of fact on de novo review unfortunately omit
or at least partially ignore the significance of, and reasonable
inferences that flow from, the important expert testimony of Dr.
Sweet.  In his testimony, Sweet made a number of clinical
psychological observations concerning mother following the
administration of several well-known standardized tests,
including the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Third Edition
(WAIS-III), the Thematic Apperception Test, and the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2).
Without belaboring Sweet's clinical findings, the
following testimony highlights some of my concerns about mother's
ability to parent.  In response to questions regarding mother's
performance on the MMPI-2, Sweet stated:
"She responded to this test in a very defensive manner. 
I expect some defensiveness because, you know, these
are critical issues.  People want to make sure that
they look pretty good.  You know, their child is in
jeopardy here, but this is an extremely defensive
profile.  What happens with those kinds of profiles is
it under-reports problems, people aren't really being
open and honest. * * * You may see her respond
appropriately in situations but there is a potential
for her to overreact inappropriately and even
aggressively.
"* * * * *
"I diagnosed her with borderline intellectual
functioning.  I have a strong suspicion that she has a
dependent personality disorder * * *."
"* * * * *
"[T]hese * * * are people that are looking to have
their own dependency needs met first * * * as opposed
to vice versa where the parents really should be very
alert to the children's needs and focus on their needs
first."
(Emphasis added.)
When discussing what a conclusive diagnosis of
dependent personality disorder would reveal about mother's
parenting abilities, Sweet testified that
"Well, people can function but they typically rely on
other people, spouse, family, close friends, for a lot
of their decision-making, even on an everyday basis.
* * * So that's why I've got some concerns about
whether that problem exists because that could have a
very adverse impact on her relationship with her son."
(Emphasis added.)
It is true that Sweet did not make an actual diagnosis
of dependent personality disorder and, as the majority describes,
he acknowledged that mother could provide basic child care needs
under the tutelage or supervision of others, presumably the
extended family.  Nevertheless, Sweet emphasized his concerns
about mother's ability to provide for her children's safety: 
"Q.  Is your concern about safety issues based
solely on one report about an inappropriate toy?
"A.  No.  I'm concerned about her judgment and her
ability to learn * * * about what the kids need * * *."
The majority opinion describes adequately other
concerns about mother's connection with reality in its discussion
of the circumstances surrounding mother's first pregnancy and the
vehement claims by her and her parents that she was a virgin or
that she was not pregnant.  Both mother and grandmother went so
far as to claim to their doctor that mother could not be pregnant
because she was continuing to menstruate.  ___ Or at ____ (slip
op at 3).  Even when she went to the hospital, with her mother,
to deliver her child, mother continued to claim to the nurses
that she was a virgin, or later, that she might have become
pregnant by taking a bath.  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 4).  Sadly,
and with as much charity as can be mustered in these
circumstances, mother is profoundly incapable of understanding
reality, making it impossible for her to make appropriate
decisions regarding the nurture and safety of her children.
That brings me to my second concern:  Notwithstanding
mother's profound inadequacies and almost total dependence on her
family, are the children nevertheless safe and will they receive
proper nurturing with the help of extended family? 
The inferences and result of the majority's findings of
fact conclude that, after approximately three years in adoptive
placement, these children will return to an untruthful or
delusional mother who is almost totally dependent on her own
parents to care for her children.  Because of the hostile views
toward state authorities that mother and her parents expressed,
there is little hope that any state protective agency will be
able to provide supervision and assistance for the children.  I
cannot conclude that that environment will meet even the most
minimal safety concerns for the children.
I recognize the possibility that a state agency could
become heavy-handed in its supervisory role.  I also recognize
that supervised clients of a state agency justifiably could
become resentful about the imposed rules and expected conduct in
settings like these.  Nonetheless, I believe that Oregonians
expect the state to move to protect children at risk, especially
when parents and extended families resist taking reasonable steps
toward providing a safe and nurturing home environment.
I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision and,
therefore, respectfully dissent.
1. It later came to light that, late one night, while
mother was babysitting a friend's children, a family friend came
to visit and propositioned her for sex.  Mother claimed that she
became woozy from cigarette smoke and consented.  She further
claimed that she never had had sexual relations before.  Finally,
mother claimed that the friend did not fully penetrate her, and
that is why she believed that she was still a virgin.  
2. Mother's parents routinely permitted neighborhood men
who were on probation or parole and who did not have a place to
shower before meetings with probation or parole officers, doctor
appointments, court hearings, and the like, to shower at their
house.  
3. Mother's parents were the foster parents of a 14-year-old neighbor boy who had a history of sexually acting out with
younger children.  Mother's parents were not supposed to permit
sex offenders to come into contact with him.  In addition, Ruston
was not permitted to come into contact with minors.  
4. Mother never directly suggested that her foster brother
might have been the child's father; once mother stopped insisting
that she was a virgin, she consistently named another man as the
father.  The only explanation in the record for Bradley's
statement is that mother implicated the foster brother, among
others, in early versions of the "conception by masturbation"
story.  However, Bradley's statement regarding the foster brother
was then repeated on numerous occasions in various official
reports in the case.  
5. Each visit lasted approximately an hour and a half.  
6. At the termination trial, evidence was presented that
Ruston had disappeared before mother gave birth and that he had
died some time earlier.  
7. For example, mother had said she was Native American,
but when pressed for information about tribal membership, she
simply repeated "six tribes" over and over.  (Mother is not
officially a member of any tribe, and the Indian Child Welfare
Act does not apply to this case.)  She stated that six attorneys
had told her she could register at the hospital under her
mother's name.  She reported that she had called six doctors
about prenatal care after she found out she was pregnant, but
none would see her.   
8. At the permanency hearing in April 2002, both Sanders
and another DHS worker testified that the agency wanted mother to
obtain independent housing because the family was hostile and it
appeared that mother herself was more assertive and less
malleable when her family members were present.  
9. Mother's lawyer apparently advised her not to sign the
agreements because of the independent living requirement.  
10. Contrary to the agency's wishes, however, mother rented
an apartment in the complex that grandmother managed, adjacent to
grandparents' home.  
11. Mother did seek and obtain prenatal care after the
termination trial.  
12. In February 2003, the state filed a First Amended
Petition To Terminate Parental Rights, which superceded the
November 2002 document.
13. The court found that answer to be "astounding and even
frightening" and stated that it was "a very stark illustration of
when [mother] would put her own interests (she distrusts Salem
doctors) ahead of the interests of her child."  
14. The judgment recited that:
"2.  The mother is unfit by reason of the
following extreme conduct toward another child, to wit:
previous involuntary termination of the mother's rights
to the [first] child * * * and the conditions giving
rise to the previous action have not been ameliorated.
"3.  The mother is unfit by reason of conduct or
condition seriously detrimental to the child and
integration of the child into the mother's home is
improbable within a reasonable time due to conduct or
condition not likely to change, including the
following:
"a) Failure to learn or assume parenting skills
for child's sibling * * * sufficient tort assume o
provide for the safe and proper raising of this child.
"b) A mental deficiency of such nature and
duration as to render the parent incapable of providing
care for extended periods of time.
"c) Lack of effort to adjust the parent's
circumstances, conduct or conditions to make return of
the child's sibling * * * to the parent possible and
said failure to materially benefit from previously
proffered services designed to remediate her parenting
deficiencies renders mother unable to parent this
child.
"4.  It is in the child's best interest that the
mother's parental rights be terminated and the child be
freed for adoption."  
15. One of the state's witnesses suggested in passing at a
hearing on the matter that the grandparents were not an
appropriate placement resource because they had been receiving
public assistance fraudulently.  The state made no other effort
to establish the truth of that statement, and in any event, the
record is devoid of any link between that fact, even if it were
true, and any harm that might come to the child from it. 
Accordingly, we do not consider it.