Case Title: In re ESTATE OF SCHLUETER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re ESTATE OF SCHLUETER2000 WY 2994 P.2d 937Case Number: 98-311Decided: 01/11/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ERWIN W. SCHLUETER, DECEASED ANNA 
M. SCHLUETER GLATT, ALFRED W. SCHLUETER, and AMANDA SCHLUETER, Appellants 
(Petitioners),v.CHRIS BOWERS, Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Erwin W. Schlueter, Appellee (Respondent).

Appeal from the District Court of 
Laramie County, Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge.         
   
Anthony F. Ross of Ross, Ross & Santini, L.L.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming, 
representing appellant.Catherine R. Rogers and John B. Rogers of Rogers and 
Associates, Cheyenne, Wyoming, Argument by Ms. Rogers, representing 
appellee.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN 
and HILL, JJ.         

Golden, Justice. 
[¶1] Anna M. Schlueter Glatt, Alfred W. Schlueter, and Amanda Schlueter 
(collectively Glatt), cousins of the decedent, Erwin W. Schlueter (Schlueter), 
appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Chris Bowers 
(Bowers). The district court found that unrefuted evidence established the 
testamentary capacity of the decedent. Holding that no material issues of fact 
exist and Bowers was entitled to partial judgment as a matter of law, we 
affirm.
ISSUES
[¶2] Glatt presents this statement of the issue:
1. That there exists [sic] genuine issues of material fact which would 
preclude summary judgment.
[¶3] Bowers phrases the issue as:
A. Whether there are any genuine issues of material fact regarding Mr. 
Schlueter's testamentary capacity on May 4, 1995 which would preclude summary 
judgment?
FACTS
[¶4] The primary question in this dispute is whether Schlueter had 
testamentary capacity when he executed his last will and testament leaving a 
large portion of his estate to Bowers. Schlueter and his wife, Frieda, lived in 
Cheyenne, as did Bowers, whom they had known since he was a toddler, and of whom 
they were reportedly very fond. In July of 1994, at the age of 82, Schlueter 
executed a General Durable Power of Attorney and a Durable Power of Attorney for 
Health Care. Both documents named Frieda as his attorney in fact, and designated 
Bowers, who was then years old, as successor in case Frieda was unable to 
serve.
[¶5] On May 4, 1995, Schlueter executed a will leaving his entire estate to 
Frieda, with Bowers to receive a large portion of the estate if Frieda did not 
survive Schlueter. The will also designated Frieda as personal representative 
and named Bowers as alternate. At the time Schlueter executed the will, Bowers 
was living in Missouri. Shortly thereafter, Bowers moved in with the Schlueters 
to care for them and help manage their affairs. Frieda died on September 15, 
1996.
[¶6] Schlueter died on March 28, 1997. The district court admitted his will 
to probate and appointed Bowers as personal representative. Glatt filed a 
petition contesting the will and Bowers' appointment, claiming that Schlueter 
lacked testamentary capacity and Bowers exercised undue influence over 
Schlueter. Bowers moved for summary judgment on both testamentary capacity and 
undue influence. On the issue of testamentary capacity, the district court 
issued its Order Granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, in which it 
said:
[¶7] THE COURT FINDS that the circumstances set forth in Rule 54(b) of the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure have been met, to-wit: multiple claims are 
involved in this action and there exists no just reason to delay the entry of a 
final judgment as to the issue of testamentary capacity[.]
[¶8] Glatt timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
[¶9] Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material 
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
W.R.C.P. 56(c); Century Ready-Mix v. Campbell County, 816 P.2d 795, 798 (Wyo. 1991). A material fact is any fact that, if proved, would 
establish or refute an essential element of a claim or defense asserted by a 
party. Id. at 799 (citing Doud v. First Interstate Bank of Gillette, 769 P.2d 927, 928 (Wyo. 
1989)). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we will consider the record 
in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and give that 
party the benefit of all favorable inferences we may fairly draw from the 
record. Id. If we can uphold summary judgment on the record presented, under any 
proper legal theory, we will do so. Id. at 799 (citing Reeves v. Boatman, 769 P.2d 917, [920] (Wyo. 
1989)).
[¶10] Glatt contends that Schlueter lacked testamentary capacity when he 
executed his last will. The standard of testamentary capacity this Court has 
adopted is:
"Testator must have sufficient strength and clearness of mind and memory, to 
know, in general, without prompting, the nature and extent of the property of 
which he is about to dispose, and nature of the act which he is about to 
perform, and the names and identity of the persons who are to be the objects of 
his bounty, and his relation towards them. He must have sufficient mind and 
memory to understand all of these facts, and to comprehend these elements in 
their relation to each other, and a charge in negative form, that capacity is 
lacking if testator is not able to know all of these facts, is erroneous, since 
he lacks capacity if he is unable to understand any one of them. He must be able 
to appreciate the relation of these factors to one another, and to recollect the 
decision which he has formed."
[¶11] Matter of Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo. 
1988) (quoting In re Estate of Morton, Wyo., 428 P.2d 725, 729 (1967)). 
An individual with testamentary capacity is able to comprehend:
(1) [T]he extent and nature of the estate, (2) the identity of the 
beneficiaries and their relationship, whether by blood or circumstances, to the 
testator, and (3) the nature of the testamentary act, that it is a disposition 
of property to take effect at death.
Id. This Court recognizes a presumption of testamentary capacity which 
attaches to a duly executed and attested will, unless the testator's 
incompetency has been established by proof or admission. Id. 
Errors in the Will
[¶12] Glatt first argues that errors in the will demonstrate that Schlueter 
did not have testamentary capacity. Specifically, the will identifies 
Schlueter's mother as his mother-in-law, and his mother-in-law as his mother. In 
addition, Schlueter's signature is identified as that of a "testatrix," denoting 
a female signatory. Bowers responds that the inconsistencies in the will have no 
bearing on our standard for testamentary capacity prescribed in Roosa, and are 
merely clerical errors having no relation to Schlueter's testamentary capacity. 
We agree.
[¶13] Bowers maintains the errors occurred because Schlueter and his wife 
executed reciprocal wills prepared with computer word processing. Uncontroverted 
affidavits from Schlueter's attorney and the secretary who typed the wills 
confirm that Mrs. Schlueter's will was done first, then the names were switched 
to make Schlueter's will, but the secretary forgot to switch the names of the 
mother and mother-in-law, or change "testatrix" to "testator." We further note 
that Schlueter's mother and his mother-in-law both used the last name, 
Schlueter, making the error even more understandable. The errors in Schlueter's 
will demonstrate clerical carelessness rather than incapacity, and cannot 
overcome our presumption of testamentary capacity. See Matter of Estate of 
Croft, 713 P.2d 782 (Wyo. 1986) 
(affidavits from testator's attorney and attorney's secretary showed that 
inconsistency in testator's will resulted from a clerical error).
Medical and Mental Condition
[¶14] Glatt next contends that Schlueter's medical and mental condition 
raises triable issues of fact regarding his testamentary capacity. Schlueter's 
physician testified in his deposition that Schlueter suffered from senile 
dementia, but declined to offer an opinion as to whether he lacked testamentary 
capacity. This Court has never before had occasion to decide whether a diagnosis 
of senile dementia is incompatible with a finding of testamentary capacity; we 
join several other states in holding that it is not. Matter of Estate of Oliver, 
934 P.2d 144, 149 (Kan. App. 1997); Lucero v. Lucero, 884 P.2d 527, 530-31 (N.M. App. 1994); Matter of Estate of Buchanan, 665 N.Y.S.2d 980, 983 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)("Mere proof that the decedent suffered from old 
age, physical infirmity and chronic, progressive senile dementia when the will 
was executed is not necessarily inconsistent with testamentary capacity and does 
not alone preclude a finding thereof, as the appropriate inquiry is whether the 
decedent was lucid and rational at the time the will was made." (internal 
citations omitted)); Street v. Waddell, 3 S.W.3d 504, 505-06 (Tenn. App. 
1999).
[¶15] In addition to senile dementia, Glatt points to anecdotal evidence 
describing Schlueter's behavior. Some of Schlueter's relatives supplied 
affidavits reporting that in September, 1992, Schlueter did not recognize a car 
he had previously owned, had forgotten how to drive, could not decide for 
himself what to eat, and once urinated in his clothes. Other relatives reported 
that in January, 1995, Schlueter could not carry on a simple conversation or 
operate a candy dispenser that a two-year-old mastered with ease. On April 3, 
1995, a home health care nurse noted in her report that Schlueter's short-term 
memory was poor.
[¶16] Although the affidavits upon which Glatt relies paint a picture of 
diminished mental abilities, they shed no light on the real question before us: 
did Schlueter have testamentary capacity, as described in Roosa, on the day he 
executed his will. The only affidavits in the record that do address that 
question are those of Schlueter's attorney, the witnesses to his will, and the 
notary who witnessed their signatures. Each surviving individual who was present 
when Schlueter signed his will has provided an affidavit saying Schlueter was 
alert and oriented, and had testamentary capacity, using the prescribed language 
from Roosa.
Implied Admission of Incompetency
[¶17] In a final attack on Schlueter's testamentary capacity, Glatt contends 
that Schlueter impliedly admitted incapacity by granting a General Durable Power 
of Attorney and a Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care before executing his 
will. Glatt argues that because these documents became effective immediately, 
rather than upon some future disability, Schlueter tacitly admitted he was 
incompetent at the time he signed them. That argument runs afoul of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 3-5-213 (LEXIS 1999), which provides that one who executes a power of 
attorney is presumed to have capacity to do so. We fail to see how a presumption 
of capacity and an admission of incapacity could arise from the same act. While 
a prior admission of incompetency is sufficient to overcome our presumption of 
testamentary capacity, we hold that granting a power of attorney does not 
constitute such an admission. See also Fincher v. Baker, 709 So. 2d 1, 5 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1996), affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds, 709 So. 2d 7 (1997) (testator who granted a power of attorney in July, 1978, was found to 
have had testamentary capacity in January, 1982); In Re Estate of Kessler, 977 P.2d 591, 601 (Wash. App. 1999) (testator who granted a power of attorney in 
April, 1993, was found to have had testamentary capacity in March, 1996).
[¶18] Because Glatt has presented no evidence or argument directly bearing 
upon our standard for testamentary capacity, we affirm the district court's 
grant of partial summary judgment on that issue. Glatt also presents arguments 
regarding Bowers' alleged undue influence over Schlueter. That issue, however, 
is not properly before us because the district court limited its findings and 
order to the issue of testamentary 
capacity.