Case Title: Cole v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2005-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
DONALD COLE,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 425, 2004 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  for the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. A. No. 0309013358 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  September 14, 2005 
Decided: October 19, 2005 
Revised: October 20, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REMANDED. 
 
 
Michael C. Heyden and Jan A. T. van Amerongen, Jr. (argued), Wilmington, 
Delaware for appellant. 
 
 
John R. Williams, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
 
 
 
2
Pursuant to an agreement he thought he had with the State, the defendant-
appellant, Donald Cole, made a statement to the police and prosecutor implicating 
one of his accomplices to a crime.  The police confronted the accomplice with 
Cole’s statement.  Cole believed that the agreement he had reached before making 
his statement prohibited the State from using the statement for any purpose other 
than determining whether the State would seek the death penalty.  On the basis of 
the alleged agreement, as he claims to have understood it, Cole moved to suppress 
all evidence obtained from the State’s use of his statement, including his 
accomplice’s testimony.  A Superior Court judge denied the motion. Cole appeals.  
Because we are unclear about whether an agreement existed, and if it did, what its 
terms were, we remand to the Superior Court for further findings.  
I.  
On December 3, 2001, Donald Cole and Elwood Hunter were charged with 
attempted murder, robbery and related charges stemming from an incident that 
occurred on August 22, 2001 at 1348 Lancaster Avenue in Wilmington. Cole and 
Hunter allegedly entered the Lancaster Avenue residence armed with handguns 
intending to steal money and drugs. The residents of the house discovered the 
intruders and an altercation ensued. During the confrontation, Cole and Hunter 
allegedly shot two of the residents.  
 
3
Before the trial, Daniel Miller, the Deputy Attorney General prosecuting 
Cole and Hunter, filed a motion in limine seeking to admit evidence concerning a 
double homicide that occurred on August 31, 2001 at 105 E. 23rd Street in 
Wilmington. Neither Cole nor Hunter had been charged with the 23rd Street 
murders, but the motion advised that the State would produce ballistics evidence to 
show that the same firearms had been used at the 1348 Lancaster Avenue 
attempted murder and then nine days later at the 23rd Street murders. The motion in 
limine also proffered that the State would produce a witness who would testify to 
seeing both Cole and Hunter near the alley behind 23rd Street armed with 
handguns. The trial judge denied the motion.  
During the course of the trial of the 1348 Lancaster Avenue attempted 
murder, the State produced an eye-witness who identified Hunter as one of the 
assailants. The witness was so sure of her identification, that she considered it to be 
an eleven on a scale of one to ten. The State produced no witnesses that identified 
Cole.  
Cole knew that the witness was mistaken in her identification of Hunter. He 
decided to plead guilty to the charges in the 1348 Lancaster Avenue case and to 
provide a statement regarding the incident if the State would drop the prosecution 
of Hunter, a man Cole knew to be innocent. Cole told his trial attorney, Brian 
Bartley, of his decision. Bartley advised Cole not to plead guilty in the 1348 
 
4
Lancaster Avenue case.  Because of the State’s in limine motion, Bartley was 
aware that the State had ballistic evidence tying the 1348 Lancaster Avenue case 
and the 23rd Street murders together. Accordingly, Bartley advised Cole that if he 
pleaded guilty to the 1348 Lancaster Avenue charges, there was a real probability 
that the State would charge him with the 23rd Street murders and possibly seek the 
death penalty. 
Despite his attorney’s advice, Cole was still determined to exonerate Hunter. 
During a break in the trial on January 13, 2003, Bartley approached Miller and 
informed him that Cole wished to plead guilty to the 1348 Lancaster Avenue 
charges and to make a statement exonerating Hunter. Bartley tried to strike a deal 
whereby Cole would be spared the death penalty should he be charged with the 
23rd Street murders. He told Miller that in exchange for a waiver of the death 
penalty in connection with the 23rd Street murders that Cole would make a 
statement about both the 1348 Lancaster Avenue and the 23rd Street incidents. 
Miller responded that he did not have the authority to make this deal because he 
had to present Cole’s offer to the Senior Staff in the Office of the Attorney General 
who would have the final say.  
Miller presented Cole’s initial offer to the Senior Staff on the morning of 
January 14, 2003. By the middle of the afternoon, the defense rested its case. After 
a lunch recess, Miller and Bartley resumed their negotiations. They decided that 
 
5
Cole would confess to the attempted murder at 1348 Lancaster Avenue and make a 
statement concerning the 23rd Street double homicides. Miller informed Bartley 
that the Senior Staff would not consider extending a non-capital offer on the 23rd 
Street homicides to Cole until they knew the content and substance of Cole’s 
proffered statement.  The agreement was not set forth in writing and Miller and 
Bartley have since consistently disagreed about its terms.  
Cole knew that Miller could not make an “up front deal” to avoid the death 
penalty in exchange for his statement. Cole thought, however, that the State would 
agree not to seek the death penalty against him if the information he provided 
turned out to be true.  He believed that Miller would take the statement back to the 
Senior Staff and, in turn, the Senior Staff would review Cole’s cooperative 
statement and give bona fide consideration to abstaining from requesting the death 
penalty.  Moreover, Cole realized that the State would attempt to corroborate the 
statement.  Finally, Bartley thought that the State’s use of Cole’s statement would 
be strictly limited to the State’s determination of the death penalty question. In 
other words, Bartley interpreted the agreement to prohibit the State from using the 
statement for investigative purposes or to in any way advance the potential 
prosecution of Cole for the 23rd Street homicides.   
With what he thought to be an agreement in place, on January 14, 2003, 
Cole made a detailed statement concerning both the 1348 Lancaster Avenue 
 
6
incident and the 23rd Street homicides. At the beginning of the statement, which 
Detective Scott Chaffin of the Wilmington Police Department recorded, Miller 
described the deal to Cole: 
…the deal right now is that we are going to take uh a [proffer] 
statement of what you have to say about anything we ask you about 
and I’m going to take that statement back to my superiors and discuss 
with them whether to make you an offer where you would be spared 
capital punishment. Do you understand that?1 
 
Cole responded that he did understand. Miller and Chaffin then proceeded to 
question Cole about the two incidents. Cole admitted his involvement in the 1348 
Lancaster Avenue attempted murder and provided a statement concerning the 
incident. Cole also provided a detailed statement regarding his involvement in the 
23rd Street murders. In connection with the 23rd Street murders, Cole implicated 
two of his accomplices, Larry Johnson and Travanian Norton. After about an hour 
of questioning, the parties finished the interrogation for the day. The following 
interchange then occurred: 
Miller:    
We’ll we’ll [sic] terminate this and uh I’m gonna [sic] go back 
to my office and do what I told you I was gonna do [at] the 
beginning of this interview. Okay and uh obviously this 
conversation is not over we’ll pick it up. Plus you don’t want us 
                                                 
1  
Police Transcript of Cole’s Statement pg 1 (emphasis added).  As we understand the 
record, Miller’s described “deal” terms did not include publishing the statement to Cole’s 
accomplices in the 23rd Street homicides or anyone else beyond Miller’s “superiors.”  That is 
what he says he wanted Cole to understand before Cole made his statement and that is what Cole 
now claims to be his understanding. 
 
  
 
 
7
to discuss the substance of this outside this room. Yeah we’re 
not gonna talk about this with Sticky or Larry Johnson or 
anybody else. I I [sic] understand what you’re saying, but listen 
[while] this is still ongoing there’s a reason why we want that. 
We know what you’re saying to us and we [sic] we’re gonna 
hold up our end. But listen we can’t have anybody [know] it the 
less people know the less it’s gonna leak out there.  
 
Cole: 
I think Sticky already knows. 
 
M:            Why do you know that? 
 
C: 
Cause we talked. 
 
M:             Alright well let’s not from now on [sic] don’t talk about it.2  
 
Later in the same afternoon, after making the statement, Cole pleaded guilty to the 
1348 Lancaster Avenue attempted murder. Cole’s statement ultimately exonerated 
Hunter with respect to the Lancaster Avenue incident and the State never charged 
Hunter with the 23rd Street murders. 
The police later took Travanian Norton into custody for other reasons.  
While Norton was in custody, Chaffin questioned him about the 23rd Street 
murders. In doing so, he did exactly what Miller told Cole that the State would 
NOT do.  Chaffin “talked about the statement with someone else.”  Moreover, 
Chaffin played a portion of Cole’s statement to him. 3 It appears that in the portion 
                                                 
2  
Id. at pg 44 (emphasis added).  We read this exchange to be entirely consistent with what 
Miller wanted Cole to understand to be the scope of Miller’s use of the statement before Cole 
gave it. 
 
3  
Appellant’s App. A-144. The state also played a portion of Cole’s statement to Larry 
Johnson. Id. at A-94.  
 
8
of the tape played, Cole implicated Norton by using Norton’s nickname. After 
being advised that Cole had implicated him in the 23rd Street murders, Norton gave 
a full statement implicating Cole and Johnson. Norton was the only eye-witness 
who unequivocally identified Cole.  
 
After corroborating a portion of Cole’s statement, the prosecution ultimately 
decided to indict Cole and seek the death penalty.  Cole filed a motion to preclude 
the State from seeking the death penalty. The Superior Court judge held a hearing 
to examine the particulars of the alleged agreement into which Bartley, Cole and 
the State entered. The trial judge concluded “the transcript contains no promises 
about benefit to Cole as a result of the proffer, other than [the State’s] willingness 
to consider the information and review his request again with the senior staff. 
Notwithstanding Cole’s assertions otherwise [that if the prosecution found his 
statement to be true that he would be spared the death penalty], it appears that it 
was not until after the proffer that a misunderstanding developed.”4 The judge also 
noted: 
The State acknowledges that the proffer is subject to the protection of 
D.R.E. 410. The State will not be permitted to use the proffer at trial 
unless the exception set forth in the rule pertains. Defendant argues 
that the State improperly used Cole’s statement in investigating the 
23rd Street crimes. Specifically, Cole charges that the State used the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
4  
Memorandum Opinion, Cr. I.D. No. 0309013358, April 21, 2004 at 11. 
 
 
9
statement to persuade Norton to give a statement. Cole offers no 
authority for [his] assertion and I decline to speculate about the legal 
basis for this position as, has previously been stated, there was no 
agreement between Cole and the State when the proffer was given…. 
 
I find no merit in the argument that the State must be held to an 
alleged agreement because the defendant acted to his detriment in 
reliance on it. There was no agreement before the proffer. There was 
no consideration for an agreement afterward. The State’s willingness 
to consider the death penalty eligibility of the defendant presumably is 
available to any defendant, depending on the circumstances of the 
crime.5  
 
The judge, accordingly, denied Cole’s motion to preclude the State from seeking 
the death penalty.  
 
Cole’s trial continued with Cole risking the death penalty if convicted. 
During the trial, the defense filed a motion to exclude the evidence gained as a 
result of Cole’s statement, including Norton’s potential testimony.  The trial judge 
denied the motion to suppress in an oral ruling in chambers. She stated, 
I reviewed the statement that was taken by the State. The statement 
was taken with counsel present, it was taken against the advice of 
counsel, and it was taken voluntarily because Mr. Cole wanted to give 
it.  
 
And the motion to suppress. The state restricted itself to the sole 
purpose of deciding whether to proceed non-capitol [sic]. In fact, as I 
review this, the only thing that the state committed itself to – it did not 
say what it would do, it said it wouldn’t use the statement at trial. In 
other words it would comply with the requirements of 404.  
                                                 
5  
Id. at 12-13.   
 
 
 
 
10
 
The only restriction the State imposed on itself was the restriction the 
Rules of Evidence imposed on the State and that is… not to use the 
defendant’s statement unless the defendant testified inconsistent [sic] 
at trial, which is what 410 says.  
 
So at this point, there being no further record presented to me, and the 
defendants having ample opportunity to explore this[,] I’m going to 
deny the motion to suppress.6  
 
Cole was ultimately convicted, but not sentenced to death. Therefore, this appeal 
concerns only the admissibility of the evidence derived from the State’s use of 
Cole’s statement. In short the question presented on appeal is whether the trial 
judge erred when she denied Cole’s motion to suppress.7  
II. 
 
We review a trial judge’s refusal to grant a motion to suppress evidence 
under an abuse of discretion standard.8  In this case, however, the trial judge based 
her denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress on the finding that there was no 
agreement between the defendant and the state. “[P]lea agreements are undertaken 
                                                 
6  
Appellant’s App. A-149.  Here, the trial judge’s ruling narrowly addresses what she was 
asked to address and nothing more – whether Norton’s testimony, induced by Cole’s statement, 
should be barred — based upon the State’s improper use of Cole’s statement. 
 
7  
While the parties briefed two additional issues, they stipulated at oral arguments that this 
court’s intervening ruling in Johnson v. State, 878 A.2d 422 (Del 2005) decided these issues. The 
appellant’s opening brief was filed on June 17, 2005. Johnson was decided on July 1, 2005.  
 
8  
Gregory v. State, 616 A.2d 1198, 1200 (Del. 1992).  
 
 
11
for mutual advantage and governed by contract principles.”9 Therefore, we look to 
contract law for the applicable standard of review.  A trial judge’s interpretation of 
contract language involves questions of law that this Court reviews de novo for 
legal error.10  Conversely, a trial judge’s ruling concerning the existence or 
nonexistence of an oral contract is a question of fact that we review for an abuse of 
discretion.11  
III.A 
 
As noted in the previous section, plea agreements, and any other agreements 
into which the State and a defendant may enter, are governed by contract 
principles. One of these contract principles is the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. While we have never before expressly considered this covenant in 
the context of a plea agreement or agreement between a criminal defendant and the 
state in any context, it is well-supported by the common law in other 
jurisdictions.12 Accordingly we make explicit what was always implicit: in 
                                                 
9  
Washington v. State, 844 A.2d 293, 296 (Del. 2004). 
 
10  
Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 872 A.2d 944, 950 (Del. 2005). 
 
11  
See e.g., Wheeler v. Clerkin, 2005 Del. LEXIS 149 (Del. 2005); See also Philips Bros. 
Elec. Contrs., Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 133 Fed. Appx. 815, 816 (3d Cir. 2005) (“In the case of 
a disputed oral contract, what was said and done by the parties, as well as what was intended by 
what was said and done by the parties, are questions of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact.”) 
 
12  
See State v. Johnson, 1981 Ohio App. LEXIS 10183, *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981) (“[T]here 
is a duty upon the prosecution to negotiate in good faith in plea bargains.”); Commonwealth v. 
Newmiller, 487 Pa. 410, 426 (Pa. 1979) (“The prosecution must bargain in good faith, strictly 
and faithfully uphold its end of a plea bargain agreement, and treat the accused with fairness 
 
12
Delaware, a covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to plea bargains as well 
as to any agreement between a criminal defendant and the State. “Stated in its most 
general terms, the implied covenant requires a party in a contractual relationship to 
refrain from arbitrary or unreasonable conduct which has the effect of preventing 
the other party to the contract from receiving the fruits of the bargain. Thus, parties 
are liable for breaching the covenant when their conduct frustrates the overarching 
purpose of the contract by taking advantage of their position to control 
implementation of the agreement's terms.”13  This concern is particularly relevant 
in the context of agreements between the State and a criminal defendant, as the 
State will almost always be in a position to take advantage of its superior ability to 
control implementation of the agreement’s terms. In light of this concern, we 
emphasize the special role of the prosecutor in a criminal case: 
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and 
                                                                                                                                                             
throughout the plea bargaining process.”); State v. Williams, 103 Wn. App. 231, 235 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2000) (“Plea agreements are contracts, and the law imposes upon the State an implied 
promise to act in good faith”); United States v. Erdil, 351 F. Supp. 2d 58, 62-63 (D.N.Y. 2005) 
(“Cooperation agreements, like plea bargains, are interpreted according to the principles of 
contract law[;]… there is an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing in every contract”); 
State v. Scott, 230 Wis. 2d 643 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (“An analysis of a plea agreement under 
standard contract law leads to the same result as does an analysis under the due process clause. 
Every contract entails an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing.”); Sides v. State, 575 
So. 2d 1232, 1236 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). 
 
13  
Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 442 (Del. 2005) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).  
 
 
 
13
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar 
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of 
which is that guilt shall not escape [n]or innocence suffer. He may 
prosecute with earnestness and vigor -- indeed, he should do so. But, 
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. 
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to 
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to 
bring about a just one.14 
 
And, unlike police officers, prosecutors have special responsibilities as 
lawyers.15 
 
From our reading of the record, we have three concerns about the State’s 
conduct in this case: 
a. 
The prosecutor, as agent for the State, may have breached the express 
 
terms of an agreement with Cole; or 
 
b. 
The prosecutor may have authorized a breach of the covenant of good 
 
faith and fair dealing implied in an agreement with Cole; or 
 
c. 
The prosecutor may have made a false representation to Cole about 
the limited use the prosecution intended to make of Cole’s 
statement.16 
 
 
As noted above, at the beginning of Cole’s statement, Miller advised Cole of 
the deal in place by saying that the quid pro quo for getting the truth from Cole 
about who participated in both incidents would be his taking the statement back to 
the Senior Staff and discussing with them whether to seek the death penalty in the 
                                                 
14  
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (U.S. 1935). 
 
15  
See e.g.,  DELAWARE LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Rule 3.8. 
 
16  
See e.g, DELAWARE LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Rule 4.1 and cmt. 
 
14
23rd Street murders.  Miller did not say that “the deal right now” contemplated any 
other use of the statement including using Cole’s statements to confront other 
suspects.  The issues thus become: (1) having promised to take the statement to his 
“superiors” for review in exchange for the identity of the perpetrators of attempted 
and consummated homicides, did the prosecutor create a reasonable expectation in 
Cole’s mind that the statement would indeed be used solely for that purpose?; and 
(2) is Cole’s reasonable expectation and interpretation of Miller’s language enough 
to require that we import the limitation on the use of Cole’s statement into  the 
agreement under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing?  
 
At the end of Cole’s statement, Miller seems to reinforce Cole’s expectation 
that the statement would be not be shown to anyone other than Senior Staff in the 
Attorney General’s Office by saying:  
Yeah we’re not gonna talk about this with Sticky or Larry Johnson or 
anybody else. I I [sic] understand what you’re saying, but listen 
[while] this is still ongoing there’s a reason why we want that. We 
know what you’re saying to us and we [sic] we’re gonna hold up our 
end. 
 
Shortly after Miller made this statement, he directly authorized Chaffin to act 
contrary to his representation to Cole.  The hearings before the trial judge largely 
focused on whether Cole could reasonably expect a bona fide review by Senior 
Staff which might result in their decision not to seek the death penalty should he be 
indicted for the 23rd Street homicides and whether the State had promised to 
 
15
comply with D.R.E. 410.  
 Neither the parties nor the trial judge gave any attention 
to the following exchange: 
MR GEORGE (State’s appellate attorney): Based on the conversations that you 
overheard with Mr. Miller and Mr. Bartley, either the day of the trial 
when this first came up or the next day when you took the statement, 
did you understand there to be any limitations on what you could do 
with a statement if it were given, meaning any limitation on your 
ability to further investigate this? 
 
A (Chaffin): That was my issue very quickly, and that’s what I brought up to Mr. 
Miller.  I asked him that directly as to, are we locked in with Mr. 
Cole.  Can I still role with the investigation.  He said, no, I’m not 
limited in what I can do.  So I went on with my investigation. 
 
MR. GEORGE:  Okay.  Thank you very much. 
 
 
On redirect, Cole’s appellate attorney, Mr. Van Amergongen, followed up: 
 
 
Q: 
You asked him if you’re locked in despite having heard the 
conversations between Mr. Miller and Mr. Bartley; correct? 
 
A (Chaffin):  Yes.17 
 
 
This exchange suggests to us that even Chaffin believed the prosecutor 
promised Cole that Cole’s statement would not be used beyond a Senior Staff 
review or at least would not be shown to any identified co-perpetrators of the 23rd 
Street homicides.  Miller told Chaffin that he was “not limited in what I [Chaffin] 
could do.”  After Miller authorized him to go forward, Chaffin did confront Norton 
                                                 
17  
A-96 Appellant’s App. (emphasis added). 
 
16
and Johnson with Cole’s statement; he even played portions of it to them. In short, 
the State did the exact opposite of what the prosecutor said it would do.   
 
During the hearing on Cole’s motion to preclude the death penalty, Miller 
testified to explain exactly what he meant by his statement at the end of Cole’s 
interrogation. According to Miller this statement did not “relate to investigative 
purposes.” It related to Cole’s “natural concern as someone who has just dimed out 
a couple other people in a murder that they might find out about it and then come 
after him, or do something else.”18 
                                                 
18  
Appellant’s App. A-85. Another relevant section of Miller’s testimony follows: 
 
Question (Cole’s appellate attorney): Well, I’ll ask you the questions… You told Mr. 
Cole and Mr. Bartley that you weren’t going to take the statement outside 
and discuss it with anybody? 
 
Answer (Miller): Incorrect. The express purpose of the statement was, it was known to 
Mr. Cole before we took the statement that I was going to take it to other 
people, including for example, the senior staff. 
 
The Court: 
I think if you read the balance of the page, it sheds a little light on it. 
 
Answer (Miller): Thank you, Your Honor. That’s a good point. The – Mr. Cole is 
picking up on the context of it too and says, “I think Sticky already 
knows,” which establishes that the context was who in the prison might 
find out about this. 
 
The Court:  That comment, “I think Sticky already knows” how do I know who’s 
saying that? 
 
Answer (Miller): Because I’m talking… I can tell you, Your Honor, that this 
conversation is between myself and Mr. Cole. And he expresses – he 
picked up, he knows the context, because he acknowledges that Sticky 
already knows.  
 
 
17
 
Miller thus explains his interchange with Cole at the end of the transcript of 
Cole’s statement in terms of protecting Cole from retribution from other criminals 
he may have implicated.19  Even if this is a plausible reading, it establishes a 
promise, leaving in issue the nature and scope of the promise to Cole.  Under its 
interpretation of the “agreement” the State essentially said “We won’t tell anyone 
about this, Mr. Cole, so your accomplices don’t come after you.”  It then 
proceeded to tell those very accomplices Miller claims to shield from Cole, Norton 
and Johnson, who would have very strong retributive motives as a result of Cole 
“diming them out.”   
III.B 
 
From the record, we are unable to reach a conclusion at this time other than 
to remand this matter to the trial judge for further consideration.  Miller’s 
statements at the beginning and the end of Cole’s interrogation suggest that some 
sort of “deal” based on a promise by the State may have been in place.  Before 
taking Cole’s proffer, Miller set forth “the deal right now.”  At the end of the 
proffer, Miller told Cole that the State would “hold up its end” by taking Cole’s 
statement back to the Attorney General’s office and do what he said he would do 
at the beginning of the interview (whatever that might have been is not sufficiently 
                                                 
19  
This explanation may strike some as odd.  The State, Miller would have us believe, 
would assure Cole that they would not show his statement to someone who might “come after 
him,” but the State would feel free to show it to that same person in order to facilitate convicting 
Cole of intentional murder and ultimately to seek his execution. 
 
18
explained in the record).  Miller further told Cole “we’re not going to talk about 
this with . . . anybody else.”  He then authorized a skeptical Chaffin to do that very 
thing.   
 
We recognize that in her Memorandum Opinion denying Cole’s motion to 
preclude the death penalty the trial judge noted that “there was no agreement” 
between Cole and the State when the proffer was given.  But we interpret that 
reference to be limited to a promise not to ask for the death penalty – the subject of 
Cole’s motion at the time – and nothing more.  Cole’s counsel argued no legal 
theory to support any other basis for breach of implied terms of an agreement.  
Therefore, the trial judge wisely did not speculate about any alternative legal bases 
for Cole’s argument.   
 
When reaching the conclusion that the state did not agree to take the death 
penalty “off the table”, the trial judge noted “[t]he State’s willingness to consider 
the death penalty eligibility of the defendant presumably is available to any 
defendant, depending on the circumstances of the crime.”  Earlier in the opinion, 
she stated “the transcript contains no promises about benefit to Cole as a result of 
the proffer, other than [the State’s] willingness to consider the information and 
review his request again with the senior staff.”  If the State’s willingness to 
consider the death penalty eligibility of a defendant is presumably available to any 
defendant, the state would not have needed to promise to consider the information 
 
19
in Cole’s case.  Nonetheless, the transcript suggests that the prosecutor made two 
representations:  a promise to have a bona fide Senior Staff review of death penalty 
eligibility; and, a promise not to compromise Cole with other suspects.  We are 
uncertain about how the State could promise not to “talk about this with . . . 
anybody else” and yet there could still be no agreement about the conditions of the 
proffer; particularly when Cole clearly gave some benefit to the State by making 
his statement clearing an innocent person wrongly accused and implicating Norton, 
one of the actual perpetrators (presumably matters of equal concern to a 
conscientious prosecutor).  We are also confused about the trial judge’s statement 
that “there was no consideration for an agreement after [Cole’s proffer].”  
Specifically, does this refer to Miller’s statement at the end of Cole’s testimony?  
Perhaps, then, the State promised to do something after the proffer, but received no 
consideration in return?  Does this ignore the reference to the limited use of the 
statement even before it was given? 
 
In her oral decision denying Cole’s motion to suppress evidence derived 
from his statement, the trial judge found that the only thing the state committed 
itself to do was to not use Cole’s statement at trial.  The Delaware Rules of 
Evidence, however, already impose this restriction on the state.20 In this case, if the 
State promised only to “consider” Cole’s proffer with respect to “death penalty 
                                                 
20  
D.R.E. 410. 
 
 
20
eligibility”, something it would presumably do in any case, and to follow the Rules 
of Evidence already in place, it would appear that Cole received no benefit from 
making his statement.  In light of the references to a “deal” and “holding up our 
end” of the deal in Miller’s statements at the beginning and, more importantly, the 
end of Cole’s interrogation, and our concern over the State’s action in apparently 
saying one thing and doing the exact opposite, we remand this case to the trial 
judge for further factual findings.  
 
We recognize that we review a trial judge’s decision on a motion to suppress 
for abuse of discretion. When the decision on a motion to suppress turns on the 
trial judge’s conclusion about the existence or non-existence of an oral contract, 
we similarly review for an abuse of discretion.  At this point, we are NOT saying 
the trial judge abused her discretion. We simply remand so that the trial judge can 
make her factual findings with respect to the motion to suppress more explicit than 
she did in her oral ruling with the benefit of the arguments we considered on 
appeal.  In doing so we ask the trial judge to consider: 
1. Did Cole and Miller enter impliedly or explicitly into any agreement before 
the proffer limiting the State’s use of Cole’s statement to consideration of 
death penalty eligibility?  
 
2. What does Miller’s statement at the end of Cole’s interrogation signify?  
 
a. Does it further clarify the deal, if any, between the parties that existed 
before the proffer?  Or does it relate only to Cole’s concern that other 
people involved in a homicide might find out about it and then come 
after him, or “do something else?” 
 
21
 
 
b. In either case, what is the significance of the prosecutor saying one 
thing (“we won’t talk about this with anyone else”) and authorizing 
the police to do the opposite (confronting Norton and Johnson with 
Cole’s statement)? More specifically, did the parties have any reason 
to believe that the bargain into which they entered before Cole made 
his statement included a limitation on its use and did the State violate 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by acting contrary 
to Cole’s reasonable expectation of the “deal?” 
 
c. Did the prosecutor misrepresent how the State would use Cole’s 
statement? 
 
3. Did Cole detrimentally rely on the State’s promise to use his statement for a 
limited purpose, if it did so promise before the proffer, before making his 
statement? 
 
4. If an agreement existed and Cole relied on it to his detriment, and the State 
breached the agreement, what remedy applies?  Would specific enforcement 
of the agreement require a new trial or, given the weight of the evidence, 
would Cole have been convicted without Norton’s testimony? 
 
III.C.  
We note that the parties could have easily avoided this confusion by putting 
their agreement in writing or on the record BEFORE the proffer.  Under Superior 
Court Civil Rule 90(c), the Superior Court will not consider agreements between 
attorneys unless they are in writing and are filed with the Prothonotary or stated in 
the record in the presence of the Court.21  Moreover, the Superior Court Criminal 
Rules provide that “in all cases not provided for by rule or administrative 
                                                 
21  
DEL. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 90(c).  
 
 
22
procedure, the court shall regulate its practice in accordance with the applicable 
Superior Court civil rule or in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules 
or the rules of the Supreme Court.”22  While the aforementioned rules do not 
expressly apply to an agreement between a criminal defendant and the State, we 
think that the policy embedded in these rules applies to the circumstances in this 
case.  To the extent possible, all agreements of this type should be in writing or 
made on the record before the court.  This will greatly reduce the potential for 
after-the-fact confusion.  More importantly, by spending the time necessary to 
reduce an agreement to writing, the parties can obviate the necessity for holding a 
hearing to determine whether an agreement exists and its terms, thereby saving 
several days of a judge’s and the parties’ time. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, this case is REMANDED to the Superior Court 
for further findings.  Jurisdiction is retained.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22  
DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 57(d). 
 
23  
DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 19(C).