Case Title: In re Cook

Citation: 

Docket Number: S240153

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2019-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re ANTHONY MAURICE COOK, JR., 
 
on Habeas Corpus. 
 
S240153 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Three 
G050907 
 
San Bernardino County Superior Court 
WHCSS1400290 
 
 
June 3, 2019 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
and Groban concurred.   
 
Justice Kruger filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. 
 
 
In re COOK 
S240153 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
In People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), the 
defendant committed a murder at age 16, was tried as an adult 
and given a sentence of 50 years to life.  He challenged the 
sentence as a violation of the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel 
and unusual punishment.  While his appeal was pending, the 
Legislature enacted Penal Code1 sections 3051 and 4801 to 
provide a parole hearing during the 25th year of incarceration 
for certain juveniles sentenced as adults.  Because Franklin was 
eligible for such a hearing, we held that his Eighth Amendment 
challenge was rendered moot, and affirmed his sentence.  
(Franklin, at pp. 280, 286.)  We also held that sections 3051 and 
4801 contemplated “that information regarding the juvenile 
offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the 
offense will be available at a youth offender parole hearing to 
facilitate” consideration by the Board of Parole Hearings 
(Board).  (Franklin, at p. 283.)  Because assembling such 
information was “typically a task more easily done at or near the 
time of the juvenile’s offense” (ibid.), we remanded the case to 
the trial court to give Franklin a chance to “put on the record 
the kinds of information that sections 3051 and 4801 deem 
relevant at a youth offender parole hearing” (id. at p. 284).  We 
authorized the trial court to receive “any documents, 
                                        
1  
All further undesignated statutory references are to the 
Penal Code. 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that 
may be relevant at [Franklin’s] eventual youth offender parole 
hearing.”  (Ibid.)     
Franklin involved a direct appeal.  The question here is 
whether a sentenced prisoner whose conviction is final can seek 
the remedy of evidence preservation and, if so, by what means.  
We conclude that offenders with final convictions may file a 
motion in the trial court for that purpose, under the authority of 
section 1203.01.  That statute provides that, postjudgment, the 
trial court may generate, collect, and transmit information 
about the defendant and the crime to the Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation.  The statute specifically 
mentions statements prepared by the court, prosecutor, defense 
counsel, and investigating law enforcement agency.  But the 
court has inherent authority under Code of Civil Procedure 
section 187 to authorize additional evidence preservation 
consistent with our holding in Franklin.  Because section 
1203.01 provides an adequate remedy at law to preserve 
evidence of youth-related factors, resort to a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus is unnecessary, at least in the first instance.            
I.  BACKGROUND 
In 2007, Anthony Cook, Jr., was convicted of two counts of 
first degree murder and one count of premeditated attempted 
murder, with findings that he personally and intentionally 
discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury or death.2  
Cook was 17 years old when he committed the offenses.  He was 
sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for the attempted 
                                        
2  
Sections 187, subdivision (a), 664, 12022.53, subdivision 
(d).     
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
murder, and five consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the 
murders and enhancements.  The judgment was affirmed on 
appeal.   
In 2014, Cook filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
challenging his sentence as cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment and Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 
U.S. 460 (Miller).  The Court of Appeal held that Cook’s sentence 
was constitutional because newly enacted sections 3051 and 
4801 entitled him to a parole hearing during his 25th year of 
incarceration.  Accordingly, it denied the writ, and Cook 
petitioned for review.   
While Cook’s petition was pending, we decided Franklin, 
supra, 63 Cal.4th 261.  Thereafter, we granted Cook’s petition 
for review and transferred the case to the Court of Appeal with 
directions to vacate its decision and consider whether, in light of 
Franklin, Cook was “entitled to make a record before the 
superior court of ‘mitigating evidence tied to his youth.’ ”  (In re 
Cook, S234512, Supreme Ct. Mins., July 13, 2016.)    
On remand, the Court of Appeal held that Cook was 
entitled to such a proceeding.  (In re Cook (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 
393, 398–399, review granted Apr. 12, 2017, S240153.)  The 
court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that habeas 
corpus relief was not available because Franklin’s remand 
procedure was not based on an underlying illegality or unlawful 
restraint as would be necessary to exercise habeas jurisdiction.  
(Id. at pp. 399–400.)  It reasoned:  “A previously convicted 
defendant may obtain relief by habeas corpus when changes in 
case law expanding a defendant’s rights are given retroactive 
effect.”  (Id. at p. 399.)  Accordingly, the court held that “the 
deprivation of the rights granted by Franklin is cognizable on 
habeas corpus” and that the “appropriate remedy . . . is to 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
remand the matter to the trial court with directions to conduct 
a hearing at which [Cook] will have the opportunity to make 
such a record.”  (Id. at p. 400.)  
We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review, 
and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Scope of Franklin’s Holding 
Whether juvenile offenders with final convictions are 
entitled to a Franklin evidence preservation proceeding turns on 
the scope of Franklin’s holding.  The Attorney General would 
have us limit entitlement to defendants sentenced after 
Franklin and to cases pending on direct appeal when Franklin 
was decided.  He points out that Franklin did not find an 
illegality in the juvenile’s sentence.  Instead, the remand 
procedure was based on a statutory change in the law providing 
for juvenile parole hearings.  The Attorney General cites the 
presumption that, in the face of legislative silence, an amended 
statute applies only to defendants whose judgments are not yet 
final.  (Citing People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 323; In re 
Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744–748.)  He urges the authority 
for the remand in Franklin logically derived from (1) the 
procedural mechanisms available to the trial court to compile a 
relevant record at the sentencing stage of an open criminal 
action (§ 1204; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.437; see Franklin, 
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284); (2) this court’s inherent supervisory 
authority over criminal trial procedure (see Tide Water Assoc. 
Oil Co. v. Superior Court (1955) 43 Cal.2d 815, 825 (Tide 
Water)); and (3) our authority on direct appeal to remand a 
criminal case “to the trial court for such further proceedings as 
may be just under the circumstances” (§ 1260).  The Attorney 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
General maintains that neither a trial nor reviewing court can 
authorize a proceeding of the scope contemplated in Franklin 
once the appeal has concluded and the conviction is final.   
It is true that Franklin did not declare the juvenile’s 
sentence unlawful.  (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 278–281, 
284.)  Rather, we concluded that “[s]ection 3051 . . . effectively 
reforms the parole eligibility date of a juvenile offender’s 
original sentence so that the longest possible term of 
incarceration before parole eligibility is 25 years.”  (Id. at p. 281.)  
“[T]he combined operation of section 3051, section 3046, 
subdivision (c), and section 4801 means that Franklin is now 
serving a life sentence that includes a meaningful opportunity 
for release during his 25th year of incarceration.  Such a 
sentence is neither [life without parole] nor its functional 
equivalent.”  (Id. at pp. 279–280.)  Accordingly, Franklin was 
“not subject to a sentence that presumes his incorrigibility; by 
operation of law, he is entitled to a parole hearing and possible 
release after 25 years of incarceration.”  (Id. at p. 281.)  Under 
our interpretation of the statutes, “Franklin’s two consecutive 
25-year-to-life sentences remain valid, even though section 
3051, subdivision (b)(3) has altered his parole eligibility date by 
operation of law . . . .”  (Id. at p. 284, italics added.)  “By simply 
transforming the affected sentences to life with parole terms, 
[section 3051] avoid[s] the Miller issues associated with the 
earlier sentences.”  (In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1054 
(Kirchner).)  In the words of the high court:  “Giving Miller 
retroactive effect . . . does not require States to relitigate 
sentences, let alone convictions, in every case where a juvenile 
offender received mandatory life without parole.  A State may 
remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide 
offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
resentencing them.”  (Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 
__ [136 S.Ct. 718, 736] (Montgomery).)       
The Attorney General understates the significance of 
Franklin’s evidence preservation function in the statutory 
scheme.  The Legislature’s intent in enacting sections 3051 and 
4801 was “ ‘to establish a parole eligibility mechanism that 
provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she 
committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release’ ” upon 
a showing of maturation and rehabilitation.  (Franklin, supra, 
63 Cal.4th at p. 277, quoting Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1.)  Franklin 
authorized postjudgment proceedings to effectuate that intent.  
A Franklin proceeding gives “an opportunity for the parties to 
make 
an 
accurate 
record 
of 
the 
juvenile 
offender’s 
characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so 
that the Board, years later, may properly discharge its 
obligation to ‘give great weight to’ youth-related factors (§ 4801, 
subd. (c)) in determining whether the offender is ‘fit to rejoin 
society’ . . . .”  (Franklin, at p. 284.)3  At the proceeding, “the 
                                        
3  
Franklin processes are more properly called “proceedings” 
rather than “hearings.”  A hearing generally involves definitive 
issues of law or fact to be determined with a decision rendered 
based on that determination.  (People v. Pennington (1967) 66 
Cal.2d 508, 521; see generally Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 
Cal.4th 1232, 1247; Black’s Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 836, col. 
1.)  A proceeding is a broader term describing the form or 
manner of conducting judicial business before a court.  (See 
generally The Recorder v. Commission on Judicial Performance 
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 258, 270–272; People v. Gutierrez (1986) 
177 Cal.App.3d 92, 99–100; Black’s Law Dict., supra, p. 1398, 
col. 1.)  While a judicial officer presides over a Franklin 
proceeding and regulates its conduct, the officer is not called 
upon to make findings of fact or render any final determination 
 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
court may receive submissions and, if appropriate, testimony 
pursuant to procedures set forth in section 1204 and rule 4.437 
of the California Rules of Court, and subject to the rules of 
evidence.  [The defendant] may place on the record any 
documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-
examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth 
offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put 
on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile 
offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears 
on the influence of youth-related factors.”  (Franklin, at p. 284.)   
We recently explained the role a Franklin proceeding 
plays in the youth offender parole process.  In People v. 
Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123 (Rodriguez), the Court of 
Appeal declined to remand the case to the trial court, reasoning 
that the defendant had a “ ‘ “sufficient opportunity” ’ ” at the 
original sentencing hearing to make a record.  (Id. at p. 1131.)  
We disagreed and held that Rodriguez was “entitled to remand 
for an opportunity to supplement the record with information 
relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing.  
Although a defendant sentenced before the enactment of Senate 
Bill No. 260 [(2013–2014 Reg. Sess.)] could have introduced such 
evidence through existing sentencing procedures, he or she 
would not have had reason to know that the subsequently 
enacted legislation would make such evidence particularly 
relevant in the parole process.  Without such notice, any 
opportunity to introduce evidence of youth-related factors is not 
adequate in light of the purpose of Senate Bill No. 260.”  (Ibid.)        
                                        
at the proceeding’s conclusion.  Parole determination are left to 
the Board.  
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
Nothing about the remands in Franklin and Rodriguez 
was dependent on the nonfinal status of the juvenile offender’s 
conviction.  On the contrary, “[t]he statutory text makes clear 
that the Legislature intended youth offender parole hearings to 
apply retrospectively, that is, to all eligible youth offenders 
regardless of the date of conviction.”  (Franklin, supra, 63 
Cal.4th at p. 278, italics added.)  By a parity of reasoning, an 
evidence preservation process should apply to all youthful 
offenders now eligible for such a parole hearing.  As Franklin 
emphasized, the possibility that relevant evidence will be lost 
may increase as years go by.  (Id. at pp. 283–284.)  This reality 
is no less true for offenders whose convictions are final on direct 
appeal.         
Nor were the remands in Franklin and Rodriguez 
dependent on this court’s authority under section 1260 to 
resolve a factual issue affecting the validity of the judgment.  
(See People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 818–819 [citing 
cases].)  Rather, a Franklin proceeding is unrelated to the 
validity of the defendant’s sentence.  Neither the entitlement to 
a youth offender parole hearing, nor the evidence preservation 
process 
“disturb[s] 
the 
finality 
of 
state 
convictions.”  
(Montgomery, supra, 577 U.S. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 736].)  It 
follows that nothing in that proceeding depends on the pendency 
of a direct appeal challenging the judgment or this court’s 
remand authority under section 1260.  Consistent with this 
view, Cook confirmed at oral argument that he does not seek to 
attack the validity of his judgment, which is final.   
Accordingly, we hold that an offender entitled to a hearing 
under sections 3051 and 4801 may seek the remedy of a 
Franklin proceeding even though the offender’s sentence is 
otherwise final. 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
B. Section 1203.01 Provides an Adequate Remedy at Law in 
the First Instance To Conduct a Postjudgment Evidence 
Preservation Proceeding in the Trial Court 
A question remains.  How does a juvenile offender with a 
final conviction gain access to the trial court for an evidence 
preservation proceeding?  We have explained that “ ‘[t]here is no 
statutory authority for a trial court to entertain a postjudgment 
motion that is unrelated to any proceeding then pending before 
the court.  [Citation.]  Indeed, a motion is not an independent 
remedy.  It is ancillary to an on-going action and “ ‘implies the 
pendency of a suit between the parties and is confined to 
incidental matters in the progress of the cause.  As the rule is 
sometimes expressed, a motion relates to some question 
collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with, 
and dependent on, the principal remedy.’ ”  [Citation.]  In most 
cases, after the judgment has become final, there is nothing 
pending to which a motion may attach.’ ”  (People v. Picklesimer 
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 337 (Picklesimer), quoting Lewis v. 
Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 70, 76–77.) 
Cook sought a writ of habeas corpus and the parties 
vigorously debate the propriety of that remedy.  The Attorney 
General argues that the remand procedure contemplated in 
Franklin was not necessary to cure an underlying illegality in 
the juvenile’s sentence.  Rather, he urges, it is an evidence-
gathering procedure designed to implement the new parole 
provisions in section 3051 by reopening youthful offenders’ 
sentencing hearings, allowing them to build a more robust 
record of their characteristics and circumstances related to the 
offense for later use at a parole hearing.  Here, the Attorney 
General reasons that, “absent any underlying unlawful 
restraint or illegal sentence, habeas corpus would not 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
historically lie to reopen a sentencing hearing in a long final case 
in order to supplement a record.”   
Cook counters that depriving him of an opportunity to 
make a record in the trial court amounts to an unlawful 
custodial restraint cognizable on habeas corpus.  According to 
Cook, a Franklin proceeding is necessary to effectively cure the 
unconstitutionality of his sentence under Miller, and to carry 
out the statutory mandate of section 4801, subdivision (c) that 
the Board “shall give great weight to the diminished culpability 
of youth as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, 
and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the 
prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.”  He argues that 
the writ of habeas corpus is a proper vehicle to oversee the 
operation of the parole system.   
Our state Constitution guarantees the right to habeas 
corpus.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 11; In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 
428, 449.)  The availability of the writ is implemented by section 
1473, subdivision (a), which provides:  “A person unlawfully 
imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any 
pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into 
the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint.”  (See also 
People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1068.)  “ ‘[I]t is well 
settled that the writ of habeas corpus does not afford an all-
inclusive remedy available at all times as a matter of right.  It 
is generally regarded as a special proceeding.  “Where one 
restrained pursuant to legal proceedings seeks release upon 
habeas corpus, the function of the writ is merely to determine 
the legality of the detention by an inquiry into the question of 
jurisdiction and the validity of the process upon its face, and 
whether anything has transpired since the process was issued 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
to render it invalid.” ’ ”  (Villa, at pp. 1068–1069, quoting In re 
Fortenbury (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 284, 289.)   
We need not decide if the writ of habeas corpus is 
expansive enough to afford Cook the relief he seeks.  Cook has a 
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law that makes resort to 
habeas corpus unnecessary, at least in the first instance.  (In re 
Gandolfo (1984) 36 Cal.3d 889, 899–900; see generally, 
Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1052, and cases cited; 6 Witkin 
& Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Writs, § 
25, pp. 630–631.)  In cases with final judgments, section 1203.01 
gives the trial court authority to conduct an evidence 
preservation proceeding as envisioned in Franklin.   
Under section 1203.01, the trial court may create a 
postjudgment record for the benefit of the Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation.  Specifically, subdivision (a) 
provides:  “Immediately after judgment has been pronounced, 
the judge and the district attorney, respectively, may cause to 
be filed with the clerk of the court a brief statement of their 
views respecting the person convicted or sentenced and the 
crime committed, together with any reports the probation officer 
may have filed relative to the prisoner.  The judge and district 
attorney shall cause those statements to be filed if no probation 
officer’s report has been filed.  The attorney for the defendant 
and the law enforcement agency that investigated the case may 
likewise file with the clerk of the court statements of their views 
respecting the defendant and the crime of which he or she was 
convicted.”  (§ 1203.01, subd. (a).)  Thereafter, the clerk of the 
court must mail copies of the statements and reports to the 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (ibid.), providing 
information to assist effective administration of the law (see In 
re Minnis (1972) 7 Cal.3d 639, 650).       
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
The purpose of section 1203.01 parallels that of a Franklin 
proceeding.  As we explained in Franklin, the statutes 
“contemplate that information regarding the juvenile offender’s 
characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense will 
be available at a youth offender parole hearing to facilitate the 
Board’s consideration.”  (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 283.)  
A Franklin proceeding serves that purpose.  (Id. at p. 284.)  
Further, recognizing the court’s authority under section 1203.01 
to gather youth offender evidence effectuates sections 3051 and 
4801.    
Section 1203.01, subdivision (a) does specify that any 
statements by the judge and prosecutor should be filed 
“[i]mmediately after judgment has been pronounced.”  As 
California Rules of Court, rule 4.480 explains, a section 1203.01 
statement “should be submitted no later than two weeks after 
sentencing so that it may be included in the official Department 
of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Adult Operations 
case summary that is prepared during the time the offender is 
being processed at the Reception-Guidance Center of the 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . .”  There is no 
indication, however, that the statute’s requirement deprives the 
court of authority to act at a later time.  (See People v. Duran 
(1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 35, 37.)   
Section 1203.01, subdivision (a) also uses permissive 
language:  If a probation report is filed, the judge, the district 
attorney, 
defense 
counsel, 
and 
the 
investigative 
law 
enforcement agency “may” cause statements about the offender 
and the offense to be filed with the clerk.  But it would be 
improper for the court to preclude a juvenile offender’s chance 
to supplement the record with information relevant to his 
eventual youth offender parole hearing.  We recently 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
emphasized that point in Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th 1123.  
There, the Court of Appeal rejected the juvenile offender’s 
request to remand the case under Franklin, reasoning that 
“ ‘[i]nformation from the probation reports prepared for both 
defendants, the juvenile fitness hearing reports, their pretrial 
statements to officers, as well as what was provided at the 
sentencing hearings, would all be available for consideration at 
the youth offender parole hearing.’ ”  (Id., at p. 1131.)  We 
concluded that, without prior notice of Senate Bill No. 260 
(2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) and the Franklin process, “any 
opportunity to introduce evidence of youth-related factors is not 
adequate in light of the purpose of Senate Bill No. 260.”  
(Rodriguez, at p. 1131.)  Accordingly, we held that the juvenile 
offender was “entitled to remand for an opportunity to 
supplement the record with information relevant to his eventual 
youth offender parole hearing.”  (Ibid.)  
At oral argument, the Attorney General agreed section 
1203.01 authorizes the 
court 
to 
receive 
postjudgment 
submissions for transmission to the Board and opined the 
statute was “the most elegant way to cut the Gordian knot in 
this case.”  But he has also emphasized the limited scope of the 
remedy, observing that “the ‘brief statement’ provisions of 
section 1203.01 bear little resemblance to the adversarial 
proceedings articulated in Franklin.”  To be sure, section 
1203.01, enacted in 1947, did not anticipate our 2016 Franklin 
decision.  Nonetheless, “[c]ourts have inherent power, as well as 
power under section 187[4] of the Code of Civil Procedure, to 
                                        
4  
Code of Civil Procedure section 187 provides:  “When 
jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by any other 
 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
adopt any suitable method of practice, both in ordinary actions 
and special proceedings, if the procedure is not specified by 
statute or by rules adopted by the Judicial Council.  It is not only 
proper but at times may be necessary for a court to follow 
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which are harmonious 
with the objects and purposes of the proceeding although those 
provisions are not specifically made applicable by the statute 
which creates the proceeding.”  (Tide Water, supra, 43 Cal.2d at 
p. 825, fn. omitted.)  While section 1203.01 does not mention a 
Franklin proceeding to preserve evidence, neither does it 
prohibit one. 
People v. Superior Court (Morales) (2017) 2 Cal.5th 523 is 
instructive.  That case considered whether the superior court 
had jurisdiction to grant a motion to preserve evidence in 
anticipation of a future hearing for postconviction discovery 
under section 1054.9 in certain habeas corpus proceedings.  
(Morales, at p. 526.)  We concluded that the granting of such a 
motion came within the trial court’s inherent authority under 
Code of Civil Procedure section 187 to facilitate its discovery 
jurisdiction.  (Morales, at pp. 531–532.)  We rejected the 
Attorney General’s argument that section 1054.9 established an 
exclusive procedure that excluded preservation motions, 
labeling that interpretation of Code of Civil Procedure section 
187 “unduly narrow in this context.”  (Morales, at p. 532.)  
Section 1054.9 simply did not speak to the situation where a 
                                        
statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means 
necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise 
of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically 
pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or 
mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most 
conformable to the spirit of this code.” 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
condemned inmate is prevented from filing a postconviction 
discovery motion because he lacks counsel.  (Morales, at p. 532.)  
Accordingly, we concluded that trial courts, which have 
jurisdiction to grant a condemned inmate’s motion for 
postconviction discovery, “have the inherent power to protect 
that jurisdiction by entertaining motions for the preservation of 
evidence that will ultimately be subject to discovery under that 
statute when the movant is appointed habeas corpus counsel.”  
(Id. at p. 533.) 
People v. Hyde (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 97 is similar.  After 
his conviction became final, Hyde filed a motion in the trial court 
for an award of presentence custody credits, relying on recent 
case authority entitling him to such credit.  (Id. at pp. 99–100.)  
The trial court denied the motion in a manner suggesting that 
it lacked jurisdiction.  (Id. at p. 99, fn. 2.)  The Court of Appeal 
reversed.  It noted that the defendant was not seeking to amend 
a final judgment; rather he was requesting that the court 
“supplement its judgment and advise the Adult Authority of a 
simple fact (how much presentence time in custody he has been 
subjected to) in an official and authentic manner so that the 
Adult Authority can take that action which the statutory law 
(and the constitutional principles applicable thereto) obligates it 
to take.”  (Id. at p. 100.)  Nonetheless, “[n]o precise statutory 
remedy” was available to solve the problem.  (Id. at p. 101.)  The 
court concluded that, although the Adult Authority ultimately 
had responsibility for the custody credit calculations, “[t]here 
must be a judicial process by which disputed facts may be 
resolved when the defendant and the Adult Authority are 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
unable to agree on the correct answer.”  (Ibid.)5  Relying on Code 
of Civil Procedure sections 128 and 187, the court held that the 
disputed question may be presented, on noticed motion, to the 
sentencing court which possessed the necessary information.  
(Hyde, at pp. 102–103.)   
Although the circumstances of Morales and Hyde differ in 
some respects from the case before us, their logic is persuasive.  
Section 1203.01, augmented by the court’s inherent authority to 
craft necessary procedures under Code of Civil Procedure 
section 187, authorizes it to preserve evidence as promptly as 
possible for future use by the Board.  Transmission of that 
record to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, in 
turn, enables the Board to “discharge its obligation to ‘give great 
weight to’ youth-related factors (§ 4801, subd. (c)) in 
determining whether the offender is ‘fit to rejoin society’ . . . .”  
(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.) 
Our recent decision in Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th 1040, 
does not compel a different result.  There, a juvenile offender 
filed a habeas corpus petition requesting resentencing because 
the court did not give due consideration to the factors laid out in 
Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460.  (Kirchner, at pp. 1042–1043.)  
Unlike this case, the petitioner in Kirchner did not qualify for a 
later youth offender parole hearing.  (Id. at p. 1049, fn. 4.)  
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal denied habeas relief, 
reasoning that the petitioner had an adequate remedy at law 
under section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) (hereafter section 
                                        
5  
Section 2900.5 was subsequently amended to require the 
trial court to calculate presentence custody credits.  (See People 
v. Mendoza (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 948, 951–952.) 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
1170(d)(2)), which authorized recall of the sentence and 
resentencing.  (Kirchner, at p. 1043.)   
We disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, 
observing, “Section 1170(d)(2) was not designed to address 
Miller error, and its recall of sentence and resentencing 
procedure is not well suited to remedy the constitutional error 
of which petitioner complains.”  (Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 
1043.)  Under the express terms of the statute, some juveniles 
were categorically excluded from its reach without regard to 
whether their sentences comported with Miller.  (Id. at pp. 1049, 
1053.)  Eligible juveniles were required to submit a petition 
describing their remorse, relating their efforts at rehabilitation, 
and stating that at least one of four qualifying circumstances 
applies.  (Id. at pp. 1049 & fn. 6, 1053.)  The sentencing court 
was required to find at least one of these circumstances true by 
a preponderance of the evidence before resentencing the minor.  
(Id. at pp. 1050, 1053.)  Finally, in considering the propriety of 
resentencing, the court “ ‘may consider’ a set of enumerated 
factors, which only partially overlap with those identified in 
Miller.”  (Id. at p. 1054.)  Reviewing these criteria, we concluded 
that section 1170(d)(2) did not provide an adequate remedy at 
law for Miller error:  “as a process designed to revisit lawful 
sentences of life without parole, section 1170(d)(2) limits the 
availability of resentencing under its terms, and the 
resentencing inquiry it prescribes does not necessarily account 
for the full array of Miller factors in the manner that a proper 
resentencing under Miller would.”  (Kirchner, at p. 1043.)   
Kirchner is distinguishable.  Cook is not seeking a 
resentencing, but instead a chance to create a record relevant to 
a parole hearing.  Further, in Kirchner, both the express 
language and legislative intent behind section 1170(d)(2) were 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
so specific as to preclude an effective Miller resentencing.  
(Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1043, 1055.)  No similar hurdle 
blocks access to a Franklin proceeding under the authority of 
section 1203.01, augmented as necessary by Code of Civil 
Procedure section 187.  In fact, section 1203.01’s framework 
provides a more flexible, efficient, and suitable means of 
collecting information for the benefit of the Board than the rigid 
requirements of habeas corpus.   
In exercising habeas jurisdiction, the courts “ ‘must abide 
by the procedures set forth in . . . sections 1473 through 1508.’ ”  
(People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 737, quoting Adoption of 
Alexander S. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 857, 865.)  Those procedures 
include a petition alleging unlawful restraint, naming the 
custodian, and specifying the facts on which the claim is based.  
The petition must be verified and include reasonably available 
documentary evidence supporting the claims.  (§§ 1474–1475; 
People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474; Romero, at p. 737.)  
It must state whether any prior application has been made and 
the result of those proceedings, and must allege that the petition 
is timely or demonstrate good cause for delay.  (§ 1475; In re 
Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780–781, 805; In re Clark (1993) 
5 Cal.4th 750, 783, 798, fn. 35.)  When presented with a habeas 
petition, the court must assess whether it states a prima facie 
case for relief and whether the stated claims are procedurally 
barred.  (Romero, at p. 737.)  If the petition meets these 
requirements, the court must issue a writ of habeas corpus or 
order to show cause, receive a return and traverse, and may, if 
necessary, order an evidentiary hearing on the claims.  (Id. at 
pp. 738–740; Duvall, at pp. 475–478.)  The purpose of the 
evidentiary hearing is to make findings of fact and credibility 
determinations necessary to adjudicate the petition.  (In re 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
Hardy (2007) 41 Cal.4th 977, 993.)  Finally, relief in habeas 
corpus is granted by “an order or judgment directing the 
petitioner’s release from custody or alteration of the conditions 
of the petitioner’s confinement.”  (Romero, at p. 743.)   
As noted, Cook is not seeking release.  Nor does he 
challenge the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of the 
proceedings that led to his now final judgment and sentence.  
The relief he seeks is entirely consistent with section 1203.01, 
which has nothing to do with the validity of a trial court’s 
judgment.  The section does not define procedures that will 
culminate in a new judgment and does not contemplate 
modification of the original judgment.  By its terms, the statute 
addresses the filing of statements with the court “after judgment 
has been pronounced.”  (§ 1203.01, subd. (a).)   Further, the 
motion we recognize under section 1203.01 does not impose the 
rigorous pleading and proof requirements for habeas corpus.  
(See discussion, post, at pp. 20‒21.)  Nor does it require the court 
to act as a factfinder.  Rather, it simply entails the receipt of 
evidence for the benefit of the Board.  (Franklin, supra, 63 
Cal.4th at p. 284.)  For these reasons, resort to the writ of habeas 
corpus in the first instance would be unnecessarily cumbersome.  
Not only is initial resort to section 1203.01, supplemented as 
necessary by Code of Civil Procedure section 187, an adequate 
remedy, it is superior in its efficiency and purpose to reliance on 
the great writ.6 
                                        
6  
Nothing we say here forecloses an offender, after 
exhausting the procedures outlined in this opinion, from filing a 
petition for writ of mandate or habeas corpus to compel the trial 
court to perform its duties under Franklin.  (See generally 
 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
Having recognized the opportunity for offenders with final 
judgments to preserve evidence in the trial court, we need not 
address arguments made by amicus curiae the Post-Conviction 
Justice Project and the Pacific Juvenile Defender Center that 
the procedures and resources available to inmates through the 
parole process are inadequate to implement the statutory 
mandates of sections 3051 and 4801.  (See Rodriguez, supra, 4 
Cal.5th at p. 1132; Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 286.)  “[I]n 
the absence of any concrete controversy in this case concerning 
suitability criteria or their application by the Board or the 
Governor, it would be premature for this court to opine on 
whether and, if so, how existing suitability criteria, parole 
hearing procedures, or other practices must be revised to 
conform 
to 
the 
dictates 
of 
applicable 
statutory 
and 
constitutional law.”  (Franklin, at p. 286.)7  We offer no opinion 
here whether the federal Constitution compels the Board to 
consider individualized evidence bearing on youth-related 
factors, or whether the unavailability of such information might 
undermine the Board’s decision.  Finally, as we have before, we 
express no view on whether a Franklin proceeding is 
constitutionally required.  (Rodriguez, at p. 1132.)  
C. Franklin Proceedings for Cases with Final Judgments 
For inmates like Cook who seek to preserve evidence 
following a final judgment, the proper avenue is to file a motion 
in superior court under the original caption and case number, 
                                        
Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 339–340; In re Gandolfo, 
supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 899–900.)  We express no opinion on the 
propriety of a writ in that context.   
7  
We now have such a case before us.  (In re Palmer, review 
granted Jan. 16, 2019, S252145.)  
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
citing the authority of section 1203.01 and today’s decision.  The 
motion should establish the inmate’s entitlement to a youth 
offender parole hearing and indicate when such hearing is 
anticipated to take place, or if one or more hearings have already 
occurred.  The structure for the proceeding is outlined in 
Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at page 284, and further informed 
by the youth-related factors set forth in section 4801, 
subdivision (c).  The proceeding is not limited to the filing of 
statements referenced in section 1203.01.  Rather, consistent 
with Franklin and the court’s inherent authority, the offender 
shall have the opportunity to “place on the record any 
documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-
examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth 
offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put 
on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile 
offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears 
on the influence of youth-related factors.”  (Franklin, at p. 284.)   
Although Franklin mandates an opportunity for evidence 
preservation, the trial court may “exercise its discretion to 
conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information 
introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord 
with 
the 
governing 
rules, 
statutes, 
and 
regulations.”  
(Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1132.)  The court may, for 
example, require an offer of proof regarding the evidence the 
offender seeks to present, so that it can determine whether such 
evidence is relevant to youth-related factors and meaningfully 
adds to the already available record.  It may also determine 
whether testimony is “appropriate” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 
at p. 284), or if other types of evidentiary submissions will 
suffice.  Finally, Franklin emphasized that the purpose of the 
proceeding was to allow the offender to assemble evidence “at or 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
near the time of the juvenile’s offense rather than decades later 
when memories have faded, records may have been lost or 
destroyed, or family or community members may have relocated 
or passed away.”  (Id. at pp. 283–284.)  Some offenders who file 
these postjudgment motions in the trial court may have spent a 
decade or more in prison.  Some may have even come before the 
Board for a youth offender parole hearing.  The court may 
consider whether a Franklin proceeding is likely to produce 
fruitful evidence considering such factors as the passage of time 
and whether the offender has already benefitted from the 
factfinding procedures set forth in section 3051, subdivision 
(f)(1) and (2) with the assistance of appointed counsel (§ 3041.7; 
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2256, subd. (c)).  Additionally, some 
offenders may choose not to present certain forms of evidence, 
such as live testimony, or to forgo a Franklin proceeding 
altogether.  Delving into the past is not always beneficial to a 
defendant.  The opportunity for a Franklin hearing is just that:  
an opportunity.  
It bears emphasis that the proceeding we outlined in 
Franklin derives from the statutory provisions of sections 3051 
and 4801.  (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 283–284; see 
Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1132 [“We expressed no view 
in Franklin, and we need not express any view here, on whether 
such a remand is constitutionally required”].)  While we 
unquestionably have the power to interpret these laws, the 
Legislature is in a superior position to consider and implement 
rules of procedure in the first instance.  The Legislature remains 
free to amend the pertinent statutes to specify what evidence-
gathering procedures should be afforded to youth offenders, 
taking into account the objectives of the youth offender parole 
hearing and the burden placed on our trial courts to conduct 
In re COOK 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
Franklin proceedings for the many thousands of offenders who 
will be eligible for them under today’s decision.   
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal granting Cook’s 
petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed and the matter is 
remanded to the Court of Appeal with directions to deny the 
petition.  The denial order shall be without prejudice to Cook’s 
filing a motion in the trial court for a Franklin proceeding under 
the authority of section 1203.01 and today’s decision.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
In re COOK 
S240153 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kruger 
 
I agree with much of what the majority says:  Although 
the youth offender parole statutes provide no mechanism for 
individuals serving final sentences to return to court to create 
records for use at their later parole hearings, Penal Code section 
1203.01 (section 1203.01) fills that gap.  That provision, which 
was enacted for the very purpose of preserving information for 
later use in parole determinations, permits both sides in a 
criminal case to submit to the court postjudgment written 
statements about the offender and his or her crime.  As the 
Attorney General acknowledged at oral argument, the provision 
applies even in the case of final judgments.  It thus supplies 
Cook and others similarly situated with the record-preservation 
mechanism that the youth offender parole statutes lack. 
My disagreement with the majority concerns the scope of 
the procedures authorized under section 1203.01.  That 
provision authorizes the submission of documentary evidence 
only; it does not authorize a full-blown evidentiary hearing, 
including the taking of live testimony, subject to cross-
examination.  Unlike the majority, I do not believe courts have 
the inherent authority to expand section 1203.01 to provide for 
such hearings when the Legislature has not chosen to do so.  The 
procedures prescribed in section 1203.01 were not casually 
selected; they represent the Legislature’s considered judgment 
about how to balance the offender’s interest in preserving 
information with the state’s interest in limiting the costs and 
In re COOK 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
2 
burdens of additional postjudgment proceedings.  Unless and 
until the Legislature reconsiders, it seems to me we are bound 
by its choice. 
It is true the procedures prescribed by section 1203.01 are 
not as expansive as the procedures we ordered in People v. 
Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 284.  But that case, unlike this 
one, came to us on direct review of a nonfinal judgment; our 
power to supervise the conduct of ongoing criminal proceedings 
gave us the power to fashion instructions for the trial court on 
remand.  We have no similar power in a case that has already 
become final.  And we have never held that the specific record-
preservation procedures we ordered in Franklin, including the 
opportunity to present live testimony, are required either by the 
terms of the youth offender parole statutes or by the 
constitutional guarantee they are designed to implement.  
Absent such a requirement, there is no reason to think that 
precisely the same procedures must be made available to the 
many thousands of youthful offenders serving final sentences, a 
great number of whom committed their offenses many years or 
even decades ago. 
This brings me to a final observation.  For many youthful 
offenders serving final sentences, it is likely already too late to 
capture all the information about the particular youthful 
characteristics that might have been available closer to the time 
of their offenses.  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 22.)  Given this 
practical reality, we should be careful not to overstate the 
importance of any particular set of record-preservation 
procedures to the proper functioning of the youth offender parole 
system.  
 
In re COOK 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
3 
By statute, the charge of the Board of Parole Hearings  is 
to give each youthful offender “a meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release” (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (e)), according “great 
weight to the diminished culpability of youth as compared to 
adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent 
growth and increased maturity” (id., § 4801, subd. (c)).  A robust 
record 
of 
an 
individual’s 
youthful 
characteristics 
will 
undoubtedly be helpful to the Board in undertaking this inquiry.  
But the majority opinion does not hold, and it should not be read 
to suggest, that in the absence of such a record the Board 
necessarily will be unable to give such youthful offenders the 
meaningful consideration to which they are entitled.  Even 
without such information, the Board can and must carry out its 
duty to give “great weight” to the mitigating nature of youth.  
Immaturity, impetuosity, and the like are “hallmark features” 
of youth (Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 477), confirmed 
by “common sense—[] what ‘any parent knows,’ ” (id. at p. 471) 
and by “science and social science as well” (ibid.).  In all cases, 
the Board is required to begin from the assumption that a crime 
committed by a juvenile does not reveal the same depravity or 
incorrigibility as the same crime committed by an adult, and to 
focus on the individual’s present maturity and record of 
rehabilitation. 
*  *  *  *  * 
Again, as noted, I agree with much of what the majority 
says today.  Under section 1203.01, Cook may submit to the 
superior court written statements respecting his youthful 
characteristics.  Consistent with Penal Code section 3051, 
subdivision (f)(2), this submission may include relevant 
evaluations, as well as statements from “[f]amily members, 
friends, school personnel, faith leaders, and representatives 
In re COOK 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
4 
from community-based organizations with knowledge about the 
individual before the crime or his or her growth and maturity 
since the time of the crime.”  In my view, however, whether to 
order additional record-preservation procedures in final cases is 
a matter for the Legislature to decide. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Cook 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 7 Cal.App.5th 393 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S240153 
Date Filed: June 3, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: Katrina West 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Anthony Maurice Cook, Jr., in pro. per.; and Michael Satris, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Petitioner Anthony Maurice Cook, Jr. 
 
Heidi L. Rummel, Ian C. Graves and Richard L. Braucher for the Post-Conviction Justice Project and 
Pacific Juvenile Defender Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner Anthony Maurice Cook, Jr. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Edward C. DuMont, State Solicitor General, 
Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland and Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant 
Attorneys General, Michael R. Johnsen, Deputy State Solicitor General, A. Natasha Cortina, Theodore 
Cropley, Parag Agrawal and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent the People. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Michael Satris 
Law Office of Michael Satris 
P.O. Box 337 
Bolinas, CA  94924 
(415) 868-9209 
 
Jeffrey M. Laurence 
Assistant Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5897