Case Title: Thomas v. Star Aggregates, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Thomas v. Star Aggregates, Inc.1999 WY 84982 P.2d 714Case Number: 98-225Decided: 06/18/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
ERIC 
L. THOMAS, Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

STAR AGGREGATES, INC., 
and STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION 
DIVISION, Appellees, (Respondents).

 

W.R.A.P. 12.09(b) 
Certification from the District Court of Laramie County Honorable Edward L. 
Grant, Judge

Rocky L. 
Edmonds, Cheyenne, WY., Representing Appellant.

John W. 
Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for 
Appellee State of Wyoming.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Eric L. Thomas 
(Claimant) appeals from an order of the Office of Administrative Hearings 
denying worker's compensation benefits.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Claimant raises a 
single issue for consideration:

Is the decision 
of the Office of Administrative Hearings supported by Substantial 
Evidence?

In addition to 
this issue, Appellee Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division 
(Division) presents an alternative ground for upholding the order denying 
benefits; specifically, that an untimely injury report by Claimant prejudiced 
the employer's ability to investigate the claim.1

FACTS

[¶4]      The much-disputed 
facts associated with this case begin with Claimant's first, and only, day of 
employment with Star Aggregates, Inc. Claimant reported for work on Friday, 
September 19, 1997, a cold and rainy day. His assignment was to clear debris 
from beneath the conveyor belts, which transported rocks to the crushers. 
According to Claimant, early in the afternoon a rock came off of the conveyor 
belt, fell a short distance, and struck his hand. While he did not notice any 
serious injury to his hand at that time because of the cold, Claimant asserted 
that he reported the incident shortly thereafter to the crusher operator. Over 
the course of the following weekend, Claimant's hand became swollen and sore. 
Claimant called in on Monday, and reported that he could not work because of 
soreness in his hand. On Wednesday, September 24, 1997, Claimant was diagnosed 
with a broken bone in his hand.

[¶5]      On September 29, 
1997, Claimant filed a Report of Injury. Star Aggregates objected, and the 
Division subsequently denied benefits. Pursuant to a request from the Claimant, 
the Office of Administrative Hearings held a hearing on March 3, 
1998.

[¶6]      At the hearing, 
the witnesses for Star Aggregates disputed much of Claimant's story. The crusher 
operator testified that Claimant did not report the incident to him on the day 
of its alleged occurrence. He also testified that while it was possible for a 
rock to hit someone as described by Claimant, it was unlikely, and no one had 
been injured in such a manner previously. In addition, the office manager 
testified that when Claimant called in on the following Monday, Claimant did not 
report the injury but simply said that he could not work because he was 
"sick."

[¶7]      The most 
contentious dispute between the parties, however, centered around Claimant's 
time card. The time card contained a column next to the space for employee's 
signature titled "Injury? " accompanied with two boxes marked "Yes" or "No. " 
Witnesses for Star Aggregates testified that the normal procedure was for each 
employee to check the appropriate box under "Injury? " at the time they signed 
their time cards. No one but an employee is allowed to check those boxes, and if 
an employee had failed to check either box, then the employee was contacted for 
an explanation. At the hearing, the time card for Claimant was introduced into 
evidence and the box under the "Injury? " column next to Claimant's signature is 
checked "No." Claimant vehemently denied ever checking the box and insinuated 
that someone else at Star Aggregates must have checked it.

[¶8]      On March 26, 
1998, the Hearing Examiner issued an Order Denying Benefits, concluding that 
Claimant had failed to meet his burden of proving that he had suffered a 
compensable work-related injury, and that the employer was prejudiced in its 
ability to investigate the claim because of an untimely injury report by 
Claimant. Claimant sought review of the Order in the district court which 
certified the matter to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶9]      When confronted 
with cases which have been certified to us pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09, this 
Court applies the appellate standards which are applicable to a reviewing court 
of the first instance. Weaver v. Cost Cutters, 953 P.2d 851, 854 (Wyo. 1998). 
W.R.A.P. 12.09(a) limits judicial review of administrative decisions to a 
determination of those matters which are specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c), which provides in pertinent part:

(c) [T] he 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action. In making the following 
determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it 
cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error. The reviewing court shall: . . . .

(ii) Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be: . . 
. .

(E) Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-3-114(c) (Michie 1997).

[¶10]   In Pederson v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997), we 
articulated the standard to be used in determining whether the hearing examiner 
correctly found that the claimant failed to meet his or her burden of proof as 
follows: 

[¶11]   A claimant for worker's 
compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the essential elements of 
the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the contested case hearing. 
Martinez v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. 917 P.2d 619, 621 
(Wyo. 1996). When an agency decides that the party charged with the burden of 
proof has failed to meet that burden, the case is reviewed under the "[a] 
rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
the law" language of Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) (1990). City of Casper v. 
Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 1995). On appeal the complainant * * * has the 
burden of proving arbitrary administrative action. Knight v. Environmental 
Quality Council of State of Wyo., 805 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1991); Wyoming 
Bancorporation v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432, 439 (Wyo. 1974); Marathon Oil Co. v. 
Welch, 379 P.2d 832, 836 (Wyo. 1963); Whitesides v. Council of City of Cheyenne, 
78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520, 526 (1957). The agency, as the trier of fact, is 
charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses. 
Utech, 895 P.2d  at 451, and cases there cited. The deference normally accorded 
to the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the administrative 
agency, and the agency's decision as to the facts will not be overturned unless 
it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Wyoming Steel 
& Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶12]   In Helm v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., No. 97-326, slip op. at 6 (Wyo. filed 
June 16, 1999), we further stated:

Applying the 
Pederson standard, we do not disturb the decision of the hearing examiner unless 
a claimant, in this instance Helm, can demonstrate that it was arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 
This rule affords the petitioner the opportunity to show that the findings of 
fact . . . were contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. When an 
agency's action or decision is "based on a consideration of relevant factors and 
is rational," we will not rule that the action or decision is arbitrary or 
capricious. Mortgage Guaranty Ins. Corp. v. Langdon, 634 P.2d 509, 520 (Wyo. 
1981).

(Footnote 
omitted.)

DISCUSSION

[¶13]   Claimant's sole issue on appeal is 
whether the Hearing Examiner's decision that Claimant failed to meet his burden 
of proof is arbitrary and capricious. Essentially, Claimant's argument is that 
since he provided the only explanation of how his injury occurred, he had met 
his burden and, thus, should have been awarded benefits.

[¶14]   In this case, the Hearing Examiner 
found that the conflicting evidence made it impossible to determine whether 
Claimant's injury was work-related. Claimant testified that his hand was injured 
by a rock which came off the conveyor belt, and that he reported the incident 
that day to the crusher operator and on the following Monday when he called into 
work. The employer's witnesses, however, denied that Claimant had informed them 
of the injury as he claimed. In addition, while Claimant denied checking the "no 
injury" box on the time card, the employer's witnesses testified that only 
employees checked the box. Ultimately, the resolution of this conflicting 
evidence was dependent upon a weighing of the evidence and the credibility of 
the witnesses. This is a function which the Hearing Examiner must perform. 
Weaver, 953 P.2d  at 855. This Court will not re-weigh the evidence nor 
substitute its judgment for that of the Hearing Examiner. Snyder v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 957 P.2d 289, 292-93 (Wyo. 1998). The 
Hearing Examiner could reasonably infer from the evidence that Claimant had not 
been injured at work, and therefore, the decision to deny benefits is supported 
by substantial evidence.

CONCLUSION

[¶15]   The decision of the Hearing 
Examiner to deny benefits is not arbitrary or capricious, and the decision is, 
therefore, affirmed.

Footnotes

1 In light of 
our conclusion that substantial evidence supported the Hearing Examiner's 
decision to deny benefits, we do not address the Division's alternative grounds 
for affirmance.