Case Title: State ex rel. General Credit Acceptance Co. v. Honorable David L. Vincent III

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC97175

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc
STATE EX REL. GENERAL CREDIT       ) 
ACCEPTANCE COMPANY, LLC, 
    ) 
    ) 
Relator, 
    ) 
    ) 
v. 
    ) 
No. SC97175 
    ) 
THE HONORABLE DAVID L. 
    ) 
VINCENT III,  
    ) 
    ) 
Respondent. 
    ) 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION 
General Credit Acceptance Company, LLC, (GCAC) filed a petition for a writ of 
prohibition barring the circuit court from taking any further action other than vacating the 
order granting class certification in whole or in part.  The circuit court abused its discretion 
by certifying an overly broad class.  The circuit court is directed to withdraw its 
certification of the class as presently defined because it includes large numbers of 
individual claims precluded by final deficiency judgments or estopped by their failure to 
disclose the claims in bankruptcy.   
Further, the named plaintiff is not typical of the class because she voluntarily 
surrendered her vehicle and because GCAC has no deficiency judgment against her.  Each 
Opinion issued April 2, 2019
2 
class and subclass must have a representative whose claims are typical of the claims of 
members of that class and subclass.  Either the class must be redefined to include only 
those for whom the named class representative is typical or a new or additional class 
representative must be named so each class or subclass has a representative whose claims 
are typical of the claims of the class.  The preliminary writ is made permanent.  
Factual and Procedural Background 
Helena Weatherspoon defaulted on payments owed to Car Credit Acceptance 
Company pursuant to a consumer credit contract requiring her to make installment 
payments.  Car Credit sent Weatherspoon notices informing her of the default and how to 
cure it.  Weatherspoon did not cure the default.  Car Credit assigned Weatherspoon's credit 
contract to GCAC.  GCAC repossessed the vehicle, but Weatherspoon regained possession. 
Weatherspoon defaulted again, and GCAC again notified her of the default and how 
to cure it.  Weatherspoon did not cure the default and voluntarily surrendered her vehicle 
to GCAC.  GCAC mailed a presale notice informing Weatherspoon her vehicle would be 
sold in compliance with the Missouri Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).  GCAC sold the 
vehicle and mailed Weatherspoon a post-sale notice of her deficiency balance.   
Weatherspoon filed the underlying class action "on behalf of all other similarly 
situated Missouri consumers" alleging GCAC, and its predecessors or successors, violated 
statutory notice requirements relating to the repossession and disposition of collateral and 
collected unlawful interest following default and repossession of the collateral.1  
1 Weatherspoon alleged GCAC violated § 408.554, RSMo 2000, by omitting statutorily required 
language from its right to cure notice; violated § 408.555, RSMo Supp. 2006, by wrongfully 
3 
 
Weatherspoon alleged the deficient notices caused her and all class members to suffer harm 
to their credit, character, and general reputation.  Weatherspoon requested "damages equal 
to the amount of any judgment wrongfully obtained by GCAC" and "a mandatory 
injunction compelling GCAC to return any money collected for deficiency judgments, time 
price differential, delinquency and collection charges from Plaintiff and the classes."  She 
also requested statutory damages, an injunction preventing GCAC from collecting 
deficiency judgments from the class, and a declaration that GCAC's form right to cure, 
presale, and post-sale notices violate Missouri law.    
GCAC introduced evidence of statistical sampling showing approximately 87 
percent of potential class members' claims against GCAC were resolved by final deficiency 
judgments or were extinguished in bankruptcy.  GCAC argued this evidence showed the 
proposed class was overbroad because the vast majority of potential class members' claims 
were resolved in prior judicial proceedings.  GCAC has no deficiency judgment against 
Weatherspoon, and she did not declare bankruptcy.    
The circuit court certified two classes and designated Weatherspoon as the sole class 
representative.  The first class included "all persons who are named as borrowers or buyers 
with a Missouri address on a loan or financing agreement with GCAC, assigned to GCAC 
or owned by GCAC; whose loan or financing agreement was secured by collateral; and 
                                                          
 
accelerating loan balances and obtaining possession of vehicles without proper notice; violated 
§ 400.9-602, RSMo Supp. 2002, and § 400.9-623, RSMo Supp. 2001, by providing presale notices 
restricting redemption payments; provided misleading presale notices regarding the timeframe for 
selling repossessed vehicles; provided inadequate disclosures on post-sale notices; and provided 
post-sale notices informing consumers they owed a balance including interest in violation of 
§ 408.553, RSMo 2000. 
4 
 
who had the possession of their collateral taken by GCAC, voluntarily or involuntarily, 
from May 12, 2008 to present."  The second class included "all persons from Class 1 who 
had the possession of their collateral taken by GCAC involuntarily."  
GCAC filed a petition for permission to appeal the certification order pursuant to 
Rule 84.035.  The court of appeals denied the petition.  GCAC filed the underlying petition 
for a writ of prohibition asserting the circuit court abused its discretion by certifying the 
class.  This Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition.   
Standard of Review 
This Court has jurisdiction to issue original remedial writs.  Mo. Const. art. V, § 4.1.   
A writ petition is the appropriate procedure for obtaining review of the court of appeals' 
denial of a petition for permission to appeal from an order granting class certification.  State 
ex rel. Coca-Cola Co. v. Nixon, 249 S.W.3d 855, 859-60 (Mo. banc 2008).   
Determining whether a claim should proceed as a class action "ultimately rests with 
the sound discretion of the trial court."  Id. at 860 (internal quotation omitted).  The circuit 
court abuses its discretion "if its order is clearly against the logic of the circumstance, is 
arbitrary and unreasonable, and indicates a lack of careful consideration."  Id. (internal 
quotation omitted).   
Class Certification 
"[T]he underlying question in any class action certification is whether the class 
action device provides the most efficient and just method to resolve the controversy at 
hand, all things considered."  Id. at 860-61.  Rule 52.08(a) provides all class actions must 
satisfy the following four elements: 
5 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.
If the Rule 52.08(a) prerequisites are met, a class action may be maintained only if 
the plaintiff shows the class satisfies one of the three additional standards set forth in Rule 
52.08(b).  The circuit court determined Weatherspoon's putative class satisfied Rule 
52.08(b)(3), which provides certification is proper if "the court finds that the questions of 
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for 
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."   
GCAC asserts the circuit court abused its discretion in certifying the class because 
individual issues predominate.  As to liability, however, the class claims are based on an 
interpretation of the form UCC notices regarding the right to cure the default and rights to 
presale and post-sale notice of disposition of the collateral.  A central aspect of 
Weatherspoon's putative class action is a determination of whether GCAC violated any 
statutory provisions governing its form UCC notices.  Claims involving the interpretation 
of form contracts often present a "classic case for treatment as a class action."  McKeage 
v. TMBC, LLC, 847 F.3d 992, 999 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted).  GCAC has
not established the circuit court abused its discretion by concluding common liability issues 
predominate.  This Court expresses no opinion about whether the issue of damages will be 
suitable for class treatment if a class is certified consistent with this opinion. 
6 
 
Class Definition 
When class certification is appropriate, Rule 52.08 presupposes a properly defined 
class that is ascertainable and not overbroad.  Coca-Cola, 249 S.W.3d at 861-62.  A 
properly defined class "is necessary to realize both the protections and benefits for which 
the class action device was created."  Id. at 861.  A class definition encompassing "more 
than a relatively small number of uninjured putative members is overly broad and 
improper."  Id.   
As a threshold matter, Weatherspoon incorrectly argues that considering the 
preclusive effect of final deficiency judgments or bankruptcy proceedings improperly 
resolves the merits of the class action at the certification stage.  "Although the class 
certification decision is independent of the ultimate merits of the lawsuit, the applicable 
substantive law is relevant to a meaningful determination of the certification issues."  
Green v. Fred Weber, Inc., 254 S.W.3d 874, 880 (Mo. banc 2008); Amgen Inc. v. 
Connecticut Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013) ("Merits questions may be 
considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining 
whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.").   
Further, the Rule 52.08(b)(3) predominance and superiority analysis requires 
consideration of "the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already 
commenced by or against members of the class."  Rule 52.08(b)(3)(B).  Considering the 
"nature and extent" of prior litigation involving individual class members is necessary to 
determine whether the Rule 52.08 class certification requirements are satisfied and does 
7 
 
not improperly resolve the merits of the claims of the class as a whole.2  In this case, the 
"extent and nature" of the litigation "already commenced . . . against members of the class" 
is that GCAC obtained final deficiency judgments against approximately 60 percent of 
class members while approximately 27 percent of class members extinguished their claims 
in bankruptcy.  The issue, then, is the preclusive effect of the prior deficiency judgments 
and bankruptcy proceedings. 
Deficiency Judgments: Res Judicata 
Res judicata "precludes not only those issues on which the court in the former case 
was required to pronounce judgment, but to every point properly belonging to the subject 
matter of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have 
brought forward at the time."  Chesterfield Vill., Inc. v. City of Chesterfield, 64 S.W.3d 
315, 318 (Mo. banc 2002) (internal quotation omitted).  Res judicata "includes within its 
ambit … a prohibition against collateral attack on a judgment."  Wright v. Bartimus 
Frickleton Robertson & Gorny PC, 364 S.W.3d 558, 564 (Mo. App. 2011).3   
                                                          
 
2 Weatherspoon also asserts the "general rule" is that affirmative defenses against individual class 
members do not defeat class certification.  William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions,          
§ 4:55 (5th ed. 2011).  This general rule is based on "the fact that a defense may arise and may 
affect different class members differently does not compel a finding that individual issues 
predominate over common ones."  Bridging Cmtys. Inc. v. Top Flite Fin. Inc., 843 F.3d 1119, 1124 
(6th Cir. 2016).  Here, approximately 87 percent of the class members' claims are precluded by 
prior final judgments or bankruptcy proceedings.  Under this overly broad class definition, the 
predominant common issue is that the vast majority of class members have no unresolved claim 
against GCAC.   
3 Determining whether res judicata applies typically requires analysis of whether the lawsuits share 
four identities: "1) identity of the thing sued for; 2) identity of the cause of action; 3) identity of 
the persons and parties to the action; and 4) identity of the quality of the person for or against 
whom the claim is made."  King Gen.Contractor, Inc. v. Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ Latter 
Day Saints, 821 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Mo. Banc 1991).  When a subsequent action constitutes a 
8 
 
"A collateral attack is an attempt to impeach a judgment, whether interlocutory or 
final, in a proceeding not instituted for the express purpose of annulling the judgment."  
Beil v. Gaertner, 197 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo. 1946).  A collateral attack is appropriate when 
the underlying judgment is void, but a subsequent action "will not be tolerated as a 
subterfuge or facade for litigating an issue to which a former final judgment is conclusive."  
Flanary v. Rowlett, 612 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Mo. App. 1981) (declaratory judgment action 
constituted an impermissible collateral attack upon final decree of dissolution).   
The deficiency judgments against approximately 60 percent of the individual class 
members established their indebtedness to GCAC following sale of the collateral securing 
the loan.4  The class action requests "damages equal to the amount of any judgment 
wrongfully obtained by GCAC," an injunction requiring GCAC to "return any money 
collected for deficiency judgments, time price differential, delinquency and collection 
charges from Plaintiff and the classes," and a declaration that GCAC's form UCC notices 
violate Missouri law.  The class action, while "not instituted for the express purpose of 
                                                          
 
collateral attack on a prior judgment, the identities analysis is unnecessary.  Wright, 364 S.W.3d 
at 564. 
4 "The right to a deficiency judgment accrues only when there is strict compliance with statutory 
requirements."  States Res. Corp. v. Gregory, 339 S.W.3d 591, 596 (Mo. App. 2011) (internal 
quotation omitted).  Section 408.556.1 required GCAC to "allege the facts of the borrower's 
default, facts sufficient to show compliance with the provisions of sections 400.9-601 to            
400.9-629, which provisions are hereby deemed applicable to all credit transactions[.]"  Sections 
400.9-601 to 400.9-629 govern the class claims regarding default, notice, repossession, 
acceleration, sale, and the calculation of the deficiency.  Further, § 408.556.2 provides "[a] default 
judgment may not be entered in the action in favor of the lender unless the petition is verified by 
the lender, or sworn testimony, by affidavit or otherwise, is adduced showing that the lender is 
entitled to the relief demanded."  Therefore, the deficiency judgments against 60 percent the 
individual class members resolved the issue of GCAC's compliance with statutory requirements 
relating to the repossession, sale of the collateral, and calculation of the deficiencies.  
9 
annulling the judgment," Gaertner, 197 S.W.2d at 613, has precisely that effect because 
the requested relief seeks to nullify and undermine the deficiency judgments previously 
entered against class members.  Therefore, approximately 60 percent of individual class 
members' claims are impermissible collateral attacks on final deficiency judgments entered 
against them.  Those claims are precluded. 
Weatherspoon asserts res judicata does not apply because GCAC obtained the 
deficiency judgments in associate circuit divisions in which there is no compulsory 
counterclaim rule.5  If there is no compulsory counterclaim rule, res judicata generally does 
not bar the assertion of that counterclaim in a subsequent action.  Hemme v. Bharti, 183 
S.W.3d 593, 599 (Mo. banc 2006).  The general rule does not apply, however, when:  
The relationship between the counterclaim and the plaintiff's claim is such 
that successful prosecution of the second action would nullify the initial 
judgment or would impair rights established in the initial action. 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 22(2)(b) (1982).  The failure to assert a counterclaim 
in the first action will be given preclusive effect "when allowance of a subsequent action 
would so plainly operate to undermine the initial judgment that the principle of finality 
requires preclusion of such an action."  Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 22, cmt. f. 
In other words, the absence of a compulsory counterclaim rule does not sanction collateral 
attacks on final judgments.  The fact the final deficiency judgments were rendered in 
5 Pleadings in associate circuit divisions are generally not subject to the Rule 55.32(a) compulsory 
counterclaim rule.  Becker Glove Intern., Inc. v. Jack Dubinsky & Sons, 41 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Mo. 
banc 2001).  
10 
proceedings in which no counterclaim was required does not justify a collateral attack on 
those judgments in a subsequent class action.6   
Bankruptcy: Estoppel 
Following repossession of their vehicles, approximately 27 percent of the putative 
class members discharged their debts to GCAC in bankruptcy.  Based on statistical 
sampling, few, if any, class members disclosed the claims they now assert against GCAC 
in their schedule of assets filed with the bankruptcy court, yet those claims would have 
existed at the time of the bankruptcy.  A provision in the bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. § 521, 
imposes upon a debtor "an express, affirmative duty to disclose all assets, including 
contingent and unliquidated claims."  Strable v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 396 S.W.3d 417, 422 
(Mo. App. 2013) (internal quotation omitted).  The failure to disclose potential claims 
against a creditor estops the debtor from later asserting those claims.  Id. at 422-23, 426.  
Therefore, approximately 27 percent of individual class members' are estopped from 
asserting their claims against GCAC in the class action.  
The class definition is overbroad and otherwise deficient 
Because approximately 87 percent of individual class members' claims are either 
precluded by deficiency judgments or have been extinguished in bankruptcy, the vast 
majority of individual class members have no unresolved claim against GCAC.  Like Coca-
6 The fact many of the deficiency judgments were entered by default does not change the analysis. 
Res judicata applies to final judgments entered by default.  Drainage Dist. No. 1 Reformed v. 
Matthews, 234 S.W.2d 567, 572-73 (Mo. 1950); State ex rel. Family Support Division v. Stovall-
Reid, 163 S.W.3d 519, 521-22 (Mo. App. 2005); State ex rel. Barnett v. Mullen, 125 S.W.3d 896, 
899 (Mo. App. 2004).  
11 
Cola, in which 80 percent of the putative class suffered no injury, the class definition in 
this case is likewise overbroad.  249 S.W.3d at 862.  The overly broad class definition is 
not necessarily fatal, because an overly broad "class definition may be modified consistent 
with the precepts of . . . Rule 52.08 in order to remove the uninjured putative members." 
Id. at 861.   
In addition, it is unclear why the court certified only a single subclass whose 
members constitute only a subset of the members of the class.  Normally, subclasses would 
be differentiated by some distinct characteristic, such as one involving a voluntary and the 
other an involuntary repossession or another differentiating characteristic.  Here, however, 
there is only one subclass, and it is for those whose vehicles were involuntarily repossessed. 
It is unclear whether this single subclass was separated from the larger class and the 
subclass members' interests may diverge from those who had their vehicles returned 
voluntarily, such as Weatherspoon.  As discussed below, this is the reason Weatherspoon 
is an inappropriate class representative.  The circuit court should carefully consider the 
definition of those subclasses, if any, it may certify.   
The circuit court is prohibited from taking any further action other than to decertify 
the existing class, but it may consider whether to certify a class without the definition 
problems here identified and that satisfies the typicality and other requirements for a class 
action, as discussed below.7   
7 GCAC also asserts class certification was improper because the request for prejudgment interest 
is barred by § 408.553, which GCAC maintains prohibits the accrual of interest after default and 
before judgment.  Unlike considering the preclusive effect of prior judgments and bankruptcy 
proceedings to determine the scope of the class, GCAC's statutory interpretation argument 
12 
Weatherspoon's claims are not typical of the class 
Class actions are "an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and 
on behalf of the individual named parties only."  Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 
147, 155 (1982) (internal quotation omitted).  A class representative's claims must be 
typical of the claims of the class. Rule 52.08(a)(3).  To satisfy the typicality requirement, 
the class representative "must be a part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer 
the same injury as the class members."  Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156 (internal quotation 
omitted); Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 766 S.W.2d 80, 86 n.10 (Mo. banc 1989).  
 Weatherspoon's claims are not typical of the class because she did not suffer the 
same alleged injury as the class members.  The second class consists of individuals "who 
had the possession of their collateral taken by GCAC involuntarily."  Weatherspoon 
testified she voluntarily surrendered her vehicle to GCAC.  Further, as the class 
representative, Weatherspoon requested "damages equal to the amount of any judgment 
wrongfully obtained by GCAC" and "a mandatory injunction compelling GCAC to return 
any money collected for deficiency judgments, time price differential, delinquency and 
collection charges from Plaintiff and the classes."  GCAC did not obtain a deficiency 
attempts to resolve the merits of the class action at the certification stage.  While this Court 
expresses no opinion about the ultimate merits of Weatherspoon's claim for prejudgment interest, 
a court may not refuse certification "on the ground that it thinks the class will eventually lose on 
the merits."  Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469, 480 (7th Cir. 2002).  
GCAC also asserts class certification was improper because it did not send right-to-cure 
notices.  Weatherspoon asserts that, even if GCAC did not send improper notices, GCAC violated 
§ 408.555 by improperly accelerating the loans and repossessing the collateral.  This argument
also goes to the merits of the action, not the scope of the class.
13 
judgment against Weatherspoon.  Weatherspoon's claim is not typical of the class because 
she was not injured by an involuntary repossession or by a deficiency judgment.   
The circuit court abused its discretion by certifying a class with Weatherspoon as 
the sole class representative because her claims are not typical of the class and she is not a 
member of the subclass.  The circuit court is prohibited from certifying the class and 
subclass as presently defined.  The court is not prohibited from considering whether 
Weatherspoon is typical of a redefined class, if a new class definition is proposed and meets 
the criteria set out in the rule and explained in this opinion, nor is it prohibited from 
appointing a new or additional class representative should one be proposed with claims 
typical of the class and who otherwise satisfies the criteria set out in the rule.  
Conclusion 
The circuit court abused its discretion by certifying an overly broad class with a 
class representative whose claims are not typical of the class.  The preliminary writ of 
prohibition is made permanent, and the circuit court is directed to take no action 
inconsistent with this opinion.  
__________________________ 
Zel M. Fischer, Chief Justice 
All concur.