Case Title: White v. L.L. Smith Trucking

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87-24

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1987-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
White v. L.L. Smith Trucking1987 WY 131742 P.2d 1286Case Number: 87-24Decided: 09/23/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
Keith O. 
WHITE, Appellant (Plaintiff)

 
 
v.

 
 
L. L. SMITH 
TRUCKING, a Wyoming corporation, Appellee (Defendant)

 
 
John C. Hoard, for 
Appellant.

 
 
David B. Hooper, for 
Appellee.

 
 
Stephen H. Kline and Bruce S. Asay 
of Kline, Buck & Asay, Amicus Curiae, for Arrow Trucking. 

 
 
Brown, C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, 
Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ. 

 
 
BROWN , Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     In this case, appellant 
Keith White, the owner of a truck and trailer, brought an action against 
appellee L.L. Smith Trucking, seeking a money judgment. Appellant sought any 
underpayment below a full eighty percent of the published tariff rate, plus 
interest and costs, for hauls appellant made for appellee under a lease 
agreement. The district court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment. On 
appeal appellant raises the following issues:

 
 
"I

 
 
"Was an issue of material fact as to 
the common carrier status of the Appellee raised by Appellant's affidavit 
opposing Appellee's summary judgment motion or the deposition of Appellee's 
president which should have precluded the trial court from entering a summary 
judgment for Appellee?

 
 
"II

 
 
"Was an issue of material fact as to 
whether the Appellee was in competition with any common carrier during the 
subject carrier hauls raised by Appellant's affidavit opposing Appellee's 
summary judgment motion which should have precluded the trial court from 
entering summary judgment for Appellee?

 
 
"III

 
 
"Did the trial court err in relying 
upon Exeter Drilling Company v. Hewitt, et al, No. C85-0194-B, United States District 
Court for the District of Wyoming (1986) and White v. Exeter Drilling Company, 
No. M-105661, Public Service Commission of Wyoming (1986) in entering summary 
judgment for Appellee?"

 
 

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     In 1981 and again in 
1982, appellant entered into a lease agreement with appellee. Both agreements 
provided that appellant was to receive "80% of the gross" for the lease of his 
truck to appellee.1 Due to deteriorating economic 
conditions in the oil and gas industry, appellee bid for much of its work. These 
bids were made at a lower rate than the tariff would require of a common 
carrier.2 Appellant's action is based upon 
the difference between the "80% of the gross" he was paid and what he would have 
been paid had appellee not bid the hauls, but charged the full tariff rate 
applicable to common carriers for such hauls.

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant claims that 
two issues of material fact existed that should have precluded summary judgment 
for appellee. These issues include whether appellee was acting as a contract 
carrier or common carrier, and whether competition existed between contract and 
common carriers on the jobs that were bid.

 
 

[¶5.]     Our well-established 
standard of review on appeal from summary judgment is based upon a dual finding 
that no genuine question of material fact exists and that the prevailing party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A party moving for summary judgment 
has the burden of proving the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact 
by affidavits or otherwise. When considering a motion for summary judgment, we 
view the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion, giving him all favorable inferences which may be drawn from the facts. 
Rule 56, Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure; and 
England 
v. Simmons, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1137 (1986). The movant must initially come 
forward with specific facts showing that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Once the party moving for summary judgment makes this showing, the 
burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to put forth specific facts 
evidencing the presence of a genuine issue of material fact. Rule 56(c), 
W.R.C.P.; and Bettencourt 
v. Pride Well Service, Inc., Wyo., 735 P.2d 722 (1987). Conclusory 
affidavits do not meet this burden. Greenwood 
v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987).

 
 

[¶6.]     Appellant argues that 
the statement made by Roger Smith, president of L.L. Smith Trucking, that 
appellee is "both a common and contract carrier," along with appellant's 
affidavit stating that appellee is a common carrier, is sufficient to raise the 
question of appellee's carrier status. These statements do nothing more, 
however, than reiterate the fact that appellee is a licensed common carrier, and 
that such license was in effect at the time the hauls were made. Appellee is 
both a common and contract carrier; therefore, merely stating that appellee is a 
common carrier does not raise an issue as to which authority appellee was 
operating under. Neither the affidavit nor the statement by Roger Smith 
demonstrates that appellee was operating under the common carrier license on 
the hauls in which White participated. Some further evidence is necessary to 
show that appellee was operating as a common carrier rather than a contract 
carrier on the pertinent hauls. Moreover, because the hauls were bid, and 
because the bids were made against other contract carriers,  it is reasonable to assume that appellee 
was acting as a contract carrier. After reviewing these facts, we hold 
appellant's proof in opposition to the summary judgment was not sufficient to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact.

 
 

[¶7.]     Appellant argues in the 
alternative, that if appellee was acting as a contract carrier, it was required 
to charge the full tariff rate according to § 37-8-108, W.S.1977. That section 
provides in part:

 
 
"* * * * If the operations of any 
contract carrier are in competition with the kind and class of service rendered 
by any common motor carrier, the commission shall require such contract carrier 
to charge a rate of fare not less than common motor carriers are required to 
charge for the same service on such route. * * * *"3

 
 

[¶8.]     The affidavit of the 
employee who bid the jobs, Harold Sinner, general manager of L.L. Smith 
Trucking, states that he had examined all of appellee's books and records and 
determined that no competition with common carriers existed on any of the bids, 
and that common carriers were not soliciting that type of haul during the period 
involved. Appellant's affidavit, in response to the Sinner affidavit, 
states:

 
 
"On the subject trips the following 
common carriers were in actual competition for the hauls:

 
 
"Melrose Trucking Company, 
Inc.

 
 
"Dick Jones 
Trucking

 
 
"John Bunning 
Transfer

 
 
"Getter 
Trucking

 
 
"Black Hills Trucking, 
Inc.

 
 
"Salt Creek 
Freightways

 
 
"Haines Trucking Co., 
Inc.

 
 
"Bob Jones 
Trucking."

 
 
No other documentation or evidence, 
however, is included in the affidavit to verify that 
claim.

 
 

[¶9.]     In view of Harold 
Sinner's affidavit verifying that no common carriers submitted bids or competed 
for the hauls in question, the burden shifted to appellant to come forward with 
specific facts in order to rebutt Sinner's affidavit and to receive further 
consideration by the court. Appellant failed to meet that 
burden.

 
 

[¶10.]  Finally, appellant argues that the 
district court erred in relying upon Exeter Drilling Co. v. Hewitt, 
C85-194-B, United States District Court for the District of Wyoming (May 22, 
1986); and White v. Exeter Drilling Co., No. M-105661, Public Service 
Commission of Wyoming (1986).4 Appellant attempts to distinguish 
Exeter Drilling from the present case by arguing that appellee is a common 
carrier, unlike defendant Arrow Trucking in Exeter who was a contract carrier. We already 
have dealt with the carrier status question, and need not return to that issue. 
The counterclaim in Exeter is virtually indistinguishable from the 
present case. In Exeter, defendant Arrow Trucking brought a 
counterclaim against Exeter Drilling Company for unjust enrichment. Arrow 
Trucking claimed that common carriers had competed for the hauls it had made and 
therefore it was required by law to charge the applicable tariff rates. The 
district court ruled that because Arrow Trucking was unable to produce evidence 
that any common carriers were actually competing for the hauls, § 37-8-108, 
W.S.1977 did not require Arrow Trucking to charge the tariff rate for common 
carriers. The counterclaim of Arrow Trucking was 
dismissed.

 
 

[¶11.]  We hold that the trial court did not err 
in finding that the decisions in Exeter and White were controlling in the 
present case. Neither did the court err in finding that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact and that appellee was entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law.

 
 

[¶12.]  We affirm the summary 
judgment.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Appellant's action is based upon the 
1981 lease which is likely superseded by the 1982 lease, but both agreements are 
substantially the same in terms of payment.

 
 

2Common carriers are not permitted to bid 
for work because they are classified as public utilities and their rates are 
therefore fixed by the Public Service Commission. Hauls made by a common carrier 
for more or less than the fixed tariff rate would constitute an illegal 
contract. Contract carriers on the other hand, are permitted to bid against 
other contract carriers. See §§ 37-8-101; 37-8-108; and 37-8-109, W.S.1977, 
repealed by § 1, Ch. 140, S.L. of Wyoming 1983, effective July 1, 1983. 
Commission authority to regulate common and contract carrier bids and rates was 
amended and relocated at § 37-8-101; 37-8-104; and 37-8-303, W.S.1977 (1986 
Cum.Supp.).

 
 

3See supra note 
2.

 
 

4We need only address the first case 
since the Public Service Commission merely adopted the earlier district court 
decision.