Case Title: Nicholaus v. Nicholaus

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Nicholaus v. Nicholaus1988 WY 87756 P.2d 1338Case Number: 87-293Decided: 06/24/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
SHEILA MARVEL NICHOLAUS, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT),

v.

ERIC SHAW NICHOLAUS, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty, Terrence L. 
O'Brien, J.

C. Robert Klus, 
Jr. of the C. Robert Klus, Jr. Law Office, Gillette, for appellant.

Deborah D. 
Michaels of Banks, Johnson, Wolfe, Hallock & Michaels, Gillette, for appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an order of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District within and for 
Campbell County (Campbell County District Court) modifying the child custody 
provisions in a prior divorce decree issued by the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District within and for Sweetwater County (Sweetwater County District 
Court). Appellant Sheila Marvel Nicholaus initially presented and briefed issues 
respecting the grounds and evidence relied upon by the Campbell County District 
Court in changing the custody of the child. Appellee Eric Shaw Nicholaus 
responded by brief accordingly. Perceiving a question as to the Campbell County 
District Court's jurisdiction to modify the previous order, this Court requested 
additional briefing by the parties on jurisdictional issues. We now conclude 
that the Campbell County District Court was without jurisdiction, and we vacate 
the judgment and order modifying the custody provisions of the divorce 
decree.

[¶2.]     Appellant, in response 
to the request for further briefing, phrases the issues identified by this Court 
in the following manner:

"I. DID THE SIXTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT WITHIN AND FOR CAMPBELL COUNTY, WYOMING HAVE 
JURISDICTION TO MODIFY THE CHILD CUSTODY, VISITATION AND SUPPORT PROVISIONS OF 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE ORIGINALLY RENDERED AND ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT WITHIN AND FOR SWEETWATER COUNTY, WYOMING?

"II. IF THE SIXTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT WITHIN AND FOR CAMPBELL COUNTY, WYOMING DID NOT HAVE 
JURISDICTION TO MODIFY THE CHILD CUSTODY, VISITATION AND SUPPORT PROVISIONS OF 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE ORIGINALLY RENDERED AND ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT WITHIN AND FOR SWEETWATER COUNTY, WYOMING, WAS SUCH JURISDICTION 
CREATED OR CONFERRED UPON THE CAMPBELL COUNTY DISTRICT COURT BY STIPULATION, 
CONSENT, ESTOPPEL OR WAIVER OF THE PARTIES?

"III. IF THE SIXTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT WITHIN AND FOR CAMPBELL COUNTY, WYOMING HAD JURISDICTION 
TO MODIFY THE CHILD CUSTODY, VISITATION AND SUPPORT PROVISIONS OF THE DECREE OF 
DIVORCE ORIGINALLY RENDERED AND ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WITHIN AND FOR SWEETWATER COUNTY, WYOMING, COULD A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT MODIFICATION OF THE CHILD CUSTODY, 
VISITATION AND SUPPORT PROVISIONS OF SAID DECREE BE PROVEN IN THE CAMPBELL 
COUNTY DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE THE RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT 
OF THE HEARING AND EVIDENCE BEFORE THE SWEETWATER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT WHEN IT 
ISSUED THE DECREE OF DIVORCE?"

[¶3.]     Appellant and appellee 
were married in Montana on July 15, 1978. The marriage 
produced one child, Douglas Shaw Nicholaus, who was born March 27, 1980. 
Subsequently, appellee filed for a divorce in the Sweetwater County District 
Court. Although appellee had filed for the divorce, the Sweetwater County 
District Court granted a decree of divorce to appellant on August 30, 1984. The 
divorce decree awarded primary care, custody, and control of the child to 
appellant with liberal visitation provisions for appellee. Thereafter, appellee 
moved to Bozeman, Montana, and appellant and the child moved to Gillette, Wyoming. The record in the instant case does 
not include any record of the earlier proceeding other than a copy of the decree 
of divorce.

[¶4.]     On May 26, 1987, 
appellee filed a petition for modification of the divorce decree in the Campbell 
County District Court. Appellee alleged in the petition that a substantial 
change in circumstances warranted a change in custody from the mother to him. 
Appellant responded and counterclaimed for a modification of the original decree 
to increase appellee's child support obligation. Appellee filed a response to 
the counterclaim. Neither party questioned or challenged the jurisdiction of the 
Campbell County District Court.

[¶5.]     After a hearing, the 
Campbell County District Court entered an order changing custody of the child to 
appellee, effective November 1, 1987. The Campbell County District Court based 
its decision upon a finding that a substantial change in circumstances and the 
best interests of the child warranted the change in custody. The Campbell County 
District Court additionally ordered appellant to make child support payments to 
appellee. This appeal followed.

[¶6.]     Although neither party 
raised the issue of the jurisdiction of the Campbell County District Court to 
modify the divorce decree, we are free to raise that issue pursuant to our 
general superintending control over all the courts of this state. Wyo. Const. Art. 5, § 2. 
That authority allows us to decide a case upon any point which we believe the 
ends of justice require. Gilbreath v. Wallace, 
Wyo., 738 P.2d 717 (1987); Allen v. Allen, Wyo., 550 P.2d 1137 (1976). We have 
said:

"This court has inherent 
power to control proceedings before it and under its jurisdiction and can and 
will summarily raise and dispose of questions arising with respect to 
jurisdiction. The supreme court has the duty to consider the integrity of an 
appeal addressed to jurisdictional defect, even though not called to its 
attention by any litigant." Hayes v. State, Wyo., 599 P.2d 569, 570 
(1979).

See also Parker 
v. Haller, Wyo., 751 P.2d 372 (1988). We therefore 
address the issues regarding the jurisdiction of the Campbell County District 
Court as presented pursuant to our request by the supplemental briefs of the 
parties. Our resolution of these issues precludes us from reaching the merits of 
the controversy with respect to the change of custody as initially presented by 
the parties.

[¶7.]     We turn first to the 
question of whether the Campbell County District Court had jurisdiction to 
modify the child custody, support, and visitation provisions of the divorce 
decree entered by the Sweetwater County District Court. Appellant argues that 
the Campbell County District Court did not have such jurisdiction and that its 
order modifying the prior decree is null and void. We 
agree.

[¶8.]     Jurisdiction over 
divorce matters in Wyoming is conferred upon the district courts 
pursuant to §§ 20-2-101 through 20-2-118, W.S. 1977. Although we have had 
occasion, pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, §§ 20-5-101 
through 20-5-125, W.S. 1977, to review the jurisdictional authority of courts of 
this state to modify custody decrees made in other states, Rosics v. Heath, 
Wyo., 746 P.2d 1284 (1987); Quenzer v. Quenzer, Wyo., 653 P.2d 295 (1982), cert. 
denied 460 U.S. 1041, 103 S. Ct. 1436, 75 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1983), the issue presented 
by the instant case is one of first impression.

[¶9.]     This Court long ago 
recognized, however, that custody determinations in a divorce decree are 
provisional in nature and ordinarily are not res judicata. Linch v. Harden, 26 
Wyo. 47, 176 P. 156 (1918). The custody provisions of a divorce decree remain open throughout 
the minority of the children involved, and the district court granting the 
divorce retains continuing jurisdiction to modify the custody and support 
aspects of the decree. Strahan v. Strahan, Wyo., 
400 P.2d 542 (1965). See also Graham v. Fenno, 
Wyo., 734 P.2d 983 (1987); Erb v. Erb, Wyo., 573 P.2d 849 (1978). These precepts are 
incorporated in § 20-2-113(a), W.S. 1977, which provides in relevant 
part:

"In granting a divorce or 
annulment of a marriage, the court may make such disposition of the children as 
appears most expedient and beneficial for the well-being of the children. * * * 
On the petition of either of the parents, the court may revise the decree 
concerning the care, custody, visitation and maintenance of the children as the 
circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children requires." 
(Emphasis added.)

Thus, the cases 
and statute contemplate the continuing jurisdiction of the district court to 
modify child custody and support provisions in its divorce 
decree.

[¶10.]  The question then becomes one of whether 
this jurisdiction is exclusive within Wyoming. Although the cases from other 
jurisdictions are not in universal accord, the prevailing view is that the 
continuing jurisdiction of the divorce court is exclusive within the same state. 
We previously have had occasion, in an opinion on a related matter, to refer to 
this majority rule. In State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court of Sheridan County, Wyo., 621 P.2d 223, 228 n. 4 (1980), we 
observed:

"[T]he long standing 
general rule [is] stated in Annotation, 146 A.L.R. 1153 (1943), `Jurisdiction 
acquired by court in divorce suit over custody and maintenance of child as 
excluding jurisdiction of other local courts, or as rendering its exercise 
improper.'

"`* * * [J]urisdiction 
acquired by a court in divorce proceedings over the subject of the custody and 
maintenance of the child or children of the parties to the divorce suit is not 
only continuing * * * but is also exclusive, and precludes any other court in 
the same state or sovereignty from thereafter acquiring or exercising 
jurisdiction over the same subject, and that all proceedings relating to the 
maintenance and custody of such child or children of the divorced parents must 
thereafter be brought in the same court in which the original decree affecting 
that subject was rendered.' 146 A.L.R. at 1155."

Recent cases 
adhering to this rule include Billings v. 
Billings, 189 Mont. 520, 616 P.2d 1104 (1980); Bailey v. Malone, Fla. App., 389 So. 2d 348 (1980); and Beard v. Greer, 116 Ariz. 536, 570 P.2d 223 (1977). See also 24 
Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation §§ 967 and 1003 (1983).

[¶11.]  In Texas, exclusive continuing jurisdiction of 
the divorce court in custody and support matters is expressly provided by 
statute. Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 11.06. The Supreme Court of Texas, in referring to 
this legislation, aptly described the policy rationale of exclusive 
jurisdiction:

"The Legislature by 
enacting the Family Code adopted a scheme for handling parent-child matters in a 
manner that avoids forum shopping, races to the courthouse, child snatching, and 
the harassment of a parent by the other parent's filing suits in random courts." 
Trader v. Dear, Tex., 565 S.W.2d 233, 235 
(1978).

The Supreme 
Court of Kansas has reached the same result relying upon principles of comity 
and the provisional nature of custody and support provisions in a divorce 
decree. That court said, with respect to custody and support modification, that 
"a court of coordinate jurisdiction should not attempt to interfere with pending 
proceedings already underway in a sister court." Nixon v. Nixon, 226 Kan. 218, 596 P.2d 1238, 
1241 (1979).

[¶12.]  We perceive the language in § 20-2-113(a) 
that "the court may revise the decree" to be consistent with the majority rule 
of continuing exclusive jurisdiction, and we hold that it should be so read. 
Appellee urges, however, that the question is more properly one of venue than of 
jurisdiction. We do not agree.

[¶13.]  Unquestionably, were this an original 
divorce action, for which all the district courts have jurisdiction, the proper 
venue would have been the Campbell County District Court because of its location 
in the county where the defendant was residing. Section 1-5-108, W.S. 1977. The 
nature of this proceeding, however, was the modification of a provisional 
custody determination in a divorce decree which remains open for such purpose 
throughout the minority of the child. Strahan v. Strahan, supra; Linch v. 
Harden, supra. As such, it is a continuation of the original action under the 
continuing jurisdiction of the divorce court. In Erb v. Erb, we referred to the 
continuing jurisdiction of the divorce court to modify its decree pursuant to § 
20-61, W.S. 1957, the predecessor to present § 20-2-113(a), and held that a 
contempt action to enforce child support provisions in a decree was not the 
institution of an action but rather a supplementary proceeding incidental to the 
original action. This rationale is equally applicable to a custody modification 
proceeding.

[¶14.]  We are aware, however, that, in Leitner 
v. Lonabaugh, Wyo., 402 P.2d 713 (1965), we employed 
language referring to a modification proceeding as having attributes of a 
separate case. We held in Leitner v. Lonabaugh that a presiding district judge 
had authority and jurisdiction to modify the child custody provisions of a 
divorce decree even though he had been disqualified in the original divorce 
action and a special judge had rendered the original decree. In sanctioning this 
procedure, we characterized a modification proceeding as being "[f]or all 
intents and purposes * * * a separate and distinct case from the original 
proceeding." Id. at 719. We further recognized, however, 
that the language in § 20-61 stating "the court may from time to time afterward 
* * * revise and alter such decree" required that a modification proceeding be 
filed under the same docket assigned in the original proceeding. The requirement 
that the modification proceeding be docketed under the original docket is 
consistent with continuing and exclusive jurisdiction of the divorce court and 
with our consistently held view that the divorce decree is provisional with 
respect to child support and custody and that it remains open throughout the 
minority of the children. The language in Leitner v. Lonabaugh as to the 
separate case characterization is somewhat inconsistent with the docketing 
requirement recognized in that case and inconsistent with our view of divorce 
decree modification proceedings as developed in other cases. Consequently, in 
conformity with our other decisions, we believe that Leitner v. Lonabaugh is 
properly read as acknowledging that, although a modification proceeding has 
attributes of a separate case, such a proceeding nevertheless is a continuation 
of the original action which remains open for such purpose. Therefore, because 
modification proceedings are a continuation of the original action, the general 
venue statute is inapplicable to those proceedings. See Billings v. Billings, 
supra; Beard v. Greer, supra; Annotation, 
Jurisdiction acquired by court in divorce suit over custody and maintenance of 
child as excluding jurisdiction of other local courts, or as rendering its 
exercise improper, 146 A.L.R. 1153, 1167 (1943).

[¶15.]  We conclude that, pursuant to the 
requirements of § 20-2-113(a) and from the persuasive authority of the majority 
of other jurisdictions where the question has been addressed, the continuing 
jurisdiction of the divorce court to modify custody and support provisions in 
the decree is exclusive jurisdiction within Wyoming. The Campbell County 
District Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to modify the custody of the child 
in this case.

[¶16.]  We next address the related issue of 
whether the Campbell County District Court could obtain jurisdiction by 
stipulation, consent, or waiver in the absence of an objection by either 
litigant. Appellant contends that the parties effectively waived any objection 
or defense to lack of personal jurisdiction but that subject matter jurisdiction 
was lacking and cannot be obtained by consent or waiver. We 
agree.

[¶17.]  Neither party objected to the Campbell 
County District Court's exercise of jurisdiction. Both parties filed petitions 
and responses, appeared at the hearing, and presented evidence. Clearly, the 
parties consented to the jurisdiction of the Campbell County District Court. A 
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person may be waived under certain 
circumstances. Steffens v. Smith, Wyo., 477 P.2d 119 (1970); State ex rel. 
Sheehan v. District Court of Fourth Judicial District, in and for Johnson 
County, Wyo., 426 P.2d 431 (1967); Rule 12(h)(1), W.R.C.P. Subject matter 
jurisdiction, however, cannot be waived, and we are obligated to independently 
consider the matter. White v. Board of Land Commissioners, Wyo., 595 P.2d 76 (1979); 
Steffens v. Smith, supra; Rule 12(h)(3), W.R.C.P. A lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction renders the proceedings void. 20 Am.Jur.2d, Courts § 97 at 458-59 
(1965).

[¶18.]  The subject matter in the instant case 
was modification of child custody provisions in a divorce decree. Since it has 
been determined that the exclusive continuing jurisdiction of this subject was 
retained by the Sweetwater County District Court, it is apparent that the 
Campbell County District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. This 
fundamental defect in the proceedings could not be cured by any waiver or 
consent of the parties. The proceedings in the Campbell County District Court 
therefore were void.

[¶19.]  The final issue upon which we requested 
supplementary briefing by the parties was whether, if jurisdiction exists, a 
substantial change in circumstances could be demonstrated absent the record and 
transcript from the initial divorce proceeding. Having found a lack of 
jurisdiction in the Campbell County District Court, we need not address this 
issue.

[¶20.]  The Campbell County District Court's 
order modifying the decree of divorce as to custody is 
vacated.