Case Title: FREEDOM ENERGY-MASSEY COAL, AS INSURED BY BRICKSTREET MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY V. FREEDOM ENERGY-MASSEY COAL, AS SELF INSURED; STEPHEN WEIR; HONORABLE CHRIS DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2013-SC-000333-WC

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2014-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION- THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED oSuprrnte Cord fefbfitnittritt 2013-SC-000333-WC FREEDOM ENERGY-MASSEY COAL, DATE It 'A—% Lk SAN4t-C.703ksoopr AS INSURED BY BRICKSTREET MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY APPELLANT ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. CASE NO. 2012-CA-0001461-WC WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 11-00716 FREEDOM ENERGY-MASSEY COAL, AS SELF INSURED; STEPHEN WEIR; HONORABLE CHRIS DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD APPELLEES MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING Appellant, Freedom Energy-Massey Coal, as insured by Brickstreet Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter "Freedom/Brickstreet"), argues in this appeal that the Workers' Compensation Board exceeded its authority by vacating and remanding this matter for further findings regarding claimant, Stephen Weir's, work-related left knee injury. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Court of Appeals. Weir was born on August 8, 1950, and worked over thirty-six years as an underground coal miner. He began working for Freedom Energy in 2006 as a belt walker, fire boss, and pre-shifter. These jobs required Weir to walk approximately fifteen miles per day over rough and confined terrain. Weir's knees began to bother him in December 2009. On December 4, 2009, he reported injuries to both knees to his superintendent, James Penson. Freedom Energy was self-insured (hereinafter "Freedom/Self"), on that date. Weir received treatment from Dr. Keith Hall, an orthopedic surgeon. Initially, Weir was treated conservatively and returned to work with a right knee brace. Since the treatment failed to alleviate Weir's pain, Dr. Hall recommended a total right knee replacement. Dr. Hall also ordered Weir to stop working and ultimately recommended he undergo a left knee replacement. Weir's last date of employment with Freedom Energy was September 28, 2010. On that date, Freedom Energy was insured by Brickstreet. Weir filed two separate Form 101 claims alleging work-related injuries. One alleged that the date of his injury was December 4, 2009, and the other alleged that the date of his injury was September 28, 2010. The ALJ rendered his opinion, order, and award on March 21, 2012. He found that Weir was totally and permanently disabled due to his right knee replacement surgery. The ALJ further determined that the left knee resulted in a compensable, permanent injury manifesting itself on December 4, 2009. However, the AL,J did not elaborate on the nature of the left knee injury. Weir was awarded income benefits and past, present, and future reasonable and necessary medical expenses for both knees. Freedom/ Self filed a petition for reconsideration, which the ALJ denied. 2 Freedom/Self appealed to the Board arguing that Freedom/Brickstreet should be responsible for a portion of Weir's benefits. Specifically, Freedom/ Self argued that the ALJ erred by determining the manifestation of the left knee injury occurred on December 4, 2009, rather than September 28, 2010. Freedom/Self did not appeal any aspect of Weir's right knee award. The Board held that the ALJ did not abuse his discretion by finding that Weir's left knee injury manifested itself on December 4, 2009, but that the ALJ erred by failing to make a determination on the extent of the knee injury as of that date. Accordingly, the Board remanded the matter for the ALJ to make a finding regarding the extent of Weir's left knee injury on December 4, 2009, and if working an additional nine months after that date caused further injury to the knee. If the AU found that Weir's additional work caused further damage, then he was ordered to determine whether Freedom/Self or Freedom/Brickstreet was liable. The Board relied on the case of Brummitt v. Southeastern Kentucky Rehab. Indus., 156 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Ky. 2005), in making its decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed. This appeal followed. Freedom/Brickstreet now appeals arguing that the Board exceeded its authority by vacating and remanding Weir's award for additional fact finding regarding the left knee injury. Freedom/Brickstreet contends that additional fact finding on the left knee is unnecessary because the ALJ determined that Weir was permanently and totally disabled as a result of his right knee injury and surgery. It also contends that since the ALJ found that Weir's left knee 3 injury manifested itself as of December 4, 2009, it is clear that the ALJ believed Freedom/Self is responsible for paying all benefits. We disagree. In Brummitt, 156 S.W.3d at 279, this Court stated that when an employee "continues to perform the same repetitive activity after a gradual injury becomes manifest, additional incidents of workplace trauma may well cause additional harmful changes." Brummitt involved an employee who filed a claim for benefits alleging work-related injuries to her wrists and hands that became manifest in April 2000. Id. at 277. The claimant continued to work after April 2000. The claimant then was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome in October 2000, and amended her claim to change the date of injury to the date of diagnosis. Her employer was covered by one insurer in April 2000 and a different insurer in October 2000. The ALJ concluded that the claimant's injuries were work-related and manifested themselves in April 2000, and the insurer on that date was responsible for her benefits. This Court reversed because the ALJ failed to consider that the claimant's wrist injuries were caused by gradual "minitrauma." Id. at 279. Thus, on remand, the ALJ needed to determine whether any additional work-related trauma occurred after April 2000, and if there was additional trauma, which insurance company was responsible to pay the benefits. Id. While the ALJ found that Weir suffered a permanent injury to his left knee as of December 4, 2009, and that finding has been upheld on appeal, he failed to make a finding whether the injury was partial or total as of that date. 4 On remand, the ALJ needs to make such a findings and determine if Weir's continued employment after December 2009 caused additional left knee damage because the ALJ granted Weir future medical benefits for his left knee injury. Then, the ALJ must determine in what proportion Freedom/Self or Freedom/Brickstreet is liable to pay benefits for the additional left knee injuries. We note that Freedom/Brickstreet argues that further fact finding on Weir's left knee injury is unnecessary because the ALJ found he was permanently and totally disabled due to his right knee replacement. However, because the AL) . did find that Weir was entitled to compensation and future medical benefits for his left knee injury, it is necessary to determine which entity is responsible for those payments. Weir's claim cannot be completely and properly adjudicated until these findings are made. For the above stated reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals. All sitting. All concur. 1 Of course the AU may find that the left knee injury was permanent and total as of December 4, 2009, and therefore any additional trauma would be inconsequential. 5 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, FREEDOM ENERGY-MASSEY COAL, AS INSURED BY BRICKSTREET MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY: A. Stuart Bennett COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, FREEDOM ENERGY-MASSEY COAL, AS SELF INSURED: Jeffrey Dale Damron Sarah Kathryn McGuire COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, STEPHEN WEIR: Glenn Martin Hammond 6