Case Title: Racine County v. Oracular Milwaukee, Inc.

Citation: 2010 WI 25

Docket Number: 2007AP002861

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
2010 WI 25 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP2861 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Racine County, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., Oracular, Inc., 
Oracular of Minnesota, LLC and Oracular of 
Michigan, Inc., 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 58 
Reported at: 317 Wis. 2d 790, 767 N.W.2d 280 
(Ct. App 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 2, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 6, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Stephen A. Simanek   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondents-petitioners there were briefs 
by Jeffrey P. Aiken, Eric J. Meier, and Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jeffrey P. Aiken. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Jeffrey L. 
Leavell, Danielle N. Lutz, and Jeffrey Leavell, S.C., Racine, 
and oral argument by Jeffrey L. Leavell. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 25
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP2861  
(L.C. No. 
2006CV1980) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Racine County, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., Oracular, Inc., 
Oracular of Minnesota, LLC and Oracular of 
Michigan, Inc., 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 2, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.    This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 that reversed and 
remanded an order of the Racine County Circuit Court, Judge 
Stephen A. Simanek presiding, which granted summary judgment to 
Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., Oracular, Inc., Oracular of Minnesota, 
LLC, and Oracular of Michigan, Inc. (collectively Oracular) and 
dismissed Racine County's breach of contract claim.  Racine 
                                                 
1 Racine County v. Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., 2009 WI App 58, 
317 Wis. 2d 790, 767 N.W.2d 280. 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
2 
 
County alleged that Oracular, a computer systems and programming 
consultant, breached the Consulting Service Agreement (the 
Agreement) entered into between the parties.  The circuit court 
granted summary judgment to Oracular on the grounds that Racine 
County's failure to name an expert witness was deficient as a 
matter of law.  According to the circuit court, the Agreement 
was effectively a contract for professional services, for which 
the basis of liability is a claim of negligence.  Racine County 
was therefore required to present expert testimony in order to 
demonstrate that Oracular's performance fell below the standard 
of care in the computer consulting industry.  The circuit court 
denied Racine County's motion for reconsideration, and Racine 
County appealed. 
¶2 
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding 
that Racine County was not required to present expert testimony 
because Oracular's alleged breaches of the Agreement were within 
the realm of the average juror's ordinary experience.  Contrary 
to the circuit court's conclusion, the court of appeals held 
that for purposes of this case, computer consultants are not 
"professionals" 
and 
thereby 
not 
subject 
to 
professional 
standards of care.  Instead, the court concluded that the 
Agreement between Racine County and Oracular was a simple 
contract for services. 
¶3 
Oracular petitioned this court for review, and we 
accepted.  Though on different grounds, we affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court for 
further proceedings. 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
3 
 
¶4 
The issue before this court is whether in order to 
survive summary judgment, Racine County was required to name an 
expert witness when the complaint alleged that Oracular breached 
the 
parties' 
Consulting 
Service 
Agreement 
by 
failing 
to 
institute the software as promised. 
¶5 
We conclude that in order to survive summary judgment, 
Racine County was not required to name an expert witness.  As 
alleged, Racine County's breach of contract claim does not 
present issues so unusually complex as to require expert 
testimony as a matter of law.  In so concluding, we do not close 
the door to the possibility that expert testimony may later 
assist the trier of fact in evaluating the breach of contract 
claim.  Rather, we decide that based upon the pleadings and 
affidavits, Racine County was not required to name an expert 
witness in order to proceed.  Moreover, the breach of contract 
claim presents numerous genuine issues of material fact which 
otherwise preclude summary judgment.  Accordingly, though on 
different grounds,2 we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
                                                 
2 We do not reach the question of whether a computer 
consultant constitutes a "professional" for purposes of this 
case because that in itself has no bearing on whether expert 
testimony is required.  The parties agree.  
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
4 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶6 
On November 10, 2003, Racine County submitted a 
Request for Proposal (RFP) to prospective vendors, "seeking a 
qualified consultant to upgrade [its] current Peoplesoft World 
software to Peoplesoft One 8.0 and install Peoplesoft One Human 
Resource and Payroll modules."  In essence, Racine County sought 
the assistance of a computer consultant, comprised of a "Project 
Manager/Project Team," in the upgrade of its human resources, 
payroll, and financial software systems.  According to the RFP, 
the 
project 
would 
include 
"software 
installation, 
data 
conversion 
(for 
payroll 
only), 
integration 
with 
other 
                                                                                                                                                             
When professional services are at issue, the basis of 
liability 
may 
be 
negligence, 
see 
Hoven 
v. 
Kelble, 
79 
Wis. 2d 444, 463, 256 N.W.2d 379 (1977); Micro-Managers, Inc. v. 
Gregory, 147 Wis. 2d 500, 513, 434 N.W.2d 97 (Ct. App. 1988); 
however, expert testimony may or may not assist the trier of 
fact, Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 186 
N.W.2d 258 (1971).  See, e.g., White v. Leeder, 149 Wis. 2d 948, 
960, 440 N.W.2d 557 (1989) (concluding that expert testimony was 
not required to assist the jury in determining whether the 
manner in which the plaintiff kept a bull negligently caused the 
defendant's injury because the issue was "within the realm of 
lay comprehension"); Hoven, 79 Wis. 2d at 452 (stating that the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur "may be applied in medical 
malpractice cases and that the likelihood that negligence was 
the cause may be shown by expert medical testimony in cases 
where it may not be so inferred on the basis of common 
knowledge" (emphasis added)); Cramer v. Theda Clark Mem'l Hosp., 
45 Wis. 2d 147, 152-53, 172 N.W.2d 427 (1969) (citing numerous 
cases in which expert testimony was not permitted because the 
jury was capable of drawing its own conclusions on the issue of 
negligence); City of Cedarburg Light & Water Comm'n v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 560, 567, 148 N.W.2d 13 (1967).  
It does not follow, then, that the requirement of expert 
testimony is necessarily linked to the rendering of professional 
services.  Accordingly, to evaluate the former, we need not 
determine whether Oracular is a "professional." 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
5 
 
applications, final implementation, going live on Peoplesoft 
One, and training," and completion of the project would "result 
in a fully operational system tailored to the needs of Racine 
County." 
¶7 
In outlining the project's scope, the RFP provided 
that "[t]he Project Manager will be involved with defining the 
project scope and creating the organization and structure needed 
to complete a successful upgrade and implementation."  In 
addition, 
the 
RFP 
assigned 
the 
Project 
Manager 
training 
responsibilities: 
Training: The Project Manager will: 
a. Identify, 
recommend 
and 
coordinate 
Racine 
County's training needs. 
b. Specify the type—— 
i. 
Formal JDE training 
ii. 
Internal workshops 
iii. 
Web training 
c. Assist in the proper training of the County's 
project team to gain the necessary understanding 
of the capabilities of the software. 
d. Assist 
in 
understanding 
the 
software's 
rich 
functionality to better identify and establish 
accurate and realistic goals and objectives. 
e. Provide effective communication and debriefing of 
the instructor(s) allowing the Project Manager to 
assist Racine County to refine the scope of 
business process analysis. 
¶8 
The RFP further provided that the project was to be 
completed in three stages.  Phase 1, titled "Set up of 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
6 
 
Infrastructure and Configurative Network Computing," required 
the consultant to "install and configure Peoplesoft One 8.0 on 
the deployment server and set up a minimum of three fat client 
stations that will all run locally."  Phase 2 was titled 
"Complete install, set up and training for new Peoplesoft One 
Human Resources/Payroll."  Within that phase, the RFP outlined 
the current and required functionality of Racine County's human 
resources and payroll systems.  Phase 3 was titled "Upgrade 
current functioning modules from Peoplesoft World to Peoplesoft 
One." 
¶9 
Finally, 
the 
RFP 
listed 
several 
"Proposal 
Requirements."  Relevant to this case, the RFP provided that 
"[v]endors shall submit a detailed proposal" that includes a 
"Project Task List": 
a. Break down the work program into the three phases 
('1' through '3') as stated above . . . . 
b. Break 
down 
each 
phase 
into 
technical 
and 
application activities. 
c. Submit a proposed GANT [sic] Chart3 schedule 
listing all procedures including training for each 
phase of the project.  Identify the task name, 
duration (no. of days), start date, finish date and 
party responsible for each task. 
¶10 On December 3, 2003, Oracular submitted to Racine 
County a "Proposal for PeopleSoft Consulting" (the proposal).  
                                                 
3 A Gantt chart, named after American engineer Henry 
Laurence Gantt, is "[a] chart that depicts progress in relation 
to time, often used in planning and tracking a project."  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 746 (3d ed. 
1992). 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
7 
 
In the proposal's "Executive Summary," Oracular stated its 
"intent to work with Racine County to implement OneWorld as a 
new baseline enterprise software solution."  Oracular wrote that 
it would "combine the talents of [its] consulting organization 
with the talents of the Racine County staff in order to complete 
this 
project 
on 
time 
and 
on 
budget." 
 
The 
proposal's 
"Preliminary Project Plan" indicated that Oracular would "[p]lan 
a staggered approach to begin each major area of accomplishment 
while focusing on a combined Go-Live date of September 1, 2004."  
Oracular also wrote, however, that "[a] detailed work plan will 
be completed prior to beginning the project and will need to be 
verified by the project team at that time." 
¶11 The 
proposal 
also 
included 
a 
list 
of 
"Project 
Assumptions."  Two of those assumptions were categorized as 
"Training & Education": 
• Racine 
County 
will 
construct 
all 
end-user 
procedures 
and 
training 
materials 
for 
the 
project. 
• All core training will be conducted internally 
and delivered by the project consulting staff.  
Training is to include guidance to key users on 
set-up 
or 
end-user 
procedure 
and 
training 
manuals. 
¶12 Finally, to complete the project, Oracular proposed a 
seven-phase plan.  Those seven phases were broken down in a 
Gantt chart, attached to the proposal as Addendum A.  The Gantt 
chart listed a project duration of 170 working days and a "Go-
Live" date of September 6, 2004. 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
8 
 
¶13 On January 12, 2004, Oracular submitted to Racine 
County an additional addendum to its proposal, which made minor 
budget 
adjustments. 
 
The 
addendum 
also 
provided: 
"After 
reviewing and adjusting the proposed project plan we have 
identified a total of 862 hours required to perform tasks by 
Racine County financial representatives.  This dedication will 
be required from January 19, 2004 through September 10, 2004 for 
a total of 35 weeks." 
¶14 Racine County selected Oracular as the vendor for its 
software upgrade project.  On February 2, 2004, the parties 
entered 
into 
a 
"Consulting 
Service 
Agreement," 
which 
incorporated by reference the RFP, the proposal, Addendum A to 
the proposal, and the January 12, 2004, addendum to the 
proposal.  In the event of a conflict or inconsistency among the 
documents, 
the 
Agreement 
instituted 
the 
following 
prioritization: (a) the Agreement, (b) Addendum A to the 
proposal, (c) the January 12, 2004, addendum to the proposal, 
(d) the proposal, and (e) the RFP.  Pursuant to the Agreement, 
the total amount of the project was not to exceed $389,250.  
Oracular agreed to provide consulting services to Racine County, 
and Racine County agreed to accept consulting services and pay 
Oracular, on certain terms, including: 
a. 
Proposal cost and project plan are based on 
requirements outlined in the Request for Proposal 
submitted 
by 
Racine 
County 
except 
for 
the 
following modifications: 
i. 
Project completion of Phase 1 through Phase 
3 shall be started in a staggered approach 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
9 
 
with a combined Go-Live goal of September 7, 
2004. 
In addition, the Agreement included a termination provision, 
which provided that "[e]ither party may terminate this Agreement 
and/or outstanding Project Proposals by written notice of not 
less than fifteen days." 
¶15 For reasons which we will discuss infra, Racine County 
terminated the Agreement on February 16, 2006, and commenced 
this lawsuit against Oracular on September 26, 2006.  The 
complaint4 alleged two causes of action: breach of contract and 
fraudulent representations in violation of Wis. Stat. § 100.18 
(2007-08).5  In particular, Racine County alleged that the staff 
provided 
by 
Oracular 
was 
"for 
all 
practical 
purposes, 
incompetent" and that Oracular misrepresented "a time table for 
completion and implementation of the project."  Oracular denied 
the allegations and counterclaimed for breach of contract, 
quantum meruit, and promissory estoppel.  
¶16 On October 1, 2007, Oracular moved for summary 
judgment on Racine County's breach of contract claim.  As its 
primary grounds, Oracular asserted that Racine County failed to 
carry its burden of proving that Oracular breached the standard 
                                                 
4 Racine County filed an amended complaint on December 15, 
2006, that incorporated by reference the original complaint. 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
On February 19, 2007, the parties stipulated to the 
dismissal of Racine County's fraudulent representations claim, 
and the circuit court ordered its dismissal without prejudice on 
February 21, 2007. 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
10 
 
of care.  According to Oracular, the Agreement in this case was 
a contract for professional services, specifically computer 
software programming services.  Therefore, citing Hoven v. 
Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 463, 256 N.W.2d 379 (1977), and Micro-
Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 147 Wis. 2d 500, 513, 434 N.W.2d 97 
(Ct. App. 1988), Oracular argued that Racine County was required 
to prove negligence.  To do so, Racine County needed expert 
testimony to demonstrate that Oracular's performance fell below 
the standard of care in the computer consulting industry.  
Because Racine County failed to name an expert witness, Oracular 
argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on 
the breach of contract claim. 
¶17 In 
opposition 
to 
Oracular's 
motion 
for 
summary 
judgment, 
Racine 
County 
challenged 
Oracular's 
attempt 
to 
transform the breach of contract claim into a negligence claim.  
Racine County argued that expert testimony is not necessary to 
prove that Oracular breached the Agreement by not completing the 
project on time and by failing to provide competent training.  
Instead, Racine County employees were capable of presenting the 
necessary "fact testimony" to prove that Oracular did not 
provide the services contracted for.   
¶18 Racine County submitted employee affidavits in support 
of its allegation that Oracular missed the original project 
deadline (the Agreement's "Go-Live goal" date of September 7, 
2004), as well as several succeeding promised deadlines.  
According to Racine County's Finance Director, Douglas Stansil, 
"the project was, at most, 34% complete" as of September 7, 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
11 
 
2004.  Stansil further claimed that Oracular missed a September 
27, 2004, extension deadline,6 a September 2005 extension 
deadline, a December 2005 extension deadline, and finally, a 
January 2006 extension deadline.  According to Stansil, by the 
time the Agreement was terminated on February 16, 2006, "the 
project as a whole was still not more than 53% done," and 
without a fully integrated software system, the project "was of 
absolutely no value to Racine County and was absolutely useless 
to Racine County." 
                                                 
6 Racine County argued in its brief before this court, and 
again at oral argument, that the promised extension deadline of 
September 27, 2004, was memorialized in a letter sent "in August 
2004" from Stansil to Oracular.  That letter was attached as an 
exhibit to Stansil's affidavit.  The letter thanks the recipient 
for "meeting with [Racine County] on August 2, 2004" and further 
states the following: 
It was helpful to review with you the importance 
of the September 27th go live date to Racine County.  
As we stated in the meeting, if the go live date is 
missed, the implementation of the HR Payroll system 
would bee [sic] delayed until next spring due to the 
increased workload at yearend.  This would Cause [sic] 
the 
County 
to 
pay 
for 
an 
additional 
year 
of 
maintenance on the Infintium system and would require 
our staff unanticipated work on the Infintium system. 
Once again we appreciate your commitment to 
meeting the Go live date with a product that the 
County can have full faith. 
However, as it appears in the record, the letter is actually 
dated November 2, 2006.  Oracular does not dispute that the 
letter was sent in August 2004, and we therefore proceed under 
that assumption.  Likewise, Racine County argued in its brief 
that "[i]n May 2005," Stansil sent another letter to Oracular 
memorializing the promised September 2005 extension deadline.  
That letter, which was also attached to Stansil's affidavit, is 
actually dated November 13, 2006. 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
12 
 
¶19 Racine 
County 
also 
submitted 
several 
employee 
affidavits in support of its allegation that Oracular failed to 
provide 
the 
contracted-for 
training. 
 
For 
example, 
the 
affidavits of Racine County's Human Resources Manager and 
payroll coordinator state that one of Oracular's training 
consultants was herself unfamiliar with the software.  In 
addition, 
Racine 
County's 
systems 
analyst 
stated 
in 
his 
affidavit that Oracular's project manager admitted that Oracular 
staffed the project for failure from the beginning.  Racine 
County argued to the circuit court that these affidavits make 
evident that the employees' testimony, without the aid of an 
expert witness, is sufficient to prove that Oracular breached 
the Agreement. 
¶20 On November 30, 2007, the circuit court granted 
Oracular's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Racine 
County's breach of contract claim.  At the motion hearing, the 
court stated that the summary judgment dispute "boil[s] down 
to . . . the necessity or lack of necessity of expert testimony 
to prove essentially what is pled as a breach of contract."  The 
court was persuaded that "no matter what nomenclature" is used, 
"the basis of liability is essentially negligence."  As support, 
the court cited Micro-Managers for the conclusion that if a 
contract is viewed as the rendering of professional services, 
then the basis of liability is a claim of negligence in failing 
to perform the services with due care.  See 147 Wis. 2d at 513.  
At issue in Micro-Managers was a contract for the design and 
development of computer software.  Id. at 503-04.  Given the 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
13 
 
complexity of developing a functioning computer system, the 
circuit court concluded that expert testimony is required in 
order for Racine County to prove that Oracular breached the 
Agreement: "[A]s a matter of law I believe the county would need 
to withstand the motion for summary judgment, someone with a 
degree of expertise opining that Oracular's performance fell 
below the standard of care required of a normal computer 
consultant when engaged in a consulting contract."  Racine 
County moved for reconsideration, which the circuit court denied 
on December 6, 2007. 
¶21 On April 8, 2009, the court of appeals reversed the 
order granting summary judgment to Oracular and remanded the 
case.  Racine County v. Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., 2009 WI App 
58, 317 Wis. 2d 790, 767 N.W.2d 280.  Adopting an eight-factor 
test,7 the court concluded that computer consultants like 
                                                 
7 The eight factors adopted by the court of appeals include 
the six identified by the District Court of New Jersey in 
Hospital Computer Systems, Inc. v. Staten Island Hospital, 788 
F. Supp. 1351, 1361 (D.N.J. 1992) (quoting Lincoln Rochester 
Trust Co. v. Freeman, 311 N.E.2d 480, 483 (N.Y. 1974)) ("'the 
requirements 
of 
extensive 
formal 
training 
and 
learning, 
admission to practice by a qualifying licensure, a code of 
ethics imposing standards qualitatively and extensively beyond 
those that prevail or are tolerated in the marketplace, a system 
for discipline of its members for violation of the code of 
ethics, a duty to subordinate financial reward to social 
responsibility, and, notably, an obligation on its members, even 
in non-professional matters, to conduct themselves as members of 
a learned, disciplined, and honorable occupation'"), and two 
additional characteristics set out by the Court of Appeals of 
New York in Chase Scientific Research, Inc. v. NIA Group, Inc., 
749 N.E.2d 161, 166 (N.Y. 2001) ("the learned professions, 
exemplified by law and medicine" and a relationship "of trust 
and confidence, carrying with it a duty to counsel and advise 
clients").  See Oracular Milwaukee, 317 Wis. 2d 790, ¶32. 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
14 
 
Oracular do not constitute "professionals" for purposes of 
determining whether they are subject to professional standards 
of care.  See id., ¶¶32-33.  Therefore, the Agreement between 
Oracular and Racine County was not a contract for professional 
services but rather a simple contract for services.  Id., ¶33. 
¶22 The court of appeals further concluded that Racine 
County is not required to present expert testimony to recover on 
its breach of contract claim because the alleged breaches are 
"within the realm of the ordinary experience of the average 
juror."  Id., ¶42.  Expert testimony is required "when the jury 
will be presented with complex [or] esoteric issues" because it 
will assist the trier of fact.  Id., ¶35 (citing Netzel v. State 
Sand & Gravel Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 186 N.W.2d 258 (1971)); see 
Wis. Stat. § 907.02.  The court concluded that in this case, 
Racine County alleges two major breaches of contract, neither of 
which is complex or esoteric: the failure to provide training 
for Racine County's employees who would be using the software 
and the failure to fulfill the contract on a timely basis.  
Oracular, 317 Wis. 2d 790, ¶¶36, 37.  Furthermore, the court of 
appeals decided that it would reach the same result even if the 
Agreement between Oracular and Racine County was a professional 
services contract: 
Contrary 
to the circuit court's holding, expert 
testimony is not required as a matter of law to prove 
                                                                                                                                                             
Because we do not reach the question of whether a computer 
consultant is a "professional," supra note 2, we take no 
position on the reasonableness of the court of appeals' eight-
factor test to identify what constitutes a "professional." 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
15 
 
negligence in performance of a professional services 
contract.  Hoven and Micro-Managers require only that, 
in 
actions 
on 
professional 
services 
contracts, 
negligence must be established for recovery; neither 
of 
those 
cases 
mandate[s] 
expert 
testimony 
on 
professional services contracts. 
Id., ¶39.  In this case, Racine County did not allege that 
Oracular breached the Agreement by failing to comply with 
industry standards; rather, Racine County alleged that Oracular 
breached the Agreement by not completing the project by the date 
agreed to and by failing to provide competent training.  Id., 
¶42. 
¶23 Though on different grounds, we now affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court 
for further proceedings. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶24 "'Whether the circuit court properly granted summary 
judgment is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.'"  
Hocking v. City of Dodgeville, 2009 WI 70, ¶7, 318 Wis. 2d 681, 
768 N.W.2d 552 (quoting Schmidt v. N. States Power Co., 2007 WI 
136, ¶24, 305 Wis. 2d 538, 742 N.W.2d 294).  We apply the same 
standards as those used by the circuit court, which are set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08.  Id.; see also Noffke v. Bakke, 
2009 WI 10, ¶9, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156.  In addition, 
whether expert testimony is necessary to prove a given claim is 
a question of law that we review de novo.  See Trinity Lutheran 
Church v. Dorschner Excavating, Inc., 2006 WI App 22, ¶26, 289 
Wis. 2d 252, 710 N.W.2d 680. 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
16 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶25 Summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).  To make its determination, the court decides 
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact; the court 
does not decide the fact.  Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338, 
294 N.W.2d 473 (1980); see also Camacho v. Trimble Irrevocable 
Trust, 2008 WI App 112, ¶11, 313 Wis. 2d 272, 756 N.W.2d 596.  
The court should "carefully scrutinize[]" the materials offered 
by the moving party, Grams, 97 Wis. 2d at 339, and should not 
grant summary judgment "unless the moving party demonstrates a 
right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for 
controversy," id. at 338. 
¶26 The party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings" but instead, 
through affidavits or otherwise, "must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(3).  If "for reasons stated," that party cannot by 
affidavit present facts essential to justify its opposition, the 
court may refuse the motion for summary judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit such discovery to be had.  § 802.08(4). 
¶27 In this case, the circuit court improperly granted 
summary judgment to Oracular.  Based upon the pleadings and 
affidavits, Racine County was not required to name an expert 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
17 
 
witness as a matter of law.  Moreover, the breach of contract 
claim presents numerous genuine issues of material fact which 
preclude summary judgment. 
A. Expert Testimony 
¶28 "The 
requirement 
of 
expert 
testimony 
is 
an 
extraordinary one."  White v. Leeder, 149 Wis. 2d 948, 960, 440 
N.W.2d 557 (1989).  Expert testimony is often required when 
"unusually complex or esoteric" issues are before the jury 
because it serves to assist the trier of fact.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02; White, 149 Wis. 2d at 960; City of Cedarburg Light & 
Water Comm'n v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 560, 567, 
148 N.W.2d 13 (1967).  In contrast, expert testimony is not 
necessary to assist the trier of fact concerning matters of 
common 
knowledge 
or 
those 
within 
the 
realm 
of 
ordinary 
experience.  See Netzel, 51 Wis. 2d at 6; Cramer v. Theda Clark 
Mem'l Hosp., 45 Wis. 2d 147, 150, 172 N.W.2d 427 (1969).  In 
fact, if the court or jury is able to draw its own conclusions 
without the aid of expert testimony, "the admission of such 
testimony is not only unnecessary but improper."  Cramer, 45 
Wis. 2d at 151.  Of course, the admission of expert testimony is 
within the sound discretion of the circuit court.  Kerkman v. 
Hintz, 142 Wis. 2d 404, 422, 418 N.W.2d 795 (1988).  Expert 
testimony is admissible provided that the witness is "qualified 
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education," and the testimony "will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."  Wis. 
Stat. § 907.02.   
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
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¶29 In this case, in order to survive summary judgment, 
Racine County was not required to name an expert witness.  As a 
preliminary point, Racine County alleged breach of contract, not 
negligence.  There is no allegation that Oracular's performance 
failed to meet the standards of the computer consulting 
industry——whatever those may or may not be.  Accordingly, the 
issue is not whether Racine County is required to present expert 
testimony in order to demonstrate that Oracular's performance 
fell below the industry standard of care.8  Instead, the issue is 
whether in order to survive summary judgment, Racine County was 
required to name an expert witness when the complaint alleged 
that Oracular breached the parties' Agreement.   
¶30 As it was alleged in the complaint and presented in 
the affidavits, Racine County's breach of contract claim does 
                                                 
8 In its brief before this court, Oracular argued that in 
order for Racine County to succeed on its breach of contract 
claim, it must present expert testimony regarding Oracular's 
failure to meet the standards in the computer consulting 
industry because implicit in every service contract is a duty to 
perform consistent with standard industry custom and practice.  
For that proposition, Oracular cited Milwaukee Cold Storage Co. 
v. York Corp., 3 Wis. 2d 13, 25, 87 N.W.2d 505 (1958).  Contrary 
to Oracular's contention, Milwaukee Cold Storage does not hold 
that a prerequisite to proving breach of a services contract is 
a showing of the failure to perform consistent with standard 
industry custom and practice.  Rather, in that case, this court 
recognized that "accompanying every contract there is a common-
law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable expedience, and 
faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and that a negligent 
failure to observe any of such conditions is a tort as well as a 
breach of contract . . . ."  Id.  That a negligent failure to 
perform a contract with care and skill gives rise to a breach of 
contract claim is an entirely different matter from what is 
necessary to prove Racine County's breach of contract claim. 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
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not present issues so "unusually complex or esoteric," White, 
149 Wis. 2d at 960, as to demand the assistance of expert 
testimony.9  See Wis. Stat. § 907.02.  Rather, the alleged 
breaches concern matters of common knowledge and are within the 
realm of ordinary experience.  See Netzel, 51 Wis. 2d at 6; 
Cramer, 45 Wis. 2d at 150.  In particular, Racine County alleges 
that Oracular breached the Agreement by not completing the 
project on time and by failing to provide competent training.  
On those alleged breaches, the trier of fact is capable of 
drawing its own conclusions without the assistance of expert 
testimony. See Cramer, 45 Wis. 2d at 151; Wis. Stat. § 907.02. 
¶31 Based on its affidavits, Racine County intends to 
produce evidence that Oracular breached the Agreement by not 
completing the project on time.  Racine County will argue that 
                                                 
9 As its primary grounds for summary judgment, Oracular 
asserted that Racine County's failure to name an expert witness 
was deficient as a matter of law.  We recognize that Racine 
County, in opposition to Oracular's motion, presented no 
affidavits 
refuting 
Oracular's specific point that expert 
testimony was required.  Instead, the affidavits were focused 
solely on supporting Racine County's claim that Oracular 
breached the Agreement. 
The party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of the pleadings but the adverse 
party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
section, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(3).  While Racine 
County set forth specific facts in its affidavits demonstrating 
a genuine issue for trial on the breach of contract claim, it 
did not set forth specific facts in its affidavits demonstrating 
a genuine issue regarding the requirement of expert testimony.  
Instead, through its brief and at the motion hearing, Racine 
County rested upon argument to the circuit court that expert 
testimony was not necessary. 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
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the Agreement expressly states that "[p]roject completion of 
Phase 1 through Phase 3 shall be started in a staggered approach 
with a combined Go-Live goal of September 7, 2004."10  If 
September 7, 2004, was intended as the project deadline, see 
discussion of "Genuine Issues of Material Fact" infra Part 
III.B., the fact-finder is capable of determining for itself 
whether 
the 
project 
was 
indeed 
completed 
by 
that 
time.  
Similarly, the fact-finder can evaluate whether the deadline was 
repeatedly modified and repeatedly missed, as Racine County 
intends to argue.  The question of whether the software 
installation project was completed by a specified date is 
distinct from the complexity of the work that goes into the 
installation——complexity that Racine County concedes.  The 
former is not so "unusually complex or esoteric," White, 149 
Wis. 2d at 
960, 
as 
to 
require 
the 
assistance 
of 
expert 
testimony.  See Wis. Stat. § 907.02. 
¶32 Racine County also intends to produce evidence that 
Oracular breached the Agreement by failing to provide competent 
training.  As shown in the affidavits, several Racine County 
employees 
will 
testify 
that 
one 
of 
Oracular's 
training 
                                                 
10 Oracular's argument that expert testimony is required to 
establish a "reasonable" time for project completion is without 
merit.  A reasonable time for performance is implied "[w]here 
there is no provision as to the time for performance."  Delap v. 
Inst. of Am., Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 507, 512, 143 N.W.2d 476 (1966).  
In 
this 
case, 
the 
Agreement 
expressly 
states 
a 
project 
completion date.  Whether that date was intended as a firm 
deadline or only a "goal" presents a question of fact which does 
not necessarily require the assistance of expert testimony. 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
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consultants was herself unfamiliar with the software and that 
Oracular's project manager admitted that the project was staffed 
for failure.  Based upon that evidence, the fact-finder is 
capable of drawing upon common knowledge and ordinary experience 
to determine whether Oracular provided competent training.  See 
Netzel, 51 Wis. 2d at 6; Cramer, 45 Wis. 2d at 150; Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02. 
¶33 We conclude only that in order to survive summary 
judgment, Racine County was not required to name an expert 
witness.  In so concluding, we do not close the door to the 
possibility that expert testimony may later assist the trier of 
fact in evaluating Racine County's breach of contract claim.  
Our point is only that in the posture of summary judgment, 
Racine County was not required to name an expert witness as a 
matter of law. 
B. Genuine Issues of Material Fact 
¶34 We also conclude that the breach of contract claim 
presents numerous genuine issues of material fact which preclude 
summary judgment at this time.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  To 
demonstrate, we need point to only the most glaring of examples.  
See id. (precluding summary judgment if there is a "genuine 
issue as to any material fact" (emphasis added)).  Whether the 
Agreement's "Go-Live goal of September 7, 2004," was intended as 
a firm deadline or only a target completion date presents a 
genuine issue of material fact.  See Younger v. Rosenow Paper & 
Supply Co., Inc., 51 Wis. 2d 619, 629-30, 188 N.W.2d 507 (1971) 
("While the legal effect to be given an agreement may, in a 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
22 
 
proper case, be determined on a motion for summary judgment, 
where there is a dispute as to the intent of the parties to the 
agreement, a fact issue is presented, and summary judgment is 
inappropriate." (emphasis omitted)(footnotes omitted)); Lemke v. 
Larsen 
Co., 
35 
Wis. 2d 427, 
431, 
151 
N.W.2d 17 
(1967).  
Likewise, Oracular's assertion that the collaborative language 
used in the RFP and the proposal imposed "bilateral performance" 
obligations on the parties, some of which were out of Oracular's 
control, is disputed by Racine County and therefore presents a 
genuine issue of material fact.  Finally, there is a factual 
dispute as to which party is responsible for the suspension of 
the project between the end of September 2004 and March 2005.  
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), any and all of these genuine 
issues of material fact preclude summary judgment at this time. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶35 In summary, we conclude that in order to survive 
summary judgment, Racine County was not required to name an 
expert witness.  As alleged, Racine County's breach of contract 
claim does not present issues so unusually complex as to require 
expert testimony as a matter of law.  In so concluding, we do 
not close the door to the possibility that expert testimony may 
later assist the trier of fact in evaluating the breach of 
contract claim.  Rather, we decide that based upon the pleadings 
and affidavits, Racine County was not required to name an expert 
witness in order to proceed.  Moreover, the breach of contract 
claim presents numerous genuine issues of material fact which 
otherwise preclude summary judgment.  Accordingly, though on 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
23 
 
different grounds, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No. 
2007AP2861   
 
 
 
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