Case Title: State ex rel. Nelson v. Fuerst

Citation: 1993-Ohio-179

Docket Number: 19912099

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1993-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO                               
     The full texts of the opinions of the Supreme Court of                      
Ohio are being transmitted electronically beginning May 27,                      
1992, pursuant to a pilot project implemented by Chief Justice                   
Thomas J. Moyer.                                                                 
     Please call any errors to the attention of the Reporter's                   
Office of the Supreme Court of Ohio.  Attention:  Walter S.                      
Kobalka, Reporter, or Deborah J. Whitten, Administrative                         
Assistant.  Tel.:  (614) 466-4961; in Ohio 1-800-826-9010.                       
Your comments on this pilot project are also welcome.                            
     NOTE:  Corrections may be made by the Supreme Court to the                  
full texts of the opinions after they have been released                         
electronically to the public.  The reader is therefore advised                   
to check the bound volumes of Ohio St.3d published by West                       
Publishing Company for the final versions of these opinions.                     
The advance sheets to Ohio St.3d will also contain the volume                    
and page numbers where the opinions will be found in the bound                   
volumes of the Ohio Official Reports.                                            
                                                                                 
The State ex rel. Nelson, Appellee, v. Fuerst, Clerk, et al.,                    
Appellants.                                                                      
     [Cite as State ex rel. Nelson v. Fuerst (1993),       Ohio                  
     St.3d      .]                                                               
Public records -- R.C. 149.43 does not require custodians to                     
     mail either copies of public records or the records                         
     themselves.                                                                 
     (No. 91-2099 -- Submitted January 5, 1993 -- Decided March                  
10, 1993.)                                                                       
     Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No.                   
62021.                                                                           
     Carl A. Nelson, Sr., relator-appellee, is incarcerated at                   
Marion Correctional Institute ("MCI"), is indigent, and has                      
exhausted all direct appeals of his convictions.  Nelson sought                  
a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County                   
to compel Cuyahoga County Clerk of Courts Gerald E. Fuerst and                   
Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney Stephanie Tubbs Jones,                      
respondents-appellants, to make available for his inspection                     
seventy-one pages of documents pertaining to his convictions,                    
apparently for rape and kidnapping.  Nelson filed for the writ                   
because respondents' $1.00 per page copying fee was less                         
affordable than the $.12 per page fee charged at MCI.                            
     The court of appeals granted the writ, holding that R.C.                    
149.43(B) "entitles all persons, at a minimum, to inspect                        
public records."  To enforce this duty, the court ordered:                       
     "(1)  Respondent Clerk of Court * * * to notify [Nelson]                    
of the cost of postage to mail the records to the Marion                         
Correctional facility;                                                           
     "(2)  Upon receipt of the postage, respondent Clerk of                      
Court is to mail the records to the Superintendent of the                        
Marion facility;                                                                 
     "(3)  Within two weeks of receipt of the records, the                       
superintendent is to collect the amount of return postage from                   
[Nelson] and make the records available for [Nelson's]                           
inspection and copying at the institution's copying fee, all                     
under supervision; and                                                           
     "(4)  The Superintendent is to mail the records back to                     
the Clerk of Court."                                                             
     The cause is before this court on an appeal as of right.                    
                                                                                 
     Carl A. Nelson, Sr., pro se.                                                
     Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Prosecuting Attorney, Patrick J.                     
Murphy and Carol Shockley, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for                  
appellants.                                                                      
     Robert E. Sexton and Thomas P. Sexton, urging denial of                     
the writ, for amicus curiae Ohio Clerk of Courts Association.                    
                                                                                 
     Per Curiam.  The issue presented for our review is: Did                     
the court of appeals err in finding that respondents had a duty                  
to mail public records on request?  For the reasons that                         
follow, we hold that R.C. 149.43 does not require custodians to                  
mail either copies of public records or the records                              
themselves.  Accordingly, we reverse.                                            
     Respondents do not dispute that the records Nelson seeks                    
are subject to public disclosure under R.C. 149.43(B).  They                     
object only to the court's procedure for enforcing this                          
statute.  Respondents contend that this procedure is contrary                    
to R.C. 149.351(A), which prohibits the removal or transfer of                   
public records from a public office, "except as provided by                      
law," and R.C. 2303.09 and 2303.03, which require the clerk of                   
the common pleas and appellate courts to preserve the papers                     
filed in his office.                                                             
     Neither R.C. 149.351(A) nor 2303.09, however, prevents the                  
removal or transfer of records, with appropriate safeguards,                     
where required by law.  For example, the clerk of a trial court                  
must transmit the record in a case on appeal pursuant to App.R.                  
10.  Similarly, if R.C. 149.43(B) guarantees inmates access to                   
public records, the custodians of those records must make the                    
records available for inspection.                                                
     The duty to allow inspection and copying of public records                  
imposed by R.C. 149.43(B), however, is not absolute.  This                       
statute provides:                                                                
     "All public records shall be promptly prepared and made                     
available for inspection to any person at all reasonable times                   
during regular business hours. Upon request, a person                            
responsible for public records shall make copies available at                    
cost, within a reasonable period of time.  In order to                           
facilitate broader access to public records, governmental units                  
shall maintain public records in such a manner that they can be                  
made available for inspection in accordance with this                            
division."  (Emphasis added.)                                                    
     Recently, we held that custodians of public records are                     
not obligated by R.C. 149.43(B) to make copies of such records                   
available by mail.  In State ex rel. Fenley v. Ohio Historical                   
Soc. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 509, 511, 597 N.E.2d 120, 122, we                     
explained:                                                                       
     "We find the language of R.C. 149.43 clear and                              
unambiguous.  A custodian of public records who makes those                      
records available for inspection, and who makes copies                           
available upon request at the governmental unit's place of                       
business, fulfills the responsibilities placed upon him by R.C.                  
149.43.  We thus find the word 'available' is not synonymous                     
with 'available by mail.'"                                                       
     Thus, to comply with R.C. 149.43(B), respondents need only                  
supply copies of requested public records at a reasonable cost                   
within a reasonable period of time during regular business                       
hours.  As the duty to allow inspection does not include                         
mailing  copies of public records, custodians of public records                  
must also have no duty to mail the records themselves for                        
inspection.  Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in                          
ordering respondents to transfer the records requested by                        
Nelson by mail for his perusal.1                                                 
     Therefore, the court of appeals' decision ordering                          
respondents to mail the pertinent public records to Nelson for                   
supervised copying is reversed.                                                  
                                    Judgment reversed.                           
     Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney and F.E. Sweeney, JJ., concur.                    
     Resnick, J., concurs in judgment only.                                      
     Douglas, Wright and Pfeifer, JJ., dissent.                                  
                                                                                 
FOOTNOTE                                                                         
1    Although Nelson does not argue that he is entitled to                       
copies of the instant records free of charge, due process                        
apparently does not guarantee this here, where the indigent                      
complainant has exhausted the direct appeal of his conviction                    
and has no post-conviction remedy pending.  State ex rel.                        
Vitoratos v. Yacobucci (1962), 173 Ohio St. 462, 464, 20 O.O.                    
2d 81, 82, 184 N.E.2d 98, 99, certiorari denied and appeal                       
dismissed (1962), 371 U.S. 25, 83 S.Ct. 135, 9 L.Ed.2d 96;                       
State ex rel. Partee v. McMahon (1963), 175 Ohio St. 243, 248,                   
24 O.O.2d 386, 388-389, 193 N.E.2d 266, 269; State ex rel. Murr                  
v. Thierry (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 45, 517 N.E.2d 226.                             
                                                                                 
     Douglas, J., dissenting.     I respectfully dissent based                   
upon my dissent in State ex rel. Fenley v. Ohio Historical Soc.                  
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 509, 512, 597 N.E.2d 120, 123.  This case                  
graphically illustrates the unfairness of the Fenley decision.                   
The majority, herein, says that appellee may have the records.                   
Now all he has to do is figure a way to get out of prison so he                  
can go to the public office involved (during regular business                    
hours, of course) and pick up those records.                                     
                                                                                 
     Wright, J., dissenting.    As I wrote in my dissent in                      
State ex rel. Fenley v. Ohio Historical Soc. (1992), 64 Ohio                     
St. 3d 509, 515, 597 N.E.2d 120, 125, I share Justice Douglas's                  
approach to R.C. 149.43(B).  I continue to believe that this                     
statute "'requires custodians of public records to accept and                    
honor, upon payment of a reasonable fee, requests for public                     
records to be mailed to a requesting person.'"  Id. at 514-515,                  
597 N.E.2d at 125 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  If the present                     
case were indistinguishable from Fenley, however, the doctrine                   
of stare decisis might well require me to concur in today's                      
judgment.  But this case is distinguishable from Fenley, and                     
even more clearly than Fenley illustrates the error of the                       
majority's position.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent.                         
     The Cuyahoga County Clerk of Courts has asked this court                    
to vacate a writ of mandamus issued by the court of appeals.                     
In the court of appeals, Carl A. Nelson, Sr. sought and                          
obtained a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk to provide                       
copies of certain records pursuant to R.C. 149.43.  There is no                  
dispute that the records he seeks are public records or that                     
the clerk's office is a public office under R.C. 149.43(A).                      
The clerk was willing to provide copies of the records, but                      
only after Nelson paid a $1.00 per page fee for copying.                         
Nelson was willing to pay postage for the records to be mailed                   
to the prison where he could inspect them and copy only those                    
portions he desired at the rate of $.12 per page.  He was also                   
willing to pay the return postage.  Nelson explained to the                      
court of appeals that at his current prison wage he could not                    
afford the copying fee charged by the clerk of courts.                           
     The court of appeals recognized that R.C. 149.43(C)                         
"entitle[d] all persons, at a minimum, to inspect public                         
records."  (Emphasis sic.)  Writing for a unanimous panel,                       
Judge Patton issued the following order:                                         
     "(1)  Respondent Clerk of Court is to notify relator of                     
the cost of postage to mail the records to the Marion                            
Correctional facility;                                                           
     "(2)  Upon receipt of the postage, respondent Clerk of                      
Court is to mail the records to the Superintendent of the                        
Marion facility;                                                                 
     "(3)  Within two weeks of receipt of the records, the                       
superintendent is to collect the amount of return postage from                   
relator and make the records available for relator's inspection                  
and copying at the institution's copying fee, all under                          
supervision; and                                                                 
     "(4)  The Superintendent is to mail the records back to                     
the Clerk of Court."                                                             
     The court of appeals' order is true to the scope and                        
purpose of R.C. 149.43.  Ohio's public-records law is                            
necessarily broad.  "'The rule in Ohio is that public records                    
are the people's records, and that the officials in whose                        
custody they happen to be are merely trustees for the people;                    
therefore anyone may inspect such records at any time, subject                   
only to the limitation that such inspection does not endanger                    
the safety of the record, or unreasonably interfere with the                     
discharge of the duties of the officer having custody of the                     
same.'"  Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Dayton (1976), 45 Ohio                       
St.2d 107, 109, 74 O.O.2d 209, 211, 341 N.E.2d 576, 577-578.                     
"*** [T]he law's public purpose requires a broad construction                    
of the provisions defining public records.  Because the law is                   
intended to benefit the public through access to records, this                   
court has resolved doubts in favor of disclosure."  State ex                     
rel. Cincinnati Post v. Schweikert (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 170,                    
173, 527 N.E.2d 1230, 1232.  Thus, in a 1976 opinion for the                     
court, Chief Justice O'Neill wrote:                                              
     "The relator seeks records which the General Assembly has                   
declared to be public records.  The statute makes them                           
available to any member of the public, including the relator,                    
at any reasonable time.  No pleading of too much expense, or                     
too much time involved, or too much interference with normal                     
duties, can be used by the respondent to evade the public's                      
right to inspect and obtain a copy of public records within a                    
reasonable time.  The respondent is under a statutory duty to                    
organize his office and employ his staff in such a way that his                  
office will be able to make these records available for                          
inspection and to provide copies when requested within a                         
reasonable time."  (Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Beacon                       
Journal Publishing Co. v. Andrews (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 283,                     
289, 2 O.O.3d 434, 437, 358 N.E.2d 565, 569.  This court's                       
interpretation of the public-records statute has never before                    
been dependent on the ability of the records seeker to travel                    
to the office in which the records are kept.                                     
     R.C. 149.43(B) provides:                                                    
     "All public records shall be promptly prepared and made                     
available for inspection to any person at all reasonable times                   
during regular business hours.  Upon request, a person                           
responsible for public records shall make copies available at                    
cost, within a reasonable period of time.  In order to                           
facilitate broader access to public records, governmental units                  
shall maintain public records in such a manner that they can be                  
made available for inspection in accordance with this                            
division."  (Emphasis added.)                                                    
     In Fenley, supra, this court held that a custodian of                       
public records "has no clear duty under R.C. 149.43(B) to                        
transmit copies of those records by mail ***."  Id. at 510, 597                  
N.E.2d at 121.  Fenley involved a genealogist, Ann Fenley, who                   
requested that the Ohio Historical Society ("Society")                           
photocopy and send to her a copy of a certain death                              
certificate.  Fenley argued that the Society was obligated to                    
provide these services at cost, plus postage, and brought a                      
mandamus action when the Society refused to do so.  It was                       
undisputed that the Society was a custodian of public records                    
and stipulated that the document sought was a public record                      
under R.C. 149.43.                                                               
     A majority accepted the Society's argument that all R.C.                    
149.43 requires of custodians "is to allow inspection and                        
copying at their place of business during business hours."  Id.                  
at 511, 597 N.E.2d at 122.  "A custodian of public records,"                     
the court went on to say, "who makes those records available                     
for inspection, and who makes copies available upon request at                   
the governmental unit's place of business, fulfills the                          
responsibilities placed upon him or her by R.C. 149.43."  Id.                    
     Although I disagree with this conclusion, the facts of                      
Fenley do not show that Fenley was unable to travel to the                       
Historical Society, search the records, and copy the death                       
certificate she was seeking.  Thus, the records were, in a                       
literal sense, "available" for Fenley's inspection.  This                        
crucial fact distinguishes the Fenley case from today's case.                    
     Nelson is locked in prison.  He is unable to leave his                      
cell, get in a car, drive to Cleveland, and copy the records he                  
seeks.  He clearly cannot afford the $1.00 per page copying fee                  
the clerk of courts has demanded -- a fee which people who can                   
travel to the clerk's office are not forced to pay in advance.                   
In a very real sense the public records Nelson seeks, which he                   
has an undisputed right to examine, are unavailable for his                      
inspection.  As a matter of undeniable common sense the records                  
cannot be made "available upon request at the governmental                       
unit's place of business."  See Fenley, supra, at 511, 597                       
N.E.2d at 122.                                                                   
     The final sentence of R.C. 149.43(B) states: "In order to                   
facilitate broader access to public records, governmental units                  
shall maintain public records in such a manner that they can be                  
made available for inspection in accordance with this                            
division."  (Emphasis added.)  I believe that the right of the                   
public to obtain records is important enough that a records                      
custodian must accommodate those unable to travel to the                         
records office so that the records "can be made available for                    
inspection."  (Emphasis added.)  To achieve the results                          
required by R.C. 149.43 will sometimes demand flexibility from                   
records custodians.  If a custodian is unwilling to seek                         
creative solutions, then a court must.  In this case the court                   
of appeals crafted an acceptable solution to a difficult                         
problem.  It properly balanced the need to keep the records                      
safe and the clerk of courts' financial concerns with Nelson's                   
right to examine the records.  I would not disturb its                           
judgment.                                                                        
     By reversing the court below, however, the majority seems                   
to hold that people who are physically unable to travel to the                   
public-records custodian are not entitled to obtain public                       
records to the same extent as people who are able to do so in                    
person.  This decision has a most devastating impact on the                      
right of prisoners, hospitalized people, and the disabled to                     
examine public records.  I feel that the court has foreclosed                    
to these groups rights under the public-records statute                          
expressly granted to all Ohioans by the General Assembly.  As                    
to the hospitalized and the disabled, I am especially concerned                  
that this decision may violate the Americans With Disabilities                   
Act of 1990, Section 12101 et seq., Title 42, U.S. Code.2  See                   
Fenley, supra, at 516, 597 N.E.2d at 126 (Wright, J.,                            
dissenting).  I am also concerned that it implicates the equal                   
protection rights of prisoners.                                                  
     With the exception of Fenley, our recent decisions have                     
interpreted R.C. 149.43 broadly in accordance with the intent                    
of the General Assembly.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Toledo Blade                  
Co. v. Univ. of Toledo Found. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 258, 602                     
N.E.2d 1159.  The majority's refusal to permit people who                        
cannot travel to the records custodian to enjoy their rights                     
under R.C. 149.43 requires a most narrow reading of the                          
statute.  I would hold that in a case in which one seeking to                    
examine a public record is physically unable to obtain the                       
record in person, a public-records custodian is obligated by                     
R.C. 149.43(B) to make the requested record available to that                    
person for inspection without prepayment of a copying fee.  I                    
would not set forth firm guidelines as to how this must be                       
done; each case is unique and must be dealt with in its own                      
manner.                                                                          
     The reasonable and well-conceived order of the court of                     
appeals should be affirmed.                                                      
     Pfeifer, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.                   
                                                                                 
FOOTNOTE:                                                                        
     2  Because the implications of the Americans With                           
Disabilities Act was not raised by the parties, it is not                        
appropriate to speculate further on its applicability at this                    
time.