Case Title: Reese v. Dow Chemical Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-253

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-11-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Reese v. Dow Chemical Co.1986 WY 205728 P.2d 1118Case Number: 85-253, 86-254Decided: 11/26/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Duane REESE, Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, and 
Dowell, a division of Dow Chemical, or Subsidiary Company, Appellees 
(Defendants).

DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, and 
Dowell, a division of Dow Chemical, or Subsidiary Company, Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

Duane REESE, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from 
DistrictCourtofFremontCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

Bernard Q. 
Phelan of Phelan Law Offices, Cheyenne, and John R. Fletcher of Fletcher & 
O'Tool, St. Cloud, Minn., for appellant 
in Case 

No. 85-253 and 
appellee in Case No. 85-254.

John R. Vincent 
of Hettinger and Leedy, P.C., Riverton, and Ramon P. Marks and Kim Tyson, 
Houston, Tex., for appellees in Case No. 
85-253 and appellants in Case No. 85-254.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In this wrongful 
discharge action a jury found that in terminating appellant Duane Reese's 
employment appellees Dow Chemical Company and its subsidiary Dowell breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and were negligent in performing 
a contractual duty but then found that Mr. Reese had sustained no damage. 
Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment for appellees Dow and 
Dowell.

[¶2.]     Reese appeals the 
judgment and the trial court's order denying his motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial. He asserts that 
the verdict contained irreconcilable and inconsistent findings, was inconsistent 
with the evidence, evidenced mistake and disregard of instructions on the part 
of the jury, and bore no relation to his loss. In their cross-appeal appellees 
Dow and Dowell contend that Reese's claims for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing and negligent performance of a contractual 
obligation are not recognized in Wyoming.

[¶3.]     We affirm the district 
court's judgment and order; and, consequently, we find it unnecessary to address 
the issues raised in the cross-appeal.

[¶4.]     Duane Reese, who began 
his career with Dow Chemical Company in 1964, was terminated as an employee of 
Dowell, a division of Dow, on December 3, 1982. In August 1984, Reese filed an 
action against Dow and Dowell seeking damages for wrongful discharge. The case 
was tried before a jury on the following theories: breach of contract, breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, estoppel, and negligent 
performance of a contractual duty. The jury found that appellees Dow and Dowell 
had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and that they 
had acted negligently in evaluating Mr. Reese's job performance. With regard to 
damages, the jury made the following findings:

"Was the negligence of 
defendant(s) the proximate cause of any damages sustained by Duane 
Reese?

"Yes X 

"No 
____

* * * * * 
*

"Was Duane Reese's 
negligence a proximate cause of any damages sustained by Duane 
Reese?

"Yes X 

"No 
____

* * * * * 
*

"Considering all of the 
fault at one hundred percent (100%), what percentage of the total fault is 
attributable to each of the following persons?

"Duane Reese, Plaintiff 
                   
(0% to 100%)                        
40%\

 "Defendant(s)                                   
(0% to 100%)                        
60% 

"Total 
100%

"What, if any, damages do 
you find were sustained by Duane Reese?

"$ None"

Appellant 
contends that the verdict contains "irreconcilable and inconsistent findings." 
Specifically, he urges that the jury's finding that appellees' actions were the 
proximate cause of any damages sustained by him is inconsistent and 
irreconcilable with its finding that he sustained no 
damages.

[¶5.]     The general rule 
regarding a court's role in evaluating the consistency of findings in special 
verdicts is stated in Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 
§ 2510, pp. 515-517 (1971):

"It is the duty of the 
court to attempt to harmonize the answers, if it is possible under a fair 
reading of them. `Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury's 
answers to special interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way.' 
In determining whether there is inconsistency in the jury's findings, the 
findings are to be construed in the light of the surrounding circumstances and 
in connection with the pleadings, instructions, and issues submitted." 
(Footnotes omitted.) (Quoting Atlantic and Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman 
Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 82 S. Ct. 780, 786, 7 L. Ed. 2d 798 
(1962)).

Applying this 
rule to the present case, we can reconcile the jury's findings without 
difficulty.

[¶6.]     The trial court 
instructed the jury that the elements of damage for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing were past and future lost wages and past 
and future lost benefits, both tangible and intangible. With respect to the 
negligence claim, the jury was instructed that the elements of damage were lost 
wages and benefits, both past and future, and emotional distress. The evidence 
presented on the issue of damages was conflicting.

[¶7.]     The record indicates 
that approximately seven months after appellant was discharged by Dowell he went 
to work for another company, InterMountain Cable. In the intervening period 
appellant was essentially unemployed. Appellees' expert witness testified, 
however, that between the time appellant was discharged by Dowell and the time 
the case was tried, appellant received $5,420 more income than he would have 
received if he had continued working for Dowell. Appellees' expert also 
testified that based on appellant's projected income and prospects for the 
future with InterMountain Cable he would suffer no future damages. The jury 
apparently determined that the "damages" arising from appellant's discharge were 
more than offset by his subsequent increase in income. The jury correctly 
assumed that any damage award should be measured by taking into account 
appellant's ultimate loss, if any, for that period of time between his discharge 
and the time of trial as well as any possible future damages. This explains the 
jury's ultimate finding of zero damages. We see no internal inconsistency in the 
verdict.

[¶8.]     Appellant next argues 
that the verdict is inconsistent with the evidence, reflects mistake on the part 
of the jury, and bears no relation to his loss. We find no merit in these 
contentions. The standards we employ when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence 
to support a jury verdict are well stated in Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. 
v. Admiral Beverage Corporation, Wyo., 638 P.2d 1272, 1274-1275 
(1982):

"[W]e assume the evidence 
in favor of the successful party to be true, leaving out of consideration 
entirely the evidence in conflict, and assigning every favorable inference to 
the evidence of the successful party that can be reasonably and fairly drawn 
from it. In addition, when reviewing a jury verdict, we leave to the jury the 
duty of ascertaining the facts, reconciling conflicts therein and drawing its 
own inferences if more than one inference is permissible. Also, when the facts 
permit the drawing of more than one inference, then it is for the jury to choose 
which one will be utilized and, if supported by substantial evidence, the jury's 
choice will be held by us to be conclusive." (Citations 
omitted.)

Our discussion 
of appellant's first issue demonstrates that appellees presented sufficient 
evidence to support the verdict. The jury obviously accepted the analysis of 
appellees' expert, and we will not disturb that finding.

[¶9.]     Appellant next 
challenges the trial judge's ruling on the admissibility of the testimony of 
appellees' expert witness, Dr. Jerome Sherman, claiming that his opinions were 
based on "unsubstantiated assumptions." The record reveals that Dr. Sherman 
relied on the following sources in forming his opinions: appellant's tax 
returns, a report by appellant's expert witness, the testimony of appellant's 
expert witness, documents obtained from Dow and InterMountain Cable, and 
conversations with employees of InterMountain Cable, Dow, and Dowell. Rule 703, 
W.R.E., permits an expert to rely on such sources.1 The trial judge specifically ruled 
that this informatin was of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
field and that Dr. Sherman's testimony would assist the jury. We cannot say that 
the trial judge abused his discretion. The adequacy of the foundation for 
opinion testimony is subject to scrutiny through cross-examination, and 
determinations of weight and credibility are for the trier of fact. Reed v. 
Hunter, Wyo., 
663 P.2d 513, 518 (1983). Appellant had an opportunity to discredit Dr. 
Sherman's testimony during voir dire of the witness, cross-examination, and 
closing argument. His failure to convince the jury that Dr. Sherman's analysis 
was incorrect does not entitle him to a new trial.

[¶10.]  Finally, appellant asserts that the jury 
disregarded the court's instructions in reaching its verdict. Appellant argues 
that "if the jury followed the court's instructions, it found a duty * * * and 
injury to plaintiff caused by the breach of duty." (Emphasis in original.) 
Appellant further argues that if the jury made a distinction between "injury" 
and "damage," he is entitled to at least nominal damages, and failure to award 
nominal damages constitutes grounds for a new trial. We disagree. Even if we 
assume, without deciding, that appellant should have been awarded nominal 
damages, he would not be entitled to a reversal or a new trial on that ground 
alone. 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 790, pp. 231-232.

[¶11.]  Because we affirm the judgment, we find 
it unnecessary to address the issues raised in appellees' cross-appeal even 
though they may be of academic interest or potentially determinative of other 
such cases. Wallace v. Casper Adjustment Service, 
Wyo., 500 P.2d 72, 73 (1972).

[¶12.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Rule 703, W.R.E., 
provides:

"The facts or 
data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference 
may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a 
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence."