Case Title: Rogers v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 473, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CHRISTOPHER ROGERS, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 473, 2002 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware, in 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
and for Sussex County in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Cr. A. Nos. IS99-09-0812R1;   
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
IS99-09-0816R1, 0817R1;  
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
IS99-10-0245R1 - 0248R1. 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
Def. ID No. 9909019686  
 
   
Submitted: February 24, 2003 
Decided: 
April 29, 2003 
 
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 29th day of April 2003, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and appendix and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Christopher Rogers, filed this appeal from an 
order of the Superior Court denying his motion for postconviction relief.  
The appellee, State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment of the 
Superior Court on the basis that it is manifest on the face of Rogers’ opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and AFFIRM. (2) 
On 
November 19, 1999, the State filed a twenty-eight count indictment against 
 
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Rogers, his brother Jermaine Rogers, and another co-defendant named 
Christopher Purnell. On the morning of trial after the jury was sworn, 
Rogers entered a guilty plea to two counts of Robbery in the First Degree, 
two counts of Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a Felony, 
Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, Possession of a Firearm 
with an Altered Serial Number, and Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  
Rogers was sentenced on May 26, 2000, to a total of forty-one years at Level 
V, suspended after serving nineteen years and upon successful completion of 
the Level V Key Program, for twenty-two years of decreasing levels of 
supervision.  Rogers did not appeal from the guilty plea or the sentence. 
(3) 
On May 20, 2002, Rogers filed a motion for postconviction 
relief.  By order dated June 26, 2002, the Superior Court summarily denied 
Rogers’ motion.  On August 8, 2002, after hearing testimony from Rogers’ 
former counsel, the Superior Court denied Rogers’ motion for reargument.  
This appeal followed. 
(4) 
In his opening brief on appeal, Rogers argues, as he did in his 
motion for postconviction relief and motion for reargument, that his guilty 
plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel.1 Rogers claims 
                                          
 
1 Rogers does not pursue a claim of an “unconstitutional lineup.”  Rogers’ failure to brief 
the issue constitutes a waiver of the claim, and the claim will not be addressed by this 
Court.  Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
 
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that his counsel was not prepared for trial, did not discuss the evidence with 
him, and did not advise him of the “severe and direct consequences” of 
pleading guilty.  According to Rogers, as a result of his counsel’s alleged 
ineffectiveness, his guilty plea was involuntary, unknowing and not 
intelligently made.   
(5) 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must show that (i) counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, and (ii) the deficiencies in counsel’s 
representation caused the defendant actual prejudice.2  In the context of a 
guilty plea, a defendant must demonstrate “`that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 
and would have insisted upon going to trial.’”3 
(6) 
The Court has carefully considered Rogers’ postconviction 
claims on appeal, and we find that the judgment of the Superior Court 
should be affirmed on the basis of the Superior Court’s well-reasoned 
decision dated June 26, 2002.  Rogers’ allegation, that his guilty plea was 
involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel, is contradicted by the 
record, including the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form and by Rogers’ 
                                          
 
2 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 
3 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 
(1985)). 
 
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statements at the plea colloquy.  In both, Rogers represented to the Superior 
Court that he voluntarily entered his plea and was satisfied with his 
counsel’s representation.  Moreover, Rogers acknowledged that he 
understood that a pre-sentence investigation would be performed, that he 
faced a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years in prison, and that the 
sentencing judge could impose a sentence of up to ninety-eight years in 
prison.  In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, 
Rogers is bound by his answers on the guilty plea form and by his sworn 
testimony prior to the acceptance of his guilty plea.4  Rogers has not 
sustained his burden of demonstrating that his counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
(7) 
It is manifest on the face of Rogers’ opening brief that this 
appeal is without merit.  The issues presented on appeal clearly are 
controlled by settled Delaware law.  To the extent judicial discretion is 
implicated, there was no abuse of discretion. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
4 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997).