Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE PARENTAL RIGHTS TO CH, A MINOR. TG v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES, Sherican, Wyoming

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-89-4

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-11-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE PARENTAL RIGHTS TO CH, A MINOR. TG v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES, Sherican, Wyoming1989 WY 209783 P.2d 155Case Number: C-89-4Decided: 11/27/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
PARENTAL RIGHTS TO CH, A MINOR. TG, APPELLANT (RESPONDENT),

v.

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES, SHERIDAN, WYOMING, APPELLEE (PETITIONER). No. 
C-89-4

Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

Clay B. Jenkins 
of Badley & Rasmussen, P.C., Sheridan, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Richard E. Dixon, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Thomas C. 
Wilson, Sheridan, guardian ad litem.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This case is added to 
the rapidly increasing storehouse of Wyoming family tragedy case law. We address a 
jury verdict termination of the mother's parental rights for CH, her 
fourteen-year-old daughter, who was one of four children in the 
family.

[¶2.]     This court joins 
counsel, trial court and the jury in overwhelming concern about the present 
welfare and future well-being of this teenage person. Appellant's counsel, in 
behalf of ethical, moral and legal responsibilities, thoughtfully and 
comprehensively challenges certain jury instructions. The State, in response, 
rejects contended error in instruction text and alternatively argues harmless 
error. We affirm the termination decision.

[¶3.]     No manifest issue is 
presented which challenges sufficiency of the evidence for the jury verdict. 
Consequently, minimal discussion of the events of observed tragedy to all 
participants will be related.

[¶4.]     Contact and involvement 
of the Sheridan County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services 
(D-PASS) commenced in January 1987 involving child abuse of not only CH, the 
subject of this appeal, but also the other children in the family which 
consisted of an older (apparently retarded) sister and older twin boys. After 
initial involvement, attempted placement, rehabilitative efforts, and counseling 
were pursued without success until December 21, 1988 when this proceeding was 
instituted upon the recommendation of the medical authorities and decision of 
the D-PASS personnel. The administrative determination was made for a basis of 
termination that family rehabilitation had failed. The twin brothers were in 
agency custody in a foster home arrangement and the older sister was with her 
natural father in Texas.

[¶5.]     Appellate issues were 
created when, during trial, the deliberating jury sent a message to the trial 
court questioning:

(1) Judge, May we have a 
more specific definition of the term "family" in point number three that we are 
being asked to determine. Does family refer to [mother] herself, [mother] and 
[CH], or the family as a whole?

(2) When parental rights 
are terminated, are the child's rights also terminated? Could [CH] contact her 
mother if she chose to do so? What is the age [CH] must attain before these 
decisions are hers alone to make?

The trial court 
answered the questions by Instruction No. 12, "[i]n answer to your first 
question, the term `Family' as it relates to question number 3 refers to 
[mother] only," and Instruction No. 13, "[t]he answer to your question number 2 
[is] not pertinent to your decision in this case. Answer questions number 1, 2 
and 3 on the Verdict Form based upon the instructions given you and the evidence 
presented at trial." Neither of the subjects addressed by the jury have 
previously been considered by this court.

[¶6.]     We are unable to tell 
whether the trial court's answer to the first question as provided in 
Instruction No. 12 was intended to provide to the jury a statement of law or 
adaptation of the trial evidence facts. At trial, the older sister was in 
Texas, the absent stepfather was in South Dakota, the twins were in foster care in another 
Wyoming county, and only the mother remained in 
SheridanCounty. Consequently, it 
could be concluded the mother and CH, the daughter, were then the entire family 
for involvement in the SheridanCounty termination proceeding. This 
constitutional analysis is not beyond argument in terms of the modern diffused 
state of many families.

[¶7.]     If the answer was 
intended to determine the law, it was in error. We do not confine the explicit 
statutory language to apply only to the mother if the family does include other 
members in addition to one child and one parent, within the terminology of W.S. 
14-2-309(a)(iii), which states as a ground for 
termination:

The child has been abused 
or neglected by the parent, and efforts by an authorized agency or mental health 
professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family or the family has refused rehabilitative 
treatment, and it is shown that the child's health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the parent.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶8.]     We could also agree 
with appellant that the current and explicit statutory changes also provide 
legislatively adopted answers to the second jury inquiry 
question.

[¶9.]     Appellant 
argues:

A new statute has been 
added to the termination act explicitly stating the effects of a termination 
order.

An order terminating the 
parent-child relationship divests the parent and the child of all legal rights, 
privileges, duties of support obligations with respect to each other except the 
right of the child to inherit from the parent shall not be effected by the 
order. Wyoming Statute § 14-2-317, emphasis supplied.

[¶10.]  Clearly, the legislature intended a 
change in the termination act. Two law review articles bracket these changes and 
note the Legislature's tightening of the standard for termination. See 
Termination of Parental Rights: Establishing Standards for the Wyoming Law, Sid Moller, XVILand and 
Water Review, No. 1, 1981, p. 295; and Family Law - Wyoming's New Termination of Parental Rights Statute, 
Becky Klempt, XVIILand and Water Review, No. 
2 1981, p. 621. The changes relevant to the court's answers to the jury's 
questions are:

OLD ACT                                                                               
NEW ACT

ELEMENTS OF 
PROOF

1. Parent abuses 
or neglects;                                  
1. Child abused or neglected by and 

parent; and

2. Termination in child's 
best                       
2. Failed efforts to rehabilitate interest. "the family" or refusal of 
rehabilitation by "the family;" 
and

3. Child's health and 
safety seriously jeopardized by return to the parent.

EFFECT OF 
ORDER

Order terminates 
the right of                                    
All rights, both of parent and 

the parents to 
the child. W.S.                                   
child are terminated except for 

1978 Cumm.Supp. 
§ 14-2-301(a),             
the child's right of inheritance. 

306(a), 
307(a)

(Emphasis in 
original.)

[¶11.]  Having recognized the technical accuracy 
of appellant's argument,1 we then analyze whether reversal in 
this well-founded jury verdict would also be either justified or required where 
sufficiency of the evidence is not presented as an issue for appeal. Matter of 
TR, 777 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1989). Cf. In Interest of J.G., 742 P.2d 770 (Wyo. 
1987).

[¶12.]  The relevance of an answer to the second 
jury inquiry will not be resolved here. The proper place to determine 
requirement and propriety of the instruction would have been at the 
pre-submission jury instruction conference. We hold that in the absence of a 
request at that time, appellant was not entitled to require supplementation 
during jury deliberation. Finding no absence of exercised discretion on a 
question clearly not central to the jury's decision of the welfare of CH, we 
find no reversible trial error. Britton v. State, 643 P.2d 935 (Wyo. 1982). The problems 
we perceive with the first supplementing instruction was either the trial court 
made a jury question finding of fact as to what encompassed the "family," or 
made a legal decision in error to only include the mother in the statutory 
term.

[¶13.]  In analysis of reversible error argument 
involving jury instructions, it is necessary to relate the questioned decision 
to the trial sequence. Generally, final consideration is given to instructions 
at the trial time conference just prior to the trial court's reading of those 
instructions to the jury and counsel's final argument.2 The office of jury instructions in 
the trial and the procedure for adaptation and presentation is well-settled in 
Wyoming case 
law.

[¶14.]  When the evidence to a fact is positive 
and not disputed or questioned, it ought to be taken as an established fact and 
the charge of the court should proceed upon this basis. Kahn v. Traders Ins. 
Co., 4 Wyo. 
419, 455 (1893). If an instruction is requested and cannot properly be given 
without modification, the judge may for that reason refuse to give it because to 
entitle it to be given, it must be wholly correct in point of law. Mere 
non-direction, partial or total, is not grounds for a new trial unless specific 
instructions, good in point of law and appropriate to the evidence, are 
requested and refused. Hay, Executor, Etc. v. Peterson, 6 Wyo. 419, 440, 45 P. 1073 
(1896). "Both parties [are] entitled to proper instructions covering their 
respective theories regarding the evidence submitted, and, it [is], of course, 
for the jury then to determine the issue." Barber v. Sheridan Trust & Savings Bank, 53 Wyo. 65, 88, 78 P.2d 1101 
(1938).

[¶15.]  In synthesis of additional principles 
relating to review of claimed error in jury instructions, this court said: 

It is 
insufficient for the litigant in objection to merely state that the instruction 
is not complete or an accurate statement of the law. Runnion v. Kitts, 531 P.2d 1307 (Wyo. 
1975). * * *

Error may not be assigned 
unless objection has been made thereto with a distinct statement of the matter 
to which objection is made and the grounds for this objection, and indicating 
with definiteness and particularity the error asserted, * * 
*.

Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co. v. Robles, 511 P.2d 963, 968 (Wyo. 1973).

"In reviewing alleged 
errors in jury instructions, a finding of error is not alone sufficient to 
reverse; prejudicial error must be found. Walton v. Texasgulf, Inc., Wyo., 634 P.2d 908 
(1981). Prejudicial error is never presumed; it must be established by the 
parties. * * *."

Goggins v. 
Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1292 (Wyo. 1985) 
(quoting from Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Wyo. 
1983)).

In order to hold an 
improper instruction reversible, the record must show that substantial rights 
were affected. Rule 7.04, W.R.A.P. For an error to be harmful, there must be a 
reasonable possibility that, in the absence of error, the verdict might have 
been more favorable to a party, and the burden is on the appellant to show where 
the error is prejudicial. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925 (1981). Merely showing an 
error occurred does not create a presumption of prejudice as injury to an 
appellant. Anderson v. Bauer, Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316 
(1984).

Condict [v. Whitehead, 
Zunker, Gage, Davidson & Shotwell, P.C.], 743 P.2d [880] at 885 [(Wyo. 
1987)].

Hashimoto v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 162 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶16.]  Inevitably, the consideration of the 
function of the jury instruction, whether couched in terms of plain error, 
harmless error or lack of prejudice, was "to give the jury guidance in reference 
to the law of the case to assist it in arriving at correct conclusions." Hursh 
Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, Inc., 664 P.2d 27, 32 (Wyo. 1983). Within the 
axiom that litigation must end some day from which the concept of harmless error 
is extrapolated, the second criteria of instruction review is that "prejudice 
will not be said to result unless it is demonstrated that the instruction 
confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of law." 
DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 186 (Wyo. 1986). See also Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶17.]  Consequently, in synthesis there is (a) 
waiver if objection is not taken or request is not made, Alberts v. State, 642 P.2d 447 (Wyo. 1982); Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Robles, 511 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 
1973); (b) proper rejection if the instruction is substantively improper, Clarke 
v. Vandermeer, 740 P.2d 921 (Wyo. 1987); Schwager v. State, 589 P.2d 1303 (Wyo. 
1979); and then (c) if no waiver and rejection was improper, final question 
whether prejudice exists in the text of the instruction in misleading or 
misinforming the jury for its decision in that case, MacManus v. Getter Trucking 
Co., 384 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1963).3

[¶18.]  A clear differentiation must be discerned 
between the initial jury instruction conference culminating in the body of law 
initially given to the jury for decision and later inquiries made during the 
jury deliberation. This rationale in difference is a subject which apparently 
has not previously been directly addressed by this court. Compare Johnston v. State, 747 P.2d 1132 (Wyo. 1987), where no 
objections were made to the supplemental instructions given by the trial court 
in response to the jury questions asked during 
deliberation.

[¶19.]  Absent the most unusual circumstances, 
trial court denial of further substantive instruction during the deliberative 
process will not constitute reversible error where either litigant objects to 
the text of any proposed specific additional statement. Britton, 643 P.2d 935. 
Conversely, if no objection is made, arguable error is waived. Scheikofsky v. 
State, 636 P.2d 1107 (Wyo. 1981). Cf. Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, reh'g denied 553 P.2d 1390 (Wyo. 1976), cert. denied 430 U.S. 956, 97 S. Ct. 1602, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1977) and Note, Absence of Counsel During 
Reinstruction of the Jury in a Criminal Proceeding. Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342 (Wyo. 1976), XIILand & Water L.Rev. 319 (1977). On the 
related subject of re-reading any portion of the transcript, discretion existed. 
Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Wyo. 
1987).

[¶20.]  The substantive instruction given on the 
issues of appeal includes:

INSTRUCTION NO. 
3

The State must prove by 
clear and convincing evidence each of the following 
elements:

1. That the child has 
been neglected by [mother] and

2. That the health and 
safety of the child would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with [mother], 
and

3. That efforts by an 
authorized agency

a. Have been unsuccessful 
in rehabilitating the family, or

b. The family has refused 
rehabilitative treatment.

If you find that the 
State has failed to prove any one of the above elements by clear and convincing 
evidence, the parental rights of [mother] will not be terminated. On the other 
hand, if you find that the State has proved all of the above elements by clear 
and convincing evidence, then the parental rights of [mother] will be 
terminated.

INSTRUCTION NO. 
6

"Termination of parental 
rights" means that all legal rights, privileges, duties, and support obligations 
are forever ended. If you find that the parental rights of [mother] should be 
terminated, it means that she will no longer have any legal rights to her child, 
[CH].

[¶21.]  No objection was taken to these 
instructions and no other instructions on the same subject were offered by 
appellant and either accepted or refused by the trial court before jury 
deliberations started. The issues requiring resolution by the jury were 
adequately addressed and when given without objection, became the law of the 
case. Saldana v. State, 685 P.2d 20 (Wyo. 
1984), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1103, 105 S. Ct. 2331, 85 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1985).

[¶22.]  We recognize a jury could develop a 
logical interest in the definition of terms and the meaning of its decision and 
particularly so in a case so highly charged with emotion as termination of 
parental rights. The fact that the jury has an interest does not mean the trial 
court is required to reopen the instructing process to answer the questions 
submitted to it. Factors of undue influence and confusion may obviously be 
presented. State v. Skinovich, 40 Wyo. 174, 276 P. 172 (1929). See Chambers v. 
State, 726 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1986). Unless singular error existed in 
the initial instructions, the trial court's denial of further instruction is 
discretionary. Additionally, we find the definition of a family as emplaced in 
the trial process to be harmless and without prejudice to a proper and just 
decision by a jury in the case considering the comprehensive and persuasive 
evidence presented relating to the issue to be resolved by the jury. A basis for 
reversal of the obviously factually justified jury decision is not now 
presented.4

[¶23.]  Affirmed. No costs 
awarded.

FOOTNOTES

1 The more fundamental 
question implicit in the jury inquiry involves rights of the child upon 
adulthood to restore relationships with the terminated parent which requires 
information from confidential files as well as, in a case such as this, 
maintenance of contact, even if adopted, with brothers and sisters and perhaps 
grandparents following the termination. These issues now raging among family 
care experts and social scientists as well as adoption agencies permit no easy 
answer. The array of circumstances presented surely denies any dogmatic concept 
by court created boundaries.

2 W.R.C.P. 51, of which 
the second paragraph is similar to but not identical with F.R.C.P. 51, 
states:

At any time before or 
during the taking of evidence, the court may give to the jury such general 
instructions as to the duties and functions of the court and jury, and the 
manner of conducting the trial, as it may deem desirable to assist the jury in 
performing its functions. Such instructions, exclusive of rulings which are 
recorded by the court reporter for inclusion in any record, shall be reduced to 
writing, numbered and delivered to the jury with the other instructions and 
shall be a part of the record in the case.

At the close of the 
evidence, or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably 
directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on 
the law as set forth in the requests. A direction by the court that requests be 
filed prior to the close of the evidence shall not preclude any party from 
filing any subsequent request necessitated by the evidence and not reasonably 
anticipated by the party prior to the time of filing. Before the argument of the 
case to the jury is begun, the court shall give to the jury such instructions on 
the law as may be necessary and same shall be in writing, numbered and signed by 
the judge, and shall be taken by the jury when it retires. No party may assign 
as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects 
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the 
matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make any such objection out 
of the hearing of the jury. All instructions offered by the parties, or given by 
the court, shall be filed with the clerk and, with the endorsements thereon 
indicating the action of the court, shall be a part of the record of the 
cause.

3 Superimposed on the 
concepts of error in instructions is the plain error rule, see Goggins v. 
Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282 (Wyo. 1985). Plain error cannot appropriately 
be applied under the circumstances involved in this termination case to any 
waiver question at instruction conference and did not occur during mid-trial 
since specific objection was taken by appellant. Cf. Johnston v. State, 747 P.2d 1132 (Wyo. 
1987).

4 Family rehabilitation 
efforts and familial cohesion fell apart in May 1988 when appellant suddenly 
left Sheridan at 
about the time CH was to return to her custody and did not return to the 
jurisdiction until November. In departing for Texas, appellant told CH she would again see 
her "some time in 1990 or whenever." Practical efforts for reconciliation 
between CH and appellant were thus permanently eroded even when appellant did 
return to Sheridan about six months later.