Case Title: State v. Claycomb

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC94526

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC94526 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
CHRISTOPHER C. CLAYCOMB, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CLINTON COUNTY 
The Honorable J. Bartley Spear, Jr., Judge 
 
Opinion issued June 30, 2015, and modified on the Court’s own motion August 4, 2015 
 
Christopher Claycomb appeals his conviction for felony criminal nonsupport 
under section 568.040.1  Mr. Claycomb argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
support a finding of guilt of criminal nonsupport because (1) the State failed to present 
any evidence of what constituted “adequate support” and (2) the State failed to prove that 
Mr. Claycomb did not provide adequate support by providing direct, in-kind support, 
such as food, clothing, medicine, or lodging. 
Although Mr. Claycomb did not file a motion for new trial or otherwise raise his 
sufficiency claim below, a claim that there is insufficient evidence to sustain a criminal 
conviction is preserved for review without regard to whether it was raised below.  Rule 
29.11(e)(2).     
                                              
1 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory citations refer to RSMo 2000. 
On the merits, this Court rejects Mr. Claycomb’s claim that the State presented no 
evidence as to what would constitute adequate support.  The State presented evidence that 
Mr. Claycomb provided no direct monetary support for his child during the relevant time 
period although subject to a child support order.  While a child support order is not 
conclusive evidence of what constitutes adequate support, it is some evidence of what is 
adequate.  Further, the provision of no support is evidence of inadequate support.   
This Court also rejects Mr. Claycomb’s argument that the State must present 
evidence of a lack of in-kind support in order to make a prima facie case of lack of 
support under section 568.040.  He cites no authority for the proposition that the State 
must prove a negative, and to so hold would be inconsistent with the long-settled 
principle that the State need not negate every inference of innocence to make a prima 
facie case.  While Mr. Claycomb was free to present evidence of adequate in-kind 
support, he presented no evidence that he provided any in-kind support, much less 
adequate in-kind support.  This Court affirms.   
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Mr. Claycomb and his wife had a son, T.C.  In 2004, the marriage was dissolved.  
The judgment of dissolution required that Mr. Claycomb pay child support in the amount 
of $247 per month.  On June 18, 2009, the State charged Mr. Claycomb with the class D 
felony of criminal nonsupport under section 568.040 because he:  
[K]nowingly failed to provide, without good cause, adequate food, 
clothing, lodging and adequate medical attention for his minor child, [T.C.], 
for whom [Mr. Claycomb] was legally obligated to provide such support, in 
that during said time [Mr. Claycomb] failed to pay any child support in 
each of six (6) individual months within the 12 month time period August 
 
3 
1, 2005 to July 31, 2006.  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At Mr. Claycomb’s bench trial, the State presented record evidence that, while Mr. 
Claycomb made the required child support payments for the first year after the 
dissolution, he stopped making payments from October 2005 until September 2006.  The 
ex-wife testified that T.C. lived with her during the 12-month period from August 1, 
2005, to July 31, 2006, and that Mr. Claycomb missed more than six monthly child 
support payments during that period.  The ex-wife also testified that Mr. Claycomb did 
not make any direct payments to her during that time though she believed he was able to 
do so, stating: 
Q. Now, during the time period from August 1st of 2005 to July 31st of 
2006 did the defendant pay you child support each month during that time 
period? 
 
A. No. 
 
Q. And did he, in fact, miss more than six months out of that 12-month time 
period? 
 
A. Yes. 
 
Q. And during that time period did he make any direct payments to you for 
any sort of food, clothing, or lodging for the minor child? 
 
A. No.  
 
Q. And are you aware of anything that would have prevented him -- either 
physically or mentally, during that time period of August 1st, 2005, to July 
31st, 2006, that would have prevented him from being able to pay you child 
support? 
 
A. No. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Claycomb testified in his own defense that he did not remember whether he 
 
4 
worked between August 2005 and July 2006 but thought that he worked construction.  
Mr. Claycomb testified that he also worked in a bar owned by his girlfriend but said he 
did not receive a wage for that work.  When asked about his child support payment 
history, Mr. Claycomb said that he “caught all that up” later in 2006 and was “paid up in 
full up until 2007 – July of 2007,” at which point he became unable to work because his 
“brain bled out” and he developed a seizure disorder.   
The records do reflect that, in September 2006, Mr. Claycomb made a $2,964 back 
payment that satisfied in full the payments he had missed during the 12-month period 
from August 1, 2005, to July 31, 2006.  But Mr. Claycomb admitted that he had missed 
payments during the time period set out in the information from August 2005 through 
July 2006: 
Q. And you stated that you paid your child support in full up until 2007; is 
that correct? 
 
A. Yes, ma’am. 
Q. And if the records reflect that you didn’t pay in full, are you stating that 
the – 
 
A. I got behind, but I caught all that up and I was paid in full. 
 
Q. So what you’re stating is there were months where you did not pay but 
you later paid? 
 
A. Yes, ma’am.    
 
Mr. Claycomb did not testify about any illness or injury that affected his ability to 
provide support during the August 2005 through July 2006 period during which the 
 
5 
information charged he had failed to support his child.2  Mr. Claycomb was not asked by 
the prosecution or by his own counsel whether he provided in-kind support, and the 
record is devoid of evidence that he did so.     
 
The trial court found Mr. Claycomb guilty of the class D felony of criminal 
nonsupport.  The trial court sentenced Mr. Claycomb to four years’ imprisonment, 
suspended execution of the sentence, and placed Mr. Claycomb on five years’ probation.  
Mr. Claycomb appeals.  Following an opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted 
transfer.  Mo. Const. art. V, § 10. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Mr. Claycomb argues that he did not need to raise his claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence below to preserve it or, alternatively, that a claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence to support the conviction always should be reviewed for plain error.               
Mr. Claycomb is correct that his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
conviction is preserved on appeal even if not raised or not timely raised in the trial court.  
Rule 29.11(e) is applicable in the circumstances of this case, a court-tried criminal case: 
[A] motion for new trial is not necessary to preserve any matter for 
appellate review. If a motion for new trial is filed, allegations of error to be 
preserved for appellate review must be included in a motion for new trial 
except for questions as to the following: … [t]he sufficiency of the evidence 
to sustain the conviction.  
 
(Emphasis added.)   To the extent that some decisions of the Missouri court of appeals 
incorrectly may be read to suggest that a sufficiency claim is not preserved (and, 
                                              
2 Although Mr. Claycomb says he later “caught up” his deficiency, this is not a defense as 
a child’s need for adequate food, clothing, housing and medicine is continuous and 
 
6 
therefore, could be reviewed only for plain error) if not included in a motion for new 
trial,3 they are overruled because they are inconsistent with Rule 29.11 and should no 
longer be followed.4  
Similarly, this Court long has held that sufficiency claims are considered on 
appeal even if not briefed or not properly briefed in the appellate courts.  See, e.g., State 
v. Withrow, 8 S.W.3d 75 (Mo. banc 1999).  To the extent that Withrow and similar cases 
have so held, they are correct.  But, to the extent that these courts reach this result by 
reasoning that an inadequately briefed claim of insufficiency of the evidence will be 
considered under plain error but that a court is mandated to find that it constitutes plain 
error, these cases unnecessarily convolute the review process.5 Sufficiency of the 
evidence is reviewed on the merits, not as plain error.  To the extent Withrow and other 
cases utilize a plain error analysis, they are no longer to be followed.  
In reviewing a claim that there was not sufficient evidence to sustain a criminal 
                                                                                                                                                  
cannot await a later “catching up.” 
3 Rule 29.11(d)(3) similarly provides in relevant part:  “In jury-tried cases, allegations of 
error to be preserved for appellate review must be included in a motion for new trial 
except for questions as to the following: … [t]he sufficiency of the evidence to sustain 
the conviction.”  No rule requires the filing of a motion for judgment of acquittal in a 
court-tried case.  Rule 27.07 provides for the filing of a motion for judgment of acquittal 
in a jury-tried case, although even then Rule 27.07(c) provides that the court may enter a 
judgment of acquittal on its own motion based on insufficiency of the evidence and that 
no motion for judgment of acquittal needs to be filed prior to the submission of the case 
in order for a defendant to seek a judgment of acquittal after the verdict. 
4 See, e.g., including but not limited to State v. Jones, 172 S.W.3d 448, 451 (Mo. App. 
2005) (jury trial), and State v. Dixon, 70 S.W.3d 540, 544 (Mo. App. 2002) (bench trial). 
5 See, e.g., including but not limited to State v. Self, 155 S.W.3d 756, 762-63 (Mo. banc 
2005) (applying Withrow and finding that the evidence was insufficient); State v. Whalen, 
49 S.W.3d 181, 184 (Mo. banc 2001) (accord); State v. McClunie, 438 S.W.2d 267, 268 
(Mo. 1969) (pre-Withrow case applying similar analysis). 
 
7 
conviction, this Court does not weigh the evidence but, rather, “accept[s] as true all 
evidence tending to prove guilt together with all reasonable inferences that support the 
verdict, and ignore[s] all contrary evidence and inferences.”  State v. Latall, 271 S.W.3d 
561, 566 (Mo. banc 2008); State v. Reed, 181 S.W.3d 567, 569 (Mo. banc 2006).  This 
Court “asks only whether there was sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact 
reasonably could have found the defendant guilty.”  Latall, 271 S.W.3d at 566. 
III. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT MR. CLAYCOMB’S 
CONVICTION 
 
“Every parent has a legal obligation to provide for his or her children regardless of 
the existence of a child support order.”  Reed, 181 S.W.3d at 570.  “Proof of the 
relationship of parent to child is sufficient to establish a prima facie basis for a legal 
obligation of support.”  Id.  Section 568.040 governs criminal nonsupport of that child.  
Section 568.040’s purpose “is to compel recalcitrant parents to fulfill their obligations of 
care and support; the purpose is not to enforce court-ordered child support obligations.”  
Id.  The version of section 568.040 in effect at the time of Mr. Claycomb’s offense stated:  
1.  
. . . [A] parent commits the crime of nonsupport if such parent 
knowingly fails to provide, without good cause, adequate support 
which such parent is legally obligated to provide for his child or 
stepchild who is not otherwise emancipated by operation of law. 
 
2.  
For purposes of this section: 
. . . . 
(3)  
“Support” means food, clothing, lodging, and medical or 
surgical attention; 
. . . . 
4.  
Criminal nonsupport is a class A misdemeanor, unless the person 
obligated to pay child support commits the crime of nonsupport in 
each of six individual months within any twelve-month period, or 
the total arrearage is in excess of five thousand dollars, in either of 
 
8 
which case it is a class D felony. 
 
Therefore, a parent commits the crime of nonsupport if he or she:  (1) knowingly fails to 
provide, (2) without good cause, (3) adequate support (4) that such parent is legally 
obligated to provide for his or her child or stepchild.   
 
Mr. Claycomb raises two related arguments challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting his conviction.  First, he asserts that the State failed to prove what 
constitutes adequate support under the statute because it failed to present evidence as to 
the amount of T.C.’s medical needs and the cost of T.C.’s necessary food, clothing and 
shelter.  Missouri law is well-settled that “a complete failure to pay child support is 
evidence of failure to pay adequate support.”  State v. Holmes, 399 S.W.3d 809, 815 (Mo. 
banc 2013);  accord, State v. Morovitz, 867 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Mo. banc 1993) (evidence 
regarding defendant’s failure to make decretal support payments for two years, while not 
conclusive of guilt, was relevant to question of legal obligation to pay support).  Further, 
while Mr. Claycomb is correct that “a child support order is not conclusive regarding 
what constitutes adequate support,” it is some evidence of what constitutes adequate 
support.  Holmes, 399 S.W.3d at 815.6  Here, the State presented evidence that             
                                              
6 Accord, State v. Reed, 181 S.W.3d 567, 570 (Mo. banc 2006) (“[T]he existence of a 
child support order is merely evidence of what constitutes ‘adequate support’”); State v. 
Sellers, 77 S.W.3d 2, 4-5 (Mo. App. 2002) (“[A] child support order provides some 
evidence of what is adequate support”; evidence defendant never provided direct 
financial support and only sporadically provided the children with in-kind help 
“constituted sufficient evidence that [the defendant] failed to provide adequate support to 
her children”); State v. Davis, 675 S.W.2d 410, 416 (Mo. App. 1984) (“Here the state 
proved [the defendant] didn’t provide a penny, but had financial assets well establishing 
his ability to support his son.  In addition the support order provided some evidence of 
what was ‘adequate’”). 
 
9 
Mr. Claycomb was under a child support order to pay support and that Mr. Claycomb 
completely failed to provide any financial support.  This was some evidence of what 
constitutes adequate support. 
Second, Mr. Claycomb argues that, even if the State proved that he failed to 
provide any direct monetary support and failed to make any of his required child support 
payments for the statutory period, the State was required to present additional evidence 
that he failed to provide adequate in-kind support.  In the absence of such evidence, he 
argues, the State failed to show criminal nonsupport under section 568.040.  The State 
counters that it did present evidence sufficient to make a prima facie case of felony 
criminal non-support.   
Section 568.040 makes the failure to support one’s child for six or more months in 
a 12-month period, although able to do so, a class D felony.  Mr. Claycomb was charged 
with failing to provide adequate support for his child during at least six of the 12 months 
between August 1, 2005, to July 31, 2006.  Here the State presented evidence that        
Mr. Claycomb was subject to a child-support order to pay $247.00 per month, that he 
paid $247 per month until September 2005, but that he failed to make any further child 
support payments or direct payments for the next 12 months.  Moreover, his ex-wife 
testified that Mr. Claycomb did not pay the mandated child support amount during this 
period and that he did not during that time period make any direct payments “for any sort 
of food, clothing, or lodging for the minor child.” 
Mr. Claycomb concedes that, through the above-noted evidence, the State proved 
that for a 10-month period that fell in the 12-month period of August 1, 2005, to July 31, 
 
10 
2006, he neither paid child support nor made direct monetary payments to his ex-wife for 
the support of T.C.  He implicitly acknowledges that if the only issue were monetary 
payments, the above evidence would be sufficient to make out a prima facie case on these 
facts.7  But he argues that this evidence was insufficient to make a prima facie case of 
criminal nonsupport here because the State also was required to present evidence that Mr. 
Claycomb did not provide in-kind support.  Mr. Claycomb argues that because no witness 
addressed the issue of in-kind support in their testimony, and neither party submitted 
record evidence regarding in-kind support, the State failed to present sufficient evidence 
to sustain a conviction for felony criminal nonsupport.  This Court disagrees.   
Although under section 568.040 the State “has the burden of proving every 
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” State v. Seeler, 316 S.W.3d 920, 925 
(Mo. banc 2010), Mr. Claycomb cites no cases, either in Missouri or elsewhere, placing 
the burden on the State to present evidence that negates the possibility that the defendant 
provided in-kind support in an amount constituting adequate support for the child.  In 
effect, Mr. Claycomb argues this Court should readopt the “equally valid inferences” rule 
under which, if the factfinder could draw two, equally valid inferences from the evidence, 
one consistent with guilt and the other with innocence, the State has failed to meet its 
burden of proof.  But this Court rejected the “equally valid inferences” rule in State v. 
Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 54 (Mo. banc 1998).  That case specifically holds that, to make a 
                                              
7 Had the evidence shown that Mr. Claycomb provided substantial monetary or other 
support for T.C. and the question was whether that support was adequate to meet the 
child’s needs, more specific evidence as to the child’s needs might well have been 
required.  
 
11 
prima facie case, the State does not have “an affirmative duty to disprove every 
reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.”  Id.  
In addition, it is self-evident that such a requirement would be unworkable.  
Requiring the State to present evidence of a negative – that a parent did not provide food 
or clothing on occasion, or quantifying when such support totals an amount adequate to 
meet a child’s needs – is unreasonable.  Knowledge about whether such in-kind support 
was provided most often would be in the hands of the parent charged with non-support.  
Indeed, the State would have difficulty locating evidence of in-kind support because, by 
its nature, it is not normally reflected in records and because the person most likely to be 
aware of it, the defendant, is not required to testify.  While, in some instances, the child 
may be old enough to testify or the other parent might be in a position to negate the 
provision of in-kind support, in other cases the child or other parent may not be in a 
position to know who provided what support or to accurately quantify that support.8   
Further, a child may not always be legally available to testify or might be subject to 
unnecessary distress by being required to testify against the child’s non-supportive 
parent.  Section 568.040 does not mandate such testimony in order for the State to make a 
prima facie case of criminal non-support.   
For these reasons, this Court holds that while evidence that the charged parent did 
provide in-kind support would be relevant and admissible, it is not the State’s burden to 
introduce it to make a prima facie case where, as here, the State presented evidence that 
                                              
8 Although Mr. Claycomb and his ex-wife testified here and could have been asked 
directly whether he provided in-kind support, that would not always be the case. 
 
12 
Mr. Claycomb failed to make any direct or child support payments.  This is not unjust, 
for evidence of in-kind support would be most available to the charged parent, while it 
would often be difficult or impossible for the State to prove a negative.   
Evidence was presented that Mr. Claycomb provided no monetary support of any 
kind during the charged time period.  While Mr. Claycomb would have been entitled to 
present evidence that he provided in-kind support that was adequate to meet T.C.’s needs, 
he failed to present any evidence of in-kind support at all.  While this Court agrees with 
Mr. Claycomb that it would have been simpler had the State simply asked T.C.’s mother 
or Mr. Claycomb whether he provided any in-kind support and, if so, how much, such an 
inquiry was not required in order for the State to make out its prima facie case.  The trial 
court, as the factfinder below, was entitled to draw an inference from the evidence 
presented that Mr. Claycomb failed to provide adequate support to T.C. for at least six of 
the 12 months specified in the information.    
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 29.11(e)(2)(C) provides that, to preserve a claim that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the conviction, a criminal defendant is not required to file a motion 
for new trial or to include a sufficiency claim in a motion for new trial if one is filed.  
Therefore, this Court reviews Mr. Claycomb’s claims on the merits.  But this Court 
rejects Mr. Claycomb’s argument that the State must show that a parent failed to provide 
adequate in-kind support for his child to make a prima facie case of criminal non-support.  
Here, the evidence was sufficient to show that Mr. Claycomb made no direct payments 
and failed to make court-ordered child support payments.  That was adequate to make a 
 
13 
prima facie case that Mr. Claycomb failed to provide adequate support for his child, T.C.  
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE 
 
 
Russell, C.J., Fischer, Wilson, JJ, concur;  
Breckenridge, J., concurs in part and dissents in  
part in separate opinion filed; Draper and Teitelman,  
JJ, concur in opinion of Breckenridge, J. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC94526 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
CHRISTOPHER C. CLAYCOMB, 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
  ) 
 
OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART  
 
 
I believe the majority opinion correctly states the proper standard of review for a 
claim that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction.  Accordingly, I concur in 
the majority opinion’s holdings that Christopher Claycomb’s claim that the evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction is preserved on appeal even if not timely raised in 
the trial court and that appellate courts are not mandated to find that insufficiency of the 
evidence constitutes plain error.  I respectfully dissent, however, from the holding of the 
majority opinion that there is sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Claycomb is guilty of 
the crime of felony criminal nonsupport, section 568.040.1  Under 568.040.1, “a parent 
commits the crime of nonsupport if such parent knowingly fails to provide adequate 
support which such parent is legally obligated to provide for his or her child or stepchild 
who is not otherwise emancipated by operation of law.”  The element of that crime at 
                                              
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo 2000. 
2 
 
issue in this case is the term “support.”  The definition of “support” is found in section 
568.040.2(1):  “‘Support’ means food, clothing, lodging, and medical or surgical 
attention.”2 
 
The majority opinion finds that there is sufficient evidence that Mr. Claycomb 
failed to provide adequate support.  In so holding, it finds sufficient testimony from      
Mr. Claycomb’s ex-wife, Jacqueline Green, that he did not pay child support for more 
than six of the 12 months from August 1, 2005, to July 31, 2006, and that he did not 
“make any direct payments to [her] for any sort of food, clothing, or lodging for the 
minor child support” to her during that time period.   Mr. Claycomb admitted during his 
testimony that he missed child support payments during that 12-month time period, 
which he later paid in full.  Neither Ms. Green nor Mr. Claycomb was asked whether    
Mr. Claycomb provided any in-kind support of food, clothing, lodging or medical or 
surgical attention.   
The majority finds that failure to provide monetary support is sufficient to support 
a conviction of criminal nonsupport because the state is not required to show the 
defendant failed to provide in-kind support.  I respectfully disagree.  In interpreting 
statutes, this Court considers the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used.  State 
v. Moore, 303 S.W.3d 515, 520 (Mo. banc 2010).  Section 568.040.2(1) defines “support” 
as “food, clothing, lodging, and medical or surgical attention.”  Courts recognize that this 
“support” may be monetary in form.  See State v. Holmes, 399 S.W.3d 809, 815 (Mo. 
banc 2013); State v. Sellers, 77 S.W.3d 2, 5 (Mo. App. 2002); State v. Davis, 675 S.W.2d 
                                              
2 Under the current version of 568.040.2, RSMo Supp. 2013, “support” is defined in 
subdivision three, but the definition remains the same.   
3 
 
410, 416 (Mo. App. 1984).  Section 568.040.2(1), however, does not limit “support” to 
direct monetary payments.    A parent’s provision of in-kind support, such as actual food 
or clothing, falls squarely within the statutory definition of “support.”  Section 
568.040.2(1).   
The state has the burden to prove each and every element of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  State v. Seeler, 316 S.W.3d 920, 925 (Mo. banc 2010).  In this case, 
the state was required to prove Mr. Claycomb failed to provide support, which includes 
in-kind support.  See section 568.040.  While it is clear Mr. Claycomb did not provide 
monetary support, the record is devoid of evidence showing Mr. Claycomb failed to 
provide any in-kind support.  The majority opinion finds that requiring the state to 
present evidence of a negative – Mr. Claycomb’s failure to provide in-kind support – is 
unreasonable.  The crime of felony nonsupport requires the state to prove a negative – the 
failure to provide support.  Id.  The state showed Mr. Claycomb failed to provide 
monetary support, in part, by asking Mr. Claycomb and Ms. Green whether                   
Mr. Claycomb had paid all of his child support due between August 1, 2005, and July 31, 
2006.3  The state likely could have met its burden of proving Mr. Claycomb’s failure to 
provide in-kind support by asking Ms. Green whether Mr. Claycomb gave Ms. Green, or 
provided the children directly, food, clothing, lodging, and medical or surgical care 
during that time. 
Requiring proof that Mr. Claycomb did not provide in-kind support does not place 
a duty on the state to disprove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.  It merely 
                                              
3 The state also admitted into evidence documents showing Mr. Claycomb’s child support 
payment history. 
4 
 
requires the state to meet its burden of proving every element of a crime, including       
Mr. Claycomb’s failure to provide adequate support as defined by section 568.040.2(1).  
For these reasons, I would find there is insufficient evidence to find Mr. Claycomb guilty 
of criminal nonsupport and would reverse his conviction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE