Case Title: State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Attorney Gen.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 234A13

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2014-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. COA12-1579 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed:  3 September 2013 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
Orange County 
No. 11 CRS 51604 
 
 
DOROTHY HOOGLAND VERKERK 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 7 September 2012 
by Judge A. Robinson Hassell in Orange County Superior Court.  
Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 May 2013. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Lauren D. Tally, for the State.  
 
Law Office of Matthew Charles Suczynski, PLLC, by Matthew 
C. Suczynski and Michael R. Paduchowski, for Defendant-
appellant. 
 
 
ERVIN, Judge. 
 
 
Defendant Dorothy Hoogland Verkerk appeals from a judgment 
sentencing her to a term of 24 months imprisonment and 
suspending that sentence for a period of 18 months on the 
condition that she serve an active term of 30 days imprisonment, 
be on supervised probation for a period of 18 months, comply 
with the usual terms and conditions of probation, pay a 
$1,000.00 fine and the costs, perform 72 hours of community 
service, and not drive until properly licensed to do so based 
-2- 
upon her conviction for driving while impaired.  On appeal, 
Defendant argues that Judge Elaine Bushfan erred by denying her 
motion to suppress evidence that she contends was obtained as 
the result of an unconstitutional vehicle stop performed by 
Lieutenant Gordon Shatley of the Chapel Hill Fire Department.  
After careful consideration of Defendant’s challenges to the 
trial court’s judgment in light of the record and the applicable 
law, we conclude that Defendant’s conviction must be vacated and 
that this case must be remanded to the Orange County Superior 
Court for the entry of a new order containing findings of fact 
and conclusions of law that adequately address the issues raised 
by Defendant’s suppression motion. 
I. Factual Background 
A. Substantive Facts 
At around 10:30 p.m. on 27 May 2011, Lieutenant Shatley was 
dispatched to 1512 East Franklin Street in Chapel Hill in 
response to a fire alarm.  At the time that Lieutenant Shatley’s 
fire engine stopped at the intersection of Estes Drive and 
Fordham 
Boulevard, 
he 
noticed 
a 
light-colored 
Mercedes 
approaching the intersection on his left.  Although there was a 
“pouring downpour,” the headlights on the Mercedes were not on.  
Instead, the Mercedes was illuminated solely by an interior dome 
light and auxiliary front lights.  A window in the Mercedes was 
-3- 
partially down despite the rain, and the vehicle was stopped 
partway into the intersection, “further out into the road than 
you would normally stop at a stoplight.” 
After the traffic light turned green, Lieutenant Shatley’s 
fire engine continued on its way to the location associated with 
the fire alarm.  Upon arriving at the location to which he had 
been dispatched, Lieutenant Shatley learned that another fire 
engine had already responded to the call and that he could 
return to the fire station.  As he drove back towards the fire 
station along Fordham Boulevard, Lieutenant Shatley saw the same 
Mercedes ahead of him.  An amber light, which appeared to be 
either a turn signal or a hazard light, on the vehicle was 
flashing.  Although the Mercedes did not appear to be moving at 
the time that he first saw it, Lieutenant Shatley observed as 
the fire engine drew closer that was it proceeding at 
approximately 30 m.p.h., some fifteen miles per hour below the 
posted speed limit of 45 m.p.h.  In addition, the Mercedes 
repeatedly weaved over the center line before moving to the far 
right fog line.  After making these observations, Lieutenant 
Shatley radioed police communications, reported that he was 
following a possibly impaired driver, and provided his location 
and a description of the vehicle in question. 
-4- 
After the Mercedes exited onto Raleigh Road, which was the 
same direction that the fire engine needed to go in order to 
return to the station, Lieutenant Shatley followed it.  As it 
entered the ramp leading to Raleigh Road, the Mercedes drove out 
of its lane and onto an area marked “not for traffic.”  Upon 
entering Raleigh Road, the Mercedes got into the center lane; 
however, it continued to weave in and out of its lane of travel.  
As Lieutenant Shatley followed the Mercedes, he observed that, 
upon approaching an intersection simultaneously with a passing 
bus, the Mercedes drifted into the bus’ lane of travel and came 
within three feet of hitting it.  At an intersection, Lieutenant 
Shatley made another call to report the location of a possibly 
impaired driver. 
As the Mercedes continued to weave in and out of its lane 
of travel and other vehicles were passing both the fire truck 
and the Mercedes, Lieutenant Shatley instructed the fire truck’s 
driver to activate the vehicle’s red lights.  Lieutenant Shatley 
did not order that this action be taken in order to effectuate a 
“traffic stop;” instead, Lieutenant Shatley acted in this manner 
in the hope that other cars would stop passing them.  Lieutenant 
Shatley testified that, if the car had not stopped, he intended 
to continue following it and providing police communications 
with additional updates concerning the vehicle’s location. 
-5- 
At the time that Lieutenant Shatley activated the fire 
engine’s red lights and tapped the siren twice, the Mercedes 
drifted to the right in an abrupt manner and hit the gutter 
curbing with sufficient force that sparks resulted from the 
contact that the rim of the Mercedes made with the curbing 
before coming to a stop.  Once the fire truck had stopped behind 
the Mercedes, Lieutenant Shatley called police communications to 
report the vehicle’s location and then spoke with Defendant, who 
was driving the Mercedes.  Lieutenant Shatley did not ask 
Defendant if she had been drinking or request that she perform 
field sobriety tests.  However, when Defendant asked why he had 
stopped her, Lieutenant Shatley explained that he was “concerned 
because of her driving” and “just wanted to make sure she was 
okay.” 
After speaking with Defendant for a few minutes without 
hearing anything from the Chapel Hill Police Department, 
Lieutenant Shatley, who had intended to ask one of the assistant 
firefighters to park Defendant’s car, inquired of Defendant as 
to whether she would be willing to park her car and have someone 
pick her up.  Although Defendant agreed to this request, she 
then “drove off” while Lieutenant Shatley “just stood there” and 
watched as she turned onto Environ Way, a side street to the 
right of Raleigh Road. 
-6- 
Shortly after Defendant drove off, officers of the Chapel 
Hill Police Department arrived on the scene.  Lieutenant Shatley 
reported the observations that he had made about Defendant’s 
driving and pointed out her vehicle to investigating officers.  
Upon 
receiving 
the 
information 
which 
Lieutenant 
Shatley 
provided, officers of the Chapel Hill Police Department pursued 
Defendant and stopped her vehicle.  In the meantime, Lieutenant 
Shatley left the scene and returned to the fire station.  To the 
best of Lieutenant Shatley’s recollection, about “ten minutes 
maybe” had elapsed between the time he activated his red lights 
and the time at which officers of the Chapel Hill Police 
Department arrived. 
B. Procedural History 
On 27 May 2011, a citation charging Defendant with driving 
while impaired and driving while license revoked was issued.  On 
10 January 2012, Judge Lunsford Long found Defendant guilty of 
driving while impaired and entered a judgment imposing a Level I 
punishment.  On 19 January 2012, Defendant noted an appeal to 
the Orange County Superior Court for a trial de novo. 
On 23 July 2012, Defendant filed a motion seeking to have 
any evidence obtained as a result of the stopping of her vehicle 
suppressed.  A hearing on Defendant’s suppression motion was 
-7- 
held before Judge Bushfan on 2 August 2012.1  On 23 August 2012, 
Judge Bushfan entered an order denying Defendant’s suppression 
motion on the grounds that (1) the stopping of Defendant’s 
Mercedes did not constitute a seizure for Fourth Amendment 
purposes; (2) in the alternative, if the stopping of Defendant’s 
vehicle constituted a seizure, it represented a lawful detention 
by a private citizen as authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
404(b); and (3) in the alternative, if the stop of Defendant’s 
car constituted a seizure that was not authorized by N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 15A-404, the seizure in question was neither a violation 
of Defendant’s constitutional rights nor the result of a 
substantial violation of any provision of Chapter 15A of the 
North Carolina General Statutes. 
On 7 September 2012, Defendant entered a negotiated plea of 
guilty to driving while impaired and stipulated that she was 
subject to Level I punishment on the understanding that the 
State would voluntarily dismiss the driving while license 
revoked charge and that sentencing would be in the discretion of 
                     
1At the hearing concerning Defendant’s suppression motion, 
the State rested after offering Lieutenant Shatley’s testimony 
and Defendant refrained from presenting any evidence.  At the 
time that the State rested, the prosecutor informed Judge 
Bushfan that, while he had other witnesses available, he 
believed that Lieutenant Shatley’s testimony sufficed to support 
the denial of Defendant’s suppression motion and had decided to 
rely on his testimony without supplementation by the testimony 
of other witnesses for that purpose. 
-8- 
the court.  In the transcript of plea which embodied her plea 
agreement, Defendant specifically reserved the right to seek 
appellate review of the denial of her suppression motion.  After 
accepting Defendant’s plea, the trial court entered a judgment 
sentencing Defendant to a term of 24 months imprisonment and 
suspending that sentence for a term of 18 months on the 
condition that Defendant serve an active term of 30 days 
imprisonment, be subject to supervised probation for a period of 
18 months, pay a $1,000.00 fine and the costs, comply with the 
usual terms and conditions of probation, perform 72 hours of 
community service, and not drive until properly licensed to do 
so.  Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial 
court’s judgment. 
II. Legal Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
“The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a 
motion to suppress is whether competent evidence supports the 
trial court’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact 
support the conclusions of law.”  State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 
167-68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (citing State v. Brooks, 337 
N.C. 132, 140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994)).  “When findings 
of fact are not challenged on appeal, ‘such findings are 
presumed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding 
-9- 
on appeal.’”  State v. Washington, 193 N.C. App. 670, 672, 668 
S.E.2d 622, 624 (2008) (quoting State v. Baker, 312 N.C. 34, 37, 
320 S.E.2d 670, 673 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)), 
disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 138, 674 S.E.2d 420 (2009).  
“Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are subject to full 
review.  Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter 
anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the 
lower tribunal.”  State v. Cathcart, __ N.C. App __, __, 742 
S.E.2d 321, 323 (2013) (quoting Biber, 365 N.C. at 168, 712 
S.E.2d at 878 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).  
“‘[T]he trial court’s conclusions of law must be legally 
correct, reflecting a correct application of applicable legal 
principles to the facts found.’”  State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 
364, 409, 533 S.E.2d 168, 201 (2000) (quoting State v. 
Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 11, 484 S.E.2d 350, 357 (1997)), cert. 
denied, 532 U.S. 931, 121 S. Ct. 1379, 149 L. Ed. 2d 305 (2001).  
As a result, when “the trial court mistakenly applies an 
incorrect legal standard in determining whether a defendant’s 
constitutional rights have been violated for purposes of a 
motion to suppress, the appellate court must remand the matter 
to the trial court for a ‘redetermination’ under the proper 
standard.”  State v. Williams, 195 N.C. App. 554, 561, 673 
-10- 
S.E.2d 394, 399 (2009) (quoting State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 
339-40, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (2001)). 
B. Seizure 
“Both the United States and North Carolina Constitutions 
protect against unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. 
amend. IV; N.C. Const. art. I, § 20.  Although potentially brief 
and limited in scope, a traffic stop is considered a ‘seizure’ 
within the meaning of these provisions.”  State v. Otto, 366 
N.C. 134, 136-37, 726 S.E.2d 824, 827 (2012) (citing Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L. Ed. 2d 
660, 667 (1979)).  “Traffic stops have ‘been historically 
reviewed under the investigatory detention framework first 
articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. 
Ed. 2d 889 (1968).’”  State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414, 665 
S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008) (citation omitted).  For that reason, 
“reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic 
stops[.]”  Styles, 362 N.C. at 415, 665 S.E.2d at 440 (citations 
omitted).  “As articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Terry, the stop must be based on ‘specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant that intrusion.’”  Otto, 366 N.C. at 137, 726 
S.E.2d at 827 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, 
20 L. Ed. 2d at 906) (citations omitted).  “The only requirement 
-11- 
[for reasonable suspicion] is a minimal level of objective 
justification, 
something 
more 
than 
an 
‘unparticularized 
suspicion or hunch.’”  State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 442, 446 
S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 
1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 11 (1989) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  As a result of the fact 
that the record clearly reflects that Defendant stopped her 
Mercedes following activation of the flashing lights and siren 
with which the fire engine that Lieutenant Shatley commanded was 
equipped, we have no hesitation in concluding that, assuming 
that the other prerequisites for the application of the 
exclusionary rule exist, the stopping of Defendant’s car 
constituted a “seizure” for Fourth Amendment purposes and that 
the trial court erred by reaching a contrary conclusion.  Having 
made that determination, we must now address a number of other 
issues which are clearly present given the unusual set of facts 
which exist in this case.2 
                     
2The remainder of this opinion will focus upon Defendant’s 
constitutional challenge to the trial court’s order.  Although 
Defendant states on a number of occasions in her brief that her 
suppression motion should have been allowed pursuant to N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 15A-974(a)(2) (requiring the suppression of 
evidence obtained “as a result of a substantial violation of the 
provisions of this Chapter” committed in the absence of “an 
objectively reasonable good faith belief that the actions were 
lawful” considering “[t]he importance of the particular interest 
violated,” “[t]he extent of the deviation from lawful conduct,” 
“[t]he extent to which the violation was willful,” and “[t]he 
-12- 
C. Lieutenant Shatley’s Status 
“The Exclusionary Rule was established in Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383, [34 S. Ct. 341,] 58 L. Ed. 652 [] (1914), 
as applicable to federal law enforcement officials and was made 
binding on the states [and was overruled in part on other 
grounds] in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, [81 S. Ct. 1684,] 6 L. 
Ed. 2d 1081 [] (1961).  The Rule is a court-established remedy 
primarily for violation of the Fourth Amendment guarantee 
against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ and is designed to 
remedy police misconduct.”  State v. Stinson, 39 N.C. App. 313, 
316, 249 S.E.2d 891, 893, disc. review denied, 296 N.C. 739, 254 
S.E.2d 180 (1979).  “The fourth amendment as applied to the 
states through the fourteenth amendment protects citizens from 
unlawful searches and seizures committed by the government or 
its agents.  This protection does not extend to evidence secured 
by private searches, even if conducted illegally.  The party 
challenging admission of the evidence has the burden to show 
                                                                  
extent to which exclusion will tend to deter future violations 
of this Chapter”), she has failed to advance an argument that 
explains why any evidence obtained as a result of the stopping 
of her Mercedes should be suppressed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 15A-974(a)(2).  As a result, we conclude that Defendant has 
abandoned any contention to the effect that her suppression 
motion should have been allowed on the grounds that the evidence 
in question was obtained as a result of a substantial violation 
of Chapter 15A of the North Carolina General Statutes.  See 
N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (providing that “[i]ssues not presented 
in a party’s brief, or in support of which no reason or argument 
is stated, will be taken as abandoned”). 
-13- 
sufficient government involvement in the private citizen’s 
conduct to warrant fourth amendment scrutiny.”  State v. 
Sanders, 327 N.C. 319, 331, 395 S.E.2d 412, 420 (1990) (citing 
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 41 S. Ct. 574, 576, 65 
L. Ed. 1048, 1051 (1921), and United States v. Snowadzki, 723 
F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 839, 105 S. 
Ct. 140, 83 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1984)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1051, 
111 S. Ct. 763, 112 L. Ed.2d 782 (1991).  “When a private party 
has engaged in a search and has seized property or information, 
the protections of the fourth amendment apply only if the 
private party ‘in light of all the circumstances of the case, 
must be regarded as having acted as an instrument or agent of 
the State.’  Once a private search has been completed, 
subsequent involvement of government agents does not transform 
the original intrusion into a government search.”  State v. 
Kornegay, 313 N.C. 1, 10, 326 S.E.2d 881, 890 (1985) (quoting 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 
2048-49, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 595 (1971), abrogated in part on 
other grounds as stated in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 
110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990)), and citing United 
States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, 6 (9th Cir. 1976)). 
“[D]etermining whether a private citizen’s search or 
seizure is attributable to the State and therefore subject to 
-14- 
constitutional scrutiny demands a totality of the circumstances 
inquiry.  Factors to be given special consideration include the 
citizen’s motivation for the search or seizure, the degree of 
governmental 
involvement, 
such 
as 
advice, 
encouragement, 
knowledge about the nature of the citizen’s activities, and the 
legality of the conduct encouraged by the police.”  Sanders, 327 
N.C. at 334, 395 S.E.2d at 422.  “Where a search [or seizure] is 
conducted by a private citizen, but only after the government’s 
initiation and under their guidance, it is in reality a search 
by the sovereign, and is subject to the Fourth Amendment.”  
State v. Hauser, 115 N.C. App. 431, 436, 445 S.E.2d 73, 77 
(1994) (citing State v. Keadle, 51 N.C. App. 660, 663, 277 
S.E.2d 456, 459 (1981)), aff’d, 342 N.C. 382, 464 S.E.2d 443 
(1995). 
In Keadle, a university residence hall advisor found 
evidence of theft during an inspection of a student’s dormitory 
room.  The trial court granted the defendant’s suppression 
motion, ruling that the residence hall advisor “acted as an 
agent of the state in a quasi-law enforcement capacity when he 
conducted his search of defendant’s dorm room.”  Keadle, 51 N.C. 
App at 661, 277 S.E.2d at 458.  On appeal, this Court reversed 
the trial court’s decision, stating that: 
[W]here an unreasonable search is conducted 
by a governmental law enforcement agent, it 
-15- 
is subject to the restraints of the fourth 
amendment 
and 
the 
exclusionary 
rule.  
Moreover, where a search is conducted by a 
private 
citizen, 
but 
only 
at 
the 
government’s 
initiation 
and 
under 
their 
guidance, it is not a private search but 
becomes a search by the sovereign.  However, 
a search not so purely governmental must be 
judged according to the nature of the 
governmental participation in the search 
process.  In the instant case, we have one 
of those vague factual situations requiring 
that we look at all of the circumstances to 
assess 
the 
amount 
of 
governmental 
participation 
and 
involvement, 
if 
any, 
either 
through 
the 
resident 
advisor’s 
contact with the government as an employee 
of the University of North Carolina or 
through direct governmental initiation and 
guidance of the search procedure. . . .  
[T]here is no evidence that law enforcement 
officials had any part whatsoever in [the 
advisor’s] initial search of defendant’s 
room. . . .  As a resident advisor in a 
dormitory, he had neither the status nor the 
authority of a law enforcement officer.  It 
would 
serve 
no 
useful 
function 
as 
a 
deterrent to illegal governmental searches 
to apply the exclusionary rule in this 
instance. 
 
Keadle at 663-64, 277 S.E.2d at 459. 
Although Keadle is one of a relatively limited number of 
North Carolina cases that address the question of whether a 
state or local government employee who conducts what would 
otherwise be a search or seizure and who lacks law enforcement 
authority as a matter of state or local law is acting as a 
private citizen or as an arm of the State, the factors 
identified in Sanders and the manner in which those factors are 
-16- 
applied in Keadle are similar to the approach which has been 
taken in other jurisdictions in addressing issues of this 
nature.  For example, in United States v. Day, 591 F.3d 679, 683 
(4th Cir. 2010), the Court stated that 
First of all, under the applicable test, 
“[t]he defendant bears the burden of proving 
that an agency relationship exists” between 
the Government and the private individual. 
. . .  [The] “two primary factors” to be 
considered 
[are]: 
 
(1) 
“whether 
the 
Government knew of and acquiesced in the 
private” individual’s challenged conduct; 
and (2) “whether the private individual 
intended to assist law enforcement or had 
some other independent motivation.” 
 
(quoting United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1185, 124 S. Ct. 1457, 158 L. Ed. 
2d 90 (2004)) (internal citation omitted). 
A factual situation similar to this case was present in 
State v. Lavergne, 991 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 2008), cert. denied, 
1 So. 3d 494 (La. 2009), in which, after a volunteer firefighter 
stopped a suspected impaired driver, a state trooper arrived and 
arrested him.  In light of the defendant’s appeal from the 
denial of his suppression motion, the Louisiana Court of Appeals 
considered 
“[w]hether 
a 
Texas 
volunteer 
fireman 
who 
had 
activated emergency lights and sirens on his vehicle, who was 
reasonably believed to be a police officer, was acting under the 
color of state law when he stopped another vehicle.”  Lavergne, 
-17- 
991 So. 2d at 88.   The defendant argued, on the one hand, that, 
“by 
activating 
his 
emergency 
lights 
and 
sirens, 
[the 
firefighter] was acting under the color of state law when he 
stopped the defendant’s vehicle” and that, because the defendant 
“reasonably 
believed 
that 
[the 
firefighter] 
was 
a 
law 
enforcement official, [his] actions should be attributable to 
the state.”  Id.  The State, on the other hand, argued that the 
trial court had correctly ruled that the fireman was acting as a 
private citizen.  In addressing the parties’ arguments, the 
Court stated that: 
Useful criteria in determining whether an 
individual was acting as a private party or 
as an instrument or agent of the government 
are:  (1) whether the government knew of and 
acquiesced in the intrusive conduct; (2) 
whether 
the 
private 
party’s 
purpose 
in 
conducting the search was to assist law 
enforcement agents or to further its own 
ends; (3) whether the private actor acted at 
the request of the government; and (4) 
whether the government offered the private 
actor a reward. 
 
Lavergne at 89 (citing United States v. Ginglen, 467 F. 3d 1071, 
1074 (7th Cir. 2006)).  After engaging in the required analysis, 
the Court determined that the trial court had not erred by 
concluding that the firefighter “acted as a private citizen in 
this case” given that “there is no evidence that [he] acted 
under the instruction of law enforcement;” that his “possession 
and 
utilization 
of 
a 
siren 
and 
emergency 
lights, 
items 
-18- 
customarily used by police, did not automatically convert his 
actions to government actions;” and that the firefighter “stated 
that his primary motivation for stopping the defendant was not 
to assist law enforcement, but to prevent ‘an accident that was 
going to happen any second.’”  Id. 
A number of other decisions from other jurisdictions 
provide additional examples of the manner in which this basic 
principle has been applied in particular situations.  For 
example, in State v. Brittingham, 296 Kan. 597, 604, 294 P.3d 
263, 268 (2013), the Kansas Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether information obtained by a housing inspector who had 
observed the presence of drugs in an apartment should be 
suppressed.  In holding that the housing inspector was acting as 
a private citizen, the Court stated that: 
[The defendant] contends that our decision 
in [State v.] Smith, 243 Kan. 715, 763 P.2d 
632 [(1988)] . . . establishes that, in this 
State, any government employee is subject to 
the 
constitutional 
prohibition 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures any time 
that employee is acting within the scope of 
his or her employment. . . .  [However, 
Smith held] that a government employee will 
be treated like a private citizen for Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure purposes where 
the person was acting outside of the scope 
of the employee’s governmental duties and 
not at the instigation of or in collusion 
with other government officials or agents. 
 
-19- 
Similarly, in United States v. Verlin, 979 F. Supp. 1334 (1997), 
a civil process server observed illegal activity while on a 
hunting trip.  Although the defendant sought the entry of an 
order suppressing the evidence obtained by the process server, 
the trial court held that the process server, who had no 
authority to effectuate an arrest, search, or seizure, was 
acting as a private citizen: 
At 
the 
time 
he 
“seized” 
Verlin 
and 
“searched” Verlin’s property, Leihsing was 
not an agent of either the state or federal 
government.  . . .  The mere fact that the 
Kansas code of civil procedure permits a 
person such as Leihsing to serve, levy and 
execute process, does not mean that every 
act taken by that person, no matter when or 
where, is automatically an act which would 
implicate the Fourth Amendment. 
 
Verlin, 979 F. Supp. at 1337.  Thus, the extent to which a 
particular person is a governmental agent or a private person 
hinges 
upon 
a 
detailed 
factual 
analysis 
which 
carefully 
considers all relevant facts and circumstances. 
In his brief, Defendant argues that the trial court erred 
by ruling that, when Lieutenant Shatley used his fire engine’s 
red lights and siren to stop her car, he was not a “State 
actor.”  However, the trial court never directly decided this 
issue, even though it did state in one of its conclusions of law 
that: 
-20- 
If a vehicle seizure did occur, it was a 
lawful detention of the defendant pursuant 
to [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 15A-404(b), which 
allows 
any 
private 
citizen 
to 
“detain 
another person when he has probabl[e] cause 
to believe that the person detained has 
committed, in his presence:  (2) A breach of 
the peace[.]” 
 
Although the language in which this conclusion is couched 
suggests that the trial court believed that any seizure that 
resulted from Lieutenant Shatley’s conduct represented the act 
of a private citizen rather than that of a governmental actor, 
the trial court never explicitly determined Lieutenant Shatley’s 
status or made the findings necessary to conduct the required 
analysis.  More specifically, the trial court made no findings 
relating to (1) Lieutenant Shatley’s authority or lack thereof 
to effect a traffic stop; (2) the degree, if any, to which law 
enforcement officers asked or encouraged Lieutenant Shatley to 
stop Defendant or took any other action which had the effect of 
precipitating the stopping of Defendant’s vehicle; (3) whether 
Lieutenant Shatley stopped Defendant for law enforcement-related 
reasons or because he wanted to protect Defendant and the public 
from the consequences of her erratic driving; and (4) any other 
facts which bear on the question of whether Lieutenant Shatley 
acted as a private or governmental actor.  As a result, given 
that we believe that the trial court could resolve this issue in 
different ways based upon the findings of fact which it makes in 
-21- 
light of the credible record evidence, we conclude that the 
trial court’s judgment must be vacated and that this case must 
be remanded to the Orange County Superior Court for entry of a 
new order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law 
addressing the issues raised by Defendant’s suppression motion 
based upon an application of the proper legal standard.  If, 
after hearing any additional evidence that it deems necessary 
and making the necessary finding, the trial court concludes that 
Lieutenant Shatley acted as a private citizen rather than as a 
governmental agent at the time that Defendant’s vehicle was 
stopped, 
then 
the 
trial 
court 
should 
deny 
Defendant’s 
suppression motion and reinstate the trial court’s judgment.  On 
the other hand, if the trial court determines that Lieutenant 
Shatley was acting as a governmental agent at the time of the 
challenged traffic stop, the trial court should make additional 
findings and conclusions addressing the constitutionality of the 
stopping of Defendant’s vehicle on the basis of the criteria set 
out later in this opinion. 
Our dissenting colleague argues that this case need not be 
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings because “the 
trial court’s findings establish that [Lieutenant Shatley] was a 
state actor[.]”  According to our dissenting colleague, this 
determination is necessitated by the fact that Lieutenant 
-22- 
Shatley stopped Defendant “with the use of” the lights and 
sirens with which his fire engine was equipped and while he was 
on duty and wearing his firefighter’s uniform.  In reaching this 
conclusion, our dissenting colleague overlooks the fact that, 
under the relevant legal standard, the undisputed evidence 
indicates that Lieutenant Shatley’s decision to stop Defendant 
was made without any knowledge of or encouragement by the Chapel 
Hill Police Department or any other law enforcement agency and 
that the reason given by Lieutenant Shatley for stopping 
Defendant stemmed from his concern for the safety of Defendant 
and other drivers rather than out of a desire to apprehend 
Defendant and ensure that she was criminally charged.  Our 
research has not revealed the existence of any reported decision 
in this or any other jurisdiction holding that an individual was 
acting as a government agent for Fourth Amendment purposes based 
solely on the fact that lights and sirens present on official 
equipment were used, the fact that the individual in question 
was wearing a uniform, or the fact that the individual in 
question possessed other trappings of authority, such as a 
firearm or badge.  As a result, although we express no opinion 
as to the nature of the result that the trial court should reach 
on remand or the extent to which the trial court should hear 
additional evidence before making its decision, we do believe 
-23- 
that the trial court’s existing findings do not permit a proper 
resolution of the issue of whether Lieutenant Shatley was acting 
as a private person or a governmental actor and that further 
proceedings must be held in the trial court in order to permit a 
proper resolution of that issue. 
D. Constitutionality of the Stop of Defendant’s Vehicle 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects 
individuals 
against 
“unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  The United States Supreme 
Court has uniformly applied a reasonableness standard in 
determining 
whether 
a 
search 
or 
seizure 
conducted 
by 
a 
governmental actor passes constitutional muster, regardless of 
whether the individual in question is a sworn law enforcement 
officer.  In fact, according to clearly established federal 
constitutional law, the extent to which a governmental actor is 
statutorily authorized to conduct searches and seizures has no 
bearing on the required constitutional inquiry.  Instead, the 
constitutionality of all searches and seizures conducted by a 
governmental actor must be evaluated according to the applicable 
constitutional standard - the existence of probable cause for an 
arrest or the existence of reasonable articulable suspicion for 
an investigative detention. 
-24- 
For example, in Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 166, 128 
S. Ct. 1598, 1601, 170 L. Ed. 2d 559, 564 (2008), the United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
evaluated 
a 
challenge 
to 
the 
constitutionality of an arrest that was “based on probable cause 
but prohibited by state law.”  The Virginia courts had held 
that, since the officers in question lacked the authority to 
make the challenged arrest as a matter of state law, the seizure 
in question violated the Fourth Amendment.  In reversing the 
Virginia court’s decision, the United States Supreme Court noted 
that it had previously “concluded that whether state law 
authorized the search was irrelevant” and that “‘whether or not 
a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment’ . . . has never ‘depend[ed] on the law of the 
particular State in which the search occurs.’”  Moore, 553 U.S. 
at 171-72, 128 S. Ct. at 1604, 170 L. Ed. 2d at 568 (citing 
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61, 87 S. Ct. 788, 790, 17 L. 
Ed. 2d 730, 733 (1967), and quoting California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35, 43, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1630, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30, 39 (1988).  
In addition, the Court noted: 
We have applied the same principle in the 
seizure context.  Whren v. United States, 
517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 
89 (1996), held that police officers had 
acted reasonably in stopping a car, even 
though their action violated regulations 
limiting 
the 
authority 
of 
plainclothes 
officers in unmarked vehicles.  We thought 
-25- 
it 
obvious 
that 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment’s 
meaning did not change with local law 
enforcement practices-even practices set by 
rule. 
 
As a result, the Court held “that[,] while States are free to 
regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do 
not alter the Fourth Amendment’s protections,” Moore at 176, 128 
S. Ct. at 1607, 170 L. Ed. 2d at 570-71, and that, “[w]hen 
officers have probable cause to believe that a person has 
committed a crime in their presence, the Fourth Amendment 
permits them to make an arrest[.]”  Moore at 178, 128 S. Ct. at 
1608, 170 L. Ed. 2d at 571-72. 
More recently, in City of Ontario v. Quon, __ U.S. __, 130 
S. Ct. 2619, 177 L. Ed. 2d 216 (2010), the United States Supreme 
Court 
addressed 
the 
constitutional 
implications 
of 
“the 
assertion by a government employer of the right . . . to read 
text messages sent and received on a pager the employer owned 
and issued to an employee.”  Quon, __ U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 
2624, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 221.  In its opinion addressing that 
issue, the United States Supreme Court stated that: 
Respondents argue that the search was per se 
unreasonable in light of the Court of 
Appeals’ 
conclusion 
that 
Arch 
Wireless 
violated [18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., or the 
Stored Communications Act] by giving the 
City 
the 
transcripts 
of 
Quon’s 
text 
messages. . . .  [E]ven if the Court of 
Appeals was correct to conclude that the SCA 
forbade Arch Wireless from turning over the 
-26- 
transcripts, 
it 
does 
not 
follow 
that 
petitioners’ 
actions 
were 
unreasonable.  
Respondents point to no authority for the 
proposition that the existence of statutory 
protection 
renders 
a 
search 
per 
se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  
And the precedents counsel otherwise. 
 
Quon, __ U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2632, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 230 
(citing Moore and Greenwood).  This Court and the Supreme Court 
have reached the same essential conclusion concerning the 
relationship between the protections afforded by state law and 
those afforded by the Fourth Amendment.  For example, in State 
v. Gwyn, 103 N.C. App. 369, 371, 406 S.E.2d 145, 146, disc. 
review denied, 330 N.C. 199, 410 S.E.2d 498 (1991), this Court 
clearly stated that: 
Under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, [81 S. Ct. 
1684,] 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the test for 
suppressing evidence following an arrest is 
not the legality of the arrest, but whether 
the stop and search was unreasonable.  Our 
Supreme Court has stated that an illegal 
arrest 
is 
not 
necessarily 
an 
unconstitutional arrest, State v. Eubanks, 
283 N.C. 556, 196 S.E.2d 706 (1973), and in 
State v. Mangum, 30 N.C. App. 311, 226 
S.E.2d 
852 
(1976), 
we 
held 
that 
the 
defendant’s 
illegal 
arrest 
beyond 
the 
policeman’s territorial jurisdiction did not 
render the seizure and search unreasonable 
since the patrolman had probable cause. 
 
As 
a 
result, 
according 
to 
well-established 
federal 
constitutional 
law 
and 
our 
own 
controlling 
precedent, 
a 
determination that Lieutenant Shatley lacked the statutory 
-27- 
authority to stop Defendant’s vehicle does not have any bearing 
upon whether the stopping of Defendant’s vehicle violated the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently applied 
traditional standards of reasonableness to searches or seizures 
effectuated by government actors who lack state law authority to 
act as law enforcement officers.  For example, in Michigan v. 
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1978), 
the Court considered the application of the Fourth Amendment to 
searches of a home conducted by firefighters, and held that 
“there is no diminution in a person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy nor in the protection of the Fourth Amendment simply 
because the official conducting the search wears the uniform of 
a firefighter rather than a policeman[.]”  Tyler, 436 U. S. at 
506, 98 S. Ct. at 1948, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 496.  Thus, the United 
States Supreme Court applied the traditional warrant requirement 
in evaluating the validity of a firefighter’s entry into a 
private house and held that, even though a burning building 
presented an exigent circumstance rendering a warrantless entry 
“reasonable” for Fourth Amendment purposes, a firefighter could 
not lawfully reenter the house several days later without having 
obtained a properly issued search warrant.  Tyler, 436 U.S. at 
511, 98 S. Ct. at 1951, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 500.  In reaching this 
-28- 
conclusion, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of the 
firefighters’ actions without giving any consideration to the 
issue of whether the firefighters’ actions were permissible for 
purposes of Michigan state law. 
Similarly, in N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S. Ct. 733, 
83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985), the United States Supreme Court 
analyzed the constitutionality of a search of a student’s purse 
conducted by public school authorities without addressing the 
extent to which the search had been conducted in accordance with 
applicable New Jersey state law.  As the Court noted at a later 
time, in “T. L. O., we . . . applied a standard of reasonable 
suspicion to determine the legality of a school administrator’s 
search of a student[.]”  Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. 
Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639, 174 L. Ed. 2d 
354, 361 (2009) (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342, 105 S. Ct. at 
742, 
83 
L. 
Ed. 
2d 
at 
734). 
 
In 
making 
the 
required 
constitutional determination, the Court utilized the familiar 
“reasonable articulable suspicion” standard even though the 
search in question was conducted by an individual who was not a 
law enforcement officer. 
In addition, courts in other jurisdictions have uniformly 
recognized that, in Moore, the United States Supreme Court 
rejected the proposition that the constitutionality of a 
-29- 
government actor’s search or seizure in any way hinged on the 
extent to which the action in question was permissible as a 
matter of state law.  See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 699 
F.3d 235, 238 (2012) (holding that, even though Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement officers lacked the authority to act as law 
enforcement officers at the time that they stopped Defendant’s 
vehicle, “the violation of the ICE policy requiring prior 
authorization did not affect the constitutionality of the stop 
under the Fourth Amendment”); Johnson v. Phillips, 664 F.3d 232, 
238 (2011) (holding that, even though a building commissioner 
and Auxiliary Reserve Police Officer” “lacked authority under 
state law to conduct a traffic stop or arrest, that fact that 
did 
not 
establish 
that 
his 
conduct 
violated 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment”) (citing Moore); and State v. Slayton, 147 N.M. 340, 
342, 223 P.3d 337, 339 (2009) (stating that, “[w]hile we agree 
that the [police service aide] did not have the authority to 
detain or arrest an individual suspected of a crime, we disagree 
that a state actor’s unauthorized seizure of a person suspected 
of committing a crime is per se a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.”).  As a result, we conclude that, in the event that 
the trial court determines on remand that Lieutenant Shatley was 
a “government actor” at the time that he stopped Defendant’s 
vehicle, 
it 
should 
then 
determine 
whether 
the 
stop 
was 
-30- 
constitutionally permissible by determining whether the stop was 
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, which is the 
standard applied in evaluating the constitutionality of traffic 
stops by law enforcement officers. 
Although our dissenting colleague does not appear to 
dispute 
the 
essential 
validity 
of 
the 
relevant 
federal 
constitutional principles we have outlined in this opinion, he 
argues, instead, that we should interpret N.C. Const. art. I, § 
20, so as to grant a criminal defendant greater rights than 
those afforded by the federal constitution and hold that, since 
Lieutenant Shatley lacked the statutory authority to stop 
Defendant’s vehicle, his actions should be deemed to be a per se 
violation of the North Carolina Constitution, resulting in the 
suppression of any evidence obtained as a result of the seizure 
of Defendant’s vehicle.  The fundamental problem with the 
position adopted by our dissenting colleague is that it rests 
upon an entirely new argument that is not even mentioned, much 
less discussed, in Defendant’s brief.  Although Defendant makes 
passing reference to the fact that unreasonable searches and 
seizures are prohibited under both the Fourth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution and under N.C. Const. art. I, § 20, she has 
not presented any argument whatsoever resting upon the language 
of 
the 
North 
Carolina 
Constitution, 
cited 
any 
authority 
-31- 
addressing the proper interpretation of the search and seizure 
provisions of the North Carolina Constitution, and or urged this 
Court to interpret N.C. Const. art. I, § 20, differently from 
the manner in which the relevant issues have been resolved for 
Fourth Amendment purposes.  As the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina has clearly reminded us, “[i]t is not the role of the 
appellate courts . . . to create an appeal for an appellant,” as 
doing so leaves “an appellee . . . without notice of the basis 
upon which an appellate court might rule.”  Viar v. N.C. Dep’t 
of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (2005) (per 
curiam) (citation omitted).  In spite of Viar, the dissent 
proposes that we resolve this case on the basis of a theory that 
Defendant never espoused and which the State has had no 
opportunity to discuss.  As a result, given Defendant’s failure 
to advance the theory on which our dissenting colleague relies 
in the trial court or in this Court, we decline to adopt the 
approach suggested by our dissenting colleague on the grounds 
that it is not properly before us. 
We also note that the same considerations which led the 
United States Supreme Court to refrain from equating the 
protections provided by the Fourth Amendment with those afforded 
by state statutory law are equally applicable in the state 
constitutional context.  Consistently with those principles, 
-32- 
this Court and the Supreme Court have clearly held that, as far 
as the substantive protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures are concerned, the federal and state constitutions 
provide the same rights.  See, e.g., State v. Hendricks, 43 N.C. 
App. 245, 251-52, 258 S.E.2d 872, 877 (1979), disc. review 
denied, 299 N.C. 123, 262 S.E.2d 6 (1980) (stating that, 
“[t]hough the language in the North Carolina Constitution 
(Article I, Sec. 20), providing in substance that any search or 
seizure must be ‘supported by evidence,’ is markedly different 
from that in the federal constitution, there is no variance 
between the search and seizure law of North Carolina and the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court of the United States”) (citing State v. Vestal, 
278 NC. 561, 577, 180 S.E. 2d 755, 766 (1971), appeal after 
remand, 283 N.C. 249, 195 S.E. 2d 297, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 
874, 94 S. Ct. 157, 38 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1973)); Gwyn, 103 N.C. 
App. at 370-71, 406 S.E.2d at 146 (stating that, although the 
“[d]fendant argues that[,] because the arrest was illegal the 
search incident to it violated the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 20, of the 
North Carolina Constitution, and [that,] under the Fourth 
Amendment’s 
exclusionary 
rule[,] 
the 
evidence 
must 
be 
suppressed,” we “do not agree” given that “North Carolina’s law 
-33- 
of search and seizure and the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States are the 
same”) (citing Hendricks); In re Murray, 136 N.C. App. 648, 652, 
525 S.E.2d 496, 500 (2000) (stating that, “[b]ecause there is no 
variance between North Carolina’s law of search and seizure and 
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States . . .  we hold that the search was proper 
under the laws of North Carolina”) (citing Hendricks); and 
Hartman v. Robertson, 208 N.C. App. 692, 697, 703 S.E.2d 811, 
815 
(2010) 
(stating 
that 
“[w]e 
disagree” 
with 
the 
“[p]etitioner’s [] argument [] that, because the traffic stop 
was illegal, the evidence gathered subsequent to the stop should 
have been suppressed” on the grounds that “Article I, section 20 
of our North Carolina Constitution provides the same protections 
as the federal Fourth Amendment”) (citing Murray).3  As a result, 
                     
3Although our dissenting colleague cites a number of 
decisions 
for 
the 
proposition 
that 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution serves as a constitutional floor and that the North 
Carolina Constitution may give citizens additional rights over 
and above those that are federally guaranteed, neither the 
Supreme Court nor this Court has ever held that the substantive 
protections afforded by N.C. Const. art. I, s. 20, exceed those 
afforded by the Fourth Amendment.  Admittedly, the Supreme Court 
rejected the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule 
found in federal search and seizure jurisprudence in State v. 
Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 710 S.E.2d 553, 554 (1988).  However, we 
have not found, and our dissenting colleague has not cited, any 
decision of this Court or the Supreme Court in which the 
limitations upon the actual conduct of governmental actors (as 
compared to the scope of the remedies which are available in the 
-34- 
even if Defendant had advanced the argument upon which our 
dissenting colleagues relies in his brief, we would be bound to 
reject it based upon the prior decisions of this Court and the 
Supreme Court.4 
E. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-404 
In its order, the trial court concluded that, even if 
Lieutenant Shatley’s stop of Defendant constituted a seizure, 
his actions would have been justified pursuant to N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 15A-404, the so-called “citizen’s arrest” statute.  
According to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-404(b), a private citizen may 
                                                                  
event that a constitutional violation has occurred) are greater 
under N.C. Const. art. I, § 20, than they are under the Fourth 
Amendment.  As a result, we believe that we are bound by the 
prior decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court equating the 
substantive limits imposed upon the conduct of governmental 
actors by the Fourth Amendment with those imposed by N.C. Const. 
art. I, § 20. 
 
4Our dissenting colleague distinguishes the cases cited in 
the text with respect to the lack of difference between the 
substantive 
protections 
found 
in 
federal 
and 
state 
constitutional search and seizure law on the ground that none of 
them involve “a seizure of a defendant by [a] state actor who 
lacked the training and experience of a law enforcement 
officer.”  In view of the fact that the approach adopted in the 
dissent 
in 
reliance 
upon 
this 
distinction 
equates 
state 
statutory law with state constitutional law, the fact that this 
approach has no support in the search and seizure jurisprudence 
developed by this Court and the Supreme Court, and the fact that 
our decision in Gwyn expressly rejected such an equation for 
purposes of both federal and state constitutional law, we do not 
believe that the distinction upon which our dissenting colleague 
relies supports a decision to hold that the absence of any 
statutory authority giving a fire fighter the authority to 
conduct investigative detentions necessarily results in a 
violation of N.C. Const. art. I, § 20. 
-35- 
“detain another person when he has probable cause to believe 
that the person detained has committed in his presence:  (1) [a] 
felony, (2) [a] breach of the peace, (3) [a] crime involving 
physical injury to another person, or (4) [a] crime involving 
theft or destruction of property.”  The key provision in the 
language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-404 is “probable cause,” which 
is 
the 
traditional 
standard 
utilized 
in 
evaluating 
the 
lawfulness of an arrest.  On the other hand, nothing in N.C. 
Gen. Stat § 15A-404 authorizes private citizens to conduct 
investigatory stops based on “reasonable articulable suspicion” 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether a criminal offense has 
been committed.  At the time that Lieutenant Shatley stopped 
Defendant’s vehicle, he did not know whether she was an impaired 
driver or whether her erratic driving stemmed from an entirely 
different cause, such as illness or mechanical difficulties.  
Thus, the record clearly shows that Lieutenant Shatley was, at 
most, conducting what amounted to an investigative stop rather 
than detaining Defendant as authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
404.  See e.g., State v. Benefiel, 1997 Ida. App. LEXIS 35 
(holding that the statutory right to make a “citizen’s arrest” 
did not encompass a right to make a brief investigative seizure 
or “Terry stop”), aff’d on other grounds, State v. Benefiel, 131 
Idaho 226, 228, 953 P.2d 976, 978 (holding that evidence 
-36- 
obtained by a law enforcement officer conducting investigatory 
activities outside of his territorial jurisdiction did not 
violate the defendant’s constitutional rights and was not 
subject to suppression), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 818, 119 S. Ct. 
58, 142 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1998)).  As a result, the trial court 
erred by upholding Lieutenant Shatley’s decision to stop 
Defendant’s vehicle on the basis of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-404 
and should not take any account of that statutory provision in 
conducting the required proceedings to be held on remand. 
F. Application of Exclusionary Rule 
In the event that the trial court concludes on remand that 
Lieutenant Shatley was a government actor and that his decision 
to stop Defendant’s vehicle was not supported by a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that Defendant was driving while subject 
to an impairing substance, it must also determine whether any 
evidence obtained by officers of the Chapel Hill Police 
Department as a result of their own activities must be 
suppressed.  As the Fourth Circuit has stated, “[n]ot all 
evidence discovered as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation, 
though, is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ and necessarily 
inadmissible at trial.  Evidence derived from an illegal search 
may 
be 
admissible 
depending 
upon 
‘whether, 
granting 
establishment of the primary illegality of the evidence to which 
-37- 
the instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation 
of 
that 
illegality, 
or 
instead 
by 
means 
sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’”  United 
States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 173 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 
417, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 456 (1963)) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  Thus, the trial court may potentially be 
required to determine on remand whether any evidence obtained by 
officers of the Chapel Hill Police Department after their 
arrival on the scene should be suppressed in the event that it 
is 
determined 
that 
Lieutenant 
Shatley 
engaged 
in 
unconstitutional conduct while acting as a governmental agent. 
In its brief, the State argues that we should uphold the 
trial court’s decision to deny Defendant’s suppression motion on 
the 
grounds 
that, 
even 
if 
Lieutenant 
Shatley’s 
stop 
of 
Defendant’s 
vehicle 
violated 
the 
federal 
and 
state 
constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, this fact does not require exclusion of the evidence 
obtained as a result of her arrest by law enforcement officers.  
According to the State, since “[t]he stop of defendant by Chapel 
Hill 
Police 
Department 
was 
independent 
of 
any 
stop 
by 
[Lieutenant] Shatley,” a proper application of “the independent 
source rule[, which] provides that evidence obtained illegally 
-38- 
should not be suppressed if it is later acquired pursuant to a 
constitutionally valid search or seizure,” State v. McKinney, 
361 N.C. 53, 58, 637 S.E.2d 868, 872 (2006) (citing State v. 
Phifer, 297 N.C. 216, 224-26, 254 S.E.2d 586, 590-91 (1979)), 
would necessitate a determination that any evidence obtained as 
a result of the activities of the Chapel Hill Police Department 
would still be admissible. 
In addition, the State argues that, even if Lieutenant 
Shatley’s stop of Defendant’s vehicle was unconstitutional, 
evidence of her impaired driving should be admitted pursuant to 
the inevitable discovery doctrine.  “The United States Supreme 
Court in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, [104 S. Ct. 2501,] 81 L. 
Ed. 2d 377 (1984), held that evidence which would otherwise be 
excluded because it was illegally seized may be admitted into 
evidence if the State proves by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered by the 
law enforcement officers if it had not been found as a result of 
the illegal action.”  State v. Pope, 333 N.C. 106, 114, 423 
S.E.2d 740, 744 (1992).  In seeking to persuade us to accept its 
inevitable discovery argument, the State points out that 
Lieutenant Shatley “testified [that] he repeatedly contacted 
communications relaying his concern about defendant’s driving, 
providing defendant’s location, and requesting Chapel Hill 
-39- 
police officers to respond” and argues that, in light of these 
communications, Defendant’s vehicle would inevitably have been 
stopped by law enforcement officers.  The record does, as the 
State contends, indicate that Lieutenant Shatley called police 
communications 
on 
multiple 
occasions 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
reporting his current location and providing a description of 
Defendant’s vehicle; that Lieutenant Shatley called police 
communications yet again to report the location at which 
Defendant’s vehicle had been stopped; and that law enforcement 
officers arrived about “ten minutes maybe” after the stop.  As a 
result, the State makes a colorable inevitable discovery 
argument as well. 
The trial court did not address any of these exclusionary 
rule-related 
issues 
in 
its 
initial 
order. 
 
Although 
a 
determination that Lieutenant Shatley acted unconstitutionally 
would necessarily require the suppression of any evidence 
obtained at the time that he stopped Defendant’s vehicle, the 
same is not necessarily true of evidence obtained after officers 
of the Chapel Hill Police Department arrived on the scene.  
Thus, in the event that the trial court concludes that a 
constitutional violation occurred at the time that Lieutenant 
Shatley stopped Defendant’s vehicle, the trial court should, on 
remand, make findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing 
-40- 
the issue of the extent, if any, to which evidence stemming from 
Defendant’s arrest by officers of the Chapel Hill Police 
Department must be suppressed as the result of Lieutenant 
Shatley’s conduct as well. 
III. Conclusion 
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the 
trial court’s judgment should be vacated and that this case 
should be remanded to the Orange County Superior Court for 
further proceedings.  On remand, the trial court should take any 
additional evidence that, in the exercise of its discretion, it 
chooses to receive and enter a new order ruling on the issues 
raised by Defendant’s suppression motion containing appropriate 
findings and conclusions addressing the issues of whether:  (1) 
Lieutenant Shatley was acting as a government agent or a private 
citizen at the time that he stopped Defendant’s vehicle; (2) 
whether, if Lieutenant Shatley was acting as a government agent 
at the time that he stopped Defendant’s vehicle, the stop was 
supported by the necessary reasonable articulable suspicion; and 
(3) whether, in the event that the stop of Defendant’s vehicle 
was not supported by the necessary reasonable articulable 
suspicion, the evidence obtained by officers of the Chapel Hill 
Police Department must be suppressed, including a consideration, 
to the extent necessary, of whether any information obtained by 
-41- 
the Chapel Hill Police Department must be suppressed under the 
“fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine or whether any evidence 
obtained by officers of the Chapel Hill Police Department would 
be rendered admissible by the independent source or inevitable 
discovery rules.  In the event that the trial court determines, 
after conducting the required proceedings on remand, that 
Defendant’s suppression motion should be denied, the trial court 
will reinstate the judgment that has been previously entered 
against Defendant.  In the event that the trial court 
determines, after conducting the required proceedings on remand, 
that Defendant’s suppression motion should be allowed, the trial 
court will order that Defendant receive a new trial. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
Judge STROUD concurs. 
Judge ROBERT C. HUNTER concurs in part and dissents in part 
by separate opinion. 
NO. COA 12-1579 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 3 September 2013 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Orange County 
No. 11 CRS 51604 
DOROTHY HOOGLAND VERKERK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
 
 
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that Lieutenant 
Shatley’s stop of defendant’s car constituted a seizure in the 
context 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution. I also agree with the majority that Lieutenant 
Shatley was not authorized to stop defendant under N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 15A-404.  However, while the majority remands the matter 
to the trial court for a determination of whether Lieutenant 
Shatley was a state actor, I conclude that Lieutenant Shatley 
was not acting as a “private person” when he stopped defendant.  
He seized defendant while acting in his official capacity as a 
fireman, a state actor, and did so without lawful authority in 
violation of defendant’s rights under Article I, Section 20 of 
the North Carolina Constitution.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent from that part of the majority’s opinion, and I would 
-2- 
reverse the trial court’s order denying her motion to suppress, 
vacate the judgment, and remand to the trial court.   
In her motion to suppress, defendant argued that the 
evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop was illegally 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and its parallel 
provision in the North Carolina Constitution.  The trial court 
concluded the Lieutenant Shatley’s stop of defendant was not a 
seizure triggering defendant’s Fourth Amendment protections nor 
a violation of her other constitutional rights.  Although not 
addressed at length, defendant again raised the argument that 
her stop by Lieutenant Shatley was in violation of the 
protections afforded to her by Article I, Section 20 of the 
North Carolina Constitution.   
“Article I, Section 20 of our North Carolina Constitution, 
like 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment, 
protects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures,”  State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 636, 
517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999), and it requires the exclusion of 
evidence obtained by such unlawful means, State v. Carter, 322 
N.C. 709, 712, 370 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1988).  The relevant 
provision 
of 
our 
state 
constitution 
provides: 
 
“General 
warrants, whereby any officer or other person may be commanded 
to 
search 
suspected 
places 
without 
evidence 
of 
the 
act 
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose 
-3- 
offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence, 
are dangerous to liberty and shall not be granted.”  N.C. Const. 
art. I, § 20.   
Because our Constitution and the Fourth Amendment provide 
these similar protections, caselaw interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment may provide guidance in our interpretation of Article 
I, Section 20.  Carter, 322 N.C. at 712, 370 S.E.2d at 555.  
Yet, despite the similarities between Article I, Section 20 and 
the Fourth Amendment, the provisions are not identical, and we 
are not precluded from determining that Article I, Section 20 
confers rights to our citizens that are distinct from those 
conferred by the Fourth Amendment.  See McClendon, 350 N.C. at 
635, 517 S.E.2d at 132 (“[W]e are ‘not bound by opinions of the 
Supreme Court of the United States construing even identical 
provisions in the Constitution of the United States.’”) (quoting 
State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 643, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260 
(1984)).  
The majority cites to several cases for the proposition 
that had defendant argued that her stop was unlawful under our 
state constitution, the majority would be bound by our prior 
decisions to reject the argument.  See State v. Hendricks, 43 
N.C. App. 245, 251-59, 258 S.E.2d 872, 877-82 (1979) (concluding 
that a search of the defendant’s home and vehicle by law 
-4- 
enforcement officers via the use of an electronic tracking 
device was lawful under the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, 
Section 20), disc. review denied, 299 N.C. 123, 262 S.E.2d 6 
(1980); State v. Gwyn, 103 N.C. App. 369, 371, 406 S.E.2d 145, 
146 (1991) (concluding that the defendant’s arrest in Virginia 
by a North Carolina police officer did not render the search and 
seizure unreasonable under our federal or state constitutions), 
disc. review denied, 330 N.C. 199, 410 S.E.2d 498; In re Murray, 
136 N.C. App. 648, 652, 525 S.E.2d 496, 499-500 (2000) 
(analyzing whether a school official’s search of a student’s 
book bag was unreasonable under North Carolina law); Hartman v. 
Robertson, 208 N.C. App. 692, 697-98, 703 S.E.2d 811, 815-16 
(2010) (concluding that evidence obtained after a police officer 
stopped 
the 
defendant’s 
vehicle 
was 
not 
subject 
to 
the 
exclusionary rule when the evidence is presented in a license 
revocation hearing, which is a civil proceeding).  I conclude 
these cases are distinguishable as they do not involve a seizure 
of a defendant by a state actor who lacked the training and 
experience of a law enforcement officer, as occurred in this 
case.   
Moreover, I cannot dispute that our state Constitution 
provides the same rights as the Fourth Amendment, but our 
caselaw also holds that Article 1, Section 20 may provide rights 
-5- 
in addition to those provided by the Fourth Amendment.  As the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina has previously stated, “the 
United States Constitution provides a constitutional floor of 
fundamental rights guaranteed all citizens of the United States, 
while the state constitutions frequently give citizens of 
individual states basic rights in addition to those guaranteed 
by the United States Constitution.”  Virmani v. Presbyterian 
Health Servs. Corp., 350 N.C. 449, 475, 515 S.E.2d 675, 692 
(1999); see Jones v. Graham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 197 N.C. App. 
279, 289-93, 677 S.E.2d 171, 178-82 (2009) (noting that “[i]f we 
determine that the policy does not violate the Fourth Amendment, 
we may then proceed to determine whether Article I, Section 20 
provides basic rights in addition to those guaranteed by the 
[Fourth Amendment]”, and concluding that while a suspicionless 
search may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment under 
certain circumstances the defendant-employer’s suspicionless 
drug testing policy violated plaintiff-employees’ rights to be 
free from unreasonable searches under Article I, Section 20 of 
our state constitution) (citation and quotation marks omitted)); 
Carter, 322 N.C. at 710, 370 S.E.2d at 554 (holding there is no 
good faith exception to the requirements of Article I, Section 
20 as applied to the defendant and declining to analyze whether 
the search and seizure at issue violated the defendant’s rights 
-6- 
under the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution).  
However, 
due 
to 
the 
relatively 
limited 
body 
of 
caselaw 
interpreting Article I, Section 20, reference to caselaw that 
determines our citizens’ rights under the Fourth Amendment is 
helpful in our analysis, but it does not control the resolution 
of this case. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures applies to seizures of the 
person, including brief investigatory stops.”  In re J.L.B.M., 
176 N.C. App. 613, 619, 627 S.E.2d 239, 243 (2006).  Such 
investigatory stops must be based on reasonable suspicion that 
criminal activity may have taken place.  Id.  Reasonable 
suspicion is based upon “‘specific and articulable facts, as 
well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed 
through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by 
[the officer’s] experience and training.’”  Id. (quoting State 
v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441-42, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) 
(emphasis added)). 
Although the majority remands the case for the trial court 
to make additional findings as to whether Lieutenant Shatley was 
a state actor when he seized defendant, I conclude the trial 
court’s findings establish that he was a state actor and that he 
violated defendant’s right to be free from unlawful seizure 
-7- 
under our state constitution.  The trial court found that 
Lieutenant Shatley stopped defendant with the use of Fire Engine 
32, of which he was in command and which was returning to the 
fire station after being dispatched to the scene of a possible 
fire.  After notifying “emergency communications” that defendant 
may be an impaired driver, Lieutenant Shatley “ordered” the 
driver of the fire engine to activate its red lights, sirens, 
and horn to cause defendant to stop her vehicle.  Once stopped, 
Lieutenant Shatley did not pass defendant, but parked Engine 32 
behind defendant’s vehicle.  Lieutenant Shatley exited the fire 
truck 
and 
approached 
defendant 
wearing 
his 
firefighter’s 
uniform.  The fire engine’s emergency lights continued to flash 
as defendant asked Lieutenant Shatley why he had stopped her, 
and he spoke to defendant for at least ten minutes.  Chapel Hill 
police officers arrived on the scene shortly thereafter.     
Had Lieutenant Shatley been a police officer with the 
appropriate training and experience as well as the lawful 
authority to stop defendant, defendant’s erratic driving would 
likely support a finding of the reasonable suspicion necessary 
to effectuate an investigatory stop.  Although Lieutenant 
Shatley had limited authority to enforce traffic laws at the 
scene of a fire or other hazards pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
20-114.1(b), 
the 
statute 
provides 
that 
firemen 
are 
not 
-8- 
considered law enforcement or traffic control officers.  Thus, 
the legislature has strictly limited the law enforcement 
authority of firemen to a narrow set of situations related to 
the execution of their duties as firemen.  See id.  If the 
legislature intended to give firemen the authority to enforce 
traffic laws at all times, it could do so.  However, under our 
current statutes, Lieutenant Shatley had no lawful authority or 
training to stop defendant.  Because Lieutenant Shatley used the 
appearance of the state’s police powers to effectuate a traffic 
stop, I conclude that he was a state actor acting outside of his 
lawful authority to seize defendant.    
To permit state actors who do not have appropriate law 
enforcement authority, training, and experience to make traffic 
stops would potentially result in greater harm than not stopping 
someone who commits a motor vehicle violation.  “‘No right is 
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common 
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and 
control of his own person, free from all restraint or 
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable 
authority of law.’”  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 20 L. Ed. 2d 
889, 898-99 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 
U.S. 250, 251, 35 L. Ed. 734, 737 (1891) (emphasis added)).  As 
our Supreme Court has aptly noted:  
-9- 
One 
of 
the 
great 
purposes 
of 
the 
exclusionary rule is to impose the template 
of the constitution on police training and 
practices.  Unavoidably, a few criminals may 
profit along with the innocent multitude 
from this constitutional arrangement . . . .  
“He does not go free because the constable 
blundered, but because the Constitutions 
prohibit securing the evidence against him.”   
 
Carter, 322 N.C. at 720, 370 S.E.2d at 560 (citation omitted). 
“A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial . . . has 
the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced 
the evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule 
withholds the constitutional imprimatur.”  Terry, 392 U.S. at 
13, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 901.  If state personnel who are not trained 
as law enforcement officers are permitted to execute traffic 
stops without lawful authority, experience, and training, but 
under the color of state police power, and the evidence obtained 
from such a seizure is admitted in a criminal prosecution, our 
courts will “be made party to lawless invasions of the 
constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered 
governmental use of the fruits of such invasions[,]” id.    
Such actions are “dangerous to [the] liberty” of our 
citizens, N.C. Const. art. I, § 20, a violation of defendant’s 
right to be free from unlawful seizure under our state 
constitution, and should not be condoned by our courts.  
Accordingly, I conclude that the trial court should have granted 
-10- 
defendant’s motion to suppress to exclude the evidence obtained 
from Lieutenant Shatley’s seizure of defendant.