Case Title: Daniels v. Mobley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 121242

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2013-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
CHARLES DANIELS,  
D/B/A THE POKER PALACE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 121242 
 
 
  JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  February 28, 2013 
EARLE C. MOBLEY, IN HIS  
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 
COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY 
FOR THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
Thomas S. Shadrick, Judge 
 
Charles P. Daniels, doing business as the Poker Palace, 
appeals from a judgment entered by the Circuit Court of the 
City of Portsmouth in a declaratory judgment action.  The 
circuit court ruled that Daniels failed to establish that Texas 
Hold ’Em poker is not illegal gambling under Code § 18.2-325 
and that Code § 18.2-328 is unconstitutionally vague.  We 
conclude that the request for declaratory judgment concerning 
the legality of Texas Hold ’Em poker under Code § 18.2-325 
failed to present a justiciable controversy over which the 
circuit court could exercise jurisdiction and that the circuit 
court did not err in determining Code § 18.2-328 to be 
constitutionally valid. 
Facts and Background 
 
Charles Daniels operated Boulevard Bingo, a charitable 
bingo hall in the City of Portsmouth for twenty-two years.  In 
2006, Daniels began hosting games of Texas Hold ’Em poker at 
 
2 
the hall for the Virginia Fraternal Order of Police.  These 
games were popular, and in 2010 Daniels leased and renovated 
the space adjacent to the bingo hall and named it the Poker 
Palace.  Daniels hosted Texas Hold ’Em games and tournaments, 
primarily for charity, in the Poker Palace.  
On July 26, 2010, Earle C. Mobley, the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney for the City of Portsmouth, sent Daniels a letter 
stating: 
After careful consideration, I have come to the 
conclusion that any and all poker games, or other 
forms of gambling not sanctioned by the Commonwealth 
of Virginia will be viewed by my office as illegal 
under Section 18.2-325 of the Code of Virginia, 1950 
as amended. 
 
I have notified the Portsmouth Police Department 
of my decision to prosecute any illegal gambling.  
Effective immediately, any violations of the statute 
will be subject to investigation and/or prosecuted.  
To avoid prosecution you must cease and desist any 
and all forms of illegal gambling, forthwith. 
 
Daniels thereafter met with Mobley and decided to close the 
Poker Palace to avoid prosecution. 
Daniels filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Portsmouth to determine whether the game 
of Texas Hold ’Em constitutes illegal gambling under Code 
§ 18.2-325 and whether Code § 18.2-328 is facially 
unconstitutional and should be found void for vagueness. 
The case proceeded to a one-day bench trial in which 
Daniels presented the testimony of (1) an expert in casino 
 
3 
math, Robert Hannum, (2) a math Ph.D., James Klinedinst, and 
(3) a world champion poker player, Gregory Raymer.  At the 
conclusion of Daniels’ case, Mobley made a motion to strike, 
which the circuit court took under advisement.  Mobley declined 
to put on evidence and renewed his motion to strike.  After a 
recess, the circuit court granted the motion to strike on the 
basis that “a game of Texas Hold ’Em for [a] single player can 
last 24 hours or it could last for one hand, and all the 
evidence indicates that the outcome of any one hand is 
uncertain; and so it is clear to me that this violates the 
statute as written; and, therefore, I will grant the motion to 
strike in regard to the claim that it is not illegal gambling 
under the statute [Code § 18.2-325].”1 
Thereafter the circuit court heard argument on whether 
Code § 18.2-3282 is unconstitutionally vague because of the 
                     
1 Code § 18.2-325(1) states, in relevant part: 
 
“Illegal gambling” means the making, placing or 
receipt of any bet or wager in the Commonwealth of 
money or other thing of value, made in exchange for a 
chance to win a prize, stake or other consideration or 
thing of value, dependent upon the result of any game, 
contest or any other event the outcome of which is 
uncertain or a matter of chance, whether such game, 
contest or event occurs or is to occur inside or 
outside the limits of the Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 Code § 18.2-328 states, in pertinent part, “The 
operator of an illegal gambling enterprise, activity or 
operation shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.”  
1 Although the 
majority states "to the extent that Daniels had requested a 
 
4 
definition of “illegal gambling” stated in Code § 18.2-325(1). 
The circuit court held that the statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague because it provides fair notice and an 
individual of ordinary intelligence can discern its meaning.  
Daniels appeals. 
 
We granted an appeal on the following assignments of 
error: 
 
1.  The trial court erroneously held that 
Virginia’s gambling statute, Va. Code § 18.2-325, can 
be violated whenever the outcome of a game is to any 
degree uncertain, as opposed to when chance 
predominates over skill in determining the outcome. 
 
 
2.  The trial court erroneously held that the 
Texas Hold ’Em Poker games hosted at the Poker Palace 
qualify as gambling under Section 18.2-325 because 
the outcome of those games is uncertain.  In making 
this error, the court misinterpreted both the term 
“uncertain,” as noted in the first assignment of 
error, as well as the word “outcome.” 
 
 
3.  The trial court erroneously held that its 
broad reading of the gambling statute did not render 
the statute unconstitutionally vague. 
 
 
Mobley presents the following assignments of cross-error: 
 
1.  The circuit court erred by not granting the 
special plea and dismissing the action on the grounds 
that Mobley, a Constitutional officer, was immune 
                                                                 
declaration of his rights, such declaration would be barred by 
sovereign immunity," the majority does not expressly hold that 
Daniels' claim regarding the legality of Texas Hold 'Em poker 
is barred by sovereign immunity.  As explained below, the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, when applicable, bars legal and 
equitable claims against the Commonwealth.  Its application is 
not dependent on the character of the judgment but the nature 
of the claims asserted, such that the sovereign's immunity 
deprives the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction.  
 
5 
from declaratory actions under the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity. 
 
 
2.  The circuit court erred by not granting the 
demurrer on the grounds that Daniels lacked standing 
to challenge a criminal statute under which he had 
not been charged. 
 
 
Analysis 
The declaratory judgment statute, Code § 8.01-184, 
provides: 
In cases of actual controversy, circuit courts within 
the scope of their respective jurisdictions shall 
have power to make binding adjudications of right, 
whether or not consequential relief is, or at the 
time could be, claimed and no action or proceeding 
shall be open to objection on the ground that a 
judgment order or decree merely declaratory of right 
is prayed for.  Controversies involving the 
interpretation of deeds, wills, and other instruments 
of writing, statutes, municipal ordinances and other 
governmental regulations, may be so determined, and 
this enumeration does not exclude other instances of 
actual antagonistic assertion and denial of right. 
Therefore, a circuit court cannot acquire jurisdiction 
over a declaratory judgment action unless the proceeding 
involves an actual adjudication of rights.  Charlottesville 
Area Fitness Club Operators Ass’n v. Albemarle Cnty. Bd. of 
Supervisors (“Charlottesville Fitness”), 285 Va. 87, 98, 737 
S.E.2d 1, ___ (2013) (“The prerequisites for jurisdiction . . . 
may be collectively referred to as the requirement of a 
‘justiciable controversy.’ ”).  A justiciable controversy, for 
purposes of declaratory judgment, must involve “specific 
 
6 
adverse claims, based upon present rather than future or 
speculative facts.”  City of Fairfax v. Shanklin, 205 Va. 227, 
229, 135 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1964). 
For a justiciable controversy to exist, it must be 
possible for the circuit court to render a decree yielding 
specific relief, such that the plaintiff’s rights will be 
thereby affected.  Charlottesville Fitness, 285 Va. at 98, 737 
S.E.2d at ___ (citing W. S. Carnes, Inc. v. Board of 
Supervisors, 252 Va. 377, 383, 478 S.E.2d 295, 299 (1996) and 
Erie Ins. Group v. Hughes, 240 Va. 165, 170, 393 S.E.2d 210, 
212 (1990)).  “Thus, when the ‘actual objective in the 
declaratory judgment proceeding [i]s a determination of [a] 
disputed issue rather than an adjudication of the parties’ 
rights,’ the case is not one for declaratory judgment.”  Id. at 
99, 737 S.E.2d at ___ (quoting Green v. Goodman-Gable-Gould 
Co., 268 Va. 102, 108, 597 S.E.2d 77, 81 (2004)); see, e.g., 
Board of Supervisors v. Town of Purcellville, 276 Va. 419, 435-
36, 666 S.E.2d 512, 520 (2008) (allowing judgment for 
declaration of rights under written agreements to guide the 
parties in their future interactions). 
It is beyond question that this Court may consider, sua 
sponte, whether a requisite justiciable controversy exists 
under the declaratory judgment statute, as the declaratory 
judgment statute was not intended to vest the courts with 
 
7 
authority to render advisory opinions.  See Martin v. Ziherl, 
269 Va. 35, 40, 607 S.E.2d 367, 369 (2005); Shanklin, 205 at 
229-30, 135 S.E.2d at 775-76.  In his complaint, Daniels 
requested that the circuit court declare “that Texas Hold ’Em 
is not ‘illegal gambling’ under Code § 18.2-325.”  The instant 
case presents a scenario in which the declaratory judgment 
petitioner seeks a declaration that a generalized activity does 
not violate a particular statute.  We conclude that such 
request concerns a determination of a disputed issue rather 
than a request for an adjudication of rights, and thus does not 
present a justiciable controversy. 
The case of Williams v. Southern Bank of Norfolk, 203 Va. 
657, 125 S.E.2d 803 (1962), is instructive to our 
determination.  The bank financed Williams’ car dealership and 
took liens on the vehicles; when Williams sold a car, he was to 
pay off the lien.  Id. at 660, 125 S.E.2d at 805.  Williams 
sold eight vehicles without promptly paying off the liens, and 
the bank informed its attorney, who in turn reported this 
information, with the bank’s consent, to the Commonwealth’s 
attorney.  Id. at 660-61, 125 S.E.2d at 806.  Williams was 
charged with eleven counts of larceny, of which all but two 
were nolle prossed.  Id. at 661, 125 S.E.2d at 806.  Williams 
was found not guilty of those counts and threatened to bring 
actions for malicious prosecution against the bank.  Id. at 
 
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660, 125 S.E.2d at 805.  The bank filed a declaratory judgment 
action, seeking to prevent Williams from bringing his actions 
at law, and the circuit court ruled in its favor.  Id. at 658-
59, 125 S.E.2d at 804-05. 
This Court reversed, holding: 
The petition of [the] Bank does not ask for the 
construction of definite rights expressed in written 
instruments or statutes.  It alleges no controversy 
between the parties as to the right of [the] Bank to 
make a defense at law, based on the facts stated 
therein, to the threatened tort actions.  The answer 
of appellant challenges the verity of the allegations 
of fact.  The only controversy is, therefore, one of 
disputed fact, that is, whether [the] Bank made a 
full, correct and honest disclosure of all the 
material facts within its knowledge to its counsel 
and the Commonwealth’s Attorney.  The determination 
of that issue rather than an adjudication of the 
rights of the parties was the real object of the 
proceeding, as shown by the allegations of the 
petition, the prayer thereof, and the conclusion 
reached by the chancellor. 
Id. at 663, 125 S.E.2d at 807. 
 
In his complaint, Daniels states that “Code § 18.2-325 
defines as ‘illegal gambling’ only those games in which the 
outcome is a matter of chance.  Texas Hold ’Em does not fall 
within this definition because skill, rather than chance, is 
the primary determinate of success.”  The stated controversy 
is, therefore, whether Texas Hold ’Em falls within the 
definition of illegal gambling.  This is posed as a factual 
inquiry.   
 
9 
As the matter was posed to the circuit court, whether the 
game of Texas Hold ’Em is illegal gambling pursuant to Code 
§ 18.2-325 depends upon the manner in which it is played at the 
Poker Palace.  The declaratory judgment action, concerning the 
legality of Texas Hold ’Em poker under Code § 18.2-325, 
requested the circuit court to make an adjudication of facts; 
it does not request an adjudication of Daniels’ rights.  The 
requested declaration cannot be obtained in the context of a 
declaratory judgment action.  See id.; see also Schwartz v. 
O'Connell, 124 N.Y.S.2d 397, 399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953). 
Additionally, the request concerning a declaration that 
Texas Hold ’Em poker was not illegal gambling concerned the 
interpretation of a criminal statute.  The traditional 
perspective is that declaratory relief is inappropriate to 
restrain the sovereign in criminal matters.  Kahaikupuna v. 
State, 124 P.3d 975, 980 (Haw. 2005); State ex rel. Edmisten v. 
Tucker, 323 S.E.2d 294, 309 (N.C. 1984) (“It is widely held 
that a declaratory judgment is not available to restrain 
enforcement of a criminal prosecution.”).  Declaratory judgment 
actions are not ordinarily available to collaterally impede 
threatened criminal prosecutions.  See, e.g., Reed v. 
Littleton, 9 N.E.2d 814, 815-16 (N.Y. 1937) (equity will not 
ordinarily intervene to enjoin a criminal prosecution, unless: 
(1) the prosecution threatens irreparable injury; (2) the sole 
 
10 
question is one of law; and (3) the declaratory petitioner has 
a clear legal right to relief);  Sun Oil Co. v. Director of 
Div. on Necessaries of Life, 163 N.E.2d 276, 279 (Mass. 1960) 
(approving use of declaratory judgment because petitioner was 
not simply seeking to avoid prosecution:  the controversy 
affected its relationship to retail dealers and involved a 
matter of overarching business policy); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Jones, 130 S.W.2d 945, 953 (Mo. 1939) (permitting 
declaratory judgment proceeding to the extent of non-injunctive 
relief where criminal aspects of action seeking declaration 
that insurance adjusters were not practicing law were 
unimportant as compared to the general impact of the matter). 
Declaratory relief with respect to criminal matters has 
been allowed in a number of jurisdictions, but only under 
limited exceptions.  Kahaikupuna 124 P.3d at 980-81 
(declaratory relief possible, where, for instance, “ ‘the 
statute is malum prohibitum, it affects a continuing course of 
business, and a method of testing the statute was not in fact 
available . . . because the predecessors of the defendant 
refused to bring criminal proceedings’ ” (quoting Pacific Meat 
Co. v. Otagaki, 394 P.2d 618, 620 (Haw. 1964))); see also Zemel 
v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 19 (1965) (“There are circumstances under 
which courts properly make exceptions to the general rule that 
equity will not interfere with the criminal process, by 
 
11 
entertaining actions for injunction or declaratory relief in 
advance of criminal prosecution.”).  The exceptions to the bar 
on declaratory judgment actions for the construction of 
criminal statutes are limited, rare and inapplicable regarding 
the requested determination of whether Texas Hold ’Em poker is 
illegal gambling as defined by Code § 18.2-325.  See Reed, 9 
N.E.2d at 815-16. 
Daniels alleges Mobley threatened him with prosecution if 
the Poker Palace did not cease hosting Texas Hold ’Em games.  
Mobley is the Commonwealth’s Attorney and is responsible for 
prosecuting crimes in the City of Portsmouth.  The criminal 
aspects of Daniels’ declaratory judgment action are dominating, 
and the unstated right Daniels seemingly wants to vindicate 
relates to criminal prosecution, rendering declaratory judgment 
inappropriate.  See Jones, 130 S.W.2d at 953. 
The futility of resorting to [e]quity to determine 
whether certain or uncertain facts constitute crime is 
apparent when we consider the different measure of 
proof in criminal and civil cases.  Should equity 
declare on disputed testimony or conflicting 
inferences by a fair preponderance of the evidence 
that a penal violation was proved, what would be the 
effect?  None.  It would not and could not be binding 
as res adjudicata or even as stare decisis in a 
subsequent prosecution where guilt must be established 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Should equity hold that no 
offense had been committed it would not be binding 
were the subsequent proof varied. 
 
Reed, 9 N.E.2d at 817.  Given the overwhelming criminal 
elements of the underlying dispute, resolution of the 
 
12 
declaratory judgment action would not impact any subsequent 
criminal proceeding.  Granting the requested declaration 
concerning the legality of Texas Hold ’Em poker would be merely 
an advisory opinion. 
Additionally, to the extent that Daniels had requested a 
declaration of his rights, such declaration would be barred by 
sovereign immunity.  A resolution of the declaratory judgment 
action in a manner which adjudicated Daniels’ rights would 
enjoin the Commonwealth from acting, in violation of the 
prohibition articulated in Azfall v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 226, 
231, 639 S.E.2d 279, 282 (2007) (“ ‘As a general rule, the 
Commonwealth is immune both from actions at law for damages and 
from suits in equity to restrain governmental action or to 
compel such action.’ ” (quoting Alliance to Save the Mattaponi 
v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 423, 455, 621 S.E.2d 78, 96 (2005))). 
Because the declaratory judgment action claim asserted by 
Daniels concerning the legality of Texas Hold ’Em poker does 
not present a justiciable controversy, the circuit court did 
not have authority to exercise jurisdiction concerning such 
claim.  Therefore, we will vacate the judgment concerning that 
claim and dismiss the claim. 
The complaint in this case also asserted that “[section] 
18.2-328 of the Code of Virginia is constitutionally void for 
vagueness.”  This is a challenge to the constitutionality of a 
 
13 
statute based upon United States law or self-executing 
provisions of the Virginia Constitution; such a request for 
declaratory judgment presents a justiciable controversy.  See 
DiGiacinto v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 281 Va. 
127, 137, 704 S.E.2d 365, 371 (2011).  Thus, the circuit court 
had jurisdiction to consider Daniels’ facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of Code § 18.2-328. 
The circuit court ruled that Code § 18.2-328 was not 
unconstitutionally vague because it gives fair notice and an 
individual of ordinary intelligence can discern its meaning.  
Daniels asserts the circuit court “erroneously held that its 
broad reading of the gambling statute did not render the 
statute unconstitutionally vague.”  Daniels argues that the 
circuit court interpreted Code § 18.2-325 so as to render the 
definition of illegal gambling in that statute 
unconstitutionally vague.  Daniels argues that application of a 
test of whether skill predominates over chance must be applied 
to the Code § 18.2-325 definition of what constitutes illegal 
gambling in order to preserve the statute’s constitutionality. 
In his complaint, Daniels claimed that Code § 18.2-328 was 
void for vagueness.  He did not claim that Code § 18.2-325 was 
void for vagueness.  He now concedes that Code § 18.2-328 would 
not be void for vagueness if skill is considered in determining 
whether one could be punished under that Code provision. 
 
14 
Code § 18.2-333 provides that 
Nothing in this article shall be construed to prevent 
any contest of speed or skill between men . . . where 
participants may receive prizes or different 
percentages of a purse, stake or premium dependent 
upon whether they win or lose or dependent upon their 
position or score at the end of such contest. 
 
Therefore, even if the definition of illegal gambling in Code 
§ 18.2-325 is “read” as not having an exception for games of 
skill, Code § 18.2-333 provides that skill be considered in 
determining whether Code § 18.2-328 has been violated.  The 
ruling of the circuit court concerning Code § 18.2-325 could 
not have rendered an otherwise valid Code § 18.2-328 void for 
vagueness.  Therefore, Daniels has demonstrated no error, and 
the circuit court’s ruling regarding the constitutionality of 
Code § 18.2-328 is affirmed. 
Conclusion 
The declaratory judgment claim asserted by Daniels 
concerning whether Texas Hold ’Em poker is illegal gambling, as 
defined in Code § 18.2-325, does not present a justiciable 
controversy, and the circuit court did not have authority under 
the declaratory judgment statute to exercise jurisdiction 
concerning such claim.  The circuit court had the authority to 
rule upon the facial challenge to the constitutionality of Code 
§ 18.2-328, and it did not err in doing so. 
 
15 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we vacate the 
judgment in part and affirm the judgment in part. 
Vacated in part and 
affirmed in part. 
 
 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
Although I concur in the Court's decision vacating the 
circuit court's judgment as to Daniels' claim seeking a 
declaration that Texas Hold 'Em poker is not illegal gambling 
under Code § 18.2-325, I would hold that this claim is barred 
by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.1  Furthermore, because I 
believe Daniels lacks standing to challenge Code § 18.2-328 as 
unconstitutionally vague, I would reverse the circuit court's 
judgment that Code § 18.2-328 is constitutionally valid.  
Therefore, I dissent from the Court's decision upholding the 
circuit court's judgment on the constitutional claim. 
 
Mobley filed a special plea in the circuit court asserting 
that Daniels' action against him is barred by sovereign 
                     
 
1 Although the majority states "to the extent that Daniels 
had requested a declaration of his rights, such declaration 
would be barred by sovereign immunity," the majority does not 
expressly hold that Daniels' claim regarding the legality of 
Texas Hold 'Em poker is barred by sovereign immunity.  As 
explained below, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, when 
applicable, bars legal and equitable claims against the 
Commonwealth.  Its application is not dependent on the 
character of the judgment but the nature of the claims 
asserted, such that the sovereign's immunity deprives the 
circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction.  
 
 
16 
immunity since he is immune from suits for declaratory relief.  
On appeal, Mobley assigns cross-error to the circuit court's 
denial of his special plea.  If Mobley is entitled to immunity 
as to either of the claims against him, the circuit court is 
deprived of subject matter jurisdiction over such claims.  
Seabolt v. County of Albemarle, 283 Va. 717, 719, 724 S.E.2d 
715, 716 (2012); Doud v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 317, 321, 717 
S.E.2d 124, 126 (2011); Afzall v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 226, 
230, 639 S.E.2d 279, 281 (2007).  "This is so because only the 
legislature acting in its policy-making capacity can abrogate 
the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity" and "vest the circuit 
court with jurisdiction."  Commonwealth v. Luzik, 259 Va. 198, 
206, 524 S.E.2d 871, 876-77 (2000).  For this reason, Mobley's 
claim of sovereign immunity should be resolved by us at the 
outset.  Seabolt, 283 Va. at 719, 724 S.E.2d at 716 ("We will 
first consider the county's claim of sovereign immunity because 
it is jurisdictional.").2   
 
"It is an established principle of sovereignty, in all 
civilized nations, that a sovereign State cannot be sued in its 
                     
2 In my view, the absence of a justiciable controversy 
would also deprive the circuit court of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  However, in Charlottesville Area Fitness Club 
Operators Ass'n v. Albemarle Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 285 Va. 
87, 113 n.1, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ n.1 (2013) (McClanahan, J., 
concurring), the Court "decline[d] to classify the nature of 
the jurisdictional defect" when the claims asserted in a 
declaratory judgment action did not present a justiciable 
controversy. 
 
 
17 
own courts . . . without its consent and permission."  Board of 
Public Works v. Gannt, 76 Va. 455, 461 (1882).  Therefore, 
" 'the Commonwealth is immune both from actions at law for 
damages and from suits in equity to restrain governmental 
action or to compel such action . . . . Sovereign immunity may 
also bar a declaratory judgment proceeding against the 
Commonwealth,' and does so for merely statutory claims."  
DiGiacinto v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 281 Va. 
127, 137, 704 S.E.2d 365, 370-71 (2011) (citation omitted).  
"Only the General Assembly can determine as a matter of policy 
whether the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity should be 
abrogated with regard to a particular type of legal action."  
Ligon v. County of Goochland, 279 Va. 312, 316, 689 S.E.2d 666, 
668-69 (2010).  
"[B]ecause the Commonwealth can act only through 
individuals, the doctrine applies not only to the state, but 
also to certain government officials."  Gray v. Virginia Sec'y 
of Transp., 276 Va. 93, 102, 662 S.E.2d 66, 70-71 (2008).  
These officials include "those who operate at the highest 
levels of the three branches of government" such as 
"[g]overnors, judges, members of state and local legislative 
bodies, and other high level governmental officials," as well 
as "other governmental officials of [a] lesser rank."  Messina 
v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 309, 321 S.E.2d 657, 661 (1984). 
 
 
18 
 
Mobley has been sued in his official capacity as 
Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Portsmouth.  As an 
attorney for the Commonwealth, Mobley is a constitutional 
officer whose duties are prescribed by law.  Va. Const. art. 
VII, § 4; Doud, 282 Va. at 321, 717 S.E.2d at 126.  He is 
primarily charged with enforcing criminal laws within his 
jurisdiction.  Code §§ 15.2-528, 15.2-1626, 15.2-1627.  
Therefore, the immunity of the Commonwealth extends to Mobley. 
 
Although Daniels posits that sovereign immunity does not 
bar actions seeking merely declaratory relief, his position 
mischaracterizes the nature of the doctrine and disregards 
essential justifications underlying our adherence to the 
doctrine.3  Protection of the public purse is certainly "[o]ne 
of the most often repeated explanations for the rule of state 
immunity from suits in tort," but it is only "one of several 
purposes for the rule."  Messina, 228 Va. at 307, 321 S.E.2d at 
660. 
[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity serves a 
multitude of purposes including but not limited 
to protecting the public purse, providing for 
smooth operation of government, eliminating 
public inconvenience and danger that might spring 
from officials being fearful to act, assuring 
that citizens will be willing to take public 
jobs, and preventing citizens from improperly 
                     
3 On brief, Daniels contends that "[s]overeign immunity 
does not bar a declaratory judgment action that does not compel 
the government to act, restrain the government from acting, or 
affect the public purse." 
 
 
19 
influencing the conduct of governmental affairs 
through the threat or use of vexatious 
litigation. 
 
Id. at 308, 321 S.E.2d at 660.  Thus, "while maintenance of 
public funds is important, another equally important purpose of 
the rule is the orderly administration of government."  Id.   
Furthermore, the doctrine is not limited to suits in tort 
seeking money damages but extends to declaratory judgment 
actions seeking relief that "would have the effect of 
interfering with governmental functions."  Afzall, 273 Va. at 
233, 639 S.E.2d at 283.  
 
The primary objective of Daniels' action is to prevent 
enforcement of the illegal gambling statutes against him.  As 
Daniels states in his amended complaint, he brought his action 
against Mobley as a result of Mobley's "threat" of "prosecuting 
[Daniels] if he resumes poker games" at the Poker Palace.  
Daniels claims that since he does not seek an injunction to 
enjoin Mobley's prosecution of him but merely seeks "clarity 
regarding his rights," a ruling in his favor "would not 
encroach upon [Mobley's] lawful authority." While Daniels does 
not seek injunctive relief against Mobley, a ruling in his 
favor would have the same effect since Mobley would be 
precluded from prosecuting Daniels for violation of the illegal 
 
 
20 
gambling statutes in connection with Daniels' operation of 
Texas Hold 'Em poker games.4 
In sum, preserving "the orderly administration of 
government" and "preventing citizens from improperly 
influencing the conduct of governmental affairs through the 
threat or use of vexatious litigation" compels application of 
sovereign immunity to Daniels' claim against Mobley.  Messina, 
228 Va. at 308, 321 S.E.2d at 660.  Furthermore, it is clear 
the relief Daniels seeks "would have the effect of interfering 
with governmental functions."  Afzall, 273 Va. at 233, 639 
S.E.2d at 283.  Therefore, I would conclude that Daniels' claim 
against Mobley seeking a declaration that Texas Hold 'Em poker 
is not illegal gambling is barred by the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.5  For this reason, I would hold the circuit court did 
                     
4 Commonwealth's Attorneys are empowered to prosecute 
felonies and certain misdemeanors, not activities deemed legal.  
See Code § 15.2-1627. 
5 Because I would hold that sovereign immunity applies to 
this claim, I would not address the issue of whether Daniels' 
claim presents a justiciable controversy.  Furthermore, one of 
the majority's primary reasons for its ruling that Daniels' 
claim does not present a justiciable controversy is that other 
jurisdictions have recognized that "declaratory relief is 
inappropriate to restrain the sovereign in criminal matters" 
and "impede criminal prosecution."  In my view, it is 
unnecessary to import from other jurisdictions a new 
prerequisite for establishing a justiciable controversy in 
Virginia when Virginia's doctrine of sovereign immunity already 
protects the sovereign from suits to restrain the 
administration and enforcement of its criminal laws. 
 
 
21 
not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this claim.  
Id. at 234, 639 S.E.2d at 284. 
 
Although sovereign immunity precludes Daniels' claim 
regarding the legality of Texas Hold 'Em, we have recognized 
that the doctrine will not deprive the court of subject matter 
jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action where the claim 
is "based on self-executing provisions of the Constitution of 
Virginia or claims based on federal law."  DiGiacinto, 281 Va. 
at 137, 704 S.E.2d at 371.6  Daniels asserts that Code § 18.2-
328 is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
Since the substantive rights conferred by the Fourteenth 
Amendment are "self-executing," City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 524 (1997), sovereign immunity does not preclude 
Daniels' constitutional challenge of Code § 18.2-328. 
 
Nevertheless, this does not end the inquiry into whether 
the circuit court may exercise jurisdiction over Daniels' claim 
because a party has no standing to make a facial attack upon a 
                     
6 While the majority concludes Daniels' claim regarding the 
legality of Texas Hold 'Em poker does not present a justiciable 
controversy, it is unclear why this same ruling does not also 
apply to Daniels' claim that Code § 18.2-328 is 
unconstitutionally vague.  DiGiancinto, relied upon by the 
majority, holds that "sovereign immunity does not preclude 
declaratory and injunctive relief claims based on self-
executing provisions of the Constitution of Virginia or claims 
based on federal law."  DiGiancinto, 281 Va. at 137, 704 S.E.2d 
at 371.  This holding does not address whether Daniels' request 
presents a justiciable controversy.  
 
 
22 
penal statute when his claim of vagueness is based on due 
process overbreadth.7   
[F]or purposes of standing to make facial attacks, 
the Supreme Court makes a distinction between two 
separate concepts of overbreadth, viz., (a) due 
process overbreadth resulting from statutory 
language so vague that it could be selectively 
construed and enforced by police, prosecutors, and 
triers-of-fact to penalize persons not before the 
court, for conduct not before the court, without 
fair warning of the criminality of their conduct, 
and (b) First Amendment overbreadth resulting 
either from statutory language so vague it could 
"chill" the exercise of constitutionally protected 
speech or conduct, or from precise statutory 
language which expressly seeks to regulate 
protected speech . . . . 
 
Stanley v. City of Norfolk, 218 Va. 504, 508, 237 S.E.2d 799, 
801 (1977).  "[W]hen overbreadth impinges upon First Amendment 
guarantees, a person accused under the statute has standing to 
make a facial attack, even though his own speech or conduct was 
not constitutionally protected."  Id. at 508, 237 S.E.2d at 
802.  However, "when overbreadth has only due process 
implications," a person accused under the statute only has 
"standing to challenge the statute as applied to his own 
conduct."  Id. 
 
Daniels' constitutional challenge is not based upon First 
Amendment guarantees but due process overbreadth.  
Specifically, Daniels claims that Code § 18.2-328 "provides no 
                     
7 Mobley also assigns cross-error to the circuit court's 
denial of his demurrer on the grounds that Daniels lacked 
standing to challenge Code § 18.2-328. 
 
 
23 
standard to differentiate between innocent conduct and 
prohibited conduct" thereby leaving to law enforcement 
officers, prosecutors, and courts "the decision of what is 
permitted and what is not."  He further contends that "[t]he 
term 'illegal gambling' fails to provide both adequate notice 
to ordinary people and minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement."  According to Daniels, the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because it encourages arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement and fails to provide people of 
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what the law prohibits.  
Thus, because Daniels "seeks to make a facial challenge based 
upon due process overbreadth," he "is without standing to make 
such a challenge."  Stanley, 218 Va. at 509, 237 S.E.2d at 802.8  
                     
8 Even if this Court treated Daniels' claim as an "as-
applied" challenge and judged it on that basis, see Motley v. 
Virginia State Bar, 260 Va. 243, 247, 536 S.E.2d 97, 99 (2000), 
Daniels would not have standing.  A penal statute is not 
applied until the challenging party has been convicted or cited 
for violation of the statute.  See Tanner v. City of Va. Beach, 
277 Va. 432, 435–36, 674 S.E.2d 848, 850 (2009) (noise 
ordinance held unconstitutionally vague after accused was 
written multiple citations for violating the ordinance); Gray, 
260 Va. at 681, 537 S.E.2d at 865 (deciding vague-as-applied 
challenge to the Virginia statute prohibiting unregistered 
possession of a firearm silencer on appeal from accused's 
conviction under the statute); Woodfin v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 
89, 92, 372 S.E.2d 377, 379 (1988) (deciding a vague-as-applied 
challenge to the Virginia capital murder statute on appeal from 
accused’s conviction under the statute); cf. City of Chicago v. 
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 50 (1999) (deciding a vague-as-applied 
challenge where defendants were convicted under the statute); 
 
 
24 
Accordingly, this claim does not present a justiciable 
controversy over which the circuit court had "authority to 
exercise jurisdiction."  Charlottesville Fitness, 285 Va. at 
106, ___ S.E.2d at ___. 
 
For these reasons, I would vacate the circuit court's 
judgment in its entirety and dismiss Daniels' action against 
Mobley. 
 
                                                                 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 354 (1983) (same); Coates v. 
City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 612 (1971) (same).