Case Title: In the Matter of Joseph W. Burton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 19S-DI-309

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2020-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 19S-DI-309 
In the Matter of 
Joseph W. Burton, 
 Respondent. 
Decided: January 29, 2020 
Attorney Discipline Action 
Per Curiam Opinion 
All Justices concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jan 29 2020, 10:36 am
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-DI-309 | January 29, 2020 
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Per curiam. 
We find that Respondent, Joseph Burton, committed attorney 
misconduct by abusing his prosecutorial authority as part of a campaign 
of retaliation against a detective. For this misconduct, we conclude that 
Respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for 90 days 
with automatic reinstatement. 
Pursuant to Indiana Admission and Discipline Rule 23(12.1)(b), the 
Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission and Respondent have 
submitted for approval a conditional agreement for discipline and related 
papers stipulating agreed facts, costs, and proposed discipline. 
Respondent’s 1992 admission to this state’s bar subjects him to this 
Court’s disciplinary jurisdiction. See IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4. The Court 
approves the agreement and proposed discipline. 
Stipulated Facts  
J. Dirk Carnahan currently is, and at all relevant times was, the elected 
prosecutor in Knox County. Respondent was Carnahan’s chief deputy 
prosecutor in Knox County until he “retired” from that position during 
the progression of events described below.1 
In December 2017, “Defendant” was facing methamphetamine-related 
charges in Greene County when she met with a “Detective” with the 
Vincennes Police Department (“VPD”). Before the interview, Detective 
had been informed by the Indiana State Police that Defendant was having 
a sexual relationship with “your prosecutor,” but Detective did not know 
if this meant Carnahan or Respondent. During the interview, Detective 
asked Defendant if either Carnahan or Respondent had engaged in a 
sexual relationship with her. Defendant indicated she had never been 
involved in such a relationship with Carnahan but that she had been 
 
1 A disciplinary complaint also has been filed against Carnahan and remains pending as a 
separate matter. Our opinion today, accepting the conditional agreement reached by the 
Commission and Respondent, binds only the parties to this case.  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-DI-309 | January 29, 2020 
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engaged in an on-and-off sexual relationship with Respondent for about 
20 years. At the conclusion of the interview Detective suggested that it 
would not be a good idea for Defendant to tell Respondent about the 
interview. 
In March 2018, after she had been convicted, sentenced, and 
incarcerated in the Greene County matter, Defendant told Respondent 
about her interview with Detective. Referring to Detective, Respondent 
told Defendant “that little bitch’s got it coming now; I’ll have that bitch by 
her fucking hair now.” He also told Defendant that Carnahan “went 
berserk” after learning of the interview and planned to escalate the matter 
to VPD’s Chief of Police. Respondent instructed Defendant to supply him 
and Carnahan with a statement about the interview, and Respondent 
provided Defendant with some specific guidance on what that statement 
should say. Defendant supplied this letter a few days later. 
In early April 2018, after receiving the letter from Defendant, Carnahan 
filed with the VPD an Employee Misconduct Complaint against Detective. 
Beginning in March 2018 and continuing through April, Respondent 
and Defendant discussed the possibilities of Defendant’s sentence being 
modified and Defendant living with Respondent on electronic monitoring 
home detention instead of serving the remainder of her sentence on work 
release. Respondent agreed to talk with the Greene County Prosecutor 
about this and told Defendant “you’ve got an ally in the right place, after 
you sent that letter.” And on April 5, after the complaint was filed with 
the VPD, Respondent called Defendant and instructed her to tell any 
future investigators that Respondent was Defendant’s attorney and any 
inquiries should be referred to him. During all of these events, 
Respondent was still the chief deputy prosecutor in Knox County; he 
“retired” from that position effective April 21. 
VPD investigators met with Defendant in prison on May 7. On May 8, 
Respondent instructed Defendant not to speak with the investigators 
again. Respondent also instructed Defendant to write another letter to 
Carnahan regarding the May 7 interview and provided guidance on what 
to include in the letter. Defendant supplied this letter to Carnahan a few 
days later. 
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The parties agree that Respondent violated these Indiana Professional 
Conduct Rules prohibiting the following misconduct: 
1.7(a)(2): Representing a client when there is a concurrent conflict of 
interest. 
8.4(d): Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice. 
8.4(e): Stating or implying an ability to improperly influence a 
government agency or official or to achieve results by means that 
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The parties cite Respondent’s substantial experience in the practice of 
law as a fact in aggravation. In mitigation the parties cite among other 
things Respondent’s lack of prior discipline, his remorse and cooperation 
with disciplinary proceedings, and his many years of public service. 
Discussion and Discipline 
Our analysis of appropriate discipline entails consideration of the 
nature of the misconduct, the duties violated by the respondent, any 
resulting or potential harm, the respondent’s state of mind, our duty to 
preserve the integrity of the profession, the risk to the public should we 
allow the respondent to continue in practice, and matters in mitigation 
and aggravation. See Matter of Newman, 958 N.E.2d 792, 800 (Ind. 2011). 
We have encountered before cases involving various collisions between 
a prosecutor’s public duties and his personal or private financial interests. 
See, e.g., Matter of Brizzi, 71 N.E.3d 831 (Ind. 2017); Matter of Henderson, 78 
N.E.3d 1092 (Ind. 2017); Matter of Thayer, 745 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 2001). But 
the stipulated facts of this case, and the two Rule 8.4 charges, involve 
more than an isolated conflict of interest. Specifically, they reflect an 
attempt by Respondent to improperly leverage his prosecutorial authority 
to exact a personal vendetta against a police detective. 
We find similarity between this case and Matter of Christoff and Holmes, 
690 N.E.2d 1135 (Ind. 1997). There, an elected prosecutor and his chief 
deputy improperly used their prosecutorial discretion and authority in a 
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coordinated effort to retaliate against a political opponent. We suspended 
the prosecutor and reprimanded the chief deputy for their violations of 
Rule 8.4(d), explaining that “[u]se of prosecutorial authority becomes 
improper when the sole or overriding motivation for exercising it is the 
prosecutor’s personal benefit or gain, and not to further the public interest 
of effective law application and enforcement.” Id. at 1141. 
Respondent similarly abused his position in an effort to retaliate against 
a detective who, acting upon information provided to her by another law 
enforcement agency, was seeking to determine whether Respondent or 
Carnahan had attempted to trade consideration of leniency in Defendant’s 
criminal matters over the years for sexual contact. Like the chief deputy in 
Christoff and Holmes, Respondent’s overriding motivation was not to 
further the public interest but rather to protect his own self-interest.   
Taking into account the nature of Respondent’s misconduct, the range 
of sanctions imposed in prior cases involving similar misconduct, and the 
stipulated factors in aggravation and mitigation, we are persuaded that 
the mid-range suspension with automatic reinstatement agreed upon by 
the parties is an appropriate sanction in this case. 
Conclusion 
The Court concludes that Respondent violated Professional Conduct 
Rules 1.7(a)(2), 8.4(d), and 8.4(e). For Respondent’s professional 
misconduct, the Court suspends Respondent from the practice of law in 
this state for a period of 90 days, effective immediately. Respondent shall 
fulfill all the duties of a suspended attorney under Admission and 
Discipline Rule 23(26). At the conclusion of the period of suspension, 
provided there are no other suspensions then in effect, Respondent shall 
be automatically reinstated to the practice of law, subject to the conditions 
of Admission and Discipline Rule 23(18)(a). 
The costs of this proceeding are assessed against Respondent. Pursuant 
to the parties’ stipulation, the Court hereby orders Respondent to pay the 
following expenses in separate checks to be transmitted to the 
Commission: (1) $98.89, payable to the Commission for investigative 
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expenses; (2) $250.00, payable to the Clerk for court costs; and (3) $375.00, 
payable to the Court for hearing officer expenses. 
With our acceptance of the parties’ agreement, the hearing officer 
appointed in this case is discharged. 
All Justices concur. 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  RES P O N D E NT  
Donald R. Lundberg 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  I ND I A NA SU P RE ME CO U R T 
D I SC I PL I NA R Y C OMM ISS I O N 
G. Michael Witte, Executive Director 
Larry D. Newman, Staff Attorney 
Aaron Johnson, Staff Attorney