Case Title: MATTER OF F B

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-08-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 80-162 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1980 I N T H E M A T T E R O F F. B. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Yellowstone, The Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For Appellant: Terry L. S e i f f e r t , B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent : Klaus P. Richter, Deputy County Attorney, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : J u l y 9, 1980 Decided: AU G 1 3 1980 Filed: M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. A p e t i t i o n f o r commitment was f i l e d a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t on March 31, 1980. A combined adjudicatory and disposi- t i o n a l hearing on a p p e l l a n t ' s mental h e a l t h w a s held on A p r i l 4 , 1980, before t h e Honorable Robert H. Wilson. Based on t h e evidence adduced a t t h e hearing, a p p e l l a n t was found t o be s e r i o u s l y mentally ill within t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 53-21-102, MCA. A commitment order was entered by t h e c o u r t on t h e s a m e day. Appellant appeals from t h a t order. O n March 28, 1980, o f f i c e r s of t h e B i l l i n g s P o l i c e Department w e r e c a l l e d t o i n v e s t i g a t e a disturbance a t t h e Northern Hotel i n B i l l i n g s , Montana. Entrance t o appel- l a n t ' s room was made by way of t h e a s s i s t a n t manager. The o f f i c e r s entered t h e room and observed a p p e l l a n t holding a b a s e b a l l b a t on h i s shoulder. The o f f i c e r s talked with a p p e l l a n t , and l a t e r , while a p p e l l a n t was s i t t i n g down, removed t h e bat. Appellant went with t h e o f f i c e r s volun- t a r i l y t o t h e Deaconess Hospital. According t o t h e testi- mony of t h e police, a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t make any o v e r t a c t t o t h e o f f i c e r s o r t h r e a t e n t h e o f f i c e r s b u t was v e r b a l l y abusive. P r i o r t o t h e a r r i v a l of t h e p o l i c e a t t h e h o t e l , appel- l a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had argued with t h e h o t e l management with regard t o h i s r e n t and a p o s s i b l e overpayment of t h e month's r e n t . D r . Thomas Van Dyk, a p s y c h i a t r i s t , t e s t i f i e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. H e f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t while a p p e l l a n t w a s a t t h e h o s p i t a l , he t o r e t h e s h e e t s off t h e bed and threw food, although he d i d n o t personally observe t h e s e a c t i o n s . The doctor a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t while a p p e l l a n t was i n t h e h o s p i t a l , he was angry and h o s t i l e . D r . Van Dyk t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r e had been no t h r e a t s o r o v e r t a c t s toward him o r any of h i s s t a f f a t t h e h o s p i t a l by appellant. He f e l t , however, t h a t t h e r e was a p o t e n t i a l t h a t a p p e l l a n t might h u r t someone. Appellant's account of t h e i n c i d e n t a t the Northern Hotel w a s s i m i l a r t o t h a t of the o f f i c e r s . However, appel- l a n t t e s t i f i e d he gave t h e b a t t o t h e o f f i c e r s and he did n o t threaten t h e o f f i c e r s i n any way. He f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e i n c i d e n t r e l a t i n g t o t h e food on t h e f l o o r a t t h e h o s p i t a l w a s due t o h i s "messy h a b i t s . " Based on t h e evidence presented, Judge Wilson found a p p e l l a n t t o be s e r i o u s l y mentally ill. He found Warm Springs S t a t e Hospital t h e least r e s t r i c t i v e a v a i l a b l e f a c i l i t y f o r providing necessary treatment and issued an appropriate order of commitment f o r a period of t h r e e months. Appellant p r e s e n t s t h e s o l e i s s u e of whether t h e r e w a s s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o support t h e D i s t r i c t Court's f i n d i n g t h a t a p p e l l a n t w a s s e r i o u s l y mentally ill within t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 53-21-102, MCA. Section 53-21-102(14), MCA, d e f i n e s s e r i o u s l y mentally ill: " ' S e r i o u s l y mentally ill' means s u f f e r i n g from a mental d i s o r d e r which has r e s u l t e d i n s e l f - i n f l i c t e d i n j u r y o r i n j u r y t o o t h e r s o r t h e imminent t h r e a t thereof o r which has deprived t h e person a f f l i c t e d of the a b i l i t y t o pro- tect h i s l i f e o r health. For t h i s purpose, i n j u r y means physical i n j u r y . N o person may be i n v o l u n t a r i l y committed t o a mental h e a l t h f a c i l i t y o r detained f o r evaluation and treat- ment because he i s an e p i l e p t i c , mentally de- f i c i e n t , mentally retarded, s e n i l e o r s u f f e r - i n g from a mental d i s o r d e r unless t h e condi- t i o n caused him t o be s e r i o u s l y mentally ill w i t h i n t h e meaning of t h i s p a r t . " The finding of seriously mentally ill places a twofold burden on t h e S t a t e t o show (1) a mental disorder and, i n conjunction t h a t ( 2 ) t h e mental disorder has r e s u l t e d i n s e l f - i n f l i c t e d i n j u r y o r physical i n j u r y t o others o r an "imminent t h r e a t thereof." The proof required f o r t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s t h a t t h e mental disorder be shown by reason- a b l e medical c e r t a i n t y and t h e standard of proof required of o v e r t a c t s i s beyond a reasonable doubt: " ( 2 ) The standard of proof i n any hearing held pursuant t o t h i s section i s proof beyond a reasonable doubt with respect t o any physi- c a l f a c t s o r evidence and c l e a r and convincing evidence a s t o a l l other matters, except t h a t mental disorders s h a l l be evidenced t o a rea- sonable medical c e r t a i n t y . Imminent t h r e a t of s e l f - i n f l i c t e d i n j u r y o r i n j u r y t o o t h e r s s h a l l by evidenced by o v e r t a c t s , s u f f i c i e n t l y recent i n t i m e a s t o be m a t e r i a l and r e l e v a n t as t o the respondent' s present condition. " Section 53-21-126 ( 2 ) , MCA. This Court addressed t h e question of what i s an "im- minent t h r e a t " i n Matter of Goedert (1979), - Mont. I 591 P.2d 222, 36 St.Rep. 393, where t h e appellant was found t o be s e r i o u s l y mentally ill. The a p p e l l a n t i n Goedert had publicly threatened t o k i l l a woman whom he had previously accused of involvement i n t h e k i l l i n g of h i s brother. H e repeated t h e t h r e a t s t o a police o f f i c e r a f t e r being a r - r e s t e d i n connection with t h e incident. This Court found t h a t the man's a c t i o n s amounted t o an "overt a c t " s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y the c i v i l involuntary commitment provision t h a t "imminent t h r e a t of i n j u r y t o o t h e r s s h a l l be evidenced by o v e r t a c t s . " I n l i g h t of t h e d i f f i c u l t y of predicting t h a t a given mental s t a t e i s l i k e l y t o r e s u l t i n f u t u r e a n t i s o c i a l con- duct, it i s necessary t o require t h e commission of some o v e r t a c t . When t h i s is coupled with p s y c h i a t r i c evalua- t i o n , the c o u r t w i l l then be i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o a s s e s s t h e likelihood of t h e individual committing s i m i l a r acts. A person can be committed t o a mental health f a c i l i t y i f he o r she is found t o be s e r i o u s l y mentally ill. Serious mental i l l n e s s i s a mental disorder and a showing of "an imminent t h r e a t of s e l f - i n f l i c t e d i n j u r y o r i n j u r y t o o t h e r s . . . " Section 53-21-102(14), MCA. This imminent t h r e a t must be evidenced by an o v e r t act. Imminent t h r e a t does n o t mean t h a t a person may possibly cause an i n j u r y a t some t i m e i n the d i s t a n t o r uncertain future. The danger must be f a i r l y immediate. A t the same time, t h e law does n o t re- q u i r e proof beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t an i n j u r y w i l l occur i n the future. Threat i s not c e r t a i n t y . The law r e q u i r e s only proof beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t t h e t h r e a t of f u t u r e i n j u r y presently e x i s t s and t h a t t h e t h r e a t i s imminent, t h a t is, impending, l i k e l y t o occur a t any moment. I f beyond a reasonable doubt t h e r e i s a present i n d i c a t i o n of probable physical i n j u r y which i s l i k e l y t o occur a t any moment o r i n t h e immediate f u t u r e , and i f t h i s i n j u r y would be a r e s u l t of a mental disorder, then t h e person s u f f e r i n g from such mental disorder i s s e r i o u s l y mentally ill within the meaning of the a c t . Courts have had d i f f i c u l t y i n determining t h e d e f i n i - t i o n of o v e r t a c t . Overt act is a behavior. This behavior tends t o be dangerous behavior o r a manifestation of danger- ousness. This behavior need not be a completed a c t . An attempt o r t h r e a t , o r even a f a i l u r e t o a c t may s u f f i c e . An individual i s not committed because of h i s conduct o r ac- t i o n s , b u t r a t h e r because of h i s s t a t u s as a mentally ill and dangerous person. The o v e r t a c t o r behavior i s merely evidence of t h i s s t a t u s . The t h r e a t t o k i l l another i s a verbal o v e r t act. I t manifests t h e commission of a dangerous a c t upon oneself o r another. When t h e r e i s proof beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t t h e r e i s a present i n d i c a t i o n of probable physical i n j u r y l i k e l y t o occur a t any moment o r i n t h e immediate f u t u r e , coupled with t h e finding within a reasonable medical cer- t a i n t y t h a t the individual i s suffering from a mental d i s - order, then involuntary c i v i l commitment of t h a t person i s required. Such was t h e case i n Goedert. I n t h e i n s t a n t case we must look a t a l l the f a c t s pre- sented and t h e record of a l l the testimony. This Court must ask: Whether appellant engaged i n behavior t h a t w a s dangerous o r manifested t h e probable occurrence of a dangerous a c t ; whether a p p e l l a n t ' s a c t i o n s o r o v e r t a c t s evidenced an immi- nent t h r e a t of s e l f - i n f l i c t e d i n j u r y o r i n j u r y t o others; whether t h e r e was proof beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t t h e r e i s a present i n d i c a t i o n of probable physical i n j u r y which i s l i k e l y t o occur a t any moment o r i n t h e immediate future; and f i n a l l y , whether t h e r e was evidence within a reasonable medical c e r t a i n t y t h a t a p p e l l a n t suffered from a mental disorder. Appellant caused several disturbances a t the Northern Hotel. H e w a s being loud and abusive and was throwing food. Police o f f i c e r s a r r i v e d and knocked on h i s door requesting t o t a l k t o him. H e refused admission of t h e o f f i c e r s . Testimony indicated t h a t appellant yelled a t the o f f i c e r s , and when entrance was made i n t o the room by the a s s i s t a n t manager, they observed appellant with a baseball b a t on h i s shoulder. Appellant t e s t i f i e d he knew they w e r e coming and, therefore, "armed" himself. I t took s e v e r a l minutes of persuasion before a p p e l l a n t s a t down and t h e b a t could be taken away. A t t h e h o s p i t a l a p p e l l a n t threw food on the f l o o r , t o r e s h e e t s off h i s bed and was disorganized. Testimony i n d i - cated appellant w a s h o s t i l e and angry a t t h e h o s p i t a l . D r . Van Dyk found appellant t o be paranoid schizophrenic, finding appellant was demanding, and when something was requested and was n o t done immediately, he became angry and threatening. W e f i n d t h e S t a t e has sustained i t s burden and has suf- f i c i e n t evidence t o answer t h e questions posed i n ordering c i v i l involuntary commitments. There w a s a present indica- t i o n of probable physical i n j u r y l i k e l y t o occur a t any moment o r i n t h e immediate future. There w a s evidence within a reasonable medical c e r t a i n t y t h a t appellant d i d s u f f e r from a mental disorder. Within t h e standard of proof required by t h e s t a t u t e , w e f i n d t h e District Court had a s u b s t a n t i a l b a s i s f o r finding t h a t a p p e l l a n t posed an "im- minent t h r e a t of i n j u r y t o others" and meets the s e r i o u s l y mentally ill d e f i n i t i o n . Appellant argues t h a t t h e r e w a s no evidence t h a t he physically h u r t himself o r another and t h a t t h i s behavior cannot be regarded a s dangerous o r requiring commitment. Recently t h e Kansas Appellate Court discussed t h i s argument. The Kansas commitment s t a t u t e i s s i m i l a r t o t h a t of Montana and t h e case i s applicable here. The c o u r t said: ". . . W e do n o t believe the l e g i s l a t u r e envi- sioned t h a t a person could be found mentally ill and s u b j e c t t o involuntary commitment only where t h e r e i s evidence of actual violence t o persons o r physical harm. To construe t h e s t a t u t e i n such a manner would f r u s t r a t e t h e obvious i n t e n t i o n of providing treatment f o r c e r t a i n mentally ill persons before physical harm r e s u l t s and would extend t h e personal safeguards of t h e s t a t u t o r y scheme t o an il- l o g i c a l degree. The l e g i s l a t i o n contains no requirement of physical harm and w e can cer- t a i n l y foresee a s i t u a t i o n , such a s t h a t pre- sented herein, where arguably passive behavior g i v e s rise t o an imminently dangerous condi- t i o n . While each case must be decided on its f a c t s , we conclude t h e evidence, when viewed i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o p e t i t i o n e r , was s u f f i c i e n t t o form t h e b a s i s f o r a reasonable inference of dangerousness within t h e meaning of K S A 1977 Supp. 59-2902(1)." Matter of Gatson (1979), 3 Kan.App.2d 265, 593 P.2d 423, 427. The order of commitment of t h e District Court i s affirmed. W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e w Q~--Q% I J u s t i c e s