Case Title: State v. Yorkey

Citation: 163 Vt 355, 657 A.2d 1079

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_YORKEY.93-537; 163 Vt 355; 657 A.2d 1079

[Filed 24-Feb-1995]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                                 No. 93-537


State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            District Court of Vermont,
                                                  Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit

John Yorkey, Douglas Willey                       November Term, 1994
and David Murray; Town of
Danville, Intervenor


David T. Suntag, J.

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Robert W. Gagnon, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee 

Jane Rickless Paul of Paul and Paul, St. Johnsbury, for intervenor-appellant

Deborah L. Markowitz, Montpelier, for amicus curiae Vermont League of Cities
and Towns 



PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



     GIBSON, J.   The Town of Danville appeals from a district court decision
that the Town lacked authority to adopt an ordinance regulating speeds on
U.S. Route 2, a state highway located within its borders.  We affirm. 

     Defendants were given tickets by a deputy sheriff for speeding on U.S.
Route 2 in Danville, pursuant to a local ordinance setting the town speed
limit equal to the preexisting state speed limit.  After the traffic bureau
ruled that 23 V.S.A.  1007(a) did not permit the Town to enact the
ordinance, it amended the citations to reflect violations of the state speed
limit under 23 V.S.A.  1003.  The Town appealed to the district court,
which affirmed the bureau's decision, concluding that Danville lacked
statutory authority to enact any ordinance governing speed on state highways.
 The present appeal followed. 

 

     The Danville ordinance was adopted in 1990, claiming authority under 23
V.S.A.  1007 and 1008, 24 V.S.A.  1971 and 2291(1), (4) and (5).  At
issue on appeal are 23 V.S.A.  1007, which provides for increases and
decreases in speed limits by municipalities under certain conditions, and 24
V.S.A.  2291(4), a general grant of authority to municipalities which
provides that "[f]or the purpose of promoting the public health, safety,
welfare and convenience," a town or city shall have the power to regulate the
speed of vehicles subject to what is now 23 V.S.A.  1081. 

     23 V.S.A.  1081(b) establishes a maximum speed limit on all highways
of fifty miles per hour.  Section 1081(c) provides that "[t]he maximum speed
limits set forth in this section may be altered in accordance with sections
1003, 1004, 1007 and 1010 of this title." 

     When Danville's ordinance was adopted in 1990, 23 V.S.A.  1007
provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 

       (a) Whenever the legislative body of a municipality determines,
     on the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation, that a
     maximum speed permitted under this chapter is greater or less than
     is reasonable and safe under conditions found to exist upon all or
     a part of any city, town or village street or highway within its
     jurisdiction, it may determine and declare a reasonable and safe
     maximum limit any provision of any municipal charter or
     ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding which
       (1) increases the limit, but not to more than fifty miles per hour;
     or
       (2) decreases the limit, but not to less than twenty-five miles per
     hour.
       (b) Whenever the legislative body of a city determines, on the
     basis of an engineering and traffic investigation, that a maximum
     speed permitted under this chapter is greater or less than is
     reasonable and safe under conditions found to exist upon all or a
     part of any state highway, other than a limited access highway,
     within its jurisdiction, it may determine and declare a reasonable
     and safe maximum limit any provision of any municipal charter or
     ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding which:
       (1) increases the limit, but not to more than fifty miles per hour;
     or
       (2) decreases the limit, but not to less than twenty-five miles per
     hour.

(Emphasis added.)

 

     As we have often pointed out, a municipality has only those powers and
functions that are specifically authorized by the Legislature, and such
additional functions as may be incident, subordinate or necessary to the
exercise thereof.  Handy v. City of Rutland, 156 Vt. 397, 400, 598 A.2d 114,
116 (1990); Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of Hinesburg, 135 Vt. 484,
485-86,