Case Title: Matter of Adoption of CJH

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-89-1

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-08-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Adoption of CJH1989 WY 168778 P.2d 124Case Number: C-89-1Decided: 08/18/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter 
of the ADOPTION OF CJH and TCH, Minor Children. SLH, Appellant 
(Respondent)

 
 
v.

 
 
CST and CLT, 
Appellees (Petitioners)

 
 
Sky D. Phifer, Lander, attorney for 
Appellant.

 
 
Richard H. Peek, Casper, attorney for 
Appellees.

 
 

Before 
Cardine, C.J., and 
Thomas, Urbigkit, Macy, and Golden, JJ.

 
 
Thomas, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The sole question 
raised in this case is whether the district court may order an adoption in the 
absence of a written consent by the child's father on the ground of willful 
failure to contribute to the support of the child when the father claims the 
failure to support was justified by a denial of the father's visitation 
privileges. The district court, following a hearing, found that the father of 
two minor children had willfully failed to contribute to the support of the 
children for a period exceeding one year immediately prior to the filing of the 
petition for adoption in accordance with § 1-22-110, W.S.1977 (June 1988 
Repl.).1 This appeal is taken from the order 
of the court that granted the right to proceed with the adoption and terminated 
the parental rights of the natural father in accordance with § 1-22-110(a)(iv). 
That order became final upon the entry of the Final Decree of Adoption. We hold 
that the denial of visitation privileges does not justify the willful failure to 
contribute to the support of the children, and the action of the district court 
in ordering that the adoption proceeding go forward and in entering the Final 
Decree of Adoption is affirmed.

 
 

[¶2.]     In his Brief of 
Appellant, the father of the two children, a little boy and a little girl, sets 
forth this issue:

 
 
"Where the Appellant failed to 
provide child support for his two minor children for a period of one year 
preceding the filing of an adoption petition, is the denial of visitation and 
custody a sufficient 'justifiable excuse' so as to preclude a finding of willful 
failure to provide support for one year and thereby requiring the Appellant's 
consent in the adoption proceeding."

 
 
In the Brief of Appellees, the issue 
is stated differently as:

 
 
"Was there sufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's finding that Appellant willfully failed to contribute 
to the support of the parties' minor children for a period of one year 
immediately prior to the filing of the Petition for Adoption, and that 
Appellant's failure was deliberate and voluntary, was done consciously and 
intentionally and without justifiable excuse, and not due to oversight or lack 
of means to make contributions."

 
 

[¶3.]     The father and the 
mother of the children were divorced in September, 1984. Primary custody was 
awarded to the mother, subject to the father's visitation rights, and the father 
was required to pay child support. Not long after the mother remarried, the 
children's father requested that they be transported to Arizona to visit him. He 
refused, however, to give the mother an address or telephone number where he 
could be contacted and, because of that and his earlier suggestions that he 
might take the children and simply disappear, the mother did not send the 
children for the summer visitation. The father then withheld the payment of 
support.

 
 

[¶4.]     In the spring of 1987, 
the mother and the father attempted to resolve their differences by an agreement 
that the district court approved in an order entered March 11, 1987. Pursuant to 
that agreement, the father was to pay $ 200 each month in current child support 
and $ 50 each month on his $ 1,000 support arrearage. With respect to 
visitation, the agreement established a schedule which gave the father custody 
of the children on alternate weekends, on alternating Christmas, Easter, and 
Thanksgiving holidays, and between June 10 and August 10 of each year. Despite 
the agreement, the mother continued to deny visitation, and the father continued 
to withhold support payments which was the situation as of the time of the 
filing of the petition for adoption.

 
 

[¶5.]     On May 4, 1988, the 
mother and her husband filed their adoption petition in the district court in 
which they alleged that the father had failed to provide for the children's 
support. That failure was asserted as a ground for not requiring the father's 
consent to the adoption pursuant to § 1-22-110(a)(iv). The mother and her 
husband asked the court to enter an order terminating the father's parental 
rights and permitting the mother and her husband to proceed with the adoption of 
the two children.

 
 

[¶6.]     By his testimony at 
trial, the father established that he considered himself able to pay support at 
all times relevant to the petition and that he had failed to do so only because 
he had been denied visitation. He testified that, in January of 1987, he earned 
$ 500 per month plus housing in his employment and that, in April and May of 
that same year, he had earned $ 400 per month plus housing. From September of 
1987 through April of 1988, he had earned in excess of $ 2,500 per month and, 
during this entire period, he received additional sums from an annuity that 
amounted to more than $ 1,500 per month. In the aggregate, in the twelve months 
immediately preceding the filing of the petition for adoption, his income had 
exceeded $ 38,400. He agreed that he had paid no child support since July of 
1986.

 
 

[¶7.]     Relying upon these 
facts, the district court, in its order of January 10, 1989, granted the relief 
requested by the petitioners. The order incorporated by reference the decision 
letter that the district judge had written, in which the court 
stated:

 
 
"The above matter having come before 
the Court for trial, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 
natural father of the minor children has willfully failed to contribute to the 
support of the children for a period exceeding one year immediately prior to the 
filing of the petition for adoption, that the petitioning step-father is a fit 
and proper person to adopt the children, that the children have resided with the 
petitioners since July of 1986, and that it would be in the best interests of 
the children to grant the relief requested in the petition for 
adoption."

 
 
While that order was an 
interlocutory one, it became final upon the entry of the Final Decree of 
Adoption on January 24, 1989, and the Notice of Appeal, filed January 23, 1989, 
became effective January 24, in accordance with Rule 2.01, 
W.R.A.P.

 
 

[¶8.]     The appellees suggest 
that there is a question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the 
finding by the district court that the father willfully failed to contribute to 
the support of the children for a period exceeding one year. The father has 
posed no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain factual 
findings by the district court. His own testimony provided sufficient evidence 
of his ability to pay support and his willful failure to do so. Had the father 
raised a question regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, Broyles v. 
Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119 (Wyo. 1985), would require us to examine that 
evidence, including his testimony, in the light most favorable to the appellees, 
resolving all conflicts in the trial testimony and exhibits in their favor. 
Under that standard, we would not be able to adjust the finding of the court. In 
reviewing factual determinations in a contested adoption case, our rule is that 
the court can be reversed only if it committed a clear abuse of its discretion; 
that is, if it could not reasonably have concluded as it did. Matter of 
Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984 (Wyo. 1986); 
Matter of Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 1982). We also recognize that, under less 
egregious circumstances, we have affirmed a district court's finding that a 
parent's failure to make support payments was "willful." CCT. (In that 
case, the parent earned $ 8,819 in the year immediately preceding the filing of 
the adoption petition; bought minor gifts for the children that were not 
sufficiently regular and substantial so as to constitute a material part of 
their support; and testified that he paid no support despite his ability to do 
so from his earnings.) Appropriately, the father, in this case, has limited his 
issue on appeal to one of law: whether the deprivation of visitation privileges 
affords a justifiable excuse to an otherwise willful failure to pay child 
support.

 
 

[¶9.]     Under our statutory 
scheme, if a parent objects to the adoption of his child, the question then is 
raised as to whether his consent is required because of the existence of one or 
more of the factors set forth in § 1-22-110. A decision by the trial court that 
the consent is not required effectively terminates parental rights and renders 
the father a stranger to the remainder of the proceedings, just as if he had 
previously or contemporaneously had those rights terminated pursuant to §§ 
14-2-309 to -319, W.S.1977 (July 1986 Repl.). Matter of Adoption of RHA, 
702 P.2d 1259 (Wyo.1985) (proceedings under either Title1 or Title 14 have a 
similar effect on parental rights). See also Matter of Adoption of JLP, 
774 P.2d 624 (Wyo. 1989) (petition for adoption permissibly 
seeks termination of parental rights under grounds set forth in § 14-2-309); § 
1-22-110(a)(ii) (consent not required if the parent has been judicially deprived 
of parental rights for any reason).

 
 

[¶10.]  Our rule is that, since a fundamental 
right of the objecting parent is at stake, the adoption statutes must be 
strictly construed at the time the threshold determination is made with respect 
to the requirement of consent so that the objecting parent receives the benefit 
of every reasonable legislative intent. GSD, 716 P.2d 984; CCT, 
640 P.2d 73; Matter of Voss Adoption, 550 P.2d 481 (Wyo. 1976). The father 
concedes, in this instance, that his willful failure to contribute to the 
support of the two children, during the year immediately preceding the filing of 
the petition for adoption, would establish an adequate basis for granting the 
adoption despite his objections. In CCT, we held, pursuant to § 1-22-110, 
that the father's consent to adoption was not required, solely on the basis of 
his willful failure to contribute to support. Under the predecessor of that 
statute, we held in Voss that an adoption without parental consent 
required proof of both willful failure to contribute to support and an intent to 
abandon the child. The difference in the two decisions is attributable to an 
adjustment in the language of the statute. In this instance, the father contends 
that a strict construction of the statutory provision requires a conclusion that 
his failure to contribute to the support of the children should not be deemed 
willful because of the withholding of visitation 
privileges.

 
 

[¶11.]  Our cases establish that, for purposes of 
applying § 1-22-110, "willful" acts or omissions are those which occur 
intentionally, purposely, voluntarily, consciously, or deliberately and without 
"justifiable excuse." We have distinguished the willful parent from the parent 
who is only careless, negligent, heedless, or thoughtless, and also from the 
parent whose acts are inadvertent or accidental. GSD, 716 P.2d 984; 
CCT, 640 P.2d 73. We have recognized implicitly that financial hardship 
could excuse a failure to contribute to the support of the child but, until this 
case, we have not been called upon to determine what other circumstances might 
constitute a "justifiable excuse." See CCT. The word "justifiable" might 
incorporate a connotation of "provable" or "reasonable," but our use of the word 
is in the more particular sense of "rightful" or "sanctioned by law." See 
Black's Law Dictionary, 778 (5th ed. 1979); Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary, 1228 (1966). The determinative question in this appeal, therefore, 
is whether Wyoming law sanctions the withholding of child 
support as a remedy for the denial of a parent's visitation 
rights.

 
 

[¶12.]  We have answered that question in the 
negative, although in factual and procedural circumstances which differ from the 
present case. Broyles, 711 P.2d  at 1127-29. We noted that both this court 
and the state legislature, in the past, had declared the Broyles rule to 
be the policy of this state. We pointed out that the duty to contribute to the 
support of a child is primarily dependent upon the needs of the child and the 
parent's ability to pay, and that the parent's opportunity to exercise his 
visitation rights bears no relation to either of those factors. An aggrieved 
parent may remedy a deprivation of his visitation rights through appropriate 
judicial channels without adversely affecting the welfare of the child or 
children, and the deprivation of visitation rights does not justify the parent 
in reducing or terminating contributions to the support of the child. Those same 
considerations pertain in this case, and the father has offered no good reason 
why the same rule should not apply.

 
 

[¶13.]  We hold that, for purposes of applying § 
1-22-110(a)(iv), the withholding of contributions to the support of the children 
is, under the circumstances, a willful failure to contribute to the support of 
the children even though the father was denied his rights of visitation. There 
was no error in the determination to that effect made by the district court. The 
Order and the Final Decree of Adoption entered by the trial court are 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Section 
1-22-110, W.S. 1977 (June 1988 Repl.), provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows:

 
 
(a) In 
addition to the exceptions contained in W.S. 1-22-108, the adoption of a child 
may be ordered without the written consent of the parents or putative father if 
the court finds that the nonconsenting parent or putative father is unknown and 
the affidavit required by W.S. 1-22-109(a)(iv) has been filed with the petition 
to adopt or if the court finds that the nonconsenting parent or putative father 
has:

* * * *

 
 
"(iv) Willfully failed to 
contribute to the support of the child for a period of one (1) year immediately 
prior to the filing of the petition to adopt; or * * * 
*."