Case Title: FRANKLIN M. RIVERS, JR., M.D. V. MOORE, MYERS & GARLAND, LLC; a Wyoming Limited Liability Company; JOSEPH F. MOORE, JR.; GLENN M. FORD; and ABIGAIL S. MOORE

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0048

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
FRANKLIN M. RIVERS, JR., M.D. V. MOORE, MYERS & GARLAND, LLC; a Wyoming Limited Liability Company; JOSEPH F. MOORE, JR.; GLENN M. FORD; and ABIGAIL S. MOORE2010 WY 102236 P.3d 284Case Number: S-09-0048Decided: 07/28/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
FRANKLIN 
M. RIVERS, JR., M.D.,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.MOORE, 
MYERS & GARLAND, LLC; a Wyoming Limited Liability Company; JOSEPH F. MOORE, 
JR.; GLENN M. FORD; and ABIGAIL S. 
MOORE,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Eldon 
E. Silverman of Preeo, Silverman, Green & Egle, P.C., Denver, Colorado 

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

W.W. 
Reeves and Anna Reeves Olson of Park Street Law Office, Casper, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Reeves.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J*., GOLDEN, HILL, and BURKE, JJ., and KAUTZ, 
D.J.

 
 
* 
Justice Voigt, who is recused from this case, was Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Franklin M. 
Rivers, Jr., M.D., (Rivers) filed a complaint against the law firm of Moore, 
Myers & Garland, LLC, (the Firm) alleging legal malpractice in the Firm's 
representation of him in his purchase of property on which he planned to 
construct a medical office building.  
Among the damages Rivers alleged were "expectancy" damages, the 
difference between the value of the larger building Rivers planned to build and 
the smaller building he was ultimately permitted to build under the property's 
restrictive covenants.  Rivers 
appeals the district court's entry of summary judgment against him on his claim 
that the Firm's breach of its duty to competently represent him was the 
proximate cause of the alleged expectancy damages.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Rivers presents 
the following issues on appeal:

 
 
            
1.         
Is Summary Judgment on Client's legal malpractice claim proper where Law 
Firm failed to support its Motion for Summary Judgment with any legally 
sufficient affidavits or testimony from any of its designated expert 
witnesses?

            
2.         
Do genuine issues of material facts exist as to the element of causation 
on Client's legal malpractice claim which would preclude summary 
judgment?

            
3.         
Do genuine issues of material facts exist as to whether Client has the 
right to recover damages for his expectancy interest?

            
4.         
Do genuine issues of material facts exist as to whether Client has the 
right to recover damages under the loss of chance 
doctrine?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Rivers is a 
medical doctor who in 2004 was practicing emergency and family medicine in 
Jackson, Wyoming.  In December 2004, 
Rivers authorized a business acquaintance, G. Anthony Morse (Morse), to locate 
and negotiate the purchase of property on which Rivers could build a medical 
office building.  In late January 
2005, Rivers asked Joseph F. Moore, Jr., who had both a personal and 
professional relationship with Rivers, to provide legal advice on the property 
acquisition and development.  Mr. 
Moore agreed to help Rivers but informed him that because he was too busy with 
other matters, he would assign other members of the firm to work with 
Rivers.  

 
 
[¶4]      Ultimately, 
Rivers purchased property known as Lot 7 in Smith's Plaza, Jackson, 
Wyoming.  Rivers purchased the 
property with the intention of building a 10,000 square foot building, but in 
the end, because of size restrictions in the property's restrictive covenants, 
he was able to build only an approximately 5,000 square foot building.  Rivers completed the 5,000 square foot 
building, but he claimed that he would not have purchased the property at all if 
he had understood the building limitation.  

 
 
[¶5]      On March 14, 
2007, Rivers filed a Complaint against the Firm, alleging legal malpractice and 
breach of contract.  Among the 
damages Rivers sought were delay damages and damages for the difference in the 
value of the building he was able to construct and the 10,000 square foot 
building he had hoped to construct.  
In his Complaint, Rivers averred, in relevant part:

 
 
            
8.         
In or about February, 2005, Plaintiff Rivers engaged Attorneys to provide 
them legal advice and assistance regarding a proposed real estate purchase 
contract involving certain real property in Jackson, Wyoming known as Lot 7 of 
the Smiths #184 Addition to the Town of Jackson, Wyoming, according to that plat 
recorded in the Office of the Clerk of Teton County on September 11, 2001 as 
Plat No. 1029 ("Lot 7").  Attorneys 
Ford and Abigail Moore reviewed the proposed purchase contract and provided 
legal advice about whether Plaintiff Rivers could construct a 2-floor, 10,000 
square foot medical office building ("Anticipated Development Project").  Plaintiff Rivers also engaged Attorneys 
to provide legal advice and assistance, prepare all necessary legal 
documentation, and handle all necessary negotiations in order to complete the 
Anticipated Development Project.

 
 
            
9.         
Plaintiff Rivers authorized Attorneys to deal with G. Anthony Morse, Jr. 
("Mr. Mo[r]se") on Plaintiff Rivers' behalf related to real estate purchase 
contract and the Anticipated Development Project.

 
 
            
10.       
Mr. Morse made clear to Attorneys Ford and Abigail Moore that said Offer 
to Purchase on behalf of Plaintiff Rivers was to develop the property for 
Plaintiff Rivers as a medical office building.  Mr. Morse provided Attorneys with a copy 
of a proposed Offer to Purchase and a copy of the Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions ("CC&Rs") regulating the property which he had received from 
the broker for the seller of the property.

 
 
            
11.       
Mr. Morse, acting as an agent for Plaintiff Rivers, explained to 
Attorneys that Plaintiff Rivers wanted to build a medical office building on the 
property considerably larger than the existing size specified in the CC&Rs 
wanting to maximize the property to include a sub-level so the project would be 
economically feasible.  Mr. Morse 
informed Attorney Ford that this is the first piece of property he and Plaintiff 
Rivers were attempting to develop and that they were relying heavily on 
Attorneys' knowledge and expertise in this regard.

 
 
            
12.       
Attorneys Ford and Abigail Moore advised Mr. Morse that the CC&Rs 
were "loosely" written, not enforceable, and did not prohibit a basement with 
regard to the existing footprint.  
He further stated that the development could clearly be expanded beyond 
the square footage and footprint designated in the CC&Rs and that no other 
owners in the shopping center governed by the CC&Rs had complied with the 
CC&Rs.

 
 
            
13.       
In reliance thereon, Plaintiff Rivers continued to proceed with the Offer 
to Purchase and the Anticipated Development Project and utilize the legal 
services of Attorneys related thereto.

 
 
            
14.       
On or about February 7, 2005, Mr. Morse, with the knowledge of Plaintiff 
Rivers and advice of Attorneys, entered into a Contract to Buy and Sale Real 
Estate ("Real Estate Contract") with Eagle Village Investors, LLC ("Seller") for 
the purchase of Lot 7.  The purchase 
price was $755,000.  An initial 
non-refundable $5,000 earnest money deposit was paid as part of the Real Estate 
Contract.

 
 
            
15.       
At the same time, Mr. Morse assigned all of his rights and interests in 
the Real Estate Contract to Plaintiff Rivers by way of an agreement entitled 
"Assignment and Assumption of Contract to Buy and Sell Real Estate" 
("Assignment").

 
 
            
16.       
Pursuant to the terms of the Real Estate Contract, Plaintiff Rivers had 
until March 17, 2005, in which to investigate and perform due diligence on Lot 7 
("Due Diligence Period").  At the 
expiration of the Due Diligence Period, Plaintiff Rivers was required to serve 
upon the Seller a Buyer's Notice to Proceed and pay an additional non-refundable 
$5,000 earnest money deposit.

 
 
            
17.       
Attorneys never advised Plaintiff Rivers before or during this Due 
Diligence Period 1) of the risks of not being able to exceed the designated 
square footage and footprint for Lot 7 in developing Anticipated Development 
Project; 2) of the need to obtain the approval of or a waiver of any objections 
from the original developer, Smith's Food and Drug Centers, Inc. ("Smith's") for 
Anticipated Development Project and/or have Smith's modify the CC&Rs 3) the 
effects if Smith's would not execute a shared parking agreement if required by 
the Town; or 4) methods to protect Plaintiff Rivers from unreasonable risk, such 
as seeking extension of time to continue the Due Diligence Period or proposing 
contractual conditions precedent to closing including, but not limited to, 
obtaining preliminary or final approval from the Town and/or 
Smith's.

 
 
            
18.       
Shortly before the Due Diligence Period expired, as to necessary required 
parking spaces, Attorney Ford advised that a shared parking analysis was already 
approved and that Plaintiff Rivers would only need to get approval of the Town 
to use that previously-approved shared parking analysis.  There was no advise of the need to 
obtain any approval from Smith's or any other risks to the right to construct 
the Anticipated Development Project.

 
 
            
19.       
Plaintiff Rivers is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, 
that Attorneys failed to contact Smith's at any time prior to expiration of the 
Due Diligence Period or prior to closing of the real estate transaction on or 
about May 12, 2005 ("Closing") to make inquiry as to Smith's position with 
regard to vital development issues.

 
 
            
20.       
Also, shortly before the Due Diligence Period expired, Attorneys Ford and 
Abigail Moore assured Plaintiff Rivers and his representatives that the 
Anticipated Development Project could be developed at the approximate 10,000 
square feet size stating, among other things, not to worry about the City or the 
CC&Rs and that Attorneys had matters under control.

 
 
            
21.       
Further, in reliance on Attorney Ford's advice and statements, Plaintiff 
Rivers paid the additional non-refundable earnest money deposit and authorized 
the contractor and architect to proceed with the preparation of architectural 
plans for the Anticipated Development Project, which were completed.  Plaintiff Rivers incurred significant 
fees and expenses related to the preparation of said plans and in financing 
charges.

 
 
            
22.       
Attorney Joseph Moore was also involved in providing and confirming the 
advice of Attorneys Ford and Abigail Moore to Plaintiff Rivers.  In the alternative and additionally, he 
failed to properly supervise Attorneys Ford and Abigail Moore or do his own 
independent review of legal issues.

 
 
            
23.       
After the payment of the additional earnest money deposit, Attorneys 
continued to provide legal services for the completion of the Anticipated 
Development Project including, but not limited to, providing legal advice 
regarding proposed development expenditures and formation of proper business 
entities.  Attorneys failed to 
advise Plaintiff Rivers regarding any risks and/or obstacles that could impede 
or interfere with the Anticipated Development Project.  If Plaintiff Rivers had been properly 
advised, he would not have closed on Lot 7 or otherwise 
proceed.

 
 
            
24.       
On or about May 12, 2005, the Closing took place and a Warranty Deed was 
issued from the Seller to Plaintiff Rivers.  At Closing, Plaintiff Rivers paid 
$755,000 to Seller and became obligated for certain loans used to fund the 
purchase.  If Plaintiff Rivers had 
not closed, his financial losses besides other out-of-pocket development 
expenses, would have been limited to the earnest money deposits plus attorney's 
fees.

 
 
            
25.       
Following Closing, Attorneys continued to provide legal services related 
to Anticipated Development Project including, but not limited to, receiving and 
reviewing plans for the over 10,000 square foot project, handling the 
design-approval process.  Attorneys 
never gave any indication that the building size or design was not 
feasible.

 
 
            
26.       
Smith's was finally consulted with regard to the Anticipated Development 
Project and rejected it.  After 
Smith's, on or about September 9, 2005, rejected Plaintiff River's design plans, 
Attorneys failed to timely and diligently respond to Plaintiff Rivers', and his 
representatives', inquiries and to diligently proceed to resolve issues and 
salvage the Anticipated Development Project.

 
 
            
27.       
Finally, on December 5, 2005, Attorney Abigail Moore responded via email 
to Mr. Morse stating that she has prepared a responsive letter to Smith's 
outlining why Smith's should approve the Anticipated Development Project.  However, in her email she states as 
follows:

 
 
I 
apologize for how long in [sic] took to produce this document.  There were periods when our workloads on 
litigation matters were consuming all of my time.  Be that as it may, I also had a bit of a 
hard time wrapping my brain and heart around these issues.  That may sound a little odd  a lawyer 
must be able to advocate for his clients needs regardless but I am more 
persuasive when I truly believe in what I am advocating.  The specific issue is why we should be 
allowed to deviate from the original sketch plan and covenants in what could be 
seen as an aggressive jump in size and in particular in the parking requirements 
for this use and this size.  I had 
never looked at the covenants because I was focused on securing the Town of 
Jackson approval.

 
 
She 
goes on to state:

 
 
However, 
we will likely need Smiths cooperation to get approval from the town if we need 
any parking off site. . . . I have been under the impression  until the letter 
that just came in from Smiths  that the parking agreement was approved . . . 
and signed by all necessary parties and only needed to be 
recorded.

 
 
            
28.       
However, again Attorneys failed to timely and diligently respond to 
Plaintiff Rivers', and his representatives', inquiries and requests for 
assistance.  

 
 
            
29.       
Having been put in an untenable legal and financial position by 
Attorneys, Plaintiff Rivers had to substantially change the Anticipated 
Development Project to his economic detriment but received permission from 
Smith's to construct only a one-story, 5,000 square foot building on Lot 7 for a 
medical office building, which is proceeding.

 
 
            
30.       
Attorney Joseph Moore admitted to misconduct by Attorneys, and Attorneys 
agreed to reimburse Plaintiff Rivers his damages incurred relating to the 
Anticipated Development Project and make him whole.

 
 
            
31.       
Attorneys failed to abide by said agreement. 

 
 
[¶6]      On June 2, 2008, 
the Firm filed Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Partial Summary 
Judgment, or to Exclude Portions of Expert Testimony.  The Firm sought a complete summary 
judgment on the ground that Rivers had been adequately advised about the 
restrictive covenants and had made an informed decision to purchase the 
property.  Through its alternative 
motion for partial summary judgment, the Firm sought to exclude from the case 
Rivers' claim for expectancy damages  that is, the difference in value between 
the allowed 5,000 square foot building and the desired 10,000 square foot 
building.  The Firm argued that: (1) 
Rivers had been competently advised of the covenants' potential restriction on 
his development of the property, but he chose to purchase the property anyway; 
(2) the purchase proved to be very profitable; and (3) his claim for the 
difference in lost profits between the medical office building he wanted to 
build and the actual profits from the building that he did build, was not 
recognized in law.    

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court denied the Firm's motion for complete summary judgment, but it granted the 
motion for partial summary judgment.  
The Firm had argued in support of its motion for partial summary judgment 
that Rivers had never made a claim that better lawyering could have produced 
approval for a larger building and was therefore not entitled to the alleged 
expectancy damages.  The district 
court granted the motion, but it framed the issue differently.  It found that there was no causal 
connection between the Firm's actions and Rivers' inability to construct a 
larger building.  The district court 
reserved ruling on the Firm's expert testimony motion, and thus this Court's 
review is limited to the question of whether there are any disputed issues of 
material fact relating to Rivers' claim for expectancy damages that would 
preclude summary judgment on that claim.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      Rule 56 of the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment proceedings.  Rule 56(c) provides that "[t]he judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories . . . together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law."  
We have said that "[t]he material presented to the trial court as a basis 
for a summary judgment should be as carefully tailored and professionally 
correct as any evidence which is admissible to the court at the time of 
trial."  Braunstein v. Robinson Family Limited 
Partnership, 2010 WY 26, ¶ 13, 226 P.3d 826, 832 (Wyo. 2010); Newton v. Misner, 423 P.2d 648, 650 
(Wyo. 1967); see also White v. 
Woods, 2009 WY 29A, ¶ 18, 208 P.3d 597, 602 (Wyo. 2009).  We have further 
stated:

 
 
[I]f 
the movant has made and supported its motion as required, "an adverse party may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings," but that 
party's response, "by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."   However, the non-moving party has 
no obligation to counter the motion with materials beyond the pleadings until 
the movant has made a prima facie showing that genuine issues of material fact 
do not exist. 

 
 

Braunstein, 
¶ 15, 226 P.3d  at 832 (quoting W.R.C.P. 56(e)).

 
 
[¶9]      This Court's 
standards for reviewing a district court's summary judgment are well 
established:

 
 
We 
treat the summary judgment movant's motion as though it has been presented 
originally to us. We use the same materials in the record that was before the 
district court. Using the materials in the record, we examine them from the 
vantage point most favorable to the nonmoving party opposing the motion, giving 
that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn 
from the materials.

 
 

Braunstein, 
¶ 16, 226 P.3d  at 833 (quoting Bangs v. 
Schroth, 2009 WY 20, ¶ 20, 201 P.3d 442, 452 (Wyo. 2009)).  Our appellate review is de novo with no 
deference afforded the district court's findings.  Id.  

 
 
[¶10]   "Summary judgment is a drastic 
remedy designed to pierce the formal allegations and reach the merits of the 
controversy, but only where no genuine issue of material fact is present."  Braunstein, ¶ 15, 226 P.3d  at 833 
(quoting Mathisen v. Thunder Basin Coal 
Co., LLC, 2007 WY 161, ¶ 9, 169 P.3d 61, 64 (Wyo. 2007)). "Summary judgments 
are especially not favored in professional malpractice actions, whether legal or 
medical."  Bangs, ¶ 20, 201 P.3d  at 452.  With respect to whether a genuine issue 
of material fact exists, we have said:

 
 
Materiality 
of a fact depends upon it having some legal significance so that it establishes 
or refutes some essential element of a cause of action or defense asserted by 
one of the parties. In any given case, the materiality of any facts is limited 
by the pertinent legal standard[s] for the asserted claim and for the 
corresponding defenses to that claim.

 
 

Braunstein, 
¶ 16, 226 P.3d  at 833 (quoting Roussalis 
v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 228 (Wyo. 
2000)).

 
 
[¶11]   Applying Rule 56 and our foregoing 
standard of review and summary judgment principles, we next examine the record 
before us to determine whether the district court correctly concluded that 
Rivers did not make a showing sufficient to avoid summary judgment on his claim 
for expectancy damages.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Summary 
Judgment Grounds

 
 
[¶12]   The elements of a legal malpractice 
claim are:  1) the existence of a 
duty arising from the attorney/client relationship; 2) the accepted standard of 
legal care; and 3) the departure by the attorney from the standard of care which 
causes harm to the client.  Horn v. Wooster, 2007 WY 120, ¶ 10, 165 P.3d 69, 72 (Wyo. 2007); Rino v. 
Mead, 2002 WY 144, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d 13, 19 (Wyo. 2002).  Rivers alleged that the Firm committed 
malpractice by failing to adequately warn Rivers of the property's development 
restrictions and by delaying in taking action on Rivers' behalf to address those 
development issues.  For purposes of 
the Firm's summary judgment motion, the district court assumed that the Firm did 
deviate from the standard of care in its work on the Rivers matter.  The court then focused its summary 
judgment analysis on determining whether that assumed breach of duty caused 
Rivers' expectancy damages.

 
 
[¶13]   As in any negligence action, a 
plaintiff in a legal malpractice action must prove that the breach of the 
standard of care was both the cause in fact and the proximate cause of the injury.  Meyer v. Mulligan, 889 P.2d 509, 516 
(Wyo. 1995).  We have defined the 
required causation as follows:

 
 
[I]f 
the conduct is "that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by 
a sufficient intervening cause produces the injury, without which the result 
would not have occurred," it must be identified as a substantial factor in 
bringing about the harm. If, however, it created only a condition or occasion 
for the harm to occur then it would be regarded as a remote, not a proximate, 
cause, and would not be a substantial factor in bringing about the 
harm.

 
 
 Anderson v. Duncan, 968 P.2d 440, 442 
(Wyo. 1998) (quoting Buckley v. Bell, 
703 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Wyo. 1985)).  

 
 
[¶14]   Rivers' claim for expectancy 
damages is premised on the contention that if the Firm had fulfilled its duty to 
adequately represent Rivers, and done so without delay, Rivers would have been 
able to build a 10,000 square foot building on Lot 7.  As the district court concluded, this 
premise finds no support in the record.  

 
 
[¶15]   As observed by both Rivers' own 
expert and the real estate attorney from which Rivers sought a second opinion, 
the restrictive covenants governing Lot 7 limit the size of any building on Lot 
7 to 4,200 square feet.  There is 
simply no indication in the record that if the Firm had performed its duties 
differently or more expeditiously that Smith's would have agreed to construction 
of a building that is over twice the size of the building permitted by the 
covenants.  The record is thus 
devoid of any indication that the Firm's conduct was a substantial factor in 
Rivers' inability to build his desired 10,000 square foot building.  

 
 
[¶16]   In response to this void in the 
record, Rivers makes two arguments.  
First, Rivers contends that the Firm failed to present affidavits showing 
that Smith's would not have agreed to a 10,000 square foot building if the Firm 
had acted expeditiously.  In the 
absence of such affidavits, Rivers argues that a genuine issue of material fact 
exists as to the question of causation and the entry of summary judgment was 
thus contrary to W.R.C.P. 56.  
Second, Rivers contends that the record does contain evidence to support 
the causal link between the Firm's conduct and Rivers' inability to build his 
desired 10,000 square foot building.

 
 
Lack 
of Affidavits

 
 
[¶17]   
Rule 56 does not support Rivers' contention that without affidavits, 
questions of material fact preclude an entry of summary judgment.   Both Rule 56 and our definition of 
materiality permit consideration of the pleadings, with or without affidavits, 
to determine whether summary judgment is proper.  See W.R.C.P. 56(c) ("[t]he judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories . . . together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law") (emphasis 
added); see also Braunstein, ¶ 16, 226 P.3d  at 833 
(quoting Roussalis, 4 P.3d at 228) 
("the materiality of any facts is limited by the pertinent legal standards for 
the asserted claim and for the corresponding defenses to that 
claim").

 
 
[¶18]   Here, Rivers' pleadings contain no 
claim or allegation that, but for the Firm's actions, Smith's would have agreed 
to the larger building.  Rivers 
instead alleged that had he been adequately advised of the limitations imposed 
by the restrictive covenants, he would not have purchased Smith's property. The 
first and only time Rivers made an allegation that the Firm's conduct cost him 
Smith's agreement to a 10,000 square foot building was in his appeal brief to 
this Court, wherein he stated: "The facts set forth in Rivers' Opposition tend 
to show that Smith's and the Town's positions likely would have been different 
if not for Law Firm's breaches of duty," and "[n]umerous facts, including the 
advice and delays by Law Firm, may have gone into Smith's ultimate decision that 
would not have been in place prior to closing if Law Firm did not breach its 
duties[.]"   

 
 
[¶19]   Rivers' late coming allegations are 
insufficient to stave off summary judgment.  A party cannot avoid summary judgment by 
demanding affidavits, or any other evidence, against an allegation that was 
never pled.  Additionally, Rivers 
does not specify which facts show that the positions of Smith's or the Town of 
Jackson may have been different, or cite to any evidence in the record to 
support such allegations.  The 
allegations are vague, speculative and conclusory and cannot create a disputed 
issue of fact in the face of the competent evidence the district court had 
before it showing no one expected Smith's to agree to a 10,000 square foot 
building, under any circumstances:  

 
 
-- 
the testimony of Rivers that he knew before closing that Smith's was up in arms 
over the covenants violation by another owner in the development;  

 
 
-- 
the testimony of Rivers that had he known of the size limitations prescribed by 
the covenants he would not have purchased the property; 
and

 
 
-- 
the opinion of Rivers' own expert that "while [the] delay is a matter of some 
concern in the context of Ms. Moore's obligation to her client to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness, the delays did not seem to be the 
underlying cause of the damage experienced by Dr. Rivers."  

 
 
[¶20]   Even in the absence of affidavits, 
the record presents no genuine issue of material fact as to the causal link 
between the Firm's conduct and Rivers' inability to build a 10,000 square foot 
building on Lot 7.  There is no 
allegation or evidence that, had the Firm complied with its duties, Smith's 
would have changed its position on the building size.  In the absence of such allegation or 
evidence, the district court correctly granted the Firm's motion for partial 
summary judgment.

 
 
Expert 
Opinion on Causation

 
 
[¶21]   Rivers' second argument in 
opposition to the entry of summary judgment is that the record does in fact 
contain evidence that the Firm's conduct caused Rivers' expectancy damages.  In support of this argument, Rivers 
cites to the following opinion of its expert, John Rogers:  

 
 
I 
have not been provided with calculations concerning Dr. Rivers' alleged economic 
loss but, assuming that he can establish an economic loss by virtue of the fact 
that he was only allowed to build a 5,000 square foot building versus a 10,000 
square foot building as well as the associated cost related to redesign, the 
fact that Dr. Rivers was not, in my opinion, properly counseled concerning the 
nature and effect of the Covenants would be a proximate cause of those damages. 

 
 
The 
district court rejected this evidence on the basis that it lacked 
foundation.  We 
agree.

 
 
[¶22]   Rule 56 requires that an affidavit 
supporting or opposing a summary judgment motion must be made based on personal 
knowledge, set forth admissible facts, and show that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated in the affidavit.  W.R.C.P. 56(e).  As noted above, "the material presented 
to the trial court as a basis for a summary judgment should be as carefully 
tailored and professionally correct as any evidence which is admissible to the 
court at the time of trial."  Braunstein, ¶ 13, 226 P.3d  at 832.  An affidavit that lacks foundation and 
specific supporting facts is inadequate for purposes of opposing a summary 
judgment motion.  See Braunstein, ¶ 14, 226 P.3d at 832;  Bangs, ¶ 24, 201 P.3d  at 452-453 
(affidavit insufficient for failing to state specific facts and for stating only 
categorical assertions of ultimate facts without specific supporting facts); Western Surety Co. v. Town of 
Evansville, 675 P.2d 258 (Wyo. 1984) (affidavit containing significant 
opinions and conclusions that may be critical in the outcome of the case must 
reveal the underlying facts and basis); Blackmore v. Davis Oil Co., 671 P.2d 334 
(Wyo. 1983) (conclusory affidavit which does not contain specific facts 
indicating presence or absence of genuine issue of material fact is inadequate); 
Keller v. Anderson, 554 P.2d 1253 
(Wyo. 1976) (affidavit containing only affiant's conclusions and hearsay 
unsupported by competent material factual statements cannot be used by court in 
disposing of summary judgment motion). 

 
 
[¶23]   As the district court observed, 
these are precisely the defects found in the affidavit opinion of Rivers' 
affidavit.  The district court 
described the missing foundational facts as follows:  

 
 
It 
would be helpful to the trier of fact if the expert opinion could explain how 
the Defendant's breach of the standard of care caused the Plaintiff to not be 
able to build a larger building.  
The regulations prohibiting a 10,000 square foot building were a known 
limitation when the Plaintiff purchased the lot.  It is obvious that the Plaintiff 
deliberately, and commendably, chose not to follow the Defendants' first 
recommendation of "go ahead and build it.  
Let them sue you."  However 
jaded this advice may have been, if followed, it would have produced the desired 
result along with the undesirable consequences of litigation.  The other option, involving persuasion 
of both Smith's and the City was dependent in part on their acquiescence.  The expert has not explained how the 
Defendants' efforts would have made the desired change of heart happen.  As a result, his bald assertion that the 
Defendants' negligence caused the Plaintiff's damages is a conclusion 
unsupported by foundational facts and is inadmissible.  W.R.E. 702; Hatch v. State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co., 930 P.2d 382, 388-89 (Wyo. 1996).  

 
 
[¶24]   The conclusory opinion of Rivers' 
expert attempts to impermissibly shift Rivers' business loss to the Firm without 
showing that the loss suffered was in fact caused by the Firm's alleged 
malpractice.  See Viner v. Sweet, 70 P.3d 1046, 1051-52 
(Cal. 2003) (causation must be shown before business loss may be shifted to 
attorney who performed underlying legal work); Gayhart v. Goody, 98 P.3d 164, 169 (Wyo. 
2004) (must establish attorney's conduct was legal cause of damages).  The district court thus correctly 
rejected the evidence and concluded that Rivers' claim for expectancy damages 
must fail as a matter of law.  

 
 
Loss-of-Chance 
Doctrine

 
 
[¶25]   As another ground to pursue his 
claim for expectancy damages, Rivers asserts that summary judgment was improper 
because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Rivers may 
recover those damages under the loss-of-chance doctrine.  The district court rejected Rivers' 
loss-of-chance argument on the ground that the doctrine applies only where a 
plaintiff can show a physical injury to person or property.  We agree that this is not the type of 
case for which a claim may be made under the loss-of-chance doctrine, but we do 
not believe that this case presents the need to address the physical injury 
distinction or to address whether the doctrine may apply to any legal 
malpractice case.  

 
 
[¶26]   The loss-of-chance doctrine 
typically arises when a plaintiff seeks to recover damages against a medical 
provider who has reduced the plaintiff's chances of survival.  McMackin v. Johnson Cty. Healthcare 
Ctr., 2004 WY 44, ¶ 7, 88 P.3d 491, 494 (Wyo. 2004).  To prevail on a loss-of-chance claim, 
the plaintiff must show: 1) that the patient has been deprived of the chance for 
successful treatment; and 2) that the decreased chance for successful treatment 
more likely than not resulted from the provider's negligence.  McMacklin v. Johnson Cty. Healthcare 
Ctr., 2003 WY 91, ¶ 15, 73 P.3d 1094, 1098-99 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 
[¶27]   To date, we have permitted recovery 
of damages under the loss-of-chance doctrine in only medical malpractice 
cases.  See Gayhart, ¶ 13, 98 P.3d  at 168 (declining 
to consider whether the loss-of-chance doctrine should apply to legal 
malpractice cases).  This case does 
not present the proper circumstance to address the doctrine's application to 
legal malpractice cases.

 
 
[¶28]   First, Rivers has presented no 
explanation as to why recovery pursuant to our usual case-within-a-case 
requirement of proof would not provide an adequate basis for recovery in this 
case.  If it were the case that 
Rivers lost an opportunity to build a larger, more profitable building because 
of the Firm's actions, that would be a matter on which concrete evidence could 
be presented in the form of witness testimony or real estate listings.  This case simply does not present 
circumstances in which the odds must be calculated to determine whether an 
opportunity was lost.  Further, even 
if this did present such a circumstance, Rivers has not designated an expert to 
testify as to the basis for quantifying the percentage chance that may have been 
lost by the Firm's alleged malpractice.  
Without such testimony, any recovery would be based on the type of 
speculation and conjecture we do not permit as a basis for damages.  See Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1134 (Wyo. 1978).

 
 
[¶29]   We do not with this decision 
declare that there can never be a circumstance under which the loss-of-chance 
doctrine may apply to a legal malpractice claim.  This case does, however, fit squarely 
within the parameters of the type of case in which the doctrine should have no 
application.  

 
 
Observing 
that the jury in a legal malpractice action has the opportunity to decide, in 
retrospect, the probable outcome of the "case within the case" also helps 
capture why the analogy to suits against physicians ultimately breaks down.  The critical prerequisite to employment 
of loss of a chance in the medical context is the existence of reliable 
statistical information, gleaned from rigorous studies that are typically 
generated outside the context of litigation, as to the survival rates of 
patients who are classified by reference to various objective 
characteristics.  This is the sort 
of information that tells us that a Hispanic woman who is forty years old, and 
presents a certain medical profile, has a thirty percent chance of surviving a 
cancer of a given type if it is diagnosed and treated in a certain way.  The presence of this sort of reliable 
statistical information, which is capable of being introduced to the jury at 
trial by a competent expert witness, helps explain the concern behind, and 
perhaps the propriety of, the adoption of loss of a chance in the medical 
setting.  For certain kinds of 
patients, we know with some confidence that three out of ten would survive 
without malpractice.  Yet we also 
know that, absent a change in the rules on proof of causation, none of those who 
suffer malpractice and would have survived in its absence will ever 
recover.

There 
is simply no comparable ground motivating the adoption of loss of a chance in 
legal malpractice.  Because we are 
dealing with outcomes determined almost entirely by human interactions, rather 
than events dominated by biological processes, there is now, and may always be, 
a dearth of controlled studies and meaningful statistical information that might 
permit a qualified expert justifiably to assign a percentage chance of success 
to a given type of legal claim.  
Likewise, there is no well-defined body of expertise that purports to set 
standards for the drawing of sound inferences about the chances of prevailing on 
a given kind of legal claim.  In 
short, the jury in a legal malpractice claim is not being presented with sound 
statistical information as to whether, absent malpractice, this sort of client, 
in this sort of circumstance, has a three in ten chance of prevailing.  Rather, the jury is necessarily required 
to consider the "case within the case" as a one-off event.  Thus, even granting that attorneys, like 
doctors, owe it to their clients to take reasonable steps to provide them with 
the best odds of prevailing, loss of a chance seems out of place in the realm of 
legal malpractice.

 
 
John 
C.P. Goldberg, What Clients are 
Owed:  Cautionary Observations on 
Lawyers and Loss of a Chance, 52 Emory L.J. 1201, 1212-13 (2003).  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶30]   The record contains no evidence or 
pleadings in support of Rivers' claim for expectancy damages, and this case does 
not present circumstances that would compel extension of the loss-of-chance 
doctrine to legal malpractice claims.  
The district court thus properly granted the Firm's motion for partial 
summary judgment.