Case Title: BUTTRELL v McBRIDE LAND LIVESTOC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-08-10T00:00:00Z

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( 0 . !.32j5 IN THE jUp!tL~k, ,OIJK.C 9F 'I'HE STA CL . ! h iVlOi~'I~i\lk 19 7 6 v ~ c 8 K l L l L TAND h LIVESTOCK, a Montana ;orporation, Defendant and Respondent. ippdd!. i r c ) l \ i : )is trlict Court of t h e Sixth J u d i c i a l D i s r r i c t , tionorable Jack D. Shans trom, Judge p r e s i d i n g , For Appellant : James A . Tulley argued, Big Timber, Montana "or Itespondent : Kenneth R. Olson argued, Big Timber, Montana Submitted: May 26, 1976 Decided : flu(, 1 6 iq X r . J u s t i c e Johli Sonway Harrison dellvereci t h e O p ~ n i o ~ l oi r h ~ Court. This is an appeal from the order of the d i s t r i c t court, Sweet Grass County dismissing p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint f o r fa.ilure to s t a t e a claim upon which r e l i e f may be granted. P l a i n t i f f , Margaret B u t t r e l l , f i l e d an action based on an alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.S. $ 5 201 through 219. She alleged she had not been paid the minimum wage and had not been paid overtime as required by the s t a t u t e . Her complaint was dismissed by the d i s t r i c t court f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a claim upon which r e l i e f may be granted, based on the c o u r t ' s finding t h a t p l a i n t i f f was not substantially engaged i n i n t e r s t a t e commerce. P l a i n t i f f appeals. The question t o be decided i s whether the dismissal of the complaint was proper. The United Sta.tes Supreme Court s e t out the c l a s s i c t e s t of the sufficiency of a complaint as against a motion t o dismiss i n Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L ed 2d 80, 84: I!* Jx I n appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted r u l e t h a t a complaint should not be dismissed for f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a claim unless it appears beyond doubt t h a t the p l a i n t i f f can prove no s e t of f a c t s i n support of h i s claim which would e n t i t l e him t o r e l i e f . " This Court said i n Kielmann v. Mogan, 156 Mont. 230, 233, "It i s well s e t t l e d that a complaint should not be dismissed f o r insufficiency unless it appears f o r c e r t a i n t h a t p l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o no r e l i e f under any s t a t e of f a c t s which could be proved i n support of the claim. Hamman v. United S t a t e s , 267 F. Supp. 411 (Mont. D.C. 1967) ." A stronger statement of t h i s r u l e i s found i n Wheeler v. Xoe, 163 Mont. 154, 160, 515 P.2d 679, where the Court, quoting from 5 Wright and M i l l e r ' s Federal Practice and Procedure, p. 598, said: I 1 I The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted. 9 : * * "'As a practical matter, a dismissal under Rule 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) is likely to be granted only in the unusual case in which plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief. In other words, dismissal is justified only when the allegations of the complaint itself clearly demonstrate that plaintiff does not have a claim. * * *I1' In the instant case then, the question is whether plaintiff made allegations on the face of her complaint which demonstrate that she does not have a claim; whether she could prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief. The district court found the insufficiency of the complaint was that there was no coverage under the Fair La.bor Standards Act. The basic provisions of that Act must be examined to determine if the court was correct in dismissing the complaint. The Act, 29 U.S.C.S. 5206, requires: " ( a ) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages at the following rates: " ( 1 ) not less than $2 an hour * * *." The Act does not attempt to cover every employee that Congress could have reached by a full exercise of the Constitution's commerce clause power. Under the Act, the determination of the extent of coverage is "a problem of statutory delineation, not constitutional power * * * . I 1 Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88, 63 S.Ct. 125, 87 L ed 83, 84. A key to the determination of the scope of coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act is the definition of "commerce". 11 29 U.S. C .S. § 2 0 3 ( b ) , defines commercet1 as : 1 1 r Commerce' means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States, or between any State and any place outside thereof ." By this definition, commerce includes the act of communication. The Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division discusses this aspect of the definition of "commerce" at 29 C.F.R. 5 776.10 ( b ) : 'I* * * since 'commerce' as used in the act includes not only 'transmission' of communications but 'communi- cation' itself, employees whose work involves the con- tinued use of the interstate mails, telegraph, telephone or similar instrumentalities for communication across State lines are covered by the act. This does not mean that any use by an employee of the mails and other channels of communication is sufficient to establish coverage. But if the employee, as a regular and recurrent part of his duties, uses such instrumentalities in obtaining or communicating information or in sending or receiving written reports or messages, or orders for goods or services, or plans or other documents across State lines, he comes within the within the scope of the act as an employee directly engaged in the work of 'communication' between the State and places outside the State." As originally enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act only 11 covered employees who were themselves engaged in commerce" or in "the production of goods for commerce". Later the Act was amended to extend coverage to employees of an "enterprise engaged in commerce" whether the employees themselves were engaged in commerce or not. In Paragraph 3 of her complaint, plaintiff set out these facts to show she was covered by the Act: "* * 9~ During the course of her employment in such position, plaintiff was called upon to conduct corres- pondence and engage in telephone conversations with prospective real estate purchasers located both within and outside the State of Montana. Plaintiff states that a substantial portion of her services during the term of her employment were rendered in dealing with persons living outside the State of Montana, and that said defendant is actively engaged in interstate commerce." After careful examination, these allegations prove s u f f i c i e n t t o show t h a t p l a i n t i f f was covered by the F a i r Labor Standards Act. The f i r s t sentence quoted i s very nearly a paraphrase of the Wage and Hour Division's regulation heretofore quoted. The allegation t h a t defendant was "actively engaged i n i n t e r s t a t e commerce" r a i s e s the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a " s t a t e of f a c t s * * * cnuld be proved i n support of the claim" t h a t would be the basis of coverage of the defendant corporation and therefore the p l a i n t i f f employee under the "enterprise" coverage. These allegations do not show, on the face of the complaint, t h a t p l a i n t i f f would not be covered by the F a i r Labor Standards Act, j u s t the opposite. They would e n t i t l e p l a i n t i f f t o r e l i e f , i f supported by the evidence presented a t t r i a l . The motion t o dismiss f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a claim upon which r e l i e f may be granted is not the proper place t o determine coverage under the F a i r Labor Standards Act. A t t h a t point such a determination is premature and must necessarily be based on inferences and not on proven facts. McComb v. Johnson, 174 F.2d 833. The issue of coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act i s often the determinitive one, there being no dispute about the wage r a t e being below the minimum established by the s t a t u t e . This issue is too important t o be decided on assumed or inferred f a c t s extrapolated from modern notice pleadings. In Clyde v. Broderick, 144 F.2d 348, decided before the amendments expanded the coverage t o include employees of an "enter- prise", the p l a i n t i f f s f a i l e d t o specifically allege t h a t t h e i r duties were devoted t o commerce. The court refused t o dismiss the complaint because it f e l t t h a t - more than the "short and plain statement" of the f a c t s i n a complaint violates the s p i r i t of simplicity, con- ciseness and directness t h a t is the basis of modern pleadings. The court pointed out t h a t f a c t s would be developed a t t r i a l o r upon further pleading which would c l e a r l y show whether the p l a i n t i f f s were covered by the Act. Any further specific information, f o r example information as t o which workweeks the p l a i n t i f f claims she wa.s engaged i n commerce during the time she s e t out i n her complaint, and who her fellow employees were i f "enterprise" coverage i s claimed, may be obtained by the proper use of the discovery tools provided i n the Montana Rules of C i v i l Procedure. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s order t o dismiss the complaint f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a claim upon which r e l i e f may be grant i s vacated. The cause i s remanded f o r further proceedings. Concur : ~ d n . Bernard W. Thomas, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison.