Case Title: State v. Whitfield

Citation: 2010-Ohio-2

Docket Number: 20081669

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-01-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Whitfield, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-2 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WHITFIELD, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Whitfield, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2.] 
Criminal law — Allied offenses of similar import — Sentencing — R.C. 
2941.25(A) — Appellate procedure — State retains right to elect which 
offense to pursue on remand to trial court — Court of appeals must 
remand for new sentencing hearing upon finding reversible error in 
imposition of multiple punishments for allied offenses — Determinations 
of guilt for each offense remain intact after merger of allied offenses for 
sentencing. 
(No. 2008-1669 — Submitted September 15, 2009 — Decided January 5, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 90244, 
2008-Ohio-3150. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
The state retains the right to elect which allied offense to pursue on 
sentencing on a remand to the trial court after appeal. 
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2. 
Upon finding reversible error in the imposition of multiple punishments 
for allied offenses, a court of appeals must reverse the judgment of 
conviction and remand for a new sentencing hearing at which the state 
must elect which allied offense it will pursue against the defendant. 
3. 
Because R.C. 2941.25(A) protects a defendant only from being punished 
for allied offenses, the determination of the defendant’s guilt for 
committing allied offenses remains intact, both before and after the merger 
of allied offenses for sentencing. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we address the proper procedure for courts of 
appeals to follow after finding reversible error with respect to sentences imposed 
for allied offenses of similar import. 
Relevant Background 
{¶ 2} After a bench trial, the trial judge found appellee, Darnell 
Whitfield, guilty of drug possession, drug trafficking, having a weapon under 
disability, and carrying a concealed weapon, as well as three firearms 
specifications.  The judge imposed three-year concurrent sentences on all counts, 
to be served consecutively to a term of one year for the three firearms 
specifications, which the judge merged at sentencing.1 
{¶ 3} Whitfield appealed, arguing that the trial court had erred in 
denying his motions to suppress and for acquittal and that it had “committed plain 
error by convicting and sentencing him on both drug possession and drug 
trafficking which are allied offense of similar import.”  After rejecting his claims 
on suppression and acquittal, the court of appeals applied our decision in State v. 
                                                          
 
1.  Inexplicably, the trial judge did not merge the drug-possession and trafficking charges, 
however.   
 
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Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625,  886 N.E.2d 181, paragraph two 
of the syllabus, and agreed that the trial court had committed plain error by 
convicting Whitfield of both drug possession and drug trafficking, which are 
allied offenses of similar import.  State v. Whitfield, Cuyahoga App. No. 90244, 
2009-Ohio-3150, ¶ 36-37.  There was no error in that portion of the ruling. 
{¶ 4} In reversing, however, the court of appeals stated, “We therefore 
sustain [Whitfield’s] third assignment of error, reverse the conviction for drug 
possession and remand the case to the trial court to vacate the drug possession 
conviction.  See R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-
Ohio-1245 [846 N.E.2d 824]; State v. Yarbrough, 104 Ohio St.3d 1, 2004-Ohio-
6087 [817 N.E.2d 845].”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at ¶ 38. 
{¶ 5} We accepted discretionary review of the state’s appeal, 120 Ohio 
St.3d 1486, 2009-Ohio-278, 900 N.E.2d 197.  The state asserts that “upon finding 
one or more counts to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, 
R.C. 2941.25(A) requires that the convictions are merged for the purposes of 
sentencing and [that] the defendant [can] be sentenced only on one.”  We agree 
and take this opportunity to provide guidance on the proper manner in which the 
courts of appeal should remand cases after finding errors committed in sentencing 
on allied offenses. 
Analysis 
{¶ 6} R.C. 2941.25(A) provides, “Where the same conduct by defendant 
can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the 
indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the 
defendant may be convicted of only one.” 
{¶ 7} At the outset of our analysis, we recognize that the statute 
incorporates the constitutional protections against double jeopardy.  These 
protections generally forbid successive prosecutions and multiple punishments for 
the same offense. 
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{¶ 8} In the case of multiple punishments, a defendant is protected only 
from multiple punishments that were not intended by the legislature.  Legislatures 
are empowered to either permit or prohibit multiple punishments for the same 
offense.  State v. Childs (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 558, 561, 728 N.E.2d 379.  By its 
enactment of R.C. 2941.25(A), the General Assembly has clearly expressed its 
intention to prohibit multiple punishments for allied offenses of similar import.  
State v. Rance (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 710 N.E.2d 699, paragraph three of the 
syllabus.  See also Maumee v. Geiger (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 238, 242-243, 74 
O.O.2d 380, 344 N.E.2d 133 (the statute is designed to prevent “shotgun 
convictions” and “double punishment” for the same offense); State v. Stewart, 
Franklin App. No. 05AP-1073, 2006-Ohio-3310, 2006 WL 1781412, ¶ 6, citing 
Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d at 635, 710 N.E.2d 699 (“Ohio’s General Assembly has 
indicated its intent to permit or prohibit cumulative punishments for the 
commission of certain offenses through the multiple-count statute set forth in R.C. 
2941.25” ).  This case involves the latter protection – the prohibition against 
multiple punishments for the same offense. 
{¶ 9} By contrast, the General Assembly exercised its power to permit 
multiple punishments by enacting R.C. 2941.25(B).  State v. Brown, 119 Ohio 
St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 17; Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d  at 635, 
citing Albernaz v. United States (1981), 450 U.S. 333, 344, 101 S.Ct. 1127, 67 
L.Ed.2d 275.  Here, however, we are not presented with such a case. 
{¶ 10} Rather, the parties agree that R.C. 2941.25(A) forbids multiple 
punishments for drug possession and drug trafficking, which are allied offenses of 
similar import.  Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625, 886 N.E.2d 181, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  The court of appeals properly recognized that on 
the facts of this case, the trial court committed reversible error and that 
Whitfield’s convictions for the allied possession and trafficking offenses must be 
merged on remand. 
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{¶ 11} This appeal poses two questions:  (1) What exactly does R.C. 
2941.25(A) prohibit when it states that a defendant may be “convicted” of only 
one of two allied offenses? and (2) When a sentencing court violates this 
prohibition, what is the proper procedure on remand? 
{¶ 12} We have little trouble with the first question.  Our past decisions 
make clear that for purposes of R.C. 2941.25, a “conviction” consists of a guilty 
verdict and the imposition of a sentence or penalty.  State v. Gapen, 104 Ohio 
St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-6548, 819 N.E.2d 1047, ¶ 135; State v. McGuire (1997), 80 
Ohio St.3d 390, 399, 686 N.E.2d 1112 (“a conviction consists of a verdict and 
sentence”).  See also State v. Fenwick (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 1252, 1253, 745 
N.E.2d 1046 (Cook, J., concurring), citing McGuire (“[f]or purposes of  R.C. 
2941.25, this court has already determined that a ‘conviction’ consists of both 
‘verdict and sentence’ ” [emphasis sic]); State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 5, 520 N.E.2d 568 (“as there is only one order of execution, there can be 
only one conviction.  See R.C. 2941.25(A) and State v. Henderson (1979), 58 
Ohio St.2d 171, 12 O.O. 177, 389 N.E.2d 494, wherein ‘conviction’ includes both 
the guilt determination and the penalty imposition” [emphasis sic]). 
{¶ 13} We recognize that certain decisions from this court might be read 
to suggest that a conviction does not necessarily require a sentence.  For example, 
in State v. Cash (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 116, 118, 532 N.E.2d 111, we held that a 
prior plea of guilty, without a sentence, was a “conviction” for purposes of 
Evid.R. 609(A) and could be used for impeachment of a witness.  See also State 
ex rel. Watkins v. Fiorenzo (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 259, 260, 643 N.E.2d 521 
(holding for purposes of R.C. 2921.42(C)(1) that a guilty finding alone is 
sufficient to constitute a conviction).  But those decisions are expressly limited to 
the discrete issues presented in them.  See Cash at 118, 532 N.E.2d 111 
(acknowledging precedent requiring both a finding of guilt and a sentence and 
limiting its own holding to impeachment under Evid.R. 609(A)); Watkins at 260, 
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643 N.E.2d 521 (recognizing that “the term ‘conviction’ normally includes both 
the finding of guilt and the sentence” and justifying its departure from that rule by 
the language of R.C. 2921.41(C)(1)).  Thus, these cases do not conflict with our 
holding today that for purposes of R.C. 2941.25(A), a conviction is a 
determination of guilt and the ensuing sentence. 
{¶ 14} We now turn to the second question:  When a sentencing court 
violates R.C. 2941.25(A) by convicting a defendant of two allied offenses and 
then sentencing the defendant on both, what is the proper procedure on remand? 
{¶ 15} The state contends that when a court correctly applies R.C. 
2941.25(A) and merges convictions for allied offenses, only the sentences should 
be merged, i.e., both underlying determinations of guilt should be left intact.  The 
state urges this court to revisit State v. Yarbrough, 104 Ohio St.3d 1, 2004-Ohio-
6087, 817 N.E.2d 845, in which this court, upon finding that the defendant had 
been improperly convicted and sentenced for two allied offenses of similar 
import, merged the convictions and dismissed one of the two counts.  Id. at ¶ 103.  
The state asks us to clarify the law, contending that confusion has resulted from 
Yarbrough and our seemingly conflicting subsequent decisions in State v. Winn, 
121 Ohio St.3d  413, 2009-Ohio-1059, 905 N.E.2d 154, and Cabrales, 118 Ohio 
St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625,  886 N.E.2d 181.  In the latter two cases, we affirmed 
appellate court decisions vacating only the sentence for one of the allied offenses 
and leaving both convictions intact, without reference to Yarbrough. 
{¶ 16} Although Yarbrough, Cabrales, and Winn addressed important 
aspects of allied-offense jurisprudence, none of them address the narrow 
argument advanced by the state.  Rather, in answering the question, we start with 
our understanding that R.C. 2941.25(A) codifies the judicial doctrine of merger. 
State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 42; State 
v. Logan (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 131, 14 O.O. 373, 397 N.E.2d 1345.  That 
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doctrine operates to merge allied offenses of similar import into a single 
conviction.  Brown at ¶ 42. 
{¶ 17} A defendant may be indicted and tried for allied offenses of similar 
import, but may be sentenced on only one of the allied offenses.  Brown at ¶ 43, 
citing Geiger, 45 Ohio St.2d at 244, 74 O.O.2d 380, 344 N.E.2d 133.  In fact, our 
precedent, including cumulative-punishment cases that predate the 1972 
enactment of R.C. 2941.25(A), makes clear that a defendant may be found guilty 
of allied offenses but not sentenced on them.  See, e.g., State v. Botta (1971), 27 
Ohio St.2d 196, 203, 56 O.O.2d 119, 271 N.E.2d 776 (“Where * * * in substance 
and effect but one offense has been committed, a verdict of guilty by the jury 
under more than one count does not require a retrial but only requires that the 
court not impose more than one sentence” [emphasis added]); Weaver v. State 
(1906), 74 Ohio St. 53, 77 N.E. 273, paragraph one of the syllabus (when there 
are multiple counts of violating liquor statutes, but only one offense, “ it is error 
for the court, on a verdict of guilty under each count, to inflict the penalties 
prescribed by each of the said sections” [emphasis added]); Woodford v. State 
(1853), 1 Ohio St. 427, paragraph three of the syllabus (“Where an offence forms 
but one transaction, and the indictment containing several counts on which the 
jury have returned a verdict of guilty, it is error in the court to sentence on each 
count separately” [emphasis added]). 
{¶ 18} In cases in which the imposition of multiple punishments is at 
issue, R.C. 2941.25(A)’s mandate that a defendant may only be “convicted” of 
one allied offense is a protection against multiple sentences rather than multiple 
convictions.  See, e.g., Ohio v. Johnson (1984), 467 U.S. 493, 498, 104 S.Ct. 
2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425, in which the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause protects against successive prosecutions and against 
multiple punishments for the same offense.  Thus, to ensure that there are not 
improper cumulative punishments for allied offenses, courts must be cognizant 
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that R.C. 2941.25(A) requires that “the trial court effects the merger at 
sentencing.”  State v. Gapen, 104 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-6548, 819 N.E.2d 
1047, ¶ 135. See also State v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 572, 687 N.E.2d 
685; Stewart, 2006-Ohio-3310, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 19} In this case, the court of appeals properly corrected the trial court’s 
error in sentencing Whitfield for the allied offenses of drug possession and drug 
trafficking.  But the court of appeals erred in ordering that this case be “remanded 
to the trial court with instructions to vacate the conviction and sentence for drug 
possession only.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 20} The General Assembly has made clear that it is the state that 
chooses which of the allied offenses to pursue at sentencing, and it may choose 
any of the allied offenses.  Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 
N.E.2d 149, ¶ 16 and 43, citing Geiger, 45 Ohio St.2d at 244, 74 O.O.2d 380, 344 
N.E.2d 133; Legislative Service Commission Summary of Am.Sub.H.B. 511, The 
New Ohio Criminal Code (June 1973) 69.  In conferring that right on the state, the 
legislature did not specify when the state must make that election.  The 
Legislative Service summary states that “the prosecution sooner or later must 
elect as to which offense it wishes to pursue,” (emphasis added), id., thereby 
implying that the state has latitude in determining when to decide which offense 
to pursue at sentencing. 
{¶ 21} In light of the legislative history, we concluded previously that the 
statute does not require the state to make its election prior to trial.  State v. Weind 
(1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 224, 236, 4 O.O.3d 413, 364 N.E.2d 224, vacated on other 
grounds (1978), 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3137, 57 L.Ed.2d 1156.  See also State v. 
Roberts (June 23, 1988), Auglaize App. No. 2-87-18, 1988 WL 68700 (the state 
does not lose its right to elect by failing to exercise it before a verdict of guilty has 
been returned).  We see nothing in the language of R.C. 2941.25(A) that would 
deny the state the same right on remand. The state therefore retains the right to 
January Term, 2010 
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elect which allied offense to pursue on sentencing on a remand to the trial court 
after an appeal. 
{¶ 22} The court of appeals impermissibly intruded on the state’s right to 
elect by directing the trial court to vacate the drug-possession conviction.  We 
reverse that portion of the court of appeals’ decision in this case and remand the 
cause to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing at which the state must elect 
the offense for which Whitfield should be punished. 
{¶ 23} When confronted with allied offenses, courts must be guided by 
two principles:  that R.C. 2941.25(A) prohibits “convictions” for allied offenses 
and that the state controls which of the two allied offenses the defendant will be 
sentenced on. 
{¶ 24} When the state elects which of the two allied offenses to seek 
sentencing for, the court must accept the state’s choice and merge the crimes into 
a single conviction for sentencing, Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 
895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 41, and impose a sentence that is appropriate for the merged 
offense.  Thereafter, a “conviction” consists of a guilty verdict and the imposition 
of a sentence or penalty. See, e.g., Gapen, 104 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-6548, 
819 N.E.2d 1047, ¶ 135; McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d at 399, 686 N.E.2d 1112; 
Fenwick, 91 Ohio St.3d at 1253, 745 N.E.2d 1046 (Cook, J., concurring).  The 
defendant is not “convicted” for purposes of R.C. 2941.25(A) until the sentence is 
imposed. 
{¶ 25} If, upon appeal, a court of appeals finds reversible error in the 
imposition of multiple punishments for allied offenses, the court must reverse the 
judgment of conviction and remand for a new sentencing hearing at which the 
state must elect which allied offense it will pursue against the defendant.  On 
remand, trial courts must address any double jeopardy protections that benefit the 
defendant.  However, as this court observed in State v. Calhoun (1985), 18 Ohio 
St.3d 373, 376-377, 18 OBR 429, 481 N.E.2d 624, “At least in the absence of an 
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acquittal or a termination based on a ruling that the prosecution’s case was legally 
insufficient, no interest protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a 
retrial when reversal is predicated on trial error alone.  The purpose of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause is to preserve for the defendant acquittals or favorable factual 
determinations but not to shield from appellate review erroneous legal 
conclusions not predicated on any factual determinations.”  Thus, the state is not 
precluded from pursuing any of the allied offenses upon a remand for a new 
sentencing hearing. 
{¶ 26} On remand, the trial court should fulfill its duty in merging the 
offenses for purposes of sentencing, but remain cognizant that R.C. 2941.25(A)’s 
mandate that a “defendant may be convicted of only one” allied offense is a 
proscription against sentencing a defendant for more than one allied offense.  
Nothing in the plain language of the statute or in its legislative history suggests 
that the General Assembly intended to interfere with a determination by a jury or 
judge that a defendant is guilty of allied offenses.  As the state asserts, by enacting 
R.C. 2941.25(A), the General Assembly condemned multiple sentences for allied 
offenses, not the determinations that the defendant was guilty of allied offenses. 
{¶ 27} Because R.C. 2941.25(A) protects a defendant only from being 
punished for allied offenses, the determination of the defendant’s guilt for 
committing allied offenses remains intact, both before and after the merger of 
allied offenses for sentencing. 2  Thus, the trial court should not vacate or dismiss 
the guilt determination. 
                                                          
 
2.  {¶ a} The dissent contends that “[in] essence, the offense that the state elects to pursue absorbs 
the other offense and nothing remains of the absorbed offense, including the finding of guilt.”  
[Dissent at ¶ 36.]  In so asserting, the dissent relies on our decision in State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio 
St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d. 824, and on two decisions from the Eighth District Court 
of Appeals, Gates Mills v. Yomtovian, 8th Dist. No. 88942, 2007-Ohio-6303, and State v. Waters, 
8th Dist. No. 85691, 2005-Ohio-5137.   
      {¶ b} Saxon, which held that the sentencing packaging doctrine is not applicable in Ohio law, 
is inapposite here and does not support the proposition for which it is cited by the dissent.  Waters, 
and the cases upon which it relies, State v. Garner, Trumbull App. No. 2002-T-0025, 2003-Ohio-
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Conclusion 
{¶ 28} For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 29} I respectfully dissent because the majority’s analysis impairs the 
finality of the judgment and may ultimately lead to a violation of a defendant’s 
right to be free from double jeopardy. 
{¶ 30} The majority states that “[t]his appeal poses two questions: (1) 
What exactly does R.C. 2941.25(A) prohibit when it states that a defendant may 
be ‘convicted’ of only one of two allied offenses? and (2) When a sentencing 
court violates this prohibition, what is the proper procedure on remand?”  The 
majority concludes that “conviction” includes both the guilt determination and the 
imposition of a sentence or penalty, citing precedent from mostly death-penalty 
cases that offer little analysis.  Two cases that were decided shortly after the 
effective date of R.C. 2941.25 offer better insight.  In Maumee v. Geiger (1976), 
45 Ohio St.2d 238, 74 O.O.2d 380, 344 N.E.2d 133, the issue was whether a 
person who admitted to the theft of property could be convicted of receiving 
stolen property.  There we stated that “the intent of the General Assembly controls 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
5222, citing State v. Collins (October 18, 2003), Cuyahoga App. No. 79064, are also inapposite 
because they are not allied offense cases.  Rather, in those cases, each judge failed to impose a 
sentence in cases in which there were multiple counts or specifications.  
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in this case, and that intent is plainly expressed in R.C. 2941.25, supra, and the 
accompanying committee comment.  Although receiving is technically not an 
included offense of theft, it is, under R.C. 2941.25, an ‘allied offense of similar 
import.’  An accused may be tried for both but may be convicted and sentenced 
for only one.  The choice is given to the prosecution to pursue one offense or the 
other, and it is plainly the intent of the General Assembly that the election may be 
of either offense.” (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 44, 74 O.O.2d 380, 344 N.E.2d 133. 
{¶ 31} In State v. Henderson (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 171, 12 O.O.3d 177, 
389 N.E.2d 494, we were asked to determine the intent of the General Assembly 
in enacting the phrase “previously been convicted of a theft offense” as used in 
former R.C. 2913.02(B), which elevated a misdemeanor theft offense to grand 
theft, a fourth-degree felony.  Henderson had been separately indicted on one 
count of receiving stolen property and one count of grand theft.  Although he had 
pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property, and the court had accepted that plea, 
he had not yet been sentenced when he was indicted for grand theft.  The trial 
court determined that a plea of guilty was sufficient to satisfy the prior-conviction 
element.  The court of appeals reversed, holding that a judgment entry of 
conviction was necessary to constitute a “conviction.”  In affirming the appellate 
court, we noted two important considerations: (1) a prior conviction was an 
integral element of the offense of grand theft and (2) R.C. 2901.04(A) requires 
that we construe the meaning of “convicted” strictly against the state and liberally 
in favor of the defendant.  Id. at 174, 12 O.O.3d 177, 389 N.E.2d 494.  This court 
determined that the statute required a more final adjudication of the defendant’s 
guilt, i.e., the pronouncement of a sentence.  Id. at 178, 12 O.O.3d 177, 389 
N.E.2d 494. 
{¶ 32} In Whitfield’s case, however, defining the term “convicted” to 
mean both a finding of guilt and a sentence works to the defendant’s detriment, 
thereby raising constitutional issues relating to a defendant’s rights.  By leaving 
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the separate finding of guilt pending, the majority prevents the defendant from 
having a final judgment on all charged offenses. 
{¶ 33} Furthermore, the use of the term “convicted” throughout the 
Revised Code, while not defined, clearly implies only the finding of guilt.  See, 
e.g., R.C. 2929.01(EE) (“ ‘Sentence’ means the sanction or combination of 
sanctions imposed by the sentencing court on an offender who is convicted of or 
pleads guilty to an offense”) (emphasis added); R.C. 2929.19(A) (“The court shall 
hold a sentencing hearing before imposing a sentence under this chapter upon an 
offender who was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony * * *”) (emphasis 
added); R.C. 2929.16(E) (“If a person who has been convicted of or pleaded 
guilty to a felony is sentenced to community residential sanction”) (emphasis 
added); R.C. 2930.19 (C) (“The failure of any person or entity to provide a right, 
privilege, or notice to a victim under this chapter does not constitute grounds for 
declaring a mistrial or new trial, for setting aside a conviction, sentence, 
adjudication, or disposition, or for granting postconviction release to a defendant 
or alleged juvenile offender”) (emphasis added). 
{¶ 34} In Henderson, 58 Ohio St.2d at 178, 12 O.O. 177, 389 N.E.2d 494, 
a case involving the enhanced penalty provisions of former R.C. 2913.02(B), we 
acknowledged that the General Assembly used the term “conviction” to mean 
simply the finding of guilt in several statutes, but concluded that “the distinction 
between conviction and sentencing in these few provisions exists solely for the 
purpose of depicting various procedures to be followed during the interval after a 
defendant’s guilt is legally adjudicated and before an appropriate penalty or 
treatment is determined.  It is unreasonable to assume that the General Assembly 
intended an intermediate stage in a criminal proceeding, evidenced by the entry of 
a plea of guilty, to invoke the enhanced penalty provisions of R.C. 2913.02(B).”  
But for purposes of R.C. 2941.25, it makes sense that the General Assembly 
intended to confine the term “convicted” to the finding of guilt, because allied 
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offenses are to be merged before sentencing.  See State v. Harris, 122 Ohio St.3d 
373, 2009-Ohio-3323, 911 N.E.2d 882, ¶ 23 (“Geiger requires the prosecution to 
elect which offense it will pursue after a finding of guilt but prior to sentencing”). 
{¶ 35} Even if I were to accept that “conviction” includes sentencing as 
well as a finding of guilt in this case, I cannot agree with the majority’s remedy.  
In State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 42, 
this court acknowledged that R.C. 2941.25 is a legislative attempt to codify the 
judicial doctrine of merger, i.e., the principle that “ ‘a major crime often includes 
as inherent therein the component elements of other crimes and that these 
component elements, in legal effect, are merged in the major crime.’ ”  Id., 
quoting State v. Botta (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 196, 201, 56 O.O.2d 119, 271 N.E.2d 
776.  See also State v. Rice (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 422, 424, 23 O.O.3d 374, 433 
N.E.2d 175; State v. Roberts (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 170, 172, 16 O.O.3d 201, 405 
N.E.2d 247; State v. Logan (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 131, 14 O.O.3d 373, 397 
N.E.2d 1345.  Although the majority acknowledges the merger doctrine, it 
inexplicably holds that the separate determination of the defendant’s guilt on each 
allied offense remains intact, both before and after merged sentencing. 
{¶ 36} This holding contradicts the concept of merger.  The allied 
offenses combine into one pursuant to R.C. 2941.25(A).  In essence, the offense 
that the state elects to pursue absorbs the other offense and nothing remains of the 
absorbed offense, including the finding of guilt.  See Gates Mills v. Yomtovian, 
8th Dist. No. 88942, 2007-Ohio-6303, ¶ 23 (“ ‘merge’ in criminal law is defined 
as, ‘[t]he absorption of a lesser included offense into a more serious offense when 
a person is charged with both crimes, so that the person is not subject to double 
jeopardy.’  Black's Law Dictionary (8 Ed. Rev.2004) 1009”).  To say that a 
determination of guilt on the merged offense survives means it remains pending in 
limbo and prevents a final judgment from being entered.  See State v. Saxon, 109 
Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 8 (a trial court must 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
separately assign a particular sentence to each offense); State v. Waters, 8th Dist. 
No. 85691, 2005-Ohio-5137 (an order that fails to impose sentence for an offense 
for which the offender was found guilty not only violates this rule, but renders the 
resultant order nonfinal and not immediately appealable). 
{¶ 37} Once the state elects which allied offense it will pursue, that 
decision should be final, and the trial court should dismiss the other allied count.  
If the court of appeals reverses the judgment of conviction, the state should not be 
given a second chance to convict on the charge merged.  By holding that the 
determination of guilt remains undisturbed after the merger of the allied offenses, 
the majority focuses on the prohibition against multiple punishments for the same 
offense, but ignores the equally important double jeopardy protection against 
successive prosecutions for the same conduct.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristen 
L. Sobieski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Spencer Cahoon, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellee. 
______________________