Case Title: Puzio v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC19-1511

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-1511 
____________ 
 
DAVID PUZIO, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
June 24, 2021 
 
LAWSON, J. 
We accepted review of the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s 
decision in the juvenile sentencing case of Puzio v. State, 278 So. 3d 
82 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019), because it expressly and directly conflicts 
with our decision in Williams v. State, 242 So. 3d 280 (Fla. 2018), 
on the same question of law.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  The 
conflict turns on the proper remedy for a harmful Alleyne error that 
occurs where, in sentencing a juvenile offender under section 
775.082(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2020), the trial court enhances the 
sentence under section 775.082(1)(b)1. without a jury finding of the 
 
- 2 - 
fact that authorizes the enhancement, namely whether the juvenile 
offender “actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the 
victim.”1  See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013) 
(“Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an 
‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”); see also Williams, 242 So. 3d at 288 (holding 
that the section 775.082(1)(b) finding authorizing the enhancement 
“is an ‘element’ of the offense, which Alleyne requires be submitted 
to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt”).   
In Williams, we held that the “proper remedy” for a harmful 
Alleyne error in this context “is to resentence the juvenile offender 
pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2.,” 242 So. 3d at 282, which 
applies to a juvenile offender “who did not actually kill, intend to 
kill, or attempt to kill the victim.”  Id. at 287 (quoting 
§775.082(1)(b)2.).  In Puzio, however, the Fourth District remanded 
for the trial judge to remedy the same harmful error through a 
 
 
1.  The 2016 version of section 775.082(1)(b) applied to the 
resentencing in Williams, whereas the 2017 version applied to the 
resentencing at issue here.  However, there is no substantive 
difference between these versions or the current version of the 
statute. 
 
- 3 - 
“ministerial correction” of sentence, for which “[t]he defendant need 
not be present.”  Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 86.  Because the remedy 
approved by the Fourth District falls short of the de novo 
resentencing that Williams requires, we quash the district court’s 
decision and remand with instructions to remand to the trial court 
for resentencing as required by Williams. 
BACKGROUND 
In 1994, when Petitioner David Puzio was a juvenile, he and 
two adults perpetrated a carjacking, in which two victims were shot 
and killed.  Id. at 84.  The jury found Puzio guilty of two counts of 
first-degree murder and one count of armed carjacking, and the 
State sought the death penalty for the two homicide convictions.  Id.  
Puzio’s jury recommended life, and the trial court sentenced Puzio 
to life in prison without parole on all three counts.  Id. 
 
In 2017, Puzio was resentenced following the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision that “mandatory life-without-parole 
sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.”  Id. (quoting 
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012)).  With respect to the 
homicide convictions, the trial court considered whether Puzio 
should be resentenced, as argued by the State, pursuant to section 
 
- 4 - 
775.082(1)(b)1.—the sentencing statute applying to juveniles “who 
actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim”—or, 
as argued by Puzio, pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2.—the 
sentencing statute applying to juveniles “who did not actually kill, 
intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim.”  Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 84 
(quoting § 775.082(1)(b) 1.-2., Fla. Stat. (2017)). 
While Puzio faced a possible life sentence under both 
provisions, if sentenced under section 775.082(1)(b)1., he would 
also receive a mandatory minimum of at least forty years in prison, 
with entitlement to a sentencing review after twenty-five years.  See 
§§ 775.082(1)(b)1., 921.1402(2)(a), Fla. Stat (2017).  In contrast, if 
sentenced under section 775.082(1)(b)2., the mandatory minimum 
would not apply, and if Puzio was sentenced to more than fifteen 
years in prison, he would be entitled to a sentencing review after 
fifteen years.  See §§ 775.082(1)(b)2., 921.1402(2)(c). 
 
Puzio argued that he should be resentenced under section 
775.082(1)(b)2. “because the jury was not asked to find, and did not 
find, that he actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill the 
victims, as required under section 775.082(1)(b)1.”  Puzio, 278 So. 
3d at 85.  He supported this argument by highlighting that the 
 
- 5 - 
verdict form failed to ask his jury to differentiate between felony 
murder and premeditation when determining whether he was guilty 
of first-degree murder.  Additionally, Puzio argued that his penalty-
phase jury made a contrary finding when it wrote the word “yes” 
next to the following mitigating factor: Puzio “was an accomplice in 
the offense . . . but the offense was committed by another person 
and [Puzio]’s participation was relatively minor.”  
Ultimately, the trial court applied section 775.082(1)(b)1. and 
resentenced Puzio on both homicide counts “to sixty years in 
prison, with entitlement to review after having spent twenty-five 
years in prison.”  Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 85.  However, contrary to 
section 775.082(1)(b)1., the trial court failed to state that Puzio 
would be imprisoned for “at least forty years on the first[-]degree 
murder counts.”  Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 85.  Puzio appealed to the 
Fourth District, which temporarily relinquished jurisdiction to the 
trial court to comply with section 775.082(1)(b)3., which requires a 
written finding by the trial court “as to whether a person is eligible 
for a sentence review hearing under s. 921.1402(2)(a) or (c),” based 
upon “whether the person actually killed, intended to kill, or 
attempted to kill the victim.”  § 775.082(1)(b)3. 
 
- 6 - 
During the relinquishment, this Court decided Williams.  
Thereafter, the trial court issued a written sentencing order in 
Puzio’s case, in which it explained that “although it proceeded 
under subsection 775.082(1)(b)(1) [in resentencing Puzio] . . . it 
equally finds a sixty-year sentence appropriate under section 
775.082(1)(b)(2) in light of the facts of this case.”  Puzio, 278 So. 3d 
at 85.  Almost two weeks later, without holding a hearing or 
notifying the parties, the trial court also issued a new disposition 
order—adding a mandatory forty-year minimum to Puzio’s 
sentences for the homicide convictions.  Id. 
 
Puzio’s appeal then proceeded before the Fourth District.  The 
district court applied this Court’s decision in Williams to conclude 
that the trial court committed an Alleyne error when resentencing 
Puzio under section 775.082(1)(b)1. because “no jury has found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually killed, intended to kill, 
or attempted to kill the victims.”  Id. at 85-86.  The district court 
further held that the Alleyne error was harmful because “[t]he 
record does not demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found the defendant killed, intended to 
 
- 7 - 
kill, or attempted to kill the victim[s].”  Id. at 86 (summarizing 
conflicting evidence and arguments in the record). 
As to the proper remedy, however, rather than ordering the 
resentencing required by Williams, the Fourth District reversed and 
remanded for “ministerial correction” of Puzio’s sentences for the 
two homicide offenses under section 775.082(1)(b)2., with a right to 
review after Puzio spent fifteen years in prison.  Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 
86.  The Fourth District further directed that Puzio “need not be 
present for this ministerial correction” and offered the following 
reasoning for why Puzio was not entitled to the resentencing 
required by Williams: 
[T]he trial court already stated that “it equally finds a 
sixty-year sentence appropriate under section 
775.082(1)(b)(2) in light of the facts of this case.” . . . 
[T]he trial court’s comments conclusively show that the 
court would have imposed the same sentence. 
 
Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 86. 
 
This Court accepted discretionary jurisdiction based on 
express and direct conflict between the “ministerial correction” 
remedy ordered in Puzio and the resentencing remedy ordered in 
Williams.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
 
- 8 - 
ANALYSIS 
We quash the Fourth District’s decision because its remedy of 
a “ministerial correction” of sentence at which “[t]he defendant need 
not be present,” Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 86, falls short of the remedy of 
resentencing pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2., which Williams 
establishes is “the appropriate remedy for” the harmful Alleyne 
error at issue, Williams, 242 So. 3d 280 at 292.  “[R]esentencing is a 
new proceeding.”  State v. Collins, 985 So. 2d 985, 989 (Fla. 2008).  
Therefore, resentencing under Williams must transpire “de novo on 
all issues bearing on the proper sentence,” Teffeteller v. State, 495 
So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 1986), pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2. in 
order to provide “the full panoply of due process considerations” to 
which the defendant is entitled, State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219, 220 
(Fla. 1983). 
We recognize that the Fourth District based its “ministerial 
correction” remedy on the trial court’s statement during 
relinquishment that it would have imposed the same sentences for 
the homicide offenses had it resentenced Puzio in the first instance 
under section 775.082(1)(b)2.  See Puzio, 278 So. 3d at 86.  
However, “[i]t is no answer to say that [Puzio] could have received 
 
- 9 - 
the same sentence with or without” the presence of the harmful 
Alleyne error.  Williams, 242 So. 3d at 287 (quoting Alleyne, 570 
U.S. at 115).  Moreover, as ministerial corrections do not function 
“to make substantive changes affecting a party’s rights,” United 
States v. Suarez-Perez, 484 F. 3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2007), the 
harmful Alleyne error that deprived Puzio of a constitutional 
resentencing in 2017 cannot be cured through a ministerial 
correction that, by definition, would continue to deny Puzio the 
constitutional sentencing proceeding he has yet to receive.  Cf. 
Jordan v. State, 143 So. 3d 335, 339 (Fla. 2014) (“[A] resentencing 
at which the trial judge has judicial discretion is not a ministerial 
act.”).  Rather, we hold that Puzio is entitled to the de novo 
resentencing required by Williams. 
Although our holding resolves the conflict issue, the State has 
asked us to go further by expanding Williams to afford it the 
opportunity to empanel a jury on resentencing to make the finding 
required to enhance Puzio’s sentence pursuant to section 
775.082(1)(b)1.  In support of its argument, the State cites our 
decision in Gaymon v. State, 288 So. 3d 1087, 1093 (Fla. 2020), 
 
- 10 - 
where we authorized such a remedy on resentencing under a 
different statutory provision. 
We decline to decide this issue for a couple of reasons.  First, 
Puzio argues that his jury already found that he did not actually 
kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victims.  Regardless of 
whether or not he is correct, the unique facts of Puzio’s case make 
it a less-than-ideal vehicle for revisiting the double-jeopardy 
concerns that caused the Williams court to forego the possibility of 
empaneling a jury and hold instead that the remedy of 
“resentencing pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2. is the more 
prudent course.”  Williams, 242 So. 3d at 293.  Moreover, and 
perhaps even more critically, the State neither asked the trial court 
to empanel a jury nor raised the issue in the district court, and the 
potential double jeopardy implications of empaneling a jury have 
not been fully briefed.  Accordingly, we limit our holding to the 
jurisdictional issue.  See Savoie v. State, 422 So. 2d 308, 312 (Fla. 
1982) (“[A]uthority to consider issues other than those upon which 
jurisdiction is based is discretionary with this Court and should be 
exercised only when these other issues have been properly briefed 
and argued . . . .”). 
 
- 11 - 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth District’s “ministerial correction” remedy falls 
short of the remedy of de novo resentencing under section 
775.082(1)(b)2., which Williams establishes is the proper remedy for 
the harmful Alleyne error at issue.  Accordingly, we quash the 
Fourth District’s decision in Puzio and remand with instructions to 
remand to the trial court for resentencing as required by Williams. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
– Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D17-3034 
 
(Broward County) 
 
Kevin J. Kulik, Coral Springs, Florida; and Ashley D. Kay, Miami, 
Florida, 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Amit Agarwal, Solicitor General, 
Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Kevin 
Golembiewski, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida; and 
Celia Terenzio, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and James J. 
 
- 12 - 
Carney, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent