Case Title: Dickson v. Rucho

Citation: 

Docket Number: 201PA12-2

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. COA12-1385 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 16 July 2013 
 
 
GEORGE CHRISTIE AND DEBORAH 
CHRISTIE, 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Orange County 
No. 11 CVS 2147 
HARTLEY CONSTRUCTION, INC.; 
GRAILCOAT WORLDWIDE, LLC; AND 
GRAILCO, INC., 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by Plaintiffs from order entered 13 August 2012 by 
Judge Gary E. Trawick in Orange County Superior Court.  Heard in 
the Court of Appeals 10 April 2013. 
 
Whitfield Bryson & Mason, LLP, by Daniel K. Bryson and Scott 
C. Harris, for plaintiff-appellants. 
 
Ragsdale Liggett PLLC, by William W. Pollock and Angela M. 
Allen, for defendant-appellee Hartley Construction, Inc. 
 
Conner Gwyn Schenck PLLC, by Andrew L. Chapin, for defendant-
appellees Grailcoat Worldwide, LLC and GrailCo, Inc. 
 
North Carolina Advocates for Justice, by Jonathan McGirt and 
Law Offices of F. Bryan Brice, Jr., by Matthew D. Quinn, 
amicus curiae. 
 
 
BRYANT, Judge. 
 
 
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Where the six-year statute of repose barred plaintiffs’ 
action despite a twenty year express warranty, we affirm the order 
of the trial court.  
Facts and Procedural History 
Plaintiffs George and Deborah Christie filed a complaint 
against 
defendants 
Hartley 
Construction, 
Inc., 
(Hartley), 
GrailCoat WorldWide, LLC, (GrailCoat), and GrailCo, Inc. (GrailCo) 
(GrailCoat & GrailCo, collectively referred to as “GrailCoat”) on 
31 October 2011.  The complaint alleged that in 2004, plaintiffs 
entered into an agreement for Hartley to construct a custom home 
(“Residence”) for plaintiffs in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.  
Plaintiffs alleged that GrailCoat made representations and express 
warranties to plaintiffs and Hartley that its “direct-applied 
exterior finish system” - a coating and waterproofing material 
applied over SIPs (structural insulated panels) – was “well-suited 
to use over [SIPS],” “waterproof,” “does not crack,” “is fully 
warranted,” and could last forty or fifty years if maintained 
properly.  Plaintiffs alleged that GrailCoat’s website expressly 
warranted their product for twenty years.  
 
Plaintiffs contend that because of the design of GrailCoat’s 
product and installation instructions provided by GrailCoat, water 
had leaked in causing the walls of the Residence “to rot and 
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delaminate, 
compromising 
the 
structural 
integrity 
of 
the 
Residence.”  Plaintiffs also alleged that GrailCoat’s product was 
inherently defective and in violation of North Carolina Building 
Codes and applicable industry standards. 
 
Plaintiffs filed the following claims against Hartley on 31 
October 2011: breach of contract, breach of implied warranty, 
negligence/negligence per se, gross or willful and wanton 
negligence, and unfair and deceptive trade practices.  Against 
GrailCoat, plaintiffs filed a claim of breach of express 
warranties, breach of implied warranties of merchantability and 
fitness for a particular purpose, negligence, and unfair and 
deceptive trade practices.  Plaintiffs sought to recover damages 
against Hartley and GrailCoat in an amount in excess of $10,000.00.  
 
Following the filing of the complaint, Hartley filed an answer 
on 3 January 2012.  GrailCoat filed its answer on 6 January 2012, 
alleging affirmative defenses along with a motion to dismiss and 
a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  On 18 April 2012, the 
trial court entered an order denying Hartley1 and GrailCoat’s 
motion to dismiss and motion on the pleadings. 
                     
1 Hartley’s motion to dismiss and motion on the pleadings is not 
found in the record. 
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On 14 June 2012, Hartley filed a motion for summary judgment. 
Hartley’s motion for summary judgment contended that “plaintiffs 
cannot forecast competent evidence of fraudulent or willful or 
wanton conduct, and therefore all claims of the plaintiffs are 
barred by North Carolina General Statute § 1-50(a)(5)[.]”  On 19 
June 2012, GrailCoat also filed a motion for summary judgment.  On 
9 July 2012, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment against 
GrailCoat on plaintiffs’ breach of express warranty claim.  
 
Following a hearing at the 16 July 2012 session of Orange 
County Superior Court, the trial court entered an order on 13 
August 2012: granting Hartley’s motion for summary judgment as to 
all of plaintiffs’ claims; granting GrailCoat’s motion for summary 
judgment as to all of plaintiffs’ claims; denying plaintiffs’ 
motion for summary judgment against GrailCoat on plaintiffs’ 
breach of express warranty claim; and dismissing Plaintiffs’ 
complaint with prejudice.  From this order, plaintiffs appeal. 
_________________________ 
 
Plaintiffs’ sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
erred by granting summary judgment in favor of GrailCoat and 
GrailCo due to the expiration of the statute of repose. 
Summary judgment is proper when the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show 
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that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that any party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law.  When 
considering a motion for summary judgment 
[t]he trial court must consider the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. 
 
Manecke v. Kurtz, __ N.C. App. __, __, 731 S.E.2d 217, 220 (2012) 
(citations and quotations omitted).  However, 
the movant has the burden of establishing that 
there are no genuine issues of material fact. 
The movant can meet the burden by either: (1) 
Proving that an essential element of the 
opposing party’s claim is nonexistent; or (2) 
Showing through discovery that the opposing 
party cannot produce evidence sufficient to 
support an essential element of his claim nor 
[evidence] 
sufficient 
to 
surmount 
an 
affirmative defense to his claim. 
 
Fatta v. M&M Props. Mgmt., __ N.C. App. __ , __, 727 S.E.2d 595, 
598 (2012) (citation omitted). 
Here, the applicable statute of repose is set out in section 
1-50(a)(5) of the North Carolina General Statutes, which states 
that  
[n]o action to recover damages based upon or 
arising out of the defective or unsafe 
condition of an improvement to real property 
shall be brought more than six years from the 
later of the specific last act or omission of 
the defendant giving rise to the cause of 
action or substantial completion of the 
improvement. 
 
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(5).  “A statute of repose is a 
substantive limitation, and is a condition precedent to a party’s 
right to maintain a lawsuit.”  Dawson v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & 
Natural Res., 204 N.C. App. 524, 528, 694 S.E.2d 427, 430 (2010) 
(citation omitted).  “Whether a statute of repose has run is a 
question of law.  Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings or 
proof show without contradiction that the statute of repose has 
expired.”  Glens of Ironduff Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Daly, __ N.C. 
App. __, __, 735 S.E.2d 445, 447 (2012) (citations omitted). 
 
Plaintiffs allege that they entered into an agreement with 
Hartley for the construction of their home in August 2004 (Hartley 
states in its Answer that the date of the agreement was April 
2004), during which time Hartley installed GrailCoat’s products.  
The Certificate of Occupancy for the Residence was issued on 22 
March 2005, indicating the last act or omission of defendants 
giving rise to the cause of action. 
In order to file a timely action under the statute of repose, 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(5), plaintiffs would have had to bring 
their action within six years, by 22 March 2011.  Plaintiffs’ 
complaint filed on 31 October 2011 was outside the statutory limit, 
and therefore, untimely.  Plaintiffs argue, however, that 
GrailCoat made an express warranty of 20 years through their 
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website, and therefore based on that warranty, their complaint is 
timely.  We disagree. 
Our Court’s decision in Roemer v. Preferred Roofing, 190 N.C. 
App. 813, 660 S.E.2d 920 (2008), is instructive.  In Roemer, on 23 
November 1999, the plaintiff homeowner and the defendant roofing 
company entered into a contract to remove the existing roof on the 
plaintiff’s home and replace it with a new roofing system which 
had an express lifetime warranty. Id. at 814, 660 S.E.2d at 922.  
“Several years after the project was completed, plaintiff 
discovered alleged defects with the roof including: (1) loose slate 
tiles; (2) separation of gutters from the house; and (3) rotten 
wood under the roof.”  Id.  On 18 July 2007, seven years after 
“substantial completion of the improvement,” the plaintiff filed 
a complaint against the defendant claiming negligence, breach of 
contract, and breach of warranty, and seeking compensatory damages 
in excess of $10,000.00. Id.  The defendant moved to dismiss all 
of the plaintiff’s claims, and the trial court dismissed 
plaintiff’s claim for damages or breach of warranty with prejudice 
based on the statute of repose. Id.  
 
Our Court in Roemer upheld the trial court’s ruling granting 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and held that “[i]f the action 
is not brought within the specified period, the plaintiff literally 
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has no cause of action.  The harm that has been done is damnum 
absque injuria – a wrong for which the law affords no redress.”  
Id. at 816, 660 S.E.2d at 923 (citation omitted).  Furthermore, 
our Court noted that “[p]laintiff’s remedy for breach of an alleged 
lifetime warranty claim that is ‘brought more than six years from 
the later of the specific last act or omission of the defendant 
giving rise to the cause of action or substantial completion of 
the improvement[,]’ lies in specific performance, and not 
damages.”  Id. at 817, 660 S.E.2d at 923 (citations omitted). 
 
In the present case, as in Roemer, defendant’s last act or 
omission was more than six years before the action was brought. 
Id. at 814, 660 S.E.2d at 922.  Despite an express lifetime 
warranty as in Roemer, or for twenty years as in the present case, 
a plaintiff whose action is not filed within the time set forth in 
the statute of repose has no cause of action for damages.  Id. at 
816, 660 S.E.2d at 923.   Therefore, we hold that plaintiffs’ 
action is barred by the statute of repose set forth in N.C.G.S. § 
1-50(a)(5).  See Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 633, 325 S.E.2d 
469, 475 (1985) (noting the effect of the statute of repose albeit 
under a different statute, as “an unyielding and absolute barrier 
that prevents a plaintiff’s right of action even before his cause 
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of action may accrue[.]”).   Accordingly, the trial court’s order 
dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint is affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
Judge MCCULLOUGH concurs. 
Judge HUNTER, JR., Robert N., concurs in part and dissents in 
part by separate opinion. 
 NO. COA12-1385 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 16 July 2013 
 
 
GEORGE CHRISTIE AND DEBORAH 
CHRISTIE, 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Orange County 
No. 11 CVS 2147 
HARTLEY CONSTRUCTION, INC.; 
GRAILCOAT WORLDWIDE, LLC; AND 
GRAILCO, INC., 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the majority that the trial court correctly 
granted summary judgment on all claims against Hartley and the 
claims against GrailCoat, with the exception of the breach of 
express warranties claim.  I do not agree with the majority that 
Roemer v. Preferred Roofing, 190 N.C. App. 813, 660 S.E.2d 920 
(2008), together with the routine application of the requirement 
that one panel of the court of appeals may not overrule another, 
In Re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989), 
dictates the result in this case regarding the breach of warranty 
claim.  I would reverse on this claim. 
 
 Roemer involved the application of a warranty “of the 
dependability and reliability of the installation of [a] roof.”  
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190 N.C. App. at 814, 660 S.E.2d at 922.  The opinion did not state 
the terms of the warranty and did not provide reasoning for why 
specific performance would be the sole remedy under those terms, 
so I would presume that the warranty in that case required specific 
performance.   
The present case involves a “full warranty.” It would be a 
paradoxical that the statute of repose would void all claims where 
the parties have contractually agreed to a period of remedy that 
exceeds the statute of repose.  I would limit Roemer to its facts 
and hold that a full warranty which exceeds the time period for 
the statute of repose is a waiver of the statute for all claims.  
If, however, the contract between the parties limits the remedies 
in some express fashion, then claims brought beyond the statute of 
repose would be limited to specific contractual relief as in 
Roemer.    
Roemer is a case of poor pleading.  I believe my approach 
reconciles Roemer with the jurisprudence of our courts pre-Roemer.  
By its decision, the majority expands Roemer to void all claims, 
a result the Roemer case does not require.  I find the logic of 
Judge Boyle’s decision in the post-Roemer case of Hart v. 
Louisiana-Pacific Corp., Order, No. 2:08-CV-47-BO (E.D.N.C. Nov. 
19, 2009), to be persuasive as I do the assessment of the authors 
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of North Carolina Contract Law § 16-7 (2009 Cum. Supp.).  To hold 
otherwise would unnecessarily impair the obligation of, and 
therefore the freedom to, contract.  For those reasons, I would 
reverse as to the breach of warranty claim against GrailCoat.