Case Title: State v. Barker

Citation: 2016-Ohio-2708

Docket Number: 2014-1560

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Barker, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-2708.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-2708 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BARKER, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Barker, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-2708.] 
Constitutional law—Fifth Amendment—Rights to counsel and due process and 
privilege 
against 
self-incrimination—R.C. 
2933.81(B)—Statutory 
presumption that electronically recorded statements made during 
custodial interrogation in place of detention are voluntary does not affect 
reviewing court’s analysis of whether defendant waived Miranda rights—
R.C. 2933.81(B) is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles because it 
impermissibly eliminates state’s burden of proving voluntariness of 
custodial statement and places burden on defendant to prove that 
statement was involuntary—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and 
matter remanded. 
(No. 2014-1560—Submitted November 17, 2015—Decided April 28, 2016.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-130214,  
2014-Ohio-3245. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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_____________________ 
 
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we examine the constitutional rights implicated by the 
custodial police interrogation of a juvenile suspect as well as the attendant 
constitutional limitations on interrogation that safeguard those rights.  We also 
consider whether, and to what extent, the General Assembly may legislatively 
affect those rights and limitations without running afoul of due process. 
{¶ 2} More specifically, we consider here the interaction between R.C. 
2933.81(B) and a juvenile suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and 
against self-incrimination as articulated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 
S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and his right to due process.  As relevant here, 
R.C. 2933.81(B) provides as follows:   
 
All statements made by a person [suspected of enumerated 
crimes] during a custodial interrogation in a place of detention are 
presumed to be voluntary if the statements made by the person are 
electronically recorded.  The person making the statements during 
the electronic recording of the custodial interrogation has the 
burden of proving that the statements made during the custodial 
interrogation were not voluntary. 
 
{¶ 3} Appellant, Tyshawn Barker, argues that R.C. 2933.81(B) does not 
affect the analysis of whether a suspect intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily 
waived his Miranda rights and, therefore, that the state retains the burden to prove 
a valid waiver.  He also argues that as applied to statements a juvenile makes 
during a custodial interrogation, the R.C. 2933.81(B) presumption that such 
statements are voluntary is unconstitutional because it violates the juvenile’s right 
to due process.  On both counts, we agree. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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Facts and procedural background 
{¶ 4} On October 17, 2011, shortly before midnight, Cincinnati Police 
Detectives Kurt Ballman and Terry McGuffey questioned 15-year-old Barker at 
the offices of the Cincinnati Police Department Homicide Unit, in relation to the 
fatal shootings of Ruddell Englemon and Carrielle Conn.  Another suspect in the 
shootings, Dequantez Nixson, implicated Barker during questioning earlier that 
evening, and the police found Barker at Nixson’s residence during the execution 
of a search warrant.  Barker was undisputedly in police custody when he was 
questioned. 
{¶ 5} The detectives began their interrogation, which was electronically 
recorded, at 11:57 p.m. by asking Barker his name, address, telephone number, 
school, mother’s name, whether he could read and write, whether he had taken 
drugs or alcohol that day, and whether he had any health problems.  The 
following exchange then occurred:  
 
DETECTIVE BALLMAN: I have got to read something 
to you. * * * What I’m going to do is I’m going to read you a 
notification. 
DEFENDANT BARKER: 
Um-hmm. 
DETECTIVE BALLMAN: All right.  When we are done 
I’m going to ask you if you understand it. 
DEFENDANT BARKER: 
Okay. 
DETECTIVE BALLMAN: And then I am going to ask 
you to sign it.  You’re not admitting to anything.  I am just telling 
you it just says that I read you this, okay? 
DEFENDANT BARKER: 
Okay. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 6} Detective Ballman proceeded to read Barker his Miranda rights—
that he had the right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used as 
evidence against him, and that he had the right to the presence of an attorney, 
either retained or appointed if he could not afford one—as printed on a form 
entitled “CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT NOTIFICATION OF 
RIGHTS.”  Barker said that he understood what Detective Ballman had read, and 
he signed the notification-of-rights form below the preprinted statement, “I 
understand my rights.”  The form does not indicate that Barker was waiving his 
rights, nor did the detectives tell Barker that signing the form constituted a 
waiver. 
{¶ 7} The detectives then questioned Barker’s understanding of his rights: 
 
DETECTIVE McGUFFEY: Tyshawn are you familiar 
with that form?  You have heard of Miranda rights before? 
DEFENDANT BARKER: 
No, sir, my first time. 
DETECTIVE BALLMAN: First time you have read, but 
you have seen it on t.v., right? 
DEFENDANT BARKER: 
Yes, sir. 
 
DETECTIVE McGUFFEY: The whole thing about you 
have the right to remain silent and all that stuff? 
 
DEFENDANT BARKER: 
Yeah. 
 
{¶ 8} The detectives continued their interrogation without inquiring 
whether Barker wanted to continue or wanted to speak with an attorney, and 
Barker implicated himself in the shootings of Englemon and Conn. 
{¶ 9} The detectives briefly questioned Barker again during the evening of 
October 18, 2011.  When Detective Ballman stated that he was going to reread 
Barker his rights, Barker stated, “I seen an attorney—an attorney, whatever that 
January Term, 2016 
 
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is. * * * And she told me if you all to come up here just to ask for an attorney.”  
Detective Ballman then asked whether Barker wanted to ask for an attorney, but 
Barker responded, “Just go on.”  Detective Ballman reread Barker his Miranda 
rights, and Barker again indicated that he understood.  Detective Ballman wrote 
on the notification-of-rights form, “Attorney, still states will answer questions.”  
The interview lasted only four minutes and consisted entirely of Barker’s 
identification of codefendant Brendan Washington from a photograph. 
{¶ 10} Barker was charged as a juvenile with aggravated murder and 
murder in relation to the deaths of Englemon and Conn.  The juvenile court found 
probable cause to believe that Barker had committed the alleged offenses and 
ordered an amenability evaluation. 
{¶ 11} Dr. Paul Deardorff evaluated Barker’s mental health and filed a 
report with the juvenile court.  Dr. Deardorff noted test evidence suggesting that 
Barker was “mildly mentally retarded,” but he opined that Barker appeared to be 
“of borderline intelligence.”  Barker informed Dr. Deardorff that he had an 
individualized education program at school because “ ‘I can’t comprehend good.’ 
”  Barker’s academic abilities ranged from the third-grade to the fifth-grade level, 
and Dr. Deardorff stated that Barker might suffer from a learning disability. 
{¶ 12} Upon consideration of Dr. Deardorff’s report and the evidence 
presented at the probable-cause hearing, the juvenile court relinquished 
jurisdiction and bound Barker over to the common pleas court. 
{¶ 13} The Hamilton County Grand Jury indicted Barker on four counts of 
aggravated murder with firearm specifications and specifications that Barker, 
Washington, and Nixson purposefully killed Englemon and Conn to prevent their 
testimony in other criminal proceedings.  The aggravated-murder counts related to 
Conn included additional specifications that Barker and his two codefendants 
committed the offense for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial 
or punishment for Englemon’s death.  The indictment also included two counts of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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conspiracy to commit, promote or facilitate aggravated murder, two counts of 
aggravated robbery, and three counts of tampering with evidence (on the night of 
Conn’s murder), all with firearm specifications. 
{¶ 14} Barker moved to suppress the statements he made during his 
custodial interrogation, arguing that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and that his statements were not voluntary.  
At the suppression hearing, the state introduced Barker’s custodial statements 
through the interrogation transcript, the audio and video recordings, and the 
signed notification-of-rights form.  Detective Ballman testified that he had no 
reason to believe that Barker did not understand his Miranda rights.  The state 
argued that because Barker’s interrogation was electronically recorded, Barker 
had the burden under R.C. 2933.81(B) to demonstrate that his statements were 
involuntary.  Barker’s counsel cross-examined Detective Ballman but did not 
present any affirmative evidence. 
{¶ 15} The trial court denied Barker’s motion to suppress without 
mentioning either R.C. 2933.81(B) or the presumption of voluntariness.  Although 
the trial court did not expressly find that Barker knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, it found that Barker voluntarily made 
statements to the police after being properly advised of, and with an 
understanding of, his rights. 
{¶ 16} Barker pled no contest to four counts of aggravated murder, two 
counts of aggravated robbery, and three counts of tampering with evidence, all 
with firearm specifications.  The trial court found Barker guilty consistently with 
his pleas and sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of 25 years to life. 
{¶ 17} On appeal, Barker initially challenged only his bindover and the 
effectiveness of his counsel during the bindover proceedings.  In a supplemental 
brief, however, Barker additionally argued that the trial court erred by overruling 
his motion to suppress because he did not knowingly, intelligently, and 
January Term, 2016 
 
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voluntarily waive his Miranda rights.  As part of that argument, Barker asserted 
that R.C. 2933.81(B) has no bearing on the requirement that a waiver of 
constitutional rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 
{¶ 18} The First District Court of Appeals affirmed Barker’s convictions.  
The First District acknowledged that courts determine whether a defendant has 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived Miranda rights based on the 
totality of the circumstances, but it went on to state that “[w]here, as here, the 
interrogation of the defendant is recorded electronically, the statements made are 
presumed to have been made voluntarily.”   2014-Ohio-3245, ¶ 12, citing R.C. 
2933.81.  The court stated that nothing in the record refuted the presumption that 
Barker’s statements were voluntary.  Id.  The court also reviewed the recording of 
Barker’s interrogation and stated that it found support for “the trial court’s finding 
that [Barker] had voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda 
rights,” id. at ¶ 13, despite the absence of an express finding by the trial court to 
that effect. 
{¶ 19} This court accepted jurisdiction to determine whether the 
presumption of voluntariness contained in R.C. 2933.81(B) violates due process 
when applied to a juvenile and whether that presumption affects a reviewing 
court’s analysis of a purported waiver of Miranda rights.  See 141 Ohio St.3d 
1473, 2015-Ohio-554, 25 N.E.3d 1080. 
Analysis 
{¶ 20} The constitutional rights implicated by custodial interrogation and 
the procedural safeguards in place to protect those rights guide our determination 
of the reach and constitutionality of R.C. 2933.81(B).  This appeal involves 
related issues that arise out of separate constitutional rights: whether Barker 
intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and whether 
Barker voluntarily decided to speak with the detectives.  Miranda rights arise 
from the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, whereas the 
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necessity that a suspect’s statement to police is voluntary implicates the guarantee 
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157, 169-170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).  Here, Barker has 
challenged both whether the statements he made while in police custody were 
voluntary and whether he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his 
Miranda rights before making the statements.  We will address those challenges 
in reverse order. 
Fifth Amendment Miranda rights 
{¶ 21} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 
that “ ‘[n]o person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself,’ and that ‘the accused shall * * * have the Assistance of 
Counsel.’ ”  (Ellipses sic.)  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 
694.  The inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation heightens the risk 
that a suspect will be denied the Fifth Amendment privilege not to be compelled 
to incriminate himself because custodial interrogation can “ ‘undermine the 
individual’s will to resist and * * * compel him to speak where he would not 
otherwise do so freely.’ ”  (Ellipsis sic.)  J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 
131 S.Ct. 2394, 2401, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011), quoting Miranda at 467; 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 
(2000).  That risk is even more troubling and acute when, as here, the subject of 
the interrogation is a juvenile.  J.D.B. at 2401. 
{¶ 22} In light of the inherent coercion involved in custodial interrogation, 
Miranda established “a set of prophylactic measures” to safeguard the 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.  Id.  In broad terms, Miranda 
held that the state may not use a defendant’s statements from custodial 
interrogation “unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to 
secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”  Miranda at 444.  Prior to 
questioning, the police must warn the suspect “that he has a right to remain silent, 
January Term, 2016 
 
9
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he 
has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.”  Id.  The 
Supreme Court recognized the importance of a suspect’s “real understanding” of 
his rights and his intelligent decision whether to exercise them.  Id. at 469. 
{¶ 23} If custodial interrogation continues in the absence of an attorney 
after a police officer advises a suspect of his rights, the government bears “a 
heavy burden” to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the suspect 
“knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and 
his right to retained or appointed counsel” before speaking to the police.  Miranda 
at 475, citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 
977 (1964), fn. 14; Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473.  See 
also State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 470, 739 N.E.2d 749 (2001) (recognizing 
requirement of knowing, intelligent waiver).  A court may not presume a valid 
waiver either from the suspect’s silence after warnings are given or from the fact 
that the suspect eventually confessed.  Miranda at 475.  Rather, the record must 
show “ ‘that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly 
rejected the offer.  Anything less is not waiver.’ ”  Id., quoting Carnley v. 
Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962).  If the state does 
not satisfy its burden, “no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be 
used.”  Id. at 479. 
{¶ 24} To determine whether a suspect knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, courts examine the totality of the 
circumstances.  State v. Clark, 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 261, 527 N.E.2d 844 (1988).  
When the suspect is a juvenile, the totality of the circumstances includes “the 
juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence” as well as his 
“capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth 
Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.”  Fare v. 
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979).  A 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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juvenile’s access to advice from a parent, guardian or custodian also plays a role 
in assuring that the juvenile’s waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  See 
In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 96. 
R.C. 2933.81(B) does not apply to waiver of Fifth Amendment rights 
{¶ 25} Barker’s second proposition of law asserts that the R.C. 2933.81(B) 
presumption that an electronically recorded custodial statement is voluntary does 
not affect the analysis of whether a suspect waived his Miranda rights, i.e., his 
rights to remain silent and to have an attorney.  We turn, first, to the statute. 
{¶ 26} R.C. 2933.81(B) states that “[a]ll statements made by a person  
* * * during a custodial interrogation in a place of detention are presumed to be 
voluntary if the statements made by the person are electronically recorded.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Nothing in R.C. 2933.81(B) creates a presumption regarding a 
waiver of constitutional rights; by its terms, the legislative presumption applies 
only to whether a statement itself was voluntary.  And the voluntariness of a 
custodial statement does not answer whether the suspect knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently waived his Miranda rights before making that statement, as those 
are distinct inquiries.  Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163-164, 169-170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 
L.Ed.2d 473; State v. Eley, 77 Ohio St.3d 174, 178, 672 N.E.2d 640 (1996).  
Absent the state’s compliance with Miranda and a suspect’s valid waiver of his 
Fifth Amendment rights, even voluntary statements are inadmissible.  Dickerson, 
530 U.S. at 444, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405. 
{¶ 27} We have held that there are no presumptions to aid the prosecution 
in proving a suspect’s valid waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights.  State v. 
Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 38, 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976), vacated on other 
grounds, Edwards v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3147, 57 L.Ed.2d 1155 (1978).  
See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, quoting 
Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70.  And even if the statutory 
presumption in R.C. 2933.81(B) did encompass the voluntariness of a suspect’s 
January Term, 2016 
 
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waiver, as opposed to merely the voluntariness of the suspect’s statement itself, 
voluntariness is but one part of the inquiry under the Fifth Amendment.  The state 
must prove not only that the suspect voluntarily waived his rights but also that the 
suspect acted knowingly and intelligently in doing so.  See State v. Dailey, 53 
Ohio St.3d 88, 91-92, 559 N.E.2d 459 (1990) (separately analyzing whether 
waiver was knowing and intelligent despite holding that a waiver is voluntary 
“absent evidence that [the suspect’s] will was overborne and his capacity for self-
determination was critically impaired because of coercive police conduct”). 
{¶ 28} A legislature may not supersede the constitutional rule announced 
in Miranda.  Dickerson at 444.  Therefore, R.C. 2933.81(B) cannot lessen the 
protections announced in Miranda by removing the state’s burden of proving a 
suspect’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of rights prior to making a 
statement during a custodial interrogation.  Although Miranda allows for 
alternative legislative solutions that are “ ‘at least as effective in apprising accused 
persons of their right * * * and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise 
it,’ ” Dickerson at 440, quoting Miranda at 467, the act of recording a suspect’s 
custodial statement does nothing to appraise a suspect of, or to protect the 
suspect’s opportunity to exercise, his Fifth Amendment rights.  While a recording 
might identify police coercion or its absence, nothing about the fact of recording 
ensures that a suspect understands his rights and knowingly and intelligently 
waives them.  In short, applying R.C. 2933.81(B) to the question of a suspect’s 
waiver of Miranda rights would impermissibly lower the state’s burden of 
demonstrating a valid waiver of those rights. 
{¶ 29} In this and other cases, the First District has conflated the questions 
of the voluntariness of a suspect’s waiver of Miranda rights and the voluntariness 
of a suspect’s custodial statement.  Here, the First District applied R.C. 
2933.81(B) in its discussion of the “Waiver of Miranda Rights,” although it 
ultimately concluded that “[n]othing in the record refutes the presumption that 
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[Barker’s] statements were made voluntarily.”  (Emphasis added.)  2014-Ohio-
3245, at ¶ 12.  It is not entirely clear from the First District’s opinion how it 
applied R.C. 2933.81(B) with respect to the waiver issue in this case.  But in other 
recent cases, the First District has expressly applied R.C. 2933.81(B) to the 
question whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived 
Miranda rights and shifted the burden to the defendant to disprove waiver.  See In 
re K.C., 2015-Ohio-1613, 32 N.E.3d 988, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.) (state bears the burden 
of proving knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights where 
R.C. 2933.81(B) does not shift that burden to the defendant); State v. Bell, 2015-
Ohio-1711, 34 N.E.3d 405, ¶ 36 (1st Dist.), appeal not accepted, 143 Ohio St.3d 
1480, 2015-Ohio-3958, 38 N.E.3d 901 (R.C. 2933.81(B) operates as an exception 
to the general rule that the state bears the burden to prove a knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights). 
{¶ 30} Contrary to the First District, we hold that the statutory 
presumption of voluntariness created by R.C. 2933.81(B) does not affect a 
reviewing court’s analysis of whether a defendant waived his Miranda rights.  
The state retains the burden of proving a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
waiver by a preponderance of the evidence.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. 
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d. 473.  
Accordingly, we adopt Barker’s second proposition of law. 
Due-process rights 
{¶ 31} Constitutional principles of due process preclude the use of coerced 
confessions as fundamentally unfair, regardless of whether the confession is true 
or false.  Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 483, 485, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 
(1972), citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-541, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 
L.Ed.2d 760 (1961).  “[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the 
finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process 
Clause.”  Connelly at 167. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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{¶ 32} When a defendant challenges his confession as involuntary, due 
process requires that the state prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
confession was voluntary.  Lego at 489.  The same standard applies to adults and 
juveniles: “ ‘Neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by 
methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law.’ ”  In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), quoting with 
approval Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948) 
(lead opinion).  See also In re Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 86, 548 N.E.2d 210 (1989), 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 33} Barker’s first proposition of law asserts that as applied to a 
juvenile, R.C. 2933.81(B) violates due process because juveniles require greater 
protections than adults during interrogation.  Barker specifically argues that 
application of R.C. 2933.81(B) to a juvenile impermissibly shifts the burden of 
proving voluntariness from the state and places on the juvenile the burden of 
proving involuntariness, in violation of due-process requirements.  The state 
responds that Barker waived his due-process challenge by not raising it in the trial 
court or the court of appeals and that a decision on this issue would be merely 
advisory. 
{¶ 34} The state introduced R.C. 2933.81(B) into this case by arguing, in 
response to Barker’s claim that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waive his Miranda rights, that the statute imposed upon Barker the 
burden of proving that his recorded statements were involuntary.  As we have 
already held, however, R.C. 2933.81(B) does not affect the resolution of whether 
Barker validly waived his Miranda rights.  Moreover, the trial court did not rely 
on R.C. 2933.81(B) in denying Barker’s motion to suppress.  The issue whether 
R.C. 2933.81(B)’s burden-shifting paradigm, as applied to juveniles, violated due 
process was not apparent in the trial court. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 35} Barker’s argument in the court of appeals mirrored the argument 
made in his motion to suppress that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waive his Miranda rights.  His appellate argument also asserted, 
presumably in response to the state’s argument at the suppression hearing, that 
R.C. 2933.81(B) has no bearing on the requirement of a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver.  But the First District, while discussing Barker’s argument that 
he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights, held 
that R.C. 2933.81(B) placed a burden on Barker to rebut the presumption that his 
statements to the police were voluntary. 
{¶ 36} Barker concedes that he did not argue in either the trial court or the 
First District that application of R.C. 2933.81(B) to a juvenile would violate due 
process.  But he claims that he raised that challenge “at the first opportunity—
after the First District merged its analysis of whether [he] knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights * * * with the statutory 
presumption of voluntariness under R.C. 2933.81.”  Indeed, Barker had no reason 
to raise an as-applied due-process challenge in the trial court or in his appeal to 
the First District because the trial court did not apply R.C. 2933.81(B).  It was the 
First District that applied R.C. 2933.81(B) in a manner that Barker contends 
violates due process.  Barker promptly raised that challenge in his memorandum 
in support of jurisdiction before this court, and we accepted jurisdiction despite 
the state’s assertion of waiver.  See 141 Ohio St.3d 1473, 2015-Ohio-554, 25 
N.E.3d 1080. 
{¶ 37} Despite the dissent’s charge that a decision on this issue 
contravenes our law regarding forfeiture and waiver, we reject the state’s 
invitation to sidestep the due-process issue in this case.  Even were we to agree 
with the state that Barker waived his due-process challenge to the application of 
R.C. 2933.81(B) to juveniles, review is appropriate here.  In the criminal context, 
this court has considered constitutional challenges to the application of statutes 
January Term, 2016 
 
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despite clear waiver “in specific cases of plain error or where the rights and 
interests involved may warrant it.”  In re M.D., 38 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 527 
N.E.2d 286 (1988).  Accord Crim.R. 52(B).  The constitutional rights at issue here 
and the importance of those rights to juveniles would justify our review even if 
Barker had waived a due-process challenge.  Thus, contrary to the dissent’s 
imputation, review of Barker’s due-process challenge is consistent with the law of 
this state. 
{¶ 38} As applied to juveniles, the R.C. 2933.81(B) presumption violates 
due process.  To satisfy due process with respect to a challenged confession, the 
state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was 
voluntary.  Lego, 404 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618.  The due-process 
test for voluntariness takes into consideration the totality of the circumstances.  
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433-434, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405, citing 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 
(1973). 
{¶ 39} The totality-of-the-circumstances test takes on even greater 
importance when applied to a juvenile.  A 14- or 15-year-old “cannot be 
compared with an adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the 
consequences of his admissions.”  Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53-54, 82 
S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962), citing Haley, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 
L.Ed. 224.  The United States Supreme Court has observed: 
 
[A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to 
have any conception of what will confront him when he is made 
accessible only to the police.  That is to say, we deal with a person 
who is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of 
the consequences of the questions and answers being recorded and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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who is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to 
get the benefits of his constitutional rights. 
 
Id. at 54. 
{¶ 40} The United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Fare, 442 U.S. at 
724-725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197, is instructive.  There, the Supreme Court 
refused to deviate from the totality-of-the-circumstances test when the question 
was whether a juvenile had waived his Miranda rights.  The totality-of-the-
circumstances test allows courts necessary flexibility to consider a juvenile’s age 
and experience.  Id. at 725.  The court stated as follows:  
 
The totality approach permits—indeed, it mandates—inquiry into 
all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, [including] 
evaluation 
of 
the 
juvenile’s 
age, 
experience, 
education, 
background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity 
to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth 
Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. 
 
Id.  It is these very features of the totality test that the statutory presumption in 
R.C. 2933.81(B) strips from the determination of whether a juvenile’s statement 
was voluntary. 
{¶ 41} “ ‘It is now commonly recognized that courts should take “special 
care” in scrutinizing a purported confession or waiver by a child.’ ”  In re C.S., 
115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 106, quoting In re 
Manuel R., 207 Conn. 725, 737-738, 543 A.2d 719 (1988), citing Haley, 332 U.S. 
at 599, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224.  When an admission is obtained from a 
juvenile without counsel, “the greatest care must be taken to assure that the 
admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or 
January Term, 2016 
 
17 
suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of 
adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.”  In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 
18 L.Ed.2d 527. 
{¶ 42} The totality of the circumstances from which a court must 
determine the voluntariness of a juvenile’s statement includes not only the details 
of the interrogation but also the juvenile’s unique characteristics.  That analysis 
here would necessarily include consideration of factors such as Barker’s age, the 
late-night time of the interrogation, the absence of a parent or guardian, Barker’s 
“borderline intelligence” and third-grade reading level, Barker’s statement that he 
was not familiar with Miranda rights other than having heard of them from 
television, and Barker’s apparent confusion about what an attorney was.  
Application of the statutory presumption would remove all consideration of the 
juvenile’s unique characteristics from the due-process analysis unless the juvenile 
introduced evidence to disprove voluntariness when the interrogation was 
electronically recorded.  But there is no rational relationship between the 
existence of an electronic recording and the voluntariness of a suspect’s 
statement.  This is especially true where, as with R.C. 2933.81(B), the statute 
requires only that the statement sought to be admitted, not the entire interrogation, 
be recorded. 
{¶ 43} In the end, the burden of establishing the voluntariness of a 
juvenile’s custodial statement falls on the state.  The General Assembly may not 
remove that burden via a presumption based on the existence of an electronic 
recording without running afoul of the due-process protections owed the child.  
States may adopt a higher standard under their own law, Lego, 404 U.S. at 489, 92 
S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618, but they may not lessen the standard that the United 
States Constitution requires.  R.C. 2933.81(B) impermissibly eliminates the 
state’s burden of proving the voluntariness of a custodial statement when the 
statement was electronically recorded and, instead, places the burden on the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
defendant to prove that the statement was involuntary.  For these reasons, we 
conclude that R.C. 2933.81(B), as applied to juveniles, is unconstitutional.  
Accordingly, we adopt Barker’s first proposition of law. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 44} The statutory presumption of voluntariness created by R.C. 
2933.81(B) does not affect the analysis of whether a suspect knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to making a 
statement to the police.  As applied to juveniles, that presumption is 
unconstitutional.  We therefore reverse the First District’s judgment and remand 
this matter to that court to consider Barker’s supplemental assignment of error 
without the R.C. 2933.81(B) presumption and with the understanding that the 
burden rested squarely on the state to demonstrate both that Barker knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and that his statements to 
the police were voluntary. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents with an opinion that KENNEDY, J., joins. 
_________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 45} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 46} The majority opinion is another example of the court’s haste to 
change the law regarding juveniles in Ohio.  This rush to judgment tramples our 
law regarding the forfeiture of matters not raised in the trial court or otherwise 
presented for appeal or properly considered by an appellate court and what should 
be considered in a plain error analysis. 
{¶ 47} In this case, Tyshawn Barker 
failed to challenge the 
constitutionality of R.C. 2933.81(B) in either his motion to suppress his 
January Term, 2016 
 
19 
statements to police or in an assignment of error in the court of appeals, and he 
concedes in this court that “when the trial court overruled the motion to suppress, 
it did not apply the statutory presumption of voluntariness set forth in R.C. 
2933.81(B).” 
{¶ 48} The failure to challenge the constitutionality of a statute in the trial 
and appellate courts forfeits all but plain error on appeal, and the burden of 
demonstrating plain error is on the party asserting it.  However, Barker has failed 
to demonstrate that the outcome would have been different, and there is nothing to 
suggest that but for the statutory presumption, his statement to police would have 
been suppressed. 
{¶ 49} Accordingly, because the constitutionality of R.C. 2933.81(B) is 
not properly before the court, I would dismiss this appeal as improvidently 
accepted. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 50} Barker, Dequantez Nixson, Brendan Washington, and Carrielle 
Conn went to an apartment building intending to shoot Samuel Jeffries, who had 
recently filed domestic violence charges against Nixson’s mother.  Barker and 
Nixson waited in the hallway while Washington and Conn knocked on Jeffries’s 
door.  However, Ruddell Englemon answered the door, and according to Barker, 
Nixson, and Washington, Conn shot him before the group fled the scene.  
Englemon later died from his injuries. 
{¶ 51} Two days later, Nixson, Barker, and Washington, concerned that 
Conn would go to the police, lured her out into an isolated wooded area near some 
railroad tracks and shot her several times, killing her. 
{¶ 52} The next day, the police took Barker, who was 15 years old at the 
time, into custody, and Detective Kurt Ballman read him his Miranda rights and 
confirmed that he understood them before questioning Barker about the shootings.  
After Barker responded, “Yes, sir,” and signed a form acknowledging that he had 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
been informed of his rights, he made statements incriminating himself in both 
shootings. 
{¶ 53} During a second interview, Barker informed detectives that he had 
seen an attorney, and when asked whether he wanted an attorney to be present, 
Barker stated, “I do want to talk to make the situation a little bit more better for 
you all, but—.”  Ballman replied to Barker, “Okay.  You tell us what you want to 
do. * * * Are you asking for an attorney?”  Barker answered, “Just go on.”  
Ballman then reread Barker his Miranda rights and asked whether Barker 
understood.  Barker replied, “Yes, sir.”  He then identified Washington from a 
photograph. 
{¶ 54} The state filed a complaint in the juvenile court, alleging that 
Barker was delinquent for committing the aggravated murders of Conn and 
Englemon.  The juvenile court found probable cause to believe that Barker 
committed these crimes and that he was not amenable to rehabilitation in the 
juvenile system, and it bound him over to the common pleas court. 
{¶ 55} A grand jury indicted Barker for the aggravated murders of 
Englemon and Conn, with firearm specifications.  There were also specifications 
that he and his two codefendants purposefully killed Englemon and Conn to 
prevent their testimony in other criminal proceedings and that they murdered 
Conn to escape detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for Englemon’s 
death.  Barker was also indicted for conspiracy, aggravated robbery, and 
tampering with evidence, all with firearm specifications. 
{¶ 56} Barker moved the trial court to suppress statements he made during 
the interrogation, asserting that he had not knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.  He did not, however, challenge the 
constitutionality of R.C. 2933.81(B).  The trial court denied the motion, finding 
that Barker understood his rights and had voluntarily made statements to the 
police. 
January Term, 2016 
 
21 
{¶ 57} Barker pleaded no contest to the charges against him.  The trial 
court found him guilty of four counts of aggravated murder, two counts of 
aggravated robbery, and three counts of tampering with evidence, all with firearm 
specifications, and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 25 years to life in 
prison. 
{¶ 58} Barker appealed to the First District Court of Appeals, arguing that 
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence on his behalf at his 
amenability hearing and that the juvenile court had abused its discretion when it 
bound him over for trial as an adult.  He also filed a supplemental brief in which 
he argued that the trial court erred when it overruled his motion to suppress, 
asserting that he did not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily waive his 
Miranda rights.  Barker did not challenge the constitutionality of R.C. 
2933.81(B). 
{¶ 59} The court of appeals affirmed Barker’s convictions and held that 
the trial court’s finding that Barker had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived his Miranda rights was supported by the record.  The court of appeals 
stated that “[n]othing in the record refutes the presumption that Tyshawn’s 
statements were made voluntarily” and that “[b]ased on our review of the 
recording, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that Tyshawn had voluntarily, 
knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights was supported by the 
record.  The court properly denied the motion to suppress.”  2014-Ohio-3245,  
¶ 12-13. 
Positions of the Parties 
{¶ 60} On appeal to this court, Barker asserts that the court of appeals’ 
application of R.C. 2933.81(B) is plain error because it implicates the 
constitutional protections of the Due Process Clause as applied to a juvenile and 
violates the constitutional protections set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and its progeny.  He argues for the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
first time in this case that the statutory presumption that a custodial statement is 
voluntary under R.C. 2933.81(B) is unconstitutional because it shifts the burden 
of proving that statements were voluntarily made from the state to the accused.  
He contends that a juvenile’s will is more easily overborne by police pressure and 
inducements than an adult’s and that requiring a juvenile to prove that a 
videotaped interrogation is involuntary thus violates due process.  Barker further 
argues that the statutory presumption of voluntariness does not affect a reviewing 
court’s analysis of whether the accused waived Miranda rights.  He maintains that 
the court of appeals improperly applied the presumption from R.C. 2933.81(B) 
rather than the Miranda totality of the circumstances test. 
{¶ 61} The state contends that res judicata bars Barker’s claim that R.C. 
2933.81(B) is unconstitutional because he did not raise the issue in the trial court 
or the court of appeals.  It therefore maintains that Barker’s request for this court 
to rule on the constitutionality of R.C. 2933.81(B) is tantamount to a request for 
an advisory opinion, because the trial court never presumed that Barker’s 
statement was voluntary when it ruled on his motion to suppress, and the court of 
appeals did not apply the statute when considering whether Barker waived his 
Miranda rights but rather, reviewed the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
his interrogation. 
{¶ 62} Barker responds that the constitutionality of R.C. 2933.81(B) was 
properly preserved, because he filed a motion to suppress the statements made 
during his interrogation and the appellate court reviewed that issue. 
{¶ 63} Accordingly, before this court addresses Barker’s challenge to R.C. 
2933.81(B), a determination should be made regarding whether the matter is 
properly before this court for review. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 64} In State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 
N.E.3d 900, we noted the “well-established rule that ‘ “an appellate court will not 
January Term, 2016 
 
23 
consider any error which counsel for a party complaining of the trial court’s 
judgment could have called but did not call to the trial court’s attention at a time 
when such error could have been avoided or corrected by the trial court.” ’ ”  Id. 
at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 489 N.E.2d 277 (1986), 
quoting State v. Childs, 14 Ohio St.2d 56, 236 N.E.2d 545 (1968), paragraph three 
of the syllabus.  And this court “will not ordinarily consider a claim of error that 
was not raised in any way in the Court of Appeals and was not considered or 
decided by that court.”  State v. Price, 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 398 N.E.2d 772 (1979), 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 65} Crim.R. 52(B) affords appellate courts discretion to correct “[p]lain 
errors or defects affecting substantial rights” notwithstanding the accused’s failure 
to meet his obligation to bring those errors to the attention of the trial court.  
However, the accused bears the burden of proof to demonstrate plain error on the 
record, Quarterman at ¶ 16, and must show “an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal 
rule” that constitutes “an ‘obvious’ defect in the trial proceedings,” State v. 
Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002), quoting State v. Sanders, 
92 Ohio St.3d 245, 257, 750 N.E.3d 90 (2001).  However, even if the error is 
obvious, it must have affected substantial rights, and “[w]e have interpreted this 
aspect of the rule to mean that the trial court’s error must have affected the 
outcome of the trial.”  Id.  Thus, as we recently clarified in State v. Rogers, 143 
Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22, the accused is “required to 
demonstrate a reasonable probability that the error resulted in prejudice.”  
(Emphasis sic.)   
{¶ 66} But even where the accused demonstrates that a plain error affected 
the outcome of the proceeding, “an appellate court is not required to correct it; we 
have ‘admonish[ed] courts to notice plain error “with the utmost caution, under 
exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 23, quoting Barnes at 27, quoting State v. Long, 53 
Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 67} Here, Barker did not raise any challenge to R.C. 2933.81(B) in his 
motion to suppress filed in the trial court or in an assignment of error on appeal.  
Rather, he argued only that he did not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily 
waive his Miranda rights, and although he briefly addressed the statutory 
presumption of voluntariness in his appellate brief, he nonetheless did not 
question the statute’s constitutionality before the appellate court.  Accordingly, 
Barker has forfeited all but plain error, and it is his burden to demonstrate a 
reasonable probability that but for an error in applying R.C. 2933.81(B), his 
statements would have been suppressed. 
{¶ 68} In my view, there is no reasonable probability that Barker’s 
statements to police would have been suppressed, and reversal here is not 
necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice.  Importantly, Barker 
concedes that the trial court did not apply R.C. 2933.81(B) when it denied his 
motion to suppress, and therefore he cannot demonstrate that it committed any 
error, much less plain error, in this regard.  And although the court of appeals 
acknowledged the existence of R.C. 2933.81(B), there is no indication that it 
would have ordered Barker’s statements suppressed but for the statutory 
presumption that statements made during an electronically recorded interrogation 
of a suspect are voluntary.  As the appellate court recognized, it had the duty to 
defer to the trial court’s factual findings, and based on its independent review of 
the interrogation recording, it upheld the trial court’s finding that Barker 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.  Nothing in 
the record shows that the statutory presumption materially impacted the appellate 
court’s analysis or that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. 
{¶ 69} Thus, this is not a case in which the accused’s statement to police 
would have been suppressed but for the presumption of voluntariness established 
January Term, 2016 
 
25 
by R.C. 2933.81(B), and because the constitutional question at issue here has not 
been presented for consideration by the trial and appellate court in the first 
instance, it is not properly before our court.  For these reasons, I would dismiss 
the appeal as improvidently accepted. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Rachel 
Lipman Curran, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Sheryl Trzaska, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellant. 
Marsha L. Levick and Steven A. Drizin, urging reversal for amici curiae, 
Juvenile Law Center and Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth, Bluhm Legal 
Clinic, Northwestern University School of Law. 
_________________