Case Title: Powell v. Bunn

Citation: 

Docket Number: S52657

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-09-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: September 8, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
NANCY POWELL,
Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for
REMINGTON POWELL,
Respondents on Review,
v.
STAN BUNN,
Superintendent of Public Instruction,
OREGON DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
and PORTLAND PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 1J,
Petitioners on Review.
(CC 010403557; CA A117310; SC S52657, S52659)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 3, 2006.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for petitioners on review Stan Bunn
and Oregon Department of Education.  With her on the brief were
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor
General.
Bruce L. Campbell, Portland, argued the cause for petitioner
on review Portland School District No. 1J.  William H. Walters
and Jeffrey D. Austin, of Miller Nash LLP, filed the brief.
Charles F. Hinkle, ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc.,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents on
review.  With him on the brief was Andrea R. Meyer, ACLU
Foundation of Oregon, Inc.
David J. Hunnicutt, Oregonians in Action Legal Center,
Tigard, filed the briefs for amicus curiae Pacific Legal
Foundation.
Thomas V. Dulcich and Sara Kobak, of Schwabe Williamson &
Wyatt P.C., Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Boy
Scouts of America.  With them on the brief were Timothy R.
Volpert and P. Andrew McStay, Jr., of Davis Wright Tremaine LLP,
Portland, and George A. Davidson and Carla A. Kerr, pro hac vice,
of Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, New York.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
Kistler, J., dissented and filed an opinion.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Ellen F. Rosenblum, Judge. 198 Or App 21, 108 P3d 37 (2005). 
GILLETTE, J.
We are called on in this case to decide whether school
district personnel can be said to "discriminate" (as that word is
used in the applicable statute) against a student if they require
that student to listen to a message about a club or activity in
which the student cannot participate because of the student's or
his or her parents' religious beliefs.  A divided Court of
Appeals concluded that evidence that school district personnel
assisted in or facilitated the presentation of a message of that
kind could support a discrimination claim and, therefore, further
concluded that the Superintendent of Public Instruction erred in
dismissing a discrimination complaint based on those facts. 
Powell v. Bunn, 198 Or App 21, 108 P3d 37 (2005).  We allowed the
petitions for review of the school district and the
superintendent and, for the reasons that follow, now reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit
court.  
The salient facts are undisputed. (1)  Petitioners in
this case are Remington Powell and his mother, Nancy
Powell. (2)  The Powells are atheists.  In 1996, Remington was
a first-grade student at Harvey Scott Elementary, a Portland
public school.  During that school year, and from time to time in
the following years, the school permitted representatives of the
Boy Scouts to make presentations during the lunch period -- i.e.,
during school hours -- at a time when and in a place where the
school required children to be present.  During those
presentations, the Boy Scouts representative encouraged boys to
join the organization, informed them when and where the meetings
would be, and invited interested boys to talk with him further,
either in the lunchroom or outside on school grounds.  School
district personnel facilitated those presentations by quieting
the children, by directing their attention to the Boy Scouts
representative, and, on occasion, by helping the Boy Scouts
representative to fasten hospital-style bracelets, imprinted with
information about a later, off-site informational meeting, on the
wrists of interested boys.  In addition, school district
personnel from time to time distributed Boy Scouts flyers in the
classroom and included information about the Boy Scouts in the
school newsletter, which the school distributed to all students
to take home to their parents. (3)  
The Boy Scouts require all members to profess a belief
in a theistic God.  However, the Boy Scouts representative did
not inform students of that fact during the presentations that
took place at the school.  Instead, the Boy Scouts representative
told the children that anyone could join.  In addition, there was
no evidence of any mention of religion whatsoever in any
presentation, flyer, or school newsletter material.  The school
district did not specially select or invite the Boy Scouts to
make a presentation.  Instead, the Boy Scouts are one of a number
of organizations that make periodic use of the school as a venue
in which to provide information relating to their organizations'
activities. 
After Nancy Powell learned that Remington's school had
allowed the Boy Scouts to make presentations during school hours,
she complained to the school and to the school district.  She
asserted that subjecting Remington to the Boy Scouts
presentations was discriminatory in light of that organization's
religious membership criterion and Remington's consequent
ineligibility to join that organization due to his atheism.  She
asserted that Remington was negatively affected by those
presentations.  
The Powells eventually filed a discrimination complaint
against the school district under ORS 659.850 and its
implementing rules, OAR 581-021-0045 to 581-021-0049. (4)  ORS
659.850 provides:
"(1) As used in this section, 'discrimination'
means any act that unreasonably differentiates
treatment, intended or unintended, or any act that is
fair in form but discriminatory in operation, either of
which is based on age, disability, national origin,
race, marital status, religion or sex.
"(2) No person in Oregon shall be subjected to
discrimination in any public elementary, secondary or
community college education program or service, school
or interschool activity or in any higher education
program or service, school or interschool activity
where the program, service, school or activity is
financed in whole or in part by moneys appropriated by
the Legislative Assembly.
"(3) The State Board of Education and the State
Board of Higher Education shall establish rules
necessary to insure compliance with subsection (2) of
this section * * *."
The district school board rejected the Powells' complaint.  
The Powells then appealed the school district's
decision to the superintendent, again asserting that permitting
the Boy Scouts to make presentations to students during school
hours violates ORS 659.850.  That appeal was governed by OAR 581-021-0049, which provides, in part:
"(1) Districts shall adopt written procedures for
the prompt resolution of complaints of discrimination.
Persons may, after exhausting local grievance
procedures or 90 days (whichever occurs first) appeal
in writing to the Superintendent of Public Instruction.
The Superintendent shall review the local school
district procedures and findings of fact to determine
if proper procedures were followed and what action if
any shall be taken. In making this determination, the
Superintendent may decide:
"(a) No substantial evidence exists for the charges
of discrimination, and no further action will be taken;
"(b) Discrimination may exist, and conciliation
will be attempted to reach agreement by both parties."
Pursuant to his obligations under OAR 581-021-0049, the
superintendent investigated the Powells' complaint and allowed
both the Powells and the school district to submit documents for
his review.  Ultimately, the superintendent issued a 17-page
order in which he concluded that no substantial evidence existed
for the charge of discrimination and that no further action would
be taken.  
The superintendent's decision was an order in other
than a contested case, as that phrase is used in Oregon's
Administrative Procedures Act, ORS 183.310 to 183.690. 
Accordingly, the Powells then sought review in the circuit court
as provided in that act for such orders.  See ORS 183.484
(describing judicial review of orders of that kind).  Under ORS
183.484(5), (5) the circuit court's review of the
superintendent's order is for substantial evidence and errors of
law.  At the conclusion of the circuit court's review, that court
concluded that the superintendent had "abused his discretion" in
determining that there was no substantial evidence of
discrimination; it therefore remanded the matter to the
superintendent for further action on the Powells' complaint.  
The superintendent and the school district appealed the
trial court's ruling to the Court of Appeals.  That court
concluded that the circuit court had erred in reviewing the
superintendent's order under ORS 183.484 for abuse of discretion,
rather than determining whether substantial evidence supported
the superintendent's factual findings and whether the
superintendent committed errors of law with respect to his legal
conclusions. (6)  With those corrections, however, the Court of
Appeals nonetheless affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 
Before we turn to our analysis here, it is important to
emphasize what is involved in this case and what is not. 
Plaintiffs in this case do not contend that the school district's
actions as described above violate constitutional or statutory
bans on the establishment of religion. (7)  Neither does this
case concern whether the school district should allow the Boy
Scouts or any other organization to recruit members during the
lunch period at an elementary school.  Instead, the only issue
before this court is whether the facts surrounding the school
district's conduct amounts to "discrimination," as that term is
defined in ORS 659.850, by a public school or school district. 
We turn to that issue.  
ORS 659.850(1) defines "discrimination" to mean 
"any act that unreasonably differentiates treatment,
intended or unintended, or any act that is fair in form
but discriminatory in operation, either of which is
based on age, disability, national origin, race,
marital status, religion or sex."  
To determine whether Remington was "subjected to discrimination"
under ORS 659.850(2), we use the familiar methodology outlined in
PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859
P2d 1143 (1993).  That is, we first examine the text of the
statute, in context, in an effort to discern the intent of the
legislature.  Id. at 610-11.  If the meaning of the statute is
clear at that level of analysis, further inquiry is unnecessary. 
Id. at 611.  
Preliminarily, we observe that ORS 659.850(2) is
phrased in the passive voice -- "no person in Oregon shall be
subjected to discrimination."  From that, we understand that the
school district may not permit anyone to discriminate against a
person in any public school program, service, or activity.  The
prohibition thus applies both to the conduct of school district
personnel as well as to the conduct of representatives of
community organizations such as the Boy Scouts.  It follows that,
to the extent that the conduct at issue was in a "public
elementary * * * education program or service, school or
interschool activity," ORS 659.850(2), it is irrelevant to our
analysis whether particular acts were done by school district
personnel or by a Boy Scouts representative.  If the school
district permitted Remington to be subjected to discrimination,
it violated ORS 659.850. 
Turning to the second part of the prohibition, ORS
659.850(2) covers discrimination "in any public elementary,
secondary or community college education program or service,
school or interschool activity * * *."  We think that it is clear
that, as pertinent here, that means that there can be no
discrimination in any public elementary or secondary or community
college education program, in any public elementary or secondary
or community college education service, and in any public
elementary or secondary or community college school or
interschool activity.  Thus, under ORS 659.850, even community
groups may not discriminate against any person in any of those
programs, services, or activities. (8)  However, it is equally
important to point out that ORS 659.850 does not prohibit
discrimination by community groups in their activities that are
not public school programs, services, or activities. 
Classroom time and the school's lunch period clearly
are, at the least, school "activities."  Therefore, if either
handing out a Boy Scouts flyer or making a brief presentation to
children encouraging boys to join the Boy Scouts amounts to
discrimination as ORS 659.850(1) uses that word, then such
discrimination took place "in [a] public elementary * * * school
* * * activity * * *."  Likewise, printing and disseminating the
school newsletter is a school activity.  Therefore, if including
information about Boy Scouts meetings in the school newsletter
amounts to discrimination, then such discrimination took place
"in [a] public elementary * * * school * * * activity * * *."  By
the same token, however, the fact that the school district
permits a community group to provide flyers to be handed out in
the classroom or to make a presentation during lunch period or to
include information in a school newsletter does not transform all
the activities of that community group, including those that take
place off-site or outside school hours, into a "public elementary
secondary * * * school * * * activity." 
With the foregoing considerations in mind, we return to
the term "discrimination."  Once again, "discrimination" is
defined in ORS 659.850(1) to mean 
"any act that unreasonably differentiates treatment,
intended or unintended, or any act that is fair in form
but discriminatory in operation, either of which is
based on age, disability, national origin, race,
marital status, religion or sex."  
To "differentiate" means "to make different: mark or show a
difference in."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 630
(unabridged ed 2002).  Thus, the school district discriminated
against Remington if it committed an act, or permitted the Boy
Scouts to commit an act, that subjected Remington to treatment
different from that afforded other children because of his
religion, or if it committed an act or permitted the Boy Scouts
to commit an act that operated to treat Remington differently
from other children on that basis.  
The Powells have asserted that the school district's
conduct in the present case falls under the first part of that
definition -- that is, it "unreasonably differentiates treatment"
based on religion.  In this case, however, the evidence is
undisputed that Boy Scouts representatives and school personnel
distributed flyers and the school newsletter containing
information about the Boy Scouts to all the children without any
mention of or regard to their religious affiliation or lack
thereof.  Likewise, those persons made lunchroom presentations to
all children; those presentations were neutral in content and
made no mention of religion or a religious requirement for
joining the Boy Scouts.  Neither did the use of identifying
wristbands introduce a religious element into the presentation. 
The actual (but undisclosed) existence of a religious aspect to
the Boy Scouts organization does not change the foregoing facts. 
In short, all the evidence points to the same conclusion: 
neither school district personnel nor the Boy Scouts
representative "differentiated treatment" among school children
by disseminating the flyers or the school newsletters, by making
presentations during the lunch period encouraging boys to join
the Boy Scouts, or by using wristbands to identify those who
expressed an interest.  Rather, all children were treated in
precisely the same way.
The Powells have argued, and the Court of Appeals in
effect agreed, that simply exposing Remington to a message about
a group that he cannot join or an activity in which he cannot
participate because of his and his parents' religious beliefs
subjects him to differential treatment.  As the Court of Appeals
stated:
"All students must listen to the introductory
presentation, but only those students who meet a
religious test may accept the invitation to join. 
Because eligibility to join the Scouts depends on
religious belief, there is substantial evidence that
the district thus subjects persons to differentiated
treatment in a school activity on the ground of
religion."
198 Or App at 40.  The Powells elaborate, arguing that "it is the
very activity that takes place in the school -- the recruitment
of members -- that is discriminatory."  (Emphasis in original.)   Saying it, however, does not make it so.  The
recruitment of members, as carried out at the school, patently is
not discriminatory.  On the contrary, the undisputed evidence is
that the Boy Scouts directed its recruitment efforts at all
children.  It is in the later enrollment in the organization that
the Boy Scouts differentiate among those who do not profess a
belief in a deity and those who do.  That enrollment, however, is
not done by the school district, nor is it done in any public
elementary school  activity.  In the same vein, the fact that
there is a religious component to enrollment in the Boy Scouts
organization does not establish that any information about the
Boy Scouts handed out at school or printed in a school newsletter
-- even information that omits any mention of a religious
connection -- is discriminatory or, more to the point, that the
school discriminates by participating in or permitting the
dissemination of that information.  
The Court of Appeals suggested that it does not matter
that the Boy Scouts' discrimination against certain children does
not occur during school hours or on school property.  According
to the Court of Appeals, that discrimination is "in a school
activity" because "the precipitating conduct -- Scouts
recruitment -- occurred at school and in the course of a school
activity, even though the ultimate impact of that conduct -- the
exclusion of Remington from membership in the Scouts -- did not
occur at the same place and time."  198 Or App at 41.  ORS
659.850, however, does not address "precipitating conduct" that
only later, at some other place and time, may ripen into
discrimination.  The statute is concerned only with
discrimination in a public school program, service, or activity. 
Here, the school district neither directly discriminated against
Remington in its treatment of him nor permitted the Boy Scouts to
discriminate against him in any such public school program,
service, or activity. (9)  
The Powells assert, alternatively, that the school
district's conduct is "fair in form but discriminatory in
operation," in contravention of the second part of the definition
of "discrimination" set out in ORS 659.850(1) ("discrimination"
means "act that is fair in form but discriminatory in
operation").  But, as we have explained, nothing that occurred in
any public school program, service, or activity was
discriminatory at all.  The Powells therefore gain no more from
their reliance on the second half of the definition than they did
from their reliance on the first half.
By its conduct in this case, the school district has
done nothing more than permit a community group to provide
nondiscriminatory information to parents and students, who may
then voluntarily decide the extent of their involvement, or
noninvolvement, in such activities.  The act of providing that
information (or facilitating the provision of that information)
does not amount to "discrimination in any public elementary,
secondary or community college education program or service,
school or interschool activity under ORS 659.850."  Put
differently, the undisputed evidence shows that, in this case,
neither the school district nor the Boy Scouts discriminated "in
any public elementary, secondary or community college education
program or service, school or interschool activity."  It follows
that the superintendent did not err in finding that there was no
substantial evidence of discrimination under ORS 659.850.  The
contrary conclusion of the Court of Appeals was in error.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
KISTLER, J., dissenting.
Harvey Scott Elementary School permitted the Boy Scouts
to come into the school during school hours and recruit its
students.  Not only did the school give the Scouts access to its
students, it required the students to attend the Scouts'
recruiting session.  During that session, the Scouts invited the
children to join the Scouts.  They did not say, although it was
true, that only those children who shared the Scouts' religious
views could join.  That distinction only became apparent later
on.  I would hold that an apparently facially neutral offer that,
in operation, turns out to discriminate on the basis of religion
violates ORS 659.850(2).  I respectfully dissent from the
majority's contrary holding.
ORS 659.850(2) provides that no person "shall be
subjected to discrimination in any public elementary * * *
program or service [or] school * * * activity."  For the purposes
of that subsection,
"'discrimination' means any act that unreasonably
differentiates treatment, intended or unintended, or
any act that is fair in form but discriminatory in
operation, either of which is based on * * *
religion[.]"
ORS 659.850(1).  In holding that no statutory violation occurred,
the majority notes that, when the Boy Scouts made their
recruitment offer during the school lunch period, the offer
ostensibly was open to all children.  Only later, off the school
grounds, did the children whom the Scouts had recruited learn
that the offer, in fact, extended only to those children whose
religious beliefs agreed with the Scouts.  It follows, the
majority concludes, that no discrimination occurred "in [a]
public elementary * * * program or service [or] school * * *
activity" (emphasis added); according to the majority, the
discrimination occurred only at a later time, apart from any
school activity.
The majority's conclusion is difficult to square with
the statutory definition of discrimination.  That definition is
not limited to overt acts of discrimination that occur in a
public school program, service, or activity, as the majority's
opinion appears to assume; it also includes "any act that is fair
in form but discriminatory in operation."  ORS 659.580(1).  That
definition assumes that an act that occurs in a public school
program, service, or activity may appear neutral when made.  It
also recognizes that that apparently neutral act may turn out to
be discriminatory in operation.  
The Scouts' offer falls squarely within that statutory
definition.  There is no dispute that, on its face, the offer to
join the Scouts was "fair in form."  It appeared to be open to
all the elementary school children without limitation.  However,
that apparently neutral offer was, in fact, limited at the time
the Scouts made it to those school children who shared the
Scouts' religious views.  That offer, both in fact and in
operation, divided the elementary school children into two
groups:  those whose religious views agreed with the Scouts'
views and those whose views did not.  The fact that the
discriminatory nature of the offer only became apparent later
neither diminishes its discriminatory nature nor takes it out of
the definition of discrimination in ORS 659.850(2).  That
definition of discrimination recognizes that an apparently
neutral act may, in operation, turn out to be discriminatory --
precisely as the Scouts' offer did.
Because I would hold that the act of making the offer
during a mandatory school session subjected the elementary school
children to discrimination in a public school activity in
violation of ORS 659.850(2), I respectfully dissent. (10)
1. The school district has raised an issue concerning the
evidence that this court should consider in this case, that is,
whether the record properly includes only what was in the
administrative record developed in the proceeding before the
superintendent or whether it also includes new evidence presented
to the trial court in the subsequent judicial review proceeding. 
Because we find that the evidence adduced in the judicial review
proceeding is of the same character as that already in the
administrative record, we conclude, as did the Court of Appeals,
that the later-adduced evidence is not essential to our decision. 
Accordingly, we need not decide the issue whether, in a case like
the present one, the trial court erred in permitting petitioners
to introduce evidence on judicial review beyond what was before
the superintendent when he made his decision.  
2. Nancy Powell appears in this case in her own capacity
and as guardian ad litem for Remington.
3. In 2000, the school district issued new guidelines to
school administrators governing presentations by community
groups, including the Boy Scouts, during noninstructional hours,
that permit the dissemination of flyers and allow brief
presentations during lunch, but that prohibit school district
personnel from assisting in the placement of bracelets on
children's wrists. 
4. At the time that the Powells initiated the present
action, ORS 659.850 was numbered as ORS 659.150.  The statute was
renumbered in 2001 but, with the exception of one minor change
not relevant here, it has remained unchanged since enactment in
1975. For convenience, we use the current designation in this
opinion.   
5. ORS 183.484(5) provides that, in its review of an order
in other than a contested case,
"(a) The court may affirm, reverse or
remand the order.  If the court finds that
the agency has erroneously interpreted a
provision of law and that a correct
interpretation compels a particular action,
it shall:
"* * * * *
"(B)  Remand the case to the agency for
further action under a correct interpretation
of the provision of law.
"* * * * *
"(c) The court shall set aside or remand
the order if it finds that the order is not
supported by substantial evidence in the
record.  Substantial evidence exists to
support a finding of fact when the record,
viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable
person to make that finding."
6. We recognize, of course, that the apparent statutory
contrast between "substantial evidence" in ORS 183.484(5)(c), on
the one hand, and "erroneously interpret[ing] a provision of
law," ORS 183.484(5)(a), on the other, is a false one.  Lack of
substantial evidence to support a finding of fact is itself an
error of law.
7. Plaintiffs earlier filed an action against the
superintendent and the school district in which they challenged
the school district's actions under the state constitution and
under ORS 327.109, which sets out procedures for responding to a
complaint that the school district "sponsors, financially
supports or is actively involved with religious activity."  The
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the superintendent and the
school district in that case on the ground that the school
district's actions did not rise to the level of an
unconstitutionally excessive entanglement of government with
religion, Powell v. Bunn, 185 Or App 334, 59 P3d 559 (2002), rev
den, 336 Or 60 (2003).  No party has raised any issue respecting
claim preclusion arising out of the earlier case, and we do not
address it. 
8. It follows from the foregoing that we reject the school
district's argument that only actions of school district
personnel can violate ORS 659.850.  The school district contends
that the statutory remedies provided for violations of ORS
659.850 are remedies to be imposed against the school district,
including the possibility of "withholding of all or part of state
funding,"  ORS 659.855(1), and that the nature of that statutory
remedy -- as well as the wording of ORS 659.850 itself --
indicates that the focus is on whether the school district
discriminated and not on what someone else has done or might do. 
But, as we have explained, the wording of ORS 659.850 indicates
to us that the school district violates that statute if someone
is "subjected to discrimination" in a public school program,
service, or activity, irrespective of who is doing the
discriminating.  
9. The Court of Appeals made what it apparently thought
was a decisive point in a footnote in which it asserted that the
analysis that it employed in the present case is no different
from what would be employed were the school district to permit
the youth auxiliary of the Ku Klux Klan to make a presentation to
students, so long as that group did not refer to limiting
participation to white Protestants.  The court stated, "We doubt
that, in that situation, either the superintendent or the dissent
would fail to find substantial evidence that the district
discriminated against racial minorities, Catholics, Jews, and
Muslims."  198 Or App at 42 n 11.  
Identifying a particularly odious group and its
doctrine does not, however, serve as a basis for reading the
words of the statute in ways that those words will not support. 
That is, notwithstanding the inflammatory nature of the
comparison, we fail to see how the wording of ORS 659.850
prohibits an organization, even a hate group, from making a
neutral presentation to students, or how such a presentation,
even by a hate group, necessarily would subject a person to
differential treatment or discrimination under ORS 659.850.  
10. Because the school required the children to attend the
recruiting session, this case does not present the question
whether permitting the Scouts to make the same offer during a
voluntary recruiting session would subject the children to
discrimination within the meaning of ORS 659.850.  Nor does it
raise the question whether presenting information about the
Scouts or other groups as part of the school curriculum would
violate ORS 659.850.