Case Title: State v. Lira

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019AP000692-CR, 2019AP000691-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2021-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 WI 81 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Cesar Antonio Lira, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 394 Wis. 2d 523,950 N.W.2d 687 
(2020 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 18, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 27, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Frederick C. Rosa   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court.   
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Jacob J. Wittwer, assistant attorney general; with whom 
on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general.  There was an 
oral argument by Jacob J. Wittwer. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Christopher P. August, assistant state public defender. There was 
an oral argument by Christopher P. August. 
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 81 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.   2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR 
(L.C. Nos. 
1992CF921195 & 1999CF163) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Cesar Antonio Lira, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 18, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Lira, Nos. 
2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Sep. 29, 2020), affirming in part and reversing in part the 
Milwaukee County circuit court's1 order denying Cesar Antonio 
Lira's motion for sentence credit. 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Frederick C. Rosa presided. 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Lira argues that he is entitled to sentence credit 
against his 1992 and 1999 sentences for time he spent incarcerated 
in Oklahoma between 2006 and 2017.  According to Lira, he was "made 
available" to Oklahoma and, under Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5) (2017-
18),2 he is entitled to credit for time served.  In addition, Lira 
claims that under Wis. Stat. §§ 304.072(5)3 and 973.155,4  he must 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated.  The full text of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5) is as follows: 
A convicted offender who is made available to another 
jurisdiction under ch. 976 or in any other lawful manner 
shall be credited with service of his or her Wisconsin 
sentence or commitment under the terms of s. 973.155 for 
the duration of custody in the other jurisdiction. 
3 The full text of Wis. Stat. § 304.072(5) is provided below: 
The sentence of a revoked probationer shall be credited 
with the period of custody in a jail, correctional 
institution or any other detention facility pending 
revocation and commencement of sentence according to the 
terms of s. 973.155. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155 states, in relevant part: 
(1)(a)  A convicted offender shall be given credit 
toward the service of his or her sentence for all days 
spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct 
for which sentence was imposed.  As used in this 
subsection, "actual days spent in custody" includes, 
without limitation by enumeration, confinement related 
to an offense for which the offender is ultimately 
sentenced, or for any other sentence arising out of the 
same course of conduct, which occurs: 
1.  While the offender is awaiting trial; 
2.  While the offender is being tried; and 
3.  While the offender is awaiting imposition of 
sentence after trial. 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
3 
 
receive credit for time he spent detained in Wisconsin and Texas 
from 2005 to 2006. 
¶3 
Both Wis. Stat. §§ 973.15(5) and 304.072(5) incorporate 
Wisconsin's foundational sentence-credit statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155, and under § 973.155, Lira is not entitled to credit.  
Neither his incarceration in Oklahoma between 2006 and 2017 nor 
his detention in Wisconsin and Texas between 2005 and 2006 were 
"in connection with the course of conduct for which [the 1992 and 
1999 sentences were] imposed."  § 973.155(1)(a).  Thus, we reverse 
the court of appeals and conclude that Lira is not entitled to 
sentence credit. 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
Over the course of 13 years, Lira transited thousands of 
miles while fleeing government authorities and committed seven 
separate offenses in two states.  The facts, as shown by the record 
and agreed upon by the parties, are stated below.  
¶5 
In July 1992, the Milwaukee County circuit court 
sentenced Lira to 10 years' imprisonment for possession of cocaine 
with intent to deliver, and he was released on parole in September 
1996.  Over two years later, in January 1999, Lira was arrested on 
separate charges.  According to the 1999 criminal complaint, Lira 
was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, 
conspiring to deliver cocaine, obstructing or resisting an 
officer, 
and 
possessing 
with 
intent 
to 
distribute 
                                                 
§ 973.155(1)(a). 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
4 
 
tetrahydrocannabinols.  Lira's parole supervision in the 1992 case 
was revoked as a result of the 1999 charges.  
¶6 
Lira pleaded guilty in May 1999 to being a felon in 
possession of a firearm and conspiring to distribute cocaine.  In 
December 1999, the Milwaukee County circuit court sentenced Lira 
to two years in prison for being a felon in possession of a firearm.  
For the conspiracy charge, the court imposed and stayed a sentence 
of 16 years imprisonment and placed Lira on probation for 12 years 
concurrent with his incarceration.  In January 2001, Lira was 
released from prison and was placed on court-ordered supervision 
for both the 1992 and 1999 cases——parole for the 1992 case and 
probation for the 1999 case.   
¶7 
As a condition of his release, Lira was required to 
report regularly to a Department of Corrections ("DOC") agent 
overseeing his supervision.  In November 2002, the DOC agent 
attempted to take Lira into custody for alleged violations of his 
conditions of release, namely, traveling to Illinois without the 
agent's permission and possessing $55,000 in cash.  In response, 
Lira fled from the agent's office and escaped.  
¶8 
Lira's whereabouts remained unknown until January 6, 
2004, when Lira was arrested by Wisconsin Department of Justice 
agents and was taken into custody.  On January 9, 2004, parole and 
probation holds were placed on Lira for the 1992 and 1999 cases.  
Lira was also charged with endangering safety by use of a dangerous 
weapon. 
¶9 
While being transported to a medical appointment on 
April 15, 2004, Lira fled officers and escaped in an awaiting 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
5 
 
vehicle with his girlfriend.  As a result, Lira was charged with 
escape.  The next day, on April 16, 2004, Lira's parole and 
probation were revoked.  The stay of the 16-year sentence in the 
1999 case was removed, and Lira's reconfinement for the 1992 case 
was ordered.  
¶10 Meanwhile, Lira was driving with his girlfriend and her 
child to Oklahoma.  Once in Oklahoma, on April 16, 2004, Lira 
initiated a high-speed car chase with police.  Lira ran a road 
block and crashed the vehicle he was driving.  His girlfriend died 
as a result of the collision.  That same day, Oklahoma police 
arrested Lira.  He later pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, 
eluding police, running a roadblock, and child abuse/neglect.  On 
September 29, 2004, a court in Creek County, Oklahoma, sentenced 
Lira to 20 years' imprisonment for his offenses.  
¶11 On or about May 22, 2005,5 Oklahoma transferred Lira to 
Wisconsin on detainer to face his 2004 charges of endangering 
safety and escape.  On June 15, 2005, Lira was released by mistake.6  
Again, Lira fled south, and on December 13, 2005, he was arrested 
in San Antonio, Texas.  Wisconsin filed a new charge of bail 
jumping against Lira, and Lira was returned to this state on 
January 11, 2006.  
                                                 
5 The record is not clear as to whether Lira was returned to 
Wisconsin on May 19 or May 22, 2005.  Because we hold that Lira is 
not entitled to sentence credit in this case for his time spent in 
Wisconsin and Texas in 2005 and 2006, the exact date on which Lira 
was provided to Wisconsin authorities in May 2005 is not material.  
6 The record is unclear whether Lira left confinement after 
posting bail or if he was released on bond.  
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
6 
 
¶12 On March 17, 2006, after entering into a global plea 
agreement on the 2004 charges of endangering safety and escape and 
the 2005 charge of bail jumping, the Milwaukee County circuit court 
sentenced Lira to three years of incarceration and three years of 
extended supervision, both to be served consecutive to his Oklahoma 
sentence.  Pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
("IAD"), entered into by both Oklahoma and Wisconsin,7 Wisconsin 
returned Lira to Oklahoma on April 5, 2006, to complete the 
remainder of his Oklahoma sentence.  Lira remained in Oklahoma 
until his sentence there was completed on June 9, 2017.  He was 
soon thereafter transported to Wisconsin to complete his sentences 
for the 1992 and 1999 cases and the 2004 and 2005 cases.  On June 
16, 2017, he arrived in Wisconsin. 
¶13 In September 2017, Lira filed a pro se motion for 
sentence credit against his sentences in the 1992 and 1999 cases.  
He argued that, under Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5), he was entitled to 
sentence credit for all the time he spent in custody in Oklahoma 
between April 16, 2004, when he was arrested for his Oklahoma 
offenses, and June 9, 2017, when his Oklahoma sentence was 
complete.  The circuit court denied this request, citing lack of 
administrative exhaustion. 
¶14 In January 2018, Lira filed a second pro se motion for 
sentence credit under Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5), this time with 
records documenting his attempts to exhaust administrative 
                                                 
7 See Wis. Stat. § 976.05 ("Agreement on detainers"); Okla. 
Stat. 
tit. 
22, 
§ 1347 
(2020) 
("Interstate 
Agreement 
on 
Detainers").  
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
7 
 
remedies with the DOC.  The circuit court denied the motion on the 
merits, reasoning that the Oklahoma sentence was separate and 
distinct from the 1992 and 1999 cases, and that Lira had already 
received sentence credit in Oklahoma for the time spent in custody 
in that state.  After obtaining appointed counsel, Lira appealed 
to the court of appeals.  However, Lira voluntarily dismissed the 
appeal in favor of filing with advice of counsel a more complete 
motion for sentence credit with the circuit court.  On July 27, 
2018, the court of appeals dismissed Lira's appeal. 
¶15 In October 2018, by appointed counsel, Lira filed a third 
motion for sentence credit.  He again argued that under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.15(5), he was entitled to sentence credit for all the time 
spent in custody from April 16, 2004, to the end of his Oklahoma 
sentence on June 9, 2017.  In addition, Lira claimed that, under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.15(5) and 304.072(4), he was entitled to credit 
for time spent in Wisconsin, Texas, and Oklahoma from May 22, 2005, 
when he was transferred to Wisconsin on detainer, to the completion 
of his Oklahoma sentence on June 9, 2017.  Finally, Lira argued 
that he was entitled to credit for the time spent in Oklahoma 
custody between his arrest on April 16, 2004, and his sentencing 
in Oklahoma on September 29, 2004.  On October 15, 2018, the 
circuit court denied the motion for lack of evidence and failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies. 
¶16 In 
November 
2018, 
Lira 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, arguing that he in fact did request sentence 
credit from the DOC.  Lira also provided additional documentation 
to assist in the circuit court's inquiry.  On March 25, 2019, the 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
8 
 
circuit court denied the motion for reconsideration.  The circuit 
court reasoned that under Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5), Lira was not 
"made available" to Oklahoma on April 16, 2004.  Lira escaped 
custody and was arrested on separate Oklahoma charges.  Thus, the 
circuit court denied his request for credit between April 16, 2004, 
and May 22, 2005.  However, with regard to Lira's request for 
sentence credit between his return to Wisconsin on May 22, 2005, 
and the completion of his Oklahoma sentence on June 9, 2017, the 
circuit court determined that Lira had not properly presented the 
issue to the DOC and therefore did not address the merits.  Lira 
appealed this decision, and on April 17, 2019, the court of appeals 
consolidated the 1992 and 1999 cases to facilitate their review.  
¶17 On September 29, 2020, the court of appeals issued a 
decision affirming in part and reversing in part the circuit 
court's order.  Lira, Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR.  First, 
the court of appeals concluded that Lira properly exhausted 
administrative remedies and his request for sentence credit was 
not foreclosed.  Id., ¶¶19-21.  The State did not appeal this 
determination.  
¶18 Next, the court of appeals concluded that as a "convicted 
offender" Lira was not "made available" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.15(5) when he escaped from Wisconsin custody and committed 
additional offenses in Oklahoma.  Id., ¶¶28-32.  The court of 
appeals also determined that under Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a), 
Lira's arrest in Oklahoma was not "in connection with the course 
of conduct" underlying the 1992 and 1999 cases.  Id., ¶¶38-40.  
Thus, Lira was not entitled to credit from April 16, 2004, to May 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
9 
 
22, 2005, while in Oklahoma custody.  Lira did not appeal this 
conclusion.  
¶19 The court of appeals continued and held that Lira was 
entitled to sentence credit for the entire time spent in Oklahoma 
custody between April 5, 2006, and June 9, 2017.  Id., ¶¶33-35.  
Citing its published decision, State v. Brown, 2006 WI App 41, 289 
Wis. 2d 823, 711 N.W.2d 708, the court of appeals held that because 
the State turned Lira over to Oklahoma officials on April 5, 2006, 
Wisconsin had "made [Lira] available to another jurisdiction" 
under Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5) and Lira qualified for credit.  Id., 
¶¶33-35.  Finally, the court of appeals concluded that Lira's 
detainment in Wisconsin and Texas between May 22, 2005, and April 
5, 2006, was sufficiently related to the 1992 and 1999 cases that 
sentence credit for that time was warranted under § 973.155(1)(a).  
Id., ¶¶41-46. 
¶20 The State filed a petition for review with this court, 
challenging the court of appeals' conclusion that sentence credit 
was due in the 1992 and 1999 cases for Lira's time spent 
incarcerated between May 22, 2005, and April 5, 2006, and between 
April 5, 2006, and June 9, 2017.  We granted the petition on 
January 20, 2021. 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶21 In this case, we are asked to interpret Wisconsin 
statutes.  "Interpretation of a statute is a question of law that 
we review de novo, although we benefit from the analyses of the 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
10 
 
circuit court and the court of appeals."  Estate of Miller v. 
Storey, 2017 WI 99, ¶25, 378 Wis. 2d 358, 903 N.W.2d 759.  
¶22 "[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily 
stop the inquiry.  Statutory language is given its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. 
for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(citations and quotations omitted).  Furthermore,  
statutory language is interpreted in the context in 
which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 
whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid 
absurd or unreasonable results.  Statutory language is 
read where possible to give reasonable effect to every 
word, in order to avoid surplusage. 
Id., ¶46 (citations omitted). 
III.   ANALYSIS 
¶23 Lira argues, and the court of appeals agreed, that he is 
entitled to sentence credit for his 1992 and 1999 convictions under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5) for the time he spent incarcerated in 
Oklahoma between April 5, 2006, and June 9, 2017.  He also claims 
that, under Wis. Stat. §§ 304.072 and 973.155(1)(a), he is entitled 
to approximately five months of sentence credit for the time he 
was detained in Wisconsin and Texas between May 22, 2005, and April 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
11 
 
5, 2006.  The State contests both these points, and we will address 
the issues in turn.  
¶24 Notably, on appeal, Lira does not seek sentence credit 
for time spent in Oklahoma custody prior to his transfer on 
detainer to Wisconsin in May 2005.  Sentence credit for time spent 
in Wisconsin from January to April 2004, prior to Lira's escape to 
Oklahoma, is also not in dispute.  Further, sentence credit for 
his 2004 and 2005 Wisconsin convictions is not at issue in this 
case.  The court is not asked to apply credit as to Lira's pre-
sentence or post-sentence confinement for his endangering safety, 
escape, and bail jumping convictions. 
¶25 As explained below, we reverse the court of appeals.  
Lira is not entitled to sentence credit in the 1992 and 1999 cases 
for his incarceration between May 22, 2005, and April 5, 2006, and 
for his incarceration between April 5, 2006, and June 9, 2017. 
During that period, Lira's time in custody was not "in connection 
with the course of conduct for which [the 1992 and 1999 sentences 
were] imposed."  Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a). 
 
A.  Time Spent in Oklahoma Between April 2006 
and June 2017. 
1.  The Statutory Text 
¶26 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.15 establishes miscellaneous 
guidelines in setting and instituting criminal sentences.  For 
example, § 973.15(1) states that Wisconsin sentences "commence at 
noon on the day of sentence."  The statute establishes basic 
calculation procedures for concurrent and consecutive sentences, 
and it confirms that, if a prisoner were to escape, his time at 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
12 
 
large "shall not be computed" as service of the sentence.  
§ 973.15(1), (2), (2m), (7).  In this context, § 973.15 includes 
a provision on sentence credit when a convicted offender in 
Wisconsin is transferred to another jurisdiction: 
A convicted offender who is made available to another 
jurisdiction under ch. 976 or in any other lawful manner 
shall be credited with service of his or her Wisconsin 
sentence or commitment under the terms of s. 973.155 for 
the duration of custody in the other jurisdiction. 
§ 973.15(5). 
¶27 The statute quoted above explicitly references, and ties 
its obligations to, Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  This is not altogether 
surprising.  In Wisconsin, § 973.155 is the foundational sentence-
credit statute.  See State v. Elandis Johnson, 2009 WI 57, ¶32, 
318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207 (reasoning that, "[t]o be eligible 
for sentence credit in Wisconsin," a defendant must comply with 
the 
credit 
requirements 
under 
§ 973.155(1)(a)); 
State 
v. 
Friedlander, 2019 WI 22, ¶22, 385 Wis. 2d 633, 923 N.W.2d 849 
("[Wisconsin] Stat. § 973.155 governs when a defendant is entitled 
to receive sentence credit.").  
¶28 Section 973.155 is titled "Sentence credit" and includes 
provisions detailing when sentence credit is due, Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(1), (1m), (3), (4), by whom and when sentence credit is 
calculated, § 973.155(2), and how a sentence credit can be 
challenged, § 973.155(5), (6).  See State v. Lopez, 2019 WI 101, 
¶26, 389 Wis. 2d 156, 936 N.W.2d 125 ("The titles of the statutes 
are not part of the statutes . . . [b]ut the titles are part of a 
statute's 
context 
and 
can 
be 
relevant 
to 
statutory 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
13 
 
interpretation." (cleaned up)); Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 
("[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it 
is used . . . .").  Wisconsin statutes repeatedly cite and refer 
back to § 973.155 for sentence credit determinations.  See, e.g., 
Wis. Stat. § 302.11(7)(am) (stating that, when revoking an 
individual's parole, calculation of the remaining sentence must be 
made "in accordance with . . . [s.] 973.155"); Wis. Stat. § 302.43 
("Good time" statute for confinement in county jails, which notes 
that inmates are given credit "for time served prior to sentencing 
under s. 973.155"); Wis. Stat. § 304.072(5) (noting that the period 
of time spent in confinement by a revoked probationer pending 
commencement of his sentence will be credited toward the sentence 
"according to the terms of s. 973.155").    
¶29 Section 973.155 sets a basic rule for sentence credit 
determinations:  a defendant will receive credit for time spent 
incarcerated when that time has a factual connection to the offense 
for which he or she was convicted.  "Sentence credit is designed 
to afford fairness so that a person does not serve more time than 
that to which he or she is sentenced."  State v. Obriecht, 2015 WI 
66, ¶23, 363 Wis. 2d 816, 867 N.W.2d 387; see also State v. Marcus 
Johnson, 2007 WI 107, ¶¶35-36, 304 Wis. 2d 318, 735 N.W.2d 505 
(explaining the background of Wis. Stat. § 973.155 and its 
enactment in the wake of a determination by this court in Klimas 
v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 244, 249 N.W.2d 285 (1977), that the lack of 
sentence credit can violate prisoners' equal protection rights).  
Thus, § 973.155(1)(a) states that "[a] convicted offender shall be 
given credit toward the service of his or her sentence for all 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
14 
 
days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for 
which sentence was imposed."  This court has interpreted this 
provision to include two requirements:  "(1) the defendant must 
show that the defendant was 'in custody'; and (2) the defendant 
must show that the custody was 'in connection with the course of 
conduct for which the sentence was imposed.'"  Friedlander, 385 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶23 (quoting § 973.155(1)(a)); see also State v. 
Carter, 2010 WI 77, ¶56, 327 Wis. 2d 1, 785 N.W.2d 516 (reasoning 
that § 973.155 requires a "factual connection between custody and 
the conduct for which sentence is imposed," not mere "procedural 
connection").  
¶30 In line with the fairness principles underlying sentence 
credits and Wis. Stat. § 973.155, this court has repeatedly held 
that, while criminal defendants are entitled to sentence credit 
for incarceration factually connected to an offense, they are not 
entitled to credit already counted toward a separate and 
consecutive sentence.  As this court explained in State v. 
Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d 86, 96-101, 423 N.W.2d 533 (1988), when 
interpreting § 973.155, the intent of sentence credit is "to make 
sure that no prisoner failed to get credit for pretrial detention"; 
sentence credit is not intended as a workaround, reducing aggregate 
lengths of sentences through "dual credit for multiple charges."  
See also Obriecht, 363 Wis. 2d 816, ¶36 ("[W]hen sentences are 
consecutive, sentence credit is not issued to more than one 
sentence so long as the first sentence to be served is sufficient 
to receive the sentence credit at issue."). 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
15 
 
¶31 Despite these principles at the core of Wisconsin's 
sentence credit law, Lira now argues, even though he was convicted 
in a separate state for conduct completely unrelated to his 1992 
and 1999 Wisconsin convictions, that he is entitled to over 11 
years of sentence credit for his Wisconsin offenses.  The law does 
not countenance this result.  
¶32 It is uncontested that Lira's 1992 and 1999 criminal 
activities did not have a factual connection to Lira's evading 
police in Oklahoma on April 16, 2004, crashing his car, and in the 
process, killing an individual and endangering a child.  Lira 
admits that he is unable to meet the standard established under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) that the period of incarceration in 
Oklahoma be factually "in connection with the course of conduct 
for which the sentence was imposed."8  Friedlander, 385 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶23.  
¶33 It is also undisputed that Lira's Wisconsin sentences 
ran consecutively to his Oklahoma sentences.  On April 16, 2004, 
Lira's parole in his 1992 conviction was revoked, and the stay was 
lifted for the sentence in his 1999 conviction.  From that time 
onward, Lira was required to serve the period of incarceration due 
in the 1992 and 1999 cases regardless of new offenses he may have 
committed in 2004 and 2005.  Thus, under Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d at 
100, Lira is not entitled to dual credit against both his Oklahoma 
                                                 
8 At oral argument, in fact, Lira's attorney conceded that 
Lira's conduct underlying his 1992 and 1999 offenses was "not 
factually connected to his fleeing in Oklahoma . . . years later."  
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
16 
 
sentence and his 1992 and 1999 Wisconsin sentences for time spent 
incarcerated in Oklahoma.  
¶34 Lira's statutory argument relies on an exceedingly 
narrow, and ultimately unconvincing, reading of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.15(5).  According to Lira, § 973.15(5)'s requirement that a 
"convicted offender . . . made available to another jurisdiction" 
receives credit toward "his or her Wisconsin sentence" trumps the 
factual-connection test under Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) and 
Boettcher.  Lira argues he was a "convicted offender" and he was 
"made available" to Oklahoma on April 5, 2006, and thus, he is 
entitled to sentence credit.  Under Lira's reasoning, § 973.155 
and the prohibition against dual credit simply do not apply.  
¶35 However, even if a "convicted offender" is "made 
available to another jurisdiction," under § 973.15(5)'s own terms, 
sentence credit must conform to "the terms of s. 973.155."  The 
language of Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5) is unambiguous:  credit is due 
under the provision only if it is warranted under § 973.155, which 
includes the factual-connection test found in § 973.155(1)(a).  
Given that "the meaning of the statute is plain," no further 
inquiry is necessary.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  Lira did not 
comply with § 973.155(1)(a), and he is attempting to receive 
improper dual credit.  See Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d at 100.   
2.  Arguments raised by Lira and the State. 
¶36 Lira argues that this plain reading of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.15(5) creates improper surplusage in Wisconsin statutes.  
According to Lira, if we require, as § 973.15(5) states, that he 
comply with the factual connection standard under Wis. Stat. 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
17 
 
§ 973.155, section 973.15(5) would have no role or utility.  A 
reader could simply look to § 973.155 to determine whether sentence 
credit applies.   
¶37 But it was the legislature's choice to require sentence 
credit under Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5) to be made "according to the 
terms of s. 973.155."  The legislature did not choose to create a 
new standard when a convicted offender is transferred to another 
jurisdiction, nor did it leave the question unresolved for the 
judiciary to fashion an appropriate test.  Instead, it explicitly 
linked § 973.15(5) to Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  We are bound to uphold 
that decision.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("If this process of 
analysis yields a plain, clear statutory meaning, . . . the 
statute is applied according to this ascertainment of its meaning." 
(quotations omitted)). 
¶38 It is true that when interpreting statutes, courts 
should strive to "avoid surplusage."  Id.  "We are to assume that 
the legislature used all the words in a statute for a reason."  
State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, ¶18, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811.  
However, Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5) is not an extraneous provision 
with no utility.  It clarifies an important point:  when a 
convicted individual in Wisconsin custody is transferred to 
another jurisdiction, he is entitled to sentence credit so long as 
it complies with § 973.155.  This explanation is significant 
because most sentence credit determinations are made immediately 
after sentencing.  See § 973.155(2) ("After the imposition of 
sentence, the court shall make and enter a specific finding of the 
number of days for which sentence credit is to be granted, which 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
18 
 
finding shall be included in the judgment of conviction.").  
Further, § 973.155(1)(a) includes provisions that specifically 
grant credit for time spent in custody prior to sentencing.  See 
§ 973.155(1)(a)1.-3. (stating that credit may be owed when an 
individual is in custody "awaiting trial," while "being tried," 
and 
while 
"awaiting 
imposition 
of 
sentence"). 
 
Without 
§ 973.15(5)'s clarification, litigants or judges may have read 
§ 973.155 to apply only in the pre-sentencing context.  The 
argument is not unknown to this court.  See, e.g., State v. Lamar, 
2011 WI 50, ¶30, 334 Wis. 2d 536, 799 N.W.2d 758 ("Lamar argues 
that § 973.155 is inapplicable here because the statute has been 
construed to govern only the award of sentence credit for pre-
sentence custody.") 
¶39 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.15(5) is included in a provision 
that details miscellaneous rules for dates, times, and lengths of 
criminal sentences.  See § 973.15(1), (2), (2m), (8).  It 
discusses sentences from other jurisdictions, as well as movement 
of 
the 
convicted 
offender 
in 
and 
out 
of 
prison.  
§ 973.15(3), (4), (7) 
(describing 
rules 
for 
concurrent 
or 
consecutive foreign sentences and how to compute a sentence when 
a prisoner escapes).  The legislature made a reasonable decision 
to confirm the applicability of Wis. Stat. § 973.155 while a 
prisoner is serving his sentence and when he is transferred out of 
the prison.  
¶40 To the extent that some surplusage exists, it is well 
accepted that redundancy occurs in statutes.  The mere existence 
of repetition cannot contravene plain language.  See Kalal, 271 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
19 
 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("Statutory language is read where possible to 
give reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage" 
(emphasis added).); Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee 
County, 2019 WI 24, ¶17 n.10, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 924 N.W.2d 153 
("Even if a plain meaning interpretation creates surplusage, 
sometimes legislatures do create surplusage and redundancies of 
language, and therefore the canon against surplusage is not 
absolute."); Antonin Scalia & Brian A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 176 (2012) ("Put to a choice, 
however, a court may well prefer ordinary meaning to an unusual 
meaning 
that 
will 
avoid 
surplusage."). 
 
Notably, 
Lira's 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5) would wholesale eliminate 
"according to the terms of s. 973.155" from the statute. 
¶41 Lira also claims that this court must accept his legal 
reasoning because it is supported by published precedent from the 
court of appeals.  We have never addressed whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.15(5) overrides the factual-connection test of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a), as the court of appeals held below. Nonetheless, 
under Lira's theory, this court must "defer" to the court of 
appeals' interpretation under stare decisis principles. 
¶42 The court of appeals in this case cited State v. Brown, 
289 Wis. 2d 823, as binding precedent.  See Lira, Nos. 2019AP691-
CR & 2019AP692-CR, ¶¶23, 33-35.  In Brown, a Wisconsin probationer 
had his probation revoked but, before beginning his Wisconsin 
sentence, he was transferred to federal authorities for separate 
federal offenses.  289 Wis. 2d 823, ¶3. The defendant in Brown 
completed his federal sentence and was transferred back to 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
20 
 
Wisconsin authorities; he then moved for sentence credit for his 
time spent in federal prison.  Id., ¶¶5-7.  According to the court 
of appeals, the government argued that because a revoked 
probationer's sentence does not begin until "the probationer 
enters the prison," Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5) was not yet triggered 
when the defendant was transferred to federal authorities and 
credit was not due.  Id., ¶8 (citing Wis. Stat. § 973.10(2)(b) 
(2003-04)).  The court of appeals rejected this approach, which 
turned primarily on the coincidence of when the probationer stepped 
foot in prison.  Id., ¶11.  However, in so doing, the court of 
appeals also concluded that Wis. Stat. § 973.155's factual-
connection test "is not the correct test" when § 973.15(5) applies.  
Id.  The court held that if an individual is a "convicted offender" 
and he is "made available to another jurisdiction," the individual 
is entitled to sentence credit, notwithstanding § 973.155.  Id.  
¶43 As explained above, the interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 973.155 and 973.15(5) provided in Brown ignores the plain 
meaning of the statutes.  Accordingly, to the extent that Brown 
controlled the meaning and application of §§ 973.155 and 973.15(5) 
prior to this decision, it is hereby overruled. 
¶44 However, Lira asserts that, even if Brown were "wrongly 
decided," this court must accept its legal analysis as a matter of 
precedent.  It is undoubtedly true that "[o]fficially published 
opinions of the court of appeals. . . have statewide precedential 
effect."  Wis. Stat. § 752.41(2).  And when this court considers 
legal questions, it "benefit[s] from the analyses of the court of 
appeals and circuit court."  State v. Denny, 2017 WI 17, ¶46, 373 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
21 
 
Wis. 2d 390, 891 N.W.2d 144.  Providing due respect to the legal 
acuity and experience of lower courts, we have stated that legal 
interpretations accepted by the court of appeals, especially when 
the interpretations are longstanding, will not be overturned 
unless they are "objectively wrong."9  Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 
103, ¶21, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405; see, e.g., AllEnergy 
Corp. v. Trempealeau Cnty. Env't & Land Use Comm., 2017 WI 52, 
¶¶50-55, 375 Wis. 2d 329, 895 N.W.2d 368 (discussing both 
Wisconsin Supreme Court and Wisconsin Court of Appeals precedent 
in existence for over 20 years and concluding that "[n]o compelling 
reason has been given to justify deviating from Wisconsin 
precedent").  
¶45 While respecting court of appeals precedent is an 
important consideration, it is not determinative.  This court has 
never applied the five factors commonly used in a decision to 
overturn supreme court caselaw to override an interpretation 
derived solely from the court of appeals.  See Bartholomew v. Wis. 
Patients Comp. Fund & Compcare Health Servs. Ins. Corp., 2006 WI 
91, ¶33, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216 (describing the five 
                                                 
9 For instance, where a decision from the court of appeals is 
well-reasoned, over the course of many years significant reliance 
interests have grown around the court of appeals decision, and 
this court has approved of the decision in prior caselaw, respect 
for precedent is of substantial importance.  See, e.g., Country 
Visions Coop. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 2021 WI 35, ¶¶22-28, 
396 Wis. 2d 470, 958 N.W.2d 511 (analyzing rights of first refusal 
for property transfers under legal principles first examined in 
Wisconsin by the court of appeals (citing Wilber Lime Prods., Inc. 
v. Ahrndt, 2003 WI App 259, 268 Wis. 2d 650, 673 N.W.2d 339)).  
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
22 
 
factors).10  Further, we have shown a repeated willingness to 
interpret and apply the law correctly, irrespective of a court of 
appeals decision that came to a different conclusion.  See, e.g., 
State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶54, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238 
(withdrawing language from a published court of appeals decision 
as precedential value because it was "contrary to the plain 
language of [a] statute"); Manitowoc County v. Samuel J.H., 2013 
WI 68, ¶5 n.2, 349 Wis. 2d 202, 833 N.W.2d 109 (concluding that 
language from a published court of appeals decision must be 
withdrawn because it "directly conflict[ed] with the plain 
language of [a] statute"); Wenke, 274 Wis. 2d 220, ¶¶76-77 
(overruling 
a 
published 
court 
of 
appeals 
decision 
"that 
incorrectly interpreted [a statute]").  
¶46 Ultimately, while "published opinions of the court of 
appeals are precedential," as the state's highest court, the 
supreme court "has the power to overrule, modify or withdraw 
language from a published opinion of the court of appeals."  Cook 
v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-90, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997).  "The 
supreme court, 'unlike the court of appeals, has been designated 
                                                 
10 The five factors are whether:  
(1) Changes or developments in the law have undermined 
the rationale behind a decision; (2) there is a need to 
make a decision correspond to newly ascertained facts; 
(3) there is a showing that the precedent has become 
detrimental to coherence and consistency in the law; (4) 
the prior decision is "unsound in principle;" or (5) the 
prior decision is "unworkable in practice."   
Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund & Compcare Health Servs. 
Ins. Corp., 2006 WI 91, ¶33, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216. 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
23 
 
by the constitution and the legislature as a law-declaring court.'"  
Id. at 189 (quoting State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Cir. Ct. 
for La Crosse County, 115 Wis. 2d 220, 229-30, 340 N.W.2d 460 
(1983)).  It is this court's responsibility to interpret statutes 
de novo, and a plain meaning reading of Wis. Stat. §§ 973.15(5) 
and 973.155 conflicts with the court of appeals decision in Brown.  
See Denny, 373 Wis. 2d 390, ¶46.  Brown's interpretation of 
§§ 973.15(5) and 973.155 is "objectively wrong" and must be 
overturned.  Wenke, 274 Wis. 2d 220, ¶21.  
¶47 Despite arguing forcefully against Lira's position 
before the circuit court, the court of appeals, and in briefing 
before this court, the State at oral argument made an abrupt change 
in strategy.  It asked the court to reject Lira's request for 
sentence credit, but also claimed that the factual-connection test 
under Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) did not apply to Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.15(5).  The State was apparently concerned that the correct 
interpretation of § 973.15(5), as previously described, would 
undermine the IAD and Wisconsin's interstate obligations. 
¶48 First, we note that the State's change in legal position 
is not binding upon the court.  "[W]e are not bound by the parties' 
interpretation of the law or obligated to accept a party's 
concession of law.  This court, not the parties, decides questions 
of law."  Carter, 327 Wis. 2d 1, ¶50.  As this court explained, an 
individual 
may 
receive 
sentence 
credit 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.15(5) only "according to the terms of s. 973.155" and only 
upon satisfaction of the factual-connection test.  
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
24 
 
¶49 Furthermore, the State's concern is misplaced.  The 
court is in no way interpreting or applying the IAD, codified under 
Wis. Stat. § 976.05.  The IAD has its own provision on sentence 
credit: 
During the continuance of temporary custody or while the 
prisoner is otherwise being made available for trial as 
required by this agreement, time being served on the 
sentence shall continue to run but good time shall be 
earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, 
the law and practice of the jurisdiction which imposed 
the sentence allows.   
§ 976.05(5)(f). 
¶50 The IAD provision could apply only if Wisconsin had 
transferred Lira to Oklahoma on detainer to face sentencing in 
Oklahoma.  Here, it was Oklahoma that transferred Lira to Wisconsin 
to face sentencing on Wisconsin charges.11  We are asked to 
interpret Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5).  The IAD and Wis. Stat. 
§ 976.05(5)(f) are simply not at issue in this case.  
¶51 In fact, the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5) 
advanced by Lira would likely undermine, not enhance, interstate 
cooperation.  If a defendant is entitled to sentence credit for 
the entire time he is in foreign custody so long as he was a 
"convicted offender" that was "made available to [the other] 
jurisdiction," 
Wisconsin 
authorities 
would 
be 
strongly 
incentivized to not transfer prisoners to foreign jurisdictions.  
By doing so, the transfer could effectively eliminate a Wisconsin 
                                                 
11 Notably, the State itself asserts that it is "likely" that 
Oklahoma, pursuant to the IAD, applied Lira's time spent on 
detainer in Wisconsin and Texas toward his Oklahoma sentence.  
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
25 
 
sentence and produce an improper windfall for a prisoner.  For 
example, if Lira's legal position were correct, someone could 
commit one murder in Wisconsin and another murder in Oklahoma.  If 
the person received consecutive sentences of the same length for 
the offenses, and he or she were transferred from Wisconsin to 
Oklahoma under Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5) to complete the Oklahoma 
sentence, the Wisconsin sentence would in effect be erased.  
Although the facts underlying this case are (thankfully) unlikely 
to frequently recur, adopting Lira's legal position could 
encourage Wisconsin authorities to refuse to return prisoners sent 
here on detainer under the IAD.  The legislature avoided such a 
result by tying § 973.15(5) to § 973.155.    
¶52 In all, Lira is not entitled to credit toward his 1992 
and 1999 convictions for the time spent in Oklahoma serving 
consecutive sentences for unrelated offenses.  
 
B.  Time Spent in Wisconsin and Texas Between  
May 2005 and April 2006. 
¶53 Lira also argues that under Wis. Stat. § 304.072(5) he 
is entitled to sentence credit for time spent in Wisconsin and 
Texas between May 22, 2005, and April 5, 2006, while on detainer 
from Oklahoma.  The court of appeals agreed with Lira and held 
that sentence credit against the 1992 and 1999 cases was due.  
Lira, Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR, ¶¶41-46.  
¶54 Wisconsin Stat. § 304.072(5) states:  
The sentence of a revoked probationer shall be credited 
with the period of custody in a jail, correctional 
institution or any other detention facility pending 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
26 
 
revocation and commencement of sentence according to the 
terms of s. 973.155. 
¶55 Lira argues that he was a "revoked probationer" who, 
between May 2005 and April 2006, was in custody "pending revocation 
and commencement of his sentence."  However, like Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.15(5), the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 304.072(5) applies 
only under "the terms of s. 973.155."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶45.  In turn, Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) permits sentence credit 
only where confinement is factually "in connection with the course 
of conduct for which the sentence was imposed." 
¶56 The parties do not dispute that Oklahoma transported 
Lira to Wisconsin in May 2005 to face pending charges for 
endangering safety and escape.  See also Lira, Nos. 2019AP691—CR 
& 2019AP692-CR, ¶8 ("In mid May 2005, Oklahoma sent Lira to 
Wisconsin to face trial on his outstanding Wisconsin charges.").  
Although Lira was inexplicably released and fled to Texas in the 
process, he eventually pleaded guilty to the 2004 and 2005 charges 
in Wisconsin.  He was sentenced on March 17, 2006, and, expectedly, 
he was transported 19 days later to Oklahoma in order to complete 
the remainder of the Oklahoma sentence.  At no point in time was 
Lira brought to and confined in Wisconsin or Texas because of or 
on the part of the revocation order in the 1992 case, or the 
removal of a stay in sentence in the 1999 case.  Lira was not 
transported to Wisconsin to serve his 1992 or 1999 sentences.  He 
was an Oklahoma prisoner sent to face trial on factually unrelated 
charges initiated in 2004 and 2005.  There is no dispute that the 
convictions for endangering safety, escape, and bail jumping are 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
27 
 
not factually connected to "the course of conduct for which [the 
sentences for the 1992 and 1999 drug and firearm offenses were] 
imposed."  Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a). 
¶57 The court of appeals granted Lira credit against the 
1992 and 1999 sentences for his time in Wisconsin and Texas while 
on 
detainer 
because 
the 
2004 
endangering 
safety 
charge 
precipitated the revocation in the 1992 case and the removal of 
the stay in sentence in the 1999 case.  According to the court of 
appeals, "Lira's endangering safety charge in 2004 initiated the 
probation 
hold, 
the 
revocation 
orders, 
and 
his 
eventual 
reconfinement on the parole and probation violations in the 1992 
and 1999 cases.  This created a relationship between the cause of 
confinement between Lira's 1992 and 1999 cases and his later 2004-
05 cases."  Lira, Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR, ¶45 (citations 
omitted).  
¶58 Yet this court has repeatedly held that the test under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) is a factual one.  Carter, 327 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶56 (requiring "factual connection between custody and 
the conduct for which sentence is imposed").  Mere "procedural 
connection" is insufficient to warrant sentence credit.  Id. 
¶59 In State v. Elandis Johnson, a criminal defendant was on 
bond pending sentencing for a marijuana trafficking charge.  318 
Wis. 2d 21, ¶¶5-6.  After breaking the conditions of bond once 
before, he was charged with possessing marijuana and also bail 
jumping.  Id., ¶7. The defendant remained in custody for a time, 
and received concurrent sentences for the initial trafficking 
charge, the marijuana possession charge, and the bail jumping 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
28 
 
charge.  Id., ¶¶8, 10, 12.  He was on bond pending resolution of 
the drug trafficking charge and he was charged with bail jumping.  
In addition, the defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences 
for the charges at the same hearing.  Despite these clear 
procedural connections, this court determined that the defendant's 
time in custody after being arrested for possessing marijuana and 
bail jumping were not "factually connected" to the trafficking 
charge under Wis. Stat. § 973.155 and credit was not due.  Id., 
¶¶3, 24 (noting that the period of custody was "tied directly to 
only [the marijuana possession and bail jumping]").  
¶60 Similarly, in State v. Beets, a criminal defendant was 
charged with burglary which "triggered [a] probation hold" for a 
separate drug offense.  124 Wis. 2d 372, 378-79, 369 N.W.2d 382 
(1985).  Although the defendant received credit against the 
burglary charge while he was in custody awaiting sentencing on 
both the burglary and drug offenses, as soon as he was sentenced 
for the drug offense and began serving time in connection with 
that offense, "any connection" to the burglary charge was 
"severed."  Id. at 379. This is despite the clear procedural 
connection between the drug and burglary offenses.  The burglary 
charge "initiated the scrutiny into Beets' background that 
resulted in the probation hold, the revocation, and the ultimate 
concurrent drug sentences."  Id. at 378-79; see also Marcus 
Johnson, 304 Wis. 2d 318, ¶¶76-77 (holding, in a criminal battery 
case, that time spent in juvenile commitment which would have 
occurred "even if the . . . battery had not occurred" did not 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
29 
 
justify sentence credit toward the battery offense, despite "[t]he 
fact that [the defendant] was on signature bond").  
¶61 By contrast, when custody of an individual is at least 
in part factually connected to an offense, this court has not been 
hesitant to provide credit under Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  For 
example, in State v. Carter, this court granted credit to a 
defendant who was detained in another state for both a probation 
violation in that state and a Wisconsin warrant.  327 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶62.  The custody resulted "in part from the Wisconsin warrant," 
and the factual-connection test was met.  Id., ¶79. 
¶62 Here, the court of appeals cites a mere procedural 
connection between the 1992 and 1999 cases and the 2004 endangering 
safety charge to justify credit.  It asserted that the endangering 
safety charge legally "initiated" Lira's reconfinement for the 
1992 and 1999 cases.  However, just as the defendant in Elandis 
Johnson was charged with bail jumping and was detained while on 
bond for a separate charge, and the defendant in Beets was 
sentenced to a drug offense only as a result of a burglary charge, 
simply because the 1992 and 1999 sentences occurred under legal 
procedure because of Lira's choice to endanger safety in 2004, 
does not mean that he was transferred to Wisconsin on May 22, 2005, 
as a matter of fact for the 1992 and 1999 sentences.  Unlike the 
defendant's custody in Carter, Lira was not sent to Wisconsin on 
a detainer to finish serving his 1992 and 1999 sentences.  Rather, 
he was transferred to Wisconsin to face the 2004 and 2005 charges 
of endangering safety, escape, and bail jumping. 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
30 
 
¶63 Despite the close procedural ties between the 1992, 
1999, 2004, and 2005 offenses, Lira would have been transferred on 
detainer to Wisconsin "even if the. . . [1992 and 1999 offenses] 
had not occurred."  Marcus Johnson, 304 Wis. 2d 318, ¶76.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) does not apply, and Lira is not 
entitled to sentence credit under Wis. Stat. §§ 304.072(5) or 
973.155 for any time spent in custody in Wisconsin and Texas 
between May 22, 2005, and April 5, 2006. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶64 Lira argues that he is entitled to sentence credit 
against his 1992 and 1999 cases for time spent incarcerated in 
Oklahoma between 2006 and 2017.  According to Lira, he was "made 
available" to Oklahoma and, under Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5), he is 
entitled to credit for time served.  In addition, Lira claims that 
under Wis. Stat. §§ 304.072(5) and 973.155, he must receive credit 
for time spent detained in Wisconsin and Texas from 2005 to 2006. 
¶65 Both Wis. Stat. §§ 973.15(5) and 304.072(5) incorporate 
Wisconsin's foundational sentence-credit statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155, and under § 973.155, Lira is not entitled to credit.  
Neither his incarceration in Oklahoma between 2006 and 2017 nor 
his detention in Wisconsin and Texas between 2005 and 2006 were 
"in connection with the course of conduct for which [the 1992 and 
1999 sentences were] imposed."  § 973.155(1)(a).  Thus, we reverse 
the court of appeals, and conclude that Lira is not entitled to 
sentence credit. 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
31 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
Nos. 2019AP691-CR & 2019AP692-CR   
 
 
 
1