Case Title: McDougal v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 170, 2023

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2024-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JAMES McDOUGAL, 
§ 
 
§ No. 170, 2023 
 
Defendant Below, 
§  
 
Appellant, 
§ Court Below: Superior Court 
 
§ of the State of Delaware  
 
v. 
§  
 
§ Cr. ID No. 2204003966 (N) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§           
              
§ 
Appellee. 
§  
 
 
Submitted: January 17, 2024 
Decided: 
March 21, 2024 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, LeGROW, and 
GRIFFITHS, Justices constituting the Court en banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and VACATED.  
 
NICOLE M. WALKER, Esquire, OFFICE OF DEFENSE SERVICES, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for Appellant James McDougal. 
 
ANDREW R. FLETCHER, Esquire, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee State of Delaware.   
 
 
 
2 
 
 
TRAYNOR, Justice, for the Majority: 
 
James McDougal was convicted of possession of a firearm by a person 
prohibited, possession of ammunition by a person prohibited, and carrying a 
concealed deadly weapon.  He was sentenced to 15 years in prison suspended after 
five years for 18 months of probation under intensive supervision.  McDougal’s 
convictions and sentence followed the Superior Court’s denial of his pretrial motion 
to suppress the evidence taken from him during a street encounter with members of 
the Wilmington Police Department.1  Although the State’s description of the 
encounter and McDougal’s ensuing detention, including the suspicions justifying 
them, has shifted over time, the principal justification for McDougal’s seizure, 
according to the State, was that “[t]he police officers had reasonable articulable 
suspicion that McDougal was loitering.”2  This suspicion, the State contends, 
justified McDougal’s initial detention.  And, so the State argues, when McDougal 
chose not to provide identification or agree to a search of his person upon the 
officers’ request, further investigation and eventually a pat-down search was 
justified.  That search resulted in the discovery of a firearm concealed in McDougal’s 
blue jeans. 
 
1 See State v. McDougal, 2023 WL 2423233 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2023) (hereinafter 
“McDougal”). 
2 Answering Br. at 2. 
3 
 
 
As we explain below, the State’s attempt to justify the officers’ seizure and 
eventual search of McDougal on the basis of a suspected loitering investigation is 
grounded in a flawed understanding of the loitering statute, the supposed violation 
of which by McDougal aroused the officers’ suspicion.  The State has yet to identify 
the police officers’ pre-detention observations that would warrant an investigative 
detention of McDougal for the crime of loitering.  Simply put, the officers’ suspicion 
of loitering was not reasonable and did not justify even a limited investigative 
seizure. 
 
The officers, of course, were permitted to approach McDougal, engage him in 
conversation, and ask him his name.  A consensual encounter like that does not 
require any level of suspicion.  But it is well-settled, too, that when a police officer 
engages in such an interaction with a citizen, the citizen is not required to answer the 
officer’s questions, and his refusal to answer cannot form the basis for reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.   
 
Applying these principles to the facts surrounding McDougal’s encounter 
with the police in this case, we have concluded that the officers’ detention of 
McDougal and the consequent nonconsensual search of his person was unlawful.  
Accordingly, we hold that the Superior Court erred when it denied McDougal’s 
motion to suppress and we reverse the court’s judgment of conviction. 
 
 
4 
 
I 
A 
 
Unless otherwise indicated, we have drawn the facts surrounding McDougal’s 
arrest from the transcript of the hearing on McDougal’s motion to suppress.  Two 
witnesses—both officers of the City of Wilmington Police Department, Officer 
Leonard Moses and Officer Shauntae Hunt—testified during that hearing.  The 
Superior Court also reviewed, as we have, two body-worn camera videos that 
depicted a portion of the interaction between McDougal and the police.  
 
The encounter occurred during the early afternoon hours of April 8, 2022.3  
During the month of March, an informant had reported to Wilmington police that 
“individuals in and around the area of 24[th] and Carter [Streets] were involved in 
street-level drug dealing.”4  The informant—who, according to Officer Moses, had 
not been shown to be reliable in the past—identified four suspected drug dealers by 
name:  Rashad Acklin, Jamir Coleman, Demy Lee, and Dashawn Smith. 
 
The tipster mentioned that, because of increased police presence in that area, 
the drug dealers, who according to the informant carried firearms, also used “ground 
stashes” to conceal their firearms.  On some indeterminate date after the police 
 
3 The indictment alleges that the charged offenses occurred on April 8, 2022, but the suppression-
hearing testimony suggests that McDougal’s arrest was on April 13, 2022.  Neither party addressed 
this discrepancy in their briefs or at oral argument, and both appear to concede that April 8 is the 
correct date.  See App. to Opening Br. at A5, A8. 
4 Id. at A34. 
5 
 
received the tip but before they arrested McDougal, the police found a “discarded 
firearm behind a trash can”5 in the area of 24th and Carter. 
 
It is unclear how much time elapsed between the informant’s tip and 
McDougal’s arrest.  Officer Moses first said that the tip was received “in the last 
weeks of March.”6  He later clarified that the tip was received during the “last two 
weeks of March.”7  Officer Moses was unsure of how much time passed between 
the discovery of the stashed firearm and the tip, but ventured his opinion that the tip 
was received “within a month”8 of the discovery. 
 
Armed with this weeks-old tip, several Wilmington police officers (we count 
six in the body-cam video) “were proactive patrolling”9 in the area of 24th and Carter 
Streets.  There, they saw three men standing on the sidewalk.  Two of the men, 
Rashad Acklin and Jamir Coleman, were among the suspected drug dealers 
identified by the informant; the third was McDougal, with whom none of the officers 
was familiar. 
 
Officer Moses alighted from his police vehicle and approached McDougal.  
According to Officer Moses, McDougal was wearing “baggy clothing with . . . 
multiple layers,”10 an indication to Officer Moses that McDougal could be 
 
5 Id. at A35. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at A38. 
8 Id. at A35. 
9 Id.  
10 Id. 
6 
 
concealing a weapon.  By contrast, the body-cam video shows that McDougal was 
dressed in blue jeans and a red t-shirt covered by an unremarkable red sweatshirt.11   
 
Although there was no outward sign that McDougal was armed, Officer 
Moses had concerns, which he then expressed to McDougal: 
I believe I asked him, I gave him what my concerns were, explained to 
him that I thought, I mean, that he had that bagg[y] clothing, asked him 
if he had any firearms on him, he said no.  I asked him if I could pat 
him down, and he said no. 
 
At that point I asked him what his name was so I could get his name 
and then we’d identify him so we can give him his warning and then 
send him on his way, and the individual refused to give us his name.12  
When McDougal refused to give his name, Officer Moses directed him to sit down 
on a nearby stoop.  Meanwhile, other officers addressed Acklin and Coleman, both 
of whom identified themselves and consented to pat-down searches.  Acklin and 
Coleman were then permitted to leave the area. 
 
When asked at the suppression hearing to identify the criminal activity of 
which Officer Moses suspected McDougal when he directed McDougal to sit, the 
 
11 Officer Moses also mentioned that McDougal’s “multiple layers” of clothing made it seem as 
though McDougal “had, like, multiple pairs of pants, or something like that under his clothing.”  
Id.  Unfortunately, the officers’ body worn cameras were not activated until their initial approach 
to McDougal, Acklin, and Coleman had concluded.  By the time the cameras were activated, 
McDougal was sitting down on a nearby stoop in compliance with Officer Moses’s order.  
McDougal’s trousers did not appear to be multi-layered until one of the officers lifted up 
McDougal’s sweatshirt.  This happened after McDougal had been, by all accounts, seized.  We 
note here that the Superior Court referred twice to Officer Moses’s observation that McDougal’s 
clothing was “baggy” and “layered.”  McDougal, at *1, *3.  We understand these references as 
reflecting Officer Moses’s characterization and not a factual finding by the court that McDougal’s 
clothing as depicted in the video meets that description.   
12 Id. at A36. 
7 
 
officer did not mention a suspicion of drug dealing or concealing a deadly weapon.  
Instead, he responded that he suspected McDougal of loitering.  When pressed to 
describe what he meant by “loitering,” Officer Moses said that “[s]tanding idle at 
the intersection of 24[th] and Carter” was the conduct underlying his suspicion of 
loitering.13  Officer Hunt, who was on the scene, having traveled there in the same 
vehicle with Officer Moses, provided a similar understanding of the loitering statute: 
Q. 
Since you cited the loitering statute in your report, can you recall 
or are you aware of a place in the loitering statute where just 
standing on the sidewalk alone without first being ordered to 
move on can constitute the crime of loitering? 
A. 
Right.  So if you are standing idle on the sidewalk, you are 
loitering. 
Q. 
Standing idle on the sidewalk? 
A. 
Yes.14 
Unlike Officer Moses, however, Officer Hunt added that the three men were 
“blocking the flow of traffic on the sidewalk.”15  But neither officer testified that 
there was any pedestrian traffic on the sidewalk to block.  Nor did either officer 
testify that anyone asked McDougal, Acklin, or Coleman to make way for pedestrian 
traffic. 
 
13 Id. at A38. 
14 Id. at A46. 
15 Id. at A45. 
8 
 
 
In any event, McDougal complied with Officer Moses’s direction to sit down 
on the stoop, and further conversation between the two ensued.  According to Officer 
Moses, this is when he first noticed a bulge in McDougal’s “waistband area.”16  
McDougal, who by this time was surrounded by as many as seven officers, denied 
that he was in possession of a weapon, specifically declined to consent to a pat-down 
search, and asked the officers why they were harassing him.  Undeterred, Officer 
Moses grabbed the front of McDougal’s blue jeans below the belt, but even then the 
officer “still didn’t feel nothing.”17  Officer Moses asked McDougal why there was 
a bulge in his waistband.  This prompted McDougal to remove an object—it appears 
to be a cloth facial mask—from the front pocket of his sweatshirt.  Officer Moses 
then lifted McDougal’s sweatshirt and reached down into his blue jeans and pulled 
out a pink handgun.18  McDougal was immediately handcuffed and placed under 
arrest. 
B 
 
McDougal was charged with, and eventually indicted for, possession of a 
firearm by a person prohibited, possession of ammunition by a person prohibited, 
 
16 Id. at A36. 
17 Id. 
18 Officer Moses testified that, after he patted down the exterior of McDougal’s blue jeans and 
“still didn’t feel nothing,” he “lifted up [McDougal’s] shirt, and you could see the firearm in his 
waistband area.”  Id.  The video evidence contradicts this account.  It was only after Officer Moses 
lifted the shirt and put his hands down the front of McDougal’s jeans and pulled them away from 
McDougal’s waist that the firearm became visible. 
9 
 
and carrying a concealed deadly weapon.  He moved to suppress the firearm that 
was taken from him on the grounds that the police did not have a reasonable 
suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity when Officer Moses directed him 
to sit on the stoop.  The State responded that “Officer Moses and the Wilmington 
[p]olice had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop, frisk and make inquiries from 
the defendant when they observed him loitering in the area where the confidential 
informant had given information that individuals had been selling street level drugs 
and carrying firearms.”19  At this juncture, the State described the stop as “a 
pedestrian stop to further investigate the information obtained from the informant 
that was corroborated through surveillance.”20  The State also described the area 
where McDougal was arrested as a “high crime area” where numerous firearm 
arrests had been made.  This, according to the State’s written response to 
McDougal’s motion, coupled with McDougal’s refusal to identify himself while 
acknowledging that he did not live in the area, provided a reason for Officer Moses 
“to deduce that [McDougal] may be in possession of a firearm.”21  The State did not 
mention McDougal’s clothing in its written response. 
 
19 Id. at A20. 
20 Id. at A22.  No evidence of corroboration of the informant’s tip was adduced during the 
suppression hearing. 
21 Id. at A23. 
10 
 
 
Following the testimony of Officers Moses and Hunt at the suppression 
hearing, the State’s argument to the trial court was, in a word, muddled.  The 
prosecutor began her argument by asserting that Officer Moses had “a reasonable 
articulable suspicion to stop Mr. McDougal . . . .”22  Indeed, she opined that, because 
the police had reports of criminal activity in the area and had observed that Coleman, 
Acklin, and McDougal “were standing out there for a good ten to 15 minutes[], . . . 
if they had wanted to issue a citation for loitering, they could have.”23  Alternatively, 
the State suggested that “the stop and then subsequent frisk was justified under Terry 
and resulting case law.”24  But when the court asked whether the initial encounter 
was an investigatory detention or a consensual encounter, the prosecutor took a 
different tack:  
I would say initially it’s a consensual encounter because if you look at 
the encounter with the first two individuals, Hey, can we have your 
name, they give it to them.  Can we pat you down, and they do.  But 
Officer Hunt said if they had said no but at least gave their name and 
date of birth and we realize they don’t have warrants, they sent them 
along their way.  They don’t arrest them.  They don’t give them a fine.  
They -- please, you know, they basically say don’t come back here or 
you may get arrested.  But that was the purpose in moving people along 
that day. 
 
22 Id. at A48. 
23 Id. at A49.  We note that the only record evidence that supports the statement that the three men 
had been standing in the area for ten to fifteen minutes came from Officer Hunt and was based on 
his post-arrest review of surveillance video.  At the suppression hearing, when asked by the court 
“how long were you, officers, in the area before you got out of the car and approached these 
individuals for loitering?” Officer Hunt responded “I don’t think it was -- I think we pulled up and 
observed them standing at the intersection and then we got out and made contact.”  Id. at A40. 
24 Id. at A49. 
11 
 
So initially it is a consensual encounter.  It was the conduct of Mr. 
McDougal and his actions and his clothing that cause them to 
investigate further, and then it became, you know, more of a stop.25 
 
McDougal responded that the officers never asked or instructed him to move 
on, and therefore he was not loitering and could not be reasonably suspected of it.  
He noted that he had a right to refuse to answer the officer’s questions in what, by 
then, the State had acknowledged was a consensual encounter.  Implicit in this line 
of argument was that Officer Moses’s order to McDougal that he sit down on the 
stoop was unjustified and that suspicion developed after that order should not be 
considered.   
 
In rebuttal, the State added to its previously offered justifications for 
McDougal’s detention, arguing that the loitering statute itself allows police to detain 
suspected loiterers to determine their identity.   
C 
 
Having heard the testimony of Officers Moses and Hunt and the argument of 
counsel, the Superior Court reserved decision.  In a memorandum opinion and order 
issued a few weeks after the hearing, the court denied McDougal’s motion.  First, 
the court resolved the threshold issue of when McDougal’s detention occurred.  
Noting that the State conceded that a detention had occurred when McDougal was 
ordered to sit down on the stoop but that McDougal claimed that the detention began 
 
25 Id. 
12 
 
upon the officers’ initial approach, the court charted a middle course.  The court 
rejected McDougal’s position, finding that, “when the officers initially approached 
the group and simply asked for their names, it cannot reasonably be said that the 
individuals did not feel free to ignore the police presence.”26  The court found, 
however, that when Officer Moses told McDougal that “if he gave his name, he 
would be allowed to move along, a reasonable person in [McDougal’s] shoes would 
not have [been] free to ignore the police presence, due to the officer’s own words.”27  
We take this to mean that, when the officer made this statement, McDougal was 
effectively seized within the meaning of Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution.28 
 
The court concluded that this seizure and the ensuing search of McDougal was 
justified by Officer Moses’s reasonable articulable suspicion that McDougal was 
engaged in criminal activity.  The court put it this way: 
Because Moses was investigating a potential violation of the loitering 
statute, 11 Del. C. § 1902[] allows further detention if Moses possessed 
a “reasonable ground to suspect” [McDougal] was “committing, has 
committed or is about to commit” that crime.  In viewing the totality of 
the circumstances, Officer Moses’ ability to articulate that three men 
were impeding the flow of pedestrian traffic, two of the three 
individuals did not live in the area and had no known lawful purpose to 
be there, the background information provided by the CI that street 
level drug sales were occurring at that location, as well as the 
observations of [McDougal’s] baggy, layered clothes in which it 
 
26 McDougal, at *2. 
27 Id. 
28 See Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 869 (Del. 1999) (determining “when a seizure has occurred 
under Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution requires focusing upon the police officer’s actions 
to determine when a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to ignore the 
police presence.”). 
13 
 
appeared he was wearing two sets of pants, a “reasonable trained police 
officer in the same or similar circumstances” would be justified in 
suspecting criminal activity.  Thus, he possessed reasonable, articulable 
suspicion at that point to detain [McDougal].29 
 
The detention thus justified, the search of McDougal’s person for weapons, 
according to the court, was permissible “under Terry v. Ohio and its Delaware 
progeny.”30  Hence, the Superior Court denied McDougal’s motion to suppress. 
D 
 
In the wake of the Superior Court’s denial of McDougal’s motion to suppress, 
the parties agreed to a “stipulated” bench trial, that is, at trial, they “stipulate[d] to 
the facts and arguments presented in the suppression hearing.”31  McDougal agreed 
further that he was a person prohibited from possessing a firearm or ammunition 
because of a prior violent-felony conviction.  The parties also stipulated that the 
firearm taken from McDougal was a fully functional 9mm handgun with a magazine 
containing eleven rounds of 9mm ammunition. 
 
With these stipulations entered, the trial was, as intended by the parties, brief. 
Detective Moses laid the foundation for the admission in evidence of the 9mm 
handgun taken from McDougal and confirmed that the gun was concealed under 
McDougal’s clothing.  As anticipated, the court found McDougal guilty under all 
 
29 McDougal, at *3. 
30 Id. 
31 App. to Opening Br. at A56. 
14 
 
three counts of the indictment and immediately sentenced McDougal as described 
above.  Two days later, McDougal filed this appeal. 
E 
 
McDougal challenges the Superior Court’s denial of his motion to suppress 
on various grounds.  His overarching theme is that the court erred when it found that 
the officers were permitted to detain him for failing to identify himself during what 
the State conceded was a consensual encounter.  McDougal also contends that, even 
if his detention were lawful, Officer Moses’s reaching inside his pants was not.  
Finally, McDougal argues that the State’s reliance on the officers’ purported 
suspicion of loitering is flawed because the officers failed to state with specificity 
the elements of the loitering violation that reasonably aroused their suspicion.   
 
The State defends the Superior Court’s denial of McDougal’s motion, 
claiming that the officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion that McDougal was 
loitering.  The State argues further that the loitering statute upon which the police 
relied required them to obtain McDougal’s name and give him a warning before they 
could issue a citation.  McDougal’s refusal to provide his name, the State contends, 
justified the prolonging of his detention and the resultant pat-down.  
 
 
 
15 
 
II 
 
We apply a mixed standard of review to a trial court’s order denying a motion 
to suppress evidence after an evidentiary hearing.32  “We review findings of fact for 
clear error, but we exercise de novo review over legal determinations.”33  “Once the 
historical facts are established, the legal issue is whether an undisputed rule of law 
is violated.  Accordingly, this Court reviews de novo whether police possessed 
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a person.”34 
III 
A 
 
“Generally speaking, investigative encounters between law enforcement and 
citizens fall within three categories:  consensual encounters or mere inquiries, 
investigative detentions, and formal arrests.”35  A consensual encounter during 
which a police officer asks a citizen a question is not a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I, § 6 of the Delaware 
Constitution.  No level of suspicion is required to support a consensual encounter.36 
 
An investigative detention, though a more limited intrusion in scope and 
duration than an arrest, nevertheless constitutes a seizure and is permissible only 
 
32 Garnett v. State, 308 A.3d 625, 641, 2023 WL 6987145, at *12 (Del. Oct. 24, 2023). 
33 Id. 
34 State v. Rollins, 922 A.2d 379, 382 (Del. 2007) (quoting Purnell v. State, 832 A.2d 714, 719 
(Del. 2003)). 
35 Diggs v. State, 257 A.3d 993, 1003 (Del. 2021). 
36 Id. at 1003–04. 
16 
 
when there is “some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about 
to be, engaged in criminal activity.”37  A classic formulation of the rule is that “law 
enforcement officers may stop or detain an individual for investigatory purposes, but 
only if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion to believe the individual 
detained is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime.”38  This 
standard is codified in 11 Del. C. § 1902.39 
 
During an investigative detention, if the officer encounters circumstances that 
support a reasonable belief that the detained person is armed, the officer may conduct 
a protective frisk for his safety.40  But “an officer may not conduct a protective search 
for weapons without first having a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity that supports an investigatory stop.”41 
 
In his concurring opinion in Terry v. Ohio, Justice Harlan articulated this 
principle so: 
[I]f the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an 
encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional 
 
37 Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1287 (Del. 2008) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 
U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). 
38 Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1262 (Del. 2001) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 11, 30 (1968); 
Jones, 745 A.2d at 860; and 11 Del. C. § 1902)). 
39 The relevant sections of 11 Del. C. § 1902 provide that “(a) [a] peace officer may stop any 
person abroad, or in a public place, who the officer has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, 
has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand the person’s name, address, 
business abroad and destination.  (b) Any person so questioned who fails to give identification or 
explain the person’s actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further 
questioned and investigated.” 
40 Moore v. State, 997 A.2d 656, 666 (Del. 2010). 
41 Id. at 666–67. 
17 
 
grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. Any person, 
including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a person he considers 
dangerous. If and when a policeman has a right instead to disarm such 
a person for his own protection, he must first have a right not to avoid 
him but to be in his presence. That right must be more than the liberty 
(again, possessed by every citizen) to address questions to other 
persons, for ordinarily the person addressed has an equal right to ignore 
his interrogator and walk away; he certainly need not submit to a frisk 
for the questioner’s protection. I would make it perfectly clear that the 
right to frisk in this case depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible 
stop to investigate a suspected crime.42 
 
The Superior Court concluded that, when McDougal was told that he would 
be free to “move along” but only after providing his name, “a reasonable person in 
[McDougal’s] shoes would not have [been] free to ignore the police presence, due 
to the officer’s own words.”43  We agree.  As of that moment, McDougal had been 
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 6.44  If that 
seizure was not based upon a reasonable articulable suspicion of unlawful activity, 
the evidence recovered as a result of the seizure—the firearm and ammunition—
should have been deemed inadmissible at trial.45 
 
42 392 U.S. at 32–33 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
43 McDougal, at *2. 
44 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (holding that “[w]hen the officers detained appellant 
for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they performed a seizure of his person subject 
to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.”); Jones, 745 A.2d at 869 (“[T]he question . . . of 
when a seizure has occurred under Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution requires focusing 
upon the police officer’s actions to determine when a reasonable person would have believed he 
or she was not free to ignore the police presence.  Under that analysis, Jones was seized within the 
meaning of Section 1902 when [the officer] first ordered him to stop and remove his hands from 
his pockets.”). 
45 Hall v. State, 981 A.2d 1106, 1110 (Del. 2009) (“Under the exclusionary rule, ‘the State may 
not use as evidence the fruits of a search incident to an illegal [seizure.]’”) (quoting Jones, 745 
18 
 
B 
 
A fundamental premise of both the State’s and the trial court’s reasoning and 
hence their conclusion that McDougal’s detention was justified is that the arresting 
officers were “investigating a potential violation of the loitering statute.”46  Given 
the centrality of the crime of loitering to the State’s argument, a review of our 
loitering statute is essential to our analysis. 
 
The relevant portions of 11 Del. C. § 1321 provide that a person is guilty of 
loitering when 
(1) 
The person fails or refuses to move on when lawfully 
ordered to do so by any police officer; or 
 
(2) 
The person stands, sits idling or loiters upon any 
pavement, sidewalk or crosswalk, or stands or sits in a 
group or congregates with others on any pavement, 
sidewalk, crosswalk or doorstep, in any street or way open 
to the public in this State so as to obstruct or hinder the 
free and convenient passage of persons walking, riding or 
driving over or along such pavement, walk, street or way, 
and fails to make way, remove or pass, after reasonable 
request from any person; or 
. . .  
 
(6) 
The person loiters, congregates with others or prowls in a 
place at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding 
individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the 
 
A.2d at 873); see also Jones, 745 A.2d at 869 (“If [a] seizure [is] not based upon reasonable and 
articulable suspicion, anything recovered as a result of that seizure is inadmissible at trial.”). 
46 McDougal, at *3 (“Because Moses was investigating a potential violation of the loitering statute, 
11 Del. C. § 1902[] allows further detention if Moses possessed a ‘reasonable ground to suspect’ 
[McDougal] was ‘committing, has committed, or is about to commit’ that crime.”); see also 
Answering Br. at 2 (“The officers testified that they were investigating McDougal for violating 
the Delaware loitering statute.”). 
19 
 
safety of persons or property in the vicinity, especially in 
light of the crime rate in the relevant area. Unless flight by 
the accused or other circumstances make it impracticable, 
a peace officer shall, prior to any arrest for an offense 
under this paragraph, afford the accused an opportunity to 
dispel any alarm which would otherwise be warranted, by 
requesting identification and an explanation of the 
person’s presence and conduct. No person shall be 
convicted of an offense under this paragraph if the peace 
officer did not comply with the preceding sentence, or if it 
appears that the explanation given by the accused was true 
and, if believed by the peace officer at the time, would 
have dispelled the alarm.47  
 
 
That Officer Moses did not have a firm grasp of the conduct that constitutes 
loitering under the statute is clear.  As we mentioned above, when asked to describe 
the conduct giving rise to his suspicion of loitering, the officer said nothing more 
than that the three individuals—Acklin, Coleman, and McDougal were “[s]tanding 
idle at the intersection of 24[th] and Carter [Streets].”48  That is not a crime.  To be 
sure, Officer Hunt added that the three men were “blocking the flow of traffic on the 
sidewalk.”49  But that is not a crime either unless the person obstructing traffic “fails 
to make way, remove or pass, after reasonable request from any person . . . .”50  No 
such request was made, which is not surprising, given the absence of any evidence 
 
47 The dissent notes that Officer Hunt also cited the City of Wilmington loitering ordinance in his 
police report.  We in turn note that the State has argued that “[t]he record is clear that the officers 
relied on [a] Delaware state statute[,] 11 Del. C. § 1321, not a municipal ordinance.”  Answering 
Br. at 15–16. We do not see any difference between the statute and the ordinance that would affect 
our analysis. 
48 App. to Opening Br. at A38. 
49 Id. at A45. 
50 11 Del. C. § 1321(2). 
20 
 
that there were any “persons walking, riding or driving over or along” the sidewalk.  
Very simply, Officer Moses could not have reasonably suspected that McDougal 
was loitering under subsections (1) or (2) of the loitering statute.  
 
The State attempts to salvage its claim that McDougal was justifiably detained 
for loitering by pointing to the requirement in subsection (6) of the loitering statute 
that “a peace officer shall, prior to any arrest for an offense under this paragraph, 
afford the accused an opportunity to dispel any alarm which would otherwise be 
warranted, by requesting identification and an explanation of the person’s presence 
and conduct.”  According to the State, this subsection required Officer Moses to 
request that McDougal identify himself and provided justification for his detention 
when he failed to do so.  This reasoning is manifestly flawed; it assumes that Officer 
Moses had probable cause to arrest McDougal for loitering under subsection (6).  
But the suppression hearing record does not establish that the officers had knowledge 
of facts and circumstances based on reasonably trustworthy information that would 
justify a belief that McDougal was engaged in conduct “warrant[ing] alarm for the 
safety of persons or property in the vicinity . . . .”51  At the point when Officer Morris 
told McDougal that he would be free to go his own way once he identified himself, 
 
51 11 Del. C. § 1321(6); see also State v. Maxwell, 624 A.2d 926, 930 (Del. 1993) (“‘Probable 
cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within . . . [the officers’] knowledge and of which 
they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed.”) (italics and 
brackets in original) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949)0. 
21 
 
McDougal had done nothing more than stand on a street corner while purportedly 
wearing baggy clothes. 
C 
 
In apparent recognition of Officer Moses’s problematic suspicion of a 
loitering violation, the Superior Court relied on facts seemingly unrelated to Officer 
Moses’s loitering rationale.  Specifically, the court pointed to the weeks-old tip from 
the confidential informant, McDougal’s “baggy” clothing, and the fact that neither 
Acklin or Coleman lived in the area of 24th and Carter Streets.  These additional 
facts, viewed separately or together, do not create a reasonable ground to suspect 
that McDougal had committed or was about to commit a crime. 
 
The several officers who descended upon the trio of men standing on the street 
corner themselves appeared to understand that the confidential informant’s tip, 
which did not mention McDougal, was stale, unreliable, and insufficient to justify a 
detention of any of the three men.  Indeed, they allowed Acklin and Coleman to go 
their own way after they had identified themselves.  Likewise, the State conceded 
that, when the officers initially confronted Acklin, Coleman, and McDougal, the 
encounter was consensual, that is, it was not a detention based on reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause.  As previously quoted, the State’s prosecutor informed 
the Superior Court, “it [was] a consensual encounter [but that] it was the conduct of 
22 
 
Mr. McDougal and his actions and his clothing that cause[d] [the police] to 
investigate further, and then it became . . . a stop.”52 
 
Nor do we find that McDougal’s clothing added anything substantial to the 
mix of information possessed by Officer Moses when he detained McDougal.  We 
have reviewed the body-worn camera video, which shows that, until Moses began 
his pat-down by grabbing McDougal’s crotch, McDougal’s clothing—a red t-shirt, 
covered by a red sweatshirt, and blue jeans—was not extraordinary.  And the State 
does not point us to anything Officer Moses could see before he ordered McDougal 
to sit on the stoop, other than McDougal’s clothing, that would arouse a reasonable 
suspicion that McDougal was armed.   
 
A more likely explanation for McDougal’s detention was his failure to 
identify himself and consent to a pat-down search.  Officer Moses admitted as much 
on cross-examination: 
Defense counsel: At some point, Officer, Mr. McDougal was 
asked to have a seat? 
 
 
Officer Moses: 
Yes, sir. 
 
Defense counsel: Was that because he would not give his 
name? 
 
 
52 App. to Opening Br. at A49.  Indeed, we would expect that, had the officer harbored such a 
suspicion, he would not have directed McDougal to move voluntarily to “sit down . . . on the 
stoop,”  id. at A36, but would have immediately seized and frisked McDougal to protect himself 
and his fellow officers from possible danger. 
23 
 
 
Officer Moses: 
Yes.53 
 
It bears repeating here that Acklin and Coleman identified themselves and 
allowed the officers to conduct pat-downs, and they were not detained.  But because 
Officer Moses did not, at the time he detained McDougal, have reason to suspect 
that McDougal had committed or was about to commit a crime, McDougal was free 
to decline to answer Officer Moses’s questions and should have been allowed to go 
on his way.54  The United States Supreme Court described the ramifications of such 
an encounter in Florida v. Royer:   
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by 
merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public 
place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by 
putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering 
in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such 
questions.  Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a 
police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure 
requiring some level of objective justification. The person approached, 
however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may 
decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. He may 
not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective 
grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, 
without more, furnish those grounds.55 
This Court echoed the Royer court in Woody v. State: 
[L]aw enforcement officers may approach and ask questions of an 
individual, without reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal 
activity is afoot. The individual, however, may not be detained and may 
 
53 Id. at A39. 
54 See 11 Del. C. § 1902; Woody, 765 A.2d at 1265.   
55 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983) (citations omitted). 
24 
 
walk or even run away. Refusal to answer the officer’s inquiry cannot 
form the basis for reasonable suspicion.56 
 
Faithful adherence to these principles permits but one conclusion here: 
detaining McDougal because of, to use the prosecutor’s words, his “conduct . . . and 
his actions”—declining to answer Officer Moses’s questions and to permit a pat-
down search—violated McDougal’s rights under both the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution.   
 
Finally, we are not persuaded that, as the Superior Court suggested, the fact 
that the police knew that Acklin and Coleman did not live “in the area and had no 
known lawful purpose to be there,” contributed meaningfully to their suspicion that 
McDougal was subject to detention.  Under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 
6, a seizure—and an investigative detention is a seizure—is “ordinarily unreasonable 
in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”57  The Superior Court 
did not explain, nor has the State endeavored to clarify, how the residence of the two 
individuals whom the police did not detain raised an individualized suspicion of 
wrongdoing by McDougal.58 
 
56 Woody, 765 A.2d at 1265. 
57 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000); see also Juliano v. State, 254 A.3d 369, 
386 (Del. 2020) (“[E]ven ‘purely pretextual’ traffic stops must be supported by articulable 
individualized suspicion.”); Montgomery v. State, 277 A.3d 1062,2020 WL 1672845, at *3 (Del. 
Apr. 3, 2020) (TABLE) (“In the absence of individualized articulable suspicion of wrongdoing, a 
search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable.”). 
58 See Brown, 443 U.S. at 49, 52 (concluding that the officer’s belief that Brown “looked suspicious 
. . . and had never [been] seen in that area before” and testimony that the area had “a high incidence 
25 
 
IV 
 
We conclude by addressing our dissenting colleagues’ conclusion that six 
“uncontested facts sufficiently established reasonable articulable suspicion” that 
McDougal was loitering when he was seized.59  First, the dissent mentions that 
“McDougal was ‘blocking pedestrian traffic’ by ‘standing idle’ in front of the house 
at 24th and Carter.”60  That, absent refusal to “move on” or “make way,” is not 
loitering.  Nor does the fact that “McDougal, unknown to the police, was with two 
individuals known not to live at that address” transform McDougal’s otherwise 
innocuous conduct into loitering.61  As for the informant’s tip, the dissent does not 
address its obvious staleness and the absence of any testimony, save what the police 
had found in the area before receiving the tip, tending to establish indicia of the tip’s 
reliability.62  The dissent also points to the officers’ discovery of a discarded firearm 
behind a trash can at 24th and Carter before they received the informant’s tip.  But 
the tip itself was at least two weeks old when Officer Moses seized McDougal, and 
the firearm discovery was a month before that.63  Regarding McDougal’s attire, we 
are simply unprepared to accept that McDougal’s sweatshirt and blue jeans as plainly 
 
of drug traffic” did not justify a reasonable suspicion that Brown was involved in a criminal 
activity.”) 
59 Dissent at 20. 
60 Id. 
61 Id.  
62 See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990) (“[A]n informant’s ‘veracity,’ ‘reliability,’ and 
‘basis of knowledge’ . . . are . . . relevant in the reasonable-suspicion context.”). 
63 App. to Opening Br. at A35. 
26 
 
depicted in the body-worn camera video “indicate[d] possession of a weapon,” as 
suggested by Officer Moses and accepted by the dissent. 
 
Finally the dissent notes that it is undisputed that “24th and Carter was a ‘high 
crime’ area.”64  We must acknowledge that “the crime rate in the relevant area” is a 
factor to be considered under subsection (6) of the loitering statute.  But that factor 
only comes into play when the police encounter a “person [who] loiters, congregates 
with others or prowls at a time or in a manner not usual for individuals under 
circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity 
. . . .”65  Our dissenting colleagues have not persuaded us that standing on a street 
corner with two friends or associates on a sunny April afternoon warrants such 
alarm.  Absent conduct creating a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, one does 
not forfeit constitutionally protected rights by living—or, for that matter being 
present—in a neighborhood where the crime rate is high. 
V 
 
For the reasons given, we conclude that the evidence seized from McDougal 
was the fruit of an unlawful seizure and should have been suppressed.66  The 
exclusion of that evidence precludes a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that 
 
64 Id. 
65 11 Del. C. § 1321(6). 
66 In light of this conclusion, we need not address McDougal’s other grounds for reversal. 
27 
 
McDougal committed the crimes charged.  Therefore, we reverse and vacate the 
Superior Court’s judgment of conviction. 
VALIHURA, J. dissenting, joined by SEITZ, C.J.: 
Under Delaware and federal law, the State must have reasonable articulable 
suspicion that a crime is being committed in order to transform a consensual encounter into 
an investigative detention.  This appeal considers whether the State established the requisite 
reasonable articulable suspicion that James McDougal (“McDougal”) was loitering prior 
to his initial detention.  I believe that the Superior Court correctly held that the officers had 
reasonable articulable suspicion that McDougal committed the crime of loitering before 
they directed McDougal to provide his name under 11 Del. C. § 1902(a).1  Additionally, I 
believe that the Superior Court properly held that the pat down and search underneath 
McDougal’s shirt was lawful.  Because I would AFFIRM McDougal’s conviction, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I. 
ANALYSIS 
 
A. Protections from Unreasonable and Warrantless Searches Generally  
 
Under our United States and Delaware Constitutions, citizens have the right to be 
secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures.2  However, in certain 
 
1 See generally State v. McDougal, 2023 WL 2423233 (Del. Super. Mar. 7, 2023).  This Court 
reviews a denial of a motion to suppress under the abuse of discretion standard.  Flowers v. State, 
195 A.3d 18, 23 (Del. 2018) (citing Stafford v. State, 59 A.3d 1223, 1227 (Del. 2012)).  “When 
we are reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence based on an allegedly illegal stop 
and seizure, ‘we conduct a de novo review to determine whether the totality of the circumstances, 
in light of the trial judge's factual findings, support a reasonable and articulable suspicion for the 
stop.’”  Id. (quoting Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Del. 2008)).  “‘We consider 
legal questions de novo and will uphold a trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous.’”  Womack v. State, 296 A.3d 882, 889 (Del. 2023) (quoting Lloyd v. State, 292 A.3d 
100, 105 (Del. 2023)). 
2 Womack, 296 A.3d at 889 (“Under the Fourth Amendment, ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated[.]’  Article I, § 6 provides that ‘[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, houses, 
2 
 
circumstances, more limited searches and seizures are found to be reasonable absent a 
warrant and absent probable cause.3  Those situations require officers to have reasonable 
articulable suspicion that a suspect has committed or is about to commit a crime.4 
This Court described three types of interactions between law enforcement officers 
and citizens in Diggs v. State: “consensual encounters or mere inquiries, investigative 
detentions, and formal arrests.”5  Consensual encounters occur when the officers initiate 
questioning,6 but an individual may freely leave the encounter.7  In Flowers v. State, this 
Court identified investigative detentions and formal arrests as “‘[t]wo categories of police-
citizen encounters which constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment[:]’”8 
First, police may “restrain an individual for a short period of time” to 
investigate where officers have “reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
 
papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures[.]’” (alterations in original) 
(quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV; Del. Const. art. I, § 6)). 
3 Flowers, 195 A.3d at 23 (“Generally, [s]earches and seizures are per se unreasonable, in the 
absence of exigent circumstances, unless authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause.” 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).  
4 Id. (holding that the trial court properly found that the evidence supported the investigative 
detention and frisk of defendant after officer saw him grabbing a rectangular object from his waist 
and blading his body away from the officers in a high crime area late at night).  
5 Diggs v. State, 257 A.3d 993, 1003 (Del. 2021) (affirming denial of suppression motion because 
the initially consensual encounter, prompted by a tip, lawfully turned into an investigative 
detention based on reasonable articulable suspicion established when an individual threw items to 
the ground and took a defensive stance). 
6 Id. at 1003–04. 
7 Williams v. State, 962 A.2d 210, 214–15 (Del. 2008). 
8 Flowers, 195 A.3d at 24 (citations omitted).  See also I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) 
(“The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all contact between the police and citizens, but is 
designed ‘to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the 
privacy and personal security of individuals.’” (quoting United States v. Martinez–Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (holding vehicle stops at fixed border checkpoint for brief questioning was 
consistent with Fourth Amendment))); Williams, 962 A.2d at 215 (a consensual encounter where 
police ask questions “neither amounts to a seizure nor implicates the Fourth Amendment.”). 
3 
 
suspect has committed or is about to commit a crime.”  It requires less than 
probable cause.  This form of seizure is the Terry “stop,” or investigative 
stop.  For simplicity, we refer to such a seizure as a “stop” in this opinion.  
Second, the police seize a person when they make an arrest, which requires 
“probable cause that the suspect has committed a crime.”9 
 
 
One type of encounter may evolve into another.10  At issue in this appeal is the 
transition from an initially consensual encounter to an investigative detention.  
“‘Determining whether an officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct a 
stop requires a threshold finding of when the stop actually took place.’”11  Once we make 
that determination, we must analyze what is constitutionally required at each stage of the 
encounter and evaluate whether those requirements were met based on the record 
evidence.12   
 
Here, the evidence largely consists of what information Officer Leonard Moses 
(“Officer Moses”) knew at the moment he requested McDougal’s name and directed him 
to sit on the stoop.  I believe that the Superior Court correctly held the detention occurred 
at that point and was lawful.  Although Officer Moses attempted initially to consensually 
resolve his suspicion that McDougal was loitering, that consensual attempt did not negate 
 
9 Flowers, 195 A.3d at 24–25 (citations omitted).  For the purposes of this opinion, I am calling 
Officer Moses’s detention of McDougal an “investigative detention.”  I intend no distinction 
between an investigative stop and investigative detention.  
10 See, e.g., Diggs, 257 A.3d at 1003–04 (transition from consensual encounter to investigative 
detention); Flowers, 195 A.3d at 24–26 (transition from investigative detention to arrest). 
11 Flowers, 195 A.3d at 26 (citations omitted). 
12 See, e.g., Diggs, 257 A.3d at 1008 (“That these facts, viewed in their totality, justified Patrolman 
Shupe's investigative detention of Diggs seems evident to us.  One simple way to reach that 
conclusion is to ask what Shupe was to do at each step along the way.”). 
4 
 
the fact that based upon an objective view of the evidence, Officer Moses had a valid basis 
to detain McDougal when he directed McDougal to provide his name. 
B. The Initial Encounter Was a Consensual Encounter  
Of the three types of encounters, a consensual encounter is the least intrusive.  Law 
enforcement officers may “[‘]initiate contact with citizens on the street for the purpose of 
asking questions.’”13  In Florida v. Royer, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court 
stated that:  
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely 
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking 
him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if 
the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal 
prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions.14 
 
During a consensual encounter, individuals approached by law enforcement officers 
may ignore their questioning, or leave without responding to it.15  Refusal to answer 
questions, without more, does not justify further detention.16  If the person refuses to 
 
13 Williams, 962 A.2d at 215 (citations omitted). 
14 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion) (Justice White announced the 
judgment of the court and delivered an opinion joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens, 
affirming the reversal below because the detective exceeded limits of investigatory stop.  Justice 
Powell and Justice Brennan filed separate concurring opinions, Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting 
opinion, and Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
O’Connor).  See also Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 (7-2 decision) (observing that “our recent decision 
in Royer, supra, plainly implies that interrogation relating to one's identity or a request for 
identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.”). 
15 Williams, 962 A.2d at 215 (“During a consensual encounter, a person has no obligation to answer 
the officer's inquiry and is free to go about his business.”).  See also Royer, 460 U.S. at 497–98 
(“The person approached, however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may 
decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way.” (citation omitted)). 
16 Royer, 460 U.S. at 498 (“He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, 
objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish 
those grounds.” (citation omitted)). 
5 
 
answer, and the officers act further “to obtain an answer, then the Fourth Amendment 
imposes some minimal level of objective justification to validate the detention or 
seizure.”17  Under Delaware law, “[a] person is ‘seized’ when, ‘in view of all of the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he 
was not free to leave.’”18  This Court analyzes when a seizure occurs by “focusing upon 
the police officer's actions to determine when a reasonable person would have believed he 
or she was not free to ignore the police presence.”19 
The evidence below suggests that Officer Moses attempted a consensual encounter 
when initially approaching McDougal.  While proactively patrolling the intersection of 
24th Street and Carter Street (“24th and Carter”) on April 13, 2022, Officer Moses, Officer 
Shauntae Hunt (“Officer Hunt”) and other accompanying Wilmington Police Department 
officers observed three individuals “standing idle” “in front of the house[,]”20 “blocking 
pedestrian traffic.”21  The individuals at the intersection were McDougal, Rashad Acklin 
 
17 Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216–17 (citations omitted). 
18 Flowers, 195 A.3d at 24 (citations omitted) (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 
(1988) (internal citations omitted)).  This standard was set forth by Justice Stewart in United States 
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), but in a part of that opinion joined only by Justice 
Rehnquist.  Three years later, a majority of the Court accepted the standard in Royer, 460 U.S. at 
502.  This Court continues to follow this standard as articulated in Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 
862, 863–864, 868–69 (Del. 1999). 
19 Jones, 745 A.2d at 869. 
20 App. to Opening Br. at A38 (Officer Leonard Moses Motion to Suppress Hearing Testimony on 
Feb. 3, 2023 [hereinafter “Moses Test. at [_]”] at 20:20–21:1).  See also McDougal, 2023 WL 
2423233, at *1. 
21 App. to Opening Br. at A45 (Officer Shauntae Hunt Motion to Suppress Hearing Testimony on 
Feb. 3, 2023 [hereinafter “Hunt Test. at [_]”] at 49:20–51:16). 
6 
 
(“Acklin”) and Jamir Coleman (“Coleman”).22  The officers considered this a high crime 
area.   
Two weeks prior to the events at issue, a confidential informant told the police that 
four individuals used “ground stashes” in the area near 24th and Carter to conceal firearms 
from police.23  A ground stash is a location where an individual “would place [a firearm] 
where they have direct control over it, but they are able to distance themselves from it if 
they think there’s going to be police contact[.]”24  Prior to the events involving McDougal 
and prior to receiving the tip, the police stopped two of the four individuals identified by 
the informant and discovered a firearm behind a trash can.  Acklin and Coleman were the 
other two individuals named by the confidential informant.25  Therefore, although the 
confidential informant was not past-proven, the police partially corroborated the 
information provided by the informant when they stopped Acklin, Coleman and 
McDougal.   
The officers did not know McDougal, but they knew that Acklin and Coleman did 
not reside at this address.26  After the officers observed the individuals standing at the 
 
22 Id. at A35, A36 (Moses Test. at 10:12–19, 12:17–13:5). 
23 Id. at A34–35 (Moses Test. at 6:23–8:16).  McDougal was not named in the tip nor known to 
these officers prior to the events at issue. 
24 Id. at A34 (Moses Test. at 7:11–16).  
25 Id. at A35 (Moses Test. at 10:16–19).  Acklin and Coleman consented to pat-down searches, 
and the officers recovered nothing.  Id. at A40 (Moses Test. at 28:20–29:20) (Acklin); Id. at A44 
(Hunt Test. at 44:7–16) (Coleman). 
26 Id. at A38 (Moses Test. at 21:7–9).  McDougal was later found not to live at that residence.  Id. 
at A42 (Moses Test. at 36:3–4). 
7 
 
intersection, the officers approached the individuals to ask them questions.  Officer Hunt 
testified that when speaking with Coleman:  
I made contact with him, I -- I asked him if he lived in the area.  He advised 
me that he did not.  I asked him if I could pat him down.  He gave me consent 
to do so.  I asked him for his name and date of birth, and we were in the 
process of getting that information as well.27 
 
 
Because Officer Hunt found no contraband, Officer Hunt told Coleman to “move 
on.” 28  Officer Moses testified about his approach to McDougal:  
Well, during the initial contact I tried to identify myself, say who I am and 
who we are and why we’re out here so it would explain that we’re out here 
because you’re loitering.  And then I explained -- normally at that point 
people are, like, well, loitering ain’t a big thing.  And I’ll explain to them, 
well, we got a lot of violence going on out here, this is one of the ways that 
we keep the violence down and ensure, that individuals that are standing out 
here on this corner are normally subject to being victims of just random 
violence, so we try and keep the area clear of people who’s not supposed to 
be out there and don’t live on the block.  
 
So I give them that briefing, and then during that briefing it would -- for his 
situation, because I had already seen some of the characteristics, I segued 
into, hey, during this contact do you mind if I pat you down just to ensure 
that I’m safe and you’re safe during this encounter.29 
 
27 Id. at A44 (Hunt Test. at 44:5–10).   
28 Id. (Hunt Test. at 44:11–16).  The same process occurred with Acklin.  Id. at A36, A37, A38, 
A40 (Moses Test. at 12:12–16, 19:11–14, 20:6–15, 22:18–22, 28:20–29:20). 
29 Id. at A42 (Moses Test. at 36:15–37:12).  Officer Moses also testified about the initial encounter 
in response to a question from the Superior Court:  
Well, I walked up to him and just introduced myself.  I advised him, told him we 
have a tip.  My normal spiel is, how you doing, you know, you not [sic] allowed to 
loiter, we got a lot of crime going on out here, we’re just trying to keep the street 
safe.  During that -- during that incident I think I segued into his clothing.  I was 
identify-- I was seeing his clothing as I was approaching, and I went through that 
and was just asking, hey, do you mind if I pat you down, make sure you don’t have 
any weapons or anything like that during this encounter, and he refused.  I asked 
him for his name.  He refused that also.  
8 
 
At this point, Officer Moses suspected that McDougal might have a firearm based 
on the “characteristics” of an armed gunman he learned through his training.  Elaborating 
on what those characteristics were, Officer Moses stated “I mean, that he had that bagging 
[sic] clothing, asked him if he had any firearms on him, he said no.  I asked him if I could 
pat him down, and he said no.”30  Officer Moses described the clothing as “baggy clothing 
with a -- looked to have multiple layers.  Like he had, like, multiple pair of pants, or 
something like that, under his clothing.”31  He testified that in his training, he was taught a 
 
The engagement-- the encounter continued, and in my head I’m like, all right, I got 
all this previous information, I have a characteristic I know is consistent with a 
person that’s -- that can conceal a firearm on their person, but I didn’t think 
necessarily I was already there, so I asked him to -- I asked him to sit down while 
we was -- while we try to identify him and make it a safe encounter, at least safe 
for us and him, at least he’s sitting down, he’s not readily available to try and injure 
us, his hands are open, I could see.  
Id. at A40 (Moses Test. at 30:2–31:2).  During his testimony, Officer Moses explained some of 
the reasons behind loitering enforcement.  Compare id. at A40, A42 (Moses Test at 30:4–7, 36:15–
37:5), with Miller v. State, 922 A.2d 1158, 1162 n.8 (Del. 2007) (citing testimony by an officer 
that “individuals sometimes take up residence in a block or on a sidewalk that don’t reside there, 
thus causing the neighbors some concern that the property may be damaged, cars might be broken 
into or engage in some type of drug activity or weapons activity.”), and id. at 1162 (“[T]he police 
were aware of community concerns about weapons activity, drug dealing, and property damage 
caused by individuals who loitered but did not reside in the area.”).   
30 App. to Opening Br. at A36 (Moses Test. at 13:17–20).  See also McDougal, 2023 WL 2423233, 
at *1 (“Moses contacted Defendant, explained to him his concerns about loitering in the area and 
asked Defendant if he was armed.  Defendant replied that he was not and was asked if he would 
consent to a pat down.  Defendant said he would not.  Officer Moses then asked Defendant for his 
name and explained that the purpose was to identify him, so that he could be given his warning 
and ‘be sent on his way.’  Defendant refused to give Officer Moses his name.  At that time, Moses 
instructed Defendant sit down on a nearby stoop out of concerns for officer safety, while he 
attempted to learn his identity.”).   
31 App. to Opening Br. at A35 (Moses Test. at 11:10–12).  
9 
 
characteristic of an armed gunman is multilayer clothing to hide the “print” or outline of 
the gun.32  The layers were unseasonable for the weather in April.33 
Officer Moses asked McDougal for his name and McDougal refused to provide it.  
Officer Moses testified that he could not order McDougal to leave or issue a warning until 
he obtained his name because “that would be part of a warning.”34  The rationale for this 
practice is to avoid miscommunication and misidentifications at future stops.35  According 
to Officer Moses, at this point, McDougal was “legally stopped for loitering.”36  Because 
McDougal refused to provide his name, Officer Moses ordered McDougal to take a seat on 
the stoop for officer safety while officers identified him.37   
McDougal was free to leave until Officer Moses told McDougal that he could leave 
if he provided his name.  The Superior Court correctly held that:  
[W]hen the officers initially approached the group and simply asked for their 
names, it cannot reasonably be said that the individuals did not feel free to 
ignore the police presence.  This is further supported by the fact that the 
officers did not further question or ultimately detain Coleman and Acklin. 
 
However, at the point that Defendant was told that if he gave his name, he 
would be allowed to move along, a reasonable person in Defendant's shoes 
would not have [sic] free to ignore the police presence, due to the officer's 
own words.38 
 
32 Id. at A36, A37 (Moses Test. at 11:13–23); McDougal, 2023 WL 2423233, at *1. 
33 McDougal, 2023 WL 2423233, at *1 (“Officer Moses noted it was unseasonable attire for the 
weather and that it appeared Defendant was wearing multiple pairs of pants.”). 
34 App. to Opening Br. at A37 (Moses Test. at 19:7–10). 
35 Id at A41 (Moses Test. at 33:16–34:3, 34:18–35:5).  The police also check for warrants.  Id. 
(Moses Test. at 35:8–13). 
36 Id. at A37 (Moses Test. at 19:22–23). 
37 Id. at A36, A39 (Moses Test. at 14:3–5, 27:15–19). 
38 McDougal, 2023 WL 2423233, at *2. 
10 
 
 
The Superior Court held, and I agree, that McDougal was initially free to leave and 
within his rights to refuse to answer questions.  McDougal could and did reject Officer 
Moses’s attempt to obtain consent to pat down McDougal.  Once Officer Moses told 
McDougal he could move on if he provided his name, McDougal could no longer feel free 
to leave.39  The Superior Court wrote “[i]t was only upon Defendant's refusal, coupled with 
the observation of his clothing and a concern for officer safety, did Officer Moses require 
Defendant to sit on the nearby stoop.”40  At this point, the attempted consensual encounter 
with McDougal became a detention.  Thus, in order for this detention to be lawful, the State 
needed to establish reasonable articulable suspicion that McDougal had committed, was 
committing, or was about to commit some crime. 
The Majority argues that Officer Moses obtained no new information during the 
consensual phase of this encounter, and therefore the State could not lawfully detain 
McDougal and establish that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion that 
 
39 Officer Moses testified that: 
I believe I asked him, I gave him what my concerns were, explained to him that I 
thought, I mean, that he had that bagging [sic] clothing, asked him if he had any 
firearms on him, he said no. I asked him if I could pat him down, and he said no.  
At that point I asked him what his name was so I could get his name and then we’d 
identify him so we can give him his warning and then send him on his way, and the 
individual refused to give us his name.  
So after refusing to give us his name, to try and keep this as safe a situation as 
possible, I asked him to sit down.  Upon having him sit down on the stoop, once he 
sat down, you could see an unusual bulge in his waistband area. 
App. to Opening Br. at A36 (Moses Test. at 13:15–14:7). 
40 McDougal, 2023 WL 2423233, at *3.  
11 
 
McDougal was loitering.  Based upon the record, including the State’s position below, I 
would frame the issue differently.41  The record suggests that the State never conceded that 
the officers could not have conducted an investigative detention of McDougal; the State 
only conceded, as the Superior Court found, that McDougal could no longer have felt free 
to leave when Officer Moses told McDougal that he could leave if he provided his name.42   
Officer Moses lawfully conducted an investigative detention because there was at 
 
41 On appeal, the State argues:   
As such, even if the encounter may have had a consensual nature initially with some 
of the individuals, the State did not concede and the Superior Court did not accept, 
McDougal’s claim that he was prevented from leaving a consensual encounter.  
Despite McDougal’s contention, the State argued that, based on the evidence 
available to them, the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to obtain 
McDougal’s name, and, at that point, Officer Moses’s words showed McDougal 
that he was not free to leave unless he provided his name. 
Answering Br. at 25. 
42 McDougal, 2023 WL 2423233, at *2 (“[T]he State concedes that a detention occurred when 
Defendant was instructed to sit down on the stoop, therefore, the analysis is limited to Officer 
Moses’ observations prior to that point and whether the initial questioning of Defendant constituted 
a seizure.”).  Below, the State argued the following at the hearing:  
 I would say initially it’s a consensual encounter because if you look at the 
encounter with the first two individuals, Hey, can we have your name, they give it 
to them.  Can we pat you down, and they do.  But Officer Hunt said if they had said 
no but at least gave their name and date of birth and we realize they don’t have 
warrants, they sent them along their way.  They don’t arrest them.  They don’t give 
them a fine.  They -- please, you know, they basically say don’t come back here or 
you may get arrested.  But that was the purpose in moving people along that day.   
So initially it is a consensual encounter.  It was the conduct of Mr. McDougal and 
his actions and his clothing that cause them to investigate further, and then it 
became, you know, more of a stop. 
App. to Opening Br. at A49 (Motion to Suppress Hearing Transcript from Feb. 3, 2023 [hereinafter 
“Hearing Trans. at [_]”] at 65:17–66:10).  See also id. at A20 (Answer to Motion to Suppress at 8) 
(“Officer Moses and the Wilmington Police had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop, frisk and 
make inquiries from the defendant when they observed him loitering in the area where the 
confidential informant had given information that individuals had been selling street level drugs 
and carrying firearms.”). 
12 
 
least reasonable articulable suspicion that the individuals were violating the loitering laws.  
Officer Moses attempted to resolve his reasonable articulable suspicion by initiating a 
consensual encounter and issuing a warning, even though, as he testified, McDougal “was 
legally stopped for loitering.”43  I believe the key is whether the State can establish that 
Officer Moses had reasonable articulable suspicion that McDougal was loitering at the 
point that McDougal could no longer believe he was free to leave.  As the Superior Court 
found that point occurred when McDougal was told if he provided his name, he would be 
allowed to leave.  I consider that question next. 
C. The State Established Reasonable Articulable Suspicion Justifying McDougal’s 
Detention on the Stoop 
 
An attempted consensual encounter can evolve into an investigative detention when 
“‘in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would 
have believed that he was not free to leave.’”44  In Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme 
Court held that an officer may only briefly detain or seize an individual for an investigative 
detention when the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that “criminal activity may 
be afoot[.]”45 
 
43 App. to Opening Br. at A37 (Moses Test. at 19:22–23). 
44 Flowers, 195 A.3d at 24 (citations omitted) (quoting Michigan, 486 U.S. at 573 (internal 
citations omitted)). 
45 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).   
13 
 
In Flowers, this Court held that “[t]he State of Delaware has adopted [the holding 
in Terry], and Section 1902 of Title 11 governs such ‘investigative’ or Terry stops in this 
State.”46  Under 11 Del. C. § 1902:  
(a) A peace officer may stop any person abroad, or in a public place, who the 
officer has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed or is 
about to commit a crime, and may demand the person's name, address, 
business abroad and destination. 
 
(b) Any person so questioned who fails to give identification or explain the 
person's actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further 
questioned and investigated. 
 
(c) The total period of detention provided for by this section shall not exceed 
2 hours.  The detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest 
in any official record.  At the end of the detention the person so detained shall 
be released or be arrested and charged with a crime.47 
 
 
This Court interprets “reasonable ground” to mean “reasonable and articulable 
suspicion.”48  As this Court held in Diggs: “‘[a] determination of reasonable suspicion must 
be evaluated in the context of the totality of the circumstances as viewed through the eyes 
of a reasonable, trained police officer in the same or similar circumstances, combining 
objective facts with such an officer's subjective interpretation of those facts.’”49   
 
46 Flowers, 195 A.3d at 24. 
47 11 Del. C. § 1902 (emphasis added).  
48 Jones, 745 A.2d at 861 (“Delaware has codified this standard for investigatory stops and 
detentions in 11 Del. C. § 1902.  For the purpose of this analysis, ‘reasonable ground’ as used in 
Section 1902(a) has the same meaning as reasonable and articulable suspicion.”). 
49 Diggs, 257 A.3d at 1004 (citing Jones, 745 A.2d at 861).  The United States Supreme Court 
elaborated on the required totality of the circumstances analysis in United States v. Cortez: 
First, the assessment must be based upon all the circumstances.  The analysis 
proceeds with various objective observations, information from police reports, if 
such are available, and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of 
certain kinds of lawbreakers.  From these data, a trained officer draws inferences 
14 
 
Reasonable articulable suspicion requires “considerably less” than “proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence” and is “less demanding than probable cause[.]”50  It 
requires more than an inarticulate hunch and good faith by the officer.51   
 
and makes deductions—inferences and deductions that might well elude an 
untrained person.  
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.  Long before 
the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain 
common sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are 
permitted to do the same—and so are law enforcement officers.  Finally, the 
evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis 
by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement. 
The second element contained in the idea that an assessment of the whole picture 
must yield a particularized suspicion is the concept that the process just described 
must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in 
wrongdoing. 
449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). 
50 Diggs, 257 A.3d at 1004 (“This level of justification is often referred to as reasonable articulable 
suspicion and is considerably less than proof by a preponderance of the evidence and less 
demanding than probable cause, which is necessary to support an arrest.” (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted)).  The United States Supreme Court held the same in U.S. v. Sokolow:  
The Fourth Amendment requires “some minimal level of objective justification” 
for making the stop.  That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of 
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.  We have held that probable cause 
means “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,” and 
the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than 
that for probable cause[.] 
490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citations and quotations omitted). 
51 Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (“Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed 
rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has 
consistently refused to sanction.  And simple ‘good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not 
enough.’” (citations and quotations omitted)). The Supreme Court observed in Terry that:  
There is nothing unusual in two men standing together on a street corner, perhaps 
waiting for someone.  Nor is there anything suspicious about people in such 
circumstances strolling up and down the street, singly or in pairs.  Store windows, 
moreover, are made to be looked in.  But the story is quite different where, as here, 
two men hover about a street corner for an extended period of time, at the end of 
which it becomes apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or anything; where 
these men pace alternately along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same 
store window roughly 24 times; where each completion of this route is followed 
15 
 
This Court held in Lopez-Vazquez v. State, that the following factors can contribute 
to finding reasonable articulable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances: 
[A]ctivity such as “leaving the scene upon the approach, or the sighting, of a 
police officer” or the “refusal to cooperate with an officer who initiates an 
encounter” cannot be the sole grounds constituting reasonable suspicion.  
These events, however, may be considered as part of the totality of the 
circumstances.  Other circumstances may also be considered, such as the 
presence of a defendant in a high crime area, the defendant's “unprovoked, 
headlong flight,” a defendant “holding a bulge in his pocket that appeared to 
be either a gun or a large quantity of drugs”, [sic] a “focused” warning shout 
of police presence, or a furtive gesture after the officer's approach or display 
of authority.  The officer's subjective interpretations and explanations of why 
these activities, based on experience and training, may have given him a 
reasonable suspicion to investigate further are also important, as is the trial 
judge's evaluation of the officer's credibility.52 
 
I now look to the statutes to compare the elements of the loitering statutes with what 
information Officer Moses knew when he directed McDougal to provide his name.53  There 
are two relevant statutes – 11 Del. C. § 1321, (“Section 1321”) and Section 36-68, the City 
 
immediately by a conference between the two men on the corner; where they are 
joined in one of these conferences by a third man who leaves swiftly; and where 
the two men finally follow the third and rejoin him a couple of blocks away.  It 
would have been poor police work indeed for an officer of 30 years' experience in 
the detection of thievery from stores in this same neighborhood to have failed to 
investigate this behavior further. 
Id. at 22–23.   
52 Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1288–89 (Del. 2008) (citations and quotations omitted). 
53 Officer Moses testified, and the Superior Court held, that he was investigating loitering.  App. 
to Opening Br. at A37, A42 (Moses Test. at 19:22–23, 36:15–18); McDougal, 2023 WL 2423233, 
at *1 (“Moses contacted Defendant, explained to him his concerns about loitering in the area and 
asked Defendant if he was armed.”); id. at *3 (“Because Moses was investigating a potential 
violation of the loitering statute, 11 Del. C. § 1902, allows further detention if Moses possessed a 
‘reasonable ground to suspect’ Defendant was ‘committing, has committed or is about to commit’ 
that crime.” (quoting 11 Del. C. § 1902(a))). 
16 
 
of Wilmington Ordinance on Loitering (“Section 36-38”) –that set forth the elements of 
the crime of loitering. 
 Under Section 1321 a person is guilty of loitering when: 
(1) The person fails or refuses to move on when lawfully ordered to do so by 
any police officer; or 
 
(2) The person stands, sits idling or loiters upon any pavement, sidewalk or 
crosswalk, or stands or sits in a group or congregates with others on any 
pavement, sidewalk, crosswalk or doorstep, in any street or way open to the 
public in this State so as to obstruct or hinder the free and convenient 
passage of persons walking, riding or driving over or along such pavement, 
walk, street or way, and fails to make way, remove or pass, after reasonable 
request from any person; or 
 
(3) The person loiters or remains in or about a school building or grounds, 
not having reason or relationship involving custody of or responsibility for a 
pupil or any other specific or legitimate reason for being there, unless the 
person has written permission from the principal; or 
 
(4) The person loiters, remains or wanders about in a public place for the 
purpose of begging; or 
 
(5) The person loiters or remains in a public place for the purpose of engaging 
or soliciting another person to engage in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual 
intercourse; or 
 
(6) The person loiters, congregates with others or prowls in a place at a time 
or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances 
that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity, 
especially in light of the crime rate in the relevant area.  Unless flight by the 
accused or other circumstances make it impracticable, a peace officer shall, 
prior to any arrest for an offense under this paragraph, afford the accused 
an opportunity to dispel any alarm which would otherwise be warranted, by 
requesting identification and an explanation of the person's presence and 
conduct.  No person shall be convicted of an offense under this paragraph if 
the peace officer did not comply with the preceding sentence, or if it appears 
that the explanation given by the accused was true and, if believed by the 
peace officer at the time, would have dispelled the alarm. 
 
17 
 
Loitering is a violation.54 
 
Although defense counsel and Superior Court discussed Section 1321 at the 
hearing,55 Officer Hunt quoted a different provision in the police report.56  Officer Hunt 
quoted to Section 36-68:  
(a) Definitions.  The following words, terms and phrases, when used in this 
section, shall have the meanings ascribed to them in this section, except 
where the context clearly indicates a different meaning: 
 
Public place means an area generally visible to public view and including 
streets, sidewalks, bridges, alleys, plazas, parks, driveways, parking lots, 
automobiles, while moving or not, within 50 feet of buildings which are 
single-family or multifamily residences, or which are open to the general 
public and which serve food or drink for consumption on or off the premises, 
or which provide entertainment, and the doorway and entrances to such 
buildings and the grounds enclosing them, or any other area either publicly 
owned or to which the public has access or any vacant property in either a 
residential or commercial district as designated by section 48-96 of this 
Code. 
 
(b) Prohibited behavior.  A person is guilty of loitering under this section 
when, within 50 feet of a single-family or multifamily residence, or within 50 
feet of a business which is open to the general public and which serves food 
or drink for consumption on or off the premises or which provides 
entertainment, or within 50 feet of any vacant property in either a residential 
or commercial district: 
 
(1) The person fails or refuses to move on when lawfully ordered to 
do so by any police officer; 
 
(2) The person stands, sits idly or loiters upon any pavement, sidewalk 
or crosswalk, or stands or sits in a group or congregates with others 
on any pavement, sidewalk, crosswalk, or doorstep, in any street or 
way open to the public in this city so as to obstruct or hinder the free 
and convenient passage of other persons walking, riding or driving 
 
54 11 Del. C. § 1321 (emphasis added). 
55 App. to Opening Br. at A45 (Hunt Test. at 49:20–51:16).  
56 Reply Br. at Ex. A.  
18 
 
over or along such pavement, walk, street or way, and shall fail to 
make way, remove or pass, after reasonable request from any other 
person; 
 
(3) The person loiters or remains in a public place for the purpose of 
solicitation as set forth in section 36-93; or 
 
(4) The person loiters, prowls, wanders or creeps in a place at a time 
or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals under 
circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or 
property in the vicinity.  Unless flight by the accused or other 
circumstances make it impracticable, a police officer shall, prior to 
any arrest for an offense under this subsection, afford the accused an 
opportunity to dispel any alarm which would otherwise be warranted, 
by requesting him to identify himself and explain his presence or 
conduct.  No person shall be convicted of an offense under this 
subsection if the police officer did not comply with the preceding 
sentence, or if it appears that the explanation given by the accused was 
true and, if believed by the police officer at the time, would have 
dispelled the alarm. 
 
(c) Notice to the public.  The owner or proprietor of any business which is 
included within the provisions of this section shall post a sign or signs in the 
business premises which shall clearly state for customers to read the 
prohibition of loitering under this section and the penalties for violation 
thereof. 
 
(d) Penalties.  Any person who violated the provisions of this section shall 
be fined $100.00 for his first offense, $250.00 for a second offense, $450.00 
for a third offense, and $500.00 for every subsequent offense.  These fines 
shall not be subject to suspension or reduction for any reason.  The current 
offense shall be considered a subsequent offense to any offense or offenses 
for the same violation which have occurred within the past five years.57 
 
The police report states that “[t]he above listed information was referenced from the 
Delaware State Code and the City of Wilmington Code.”58  This statement indicates an 
 
57 Wilm. C. § 36-68 (emphasis added) (subsection title emphasis in original). 
58 Reply Br. at Ex. A. 
19 
 
attempt to reference both statutes, rather than rely only on Section 36-68 as McDougal 
suggests.  McDougal argues that the State failed to name with specificity which provision 
formed the basis of Officer Moses’s investigation and therefore the State lacked reasonable 
articulable suspicion to detain McDougal.  This lack of specificity as to which of the two 
substantially similar statutes was at issue does not invalidate the detention.  11 Del. C.          
§ 1902 required only that Officer Moses have reasonable ground to suspect McDougal “is 
committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime[.]”59   
 
In Miller v. State, this Court held that the police established reasonable articulable 
suspicion to detain an individual for loitering under 11 Del. C. § 1321(6) when they 
observed an individual “sit on the step of the vacant business for twenty to thirty minutes; 
the vacant building was formerly used in an illegal bookmaking operation; it was 9 p.m., 
and the general area was known for drug problems and other criminal activity.”60   
Similarly, at the time Officer Moses directed McDougal to provide his name, the 
officers knew information from the confidential informant and their observations that 
 
59 11 Del. C. § 1902(a) (emphasis added). 
60 Miller, 922 A.2d at 1162–63.  The Court in Miller also held:  
Although the Delaware statute does not generally define loitering, a common 
definition of the word “loiter” is “to remain in an area for no obvious reason.”  A 
reasonable, trained police officer, viewing a person sitting on the steps of a vacant 
building at night for an extended period of time doing nothing, would have a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person was loitering.   Accordingly, in 
accordance with Delaware's loitering statute, such activity would warrant a brief 
detention to investigate or warn the person to move on.  
Id. at 1162 (citations omitted). 
20 
 
implicated many of the elements of Section 1321 and Section 36-38.  The following facts 
establish reasonable articulable suspicion that McDougal was violating a loitering statute:  
• McDougal was “blocking pedestrian traffic” by “standing idle” “in front 
of the house” at 24th and Carter; 61 
 
• McDougal, unknown to the police, was with two individuals known not 
to live at that address;62 
 
• Officers were investigating a tip by a confidential informant which 
indicated that McDougal’s companions and two other individuals used 
ground stashes in this area to hide drugs and guns;63 
   
• Prior to receiving that tip, officers stopped the other two individuals 
identified by the confidential informant around the area of 24th and Carter 
and “located a discarded firearm behind a trash can;”64 
 
• 24th and Carter was in a “high crime” area; 65 
 
• McDougal was dressed in baggy and multiple-layered clothing, 
inappropriate for the season, which was a characteristic known from 
police training and experience to indicate possession of a weapon (for 
example, by hiding the “print” of a gun).66 
 
The above uncontested facts sufficiently established reasonable articulable 
suspicion of loitering.  Officer Moses observed the individuals and their position relative 
to the residence at 24th and Carter.  The confidential informant’s tip was relevant to 
 
61 App. to Opening Br. at A38, A45 (Moses Test. at 20:20–21:1; Hunt Test. at 51:9–51:16).  See 
also McDougal, 2023 WL 2423233, at *1. 
62 App. to Opening Br. at A38, A41 (Moses Test. at 21:7–9, 35:16–19). 
63 Id. at A34–35 (Moses Test. at 6:23–8:16).   
64 Id. at A35 (Moses Test. at 8:17–21); McDougal, 2023 WL 2423233, at *1.   
65 App. to Opening Br. at A39 (Moses Test. at 25:7–8). 
66 Id. at A35 (Moses Test. at 11:10–12) (“baggy clothing with a – looked to have multiple layers.  
Like he had, like, multiple pair of pants, or something like that, under his clothing.”); id. (Moses 
Test. at 11:16–23) (baggy clothing hides weapons); McDougal, 2023 WL 2423233, at *1. 
21 
 
whether McDougal’s behavior was “not usual for law-abiding individuals under 
circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity[,]”67 
“especially in light of the crime rate in the relevant area.”68  Although reasonable 
articulable suspicion requires more than a hunch,69 it also requires “considerably less” than 
“proof by a preponderance of the evidence” and is “less demanding than probable 
cause[.]”70  What Officer Moses knew prior to detaining McDougal may amount to less 
than proof by preponderance of the evidence but was sufficiently more than a hunch that 
one of the provisions was violated.  Even if Officer Moses initially attempted to resolve 
the loitering violation through a consensual encounter, that does not negate the existence 
of reasonable articulable suspicion to detain McDougal at the time that Officer Moses 
ordered McDougal to provide his name.  Therefore, I believe that the Superior Court 
correctly held that the State had a valid basis to detain McDougal because the State 
established that Officer Moses had reasonable articulable suspicion that McDougal 
committed the crime of loitering.71   
 
67 11 Del. C. § 1321(6); Wilm. C. § 36-68(4). 
68 11 Del. C. § 1321(6). 
69 Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (citations omitted). 
70 Diggs, 257 A.3d at 1004 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
71 The Superior Court held:  
14.  Because Moses was investigating a potential violation of the loitering 
statute, 11 Del. C. § 1902, allows further detention if Moses possessed a 
“reasonable ground to suspect” Defendant was “committing, has committed or is 
about to commit” that crime.  In viewing the totality of the circumstances, Officer 
Moses’ ability to articulate that the three men were impeding the flow of pedestrian 
traffic, two of the three individuals did not live in the area and had no known lawful 
purpose to be there, the background information provided by the CI that street level 
drug sales were occurring at that location, as well as the observations of Defendant's 
22 
 
Because Officer Moses had a reasonable articulable suspicion that McDougal 
committed a loitering violation, he could detain McDougal pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 1902(a) 
and request his name, address, and business abroad.  Because McDougal did not provide 
his name, Officer Moses could then detain McDougal pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 1902(b) to 
question McDougal and further investigate the reasonable articulable suspicion of 
loitering.  This detention had to be under two hours and limited to the purpose of the stop 
pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 1902(c).   The nature of the detention itself, asking McDougal to 
sit on the stoop, was “limited, justified at its inception, and ‘reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’”72  Therefore, the 
Superior Court correctly concluded that the officers lawfully detained McDougal. 
D. The State Needed Reasonable Articulable Suspicion That McDougal was Armed 
and Presently Dangerous to Pat Him Down for Weapons 
 
As required under Delaware law, the State established reasonable articulable 
suspicion that McDougal was armed and presently dangerous to Officer Moses and others 
prior to patting down McDougal.  Therefore, I believe the pat down was lawful.  
 
baggy, layered clothes in which it appeared he was wearing two sets of pants, a 
“reasonable trained police officer in the same or similar circumstances” would be 
justified in suspecting criminal activity.  Thus, he possessed reasonable, articulable 
suspicion at that point to detain Defendant. 
15.  Accordingly, no violation under either Article I, § 6 of the Delaware 
Constitution, or the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution occurred 
when the officers approached, and eventually detained Defendant. 
McDougal, 2023 WL 2423233, at *3 (quoting 11 Del. C. § 1902(a)). 
72 Flowers, 195 A.3d at 25 (quotation and citations omitted). 
23 
 
On appeal, the State asserts that McDougal waived any claim that the pat down was 
unlawful.  At the suppression hearing, McDougal’s attorney confirmed he did not challenge 
the retrieval of the gun.  The State argues that this was a strategic decision of trial counsel, 
which precludes appellate review under our Supreme Court Rule 8.73  Because McDougal’s 
trial counsel did not challenge,74 and the Superior Court did not analyze whether the pat 
down was lawful, the plain error standard applies.75    
In Flowers, this Court articulated the standard for when an officer may pat down an 
individual during an investigative detention: 
“During a Terry stop, officers may take measures that are reasonably 
necessary to protect themselves and maintain the status quo.”  A police 
officer is empowered to “take necessary measures to determine whether [an 
individual] is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of 
physical harm” when the officer “is justified in believing that the individual 
whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and 
presently dangerous to the officer or to others.” 
 
During an investigative stop, officers may, under appropriate circumstances, 
search the detainee to determine whether he is armed.  An officer may 
conduct such a search for weapons if “he has reason to believe that he is 
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he 
has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.”  The search must be 
strictly circumscribed by the exigencies that justify its initiation.76 
 
73 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
74 App. to Opening Br. at A50 (Hearing Trans. at 71:3–6) (“Certainly when an officer sees a bulge, 
that’s when Mr. McDougal is sitting down.  Obviously I can’t contest the case law when the officer 
sees a bulge.”). 
75 This Court considers arguments not raised below under a plain error standard of review.  A plain 
error is “[‘]so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of 
the trial process . . . [and is a] material defec[t] which [is] apparent on the face of the record [and 
is] basic, serious and fundamental. . . .’” El-Abbadi v. State, – A.3d –, –,  2024 WL 14537, at *20 
(Del. Jan. 2, 2024) (alterations in original) (quoting Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281, 1284 (Del. 
2002)).  
76 Flowers, 195 A.3d at 28 (citations and quotations omitted). 
24 
 
Regarding the scope of the search, “[t]he form of ‘search’ deemed ‘reasonable’ 
under such circumstances is also a limited one: a ‘frisk’ or pat down to find weapons.”77  
A pat down must be “limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which 
might be used to harm the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be characterized 
as something less than a ‘full’ search, even though it remains a serious intrusion.”78   
The State established, under the totality of the circumstances, that Officer Moses 
had reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that he was dealing with an “armed and 
presently dangerous” person.79  At the hearing below, Officer Moses testified that he saw 
an “unusual bulge” in McDougal’s waist area when McDougal sat on the stoop.80  Officer 
Moses asked McDougal about the bulge, and McDougal removed “some articles” out of 
his pocket; however, the bulge remained.81  Officer Moses observed McDougal’s multiple 
layers of clothing and knew that to be a characteristic of an individual concealing a firearm.  
Officer Moses also knew from his training and experience that the bulge was at 
McDougal’s waist where a person might conceal a firearm.  Therefore, the State established 
that Officer Moses had reasonable articulable suspicion that McDougal was armed and 
presently dangerous prior to patting down McDougal.82  Thus, I believe there was no error 
 
77 Id. at 25–26 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 26). 
78 Terry, 392 U.S. at 26.  See also Royer, 460 U.S. at 498 (“[T]he search must be limited in scope 
to that which is justified by the particular purposes served by the exception.”). 
79 Flowers, 195 A.3d at 28 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24). 
80 App. to Opening Br. at A36 (Moses Test. at 14:5–7).  
81 Id. (Moses Test. at 14:12–15:4).  See also McDougal, 2023 WL 2423233, at *2 (“Defendant was 
asked about the bulge and in response pulled out a medical facemask and a hair cap.”). 
82 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (“And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such 
circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
25 
 
when Superior Court held, even without additional analysis, that “Officer Moses 
appropriately engaged in the pat down of Defendant once on the stoop[.]”83   
Finally, McDougal’s argument that Officer Moses searched McDougal beyond the 
permitted scope of a pat down has no merit.  Officer Moses testified as follows on direct 
examination: 
Q.  When you say you reached down, could you describe more of what you 
do?  Are you going in his pants?  Are you going over the top of his pants to 
feel it?  What are you doing? 
 
A.  I believe what happened is I reached down and I was patting it down, and 
then still didn’t feel nothing, and I lifted up his shirt, and you could see the 
firearm in his waistband area. 
 
Q.  Okay.  So when you pat, could you still feel something? 
 
A.  Yes.  
 
Q.  All right.  And because you felt something, then you lifted his shirt? 
 
A.  Correct.84 
 
Although Officer Moses initially stated he felt nothing, when the State specifically 
asked him if he felt something, he altered his answer.  McDougal’s trial counsel did not 
cross-examine Officer Moses regarding that initial description of the pat down.  The 
Superior Court was in a better position to determine Officer Moses’s credibility, having 
observed Officer Moses’s body language and tone during his testimony, and then by 
 
‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in 
light of his experience.” ).   
83 McDougal, 2023 WL 2423233, at *3. 
84 App. to Opening Br. at A36–37 (Moses Test. at 15:16–16:6). 
26 
 
comparing that testimony to what the judge saw when reviewing the body camera footage.  
The Superior Court did not make a finding of fact regarding whether Officer Moses felt 
anything: 
Upon being placed on the stoop, Officer Moses observed a “unusual” bulge 
in Defendant's waistband.  Defendant was asked about the bulge and in 
response pulled out a medical facemask and a hair cap.  The bulge was still 
present, so Officer Moses conducted a pat down of Defendant.  During the 
pat down, a loaded pink and black 9mm firearm was located in his clothes at 
his waistband.85 
 
The lack of argument by trial counsel and lack of finding of fact by the Superior 
Court suggests that the parties and court were satisfied that the pat down was conducted 
properly.  It also suggests that the parties and the court understood that Officer Moses 
corrected himself in his testimony.  I see no error in the result, and if there were an error, 
it was not “[‘]so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and 
integrity of the trial process . . . [and is a] material defec[t] which [is] apparent on the face 
of the record [and is] basic, serious and fundamental. . . .’”86  Accordingly, I believe that 
McDougal has not satisfied the plain error standard. 
II. 
CONCLUSION 
Our law enforcement officers must follow proper procedural safeguards and satisfy 
the requisite standard during each step of their investigation from consensual encounter to 
arrest.  This ensures that law enforcement officers can investigate efficiently, and 
simultaneously protects the paramount constitutional rights of Delawareans.  I believe that 
 
85 McDougal, 2023 WL 2423233, at *2 (emphasis added). 
86 El-Abbadi, 2024 WL 14537, at *20 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).  
27 
 
the Superior Court correctly determined that the State justified both detaining McDougal 
and conducting the pat down with the required reasonable articulable suspicion.  Therefore, 
I would AFFIRM McDougal’s conviction and accordingly, I respectfully DISSENT.