Case Title: Arthur Wildoner v. The Borough of Ramsey

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-74-98

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). GARIBALDI, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The primary issue in this appeal is what circumstances constitute probable cause, or would justify a reasonably objective police officer in believing in the existence of probable cause, to make an arrest under New Jersey's Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C: 25-17 to -33 (Act). The issue arises in a civil suit filed by Arthur Wildoner against the Borough of Ramsey, the Ramsey Police Department, individual police officers, and others under state common law and 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983 (Section 1983) for false arrest, false imprisonment, mistreatment, and malicious prosecution. Two Ramsey police officers arrested plaintiff on September 15, 1993, for an act of domestic violence against his wife, Cecilia, with whom he lived in an apartment in a senior citizens housing complex. The police had been called by the manager of the complex, who had been told by a neighbor of the Wildoners that plaintiff was using loud and abusive language and threatening to throw knives at his wife. After the neighbor repeated what she had heard to the police, the officers went to the Wildoners' apartment and Mrs. Wildoner let them in. The officers saw a knife on the kitchen floor and noticed a red mark on Mrs. Wildoner's arm. The officers arrested plaintiff and removed him from the apartment in a wheelchair, covered by a blanket. He was taken to the police station in an ambulance. A police officer signed a complaint for simple assault against plaintiff and because Mrs. Wildoner would not sign a domestic violence complaint against her husband, the police applied for and received a temporary restraining order (TRO) under the Act to keep plaintiff from his home and directed the Wildoners to appear for a hearing in Superior Court. Plaintiff was released to the custody of his son, a Garfield police officer, without being required to post bail. The TRO was vacated the next day after the court heard testimony from Mrs. Wildoner only and the assault complaint in municipal court was dismissed at the end of the State's case. Thereafter, plaintiff filed his law suit against those involved in his arrest, seeking punitive and compensatory damages. During the course of discovery, depositions were taken of the two police officers, the Wildoners, and their son, Arthur Wildoner, Jr. The police and the Wildoners differed in their recounting of the events at the apartment the day of the arrest, but all agreed on the presence of a knife in the kitchen and a red mark on Mrs. Wildoner's arm. Wildoner, Jr. testified to a history of verbal altercations between his parents and that during the twenty-one years they had lived in a home in Garfield, the police had been called out for domestic disturbances five times, none to his knowledge involving physical assaults or the filing of domestic violence complaints. After discovery was completed, defendants moved for summary judgment, seeking to have the complaint dismissed. The trial court agreed with defendants that there were no material facts in dispute so as to preclude judgment for defendants. The court found the undisputed facts to support the officers' objective good faith in arresting plaintiff and to establish probable cause to believe that plaintiff had committed an offense. The court held that defendants were immune from liability under Section 1983 and under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed in part, being of the view that the differing versions of the police investigation at the apartment and the Wildoners' denial that any act of domestic violence occurred raised genuine issues of material fact about the existence of probable cause to arrest plaintiff. The court saw sufficient evidence to let a jury decide the question of probable cause. The court did affirm the dismissal of some claims. The Supreme Court granted defendants' petition for certification. 1. For claims asserted under Section 1983, a defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity based on probable cause or a reasonable belief that probable cause existed is a question of law that should be decided as early in the case as possible.The same standard of objective reasonableness governs questions of good faith under the Tort Claims Act and a good faith immunity exists under the Act. (pp. 14-20) 2. Probable cause is an absolute defense to plaintiff's claims for false arrest and imprisonment and for malicious prosecution, as well as the Section 1983 claims. Probable cause can be based on the statement of a witness or informant, with a report by an ordinary citizen, like the neighbor here, who was motivated only by concern for Mrs. Wildoner's safety, generally being considered reliable. The officers properly placed substantial reliance on the neighbor's statement. (pp. 20-24) 3. Studies have reported and courts have recognized that victims of domestic violence often do not report their abuse to law enforcement agencies. Accounts of neighbors or other concerned citizens who witness acts of domestic violence therefore are crucial tools in combating domestic violence. In this case, the failure of the alleged victim and perpetrator to confirm the allegations did not create a material issue of fact to defeat probable cause. The officers' independent observation of a knife and a red mark on the alleged victim, combined with the neighbor's report, which was repeated unchanged to the police, provided, at a minimum, an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. Neither plaintiff's age (seventy) nor his physical condition (he required the use of a cane to walk) indicate that he could not commit an act of domestic violence. ( pp. 25-29 ) 4. The decision of the police to arrest plaintiff was a valid judgment call consistent with the Legislature's no tolerance policy regarding incidents of domestic violence. The failure to find probable cause in circumstances like those presented here would have a chilling effect on the willingness of police officers to act in a manner consistent with the goals of the Act. Because many victims of domestic violence do not seek police assistance, law enforcement officers must be able to rely on the reports of concerned citizens to arrest an alleged abuser without fear of civil liability. ( pp. 29-31) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the order of the Law Division dismissing the complaint is REINSTATED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE GARIBALDI's opinion. ARTHUR WILDONER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. THE BOROUGH OF RAMSEY, RAMSEY POLICE DEPARTMENT, OFFICER KANE ZUHONE and OFFICER BRIAN O'DONAHUE, Defendants-Appellants, and HELEN GANNON and MARGARET DIEFERT, Defendants. Argued October 13, 1999 -- Decided January 31, 2000 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 316 N.J. Super. 487 (1998). Thomas A. Keenan argued the cause for appellants (Harwood Lloyd, attorneys; Eileen P. Kuzma, on the brief). Thomas L. Ferro argued the cause for respondent. Lawrence S. Lustberg argued the cause for amicus curiae, New Jersey Coalition for Battered Women (Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione, attorneys; Mr. Lustberg and Lori Outzs Borgen, on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by GARIBALDI, J. Plaintiff, Arthur Wildoner, was arrested for domestic violence against his wife, Cecilia Wildoner, by Borough of Ramsey Police Officers Kane Zuhone and Brian O'Donahue. This appeal arises out of plaintiff's action against the Borough of Ramsey (the Borough ), the Ramsey Police Department (the Department ) and Officers O'Donahue and Zuhone, under state common law and 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983 ( Section 1983"), for false arrest, false imprisonment, mistreatment, and malicious prosecution. The central issue in this appeal is what circumstances constitute probable cause, or would justify a reasonably objective police officer in believing in the existence of probable cause, to effectuate an arrest under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -33 (the Act or Domestic Violence Act ). Specifically, did police officers acting on a concerned citizen's report, supported by the officers' analysis of the totality of the circumstances, act reasonably when they arrested an alleged perpetrator even though the victim and the alleged perpetrator deny that an act of domestic violence occurred. plaintiff raised genuine issues of material facts necessary to determine whether there was probable cause for his arrest and whether defendants were protected by good faith immunity under 1983. Because plaintiff's claims of false arrest and false imprisonment depend on whether there was probable cause for the arrest, it was error to dismiss those claims and the claim for malicious prosecution. We affirm the dismissal of the state-law claim for damages for pain and suffering against all defendants and affirm the dismissal of the claim for punitive damages and malicious prosecution against the Ramsey Police Department and the Borough of Ramsey. The Appellate Division held, however, that the punitive damages claims against the individual officers could go forward on remand. Id. at 508. The Appellate Division based its conclusion that plaintiff submitted evidence sufficient to allow a jury reasonably to find that the police lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff principally upon the Wildoners' denials that any act of domestic violence had occurred and the differing versions of the police investigation presented by defendants and the Wildoners. For example, although defendants maintain that Mrs. Wildoner initially told police that her husband was intoxicated and had attacked her, Mrs. Wildoner denies ever making those allegations. Although police contend that Mrs. Wildoner initially told police that her husband caused the red mark on her arm, Mrs. Wildoner denies making that statement and claims she sustained the red mark by hitting her arm on the table. Although police allege that they observed a knife on the kitchen floor upon their entry into the apartment and plaintiff concedes that there might have been a knife on the floor, Mrs. Wildoner denies that a knife was on the floor and plainiff asserts that he accidentally dropped the knife while his wife was out of the room. Id. at 499-500. In addition, the Appellate Division found that plaintiff's poor physical condition was a circumstance which a reasonable police officer should have considered, noting that the Wildoners and their son all agreed that plaintiff is physically incapable of inflicting injury upon his wife. Id. at 500. Those factors, the court concluded, raised genuine issues of material fact regarding the existence of probable cause sufficient to preclude summary judgment. We granted defendants' petition for certification. 158 N.J. 75 (1999). To establish a valid claim, plaintiff must prove that defendants acted under color of state law and deprived him of a well-established federal constitutional or statutory right. There is no dispute that the rights asserted by plaintiff are clearly established for purposes of Section 1983 or that the officers acted under color of law. Under Section 1983, even if probable cause does not exist in fact, defendants may be entitled to assert a defense of qualified immunity if they reasonably believed that probable cause existed. The Supreme Court set forth the defense of qualified (or good faith) immunity and its purpose as follows: [W]e conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment. [Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 410 (1982) (citations and footnote omitted).] In Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 337, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1094, 89 L. Ed. 2d 271, 276 (1986), a case similar to the present case, the Supreme Court considered the question of the degree of immunity accorded a defendant police officer in a damages action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 when it is alleged that the officer caused the plaintiff[] to be unconstitutionally arrested . . . [without] probable cause. The Court, concluding that an officer applying for a warrant is entitled to assert qualified but not absolute immunity, observed that the defense of qualified immunity provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. . . . Under the Harlow standard . . . an allegation of malice is not sufficient to defeat immunity if the defendant acted in an objectively reasonable manner. . . . Defendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue, but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized. [Id. at 341, 106 S. Ct. at 1096, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 278.] In Kirk v. City of Newark, 109 N.J. 173 (1988), we adopted Harlow's objective reasonableness standard for determining whether law enforcement officials are entitled to the qualified immunity defense in Section 1983 actions. In that case, we found that a law enforcement official can defend a section 1983 claim by establishing either that he or she acted with probable cause, or even if probable cause did not exist, that a reasonable police officer could have believed in its existence. As part of the Act the Legislature encouraged the training of police and judicial personnel in the procedures and enforcement of the Act, and about the social and psychological context in which domestic violence occurs. Ibid. The Act also broadened the discretion of a police officer to arrest an alleged perpetrator, even when the victim did not corroborate the incident, provided that the officer had probable cause to believe the incident occurred. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21(b). The purpose of this broadened authority to arrest was not to punish the perpetrator, but to protect the victim. Carfagno v. Carfagno, 288 N.J. Super. 424, 434 (Ch. Div. 1995). With those provisions, the Legislature attempted to assure that more arrests would be made, and more victims protected, from domestic violence. To ensure protection for law enforcement officers and others who in good faith report a possible incident of domestic violence, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2C:25-22, which provides: A report by a concerned citizen, however, generally has not been viewed with the same degree of suspicion that applies to a tip by a confidential informant. Different considerations obtain . . . when the informer is an ordinary citizen. State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 506 (1986) (holding police entitled to rely as basis for investigatory stop on telephone call from member of Springfield First Aid Squad reporting that two individuals were "hanging around" closed gasoline service station at midnight and noting that officer might well have been derelict in his duties had he not stopped and questioned the defendant ). There is an assumption grounded in common experience that such a person [a concerned citizen], in reporting criminal activity, would be motivated by factors which are consistent with law enforcement goals. Such indicia of reliability are heightened still further when the citizen provides the police with a sworn statement, thus subjecting himself or herself to potential civil or criminal liability. Here the police were not dealing with a faceless member of the criminal milieu, but instead with an ordinary citizen who claimed to be the victim of a frightening crime. The police cannot be faulted for acting upon the information received. [Sanducci, supra, 315 N.J. Super. at 482.] In State v. Lakomy, 126 N.J. Super. 430, 435 (App. Div. 1974), the court explained why a different rationale exists for establishing the reliability of named 'citizen-informers' as opposed to the traditional idea of unnamed police contacts or informers who usually themselves are criminals. Information given by the criminal informant is usually given in exchange for some concession, payment or simply out of revenge against the subject, whereas an ordinary citizen acts with an intent to aid the police in law enforcement because of his concern for society or for his own safety. He does not expect any gain or concession in exchange for his information. Lakomy, supra, 126 N.J. Super. at 435-36 (quoting State v. Paszek, 184 N.W.2d 836, 842-43 (Wis. 1971). Under the circumstances of this case, the officers properly placed substantial reliance on Gannon's statement. Gannon did not phone in an anonymous tip; rather, she waited at the scene and confirmed her report to police, conduct that eventually led to her also being named as a defendant in this suit. There was no allegation that Gannon reported the incident out of any motivation other than concern for Mrs. Wildoner's safety. Moreover, because this arrest occurred in a context where the reactive measures taken are for the limited purpose of neutralizing a dangerous situation, Lakomy, supra, 126 N.J. Super. at 436, the police appropriately relied on the report as a factor in their decision to arrest. That an officer may enjoy broad discretion in effecting an arrest to separate an alleged victim from an alleged perpetrator is illustrated by this Court's decision in Kirk, supra, 109 N.J. 173. The plaintiff in Kirk alleged that the defendant police detective had caused him to be arrested without probable cause in connection with the detective's investigation of the scalding of a three-year-old child. Kirk was arrested based on the Division of Youth and Family Service's investigation and a doctor's report that found the injuries to be of 'questionable origin.' Id. at 176. A month later, the detective spoke for the first time with the doctor and requested a more detailed report. The doctor informed the detective that the burns were accidental in nature, consistent with the plaintiff's initial written statement that the burns resulted from the breaking of a bathroom sink pipe. Id. at 177. The Court in Kirk recognized that [p]rior to filing the complaint, defendant made no attempt to interview either the child, the mother, Dr. Fuller or attending nurses, nor did she visit plaintiff's apartment or inquire whether photographs had been taken. Id. at 187. Nevertheless, the Court rejected the plaintiff's claim that Kirk was unreasonable in failing to investigate further or exercise due diligence. In so holding, the Court was mindful . . . that the investigation focused on the possibility of the scalding of a three-year-old child by a man living with the child's mother. Ibid. Under those circumstances, the Court concluded, the investigator had been objectively reasonable in promptly effecting the plaintiff's arrest. Similarly, the arrest in this case was effected for the principal purpose of removing the alleged perpetrator from the victim's presence and to allow the parties time to cool off. It is well documented that, for a number of reasons, victims of domestic violence often do not report their abuse to law enforcement officers. Many victims deny the abuse when questioned. According to estimates from National Crime Victimization Survey data, only fifty-six percent of battering incidents are reported to police. Understanding Violence Against Women 117 (Nancy A. Crowell & Ann W. Burgess, eds., 1996). Other research suggests that the reporting rate is even lower, and that as few as seven to fourteen percent of battering incidents are reported. Ibid. See also American Medical Association, When Someone You Love Hurts You, 280 JAMA 488 (1998) (estimating that as few as five percent of battered women are identified and treated by emergency department staff) . Accounts of concerned citizens -- often neighbors -- who have seen or heard domestic violence nearby, and who report it to the police, are therefore a crucial tool in combating domestic violence. Courts, too, have recognized that victims of domestic violence do not often report their abuse to law enforcement agencies. Indeed, this Court has noted the high incidence of unreported abuse [and that] . . . the FBI and other law enforcement experts believe that wife abuse is the most unreported crime in the United States. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 191 (1984). See also Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 198-99 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding police officers had acted reasonably in conducting limited search of premises of alleged domestic violence incident even though victim's statements suggested that she did not want police to pursue their investigation, the court finding that victim's statements were contradicted by neighbors' independent reports of dispute and that victim's statements were self-contradictory); United States v. Bartelho, 71 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 1995) (recognizing that the police were not required to take [the victim's] statements at face value, given her demeanor, their training regarding domestic violence, and [a neighbor's] report. ). See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing Domestic Violence 226-230 (1992) (discussing role of neighbors in reporting and countering domestic violence in chronic cases). We find that the failure of the victim and the alleged perpetrator to corroborate the allegations did not create a material issue of fact defeating probable cause. In certain cases, lack of corroboration can defeat the reliability of an informant's tip as a basis for probable cause. In the totality of circumstances here, however, Gannon's report was sufficient. She was plaintiff's neighbor who heard plaintiff yelling and threatening to throw knives at his wife, and she reported those specific details directly to the police. Moreover, although plaintiff and his wife did not corroborate Gannon's report to the police, the police were able to corroborate adequately the details of the report through their independent investigation. It is undisputed that when the police were at the apartment, they saw a knife in plain view and a red mark on Mrs. Wildoner's arm. Combined with Gannon's report, the officers had, at a minimum, an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. That the police acted in good faith is underscored by the fact that, unlike in Kirk, where the plaintiff remained incarcerated for four days until bail was posted, plaintiff was merely held until his son arrived to take him home, with no bail having been imposed. We find little merit in plaintiff's arguments that his physical condition precluded his being arrested because his wife, being in better physical condition, could have gotten away or physically resisted him before he inflicted any serious injury. As this Court has recognized, women in abusive situations do not always take measures to protect themselves, even when those measures appear to be self-evident and readily available. See Kelly, supra, 97 N.J. at 187 (recognizing admissibility of battered women's syndrome evidence). Moreover, the Wildoners have been married since 1945, and a pattern of spousal abuse could have been well entrenched by the time of this incident. Although the police officers did not know that at the time of the arrest, the deposition of Wildoner, Jr. confirms the history of abuse. Perpetrators of domestic violence can be found in all age, racial, socioeconomic, educational, occupational, and religious groups. . . . They do not fit into any specific personality diagnosis. The Maryland Institute for Continuing Professional Education of Lawyers, Inc., Domestic Violence Training Manual Chap. I, III. A. 1. (1995). As one doctor who has counseled hundreds of batterers has said: We just can't tell the perpetrators by looking at them. Donald G. Dutton with Susan K. Golant, The Batterer 5 (1995). The simple fact of plaintiff's physical condition thus does not indicate that he could not commit an act of domestic violence. Nor does his age. In one research study, the battered women interviewed ranged in age from seventeen to seventy-six, while the batterers ranged from sixteen to seventy-six. Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman 31, 36 (1979). Indeed, in 1997, there were 897 domestic violence assaults reported in New Jersey against elderly individuals 60 years of age or over. New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety, Fifteenth Annual Domestic Violence Offense Report 11 (1997). Of the 897 victims, 264 were assaulted by their spouses, and in 72" of these assaults, the victim was the wife. Id. There were also 268 reported cases of harassment by a spouse and, 69" of the time, the wife was the victim. Id. A factor crucial to determining whether the officers reasonably believed that they had probable cause here is the underlying incident of domestic violence. As a result of the Domestic Violence Act, police officers have received training in the procedures and enforcement of the Act in order to further the Legislature's intention to communicate the attitude that violent behavior may not be excused or tolerated. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-20 (mandating domestic violence training for police). In determining whether they have probable cause to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence, police must be able to rely on their training and knowledge of domestic violence, including the unwillingness of many victims to tell them what has happened, if the Act's goals are to be served. See Sanducci, supra, 315 N.J. Super. at 481 (noting that the common and specialized experience and work-a-day knowledge of police [officers] must be taken into account in determining whether police had probable cause) (quoting Contursi, supra, 44 N.J. at 431). The decision by police to arrest plaintiff was a valid judgment call that was consistent with the no tolerance policy of the Legislature regarding incidents of domestic violence. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE GARIBALDI's opinion. NO. A-74 ARTHUR WILDONER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. THE BOROUGH OF RAMSEY, RAMSEY POLICE DEPARTMENT, OFFICER KANE ZUHONE and OFFICER BRIAN O'DONAHUE, Defendants-Appellants, and HELEN GANNON and MARGARET DIEFERT, Defendants. DECIDED January 31, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz