Case Title: Bullen v. Brown

Citation: 535 So. 2d 76

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1988-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
535 So. 2d 76 (1988)
Judy BULLEN, executrix of the estate of Lois Brown, deceased, and Eulalia Brown
v.
Gene BROWN, et al.
87-74.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 29, 1988.
Rehearing Denied October 21, 1988.
Rebecca Lou Green, Red Bay, for appellants.
Lindsey Mussleman Davis of Holt, McKenzie, Holt & Mussleman, Florence, for appellees.
BEATTY, Justice.
Appeal by Judy Bullen, executrix of the estate of Lois Brown, deceased, and by Eulalia Brown, widow of Lois Brown, from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict in favor of the contestants of a document offered as Lois Brown's last will. We reverse and remand.
Brown died on April 16, 1986. On that date Judy Bullen filed in the probate court a petition for probate of the will, and the next day, April 17, 1986, she filed her petition for letters testamentary. Her letters were granted on May 2, 1986, and the will was admitted to probate on that date.
*77 Apparently a hearing was set in the probate court for May 29, 1986, and then postponed until June 23, 1986. On May 30, 1986, notices of the hearing set for June 23, 1986, were sent by certified mail to the heirs of Lois Brown, i.e., Linda Brewer, Gene Brown, and Mary Hall. That hearing, likewise, appears to have been postponed until August 6, 1986. The record does not reflect whether or not any notices of the new hearing date were sent to the above-named heirs. However, it is clear that they did know of that date because, on July 25, 1986, they filed in the probate court a motion for a continuance containing the following grounds:
Bullen filed an answer in opposition to that request, asserting that one postponement had already been accorded for the same purpose, and that a further continuance would work a hardship on the widow. The motion for a continuance was denied by the probate court on August 6, 1986. However, in the meantime, the above named heirs of Lois Brown, pursuant to Code of 1975, § 12-11-41, petitioned the probate court, and apparently the circuit court as well, for the removal of the estate on the ground that "the said estate can best be administered in the Circuit Court." See § 12-11-41. The circuit court, on August 5, 1986, ordered the removal, and on August 12, 1986, the probate court entered an order removing the estate to circuit court.
Then on December 15, 1986, Bullen, the executrix, moved the circuit court to set a hearing, citing as grounds the prior postponements and the resulting hardships sustained by the widow. Thereupon the circuit court set a scheduling conference for January 21, 1987. The ensuing order from that conference required that motions be filed on or before May 1, 1987, and set the trial date as May 11, 1987.
On April 22, 1987, the heirs of Lois Brown filed an amendment to their petition for removal by adding the following:
A later amendment to the "complaint" added this paragraph: "That the source of the undue influence on said Lois Brown was his wife, Eulalia Brown who overpowered the true wishes and desires of said Lois Brown."
Following the filing of that amendment, Bullen, the executrix, filed her motion to dismiss. Because the contents of that motion postulate the position of the proponents-appellants on this appeal, the pertinent parts of that motion are quoted below:
". . . .
"No Complaint was filed in this cause.
". . . .
". . . .
". . . .
". . . .
That motion was overruled, and the case proceeded to trial to a jury. A first trial resulted in a mistrial. A second trial resulted in a jury verdict finding against the will. Judgment was entered accordingly. No post-judgment motions were filed.
The controlling issue presented to us is whether or not the circuit court erred in overruling the proponents' motion to dismiss. We find that it did err.
The contestants-appellees contend that when they filed their motion for a continuance, quoted above, they "initially pled" in the probate court in accord with the Rules of Civil Procedure, and thus that the proponents were aware that a challenge of the will had been made.
Jurisdiction to entertain a will contest is conferred upon both the probate courts and the circuit courts by statute. Forrester v. Putman, 409 So. 2d 773 (Ala.1981).
If a will has been probated, one who has not therefore contested it may do so within six months after it has been probated by filing a complaint in circuit court under § 43-8-199:
It is clear that will contest jurisdiction, being statutorily conferred, must comply with the statutory language strictly in order to quicken jurisdiction of the appropriate court. Kaller v. Rigdon, 480 So. 2d 536 (Ala.1985); Ex Parte Stephens, 259 Ala. 361, 66 So. 2d 901 (1953).
How is a will contested under § 43-8-199? Construing a substantially similar predecessor to this statute, this Court stated in Barksdale v. Davis, 114 Ala. 623, 22 So. 17 (1897) (overruled on other grounds, Alexander v. Gibson, 176 Ala. 258, 57 So. 760 (1912)):
(Emphasis added.) 114 Ala. at 629-30, 22 So.  at 19. In Kaller, 480 So. 2d  at 538-39, this Court discussed the requirements under § 43-8-198 for a "demand" for a transfer at the time the contestant files his initial "pleading." That discussion is pertinent here:
These requirements for a pleading in the nature of a complaint in a will contest under § 43-8-198 find additional support in Simpson v. Jones, 460 So. 2d 1282, 1284-85 (Ala.1984), which discussed the requirements for bringing a will contest under § 43-8-199:
Now in this case the heirs filed a motion for a continuance in order to have an expert examine the purported signature of the testator. True, they stated in the motion that "the crucial issue ... is the validity of the will." Nevertheless, they did not attack the validity of the signature in that motion, nor did they in any other manner attack the validity of the will. They simply expressed a desire for a delay in the hearing to be held after the will had been probated. Thus, there was no contest of the will in the probate court when the heirs petitioned the circuit court on August 4, 1986, for the removal of the estate to circuit court on the ground that it "can best be administered" in that court, and the petition for removal itself was not a complaint. Neither the motion for a continuance nor the petition for transfer constituted a complaint, and thus, if § 43-8-199 was thought to authorize the heirs' action, nothing had been filed to toll the operation of the six-month limitation under that statute. If, on the other hand, §§ 43-8-190 and -198, were thought by the heirs to be applicable, no initial pleading in the form of a contest was made as required by statute.
Indeed, it was not until April 22, 1987, that the heirs alleged any grounds for contesting the will. They did this by amending their petition for removal, more than eleven months after the letters testamentary had been granted. But, as we have shown, there was no contest to amend, there having been no pleading filed as required by statute. Kaller; Simpson; Barksdale, supra. Hence, the statute of limitations contained in § 43-8-199 had run before the heirs' complaint was filed.
For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court must be, and it hereby is, reversed, and a judgment rendered for the proponents.
*81 REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.