Case Title: Skipworth v. Skipworth

Citation: 383 So. 2d 524

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1980-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
383 So. 2d 524 (1980)
Clarence SKIPWORTH, Parnell Skipworth, Elsie Gossett and Eva Joseph
v.
Mary Burke SKIPWORTH.
78-767.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 2, 1980.
*525 Noble J. Russell and Robert Straub, Decatur, for appellants.
Kenneth Shelton, Decatur, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
This appeal involves an application of Alabama's homestead laws.
The trial court, interpreting Alabama's homestead law, set aside to decedent's common-law wife [Skipworth v. Skipworth, 360 So. 2d 975 (Ala.1978)] a piece of property which was less than 160 acres in area, but was valued at more than $6,000. The trial court found that the property, a city lot on which were located improvements, was not the decedent's homestead; nevertheless, the trial judge set aside, in fee, the entire property to the surviving widow. The collateral heirs of the decedent, appellants here, claim that the trial court misapplied the law to the facts. We agree with their argument.
Many of the background facts are set out in the opinion on the prior appeal, Skipworth v. Skipworth, 360 So. 2d 975 (Ala.1978), but we set out a few in this opinion for a better understanding of the legal issue presented.
The evidence shows without question that when the decedent, Bill Skipworth, married Mary Burke, he owned and lived in the subject property on which he had claimed a homestead exemption. He and Mary lived there for a short time immediately after their marriage and ran a small shop in connection with the living quarters. They later moved to Mary's home at 604 Moulton Street in Decatur, where they lived for many years. Following this, they moved to a farm, also owned by Mary Burke, and they were living there at the time of Bill's death. Bill died intestate in October, 1976, without issue. His heirs at law, two brothers and two sisters (the appellants), contested Mary's petition to have the subject property set aside for her, in fee, as homestead property. The trial court heard all testimony ore tenus, and found as follows:
"4. The decedent left no Last Will and Testament.
The trial court concluded that "[t]he petitioner is entitled to have the suit property vest in her absolutely in fee simple under the statutes pertaining to homestead."
*526 The appellants admit that the findings of fact are amply supported by the evidence, but they contend that the trial court erroneously applied the law to those facts. The appellee, on the other hand, argues that the finding that "the suit property did not have the character of homestead" is palpably wrong, but that the trial court reached the correct result in setting aside the homestead in her favor.
The definition of "homestead property" was cogently discussed in Mordecai v. Scott, 294 Ala. 626, 320 So. 2d 642 (1975), when Chief Justice Heflin, writing for the Court, stated that:
"Where the trial court makes findings after hearing witnesses ore tenus, every presumption will be indulged in favor of the court's findings, and its findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are found to be palpably wrong." Russell v. Russell, 361 So. 2d 1053 (Ala.1978). We find that the evidence adduced at trial adequately supports the finding of the trial court that, at the time of Bill's death, the subject property did not have the character of a homestead. Cf. Garrett & Sons v. Jones, 95 Ala. 96, 10 So. 702 (1891).
Mordecai v. Scott, supra, does hold ". . . that a homestead of unlimited value vests absolutely in the eligible survivors where the homestead is all the real estate owned by decedent in the state at his death, decedent's estate owes no debts and the property has not been devised, provided it doesn't exceed 160 acres." In Mordecai, this Court construed the second sentence of what is now Code 1975, § 6-10-60 in context with Code 1975, § 6-10-62 to reach the result it reached. The rule of Mordecai, however, is based upon a finding that the subject property was, in fact, homestead property. In the instant case we have no such finding. In fact, we have a finding to the contrary; therefore, the rule of Mordecai is inapplicable.
In view of the fact that the trial court found that the suit property did not have the character of homestead, can its judgment setting aside the entire suit property be sustained? We hold that it cannot.
The law in effect at the date of the decedent's death provided that when a decedent has no homestead exempt to him at the time of death a surviving widow could have an exemption established as follows:
The legislature has made specific provision for carving out the homestead in cases such as this and for selling the property and paying the widow when carving out the homestead cannot be done. The trial court should have followed the procedure outlined in Code 1940 (Recomp.1958), Tit. 7, § 662.
Because the trial court erred in setting aside the entire property, in fee, to the widow as a homestead, the cause is due to be reversed and remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C. J., and JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.