Case Title: Walker v. Mason

Citation: 

Docket Number: 980345

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-01-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
MICHAEL J. WALKER 
 
v.  Record No. 980345     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 8, 1999 
DEWAYNE K. MASON 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Randall G. Johnson, Judge 
 
 
TAMARA S. WILLIAMS 
 
v.  Record No. 980568 
 
SHONA R. SIMMONS 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Walter W. Stout, III, Judge 
 
 
DEVEATA ANITA WALKER 
 
v.  Record No. 980254 
 
JACK CREASY 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AMHERST COUNTY 
J. Michael Gamble, Judge 
 
 
The three appeals addressed in this opinion involve the 
proper application of principles for determining whether a 
jury verdict is inadequate as a matter of law.  The trial 
court in each of these cases set aside the jury verdict 
relying on the principle enunciated in Bowers v. Sprouse, 254 
Va. 428, 492 S.E.2d 637 (1997). 
In Bowers, the jury returned a verdict in the exact 
amount of the special damages introduced by the plaintiff.  
The Court in Bowers reversed the trial court's denial of 
plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict, stating that "a 
jury award in a personal injury action which compensates a 
plaintiff for the exact amount of the plaintiff's medical 
expenses and other special damages is inadequate as a matter 
of law, irrespective of whether those damages were 
controverted."  Id. at 431, 492 S.E.2d at 639.  The basis of 
this rule is that a verdict for the exact amount of the 
plaintiff's medical expenses and special damages indicates 
that although the jury found the plaintiff was injured and had 
incurred special damages, the jury, for whatever reason, 
failed to compensate the plaintiff for any other items of 
damage.  Id., 492 S.E.2d at 638. 
This bright line rule is limited, however, to those 
factual situations in which the jury verdict is identical to 
the full amount of the special damages.  The rationale 
underlying the rule does not extend to an award which deviates 
from the amount of all the special damages claimed, even if 
the amount of the verdict corresponds to an identifiable 
portion of the special damages.  In such case, the bright line 
rule of Bowers cannot be applied.  
I.  Walker v. Mason, Record No. 980345
In Walker v. Mason, the plaintiff claimed special damages 
of $4,431. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $230, 
an amount equal to the amount of the hospital emergency room 
bill.  The trial court set the verdict aside, concluding that, 
 
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even though the verdict was not in the exact amount of all the 
special damages presented, the verdict was in the exact amount 
of a portion of the special damages, and that, under Bowers, 
"you just cannot have a verdict for the amount of specials."  
The trial court, applying the additur statute, Code § 8.01-
383.1(B)(1994)(amended 1998), entered judgment for $7,730. 
The trial court's application of Bowers was error for 
reasons previously stated.  The case of Doe v. West, 222 Va. 
440, 281 S.E.2d 850 (1981), is instructive under the 
circumstances presented here.  In Doe, the plaintiff sought to 
recover lost wages of $200 per week for 14 weeks.  The jury 
returned a verdict for $2,800 which the trial court calculated 
as the exact amount of the lost wages claimed by the 
plaintiff.  The trial court set aside the verdict, finding 
that it did not include any other items of damages that the 
jury was required to consider under the instructions given.  
In reversing the trial court, the Court in Doe stated that 
[t]he failure of the jury to return, from 
conflicting evidence, a verdict in a greater amount 
than the trial judge's calculation of West's lost 
wages does not justify the inference that the jury 
failed to consider all the elements of damages 
permitted under the court's instruction.  We cannot 
say that the verdict was based upon an unreasonable 
interpretation of the evidence, which was 
susceptible to different findings.  Under these 
circumstances, the trial court should not have set 
aside the first verdict.  See May v. Leach, 220 Va. 
472, 473-74, 260 S.E.2d 456, 457 (1979); Brown v. 
Huddleston, 213 Va. 146, 147, 191 S.E.2d 234, 235 
(1972).  
 
 
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222 Va. at 446, 281 S.E.2d at 853. 
As in Doe, whether the verdict in Walker v. Mason was 
inadequate depends on the evidence presented.  Here, the 
record shows that the extent of Walker's injuries was 
controverted.  His doctor, Leon J. Brown, Jr., testified that, 
other than muscle spasms in Walker's neck, there were no 
injuries which could be verified objectively.  Mason's 
injuries, as he described them to Dr. Brown, were pain and 
tenderness in his neck, back, and knee.  There were no 
contusions or swelling in the knee.  Dr. Brown prescribed an 
anti-inflammatory medication, a muscle relaxer, an analgesic 
cream and use of moist heat at home.  Dr. Brown eventually 
referred Mason to an orthopedic surgeon based on Mason's 
complaints about his knee.  Mason saw the surgeon on two 
occasions over the course of two months.  Physical therapy was 
also prescribed, although Mason testified that he had missed 
some of the appointments.  The record also reflects that Mason 
was playing basketball during this period. 
This record is susceptible to varying interpretations 
regarding the extent of the injuries and expenses proximately 
caused by the automobile accident and, therefore, we cannot 
say that the verdict was based on an unreasonable 
interpretation of the evidence or a failure to consider 
elements of damages under the court's instructions.  
 
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Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court 
and reinstate the jury verdict in the amount of $230.  
II.  Williams v. Simmons, Record No. 980568
In Williams v. Simmons, the plaintiff claimed special 
damages of medical bills and lost wages totaling $1,386.  The 
jury returned a verdict of $560, the amount of the lost wage 
claim.  In reviewing the adequacy of the verdict, the trial 
court stated that the amount of the jury verdict constituted a 
finding by the jury that the plaintiff was "entitled to be 
compensated for lost wages," which then "necessitated its 
finding that the plaintiff had suffered from her injuries."  
Citing Bowers, the trial court concluded that, because the 
jury found the injury compensable but did not return a verdict 
reflecting the plaintiff's pain, suffering, inconvenience, or 
medical bills, the verdict was inadequate as a matter of law.  
Relying on the additur statute, Code § 8.01-383.1(B)(1994)  
(amended 1998), the trial court entered judgment in favor of 
Simmons for $2,500. 
As indicated above, the trial court's reliance on Bowers 
was misplaced.  The amount of the jury verdict, although 
equivalent to the lost wages claimed, does not of itself 
justify the inference that the jury did not consider all the 
elements of the damage instruction.  In this case, while the 
jury necessarily accepted the plaintiff's version of the 
accident and defendant's negligence as a predicate for 
 
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awarding any damages, the testimony regarding the seriousness 
of the injuries and the damages suffered by the plaintiff as a 
result of the accident was subject to conflicting 
interpretations. 
Although the plaintiff described the impact in the 
accident as "pretty hard," the defendant maintained that it 
was only "[a] light bump."  Immediately following the 
accident, the plaintiff did not complain of any injury or seek 
medical care, but proceeded to attend a high school football 
game.  She testified that she had a stiff neck and back the 
next morning and that her chest hurt.  She took a non-
prescription pain medication and applied heat to the area of 
soreness.  The plaintiff testified that she went to a hospital 
emergency room the day after the accident.  She did not 
request any damages relating to this hospital visit. 
Eleven days after the accident, the plaintiff consulted 
Dr. William R. Mauck.  She did not tell him of her emergency 
room visit.  Dr. Mauck testified that the plaintiff had no 
objective symptoms.  He treated her for tenderness of the neck 
and lower back muscles and "guarding of motion," which he 
described as reluctance to move her neck and lower back to 
their full range of motion.  The chest pain of which the 
plaintiff also complained was an aggravation of a pre-existing 
chest condition.  Dr. Mauck prescribed rest, wet heat, a 
muscle relaxant, and electric heat treatment for the muscular 
 
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soreness and pain described by the plaintiff.  The plaintiff, 
a child care provider, continued working for two weeks 
following the accident, but did not work during the subsequent 
two weeks while under the care of Dr. Mauck. 
Based on this evidence, the jury was entitled to conclude 
that the plaintiff had not been injured as seriously as she 
claimed and, accordingly, elected to award a monetary amount 
commensurate with the damages it concluded were actually 
incurred.  While one may speculate as to the components of the 
damage amount awarded on this conflicting evidence, such 
speculation is not sufficient to warrant the conclusion, as a 
matter of law, that the jury did not consider all the elements 
of damage in reaching the amount of its verdict.  Doe v. West, 
222 Va. at 446, 281 S.E.2d at 853; see Richardson v. Braxton-
Bailey, 257 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (1999)(this day 
decided).  We cannot say that the verdict was based on an 
unreasonable interpretation of the evidence. 
Because the trial court erred in concluding that the 
verdict was inadequate as a matter of law, we will reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and reinstate the jury verdict of 
$560. 
III.  Walker v. Creasey, Record No. 980254
Finally, in Walker v. Creasey, the jury returned a 
verdict of $2,700, an amount that exceeded the special damages 
claimed by approximately $86.00.  The trial court set the 
 
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verdict aside.  It found that the jury had "rounded its 
verdict to the next higher one hundred dollars," and that, 
under the decision in Bowers, the verdict was inadequate as a 
matter of law because it is "for the amount of the 
compensatory medical expenses."  The trial court thus 
concluded that the jury failed to take into consideration 
other elements of damage as instructed.  Relying on Code § 
8.01-383.1(B)(1994)(amended 1998), the trial court entered 
judgment for $5,000 in favor of Creasy. 
The facts of this case, however, do not bring it within 
the ambit of the narrow rule promulgated in Bowers, and the 
trial court erred in setting aside the verdict on that basis.  
As pointed out by Walker, the facts in this case are similar 
to Dinwiddie v. Hamilton, 201 Va. 348, 111 S.E.2d 275 (1959).  
In that case, the jury verdict exceeded the claimed special 
damages by $761.  The Court in Dinwiddie affirmed the jury 
verdict, stating that compensation for pain and suffering is 
within the discretion of the jury and "no mere difference of 
opinion of the trial judge, however decided, will justify an 
interference with their verdict, unless it appears from the 
record that the jury has been influenced by partiality or 
prejudice, or have been misled by some mistaken view of the 
merits of the case."  Id. at 352, 111 S.E.2d at 278.  There is 
nothing in the record in the instant case which would support 
a conclusion that the jury's verdict was the result of 
 
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improper influence or a mistaken view of the merits of the 
case. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and enter judgment reinstating the original jury verdict 
of $2,700. 
IV.  Summary 
In summary, we conclude that the trial court in each of 
the cases improperly applied the rule set out in Bowers.  When 
the jury verdict is not in the exact amount of all the special 
damages claimed, Bowers is not applicable, and the trial court 
must review the evidence under traditional principles relating 
to the adequacy of jury verdicts.  See, e.g., Bradner v. 
Mitchell, 234 Va. 483, 362 S.E.2d 718 (1987), and cases cited 
therein.  In light of our disposition of these cases, we need 
not address issues raised with regard to the imposition of 
additur under Code § 8.01-383.1(B). 
Record No. 980345 — Reversed and final judgment. 
Record No. 980568 — Reversed and final judgment. 
Record No. 980254 — Reversed and final judgment.
 
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