Case Title: Ferguson v. Coronado Oil Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93-164

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-11-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ferguson v. Coronado Oil Co.1994 WY 127884 P.2d 971Case Number: 93-164, 93-165Decided: 11/14/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Darry A. 
FERGUSON,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

CORONADO OIL COMPANY, a 
Colorado corporation,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

CORONADO OIL COMPANY, a 
Colorado corporation,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Darry A. FERGUSON, 
individually; Petrocarbon Energy Corporation, a Colorado corporation, for itself 
and as successor-by-merger to Pioneer Engineering Corporation, a Colorado 
corporation; Pioneer Engineering Corporation, formerly known as Engineering 
Operators, Inc., a Colorado corporation,

Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Appeal from District 
Court, Weston County, Terrence L. O'Brien, J.

 

Representing 
Appellant/Appellee Ferguson:

Tim Newcomb of Grant 
& Newcomb, Cheyenne, and Dana L. Eismeier of Burns, Figa & Will, 
Englewood, CO.

Representing 
Appellee/Appellant Coronado:

David D. Uchner, 
Cheyenne, and Peter A. Bjork and Gregory R. Danielson of Bjork, Seavy, Lindley 
& Danielson, Denver, CO.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE*, MACY and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

CARDINE, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1]      These 
consolidated appeals are the result of a dispute between an operator of an oil 
field and a non-operator net profits interest owner. Darry A. Ferguson 
(Ferguson) appeals a jury verdict resulting in an award of $611,138.00 for 
conversion of Coronado Oil Company's (Coronado) net profits and $600,000.00 in 
exemplary damages. Ferguson challenges the appropriateness of an action for 
conversion in the context of a net profits agreement. Ferguson also asserts that 
the damages award should be reduced because of Coronado's failure to comply with 
a provision of the agreement. Coronado cross-appeals claiming that the district 
court failed to apply the correct interest rate to the damages 
award.

[¶2]      We affirm in 
part, reverse in part and remand.

[¶3]      In his appeal, 
No. 93-164, Ferguson frames the issues for review as follows:

Issue I: Conversion claim 
cannot lie because Coronado has no interest in the subject of 
conversion.

Issue II: Damages limited 
by Coronado's failure to provide written exceptions as required by 
agreement.

Coronado raises 
two issues in its appeal, No. 93-165:

1. Whether the Trial 
Court erred in dismissing the Plaintiff's and Cross-Appellant's fraud claim 
against the Defendants;

2. Whether the Trial 
Court erred in holding that Wyoming Statute §§ 30-5-301 to 305 (1992 Cum.Supp.) 
does not apply to the net profits interest owned by Coronado.

 

FACTS

[¶4]      In the mid 1950s, 
Coronado began to explore the possibility of utilizing waterflood operations to 
exploit the Osage oil field (the field) near Newcastle, Wyoming. Experimental 
projects indicated that the field was conducive to such operations. At the time, 
however, Coronado did not have the financial resources to fully capitalize on 
the field's potential. So Coronado sought an alliance with a company which did 
have the financial capability.

[¶5]      On July 23, 1968, 
Coronado entered into an agreement with Buttes Gas and Oil Company (Buttes). 
Coronado conveyed all of its interests in the underlying leases to Buttes while 
retaining a 50 percent, later reduced to 47.5 percent, interest in the net 
profits of any oil produced. In return, Buttes was to be the operator of the 
waterflood project. Buttes was to remit on a monthly basis the net profits, if 
any, to Coronado, determined in accordance with the accounting practices 
promulgated by the Council of Petroleum Accountants Societies of North America, 
which was an addendum to the agreement. Buttes was allowed to deduct certain 
expenses from the oil proceeds, limited to its actual costs. Buttes was not 
supposed to make any profit by virtue of the fact that it was the operator; 
profits were to be derived solely from the actual production of oil.

[¶6]      The agreement 
contains two other provisions which are relevant. First, Coronado retained the 
right to audit the operator's books to ensure that all expenses charged were 
legitimate. Second, Coronado had to make a written exception to any monthly 
statement from the operator within 24 months after the end of the calendar year 
in which the statement was received or the statement was presumed 
correct.

[¶7]      In 1980, Buttes 
sold its interest to Petro Lewis Oil Corporation (Petro Lewis). Petro Lewis ran 
the operation until 1985 when Petrocarbon Energy (Petrocarbon) bought its 
interest. Under Buttes and Petro Lewis's operation, Coronado received payments 
of net profits for 168 consecutive months.

[¶8]      At the time 
Petrocarbon purchased the Osage field operations, Ferguson was the president, 
treasurer, a director and owned 95 percent of the stock of the company. 
Petrocarbon contracted with Pioneer Engineering Corporation (Pioneer) to do the 
actual field operations. Pioneer was subsequently merged into Petrocarbon. A new 
corporation, Engineering Operators, Inc., was formed, and it took over Pioneer's 
field operations. Later, Engineering Operators was renamed Pioneer Engineering 
Corporation. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to these entities 
collectively as "Pioneer." Ferguson owned 100 percent of Pioneer's 
stock.

[¶9]      Coronado received 
net profits payments for the first three months of Petrocarbon's operation. 
Coronado never received another payment. The operating expenses charged by 
Petrocarbon increased dramatically at that time. For example, Petrocarbon's 
expenses for the first fourteen months of operations averaged $85,503.05 per 
month while Petro Lewis, during the last eleven months of its operation, 
averaged $60,000.00 per month. The result was a net loss which, according to the 
terms of the agreement, was carried on to the next month. Through 1988 the 
cumulative net loss was over $300,000.

[¶10]   Coronado unsuccessfully attempted 
to alleviate its concerns about the expenses being charged. As required by the 
agreement, Coronado took written exceptions to the charges of November and 
December of 1985. Coronado also requested an audit of Petrocarbon's and 
Pioneer's books. Ferguson refused to allow an audit of Pioneer's books because, 
he claimed, Pioneer was a separate company, not subject to the provisions of the 
agreement.

[¶11]   An audit was conducted by Maupin 
& Associates (Maupin) in February of 1990. Maupin was allowed access only to 
Petrocarbon's books and only for 1988 and 1989. Maupin found numerous financial 
irregularities which led it to conclude that Petrocarbon had used its related 
entity, Pioneer, to circumvent the requirement of charging only costs. Maupin 
also concluded that Petrocarbon had double charged expenses and had included 
expenses which were not properly chargeable. It was also discovered that 
Petrocarbon did not repay Pioneer for expenses charged to Petrocarbon although 
the expenses were being passed on to Coronado.

[¶12]   Later, during the discovery 
process, Maupin was able to audit Pioneer's books which permitted a precise 
calculation of Petrocarbon's overcharges. The final tally was a total of 
$2,194,292 in overcharges by Petrocarbon. Maupin recalculated the monthly net 
profits and concluded that Petrocarbon should have remitted to Coronado $508,000 
as of June 1991.

[¶13]   In September of 1990, Coronado 
filed this action against Ferguson, Petrocarbon and Pioneer in the District 
Court for Weston County, Wyoming. In its second amended complaint, Coronado made 
claims for relief based on breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, 
negligence, fraud, conversion and alter ego liability. Coronado also requested 
an accounting, appointment of a receiver and imposition of a constructive trust. 
Coronado's claims on breach of fiduciary duty, negligence and fraud were 
ultimately dismissed by the court.

[¶14]   Pioneer failed to appear, and 
default was entered against it. After trial, a jury returned a verdict against 
Ferguson and Petrocarbon. The jury found that Petrocarbon and Pioneer were 
acting as the alter egos of Ferguson. The jury awarded damages of $611,138 on 
the conversion claim and $600,000 for exemplary damages. The judge then awarded 
Coronado $107,891.34 in interest. Based on the alter ego finding, Petrocarbon, 
Pioneer and Ferguson are jointly and severally liable for all damages. Only 
Ferguson has chosen to appeal to this court. Coronado appeals the adequacy of 
the interest award.

ISSUES

A. 
Ferguson's Appeal

1. 
Conversion

[¶15]   Ferguson makes two arguments which 
are directed at the appropriateness of a conversion action under these 
circumstances. First, Ferguson argues that a net profits interest is not a 
property interest but contractual in nature. Since only property can be 
converted, Ferguson concludes that Coronado's interest was not susceptible of 
being converted. Second, Ferguson argues money cannot be converted unless it is 
in a form which is tangible, identifiable and segregated. Ferguson maintains 
that the money due Coronado under the net profits agreement fails to meet that 
criteria.

[¶16]   "Conversion is defined as any 
distinct act by dominion wrongfully executed over one's property in denial of 
his right or inconsistent with it." Western Nat'l Bank of Casper v. 
Harrison, 577 P.2d 635, 640 (Wyo. 1978). Essentially, conversion occurs when 
a person treats another's property as his own, denying the true owner the 
benefits and rights of ownership. Frost v. Eggeman, 638 P.2d 141, 144 
(Wyo. 1981). To establish a cause of action in conversion a plaintiff must show 
that:

(1) he had legal title to 
the converted property; (2) he either had possession of the property or the 
right to possess it at the time of the conversion; (3) the defendant exercised 
dominion over the property in a manner which denied the plaintiff his rights to 
use and enjoy the property; (4) in those cases where the defendant lawfully, or 
at least without fault, obtained possession of the property, the plaintiff made 
some demand for the property's return which the defendant refused; and (5) the 
plaintiff has suffered damage by the loss of the property.

Frost, at 144; see also De 
Clark v. Bell, 10 Wyo. 1, 7, 65 P. 852, 853 (1901). Only personal property 
(chattel) can be converted. Restatement, Second, of Torts § 222A (1965); 
see H.D. Warren, Annotation, Nature of property or rights other than tangible 
chattels which may be subject of conversion, 44 A.L.R.2d 927, 936 (1955); De 
Clark.

[¶17]   We address Ferguson's contention 
that a net profits interest is not a property interest first, since, if Ferguson 
is correct, Coronado's interest could not have been converted in the first 
place. In Young v. Young, 709 P.2d 1254 (Wyo. 1985), we held that oil and 
gas royalties, which are wrongfully withheld, may be recovered through a 
conversion action. We noted that after oil and gas has been brought to the 
surface it becomes personal property and therefore the plaintiff 

had a property right in 
the severed oil and gas and to royalties, arising out of the proceeds from their 
sale, paid as a money equivalent of the property interest.

Young, at 1257. Ferguson 
attempts to distinguish Young by pointing out the difference between a 
royalty interest and a net profits interest. Ferguson argues that a royalty 
interest is a property interest because the owner of the interest has the option 
of taking his royalty in kind, thus giving him a possessory right in the oil and 
gas itself, which, as personal property, is subject to conversion. A net profits 
interest is not a property interest, Ferguson argues, because it is an interest 
in money due under a contract; it does not give the interest holder any right to 
take oil or gas in kind. Since a net profits interest is not a property 
interest, Ferguson theorizes that it cannot be converted.

[¶18]   Unfortunately, the law in regard to 
net profits interests is not well developed. A leading treatise describes it 
thusly:

[T]here is not a large 
body of law clearly defining the net profits interest, its nature, and its 
incidents. The only thing that can be said with any assurance is that a net 
profits interest may or may not be an interest in land and that the nature of 
the interest and the rights of its owner must be determined from the provisions 
of the instrument which created it.

* * * * * *

Regarding the nature of 
the interest that might be created, there are at least four [sic] realistic 
possibilities: (1) it can be a contractual right that is personal to the 
parties, (2) it can be a covenant running with the land or with a lease, (3) it 
can be a charge on the land, (4) it can create a lease or a sublease, or (5) it 
can be a separately identifiable property interest with its own recognized 
incidents.

5 Kuntz, Oil 
and Gas, § 63.5 (1991). While the cases focus on the specific agreement at 
issue, two general considerations can be stated: (1) a net profits interest in 
an oil and gas lease has no independent meaning, and (2) its nature is 
determined from the instrument creating the interest. Christy v. Petrol 
Resources Corp., 102 N.M. 58, 691 P.2d 59, 62 (App. 1984).

[¶19]   We now turn to the instrument which 
created Coronado's net profits interest. The agreement provides in relevant 
part:

3(a) Subject only to 
acceptance of title by Buttes as provided in Section 2 above, Coronado agrees to 
sell, convey, assign, transfer and set over to Buttes, and Buttes agrees to 
purchase and receive from Coronado for the consideration hereafter stated, all 
of the right, title, interest, claim and demand of Coronado in and under each of 
the Exhibit "A" Leases * * *. The sale and transfer of its interests by Coronado 
to Buttes shall be subject to * * * the reservation of net profits to Coronado 
hereafter provided[.]

* * * * * *

5. Coronado shall be 
entitled to except and reserve in its assignments of Exhibit "A" Leases under 
Section 3(a) above an interest equal to 50% of the net profits realized by 
Buttes from all operations on the Exhibit "A" Leases subsequent to the effective 
date and time hereafter set forth. Net profits shall be computed on the basis of 
the gross proceeds of oil, gas, casinghead gas and other hydrocarbons produced, 
saved and sold from the Exhibit "A" Leases[.]

Initially, we 
can conclude that the interest reserved by Coronado is not a mineral interest 
which is an interest in real property. Picard v. Richards, 366 P.2d 119, 
123 (Wyo. 1961). Oil and gas is real property while it remains in the ground. 
State ex rel. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 163, 187, 212 P. 758, 
762 (1923). Nothing in the agreement purports or can be read to give Coronado 
title to the minerals while they are in situs or the right to bonus and delay 
rentals, the traditional indicia of a mineral interest. Picard, at 
123.

[¶20]   Having eliminated one possibility, 
we are left with two others: the interest may be contractual in nature or a 
personal property right. We conclude that the interest reserved by Coronado in 
the agreement is akin to a separate identifiable personal property 
right.

[¶21]   Coronado's net profit interest 
entitles it to a share of the proceeds from production in the oil and gas field. 
That interest is similar to a non-participating royalty interest. See 
generally 1 Kuntz, Oil and Gas, § 16.2 (1987). A non-participating 
royalty is a right to or an interest in oil and gas only after it has been 
removed from the ground. Id. Instruments using the phrase "oil and gas 
produced and saved" have been construed as creating a royalty interest. 
Id. Coronado's interest also gives it the right to share in the proceeds 
of the oil and gas only after it has been removed. Further, the instrument 
creating that interest uses the phrase "hydrocarbons produced, saved and sold," 
which is similar to the language used to create a non-participating royalty. 
Id. Coronado's net profits interest is analogous to a non-participating 
royalty interest. See Kumberg v. Kumberg, 232 Kan. 692, 659 P.2d 823, 830 
(1983) (net profits interests are in the nature of "royalty interests" 
constituting personal property); T-Vestco Litt-Vada v. Lu-Cal One Oil 
Co., 651 S.W.2d 284, 295 (Tex. App. 1983) (a "net profits reversionary 
interest" created a royalty or a similar non-possessory interest in the mineral 
estate).

[¶22]   Having found that Coronado's 
interest is similar to a royalty interest, we must address a possible conflict 
in our prior cases before determining whether Coronado's interest is a personal 
property interest. As we have already discussed, in Young we concluded 
that the proceeds due an overriding royalty interest holder could be the subject 
of a conversion action. However, in Dame v. Mileski, 80 Wyo. 156, 170, 
340 P.2d 205, 208 (1959), which was not cited in Young, we held that an 
overriding royalty interest was an interest in real property and the plaintiff 
could thus maintain an action to quiet title. Since real property cannot be 
converted, these cases seemingly conflict. See also Torgeson v. Connelly, 
348 P.2d 63, 68 (Wyo. 1959) (a royalty interest in a lease with an indefinite 
term of duration is an interest in real property); Denver Joint Stock Land 
Bank v. Dixon, 57 Wyo. 523, 539, 122 P.2d 842, 848 (1942) 
(same).

[¶23]   The cases can, however, be 
reconciled. Torgeson, Dame and Denver Joint Stock involved quiet 
title actions where the existence of the royalties was in dispute. Thus the 
dispute was over the ownership of proceeds from minerals which were still in the 
ground and real property. This case and Young involve the disposition of the 
proceeds due to the royalty (or net profits) owner after the oil and gas has 
been removed from the ground and sold. Once the oil and gas were removed, they 
became personal property. Denver Joint Stock, 57 Wyo. at 533, 122 P.2d  at 
845. In discussing the nature of a lessor's royalty interest, the Kansas court 
of appeals commented:

The lessor reserves his 
rights to royalty out of the grant. His rights arise from his ownership of the 
real estate rather than the lease and are therefore interests in real estate 
until the oil and gas are captured. It follows then that future royalty 
(unaccrued royalty) is a part of the real estate of the lessor; it is uncaptured 
and of an undetermined amount or location. Present royalty (accrued royalty) on 
the other hand, is captured and severed from the realty; it is personal 
property.

Matter of 
Estate of Sellens, 7 Kan. App. 2d 48, 637 P.2d 483, 486 (1981); see also United States v. Noble, 237 U.S. 74, 80, 
35 S. Ct. 532, 535, 59 L. Ed. 844 (1915) ("The rents and royalties were profit 
issuing out of the land. When they accrued, they became personal property; but 
rents and royalties to accrue were a part of the estate remaining in the 
lessor.").

[¶24]   We hold that Coronado's net profits 
interest is analogous to a royalty interest and since it has accrued, the 
interest is personal property. Contrary to Ferguson's contention, this was the 
key to the holding in Young; not that the royalty owner had a 
theoretical, but impractical, right to take the minerals in kind. In Young 
the plaintiff was seeking the monetary value of past royalties which were 
wrongfully withheld by the defendant. Young, at 1255-56. Coronado is 
seeking the same thing. Young, therefore, is dispositive; and Coronado's 
interest was susceptible to conversion by Ferguson. 

[¶25]   Ferguson next argues that the money 
owed to Coronado under the agreement was not sufficiently identifiable, tangible 
or segregated to be subject to a conversion. That money may be the subject of a 
conversion action is an old and well established legal principle. See 
Annotation, 44 A.L.R.2d at 929 (citing cases). The money must be identifiable, 
though specific coins or bills do not have to be identified. 89 C.J.S. Trover 
& Conversion § 23 (1955); 7 Stuart M. Speiser et al., The American 
Law of Torts § 24:6 (1990); Estate of Jackson v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 676 F. Supp. 1142, 1146 (S.D.Ala. 1987). There must also be an 
obligation to deliver that money in a specific manner. Richardson's 
Restaurants, Inc. v. Nat'l Bank of South Carolina, 304 S.C. 289, 403 S.E.2d 669, 672 (App. 1991); Intermarkets U.S.A., Inc. v. C-E Natco, 749 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tex. App. 1988); Autoville, Inc. v. Friedman, 20 Ariz. App. 89, 
91, 510 P.2d 400, 402 (1973).

[¶26]   Once again, we find Young to 
be dispositive. Like the wife in that case, Coronado was entitled to a 
percentage of the oil and gas produced on the property. Coronado was entitled to 
that money each month. The precise amount owed to Coronado was easily 
determinable at the time it was due. Ferguson wrongfully retained that money and 
converted it to his own use through his elaborate accounting scheme. An oil and 
gas royalty is amenable to an action in conversion when it accrues and is then 
wrongfully retained. Young, at 1257-58. At the moment of accrual, the 
amount owed to the interest holder is identifiable with a concomitant obligation 
on behalf of the non-interest holder to pay the amount in the manner specified 
in the agreement. See W.S. 30-5-301(a).

[¶27]   Since we have already determined 
that Coronado's interest is identical to a royalty, it follows that its interest 
was just as capable of conversion. The district court did not err in allowing 
Coronado to bring an action in conversion.

2. Contract 
Defense

[¶28]   The agreement required Coronado to 
take a written exception to any monthly statement within 24 months after the end 
of the calendar year in which the statement was received or the statement was 
presumed correct. Ferguson argues that Coronado failed to take a written 
exception for the months between January 1986 and December 1988. Therefore, 
Ferguson contends, the statements were presumed correct and Coronado should not 
be able to obtain damages for those months.

[¶29]   Both parties vigorously contest 
whether Coronado did indeed comply with the exception requirement. We need not, 
however, decide that question because we conclude that the contract defense is 
unavailable to defeat an action in tort.

Where the transaction 
complained of has its origin in a contract which places the parties in such a 
relation that in attempting to perform the promised service the tort was 
committed, the breach of contract is not the gravamen of the action. The 
contract in such case is mere inducement, creating the state of things which 
furnishes the occasion of the tort, and in all such cases the remedy is an 
action ex delicto, and not an action ex contractu.

Schneider 
Nat'l, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 586 
(Wyo. 1992) (quoting 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 732 (1991)). 
Coronado's action was in tort, not contract. The exceptions clause in the 
contract is unavailable to defeat or mitigate Coronado's damages arising out of 
the tort committed by Ferguson.

B. 
Coronado's Appeal

[¶30]   Coronado raises two issues on 
appeal. The first is whether the district court erred in dismissing Coronado's 
fraud claim. We need not address this issue since we have upheld the jury award 
based on conversion.

[¶31]   The second issue is whether the 
district court erred by not applying the statutory interest rate of 18 percent. 
Coronado argues that W.S. 30-5-301 to -305 are applicable to the net profits 
interest entitling it to an interest rate of 18 percent on the unpaid proceeds. 
We agree and reverse and remand for a recalculation of the appropriate interest. 

The Royalty Payment Act 
[W.S. 30-5-301 to -305] is a remedial statute intended "to stop oil producers 
from retaining other people's money for their own use." [Independent 
Producers Marketing Corp. v.] Cobb, 721 P.2d [1106,] 1110 [(Wyo. 1986)]. * * 
* Equity is not a factor for consideration because there are no exceptions in 
the Act providing justification for royalty nonpayment.

Cities Serv. 
Oil & Gas Corp. v. State, 838 P.2d 146, 156 (Wyo. 
1992). The Act is to be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose. 
Moncrief v. Harvey, 816 P.2d 97, 105 (Wyo. 1991).

The relevant portions of 
the Act provide: The proceeds derived from the sale of production from any 
well producing oil, gas or related hydrocarbons in the state of Wyoming shall be 
paid to all persons legally entitled thereto, except as hereinafter 
provided, commencing not later than six (6) months after the first day of the 
month following the date of first sale and thereafter not later than sixty (60) 
days after the end of the calendar month within which subsequent production is 
sold, unless other periods or arrangements for the first and subsequent payments 
are provided for in a valid contract with the person or persons entitled to such 
proceeds. Payment shall be made directly to the person or persons entitled 
thereto by the lessee or operator or by any party who assumes such payment 
obligation under any legal arrangement.

W.S. 30-5-301(a) 
(1983) (emphasis added).

Any lessee or operator, 
purchaser or other party legally responsible for payment who violates the 
provisions of this article is liable to the person or persons legally entitled 
to proceeds from production for the unpaid amount of such proceeds, plus 
interest at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum on the unpaid principal 
balance from the due date specified in W.S. 30-5-301(a).

W.S. 30-5-303(a) 
(1994 Cum.Supp.).

[¶32]   The statute unambiguously requires 
the party who has the legal obligation to pay any proceeds from the production 
of an oil or gas well to make the payments in accordance with either the time 
set out in the statute or within a time frame established by a legal agreement 
between the parties. Failure to do so results in liability for the amount of the 
unpaid proceeds plus 18 percent per annum interest. There are no exceptions. 
Cities Serv., at 156.

[¶33]   The net profits owed to Coronado 
are "proceeds derived from the sale of production from any well producing oil * 
* *." W.S. 30-5-301(a). The agreement provided that the net profits were to be 
"computed on the basis of the gross proceeds of oil * * * produced, saved and 
sold from * * *" the field. Ferguson did not remit Coronado's share of the 
proceeds as required; the statute mandates an interest rate of 18 percent on the 
delinquent amount.

CONCLUSION

[¶34]   The net profits interest owned by 
Coronado was personal property that was converted by Ferguson. Since conversion 
is an action in tort, Ferguson could not rely upon a defense in contract to 
defeat or limit Coronado's damages. Finally, Ferguson is liable for 18 percent 
interest on the proceeds he failed to pay Coronado.

[¶35]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part 
and remanded for the recalculation of damages based on the 18 percent interest 
rate.

 

FOOTNOTES

*Retired July 
6, 1994.