Case Title: Candido v. Polymers, Inc.

Citation: 166 Vt. 15, 687 A.2d 476

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Candido v. Polymers, Inc.  (95-590); 166 Vt. 15; 687 A.2d 476

[Filed 08-Nov-1996]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 95-590

Tammy Candido                                     Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Addison Superior Court

Polymers, Inc.                                    June Term, 1996

Matthew I. Katz, J.

James A. Dumont and Sandra M. Lee of Keiner & Dumont, P.C., Middlebury, for
  plaintiff-appellant

Susan J. Flynn and Karen McAndrew of Dinse, Erdmann, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C.,
  Burlington, for defendant-appellee

PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Martin, Super. J.,
          Specially Assigned

       GIBSON, J.   Plaintiff Tammy Candido appeals from an order of the
  Addison Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant
  Polymers, Inc. on Candido's negligence claims.  Candido contends that the
  court erred in finding her, a worker hired through a temporary employment
  agency, Polymers's borrowed servant, and that her common-law claims are
  therefore barred under the employer-immunity provision of the Workers'
  Compensation Act, 21 V.S.A. § 622.  We affirm, but on the basis that
  Polymers qualifies as Candido's "employer" and Candido qualifies as
  Polymers's "employee" under the statutory language.

       Polymers is a manufacturer of commercial brush fibers.  In March 1992,
  Candido inquired about employment opportunities at Polymers's factory in
  Middlebury and was told to submit an application to TAD Technical Services
  Corp. (TAD), an employment agency that had a contract with Polymers to
  provide temporary workers.  Candido submitted an application to TAD, which
  hired her and assigned her to work at Polymers's Middlebury plant.

       The contract between Polymers and TAD provided that TAD would "[a]ct
  as `The

 

  Employer' for hiring and employing temporary workers," but that Polymers
  reserved the right to disapprove applicants recommended by TAD.  Under the
  contract, TAD established the pay rate of temporary workers and completed
  "all wage and hour documents as the temporary workers will be on [TAD's]
  payroll."  TAD also provided temporary workers with hazard communication
  training using Polymers's "Hazard Communication Program."  Polymers's role
  under the contract was to "[p]rovide TAD with a pool of recommended
  applicants and notify them of temporary employment needs."  Polymers
  established work schedules, provided job and safety training, supervised
  the temporary workers, and could request replacement of an unsatisfactory
  worker.

       According to the deposition testimony of Martin Thompson, who signed
  the contract on behalf of Polymers, Polymers did not pay workers'
  compensation insurance premiums for temporary workers, but instead required
  during contract negotiations that TAD provide liability coverage and
  workers' compensation coverage for temporary workers.  Thompson further
  stated his belief that the "upcharge" that Polymers paid to TAD included
  the cost of workers' compensation coverage provided by TAD to temporary
  workers.

       On April 25, 1993, while working at Polymers's plant, Candido cut her
  knee and suffered temporary total loss and permanent partial loss of use of
  her leg.  Candido sought and obtained workers' compensation benefits from
  TAD and then commenced a tort action in superior court against Polymers and
  the supervisor who had overseen her training and work.

       Polymers moved for summary judgment, arguing that, as Candido's
  employer under both the statutory definition of "employer" in Vermont's
  Workers' Compensation Act, 21 V.S.A. § 601(3), and the "borrowed servant"
  doctrine, it was entitled to the employer-immunity provisions of 21 V.S.A.
  § 622.  The superior court found that Candido was Polymers's "borrowed
  servant" and granted summary judgment in favor of Polymers.

       We review a grant of summary judgment using the same standard as the
  superior court. Madden v. Omega Optical, Inc., 7 Vt. L.W. 187, 187 (1996). 
  Summary judgment is

 

  appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
  admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
  is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled
  to a judgment as a matter of law."  V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3).  In determining
  whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we take as true the facts
  as alleged by the nonmoving party, Andrew v. State, 7 Vt. L.W. 178, 179
  (1996), and give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable doubts
  and inferences.  Wilcox v. Village of Manchester Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
  159 Vt. 193, 196, 616 A.2d 1137, 1138 (1992).

       The parties dispute whether Polymers was Candido's employer for
  workers' compensation purposes.  We agree with the superior court that
  summary judgment for Polymers was appropriate in this case, but employ
  different reasoning.  See Ross v. Times Mirror, Inc., ___ Vt. ___, ___,