Case Title: Logan v. Kuhn's Big K Corp.

Citation: 676 S.W.2d 948

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1984-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
676 S.W.2d 948 (1984) George Randy LOGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KUHN'S BIG K CORPORATION, Jo Ann Ross and Ann Patrick, Defendants-Appellants. Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville. September 17, 1984. *949 Hugh C. Howser, Nashville, for plaintiff-appellee. William Cragg, Nashville, for defendants-appellants. BROCK, Justice. In this action for damages for malicious prosecution the trial judge at the conclusion of all the evidence directed a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded for a new trial. We granted discretionary review. The pertinent facts in this case have been stated by the Court of Appeals: The offense with which the plaintiff was charged by the defendants is defined in T.C.A., § 39-3-1124, as follows: T.C.A., § 39-3-1124, is augmented and clarified by T.C.A., § 39-3-1125, which provides as follows: The trial judge cited the last quoted statute in directing a verdict for the defendants, finding that as a matter of law the plaintiff had concealed articles of the defendants' goods within the meaning of T.C.A., § 39-3-1125, and, therefore, that the evidence showed, as a matter of law, that defendants acted with probable cause in procuring the plaintiff's arrest and prosecution. The Court of Appeals disagreed with that conclusion of the trial judge and, accordingly, *951 reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded for a new trial. We agree with that disposition of the case by the Court of Appeals but granted review to consider questions raised by the opinion of the Court of Appeals. In its opinion in this case the Court of Appeals expressed its disapproval of the opinion of this Court in Lewis v. Williams, Tenn., 618 S.W.2d 299 (1981), Justice Drowota dissenting. However, we continue to adhere to the views expressed by Mr. Justice Cooper, writing for the Court, in Lewis v. Williams, supra. Thus, we reiterate: Likewise, we reaffirm the following statements from the Lewis v. Williams opinion, to wit: In conducting further proceedings in the instant case and in other malicious prosecution cases the courts of this state should apply the teachings of Lewis v. Williams, supra. It is our opinion that, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, as we are required to do in determining a motion for directed verdict, it was error for the trial court to direct a verdict for defendants in this case. Thus, defendants assert that the plaintiff was heading for the exit when he was apprehended but the plaintiff's insistence is that he was still in the aisle shopping and had not gone toward the door nor was he anywhere close thereto when he was apprehended. This constitutes an important dispute in the evidence bearing upon the question of the plaintiff's criminal intent and upon the issue of probable cause; it is an issue which should have been determined by the jury. Also pertinent to these issues was the fact that the sack into which the plaintiff placed his proposed purchases of deodorant and chewing gum had been supplied to him by the defendant's employee upon plaintiff's entry to the store. Moreover, it appears that the trial judge placed undue emphasis upon the fact that the plaintiff placed proposed purchases into the sack supplied to him by the defendant. Thus, in explaining his directed verdict to the jury, the trial judge stated: Again, the trial judge stated: It must be remembered that the type of concealment which creates a presumption of criminal intent under the provisions of T.C.A., § 39-3-1125, is willful concealment of unpurchased goods. We agree with the following observation of the Court of Appeals: In our opinion this question, whether the concealment in this case was willful, that is, purposeful and deliberate, or whether it was merely inadvertent and heedless, is properly a question for the jury, to be determined from their consideration of all the relevant evidence. The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the trial court erred in permitting the magistrate in the criminal proceeding to testify in this case, recounting his reasons for dismissing the shoplifting charge against the plaintiff. The judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court is affirmed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for a new trial consistent with this opinion. Costs incurred upon appeal are taxed against the defendants-appellants. FONES and HARBISON, JJ., and HUMPHREYS, Special Justice, concur. DROWOTA, J., filing separate opinion concurring in part; dissenting in part. DROWOTA, Justice, concurring in part; dissenting in part. I concur with the majority opinion that "it was error for the trial court to direct a verdict for Defendant in this case." With respect to the issue of whether it is for the trial judge or the jury to determine the issue of probable cause in a malicious prosecution case, I must again disagree with the majority's conclusion that it is for the Court. I adhere to my views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Lewis v. Williams, 618 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1981), when I stated: 618 S.W.2d at 304, 305.