Case Title: State v. Graydon

Citation: 506 So. 2d 393

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1987-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
506 So. 2d 393 (1987)
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Marvin GRAYDON, Respondent.
No. 69252.

Supreme Court of Florida.
April 30, 1987.
*394 Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and John W. Tiedemann, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Martha Ann Lott, Gainesville, for respondent.
OVERTON, Justice.
This is a petition to review Graydon v. State, 492 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), in which the district court held that section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1985), relating to resisting an officer with violence, does not include state correctional officers. On the state's suggestion, the court certified the following question:
492 So. 2d  at 724. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer the certified question in the negative and approve the First District Court of Appeal's decisions in this cause and in Amaker v. State, 492 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
In the instant case, the appellant, Marvin Graydon, a Union Correctional Institution inmate, had a physical encounter with a state corrections officer. Graydon was charged with battery of a law enforcement officer under section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1985), and with resisting an officer with violence under section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1985). He was found guilty of both offenses. The only issue before us is whether section 843.01 includes state Department of Correction officers within its provisions. That statute reads as follows:
The district court ruled that state correctional officers are not covered by this statute. As stated by the First District in Amaker, this statutory section "enumerates specific categories of law enforcement officers but not state correctional officers. Penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the person against whom a penalty could be imposed." 492 So. 2d  at 420. The district court, in Amaker, reviewed the statute's legislative history which reflected that at one time the statute included all correctional officers, but it was amended to specifically enumerate "county and municipal correctional officers." 492 So. 2d  at 420.
The state argues it is absurd to suggest that the legislature intended to criminalize resistance to county and municipal, but not state, correctional officers. The state further contends that since correctional officers are legally authorized to execute process on prisoners, they are included under section 843.01 even if they are not specifically identified in the statute. We reject *395 these arguments. We are not going to speculate why the legislature did not include state correctional officers within the statute. This Court does not have the authority to legislate, and only the legislature can include state correctional officers within the provisions of section 843.01. Accordingly, we approve the district court's decisions in the instant case and in Amaker.
It is so ordered.
McDONALD, C.J., and EHRLICH, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.