Case Title: DeGraff v. Burnett

Citation: 2007 VT 95

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
DeGraff v. Burnett (2006-266)

2007 VT 95

[Filed 31-Aug-2007]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
  40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
  Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
  order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 2007 VT 95

                                No. 2006-266


  Danny L. DeGraff, Nancy R. DeGraff             Supreme Court
  and MBS Hardware & Lumber, Inc. d/b/a 
  Milton Hardware Supply                        On Appeal from
                                                Chittenden Superior Court
      v.  

  Norman Burnett                                March Term, 2007


  Richard W. Norton, J.

  William B. Towle of Ward & Babb, South Burlington, for
    Plaintiffs-Appellants/ Counterclaim Defendants/Appellants.

  Eric G. Parker of Bauer, Gravel, Farnham, Nuovo, Parker & Lang, Burlington,
    for  Defendant-Appellee.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.

       ¶  1.  DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiffs Danny L. DeGraff, Nancy R. Degraff,
  and MBS Hardware & Lumber, Inc., appeal from the trial court's order in
  this quiet-title action.  The court determined that, pursuant to the terms
  of their deed, plaintiffs possessed a twenty-seven-foot-wide triangular
  easement on land owned by defendant Norman Burnett, which they could use
  for garage space and storage of lumber.  Plaintiffs argue that the trial
  court erred in: (1) interpreting their deed; (2) denying their claim for
  damages; and (3) denying their request for a jury trial.  We affirm.
   
       ¶  2.  Plaintiffs and defendant own adjoining commercial lots in
  Milton, Vermont.  Plaintiffs purchased their lot, Lot 5, in 1990 from
  William and Lois Warren.  Lot 5 has westerly frontage on Route 7, and
  easterly frontage on Town Highway 47 (TH 47).  It is about twice as long as
  it is wide, and it is shaped "like a rectangle that has been bent against
  someone's knee."  Plaintiffs operate Milton Building Supply, a lumber and
  hardware business, on their lot, as did the Warrens before 1990.

       ¶  3.  Plaintiffs' deed contained two express easements.  The first,
  at issue in this appeal,  burdened an adjacent lot, Lot 3, then owned by
  the Warrens and now owned by defendant.  The deed specifically provided: 

     The property herein conveyed has the benefit of an easement across
    the northerly boundary of Lot 3 as depicted on said plan, for the
    purpose of storing lumber and garage space for the lumber business
    located on Lot 5.  This easement is 27 feet in width at its widest
    point, extending southerly from the southeasterly corner of Lot 5. 
    The easement area follows an existing fence line.

  Plaintiffs were also granted a right of "ingress and egress" across the
  northern boundary of Lot 7, another adjacent lot owned by the Warrens.

       ¶  4.  In 2002, Mr. Warren deeded Lot 3 to defendant.  The deed is
  expressly subject to plaintiffs' easement and  provides that "[n]o warranty
  is made that the size and exact location of said easement are as shown on
  any survey plans."  Lot 3 is shaped "like a square with a tail."  It fronts
  TH 47 on the east, Lot 5 on the north, and Lot 7 on the west.  Lot 3 does
  not extend to Route 7, and it is only half as long as Lot 5. 
   
       ¶  5.  At about the time that defendant took possession of Lot 3 in
  2002, plaintiffs made improvements to the easement property.  They built up
  the easement path with gravel to accommodate large delivery trucks,
  extended the existing fence line, and put a gate at the entrance to TH 47. 
  Shortly thereafter, defendant removed the gate, the gravel, and the fence. 
  Plaintiffs then filed a quiet-title action and a claim for damages, seeking
  to clarify the boundaries of their easement, receive compensation for the
  destruction of their improvements, and resume their asserted use of the
  easement as an access point for trucks delivering lumber and other
  merchandise. 

       ¶  6.  In October 2002, defendant moved for partial summary judgment,
  arguing that plaintiffs' deed was unambiguous in its description of two
  sides of the easement area and in its description of the allowed use.  He
  asked the court to exclude any extrinsic evidence offered by plaintiffs on
  these issues.  Plaintiffs opposed the motion, and filed a cross-motion for
  summary judgment on all issues.  They asserted that the "fence line"
  referenced in the deed was sixty-five feet from the southeast corner of Lot
  5, not twenty-seven feet as set forth in the deed.  According to
  plaintiffs, they were entitled to the wider easement despite the reference
  to the twenty-seven-foot  width because the fence line, as a monument,
  controlled over the metes-and-bounds description as a matter of law. 
  Plaintiffs also argued that their easement necessarily included a right of
  ingress and egress from TH 47.
   
       ¶  7.  In an April 2003 order, Judge Dennis Pearson denied both
  motions.  He found defendant's motion inadequately supported and concluded,
  as to plaintiffs' request, that extrinsic evidence would be needed to
  resolve ambiguities in the deed as to both the allowed use and the location
  of the easement.  As to allowed use, the court rejected plaintiffs'
  assertion that they necessarily possessed a right of ingress and egress,
  explaining that no such right was conveyed by the deed.  Rather, the deed
  plainly stated that the easement was to be used for "storing lumber and
  garage space."  The court found it apparent that Mr. Warren knew how to use
  appropriate language when he intended to convey a right of access, and it
  also noted that plaintiffs had access from TH 47 to the storage area across
  their own property.

       ¶  8.  As to location, the court found that the only descriptions of
  the easement in the deed that had any precision were that: (1) its widest
  point was twenty-seven feet measured "southerly" from the "southeasterly
  corner of Lot 5," a corner that could be located, and that (2) it "follows
  an existing fence line."  While plaintiffs argued that the easement, as
  described, abutted and had as its actual southerly boundary the existing
  fence line, the court found that this boundary would make the easement area
  approximately sixty-five feet wide at the edge of TH 47 (where the
  southeasterly corner of Lot 5 was located), which was clearly contrary to
  and inconsistent with the express deed language.  Defendant, on the other
  hand, argued that the easement was twenty-seven feet at its widest point,
  as described in the deed, and its southerly boundary ran from that point
  parallel to the fence line.  

       ¶  9.  The court found both interpretations plausible given the
  imprecise phrase, "follows an existing fence line."  Moreover, the court
  explained, because defendant's preferred construction would harmonize both
  the express terms of the deed, and the existing "monument" on the ground,
  there was arguably no conflict to trigger the rule strongly urged by
  plaintiffs, that "in [any] conflict between courses and distances, and
  known boundaries and monuments, courses and distances must yield."  In any
  event, the court concluded, disputed issues of material fact precluded
  entry of judgment in plaintiffs' favor. 
   
       ¶  10.  After a three-day trial before Judge Richard Norton, the court
  issued its final order, which relied upon and partially incorporated Judge
  Pearson's order denying summary judgment.  The court explained that, in
  light of the earlier finding of ambiguity, it had taken extrinsic evidence
  to establish the easement with precision, including the circumstances
  surrounding contract formation as well as hearsay statements from the
  grantor regarding the easement's boundaries.(FN1)  It ultimately adopted
  defendant's proposed construction of the deed.  

       ¶  11.  In reaching its conclusion, the court was unpersuaded by the
  extrinsic evidence offered by plaintiffs.  Plaintiff Danny DeGraff
  testified, for example, that Mr. Warren promised to convey him an easement
  up to the fence line, and that plaintiffs had been using the area up to the
  fence line since 1990.  Nonetheless, the court explained, the deed plainly
  provided that the easement was twenty-seven feet at its widest point,
  extending southerly from the southeasterly corner of Lot 5, and neither Mr.
  DeGraff nor Mr. Warren's former wife, Lois Strong, could explain why or how
  the explicit twenty-seven-foot measurement was inserted into the deed. 

       ¶  12.  While a 1998 survey map depicted plaintiffs' easement as
  extending sixty-five-feet at its base, the map contained a disclaimer
  indicating that it depicted the easement as it appeared on the ground in
  1998 when plaintiffs were admittedly occupying the entire area in question. 
  Given this, as well as the surveyor's testimony that his map was not
  conclusive on the width of the easement, the court found that the survey
  map did not represent what the easement should be under the terms of the
  deed.   
   
       ¶  13.  In contrast, the court found that defendant produced evidence
  to credibly support his assertion that Mr. Warren told him that the
  sixty-five-foot easement boundary depicted on the 1998  survey map
  encroached onto Lot 3.  Defendant testified to this effect.  An individual
  named Steve Jangraw also testified that he looked at Lot 3 in 2001 with
  defendant and Mr. Warren.  He stated that Mr. Warren told them that the
  existing fence was not a boundary line but rather, plaintiffs' easement ran
  twenty-seven feet south from a pin near a mailbox on the road, and this
  measurement was reflected in plaintiffs' deed.  The court found Mr. Jagraw
  persuasive and credible, and it adopted his testimony as factual. 

       ¶  14.  The court also credited the testimony of David Bowers, an
  individual who had extensive experience with maps and surveying.  Mr.
  Bowers testified that he laid out the easement's boundaries, starting from
  a pin that marked the southeast corner of Lot 5, proceeding twenty-seven 
  feet southerly, and then proceeding along the existing fence line
  approximately ninety feet.  The court found Mr. Bowers's testimony
  compelling and his findings conclusive on the measure and nature of the
  easement.  

       ¶  15.  In light of this and other evidence supporting the
  twenty-seven-foot measurement, the court concluded that the phrase "follows
  an existing fence line" in the deed must mean "to run besides" - follow
  along - to a point logically narrower than the fence line.  The court found
  that this  interpretation harmonized all of the deed's terms - a preferred
  construction - and it was uncontradicted by any evidence offered by Mr.
  DeGraff.  Rather than reading out the twenty-seven-foot language, as
  plaintiffs suggested, the court found that the evidence showed that Mr.
  Warren understood the easement to extend only that far.  In reaching its
  conclusion, the court found Mr. DeGraff's testimony entitled to less weight
  than that of other witnesses because it was essentially self-serving.  The
  court also found Mr. Warren's hearsay statement more credible in that it
  explained the existence of the twenty-seven-foot language in plaintiffs'
  deed.  
   
       ¶  16.  The court thus concluded that the easement area was that
  described by Mr. Bowers above - a triangular area, twenty-seven feet at its
  base, that followed a line parallel to the fence line, which was consistent
  with the deed language.  In this respect, the court explained, it accepted
  Mr. DeGraff's argument that the fence line was a monument in the deed. 
  But, the court concluded, the monument marked the direction of the easement
  rather than its boundary.  Therefore, it did not control over the clear
  metes-and-bounds description but rather informed the direction of that
  distance.

       ¶  17.  As to the allowable use of the easement, the court explained
  that the DeGraffs had presented evidence of their current and previous use
  of the easement as essentially a commercial driveway and storage area, but
  they offered no other evidence that would clarify the meaning of the
  language in their deed and the intent of the parties.  The court found
  plaintiffs' mixed use inconsistent with the language of the deed, which
  gave them only a right to store lumber and use the easement for garage
  services.  None of the evidence offered supported use of this easement as
  an ingress/egress or otherwise as an access point to the rear of Lot 5. 
  Thus, because such use was unsupported by either the language of the deed
  or the evidence of its meaning, the court concluded that it could not be
  continued.  The court also rejected plaintiffs' claim for damages arising
  from the loss of the gate or any structures on the encroached area.  This
  appeal followed. 
   
       ¶  18.  Plaintiffs argue that the court erred in interpreting the
  terms of their deed.  They first assert that the deed is unambiguous and
  that no extrinsic evidence was required to ascertain the parties' intent. 
  According to plaintiffs, the phrase "follows an existing fence line" can
  mean only that the fence line itself is the boundary, and any discrepancy
  between the twenty-seven-foot measurement and the fence line must be
  resolved in favor of the fence line as a matter of law.  Assuming that
  ambiguity does exist, plaintiffs argue that the court erred by looking
  beyond the parties' intent at the time of conveyance and engaging in a
  "general survey" of the situation.  They also assert that the court
  committed reversible error by excluding certain evidence relevant to the
  parties' intent. 

       ¶  19.  We find no error.  As discussed below, we conclude that the
  trial court properly considered extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguities
  in the deed, and its findings regarding the parties' intent are supported
  by the record.   

       ¶  20.  Our master rule in construing a deed is that "the intent of
  the parties governs."  Main St. Landing, LLC v. Lake St. Ass'n, Inc., 2006
  VT 13, ¶ 7, 179 Vt. 583,