Case Title: Matter of Terner

Citation: 120 N.J. 706, 577 A.2d 511

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 1990-08-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
120 N.J. 706 (1990) 577 A.2d 511 IN THE MATTER OF MARC J. TERNER, AN ATTORNEY-AT-LAW. The Supreme Court of New Jersey. Argued February 13, 1990. Decided August 8, 1990. John J. Janasie, Deputy Ethics Counsel, argued the cause on behalf of Office of Attorney Ethics. Peter R. Willis, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. *707 PER CURIAM. This disciplinary action is based on numerous complaints from thirteen clients charging respondent, Marc J. Terner, with gross negligence, RPC 1.1(a); failure to act with reasonable diligence, RPC 1.3; failure to communicate with clients, RPC 1.4; conflicts of interest, RPC 1.7 and 1.8; and misleading communications regarding his services, RPC 7.1. Three additional complaints alleged a pattern of neglect, lack of diligence, and unprofessional conduct over a prolonged period. RPC 1.1(b). In addition, an audit of respondent's books and records by the Office of Attorney Ethics led to a charge of numerous recordkeeping improprieties, R. 1:21-6, but not of the misappropriation of funds. By order of this Court, retired Judge Paul R. Huot was assigned as a special master to hear the case for the District XI Ethics Committee. After ten days of hearings, the Special Master found that respondent had committed numerous ethical violations, and recommended three private reprimands, three public reprimands, and a forty-eight-month suspension from the practice of law. The Special Master also recommended as a condition of reinstatement that respondent submit to drug tests twice a week during the period of suspension and for two years following his reinstatement. The Disciplinary Review Board (the DRB or Board) agreed that respondent had committed the alleged violations, and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for three years. In addition, the Board recommended that before reinstatement, respondent be required to provide proof that he has not used drugs during the period of suspension, that he is competent to practice law, and that he has satisfactorily completed the Skills and Methods courses offered by the Institute for Continuing Legal Education. We agree. As summarized by the DRB, the relevant facts are: Based on those factual findings, the Board concluded that Before us, respondent has emphasized his drug addiction as the cause of his numerous derelictions, and has pointed to his efforts towards rehabilitation. Those efforts include admission to private hospitals, psychotherapy, and weekly attendance *718 at meetings of both Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholic Anonymous. For these efforts, respondent deserves to be commended. For disciplinary purposes, however, they come too late. We continue to believe that "the public may be best protected by a policy that encourages [substance-abusing] lawyers to seek rehabilitation at the earliest possible moment." In re Willis, 114 N.J. 42, 49, 552 A.2d 979 (1989). Respondent committed his infractions years before he sought help. As he wrote in his brief to this Court, "[u]ntil my hospitalization in December of 1987, I denied my illness, not only to myself, but to my family and the whole world." Given the fact that this Court appointed the Special Master in December 1987, the same month in which he was first hospitalized, we cannot find that respondent sought "rehabilitation at the earliest possible moment." In fact, he did not seek help until he was in trouble with the disciplinary system. Although we recognize that we have much to learn about drug addiction, ibid., we remain committed to the proposition that such addiction is neither a defense to nor a mitigating factor in attorney discipline. Nor can we ignore the different legal consequences attendant on the abuse of cocaine as distinguished from alcohol. Attorneys who use cocaine or other controlled dangerous substances necessarily violate the law. We would be remiss in condoning such activity, even to the extent of allowing it to ameliorate the penalty in a disciplinary proceeding. As the Special Master concluded, We decline to consider cocaine addiction as a mitigating factor, especially when, as here, the affected lawyer does not readily admit his problem and seek help. Respondent shall be suspended for three years, subject to proof at the end of that period that he has not used drugs during the period of suspension, that he is competent to practice *719 law, and that he has satisfactorily completed the Skills and Methods courses. Respondent shall reimburse the Ethics Financial Committee for appropriate administrative costs, including the costs of transcripts. So ordered. For Suspension Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN 7. Opposed None. It is ORDERED that MARC J. TERNER of WAYNE, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1976, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years, effective as of August 22, 1990, and until further Order of this Court; and it is further ORDERED that prior to an application for restoration, MARC J. TERNER shall be required to provide proof that he has not used drugs during the period of his suspension, that he is competent to practice law, and that he has satisfactorily completed the Skills and Methods courses offered by the Institute for Continuing Legal Education; and it is further ORDERED that MARC J. TERNER reimburse the Ethics Financial Committee for appropriate administrative costs; and it is further ORDERED that MARC J. TERNER be restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of his suspension; and it is further ORDERED that MARC J. TERNER comply with Administrative Guideline Number 23 of the Office of Attorney Ethics dealing with suspended attorneys.