Case Title: Steward v. McDonald

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
William T. STEWARD and Jeannine G. Steward v.
Jerry Eugene McDONALD and Professional
Services Industries, Inc.

97-137                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered December 18, 1997


1.   Landlord & tenant -- duty to repair. -- Under the common-law rule,
     a lessor owes no duty to the lessee to repair the premises;
     however, a lessor can be held liable where he agrees to
     undertake the repairs.

2.   Landlord & tenant -- landlord's liability for physical harm caused to
     tenant and others. -- A landlord is subject to liability for
     physical harm caused to the tenant and others upon the leased
     property with the consent of the tenant or his subtenant by a
     condition of disrepair existing before or arising after the
     tenant has taken possession if: (1) the landlord, as such, has
     contracted by a promise in the lease or otherwise to keep the
     leased property in repair; (2) the disrepair creates an
     unreasonable risk to persons upon the leased property which
     the performance of the landlord's agreement would have
     prevented; and (3) the landlord fails to exercise reasonable
     care to perform his contract.

3.   Landlord & tenant -- no legal obligation to tenant for injuries sustained
     in common areas absent statute or agreement. -- A landlord is under no
     legal obligation to a tenant for injuries sustained in common
     areas, absent a statute or agreement; a party who gratuitously
     undertakes a duty can, however, be liable for negligently
     performing that duty; a duty can also arise, in certain
     circumstances, under the terms of a lease between a landlord
     and tenant.

4.   Statutes -- not taken in derogation of common law unless act shows
     legislative intent. -- Statutes will not be taken in derogation of
     the common law unless the act shows that such was the intent
     of the legislature; the supreme court strictly construes
     statutes that impose duties or liabilities unknown at common
     law in favor of those upon whom the burden is sought to be
     imposed, and nothing will be taken as intended that is not
     clearly expressed.

5.   Landlord & tenant -- no legislative intent to impose greater liability on
     owner of workplace than on employer. -- Reading Ark. Code Ann.  11-
     2-117(b) (Repl. 1996) in conjunction with Ark. Code Ann.  11-
     2-102(1) (Repl. 1996), the supreme court could not ascertain
     a legislative intent to impose greater liability on an owner
     of a place of employment than that imposed on an employer;
     applying the rules of strict construction, the court could not
     say that the legislature plainly intended that the
     responsibility for a safe workplace should be greater on an
     owner of a place of employment than it is on an employer, who
     may be penalized under the statute for having an unsafe
     workplace under its control or custody.

6.   New trial -- when order granting motion may be reversed. -- The
     appellate court will reverse a trial court's order granting a
     motion for a new trial only if there is a manifest abuse of
     discretion; a clearly erroneous interpretation of the law or
     a clearly erroneous application of a law or rule can
     constitute such manifest abuse of discretion.

7.   Landlord & tenant -- no duty under which to impose liability on appellants
     as landlords -- misinterpretation of law constituted abuse of discretion -
     - order granting new trial reversed -- appeal dismissed. -- The supreme
     court held that, without an assumption of responsibility for
     repairs, there was no common-law duty under which it could
     impose liability on appellants, as landlords, to provide a
     safe workplace for the employees of their tenant and that none
     was created by the statute; the court concluded that the trial
     court misinterpreted Ark. Code Ann.  11-2-117 in its order
     granting a new trial, and that this misinterpretation of the
     law constituted a manifest abuse of discretion; the court
     reversed the trial court's order granting a new trial and
     dismissed the appeal.


     Appeal from Crawford Circuit Court; Don Langston, Judge;
reversed and dismissed.
     Warner, Smith & Harris, PLC, by: Joel D. Johnson, for
appellants.
     Eddie H. Walker, Jr., and Stephen M. Sharum, for appellee
Jerry Eugene McDonald.

     Ray Thornton, Justice.
     The issue in this case is whether a landlord owes a duty of
care to his tenant's employees.  Appellants William T. Steward and
Jeannine G. Steward ("Landlords") leased a building to appellee
Professional Services Industries, Inc. (PSI).  PSI employed
appellee Jerry Eugene McDonald, who was injured when a riser broke
while he was carrying boxes weighing approximately 120 pounds up a
flight of stairs in the leased building.  The stairway did not have
a handrail at the time the injury occurred.  After the accident,
McDonald received benefits under the Arkansas Workers' Compensation
Act.
     McDonald filed a complaint against the Landlords, alleging
that they had failed to maintain, repair, and construct the
stairway in violation of our general unsafe-place-to-work statute,
Ark. Code Ann.  11-2-117 (1987), and that the Landlords were
negligent in failing to provide guardrails, toeboards, and
handrails as required by OSHA.  McDonald later amended his
complaint to allege violations of the Arkansas Department of Labor
Basic Safety Manual.  The Landlords then filed a third-party
complaint against PSI, as the tenant, based on the principle of
implied indemnification.  The Landlords and PSI both filed motions
for summary judgment.  The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of PSI; however, it denied the Landlords' motion, and
McDonald's claim against them proceeded to trial.  The jury
returned a general verdict in favor of the Landlords.  
     McDonald then filed a motion for new trial, on the basis that
the verdict was "clearly contrary to the preponderance of the
evidence or . . . contrary to the law."  Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6). 
The trial court premised its order granting a new trial on its
interpretation of our general unsafe-place-to-work statute, Ark.
Code Ann.  11-2-117 (Repl. 1996), which states in pertinent part:
     Every employer and every owner of a place of
employment, place of public assembly, or public building,
now or hereafter constructed, shall construct, repair,
and maintain it so as to render it safe.
Ark. Code Ann.  11-2-117(b) (emphasis added).  The trial court
found that the statute applied to the Landlords and created a duty
to provide a safe place to work.  It further found that the jury's
failure to find the Landlords negligent on that basis was clearly
against a preponderance of the evidence.
     In construing the statute, we have determined that the general
assembly did not intend for the phrase "every owner of a place of
employment" to expand or extend a landlord's duty to provide a safe
place to work for his tenant's employees.  We have not previously
had occasion to interpret the meaning of this phrase in the context
of this statute.
     In his complaint, McDonald alleged that this statute imposes
a duty on property owners, who lease a place of employment, to
construct, repair, and maintain the property in a manner that
renders it reasonably safe.  McDonald based this argument solely on
the statutory language.  The trial court's order granting a new
trial indicates that the court likewise found "that the jury
finding that the Defendants were not negligent in failing to
provide a safe place to work as required by A.C.A  11-2-117 is
clearly against the preponderance of the evidence."
     McDonald also argued that the lease agreement, which contained
language stating that the Landlords were responsible for major
repairs and the tenant for minor repairs, could be interpreted to
mean that the Landlords had a contractual duty to repair the
stairs.  This question was submitted to the jury for determination,
and the jury found that the Landlords were not negligent.  However,
the trial court's order granting a new trial was not based on any
assertion of duty imposed under the terms of the lease agreement,
but rather that a duty was imposed by statute and by the safety
regulations.  Therefore, we confine our discussion to the issues on
which the trial court predicated its order in granting a new trial.
     We have followed the common-law rule that a lessor owes no
duty to the lessee to repair the premises.  Majewski v. Cantrell,
293 Ark. 360,