Case Title: JAMES PINKER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0187

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
JAMES PINKER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 86188 P.3d 571Case Number: S-07-0187Decided: 01/22/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
JAMES 
PINKER,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCountyThe 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; and Tina N. Kerin, Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. 
Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. Pojman, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, James 
Pinker (Pinker), entered a plea of guilty to a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007).1  On July 22, 2006, Pinker inflicted 
injuries on his two-month-old daughter which caused her serious, permanent, and 
disabling injuries.  Pinker was 
sentenced to be imprisoned for six to eight years.  In addition, he was also ordered to 
complete restitution to the Office of Healthcare Financing (OHCF), care of ACS 
Third Party Liability, in the amount of $156,671.92.  That was the amount of Medicaid benefits 
that had been paid on behalf of his daughter as of the date the presentence 
report prepared in Pinker's case was completed.  The presentence report also provided the 
court with verification that OHCF was "subrogated to the rights of [Pinker's 
daughter] with respect to any claim that  she may have arising from the 
accident or incident and this subrogation extends to all Medicaid funds paid or 
to be paid on account of her injuries, and OHCF must be reimbursed for those 
amounts."  It is this provision of 
the sentence imposed in this case that commands our attention in this appeal, as 
well as Pinker's assertion that the district court's oral pronouncements 
concerning restitution conflict with the written sentence.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Pinker raises 
these issues:

 
 
I.          
Is the district court's oral pronouncement of restitution controlling, 
and an illegal sentence?

 
 
II.         
Did the district court exceed its statutory authority in awarding 
restitution to the Office of Healthcare Financing, as that entity is not a 
"victim" as defined by statute?

 
 
The 
State conforms its statement of the issues to those raised by 
Pinker.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      From the outset 
of these proceedings, it was evident that Pinker intended to enter a plea of 
guilty to the charge against him.  
On February 16, 2007, Pinker entered a plea of guilty, as planned.  Pinker gave a factual basis for his 
plea, but the State was not satisfied with the accuracy of that recitation 
because Pinker tended to minimize his culpability.  The State gave a recitation of the facts 
it intended to prove at trial, if necessary.  Those facts consisted mainly of 
conflicting statements given by Pinker to police investigators that were 
considerably more incriminating than the recitation of facts he owned up to, at 
his final arraignment.  It was 
agreed that between those two versions of the events of July 22, 2006, the 
district court had a factual basis adequate to support the plea of 
guilty.

 
 
[¶4]      A bit of 
background about Pinker is pertinent to this discussion, so as to provide 
context for the issues presented by the appeal.  Pinker was born in 1987 and was 19 years 
of age at the time of his crime.  He 
had legal and substance abuse difficulties throughout his teenage years, and his 
problems were addressed in both criminal and juvenile courts.  He did manage to graduate from high 
school in 2005, but only with special assistance.  He held a few menial jobs both during 
and after high school, for short periods of time.  He was working at a local truck stop at 
the time of sentencing in this case.  
Pinker and his wife of a few months lived in a small apartment with their 
infant daughter.  Pinker's wife did 
not work, but rather cared for the child most of the time, unless Pinker was not 
working.  On the date of the crime, 
July 22, 2006, Pinker was at home with the child.  He received a call from his employer 
requiring him to come to work to perform mandatory overtime.  He was in the process of getting ready 
to take the child to a care-giver when the incident that led to her injuries 
occurred.  On July 23, 2006, Pinker 
and his wife took the child to the local hospital because of the symptoms she 
was exhibiting.  The child was 
examined and released to return home with her parents.  Pinker did not reveal to hospital 
personnel what had happened at home (i.e., that he had dropped her on her head  
either accidentally or intentionally).  
The child's condition worsened over the next 24 hours, and on July 24, 
2006, Pinker again presented her at the local hospital for treatment.  The child was flown to Denver where she was 
treated for traumatic head injury (non-accidental, but consistent with child 
abuse).  The child was in foster 
care at the time of the proceedings in this case.

 
 
[¶5]      The plea 
agreement was summarized at Pinker's guilty plea proceeding.  Also, a detailed written statement of 
the provisions of the plea agreement was filed with the district court prior to 
those proceedings:

 
 
PLEA 
AGREEMENT

 
 
            
PURSUANT to Rule 11 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, the above 
referenced parties have entered into the following agreement as it concerns the 
disposition of the criminal charges filed in this Docket.

 
 
            
The State of Wyoming, represented by Assistant District 
Attorney Tillie Routh, and the above named Defendant JAMES PINKER, represented by Diane 
Lazano, concerning the disposition of the criminal charges contained in the 
above referenced docket, agrees as follows:

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT hereby agrees to plead guilty to the following counts as 
set forth in the Citation, Information or Amended Information filed in this 
matter:

 
 

The 
Defendant agrees 
to plead guilty to the charge of Aggravated Assault, serious bodily injury, as 
charged in Count I of the Information filed herein, in violation of W.S. § 
6-2-502(a)(i).

 
 
            
FURTHER, the Defendant expressly agrees to provide a complete and 
truthful factual basis for all charges subject to this agreement and further 
understands the Court may not accept this agreement or any sentence 
recommendation made by either party.

 
 
            
THE STATE OF WYOMING agrees that if the 
DEFENDANT fully and completely satisfies the requirements set forth above, the 
STATE OF WYOMING shall make the following sentencing 
recommendations to the court:

 
 
            
1.  As to Count 1, a sentence not less than eight (8) nor more 
than ten (10) years, with a referral to Boot Camp.

 
 
            
FAILURE of the Defendant to respond to this offer 20 days prior to the 
date of trial will be considered by the State as a rejection and as a result the 
offer will be rescinded.

 
 
            
IN THE EVENT that the Defendant accepts the State's offer, THE DEFENDANT 
agrees and understands that by entering this agreement and by entering the above 
plea(s) that the Defendant is giving up the right to a trial in this/these 
matters, the right to call and confront witness(es) in said trial, the right to 
remain silent as to a factual basis for this matter or as to any Pre-Sentence 
Investigation Report required in this matter, and the right to appeal any 
charges, means by which the evidence/statements were obtained, and defects in 
charging documents or jurisdiction.

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT agrees and understands that the Defendant is responsible 
for restitution for all victims of the Defendant's actions, including victims 
of any dismissed or uncharged incidents referenced above.   The Defendant agrees and 
understands regardless of any other provision of the agreement the State shall 
request restitution for these victims and the Court shall order the Defendant to 
pay restitution as the Court deems appropriate.

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT agrees and understands that the attorney for the State, as 
an officer of the Court, is required to correct any factual mistake or 
misrepresentation made to the Court and to inform the Court of any omission of 
criminal history or bond violations or violations of law which occur while 
Sentencing in this matter was pending.

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT understands and agrees that the Court is not in any way 
bound by this recommendation and that the Court may sentence the Defendant 
otherwise within the maximum penalties provided by law.

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT understands and agrees that in the event the Court chooses 
to disregard the proposed plea agreement the Defendant may NOT withdraw the plea(s) 
entered.

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT understands and agrees to obey all laws and any bond 
conditions to which the Defendant is subject while he is released from custody 
pending sentencing.  The DEFENDANT 
agrees that any violation of this agreement or bond may entitle the State to 
withdraw its sentencing recommendation and that the Defendant shall NOT be allowed to withdraw the 
plea(s) entered.  [Emphases in 
original.]

 
 
[¶6]      We do not 
consider the above-form a model.  
However, with a little thoughtful editing and attention to detail, it is 
certainly a workable starting place and a vast improvement over an informal oral 
agreement.  The agreement was signed 
by a representative of the district attorney's office, by Pinker's attorney, and 
by Pinker.  A presentence report 
(PSR) was prepared and its author questioned the appropriateness of Pinker being 
sent to Boot Camp, as provided in the Plea Agreement.  At sentencing, the district attorney 
stood by its commitment to recommend Boot Camp as part of the sentence.  Pinker objected to the PSR on the basis 
that the remarks/recommendations made by its author went beyond the scope of the 
information that is appropriate in a PSR.  
See W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(2).2  As a remedy, Pinker asked that the 
affidavit of probable cause included in the PSR be disregarded by the trial 
court, that the trial court disregard the PSR's questioning of the gravamen of 
the plea agreement, and that the district court cause a copy of the transcript 
of the guilty plea proceeding be attached to the PSR.  The district court granted relief as to 
that last item, and a copy of the guilty plea proceedings is attached to the PSR 
in the record on appeal.

 
 
Effect 
of Oral Pronouncement

 
 
[¶7]      Pinker claims 
that the restitution portion of the sentence, as written in the sentencing 
order, is an illegal sentence because it is inconsistent with, and 
irreconcilably in conflict with, the oral pronunciation of the sentencing court 
made at the sentencing hearing.  A 
long-recognized rule of this Court is that where there is conflict between the 
sentence as articulated at sentencing, and the written sentence, the oral 
sentence prevails.  The 
determination of whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law, which we 
review de novo.  Barnes v. State, 2008 WY 6, ¶ 11, 
174 P.3d 732, 736 (Wyo. 2008).  

 
 
[¶8]      At the guilty 
plea proceedings, the district court indicated that it was uncertain as to what 
the amount of restitution would be, because the victim's treatment was on-going 
and would last as long as she lived.  
At the time the district court rendered its oral sentence, it had a 
report available to it indicating that restitution up to that point appeared to 
be about $156,000.00, but would probably go higher.  Although the sentencing court and the 
parties appeared to be in agreement that it was very unlikely that Pinker would 
ever be able to pay any restitution, and little attention was given to detail in 
fashioning a realistic restitution order that was arrived at in the way 
contemplated by the governing statutes, eventually the district court made this 
oral pronouncement with respect to restitution:  "I don't think it is likely Mr. Pinker 
will ever make substantial restitution.  
The Court will order that he make restitution in whatever amount winds up 
being appropriate not to exceed $200,000.00 because it's ongoing.  We don't know what the final amount will 
be."  In the oral pronouncement, the 
district court did not name a "victim" who was eligible to receive 
restitution.  In the written 
sentence, the district court set restitution at $156,671.92 and identified a 
victim (precisely what was advanced by the PSR).  The record on appeal contains evidence 
that will support only that latter sum as the correct amount of restitution 
owing at the time of sentencing.

 
 
[¶9]      With respect to 
restitution, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103 (LexisNexis 2007) 
provides:

 
 
§ 
7-9-103. Determination of amount owed; execution.

            
(a)  As part of the sentencing process including deferred 
prosecutions under W.S. 7-13-301, in any misdemeanor or felony case, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present to the court any claim for restitution 
submitted by any victim.

            
(b)  In every case in which a claim for restitution is 
submitted, the court shall fix a 
reasonable amount as restitution owed to each victim for actual pecuniary 
damage resulting from the defendant's criminal activity, and shall include 
its determination of the pecuniary damage as a special finding in the judgment 
of conviction or in the order placing the defendant on probation under W.S. 
7-13-301.  In determining the amount 
of restitution, the court shall consider and include as a special finding, each 
victim's reasonably foreseeable actual pecuniary damage that will result in the 
future as a result of the defendant's criminal activity.  A long-term physical health care 
restitution order shall be entered as provided in W.S. 7-9-113 through 
7-9-115.

            
(c)  The court shall order the defendant to pay all or part of 
the restitution claimed or shall state on the record specific reasons why an 
order for restitution was not entered.  
If the court determines that the defendant has no ability to pay and that 
no reasonable probability exists that the defendant will have an ability to pay 
in the future, the court shall enter specific findings in the record supporting 
its determination.

            
(d)  Any order for restitution under this chapter constitutes a 
judgment by operation of law on the date it is entered.  To satisfy the judgment, the clerk, upon 
request of the victim or the district attorney, may issue execution in the same 
manner as in a civil action.

            
(e)  The court's determination of the amount of restitution 
owed under this section is not admissible as evidence in any civil 
action.

            
(f)  The defendant shall be given credit against his 
restitution obligation for payments made to the victim by the defendant's 
insurer for injuries arising out of the same facts or event.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶10]   The essence of Pinker's argument is 
that the district court's oral sentence effectively awarded an uncertain and 
unspecified amount of restitution, not to exceed $200,000.00, and did not name 
the victim.  His claim is that both 
of these matters are required to be made definite in the oral sentence and, 
having failed to comply with the statute, the sentence is illegal.  We conclude that there is no real 
ambiguity in the trial court's sentences, both oral and written and, 
furthermore, there is no real discrepancy or conflict between them.  See Williams v. State, 949 P.2d 878, 879-80 
(Wyo. 1997); Christensen v. State, 854 P.2d 675, 
678-81 (Wyo. 
1993).  Under the circumstances 
presented here, the plea agreement clearly informed Pinker that he would be required to pay 
restitution for the treatment provided to his daughter.  The district court mistakenly believed 
that it could order Pinker to be required to pay restitution in an amount "to be 
determined."  Id., at 
681.  However, that mistaken belief 
was corrected prior to entry of the written sentence.  The evidence of record fully supported 
the district court's initial oral findings and that can easily be followed 
through to the written sentence.  
Under these circumstances, we must reject Pinker's contention that the 
oral sentence conflicts with the written sentence, and we also must reject any 
suggestion that the oral sentence was illegal.  We also note that Pinker did not make 
objections to the restitution award either at the sentencing hearing or after 
the written sentence was entered of record.  See Chippewa v. State, 2006 WY 11, 
¶¶ 6-7, 126 P.3d 129, 131 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
Authority 
of the District Court to Order Restitution to OHCF

 
 
[¶11]   Pinker contends that the OHCF is 
not a victim as defined by the governing statute and, hence, the district court 
exceeded its statutory authority.  
As with the issue discussed above, this is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  A part of the plea agreement in force in 
this case made it clear that Pinker would be paying restitution to the victim or 
victims of his crime.  That, of 
course, was aimed directly and primarily at the costs of caring for and 
maintaining his daughter.  "Victim" 
is defined by statute:  "Victim' 
means a person who has suffered pecuniary damage as a result of a defendant's 
criminal activities.  An insurer 
which paid any part of a victim's pecuniary damages shall be regarded as the 
victim only if the insurer has no right of subrogation and the insured has no 
duty to pay the proceeds of restitution to the insurer."  Wyo. Stat. Ann § 7-9-101(a) (v) 
(LexisNexis 2007).

 
 
[¶12]   In this regard it is also relevant 
to consider the provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-106 (LexisNexis 
2007):

 
 
§ 
7-9-106. Factors considered by probation and parole officer, and by 
court.

            
(a)  The probation and parole officer or other person directed 
by the court when assisting the defendant in preparing the plan of restitution, 
and the court before approving or modifying the plan of restitution, shall 
consider:

                        
(i)  The number of victims;

                        
(ii)  The pecuniary damages of each victim including, for those 
cases within the provisions of W.S. 7-9-113 through 7-9-115, the long-term 
physical health care cost of the victim;

                        
(iii)  The defendant's:

                                    
(A)  Physical and mental health and 
condition;

                                    
(B)  Age;

                                    
(C)  Education;

                                    
(D)  Employment circumstances;

                                    
(E) Potential for employment and vocational 
training;

                                    
(F)  Family circumstances; and

                                    
(G)  Financial condition and whether the defendant has an 
ability to pay or whether a reasonable probability exists that the defendant 
will have an ability to pay.

                        
(iv)  Whether compensation has been paid to any victim under 
the Crime Victims Compensation Act [§§ 1-40-101 through 
1-40-119];

                        
(v)  What plan of restitution will most effectively aid the 
rehabilitation of the defendant; and

                        
(vi)  Other appropriate factors. 

 
 
[¶13]   Wyo. Stat. Ann §§ 7-9-113, 7-9-114, 
and 7-9-115 (LexisNexis 2007) provide:

 
 
§ 
7-9-113. Restitution for long-term care.

            
(a)  In addition to any other punishment prescribed by law and 
any restitution ordered pursuant to W.S. 7-9-102 which did not include long-term 
physical health care costs, the court may, upon conviction of any misdemeanor or 
felony, order a defendant to pay restitution to a victim in accordance with the 
provisions of W.S. 7-9-114 if the victim has suffered physical injury as a 
result of the crime which is reasonably probable to require or has required 
long-term physical health care for more than three (3) 
months.

            
(b)  As used in W.S. 7-9-113 through 7-9-115 "long-term 
physical health care" includes mental health care.

 
 
§ 
7-9-114. Determination of long-term restitution; time for order; 
enforcement.

            
(a)  In determining the amount of restitution to be ordered for 
long-term physical health care, the court shall consider the factors stated in 
W.S. 7-9-106 together with an estimated monthly cost of long-term physical 
health care of the victim provided by the victim or his representative.  The victim's estimate of long-term 
physical health care costs may be made as part of a victim impact statement 
under W.S. 7-21-103 or made separately.  
The court shall enter the long-term physical health care restitution 
order at the time of sentencing.  An 
order of restitution made pursuant to this section shall fix a monthly amount to 
be paid by the defendant for as long as long-term physical health care of the 
victim is required as a result of the crime.  The order may exceed the length of any 
sentence imposed upon the defendant for the criminal activity.  The court shall include as a special 
finding in the judgment of conviction its determination of the monthly cost of 
long-term physical health care.

            
(b)  Restitution ordered under this section shall be paid as 
provided in W.S. 7-9-108.  The 
restitution order shall be a civil judgment against the defendant and may be 
enforced by any means provided for enforcing other restitution orders and civil 
judgments.

 
 
§ 
7-9-115. Modification of order.

            
After a long-term physical health care restitution order has been 
entered, the court may from time to time, on the petition of either the 
defendant or the victim, or upon its own motion, modify the order as to the 
amount of monthly payments.  Any 
modification of the order shall only be based upon a substantial change of 
circumstances relating to the cost of long-term physical health care or the 
financial condition of either the defendant or the victim.  The petition shall be filed as part of 
the original criminal docket.

 
 
[¶14]   Although the record on appeal does 
not provide us with any clues as to why these statutes were not consulted, they 
were not, and no issue is raised by Pinker in that regard.

 
 
[¶15]   We continue our discussion, but not 
without first noting that there was a general agreement below that Pinker should 
be required to pay restitution of some sort.  How much that should be, and to whom it 
should be paid, did not appear to be given much thought by anyone, prior to the 
day of sentencing.  The crux of 
Pinker's argument is that this Court has held that an order of restitution which 
exceeds the authority granted by the statutes governing restitution would be 
void, and a void order may be challenged at any time.  Hite v. State, 2007 WY 199, ¶ 10, 
172 P.3d 737, 739-40 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶16]   This language from the statutory 
definition of "victim" gives rise to the second issue the parties ask us to 
resolve: "An insurer which paid any part of a victim's pecuniary damages shall 
be regarded as the victim only if the insurer has no right of subrogation and 
the insured has no duty to pay the proceeds of restitution to the insurer."  In this case, Medicaid paid the enormous 
medical bills generated by the treatment for the injuries inflicted by Pinker on 
his daughter.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
42-4-201 through 42-4-206 (LexisNexis 2007) detail the State of Wyoming's right 
to recover, by way of subrogation, benefits paid for Medicaid services under 
circumstances like those presented in this case.  We resolved a similar issue in Nixon v. State, 994 P.2d 324, 330 
(Wyo. 
1999):

 
 
Nixon 
contends the court's order to pay $95 to the Division is not authorized under 
the restitution statute.  In 
ordering restitution, the trial court's exercise of discretion is circumscribed 
by the statutes authorizing restitution.  
Aldridge v. State, 956 P.2d 341, 343 (Wyo.1998).  Whether the 
restitution statutes authorize payment to the Division is a question of law, 
which we review de novo.  Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 137 
(Wyo.1995).  If the trial court's 
conclusion is in accordance with law, it is affirmed.  Id. 
(citing Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. 
Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 
(Wyo.1993)).

 
 
            
Wyo. 
Stat.  Ann. § 7-9-102 (LEXIS 1999) 
directs the sentencing court to order payment of restitution to each 
victim.  "Victim" is defined in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(a)(v) (LEXIS 1999):

 
 
      
(v)  "Victim" means a person who has suffered pecuniary damage 
as a result of a defendant's criminal activities.  An insurer which paid any part of a 
victim's pecuniary damages shall be regarded as the victim only if the insurer 
has no right of subrogation and the insured has no duty to pay the proceeds of 
restitution to the insurer.

 
 
            
Nixon contends the Division does not qualify as a victim under the 
restitution statute because it is an insurer with a right of subrogation.  Nixon's argument focuses on whether the 
Division has a right of subrogation.  
We agree that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105 (LEXIS 1999) allows 
subrogation.  However, that still 
leaves the question of whether the Division is an 
"insurer."

 
 
The 
restitution statute does not define "insurer."  Looking to the logical source for a 
definition, we turn to the Wyoming Insurance Code which defines "insurer" as 
"any person engaged as indemnitor, surety or contractor in the business of 
entering into contracts of insurance or annuity" and defines insurance as a 
contract.  Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 26-1-102(a)(xvi), (xv) (LEXIS 
1999).  The Division is not in the 
business of entering into contracts of insurance or annuity and does not enter 
into contracts with employees or employers for insurance.  The Insurance Code does not purport to 
govern the workers' compensation system.  
Further, the Division was required to pay Deputy Urman's medical expenses 
which resulted from Nixon's assault.  
It would be against public policy to allow a criminal defendant to avoid 
responsibility for damages he caused merely because the injured party was acting 
within the scope of his employment.  
Therefore, we hold the Division is not an insurer for purposes of the 
restitution statute, and the trial court's order is 
affirmed.

 
 
Also see 
Whitten v. State, 2005 WY 55, 
¶¶ 20-22, 110 P.2d 892, 897 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶17]   The same basic analysis applies 
here as well.  Also see 
generally,  Kimberly J. Winbush, 
Annotation, Persons or Entities Entitled 
to Restitution as "Victim" under State Criminal Restitution Statute, 92 
A.L.R. 5th 35, § 25 (Insurance company) (2001 
and Supp. 2008).

 
 
[¶18]   The complexities of this matter 
were not specifically called to the attention of the district court, nor were 
they given any serious consideration below.  However, based upon the record extant, 
we decline to hold that the district court exceeded its statutory authority to 
impose restitution under the circumstances of this case, as demonstrated by the 
record on appeal available to this Court.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶19]   The judgment and sentence of the 
district court are affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1§ 6-2-502. Aggravated 
assault and battery; penalty.

            
(a) A person is guilty of 
aggravated assault and battery if he:

                        
(i) Causes serious bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life;

                        
(ii) Attempts to cause, or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily 
injury to another with a deadly weapon;

                        
(iii) Threatens to use a drawn deadly weapon on another unless reasonably 
necessary in defense of his person, property or abode or to prevent serious 
bodily injury to another;  
or

                        
(iv) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to a 
woman whom he knows is pregnant.

(b) Aggravated assault 
and battery is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) 
years.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 

2(2) Report. 
-- The report of the presentence investigation shall 
contain:

            
(A)  Information about the history and characteristics of the 
defendant, including prior criminal record, if any, financial condition, and any 
circumstances affecting the defendant's behavior that may be helpful in imposing 
sentence or in the correctional treatment of the 
defendant;

            
(B)  Verified information stated in a nonargumentative style 
containing an assessment of the financial, social, psychological, and medical 
impact upon, and cost to, any individual against whom the offense has been 
committed and attaching a victim impact statement as provided in W.S. 7-21-103 
if the victim chooses to make one in writing.  In any event the report shall state that 
the victim was advised of the right to make such a statement orally at the 
defendant's sentencing or in writing.  
If the victim could not be contacted, the report shall describe the 
efforts made to contact the victim;

            
(C)  Unless the court orders otherwise, information concerning the nature and extent of 
non-prison programs and resources available for the defendant;  and

            
(D)  Such other information as may be required by the 
court.