Case Title: Diversicare Leasing Corp. v. Hubbard

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1131027

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2015-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:09/30/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2015
____________________
1131027
____________________
Diversicare Leasing Corp. d/b/a Canterbury Healthcare
Facility
v.
Betty Hubbard, as the personal representative of the Estate
of Johnathan Hubbard 
Appeal from Russell Circuit Court
(CV-13-900029)
BOLIN, Justice.
Diversicare Leasing Corp. d/b/a Canterbury Healthcare
Facility ("Canterbury") appeals from an order denying its
motion 
seeking 
to compel arbitration of a wrongful-death claim
1131027
filed by Betty Hubbard, as the personal representative of the
estate of Johnathan Bernard Hubbard.  We affirm the order.
Facts and History
Johnathan Bernard Hubbard was diagnosed with cerebral
palsy when he was six months old, which caused him to be
developmentally delayed and to suffer from a 
seizure 
disorder. 
Betty Hubbard, Johnathan's mother, testified that it was
determined that Johnathan was "profoundly mentally retarded"
and totally dependant upon others for his care. Betty stated
that Johnathan could not walk and was confined to a wheelchair
his entire life; that he could not speak; that he could not
feed, clean, or dress himself; that he had no use of his
hands; and that he could not otherwise communicate his needs
to others.  Betty testified that Johnathan was like "an
infant" and that he then progressed to the capacity of a "pre-
toddler"  and that that was as far as "his mental capacity
went."
Johnathan 
spent 
various 
periods 
of 
his 
life 
in
residential-care facilities.  He was first admitted to a
residential-care facility when he was three years old, and he
stayed at that facility for almost two years.  Johnathan then
2
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returned home to live with his mother until he was
approximately 11 years old, at which time he returned to a 
residential-care facility for approximately 5 more years. 
Johnathan then returned home to live with his mother, where he
remained until 2009 when he was admitted to Canterbury, a
long-term-care nursing facility.    
Betty was Johnathan's sole custodial parent, and she made
all health-care-related decisions for him.  Betty 
executed all
Medicare and Medicaid documents relative to Johnathan's care
and maintained a bank account on his behalf.  Betty was the
payee on all government-related health-care benefit checks
received for Johnathan's care, and she also received child
support on behalf of Johnathan from Johnathan's father.  Betty
testified that each residential facility in which Johnathan
had resided looked to her for decision-making authority
regarding Johnathan's care. Betty further stated that the
nurses and aides who treated Johnathan in her home when he
resided with her also looked to her for decision-making
authority regarding Johnathan's care. Betty testified that at
the time Johnathan was admitted to Canterbury he was unable to
make decisions for himself and was unable to appoint another
3
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person to make decisions for him.  In sum, Betty made all
health-care decisions relating to Johnathan's care and
executed all documents in furtherance of that care.
In 2009, when Johnathan was 21 years old, Betty  could no
longer properly care for him at home, and she admitted
Johnathan to Canterbury.  Betty testified that she was
"adamant about 
[Johnathan's] getting care because he 
could 
not
come home to me."    Betty executed a number of documents upon
1
Johnathan's admission to Canterbury, including the admission
agreement and the arbitration agreement made the basis of this
appeal.  
Section 1 of the admission agreement provided:
"This Admission Agreement ('Agreement') states
the terms and conditions agreed to by you, Johnathan
Hubbard, your Responsible Party, Betty Hubbard and
Canterbury.
"In this Agreement 'you' and 'your' refers to
the person who wishes to become a resident at the
Facility, and the Facility refers to Canterbury.
"Your Responsible Party is your legal guardian,
if one has been appointed, or your Attorney-in-Fact,
if you have executed a power of attorney, or some
other individual or family member who agrees to
assist the Facility in providing for your healthcare
and 
maintenance. 
 
The 
obligations 
of 
your
Johnathan 
had 
been 
hospitalized 
for 
approximately 
20 
days
1
at the time Betty decided to admit him to Canterbury. 
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Responsible Party are described more fully in this
Agreement and in the Resident Handbook, both of
which you and your Responsible Party should read
carefully before signing this Agreement."
The 
admission 
agreement 
contained 
a 
section 
entitled
"Responsible 
Party," 
which 
provided 
that 
"[t]he 
person 
signing
this Agreement as your Responsible Party has the following
relationship(s) to the Resident (please check all that apply)
(If Legal Guardian, Attorney-In-Fact, Power of Attorney,
Health Care Agent, etc., Responsible Party must provide
documentation to that Effect.)" The admission agreement
provided several relationship options from which to choose,
including "spouse"; "relative"; "legal guardian"; "attorney-
in-fact"; "friend or interested person"; and "other."  Betty 
checked 
the 
"relative" 
option; 
thereafter, 
Betty 
indicated 
her
acceptance of the terms of the admission agreement by both
initialing and signing the document in the space designated
for the "Responsible Party."   
2
Paragraph 3 of the arbitration agreement provided:
Betty also signed other documents appended to the
2
admission agreement as part of Johnathan's admission to
Canterbury, including a patient-account fund authorization; a
beneficiary-designation form; billing authorizations; a bed-
hold policy; and a representative payee form. 
5
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"The claims or disputes covered by this
Agreement shall include any action, dispute or claim
of any kind between the Resident or Resident's
Representative, 
Resident's 
estate, 
successors,
assigns, heirs, personal representatives, executors
and administrators that relates in any way to
healthcare services or any other items or services
provided by [Canterbury], and agreements between the
Resident and [Canterbury], or any other aspect of
the past, present, or future relationships between
[Canterbury] and Resident.  This agreement shall
survive the death of the resident."
Paragraph 4 of the arbitration agreement provides that "[a]ny
and all disputes and claims described in paragraph 3 of this
agreement shall be resolved by binding arbitration."  The
arbitration agreement defines the "Resident's Representative"
as
"the resident's Legal Guardian, Attorney-in-Fact,
Power of Attorney, or Health Care Sponsor.  In the
event a representative with such legal authority
does not exist, the Resident may authorize a duly
appointed person such as the Responsible Party to
serve as his/her Representative and to sign this
agreement on his/her behalf."
The arbitration agreement defines the "Responsible Party" as
"an individual or family member who agrees to assist
[Canterbury] 
in 
providing 
for 
your 
healthcare 
and
maintenance."  On the signature page of the arbitration
agreement appeared three options as to how the resident could
execute the arbitration 
agreement. 
The first option  consisted
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1131027
simply of a signature line for the resident and two signature
lines for the required two witnesses.  The second option
provided as follows: "If Resident is unable to sign this
Agreement because of physical disability, Resident must
acknowledge consent to this Agreement and the acknowledgment
shall be executed by two witnesses."  This phrase was followed
by two witness lines.  The third option provided as follows:
"If Resident is unable to consent or sign this Agreement, this
Agreement shall be executed by Resident's Representative." 
Betty executed the document by signing her name on the line
provided for the "Resident's Representative."
Johnathan was found unresponsive by the Canterbury staff
on February 20, 2011, and was transferred to a local hospital.
Johnathan was diagnosed with sepsis; he died on February 21,
2011.  On January 17, 2013, Betty petitioned the Probate Court
of Russell County for letters of administration for
Johnathan's estate.  On January 23, 2013, the probate court
entered an order granting Betty's petition for letters of
administration and appointing her the administrator of
Johnathan's estate.  On February 15, 2013, Betty, as the
personal 
representative 
of 
Johnathan's 
estate, 
sued
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1131027
Canterbury, asserting a wrongful-death claim. On March 22,
2013, Canterbury moved the trial court to compel arbitration
of Betty's wrongful-death claim and to stay 
the 
wrongful-death
claim pending the arbitration.  Betty argued in response to
the motion to compel that she lacked the legal authority to
bind Johnathan to the arbitration agreement because at the
time the agreement was executed Johnathan was incapacitated
and was 21 years old and had reached the age of majority, and 
she did not hold his power of attorney nor had she been
appointed his personal representative or guardian by any
court.  Following a hearing, the trial court, on May 1, 2014,
entered an order denying Canterbury's motion to compel
arbitration and to stay the proceedings.  
Canterbury 
appealed. 
                     Standard of Review
This Court has stated:
"'[T]he standard of review of a trial court's
ruling on a motion to compel arbitration at the
instance of either party is a de novo determination
of whether the trial judge erred on a factual or
legal issue to the substantial prejudice of the
party seeking review.' Ex parte Roberson, 749 So. 2d
441, 446 (Ala. 1999). Furthermore:
"'A motion to compel arbitration is
analogous to a motion for summary judgment.
TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 739 So. 2d
8
1131027
1110, 1114 (Ala. 1999). The party seeking
to compel arbitration has the burden of
proving the existence of a contract calling
for arbitration and proving that that
contract evidences a transaction affecting
interstate commerce. Id. "After a motion to
compel arbitration has been made and
supported, the burden is on the non-movant
to present evidence that the supposed
arbitration agreement is not valid or does
not apply to the dispute in question."'
"Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Bruno, 784 So. 2d 277,
280 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Jim Burke Auto., Inc. v.
Beavers, 674 So. 2d 1260, 1265 n. 1 (Ala. 1995)
(emphasis omitted))."
Vann v. First Cmty. Credit Corp., 834 So. 2d 751, 752–53 (Ala.
2002). 
Discussion
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether Canterbury has
satisfied its burden of proving the existence of a contract
calling 
for 
arbitration. 
 More 
specifically, 
whether 
arbitration is enforceable in this case as to the wrongful-
death claim asserted by Betty on behalf of Johnathan's estate
where, because of his incapacity, Johnathan did not sign the
arbitration agreement.  Generally, "a nonsignatory to an
arbitration agreement cannot be forced to arbitrate [her]
claims." Cook's Pest Control, Inc. v. Boykin, 807 So. 2d 524,
9
1131027
526 (Ala. 2001). However, as with most general rules, there
are exceptions.  Justice Stuart has noted that this "Court has
created a distinct body of caselaw considering specifically
the issue how and when arbitration agreements executed by the
owners and operators of nursing homes and their residents
and/or their residents' family members should be enforced." 
SSC Montgomery Cedar Crest Operating Co. v. Bolding, 130 So.
3d 1194, 1196 (Ala. 2013).  See also Owens v. Coosa Valley
Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 983 (Ala. 2004); Briarcliff
Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661 (Ala. 2004);
Noland Health Servs., Inc. v. Wright, 971 So. 2d 681 (Ala.
2007); Carraway v. Beverly Enters. Alabama, Inc., 978 So. 2d
27 (Ala. 2007); and Tennessee Health Mgmt., Inc. v. Johnson,
49 So. 3d 175 (Ala. 2010).   Justice Stuart, citing the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit in Entrekin v. Internal Medicine Associates
of Dothan, P.A., 689 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2012), further
noted that that court had reviewed the 
above-mentioned 
caselaw
and correctly concluded "that the principle to be extracted
from these cases is that an arbitration agreement that binds
the 
nursing-home 
resident 
also 
binds 
the 
resident's
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representative."  Bolding, 130 So. 3d at 1196.  Therefore, it
is that principle that we will apply in determining the issues
presented in this appeal. 
Canterbury argues on appeal that the arbitration
agreement is enforceable as to Johnathan because, it says,
Betty had the authority, as Johnathan's parent, to act on his
behalf and thus bound Johnathan to the arbitration agreement
when she executed it as the "Resident's Representative." 
Further, Canterbury also argues that Betty herself is bound by
the arbitration agreement because she signed the agreement as
the "Resident's Representative" and subsequently brought the
wrongful-death claim as the personal representative of
Johnathan's estate.  Thus, Canterbury contends that Betty, as
a signatory to the arbitration agreement, has bound herself to
the arbitration agreement and must submit the wrongful-death
claim to arbitration.   
Betty responds by arguing that Canterbury has failed to
establish the existence of a binding arbitration agreement
because, she says, her signature on the arbitration agreement
was ineffective to bind Johnathan in that she did not have the
proper legal authority to bind Johnathan. Betty contends that
11
1131027
Johnathan was an incapacitated adult and that at the time he
was admitted to Canterbury she had not been given his power of
attorney and had not been previously appointed by a court of
competent jurisdiction as his guardian or conservator or
otherwise to handle his affairs.  Betty also argues that the
arbitration agreement is void on the ground that it is
unconscionable.  We address these arguments in turn. 
In Owens, supra, the nursing-home resident was admitted
to the  nursing home following a two-week hospitalization for
heart failure.  The resident signed no admission papers upon
being admitted to the nursing home.  Rather, the resident's 
admission to the nursing home was handled by her daughter, who
signed the relevant admission documents as the resident's
guardian 
and sponsor. One of the admission documents contained
an arbitration agreement. Subsequently, the resident sued the
nursing home, alleging that it had failed to provide adequate
care. Following the resident's death, her daughter, as
administrator 
of the resident's 
estate, was substituted as 
the
plaintiff.  The nursing home filed a motion to stay the
proceedings and to compel arbitration.  The trial court
granted the motion to compel arbitration. 
12
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The daughter argued on appeal, among other things, that
the trial court erred in granting the nursing home's motion to
compel arbitration because the resident did not sign the
arbitration agreement and therefore should not be bound by it.
In holding that the nursing-home resident was bound by the
arbitration agreement, this Court stated:
"[I]t is undisputed that [the daughter], on behalf
of [the resident], entered into the arbitration
agreement with [the nursing home]. The agreement
explicitly states that it is 'between [the nursing
home] .... and the undersigned Patient, Guardian and
Sponsor (hereinafter known as "Patient").' [The
resident] is clearly designated on the signature
page as the 'Patient'; [the daughter]  is clearly
designated on the signature page as both 'Guardian'
and 'Sponsor'; and the agreement states that '[t]he
meaning of "Patient" shall include Patient and his,
her or their sponsors, guardians, heirs, executors,
successors, and assigns.' There is no evidence
indicating that [the resident] had any objection to
[the daughter's] acting on her behalf in admitting
[the resident] to the nursing home. [The nursing
home] has met its burden of proving the existence of
a contract between [the nursing home] and [the
resident] calling for arbitration."
Owens, 890 So. 2d at 987.  Nothing in Owens indicated that the
resident was in any way mentally incapacitated.  Further,
important to this Court's analysis in Owens was the fact that
the evidence indicated that the resident had no objection to
her daughter's acting on her behalf. 
13
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In Briarcliff, supra, Noella Turcotte and Sarah Carter
were admitted to the Briarcliff nursing home.  David Turcotte
and Kyra Woodman completed the admission documents on behalf
of Noella and Sarah, respectively; one document included an
arbitration agreement.  David signed the admission agreement
for Noella in his capacity as "Fiduciary Party."  Kyra signed
the admission agreement relating to Sarah in her capacities as
"Fiduciary Party" and "Attorney–In–Fact under [a] validly
executed power of attorney."  Subsequently, David and Kyra, in
their capacities as the personal representatives of the
estates of Noella and Sarah, separately sued Briarcliff for
the alleged wrongful deaths of Noella and Sarah.  Briarcliff
moved to compel arbitration on the ground that agents for
Noella and Sarah had signed admission contracts that contained
an arbitration provision.  David and Kyra  opposed the motions
to compel arbitration, arguing that neither of them, in their
capacities as executor and administratrix, respectively, of
the deceased estates had signed or had otherwise entered into
the admission contracts and that the "fiduciary parties" who
signed the admission contracts on behalf of  Noella and Sarah
while they were alive could not contractually bind the then
14
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nonexistent wrongful-death claims to arbitration.  The trial
court denied Briarcliff's motions to compel arbitration. 
Briarcliff 
filed 
separate 
appeals, 
and 
this 
Court 
consolidated
the appeals because they raised identical issues. 
In concluding that David and Kyra, in their capacities as
the personal representatives of the estates of Noella and
Sarah, 
were bound to arbitrate the wrongful-death claims, 
this
Court stated:
"In SouthTrust Bank [v. Ford, 835 So. 2d 990
(Ala. 2002)], the underlying dispute involved
SouthTrust's negligent cashing of a check on Edwin
Edwards's account. Edwards died before the dispute
was resolved, and Melody Ford, his daughter, as the
administratrix of Edwards's estate, sued SouthTrust
alleging that it had negligently cashed the check.
She also sued SouthTrust in her individual capacity,
asserting related claims. The deposit agreement that
governed Edwards's account at SouthTrust contained
an arbitration provision. On the basis of that
provision, SouthTrust moved to compel arbitration;
the trial court denied the motion. SouthTrust
appealed, and this Court found that 'Melody's claim
to recover the value of the improperly paid check is
subject to arbitration because she is asserting that
claim in her role as the administratrix of Edwards's
estate.' Id. at 994. We further stated:
"'We recognize that an administratrix
of a decedent's estate stands in the shoes
of the decedent. We also recognize that the
"[p]owers [of an executor], in collecting
the debts constituting the assets of the
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estate, are just as broad as those of the
deceased." For the same reason the powers
of 
an 
executor 
or 
an 
administrator
encompasses all of those formerly held by
the decedent, those powers must likewise be
restricted in the same manner and to the
same extent as the powers of the decedent
would have been. Thus, where an executor or
administrator asserts a claim on behalf of
the estate, he or she must also abide by
the terms of any valid agreement, including
an arbitration agreement, entered into by
the decedent.'
"Id. at 993–94 (citations omitted). Therefore, in
this case, Turcotte, as executor of Noella's estate,
and Woodman, as administratrix of Sarah's estate,
are bound by the arbitration provisions contained in
the admission contracts."
Briarcliff, 894 So. 2d at 664-65. Again, nothing in Briarcliff
indicated that the nursing-home residents were mentally
incapacitated and not capable of acquiescing to the
individuals' acting on their behalf by signing the admitting
documents and binding the residents to the arbitration
provision.  
This Court next decided Noland Health, supra, a plurality
opinion, in which the resident, who was suffering from
dementia related to Alzheimer's disease, was admitted to the
nursing home while  accompanied by her daughter-in-law.  The
resident's daughter-in-law completed the admission agreement
16
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on the resident's behalf. The admission agreement contained an
arbitration provision. 
The admission agreement had a 
page that 
contained blank spaces for identification of the parties. In
the space for identifying the "Resident," the daughter-in-law
wrote in the resident's name.  The space designated for
"Resident's Legal Representative (if applicable)" was left
blank. The space designated for the "Resident's Responsible
Party (if applicable)" was signed by the daughter-in-law. The
last page of the agreement, the signature page, contained
lines with the identical designations. The spaces designated
for the signatures of the "Resident" and the "Resident's Legal
Representative 
(if 
applicable)" 
were 
left 
blank. 
The 
daughter-
in-law signed in the space designated for the "Resident's
Responsible Party (if applicable)." 
Subsequently, the resident fell on a couple of occasions
and suffered injuries to her hip and neck.  In January 2005,
a complaint was filed against the nursing home by the resident
individually, and by her son and daughter-in-law as her next
friends, alleging that she had received negligent and
substandard care and treatment at the nursing home. The
resident died in February 2005.  Thereafter, Peter Wright, as
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administrator of the resident's estate, amended the complaint
to add a wrongful-death claim.  The nursing home moved to
compel arbitration; the trial court denied the motion. 
The nursing home appealed, arguing that the arbitration
provision was enforceable against Wright as the resident's
personal representative, notwithstanding the fact that the
resident did not personally sign the admission agreement
because, it said, the resident's daughter-in-law had signed
the admission agreement on the resident's behalf as the 
"responsible party." Wright, however, argued that the
daughter-in-law's 
signature 
on 
the 
agreement 
as 
the
"responsible party" was ineffective to bind the resident to
the arbitration provision in the agreement. 
In concluding that the admission agreement signed by the
resident's daughter-in-law did not bind the resident, a
plurality of this Court explained:
"It is undisputed that when [the daughter-in-
law] was given the option to sign the agreement as
a 
'responsible 
party' 
or 
as 
a 
'legal
representative,' she chose the former option. The
agreement explained that '[a] Legal Representative
is an individual who, under independent legal
authority, such as a court order[,] has authority to
act on the Resident's behalf' and listed 'a
guardian, a conservator, and the holder of a Durable
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Power of Attorney executed by the Resident' as
examples of legal representatives.
"Wright contends that at the time of [the
resident's] admission to the nursing home, [the
daughter-in-law] 'did not hold power of attorney for
[the resident], was not her guardian, and had never
been appointed by [the resident] or by a court of
competent jurisdiction to handle the affairs' of her
mother-in-law....
"....
"... 
[I]n 
executing 
the 
agreement 
[the 
daughter-
in-law] did not sign [the resident's] name in any
purported capacity and did not purport to be [the
resident's] legal representative. [The daughter-in-
law's] signatory role was, therefore, effectively
that of a 'next friend,' who 'voluntarily agree[d]
to honor certain specified obligations' of her
mother-in-law. ... It has long been established in
this State, however, that one who purports to act
merely as a 'next friend' of a 'non compos mentis'
is 'wholly without authority to make any contract
that would bind her or her estate.' Page v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 129 Ala. 232, 238, 29
So. 676, 678 (1901).
"In that connection, the trial court found that
'[the resident] was not competent at the time her
daughter-in-law signed the contract of admission in
this case.' ... Indeed, there is no conflict in the
evidence, which includes medical reports as to [the
resident's] 
mental 
capacity. 
One 
such 
report
describes [the resident] 'an 86 year old demented
female' ... who was '[n]ot oriented to person, place
or time.' In another medical report, she is
described as 'always confused.' Thus, we conclude
that [the daughter-in-law's] signature in the
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capacity of a next friend, or 'responsible party,'
was ineffective to bind [the resident] or her
personal representative to the agreement."
Noland, 971 So. 2d at 685-86 (emphasis omitted).  
The decision in Noland is clearly distinguishable from
the decisions in Briarcliff and Owens, in that the resident in
Noland was mentally incapacitated and could not consent to her
daughter-in-law, who had not been appointed her legal
representative, acting on her behalf by signing the admission
documents and thereby 
binding 
her to the arbitration provision
contained in the admission agreement.  The residents in both
Briarcliff and Owens did not suffer from any mental
incapacities 
or 
infirmities that 
prevented 
them 
from
acquiescing to individuals' acting on their behalf in
executing the admission documents that bound them to the
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arbitration provision.  This distinguishing factor is further 
3
highlighted in subsequent cases decided by this Court.
In Carraway, supra, Richard Carraway executed a number of
documents on behalf of his sister, Shirley Carraway, as her
authorized representative when she was admitted to a nursing
home. Shortly after she was admitted as a resident into the
nursing home, Shirley executed a durable power of attorney,
naming Richard as her attorney-in-fact. Shirley subsequently
died, and Richard brought a wrongful-death claim against the
nursing home. The nursing home moved the trial court to compel
arbitration, and the trial court granted the motion.  Richard
appealed.
Richard argued on appeal that the nursing home had failed
to establish the existence of a valid arbitration agreement
between Shirley and the nursing home because Shirley did not
The plurality Court in Noland also distinguished that
3
case from Briarcliff on the additional ground that the
personal representatives in Briarcliff were also signatories
to 
the 
arbitration 
agreement, 
whereas 
the 
personal
representative in Noland was not a signatory to the
arbitration agreement.  The fact that Betty signed the
arbitration agreement on behalf of Johnathan and then
subsequently brought the wrongful-death claim as Johnathan’s
personal representative forms the basis of Canterbury’s
argument that Betty is bound to the agreement.  This issue
will be discussed in more detail infra. 
21
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sign the arbitration agreement herself.  In concluding that a
binding arbitration agreement existed between Shirley and the
nursing home even though Shirley did not sign the agreement,
this Court stated:
"Just as Richard signed all the other documents
relating to Shirley's admission into the nursing
home on Shirley's behalf, Richard signed the
arbitration agreement on Shirley's behalf expressly
as 
an 
'authorized 
representative.' 
Apparent
authority 'is implied where the principal passively
permits the agent to appear to a third person to
have the authority to act on [her] behalf.'
Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Courtesy Auto Brokers, Inc.,
426 So. 2d 859, 861 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983). 'It is
not essential that the right of control be exercised
so long as that right actually exists.' Wood
Chevrolet Co. v. Bank of the Southeast, 352 So. 2d
1350, 1352 (Ala. 1977). There is no evidence
indicating that Shirley had any objection to
Richard's acting on her behalf in admitting Shirley
to the nursing home. On the contrary, the evidence
suggests that Shirley approved of her brother's
acting on her behalf. A few weeks into Shirley's
residency at the nursing home, she executed a power
of attorney, giving Richard further authority to act
on her behalf. The arbitration agreement did not
call for the signature of a legal representative;
instead, it provided that 'a person duly authorized
by the Resident' could sign the agreement on the
resident's behalf."
Carraway, 978 So. 2d at 30-31.
In Johnson, supra, Dolores J. Rousseau was admitted to 
a nursing home on January 26, 2008, following hip-replacement
22
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surgery.  Barbara Rousseau, Dolores’s daughter, signed
numerous forms, including an arbitration agreement, on
Dolores's behalf upon her admittance to the nursing home.
Barbara signed the admission forms in the various capacities
of the patient's representative, the patient or a responsible
party, 
the 
resident's 
representative, 
the 
resident/family, 
the
family or legal representative, the legal representative, or
the responsible family member. Dolores never objected to
Barbara's signing the various admission forms on her behalf,
and there was nothing to indicate that Dolores was mentally
incompetent when she was admitted to the nursing home. Dolores
was discharged from the nursing home six days later on
February 1, 2008. 
On May 23, 2008, Dolores, acting through Barbara as her
next friend, sued the nursing home, alleging negligence,
wantonness, and breach of contract.  Dolores alleged that
while she was a resident of the nursing home she suffered
dehydration, 
a 
urinary-tract 
infection, 
an 
abdominal 
blockage,
and other bodily injuries, as well as mental anguish and
emotional distress. The nursing home moved to compel
arbitration. 
Dolores 
opposed 
the 
motion 
to 
compel 
arbitration, 
23
1131027
arguing that Barbara did not have a power of attorney over her
and had no any other legal basis for signing her name to the
various 
admission 
documents; 
that 
Barbara 
signed 
the 
admitting
paperwork in her individual capacity; and that Dolores did not
sign the admitting paperwork and did not direct Barbara to
sign the paperwork.  The trial court denied the motion to
compel arbitration.  In June 2008, Dolores died, and another
daughter, Carol J. Rousseau Johnson, as Dolores's personal
representative, amended the complaint to add a wrongful-death
claim against the nursing home. The nursing home renewed its
motion to compel arbitration, which the trial court again
denied. 
The nursing home argued on appeal that Barbara had the
apparent authority to sign the arbitration agreement for
Dolores 
because, it argued, Barbara had represented herself 
on
the admission documents as someone who had the legal authority
to bind Dolores and because Dolores did not object to 
Barbara's signing the admission documents on her behalf. 
Carol
argued, among other things, that Dolores was not bound by the
arbitration agreement because she did not sign it. In holding
24
1131027
that Dolores was bound to the arbitration agreement signed on
her behalf by Barbara, this Court explained:
"Carol also argues that Dolores is not bound by
the ADR [alternative dispute resolution] agreement
because she did not sign it and she was not present
when Barbara signed it. Barbara's claims, if any,
may be subject to arbitration, Carol argues, but as
a nonsignatory to the agreement, Dolores could not
be forced to arbitrate her claims. Carol relies upon
Noland Health Services, Inc. v. Wright, 971 So. 2d
681 (Ala. 2007). In Noland, a plurality of this
Court held that a daughter-in-law's signature as the
responsible party on a nursing-home arbitration
agreement was ineffective to bind the resident to
the agreement. Noland is distinguishable from this
case, however, because the nursing-home resident in
Noland was mentally incompetent and could not
authorize anyone to act on her behalf and because
the daughter-in-law did not sign any document in the
capacity 
of 
her 
mother-in-law's 
legal
representative."
49 So. 3d at 180-81 (emphasis added).  Thus, Dolores was bound
to the arbitration agreement, despite not actually having
signed the arbitration agreement, because she was mentally
competent and capable of authorizing Barbara to act on her
behalf in signing the agreement. 
In Bolding, supra, also a plurality opinion, Norton Means
was admitted to a nursing home for rehabilitation and nursing
services while he recovered from stroke- and/or heart-attack-
like symptoms.  Means was accompanied by his daughter,
25
1131027
Michelle Pleasant, who completed the admitting paperwork on
his behalf. Among the paperwork completed and signed by
Pleasant was an arbitration agreement. Pleasant signed her
name on the arbitration agreement on a line indicated for the
"Signature of Legal Representative or Family Member." 
Subsequently, Means was readmitted to the hospital. Linda
Bolding, another of Means's daughters to whom he had
previously granted a durable power of attorney, sued the
nursing home alleging that the nursing home had negligently
cared for Means, resulting in his suffering dehydration,
malnourishment, and an untreated infection that resulted in
his readmission to the hospital. The nursing home moved to
compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the arbitration
agreement. Bolding responded by arguing that the arbitration
agreement was unenforceable as to Means because Pleasant had
no legal authority to act on his behalf at the time she
executed the arbitration agreement.  The trial court entered
an order denying the motion to compel arbitration. The nursing
home appealed.
In affirming the denial of the motion to compel
arbitration and holding that the arbitration agreement signed
26
1131027
by Pleasant on behalf of Means was ineffective to bind Means,
Justice Stuart aptly explained the distinguishing principle
between arbitration agreements signed on behalf of competent
nursing-home residents and arbitration agreements signed on
behalf of mentally incompetent nursing-home residents, making
clear this Court's treatment of the two:
"The only evidence before the Court in this case
indicates that Means was mentally incompetent when
he was admitted to [the nursing home] and the DRA
[dispute resolution agreement] 
was executed; indeed,
[the nursing home] does not even argue that he was
competent at any relevant time. ...
"Children and the mentally incompetent have
traditionally been treated differently under the law
than the standard competent adult. See, e.g., Ex
parte E.R.G., 73 So. 3d 634, 678 (Ala. 2011) (Main,
J., dissenting) ('The state necessarily injects
itself into the affairs of children and the mentally
incompetent when they are in need of protection
because their developmental differences and their
environmental restraints render them more vulnerable
than competent adults.'). And, while we have held
that competent residents of nursing homes may be
bound by arbitration agreements executed by their
representatives, see, e.g., Carraway, 978 So. 2d at
30–31, and Johnson, 49 So. 3d at 176, our cases also
indicate that incompetent residents are not so
bound. In Noland Health Services, we considered
whether the administrator of Dorothy Willis's estate
was 
bound 
to 
arbitrate 
personal-injury 
and
wrongful-death 
claims 
stemming 
from 
Dorothy's
treatment at a nursing home pursuant to an
arbitration provision in a contract executed by
Dorothy's 
daughter-in-law, 
Vicky 
Willis, 
when
27
1131027
Dorothy was admitted to the nursing home. 971 So. 2d
at 683. A plurality of the Court agreed with the
trial court's finding that Dorothy was incompetent
when the contract was signed and that Vicky's
signature as the 'responsible party' or next friend
on that contract 'was ineffective to bind Dorothy or
her personal representative to the agreement.' 971
So. 2d at 686. In support of that conclusion, the
plurality opinion quoted Page v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R., 129 Ala. 232, 238, 29 So. 676, 678
(1901), for the proposition that 'one who purports
to act merely as a "next friend" of a "non compos
mentis" is "wholly without authority to make any
contract that would bind her or her estate."' 
Noland Health Servs., 971 So. 2d at 686.
"Of course, Noland Health Services was a
plurality opinion, and its precedential value is
accordingly limited. Ex parte Achenbach, 783 So. 2d
4, 7 (Ala. 2000). However, this Court subsequently
recognized the principle for which Noland Health
Services is now cited in Johnson. In Johnson,
Tennessee Health Management ('THM') appealed the
denial of its motion to enforce an arbitration
agreement against Carol Rousseau Johnson, who was
prosecuting 
personal-injury 
and 
wrongful-death
claims against THM in her capacity as the personal
representative of the estate of Dolores Rousseau,
who allegedly was injured while a resident of a
nursing home operated by THM. 49 So. 3d at 176. When
Dolores was admitted to that nursing home, her
daughter Barbara Rousseau had signed an arbitration
agreement with THM, but '[t]here is no evidence
indicating that Dolores ... was mentally incompetent
when she was admitted....' 49 So. 3d at 176–77.
Citing Noland Health Services, Carol subsequently
argued to this Court that Dolores was not bound by
the arbitration agreement because she had not signed
it. 49 So. 3d at 180. This Court rejected her
argument, distinguishing Noland Health Services as
follows:
28
1131027
"'Carol 
relies 
upon 
Noland 
Health 
Services,
Inc. v. Wright, 971 So. 2d 681 (Ala. 2007).
In Noland, a plurality of this Court held
that a daughter-in-law's signature as the
responsible 
party 
on 
a 
nursing-home
arbitration agreement was ineffective to
bind the resident to the agreement. Noland
is 
distinguishable 
from 
this 
case, 
however,
because 
the 
nursing-home 
resident 
in 
Noland
was mentally incompetent and could not
authorize anyone to act on her behalf and
because the daughter-in-law did not sign
any document in the capacity of her
mother-in-law's legal representative.'
"Johnson, 49 So. 3d at 180–81. We thereafter held
that the arbitration agreement executed by Barbara
did bind Dolores and was therefore enforceable
against Carol, thus recognizing the distinction
between arbitration agreements signed on behalf of
nursing-home residents who are incompetent and those
signed on behalf of nursing-home residents who are
competent. 49 So. 3d at 181.
"[The nursing home] argues that Noland Health
Services is distinguishable inasmuch as Vicky Willis
did not sign the contract containing the arbitration
provision in Noland Health Services as Dorothy's
legal representative, while, [the nursing home]
asserts, Pleasant did sign the DRA as Means's legal
representative. We disagree, however, with [the
nursing home's] assertion that Pleasant signed the
DRA as Means's legal representative. The signature
block on the DRA indicates that Pleasant signed the
DRA as 'Legal Representative or Family Member.'
(Emphasis added.) Moreover, although the paragraph
above the signature line indicates that the signer
of the document is asserting that he or she has 'the
authority to sign the agreement on [the resident's]
behalf,' merely claiming to have legal authority on
someone else's behalf or claiming to be someone
29
1131027
else's legal representative does not make it so. It
is undisputed that Pleasant has never held a power
of attorney for Means, and she also stated in an
affidavit submitted to the trial court that she was
granted 'no legal authority by him or anyone else to
enter into the [DRA] on his behalf.'
"[The nursing home] argues in the alternative
that the doctrine of apparent authority should
nevertheless bind Means, and by extension Bolding,
to the DRA. In Carraway, we applied the doctrine of
apparent authority to hold that Shirley Carraway, a
nursing-home resident, was bound by an arbitration
agreement signed by her brother Richard Carraway:
"'Just as Richard signed all the other
documents relating to Shirley's admission
into the nursing home on Shirley's behalf,
Richard 
signed 
the 
arbitration 
agreement 
on
Shirley's 
behalf 
expressly 
as 
an
"authorized 
representative." 
Apparent
authority "is implied where the principal
passively permits the agent to appear to a
third person to have the authority to act
on [her] behalf." Treadwell Ford, Inc. v.
Courtesy Auto Brokers, Inc., 426 So. 2d
859, 861 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983). "It is not
essential that the right of control be
exercised so long as that right actually
exists." Wood Chevrolet Co. v. Bank of the
Southeast, 352 So. 2d 1350, 1352 (Ala.
1977). There is no evidence indicating that
Shirley had any objection to Richard's
acting on her behalf in admitting Shirley
to the nursing home. On the contrary, the
evidence suggests that Shirley approved of
her brother's acting on her behalf. A few
weeks into Shirley's residency at the
nursing home, she executed a power of
attorney, giving Richard further authority
to act on her behalf.'
30
1131027
"978 So. 2d at 30–31. We likewise applied the
doctrine of apparent authority in Johnson, stating
that Dolores 'passively permitted Barbara to appear
to THM to have the authority to act on her behalf,
and Barbara's apparent authority is, therefore,
implied.' 49 So. 3d at 180. However, in both
Carraway and Johnson the nursing-home resident was
competent and effectively acquiesced to and/or
ratified the decisions made by their respective
representative, thus making the application of the
apparent-authority doctrine appropriate.
"In contrast, the only evidence in the record in
this case indicates that Means is incompetent and
thus unable to empower an agent, whether passively
or through affirmative acts. See Johnson, 49 So. 3d
at 180–81 ('[T]he nursing-home resident in Noland
was mentally incompetent and could not authorize
anyone to act on her behalf....'). Thus, at best
Pleasant may have purported to be Means's legal
representative, but that is an insufficient basis
upon which to apply the doctrine of apparent
authority. Northington v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 445
So. 2d 283, 286 (Ala. 1984) ('[I]n order for a
principal to be held liable under the doctrine of
apparent authority and estoppel, the principal must
have engaged in some conduct which led a third party
to believe that the agent had authority to act for
the principal.' (emphasis added)). See also Gray v.
Great American Reserve Ins. Co., 495 So. 2d 602, 607
(Ala. 1986) (noting that one cannot 'blindly trust'
another's statements regarding the extent of his or
her agent power), and City Stores Co. v. Williams,
287 Ala. 385, 391, 252 So. 2d 45, 51 (1971) ('The
burden of proving agency rests upon the party
asserting it.').
"In conclusion, we hold that Means was not bound
by the DRA executed by Pleasant; therefore, Bolding
was not bound. However, we emphasize that this
conclusion is not reached because Means did not
31
1131027
personally execute the DRA. Rather, it is because
all the evidence in the record indicates that Means
is incompetent. Thus, while Bolding, as the holder
of a durable power of attorney granted by Means, may
have been able to bind him to an arbitration
agreement, Pleasant, as merely a family member or
next friend, could not."
Bolding, 130 So. 3d at 1196-99 (final emphasis added).
Here, it is undisputed that at the time Johnathan was
admitted to Canterbury he was 21 years old  and mentally
4
incompetent.  All the evidence indicates that Johnathan had
the mental capacity of "an infant" or a "toddler" and that he
was totally dependant upon others for his care because he was
confined to a wheelchair; he had no use of his hands; he could
not speak; and he could not feed, clean, or dress himself.
Because Johnathan was mentally incompetent at the time Betty
executed the arbitration agreement, he cannot be bound to the
agreement since he was incapable of authorizing or empowering
Betty to act on his behalf.  Bolding, supra; Noland, supra;
and Johnson, supra.
The age of majority to contract in Alabama is 19 years
4
old.  See Stinson v. Larson, 893 So. 2d 462 (Ala. Civ. App.
2004).  
32
1131027
Furthermore, Betty was without the legal authority or
capacity to bind Johnathan to the arbitration agreement. The
arbitration agreement
provided that "[i]f [the] Resident is
unable to consent or sign this Agreement, this Agreement shall
be 
executed 
by [the] Resident's Representative." The
arbitration agreement defined the "Resident's Representative"
as
"the resident's Legal Guardian, Attorney-in-Fact,
Power of Attorney, or Health Care Sponsor.  In the
event a representative with such legal authority
does not exist, the Resident may authorize a duly
appointed person such as the Responsible Party[ ] to
5
The admission agreement defined "Responsible Party" as
5
the resident's "legal guardian, if one has been appointed, or
your Attorney-in-Fact, if you have executed a power of
attorney, or some other individual or family member who agrees
to assist the Facility in providing for your healthcare and
maintenance."  The admission agreement contained a section
entitled "Responsible Party" in which the individual signing
the agreement as the "Responsible Party" was to indicate his
or her relationship to the resident.  The admission agreement
provided 
the 
signatory 
several 
relationship 
options 
from 
which
to choose, including "spouse"; "relative"; "legal guardian";
"attorney-in-fact"; "friend or interested person"; and
"other."  The "Responsible Party" was to check each option
that was applicable to describe the relationship status of the
resident and "Responsible Party."  Betty indicated her
relationship status to Johnathan by checking only the
"relative" option and signed the admission agreement on 
behalf
of Johnathan as the "Responsible Party."  
33
1131027
serve as his/her Representative and to sign this
agreement on his/her behalf."
(Emphasis added.)  Betty executed the 
arbitration 
agreement by
signing her name as the "Resident's Representative."  It is
undisputed that, once Johnathan had reached the age of
majority, Betty had never been given Johnathan's power of
attorney, health-care sponsorship, or attorney-in-fact and
that she had not been appointed by a court of competent
jurisdiction as his legal guardian, conservator, 
or 
the holder
of any protective orders.    Thus, according to the express
6
It 
is 
undisputed 
that 
Johnathan 
was 
an 
adult
6
incapacitated person.  The Alabama Uniform Guardianship and
Protective Proceedings Act, § 26-2A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975,
provides options for the care and financial needs of an adult
incapacitated person.  Section 26-2A-102(e), Ala. Code 1975, 
provides:
"The custodial parent or parents or an adult
custodial sibling of an adult child who is
incapacitated 
by 
reason 
of 
an 
intellectual
disability, may file, in lieu of a petition, a
written request [to the probate court] to be
appointed guardian of his or her adult child or his
or her adult sibling in order to continue performing
custodial and other parental responsibilities or
family responsibilities, or both responsibilities,
for the child after the child has passed his or her
minority." 
Section 
26-2A-136(b)(3), 
Ala. 
Code 
1975, 
regarding
conservatorships and other protective orders also provides: 
34
1131027
terms of the arbitration agreement, in order for Betty to act
on Johnathan's behalf and to sign the arbitration agreement he
was required to "authorize a duly appointed person such as the
Responsible Party to serve as his/her Representative." As
discussed above, it is undisputed that Johnathan was mentally
incompetent and was incapable of authorizing Betty to act on
his behalf. Thus, Betty did not bind Johnathan to the
arbitration agreement by signing it in her capacity as the
"Resident's Representative." Bolding, supra; Noland, supra;
and Johnson, supra.
Accordingly, we agree with the reasoning in Noland and
Bolding, as well as the holding in Johnson, and we conclude
that Johnathan could not be bound to the arbitration agreement
because he was mentally incompetent and incapable of
authorizing Betty, who did not otherwise hold or possess the
"After hearing and upon determining that a basis for
an appointment or other protective order exists with
respect to a person for reasons other than minority,
the court, for the benefit of the person ... has all
the powers over the estate and business affairs
which the person could exercise if present and not
under disability. ... [T]hese powers include ...
power ... to enter into contracts." 
 
35
1131027
proper legal authority, to act on his behalf in executing the
arbitration agreement. 
Relying upon the decision in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
Chapman, 90 So. 3d 774 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012), Canterbury next 
argues that because Betty was a signatory to the arbitration
agreement 
in 
the 
capacity 
of 
Johnathan's 
"Resident
Representative," she is now bound to the agreement in her
capacity as Johnathan's personal representative.  Thus,
Canterbury 
contends, 
the 
wrongful-death 
claim 
brought 
by 
Betty
on behalf of Johnathan's estate must be submitted to
arbitration.  We disagree. 
In Chapman, a father, as the administrator of his
daughter's estate, brought a wrongful-death action against a 
bank alleging that the bank impermissibly had allowed the
daughter to access funds held in a certificate of deposit
("CD") –- which the father held in his name as the custodian
for the daughter  –-  that she then used to purchase illegal
drugs on which she eventually overdosed and died.  The bank
moved the trial court to compel arbitration on the basis that
the father was a signatory to an arbitration agreement that
was executed in conjunction with the issuance of the CD. The
36
1131027
trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, and the
bank appealed.  The father argued, among other things, that he
was not required to submit the wrongful-death claim to
arbitration because, he said, the arbitration agreement did
not apply to the wrongful-death claim since that claim was not
his daughter's to assert, and, therefore, she could not agree
to arbitrate that claim. Chapman, supra.  In concluding that
the father, as the administrator of the daughter's estate,
must submit the wrongful-death claim to arbitration, 
the 
Court
of Civil Appeals explained:
"We assume that [the father] advances this
argument because [he] contends that he did not sign
the SouthTrust signature card and that he is
therefore not bound by the SouthTrust arbitration
agreement. We have concluded that the evidence
establishes that [the father] did sign the signature
card, however; therefore, we need not determine
whether Carraway and [Briarcliff] stand for the
proposition that a decedent may agree to arbitrate
a wrongful-death claim arising from his or her own
death. Instead, we may rely on [the father's] being
a signatory to the SouthTrust arbitration agreement
to compel him to arbitrate the wrongful-death claim
like the personal representatives in Carraway and
[Briarcliff]."
Chapman, 90 So. 3d at 782.  Thus, because the evidence
indicated that the father had previously signed the
arbitration agreement, the Court of Civil Appeals concluded
37
1131027
that the father was bound to arbitrate the wrongful-death
claim asserted in the father's representative capacity as the
administrator of his daughter's estate.  This conclusion
represents a misapprehension of the foregoing caselaw, which
defined the principle that an arbitration agreement that binds
a 
nursing-home 
resident 
also 
binds 
the 
resident's
representative.  Bolding, supra.   
7
As mentioned earlier, in holding that the personal
representative was not required to submit the wrongful-death
claim to arbitration, the Noland plurality distinguished that
case from Briarcliff on a second ground, noting that the
executors in Briarcliff were signatories to the arbitration
agreement, whereas the executor in Noland had not signed the
arbitration agreement.  The conclusion drawn was that, where
an individual has previously signed an arbitration agreement
on behalf of a nursing-home resident and then subsequently
brings a wrongful-death claim on behalf of that nursing-home
resident in the individual's capacity as the nursing-home
resident's personal representative, that individual could be
This misinterpretation notwithstanding this Court is not
7
bound by the decisions of the Court of Civil Appeals.  See
generally § 12-3-16, Ala. Code 1975.
38
1131027
bound to the arbitration agreement he or she signed before the
nursing-home resident's death and his or her appointment as
the personal representative.  
In Entrekin, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit explained how the second ground upon which
Noland was distinguished from Briarcliff is contrary to the
principle that an arbitration agreement that binds a
nursing-home 
resident 
also 
binds 
the 
resident's
representative, a principle this Court has defined from the
body of caselaw specifically addressing the issue of how and
when arbitration agreements are binding upon nursing-home
residents and their family members.  The Entrekin court
explained:
"This part of the Noland plurality opinion, the
positing of a second distinction between that case
and the Briarcliff and Carraway cases, is where the
wrinkle arises. That second distinction appears to
rest on the novel premise that an agent who signs a
contract on behalf of a principal binds not only the
principal but also the agent himself in another
capacity –- even if the agent has not yet acquired
that other capacity (e.g., an executor who is not
yet an executor because the decedent-to-be is not
yet deceased). That is the same premise that the
district court relied on in denying Westside
Terrace's motion to compel arbitration. Applying
that premise here would lead to the conclusion that
the executor is not bound by the agreement that
39
1131027
Entrekin signed because the executor himself did not
sign it.
"We are not bound to apply that premise from the
Noland plurality opinion, however, because it is
only a plurality opinion. ... 
"....
"Not only that, but a later decision of the
Alabama Supreme Court vitiated whatever persuasive
value the second premise of the Noland plurality
opinion might otherwise have had. The case is
Tennessee Health Management, Inc. v. Johnson, 49 So.
3d 175 (Ala. 2010). A daughter, acting as her
mother's personal and legal representative, signed
all nursing home admissions forms on her mother's
behalf. Id. at 176. The daughter later sued the
nursing home on her mother's behalf alleging that
her mother suffered various injuries during her stay
at the nursing home. Id. at 177. The mother died
while that lawsuit was pending, and a different
daughter became the executor of the mother's estate.
Compare id. at 176 (identifying 'Barbara Rousseau'
as the pre-mortem personal representative who signed
the arbitration agreement), with id. at 178
(identifying 'Carol J. Rousseau Johnson' as the
executor of the estate). As executor, that different
daughter filed an amended complaint against the
nursing home, adding a wrongful death claim alleging
that the various injuries 'resulted in [the
resident's] death.' Id. at 178. When the nursing
home moved to compel arbitration, the executor
objected on the ground that the decedent was 'not
bound by the [arbitration] agreement' because she
had not signed it and 'was not present' when her
daughter signed it on her behalf, as her personal
and legal representative. Id. at 180.
40
1131027
"Relying on the Carraway decision, which
followed the simple rule from Briarcliff that an
arbitration agreement that binds a decedent binds
the executor of her estate, the Alabama Supreme
Court in Johnson quickly disposed of the executor's
argument. See id. at 181. It held that one reason
the decedent was bound by the arbitration agreement
was that her daughter had signed it on her behalf as
her 
legal 
representative. 
Id. 
The 
Court
distinguished 
the 
Noland 
case 
'because 
the
nursing-home 
resident 
in 
Noland 
was 
mentally
incompetent and could not authorize anyone to act on
her behalf and because the daughter-in-law did not
sign 
any 
document 
in 
the 
capacity 
of 
her
mother-in-law's 
legal 
representative.' 
Id. 
at
180–81. In the case before it, the Johnson Court
concluded that the daughter who signed the nursing
home admission forms, including the arbitration
agreement, 'had the apparent authority to bind [her
mother]' when she signed those documents because the
evidence showed that the mother 'passively permitted
[her daughter] to act on her behalf.' Id. at 181.
"Because the signature of the daughter as
pre-mortem personal representative of the mother
bound the mother to the contract in Johnson, there
was 'a valid contract calling for arbitration'
between the decedent and the nursing home. Id. And
because there was a valid contract between the
decedent 
and 
the 
nursing 
home 
calling 
for
arbitration, '[t]he trial court erred in denying the
motion to compel arbitration' of the wrongful death
and other claims brought by the executor (a
different daughter, who never signed the agreement
in any capacity). Id.
"The Alabama Supreme Court's reasoning in
Johnson mirrors its reasoning in Briarcliff and
Carraway: the executors in each case had to
arbitrate the wrongful death claim because there was
a valid arbitration agreement between the decedent
41
1131027
and the nursing home. That reasoning and those
holdings are inconsistent with the second premise
articulated in the Noland plurality opinion, which
is that executors who sign an arbitration agreement
on behalf of a resident are bound by the agreement
as executors but those who do not sign it on behalf
of a resident are not. In Johnson the executor did
not sign the arbitration agreement in any capacity
and 
thus 
was 
not 
a 
'signatory 
personal
representative,' yet the Alabama Supreme Court
compelled arbitration of the claims anyway. And we
are compelled to follow its holdings and compel
arbitration of the wrongful death claim in this
case."
Entrekin, 689 F.3d at 1257-59 (emphasis added).  We agree with
the Entrekin court's conclusion that the second premise set
forth in Noland -- that personal representatives of the
estates of deceased nursing-home residents who happened to
also have signed arbitration agreements on behalf of those
residents are bound by those agreements in their capacities as
personal 
representatives 
but 
that 
those 
personal
representatives who have not signed an arbitration agreement
on behalf of deceased nursing-home residents are not so bound
–- is inconsistent with the rather simple principle carved
from the caselaw in this area that, if a deceased nursing-home
resident was bound to an arbitration agreement, so too would
be the personal representative of that resident's estate
regardless of whether that personal representative was a
42
1131027
signatory to the arbitration agreement in some capacity other
than the resident's legal representative.  Accordingly, we
conclude that Betty cannot be bound to the arbitration
agreement in her capacity as the personal representative of
Johnathan's estate when she signed the arbitration agreement
in what amounts to her capacity as Johnathan's relative or
next friend.  
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's
decision to deny the motion to compel arbitration.
AFFIRMED.
Stuart, Parker, Murdock, Shaw, Main, and Wise, JJ.,
concur.
Moore, C.J., and Bryan, J., concur in the result.
  
      
43