Case Title: Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. Michael J. Gableman

Citation: 2010 WI 62

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
2010 WI 61 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP2458-J  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against the Honorable Michael J. 
Gableman 
 
 
 
Wisconsin Judicial Commission, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
The Honorable Michael J. Gableman, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., and N. 
PATRICK CROOKS, J. 
¶1 
Under normal circumstances the court would be issuing 
a per curiam opinion (an opinion BY THE COURT), setting forth 
the separate writings of the members of the court.  See our 
proposed per curiam attached as Attachment A.  See also, State 
v. Allen, 2010 WI 10, 322 Wis. 2d 372, 778 N.W.2d 863 (Feb. 11, 
2010). 
 
Unfortunately, 
Justices 
David 
Prosser, 
Patience 
Roggensack, and Annette Ziegler are unwilling even to join us in 
the proposed per curiam attached. 
¶2 
Surprisingly, 
Justices 
Prosser, 
Roggensack, 
and 
Ziegler do not wish their separate writing to have the same 
 
 
2 
public domain citation as our writing – a complete break from 
our usual practice.  Our writing will have a public domain 
citation of 2010 WI 61.  The separate writing of Justices 
Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler will have a public domain 
citation of 2010 WI 62. 
 
 
 
3 
ATTACHMENT A 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2008AP2458-J 2008AP2458 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against the Honorable Michael J. 
Gableman 
 
 
 
Wisconsin Judicial Commission, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
The Honorable Michael J. Gableman, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
PER CURIAM.   Separate writings attached.     
 
 
 
4 
¶3 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.; ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.; 
and N. PATRICK CROOKS, J., deliver the following opinion.   
¶4 
For ease of reference, here is a road map to this 
opinion. 
 
I. 
Justice Gableman's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Fails to Capture 4 Votes. (See ¶¶3-19) 
 
We three, Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson, Justice Ann 
Walsh Bradley, and Justice N. Patrick Crooks, conclude: 
 
• Justice Gableman's advertisement violated the first 
sentence of SCR 60.06(3)(c).  
 
• The advertisement "misrepresent[ed] . . . [a] fact 
concerning . . . an opponent" and was made knowingly 
or with reckless disregard for truth or falsity.   
 
• The First Amendment does not protect knowingly false 
statements.   
 
Justice David T. Prosser, Justice Patience D. Roggensack, 
and Justice Annette K. Ziegler1 conclude otherwise and 
anticipate a further motion from the Judicial Commission.   
 
Because of a deadlock, we three conclude that a remand to 
the Judicial Commission for a jury hearing is required.  
 
II. 
The Advertisement Violates the First Sentence of 
SCR 60.06(3)(c). (See ¶¶20-63) 
 
III. 
The First Amendment Does Not Protect Knowingly 
Made False Statements.  (See ¶64-113). 
I 
¶5 
The 
Wisconsin 
Judicial 
Commission 
(Judicial 
Commission) filed a complaint against Justice Michael J. 
Gableman based on a TV advertisement run by his campaign. 
                     
1 See 2010 WI 62 for the separate writing of Justices 
Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler. 
 
 
5 
¶6 
The 
Wisconsin 
Judicial 
Commission 
contends 
that 
Justice Gableman's advertisement violated the first sentence of 
SCR 
60.06(3)(c) 
because 
the 
advertisement 
"misrepresent[ed] . . . [a] fact concerning . . . an opponent."   
¶7 
A Judicial Conduct Panel (Panel) was designated to 
hear this matter under Wis. Stat. § 757.87(3).  The parties 
filed proposed statements of facts,2 and the Judicial Commission 
then moved the panel to compel further response from Justice 
Gableman.  The Panel denied this motion, stating that "[g]iven 
the existence of factual disputes, an evidentiary hearing is the 
next step in the process."  Justice Gableman then moved the 
Panel for summary judgment.   
¶8 
The Panel received briefs and heard oral argument on 
Justice Gableman's motion for summary judgment.  In its 
determination of the motion for summary judgment, the Panel made 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The Panel recommended 
that Justice Gableman's motion for summary judgment be granted3 
and that the Judicial Commission's complaint be dismissed.4  The 
                     
2 Following a procedure jointly proposed by the parties, the 
Judicial Commission filed a Statement of Facts, Justice Gableman 
filed a Statement of Facts and Response to the Commission's 
statement, and the Judicial Commission filed a Response to 
Justice Gableman's Statement. 
3 Judicial Conduct Panel, slip op. at 4, n.4 ("The judicial 
conduct panel, of course, cannot grant or deny summary judgment.  
Rather, this panel may make its recommendation as to whether the 
motion for summary judgment should be granted to the supreme 
court, which retains the ultimate authority to grant or deny the 
motion.") 
4 Judicial Conduct Panel, slip op. at 15 ("[W]e recommend 
that Justice Gableman's motion for summary judgment be granted 
and the Commission's complaint be dismissed."). 
 
 
6 
matter comes before the court on review of the Panel's 
recommendation to grant summary judgment.5  The Panel entered its 
recommendation recognizing that the Supreme Court "retains the 
ultimate authority to grant or deny the motion."  Judicial 
Conduct Panel, slip op. at 4 n.4.  The court is equally divided 
with respect to the Panel's recommendation.   
¶9 
Summary judgment is available to a party "if the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, 
and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).6  In Grams v. Boss, this court set forth 
the method for evaluating such a motion: 
If the complaint states a claim and the pleadings show 
the existence of factual issues, the court examines 
the moving party's (in this case the defendants') 
affidavits or other proof to determine whether the 
moving party has made a prima facie case for summary 
judgment under sec. 802.08(2).  To make a prima facie 
case for summary judgment, a moving defendant must 
show a defense which would defeat the plaintiff.  If 
the moving party has made a prima facie case for 
summary 
judgment, 
the 
court 
must 
examine 
the 
affidavits and other proof of the opposing party 
(plaintiffs in this case) to determine whether there 
exists disputed material facts, or undisputed material 
facts from which reasonable alternative inferences may 
                     
5 Justice Gableman moved this court for review of the 
panel's recommendation that summary judgment be granted pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 757.91.  The Judicial Commission agreed that the 
factual record was complete and could form the basis for this 
court's review.  This court ordered briefing and scheduled oral 
argument. 
6 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-
08 version. 
 
 
7 
be drawn, sufficient to entitle the opposing party to 
a trial. 
 
. . . .    
The papers filed by the moving party are carefully 
scrutinized.  The inferences to be drawn from the 
underlying facts contained in the moving party's 
material should be viewed in the light most favorable 
to 
the 
party 
opposing 
the 
motion. . . . If 
the 
material presented on the motion is subject to 
conflicting interpretations or reasonable people might 
differ as to its significance, it would be improper to 
grant summary judgment. 
Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980).  In 
Green Springs Farms v. Kersten, we clarified that the approach 
taken by an appellate court to a summary judgment motion is 
identical to that taken by a trial court: 
There is a standard methodology which a trial court 
follows when faced with a motion for summary judgment. 
The first step of that methodology requires the court 
to examine the pleadings to determine whether a claim 
for relief has been stated.  
If a claim for relief has been stated, the inquiry 
then shifts to whether any factual issues exist. 
. . . . 
When this court is called upon to review the grant of 
a summary judgment motion, as we are here, we are 
governed by the standard articulated in section 
802.08(2), and we are thus required to apply the 
standards set forth in the statute just as the trial 
court applied those standards.  
Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 314-15, 401 
N.W.2d 816 (1987) (citations omitted). 
¶10 The court is equally divided on the recommendation of 
the Panel that Justice Gableman's motion for summary judgment be 
granted and the Commission's complaint dismissed.  Three 
justices would reject the recommendation of the Panel and three 
would accept it.  We three justices, Chief Justice Abrahamson, 
 
 
8 
Justice 
Bradley, 
and 
Justice 
Crooks, 
would 
deny 
Justice 
Gableman's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that he 
has failed to establish a prima facie case for summary judgment.   
¶11 Justice 
Prosser, 
Justice 
Roggensack, 
and 
Justice 
Ziegler would accept the Panel's recommendation to grant Justice 
Gableman's 
motion 
for 
summary 
judgment 
and 
dismiss 
the 
complaint, on the grounds that the Judicial Commission has 
failed to establish a prima facie case for summary judgment and 
has failed to meet, to a reasonable certainty by evidence that 
is clear and convincing, its burden of proof with regard to 
Justice Gableman's alleged violation of the Judicial Code. 
¶12 The court is equally divided on the question of 
whether the advertisement constituted a violation of SCR 
60.06(3)(c) for which discipline may be imposed.   
¶13 We three, Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley, 
and Justice Crooks, would reject and three justices, Justice 
Prosser, Justice Roggensack, and Justice Ziegler, would accept 
the Panel's recommended conclusion that there was no violation 
of the first sentence of SCR 60.06(3)(c).7    
                     
7 SCR 60.06(3)(c) provides: 
Misrepresentations. A candidate for a judicial office 
shall not knowingly or with reckless disregard for the 
statement's 
truth 
or 
falsity 
misrepresent 
the 
identity, qualifications, present position, or other 
fact concerning the candidate or an opponent.  A 
candidate for judicial office should not knowingly 
make 
representations 
that, 
although 
true, 
are 
misleading, or knowingly make statements that are 
likely to confuse the public with respect to the 
proper role of judges and lawyers in the American 
adversary system.   
 
 
9 
¶14 We three justices, Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice 
Bradley, and Justice Crooks, conclude that the advertisement 
misrepresented a fact about Justice Gableman's opponent and that 
this misrepresentation was made knowingly or with reckless 
disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement, and thereby 
violates the first sentence of SCR 60.06(3)(c).  Specifically, 
the advertisement knowingly (or with reckless disregard of the 
truth or falsity of the statements) communicated the falsehood 
that Louis Butler's conduct as Mitchell's defense attorney in 
finding a "loophole" facilitated Mitchell's release and later 
offense.  The advertisement can reasonably be viewed only as 
communicating that Louis Butler's actions in representing 
Mitchell and finding a "loophole" led to Mitchell's release and 
his commission of another crime.8 
¶15 Further, we conclude that imposing discipline under 
SCR 60.06(3)(c) would not violate the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution in the present case.  Since we three 
justices who find that a violation occurred do not constitute a 
majority, we do not reach the question of the appropriate 
sanction.   
¶16 The question of whether the advertisement constituted 
a misrepresentation remains unresolved at this point.  This case 
reaches us in summary judgment posture.  Given that no majority 
of justices agrees to accept the Panel's recommendation that 
                     
8 We conclude that by approving the advertisement, Justice 
Gableman was in willful violation of the mandatory prohibition 
against misrepresentations contained in the first sentence of 
SCR 60.06(3)(c) and therefore engaged in judicial misconduct as 
defined by Wis. Stat. § 757.81(4)(a). 
 
 
10 
summary judgment be granted, the Judicial Commission's complaint 
has survived summary judgment.   
¶17 It is contrary to every precedent and principle of 
civil 
procedure 
to 
suggest, 
as 
Justice 
Prosser, 
Justice 
Roggensack, 
and 
Justice 
Ziegler 
do, 
that 
the 
Judicial 
Commission, which was successful in defeating a motion for 
summary judgment in this court, should then be coercively 
"invited" to bring a motion to dismiss the case that it has not 
actually lost.  Rather, the standard procedure is that a case 
surviving summary judgment typically proceeds to trial.  It is 
therefore appropriate at this juncture to remand this cause to 
the Judicial Commission for further proceedings9 under Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.87.10   
¶18 Though the recommendation of the Panel failed, it 
remains necessary to resolve the matter in accordance with the 
                     
9 See, e.g., Racine County v. Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., 2010 
WI 25, ¶5, 781 N.W.2d 88 (remanding for further proceedings 
after finding that plaintiff had survived summary judgment). 
10Wisconsin Stat. § 757.87 provides: 
Request for jury; panel.  (1) After the commission has 
found probable cause that a judge  . . .  has engaged 
in 
misconduct 
 . . . , 
the 
commission 
may . . . request a jury hearing. 
(2) If a jury is requested under sub. (1), the hearing 
under s. 757.89 shall be before a jury selected under 
s. 805.08.  A jury shall consist of 6 persons, unless 
the commission specifies a greater number, not to 
exceed 12.  Five-sixths of the jurors must agree on 
all questions which must be answered to arrive at a 
verdict.  A court of appeals judge shall be selected 
by the chief judge of the court of appeals to preside 
at the hearing, on the basis of experience as a trial 
judge and length of service on the court of appeals. 
 
 
11 
governing statutes.  When this court cannot reach a decision 
because of a deadlock, it is incumbent on this court to ensure 
that a tribunal decide the matter presented by the Judicial 
Commission's complaint and the recommendations of the Judicial 
Conduct Panel.   
¶19 Upon remand, therefore, the Commission needs to 
request a jury hearing, with a jury of 12 persons, on the 
question of whether the campaign ad violated the Judicial Code.  
As noted above, the parties have submitted statements of facts, 
but on the record presented, Justice Gableman's motion for 
summary judgment has not succeeded.  There are facts bearing on 
this case that were not included in the Panel's findings.  For 
example, at oral argument Justice Gableman's counsel urged the 
court to consider the relevance of case citations that were 
visually included in the disputed advertisement.  The Panel 
offered no findings or discussion regarding the case citations 
or the visual aspect of the advertisement.  We discuss the  
citation information at ¶¶50-54.  Contrary to Justice Gableman's 
counsel, we conclude that a jury could find that this citation 
information misrepresented relevant facts, thus corroborating, 
rather than disproving, the Judicial Commission's allegation 
that the advertisement violated SCR 60.03(3)(c).  
¶20 On remand, the jury must hear testimony and arguments 
and view the advertisement at issue.  The question for the jury 
is whether the facts as found by the jury constitute a violation 
of SCR 60.06(3)(c).  The question of the First Amendment's 
relevance, if any, to SCR 60.06(3)(c), in contrast, is a 
question of law to be answered, if necessary, by the judge.  The 
 
 
12 
statutes set forth the procedures following a jury request:  "A 
court of appeals judge shall be selected by the chief judge of 
the court of appeals to preside at the hearing,11 on the basis of 
experience as a trial judge and length of service on the court 
of appeals."  Wis. Stat. § 757.87(2).  "The allegations of the 
complaint or petition must be proven to a reasonable certainty 
by evidence that is clear, satisfactory and convincing.  The 
hearing shall be held in the county where the [respondent 
justice] resides unless the presiding judge changes venue for 
cause shown or unless the parties otherwise agree. . . . [T]he 
presiding judge shall instruct the jury regarding the law 
applicable to judicial misconduct or permanent disability, as 
appropriate."  Wis. Stat. § 757.89.  The presiding judge shall 
then "file the jury verdict and his or her recommendations 
regarding appropriate discipline for misconduct . . . with the 
supreme court."  Id. 
¶21 It is clear that the court is equally divided 
regarding the disposition of the matter.  No four justices have 
voted either to accept or to reject the Judicial Conduct Panel's 
recommendations, nor have four justices agreed on Justice 
Gableman's motion for summary judgment or any disposition of the 
Judicial Commission's complaint.  No action can therefore be 
taken on the Panel's recommendation.  The Judicial Commission 
has failed to obtain a majority of justices to reject the 
                     
11 In order to avoid any question under Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(e) and SCR 60.04(b) of a judge's eligibility to 
preside at the hearing, the judge appointed should not be one of 
the 
three 
judges 
who 
"previously 
handled 
the 
action 
or 
proceeding" when the matter was before the Panel. 
 
 
13 
recommendation of the Panel.  Under these circumstances, the 
Panel is relieved of any further responsibility in this matter, 
and we remand the matter to the Judicial Commission with 
directions to request a jury hearing, in accord with Wis. Stat. 
§§ 757.87, 757.89, and 805.08.   
II 
¶22 The full narration of the advertisement at issue was 
as follows: 
Unbelievable.  Shadowy special interests supporting 
Louis Butler are attacking Judge Michael Gableman. 
It's not true! 
Judge, 
District 
Attorney, 
Michael 
Gableman 
has 
committed his life to locking up criminals to keep 
families safe——putting child molesters behind bars for 
over 100 years. 
Louis Butler worked to put criminals on the street.  
Like Reuben Lee Mitchell, who raped an 11-year-old 
girl with learning disabilities.  Butler found a 
loophole.  Mitchell went on to molest another child. 
Can Wisconsin families feel safe with Louis Butler on 
the Supreme Court? 
¶23 First we examine whether the advertisement at issue 
violates the first sentence of SCR 60.06(3)(c).  The first 
sentence of SCR 60.06(3)(c) states:  "A candidate for a judicial 
office shall not knowingly or with reckless disregard for the 
statement's 
truth 
or 
falsity 
misrepresent 
the 
identity, 
qualifications, present position, or other fact concerning the 
candidate or an opponent."   
 
 
14 
¶24 SCR 60.06(3)(c) applied to then-circuit court Judge 
Gableman as a candidate in the 2008 campaign for judicial 
office, namely to be a Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.12   
¶25 Justice 
Gableman's 
advertisement 
related 
to 
his 
opponent, Louis Butler.  The narration of the TV advertisement, 
set out in full above at ¶20, stated in relevant part: 
Louis Butler worked to put criminals on the street.  
Like Reuben Lee Mitchell, who raped an 11-year-old 
girl with learning disabilities.  Butler found a 
loophole.  Mitchell went on to molest another child. 
Can Wisconsin families feel safe with Louis Butler on 
the Supreme Court? 
¶26 The narration does not include the visual aspects of 
the advertisement.  Viewing the advertisement is, of course, the 
best way to evaluate the advertisement to determine whether it 
presents a violation of SCR 60.06(3)(c).  For instance, the 
advertisement visually includes case citation information which 
the narration does not reflect.  We discuss the import of the 
citation information at ¶¶50-54.  The reader can access a video 
copy of the advertisement, which was Exhibit A attached to the 
Commission's 
complaint, 
at 
http://sc-media.wicourts.gov/sc-
media/Gableman_Ad_Titled_Prosecutor.wmv.   
¶27 We next explore what Justice Gableman knew when he ran 
the 
advertisement. 
 
Knowledge 
is 
important 
because 
SCR 
60.06(3)(c) bars a candidate for judicial office from "knowingly 
or with reckless disregard for the statement's truth or falsity  
misrepresent[ing] . . . [a] fact concerning . . . an opponent."  
                     
12 Judicial Conduct Panel Finding of Fact #2; SCR 60.01(2).  
 
 
15 
SCR 60.03(9) defines "knowingly" or "knowledge" as "actual 
knowledge of the fact in question, which may be inferred from 
the circumstances."  
¶28 Here are the facts relating to Justice Gableman's 
knowledge.  "The advertisement refers to Butler's representation 
of Mitchell."13  Justice Gableman "became familiar with the 
decisions of the court of appeals and supreme court in Reuben 
Lee Mitchell's appeal, State v. Mitchell, 139 Wis. 2d 856, 407 
N.W.2d 566 (Ct. App. 1987) (unpublished slip op.), reversed, 
State 
v. 
Mitchell, 
144 
Wis. 2d 596, 
424 
N.W.2d 698 
(1988) . . . ."14   
¶29 Justice Gableman made "every reasonable effort to 
ensure that the Ad was accurate" by "being familiar with the 
Mitchell cases in general, with their facts and holdings, and 
the arguments advanced by Butler, who represented Mitchell."15  
"Justice Gableman personally reviewed both the audio and video 
of the advertisement before its release."16  "Justice Gableman 
viewed the Ad and reviewed the Ad's script prior to approving it 
for publication."17  Justice Gableman "delayed the release of the 
                     
13 Judicial Conduct Panel Finding of Fact #10. 
14 Judicial Conduct Panel Finding of Fact #6.  Justice 
Gableman's answer #13: "In response to [the allegation in the 
complaint that "prior to publication of the Advertisement, Judge 
Gableman was familiar with the facts and holdings of both the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals decisions"], Justice 
Gableman 
affirmatively 
alleges 
that 
he 
had 
a 
general 
understanding of the decisions . . . ."    
15 Justice Gableman's Responsive Statement of Facts, #13(b). 
16 Judicial Conduct Panel Finding of Fact #5.  
17 Justice Gableman's Responsive Statement of Facts, #12.   
 
 
16 
advertisement while he sought to verify the accuracy of its 
contents."18   Justice Gableman "approved the advertisement as it 
had been originally presented to him."19   
¶30 Justice Gableman approved and ran the advertisement 
after knowing key facts about his opponent's role as a public 
defender representing Reuben Lee Mitchell.   
¶31 The advertisement refers to Butler's representation as 
an appellate state public defender of Mitchell from 1985 to 1988 
in Mitchell's appeal from a conviction of first-degree sexual 
assault of a child.20   The reference in the advertisement to the 
"loophole" Butler found was to his successful argument that "the 
rape-shield law . . . had been violated."21    
¶32 Justice Gableman knew that the Supreme Court agreed 
with Butler's "loophole" argument that the circuit court had 
erroneously admitted evidence against Mitchell in violation of 
the rape-shield law.22  Justice Gableman knew that the Wisconsin 
supreme court declared the circuit court's evidentiary error 
harmless.23   
                     
18 Judicial Conduct Panel Finding of Fact #5. 
19 Judicial Conduct Panel Finding of Fact #7. 
20 Judicial Conduct Panel Finding of Fact #10. 
21 Judicial Conduct Panel Finding of Fact #20.  See also 
Justice Gableman's Responsive Statement of Facts, #7.  
22 Justice Gableman's Answer #10 admits this is a correct 
summary of the decisions.  The Judicial Conduct Panel Finding of 
Fact #6 is that "Justice Gableman became familiar with the 
decisions of the court of appeals and supreme court in Reuben 
Lee Mitchell's" cases before these courts.  
23 Justice Gableman's Answer #10. 
 
 
17 
¶33 Justice Gableman knew that Mitchell remained in prison 
until Mitchell was released according to the terms of his 
sentence on conviction of the charge on which Louis Butler 
represented him.  Justice Gableman knew that after Mitchell's 
release from prison on parole, Mitchell committed a new 
offense.24 
¶34 On this record, only one conclusion can be reached:  
Justice Gableman had knowledge of Butler's representation of 
Mitchell to which the advertisement referred and had knowledge 
that Louis Butler's representation of Mitchell in finding a 
"loophole" did not lead to the release of Mitchell.    
¶35 The Judicial Conduct Panel found that "[n]othing that 
Justice Butler did in the course of his representation of 
Mitchell caused, facilitated, or enabled Mitchell's release from 
prison in 1992."25  The Panel further found that "[n]othing that 
Justice Butler did in the course of his representation of 
Mitchell had any connection to Mitchell's commission of a second 
sexual assault of a child."26 
¶36 Having established what Justice Gableman knew about 
his opponent's representation of Mitchell in the supreme court, 
we now determine whether the following sentences in the TV 
advertisement 
violated 
SCR 
60.06(3)(c) 
by 
"misrepresent[ing] . . . [a] fact concerning the candidate or an 
opponent."  The key sentences are: 
                     
24 Justice Gableman's Answer #10 admits these facts.   
25 Judicial Conduct Panel Finding of Fact #16. 
26 Judicial Conduct Panel Finding of Fact #17. 
 
 
18 
Louis Butler worked to put criminals on the street.  
Like Reuben Lee Mitchell, who raped an 11-year old 
girl with learning disabilities.  Butler found a 
loophole.  Mitchell went on to molest another child. 
¶37 The Judicial Conduct Panel made findings of fact that 
each of the four sentences in the advertisement relating to 
Louis Butler was factually true.27 
¶38 Two judges of the Judicial Conduct Panel concluded 
that four true statements cannot fit within the prohibition of 
the first sentence of SCR 60.06(3)(c).  They reached the wrong 
decision for two reasons.   
¶39 First, these two judges misread the text of the first 
sentence.  They assert that the first sentence applies only to 
statements that are false and cannot apply to a true statement.  
They reach this conclusion, writing that "[t]he first sentence 
of SCR 60.06(3)(c) speaks to the 'truth or falsity' of any 
statement 
that 
'misrepresent[s] 
the 
identify 
[sic], 
qualifications, present position, or other fact concerning the 
candidate or an opponent."28  This is not what the first sentence 
says.   
¶40 The phrase "truth or falsity" in the first sentence 
modifies the words "reckless disregard" in the scienter part of 
the sentence.  The phrase "truth or falsity" does not modify the 
core prohibition, namely that a candidate "shall not . . . 
knowingly misrepresent" a "fact concerning the candidate or an 
                     
27 Judicial Conduct Panel Findings of Fact #18-21. 
28 Judicial Conduct Panel, slip op. at 14. 
 
 
19 
opponent.29  The operative language of the Rule is not focused on 
the "truth or falsity" of individual "sentences" but rather 
whether 
a 
knowing 
misrepresentation 
was 
made. 
 
By 
misapprehending the application of the words "truth or falsity," 
in the first sentence, the two Panel judges incorrectly 
concluded that the first sentence of SCR 60.06(3)(c) does not 
apply to an objective misrepresentation of the facts regardless 
of the "truth or falsity" of each individual sentence.   
¶41 Second, these two judges——and Justice Gableman——would 
read each of the sentences of the TV advertisement in isolation, 
as if the other sentences did not exist.  They assert that 
because each sentence is, by itself, literally true, the four 
sentences together cannot amount to a false statement or a 
misrepresentation.  They ask us to read each sentence standing 
alone, denuded of any context or meaning. 
¶42 The absurdity of that position is evident——it would 
allow speakers to knowingly convey false information, so long as 
they are fastidious in their punctuation, clever in the use of 
omitting a word, and tactical in using as few words as possible.  
We do not accept such a cramped view of what it means to make a 
"misrepresentation."   
                     
29 Justice Gableman picks up this misconstruction of the 
rule's text in his brief at 4, emphasizing the words of SCR 
60.06(3)(c) as follows: 
"A candidate for a judicial office shall not knowingly or 
with reckless disregard for the statement's truth or falsity 
misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position, or 
other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent." 
This emphasis graphically shows the misinterpretation of 
the words of the first sentence in SCR 60.06(3)(c). 
 
 
20 
¶43 This view would ignore the normal way that people 
speak, read, and listen, the way in which people express meaning 
through language, and the way people understand not just words 
but sentences, and ultimately meaning.  Construing each sentence 
as an isolated true statement rather than admitting of a single 
representation or statement, would adopt a view that ignores the 
way that human language and communication function.   
¶44 Justice Gableman's position would allow for a thinly-
sliced dissection of syntax to create "plausible deniability" 
after the fact, rather than acknowledging the only reasonable 
meaning communicated by the advertisement.  Sadly, the approach 
offered in defense of the advertisement at issue here would 
approach the Code of Judicial Conduct in the manner of wordplay 
and linguistic gamesmanship, rather than as an embodiment of 
substantive ethical standards.   
¶45 We refuse to approach the Code of Judicial Conduct in 
that manner or to adopt an approach to SCR 60.06(3)(c) that 
invites future judicial candidates to push and distort the 
content of advertising in judicial campaigns as far past 
truthful communication as the creative use of language may 
allow.  
¶46 In contrast to Justice Gableman and two judges of the 
Judicial Conduct Panel, we determine that several literally true 
sentences can be strung together to communicate an objectively 
false statement.  The law has long acknowledged that to discern 
 
 
21 
the meaning of language it must be read in context.30  As Judge 
Learned 
Hand 
put 
it, 
"Words 
are 
not 
pebbles 
in 
alien 
                     
30 See, e.g., State ex rel Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Co., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (2003) 
("Context is important to meaning . . . . [S]tatutory language 
is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in 
isolation but as part of a whole . . . .").  
Long-settled law established in defamation cases involving 
the First Amendment (including cases relating to "political 
speech") informs our decision in the present case.  Cf. In re 
Chmura, (Chmura II), 626 N.W.2d 876, 885 (Mich. 2001) ("The 
language used in Canon 7(B)(1)(d) has its roots in defamation 
law.  New York Times [v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)].  Thus, 
we examine defamation case law for guidance in analyzing whether 
a judicial candidate knowingly, or with reckless disregard, has 
used or participated in the use of any form of public 
communication that is false."). 
Courts have long declared that in determining whether 
statements were false (and therefore could be defamatory) the 
words used must be construed in the plain and popular sense in 
which they would naturally be understood.  "In determining 
whether language is defamatory, the words must be reasonably 
interpreted and must be construed in the plain and popular sense 
in which they would naturally be understood in the context in 
which they were used and under the circumstances they were 
uttered. . . . One may not dissect the alleged defamatory 
statement into non-defamatory parts and thus lose the vital 
overall meaning."  Frinzi v. Hanson, 30 Wis. 2d 271, 276-77, 140 
N.W.2d 259 (1966) (emphasis added) (relating to political 
speech); see also, e.g., Kaminske v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 102 F. 
Supp. 2d 1066, 1081 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (same);  Dilworth v. 
Dudley, 75 F.3d 307, 310 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying Wisconsin 
law) (same).   
(continued) 
 
 
22 
juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only 
does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in 
their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which 
they are used, of which the relation between the speaker and the 
hearer is perhaps the most important part."31   
¶47 Here, the four sentences at issue must be understood 
in the context in which they were offered, spoken in series in a 
matter of 10-15 seconds.  Each sentence takes meaning from the 
sentence before and gives meaning to the sentence that follows.  
Accepting this common and necessary approach, we must agree with 
the Judicial Commission and with Judge Fine's concurrence that 
the advertisement communicated an objectively false statement.   
¶48 The advertisement can reasonably be viewed only as 
communicating that Louis Butler's actions in representing 
Mitchell and finding a "loophole" led to Mitchell's release and 
his 
commitment 
of 
another 
crime. 
 
No 
other 
reasonable 
                                                                  
Defamation cases are instructive because, like potential 
judicial discipline for campaign speech under SCR 60.06(3)(c), 
defamation law imposes liability for false speech.  Of course a 
judicial determination of whether statements made were, in fact, 
false, is required.  See generally 3 Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla 
and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 23:6 ("[T]he First Amendment 
does not permit liability for defamation unless the plaintiff 
also demonstrates that the defamatory statement was a false 
statement of fact.").  A state imposition of consequences on 
speech 
implicates 
First 
Amendment 
considerations 
in 
both 
defamation and judicial discipline cases and both require a 
court to examine language to determine whether it expresses a 
false statement of fact.         
31 Nat'l 
Labor 
Relations 
Bd. 
v. 
Federbush 
Co., 
121 
F. 2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941). 
 
 
23 
interpretation of the advertisement has been suggested.32  The 
message communicated was that Butler facilitated Mitchell's 
release and later crime.  This message is objectively false.  
The four sentences misrepresented a fact concerning Louis 
Butler, Justice Gableman's opponent.   
¶49 Another layer of misrepresentation is added to the 
advertisement's false narration by the visual presentation of 
case citation information.   
¶50 At oral argument Justice Gableman's counsel suggested 
that a viewer could learn the facts for himself or herself by 
checking the citations and therefore the advertisement could not 
have contained a misrepresentation.  Justice Gableman's attorney 
stated that the visuals allowed the viewer to conduct his or her 
own 
inquiry 
into 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
statements 
in 
the 
advertisement:  
                     
32 As Judge Fine put it, "The 'fact' asserted in the 
advertisement, by its language and the juxtaposition of that 
language, is that Justice Butler did something when he was a 
lawyer representing Mitchell that permitted Mitchell to commit 
another sex crime."  Judicial Conduct Panel, slip op. at 23 
(Fine, J., concurring). 
Judge Fine's concurrence explains that he posed several 
hypotheticals to Justice Gableman's counsel in the hearing 
before the Judicial Conduct Panel to determine whether Justice 
Gableman's counsel found any of them misrepresentations within 
the first sentence of SCR 60.06(3)(c).  Some of Judge Fine's 
examples were blatant misrepresentations of fact within the 
meaning of SCR 60.06(3)(c).  Nevertheless, in Justice Gableman's 
counsel's view, none was a misrepresentation.  Judge Fine 
characterized counsel's view as "sophistry," bordering on 
"'pleated cunning.'"  Judicial Conduct Panel, slip op. at 26 
(Fine, J., concurring) (quoted source omitted).  We agree with 
Judge Fine.   
 
 
24 
Ultimately the ad provides the underlying factual 
references that demonstrate to the viewer, not after 
the fact when we're arguing about whether this ad is 
true or not, but to the viewer, the viewer has the 
references in the visual piece of the ad to determine 
what these statements relate to, and the viewer has 
the ability to conduct his or her own inquiry into the 
nature of the statements that are made. 
¶51 That an attentive viewer was given this information 
does 
not 
change 
the 
fact 
that 
the 
advertisement 
itself 
misrepresented the facts, as is prohibited by SCR 60.06(3)(c).  
The prohibition against knowing misrepresentations does not 
depend on whether a viewer might later learn the truth. 
¶52 More 
importantly, 
however, 
the 
case 
information 
provided by the advertisement is in and of itself objectively 
false and exacerbates the misrepresentation of the spoken words.  
The advertisement visually contains the following three citation 
references to cases: "State of Wisconsin CASE # 1984CF000250," 
"State of Wisconsin CASE # 1995CF952148," and "139 Wis. 2d 856."  
The first two references are circuit court case numbers for 
felony convictions of Reuben Lee Mitchell.  The third is a 
citation to the disposition table of unpublished court of 
appeals decisions.  The disposition table states that in the 
Mitchell case the court of appeals "reversed [the trial court 
conviction] and remanded [the case]."33    
¶53 The advertisement does not contain the citation for 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in the Mitchell case, 144 
Wis. 2d 596 (1988).  Justice Gableman knew that Butler continued 
to represent Mitchell in the supreme court and knew the contents 
                     
33 The notation in the disposition table states that a 
petition for review is pending. 
 
 
25 
of the supreme court decision.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
reversed the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed 
Mitchell's conviction.  Even for an industrious viewer who 
wished to "conduct his or her own inquiry," the advertisement 
omitted the key reference to the supreme court case that proves 
the misrepresentation contained in the advertisement itself.  
Thus the advertisement misrepresented the court of appeals 
decision as the final decision on appeal, overturning Mitchell's 
conviction.  A viewer who reviewed the citations referenced by 
the advertisement would conclude that the misrepresentation 
contained in the advertisement——that Butler's representation led 
to Mitchell's release and later crime——was true. 
¶54 As we have stated previously, Justice Gableman knew 
that Louis Butler's representation in the court of appeals and 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, including finding a "loophole," did not 
facilitate Mitchell's release or allow Mitchell to commit a new 
offense.  Accordingly, we conclude that Justice Gableman 
knowingly or with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of 
the 
statements 
in 
the 
TV 
advertisement 
"misrepresent[ed] . . . [a] fact concerning . . . an opponent" 
in violation of the first sentence of SCR 60.06(3)(c).    
¶55 In contrast to our conclusion, Judge Deininger's 
concurring opinion, Judicial Conduct Panel, slip op. at 17-19, 
concluded that the advertisement violated the second sentence of 
SCR 60.06(3)(c) and warranted condemnation even if formal 
 
 
26 
discipline was not appropriate.34  The second sentence of SCR 
60.06(3)(c) provides:  A candidate for judicial office should 
not knowingly make representations that, although true, are 
misleading . . . ."  To fit within the second sentence, the 
statements 
must 
be 
"true" 
"representations" 
that 
are 
"misleading."     
¶56 We 
disagree 
with 
Judge 
Deininger 
that 
the 
TV 
advertisement makes a true representation.  It is not true that 
Mitchell went on to molest another child because Butler 
represented Mitchell and found a loophole.  We agree with Judge 
Deininger that the TV advertisement was misleading.  But 
contrary 
to 
what 
Judge 
Deininger 
says, 
misleading 
and 
misrepresentation 
are 
not 
mutually 
exclusive 
concepts. 
A 
misrepresentation is, by its very nature, misleading.   
                     
34 At oral argument in our court, Justice Gableman's counsel 
urged that the four sentences were not even misleading under the 
second sentence of SCR 60.06(3)(c).  Judge Deininger, one of the 
two judges who concluded that the advertisement did not violate 
the first sentence, asserted that Justice Gableman's counsel 
"virtually conceded at oral argument [before the Judicial 
Conduct Panel] that the advertisement is misleading."  Judicial 
Conduct Panel, slip. op. at 17 (Deininger, J., concurring). 
Judge Deininger wrote that "[t]he advertisement would be 
every bit as deserving of condemnation under SCR 60.06(3)(c) had 
Justice Butler's representation of Mitchell in fact resulted in 
Mitchell's release from prison."  We agree with Judge Deininger 
that the advertisement "confuse[d] the public with respect to 
the proper role of . . . lawyers in the adversary system," a 
misrepresentation 
which 
SCR 
60.06(3)(c) 
cautions 
judicial 
candidates to avoid.    Judge Deininger wrote that "[t]hat is 
precisely 
what 
the 
advertisement 
does, 
and 
what 
the 
advertisement was apparently intended to do."  Judicial Conduct 
Panel, slip. op. at 17-18 (Deininger, J., concurring). 
 
 
 
27 
¶57 We conclude that by publishing the advertisement 
Justice Gableman willfully violated the first sentence of SCR 
60.06(3)(c) and engaged in judicial misconduct pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 757.81(4)(a).  By means of the advertisement, which he 
personally reviewed after personally reviewing the underlying 
facts, Justice Gableman knowingly or with reckless disregard for 
the 
statements' 
truth 
or 
falsity 
misrepresented 
a 
fact 
concerning an opponent within the meaning of SCR 60.06(3)(c).   
¶58 We turn now to the argument that SCR 60.06(3)(c) and 
its application in the present case are unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
III 
¶59 Because we determine that the advertisement at issue 
here violates SCR 60.06(3)(c), we next address the question 
whether imposing discipline for this misrepresentation would 
violate the guarantee to freedom of speech provided by the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.35   
                     
35 "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press . . . ." 
Article 
I, 
section 
3 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
provides:  
Every person may freely speak, write and publish his 
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the 
abuse of that right, and no laws shall be passed to 
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the 
press. In all criminal prosecutions or indictments for 
libel, the truth may be given in evidence, and if it 
shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as 
libelous be true, and was published with good motives 
and 
for 
justifiable 
ends, 
the 
party 
shall 
be 
acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to 
determine the law and the fact. 
 
 
28 
¶60 The law is clear:  The First Amendment does not 
protect a false statement that is made "with knowledge that it 
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or 
not."  New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).  
The New York Times case adopted the "actual malice" standard:  
false statements made with actual malice, that is, with 
knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard as to truth or 
falsity, are not protected speech.  The actual malice standard 
distinguishes 
between 
on 
the 
one 
hand 
speech 
that 
is 
constitutionally protected, even if it contains some false 
statements, and on the other hand speech that the speaker knows 
to be false or speech uttered with reckless disregard for its 
truth or falsity, which is not protected by the First Amendment.  
¶61 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), first 
articulated this standard in a case of civil libel (defamation).  
Civil libel actions involve the First Amendment because state 
action (tort law and the court) imposes a sanction on speech.  
The "actual malice" standard was, however, quickly applied to a 
criminal prosecution for defamation in Garrison v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 64 (1964), which was published in the same year and 
authored by the same Justice who authored New York Times v. 
Sullivan.  The Garrison court recognized that "the paramount 
public interest in a free flow of information to the people 
concerning public officials" was at stake and described the kind 
of speech involved as "the essence of self-government."36    
                     
36 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77, 75 (1964).   
(continued) 
 
 
29 
¶62 The United States Supreme Court explained in Garrison 
that an honest but inaccurate utterance may further the exercise 
of free speech and robust political discourse, while a knowing 
and deliberate or reckless falsehood used for political ends is 
at odds with the premises of a democratic government and the 
guarantee of free speech protected by the First Amendment:  
The use of calculated falsehood, however, would put a 
different 
cast 
on 
the 
constitutional 
question. 
Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may 
further the fruitful exercise of the right of free 
speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and 
deliberately published about a public official, should 
enjoy a like immunity.  At the time the First 
Amendment was adopted, as today, there were those 
unscrupulous enough and skillful enough to use the 
deliberate or reckless falsehood as an effective 
political tool to unseat the public servant or even 
topple an administration.  Cf. Riesman, Democracy and 
Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment I, 42 Col[um]. 
                                                                  
The Court saw no meaningful distinction between the 
interests implicated by civil defamation actions brought by 
private parties and enforcement of criminal libel law by the 
state:  
[W]e must decide whether, in view of the differing 
history and purposes of criminal libel, the New York 
Times rule also limits state power to impose criminal 
sanctions for criticism of the official conduct of 
public officials.  We hold that it does.   
Where criticism of public officials is concerned, we 
see no merit in the argument that criminal libel 
statutes serve interests distinct from those secured 
by civil libel laws, and therefore should not be 
subject to the same limitations. 
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 67.  Thus the constitutional standard 
was the same, whether the cause of action was public or private 
and whether the sanctions imposed were civil or criminal.  
"Whether the libel law be civil or criminal, it must satisfy 
relevant constitutional standards."  Garrison, 379 U.S. at 68 
n.3. 
 
 
30 
L. Rev. 1085, 1088-1111 (1942).  That speech is used 
as a tool for political ends does not automatically 
bring 
it 
under 
the 
protective 
mantle 
of 
the 
Constitution.  For the use of the known lie as a tool 
is at once at odds with the premises of democratic 
government and with the orderly manner in which 
economic, social, or political change is to be 
effected.  Calculated falsehood falls into that class 
of utterances which "are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality. . . . "  Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572. . . . Hence the 
knowingly false statement and the false statement made 
with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy 
constitutional protection.37 
¶63 Since 1964, when New York Times v. Sullivan and 
Garrison v. Louisiana first established "actual malice" as the 
constitutional standard, numerous cases have invoked the rule 
                     
37 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added). 
 
 
31 
that knowingly false statements are not sheltered from penalty 
by the First Amendment.38 
                     
38 See, e.g., Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 
U.S. 731, 743 (1983) ("Just as false statements are not 
immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, 
baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment 
right to petition." (internal citations omitted)); Brown v. 
Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61-62 (1982) (striking down state law 
that "provided that a candidate for public office forfeits his 
electoral victory if he errs in announcing that he will, if 
elected, serve at a reduced salary;" citing defamation cases in 
the context of campaign speech regulation and reaffirming that 
"[o]f course, demonstrable falsehoods are not protected by the 
First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements"); 
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171 (1979) ("Spreading false 
information in and of itself carries no First Amendment 
credentials. '[T]here is no constitutional value in false 
statements of fact.'" (internal citation omitted)); Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) ("Under the 
First 
Amendment 
there 
is 
no 
such 
thing 
as 
a 
false 
idea. . . . But there is no constitutional value in false 
statements of fact.  Neither the intentional lie nor the 
careless 
error 
materially 
advances 
society's 
interest 
in 
'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues.  
They belong to that category of utterances which 'are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may 
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality." (internal citations omitted)); 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44, 52 (1971) 
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (applying "actual malice" 
standard in a case brought by a private plaintiff, "extending 
constitutional protection to all discussion and communication 
involving matters of public or general concern, without regard 
to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous" and 
maintaining that "[c]alculated falsehood, of course, falls 
outside 'the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech'" 
(quoted source omitted)); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 
732 (1968) ("[N]either lies nor false communications serve the 
ends of the First Amendment"; applying the "actual malice" 
standard to follow "the line which our cases have drawn between 
false communications which are protected and those which are 
not"); Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389-90 (1967) (applying 
"actual malice" standard in case brought under state right of 
privacy statute, maintaining that "constitutional guarantees can 
tolerate 
sanctions 
against 
calculated 
falsehood 
without 
significant 
impairment 
of 
their 
essential 
(continued) 
 
 
32 
¶64 The New York Times v. Sullivan "actual malice" 
standard is explicitly incorporated in the language of SCR 
60.06(3)(c).  The Rule prohibits a candidate for a judicial 
office from making misrepresentations about specified subjects 
either (1) knowingly or (2) with reckless disregard for the 
truth or falsity of the statement.   
¶65 Justice Gableman agrees that even in what he calls 
"core political speech," the First Amendment does not protect 
"objectively false" statements.39  The First Amendment argument 
as presented by Justice Gableman therefore continues to focus on 
                                                                  
function. . . . [C]alculated falsehood should enjoy no immunity 
in the situation here presented us" (citing Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 75)); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers 
of Am. Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 62-63 (1966) (civil libel case 
arising 
in 
a 
labor 
organizing 
campaign 
and 
election; 
acknowledging "a congressional intent to encourage free debate 
on issues dividing labor and management" and that "cases 
involving speech are to be considered 'against the background of 
a 
profound . . . commitment 
to 
the 
principle 
that 
debate . . . should 
be 
uninhibited, 
robust, 
and 
wide-
open . . . '"; maintaining that "the most repulsive speech 
enjoys immunity provided it falls short of a deliberate or 
reckless 
untruth. . . . [M]alicious 
libel 
enjoys 
no 
constitutional protection in any context" (emphasis added)); 
Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2002) 
("restrictions on candidate speech during political campaigns 
must be limited to false statements that are made with knowledge 
of falsity or with reckless disregard as to whether the 
statement is false——i.e., an actual malice standard"). 
39 At oral argument, counsel for Justice Gableman took the 
position that "The First Amendment would not protect objectively 
false statements.  That's the crux of the issue in this case." 
We note that this view is different from the more 
categorical position of Judge Fine's concurrence to the Judicial 
Conduct Panel's recommendation.  Judge Fine concluded that "the 
only tribunal that may assess whether campaign speech is true or 
false is the electorate."  Judicial Conduct Panel, slip op. at 
29.   
 
 
33 
the 
determination 
we 
have 
already 
addressed——whether 
the 
advertisement at issue here knowingly misrepresented a fact 
about Justice Gableman's campaign opponent or, in the terms used 
by Justice Gableman, whether the advertisement was "objectively 
false."40 
 
Because 
we 
have 
already 
determined 
that 
the 
advertisement communicated a knowing misrepresentation of fact, 
and because we agree with Justice Gableman that objectively 
false speech may properly be disciplined, we conclude that the 
First Amendment does not prevent the court from imposing 
discipline on the basis of the advertisement in question here.   
¶66 We are guided by the Garrison Court, which stated 
unequivocally: "Calculated falsehood falls into that class of 
utterances which 'are no essential part of any exposition of 
ideas . . . . Hence the knowingly false statement and the false 
                     
40 It is not clear in Justice Gableman's brief whether he 
argues that SCR 60.06(3)(c) is unconstitutional on its face or 
only if applied to the advertisement in the instant case.  
At certain points the brief implies that the law should 
prohibit judicial adjudication of the truth or falsity of any 
statement made in an election campaign, arguing that discipline 
"would be unconstitutional because of this Court's role in 
determining whether his speech is true or false."  Brief of 
Respondent at 19. 
At other points, Justice Gableman's brief, citing Burson v. 
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992), and Rickert v. State, 168 
P.3d 826, 827 (Wash. 2007), suggests that political campaign 
speech may be subject to some governmental regulation but that 
such regulation is then subject to "strict scrutiny" by the 
courts.  See Brief of Respondent at 20.   
At oral argument, Justice Gableman agreed that objectively 
false statements would not be protected by the First Amendment; 
the corollary to this argument is that SCR 60.06(3)(c) would be 
constitutional at least as applied to regulate "objectively 
false" statements. 
 
 
34 
statement made with reckless disregard of the truth do not enjoy 
constitutional protection."41  
¶67 Justice Gableman argues, however, that "defamation law 
is inapplicable in the context of constitutionally protected 
political speech," or "core political speech," at issue here.42  
¶68 Justice Gableman's brief argues that the Judicial 
Commission has not cited authority bringing the "actual malice" 
(that is, defamation) analysis specifically to bear in the 
context of election campaigns.  True.  But neither has Justice 
Gableman cited any authority (other than a case decided by a 
significantly divided Washington Supreme Court) supporting his 
position that the clearly articulated, oft-adopted "actual 
malice" standard does not apply in campaign advertising cases. 
¶69 Some tension exists in the language of First Amendment 
cases.   
¶70 On the one hand, First Amendment cases often include 
rhetorical statements which, if read in isolation, sound like 
                     
41 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75. 
42 See Brief of Respondent at 8. 
Although Justice Gableman's position concedes that the 
First Amendment does not protect objectively false statements, 
he argues that the advertisement here was not objectively false.  
In effect, this argument restates the claim already addressed:  
that the four sentences do not contain a false statement or a 
misrepresentation of fact. 
 
 
35 
absolute protection for free speech.43  For example, the United 
States Supreme Court recently reminded us in United States v. 
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010):  "[T]he First Amendment's free 
speech guarantee does not extend only to categories of speech 
that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and 
benefits.  The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the 
American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the 
Government outweigh the costs. . . . Our Constitution forecloses 
any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that 
some speech is not worth it."44   
¶71 On the other hand, while absolutist statements have a 
rhetorical value in emphasizing the commitment our constitution 
makes to freedom of speech, such absolutism is not the rule of 
law.45  A clear line of authority exists protecting against 
dishonesty in public discourse and safeguarding open and 
                     
43 See, 
e.g., 
Wisconsin 
Right 
to 
Life, 
Inc., 
("Our 
jurisprudence over the past 216 years has rejected an absolutist 
interpretation of those words, but when it comes to drawing 
difficult lines in the area of pure political speech between 
what is protected and what the Government may ban it is worth 
recalling the language we are applying . . . we give the benefit 
of the doubt to speech, not censorship. The First Amendment's 
command that 'Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech' demands at least that."). 
44 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1580, 1585 
(2010).   
45 See generally 1 Rodney A Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on 
Freedom of Speech §§ 2:10, 2:49, 2:50 (2006).  "It should come 
as no surprise that the reality of absolutism does not match its 
rhetoric."  Id., § 2:50.  
 
 
36 
fruitful 
public 
discourse,46 
namely 
the 
"actual 
malice" 
standard.47 
 
As 
the 
Stevens 
case 
reminds 
us, 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10183527771703896207
&q=buckley+v.+valeo&hl=en&as_sdt=400000000000002there 
continue 
to exist "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought 
to raise any Constitutional problem."48  Relevant here is that 
knowingly uttered false speech is one such category of speech 
for which the government may impose sanctions without violating 
the First Amendment.49    
¶72 The United States Supreme Court has not directly 
addressed how knowingly false statements, when made in a 
political 
campaign, 
may 
be 
regulated. 
 
There 
are 
cases 
addressing the regulation of campaign advertising in which false 
statements are not at issue.  There also are cases allowing 
liability for knowingly false speech regarding public officials 
                     
46 We have a "profound national commitment to the principle 
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open . . . ." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 
(1964). 
47 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14-15 ("In a republic 
where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to 
make informed choices among candidates for office is essential, 
for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably 
shape the course that we follow as a nation."). 
48 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571–572 (1942)). 
49 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1580 (recognizing defamation and 
fraud as among the areas where speech may be punished or 
prohibited without violating the First Amendment). 
 
 
37 
or public affairs, but not in the specific context of judicial 
discipline for political campaign advertising.    
¶73 To discern the applicable law in this judicial 
discipline case, we must look below the surface of the rhetoric 
to the analysis and legal standards of the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretations of the First Amendment.   Our analysis 
must "harmonize these two strains of law."50  We proceed 
recognizing 
that 
"[p]rotecting 
judicial 
integrity 
is 
a 
government interest of highest magnitude, as is protecting the 
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.  Reconciling these two 
competing interests is no small feat . . . ."51   
¶74 Justice Gableman's brief extracts language from cases 
interpreting federal statutes regulating political election 
campaigns, such as Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976),52 and 
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 
                     
50 See Siefert v. Alexander, No. 09-1713, slip op. at 11 
(7th Cir. June 14, 2010).  
51 Siefert v. Alexander, No. 09-1713, slip op. at 33 (7th 
Cir. June 14, 2010) (Rovner, J., dissenting in part). 
52 We agree with and apply the teaching of Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976):  "Discussion of public issues and debate 
on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the 
operation of the system of government established by our 
Constitution. 
The 
First 
Amendment 
affords 
the 
broadest 
protection to such political expression in order 'to assure 
[the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people.'"  (quoting 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
 
 
38 
551 U.S. 449 (2007).53  Justice Gableman's reliance on the 
federal campaign law cases does not support a categorically 
different analysis for regulation of campaigns and judicial 
discipline than for other First Amendment cases.  The language 
from these cases is not persuasive to overcome the application 
of the "actual malice" standard to the present case for several 
reasons.  Rather, the U.S. Supreme Court's holdings "do not 
necessarily 
forbid 
any 
regulation 
of 
a 
judge's 
speech. . . . [R]estrictions on judicial speech may, in some 
circumstances, be required by the Due Process Clause.  This 
provides a state with a sufficient basis for restricting certain 
suspect categories of judicial speech, even political speech."54  
Knowingly false speech is such a "suspect category."     
¶75 
First, the United States Supreme Court in 
Wisconsin 
Right 
to 
Life 
elaborated 
a 
standard 
that 
is 
"objective, focusing on the substance of the communication 
rather than amorphous considerations of intent and effect."55  
                     
53 Significantly, the analysis in these cases is not about 
evaluating the truth or falsity of campaign communication, but 
about 
whether 
the 
communication 
falls 
within 
categories 
distinguished in federal election law, such as advertisements 
advocating election or defeat of candidates or those discussing 
issues. 
54 Siefert v. Alexander, No. 09-1713, slip op. at 19 (7th 
Cir. June 14, 2010). 
55 The United States Supreme Court rejected a test "for 
distinguishing between discussions of issues and [discussions 
of] candidates" that depends either the intent of the speaker or 
the subjective effect the communication had upon a listener. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 467-68.  The analysis 
instead focuses on the "substance of the communication."  
Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 469. 
(continued) 
 
 
39 
The objective standard approach to the assessment of political 
advertisements adopted in Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 
469 (2007), is the very approach that we use in the instant case 
regarding campaign advertisements and judicial discipline.  See 
¶¶3, 18, 32, above.   
¶76 This objective standard approach in the United States 
Supreme Court cases not only comports with our approach to the 
language and substance of Justice Gableman's advertisement but 
also comports with the approach taken in Wisconsin defamation 
cases.  As the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in Frinzi v. 
Hanson, 30 Wis. 2d 271, 276-77, 140 N.W.2d 259 (1966), discussed 
at ¶46 n.30 above: "[W]ords must be reasonably interpreted and 
must be construed in the plain and popular sense in which they 
would naturally be understood in the context in which they were 
used and under the circumstances they were uttered. . . . One 
may 
not 
dissect 
the 
alleged 
defamatory 
statement 
into 
nondefamatory parts and thus lose the vital over-all meaning."  
Like the Court in Wisconsin Right to Life, we reject a focus on 
                                                                  
The United State Supreme Court maintained and applied this 
objective approach to determining what meaning was conveyed by 
the contested campaign speech in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889-90 (2010) ("a court 
should find that [a communication] is the functional equivalent 
of express advocacy only if [it] is susceptible of no reasonable 
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a 
specific candidate") (emphasis added); see also id. at 898 
("While it might be maintained that political speech simply 
cannot 
be 
banned 
or 
restricted 
as 
a 
categorical 
matter . . . [Wisconsin 
Right 
to 
Life, 
Inc.] 
provides 
a 
sufficient framework for protecting the relevant First Amendment 
interests in this case."). 
 
 
40 
the speaker's intent and focus instead on the "substance of the 
communication" in the present case. 
¶77 In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 
(1990), the United States Supreme Court addressed an analogous 
issue.  The Court had to decide "whether a reasonable factfinder 
could 
conclude 
that 
the 
statements 
[in 
a 
newspaper 
article] . . . imply an assertion" that was factually false.  
The argument was made that the statements were constitutionally 
protected as "opinion."  
¶78 The Milkovich Court determined that the article's 
"connotation" was "sufficiently factual to be susceptible of 
being proved true or false.  A determination whether petitioner 
lied in this instance can be made on a core of objective 
evidence . . . . Unlike a subjective assertion the averred 
defamatory language is an articulation of an objectively 
verifiable event."  Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21.   
¶79 Similarly 
here, 
the 
fact 
communicated 
by 
the  
advertisement, 
"unlike 
a 
subjective 
assertion," 
was 
"an 
articulation of an objectively verifiable event."  Milkovich, 
497 U.S. at 22.  Because the legal standard we apply turns on 
establishing factual truth or falsity, the nature of the 
required determination is the same in the present case as in 
Milkovich and other defamation cases.   
¶80 Second, in Wisconsin Right to Life the United States 
Supreme Court's bottom-line determination was whether "the ad is 
susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than" the one 
that would make it subject to the prohibitions of federal 
campaign law.  Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 469-
 
 
41 
70; id. at 474 (the test is whether "the ads can only reasonably 
be viewed as advocating or opposing a candidate . . . ").56  We 
use this very same "no reasonable approach other than" basis in 
evaluating Justice Gableman's advertisement in this judicial 
discipline case.  We conclude that the advertisement can 
reasonably be viewed only as communicating that Louis Butler's 
actions in representing Mitchell and finding a loophole led to 
                     
56 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. 
Ct. 876, 890 (2010), followed the same method for determining 
what meaning was communicated by the contested film and whether 
that meaning brought it into conflict with the relevant 
statutory restriction.  There, the Court applied the objective 
standard as "elaborated in [Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.]" to 
reject the appellant's argument that the content of the 
contested film should be viewed narrowly and as falling outside 
the restrictions analyzed in that case governing communications 
that are "the functional equivalent of express advocacy."   
In evaluating whether a communication did or did not 
violate 
the 
statutory 
prohibition, 
the 
Court 
viewed 
the 
communication as a whole and in context, as we have reviewed the 
contested communication here.  There, the Court observed how 
"the film would be understood by most viewers" and noted that 
"[t]he narrative may contain more suggestions and arguments than 
facts, but there is little doubt that the thesis of the film is 
that [then-Senator Clinton] is unfit for the Presidency."  130 
S. Ct. at 890.  In light of those observations, the Court 
concluded that "there is no reasonable interpretation of Hillary 
other than as an appeal to vote against Senator Clinton."  Id.   
Contrary to Justice Gableman's suggested approach, the 
Court in Citizens United did not analyze each sentence in 
isolation.  Rather, the Court employed the "no reasonable 
interpretation other than" approach, looking to the "thesis" of 
the communication when viewed as a whole.  Likewise here, there 
is no doubt how the advertisement "would be understood by most 
viewers" or that its "thesis" was that Butler was somehow 
responsible for Mitchell's release.  Our method of determining 
whether the advertisement violated the relevant prohibition in 
this 
case 
is 
entirely 
consistent 
with 
the 
approach 
for 
evaluating the content of regulated political speech in Citizens 
United. 
 
 
42 
Mitchell's release and his commitment of another crime.  No 
other reasonable interpretation of the advertisement, reading 
its language in context, has been suggested.   
¶81 Third, in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 
469 (emphasis added), the Court focused on protecting "the 
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public 
concern . . . ."  The focus of the First Amendment protection 
was not articulated by the Court in terms of "campaign speech," 
but in terms of discussing "all matters of public concern."57  
This language rebuts Justice Gableman's argument that the law 
takes a categorically different view in an election campaign 
context than in regulation of other public speech addressing 
important public matters.  Furthermore, Wisconsin Right to Life, 
Inc. stated that the speech to be protected is that which 
"truthfully" addresses matters of public concern, not that which 
misrepresents the facts about such matters. 
¶82 Fourth, while Justice Gableman quotes language in 
these cases that properly observes the vital role of protecting 
free speech in the context of political campaigns, the United 
States Supreme Court considered equally weighty First Amendment 
"political speech" values in the cases in which the "actual 
malice" standard was first developed.  Garrison, for instance, 
was a case decided in the context of public criticisms of 
                     
57 In this central statement of the holding, Wisconsin Right 
to Life, Inc. cites Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public 
Service Commissionn of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980). 
 
 
43 
elected judges, addressing their fitness for office.  Garrison, 
379 U.S. at 64-65.58 
¶83 Fifth, the "actual malice" standard is a demanding 
one, difficult to meet and highly protective of free speech.  It 
is therefore a standard that can be applied to political 
campaigns in which the First Amendment "has its fullest and most 
urgent application."59 
¶84 Sixth, because the First Amendment allows a court to 
adjudicate the questions of (1) speaking "knowingly," or (2) 
with "reckless disregard of the truth or falsity," as well as 
(3) the "truth or falsity" of statements in civil and criminal 
defamation cases, we see no reason why the First Amendment would 
raise a categorical bar against adjudicating the same questions 
in a judicial disciplinary proceeding, the setting in which the 
issue arises here. 
¶85 Seventh, differences between defamation law and the 
legal sanction of false speech in the present case do not 
provide a reasoned basis why the actual malice standard should 
not be applied here.  A plaintiff in a traditional defamation 
action, unless proceeding on a theory of defamation per se, 
proves damages or a harm to reputation.  Here, the Judicial 
                     
58 The United States Supreme Court's analysis in the 
Wisconsin Right to Life case also undermines the suggestion that 
a sharp distinction can be maintained between formal campaign 
speech and speech that, although not directly addressing a 
candidate 
or 
campaign, 
implicates 
core 
First 
Amendment 
interests.  See Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 457 ("the 
distinction between campaign advocacy and issue advocacy 'may 
often dissolve in practical application.'") (quoted source 
omitted).   
59 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). 
 
 
44 
Commission need not prove harm to reputation or damage.  Knowing 
misrepresentations of an opponent cause harm to elections and 
damage judicial integrity.  The interests the first sentence SCR 
60.06(3)(c) protects are not private reputational interests but 
substantial well-recognized interests.   
¶86 SCR 60.06(3)(c) protects the reputation, independence 
and 
integrity 
of 
Wisconsin's 
judicial 
elections 
and 
the 
judiciary.  A state has a compelling interest in preserving the 
integrity of its election process."60  "[A] state has a 
compelling interest in the integrity of its judiciary,"61 and may 
"properly protect the judicial process from being misjudged in 
the minds of the public."62  "There could hardly be a higher 
governmental interest than a State's interest in the quality of 
its judiciary,"63 and "[t]he state's interest in the integrity of 
the judiciary extends to preserving public confidence in the 
judiciary."64  See ¶¶101-102, below.     
                     
60 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (quoting Eu 
v. San Francisco Co. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 
(1989)). 
61 Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. f the Supreme Court of 
Penn., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1991). 
62  Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965). 
63 Landmark Comm'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 848 
(1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
64 In re Chmura (Chmura I), 608 N.W.2d 31, 40 (Mich. 2000):  
The state's interest in the integrity of the judiciary 
extends 
to 
preserving 
public 
confidence 
in 
the 
judiciary. 
 
The 
appearance 
of 
fairness 
and 
impartiality is necessary to foster the people's 
willingness to accept and follow court orders.  The 
state's interest in protecting the reputation of the 
judiciary is also a compelling interest.     
 
 
45 
¶87 For the reasons we have just set forth, we conclude 
that in accordance with the United States Supreme Court cases, 
the "actual malice standard" set forth in New York Times, 
Garrison, and subsequent cases is applicable in the instant 
case.  
¶88 Our First Amendment analysis is supported by other 
courts.   Some courts have applied much the same standard we use 
to evaluate political campaign material and to determine that 
provisions similar to SCR 60.06(3)(c) do not impermissibly 
curtail the freedom of speech either facially or as applied.65   
¶89 We look first to Rickert v. State of Washington, 
Public Disclosure Commission, 168 P.3d 826 (Wash. 2007), upon 
which Judge Fine's concurring opinion at the Judicial Conduct 
Panel relied (although Judge Fine did not adopt all of the 
Washington court's analysis). 
¶90 In Rickert, the nine Justices of the Supreme Court of 
Washington divided 4-1-4 in deciding the constitutionality of a 
state statute prohibiting a person from "sponsor[ing] with 
actual malice . . . [p]olitical advertising or an electioneering 
communication that contains a false statement of material fact 
about a candidate for public office."  Rickert, 168 P.3d at 828.   
¶91 Four of nine justices joined a "majority" opinion that 
declared that any statute purporting to regulate "speech uttered 
during a campaign for political office" based on its content is 
                     
65 Decisions of other courts have sometimes struck down as 
unconstitutional provisions that limit or penalize campaign 
speech, using standards encompassing a broader swath than is 
addressed by the first sentence of SCR 60.06(3)(c). 
 
 
46 
subject to "strict scrutiny" analysis, under which the State 
must demonstrate that the statute "is necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end.'"  168 P.3d 826, ¶8 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 
504 U.S. 191 (1992)).  These justices concluded that the statute 
in question did not meet this test. 
¶92 Chief Justice Alexander concurred in the result, 
nevertheless concluding that "the majority goes too far" and 
that "the government . . . may penalize defamatory political 
speech."  The Chief Justice viewed the Washington statute as 
also prohibiting nondefamatory speech.66  
¶93 Four other justices dissented.  They viewed the 
majority result as "an invitation to lie with impunity."  
Rickert, 168 P.3d 826, ¶30 (Madsen, J., dissenting).  Rejecting 
the 
majority's 
interpretation 
and 
application 
of 
prior 
Washington cases, the dissenters concluded that "[t]he United 
States Supreme Court has made it absolutely clear that the 
deliberate lie in political debate has no protected place under 
the First Amendment because such lies do not advance the free 
political process but rather subvert it."  Rickert, 168 P.3d 
826, ¶32 (Madsen, J., dissenting) (citing Garrison, 379 U.S. at 
75).67   
                     
66 Rickert, 168 P.3d 826, ¶28. 
67 Other features of the analysis in Rickert also make the 
case inapplicable to our evaluation of SCR 60.06(3)(c) and the 
facts of the present case.  In Rickert, the Washington court 
viewed the statute as "underinclusive" because it limited speech 
about a campaign opponent but included an exception for a 
candidate's speech about himself or herself.  Rickert, 168 P.3d 
826, ¶¶19-20.  In contrast, SCR 60.06(3)(c) governs speech both 
about a candidate and his or her opponent.   
(continued) 
 
 
47 
¶94 We are neither bound by the majority result in Rickert 
nor persuaded by its reasoning.  We conclude that the dissenting 
opinion in Rickert has the correct view of the First Amendment 
to be applied in the instant case: "[I]f the actual malice 
standard is met the speech falls within a class of speech that 
is not constitutionally protected.  Therefore, a statute that 
proscribes speech under this standard does not have to meet the 
strict scrutiny/compelling governmental interest test . . . ."  
Rickert, 168 P.3d 826, ¶36.   
¶95 We agree with the Rickert dissent that the strict 
scrutiny analysis is not necessary because the only speech 
prohibited by the first sentence of SCR 60.06(3)(c) is knowingly 
false speech, which the First Amendment does not shield from the 
imposition of sanctions.68 
                                                                  
The restriction addressed in Rickert was also enforced 
through an administrative body with members appointed by the 
governor, 
a 
procedural 
mechanism 
that 
the 
four-justice 
"majority" 
opinion 
viewed 
as 
impermissibly 
limiting 
a 
candidate's access to independent, de novo judicial review.  
Rickert, 168 P.3d 826, ¶22-24.  Wisconsin's system of judicial 
discipline creates no such concerns.  Grievances against judges  
are presented first to an independent Judicial Commission 
composed of a majority of public members (non-lawyers), judges, 
and lawyers.  If the grievance is found to have merit, a 
complaint is filed and heard by a Judicial Conduct Panel 
composed of three court of appeals judges.  The Panel makes 
recommendations to the supreme court, which makes the final 
disciplinary determination. 
68 SCR 60.06(3)(c) also cannot be considered presumptively 
unconstitutional as a prior restraint on speech.  "In First 
Amendment 
jurisprudence, 
prior 
restraints 
are . . . traditionally 
contrasted 
with 
'subsequent 
punishments,' which impose penalties on expression after it 
occurs."  2 Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of 
Speech § 15:1. 
(continued) 
 
 
48 
¶96 In any event, SCR 60.06(3)(c) can withstand a strict 
scrutiny analysis.  The first sentence of the rule is necessary 
to protect the reputation, independence, and integrity of 
Wisconsin's judiciary.  These are compelling interests.  A state 
may "properly protect the judicial process from being misjudged 
in the minds of the public."69  "[T]here could hardly be a higher 
governmental interest than a State's interest in the quality of 
its judiciary,"70 and "[t]he state's interest in the integrity of 
the judiciary extends to preserving public confidence in the 
judiciary."71  The compelling interest in judicial integrity 
places it "beyond doubt that states have a compelling interest 
in developing, and indeed are required by the Fourteenth 
                                                                  
In Citizens United, the United States Supreme Court 
suggested that the regulatory scheme at issue there, although 
"not a prior restraint on speech in the strict sense," 
"function[ed] as the equivalent of prior restraint" "[A]s a 
practical matter," because "a speaker wishing to avoid threats 
of criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending against 
FEC enforcement must ask a governmental agency for prior 
permission . . . ."  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 882.  The 
FEC employed an "11-factor balancing test" to determine whether 
a communication was prohibited.  No similar complexity or 
regulatory scheme for prior approval is involved in SCR 
60.06(3)(c).   
69 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965). 
70 Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) 
(Stewart, J., concurring). 
71 In re Chmura (Chmura I), 608 N.W.2d 31, 40 (Mich. 2000):  
The state's interest in the integrity of the judiciary 
extends 
to 
preserving 
public 
confidence 
in 
the 
judiciary. 
 
The 
appearance 
of 
fairness 
and 
impartiality is necessary to foster the people's 
willingness to accept and follow court orders.  The 
state's interest in protecting the reputation of the 
judiciary is also a compelling interest.     
 
 
49 
Amendment 
to 
develop . . . independent-minded 
and 
faithful 
jurists."72   
¶97 Furthermore, the State "indisputably has a compelling 
interest in preserving the integrity of its election process."73  
The United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the 
important governmental interest in "providing information to the 
electorate" and in political campaigns.74  Voters must "be able 
to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected,"75 
and the transparency of information provided in campaign 
advertisements 
"enables 
the 
electorate 
to 
make 
informed 
decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and 
messages."76  
                     
72 Siefert v. Alexander, No. 09-1713, slip op. at 8 (7th 
Cir. June 14, 2010) (citing, inter alia, Republican Party of 
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 794, 796 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 
2259 (2009)). 
73 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (quoting Eu 
v. San Francisco Co. Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 
231 (1989)); see also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61, (1982) 
(recognizing the "state interest in protecting the political 
process from distortions caused by untrue and inaccurate 
speech"). 
74 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (upholding disclosure 
requirements under "exacting scrutiny" analysis, which is less 
demanding than "strict scrutiny" and requires a "substantial 
relation" 
between 
the 
burden 
on 
political 
speech 
and 
a 
"sufficiently important" governmental interest). 
75 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915. 
76 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (recognizing the 
"sufficiently important" governmental interests passing the 
"exacting scrutiny" analysis to uphold disclaimer and disclosure 
requirements 
which 
"may 
burden 
the 
ability 
to 
speak, 
but . . . 'impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities and 
'do not prevent anyone from speaking.'").  
 
 
50 
¶98 Knowing misrepresentations are "no essential part of 
any exposition of ideas . . . ."77  They may undermine the 
electorate's ability to "make informed decisions" and "give 
proper weight" to competing speakers and messages.78  The open, 
even contentious exchange of ideas in an election need not 
permit knowingly false statements, which undermine rather than 
serve the First Amendment's protection for political debate.79  
¶99 SCR 60.06(3)(c) serves compelling state interests.  "A 
prime purpose of judicial discipline is to foster public trust 
and confidence in the judicial system";80  "[d]iscipline is 
designed to restore and maintain the dignity, honor, and 
impartiality of the judicial office."81  By deterring the use of 
knowingly false statements about candidates in a judicial 
election, the Code fosters an electoral process in which the 
public can have greater confidence and a climate in which the 
                     
77 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (citing 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942)).  
78 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915-16.  
79 Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87, 100 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 
1975) (concluding that provisions of New York campaign code were 
unconstitutional because they were overbroad and reached past 
the "actual malice" standard; recognizing that "[n]othing in our 
decision downgrades the state's legitimate interest in insuring 
fair and honest elections.  Undoubtedly, deliberate calculated 
falsehoods when used by political candidates can lead to public 
cynicism and apathy toward the electoral process."). 
80 In re Ziegler, 2008 WI 47, ¶¶5, 35, 309 Wis. 2d 253, 750 
N.W.2d 710.  
81 Id. at ¶35 ("Discipline is not imposed to punish the 
individual judge.  Rather, the purpose of judicial discipline, 
like the purpose of the Code of Judicial Conduct, is to protect 
our court system and the public from misconduct."). 
 
 
51 
public can elect the candidate of their choice based on correct 
information.   
¶100 Thus, numerous compelling interests are served by SCR 
60.06(3)(c) and its enforcement through judicial discipline 
proceedings.  The necessity of protecting these interests 
through reasonable enforcement of the Code of Judicial Conduct 
is apparent and well recognized.  The interests protected relate 
to both the integrity and reputation of the judiciary and the 
integrity of the election process, and the rule reaches only 
those whose conduct implicates both the judiciary and elections.  
The Rule applies evenly to all candidates for judicial office  
and is not overinclusive or underinclusive.  Most importantly, 
SCR 60.06(3)(c) prohibits only statements made under the "actual 
malice" standard, a narrow category of speech not protected by 
the First Amendment.  The first sentence of SCR 60.06(3)(c) 
therefore passes a strict scrutiny analysis. 
¶101 We also examine the two In re Chmura cases decided by 
the Michigan Supreme Court.82  There, the constitutionality of 
Canon 7(B)(1)(d) of Michigan's Code of Judicial Conduct was 
challenged.  The Canon reached much more broadly than SCR 
60.06(3)(c), restricting "communication that the candidate knows 
or reasonably should know is false, fraudulent, misleading, 
deceptive, 
or 
which 
contains 
a 
material 
misrepresentation . . . or omits a fact necessary to make the 
statement 
considered 
as 
a 
whole 
not 
materially 
                     
82 In re Chmura (Chmura I), 608 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 2000); In 
re Chmura (Chmura II), 626 N.W.2d 876 (Mich. 2001).   
 
 
52 
misleading . . . ."83  The Michigan court held that the Canon was 
overbroad and therefore facially unconstitutional.  The court 
gave the rule a "saving construction," narrowing it only "to 
prohibit a candidate for judicial office from knowingly or 
recklessly using or participating in the use of any form of 
public communication that is false." 84     
                     
83 Chmura I, 608 N.W.2d at 32 n.1. 
84 Chmura I, 608 N.W.2d at 43.   
Similar to the outcome of Chmura I is Weaver v. Bonner, 309 
F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002), in which the court struck down 
provisions of Georgia law that were not narrowly tailored to the 
compelling interests and that reached too broadly, stating that 
"to be narrowly tailored, restrictions on candidate speech 
during political campaigns must be limited to false statements 
that are made with knowledge of falsity or with reckless 
disregard as to whether the statement is false, i.e., an actual 
malice standard."   
Using similar reasoning, in Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. 
Supp. 87, 95 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1975), a panel convened of judges of 
the 
federal 
Eastern 
and 
Southern 
Districts 
of 
New 
York 
"concluded that the deliberate calculated falsehood does not 
enjoy constitutional protection even when made during the course 
of a political campaign and when it involves a proceeding by the 
Board [of Elections] rather than a civil defamation suit or 
criminal prosecution."  In analyzing the application of the 
"actual malice" standard, the court stated:  
It is important to emphasize . . . that any state 
regulation of campaign speech must be premised on 
proof and application of a Times "actual malice" 
standard.  We are not dealing with defamation suits 
brought by "private individuals" where a standard 
somewhat less than that required by Times would be 
appropriate.  To the contrary, Board proceedings 
concern regulation of the speech of "public officers" 
and "public figures" during campaigns for political 
office where the constitutional guarantee of freedom 
of 
speech 
"has 
its 
fullest 
and 
most 
urgent 
application."  With this proposition in mind, we can 
agree with the Board's argument that calculated 
falsehoods are of such slight social value that no 
(continued) 
 
 
53 
¶102 Thereafter, in Chmura II, the Michigan Supreme Court 
applied its rewritten narrower rule.85  Reckoning with the 
concept of falsity in a political advertisement, the Michigan 
Court rejected application of the "substantial truth" doctrine 
from tort law "because a judicial candidate's communication 
could be interpreted in 'numerous, nuanced ways.'"  Chmura II, 
626 N.W.2d at 887 (quoted source omitted).  The court then 
reviewed the substance of the contested advertisements and found 
                                                                  
matter what the context in which they are made, they 
are not constitutionally protected.   
Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87, 92 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1975).   
See also District One Republican Comm'n v. District One 
Democrat Comm'n, 466 N.W.2d 820, 828, 829 (N.D. 1991) (applying 
a prohibition that "[n]o person may knowingly sponsor any 
political advertisement or news release that contains any 
assertion, representation, or statement of fact, including 
information concerning a candidate's prior public record, which 
the sponsor knows to be untrue, deceptive, or misleading;" 
holding that "sensitive First Amendment considerations for 
political speech dictated that stringent mental culpability 
requirement and that the constitutional requirements necessary 
to impose liability for defamation of a public figure ["actual 
malice" standard] also established a minimum culpability for 
political speech;" determining the required "knowing" mental 
state was not established in the case before it). 
85 In re Chmura (Chmura II), 626 N.W.2d 876 (Mich. 2001). 
 
 
54 
them "substantially true despite their inaccuracies,"86 thus 
declining to impose discipline.  A dissent agreed with the 
standard but disagreed with its application to some of the 
advertisements at issue.  No justice determined that the 
application of the standard would present a First Amendment 
problem.   
¶103 In other words, once the Michigan Rule was properly 
narrowed to track the "actual malice" standard, the Michigan 
Court had no constitutional qualms in applying the rule to 
prohibit campaign communications which were false and made 
knowingly or with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of 
the communications. 
¶104 In Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commission, 926 F.2d 573, 
577 (6th Cir. 1991), the United States Court of Appeals 
                     
86 Chmura II, 626 N.W.2d at 897.  The court determined that 
in analyzing whether a judicial candidate had violated the Code 
restriction 
on 
false 
campaign 
communication, 
"the 
public 
communication 
must 
be 
analyzed 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
statements 
communicated 
are 
literally 
true. . . . [I]f 
the 
communication conveys an inaccuracy, the communication as a 
whole must be analyzed to determine whether 'the substance, the 
gist, the sting,' of the communication is true despite the 
inaccuracy.  In other words, we must decide whether the 
communication is substantially true."  Chmura, 626 N.W.2d at 
887.  Were we to apply that standard in the present case, it is 
clear that the advertisement was substantially and objectively 
false. 
The Chmura I case also determined that in evaluating 
whether 
a 
candidate 
recklessly 
disregarded 
the 
truth, 
a 
contested communication was to be analyzed using an "objective" 
standard, by which it meant a standard that did not require a 
showing that the speaker "actually entertain[ed] serious doubts" 
as to the truth of the statement.  Chmura I, 608 N.W.2d at 44.  
This standard sanctions more, rather than less speech than our 
interpretation of SCR 60.06(3)(c) allows. 
 
 
55 
evaluated portions of an Ohio statute which proscribed "only the 
knowing making of false statements"  and determined that these 
"clearly come within the Supreme Court holdings in Garrison v. 
Louisiana and New York Times v. Sullivan."   
¶105 These cases demonstrate that false speech, even false 
political speech, "does not merit constitutional protection if 
the speaker knows of the falsehood or recklessly disregards the 
truth."87  Pestrak comports with our view of the applicable law, 
namely, 
that 
SCR 
60.06(3)(c) 
supports 
the 
imposition 
of 
discipline using the "actual malice standard" for false campaign 
speech without violating the First Amendment. 
¶106 We conclude that the rule emphasized in Garrison v. 
Louisiana 
and 
explicitly 
maintained 
in 
cases 
thereafter, 
including in the context of political speech, is determinative 
here:  False statements knowingly made or false statements made 
in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity are not 
protected by the First Amendment.  Because SCR 60.06(3)(c) 
incorporates 
this 
standard, 
its 
application 
to 
judicial 
discipline in the present case does not violate the First 
Amendment.     
* * * * 
                     
87 Pestrak, 926 F.2d at 577.  The court in Pestrak went on 
to determine that enforcement of the measure by fines or cease 
and 
desist 
orders 
issued 
by 
an 
administrative 
body 
was 
unconstitutional 
because the administrative nature of the 
enforcement provisions did not meet the "clear and convincing" 
evidentiary burden as imposed administratively and because the 
cease and desist orders amounted to an impermissible prior 
restraint rather than a subsequent punishment.  Pestrak, 926 
F.2d at 578. 
 
 
56 
¶107 We conclude that by publishing the advertisement at 
issue, Justice Gableman willfully violated the first sentence of 
SCR 60.06(3)(c) and engaged in judicial misconduct pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 757.81(4)(a).  By means of the advertisement that 
he personally reviewed and checked out, Justice Gableman 
knowingly or with reckless disregard for the statements' truth 
or falsity misrepresented a fact concerning an opponent within 
the meaning of SCR 60.06(3)(c).   
¶108 We further conclude that the rule emphasized in 
Garrison v. Louisiana and explicitly maintained in cases 
thereafter is determinative here:  False statements knowingly 
made or false statements made in reckless disregard of their 
truth or falsity are not protected by the First Amendment.  
Because 
SCR 
60.06(3)(c) 
incorporates 
this 
standard, 
its 
application to judicial discipline in the present case does not 
violate the First Amendment. 
¶109 It is clear that the court is equally divided 
regarding the disposition of the matter.  No four justices have 
voted either to accept or to reject the Judicial Conduct Panel's 
recommendations, nor have four justices agreed on Justice 
Gableman's motion for summary judgment or any disposition of the 
Judicial Commission's complaint.  No action can therefore be 
taken on the Panel's recommendation.  The Judicial Commission 
has failed to obtain a majority of justices to reject the 
recommendation of the Panel.  Under these circumstances, the 
Panel is relieved of any further responsibility in this matter, 
and we remand the matter to the Judicial Commission with 
 
 
57 
directions to request a jury hearing, in accord with Wis. Stat. 
§§ 757.87, 757.89, and 805.08.   
¶110 For the reasons set forth we write separately. 
 
 
 
 
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