Case Title: Lowseth v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93-184

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lowseth v. State1994 WY 62875 P.2d 725Case Number: 93-184Decided: 06/02/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Scott 
Bradley LOWSETH,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Leonard 
D. Munker, State Public Defender, Deborah Cornia, Asst. Public Defender, Gerald 
M. Gallivan, Director, Defender Aid Program, and Robert M. Vang, Student 
Intern.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., D. Michael Pauling, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance 
Program, and Lori K. Bohlender, Student Intern.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      A Sweetwater 
County jury convicted Scott Lowseth (Lowseth) of aggravated assault stemming 
from an armed standoff with Sweetwater County Sheriff's officers. In this 
appeal, Lowseth seeks reversal of his conviction, arguing: (1) six of the 
written jury instructions were never returned to the trial court, (2) the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction due to a defective criminal information, and (3) the 
trial court improperly refused to further instruct the jury during its 
deliberations.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Lowseth presents 
the following arguments:

I. 
The failure of the clerk of court to deliver six (6) written jury instructions 
to the trial court with the jury verdict, as required under Wyoming Statute 
7-11-201(a)(vi), constituted plain error.

II. 
The trial court lacked jurisdiction over the defective information and the State 
cannot use a bill of particulars to amend a criminal information, where the bill 
of particulars changed the nature of the crime.

III. 
A defendant cannot be convicted of using an "actual threat of physical injury 
during the act of employing a deadly weapon," when the trial court fails to 
instruct the jury on the meaning of "threatens to use," after the jury asks for 
additional instruction.

I. 
FACTS

[¶4]      During the 
afternoon and evening of June 16, 1992, Lowseth and his boss went to two bars 
where they consumed a number of mixed drinks and beers. Later that evening, at 
around midnight, Lowseth and his boss went to Lowseth's trailer, where they 
continued drinking. At approximately 2:00 a.m. on June 17, 1992, Lowseth began 
shooting his .357 colt revolver inside his trailer. Lowseth, distraught over his 
father's recent death, would aim the gun at himself and then move the gun before 
firing. Around 5:45 a.m., Lowseth phoned 911 and reported that shots had been 
fired in his trailer. Several sheriff officers were dispatched as well as the 
county's Tactical Response Team.

[¶5]      Around 6:40 a.m. 
that morning, the negotiator for the Tactical Response Team contacted Lowseth 
using a cellular phone. During these phone conversations with the negotiator, 
Lowseth made a number of expletive filled statements 
including,

I 
can see them [expletive] out there with those rifles and those scopes. I've got 
more than they have in here. I've got more guns than they've 
got.

Later 
that morning, Sweetwater County Sheriff, Gary Bailiff (Sheriff Bailiff), noticed 
Lowseth peering out through a kitchen window. Around that same time, Sheriff 
Bailiff summoned Officer Barneski to the sheriff's position. Just before Officer 
Barneski arrived at Sheriff Bailiff's position, at approximately 8:30 a.m., 
Sheriff Bailiff heard and saw three shots come out Lowseth's kitchen window and 
kick up dirt. At the same time, Officer Barneski, while trying to get to Sheriff 
Bailiff, crawled through a flower bed and over a trailer hitch in an adjacent 
lot. While climbing over the trailer hitch, Officer Barneski heard two shots and 
then immediately heard two bullets pass within two to ten feet of him. Officer 
Barneski then quickly took cover next to Sheriff Bailiff.

[¶6]      After conferring 
with Sheriff Bailiff, Officer Barneski ordered another officer to shoot tear gas 
into Lowseth's trailer. Lowseth exited his trailer and was subdued by several 
officers after the tear gas filled his trailer. The officers discovered a 
substantial arsenal inside Lowseth's trailer, including two pistols, a revolver, 
a shotgun and an ample supply of ammunition.

[¶7]      On June 18, 1992, 
an information was filed charging Lowseth with aggravated assault, which 
stated:

Lowseth 
threatened to use a drawn deadly weapon on officers of the Sweetwater County 
Sheriff's office; contrary to Wyoming Statute § 6-2-502(a)(iii), 1977, as 
amended * * *.

An 
affidavit attached to that information stated that Lowseth had fired three shots 
at Sheriff Bailiff but did not mention any shots fired at Officer 
Barneski.

[¶8]      On February 3, 
1993, after a number of pre-trial hearings concerning Lowseth's competency to 
stand trial and on motions to dismiss the information, and after several 
continuances were granted to Lowseth, Lowseth's counsel moved to withdraw. 
Lowseth's counsel was permitted to withdraw. The State obtained a continuance 
from this court. 

[¶9]      On March 8, 1993, 
Lowseth's new counsel moved for a bill of particulars asking for the identity of 
the specific officer whom Lowseth had allegedly threatened. On March 15, 1993, 
at a hearing on the motion for bill of particulars, the State, for the first 
time, explained that Officer Barneski was the officer who Lowseth was charged 
with threatening and that the manner of the threat was the firing of a loaded 
revolver. The trial court ordered the State to provide a bill of particulars 
naming the individual officer allegedly threatened by Lowseth and describing the 
precise manner of the alleged threat. No written bill of particulars appears in 
the record.

[¶10]   The trial began on March 30, 1993; 
and, at the close of Lowseth's case, the court read all the instructions to the 
jury. During deliberations the jury asked the trial court: "In an aggravated 
assault charge, does the defendant have to see the victim?" The court replied: 
"I am not permitted to instruct you further." The jury returned a verdict of 
guilty of aggravated assault. After the jury was dismissed, the clerk of court 
went to the jury room to collect the written instructions but found that six 
instructions were missing. Those written instructions were never located, but 
the court reproduced them for purposes of the record from the transcript and 
unsigned copies.

II. 
DISCUSSION

A. 
Instructions

[¶11]   Lowseth first argues that the trial 
court committed plain error because six of the written instructions were not 
returned with the verdict into the court in violation of W.S. 7-11-201(a)(vi) 
(1987), which provides:

Before 
the argument of the case is begun, the court shall immediately, and before 
proceeding with other business, charge the jury. The charge shall be reduced to 
writing by the court, if either party request [requests] it. No charge or 
instruction provided for in this section, when written or given, shall be orally 
qualified, modified or explained to the jury by the court. All written 
charges and instructions, shall be taken by the jury in their retirement and 
returned with their verdict into court, and shall remain on file with the papers 
of the case. [emphasis added]

Lowseth 
does not argue that the trial court failed to provide the jury with all the 
written instructions for its deliberations nor that the jury did not have all 
the instructions during deliberations. Instead, Lowseth argues that this court 
must reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial because six written 
instructions were not returned to the court with the verdict. This claim is 
premised on our recent decision in Rissler & McMurry v. Snodgrass, 
854 P.2d 69 (Wyo. 1993), where we held that a trial court had committed plain 
error when it violated W.S. 1-11-209 (1988) by answering a written question 
presented to it by the jury during deliberations without reporting it on the 
record and in open court. Id. at 70-71.

[¶12]   As Lowseth recognizes, because this 
alleged error was not brought to the attention of the court, we limit our review 
to a search for plain error. State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1137 (Wyo. 
1993). The statute is mandatory: "All written charges and instructions, shall be 
* * * returned with their verdict into court * * *." The reasons for this 
requirement are twofold: First, to assure that the jury took all the written 
instructions with them to deliberation, and secondly, to preserve the written 
instructions for appeal. Clearly, all the written instructions were not returned 
with the verdict convicting Lowseth. Peering through our "plain error 
spectacles," however, we find no substantial right of Lowseth's to be adversely 
affected. Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 746 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶13]   The trial transcript demonstrates 
that the trial court read each of the missing instructions to the jury 
accurately before the jury retired to deliberate. Both counsel agreed at 
argument that all of the written instructions, including the missing six, were 
given to the jury and taken to the jury room. Whatever the cause for the loss of 
six instructions, the fact is that the clerk of court was able to reproduce each 
of the missing instructions for the record on appeal. The purposes of W.S. 
7-11-201(a)(vi) providing for the giving of instructions to the jury are: to 
require that the trial court charge the jury by reading the written instructions 
to it; that the jury have the written charge available during its deliberations; 
and that the charge (instructions) be available and a part of the record for 
review on appeal. Each of the purposes was accomplished in this case. Therefore 
there was no plain error that would require reversal.

[¶14]   Lowseth also argues that Bearpaw 
v. State, 803 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1990) requires a new trial because a necessary 
part of the record is absent. In Bearpaw, we reversed a conviction and 
remanded it for a new trial because several portions of the trial, i.e., opening 
statements, voir dire, the instruction conference, and closing arguments, were 
not made available for the appellate record and therefore it could not be 
determined whether the accused received a fair trial. Id., at 78. The 
circumstances of Bearpaw do not exist here. As we stated above, all of 
the written jury instructions were reproduced for our review, and Lowseth does 
not challenge their accuracy. Thus, Bearpaw is 
inapplicable.

B. 
Identity of the Victim

[¶15]   Lowseth argues next that the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction because the information failed to identify the alleged 
victim and, he asserts, the allegedly defective information cannot be cured 
through a bill of particulars. He premises this claim on Walker v. State, 
847 P.2d 542 (Wyo. 1993), which he claims held that a trial court lacks 
jurisdiction where the charging document fails to identify the 
victim.

[¶16]   In Walker the accused was charged 
with two counts of indecent liberties in a criminal complaint and then later in 
an information. The identities of the alleged victims were not provided in 
either the criminal complaint or the information. Subsequently, at a preliminary 
hearing, the accused's counsel demanded the alleged victims' identities, but the 
prosecutor refused to give more than their initials. The trial court sustained 
the prosecutor's action. At the accused's arraignment, his counsel again 
demanded the victims' identities and was rebuffed. The accused then demanded the 
victim's identities through a motion for a bill of particulars, after which the 
trial court issued a discovery order. The prosecutor continued to resist 
divulging the identities until specifically ordered to do so by the trial court. 
After the trial court's order, the prosecutor divulged the victims' identities 
solely to the accused's counsel. Finally, the identities were fully disclosed in 
the instructions to the jury. Walker, 847 P.2d  at 
544.

[¶17]   In Walker, a majority (three 
justices) of this court found reversible error because the prosecution, with 
some help from the trial court, actively withheld the names of the victims. That 
majority of justices, however, arrived at its decision for different reasons. 
Two justices reasoned that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the 
information failed to name the victims and thus was fatally defective. The third 
justice, however, premised his finding of reversible error on the court's 
constitutional supervisory power found at Art. 5, § 2 of the Wyoming 
Constitution. Therefore, in Walker a majority of this court held, solely, 
that there was reversible error. Lowseth is incorrect in stating that Walker 
stands for the proposition that a trial court lacks jurisdiction when the 
charging document fails to name the victim or victims.

[¶18]   On March 9, 1994, this court, in 
McDermott v. State, 870 P.2d 339 (Wyo. 1994), affirmed a conviction 
despite the fact that the victim's name did not appear on the charging document. 
In so holding, we said:

Since 
McDermott had actual knowledge of the identity of the victim, there could be no 
prejudice to him because of the failure of the information to incorporate the 
victim's name. Consequently, we hold no error can be claimed under 
Walker.

Id. 
at 348.

[¶19]   This case differs from both Walker 
and McDermott because the information here provided at least a general identity 
of the victim - "officers of the Sweetwater County Sheriff's Office." Since the 
information specifically informed Lowseth that the alleged victim was an officer 
in the Sweetwater County Sheriff's Office and the State, upon request, clarified 
which officer several weeks before trial, the fact that the information failed 
to specifically include Officer Barneski's name did not prejudice Lowseth. 
McDermott, at 348. 

C. 
Further Instructions

[¶20]   In his final claim, Lowseth argues 
that the trial court committed plain error when it failed to further instruct 
the jury on the meaning of the phrase "threatens to use" when, during 
deliberations, the jury asked: "In an aggravated assault charge, does the 
defendant have to see the victim?" Lowseth claims that since the jury asked this 
particular question, they were confused as to what constitutes "threatens to 
use," and therefore, the court should have further instructed the jury on the 
meaning of "threatens to use."

[¶21]   Concerning claims of error 
involving jury instructions, we have said,

[A] 
trial court's ruling on an instruction will not constitute reversible error 
absent a showing of prejudice, and prejudice will not be said to result unless 
it is demonstrated that the instruction confused or misled the jury with respect 
to the proper principles of law.

DeJulio 
v. Foster, 
715 P.2d 182, 186 (Wyo. 1986) (citing Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032 
(Wyo. 1983)).

Instruction 
No. 7 provided:

The 
phrase "threatens to use" as a element of the offense of aggravated assault, 
requires proof of an actual threat of physical injury during the act of 
employing a deadly weapon.

The 
language in this instruction, which was offered by Lowseth over the prosecutor's 
objection and given by the court, is taken directly from Johnston v. 
State, 747 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Wyo. 1987). It is an accurate statement of law 
approved by this court and is not confusing.

[¶22]   As Lowseth acknowledges, because he 
failed to object to the trial court's refusal to further instruct the jury after 
its inquiry, we review this claim for plain error only. Johnston, 747 P.2d  at 1133-34. The jury's question - "In an aggravated assault charge, does 
the defendant have to see the victim?" - is not one which required the trial 
court to apply some clear and unequivocal rule of law, e.g., where the trial 
court failed to instruct on the necessary elements of the crime. See Vigil v. 
State, 859 P.2d 659, 662 (Wyo. 1993). In addition, Instruction No. 7 
accurately reflects the law and, from the question posed by the jury, it is not 
clear that the jury was confused by Instruction No. 7; rather, it appears that 
the jury sought an additional, albeit unnecessary, instruction. Therefore, we 
find no plain error because Lowseth has not demonstrated violation of a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law nor has he shown prejudice or that the jury was 
confused or misled by Instruction No. 7.

III. 
CONCLUSION

[¶23]   Lowseth has not demonstrated that 
the criminal information's failure to include a specific victim prejudiced his 
ability to defend. In addition, we find no plain error in the failure of the 
jury to return six of the written jury instructions nor in the court's refusal 
to further instruct the jury during deliberations.

[¶24]   We affirm.