Case Title: State v. Arnett

Citation: 2000-Ohio-302

Docket Number: 19990468

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 2000-Ohio-302.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. ARNETT, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Arnett (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 208.] 
Criminal law — When sentencing judge acknowledges consulting a religious text 
during deliberations and quotes a portion of that text on the record in the 
sentencing proceeding, such conduct is not per se impermissible and does 
not violate the offender’s right to due process, when. 
When a sentencing judge acknowledges that he or she has consulted a religious 
text during his or her deliberations and quotes a portion of that text on the 
record in the sentencing proceeding, such conduct is not per se 
impermissible and does not violate the offender’s right to due process, when 
the judge adheres to the sentencing procedures outlined in the Revised Code 
and when the judge’s religious references do not impair the fundamental 
fairness of the sentencing proceeding. 
(No. 99-468 — Submitted December 14, 1999 — Decided March 15, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, Nos. C-980172 and C-
980173. 
 
In November 1997, the Grand Jury of Hamilton County indicted appellee, 
James F. Arnett, on ten counts of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). Each 
count of the indictment alleged the rape of the same child, who was under thirteen 
 
 
2
years of age at the time of the alleged conduct, and each count carried a 
specification that Arnett was a sexually violent predator under R.C. 2950.09(A). 
Arnett eventually entered a plea of guilty to all ten counts.  When Arnett entered 
his pleas, the state agreed to dismiss allegations of force that appeared in Counts I 
and II of the indictment and agreed to submit the issue of whether Arnett was a 
sexual predator to the judge during sentencing.  Counsel for both parties notified 
the court that there had been “no discussion or agreement on the appropriate 
sentence in this case.”  The trial court accepted Arnett’s pleas, entered a finding of 
guilty on all ten counts, and scheduled sentencing for January 1998. 
 
One day before the scheduled sentencing proceeding, the grand jury indicted 
Arnett for a single additional count of pandering obscenity involving a minor in 
violation of R.C. 2907.321(A)(5).  This indictment concerned computer disks 
containing obscene images. 
 
The following day, the parties appeared before the court as scheduled for 
sentencing on the ten rape counts.  At that time, the court accepted Arnett’s plea of 
guilty to the new pandering charge, and proceeded to sentencing on all eleven 
counts.  Due to the nature of this appeal, we now provide a detailed summary of 
the sentencing proceeding. 
 
Defense 
counsel 
began 
the sentencing hearing by introducing the 
 
 
3
testimony of a psychologist, who discussed Arnett’s experience as a victim of 
sexual abuse in his youth, Arnett’s difficulties with substance abuse, and other 
emotional problems.  On direct examination, the psychologist opined that there 
was a need to “safeguard the community” and to provide from five to eight years 
of “continuing * * * and intensive” treatment.  The court permitted the state to 
cross-examine the psychologist.  On cross-examination, the psychologist agreed 
that Arnett had a “very strong appetite” for sexual contact and that these urges 
would remain for the rest of Arnett’s life.  The psychologist also agreed with the 
state that the victim had been “severely traumatized in her ability to form healthy 
relationships with other people.” 
 
Following the psychologist’s testimony, defense counsel asked the court if it 
had reviewed the letters sent from Arnett’s family.  The judge indicated that she 
had reviewed at least five letters from various individuals, and then permitted 
defense counsel to make a statement.  Arnett’s attorney highlighted his client’s 
struggle with chemical dependency and urged the court to recommend that Arnett 
receive treatment from the Department of Corrections.  Arnett’s older sister spoke 
briefly and described their family’s disadvantaged background.  The assistant 
prosecuting attorney then discussed Arnett’s likelihood of recidivism, as well as 
 
 
4
the harm suffered by his victim, and urged the court to keep Arnett “where he 
belongs for the rest of his days.” 
 
The sentencing judge reviewed the facts of the case on the record, noting the 
age of the victim, the nature of the offense, and the “demonstrated use of abuse in 
regards to the child.”  The court then determined that Arnett was a sexual predator 
under R.C. Chapter 2950.  Finally, the court permitted Arnett to make a statement.  
Arnett said, “I’m very remorseful, very remorseful for what I did.  I definitely am 
going to seek as much treatment as I can.  And I’m never going to do this again 
ever. * * * And it was just a silly thing that started and got totally out of control.” 
 
Just before pronouncing sentence, the sentencing judge began the 
monologue that is the basis of the instant appeal: 
 
“So, Mr. Arnett, I was struck by the idea of who is James Arnett through this 
particular case.  And I thought about it all last evening as I was trying to determine 
in my mind what type of sentence you deserved in this particular case.” 
 
At this point, the judge commented on the photographs and letters that 
several interested parties had submitted to the court on Arnett’s behalf.  The judge 
referred to submissions from the victim’s father and mother, statements from the 
victim herself, and testimony provided by the defendant’s psychologist at the 
sentencing hearing.  As she discussed these submissions, the judge made 
 
 
5
several references to the victim’s young age.  She mentioned the concern that the 
victim’s father had for his “little girl,” and noted that “[a] child should not know” 
the sexually graphic details that Arnett introduced her to.  The judge told Arnett 
that he had “robbed that child of that whole sense of growing up.”  The judge 
concluded the proceedings with the following comments: 
 
“Recently, Mr. Arnett, I had a murder case of an individual who had no 
remorse and the sentence was 20 years, and I thought about that in regards to 
sentencing you.  Because I was looking for a source, what do I turn to, to make, to 
make that determination, what sentence you should get.  And I thought in regards 
to a 20-year sentence, that individual, that victim, who’s the victim of that case, at 
least is gone to their reward, they’re not hurting anymore.  But for Rachel, the rest 
of her life, unless she takes care of herself, she’s hurting. 
 
“ * * * And in looking at the final part of my struggle with you, I finally 
answered my question late at night when I turned to one additional source to help 
me.  And basically, looking at Rachel on one hand, looking at the photographs of 
you happily as a child, and looking at the photographs of downloading that came 
from your computer, I agree they’re very sad photographs, they’re pure filth, it just 
tells me how ill you are. 
 
“And that passage where I had the opportunity to look is Matthew 18:5, 6.  
 
 
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‘And whoso shall receive one such little child in my name, [sic] receiveth me.  But, 
[sic] whoso shall offend one of these little ones which believe in me, it were better 
for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that [sic] he were 
drowned in the depth of the sea.’1 
 
“Pandering obscenity count, one year.  Ten counts of rape, five years on 
each, running consecutive.  Sentence, 51 years. 
 
“Mr. Arnett, I hope God has mercy on you and the hell that you have 
created.  Thank you.” 
 
The proceedings concluded immediately following these comments. 
 
Arnett appealed his sentence and conviction to the Court of Appeals for 
Hamilton County, asserting three assignments of error.  In his first assignment of 
error, Arnett raised two challenges to the sentencing judge’s concluding remarks.  
First, Arnett argued that the judge’s religious beliefs were neither a mandatory nor 
a relevant factor for consideration under R.C. 2929.12.  Arnett also claimed that 
the sentencing judge’s religious references violated the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, as well as Section 7, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  
In his second assignment of error, Arnett argued that the trial court failed to make 
the findings required under R.C. 2929.14(E)(3) and 2929.19(B)(2)(c) to impose 
consecutive sentences.  Finally, Arnett argued that the trial court erred when it 
 
 
7
accepted his plea without informing him that the maximum penalty for his offenses 
included the possible imposition of consecutive sentences. 
 
The court of appeals treated Arnett’s first two assignments of error together 
and held that a trial judge’s religious beliefs are not a factor that may be considered 
under the sentencing provisions of the Revised Code.  Although the court of 
appeals determined that religious comments during sentencing are not per se 
impermissible, the court concluded that the sentencing judge’s references to the 
Book of Matthew indicated that her religion had a “heavy influence,” or was a 
“determining factor,” in the sentence that she imposed.  For this reason, the court 
of appeals held that the sentencing judge acted outside the sentencing guidelines 
and violated Arnett’s due process rights. 
 
The court of appeals thus affirmed the trial court’s adjudication of guilt 
based on the trial court’s acceptance of Arnett’s pleas, but vacated the sentence and 
remanded for resentencing.  A dissenting judge on the panel determined that the 
trial judge’s personal religious views were not the basis of her sentencing decision, 
that the quoted biblical passage merely reflected society’s interest in protecting 
children, and that the judge imposed Arnett’s sentence in full compliance with the 
Revised Code. 
 
Though Arnett mentioned the First Amendment to the United States 
 
 
8
Constitution and Section 7, Article I of the Ohio Constitution in his first 
assignment of error to the court of appeals, Arnett did not develop an 
Establishment Clause argument in his appellate brief, and the court of appeals did 
not pass on such an argument.  Likewise, though Arnett mentioned these 
constitutional provisions in his second proposition of law to this court, Arnett did 
not articulate an Establishment Clause challenge to the judge’s conduct in his 
arguments to this court.  We therefore limit our discussion today to those issues 
that the parties have preserved and briefed for our review. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, James Michael 
Keeling, Ronald Springman and Philip R. Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting 
Attorneys, for appellant. 
 
Charles H. Bartlett, Jr., for appellee. 
 
Mark B. Greenlee, pro se, urging reversal as amicus curiae. 
 
Abby R. Levine, ACLU Cooperating Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc. 
__________________ 
 
 
9
 
COOK, J.  This case asks whether the sentencing judge violated the statutory 
requirements of the Revised Code or the constitutional dictates of due process 
when she acknowledged referring to the Bible during her deliberations, and then 
quoted a biblical passage on the record at the sentencing proceeding.  Because we 
determine that the trial court complied with the applicable provisions of R.C. 
Chapter 2929 and that the judge’s reference to the Bible did not impair the 
fundamental fairness of the proceedings, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and reinstate the trial court’s sentence. 
 
In Part I, below, we demonstrate that this trial judge’s particular reference to 
the Bible did not offend the sentencing provisions of the Revised Code.  Turning to 
the Bible during her deliberations merely assisted the judge in weighing a 
seriousness factor required for the court’s consideration under R.C. 2929.12, and 
the Code does not prohibit the trial judge from describing the nature of her 
deliberations on the record.  In Part II, we examine the guarantees of due process in 
the context of a sentencing proceeding, and conclude that the judge’s 
acknowledged reference to the Bible did not violate Arnett’s due process right to a 
fundamentally fair sentencing hearing. 
I.  R.C. Chapter 2929 
 
Arnett entered guilty pleas to ten counts of rape, a first-degree felony, and 
 
 
10
one count of pandering obscenity involving a minor, a fourth-degree felony.  R.C. 
2907.02(A)(1)(b); R.C. 2907.321(A)(5).  A court imposing penalties for these 
felonies must comply with the procedures outlined in R.C. 2929.11 et seq.  The 
court of appeals noted that these provisions limit a sentencing court’s discretion, 
and determined that “the religious beliefs of the trial judge are not a statutory 
factor that may be considered” during sentencing. 
A.  R.C. 2929.11 
 
In general, the sentencing judge must adhere to the overriding purposes of 
felony sentencing described in R.C. 2929.11.  This section provides that a sentence 
shall punish the offender and protect the public from future offenses by the 
offender and others.  R.C. 2929.11(A).  It also provides that a court “shall not base 
the sentence upon the * * * religion of the offender.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
2929.11(C).  Arnett misreads R.C. 2929.11(C) to be a general  prohibition on the 
“consideration of religious beliefs or * * * dogma” by a sentencing judge.  This 
section, however, specifically prohibits a sentencing judge from discriminating 
against an offender on the basis of the offender’s religion.  R.C. 2929.11(C).  It 
does not, therefore, support the court of appeals’ decision to vacate Arnett’s 
sentence. 
B.  The R.C. 2929.12 Seriousness and 
Recidivism Factors 
 
 
11
 
R.C. 2929.12(A) requires the sentencing judge to consider the applicable 
seriousness and recidivism factors outlined in R.C. 2929.12(B), (C), (D), and (E) 
as she exercises her discretion to determine the most effective way to comply with 
the purposes and principles of sentencing outlined in R.C. 2929.11.  A catchall 
provision in R.C. 2929.12(A) also permits the sentencing judge to consider “any 
other factors that are relevant to achieving those purposes and principles of 
sentencing.”  R.C. 2929.12(A). 
 
The parties here agree that the sentencing judge properly considered the R.C. 
2929.12 seriousness and recidivism factors even though it would seem that the 
court need not consider those factors for the rape charges.  Rape carries a 
mandatory prison term under R.C. 2929.13(F)(2) and the statutory mandate to 
assess the factors arises “[u]nless a mandatory prison term is required by division 
(F) of section 2929.13 or section 2929.14.” (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2929.12(A).2  
Nonetheless, the pandering charge merits the judge’s consideration of the 
applicable seriousness and recidivism factors before imposing Arnett’s sentence.  
R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(a); R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(f). 
 
With this background, we summarize the arguments of the parties before the 
court as follows:  Arnett contends that the Code prohibits the trial judge’s 
acknowledged consideration of the Bible, because “religious consideration” 
 
 
12
does not appear as one of the seriousness or recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12(B), 
(C), (D), or (E), and because, he submits, the R.C. 2929.12(A) catchall provision 
would not embrace such considerations.  The state, on the other hand, argues that 
the Code does not prohibit the judge’s acknowledged reference to the Bible during 
her deliberations.  The state views the judge’s reference to the particular biblical 
verse at issue as the “functional equivalent” of the judge’s consideration of the 
seriousness factor in R.C. 2929.12(B)(1), which concerns the age of the victim. 
 
We agree with the state that the sentencing court’s reference to the Book of 
Matthew acknowledged her consideration, during her deliberations, of the societal 
interest in protecting children.  The General Assembly specifically recognized this 
societal interest in the form of a seriousness factor for the sentencing court to 
consider under R.C. 2929.12(B)(1).  This section requires a judge, when 
applicable, to consider how the victim’s age relates to the seriousness of the 
offense.  It provides: 
 
“(B) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply 
regarding * * * the victim * * * as indicating that the offender’s conduct is more 
serious than conduct normally constituting the offense: 
 
“(1) The physical or mental injury suffered by the victim of the 
offense * * * was exacerbated because of the * * * age of the victim.”  
 
 
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R.C. 2929.12(B)(1). 
 
The General Assembly thus explicitly instructs sentencing courts to consider 
how the age of a victim relates to the relative seriousness of an offense when 
imposing a sentence in order to conform to the overriding purposes of felony 
sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11. 
 
Here, the sentencing judge followed the General Assembly’s mandate as 
expressed in R.C. 2929.12(B)(1).  Arnett pleaded guilty to ten counts of engaging 
in various sex acts with a five-year-old girl on a continuing basis and to pandering 
obscenity involving a minor.  The testimony at the sentencing hearing amply 
informed the judge that Arnett’s principal victim suffered exacerbated harm due to 
her tender years.  R.C. 2929.12(B)(1), then, required the sentencing court to 
consider whether the victim’s age made Arnett’s conduct more serious than 
conduct normally constituting the offense. 
 
The Code does not specify that the sentencing judge must use specific 
language or make specific findings on the record in order to evince the requisite 
consideration of the applicable seriousness and recidivism factors.  R.C. 2929.12.  
For this reason, the sentencing judge could have satisfied her duty under R.C. 
2929.12 with nothing more than a rote recitation that she had considered the 
applicable 
age 
factor 
of 
R.C. 2929.12(B)(1).3  See State v. Edmonson 
 
 
14
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326, 715 N.E.2d 131, 134.  Arnett’s sentencing judge, 
however, helpfully supplemented the record by specifically referring to the young 
age of the victim and by explaining how the victim’s age had exacerbated her 
injuries.  The judge noted that “a child should not know” the sexually graphic 
details that Arnett exposed her to, and told Arnett that he “robbed that child of that 
whole sense of growing up and who she is.”  These remarks confirm that the 
sentencing court considered the statutory age factor. 
 
The judge further supplemented the record with the religious remarks at 
issue in this case.  She acknowledged that she had “turned to one additional 
source” to help her during her deliberations, and she quoted the biblical verse to 
which she referred.  The verse describes the seriousness of offending a “little 
child” or “one of these little ones.” Matthew 18:5, 6.  The court explained how this 
biblical verse aided its “struggle” regarding the proper sentence to impose.  Due to 
the text of this verse, and the judge’s stated reason for considering it, we conclude 
that her reference to the Bible assisted her in determining the weight that she would 
give to a statutory factor—the age of the victim. 
 
This court has held that the individual decisionmaker has the discretion to 
determine the weight to assign a particular statutory factor.  State v. Fox (1994), 69 
Ohio St.3d 183, 193, 631 N.E.2d 124, 132, citing State v. Mills (1992), 62 
 
 
15
Ohio St.3d 357, 376, 582 N.E.2d 972, 978.  A discretionary decision necessitates 
the exercise of personal judgement, and we have determined that when making 
such judgments, the sentencing court “is not required to divorce itself from all 
personal experiences and make [its] decision in a vacuum.”  State v. Cook (1992), 
65 Ohio St.3d 516, 529, 605 N.E.2d 70, 84, citing Barclay v. Florida (1983), 463 
U.S. 939, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134.  For this reason, we have previously 
permitted a judge in a death-penalty case to refer, during sentencing, to a personal 
friend of his who was murdered.  Id. 
 
This court has also recognized that there are limits to a court’s discretion 
when the court refers to external sources while weighing a statutory factor.  See 
State v. Bays (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 31, 716 N.E.2d 1126, 1143.  In Bays, a 
court of appeals engaging in a review of a death sentence quoted at length from a 
two-year study of two hundred sixty-seven cocaine users.  Based on the authors’ 
hypothesis concerning addiction and recidivism, the court of appeals decided that 
the appellant’s addiction was not a significant mitigating factor.  Id.  We 
determined that the court of appeals improperly relied on this hypothesis because 
the court based its factual conclusions “upon what amounted to an expert opinion, 
which should have been subject to adversarial testing.”  Id., citing Gardner v. 
 
 
16
Florida (1977), 430 U.S. 349, 360-362, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1205-1207, 51 L.Ed.2d 393, 
403-404. 
 
We distinguish the judge’s reference to the Bible in this case from the error 
committed by the court of appeals in Bays.  In Bays, the court used a highly 
specific scientific study as a “basis for drawing case-specific factual inferences 
about the relation between Bays’s addiction and his behavior.”  State v. Bays, 87 
Ohio St.3d at 31, 716 N.E.2d at 1143, fn. 5.  Here, in contrast, the sentencing judge 
referred to a biblical verse containing the same general message explicitly 
recognized in R.C. 2929.12(B)(1)—that offenses against children are especially 
serious. 
 
The judge’s acknowledged reference to the Bible here constituted a 
permissible exercise of her discretion.  The judge did not add an impermissible 
factor to her analysis; rather, she acknowledged an influence upon her 
consideration of an explicitly permitted factor.  Much like the judge’s background, 
education, and moral values, the judge’s insight from the Bible guided the judge in 
weighing the statutorily permissible age factor during her deliberations and aided 
her in justifying, in her mind, the lawful sentence she imposed.  See State v. Fox; 
State v. Cook, supra. 
 
Because 
R.C. 
2929.12(B) requires a sentencing judge to consider 
 
 
17
how a victim’s age exacerbates the physical or mental injury suffered, it would be 
a significant and censorial step for this court to prohibit judges from accurately 
describing the nature of these considerations on the record.  As the state’s amicus 
notes, a per se rule prohibiting all references to religious texts by a sentencing 
judge would amount to this court’s imposition of a particular and restrictive model 
of judicial decisionmaking.  Such a model would prohibit references to religious 
convictions in the oral or written justifications of judicial decisions, even though 
such considerations may unavoidably surface during the judge’s private 
deliberations.4  The sentencing scheme enacted by the General Assembly does not 
adopt such a restrictive model for the sentencing judge.  Indeed, as this court 
recently noted, some statutes require the sentencing judge to state both the findings 
and the reasons for those findings on the record.  See  State v. Edmonson (1999), 
86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326, 715 N.E.2d 131, 134; see, also R.C. 2929.19(B)(2). 
 
Because we find that the judge’s acknowledged consideration of the 
particular biblical verse in this case constituted a permissible exercise of her 
discretion to weigh the R.C. 2929.12(B)(1) factor, we need not determine whether 
this specific religious verse, or whether religious texts in general, may qualify as 
“any other factor[s] that are relevant” under R.C. 2929.12(A). 
II.  Due Process and the Sentencing 
Proceeding 
 
 
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The court of appeals determined that “[b]y factoring in religion” during the 
sentencing proceeding, the sentencing court violated Arnett’s due process rights. 
We agree with the court of appeals that consideration of religious beliefs or 
religious texts by a sentencing judge may violate an offender’s due process rights 
when such considerations constitute the basis for the sentencing decision and 
thereby undermine the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.  Nevertheless, as 
we explain more fully below, the biblical reference here did not result in a 
violation of Arnett’s right to a fundamentally fair sentencing hearing. 
A.  Due Process, Sentencing Proceedings, and Fundamental Fairness 
 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that even a sentence within 
the limits of a state’s sentencing laws may violate due process if the sentencing 
proceedings are fundamentally unfair.  Townsend v. Burke (1948), 334 U.S. 736, 
741, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 1255, 92 L.Ed. 1690, 1693; see, also, Gardner v. Florida 
(1977), 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1205, 51 L.Ed.2d 393, 402 (“[t]he 
defendant has a legitimate interest in the character of the procedure which leads to 
the imposition of sentence even if he may have no right to object to a particular 
result of the sentencing process”), citing Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 
510, 521-523, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-1778, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, 784-786. 
 
In Townsend, supra, the Supreme Court addressed the habeas corpus 
 
 
19
petition of a prisoner who had pleaded guilty to robbery and burglary but alleged 
that the court deprived him of due process during his sentencing proceeding.  The 
Pennsylvania sentencing judge, just before imposing sentence, addressed the 
offender and recounted a list of prior offenses, remarking:  “1937, receiving stolen 
goods, a saxophone.  What did you want with a saxophone?  Didn’t hope to play in 
the prison band then, did you?”  Townsend, 334 U.S. at 740, 68 S.Ct. at 1255, 92 
L.Ed. at 1693.  The Supreme Court determined that “[t]he trial court’s 
facetiousness casts a somewhat somber reflection on the fairness of the proceeding 
when we learn from the record that actually the charge of receiving the stolen 
saxophone had been dismissed.”  Id.  The record also revealed other blatant 
inaccuracies in the judge’s concluding comments.  Id.  The Supreme Court held 
that the petitioner’s sentence was “inconsistent with due process,” because it 
lacked an essential requirement of “fair play,” since the court sentenced the 
petitioner “on the basis of assumptions concerning his criminal record which were 
materially untrue.”  Id., 334 U.S. at 741, 68 S.Ct. at 1255, 92 L.Ed. at 1693. 
 
The Townsend court carefully narrowed the scope of the fairness standard 
that it applied, saying, “[I]t is not the duration or severity of this sentence that 
renders it constitutionally invalid; it is the careless or designed pronouncement of 
sentence on a foundation so extensively and materially false, which the prisoner 
 
 
20
had no opportunity to correct * * *, that renders the proceedings lacking in due 
process.”  Id. 
 
Since Townsend, several federal circuit courts have recognized that 
reviewing courts may vacate sentences as violative of due process when the 
sentencing judge’s comments reveal that the court imposed or enhanced the 
offender’s sentence because of improper considerations such as the offender’s race 
or national origin, United States v. Borrero-Isaza (C.A.9, 1989), 887 F.2d 1349, 
false or unreliable information, United States v. Safirstein (C.A.9, 1987), 827 F.2d 
1380, or parochialism, United States v. Diamond (C.A.4, 1977), 561 F.2d 557, 559. 
B.  Fundamental Fairness and Religious Comments:  United States v. Bakker 
 
In the principal case discussed by the parties here, the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals applied the rules described above in the specific context of religious 
comments by a sentencing judge.  United States v. Bakker (C.A.4, 1991), 925 F.2d 
728, 740, citing Gardner, Borrero-Isaza, and Safirstein, supra.  The Bakker court 
recognized that even though a sentencing judge represents “the embodiment of 
public condemnation and social outrage” and a judge “can lecture a defendant as a 
lesson to that defendant and as a deterrent to others,” fundamental notions of due 
process act as a constraint on the trial court’s discretion in the sentencing 
proceeding.  Bakker, 925 F.2d at 740. 
 
 
21
 
In Bakker, which concerned the sentencing of a well-known televangelist 
after convictions for mail and wire fraud, the district judge made the following 
statement on the record about the offender:  “He had no thought whatever about his 
victims and those of us that do have a religion are ridiculed as being saps from 
money-grubbing preachers or priests.”  Id.  The Fourth Circuit vacated the 
sentence, holding that courts “cannot sanction sentencing procedures that create the 
perception of the bench as a pulpit from which judges announce their personal 
sense of religiosity and simultaneously punish defendants for offending it. * * *  
Regrettably, we are left with the apprehension that the imposition of a lengthy 
prison term here may have reflected the fact that the court’s own sense of religious 
propriety had somehow been betrayed.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., 925 F.2d at 740-
741. 
 
The Bakker court emphasized that it vacated the sentence only because the 
district judge’s “personal religious principles” were “the basis” of the sentencing 
decision.  (Emphasis added.)  Id., 925 F.2d at 741.  By contrast, here the judge’s 
disclosed religious principle mirrored a sentencing factor in the Ohio Revised 
Code.  Moreover, the biblical passage could not be said to be the primary premise 
for the judge’s sentencing decision, as she considered various statutorily 
 
 
22
sanctioned bases.  Bakker, therefore, does not support the court of appeals’ 
decision to vacate Arnett’s sentence. 
1.  The Limits of Bakker 
 
The Bakker court underscored its “genuine reluctance” to vacate the 
sentence and repeatedly stressed the limits of its decision.  Id., 925 F.2d at 741.  
The court noted, “Our Constitution, of course, does not require a person to 
surrender his or her religious beliefs upon the assumption of judicial office.”  Id. at 
740.  The court also recognized that judges occasionally misspeak, and that “every 
ill-advised word will not be the basis for reversible error.”  Id. at 741.  The Bakker 
court vacated the sentence only because the judge’s “intemperate” comments 
revealed that an “explicit intrusion of personal religious principles” was “the 
basis” of the sentencing decision.  (Emphasis added.)  Id. 
 
Recognizing the limits stressed by the Bakker court, federal courts 
interpreting Bakker have refused to vacate sentences unless the trial judge’s 
religious remarks create an appearance of sentencing based on improperly 
considered, highly personal beliefs.  In a recent example, the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed a sentence even though the sentencing court commented on the fact that 
the defendant considered using his church to pass classified documents to a South 
Korean military attaché, and declared this behavior to be “horrible hypocrisy.”  
 
 
23
United States v. Kim (Jan. 14, 1999), C.A.4 No. 97-4606, unreported, 1999 WL 
12924, disposition reported at 172 F.3d 45.  Though Kim argued that Bakker 
prohibited the judge’s remarks, the Fourth Circuit found no constitutional violation 
in the judge’s comment, which the judge made after deciding not to depart from 
the federal guidelines.  Id. at *1. 
 
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a sentence that an offender 
challenged on due process grounds when the sentencing judge spoke of “personal 
considerations that [the offender] brings to me.”  United States v. Autullo (July 12, 
1995), C.A.7 No. 95-1020, unreported, 1995 WL 417577, disposition reported at 
62 F.3d 1419.  Though the offender in Autullo attempted to analogize the judge’s 
comments to those disallowed in Bakker, based on the judge’s use of the phrase 
“personal considerations,” the Autullo court determined that the sentencing judge’s 
comments “did not demonstrate personal animus but were an expression of outrage 
at the great harm and tragic results that Autullo’s crimes had on the youth of the 
community.”  Id. at *3. 
 
In a case where the judge’s specific comments were more similar to those 
presently before us, a Rhode Island district court denied a habeas corpus petition 
when the sentencing judge referred to a biblical verse by stating that “no man 
should take more than he is willing to give.”  Gordon v. Vose (D.R.I. 1995), 
 
 
24
879 F.Supp. 179.  The Gordon court determined that the sentencing judge 
expressed no personal religious bias of the type Bakker prohibited, but that the 
judge simply stated a generally accepted proposition that if one commits a serious 
crime, he or she must expect to receive a severe punishment.  Id. at 185. 
 
Several state supreme courts, though they cite Bakker with approval, have 
declined to vacate sentences where the judge’s religious comments merely 
acknowledge generally accepted principles, as opposed to highly personal religious 
beliefs that become the basis for the sentence imposed.  See, e.g., Poe v. State 
(1996), 341 Md. 523, 533, 671 A.2d 501, 505 (upholding sentence when 
sentencing judge said, “I still believe in good old-fashioned law and order, the 
Bible, and a lot of things that people say I shouldn’t believe anymore” prior to 
sentencing); Gordon v. State (R.I. 1994), 639 A.2d 56, 56-57 (upholding sentence 
when sentencing judge referred to Bible by saying that “no man takes more than 
he’s willing to give”); People v. Halm (1993), 81 N.Y.2d 819, 595 N.Y.S.2d 380, 
611 N.E.2d 281 (upholding sentence for sodomy when sentencing judge referred to 
“Biblical times” and expressed his opinion about the seriousness of the crime). 
 
Taken together, these federal and state decisions support our conclusion that 
Bakker in no way supports a per se rule prohibiting all religious references by a 
sentencing judge.  Rather, Bakker represents the exceptional case where a 
 
 
25
judge’s religious comments implicate the fundamental fairness of a sentencing 
proceeding by revealing that the judge’s personal religious views were the primary 
basis for the sentencing decision. 
2.  Applying Bakker to the Present Case 
 
We agree with the state that Bakker is distinguishable from the present case.  
The sentencing judge’s comments in Bakker revealed that he had been personally 
offended, as a religious person, by the offender’s frauds.  When he said “those of 
us who do have a religion are ridiculed as being saps from money-grubbing 
preachers or priests,” the sentencing judge in effect inserted himself as a party to 
the case—aligning himself with the plaintiffs whom the televangelist defrauded.  
As the court in Gordon v. Vose noted, the sentencing judge in Bakker was 
“expressing a personal religious preference and then sentencing petitioner for 
violating it.”  (Emphasis added.)  879 F.Supp. at 185. 
 
Here, on the other hand, Arnett’s sentencing judge cited a religious text 
merely to acknowledge one of several reasons—”one additional source”—for 
assigning significant weight to a legitimate statutory sentencing factor.  The 
particular passage she cited mirrored the Revised Code’s seriousness factor 
regarding the victim’s young age.  R.C. 2929.12(B)(1).  Much like the comments 
allowed in United States v. Autullo, and Gordon v. Vose, supra, the text of the 
 
 
26
biblical verse that the judge cited here reflects the general proposition that offenses 
against young victims are especially serious—a principle that the General 
Assembly explicitly recognized in R.C. 2929.12(B)(1). 
 
Arnett contends that the sentencing judge in this case “considered the 
heinousness of the crime as expressed in her own religious teachings as the most 
essential factor in determining the length of the sentence to be served.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  We disagree.  If the sentencing judge had so relied on the biblical passage 
she referred to, which, when taken literally, recommends death by drowning for 
those who injure children, the judge presumably would have imposed a sentence 
much closer to the statutory maximum than the sentence she actually imposed.  See 
R.C. 2929.14(A). 
 
The court of appeals determined that a constitutional violation occurred here 
under Bakker because, in its view, the Book of Matthew functioned as a 
“tiebreaker” for a sentencing judge torn between a more lenient or a more harsh 
sentence.  State v. Arnett (Feb. 5, 1999), Hamilton App. Nos. C-980172 and C-
980173, unreported, at 5, 1999 WL 65632.  Though a fair reading of the record 
supports the court of appeals’ conclusion that the judge’s reference to the Book of 
Matthew assisted her in finally resolving her deliberative struggle, Bakker merely 
prohibits a judge’s personal religious principles from being “the basis of a 
 
 
27
sentencing decision.” (Emphasis added.)  Bakker, 925 F.2d at 741.  Here, the 
record discloses many factors that cumulatively formed the basis of the court’s 
sentence, including the testimony and letters provided to the court on behalf of 
Arnett and the victim, the psychologist’s testimony regarding the harm suffered by 
the victim, and the nature of the multiple offenses.  The Bible was but one factor, 
among many, that supported this judge’s legally unremarkable decision to assign 
significant weight to the seriousness of Arnett’s offenses against young victims. 
III.  Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that when a sentencing judge 
acknowledges that he or she has consulted a religious text during his or her 
deliberations and quotes a portion of that text on the record in the sentencing 
proceeding, such conduct is not per se impermissible and does not violate the 
offender’s right to due process, when the judge adheres to the sentencing 
procedures outlined in the Revised Code and when the judge’s religious references 
do not impair the fundamental fairness of the sentencing proceeding. 
 
Like the court in Bakker, we emphasize the limits of our holding today.  We 
agree with the Bakker court’s recognition of the fundamental constraints of due 
process in a sentencing proceeding.  We also agree that a sentencing judge’s 
religious comments may violate an offender’s due process rights when they 
 
 
28
reveal an “explicit intrusion of personal religious principles as the basis of a 
sentencing decision.”  Bakker, supra, 925 F.2d at 741.  We determine, however, 
that no such constitutional violation occurred in this case. 
 
We note that comments by a sentencing judge may implicate this state’s 
ethical rules concerning impartiality and bias.  One such rule provides that “[a] 
judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice.  A judge shall not, in 
the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, 
including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon * * * religion * * * .” 
(Emphasis added.) Canon 3(B)(5) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  We highlight 
this rule as a cautionary reminder; we do not imply that an ethical violation 
occurred in this case. 
 
The Eighth District Court of Appeals referred to these ethical considerations 
when it determined that another sentencing judge’s comments, though they did not 
affect the outcome of the case, went “well beyond the permissible limits of 
rhetorical hyperbole.”  State v. Conner (June 27, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 
65385, unreported, at 11, 1996 WL 355287.  In its analysis of these comments, the 
Conner court included a quotation from Benjamin N. Cardozo, which—though not 
a part of our holding—bears repeating here, lest our decision today be misread as a 
license for sentencing judges to preach from the bench: 
 
 
29
 
“ ‘The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free.  He is not to 
innovate at pleasure.  He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his 
own ideal of beauty or goodness.  * * *  He is to exercise a discretion informed by 
tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to “the 
primordial necessity of order in the social life.”  Wide enough in all conscience is 
the field of discretion that remains.’ ”  (Footnote omitted.)  Id., quoting Benjamin 
N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1991), at 141. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
As the court of appeals noted, the biblical passage as it appears in the 
transcript from the sentencing proceeding contains slight differences from the 
Bible, King James version.  The notation “sic” marks two commas not in the 
original and the omission of italics from the word “that.” 
 
2. 
See State v. Licardi (Feb. 4, 1999), Cuyahoga App. No. 72171, 
unreported, 1999 WL 61003;  State v. Coyle (Oct. 13, 1997), Clermont App. No. 
CA97-02-014, unreported, 1997 WL 632836.  Under the reasoning in Licardi 
 
 
30
and Coyle, the sentencing judge in this case would not have been required to 
consider the R.C. 2929.12 seriousness and recidivism factors when imposing 
sentence for Arnett’s ten rape convictions, which carry mandatory prison terms 
under R.C. 2929.13(F)(2).  But, see,  Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission, 
Quick Reference Guide (Oct. 1996), at 1;  Griffin & Katz, Ohio Felony Sentencing 
Law (1998) 286, Section T 1.11. 
 
3. 
Just prior to adjudicating Arnett a sexual predator, the sentencing 
judge made one such rote recitation when she noted on the record that she was 
“considering the age of the victim of the sexually oriented offense.” 
 
4. 
The brief of Mark Greenlee, amicus curiae in support of the state, 
discusses four possible models of judicial decisionmaking.  The “separatist” model 
would prohibit any reliance upon religious convictions both during a judge’s 
internal deliberations and in the oral or written justifications for the judge’s 
decisions.  Under a “publicist” model, which might exist in a society ruled 
exclusively by religious laws, a judge would always justify his or her decisions 
with religious considerations, even if the judge did not actually rely on such 
considerations during his or her deliberations.  Under the “privatist” model, a judge 
might include religious considerations during the deliberative stage, but could not 
make 
oral 
or 
written 
religious references in the justification stage.  
 
 
31
Finally, under the “wholist” model, a judge could rely on religious convictions, at 
least to some extent, in both the deliberation and justification stages.