Case Title: Clark County Office of the Coroner v. Las Vegas Review-Journal

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 5

Docket Number: 74604

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2020-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
136 Nev, Advance Opinion 5
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

CLARK COUNTY OFFICE OF THE No. 74604
CORONER/MEDICAL EXAMINER,

Appellant, FILED
vs.

LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, FEB 27 2020
Respondent. ezrin eee,

CLARK COUNTY OFFICE OF THE ms
CORONER/MEDICAL EXAMINER,
Appellant,

vs.

LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL,
Respondent.

 

Appeal from a district court order requiring the Clark County
Office of the Coroner/Medical Examiner to disclose unredacted juvenile
autopsy reports under the Nevada Public Records Act (Docket No. 74604),
and appeal from a post judgment district court order awarding attorney fees
and costs (Docket No. 75095). Bighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;
James Crockett, Judge.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded (Docket No.
74604); vacated (Docket No. 75095).

Steven B, Wolfson, District Attorney, and Laura C. Rehfeldt, Deputy
District Attorney, Clark County; Marquis Aurbach Coffing and Micah S.
Echols and Jacqueline V. Nichols, Las Vegas,

for Appellant.

‘McLetchie Law and Margaret A. McLetchie and Alina M. Shell, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.

10-0181

 
McDonald Carano LLP and Kristen T. Gallagher, Las Vegas,
for Amici Curiae the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 11
media organizations.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION
By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE,

‘These appeals require us to interpret various provisions of the
Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA) and other statutory provisions

 

 

addressing public access to information concerning the deaths of children
and juveniles. Specifically, we are asked to review a district court order
requiring the Clark County Coroner's Office to produce unredacted juvenile
autopsy reports under the NPRA. We are also asked to review the district
court’s award of attorney fees and costs to the Las Vegas Review-Journal
(LVRJ), which had petitioned the district court to compel production of the
autopsy reports after the Coroner's Office refused.

‘The Coroner's Office argues that it may refuse to disclose a
juvenile autopsy report once it has provided the report to a Child Death
Review (CDR) team under NRS 432B.407(6). We disagree. Because NRS
482B.407(6) limits access to public information, particularly information
that the Legislature has determined should be generally available to the
public, we interpret NRS 432B.407(6)'s confidentiality provision narrowly
and conclude that it applies strictly to the CDR team as a whole and may
not be invoked by individual agencies within a CDR team to limit access to

information the agency holds outside of its role on the team.

 

 
We agree, however, with the Coroner's Office's argument that
juvenile autopsy reports may include sensitive, private information and
that such information may be properly redacted as privileged. In this
regard, we conclude that the district court erred when it ordered the
production of unredacted juvenile autopsy reports. We therefore remand
for the district court to assess whether any such information that may be
contained in the requested autopsy reports should be redacted under the
test adopted in Clark County School District v. Las Vegas Review-Journal,
134 Nev. 700, 707-08, 429 P.3d 313, 320-21 (2018), and we explain the
amount the Coroner's Office may collect for expending resources to provide
any such redaction.

In addition, we reject the Coroner's Office's argument that NRS
239.012 immunizes a governmental entity from an award of attorney fees
when the entity, in response to a records request, withholds public records
in good faith. We conclude instead that NRS 239.012's immunity provision
applies explicitly to damages and should be interpreted independently from
NRS 239.011, which entitles a prevailing records requester to recover
attorney fees and costs regardless of whether the government entity
withholds requested records in good faith. Thus, a governmental entity is
not immune from an attorney fees award to which a prevailing records
requester is entitled under NRS 239.011. We vacate the district court's

award of attorney fees to LVRJ because it is premature to determine here
whether the LVR4J is the prevailing party in the underlying NPRA action.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2017, the LVRJ submitted to the Coroner's Office a
public records request under the NPRA. LVRJ sought autopsy reports,
notes, and other documentation for all autopsies the Coroner's Office

 

 
performed between January 2012 and April 2017 on decedents under the
age of 18 at the time of death. The Coroner's Office timely responded and
informed LVRJ that the requested juvenile autopsy reports would not be
produced because they contained confidential medical information. The
Coroner's Office initially based its response on Attorney General Opinion
82-12 (AGO 82-12) and provided LVRJ with a spreadsheet identifying
Juvenile deaths that occurred in Clark County from January 2012 to the
date of the request. The spreadsheet identified each decedent's name, age,
race, and gender, as well as the cause, manner, and location of death.

Dissatisfied with the Coroner’s Office's response, LVRJ
contacted the Clark County District Attorney's Office, asserting’ the
Coroner's Office lacked any legal authority to withhold the juvenile autopsy
reports. The district attorney's office informed LVRJ that autopsy reports
are released only to a decedent’s next of kin, basing its response on AGO 82-
12 and then-pending legislation. See A.B. 57, 79th Leg. (Nev. 2017). The
district attorney's office further explained that A.B. 57 as proposed would
codify in statute the Coroner's Office’s policy of releasing autopsy reports
only in limited circumstances.

LVRJ reporters and Coroner's Office representatives met to
further discuss LVRJ's records request. The discussion led Clark County
Coroner John Fudenberg to determine that LVRJ sought autopsy reports
and records pertaining to the deaths of children who were involved with the
Clark County Department of Child and Family Services. The Coroner's
Office then expanded its legal basis for withholding records to include NRS
432B.407(6), which renders confidential any records or information

acquired by a CDR team. The district attorney's office offered to review and
redact responsive reports not considered confidential under NRS Chapter

 

 
4328, provided LVRJ was willing to pay a fee to cover the extraordinary use
of personnel for redacting the reports.

LVRJ filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, requesting that
the district court compel the disclosure of all juvenile autopsy reports
generated between January 2012 and the date of LVRJ's April 2017 request.
‘The district court granted LVRJ's petition and ordered the Coroner's Office
to produce all records without redaction, rejecting the Coroner's Office's
argument that the reports could be categorically withheld as CDR records
and concluding that there was no other basis for withholding or redacting
the reports. The district court further determined that because the
Coroner's Office did not claim that the records were confidential under NRS
Chapter 432B in its initial response, the Coroner's Office waived that
argument and could not raise it later.

LVRJ thereafter moved for an award of attorney fees and costs,
and the Coroner's Office opposed the motion. The Coroner's Office argued
that it was immune from an award of attorney fees by virtue of NRS

239.012, which provides immunity from “damages” for disclosing or
withholding records in good faith. ‘The district court rejected the Coroner's
Office's immunity argument and awarded LVRJ attorney fees and costs.
‘These appeals followed and challenge both the district court’s order
‘compelling the Coroner's Office to produce unredacted juvenile autopsy
reports (Docket No. 74604) and the district court's award of attorney fees
and costs to LVRJ (Docket No. 75095).

 

 
DISCUSSION

Primarily at issue here are questions related to the
interpretation of the NPRA, NRS 239.001-.030," and NRS 432B.407(6), the
former generally requiring access to public records and the latter explicitly
designating certain information as confidential for specific purposes
relating to the review of child fatalities. We must also address whether the
NPRA immunizes a governmental entity from an award of attorney fees
when responding to a public records request in good faith.

When a district court's order granting a petition to compel
access to records under the NPRA entails questions of law and statutory
interpretation, we review the district court's order de novo. Reno
Newspapers, Inc. v. Gibbons, 127 Nev. 873, 877, 266 P.3d 623, 626 (2011).
Similarly, an attorney fee award based on an interpretation of a statute
providing for attorney fee eligibility presents a question of law subject to de
novo review. In re Estate & Living Tr. of Rose Miller, 125 Nev. 550, 552-53,
216 P.3d 239, 241 (2009). Thus, we review both orders at issue here de novo,
and we begin with foundational principles informing our interpretation of
the NPRA and NRS 432B.407(6).

When a statute's language is clear on its face, we must adhere
to the plain meaning of such language. City of Sparks v. Reno Newspapers,
Inc., 133 Nev. 398, 402, 399 P.3d 352, 356 (2017). When a statute is

1We acknowledge that during the recent 2019 Legislative Session, the
Nevada Legislature unanimously adopted numerous amendments to the
NPRA with the passage of S.B. 287. S.B. 287, 80th Leg. (Nev. 2019).
Because S.B. 287’s “amendatory provisions . .. apply to all actions filed on
or after October 1, 2019,” we interpret in this opini
NPRA in effect at the time the instant actions were i
Stat,, ch. 612, § 11, at 4008.

 

 

 

 
ambiguous, however, meaning “it is capable of being understood in two or
more senses by reasonably informed persons,” Chanos v. Nev. Tax Comm'n,
124 Nev. 232, 240, 181 P.3d 675, 680-81 (2008) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted), or when it does not speak to the particular matter
at issue, we will construe it by considering reason and public policy to
determine legislative intent. Salas v. Allstate Rent-A-Car, Inc., 116 Nev.
1165, 1168, 14 P.3d 511, 514 (2000), as amended (Dec. 29, 2000). We
“assume ] that, when enacting a statute, the Legislature is aware of related
statutes.” City of Sparks, 133 Nev. at 402, 399 P.3d at 356 (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “The meaning of the words used may
be determined by examining . . . the causes which induced the legislature to
enact it.” McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors of Carson City, 102 Nev. 644, 650-51,
730 P.2d 438, 443 (1986).

If possible, this court will “interpret a rule or statute in
harmony with other rules or statutes.” Watson Rounds, P.C. v. Eighth
Judicial Dist, Court, 131 Nev. 783, 789, 358 P.3d 228, 232 (2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “{T7his court has a duty to construe statutes as

 

a whole, so that all provisions are considered together and, . . . will seek to
avoid an interpretation that leads to an absurd result.” Smith v. Kisorin
USA, Inc., 127 Nev. 444, 448, 254 P.3d 636, 639 (2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

A governmental entity does not waive a legal basis for withholding records
by failing to cite the legal authority in its initial five-day response to a records
request, if it provides some legal basis in its first response

A governmental entity that denies a public records request for

confidentiality reasons must provide, in writing, a citation to authority for
its denial. NRS 239.0107(1Xd) (providing that the written notice of denial
must include “{a] citation to the specific statute or other legal authority that

 

 
om

 

makes the public book or record, or a part thereof, confidential”). ‘The
district court concluded that because the Coroner's Office did not initially
base its decision to withhold juvenile autopsy reports on NRS 432B.407(6),
it could not thereafter rely on that provision to withhold the reports. We
disagree with the district court’s conclusion and hold that the NPRA does
not provide that a governmental entity waives a legal argument it omits
from its initial five-day response to a records request.

As we recently explained in Republican Attorneys General
Association v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 136 Nev., Adv.
Op. 3,__ P.3d __ (February 20, 2020), the NPRA is silent as to forfeiture
or waiver of a legal basis for withholding records. The NPRA simply
requires the governmental entity to provide to the requester some legal
authority for denying access to a record on the basis that the record is
confidential. Because the statute is silent as to whether an omitted legal
basis for withholding records is waived, we turn to legislative history to
determine legislative intent.

The NPRA’s legislative history indicates that the Legislature
rejected a proposal providing for a governmental entity's waiver of a legal
basis for withholding records when the citation was not included in the
initial response to a records request. In particular, the Legislature
amended the NPRA in 2007 with the passage of Senate Bill 123. See S.B.
123, 74th Leg. (Nev. 2007); 2007 Nev. Stat., ch. 435, § 4, at 2061-62. As
introduced, section 4(2) of the bill provided that if a governmental entity
denies access to a public record based on confidentiality, but in doing so “the
governmental entity fails to comply with the provisions of paragraph (4) of
subsection 1, the governmental entity shall be deemed to have waived its

right to claim that the public . . . record is confidential.” $.B. 123, 74th Leg.,

 

 
om

 

§ 4(2) (Nev., as introduced on February 20, 2007). Senator Terry Care, the
Dill’s sponsor and a former journalist, testified that section 4(2) was drafted
to ensure that “if the governmental entity responds by citing a statute, it is
stuck with the original position and cannot come up with another position
if the requestor petitions the court later.” Hearing on $.B. 123 Before the
Senate Governmental Affairs Comm., 74th Leg. (Nev., February 26, 2007)
(testimony of Senator Terry Care). Section 4(2) was later removed from the
bill through Amendment No. 415, and as enacted, the waiver provision was
‘omitted in its entirety. 2007 Nev. Stat., ch. 435, § 4, at 2061-62. The
Legislature thus considered and rejected the waiver provision that LVRJ
‘urges us now to read into the NPRA.

In light of the Legislature's rejection of the waiver amendment
to the NPRA, the district court incorrectly concluded that the Coroner's
Office waived its reliance on NRS 432B.407(6). ‘The NPRA does not impose
such a waiver requirement; the Legislature declined to adopt it when it was
proposed. Interpreting the NPRA to prohibit a governmental entity from
expanding on its initial legal reasoning for withholding records would be
rewriting the NPRA in a manner squarely contradicting legislative intent.
We decline to doso. See Gibbons, 127 Nev. at 882, 266 P.3d at 629 (declining
to adopt a requirement that a Vaughn index be provided in every NPRA
dispute where such a requirement “would essentially be rewriting the
NPRA because it imposes no such unqualified requirement”); see also
Century Sw. Cable Television, Inc. v. CIF Assocs., 33 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th
Cir. 1994) (“Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier
version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that
the limitation was not intended.” (quoting Russello v. United States, 464
USS. 16, 23-24 (1983))).

 
NRS 432B.407(6)'s confidentiality provision, narrowly interpreted, does not
trump the NPRA’s provisions generally favoring access to public records

The NPRA provides that “unless otherwise declared by law to
be confidential, all public books and public records of a governmental entity
must be open at all times . . . to inspection by any person, and may be fully
copied.” NRS 239.010(1) (2017). The NPRA serves “to foster democratic
principles” and furthers the goals of “government transparency and
accountability.” PERS v. Nev. Policy Research Inst., 134 Nev. 669, 671, 429
P.3d 280, 283 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted); see NRS 239.001(1)
(2017). The NPRA’s provisions must be liberally construed in favor of the
public's right to access government records, and “any limitations or
restrictions on (that) access must be narrowly construed.” PERS, 134 Nev.
at 671, 429 P.3d at 283 (alteration in original) (quoting Gibbons, 127 Nev.
at 878, 266 P.3d at 626); see NRS 239.001(3) (2015).

NRS 432B.407 is included among several hundred other
statutory exceptions to the NPRA that declare certain public records to be
confidential or otherwise exempt from disclosure. NRS 239.010(1)
(identifying at least 461 statutory exceptions to the NPRA). Where, as here,
a statute “clearly and unambiguously creates an exception” to disclosure of
a publie record, and provides an “affirmative grant of confidentiality,” the
‘exception or grant of confidentiality must be interpreted narrowly. Reno
Newspapers, Inc. v. Haley, 126 Nev. 211, 215-16, 234 P.3 922, 925-26
(2010) (narrowly interpreting the confidentiality provisions of NRS
202.3662(1)).

As its title makes clear, NRS Chapter 432B generally addresses
the protection of children from abuse and neglect, and NRS 432B.403-.4095,

in particular, establish the creation, organization, composition, and duties

 

 
of “multidisciplinary teams to review the deaths of children.” NRS
432B.403, These multidisciplinary entities are referred to as CDR teams,
which are formed to “[rleview the records of selected cases of deaths of
children under 18 years of age...[alssess and analyze such
cases[,] . .. [make recommendations for improvements to laws, policies and
practicel,] ... {s]upport the safety of children ... and... [plrevent future
deaths of children.” NRS 432B.403(1)-(6). A CDR team is made up of
representatives from a variety of public agencies, including law
enforcement, medical care providers, educational agencies, child welfare
agencies, district attorney offices, and notably here, coroner's offices. NRS
432B.406(1Xa)(9. A CDR team may also include “such other
representatives of other organizations concerned with the death of the child
as the agency which provides child welfare services deems appropriate.”
RS 432B.406(2).

In furtherance of its duties, NRS 432B.407(1Xa)d) authorize a
CDR team to access certain investigatory records and information
regarding a case involving the death of a child. Specifically, a CDR team
may access, among other things, “[alny autopsy and coroner's investigative
records relating to the [child's) death.” NRS 432B.407(1Xb). NRS
432B.407(6) provides that “information acquired by, and the records of, a
(CDR team] . .. are confidential, must not be disclosed, and are not subject
to subpoena, discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil or criminal
proceeding.”

‘The Coroner's Office argues that by virtue of NRS 432B.407(6),
any juvenile autopsy reports provided to a CDR team are exempt from the
NPRA's disclosure requirements. More specifically, the Coroner's Office

maintains that, as a representative of a CDR team, it may invoke the CDR

 

 
 

privilege and categorically deny access to juvenile autopsy reports on behalf
of the CDR team.

Because NRS 432B.407(6) limits the disclosure of records
obtained by a CDR team and designates such records as confidential, the
provision must be interpreted narrowly. NRS 239.001(3) (“Any exemption,
exception or balancing of interests which limits or restricts access to public
books and records . .. must be construed narrowly . ...”); Haley, 126 Nev.
at 214-17, 234 P.3d at 924-26. By its plain language, NRS 432B.407(6)
makes confidential only the records or information “acquired by” the “team.”

 

The statute's language makes no mention of the authority of individual
agencies to invoke the confidentiality privilege on the team’s behalf. The
statute's language further applies explicitly to records or information
“acquired by” the team, not to records or information held by an agency
regardless of any CDR team activity. Moreover, NRS 432B.4075 refers to
the “access and privileges granted to a [CDR] team.” (Emphasis added.)
The statute applies exclusively to a CDR “team,” not to the broad categories
of individual public agencies that may be part of a CDR team. Narrowly
interpreting the plain language of NRS 432B.407(6), as we must, we
conclude that only a CDR team may invoke the confidentiality privilege to
withhold information in response to a public records request, and NRS
432B.407(6) makes confidential only information or records “acquired by”
the CDR team.

Our conclusion is reinforced by the CDR team’s unique and
essential role of obtaining and assessing information that may otherwise be
withheld from it on the basis of confidentiality. In reviewing the death of a
child, the CDR team must be able to access sensitive information from a

variety of entities, including medical, educational, social services, and law

12

 
om

 

enforcement agencies. To enable a CDR team to access such information,
NRS 432B.407(6) designates any records acquired by the CDR team as
confidential. This is to ensure that agencies do not withhold information
from the CDR team, not to authorize a government agency to withhold
information from the public.

In addition to NRS 432B.407(6)s plain language, the statutory
scheme of NRS Chapter 432B as a whole reflects a clear legislative intent
to make certain information concerning child fatalities publicly available.
As noted, we are bound to consider the entirety of NRS Chapter 432B when
interpreting component provisions thereof, Smith v. Kisorin USA, Inc., 127
Nev. 444, 448, 254 P.3d 636, 639 (2011) (“[This court has a duty to construe
statutes as a whole, so that all provisions are considered together . .
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

NRS 432B.175(1) explicitly provides, with some exceptions,
that “[dlata or information concerning reports and investigations thereof
made pursuant to this chapter must be made available pursuant to this
section to any member of the general public upon request if the child who is,
the subject of a report of abuse or neglect suffered a fatality or near fatality.”
‘The Legislature adopted this provision in 2007 with the passage of
Assembly Bill 261, a bill generally requiring public agencies to share and
disclose information regarding abused, neglected, or missing children. A.B.
261, 74th Leg. (Nev. 2007). In her introductory remarks as a sponsor of the
legislation, then-Assemblywoman Barbara Buckley testified that A.B. 261
addressed “the disclosure of records, and the purpose is to provide as much
disclosure as possible with regard to children who suffer fatalities or near
fatalities while in the care of the child welfare system.” Hearing on A.B.
261 Before the Assembly Health and Human Servs. Comm., 74th Leg. (Nev.,

13

 

 
March 14, 2007) (testimony of Assemblywoman Barbara Buckley)
(emphasis added). Assemblywoman Buckley testified that records
concerning child deaths should be accessible to “a member of the public, a
relative of the child, a member of the media, or a member of a child welfare
organization.” Id. This legislative history indicates that A.B. 261 codified
the Legislature's intent to make information pertaining to the deaths of
children in the custody of child welfare agencies available to the public, and
that the Legislature specifically contemplated ensuring the media's access
to this specific eategory of information.

Additional testimony during the Legislature's consideration of
A.B. 261 indicates the measure was intended to ensure the state’s continued
compliance with the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA),
federal legislation that provides grant funds to states in order to assist in
improving child protective service systems.* To qualify for federal grant
funds made available through CAPTA, states must ensure “public
disclosure of the findings or information about the case of child abuse or

See generally Emilie Stoltzfus, Cong. Research Serv., R40899, The
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA): Background,
Programs, and Funding, at 17 (2009) “In general, states must maintain the
confidentiality of all records and reports related to their child abuse and
neglect investigations. At the same time, a state must have procedures to
release information from these confidential records to any federal, state, or
local government entity, or an agent of these entities, that needs this
information to carry out its responsibilities under law to protect children
from abuse and neglect. ‘Two of these entities, child fatality review panels
and citizen review panels, are specifically named in the statute and must
be given access to confidential information needed to perform their work.
Further, the state is required to release to the public information concerning
a child abuse and neglect case when it resulted in the death or near death
ofa child”).

 

 
   

neglect which has resulted in a child fatality or near fatality.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 5106a(b\.2XBXx) (2012). In his testimony supporting A.B. 261, then-
Director of the Nevada Department of Health and Human Services Michael
Willden stated that the legislation was introduced because the state was
“underreporting child fatalities to the federal government” and in order “to
bring our statutes into clearer compliance with [CAPTA].” Hearing on A.B.
261 Before the Senate Human Res. & Educ. Comm., 74th Leg. (Nev., May
2, 2007) (testimony of Michael J. Willden, Director, Department of Health
& Human Services); see McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors of Carson City, 102
Nev. 644, 650-51, 730 P.2d 438, 443 (1986) (explaining that a statute's
meaning “may be determined by examining the context and the spirit of the
law or the causes which induced the [Llegislature to enact it”).

NRS Chapter 4328's legislative history demonstrates the
Legislature's intent to make reports about, and information pertaining to,
child fatalities publicly accessible as a matter of policy favoring
transparency and as a matter of compliance with federal law requiring
disclosure as a condition for child services grant funds. We must construe
RS 432B.407(6)'s confidentiality provision in light of NRS Chapter 432B’s
statutory scheme as a whole, and the Coroner's Office's argument
undermines the scheme’s obvious commitment to public transparency with
regard to information concerning child deaths. Accordingly, we reject the
Coroner's Office's broad assertion that it may invoke NRS 432B.407(6) to
withhold juvenile autopsy reports on the basis that the report: was provided
toa CDR team.

We therefore conclude, based on the plain language of NRS
432B.407(6) and the expressed purposes behind NRS Chapter 432B, that
the CDR team confidentiality provision is not intended to categorically

15

 
exempt records held by an individual CDR agency, such as the Coroner's
Office, from the NPRA’s disclosure requirements. Instead, we interpret
NRS 432B.407(6)'s language narrowly as applying only to records acquired
by the CDR team, not held by the team’s constituent agencies, for the
purpose of allowing the team to access the records and information it needs
to review a child fatality. Nothing in this opinion precludes a governmental
entity from withholding or redacting records on some other basis of
confidentiality, as discussed below. We hold simply that the Coroner's
Office may not rely on NRS 432B.407(6) to withhold juvenile autopsy
reports or claim that such reports are eategorically exempt from disclosure
by virtue of a confidentiality designation applicable only to the CDR team.

The Coroner's Office has identified nontrivial privacy interests in personal
‘medical information contained in juvenile autopsy reports

‘The Coroner's Office also argues that it may withhold juvenile
autopsy reports in their entirety in order to protect sensitive personal
medical information of child decedents. The Coroner's Office relies on
several authorities for this proposition, including the federal Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), NRS 629.021,
Assembly Bill 57, a measure the Nevada Legislature passed in 2017, and
Attorney General Opinion 82-12. We disagree that these authorities justify
withholding juvenile autopsy reports in their entirety.

First, as the district court concluded, coroners and medical
examiners are not defined as covered entities subject to HIPAA’s
prohibitions against disclosing medical information. See 45 C.F-R.
§ 160.103 (identifying and defining covered entities subject to HIPAA).

42 U.S.C. § 13204-7 (2012); 45 C.FR. § 164.502(f)-(g) (2013).

 

 
 

Similarly, NRS 629.021 applies only to records “received or produced by a
provider of health care.” NRS 629.031, in turn, includes an exhaustive list
defining “providers of health care” that does not include coroners or forensic
pathologists, whose duties instead are governed by NRS Chapter 259.
While we conclude that the Coroner’s Office was correct to invoke HIPAA
and NRS 629.021 in identifying a nontrivial privacy interest in medical
information, as discussed infra, these authorities do not justify categorically
withholding juvenile autopsy reports in their entirety.

‘The Coroner's Office also relied on Assembly Bill 57, adopted in
2017, which amended NRS 259.045's provisions requiring coroners to notify
the next of kin of a decedent's death. The Coroner's Office argues that A.B.
57, by authorizing a coroner to release an autopsy report to certain persons
who are not a decedent's legal next of kin, indicates the Legislature's tacit
endorsement of the Coroner’s policy restricting access to autopsy reports.
A.B. 57, however, makes no mention whatsoever of confidentiality of
autopsy reports or of withholding autopsy reports in response to a public
records request. The bill also made no mention of other classes of parties
that Clark County Coroner Fudenberg, in a sworn declaration in the
proceedings below, identified as entitled to autopsy reports, including, for
example, administrators or executors of an estate and law enforcement
officers performing their official duties. Under the Coroner's Office's
reasoning, these parties would be precluded from receiving autopsy reports
because they are not identified in A.B. 57. We are not persuaded that such
a result was intended. Instead, the bill appears to have been intended to
expand rather than restriet access to autopsy reports in specific
circumstances where a next of kin is the suspect in the decedent's death.
2017 Nev. Stat., ch. 108, § 3(2), at 475; see also Hearing on A.B. 57 Before

7

  

 
 

the Assembly Governmental Affairs Comm., 79th Leg. (Nev., March 8, 2017)
(testimony of John Fudenberg, Clark County Coroner) (“(A.B. 57] will
ensure that coroners statewide will be allowed to release reports to someone
who is not necessarily the legal next of kin when the legal next of kin is a
suspect in the death.”)

While the authorities the Coroner's Office invokes do not
authorize categorically withholding juvenile autopsy reports, they do
implicate a significant privacy interest in medical information such that the
reports may contain information that should be redacted. The NPRA
forbids a governmental entity from denying a public records request on the
basis of confidentiality “if the governmental entity can redact, delete,
conceal or separate the confidential information from the
information . .. that is not otherwise confidential.” NRS 239.010(3) (2017).

We have adopted the two-part test articulated in Cameranesi v.
United States Department of Defense, 856 F.3d 626, 637 (9th Cir. 2017) (the
Cameranesi test) for “determin{ing] if a government entity should redact
information in a public records request.” Clark Cty. School Dist. v. Las
Vegas Review-Journal, 134 Nev. 700, 707-08, 429 P.3d 313, 320-21 (2018).
The first step in a Cameranesi analysis requires the government to
establish that disclosure implicates a personal privacy interest that is
nontrivial or more than de minimis. If the government shows that the
privacy interest at stake is nontrivial, the requester must then show that
the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one and the
information sought is likely to advance that interest. If the second prong is
not met, the information should be redacted. The Cameranesi test thus
balances “individual nontrivial privacy rights against the public’s right to
access public information.” Id. at 708, 429 P.3d at 321. This balancing test

18

 
approach “ensures that the district courts are adequately weighing the
competing interests of privacy and government accountability.” Id. at 709,
429 P.3d at 321; see also Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. Nat'l Park Serv., 194
F.3d 120, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (explaining that the Freedom of Information
‘Act (FOIA) protects against “unwarranted ‘invasions’ of privacy” and that
such invasions “trigger{] a weighing of the public interest against the
private harm inflicted,” and concluding that “the release of photos of the
decedent at the scene of his death and autopsy qualifies as such an
invasion”).

Here, the Coroner's Office has demonstrated that a nontrivial
privacy interest is at stake in the potential disclosure of juvenile autopsy
reports. In his sworn declaration, Clark County Coroner John Fudenberg
explained that an autopsy requires a complete physical examination of the
decedent, including a review of blood samples and lab results. Fudenberg
explained that an autopsy may incorporate review of medical records and
health history completed prior to the physical examination, and that an
autopsy report will generally include “detailed descriptions and medical
evaluations of the condition” of the decedent and “references to specific
medical records, specific medical or health information and personal
characteristics about the decedent.” Such private information and personal
characteristics, according to Fudenberg, may include the decedent's sexual
orientation, preexisting medical conditions, drug or alcohol addiction, and
various types of diseases or mental illness, as well as other personal
information that the decedent or the decedent's family might wish to remain
private. Fudenberg’s declaration comports with a general understanding

that autopsy reports may “yield detailed, intimate information about the
subjeet’s body and medical condition,” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Med.

 

 
Exam'r, 533 N.E.2d 1356, 1357 (Mass. 1989), and may “reveal volumes of
information, much of which is sensitive medical information, irrelevant to
the cause and manner of death,” Penn Jersey Advance, Inc. v. Grim, 962
A.2d 632, 638 (Pa, 2009) (Eakin, J., concurring and dissenting).

Aside from Fudenberg’s declaration, the authorities the
Coroner’s Office invokes to withhold the autopsy reports reflect a clear
publie policy favoring the protection of private medical and health-related
information. In its first response to LVRJ's records request, the Coroner's
Office explained that its decision to withhold the reports was based on the
rationale set forth in AGO 82-12, discussing the “[s]trong public policy of
confidentiality of medical records.” See 82-12 Op. Att'y Gen. 37 (1982). AGO
82-12 identified “a strong public policy that the secrets of a person's body
are a very private and confidential matter upon which any intrusion in the
interest of public health or adjudication is narrowly circumscribed.” Id. at
40. Although we are not bound by AGO 82-12's conclusions of law, see Univ.
& Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev. v. DR Partners, 117 Nev. 195, 203, 18 P.3d 1042,
1048 (2001), for purposes of the first step of a Cameranesi analysis, the
Coroner's Office appropriately relied on AGO 82-12's public policy
pronouncements, Cannon v. Taylor, 88 Nev. 89, 91-92, 493 P.2d 1313, 1314
(1972) (“While the Attorney General's opinions are not binding on [this
court] ... [olne of the duties of the Attorney General is to issue written

‘See also Jeffrey R. Boles, Documenting Death: Public Access to
Government Death Records and Attendant Privacy Concerns, 22 Cornell J.L.
& Pub, Pol'y 237, 279 (2012) (“[P]rivacy concerns regarding autopsy reports
are heightened due to the significant volume of highly sensitive medical
information routinely contained within the reports.”).

 

 
opinions upon questions of law to guide public officials.”). AGO 82-12 shows
that there is a personal privacy interest in medical information that is
neither trivial nor de minimis.’

The Coroner's Office also correctly points out that NRS
482B.4095 imposes a civil penalty of up to $500 if any CDR team member,
a team organized to oversee a CDR team, or the Executive Committee to
Review the Death of Children discloses “any confidential information
concerning the death of a child.” NRS 432B.4095(1). While this provision
does not render juvenile autopsy reports confidential in their entirety, it
does reinforce the Coroner's Office's assertion that juvenile autopsy reports
may include confidential information that should be redacted before
disclosure. The NPRA contemplates that any such information should be
redacted, concealed, or otherwise separated from nonconfidential
information in the report. NRS 239.010(3). Accordingly, we conclude that
the Coroner's Office met its burden under Cameranesi, and LVRJ must

‘To the extent the district court's order concluded that an Attorney
General opinion cannot be used as a legal basis for withholding records, we
disagree. AGO 82-12 did not specifically address the distinct issue here
related to juvenile autopsy reports, which, in light of NRS Chapter 432B as
a whole, implicates a specific policy issue that AGO 82-12 did not
contemplate. We need not address the substance of the opinion beyond
concluding that it sufficiently identifies a nontrivial privacy interest in
confidential medical information. We further note, however, that while
Attorney General opinions are not binding legal authority, they are of
persuasive legal significance and may elucidate legal questions for the
purpose of guiding public agencies. This court, for instance, has found
Attorney General opinions useful in determining whether records are
available for inspection under the NPRA. PERS v. Nev. Pol’y Research Inst.,
134 Nev. 669, 674 n.4, 429 P.3d 280, 285 n.4 (2018).

 

 
om

 

show that the public interest it seeks to advance is significant and that the
information sought will advance that interest.

As discussed supra, the public policy interest in disseminating
information pertaining to child abuse and fatalities is significant. What is
unclear, however, is the nature of the information contained in the juvenile
autopsy reports that LVRJ seeks and how that information will advance a
significant public interest. The Coroner's Office initially provided a
spreadsheet to LVRJ identifying the case number; the decedent's name,
gender, age, and race; and the cause, manner, and location of death for
juveniles who were the subject of autopsies, and the Office also provided
heavily redacted sample autopsy reports for cases not handled by a CDR
team. Moreover, the CDR teams exist in part to provide information that
is used to “Iclompile and distribute a statewide annual report, including
statistics and recommendations for regulatory and policy changes.” NRS
432B.409(2X9; see, e,g., Exee. Comm. to Review the Death of Children, Nev.
Div. of Child & Fam. Servs., 2016 Statewide Child Death Report (2016). It
is unclear what additional information LVRJ seeks to glean from the
requested juvenile autopsy reports that, in unredacted form, would advance
the public's interest.

Accordingly, we remand for the district court to determine,
under the Cameranesi test, what autopsy report information should be
disclosed under the NPRA and what information should be redacted as
private medical or health-related information.

‘The NPRA explicitly limits an “extraordinary use” fee to 50 cents per page

‘The Coroner's Office argues that it is entitled to charge a fee for
the “extraordinary use” of personnel who must review and redact the
juvenile autopsy reports before disclosing them. See NRS 239.055(1). The

22

 
Coroner's Office estimated that it would require two employees to spend 10
to 12 hours reviewing and redacting the reports, and it requested that LVRJ
pay $45 per hour for the staff review. The district court concluded that the
Coroner's Office could not charge the $45-per-hour fee and limited any
recoverable costs to the actual costs of producing electronic copies on a CD.
We conclude that the Coroner’s Office is not entitled to charge a fee for the
privilege review in excess of the 50 cents-per-page cap imposed by the NPRA
for extraordinary use of personnel.

‘The NPRA provides that a governmental entity may recover a
fee for providing a copy of a public record, not to exceed 50 cents per page.
NRS 239.052(4). In 2017, the NPRA also provided for an additional fee to
be charged for “extraordinary use” of resources:

Of a request for a copy of a public record would
require a governmental entity to make
extraordinary use of its personnel or technological
resources, the governmental entity may, in
addition to any other fee authorized pursuant to
this chapter, charge a fee not to exceed 50 cents per
page for such extraordinary use. Such a request
must be made in writing, and upon receiving such
a request, the governmental entity shall inform the
requester, in writing, of the amount of the fee
before preparing the requested information. The
fee charged by the governmental entity must be
reasonable and must be based on the cost that the
governmental entity actually incurs for the
extraordinary use of its personnel or technological
resources. The governmental entity shall not
charge such a fee if the governmental entity is not
required to make extraordinary use of its personnel
or technological resources to fulfill additional
requests for the same information.

 

 
NRS 239.055(1) (2013) (emphasis added) (repealed 2019); see 2019 Nev.
Stat., ch. 612, § 13, at 4008. The NPRA, by its plain language, limits any
fee recoverable for the “extraordinary use” of personnel to “50 cents per
page.” NRS 239.055(1) is a specific provision dealing precisely with the
topic of a governmental entity’s “extraordinary use” of personnel to
“preparfe] the requested information” in response to a public records
request. It is unmistakable from the plain language that the 50-cent cap
applies to a fee “for such extraordinary use.” Such a provision, applying
specifically to fees for “extraordinary use,” must control over any other
provision providing generally for permissible fees associated with producing
a public record. In re Resort at Summerlin Litig., 122 Nev. 177, 185, 127
P.3d 1076, 1081 (2006) (“[W)here a general statutory provision and a
specific one cover the same subject matter, the specific provision controls.”);
State, Div. of Ins. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 116 Nev. 290, 293, 995
P.2d 482 485 (2000) (explaining that statutory language that is “plain and

 

unambiguous” leaves “no room for construction” (internal quotation marks
omitted))

In this instance, to permit the Coroner's Office to charge $45
per hour for staff to review the requested reports before disclosing them,
and to allow such costs as “extraordinary use” costs, would be to flatly ignore
the plain language of NRS 239.055(1) explicitly limiting fees that may be
assessed specifically for “extraordinary use” of personnel. The Coroner's
Office may charge a fee for extraordinary use of personnel or technological
services, and it may inform a requester, in writing, of the amount of such a
fee “before preparing the requested information.” NRS 239.055(1). But the

fee is expressly limited to 50 cents per page, it “must be reasonable,” and it
“must be based on the cost[s} [the Coroner's Office] actually incurs for the

 

 
m8

 

extraordinary use of its personnel.” Id. This court is not at liberty to set
aside, disregard, or rewrite the NPRA’s explicit limitations on fees
recoverable for a governmental entity's extraordinary use of personnel.
‘The NPRA does not immunize a public entity from an award of attorney fees

‘The Coroner's Office argues that it is immune from an award of
attorney fees because it withheld the requested autopsy reports in good
faith. Specifically, the Coroner's Office contends that NRS 239.011(2) and
NRS 239.012 must be interpreted together, such that NRS 239.012's
immunity from “damages” provision must be read to encompass NRS
239.011’s attorney fees provision. Interpreting NRS 239.011(2/s language
as “explicit and plain,” the district court concluded that LVRJ was entitled
to attorney fees as a prevailing party in its NPRA action. We review the
district court’s conclusions of law de novo. Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 264,
‘950 P.8d 1139, 1141 (2015) (holding when eligibility for a fee award depends
‘on interpretation of a statute or court rule, the district court's decision is
reviewed de novo). We affirm the district court’s order insofar as it correctly
interpreted NRS 239.011(2) as entitling a prevailing records requester to
attorney fees regardless of whether the governmental entity responds in
good faith to a public records request.

NRS 239.011@) provides that in an action to obtain access to

 

public records, “[ilf the requester prevails, the requester is entitled to
recover ... costs and reasonable attorney's fees in the proceeding from the
governmental entity whose officer has custody of the book or record.”
(Emphasis added.) NRS 239.012 provides that “lal public officer or
employee who acts in good faith in disclosing or refusing to disclose
information and the employer of the public officer or employee are immune
from liability for damages, either to the requester or to the person whom

25

 
 

the information concerns.” The plain language of both provisions compels,
reading them independent of one another, such that eligibility for attorney
fees does not depend on the good-faith response of the governmental entity,
but solely on whether the requester is a prevailing party.

As defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, the term “entitle” means
“{tJo grant a legal right to or qualify for,” Entitle, Black's Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019), and an “entitlement” is defined as “[aln absolute right to a
(usually monetary) benefit ... granted immediately upon meeting a legal
requirement,” Entitlement, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The
statute's language plainly provides that if LVRJ is the prevailing requester,
it has met the sole legal requirement which qualifies it for, or makes it
“entitled to,” reasonable attorney fees and costs. See also Las Vegas Metro.
Police Dep't v. Blackjack Bonding, Inc., 131 Nev. 80, 82, 343 P.3d 608, 610
(2015) (holding a records requester “was a prevailing party and thus
entitled to recover attorney fees and costs pursuant to NRS 239.011").

NRS 239.012, on the other hand, by its plain language deals
with governmental immunity from civil “damages” for good-faith disclosure
of information, We have interpreted “damages” in other governmental
immunity statutes to exclude an award of attorney fees. See Las Vegas
Metro. Police Dep't. v. Yeghiazarian, 129 Nev. 760, 768-69, 312 P.3d 503,
509 (2013) (allowing recovery of attorney fees in addition to damages subject
to NRS 41.035's cap); Arnesano v. State, Dep't of Transp., 113 Nev. 815, 821,
942 P.2d 139, 143 (1997). Because NRS 239.012 relates specifically to
governmental immunity, “damages” as used in this provision must be
interpreted consistently with our interpretation of “damages” as used in
other governmental immunity statutes. See Savage v. Pierson, 123 Nev. 86,
94, 157 P.3d 697, 702 (2007) (“{When the same word is used in different

26

 
statutes that are similar in respect to purpose and content, the word will be
used in the same sense, unless the statutes’ context indicates

otherwise .

 

The Coroner's Office argues that interpreting “damages”
independently would yield an absurd result, because other than the
attorney fees provided for in NRS 239.011(2), there is no other type of
“damages” that could flow from a governmental entity withholding a public
record or other information in good faith. In light of the Coroner's Office's
privacy argument, with which we partly agree, it is not difficult to conclude
that “damages” as used in NRS 239.012 contemplates civil damages, not
attorney fees. As we discussed in Clark County School District v. Las Vegas
Review-Journal, “Nevada's common law recognizes the tort of invasion of
privacy for unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another. ‘The
purpose of the tort is to provide redress for intrusion into a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy ....” 134 Nev. at 708, 429 P.3d at 320
(citations omitted). We decline to speculate as to whether the Legislature
conceived of specific privacy-based or other causes of action when enacting
NRS 239.012's immunity provision. A prevailing requester’s entitlement to
attorney fees and costs does not depend on whether the government
withheld the requested records in good faith. Here, however, it is premature
to conclude whether LVRJ will ultimately prevail in its NPRA action. The

district court must decide the extent to which the juvenile autopsy reports
contain private information that the Coroner's Office should redact. We
conclude that NRS 239.012, as a matter of law, immunizes a governmental

 

 
entity from “damages,” and that the term does not encompass attorney fees
and costs.¢
CONCLUSION

We conclude that the Coroner's Office has not demonstrated
that NRS 432B.407(6), or any other authority, authorizes it to withhold
juvenile autopsy reports in their entirety in response to a public records
request. To the extent that the requested reports may contain private
information or confidential medical information, we remand for the distriet
court to evaluate under Cameranesi the scope of information that should be
redacted from the reports. While NRS 239.012 does not immunize the
Coroner's Office from an award of attorney fees as a matter of law, we
nonetheless vacate the district court's award of attorney fees because it
cannot yet be determined whether LVRJ is a prevailing party in its
underlying NPRA action.

In light of the foregoing, we affirm the district court's conclusion
that the Coroner’s Office may not rely on NRS 432B.407(6) to withhold
juvenile autopsy reports in their entirety in response to a public records
request. We further affirm the district court’s conclusion that NRS 239.012
does not immunize a governmental entity from an award of attorney fees to
which a prevailing records requester in a publie records action is entitled.
We reverse the district court's order requiring production of unredacted
juvenile autopsy reports, and we remand for the district court to assess the

extent to which the reports may contain private information and medical or

“In light of our decision to reverse and remand for further
proceedings, we leave to the sound discretion of the district court the
determination of whether LVR4J is entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing
party in this action.

 

 
 

other health-related information that should be redacted. Finally, because
it is not yet determined what information LVRJ will ultimately obtain as a
result of its petition, we cannot yet conclude whether LVRJ is a prevailing
party, and we accordingly vacate the district court's order awarding
attorney fees to LVRJ.

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