Case Title: State ex rel. Dillery v. Icsman

Citation: 2001-Ohio-193

Docket Number: 20002151

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Dillery v. Icsman, 92 Ohio St.3d 312, 2001-Ohio-193.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. DILLERY, APPELLEE, v. ICSMAN, LAW DIR., ET AL., 
APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Dillery v. Icsman (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 312.] 
Public records — R.C. 149.43 — Court of appeals erred in granting attorney 
fees when request for public records was overbroad — Cause remanded 
to court of appeals to determine attorney fees related to public records 
request that benefited the public. 
(No. 00-2151 — Submitted May 30, 2001 — Decided July 18, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Erie County, No. E-99-051. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  The Sandusky Police Department received several reports 
about appellee, Kelly Dillery, who is handicapped, riding in a motorized 
wheelchair on city roads.  At times, Dillery allegedly operated her wheelchair on 
Sandusky streets while her child sat on her lap.  Dillery was ultimately charged 
with being a pedestrian in the roadway and with child endangering. 
 
On December 3, 1998, Dillery’s criminal defense attorney requested that 
appellant Sandusky Police Chief Robert Runner provide copies of “any and all 
records generated, in the possession of your department, containing any reference 
whatsoever to Kelly Dillery.”  On the same date, a paralegal employed by 
Dillery’s attorney requested that appellant Sandusky Public Works Superintendent 
Randy Whitman provide copies of records concerning repairs and replacements 
for certain sections of three city streets from July 26, 1990, until the date of the 
request.  On December 8, 1998, appellant Sandusky Law Director Donald C. 
Icsman denied both requests because of Dillery’s pending criminal charges and 
referred her to Crim.R. 16, which governs discovery in criminal proceedings.  
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While her charges were pending, Dillery made no request for discovery under 
Crim.R. 16. 
 
In February 1999, the managing editor of the Sandusky Register requested 
that the city provide him with copies of various records, including all Sandusky 
police reports concerning Kelly Dillery and a detailed report of all wheelchair-
related incidents involving persons other than Dillery.  The editor specified that 
the reports relating to Dillery consist of citations, complaints, and warnings.  The 
city subsequently provided the newspaper with approximately sixty pages of 
police reports on Dillery. 
 
Dillery was found not guilty of child endangering and, although she was 
convicted of being a pedestrian in the roadway, that conviction was reversed on 
appeal because she had not been prosecuted within the time specified in R.C. 
2945.71.  See State v. Dillery (Mar. 31, 2000), Erie App. No. E-99-027, 
unreported, 2000 WL 331386. 
 
On May 28, 1999, Dillery was again charged with being a pedestrian in 
the roadway, and after she demanded discovery under Crim.R. 16, Sandusky 
provided her with copies of police reports related to the new charge.  The charge 
was subsequently dismissed upon the request of the city. 
 
On June 10, 1999, Dillery filed a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio seeking relief under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and other federal statutes.  In response to her discovery requests 
in that action, the city provided Dillery with over three thousand documents. 
 
On June 16, 1999, Dillery filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for 
Erie County.  In her complaint, as subsequently amended, Dillery prayed for a 
writ of mandamus to compel appellants, Icsman, Runner, and Whitman, to 
provide her with copies of the records that she had requested on December 3, 
1998.  Appellants subsequently provided Dillery with the requested records, and 
the court of appeals ordered evidence and briefing on the issue of whether Dillery 
January Term, 2001 
3 
was entitled to an award of attorney fees.  The court of appeals also ordered 
Dillery to submit her itemized proposed billing statement for attorney fees. 
 
The parties filed evidence and briefs, and Dillery submitted a fee 
statement detailing $9,337.50 in attorney fees for 39.25 billable hours.  Dillery’s 
fee statement also listed $719.09 in telephone, copying, mailing, filing, and 
paralegal expenses. 
 
In October 2000, the court of appeals entered a judgment in which it found 
Dillery’s mandamus claim moot, but ordered appellants to pay Dillery $5,887.50 
(based upon a lower hourly rate) in attorney fees and $719.09 in litigation 
expenses for a sum of $6,606.59. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon appellants’ appeal as of right and 
their request for oral argument.  The Attorney General has filed an amicus curiae 
brief in support of appellants. 
 
Appellants assert that the court of appeals erred in granting attorney fees 
and expenses.  In an appeal of a judgment granting or denying fees in a public 
records case, we review whether the court abused its discretion.  See State ex rel. 
Mazzaro v. Ferguson (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 37, 41, 550 N.E.2d 464, 468.  An 
abuse of discretion implies an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude.  
State ex rel. Wilke v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 55, 61, 
734 N.E.2d 811, 818.  For the reasons that follow, we find that the court of 
appeals abused its discretion in granting attorney fees related to Dillery’s first 
records request, and in granting expenses regarding both requests, and reverse the 
judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
Under the applicable test, “[a] court may award attorney fees pursuant to 
R.C. 149.43 where (1) a person makes a proper request for public records 
pursuant to R.C. 149.43, (2) the custodian of the public records fails to comply 
with the person’s request, (3) the requesting person files a mandamus action 
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pursuant to R.C. 149.43 to obtain copies of the requested records, and (4) the 
person receives the requested public records only after the mandamus action is 
filed, thereby rendering the claim for a writ of mandamus moot.”  State ex rel. 
Pennington v. Gundler (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 171, 661 N.E.2d 1049, syllabus.  
Appellants concede that the second, third, and fourth requirements of the 
Pennington test have been established. 
 
Appellants initially contend that the court of appeals erred in awarding 
fees to Dillery because she did not establish the first Pennington requirement, i.e., 
a proper request for public records.  We agree in part. 
 
Dillery’s first request to the Sandusky Police Chief was overbroad.  
Despite her contentions on appeal that her request was limited to “routine 
[offense] and incident reports,” her request was much more general:  “any and all 
records generated * * * containing any reference whatsoever to Kelly Dillery.”  
Because Dillery did not specify in her first request that she wanted access only to 
offense and incident reports, she failed in her duty to identify the records she 
wanted with sufficient clarity.  State ex rel. Taxpayers Coalition v. Lakewood 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 385, 391, 715 N.E.2d 179, 185, quoting State ex rel. Fant v. 
Tober (May 20, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 63737, unreported, 1993 WL 173743, 
affirmed (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 117, 623 N.E.2d 1202. 
 
Moreover, Dillery’s request was so broad that it encompassed records that 
were exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43.  “Except 
as required by Crim.R. 16, information assembled by law enforcement officials in 
connection with a probable or pending criminal proceeding is, by the work 
product exemption found in R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c), excepted from required release 
as said information is compiled in anticipation of litigation.”  State ex rel. 
Steckman v. Jackson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 639 N.E.2d 83, paragraph five of 
the syllabus. 
January Term, 2001 
5 
 
In Steckman, we noted that permitting broad requests for all records in 
connection with a particular criminal defendant renders Crim.R. 16 meaningless 
because there is no right of prosecutors for reciprocal discovery under R.C. 
149.43.  See Crim.R. 16(C); Steckman, 70 Ohio St.3d at 428-429, 639 N.E.2d at 
90 (“The playing field is not level as there is no reciprocal right of prosecutors to 
obtain additional discovery beyond Crim.R. 16[C].”). In overruling previous 
precedent, we observed: 
 
“[C]ourts (and the persons and agencies involved with producing and 
keeping such records) are regularly faced with demands to release the entire 
contents of a prosecutor’s file and all the records accumulated and maintained by 
a police department in connection with a particular defendant and his or her 
criminal proceeding.  Because of our cases, the exceptions to required disclosure 
* * * have virtually been rendered meaningless.  Additionally, these cases have, 
for all practical purposes, just about written Rule 16 out of the Criminal Rules.  
Simply put, this chaos cannot be permitted to continue.”  (Emphasis added in 
part.)  Steckman, 70 Ohio St.3d at 431, 639 N.E.2d at 92. 
 
With these considerations in mind, we held that “[i]n the criminal 
proceeding itself, a defendant may use only Crim.R. 16 to obtain discovery.”  Id. 
at paragraph two of the syllabus.  Dillery violated this holding by broadly 
requesting all police department records referring to her pursuant to R.C. 149.43 
instead of Crim.R. 16. 
 
Dillery’s general request to the police chief was improper, a fact that the 
court of appeals appeared to recognize when it noted that the request “may have 
been overly broad and may have encroached on the area encompassed by Crim.R. 
16.”  Since that general request was improper, the court of appeals abused its 
discretion in awarding attorney fees related to that request. 
 
Further, the city’s release of police reports to the newspaper did not 
thereby entitle Dillery to disclosure of these records.  The newspaper’s request, in 
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contrast to that of Dillery, specified police reports, including citations and 
complaints.  The record also remains unclear whether the newspaper received all 
of the police records containing any reference to Dillery.  See State ex rel. WLWT-
TV5 v. Leis (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 357, 361, 673 N.E.2d 1365, 1369-1370 
(“Absent evidence that respondents have already disclosed the investigatory 
records to the public and thereby waived application of certain exemptions, the 
exemptions are fully applicable.”).  Unlike the respondents in State ex rel. Zuern 
v. Leis (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 20, 564 N.E.2d 81, the case cited by Dillery in 
support of her claim that appellants waived their right to rely on exemptions, 
appellants assert that Dillery should have used Crim.R. 16 to obtain the requested 
records.  Id., 56 Ohio St.3d at 21, 564 N.E.2d at 83 (“Nor are we confronted with 
an argument concerning the relationship between Crim.R. 16 and R.C. 149.43.”). 
 
Dillery’s second records request (the request by the paralegal), however, 
was proper.  This request was directed to the city’s public works superintendent 
and specified repair records for certain portions of three named streets.  These 
records are unquestionably public records.  The mere fact that these records might 
have subsequently become relevant to Dillery’s criminal cases did not transform 
them into records exempt from disclosure.  “ ‘Once clothed with the public 
records cloak, the records cannot be defrocked of their status.’ ”  State ex rel. 
Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Maurer (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 57, 741 
N.E.2d 511, 515, quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty. 
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 378, 662 N.E.2d 334, 338; see, also, State ex rel. 
WLWT-TV5 v. Leis, 77 Ohio St.3d at 361, 673 N.E.2d at 1370 (“Certain records 
are unquestionably nonexempt and do not become exempt simply because they 
are placed in a prosecutor’s file.”). 
 
Therefore, Dillery’s second request met the Pennington factors, and the 
court of appeals could exercise its discretion to determine whether Dillery was 
entitled to attorney fees with respect to that request.  Relator, however, must still 
January Term, 2001 
7 
have demonstrated a sufficient benefit to the public to warrant a fee award, and 
courts may consider the reasonableness of the custodian’s failure to comply, 
because attorney fees are regarded as punitive.  State ex rel. Gannett Satellite Info. 
Network v. Shirey (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 400, 404, 678 N.E.2d 557, 561; State ex 
rel. Findlay Publishing Co. v. Hancock Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1997), 80 Ohio 
St.3d 134, 139, 684 N.E.2d 1222, 1226; State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing 
Co. v. Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d at 58, 741 N.E.2d at 515, quoting State ex rel. 
Multimedia, Inc. v. Whalen (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 99, 100, 554 N.E.2d 1321, 1322 
(“Awarding ‘attorney fees in public records cases is discretionary and is to be 
determined by the presence of a public benefit conferred by [the] relator seeking 
the disclosure.’ ”). 
 
Appellants next contend that the court of appeals abused its discretion by 
determining that Dillery established a sufficient public benefit from her 
mandamus action.  For the following reasons, we find appellants’ contention to 
have partial merit. 
 
The court of appeals erred in holding that as long as the request for public 
records is proper, there is a sufficient public benefit warranting attorney fees, 
stating: 
 
“Respondent [law director] has throughout this action vigorously attacked 
the propriety of relator’s request for the specified documents.  We are compelled 
to note, however, that while relator’s initial documentary request may have been 
overly broad and may have encroached on the area encompassed by Crim.R. 16, 
the second request was clearly proper under the terms of R.C. 149.43.  Therefore, 
we conclude that relator has established a sufficient public benefit and that 
respondents unreasonably delayed in providing the documents requested, 
warranting an award of attorney fees.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
By this holding, the court of appeals improperly converted a discretionary 
attorney fee award into a mandatory award.  See State ex rel. Olander v. French 
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(1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 176, 179, 680 N.E.2d 962, 964 (“The award of attorney 
fees in a public records case is not automatic.”); Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d at 58, 741 
N.E.2d at 515. 
 
Furthermore, in the court of appeals, Dillery initially erroneously claimed 
automatic entitlement to attorney fees once the Pennington factors are met, and 
she subsequently asserted that she was entitled to attorney fees because she is 
“just a taxpayer seeking information for herself.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Moreover, Dillery is entitled to fees only insofar as her requests had merit.  
Dillery is not entitled to fees related to her improperly broad request to the 
Sandusky Police Chief.  See State ex rel. Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. 
Mentor (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 440, 448, 732 N.E.2d 969, 977 (“Relators are not 
entitled to attorney fees concerning those [public records] claims that were 
meritless.”).  To the extent that the court of appeals held otherwise, it erred. 
 
Nevertheless, concerning Dillery’s request for street-repair records, she 
established a sufficient public benefit.  The public has an unquestioned right to 
know about the nature and quality of repairs of city streets as well as the steps a 
city has taken to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act.  In addition, 
given the manifestly public nature of these street-repair records, see Beacon 
Journal and Cincinnati Enquirer, supra, the custodian’s failure to comply with 
Dillery’s request was unreasonable and unjustifiable.  See Gannett, 78 Ohio St.3d 
at 404, 678 N.E.2d at 561.  Therefore, although, as the Attorney General asserts, 
some of Dillery’s belated attempts to specify a public benefit may seem 
unpersuasive, we find that she has established a cognizable, sufficient public 
benefit to warrant attorney fees. 
 
Finally, we have plenary authority to consider extraordinary writ cases as 
if they originally had been filed here when a court of appeals errs in its judgment.  
See State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., Ohio Conference v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. 
Serv. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 577, 579, 728 N.E.2d 395, 397-398.  Given the 
January Term, 2001 
9 
previously detailed error by the court of appeals in awarding attorney fees related 
to an improperly broad records request by Dillery, we exercise this authority to 
hold that the court of appeals further erred by awarding litigation expenses to 
Dillery.  Except for various court filing fees for prevailing parties, these expenses 
are not recoverable in public records cases.  See White v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs. (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 1267, 1268, 675 N.E.2d 471, 472; State ex rel. 
Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 1218, 1218-
1219, 667 N.E.2d 1232, 1232-1233. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals erred in awarding attorney 
fees relating to Dillery’s improperly broad records request and further erred in 
awarding her litigation expenses.  Dillery is not entitled to attorney fees 
concerning the improper records request.  Dillery is, however, entitled to attorney 
fees regarding her meritorious street-repair records request.  State ex rel. Ohio 
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. Mentor, 89 Ohio St.3d at 448-449, 732 N.E.2d at 
977-978.  On remand, the court of appeals should also determine whether Dillery 
is entitled to an award of her costs, i.e., her filing fee.  Cf. State ex rel. Reyna v. 
Natalucci-Persichetti (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 194, 198, 699 N.E.2d 76, 79 
(“Denying costs to both parties can be appropriate when neither party entirely 
prevails.”). 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals to the extent 
indicated and remand the cause to the court of appeals for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.1 
 
                                                          
 
1. 
By so holding, we need not consider appellant’s claim that Crim.R. 16 cannot be 
constitutionally superseded by R.C. 149.43.  See State ex rel. Mason v. Griffin (2000), 90 Ohio 
St.3d 299, 304, 737 N.E.2d 958, 961-962, quoting State ex rel. DeBrosse v. Cool (1999), 87 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 7, 716 N.E.2d 1114, 1119  (“ ‘Courts decide constitutional issues only when absolutely 
necessary.’ ”).  We also deny appellants’ request for oral argument.  They have not established 
that oral argument is necessary for the resolution of this appeal.  Evans v. Klaeger (1999), 87 Ohio 
St.3d 260, 262, 719 N.E.2d 546, 548, fn. 1. 
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Judgment reversed and cause 
remanded for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur in judgment. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
RESNICK, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I concur in the 
judgment and opinion reversing the judgment of the court of appeals awarding 
Dillery attorney fees for her first request for records “containing any reference 
whatsoever” to Dillery and in additionally reversing the court’s award of her 
litigation expenses.  For the following reasons, however, I respectfully dissent 
from that portion of the judgment and opinion holding that Dillery is entitled to 
attorney fees for her request for street-repair records. 
 
In the court of appeals, Dillery neither specifically asserted nor established 
a cognizable public benefit from her mandamus action.  To the contrary, as the 
majority acknowledges, she initially erroneously claimed automatic entitlement to 
attorney fees once the Pennington factors are met, and she subsequently asserted 
that she was entitled to attorney fees because she is “just a taxpayer seeking 
information for herself.”  (Emphasis added.)  By so stating, it is evident that 
Dillery sought release of the street-repair records in this case for her personal 
battle against the city and not for any public purpose.  See State ex rel. Olander v. 
French (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 176, 180, 680 N.E.2d 962, 965. 
 
Even in this court, Dillery’s belated attempts to specify a public benefit 
are, as the majority intimates, unpersuasive.  In her appellate brief, Dillery claims 
that the public benefit emanated from her need for these records in order “to fully 
and accurately respond to questions [from] the various media” and “to see if she 
January Term, 2001 
11 
had the merits to file a lawsuit in federal court against the city of Sandusky for 
violating her civil rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act.”  Although a 
public benefit may result from the satisfaction of the public’s right to know, id., 
Dillery is not a member of the media and her asserted interest in informing the 
public is speculative and unsupported by the record.  In addition, at the time she 
filed her mandamus action, Dillery had already filed her action against the city in 
federal court with claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, so her 
attempted justification of needing the records to determine if she could file a 
federal lawsuit is meritless. 
 
Moreover, in considering the reasonableness of the city officials’ failure to 
comply with her street-repair records request, State ex rel. Gannett Satellite Info. 
Network v. Shirey (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 400, 404, 678 N.E.2d 557, 561, it is 
significant that whenever Dillery requested records in her cases in accordance 
with criminal and civil discovery provisions, the city timely provided her with 
access to those records.  Given Steckman, appellants could have reasonably 
believed that Dillery’s records requests were little more than unfounded attempts 
to circumvent Crim.R. 16 in her criminal cases or the civil discovery process in 
her federal case.  See State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 
639 N.E.2d 83, at paragraph two of the syllabus; see, also, State ex rel. WHIO-TV-
7 v. Lowe (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 350, 354, 673 N.E.2d 1360, 1363, quoting United 
States v. Anderson (C.A.11, 1986), 799 F.2d 1438, 1441 (“ ‘Discovery, whether 
civil or criminal, is essentially a private process because the litigants and the 
courts assume that the sole purpose of discovery is to assist trial preparation.  That 
is why parties regularly agree, and courts often order, that discovery information 
will remain private.’ ”) 
 
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals erred in awarding attorney 
fees and litigation expenses to Dillery.  Reversal is therefore warranted, and 
remand should be limited to the issue of whether Dillery might be entitled to 
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recover her costs, i.e., her filing fee.  Because the majority does not deny Dillery’s 
request for attorney fees regarding her request for street-repair records, I 
respectfully dissent from that portion of the judgment and opinion. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
K. Ronald Bailey & Associates Co., L.P.A., and K. Ronald Bailey, for 
appellee. 
 
Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, Mark R. Weaver and Barbara Kozar 
Letcher, for appellants. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Stephen P. Carney, 
Associate Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae Attorney General of Ohio. 
__________________