Case Title: JESSE THOMAS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-266

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
JESSE THOMAS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 186170 P.3d 1254Case Number: 06-266Decided: 11/20/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
JESSE 
THOMAS,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant 
Attorney General.        

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, Jesse Thomas pleaded no contest to one count of attempted second 
degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault and battery.  On appeal, he claims he should be allowed to withdraw his 
no contest pleas because the district court did not properly advise him in 
accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 11 and, consequently, his pleas were not knowing and 
voluntary.  Mr. Thomas also contends 
the State breached the plea agreement by arguing for a prison term of greater 
than 20 years on the attempted murder charge.            

 
 
[¶2]      We conclude the 
district court failed to advise Mr. Thomas in accordance with Rule 11 and its 
error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Thomas 
presents the following appellate issues:

 
 
I.          
Jesse Thomas' plea was involuntary due to the fact that the trial court 
failed to apprise Mr. Thomas of the maximum and minimum penalties and 
assessments at the change of plea hearing.

 
 

II.                  
The 
State of Wyoming violated its plea agreement by 
recommending a sentence in excess of the negotiated sentencing 
cap.

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issues as:

 
 

I.                    
Was 
the district court's failure to advise appellant pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(b) 
harmless?

 
 

II.                  
Did 
the State materially and substantially breach the plea 
agreement?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, Mr. Thomas pled no contest to one count of attempted second 
degree murder, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-301(a) and 6-2-104 
(LexisNexis 2007),1 and two counts of aggravated 
assault and battery, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2007).2  The charges arose from an incident on 
August 2, 2005, when Mr. Thomas hit his former girlfriend with his truck and 
pointed a gun at her and another woman.    

 
 
[¶5]      At the 
re-arraignment hearing, defense counsel recited the terms of the plea 
agreement.  She indicated the State 
agreed to amend the original information, which charged one count of attempted 
first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault and battery and two counts 
of reckless endangerment, to charge one count of attempted second degree murder 
and two counts of aggravated assault.  
In addition to amending the charges, the State agreed to "cap its 
sentencing recommendation at no higher than 20 years" on the attempted second 
degree murder charge.  Defense 
counsel stated that, with regard to the aggravated assaults, "we can argue 
whatever we want for those concurrent or consecutive sentences."    

 
 
[¶6]      At the sentencing 
hearing, counsel indicated that, in order to comply with the attempted second 
degree murder statute and Wyoming's indeterminate sentencing statute, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-13-201 (LexisNexis 2007),3 the State's recommendation would 
have to be for a minimum of 20 years and a maximum of 22 years and a few 
months.  The district court then 
proceeded to sentence Mr. Thomas to a period of not less than 240 months nor 
more than 266 months on the attempted murder charge, 96 to 120 months on one of 
the aggravated assault charges, and 84 to 120 months on the other.  The court made the first two sentences 
concurrent, but the third was to run consecutively.  Mr. Thomas appeals from the judgment and 
sentence.     

 
 
STANDARDS 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      The issue of 
whether the district court adequately advised Mr. Thomas of the consequences of 
his plea is a question of law we review de novo.  Whitten v. State, 2005 WY 55, ¶ 6, 110 P.3d 892, 894 (Wyo. 2005).  
Similarly, the issue of whether the State breached its obligations under 
the plea agreement is subject to de 
novo review.  Frederick v. State, 2007 WY 27, ¶ 13, 151 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Thomas claims 
his pleas were not knowing and voluntary because the district court did not 
advise him of the minimum and maximum penalties for his crimes, the possibility 
that restitution would be ordered, or that his sentences could run 
consecutively.  Rule 11 of the 
Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure sets out the procedure for pleas.  Subsection (b) of that rule delineates 
the advisements the district court must give a defendant before accepting a plea 
of guilty or no contest:

 
 
            
(b) Advice to Defendant.  
Except for forfeitures on citations (Rule 3.1) and pleas entered under Rule 
43(c)(2), before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony or to 
a misdemeanor when the defendant is not represented by counsel, the court must 
address the defendant personally in open court and, unless the defendant has 
been previously advised by the court on the record and in the presence of 
counsel, inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, 
the following:

 
 
            
   (1) The nature of the 
charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by 
law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law and other 
sanctions which could attend a conviction including, when applicable, the 
general nature of any mandatory assessments (such as the surcharge for the Crime 
Victim Compensation Account), discretionary assessments (costs, attorney fees, 
restitution, etc.) and, in controlled substance offenses, the potential loss of 
entitlement to federal benefits.  
However:

            
     (A) 
Disclosure of specific dollar amounts is not required;

            
     (B) 
Failure to advise of assessments or possible entitlement forfeitures shall not 
invalidate a guilty plea, but assessments, the general nature of which were not 
disclosed to the defendant, may not be imposed upon the defendant unless the 
defendant is afforded an opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea;  and

            
     (C) If assessments or forfeitures 
are imposed without proper disclosure a request for relief shall be addressed to 
the trial court under Rule 35 before an appeal may be taken on that 
issue.

            
  (2) The defendant has the 
right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding and, if 
necessary, one will be appointed to represent the 
defendant;

            
  (3) The defendant has the 
right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been 
made, the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial the right to the 
assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses, the right to court process to obtain the testimony of other 
witnesses, and the right against compelled 
self-incrimination;

            
  (4) If a plea of guilty or 
nolo contendere is accepted by the court there will not be a further trial of 
any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere the defendant waives the 
right to a trial;  
and

            
  (5) If the court intends to 
question the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of 
counsel, about the offense to which the defendant has pleaded guilty, that the 
defendant's answers may later be used against the defendant in a prosecution for 
perjury or false statement.

 
 
[¶9]      In Ingalls v. State, 2002 WY 75, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d 856, 860 (Wyo. 2002), we explained that W.R.Cr.P. 11 sets forth the 
procedure for courts to use in determining that a defendant's plea is 
intelligent, knowing and voluntary and entered with an understanding of the 
consequences.  See also, Bird v. State, 901 P.2d 1123, 1128 
(Wyo. 1995), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 907, 121 S. Ct. 253, 148 L. Ed. 2d 183 
(2000); Smallwood v. State, 748 P.2d 1141, 1143 (Wyo. 1988).  We have stressed that "[s]trict 
compliance with the rule is required to ensure due process of law."  Ingalls, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d  at 860.  Other than as specifically allowed in 
Rule 11, "resort to the extended record should not be required; the record made 
at the time a guilty plea is entered should satisfy the rule's 
requirements."  Id. See also, Follett v. State, 2006 WY 47, ¶ 23, 132 P.2d 1155, 1163 (Wyo. 2006) (recognizing that Rule 11 does not require the court 
to give the defendant advice at the change of plea hearing that has previously 
been given on the record and in the presence of counsel).

 
 
[¶10]   The colloquy at the hearing when 
Mr. Thomas changed his plea to no contest to the three counts for which he 
ultimately was sentenced was quite short.  
Defense counsel described the plea agreement as: 

 
 
            
[Defense Counsel]: The agreement is 
that the State will reduce the charge from attempted first-degree murder to 
attempted second-degree murder.  
They will put a cap of 20 years for their arrangement (sic) on what his 
sentence would be after we receive the presentence investigation 
report.

 
 
            
He also will plead guilty to two aggravated assaults, and we can argue 
whatever we want for those concurrent or consecutive 
sentences.

 
 
The 
district court reviewed the terms of the plea agreement and then addressed Mr. 
Thomas as follows:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Sir, do you understand the 
arrangement that's been made in your behalf by your 
attorney?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  I do, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Is that with your knowledge 
and participation?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yeah  yes, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  And other than that 
agreement has anybody made any promise to you or has anybody threatened you in 
any way to induce you to offer a plea of guilty?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  No, sir, Your 
Honor.

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: I'm sorry, Your Honor.  To make it clear, he's going to plead no 
contest.  . . 
.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  That's correct, Your Honor. . . . 

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Mr. Thomas, you understand, 
I presume, that the plea of nolo contendere carries the same legal consequences 
as a guilty plea?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  You were seated here in the 
jury box a while ago.  I gave 
advisement on the consequences of a guilty plea.  That is, by such a plea, should the 
Court accept it, [you] permanently waive and give up your right to a trial and 
subject yourself to the possibility of the maximum penalties.  Did you hear and understand that 
advisement?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  I yes, I did, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Do you have any questions 
about it?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  No, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  The first count, sir, is 
that on or about the 2nd day of August of 2005 in LaramieCounty you unlawfully with the intent to 
kill [the victim] drove your vehicle into [the victim] contrary to the 
statute.  Is that  will that be the 
form of the amended charge?

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  Essentially, yes, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  But it would be without 
premeditation.

 
 
[Prosecutor]: 
 That's correct, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  You understand the charge, 
Mr. Thomas?  

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, I 
do.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  And how do you plead to that 
charge?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  No contest.  

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Who can provide the - - 

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  State will provide a factual basis, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  We'll go ahead with the 
other, too, and then you will do that, please.

 
 
            
Then the second count, Mr. Thomas, alleges on the 2nd day of 
August of 2005, you did unlawfully threaten to use a drawn deadly weapon on the 
same person, [the victim]; that, on the 2nd 
day of August 2005, you unlawfully threatened to use a drawn deadly weapon on 
another, did so unlawfully threaten to use a drawn deadly weapon on [the other 
victim].  How do you plead to those 
two charges?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  No 
contest.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  We gather the additional 
items are to be dismissed; is that correct?

 
 
[Prosecutor]: 
 That is correct, Your Honor. 

 
 
The 
prosecutor, with a couple of additions by defense counsel, provided a factual 
basis for Mr. Thomas' no contest pleas.  
The colloquy continued as follows:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Mr. Thomas, the fact is 
here, apparently, that you were severely intoxicated at the time these events 
occurred; is that correct?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  So I gather you don't have a 
good memory of what happened; is that correct?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  That's correct, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  So you've offered these 
pleas of no contest, meaning you don't contest the State would offer the 
evidence [the prosecutor] just - - 

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Do you have any questions 
about any of this so far, Mr. Thomas?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  No, sir, Your 
Honor.  

 
 
THE 
COURT:  As counsel have indicated, 
there was the evaluation at the state hospital, [which] has been returned.  Counsel do not contest its content.  The Court hereby makes a finding that 
Mr. Thomas is competent to proceed, and Mr. Thomas, you appear to be responding 
appropriately this morning.  You 
understand the conversation I'm having with you.  I take it on that basis you're not under 
the influence of any substance this morning.  

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  No, sir, I'm 
not.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  And you're not under any 
disability?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  No, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  You're satisfied that you 
understand what was done here this morning, what the Court - - 

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
sir.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  The Court therefore will 
accept and enter the pleas that have been offered as having been underlain by a 
factual basis, no improper inducement, so we'll order a presentence 
investigation report.

 
 
[¶11]   As referenced by the district 
court, prior to individually addressing Mr. Thomas, it spoke to all the criminal 
defendants who were in the courtroom and advised them that, if they were 
pleading guilty, they would be waiving several rights, including the right to a 
jury trial where the State would be put to its proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the right to the presumption of innocence, the right to put on a case in 
defense, and the right to appeal.  
It also informed them: 

 
 
The 
other main consequence [of pleading guilty] is that you subject yourself to the 
possibility of the maximum penalty provided by law.  The state legislature's provided maximum 
penalties for the various offenses.  
The court is authorized by the legislation to impose a sentence up to 
that maximum.  The Court is not 
required to do so, but may do so.

 
 
            
When a plea comes about as a result of a joint recommendation of counsel 
for a given sentence or disposition, the Court always very seriously considers 
that joint recommendation and customarily abides by it, but is not bound to do 
so.  So you have no absolute 
guarantee of that.  

 
 
            
In addition to the maximum terms of imprisonment and/or fine, the Court 
is required to impose other monetary obligations such as repayment to the State 
for the cost of the public defender services, repayment to the public defender's 
office for the cost of that service, and certain items of cost.    

 
 
The 
district court gave Mr. Thomas no other advisements concerning the possible 
penalties attendant to his crimes.   

 
 
[¶12]   Thus, while Mr. Thomas was informed 
that he could be subject to the maximum penalties authorized by law for his 
crimes, the district court did not advise him about the specific minimum or 
maximum penalties associated with any of his crimes.  At his initial arraignment, he waived 
reading of the information.  At the 
change of plea hearing, the district court did not recite the penalties for the 
attempted second degree murder charge or the aggravated assault charges.  The only references to penalties were 
the State's agreement to "cap" its recommended sentence for the attempted second 
degree murder charge at 20 years and defense counsel's statement that the 
question of whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively was 
open to argument by both parties.  

 
 
[¶13]   The State admits the district court 
erred by failing to advise Mr. Thomas of the penalties for his crimes but argues 
the error was harmless.  W.R.Cr.P. 
11(h) provides:  "Harmless 
error.  Any variance from the 
procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall 
be disregarded."  We have 
consistently held that, because strict compliance with Rule 11 is required to 
ensure that a defendant's constitutional rights are protected, error in the plea 
acceptance procedure demands reversal unless the State demonstrates it is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Ingalls, ¶¶ 10, 22, 46 P.3d  at 
859, 863.  See also, Maes, ¶ 8, 114 P.3d  at 710; Stice v. State, 799 P.2d 1204, 1208-09 
(Wyo. 
1990).  

 
 
[¶14]   In Keller v. State, 723 P.2d 1244, 1247 
(Wyo. 1986), 
we held under a prior version of the rule, that the district court's failure to 
inform the defendant of the maximum penalties associated with his crime was not 
harmless and, consequently, demanded reversal.  Similarly, in Ingalls there was no showing that the 
defendant had received any Rule 11 advisements in entering his guilty 
pleas.  Ingalls, ¶ 14, 46 P.3d  at 861.    

 
 
[¶15]   In Rodriguez v. State, 917 P.2d 172, 175 
(Wyo. 1996), we held that the district court's error in informing the defendant 
of a higher maximum penalty than the charges actually carried "undermined the 
voluntariness" of his plea and violated his constitutional right to due 
process.   This Court 
explained:  "The district court 
violated the W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(1) requirements by failing to correctly inform 
Appellant with respect to the maximum penalties which could be imposed on him if 
he were to plead guilty."  
Id.  
We declined to apply a harmless error analysis in Rodriguez because the state did not 
demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   It was "impossible to determine 
how Appellant might have pleaded had he been provided with accurate sentencing 
information."  Id. at 176.  

 
 
[¶16]   We have, however, found errors 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in proper cases.  In Nixon v. State, 4 P.3d 864, 869-70 (Wyo. 
2000), we ruled the district court's error in informing the defendant that 
probation was a possibility for his pleas of guilty to first degree murder and 
aggravated assault and battery was not reversible error because the district 
court had correctly recited the applicable penalties numerous times and the 
record clearly demonstrated that the defendant did not rely upon the district 
court's incorrect statement in entering his guilty plea.  In Bird, 901 P.2d  at 1126, the defendant 
argued that the district court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty 
plea because he was improperly informed by the district court when he pleaded 
guilty that he could be subjected to three life sentences if convicted of the 
charged crimes.  In truth, he was 
only subject to the possibility of two life sentences under the relevant 
statutes.  Id. at 
1127-28.  Mr. Bird waived his right 
to a presentence investigation and he was sentenced immediately.  During the sentencing phase of the 
hearing, counsel informed the district court that the maximum sentence was 
actually two life sentences.  The 
district court ultimately sentenced Mr. Bird to serve two concurrent life 
sentences.  Mr. Bird did not ask to 
withdraw his guilty pleas at that time, but later filed such a motion.  Id.  
Affirming the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his 
pleas, we held that the district court's error in advising the defendant on the 
maximum possible penalty for his crimes was harmless:

 
 
We 
cannot discern how Bird was prejudiced in any way by the initial misstatement of 
the maximum sentence.  That 
misstatement was corrected in Bird's presence prior to sentencing and Bird, in 
fact, was sentenced to only two, not three, life sentences which were made to 
run concurrently.  Bird had an 
opportunity to comment with respect to sentencing, and another opportunity to 
inform the court of any reason why it should not pronounce sentence.  He declined each 
offer.

 
 
            
Bird does not claim, nor can he, that he was threatened, directly or 
indirectly, with three consecutive life sentences should he not plead 
guilty.  The misstatement occurred 
after Bird had advised the court through counsel of his desire to enter pleas of 
guilty.  The erroneous statement did 
not induce Bird to change his plea from not guilty to guilty.  The State's position rather promptly was 
articulated that Bird could only receive two life sentences, and that they 
should be imposed to run concurrently.  
The actual sentence imposed was consistent with the position of the State 
and Bird, speaking through his attorney.  
While it is clear the trial court misadvised Bird with respect to the 
maximum penalty contrary to the requirement of WYO.R.CRIM.P. 11(b)(1), that 
error was harmless in light of the entire record.  We are satisfied no substantial right 
held by Bird was affected, and he was not prejudiced in any respect.  

 

Id. at 1130 
(footnote omitted).

 
 
[¶17]   The State asserts the error in this 
case was harmless because the record indicates Mr. Thomas understood the 
consequences of his no contest pleas, including the penalties for his 
crimes.  The State insists he was 
aware of the penalties for the two assault charges because they were listed in 
the arrest warrant.  The arrest 
warrant stated that the penalties for the aggravated assault charges were "0-10 
years and/or $10,000 Fine."    

 
 
[¶18]   The State also directs us to a 
competency evaluation which is included in the record.  The psychologists performing the 
evaluation indicated that Mr. Thomas was aware of the penalties for the original 
charges and possible amended charges associated with a potential plea 
agreement.   The evaluation 
stated in part:

 
 
            
5.         
Psycholegal Abilities Related to Competency to 
Proceed

            

CAPACITY 
TO COMPREHEND AND APPRECIATE CHARGES  

 
 
Upon 
review of Mr. Thomas' legal situation, he was able to identify his current 
charges in addition to alerting me to a possible plea bargain or amended 
information of the current charges.  
In a conversation with Mr. Thomas' attorney for my clarity on this 
matter, [defense counsel] informed me that a possible plea offering was 
submitted to her by the prosecuting attorney.  The plea bargain that was presented by 
the prosecution was consistent with information that was provided by Mr. Thomas 
during his interview.

 
 
Mr. 
Thomas reported that all charges against him at this time constitute felony 
charges.  He was corrected with 
respect to the two counts of Reckless Endangering, which carry a misdemeanor 
classification.  Mr. Thomas 
demonstrated an awareness that a felony charge is more serious than a 
misdemeanor crime.  He demonstrated 
comprehension of the police version of the alleged criminal conduct by providing 
a brief synopsis of what the police say occurred.  In assessing his appreciation for the 
seriousness of the potential penalties he could receive if convicted as charged, 
Mr. Thomas related that he could be facing a life sentence in prison as the main 
penalty for the Attempted Murder charge.  
Initially, Mr. Thomas was uncertain as to the penalties for all charges 
against him.  However, upon review 
of the penalties throughout his interview, he demonstrated the capacity to 
recall and relate this information back to me.  During these reviews and discussions, 
Mr. Thomas exhibited the capacity to appreciate the gravity of possible 
convictions regarding some or all of the crimes for which he is currently 
accused.

 
 

Degree 
of incapacity in this area is assessed to be: None 
based on mental illness or deficiency.

 
 

Specific 
concerns:             
During his interview, Mr. Thomas demonstrated the ability to relate 
concrete information regarding his charges and potential penalties, although 
initially he required some prompting and reminding.  Following a couple of reviews of this 
information, he was more readily able to communicate this information 
independently.  [Defense counsel] 
may find it helpful to review this information with Mr. Thomas from time to time 
throughout the adjudicative process to ensure Mr. Thomas has an up-to-date and 
thorough awareness of allegations against him.

 
 
Finally, 
the State argues that we should assume his attorney discussed the plea bargain 
with him and informed him of the penalties associated with his crimes. 

 
 
[¶19]   The State's arguments ignore the 
importance of the advisements mandated by Rule 11.  In Ingalls, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d  at 860, we stated 
that the district court must make the requisite advisements on the record in 
accordance with Rule 11 and "resort to the extended record should not be 
required."  Even if we were 
comfortable with relying on the extended record, including the arrest warrant 
and competency evaluation, it does not conclusively establish that Mr. Thomas 
was fully and correctly informed of the penalties for his crimes.  The arrest warrant set forth the 
penalties for the aggravated assault charges but, because it pertained to the 
original charges, it said nothing about the penalties for attempted second 
degree murder.  The competency 
evaluation indicates that the psychologists discussed the potential penalties 
associated with the charges in a proposed plea agreement with Mr. Thomas, but it 
does not delineate the details of the proposed agreement or the psychologists' 
understanding of the penalties associated with these new charges.  We have no way of knowing if the charges 
discussed were even the same charges to which Mr. Thomas pleaded no contest or 
if the psychologists properly informed him of the penalties associated with the 
charges.  

 
 
[¶20]   Moreover, as we explained in Major v. State, 2004 WY 4, ¶ 20, 83 P.3d 468, 478 (Wyo. 2004), we should not "confuse the question of competence with the 
separate question of whether a plea is knowing and voluntary."  The competency evaluation looked at 
whether Mr. Thomas was competent at the time he committed the crimes and whether 
he was competent to proceed with the legal proceedings.  It was not intended to answer the 
question of whether he had a sufficient understanding of the nature of the 
charges and penalties associated with the charges to effectively enter no 
contest pleas.     

 
 
[¶21]   Finally, if we simply assume, as 
the State asks us to, that Mr. Thomas' defense attorney adequately advised him 
of the nature of the plea agreement and the consequences of accepting it without 
requiring the district court to make the requisite advisements on the record, 
the purposes of the rule would be lost.  
Rule 11 specifically requires the court to personally address the 
defendant to ensure that his plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered.  In Stice, 799 P.2d  at 1208, this Court concluded that the 
district court erred by failing to personally question the defendant about his 
knowledge of the maximum penalty for his crime.  We held, however, that the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because, in response to a question by defense 
counsel at the change of plea hearing, the defendant was able to inform the 
court of the maximum penalty associated with his crime.  Id.  
Thus, it was clear on the record in Stice that the defendant understood the 
consequences of his guilty plea.  
Here, the State is asking us to assume that defense counsel properly 
advised Mr. Thomas of the penalties for his crimes outside of the recorded court 
proceeding.  Rule 11 and our 
precedent does not allow for such an assumption.

 
 
[¶22]   In determining whether the error in 
this case was harmless, we are cognizant of the fact that the State's 
recommended sentence on the attempted murder charge and the sentence actually 
imposed was the lowest possible sentence allowed under the law.   The penalty for attempted second 
degree murder is 20 years to life imprisonment.  Section 6-2-104.  This fact suggests that Mr. Thomas 
suffered no prejudice even though he was not informed of the penalties 
associated with attempted second degree murder.   

 
 
[¶23]   In considering this aspect of the 
harmless error analysis, we are drawn to the argument Mr. Thomas sets out in his 
second issue.  At the change of plea 
hearing, defense counsel represented that, in exchange for Mr. Thomas' no 
contest pleas, the State agreed to cap its sentencing recommendation on the 
attempted murder charge at 20 years.  
 That was the information Mr. 
Thomas had when he pleaded.  At the 
sentencing hearing, counsel indicated that, in order to comply with the second 
degree murder statute, which contained a mandatory minimum of 20 years, and the 
indeterminate sentencing statute, which requires minimum and maximum terms be 
included in sentences, the State's recommendation would have to be for a minimum 
sentence of 20 years and a maximum sentence of 22 years and a few months.  Mr. Thomas did not object at that point, 
but on appeal, he argues the State breached the plea agreement.  Irrespective of the State's alleged 
breach of the agreement, we believe that the district court's failure to inform 
Mr. Thomas of the penalties associated with his crimes contributed to the error 
in the plea agreement.  Had the 
court recited the minimum and maximum penalties at the change of plea hearing, 
the fact that the State could not recommend a maximum sentence of 20 years would 
have become obvious.  Thus, the 
district court's acceptance of a plea agreement which included an illegal 
sentence recommendation further undermines the validity of Mr. Thomas' no 
contest pleas.   

 
 
[¶24]   On this record, we are compelled to 
rule that the district court's error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
and Mr. Thomas must be allowed to withdraw his no contest pleas.  Unlike the defendants in Nixon and Bird where we found the district court's 
error harmless, the district court never advised Mr. Thomas of the penalties for 
his crimes.  This case is more akin 
to Keller and Ingalls where we ruled that the district 
court's errors in failing to give the proper advisements were not harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  In light 
of our holding, it is unnecessary for us to consider the remainder of Mr. 
Thomas' complaints about the validity of his pleas or whether the State 
materially breached the plea agreement.

 
 
[¶25]   Reversed and 
remanded.

 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Section 
6-1-301(a) states:

 
 
(a) A person 
is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if:

            
(i) With the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which is a 
substantial step towards commission of the crime.  A "substantial step" is conduct which is 
strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person's intention to complete the 
commission of the crime;  
or

            
(ii) He intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime 
had the attendant circumstances been as the person believes them to 
be.

 
 
Section 
6-2-104 states:  

 
 
            
Whoever purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any 
human being is guilty of murder in the second degree, and shall be imprisoned in 
the penitentiary for any term not less than twenty (20) years, or during 
life.

 
 
            

2Section 
6-2-502(a)(iii) states:

 
 
(a)  A person is guilty of aggravated assault 
and battery if he:

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
      (iii) Threatens to use a drawn 
deadly weapon on another unless reasonably necessary in defense of his person, 
property or abode or to prevent serious bodily injury to another;          

 
 

3Section 
7-13-201 states:                                         

 
 
            
Except where a term of life is required by law, or as otherwise provided 
by W.S. 7-13-101, when a person is sentenced for the commission of a felony, the 
court imposing the sentence shall not fix a definite term of imprisonment but 
shall establish a maximum and minimum term within the limits authorized for the 
statute violated.  The maximum term 
shall not be greater than the maximum provided by law for the statute violated, 
and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum provided by law for the 
statute violated, nor greater than ninety percent (90%) of the maximum term 
imposed.