Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Maynard

Citation: 672 So. 2d 530

Docket Number: 83918, 84648

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1996-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
672 So. 2d 530 (1996)
THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant,
v.
John Lobban MAYNARD, Respondent.
Nos. 83918, 84648.

Supreme Court of Florida.
April 18, 1996.
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director and John T. Berry, Staff Counsel, Tallahassee; and Jan Wichrowski, Bar Counsel and *531 Frances R. Brown, Co-Bar Counsel, Orlando, for Complainant.
Gavin D. Lee of Gavin D. Lee, P.A., Maitland, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM.
We have for review two complaints of The Florida Bar (Bar) against John Lobban Maynard and the referee's report in each case. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 15 of the Florida Constitution and consolidate the two cases for purposes of this review.
After a hearing, the referee concluded that Maynard was guilty of three counts of misconduct[1] and made the following findings:
The referee recommended that Maynard be found guilty of violating rule 5-104(A) of the former Code of Professional Responsibility for entering into a business transaction with a client wherein they have differing interests and where the client expects the lawyer to exercise his or her professional judgment for the protection of the client. The referee also found violations of the following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: 4-1.4(a) for failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; 4-1.4(b) for failing to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representations; 4-1.7(a) for representing a client where that representation will be directly adverse to the interest of another client; 4-1.7(b) for representing a client where the lawyer's exercise of independent professional judgment in the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibility to another client or to a third person or by the lawyer's own interest; 4-1.7(c) for representing multiple clients in a single matter without explaining the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved; 4-1.8(a) for entering into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to the client; 4-1.8(b) for using information relating to the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client; 4-1.15(a) for commingling; 4-2.1 for failing to exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice in representing a client; 4-8.4(c) for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; 5-1.1 for using trust funds for purposes other than those for which they were entrusted to him; and 5-1.2 for failing to follow the minimum trust accounting procedures and maintain the minimum trust accounting records. The referee recommended a ninety-one-day suspension and also assessed all costs against Maynard, which amounted to $7,264.80 according to the Bar counsel's amended affidavit.
*537 The Bar contends that the misconduct found by the referee warrants disbarment. On cross-appeal, Maynard contends that in determining that he had failed to provide Strausberg's accountant with the necessary correspondence regarding an uncollectible loan, the referee relied solely upon hearsay in Strausberg's testimony that was not subject to cross-examination. Maynard argues that this testimony does not constitute competent substantial evidence to support the referee's finding. However, in disciplinary cases, hearsay evidence is admissible, particularly where its credibility is established. Florida Bar v. Vannier, 498 So. 2d 896, 898 (Fla.1986). Here, Strausberg's testimony was corroborated by a 1992 letter from Maynard to Strausberg's accountant containing information that he would have needed to claim the bad debt deduction for Strausberg.
Maynard also attacks the referee's denial of Maynard's motion in limine in which he alleged that the Bar had failed to return all of the trust account records he produced. However, before ruling on Maynard's motion, the referee heard testimony from the paralegal who supervised the copying of the trust account records and the staff investigator who delivered them. After permitting Maynard to review the records to determine which, if any, were missing, the referee denied the motion. Nevertheless, he specifically stated that he would permit Maynard to raise the same issues again as they became relevant. When the Bar subsequently introduced three of Maynard's trust account records, he made no objection that they were incomplete. We find no abuse of discretion.
The Bar charged Maynard with nine counts of misconduct. The referee found him guilty of only count V and made the following findings:
The referee recommended that Maynard be found guilty of violating rules 4-1.7(b) and 4-1.8(a) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. He recommended a ninety-day suspension to run concurrently with the suspension in case number 83,918. The referee also assessed all costs against Maynard, which the Bar's counsel has calculated to be $1,835.50.
In this appeal the Bar contends that the respondent was guilty of misconduct as charged in count VIII. The referee's findings with respect to this count were as follows:
We agree with the Bar that the referee's own findings in Count VIII demonstrate that Maynard was guilty of violating rule 4-3.3(a)(1) for knowingly making a false statement to a tribunal and rule 4-8.4(c) for engaging in conduct involving fraud, dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation.[2]
We turn at last to the Bar's challenge to the referee's recommended discipline. Our scope of review in this area is broad because it is we who bear the ultimate responsibility to order an appropriate sanction in attorney disciplinary cases. Florida Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989). As we have stated before, discipline must serve three purposes:
Florida Bar v. Lord, 433 So. 2d 983, 986 (Fla.1983) (emphasis and citations omitted).
Disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate punishment when a lawyer has misused client funds. Florida Bar v. Shanzer, 572 So. 2d 1382, 1383 (Fla.1991). Mitigating evidence may rebut this presumption, leading to the lesser punishment of suspension. Id. Although Maynard did not have an opportunity to present mitigating evidence in case number 83,918,[3] we need not remand this cause for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of mitigation. Maynard had the opportunity to present mitigating evidence in case number 84,648 and he did not do so. In any event, we find the mitigating circumstances which Maynard alludes to in his reply brief[4] insufficient to overcome the aggravating circumstances that we find here. Maynard received a two-month suspension in 1979 for trust account record-keeping violations. Adding to this the severity and number of violations here and the lengthy period of time over which these violations occurred, we find the concurrent ninety- and ninety-one-day suspensions are grossly inadequate. Such lenient discipline does not serve any of the purposes set forth above. We conclude that disbarment is the only appropriate punishment.
John Lobban Maynard is hereby disbarred. The disbarment will be effective *541 thirty days from the filing of this opinion so that Maynard can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing clients. If Maynard notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order making the disbarment effective immediately. Maynard shall accept no new business from the date this opinion is filed. Further, Maynard shall make restitution to Strausberg and Seibel. Judgment for costs in the amount of $9,100.30 is entered in favor of The Florida Bar and against John Lobban Maynard, for which sum let execution issue.
It is so ordered.
GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
[1]  The referee found Maynard not guilty of two other counts.
[2]  We reject the Bar's contention that the referee's findings on Counts III and VI also mandated the conclusion that Maynard was guilty of ethical violations.
[3]  Upon the Bar's motion, the referee issued an order consolidating the two cases for the purpose of holding one hearing on the issue of discipline. Accordingly, at the close of the evidentiary hearing in case number 83,918, the referee indicated that he would defer any recommendations of discipline in his official report until after the hearing in case number 84,648, and then hear the disciplinary portion of both cases together. Instead, the referee's report in case number 83,918 contained a suspension recommendation without any explanation as to why the referee did postpone his recommendation of discipline.
[4]  Maynard mentions his lack of bad motive, alcohol abuse and subsequent rehabilitation, and the sophisticated nature of his clients in financial and investment matters.