Case Title: Matter of Adoption of Glover

Citation: 288 Ark. 59, 702 S.W.2d 12

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1986-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
702 S.W.2d 12 (1986) 288 Ark. 59 In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF Nicole Michelle GLOVER. No. 85-208. Supreme Court of Arkansas. January 21, 1986. B. Michael Easley, Forrest City, for appellant. Robert Ford, Wynne, for appellee. HOLT, Chief Justice. Appellants Doug and Marge Glover petitioned to adopt their granddaughter, nine-year-old Nicole Glover, who had lived with them continuously for the preceding four and one-half years. The appellants' son consented to his daughter's adoption, but Mary Crenshaw, Nicole's mother and the appellee, refused to grant her consent. Appellants attempted to dispense with the mother's consent requirement through exceptions provided in Ark.Stat.Ann. § 56-207 (Supp.1985). The probate court held that appellee's consent was required and we affirm. Supreme Court jurisdiction is pursuant to Sup.Ct.R. 29(1)(c). Generally, the natural parents must consent to an adoption for it to be valid. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 56-206 (Supp.1985). The exceptions in Ark.Stat.Ann. § 56-207 provide: When proving that a natural parent's consent is not required, the parties seeking to adopt "bear the heavy burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence facts which justify dispensing with the required consent of the natural parents" and the finding by the trial court that this burden has not been met will be upheld unless clearly erroneous. Loveless v. May, 278 Ark. 127, 644 S.W.2d 261 (1983). Nicole's parents were divorced four and one-half years before the petition and appellee was granted custody of the child. The father was ordered to pay $94.00 a month in support, which could be offset by any support paid by his parents, the appellants. Three days after the decree, however, appellee and appellants agreed that Nicole should stay with appellants. The appellants have provided all the support and care of Nicole since that time without contribution from appellee. The probate court found that appellee had sent letters and gifts to Nicole, some of which were returned unclaimed, and had made occasional visits, and had therefore not failed significantly to communicate with Nicole for more than one year. The court, in addition, found that the appellee had justifiable cause not to provide support because of her reliance on the divorce decree's order that the father pay support and because the appellants were in effect put in the position of parents while they had custody of Nicole. The probate court opinion recognized that the original divorce complaint provided that the appellants should remain responsible for support and maintenance of Nicole while they had custody and that the appellants were given the derivative rights of their son. The probate court relied on the case of In Re C.J.U., 660 P.2d 237 (Utah 1983), for the proposition that In Loveless v. May, supra, we held that a mother, who moved to Florida and left her child with babysitters before custody was given to other relatives by court order, had not lost her right to withhold consent inasmuch as she had relied on the court order and the advice of the juvenile court judge in assuming that her support was not required while the relatives had custody. Granted, a parent cannot simply turn a child's care and support over to another and thereby be excused from the duty of providing support for the child, a duty which exists whether ordered by a court or not. Pender v. McKee, 266 Ark. 18, 582 S.W.2d 929 (1979). We cannot say, however, given the appellee's reliance on the special circumstances in this case, that the probate court findings were clearly erroneous that appellants failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that appellee had no justifiable cause for failing to personally provide support for her child. The court gives careful protection to a natural parent's rights. As announced in Woodson v. Lee, 221 Ark. 517, 254 S.W.2d 326 (1953), quoting In re Cordy, 169 Cal. 150, 157, 146 P. 532 (1914), For these reasons, we affirm the trial court. PURTLE, J., not participating.