Case Title: State v. Counihan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017AP002265-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2020-02-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
2020 WI 12 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP2265-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Carrie E. Counihan, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
385 Wis. 2d 211,923 N.W.2d 180 - Unpublished 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 13, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 21, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Door   
 
JUDGE: 
David L. Weber   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, 
JJ., joined, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY and KELLY, JJ., joined 
with respect to ¶¶39-51.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Courtney K. Lanz, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul attorney general there was an oral 
argument by Courtney K. Lanz.  
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Ana L. Babcock and Babcock Law, LLC, Green Bay. There was 
an oral argument by Ana L. Babcock. 
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 12
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP2265-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF41) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Carrie E. Counihan, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 13, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. delivered the majority opinion of the Court, 
in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, DALLET, and HAGEGORN, JJ.., 
joined, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY and KELLY, JJ.., joined with 
respect to ¶¶39-51.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined.  
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified, and 
as modified, affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Carrie E. 
Counihan, seeks review of an unpublished, authored decision of the 
court of appeals affirming her judgment of conviction and the 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
2 
 
denial of her motion for postconviction relief.1  She asserts that 
the circuit court violated her right to due process at sentencing 
and, alternatively, that her trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance at sentencing.   
¶2 
Specifically, she argues that the circuit court denied 
her due process at sentencing by failing to provide her with notice 
that it would consider previously unknown information first raised 
by the circuit court at sentencing.  Further, Counihan contends 
that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
the consideration of such information and for failing to seek an 
adjournment to allow time to investigate and review the information 
on which the circuit court relied. 
¶3 
In response, the State asserts that Counihan forfeited 
her direct challenge to the previously unknown information 
considered at sentencing because she failed to object at the 
sentencing hearing.  It further contends that Counihan's trial 
counsel was not ineffective for failing to object or seek an 
adjournment. 
¶4 
We conclude that where previously unknown information is 
raised by the circuit court at the sentencing hearing, a defendant 
does not forfeit a direct challenge to the use of the information 
                                                 
1 State v. Counihan, No. 2017AP2265-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2018) (affirming the judgment and order of 
the circuit court for Door County, David L. Weber, Judge).  The 
appeal was decided by one judge, Judge Mark Seidl, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(f) (2015-16). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
3 
 
by failing to object at the sentencing hearing.  Under the facts 
of this case, Counihan appropriately raised the alleged error in 
a postconviction motion.   
¶5 
Further, we conclude that Counihan's due process rights 
were not violated by the circuit court's use of the previously 
unknown information regarding similarly situated defendants.  
Because there was no due process violation, we need not address 
Counihan's alternative argument that her counsel provided 
ineffective assistance at sentencing. 
¶6 
Accordingly, we modify the decision of the court of 
appeals, and as modified, affirm. 
I 
¶7 
As part of a plea agreement, Counihan pleaded no contest 
to five misdemeanor counts of theft in a business setting.2  The 
charges stemmed from allegations that, while Counihan was the 
executive director of the Door County Humane Society, she used an 
organizational credit card to pay personal expenses totaling over 
$22,000. 
¶8 
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the parties jointly 
recommended that the circuit court withhold sentence and place 
Counihan on probation for up to three years, which could end any 
time after two years if all other conditions of probation were 
fulfilled.  The joint recommendation also included conditions that 
Counihan pay restitution along with fines and costs, pen a written 
apology to the Humane Society, and serve 60 days of conditional 
                                                 
2 See Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(b). 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
4 
 
jail which would be stayed as long as Counihan complied with all 
other probation conditions. 
¶9 
After hearing from both parties and several witnesses at 
the sentencing hearing, the circuit court began its sentencing 
remarks by explaining its methodology in determining the 
appropriate sentence.  The circuit court explained that it had 
read the file in detail, including the criminal complaint, 
information and police report.  It further indicated that it had 
read all victim impact statements, as well as several other letters 
that the court had received and some credit card entries submitted 
by defense counsel. 
¶10 Most relevant to the issue we are examining in this 
appeal, the circuit court also indicated that as part of its 
sentencing methodology it had reviewed the sentences imposed in 
other similar cases within the county.  Specifically, the circuit 
court stated, "Perhaps most significantly, I pulled all files that 
we could find in Door County where somebody has pled to theft in 
a business-type setting.  There were about six or seven of them 
that we could find, and I have reviewed those files in detail."   
¶11 The circuit court provided for the record the seven case 
numbers of the cases it reviewed and stated that "[s]ome of the 
themes and dynamics of these cases were very interesting to me."  
It subsequently described the facts of these cases and the 
sentences imposed as follows: 
The amount stolen in these cases ranged over just several 
thousand dollars to as much as $300,000.  Every one of 
the defendants in these cases, except one, spent time in 
jail.  Every single one of them.  The one person that 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
5 
 
did not spend time in jail paid all of the money back 
before sentencing.  It did not involve a public entity, 
it was a private association.  The jail time for the 
others ranged from 15 days in jail to up to a year in 
jail.  Several people spent a year in jail.  Several 
spent six months. 
Every single one of those defendant[s] was placed on 
probation; in other words, the sentence was actually 
withheld and the jail was placed on them as a condition 
of probation. 
After discussing the jail and probation ordered in the other cases, 
the circuit court also observed that in the other cases "[a]ll 
were ordered to pay fines and restitution.  Every single one of 
them." 
¶12 Continuing in its remarks, the circuit court found one 
of the other cases particularly analogous to Counihan's case.  It 
emphasized, however, that every case is different. 
Now, this case here is most like a case where a woman 
stole approximately $30,000 from a local business, was 
not a charity, and stole the money over many months.  
And that particular woman spent 11 months in jail and 
was ordered to pay full restitution. 
Now, this Court realizes——this Court, this person, this 
attorney practiced law for many years, 30 years, and I 
certainly 
understand 
that 
every 
single 
case 
is 
different.  Every case has a nuance.  So these prior 
cases, these other cases in Door County, have provided 
this Court guidance, but I am not relying solely on these 
other cases.  
¶13 With respect to the facts of this case, the circuit court 
observed that Counihan was in a position of trust, and that she 
committed the thefts over the course of many years.  It further 
noted the effect Counihan's crimes had on the Humane Society and 
on nonprofit organizations in general:  "to the extent that donors 
will be less likely to donate money for fear that their money will 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
6 
 
be stolen, or that they would have a question about it, is very, 
very concerning to this Court."     
¶14 Prior to formally pronouncing the sentence, the circuit 
court asked Counihan if she knew "any reason why sentence should 
not be pronounced . . . ."  Counihan responded, "No, Your Honor."   
¶15 Subsequently, the circuit court rejected the parties' 
joint recommendation and sentenced Counihan to nine months in jail 
on each count, to be served concurrently.  It found such a sentence 
to be consistent with the sentences ordered in the similar cases 
in the county it had considered:  "All other cases, except one, 
received jail time, and I don't see any reason why you shouldn't 
serve jail time."   
¶16 Probation was not ordered because in the circuit court's 
view, "probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the 
offenses here."  The circuit court further ordered Counihan to pay 
restitution, fines and court costs.  After the sentence had been 
handed down and before concluding proceedings, the circuit court 
asked if either Counihan or the State had "anything further" to 
discuss, and each responded in the negative. 
¶17 Counihan moved for postconviction relief.3  As relevant 
here, she argued that her counsel was ineffective at sentencing 
                                                 
3 Counihan filed two motions for postconviction relief.  In 
her first motion, filed pro se, Counihan directly challenged the 
circuit court's reliance on the similar Door County cases.  
Although Counihan did not style her challenge as a due process 
claim, we liberally construe pro se pleadings.  See State ex rel. 
L'Minggio v. Gamble, 2003 WI 82, ¶16, 263 Wis. 2d 55, 667 N.W.2d 1.  
Counihan's second motion for postconviction relief, filed by 
counsel, focused on ineffective assistance. 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
7 
 
for failing to object and failing to seek an adjournment to review 
the similar Door County cases the circuit court cited in fashioning 
its sentence.4   
¶18 Following a Machner5 hearing, the circuit court denied 
Counihan's postconviction motion.  As relevant here, it determined 
that Counihan's counsel at sentencing was not ineffective, 
reasoning that "his tactical decision not to object or ask for a 
recess or to try to make distinguishing arguments from those cases" 
did not fall "below an objective standard of care . . . ."  
Further, the circuit court found that even if the attorney's 
representation was deficient, "I don't find that it would have 
changed anything."   
¶19 In denying Counihan's motion, 
the circuit court 
reiterated that it did not rely solely on the other Door County 
cases:  "I came to a conclusion independently of any of these 
cases, but I wanted to use the cases to make sure they supported 
what I was going to do."  The circuit court further commented on 
the propriety of seeking out similar cases from the county, 
stating: 
[W]hen I sentenced Miss Counihan I had been on the bench 
for 
about 
three 
or 
four 
months 
at 
that 
                                                 
4 Counihan also asserted that her counsel was ineffective at 
sentencing for additional reasons not argued here.  She further 
asserted that neither her counsel nor the circuit court properly 
informed her of her right to appeal.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.18(2).  
This issue was not raised before this court and we do not address 
it further. 
5 See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. 
App. 1979). 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
8 
 
time. . . . [W]hat my goal was in conducting this 
inquiry into other cases was to determine what the 
institutional memory of this Court was, because I didn't 
have it myself.  I felt like if I had been a judge for 
twenty years, of course I would have fallen back on my 
memory of what I had done in other cases.  I probably 
wouldn't need to look at other cases literally.  I would 
look at them in my mind. 
And I think judges do that all the time.  They can't 
erase their memories.  But I didn't have that memory, so 
it felt, in my opinion, to me that I had the 
responsibility——I had the responsibility not only to 
Miss Counihan, but to the community, to determine what 
had been done in other cases. 
And I didn't do so in order to get a litmus test or a 
necessarily a recipe that I could come up with a sentence 
for Miss Counihan.  I felt like I want to know if what 
I was going to do with Miss Counihan, what I was going 
to sentence her to, was consistent with what had been 
done in the past. 
¶20 Counihan appealed, asserting that the circuit court's 
reliance on past case files without providing notice violated her 
due process rights.  In the alternative, she maintained her claim 
that her counsel at sentencing was ineffective for failing to 
object or request an adjournment for the purpose of investigating 
the circuit court's cited cases. 
¶21 The court of appeals rejected Counihan's arguments and 
affirmed the circuit court.  It determined first that Counihan 
forfeited her due process argument because she did not object to 
the use of the similar Door County cases at the sentencing hearing.  
State v. Counihan, No. 2017AP2265-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶10 
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2018).  Accordingly, the court of appeals 
did not address the merits of Counihan's claim that the use of 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
9 
 
such information by a circuit court constitutes a due process 
violation.  Id. 
¶22 Second, the court of appeals concluded that Counihan 
failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel because 
she did not establish that she was prejudiced by any allegedly 
deficient performance.  Id., ¶13.  Specifically, the court of 
appeals determined that "Counihan cannot show that but for her 
attorney's alleged error, there is a reasonable probability that 
her sentence would have been different."  Id., ¶14.  It reached 
this conclusion because in its view "[t]he record supports the 
circuit court's finding at the postconviction hearing that if the 
Door County cases played any role in her sentence, the role was 
minimal."  Id. 
II 
¶23 We are called upon to determine whether Counihan 
forfeited her direct challenge to the use of previously unknown 
information raised by the circuit court at sentencing.  If Counihan 
did not forfeit this direct challenge, then we must address the 
merits of her argument that the circuit court violated her right 
to due process.  These issues present questions of law that we 
review independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  See State v. Corey J.G., 215 
Wis. 2d 395, 405, 572 N.W.2d 845 (1998); State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 
68, ¶29, 371 Wis. 2d 235, 881 N.W.2d 749. 
III 
¶24 We begin by addressing whether Counihan forfeited her 
direct due process challenge to the circuit court's use of 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
10 
 
previously unknown information raised by the circuit court at 
sentencing without providing her with notice.  Subsequently, we 
address the merits of Counihan's due process challenge to the use 
of such information at sentencing. 
¶25 Forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion 
of a right.6  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 
761 N.W.2d 612 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 
(1993)).  Some rights are forfeited when they are not claimed at 
trial, and a mere failure to object constitutes forfeiture of the 
right on appellate review.  Id., ¶30. 
¶26 The purpose of the forfeiture rule is to enable the 
circuit court to avoid or correct any error as it comes up, with 
minimal disruption of the judicial process and maximum efficiency.  
Id.; see Townsend v. Massey (In re Guardianship of Willa L.), 2011 
WI App 160, ¶26, 338 Wis. 2d 114, 808 N.W.2d 155.  Such a practice 
encourages timely objections and obviates the need for appeal.  
State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 766, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999); 
State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶12, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727.  
¶27 Further, the forfeiture rule gives the parties and the 
circuit court notice of an issue and a fair opportunity to address 
the objection.  Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶30.  It additionally 
                                                 
6 "Although cases sometimes use the words 'forfeiture' and 
'waiver' interchangeably, the two words embody very different 
legal concepts."  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 
761 N.W.2d 612.  "Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the 
timely 
assertion 
of 
a 
right, 
waiver 
is 
the 
intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right."  Id. (quoting 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
11 
 
"encourages attorneys to diligently prepare for and conduct 
trials" and "prevents attorneys from 'sandbagging' opposing 
counsel by failing to object to an error for strategic reasons and 
later claiming that the error is grounds for reversal."  Id.  The 
forfeiture rule is a rule of judicial administration, and thus a 
reviewing court may disregard a forfeiture and address the merits 
of an unpreserved issue in an appropriate case.  State ex rel. 
Universal Processing Servs. of Wis., LLC v. Cir. Ct. of Milwaukee 
Cty., 2017 WI 26, ¶53, 374 Wis. 2d 26, 892 N.W.2d 267.   
¶28 Generally, if a claim is forfeited, we address that claim 
in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Erickson, 
227 Wis. 2d at 766.  That is, the defendant must demonstrate that 
counsel's failure to object constituted deficient performance and 
that such deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.  State 
v. Maloney, 2005 WI 74, ¶14, 281 Wis. 2d 595, 698 N.W.2d 583 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).   
¶29 The court of appeals here determined that Counihan 
forfeited her challenge to the circuit court's use of the analogous 
Door County cases when she failed to object at the sentencing 
hearing.  Counihan, No. 2017AP2265-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶10.  
It further refused to ignore the forfeiture, thereby declining to 
address the underlying merits of the issue.  Id. 
¶30 Counihan contends that the court of appeals erred by 
applying the forfeiture rule to her claim.  In Counihan's view, 
the forfeiture rule should not apply to information first disclosed 
during the sentencing hearing because such an application 
undermines the values the forfeiture rule intends to protect. 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
12 
 
¶31 With respect to the underlying facts of this case, we 
agree with Counihan.  When previously unknown information is first 
raised by the circuit court at the sentencing hearing, the 
defendant has not had a chance to investigate or rebut the 
information.  At the time the information is raised, a defense 
attorney is put in a difficult position if the forfeiture rule is 
to be applied——either object to the use of the information and 
risk that the details will be detrimental to the client or stay 
silent and forfeit the argument should the information be 
beneficial to the client.   
¶32 Applying forfeiture under such circumstances would not 
promote judicial efficiency, but instead would actually hinder it.  
Rather than forfeit an issue, defendants would likely seek 
adjournments for purposes of investigation, thus delaying 
sentencing hearings.  Such a practice would run counter to the 
stated purposes of the forfeiture rule of maximizing the efficiency 
of the judicial process.  See Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶30. 
¶33 Contrary to the State's argument, Counihan's negative 
response when the circuit court asked her if she knew "any reason 
why sentence should not be pronounced" prior to setting forth the 
sentence does not indicate that forfeiture should be applied.  
Likewise, the circuit court perfunctorily asking if either 
Counihan or the State had "anything further" to discuss before the 
close of the hearing has no effect on the outcome.  Although 
Counihan could have spoken up at either of these points, and it is 
certainly the best practice to do so, it does not behoove the 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
13 
 
interests protected by the forfeiture rule to require such an 
objection lest the claim be forfeited. 
¶34 The State points us to several cases to support the broad 
proposition that defendants can incur forfeiture by failing to 
object at sentencing.  Yet, none of these cases deals with the 
specific circumstances we review here——where information was first 
raised by the court in its sentencing remarks.  The present 
situation is different from a breach of a plea agreement,7 a claim 
of inaccurate information in a report introduced by defense 
counsel8 or in a presentence investigation report,9 or the 
consideration of behavior underlying expunged convictions.10   
¶35 Unlike the claim at issue here, the aforementioned 
claims involve information to which a defendant would have access 
and the ability to investigate prior to the sentencing hearing.  
However, when the circuit court first raises information during 
its sentencing remarks, a defendant has been deprived of the 
opportunity to investigate and defense counsel must act on the 
basis of incomplete information.  This weighs against the 
                                                 
7 State v. Robinson, 2001 WI App 127, ¶13, 246 Wis. 2d 180, 
629 N.W.2d 810. 
8 State v. Benson, 2012 WI App 101, ¶17, 344 Wis. 2d 126, 822 
N.W.2d 484. 
9 State v. Mosley, 201 Wis. 2d 36, 46, 547 N.W.2d 806 (Ct. 
App. 1996). 
10 State v. Leitner, 2001 WI App 172, ¶41, 247 Wis. 2d 195, 
633 N.W.2d 207, aff'd 2002 WI 77, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341. 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
14 
 
application of forfeiture and in favor of allowing a defendant to 
first raise the issue in a postconviction motion.  
¶36 Our refusal to apply forfeiture in the circumstances 
presented 
is 
consistent 
with 
this 
court's 
precedent.  
Specifically, in State v. Grady, we stated that the defendant "did 
not waive the issues presented because he filed a postconviction 
motion pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(h).  Filing a 
postconviction motion is a timely means of raising an alleged error 
by the circuit court during sentencing."  2007 WI 81, ¶14 n.4, 302 
Wis. 2d 80, 734 N.W.2d 364 (citing State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 
¶14, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197).11  Further, State v. 
Tiepelman is demonstrative of the general practice that challenges 
to information at sentencing are brought via postconviction 
motion.  2006 WI 66, ¶7, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1.  The 
alleged error in sentencing here is an issue that can likewise be 
first raised in a postconviction motion.   
¶37 Accordingly, we conclude that where previously unknown 
information is raised by the circuit court at the sentencing 
hearing, a defendant does not forfeit a direct challenge to the 
use of the information by failing to object at the sentencing 
hearing.  Under the facts of this case, Counihan appropriately 
raised the alleged error in a postconviction motion.  Because the 
                                                 
11 Cases sometimes use the words "waiver" and "forfeiture" 
interchangeably.  Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶29.  Indeed, the Grady 
court did just this.  When it spoke of "waiver," it was actually 
referring to "forfeiture."  See State v. Grady, 2007 WI 81, ¶14 
n.4, 302 Wis. 2d 80, 734 N.W.2d 364. 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
15 
 
court of appeals determined that Counihan forfeited such a 
challenge, we modify the decision of the court of appeals. 
IV 
¶38 Because Counihan did not forfeit her direct due process 
challenge to the use of previously unknown information at 
sentencing, we next address the merits of that claim. 
¶39 As part of the constitutional due process guarantee that 
a defendant be sentenced on reliable information, the defendant 
has the right to rebut evidence that is admitted by a sentencing 
court.  State v. Spears, 227 Wis. 2d 495, 508, 596 N.W.2d 375 
(1999).  "Obviously, if sentencing information is kept from the 
defendant, [the defendant] cannot exercise this right."  State v. 
Lynch, 2006 WI App 231, ¶24, 297 Wis. 2d 51, 724 N.W.2d 656. 
¶40 Circuit courts are required to set forth on the record 
the reasons for sentences they impose.  Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 
¶¶38-39.  This includes explanation of the objectives of the 
sentence, which may be, without limitation, the protection of the 
community, punishment of the defendant, rehabilitation of the 
defendant, and deterrence to others.  Id., ¶¶40-41.  The facts 
relevant to these objectives and an explanation of why the 
particular component parts of the sentence imposed advance the 
specified objectives must also be set forth on the record.  Id., 
¶42. 
¶41 "Courts must also identify the factors that were 
considered in arriving at the sentence and indicate how those 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
16 
 
factors fit the objectives and influence the decision."12  Id., 
¶43.  We have further encouraged circuit courts to "refer to 
information provided by others[,]" such as recommendations of 
counsel and any presentence investigation report, in fashioning a 
sentence.  Id., ¶47.   
¶42 Counihan contends that the circuit court's consideration 
of the sentences given in similar cases without providing her with 
notice that it would do so violates her due process right to rebut 
information presented at sentencing.  She asserts that she is 
entitled to resentencing because she was not given the opportunity 
                                                 
12 Such factors include:  
(1) Past record of criminal offenses; (2) history of 
undesirable behavior pattern; (3) the defendant's 
personality, character and social traits; (4) result of 
presentence investigation; (5) vicious or aggravated 
nature of the crime; (6) degree of the defendant's 
culpability; (7) defendant's demeanor at trial; (8) 
defendant's age, educational background and employment 
record; 
(9) 
defendant's 
remorse, 
repentance 
and 
cooperativeness; 
(10) 
defendant's 
need 
for 
close 
rehabilitative control; (11) the rights of the public; 
and (12) the length of pretrial detention.  
State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶43 n.11, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 
N.W.2d 197 (quoting Harris v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 513, 519-20, 250 
N.W.2d 7 (1977)). 
We have also recognized additional factors as appropriate 
considerations, such as dismissed and read-in charges and the 
effect of the crime on the victim.  Id. (citing Austin v. State, 
49 Wis. 2d 727, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971); State v. Jones, 151 
Wis. 2d 488, 444 N.W.2d 760 (Ct. App. 1989)). 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
17 
 
to review the information in the other case files referenced and 
on which the circuit court relied.13 
¶43 We disagree with Counihan's argument.  "[I]n sentencing, 
a trial judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope 
and largely unlimited either as to the kind of information 
considered or the source from which it comes."  Handel v. State, 
74 Wis. 2d 699, 703, 247 N.W.2d 711 (1976).  Consistent with this 
mandate in Handel, we expressly stated in Gallion that circuit 
courts "may . . . consider information about the distribution of 
sentences in cases similar to the case before it."  Gallion, 270 
Wis. 2d 535, ¶47.   
¶44 Such a practice is congruent with the general policy 
that "consistency in criminal sentencing is desirable . . . ."  In 
re Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 203, 353 
N.W.2d 793 (1984) (per curiam).  Indeed, the court's statement in 
Gallion does not limit the circuit court to considering only "the 
distribution of sentences in cases similar to the case before it" 
that are within its unassisted recollection.  See Gallion, 270 
Wis. 2d 535, ¶47.   
¶45 The 
circuit 
court's 
actions 
in 
this 
case 
are 
fundamentally different from those in In re Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Piontek, 2019 WI 51, 386 Wis. 2d 703, 927 
N.W.2d 552, to which Counihan attempts to draw a parallel.  As 
relevant here, in Piontek, the circuit court conducted its own 
                                                 
13 Notably, Counihan does not argue that the information 
contained within the other case files was inaccurate. 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
18 
 
independent internet research regarding a criminal defendant's 
nursing licenses and related matters.  Id., ¶16.  From such 
research, the circuit court discovered what it believed to be 
incriminating information from the states of Texas and Illinois 
and incorrectly deduced that the defendant had never been licensed 
as a nurse in Illinois.  Id. 
¶46 Without providing notice to the parties or their 
attorneys, 
the 
circuit 
court 
brought 
up 
its 
independent 
investigation at the sentencing hearing.  Id., ¶¶17-18.  In 
fashioning the sentence, the circuit court relied on the incorrect 
information it had obtained from its internet research.  Id., ¶18.  
Imposing judicial discipline, this court stated that "it is clearly 
improper for a judge to both conduct an independent investigation 
and to fail to give a party a chance to respond to the judge's 
misinformed allegations based on that investigation."  Id., ¶37.   
¶47 The circuit court's "investigation" in this case was of 
a completely different nature.  Unlike in Piontek, the circuit 
court here did not investigate facts or gather evidence related to 
Counihan's case.  Instead, it merely conducted a file review to 
"determine what the institutional memory of [the] Court was" due 
to its relative inexperience.   
¶48 We are loath to adopt a rule that would prevent a circuit 
court from accessing its institutional memory, thereby requiring 
it to view each exercise of its discretion in a vacuum.  Such a 
rule would run counter to the consistency in criminal sentencing 
that we have previously stated is "desirable."  Felony Sentencing, 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
19 
 
120 Wis. 2d at 203.14  The circuit court's actions in this case are 
no different from long-tenured judges reaching back into their 
memories without the aid of hard-copy files.   
¶49 Further, the failure to provide notice of the cases 
considered likewise does not violate due process.  When a circuit 
court accesses its institutional memory without the aid of written 
material, it is not required to inform the parties of all past 
cases that came to mind.  The use of hard copy files does not 
occasion a different rule.   
¶50 Nothing in this record indicates that Counihan did not 
receive the individualized sentence to which she is entitled.  See 
Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶48 ("Individualized sentencing, after 
all, has long been a cornerstone to Wisconsin's criminal justice 
jurisprudence."); 
Loomis, 
371 
Wis. 2d 235, 
¶¶67-68, 
74 
(recognizing the due process implications of sentences based on 
group data rather than individualized determinations).  On the 
                                                 
14 See also Bertrall L. Ross II, Reconciling the Booker 
Conflict:  A Substantive Sixth Amendment in a Real Offense 
Sentencing System, 4 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol'y & Ethics J. 725, 774 
(2006) ("Judges have experience in sentencing such that they have 
created an institutional memory that allows them to rank crime and 
the culpability of criminals relevant to each other."); id. at 774 
n.227 ("The institutional memory does not necessarily apply to new 
judges, but through training and collaboration with other judges, 
even new judges will have a greater understanding of proportionate 
ranking of crimes and other relevant characteristics.").  A file 
review such as that conducted by the judge in this case allows a 
new judge to access the same information the judge would learn 
through "collaboration with other judges," and can be a useful 
option for judges in counties with a low number of judges (or even 
a single judge) in striving for consistency in their exercises of 
discretion.   
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
20 
 
contrary, the circuit court referenced numerous facts specific to 
Counihan's background on which it based its sentence, including 
her educational background, the position of trust she held at the 
Humane Society, and the fact that the thefts took place over a 
period of many years.  It also appropriately focused on the nature 
and gravity of the offense, and the effect of the offense on the 
community's willingness to support nonprofit organizations.  The 
circuit court's remarks in this case taken as a whole reflect the 
individualized sentence that Gallion and due process require. 
¶51 Accordingly, we conclude that Counihan's due process 
rights were not violated by the circuit court's use of the 
previously unknown information regarding similarly situated 
defendants.15   
V 
¶52 In sum, we conclude that where previously unknown 
information is raised by the circuit court at the sentencing 
hearing, a defendant does not forfeit a direct challenge to the 
use of the information by failing to object at the sentencing 
hearing.  Under the facts of this case, Counihan appropriately 
raised the alleged error in a postconviction motion.   
                                                 
15 Because the claim was not forfeited and we address the 
merits of Counihan's argument directly, we need not address her 
alternative argument regarding ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Even if we did, we would conclude that because there was no due 
process violation, any objection to the consideration of the 
analogous Door County cases would have been meritless.  The failure 
to raise a meritless objection does not constitute deficient 
performance.  See State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, ¶53, 383 
Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120. 
No. 
2017AP2265-CR   
 
21 
 
¶53 Further, we conclude that Counihan's due process rights 
were not violated by the circuit court's use of the previously 
unknown information regarding similarly situated defendants.  
Because there was no due process violation, we need not address 
Counihan's alternative argument that her counsel provided 
ineffective assistance at sentencing. 
¶54 Accordingly, we modify the decision of the court of 
appeals, and as modified, affirm. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified, and as modified, affirmed. 
 
No.  2017AP2265-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶55 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that Counihan's due process claim fails.  A circuit 
court's consideration of sentences imposed in similar cases does 
not offend a defendant's due process rights.  I join ¶¶39-51 of 
the majority opinion.  However, I write separately because I 
disagree with the majority's decision to address forfeiture and 
the merits of Counihan's due process claim rather than disposing 
of the case under an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis.   
¶56 Because Counihan's counsel did not object during the 
sentencing hearing, this case should have been resolved under the 
rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See State v. 
Erickson, 
227 
Wis. 2d 758, 
766-68, 
596 
N.W.2d 749 
(1999) 
(explaining that when defense counsel fails to object in criminal 
cases, appellate courts typically "analyze the waiver within the 
ineffective assistance of counsel framework.").  During the 
Machner hearing,1 Counihan's counsel expressed a reasonable, 
strategic basis for not objecting to the sentencing court's 
consideration of sentences in former cases in fashioning 
Counihan's sentence.  The assistance counsel provided to Counihan 
was not ineffective.  That should suffice to end the analysis and 
defeat Counihan's claims.  Instead, the majority disregards the 
ineffective assistance of counsel rubric in order to address the 
issues of forfeiture and due process.  Because the majority's due 
process analysis is correct, I join it.  In choosing to reach the 
                                                 
1 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No.  2017AP2265-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
merits of forfeiture, however, the majority crafts an overly-broad 
new rule of law that will allow defendants to avoid raising 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in hopes of successfully 
persuading appellate courts to apply a discretionary forfeiture 
exception.  Because I would not reach the merits of Counihan's 
claims, but nevertheless reach the same result as the majority 
under 
an 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
analysis, 
I 
respectfully concur.  
I.  INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
¶57 When a defendant bases her appeal on trial counsel's 
failure to object, we review the case under the ineffective 
assistance of counsel rubric.  "The absence of any objection 
warrants that we follow 'the normal procedure in criminal cases,'" 
which is to address the alleged forfeiture "within the rubric of 
the ineffective assistance of counsel."  State v. Carprue, 2004 WI 
111, ¶¶36-47, 274 Wis. 2d 656, 683 N.W.2d 31 (quoted and cited 
sources omitted); see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 
374-75 (1986) (in absence of objection, error should be analyzed 
under ineffective assistance of counsel standards, even when error 
is of constitutional dimension).  Reviewing the Machner2 hearing 
                                                 
2 The Machner court held:  "[I]t is a prerequisite to a claim 
of ineffective representation on appeal to preserve the testimony 
of trial counsel.  We cannot otherwise determine whether trial 
counsel's actions were the result of incompetence or deliberate 
trial strategies.  In such situations, then, it is the better rule, 
and in the client's best interests, to require trial counsel to 
explain the reasons underlying his handling of a case."  92 
Wis. 2d at 804.  The Machner hearing affords trial counsel the 
opportunity to explain the reasons for his choices and assists the 
circuit court in deciding whether trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance.   
No.  2017AP2265-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
transcript in this case shows that Counihan's lawyer gave her 
effective assistance.    
¶58 During the Machner hearing, Counihan's defense lawyer 
repeatedly explained why he did not object to the sentencing 
court's reference to similar cases in arriving at Counihan's 
sentence:  "I can't say it was so out-of-the-box as to be 
concerning to -- concerning to me overall.  Judges do that all the 
time about what -- what they think the going rate is for something 
or what the guidelines are for a particular offense in the county."  
In 
fact, 
defense 
counsel 
perceived 
the 
circuit 
court's 
consideration of this information as favorable for his client:  "I 
thought it was . . . kind of thoughtful that [the judge] was being 
so measured."  Defense counsel believed examination of prior cases 
would likely prevent the circuit court from imposing too high a 
sentence in response to strong community anger over the defendant's 
crime:  "[T]hat sort of research to figure out if there has been 
a case like that in the past, I can see where the judge would be 
interested to know -- to know to make sure that he's not punishing 
-- overpunishing, despite the fact there's so many angry people 
here."  When asked if he thought it would have been helpful for 
him to review the prior cases the sentencing court referenced, 
Counihan's trial lawyer said:  "If there was a benefit it would 
have been tremendously minimal" because Counihan's actions were 
more aggravated than the conduct of similarly-charged defendants 
in other cases.  When asked whether his strategy was to avoid 
repeatedly objecting during sentencing because he thought repeated 
objections would "cause more harm" to his client's case, Counihan's 
No.  2017AP2265-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
defense lawyer answered in the affirmative, "Yeah[]" and "I didn't 
want to buy my client an extra month."  He also testified that he 
did not object or seek an adjournment because the outgoing district 
attorney had offered a favorable plea deal for Counihan, which 
defense counsel feared the newly elected district attorney might 
revoke.  In summary, Counihan's defense counsel declined to object 
to what he recognized as a typical practice of circuit courts, 
making this decision in consideration of his client's best 
interests.   
¶59 Because there was nothing objectionable about the 
circuit court's consideration of sentences imposed in prior cases, 
Counihan's counsel did not provide ineffective assistance.  Even 
if an argument could be made that defense counsel should have 
objected, his testimony at the Machner hearing disclosed ample 
strategic reasons why he chose not to.  Instead of deciding the 
case on these well-established grounds, the majority allowed 
Counihan to present a substantive issue, thereby opening the door 
for defendants to dodge the previously prevailing ineffective 
assistance of counsel rubric on appeal, a tougher hurdle to 
overcome 
than 
a 
review 
on 
the 
merits.3 
 
The 
majority's 
new 
procedure 
allows defendants to do an end run around ineffective assistance 
                                                 
3  "A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel."  State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, 
¶32, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89; see also Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).  "To establish the assistance 
a defendant received was ineffective, he must prove two elements:  
(1) his counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient 
performance prejudiced [him].  Sholar, 381 Wis. 2d 560, ¶32. 
 
No.  2017AP2265-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
claims, encouraging appellate counsel to instead argue the merits 
of an issue in postconviction motions and obviating the need for 
a Machner hearing at all.  The whole purpose of a Machner hearing 
in this context is to explore the reason why an attorney did not 
object at sentencing and if the attorney presents a reasonable 
basis for not objecting, the defendant's claim fails, and the case 
is over.  That is how the court should have decided this case.  
Instead, this court's disposition will allow appellate counsel to 
pursue a different strategy than trial counsel even if trial 
counsel provided effective assistance, resulting in many more 
appeals on the merits in cases that should end at the 
postconviction motion stage.   
II.  FORFEITURE 
 
¶60 Because the majority chose to focus on forfeiture in 
deciding this case, an overview of the application of this doctrine 
in Wisconsin merits discussion.  Forfeiture results from a 
defendant's failure to timely assert her rights.  State v. Ndina, 
2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (citation 
omitted); majority op., ¶25.  Forfeiture has long been engrained 
in procedural law.  See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 
(1944) ("No procedural principle is more familiar . . . than that 
a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as 
civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right 
before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it."  (citations 
omitted)); see also Clements v. Macheboeuf, 92 U.S. 418, 425 (1875) 
("Matters not assigned for error will not be examined[.]").  "The 
rule preventing an appellate court from considering an issue not 
No.  2017AP2265-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
raised in the trial [court] is as old as the common law system of 
appellate review."  Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on 
Appeal:  The General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 
1023, 1061 (1987).   
¶61 "The purpose of the 'forfeiture' rule is to enable the 
circuit court to avoid or correct any error with minimal disruption 
of the judicial process, eliminating the need for appeal."  Ndina, 
315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶30 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).  Other 
"underlying justifications for the raise or lose rule are the 
adversarial process, judicial efficiency and finality, and respect 
for the differing roles of the trial and appellate courts."  Tory 
A. Weigand, Raise or Lose:  Appellate Discretion and Principled 
Decision-Making, 17 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 179, 183 
(footnote omitted) (referring to forfeiture as the "raise or lose" 
rule).  In State v. Huebner, this court expressed the "several 
important objectives" of the rule:   
Raising issues at the trial court level allows the 
trial court to correct or avoid the alleged error in the 
first place, eliminating the need for appeal.  It also 
gives both parties and the trial judge notice of the 
issue and a fair opportunity to address the objection.  
Furthermore, the . . . rule encourages attorneys to 
diligently prepare for and conduct trials.  Finally, the 
rule prevents attorneys from "sandbagging" errors, or 
failing to object to an error for strategic reasons and 
later claiming that the error is grounds for reversal.  
For all of these reasons, the . . . rule is essential to 
the efficient and fair conduct of our adversary system 
of justice.   
2000 WI 59, ¶12, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (internal 
citations omitted); see also Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶30.  Huebner 
referenced these objectives while using the term "waiver," but the 
No.  2017AP2265-CR.rgb 
 
7 
 
court meant "forfeiture," as our later cases make clear.  See 
Huebner, 235 Wis. 2d 486, ¶11 n.2.4  "The need for the traditional 
forfeiture rule . . . is obvious.  Without that incentive to raise 
legal objections as soon as they are available, the time of lower 
court judges and of juries would frequently be expended uselessly, 
and appellate consideration of difficult questions would be less 
informed and less complete."  Freytag v. Comm'r of Internal 
Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 900 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).  For all of these 
reasons, forfeiture is "essential to the orderly administration of 
justice."  9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 2472 (1971).  
 
¶62 While the rationale underlying the forfeiture rule is 
clearly established, the application of the rule by our courts has 
been anything but discernable.  In some cases, we apply the 
forfeiture rule when a party fails to timely object.  See, e.g.,  
State v. Pinno, 2014 WI 74, ¶¶2, 57, 66, 68, 356 Wis. 2d 106, 850 
N.W.2d 207 (holding that two defendants who knew of a courtroom 
closure and failed to object forfeited the right to a public 
trial); Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶¶3, 6, 15, 
                                                 
4 In State v. Huebner, this court recognized that its use of 
the term "waiver" was imprecise and really means "forfeiture."  
2000 WI 59, ¶11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727.  Regardless, 
the court used the term to remain consistent with its past 
practice.  Id.  This court later clarified that "waiver" and 
"forfeiture" are two distinct concepts.  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 
21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612.  "[W]aiver is the 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right"; 
"forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a 
right[.]"  Id.  (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 
(1993)).    
No.  2017AP2265-CR.rgb 
 
8 
 
27, 31, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190 (holding that the defendant 
forfeited an objection to the circuit court's competency by failing 
to object in the circuit court); Huebner, 235 Wis. 2d 486, ¶¶8, 
10, 36 (concluding the defendant forfeited his right to a 12-
person jury because he failed to object to the use of a 6-person 
jury at trial).  In other cases, we forego applying forfeiture 
when a party fails to object, and instead reach the substantive 
merits.  See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 2017 WI 63, ¶51 n.7, 376 
Wis. 2d 92, 896 N.W.2d 682 (not applying forfeiture even though 
the defendant failed to object to a circuit court ruling, because 
the "important" issue on appeal was already briefed and argued); 
State v. McKellips, 2016 WI 51, ¶47, 369 Wis. 2d 437, 881 
N.W.2d 258 (reaching the merits of whether a jury instruction was 
misleading even though the defendant forfeited the claim by failing 
to object); Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶38 (reaching the merits even 
though the defendant did not assert his public trial right and 
failed to object when the circuit court excluded family members 
from the courtroom because the State also forfeited an issue and 
the parties already briefed the underlying legal issues). 
 
¶63 The court of appeals is similarly inconsistent in 
applying forfeiture.  In some cases, the court of appeals held a 
failure to object in the circuit court results in forfeiture.  See, 
e.g., State v. Benson, 2012 WI App 101, ¶¶5, 7, 16-17, 344 
Wis. 2d 126, 822 N.W.2d 484 (holding that a defendant who 
submitted a report with inaccurate information at sentencing 
forfeited a due process claim by failing to object to the report, 
limiting the court of appeals' review to ineffective assistance of 
No.  2017AP2265-CR.rgb 
 
9 
 
counsel); State v. Saunders, 2011 WI App 156, ¶¶1, 28-32, 338 
Wis. 2d 160, 807 N.W.2d 679 (applying forfeiture because the 
defendant failed to bring a sleeping juror to the circuit court's 
attention until after the trial).  Like this court, the court of 
appeals has also reached the merits instead of applying forfeiture, 
even when the defendant failed to object in the circuit court.  
See, e.g., Dalka v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 WI App 90, ¶¶5-
6, 334 Wis. 2d 686, 799 N.W.2d 923 (holding Dalka forfeited his 
right to appellate review by not preserving the appealed issue in 
the circuit court, but deciding the appeal anyway because it was 
already briefed and involved a question of law); State v. Leitner, 
2001 WI App 172, ¶¶41-42, 247 Wis. 2d 195, 633 N.W.2d 207 (holding 
that the defendant "waived" his claim by not objecting to the 
court's consideration of certain behavior at sentencing, but 
ignoring the "waiver") aff'd, 2002 WI 77, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 
N.W.2d 341.5 
                                                 
5 See also State v. Greenup, No. 2018AP709-CR, unpublished 
slip op., ¶¶9-11, 15-17 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2019) (applying 
forfeiture to the defendant's due process claim because objection 
based on the audibility of video evidence was insufficient; court 
addressed under ineffective assistance of counsel analysis); State 
v. Murphy, No. 2017AP1559-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶2, 11, 14, 
58-66 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2018) (applying forfeiture when the 
defendant failed to object to the testimony of a witness); State 
v. DeAngeles, No. 2015AP348-CR, unpublished order  (Wis. Ct. App. 
Apr. 26, 2016) (applying forfeiture when the defendant failed to 
raise new grounds for plea withdrawal in the circuit court); State 
v. Jackson, No. 2015AP934-CR, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. 
Dec. 8, 2015) (applying forfeiture when the defendant failed to 
raise objections to information included in the presentence 
investigation report at the sentencing); State v. Wojczak, No. 
2010AP3138-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶19 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 
2012) (not applying forfeiture when the defendant did not alert 
the sentencing court to circumstances surrounding a material 
pregnancy, because nothing indicated the defendant or his attorney 
No.  2017AP2265-CR.rgb 
 
10 
 
 
¶64 The bench and bar would benefit from a clear rule, 
consistently applied, regarding what factors trigger forfeiture 
versus what warrants application of an exception to the general 
rule.  "[J]udicial 
discretion . . . [leads 
to] 
a 
loss 
of 
predictability and the ability of citizens and litigants to know 
what the law proscribes.  It can be antithetical to the rule of 
law and accountability particularly in the absence of a higher 
review of the discretion."  Weigand, supra ¶61, at 245.  The 
majority seemingly recognizes that the application of forfeiture 
is subject to the will rather than the judgment of each appellate 
court.  The majority says, "[t]he forfeiture rule is a rule of 
judicial administration, and thus a reviewing court may disregard 
a forfeiture and address the merits of an unpreserved issue in an 
appropriate case."  Majority op., ¶27 (citation omitted).  Our 
cases never identify what an "appropriate case" looks like, except 
on an ad hoc basis.  Inconsistent exercise of this discretion 
produces 
adverse 
consequences, 
as 
recognized 
in 
other 
jurisdictions and by legal scholars:   
[An exception to the general rule of forfeiture] 
has never developed into a principled test, but has 
remained essentially a vehicle for reversal when the 
predilections of a majority of an appellate court are 
offended. . . . The 
other 
major 
weakness 
of 
[the 
exception] is its ad hoc nature.  The [exception] has 
been formulated in terms of what a particular majority 
of an appellate court considers basic or fundamental.  
Such a test is unworkable when neither the [exception] 
                                                 
was aware of the pregnancy's significance at the time of 
sentencing).  I cite these cases not in support of their legal 
propositions, but instead as further illustrations of the 
inconsistency in applying our forfeiture jurisprudence. 
No.  2017AP2265-CR.rgb 
 
11 
 
itself nor the case law applying it develop a 
predictable, neutrally-applied standard.   
Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 322 A.2d 114, 116-17 (1974) 
(emphasis added; internal footnotes omitted).   
¶65 While "no general principle [of law] can achieve a 
perfect fit[,]" establishing general rules is preferable to the 
sort of discretionary, ad hoc approaches reflected in our 
forfeiture jurisprudence, which yield inequality of treatment and 
unpredictability in the law.  See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law 
as a Law of Rules, 56 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1177-80, 1183 (1989) 
(emphasis omitted); see also Martineau, supra ¶60, at 1057-58 
("Inconsistency is the hallmark of the various exceptions.  For 
every case that can be found in which an exception to the general 
rule [of forfeiture] is allowed, another exists in which the court 
refused to permit the exception and enforced the general 
rule. . . . This is ad hoc decision making at its worst."); 
Weigand, supra ¶61, at 181 (discussing discretion in applying 
forfeiture 
leading 
to 
"uncertainty 
and 
unevenness 
in 
application").  This court's forfeiture jurisprudence promotes 
decision-making devoid of discernable principles, at the expense 
of the rule of law:   
Making adherence to the general rule [of raising 
issues in the trial court] a matter of discretion in the 
appellate court has resulted in the effective abolition 
of the general rule.  The general rule has been replaced 
by a system in which the question . . . is decided 
solely on the basis of whether a majority of the court 
considers the new issue necessary to decide the case in 
accordance with their view of the relative equities of 
the parties.  The only consistent feature of the current 
system is inconsistency.  If courts are free to disregard 
the general rule whenever they wish to do so, in effect 
there is no general rule.  The current situation is 
No.  2017AP2265-CR.rgb 
 
12 
 
destructive of the adversary system, causes substantial 
harm to the interests that the general rule is designed 
to protect, and is an open invitation to the appellate 
judges to "do justice" on ad hoc rather than principled 
bases.   
Martineau, supra ¶60, at 1061.   
¶66 In arguing whether forfeiture should apply, neither 
party in this case advocated for a fine tuning of our forfeiture 
jurisprudence, much less suggested an alternative to our current 
ad hoc approach to the doctrine.  It is a rule of judicial 
administration that would benefit from greater clarity and 
predictability in its application.  Because this court would 
benefit from full adversarial briefing regarding the doctrine, 
which is unnecessary to decide this case, the issue is better left 
to be explored in a case that squarely presents it.   
III.  NEW FORFEITURE EXCEPTION IN SENTENCING 
¶67 As the majority points out, this court previously 
decided that sentencing courts may consider the "distribution of 
sentences in cases similar to the case before it."  Majority op., 
¶¶43-44 (quoting State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶47, 270 
Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197).  That is precisely what the 
sentencing court did in this case.  Nevertheless, the majority 
perceives a need to create a new rule:  "where previously unknown 
information is raised by the circuit court at the sentencing 
hearing, a defendant does not forfeit a direct challenge to the 
use of the information by failing to object at the sentencing 
hearing."  Majority Op., ¶¶4, 37, 52.   
¶68 Adopting the majority's new rule is unnecessary because, 
as the majority recognizes, accessing the circuit court's 
No.  2017AP2265-CR.rgb 
 
13 
 
institutional memory is entirely permissible during sentencing.  
Furthermore, such information is not "unknown"; as defense counsel 
testified during the Machner hearing, sentencing courts "do that 
all the time."  If, as explained in Gallion, the sentencing court 
"may . . . consider 
information 
about 
the 
distribution 
of 
sentences in cases similar to the case before it[,]"6 then the 
sentencing court's consideration of such information in this case 
could not be objectionable.  If there was no basis for Counihan to 
object to this information, then why is the majority deciding 
whether Counihan forfeited her challenge to the sentencing court's 
consideration of information we have long recognized to be a 
permissible factor in sentencing?  The legal issues in this case 
are not novel at all, yet the majority nevertheless devises a new 
rule.  Why? 
¶69 If the majority's approach to this case constituted an 
unnecessary, but harmless vetting of the substantive issues 
presented, I might have joined without writing separately.  To the 
contrary, the majority's new rule will only encourage meritless 
postconviction motions based on allegedly (but not really) 
"previously unknown information raised by the circuit court at 
sentencing."  A defendant's due process rights at sentencing 
protect against the sentencing court's reliance on inaccurate 
information.  State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, ¶9, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 
717 N.W.2d 1.  This case does not involve an allegation of 
inaccurate information; rather, it involves information being used 
                                                 
6 State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶47, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 
N.W.2d 197. 
No.  2017AP2265-CR.rgb 
 
14 
 
at sentencing that was not only available to the defense before 
sentencing, but also constitutes the type of information Gallion 
instructed long ago is fairly considered by sentencing courts. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶70 Our forfeiture jurisprudence suffers from inconsistency 
leading to unpredictability in applying the general rule, which 
has largely been swallowed by exceptions.7  In some cases, our 
appellate courts apply the general rule of forfeiture if a party 
fails to object in a proceeding below.  In other cases, we ignore 
forfeiture, with scant explanation.  Wisconsin's "discretionary 
conferring approach" to forfeiture renders it "very difficult to 
predict with any certainty when an issue will be deemed [forfeited] 
or not[.]"  Weigand, supra ¶61, at 245.  The bench and bar would 
benefit from clear guidance regarding when forfeiture will apply 
as well as identifiable bases for instead invoking one of its 
exceptions.   
¶71 The majority fashions a broad, categorical rule against 
forfeiture, which is unnecessary to properly dispose of this case.  
The majority should have denied Counihan's claims under the rubric 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Counihan's counsel had an 
objectively reasonable basis for declining to object to the 
sentencing court's consideration of sentences imposed in similar 
cases preceding Counihan's.  Additionally, we have long recognized 
                                                 
7 This could be attributable in part to a variety of factors, 
including the specific arguments parties present in individual 
cases as well as differences between civil and criminal cases.  
Criminal cases, of course, provide review of ineffective 
assistance claims, whereas civil cases do not.  
No.  2017AP2265-CR.rgb 
 
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the permissibility, if not desirability, of a sentencing court 
accessing its institutional memory in order to ensure consistency 
in sentencing across cases.  Because the majority unnecessarily 
resolved this case on the merits and in the process established a 
new rule fraught with adverse impact in its application, I 
respectfully concur.  
¶72 I am authorized to state that Justice DANIEL KELLY joins 
this concurrence.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2017AP2265-CR.rgb 
 
 
 
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