Case Title: Park County v. Cooney

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-12-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Park County v. Cooney1992 WY 161845 P.2d 346Case Number: 91-182Decided: 12/02/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming

PARK 
COUNTY, 
WYOMING, CHRIS 
J. WHITE, and ROBERT MAYOR, Appellants (Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
THOMAS 
RUSSELL COONEY and LORA JOHN COONEY, Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).

 
 
Edward 
G. Luhm of Scott, Shelledy, and Luhm, Worland, for appellant Robert 
Mayor.

 
 
L. B. 
Cozzens of Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & 
Dietrich, Billings, 
Montana, for 
appellees.

 
 
Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT, * and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 
* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The issue in this case 
is whether a probation officer who knowingly prepares a perjured petition for 
revocation of probation is entitled to immunity in an action under 42 
U.S.C.  1983 arising from the 
probationer's subsequent arrest and incarceration.  The probation officer, Robert Mayor 
(Mayor), appeals the trial court's order denying his motion to dismiss 
appellees' amended § 1983 complaint against him.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant states the 
issue as follows:

 
 
Whether 
the District Court erred by holding that, in January, 1986, a reasonable Wyoming 
Probation and Parole Agent would have understood that the preparation of a 
perjured probation revocation petition, and the forwarding of said petition to a 
prosecuting attorney who requested it, was unlawful in light of clearly 
established law?

 
 

[¶4.]     The facts underlying 
this case are set out in Cooney v. Park 
County, 792 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 1990) (Cooney I). For the convenience of the 
reader, we reiterate from that opinion the facts relevant to this 
appeal:

 
 
In 1985, 
Thomas Cooney pled guilty to writing bad checks in Park County, Wyoming. The district court accepted his 
guilty plea and sentenced him to five years of supervised probation, which 
required him to stay in regular contact with officers of the Wyoming Department 
of Probation and Parole.  When 
sentenced, Mr. Cooney lived in Riverton, Wyoming, where his parole officer was Cindy 
Johnson.  In September 1985, Mr. 
Cooney requested permission from the Department to move with his wife and child 
to Baroil because of a change in his job. Johnson granted Mr. Cooney permission 
to move and told him that he would be contacted by a Department officer in 
Rawlins for continued supervision under the terms of his 
sentence.

 
 
The 
Cooneys moved to Baroil in October 1985, and Johnson forwarded Thomas Cooney's 
file to Tracy Reinke, a Department officer in Rawlins.  Unknown to the Cooneys, however, Johnson 
erroneously advised Reinke that Thomas Cooney and his family were now living in 
La Barge, Wyoming, instead of Baroil. Because of this 
erroneous advice, Reinke returned the Cooney file to Johnson in Riverton and 
instructed Johnson to forward it to the Department office in Evanston, Wyoming, 
the Department office with jurisdiction over probationers living in Barge. On 
October 21, 1985, Johnson mailed the Cooney file to the Department office in 
Evanston where 
it was assigned to appellee Robert Mayor.  
After receiving the file, Mayor made unsuccessful attempts to locate Mr. 
Cooney In La Barge because the 
Cooneys were in Baroil.

 
 
In the 
meantime, Mr.  Cooney, still unaware 
of the Department's foul-ups, contacted Johnson several times by telephone 
inquiring about the contact he expected to receive from a Department officer in 
Rawlins.  Based on those calls, 
Johnson filed reports verifying Mr. Cooney's compliance with the terms of his 
probation in October and November of 1985. During December 1985, Mr. Cooney 
telephoned the Department office in Rawlins to contact Reinke about his 
probation.

 
 
In 
mid-January, 1986, Mayor contacted Johnson to inform her that he could not 
locate Mr. Cooney In his area.  Unexplainably, Johnson told Mayor that 
Mr. Cooney had relocated to Barge, Wyoming, in October 1985, and that she had not 
heard from him since his move. This incorrect information prompted Mayor on 
January 24, 1986, to call appellee Chris  
White, who was then deputy county attorney for Park County, Wyoming; Mayor told White that Mr. Cooney had 
not been in contact with his probation officers as required by the terms of his 
sentence and that he had moved from Riverton without Department permission. 

 
 
White 
asked Mayor to prepare a petition revoking Mr. Cooney's 
probation.

 
 
On 
January 29, 1986, Johnson telephoned Mayor and told him that the Cooneys lived 
in Baroil, had permission from the Department to be there, and that Mr. Cooney 
had been in contact with her office during October and November 1985. Mayor then 
telephoned White and relayed those facts to him. Despite this information, White 
reiterated his request that Mayor draft the petition to revoke Mr. Cooney's 
probation. Mayor followed White's instructions and prepared a document entitled 
"Petition for Revocation of Probation and Bench Warrant" dated January 29, 1986. 
In that document, and despite his contrary knowledge, Mayor swore under oath 
that Mr. Cooney changed his address without the Department's permission and 
failed to maintain contact with the Department after he moved. Mayor then 
forwarded the petition to White who presented it to the district court. Based on 
the petition, the district court issued a bench warrant for Mr. Cooney's arrest 
on February 7, 1986.

 
 
* * * * 
*

 
 
* * * On 
March 15, 1986, a highway patrol officer stopped Mr. Cooney, his wife, and child 
and arrested him pursuant to the bench warrant issued because of the information 
provided to the district court by Mayor and White. * * *

 
 
Mr. 
Cooney remained in the ParkCounty jail until April 21, 1986 * * 
*.

 
 
 Cooney, 792 P.2d  at 
1288-89.

 
 

[¶5.]     The Cooneys sued 
ParkCounty, the State of Wyoming, the Wyoming Department of Probation 
and Parole, White and Mayor for claims arising out of Mr. Cooney's wrongful 
detention. The complaint alleged grounds for recovery under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Upon W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
motions by the defendants, the trial court dismissed all claims against White 
and ParkCounty, and the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act 
claims  against the State of 
Wyoming, the 
Department of Probation and Parole, and Mayor. It then issued an order 
certifying the case for appeal under W.R.C.P. 54(b).  The Cooneys took appeal from the 
dismissals.  We initially dismissed 
the appeal because of the trial court's failure to explain its reasons for 
granting Rule 54(b) certification. The trial court then amended its order, and 
Cooneys renewed their appeal.

 
 

[¶6.]     In Cooney I, we affirmed the trial court's 
orders of dismissal. The Cooneys then filed a petition for certiorari to the 
United States Supreme Court, which was granted sub nom., Cooney v. White, 115 L. Ed. 2d 965, 111 S. Ct. 2820 (1991). The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Cooney I and remanded to us for further 
consideration in light of Burns v. 
Reed, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547, 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991). On June 17, 1991, we ordered 
rebriefing and rehearing on the matter.

 
 

[¶7.]     Meanwhile, on September 
7, 1989, Mayor, the State of Wyoming, and the Department of Probation and Parole 
had filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider its failure to 
previously dismiss the § 1983 counts against them. This motion cited the United 
States Supreme  Court's holding in 
Will v. Michigan Department of State 
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989), that states 
and state officials acting in their official capacity cannot be sued under § 
1983. In response, the Cooneys filed a motion to amend their complaint to assert 
a claim against Mayor individually, and also to add a claim for "constitutional 
tort" against him.

 
 

[¶8.]     On August 7, 1990, by 
stipulation of the parties, the trial court dismissed with prejudice the § 1983 
complaints against the State and the probation department. Subsequently, the 
trial court dismissed the § 1983 action against Mayor in his official capacity. 
In the same order, it also granted the Cooneys' motion to amend the complaint to 
assert a § 1983 claim against  Mayor 
personally, but denied the Cooneys' motion to add an allegation of 
constitutional tort. The Cooneys filed an amended complaint on April 1, 1991, to 
which Mayor responded.

 
 

[¶9.]     Mayor filed a motion to 
compel discovery against the Cooneys.  
His motion was based on his need to gather information to assert a 
defense of qualified immunity. He also filed for a protective order to prevent 
the Cooneys from conducting further discovery against him until the issue of 
qualified immunity had been resolved. The trial court announced its decision to 
treat these two motions as a motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified 
immunity under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Both parties filed briefs on whether the case 
should be dismissed. The trial court entered an order denying the motion to 
dismiss from which Mayor took timely appeal.

 
 
Appealability 
of Order

 
 

[¶10.]  A threshold question to be considered is 
whether Mayor's appeal is properly before the court at this time. Mayor is 
appealing the denial of his W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based on 
qualified immunity. Generally, an order denying a motion to dismiss is not a 
final, appealable order from which appeal may be taken.  Wyoming Rule of Appellate Procedure 1.05 
defines a "final order" as

 
 
(1) an 
order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order ineffect 
determines the action and prevents a judgment; (2) an order affecting a 
substantial right, made in a special proceeding, or upon a summary application 
in an action, after judgment; (3) an order,  including a conditional order, granting 
a new trial on the grounds stated in Rule 59(a)(4) and (5), W.R.C.P. * * 
*.

 
 
We have 
stated that a final order from which appeal may be taken is one which 
"determines the merits of the controversy and leaves nothing for future 
consideration." Public Serv. Comm'n v. 
LowerValley Power and Light, Inc., 608 P.2d 660, 661 
(Wyo. 
1980).

 
 

[¶11.]  The United States Supreme Court has held, 
however, that a federal district court's denial of a motion to dismiss based on 
qualified immunity was "an appealable 'final decision' * * * notwithstanding the 
absence of a final judgment." Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2817, 
86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985). The Court reasoned that qualified immunity provides "an 
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, and like an absolute 
immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to 
trial." Mitchell, 472 U.S.  at 526, 105 S. Ct.  at 2815 
(emphasis in original).  In other 
words, unless the order denying dismissal can be reviewed before trial, it can 
never be effectively reviewed  at 
all, because the defendant will have already suffered an irreparable loss to his 
immunity from suit. The Mitchell 
Court also noted that an order denying dismissal on the basis of qualified 
immunity fits the collateral-order exception established in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 
337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949). The Court in Cohen noted 
that there is a "small class [of orders appealed from] which finally determine 
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the 
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause 
itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case 
is adjudicated." Mitchell, 472 U.S.  at 524, 105 S. Ct.  at 
2814, quoting Cohen, 337 U.S.  at 546, 69 S. Ct.  at 
1225.

 
 

[¶12.]  State courts are divided on whether 
interlocutory appeal is available under these circumstances. We believe the 
state decisions which allow appeal, for the reasons detailed in Mitchell as 
cited above, are better reasoned; and we therefore hold that an order denying 
dismissal of a claim based on qualified immunity is an order appealable to this 
court. See Henke v. Superior Court, 
161 Ariz. 96, 775 P.2d 1160, 1162-64 
(Ariz. 
1989).

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶13.]  When reviewing the trial court's 
disposition of a motion to dismiss under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), we accept the facts 
alleged in the complaint as true and view them more favorably toward the party 
opposing  the motion below. Mummery v. Polk, 770 P.2d 241, 243 
(Wyo. 1989). 
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted sparingly by the trial courts, 
and is not favored on appeal. Id.

 
 
Absolute 
or Qualified Immunity

 
 

[¶14.]  Appellant concedes that his actions are, 
at most, cloaked with qualified rather than absolute immunity. This means the 
"type of immunity" question is not presented for our review. We find it helpful, 
however, to discuss the basis for considering appellant's actions for only 
qualified immunity.

 
 

[¶15.]  In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976), the United States Supreme Court considered 
the immunity to be accorded a state prosecuting attorney from a suit for damages 
under § 1983. The Court concluded that the prosecutor was absolutely immune from 
a suit based on his initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution. Its 
holding was based on a functional approach which grants absolute immunity where 
the prosecutor's actions "were intimately associated with the judicial phase of 
the criminal process, and thus were functions to which the reasons for absolute 
immunity apply with full force." 424 U.S.  at 430; 96 S. Ct.  at 995. The 
Court took no position on whether the prosecutor would retain his absolute 
immunity when exercising administrative or investigative 
functions.

 
 

[¶16.]  Two years later, in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 57 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1978), the Court considered the scope of personal immunity of Department of 
Agriculture officials who had allegedly instituted a retaliatory investigation 
and administrative proceeding against the plaintiff. It held that the executives 
were entitled only to qualified immunity.

 
 

[¶17.]  In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982), the Supreme Court distinguished absolute from qualified immunity 
as follows:

 
 
Our 
decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two kinds.  For officials whose special functions or 
constitutional status requires complete protection from suit, we have recognized 
the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute immunity of legislators, in 
their legislative functions, and of judges, in their judicial functions, now is 
well settled.  Our decisions also 
have extended absolute immunity to certain officials of the Executive 
Branch.  These include prosecutors 
and similar officials, executive officers engaged in adjudicative functions, and 
the President of the United 
States.

 
 
For 
executive officers in general, however, our cases make plain that qualified 
immunity represents the norm.

 
 

Harlow, 457 U.S.  at 807; 102 S. Ct.  at 2732 
(citations omitted). The Court reiterated its adherence to the functional 
approach to immunity law, noting that although the judicial, prosecutorial, and 
legislative functions require absolute immunity, its protections have been 
extended no further than its justification would warrant.  457 U.S. at 810-11; 
102 S. Ct.  at 2734. [**14]

 
 

[¶18.]  Most recently, in Burns v. Reed, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547, 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991), the Supreme Court clarified the functional approach, as 
applied to a prosecutor 's misconduct. Addressing the question left open in Imbler, the Court held that the 
prosecutor had absolute immunity for his conduct in appearing at the probable 
cause hearing, a function "intimately associated with the judicial phase of a 
criminal process," but had only qualified immunity for his act of giving advice 
to the police, a function not "connected with the prosecutor's role in judicial 
proceedings." Burns, 111 S. Ct.  at 
1943.

 
 

[¶19.]  It must be admitted that several federal 
circuits have extended absolute immunity to federal and state probation officers 
for their conduct in preparing presentence reports for use by the trial court. 
See e.g., Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133 (2nd Cir. 1987); Spaulding v. 
Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1979); Freeze v. Griffith, 849 F.2d 172 (5th 
Cir. 1988); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1985); Tripati v. 
U.S.I.N.S., 784 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1028, 108 S. Ct. 755, 98 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1988) (preparation of pretrial bond report and 
presentence report);  Hughes v. Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489 (11th 
Cir. 1984) (state probation officer); Turner v. Barry, 272 U.S. App. D.C. 377, 
856 F.2d 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1988). However, we must be wary of extending the rule 
in these cases beyond their facts.  
Absolute, quasi-judicial immunity was given because the preparation of a 
presentence report is "an integral part of the sentencing process, and in 
preparing the report the probation officer acts at the direction of the court." 
Spaulding, 599 F.2d  at 
729.

 
 

[¶20.]  Where a probation officer exercises the 
discretionary, executive function of seeking probation revocation, the fifth 
circuit has held, applying the functional analysis, that no such connection 
requiring absolute immunity exists. In Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied 466 U.S. 949, 104 S. Ct. 2150, 80 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1984), the fifth circuit held that when a 
probation officer erroneously prepared a motion for revocation of appellant's 
probation, she was only entitled to qualified immunity. The court distinguished 
its earlier case of Spaulding v. Nielsen, 
supra:

 
 
We find 
Spaulding not controlling in the case 
at hand. Whereas in Spaulding the 
probation officer was acting at the direction of the court during the 
presentence report process, in the immediate case the probation officer acted at 
her own initiative and at a different phase of the criminal process less 
intimately associated with the judiciary.

 
 

Galvan, at 
215. See also Griffin v. Leonard, 821 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding under facts presented that probation officer 
was entitled to "at least" qualified immunity). We note also third circuit 
decisions, applying the functional approach, which have refused absolute 
immunity to officers who allegedly acted wrongfully to revoke a plaintiffs 
parole status. See Harper v. 
Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281 (3rd Cir. 1986); Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772 (3rd Cir. 
1989).

 
 

[¶21.]  Even if Mayor did not concede his 
entitlement to only qualified immunity, the proper, functional analysis of 
Mayor's alleged conduct would lead us to refuse him absolute immunity. The 
exercise of his discretionary duties at issue in this case was not so 
"intimately connected with the judicial process" to create absolute immunity. If 
anything, he might receive qualified immunity.

 
 
Qualified 
Immunity -- Application

 
 

[¶22.]  Appellant claims that he is shielded from 
liability for his actions in this case because of the qualified immunity enjoyed 
by a probation officer who performs the discretionary function of preparing a 
petition to revoke probation. In Harlow 
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.  at 817-18, 102 S. Ct.  at 2738, 
the United States Supreme Court set forth the standard for evaluating a claim of 
qualified immunity:

 
 
We 
conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject 
government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of 
broad-reaching discovery.  We 
therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known. [emphasis added]

 
 

[¶23.]  In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 
3038-39, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987), the Court took up the question of what 
constitutes a "clearly established legal rule" for purposes of qualified 
immunity:

 
 
The 
operation of this standard, however, depends substantially upon the level of 
generality at which the relevant "legal rule" is to be identified. For example, 
the right to due process of law is quite clearly established by the Due Process 
Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that violates that Clause 
(no matter how unclear it may be that the particular action is a violation) 
violates a clearly established right. Much the same could be said of any other 
constitutional or statutory violation. But if the test of "clearly established 
law" were to be applied at this level of generality, it would bear no 
relationship  to the "objective 
legal reasonableness" that is the touchstone of Harlow. Plaintiffs would be 
able to convert the rule of qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish 
into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of 
extremely abstract rights. * * * It should not be surprising,  therefore, that our cases establish that 
the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been "clearly 
established" in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is 
doing violates that right.  This 
is not to say that official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the 
very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that 
in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. [emphasis 
added and citations omitted]

 
 

[¶24.]  The question, then, under Harlow and Anderson, is whether a reasonable 
probation agent, in January 1986, would have known that he was violating a 
probationer's clearly established right by preparing a perjured petition for 
revocation of probation. A clearly established right is one recognized by either 
the highest state court in the state where the case arose, a United States Court 
of Appeals, or the United States Supreme Court. Robinson v. Bibb, 840 F.2d 349, 351 (6th 
Cir. 1988). To this list, we might add those rights expressly provided for by 
controlling statute or administrative regulation. Moreover, the right need not 
have been previously recognized in the exact circumstances of the given case; a 
reasonable official is required to "relate established law to analogous factual 
settings." Garcia by Garcia v. Miera, 
817 F.2d 650, 657 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 485 U.S. 959, 108 S. Ct. 1220, 99 L. Ed. 2d 421 (1988) quoting People of Three Mile Island v. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm'rs, 747 F.2d 139, 144 (3rd Cir. 1984).

 
 

[¶25.]  A reasonable probation agent would 
certainly have known that perjury was illegal. Wyoming Statute 6-5-301(a), which 
was in effect at the time Mayor allegedly prepared the perjured petition, reads 
as follows:

 
 
A person 
commits perjury if, while under a lawfully administered oath or affirmation, he 
knowingly testifies falsely or makes a false affidavit, certificate, 
declaration, deposition or statement, in a judicial, legislative or 
administrative proceeding in which an oath or affirmation may be required by 
law, touching a matter material to a point in question.

 
 

[¶26.]  The question is whether such unlawfulness 
comprises an violation of the probationer's constitutional rights. The trial 
court found numerous violations of both plaintiffs' rights. For our purposes, we 
need consider only Mr. Cooney's right to due process in connection with the use 
of the perjured petition, without denying the validity of the other reasons 
provided by the trial court.

 
 

[¶27.]  "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment imposes procedural and substantive limits on the revocation of the 
conditional liberty created by probation." Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 610, 
105 S. Ct. 2254, 2257, 85 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1985), reh. denied 473 U.S. 921, 105 S. Ct. 3548 
(1985), citing Bearden  v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666, n.7, 
103 S. Ct. 2064, 2069, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221, n.7 (1983). Mayor should have been aware 
of a plethora of pre-1985 federal cases, including a Tenth Circuit decision, 
which held or stated that the knowing use of perjured testimony by the state in 
a criminal prosecution violates the defendant 's right to due process. See e.g., Williams v. Griswald, 743 F.2d 1533, 1541 (11th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Jones, 730 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553, 
1565 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 
467 U.S. 1243, 104 S. Ct. 3517, 82 L. Ed. 2d 825 (1984); United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 688 
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub aliter 
nom.  457 U.S. 1124, 1139, 
102 S. Ct. 2944, 2972 (1982).

 
 

[¶28.]  Appellant argues that the facts of these 
federal cases cannot be analogized to the facts of Cooney's case. He attempts 
to  distinguish the federal cases by 
noting that they refer to a prosecutor's use of perjured testimony at trial 
rather than a probation officer's preparation of a perjured petition for 
revocation. We are not persuaded by appellant's arguments. As the trial court 
very aptly stated:

 
 
[T]he 
use of perjured evidence in a criminal trial is not the sole evil of such 
evidence.  It corrupts not just the 
trial, but the entire criminal justice system. To assert that it is only during 
the trial that perjured evidence may not be used is wholly baseless.  It is beyond the pale to believe that a 
reasonable probation officer would consider the use of perjured evidence in an 
affidavit for revocation of parole to be anything other than 
wrongful.

 
 
In Edwards v. State, 577 P.2d 1380, 1384 
(Wyo. 1978), 
we said that the perjury statute "keeps the process of justice free from the 
contamination of false testimony. It is for the wrong done to the judicial 
system and the administration of justice that punishment is provided." Public 
policy thus favors a remedy in damages to redress constitutional violations 
created by the use of perjured testimony at all stages of a criminal or probation 
revocation proceeding.

 
 

[¶29.]  Nor are we persuaded by appellant's 
argument that the impact of perjured testimony in a revocation petition is less 
serious than at a criminal trial because the subsequent revocation hearing 
provides "procedural safeguards" against improper revocation. This argument 
ignores the fact that at issue here is the time Mr. Cooney spent in jail prior to the revocation hearing. Surely 
counsel cannot mean to suggest that because a person has been once sentenced to 
probation, subsequent wrongful incarceration for thirty-eight days is of no 
constitutional significance! We must reject any such cavalier diminishment of 
the scope and force of the due process guarantee.  See Cooney I, 792 P.2d  at 1308-09 
(Urbigkit, J., dissenting.)

 
 

[¶30.]  We hold that a reasonable probation 
officer would have known that the perjury allegedly committed here implicated 
the probationer's right to substantive due process under the United States 
and Wyoming Constitutions. We affirm the trial court's holding that appellant 
Mayor is not entitled to dismissal of Cooneys' claims against him on the basis 
of qualified immunity, and remand this case to the trial court for further 
proceedings.