Case Title: GGNSC Administrative Services, LLC v. Schrader

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12714

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12714 
 
GGNSC ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, LLC, & others1  vs.  JACKALYN M. 
SCHRADER, personal representative.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 4, 2019. - February 27, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Nursing Home.  Wrongful Death.  Negligence, Nursing home, 
Wrongful death.  Arbitration, Appeal of order compelling 
arbitration, Scope of arbitration.  Consent.  Uniform 
Arbitration Act. 
 
 
 
 
Certification of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial 
Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit. 
 
 
 
John Vail, of the District of Columbia (David J. Hoey also 
present) for the defendant. 
 
Joseph M. Desmond (Alex Harrington also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Jennifer A. Creedon for Massachusetts Defense Lawyers 
Association. 
                     
 
1 Golden Gate National Senior Care, LLC; GGNSC Holdings, 
LLC; GGNSC Chestnut Hill, LLC, doing business as Golden Living 
Center -- Heathwood. 
 
 
2 Of the estate of Emma J. Schrader. 
2 
 
 
 
Meryl D. Grenadier, William Avarado Rivera, & Kelly Bagby, 
of the District of Columbia, Eric M. Carlson of California, 
Steven Schwartz, & Rebecca J. Benson for AARP & others. 
 
John J. Barter for Professional Liability Foundation, Ltd. 
 
Robert E. Curtis, Jr., for Massachusetts Advocates for 
Nursing Home Reform, Inc. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  After the decedent died in the care of a nursing 
home, her daughter commenced a wrongful death action against the 
nursing home notwithstanding the existence of an arbitration 
agreement between the decedent and the nursing home.  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (First Circuit) 
certified two questions to this court.3  The first question, 
whether our wrongful death statute, G. L. c. 229, § 2, provides 
rights to statutory beneficiaries derivative of or independent 
from what would have been the decedent's own cause of action for 
the injuries causing her death (decedent's action), informs the 
underlying dispute about whether the decedent's arbitration 
agreement binds the decedent's statutory beneficiaries of the 
wrongful death action.  The language of G. L. c. 229, § 2, and 
our interpretation of the statute through its various iterations 
convince us that the Legislature intended wrongful death actions 
to be derivative of the decedent's action.  To the extent that 
the statute's derivative character does not answer the second 
                     
 
3 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
certified the questions to us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 1:03, as 
appearing in 382 Mass. 700 (1981). 
3 
 
 
certified question, whether the arbitration agreement is 
otherwise enforceable, we conclude that, in the circumstances of 
this case, the arbitration agreement does, indeed, control the 
beneficiaries.4 
 
1.  Factual and procedural background.  We recite the 
undisputed facts as established by the United States District 
Court judge in his decision granting the plaintiffs' motion to 
compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. 
Jackalyn Schrader brought the decedent, her mother, Emma 
Schrader, to the Golden Living Center Heathwood (Heathwood) in 
February 2013.5  Heathwood is part of a larger corporate 
structure known as GGNSC.  When Jackalyn brought the decedent to 
Heathwood, an administrator handed Jackalyn a stack of 
paperwork.  Heathwood did not condition admission of the 
decedent or caring for her upon the completion of all of the 
documents, some of which, including an arbitration agreement, 
were voluntary and clearly labeled as such. 
                     
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by AARP, AARP 
Foundation, National Consumer Voice for Quality Long-Term Care, 
Justice in Aging, Center for Public Representation, and National 
Academy of Elder Law Attorneys; Professional Liability 
Foundation, Ltd.; Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association; and 
Massachusetts Advocates for Nursing Home Reform. 
 
 
5 Because the decedent and the defendant share a last name, 
we refer to Jackalyn by her first name. 
4 
 
 
 
The arbitration agreement pertained to Heathwood and the 
"Resident."  The agreement defined "Resident" as including "all 
persons whose claim is or may be derived through or on behalf of 
the Resident [the decedent], including any next of kin, 
guardian, executor, administrator, legal representative, or heir 
of the Resident, and any person who has executed this Agreement 
on the Resident's behalf."  Jackalyn is both the decedent's next 
of kin and her personal representative as executor of her 
estate.  Following the decedent's admission to Heathwood, 
Jackalyn signed the arbitration agreement.  Jackalyn acted only 
as power of attorney for the decedent and did not sign any 
documents in her individual capacity.6 
 
On December 3, 2013, the decedent died in Heathwood's care.  
On February 4, 2016, Jackalyn brought a wrongful death action 
pursuant to G. L. c. 229, § 2, in the Superior Court in her 
capacity as the decedent's personal representative, alleging 
that GGNSC negligently caused the decedent's death.  The 
complaint further alleged that the decedent's injuries were ones 
"for which [the decedent] would have been entitled to bring an 
                     
 
6 As a matter of law, the decedent signed the agreement.  
See Johnson v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., 466 Mass. 779, 785 
(2014), citing G. L. c. 190B, § 5-502. 
 
5 
 
 
action had she survived, and the right to bring such action 
survives her."7 
 
On March 15, 2016, GGNSC sued Jackalyn in the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts to compel 
arbitration.  Jackalyn opposed arbitration on two grounds. 
First, she contended that the arbitration agreement was both 
procedurally and substantively unconscionable.  The Federal 
District Court judge held that the arbitration agreement was 
valid and not unconscionable.8 
 
In the alternative, Jackalyn argued that the arbitration 
agreement could not bind the decedent's beneficiaries because 
they were not its signatories.  In other words, Jackalyn claimed 
that the arbitration agreement could not control the wrongful 
death claim because the beneficiaries' claim under the wrongful 
death statute was independent of the decedent's action and the 
                     
 
7 Specifically, Jackalyn claims that "preventable sacral 
decubitus" (bedsores or pressure ulcers) resulted in the 
decedent's pain and suffering, eventually requiring surgery, 
from which the decedent never recovered. 
 
 
8 Jackalyn also brought a negligence claim in the Superior 
Court. The Federal District Court judge considered only the 
wrongful death action, and on appeal to the First Circuit, the 
parties and court treated the wrongful death action and the 
negligence claim as equivalent.  In her brief to us, Jackalyn 
claims that she also brought a survival action in the Superior 
Court.  Her complaint, however, does not point to our survival 
statute, G. L. c. 228, § 1.  Although we assume that her 
appellate brief meant to refer to a negligence claim, we only 
address the wrongful death claim because that is the question 
that the First Circuit certified to us. 
6 
 
 
decedent was the only legal party to sign the arbitration 
agreement.  The Federal District Court judge concluded that the 
cause of action was derivative, and thus the arbitration 
agreement bound the estate on behalf of the wrongful death 
beneficiaries.9  The judge then granted the motion to compel 
arbitration, but declined to stay Jackalyn's Superior Court 
action pending the outcome of the arbitration.  Instead, the 
parties agreed to do so.  Jackalyn then asked the judge to 
certify questions to this court, but he declined to do so at the 
"thirteenth hour."  Jackalyn appealed from this decision to the 
First Circuit. 
 
The First Circuit certified two questions to us: 
"1.  Is the wrongful death claim of [the decedent's] 
statutory heirs derivative or independent of [the 
decedent's] own cause of action? 
 
"2.  If the answer to the first question does not resolve 
the issue presented to the federal court, is Jackalyn['s] 
wrongful death claim nonetheless subject to [the 
decedent's] Agreement that her 'next of kin, guardian, 
executor, administrator, legal representative, or heir' 
would arbitrate claims against GGNSC?" 
 
 
Although we have addressed the first question in cases 
involving past iterations of our wrongful death statute, our law 
today is clearly unsettled on the matter and, although the 
                     
 
9 In his decision, the judge explicitly disagreed with the 
reasoning in another opinion that was decided in the Federal 
District Court in Massachusetts.  See Oahn Nguyen Chung vs. 
StudentCity.com, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 10-10943 (D. Mass. 
Sept. 9, 2011). 
7 
 
 
parties raised the issue in Johnson v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., 
466 Mass. 779 (2014), we did not address it because we decided 
the case on different grounds.  See id. at 788 n.14 (health care 
agent's decision to arbitrate disputes does not bind patient 
under health care proxy statute).  Based on a plain reading of 
the wrongful death statute and our interpretation of common-law 
wrongful death actions over time, and in light of persuasive 
authority from other States, we determine that a wrongful death 
claim of a statutory beneficiary is derivative of the decedent's 
action and that the arbitration clause in question is 
enforceable. 
 
2.  Discussion.   a.  Characterization of wrongful death 
claims as derivative or independent.  i.  Under wrongful death 
statute.  The issue in this case cannot be understood without an 
explanation of the two approaches to an action for wrongful 
death, derivative and independent. 
 
If we characterize claims of beneficiaries under a wrongful 
death statute as "derivative," then the "wrongful death 
liability is but an extension of the decedent's personal injury 
claim."  Willis & Peverall, The "Vanishing Trial":  Arbitrating 
Wrongful Death, 53 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1339, 1352 (2019) (Willis & 
Peverall).  This means that "the beneficiaries of the death 
action can sue only if the decedent would still be in a position 
to sue."  Ellis v. Ford Motor Co., 628 F. Supp. 849, 858 (D. 
8 
 
 
Mass. 1986), quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 46 
comment c (1982) (Restatement).  Courts that follow this 
interpretation emphasize "that the same tortious 'conduct' which 
caused the decedent's personal injury also undergirds the 
wrongful death action."  Willis & Peverall, supra at 1353.  
Under this view, because the wrongful death action is derivative 
of the decedent's rights, the decedent "enjoys [exclusive] 
rights over the wrongful death action such that he or she can 
agree to arbitrate that claim entirely."  Id. 
 
On the other hand, if claims under a wrongful death statute 
are "independent," then "the decedent's disposition of his 
personal injury claim would have no effect on the wrongful death 
claim.  The situation would be as though the injured person and 
his beneficiary each had a separate legal interest in his life, 
assertable by separate action."  Ellis, 628 F. Supp. at 858, 
quoting Restatement, supra.  Courts following this 
interpretation have held that "wrongful death liability does not 
concern recovery for personal injury at all or . . . any other 
claim that the decedent may have had against the tortfeasor."  
Willis & Peverall, supra at 1354.  The action "deals only with 
the economic effect the decedent's death had upon specific 
family members."  Id.  Thus, the decedent would be without 
authority to bind beneficiaries like Jackalyn to arbitration for 
her wrongful death claims.  See id. 
9 
 
 
 
Unlike with statutes giving rise to derivative claims, 
then, statutes giving rise to independent claims could have an 
inefficient application; if a nursing home resident signed an 
arbitration agreement and her nursing home injured her, she 
could bring only her negligence claim through arbitration.  If 
she later died from those injuries, a statute giving rise to 
independent wrongful death claims would permit her executor to 
commence a wrongful death action in court based on the same 
conduct even if she had resolved her negligence claims against 
the nursing home through arbitration.  See Ellis, 628 F. Supp. 
at 857-858. 
 
ii.  Common-law basis for wrongful death claims.  Jackalyn 
argues that our wrongful death statute, G. L. c. 229, § 2, does 
not negate an independent common-law right to bring a wrongful 
death claim.  Like most jurisdictions, we previously held that 
"there [was] no common law right to civil recovery for death, 
and that any right to such recovery [was] solely a creation of 
the statutes."  Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 64 (1972).10  In 
Gaudette, however, we followed the United States Supreme Court 
in concluding that our law had evolved; thus, "the right to 
recovery for wrongful death is [now] of common law origin," and 
                     
 
10 For a thorough history of the development of our common-
law wrongful death jurisprudence, see Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 452 
Mass. 1, 21-23 (2008), and Gaudette, 362 Mass. at 64-70. 
10 
 
 
no longer solely created by statute.  Id. at 71, discussing 
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970).  
The defendant points to Gaudette as support for the proposition 
that our wrongful death jurisprudence, with its common-law 
foundation, is open to judicial control. 
 
The defendant misunderstands our interpretation of G. L. 
c. 229, § 2.  See Bratcher v. Galusha, 417 Mass. 28, 30-31 
(1994) (declining plaintiff's request to "rewrite or ignore the 
plain language"); Hallett v. Wrentham, 398 Mass. 550, 555 (1986) 
("Gaudette does not stand for the proposition that the 
requirements of the statute may be disregarded").  Far from 
providing this court unbridled power to interpret G. L. c. 229, 
§ 2, the Gaudette decision instead requires that we follow the 
procedures prescribed in that statute, see Marco v. Green, 415 
Mass. 732, 735 (1993), so long as we anchor that statutory 
interpretation to the common law so as to "meet changes in the 
evolving life of the Commonwealth" as we do with "all common-law 
causes of action," Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 452 Mass. 1, 23 
(2008).  See id. at 4 (recognizing that loss of chance of 
survival due to medical negligence "comports with the common law 
of wrongful death as it has developed in the Commonwealth" and 
with G. L. c. 229, § 2).11  In deciding whether wrongful death 
                     
 
11 Any of our interpretations of the common law must 
therefore recognize that G. L. c. 229 sets forth (a) that 
11 
 
 
rights are derivative or independent, we look first to the 
statute and then, if the language does not resolve the question, 
to the common law for guidance.  See Pobieglo v. Monsanto Co., 
402 Mass. 112, 116 (1988). 
 
b.  Wrongful death claims under G. L. c. 229, § 2, as 
derivative.  i.  Statutory history.  In 1840, Massachusetts was 
the first State to enact a wrongful death statute.  See Willis & 
Peverall, supra at 1359.  The Legislature set the foundation of 
the statute's modern iteration in 1946, by establishing 
liability for towns and common carriers whose negligence 
resulted in death.  St. 1946, c. 614, § 1.  The Legislature 
amended the statute in 1947, broadening the liability for 
"wilful, wanton, or reckless" behavior.  St. 1947, c. 506, § 1A. 
 
In 1958, the Legislature enacted the language more or less 
as it stands today.12  St. 1958, c. 238, § 1.  Section 2 of G. L. 
c. 229 states, in pertinent part: 
"A person who (1) by his negligence causes the death 
of a person in the exercise of due care, or (2) by 
willful, wanton or reckless act causes the death of a 
person under such circumstances that the deceased 
                     
damages are assessed based on the degree of the defendant's 
culpability; (b) the range of recoverable damages; (c) that only 
a "personal representative on behalf of the designated 
categories of beneficiaries" can bring the action; and (d) a 
statute of limitations.  Gaudette, 362 Mass. at 71. 
 
12 After 1958, amendments to the statute were relatively 
minimal, for example, increasing the statute of limitations, St. 
1989, c. 215, § 1, and increasing the amount recoverable by the 
claimant, St. 1972, c. 440, § 1. 
 
12 
 
 
could have recovered damages for personal injuries if 
his death had not resulted . . . shall be liable in 
damages in the amount of: (1) the fair monetary value 
of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the 
damages recovered, as provided in [G. L. c. 229, § 1]  
. . . .  Damages under this section shall be recovered 
in an action of tort by the executor or administrator 
of the deceased."13 
 
 
ii.  Plain language.  "When conducting statutory 
interpretation, this court strives to effectuate the 
Legislature's intent by looking first to the statute's 
plain language" (quotations and citation omitted).  
Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal 
Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 604 (2019).  We consider the plain 
language of the section at issue by analyzing the statute 
as a whole.  See id. at 605. 
 
In 1958, the Legislature amended G. L. c. 229, § 2, to 
permit compensation only "under such circumstances that the 
deceased could have recovered damages for personal injuries 
if his death had not resulted."  St. 1958, c. 238, § 1.  
Through this amendment, the Legislature expressly tethered 
a wrongful death claim to tortious conduct that caused the 
decedent's personal injury.  In other words, where no cause 
of action for wrongful death exists unless the decedent 
could have sued for personal injury, then the wrongful 
                     
 
13 General Laws c. 229, § 1, creates a roadmap of who 
constitutes a beneficiary of the decedent. 
13 
 
 
death claim necessarily derives from the underlying tort.  
As we have noted in other contexts, "claims for recovery 
based on personal injury, wrongful death, or loss of 
consortium are not distinct when they derive from the same 
constellation of facts."  Sisson v. Lhowe, 460 Mass. 705, 
710 (2011). 
 
The "under such circumstances" clause certainly 
modifies wrongful death actions brought based upon 
"willful, wanton, or reckless act[s]."  G. L. c. 229, § 2.  
By virtue of the conjunction "or" placed between the 
different types of acts causing wrongful death, the clause 
also seems to modify the cause of action based on 
negligence.  Id.  In any event, we conclude that the clause 
applies to both wrongful death actions caused by willful, 
wanton, or reckless acts, as well as by negligence.  
Moreover, the elements of our wrongful death action based 
on negligence mirror those of an ordinary negligence claim.  
See Correa v. Schoeck, 479 Mass. 686, 693 (2018) ("To 
prevail in her wrongful death suit [under G. L. c. 229, 
§ 2, plaintiff] must prove that the defendants were 
negligent").  Thus, the decedent's "executor or 
administrator" can bring a negligence claim pursuant to 
G. L. c. 229, § 2 only "under such circumstances" in which 
14 
 
 
the decedent could have raised an ordinary negligence 
claim. 
 
The language and structure of our wrongful death 
statute also reflects the derivative nature of claims 
brought under it.  Under G. L. c. 229, § 2, only the 
"executor or administrator of the deceased" can initiate 
the wrongful death action, and the statute separates the 
permissible claimant from the permissible beneficiaries in 
§ 1.  The Legislature thereby intended wrongful death 
rights to remain tied to the decedent's action; if the 
rights belonged to the statutory beneficiaries, then the 
Legislature presumably would have listed them in § 2 with 
the other claimants permitted to commence lawsuits.  
Indeed, both G. L. c. 229, §§ 1 and 2, "provide[] for a 
single action[, on behalf of the class of beneficiaries 
defined in G. L. c. 229, § 1,] brought by the decedent's 
executor or administrator.  The executor or administrator 
presents all claims by the designated beneficiaries for 
damages flowing from the wrongful death."  Hallett, 398 
Mass. at 555.  Id. at 556 (loss of consortium and wrongful 
death claims not independent). 
 
iii.  Evolving judicial interpretation.  We also find 
support for concluding that wrongful death claims brought 
under G. L. c. 229, § 2, are derivative in our 
15 
 
 
interpretation of the various legislative amendments.  See 
Commonwealth v. Wassilie, 482 Mass. 562, 576 (2019), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Quinn, 439 Mass. 492, 499-500 
(2003) ("unspecific statutory language 'may nonetheless be 
sufficiently definite because of judicial construction, 
common law meaning, or the statutory history of particular 
terms'").  Prior to the Legislature's amendments in 1958, 
we interpreted our wrongful death statutes to create 
independent rights for beneficiaries.  See Ellis, 628 F. 
Supp. at 858, citing McCarthy v. William H. Wood Lumber 
Co., 219 Mass. 566, 567 (1914) ("At one time it was 
undisputed that Massachusetts' wrongful death action was of 
the 'independent' variety").  See also Oliveria v. 
Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 301 (1940), overruled on another 
ground by Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350 (1975) ("The 
statute does not limit the remedy, as do the statutes of 
many jurisdictions, to instances where the deceased could 
have maintained an action if he had lived.  The action for 
death is not derivative in character"); Wall v. 
Massachusetts Northeastern St. Ry., 229 Mass. 506, 507 
(1918) (wrongful death actions did not accrue during 
decedent's lifetime and Massachusetts differed from 
derivative state statutes providing "a right of action for 
the death of the injured person only if he might have 
16 
 
 
maintained an action had he lived" [quotations and citation 
omitted]); Montellier v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 384, 
394 (E.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 315 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1963) 
("[because Massachusetts's wrongful death statute] created 
a right in the survivors which did not arise until the 
wrongful death, the deceased had no power to barter it away 
and his execution and delivery of a release was nugatory as 
to his survivors").14 
 
Since the amendments to G. L. c. 229, § 2, in 1958, 
this court has not held claims under the statute to be 
independent.  See Johnson, 466 Mass. at 788 n.14.  Although 
we have not directly reached the issue, see id., the 
direction of our case law in other contexts appears clear.  
See Sisson, 460 Mass. at 710 (wrongful death not distinct 
from other claims when facts same); Tobin v. Norwood 
Country Club, Inc., 422 Mass. 126, 138 (1996) (contributory 
negligence of decedent reduces damages on all claims, not 
just those awarded to estate); Santos v. Lumbermens Mut. 
Cas. Co., 408 Mass. 70, 77-78 (1990) (beneficiaries receive 
award, but must operate through "conduit" of executor or 
                     
 
14 See also Beausoleil's Case, 321 Mass. 344, 347 (1947) 
(decedent cannot "prevent his statutory beneficiaries from 
exercising [right to bring wrongful death claim] when it comes 
into existence at his death"); Eldridge v. Barton, 232 Mass. 
183, 186 (1919) ("damages recovered [for decedent's death] would 
not be assets of the estate in the hands of the administrator"). 
17 
 
 
administrator); Norman v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 
403 Mass. 303, 308 (1988) ("In a wrongful death action, 
damages are not recoverable both for the injured person's 
losses and the derivative losses of others"); Hallett, 398 
Mass. at 556 (loss of consortium and wrongful death not 
independent claims).  Overall, the "trend in [our] law is 
against allowing" claims under G. L. c. 229, § 2, to be 
independent of the decedent's own cause of action.  Fidler 
v. E.M. Parker Co., 394 Mass. 534, 547 (1985) (discussing 
movement away from independent claims for wrongful death 
and loss of consortium). 
 
iv.  Other jurisdictions.  The wrongful death statutes 
in other jurisdictions and the judicial interpretations 
thereof augment our conclusion.  See Doe v. Superintendent 
of Schs. of Worcester, 421 Mass. 117, 130 n.4 (1995).  The 
majority of States conclude that where an action for the 
injuries causing the decedent's death "could not have been 
brought by the deceased, had he survived, . . . no right of 
action [for wrongful death] . . . can vest in the 
deceased's administrator or representative for the benefit 
of the beneficiaries" because "even though the right 
created by the statute is a new cause of action, it is 
still derivative and dependent on the continuance of a 
right in the decedent to maintain an action for his injury 
18 
 
 
up to the time of his death."  12 Am. Jur. Trials, Wrongful 
Death Actions § 16, at 344-345 (1966).  The States 
following the majority rule do not provide express 
independent causes of action for the beneficiaries.  See, 
e.g., Behurst v. Crown Cork & Seal USA, Inc., 346 Or. 29, 
40 (2009) (en banc) ("Only the . . . personal 
representative may maintain an action under" wrongful death 
statute).  See also In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 
S.W.3d 640, 646 (Tex. 2009) ("While it is true that damages 
for a wrongful death action are for the exclusive benefit 
of the beneficiaries and are meant to compensate them for 
their own personal loss, the cause of action is still 
entirely derivative of the decedent's rights").  But see 
Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 598 (Ky. 
2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 954 (2013) (predispute 
arbitration agreement not enforceable against wrongful 
death claim where " wrongful death and survival actions are 
separate and distinct"); Gilloon v. Humana, Inc., 100 Nev. 
518, 520 (1984) (wrongful death statute creates independent 
cause of action for heirs). 
 
Because of the 1958 legislative amendments to G. L. 
c. 229, § 2, we adopt the majority rule that precludes 
wrongful death actions unless decedents could have brought 
an action for the injuries that caused their death.  There 
19 
 
 
are, however, other ways that an arbitration agreement may 
be invalid. 
 
c..  Other possible grounds for invalidating 
arbitration agreement.  i.  Lack of consent.  A contract 
generally only binds those who consent to its terms 
(citation omitted).  See Levy v. Levy, 309 Mass. 230, 234 
(1941).  Jackalyn argues that even if wrongful death claims 
are derivative, the arbitration agreement cannot control 
the decedent's beneficiaries because they never consented 
to its terms.15  We need not consider consent, however, 
because the cause of action for the injuries resulting in 
the decedent's wrongful death belongs to the decedent 
alone, and the decedent alone had the right to decide 
whether the beneficiaries must arbitrate those claims.  The 
beneficiaries' lack of consent is thus inconsequential. 
 
ii.  Contract defenses under Massachusetts Arbitration 
Act.  That we classify the wrongful death action as 
derivative is not necessarily dispositive of the question 
whether the arbitration agreement binds decedent's 
beneficiaries.  We assess the validity of nursing home 
arbitration agreements pursuant to the Federal Arbitration 
                     
 
15 There are common-law rules for binding nonsignatory third 
parties to a contract.  See Machado v. System4 LLC, 471 Mass. 
204, 209 (2015). 
20 
 
 
Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., and the Massachusetts 
Arbitration Act, G. L. c. 251.  See Miller v. Cotter, 448 
Mass. 671, 678 (2007) (applying Massachusetts Arbitration 
Act although "cognizant that the Federal [Arbitration] Act 
almost certainly applies as well").  Moreover, the 
Massachusetts Arbitration Act, the Federal Arbitration Act, 
and relevant case law all demonstrate the strong public 
policy in favor of arbitration in commercial disputes.  See 
id. at 676.  Under both acts, arbitration agreements are 
enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract."  St. Fleur v. 
WPI Cable Sys./Mutron, 450 Mass. 345, 350 (2008), quoting 9 
U.S.C. § 2.  We therefore "apply generally applicable 
State-law contract defenses . . . to determine the validity 
of an arbitration agreement" even if we find it to be 
derivative.  See St. Fleur, supra.  These defenses include 
fraud, undue influence or duress, or unconscionability.  
See Miller, supra at 679.   However, we have declined to 
adopt a "per se rule that predispute arbitration agreements 
in the nursing home context should be void as a matter of 
public policy."  Id. at 682. 
 
As we found in Miller, 448 Mass. at 679-684, the facts 
here, as determined by the Federal District Court judge, 
demonstrate no fraud, duress, undue influence, or 
21 
 
 
unconscionability.  Heathwood allowed Jackalyn to study the 
documents for some time before signing, and there was no 
evidence that she did not assent to the terms of the 
arbitration agreement.  The agreement also was not 
procedurally unconscionable, given that it clearly 
indicated, in bold-faced capital letters, that the 
agreement was not mandatory for continuing care or 
admission.  The agreement further advised Jackalyn to read 
it carefully before signing, and Heathwood provided a 
thirty-day revocation period.16 
3.  Conclusion.  We answer the certified questions as 
follows.  We conclude that claims of statutory 
beneficiaries under our wrongful death statute, G. L. 
c. 229, § 2, are derivative of the decedent's own cause of 
                     
 
16 Placing a loved one in a nursing home is for many, if not 
most, people a heart-wrenching decision. Once the decision has 
been made and the day arrives to register one's parent, spouse, 
significant other, dear friend or other family member, residents 
and their legal proxies may feel too overwhelmed by 
circumstances to comprehend complex legal language.  Prudence 
and good practice requires that those registering the resident 
explain any arbitration agreement in clear and straightforward 
language and provide ample time for residents, or their 
representatives, to decide whether to sign such an agreement.  
We will scrutinize arbitration agreements with particular care 
if admission to a nursing home is conditioned on agreeing to 
arbitrate any legal claims.  There are many reasons why 
arbitration agreements might make sense and many reasons that 
such agreements may raise grave concerns.  Ultimately, the 
appropriateness of predispute arbitration agreements between 
nursing homes and residents, as a general rule, is a legislative 
prerogative. 
22 
 
 
action, and that therefore the decedent's arbitration 
agreement binds those beneficiaries.  We also conclude 
that, in the circumstances of this case, the arbitration 
agreement binds the executor or administrator of the 
decedent's estate to arbitrate the wrongful death action on 
behalf of the decedent's statutory beneficiaries. 
The Reporter of Decisions is to furnish attested 
copies of this opinion to the clerk of this court.  The 
clerk in turn will transmit one copy, under the seal of the 
court, to the clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit, as the answer to the questions 
certified, and will also transmit a copy to each party.