Case Title: In re H.V.

Citation: 2014-Ohio-812

Docket Number: 2012-1688

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-03-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re H.V., Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-812.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-812 
IN RE H.V. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as In re H.V., Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-812.] 
R.C. 5139.52(F)—Juvenile court has authority under R.C. 5139.52(F) to commit 
a juvenile to the custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services for a 
period exceeding 30 days—Juvenile court may order a commitment term 
for a supervised-release violation to be served consecutively to a 
commitment term for a new crime. 
(No. 2012-1688—Submitted August 20, 2013—Decided March 13, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County,  
Nos. 11CA010139 and 11CA010140, 2012-Ohio-3742. 
____________________ 
O’NEILL, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case we are asked to decide whether a juvenile court has the 
authority to commit a delinquent juvenile to the Ohio Department of Youth 
Services (“ODYS”) for a minimum period in excess of 30 days for violating his 
supervised release.  We must then decide whether a juvenile court, when 
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committing a juvenile to the ODYS for a supervised-release violation, can order 
that the commitment period be served consecutively to the commitment period 
imposed for the crime that resulted in the violation of supervised release.  We 
answer both questions in the affirmative. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} On December 8, 2010, a Lorain County Court of Common Pleas 
Juvenile Court judge found H.V. to be delinquent for having committed an act 
that if committed by an adult would have constituted attempted domestic 
violence, a felony of the fourth degree.  At the time of the offense, H.V. was on 
supervised release for committing two earlier domestic-violence offenses.  Thus, 
H.V. had also been charged with violating the terms of his supervised release, but 
that charge was merged with the attempted-domestic-violence charge.  The court 
committed H.V. to the ODYS for a minimum term of six months. 
{¶ 3} On March 17, 2011, roughly three months after his “minimum six-
month commitment” to the ODYS, H.V. was placed on supervised release from 
the ODYS.  H.V. had been involved in two fights with other juveniles before 
being released. 
{¶ 4} Approximately six months after H.V.’s release, H.V., then age 16, 
was charged with second-degree felonious assault in violation of R.C. 
2903.11(A)(1).  He was also charged with violating the terms of his supervised 
release in the 2010 domestic-violence case. 
{¶ 5} On November 23, 2011, the juvenile court judge conducted a 
dispositional hearing, revoked H.V.’s supervised release, and committed H.V. to 
the ODYS for a minimum period of 90 days for violating the conditions of his 
supervised release.  Five days later, the judge found H.V. to be delinquent and 
committed him to the ODYS for a minimum term of one year for the felonious 
assault.  The court order specified that the 90-day term imposed for the violation 
January Term, 2014 
3 
 
of supervised release would run consecutively to the one-year term imposed for 
the felonious assault. 
{¶ 6} On December 27, 2011, H.V. appealed to the Ninth District Court of 
Appeals asserting four assignments of error, two of which are relevant here.  First, 
H.V. alleged that pursuant to R.C. 5139.52(F), the juvenile court erred in 
committing him to the ODYS for a minimum period in excess of 30 days for 
violating the terms of his supervised release.  Second, he claimed that pursuant to 
R.C. 2152.17(F), the juvenile court erred when it ordered H.V. to serve his 
sentences consecutively.  The Ninth District rejected both of H.V.’s claims and 
affirmed the order of the trial court. 
{¶ 7} H.V. now seeks this court’s review of the court of appeals’ 
judgment.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the Ninth 
District. 
Analysis 
{¶ 8} A juvenile court’s disposition order will be upheld unless the court 
abused its discretion.  In re D.S., 111 Ohio St.3d 361, 2006-Ohio-5851, 856 
N.E.2d 921.  The term “abuse of discretion” implies that the trial court’s attitude 
was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.  Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio 
St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 
{¶ 9} In reviewing a case that originated in the juvenile court, we keep in 
mind the overriding purposes for dispositions of juvenile offenders as set forth by 
the General Assembly in R.C. 2152.01: to provide for the care, protection, and 
mental and physical development of the juvenile offender; to protect the public 
interest and safety; to hold the juvenile offender accountable; to restore the 
victim; and to rehabilitate the juvenile offender.  The statute further states that 
these purposes are to be achieved “by a system of graduated sanctions and 
services.”  R.C. 2152.01(A). 
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{¶ 10} First, we are asked to determine whether a juvenile court has the 
authority under R.C. 5139.52(F) to commit a delinquent juvenile to the ODYS for 
a minimum period in excess of 30 days for a violation of supervised release.  H.V. 
asserts that the juvenile court erred in committing him to the ODYS for a 
minimum period longer than 30 days.  H.V. argues that the Revised Code does 
not authorize a juvenile court to commit a delinquent juvenile to the ODYS for a 
specific minimum period for a violation of supervised release.  He argues that 
R.C. 5139.52(F) authorizes the juvenile court to return a delinquent juvenile to the 
ODYS but does not authorize the court to determine the length of the 
commitment.  H.V. suggests that following a revocation of supervised release, 
only the ODYS has the authority to impose a new period of incarceration beyond 
30 days.  We disagree. 
{¶ 11} R.C. 5139.52(F) clearly authorizes juvenile courts to return 
juveniles who have committed serious violations of the terms of their supervised 
release to the ODYS for a minimum period of 30 days.  The statute provides:  
 
(F) If a child who is on supervised release is arrested under 
an order of apprehension, under a warrant, or without a warrant as 
described in division (B)(1), (B)(2), or (C) of this section and taken 
into secure custody, and if a motion to revoke the child’s 
supervised release is filed, the juvenile court of the county in 
which the child is placed promptly shall schedule a time for a 
hearing on whether the child violated any of the terms and 
conditions of the supervised release.  If a child is released on 
supervised release and the juvenile court of the county in which the 
child is placed otherwise has reason to believe that the child has 
not complied with the terms and conditions of the supervised 
release, the court of the county in which the child is placed, in its 
January Term, 2014 
5 
 
discretion, may schedule a time for a hearing on whether the child 
violated any of the terms and conditions of the supervised release.  
If the court of the county in which the child is placed on supervised 
release conducts a hearing and determines at the hearing that the 
child did not violate any term or condition of the child’s supervised 
release, the child shall be released from custody, if the child is in 
custody at that time, and shall continue on supervised release under 
the terms and conditions that were in effect at the time of the 
child’s arrest, subject to subsequent revocation or modification.  If 
the court of the county in which the child is placed on supervised 
release conducts a hearing and determines at the hearing that the 
child violated one or more of the terms and conditions of the 
child’s supervised release, the court, if it determines that the 
violation was a serious violation, may revoke the child’s 
supervised release and order the child to be returned to the 
department of youth services for institutionalization or, in any 
case, may make any other disposition of the child authorized by 
law that the court considers proper.  If the court orders the child to 
be returned to a department of youth services institution, the child 
shall remain institutionalized for a minimum period of thirty days, 
the department shall not reduce the minimum thirty-day period of 
institutionalization for any time that the child was held in secure 
custody subsequent to the child’s arrest and pending the revocation 
hearing and the child’s return to the department, the release 
authority, in its discretion, may require the child to remain in 
institutionalization for longer than the minimum thirty-day period, 
and the child is not eligible for judicial release or early release 
during the minimum thirty-day period of institutionalization or any 
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period of institutionalization in excess of the minimum thirty-day 
period. 
 
{¶ 12} This provision clearly means that the ODYS is prohibited from 
releasing a returning violator for 30 days.  The statute speaks only to the 
minimum period of institutionalization.  It clearly vests the ODYS with the 
authority to increase the judge’s original sentence—presumably for juveniles who 
simply cannot be rehabilitated within that time—but there is no indication in this 
section that the juvenile court is limited in the amount of time that it may impose 
under this provision.  Nothing in the statute, or common sense, supports the 
proposition that the judge is limited to ordering a maximum 30-day commitment 
to the ODYS.  Our reading of the statute is further supported by the final clause 
that specifically prohibits the granting of judicial release or early release “during 
the minimum thirty-day period of institutionalization or any period of 
institutionalization in excess of the minimum thirty-day period.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  R.C. 5139.52(F).  It makes no sense to include this clause in the statute if 
the legislature intended to vest the release authority with the exclusive authority to 
determine whether the juvenile should be held for a period beyond the minimum 
30 days.  The statute is clear on its face, and the trial court and the court of 
appeals properly applied the law. 
{¶ 13} Here we have a case in which a juvenile on supervised release 
following two prior offenses was committed in 2010 to the ODYS for attempted 
domestic violence, a felony of the fourth degree.  The juvenile court merged the 
charge for that violation of supervised release with the charge for the attempted 
domestic violence.  The juvenile was later placed on supervised release, and 
within six months, he committed yet another crime, this time a felonious assault, a 
felony of the second degree.  The juvenile court properly revoked the juvenile’s 
supervised release and committed him to the ODYS for a minimum of 90 days for 
January Term, 2014 
7 
 
the supervised-release violation and for one year for the felonious assault.  We 
will not construe the statute to prevent the court from holding H.V. fully 
accountable for his behavior or to force the court to ignore the fact that H.V. was 
not only guilty of violating the conditions of his supervised release but had also 
committed another violent act.  There is no rational reason to suggest that a 
juvenile court should be limited in the sanctions that it can apply in such a 
situation.  The court’s job, after all, is not only to attempt to correct the juvenile 
but to protect the public as well.  R.C. 2152.01(A). 
{¶ 14} Felonious assault, without question, is a serious offense and a 
serious violation of supervised release.  H.V. appeared before the same juvenile 
court judge for each of the criminal offenses leading up to the felonious assault.  
We are wholly unpersuaded that this juvenile’s latest violation of supervised 
release deserved the same sanction that was imposed as a result of his previous 
supervised-release violation or that the judge abused her discretion when she 
ordered a term of commitment beyond the statutory minimum of 30 days. 
{¶ 15} We can find no provision in the Revised Code that gives the release 
authority of the ODYS the power to override a statutory minimum period of 
commitment or a minimum period of commitment ordered by a juvenile court.  
R.C. 5139.50 specifies the powers and duties of the ODYS release authority, and 
R.C. 5139.51 specifies the procedures that the ODYS release authority must 
follow when releasing a juvenile from the secure facility in which he was placed 
following a juvenile court’s order of commitment.  Both of these statutes include 
clear prohibitions against releasing a juvenile who was committed to the ODYS 
by a juvenile court order.  R.C. 5139.50(E)(1)1 and R.C. 5139.51.2   
                                                 
1 The ODYS release authority is a five-member bureau within the ODYS whose members are 
appointed by the director of the ODYS.  R.C. 5139.50(A).  R.C. 5139.50 specifies the powers and 
duties of the release authority.  The statute specifically prohibits the release authority from 
releasing juvenile offenders who have been committed to the legal custody of the ODYS and “who 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 16} Thus, we hold that a juvenile court is within its statutory authority 
under R.C. 5139.52(F) to commit a juvenile for a period exceeding the 30-day 
minimum set forth in the statute. In so doing, we affirm the judgment of the Ninth 
District Court of Appeals.  If the ODYS release authority releases a juvenile prior 
to the statutorily prescribed minimum period of 30 days, that release is contrary to 
law.  Likewise, if the ODYS release authority releases a juvenile prior to the 
expiration of the minimum time specified by a juvenile court’s order, that release 
violates a court order and is contrary to law. 
{¶ 17} Next, we are asked to determine whether a juvenile court may 
order a commitment term for a supervised-release violation to be served 
consecutively to a commitment term for a new crime.  H.V. asserts that the 
juvenile court erred when it ordered that his commitment for his supervised-
release violation pursuant to R.C. 5139.52(F) be served consecutively to his 
commitment for his new felonious-assault offense pursuant to R.C. 2152.16.  
H.V. argues that because R.C. 2152.17(F) authorizes a court to impose 
consecutive commitment periods when a juvenile commits multiple felony 
offenses and because that section does not specifically state that a court may order 
a commitment term for a new felony offense to be served consecutively to a term 
for a supervised-release violation, the juvenile court lacks the authority to require 
that these terms be served consecutively. 
                                                                                                                                     
have not completed a prescribed minimum period of time or prescribed period of time in a secure 
facility.”  R.C. 5139.50(E)(1). 
 
2 R.C. 5139.51, the statute describing the procedures the ODYS release authority must follow 
when releasing a juvenile offender, specifically states that the release authority “shall not 
discharge the child or order the child’s release on supervised visitation release prior to the 
expiration of the prescribed minimum period of institutionalization or institutionalization in a 
secure facility or prior to the child’s attainment of twenty-one years of age, whichever is 
applicable under the order of commitment, other than as is provided in section 2152.22 of the 
Revised Code [the statute setting forth the procedures for judicial release].”  
 
January Term, 2014 
9 
 
{¶ 18} We agree with H.V. that R.C. 2152.17 does not apply in this case; 
however we disagree with his assertion that because R.C. 2152.17 does not apply, 
the juvenile court lacks the statutory authority to order that the term it imposes for 
a supervised-release violation be served consecutively to the term it imposes for 
felonious assault.  Authority to impose consecutive terms can be found in R.C. 
2152.19(A)(8), which provides that “[i]f a child is adjudicated a delinquent child, 
the court may * * * [m]ake any further disposition that the court finds proper, 
* * *.” 
{¶ 19} H.V. argues that because the Revised Code enumerates 
circumstances under which a juvenile court may impose consecutive terms of 
commitment, juvenile courts are prohibited from imposing consecutive sentences 
under any other circumstances.  This court rejected that argument in In re 
Caldwell, 76 Ohio St.3d 156, 158-159, 666 N.E.2d 1367 (1996), and we reject it 
in this case as well. 
{¶ 20} Here, the juvenile court was presented with a repeat offender 
whose criminal conduct showed no signs of ebbing.  In fact, it was escalating—
from an earlier domestic-violence charge to the current felonious-assault charge.  
Under these circumstances, it would have been contrary to R.C. 2152.01(A), 
which requires juvenile courts to hold offenders accountable for their actions by 
imposing graduated sanctions, for the juvenile court to continue to order the same 
sanction despite the escalating and dangerous criminal behavior.  R.C. 
2152.19(A)(8) expressly grants juvenile courts the authority to make any 
disposition that the court finds proper.  By ordering that the commitment period 
imposed for H.V.’s latest supervised-release violation be served consecutively to 
the commitment period imposed for the felonious assault, the juvenile court, 
pursuant to the authority in R.C. 2152.19(A)(8), imposed a more severe sanction 
than it had imposed for his previous violation, in accordance with R.C. 
2152.01(A). 
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{¶ 21} Thus, we hold that the juvenile court was within its statutory 
authority under R.C. 2152.19(A)(8), 5139.52(F), and 2152.01(A) to order H.V. to 
serve the imposed term of commitment for his supervised-release violation 
consecutively to the imposed term of commitment for his new crime.  In so doing, 
we affirm the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 22} We hold that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it 
ordered H.V. to serve a minimum 90-day term for a serious violation of 
supervised release.  This order was made in accordance with the plain language of 
R.C. 5139.52(F).  We also hold that it was not an abuse of discretion for the 
juvenile court to order the term of commitment imposed for the supervised-
release violation to be served consecutively to the term of commitment imposed 
for the underlying offense and that this order was made in accordance with the 
plain language of R.C. 2152.19(A)(8) and 2152.01(A). 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. 
FRENCH, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., dissent. 
____________________ 
 
FRENCH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 23} I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the juvenile court could 
order H.V.’s commitments to be served consecutively.  Like the majority, I find 
In re Caldwell, 76 Ohio St.3d 156, 666 N.E.2d 1367 (1996), to be dispositive on 
this issue. 
{¶ 24} Caldwell dealt with identical statutory language and identical 
arguments.  There, we were asked to decide whether a juvenile court had 
authority to order consecutive terms of commitment under former R.C. 
2151.355(A)(11), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 725, 144 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6368, 6372, 
January Term, 2014 
11 
 
effective April 16, 1993.  Former R.C. 2151.355(A)(11) gave juvenile courts the 
ability to “[m]ake any further disposition that the court finds proper.”  We held 
that this catchall language allows courts to impose consecutive commitment 
terms.  Id. at 159. 
{¶ 25} R.C. 2151.355(A)(11) was repealed in 2002, but the pertinent 
language from that section was reenacted in R.C. 2152.19(A), the statute at issue 
here.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 179, 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 9447, 9573, relevant 
sections effective January 1, 2002.  The relevant language of both statutes is 
identical; like its predecessor, R.C. 2152.19(A)(8) gives a court the authority to 
“[m]ake any further disposition that the court finds proper.”  Per Caldwell, this 
language clearly “includes the authority to order consecutive terms of 
commitment.”  Id. at 159.  Because Caldwell is dispositive and indistinguishable, 
I agree with the majority opinion that the juvenile court had the authority to order 
consecutive commitments. 
{¶ 26} I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority’s determination 
that the juvenile court can commit a juvenile to a minimum term of commitment 
in excess of 30 days.  If a juvenile violates parole, a court can, under R.C. 
5139.52(F), revoke the parole and return the child to the Ohio Department of 
Youth Services (“ODYS”).  R.C. 5139.52(F) does not grant the court any 
authority to determine the term of the juvenile’s commitment, minimum or 
maximum.  The minimum 30-day term is imposed by statute, and the maximum 
term (or rather, the child’s release date) is left solely to the discretion of ODYS.  
The court simply has no authority to determine the length of the ODYS 
commitment at all.  It may only revoke parole and return the child to ODYS.  I 
join the Chief Justice’s well-reasoned dissent on this issue. 
____________________ 
 
 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 27} The majority’s decision to affirm the Ninth District Court of 
Appeals is not supported by the language of the relevant statutes or by the General 
Assembly’s rationale in enacting those laws. 
{¶ 28} The juvenile court did not have the power to designate a mandatory 
minimum confinement term of 90 days when ordering H.V.’s return to the Ohio 
Department of Youth Services (“ODYS”) to continue serving under his 2010 
disposition, and that portion of the juvenile court’s November 23, 2011 revocation 
disposition should be reversed as unlawful.  And because the juvenile court did 
not have the power to order H.V. to serve the confinement term imposed for his 
supervised-release violation consecutively to the confinement term imposed for 
the new delinquency adjudication, that portion of the November 23, 2011 
disposition also should be reversed as unlawful.  I therefore dissent. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 29} Upon revocation of a child’s supervised release, a juvenile court 
has no authority to increase the 30-day mandatory minimum period of 
confinement set forth in R.C. 5139.52(F).  Additionally, in enacting R.C. 2152.17, 
the General Assembly chose to permit consecutive terms of confinement only for 
certain enumerated specifications or dispositions involving multiple offenses that 
would be felonies if committed by an adult, leaving juvenile courts without 
authority to impose consecutive terms outside of these specified circumstances.  
The juvenile court therefore acted in excess of its statutory authority when it 
increased H.V.’s mandatory minimum term of confinement under R.C. 
5139.52(F) and imposed consecutive terms of confinement in a way that was not 
permitted by R.C. 2152.17. 
 
 
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13 
 
A juvenile court has no authority to increase the statutory 
minimum term of institutionalization 
{¶ 30} The plain language of R.C. 5139.52(F) dictates that once a 
juvenile’s supervised release is revoked and his original indefinite term of 
institutionalization is reinstated, a minimum 30-day term of institutionalization 
arises as a matter of law.  By construing the 30-day term in R.C. 5139.52(F) as 
merely the baseline for the juvenile court’s discretion to impose any minimum 
term of institutionalization, the majority fails to recognize the significance of 
minimum and indefinite sentencing provisions in the context of juvenile cases, as 
well as the significance of statutory limitations on the discretionary authority of 
both the juvenile court and the ODYS. 
{¶ 31} The juvenile justice system exists as “ ‘an uneasy partnership of 
law and social work,’ ” In re Agler, 19 Ohio St.2d 70, 73, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969), 
quoting Whitlatch, The Juvenile Court, 18 W.Res.L.Rev. 1239, 1246 (1967), 
which serves to both support and correct its wards in an “institutionalized and 
thus reliable manner,” id.  Juvenile proceedings are neither criminal nor penal in 
nature, and the juvenile justice system must value, above all, the child’s welfare 
and betterment.  See In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 
1177, ¶ 66-67. 
{¶ 32} The purposes underlying all juvenile dispositions are set forth in 
R.C. 2152.01(A): “to provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical 
development of children subject to this chapter [R.C. Chapter 2152], protect the 
public interest and safety, hold the offender accountable for the offender’s 
actions, restore the victim, and rehabilitate the offender.”  And “[t]hese purposes 
shall be achieved by a system of graduated sanctions and services.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Id.  The various traditional juvenile dispositions available to a trial court 
are delineated in R.C. 2152.16, 2152.17, 2152.19, and 2152.20.  R.C. 2152.02(Z).  
A child is eligible for harsher sanctions only upon reaching a certain age and for 
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certain serious misconduct.  See, e.g., R.C. 2152.11 (serious-youthful-offender 
dispositions); R.C. 2152.12 (transfer of cases from juvenile to adult criminal 
proceedings). 
{¶ 33} In this case, H.V. was adjudicated through the traditional juvenile 
process for committing a fourth-degree felony at the age of 15.  In fashioning an 
appropriate disposition for H.V., the juvenile court had a choice among various 
traditional juvenile dispositions: placement into the legal custody of ODYS for 
secure confinement, R.C. 2152.16; placement in a detention facility, R.C. 
2152.19(A)(3); placement under house arrest, R.C. 2152.19(A)(4)(j); the 
imposition of fines, R.C. 2152.20(A)(1); and additional options or combinations 
of options. 
{¶ 34} But after the juvenile court chose to place H.V. in the legal custody 
of ODYS for secure confinement, the court’s discretion regarding that 
confinement was limited by R.C. 2152.16 and 2152.18.  Because H.V. was 
adjudicated delinquent for a fourth-degree felony, the juvenile court had no 
discretion to impose anything other than an indefinite term of institutionalization 
with a minimum period of six months and a maximum period up to H.V.’s 21st 
birthday.  R.C. 2152.16(A)(1)(e).  The juvenile court was also required to credit 
H.V. for the 83 days that H.V. spent in a detention home while awaiting the 
juvenile court’s December 8, 2010 dispositional decision, causing H.V.’s 
minimum six-month term to expire on or about March 16, 2011.  R.C. 
2152.18(B).3 
{¶ 35} Because the juvenile court committed H.V. to the permanent legal 
custody of ODYS, the court ceased to have jurisdiction over H.V. in relation to 
the 2010 adjudication, except under limited circumstances.  R.C. 2152.22(A).  
The juvenile court’s jurisdiction became limited to (1) granting judicial release 
                                                 
3 The majority implies in ¶ 3 that ODYS permitted H.V.’s release after he had served only three 
months toward his six-month mandatory minimum term.  This implication is patently incorrect.   
January Term, 2014 
15 
 
during H.V.’s minimum six-month institutionalization period under certain 
conditions provided in R.C. 2152.22(B) and (C), (2) granting judicial release at 
any time after the minimum period under R.C. 2152.22(D), (3) determining 
whether H.V. violated the terms of his judicial release and, if so, revoking judicial 
release pursuant to the conditions of R.C. 2152.22(E), and (4) under R.C. 
2152.22(H), performing certain judicial functions related to a decision by ODYS 
to release H.V. and revocation of that release under R.C. 5139.51 and 5139.52.  
Conversely, upon being granted permanent legal custody of H.V. up to his 21st 
birthday, ODYS’s authority to determine the trajectory of H.V.’s rehabilitation 
was plenary, subject to the above limitations provided by statute.  R.C. 
2152.22(A). 
Within 
the 
parameters 
of 
H.V.’s 
indefinite 
term 
of 
institutionalization, ODYS had the authority to release H.V. at any point that it 
determined that its rehabilitative efforts had reached a satisfactory end.  Ohio 
Adm.Code 5139-68-03. 
{¶ 36} A review of the authority granted to and the constraints placed 
upon both the juvenile court and ODYS by the legislature requires a conclusion 
that after the disposition in a traditional juvenile proceeding, the statutes are 
primarily focused on facilitating the release of the child from confinement.  After 
a child serves a minimum period of confinement, the ODYS has the authority to 
release the child, even if the juvenile court does not believe that he or she should 
be released.  And the juvenile court can order the child’s release, even if ODYS 
does not believe that he or she should be released.  R.C. 5139.51; 2152.22.  
Neither of these statutes allows either entity to compel a child’s confinement past 
the minimum term if the other entity wants him or her to be released. 
{¶ 37} This general standard of promoting release from institutionalization 
is subject to few exceptions, but the revocation-of-supervised-release rule of R.C. 
5139.52(F) contains one of those exceptions.  The statute provides that after a 
juvenile court determines that a child has committed a serious violation of the 
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terms and conditions of the child’s supervised release, the juvenile court may 
return the child to ODYS pursuant to the prior adjudication or it may craft any 
other disposition that is “authorized by law that the court considers proper.”  R.C. 
5139.52(F). 
{¶ 38} Although the juvenile court’s discretionary authority under the 
language of R.C. 5139.52(F) seems practically limitless when read out of context, 
it must be remembered that the juvenile court’s authority under R.C. 5139.52(F) 
arises only in circumstances in which the court’s general authority has otherwise 
been extinguished.  R.C. 2152.22(A).  Because the juvenile court’s authority over 
the child is restored only to the limited extent provided by R.C. 5139.52(F), the 
majority’s generosity in construing the court’s discretionary powers is not 
supported by the statutory scheme.  Moreover, just as with H.V.’s original 2010 
disposition, when the juvenile court revoked H.V.’s supervised release, the 
juvenile court had the discretion to choose among various lawful dispositional 
options, but its discretion became limited by the applicable terms of the option it 
selected.  Thus, once the juvenile court opted to return H.V. to ODYS, the other 
terms of H.V.’s disposition were controlled by the remainder of the language in 
R.C. 5139.52(F):   
 
[T]he child shall remain institutionalized for a minimum period of 
thirty days, [ODYS] shall not reduce the minimum thirty-day 
period of institutionalization for any time that the child was held in 
secure custody subsequent to the child’s arrest and pending the 
revocation hearing and the child’s return to [ODYS], the [ODYS] 
release authority, in its discretion, may require the child to remain 
in institutionalization for longer than the minimum thirty-day 
period, and the child is not eligible for judicial release or early 
release 
during 
the 
minimum 
thirty-day 
period 
of 
January Term, 2014 
17 
 
institutionalization or any period of institutionalization in excess of 
the minimum thirty-day period. 
 
{¶ 39} When construing this and any other statute, our paramount concern 
is the legislative intent in enacting the statute, and our interpretation of the 
specific words used is guided by their plain, customary meaning.  Yonkings v. 
Wilkinson, 86 Ohio St.3d 225, 227, 714 N.E.2d 394 (1999).  A plain reading of 
the terms and modifiers in the above statutory language reveals that the trial court 
no longer has any control over the length of a child’s confinement after choosing 
to return the child to the custody of ODYS.  It is only ODYS that is authorized to 
resume its role of carrying out the indefinite term of institutionalization imposed 
in the original disposition. 
{¶ 40} Although the statute states that “the court * * * may * * * order the 
child to be returned” to ODYS, it does not authorize the court to prescribe a 
minimum term of institutionalization.  R.C. 5139.52(F).  Instead, the 30-day-
minimum term arises from the statute, and all further references to the juvenile 
court serve only to vitiate the court’s normal discretionary power to release the 
child from confinement.  Thus the length of the child’s confinement after 
revocation is not within the trial court’s authority.  This makes sense because the 
revocation is merely a reinstatement of the juvenile court’s previous disposition 
for the child, and a court neither has the power to alter the terms of the original 
disposition nor the power to increase the child’s minimum term of confinement. 
{¶ 41} The General Assembly’s reason for inserting a minimum-term-of-
confinement rule in R.C. 5139.52(F) is clear.  The child has necessarily already 
completed a minimum term of confinement, so both the court and ODYS would 
ordinarily have the authority to immediately release the child the moment after the 
child returns to secure confinement.  The 30-day rule acts, in effect, as a 
temporary stay on the release powers that either entity might be able to exercise.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
The 30-day rule, as well as its provision that prevents ODYS from reducing that 
30-day minimum period by crediting the child with the time he or she served, 
prevents an immediate release from occurring, and ensures that a child will be 
held accountable for the violation of supervised release. 
{¶ 42} The majority gives a juvenile court discretion to impose a longer 
minimum confinement period than the 30 days allowed by statute when the 
juvenile court believes that 30 days is not sufficient to hold the juvenile 
accountable for the new offense.  But the majority’s concerns are addressed in 
provisions such as R.C. 2152.16(C) and 2152.19, which direct a juvenile court to 
consider any prior adjudications when fashioning a disposition for a new 
adjudication.  Nothing in R.C. 5139.52(F) diminishes the juvenile court’s 
authority to impose other terms of institutionalization for newly committed 
offenses, so the majority’s concern that a juvenile will not be held accountable for 
additional offenses is mistaken. 
{¶ 43} Thus, not only is the majority’s expansion of judicial discretion 
unsupported by the plain language of the statutory scheme, it is redundant, as its 
purposes are already served by the 30-day “stay” of R.C. 5139.52(F) and statutory 
directives for new adjudications. 
{¶ 44} The majority stresses that nothing in R.C. 5139.52(F) indicates that 
the child can be reinstitutionalized for a maximum of 30 days.  The majority is 
certainly correct on that point:  any child who was originally committed to secure 
confinement under R.C. 2152.16(A)(1) has a maximum, indefinite term that 
extends to the child’s attainment of 21 years of age, and nothing in R.C. 
5139.52(F) allows the trial court to decrease that maximum when the child is 
returned to commitment under his original disposition.  By the same token, 
however, nothing in R.C. 5139.52(F) allows the trial court to take it upon itself to 
increase the mandatory minimum terms provided by R.C. 2152.16(A)(1). 
January Term, 2014 
19 
 
{¶ 45} Discretion to upwardly depart from minimum periods of 
confinement should not be read into a juvenile dispositional statute, particularly 
where the General Assembly elsewhere has explicitly evidenced its intent for the 
court to have such discretion in other dispositional provisions.  See, e.g., R.C. 
2152.16(A)(1)(b) (for attempted murder or attempted aggravated murder, the 
sentence prescribed is “a minimum period of six or seven years as prescribed by 
the court and a maximum not to exceed the child’s attainment of twenty-one years 
of age” [emphasis added]); R.C. 2152.16(A)(1)(c) (for certain enumerated 
felonies, “a minimum period of one to three years, as prescribed by the court, and 
a maximum period not to exceed the child’s attainment of twenty-one years of 
age” [emphasis added]). 
{¶ 46} Although the majority finds authority for the juvenile court in the 
absence of an explicit prohibition from the General Assembly, doing so severely 
undermines other provisions within the juvenile justice system.  For example, 
although R.C. 2152.16 provides instructions only for the institutionalization of 
children who have committed felony offenses, nothing in the statute prohibits the 
court from institutionalizing a child for a misdemeanor offense.  But it is well 
settled that a juvenile court does not have the authority to institutionalize a 
misdemeanant child, regardless of its discretion to impose any disposition it 
deems proper.  In re J.W., 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2004-02-036 and CA2004-
03-061, 2004-Ohio-7139, ¶ 16-21; Wright v. Bower, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 
79794, 2001 WL 824472 (July 16, 2001); In re T.N., 3d Dist. Union No. 14-12-
13, 2013-Ohio-135, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 47} In R.C. 5139.52(F), the only entity identified as having the 
discretion to determine the timing of a child’s release from an indefinite term of 
confinement after the 30-day minimum period is the ODYS release authority.  
The General Assembly easily could have stated that the juvenile court also had 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
the authority to extend a child’s term of institutionalization, but the General 
Assembly chose not to do so. 
{¶ 48} When the juvenile court committed H.V. to the custody of ODYS 
in 2010, it had no authority to impose a definite term of institutionalization, and 
no authority to alter the minimum and maximum terms of the mandatory 
indefinite sentence provided in R.C. 2152.16(A)(1)(e).  It is illogical to assume 
from a mere lack of explicit prohibition that the juvenile court would later have 
the discretion to impose a definite term of institutionalization for a supervised-
release revocation, even up to the very maximum limits.  There is nothing to 
indicate that the General Assembly intended such a result, particularly in light of 
the fact that a child institutionalized pursuant to R.C. 5139.52(F) as a result of a 
supervised-release revocation is not eligible for early release.  A provision 
providing the court with the discretion to impose an irrevocable, definite term of 
institutionalization for a supervised-release revocation—in excess of any possible 
term of institutionalization that would have been lawful in the child’s original 
disposition—would completely undermine the purpose of the laws that a juvenile 
judge is obligated to uphold. 
{¶ 49} It would be antithetical to the rehabilitative goals of the traditional 
juvenile system to allow a permanent term of confinement to be imposed prior to 
the child’s reintroduction to an ODYS institutional environment, because at that 
time, it is not known how the child is going to respond to rehabilitative efforts.  
Such a disposition would be even more restrictive and punitive than the use of 
stayed adult sentences in serious-youthful-offender dispositional proceedings, as 
it would leave a child no motivation to change his or her behavior and meet 
assigned rehabilitative goals in order to avoid a definite sentence. 
{¶ 50} If the 30-day-minimum-institutionaliztion provision in R.C. 
5139.52(F) truly allows a trial court to impose any definite term of 
institutionalization that it deems proper within the range of the child’s previous 
January Term, 2014 
21 
 
indefinite term, the revocation no longer has the quality of a juvenile disposition.  
Instead, it is a punitive sentence.  The juvenile court has the authority to enforce 
its own judgment by returning the child to ODYS under the original disposition, 
and it has the authority to do anything else that might be lawful and proper.  But 
lawful and proper dispositions do not include those in which the court exceeds the 
dispositional mandates and instructions of the legislature and imposes what is, in 
essence, a criminal sentence within traditional juvenile proceedings. 
{¶ 51} I would therefore hold that the juvenile court did not have the 
power to impose a mandatory minimum institutionalization term of 90 days after 
ordering H.V.’s return to ODYS to continue serving under his 2010 disposition 
and would hold that the disposition must be reversed as unlawful. 
The juvenile statutory scheme does not permit a juvenile court to  
impose an institutionalization term for a supervised-release  
revocation consecutively to a new term of institutionalization 
{¶ 52} Just as the phrase “any other disposition * * * that the court 
considers proper” in R.C. 5139.52(F) is not carte blanche for juvenile courts to 
disregard other statutory limits, the general reference in R.C. 2152.19(A)(8) to the 
juvenile court’s authority to make any disposition that it finds proper does not 
expand what constitutes a lawful disposition under the juvenile statutory scheme.  
Looking at the more specific terms of R.C. 2152.17, it is clear that the General 
Assembly has delineated the circumstances under which a court may impose 
consecutive terms of institutionalization and that the circumstances of H.V.’s 
dispositions are not among those listed. 
{¶ 53} Neither the dispositional provisions of R.C. 2152.16 nor the 
revocation provisions of R.C. 5139.52 provide the juvenile court with the 
authority 
to 
run 
institutionalization 
terms 
for 
revocation 
dispositions 
consecutively to institutionalization terms for new delinquency dispositions.  
Most certainly, the juvenile court does not have the “inherent power” to run the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
terms consecutively, as the Ninth District held in this case.  In re H.V., 9th Dist. 
Lorain Nos. 11CA010139 and 11CA010140, 2012-Ohio-3742, at ¶ 10. 
{¶ 54} A court’s inherent authority is a power that is neither created nor 
assailable by acts of the legislature.  Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 215, 45 N.E. 
199 (1896). But a juvenile court is a creature of statute and therefore has only 
such powers as are conferred upon it by the legislature.  See In re Agler, 19 Ohio 
St.2d at 72-74, 249 N.E.2d 808.  Thus it has little, if any, inherent power. 
{¶ 55} It is the legislature that has the authority to define offenses and fix 
penalties, and it is the legislature that authorizes the judiciary to pass a particular 
sentence upon an accused.  Ex parte Fleming, 123 Ohio St. 16, 173 N.E. 441 
(1930), at paragraph one of the syllabus; Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42, 
37 S.Ct. 72, 61 L.Ed. 129 (1916).  See also State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 
2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 22 (“Judges have no inherent power to create 
sentences”). 
{¶ 56} In the face of silence on the issue of consecutive terms of 
institutionalization, it should not be inferred that a juvenile court has the 
discretion to order multiple confinement terms to be served consecutively.  
Although this court made that inference in In re Caldwell, 76 Ohio St.3d 156, 666 
N.E.2d 1367 (1996), the circumstances of Caldwell, both in law and in fact, are 
far different from the circumstances of the present case. 
{¶ 57} In Caldwell, the child had been adjudicated delinquent in 1994 in 
two cases that were heard together.  In re Caldwell, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 
94APF07-996 and 94APF07-997, 1995 WL 46199 (Jan. 31, 1995).  In the first 
case, the child was adjudicated delinquent on two fourth-degree felony counts of 
aggravated vehicular assault, and in the second case, the child was adjudicated 
delinquent on a third-degree felony count of receiving stolen property.  The 
juvenile court imposed terms of institutionalization for each of the three counts 
and ordered that they be served consecutively.  This court’s approval of the 
January Term, 2014 
23 
 
juvenile court’s dispositional decision was based on the fact that (1) the applicable 
version of R.C. Chapter 2151 made no mention of consecutive dispositions, (2) 
the only guidance on the issue was found in the instructions that a court shall 
“[m]ake any further disposition that the court finds proper” under former R.C. 
2151.355(A)(11), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 725, 144 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6368, 6372, 
effective April 16, 1993, and (3) future cases would be governed by the then 
newly amended R.C. 2151.355(B)(2), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, 146 Ohio Laws, Part I, 
31, 34, effective January 1, 1996, which expressly provided for consecutive terms 
of confinement in cases such as Caldwell’s.  Caldwell, 76 Ohio St.3d at 158-159, 
666 N.E.2d 1367, fn. 1. 
{¶ 58} Caldwell was decided at a time when R.C. Chapter 2151 governed 
children who were abused, neglected, or dependent, as well as juvenile 
delinquents.  See In re Cross, 96 Ohio St.3d 328, 2002-Ohio-4183, 774 N.E.2d 
258, ¶ 9.  However, the juvenile statutory scheme was significantly altered in 
2002 by the Juvenile Justice Reform Act, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 179, 148 Ohio Laws, 
Part IV, 9447.  Both bodies of juvenile law were revised, and R.C. Chapter 2152 
was enacted to exclusively address juvenile delinquency.  Cross at  ¶ 11. 
{¶ 59} Caldwell was also decided at a time when Ohio’s criminal 
sentencing code retained the common-law preference for consecutive sentences.  
State v. Hodge, 128 Ohio St.3d 1, 2010-Ohio-6320, 941 N.E. 2d 768, ¶ 26 (stating 
that “the common law prefer[red] consecutive sentences over concurrent 
sentences”).  Comprehensive changes were made to the sentencing code by 1995 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136, effective July 1, 1996.  For 
example, R.C. 2929.41(A) was amended to presume that sentences would be 
served concurrently unless a court stated otherwise.  Although R.C. 2929.41(A) 
was excised by State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 
470, the identical language of R.C. 2929.41(A) was reenacted in full by the 
legislature in 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86, effective September 30, 2011.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
Accordingly, a whole host of direct and analogous presumptions that existed at 
the time of Caldwell are no longer valid in the present day. 
{¶ 60} Here, we are not facing the same lack of direction on the issue of 
consecutive terms of confinement in the juvenile statutes as we were in Caldwell, 
and we are also facing a very different juvenile statutory scheme from what 
existed at the time of Caldwell.  The General Assembly has now addressed the 
issue of consecutive terms of confinement for a delinquent child by enacting R.C. 
2152.17.  Pursuant to R.C. 2152.17(E), if a child is adjudicated a delinquent for a 
felony and the child also committed one of several enumerated specifications, the 
child’s term of confinement for the specification must be served consecutively to 
the term of confinement for the underlying delinquent act.  And pursuant to R.C. 
2152.17(G), the juvenile court may impose consecutive terms of confinement if it 
adjudicates a child delinquent for multiple felony offenses and commits the child 
to the legal custody of ODYS for each offense.  Neither of those circumstances 
applies here. 
 
The Ohio Legislature having dealt with the subject, and having 
made certain provisions and certain exceptions thereto, it will be 
presumed that the Legislature has exhausted the legislative intent, 
and that it has not intended the practice to be extended further than 
the plain import of the statutes already enacted. The well-known 
maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, applies. 
 
Madjorous v. State, 113 Ohio St. 427, 433, 149 N.E. 393 (1925). 
{¶ 61} R.C. 2152.17 does not state that a juvenile court is permitted to 
order that a term of confinement imposed from a revocation disposition be served 
consecutively to a term of confinement from a new adjudication of delinquency.  
And this court has no power to create additional juvenile court authority.  The 
January Term, 2014 
25 
 
extension of authority to impose consecutive confinement terms is a policy matter 
within the purview of the legislature.  In re M.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-
Ohio-4538, 978 N.E.2d 164, ¶ 28 (Lanzinger, J., concurring).  Just as the General 
Assembly amended R.C. Chapter 2152 to allow for consecutive confinement 
terms in certain circumstances, it could do so for the circumstances in this case. 
{¶ 62} We must remain mindful throughout this process that if the 
juvenile court has decided to utilize the traditional juvenile process rather than 
bind a juvenile over to adult criminal proceedings, we cannot allow criminal-
sentencing notions to creep into our assumptions, and we certainly cannot allow 
them to creep into our explicit analysis.  Instead, we must keep in mind the 
fundamental rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system.  See In re C.S., 
115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 67. 
{¶ 63} If a county prosecuting attorney thinks that a child’s offenses are 
serious enough that the traditional juvenile process will not rehabilitate the child 
and protect the public and that harsher sanctions should apply, the prosecuting 
attorney may request serious-youthful-offender proceedings as provided in R.C. 
2152.13 or move to bind the child over to adult criminal proceedings as provided 
in R.C. 2152.12, and the court will grant such requests under the appropriate 
circumstances.  If the minimum confinement period of a possible disposition does 
not adequately address the concerns voiced by the majority regarding a child’s 
serious, repeated, or escalating criminal conduct, the proper remedy is to use the 
alternative “graduated sanctions” that are available within the juvenile code.  R.C. 
2152.01(A).  But the court cannot, and should not, change or expand the 
dispositions available in the juvenile code. 
{¶ 64} I would therefore hold that the juvenile court did not have the 
authority to order that the confinement term imposed for the supervised-release 
revocation be served consecutively to the confinement term imposed for the new 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
delinquency disposition and that the offending portion of the November 23, 2011 
disposition must be reversed as unlawful. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 65} In the end, it may have been a very good idea for H.V. to remain in 
secure confinement for the term imposed by the juvenile court.  But the fact that 
H.V.’s case does not cry out for a shorter term of institutionalization is irrelevant 
to the determination whether the juvenile court had statutory authority to act as it 
did.  Unsympathetic circumstances provide a perfect opportunity for bad law—
law that will have an adverse impact on more sympathetic cases in the future.  But 
my concern is not solely with the court’s trampling on the important public 
policies behind the juvenile code, e.g., to rehabilitate young offenders.  It offends 
the law and our constitutions when a judge legislates from the bench in order to 
increase the confinement period that may be imposed on a child merely because 
the judge believes that the confinement period allowed under the statute is too 
lenient in a particular situation.  The statutes that govern dispositions in juvenile 
cases are for the General Assembly, and not judges, to create.  Once created, 
courts must employ the statutes in order to fashion proper, just sanctions for 
delinquent youth. 
{¶ 66} In cases in which we believe that punishment is paramount to 
rehabilitation, judges must rely on the juvenile statutes that allow for bindover, 
serious-youthful-offender hybrid sentencing, or any number of additional 
dispositions, to address cases in which the juvenile presents a risk that cannot be 
addressed in the juvenile system.  Judges cannot, however, alter a statutory 
scheme in order to fashion a remedy in any given case.  Because the majority 
ignores the proper role of the judicial branch, I dissent. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
January Term, 2014 
27 
 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Sheryl Trzaska, Assistant 
State Public Defender, for appellant. 
Dennis P. Will, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and Chris A. 
Pyanowski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee, the state of Ohio. 
_________________________