Case Title: State v. Edron D. Broomfield

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1997AP000520-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0520-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Edron D. Broomfield,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  214 Wis. 2d 591, 571 N.W.2d 925 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 2, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 8, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
John H. Lussow 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Charles Bennett Vetzner, assistant 
state public defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Paul Lundsten, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No.  97-0520-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
 
 
No. 97-0520-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Edron D. Broomfield,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
FEB 2, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.  The defendant, Edron D. Broomfield, 
seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 
which affirmed his judgment of conviction for burglary and for 
operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent, and the 
order denying his motion for post-conviction relief entered by 
the Circuit Court for Rock County, John H. Lussow, Judge.  
Broomfield argues that he was denied his right to a fair and 
impartial jury because a juror, who prior to trial had overheard 
information regarding his past alleged misconduct, was biased 
against him, and this bias infected the jury’s deliberations 
warranting a new trial.  The circuit court and court of appeals 
determined 
that 
Broomfield 
failed 
to 
establish 
that 
the 
                     
1 State v. Broomfield, No. 97-0520-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1997).   
No. 97-0520-CR 
 
2 
“extraneous information,” as defined in Wis. Stat. § 906.06(2) 
(1995-96),2 had tainted the jury, or had ever been discussed by 
the jury.  Thus, the information did not impeach the verdict.  
We agree, and therefore, we affirm.  
 I. 
¶2 
The relevant facts are as follows.  Broomfield and a 
companion, Ferdinand Sparger, were charged with burglary and 
operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent after the 
two entered a home where a friend lived with her grandmother, 
and without permission, drove off with the grandmother’s car.3  
Prior to the selection of the jury for Broomfield’s August 1995 
trial, his counsel informed the court that the jury impaneled 
for this trial included members of a prior panel as well as 
several jurors who had served on a previous trial involving 
Broomfield on different charges.  The jury on the previous trial 
was unable to reach a verdict, resulting in a hung jury and a 
mistrial.  Broomfield’s trial counsel expressed concern whether 
Broomfield could receive an impartial panel.  At the State’s 
suggestion, the circuit court agreed to use the voir dire 
process to determine whether any jurors had any prejudices or 
                     
2 All references are to the 1995-96 version of the statutes 
unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Two days earlier, someone had attempted to burglarize the 
home, and in the process had beaten up the grandmother.  Even 
though she owned the home, and had left most of her things in 
the home, the grandmother at the time of the auto theft had 
moved to another daughter’s home.  The granddaughter’s family 
remained in the home.   
No. 97-0520-CR 
 
3 
not.  Trial counsel did not voice any further objection to 
proceed with trial.   
¶3 
During the jury selection process, eight jurors from 
the defendant’s previous trial were called; five were removed 
for cause and the three remaining jurors were dismissed on 
peremptory challenges, two by the defense and one by the State. 
In the process, the entire panel learned of Broomfield’s prior 
trial and the resulting hung jury.4  The circuit court explained 
that the trial had an “acrimonious ending” with “a lot of 
disagreement among people,” but it specifically instructed the 
panel that this is a new case and “whatever else went on in 
another court has absolutely nothing to do with this.”   
¶4 
At trial, a neighbor testified that she phoned the 
police when she saw two men suspiciously hanging around the 
victim’s home.  The neighbor watched the men check the doors, 
enter the garage and then drive off in the victim’s vehicle.  
The two men were picked up by police and positively identified 
by the neighbor as the men who took the vehicle.  Both 
Broomfield’s friend and her grandmother, the victim, testified 
                     
4 Broomfield’s trial counsel specifically asked the three 
jurors from the prior trial if they would be able to decide the 
guilt or innocence of Broomfield on the merits of this case and 
not be affected by the prior case.  All three nodded 
affirmatively.  Counsel also asked the three jurors separately, 
and then the entire panel if there was something about the prior 
case that might affect their ability to listen to this case 
impartially and weigh the evidence fairly, to which there was no 
response.  Counsel then wanted to know if the panel’s knowledge 
of Broomfield’s prior charges caused them to think he is guilty 
in this case.  Again, no one responded affirmatively.   
No. 97-0520-CR 
 
4 
that they did not give Broomfield or his accomplice permission 
to enter the home, to enter the garage, or to use the vehicle. 
¶5 
Broomfield’s accomplice also testified as part of a 
plea agreement with the State.  He indicated that Broomfield 
suggested that they steal the car and then sell it.  When they 
were stopped by the police, he stated that they agreed to say 
that the victim’s granddaughter had given them permission to 
take the car even though that was not true.   
¶6 
The jury found Broomfield guilty on both counts.  
Following the conviction, he filed a motion for post-conviction 
relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  At the 
August 1996 hearing on the motion, one of the jurors who had 
served on the jury, Gerald McCann, testified that before court 
was in session, he had overheard a man and a woman discussing 
Broomfield.  They said he was “a gangster” and a troublemaker 
with pending trials, that he beat up a bunch of kids and that he 
was involved in “drive-bys.”  He understood that one of them had 
been on a previous jury involving Broomfield, and that neither 
of them wanted to be on another trial.  He stated that he “kind 
of shrugged [the information] off a little bit,” but was 
interrupted by Broomfield’s appellate counsel before he could 
explain why.  
¶7 
When asked if he had discussed the information he had 
overheard with anyone, McCann stated that he had no specific 
recollection of telling the other jurors.  He testified that the 
only information he could remember being discussed during jury 
deliberations that related to the previous trial was how long it 
No. 97-0520-CR 
 
5 
had lasted; a woman wanted to know if she would be home in time 
for lunch.  McCann also testified that, as he told the court 
during voir dire, he set aside other information and confined 
his decision solely on the facts presented.  
¶8 
Broomfield’s trial counsel also testified at the 
motion hearing.  Counsel stated that he was concerned about the 
jury panel because a number of the potential jurors had served 
on the previous hung jury, some of whom looked quite frustrated 
at the end of trial, and that there may be prior jurors who were 
annoyed that Broomfield was not convicted in the prior case.  It 
also concerned him that these prior jurors were aware of the 
earlier charges brought against Broomfield.  He did believe the 
voir dire process was an adequate procedure to eliminate the 
problem.  However, there were no questions asked of the jury 
panel, by the judge or attorneys, whether they knew anything 
else about, or knew Broomfield in any way.5  
¶9 
The circuit court found that prior to the jury 
selection, juror McCann heard some mention of a hung jury, but 
could not be specific about what was said.  As to his testimony 
about discussions in the jury room, the court found it to be 
“very indefinite and nebulous.”  The court also found that juror 
                     
5 At the post-conviction hearing, Broomfield’s trial counsel 
indicated that he did not consider the possibility that there 
could have been some possible discussion among prior jurors and 
those on the panel who were unfamiliar with Broomfield.  Even if 
he had considered that, he testified that he would not have 
acted differently. 
No. 97-0520-CR 
 
6 
McCann’s testimony that he was fair and impartial and that he 
and the jury followed the instructions was believable.  
¶10 The circuit court further determined that based on 
Broomfield’s 
trial 
counsel’s 
history 
of 
exceptional 
representation, including an “excellent job” in this case, and 
because the decisions were a matter of trial strategy, his 
performance was not deficient.  In addition, the court held that 
based on the overwhelming evidence in this case, Broomfield 
suffered 
no 
prejudice. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
court 
rejected 
Broomfield’s contention that the jury was biased by any improper 
information it heard, or that a new trial was warranted.  The 
court affirmed the verdict and Broomfield appealed. 
¶11 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
affirmed. 
Addressing 
the 
extraneous information,6 the court concluded that even assuming 
juror McCann was competent to testify, he could not state with 
specificity one single extraneous fact that had actually been 
discussed by the jury.  Therefore, the evidence presented by 
Broomfield, at the post-conviction motion, was insufficient to 
impeach the verdict.  Broomfield petitioned this court for 
review which we granted. 
II. 
                     
6  Broomfield raised two other arguments before the court of 
appeals:  (1) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object when the venire learned of his prior bad acts and by 
failing to move to strike the three jurors from the prior panel 
for cause; and (2) an erroneous jury instruction violated his 
constitutional right to remain silent.  The court of appeals 
rejected both contentions, and Broomfield appears to have 
abandoned these arguments on appeal before this court. 
No. 97-0520-CR 
 
7 
¶12 We will briefly discuss the standard analyses for 
juror bias.  In State v. Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d 254, 518 N.W.2d 
232 (1994), this court explained what testimony by jurors was 
barred under Wis. Stat. § 906.06(2),7 and what testimony was 
competent under the statute.  Section 906.06(2) does not prevent 
jurors from testifying for purposes of determining whether a 
juror failed to reveal potentially prejudicial information 
during voir dire.  Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d at 267.  Section 
906.06(2) also provides two limited exceptions to the rule 
against juror testimony:  jurors can testify whether “extraneous 
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s 
attention” or whether “any outside influence was improperly 
                     
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 906.06(2), is a codification of the 
common law rule prohibiting juror testimony on the deliberative 
process of the jury, testimony that might impeach the verdict.  
Section 906.06(2) provides as follows: 
  INQUIRY INTO VALIDITY OF VERDICT OR INDICTMENT.  Upon an 
inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, 
a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement 
occurring 
during 
the 
course 
of 
the 
jury’s 
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon the 
juror’s or any other juror’s mind or emotions as 
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the 
verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental 
processes in connection therewith, except that a juror 
may 
testify 
on 
the 
question 
whether 
extraneous 
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the 
jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was 
improperly brought to bear upon any juror.  Nor may 
the juror’s affidavit or evidence of any statement by 
the juror concerning a matter about which the juror 
would be precluded from testifying be received. 
No. 97-0520-CR 
 
8 
brought to bear upon any juror.”  See also, Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d 
at 274.   
III. 
¶13 We first consider whether juror McCann failed to 
reveal potentially prejudicial information during the voir dire. 
 The question is whether juror McCann should have revealed, in 
response to voir dire questioning, the information or discussion 
he overheard about the defendant before the court was in 
session.  
¶14 The proper time to determine whether a juror is 
impartial is on voir dire examination.  Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d at 
267.  The voir dire, with its peremptory strikes and strikes for 
cause, is the prime instrument of the common law designed to 
assure an impartial jury and a fair trial.  State v. Shillcutt, 
119 Wis. 2d 788, 812, 350 N.W.2d 686 (1984) (Heffernan, C.J., 
concurring).  The effectiveness of voir dire, however, is 
dependent upon the responses provided by prospective jurors and 
there are no guarantees that a juror will respond honestly, 
accurately or completely.  Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d at 268. 
¶15 In State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745 
(1985),8 this court set forth a two-step test to follow when bias 
is alleged to have resulted from a juror’s failure to reveal 
information on voir dire.  In Wyss, we held that in order to be 
                     
8 State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 
493, 504-05, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). 
No. 97-0520-CR 
 
9 
awarded a new trial in such instances, a litigant must 
demonstrate:  
 
(1) 
that 
the 
juror 
incorrectly 
or 
incompletely 
responded to a material question on voir dire; and if 
so, (2) that it is more probable than not that under 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular 
case, the juror was biased against the moving party. 
 
Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 726.   
¶16 The State argues that Wyss is not applicable because 
there is no evidence that juror McCann improperly withheld 
information or that he provided incomplete or incorrect answers 
to the questions asked during voir dire.  The defendant admits 
that the absence of any accusations that juror McCann improperly 
withheld information eliminates one possible indication of bias, 
and renders the Wyss test inapplicable.  Nevertheless, the 
defendant maintains that other, countervailing considerations 
present a “strong case for finding implied if not actual juror 
bias.”  The defendant points to the inflammatory nature of the 
information juror McCann overheard and the possibility that the 
negative information was discussed by the jury and/or considered 
by McCann himself.  Thus, he maintains juror McCann’s “presumed 
bias” ripened into actual bias.    
¶17 The record reveals that neither the circuit judge nor 
the attorneys asked the jury panel if they knew the defendant or 
if they knew anything, other than what was explained during voir 
dire, about the defendant.  Because juror McCann was never 
specifically asked, his responses could not have been incorrect 
or incomplete.  We find that the defendant has failed to satisfy 
No. 97-0520-CR 
 
10
the first prong of the test in Wyss; accordingly, we will not 
address the second prong.  
IV. 
 
¶18 We next address whether any “extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention” or 
whether “any outside influence was improperly brought to bear 
upon any juror” such that the verdict may be impeached.  Wis. 
Stat. § 906.06(2).  Specifically, we must determine whether the 
testimony of juror McCann falls within the first of these 
exceptions.   
¶19 Under Wis. Stat. § 906.06(2), the party seeking to 
impeach the verdict must demonstrate that a juror’s testimony is 
admissible under § 906.06(2) by establishing (1) that the 
juror’s testimony concerns extraneous information (rather than 
the deliberative process of the jurors), (2) that the extraneous 
information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention, and 
(3) that the extraneous information was potentially prejudicial. 
 State v. Eison, 194 Wis. 2d 160, 172, 533 N.W.2d 738 (1995).  
After the circuit court determines whether the party has 
satisfied § 906.06(2), it determines whether one or more jurors 
engaged in the alleged conduct and whether the error was 
prejudicial.  Eison, 194 Wis. 2d at 172-73.   
¶20 In this case, the circuit court did not explain its 
rationale for permitting juror McCann to testify or its finding 
that his testimony relating to any discussions in the jury room 
was “very indefinite and nebulous.”  We independently review the 
record to determine whether it provides a basis for the circuit 
No. 97-0520-CR 
 
11
court’s implicit determination that juror McCann was competent 
to testify about potentially prejudicial information improperly 
brought to the jury, but that the defendant failed to prove that 
the jury was biased by any improper information, or that a new 
trial was warranted.  Id. at 173. 
¶21 Extraneous information is information which a juror 
obtains from a non-evidentiary source, other than the “general 
wisdom” we expect jurors to possess.  Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d at 
275.  Extraneous information does not extend to statements which 
simply evince a juror’s subjective mental process; rather, it 
refers to information “coming from the outside.”  Id. (quoting 
Shillcutt, 119 Wis. 2d at 798).   
¶22 Juror 
McCann 
overheard 
information 
from 
a 
non-
evidentiary source.  He testified that he overheard two other 
people talking about a prior hung jury involving the defendant, 
and other bad acts allegedly committed by the defendant, prior 
to the jury selection process.  The information juror McCann 
possessed was extraneous. 
¶23 The extraneous information, in order to fall within 
the 
exception 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 906.06(2), 
must 
also 
be 
potentially prejudicial.  The level of prejudice required for 
purposes 
of 
determining 
competency 
under 
§ 906.06(2) 
is 
necessarily lower than prejudice needed to successfully impeach 
a verdict.  Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d at 276.  Information may be 
potentially prejudicial if it conceivably relates to a central 
issue of the trial.  Eison, 194 Wis. 2d at 176.   
No. 97-0520-CR 
 
12
¶24 Here, the extraneous information that juror McCann 
overheard was potentially prejudicial.  The information related 
to the defendant’s character and consisted of other, unrelated 
acts committed by the defendant, evidence which likely would not 
have been admissible during the trial.9 
¶25 We 
further 
conclude 
that 
the 
extraneous 
and 
potentially prejudicial information was improperly brought to 
the jury’s attention.  Information not on the record is not 
properly before the jury even if only one juror is exposed to 
it.  Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d at 279, 280 n.17.   
¶26 Because the information juror McCann possessed was 
extraneous and potentially prejudicial information that was 
improperly brought before the jury, we conclude, as the circuit 
court implicitly did, that he was competent to testify under 
Wis. Stat. § 906.06(2).   
¶27  After determining whether testimony is competent 
under Wis. Stat. § 906.06(2), courts must conduct two additional 
analyses before deciding whether a new trial is warranted.  
First, the circuit court must determine by clear, satisfactory, 
and convincing evidence that the juror made or heard the 
statements or engaged in the conduct alleged.  Messelt, 185 Wis. 
2d at 281.  Only if the evidence is clear, satisfactory, and 
                     
9 Other acts evidence may be admitted for limited reasons 
under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2), such as proof of motive or intent, 
if it is relevant, and more probative than prejudicial.  Wis. 
Stat. §§ 904.04(2), 904.01 and 904.03.  Such evidence is not 
admissible 
to 
prove 
conformity 
with 
character. 
Section 
§ 904.04(2).  
No. 97-0520-CR 
 
13
convincing must the court then make the legal determination of 
whether the extraneous information constitutes prejudicial error 
requiring reversal of the verdict.  Id.   
¶28 McCann’s 
testimony 
satisfies 
the 
first 
of 
these 
inquiries.  The circuit court found that prior to jury 
selection, juror McCann heard some mention of a hung jury, but 
could not be specific about what was said.  We disagree.  Juror 
McCann testified that he overheard two individuals calling 
Broomfield a gangster, a troublemaker, that he beat up a bunch 
of kids and that he was involved with “drive-bys.”  On this 
point, juror McCann was unequivocal.  The circuit court’s 
finding to the contrary is clearly erroneous.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.17(2). 
¶29 As a result, we must determine whether as a matter of 
law, the information in juror McCann’s possession constitutes 
prejudicial error requiring reversal of the verdict.  Messelt, 
185 Wis. 2d at 281.  This is a question of law which we review 
without deference to the circuit court.  Id. at 281-82.  As we 
stated in Messelt, this analysis will focus on whether there is 
a reasonable possibility that the information in juror McCann’s 
possession would have a prejudicial effect upon a hypothetical 
average juror.  Id. at 282.   
¶30 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
information 
juror 
McCann 
overheard would not have had a prejudicial effect upon a 
hypothetical average juror.  We first point to the reliability 
of 
the 
information 
juror 
McCann 
overheard 
between 
two 
individuals who were possibly on a prior hung jury involving the 
No. 97-0520-CR 
 
14
defendant.  As the circuit court explained, there was a lot of 
disagreement among those jurors who served on the hung jury.  
Overhearing comments between two displeased panel members is 
quite unlike a potential juror reading information in the 
newspaper or hearing it on the news.  The information has little 
indication of trustworthiness.  Cf. Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d at 259, 
271 (unconfirmed “gossip” told to a juror years earlier about 
the defendant was not reliable).  Juror McCann indicated as much 
when he testified that he “shrugged it off a little bit.”   
¶31 Moreover, as the circuit court stated, the evidence in 
support of the jury’s verdict was overwhelming.  The jury heard 
eyewitness testimony describing the burglary and the taking of 
the victim’s vehicle.  The jury learned that Broomfield was 
picked up by police while driving the vehicle and was then 
identified 
by 
the 
eyewitness 
as 
one 
of 
the 
burglars.  
Broomfield’s accomplice testified to the plan to steal and then 
sell the car, as well as the their agreement to claim they had 
permission to take the car.  The victim and her granddaughter 
refuted the claim that Broomfield had permission to take the 
vehicle from the garage.   
¶32 In addition, at the post-conviction hearing, juror 
McCann testified that he had no specific recollection of telling 
the other jurors any of the information that he had heard prior 
to jury selection.  He also stated that the information did not 
affect him—he “kind of shrugged it off a little bit.”  The 
circuit court found that the evidence, juror McCann’s testimony, 
was “indefinite and nebulous” as to whether the jury discussed 
No. 97-0520-CR 
 
15
Broomfield’s alleged past behavior while deliberating.  The 
circuit court’s finding in this regard will be affirmed unless 
clearly erroneous.  Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2).  Our review of the 
record supports the circuit court’s determination that the 
evidence relating to any conversations during deliberations is 
too indefinite and equivocal to justify a new trial.  Because we 
conclude that the information juror McCann overheard would not 
have had a prejudicial effect upon a hypothetical average juror, 
we affirm both the judgment and the order. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
1