Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Bandman

Citation: 2010-Ohio-2115

Docket Number: 20092316

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Bandman, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2115.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-2115 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. BANDMAN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Bandman,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2115.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Misappropriation of trust assets — Indefinite 
suspension. 
(No. 2009-2316 — Submitted February 24, 2010 — Decided May 20, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-035. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Marc Benjamin Bandman of Lewis Center, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0038487, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1987.  Based upon its findings that respondent committed multiple violations of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct in administering a client’s family trust, the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends that we 
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suspend respondent’s license to practice indefinitely.  We adopt the board’s 
findings of misconduct and the recommended sanction. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 2} In April 2009, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a complaint 
charging respondent with violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a)(2) (providing that a 
lawyer’s continued representation of a client creates a conflict of interest if there 
is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s ability to represent the client will be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s own personal interests), 8.4(c) (prohibiting 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) 
(prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(h) 
(prohibiting conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice 
law).  These alleged violations arose from respondent’s conduct in writing checks 
drawn on a client’s family trust account, payable to himself, his business, and his 
fiancée and business partner without the knowledge or approval of the grantor or 
her granddaughter, who served as her attorney-in-fact. 
{¶ 3} The stipulated facts and testimony at the panel hearing 
demonstrate, and the board found, that the client had worked for respondent’s 
mother and her family for a number of years and had helped raise him from 
infancy.  Respondent considered her to be his “surrogate mom or grandmother.”  
At the time of the hearing in this matter, the client was 96 years old. 
{¶ 4} In October 2005, at the client’s request, respondent prepared the 
family trust.  Pursuant to client’s wishes, the trust agreement designated 
respondent as the trustee.  The client executed the trust agreement on November 
2, 2005, and funded the trust with $59,249.83 she received from the sale of her 
home. 
{¶ 5} Respondent waited until June 2007 to submit a bill for preparation 
of the trust and other estate-planning tasks.  The client’s attorney-in-fact paid the 
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$6,000 invoice with funds held outside of the trust.  In the interim, the client was 
diagnosed with dementia in 2006. 
{¶ 6} Respondent testified that he did not initially intend to charge a fee 
for administering the trust but that the client insisted that he should be paid for his 
services.  When he eventually decided to charge for his services, he failed to 
advise either the client or her attorney-in-fact.  Instead, in April 2007, respondent 
began writing checks drawn on the trust account and made payable to himself, his 
business, and his business partner and fiancée.  While he testified that some of the 
money represented earned fees, he also acknowledged that to alleviate his own 
financial difficulties, he “borrowed” money from the trust on a short-term basis, 
believing that his actions would not affect anybody. 
{¶ 7} From April 2007 to March 2008, respondent wrote 31 checks, 
totaling $60,050, without the knowledge or consent of the client or her attorney-
in-fact.  As of June 18, 2008, only $ 4,805.18 remained in the trust account.  
Although respondent testified that he considered the majority of the money he 
withdrew to be a loan, he did not create or sign a promissory note setting forth the 
terms for repayment. 
{¶ 8} In the spring of 2008, respondent advised the client’s attorney-in-
fact that he had improperly taken funds from the trust but did not share the trust 
account records or advise her that she might want to speak with another attorney 
before agreeing to resolve the matter.  Nor did he obtain a written waiver of this 
inherent conflict of interest.  On June 24, 2008, respondent repaid $45,000 to the 
trust, representing the amount he claimed to have borrowed, without interest.  As 
of the date of the hearing, respondent remained the trustee of the family trust. 
{¶ 9} Respondent acknowledged that he and relator were unable to reach 
an agreement as to what fees, if any, he was entitled to receive for services he 
allegedly provided to the trust.  At the panel hearing, respondent claimed that the 
$45,000 he repaid to the trust represented money that he had “borrowed” and that 
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the remaining balance of $15,050 represented legitimate payments to himself and 
to his fiancée for services rendered on behalf of the trust.  Despite the fact that 
respondent charged administration fees equaling approximately 25 percent of the 
trust assets, he testified that the client’s family had not questioned him about any 
of the charges or, to his knowledge, filed a claim with the Client Security Fund. 
{¶ 10} Respondent testified that he wrote five checks on April 16, 2007, 
but dated them as if they had been issued on April 15, April 30, June 30, 
September 30, and December 31, 2006.  He admitted that he wrote misleading 
and inaccurate notations on the memo line for some of the 31 checks, falsely 
indicating that those checks represented payments for services provided to the 
trust.  He further admitted that after the client’s attorney-in-fact began to request 
bank statements or other documentation regarding the trust assets, he provided her 
with a December 2007 bank statement that he had altered to (1) reflect that the 
account balance was $53,210.82 on December 18, 2007, when the actual balance 
on that date was only $43,702.62, and (2) conceal a $2,500 check that he had 
written to himself that had cleared the account in November 2007. 
{¶ 11} In addition to these findings of the board, we also note that 
respondent testified that he failed to keep contemporaneous records of the hours 
he devoted to trust business, preparing only a “recap” of the work performed at a 
later time.  Moreover, the charges for some of some of the services he claims to 
have rendered are questionable, at best.  For example, respondent testified that he 
charged one-half hour for reviewing the trust’s December 2005 bank statement, 
and one hour for his fiancée to review that document and enter the statement’s 
information into an accounting record.  Yet the bank statement reflects only the 
beginning account balance and a single transaction – the deposit of $181.65 in 
accrued interest. 
{¶ 12} Similarly, for the first quarter of 2006, respondent claims to have 
billed five hours, two hours at his rate and three hours at his fiancée’s rate, for 
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“Trust administration including reviewing statements and entry into accounting 
record and filing paperwork and reviewing bank rates and charges.”  Yet the bank 
statements for the months of November 2005 through April 2006, like the 
December 2005 statement, reflect only a monthly deposit of accrued interest.  
Furthermore, none of the statements reveal any bank charges that would require 
review. 
{¶ 13} The parties stipulated and the board found that respondent’s 
conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a)(2), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h). The record 
demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated his duties 
to both his client and the trust by appropriating trust assets for his own benefit and 
concealing his actions by (1) falsely dating checks to make it appear as though he 
had routinely billed the trust for services rendered, (2) making false and 
misleading notations on checks asserting that they represented payment for the 
quarterly administration of the estate,  and (3) altering a bank record to conceal 
his wrongful actions.  Respondent’s actions created a conflict of interest between 
his own interests and those of his client, which he failed to disclose to his client.  
These actions involving misappropriation, misrepresentation, and deceit are also 
inherently prejudicial to the administration of justice and adversely reflect upon 
respondent’s fitness to practice law.  Therefore, we accept the board’s findings of 
misconduct. 
Sanction 
{¶ 14} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
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Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.   
{¶ 15} The board noted that respondent has spent a significant portion of 
his legal career focused upon technological issues related to the practice of law.  
After passing the bar exam, he was employed by the Ohio attorney general’s 
office, where he set up the first e-mail system for the National Association of 
Attorneys General.  He later started his own business in records management and 
performed some consulting work.  The work he performed for this client and the 
trust was the only legal work for which he charged a fee.  He did not maintain 
malpractice insurance, because he did not have any other clients. 
{¶ 16} The board found that four of nine aggravating factors weighing in 
favor of a more severe sanction, including (1) a dishonest or selfish motive, (2) a 
pattern of misconduct, (3) multiple offenses, and (4) the vulnerability of and 
resulting harm to the victim.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (c), (d), and (h). 
{¶ 17} In mitigation, the parties stipulated and the board found that the 
respondent does not have a prior disciplinary record and that he has demonstrated 
a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(a) and (d).  The board noted that respondent has exhibited significant 
remorse for his actions and paid restitution of $45,000 to the trust.  The board also 
considered that respondent claimed to have self-reported his actions to 
Disciplinary Counsel in 2008 on the advice of an attorney friend, who had filed a 
complaint with Disciplinary Counsel. 
{¶ 18} Having weighed these factors, the board recommends that we 
indefinitely suspend respondent’s license to practice law, with reinstatement 
conditioned upon proof that he has made full restitution, including interest, to the 
trust, or reimbursed the  Client Security Fund for any claims paid as the result of 
his misconduct. 
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{¶ 19} We have previously recognized that permanent disbarment is the 
appropriate sanction for cases involving the misappropriation of client funds.  
See, e.g., Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Churilla (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 348, 350, 
678 N.E.2d 515.  This is because “[t]he continuing public confidence in the 
judicial system and the bar requires that the strictest discipline be imposed in 
misappropriation cases.”  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Belock (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 98, 
100, 694 N.E.2d 897.  As the board notes, however, we have previously imposed 
indefinite suspensions in misappropriation cases, based in part upon the existence 
of mitigating factors.  See, e.g., Akron Bar Assn. v. Dietz, 108 Ohio St.3d 343, 
2006-Ohio-1067, 843 N.E.2d 786, ¶ 23 (mitigating factors included payment of 
restitution, waiver of fees, no prior discipline during career of more than 20 years, 
good character); Disciplinary Counsel v. Nagorny, 105 Ohio St.3d 97, 2004-Ohio-
6899, 822 N.E.2d 1233, ¶ 15 (mitigating factors included payment of restitution, 
good character, remorse). 
{¶ 20} Having weighed respondent’s conduct and the aggravating and 
mitigating factors, and having considered the sanctions imposed for comparable 
conduct, we adopt the board’s recommended sanction of an indefinite suspension, 
with reinstatement conditioned upon proof that respondent has made full 
restitution, including interest, to the trust, or reimbursed the Client Security Fund 
for any claims paid as the result of his misconduct.  Accordingly, Marc Benjamin 
Bandman is indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in the state of Ohio.  
Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
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Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Robert R. Berger, Senior 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Alvin E. Matthews Jr., for respondent. 
______________________