Case Title: Branch v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12603

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12603 
 
BEN BRANCH & others1  vs.  COMMONWEALTH EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 
BOARD & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 8, 2019. - April 9, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Union, Freedom of association.  Voluntary 
Association, Labor union.  Labor, Union agency fee, Fair 
representation by union, Public employment.  Moot Question.  
Commonwealth Employment Relations Board. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from a decision of the Commonwealth Employment 
Relations Board. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Bruce N. Cameron (Aaron B. Solem, of Minnesota, also 
present) for the employees. 
 
Timothy J. Casey, Assistant Attorney General (T. Jane 
Gabriel also present) for Commonwealth Employment Relations 
Board. 
                                                 
1 William Curtis Conner, Jr.; Deborah Curran; and Andre 
Melcuk. 
 
2 Massachusetts Society of Professors, MTA/NEA; Hanover 
Teachers Association, MTA/NEA; and Professional Staff Union, 
MTA/NEA, interveners. 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Jeffrey W. Burritt, of the District of Columbia, for the 
interveners. 
 
Mark G. Matuschak & Robert K. Smith, for Pioneer Institute, 
Inc., were present but did not argue. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Deborah J. La Fetra, of California, & Brad P. Bennion for 
Pacific Legal Foundation & others. 
 
James A.W. Shaw & Donald J. Siegel for Massachusetts AFL-
CIO. 
 
Charlotte Garden, of the District of Columbia, & Brendan 
Sharkey for twenty-six labor law professors. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  Massachusetts, like most States, allows public 
sector employees in a designated bargaining unit to elect a 
union by majority vote to serve as their exclusive 
representative in collective bargaining with their government 
employer.  No eligible employee is required to join a union, but 
unions have historically collected mandatory "agency fees" from 
nonmembers in the bargaining unit to fund their operations as 
the exclusive representatives of members and nonmembers alike.  
In the instant case, four public employees raise challenges 
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to 
both the exclusive representation and the mandatory agency fee 
provisions of G. L. c. 150E. 
 
The employees initially filed charges of prohibited 
practice before the Department of Labor Relations (DLR).  A DLR 
investigator dismissed the case, and the Commonwealth Employment 
Relations Board (board), the three-member board within the DLR 
responsible for reviewing investigator decisions, upheld the 
 
 
 
3 
 
dismissal.  The employees appealed to the Appeals Court, and 
while the case was on appeal, the United States Supreme Court, 
in Janus v. American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees, 
Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 & n.28 (2018), held that all 
State "agency-fee laws . . . violate the [First Amendment]" by 
compelling nonmembers of public sector unions to support their 
unions' speech.  The employees argue that Janus requires us to 
overturn the board's decision dismissing their charges and 
declare the agency fee provision of the collective bargaining 
statute, G. L. c. 150E, § 12, unconstitutional on its face, and 
the exclusive representation provisions of the statute, G. L. 
c. 150E, §§ 2, 4, 5, 12, unconstitutional as applied to the 
employees. 
We hold that the employees' constitutional challenge to the 
agency fee provision is moot because the unions voluntarily 
stopped collecting agency fees to comply with Janus.  It is not 
reasonably likely that they will recommence collecting the fees, 
as the Attorney General and the DLR have issued guidance 
explaining that Janus categorically prohibits public sector 
unions from collecting agency fees from members of a bargaining 
unit who do not belong to the union and do not consent to pay 
the fees, and the question of law is now settled.  We further 
hold that the employees' First Amendment challenge to the 
exclusive representation provisions of G. L. c. 150E is 
 
 
 
4 
 
foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent and thus lacks merit.  We 
accordingly vacate as moot the board's decision with respect to 
the constitutionality of the agency fee provisions of G. L. 
c. 150E and affirm the board's decision with respect to the 
exclusive representation provisions of G. L. c. 150E.3 
1.  Facts and procedural history.  The significant facts in 
this case are not disputed.  As mentioned, the employees are 
public sector employees working in designated bargaining units.  
At all relevant times, however, they were not members of the 
unions that served as their exclusive bargaining 
representatives.4  The collective bargaining agreements between 
the employers and the unions nonetheless contained provisions 
                                                 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted in support of 
the employees by the Pacific Legal Foundation, National 
Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, 
and Mackinac Center for Public Policy; and by the Pioneer 
Institute, Inc.; and the amicus briefs submitted in support of 
the Commonwealth Employment Relations Board and the interveners 
by twenty-six labor law professors and by the Massachusetts AFL-
CIO. 
 
4 Two of the employees are faculty members represented by 
the Massachusetts Society of Professors (MSP), one is a 
university employee represented by the Professional Staff Union 
(PSU), and one is a middle school teacher represented by the 
Hanover Teachers Association (HTA).  These three unions are 
affiliates of the Massachusetts Teachers Association (MTA).  The 
MTA in turn is an affiliate of the National Education 
Association.  The agency fee requests at issue in this case were 
imposed by the various unions, with the exception of the HTA. 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
authorizing the unions to collect agency fees from nonmembers.5  
The unions also maintained rules that nonmembers were "not 
entitled . . . to participate in affiliate decision-making," 
specifically to attend union meetings (other than contract 
ratification meetings) or "vote on election of officers, bylaw 
modifications, contract proposals or bargaining strategy." 
In the spring of 2014, the unions requested that the 
employees pay their annual agency fees for the 2013-2014 
academic year.  In response, the employees filed complaints with 
the DLR alleging that these fee requests constituted a 
prohibited practice on the part of the unions and the employers.6  
                                                 
5 General Laws c. 150E, § 12, provides, in relevant part, 
that nonunion members may be required to pay "a service fee 
[(i.e., agency fee)] to the employee organization" when the 
"collective bargaining agreement requiring its payment as a 
condition of employment has been formally executed, pursuant to 
a vote of a majority of all employees in such bargaining unit 
present and voting."  Section 12 further provides that the 
amount of the service fee shall be equal to membership dues, 
provided that the employee organization has a procedure to 
provide a rebate for political, ideological, or other expenses 
"not germane to the [organization's] governance or duties as 
bargaining agent."  Finally, § 12 provides that "[i]t shall be a 
prohibited labor practice for an employee organization or its 
affiliates to discriminate against an employee on the basis of 
the employee's membership, nonmembership or agency fee status in 
the employee organization or its affiliates." 
 
6 One of the employees had earlier filed a charge 
challenging the calculation of the amount of his agency fee.  
The employee subsequently filed an amended charge that rescinded 
his earlier allegation and raised a challenge to the validity of 
the agency fee that was identical to that raised by the other 
three employees. 
 
 
 
6 
 
The employees alleged that the requirement that they pay agency 
fees constituted a prohibited practice under G. L. c. 150E, 
§§ 10 (a) (1), (3), (b) (1), and 12, because "compulsory union 
fees . . . are unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments [to the United States Constitution]."7  More 
specifically, the employees claimed that G. L. c. 150E, § 12, 
the statutory provision that authorizes public sector unions to 
collect agency fees, was unconstitutional on its face.8  They 
also claimed that this statute was unconstitutional as applied 
to them because it required them to pay agency fees "even though 
they are not entitled to attend union meetings or be involved in 
any union activities such as having a voice or a vote on 
bargaining representatives, contract proposals or bargaining 
                                                 
7 Under G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (1) and (3), it is a 
prohibited practice for a public employer to "[i]nterfere, 
restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise of any right 
guaranteed under this chapter" or to "[d]iscriminate in regard 
to hiring, tenure, or any term or condition of employment to 
encourage or discourage membership in any employee 
organization."  Under G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (b) (1), it is a 
prohibited practice for a union to "[i]nterfere, restrain, or 
coerce any employer or employee in the exercise of any right 
guaranteed under this chapter." 
 
8 The employees claimed that the agency fee provision was 
facially unconstitutional because it required them to (1) 
support the unions' political beliefs despite their opposition 
to those beliefs; and (2) affirmatively object to challenge the 
amount of the fee.  They also claimed that the requirement that 
they affirmatively object to the imposition of an agency fee was 
unconstitutional as applied. 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
strategy."  Finally, they challenged the constitutionality of 
the exclusive representation provisions of G. L. c. 150E, § 5, 
for essentially the same reasons.9 
A DLR investigator took affidavits from the employees and 
the unions, and then issued a decision in November 2014 
dismissing the charges.10  In her decision, the investigator 
concluded that the DLR did not have authority to address the 
employees' constitutional arguments.  Instead, she only 
considered whether the employers and the unions had violated 
G. L. c. 150E.  She concluded that G. L. c. 150E, § 5, expressly 
authorized the unions to serve as the employees' exclusive 
representatives and that they were permitted to enforce 
membership rules restricting service on negotiating committees 
                                                 
9 General Laws c. 150E, § 5, provides that the "exclusive 
representative shall have the right to act for and negotiate 
agreements covering all employees in the unit and shall be 
responsible for representing the interests of all such employees 
without discrimination and without regard to employee 
organization membership." 
 
10 The employees submitted affidavits on their own behalf, 
as well as from four experts.  The unions moved to strike these 
affidavits and, when this motion was denied, submitted 
counteraffidavits.  The investigator admitted the employees' 
affidavits and those of two of the experts.  She excluded some 
portions of the unions' affidavits and the employees' other two 
expert affidavits on the grounds that they were not relevant to 
agency fee procedures in Massachusetts.  We decline to disturb 
the investigator's evidentiary ruling with respect to the 
employees' expert affidavits.  See Maddocks v. Contributory 
Retirement Appeal Bd., 369 Mass. 488, 498 (1976) (court will not 
overturn agency's discretionary exclusion of evidence absent 
"denial of substantial justice"). 
 
 
 
8 
 
to union members.  She further concluded that, under controlling 
precedent of this court and the United States Supreme Court, 
neither the employers nor the unions engaged in a prohibited 
practice by requiring nonmember employees to pay agency fees to 
a public sector union pursuant to G. L. c. 150E, § 12. 
 
The employees sought review of the investigator's dismissal 
of their charges by the board pursuant to G. L. c. 150E, § 11.  
They conceded in their briefing that "existing precedent" 
required the board to uphold the dismissal of the unfair labor 
practice charges but appealed in order "to exhaust 
administrative remedies" and preserve their constitutional 
arguments for appellate review.  In February 2015, the board 
affirmed the dismissal in its entirety for the reasons set forth 
in the investigator's decision.  The employees then appealed 
from the board's decision to the Appeals Court.  That court 
granted the unions' motion to intervene and stayed the case 
until the Supreme Court issued Janus in June 2018.  We then 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion and ordered 
supplemental briefing. 
2.  Mootness.  We first address the employees' argument 
that Janus requires us to overturn the board's decision 
upholding the unions' collection of agency fees pursuant to the 
agency fee provision, G. L. c. 150E, § 12.  The Supreme Court, 
in Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486, held that "States and public 
 
 
 
9 
 
sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from 
nonconsenting employees," and the board and the unions 
accordingly concede that "public employers and public-sector 
unions can no longer collect agency fees from nonunion employees 
unless they affirmatively consent."  The board argues that both 
the employers and unions have voluntarily complied with Janus by 
no longer permitting the nonconsensual collection of agency fees 
from employees who are not in a union, and hence that the 
portion of its decision dismissing the employees' constitutional 
challenges to the imposition of agency fees and the manner of 
their collection should be vacated and dismissed as moot.11  We 
                                                 
11 The intervener unions argue that we lack jurisdiction to 
decide the employees' constitutional challenges because the 
employees brought them before an administrative agency rather 
than through seeking a declaratory judgment in the Superior 
Court.  We disagree.  The instant case did not just raise a 
direct challenge to the constitutionality of the agency fee 
provision of G. L. c. 150E, § 12.  Instead, it required the 
Department of Labor Relations (DLR) to apply multiple statutory 
requirements consistent with its understanding of constitutional 
law and to draw on its own expert knowledge of labor relations 
practices and procedures in deciding the questions before it. 
 
As explained by the DLR investigator, while the charges 
presented facial challenges to the constitutionality of the 
agency fee and exclusive representation provisions in G. L. 
c. 150E, they also "raised allegations . . . that the service 
fees demanded violate specific provisions of [G. L. c. 150E], 
i.e. that prohibiting non-members from joining a union 
negotiating team, while simultaneously requiring service fees, 
violates [G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (b) (1),] by coercing employees in 
the exercise of their rights to non-membership; and that the 
employers' agreement to a contractual service fee provision 
violated [§ 10 (a) (3)]."  In deciding these issues the DLR was 
required to "apply [§ 12] . . . constitutionally, using 
 
 
 
10 
 
                                                 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court to guide its 
construction of [G. L. c. 150E]," and to resolve "factual issues 
that are appropriate for the agency's consideration, i.e. the 
extent to which the unions allow or prohibit fee payers from 
participating in the negotiations process." 
 
We conclude that the DLR correctly assumed jurisdiction 
here for the reasons it stated.  In the course of their 
adjudications, agencies must "decide questions of law, 
including, at times, questions of constitutional law."  Temple 
Emanuel of Newton v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 463 Mass. 472, 483 (2012).  "Although an agency 
cannot decide an ultimate constitutional issue [regarding the 
legality of its statute], the question remains whether such an 
issue must nonetheless be brought before it to inform the 
agency's resolution of the statutory and regulatory questions it 
must consider and to draw on its specialized expertise for 
necessary fact finding."  Maher v. Justices of the Quincy Div. 
of the Dist. Court Dep't, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 612, 619 (2006).  
With the benefit of an agency's factual determinations, 
understanding of its regulated industry, and statutory 
construction, a court can then decide whether the agency's 
determinations were made in compliance with or "[i]n violation 
of constitutional provisions."  G. L. c. 30A, § 14.  See, e.g., 
Selectmen of Framingham v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 366 Mass. 547, 
554 (1974) (emphasizing that Civil Service Commission "will need 
to take up and consider the factual matters underlying the issue 
of the constitutional validity of the regulation since these 
matters are here intrinsic to a decision as to 'just cause'" 
even though "the ultimately controlling decision of a 
constitutional issue is for the courts").  Although not directly 
argued below, the instant case also depends on an interpretation 
of the duty of fair representation, which involves the special 
expertise of the DLR.  "As a matter of promoting proper 
relationships between the courts and administrative agencies, 
strong policies support the primary jurisdiction of the [DLR] 
over cases involving the duty of fair representation."  Leahy v. 
Local 1526, Am. Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees, 399 
Mass. 341, 349 (1987). 
 
A different question would be presented if this case were 
only presenting a challenge to the constitutionality of enabling 
legislation.  Cf. Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 630-631 (2011) (court 
without jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenge to 
agency's enabling statute and implementing regulations when 
 
 
 
11 
 
agree with the board, and thus vacate that portion of the 
board's decision as moot. 
It is a "general rule that courts decide only actual 
controversies . . . and normally do not decide moot cases."  
Boston Herald, Inc. v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court, 
421 Mass. 502, 504 (1995).  "[L]itigation is considered moot 
when the party who claimed to be aggrieved ceases to have a 
personal stake in its outcome."  Bronstein v. Board of 
Registration in Optometry, 403 Mass. 621, 627 (1988).12  A moot 
                                                 
first brought on appeal from agency decision rather than in 
declaratory judgment action in court).  If after Janus v. 
American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees, Council 31, 
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018), had been decided, the employees 
had simply brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a 
declaration that G. L. c. 150E, § 12, was unconstitutional, such 
an action should have been brought in the Superior Court.  The 
multifaceted challenge here is different and requires 
administrative review in the first instance.  See Gurry v. Board 
of Pub. Accountancy, 394 Mass. 118, 126 (1985) ("Except for 
jurisdictional claims based upon constitutional challenges to an 
agency's enabling legislation, litigants involved in 
adjudicatory proceedings should raise all claims before the 
agency, including those which are constitutionally based").  
See, e.g., Seagram Distillers Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control 
Comm'n, 401 Mass. 713, 724 (1988) (facial and as applied 
constitutional challenges to statute "not raised before the 
commission and we therefore decline to consider them here for 
the first time").  See also, e.g., McCormick v. Labor Relations 
Comm'n, 412 Mass. 164, 169-170 (1992) (relying on Seagram 
Distillers Co., supra, to conclude that party raising First 
Amendment challenge to validity of agency fee waived that 
challenge by not raising it before Labor Relations Commission). 
 
We thus conclude that the DLR correctly determined that it 
had jurisdiction. 
12 "The mootness doctrine applies to judicial review of 
administrative decisions as well as to appellate review of lower 
 
 
 
12 
 
case is one where a court can order "no further effective 
relief."  Lawyers' Comm. for Civ. Rights & Economic Justice v. 
Court Adm'r of the Trial Court, 478 Mass. 1010, 1011 (2017). 
Here, the unions presented affidavits13 demonstrating that 
they did not collect any agency fees from the employees while 
their complaints were pending, stopped collecting agency fees 
entirely in anticipation of Janus, and no longer collected 
agency fees from nonmembers once Janus was issued in order to 
comply with the decision.14  Furthermore, both the Attorney 
                                                 
court decisions."  International Marathons, Inc. v. Attorney 
Gen., 392 Mass. 376, 380 (1984). 
 
13 To determine whether a case has become moot while it is 
on appeal, we may consider evidence introduced by the parties in 
the form of affidavits.  Doe v. Superintendent of Sch. of 
Worcester, 421 Mass. 117, 123 (1995), citing Hubrite Informal 
Frocks, Inc. v. Kramer, 297 Mass. 530, 532–533 (1937) 
("Affidavits are the proper way to raise a question of 
mootness"). 
 
14 To comply with the prohibition on the collection of 
agency fees announced in Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486, the general 
counsel of the MTA sent letters to its local affiliates on April 
25 and May 2, 2018, instructing them to stop collecting agency 
fees preemptively as of June 1, 2018, in the event that "the 
collection of agency fees is declared unconstitutional."  
Following the issuance of Janus on June 27, 2018, the MTA 
informed its affiliates that they may "no longer deduct agency 
fees from a nonmember's wages" and processed a "bulk 
cancellation" of agency fees.  Furthermore, the presidents of 
the affiliate unions involved in this case (i.e., the MSP, PSU, 
and HTA) stated that, on account of Janus, they no longer 
collect agency fees.  Additionally, in November 2018, the MTA 
executive committee approved the removal of any reference to 
"agency service fees" from its bylaws. 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
General and the DLR issued guidance explaining that Janus 
prohibits public employers and public sector unions from 
collecting agency fees from members of a bargaining unit who do 
not belong to the union and do not consent to pay the fees.15  
And, as mentioned, the unions and employers concede that they 
are bound by Janus.  In light of these significant steps by the 
unions and the unequivocal legal guidance issued by the relevant 
agencies, we are not persuaded by the employees' claim that 
there is "no reason to expect any change" in the challenged 
conduct involving agency fees.16  Nor is this the exceptional 
                                                 
15 See Department of Labor Relations, Question and Answer 
Regarding Impacts of Janus v. American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, https://www.mass 
.gov/service-details/dlr-qa-re-janus-v-american-fed-of-state-
cty-muni-employees [https://perma.cc/XG43-Z9DW] ("The Janus 
decision makes it unlawful for public sector employers or unions 
to require that an employee who is not a voluntary dues paying 
union member to pay an agency fee to a union as a condition of 
obtaining employment or continued employment" and any "agency 
shop arrangements contained in collective bargaining agreements 
are invalidated"); Office of the Attorney General, Attorney 
General Advisory:  Affirming Labor Rights and Obligations in 
Public Workplaces, https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018 
/07/03/Attorney%20General%20Advisory%20-%20Rights%20of%20Public 
%20Sector%20Employees%20%287-3%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/74LP-
EVMF] ("Under Janus, public employers may not deduct agency fees 
from a nonmember's wages, nor may a union collect agency fees 
from a nonmember, without the employee's affirmative consent"). 
 
16 A defendant whose voluntary conduct renders a case moot 
must satisfy a "heavy burden of showing that there is no 
reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated; and a 
defendant's mere assurances on this point may well not be 
sufficient."  Cantell v. Commissioner of Correction, 475 Mass. 
745, 753 n.16 (2016), quoting Wolf v. Commissioner of Pub. 
Welfare, 367 Mass. 293, 299 (1975).  This burden may be met by a 
 
 
 
14 
 
case where we exercise our discretion to decide a moot case.17  
Because no agency fee demands are currently being made on the 
employees, and because any such demands are not likely to recur, 
there is no "actual controvers[y]" for the court to decide and 
no "effective relief" for it to order.  Murphy v. National Union 
Fire Ins. Co., 438 Mass. 529, 533 (2003).  See Lawyers' Comm. 
                                                 
policy change by an administrative agency or by other change in 
conduct to comply with the law.  See Bronstein v. Board of 
Registration in Optometry, 403 Mass. 621, 626-627 (1988) (case 
moot where administrative board agreed not to enforce order that 
was no longer in compliance with amended statute); Buchannan v. 
Superintendent of Mass. Correctional Inst. at Concord, 9 Mass. 
App. Ct. 545, 548-550 (1980) (case moot where bulletin issued by 
Department of Correction addressed challenged correctional 
practice and issuance of bulletin suggested defendants did not 
"cease[] their allegedly wrongful conduct in order to escape 
review").  See also Danielson v. Inslee, 345 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 
1339 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (post-Janus challenge to mandatory agency 
fee law moot because it was "improbable that the State will 
renege on a policy it has justified by legal precedent"). 
 
17 We have discretion to decide a moot case where the issue 
is one of "significant public importance, and there appears to 
be some uncertainty about it," or "where the parties have fully 
briefed and argued the issues of a case, and . . . the issues 
are capable of repetition, yet evading review" (quotation and 
citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. McCulloch, 450 Mass. 483, 
486 (2008).  Here, there is no uncertainty that Janus forbids 
the collection of agency fees from nonconsenting bargaining unit 
members who are not in a union.  See Ladley vs. Pennsylvania 
State Educ. Ass'n, No. CI-14-08552, slip op. at 23 (Pa. Ct. Com. 
Pl. Oct. 29, 2018) (declining to decide moot post-Janus agency 
fee challenge on public interest grounds because no need for 
court to create "guideposts for future conduct or action" 
[citation omitted]).  Nor is the issue one that is likely to 
evade review should it arise again:  the challenged issue "is 
one of law" that would likely receive immediate judicial review 
and rebuke if a union sought to impose an agency fee despite 
Janus.  Ott v. Boston Edison Co., 413 Mass. 680, 684 (1992). 
 
 
 
15 
 
for Civ. Rights & Economic Justice, 478 Mass. at 1011.  We 
therefore hold that the unions' cessation of agency fee 
collection to comply with Janus and the issuance by the Attorney 
General and the DLR of guidance categorically prohibiting their 
collection has rendered moot the employees' challenge to the 
agency fee provisions of G. L. c. 150E.18 
 
3.  Constitutionality of exclusive representation.  The 
employees also challenge the constitutionality of their unions' 
exclusive representation of their employees in collective 
bargaining, claiming that exclusive representation compels them 
to associate with the unions in violation of the First 
Amendment.19  We conclude that, under controlling Supreme Court 
                                                 
18 This conclusion accords with those of other courts that 
have dismissed challenges to the constitutionality of State 
agency fee laws on mootness grounds following the issuance of 
Janus and the corresponding cessation in the collection of 
agency fees by public sector unions.  See Danielson, 345 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1339-1340; Danielson v. American Fed'n of State, 
County, & Mun. Employees, Council 28, AFL-CIO, 340 F. Supp. 3d 
1083, 1084 (W.D. Wash. 2018); Lamberty vs. Connecticut State 
Police Union, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 3:15-cv-378 (D. Conn. Oct. 19, 
2018); Yohn vs. California Teachers' Ass'n, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 
SACV 17-202-JLS-DEM (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2018); Ladley, supra. 
 
19 The unions argue that the employees' exclusive 
representation challenge is not properly before this court 
because the employees failed to raise it below.  Specifically, 
they point out that the employees' charges were addressed to 
G. L. c. 150E, § 12, the agency fee provision, and not to the 
exclusive representation provisions of G. L. c. 150E.  Yet the 
investigator's decision addressed the employees' "challenge [to] 
the concept of exclusive representation as a burden on their 
[First] Amendment right of association."  The employees then 
appealed to the board from the investigator's conclusion that 
 
 
 
16 
 
precedent, neither the exclusive representation provisions of 
G. L. c. 150E nor the unions' internal policies and procedures 
barring nonmembers from various collective bargaining activities 
violate the First Amendment. 
General Laws c. 150E, § 4, provides that "[p]ublic 
employers may recognize an employee organization designated by 
the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit 
as the exclusive representative of all the employees in such 
unit for the purpose of collective bargaining."  In turn, G. L. 
c. 150E, § 5, provides that the "exclusive representative shall 
have the right to act for and negotiate agreements covering all 
employees in the unit and shall be responsible for representing 
the interests of all such employees without discrimination and 
without regard to employee organization membership."  We have 
explained that the "exclusive representation concept" is "a 
basic building block of labor law policy under G. L. c. 150E."  
Service Employees Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, Local 509 v. Labor 
Relations Comm'n, 431 Mass. 710, 714–715 (2000).  The same is 
true under Federal labor relations law.20 
                                                 
"[e]xclusive representation, pursuant to G. L. c. 150E §§ 4 
[and] 5, is constitutional."  We thus conclude that the issue 
was sufficiently raised below. 
 
20 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides that 
"[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of 
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit 
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
Our analysis of exclusive representation is guided by an 
uninterrupted line of decisions in which the Supreme Court has 
affirmed its "long and consistent adherence to the principle of 
exclusive representation tempered by safeguards for the 
protection of minority interests" provided by the duty of fair 
representation.  Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition 
Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 65 (1975).  Exclusive 
representation, as the Supreme Court has explained, is necessary 
to effectively and efficiently negotiate collective bargaining 
agreements and thus promote peaceful and productive labor-
management relations.  See, e.g., National Labor Relations Bd. 
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967) ("National 
                                                 
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the 
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, 
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment."  
29 U.S.C. § 159(a).  For cases discussing exclusive 
representation under the NLRA, see, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. 
Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 270–271 (2009), quoting Emporium Capwell 
Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975) 
("In establishing a regime of majority rule, Congress sought to 
secure to all members of the [bargaining] unit the benefits of 
their collective strength and bargaining power, in full 
awareness that the superior strength of some individuals or 
groups might be subordinated to the interest of the majority"); 
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967) (discussing importance 
of exclusive representation in grievance arbitration context); 
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 200-201 
(1944) (describing exclusive representation under NLRA); J.I. 
Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 321 U.S. 332, 338-339 
(1944) (under NLRA, employer must bargain with exclusive 
representative, rather than individually with employees, because 
"the majority rules" and to allow individual negotiations would 
"prove . . . disruptive of industrial peace). 
 
 
 
18 
 
labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their 
economic strength and acting through a labor organization freely 
chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit 
have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in 
wages, hours, and working conditions.  The policy therefore 
extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own 
relations with his employer and creates a power vested in the 
chosen representative to act in the interests of all 
employees").  See also Carlson, The Origin and Future of 
Exclusive Representation in American Labor Law, 30 Duq. L. Rev. 
779, 780 (1992) ("Majority-rule based exclusivity bolsters a 
union's bargaining position, legitimizes its complete control 
over employee bargaining within a unit and, even from the 
employer's perspective, simplifies the bargaining process.  
Collective bargaining on any other basis faces considerable 
practical difficulties" [footnote omitted]).21 
                                                 
21 For discussions of the policy rationales for exclusive 
representation, see, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465 (discussing 
how exclusive representation serves "compelling state interest" 
in "labor peace" [citation omitted]); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry 
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 38-39, 52 (1983) (rejecting 
First Amendment challenge to term in collective bargaining 
agreement restricting use of interschool mail system to 
exclusive representative because "exclusion of the rival union 
may reasonably be considered a means of insuring labor-peace 
within the schools"); Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191 (explaining that if 
individual employees could bypass collective bargaining 
agreement with respect to grievance arbitration "the settlement 
machinery provided by the contract would be substantially 
undermined, thus destroying the employer's confidence in the 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
In particular, our analysis of the constitutionality of 
exclusive representation is informed by Knight v. Minnesota 
Community College Faculty Ass'n, 460 U.S. 1048 (1983) (Knight 
I); Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 
U.S. 271 (1984) (Knight II); and Janus itself.  In the two 
Knight decisions and Janus, the majority and the dissents alike 
recognized and respected the importance of exclusive 
representation in the collective bargaining process, at least in 
the negotiation of the terms and conditions of employment. 
In Knight I, 460 U.S. at 1048, a case involving faculty at 
State community colleges, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed 
the portion of the lower court's decision concluding that it was 
constitutional to limit collective bargaining sessions (known as 
"meet and negotiate" sessions) regarding the terms and 
conditions of employment to the faculty's exclusive 
representative.  See Knight II, 465 U.S. at 279 ("The Court's 
                                                 
union's authority and returning the individual grievant to the 
vagaries of independent and unsystematic negotiation"); Medo 
Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 321 U.S. 
678, 685 (1944) ("orderly collective bargaining requires that 
the employer be not permitted to go behind the designated 
representatives, in order to bargain with the employees 
themselves").  See also Matter of Houde Engineering Corp. & 
United Auto. Workers Fed. Labor Union No. 18839, 1 N.L.R.B. 35, 
40 (1934) (exclusive representation provision of Federal law 
designed to stop employers from exploiting "differences within 
the ranks" of employees); Carlson, The Origin and Future of 
Exclusive Representation in American Labor Law, 30 Duq. L. Rev. 
779, 814 (1992) ("Without exclusivity, employee factions would 
inevitably make conflicting proposals and demands"). 
 
 
 
20 
 
summary affirmance . . . rejected the constitutional attack on 
[the State statute's] restriction to the exclusive 
representative of participation in the 'meet and negotiate' 
process").  In summarily affirming the lower court, it thus 
appeared noncontroversial to the Court to limit collective 
bargaining regarding the terms and conditions of employment to 
the exclusive representative and to recognize the 
"constitutionality of exclusive representation bargaining in the 
public sector."  Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty 
Ass'n, 571 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Minn. 1982), aff'd in part, 460 
U.S. 1048 (1983).  This decision is in line with earlier Supreme 
Court decisions that recognize and respect the need for an 
exclusive bargaining representative.  See Emporium Capwell Co., 
420 U.S. at 65.  See also notes 20 and 21, supra (citing cases). 
In Knight II, 465 U.S. at 292, the Court extended the right 
of exclusive representation to "meet and confer" sessions with 
the employer regarding university governance and academic 
matters outside the scope of the mandatory bargaining that took 
place in the "meet and negotiate" sessions deemed constitutional 
in Knight I.  Although Knight II, supra at 288, presented a more 
difficult question than exclusive representation in the 
collective bargaining context, and one that divided the Court, 
the majority held that the nonmembers' "speech and associational 
rights . . . [had] not been infringed" even by this type of 
 
 
 
21 
 
government-imposed exclusive representation.  Specifically, the 
Court observed that exclusive representation was constitutional 
because the First Amendment creates no "government obligation to 
listen" to particular voices on policy questions, and the 
State's right to designate the faculty union as the exclusive 
representative for the "meet and confer" sessions (as well as 
the "meet and negotiate" sessions) was within its inherent right 
to "choose its advisers."  Id. at 288 & n. 10. 
The Court further explained that such exclusive 
representation did not impair the nonmember employees' 
associational freedoms, as the nonmembers were "not required to 
become members of the [union]."  Id. at 289.  Although the 
nonmembers "[might] well [have felt] some pressure to join the 
exclusive representative" to gain a "voice" in the "meet and 
confer" sessions, such pressure was "no different from the 
pressure to join a majority party that persons in the minority 
always feel."  Id. at 289-290.  This sort of pressure, the Court 
explained, is inherent both in majority rule, which is a guiding 
principle of "our system of government," and in the collective 
bargaining process; as such, "it does not create an 
unconstitutional inhibition on associational freedom."  Id. at 
290. 
Janus, a challenge to the agency fee provision of a State 
collective bargaining law, did not in any way question the 
 
 
 
22 
 
centrality of exclusive representation, at least in the 
collective bargaining process.  There, the Court "noted" that 
exclusive representation provided the union with the "exclusive 
right to speak for all the employees in collective bargaining" 
and that the employer was "required by state law to listen to 
and bargain in good faith with only that union."  Janus, 138 S. 
Ct. at 2467.  Indeed, the Court expressly observed that it is 
"not disputed that the State may require that a union serve as 
exclusive bargaining agent for its employees," and that, with 
the exception of laws permitting mandatory agency fees, "States 
can keep their labor-relations systems exactly as they are."  
Id. at 2478, 2485 n.27.  See id. at 2489 (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
("The majority does not take issue with the [concept of 
exclusive representation]").  And the Court assumed that "labor 
peace," defined as the avoidance of "the conflict and 
disruption" that would occur if employees were "represented by 
more than one union," was a "compelling state interest," but 
that mandatory agency fees were not "inextricably linked" to 
such peace (citation omitted).  Id. at 2465.  It was this 
"compelling state interest" that apparently justified the 
"significant impingement on associational freedoms that would 
not be tolerated in other contexts."  Id. at 2478.22 
                                                 
22 This conclusion accords with those of other courts that 
have rejected First Amendment challenges to the 
 
 
 
23 
 
                                                 
constitutionality of exclusive representation provisions of 
State public sector collective bargaining laws, including a 
previous challenge to G. L. c. 150E.  See D'Agostino v. Baker, 
812 F.3d 240, 243 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2473 
(2016) (Justice Souter, writing for court and rejecting First 
Amendment challenge to G. L. c. 150E on basis of Minnesota State 
Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 [1984] 
[Knight II], reasoned, "Since non-union professionals, college 
teachers, could claim no violation of associational rights by an 
exclusive bargaining agent speaking for their entire bargaining 
unit when dealing with the state even outside collective 
bargaining, the same understanding of the First Amendment should 
govern the position taken by the [appellants] here, whose 
objection goes only to bargaining representation").  See also 
Mentele v. Inslee, 916 F.3d 783, 789 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding, 
on basis of Knight II, that State's "authorization of an 
exclusive bargaining representative does not infringe" on First 
Amendment rights of nonunion members); Bierman v. Dayton, 900 
F.3d 570, 574 (8th Cir. 2018) (home care providers' argument 
that their First Amendment rights were violated by compelled 
association with their exclusive representative "foreclosed by 
[Knight II]"); Hill v. Service Employees Int'l Union, 850 F.3d 
861, 864 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 446 (2017) (Knight 
II "forecloses . . . argument" of home health care and child 
care providers that exclusive representation creates "mandatory 
association" subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny); 
Jarvis v. Cuomo, 660 Fed. Appx. 72, 74 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 1204 (2017) (child care providers' argument 
that their First Amendment rights were violated by compelled 
association with their exclusive representative "foreclosed" by 
Knight II); Thompson vs. Marietta Education Ass'n, U.S. Dist. 
Ct., No. 2:18-cv-628 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2019) (Knight II 
"forecloses" high school Spanish teacher's First Amendment 
challenge to exclusive representation provision of State 
statute); Reisman vs. Associated Faculties of the Univ. of Me., 
U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 1:18-cv-00307-JDL (D. Me. Dec. 3, 2018) 
("binding precedent" of Knight II "forecloses" faculty member's 
First Amendment challenge to exclusive representation provision 
of State collective bargaining law); Uradnik vs. Inter Faculty 
Org., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 18-1895 (PAM/LIB) (D. Minn. Sept. 27, 
2018), aff'd, U.S. Ct. App., No. 18-3086 (8th Cir. Dec. 3, 2018) 
(Knight II "foreclose[s]" faculty member's First Amendment 
challenge to exclusive representation provision of State 
collective bargaining law). 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Janus and the other Supreme Court cases have thus not 
questioned the constitutionality of exclusive representation.  
The Court has, however, inextricably coupled exclusive 
representation with a union's duty of fair representation.  See, 
e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2469 (duty of fair representation "is 
a necessary concomitant of the authority that a union seeks when 
it chooses to serve as the exclusive representative of all the 
employees in a unit").  As the exclusive representative of both 
members and nonmembers, the union has a duty "fairly to 
represent all [employees in the bargaining unit], both in its 
collective bargaining with [the employer] . . . and in its 
enforcement of the resulting collective bargaining agreement."  
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).23 
The focus of this duty in the negotiating context has not 
been on input but on output, i.e., on the results of the 
collective bargaining process.  Most significantly, the "union 
may not negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement that 
                                                 
23 The Supreme Court has stated that "constitutional 
questions [would] arise" regarding the legitimacy of exclusive 
representation in the absence of the duty of fair 
representation.  Steele, 323 U.S. at 198.  In Massachusetts, 
that duty is codified by statute.  See G. L. c. 150E, § 5 
(exclusive representative required to "represent[] the interests 
of all . . . employees without discrimination and without regard 
to employee organization membership").  See also Leahy, 399 
Mass. at 348 ("even if the Massachusetts statute did not provide 
for the duty of fair representation, the courts would infer it 
as a constitutional requirement"). 
 
 
 
25 
 
discriminates against nonmembers."  Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2468.  
Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) ("mere 
existence of . . . differences" in way that "negotiated 
agreement affect[s] individual employees and classes of 
employees" will not violate duty of fair representation so long 
as differences are reasonable and negotiated in good faith).  By 
contrast, the duty of fair representation has not been found to 
apply to how the union selects its negotiators and develops its 
proposals.  See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Financial Inst. 
Employees of Am., Local 1182, Chartered by United Food & 
Commercial Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 475 U.S. 192, 205 
(1986) (Financial Inst. Employees), quoting Allis-Chalmers Mfg. 
Co., 388 U.S. at 191 (explaining that union may "select union 
officers and bargaining representatives" without input of 
nonmembers because "[n]on-union employees have no voice in the 
affairs of the union"); Standard Fittings Co. v. National Labor 
Relations Bd., 845 F.2d 1311, 1319 (5th Cir. 1988), citing 
Financial Inst. Employees, supra (duty of fair representation 
does not give nonmembers right to "ratify a collective-
bargaining agreement or select union officers and bargaining 
representatives"); Branch 6000, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers 
v. National Labor Relations Bd., 595 F.2d 808, 811 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) ("non-union employees properly may be excluded" from 
processes of formulating union's negotiating position without 
 
 
 
26 
 
violating duty of fair representation).  See also Southern 
Worcester County Reg'l Vocational Sch. Dist. v. Labor Relations 
Comm'n, 377 Mass. 897, 904 (1979) ("selection of the union 
negotiating team [is] an internal union matter"); George v. 
Local Union No. 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., AFL-CIO, 100 F.3d 1008, 1010–
1011, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (union did not violate duty of fair 
representation by not permitting member from serving on 
negotiating committee or attending negotiating meetings); Sears 
v. Automobile Carriers, Inc., 711 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(unpublished) (union did not commit breach of duty of fair 
representation by removing member from negotiating committee); 
Bass v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 630 F.2d 1058, 1063 
(5th Cir. 1980) ("internal union decisions" are "not 
circumscribed by the constraints of the [duty of fair 
representation]"); Matter of Phalen v. Theatrical Protective 
Union No. 1, Int'l Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees, 
A.F.L.-C.I.O., 22 N.Y.2d 34, 44, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 
(1968) ("an action for breach of the duty of fair representation 
by one who has been discriminated against, although it may 
afford him an important remedy, is no substitute for democratic 
participation in the affairs of the union.  Unless an individual 
is a member of the union, he can have no voice in the selection 
of its officers who are his representatives in the collective 
 
 
 
27 
 
bargaining process").  Cf. Anderson v. Commonwealth Employment 
Relations Bd., 73 Mass. App. Ct. 908, 909 n.5 (2009) (union rule 
that retired members could not vote on collective bargaining 
agreements did not "violate[] the duty of fair representation" 
because "the plaintiffs' voting claim" was "a purely internal 
matter"). 
 
We now address the employees' contention that they are not 
challenging exclusive representation "in the abstract," but only 
insofar as the unions use exclusive representation to deprive 
them of "a voice and a vote in their workplace conditions" with 
respect to bargaining representatives, contract proposals, and 
bargaining strategy unless they join the unions and support 
their politics.  We conclude that this argument is likewise 
without merit. 
 
As an initial matter, we address the employees' claim that 
the unions are involved in "State action" for purposes of a 
First Amendment challenge to their internal rules restricting 
the participation of nonmembers in certain meetings or strategy 
sessions.  As then Circuit Judge Breyer, writing for the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, explained, the 
"link between the union's [government-created] bargaining power 
and its membership requirements is too distant to impose 
constitutional restrictions."  Hovan v. United Bhd. of 
Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 704 F.2d 641, 645 (1st Cir. 1983).  
 
 
 
28 
 
He further concluded that, while exclusive representation is a 
creature of statute, internal union rules not dictated by 
statute do not constitute State action, and holding otherwise 
"would radically change not only the legal, but the practical, 
nature of the union enterprise."  Id. at 642-643.  Accord United 
Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 
104, 121 n.16 (1982) (union's adoption of "outsider rule" 
prohibiting nonmembers from contributing to union elections did 
not violate "nonmembers' constitutional rights of free speech 
and free association" because "the union's decision to adopt an 
outsider rule does not involve state action"); Kidwell v. 
Transportation Communications Int'l Union, 946 F.2d 283, 299 
(4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1005 (1992) (for 
purposes of First Amendment challenge, "the internal membership 
and procedural decisions of a union . . . , although having an 
impact on those who may participate in the union's duties in 
carrying out its role as collective bargaining representative, 
do[] not constitute state action"); Turner v. Air Transport 
Lodge 1984 of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 
AFL-CIO, 590 F.2d 409, 413 n.1 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 
U.S. 919 (1979) (per curiam) (Mulligan, J., concurring) ("since 
union constitutions and rules are formulated and enforced by the 
union, a private entity, no federal constitutional right of free 
speech is . . . involved").  While these cases involved private 
 
 
 
29 
 
sector unions, State action has been found lacking in the public 
sector union context as well.  See, e.g., Hallinan v. Fraternal 
Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 817 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1049 (2009) ("Here, it was the 
Union, rather than the employer, that barred the plaintiffs from 
membership.  And union actions taken pursuant to the 
organization's own internal governing rules and regulations are 
not state actions"); Harmon v. Matarazzo, 162 F.3d 1147 (2d 
Cir.) (unpublished), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1042 (1998) (police 
officer's Federal civil rights claim against police union "not 
actionable" because union "is not a state actor"); Messman v. 
Helmke, 133 F.3d 1042, 1044 (7th Cir. 1998) ("a union's internal 
governing rules usually are not subject to First Amendment 
prohibitions"); Jackson v. Temple Univ. of the Commonwealth Sys. 
of Higher Educ., 721 F.2d 931, 933 (3d Cir. 1983) (public 
employee's Federal civil rights claim against union not 
actionable where plaintiff failed "to set forth any facts 
suggesting that the state was responsible for the Union or that 
the Union was acting under color of state law in deciding not to 
bring [his] grievance to arbitration").  We conclude that here 
the link between exclusive representation and the unions' 
membership requirements are likewise too attenuated to 
constitute State action. 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
Moreover, even if we were to assume that the link between 
statutorily required exclusive representation and union 
membership requirements might be sufficient in certain 
circumstances to satisfy the State action requirement, we would 
still discern no constitutional problems.  Employees in the 
bargaining unit received a vote on whether to form their unions; 
those opposed to having a union lost that vote.  The "majority-
rule concept is . . . unquestionably at the center of our 
federal labor policy," and hence the "complete satisfaction of 
all who are represented is hardly to be expected" (citations 
omitted).  Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 180.  See 
Emporium Capwell Co., 420 U.S. at 62 ("majority rule" is 
"[c]entral to the policy of fostering collective bargaining").  
Indeed, as the Court in Knight II, 465 U.S. at 290, observed, 
majority rule is a fundamental aspect of American democratic 
government.  Those who lose elections often do not have 
representatives speaking in favor of their personal policy 
preferences, at least until the next election.  Like these 
members of the electorate, the employees have another chance to 
vote:  they can vote to decertify the union after a certain 
period of time.  See G. L. c. 150E, § 4.  See also Watertown v. 
Watertown Mun. Employees Ass'n, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 285, 291-292 
(2005) (describing "the employees' right to select new union 
 
 
 
31 
 
representation" as "a collective bargaining right that is beyond 
the arbitrator's powers" to penalize). 
 In the meantime, their inability to select bargaining 
representatives or participate in bargaining sessions is a 
consequence of losing the election regarding union 
representation and choosing not to join the union after having 
lost.  This is an intended and expected feature of exclusive 
representation.  See Emporium Capwell Co., 420 U.S. at 62 (in 
creating exclusive representation, Congress intended "regime of 
majority rule" in which interests of some employees "might be 
subordinated to the interest of the majority").  Hence, 
"exclusive bargaining representation by a democratically 
selected union does not, without more, violate the right of free 
association on the part of dissenting non-union members of the 
bargaining unit."  D'Agostino v. Baker, 812 F.3d 240, 244 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2473 (2016). 
Moreover, as discussed, conflicting representatives in 
collective bargaining is not practicable:  to have the employee 
representatives speak with one voice at the bargaining table is 
critical to the efficient resolution of labor-management 
disputes and protects the bargaining unit employees from divide-
and-conquer tactics by employers.  See note 21, supra (citing 
cases).  Thus, as the Court in Knight II, 465 U.S. at 291, 
concluded, "The state has a legitimate interest in ensuring that 
 
 
 
32 
 
its public employers hear one, and only one, voice presenting 
the majority view of its professional employees on employment-
related policy questions," and exclusive representation is a 
"rational means of serving that interest." 
Finally, the nonunion employees, even if they do not have 
input into bargaining committees or bargaining proposals, remain 
protected by the duty of fair representation.  As mentioned, 
that duty ensures that the unions may not negotiate a collective 
bargaining agreement that discriminates against nonmembers in 
the terms and conditions of employment.  See Janus, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2468; Emporium Capwell Co., 420 U.S. at 64 ("by the very 
nature of the exclusive bargaining representative's status as 
representative of all unit employees, Congress implicitly 
imposed upon it a duty fairly and in good faith to represent the 
interests of minorities within the unit").  Here, the employees 
have not plausibly alleged that the unions committed a breach of 
the duty of fair representation for the reasons discussed supra.  
Thus, we conclude, it is not a breach of the duty of fair 
representation to prevent nonmembers from participating in the 
selection of bargaining committees or the development of 
bargaining proposals.  The Supreme Court has deemed such 
exclusive representation to be constitutional. 
 
4.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we vacate as 
moot the board's decision with respect to the agency fee 
 
 
 
33 
 
provisions of G. L. c. 150E, § 12, and we affirm the board's 
decision with respect to the exclusive representation provisions 
of G. L. c. 150E, §§ 2, 4, 5, and 12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.