Case Title: RUSK v SKILLMAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1973-07-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12396 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T OF T H E STATE OF M O N T A N A 1973 KAREN RUSK, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - ELOISE P. SKILLMAN, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Berger, Anderson, S i n c l a i r and Murphy, B i l l i n g s , Montana. Arnold Berger argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana. For Respondent: Pedersen and Herndon, B i l l i n g s , Montana. Donald Herndon argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana. Submitted: May 31, 1973 Decided: J U L 2 4 1973 Filed : JuL 2 4 1 9 7 3 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s a guest passenger personal i n j u r y action against the driver of the automobile i n which p l a i n t i f f was a passenger t r i e d i n the d i s t r i c t court of Broadwater County. The court on August 9, 1972, ordered dismissed the claim against defendant Carlton Sherwood, by s t i p u l a t i o n of a l l p a r t i e s . O n September 22, 1972, the court made findings of f a c t and conclusions of law and entered judgment f o r defendant Eloise Skillman. From t h a t judgment p l a i n t i f f Karen Rusk appeals. From the t r i a l record i t appears the automobile accident which is the subject of t h i s l i t i g a t i o n occurred on June 21, 1969, a t about 1:00 p.m. on U.S. Highway 12 near the west end of the Missouri River bridge, approximately one mile northwest of Townsend, Montana. The morning of June 21, 1969, Eloise Skillman and Karen Rusk l e f t t h e i r respective homes i n Livingston and proceeded i n Ifiss Skillman's c a r t o Helena by way of Townsend. The t r i p was a pleasure outing and Miss Rusk incidentally intended t o look a t an automobile i n Helena which her f a t h e r was considering buying. Miss Rusk contributed $5 toward gasoline expense and Miss Skillman drove her automobile, a 1966 Buick which she had purchased some ten days e a r l i e r . Immediately p r i o r t o the accident, Miss Skillman was pro- ceeding out of Townsend toward Helena and, according t o the t r i a l c o u r t ' s findings of f a c t , exceeding the posted 55 m i l e per hour speed l i m i t i n t h a t area, but was not going i n excess of 65 miles per hour. Miss Skillman contended t h a t a s she approached t h e Missouri River Bridge she was unable t o see a vehicle driven by Carlton Sherwood a t the opposite end of the bridge u n t i l she was almost upon the bridge. The Sherwood vehicle was e i t h e r stopped o r proceeding very slowly, preparatory t o making a l e f t hand turn onto a gravel road. This gravel road i s known as the Indian Creek Road and connects with U.S. Highway 12 near the w e s t end of the Missouri River bridge. Miss Skillman t e s t i f i e d that upon seeing the Sherwood vehicle and realizing it was stopped she braked her vehicle hard and swerved l e f t t o avoid the Sherwood vehicle. She stated she believed her car went crassways between the two t r a f f i c lanes and she never saw the vehicle driven by Reed Palmer i n the oncoming lane of t r a f f i c . She collided with the Palmer vehicle. Reed Palmer t e s t i f i e d that immediately prior t o the c o l l i - sion he was approaching the bridge, proceeding east toward Town- send a t a speed of about 55 m i l e s per hour. He f i r s t observed the Sherwood vehicle slow down as it was proceeding w e s t and the driver gave an arm signal indicating a l e f t hand turn. He stated that a s he came near the Sherwood vehicle he observed the Skillman vehicle come over the f a r end of the bridge, apparently going a t a high r a t e of speed. Palmer t e s t i f i e d that he then began t o slow down and, upon observing the Skillman vehicle continue t o rapidly approach him, he slammed on h i s brakes and attempted t o swerve but collided with the Skillman vehicle. The collision occurred i n h i s lane of t r a f f i c . The Sherwood vehicle was not involved i n the collision. A Montana highway patrolman who investigated the accident t e s t i f i e d that the length of the skidmarks l e f t by the Skillman vehicle was about 180 feet and the collision occurred on the side of the highway properly occupied by the Palmer vehicle. The patrolman issued a t r a f f i c citation t o Miss Skillman for operating her vehicle a t a speed i n excess of the safe speed having due regard for the circumstances then and there existing. Plaintiff brings several issues for review, most r e l a t e t o specific findings of fact made by the t r i a l court which she maintains were not supported by substancial evidence before the court. The remaining issues concern whether the court was correct i n designating Miss Rusk a "guest passenger" and whether the court was correct i n finding Miss Skillman guilty of ordinary rather than gross negligence. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s designation of Miss Rusk a s a "guest passenger" r a t h e r than a "passenger f o r hire" i s a correct ap- plication of section 32-1113, R.C.M. 1947. Under section 32-1113, I' i f the passenger i s r i d i n g i n said motor vehicle as a guest o r by i n v i t a t i o n and not f o r hire" the proof of gross negligence r a t h e r than ordinary negligence i s required t o e s t a b l i s h l i a b i l i t y . I n an action f o r personal i n j u r i e s r e s u l t i n g from an auto- mobile accident where it appears t h a t p l a i n t i f f accepted an in- v i t a t i o n t o accompany defendant on a t r i p , t h e burden i s on the p l a i n t i f f t o show any change i n relationship by v i r t u e of sub- sequent agreement. Copp v. Van Hise, 119 F.2d 691. N o testimony was introduced by Miss Rusk t o indicate her $5 contribution was anything more than an incidental, friendly g r a t u i t y r a t h e r than l e g a l consideration f o r services t o be rendered. A s t o t h e remaining issues f o r review, we find merit i n p l a i n t i f f ' s contention t h a t the t r i a l court went outside the evidence properly before i t t o make findings of f a c t concerning the inherently hazardous condition of the highway a s maintained by the s t a t e . Conversely, we find from examination of the t r i a l record, there was s u f f i c i e n t evidence, considered a s a whole, before the court t o establish t h a t Miss Skillman's operation of her vehicle immediately p r i o r t o the accident constituted "gross negligence" and t h a t such gross negligence was the proximate cause of the i n j u r i e s sustained by Miss Rusk i n the accident. W e agree, a s a general proposition, highway intersections with gravel roads and bridge abutments along highways a r e s e t t i n g s where accidents occur more frequently than other highway areas. However, it does appear from the t r i a l record, p a r t i c u l a r l y the testimony of the highway patrolman, t h a t had Miss Skillman (1) been observing the posted speed l i m i t i n the area of the accident, (2) maintained a proper lookout i n order t o observe the Sherwood vehicle when it f i r s t came i n t o her l i n e of vision, (3) applied her brakes a t the point where she t e s t i f i e d she f i r s t saw the Sherwood vehicle (which appears t o be some considerable distance ahead of the point her skid marks began t o appear on the highway), and ( 4 ) guided her vehicle t o the r i g h t hand shoulder of the highway r a t h e r than veering t o the l e f t and i n t o the oncoming lane, she could have avoided the accident i n Palmer's lane of t r a f f i c . Legal writers repudiate the e n t i r e premise t h a t the con- cept of "negligence" can and should be delineated i n t o degrees. Prosser, Law of Torts, 4 t h Ed., Ch. 5 , 534, p. 182, s t a t e s : "Nevertheless, the idea of degrees of negligence, or a t l e a s t some kind of aggravated negligence which w i l l r e s u l t i n l i a b i l i t y where ordinary negligence w i l l not, has been adopted i n a number of s t a t u t e s , which have forced the courts,however reluctantly, t o attempt t o do again what they declared t h a t they could not do, and t o make such e f f o r t s a s a r e possible t o supply a defi- n i t i o n f o r the undefinable. Some of these s t a t u t e s have attempted t o codify the e n t i r e doctrine, o r apply i t t o particular s i t u a t i o n s such a s bailments, criminal negligence, o r contributory negligence cases. Most of them, however, a r e automobile guest s t a t u t e s . I I Montana's automobile guest s t a t u t e places the task upon the courts t o define the undefinable i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between "ordinary" and "gross" negligence. The concept of gross negli- gence, a s it has developed by precedent and application, shows a dichotomy between c i v i l t o r t law and criminal law. Such I I d e f i n i t i o n a l terms a s malignant mind" and "willful and wanton disregard of consequences" a r e applied only t o the criminal con- cept. Holland v. Konda, 142 Mont. 536, 543, 385 P.2d 272, provides an example of automobile t o r t gross negligence: "AS the p l a i n t i f f *was a guest i n the c a r of appellant Konda, the d u t i e s owed her by the driver were governed by R.C.M. $ 5 32-1113 t o 32-1115, inclusive. The sub- stance of these provisions i s t h a t the guest assumes, a s between himself and the driver, the ordinary negli- gence of the driver. Thus, i n order f o r the driver t o be l i a b l e i n damages t o the guest, h i s actions must be I those which a r e termed 'grossly negligent. This court I had defined ross negligence a s the f a i l u r e t o use s l i h t care.' Batchoff v. Craney, 119 Mont. 1 5 / , 1.12 *(Emphasis added). See also: Heen v. Tiddy, 151 Mont. 265, 442 P.2d 434. Nangle v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 96 Mont. 512, 522, 32 P.2d 11, states: 11 t Gross negligence' and 'reckless operation' are variously defined by different courts. Most, i f not a l l , of them are of l i t t l e assistance i n the classification of various s t a t e s of facts within o r without such definitions. Under the construction of t h i s s t a t u t e herein announced, whether 'gross negligence' and 'reckless operation' a r e synonymous o r said to be different i n meaning one from the other i s immaterial, for i f the conduct of the driver of the automobile was i n fact something more than ordinary negligence, it matters not, under the Act i n question, [Montana Automobile Guest Statute1 - - by what name it i s called, a r by what adjective it may be described; the defendant is nevertheless liable. " (Emphasis added). See also: Carter v. Miller, 140 Mont. 426, 372 . ~ . 2 d 421. Applying "failure to use s l i g h t care" and "some- thing more than ordinary negligence" t o the facts of the instant case, we must determine that the acts and omissions of defendant Skillman, considered i n their entirety, constitute gross negli- gence and impart l i a b i l i t y t o her. The judgment i s reversed and the cause remanded t o the d i s t r i c t court for t r i a l on the Justice I N THE S U P R E M E COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA - No, 12396 KAREN RUSK, Plaintiff and Appellant, VS . ELOISE P. SKILLMAN, Defendant and Respondent ORDER AMENDING OPINION AND DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING P E R CUIBICAM: ~ e s ~ o n d e n t 's petition for rehearing i n the above entitled matter is hereby denied. It appearing that surnmry judgment was entered by the t r i a l court prior t o presentation of defendant SkfPHman's defense herein, I T IS ORDERED that the Opinion dated July 24, 1373, be amended by striking the f i n a l sentence of the Opinion and sub- s t i t u t i n g the following therefor: 1t The summary judgment against defendant Skillman i s vacated and the cause against that defendant i s remanded t o the d i s t r i c t court for a new t r i a l on a l l issues, I 1 DATED t h i s 15th day of October, 1973.