Case Title: White v. ITD

Citation: 

Docket Number: 50746

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2024-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 50746 
 
 
AARON MICHAEL WHITE, 
 
     Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION 
DEPARTMENT, 
 
     Respondent. 
______________________________________  
 
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Lewiston, April 2024 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: June 3, 2024 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Shoshone County. Barbara A. Duggan, District Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Sullivan Law Office, PLLC, Coeur d’Alene, for Appellant. Joseph Sullivan 
argued. 
 
Mark Alan Jackson, Coeur d’Alene, for Respondent. Mark Alan Jackson argued. 
  
_____________________ 
 
BRODY, Justice.  
This appeal concerns a petition for judicial review of the administrative suspension of 
Aaron White’s driving privileges and whether the common law defense of necessity may be 
raised during an administrative license suspension (“ALS”) hearing. White received a DUI 
citation and a notice of suspension of his driving privileges after he drove his wife to the hospital 
for emergency medical treatment following an ATV accident. During an Idaho Transportation 
Department (“ITD”) ALS hearing, the ALS Hearing Officer rejected White’s argument that his 
conduct was legally excusable under the necessity defense. The district court affirmed the ALS 
Hearing Officer’s decision to sustain White’s suspension. White timely appealed to this Court, 
arguing that the district court erred when it held White could not avail himself of the necessity 
defense in the ALS hearing. We affirm the district court’s decision. 
 
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I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
On August 26, 2022, Aaron White and his wife Kristy White (“Kristy”) were camping at 
a campsite in Shoshone County, Idaho. Kristy was injured after crashing her ATV. During the 
ALS hearing, Kristy testified that her injuries were severe, including a head injury, broken ribs, 
and a collapsed lung. She believed her injuries to be life threatening. White testified that he 
attempted to call 9-1-1 for an ambulance at their campsite; however, cell phone service was 
“spotty” and he was unable to successfully complete the call. White further testified he drove 
about “halfway down” “Two Mile Road” and, once they regained cell phone service, Kristy 
called 9-1-1 to request an ambulance. White gave the dispatcher their exact location and she 
informed him an officer was en route. 
At approximately 1:00 A.M., Deputy Minier was dispatched to the scene and encountered 
the Whites near the bottom of the hill on Two Mile Road. White testified to the following 
exchange between himself and Deputy Minier:  
[W]hen we got down to the bottom of the hill, there was an officer down there. 
And he said, “Would you like me to call an ambulance?” And I said, “I don’t 
know if we have the time.” And he said, “I’ll follow you there.” And we drove to 
the hospital. 
White testified that he understood Deputy Minier’s offer to call an ambulance to mean an 
ambulance had not yet been requested when he and Kristy initially made the request to the 9-1-1 
dispatcher. White testified that at the time he and Kristy encountered Deputy Minier, about an 
hour to an hour-and-a-half had passed since the time Kristy was injured. White believed an 
ambulance would take another fifteen to twenty minutes to arrive at their location. White 
testified that Kristy “was not herself by any means,” had significant amounts of blood in her hair 
and on her face, and was not “conscious and alert and responsive to normal conversation.” White 
was scared and worried about his wife’s injuries and blood loss and wanted to protect her well-
being by getting her to the hospital as quickly as possible. 
As the Whites were about to leave the bottom of the hill on Two Mile Road with Deputy 
Minier following behind, a second law enforcement officer, Deputy Bowman, arrived at the 
scene. Deputy Minier informed Deputy Bowman he would follow behind the Whites’ vehicle as 
White drove to the Shoshone Medical Center (“SMC”). All three vehicles arrived at SMC around 
the same time. 
 
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In his probable cause affidavit, Deputy Bowman of the Shoshone County Sheriff’s Office 
(“SCSO”) stated that he arrived at SMC at approximately 1:19 A.M. When he arrived, he 
observed White exiting the driver’s seat of his truck, helping Kristy into the hospital, and then 
parking his truck in the parking lot. Deputy Bowman approached White and spoke to him next to 
White’s truck. According to the affidavit, White was slurring his speech and speaking in a slow 
tone and Deputy Bowman asked him whether he had been drinking. White admitted to drinking 
six beers, the last at 9:00 P.M. (four hours prior), and, when prompted, White stated that he 
thought he was over the legal limit. Deputy Bowman then informed White he had reason to 
believe White operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and asked White if 
he would be willing to perform field sobriety tests. White agreed. Deputy Bowman reported that 
White failed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN), walk and turn, and one leg stand tests. 
Thereafter, White agreed to a breathalyzer test and, at approximately 2:04 A.M., provided two 
breath samples. Deputy Bowman recorded White’s breathalyzer results as .159 and .156 BrAC 
(breath alcohol content). 
Deputy Bowman issued White a misdemeanor citation for driving under the influence, 
Idaho Code section 18-8004(1)(a), and a notice of suspension of his driving privileges pursuant 
to Idaho Code section 18-8002A, which mandates administrative license suspension when a 
driver fails evidentiary tests for alcohol concentration. After giving White the citation and notice 
of administrative license suspension, Deputy Bowman allowed White to re-enter SMC. 
B. Procedural Background 
Three days after White was cited, he requested an ALS hearing before an ALS Hearing 
Officer to contest his license suspension. During the hearing, White did not dispute that he drove 
his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in excess of the legal limit. Rather, White argued 
that his conduct was legally excusable under the common law necessity defense. 
The ALS Hearing Officer rejected White’s argument and concluded that “the common 
law ‘necessity’ defense is not grounds for challenging [an] administrative license suspension and 
is not sufficient cause for vacating the suspension.” In support of this conclusion, the Hearing 
Officer noted that the necessity defense is not one of the five enumerated grounds for vacating a 
license suspension under Idaho Code section 18-8002A(7)(a)-(e). The ALS Hearing Officer also 
cited an unpublished district court decision, Hemry v. Idaho Transportation Department, Adams 
County Case CV2014-3228 (2014), which rejected a similar argument:  
 
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Additionally, Hemry v. ITD, Adams County Case CV2014-3228, entered 
September 18, 2014, provides in part that the necessity defense is not available to 
a petitioner as a defense in an administrative license suspension case as plain 
language of the statute and interpreting case law limit the grounds available to the 
petitioner. 
 
White timely petitioned the district court for judicial review of the ALS Hearing Officer’s 
decision sustaining White’s suspension. After hearing oral arguments, the district court affirmed 
the ALS Hearing Officer’s decision to sustain White’s suspension. 
 
White timely filed a notice of appeal. 
II. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
“An [ALS] hearing under Idaho Code section 18-8002A results in an ‘agency action’ and 
is, therefore, governed by the [Idaho Administrative Procedure Act].” Wood v. Idaho Transp. 
Dep’t, 172 Idaho 300, 306, 532 P.3d 404, 410 (2023) (quoting Reagan v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 
169 Idaho 689, 693, 502 P.3d 1027, 1031 (2021)). The hearing officer’s order is subject to 
challenge through a petition for judicial review. I.C. § 18-8002A(8). The Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA,” Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code) limits the grounds upon which an 
agency action may be set aside: 
On judicial review, the APA directs that the hearing officer’s decision must be 
affirmed unless the court determines that the officer’s “findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions” are:  
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;  
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;  
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;  
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or  
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
Wood, 172 Idaho at 306-07, 532 P.3d at 409-10 (quoting I.C. § 67-5279(3)).  
“On appeal, this Court reviews agency decisions directly, independent of the district 
court’s determination.” Wood, 172 Idaho at 306, 532 P.3d at 409 (quoting Reagan, 169 Idaho at 
693, 502 P.3d at 1031). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review. Williams v. Idaho State Bd. of Real Estate Appraisers, 157 Idaho 496, 502, 
337 P.3d 655, 661 (2014) (quoting Kimbrough v. Idaho Bd. of Tax Appeals, 150 Idaho 417, 420, 
247 P.3d 644, 647 (2011)). This Court may set aside the agency’s decision if it determines the 
agency erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code section 67-5279(3)(a)-(e) and that “a 
substantial right of the challenging party has been prejudiced.” Wood, 172 Idaho at 306, 532 P.3d 
 
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at 410 (quoting I.C. § 67-5279(4)). “If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in 
whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.” Id. (quoting I.C. § 67-
5279(3)). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The necessity defense is unavailable to petitioners in ALS proceedings under the 
plain language of the ALS statute. 
White challenges the ALS Hearing Officer’s conclusion that the common law defense of 
necessity is unavailable to petitioners in ALS proceedings. Citing to this Court’s decision in 
Reagan v. Idaho Transportation Department, 169 Idaho 689, 502 P.3d 1027 (2021), White 
contends that the failure to provide for such a defense in an ALS proceeding violates 
constitutional standards, specifically his right to raise a defense under the Sixth Amendment and 
his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In response, ITD argues that the ALS 
Hearing Officer did not err because: (1) the Idaho Legislature did not include the necessity 
defense among the five enumerated grounds for vacating an automatic driver’s license 
suspension under Idaho Code section 18-8002A(7)(a)-(e); and (2) the necessity defense is a 
common law defense, not a constitutional defense. ITD further argues that Reagan is 
distinguishable from this case because Reagan did not hold that a hearing officer may vacate an 
administrative license suspension based on a necessity defense, nor did it hold that the necessity 
defense is a constitutional defense or issue. Instead, ITD contends Reagan is limited to the 
holding that evidence gathered incident to an unlawful arrest violated Fourth Amendment 
constitutional standards in an ALS proceeding. 
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the ALS Hearing Officer did not err in 
concluding that the necessity defense is unavailable to petitioners in ALS proceedings. 
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s decision to reject White’s challenge. 
Necessity is a recognized common law defense in Idaho. State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 
854, 856, 801 P.2d 563, 565 (1990); State v. Beavers, 152 Idaho 180, 183, 268 P.3d 1, 4 (Ct. 
App. 2010). “The basic premise behind the necessity defense is that a person who is compelled 
to commit an illegal act in order to prevent a greater harm should not be punished for that act.” 
Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855, 801 P.2d at 564. The necessity defense requires the following four 
elements: (1) “[a] specific threat of immediate harm;” (2) “[t]he circumstances which necessitate 
the illegal act must not have been brought about by the defendant;” (3) “[t]he same objective 
 
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could not have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative available to the actor;” and (4) 
“[t]he harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm avoided.” Id. 
Traditionally, the states have been “accorded great leeway in adopting summary 
procedures to protect public health and safety.” Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979). “A 
suspension of driving privileges pursuant to [Idaho Code section] 18-8002A is a civil penalty 
separate and apart from any other suspension imposed for a violation of other Idaho motor 
vehicle codes or for a conviction of an offense.” In re Bowman, 135 Idaho 843, 845, 25 P.3d 866, 
868 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing I.C. § 18-8002(5)). The ALS statute, Idaho Code section 18-8002A, 
requires that ITD summarily suspend the driver’s license of a driver who fails an evidentiary test 
administered by a law enforcement officer for concentration of alcohol or other intoxicating 
substances pursuant to Idaho Code section 18-8004. I.C. § 18-8002A(4). During an ALS hearing 
challenging the suspension, the burden of proof rests on the driver raising the challenge. I.C. § 
18-8002A(7). The hearing officer “shall not vacate the suspension” unless the driver has shown, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, one of the following:  
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been driving or 
was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of 
section [sic] 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs 
or other intoxicating substances in violation of section [sic] 18-8004, 18-
8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances 
administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in 
accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code, or the 
testing equipment was not functioning properly when the test was 
administered; or 
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary 
testing as required in subsection (2) of this section. 
I.C. § 18-8002A(7). 
As noted, the plain language of Idaho Code section 18-8002A(7) provides five grounds 
upon which an ALS hearing officer can vacate an administrative license suspension if the person 
challenging the suspension has proven one of the grounds by a preponderance of the evidence. 
I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(a)-(e). The necessity defense is not one of the grounds enumerated in the 
statute. Therefore, by the plain language of the statute, an ALS hearing officer cannot vacate an 
administrative license suspension based upon a necessity defense. 
 
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While not binding upon this Court, our sister states have consistently held that the 
necessity defense is not available to petitioners in ALS proceedings, based on the plain language 
and legislative purpose of their ALS statutes. For example, in State v. Pollander, 706 A.2d 1359, 
1363 (Vt. 1997), the Vermont Supreme Court noted that Vermont’s recognition of the necessity 
defense “emanates not from any state or federal constitutional imperative but rather from the 
common law,” which leaves its legislature “free to determine whether a necessity defense is an 
issue to be considered in a civil suspension hearing.” (Citations omitted). Therefore, the court 
concluded that it “may consider whether to permit a necessity defense in the civil suspension 
setting only if the Legislature has left the issue unresolved.” Id. (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). The court held that the plain language of the statute indicated the Vermont 
Legislature’s intent to limit the issues that may be presented at a civil suspension hearing to those 
enumerated in the statute. Id. The court further held that the purpose of the state’s ALS statute 
was to serve “the legitimate purpose of protecting public safety by quickly removing ‘potentially 
dangerous drivers from the road’” and minimizing procedural delay, which was served by 
excluding the necessity defense and other affirmative defenses from among the issues to be 
litigated. Id. (quoting State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510, 513 (Vt. 1992)).  
Similarly, in Foster v. Snyder, 76 Cal. App. 4th 264, 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), a 
California court of appeals considered the language and legislative history of its “implied 
consent” statute, an analog to Idaho’s ALS statute, finding it to be “remedial in nature,” “aimed 
at reducing the hazards of drunken driving” on the state highways, and “designed to secure the 
civil cooperation of all persons privileged to drive.” (Emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
The court reasoned that “[a] court should not read into a remedial statute an exception that would 
impose obstacles to the achievements of its purposes” and held that duress and necessity 
defenses are inapplicable in administrative civil suspension proceedings. Id. at 270, 273 
(citations omitted). 
The approach of our sister states is instructive, especially considering this Court has 
recognized ALS proceedings fulfill a different statutory purpose than criminal DUI proceedings. 
In State v. Talavera, 127 Idaho 700, 705, 905 P.2d 633, 638 (1995), this Court explained that the 
stated purpose of Idaho Code section 18-8002A is to provide “safety for all persons using the 
highways of this state by quickly revoking the driving privileges of those persons who have 
shown themselves to be safety hazards by driving with a blood alcohol content which exceeds 
 
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the legal limit provided for in [s]ection 18-8004, Idaho Code.” (Quoting Statement of Purpose, 
H.B. 252, 1993 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 1993)). We continued, stating that ALS proceedings 
accomplish the statute’s objective “by expediting the removal of drivers who fail the BAC 
evidentiary test from the public roads, thus avoiding the often time-consuming delays inherent in 
criminal prosecutions.” Talavera, 127 Idaho at 706, 905 P.2d at 638 (citing State v. Savard, 659 
A.2d 1265, 1267-68 (Me. 1995)).  
White contends that this Court’s holding in Reagan v. Idaho Transportation Department, 
169 Idaho 689, 502 P.3d 1027 (2021), expanded the statutory grounds for vacating an 
administrative license suspension to include consideration of the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule, a “constitutional standard.” Specifically, he argues that the necessity defense 
is rooted in the constitutional right to present a defense stemming from the Sixth Amendment’s 
Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause and, therefore, after Reagan, the necessity defense should also be considered in ALS 
proceedings. White’s reliance on Reagan is misplaced.  
In Reagan, a police officer responded to Reagan’s residence, acting on a citizen’s report 
of a potentially intoxicated driver operating a vehicle registered to Reagan. Reagan, 169 Idaho at 
692, 502 P.3d at 1030. The officer did not himself witness Reagan operating or otherwise in 
control of a vehicle. Id. Reagan admitted to consuming alcohol, failed several field sobriety tests, 
and the officer arrested her for DUI, placing her in handcuffs in the back of a patrol car. Id. The 
officer played a recording of the ALS notice before administering a breathalyzer test, the results 
of which indicated Reagan’s BAC exceeded the legal limit. Id. at 692-93, 502 P.3d at 1030-31. 
Reagan’s driver’s license was suspended for one year under Idaho Code section 18-8002A. Id.  
Reagan appealed to the district court, which reversed Reagan’s suspension, holding, in 
part, that Reagan’s arrest was unlawful. Reagan, 169 Idaho at 693, 502 P.3d at 1031. ITD 
subsequently appealed. Id. at 692, 502 P.3d at 1030. This Court held that the district court 
correctly vacated Reagan’s suspension because Reagan’s arrest violated the United States and 
Idaho Constitutions and, therefore, the breathalyzer results obtained incident to the unlawful 
arrest violated constitutional standards. Id. at 698, 700, 502 P.3d at 1036, 1038. Thus, this Court 
concluded that the breathalyzer results could not be used to form the basis of Reagan’s 
administrative license suspension and the district court correctly vacated the suspension. Id. 
 
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The facts in Reagan are distinguishable from White’s appeal, and Reagan does not 
expand the grounds for vacating an administrative license suspension as White suggests. Reagan 
did not hold that all common law defenses or criminal defenses are grounds for vacating an 
administrative license suspension. Instead, this Court explained in Reagan that, “[e]ven though 
an ALS hearing is an administrative proceeding to which the Fourth Amendment is not directly 
applicable, the purpose of an ALS hearing is to evaluate the evidence of BAC obtained as part of 
a criminal detention or seizure.” Id. at 689, 699, 502 P.3d at 1037 (emphasis added). 
“Therefore,” this Court held, “any search by which BAC evidence is obtained for purposes of the 
ALS must satisfy constitutional standards.” Id. Unlike in Reagan, no issue concerning the 
lawfulness of the search, meaning the evidentiary test results, has been raised in this appeal. The 
necessity defense was not at issue in Reagan, and we did not hold that the necessity defense is a 
constitutionally protected interest of petitioners in ALS proceedings. Reagan did not expand the 
grounds for vacating an administrative license suspension to include all criminal common law 
defenses. Thus, we agree with the district court that Reagan is not dispositive in this appeal, 
which is fatal to White’s appeal. 
Intertwined with White’s reliance on Reagan is his assertion that the right to present a 
necessity defense in an ALS proceeding stems from the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Because Reagan addressed the issue of a Fourth Amendment constitutional violation as grounds 
for vacating a suspension, White argues his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights were violated, such that his suspension should be vacated.  
 
White contends that his Sixth Amendment “constitutional right to present a defense” 
should have permitted him to “avail himself” of the necessity defense in the ALS hearing. 
However, he provides no further authority to suggest that the common law necessity defense is 
grounded in constitutional imperatives. Furthermore, by its plain language, the Sixth Amendment 
applies to “criminal prosecutions,” not civil proceedings. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Indeed, in 
White’s description of the necessity defense and its elements, he cites exclusively to criminal 
opinions of the Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals and to the Idaho Criminal Jury 
Instructions. He provides no legal authority to support his argument that the Sixth Amendment 
right to present a defense includes a right to present a necessity defense in a civil ALS hearing. 
We have previously considered Sixth Amendment challenges to ALS hearing decisions 
concerning a petitioner’s right to counsel before deciding whether to submit to or refuse a law 
 
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enforcement request for evidentiary testing for alcohol concentration under Idaho Code section 
18-8002A and its predecessors. E.g. State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1, 5-6, 704 P.2d 333, 337-38 
(1985) (holding, under Idaho Code section 49-352, a precursor to Idaho Code section 18-8002, 
that “a person does not have a constitutional right to consult with an attorney before deciding 
whether to submit to an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration”); Mills v. Bridges, 93 Idaho 
679, 682, 471 P.2d 66, 69 (1970) (citations omitted) (stating, under Idaho Code section 49-352, 
that drivers do not have a constitutional right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether 
to accede to evidentiary tests for alcohol concentration “because an administrative proceeding for 
the suspension of a driver’s license is a civil proceeding, and not a criminal prosecution . . . .”). 
This Court has refused to apply the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in those circumstances 
because such tests are civil in nature, rather than criminal. Id. Sixth Amendment rights expressly 
apply to criminal prosecutions. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Even if White had been able to 
adequately support his argument that the ability to present a necessity defense is a Sixth 
Amendment constitutional interest, it would not inevitably follow that petitioners have a right to 
raise necessity defenses in ALS proceedings. Just as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is 
restricted in ALS proceedings, so too is the Sixth Amendment right to raise a defense restricted 
by the legislature explicitly providing the grounds for vacating an administrative license 
suspension, none of which include an affirmative necessity defense.  
Finally, White asserts that his “constitutional right to present a defense” is rooted in the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. White argues that not being able to “avail himself” 
of the necessity defense during the ALS hearing was a violation of Fourteenth Amendment 
constitutional standards. We assume, although White does not expressly articulate, that his 
argument raises an issue of procedural due process, rather than substantive due process. In 
procedural due process challenges, we must determine the adequacy of a particular process by 
balancing three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) 
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute requirements would entail." Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork 
v. Valley Cnty., 145 Idaho 121, 127, 176 P.3d 126, 132 (2007) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). 
 
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Addressing the first and second factors, the private interest at stake is, of course, White’s 
driving privileges. “It is well recognized that an individual’s interest in a driver’s license is 
substantial.” Ankney, 109 Idaho at 4, 704 P.2d at 336 (citing Mackey, 443 U.S. at 11). However, 
the risk of erroneous deprivation of White’s driving privileges after the ALS hearing was low. 
Pursuant to the Idaho APA and the ALS statute, White was granted an ALS hearing where he 
was given the opportunity to testify and present his necessity defense. He was afforded the 
opportunity to present his necessity defense again on judicial review before the district court and 
in the present appeal. Both the ALS Hearing Officer and the district court heard White’s 
necessity defense but rejected his arguments primarily on statutory grounds. Considering White’s 
opportunities to be heard at the ALS hearing and on judicial review, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of his driving privileges was minimal. In fact, part of the Idaho Legislature’s stated 
purpose in enacting Idaho Code section 18-8002A was “[t]o guard against the potential for an 
erroneous deprivation of the driving privilege by providing for an administrative hearing on the 
revocation, if requested, within seven days of service of the notice of suspension.” Statement of 
Purpose, H.B. 252, 1993 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 1993) (emphasis added). The probable value of 
requiring ALS hearing officers to vacate suspensions based on necessity defenses would be 
negated by the direct conflict with the ALS statute’s plain meaning and legislative intent to 
“quickly revok[e] the driving privileges of those persons who have shown themselves to be 
[public] safety hazards.” Statement of Purpose, H.B. 252. 
Addressing the third factor above, the government’s interest includes (1) setting forth 
conditions on driving privileges that will prevent intoxicated persons from driving, and (2) 
defining any exceptions that would excuse a driver’s violation of those conditions. “As 
acknowledged by the [United States] Supreme Court, ‘the interest of the states in depriving the 
drunk driver of permission to continue operating an automobile is particularly strong.’ ” Ankney, 
109 Idaho at 4, 704 P.2d at 336 (quoting Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112, 1118 (1983)). In 
balancing the private interest at stake with the government’s interest, this Court held in Ankney 
that,“[a]lthough an individual does have a substantial right in his driver's license, the state's 
interest in preventing intoxicated persons from driving far outweighs the individual's interest,” 
especially because the individual is entitled to a prompt post-seizure hearing. Id. at 5, 704 P.2d at 
337 (emphasis added). Likewise, while White has a recognized private interest in maintaining his 
 
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driving privileges, the government’s interest in preventing intoxicated individuals from driving 
far outweighs White’s private interest.  
For these reasons, we conclude that the ALS Hearing Officer did not violate White’s due 
process rights by determining that the necessity defense was an invalid basis for vacating an 
administrative license suspension. Therefore, we hold that the district court was correct in 
affirming the ALS Hearing Officer’s decision under Idaho Code section 67-5279(3) because 
White’s argument under Reagan, predicated on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, failed to 
show that the ALS Hearing Officer’s “findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions” were “in 
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions.” 
B. ITD 
is 
not 
entitled 
to 
attorney 
fees 
on 
appeal 
under 
Idaho 
Code  
section 12-121. 
 
ITD requests attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121. Section 12-121 permits the 
court to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party where “the case was brought, 
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.” ITD contends that 
White’s argument is made “without foundation or legal authority” because neither the “plain 
reading of the ALS statute, nor Reagan, allow the ALS Hearing Officer to address a necessity 
defense.” 
While White’s arguments have been unsuccessful, it does not inevitably follow that his 
appeal was filed frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. See Floyd v. Board of Ada 
Cnty. Commissioners, 164 Idaho 659, 668, 434 P.3d 1265, 1274 (2019) (holding that although a 
party’s arguments proved unsuccessful, their appeal was not filed frivolously, unreasonably, or 
without foundation because it raised novel arguments and constitutional challenges to a provision 
of Idaho Code). The issue on appeal, whether the necessity defense is available to petitioners in 
ALS proceedings, is an issue of first impression for this Court. We have held that “attorney fees 
may not be awarded under Idaho Code section 12-121 when the case involves an issue of first 
impression.” Abell v. Abell, 172 Idaho 531, 547, 534 P.3d 957, 973 (2023) (quoting Erickson v. 
Erickson, 171 Idaho 352, 371, 521 P.3d 1089, 1108 (2022)). Therefore, we decline to award ITD 
attorney fees for this appeal under Idaho Code section 12-121. ITD is entitled to costs on appeal 
as a matter of right pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a). 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
 
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision on judicial review that 
affirmed the ALS Hearing Officer’s order to sustain White’s administrative license suspension. 
ITD is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121. ITD is entitled 
to costs on appeal as a matter of right pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a). 
Chief Justice BEVAN, Justices MOELLER and MEYER, and Justice Pro Tem JUDGE 
CONCUR.