Case Title: Ademiluyi v. State Board of Elections

Citation: 

Docket Number: 35/17

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2018-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
April Ademiluyi v. Maryland State Board of Elections; Administrator State Board of 
Elections, Linda Lamone; State Governor, Lawrence Hogan; Judge Ingrid Turner, No. 35, 
September Term, 2017 
 
ELECTION LAW – MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW (2002, 2010 REPL. VOL.) § 12-
202 – CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL CANDIDATE’S ELIGIBILITY – STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS – DOCTRINE OF LACHES – UNREASONABLE DELAY – 
PREJUDICE – Court of Appeals held that trial court correctly granted appellees’ motion 
to dismiss on grounds that appellant’s petition raising election claims as to judge’s 
eligibility for judicial office was untimely under Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law (2002, 2010 
Repl. Vol.) (“EL”) § 12-202(b)’s statute of limitations, and barred by doctrine of laches.  
Court concluded that petition was untimely filed under EL § 12-202(b) because appellant 
did not file petition in trial court until May 9, 2017, more than six months after 2016 general 
election, and more than one year after appellant admittedly became aware of facts that 
served as basis for election claims; and petition was filed at least several months after 
election results were certified.  Court determined that there was no basis on which to toll 
statute of limitations.  Additionally, independent of statutory limitations period of EL § 12-
202(b), Court held that petition was barred by doctrine of laches because, in filing petition 
in trial court more than six months after 2016 general election, appellant unreasonably 
delayed in assertion of rights, and delay prejudiced appellees. 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 35 
 
September Term, 2017 
______________________________________ 
 
APRIL ADEMILUYI 
 
v. 
 
MARYLAND STATE BOARD OF 
ELECTIONS; ADMINISTRATOR STATE 
BOARD OF ELECTIONS, LINDA LAMONE; 
STATE GOVERNOR, LAWRENCE HOGAN; 
JUDGE INGRID TURNER 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
Adkins 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Battaglia, Lynne A. (Senior 
Judge, Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Watts, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: March 26, 2018 
 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
Case No. C-02-CV-17-001383 
 
Argued: January 9, 2018 
 
 
Pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law (2002, 2010 Repl. Vol.) (“EL”) § 12-202(a), 
where “no other timely and adequate remedy is provided by” the Election Law Article, a 
registered voter may bring an action with respect to “any act or omission relating to an 
election” that is “(1) inconsistent with [the Election Law A]rticle or other law applicable 
to the elections process[] and (2) may change or has changed the outcome of the election.”  
(Paragraph break omitted).  This Court has explained that EL § 12-202 “governs judicial 
challenges to certain irregularities in relation to an election[,]” and that, in particular, EL § 
12-202 “is the mechanism for challenging the qualifications of a candidate seeking 
election.”  Lamone v. Schlakman, 451 Md. 468, 482, 153 A.3d 144, 152 (2017) (cleaned 
up).   
EL § 12-202(b) sets forth strict deadlines for filing such an action, providing: 
A registered voter may seek judicial relief under this section in the 
appropriate circuit court within the earlier of: 
 
(1) 10 days after the act or omission or the date the act or omission 
became known to the petitioner; or  
 
(2) 7 days after the election results are certified, unless the election 
was a gubernatorial primary or special primary election, in which case 3 days 
after the elections results are certified. 
 
This Court has described EL § 12-202(b) as providing “a statutory limitations period[.]”  
Schlakman, 451 Md. at 485, 153 A.3d at 154.  A registered voter who fails to file an action 
within the statutory limitations period risks having his or her judicial challenge dismissed 
as untimely.  Importantly, “the very short time limits for filing a suit challenging an aspect 
of an election pursuant to EL § 12-202(b) are evidence of this State’s public policy that 
claims for judicial relief relative to an election must be prosecuted without delay.”  Baker 
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v. O’Malley, 217 Md. App. 288, 296, 92 A.3d 588, 593, cert. denied, 440 Md. 115, 99 A.3d 
779 (2014).   
Given the clear mandate for prompt action in election cases, independent of EL § 
12-202(b)’s statutory limitations period for challenging any act or omission relating to an 
election, a registered voter’s action may be barred by the doctrine of laches.  “The doctrine 
of laches, which is both an affirmative defense and an equitable defense, applies where 
there is an unreasonable delay in the assertion of one party’s rights and that delay results 
in prejudice to the opposing party.”  Jones v. State, 445 Md. 324, 339, 126 A.3d 1162, 1171 
(2015) (cleaned up).  The doctrine of laches has been invoked to bar a registered voter’s 
election claims “where the delay in seeking judicial relief was measured in days[.]”  Baker, 
217 Md. App. at 296, 92 A.3d at 593.  Indeed, even an action that is arguably filed within 
the statutory limitations period of EL § 12-202(b)—i.e., before the election results are 
certified, and within ten days after the registered voter has knowledge of the challenged act 
or omission—may nevertheless be barred by the doctrine of laches.  See generally Ross v. 
State Bd. of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 668 & n.8, 672-73, 876 A.2d 692, 703 & n.8, 705-06 
(2005). 
In this case, on May 9, 2017, more than six months after the 2016 general election, 
April Ademiluyi (“Appellant”), an unsuccessful candidate for the position of judge of the 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Anne 
Arundel County (“the circuit court”) seeking to have the candidacy of the successful 
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candidate, the Honorable Ingrid M. Turner (“Judge Turner”),1 decertified.  Appellant 
alleged that Judge Turner had never practiced law in Maryland, and was, therefore, 
constitutionally unqualified for judicial office.  Appellant named as defendants the 
Maryland State Board of Elections, State Administrator of Elections Linda Lamone, 
Governor Lawrence J. Hogan, Jr., and Judge Turner (together, “Appellees”).  In the 
petition, Appellant sought a writ of mandamus ordering the Governor to rescind the 
commission that he had issued2 to Judge Turner, and an order decertifying both Judge 
Turner’s candidacy and the election results.  On May 22, 2017, Appellant filed an amended 
petition, raising the same allegations and seeking the same relief.  Before any response 
from Appellees, Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum of 
law, contending that she was entitled to the position of judge of the Circuit Court for Prince 
George’s County.   
Thereafter, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, a cross-motion 
for summary judgment, arguing, in relevant part, that the election claims were untimely 
under EL §12-202(b) and barred by the doctrine of laches.  On September 8, 2017, the 
                                              
1Although some of the relevant events in this case occurred before Judge Turner 
assumed the office of judge, we refer to her as “Judge Turner.” 
2Generally speaking, a “commission” is “[a] warrant or authority, from the 
government or a court, that empowers the person named to execute official acts[.]”  
Commission, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  Art. IV, § 11 of the Constitution of 
Maryland, concerning certification of judicial election results, provides, in pertinent part, 
that “[t]he election for Judges . . . shall be certified, and the returns made . . . to the 
Governor, who shall issue commissions to the different persons for the offices to which 
they shall have been, respectively, elected[.]”  Thus, in Maryland, the Governor issues a 
commission to an individual who is elected to the position of judge, which empowers that 
individual to serve as a judge. 
(Continued...) 
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circuit court conducted a hearing, and granted the motion to dismiss.  The circuit court 
ruled, in pertinent part, that the petition was untimely filed under EL § 12-202(b), and that 
the doctrine of laches barred the election claims.  On the same day, Appellant filed a notice 
of appeal to this Court pursuant to EL § 12-203.3  On September 12, 2017, consistent with 
its oral ruling, the circuit court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss.   
In this direct appeal, we consider whether the circuit court properly granted the 
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the petition was untimely filed under EL § 12-202(b) 
and barred by the doctrine of laches.  We hold that the circuit court was correct on both 
counts.  The petition was untimely filed under EL § 12-202(b) because Appellant did not 
file the petition in the circuit court until May 9, 2017, more than six months after the 2016 
general election, and more than one year after Appellant admittedly became aware of the 
facts that served as the basis for the election claims and at least several months after the 
election results were certified.  And, we determine that there is no basis on which to toll 
the statute of limitations.  Additionally, independent of the statutory limitations period set 
forth in EL § 12-202(b), the petition is barred by the doctrine of laches because, in filing 
the petition in the circuit court more than six months after the 2016 general election, 
Appellant unreasonably delayed in asserting her rights, and that delay prejudiced 
Appellees.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.  Because we hold that 
                                              
3EL § 12-203(a)(3) provides that an appeal in a proceeding involving an election 
claim “shall be taken directly to the Court of Appeals within 5 days of the date of the 
decision of the circuit court.”  And EL § 12-203(b) provides that “[t]he Court of Appeals 
shall give priority to hear and decide an appeal brought under subsection (a)(3) of this 
section as expeditiously as the circumstances require.”  
(Continued...) 
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the circuit court correctly granted the motion to dismiss, we need not address the three 
other questions presented on brief by Appellant that concern the merits of the election 
claims.4 
                                              
4Specifically, Appellant raises the following three issues concerning the merits:   
 
2.  
Whether [Judge Turner], in this case, committed the crime of 
misconduct while in office or violated public ethics laws through using the 
Attorney General to defend a judicial challenge to her constitutional 
qualifications to appear on the election ballot and campaign misconduct[.] 
 
3.  
Whether a member of the Maryland bar, whose only experience with 
the practice of law is military law as an active member of the U.S. Navy[,] 
meets the qualifications of Art. IV §[ ]2 of the Maryland Constitution to serve 
as a Circuit Court Judge[.] 
 
4. 
Upon an attorney candidate’s disqualification after winning a judicial 
election, whether Art. IV §[ ]5 grants the commission to a qualified 
candidate[,] who also ran in the judicial election[.]  
 
In any event, with respect to the third question presented, to the extent that Appellant 
raises a claim that Judge Turner has never practiced law in Maryland and is, therefore, not 
eligible for judicial office, she is mistaken.  Art. IV, § 2 of the Constitution of Maryland 
provides that judges in this State “shall be not less than thirty years of age at the time of 
their election or appointment, and shall be selected from those who have been admitted to 
practice Law in this State, and who are most distinguished for integrity, wisdom and sound 
legal knowledge.”  The plain language of Art. IV, § 2 requires simply that a judicial 
candidate be “admitted to practice Law in this State[,]” which means that a judicial 
candidate must be a member of the Bar of Maryland.  See, e.g., Bernstein v. State, 422 Md. 
36, 45 & n.2, 29 A.3d 267, 272 & n.2 (2011) (This Court noted that Art. IV, § 2’s clause 
requiring that a judicial candidate be “admitted to practice Law in this State” “is commonly 
read to require that certain judicial offices be filled by current members of the Maryland 
Bar[,]” and that “it is well established[] that having been admitted to practice law in this 
State is a requirement for selection as a judge[.]”).  In other words, this Court has 
interpreted the plain language of Art. IV, § 2 to require only that a judicial candidate be 
“admitted to practice Law in this State[,]” i.e., be a member of the Bar of Maryland.  In 
this case, it is undisputed that Judge Turner is a current member of the Bar of Maryland, 
having been admitted in 1994.  Thus, Judge Turner clearly satisfies Art. IV, § 2’s 
requirement that a judicial candidate be “admitted to practice Law in this State[.]”   
(Continued...) 
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BACKGROUND 
2016 General Election and Judicial Disabilities Complaint 
In 2016, Appellant was a candidate for judge of the Circuit Court for Prince 
George’s County in the primary and general elections.  In the general election, the 
candidates included three incumbent judges of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s 
County,5 as well as two lawyers, Appellant and Judge Turner.  On November 8, 2016, in 
the general election, Judge Turner and the three incumbent judges received sufficient votes 
to win the election; Appellant finished last.  After the election results were certified, 
Governor Hogan issued commissions to the successful candidates, including Judge Turner, 
who subsequently took the oath that is prescribed by the Constitution of Maryland, and 
assumed the office of judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.   
Now, we briefly describe events that occurred before the 2016 general election.  On 
April 14, 2016, before both the 2016 primary election on April 26, 2016, and the general 
election, Appellant filed with the Commission on Judicial Disabilities (“the Commission”) 
a complaint against Judge Turner, alleging that Judge Turner had committed various ethical 
violations during the election campaign by engaging in prohibited political activities, 
including endorsing numerous politicians.6  In the ethics complaint, Appellant alleged that 
                                              
5The incumbent judges were the Honorable Herman C. Dawson, the Honorable 
Dorothy Michelle Engel, and the Honorable Karen Holliday Mason.   
6The Commission is empowered to, among other things, “[i]nvestigate complaints 
against any judge of” any Maryland court.  Md. Const., Art. IV, § 4B(a)(1)(i).  A judge 
commits “sanctionable conduct” where the judge engages in “misconduct while in office, 
the persistent failure by a judge to perform the duties of the judge’s office, or conduct 
(Continued...) 
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Judge Turner had made a quid pro quo agreement with Maryland Delegate Joseline Peña-
Melnyk that Judge Turner would drop out of a congressional race in which Judge Turner 
had initially been a candidate, run for judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s 
County, and endorse Delegate Peña-Melnyk for the congressional seat; and, in turn, 
Delegate Peña-Melnyk would endorse Judge Turner for the judgeship.7   
                                              
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice[,]” or where the judge violates “any of 
the provisions of the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct[.]”  Md. R. 18-401(j)(1).   
By contrast, a candidate for judicial office who is an attorney “shall comply with 
Rule 19-308.2 of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct [(“MARPC”)].”  
Md. R. 18-104.6(a).  In turn, MARPC 8.2(a), i.e., Maryland Rule 19-308.2(a), provides, in 
relevant part, that “[a]n attorney shall not make a statement that the attorney knows to be 
false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or 
integrity of . . . a candidate for election or appointment to judicial legal office.”  And, 
MARPC 8.2(b)(3) provides that an attorney who becomes a candidate for judicial office 
“shall not knowingly misrepresent his or her identity or qualifications[.]”   
Nevertheless, Maryland Rule 18-104.6(b) provides: “A successful candidate and a 
judge who unsuccessfully sought a different judicial office are subject to judicial discipline 
for campaign conduct.  An unsuccessful candidate who is an attorney is subject to attorney 
discipline for campaign conduct.”  In other words, whether a judge or an attorney, a 
candidate for judicial office may be subject to discipline for campaign conduct.  Which 
entity has jurisdiction over alleged campaign misconduct, however, depends on whether 
the individual is a judge or an attorney—if the individual is a judge, then the Commission 
has jurisdiction, whereas, if the individual is an attorney, then the Attorney Grievance 
Commission has jurisdiction. 
7On December 6, 2017, Appellees filed in this Court a “Motion to Seal 
Proceedings,” requesting that this “Court enter an order sealing the proceedings in this 
Court and in the [c]ircuit [c]ourt[.]”  Appellees contended that the proceedings in the case 
involved the filing of the ethics complaint with the Commission against Judge Turner, a 
successful candidate for judicial office, and the resolution of the ethics complaint before 
the filing of any formal charges.  Appellees argued that proceedings before the Commission 
are confidential, and that, because Appellant relied on, and included in her filings, matters 
pertaining to the ethics complaint, the proceedings in this Court and the circuit court should 
be sealed.  On December 10, 2017, Appellant filed an opposition to the motion to seal.  On 
December 15, 2017, this Court issued an order deferring action on the motion to seal 
pending oral argument.  On January 8, 2018, one day before oral argument in this case, 
Appellees filed a letter advising that the motion to seal was withdrawn.  As such, we do 
not consider the matter further. 
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While the ethics complaint was pending before the Commission, on April 21, 2016, 
a few days before the 2016 primary election, The Washington Post published an article, 
which included, in relevant part, the following information about Judge Turner: 
The other challenger is veteran politician [] Turner, who dropped out of a 
crowded congressional race to compete for a judgeship, hoping to capitalize 
on her experience as a military lawyer and former member of the [Prince 
George’s C]ounty [C]ouncil.   
 
* * * 
 
Turner, a former Prince George’s County Council member, wants to reform 
the judicial system.  “We need an eye toward rehabilitation and becoming 
more of a problem-solving court,” she said. 
 
Turner, 52, was running for Congress when she learned about the court 
opening.  The retired military attorney quickly changed gears. 
 
For 20 years, the [United States] Naval Academy graduate served as legal 
counsel to admirals, administrative units[,] and sailors.  But she has little 
experience in local courts.  She returned to Prince George’s [County] after 
her 2006 retirement[,] and was elected to two terms on the [C]ounty 
[C]ouncil.   
 
Turner’s detractors say [that] the politician is simply seeking secure 
employment — the job pays about $154,000 a year — after she was term-
limited and dropped out of the congressional race. 
 
But Turner says she is running to educate voters that they have a choice when 
it comes to the judicial system.   
 
“In 1986, they didn’t want women at the [United States Naval A]cademy.  
Let alone a black woman,” she said.  “When I ran in 2006 for [Prince 
George’s] County Council, they said I wouldn’t win because I wasn’t in the 
politician pipeline.  But the community rallied around me[,] and told me I 
belonged.”   
 
Arelis R. Hernández, A rare challenge in Maryland judge’s race, Wash. Post, Apr. 21, 
2016, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/a-rare-challenge-in-
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maryland-judges-race/2016/04/21/65468dfe-f513-11e5-9804-537defcc3cf6_story.html? 
utm_term=.feb4d1c8449f [https://perma.cc/5BGG-UA98].8  In an affidavit that was later 
filed in the circuit court, Appellant averred that she “had no knowledge of [Judge] Turner’s 
legal practice history until [T]he Washington Post[’s] article[] dated April 21, 2016 had 
been published[,] and [the Commission] was invest[igat]ing [Judge] Turner.”  (Record 
citation omitted).   
Over a year later, after the 2016 primary and general elections, the Commission 
responded to Appellant’s ethics complaint against Judge Turner, who had assumed office.  
Specifically, in a letter dated April 26, 2017, the Commission stated that the ethics 
complaint against Judge Turner had been “reviewed and discussed by the Judicial Inquiry 
Board” and the Commission, and,  
after the full and complete review of the materials and discussion by the 
Board and Commission, the Commission concluded that the evidence failed 
to show that Judge Turner committed sanctionable conduct, as defined [by] 
Maryland Rule 18-401([j]).  As a result, the Commission dismissed the 
complaint, as required by Maryland Rule 18-406(a)(1).   
 
Proceedings in the Circuit Court 
On May 9, 2017, almost two weeks after the date of the Commission’s letter, and 
                                              
8According to Judge Turner’s official biography from the Maryland Manual On-
Line, attached as an exhibit to Appellant’s motion for summary judgment, in 1986, Judge 
Turner graduated from the United States Naval Academy, and, in 1994, Judge Turner was 
admitted to the Bar of Maryland.  According to another exhibit, Judge Turner’s biography 
on princegeorgescourts.org, Judge Turner served as a judge advocate in the United States 
Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps, achieving the rank of Commander before retiring.  
And, in a motion to dismiss filed in the circuit court, Appellees stated that Judge Turner 
“served as Deputy Legal Counsel at the National Naval Medical Center, in Bethesda, 
Maryland, from 2001 to 2004.”   
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more than six months after the 2016 general election, Appellant filed in the circuit court a 
“Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief” 
against Appellees, contending that Judge Turner was constitutionally unqualified for office 
because she allegedly had never practiced law in Maryland.  Appellant requested that the 
circuit court issue a writ of mandamus ordering Governor Hogan to rescind Judge Turner’s 
commission, as well as an order decertifying both Judge Turner’s candidacy and the 
election results.  In the petition, Appellant alleged that Judge Turner, as a military lawyer, 
had not practiced law in Maryland, and, accordingly, was not qualified to be a Maryland 
judge.  In the petition, Appellant also contended that there was no prejudice or 
unreasonable delay in the timing of the filing of the petition.  On May 22, 2017, Appellant 
filed an amended petition, raising the same allegations and seeking the same relief.   
Before any response by Appellees to the petition or the amended petition, on July 
9, 2017, Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum of law.  In 
the memorandum, Appellant contended that Judge Turner was constitutionally unqualified 
to be a judge in Maryland because she allegedly had not practiced law in Maryland, and 
argued that she (Appellant) was entitled to the commission for judgeship in the Circuit 
Court for Prince George’s County.  Appellant asserted that the statute of limitations, EL § 
12-202(b), was inapplicable, or, in the alternative, must be tolled.  Appellant maintained 
that Judge Turner had committed fraud upon Maryland taxpayers to secure her salary as a 
judge, and that such fraud warranted tolling the statute of limitations.  According to 
Appellant, she “was entirely justified in pursuing and awaiting disposition of her claims 
with [the Commission] because [Judge] Turner’s lack of qualifications and prohibited 
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political activity during the 2016 election cycle [were] so prejudicial to the administration 
of justice that it could have resulted in [Judge Turner’s] removal.”  In the memorandum, 
Appellant contended that the doctrine of laches did not apply because there was neither 
prejudice nor inexcusable delay.   
In an “Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,” Appellant averred, 
in relevant part, as follows: 
[] I had no knowledge of [Judge] Turner’s legal practice history until [T]he 
Washington Post[’s] article[] dated April 21, 2016 had been published[,] and 
[the Commission] was invest[igat]ing [Judge] Turner. 
 
* * * 
 
[] On April 29, 2017, I received notice from the [Commission] that my 
complaint against [Judge] Turner went through the full process[,] but the 
[Commission] decided not to take action. 
 
[] After receiving notice of disposition from [the Commission], I 
immediately verified [Judge] Turner’s online official Maryland biographies 
and commenced this suit[.]   
 
(Record citations omitted). 
On July 21, 2017, Appellees filed a “Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to [Appellant]’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment,” contending that the election claims were barred in their “entirety by limitations 
and [the doctrine of] laches,” and, that the claims, “as a matter of law,” lacked merit.  
Appellees requested that the circuit court dismiss the amended petition, or, in the 
alternative, issue a declaratory judgment in their favor.  In the motion to dismiss, in relevant 
part, Appellees argued that Appellant’s claims, in which she challenged Judge Turner’s 
qualifications as a candidate for judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, 
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were election claims that were not filed within the statutory limitations period that was 
prescribed by EL § 12-202(b), and, as such, were barred.    
Appellees pointed out that Appellant waited to bring the election claims until more 
than a year after the 2016 primary election, and more than six months after the 2016 general 
election, which, “on its face,” demonstrated that the claims were untimely under EL § 12-
202(b).  Appellees also asserted that, in the affidavit in support of the motion for summary 
judgment, Appellant acknowledged seeing The Washington Post’s article in April 2016, 
and, accordingly, Appellant “admittedly had knowledge of the alleged deficiency in 
qualifications by April 2016[.]”  Appellees contended that filing the ethics complaint with 
the Commission concerning a judicial candidate’s campaign conduct did not toll EL § 12-
202(b) with respect to an election claim concerning a judicial candidate’s qualifications.  
Appellees asserted that Appellant failed to demonstrate any ground on which to toll the 
statute of limitations because Appellant had not alleged “that she was somehow tricked or 
deceived into missing the deadline[, or] that the failure to meet the deadline was beyond 
her control.”   
Appellees also contended that the election claims were barred by the doctrine of 
laches, and that claims challenging the qualifications of a judicial candidate must be 
promptly brought so that such claims can be resolved prior to an election.  Appellees argued 
that the delay in bringing the election claims—more than six months after the general 
election—was inexcusable, and that the delay prejudiced Judge Turner, the State Board of 
Elections, the voters of Prince George’s County, and the circuit court.  Appellees asserted 
that, if Appellant were successful in bringing the election claims, and Judge Turner were 
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disqualified and removed, voters who had voted for Judge Turner would be prejudiced by 
having their votes invalidated.   
On July 23, 2017, Appellant filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, requesting 
that the circuit court grant summary judgment in her favor, declare the commission that 
Governor Hogan issued to Judge Turner to be void, and order Governor Hogan to issue the 
commission for judgeship in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to Appellant.   
On September 8, 2017, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment and the motion to dismiss.  During the hearing, as to The Washington 
Post’s article, Appellant argued as follows: 
I reported to [the] Commission[,] and[,] as soon as I reported my complaint[, 
it] started investigating.  But it was maybe a few days before the primary 
[election] that [The] Washington Post[’s] article came out[,] outlining 
everyone’s qualifications and criticizing [Judge] Turner for her motives [in] 
switching from the congressional race to the judge race[,] and also criticizing 
her qualifications. 
 
She has never practiced law.  That is actually when I found out that 
she has never practiced law.  And [I] actually started researching her 
bio[graphie]s on[]line, asking some people.  No, she has never practiced law 
in this State. 
 
But[,] at that time[,] I already had the ethics complaint pending.  
 
When asked by the circuit court why she did not file a complaint in the circuit court 
concerning Judge Turner’s alleged lack of qualifications, in addition to the ethics complaint 
filed with the Commission, Appellant responded: 
Well, I thought [that] it was best for the [] Commission to handle it.  I mean, 
you know, as I said[,] it was [Judge Turner’s] lack of qualifications on top of 
the rules that she had breached, I thought bolster[ed] the ethics complaint.  It 
made it more appropriate for the [] Commission to investigate and to take 
action than myself.  It made more sense to me to wait for [the Commission] 
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to do what the[] Constitution specially created [it] to do.  So, I thought [that] 
it made sense to allow the [] Commission to act first.   
 
Appellant acknowledged that she “could have” pursued both actions simultaneously, but 
maintained that, “[i]f [she had] filed an ethics complaint against [Judge Turner,] and [Judge 
Turner] could have been disqualified at any point in time by the [] Commission, [Judge 
Turner] was on notice that that could have happened.”   
After hearing argument from the parties on the motion to dismiss, the circuit court 
orally granted the motion to dismiss, explaining that the petition was untimely filed under 
EL § 12-202(b) and that the doctrine of laches barred the election claims: 
And[,] in this case[,] I can’t get around the fact that[,] while you filed 
the ethics complaint . . . with [the Commission,] the Election Law Article 
clearly provided that you had to file within 10 days after the act or omission[,] 
or within seven days after the election results were certified. 
 
And[,] even in the light most favorable to [Appellant], in the 
complaint, [she stated that she] didn’t do it until six months later. 
 
The question becomes [whether] equitable tolling [would] apply.  And 
I have not seen a case or a statute [that] would allow the [c]ourt to reach the 
equitable tolling argument. 
 
There is nothing to indicate in the pleadings that [Appellant was] 
misled.  There is nothing to indicate that there was [an] inability to file.  And 
there is nothing that I have read in the complaint [that] would indicate that 
there [were] some unavoidable circumstances.   
 
And[,] as I read the election cases, it certainly seems to the [c]ourt that 
[the doctrine of] laches may come into play because[,] were I to vacate the 
seat, then I would be overturning an election, depriving the citizens of 
who[m] they voted for, depriving [Judge] Turner of her seat in the Circuit 
Court [for Prince George’s County] and depriving the Circuit Court [for 
Prince George’s County] of a judge.   
 
* * * 
 
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. . . I feel compelled to grant the [m]otion to [d]ismiss for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted even in the light most favorable 
reading of the complaint because of the clear language of [EL §] 12-202[,] 
and there not being a timely challenge[,] and no facts within the complaint 
to indicate [that] equitable tolling would be appropriate.  And the [c]ourt 
would also find that [the doctrine of] laches applies.   
 
The circuit court stated that the order granting the motion to dismiss would specify that the 
motion to dismiss was being granted “for failure to state a claim because[,] under the 
[s]tatute of [l]imitations[,] the [c]ourt finds that [EL §] 12-202[(b)] applies.  And equitable 
tolling does not apply. . . . And [the doctrine of] laches applies.”  According to the circuit 
court, it did not need to address the motion for summary judgment, but, were it to rule on 
the motion for summary judgment, there were no disputed facts, and it “would have granted 
[s]ummary [j]udgment for [Appellees,] and not for [Appellant].”9  
 
On the same day as the hearing, September 8, 2017, Appellant filed a notice of 
appeal directly to this Court pursuant to EL § 12-203.   
 
On September 12, 2017, consistent with its oral ruling, the circuit court issued an 
order granting the motion to dismiss that stated, in pertinent part, as follows: 
[The circuit court has] determined that (a) [Appellant] failed to avail 
herself within the applicable time limits of her statutory remedy under [EL] 
                                              
9As to the merits of the election claims, the circuit court stated that, were it to reach 
the constitutional challenge, “it seem[ed] clear to the [c]ourt that the Constitution simply 
requires [a candidate for judgeship] to be admitted to practice law[, and] there is no 
requirement that [a candidate for judgeship] actually practice law.”  The circuit court 
further explained that it would issue a declaratory judgment declaring that Judge Turner 
was “a qualified candidate under [] Art[.] IV, [§] 2 [of the Constitution of Maryland,] and 
also that there is a remedy provided by [EL §] 12-202.”  In other words, as the circuit court 
stated, because there was a remedy available under EL § 12-202, mandamus relief was not 
available, and “there [was] a failure to state a claim [for] relief [in the form of] mandamus[,] 
as there [was] no clear legal right to the office under [] Art[.] IV, [§] 5 [of the Constitution 
of Maryland].”  (Italics omitted).   
- 16 - 
§ 12-202 . . . ; (b) equitable tolling does not apply; (c) [Appellant]’s claims[,] 
brought months after the election[,] are barred by [the doctrine of] laches[;] 
and (d) [Appellant] has failed to state a claim for mandamus relief[.]  
 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
On November 27, 2017, in this Court, Appellant filed a “Motion to Disqualify 
Counsel and Other Relief,” requesting that “this Court [] disqualify the Attorney General’s 
representation of [Judge] Turner, and hold [Judge] Turner in default, and if that relief 
[were] granted,” Appellant further “move[d], pursuant to [Maryland] Rule 8-523(a)(2),[10] 
to dispose of the case without oral argument[.]”  In the motion to disqualify, Appellant 
contends that the Attorney General was prohibited by statute from representing Judge 
Turner “because this case does not involve [Judge] Turner acting in her official duties[.]”  
Appellant argues that there is a conflict of interest in having the Attorney General represent 
Judge Turner where Appellant has alleged that Judge Turner “violat[ed] the laws and 
Constitution[.]”  Specifically, Appellant asserts:  
If [Judge] Turner is not qualified, then the State has an interest in removing 
her from the bench[,] but the Attorney General is fighting to avoid that 
outcome.  It[ is] highly unethical for the Attorney General to spend 
tax[]pay[e]r dollars to assist one candidate over the other to win a judicial 
election.   
 
(Citation omitted).  Thus, according to Appellant, the Attorney General should be 
disqualified from representing Judge Turner, and Judge Turner should be held in default.   
 
On November 28, 2017, Appellees filed an opposition to the motion to disqualify, 
                                              
10Maryland Rule 8-523(a)(2) provides: “In the Court of Appeals a party may not 
submit an appeal for consideration on brief except with permission of the Court.  A request 
to submit on brief shall be made in writing at least 15 days before argument.” 
- 17 - 
contending that the motion to disqualify should be denied for three reasons.  First, 
Appellees correctly point out that Appellant failed to raise any issue concerning 
disqualification of the Attorney General until on appeal in this Court, and Appellees argue 
that, accordingly, the motion is untimely, and any issue of disqualification has been waived.  
Second, Appellees assert that, even if this Court were to consider the merits, the motion to 
disqualify fails to identify any violation or potential violation of the Maryland Attorneys’ 
Rules of Professional Conduct by the Office of the Attorney General or its attorneys.  
Appellees maintain that the Attorney General’s representation of Judge Turner is 
appropriate because Judge Turner is a duly elected and sworn State official, and, when the 
Office of the Attorney General began representing Judge Turner, neither Appellant nor 
Judge Turner was a candidate for judicial office, as the election was over, and the results 
certified.  Finally, Appellees contend that the concept of “default” has no application here, 
that granting the motion to disqualify would merely permit Judge Turner to obtain other 
counsel, and that the Attorney General would continue representing the State officers and 
State Board of Elections.     
 
On November 29, 2017, Appellant filed a reply to the opposition to the motion to 
disqualify, contending that: (1) the Attorney General has engaged in an “unethical pursuit” 
favoring Judge Turner over Appellant for the position of judge of the Circuit Court for 
Prince George’s County; (2) there is a conflict of interest that cannot be waived; and (3) 
Judge Turner may be held in default on appeal, and, if held in default, Judge Turner is not 
entitled to additional time to seek new counsel.   
 
On the same day, November 29, 2017, this Court issued an order deferring action 
- 18 - 
on the motion to disqualify pending oral argument.11  We now address the motion to 
disqualify, and deny the motion.   
It is undisputed that, until the filing of the motion to disqualify in this Court, 
Appellant had not raised, either in the circuit court or this Court, any issue as to 
disqualification of the Office of the Attorney General in representing Judge Turner.  This 
circumstance raises an issue of waiver.  In Balt. Cty. v. Barnhart, 201 Md. App. 682, 684-
85, 712-13, 30 A.3d 291, 293, 309 (2011), where a former Baltimore County Attorney had 
represented a former Baltimore County employee in an administrative appeal of Baltimore 
County’s calculation of the former employee’s retirement benefits, the Court of Special 
Appeals discussed waiver of the ability to request an attorney’s disqualification, stating: 
When determining whether a party has waived its right to move to 
disqualify counsel, the Court must examine whether the party filed its motion 
in a timely manner.  Timely service of a motion to disqualify helps to curb 
the potential use of the motion as a litigation tactic or to harass the opposing 
party.  Courts analyze a number of factors when considering whether the 
motion was timely made, including:  
 
when the movant learned of the conflict; whether the movant 
was represented by counsel during the delay; why the delay 
occurred, and, in particular, whether the motion was delayed 
for tactical reasons; and whether disqualification would result 
in prejudice to the nonmoving party. 
 
(Cleaned up). 
                                              
11On January 9, 2018, at the start of oral argument in this case, Appellant mentioned 
that the motion to disqualify was pending.  Later during oral argument, Appellant 
contended that, by statute, the Attorney General is permitted to represent a State official 
only in cases related to “the State’s legal business[,]” and, according to Appellant, running 
for public office and having a name placed on an election ballot “is a personal matter[,]” 
and not the State’s legal business.   
- 19 - 
 
Although this case arises in a different context, the factors that were discussed by 
the Court of Special Appeals in Barnhart with respect to waiver of the ability to request 
disqualification of an attorney apply with equal force here.  Applying those factors, we 
conclude that Appellant has waived any right to move for disqualification of the Attorney 
General.  As to the first factor—when Appellant learned of the alleged conflict—on June 
26, 2017, after Appellees were served with Appellant’s petition, an Assistant Attorney 
General filed in the circuit court a consent motion to extend the time for Appellees to file 
a response to the petition.  In the consent motion, the Assistant Attorney General stated 
that service on Judge Turner was ineffective because it was not made by serving the 
Attorney General.  It would have been readily apparent from the consent motion that the 
Attorney General was representing Judge Turner.  Yet, Appellant never filed in the circuit 
court a motion to disqualify.  Indeed, it was not until November 27, 2017, over five months 
after being made aware that the Attorney General was representing Judge Turner, that 
Appellant filed in this Court the motion to disqualify.   
 
As to the second factor—whether Appellant was represented by counsel during the 
delay—although Appellant represents herself, Appellant is an attorney who, according to 
the amended petition, has been both licensed to practice law in Maryland, and has owned 
and operated a solo practice, for approximately nine years at the time of the filing.  As to 
the third factor—why the delay occurred, and whether the motion to disqualify was delayed 
for tactical reasons—Appellant fails to provide any explanation in either the motion to 
disqualify or the reply as to why she waited over five months to file a motion to disqualify, 
or why she did not move to disqualify the Attorney General in the circuit court.   
- 20 - 
 
Finally, as to the fourth factor—whether disqualification would prejudice Judge 
Turner, the nonmoving party—obviously, had the Attorney General been disqualified from 
representing Judge Turner before the completion of briefing and oral argument in this 
Court, Judge Turner would have been prejudiced, as Judge Turner would have needed to 
either seek new counsel or represent herself.  Plainly, consideration of the above factors 
leads to the conclusion that, through Appellant’s inaction, despite knowing of the Attorney 
General’s representation of Judge Turner as early as June 2017, Appellant has waived the 
right to request the Attorney General’s disqualification.  The motion to disqualify is 
denied.12 
DISCUSSION 
 
Having denied the motion to disqualify, we now address the dismissal of 
Appellant’s petition on the grounds that the petition was untimely filed under EL § 12-
                                              
12In any event, as to the merits of the motion, we note that, when the petition was 
filed in the circuit court, Judge Turner was an elected and sworn State official, see, e.g., 
Md. Const., Art. IV, § 3 (The section provides for judicial elections and refers to judges as 
holding “office[.]”), and was entitled to representation by the Attorney General, see Md. 
Code Ann., State Gov’t (1984, 2014 Repl. Vol.) § 6-106(b) (“Unless a law expressly 
provides for a general counsel as the legal adviser and representative of the officer or unit, 
the Attorney General is the legal adviser of and shall represent and otherwise perform all 
of the legal work for each officer and unit of the State government.”).  And, because the 
election was over, and the results certified, when the petition was filed, neither Appellant 
nor Judge Turner was a candidate for judicial office.  As such, contrary to Appellant’s 
contention, the Attorney General’s representation of Judge Turner did not “assist one 
candidate over the other to win a judicial election.”  (Citation omitted).  Rather, the 
Attorney General represented all of the State defendants, consisting of three State officials 
and one State agency, in an action that involved a challenge to an election that had occurred 
more than six months earlier. 
- 21 - 
202(b) and barred by the doctrine of the laches.  
The Parties’ Contentions 
 
Appellant contends that neither EL § 12-202(b)’s statutory limitations period nor 
the doctrine of laches applies in this case.  Appellant argues that Art. IV, § 5 of the 
Constitution of Maryland requires that “Judge Turner’s qualifications be verified[,]” and 
that applying EL § 12-202(b)’s statutory limitations period would conflict with that 
constitutional requirement.  (Bolding omitted).  Alternatively, Appellant asserts that Judge 
Turner’s alleged “inequitable conduct” justifies tolling EL § 12-202(b)’s statutory 
limitations period.  (Bolding omitted).  Specifically, Appellant maintains that, in becoming 
a  judge, Judge Turner committed fraud and constructive fraud on the taxpayers.  As to this 
point, Appellant contends, in pertinent part: 
[Judge] Turner did not care whether she was qualified, which is shown when 
she bragged to [T]he [Washington] Post about her ability to beat the odds in 
her life[]time.  [Judge] Turner also did not proffer an affidavit to the [circuit] 
court demonstrating her due diligence to assess her qualifications.  Thus[, 
Judge] Turner’s unclean hands created the wrong in which Appellant seeks 
relief.   
 
(Citations omitted).  Appellant argues that she “was entirely justified in” filing and 
awaiting resolution of the ethics complaint by the Commission “because [Judge] Turner’s 
lack of qualifications and prohibited political activity during the 2016 election cycle [were] 
so prejudicial to the administration of justice that [they] could have resulted in her 
removal.”  Appellant asserts that the filing of the complaint with the Commission provided 
notice to Judge Turner of Appellant’s claims to disqualify her candidacy; Appellant 
maintains that this filing satisfied the purpose of the statute of limitations.   
- 22 - 
Appellant contends that the doctrine of laches does not apply because there was no 
inexcusable delay or prejudice.  Appellant asserts that she “has been diligent in pursuing 
her claims with the [Commission] and” in the circuit court.  According to Appellant, there 
is no prejudice to Judge Turner because she has known since the filing of the ethics 
complaint that Appellant is challenging “the legitimacy and integrity of her candidacy[.]”   
 
Appellees respond that a registered voter must seek judicial relief in the circuit court 
within the timeframe that is specified by EL § 12-202(b), which ensures that an election 
claim is processed expeditiously and without unreasonable delay.  Appellees contend that, 
here, Appellant waited six months after the election before filing the petition, despite 
having become aware of the facts that served as the basis for the election claims in April 
2016, when The Washington Post’s article was published.  According to Appellees, under 
the circumstances, the circuit court correctly ruled that Appellant failed to file the election 
claims within EL § 12-202(b)’s statutory limitations period.  Appellees argue that 
Appellant confuses eligibility for judicial office—i.e., having the requisite qualifications 
such as residency, age, and bar membership—with the process of qualifying for judicial 
office, which includes receiving a commission, taking an oath, and posting any applicable 
bond.  Appellees argue that the use of the term “qualification” in Art. IV, § 5 of the 
Constitution of Maryland refers to the process of qualifying for judicial office, not an 
individual’s eligibility for judicial office, and thus does not provide a basis on which to 
challenge a candidate’s eligibility more than six months after an election.   
 
Appellees assert that the filing of the ethics complaint with the Commission 
concerning Judge Turner’s campaign conduct did not toll EL § 12-202(b)’s statutory 
- 23 - 
limitations period for an election claim concerning Judge Turner’s eligibility.  Appellees 
maintain that equitable tolling applies only where a plaintiff has been tricked or induced 
by a defendant’s conduct into not filing a claim within the limitations period—i.e., there 
must be some wrongful conduct by the defendant.  Appellees contend that, in this case, the 
circuit court properly concluded that equitable tolling did not apply because Appellant was 
neither tricked nor induced into delaying in filing the election claims.  Appellees argue 
that, instead, Appellant decided of her own accord to await the outcome of the ethics 
complaint with the Commission before filing the petition in the circuit court.   
 
Appellees also assert that the election claims, which were filed more than six months 
after the election, are barred by the doctrine of laches.  Appellees maintain that Appellant 
knowingly failed to file the election claims expeditiously, and that the delay prejudiced 
Judge Turner, who relied upon the initial certification of her candidacy and later on the 
certification of the election results.  Appellees argue that the delay may also prejudice the 
voters of Prince George’s County, and in particular those who voted for Judge Turner, 
because they may have their votes invalidated.   
Standard of Review 
 
In State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 496-97, 92 A.3d 
400, 426-27 (2014), this Court explained that we review without deference a trial court’s 
grant of a motion to dismiss to determine whether the ruling was legally correct, stating:  
Considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, a court must assume the truth of, and view in a 
light most favorable to the non-moving party, all well-pleaded facts and 
allegations contained in the complaint, as well as all inferences that may 
reasonably be drawn from them, and order dismissal only if the allegations 
- 24 - 
and permissible inferences, if true, would not afford relief to the plaintiff, 
i.e., the allegations do not state a cause of action for which relief may be 
granted.  Consideration of the universe of “facts” pertinent to the court’s 
analysis of the motion are limited generally to the four corners of the 
complaint and its incorporated supporting exhibits, if any.  The well-pleaded 
facts setting forth the cause of action must be pleaded with sufficient 
specificity; bald assertions and conclusory statements by the pleader will not 
suffice.  Upon appellate review, the trial court’s decision to grant such a 
motion is analyzed to determine whether the court was legally correct. 
 
(Citation omitted).  Similarly, where a trial court considers materials outside of the 
pleadings, such as an affidavit, it is appropriate to treat the trial court’s grant of a motion 
to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, and “[w]e review all questions of law, 
including whether summary judgment was properly granted, without deference.”  Vito v. 
Grueff, 453 Md. 88, 104, 160 A.3d 592, 601 (2017) (citations omitted).  Moreover, “insofar 
as [the circuit court’s decision] rested on the interpretation of the Election Law Article[,]” 
“[w]e review de novo” the circuit court’s decision.  Cabrera v. Penate, 439 Md. 99, 106, 94 
A.3d 50, 54 (2014) (citation omitted).  And, “[w]here the issue is whether a party is 
precluded by [the doctrine of] laches from challenging an action of another party, we shall 
review the trial court’s ultimate determination of the issue de novo.”  Schlakman, 451 Md. 
at 480, 153 A.3d at 151 (cleaned up).   
EL § 12-202 
 
EL § 12-202, concerning judicial challenges to elections, provides, in its entirety: 
(a) In general. — If no other timely and adequate remedy is provided by this 
article, a registered voter may seek judicial relief from any act or omission 
relating to an election, whether or not the election has been held, on the 
grounds that the act or omission: 
 
(1) is inconsistent with this article or other law applicable to the 
elections process; and  
- 25 - 
 
(2) may change or has changed the outcome of the election. 
 
(b) Place and time of filing. — A registered voter may seek judicial relief 
under this section in the appropriate circuit court within the earlier of: 
 
(1) 10 days after the act or omission or the date the act or omission 
became known to the petitioner; or 
 
(2) 7 days after the election results are certified, unless the election 
was a gubernatorial primary or special primary election, in which case 3 days 
after the election results are certified. 
 
Significantly, EL § 12-202 “is the mechanism for challenging the qualifications of 
a candidate seeking election.”  Schlakman, 451 Md. at 482, 153 A.3d at 152 (cleaned up).  
See also Cabrera, 439 Md. at 109, 94 A.3d at 56.  In Schlakman, 451 Md. at 482, 153 A.3d 
at 152, we described EL § 12-202 as follows:  
[EL §] 12-202 . . . governs judicial challenges to certain irregularities 
in relation to an election; it provides judicial redress for any act or omission 
that violates the Election Law Article. . . . [EL] § 12-202(b)[,] by its terms, 
affords a party the opportunity to challenge irregularities as elaborated in 
[EL] § 12-202(a) by seeking judicial relief in the appropriate circuit court, 
and constitutes general judicial review authority when no other Election Law 
provisions apply. 
 
(Cleaned up).   
EL § 12-202(b) provides “a statutory limitations period” in which an election claim 
must be filed.  Id. at 485, 153 A.3d at 154.  The purpose of EL § 12-202(b), the statute of 
limitations for election claims, is to ensure that “any claim against a [S]tate electoral 
procedure [is] expressed expeditiously, [and] without unreasonable delay, so as to not 
cause prejudice to the defendant.”  Liddy v. Lamone, 398 Md. 233, 245, 919 A.2d 1276, 
1284 (2007) (cleaned up).  Notably, as the Court of Special Appeals has recognized, “the 
- 26 - 
very short time limits for filing a suit challenging an aspect of an election pursuant to EL 
§ 12-202(b) are evidence of this State’s public policy that claims for judicial relief relative 
to an election must be prosecuted without delay.”  Baker, 217 Md. App. at 296, 92 A.3d at 
593.  Indeed, a registered voter who fails to file an action within the statutory limitations 
period risks having his or her judicial challenge dismissed as untimely.  
Under certain circumstances, a statute of limitations may be tolled, i.e., stopped.  In 
Booth Glass Co., Inc. v. Huntingfield Corp., 304 Md. 615, 623, 500 A.2d 641, 645 (1985), 
this Court stated that “[w]e have long adhered to the principle that[,] where the [General 
Assembly] has not expressly provided for an exception in a statute of limitations, the court 
will not allow any implied or equitable exception to be engrafted upon it.”  (Citations 
omitted).  We noted, as one example, an exception to the general three-year statute of 
limitations for civil actions where “a party is kept in ignorance of a cause of action by the 
fraud of an adverse party”; in that circumstance, the cause of action accrues—i.e., the 
statute of limitations begins to run—“when the fraud is discovered.”13  Booth Glass, 304 
Md. at 623-24, 500 A.2d at 645 (cleaned up).  As to whether equitable estoppel may toll a 
statute of limitations, we stated: “In Maryland, [] it is well settled that equitable estoppel 
will not toll the running of limitations absent a showing that the defendant held out any 
inducements not to file suit or indicated that limitations would not be pleaded.”  Id. at 624, 
500 A.2d at 645 (cleaned up).  More recently, in Adedje v. Westat, Inc., 214 Md. App. 1, 
                                              
13Specifically, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.) § 5-203 
provides: “If the knowledge of a cause of action is kept from a party by the fraud of an 
adverse party, the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue at the time when the party 
discovered, or by the exercise of ordinary diligence should have discovered[,] the fraud.” 
- 27 - 
13, 75 A.3d 401, 408 (2013), the Court of Special Appeals explained that “equitable tolling 
seeks to excuse untimely filing by an individual plaintiff[,] and is generally applicable 
where the plaintiff has been induced or tricked by the defendant’s conduct into allowing 
the filing deadline to pass.”  (Cleaned up).  Stated otherwise, for equitable estoppel to toll 
a statute of limitations, a plaintiff must show that there was some wrongful conduct on the 
part of the defendant that prevented the plaintiff from asserting his or her claim. 
The Doctrine of Laches 
The doctrine of “[l]aches is a defense in equity against stale claims[ that] is based 
upon grounds of sound public policy by discouraging fusty demands for the peace of 
society.”  Ross, 387 Md. at 668, 876 A.2d at 703 (cleaned up).  This Court has explained 
that “[t]he doctrine of laches, which is both an affirmative defense and an equitable defense, 
applies where there is an unreasonable delay in the assertion of one party’s rights[,] and 
that delay results in prejudice to the opposing party.”  Jones, 445 Md. at 339, 126 A.3d at 
1171 (cleaned up).  Application of the doctrine of laches is determined on a case-by-case 
basis.  See Schlakman, 451 Md. at 485, 153 A.3d at 154 (“[T]here is no inflexible rule as 
to what constitutes, or what does not constitute, laches; hence, its existence must be 
determined by the facts and circumstances of each case.”  (Cleaned up)).  Significantly, the 
doctrine of laches has been invoked in the context of election cases and held to bar a 
plaintiff’s election claims.  This is so because this Court has recognized that, to avoid 
prejudice to a defendant, “any claim against a [S]tate electoral procedure must be expressed 
expeditiously[ and] without unreasonable delay[.]”  Liddy, 398 Md. at 245, 919 A.2d at 
1284 (cleaned up).   
- 28 - 
Recently, in Schlakman, 451 Md. at 473, 485, 153 A.3d at 147, 154, this Court held 
that the plaintiffs’ challenge “to a candidate’s qualifications to appear on the ballot” was 
“barred as a matter of law by [the doctrine of] laches.”  In Schlakman, id. at 473, 153 A.3d 
at 147, the plaintiffs, along with an individual named Dan Sparaco, were candidates in the 
2016 general election for the Councilmanic District Twelve seat on the Baltimore City 
Council.  On January 13, 2016, Sparaco, an independent candidate, filed a campaign 
finance report with the State Board of Elections.  See id. at 475, 153 A.3d at 148.  Sparaco 
did not file a declaration of intent by February 3, 2016; instead, on May 20, 2016, Sparaco 
filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland a complaint 
“challenging the constitutionality of the early filing deadline for unaffiliated candidates.”  
Id. at 475-76, 153 A.3d at 148-49 (cleaned up).  On August 15, 2016, Sparaco voluntarily 
dismissed the federal case.  See id. at 476, 153 A.3d at 149.  In the meantime, on July 11, 
2016, Sparaco filed with the Baltimore City Board of Elections a declaration of intent to 
seek nomination by petition for the District Twelve seat, and, on August 2, 2016, that board 
approved the petition signatures and certified Sparaco’s candidacy.  See id. at 476, 153 
A.3d at 149.  Thereafter, the State Board of Elections included Sparaco’s name on the 
ballot; and, on August 31, 2016, it posted on its website ballot proofs that included 
Sparaco’s name.  See id. at 476, 153 A.3d at 149.  
The plaintiffs challenged the Baltimore City Board of Elections’s decision to certify 
Sparaco as an eligible candidate and the State Board of Elections’s decision to include him 
as a candidate on the ballot, contending that Sparaco had failed to timely comply with 
statutory filing requirements, and, therefore, was disqualified.  See id. at 473, 153 A.3d at 
- 29 - 
147.  Initially, on August 25, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an action in the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland against the State Board of Elections, but the federal court 
dismissed the case because the plaintiffs’ counsel had not been admitted to practice before 
the federal court.  See id. at 473, 153 A.3d at 147.  Then, on September 20, 2016, the 
plaintiffs filed in a State trial court a complaint against the Administrator of the State Board 
of Elections and the Election Director of the Baltimore City Board of Elections.  See id. at 
473-74, 153 A.3d at 147.  Two days later, on September 22, 2016, in response to the 
plaintiffs’ ex parte request for an immediate temporary restraining order, the trial court 
issued a temporary restraining order that required the defendants to remove Sparaco’s name 
from ballots.  See id. at 474, 153 A.3d at 147-48.  Thereafter, we granted the defendants’ 
petition for a writ of certiorari.  See id. at 474, 153 A.3d at 148. 
In this Court, the defendants contended that the plaintiffs’ complaint was untimely 
because it was not filed within the time period specified by EL § 12-202(b)(1), and argued 
that the challenge was also barred by the doctrine of laches.  See id. at 483, 153 A.3d at 
153.  At the outset, we noted that, “because the action before us [was] an equitable one, 
[the doctrine of] laches, rather than direct application of the statutory time period, [was] 
the proper focus[,]” but that we could “gauge the[ plaintiffs’] delay against the statutory 
limitations period because courts sitting in equity will apply statutory time limitations in 
determining, at least as an outside limit, whether laches has run.”  Id. at 484, 153 A.3d at 
153 (cleaned up).  We stated that “a statutory limitations period, such as that provided by 
[EL] § 12-202(b)(1), provides a benchmark for the application of [the doctrine of] laches . 
. . against which this Court can assess whether the [plaintiff]s’ delay in filing in the [trial 
- 30 - 
c]ourt was unreasonable and whether it prejudiced the interests of [the defendant]s.”  Id. at 
485, 153 A.3d at 154. 
Applying these principles, this Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint was 
barred by the doctrine of laches, explaining: 
Even granting, arguendo, that [the plaintiffs] did not learn of the [Baltimore] 
City Board[ of Elections]’s certification of [] Sparaco’s candidacy until 
August 15, 2016, [the date on which Sparaco voluntarily dismissed his 
complaint in the federal court,] their challenge under [EL] § 12-202(a) came 
too late because they did not file the instant action in the [c]ircuit [c]ourt . . . 
until September 20, 2016, when their complaint was docketed by the clerk[,] 
and, on this record, their delay was unreasonable and prejudicial to [the 
defendant]s and the election process. 
 
Id. at 485, 153 A.3d at 154 (footnote omitted).  We determined that there was “no basis . . 
. to hold that [the plaintiff]s’ obligation to file in the appropriate circuit court, as instructed 
by [EL] § 12-202(b)(1)[,] was tolled by their failed attempt to” obtain relief in the federal 
court.  Id. at 486, 153 A.3d at 155.  We observed that the plaintiffs had “offered no valid 
explanation as to why they waited until September 20[, 2016,] to” file the complaint in the 
State trial court, despite having notice of Sparaco’s certification on August 15, 2016.  Id. 
at 488, 490, 153 A.3d at 156, 157.  As a final point, we noted that the plaintiffs failed to 
explain “why they did not institute a parallel action in the [trial c]ourt within the time limits 
mandated by [EL] § 12-202(b).”  Id. at 490, 153 A.3d at 157. 
In Liddy, 398 Md. at 236, 919 A.2d at 1278-79, this Court held that the doctrine of 
laches barred a plaintiff’s election claim where the plaintiff filed a complaint eighteen days 
before the 2006 general election, alleging that Douglas F. Gansler, the Democratic Party’s 
nominee for Attorney General, was ineligible because he allegedly had not practiced law 
- 31 - 
in Maryland for at least ten years.  We held that the trial court “erred in not invoking the 
doctrine of laches as a bar to the [plaintiff]’s untimely claim when it placed the 
determination of a candidate’s eligibility ahead of the urgency of the election itself and the 
possible disenfranchisement of Maryland voters.”  Id. at 249-50, 919 A.2d at 1287.  We 
explained that permitting “challenges to be brought at such a late date would call into 
question the value and the quality of our entire elections process[,] and would only serve 
as a catalyst for future challenges.  Such delayed challenges go to the core of our 
democratic system[,] and cannot be tolerated.”  Id. at 255, 919 A.2d at 1291.   
As to unreasonable delay, we observed that the plaintiff filed the complaint on 
October 20, 2006, only eighteen days before the 2006 general election; that, on October 
25, 2006, the trial court conducted a hearing in the case; and that, on November 2, 2006, 
this Court heard oral argument, “leaving only 5 days remaining before the general 
election.”  Id. at 252, 919 A.2d at 1288-89.  We explained that, “notwithstanding that the 
[plaintiff]’s filing may have been within the governing statutory provisions [that are] 
outlined in the Election Law Article, his failure diligently to pursue his challenge left this 
Court, as well as the [trial] court [], a very brief time in which to consider and decide th[e] 
matter.”  Id. at 252, 919 A.2d at 1289 (citation omitted).  We determined that the untimely 
filing of the complaint prejudiced Gansler, who relied on the initial certification of his 
candidacy and the certification of the primary election results, and we pointed out that the 
plaintiff’s challenge could have been brought as early as anytime after June 28, 2006, when 
Gansler filed his certification of candidacy.  See id. at 253, 919 A.2d at 1289.  Significantly, 
we concluded that the delay prejudiced the electorate as a whole, explaining: 
- 32 - 
The relief [that was] sought by the [plaintiff], i.e. the removal of Gansler’s 
name from the ballot, or, in the alternative, signs being posted to indicate 
Gansler’s ineligibility to voters, would have caused a great deal of 
uncertainty in the entire election process.  The confusion that would have 
resulted from such last-minute changes would have, indubitably, interfered 
with the rights of Maryland voters, particularly those who had already cast 
absentee ballots, causing them to be disenfranchised and the value of their 
votes diluted[,] as they would not be able to vote again. 
 
Id. at 254-55, 919 A.2d at 1290. 
 
In Ross, 387 Md. at 668 & n.8, 672-73, 876 A.2d at 703 & n.8, 705-06, this Court 
determined that an action that was arguably filed within the statutory limitations period of 
EL § 12-202(b)—i.e., before the election results were certified, and within ten days after 
the plaintiff had knowledge of the challenged act or omission—was nevertheless barred by 
the doctrine of laches.  On June 30, 2003, Paula Johnson Branch filed a certificate of 
candidacy to run for the Thirteenth Councilmanic District seat on the Baltimore City 
Council.  See id. at 654, 876 A.2d at 694.  In September 2003, Branch won the Democratic 
primary election.  See id. at 654, 876 A.2d at 694.  Then, throughout 2003 and 2004, two 
campaign finance entities raising funds for Branch’s campaign failed to file required 
campaign finance reports; and, a newspaper article dated October 13, 2004 mentioned that 
a committee supporting Branch was delinquent in filing its campaign finance reports, and 
that the plaintiff, who was the Green Party candidate for the same seat, was raising it as an 
issue during the campaign.  See id. at 654-55, 876 A.2d at 694-95.  On October 22, 2004, 
the plaintiff’s campaign e-mailed the State Board of Elections to request that it discuss 
Branch’s disqualification at its October 26, 2004 meeting; the State Board considered the 
matter at that meeting, but declined to act.  See id. at 655, 876 A.2d at 695.  Branch 
- 33 - 
ultimately remained on the ballot, and, on November 2, 2004, won the general election.  
See id. at 656, 876 A.2d at 696.  Three days after the election, on November 5, 2004, the 
plaintiff filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, requesting that the 
Baltimore City Board of Canvassers be enjoined from certifying Branch as the victor, that 
Branch be declared ineligible to be a candidate, that the election for the Thirteenth 
Councilmanic District seat be declared void, and that a new election be held.  See id. at 
656, 876 A.2d at 696. 
In Ross, id. at 658, 876 A.2d at 697, we held that the plaintiff’s claims were untimely 
under the doctrine of laches.  We explained: 
[The plaintiff]’s petition . . . was governed by [EL §] 12-202 [], which 
provides for a ten-day “window” for seeking judicial redress for an act or 
omission that violates the Election Law Article and has[ changed,] or would 
change[,] the outcome of the election once the registered voter [knew] of it.  
[The plaintiff] appears to concede, by attaching the [newspaper] article to his 
initial petition filed in the [trial c]ourt, that he knew of Branch’s campaign 
finance entity’s failure to file campaign finance reports on October 13[, 
2004].  Thus, under the operation of the ten-day time period in [EL §] 12-
202, [the plaintiff] should have filed his petition at least a week before the 
election, that is, by October 23[, 2004].  Instead, he waited until November 
5[, 2004], a full three days after the election occurred.  Therefore, we find 
that it is barred as a matter of law by the common[-]law doctrine of laches as 
argued by [the defendant]s[.]  
 
Id. at 667-68, 876 A.2d at 703.  In a footnote immediately following our holding, we stated: 
“Even if we were to agree with [the plaintiff] that the ten-day time period under [EL §] 12-
202 began to run on October 26[, 2004], when the State Board [of Elections] declined to 
act, his action would remain barred by [the doctrine of] laches.”  Id. at 668 n.8, 876 A.2d 
at 703 n.8.   
As to unreasonable delay, we noted that the plaintiff had failed to provide any 
- 34 - 
explanation for the delay in filing the petition three days after the election, and concluded 
that the plaintiff’s “wait and see” strategy was an unjustifiable delay “that prejudiced 
Branch, the State Board of Elections, and the residents of the Thirteenth Councilmanic 
District.”  Id. at 672, 876 A.2d at 705-06.  We explained that “a candidate or other election 
participant should not be allowed to ambush an adversary or subvert the election process 
by intentionally delaying a request for remedial action to see first whether [he or she] will 
be successful at the polls.”  Id. at 672, 876 A.2d at 705-06 (cleaned up).  As to prejudice, 
we elaborated: 
Branch relied upon her certification by the State Board [of Elections] as a 
qualified candidate for the office and the result of the election in which she 
overwhelmingly won, only to have the results belatedly challenged on a 
ground that was ripe prior to Election Day.  The State Board [of Elections] 
likewise was prejudiced because it too relied upon the correctness of the 
ballots and expended considerable efforts in overseeing the election when 
Branch’s candidacy could have been protested judicially prior to the election 
on November 2nd.  Most importantly, [the plaintiff]’s actions also prejudiced 
the electorate as a whole by denying them the efficacy of their vote and 
undermining their faith in a free and fair election.  Thus, because [the 
plaintiff]’s delay would result in [the defendant]s and the people of the 
Thirteenth Councilmanic District being placed in a less favorable position 
due to their justifiable reliance on the circumstances in existence on Election 
Day, we find [the plaintiff]’s actions sufficiently prejudicial so as to warrant 
the application of [the doctrine of] laches.  
 
Id. at 672-73, 876 A.2d at 706.  See also Baker, 217 Md. App. at 298, 92 A.3d at 594-95 
(The Court of Special Appeals concluded that a plaintiff’s petition for a writ of mandamus 
was barred by the doctrine of laches, and explained that, although the plaintiff initially filed 
the petition approximately five-and-a-half months after the governor declined to issue her 
a commission, “under Ross and Liddy, a delay of even that magnitude would constitute an 
unreasonable delay in challenging a governor’s failure to issue a commission after an 
- 35 - 
election.”). 
Analysis 
 
Here, we hold that the circuit court correctly granted the motion to dismiss and 
concluded that Appellant’s petition was untimely under EL § 12-202(b) because Appellant 
did not file the petition in the circuit court until May 9, 2017, more than six months after 
the 2016 general election, and more than one year after Appellant admittedly became aware 
of the facts that served as the basis for the election claims; and, the petition was filed at 
least several months after the election results were certified.  Further, there is no basis on 
which to toll the statute of limitations.  We hold that, independent of the statutory 
limitations period set forth in EL § 12-202(b), the petition is barred by the doctrine of 
laches because, in filing the petition in the circuit court more than six months after the 2016 
general election, Appellant unreasonably delayed in asserting her rights, and that delay 
prejudiced Appellees.  We turn first to EL § 12-202.  As an initial matter, it is evident that 
the election claims—concerning Judge Turner’s alleged ineligibility, i.e., lack of 
qualifications, for office of judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County—
constitute a challenge to the qualifications, i.e., eligibility, of a candidate seeking election 
and, thus, fall within the purview of EL § 12-202(a).  In other words, EL § 12-202 applies.   
 
Appellant was required to file the petition in the circuit court within the statutory 
limitations period specified in EL § 12-202(b)—namely, “within the earlier of: (1) 10 days 
after the act or omission or the date the act or omission became known to [Appellant]; or 
(2) 7 days after the election results [were] certified[.]”  (Paragraph breaks omitted).  For 
purposes of EL § 12-202(b)(1), we must examine the date on which the act or omission 
- 36 - 
became known to Appellant, i.e., the date on which Appellant became aware of the facts 
that served as the basis for the election claims.  A review of the record leads to the 
conclusion that Appellant became aware of Judge Turner’s alleged ineligibility, or lack of 
qualifications, to be a judge when or shortly after The Washington Post published its article 
about the contested judicial election, setting forth information about Judge Turner’s legal 
practice background.  The record demonstrates that, on April 21, 2016, prior to the 2016 
primary election, The Washington Post published an article containing information about 
Judge Turner, including the circumstances that Judge Turner had been a military lawyer 
and a member of the Prince George’s County Council, and that Judge Turner apparently 
had “little experience in local courts.”  Significantly, in an affidavit that she filed in support 
of the motion for summary judgment, Appellant averred that she “had no knowledge of 
[Judge] Turner’s legal practice history until [T]he Washington Post[’s] article[] dated April 
21, 2016 had been published[,] and [the Commission] was invest[igat]ing [Judge] Turner.”  
During the hearing in the circuit court, Appellant argued that, a few days before the 2016 
primary election, The Washington Post’s “article came out[,] outlining everyone’s 
qualifications and criticizing [Judge] Turner for her motives [in] switching [from] the 
congressional race to the judge race[,] and also criticizing her qualifications.”  Appellant 
explained that, upon seeing the article, “[t]hat is actually when [she] found out that [Judge 
Turner] ha[d] never practiced law.  And [Appellant] actually started researching her 
bio[graphie]s on[]line, asking some people.  No, [Judge Turner] has never practiced law in 
this State.”  At oral argument, Appellant asserted that she did not discover that Judge 
Turner “did not meet the constitutional qualifications” until after Judge Turner won the 
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2016 primary election.  At oral argument, Appellant stated that she did not “figure[] out” 
that Judge Turner was ineligible until after she had filed the ethics complaint with the 
Commission, and Appellant advised this Court that she supplemented the ethics complaint 
with information about the eligibility issue.   
 
In our view, despite Appellant’s attempt to give a different impression, her 
statements at oral argument are wholly consistent with the conclusion that she became 
aware of The Washington Post’s article and Judge Turner’s alleged ineligibility for judicial 
office in late April 2016 or shortly thereafter.  The record reveals the following 
straightforward sequence of events: (1) on April 14, 2016, Appellant filed the ethics 
complaint with the Commission; (2) on April 21, 2016, The Washington Post’s article was 
published; and (3) on April 26, 2016, the 2016 primary election occurred.  In other words, 
as of the dates of The Washington Post’s article and the 2016 primary election, the ethics 
complaint was pending with the Commission.  In the circuit court, Appellant was clear that 
she saw The Washington Post’s article when it was published, and, as a result, became 
aware of Judge Turner’s legal practice background.  In other words, in the circuit court, 
Appellant did not allege that she saw The Washington Post’s article only shortly before 
filing the petition on May 9, 2017, or that she had only recently become aware of Judge 
Turner’s legal practice background; indeed, nothing in the record supports the inference 
that Appellant became aware of the facts underlying the election claims at some point other 
than in April 2016 or shortly thereafter.  And, both of Appellant’s statements at oral 
argument in this Court—that she did not discover Judge Turner’s ineligibility for judicial 
office until after the 2016 primary election, and that she did not “figure[] out” that Judge 
- 38 - 
Turner was ineligible until after the filing of the ethics complaint—refer to events that 
occurred in April 2016, i.e., the primary election on April 26, 2016, and the filing of the 
ethics complaint on April 14, 2016.  Appellant advised this Court that she raised the 
eligibility issue with the Commission by providing supplements to it after the ethics 
complaint had been filed.  Simply put, Appellant’s statements at oral argument confirm, 
rather than contradict, the conclusion that Appellant became aware of the basis for the 
election claims after reading The Washington Post’s article when or shortly after it was 
published on April 21, 2016. 
Interestingly, on brief, in a section labeled “Statement of the Case,” Appellant states, 
without any citation to the record: 
Prior to filing the action[,] and upon learning of [Judge] Turner being 
sworn, on January 9, 2017, [Appellant] gave notice to the Attorney General 
that she was awaiting a decision on the disqualification of [Judge] Turner 
from [the Commission], and [Appellant] would be seeking judicial 
intervention, if necessary, to declare her the qualified winner of the election.  
 
At oral argument, however, Appellees’ counsel advised the Court that Appellees did not 
have a copy of such notice, and that no such notice was contained in the record.  Appellees’ 
counsel advised that she had received various e-mails from Appellant, in which Appellant 
asserted her right to Judge Turner’s judgeship, but that she had not received the notice to 
which Appellant referred on brief.  Appellees’ counsel stated that she was unaware of any 
type of “official notice” that Appellant gave concerning her intent to file an action.  
Notwithstanding that Appellees’ counsel did not receive the notice to which Appellant 
referred, Appellant’s statements on brief demonstrate that, at a minimum, Appellant knew 
of any issue related to Judge Turner’s eligibility for judicial office by January 9, 2017, the 
- 39 - 
date on which she claims to have provided notice to Appellees’ counsel of her intent to 
await the outcome of the ethics complaint before filing a complaint in the circuit court.  In 
other words, Appellant’s own words in her brief confirm that she knew of the eligibility 
issue pertaining to Judge Turner by January 9, 2017 at the latest, yet Appellant still waited 
four months before filing the petition in the circuit court.  
 
In addition to the record demonstrating that Appellant gained knowledge of Judge 
Turner’s legal background when or shortly after The Washington Post’s article was 
published, the issue of whether Judge Turner had been admitted to the Bar of Maryland or 
had practiced law in Maryland, i.e., Judge Turner’s legal practice background, is something 
that would have been easily ascertainable by Appellant through minimal investigation; i.e., 
these are facts that would have been readily discernible in today’s digital age.  Indeed, after 
Judge Turner filed a certificate of candidacy, and even prior to the 2016 primary election, 
anyone could have easily investigated Judge Turner’s background and found out whether 
she had been admitted to the Bar of Maryland, and whether she had practiced law in 
Maryland.  For example, in the affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment, 
Appellant averred that, on April 29, 2017, upon receiving notice of the disposition of the 
ethics complaint from the Commission, she “immediately verified [Judge] Turner’s online 
official Maryland biographies[.]”  Clearly, Appellant had the ability to access information 
about Judge Turner’s professional background through minimal investigation, and there 
was no need to delay filing the petition in the circuit court.  
In short, we determine that the record supports the conclusion that Appellant became 
aware of Judge Turner’s alleged ineligibility, or lack of qualifications, to be a judge when 
- 40 - 
or shortly after The Washington Post published its article on April 21, 2016, and Appellant 
had the ability to uncover information about Judge Turner’s legal background regardless 
of the publication of The Washington Post’s article.  The date on which Appellant actually 
became aware of the alleged act or omission underlying the election claims—on or shortly 
after April 21, 2016—is far earlier than the date on which the election results were certified, 
which occurred after November 8, 2016.14  Under EL § 12-202(b)(1), Appellant was 
required to file the petition in the circuit court within ten days after the act or omission 
became known to her, which she failed to do; instead, Appellant waited until May 9, 2017, 
to file the petition in the circuit court.  And, even if Appellant were unaware of the facts 
giving rise to the election claims until January 9, 2017—the date on which she states she 
notified the Attorney General that she was awaiting the Commission’s decision on the 
ethics complaint before filing a complaint in the circuit court—it is undisputed that 
Appellant did not file the petition within ten days of that date either.  Even were we to 
consider EL § 12-202(b)(2), instead of EL § 12-202(b)(1),  as providing the relevant 
statutory limitations period, undisputedly, Appellant filed the petition in the circuit court 
                                              
14The record does not reveal the date on which the 2016 general election results 
were certified.  EL § 11-503(a)(1)(ii), however, requires the Board of State Canvassers to 
“convene within 35 days of” a State general election, and EL § 11-503(a)(4) requires the 
Board of State Canvassers to “prepare and transmit a certified statement of the election 
results to the State Board of Elections.”  In a document entitled “2016 Presidential Election 
Calendar,” the State Board of Elections identified December 13, 2016, as the deadline for 
the State Board of Canvassers to convene to certify the election results, and December 14, 
2016, as the date on which the State Board of Elections was to “deliver to the winners of 
the general election a certified statement under its seal.”  Maryland State Board of 
Elections, 2016 Presidential Election Calendar, at 9 (Aug. 26, 2016),  available at http:// 
www.elections.state.md.us/elections/2016/2016_Election_Calendar.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2UNV-VHL7]. 
- 41 - 
on May 9, 2017, more than six months after the 2016 general election, and long after the 
2016 general election results had been certified.  Under either deadline set forth in EL § 
12-202(b), Appellant’s filing of the petition more than six months after the 2016 general 
election was untimely, and, accordingly, EL § 12-202(b) bars the election claims.  
Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, we are unconvinced that Art. IV, § 5 of the 
Constitution of Maryland offers any support for the notion that the “qualification” of a 
judicial officer may be challenged after the timeframe set forth in EL § 12-202(b).  Art. IV, 
§ 5 simply does not provide a basis on which to dispute a candidate’s eligibility for judicial 
office months after an election occurs, and months after the candidate becomes a judge.  
Indeed, as Appellees contend, it appears that Appellant fails to appreciate the distinction 
between a candidate’s eligibility for judicial office—i.e., circumstances such as residency, 
age, and bar membership—and the process of qualifying for office—i.e., receiving a 
commission, taking an oath, and posting any applicable bond.  Art. IV, § 2 of the 
Constitution of Maryland, concerning judicial qualifications, provides: 
The Judges of all of the said Courts shall be citizens of the State of Maryland, 
and qualified voters under this Constitution, and shall have resided therein 
not less than five years, and not less than six months next preceding their 
election, or appointment, as the case may be, in the city, county, district, 
judicial circuit, intermediate appellate judicial circuit[,] or appellate judicial 
circuit for which they may be, respectively, elected or appointed.  They shall 
be not less than thirty years of age at the time of their election or appointment, 
and shall be selected from those who have been admitted to practice Law in 
this State, and who are most distinguished for integrity, wisdom[,] and sound 
legal knowledge. 
 
In other words, Art. IV, § 2 sets forth certain requirements that a candidate must meet to 
be eligible to be a judge in this State, including requirements as to residency, age, and 
- 42 - 
membership in the Bar of Maryland. 
 
By contrast, to qualify for office, i.e., the process of assuming office, Art. I, § 10 of 
the Constitution of Maryland provides, in relevant part: 
Any officer elected or appointed in pursuance of the provisions of this 
Constitution, may qualify, either according to the existing provisions of law, 
in relation to officers under the present Constitution, or before the Governor 
of the State, or before any Clerk of any Court of Record in any part of the 
State; but in case an officer shall qualify out of the County in which he [or 
she] resides, an official copy of his [or her] oath shall be filed and recorded 
in the Clerk’s office of the Circuit Court of the County in which he [or she] 
may reside, or in the Clerk’s office of the Superior Court of the City of 
Baltimore, if he [or she] shall reside therein.  
 
Art. I, § 10 expressly authorizes the Governor or the clerk to qualify an officer by 
administering the necessary oath.  Thus, Art. I, § 10 refers to an officer qualifying for 
office, i.e., taking the oath of office.   
Art. IV, § 5 of the Constitution of Maryland—the provision on which Appellant 
relies—concerns a vacancy in the office of a circuit court judge, and provides that, upon 
the occurrence of a such a vacancy, “the Governor shall appoint a person duly qualified to 
fill said office, who shall hold the same until the election and qualification of his 
successor.”  Obviously, Art. IV, § 5’s use of the phrase “duly qualified” refers to the 
individual’s eligibility for judicial office and whether that individual satisfies the 
requirements set forth in Art. IV, §  2, whereas Art. IV, § 5’s use of the word “qualification” 
means taking the oath of office, and does not mean determining whether the individual 
meets the applicable eligibility requirements.  In any event, significantly, Art. IV, § 5 does 
not provide a basis or mechanism through which a registered voter may challenge a 
candidate’s eligibility, i.e., qualifications, to seek judicial office; rather, as stated, EL § 12-
- 43 - 
202 provides such a mechanism by permitting a judicial challenge within the statutory 
limitations period specified in EL § 12-202(b).  Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, we 
discern no conflict between Art. IV, § 5 and EL § 12-202, such that EL § 12-202(b)’s 
statutory limitations period is unconstitutional or otherwise inapplicable under the 
circumstances of this case.   
Likewise, we reject Appellant’s contention that EL § 12-202(b) is tolled either due 
to wrongdoing on Judge Turner’s part, or because Appellant filed the ethics complaint with 
the Commission.  Setting aside the issue of whether the General Assembly has expressly 
permitted an exception to the statute of limitations set forth in EL § 12-202(b), see Booth 
Glass, 304 Md. at 623, 500 A.2d at 645 (“[W]here the [General Assembly] has not 
expressly provided for an exception in a statute of limitations, the court will not allow any 
implied or equitable exception to be engrafted upon it.”  (Citations omitted)), we fail to 
discern any basis on which to toll the statute of limitations.  There is nothing in the record 
that indicates that Appellant was “induced or tricked by [Judge Turner] into allowing the 
filing deadline to pass.”  Adedje, 214 Md. App. at 13, 75 A.3d at 408 (citations omitted).  
Appellant’s bare allegations that Judge Turner committed fraud on the taxpayers to secure 
her position as a judge and that Judge Turner has unclean hands are insufficient to establish 
that Judge Turner engaged in wrongful conduct that prevented Appellant from asserting 
the election claims.  Rather, as the record demonstrates, on or shortly after April 21, 2016, 
Appellant became aware of Judge Turner’s candidacy and eligibility for office, i.e., of the 
basis for the election claims, and Appellant was neither tricked nor induced into delaying 
filing the petition in the circuit court until May 9, 2017, over a year later.  Instead, according 
- 44 - 
to Appellant herself, she elected to await the outcome of the ethics complaint with the 
Commission before filing the petition in the circuit court.  We are unable to identify any 
wrongful conduct on Judge Turner’s part that resulted in Appellant’s delay in filing the 
petition in the circuit court. 
We are unpersuaded that the filing of the ethics complaint with the Commission 
tolls the statute of limitations for the election claims filed in the circuit court.  Indeed, the 
ethics complaint that Appellant filed with the Commission concerned Judge Turner’s 
conduct as a judicial candidate during a campaign, and alleged that Judge Turner had 
committed various ethical violations during the campaign by engaging in prohibited 
political activities.  By contrast, the petition filed in the circuit court concerned Judge 
Turner’s eligibility as a judicial candidate, not alleged campaign misconduct.  Plainly put, 
the substance of the ethics complaint was distinct from that of the petition.  And, even if 
Appellant had supplemented the ethics complaint with the issue of Judge Turner’s 
eligibility for judicial office, the Commission would have been unable to address that issue 
because the responsibility for determining a candidate’s eligibility to run for office rests 
with the courts through an action under EL § 12-202.  The filing of the ethics complaint 
with the Commission does not support tolling of EL § 12-202(b)’s statutory limitations 
period, and does not excuse Appellant’s failure to timely challenge Judge Turner’s 
eligibility for office under EL § 12-202. 
Independent of our holding that the election claims are barred by EL § 12-202(b) 
due to the untimely filing of the petition in the circuit court, we hold that the doctrine of 
laches bars the election claims.  In filing the petition in the circuit court more than six 
- 45 - 
months after the 2016 general election, there was an unreasonable delay in Appellant’s 
assertion of the election claims, and that delay resulted in prejudice to Appellees.  
Appellant’s filing of the petition in the circuit court on May 9, 2017, more than six months 
after the 2016 general election, and over a year after Appellant became aware of the facts 
that formed the basis for the election claims, constitutes a clear-cut example of 
unreasonable delay for purposes of the doctrine of laches.  As we noted in Schlakman, 451 
Md. at 485, 153 A.3d at 154, the statutory limitations period set forth in EL § 12-202(b) 
“provides a benchmark for the application of [the doctrine of] laches . . . against which this 
Court can assess whether [Appellant’s] delay in filing in the [c]ircuit [c]ourt was 
unreasonable[.]”  Under EL § 12-202(b)(1) or (2), Appellant was required to file the 
petition in the circuit court within ten days after she became aware of The Washington 
Post’s article published on April 21, 2016, or within seven days after the 2016 general 
election results were certified.  These dates—on or shortly after April 21, 2016, or shortly 
after the November 8, 2016 general election—provide a benchmark from which we may 
measure Appellant’s delay in filing the petition.  When compared to either date, 
Appellant’s filing of the petition on May 9, 2017, is simply unreasonable.   
It is evident that Appellant failed to act with the expediency that is required of 
election claims.  As in Ross, 387 Md. at 672-73, 876 A.2d at 705-06, Appellant’s “wait 
and see” strategy, waiting until more than six months after the general election and almost 
two weeks after the date of the letter in which the Commission notified Appellant of the 
outcome of the ethics complaint concerning matters other than those raised in the election 
claims, was an unjustifiable, intentional delay in the assertion of her rights.  What we stated 
- 46 - 
in Ross, id. at 672, 876 A.2d at 705-06, applies with equal force here—“a candidate . . . 
should not be allowed to ambush an adversary or subvert the election process by 
intentionally delaying a request for remedial action to see first whether [he or she] will be 
successful at the polls.”  (Cleaned up).  We observe that Appellant’s delay in filing the 
petition was more egregious than the delays in Schlakman, Liddy, and Ross, all cases in 
which this Court concluded that there was unreasonable delay for purposes of the doctrine 
of laches.  See Schlakman, 451 Md. at 490, 153 A.3d at 157 (delay in filing the complaint 
until over a month after the plaintiffs were on notice of the facts underlying the complaint); 
Liddy, 398 Md. at 252, 919 A.2d at 1288-89 (delay in filing the complaint until eighteen 
days before the general election); Ross, 387 Md. at 668, 876 A.2d at 703 (delay in filing 
the complaint until three days after the general election, despite being aware of the facts 
underlying the complaint over three weeks earlier).  
As in Schlakman, 451 Md. at 488, 490, 153 A.3d at 156, 157, we observe that 
Appellant has “offered no valid explanation as to why” she waited until May 9, 2017, to 
file the petition in the circuit court, despite having notice of the facts forming the basis for 
the election claims when or shortly after The Washington Post’s article was published on 
April 21, 2016, or why she “did not institute a parallel action [to the ethics complaint] in 
the [c]ircuit [c]ourt within the time limits mandated by [EL] § 12-202(b).”  As to the latter 
point, at the hearing in the circuit court, when asked by the circuit court why she did not 
file a complaint in the court concerning Judge Turner’s alleged lack of qualifications, in 
addition to the ethics complaint filed with the Commission, Appellant simply responded 
that she was waiting for the Commission “to handle” the ethics complaint and that she 
- 47 - 
believed “it made sense to allow the [] Commission to act first.”  Appellant explicitly 
acknowledged, however, that she “could have” pursued both the ethics complaint and the 
petition simultaneously.  Appellant’s explanation and acknowledgement demonstrate that 
Appellant knew of her rights, yet deliberately delayed and failed to expeditiously pursue 
the election claims, thereby unreasonably delaying in pursuing the claims.   
In short, waiting until more than six months after the election to challenge a 
candidate’s eligibility for judicial office was unreasonable, and provided no opportunity 
whatsoever for either the circuit court or this Court to assess the election claims before the 
2016 general election.  Cf. Liddy, 398 Md. at 252, 919 A.2d at 1289 (This Court observed 
that, despite the circumstance that the plaintiff’s complaint was filed within the timeframe 
specified by the Election Law Article, the plaintiff’s “failure diligently to pursue his 
challenge left this Court, as well as the [trial] court [], a very brief time in which to consider 
and decide th[e] matter[,]” specifically, leaving only five days between the date of oral 
argument and the general election.).   Obviously, in this case, by the time that Appellant 
filed the petition, the election results were certified, and Judge Turner had assumed the 
office of judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, and was an active judge 
in this State.   
Appellant’s unreasonable delay in bringing the election claims in the circuit court 
prejudiced Appellees.  As an initial matter, we reject Appellant’s bald assertion that there 
is no prejudice because, if Judge Turner is ineligible for judicial office, then it would 
actually be beneficial to the State and the voters of Prince George’s County to remove 
Judge Turner from office.  This argument is circular, and depends wholly on the validity 
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of Appellant’s position concerning Judge Turner’s eligibility for judicial office.   
Under the circumstances of this case, at a minimum, the unreasonable delay in 
Appellant’s filing of the petition prejudiced Judge Turner and the State Board of Elections.  
The untimely filing of the petition obviously prejudiced Judge Turner, who relied on the 
certification of her candidacy and the certification of the general election results, “only to 
have the results belatedly challenged on a ground that was ripe prior to Election Day.”  
Ross, 387 Md. at 672, 876 A.2d at 706.  The State Board of Elections “likewise was 
prejudiced because it too relied on the correctness of the ballots and expended considerable 
efforts in overseeing the election when [Judge Turner]’s candidacy could have been 
protested judicially prior to the election[.]”  Id. at 672-73, 876 A.2d at 706.   
And, as in Liddy, Appellant’s unreasonable delay in filing the petition in the circuit 
court may have resulted in prejudice to the voters of Prince George’s County.  See Liddy, 
398 Md. at 254-55, 919 A.2d at 1290 (“The confusion that would have resulted from [] 
last-minute changes [to the election] would have, indubitably, interfered with the rights of 
Maryland voters, particularly those who had already cast absentee ballots, causing them to 
be disenfranchised and the value of their votes diluted[,] as they would not be able to vote 
again.”).  Ultimately, as in Ross, 387 Md. at 673, 876 A.2d at 706, we conclude that, 
because Appellant’s “delay would result in [Appellee]s and the people of [Prince George’s 
County] being placed in a less favorable position due to their justifiable reliance on the 
circumstances in existence on Election Day, [Appellant]’s actions [are] sufficiently 
prejudicial so as to warrant the application of [the doctrine of] laches.”  For all of these 
reasons, the circuit court was correct in concluding that the election claims are barred by 
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the doctrine of laches.   
 
In sum, we hold that the circuit court correctly granted the motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that the election claims were untimely under EL § 12-202(b), the statute of 
limitations, and barred by the doctrine of laches.  We conclude that Appellant’s petition 
was untimely filed under EL § 12-202(b) because Appellant did not file the petition in the 
circuit court until May 9, 2017, more than six months after the 2016 general election, and 
more than one year after Appellant admittedly became aware of the facts that served as the 
basis for the election claims; and the petition was filed at least several months after the 
election results were certified.  We discern no basis on which to toll the statute of 
limitations.  Additionally, we determine that, apart from EL § 12-202(b)’s statutory 
limitations period, the petition is barred by the doctrine of laches because, in filing the 
petition in the circuit court more than six months after the 2016 general election, Appellant 
engaged in unreasonable delay, and that delay resulted in prejudice to Appellees.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.15   
 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR 
ANNE 
ARUNDEL 
COUNTY 
AFFIRMED.  
APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS. 
                                              
15Because we conclude that the circuit court correctly granted the motion to dismiss 
based on the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches, we need not—and do not—
address the merits of the election claims as presented in the other three issues raised on 
brief by Appellant.  Indeed, to do so would simply be an academic exercise.  To be sure, 
the merits of the election claims raise interesting issues; however, any discussion of the 
merits of the case by this Court, in light of the untimeliness of the filing of the petition, 
would be dicta.  Rather, under the circumstances of this case, we cabin our consideration 
to the issues that are dispositive of the case—namely, application of EL § 12-202(b)’s 
statutory limitations period and the doctrine of laches.