Case Title: DALE EVAN PEDEN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-17

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
DALE EVAN PEDEN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 26130 P.3d 869Case Number: 05-17Decided: 03/14/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
DALE 
EVAN PEDEN,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina N. 
Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Daniel M. Fetsco, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In November 2004, 
the district court sentenced Dale Peden (the appellant) for felony conspiracy to 
deliver methamphetamine.  The 
appellant now appeals that sentence, claiming that the district court improperly 
considered prior uncharged criminal activity at sentencing.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Whether the 
district court abused its discretion when it sentenced the 
appellant?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The appellant was 
initially charged with two felonies:  1) conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(i) and 35-7-1042 (LexisNexis 
2005); and 2) possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i).  Pursuant to a plea agreement, the 
appellant pled guilty to the conspiracy charge and the State dismissed the 
possession charge.  The parties 
apparently had no agreement as to what sentence the appellant should 
receive.

 
 
[¶4]      At sentencing, 
the prosecutor sought to have Campbell County sheriff's sergeant Steven Hamilton 
(Hamilton) testify about a 2001 investigation that produced a series of taped 
phone calls between a confidential informant and another individual, whom the 
officer identified as the appellant.1  The appellant's trial counsel questioned 
the relevancy of this testimony because the appellant had never faced criminal 
charges as a result of the 2001 investigation.  The prosecutor asserted that such 
evidence was "an aggravator, especially given [the appellant's] minimization of 
his involvement with methamphetamine in this case."  The district court overruled the 
appellant's objection and allowed Hamilton to testify.

 
 
[¶5]      According to 
Hamilton, who was assigned to the Wyoming 
Division of Criminal Investigation's northeast drug enforcement team, the 
appellant claimed during the taped phone calls to have "brought back ounces of 
controlled substances to CampbellCounty from Colorado."  He then agreed to travel to Rifle, 
Colorado, and 
purchase an ounce of cocaine and an ounce of methamphetamine for the 
informant.  The informant wired the 
appellant approximately $2,500 for that purpose.  When the appellant did not return to 
Wyoming with 
the drugs, the informant called the appellant.  The appellant stated that he had 
experienced car trouble and still needed to find a ride back to Wyoming.  The appellant ultimately surrendered to 
South Dakota 
authorities on other drug charges prior to delivering the cocaine and 
methamphetamine to the informant.  
Hamilton 
testified that law enforcement did not recover the money the informant had wired 
to the appellant, and the drugs apparently "went to an unnamed or unknown 
individual who is now deceased."

 
 
[¶6]      The appellant's 
trial counsel renewed his objection to Hamilton's testimony, adding that there had 
"been no real positive identification of the [appellant.]"  Hamilton's testimony in that regard was 
essentially as follows:

 
 
           
[Prosecutor:]    
Okay.  Did you have an 
opportunity to review the content of the [tapes] and listen to the 
voices?

 
 
           
[Hamilton:]        I did 
not listen to them.  I have them in 
my possession.  I did read the 
transcript of the very first conversation, which is in the body of my 
report.

 
 
           
[Prosecutor:]    
Okay.  Did you  how were you 
able to identify that the party other than the confidential informant who was 
involved in those discussions was [the appellant]?

 
 
           
[Hamilton:]        At 
the time of the investigation, there was a great deal of contact between the 
[appellant] and the confidential informant.  We believe from this contact, from 
conversations from individuals who came on the phone, including relatives of 
[the appellant] during these phone calls, that we absolutely had identified the 
[appellant] as the person on the other end of the phone.

 
 
[¶7]      Hamilton acknowledged that 
there had been no visual identification of the appellant as the person on the 
phone with the informant and that the tapes were never subjected to scientific 
voice analysis.  The district 
court's ruling on the appellant's objection was as follows:  "Overruled.  I'll take it into 
consideration."

 
 
[¶8]      The prosecutor 
asked that the district court sentence the appellant to imprisonment for eight 
to fifteen years.  In making that 
request, the prosecutor referred to the appellant's prior felony convictions, 
the appellant's failure to rehabilitate himself despite several prior 
opportunities to do so, and Hamilton's testimony (which testimony was offered 
"to rebut [the appellant] on allegations that his involvement in the 
methamphetamine culture was . . . limited to sort of a user kind of person" or 
"using and trafficking to support his drug habits").  The appellant's trial counsel asked that 
the district court sentence the appellant to imprisonment for eight to fifteen 
years, suspend that sentence and impose a split sentence of one year in the 
county jail, order the appellant to participate in an inpatient treatment 
program, and place the appellant on supervised probation for seven to eight 
years.

 
 
[¶9]      The district 
court sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for seven to fifteen years.  In pronouncing the appellant's sentence, 
the district court specifically referred to the appellant's extensive criminal 
history and the fact that the appellant was "unwilling when he's free to take 
steps to try to get his conduct to conform to the law."  This appeal followed.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]                
            
Sentencing decisions are normally within the discretion of the trial 
court.  Hamill v. State, 948 P.2d 1356, 1358 
(Wyo.1997).  "A sentence will not be 
disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless the defendant can show an 
abuse of discretion,[2] procedural conduct 
prejudicial to him, and circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and 
injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play."  Smith v. State, 941 P.2d 749, 750 
(Wyo.1997).  "An error warrants 
reversal only when it is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial 
rights.  The party who is appealing 
bears the burden to establish that an error was prejudicial."  Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 
439-40 (Wyo.1995) (citations omitted); see also Robinson v. Hamblin, 914 P.2d 152, 155 (Wyo.1996).

 
 

Trusky 
 v. State, 
7 P.3d 5, 13 (Wyo. 2000).  It is the 
appellant's "burden to establish that the sentencing court in fact rested the 
sentence on false or improper premises."  
Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 440 (Wyo. 
1995), overruled on other grounds by 
Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, ¶ 43, 43 P.3d 551, 566 (Wyo. 2002) (citation 
omitted). 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   On appeal, the appellant questions 
the reliability of Hamilton's testimony that the appellant was 
"involved in this alleged transaction with the confidential informant."  He claims that there was "no showing of 
reliability at all" because Hamilton "really had no personal knowledge to 
relay" to the district court and there was "no identification" of the 
appellant's voice.  The appellant 
emphasizes the following facts:  1) 
Hamilton "never 
even listened to the tapes"; 2) the "voice recording was never tested"; 3) the 
tapes were not played at the sentencing hearing; and 4) the informant did not 
testify at the sentencing hearing.  
The appellant concludes that Hamilton's testimony "cannot fit into that wide 
range of factors that it is appropriate for the sentencing court to consider" 
and his right to due process3 was therefore 
violated.

 
 
[¶12]   A sentencing court clearly may, in 
its discretion, consider prior uncharged or unadjudicated criminal 
activity.  See, for example, Nichols v. United 
States, 511 U.S. 738, 747, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1928, 128 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1994); Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1465 
(10th Cir. 1995); People v. Newman, 
91 P.3d 369, 372 (Colo. 2004); Manes v. 
State, 2004 WY 70, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 289, 292 (Wyo. 2004); and Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1117 
(Wyo. 1993) (scope of inquiry may include hearsay reports implicating defendant 
in other crimes if reports are deemed sufficiently reliable).  In particular, we have said that 
when

 
 
imposing 
sentence, the trial court is given broad discretion to consider a wide variety 
of factors about the defendant and his crimes.  Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1115 
(Wyo.1993); Griebel v. State, 763 P.2d 475, 477 (Wyo.1988).  . . 
.  "W.R.Cr.P. 32(a) specifically 
permits information about the prior criminal record of the defendant and his 
characteristics to be considered by the trial court before imposing 
sentence.  In evaluating character, 
the trial court, in exercising its discretion, may consider a broad range of 
reports and information."  [Mehring, 860 P.2d at 1116-17]; see also Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Wyo.1987).  Evidence 
of prior criminal activity is "highly relevant to the sentencing decision" and 
may be considered by the sentencing court despite the fact that no prosecution 
or conviction may have resulted.  Mehring, at 1117.   

 
 

Manes, 
¶ 9, 92 P.3d  at 292.  However, 
sentencing must still "satisfy the requirements of due process" and "[o]utside 
of capital proceedings, sentencing must ensure that the information the 
sentencing court relies upon is reliable and accurate . . . ."  Kenyon v. State, 2004 WY 100, ¶ 11, 96 P.3d 1016, 1021 (Wyo. 2004), cert. 
denied, 543 U.S. 1175 (2005).  See also Manes, ¶ 13, 92 P.3d  at 
293.  It is also worth noting that 
the rules of evidence do not apply in this context and that "[a]s it pertains to 
hearsay information, due process requires that the information used have some 
minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation."  W.R.E. 1101; United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 497 U.S. 1038 (1990) (internal quotations 
and citations omitted).  

 
 
[¶13]   The appellant does not offer any 
cogent argument that the manner in which Hamilton's testimony was presented to the 
district court, or the manner in which the district court addressed the issues 
raised during the sentencing hearing, constituted what the above-quoted standard 
of review refers to as "procedural conduct prejudicial to him."  Therefore, our review will only 
encompass whether there was a sufficient basis for Hamilton to testify that 
the appellant was the "other party" to the 2001 transaction.  The due process afforded a defendant 
during sentencing is less stringent than at trial, including relaxation of 
confrontation clause and hearsay considerations, the primary focus being upon 
the reliability of the information upon which the sentence is based.  See, for example, United States v. Fennell, 65 F.3d 812, 
814 (10th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1993), amended, 992 F.2d 1015 (1993); United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 402 
(8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 989 (1993); and Beaulieu, 893 F.2d  at 1179-81.  We conclude that, 
in light of the following considerations, the appellant has not demonstrated 
Hamilton's 
testimony was so lacking in reliability that it implicated the appellant's right 
to due process:

 
 
1.    It is apparent from Hamilton's testimony that 
he was intimately involved in the 2001 investigation.  He knew the details of the contacts 
between the informant and the other party to the transaction, possessed the 
tapes of the phone calls between the two, and the informant was under his 
"control."

 
 
2.    Hamilton maintained close 
contact with his informant and the informant obviously knew who he or she was 
dealing with in consummating the 2001 transaction.  According to Hamilton, there was "a 
great deal of contact" between the informant and the other party to the 
transaction; the informant initiated some of the phone calls and the other party 
initiated some of the phone calls.  
The informant also wired the other party money in order to purchase the 
drugs.  It is reasonable to infer 
that Hamilton's 
testimony was based partially on the information he obtained from the 
informant.

 
 
3.    The phone calls between the 
informant and the other party were taped.  
Hamilton did not actually listen to the 
tapes, but did review a transcript of one of the tapes, which review produced 
enough substantive details that Hamilton included them in his written 
investigative report.  It is 
reasonable to infer that Hamilton's testimony was based partially on the 
information he gleaned from that transcript.  Considering Hamilton's use of the word "we" in his above-quoted hearing 
testimony, it is also reasonable to infer that one or more additional law 
enforcement officers participated in the investigation and that Hamilton communicated with 
the other officer(s) about the taped phone conversations.

 
 
4.    Some objective facts 
corroborate Hamilton's testimony.  Hamilton indicated that other individuals 
(including individuals identified as the appellant's relatives) engaged in 
conversation during the taped phone calls.  
The appellant did not impeach or rebut Hamilton's representations in that regard, and Hamilton clearly relied on 
this information in testifying that "we absolutely had identified" the 
appellant.  The presentence 
investigation report also indicates that the appellant pled guilty to, and was 
sentenced for, a felony drug charge in South Dakota during the time period 
relevant to Hamilton's investigation, that the appellant had substantial ties to 
Gillette, and that the appellant worked in Rifle, Colorado, for six months in 
2003.

 
 
[¶14]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion when it sentenced the appellant and we, therefore, 
affirm.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1This 
information was not included in the presentence investigation report, but the 
prosecutor had apparently discussed the nature of Hamilton's testimony with the appellant's trial 
counsel prior to the sentencing hearing.

 
 

2"Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.'"  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 
(Wyo. 1998) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 
(Wyo. 1986)) 
(citation omitted).

 
 

3See 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 and 
Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 6.