Case Title: Lyles v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 3m/21

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2022-05-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jabari Morese Lyles v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., Misc. No. 3, September Term, 
2021.  Opinion by Getty, C.J. 
 
COMMERCIAL LAW — CREDIT GRANTOR CLOSED END CREDIT 
PROVISIONS — PENALTY FOR KNOWING VIOLATION — CALCULATION 
OF DAMAGES  
Answering a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland, the Court of Appeals held that Maryland Code (1983, 2013 Repl. Vol., 2021 
Supp.), Commercial Law Article § 12-1018(b) requires a credit grantor that knowingly 
violates the Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions to forfeit to the borrower treble 
the amount of interest, fees, and charges collected in violation of the subtitle.  
 
United States District Court 
For the District of Maryland 
Case No. 1:21-cv-00566-CCB 
Argued: October 4, 2021 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. No. 3 
 
September Term, 2021 
 
  
JABARI MORESE LYLES 
 
 
 
v. 
 
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC. 
 
 
*Getty, C.J. 
*McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Wilner, Alan M. 
     (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) 
 
JJ. 
 
 
Opinion by Getty, C.J. 
 
 
Filed: May 13, 2022 
 
*Getty, C.J., and McDonald, J., now Senior 
Judges, participated in the hearing and conference 
of this case while active members of this Court; 
after being recalled pursuant to Maryland 
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, they also 
participated in the decision and adoption of this 
opinion.
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
2022-05-13
13:46-04:00
 
Consumers may use “closed end credit” and “revolving credit” in making purchases 
for a variety of consumer goods by borrowing funds through a credit plan.  “Closed end 
credit” requires a borrower to repay the amount owed in multiple installments, generally 
of an equal amount, over a fixed period of time.  “Revolving credit” enables a borrower to 
purchase goods or secure loans on a continuing basis as long as the borrower’s total balance 
does not exceed a specified limit.  The borrower has the option of paying the minimum 
required monthly payment, paying any amount above the minimum payment each month, 
or paying off the entire balance.   
Borrowers frequently access closed end credit to finance the purchase of a motor 
vehicle.  In Maryland, if the purchase of a motor vehicle is financed by an installment sale, 
the lender may elect for the contract to be governed by either of two statutes located in 
Title 12 of the Commercial Law Article (“CL”) of the Maryland Code—the Credit Grantor 
Closed End Credit Provisions (“CLEC”), CL §§ 12-1001 et seq., or the Maryland Retail 
Installment Sales Act, CL §§ 12-601 et seq.  See Patton v. Wells Fargo Fin. Md., Inc., 437 
Md. 83, 88–89 (2014).  The present matter involves a borrower who purchased a motor 
vehicle and financed it by closed end credit pursuant to an agreement governed by CLEC.  
Before this Court is a certified question of law from the United States District Court 
for the District of Maryland (“federal district court”) regarding the calculation of damages 
under Maryland Code (“Md. Code”), (1983, 2013 Repl. Vol., 2021 Supp.), Commercial 
Law Article § 12-1018(b).  Appellant Jabari Morese Lyles (“Mr. Lyles”) initiated the 
underlying class action against Appellee Santander Consumer USA, Inc. (“Santander”) for 
alleged violations of CLEC.   
 
2 
 
This matter comes before the Court with unique posturing.  The question posed to 
this Court will inform the federal district court’s analysis of its subject matter jurisdiction 
after resolution of the certified question.  Mr. Lyles, the Plaintiff in the federal district 
court, advocates for a damages calculation that would entitle him to lesser monetary relief 
than the interpretation Santander argued before the federal district court.  We hold that, 
based upon prior caselaw regarding CLEC, a plain language analysis of CL § 12-1018(b), 
and a review of the pertinent legislative history, CL § 12-1018(b) requires a credit grantor 
who knowingly violates CLEC to forfeit three times the amounts of interest, fees, and 
charges collected in violation of CLEC.          
BACKGROUND 
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Md. Code 
(1996, 2020 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”) §§ 12-601 et seq., 
this Court has the power to certify questions of law to another court and answer questions 
of law presented to it.  “[I]f the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending 
litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional 
provision, or statute of this State[,]” this Court may “answer a question of law certified to 
it by a court of the United States[.]”  CJ § 12-603; see also United Bank v. Buckingham, 
472 Md. 407, 411 (2021).  In answering a certified question of law, this Court resolves 
only issues of Maryland law, not questions of fact.  Parler & Wobber v. Miles & 
Stockbridge, 359 Md. 671, 681 (2000).  As such, this Court accepts the statement of facts 
submitted to it by the certifying court and will not “evaluate or weigh the evidence[.]”  Reed 
 
3 
 
v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 228 (1993) (quoting Food Fair Stores v. Joy, 283 Md. 205, 
219 n.7 (1978)). 
The Maryland General Assembly enacted CLEC and other legislation as a part of 
the Credit Deregulation Act of 1983 “to entice creditors to do business in the State[.]”  Ford 
Motor Credit Co., LLC v. Roberson, 420 Md. 649, 662 (2011); see also 1983 Md. Laws, 
ch. 143.  The General Assembly intended to enable Maryland banks “to compete more 
effectively with banks in nearby states.”  Patton, 437 Md. at 105.  As this Court has 
previously explained: 
Prior to the 1983 session of the General Assembly, four Maryland banks 
transferred certain of their operations to Delaware where the banking laws 
were more favorable.  These included the credit card operations of two major 
banks based in Baltimore.  Some 1,000 jobs were lost in the Baltimore area.  
The response by the General Assembly was Chapter 143 of the Acts of 1983, 
the enactment of which was urged by then Mayor Schaefer of Baltimore and 
others.  Chapter 143 has become known as the Credit Deregulation Act of 
1983. 
 
Biggus v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 328 Md. 188, 197 (1992). 
 
CLEC provides consumer protection to borrowers in transactions involving closed 
end credit, as well as establishes parameters and requirements with which credit grantors 
must comply.  Patton, 437 Md. at 89.  The subtitle also establishes various remedies to a 
borrower if the credit grantor fails to comply with CLEC.  Id. at 90.  Notably, these 
protections, parameters, requirements, and remedies only apply if a credit grantor 
affirmatively elects CLEC to apply to a closed end credit loan.  See CL § 12-1013; 
CL § 12-1013.1. 
 
4 
 
The following facts are provided in the federal district court’s Certification Order.  
On or about January 11, 2021, Mr. Lyles initiated the underlying class action in the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City alleging that Santander violated CLEC.  Mr. Lyles entered into a 
Retail Installment Sales Contract (“RISC”) to finance the purchase of a motor vehicle.  The 
RISC, subsequently assigned to Santander, expressly invoked CLEC as the governing law.  
Mr. Lyles financed $20,657.00 in the RISC with finance charges of $15,596.44 throughout 
the duration of the RISC.  Mr. Lyles completed several payments to Santander under the 
RISC.  As of the filing of the underlying class action, Santander collected at least 
$27,029.67 on the RISC, which amounts to $6,372.67 more than the amount Mr. Lyles 
financed under the RISC.  According to Santander, $15,603.54 remains due on the RISC. 
Santander charges a convenience fee to its customers “for making a payment by 
phone through a live representative or through an automated system or through the 
internet[.]”  On Mr. Lyles’ RISC, Santander charged and collected twelve convenience 
fees, each for $10.95, totaling $131.40. 
Mr. Lyles maintains that Santander knowingly violated CLEC by charging the 
twelve convenience fees and asserts that he and the purported class are entitled to relief 
under CL § 12-1018(a)(2) and CL § 12-1018(b).  Santander removed this action to the 
federal district court on March 4, 2021 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)1, which, in part, 
requires the class action’s amount in controversy to exceed $5,000,000.   
 
1 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) sets forth the requirements for a federal district court to have original 
jurisdiction over a class action.  This statute provides:  
 
 
5 
 
Presently, a Motion for Remand is pending before the federal district court.  As 
such, the federal district court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this matter is dependent on 
the proper amount in controversy—i.e., the appropriate amount of damages Mr. Lyles may 
be entitled to under CL § 12-1018(b).  
The federal district court certified the following question of law to this Court to 
determine the appropriate interpretation of CL § 12-1018(b):   
If a credit grantor is found to have knowingly violated Credit Grantor Closed 
End Credit Provisions (“CLEC”), Maryland Code Annotated, Commercial 
Law §§ 12-1001, et seq., does [CL] § 12-1018(b) require the credit grantor 
to return three times: (1) all amounts collected by the credit grantor in excess 
of the principal amount financed; (2) only those amounts collected that the 
borrower contends violate CLEC (in this case, the convenience fees); or (3) 
some other amount? 
 
For the reasons that follow, we hold that CL § 12-1018(b) requires a credit grantor 
to return three times the amount of interest, fees, and charges collected that the borrower 
contends violate CLEC (in this case, the convenience fees). 
 
(2) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in 
which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, 
exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which– 
 
(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State 
different from any defendant; 
 
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a 
citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a 
citizen of a State; or  
 
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State 
and any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a 
foreign state.  
 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
 
6 
 
DISCUSSION 
A. 
Parties’ Contentions 
Mr. Lyles maintains that if a credit grantor knowingly violates CLEC, 
CL § 12-1018(b) requires the credit grantor to forfeit three times the amount of the 
unauthorized charges.  In this case, that would total $394.20, which is three times $131.40, 
the total amount collected for the twelve convenience fees charged.  In support of this 
contention, Mr. Lyles relies upon the recent Court of Special Appeals’ holding in Bolling 
v. Bay Country Consumer Finance, Inc., 251 Md. App. 575 (2021).  Mr. Lyles asserts that 
the Court of Special Appeals’ interpretation of CL § 12-1018(a)(2), in conjunction with the 
plain language of CL § 12-1018(b), indicates that a knowing violation of CLEC entitles 
the borrower to treble the unauthorized amounts charged.   
In addition, Mr. Lyles emphasizes that the legislative history of CL § 12-1018(b) 
demonstrates that the penalty provisions set forth in CLEC are identical to the penalties set 
forth in CL § 12-413, the Maryland Secondary Mortgage Loan Law.  Accordingly, Mr. 
Lyles asserts that caselaw and regulatory decisions interpreting CL § 12-413 provide the 
appropriate calculation of damages under CL § 12-1018(b).  
Before the federal district court, Santander argued that under CL § 12-1018(b) a 
credit grantor would be required to pay three times the amount collected in excess of the 
principal amount financed under the RISC.  In this matter, that would total $19,118.01, 
which is three times $6,372.67, the amount Santander has collected above the amount 
financed under the RISC.  However, before this Court, Santander did not substantively 
oppose Mr. Lyles’ interpretation of CL § 12-1018(b).  Counsel for Santander emphasized 
 
7 
 
at oral arguments the “interesting position” Santander maintains of “having an adversary 
reducing the amount sought by two million dollars.”  Santander cautions that the Bolling 
decision is not properly before the Court.  Therefore, it would be imprudent to endorse that 
holding here.  Further, Santander maintains that Bolling did not specifically analyze 
CL § 12-1018(b) and, accordingly, should not influence this Court’s statutory 
interpretation.  
B. 
Caselaw Interpreting CL § 12-1018(a) 
 
The Court’s analysis of CL § 12-1018(b) begins, naturally, with CL § 12-1018(a).  
See Berry v. Queen, 469 Md. 674, 687 (2020) (citing Neal v. Balt. City Bd. of Sch. 
Comm’rs, 467 Md. 399, 415 (2020)) (“Our inquiry is not confined to the specific statutory 
provision at issue on appeal.”).  CL § 12-1018(a) provides, in part: 
(2) Except for a bona fide error of computation, if a credit grantor violates 
any provision of this subtitle the credit grantor may collect only the principal 
amount of the loan and may not collect any interest, costs, fees, or other 
charges with respect to the loan. 
 
CL § 12-1018(a)(2).  
 
At the outset, the Court notes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, and the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland have all interpreted CL § 12-1018(a)(2), some of which have 
produced divergent results.  We address each case in turn.  
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first wrestled with the 
statutory language of CL § 12-1018(a)(2) in Bedaiko v. American Honda Finance Corp., 
 
8 
 
537 F. App’x. 183, 186–87 (4th Cir. 2013).2  There, Melissa Bedaiko, on behalf of a 
putative class, asserted that American Honda Finance Corporation (“Honda Finance”) 
violated CLEC by providing inadequate notice of the private sale of her repossessed 
automobile.  Id. at 184.  In 2004, Ms. Bedaiko purchased a used automobile with financing 
she obtained by a RISC.  Id. at 185.  Ms. Bedaiko eventually defaulted on her loan, and, as 
a result, Honda Finance repossessed her vehicle on or before April 28, 2005.  Id.  Honda 
Finance notified Ms. Bedaiko in writing that it would sell the vehicle at a private sale after 
May 15, 2005.  Id.  Honda Finance sold the vehicle in a private sale on July 1, 2005, and 
subsequently sent a post-sale notice to Ms. Bedaiko demanding payment on the deficiency 
of $7,036.80, which remained due on the RISC.  Id.   
In 2010, Ms. Bedaiko filed a putative class action complaint in the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland against Honda Finance alleging defects in the 
notice provided.  Bedaiko, 537 F. App’x. at 185.  Honda Finance filed a motion to dismiss 
asserting that Ms. Bedaiko’s claims failed as a matter of law.  Id.  The court granted Honda 
Finance’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the purported CLEC violation did not result 
in any actionable damages “because CLEC permits Honda Finance to recover the principal 
amount of its loan notwithstanding the alleged CLEC violation.”  Id.  Ms. Bedaiko 
subsequently appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.  Id.  
The dispositive issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether Ms. Bedaiko failed to state a 
 
2 Unpublished opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit are not 
binding precedent in that court; however, it is appropriate to begin with Bedaiko, which 
laid the foundation for the published opinions that followed.  
 
9 
 
claim because Honda Finance had not collected more than the principal amount of her loan.  
Id. at 185–86.   
 
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland’s conclusion that Ms. Bedaiko’s claims failed as a matter of law due to her 
deficiency in alleging actual, compensable damages.  Bedaiko, 537 F. App’x. at 186.  The 
Court explained that CL § 12-1018(a)(2), “by its plain terms, limits a debtor’s relief under 
CLEC to any amounts paid in excess of the principal amount of the loan.”  Id.  The Court 
further emphasized that CL § 12-1018(a)(2) “expressly permits creditors to recover the 
principal amount of a loan.”  Id. at 187.  As such, the Court determined that Ms. Bedaiko 
had “no right to monetary relief under [CL §] 12-1018(a)(2).”  Id.  
 
Two years after Bedaiko, the Fourth Circuit revisited this topic—this time issuing a 
published opinion—in Gardner v. GMAC, Inc., 796 F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 2015).  
Gardner also involved a credit grantor repossessing vehicles following borrowers 
defaulting on their respective loans.  Id. at 393.  The borrowers in Gardner attempted to 
distinguish the Fourth Circuit’s previous holding in Bedaiko by claiming that the credit 
grantor in Bedaiko fully complied with CLEC.  Id. at 394.  The Fourth Circuit declined to 
make this distinction and, instead, chose to follow the rules articulated in its prior holding.  
Id.  The Court explained that the borrowers had not paid anything in excess of the principal 
amount of their loans to the credit grantor, and, therefore, did not allege any actual damages 
under CL § 12-1018(a)(2).  Id.   
 
Under this reasoning, regardless of whether a borrower has asserted a valid CLEC 
violation, if the borrower has not paid the credit grantor in excess of the principal loan 
 
10 
 
amount, the borrower “‘is unable to state a claim because she [or he] has suffered no actual 
damages that are compensable under CLEC.’”  Gardner, 796 F.3d at 394 (quoting Bedaiko, 
537 F. App’x at 188).  To determine if the credit grantor has received money in excess of 
the principal loan amount, the federal courts “recharacterize all of the borrower’s payments 
during the life of the loan as payments toward [the] principal and then subtract that total 
and the sale proceeds from the original principal amount of the loan.”  Id. (citing Bedaiko, 
537 F. App’x at 186 & n.1). 
 
Relying principally on Bedaiko and Gardner, the United States District Court for 
the District of Maryland had occasion to apply CL § 12-1018(a)(2) in Campbell v. Toyota 
Motor Credit Corp., No. PWG-18-150, 2018 WL 3439250 at *2 (D. Md. July 17, 2018).  
In Campbell, Delphine Campbell entered into a RISC assigned to Toyota Motor Credit 
Corporation (“TMCC”), which affirmatively elected CLEC as the governing law, to 
purchase an automobile.  Id.  Ms. Campbell eventually stopped making payments to TMCC 
under the RISC.  Id.  As such, TMCC repossessed the vehicle, conducted a private sale of 
the automobile, and provided Ms. Campbell with a post-sale notice.  Id.  Ms. Campbell 
filed a class action lawsuit against TMCC in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
alleging violations of CLEC’s notice requirements.  Id. at *1.  TMCC subsequently 
removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.  Id.  
Before that court, TMCC filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Ms. Campbell failed to 
state a claim because “CLEC does not permit statutory damages[,]” and Ms. Campbell did 
not make payments to TMCC in excess of the principal amount of the loan.  Id. at *6.   
 
11 
 
In conducting its analysis, the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland emphasized that CL § 12-1018(a)(2) “merely stops a creditor’s collection from 
the debtor beyond the principal loan amount.”  Campbell, 2018 WL 3439250 at *7.   The 
court went on to explain that “even if TMCC violated CLEC’s notice requirement as Ms. 
Campbell alleges, it still would be entitled to collect the principal amount of the loan; 
TMCC is not required, as a result of its alleged CLEC violation, to refund or forfeit all 
money it received beyond the principal.”  Id.  Accordingly, the United States District Court 
for the District of Maryland concluded that Ms. Campbell did not appropriately plead a 
claim “under CLEC because she [had] not suffered any injury for which the statute affords 
a monetary recovery.”  Id. at *8.   
Most recently, the Court of Special Appeals interpreted CL § 12-1018(a)(2) in 
Bolling.  251 Md. App. at 611.  Compared to the federal courts’ interpretations, the Bolling 
court rendered a different analysis of when a borrower may bring a claim for relief under 
CL § 12-1018(a)(2).  Id. at 594.  The intermediate appellate court determined that 
CL § 12-1018(a)(2) does not “bar relief for a violation of CLEC until after the borrower 
pays off the principal amount of the loan[.]”  Id.  Instead, the Court of Special Appeals 
concluded that CL § 12-1018(a)(2) “limit[s] the amount of damages that a credit [grantor] 
has to pay[.]”  Id.  As such, the intermediate appellate court ultimately held that “a cause 
of action may accrue after a violation has occurred where the borrower can show that she 
[or he] has suffered compensable damage under CLEC . . . or where the borrower requests 
appropriate declaratory or injunctive relief.”  Id. at 596–97.   
 
12 
 
It is clear that the federal courts and the intermediate appellate court disagree as to 
when a borrower is permitted to bring a claim under CL § 12-1018(a)(2).  However, the 
federal courts and the intermediate appellate court both recognize that “‘CLEC does not 
provide for any fixed statutory damages beyond the [borrower’s] actual loss[,]’” and “that 
the penalty prescribed under CL § 12-1018(a)(2) confines the credit grantor to collection 
of the principal amount of the loan, thereby forfeiting any outstanding interest, charges, 
costs and fees[.]”  Bolling, 251 Md. App. at 594 (quoting Bedaiko, 537 F. App’x at 187).  
The issue of when a borrower is permitted to bring a claim under CL § 12-1018(a)(2) is 
not presently before this Court.  Nonetheless, the principle that CL § 12-1018(a)(2) limits 
a credit grantor’s collection to the principal loan amount informs this Court’s 
understanding of CL § 12-1018(b), to which we now turn.   
C. 
CL § 12-1018(b) 
Well-settled principles of statutory construction guide the appropriate calculation of 
damages under CL § 12-1018(b).  When engaging in statutory interpretation, this Court’s 
“chief objective is to ascertain the General Assembly’s purpose and intent when it enacted 
the statute.”  Berry, 469 Md. at 687 (citing Neal, 467 Md. at 415).  As such, “[w]e assume 
that the legislature’s intent is expressed in the statutory language and thus our statutory 
interpretation focuses primarily on the language of the statute to determine the purpose and 
intent of the General Assembly.”  Id.  (quoting Brown v. State, 454 Md. 546, 550–51 
(2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Further, “[w]e read the ‘statute as a whole to 
ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, 
 
13 
 
meaningless or nugatory.’”  United Bank, 472 Md. at 423 (quoting Town of Forest Heights 
v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park and Planning Comm’n, 463 Md. 469, 478 (2019)).        
We apply these principles to the relevant statutory language, which provides:  
(b) In addition, a credit grantor who knowingly violates any provision of this 
subtitle shall forfeit to the borrower 3 times the amount of interest, fees, and 
charges collected in excess of that authorized by this subtitle. 
 
CL § 12-1018(b). 
CL § 12-1018(b) provides the penalty provision for knowing violations of CLEC.  
The provision begins with the words “[i]n addition,” which signals that this is an additional 
penalty to the penalty set forth in subsection (a)(2).  A credit grantor that violates CLEC is 
limited by CL § 12-1018(a)(2) to collect only the principal loan amount from the borrower, 
and a credit grantor that knowingly violates the subtitle is subject to further liability under 
CL § 12-1018(b).   
The provision continues, stating that the amounts to be trebled are the “interest, fees, 
and charges collected in excess of that authorized by this subtitle.”  CL § 12-1018(b).  The 
phrase “in excess of that authorized by this subtitle” is central to this Court’s analysis.   This 
language identifies that the amount to be trebled is that which the credit grantor is not 
permitted to charge to the borrower under CLEC.  Put differently, the amounts that a credit 
grantor charged in violation of CLEC are the amounts to be trebled for a knowing violation 
of the subtitle.   
If the General Assembly intended for this penalty provision to require a credit 
grantor to pay treble the amount collected in excess of the principal loan amount, it would 
have written the provision to read as such.  See Peterson v. State, 467 Md. 713, 727 (2020) 
 
14 
 
(explaining that this Court presumes that the General Assembly “meant what it said and 
said what it meant.”); Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Corp. v. Beebe-Lee, 431 Md. 474, 491 
(2013) (holding that if the General Assembly wanted to impose a settlement agreement 
constraint on a statute’s authority, it would have done so in the plain language of the statute 
at issue); Sacchet v. Blan, 353 Md. 87, 93 (1999) (emphasizing that if the General 
Assembly intended to include certain common law crimes in its legislation, it would have 
written the statute at issue to reflect such an intention).  However, the plain language of 
CL § 12-1018(b) makes no reference to amounts collected in excess of the principal 
amount financed.  The General Assembly only expressly authorized forfeiture of “the 
amount of interest, fees, and charges” that are “collected in excess of that authorized by the 
subtitle.”   
As such, the amount to be trebled under CL § 12-1018(b) are those amounts 
collected that are not authorized under CLEC.   
D. 
Legislative History of CL § 12-1018 
“While this Court ‘begin[s] our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain 
meaning of the language of the statute,’” “[i]t is the ‘modern tendency of this Court to 
continue the analysis of the statute beyond the plain meaning’ of the statutory language.” 
United Bank, 472 Md. at 426 (quoting Brown, 454 Md. at 551); Moore v. RealPage Util. 
Mgmt., Inc., 476 Md. 501, 514 (2021) (quoting In re: S.K., 466 Md. 31, 50 (2019)).  In 
doing so, the Court may examine “the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, 
and archival legislative history of relevant enactments.”  In re: S.K., 466 Md. at 50 (quoting 
Brown, 454 Md. at 551) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We see fit to engage in such 
 
15 
 
a check here, as an overview of the statute’s legislative history indicates that the language 
adopted in CL § 12-1018(a)(2) and CL § 12-1018(b) is not unique to CLEC.  Here, the 
legislative history reveals that this language originated in CL § 12-413, the Maryland 
Secondary Mortgage Loan Law. 
As previously discussed, the General Assembly enacted CLEC as a part of the 
Credit Deregulation Act of 1983.  1983 Md. Laws, ch. 143.  When Senate Bill 591, which 
became CLEC, was introduced in the General Assembly, it was viewed primarily as a 
deregulation effort to enable Maryland banks “to compete more effectively with banks in 
nearby states.”  Patton, 437 Md. at 105.  Notably, Senate Bill 591’s original language did 
not include the penalty provisions that would eventually be codified as CL § 12-1018(a) 
and CL § 12-1018(b).  Instead, upon urging from the Attorney General and the Secretary 
of Licensing and Regulation,3 additional protections for borrowers and penalties for credit 
grantors who violated the provisions were added as amendments to the bill.  Patton, 437 
Md. at 105–06.  Markedly, the bill file indicates that “[t]hese amendments would add new 
sections . . . identical as to penalty, as those now existing under the Maryland Secondary 
Mortgage Loan Law.”4  See Senate Bill 591, Analysis of Proposed Administration 
 
3 The Division of Labor and Industry has been a subunit within a cabinet-level department 
that has changed names three times since 1970.  From 1970 to 1995, it was the Department 
of Licensing and Regulation.  It was renamed the Department of Labor, Licensing, and 
Regulation from 1995 to 2019.  In 2019, it was renamed the Department of Labor.  See 
Maryland Department of Labor—Historical Evolution, Maryland Manual On-Line 
https://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/20dllr/html/dllrh.html [https://perma.cc/XW69-
6882].  
 
4 It is evident that CL § 12-413 served as a template for the General Assembly in drafting 
the language of CL § 12-1018(a) and CL § 12-1018(b).  CL § 12-413 states: 
 
16 
 
Amendments (March 28, 1983) in legislative bill file for Senate Bill 591.  The General 
Assembly ultimately adopted the proposed amendments with the penalty provisions, which 
were codified as CL § 12-1018(a) and CL § 12-1018(b) respectively.  In their original form, 
these provisions read as follows: 
(a) Except for a bona fide error of computation, if a credit grantor violates 
any provision of this subtitle the credit grantor may collect only the principal 
amount of the loan and may not collect any interest, costs, or other charges 
with respect to the loan.  
 
(b) In addition, a credit grantor who knowingly violates any provision of this 
subtitle shall forfeit to the borrower 3 times the amount of interest and 
charges collected in excess of that authorized by this subtitle.  
 
1983 Md. Laws, ch. 143. 
In 1990, the General Assembly amended CLEC to “clarif[y] the rights of borrowers 
and credit grantors under Subtitles 9 and 10 of Commercial Law when errors are discovered 
in certain credit agreements.”  See Senate Bill 403, Bill Analysis of Revolving and Closed 
End Credit, Corrections (1990 General Assembly) in legislative bill file for Senate Bill 
403.  The General Assembly specifically amended CL § 12-1018(a) to provide credit 
grantors a right to cure certain CLEC violations if: (1) the violation was unintentional and 
 
 
Except for a bona fide error of computation, if a lender violates any provision 
of this subtitle he may collect only the principal amount of the loan and may 
not collect any interest, costs, or other charges with respect to the loan.  In 
addition, a lender who knowingly violates any provision of this subtitle also 
shall forfeit to the borrower three times the amount of interest and charges 
collected in excess of that authorized by law.  
 
CL § 12-413.  
 
 
17 
 
in good faith; (2) within 10 days after receiving notice of the error or violation, the credit 
grantor corrects the error or violation; and (3) the credit grantor makes the borrower whole 
for all losses, including reasonable attorney’s fees and interest.  Id.; see 
CL § 12-1018(a)(3).   
Although the General Assembly amended CL § 12-1018(a) during the 1990 
Legislative Session, CL § 12-1018(b) remained unchanged in its original form.  During the 
1993 Legislative Session, the General Assembly amended CL § 12-1018 to include the 
word “fees” as an impermissible collection.  1993 Md. Laws, ch. 404.  As such, 
CL § 12-1018(b) has remained unchanged since its original enactment in 1983, with the 
exception of this one-word addition.    
  Nothing in the legislative history indicates that the General Assembly intended for 
CL § 12-1018(b) to be interpreted inconsistently with its plain meaning.  This penalty is 
distinctly separate from CL § 12-1018(a)(2), which addresses the amounts collected in 
excess of the principal loan amount.  CL § 12-1018(b) provides an additional penalty for 
credit grantors that knowingly violate CLEC, and, therefore, are liable for treble the 
amounts that were collected in violation of the subtitle.  Accordingly, assuming Santander 
knowingly collected the convenience fees alleged by Mr. Lyles in violation of CLEC, the 
appropriate calculation of damages under CL § 12-1018(b) is treble the amount of 
convenience fees collected.   
 
 
 
 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that CL § 12-1018(b) requires a credit grantor 
that is found to have knowingly violated CLEC to forfeit three times the amount of interest, 
fees, and charges collected in violation of the subtitle.   
CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW 
ANSWERED AS SET FORTH ABOVE.  
COSTS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY.