Case Title: Grosvenor v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 61, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JAMAH K. GROSVENOR, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 61, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0204003496 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: April 21, 2006 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: June 26, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 26th day of June 2006, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Jamah K. Grosvenor, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s January 6, 2006 order denying his second motion 
for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment 
of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of 
Grosvenor’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and 
affirm. 
 
2
 
(2) 
In December 2002, Grosvenor pleaded guilty to two counts of 
Robbery in the First Degree and one count of Possession of a Firearm 
During the Commission of a Felony.  He was sentenced to seven years 
incarceration at Level V, to be followed by eight years of decreasing levels 
of probation.1  Grosvenor did not file a direct appeal.  Grosvenor’s first 
postconviction motion was denied by the Superior Court.  This Court 
affirmed the Superior Court’s decision on appeal on the grounds that 
Grosvenor’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and that his counsel did 
not provide ineffective assistance in connection with the plea.2 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Grosvenor claims that: a) the State’s failure to 
arraign him violated his constitutional rights; b) his attorney coerced his co-
defendant into pleading guilty and signing a statement against him; c) his 
attorney provided ineffective assistance; and d) the Superior Court abused its 
discretion by failing to grant his motion for postconviction relief on these 
grounds.   
 
(4) 
Grosvenor’s first claim concerning the lack of an arraignment is 
procedurally barred because he failed to raise it in his first postconviction 
                                          
 
1 Two of Grosvenor’s co-defendants went to trial and each received a minimum 
mandatory term of twenty-four years in prison. 
2 Grosvenor v. State, Del. Supr., No. 141, 2004, Berger, J. (Nov. 22, 2004). 
 
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motion.3  Moreover, this Court has previously determined that Grosvenor’s 
guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.  A voluntary guilty plea constitutes a 
waiver of any alleged defects or errors occurring prior to the entry of the 
plea.4  As such, Grosvenor has waived his claim that the State’s failure to 
arraign him violated his constitutional rights.         
 
(5) 
Grosvenor’s second claim is that his attorney coerced his co-
defendant into pleading guilty and signing a statement against him.  Because 
this claim was litigated previously in Grosvenor’s first postconviction 
motion, consideration of the claim is foreclosed in this action.5  Moreover, 
Grosvenor’s attempt to bolster the claim with a recent affidavit signed by his 
co-defendant is unavailing.  The affidavit is deficient in both form and 
substance and the Superior Court was within its discretion to reject it as 
unreliable.6   
 
(6) 
Grosvenor’s third claim is that his attorney provided ineffective 
assistance.  In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
in connection with a guilty plea, a defendant must show that, but for his 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, he would not have pleaded guilty, but would 
                                          
 
3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (2). 
4 Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 311-12 (Del. 1988). 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4). 
6 Johnson v. State, 410 A.2d 1014, 1015 (Del. 1980). 
 
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have insisted on proceeding to trial.7  There is no support in the record for 
Grosvenor’s claim that he received ineffective assistance in connection with 
his guilty plea.  In exchange for his guilty plea, Grosvenor was sentenced to 
only seven years in prison.  Each of his co-defendants who went to trial 
received a twenty-four year sentence.  Grosvenor derived an enormous 
benefit from his attorney’s advice to plead guilty.  To the extent that 
Grosvenor’s specific allegations of ineffective assistance have not already 
been adjudicated in his previous motion for postconviction relief,8 we 
conclude that they are without merit.9 
 
(7) 
Grosvenor’s final claim is that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion by not granting his motion for postconviction relief.  While the 
Superior Court based its decision on grounds different from those 
enumerated here,10 it, nevertheless, correctly determined that Grosvenor’s 
claims were without merit.    
 
(8) 
It is manifest on the face of Grosvenor’s opening brief that this 
appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled 
                                          
 
7 MacDonald v. State, 778 A.2d 1064, 1074 (Del. 2001). 
8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4). 
9 Any allegations of ineffective assistance occurring prior to the entry of Grosvenor’s 
guilty plea have been waived.  Downer v. State, 543 A.2d at 311-12. 
10 Unitrin v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995). 
 
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by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is 
implicated, clearly there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice