Case Title: State v. Edward Terrell Jennings

Citation: 2002 WI 44

Docket Number: 2000AP001680-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 44 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1680-CR 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Edward Terrell Jennings,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 1, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 3, 2001 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock-Janesville 
 
JUDGE: 
John W. Roethe 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BABLITCH and BRADLEY, J.J., join dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by Gregory 
M. Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument 
by 
Margaret 
A. 
Maroney, 
assistant 
state 
public 
defender. 
 
 
2002 WI 44 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-1680-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99 CF 1829) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Edward Terrell Jennings,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 1, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Rock County, 
John W. Roethe, Circuit Court Judge.  Reversed and cause 
remanded.     
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  This is an interlocutory appeal of 
a circuit court order suppressing the defendant's custodial 
statement in which he implicated himself in a homicide.  The 
circuit court concluded that the defendant's statement was made 
after he invoked his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966).  The court's order was based primarily on 
Wentela v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 283, 290 N.W.2d 313 (1980), a 
decision of this court that the State  asserts has been 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
2 
 
effectively overruled by the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
¶2 
The court of appeals certified the case to us on the 
question of "whether the court of appeals may, must, or must not 
follow a decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court which is 
directly on point, but which appears to conflict with subsequent 
precedent from the United States Supreme Court." 
¶3 
We conclude that when confronted with a direct 
conflict between a decision of this court and a later decision 
of the United States Supreme Court on a matter of federal law, 
the court of appeals may, but is not required to, certify the 
case to us pursuant to Wis. Stat § 809.61.  If it does not, or 
if this court declines to accept certification, the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution compels adherence to 
United States Supreme Court precedent on matters of federal law, 
although it means deviating from a conflicting decision of this 
court. 
¶4 
The underlying substantive issue in the case concerns 
the sufficiency of the defendant's request for counsel during 
his custodial interrogation——more specifically, whether his 
statement, "I think maybe I need to talk to a lawyer," 
unequivocally invoked his right to counsel such that any 
subsequent statements must be suppressed.  In Wentela, 95 Wis. 
2d at 292, we held that the statement, "'I think I need an 
attorney,' or 'I think I should see an attorney,'" constituted a 
sufficient request for counsel.  In State v. Walkowiak, 183 Wis. 
2d 478, 486-87, 515 N.W.2d 863 (1994), we further held that when 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
3 
 
a suspect makes an equivocal reference to counsel——there, it was 
the question "Do you think I need an attorney?"——then "[t]he 
police must cease all interrogation, except they may attempt to 
clarify the suspect's desire for counsel."   
¶5 
The validity of both holdings——what constitutes a 
sufficient request for counsel and the obligations of the police 
when an ambiguous or equivocal request is made——was called into 
question by the Supreme Court's decision in Davis.  There, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the statement "Maybe I should talk 
to a lawyer" was equivocal and therefore not sufficient to 
invoke the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment.  Davis, 
512 U.S. at 459-62.  The Court further held that when a suspect 
makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to counsel, the police 
need neither cease questioning nor clarify the suspect's desire 
for counsel, although the Court did say that the latter "will 
often be good police practice."  Id. at 461. 
¶6 
The Supreme Court's decision in Davis means that 
Wentela and Walkowiak are no longer valid as a matter of Fifth 
Amendment law, and we therefore overrule them.  We also decline, 
in this instance, to interpret the Wisconsin Constitution's 
right against self-incrimination more broadly than the federal 
constitutional right.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit 
court's suppression order. 
I 
¶7 
On June 25, 1999, defendant Edward Jennings was 
arrested in Loves Park, Illinois, in connection with a Rock 
County, Wisconsin, homicide investigation.  After Jennings' 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
4 
 
arrest, two officers from the City of Beloit Police Department, 
Detectives Kreitzmann and Anderson, went to Loves Park to 
interview Jennings.   
¶8 
Detective 
Kreitzmann 
advised 
Jennings 
of 
his 
constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda and obtained a valid 
waiver of those rights.  Detective Kreitzmann, interviewing 
Jennings alone, began questioning him about the Rock County 
homicide.  Jennings, who is blind, initially denied any 
knowledge or involvement.  After further questioning, Jennings 
admitted that he was present at the scene when the homicide 
occurred and that he had heard three gunshots.   
¶9 
When Detective Kreitzmann asked Jennings if he would 
put the statement in writing, Jennings replied, "I think maybe I 
need to talk to a lawyer."  Detective Kreitzmann immediately 
asked Jennings, "Are you telling me you want a lawyer?"  
Jennings responded with the same statement: "I think maybe I 
need to talk to a lawyer."  Detective Kreitzmann testified that 
at that point, because he was unable to clarify whether Jennings 
was specifically asking for an attorney, and "to be on the safe 
side," 
he 
stopped 
questioning 
Jennings 
and 
left 
the 
interrogation room. 
¶10 Approximately 15 minutes later, Detective Anderson 
entered the room and began to question Jennings.  Detective 
Anderson first asked Jennings if he remembered his Miranda 
warnings.  Jennings replied that he did.  Detective Anderson 
also asked Jennings if he would be willing to speak with him.  
Jennings said that he would.  During the questioning by 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
5 
 
Detective Anderson, Jennings again placed himself at the scene 
of the crime, and implicated himself in the homicide by 
describing a confrontation between himself, the victim, and 
several other people that immediately preceded the shooting.  
Jennings did not ask for a lawyer at any time during Detective 
Anderson's questioning. 
¶11 Jennings was charged with being party to the crime of 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. §§  940.01(1) and 939.05 (1999-2000)1  Jennings moved 
to suppress the statement he made to Detective Anderson, 
claiming that it was given after he had invoked his right to 
counsel.  The Rock County Circuit Court, John W. Roethe, Judge, 
granted the motion, concluding that Jennings had unambiguously 
invoked his right to counsel, and citing Davis, Wentela, and 
State v. Long, 190 Wis. 2d 386, 526 N.W.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1994).  
The State appealed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.05(1)(d)2 and 3, 
and the court of appeals certified the case to us. 
II 
¶12 In its certification order, the court of appeals has 
essentially asked for guidance in resolving the problem of a 
direct conflict between a controlling decision of this court and 
a subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court.  The 
State and the defendant suggest a procedural solution: a rule 
requiring the court of appeals to certify to this court, 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
6 
 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61, any case that presents a 
conflict between our precedent and a subsequent decision of the 
United States Supreme Court.   
¶13 We clearly have the power to impose such a rule.  
Article VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution expressly 
confers upon 
this 
court 
superintending 
and 
administrative 
authority over the lower state courts.2  The constitutional grant 
of superintending and administrative authority "is a grant of 
power.  It is unlimited in extent.  It is indefinite in 
character."  State ex rel. Fourth National Bank of Philadelphia 
v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 611, 79 N.W. 1081 (1899).   
¶14 Article 
VII, 
Section 
3 
has 
been 
described 
as 
establishing 
"a 
duty 
of 
the 
supreme 
court 
to 
exercise . . . administrative authority to promote the efficient 
and effective operation of the state's court system."  In re 
Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 783, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984). Accordingly, 
within this administrative power and duty, is "the inherent 
power to adopt those statewide measures which are absolutely 
essential to the due administration of justice in the state."  
In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 518, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975).   
¶15 Although 
unquestionably 
broad 
and 
flexible, 
our 
superintending authority will not be invoked lightly.  In re 
                                                 
2 Article VII, Section 3, subsection 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
states: 
"The 
supreme 
court 
shall 
have 
superintending and administrative authority over all courts." 
 
 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
7 
 
Phelan, 225 Wis. 314, 321, 274 N.W. 411 (1937); see also Arneson 
v. Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 226, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996); State 
v. Kendall, 94 Wis. 2d 63, 66, 287 N.W.2d 758 (1980); McEwen v. 
Pierce County, 90 Wis. 2d 256, 269-70, 279 N.W.2d 469 (1979).  
Whether this court in a given situation will exercise its 
superintending authority is a matter of "judicial policy rather 
than one relating to the power of this court."  Phelan, 225 Wis. 
at 320.  
¶16 We decline to exercise our superintending authority to 
interpose a rule requiring certification of all cases that 
present a conflict between our precedent and subsequent United 
States Supreme Court precedent.  Requiring certification would 
interfere with the discretion of the court of appeals in its 
power to decide cases before it, including the decision whether 
or not to certify a case to this court.  See Phelan, 225 Wis. at 
320 (superintending authority generally will not be exercised to 
interfere with the discretion of another court).  
¶17 While we decline to establish a rule requiring it, 
certification will certainly be highly appropriate in a case 
such as this, in which a controlling decision of this court has 
arguably been overruled by a subsequent decision of the United 
States Supreme Court.  Only this court may "overrrule, modify or 
withdraw language from a previous [state] supreme court case."  
In re Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997); 
see also State v. Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d 428, 432, 367 N.W.2d 816 
(Ct. App. 1985). 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
8 
 
¶18 But certification need not be mandatory, because the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution governs the 
outcome of any direct conflict between state and federal supreme 
court precedent on a matter of federal law, regardless of 
whether the conflict is resolved in the court of appeals or 
here.3  All state courts, of course, are bound by the decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court on matters of federal law.   
See State v. Mechtel, 176 Wis. 2d 87, 94, 499 N.W.2d 662 (1993); 
see also United Sates ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 
(7th Cir. 1970). 
¶19 Accordingly, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
may, 
in 
its 
discretion, and pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61, certify to this 
court a case that presents a conflict between a decision of this 
court and a subsequent decision of the United States Supreme 
Court on a matter of federal law.  If it declines to do so, or 
if this court declines to accept certification of such a case, 
the court of appeals must necessarily adhere to the subsequent 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
decision, 
although 
it 
means 
deviating from the conflicting earlier decision of this court.  
                                                 
3 Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution 
states: "This constitution, and the laws of the United States 
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under the authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in 
every 
state 
shall 
be 
bound 
thereby, 
any 
thing 
in 
the 
constitution 
or 
laws 
of 
any 
state 
to 
the 
contrary 
notwithstanding." 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
9 
 
The court of appeals must not follow a decision of this court on 
a matter of federal law if it conflicts with a subsequent 
controlling decision of the United States Supreme Court.4  See 
e.g., Long, 190 Wis. 2d at 396; State v. Whitaker, 167 Wis. 2d 
247, 261, 481 N.W.2d 649 (Ct. App. 1992). 
III 
¶20 The substantive issue in this case concerns the 
sufficiency of the defendant's invocation of his right to 
counsel mid-way through his custodial interrogation.  This is a 
question of constitutional fact that we review under a two-part 
standard.  State v. Henderson, 2001 WI 97, ¶16, 245 Wis. 2d 345, 
629 N.W.2d 613.  We uphold the circuit court's findings of 
historical 
or 
evidentiary 
fact 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous.  Id.  We review independently the lower court's 
application of constitutional principles to those evidentiary 
facts.  Id. 
¶21 In State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 570 N.W.2d 384 
(1997), a Sixth Amendment right to counsel case, we discussed 
the rationale for the two-part standard of review applicable to 
questions of constitutional fact: 
 
Questions of constitutional fact are sometimes 
referred to as mixed questions of fact and law, 
requiring the court to determine what happened and 
                                                 
4 The court of appeals, like this court, independently 
determines state constitutional claims.  See infra ¶¶37-42. 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
10 
 
whether the facts found fulfill a particular legal 
standard.  Ordinarily, when reviewing a mixed question 
of fact and law, appellate courts engage in a two-part 
inquiry.  The first inquiry relates to the circuit 
court's findings of fact.  Neither the court of 
appeals nor this court will reverse a circuit court's 
findings of historical or evidentiary fact unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  The second inquiry relates to 
the question whether the historical or evidentiary 
facts satisfy the relevant constitutional standard.  
Such an inquiry is made by this court independent of 
the circuit court and court of appeals.  However, in 
deciding whether the facts satisfy the constitutional 
standard this court may benefit from and draw upon the 
reasoning of the circuit court and court of appeals 
and may draw upon the circuit court's observational 
advantage.  Nevertheless, this court independently 
measures the facts against a uniform constitutional 
standard. 
 
 
The principal reason for independent appellate 
review of matters of constitutional fact is to provide 
uniformity in constitutional decision making.  In 
applying the skeletal constitutional rule, appellate 
courts flesh out the rule and provide guidance to 
litigants, lawyers, and trial and appellate courts.  
Id. at 165-66 (footnotes omitted). 
¶22 There is no dispute in this case that Jennings was 
properly advised of his rights under Miranda and that he 
voluntarily waived his right to remain silent and agreed to be 
questioned by Beloit Police Detectives Kreitzmann and Anderson 
without an attorney present.  The central evidentiary findings 
relevant to the suppression motion concern the circumstances 
surrounding Jennings' mid-interrogation statement to Detective 
Kreitzmann, "I think maybe I need to talk to a lawyer." 
¶23 According to the circuit court's written factual 
findings, Jennings made the reference to a lawyer after 
Detective Kreitzmann asked if he would be willing to put his 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
11 
 
verbal statement in writing.  When Jennings said, "I think maybe 
I need to talk to a lawyer," Detective Kreitzmann "tried to 
clarify if the defendant was asking for an attorney, and could 
never get the defendant to give a definitive yes or no answer as 
to whether he wanted an attorney."  Detective Kreitzmann then 
terminated the interrogation "because he decided to take the 
safe route."  Finally, "about fifteen minutes later, Detective 
Anderson began questioning the defendant."  These findings of 
historical fact are not clearly erroneous (no one argues that 
they are), and we therefore uphold them. 
¶24 The real dispute here is whether these historical 
facts are sufficient to establish an unequivocal request for 
counsel such that Jennings' subsequent statements to Detective 
Anderson must be suppressed.  Applying Davis, Wentela and Long, 
the circuit court concluded that Jennings' statement, "I think 
maybe I need to talk to a lawyer," was sufficient to constitute 
an unambiguous request for counsel. 
¶25 Jennings 
characterizes 
this 
as 
a 
finding 
of 
evidentiary or historical fact entitled to deference.  It is 
not.  The legal sufficiency of a defendant's invocation of the 
right to counsel during a custodial interrogation is determined 
by the application of a constitutional standard to historical 
facts.  As noted above, an appellate court independently 
measures the historical facts against a uniform constitutional 
standard, benefiting from, but not deferring to, the circuit 
court's decision.  See e.g., Long, 190 Wis. 2d at 393-97; State 
v. Esser, 166 Wis. 2d 897, 904, 480 N.W.2d 541 (Ct. App. 1992). 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
12 
 
¶26 The constitutional standards applicable here derive 
from Miranda, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and 
Davis.  In Miranda,5 the United States Supreme Court recognized 
the right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation 
to safeguard the right against compulsory self-incrimination 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
467-74.  In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that the police must 
immediately cease questioning a suspect who clearly invokes the 
Miranda 
right 
to 
counsel 
at 
any 
point 
during 
custodial 
interrogation.  Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.  The Court in 
Edwards concluded that "it is inconsistent with Miranda and its 
progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate 
an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to 
counsel."  Id. at 485. 
¶27 While the Supreme Court in Edwards established a 
bright-line, no-further-questioning rule applicable to clear and 
unequivocal requests for counsel during custodial interrogation, 
it did not address the subject of requests for counsel that were 
not so clear and unequivocal.  Thirteen years later it did so, 
in Davis. 
¶28 The case arose in the context of a Navy court martial.  
Robert Davis was under investigation by the Naval Investigative 
Service (NIS) for the beating death of another sailor.  Davis, 
                                                 
5 The United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed 
that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), established a 
federal constitutional rule governing the admissibility of 
custodial statements in both state and federal courts under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  See, Dickerson v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 428, 431 (2000). 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
13 
 
512 U.S. at 454.  He was interviewed by NIS agents and, after 
being advised of his rights consistent with Miranda and the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, waived his right to remain 
silent and his right to counsel.  Id. at 454-55.  After about an 
hour and a half of questioning he said, "Maybe I should talk to 
a lawyer." Id. at 455. The NIS investigators attempted to 
clarify Davis's statement, and Davis responded, "No, I'm not 
asking for a lawyer."  Id.  Davis then continued to answer 
questions for about another hour.  Id.  He then said, "I think I 
want a lawyer before I say anything else."  Id.  The NIS agents 
then stopped all questioning.  Id. 
¶29 Davis moved to suppress his statement.  The military 
judge denied the motion, Davis was convicted, and both the Navy-
Marine Corps Court of Military Review and the Court of Military 
Appeals affirmed.  Id. at 455-56.  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari 
and 
held 
that 
a 
suspect 
must 
clearly 
and 
unambiguously request counsel in order for the Edwards rule to 
apply.  Id. at 458-59.  "If a suspect makes a reference to an 
attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable 
officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only 
that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our 
precedents do not require the cessation of questioning."  Id. at 
459. 
¶30 The Supreme Court emphasized that the inquiry is an 
objective one.  Id.  "Although a suspect need not 'speak with 
the discrimination of an Oxford don,' post, at 476 (Souter, J., 
concurring in judgment), he must articulate his desire to have 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
14 
 
counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police 
officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to 
be a request for an attorney."  Id.   Any lower standard "'would 
transform 
the 
Miranda 
safeguards 
into 
wholly 
irrational 
obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity.'"  Id. at 
460 (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975)).  
¶31 The Supreme Court declined to extend Edwards to 
require officers to stop an interrogation when a suspect makes 
any reference to an attorney.  Davis, 512 U.S. at 459-60.  In 
addition, the Supreme Court refused to adopt a requirement that 
officers must ask clarifying questions to resolve an ambiguous 
reference to counsel.  Id. at 461.  "[W]hen a suspect makes an 
ambiguous or equivocal statement it will often be good police 
practice for the interviewing officers to clarify whether or not 
he actually wants an attorney."  Id.  But the Court was 
"unwilling to create a third layer of prophylaxis to prevent 
police questioning when the suspect might want a lawyer.  Unless 
the suspect actually requests an attorney, questioning may 
continue."  Id.  Davis's statement, "Maybe I should talk to a 
lawyer," was not a clear and unequivocal request for counsel, 
and his conviction was affirmed.  Id. at 462.     
¶32 The two holdings of Davis——that officers need neither 
stop an interrogation nor ask clarifying questions when a 
suspect makes an equivocal request for counsel——effectively 
overrule two prior decisions of this court, at least as a matter 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
15 
 
of federal constitutional law.6  In Wentela, a post-Miranda, pre-
Edwards case, we held that the defendant's statement "I think I 
need an attorney" or "I think I should see an attorney" 
constituted a sufficient request for counsel.  Wentela, 95 Wis. 
2d at 292.  We declined, however, to adopt a per se rule 
requiring the police to cease questioning a suspect who invokes 
his right to counsel, borrowing instead from the more flexible 
approach of Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, a "right to remain 
silent" case.  Wentela, 95 Wis. 2d at 293-95; see also Leach v. 
State, 83 Wis. 2d 199, 265 N.W.2d (1978). 
¶33 A year after Wentela was decided, Edwards established 
the bright-line rule requiring cessation of questioning when a 
suspect clearly requests counsel, effectively supplanting the 
latter holding of Wentela.  Similarly, the former holding of 
Wentela——that the statement "I think I need an attorney" or "I 
think I should see an attorney" is sufficient to invoke the 
right to counsel——has  been overruled by the conclusion in Davis 
                                                 
6 The dissent notes several times that Davis v. United 
States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) was decided by a 5-4 vote, as if to 
suggest that the margin by which a divided high court decides a 
case has some legal significance. The dissent apparently 
concedes 
that 
Davis is 
binding as 
a 
matter 
of federal 
constitutional law, but seems to suggest that the one-vote 
margin lends support for interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution 
to 
require 
greater 
protection 
for 
suspects 
in 
custodial 
interrogations.  Dissent at ¶¶52-53.  While the Wisconsin 
Constitution may indeed in particular instances provide greater 
protection for individual rights than its federal counterpart 
(see infra Part IV), the margin by which the United States 
Supreme Court decides the corresponding federal constitutional 
issue is irrelevant to our analysis of whether the state 
constitution requires more. 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
16 
 
that the nearly identical statement, "Maybe I should talk to a 
lawyer" is equivocal and therefore  insufficient  for purposes 
of the Edwards rule.  Accordingly, based upon Edwards and Davis, 
we hereby expressly overrule Wentela in its entirety. 
¶34 Davis also undermines our decision in Walkowiak.  
There, we held that the defendant's statement, "Do you think I 
need an attorney?" was equivocal and therefore insufficient to 
invoke the right to counsel.  Walkowiak, 183 Wis. 2d at 479.  We 
then adopted a rule that when a suspect makes an equivocal or 
ambiguous reference to counsel, "[t]he police must cease all 
interrogation, except they may attempt to clarify the suspect's 
desire for counsel.  Interrogation may not begin anew until the 
ambiguity is resolved."  Id. at 486-87. 
¶35 Our decision in Walkowiak was tethered to the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments and Miranda/Edwards jurisprudence up 
to that point.  Davis was decided a month later.  The following 
year, we acknowledged the conflict between Walkowiak and Davis, 
but did not explicitly overrule Walkowiak.7  See State v. Jones, 
192 Wis. 2d 78, 95 n.4, 532 N.W.2d 79 (1995).  We now do so.    
¶36 Applying Davis, we conclude that Jennings' statement 
to Detective Kreitzmann, "I think maybe I need to talk to a 
lawyer," was substantially equivalent to Davis's statement, 
                                                 
7 See State v. Jones, 192 Wis. 2d 78, 111, 532 N.W.2d 79 
(1995) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) ("The Supremacy Clause 
dictates 
that 
the 
Davis 
interpretation 
of 
the 
federal 
constitution is binding on all courts of this state.  Thus, 
although the majority neglects to acknowledge it, Walkowiak has 
been superseded by Davis."). 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
17 
 
"Maybe I should talk to a lawyer."  As such, it was "ambiguous 
or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the 
circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might 
be invoking the right to counsel."  Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.  
Therefore, Jennings' statement was insufficient to invoke his 
right to counsel under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and 
the officers were not required to cease questioning him.  Nor 
were they required to clarify his statement.  Accordingly, there 
is no federal constitutional impediment to the admission of 
Jennings' statement to Detective Anderson. 
IV 
¶37 Finally, we are invited to interpret the Wisconsin 
Constitution's right against self-incrimination more broadly 
than the federal right, and establish a state constitutional 
rule requiring the police to clarify ambiguous references to 
counsel 
during 
custodial 
interrogations. 
This 
implicates 
"[i]ssues of federalism and sovereignty," since "[t]he holdings 
of the United States Supreme Court do 'not affect the State's 
power to impose higher standards . . . than required by the 
Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so.'"  State v. Ward, 
2000 WI 3, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 750, 604 N.W.2d 517 (quoting Cooper 
v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)). 
¶38 We have said that "[t]his court . . . will not be 
bound by the minimums which are imposed by the Supreme Court of 
the United States if it is the judgment of this court that the 
Constitution of Wisconsin and the laws of this state require 
that greater protection of citizens' liberties ought to be 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
18 
 
afforded."  State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 172, 254 N.W.2d 210 
(1977). 
 
We 
have 
further 
recognized 
that 
it 
is 
"our 
responsibility to examine the State Constitution independently.  
This duty exists even though our conclusions in a given case may 
not differ from those reached by the [United States] Supreme 
Court when it interprets" the federal constitution.  Ward, 2000 
WI 3, ¶59. 
¶39 However, we have also noted that any decision to 
engage in an upward departure from the federal constitutional 
standards adopted by the United States Supreme Court for 
purposes of our own state constitutional law must itself be 
grounded in requirements found in the state constitution or 
laws.  State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 180-81, 593 N.W.2d 427 
(1999).  "Where . . . the language of the provision in the state 
constitution is 'virtually identical' to that of the federal 
provision or where no difference in intent is discernible, 
Wisconsin courts have normally construed the state constitution 
consistent with the United States Supreme Court's construction 
of the federal constitution."  Id. (citing State v. Tompkins, 
144 Wis. 2d 116, 133, 423 N.W.2d 823 (1988)).  
¶40 The state constitutional right against compulsory 
self-incrimination is textually almost identical to its federal 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
19 
 
counterpart.8  In Agnello, we concluded that because the two 
provisions were "nearly identical," the state constitution did 
not require that the voluntariness of a confession be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt when the United States Supreme Court 
had 
required 
only 
the 
lower 
preponderance 
standard 
for 
determining compliance with Miranda.  Id. at 181-82.     
¶41 Similarly, in State v. Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226, 259-
60, 421 N.W.2d 77 (1988), we declined to expand our state 
constitutional jurisprudence beyond the requirements of the 
federal constitution on the issue of a prosecutor's cross-
examination and closing argument comment on a defendant's post-
arrest silence when a defendant testifies in his own defense:   
 
The defendant further argues that art. I, sec. 8 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, which protects against 
self-incrimination, 
might 
be 
interpreted 
more 
liberally than federal fifth amendment provisions to 
shield 
his 
silence. 
 
In 
the 
past, 
our 
cases 
interpreting 
the 
right 
to 
remain 
silent 
have 
paralleled federal analysis used for the United States 
Constitution 
and 
Amendments. . . . Further, 
in 
comparing 
the 
language 
of 
the 
federal 
self-
incrimination provision with that of the Wisconsin 
section, we note the federal amendment uses the word 
"shall," while the Wisconsin Constitution uses the 
word, "may."  While both protect against self-
incrimination there can be no logical argument that 
                                                 
8 Article I, Section 8, subsection (1) provides: "No person 
may be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process 
of law, and no person for the same offense may be put twice in 
jeopardy of punishment, nor may be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself or herself."  The Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in 
relevant part, "No person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
20 
 
the state constitutional provision creates a broader 
right since the language of the Wisconsin Constitution 
is certainly no stronger than that used in the United 
States Constitution.  As a result, we find no basis 
for interpreting state constitutional language beyond 
the 
articulated 
scope 
of 
federal 
constitutional 
guarantees in this case. 
Id. at 259-60 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
¶42 The same analysis applies here.  We cannot discover 
any 
meaningful 
difference 
between 
the 
state 
and 
federal 
constitutional protections against compulsory self-incrimination 
that would justify or require a "third layer of prophylaxis" 
that the United States Supreme Court has found unnecessary.  We 
agree with Justice O'Connor's observation in Davis that the 
police are well-advised to clarify a suspect's ambiguous 
reference to counsel, in order to "protect the rights of the 
suspect by ensuring that he gets an attorney if he wants one, 
and . . . minimize the chance of a confession being suppressed 
due to subsequent judicial second-guessing. . . . "  Davis, 512 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
21 
 
U.S. at 461.  We decline, however, to impose a clarification 
requirement as a matter of state constitutional law.9  
V 
¶43 Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeals 
may, but need not necessarily, certify to this court a case that 
presents a direct conflict between a decision of this court and 
a subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court on a 
matter of federal law.  The Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution requires all state courts to adhere to 
United States Supreme Court precedent on matters of federal law, 
although it means deviating from a conflicting decision of this 
court.  We overrule both Wentela and Walkowiak in light of 
Davis, and decline to adopt a state constitutional rule 
requiring the police to cease an interrogation and clarify a 
                                                 
9 The dissent would invoke our superintending authority to 
impose 
a 
requirement 
that 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
ask 
clarifying 
questions 
when 
a 
suspect 
makes 
an 
equivocal  
reference to counsel.  Dissent at ¶55.  We have superintending 
authority over the lower courts, not over law enforcement.  See, 
Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(1), supra, at n.2.  On the substantive 
state constitutional question, the dissent relies entirely on 
Carpenter v. Dane Co., 9 Wis. 249 (1859), which interpreted the 
state constitutional right to counsel to include the right to 
counsel at public expense for indigent criminal defendants.  
Dissent at ¶62.  
The 
dissent suggests that 
this 
state 
constitutional right to counsel at trial would be rendered 
meaningless if law enforcement officers are not required to 
clarify a suspect's equivocal reference to counsel during 
custodial interrogation.  Dissent at ¶67.  The premise seems to 
be 
that 
a 
confession 
assures 
conviction 
and 
therefore 
eviscerates the right to counsel at trial.  This analysis is a 
little indirect, and takes the focus off the constitutional 
right at issue here, the right against self-incrimination. 
No. 
00-1680-CR   
 
22 
 
suspect's equivocal or ambiguous reference to counsel, but note 
that it is better practice for the police to do so. 
¶44 Because Jennings' statement to Detective Kreitzmann, 
"I think maybe I need to talk to a lawyer," was equivocal under 
Davis and therefore insufficient to invoke his right to counsel 
under 
Edwards 
and 
Miranda, 
the 
officers 
were 
not 
constitutionally required to stop questioning him, nor were they 
required to clarify his intentions regarding counsel.  We 
reverse the circuit court's order granting Jennings' suppression 
motion, and remand for further proceedings.      
By the Court.—The order of the Rock County Circuit Court is 
reversed and the cause is remanded.   
 
 
 
No.  00-1680-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶45 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
Relying on a five-justice opinion in Davis v. United States, 512 
U.S. 452 (1994), this court's majority opinion disregards 
Wisconsin jurisprudence dating back to 1859,10 and overrules two 
Wisconsin cases.11   
¶46 The majority opinion holds that when a suspect makes 
an 
equivocal 
request 
for 
an 
attorney 
during 
custodial 
questioning, 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
can 
continue 
the 
questioning as if the suspect had said nothing about an 
attorney. 
¶47 I dissent for three reasons:  The majority opinion 
contravenes concepts of 
federalism 
and 
state 
sovereignty; 
Wisconsin's rule requiring law enforcement officers to clarify a 
suspect's equivocal request for an attorney is the prudent rule; 
and Wisconsin constitutional jurisprudence supports interpreting 
the Wisconsin Constitution as requiring law enforcement officers 
to clarify a suspect's equivocal request for an attorney.  I 
cannot join an opinion that undermines the  interests of law 
enforcement to safeguard confessions from suppression by a 
court.  I cannot join an opinion that jeopardizes the right of a 
suspect to an attorney and a full and fair trial.  And I cannot 
join an opinion that ignores more than 140 years of Wisconsin 
law. 
 
                                                 
10 Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 249 (1859). 
11 Wentala v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 283, 290 N.W.2d 313 (1980); 
State v. Walkowiak, 183 Wis. 2d 478, 515 N.W.2d 863 (1994). 
No.  00-1680-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
I 
¶48 The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that the 
Miranda safeguards were not intended to create a constitutional 
straitjacket hindering state efforts at reform.  Rather, the 
Court encouraged states to "continue their laudable search for 
increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the 
individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal 
laws."12    
¶49 Under our system of federalism and state sovereignty, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has tossed the ball back to each state 
court to determine whether the state should require, as a matter 
of state constitutional law or as a matter of a state supreme 
court's superintending authority, that law enforcement officers 
clarify a suspect's equivocal request for an attorney.  This 
court has, in my opinion, now fumbled that ball. 
 
II 
¶50 The Wisconsin rule requiring law enforcement officers 
to clarify a suspect's equivocal request for an attorney is 
generally accepted as the prudent rule to protect suspects who 
do not have a confident command of the English language or do 
not assert themselves.13   
¶51 In Davis, during custodial interrogation the suspect 
said "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer."  The federal officers in 
                                                 
12 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
13 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 469-470, 470 n.4 
(1994) (J. Souter, concurring in the judgment). 
No.  00-1680-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
Davis questioned the suspect to clarify whether he wanted an 
attorney.  The suspect then unequivocally stated that he was not 
asking for an attorney.  The questioning continued.  The suspect 
argued before the U.S. Supreme Court that questioning should 
have stopped at his equivocal request for an attorney.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected the suspect's argument and held that 
questioning did not have to cease at the equivocal request. 
¶52 The five-justice majority in Davis declared, in what 
would probably ordinarily be labeled dicta, that they were not 
willing to impose a federal constitutional requirement that a 
law enforcement officer must clarify a suspect's equivocal 
request for an attorney before continuing the questioning.  The 
four-justice opinion concurring in the judgment concluded that 
to 
ensure 
constitutional 
rights 
clarification 
by 
a 
law 
enforcement officer should be required.14  
¶53 In further dicta, the five-justice majority strongly 
advocated that law enforcement officers clarify a suspect's 
equivocal request for an attorney, stating that "it will often 
be good police practice for the interviewing officers to clarify 
whether or not [a suspect] actually wants an attorney."15  The 
majority opinion in the present case similarly opines.  See 
majority opinion at ¶42. 
                                                 
14 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 466 (1994) 
(Justices Souter, Blackmun, Stevens and Ginsburg concurring in 
the judgment). 
15 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994). 
No.  00-1680-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶54 The majority opinion cites no authority for the 
proposition that it is unwise for law enforcement officers to 
ask clarifying questions.  Indeed, the authors of the seminal 
work on law enforcement interrogation procedure stated that in 
light of Davis, the "prudent course" for an interrogator to 
follow after receiving a suspect's equivocal request for an 
attorney is to clarify the suspect's desires by simply asking 
whether the suspect wants an attorney.16   
¶55 I conclude that it is prudent, as a matter of our 
superintending authority,17 for this court to require this good 
practice for the admission of evidence obtained at the custodial 
interrogation.  As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Davis, 
the practice of clarifying the suspect's equivocal request for 
an 
attorney 
protects 
the 
suspect's 
constitutional 
rights 
encompassed in a full and fair trial, assists law enforcement, 
and ensures the fair administration of justice. 
¶56 The practice of clarifying the suspect's equivocal 
request for an attorney will "help protect the rights of the 
                                                 
16 Fred E. Imbau, John E. Reid, Joseph P. Buckley, and Brian 
C. Jayne, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 499 (4th ed. 
2001). 
This text has been described as "written for the purpose of 
explaining to law enforcement officers the strategies of 
interrogation and the applicable law."  Grace F. Ashikawa, R. v. 
Brydges: The Inadequacy of Miranda and A Proposal to Adopt 
Canada's Rule Calling for the Right for Immediate Free Counsel, 
3 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 245 (1996). 
17 See Wis.Const. art. VII, § 3(1); State v. Anderson, 2002 
WI 7, ¶29, n.12, 249 Wis. 2d 586, 638 N.W.2d 301 (discussing 
superintending authority).  
No.  00-1680-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
suspect by ensuring that he gets an attorney if he wants one," 
declared the Davis court.18 
¶57 Clarifying the suspect's equivocal request for an 
attorney, declared the Davis court, also "will minimize the 
chance of a confession being suppressed due to subsequent 
judicial second-guessing as to the meaning of the suspect's 
statement regarding counsel."19  Abandoning the rule regarding 
clarification simply increases the chances that a court will 
later suppress a confession.20 
¶58 Thus the rule adopted by the majority opinion today 
puts law enforcement officers at their peril when a suspect has 
made what might appear to be an equivocal request for an 
attorney. 
 
Continuing 
questioning 
without 
clarifying 
the 
suspect's request jeopardizes the admission of a confession or 
other evidence.   
¶59 Because the Davis rule places law enforcement officers 
in this predicament and endangers a suspect's constitutional 
rights, courts have greeted the Davis decision "with less than 
total enthusiasm," according to a leading text in criminal 
procedure that is often cited by this court.21  Indeed some state 
                                                 
18 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994).  
Clarifying questions are not difficult to administer. See State 
v. 
Walkowiak, 
183 
Wis. 2d 478, 
494-495, 
515 
N.W.2d 863 
(1994)(Abrahamson, J. concurring and dissenting). 
19 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994). 
20 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994). 
21 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, & Nancy J. King, 
Criminal Procedure § 6.9(g) at 615, n.170 (2d ed. 1999). 
No.  00-1680-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
courts, including the supreme court of our neighboring state of 
Minnesota, have rejected the Davis rule.22 
¶60 Since 1994, Wisconsin law has required that law 
enforcement officers clarify an equivocal request for an 
attorney if questioning is to continue.23  This rule of law has 
apparently worked well in Wisconsin.  The State does not claim 
that the rule has created any problems for law enforcement 
officers 
or 
that 
the 
rule 
has 
interfered 
with 
criminal 
investigations.  We ought not to abandon our prudent rule in 
favor of a problematic rule such as the one adopted by the 
majority opinion. 
 
III 
                                                                                                                                                             
Another commentator stated that "[a]lready several states' 
highest courts have chosen to circumvent Davis and retain their 
old rules.  The confusion and the split among lower courts that 
existed before Davis has returned, albeit to a somewhat lesser 
degree."  Susan L. Ross, Davis v. United States: The Ambiguous 
Request for Counsel, 30 New Eng. L. Rev. 941, 990 (1996). 
22 See, e.g., State v. Hannon, 636 N.W.2d 796, 804 (Minn. 
2001) (holding Minnesota constitution requires that when an 
accused makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement that can 
reasonably be interpreted as a request for an attorney, 
questioning must stop except for narrow questions to clarify the 
suspect's intentions); State v. Risk, 598 N.W.2d 642, 649 (Minn. 
1999) (same); Hawaii v. Hoey, 881 P.2d 504 (Haw. 1994) (adopting 
Justice Souter's reasoning in the concurring opinion in Davis; 
Hawaii's constitution requires that law enforcement officers 
either 
cease 
all 
questioning 
or 
seek 
non-substantive 
clarification when a suspect makes equivocal request for an 
attorney during custodial interrogation). 
23 State 
v. 
Walkowiak, 
183 
Wis. 2d 478, 
486-87, 
515 
N.W.2d 863 (1994). 
No.  00-1680-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶61 Finally, 
more 
than 
140 
years 
of 
Wisconsin 
constitutional jurisprudence supports interpreting the Wisconsin 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, Article I, 
Section 8, to require law enforcement officers to clarify a 
suspect's equivocal request for an attorney during custodial 
interrogation.  Bounded only by the federal Supremacy Clause, 
the Wisconsin Constitution stands as our state's primary source 
of law.  This court is the final interpreter of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  We perform this role with an understanding of the 
unique experience of Wisconsin law. 
¶62 The majority opinion ignores Wisconsin jurisprudence 
by ignoring the state constitutional rights to a full and fair 
trial which rest, according to the Carpenter case, on the right 
to an attorney and the interaction of that right with the 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.  
¶63 The 
majority 
opinion 
reaches 
its 
conclusion 
by 
reasoning as follows: 
 
1. The majority opinion states that the privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination is almost identical in the 
texts of the federal and Wisconsin constitutions.  I agree.  
 
2. The majority opinion states that the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court has ordinarily, but not always, construed the 
Wisconsin Constitution consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's 
construction of the U.S. Constitution.  I agree. 
 
3. The majority opinion states that no basis exists to 
interpret the language of the Wisconsin Constitution on the 
No.  00-1680-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
privilege against self-incrimination as creating guarantees 
beyond the guarantees under the U.S. Constitution.  I disagree.  
¶64 The majority opinion errs because it ignores our own 
state's 
constitutional 
history 
that 
provides 
a 
basis 
to 
interpret 
the 
Wisconsin 
constitutional 
provision 
on 
the 
privilege against self-incrimination beyond the scope of the 
U.S. Constitution.  The majority opinion fails to examine 
Wisconsin's history of protecting the state constitutional right 
to an attorney as the means of ensuring a full and fair trial 
and the nexus between the right to an attorney at trial and the 
state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.  The 
majority opinion has forgotten the admonition of Justice Smith 
in 1855 urging this court to construe its own state constitution 
to ascertain its true intent and meaning.  "The people then made 
this constitution, and adopted it as their primary law.  The 
people of other states made for themselves respectively, 
constitutions which are construed by their own appropriate 
functionaries.  Let them construe theirs——let us construe, and 
stand by ours."24  
¶65 Wisconsin 
has 
a 
long 
and 
cherished 
history 
of 
protecting an accused's right to an attorney under the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  In 1859, eleven years after statehood, this court 
declared in Carpenter v. Dane County25 that an accused has a 
fundamental 
right 
to 
an 
attorney 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
                                                 
24 Attorney General ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567, 
785 (1855). 
25 9 Wis. 249 (1859). 
No.  00-1680-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
Constitution and required counties to appoint an attorney for 
indigent felons at government expense.  Our court reached this 
conclusion one hundred and four years before the U.S. Supreme 
Court recognized a similar federal constitutional right to an 
attorney in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).   
¶66 Our 
court 
in 
Carpenter 
reasoned 
that 
Wisconsin 
constitutional rights to a full and fair trial such as "to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him; to 
meet the witnesses face to face; to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, etc." were 
meaningless when an accused did not have the ability to exercise 
those rights by employing an attorney.  The court stated: 
 
And would it not be a little like mockery to secure to 
a pauper these solemn constitutional guaranties for a 
fair and full trial of the matters with which he was 
charged, and yet say to him when on trial, that he 
must employ his own counsel, who could alone render 
these guaranties of any real permanent value to him.  
 
 . . . . 
 
But surely the citizens of a county are vitally more 
interested in saving an innocent man from unmerited 
punishment than in conviction of a guilty one. 
 
 . . . . 
 
Why this great solicitude to secure him a fair trial 
if he cannot have the benefit of counsel?26 
 
¶67 Similar 
reasoning 
applies 
in 
the 
present 
case.  
According 
to 
Carpenter, 
to 
protect 
an 
accused's 
state 
constitutional guarantees for a full and fair trial, a suspect 
                                                 
26 Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 249, 251-52 (1859).  
No.  00-1680-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
is given an attorney at trial at government expense.  Following 
the reasoning in Carpenter, the state constitutional guarantees 
for a fair and full trial and an attorney at trial would be 
hollow rights if a conviction at trial is already assured 
because the suspect incriminates himself or herself during 
custodial questioning.27  Thus a suspect is given the right to an 
attorney during custodial questioning to help ensure that an 
accused gets the benefit of the constitutional guarantee against 
self-incrimination.28  A suspect's right to an attorney at 
custodial questioning to protect the privilege against self-
incrimination is thus intricately intertwined with an accused's 
state constitutional right to a full and fair trial and a 
meaningful state constitutional right to an attorney at trial.   
¶68 The state constitutional history protecting a full and 
fair trial by granting a meaningful right to an attorney is over 
140 years old.  In keeping with this history, the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
guarantee 
against 
self-incrimination 
should 
therefore be interpreted to require a clarifying question when a 
suspect makes an equivocal request for an attorney during 
custodial questioning.  A clarifying question ensures that a 
suspect who wants an attorney gets an attorney at custodial 
                                                 
27 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487 (1964). 
28 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979); Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 
U.S. 478, 487-88 (1964).   
No.  00-1680-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
questioning and thus protects a meaningful right to an attorney 
at trial and a meaningful fair and full trial.  In interpreting 
the Wisconsin Constitution in this way, this court would 
appropriately 
heed 
Wisconsin's 
long-standing 
state 
constitutional 
history 
of 
guaranteeing 
an 
accused 
the 
constitutional rights guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶69 The gamesmanship of ignoring a suspect's statements 
regarding 
an 
attorney 
during custodial 
questioning 
merely 
invites the public to view the behavior of law enforcement 
officers as marked by trickery and deceit and to view Wisconsin 
constitutional 
guarantees 
to 
the 
criminally 
accused 
with 
cynicism.  The result is a loss of public trust and confidence 
in law enforcement, the rule of law, and the courts, thereby 
undermining the credibility of the legal system itself. 
¶70 In order for law enforcement and the courts to be 
successful in carrying out their responsibilities, they must 
have the cooperation, trust, and confidence of the public.  The 
majority opinion undermines that trust and confidence, ignores 
Wisconsin jurisprudence, and betrays Wisconsin's constitutional 
guarantees.  Therefore, I dissent. 
¶71 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this opinion. 
 
No.  00-1680-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1