Case Title: Sprenger v. PSC

Citation: 400 Md. 1

Docket Number: 125/06

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Paul C. Sprenger v. The Public Service Commission of Maryland, No. 125, September Term
2006.
Headnote:  This case is the second of two cases to reach the Court of Appeals challenging
the process by which the Public Service Commission approved the construction of a wind
turbine facility in Garrett County Maryland.  In this case, the Court of Appeals determined
that the Circuit Court for Garrett County was correct in dismissing an action for declaratory
relief because the General Assembly provided specific remedies to resolve this particular
type of  case, petitioners did not exhaust those remedies, and the petition for declaratory
relief was duplicitous litigation.  The Court also determined that notice by advertising in a
newspaper of general circulation was appropriate under the language of the relevant statutes.
Circuit Court for Garret County
Case # 11-C-05-00898
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 125
September Term 2006
Paul C. Sprenger, et al.
v.
The Public Service Commission of
Maryland, et al.
Raker
Cathell
Harrell
Greene
Eldridge, John C.
    (Retired specially assigned)
Wilner, Alan M.
 
     (Retired specially assigned)
Bloom, Theodore G.
     (Retired specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Raker, Harrell and Eldridge, JJ., concur
Filed:   June 21, 2007
1 In addition to Sprenger and Harvey, Russell W. Bounds, Eric Tribbey, and Paul
Roderick were also plaintiffs before the Circuit Court for Garrett County and appellants
before the Court of Special Appeals.  Only Sprenger and Harvey sought review by this Court
on the outcome of the action for declaratory relief filed in the Circuit Court for Garrett
County.
This case arises from the approval by the Public Service Commission (the
Commission) of a plan of Clipper Windpower (“Clipper”), to construct the Allegheny
Heights Windpower Facility (the “Facility”) in Garrett County, Maryland.  Paul C. Sprenger
and Rebecca Harvey,1 petitioners, filed an action for declaratory relief in the Circuit Court
for Garrett County, asking that court to rescind two Commission orders.  The first order
approved Clipper’s plan to build the Facility, and the second denied a request for rehearing
on the approval of the Facility.  The Circuit Court for Garrett County denied petitioners’
action for declaratory relief, and they appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  In a reported
opinion, that court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court.  Sprenger v. Public Service
Comm’n, 171 Md. App. 444, 910 A.2d 544 (2006).  This Court granted certiorari to consider
the following questions:
“I.
IS AN INTERESTED PERSON WHO IS ADVERSELY
IMPACTED BY AN ORDER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
ENTITLED TO BRING AN ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IF
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION FAILS TO PROVIDE REQUIRED
NOTICE AND THE TIME TO FILE AN APPEAL FROM THE PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION ORDER HAS EXPIRED?
“II.
DOES A CIRCUIT COURT HAVE JURISDICTION TO
CONSIDER AND TRY THE SAME ISSUES RAISED BUT NOT TRIED IN
ANOTHER CIRCUIT COURT IN AN ACTION DISMISSED AS
UNTIMELY IF THE ISSUE OF TIMELINESS, NOT THE LACK OF
NOTICE ISSUE RAISED IN BOTH CASES, IS PENDING IN AN
APPELLATE COURT?”
Sprenger v. Public Service Comm’n, 396 Md. 524, 914 A.2d 768 (2007).  We answer the first
2 It is axiomatic that we need not answer the second question presented because our
holding, under the first question presented, that petitioners are not entitled to bring an action
for declaratory relief, turns the second question into a hypothetical question.  As a general
rule, this Court does not answer hypothetical questions.
3 Clipper v. Sprenger, __ Md. __(2007) (No. 136, September Term, 2005) (filed June
8, 2007).
4 The parties do not dispute that the notices appeared in either of the newspapers nor
do they dispute that both of the newspapers are papers of general circulation in Garrett
County.
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question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.2
I. Facts
This case is the second of two cases, both challenging the process by which the
Facility was approved, to reach this Court .  As our decision in this case, the second one, is
inexorably linked to the first case, we shall summarize the background of that case before
reviewing the facts relevant to the present case.  For clarity’s sake we will refer to the first
case as “Clipper I”3 and, when necessary, we will refer to this case as “Clipper II.”
Clipper I
In Clipper I, filed earlier, we summarized the relevant facts as follows:
“On August 26, 2002, Clipper filed an application with the Commission
seeking authorization to build a wind turbine facility for the purpose of
generating electricity.  As required, Clipper notified the public of its
application to build the facility, and the date, time, and location of a scheduled
pre-hearing conference by publishing a notice in both The Republican and The
Cumberland Times-News, generally circulated newspapers in Garrett County,
on the successive weeks of September 26, 2002, September 30, 2002, October
3, 2002, and October 6, 2002.[4]
“The wind turbine facility was to be composed of up to 67 individual
turbines.  Each turbine would consist of a free-standing tower approximately
262 feet in height.  A rotor, having a diameter not in excess of 262 feet (80m)
5 “It appears that access to the project area via ‘improved hardtop roads’ was also a
factor in choosing this particular site over others.”  Clipper I, ___ Md. at ___ n. 7, ___ A.2d
at ___ n. 7.  
6 The hearing was conducted on January 7-8, 2003.
7 “They were Chandler S. Robbins, Ajax Eastman, D. Daniel Boone, and Jon E.
Boone.  None of these individuals is a party to the present action.”  Clipper I, ___ Md. at ___
n. 8, ___ A.2d at ___ n. 8.   
8 According to a letter Tribbey wrote to the Commission on behalf of the “Friends of
Backbone Mountain” (“Friends”), that organization is “a growing group of over 100 Garrett
(continued...)
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(39m blades), would be attached to the tower.  The maximum combined height
would be approximately ‘394 ft (120 m) with one blade in the vertical
position.’  Clipper’s executive summary of its proposal for the facility implied
that some, but not all, of the turbines would be of that size and stated that all
67 turbines may not need to be built depending upon ‘factors . . . not identified
prior to [the] start of construction.’  In addition to the tower and the blade, each
turbine would consist of a foundation anchoring it to the ground and a
transformer that would collect the power from the turbines and transfer it to a
substation through an ‘underground electrical collection system.’  All-weather
gravel service roads would be built from existing hardtop roads and the cables
associated with the electrical collection system were to be buried alongside
such service roads.  The total project area would cover approximately 10.8
miles and would be constructed on Backbone Mountain extending from ‘Wild
Turkey Rock at an elevation of 3,228 ft (984 m) above sea level
southwestward to Allegheny Heights at 3,200 ft (975 m).’  Although three
other sites were surveyed, Allegheny Heights was selected ‘because of wind
resource potential and favorable site characteristics (primarily contiguous,
well-exposed areas and proximity to three transmission lines).’[5]
“An adjudicatory hearing[6] regarding Clipper’s proposal, at which
attendance was high, ‘standing room only,’ was held.  Clipper, the Department
of Natural Resources’s Power Plant Research Program, the staff of the
Commission, and the Office of People’s Counsel were the named parties to the
proceeding.  Pursuant to PUC § 3-106, four individual members of the public
intervened and were granted party status.[7]  Among those in attendance were
respondents Eric Tribbey and Russell Bounds . . . .  Although both Tribbey and
Bounds submitted citizen comment letters following the conclusion of the
hearing, neither they, nor Friends,[8] sought to intervene.
8(...continued)
County citizens’” seeking to obtain “‘ a moratorium on construction of wind projects in
Garrett County until enforceable siting criteria can be enforced.’”  Clipper I, ___ Md. at ___
n. 9, ___ A.2d at ___ n. 9.  Apparently, Friends was created after the Commission’s initial
order allowing the Facility to be built.
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“The hearing examiner issued a proposed order that contained and
recommended settlement conditions to which all of the parties had agreed,
which the Commission subsequently adopted.  It issued a final order (Order
No. 78354) approving Clipper’s plan.
“Tribbey, then, writing on behalf of Friends, submitted a letter to the
Commission requesting a rehearing.  The Commission, by Order No. 78617,
denied the request, explaining:  
‘This matter comes before the Public Service
Commission (“Commission”) as a result of a series of filings
made by entities that did not appear as parties in the above-
captioned proceeding.  On April 24, 2003, the Friends of
Backbone Mountain (“Friends”) filed a pro se formal request for
rehearing in this case.  On April 25, 2003, Citizens for
Responsible Wind Power (“Citizens”) also filed a pro se formal
request for rehearing in this case.  A third pro se formal request
for rehearing in this matter was filed on April 28, 2003, by The
Garrett County Historical Society (“Garrett Historical”). . . .
Friends made an additional filing, by Counsel, on June 27, 2003.
This June 27th filing includes two documents: (1) an Application
to Intervene, and (2) a Supplement to Request for Rehearing and
Application to Reopen for Further Evidence . . . .  On August 5,
2003, Counsel for Paul C. Sprenger filed an Application to
Intervene and a Motion for Reconsideration and for
Modification of the Order of the Public Service Commission
(“Sprenger Motion”).  This August 5th filing includes four
exhibits (“Sprenger Exhibits A, B, C, and D”).  None of the
actual parties to the case have raised any objection to the
Commission’s Order No. 78354, issued on March 26, 2003.  
‘The Commission denies all four requests.  Public Utility
Companies (“PUC”) Article §3-114(c)(1) restricts the right to
apply for rehearing to parties: “A party in interest may apply to
the Commission for rehearing within 30 days after service of a
final order on the party.” [Emphasis added.] Since none of the
four entities requesting rehearing were parties to the proceeding,
9 “COMAR § 20.07.02.08 states:
‘.08 Rehearings.
‘A. Applications for reopening a cause after final submission, or for
rehearing after final order, shall be made by petition in writing, stating
specifically the grounds upon which the application is based.
‘B. If the application is to reopen the cause for further evidence, the
nature and purpose of the evidence shall be stated, and may not be
merely cumulative.
‘C. If the application is for a rehearing, the petition shall specify the
findings of fact or of law claimed to be erroneous, together with a brief
statement of the ground of the alleged error.
‘D. A petition seeking to reverse or modify a decision, order, or
requirement of the Commission shall:
‘(1) Fully set forth the facts, circumstances, and consequences 
relied upon; and
‘(2) Allege:
‘(a) The facts and circumstances which have arisen after
the hearing or order which justify the reversal or
modification; or
‘(b) The consequences resulting from compliance with
the decision, order, or requirement which justify or
entitle the applicant to the reversal or modification.’”
Clipper I, __ Md. __ n. 10, __A.2d at __ n. 10. 
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none qualify to request rehearing.  Additionally, the filing made
on behalf of Friends on June 27, 2003, is not a filing provided
for either under PUC § 3-114 or Code of Maryland Regulations
(“COMAR”) § 20.07.02.08,[9] both of which contemplate a
single, comprehensive rehearing application by a party.
Friends’ June 27th filing is also well beyond the thirty-day
period during which parties may request rehearing.  Sprenger’s
filings are still further beyond the thirty-day period during which
parties may request rehearing.
‘Clipper complied with all of the procedural elements of
the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (“CPCN”)
process, including the provisions of COMAR § 20.79.01.03, and
also complied with the Hearing Examiner’s direction to
advertise the pre-hearing conference and the public hearings in
local Garrett County newspapers.  The four entities requesting
rehearing had sufficient notice and opportunity to intervene as
10 Both of the petitions for judicial review in Clipper I were filed on September 3,
2003, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
11 “Specifically, the court asked respondents’ counsel, ‘You’re not claiming that either
of the [respondents] here was a party to the proceedings?’  To which respondents’ counsel
replied, ‘No, I’m not.’  Respondents claimed that they were ‘persons in interest.’”  Clipper
I, __ Md. __ n. 12, __A.2d at __ n. 12.   
-6-
parties; since they did not, they do not have standing to request
rehearing. . . .
‘. . . as already stated, Clipper properly advertised the pre-
hearing conference and the public hearings in local Garrett
County newspapers, thus providing sufficient notice to enable
prompt and timely intervention.  This is not a question of
whether Friends could have intervened “sooner in the process,”
but rather an issue of whether Friends attempted to intervene
during the process at all.  The Commission finds that the
attempted intervention is outside the process, and cannot be
granted since the proceeding closed prior to the attempted
intervention.’
Order No. 78617 (internal footnotes omitted).  Thus, the Commission
concluded that Friends was not a ‘party in interest’ under PUC § 3-114
because it had not properly intervened under PUC § 3-106.  The Commission
also determined that it already had fully considered the issues presented for
rehearing in the original proceedings and it was not necessary to readdress
them or to address them further.
“Thereafter, . . . Tribbey, on his own behalf, and not on behalf of
Friends, filed a petition for judicial review of the Commission’s Order No.
78617, and, on the same day, a separate petition for judicial review of the
Commission’s Order was filed by the respondent[s] Sprenger, Bounds, and
Gnegy.[10]  The actions having been consolidated, the petitioners each filed a
motion to dismiss the petitions as untimely.  Before the Circuit Court, the
respondents did not contend that they were “parties” to the proceeding, just
that they were ‘persons in interest.’[11]  Tribbey argued, in addition, that
although Friends was not a ‘party in interest,’ its application for rehearing
tolled the deadline for filing a petition for judicial review.
“The Circuit Court [for Baltimore City] dismissed both actions [on
March 31, 2004], ruling that none of the respondents had filed a timely request
for rehearing and that their petitions for judicial review were similarly
untimely. . . . [According to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, even though]
12
 “The court [reasoned] that Mr. Sprenger was not a ‘party in
interest’ to the proceeding because he was not a ‘party’ to the
proceeding.  Moreover, none of the respondents would be a
‘party in interest’ ‘because none was personally and specifically
affected in a way different from the public generally.’”  
Clipper I, __ Md. __ n. 13, __A.2d at __ n. 13.   The latter criteria was determined in Clipper
I to be the “wrong standard” to apply to review of Commission decisions in this regard.  Id.
at ___ n. 20, ___ A.2d at ___ n. 20. 
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Friends’ request for rehearing may have been timely filed, its request was
invalid because Friends was not a ‘party in interest’ and, thus, was not entitled
to a rehearing under PUC § 3-114.
“Thereafter, the respondents appealed to the Court of Special Appeals,
which, in an unreported opinion, [filed July 27, 2005,] reversed the judgment
of the Circuit Court [for Baltimore City]. [The intermediate appellate court
found] that the judicial review action should not have been dismissed as
untimely . . . .[12]  The court concluded that ‘it would be exalting form over
substance to hypothesize that Mr. Tribbey made the request for a rehearing
“solely” as a representative of the Friends of Backbone Mountain.’  On this
premise, the court held that, ‘as a result of the timely request for rehearing
filed by Mr. Tribbey, all of the appellants had 30 days from August 8, 2003 to
file their actions for judicial review of the Commission’s March 26, 2003
order.’”
Clipper I, __ Md. at __, __ A.2d at __ (some footnotes omitted).
After granting both the Commission’s and Clipper’s petitions for certiorari, we
consolidated them and reviewed the following question in Clipper I:
“‘Whether PUC § 3-114(c) limits the right to request rehearing solely
to “a party in interest” that has properly intervened as such in the
Commission’s proceedings, and is thus distinguishable from PUC § 3-202(a)
which provides a right to judicial review to “a party or person in interest . . .
dissatisfied by a final decision or order of the Commission . . .”?’”
Clipper I, __ Md. at __, __ A.2d at __ (footnote omitted).  Answering the question in the
affirmative, we determined that the petition for judicial review was not timely filed, stating:
“The facts of the instant case show that neither Friends nor Tribbey timely
13
 “The fact that Tribbey was an adjoining landowner and was
present at the adjudicatory hearing in January of 2003, does not,
in and of itself, make him a ‘party.’  In order to have become a
‘party’ Tribbey would have had to apply to intervene, pursuant
to PUC § 3-106.  It is evident that he did not.”     
Clipper I, __ Md. __ n. 17, __A.2d at __ n. 17. 
14
  “The respondents also argue that Friends’ application for
rehearing stayed the time for filing a petition for judicial review
for all entities until the Commission had made its ruling on
August 8, 2003.  Maryland Code (1998), § 3-204(c) of the
Public Utility Companies Article provides: ‘If a rehearing by the
Commission is applied for, a proceeding for judicial review may
be filed after service of the decision of the Commission that
denies the rehearing.’  This may be true when a proper
application (by an entity who has sought and has been permitted
to intervene as a party) for rehearing is timely filed.  In the
instant case, however, as discussed supra, there was no timely
application by a ‘party’ or ‘party in interest’ for rehearing.
Thus, the time for filing a petition for judicial review was not
stayed.”
(continued...)
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filed an application to intervene.  Friends filed to intervene on June 27, 2003,
after it had attempted to apply for rehearing and well after it would have been
timely to intervene (i.e., prior to the close of proceedings).  Failing timely to
intervene, Friends was not a party, and, therefore, not a ‘party in interest,’
when it filed for rehearing on April 24, 2003.  Thus, the Commission’s denial
of Friends’ application for rehearing was appropriate.  Similarly, Tribbey
never filed to intervene in his own right and, thus, also never became a party
or ‘party in interest.’[13]  As a result, even if we were to consider Tribbey’s
representation of Friends to satisfy somehow his own personal filing for
rehearing, he still would not have properly filed, as he never intervened to
become a party.
. . .
“Tribbey did not timely or properly apply for rehearing because he was not
himself a ‘party’ or ‘party in interest.’  Therefore, the Court of Special
Appeals’ erred in its determination as to the respondents’ petitions for judicial
review.  The respondents did not have ‘30 days from August 8, 2003 to file
their actions for judicial review of the Commission’s March 26, 2003 order.’[14]
14(...continued)
Clipper I, __ Md. __ n. 21, __A.2d at __ n. 21.
15  “It is also clearly evident that Friends never filed a petition for judicial review.” 
Clipper I, __ Md. __ n. 23, __A.2d at __ n. 23.  
16 Throughout this opinion we are required to discuss the Public Utility Companies
Article and the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code.  We will
abbreviated them as “PUC” and “CJP,” respectively, when possible.  In the interests of
clarity and ease of reading, we may sometimes use the entire citation or simply cite to the
relevant section of the Code in context.
17 The present case began after Clipper I had been appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals.  It may be helpful to review a brief chronology of the combined proceedings thus
far.  On September 3, 2003, the Clipper I petitions for judicial review were filed in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City; on March 31, 2004, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
dismissed the consolidated petitions for judicial review and, shortly thereafter, an appeal was
noted in Clipper I to the Court of Special Appeals.  The Court of Special Appeals did not file
its opinion in Clipper I until July 27, 2005 – three months after the present action for
declaratory relief was filed.
18 At the time of the initial hearing, Maryland Code (1998), § 3-201 of the Public
Utility Companies Article, in relevant part, provided:
(continued...)
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Rather, they had 30 days from March 26, 2003.
“None of the respondents[15] filed a petition for judicial review within that time
period and, hence, their petitions for judicial review, not being timely, were
properly denied.”
Clipper I, __ Md. at __, __ A.2d at __.
Clipper II16
On or about April 25, 2005, Paul C. Sprenger, Russell W. Bounds, Eric Tribbey, Paul
Roderick, and Rebecca M. Harvey filed a petition for declaratory relief in the Circuit Court
for Garrett County.17  The action was brought pursuant to Maryland Code (1998), § 3-201
of the Public Utility Companies Article,18 or, alternatively, under Maryland Code (1984,
18(...continued)
   “(a) In general. – (1) The validity of a regulation of the Commission may be
determined on a petition for declaratory judgment whenever it appears that the
regulation, or its application, actually or potentially interferes with or impairs
the legal rights or privileges of the petitioner.”
Maryland Code (1998, 2006 Cumm. Supp.), § 3-201 of the Public Utility Companies Article,
effective June 1, 2004, provides:
   “(a) In general. – Notwithstanding § 10-120 of the State Government
Article, the validity of a regulation of the Commission shall be challenged in
accordance with § 10-125 of the State Government Article.”
Petitioners did not make clear under which version of PUC § 3-201(a) they were
seeking declaratory relief.  It is, however, irrelevant for two reasons.  First, under either
version, the analysis would have been the same.  If petitioners were seeking relief under the
pre-June 2004, version of PUC § 3-201(a), that section would have controlled and relief
could not have been sought under § 10-125 of the State Government Article.  If, on the other
hand, petitioners were seeking relief under the post-June 2004, version of PUC § 3-201(a),
that section is still controlling, but requires the action to be brought under § 10-125 of the
State Government Article, which is substantially the same as the pre-June 2004 PUC § 3-
201(a).  The second reason the distinction is irrelevant is that, in the present case, we do not
reach the merits of petitioners’ arguments because we are only concerned with whether the
trial judge was correct in dismissing the action for declaratory relief.
19 Maryland Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 10-125 of the State Government Article
reads in relevant part:
   “(a) Petition authorized. – (1) A person may file a petition for a declaratory
judgment on the validity of any regulation, whether or not the person has asked
the unit to consider the validity of the regulation.”
20 Sections 3-401-415 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, comprise the
Declaratory Judgment Act.  The relevant portions will be discussed infra.
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2004 Repl. Vol.), § 10-125 of the State Government Article,19 or Maryland Code (1973, 2006
Repl. Vol.), § 3-401 et seq of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.20  Before the trial
court, petitioners asserted that they were interested parties essentially because the
construction of the Facility would adversely affect their property values.  They also asserted
that Clipper was seeking to expand an existing right of way without consent and use it for
21 Maryland Code (1998), § 7-207(c)(1) of the Public Utility Companies Article,
provides:
“(c) Notice to interested persons. – (1) On receipt of an application for a
certificate of public convenience and necessity under this section, the
Commission shall provide notice to the Office of Planning and to all other
interested persons.”
22 Without accepting or rejecting their argument, at this juncture, it appears that
petitioners erroneously cite to PUC § 7-208(d)(2)(i) as standing for the proposition that
interested persons are to receive notice.  See p. 5, of petitioners’ brief and p. 4 of the original
petition for declaratory relief.  Section 7-208(d)(2)(i) does not appear to be at all relevant to
petitioners’ argument.  We think petitioners intended to cite to § 7-208(d)(1)(i) both from
reading § 7-208(d) in its entirety and from how petitioners’ reproduced just § 7-208(d)(1)(i)
(as opposed to 7-208(d)(2)(i)) in the appendix to their brief.  See App. at 5.
We have transcribed § 7-208(d) in its entirety, but we will only discuss § 7-
208(d)(1)(i), infra, because we deem the remainder of that subsection irrelevant under the
circumstances:
  “(d) Notice and public hearing. – (1) On receipt of an application under this
section, together with any additional information requested under subsection
(c)(2) of this section, the Commission shall provide notice to:
     (i) all interested persons;
     (ii) the Department of Agriculture;
     (iii) the Department of Business and Economic Development;
     (iv) the Department of the Environment;
     (v) the Department of Natural Resources;
     (vi) the Department of Transportation;
     (vii) the Office of Planning.
(continued...)
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impermissible purposes.
Petitioners, at the trial level, mounted a two pronged attack against the manner in
which the Commission and Clipper provided notice to them regarding the hearing related to
Clipper’s application to build the Facility.  The first prong alleged a constitutional violation
(which we will construe, more specifically, as an alleged due process violation).  According
to petitioners, Maryland Code (1998), §§ 7-207(c)(1)21 and 7-208(d)22 of the Public Utility
22(...continued)
   (2) The Commission shall hold a public hearing on the application as
required by § 7-207 of this subtitle, after;
(i) the receipt of any additional information requested under subsection
(c)(2) of this section that the Commission considers necessary; and
(ii) any publication of notice the Commission considers to be proper.
   (3)(i) At the public hearing, the Commission shall ensure presentation of the
information and recommendations of the State units specified in paragraph (1)
of this subsection and shall allow the official representative of each unit to sit
during hearing of all parties.
(ii) Based on the evidence relating to the unit’s areas of concern, the
Commission shall allow each unit 15 days after the conclusion of the hearing
to modify or affirm the units initial recommendations.” (Bolding added.)
(Emphasis added.)
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Companies Article, required that they be given personal notice of the hearing because they
owned property contiguous to or within one half mile of the proposed facility.  The second
prong, closely related to the first, alleged that the Commission violated the statutory
requirements of those same sections by not giving the “required” personal notice.
On or about May 26, 2005, both the Commission and Clipper filed motions to dismiss
the petition for declaratory relief.  Respondents argued that the petitioners’ challenge under
PUC § 3-201 and § 10-125 of the State Government Article should fail because they did not
challenge the validity of a regulation, they lacked standing, and that the petition was
untimely.  The motions also asserted that the petition for declaratory relief was barred by res
judicata because it “merely re-labels the Petition for Judicial Review already litigated in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City . . . .”
At oral argument before the Honorable James L. Sherbin of the Circuit Court for
23 This project encompassed 10.8 miles.  Presumably, there may have been hundreds,
or even thousands, of persons in close proximity to a project of this size.
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Garrett County on August 16, 2005, the Commission summarized these arguments.  Judge
Sherbin, referring to the similarities between Clipper I and Clipper II and foreshadowing his
ultimate judgment said:  “I haven’t heard anything . . . from [counsel for petitioners], but I’m
beginning to wonder now why we are in this court. . . .  So make a note of that, [counsel for
petitioners.] . . .”
In response to these arguments, and in response to Judge Sherbin’s concern, counsel
for petitioners attempted to explain why an action for declaratory relief was being brought
in the Circuit Court for Garrett County:
“[M]y clients own farms and residential properties very near to the
project, that will be impacted by visual and by the noise impact, and they are
concerned about the impact, and they think that they should have received
notice in advance of what was going on and what its potential impact would
be, and that notice wasn’t given.  I don’t want to argue the merits of what
we’re claiming, but essentially, our position is that the Public Utilities
Commission statute, when it says that a copy of the application go[es] to
interested persons, that these people within very near proximity to this project
are interested persons, and they should have been given notice when the
application was filed.[23]
“Secondly, constitutionally, our position is that this project will have an
impact on their property, and since it’s going to have an impact on their
property, they’re at least entitled to notice and a hearing to present their
position on their side of it.  We have been searching for a remedy, but every
remedy we try, the Public Service Commission and Clipper says, that is not the
right remedy.
“Essentially, our position is that the proceedings that [were] conducted,
that resulted in the certificate, [were] flawed because they failed to comply
with the statute on notice and the Constitutional requirements on notice, as to
our client.  Well, if our clients aren’t given notice of the proceedings, it’s kind
of hard to file an appeal from the proceedings, because by the time all that
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water’s over the dam, then you find out what’s going on, it’s too late to file the
appeal.
“Now, in this case, one of the participants was Eric Tribbey, and on
behalf of himself and Backbone – Friends of Backbone Mountain, he filed a
request for rehearing.  The request for rehearing stays the time for the appeal,
and during that time, we filed additional information with the Commission to
try to get – try to convince them that they should have given notice and that
they should allow us to participate in the proceedings, and those motions were
denied, and the request for rehearing was denied, and that resulted in our
appeal of the case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
“The issues raised in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City are almost
exactly the same issues that I raised in Garret County.  I mean . . . there’s no
secret there.
. . .
“The law in Maryland says that you cannot have the same issues
pending in two different Circuit Courts at the same time.  Our issues aren’t
pending in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City anymore.  They’ve been
dismissed.  If there is no petition for cert[iorari] [] and the case is remanded
back to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, then there would be similar issues
pending in both jurisdictions and the proper remedy at that point is probably
to combine the cases.  But right now, the issues are not pending in Baltimore
City.”  (Emphasis added.)
Additionally, Counsel for petitioners argued that Clipper I was no longer before the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City, therefore, filing a petition for declaratory relief was still
a viable option because Clipper and the Commission had not, at that time, decided whether
to petition this Court to review the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in Clipper I.
Thus, according to petitioners in the present case, the declaratory judgment action was
necessary to prevent Clipper from beginning construction of the Facility.  Judge Sherbin
clearly understood the dilemma posed by allowing the petitioners’ action for declaratory
relief to continue, as demonstrated by the following colloquy:
THE COURT:  “Wouldn’t that be folly for someone to construct these
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very expensive items when the case is [potentially] on appeal to the Court of
Appeals of the State, and wouldn’t it be equally foolish for a Circuit Court in
Garrett County to be deciding issues which are [potentially] in front of the
Court of Appeals of this State?  And maybe we’d get it identically correct, and
maybe we wouldn’t, and if we didn’t, guess who would take precedence[?]
[Counsel for petitioners]:  “I think you would, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  “No, I don’t think I would prevail with the Court of
Appeals of this State.”
On August 26, 2005, Judge Sherbin issued an opinion and order dismissing the
petition for declaratory relief.  The trial court based the dismissal on the grounds that the
petition was, in essence, an untimely petition for judicial review of the Commission’s March
26, 2003, order, see Clipper I.  The trial court also opined that it was not in the interests of
judicial economy for the Circuit Court for Garrett County to consider the same issues that
still had the potential of being litigated in Clipper I if Clipper or the Commission chose to
file a petition for a writ of certiorari to this Court (which they ultimately did).
Petitioners appealed the decision of the Circuit Court for Garrett County to the Court
of Special Appeals.  Sprenger, 171 Md. App. 444, 910 A.2d 544 (2006).  The Court of
Special Appeals determined that the Circuit Court for Garrett County did not err in finding
that the petition for declaratory relief was the functional equivalent of a belated appeal,
stating:  “Declaratory relief under the Act does not afford a failsafe to parties who fail to
satisfy the procedural requirements of the statutory remedy.  Failure to timely exercise their
statutory remedy does not entitle appellants to now obtain declaratory relief under the Act.”
Id. at 454-55, 910 A.2d at 550.  That court also determined that the trial court was correct in
concluding that petitioners’ claim was barred because the same issue was pending before
-16-
another Circuit Court in Maryland:
“Assuming [petitioners’] petition for declaratory relief is proper, and
assuming that the Court of Appeals remands [Clipper I] [] to the circuit court
as timely filed, two cases involving identical issues would proceed on the
merits.  The Circuit Court for Garrett County aptly stated: ‘What concerns me
is the integrity of the process, in that we have, seemingly, the same complaint
in two different areas . . . and we can’t have two litigations, covering the same
items, going on at the same time.’. . .”
Id. at 458, 910 A.2d at 552-53.
II. Standard of Review
Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 3-409(a) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article provides that a court “may grant a declaratory judgment or decree in a
civil case . . . .”  (Emphasis added).  It follows that “declaratory judgment generally is a
discretionary type of relief.”  Converge Services Group v. Curran, 383 Md. 462, 477, 860
A.2d 871, 879 (2004).  If the Circuit Court abuses its discretion in refusing to grant an order
for declaratory relief, this Court will reverse the lower court.  Id. at 477, 860 A.2d at 879
(citing A.S. Abell Co. v. Sweeney, 274 Md. 715, 720, 337 A.2d 77, 81 (1975) (concluding that
“‘some discretion is left to the courts’ in granting declaratory relief’”) (quoting Grimm v.
County Comm’rs of Washington County, 252 Md. 626, 632, 250 A.2d 866, 869 (1969))).
On the one hand, we have admonished trial courts to grant declaratory judgment when
it has been petitioned for and the circumstances of the controversy warrant it.  Converge
Services Group, 383 Md. at 477, 860 A.2d at 880; Salamon v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co.,
379 Md. 301, 308 n. 7, 841 A.2d 858, 862 n. 7 (2004).  On the other hand, “is the logical
converse, that is, when a declaratory judgment action is brought and the controversy is not
-17-
appropriate for resolution by declaratory judgment, the trial court is neither compelled, nor
expected, to enter a declaratory judgment.”  Converge Services Group, 383 Md. at 477, 860
A.2d at 880 (citing Popham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 333 Md. 136, 140-41 n. 2, 634 A.2d
28, 30 n. 2 (1993)).  Thus, we generally review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny
declaratory judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.
In the present case, the trial court did not reach the merits of the petition for
declaratory judgment because it held, as a matter of law, that the petition could not be
maintained and then, in the first instance, granted respondents’ motions to dismiss.  In
reviewing a motion to dismiss, “we accept all well-pled facts in the complaint, and
reasonable inferences drawn from them, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party,”
Converge Services Group, 383 Md. at 475, 860 A.2d at 878 (citing Porterfield v. Mascari
II, Inc., 374 Md. 402, 414, 823 A.2d 590, 597 (2003)), because the object of a motion to
dismiss is to argue that relief could not be granted on the facts alleged as a matter of law.
Converge Services Group, 383 Md. at 475, 860 A.2d at 878 (citing Paul V. Niemeyer &
Linda M. Schuett, Maryland Rules Commentary, 206 (3d ed. 2003)).  We will only find that
dismissal was proper “‘if the alleged facts and permissible inferences, so viewed, would, if
proven, nonetheless fail to afford relief to the plaintiff.’”  Pendleton v. State, __ Md. __
(2007) (No. 31, September Term, 2005) (filed April 13, 2007) (quoting Ricketts v. Ricketts,
393 Md. 479, 491-92, 903 A.2d 857, 864-65 (2006)).  When reviewing the grant of a motion
to dismiss, an appellate court is concerned with determining whether the trial court was
legally correct.  Pendleton v. State, __ Md. __ (2007) (No. 31, September Term, 2005) (filed
24 Maryland Code (1998), § 3-202 of the Public Utility Companies Article provides
in relevant part:
   “(a) In general. – Except for the staff of the Commission, a party or person
in interest, including the People’s Counsel, that is dissatisfied by a final
decision or order of the Commission may seek judicial review of the decision
or order as provided in this subtitle. . . .”
Although § 3-202 does not provide a specific time period within which a person in interest
must seek judicial review, Maryland Rule 7-203 provides:
   “(a) Generally.  Except as otherwise provided in this Rule or by statute, a
petition for judicial review shall be filed within 30 days after the latest of:
   (1) the date of the order or action of which review is sought;
   (2) the date the administrative agency sent notice of the order or action to the
petitioner, if notice was required by law to be sent to the petitioner; or
   (3) the date the petitioner received notice of the agency’s order or action, if
notice was required by law to be received by the petitioner.
   (b) Petition by other party.  If one party files a timely petition, any other
person may file a petition within ten days after the date the agency mailed
notice of the filing of the first petition, or within the period set forth in section
(a), whichever is later.”
-18-
April 13, 2007) (citing Benson v. State, 389 Md. 615, 626, 887 Md 525, 531 (2005)).
III.  Discussion
Petitioners assert that declaratory relief is appropriate under the circumstances of this
case because they were “entitled to notice, denied notice and, as a result, denied judicial
review.”  Essentially, petitioners argue that the Commission’s alleged failure to provide them
individually with sufficient notice of the January 7-8, 2003, administrative hearing denied
them the ability to participate in those proceedings.  They further contend that their lack of
knowledge of the proceedings and the Commission’s resulting order denied them the ability
to seek judicial review under Maryland Code (1998), § 3-202 of the Public Utility Companies
Article24 which is the legislatively provided means for judicial review of the Commission’s
25 Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 3-406 of the Courts and Judicial
(continued...)
-19-
orders.  Thus, according to petitioners, they should be permitted to seek declaratory relief
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), §§ 3-401-3-
415 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
Clipper and the Commission argue in the instant case that the relevant portions of the
Public Utility Companies Article do not require personal notice and that publication is
satisfactory because it “is the long-established means of providing notice of development
projects to interested individuals where there will be no physical entry onto or invasion of
their property.”  Additionally, respondents assert that, although PUC §§ 7-207(c) and 7-
208(d) require notice to parties in interest, there is no requirement in those sections that
individual notice is to be given.  Respondents also argue that when the General Assembly
provides a statutory means for petitioners’ grievances to be addressed, as it did in PUC § 3-
202, the Declaratory Judgment Act may not be invoked because the “legislature has provided
a more specialized procedure for seeking judicial review.”  They assert that the onus was on
petitioners to avail themselves of the process provided for in PUC § 3-202 and the fact that
they failed to do so, regardless of the reason, does not permit them to seek relief under the
Declaratory Judgment Act.  Respondents now contend that even if petitioners are entitled to
bring an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, they cannot do so because the claims
presented in this case duplicate those presented by the complaining parties in Clipper I. 
A.  Declaratory Relief 25 and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
25(...continued)
Proceedings Article states:
   “Any person interested under a deed, will, trust, land patent, written contract,
or other writing constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, administrative rule or
regulation, contract, or franchise, may have determined any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance,
administrative rule or regulation, land patent, contract, or franchise and obtain
a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations under it.”
-20-
The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to “settle and afford relief from
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.”  Maryland
Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 3-402 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  The
Act “is remedial” in nature and “shall be liberally construed and administered.”  CJP § 3-402.
Our cases have repeatedly recognized the broad remedial purpose of the Declaratory
Judgment Act.  See Maryland-Nat.’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Washington Nat’l
Arena, 282 Md. 588, 595, 386 A.2d 1216, 1222 (1978) (recognizing “the strong legislative
policy favoring the liberal use and interpretation of the Declaratory Judgments Act . . .”);
Himes v. Day, 254 Md. 197, 206, 254 A.2d 181, 186 (1969) (stating that “‘the object of the
declaratory judgment act is to supplement and enlarge procedural relief in a field not wholly
or adequately occupied by subsisting remedies of law and equity.’”) (quoting Schultz v.
Kaplan, 189 Md. 402, 56 A.2d 17 (1947)).
Even though the Declaratory Judgment Act is to be liberally construed, there are
certain restrictions in its application.  Section 3-409(b) of the Declaratory Judgment Act
states that: “If a statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that
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statutory remedy shall be followed in lieu of a proceeding under this subtitle.”  (Bolding
added) (Emphasis added).  This Court has echoed that requirement on several occasions:  “It
is well settled in Maryland that when there is a special statutory remedy for a specific type
of case, and that remedy is intended to be exclusive or primary, a party ‘may not circumvent
those [special statutory] proceedings by a declaratory judgment . . . action . . . .’”  Utilities,
Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 362 Md. 37, 45, 763 A.2d 129, 133 (2000)
(quoting Montgomery County v. Broadcast Equities, 360 Md. 438, 456-61, 758 A.2d 995,
1005-08 (2000)); see  Maryland Reclamation Assoc.’s, Inc. v. Harford County, 382 Md. 348,
362, 855 A.2d 351, 359 (2004) (recognizing that when a statute provides for administrative
remedies, those remedies must be pursued instead of pursuing declaratory relief).  Thus,
declaratory relief “is barred by some statutory and judicially-crafted restrictions in limited
circumstances.”  Converge Services Group, 383 Md. at 478, 860 A.2d at 880.
It is the general rule in this State that when an administrative remedy is provided by
the General Assembly, administrative process must be exhausted before the aggrieved party
may resort to the courts for other  relief.  Prince George’s County v. Ray’s Used Cars, __Md.
__, __(2007) (No. 133, September Term, 2005) (filed May 4, 2007); Zappone v. Liberty Life
Ins. Co., 349 Md. 45, 63, 706 A.2d 1060, 1069 (1998) (stating that there is a “presumption
that the administrative remedy is intended to be primary, and [] a claimant cannot maintain
the alternative judicial action without first invoking and exhausting the administrative
remedy.”).  See e.g., Maryland Reclamation Assoc.’s, 382 Md. at 362, 855 A.2d at 359
(“[W]hen administrative remedies exist in zoning cases, they must be exhausted before other
26 We have recognized several exceptions to the general rule that bars declaratory
relief when a statute requires administrative remedies to be pursued and exhausted.
Maryland Reclamation Assoc.’s, 382 Md. at 362 n. 5, 855 A.2d at 359 n. 5.  When the
challenge to the facial validity of a statute is made, we will often, though not always, make
an exception to the exhaustion requirement.  Comm’n on Human Relations v. Mass Transit
Admin., 294 Md. 225, 232, 449 A.2d 385, 388 (1982).  We have also determined that when
the General Assembly expresses an intent that the administrative remedy need not be invoked
or exhausted, the exhaustion requirement may not apply.  Id. at 232 n. 4, 449 A.2d at 388 n.
4 (citing White v. Prince George’s Co., 282 Md. 641, 649, 387 A.2d 260, 265 (1978);
Washington Nat’l Arena, 282 Md. at 595-96, 386 A.2d at 1222-23).  Furthermore, there may
not be a need to exhaust administrative remedies when an agency is without jurisdiction.
Comm’n on Human Relations v. Freedom Express/Domegold, Inc., 375 Md 2, 19, 825 A.2d
354, 364 (2003); SEFAC Lift & Equipment Corp. v. Mass Transit Admin., 367 Md. 374, 382,
788 A.2d 192, 197 (2002).
Although petitioners make a vague and unavailing argument that they have been
deprived of constitutionally guaranteed due process by not receiving personal notice of the
hearings on the proposed Facility, they do not challenge the constitutionality of any statute
and, therefore, cannot obtain relief via the first exception described above.  We addressed the
second exception, regarding the General Assembly’s intent, in Clipper I and do so again
infra.  The third exception is not raised by petitioners and is not, in any event, relevant to the
present case in its current posture.  Thus, none of the exceptions permitting an action for
declaratory relief to be pursued prior to the exhaustion of administrative remedies are
applicable in the present case.
-22-
actions, including requests for declaratory judgments, mandamus, and injunctive relief, may
be brought.” (citing Josephson v. City of Annapolis, 353 Md. 667, 674-78, 728 A.2d 690,
693-95 (1998))); Fosler v. Panoramic Design, Ltd., 376 Md. 118, 128, 829 A.2d 271, 277
(2003) (“[T]he presumption that a statutory administrative remedy is primary is reflected in
the Declaratory Judgment Act.”).26
By enacting the Public Utility Companies Article, the General Assembly provided a
special form of remedy for specific types of cases such as the present one.  The fact that
petitioners failed to avail themselves of that legislatively provided remedy does not enable
-23-
them to deny the existence of the remedy found in the Public Utility Companies Article nor
does it entitle them to declaratory relief in lieu of the administrative remedy.  Were we to
allow petitioners’ action for declaratory relief to proceed, the Commission (and other similar
administrative agencies) would never be able to have a final decision and litigation could
continue as each geographically successive owner of property in the vicinity of such a large
scale facility files his or her own declaratory judgment action, ad infinitum.
At the time this action was filed and resolved, petitioners had failed to exhaust the
applicable administrative remedy found in the Public Utility Companies Article because
Clipper I was still pending before the Court of Special Appeals.  In Clipper I, the central
issue was whether the respondents in that case properly applied for rehearing and if such
application was then timely, whether the application stayed the time for petitioning for
judicial review.  Until a final decision was reached in Clipper I, it was still possible that the
final decision of that case would result in a finding that the petition for judicial review was
timely filed.  If that result were to have occurred, the Clipper I respondents (some of whom
were plaintiffs below in this case) would not have exhausted their administrative remedies
because they would have succeeded in obtaining a new hearing before the Commission and,
under the statutory scheme, would only have been able to seek judicial review after another
adverse ruling by the Commission.  Therefore, this action for declaratory relief was
premature at the time it was filed (and decided) under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Most importantly, we have previously determined that, as a general rule, it is
27 The present case demonstrates, to a degree, the amount of time and money
consumed by duplicitous litigation.  Even though Judge Sherbin very quickly determined that
petitioners action for declaratory relief was duplicitous and correctly dismissed it, the filing
and subsequent appeals of his decision, and that of the trial court in Clipper I have still
consumed the resources of the Circuit Courts for Garrett County and Baltimore City, the
Court of Special Appeals (twice), and this Court (twice).
-24-
inappropriate for a court to “entertain a declaratory judgment action ‘if there is pending, at
the time of the commencement of the action for declaratory relief, another action or
proceeding involving the same parties and in which the identical issues that are involved in
the declaratory action may be adjudicated.”  Post v. Bregman, 349 Md. 142, 160, 707 A.2d
806, 814 (1998) (quoting Waicker v. Colbert, 347 Md. 108, 113, 699 A.2d 426, 428 (1997)).
The reasons for this limitation are, or should be, obvious.  In situations such as the present
one, where identical parties bring identical claims in two different courts, limited judicial
resources are wasted in addition to the possibility that conflicting judgments could be entered
by the different courts involved.27
Initially, we note that the parties in Clipper I and this case were substantially the same
at the time that each action was filed.  In Clipper I, the original plaintiffs were:  Eric Tribbey,
Paul Sprenger, Russell Bounds, and Troy Gnegy.  In the declaratory judgment action, the
present case, the original plaintiffs were:  Eric Tribbey, Paul Sprenger, Russell Bounds, Paul
Roderick, and Rebecca Harvey.  The two cases have three original plaintiffs in common.
The plaintiffs in both actions were represented by the same counsel.  Some of the original
plaintiffs in both Clipper I and this case dropped out of litigation as each case proceeded
through the appeals process, but that fact does not alter our conclusion that the parties were
28 Judge Eldridge states in his concurring opinion that:  “Although I fully agree with
the Court that the notice given by the Public Service Commission met the statutory notice
requirement, it is not an issue appropriate for declaratory judgment consideration.  Section
3-409(b) simply prohibits a declaratory judgment action.”  We agree.
-25-
substantially the same for the purposes of determining whether the declaratory judgment was
appropriate.
As we have already explained, supra, Clipper I was still pending at the time the
petition for declaratory relief was filed (and decided) in this case.  Even though counsel for
petitioners argued, incorrectly, before the Circuit Court for Garrett County that Clipper I was
not still pending, he conceded that:  “The issues raised in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City are almost exactly the same issues that I raised in Garret County.  I mean . . . there’s
no secret there.”  (Emphasis added).  Counsel was ethically bound to make that admission,
but the concession is fatal to petitioners action for declaratory relief.  The parties in Clipper
I and this case are substantially the same, the issues in both cases were identical at the time
they were filed, and at the time the present action for declaratory relief was filed, Clipper I
was still pending.  Judge Sherbin was legally correct in dismissing the petition for
declaratory relief.
B.  Notice28
Petitioners erroneously conclude that certain language in PUC §§ 7-207(c) and 7-
208(d) required that notice of the adjudicatory hearing dates be served on them personally.
They imply that publication in a newspaper of general circulation, which occurred in this
case, is not proper.  The language they rely on is:
-26-
   “(c) Notice to interested persons. – (1) On receipt of an application for a
certificate of public convenience and necessity under this section, the
Commission shall provide notice to the Office of Planning and to all other
interested persons.”
PUC § 7-207(c) (emphasis added).  Petitioners also point to and rely on similar language in
the section immediately following, § 7-208(d):
   “(d) Notice and public hearing. – (1) On the receipt of an application under
this section, together with any additional information requested under
subsection (c)(2) of this section, the Commission shall provide notice to:
  (i) all interested persons; . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
Assuming, arguendo, that petitioners are interested persons within the meaning of both §§
7-207(c) and 7-208(d), we must only determine whether those sections require personal
service of notice to interested parties.  In so doing we will also address whether publication
in the local newspapers of general jurisdiction is within the meaning of “notice” as it is used
in §§ 7-207(c) and 7-208(d) of the Public Utility Company Article.
We have often said that “‘the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain
and effectuate the intent of the legislature[.]’” Dep’t of Human Resources v. Howard, 397
Md. 353, 361, 918 A.2d 441, 446 (2007) (quoting Mayor & Town Council of Oakland v.
Mayor & Town Council of Mountain Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316, 896 A.2d 1036, 1045
(2006)); Melton v. State, 379 Md. 471, 476, 842 A.2d 743, 746 (2004).  The first step in
determining the intent of the General Assembly is to look “‘to the language of the statute,
giving it its natural and ordinary meaning.’”  Howard, 397 Md. at 361, 918 A.2d at 446-47
(quoting Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning
Comm’n, 348 Md. 2, 13, 702 A.2d 690, 696 (1997)).  Although we have expressed this
-27-
principle of construction repeatedly, our cases have articulated it slightly differently:  
“A court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not
evidenced in the plain unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it
construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its
application.  County Council v. Dutcher, 365 Md. 399, 416-17, 780 A.2d 1137,
1147 (2001).  In short, if the words of a statute clearly and unambiguously
delineate the legislative intent, ours is an ephemeral enterprise.  We need
investigate no further but simply apply the statute as it reads.  Derry[ v. State],
358 Md. [325, 335,] at 748 A.2d [478,] at 483 [(2000)]; Kaczorowski v. City
of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987).”
Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003).  We said in Chow v. State:
“‘If statutory language is unambiguous when construed according to its
ordinary and everyday meaning, then we give effect to the statute as it is
written.  Collins[ v. State], 383 Md.[ 684] at 688-89, 861 A.2d[ 727] at 730[
(2004)].  If there is no ambiguity in that language, either inherently or by
reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative
intent ends; we do not need to resort to the various, and sometimes
inconsistent, external rules of construction, for “the Legislature is presumed
to have meant what it said and said what it meant.”  Arundel Corp. v. Marie,
383 Md. 489, 502, 860 A.2d 886, 894 (2004) (quoting Witte v. Azarian, 369
Md. 518, 525, 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002)).’”
Chow, 393 Md. 431, 443-44, 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006) (quoting Kushell v. Dep’t of Natural
Resources, 385 Md. 563, 576-77, 870 A.2d 186, 193-94 (2005)).
Returning to the language of the sections at issue, we find no ambiguity.  There is no
requirement in either PUC § 7-207(c) or PUC § 7-208(d) that personal service of notice be
given to interested persons.  Those sections only require that notice be given to interested
persons.  If we were to agree with petitioners that these sections required personal service of
notice, we would be, at best, forcing an interpretation that limits the manner in which notice
may be given.  At worst, we would be adding text to the statute that would alter its meaning.
29 Counsel for the Commission, arguing before the Circuit Court for Garrett County,
summarized this point:
“The [L]egislature has told the Commission [how] it’s supposed to provide
notice[] [in] [§§] 7-207 and 7-208, it’s by publication in a newspaper.  That’s
how we do it. The [L]egislature knows how to do it differently.  In [s]ection
7-204, the [L]egislature did it differently, . . . under that section, we do have
to give actual notice to property owners . . . .  That section applies only when
there’s going to be a transmission line that goes over, on, or under the land of
the property owner. . . .  The [L]egislature tells us, in that circumstance, that
we must give actual direct notice, individual notice, to these property owners.
The [L]egislature tells us, otherwise, using [§§] 7-207 and 7-208, you do it by
publication, and that’s what the Commission did.”
-28-
Doing either would be contrary to the above expressed principles of statutory construction
that we have so frequently espoused, rendering them nothing more than guidelines to be cast
to the wind.
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the General Assembly, had it intended to
mean personal service of notice in PUC §§ 7-207(c) and 7-208(d), would have used language
to that effect as it did earlier in the same subtitle.  In PUC § 7-204, the General Assembly
provided that:
   “(a) Required notice to property owners. – (1) Notwithstanding any other
provision of this article, at least 30 days before a hearing, a public service
company shall provide to each owner of land, by certified mail, written notice
of intent to run a line or similar transmission device over, on, or under the
land.” (Emphasis added.)
No such specific language was used in §§ 7-207(c) and 7-208(d).  Instead, the General
Assembly used the more broad language “shall provide notice.”29  If petitioners’ assertion
that §§ 7-207(c) and 7-208(d) require individualized service of written notice (presumably
by certified mail)  is correct, that would mean that the General Assembly expressly required
30 The record does not indicate how many property owners or residents live within a
half mile of this 10.8 linear mile facility.
-29-
that the Commission provide the affected parties with personal service of notice in § 7-204,
then used less specific language in §§ 7-207(c) and 7-208(d), and somehow intended all three
sections to require personal individualized service of notice.  Such a theory is contrary to the
established principles of statutory construction.  The notice requirement found in PUC  §§
7-207(c) and 7-208(d) does not require personal service of notice.  It only requires
reasonable notice judged according to the circumstances.
In the present case and under petitioners’ theory, all interested persons should receive
personal service of notice.  Petitioners, without substantive explanation, define interested
persons as those owning property contiguous to the Facility and those within half a mile of
the project.30  Despite petitioners’ attempts to justify the half mile demarcation, we are
persuaded that it is an arbitrary boundary with no basis in law or fact (none provided by
petitioners and none revealed by our own research).  Without the arbitrary half mile limit,
how then would the Commission determine who are interested persons?  In the circumstances
of this case should individuals whose sight lines are affected by the towers be included?
They could be five miles or more away located in the mountainous terrain where the Facility
is sited.  Would environmental groups interested in protecting creatures or habitats in the area
be considered interested persons?  What about those groups interested in protecting creatures
that migrate through the area, but the group is headquartered half a continent away?  And
what about those thousands who might claim to be, or to pass, within earshot of the spinning
31 We point out that both Eric Tribbey and Russell Bounds, plaintiffs in the present
action below, were present at the hearing in question.  It seems safe to assume that they
received notice that the hearing was going to take place and that notice by advertisement was
(continued...)
-30-
blades?  Would all of such persons or groups, and many others, be entilted to “personal”
individualized service of notice?
We could go on, but the point is clear, especially when the present situation is
contrasted with the circumstances envisioned by PUC § 7-204(a) and the express language
therein requiring personal service of notice by certified mail to property owners who are
going to have power lines placed over, on, or under their property.  Such § 7-204(a) property
owners will always be a known, definite, and certain group-the persons over whose property
the lines will go.  Presumably, the utility will know where they are placing their own lines.
In the present situation, governed by PUC §§ 7-207(c) and 7-208(d), the potential pool of
interested persons, no matter how remotely interested, is virtually limitless.  The extent of
the pool of interested persons could never be determined.  Personal notification of all such
potentially interested persons, under the circumstances of this case (or similar cases), would
be impossible.  The agency could never be sure it had served notice, by certified mail or
otherwise, on all interested parties.  In essence, the business of the Commission could
effectively be brought to a halt.  Thus, unless the General Assembly specifies otherwise,
notification by advertisement in a newspaper of general circulation in the area of the
proposed project is sufficient to meet the notice requirement contained in PUC §§ 7-207(c)
and 7-208(d) of the Public Utility Companies Article.31
31(...continued)
sufficient in their cases.  Moreover, the attendance at the hearing was “standing room only.”
Clipper I, __ Md. at __, __ A.2d at __.  Apparently, the advertising of notice of the meeting
in the newspapers was effective.
-31-
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Circuit Court for Garrett County was
correct in granting respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition for declaratory relief.  The
petition for declaratory relief was properly dismissed because the General Assembly
provided specific remedies to resolve cases of this nature, petitioners did not exhaust those
remedies, and because the petition for declaratory relief was duplicative.  We also hold, that
under the circumstances of this case, advertisement in newspapers of general circulation met
the notice requirement contained in PUC §§ 7-207(c) and 7-208(d).
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE PAID BY PETITIONERS.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 125
September Term, 2006
_________________________________________
Paul C. Sprenger, et al.
v.
The Public Service Commission of 
Maryland, et al.
________________________________________
Raker
         
Cathell
Harrell
Greene
Eldridge, John C. 
(Retired, Specially Assigned)
Wilner, Alan M.
(Retired, Specially Assigned)
Bloom, Theodore G.
(Retired, Specially Assigned),
                  JJ.
________________________________________
Concurring Opinion by Eldridge, J., 
which Raker and Harrell, JJ., Join.
_________________________________________
Filed: June 21, 2007
Eldridge, J., concurring:
I concur in both the judgment and in the Court’s opinion.  Nonetheless, I believe
that some of the petitioners’ arguments, and the premises upon which they are based,
warrant additional comment.
The petitioners have brought this action under the Declaratory Judgments Act,
Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), §§ 3-401 et seq. of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, to challenge an adjudicatory administrative decision of the Public
Service Commission.  The simple, short and dispositive answer to all of the petitioners’
arguments is that no such declaratory judgment action will lie.  It has been expressly
precluded by the General Assembly.
Maryland Code (1998, 2006 Supp.), §§ 3-101 through 3-209 of the Public Utility
Companies Article, sets forth a special administrative remedy before the Public Service
Commission, with detailed provisions for judicial review, encompassing cases such as
the present one.  In Bell Atlantic v. Intercom, 366 Md. 1, 782 A.2d 791 (2001), this
Court comprehensively reviewed these statutory provisions and held that the statutorily
specified administrative-judicial review remedy was “primary” and that a litigant “may
not circumvent” the statutory remedy “by filing an independent judicial action,” Bell
Atlantic v. Intercom, supra, 366 Md. at 25-26, 782 A.2d at 805-806.
Since the statutory administrative-judicial review remedy was primary, rather
than exclusive, the Court in Bell Atlantic further held that, when the administrative
remedy had been invoked and fully exhausted, and a judicial review action had been
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filed, the Circuit Court could entertain together the judicial review action and a
previously stayed common law tort or breach of contract action.  The reason for
permitting both actions to be considered together when the administrative-judicial
review action was primary, rather than exclusive, is that the litigant may, under the
common law actions, be entitled to “remedies beyond the scope of the Commission,”
Bell Atlantic, 366 Md. at 28, 782 A.2d at 807.  See also, e.g., Maryland Reclamation
v. Harford County, 382 Md. 348, 367, 855 A.2d 351, 362 (2004); Kim v. Comptroller,
350 Md. 527, 536-537, 714 A.2d 176, 180 (1998); McCullough v. Wittner, 314 Md.
602, 612-613, 552 A.2d 881, 886 (1989); Md.-Nat’l Cap. P. & P. Comm’n v. Crawford,
307 Md. 1, 18, 511 A.2d 1079, 1087-1088 (1986).  Neither Bell Atlantic nor any of the
other above-cited opinions, however, held that a separate declaratory judgment action
would lie to challenge the administrative decision; no declaratory judgment action was
brought in any of these cases.
The Declaratory Judgments Act, in § 3-409(b) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, unambiguously states as follows:
“Special form of remedy provided by statute. – If a statute
provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that
statutory remedy shall be followed in lieu of a proceeding under
this subtitle.”
This Court has consistently held that, where a statutory administrative-judicial review
remedy is exclusive or primary, the above-quoted provision in the Declaratory
Judgments Act prohibits a declaratory judgment action brought to challenge an
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adjudicatory administrative decision rendered within the agency’s jurisdiction.
Although a common law or other type of statutory action may sometimes be
entertained along with the judicial review action when the administrative-judicial
review remedy is primary instead of exclusive, a declaratory judgment proceeding may
not be brought.  The plain language of the statute, as well as the opinions of this Court,
make this clear.
For example, in Hartman v. Prince George’s County, 264 Md. 320, 286 A.2d 88
(1972), opponents of an administrative decision, like the petitioners in the present case,
attempted to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging the decision.  This Court,
in an opinion by Chief Judge Hammond, after quoting the language now codified as
§ 3-409(b) of the Declaratory Judgments Act (then codified as Code (1957, 1971 Repl.
Vol.), Art. 31A, § 6), stated (264 Md. at 323, 286 A.2d at 89):
“This Court consistently has applied the rule of § 6 that
declarations will not be given where ‘a statute provides a special
form of remedy for a specific type of case’ because ‘that form of
remedy must be followed.’  See Reiling v. Comptroller, 201 Md.
384; Tanner v. McKeldin, 202 Md. 569 (right to vote must be
determined as Art. 33 provides and liability to income tax must be
determined as the Income Tax Act provides); Albert v. Public
Service Commission, 209 Md. 27, 41 . . . .” 
Similarly, in Gingell v. County Commissioners, 249 Md. 374, 377, 239 A.2d 903,
905 (1968), this Court affirmed the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action
challenging an adjudicatory administrative decision, saying, inter alia, that 
“where a statute provides a specific form of remedy in a specific
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1
It should be noted that the statutory administrative-judicial review proceedings applicable in
the Ray’s Used Cars, Hartman, and Gingell cases have not been held to be exclusive.  The holding
that no action could be brought under the Declaratory Judgements Act was deemed applicable
regardless of whether the administrative-judicial review proceedings were deemed exclusive or
primary.  See Prince George’s County v. Ray’s Used Cars, supra.
2
There are a few “exceptions” to the principle that a declaratory judgment action, challenging
an adjudicatory administrative decision made within the agency’s jurisdiction, will not lie.  In
reality, however, they may not be “exceptions” but may be consistent with the principle.  Thus,
(continued...)
case then this remedy must be followed.  Code (1957), Article 31A,
Section 6 . . . .”
Very recently, this Court unanimously reaffirmed the interpretation of the
Declaratory Judgments Act that, where a statute provides a primary administrative-
judicial review remedy for a specific type of case, a declaratory judgment action
challenging an administrative decision in such a case, rendered within the agency’s
jurisdiction, is prohibited.  Prince George’s County v. Ray’s Used Cars, __ Md. __, __
A.2d __ (2007), and cases there cited.1  See also, e.g., Fertitta v. Brown, 252 Md. 594,
598, 599-600, 251 A.2d 212, 214, 215 (1969) (“We think this is one of those relatively
rare instances of a petition for declaratory relief in which a demurrer properly was filed,
as a justified challenge to the availability of the remedy sought to be used [to challenge
an administrative decision].  * * *  Declaratory Proceedings were not intended to and
should not serve as a substitute for appellate review or a belated appeal”); Poe v.
Baltimore City, 241 Md. 303, 315-316, 216 A.2d 707, 713-714 (1966) (discussing and
applying the provision of the Declaratory Judgments Act precluding an action under
that statute where the Legislature has provided a specific form of remedy); Baltimore
v. Seabolt, 210 Md. 199, 204, 210, 123 A.2d 207, 209, 212 (1956) (same).2
-5-
2
(...continued)
where the declaratory judgment challenge is not to the agency’s decision within the sphere of its
valid jurisdiction, but is directed at the legislative validity of the enactment as a whole, which the
agency is applying, a declaratory judgment will lie under some circumstances.  See, e.g.,
Montgomery County v. Broadcast Equities, 360 Md. 438, 452-461, 758 A.2d 995, 1002-1007
(2000); Harbor Island Marina v. Calvert Co., 286 Md. 303, 308-309, 407 A.2d 738, 741 (1979);
Pressman v. State Tax Commission, 204 Md. 78, 83-84, 102 A.2d 821, 824-825 (1954).  Also, when
an agency ultimately decides that it has no jurisdiction over a particular type of case, and that
decision is not reversed upon judicial review, a stayed declaratory judgment action involving the
controversy may proceed in court.  State v. State Board of Contract Appeals, 364 Md. 446, 458-459,
773 A.2d 504, 511-512 (2001).  The case at bar falls within no “exceptions” to § 3-409(b) of the
Declaratory Judgments Act.
Consequently, although I agree with the Court that this case “is inexorably
linked” to the judicial review action because both actions are challenges to the same
administrative decision by the Public Service Commission, the decision in this case is
not dependent upon or linked to the decision in the judicial review action.  In light of
§ 3-409(b) of the Declaratory Judgments Act, the instant declaratory judgment action
will not lie regardless of whether the Public Service Commission’s decision in the
judicial review action is upheld or overturned. 
The petitioners rely on the fact that, at the time this action was brought, the
judicial review action was no longer pending at the circuit court level.  Nevertheless,
as numerous opinions by this Court illustrate, the status of the judicial review action
is immaterial.  It does not matter whether the judicial review action had even been filed,
or was pending before the agency, or was pending before a circuit court, or was pending
before an appellate court, or had been terminated.  What precludes an action under the
Declaratory Judgments Act is the fact that the General Assembly has enacted “a special
form of remedy for [this] specific type of case,” § 3-409(b) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article.  The existence of the statute providing a special form of remedy,
-6-
3
It is conceivable, I suppose, that one aggrieved by administrative action may have standing to
challenge that action in court, but, because of a peculiar and limiting statute relating to standing
before the agency, would not have standing to appear at the adjudicatory administrative proceedings.
Under such circumstances, the person may be entitled to bring a common law or equitable action
in court challenging the administrative decision.  Such person could not, however, bring a
declaratory judgment action.
not the status of a case, if any, brought under that statute, is what precludes a
declaratory judgment action.
Similarly, it is also immaterial whether the parties in the two actions are the same
or are different.  Instead, it is the provision of a statutory special form of remedy, not
who happens to invoke that remedy, which takes the present case outside of the scope
of the Declaratory Judgments Act.3  
The same is true regarding the petitioners’ “notice” argument.  Although I fully
agree with the Court that the notice given by the Public Service Commission met the
statutory notice requirement, it is not an issue appropriate for declaratory judgment
consideration.  Section 3-409(b) simply prohibits a declaratory judgment action.  If, in
some other case, the notice given by an administrative agency were to violate statutory
or constitutional requirements, and an aggrieved person were prejudiced by the lack of
notice and unable, because of such insufficient notice, to appear before the agency, a
common law mandamus action might well lie to require that administrative officials
comply with the law.  Cf. Murrell v. Baltimore, 376 Md. 170, 192-199, 829 A.2d 548,
561-565 (2003); Gisriel v. Ocean City Elections Board, 345 Md. 477, 497-500, 693
A.2d 757, 767 (1997), and cases there cited.  An action under the Declaratory
Judgments Act, however, does not lie.
-7-
Judges Raker and Harrell join this concurring opinion.