Case Title: State Ex Rel. Balsinger v. Town of Madisonville

Citation: 435 S.W.2d 803

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1968-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
435 S.W.2d 803 (1968) STATE of Tennessee ex rel. Carl BALSINGER, Plaintiff-in Error, v. TOWN OF MADISONVILLE, Defendant-in-Error. Supreme Court of Tennessee. December 23, 1968. *804 W.E. Badgett, Knoxville, for plaintiff in error. Lee & Pennington, Madisonville, for defendant in error; J.D. Lee, Madisonville, of counsel. CHATTIN, Justice. This is an appeal from an adverse judgment of the Circuit Court of Monroe County upholding the validity of an ordinance passed for the purpose of annexing a certain area to the City of Madisonville. Relator, Balsinger, filed the suit under authority of T.C.A. Section 6-310 seeking to have the ordinance vacated as unreasonable and unnecessary in consideration of the health, safety and welfare of the citizens residing within the area to be annexed as well as those residing within the City. Relator demanded a jury to try the issues. The trial judge, after hearing extensive evidence, dismissed the jury and decided the ordinance was reasonable and valid in all respects. Relator assigns as error the following: With respect to the first assignment of error, the record shows the Board of Mayor and Aldermen of the Town of Madisonville met at nine P.M., on May 30, 1966, and passed the ordinance on first reading. The Board adjourned until ten P.M., the same day, at which time the ordinance was passed on second reading. The Board then *805 adjourned until the following day and passed the ordinance on third and final reading. The charter of Madisonville does not make provision as to the number of readings necessary for the adoption of an ordinance. The charter does provide the regular meetings of the Board of Mayor and Aldermen shall be held quarterly; that is, four each year. Relator insists the ordinance was not passed in accord with the following provision of the charter: The trial judge correctly found the ordinance had passed three separate readings at one meeting. Relator further contends the evidence shows prior Boards of the Town had consistently passed ordinances on three separate and distinct meetings and thus a practice or custom had been set which was binding in the instant case. We disagree. There is a presumption in favor of the validity of an ordinance and those questioning this validity have the burden of proof. State ex rel. Senff v. City of Columbia, 208 Tenn. 59, 343 S.W.2d 888 (1961). There is no proof of fraud or bad faith on the part of the Board. Nor does the charter provide an ordinance must pass one reading at three separate meetings. We overrule the assignment. By the second assignment of error, relator insists the resolution adopting the plan of services is vague, evasive, wholly inadequate and does not comply with T.C.A. Section 6-309. In the case of State ex rel. Robbins v. City of Jackson, 218 Tenn. 322, 403 S.W.2d 304 (1966), this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Creson, said: There is proof in the record services of fire protection, police protection, garbage disposal, erection of street signs, signals and markings would become effective as soon as the annexation ordinance became operative. The matter of extending water and sewer service would be done as soon as it was determined the areas in which the extensions were feasible. Engineering studies were being made for this purpose. The record further shows the City had an average bond issuing rating and had no outstanding general obligation bonds which might affect the issuance and sale of bonds to finance the services outlined in the plan of services. In view of the testimony relating to the plan of services and the foregoing opinion of this Court, we think the City has complied with T.C.A. Section 6-309 as held by the trial judge. The third, fourth and sixth assignments will be treated together. These assignments deal with the question of whether the trial judge erred in taking the case from the jury and deciding the question of the reasonableness of the annexation ordinance. T.C.A. Section 6-310 provides an aggrieved property owner may contest an annexation ordinance in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding. This statute has been held constitutional. Witt v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 360, 292 S.W.2d 392 (1956). In the case of Morton v. Johnson City, 206 Tenn. 411, 333 S.W.2d 924 (1960). In commenting on Witt v. McCanless, supra, the Court said: The constitutional guaranty of trial by jury refers to common law actions and not to suits of an equitable nature. Hunt v. Hunt, 169 Tenn. 1, 80 S.W.2d 666 (1935). In the Morton case, the Court further said: In the case at bar there are two volumes of testimony both for and against annexation from which the trial judge determined the question of the reasonableness of the ordinance was a fairly debatable *807 one. Consequently, he was not in error in withdrawing the issues from the jury and finding the ordinance reasonable. Relator's fifth assignment contends the ordinance violates the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Tennessee in that it subjects residents of the area to be annexed to pre-existing bonded indebtedness of the City and thus takes their property without consent and just compensation. He also insists this violation of constitutional rights was compounded by the denial of a jury trial. We have heretofore seen there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in such cases. As to the contention the ordinance conflicts with certain provisions of our State and Federal Constitutions, this Court, in the case of Williams v. Nashville, 89 Tenn. 487, 15 S.W. 364 (1891), said: The seventh and final assignment of error urges there is no material or substantial evidence in the record to support the judgment of the trial court. Our review is de novo of all matters of fact and law appearing in the record, but there is a statutory presumption in favor of the judgment of the trial court unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Any conflict in testimony requiring a determination of the credibility of a witness or witnesses is for the trial court and binding on this Court unless from other real evidence we are compelled to conclude to the contrary. There is evidence of witnesses for both relator and defendant the ordinance was reasonable and necessary for the health, safety and welfare of the residents of the City and the area to be annexed. An expert testified he had assisted other cities and towns in the State with annexations and in his opinion the ordinance was reasonable. He was also of the opinion the City was in a position to furnish services as set forth in the plan of services. There is also evidence of the financial status of the City and of a financial expert *808 the City enjoyed an average rating for the sale of bonds. From a review of all the evidence and the presumption of the correctness of the judgment of the trial court, we do not find the evidence preponderates against the judgment. All assignments are overruled and the judgment of the trial judge is affirmed. Relator will pay the costs. BURNETT, C.J., DYER, CRESON and HUMPHREYS, JJ., concur.