Case Title: Grandison v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 117/10

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
HEADNOTE:
Anthony Grandison v. State of Maryland, No. 117, September Term, 2010
CRIMINAL LAW—RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A defendant does not have the right to
counsel on collateral motions, such as ones to reopen postconviction proceedings, in a
criminal case where he has previously faced a postconviction proceeding and fired his
public-defender-appointed counsel.
CRIMINAL LAW—WAIVER: Failure to state a claim on direct appeal, during habeas
corpus proceedings, or during a petition for postconviction relief, combined with a failure
to address waiver in a petition to reopen postconviction proceedings, does not rebut the
statutory presumption that those claims have been waived.
CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE: The U.S. Supreme Court’s rule in Crawford v.
Washington does not apply retroactively in Maryland.
CRIMINAL LAW—CORRECTING ILLEGAL SENTENCE: This Court has previously
rejected constitutional challenges to the death penalty, and no Constitutional change has
occurred since that rejection.  The death penalty is not now illegal as a matter of
constitutional law, and a motion to correct an illegal sentence is not a cognizable claim
against a death sentence.
CRIMINAL LAW—CAPITAL SENTENCING: Capital sentencing issues are to be
resolved in a single proceeding, leaving no discretion with a trial court to permit a bifurcated
proceeding
Circuit Court for Somerset County
Case No. 4010
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 117
September Term, 2010
                                                                             
ANTHONY GRANDISON
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                             
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Greene
Adkins
Rodowsky, Lawrence F.
(Retired, Specially Assigned)
Raker, Irma S.
(Retired, Specially Assigned)
Wilner, Alan M.,
(Retired, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Adkins, J.
                                                                             
Filed:   February 22, 2012
1Grandison was convicted of first degree murder in 1984 for orchestrating the slaying
of two people.
2Previous published opinions are: Evans [and Grandison] v. State, 301 Md. 45, 481
A.2d 1135 (1984) (“Grandison I”); Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 506 A.2d 580 (1986)
(“Grandison II”); Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175, 670 A.2d 398 (1995) (“Grandison III”);
Grandison v. State, 351 Md. 732, 720 A.2d 322 (1998) (“Grandison IV”); 390 Md. 412, 889
A.2d 366 (2005) (“Grandison V”).
3After Grandison fired his attorneys, the Office of the Public Defender did not appoint
new counsel to aid him in pursuing his collateral motions.  He was appointed counsel, for
this appeal, by the Public Defender on or about April 25, 2011.
In his sixth journey to the Court of Appeals, Anthony Grandison, a prisoner on death
row for his role in a pair of 1983 murders, presents various requests for relief.1  His previous
appeals have resulted in one order denying an appeal and four published opinions, the latest
in 2005.2  Since this Court last ruled on Grandison’s case, he has made numerous motions
to keep the case active in the Maryland courts, and he has fired several lawyers during the
pendency of those motions.  The Circuit Court for Somerset County (“Circuit Court”)
evaluated his motions: (1) to reopen postconviction proceedings; (2) to correct an illegal
sentence; (3) for a new resentencing hearing or, alternatively, to file a belated appeal; and
(4) for a new trial.  After consideration, the Circuit Court dismissed the motions and denied
Grandison relief.
Meanwhile, the Circuit Court granted his motion to fire two appointed attorneys from
the Office of the Public Defender, and he proceeded pro se for part of the aforementioned
collateral proceedings.3  Now, Grandison argues that he had a right to counsel for those
proceedings, and has requested that he be appointed counsel by the Office of the Public
Defender, so that he may go back and litigate the denied collateral claims with the benefit
4In making this transfer, the Court of Special Appeals cited Maryland Code (1999,
2006 Repl. Vol.), Section 12-307(4) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which
provides that the Court of Appeals has “[e]xclusive appellate jurisdiction over a criminal
case in which the death penalty is imposed[.]”
2
of counsel.
Grandison also appealed the denial of the motions, on the merits, to the Court of
Special Appeals, which transferred the case to this Court on December 15, 2010.4
Grandison presents nine questions for our review:
1. Was Appellant deprived of his right to counsel, in a capital
case, after he filed various motions seeking a new trial, a re-
opened post conviction, or a new sentencing?
2. Where Appellant was entitled to a hearing on the question of
whether the State engaged in racial discrimination in exercising
peremptory strikes, and where his appellate counsel failed to
make that argument, did the court below err in failing to rule on
whether his post conviction should be opened for consideration
of those issues?
3. Should the rule of evidence announced in Crawford v.
Washington be applied retroactively in Maryland?
4. From the pre-marking of two mitigating circumstances on the
sentencing form, could the jurors have inferred a finding by the
Court that only two mitigating circumstances existed or merited
serious consideration?
5. Should Appellant have either a new resentencing or a belated
appeal, where a letter that was not admitted into evidence was
sent to the jury and characterized by the State as a critical piece
of evidence?
6. At Appellant’s 1984 trial, was the jury instruction on
reasonable doubt plain error?
7. Do the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws
preclude the retroactive application to Appellant of any new
execution regulations?
8. Was it an abuse of discretion to deny the motion for new
trial?
9. Was the death sentence illegal, where the aggravating
5Grandison first came before us on an appeal of an interlocutory order, in which the
trial court denied his motion to dismiss the charges before him on federal constitutional
grounds.  See Grandison I, 301 Md. at 49, 481 A.2d at 1137.  Then came a direct appeal of
his murder conviction.  See Grandison II, 305 Md. at 696, 506 A.2d at 585. 
3
circumstance occurred after the murders had already been
committed?
The State has moved to dismiss Questions Two, Three, Four, and Six.  For reasons explained
below, we shall deny the State’s motion to dismiss these four questions.  We shall also hold
that Grandison did not have a right to counsel during the collateral proceedings.  We shall
affirm the denial and dismissal of Grandison’s motions by the Circuit Court.
Facts and Legal Proceedings
Grandison’s case was most recently before this Court in Grandison V.5  By way of
introduction, in that case we described much of the early procedural history of this matter:
The appellant, Anthony Grandison, was convicted of hiring
Vernon Evans, Jr. to murder David Scott Piechowicz and Cheryl
Piechowicz on April 28, 1983 at the Warren House Motel
located in Baltimore County, Maryland; however, because Ms.
Piechowicz was ill, her sister, Susan Kennedy, who was filling
in for her, was murdered in her stead.  Grandison was convicted
of first degree murder of both victims and was sentenced to
death.  This Court has, in four previous opinions, rejected
Grandison’s various challenges to his trial, convictions, and
sentences. 
Grandison V, 390 Md. at 416, 889 A.2d at 368.  This Court also summarized some of the
previous opinions, which we present here once again:
On November 1, 1990, Grandison filed a petition, pursuant to
Md. Code (1957, 1987 Repl. Vol., 1990 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27,
§ 645A, in the Circuit Court for Somerset County seeking post
4
conviction relief.  On July 31, 1992, the circuit court granted
such relief, ordering a new capital sentencing proceeding on
Grandison’s convictions of first degree murder.  Relying upon
the Supreme Court’s decision in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S.
367, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1988), the circuit court
granted the requested relief on the grounds that the sentencing
form and related jury instructions employed at Grandison’s first
sentencing proceeding offended the dictates of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution that
the death penalty not be imposed where there are mitigating
factors which may call for a less severe penalty. The circuit
court also decided that Grandison was entitled to retroactive
application of the Mills decision. The State applied to this Court
for leave to appeal from the circuit court’s grant of post
conviction relief as to the death sentences, and Grandison filed
a cross-application seeking review of the circuit court’s denial
of collateral relief on the underlying convictions. We denied
both applications. Grandison v. State, Misc. No. 29, Sept. Term
1992 (order filed October 23, 1992).  The Supreme Court
denied a petition and cross-petition for writ of certiorari on
March 22, 1993.  Maryland v. Grandison, 507 U.S. 985, 113 S.
Ct. 1581, 123 L. Ed. 2d 149 (1993); Grandison v. Maryland,
507 U.S. 985, 113 S. Ct. 1581, 123 L. Ed. 2d 149 (1993).
In 1993, Grandison filed a number of motions in the circuit
court to bar his re-sentencing on double jeopardy grounds. The
circuit court denied these motions and Grandison’s subsequent
request for a stay of the re-sentencing proceeding pending an
appeal of the circuit court’s ruling on his motions. Grandison
then applied to the Court of Special Appeals for a stay of the
re-sentencing. On May 11, 1994, the matter was transferred to
this Court. We issued an order denying the requested stay.
Grandison v. State, Misc. No. 20, Sept. Term, 1994 (order filed
May 12, 1994). 
* * *
Grandison’s re-sentencing proceeding began on May 24, 1994
and lasted eight days. The prosecution presented the same
evidence that it had introduced at Grandison’s guilt/innocence
trial including testimony from Cheryl Piechowicz, Charlene
Sparrow, James Savage, and Calvin Harper, which was
5
essentially identical to their testimony in the 1984 trial. The
State also introduced testimony from Janet Moore for the first
time during the re-sentencing proceeding. Moore’s testimony
corroborated the statements made by Sparrow regarding the
events of the two days immediately prior to the murders. She
also stated that she heard Grandison tell Kelly to take Evans to
the Warren House and show him “who the white couple was.”
At the conclusion of Grandison’s capital re-sentencing
proceeding, on June 3, 1994, a Somerset County jury imposed
two death sentences. This Court affirmed the death sentences in
[Grandison III].
Id. at 420–21, 889 A.2d at 370–71.
Grandison then filed a petition for postconviction relief in the Circuit Court, which
eventually denied relief.  This Court denied Grandison’s application for leave to appeal and
his motion to reconsider denial of his application for leave to appeal.  See Grandison IV, 351
Md. at 732, 720 A.2d at 322.  Grandison also petitioned for federal habeas relief, which was
denied.  See generally Grandison v. Corcoran, 78 F. Supp. 2d 499 (D. Md. 2000), appeal
dismissed at 225 F.3d 654 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied 532 U.S. 996, 121 S. Ct. 1658
(2001).
Beginning in 1999, Grandison filed several motions in Circuit Court, including a
motion for a new trial, motion to correct an illegal sentence, and a pro se motion to reopen
postconviction proceedings.  See Grandison V, 390 Md. at 421, 889 A.2d at 371.  The
Circuit Court held evidentiary hearings and then denied Grandison’s motions in their
entirety.  See id. at 422, 426–27, 889 A.2d at 372, 374.  This Court affirmed those denials.
Id. at 448, 889 A.2d at 387.
6
Continued Motions
After we decided Grandison V, Grandison’s pursuit of further relief continued
unabated.  He first filed a motion on February 3, 2006, to reopen his postconviction
proceedings, in which he argued that: (1) several items in the State’s evidence were deficient
under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004); (2) the trial court had
erroneously pre-marked mitigating factors on a jury sentencing form; and (3) he received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Grandison concomitantly filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, in which he
made the same arguments about evidence under Crawford, the jury sentencing form, and
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Shortly thereafter, he filed an “Addendum to Motion to
Reopen Post-Conviction Proceedings and Request for Hearing and Discovery.”  In this
addendum, he alleged statewide racial bias and discriminatory prosecution with respect to
the death penalty.  The State answered all three motions.
Next, Grandison filed a Second Addendum to his motion to reopen the postconviction
proceedings; an Addendum to his motion to correct the illegal sentence; and a supplement
to his previously filed claim about racial bias.  This was only the beginning.  The record also
reflects, inter alia, the following activity by Grandison:
•
Four motions filed March 1, 2007: (1) An ex parte motion to withdraw
counsel of record; (2) a motion for a new resentencing hearing or,
alternatively, to file a belated appeal; (3) a motion for a new trial; and (4) a
6Proceedings were held on July 3, 2007; September 5, 2008; June 30, 2009; and April
26, 2010.  These will be discussed in further detail below, as each bears on Grandison’s
interactions with various counsel.
7
motion to correct an illegal sentence.
•
Another motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed March 16, 2007.
•
A combined motion for a new trial and motion to reopen postconviction
proceedings, filed August 9, 2007.
•
A motion, filed October 24, 2007, claiming that the State’s failure to answer
old motions required the court to grant them.
•
A motion for an evidentiary hearing on previous motions, filed May 27, 2008.
Resolving all the unsettled issues before it, the Circuit Court distilled everything
raised in the pending motions and related hearings6 into four avenues of relief sought by
Grandison.  In a memorandum opinion on September 1, 2010, the court denied relief.
First, the Circuit Court addressed Grandison’s motion to reopen postconviction
proceedings.  The court analyzed this motion on five points:
Grandison contends the Court incorrectly admitted into
evidence:
1. Reports of [his] behavior within the institution,
2. Victim impact statements,
3. The doctor’s statement concerning Helen
Kondilidis’s grave health,
and erred when it:
4. Pre-marked the mitigators in Grandison’s favor
on the sentencing form, and,
8
5. Failed to prevent the systematic exclusion of
African-American jurors.
After analyzing all five issues, the Circuit Court denied Grandison’s motion to reopen
postconviction proceedings across the board.  Each of these five issues is now before us:
Issues 1–3 are now presented as Question Three; Issue 4 is now presented in Question Four;
and Issue 5 is presented in Question Two.
Second, the Circuit Court addressed Grandison’s motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Grandison made two arguments in support of this motion: (1) that the death sentence was
illegal because the aggravating circumstances leading to Grandison’s death sentence
happened after the murders had already been committed; and (2) that the death penalty has
been illegal in Maryland since 2006.  The Circuit Court addressed the merits of these
arguments and denied Grandison’s motion to correct an illegal sentence.  Issue 1 is now
presented to this Court as Question Nine, and Issue 2 is now presented to us, in moderately
different form, as part of Question Seven.
Third, the Circuit Court addressed Grandison’s motion for a new resentencing
hearing.  Grandison offered three arguments in support of this motion: (1) he was entitled
to litigate the admissibility of State’s Exhibit 21; (2) the trial court’s reasonable doubt
instruction during his 1984 trial was improper; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of
counsel.  The Circuit Court addressed the merits of these arguments and denied his motion.
Issue 1 is now presented to this Court as Question Five; Issue 2 is presented as Question Six;
and Issue 3 is not before us.
9
Lastly, the Circuit Court addressed Grandison’s motion for a new trial.  The court
summarized Grandison’s argument in support of this motion:
1. The State used perjured testimony of Cheryl Piechowicz and
James Savage,
2. The State knowingly suppressed exculpatory evidence that
showed Etta Horne, Charlene Sparrow, and Helen Kondilidis
committed perjury, and
3. The mental [disorder] of Helen Kondilidis at the time of the
1984 trial [was undisclosed].
Again, the court addressed the merits of each of these arguments and denied the motion.
These three arguments are now before us, presented as Question Eight.
The Circuit Court concluded: “Accordingly, after full and fair consideration of the
arguments of the parties, this Court finds that, for the reasons mentioned, it is ORDERED
that, any and all relief requested by Movant Anthony Grandison is hereby DENIED and
DISMISSED.”
Grandison’s Counsel
From his 1984 trial through 2007, Grandison changed attorneys multiple times,
largely at his own initiative.  During this period, he was represented by more than a dozen
attorneys.  In February 2007, his counsel of record were Gary E. Proctor and Michael E.
Lawlor, each appointed by the Public Defender.  In a letter to the Circuit Court on or about
February 28, 2007, Grandison filed an ex parte motion to withdraw counsel of record.
Grandison then wrote a letter to the Circuit Court on April 18, 2007, expressing his
continued desire to proceed without appointed counsel.
10
Proctor then wrote to the Circuit Court, saying he had spoken with the head of the
Capital Division of the Office of the Public Defender.  Proctor stated that, in the event he and
Lawlor were discharged as counsel, the Public Defender would not appoint other counsel to
represent Grandison.  In response to this letter, Grandison wrote to the Circuit Court and said
“I do not want either Mr. Proctor or Mr. Lawlar [sic] to act in my behalf in any capacity, and
will not accept either under any circumstances as standby counsel.” 
The Circuit Court held a heading on July 3, 2007, to determine “[1]whether or not the
Court will allow . . .Grandison to discharge counsel . . . [2] whether or not the request to
discharge counsel is meritorious . . . [and] [3] whether or not it’s appropriate to appoint
counsel or to request a public defender to proceed further with appointed counsel.”  The
record reflects the following exchange between the court and Proctor:
The Court: What is your position with respect to continuing to
represent Mr. Grandison?
Mr. Proctor: If Mr. Grandison — I’ve got enough clients that
want my help, without forcing myself on someone who doesn’t.
I have no objection to Mr. Grandison’s motion. I don’t think
there’s cause.  And in good [conscience], I can’t stand in front
of this Court and represent that I should have done things that
I haven’t.  I think I’ve provided him with effective assistance
throughout, but neither do I want to force myself on him, so I
have no objection to his motion to fire me, basically.  That’s
fine.
The Court: Would you be prepared to continue if he agreed to
allow you to continue?
Mr. Proctor: Yes, I would.
11
The Court: Are you prepared to prosecute the motions?
Mr. Proctor: The motions I file, yes, and — of which I think 90
percent will agree with the motions Mr. Grandison wants to file.
We’ll just lock heads over a few issues, I’m sure.  But, you
know, I believe in Mr. Grandison’s right to counsel.  I want him
to have his day in court.  If he withdraws his motion, I’ll
continue to represent him to the best of my ability.
Lawlor testified:
The truth of the matter is, is that Mr. Grandison’s motions are
ridiculous and frivolous and insulting, but it’s his choice.  It’s
his life.  As Mr. Proctor said, I am not going to beg and plead to
work in my office and not spend time with my wife and not
work on my other cases to an individual who doesn’t want my
representation.  I would stay.  I will stay.  I undertook the
representation knowing what it entails.
Grandison spoke as well:
The Court: What else do you want to say in response to either
something that Mr. Proctor said or Mr. Lawlor said?  Do you
want them to continue to represent you?
Mr. Grandison: No, definitely not.
The Court: Do you want to discharge them?
Mr. Grandison: Yes, sir.
Grandison was also advised that “the public defender may not appoint additional
counsel” were he to discharge Proctor and Lawlor.  In response, Grandison said, “that’s a
bridge I’ll have to cross, you know what I’m saying, when I get there.”  The State then said
that Grandison had not shown “good cause” to discharge Proctor and Lawlor.
The Court made its ruling:
I will allow Mr. Grandison to discharge counsel, Mr. Proctor
and Mr. [Lawlor].  The Court has fully and fairly considered the
12
arguments and the pleadings and the correspondence.  The
Court finds that there is no meritorious reason for discharge of
counsel, but will allow the same to occur.
Grandison appeared again in Circuit Court, this time pro se, on September 5, 2008.
At this hearing, Grandison said, “I wish counsel,” but also stated that he had requested
counsel from the public defender’s office and had not received a response.  Grandison
averred that he was prepared to represent himself on his request for an evidentiary hearing,
and the Circuit Court heard his argument.  The court denied the motion.  When the hearing
concluded, the court said: 
Given the nature of this case I’m willing to give you one more
shot at getting counsel.  I will tell you I think it’s probably an
exercise in futility based on my previous experience in eighteen
years with Mr. Grandison, but I’m willing to allow him the
opportunity to get counsel and continue this case for a short
period of time.
The Circuit Court also requested that Grandison submit a letter within sixty days advising
the court about his efforts to secure counsel.
On or about December 15, 2008, Grandison filed a pro se motion for appointment of
counsel.  At a hearing on June 30, 2009, Grandison had not secured counsel. 
At this hearing, the Court also mentioned:
[T]he Court received a letter from Nancy Forster who is the
Public Defender who indicated to the Court that the Public
Defender would not provide counsel . . . . [quoting from letter:]
“I will not authorize the appointment of another attorney from
the Office of the Public Defender to represent Mr. Grandison in
any further proceeding.”
13
The Circuit Court continued the case for 120 days to afford Grandison the opportunity to
find counsel, adding:
if representation does not come forward within that . . . period
and there is not a reasonable request for a continuance from
counsel who may enter an appearance for Mr. Grandison[,]
whatever date we decide this case is going to be heard[,] the
Court is not going to do anything further with respect to
securing counsel.
At a fourth hearing on April 26, 2010, the judge and Grandison discussed his various
attempts to obtain counsel.  Grandison mentioned he had sent letters to various attorneys
suggested by the Circuit Court.  Grandison had received a letter from the Death Penalty
Representation Project, saying that group would be unable to represent him.  The judge also
stated that he had reached out to various pro bono practices at firms, without success.  The
judge indicated he had contacted several law professors in an attempt to procure counsel,
also without success. 
After some discussion of a recently decided case, Office of the Public Defender v.
State, 413 Md. 411, 993 A.2d 55 (2010) (“OPD”), the Circuit Court made the following
ruling:
[T]he Court is not persuaded that [OPD] requires the Court
under the facts of this case to order the Public Defender to
provide counsel for you, Mr. Grandison.  
And given the reasons that Ms. Forster[,] who was then the
Public Defender[,] gave for declining to provide representation
previously[,] the Court believes that the Rules and the case law
do not require that counsel be appointed at State expense for
these proceedings.  And notwithstanding what I just said[,] the
14
Court has . . . on several occasions . . . continued this case
because the Court believes it’s important that Mr. Grandison
have representation if representation is available and willing to
provide advice and counsel to him.
The Court has made efforts beyond what I think is required of
the Court in order to find representation for Mr. Grandison
unsuccessfully.
At trial twice the Court is aware[,] because I was at one of those
trials[,] that Mr. Grandison[,] because of disagreements with his
attorneys[,] discharged them and proceeded pro se.  And,
accordingly, the Court is going to deny the motion to appoint
counsel.
Now, what’s interesting in looking back the last few days
through these motions[;] most if not all of the motions that were
filed[,] even though it’s filed by counsel who may have been
representing Mr. Grandison at the time[,] were his product.  The
Court is mindful of and respects Mr. Grandison’s ability to
understand and argue the issues.  And once again the motion for
appointment of counsel is denied.
Motion to Dismiss
The State moved to dismiss Questions Two, Three, Four, and Six in this case on
procedural grounds.  The State directs us to several statutory provisions and rules to support
its dismissal.  First, the State cites Section 7-109(a) of the Criminal Procedure Article, which
requires that an appeal of postconviction proceedings begin with an application for leave to
appeal.  Md. Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 7-109(a) of the Criminal Procedure Article.
Although this section provides that “person[s] aggrieved by” a postconviction order “may
apply to the Court of Special Appeals for leave to appeal the order,” we have said that
Section 2-401 of the Criminal Law Article, “when construed in conjunction with [Section
15
7-109(a) of the Criminal Procedure Article], provides for direct review by this Court of any
proceedings in a case where the death penalty has been imposed.”  Johnson v. State, 292 Md.
405, 435–36 n.16 (1982).  We also adopted Maryland Rule 8-306, which “applies to . . . an
application for leave to appeal from a judgment granting or denying relief in a post
conviction proceeding brought to review a judgment imposing a sentence of death,” and
directs that the application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals be made “by filing the
application with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals.”  Md. Rule 8-306(a), (e)(1).
 As the State argues, “Grandison has never filed an [application for leave to appeal]
after his motions to reopen post conviction were denied; rather, he filed what was tantamount
to a direct appeal, through a pleading captioned: ‘Notice of Appeal.’”  The State’s argument
proceeds:
[Rule 8-306] provides that Maryland Rule 8-204 “applies to all
applications for leave to appeal subject to this Rule[.]” Md. Rule
8-306(e) (2011).  Grandison’s “Notice of Appeal” did not
provide, in any conceivable way, the content required by
Maryland Rule 8-204 for [applications for leave to appeal]:
“The application shall contain a concise statement of the reasons
why the judgment should be reversed or modified and shall
specify the errors allegedly committed by the lower court.” Md.
Rule 8-204(b)(3) (2011).
Because of this failure to file an application for leave to appeal or provide the content
required by the rule, the State urges us to dismiss issues II, III, IV, and VI, as “procedurally
defaulted.”
Grandison counters that “the Court of Special Appeals, on its own motion, routinely
16
treats an ‘appeal’ filed by an indigent defendant, pro se, as an ‘Application for Leave to
Appeal,’ where the latter is the correct pleading, thereby affording the appellant (applicant)
an opportunity to provide reasons for granting the application.”  Grandison directs our
attention to a footnote in State v. Daughtry, 419 Md. 35, 44 n.4, 18 A.3d 60, 65–66 n.4
(2011), in which this Court mentioned a “Notice of Appeal, which the Court of Special
Appeals docketed as an Application for Leave to Appeal.”
Grandison argues that this Court “explicitly noted [the] routine practice, apparently
with approval.”  Without question, the Court of Special Appeals has sometimes treated a
Notice of Appeal as an Application for Leave to Appeal.  See, e.g., Miller v. State, 185 Md.
App. 293, 295, 970 A.2d 332, 333 (2009) (“The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal,
which this Court treated as an application for leave to appeal[.]”); Bagley v. Warden, 1 Md.
App 154, 158, 228 A.2d 491, 492 (1967) (treating the document “designated by applicant
as a ‘Notice of Appeal’” as an “application for leave to appeal”).  This practice likely
prevails in any number of unreported opinions.  At least one reported case, however, has
required strict compliance with the dictates of Rule 8-204.  See, e.g., Britton v. State, 201
Md. App. 589, 595, 30 A.3d 236, 239 (2011) (“Because appellate review of a guilty plea
may only be obtained by an application for leave to appeal and because appellant’s notice
of appeal lacked sufficient content to be deemed the substantive equivalent of an application
for leave to appeal, this Court dismissed his appeal.”).  We view the decision as to whether
an appellate court will require strict compliance with the terms of Rules 8-204 or 8-306 to
17
be discretionary.  In this death penalty case, in which the defendant was unrepresented at the
time he filed what should have been termed an “application for leave to appeal,” we elect to
consider the arguments he raises, notwithstanding this procedural deficiency.  Cf. Doering
v. Fader, 316 Md. 351, 360, 558 A.2d 733, 738 (1989) (“The penalty of death ‘is
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long[.]’” (quoting
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976))). 
Question One: Right to Counsel
Grandison argues that he “was deprived of his right to counsel, in a capital case, after
he filed various motions seeking a new trial, a reopened post conviction, [and] a new
sentencing.”  Grandison draws our attention to State v. Walker, 417 Md. 589, 11 A.3d 811
(2011), in which we quoted a case that “summarized aptly the right of a defendant in a
criminal case to the assistance of counsel,” id. at 596–97, 11 A.3d at 816.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees the same right to the assistance of
counsel, including the right to the appointment of counsel in the
case of the indigent defendant, in state criminal prosecutions[.]
Central to the cases dealing with the right to counsel is the
recognition that the assistance of a lawyer is essential to assure
a fair trial[.]
Consequently, because essential fairness is lacking if an accused
cannot put his case effectively in court . . . and because it is
unlikely that an accused will be able to present his case
effectively without the assistance of counsel, a conviction
18
cannot be allowed to stand where the accused is not represented
at trial by counsel unless it be determined that there was an
intelligent and competent waiver by the accused[.]  To assure
protection of so fundamental a right, courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver . . . and do not permit
waiver to be presumed from a silent record[.]  It must appear
affirmatively on the record that the accused was offered counsel
but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer.
(Citations and quotation marks omitted.)
Id.  In Walker, however, the defendant represented herself at trial, and we were faced with
a direct appeal of her conviction.  Id. at 595–96, 11 A.3d at 815.  As the State observes,
Grandison has not lodged this appeal from his conviction at trial.  These proceedings are
collateral matters, all filed years after Grandison’s initial trial and sentencing, and indeed,
after other collateral proceedings.  Different standards apply to these proceedings, and
Walker and the principles utilized therein are not applicable here.
Grandison makes several arguments in support of his claim.  He directs our attention
to Sites v. State, in which this Court held that although a person apprehended for driving
while intoxicated has no statutory or Sixth Amendment right “to consult counsel before
deciding whether to submit to a chemical sobriety test,” that right is protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  Sites
v. State, 300 Md. 702, 707, 717, 481 A.2d 192, 194, 199 (1984).  As we explained:
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has long
been recognized as a source of a right to counsel independent of
the Sixth Amendment where critically important to the fairness
of the proceedings.  We recognized in Rutherford v. Rutherford,
296 Md. 347, 358, 464 A.2d 228 (1983) that the constitutional
right to counsel is broader than the specific guarantee of the
19
Sixth Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights in that, under certain circumstances, the requirements
of due process include a right to counsel, with appointed
counsel for indigents, in civil cases or other proceedings not
constituting critical stages of criminal trials.  The concept of a
due process right was described as far back as Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937)
as a guarantee of respect for those personal immunities which
are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental or implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty. While the exact contours of the due process
right are not definable with precision, the right, as restated in
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173, 72 S. Ct. 205, 210, 96
L.Ed. 183 (1952), is one that assures that convictions cannot be
brought about in criminal cases by methods which offend a
sense of justice. (Citations and quotation marks omitted.)
Id. at 716, 481 A.2d at 199.  Grandison argues that it would indeed “offend a sense of
justice” for courts to find that he may not have counsel appointed for a motions hearing in
a death penalty case, but that he may have counsel appointed before this Court, immediately
thereafter, for an appeal from rulings made at that hearing.  He also argues that it would also
offend a sense of justice “if the right to appointed counsel were more freely extended to one
facing probation for drunk driving[] than to one facing execution for murder.”
Keeping in mind the unique nature of capital cases, we still are not persuaded by
Grandison’s argument on this issue.  First, the decision by the Public Defender to provide
Grandison with representation for this appeal does not mean that he has a constitutional or
statutory right to such representation.  Second, in Sites, our primary concern was that
“convictions cannot be brought about in criminal cases by methods which offend a sense of
justice.” Id (emphasis added).  Here, Grandison’s conviction and direct appeal thereof have
20
long since passed, and he has been represented by counsel for several postconviction
proceedings.  Any argument that Grandison must have counsel for these collateral motions
is further muted by the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Pennsylvania v. Finley:
We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to
counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their
convictions, and we decline to so hold today. Our cases
establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to the first
appeal of right, and no further. Thus, we have rejected
suggestions that we establish a right to counsel on discretionary
appeals.
* * *
Postconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal
trial than is discretionary direct review. It is not part of the
criminal proceeding itself, and it is in fact considered to be civil
in nature.  It is a collateral attack that normally occurs only after
the defendant has failed to secure relief through direct review of
his conviction. States have no obligation to provide this avenue
of relief, and when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated
by the Due Process Clause does not require that the State supply
a lawyer as well. (Citations omitted.)
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555–57, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1993–94 (1987).
This Court’s previous interpretations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights paint a
similar picture:
The Maryland Constitution has not hitherto been interpreted to
provide a right to counsel in collateral proceedings challenging
a criminal conviction. Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, every man
hath a right . . . to be allowed counsel . . .” This Court has held
that Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights does not
afford any right to counsel which is more expansive than that
afforded by the Sixth Amendment. See State v. Campbell, 385
Md. 616, 626 n.3, 870 A.2d 217, 223 n.3 (2005) (stating that the
right to counsel provisions in Article 21 are in [pari materia]
21
with Sixth Amendment); State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 440,
509 A.2d 1179, 1185 (1986) (holding that “[t]here is no
distinction between the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment and Art. 21 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights”).
Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 235, 909 A.2d 1020, 1033 (2006).  Grandison asks us to
recognize rights that simply do not exist.  Grandison’s analogy to the drunken driving cases
is also unpersuasive, as he was represented by counsel throughout his criminal trial, direct
appeal, resentencing, and first set of postconviction proceedings.
Grandison also attempts to use selective citation of rules and statutes to bolster his
claim.  He first cites Maryland Rule 4-214(b), which provides that “[w]hen counsel is
appointed by the Public Defender or by the court, representation extends to all stages in the
proceedings, including but not limited to” the post-trial motions and other legal proceedings
enumerated in Rule 4-214(b).  The final sentence of Rule 4-214(b), however, conspicuously
absent from his brief, provides: “The representation of appointed counsel does not extend
to the filing of subsequent discretionary proceedings including petition for writ of certiorari,
petition to expunge records, and petition for post conviction relief.”
The statutory framework offers no help to Grandison either.  First, the Uniform
Postconviction Procedure Act exempts such motions from the right to counsel.  It provides:
(a) In general. — Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section,  “a person is entitled to assistance of counsel [in a
postconviction proceeding.] 
(b) Exceptions. – If a person seeks to reopen a postconviction
proceeding under § 7-104 of this subtitle, the court shall
determine whether assistance from counsel . . . should be
22
granted.
Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 7-108(a)-(b)(1) of the Criminal Law Article.
Thus, the Act grants the right to counsel in postconviction proceedings, except that in a
request to reopen, the court shall determine whether assistance from counsel should be given.
This is exactly what the Circuit Court did in this case.  The passages from the Circuit Court
proceedings that we quoted earlier demonstrate that the Circuit Court considered whether
the law required the appointment of counsel, and decided there was no such requirement.
We affirm that decision.  As the State argues, the statute that empowers and defines the
rights and obligations of the Office of the Public Defender “does not contemplate the
extension of counsel to collateral attacks so far removed from a defendant’s conviction,
direct appeal, or state post conviction proceeding such as the challenges Grandison brings
here.”
Grandison merely asserts that because this is a capital case, the Circuit Court abused
its discretion, under section 7-108, by having him proceed pro se.  If anything, the Circuit
Court went to considerable length to attempt to secure counsel for Grandison, even though
it was under no obligation to do so.  As the State correctly points out, the Circuit Court’s
failure to secure counsel for Grandison on these motions does not “render the lower court’s
efforts erroneous or an abuse of discretion.”  The Circuit Court’s effort to help Grandison
find counsel for these collateral proceedings did not spawn an affirmative right for
Grandison to have counsel.  Grandison’s previous treatment and dismissal of various counsel
23
appointed for him likely plagued his and the Circuit Court’s efforts to secure counsel for him
at the hearing in this case.  That is Grandison’s own doing, and he must suffer the
consequences. 
Grandison also seeks support from our decision in OPD. We summarized the question
presented in that case and answered it:
In the present case, we must determine whether a Maryland trial
court possesses the authority, statutory or otherwise, to appoint
an attorney from a local Office of the State Public Defender
(“OPD”) to represent a criminal defendant who qualifies for
public representation based on indigency, as defined by the
Maryland Code, upon the court’s finding that the local OPD
denied previously and erroneously representation to the
defendant. For reasons we shall explain, we answer that
question in the affirmative.
OPD, 413 Md. at 415, 993 A.2d at 57.
We explained:
OPD contends that the Circuit Court’s actions in this regard
exceeded its authority, and that, although a circuit court may
appoint counsel for an indigent defendant who has been denied
representation by the local OPD, the circuit court may not
appoint an attorney from the local OPD once the local OPD
declines representation of the defendant.  For reasons we shall
explain, we disagree and hold that, upon finding that the local
OPD denied erroneously representation to an indigent
defendant, a circuit court may appoint any attorney, including
an attorney from the local OPD, to represent a defendant.
OPD, 413 Md. at 428–29, 993 A.2d at 66.
In OPD, defendant Jason Flynn Stinnett was erroneously denied representation on the
grounds that he did not meet the indigency standards utilized by the Public Defender, and
7Additionally, as the State argues, if OPD did apply, “the lower court in this case
would be required to appoint counsel from the OPD every time Grandison fires counsel,
essentially ad infinitum, which is untenable.”
24
as a consequence, entered a guilty plea and received a three-year suspended sentence and
two years’ probation.  Id. at 421–22, 426–27, 993 A.2d at 61, 64–65.  We held that:
where the local OPD declines representation to a defendant
erroneously, because of the local OPD’s failure to consider
properly the statutorily-mandated criteria for determining
indigency, and where a court finds, upon its subsequent
mandatory independent review, that the individual qualifies for
representation, the trial court, in carrying out its role as
“ultimate protector” of the Constitutional right to counsel, may
appoint an attorney from the local OPD to represent the indigent
individual unless an actual and unwaived or unwaivable conflict
of interest would result thereby.
Id. at 434, 993 A.2d at 69.  
It is manifestly clear that OPD does not apply to Grandison in this proceeding.
Grandison is well past the trial phase, and there was no previous or erroneous denial of
representation by the Office of the Public Defender.  There was no finding by that office that
Grandison did not qualify for representation because he failed the indigency test.  Grandison
was also not compelled to proceed through a trial pro se because of such an erroneous
denial.7 
Even though the Circuit Court has inherent authority as the “ultimate protector” of
a defendant’s rights, that kind of authority, as the State argues, “does not transform into an
affirmative duty by the lower court to obtain counsel for Grandison when he otherwise has
no legal right to counsel at this stage of the proceedings, especially when Grandison fired
8As originally enacted in 1958, the postconviction statute did not place any limits on
the number of postconviction proceedings that a petitioner could file.  See Grayson v. State,
354 Md. 1, 4, 728 A.2d 1280, 1281 (1999).  In 1986, the Legislature limited a petitioner to
two petitions, and in 1995, it further limited a petitioner to only one petition.  See id.  The
1995 revision gave courts the power to reopen the postconviction procedure if it determined
that such action “is in the interests of justice.”  See id.; Chapter 110 of the Acts of 1995.
Because of this limitation, Grandison must have his postconviction procedure reopened for
his claims to be considered.
25
the counsel who were appointed to him.”  We therefore hold that the Circuit Court did not
err or abuse its discretion in allowing Grandison to discharge Lawlor and Proctor, of his own
volition.  We also affirm the Circuit Court’s decisions in response to Grandison’s discharge
of counsel.
Question Two: Peremptory Strikes
Questions Two through Four regard the various arguments Grandison raises in
support of his motion to reopen a postconviction proceeding.  First, we observe that
Maryland law limits a defendant to one postconviction proceeding.  See Gray v. State, 388
Md. 366, 375, 879 A.2d 1064, 1069 (2005); Grayson v. State, 354 Md. 1, 4, 728 A.2d 1280,
1281 (1999); see also Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.) § 7-103(a) of the Criminal
Procedure Article (“For each trial or sentence, a person may file only one petition for
relief[.]”).  Additionally, “[t]he court may reopen a postconviction proceeding that was
previously concluded if the court determines that the action is in the interests of justice.”
Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 7-104 of the Criminal Procedure Article.8
Grandison argues that his postconviction proceedings should be reopened to consider
the question of whether the State “engaged in racial discrimination in exercising peremptory
9This Court has held that the State may not raise the issue of waiver for the first time
on an appeal; it must be presented to the circuit court during post conviction proceedings.
See Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 587–88, 790 A.2d 15, 24–25 (2002).  Although the
Circuit Court in this case did not address the issue of waiver, the State did raise it in its
“Answer to Defendant’s Addendum to Motion to Reopen Post-Conviction,” filed March 10,
2006.  As such, it was not waived and this Court may properly consider it.
26
strikes” on potential jurors preceding Grandison’s 1984 trial.  
The Circuit Court denied Grandison’s motion to reopen his postconviction proceeding
on this point.  The Circuit Court found “Grandison’s claim that the State systematically
excluded African-Americans from the jury to be without merit.”  The Circuit Court did not,
however, address the issue of whether Grandison had waived this claim.9
To raise an allegation of error in a postconviction proceeding, it must not have been
waived previously.  Under the postconviction statute:
(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, an
allegation of error is waived when a petitioner could have made
but intelligently and knowingly failed to make the allegation:
1. before trial;
2. at trial;
3. on direct appeal, whether or not the petitioner
took an appeal;
* * *
6. in a prior petition under this subtitle; or
7. in any other proceeding that the petitioner
began.
(ii) 1. Failure to make an allegation of error shall be excused if
special circumstances exist.
2. The petitioner has the burden of proving that special
circumstances exist.
10Although the postconviction statute underwent revisions in the years since
Grandison’s first postconviction proceeding, the Revisor’s Note indicates that Section 7-106
contains “new language derived without substantive change” from the superseded provision,
which is confirmed by a close comparison of the various statutory revisions.  See Maryland
Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol), § 7-106(b)(1) of the Criminal Procedure Article.
27
Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol), § 7-106(b)(1) of the Criminal Procedure Article.10
Our cases have further defined when a petitioner waives claims in postconviction
relief.  The requirement that the waiver be “knowing and intelligent” applies only to whether
the claim involves a “fundamental” right; a lesser standard applies to waiver of claims of
error that are non-fundamental.  As we explained in McElroy v. State:  
We reasoned that the legislature did not require intelligent and
knowing waiver in the case of all errors, but only with respect
to errors which deprived a petitioner of fundamental
constitutional rights.  As to those fundamental rights, intelligent
and knowing waiver requires that the petitioner’s knowledge of
the right and the petitioner’s personal waiver of the right be
reflected on the record.  As to lesser or non-fundamental rights,
the petitioner will be deemed to have waived any claim of error
if petitioner or petitioner’s counsel failed to exercise a prior
opportunity to raise it notwithstanding a lack of personal
knowledge of the right of which petitioner was deprived, except
when the failure to allege the error is excused by special
circumstances. 
When an allegation of error affecting fundamental constitutional
rights could have been made by petitioner in a prior proceeding,
[the postconviction statute] provides that “there shall be a
rebuttable presumption that said petitioner intelligently and
knowingly failed to make such allegation.”  The burden of
producing evidence to rebut the presumption of waiver is placed
upon the petitioner.  (Footnotes and citations omitted.)
11Several of our cases attempt to delineate what constitutes a “fundamental right.”
See, e.g., State v. Rose, 345 Md. 238, 244–48, 691 A.2d 1314, 1317–19 (1997); see also
Oken v. State, 43 Md. 256, 270–71, 681 A.2d 30, 37 (1996) (discussing what types of claims
require a knowing and intelligent waiver).
28
McElroy v. State, 329 Md. 136, 140–42, 617 A.2d 1068, 1070–71 (1993).11  We need not
pass judgment here, however, on whether Grandison’s jury selection claim implicates a
fundamental right, as his failure to raise the claim in any number of prior proceedings
constituted a knowing, intelligent waiver.
Grandison acknowledges that “[t]he issue of racial discrimination in jury selection
was not raised, on direct appeal, by Mr. Grandison’s assigned public defender” in Grandison
II.  But Grandison’s delay in raising this issue goes further than he acknowledges.  As the
State argues:
Grandison never raised this claim, either on its merits or as part
of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, in any prior
proceeding before this one, including Grandison III, Grandison
IV, Grandison V, or in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
Grandison first raised this claim on March 9, 2006, when his
counsel . . . filed a Second Addendum to Motion to Reopen
Post-Conviction Proceeding and Request for Hearing and
Discovery . . . .  In the Second Addendum, [counsel]
acknowledges that “[t]he racial skewing of the jury in Mr.
Grandison’s case has inexcusably never been raised.”
At no point does Grandison address waiver in his brief, nor does he point to any
“special circumstances” that might excuse such waiver.  Grandison’s failure to allege this
particular error or to explain why it was waived—on direct appeal, during habeas corpus
proceedings, or at any other stage of this case—are fatal to his claim at this point in the
29
proceedings, as he does not rebut the statutory presumption of waiver against him.  As such,
we affirm the Circuit Court’s denial of his motion on this point, without reaching the merits.
Question Three: Crawford
Also in his motion to reopen a postconviction proceeding, Grandison argues that the
following were incorrectly admitted into evidence: (1) reports of Grandison’s behavior in
prison; (2) victim impact statements; and (3) the former testimony of Helen Kondilidis.
Grandison argues that these statements run afoul of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), which should be applied retroactively to cover the happenings at his
own trial.  
The Circuit Court held that Crawford does not apply retroactively to Grandison’s
trial.  It held that Grandison’s conviction was final, and as such, his right to appeal had been
exhausted.  It also held that victim impact statements are admissible in capital proceedings,
and that Kondilidis’s statements were properly admitted as former testimony.
In Crawford, the Supreme Court held: “Testimonial statements of witnesses absent
from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”  541 U.S. at 59, 124 S. Ct. at 1369.
The Supreme Court then addressed the issue of retroactivity in Whorton v. Bockting, 549
U.S. 406, 417, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1181 (2007), which held that the rule in Crawford was
procedural, not substantive.  As such, Crawford could not be applied retroactively “unless
it is a watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and
12The “watershed rule” analysis comes from Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311, 109
S. Ct. 1060, 1076 (1989). 
13Article 21 gives an accused the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against
him” and “to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath[.]” Art. 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights.
30
accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”  Id. (quotations omitted).12  The Court decided that
Crawford was not a watershed rule, and therefore, not applicable retroactively.  Id. at
417–421, 127 S. Ct. at 1182–84.
Whorton, however, applied to Crawford in a federal context.  Grandison refers us to
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 282, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1042 (2008), which said that
retroactivity analysis “limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will entitle an
individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a state
court, when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to provide a remedy for a violation
that is deemed ‘nonretroactive.’”  In his brief, Grandison argues that “Maryland should
exercise its power, recognized in Danforth, to retroactively apply the rule stated in
Crawford, under Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights[.]”13  
Before and after Crawford, this court has ruled that Article 21 and the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution are to be read in pari materia.  See Simmons v. State,
333 Md. 547, 555 n.1, 636 A.2d 463, 467 n.1 (1994) (“The Confrontation Clauses of the
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights are in pari materia.” (citations omitted)); State v. Snowden, 385 Md.
64, 74 n.9, 867 A.2d 314, 320 n.9 (2005) (“This Court often has construed the Confrontation
14Grandison’s sole argument under Question Three is that Crawford should apply
retroactively.  He does not make a general argument that reopening his postconviction
proceeding to address the three evidentiary issues listed above would be “in the interests of
justice,” as required by Section 7-104 of the Criminal Procedure Article, discussed supra.
15This claim was also presented as part of Grandison’s motion to correct an illegal
sentence.  The Circuit Court analyzed it under the motion to reopen postconviction
proceedings only.
31
Clause and Article 21 of the MDR to be in pari materia.” (citations omitted)).  We see no
reason to modify these precedents or depart from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Whorton that
Crawford is procedural and need not be applied retroactively.14  We therefore affirm the
Circuit Court’s denial of Grandison’s motion to reopen postconviction proceedings on this
question.
Question Four: Mitigating Factors on Sentencing Form
Grandison’s final argument in support of his motion to reopen postconviction
proceedings15 is that he was harmed by the trial court’s markings on a sentencing form
provided to the jury.  The Circuit Court described this argument in fuller detail:
At [Grandison’s] 1994 re-sentencing hearing, the jury was
provided with two forms [titled] “Findings and Sentencing
Determination.”  The first concerned the death of Scott
Piechowicz; the other, the death of Susan Kennedy.  With the
exception of the Court marking two mitigators, both forms were
blank.  Grandison argues in his motion:
[I]f the jury [were] told that they must accept the
Court’s determination as to what mitigators
existed, then little or no discussion would have
occurred as to the positive aspects of
[Grandison’s] character.  The jury would then
have spent almost the totality of their
32
deliberations discussing the aggravator. (Citations
omitted).
The Circuit Court considered this argument “without merit,” and denied Grandison’s motion.
As the State observes, Grandison did not, during his 1994 resentencing hearing, object
to the manner in which the sentencing form was marked.  He did not make any exceptions
to the resentencing court’s jury instructions pertaining to how the jury used the sentencing
form.  Grandison has also never raised this claim in any of the five previous appeals to this
Court that span the seventeen years since the resentencing hearing.  Grandison never raised
this claim during previous postconviction proceedings, either standing alone or as part of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Grandison also makes no argument that reopening
his postconviction proceedings on this point is somehow in the interests of justice.
In his brief, Grandison even references that the postconviction judge already, in 1998,
ruled about the pre-marking of the sentencing forms on a different point.  This makes it
further clear to us that Grandison had knowledge of the sentencing form, and that he had
ample opportunity to raise this claim in earlier proceedings.  That he did not do so constitutes
waiver.  As such, we affirm the Circuit Court’s denial of Grandison’s motion on this
question. 
Question Five: Letter to Jury
Grandison argues that he is entitled to resentencing or a belated appeal in order to
litigate the admissibility of the State’s Exhibit 21, a letter written by Grandison to Janet
16The Circuit Court used the standard of review outlined in Foley v. K. Hovnanian at
Kent Island, LLC, 410 Md. 128, 141, 978 A.2d 222, 230 (2009) (“Ordinarily, an appellate
court will not review an issue that has not been preserved in the trial court.”) and Basoff v.
State, 208 Md. 643, 650, 119 A.2d 917, 921 (1956) (“When a party has the option either to
object or not to object, his failure to exercise the option while it is still within the power of
the trial court to correct the error is regarded as a waiver of it estopping him from obtaining
a review of the point or question on appeal.”).
33
Moore.  The Circuit Court was not persuaded by this argument:
Grandison first raised [the admissibility of Exhibit 21] during
his post conviction proceeding in 1998.  In that proceeding, that
Court held that the evidentiary issue was never raised on direct
appeal and consequently should not be addressed.  If, as that
Court ruled in 1998, Grandison failed to raise an objection at
trial or on direct appeal, then the Post Conviction Court’s 1998
ruling would be accurate.
* * *
In this case, the Post Conviction Court ruled that Grandison had
an opportunity to object to the use of State’s Exhibit 21 at trial
and on appeal, but failed to do so.  As a result, that Court held
that Grandison waived his right to contest the admission of
Exhibit 21. (Citations omitted.)
At the hearing on April 26, 2010, Grandison argued that he had objected to the admission
of Exhibit 21 on May 27, 1994, which would have properly preserved the objection.  The
Circuit Court did not find “persuasive evidence” that such an objection was made and
declined to grant Grandison’s motion for resentencing on this ground.16
We decline to consider the merits of Grandison’s argument on this question.  As the
State argues, Grandison made no mention of Exhibit 21 in his direct appeal to this Court in
1995 in Grandison III, and the postconviction court summarily denied Grandison’s claim
relating to that exhibit in 1998.  The postconviction court specifically held that Grandison,
34
“by not raising this issue on appeal and providing no evidence to the Court for his reasons
for failing to raise the issue previously, has waived his right to advance this issue on post
conviction.”  Afterward, this Court denied Grandison’s motion to reconsider denial of
application for leave to appeal, which he had filed in response to his denial of postconviction
relief.  See Grandison IV, 351 Md. at 732, 720 A.2d at 322 (1998).
Furthermore, this claim was raised in Grandison’s federal habeas corpus petition and
also resolved by the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland:
[Grandison] claims that counsel should have raised the issue
regarding Exhibit 21, the letter that allegedly was never
formally moved into evidence.  Strickland did not require the
argument to be pressed as a matter of reasonable appellate
representation, as there was no error in connection with the
exhibit of a prejudicial nature, and petitioner’s failure to make
the proper objections below would have resulted in the error
not being preserved for appellate review as a matter of
Maryland law anyway. (Emphasis added.)
Grandison v. Corcoran, 78 F. Supp.2d 499, 511 (D. Md. 2000).  
The pertinent statute reads:
For the purposes of this title, an allegation of error is finally
litigated when: (1) an appellate court of the State decides on the
merits of the allegation: (i) on direct appeal; or (ii) on any
consideration of an application for leave to appeal filed under
§ 7-109 of this subtitle[.]
Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 7-106(a) of the Criminal Procedure Article.
We agree with the State that this claim has been finally litigated.  We need not revisit
35
this claim, and affirm the Circuit Court on Question Five. 
Question Six: Jury Instruction
Grandison alleges that the instructions given to the jury at his 1984 trial were faulty.
Although Grandison included this line of argument in various motions, the Circuit Court
analyzed it under Grandison’s motion for resentencing.  The Circuit Court’s full analysis
follows:
Grandison further claims the trial court’s reasonable doubt
instruction given in [the] 1984 trial “erroneously equated [the]
reasonable doubt standard with [the] preponderance of the
evidence standard.”  Unfortunately for Grandison, this claim
meets a fate similar to his claim regarding admissibility of
Exhibit 21.  Importantly, this is the first time in 25 years
Grandison has noted this objection.  No objection was preserved
regarding this issue at trial or on appeal.  As the Basoff court
noted,
When a party has the option either to object or not
to object, his failure to exercise the option while
it is still within the power of the trial court to
correct the error is regarded as a waiver of it
estopping him from obtaining a review of the
point or question on appeal.
Under that clear instruction, this Court finds Grandison waived
his right to appeal the reading of the reasonable doubt
instruction at the 1984 trial when he failed to object at said trial
and on appeal.  (Quoting Basoff v. State, 208 Md. 643, 650, 119
A.2d 917, 922 (1956)).
The Maryland Rules and case law support the Circuit Court’s ruling that Grandison
waived appellate review of the jury instructions in this case.  First, Rule 4-325(e) provides:
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an
36
instruction unless the party objects on the record promptly after
the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which
the party objects and the grounds of the objection.  Upon
request of any party, the court shall receive objections out of the
hearing of the jury.  An appellate court, on its own initiative or
on the suggestion of a party, may however take cognizance of
any plain error in the instructions, material to the rights of the
defendant, despite a failure to object.
We have interpreted this rule to mean that “the failure to object to a jury instruction
at trial results in a waiver of any defects in the instruction, and normally precludes further
review of any claim of error relating to the instruction.” State v. Rose, 345 Md. 238, 245, 691
A.2d 1314, 1317 (1997); see also State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 202, 411 A.2d 1035,
1037 (1980) (“[A]ppellate review of jury instructions [will not] ordinarily be permitted under
our rules unless the complaining party has objected seasonably so as to allow the trial judge
an opportunity to correct the deficiency before the jury retires to deliberate.”).
Preservation of the issues for appeal is an important cog in our overall evidence
scheme, even in capital cases, as we have previously stated:
The rules for preservation of issues have a salutary purpose of
preventing unfairness and requiring that all issues be raised in
and decided by the trial court, and these rules must be followed
in all cases including capital cases. The few cases where we
have exercised our discretion to review unpreserved issues are
cases where prejudicial error was found and the failure to
preserve the issue was not a matter of trial tactics.
* * *
Counsel should not rely on this Court, or any reviewing court,
to do their thinking for them after the fact. Furthermore, we
have stated that even in a death penalty case, with the potential
finality of its outcome, litigation cannot continue ad infinitum
through counsel “withholding issues or framing the questions
37
differently each time.”
Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 327, 893 A.2d 1018, 1040 (2006) (quoting Conyers v. State,
354 Md. 132, 150–51, 729 A.2d 910, 919–20 (1999)).  Furthermore, this Court has recently
explained that “[e]ven errors of a Constitutional dimension may be waived for failure to
interpose a timely objection at trial.”  Robinson v. State, 410 Md. 91, 106, 976 A.2d 1072,
1081 (2009) (citations omitted).  
The State argues that Grandison has declined to raise the jury instruction claim at
numerous stages of his lengthy proceedings, waiting until 2007 to do so:
Grandison acknowledges that he did not object or note an
exception to the reasonable doubt jury instruction when it was
given in 1984. . . . Grandison never raised this claim in any of
the five previous appeals to this Court beginning in 1984
(Grandison I, 301 Md. at 45, Grandison II, 305 Md. at 685,
Grandison III, 341 Md. at 175, Grandison IV, 351 Md. at 732,
and Grandison V, 390 Md. at 412), nor in federal habeas corpus
proceedings (Grandison, 78 F.Supp.2d at 499).  Rather,
Grandison raised this claim for the first time in a pleading
[titled] “Motion for New Trial and Motion to Reopen Original
Post Conviction Proceeding” filed in the [Circuit Court] on
August 6, 2007.
In his briefs before this Court, Grandison makes arguments from the Constitution and
from case law, but at no point does he address the waiver of this claim—the very reason for
the Circuit Court’s denial of his motion.  Grandison’s failure to raise his objection to the jury
instruction in timely fashion, combined with his failure to even address the waiver argument
before this Court, persuades us to affirm the dismissal of his motion on this question.
Question Seven: Legal Status of the Death Penalty in Maryland
38
 In his Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, under Maryland Rule 4-345, Grandison
argued that this Court’s ruling in Evans v. State, 396 Md. 256, 914 A.2d 25 (2006),
“establishes that the implementation of a death sentence as a penalty for first degree murder
is not [a] possibility[.]”  As stated in his brief before this Court, Grandison also avers that
“it would violate constitutional prohibitions against ‘ex post facto laws’ for any warrant of
execution to be issued, in the future[.]”  The Circuit Court denied Grandison’s motion on the
grounds that the death penalty has not been eliminated in Maryland and, as Grandison
observes, without addressing the ex post facto argument. 
Our analysis in Evans v. State is squarely on point:
Maryland Rule 4-345(a) permits a court to “correct an illegal
sentence” at any time. If the sentence is not “illegal,” the court's
revisory power over it, with exceptions not pertinent here, is
limited to a showing of fraud, mistake, or irregularity in the
sentence. There has been no contention by Evans, and there is
no basis in the record for such a contention, that the 1992 death
sentence imposed on him was the product of fraud, mistake, or
irregularity. In order to be entitled to relief under Rule 4-345(a),
therefore, Evans must show that the death sentence he is
challenging is “illegal.”
In two of Evans’s prior appeals[,] we confirmed earlier rulings
and made clear that [a] motion to correct an illegal sentence
ordinarily can be granted only where there is some illegality in
the sentence itself or where no sentence should have been
imposed. In the more recent of those cases, we flatly held that
there was nothing intrinsically illegal in Evans’s sentence; he
was properly found to be a principal in the first degree in two
first degree murders for which the death penalty could lawfully
be imposed, and the court properly found that the aggravating
factors proved outweighed any mitigating factors and that death
was the appropriate sentence. Nothing has been presented in
17This has not yet occurred.
39
these appeals that would cause us to reconsider, much less
overrule, that holding. (Citations omitted.)
Evans, 396 Md. at 271–72, 914 A.2d at 34.  In Evans, this Court enjoined the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City from carrying out the death penalty against Vernon Evans because the
regulations governing administration of the lethal injections had been adopted using
procedures violating the Administrative Procedure Act.  The injunction would remain in
effect until new regulations were properly promulgated.17  Id. at 350, 914 A.2d at 81.  The
legality, in administrative law terms, of the method used for adoption of the procedures for
administering a lethal injection, however, is distinct from the question of whether the death
penalty sentence is itself illegal.  Our opinion in Evans did not render unconstitutional the
death penalty in Maryland; rather, it reaffirmed the importance of procedural integrity in
carrying out such a penalty.  
In Evans, we rejected the constitutional challenge to the death penalty.  Evans
contended that systemic racial bias rendered the death penalty invalid in Maryland under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as Articles 16, 24, and
25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  See id. at 294–327, 914 A.2d 46–67.  We denied
this challenge.  See id. at 327, 914 A.2d at 67.  This part of Evans is consistent with our
earlier holdings that the death penalty is not unconstitutional in Maryland.  See Tichnell v.
State, 287 Md. 695, 729, 415 A.2d 830, 848 (1980) (“In short, we hold that, on its face, the
Maryland statutory scheme for imposition of the death penalty satisfies the requirements of
40
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution, and Art. 25 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.”); Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 436, 439 A.2d 542,
559–60, (1982) (rejecting the argument that “the death penalty is per se cruel and unusual
punishment as measured against the standards of the Maryland Constitution”).
Grandison asks us to hold that his death sentence is unconstitutional because of our
ruling in Evans, contending that any new regulation enabling the State to execute him would
be ex post facto since it would be carried out by a method unavailable at the time he was
sentenced, given that the regulations then in place were invalid.  This Court, however,
implicitly rejected such a line of reasoning in Evans when we remanded Evans’ case to the
circuit court,
with instructions to enjoin enforcement of lethal injection
checklist included as part of division of correction execution
operations manual until such time as the contents of that
checklist, in their current or any amended form, are adopted as
regulations in accordance with the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act or the General Assembly exempts
the checklist from the requirements of that Act[.]
Id. at 350, 914 A.2d at 81.  Our mandate to the circuit court allowed for the executions to
proceed once the procedural dictates were properly followed.  Because we held Evans’s
execution could eventually proceed once the Administrative Procedure Act violation was
remedied, logically, so could Grandison’s because they stand in the same position.
Grandison, much like Evans—who was the man hired by Grandison to carry out the
murders—was “properly found to be a principal” in first degree murders, for which the death
18The Circuit Court said “it is clear the death penalty has not been invalidated in
Maryland, rather[,] Maryland Courts have reinforced the necessity of adhering to legislative
protocol.”
41
penalty could have lawfully been imposed.  Because no illegality inhered in the death
penalty itself, we also declared that Evans’ claims were “not cognizable in a motion under
Rule 4-345(a) to correct an illegal sentence.”  Evans, 396 Md. at 276, 914 A.2d at 37.  For
the same reason, Grandison’s claims are not cognizable under the same Rule.
In Evans, we did recognize a limited exception to the aforementioned rule when,
in a capital sentencing proceeding, an alleged error of
constitutional dimension may have contributed to the death
sentence, at least where the allegation of error is partly based
upon a decision of the United States Supreme Court or of this
Court rendered after the defendant’s capital sentencing
proceeding.  To the extent that there is such an exception, it is
a very narrow one. The subsequent decision relied upon must
constitute a new judicial interpretation of a constitutional
provision. (Citations, quotation marks, and footnotes omitted.)
Evans, 396 Md. at 272–73, 914 A.2d at 34–35.  Grandison cites no case from this Court or
the U.S. Supreme Court, adjudged since Evans, that would cause us to revisit our holding
there.  It is plain that no illegality inhered in the death sentence when first handed down to
Grandison, and no Constitutional change has occurred since our decision in the Evans case.
As the Circuit Court held, the penalty, legal when administered, is not now illegal as a matter
of constitutional law.18  Because a motion to correct an illegal sentence is not proper on this
claim, we need not reach Grandison’s ex post facto arguments.  Thus, we affirm the Circuit
Court’s denial of Grandison’s motion on this Question.
42
Question Eight: Motion for a New Trial
To support his motion for a new trial, Grandison makes the same three arguments
before this Court that he raised at the Circuit Court:
1. The State used perjured testimony of Cheryl Piechowicz and
James Savage,
2. The State knowingly suppressed exculpatory evidence that
showed Etta Horne, Charlene Sparrow, and Helen Kondilidis
committed perjury, and
3. The mental [disorder] of Helen Kondilidis at the time of the
1984 trial [was undisclosed].
The Circuit Court denied his motion on all three grounds.  The Circuit Court also denied
Grandison’s claim that he is entitled to a new trial because his capital sentencing procedure
should have been bifurcated.
Maryland Rule 4-331 governs motions for new trial.  A Circuit Court may grant a
new trial at any time “in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity.”  Maryland Rule 4-331(b).
Additionally, the rule provides:
The court may grant a new trial or other appropriate relief on the
ground of newly discovered evidence which could not have been
discovered by due diligence [within ten days of the verdict] . . .
on motion filed at any time if a sentence of death was imposed
and the newly discovered evidence, if proved, would show that
the defendant is innocent of the capital crime of which the
defendant was convicted or of an aggravating circumstance or
other condition of eligibility for the death penalty actually found
by the court or jury in imposing the death sentence[.]
Maryland Rule 4-331(c).  
In examining a circuit court’s denial of a motion for a new trial, this Court has
43
generally used the abuse of discretion standard.  See Merritt v. State, 367 Md. 17, 28–29, 785
A.2d 756, 763–64 (2001).  When an alleged error was committed during a trial, and the
losing party, without fault, does not discover the alleged error during the trial, but instead
raises the issue in a motion for new trial, we have used a standard of whether the denial of
such motion was erroneous.  Id. at 30–31, 785 A.2d at 764.  
Under either standard, Grandison’s argument before this Court fails.  Regarding the
testimony of Piechowicz and Savage, Grandison does not specifically identify what newly
discovered evidence would entitle him to a new trial.  He does not demonstrate how such
evidence could demonstrate his innocence for the crime for which he had been convicted,
as required by Rule 4-331(c).  He also does not argue that the Circuit Court’s ruling was an
abuse of discretion or erroneous.  Furthermore, Grandison already raised such claims in
Grandison II and Grandison III, and they were rejected.  See Grandison II, 305 Md. at
736–39, 506 A.2d 606–07 (reviewing the claim with respect to Savage); Grandison III, 341
Md. at 205–10, 670 A.2d at 412–15 (reviewing the claim with respect to Piechowicz).
Regarding the testimony of Horne, Sparrow, and Kondilidis, this issue was already
raised, and decided, in Grandison V.  See Grandison V, 390 Md. at 423–37; 889 A.2d at
372–381.  The Circuit Court found “no persuasive evidence . . . to retreat from the previous
and most current interpretation of this claim,” and we agree.  It was not an abuse of
discretion to deny Grandison’s motion on this ground.
Regarding the mental health of Kondilidis, the Circuit Court found Grandison’s
44
assertions to be “baseless, bald allegations.”  We agree.  Grandison fails to articulate how
the Circuit Court’s ruling was either erroneous or an abuse of discretion. There is simply no
evidence to support Grandison’s claim in a way that would satisfy Rule 4-331.
Finally, Grandison argues that his capital sentencing proceeding should have been
bifurcated because State used victim impact evidence.  The Circuit Court denied this claim,
relying on our holding in Grandison III.  See Grandison III, 341 Md. at 229–30, 670 A.2d
at 424 (making clear that “capital sentencing issues are to be resolved in a single proceeding,
leaving no discretion with the trial court to permit a bifurcated proceeding”).  Grandison
does not explain why this Court should revisit this issue, let alone why it necessitates a new
trial.  We therefore reject Grandison’s claims for a new trial and affirm the Circuit Court’s
decision.
Question Nine: Aggravating Circumstances
Grandison argues that the death sentence he received was illegal because it was based
on an aggravating circumstance that occurred after the murders had been committed.  Both
parties agree that the relevant aggravating circumstance in this case is that:
[t]he defendant engaged or employed another person to commit
the murder and the murder was committed pursuant to an
agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration.
Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 413(d)(7).  Grandison’s brief
acknowledges that this Court ruled on the sufficiency of that evidence twice before.  See
Grandison II, 305 Md. at 767, 506 A.2d at 621 (“We have thoroughly reviewed the record
45
and are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to have allowed the jury to find an
agreement between Grandison and Evans to have Scott and Cheryl Piechowicz killed so they
would not be available as witnesses against Grandison in his federal drug trial.”);
Grandison V, 390 Md. at 436, 889 A.2d at 380 (“The evidence presented by the prosecution
at Grandison’s 1983 trial, including that of Evans’s guilt and Grandison’s role as mastermind
is overwhelming and supports our confidence in the result of Grandison’s 1983 trial.”).
Even after acknowledging these holdings, Grandison asks us to revisit the sentence on this
ground.  We decline to do so.
We agree with the State that this issue “amounts to nothing more than a back-door
challenge to the sufficiency of evidence sustaining his conviction and sentence.”
Furthermore, we held in Grandison V that the sentences were proper in the face of a similar
argument.  See Grandison V, 390 Md. at 448, 889 A.2d at 387 (“Furthermore, because
Grandison was sentenced to death based on the jury’s determination that he employed Evans
to commit murder as contemplated by Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Article 27,
Section 413 (d)(7), we hold that his sentences were proper.”).  Grandison’s argument on this
point is nothing more than an attempt to relitigate an issue that this Court has spoken on
multiple times.  We therefore affirm the Circuit Court’s denial of Grandison’s motion to
correct an illegal sentence on this ground.
Conclusion
For the reasons outlined above, we hold that Grandison had no right to counsel during
46
his collateral motions, and that the Circuit Court did not err or abuse its discretion in
allowing Grandison to discharge counsel and continue pro se.  We also affirm the Circuit
Court’s denial and dismissal of Grandison’s motions: (1) to reopen postconviction
proceedings; (2) to correct an illegal sentence; (3) for a new resentencing hearing; and (4)
for a new trial.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR SOMERSET COUNTY AFFIRMED.
APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS.