Case Title: GARY ALLEN WEISS V. KATHRYN BRINKMAN WEISS; KATHRYN BRINKMAN WEISS V. GARY ALLEN WEISS

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0030

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-10-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
GARY ALLEN WEISS V. KATHRYN BRINKMAN WEISS; KATHRYN BRINKMAN WEISS V. GARY ALLEN WEISS2009 WY 124217 P.3d 408Case Number: S-09-0030, S-09-0068Decided: 10/09/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
GARY 
ALLEN WEISS,Appellant(Defendant),v.KATHRYN BRINKMAN 
WEISS,Appellee(Plaintiff).,

KATHRYN 
BRINKMAN WEISS,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.GARY ALLEN 
WEISS,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Gary Allen Weiss:

L. 
Kimberly Weiss of Law Offices of L. Kimberly Weiss, Wilson, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Kathryn Brinkman Weiss:

Kenneth 
S. Cohen of Cohen Law Office, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming, and Heather Noble of 
Jackson, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Cohen.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      
These 
combined appeals arise out of post-divorce proceedings.  In S-09-0030, Father appeals the 
district court's order that he pay Mother $135,000 for the attorneys' fees and 
costs she incurred in defending his motion to modify custody, and in S-09-0068, 
Mother appeals the district court's order changing child custody in a subsequent 
proceeding.  Finding no abuse of 
discretion as to the first order, we will affirm it.  Finding that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to enter the second order, we will dismiss that appeal and remand 
with instructions to vacate the order changing custody.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.   Whether the district court abused 
its discretion in awarding Mother $135,000 in attorneys' fees and costs under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-111 (LexisNexis 2009)?

 
 
            
2.   Whether the district 
court had jurisdiction to enter an order modifying the child custody provisions 
of a divorce decree in the absence of a petition from either party/parent 
seeking such modification?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The issues in 
this case rest in its procedural development, rather than in the underlying 
facts, so it will be necessary for us to identify the major procedural steps 
shown in the record.  Mother filed 
for divorce on September 30, 2005.  The parties entered into a Property 
Settlement and Child Custody Agreement, which was filed on October 21, 
2005.  A Decree of Divorce based 
upon that settlement agreement was entered on October 24, 2005.  Custody of the children was shared by the 
parties, with Mother having primary residential custody.

 
 
[¶4]      On March 14, 
2006, Father filed an Emergency Motion for Guardian Ad Litem and Emergency 
Motion for Temporary Custody to Defendant.  An Order Appointing Guardian Ad Litem was 
entered on March 16, 2006.  The 
parties then entered into a Stipulation of the Parties, filed on June 9, 2006, 
the terms of which were intended to supersede their prior agreement, although 
Mother continued to be the primary residential custodian.  The district court entered an Order 
Adopting Stipulation of the Parties on June 16, 2006.

 
 
[¶5]      On October 17, 
2006, Father filed a Motion to Modify Custody, Re-Appointment of the Guardian Ad 
Litem and Motion for Hearing.1  The guardian ad litem was reappointed by an order 
entered on October 30, 2006.  Numerous discovery motions and orders, 
and other interim pleadings, including [Mother's] Motion for Review of Child 
Support Order, followed.  On August 
30, 2007, these disputes were resolved by the filing of an Amended Child Custody 
Agreement.  The district court 
entered its Order Approving Amended Child Custody Agreement on October 19, 2007. 
 Once again, Mother retained primary 
physical custody of the children.

 
 
[¶6]      On January 24, 
2008, Mother filed a Motion for (i) Attorney's Fees, (ii) Past Due Alimony, 
(iii) Reimbursement for Medical Expenses, Extracurricular Activities/School 
Fees, and (iv) Modification of Support.  Father filed an objection to the 
reasonableness of the attorneys' fees, and a separate response to the entire 
motion.  The matter was heard on 
October 8, 2008, and an Order followed on December 10, 2008.  The district court awarded Mother 
attorneys' fees in the amount of $135,000 pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 20-2-111, plus reimbursement by Father for medical expenses and 
extracurricular activities/school fees, the latter in unspecified amounts, but 
denied the request for past due alimony.2  The district court also ordered the 
parties to file updated financial affidavits for consideration with regard to 
child support.  Father's appeal of 
the December 10, 2008 order is before this Court in case number 
S-09-0030.

 
 
[¶7]      The next 
pertinent document filed in this case was filed on December 30, 2008, not by one 
of the parties, but by the guardian ad 
litem.  It is entitled "Notice 
of Filing Report of Dr. Steven Nelson Including Recommendations Regarding the 
Weiss Children and Motion by Guardian Ad Litem for Implementation of the 
Recommendations."  On December 31, 
2008, without notice to Mother, the district court entered its Order Accepting 
and Adopting the Recommendations of Dr. Steven Nelson and the Guardian Ad Litem 
and Transferring the Residential Custody of [the Parties' Children] to Their 
Father, Gary Weiss."  The effect of 
that order, as its title suggests, was modification of the existing custody 
decree, changing custody of the children from Mother to Father, despite the 
absence of any petition to modify filed by either party/parent.  Mother filed a belated response on 
January 5, 2009, which the district court set for hearing.  After a hearing on January 28, 2009, the 
district court entered an Order for Change of Custody, transferring primary 
residential custody of the children to Father.  Mother's appeal from that order is before 
this Court in case number S-09-0068.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Whether 
the district court abused its discretion in awarding Mother $135,000 in 
attorneys' fees and costs under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-111 (LexisNexis 
2009)?

 
 
[¶8]      Although Wyoming 
generally subscribes to the American rule regarding the recovery of attorney's 
fees, under which rule each party pays his or her own fees, a prevailing party 
may be reimbursed for attorney's fees when provided for by contract or 
statute.  Forshee v. Delaney, 2005 WY 103, ¶ 7, 
118 P.3d 445, 448 (Wyo. 2005).  In 
determining the reasonableness of the fees requested, our trial courts are to 
follow the federal lodestar test, which requires a determination of "(1) whether 
the fee charged represents the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable 
rate; and (2) whether other factors of discretionary application should be 
considered to adjust the fee either upward or downward."  Id. at ¶ 7, at 448; Shepard v. Beck, 2007 WY 53, ¶ 17 n.5, 
154 P.3d 982, 989 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶9]      The statute 
relied upon to award attorneys' fees in this case was Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 20-2-111, the provisions of which are set forth above.  See supra ¶ 6 n.2.  The statute does not require the party 
requesting an award of fees to prove financial necessity, nor is the award meant 
to punish the non-prevailing party.  
Black v. De Black, 1 P.3d 1244, 1252 (Wyo. 2000); Hendrickson v. 
Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Wyo. 1978).

 
 
[T]he 
decision to award attorney's fees under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-111 rests within 
the sound discretion of the district court.  Russell v. Russell, 948 P.2d 1351, 
1355-56 (Wyo. 1997); Rocha v. Rocha, 
925 P.2d 231, 234 (Wyo. 1996).  The 
party seeking to recover attorneys' fees bears the burden of establishing the 
reasonableness of the fees requested.  
Id.

 
 

Seherr-Thoss 
v. Seherr-Thoss, 
2006 WY 111, ¶ 12, 141 P.3d 705, 712 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶10]   First, we must address Father's 
contention that the district court erred as a matter of law in awarding 
attorneys' fees under the statute, rather than looking to the attorneys' fees 
provision of the parties' June 2006 stipulation, which provided in pertinent 
part as follows:

 
 
            
26.  The parties are entering 
into this agreement in the spirit of cooperation; however should either party 
fail to respect and abide by that spirit, the offended party may apply to the 
Court for the appropriate orders including attorney fees and 
costs.

 
 
[¶11]   This Court does, indeed, have a 
preference for honoring divorce settlement agreements.  Richard v. Richard, 2007 WY 180, ¶ 4, 
170 P.3d 612, 614 (Wyo. 2007); Lewis v. 
Lewis, 716 P.2d 347, 350 (Wyo. 1986).  
However, even if we could say that the nebulous provision set forth above 
was capable of enforcement (see supra 
¶ 10), the record in this case simply does not show that Mother, who maintained 
primary custody of the children in the face of Father's modification attempt, 
"fail[ed] to respect and abide by" the spirit of the agreement, nor does the 
record support a description of Father as the "offended party."  Furthermore, Father not having shown 
that, as a matter of law, attorney's fees statutes are "trumped" by the parties' 
agreement, we are not inclined to fault the district court for relying upon the 
statute in this instance.  That is 
especially true because, rather than this being an attempt to enforce the 2006 
stipulation, this was Father's attempt to modify it, and Mother was merely 
defending against that action.

 
 
[¶12]   We cannot say that the district 
court's decision to award Mother her attorneys' fees and costs was unreasonable, 
or that Mother failed to prove the reasonableness of the fees under the federal 
lodestar test.  Mother's motion was 
fifteen legal pages in length, with minute detail as to all that was involved in 
incurring the fees and costs.  Attached to the motion was the affidavit 
of Mother's attorney, once again detailing the work done, the complexities of 
the case, the reasonableness of the hourly rate charged by himself and by other 
retained counsel, and attaching as exhibits thereto his itemized legal bills and 
those of other retained counsel.  In 
addition, the record contains the transcript of the motion hearing during which 
counsel argued as to the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees.3  We find that this case more nearly 
resembles Breitenstine v. 
Breitenstine, 2006 WY 48, ¶¶ 17-19, 132 P.3d 189, 194-95 (Wyo. 2006), where 
we affirmed an attorney's fee award, than it does Hinckley v. Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907, 915 
(Wyo. 1991), where we reversed an attorney's fee award for lack of 
proof.

 
 
Whether 
the district court had jurisdiction to enter an order modifying the child 
custody provisions of a divorce decree in the absence of a petition from either 
party/parent seeking such modification?

 
 
[¶13]   Generally, courts have "only that 
authority to act which is conferred by the subject statute."  Bush v. State, 2003 WY 156, ¶ 9, 79 P.3d 1178, 1183 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Merkison 
v. State, 996 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Wyo. 2000)).  It is well settled that divorce is 
purely a statutory process, with courts having no authority in such proceedings 
other than that provided by statute.  
Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 
73 P.2d 953, 956 (1937); 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 7 (2008).  This limitation extends to the court's 
power to modify a divorce decree.  
Aragon v. Aragon, 2005 WY 5, ¶ 
10, 104 P.3d 756, 759-60 (Wyo. 2005); Smith v. Smith, 895 P.2d 37, 41 (Wyo. 
1995); CSP v. DDC, 842 P.2d 528, 531 
(Wyo. 1992); 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and 
Separation § 369 (2008).  In 
that regard, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-2-203(c) and 20-2-204(a) (LexisNexis 2009) 
allow any "party" or "parent" to seek modification of a custody order.  No statute authorizes a child or his or 
her guardian ad litem to initiate a 
petition for change of custody.  The 
husband and wife are the only proper parties in a divorce action; the parties' 
children are not parties.  Ihinger v. Ihinger, 2003 VT 38, ¶ 7, 175 
Vt. 520, 824 A.2d 601, 603 (Vt. 2003); 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 197 
(2008).  In the instant case, the 
district court modified custody, despite the absence of any petition to modify 
filed by either party/parent.  It 
was without jurisdiction to do so.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶14]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in awarding Mother statutory attorneys' fees and costs for her 
defense of Father's 2006 motion to modify custody, and we affirm that decision 
in S-09-0030.  The district court 
was without jurisdiction, however, to modify custody based upon a report of the 
guardian ad litem, where no petition 
to modify had been filed by either party/parent.  We therefore dismiss the appeal in 
S-09-0068 and remand to the district court for entry of an order vacating the 
Order for Change of Custody filed on February 13, 2009.

 
 
[¶15]   Because this case involves the 
custody of children, with the imminent potential for a residential relocation, 
we note that the decision herein does not prevent the district court from 
hearing an appropriately filed petition regarding custody, which ought to be 
done with all deliberate speed, or from making temporary placement decisions in 
the best interests of the children, once such a petition has been filed.  See Inman v. Williams, 2008 WY 81, ¶ 18, 
187 P.3d 868, 876 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
relevant statutes, discussed below, refer to the filing of a "petition" rather 
than a "motion" when a modification is being sought.  See infra ¶ 13.

 
 

2Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-111 reads as follows:

 
 
            
In every action brought for divorce, the court may require either party 
to pay any sum necessary to enable the other to carry on or defend the action 
and for support and the support of the children of the parties during its 
pendency.  The court may decree 
costs against either party and award execution for the costs, or it may direct 
costs to be paid out of any property sequestered, in the power of the court, or 
in the hands of a receiver.  The 
court may also direct payment to either party for such purpose of any sum due 
and owing from any person.

 
 

3An 
interesting fact, although perhaps not dispositive, is that Father's counsel and 
Mother's counsel billed almost identical amounts for their respective 
fees.