Case Title: In the Matter of Registrant M.F.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-39-00

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court. This appeal concerns the notification requirements of a Tier Two or moderate risk sex offender under the Registration and Community Notification Laws ( RCNL ), commonly known as Megan's Law. The issue is whether the State is required to affirmatively establish that a registrant classified as a Tier Two offender is reasonably certain to encounter those attending schools in the pertinent geographic area before notification will occur. M.F.'s criminal history reveals three progressively serious sexual offenses. In 1979, he was arrested for criminal sexual contact occurring in a Union County department store. The presentence report described the charge as open lewdness and included touching women. It was ultimately dismissed as part of a plea agreement in which M.F. pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled dangerous substance. In 1985, M.F. again was charged with criminal sexual contact. An undercover officer approached a vehicle in the lot of a Clifton department store, and observed M.F. sitting behind the steering wheel with his pants unfastened, his private parts exposed, and masturbating. M.F. was convicted and sentenced to one year probation. M.F.'s most recent sexual-offense conviction involved second-degree sexual assault. In 1997, while in the rear portion of a Pathmark store in Elizabeth, M.F. exposed himself and proceeded to masturbate in the presence of a seven-year-old girl. M.F. fled, but the child identified him on a video taken by the store's security camera. M.F. was convicted and sentenced to five years of probation and required to obtain alcohol and drug counseling. In February 2000, the Union County Prosecutor informed M.F. that he posed a moderate risk and he was classified as a Tier 2 offender under the RCNL. Such a classification would require notice to four schools, a church and a nursery school near M.F.'s residence in Roselle. The oldest of M.F.'s three children attends one of the schools, a high school. The trial court affirmed M.F.'s Tier 2 classification. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the Tier 2 classification, but deleted all provisions for community notification. The Appellate Division noted that none of M.F.'s prior sexual offenses occurred at or near a school, and held that because the State had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that M.F. is likely to encounter anybody in a school, notification of those schools would serve no purpose. The Court granted the State's petition for certification. HELD: Once a registrant's classification as a Tier Two offender is correctly established, there is a presumptive requirement of notification to schools and organizations in charge or care of women or children within the pertinent geographic area. Although specific limiting circumstances may counter the presumption in individual cases, the State is not required affirmatively to establish, absent proof of those limiting circumstances, that a Tier Two registrant is reasonably certain to be encountered at the school or organization to which notice would be given. 1. In Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 14 (1995), the Court considered a specific challenge to the excessiveness of the notification provisions of the RCNL, and interpreted the statute to require that notification for a Tier Two offender be limited to an institution or organization likely to encounter the offender. In defining what likely to encounter means, the Court stated that the factor that would ordinarily be critical to the determination is geography - the proximity of the institution or organization to the offender's residence, place of work, or school. In addition, the Court stated that factors other than geography may be considered if they are relevant to the offender's likely whereabouts . . . . Subsequently, courts have limited the geographic area of notification where unique circumstances were established, such as for the incest-type sexual offender, or to account for population density among various communities. (Pp. 7-21) 2. M.F. argues that before community notification of Tier Two offenders can occur, the State must show that it is reasonably certain that the registrant will show up at schools and community organizations located within a half- mile radius of the registrant's home. That interpretation would render meaningless the presumptive effect of the Legislature's language that decreed notification to schools and organizations in the community that are in charge of the care or supervision of women or children once a registrant is classified as a Tier Two offender. The Legislature is entitled to apply a presumptive test if the presumption finds support in logic or fact. The presumption of notification is reasonable and proceeds from commonsense and logic.. Unless the registrant demonstrates limiting circumstances that affect the nature of a Tier Two registrant's risk of re-offense, the State is entitled to give effect to the presumption. (Pp. 21-26) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for a rehearing in accordance with this opinion. JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, and ZAZZALI, and Appellate Division Judge HAROLD B. WELLS, III, (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA's opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG and VERNIERO did not participate. IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT M.F. ________________ Argued May 1, 2001 -- Decided July 17, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Jessica S. Oppenheim, Deputy Attorney General and Barry Stephen Finkel, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant, State of New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney; Ms. Oppenheim, Mr. Finkel and Dominick DiRocco, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs). Michael Z. Buncher, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent, M.F. (Peter A. Garcia, Acting Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Buncher and Edward L. Barocas, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief). Jessica A. Roth argued the cause for amicus curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione, attorneys; Ms. Roth, John J. Gibbons and Lawrence S. Lustberg, on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by LaVECCHIA, J. The State asserted that the proposed scope of notification was reasonable because M.F.'s three sexual offenses established that he had a habit of leaving the confines of his residence to seek his victims, and that his victims included a child. Noting that M.F.'s offenses occurred in a department store, grocery store, and shopping center parking lot, not in a school, the court set forth its interpretation of the State's burden on the issue of scope of notification: The question is, has the State shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that this man is likely to encounter anybody in a school? Unconvinced that the State had met that burden, the court issued an order affirming M.F.'s Tier Two classification, but delet[ed] therefrom all provisions for community notification. The order further stated that there was no clear and convincing evidence that the children attending the schools and agencies designated in the order are reasonably certain to encounter registrant or that registrant visits [those] locations on a regular basis. When we granted the State's petition for certification on the issue of the standard that the State must meet, we also requested that the parties address any potential impact that the recently enacted constitutional amendment concerning sex-offender notification, N.J. Const. art. IV, 7, 12, may have on this appeal. The American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey was granted amicus curiae status to address that issue. Upon review of the papers submitted, and the argument before the Court, we are convinced that the new Amendment has no applicability to this appeal. Accordingly, we shall review the question of the proper scope of notification for M.F. under the existing RCNL and current Attorney General Guidelines for Law Enforcement for the Implementation of Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Laws (March 2000) ( Guidelines ). NO. A-39 IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT M.F. _______________________ DECIDED July 17, 2001 Justice Stein