Case Title: Plymouth Citrus Products Co-Op. v. Williamson

Citation: 71 So. 2d 162

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1954-03-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
71 So. 2d 162 (1954)
PLYMOUTH CITRUS PRODUCTS CO-OP.
v.
WILLIAMSON et al.

Supreme Court of Florida. Division A.
March 16, 1954.
Rehearing Denied April 5, 1954.
J. Thomas Gurney, Orlando, for petitioner.
Lester Harris, Orlando, Rodney Durrance and Burnis T. Coleman, Tallahassee, for respondents.
MATHEWS, Justice.
This is a Workmen's Compensation case. Williamson was hurt on June 18, 1951. There was some conflicting evidence before the Deputy Commissioner but he found that the claimant did not suffer an accident under the decision in the case of McNeill v. Thompson, Fla., 53 So. 2d 868. On an appeal the order of the Deputy was affirmed by the Full Commission and no appeal was taken from the order by the Full Commission.
At a later date an opinion in the case of Gray v. Employers' Mutual Liability Insurance Co., Fla., 64 So. 2d 650, was handed down by this Court. Claimant filed a petition for modification and at the second hearing before the Deputy, the Deputy held that there was a mistake in determination of fact and awarded compensation. An appeal was prosecuted from this second award and the Full Commission made an order affirming the Deputy. In its order, now under review by the petition for certiorari, the Full Commission stated:
There must be an end to litigation sometime. As to the facts in this particular case, the doctrine of res adjudicata applies. Trigg v. Industrial Commission, 364 Ill. 581, 5 N.E.2d 394, 108 A.L.R. 153; Cooper v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Tex.Com.App., 29 S.W.2d 971; Cooper v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Tex.Com.App., 33 S.W.2d 189.
The case of Wagner v. Baron, Fla., 64 So. 2d 267, was strongly relied upon by petitioner in this case but it is not applicable. In that case we were dealing with a statute which imposed certain additional liabilities upon the father of a bastard child in the nature of support for the said child during a certain period of time and for the determination of the question of fatherhood. There was no question involved in that case of an intervening decision which changed the rule of law or the responsibilities, duties and liabilities of the father of the bastard child. The change in that case was effected by a statute.
After a judgment, order or decree has become final and the time for appeal has expired, an intervening decision which may change the liability or the rule of law applicable to a case is not sufficient ground to open the case up for the filing of a new claim under the same facts.
It appears that the Full Commission did not proceed in accordance with the essential requirements of the law in this matter. The writ of certiorari should be granted and the order of the Full Commission, affirming the Deputy Commissioner, should be quashed and set aside and a proper order entered by the Full Commission, reversing and setting aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, C.J., and TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.