Case Title: State v. Brereton

Citation: 2013 WI 17

Docket Number: 2010AP001366-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-02-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 17 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP1366-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
James G. Brereton, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 337 Wis. 2d 145, 804 N.W.2d 243 
(Ct. App. 2011 - Published) 
PDC No: 2011 WI App 127 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 6, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 6, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael S. Gibbs 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
Abrahamson, C.J., dissents. (Opinion filed.)  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
and oral argument by Matthew S. Pinix, Milwaukee. 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.    
 
 
 
2013 WI 17
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP1366-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF411) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
James G. Brereton, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 6, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 that affirmed the 
decision of the Circuit Court for Walworth County2 denying 
defendant James G. Brereton's motion to suppress evidence 
obtained through monitoring by a global positioning system (GPS) 
device installed on Brereton's vehicle.  The installation and 
monitoring of Brereton's vehicle was accomplished pursuant to a 
warrant, and Brereton does not allege that the use of GPS is per 
                                                 
1 State v. Brereton, 2011 WI App 127, 337 Wis. 2d 145, 804 
N.W.2d 243. 
2 The Honorable Michael S. Gibbs presided. 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
2 
 
se unreasonable.  Rather, Brereton's challenge first alleges 
that law enforcement officers lacked probable cause to seize his 
vehicle and move it to another location where a GPS device could 
be safely installed.3  Therefore, he contends, the subsequent 
installation and monitoring of the GPS device constituted a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable 
seizures.  Additionally, Brereton claims that the GPS tracking 
of his vehicle utilized more advanced technology than was 
contemplated 
under 
the 
warrant, 
thereby 
effecting 
an 
unreasonable search through the execution of the warrant.  We 
conclude that neither of Brereton's arguments demonstrates a 
violation of Fourth Amendment rights, and affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
¶2 
First, we conclude that the seizure of Brereton's 
vehicle was supported by probable cause that the vehicle was, or 
contained, evidence of a crime, and was therefore permissible 
under the Fourth Amendment.  The seizure was supported by 
witnesses' reports that a car matching the make, model, and 
license plate number of that particular vehicle had been seen at 
the locations of recent burglaries in the area.  Additionally, 
after officers lawfully stopped Brereton and his co-defendant 
Brian Conaway4 in the suspect vehicle, they discovered that the 
                                                 
3 Brereton does not contend that the initial stop was not 
lawful.  
4 At 
trial, 
Brereton 
joined 
Conaway's 
motion 
seeking 
suppression of the evidence at issue; however, Conaway is not a 
party to this appeal. 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
3 
 
vehicle identification number (VIN) did not match the license 
plate, and that the occupants of the vehicle were notably 
similar to the two men seen at multiple recent burglaries.  
Accordingly, the three-hour seizure of Brereton's vehicle, 
whereby officers were able to install the GPS device, did not 
constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, 
as applied to automobiles.  Moreover, in light of Brereton's 
Fourth Amendment interest in avoiding government usurpation of 
his property for the purpose of conducting surveillance on him, 
the officers' decision to obtain a warrant prior to conducting 
the GPS search was proper. 
¶3 
We 
also 
conclude 
that 
the 
technology 
used 
in 
conducting the GPS search did not exceed the scope of the 
warrant allowing GPS tracking of Brereton's vehicle.  Judge 
Carlson issued the warrant based on the probable cause set forth 
through the facts recited in a detective's affidavit.  The 
affidavit and warrant's language contemplated the installation 
of a GPS device that would track the vehicle's movements.  That 
the device provided officers with real-time updates of those 
movements did not alter the kind of information to be obtained 
under the warrant, or the nature of the intrusion allowed.  
Therefore, the officers' execution of the warrant was not 
unreasonable.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
In late summer and early fall of 2007, law enforcement 
agencies in Rock and Walworth Counties received multiple reports 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
4 
 
of burglaries, many of which shared similar characteristics.  
Witnesses repeatedly reported having seen two men in a blue or 
teal late 1980s or early 1990s Pontiac Grand Am or Grand Prix 
near the burglaries.  Multiple other witnesses independently 
reported that a similar vehicle, also occupied by two men 
described as similar to those seen at the burglaries, had 
approached witnesses' houses.  In each instance, the man who 
approached the house had asked whether "Billy Massey" lived 
there.  Also, at multiple burglarized locations, law enforcement 
found that doors to houses or garages had been kicked in, 
apparently as a method of entry.  At one of the burglarized 
homes, the detectives found fresh tire tread marks, and noted 
the design and wear pattern for later comparison.5 
¶5 
Notably, one of the witnesses reported that the 
Pontiac bore an Illinois license plate, number 8643511.  A check 
of the Illinois Department of Transportation database showed 
that that registration was expired, but that the license plate 
had been issued to Nicholas Klabacha, 1510 Willowbrook Drive, 
Belvidere, Illinois, for a 1996 Pontiac coupe.  Walworth County 
detectives visited that location, but found an unoccupied 
residence.  Additionally, Rock County Sheriff's Department 
records for that Illinois license plate showed that deputies had 
recently stopped a Buick bearing that plate, and that Brereton's 
                                                 
5 Ultimately, the officer determined that the tire tread 
marks at the scene of the robbery bore similar design and wear 
pattern to the vehicle in which Brereton and Conaway were 
stopped. 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
5 
 
co-defendant Conaway had been a passenger in that vehicle when 
it was stopped. 
¶6 
On October 5, 2007, Detective Robert Sharp of the 
Walworth County Sheriff's Department contacted Detective Richard 
Kamholtz of the Rock County Sheriff's Department to exchange 
information regarding the burglaries that had been occurring in 
the area.  Detective Kamholtz advised Detective Sharp of at 
least two burglaries in Rock County with very similar facts to 
those in Walworth County, and reported that a Rock County 
Sheriff's deputy had located a blue Pontiac bearing Illinois 
license plate number 8643511 outside of a residence in Beloit.  
Detective Kamholtz stated that he would visit the residence to 
determine if a GPS device could be installed on the vehicle at 
that location. 
¶7 
Detective Kamholtz later determined that the area 
where the car was located was not conducive to installation of a 
GPS device, and decided to continue to monitor the vehicle 
visually.  At that same time, another Walworth County Sheriff's 
detective, Robert Schiltz, was in the process of preparing an 
affidavit for a court order to authorize installation of a GPS 
device on the vehicle. 
¶8 
The officers decided that they would conduct a stop of 
the vehicle based on its expired registration, its missing 
rearview mirror, and its loud exhaust, in an attempt to 
facilitate installation of a GPS tracking device in the vehicle.  
In accordance with this plan, a Rock County Sheriff's deputy 
then stopped the vehicle, a blue 1993 Pontiac Grand Am, along 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
6 
 
Highway 51 outside of Janesville, where he was joined by two 
Walworth County detectives. 
¶9 
After stopping the vehicle, the officers obtained 
identification from the two occupants, Brereton and Conaway.  At 
that time, the officers learned that neither man had a valid 
driver's license.  During the stop, the detectives also 
discovered that the vehicle's VIN did not match the VIN 
associated with the Illinois license plate.  Instead, the VIN of 
the men's vehicle showed that that vehicle was registered to a 
woman who resided in Clinton, Wisconsin. 
¶10 After the officers determined that neither Brereton 
nor Conaway had a valid driver's license, and therefore neither 
could legally operate the vehicle, the officers took them to a 
nearby Dollar Store so that the men could make arrangements for 
someone else to pick up the vehicle.  The joint law enforcement 
team decided that rather than installing a GPS device on the 
side of Highway 51, which would be potentially unsafe, the 
vehicle would 
be 
towed to a private impound lot where 
installation of the GPS could be accomplished.  Neither Brereton 
nor Conaway were told that the vehicle was being towed. 
¶11 Soon after the vehicle was towed to the impound lot, 
Detective Schiltz obtained a signed court order allowing the 
installation of a GPS device in the seized vehicle.6  The order, 
                                                 
6 As recognized in State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, ¶¶20 & 39, 
328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317, such an order constitutes a 
warrant for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
7 
 
which was based on Detective Schiltz's affidavit, provided in 
relevant part: 
 
The Walworth County Sheriff's Department . . . or 
other law enforcement agencies acting on its behalf, 
are authorized to place an electronic tracking device 
on:  a 1993 blue Pontiac Grand Am SE 4 door registered 
to Sherry 
Bloyer of Clinton, Wisconsin, vehicle 
identification # 1G2NE543N7PM605764, and they are 
hereby authorized to surreptitiously enter and re-
enter 
the 
vehicle, any buildings and structures 
containing the vehicle[] or any premises on which the 
vehicle[] [is] located to install, use, maintain and 
conduct surveillance and monitoring of the location 
and movement of the target vehicle in all places 
within or outside the jurisdiction of Walworth County.  
This 
includes, 
but 
is 
not 
limited 
to 
private 
residences and other locations not open to visual 
surveillance, 
to 
accomplish 
the 
installation.  
Officers are authorized to obtain and use keys to 
operate and move the vehicle[] for the required time 
to a concealed location and are authorized to open the 
engine compartment[] and trunk area[] of the vehicle[] 
to install the device[]. 
 
It is further ordered that Detective Robert 
Schiltz, or other law enforcement officers, shall 
remove the electronic tracking device as soon as 
practicable after the objectives of the surveillance 
are accomplished or not later than sixty (60) days 
from the date this order is signed unless extended by 
this court or another court of competent jurisdiction. 
Thereafter, law enforcement officers installed the GPS device 
inside the hood of Brereton's vehicle,7 and then returned the 
                                                 
7 We refer to "Brereton's vehicle" for ease of reference, 
and make no substantive determination of Brereton's actual 
interest in the tracked vehicle.  As discussed below, the State 
has asserted that Brereton had no valid possessory or privacy 
interests in the vehicle in which the GPS unit was installed.  
Our decision in this case, however, is unaffected by the State's 
argument, and we assume without deciding that Brereton's 
possessory or privacy interest in the vehicle was sufficient to 
assert a claim for a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
8 
 
vehicle to the location at which Brereton and Conaway had been 
stopped. 
¶12 Over the next four days, the GPS device transmitted 
information about the movements of the vehicle.  Walworth County 
law enforcement officers received text messages to the telephone 
associated with the GPS device whenever the vehicle started 
moving and when movement ended.  Officers could then track the 
vehicle's movement in real-time8 using computer software. 
¶13 Four days after the GPS device was installed, law 
enforcement tracked the vehicle to a residential location in the 
town of Janesville, where the vehicle stopped for approximately 
ten minutes.  Officers were dispatched to check that area for 
possible burglaries, and discovered a house with the front door 
kicked in.  When officers went inside, it appeared that numerous 
personal belongings were missing.  The owner of the residence 
confirmed 
that, 
in 
addition 
to 
the 
personal 
belongings, 
including a flat screen computer monitor, $1,500 in currency (in 
$100 denominations) also was missing. 
¶14 Soon after discovering the break-in, law enforcement 
officers stopped the GPS-tracked vehicle, which was driven by 
Brereton with Conaway as a passenger.  Both were immediately 
arrested.  Incident to that arrest, officers searched the 
vehicle, wherein they found a flat screen computer monitor; 
                                                 
8 Real-time transmission relays information at the actual 
time that the vehicle's movement happens. 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
9 
 
additionally, Brereton had $1,300 in $100 bills clenched in his 
hand. 
¶15 Brereton 
was 
charged 
with 
14 
criminal 
counts, 
including both felonies and misdemeanors.  Brereton subsequently 
moved to suppress evidence obtained through the use of the GPS 
device, including evidence found in his vehicle on the day he 
was arrested, on the ground that the evidence was obtained in 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.9 After briefs, testimony, and oral 
argument, 
the 
Circuit 
Court 
for 
Walworth 
County 
denied 
Brereton's motion.  Brereton then pleaded guilty to some counts, 
and others were dismissed but read in.10  Brereton was sentenced 
to 
12 
years 
imprisonment, 
consisting 
of 
seven 
years 
of 
incarceration and five years of extended supervision.   
¶16 After judgment was entered on his plea, Brereton 
appealed the denial of his suppression motion, in accordance 
with Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10) (2009-10) (allowing review of a 
motion to suppress after entry of a guilty plea and judgment 
thereon).  The court of appeals affirmed.  We accepted 
                                                 
9 Brereton bases his challenge exclusively on the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, without relying on 
the parallel provision in the Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, 
Section 11. 
10 When charges are read in, the circuit court agrees to the 
dismissal of those charges, and the defendant agrees that the 
circuit court can consider the read in charges when sentencing 
is done on the counts to which the defendant has pleaded guilty.  
See State v. Frey, 2012 WI 99, ¶35, 343 Wis. 2d 358, 817 N.W.2d 
436.    
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
10 
 
Brereton's petition and now affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶17 Brereton argues that the installation of the GPS 
device was accomplished by an illegal seizure of his vehicle, 
and that the information that law enforcement obtained by using 
the GPS device unreasonably exceeded the scope of the warrant.  
Both of the issues raised turn on whether law enforcement 
officers' conduct violated the Fourth Amendment's protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  These issues 
present questions of constitutional fact.  See State v. Sveum, 
2010 WI 92, ¶16, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317.  We uphold the 
circuit court's findings of historical fact unless those 
findings are clearly erroneous; however, the application of 
Fourth Amendment principles to the facts found presents a 
question of law that we review independently.  Id. 
B.  Standing 
¶18 We begin by addressing the State's argument that 
Brereton does not have Fourth Amendment "standing" to challenge 
the search or seizure in this case.  The State contends that 
Brereton 
has 
not 
demonstrated 
any 
possessory 
or 
privacy 
interests in the vehicle and therefore, he does not have 
standing to assert that the actions of law enforcement infringed 
his Fourth Amendment rights.  In particular, the State claims 
that there is no evidence in the record showing that Brereton 
owned the vehicle, that he had permission to use it, or even 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
11 
 
that the vehicle was not stolen.  Cf. State v. Bruski, 2007 WI 
25, ¶22, 299 Wis. 2d 177, 727 N.W.2d 503. 
¶19 We decline to address the State's standing argument.  
The State raises this issue for the first time before this court 
and "[t]he general rule is that issues not presented to the 
circuit court will not be considered for the first time on 
appeal."  State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 
(1997).  Although we may choose to consider such issues, 
countervailing 
considerations 
of 
fairness, 
efficiency, 
and 
institutional 
competency 
are 
generally 
persuasive 
when 
determining whether an issue raised for the first time on appeal 
should be addressed.  Id. at 604-05. 
¶20 Furthermore, for our discussion of GPS devices and 
their impacts on Fourth Amendment concerns, the matter of 
standing need not be addressed.  Accordingly, we assume, without 
deciding, that Brereton has standing to assert Fourth Amendment 
challenges in this case.   
C.  Relevant Fourth Amendment Principles 
1.  Fourth Amendment standards regarding seizures 
¶21 Brereton 
contends that the officers' towing his 
vehicle constituted an unreasonable seizure.  This argument 
asserts that law enforcement seized Brereton's vehicle without a 
warrant or probable cause.  Accordingly, we examine the Fourth 
Amendment's requirements for seizures of vehicles. 
¶22 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that: 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
12 
 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.   
¶23 A seizure deprives an individual of "dominion over his 
or her person or property," Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 
133 (1990), whereas a search occurs "when an expectation of 
privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is 
infringed."  United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 
(1984).  The two interests underlying seizures and searches are 
analytically distinct, and the infringement of one does not 
always implicate the other.  See State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, 
¶25, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748.  In particular, seizures 
generally are considered less intrusive than searches, based on 
the type of rights infringed:  "[a] seizure affects only the 
person's possessory interests; a search affects a person's 
privacy interests."  Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806 
(1984).  We first examine the law relevant to seizures involving 
automobiles, and then turn to the privacy interests implicated 
by the search of a vehicle, namely, the tracking of a vehicle 
using GPS technology.  
¶24 The 
stop 
of 
an 
automobile 
by 
law 
enforcement 
constitutes a seizure of the vehicle, as well as its occupants.  
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996).  The 
towing of the vehicle from the location at which it was stopped 
continues a seizure of the vehicle.  See State v. Sumner, 2008 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
13 
 
WI 94, ¶9, 312 Wis. 2d 292, 752 N.W.2d 783 (noting that a seized 
vehicle would be towed because the driver's license was 
suspended).  A seizure conducted without a valid warrant is 
presumptively unreasonable.  See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798, 824–25 (1982).  The requirement that seizures be undertaken 
pursuant to a valid warrant is subject to certain, limited 
exceptions.  Id. at 825.  Relevant here is what is referred to 
as the "automobile exception," which recognizes that law 
enforcement officers may, in certain circumstances, conduct 
seizures 
involving 
automobiles 
without 
first 
obtaining 
a 
warrant.  See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48–52 (1970). 
¶25 Initially established in Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132 (1925), the automobile exception provides that law 
enforcement officers may seize a vehicle, its occupants, and 
personal property inside the vehicle, without a warrant, when 
officers demonstrate that probable cause exists to justify the 
intrusion.11  See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51–52; Whren, 517 U.S. at 
809–10.  We have stated that probable cause requires that law 
enforcement officers show that there was a "fair probability" 
that the place or container seized (in this case, a vehicle) 
contained or was itself evidence of a crime.  See State v. 
Carroll, 2010 WI 8, ¶28, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 1; see also 
Chambers, 399 U.S. at 49 ("'The measure of legality of such a 
                                                 
11 The necessary antecedent to the seizure of a vehicle is 
that, prior to stopping the vehicle, law enforcement officers 
must have at least reasonable suspicion that criminal activity 
is afoot.  See State v. Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, ¶47, 341 Wis. 2d 
576, 815 N.W.2d 675. 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
14 
 
seizure is, therefore, that the seizing officer shall have 
reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile 
which he stops and seizes has contraband . . . therein which is 
being illegally transported.'") (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 
155–56). 
¶26 Chambers is a hallmark case involving the automobile 
exception.  In Chambers, officers stopped a vehicle based on 
witness reports that a similar vehicle with similar occupants 
had been seen fleeing the scene of a robbery.  Chambers, 399 
U.S. at 44.  Within an hour, officers located a vehicle that 
matched the witnesses' description, and whose occupants also 
matched the witnesses' particularized reports of suspects 
present at the robbery.  See id.  After removing the suspects 
from the vehicle, officers decided that they would move the 
vehicle from the dark parking lot in which the vehicle was 
stopped to the police station, where they could more safely and 
effectively conduct a search.  See id. at 52 n.10. 
¶27 In evaluating whether the officers' decision to move 
the vehicle was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the 
Court examined the "automobile exception," and explained that 
the purpose of the exception was to allow officers to seize 
vehicles upon probable cause, but without a warrant, because 
doing so serves the substantial state interest of preventing 
probable criminals from avoiding capture, as well as preventing 
the removal of incriminating evidence from law enforcement's 
jurisdiction.  See id. at 47–52.  The Court concluded that the 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
15 
 
officers' decision to continue the seizure and move the vehicle 
was reasonable under the circumstances.  See id. at 51–52. 
¶28 Since Chambers, the Court has reaffirmed the validity 
of the automobile exception, as well as its allowance that 
officers may continue the seizure of a vehicle and move it, 
based upon probable cause that the vehicle is or contains 
evidence of a crime, when doing so serves substantial law 
enforcement interests, and when law enforcement officers have 
sought to use those methods least likely to infringe upon 
citizens' Fourth Amendment rights.  See Ross, 456 U.S. at 808 
n.10.  Accordingly, when analyzing an individual's Fourth 
Amendment claim of an unreasonable seizure of an automobile, one 
of the court's considerations is to balance the public interest 
in investigating and thwarting crime against the private 
interests in maintaining dominion over one's possessions; the 
court must examine the extent to which the seizure serves the 
public interest and infringes upon private interests.  See 
Arias, 311 Wis. 2d 358, ¶34; see also United States v. Place, 
462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983).  In the context of warrantless 
seizures 
involving 
automobiles, 
there 
exists 
a 
strong 
governmental interest, recognized under the Fourth Amendment, to 
ferret out crime and conduct necessary investigations before the 
vehicle and its occupants may be "spirited away."  See Florida 
v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 565 (1999). 
¶29 In addition to law enforcement officers' substantial 
interest in investigating and preventing crime upon a showing of 
probable cause, other "substantial" governmental interests may 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
16 
 
justify warrantless seizures.  See Place, 462 U.S. at 703–04.  
Particularly relevant in this case are law enforcement's 
"substantial" interests in "minimizing the risk of harm" to 
officers or occupants of a vehicle.  See id.  These interests 
are significant when the object to be seized is a vehicle 
located in a public place.  See White, 526 U.S. at 565–66. 
¶30 The 
Fourth 
Amendment's 
general 
allowance 
of 
warrantless seizures of vehicles based upon probable cause is 
intended 
to 
strike 
a 
balance 
between 
the 
protection 
of 
individual rights and the recognition that, when an individual 
has given law enforcement officers probable cause to believe 
that a crime is being or has been committed, the individual's 
Fourth Amendment interests are diminished: 
[I]f an immediate search on the scene could be 
conducted, but not one at the station if the vehicle 
is impounded, police often simply would search the 
vehicle 
on 
the 
street——at 
no 
advantage 
to 
the 
occupants, yet possibly at certain cost to the police.  
The rules as applied in particular cases may appear 
unsatisfactory.  They reflect, however, a reasoned 
application of the more general rule that if an 
individual gives the police probable cause to believe 
a vehicle is transporting contraband, he loses the 
right 
to 
proceed 
on 
his 
way 
without 
official 
interference. 
Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n.9.  Therefore, as long as officers have 
probable cause to believe that the vehicle is, or contains, 
evidence of a crime, warrantless seizures of automobiles may be 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
17 
 
lawful, provided that they are conducted reasonably.12  See 
Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51–52; Ross, 456 U.S. at 824–25; see also 
Place, 462 U.S. at 707–10 (recognizing that warrantless seizures 
must be conducted reasonably). 
2.  Fourth Amendment standards regarding searches 
¶31 The Fourth Amendment interests implicated by searches 
differ 
from 
those 
implicated 
by 
seizures. 
 
Whereas 
the 
allegations that a seizure was unreasonable are analyzed in 
terms of a balance of the public and private interests at issue, 
as well as the reasonableness of the means used to effectuate 
the seizure, the reasonableness of a search looks to how and 
where a search was conducted.  See Arias, 311 Wis. 2d 358, ¶¶31–
32.  Focusing on how and where a search was conducted addresses 
whether the search was unreasonable because the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits 
unreasonably 
intrusive 
incursions 
upon 
privacy 
interests of individuals.  See id., ¶31. 
¶32 Accordingly, whether an individual has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in avoiding the method of search and a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched are the 
questions that drive a court's examination of the reasonableness 
of the search.  This is so because the protection against 
                                                 
12 Notably, in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806 n.8 
(1982), the Court relied upon the longstanding history of the 
warrant 
requirement's 
exception 
for 
movable 
vehicles, 
recognizing that "individuals always had been on notice that 
movable vessels may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise 
to probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband, without 
the protection afforded by a magistrate's prior evaluation of 
those facts." 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
18 
 
unreasonable searches attaches to people, not places or things, 
"aside from their relationships to people affected by government 
action."  See id., ¶24.  For example, when the claim alleged is 
an unreasonable search, interference with places or things is 
insufficient to sustain the claim unless the individual alleging 
an unreasonable search demonstrates that he or she had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or thing 
searched.  See id.; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 351 (1967). 
¶33 In Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, ¶¶39, 52, we upheld the 
validity of a search warrant authorizing the use of GPS 
technology to track an individual's vehicle and monitor the 
occupants' movements and locations.  In Sveum, we assumed, 
without deciding, that the use of a GPS device constituted a 
search.  Id., ¶¶73–74.  However, recently, in United States v. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), the Supreme Court confirmed that 
the use of GPS technology to track an individual's movements in 
his vehicle is a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.  Id. at 
949-50.    
¶34 Although 
the 
Court's 
majority 
opinion 
in 
Jones 
discussed the Fourth Amendment violation in terms of the 
government's trespass upon an individual's property, see id. at 
949–51, warrantless GPS tracking would constitute a search "even 
in the absence of a trespass, [because] a Fourth Amendment 
search 
occurs 
when 
the 
government 
violates 
a 
subjective 
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable."  
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
19 
 
Id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).13  The privacy interest at issue in Jones, and in this 
case, where the government has utilized Brereton's property14 to 
apply GPS technology to monitor his movements, is government 
usurpation of an individual's property "for the purpose of 
conducting 
surveillance 
on 
him, 
thereby 
invading 
privacy 
interests long afforded, and undoubtedly entitled to, Fourth 
Amendment protection."  See id. at 954 (citing Silverman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961)). 
3.  Warrant execution 
¶35 In 
contrast 
to 
warrantless 
seizures 
under 
the 
"automobile exception," which are not entitled to a reviewing 
court's deference, where a neutral and detached magistrate has 
determined that probable cause exists for the issuance of a 
warrant, courts will accord great deference to the magistrate's 
determination.  See Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, ¶25.  Where a valid 
warrant exists, the reasonableness of the method by which a 
search or seizure was conducted nevertheless will be examined.  
See id., ¶53.  However, the choice of method of execution of a 
                                                 
13 It is important to note that the majority opinion in 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), did not overrule 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and the cases that 
follow Katz's reasoning, but rather, relied on another Fourth 
Amendment concern.   
14 Because we assumed, without deciding, that Brereton had 
standing to raise Fourth Amendment claims, we must assume that 
Brereton had at least the right to possess the vehicle in 
question. 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
20 
 
warrant is typically left to the discretion of law enforcement 
officers, provided that the chosen method is "reasonable."  See 
id. 
D.  Application 
¶36 Brereton's first argument for suppressing the GPS 
evidence against him is that the extension of the seizure of his 
vehicle to tow it was illegal as not having been supported by 
probable 
cause, 
and 
that, 
alternatively, 
the 
method 
of 
effectuating the seizure was unreasonable because officers did 
not wait for the warrant before towing his vehicle.  We 
disagree.   
¶37 By the time that Brereton and Conaway were stopped by 
Rock and Walworth County officers, officers from both counties' 
sheriff's departments had conducted substantial investigations 
and surveillance in connection with the burglaries in which the 
vehicle was implicated.  The two departments had investigated 
approximately 35 burglaries that shared similar characteristics.  
Therefore, 
Walworth 
County 
Sheriff's 
officers 
possessed 
information that (1) the vehicle in which the men were riding 
was very similar to the vehicle that had been seen at multiple 
burglaries; (2) the vehicle also was similar to the vehicle 
described as having been used by two men similar to the 
burglars, who had suspiciously approached homes in the area of 
the 
burglaries; 
(3) 
the 
license 
plate 
of 
the 
vehicle 
corresponded to at least one witness's account of a suspicious 
vehicle in the area near one of the burglaries; and (4) the 
vehicle had a loud exhaust, no rearview mirror, and expired 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
21 
 
license plates whose legitimacy was already suspect due to 
reports that the plate had recently been found on a Buick in 
Rock County.  Accordingly, the officers had at least a "fair 
probability" that the vehicle was or contained evidence of a 
crime.  See Carroll, 322 Wis. 2d 299, ¶28. 
¶38 Then, when the officers approached the vehicle and 
began to interact with Brereton and Conaway, they discovered 
that the men did not have valid driver's licenses and that the 
vehicle's VIN did not correspond to the license plate.  It 
should be noted that neither of these facts (no licenses, 
incongruous VIN) was necessary to show that the officers had 
probable cause to seize Brereton's vehicle.  The information 
that the officers obtained after stopping the vehicle simply 
lent further support to the conclusion that probable cause 
existed for the continuing seizure of the vehicle. 
¶39 Brereton argues, however, that the warrant that was 
issued impermissibly relied upon the information that officers 
learned after the stop, namely the VIN and the physical 
similarities that Brereton and Conaway shared with witnesses' 
reports of the men seen at the locations of the burglaries.  
Brereton 
argues 
that 
reliance 
on 
that 
information 
is 
impermissible because those additional pieces of information 
were obtained as a result of the illegal seizure of the vehicle.  
Brereton is mistaken on at least two grounds. 
¶40 First, as discussed above, the officers had probable 
cause to continue the stop and tow the vehicle, based on the 
plethora of information suggesting that the vehicle Brereton was 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
22 
 
driving was connected to numerous burglaries in the area.  
Second, the officers were justified in noting the vehicle's VIN, 
as well as the physical characteristics of the vehicle's two 
occupants.  Law enforcement officers are not prohibited from 
continuing their investigatory efforts after a lawful stop, when 
they have probable cause to believe the vehicle is, or contains, 
evidence of a crime.  Cf. Carroll, 322 Wis. 2d 299, ¶¶22–25 
(recognizing officer's valid possession of defendant's cell 
phone, after defendant exited vehicle following high-speed chase 
and officer ordered defendant to drop what was in his hands; 
analogizing cell phone to evidence collected during pat-down 
search incident to investigatory stop). 
¶41 Moreover, the probable cause that the officers had at 
the time of the stop of Brereton's vehicle was sufficient to 
justify the officers' decision to continue the seizure of the 
vehicle and move it to a location where a GPS device could be 
installed more safely and effectively.  See Ross, 456 U.S. at 
807 n.9 (reaffirming that where officers have probable cause to 
justify the warrantless seizure of an automobile, they may 
conduct an immediate search of the vehicle, and if an immediate, 
warrantless search on the street is justified, moving the 
vehicle 
for 
a 
search 
at 
another 
location 
is 
equally 
permissible). 
¶42 Indeed, 
the 
Supreme 
Court's 
decisions 
in 
Ross, 
Chambers, and White provide explicit support for the methods 
chosen by the officers in this case.  After seizing Brereton's 
vehicle pursuant to probable cause that the vehicle was or 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
23 
 
contained evidence of the rash of local burglaries, the officers 
elected to move the vehicle from its location along Highway 51 
to 
the 
impound 
lot, 
where 
officers 
awaited 
judicial 
authorization prior to installing the GPS device.  Cf. Chambers, 
399 U.S. at 51–52.  After receiving such authorization, officers 
installed the GPS device.  Accordingly, under the relevant 
Supreme Court precedent, with probable cause for the seizure, 
neither the fact that officers moved the vehicle to install the 
GPS, nor the amount of time that officers held the vehicle can 
be said to be unreasonable in light of law enforcement's 
substantial 
interests 
in 
safety 
and 
in 
the 
effective 
installation of the GPS device that was used to search the 
vehicle. 
¶43 Notwithstanding 
our 
acceptance 
of 
the 
officers' 
decision to continue the seizure of Brereton's vehicle and to 
move it, we also recognize that the decision to install a GPS 
device on Brereton's car required officers to obtain a warrant 
because the use of a GPS constituted a search that extended 
beyond the scope of the automobile exception for warrantless 
searches.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-50.  The installation of the 
GPS was distinguishable from the typical search under the 
automobile exception because law enforcement's target was not 
evidence within the car, which under the exception gives rise to 
a need to quickly collect evidence within the car before the 
evidence can be removed from the jurisdiction.  See White, 526 
U.S. at 565. 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
24 
 
¶44 Here, although officers did have an interest in the 
attachment of the GPS before the car escaped the jurisdiction, 
the nature of the evidence that they sought and the privacy 
interest 
implicated 
by 
the 
GPS 
search 
required 
judicial 
authorization, which the officers dutifully obtained.  By 
receiving judicial authorization, the officers adhered to the 
Fourth Amendment's protection of Brereton's interest against 
unwarranted government usurpation of his property for the 
purpose of conducting surveillance on him.  See Jones, 132 
S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  The judicial 
approval, based on an affidavit setting forth probable cause for 
the search, is entitled to deference, see Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 
369, ¶25, and Brereton has demonstrated no basis for us to 
disturb the judge's decision to issue the warrant. 
¶45 We turn, then, to Brereton's second asserted basis for 
suppressing the evidence, i.e., that the method of executing the 
warrant exceeded the scope of the search the warrant authorized.  
Brereton's argument reduces to a claim that, because neither the 
affidavit in support of the warrant for installing the GPS 
device, nor the warrant itself, contemplated the use of a GPS 
device that would allow officers to track Brereton in real-time, 
the execution of the warrant was unreasonable. 
¶46 Our analysis of this claim begins and ends with the 
language used in the affidavit in support of the warrant and in 
the warrant itself.  In the relevant portion of his affidavit 
seeking permission to install a GPS device, Walworth County 
Detective Robert Schiltz stated that: 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
25 
 
[T]he GPS tracking device, which is covertly placed on 
a criminal suspect's automobile, is equipped with a 
satellite radio receiver, which, when programmed, 
periodically records at specified times, the latitude, 
longitude, date and time of readings and stores these 
readings until they are downloaded to a computer 
interface unit and overlaid on a computerized mapping 
program for analysis. 
The warrant that Judge Carlson issued incorporated the premises 
of Detective Schiltz's affidavit, and simply added the manner in 
which law enforcement officers could install and maintain a GPS 
device. 
¶47 Brereton makes much of what he reads in the affidavit 
as limitations on how a GPS device would be utilized, and 
asserts that the language mandates that the system would be 
limited to storing locational information on that device, and 
that officers would be able to learn of Brereton's movements 
only after retrieving the GPS device from Brereton's vehicle and 
manually downloading the information to a computer for analysis.  
However, neither the language of the affidavit, nor the 
practical realities of constantly evolving electronic tracking 
technology require such a cabined reading of the language 
setting forth the permissible scope of GPS tracking under the 
warrant. 
¶48 Brereton's argument hinges largely on the use of the 
terms "periodically," "store," and "download" in the affidavit.  
His position seems to be based upon the similarity between the 
warrant at issue in this case and the affidavit and warrant in 
Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, ¶¶6–9.  In Sveum, the warrant authorized 
the installation and continued use of a GPS device that required 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
26 
 
law enforcement officers to occasionally retrieve the device 
from the target vehicle and manually download the stored 
locational data onto a computer for review.  Id.  Brereton 
suggests that this similarity between the warrants led Judge 
Carlson to believe that the warrant he was issuing contemplated 
exactly the same hardware and software as was utilized in Sveum, 
and nothing else. 
¶49 The language used in the affidavit in this case does 
not bind law enforcement to a specific GPS technology, and we 
decline to read such limitations into the warrant based on the 
type of GPS technology used in Sveum.  Although we do not 
attempt to compare and contrast the technological intricacies of 
GPS 
devices 
and 
their 
corresponding 
software, 
here, 
the 
challenged language in the affidavit and warrant can reasonably 
be read to allow the use of the GPS device that officers chose, 
notwithstanding 
its 
advanced 
technology 
that 
permitted 
transmission of information in real-time. 
¶50 For example, although "periodically" might be read to 
mean "every fifteen minutes," without any other suggestion in 
the affidavit to that effect, the term could just as easily mean 
"every millisecond."  The same relativity is apparent in the 
term "store":  storage could refer to long-term storage on the 
device, or it might refer to the instantaneous and temporary 
storage of the information on the device prior to its 
transmission to another storage location, whether in cloud 
storage or on a designated hard drive.  The same can be said for 
"download," which can occur automatically and immediately after 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
27 
 
collection of the information, or it may require manual effort 
at a later time. 
¶51 This is not a case in which the language of the 
affidavit or warrant required one kind of GPS tracking device.  
Here, the officers used technology reasonably contemplated under 
the warrant, whereby the officers were able to increase their 
efficiency,15 at no demonstrated, unreasonable cost to the Fourth 
Amendment interests of Brereton. 
¶52 Brereton 
argues, 
however, 
that 
the 
instantaneous 
nature of the informational transmission created an intrusion 
that is different in kind, rather than simply a difference in 
degree.  His argument makes reference to the requirement that 
warrants particularly describe the places and things to be 
searched, and suggests that the warrant in this case described 
the kind of evidence for which officers could search by 
reference to the technological capabilities of Sveum-esque 
hardware and software.   
¶53 We see no basis in the affidavit, the warrant, or 
existing law for this conclusion.  The warrant, by incorporating 
Detective Schiltz's affidavit, provided what law enforcement 
officers 
were 
authorized 
to 
seek 
using 
the 
GPS 
device:  
"evidence 
of 
the 
. . . 
criminal 
violation 
[discussed 
in 
Detective Schiltz's affidavit], as well as the location where 
                                                 
15 For example, in Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, ¶8, over the 
course of an entire month, officers were required to return to 
the vehicle twice after the initial installation to recover and 
replace the GPS unit.  Here, the GPS tracking was completed in 
four days. 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
28 
 
the fruits of the crimes are being stored and the identification 
of associates assisting in the aforementioned crimes."  This is 
the same kind of information that officers obtained under the 
warrant in Sveum. 
¶54 Instantaneous 
transmission 
of 
the 
same 
kind 
of 
information as would be available for later download from a 
Sveum-type GPS device does not alter the kind of information 
transmitted, or make the warrant allowing such search any less 
particularized as to the places and things that it allowed to be 
searched.  It simply allows law enforcement officers to conduct 
their investigation efficiently, and in real-time, as opposed to 
after the fact.  The difference here, between Brereton's hoped-
for, more antiquated GPS device and that which was actually 
used, is merely one of degree:  a decrease in the amount of time 
between when the vehicle moves and when officers learn about 
that movement. We have never equated police efficiency with 
unconstitutionality, and we decline to do so now.16 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶55 We conclude that the seizure of Brereton's vehicle was 
supported by probable cause that the vehicle was, or contained, 
evidence of a crime, and was therefore permissible under the 
Fourth Amendment.  The seizure was supported by witnesses' 
reports that a car matching the make, model, and license plate 
number of that particular vehicle had been seen at the locations 
                                                 
16 We suggest that the legislature address the constantly 
evolving nature of electronic incursions. 
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
29 
 
of recent burglaries in the area.  Additionally, after officers 
lawfully stopped Brereton and Conaway in the suspect vehicle, 
they discovered that the VIN did not match the license plate, 
and that the occupants of the vehicle were notably similar to 
the two men seen at multiple recent burglaries.  Accordingly, 
the three-hour seizure of Brereton's vehicle, whereby officers 
were able to install the GPS device, did not constitute an 
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, as applied to 
automobiles.  Moreover, in light of Brereton's Fourth Amendment 
interest in avoiding government usurpation of his property for 
the purpose of conducting surveillance on him, the officers' 
decision to obtain a warrant prior to conducting the GPS search 
was proper. 
¶56 We 
also 
conclude 
that 
the 
technology 
used 
in 
conducting the GPS search did not exceed the scope of the 
warrant allowing GPS tracking of Brereton's vehicle.  Judge 
Carlson issued the warrant based on the probable cause set forth 
through the facts recited in a detective's affidavit.  The 
affidavit and warrant's language contemplated the installation 
of a GPS device that would track the vehicle's movements.  That 
the device provided officers with real-time updates of those 
movements did not alter the kind of information to be obtained 
under the warrant, or the nature of the intrusion allowed.  
Therefore, the officers' execution of the warrant was not 
unreasonable.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals.   
No. 
2010AP1366-CR   
 
30 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶57 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  Search 
and seizure of automobiles (and their contents) have a long, and 
still developing, constitutional history in state and federal 
courts.1  This jurisprudence, although mired by plurality and 
conflicting opinions, has generally been favorable to searches 
and seizures of automobiles without warrants.  Most recently, 
however, the United States Supreme Court has trended toward 
restricting law enforcement's ability to conduct warrantless 
searches of automobiles.2    
¶58 The present case rests on a familiar narrative:  Law 
enforcement officers stop and seize a vehicle on probable cause 
for a violation of traffic laws.  The basis for the stop and 
seizure is pretextual.  The officers' true motive for stopping 
the vehicle is not to issue a traffic citation, but to search 
the vehicle, typically for contraband drugs.  
I 
¶59 Just like in that narrative, the officers in the 
present case made a "routine pretextual traffic stop."  One 
distinguishing factor in the present case is that the officers 
freely admit the pretext.  Therefore, this court need not guess 
at their motives. 
¶60 After 
coming 
upon 
the 
defendant's 
vehicle 
and 
realizing the license plate matched that of a vehicle seen near 
                                                 
1 See generally case law discussed by 3 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, ch. 7 
(5th ed. 2012) (Search and Seizure of Vehicles). 
2 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. 
Ct. 945 (2012); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
a reported burglary, the officers followed the vehicle for 
nearly two hours.  While other officers were in the process of 
seeking a warrant authorizing a seizure of the vehicle and a 
search of the vehicle (that is, installation of a GPS device on 
the vehicle), the officers following the vehicle found probable 
cause to stop the vehicle for traffic violations.  They then 
conducted what they readily admitted was a routine pretextual 
traffic stop.3  Specifically, the officers admitted that their 
                                                 
3 The officers testified that at approximately 11:00 a.m. on 
October 5, 2007, they located the defendant's vehicle parked 
outside a Beloit residence and decided to attach a GPS device to 
it.  The officers determined that the vehicle's location at the 
time would not allow them to attach a GPS device undetected, 
because it was parked on a residential street and several people 
walking around the neighborhood would see them.  The officers 
decided to keep the vehicle under surveillance and apply for a 
warrant for the GPS device.  
The officers followed the vehicle when it left the 
residence and traveled to a restaurant in Janesville.  The 
officers then decided that they would stop the vehicle when it 
left the restaurant because "the license plates on the vehicle 
[were] expired and the vehicle [had] a loud exhaust."  The 
officers watching the vehicle noticed that "the two male/white 
occupants in the vehicle fit the description perfectly of the 
suspicious subjects that had been witnessed by a complainant in 
our county on the day that several of their daytime residential 
burglaries started." 
At approximately 12:56 p.m., a Rock County Deputy Sheriff 
conducted a pretextual traffic stop of the vehicle along Highway 
51 by the Rock County Airport, near Janesville.  The deputy 
observed the vehicle had expired plates, no rear view mirror and 
a slightly louder than normal muffler.  A Rock County Sheriff's 
Department detective arrived on the scene and observed the 
vehicle as a "medium blue" car, which could also reasonably be 
described as teal or robin's egg blue.  The vehicle seemed to 
fit the description of a car observed near reported burglaries.  
The two white male occupants, Brereton and Conaway, whose 
identities were ascertained during the initial traffic stop, 
also fit the description of the men seen near the burglaries. 
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
goal in conducting the traffic stop was not to warn or cite the 
defendant for a traffic violation, but rather to seize the 
vehicle so that they could search it by installing a GPS device 
to monitor the vehicle's future whereabouts and investigate 
whether the vehicle and its occupants were involved in reported 
burglaries in the area.4   
¶61 After the valid traffic stop, the officers removed the 
occupants from the vehicle, transported them to a distant 
                                                                                                                                                             
When a vehicle is lawfully stopped, an officer ordinarily 
may ask the driver for his or her name, driver's license and 
registration as a routine matter.  State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 
72, ¶¶45-51, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72. 
With regard to the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), 
which was obtained at the initial stop and included in the 
warrant 
affidavit, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
explained:  "In sum, because of the important role played by the 
VIN in the pervasive governmental regulation of the automobile 
and the efforts by the Federal Government to ensure that the VIN 
is placed in plain view, we hold that there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the VIN."  New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 
106, 114 (1986). 
4 The affidavit in support of the warrant explained that the 
purpose of installing the GPS device was to "lead to evidence of 
the aforementioned criminal violation, as well as the location 
where the fruits of the crimes are being stored and the 
identification of associates assisting in the aforementioned 
crimes."  There is no time stamp recording when the affidavit 
for the warrant was submitted.  It is clear, however, that the 
affidavit was submitted after the initial traffic stop because 
the affidavit includes information that the officers learned 
only after they stopped the vehicle.   
At 1:08 p.m., twelve minutes after the stop, one officer 
informed another officer that he was getting a court order for 
the installation of a GPS device.  At 1:14 p.m., an officer 
relayed information to another officer and to an assistant 
district attorney.  This information was included in the 
affidavit.  
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
location and clandestinely took control of the vehicle without a 
warrant, towing it to a private lot, thus interfering with the 
defendant's possessory and privacy interests in the vehicle for 
at least three hours.5  Law enforcement seized the vehicle before 
a warrant was issued.     
¶62 After obtaining a warrant to seize and search the 
vehicle, the officers executed the search by opening the vehicle 
and installing the GPS device.6  The process of obtaining the 
warrant and installing the GPS device apparently took about 
three hours.7  The officers then returned the vehicle to the 
place where they originally had stopped it, and the vehicle 
remained there for another four hours. 
                                                 
5 The defendant asserts that the seizure began when he was 
removed from the vehicle and taken to the Dollar Store to 
arrange for him and the car to be retrieved.  The record does 
not show the defendant objected to leaving the vehicle or asked 
to remain with the vehicle.   
6 United States v. Jones, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012), establishes that the installation of a GPS device in a 
car constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
7 At approximately 3:35 p.m., officers at the private lot 
were notified that the court order had been signed and that they 
could go ahead and install the GPS device on the vehicle.  
Installation was completed at approximately 3:56 p.m. 
There is no record of when the vehicle actually was removed 
from the private lot and returned to Highway 51.  It is known 
that the vehicle did not leave its location on Highway 51 until 
approximately 7:47 p.m.  
Except for the impounding of the vehicle before the warrant 
was issued, this case demonstrates excellent police work. 
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶63 The traffic stop was based on probable cause to 
believe that the defendant had violated traffic laws.  The 
defendant's brief clearly states that the defendant does not 
object to the initial traffic stop and the "seizure" of the 
automobile at that time (even though it was a pretextual stop).  
Such an objection would in all likelihood be unsuccessful.  
Rather, 
the 
defendant 
challenges 
the 
State's 
subsequent 
interference with his possessory and privacy interests in his 
personal property.     
¶64 The defendant and the State focus on the validity of 
the conduct of the law enforcement officers after the lawful 
traffic stop in towing and stowing the vehicle for three hours.  
Because the seizure under the initial traffic stop lasted for at 
least three hours (and perhaps longer) and morphed into a 
burglary investigation, the defendant and the State treat the 
impounding of the vehicle (towing and stowing the vehicle) as a 
seizure separate and distinct from the initial traffic stop and 
seizure.   
¶65 The continuation of a traffic stop based on probable 
cause must be reasonably limited in time and scope to fulfill 
the purposes of the initial stop.8  A valid traffic stop and 
seizure can become unlawful if it is prolonged and is not 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified 
the initial interference in the first place.9  As Professor 
                                                 
8 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407-08 (2005); State 
v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, ¶¶24, 26, 274 Wis. 2d 540, 683 N.W.2d 1. 
9 Griffith, 236 Wis. 2d 48,  ¶26. 
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
LaFave puts it, the questions are how long the seizure may last 
and what is permissible during that interval.10  
¶66 I begin by noting that under the Fourth Amendment, the 
defendant's vehicle is a constitutionally protected "effect."  
In the present case, the State engaged in a physical invasion of 
the defendant's "effect" by towing and stowing the vehicle.  In 
other 
words, 
the 
State 
encroached 
on 
a 
constitutionally 
protected area by trespassing on the defendant's property.     
¶67 The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people 
to 
be 
secure 
in 
their . . . effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures."  Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority in United States v. Jones, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012), discussed the relationship of the Fourth Amendment and 
trespass 
as 
follows: 
 
The 
Fourth 
Amendment 
embodies 
"a 
particular concern for government trespass upon the area 
('persons, houses, papers, and effects') it enumerates."11   
¶68 A 
seizure 
of 
a 
vehicle 
without 
a 
warrant 
is 
presumptively violative of the Fourth Amendment.  Majority op., 
¶24.   
¶69 I conclude that in the present case, as in Jones, the 
State committed a common law trespass.  I further conclude that 
the 
trespass 
(seizure) 
was 
not 
reasonable 
under 
the 
                                                 
10 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment, § 0.2 at 436, § 9.3 at 472 (5th ed. 2012).  
11 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950. 
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
circumstances of the present case.12  The majority explains that 
to determine the reasonableness of a seizure, a court must 
balance the public interest in investigating and thwarting crime 
against the private interests in maintaining dominion over one's 
possessions.  Majority op., ¶28.  Unfortunately, the majority 
does not conduct this balancing test.     
¶70 In applying the test of objective reasonableness to 
the seizure and its continuation, I conclude that under the 
circumstances of the present case, the State's dominion over the 
defendant's vehicle was prolonged beyond a reasonable time and 
was not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which, 
according to the majority opinion, justified the initial and 
continuing seizure of the vehicle.         
¶71 To render the seizure reasonable, the majority opinion 
attempts to place the towing and stowing of the vehicle within 
the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement.  Courts 
have been more lenient in permitting warrantless searches or 
seizures of automobiles than warrantless searches of other 
premises.  The automobile exception has over the years been 
based on the mobility of cars and diminished expectation of 
privacy in cars.13  Under the automobile exception relevant to 
the instant case, a car may be seized or searched (1) if the car 
                                                 
12 The United States Supreme Court did not reach the issue 
of the reasonableness of the warrantless installation of the GPS 
device because the Government did not raise that issue in the 
court of appeals.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. 
13 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment, § 7.2 at 721-22 (5th ed. 2012). 
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
contains evidence of a crime; or (2) if the car is evidence of a 
crime.  
¶72 Quoting snippets of United States Supreme Court cases 
dealing 
with 
the 
automobile 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement, the majority opinion declares that the officers had 
probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of 
a crime or was evidence of a crime and that therefore the 
warrantless seizures of the automobile was lawful.  Majority 
op., ¶¶2, 30, 42, 55.14 
                                                 
14 Although the automobile exception developed to apply in 
exigent circumstances, later cases eliminated the exigency 
requirement.  Doubts remain about the necessity of an exigency 
requirement for purposes of a warrantless seizure of a vehicle 
on probable cause.   
In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970), addressing 
the automobile exception, the Court stated: "Only in exigent 
circumstances will the judgment of the police as to probable 
cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search."   
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-64 (1971), 
involving a warrantless seizure of a vehicle, the Court declared 
that 
the 
seizure 
was 
unconstitutional 
when 
no 
exigent 
circumstances existed making it impracticable to secure a 
warrant.  In Coolidge, as in the instant case, "the police had 
known for some time of the probable role of the [automobile] in 
the crime," and police knew the whereabouts of the driver, 
negating the argument that the car could be moved quickly 
without the police's knowledge.     
In Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999), the 
Court explained that exigent circumstances are no longer 
required to conduct a warrantless search of a car as long as the 
car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe the 
vehicle contains contraband.  
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶73 The majority opinion repeatedly explains that the 
continued seizure was valid because the defendant's vehicle 
contained evidence of a crime, justifying the warrantless 
seizure.  Nevertheless, at ¶43, the majority opinion reveals 
that "law enforcement's target was not evidence within the car, 
which under the exception gives rise to a need to quickly 
collect evidence within the car before the evidence can be 
removed from the jurisdiction."  Indeed, the law enforcement 
officers in the present case made no attempt to examine the 
interior of the vehicle to collect evidence of a crime within 
the vehicle.   
¶74 The 
State's 
warrantless 
interference 
with 
the 
defendant's dominion over the vehicle for three hours was not 
reasonably related in time or scope to the circumstances which, 
according to the majority opinion, justified the initial and 
continuing seizure of the vehicle, namely examining the interior 
of a vehicle for evidence of a crime contained within the 
vehicle.  The officers extended their seizure beyond the time 
and scope reasonably permitted by the automobile exception for 
warrantless seizures of a car for evidence within the car. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Court has not addressed whether exigent circumstances 
are required to seize a car without a warrant as evidence of a 
crime when the vehicle is not readily mobile.  The vehicle in 
the present case was not readily mobile when the unlicensed 
driver was removed from the vehicle and the officers could 
ensure that the vehicle was not mobile by watching over the 
vehicle without seizing it.  See 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 9.2 at 436, § 9.3 
at 360 (5th ed. 2012).    
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶75 With regard to the majority's numerous assertions that 
the vehicle itself was evidence of a crime, such that the State 
could commit a trespass and tow and stow the vehicle for three 
hours without judicial authorization, the majority states:  
"[A]lthough officers did have an interest in the attachment of 
the GPS before the car escaped the jurisdiction, the nature of 
the 
evidence 
that 
they 
sought 
and 
the 
privacy 
interest 
implicated 
by 
the 
GPS 
search 
required 
judicial 
authorization . . . ."  Majority op., ¶44.   
¶76 This concession that a warrant was required due to the 
nature 
of 
the 
evidence 
sought 
and 
the 
privacy 
interest 
implicated undercuts the majority's rationale that the State's 
warrantless seizure was justified because the vehicle was in and 
of itself evidence of a crime.  The State's interference with 
the defendant's dominion over the vehicle did not reasonably 
relate in time or scope to the circumstances that, according to 
the majority opinion, justified the initial and continuing 
seizure of the vehicle, namely that the vehicle was in and of 
itself evidence of a crime.  The officers extended their seizure 
of the vehicle beyond the scope permitted by the automobile 
exception for warrantless seizures of automobiles as evidence of 
a crime.     
¶77 According 
to 
the 
case 
law, 
the 
most 
common 
justifications for a warrantless seizure of a vehicle as 
evidence of a crime are that there is probable cause to believe 
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
that a crime occurred in the vehicle;15 that the vehicle was used 
as a weapon;16 or that the vehicle is an instrumentality of a 
crime such as drug trafficking or gun running.17   
¶78 The vehicle in the present case was not seized for 
three hours for any of these purposes.  There was no probable 
cause to believe a crime occurred in the vehicle or that the 
vehicle was used as a weapon.  If probable cause existed to 
believe the vehicle was an instrumentality of a crime (burglary) 
inasmuch as the vehicle matched eyewitness descriptions of a 
                                                 
15 United States v. Noster, 590 F.3d 624 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(vehicle seized after officers determined it had been reported 
stolen); Capraro v. Bunt, 44 F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 1995) (vehicle 
seized incident to arrest as evidence of a kidnapping that 
defendant used his vehicle to commit); State v. Serna, 290 
N.W.2d 446 (Minn. 1980) (vehicle seized so sexual assault victim 
could identify vehicle in which assault had occurred); State v. 
Clark, 24 P.3d 1006 (Wash. 2001) (vehicle impounded to search 
for evidence of a rape and murder that occurred in the vehicle). 
16 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (vehicle seized to 
inspect tires and take paint scrapings to identify vehicle that 
pushed another vehicle over an embankment); United States v. 
Belt, 854 F.2d 1054 (7th Cir. 1988) (vehicle seized incident to 
arrest so victim could identify it as vehicle that tried to run 
him off the road); Tackett v. State, 822 S.W.2d 834 (Ark. 1992) 
(parts 
of 
vehicle 
seized 
to 
establish 
that 
vehicle 
had 
intentionally rear ended another vehicle); Commonwealth v. A 
Juvenile (No. 2), 580 N.E.2d 1014 (Mass. 1991) (vehicle seized 
to preserve evidence of a hit-and-run accident involving the 
vehicle); Edlin v. State, 523 So. 2d 42 (Miss. 1988) (vehicle 
seized as evidence of a hit-and-run accident involving the 
vehicle). 
17 United States v. Dickey-Bey, 393 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(vehicle seized with probable cause that vehicle was used as an 
instrumentality of the crime); United States v. Brookins, 345 
F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 2003) (vehicle seized after arrest when 
defendant's wife attempted to flee in vehicle and police had 
probable cause to believe contraband would be found in the 
vehicle).  
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
vehicle seen in the vicinity of reported burglaries, the least 
intrusive method of identification would have been to photograph 
the vehicle.  Officers could have photographed the vehicle where 
they initially located it, or at the site where the vehicle was 
stopped, before releasing it.  The photographs could have been 
shown at trial for witnesses to identify as the vehicle they saw 
leaving the burglary scene.18  The officers in this case, after 
seizing the vehicle and towing and stowing it, did indeed 
photograph the tires, exterior, and interior of the vehicle 
(through the windows) while awaiting the warrant. 
¶79 I conclude that the State's interference with the 
defendant's dominion over the vehicle by moving and detaining 
the vehicle for three hours to install a GPS device is not 
reasonably related in time or scope to the circumstances that, 
according to the majority opinion, justified the initial and 
continuing seizure of the vehicle, namely that the vehicle was 
in and of itself evidence of a crime.      
¶80 In addition to trying unsuccessfully to squeeze the 
seizure into the automobile exception, the majority opinion also 
tries to characterize the seizure of the car as falling within 
other exceptions to the warrant requirement.     
¶81 The majority opinion asserts that the seizure was 
required by exigent circumstances because the officers were 
trying to minimize the risk of harm to themselves, others, and 
                                                 
18 See Keplin v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 24 Wis. 2d 319, 
331, 129 N.W.2d 321 (1964) (photographs of a car are sufficient 
to be used as evidence at trial so that actual car does not have 
to be viewed). 
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
the vehicle.  Majority op., ¶¶29, 41, 42.  Such a pretext here 
is patent.  After following the vehicle for nearly two hours, 
the law enforcement officers chose the place to conduct the 
traffic stop; they cannot create the exigency.   
¶82 The facts further belie the majority's assertion.  The 
law enforcement officers testified that they towed the vehicle 
in order to install a GPS device secretly.  The law enforcement 
officers further testified that they did not follow the 
department's guidelines for impounding the vehicle.19  Adherence 
to department protocol is evidence of reasonableness.20  The 
officers then returned the vehicle to the place where it was 
initially stopped.   
¶83 The seizure also cannot be justified by an immediate 
need to seize the vehicle or install a GPS device.  The officers 
could have simply maintained the status quo and waited by the 
stopped vehicle until the warrant arrived authorizing the 
seizure and search.21  The officers did not fear the vehicle 
would move because the driver had been transported to a distant 
location, and the officers could ensure that the vehicle did not 
leave its location by watching over it without seizing it.  
                                                 
19 Both the Rock County and Walworth County Sheriff's 
Departments have General Orders for Policy and Procedure that 
seem to require that once a vehicle is seized, the contents are 
to be inventoried. 
20 State v. Callaway, 106 Wis. 2d 503, 518, 317 N.W.2d 428 
(1982) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 
(1976). 
21 See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 801, 812-13 
(1984). 
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
Instead, officers had the vehicle towed and waited by the 
vehicle in the lot to which it was towed.  Here the officers 
took affirmative steps, without any exigent circumstances and 
prior to obtaining a warrant, to tow and stow the vehicle 
without a warrant that they later did obtain. 
¶84 All told, this case needs far more careful discussion 
and analysis by the majority opinion of the State's invasion of 
the defendant's possessory and privacy interest in the vehicle 
and 
the 
defendant's 
privacy 
interest 
with 
respect 
to 
surveillance of the movements of the vehicle before a reader is 
persuaded that the State has overcome the presumption that the 
warrantless seizure of the vehicle is a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.22  
II 
¶85 I began with a narrative about oft-heard, old-time 
twentieth century cases in which officers stop and seize a 
vehicle on probable cause for violation of traffic laws.  I end 
with the present case, a twenty-first century narrative grounded 
in GPS technology.   
¶86 The single main difficulty with the majority opinion 
is that it fails to appreciate that this case presents the court 
with the opportunity to begin the process of reconciling ever-
changing 
technology 
with 
constitutional 
principles. 
 
The 
                                                 
22 For a good discussion of the issues involved in the 
automobile exception and the case law, see case law discussed by 
3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment, ch. 7, entitled "Search and Seizure of Vehicles" (5th 
ed. 2012). 
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
majority opinion fails to grasp, as United States Supreme Court 
Chief Justice John Roberts has carefully expounded, that the 
most daunting challenge for courts in the next 50 years will be 
to determine how to apply the Constitution in cases as science 
and technology advance.23   
¶87 Chief Justice Roberts recently counseled students at 
Rice University as follows:  "When the framers wrote the Fourth 
Amendment 
about 
search 
and 
seizures, 
did 
they 
envision 
wiretaps?"  "Is being able to see through walls a violation of 
search and seizure protections?  I think it will be a good 
opportunity to see how prescient the framers were if the 
Constitution will be able to deal with these questions."  "[S]o 
we try to find the . . . fundamental principle underlying what 
constitutional protection is and apply it to new issues and new 
technology."24    
¶88 The Chief Justice clearly identified the challenge.  
Our court seems oblivious to it. 
¶89 Police 
surveillance 
techniques 
will 
change 
as 
technology advances.  Many new devices permit the monitoring of 
vehicles and people, and in all likelihood more will come.  A 
new vehicle may be equipped with devices that permit others to 
ascertain its location at any time.  Cell phones and wireless 
                                                 
23 Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Speech at Rice 
University (Oct. 17, 2012).  Full video of the speech is 
available 
at 
https://mediacore.rice.edu/media/centennial-
lecture-series-a-conversation-with-the-.  
24 See Mike Tolson, Chief Justice Roberts: Technology Among 
Top Issues for Court, Houston Chronicle, Oct. 17, 2012.  
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
devices permit carriers to track and record the location of 
users.  The quest for new technology is endless, and it is only 
a matter of time before a court must consider the next 
advancement.   
¶90 With each technological advance, courts must stand 
firm and guard the very core of the Fourth Amendment——the 
security of one's privacy from arbitrary intrusion by the 
government.25  The Fourth Amendment is not designed to protect 
the criminal; it is designed to protect all of us. 
¶91 With 
ever-expanding 
technological 
advances, 
law 
enforcement should not necessarily be bound to the use of 
earlier approved specific technology.  Still, the surveillance 
technology used does affect a court's view of the nature and 
validity of the intrusion.   
¶92 The United States Supreme Court first validated the 
use of mobile tracking technology in United States v. Knotts 
when it analyzed the nature and intrusion of the warrantless 
insertion of a beeper into a container in order to track the 
container's movements.26  The signal from the beeper enabled law 
enforcement officers to follow a vehicle carrying the container 
more easily.  The beeper could not, however, perform any 
tracking on its own or record the location of the container.  
                                                 
25 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). 
26 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-83 (1983) (no 
Fourth Amendment violation when beeper surveillance amounted 
principally to following an automobile on public streets and 
highways).  Compare United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 
(1984) (warrant required to use a beeper to monitor activities 
inside a private residence). 
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
GPS locational tracking technology has more capabilities than 
the beeper technology.  A GPS device's advanced technology does 
not simply assist visual surveillance as did the beeper.  It 
tracks the details of every movement of the vehicle.  The nature 
of the technology does affect the Fourth Amendment analysis.  
¶93 Here, law enforcement officers had a warrant for the 
installation of a GPS device.  The warrant does not comply with 
the Wisconsin statutes governing warrants, but non-statutory 
warrants have been accepted by this court.  I continue to 
disagree with this position.27      
¶94 The GPS device installed did not match the device 
described in the affidavit.  The Fourth Amendment requires that 
a search warrant restrict the scope of a search by "particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized,"28 and that the warrant be reasonably executed.29  
                                                 
27 I wrote in dissent in State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, ¶90, 
328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting), 
that the warrant authorizing the GPS device in the Sveum case 
did not comply with the statutes authorizing warrants and was 
therefore void.  The Sveum majority held statutory authority was 
not necessary for the issuance of a warrant.  The warrant in the 
present case, like the warrant in Sveum, does not comply with 
the Wisconsin warrant statute. 
28 Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979).   
The particularity requirement prevents three evils: general 
searches, the issuance of warrants on less than probable cause, 
and the seizure of objects other than those described in the 
warrant.  Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, ¶28. 
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on whether an 
officer's failure to comply with restrictions in the warrant 
demands suppression of evidence under the Fourth Amendment.30  
This court does not carefully examine the terms and execution of 
the 
warrant 
to 
evaluate 
the 
invasion 
of 
privacy 
and 
reasonableness of the search.   
¶95 In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has begun 
the discussion.  The United States Supreme Court recently 
decided a GPS device case, United States v. Jones, ___ U.S. ___, 
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), in which a unanimous court held that the 
warrantless installation of a GPS device within a vehicle 
constituted an invalid search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.  But the Court was divided on the rationale.  The 
Justices in separate opinions explored the legal issues to give 
themselves, the bar, law enforcement, and the public insight 
into the troublesome issues. 
¶96 Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence in Jones raised 
important considerations in taking the attributes of GPS 
monitoring into account when considering the application of the 
Fourth Amendment to these searches.  A GPS device does not 
merely record illegal activity.  It records every movement of 
                                                                                                                                                             
29 In Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948, the government conceded 
noncompliance with a warrant authorizing installation of a GPS 
device in the District of Columbia and within ten days.  The 
device was installed on the 11th day and in Maryland, not the 
District.  The Court treated the installation of the GPS device 
as a warrantless search. 
30 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 n.11 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
the car and its occupants——every site visited.  The GPS device 
thus gives the government significant personal information about 
the car and its occupants, in addition to any information it may 
provide about criminal activity.  Justice Sotomayor explored GPS 
technology and the Fourth Amendment's protection of a person's 
reasonable expectation of privacy as follows:  
In cases involving even short-term monitoring, some 
unique 
attributes 
of 
GPS 
surveillance . . . will 
require particular attention. GPS monitoring generates 
a precise, comprehensive record of a person's public 
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her 
familial, 
political, 
professional, 
religious, 
and 
sexual associations.  The Government can store such 
records and efficiently mine them for information 
years into the future.  And because GPS monitoring is 
cheap 
in 
comparison 
to 
conventional 
surveillance 
techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, 
it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive 
law enforcement practices: "limited police resources 
and community hostility."   
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills 
associational 
and expressive freedoms.  And the 
Government's unrestrained power to assemble data that 
reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to 
abuse.  The net result is that GPS monitoring——by 
making available at a relatively low cost such a 
substantial quantum of intimate information about any 
person 
whom 
the 
Government, 
in 
its 
unfettered 
discretion, 
chooses 
to 
track——may 
"alter 
the 
relationship between citizen and government in a way 
that is inimical to democratic society."   
I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into 
account when considering the existence of a reasonable 
societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one's 
public 
movements. 
 
I 
would 
ask 
whether 
people 
reasonably 
expect 
that 
their 
movements 
will 
be 
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the 
Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their 
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so 
on.  I do not regard as dispositive the fact that the 
Government might obtain the fruits of GPS monitoring 
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
through lawful conventional surveillance techniques.  
I 
would 
also 
consider 
the 
appropriateness 
of 
entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any 
oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable 
to 
misuse, 
especially 
in 
light 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment's goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police 
power 
to 
and 
prevent 
"a 
too 
permeating 
police 
surveillance."  
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider 
the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties.  This approach is ill 
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a 
great deal of information about themselves to third 
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.  
People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or 
text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they 
visit and the e-mail addresses with which they 
correspond to their Internet service providers; and 
the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to 
online retailers.  Perhaps, as Justice ALITO notes, 
some people may find the "tradeoff" of privacy for 
convenience "worthwhile," or come to accept this 
"diminution of privacy" as "inevitable," and perhaps 
not.  I for one doubt that people would accept without 
complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government 
of a list of every Web site they had visited in the 
last week, or month, or year.  But whatever the 
societal 
expectations, 
they 
can 
attain 
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a 
prerequisite for privacy.  I would not assume that all 
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of 
the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason 
alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.31  
¶97 Justice Alito in his concurrence in Jones opined that 
the best solution to privacy concerns regarding long-term 
                                                 
31 Jones, 132 S. Ct at 955-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(citations and parenthetical comments omitted).  
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
21 
 
monitoring devices may be legislative.32  He wrote that until the 
legislature acts on new technological methods of surveillance, 
the "best that we can do . . . is to apply existing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in 
a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a 
reasonable person would not have anticipated."33  Using this 
approach, the Justice concluded that "the use of longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on 
expectations of privacy."34  (The warrant in the present case 
authorized use of the GPS device for 60 days; it was maintained 
for four days.  The issue of the duration for which the GPS may 
be authorized or used is not broached in the majority opinion in 
the instant case.) 
                                                 
32 I repeat the essence of what I wrote in my earlier 
dissent in Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, ¶126 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
dissenting):  I recognize that the problems presented by 
technologically assisted physical surveillance are complex and 
that 
the 
interests 
of 
privacy 
and 
crime 
detection 
are 
substantial.  The courts, and especially this court, should not 
do violence to the legislatively enacted warrant statutes in an 
ill-advised attempt to bend clear and established law to fit 
novel and fast-changing technology.  The myriad of technical, 
legal, and policy issues involved in electronic surveillance 
lend themselves to legislative resolution, not ad hoc judicial 
authorizations or a bewilderingly complex judicial attempt to 
shoehorn the possibilities of new surveillance technologies into 
the parameters of statutes that were never meant to accommodate 
them. 
33 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
Justice Crooks, Justice Ziegler, and I made a similar 
request to the Wisconsin legislature in our separate opinions in 
Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, ¶¶77, 79, 84, 126.  The Wisconsin 
legislature has not yet acted. 
34 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
22 
 
¶98 This court has already advised the legislature that 
legislative action is needed.  None has been taken.  Here, the 
court makes a second request.  
¶99 I would urge the Judicial Council,35 the Legislative 
Council, the Office of the State Public Defender, the Attorney 
General, and the Criminal Law Section of the State Bar,36 either 
separately or jointly, to study the Fourth Amendment issues 
raised by GPS devices and other technological developments and 
make proposals to the legislature or to this court (if 
appropriate for rule making).  
¶100 I recognize, however, that as long as this court 
appears to allow any conditions in the warrant authorizing 
installation of a GPS device and the use of any type of GPS 
technology without legislative authority, there is no incentive 
to seek a legislative solution regarding the parameters for 
                                                 
35 The Judicial Council has begun consideration of the GPS 
device issue but has stopped its study to await the decision in 
the present case. 
36 The Criminal Law Section "provides education, resources 
and other support for prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges 
who practice criminal law at the local, state and federal 
levels.  The section monitors and proposes legislation in the 
area 
of 
criminal 
law . . . ." 
 
State 
Bar 
of 
Wisconsin, 
http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Criminal_Law_Secti
on (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).   
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
23 
 
warrants authorizing the installation and monitoring of GPS 
devices.37 
¶101 The 
majority 
opinion 
does 
a 
disservice 
to 
law 
enforcement, the bar, the bench, and the public by not carefully 
exploring issues presented in the instant case that Chief 
Justice 
Roberts 
and 
Justices 
Sotomayor 
and 
Alito 
have 
highlighted.            
¶102 For the reasons set forth, I cannot join the majority 
opinion.   
 
 
 
                                                 
37 One final comment about the case:  Even if the towing and 
stowing of the vehicle were illegal, it does not inevitably 
follow 
that 
the 
evidence 
ultimately 
discovered 
must 
be 
suppressed when a valid (according to the majority) search 
warrant was executed.  To determine whether the warrant issued 
was "genuinely independent" of the earlier "tainted" seizure, 
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988), is instructive.  
See also State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 
N.W.2d 1 (discussing Murray).  Neither the parties nor the 
majority opinion discusses this aspect of Fourth Amendment and 
exclusion law, and I need not and will not comment further on 
this point. 
No.  2010AP1366-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1