Case Title: Martin v. Industrial Commission

Citation: 352 P.2d 352, 88 Ariz. 14

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1960-05-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
88 Ariz. 14 (1960) 352 P.2d 352 Harold E. MARTIN, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona and J.S. Sundt, Respondents. No. 6801. Supreme Court of Arizona. May 25, 1960. *16 W. Edward Morgan, Tucson, for petitioner. Donald J. Morgan, Phoenix, John R. Franks, James D. Lester, Frances M. Long, Phoenix, and Edward E. Davis, Glendale, of counsel, for respondents Industrial Commission and J.S. Sundt. JOHNSON, Justice. Certiorari to review an award of the Industrial Commission denying the application of petitioner to reopen a claim for workman's compensation. It appears from the record that on November 29, 1942, Harold E. Martin, petitioner herein, was nailing a partition for his employer, the Sundt Construction Company, in Tucson, Arizona, when a plank struck petitioner on the back of the head and neck, or medically, between the scapulae. Thereafter, petitioner was examined by Dr. R.W. Rudolph, who filed an Industrial Report of Attending Physician, advising that he found soreness throughout petitioner's shoulder and neck area, for which a treatment of heat and bed-rest was prescribed. Petitioner was treated for a day or two and returned to work. For this injury, no claim for lost time was filed, nor workman's report of injury or claim for compensation made or filed. The Commission paid the $5 bill of Dr. Rudolph and closed its file on petitioner's case. No further action was taken by petitioner in the matter until October 3, 1958, *17 when petitioner filed a claim for physical disability allegedly resulting from the 1942 injury. In support thereof, petitioner filed a letter containing history and complaints, inventory and examinations of Dr. Lindsay E. Beaton, with conclusions and recommendations. Thereafter, the Commission, on administrative hearing, based upon evidence submitted by petitioner and its own records, entered its award finding that it was without jurisdiction to entertain the claim on the ground that applicant failed to file within one year from the date the injury occurred, or the right thereto accrued, as provided by A.R.S. § 23-1061. The petitioner filed a timely protest and petition and application for rehearing to this award, objecting to the justice of the award and alleging that he had not received a claim form at the time of the injury. It is from this order denying a rehearing and affirming the previous finding and award of the commission that this writ of certiorari issued. In order best to understand the medical aspects of petitioner's case, we quote from the report of Dr. Beaton, dated September 29, 1958: In concluding his report, Dr. Beaton said: A.R.S. § 23-1061 provides, in part: In determining the day upon which the right to compensation accrues, we follow the liberal rule that if an injury is slight or trivial at the time of the accident and not compensable, but later on there develop unexpected results for which the employee could not have been expected to make a claim, the statute of limitations runs from the time the injury becomes manifest and not from the date of the accident. Hughes v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 81 Ariz. 264, 304 P.2d 1066. Another statement of the test is that an employee should not be deprived of compensation when in the exercise of reasonable care he is unable to make a correct diagnosis of his injury. English v. Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 86, 237 P.2d 815. But when the employee definitely becomes conscious of a serious injury arising out of and in the course of his employment to the extent that he is then and there entitled to compensation, it is his duty to make that fact known to his employer and to the Commission by filing an application for compensation within the purview of A.R.S. § 23-1061; the latter, of course, begins to run when the claim becomes compensable whether it is filed or not. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Company v. Smith, 78 Ariz. 355, 280 P.2d 273. It is abundantly clear that initially petitioner was fully justified in regarding his injury as not of a serious or compensable nature. Since the injury was not compensable at the time of occurrence, the one-year statute of limitations, A.R.S. § 23-1061, *19 did not begin to run against petitioner from the date of injury. The Commission finding, therefore, that petitioner is barred from the further prosecution of his claim, must be predicated upon that part of the above section requiring a claim to be filed within one year of the day on which the right to compensation accrued. In order to determine this date, the Commission must find that at a particular time petitioner could be charged with a definite consciousness of an injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment. In other words, not only that petitioner was aware of his disability; but also that petitioner realized its connection to a particular industrial mishap. The Commission defeated petitioner on this ground without a hearing, and denied the petition for rehearing stating that petitioner failed to raise any matters which had not been considered previously by the Commission, concluding that no useful purpose could be served by holding a rehearing in the matter. The Commission is wrong. The function of the Commission in making awards is judicial in its nature and is governed by the same general principles as the judgments of the courts. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Comm., 33 Ariz. 490, 266 P. 11; Doby v. Miami Trust Co., 39 Ariz. 228, 5 P.2d 187. One of these principles is that every person is entitled to his day in court, the opportunity to present one's case fully and freely at least once before an impartial tribunal. Hogle v. Arizona Concrete Co., 44 Ariz. 1, 33 P.2d 589. Consequently, it long has been the law in this State that an award, acquiesced in by all the parties, may be made by the Commission without a formal hearing provided always that a dissatisfied party may have a rehearing on the award, at which time he will be given opportunity to present his evidence in the usual manner. Hogle v. Arizona Concrete Co., supra; Edens v. L.E. Dixon Construction Co., 42 Ariz. 519, 27 P.2d 1107; Dustin v. Industrial Commission, 43 Ariz. 96, 29 P.2d 155. It is difficult to discern the legal basis for the procedure used by the Commission to deny petitioner's application for rehearing, for as we explained in Scott v. L.E. Dixon Co., 42 Ariz. 525, 27 P.2d 1109, 1111: And, in amplification, we said in Hogle v. Arizona Concrete Co., supra [44 Ariz. 1, 33 P.2d 590]: Nor is A.R.S. § 23-945, subparagraph B of any benefit to the Commission. This section provides, in part: This Court has ruled that no award can be held to have been "adequately considered" within the meaning of the provision unless and until, once at least, an opportunity has been afforded a petitioner to present his case at a hearing of the type herein described. Hogle v. Arizona Concrete Co., supra. The Commission, however, suggests that petitioner waived any right to a formal rehearing because petitioner failed to make proper allegations in his petition for rehearing, as required by the Commission rules of procedure. Thus, the Commission points out that petitioner failed to allege that his disability did not become manifest until within one year from the time he filed; that he did not raise any new matter or express the desire to produce further material evidence; and that he did not apply to cross-examine any person who had given evidence in this matter. We would be inclined toward the Commission's view had there been an actual hearing in the first instance. Where, however, as here, no hearing whatsoever has been held prior to the petition for rehearing, and the award has been rendered on a purely informal basis, the law is that any aggrieved party may have a rehearing *21 provided a timely request therefor is made. Hogle v. Arizona Concrete Co., supra. The Commission supported its award on the finding that petitioner's disability manifested itself more than a year prior to the date of filing. By his timely petition for rehearing, petitioner effectively denied the validity of this finding and requested his day in court on the issue. He shall have it. The award is set aside. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., and PHELPS, UDALL, and BERNSTEIN, JJ., concurring.