Case Title: Commonwealth v. Escobar

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12371

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-03-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12371 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EMILIA ESCOBAR. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 10, 2018. - March 29, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
False Impersonation & Identity Fraud.  Fraud.  Practice, 
Criminal, Plea.  Words, "Anything of value." 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Roxbury Division of 
the Boston Municipal Court Department on October 2, 2003. 
 
 
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, filed on November 
18, 2016, was heard by Kenneth J. Fiandaca, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Edward Crane for the defendant. 
 
Dara Z. Kesselheim, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The defendant, Emilia Escobar, pleaded guilty to 
identity fraud pursuant to G. L. c. 266, § 37E (b), in 
connection with providing a false name to a police officer 
during a traffic stop.  Here, she appeals from the denial of a 
2 
 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea, claiming that there were 
insufficient facts to establish that she attempted to receive, 
or received, "anything of value" within the meaning of § 37E 
(b).  Because we conclude that the phrase "anything of value," 
as it appears in the statute, does not include avoiding criminal 
prosecution, we reverse. 
 
Background.  The facts are uncontested.  In October, 2002, 
a State police trooper stopped the defendant for driving an 
automobile with an excessively loud exhaust.  The defendant told 
the trooper falsely that her name was Ana Escobar, gave a false 
date of birth, and said that she did not have her license with 
her.  Upon conducting a check with the registry of motor 
vehicles, the trooper learned that Ana Escobar's license was 
suspended and issued a citation in Ana Escobar's name. 
 
Almost one year later, an investigation revealed that the 
defendant had been untruthful at the time of the stop.  A 
complaint was issued charging the defendant with multiple 
infractions in addition to identity fraud:  operating a motor 
vehicle with a suspended license;1 improper operation of a motor 
vehicle; failing to possess a license while operating a motor 
vehicle; and providing a false name to a police officer. 
                     
 
1 A check with the registry of motor vehicles revealed that 
the defendant, too, had a suspended license. 
3 
 
 
In March, 2004, pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant 
admitted to sufficient facts on all charges except the charge of 
providing a false name to a police officer, which was dismissed. 
Charges of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license 
and identity fraud were continued without a finding for nine 
months, then dismissed, and the remaining charges were placed on 
file. 
 
Over a decade later, in November, 2016, the defendant filed 
a motion to withdraw her plea to the charge of identity fraud, 
alleging that there was an insufficient factual basis for the 
charge.2  After a hearing, the judge denied the defendant's 
motion.  The defendant appealed, and we allowed her application 
for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  In order for a judge to accept a guilty plea, 
he or she must find "sufficient facts on the record to establish 
each element of the offense."  Commonwealth v. Hart, 467 Mass. 
                     
 
2 There is no explanation in the record for why the 
defendant waited more than ten years to attempt to withdraw her 
plea.  However, in the memorandum supporting her motion, the 
defendant argues that her admission to sufficient facts for a 
finding of guilty on the identity fraud charge could have 
significant consequences on her status as a legal permanent 
resident and the risk of deportation.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2012) ("Any alien who at any time after 
admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral 
turpitude . . . is deportable"); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 
223, 227 (1951) ("Without exception, [F]ederal and [S]tate 
courts have held that a crime in which fraud is an ingredient 
involves moral turpitude"); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)(i) (2012) 
(defining "conviction" to include admission of sufficient facts 
to warrant finding of guilt). 
4 
 
322, 325 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. DelVerde, 398 Mass. 
288, 297 (1986).  Ordinarily, during a plea colloquy the 
prosecutor recites the facts that the Commonwealth would have 
proved if the case had gone to trial.  The defendant indicates 
whether he or she agrees with the facts as presented and may 
provide clarifications.  The judge then determines whether the 
facts as stated establish that a particular crime has been 
committed.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (3), as appearing in 
470 Mass. 1501 (2015). 
In this case, although the judge accepted the defendant's 
plea of guilty to identity fraud on the facts as outlined supra, 
the defendant now argues that the facts the Commonwealth 
presented did not establish each element of that offense.  We 
normally review a motion judge's decision on a defendant's 
motion to withdraw her guilty plea for clear error or abuse of 
discretion.  Hart, 467 Mass. at 324.  However, where, as here, 
there is a question of statutory interpretation, we review the 
matter de novo.  Commonwealth v. Martin, 476 Mass. 72, 75 
(2016). 
1.  The identity fraud statute.  General Laws c. 266, 
§ 37E, is the identity fraud statute.  Subsection (b) of § 37E 
provides: 
"Whoever, with intent to defraud, poses as another person 
without the express authorization of that person and uses 
such person's personal identifying information to obtain or 
5 
 
to attempt to obtain money, credit, goods, services, 
anything of value, any identification card or other 
evidence of such person's identity, or to harass another 
shall be guilty of identity fraud . . . ." 
 
The elements of identity fraud, thus, are "that a defendant (1) 
posed as another person; (2) did so without that person's 
express authorization; (3) used the other person's identifying 
information to obtain, or attempt to obtain, something of value; 
and (4) did so with the intent to defraud."  Commonwealth v. 
Giavazzi, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 374, 376 (2004) (footnote omitted). 
The defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to 
present any facts tending to establish that she attempted to 
obtain something of value pursuant to § 37E (b) because the 
evasion (or the attempted evasion) of criminal prosecution is 
not something of value within the meaning of the statute.3  In 
contrast, the Commonwealth argues that "value" as it appears in 
§ 37E (b) includes intangible things, including avoiding 
criminal charges.  We agree with the defendant. 
 
The question whether the defendant committed identity fraud 
depends upon what the Legislature meant by the phrase "anything 
of value" within the context of § 37E (b).  See Pyle v. School 
Comm. of S. Hadley, 423 Mass. 283, 285 (1996) ("Our primary duty 
is to interpret a statute in accordance with the intent of the 
                     
 
3 Because we conclude that the Commonwealth has failed to 
establish every element of the offense, we do not reach the 
question whether the actions of the defendant defrauded a police 
officer within the meaning of § 37E (b). 
6 
 
Legislature").  See also Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n v. 
Boston, 435 Mass. 718, 719-720 (2002), and cases cited.  "We 
derive the words' usual and accepted meaning from sources 
presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as their use in 
other legal contexts and dictionary definitions."  Commonwealth 
v. Campbell, 415 Mass. 697, 700 (1993), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977). 
 
The statute does not define "value," and the ordinary 
meaning of the term can encompass both tangible and intangible 
things.  Webster's dictionary defines "value" as: 
"[1] the amount of a commodity, service, or medium of 
exchange that is the equivalent of something else:  a fair 
return in goods, services, or money . . . [2] monetary 
worth of something:  marketable price usu. in terms of a 
medium of exchange . . . [3] relative worth, utility or 
importance:  degree of excellence:  status in a scale of 
preferences . . . ." 
 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2530 (1993).  The 
fact that the term has multiple meanings does not shed light on 
whether its use in the statute is meant to include all of them.  
See Commonwealth v. Scott, 464 Mass. 355, 358 (2013) (term with 
multiple meanings may have only one within context of statute).  
"When the meaning of a statute is not clear from its plain 
language, well-established principles of statutory construction 
guide our interpretation."  Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Rego, 
474 Mass. 329, 334 (2016). 
7 
 
a.  Ejusdem generis.  Viewing the term "value" in the 
context of the statute is instructive.  One who "uses 
[another's] personal identifying information to obtain or to 
attempt to obtain money, credit, goods, services, [or] anything 
of value[] . . . shall be guilty of identity fraud."  § 37E (b).  
The canon of statutory interpretation known as ejusdem generis 
limits "general terms which follow specific ones to matters 
similar to those specified."  Commonwealth v. Gallant, 453 Mass. 
535, 542 (2009), quoting Powers v. Freetown–Lakeville Regional 
Sch. Dist. Comm., 392 Mass. 656, 660 n.8 (1984).  See Banushi v. 
Dorfman, 438 Mass. 242, 244 (2002).4 
Ejusdem generis requires that the general phrase "anything 
of value" in the statute be interpreted to mean only those 
things that share the characteristics of the terms that appear 
before it, here, "money, credit, goods, [or] services."  As the 
terms "money," "credit," "goods," and "services" all refer to 
that which has a market or monetary value, the phrase "anything 
of value" should be limited similarly to that which can be 
exchanged for a financial payment.5  See Banushi, 438 Mass. at 
                     
4 Meaning "of the same general kind or class," ejusdem 
generis is an English common-law principle of statutory 
construction that can be traced back to 1596.  A. Scalia and 
B.A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 
§ 32, at 199, 200 (2012). 
 
 
5 The Wisconsin case upon which the Commonwealth relies is 
distinguishable.  Wisconsin has an identity fraud statute 
8 
 
244 (limiting meaning of "building" to place of public or 
commercial use where statutory term was preceded by "place of 
assembly, theatre, special hall, public hall, factory, workshop, 
[or] manufacturing establishment"); Powers, 392 Mass. at 660 
(limiting meaning of "or other good cause" in statute to poor 
performance where phrase was preceded by "inefficiency, 
incapacity, unbecoming conduct, [or] insubordination"). 
 
The Commonwealth argues that if the Legislature had 
intended to limit the statute in such a way, then the phrase 
"anything of value" would be unnecessary and superfluous.  We 
are not persuaded.  The phrase serves to encompass any other 
items that do not appear but are similar to those items that do 
appear.  Adopting the Commonwealth's view would vitiate the 
statutory canon of ejusdem generis; the more general term would 
always strip the more specific terms of any meaning whatsoever.  
See Santos v. Bettencourt, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 90, 93 (1996). 
 
b.  Related subsections.  A review of other relevant 
subsections of G. L. c. 266, § 37E, that refer to financial harm 
                                                                  
similar to ours in that it punishes anyone who "intentionally 
uses or attempts to use any personal identifying information or 
personal identification document of an individual to obtain 
credit, money, goods, services, or anything else of value 
. . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2).  In State v. Peters, 263 Wis. 
2d 475, 482 (2003), the defendant was convicted under 
Wisconsin's identity fraud statute for providing a false 
identity so as to receive a lower bail amount.  Id. at 478.  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the conviction concluding that 
bail is a form of credit.  Id. at 485.  Thus, the court did not 
need to interpret the phrase "anything else of value." 
9 
 
to victims reinforces our reading of § 37E (b).  See Chin v. 
Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 532 (2015) (to ascertain legislative 
intent we may "consider . . . other sections of the statute and 
examine the pertinent language in the context of the entire 
statute").  See also Quincy City Hosp. v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 
406 Mass. 431, 442 (1990). 
 
Section 37E (a) provides several definitions for the 
purposes of § 37E, including "victim," which it defines as "any 
person who has suffered financial loss or any entity that 
provided money, credit, goods, services, or anything of value 
and has suffered financial loss as a direct result of the 
commission or attempted commission of a violation of this 
section."6  G. L. c. 266, § 37E (a).  Similar to § 37E (b), 
§ 37E (c) prohibits obtaining the personal identifying 
information of another without his or her permission for the 
purpose of obtaining "money, credit, goods, services, anything 
of value, any identification card or other evidence of such 
person's identity, or to harass another."  Last, § 37E (d) 
requires anyone found guilty of identity fraud to make 
restitution to the victim for financial losses suffered.  These 
                     
 
6 Significantly, although technically Ana Escobar could be 
considered the victim in this case, there is no allegation that 
she (or anyone else) suffered financial loss as a result of the 
misuse of her identity. 
10 
 
provisions make it clear that the Legislature intended the whole 
of § 37E to prohibit using a false identity for financial gain. 
 
c.  Neighboring sections.  Viewing § 37E (b) in the context 
of statutory provisions that precede it also is illuminating.  
See Commonwealth v. Levia, 385 Mass. 345, 348 (1982) (discussing 
import of provision's location in code).  General Laws c. 266, 
§§ 37A, 37B, 37C, and 37D, each criminalize conduct pertaining 
to credit cards.  Section 37A provides definitions relating to 
the misuse of credit cards.  Section 37B criminalizes certain 
types of that misuse, such as making false statements for the 
purpose of procuring a credit card.  Section 37C prohibits 
additional types of misuse, such as "obtain[ing] control over a 
credit card" with intent to defraud.  Finally, § 37D bars 
fraudulent publication of certain credit card information.  
Given that each of the four provisions that precede § 37E deals 
with credit card misuse or fraud, it is likely that the 
Legislature similarly intended that § 37E (b) criminalize use of 
a false identity in connection with financial gain or to affect 
the credit of another. 
 
d.  Legislative history.  Our interpretation of § 37E (b) 
also is buttressed by supplementary documentation published at 
the time the statute was enacted.  See Commonwealth v. 
Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 633 (2013), quoting Wright v. 
Collector & Treas. of Arlington, 422 Mass. 455, 457-458 (1996) 
11 
 
(statutory interpretation must be reasonable and supported by 
purpose and history of statute). 
 
A March, 1998, memorandum released by the Senate Post Audit 
and Oversight Committee described § 37E (b) as a way to "crack 
down on identity fraud, a scam that can cause financial 
nightmares for its victims."  Senate Post Audit and Oversight 
Committee, Jacques, Jajug, and Caron Announce That Identity 
Fraud Legislation Becomes Law Tomorrow at 1 (March 2, 1998).  
Elaborating on these concerns, the then-chair of the committee, 
Senator Cheryl A. Jacques, described identity fraud as a crime 
that "has been occurring for years, destroying hundreds of 
credit histories and reputations."  Id. at 2.  The memorandum 
notes that identity fraud often occurs where someone uses 
another's identity to "gain credit, run up debts, and taint his 
credit history."  Id.  Further, a memorandum to the then-
Governor from the office of legal counsel recommending signing 
the bill notes that identity fraud often "is used to harass 
victims of domestic violence (e.g., to obtain goods or services 
or to disconnect utilities, etc.)."  Memorandum from Office of 
the Governor's Legal Counsel to Governor Argeo P. Cellucci, 
House Bill No. 5174, "An Act Relative to False Impersonation and 
Identity Fraud" at 2 (November 23, 1998). 
2.  Statutes directly related to providing a false name to 
police.  Finally, we find additional support for our conclusion 
12 
 
in comparing § 37E (b) to the two statutes that directly 
prohibit providing a false name to the police. 
The first, G. L. c. 90, § 25, enacted in 1906, directly and 
unambiguously prohibits the exact conduct at issue here, i.e., 
providing a false name to a police officer while operating a 
motor vehicle.7,8  See St. 1906, c. 412, § 6.  It is unlikely 
that the Legislature intended also to punish the same conduct 
indirectly by enacting § 37E (b) decades later.  See Alliance to 
Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 
457 Mass. 663, 673 (2010) ("We presume that the Legislature acts 
with full knowledge of existing laws"). 
The second, G. L. c. 268, § 34A, bars providing a false 
name to a police officer following an arrest.9  Significantly, it 
was enacted at the same time, and in the same bill, as § 37E 
(b).  St. 1998, c. 397, § 2.  If the Legislature had intended 
for § 37E (b) to encompass providing a false name to a police 
                     
7 The statute provides in pertinent part:  "Any person who, 
while operating or in charge of a motor vehicle, shall . . . 
give a false name or address, [to] any police officer . . . 
shall be punished . . . ."  G. L. c. 90, § 25. 
 
 
8 As discussed supra, the defendant was charged with 
violating this statute; the charge was later dismissed as part 
of a plea deal. 
 
9 The statute provides in pertinent part:  "Whoever 
knowingly and willfully furnishes a false name or Social 
Security number to a law enforcement officer or law enforcement 
official following an arrest shall be punished . . . ."  G. L. 
c. 268, § 34A. 
13 
 
officer, it need not have enacted G. L. c. 268, § 34A.  See 
Commonwealth v. J.A., 478 Mass. 385, 387 (2017). 
Together, the two statutes that directly prohibit providing 
a false name to a police officer make it unlikely that § 37E (b) 
is also meant to indirectly prohibit the same conduct.  See 
J.A., supra. 
 
Conclusion.  The order of the Boston Municipal Court judge 
denying the defendant's motion to withdraw her plea of guilty is 
reversed, and the matter is remanded for entry of an order 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.