Case Title: DODD v CITY OF EAST HELENA

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1979-03-05T00:00:00Z

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No. 14274 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 STAN DODD, Plaintiff and Appellant, THE CITY OF EAST HELENA, a Montana Corporation, and JOHN VERBANAC, the Mayor of East Helena, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Jackson and Kelley, Helena, Montana For Respondents: Luxan, Murfitt, Davis and Cosgrove, Helena, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Keller, Reynolds & Drake, Helena, Montana Filed: Submitted on briefs: January 29, 1979 Decided ~ i ~ , i i - 1979 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal by Stan Dodd, a former policeman i n t h e C i t y of E a s t Helena, County of Lewis and Clark, Montana, from a r u l i n g of t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , determining t h a t he w a s n o t e n t i t l e d t o overtime compensation a s a policeman of a t h i r d c l a s s c i t y . The i s s u e on appeal i s whether o r not t h e t r i a l c o u r t properly determined t h a t policemen of t h i r d c l a s s c i t i e s a r e n o t e n t i t l e d t o overtime compensation. Appellant was employed a s a policeman f o r t h e C i t y of E a s t Helena, Montana, from January 1, 1975, t o May 19, 1977. Appellant has a l l e g e d t h a t during t h i s period he r e g u l a r l y worked overtime without any reimbursement. The C i t y of E a s t Helena admits t h a t it d i d n o t pay any overtime t o a p p e l l a n t during t h e period of h i s employment. The i s s u e on appeal involves t h e s o l e question of whether o r n o t policemen of t h i r d c l a s s cities a r e e n t i t l e d t o overtime compensation. I n 1971 t h e l e g i s l a t u r e enacted t h e Minimum Wages and Hours Act which was c o d i f i e d a s s e c t i o n 41-2301, e t seq., R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 39-3-401 e t seq. MCA, which became e f f e c t i v e J u l y 1, 1971. I n conformity with t h e provisions of t h e a c t , t h e Commissioner of Labor i s s u e d , on J u l y 1, 1971, i n i t i a l r e g u l a t i o n s i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e provisions of t h e Minimum Wage Act. Request was made of t h e Commissioner by t h e Montana P o l i c e Association as t o whether policemen w e r e covered by t h e a c t and e n t i t l e d t o overtime compensation. The Commissioner by l e t t e r responded i n t h e a f f i r m a t i v e . On J u l y 27, 1971, a p e t i t i o n f o r a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment was f i l e d i n t h i s Court i n Cause No. 12100, e n t i t l e d t h e C i t y of B i l l i n g s and Yellowstone County v. The Honorable Sid Smith, Commissioner of Labor of t h e S t a t e of Montana. Numerous i s s u e s w e r e r a i s e d i n t h e p e t i t i o n regarding t h e v a l i d i t y and coverage of t h e Minimum Wage A c t . The p e t i t i o n alleged (1) t h a t t h e a c t was unconstitutional and void, and ( 2 ) t h a t p o l i c e o f f i c e r s , firemen, and deputy s h e r i f f s were excluded from t h e provisions t h e r e i n on t h e grounds t h a t each was a professional. This Court accepted o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n and issued i t s opinion on October 29, 1971. City of B i l l i n g s v. Smith (1971), 158 Mont. 197, 490 P.2d 221. The a c t w a s determined t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , b u t w e held t h a t policemen were bona f i d e professionals and thereby exempt from i t s provisions. By reason of t h i s Court's decision, t h e 1973 l e g i s l a - t u r e amended t h e Municipal Police Act by enactment of sec- t i o n 11-1832.2, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 7-32-4119 MCA, which provides: "Members of t h e p o l i c e departments of c i t i e s of t h e f i r s t and second class, except those o f f i c e r s holding t h e rank of captain o r above, are e n t i t l e d t o compensation f o r overtime as provided under s e c t i o n 41-2303 (b) ." The B i l l i n g s determination by t h i s Court was n o t limited i n any way t o t h e policcimen working i n cities of any s p e c i f i c s i z e . On t h e contrary, f o r t h e reasons set f o r t h i n t h e opinion, they a r e applicable t o policemen working i n any c i t y o r town i n t h e S t a t e of Montana. I n f a c t , t h e l e g i s l a - t i v e treatment of policemen r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e opinion i s contained i n what i s known a s t h e Municipal Police Act, s e c t i o n 11-1801, e t seq., R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 7-32-4101 e t seq. MCA, which provides t h e b a s i c guidelines f o r a l l cities and towns f o r t h e administration and operation of t h e i r p o l i c e departments. A s a r e s u l t of t h e B i l l i n g s d e c i s i o n , no policemen i n Montana w e r e e n t i t l e d t o r e c e i v e any overtime compensation. A s noted, t h e 1973 l e g i s l a t i v e assembly amended t h e P o l i c e A c t by adding s e c t i o n 11-1832.2, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 7- 32-4119 MCA. According t o t h e amendment, those policemen i n first and second c l a s s c i t i e s became e n t i t l e d t o overtime compensation. The d e c i s i o n i n B i l l i n g s applied t o a l l policemen. The e f f e c t of s e c t i o n 11-1832.2 was t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e overruled t h e B i l l i n g s d e c i s i o n only a s it applied t o policemen i n f i r s t and second class c i t i e s . Consequently, policemen employed by c i t i e s of t h e t h i r d c l a s s w e r e n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e c e i v e overtime compensation. The d e c i s i o n of t h i s Court has n o t been changed by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o r by t h i s Court. A l l t h e arguments of appel- l a n t notwithstanding, t h e s t a t e of t h e l a w a t t h i s t i m e i s t h a t while t h e B i l l i n g s d e c i s i o n applied t o a l l policemen, t h e r e i s a s p e c i a l act which now segregates t h i r d c l a s s c i t y policemen. Subissue (a) s e t f o r t h by a p p e l l a n t i s whether t h e B i l l i n a s d e c i s i o n contains an i n h e r e n t c o n f l i c t which must be addressed by t h i s Court. Appellant argues t h a t t h e r e i s c o n f l i c t i n t h e reasoning of t h i s C o u r t ' s opinion which must be c l a r i f i e d . H e argues t h a t " [ I ] £ policemen are excluded from t h e Minimum Wages Act, then t h e r e can be no c o n f l i c t between t h e Minimum Wage Act and Section 25-604. This i n h e r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n should be addressed and c l a r i f i e d by t h e Honorable Supreme Court of t h e S t a t e of Montana." The c o n t r a d i c t i o n which a p p e l l a n t addresses does not e x i s t . The B i l l i n g s c a s e held t h a t policemen were excluded from t h e t e r m s of t h e a c t because of t h e i r s e p a r a t e t r e a t - ment under t h e t e r m s of t h e ~ u n i c i p a l P o l i c e Act, Chapter 18, T i t l e 11. The s t a t u t e r e f e r r e d t o by a p p e l l a n t , s e c t i o n 25-604, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n s 7-4-2505 and -2402 MCA, r e l a t e s only t o compensation f o r deputy s h e r i f f s . This Court i n f i n d i n g t h a t a deputy s h e r i f f was excluded r e f e r r e d t o a c o n f l i c t between t h e s p e c i f i c s t a t u t e (25-604) speci- fying t h e i r pay and t h e general s t a t u t e , t h e Minimum Wage A c t , and a determination of which s t a t u t e would govern. That discussion had nothing t o do with t h e r a t i o n a l e f o r finding t h a t policemen w e r e professionals. W e f i n d no c o n f l i c t i n t h e opinion which r e q u i r e s f u r t h e r c l a r i f i c a t i o n . Appellant next addresses h i s subissue ( b ) concerning t h e e f f e c t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s enactment of s e c t i o n 1 1 - 1832.2, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 7-32-4119 MCA. Appellant argues t h a t t h e omission of policemen of t h i r d c l a s s c i t i e s from t h e s t a t u t e w a s a mistake and t h a t t h i s Court should c o r r e c t same. H e s t a t e s t h a t " t h e r e f o r e , it i s q u i t e evi- d e n t t h a t t h e i n s e r t i o n of f i r s t and second c l a s s c i t i e s i n t h e above a c t w a s e i t h e r a d r a f t i n g e r r o r o r i n s e r t e d simply through t h e ignorance of t h e p o s s i b l e consequences." The argument t h a t t h i s exclusion was " s c r i v e n e r ' s e r r o r " on t h e p a r t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e and t h e r e q u e s t t h a t t h i s Court rewrite t h e s t a t u t e t o i n s e r t t h i r d class c i t i e s w i t h i n i t s provisions contain no c i t a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y t o support such an a c t i o n by t h i s Court. W e have held on numerous occasions t h a t t h i s Court cannot r e w r i t e s t a t u t e s t o omit what p a r t i e s f e e l should be omitted o r i n s e r t what p a r t i e s f e e l should be i n s e r t e d . I n a r e c e n t decision, Mont. Depart. of Rev. v. Am. Smelting & Refining (1977), Mon t . , 567 P.2d 901, 905-06, 34 St.Rep. 597, 602, t h e Court said: "The function of t h e Supreme Court when con- s t r u i n g a s t a t u t e i s simply t o a s c e r t a i n and d e c l a r e what i s i n substance s t a t e d t h e r e i n , and n o t t o i n s e r t what has been omitted o r t o omit what has been i n s e r t e d . ( C i t a t i o n s omitted. ) The fundamental r u l e of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t h a t t h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e c o n t r o l s . ( C i t a t i o n s omitted.) Where t h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e can be determined from t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e words used, t h e c o u r t s may n o t go f u r t h e r and apply any o t h e r means of i n t e r - p r e t a t i o n . . ." See a l s o Matter of E s t a t e of Baier (1977), Mont . I 567 P.2d 943, 34 St.Rep. 860; Myers v. 4 B ' s Restaurant, Inc. (1977), 172 Mont. 159, 561 P.2d 1331, 34 St.Rep. 187; Lester v. J. & S. Investment Company (1976), 171 Mont. 149, 557 P.2d 299, 33 St.Rep. 1104; S t a t e ex rel. Nawd's T.V. & App. Inc. v. D i s t r i c t Court (1975), 168 Mont. 456, 543 P.2d Applying t h e s e r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n sup- p o r t s t h e proposition t h a t t h e r e i s no mistake on t h e p a r t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . I t s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned c i t i e s of f i r s t and second c l a s s only and f a i l e d t o mention c i t i e s of t h i r d c l a s s o r towns. W e a r e bound by t h e following r u l e of s t a t u t o r y construction: " . . . It is a r u l e of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t t h e express mention of one matter excludes o t h e r s i m i l a r matters n o t mentioned. . ." Helena Valley Irr. D i s t . v. S t a t e Highway Comrn'n (1967), 150 Mont. 192, It was a l s o noted i n t h e above e n t i t l e d case t h a t t h e r e i s a presumption t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e a c t s knowing f u l l w e l l t h e f a c t s e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i m e of t h e enactment of t h e l e g i s l a t i o n . " I t i s a l s o a r u l e of s t a t u t o r y construction t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e acted with f u l l knowledge and informa- t i o n a s t o t h e s u b j e c t matter and e x i s t i n g conditions in- cluding t h e construction placed on previous law by t h e executive o f f i c e r s a c t i n g under it. . ." 150 Mont. a t 199, The l e g i s l a t u r e obviously was aware of t h e B i l l i n g s d e c i s i o n when it amended t h e a c t t o include policemen of f i r s t and second c l a s s c i t i e s and knew f u l l w e l l of t h e e f f e c t of t h i s act and intended s p e c i f i c a l l y t o l i m i t it t o t h e l a r g e r c i t i e s and t o exclude t h e smaller c i t i e s . Appellant argues t h a t t h e enactment of s e c t i o n 11-1832.2 repealed t h e B i l l i n g s decision. W e do n o t agree. A l l t h a t w a s done was t o provide c e r t a i n policemen with overtime compensation. The e f f e c t of t h e l e g i s l a t i o n d i d not.-aff e c t t h e s t a t u s of policemen i n t h i r d c l a s s cities, and they a r e s t i l l bound by t h e provisions of t h e B i l l i n g s decision. I t i s a l e g i s l a t i v e m a t t e r t o decide whether o r not policemen of t h i r d c l a s s cities and towns a r e t o be given overtime compensation. Appellant then r a i s e s t h e i s s u e of whether s e c t i o n 11- 1832.2 v i o l a t e s t h e r i g h t s of policemen i n t h i r d c l a s s c i t i e s by denying them overtime. This i s s u e of unconstitu- t i o n a l i t y of t h e treatment of policemen of t h i r d c l a s s c i t i e s w a s r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on appeal. N o attempt was made by a p p e l l a n t t o s e r v e t h e Attorney General of t h e S t a t e of Montana. W e hold, therefore, t h a t t h e i s s u e i s n o t prop- e r l y before t h i s Court. This Court i n Johnson v. Doran (1975), 167 Mont. 501, 511, 540 P.2d 306, s t a t e d , "As t o Doran's contention t h a t s e c t i o n 66-1940(c), R.C.M. 1947, i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , t h i s i s s u e was r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on appeal. This Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y r u l e d t h a t a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e i s waived i f n o t presented a t t h e earliest opportunity. . ." See a l s o Clontz v. Clontz (1975), 166 Mont. 206, 531 P.2d 1003; Union Interchange, Inc. v. Allen (1962), 140 Mont. 227, 370 P.2d 492; Rule 38, M.R.App.Civ.P. The d e c i s i o n of t h e District Court i s affirmed. W e concur: L/ c J T A & . u s t i c e s