Case Title: State v. Michael A. DeLain

Citation: 2005 WI 52

Docket Number: 2003AP001253-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 52 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1253-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael A. DeLain,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 79 
Reported at:  272 Wis. 2d 356. 679 N.W.2d 562 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 26, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 6, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Dietz   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Robert R. Henak and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Robert R. Henak. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Christopher G. Wren, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2005 WI 52 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1253-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2001CF624) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael A. DeLain,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 26, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   Michael A. DeLain 
requests review of a published decision of the court of appeals, 
State v. DeLain, 2004 WI App 79, 272 Wis. 2d 356, 679 N.W.2d 
562.  The court of appeals affirmed a judgment of conviction, as 
well as an order denying post-conviction relief, of the circuit 
court 
for 
Brown 
County, 
the 
Honorable 
Richard 
J. 
Dietz 
presiding.  We review whether the evidence presented to the jury 
was sufficient to sustain a conviction for sexual exploitation 
by a therapist, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.22(2) (2001-02),1 
                                                 
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2003AP1253-CR  
 
2 
 
and in particular, whether a finding that there was "an ongoing 
therapist-patient . . . relationship" during a therapy session 
is precluded if the victim was secretly recording that session 
in cooperation with police.  
¶2 
We conclude that, for the purpose of establishing 
criminal liability under Wis. Stat. § 940.22(2), whether there 
is an ongoing therapist-patient relationship is determined by 
examining the totality of the circumstances.  We also conclude 
that J.F.'s assisting the police by recording her therapy 
session is not sufficient to preclude a finding that a 
therapist-patient relationship was ongoing.  Further, based on 
the totality of the circumstances, which in this case included a 
stipulation that DeLain provided therapy to J.F. on all her 
visits, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that an ongoing therapist-patient relationship 
existed on May 2, 2001.  We therefore affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals, although on different grounds.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
J.F., a 16-year old, had five psychotherapy sessions 
with Dr. Michael DeLain in April and May 2001.  After the fourth 
session, on April 25, 2001, she told her family that she did not 
want to see DeLain again because he had sexually assaulted her 
during therapy.  J.F. and her parents then went to the police.  
At law enforcement's request, J.F. returned for a final session 
with DeLain on May 2, 2001, to surreptitiously audio- and video- 
record the session.  DeLain was subsequently charged with 
multiple 
criminal 
counts, 
including 
a 
count 
of 
sexual 
No. 
2003AP1253-CR  
 
3 
 
exploitation by a therapist under Wis. Stat. § 940.22(2) based 
on the allegation that DeLain had sexual contact with J.F. 
during the May 2, 2001 session.   
¶4 
A jury trial was conducted, wherein DeLain and the 
State stipulated to the following:  "In April and May, 2001, Dr. 
Michael DeLain was a psychologist who performed psychotherapy on 
patients, including [J.F.]."   
¶5 
At trial, DeLain testified to the method of therapy he 
used to treat J.F., his diagnosis of J.F. and his efforts to 
assist J.F.  He denied any sexual contact with J.F. and 
addressed specific acts that were alleged to have occurred.  He 
also testified that when he told J.F. he would be reporting her 
sexual relationship with an adult to authorities, she became 
angry and threatened to make accusations against him. DeLain 
also called others to testify on his behalf, including social 
service agency employees, who testified that DeLain had made a 
report that J.F. was having sex with an adult, and other 
witnesses who testified to DeLain's nonexploitative character.   
¶6 
In closing argument, the State asserted that it was 
stipulated to and agreed upon that J.F. and DeLain had a 
therapist-patient relationship during the time period relevant 
to the conduct alleged to be criminal.  In DeLain's closing 
argument, he did not disagree, but instead argued to the jury 
that no sexual contact occurred.  The jury convicted DeLain of 
the count at issue in this review, as well as two of the other 
counts charged.   
No. 
2003AP1253-CR  
 
4 
 
¶7 
In a post-conviction motion, DeLain requested the 
circuit court to vacate the conviction for sexual exploitation 
by a therapist that resulted from the May 2, 2001 session 
because the evidence was insufficient to establish that the 
alleged sexual contact took place during an "ongoing therapist-
patient relationship," as required by Wis. Stat. § 940.22(2).  
The circuit court denied DeLain's motion.  The court of appeals 
affirmed, and we subsequently granted DeLain's petition for 
review.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶8 
Wisconsin Stat. § 940.22(2) prohibits sexual contact 
between a therapist and a patient or client.  The statute 
states:   
Sexual contact prohibited.  Any person who is or who 
holds himself or herself out to be a therapist and who 
intentionally has sexual contact with a patient or 
client 
during 
any 
ongoing 
therapist-patient 
or 
therapist-client relationship, regardless of whether 
it 
occurs 
during 
any 
treatment, 
consultation, 
interview or examination, is guilty of a Class F 
felony.  Consent is not an issue in an action under 
this subsection.   
Section 940.22(2). 
¶9 
To obtain a conviction for a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.22(2), the State must prove three elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt:  (1) that the defendant was or held himself or 
herself out to be a therapist; (2) that the defendant had 
intentional sexual contact with a patient or client; and (3) 
that the sexual contact occurred during an ongoing therapist-
No. 
2003AP1253-CR  
 
5 
 
patient or therapist-client relationship.2  State v. Miller, 2002 
WI App 197, ¶17 n.5, 257 Wis. 2d 124, 650 N.W.2d 850; see also 
State v. Ambrose, 196 Wis. 2d 768, 777, 540 N.W.2d 208 (Ct. App. 
1995) (holding that the actor and the complainant "must be 
engaged 
in 
a 
professional 
therapist-patient/client 
relationship"). 
¶10 DeLain contends there was not sufficient evidence to 
find the third element, that sexual contact occurred during an 
ongoing 
therapist-patient 
or 
therapist-client 
relationship, 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Our review of DeLain’s contention, 
in light of actual trial testimony, presents us with a limited 
record because DeLain’s defense was that sexual contact did not 
occur, 
not 
that 
there 
was 
no 
ongoing 
therapist-patient 
relationship.  Rather than try the third element of Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
2 We note that the pattern jury instructions open by 
stating, "Sexual exploitation by a therapist, as defined in 
§ 940.22 . . . is committed by one who is or holds himself out 
to be a therapist and who intentionally has sexual contact with 
a patient or client during any ongoing therapist-patient or 
therapist-client relationship," Wis JI——Criminal 1248 (emphasis 
added).  This opening statement appropriately includes intent.  
However, in stating that the second element of the crime is the 
defendant's 
sexual 
contact 
with 
the 
victim 
during 
the 
relationship, and in describing this second element, the 
instructions fail to include intent.  See id. (stating, "Second, 
that the defendant had sexual contact with (name of victim)," 
and later stating, "The second element requires that the 
defendant had sexual contact with (name of victim).").  We 
therefore suggest review of these instructions. 
No. 
2003AP1253-CR  
 
6 
 
§ 940.22(2), 
DeLain 
stipulated 
that 
he 
was 
performing 
psychotherapy on J.F. during May 2001.3 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶11 Notwithstanding the way in which this case was tried, 
we have been asked to determine when evidence is sufficient to 
prove that an ongoing therapist-patient relationship existed, as 
that phrase is used in Wis. Stat. § 940.22(2).  This requires 
interpretation of § 940.22(2).  Interpretation of a statute is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  Johnson v. ABC Ins. 
Co., 193 Wis. 2d 35, 43, 532 N.W.2d 130 (1995).  Additionally, 
when we review the sufficiency of evidence to support a 
conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the verdict and determine whether "any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Ambrose, 196 Wis. 2d at 772 (citing Jackson 
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 
B. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 940.22(2) 
¶12 To interpret the phrase "during any ongoing therapist-
patient . . . relationship" in Wis. Stat. § 940.22(2), we begin 
by examining the plain meaning of the statutory language, in 
context, as is required by State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 
110.  "[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in 
                                                 
3 The only time DeLain and J.F. saw one another in May 2001 
was May 2, 2001, when the sexual contact that forms the basis 
for the criminal conviction at issue here was alleged to have 
occurred. 
No. 
2003AP1253-CR  
 
7 
 
which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole . . . 
and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id. 
¶13 In interpreting the meaning of "during any ongoing 
therapist-patient . . . relationship," the court of appeals 
decision drew on Wis. Stat. § 939.23(3)4 to conclude that whether 
there was an ongoing therapist-patient relationship turned 
solely on DeLain's subjective belief.  DeLain, 272 Wis. 2d 356, 
¶¶10-12.  The court of appeals explained, "[B]ecause the 
undisputed evidence is that DeLain believed the specific fact 
existed, namely that [J.F.] was a patient and this was part of 
the ongoing therapist-patient 
relationship, 
any 
acts 
that 
occurred during this session were during an ongoing therapist-
patient relationship as those terms are used in the statute."  
Id., ¶12. 
¶14 DeLain disagrees with the court of appeals, arguing 
that 
the 
therapist's 
belief 
that 
a 
therapist-patient 
relationship is ongoing does not establish that the relationship 
is actually ongoing in fact.  The State also disagrees with the 
court of appeals' reasoning, conceding that the factual question 
of whether a therapist-patient relationship is ongoing does not 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.23(3) states:  
"Intentionally" means that the actor either has a 
purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, 
or is aware that his or her conduct is practically 
certain to cause that result.  In addition, except as 
provided in sub. (6), the actor must have knowledge of 
those facts which are necessary to make his or her 
conduct criminal and which are set forth after the 
word "intentionally." 
No. 
2003AP1253-CR  
 
8 
 
turn solely on what the therapist knows.  For reasons discussed 
at length below, we accept the State's concession. 
¶15 DeLain further argues that the term "relationship," in 
the 
phrase 
"ongoing 
therapist-patient 
. . . 
relationship," 
requires a "two-way street," with both the therapist and the 
patient consenting to the continuing relationship.  He asserts 
that the relationship "may be terminated, inter alia, by mutual 
consent of the parties, or by the unilateral action of the 
patient."  As such, he argues that a patient who goes to the 
police to complain of sexual contact made by a therapist and 
agrees to cooperate in a criminal investigation during a 
subsequent therapy session has acted unilaterally to withdraw 
from the therapist-patient relationship and continues as only a 
"feigned" patient.  He urges this court to conclude that based 
on that one circumstance he and J.F. did not have an ongoing 
therapist-patient relationship on May 2, 2001.  
¶16 The 
State 
argues 
that, 
even 
if 
we 
accept 
its 
concession regarding the court of appeals' reasoning, we should 
nevertheless affirm the court of appeals decision.  The State 
asserts that a therapist-patient relationship continues to exist 
as a matter of law "until one of the parties explicitly and 
openly advises the other party that the relationship has 
terminated."  The State further counters that it would be 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
strict 
obligation 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.22(2) imposes on therapists to conclude that a patient's 
secret cooperation with law enforcement terminates an ongoing 
therapist-patient relationship.  
No. 
2003AP1253-CR  
 
9 
 
¶17 The 
parties 
present 
competing 
standards 
for 
establishing 
the 
"ongoing 
therapist-patient 
relationship" 
element of Wis. Stat. § 940.22(2).  We need to decide whether 
those interpretations are reasonable in order to determine 
whether the statute is ambiguous.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47.  
"Relationship" 
is 
not 
defined 
in 
the 
statute.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 990.01(1) 
instructs 
that 
words 
that 
are 
neither defined by statute nor technical in nature shall be 
defined according to common and approved usage.  Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary defines "relationship" as "a state of 
affairs existing between those having relations or dealings."  
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 975 (1977) (emphasis added); 
see also FH Healthcare Dev., Inc. v. City of Wauwatosa, 2004 WI 
App 182, ¶20, 276 Wis. 2d 243, 687 N.W.2d 532 (concluding that 
common and approved usage of undefined words may be ascertained 
from their dictionary definitions).  That a relationship exists 
"between" those having dealings indicates that both parties may 
have to consent for the relationship to continue.  See id.  
Therefore, DeLain's interpretation, that an ongoing therapist-
patient relationship requires continuing mutual consent, appears 
reasonable based on the plain meaning of the statutory language 
in question.   
¶18 However, examining the language under review in the 
context of the statute as a whole, Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46, 
we also note that the statute's scope is broad, as it includes 
one who simply "holds himself or herself out to be a therapist."  
Wis. Stat. § 940.22(2).  Stated another way, one who is only 
No. 
2003AP1253-CR  
 
10 
 
pretending to be a therapist is within the scope of those whose 
behavior comes within the statutory prohibition.  Accordingly, 
the 
types 
of 
relationships 
in 
which 
sexual 
contact 
is 
criminalized are broader than those relationships that are 
between a therapist in fact and a patient or client.  As the 
statute covers relationships where the interaction may not 
actually involve the delivery or the receipt of therapy, the 
State's interpretation that a "relationship" may continue, even 
if one party is secretly cooperating in a criminal investigation 
of the therapist, also appears reasonable.  Therefore, because 
both 
DeLain 
and 
the 
State 
have 
set 
out 
reasonable 
interpretations of § 940.22(2), we conclude that this statutory 
language is ambiguous.  Stated another way, it has been 
"understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more 
senses."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47.   
¶19 To resolve this dispute, we turn to the legislative 
history 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.22(2) 
for 
evidence 
of 
the 
legislature's 
intent. 
 
See 
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 
633, 
¶51 
("[L]egislative history need not be and is not consulted except 
to resolve an ambiguity in the statutory language, although [it] 
is sometimes consulted to confirm or verify a plain-meaning 
interpretation.").   
¶20 Before 1986, Wis. Stat. § 940.22(2) read in relevant 
part: "Any person who is or who holds himself or herself out to 
be a therapist and who intentionally has sexual contact with a 
patient or client during any treatment, consultation, interview 
or examination is guilty."  Wis. Stat. § 940.22(2) (1983-84).  
No. 
2003AP1253-CR  
 
11 
 
However, in 1986, the legislature added the language we are 
examining here, making a therapist culpable for having sexual 
contact with a patient "during any ongoing therapist-patient or 
therapist-client relationship, regardless of whether it occurs 
during any treatment, consultation, interview or examination."  
Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1985 Wis. Act. 
275, § 6.  As the Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis 
published with the bill that created 1985 Wis. Act. 275 
explains, "[T]he bill expands the crime's coverage to apply to 
sexual contact with a client while there is an ongoing 
therapist-client relationship, regardless of whether the sexual 
contact occurs during treatment or examination."  1985 A.B. 776.  
Further, 
notes 
from 
a 
meeting 
with 
Representative 
James 
Rutkowski, who introduced the bill, state that the statute was 
to be changed to "[r]evise [the] scope of [the] crime to the 
ongoing period during which treatment occur[s], [e].g. if being 
treated on a regular outpatient basis, they can't engage in sex 
outside the office." Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File 
for 1985 Wis. Act 275, § 6.  This change was made so that the 
therapist would be criminally liable for sexual contact with a 
patient, regardless of where that sexual contact took place.   
¶21 The same legislative act also added the statute's 
final sentence: "Consent is not an issue in an action under this 
subsection."  1985  Wis. Act. 275, § 6.  This change explicitly 
removed the patient's consent to the sexual contact as a 
defense, see id., again broadening the protection afforded to 
the public.   
No. 
2003AP1253-CR  
 
12 
 
¶22 These two changes recognize the vulnerabilities of a 
person seeking therapy and the ways in which a therapist, or 
someone posing as a therapist, may prey upon such a person.  
While neither of these changes specifically addresses the issue 
presented here, they do indicate the legislature’s intent to 
give 
broad 
protection 
to 
the 
public 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.22(2).   
¶23 The State contends that the court of appeals erred in 
its interpretation of the word "knowledge" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.23(3).  According to the State, the meaning of the word 
"knowledge" in the definition of "intentionally" does not derive 
from or depend on the definition of "know" in § 939.23(2).  We 
note that a therapist-patient relationship is necessarily a 
trust relationship, see Ande v. Rock, 2002 WI App 136, ¶10, 256 
Wis. 2d 365, 647 N.W.2d 265, and as such, an individual seeking 
therapy is particularly vulnerable to the influence of the 
therapist.  For a defendant's subjective intent to be the sole 
determinant of whether an ongoing therapist-patient relationship 
exists, as held by the court of appeals, would permit a 
therapist to prey upon a patient who relies on that relationship 
for help.  We conclude that is too narrow a construction of the 
statute. 
¶24 Accordingly, 
we 
disavow 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
discussion of "intentionally."  DeLain, 272 Wis. 2d 356, ¶¶10-
11.  Instead, we conclude that it is the totality of the 
circumstances, which in this case included a stipulation that 
DeLain provided therapy to J.F. on all her visits, that 
No. 
2003AP1253-CR  
 
13 
 
determines 
whether 
there 
was 
an 
ongoing 
therapist-
patient relationship 
when 
sexual 
contact 
occurred. 
 
A 
defendant's state of mind is one factor in this totality of the 
circumstances analysis.  Further, a secret unilateral action of 
a patient may also be a factor, although not necessarily the 
decisive factor, as urged by DeLain.  Similarly, the explicit 
remarks of one party to the other regarding the status of the 
relationship 
may 
be 
a 
factor, 
but 
not 
necessarily 
the 
dispositive factor, as proposed by the State.  Other factors 
that may appropriately enter into the analysis include, but are 
not limited to:  how much time has gone by since the last 
therapy session; how close together the therapy sessions had 
been to each other; the age of the patient; the particular 
vulnerabilities experienced by the patient as a result of his or 
her mental health issues; and the ethical obligations of the 
therapist's profession.5  Only upon consideration of all the 
                                                 
5 For example, rules regarding how a patient or client 
relationship should be terminated in the therapist's profession 
may be a factor in this totality of the circumstances analysis. 
See Wis. Admin. Code § Psy 5.01(31) (requiring psychologists to 
notify clients when service will be interrupted or terminated);  
Wis. Admin. Code § MPSW 20.02(21) (requiring marriage and family 
therapists, counselors, and social workers to make reasonable 
efforts 
to 
notify 
a 
client 
or 
a 
client's 
authorized 
representative 
when 
the 
professional 
will 
be 
terminating 
services); see also McManus v. Donlin, 23 Wis. 2d 289, 300, 127 
N.W.2d 22 (1964) (stating that a physician or surgeon's 
"obligation of continuing attention can be terminated only by 
the cessation 
of 
the 
necessity which 
gave 
rise to the 
relationship, or by the discharge of the physician by the 
patient, or by the withdrawal from the case by the physician 
after giving the patient reasonable notice so as to enable the 
patient to secure other medical attention"). 
No. 
2003AP1253-CR  
 
14 
 
circumstances that are relevant in a given case may we fully 
address the legislature's concern for protecting the public. 
C. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
                                                                                                                                                             
Further, the administrative rules of professional conduct 
for some professions explicitly address sexual contact with 
clients or patients, and such rules may provide useful factors 
in evaluating the totality of the circumstances.  For example, 
psychologists are prohibited from engaging in sexual contact 
with a client or a former client within two years of the 
termination of professional services.  Wis. Admin. Code § Psy 
5.01(14), (14)(a)-(b).  In determining whether sexual contact is 
prohibited with a former client more than two years after 
professional services have terminated, the psychologist must 
demonstrate that "there has been no exploitation of the former 
client" and that "the former client is not vulnerable by reason 
of emotional or cognitive disorder to exploitive influence by 
the psychologist."  Wis. Admin. Code § Psy 5.01(14)(c).  This 
determination is to be made "in light of all relevant factors," 
id., including the following: 
1. 
The length of time which had passed between 
the termination of professional services and the 
conduct. 
2. 
The nature and duration of the professional 
services. 
3. 
The circumstances of termination. 
4. 
The client's personal history. 
5. 
The client's mental status at the time the 
conduct took place. 
6. 
The likelihood of adverse impact on the 
client or others. 
7. 
Statements or actions made by the licensee 
during the course of professional services suggesting 
or inviting the possibility of a post-termination 
sexual or romantic relationship with the client. 
Wis. Admin. Code § Psy 5.01(14)(c)1-7. 
No. 
2003AP1253-CR  
 
15 
 
¶25  We now apply the totality of the circumstances 
standard to the May 2, 2001 session.  The testimony was 
undisputed that DeLain was a licensed psychologist who had 
provided therapy to J.F. on April 25, one week prior to the 
sexual contact at issue here; that J.F. was only 16 years of 
age; that DeLain knew that J.F. had problems with intimate 
relationships; that DeLain intended to provide therapy; that 
during the May 2 therapy session J.F. was wearing a recording 
device; that J.F. never formally withdrew from therapy; and that 
the parties stipulated that DeLain was performing psychotherapy 
on J.F. in May 2001.  Based on the totality of these 
circumstances, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could 
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual contact 
occurred during an ongoing therapist-patient relationship. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶26 In 
sum, 
we 
conclude 
that, 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
establishing criminal liability under Wis. Stat. § 940.22(2), 
whether there was an ongoing therapist-patient relationship at 
the time of the sexual contact is determined by examining the 
totality of the circumstances.  We also conclude that J.F.'s 
assisting the police by recording her therapy session is not 
sufficient to preclude a finding that a therapist-patient 
relationship was ongoing during that session.  Further, based on 
the totality of the circumstances, which in this case included a 
stipulation that DeLain provided therapy to J.F. on all her 
visits, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that an ongoing therapist-patient relationship 
No. 
2003AP1253-CR  
 
16 
 
existed on May 2, 2001.  We therefore affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals, although on different grounds. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
2003AP1253-CR  
 
 
 
1