Case Title: State of New Jersey v. Richard Gary Holland

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-150-01

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). On August 19, 1995, a Glassboro policeman responded to a call to assist an ambulance crew at 33 South Academy Street, a duplex that shared a common porch with its other half, located at 31 South Academy Street. When the patrolman walked toward the porch, he noticed a very strong odor of burning marijuana, which he then believed was emanating from the 31 South Academy address. After the ambulance crew departed the scene, the patrolman radioed for backup officers to assist him in locating the source of the marijuana odor. Two other policemen and a sergeant arrived for that purpose and all four officers subsequently identified the 31 South Academy address as the source of the odor. They heard laughter and conversation coming from within the residence. One of the officers knocked on the front door and loudly announced that it was the Glassboro police. Through an open front window, another officer observed a man, later identified as defendant Richard Holland, run toward the rear of the house. Another officer, stationed by the back door of the residence, saw the defendant exit the house through the back door. Outside, the defendant dropped some vegetation on the ground that the officer suspected was a small piece or bud of marijuana. He was handcuffed and arrested. In response to a specific question, Holland indicated that there were other occupants in the house. Thereafter, two of the officers entered the residence to secure their own safety and to determine if any other person was part of a crime. While inside, the officers noticed drug paraphernalia, marijuana roaches in the living room ashtray, several glassine bags, a scale, and green vegetation that they suspected was marijuana. In addition, the officers discovered two rooms within the residence that they suspected were grow rooms for marijuana. Although the officers seized none of the drug paraphernalia items, they did secure for their protection a Colt .45 semi-automatic pistol they found in a basement stairway. After the officers searched and secured the entire house, the sergeant notified a detective and informed him of what they had seen. At that point, the detective assumed the investigation. That same day, the detective drafted a search warrant application and supporting affidavit, describing in detail the facts and the items found inside Holland s home as related by the officers. On that basis, a Superior Court judge issued a search warrant. The police executed that warrant and seized the objects initially observed by the officers and the sergeant. A grand jury indicted Holland on several drug offenses. Holland then moved to suppress the evidence derived from the search of his home, which the trial court denied. Holland was subsequently convicted on several counts of drug possession and possession with intent to distribute and was sentenced on the basis of those convictions. Holland appealed his conviction, challenging the trial court s denial of his suppression motion. In a reported decision, the Appellate Division determined that while the officers had probable cause to believe that one or more persons on the premises possessed an unknown quantity of marijuana, a disorderly personas offense, that offense was minor and rarely would support a finding of exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless home entry. The panel further rejected the officers claim that the circumstances authorized them to make a protective sweep of the premises because there was no evidence to support a reasonable belief on the part of the police that they were in danger before they entered the house. Thus, the Appellate Division remanded the matter to the trial court for it to determine whether the evidence should be suppressed or whether it might be permissible pursuant to the independent source rule. On remand, applying the independent source rule, the trial court again denied Holland s suppression motion. The Appellate Division affirmed in an unreported opinion. The Supreme Court granted Holland s petition for certification. HELD : Under the framework the Court has articulated here, the independent-source rule cannot sustain what otherwise was an impermissible search of defendant s home where the officers could not prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that they would have sought a search warrant independent of the tainted knowledge or evidence that they previously had acquired or viewed. Consistent with both the United States and the New Jersey Constitutions, police officers must obtain a warrant from a neutral judicial officer prior to searching a person s home, unless the search falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Generally, evidence directly or derivatively seized in violation of the warrant requirement is suppressed, the well-accepted purpose of the exclusion being to compel respect for the constitutional guarantee by removing the incentive to disregard it. (pp. 8-9) The independent-source rule, an exception to the exclusionary rule, and an established part of New Jersey s constitutional jurisprudence, allows admission of evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation. (pp. 9-11) Although New Jersey Courts have been referring to the independent-source doctrine for the past seventy-five years, it has not always been straightforward in its application. (pp. 11-18) Although the government should be held to an elevated burden of proof when justifying a search under the independent-source rule, when applying that rule, our courts must harmonize it with existing case law that permits redaction of tainted information from warrant applications in certain circumstances. (p. 19) When evaluating the independent-source doctrine under the New Jersey Constitution, the following framework is to be applied: 1) the State must demonstrate that probable cause existed to conduct the challenged search without the unlawfully obtained information; 2) the State must demonstrate in accordance with an elevated standard of proof, that is - by clear and convincing evidence, that the police would have sought a warrant without the tainted knowledge or evidence that they previously had acquired or viewed; and 3) regardless of the strength of their proof under the first and second prongs, prosecutors must demonstrate by the same enhanced standard that the initial impermissible search was not the product of flagrant police misconduct. (pp. 19-20) The Court s formulation of the independent-source rule s contours, including the elevated burden of proof, is necessary to restore a fair balance between the adversarial positions of the parties and constitutes a proper accommodation of the conflicting interests of the State and the defendant. (pp. 20-22) Although courts generally have avoided per se rules in the search and seizure context in favor of a case-by-case analysis guided by a totality of the circumstances, courts must apply scrupulously each part of the test. The government s failure to satisfy any one prong of the standard will result in suppression of the challenged evidence. (p. 22-23) Applying the standard articulated for the application of the independent-source doctrine, in this case, under a clear and convincing standard of proof, it cannot be concluded that the information acquired by the officers wholly apart from the impermissible search would have prompted them to secure a warrant. Thus, the seizure of evidence here cannot be sustained under the second prong of the analysis. (pp. 23-25) An individual s privacy interests are nowhere more clearly defined or rigorously protected by the courts than in the home, the core of Fourth Amendment rights, and the fact that the police conduct in this case occurred inside defendant s residence fortifies the Court s holding that the independent-source rule cannot sustain what otherwise was an impermissible search. Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN, LONG, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE VERNIERO s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN did not participate. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RICHARD GARY HOLLAND, Defendant-Appellant. Argued March 17, 2003 Decided June 3, 2003 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Linda Mehling, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). Michael J. Williams, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter C. Harvey, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Mr. Williams and Joseph H. Enos, Jr., Assistant Gloucester County Prosecutor, on the briefs). The opinion of the Court was delivered by VERNIERO, J. This case implicates defendant s right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures in a residential setting. We are called on to apply the independent-source rule, which allows admission of evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2508, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 387 (1984). Although prior New Jersey decisions have cited the independent-source rule with varying elaboration, this case presents our first opportunity to articulate the rule s contours. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the rule cannot sustain what otherwise was an impermissible search of defendant s home. [State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 210 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).] As a general rule, evidence directly seized in violation of the warrant requirement is suppressed at trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). Sometimes the police obtain evidence not as a primary result of warrantless conduct, but as a consequence of it. During an illegal search, for example, the police might acquire information that leads to other evidence useful to prosecutors. Under that circumstance, the later-derived evidence might be suppressed or excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. Nix, supra, 467 U.S. at 441, 104 S. Ct. at 2508, 81 L. Ed 2d at 386. The well-accepted purpose of excluding such primary or derivative evidence is to compel respect for the constitutional guarantee in the only effective way by removing the incentive to disregard it. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S. Ct. 613, 620, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 571 (1974) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 376 (2003) (describing deterrent effect of exclusionary rule). The exclusionary rule, however, is not absolute. One exception is the independent-source rule. As noted, that exception allows admission of evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation. Nix, supra, 467 U.S. at 443, 104 S. Ct. at 2508, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 387. The rule s federal genesis can be traced to Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319 (1920). In Silverthorne, the United States Supreme Court stated that if the police acquired facts from evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, those facts did not become sacred and inaccessible for all purposes. Id. at 392, 40 S. Ct. at 183, 64 L. Ed. at 321. The Court explained that [i]f knowledge of [the illegally obtained facts] is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others[.] Ibid. One of the earliest reported New Jersey references to the independent-source doctrine is found in State v. Black, 5 N.J. Misc. 48 (1926), a decision of the then-sitting Court of Quarter Sessions. (Under New Jersey s 1776 constitution, the Court of Quarter Sessions was one of [t]he principal courts dealing with criminal matters[.] Edward B. McConnell, A Brief History of the New Jersey Courts, 7 West s New Jersey Digest 351 (1954). The court continued under our 1844 constitution, but ultimately was replaced by the judicial structure established by the 1947 constitution. Id. at 354.) In Black, supra, the court cited Silverthorne, observing that evidence once obtained by the government by unreasonable search and seizure must remain effectively suppressed against any further subpoena or search warrant unless such subpoena or search warrant is based upon evidence obtained independently of the articles ordered returned or the information illegally obtained[.] 5 N.J. Misc. at 49. More recently, this Court approvingly cited Silverthorne in State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338 (1982), in which we discussed the consequence to prosecutors when the police obtain evidence as fruit of the poisonous tree. That form of evidence, the Court declared, is not automatically inadmissible. If the subsequently obtained evidence was acquired from an independent source unrelated to the illegal search, . . . then such evidence is admissible. Id. at 349 (internal citations omitted). The underlying issue in Hunt was whether Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protects a citizen s telephone billing records. Accordingly, the Court s reference to the independent-source rule indicates that the rule is an established part of our State s constitutional jurisprudence. See also State v. Ravotto, 169 N.J. 227, 245 (2001) (referring briefly to independent-source doctrine in search-and-seizure case decided under both Fourth Amendment and Article I, paragraph 7). We think this is also true with the tangible evidence, the bales of marijuana. . . . The independent source doctrine [rests] . . . upon the policy that, while the government should not profit from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied. So long as a later, lawful seizure is genuinely independent of an earlier, tainted one (which may well be difficult to establish where the seized goods are kept in the police s possession) there is no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply. The ultimate question, therefore, is whether the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the information and tangible evidence at issue here. This would not have been the case if the agents decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what they had seen during the initial entry, or if information obtained during that entry was presented to the Magistrate and affected his decision to issue the warrant. [Id. at 541-42, 108 S. Ct. at 2535-36, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 483-84 (internal citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis added to last sentence).] Justice Marshall dissented. He acknowledged that the affidavit presented to the magistrate did not cite information obtained from the earlier illegal entry. Id. at 546, 108 S. Ct. at 2538, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 486 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He nonetheless would have suppressed the evidence retrieved during the second search, explaining: When, as here, the same team of investigators is involved in both the first and second search, there is a significant danger that the independence of the source will in fact be illusory, and that the initial search will have affected the decision to obtain a warrant notwithstanding the officers subsequent assertions to the contrary. It is therefore crucial that the factual premise of the exception complete independence be clearly established before the exception can justify admission of the evidence. . . . To ensure that the source of the evidence is genuinely independent, the basis for a finding that a search was untainted by a prior illegal search must focus . . . on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment. In the instant case[], there are no demonstrated historical facts capable of supporting a finding that the subsequent warrant search was wholly unaffected by the prior illegal search. The same team of investigators was involved in both searches. The warrant was obtained immediately after the illegal search, and no effort was made to obtain a warrant prior to the discovery of the marijuana during the illegal search. The only evidence available that the warrant search was wholly independent is the testimony of the agents who conducted the illegal search. Under these circumstances, the threat that the subsequent search was tainted by the illegal search is too great to allow for the application of the independent source exception. [Id. at 548-49, 108 S. Ct. at 2539, 101 L. Ed 2d at 487-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks, citation, and footnote omitted).] Complicating the analysis is a line of pre- and post-Murray decisions by federal and State courts holding that if an affidavit submitted in support of an application for a search warrant contains lawfully obtained information which establishes the probable cause required for a search, evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant will not be suppressed on the ground that the affidavit also contains false or unlawfully obtained information. [State v. Chaney, 318 N.J. Super. 217, 221 (App. Div. 1999) (citing numerous federal and State decisions in this area of law).] The Appellate Division confronted that complication in Chaney. In that case, the police arrested a man who had attempted to sell some stolen jewelry at a local store. Id. at 219. The man informed the police that he was staying at a nearby motel with the defendant, Walter Chaney. Id. at 220. After ascertaining that there were two outstanding arrest warrants for the name Walter Chaney, the police went to the motel room identified by the first man. Ibid. The police knocked on the door, but no one responded. Ibid. The police then entered the room, only to find that the defendant had fled via the bathroom window. Ibid. While in the motel room, the police observed several items that certain homeowners previously had reported as stolen. Ibid. Based partly on what the police had observed, one of the officers involved in the prior search applied to a Superior Court judge for a warrant to search the identified motel room. Ibid. The judge issued the warrant, and the police officers executed it later that day, which resulted in the discovery of property stolen in five of the burglaries [that the police had been investigating]. Ibid. Later, the police learned that the arrest warrants that they previously believed had been issued for the defendant were for a different Walter Chaney. Ibid. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence rediscovered and seized as a result of the second search. The trial court granted that motion, and the Appellate Division reversed. Id. at 220-21. Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Skillman assumed that the first entry into the motel room was unlawful. Id. at 221. He thus framed the issue as being whether the warrant authorizing the search of the motel room was invalid because the warrant affidavit included a description of the apparent contraband which the police had seen during their prior unlawful entry. Id. The court then focused on the sentence in Murray, supra, highlighted above, in which the Supreme Court observed that a warrant would not pass muster under the independent-source rule if the agents decision to seek [it] was prompted by what they had seen during the initial entry, or if information obtained during that entry was presented to the Magistrate and affected his decision to issue the warrant. 487 U.S. at 542, 108 S. Ct. at 2536, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 483 (footnote omitted). After carefully reviewing the relevant case law, Judge Skillman concluded that that single sentence in Murray did not refute the pre-Murray holdings that inclusion of illegally-acquired information on a warrant affidavit does not invalidate the warrant if the affidavit s other averments set forth probable cause. Chaney, supra, 318 N.J. Super. at 225 (quoting United States v. Restrepo, 966 F.2d 964, 969-70 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, sub. nom., Pulido v. United States, 506 U.S. 1049, 113 S. Ct. 968, 122 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1993)). Consistent with that analysis, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court s suppression order, upholding the search under the independent-source rule. First, the panel redacted the affidavit and found that probable cause existed without the unlawful information. Id. at 225. Next, the panel determined that the police would have sought a warrant regardless of what they previously had viewed in the motel room. Id. at 226. As support, the court cited testimony that indicated that the police were going to take whatever steps were necessary to search [the] defendant s motel room based on the untainted information that they had received from the first man they arrested. Ibid. In a critical passage the court also concluded that, based on the totality of circumstances, the initial entry into the motel room was not a product of flagrant police misconduct. The panel stated: [W]e note that this is not a case where the police deliberately conducted an unlawful search for the purpose of confirming the presence of contraband before applying for a warrant. Rather, the information received by the police concerning the arrest warrants for a person with the same name as [the] defendant, whose last known address was the motel in which [the] defendant was registered, provided the police with objectively reasonable grounds for believing that they were authorized to enter the motel room to execute the warrants. Consequently, there is no basis for arguing that the initial entry into the motel room constituted such flagrant police misconduct that the evidence subsequently obtained pursuant to the warrant should be suppressed to deter similar future violations of constitutional rights. Cf. State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 639, 653, 573 A.2d 909 (1990) (holding that one factor in the determination of whether evidence is the fruit of illegal police conduct is the flagrancy and purpose of the police misconduct ) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 427 (1975)). Therefore, this case is not an example of a search first, warrant later [police] mentality. Murray, supra, 487 U.S. at 540 n.2, 108 S. Ct. at 2535 [n.2], 101 L. Ed. 2d at 482 [n.2]; see also State v. Nichols, 253 N.J. Super. 273, 279-80, 601 A.2d 753 (App. Div. 1992). [Id. at 226-27.] Accordingly, the Appellate Division set aside the trial court s suppression order and remanded the case for trial. Id. at 227. . . . . . . . [T]he inevitable discovery doctrine is analytically similar to the independent source doctrine, in that both are intended to ensure that suppression does not outrun the deterrence objective: the prosecution is neither put in a better position than it would have been if no illegality had transpired nor put in a worse position simply because of some earlier police error or misconduct. [5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, 11.4(a) at 241, 44 (3d ed. 1996) (internal citation omitted) (footnotes omitted).] In Sugar II, supra, we adopted the inevitable-discovery exception but only after articulating a restrictive formulation that included a clear-and-convincing burden of proof imposed on the government. 100 N.J. at 238. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Handler explained in an instructive passage: In a case in which the State seeks to rely on the inevitable discovery exception, it is because the police have already violated the law. Evidence has been obtained unlawfully; a defendant s constitutional rights have been denied. The State itself is directly responsible for the loss of the opportunity lawfully to obtain evidence; the State has created a situation in which it is impossible to be certain as to what would have happened if no illegal conduct had occurred. Moreover, the State itself is in possession of all relevant evidence bearing upon its ability to have otherwise lawfully discovered the evidence. Finally, the defendant is at a gross disadvantage; defendant s constitutional rights were in fact abridged, and, he is in possession of no independent evidence concerning whether the evidence that had been seized unlawfully would have otherwise been discovered through lawful means. Consequently, the State should be required to make a strong showing that, by the admission of the evidence, it is in no better position than it would have enjoyed had no illegality occurred. We conclude therefore that a clear and convincing burden must be imposed on the State. This, we believe, would restore a fair balance between the adversarial positions of the parties and constitute a proper accommodation of the conflicting interests of the State and the defendant. Thus, . . . [t]he State must show by clear and convincing evidence that had the illegality not occurred, it would have pursued established investigatory procedures that would have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the controverted evidence, wholly apart from its unlawful acquisition. [Id. at 239-40 (internal citations omitted).] We reason similarly in respect of the independent-source rule. Our formulation of the rule s contours, including the elevated burden of proof imposed on the State, is necessary to restore a fair balance between the adversarial positions of the parties and constitute[s] a proper accommodation of the conflicting interests of the State and the defendant. Id. at 240. Only by rigorously applying the rule s three prongs can we be satisfied that an error of the State s making does not subvert the warrant requirement under Article I, paragraph 7. Our approach differs somewhat from Justice Marshall s dissenting opinion in Murray. We construe that opinion as suggesting a per se rule that would eliminate the independent-source doctrine whenever an officer participates, to whatever degree, in an initial warrantless search that is followed by a subsequent search based on a properly issued warrant. Our case law generally has eschewed per se rules (both in favor of and against the State s interests) in the search-and-seizure context. We prefer instead a case-by-case analysis guided by the totality of circumstances. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra, 169 N.J. at 216 (declining to adopt per se rule establishing probable cause whenever State conducts controlled-drug buy, explaining that such rule would be antithetical to our jurisprudence); Ravotto, supra, 169 N.J. at 249 (emphasizing that whether police used unreasonable force in obtaining evidence does not turn on any one factor in the analysis but on totality of circumstances); but see Bolte, supra, 115 N.J. at 597 (adopting, in essence, per se rule providing that minor offenses cannot support finding of exigent circumstances sufficient to justify warrantless home entry). That said, when the same officer participates in an improper search and in an arguably lawful one occurring only a short time later, the State s burden in demonstrating the validity of the second search will be most difficult. We echo Justice Marshall s concern that unrestrained application of the independent-source rule could emasculate[] the Warrant Clause and provide[] an intolerable incentive for warrantless searches. Murray, 487 U.S. at 550, 108 S. Ct. at 2540, 101 L. Ed 2d at 485 (Marshall, J., dissenting). We address that concern by adopting the multi-faceted formulation to which we have adverted. We stress that courts must apply scrupulously each part of the test, and that the government s failure to satisfy any one prong of the standard will result in suppression of the challenged evidence. NO. A-150 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RICHARD GARY HOLLAND, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED June 3, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Verniero CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY