Case Title: Dayton Bar Assn. v. Brown

Citation: 2009-Ohio-6424

Docket Number: 20091231

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Dayton Bar Assn. v. Brown, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-6424.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-6424 
DAYTON BAR ASSOCIATION v. BROWN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Dayton Bar Assn. v. Brown,  
Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-6424.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Failure to cooperate in the disciplinary 
process — Indefinite license suspension. 
(No. 2009-1231 ⎯ Submitted September 16, 2009 ⎯ Decided  
December 15, 2009.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 08-077. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Keith J. Brown of Jasper, Indiana, Attorney 
Registration No. 0025640, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1981.  
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends that we 
indefinitely suspend respondent’s license to practice, based on findings that he 
failed to transfer property into trusts for two couples and then, after one of those 
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clients died, failed in his duty to attest to the veracity of the signature on affidavits 
of the surviving spouse and joint survivor.  We accept the board’s findings that 
respondent committed this professional misconduct and the recommendation for 
the indefinite suspension of his license. 
{¶ 2} Relator, Dayton Bar Association, charged respondent with 
violations of the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility 
and the current Rules of Professional Conduct.1  The board sent notice of the 
original complaint and the complaint as amended by certified mail to respondent’s 
last known address in Indianapolis, Indiana, the address on record for his attorney 
registration.  Two notices of the amended complaint were returned: one for 
expiration of the forwarding address and one as undeliverable.  Pursuant to 
Gov.Bar R. V(11)(B), the board served the complaint on the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court. 
{¶ 3} Respondent did not answer either complaint, and pursuant to 
Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F), relator moved for default.  A master commissioner appointed 
by the board made findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation for 
an indefinite suspension of respondent’s license.  The board adopted the master 
commissioner’s findings of misconduct and recommendation. 
Respondent’s Claimed Lack of Notice 
{¶ 4} Respondent objects to the board’s report, arguing that he received 
insufficient notice of the disciplinary proceedings and of the charges against him.  
We disagree. 
{¶ 5} Lawyers admitted to the Ohio bar are required under Gov.Bar R. 
VI(1)(A) to register as attorneys with this court’s Office of Attorney Registration 
                                                 
1.  Relator charged respondent with misconduct under applicable rules for acts occurring before 
and after February 1, 2007, the effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
supersede the Code of Professional Responsibility.  To the extent that both the former and current 
rules are cited for the same acts, the allegations compose a single ethical violation.  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Freeman, 119 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008-Ohio-3836, 894 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 1, fn. 1. 
 
January Term, 2009 
3 
 
every two years.  Gov.Bar R. VI(D) requires attorneys who are registered for 
active status to provide notice of their current residence and office address and to 
apprise the attorney registration office of any changes in this information.  During 
the investigation of the grievances underlying relator’s complaint and the board’s 
proceedings, respondent was registered as on active status. 
{¶ 6} The board was thus entitled to rely on the address on record for 
respondent in providing any required legal notices.  The board did so before 
affording respondent constructive notice of the charges against him by sending 
copies of the complaints, in conformity with Gov.Bar R. V(11)(B), to the clerk of 
this court.  Relator was also entitled to rely on the registration address, and in 
doing so during the investigation of the underlying grievances, relator received 
telephone calls and a letter from respondent, signaling his actual notice of that 
proceeding. 
{¶ 7} Respondent does not dispute these facts.  He had telephone 
interviews with relator’s investigator, conversations that the investigator recalled 
as being combative and dismissive.  And in his letter, respondent declined an 
invitation to meet with the investigator, advising that the trip would be “at best an 
inconvenience and at worst a huge waste of resources.”  At the conclusion of the 
investigation, relator’s certified grievance committee scheduled another meeting, 
and on the appointed date, respondent called to inform the committee that he was 
in rehabilitation for alcohol dependence.  But when relator then rescheduled the 
meeting as an accommodation, respondent did not appear or provide explanation. 
{¶ 8} With the exception of his objections, relator has not heard from 
respondent since the investigation.  After filing the motion for default, the 
investigator, nevertheless, located a rehabilitation facility at which he thought 
respondent might be residing.  The investigator called and sent to that address a 
copy of the amended complaint; however, no one at the facility confirmed 
respondent’s presence by accepting the call or correspondence on his behalf. 
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{¶ 9} Relator asserts that respondent has voluntarily made himself 
inaccessible, despite his knowledge that disciplinary proceedings were underway.  
We agree.  In fact, respondent did not appear for oral argument after filing his 
objections to the board’s report.  We take from respondent’s intermittent 
communications and failures to appear that he has chosen not to avail himself of 
opportunities to defend.  The objection is therefore overruled. 
Misconduct 
The First Client’s Grievance 
{¶ 10} After attending a financial planning seminar in 2004, a couple 
retained respondent to prepare various estate-planning documents, including wills, 
a revocable trust, and deeds to assure that three parcels of property would not 
become part of their estate.  Respondent agreed to complete these transactions.  
For his services, relator charged the couple $1,650, which they paid in full.  The 
couple gave respondent copies of the deeds to the three properties. 
{¶ 11} In December 2004, the couple met with respondent and signed 
various documents, including a revocable trust and quitclaim deeds to transfer the 
real property into the trust.  But after her husband’s death in June 2006, the wife 
learned that respondent had still not recorded one of the quitclaim deeds.  
Respondent charged an additional $166.50 to fix the problem. 
{¶ 12} Then, in attempting to transfer the property, respondent told the 
wife that he needed her to sign the affidavits as surviving spouse and joint 
survivor to put her “ownership of the * * * properties on record.”  But when he 
mailed the affidavits to the wife, respondent had already notarized the blank 
signature line, although the document stated that the affiant had signed in his 
presence.  This violated the jurat on both affidavits, and realizing the impropriety, 
the wife would not sign either affidavit. 
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5 
 
{¶ 13} The wife later hired other counsel to resolve the transfer of 
property and close her husband’s estate, incurring additional attorney fees and 
other expenses in the process. 
{¶ 14} Because respondent had violated his duty to assure the authenticity 
of his client’s signature on two affidavits while also failing to transfer property as 
promised, the board found the evidence clear and convincing that he had violated 
DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (prohibiting conduct that adversely reflects 
on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law), and 6-l01(A)(3) (prohibiting the neglect 
of an entrusted legal matter).  We accept these findings of misconduct. 
The Second Client’s Grievance 
{¶ 15} After reviewing their insurance and estate planning needs in late 
2006, a second couple consulted respondent about establishing an irrevocable 
trust.  Respondent agreed to create the trust and to transfer the couple’s real estate 
into it.  The couple paid respondent’s $2,000 fee and executed the trust document 
that he prepared. 
{¶ 16} On respondent’s recommendation, the couple agreed to have title 
to vehicles and bank accounts transferred into the trust.  They also anticipated the 
transfer of their real estate, but as time passed, they continued to receive tax 
notices for the property in their name rather than in the name of the trust.  When 
the couple asked respondent to explain, he promised to look into the matter. 
{¶ 17} Respondent never spoke with the couple again, despite all their 
efforts to contact him.  The couple eventually retained other counsel, who in late 
August 2008 completed transfer of the trust property.  In doing so, successor 
counsel discovered that the declaration of trust had not been filed with the county 
recorder.  The successor counsel arranged for this filing, which cost the couple an 
additional $150 to $200. 
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{¶ 18} With the irrevocable trust, this couple had hoped to facilitate their 
eventual move into a nursing home and receipt of Medicaid benefits.  
Respondent’s one and one-half year delay in transferring their property into the 
trust, however, also delayed Medicaid eligibility under that plan.  Respondent did 
not return any portion of the $2,000 for his failure to complete the transfer of 
property into the irrevocable trust. 
{¶ 19} Because respondent failed to complete work as promised and then 
lost all contact with these clients, the board found the evidence clear and 
convincing that he had violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide 
competent representation with the thoroughness and preparation reasonably 
necessary under the circumstances); 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client) and its earlier counterpart, DR 
6-10l(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from neglecting an entrusted legal matter); 
8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice); and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (prohibiting conduct that 
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law) and its predecessor, DR 
1-102(A)(6). 
Sanction 
{¶ 20} In recommending a sanction for respondent’s misconduct, the 
board weighed the mitigating and aggravating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B). 
{¶ 21} As a mitigating factor under BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), the 
board cited respondent’s lack of any prior disciplinary record.  But the board 
attributed no mitigating effect to respondent’s asserted alcohol dependence.  
Though this condition might have weighed in his favor under BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(g), he failed to satisfy requirements of the rule, including that the 
condition had been medically diagnosed and had contributed to cause his 
misconduct.  As aggravating factors, the board found that respondent had 
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committed multiple offenses, had failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process, 
had harmed vulnerable victims, and had failed to make restitution.  See BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d), (e), (h), and (i). 
{¶ 22} We accept these findings.  Moreover, because an indefinite 
suspension is commensurate with sanctions imposed in similar cases, we also 
accept the board’s recommendation of that sanction.  A lawyer’s indifference 
toward the process of discipline within the legal profession is entirely 
unacceptable.  Indeed, we have held that an indefinite suspension from the 
practice of law “is especially fitting * * * [where] neglect of a legal matter is 
coupled with a failure to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation.”  
Warren Cty. Bar Assn. v. Lieser (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 488, 490, 683 N.E.2d 
1148.  The single mitigating factor that a lawyer has no previous disciplinary 
record does not warrant a departure from this rule. 
{¶ 23} We therefore indefinitely suspend respondent from the practice of 
law in Ohio.  Pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(10)(B), he may not apply for the 
reinstatement of his license for two years from the date of this order.  Costs are 
taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
David M. Rickert, for relator. 
______________________