Case Title: State ex rel. Womack v. Marsh

Citation: 2011-Ohio-229

Docket Number: 20101157

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-01-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Womack v. Marsh, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-229.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-229 
THE STATE EX REL. WOMACK, APPELLANT, v. MARSH, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Womack v. Marsh, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-
229.] 
Mandamus — Writ sought to compel common pleas court judge to rule on motion 
for resentencing — Claim rendered moot after motion was denied — 
Court of appeals’ dismissal of petition for writ affirmed. 
(No. 2010-1157 — Submitted January 4, 2011 — Decided January 25, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-100287. 
_____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the court of appeals 
dismissing the petition of appellant, James E. Womack, for a writ of mandamus to 
compel appellee, Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas Judge Melba D. 
Marsh, to rule on his motions for resentencing, vacate his judgment of conviction 
and sentence, conduct a new sentencing hearing, and issue a new judgment.  
Because Womack’s petition failed to state a claim upon which the requested 
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extraordinary relief in mandamus can be granted, we affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} After a jury trial, Womack was convicted of four counts of robbery 
in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(3), which is a felony of the third degree.  See 
R.C. 2911.02(B).  At his sentencing hearing, the trial court notified Womack that 
he was subject to a mandatory term of three years of postrelease control.  R.C. 
2967.28(B)(3).  In the June 13, 2006 sentencing entry, however, the court 
mistakenly referred to the robbery convictions as felonies of the first degree and 
imposed a mandatory postrelease-control term of five years instead of three 
years.1  The court also sentenced Womack to an aggregate prison term of 20 
years.  Womack appealed, the court of appeals affirmed his convictions, and this 
court did not accept his further appeal for review.  See State v. Womack, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 1413, 2007-Ohio-4884, 873 N.E.2d 1317. 
{¶ 3} On June 8, 2009, Womack filed a motion in the common pleas 
court for resentencing pursuant to State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-
856, 845 N.E.2d 470, in which we held that certain sentencing statutes were 
unconstitutional because they required judicial fact-finding before imposition of 
consecutive sentences.  On December 1, 2009, Womack filed a motion in the 
common pleas court for resentencing due to the error in imposing postrelease 
control. 
{¶ 4} On May 3, 2010, Womack filed a petition in the Court of Appeals 
for Hamilton County for a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Marsh to rule on 
his motions for resentencing.  Womack also requested that Judge Marsh be 
compelled to vacate his convictions and sentence, conduct a new sentencing 
hearing, and issue a new judgment.  Four days later, Judge Marsh denied 
                                                 
1 Judge Ralph Winkler entered the judgment.  Judge Marsh succeeded Judge Winkler as the judge 
presiding over the criminal case. 
January Term, 2011 
3 
Womack’s motions and determined that he was not entitled to a new sentencing 
hearing.  Nevertheless, Judge Marsh corrected Womack’s sentencing entry to 
specify that he was subject to three years, not five years, of mandatory postrelease 
control: 
{¶ 5} “The court further finds that the defendant is correct that the 
mandatory term of post-release control is three years as opposed to the five years 
originally ordered by this Court.  Therefore, it is the order of this Court that, as 
the defendant is well aware, he shall be subject to three years of post-release 
control.” 
{¶ 6} Judge Marsh then moved to dismiss Womack’s mandamus petition 
because his claim was rendered moot by her ruling.  The court of appeals granted 
the judge’s motion and dismissed the petition. 
{¶ 7} This cause is now before the court upon Womack’s appeal as of 
right. 
Legal Analysis 
Mandamus 
{¶ 8} Womack asserts that the court of appeals erred in dismissing his 
mandamus petition.  “A court can dismiss a mandamus action under Civ.R. 
12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if, after all 
factual allegations of the petition are presumed true and all reasonable inferences 
are made in the relator’s favor, it appears beyond doubt that he can prove no set of 
facts entitling him to the requested writ of mandamus.”  State ex rel. Russell v. 
Thornton, 111 Ohio St.3d 409, 2006-Ohio-5858, 856 N.E.2d 966, ¶ 9.  The court 
of appeals could  take judicial notice of the entry attached to Judge Marsh’s  
motion to dismiss in support of her claim that the entry rendered Womack’s 
mandamus claim moot without converting the motion to a motion for summary 
judgment.  State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 115 Ohio St.3d 195, 2007-Ohio-
4798, 874 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 10. 
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{¶ 9} To be entitled to the writ, Womack must establish a clear legal 
right to the requested relief, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of Judge 
Marsh to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of 
the law.  State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-5327, 
915 N.E.2d 1215, ¶ 8. 
Ruling on Motions for Resentencing 
{¶ 10} The court of appeals properly dismissed Womack’s petition to 
compel Judge Marsh to rule on his motions for resentencing once the judge had 
ruled on the motions.  “Mandamus will not compel the performance of an act that 
has already been performed.”  State ex rel. Dehler v. Kelly, 123 Ohio St.3d 297, 
2009-Ohio-5259, 915 N.E.2d 1223, ¶ 1. 
Vacation of Convictions, New Sentencing Hearing, 
and New Judgment Entry 
{¶ 11} Nevertheless, Womack’s petition also requested that Judge Marsh 
vacate his convictions, conduct a new sentencing hearing, and issue a new 
sentencing entry.  Although in his petition he requested this relief based on both 
the error in imposing postrelease control and Foster, his appeal is limited to his 
contentions concerning postrelease control. 
{¶ 12} To be sure, Womack is correct that if a trial court refuses to issue a 
new sentencing entry that includes the appropriate term of postrelease control, a 
party can generally compel the trial court to do so by filing an action for a writ of 
mandamus or a writ of procedendo.  See State ex rel. Carnail v. McCormick, 126 
Ohio St.3d 124, 2010-Ohio-2671, 931 N.E.2d 110.  We have also held, in general, 
“For criminal sentences imposed prior to July 11, 2006, in which a trial court 
failed to properly impose postrelease control, trial courts shall conduct a de novo 
sentencing hearing in accordance with decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio.”  
State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
January Term, 2011 
5 
{¶ 13} Judge Marsh has now corrected Womack’s original sentencing 
entry to reflect the appropriate three-year term of mandatory postrelease control, 
which is what the trial court had properly imposed at Womack’s sentencing 
hearing.  No new sentencing hearing is required because the trial court’s failure to 
include the postrelease-control term in the original sentencing entry was 
manifestly a clerical error.  It appears that this error arose from the trial court’s 
mistaken designation of Womack’s robbery convictions as felonies of the first 
degree instead of felonies of the third degree.  R.C. 2911.02(A)(3) and 
2911.02(B).  Although trial courts generally lack authority to reconsider their own 
valid final judgments in criminal cases, they retain continuing jurisdiction to 
correct clerical errors in judgments by nunc pro tunc entry to reflect what the 
court actually decided.  State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 
2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 18-19; Crim.R. 36 (“Clerical mistakes in 
judgments, orders, or other parts of the record, and errors in the record arising 
from oversight or omission, may be corrected by the court at any time”). 
{¶ 14} Because appellant was notified of the proper term of postrelease 
control at his sentencing hearing and the error was merely clerical in nature, Judge 
Marsh was authorized to correct the mistake by nunc pro tunc entry2 without 
holding a new sentencing hearing.  Cf. Cruzado at ¶ 20, fn. 1 (error in postrelease 
control in sentencing entry was not treated as a clerical error by the judge when he 
held a sentencing hearing before entering the new sentencing order). 
{¶ 15} Finally, the nunc pro tunc entry related back to Womack’s original 
sentencing entry so that neither Crim.R. 32(C) nor State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 
197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, syllabus, has been violated.  See 
Harrison, 2010-Ohio-2709, ¶ 24, citing Battle, 2007-Ohio-2475, ¶ 6 (“generally, 
[a] nunc pro tunc entry relates back to the date of the journal entry it corrects”); 
                                                 
2  Although Judge Marsh did not specify that the entry was a nunc pro tunc entry, we conclude that 
it had the same effect. 
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State v. Yeaples, 180 Ohio App.3d 720, 2009-Ohio-184, 907 N.E.2d 333, ¶ 15 (“A 
nunc pro tunc entry is the procedure used to correct clerical errors in a judgment 
entry, but the entry does not extend the time within which to file an appeal, as it 
relates back to the original judgment entry”). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 16} Based on the foregoing, Womack is not entitled to the requested 
extraordinary relief in mandamus.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals dismissing Womack’s mandamus petition. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
_____________________ 
 
James E. Womack, pro se. 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. 
Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
_____________________