Case Title: Korslund v. Troup

Citation: 409 P.2d 856, 67 Wash. 2d 773

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1966-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
67 Wn.2d 773 (1966) 409 P.2d 856 ROBERT KORSLUND, Respondent, v. JAMES B. TROUP, Appellant.[*] No. 37752. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. January 13, 1966. Davies, Pearson, Anderson & Pearson, by Vernon R. Pearson, for appellant. Rush & Lynch, by William J. Rush, for respondent. *774 KALIN, J.[] Respondent and appellant played as doubles partners on a handball team representing the Tacoma Elks Lodge in a league. Both parties participated in handball for its recreational benefits. They were not paid for playing and the leagues were similar to bowling leagues. The lodge, in order to compete in the league, had to enter two doubles teams of two players each and one singles player. On this particular occasion, respondent and appellant had signed up to play a doubles match against the Washington Athletic Club of Seattle. While appellant was driving his car to Seattle, with respondent as passenger, they were involved in an accident and respondent was injured. A few days prior to the match, they discussed when they should leave, what time they would meet to leave and whose car they would take. It was decided that appellant would take his car because respondent's place of work was right on the way and it was more convenient to use appellant's car. Other members of the lodge team left earlier, but respondent and appellant worked until 6 p.m. Respondent testified as follows: There was no agreement to share expenses of the trip and, in fact, they were not shared. Respondent testified either participant could withdraw as a doubles partner and someone else could be substituted or, if no substitutes were available, the match would be forfeited. Respondent's complaint alleged gross negligence, negligence and joint adventure. The trial court eliminated gross negligence as an issue but entered judgment on a jury verdict for the respondent. *775 Appellant contends that the facts show nothing more than a host-guest relationship, in which case there could be no recovery in the absence of gross negligence. Respondent argues, on the other hand, that the facts of the case are such as to make it a joint adventure, in which event ordinary negligence would be sufficient to allow recovery. We omit a discussion of other assigned errors since our holding on the issue of joint adventure obviates the necessity of deciding them. This court, in the leading case of Carboneau v. Peterson, 1 Wn.2d 347, 374, 95 P.2d 1043 (1939), reviewed 27 prior decisions on the subject of joint adventure, and from these opinions, some seemingly in conflict, derived the following statement of the rule: The issue is whether the four elements of joint adventure are borne out by the evidence in the present case, as viewed most favorably to respondent. *776 It is remembered that either appellant or respondent could be a participant in the handball tournament or withdraw and have someone substituted. We mention this because respondent contends that the first element of joint adventure, "consideration," was the reliance of each party on the other to participate in the handball match, whereby each was essential for the other to compete. In addition, the Elks Lodge relied upon both parties who had agreed to participate on its behalf. The winning or losing of the match was significant to both parties with respect to their ultimate goal of winning a trophy for their combined and individual efforts. We cannot make out a contract between respondent and appellant from their discussion as to how they would travel from Tacoma to Seattle. In fact, respondent does not seriously contend that anything in the nature of a contract was made at that time. However, assuming, as respondent contends, that the agreement arises from the reliance of each party on the other to participate in the handball match, these circumstances, we believe, more properly constitute a common purpose the second element of the Carboneau rule. [1] Respondent's contention, however, is that we are dealing here with a promise for a promise, which is sufficient consideration to make a binding contract, and that the facts, therefore, establish the first of the four elements of joint adventure as laid down in the Carboneau case, supra, i.e., a contract. We disagree. 1 Williston, Contracts § 104, at 400 (3d ed.) states: To the same effect, Simpson, Contracts, ch. 3, § 37, at 103 (1954): Restatement, Contracts § 79 (1932), provides: There was no binding contract which the parties were mutually obligated to perform or which, if not performed, would have been considered, in law, as a breach of contract. It was merely an agreement or arrangement from which either of the parties could have withdrawn at any time. The appellant, having alternate choices as to participating or not, can escape without any detriment. There being no consideration, there can be no contract, and respondent's cause of action fails to meeet the test of the rule on joint adventure, as to the first element laid down in the Carboneau case, supra. [2] Since the Carboneau decision, this court has steadfastly required compliance with the four elements of the rule on joint adventure, especially the requirement of a contract. Moen v. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co., 3 Wn.2d 347, 101 P.2d 323 (1940); Paulson v. McMillan, 8 Wn.2d 295, 111 P.2d 983 (1941); Finn v. Drtina, 30 Wn.2d 814, 194 P.2d 347, 2 A.L.R.2d 919 (1948); Veek v. Tacoma Suburban Lines, Inc., 49 Wn.2d 584, 304 P.2d 700 (1956); Wines v. Engineer's Ltd. Pipeline Co., 51 Wn.2d 487, 319 P.2d 563 (1957). We said in Finn v. Drtina, supra, p. 826: Having decided that the first requirement for a joint adventure contract as prescribed by Carboneau, supra, is lacking, it would serve no useful purpose to consider the other elements. Appellant's motion to dismiss should have been granted. The judgment is reversed. ROSELLINI, C.J., DONWORTH and HAMILTON, JJ., concur. FINLEY, J., dissents. March 9, 1966. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 409 P.2d 856. [] Judge Kalin is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution.