Case Title: Matter of Kokesh's Estate

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-14

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Kokesh's Estate1983 WY 61664 P.2d 127Case Number: 83-14Case Number: 83-14Decided: 06/07/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF HUGH 
N. KOKESH, DECEASED. CHARLES R. KOKESH, KIM C. KOKESH, MICHAEL O. KOKESH, AND 
PATRICIA G. KOKESH, APPELLANTS (OBJECTORS),

v.

JOSEPH A. KOKESH, APPELLEE 
(PETITIONER).

Appeal from the District Court, 
CrookCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

Michael A. Maycock of Daly, 
Maycock, Anderson & Taylor, Gillette, for appellants.

Richard S. Dumbrill of 
Jones, Dumbrill & Hansen, Newcastle, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ.

BROWN, Justice.

[¶1.]      This case was 
first before us over twenty years ago, In 
re Kokesh's Estate, Wyo., 360 P.2d 368 (1961). In 1961 this court 
issued a mandate to the district court sitting in probate directing it to modify 
the decree of distribution.

[¶2.]      The parties in 
the case here were parties and heirs of parties involved in In re Kokesh's 
Estate, supra. In 1982 Joseph Kokesh, legatee under the will, who is the 
appellee in the present case, petitioned the trial court to carry out our 1961 
mandate. Charles R. Kokesh, Kim C. Kokesh, Michael O. Kokesh and Patricia G. 
Kokesh, heirs of the deceased Charles R. Kokesh, another legatee under the will, 
objected to appellee's petition. After hearing, the district court sitting in 
probate granted appellee's petition and entered its "Order Modifying Decree of 
Settlement of Accounts and Distribution Pursuant to Mandate of the Wyoming 
Supreme Court," from which appellants appeal.

[¶3.]      We 
affirm.

[¶4.]      When this court 
decided the case In re Kokesh's Estate, supra, the question centered on what 
interest the legatees were to receive under the terms of Hugh N. Kokesh's will. 
Charles R. Kokesh appealed the decree of distribution, alleging that Joseph 
Kokesh was not abiding by the terms of the will. The will left a life estate to 
the testator's wife, Louise Kokesh, including the power to mortgage or dispose 
of the real property, except that she could not make a testamentary disposition 
of the property. The will also provided:

"`Upon the death of my beloved wife, 
Louise Kokesh, I do give, devise and bequeath my real property to my beloved 
children * * * in the following manner and proportions, 
to-wit:

"`To my beloved son, Joseph Kokesh, 
all real estate owned by me at the time of my demise, to have and to hold the 
same forever.

"`In making this bequest it is my 
wish and desire that the ranch now owned by me be kept intact, and I therefore 
have not devised the real property to my beloved children * * * but it is my 
intent that they and each of them be paid for their one-ninth (1/9) interest in 
the same by my son, Joseph Kokesh, at the price established by the appraisal of 
my estate, and that upon said appraisal price being established, the said Joseph 
Kokesh is to pay to each of them one-ninth (1/9) of said sum so fixed, less 
mortgages if any, either in cash or by execution of promissory notes, for said 
sum for said real property so that the ranch may be continued in operation by my 
said son, Joseph Kokesh, with the interests of my other children and 
granddaughter, being paid for by him. It is my wish and desire that not to 
exceed Seven (7) years' time be had by him for payment of the respective shares 
of interest to the other children and my granddaughter.'"

[¶5.]      Charles R. Kokesh 
contended that under the will his interest was a vested remainder interest, and 
that, until Joseph Kokesh paid him, he and Joseph Kokesh were co-owners instead 
of merely creditor and debtor. This court agreed. We directed the probate 
court:

"* * * to modify the decree herein 
to the effect that, subject to the provisions of the will in favor of the widow, 
Charles Kokesh retains a one-ninth interest in and to the land involved herein 
until he has been paid the heretofore appraised value thereof, less the 
proportionate share of any lands disposed of or liens created by the widow, such 
payment to be made within the time provided in the will. Thereupon the title to 
the whole of the land shall become the sole property of Joseph Kokesh. * * *" In 
re Kokesh's Estate, supra, at 371.

[¶6.]      The probate court 
in 1982 added the following language to the original 
decree:

"It being understood that Charles R. 
Kokesh retains a one-ninth interest in and to the land involved herein until he 
has been paid the heretofore appraised value thereof, less the proportionate 
share of any lands disposed of or liens created by the widow, such payment to be 
made within the time provided in the will. Thereupon the title to the whole of 
the land shall become the sole property of Joseph Kokesh."

[¶7.]      We have stated 
the rule concerning a court's power on remand:

"When a case is affirmed but 
remanded to the district court for modification of the judgment consistent with 
the appellate court's opinion, the trial court is bound to substantially comply 
with the mandate and its discretion is strictly limited. It has authority to 
determine only those issues directed by the mandate and opinion, and issues 
necessary to reach a decision on the mandated issues. `If a cause is remanded 
for a specified purpose, any proceedings inconsistent therewith are error.' 
[Citations.]" Sanders v. Gregory, Wyo., 
652 P.2d 25, 26 (1982).

[¶8.]      Here, the court 
below used our exact words of In re Kokesh's Estate, supra, in its modification. 
Appellants specifically object to the last sentence that the title to the whole 
of the land shall become the sole property of Joseph Kokesh. They argue that the 
probate court quieted title, which it did not have jurisdiction to 
do.

[¶9.]      "Lawyers spend a 
great deal of their time shoveling smoke," according to Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr. That appears to be what appellants are doing here. They want us to believe 
that the wording is incorrect because neither they nor appellee would be able to 
bring "a quiet title action, partition suit, or other appropriate action * * * 
in the district court to settle the issue of when the seven years commences." 
Appellants make two incorrect assumptions. First, the trial court order 
modifying the decree did not quiet title in Joseph Kokesh. Second, the questions 
of when the seven-year period starts to run and of whether Joseph Kokesh has 
complied with the terms of the will are questions of interpretation of the will, 
to be handled in probate court.

[¶10.]    It is unquestioned that in 
Wyoming a 
probate court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate title to 
property.

"* * * In Estate of Blaney, Wyo., 
607 P.2d 354 (1980), this court quoted from the controlling rule * * * to the 
effect that title to property as between the estate, the heirs or devisees and a 
third person may not be tried in probate proceedings. * * *" Matter of 
Estate of Harrington, Wyo., 
648 P.2d 556, 559 (1982).

[¶11.]    However, the decree of 
modification does not purport to quiet title. It only says that when appellee 
has complied with the terms of the will, the title to all of the land shall 
become his. Whatever title Hugh Kokesh had which was not disposed of by Louise 
Kokesh will pass to appellee upon compliance with the terms of the will. This 
decree determines the respective rights of appellee and of Charles R. Kokesh's 
heirs, not the type of title.

[¶12.]    As to appellants' second 
assumption, they imply that they might want to go into district court to decide 
when the seven years commence. When a court is operating as a probate court, it 
is true that it may only consider matters relating to distribution and 
settlement of estates. First Wyoming 
Bank, N.A.-Cheyenne v. First National Bank and Trust Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 628 P.2d 1355 (1981). However, the 
question of when the seven-year period commences under the terms of the will is 
just such a matter. If the appellants are going to adjudicate when the seven 
years start and whether Joseph Kokesh has complied with the terms of the will, 
they will have to do so in probate court.1

[¶13.]    Indeed, appellants tried to 
raise this question in their objection to appellee's petition, which 
prayed:

"3. That any such decree reflect 
that payment by Joseph A. Kokesh to Charles R. Kokesh was not made within the 
time provided by the Will of Hugh N. Kokesh and that the interest of Charles R. 
Kokesh in the Estate of Hugh N. Kokesh pass to the heirs at law of Charles R. 
Kokesh."

The probate court in its 
order modifying the 1961 decree specifically denied appellants' requested relief 
concerning the seven-year time period. We assume that it properly denied relief 
because it did not have the authority under the limits of our mandate to decide 
the matter. However, if it was making a ruling on the merits, perhaps appellants 
should take heed that they may face a difficult task in getting any court to 
agree with their interpretation of the will.

[¶14.]    
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 It is questionable whether they 
could even adjudicate the issue of when the seven-year period starts, because 
they most probably would be estopped from doing so. Appellants argue that the 
seven years began with the death of Hugh Kokesh. They assert that the will 
should be interpreted to mean that Joseph Kokesh had to pay his debt to Charles 
Kokesh within seven years of Hugh Kokesh's death Since Joseph has not done so, 
they want to assert that he no longer is able to elect under the will to 
purchase the land from them. This position is inconsistent with Charles R. 
Kokesh's position in the earlier case, where it was argued that the time should 
start to run upon the death of Louise Kokesh. Counsel for Charles R. Kokesh also 
argued that the decree should not permit the execution of the promissory notes 
until Louise Kokesh's death, "at which time all the facts necessary for the 
drawing thereof or of making a cash payment will be known." In re Kokesh's Estate, Wyo., 360 P.2d  at 368, 
370 (1961).

Appellee makes a sound argument in 
his brief that any interpretation which argues that the seven-year period 
commences with the death of Hugh Kokesh ignores the context of the will and is 
unreasonable when one realizes that Louise Kokesh at any time during her life 
had the right to sell the entire ranch to anyone.

THOMAS, Justice, dissenting, with whom ROSE, Justice, 
joins.

[¶15.]    I do not really find fault in 
the disposition of this case by the majority of the court, but I do feel 
strongly enough about the fact of disposition that I am compelled to voice my 
disagreement. This appeal should have been dismissed. It should not have been 
considered on the merits. In Snell v. 
Ruppert, Wyo., 
541 P.2d 1042, 1047 (1975), this court quoted the general rule as set forth in 4 
C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 137a, p. 444, as 
follows:

"Generally, no appeal or error lies 
from or to a judgment entered pursuant to the mandate of an appellate court, but 
an appeal will lie from such judgment if it fails to conform to the mandate or 
involves matters not determined by the original appeal or follows new 
proceedings made necessary by the mandate."

 

My perception of this case 
is that none of the exceptions set forth in the latter portion of this rule 
apply, and this is a case in which no appeal should be 
considered.

[¶16.]    The rationale behind the rule 
that the appellate court does not entertain an appeal from a judgment or order 
entered in accordance with its mandate by a lower court is stated quite aptly in 
Stewart v. Salamon, 97 U.S. 361, 361-362, 24 L. Ed. 1044 
(1878):

"An appeal will not be entertained 
by this court from a decree entered in the circuit or other inferior court, in 
exact accordance with our mandate upon a previous appeal. Such a decree, when 
entered, is in effect our decree, and the appeal would be from ourselves to 
ourselves. If such an appeal is taken, however, we will, upon the application of 
the appellee, examine the decree entered, and if it conforms to the mandate, 
dismiss the case with costs. If it does not, the case will be remanded with 
appropriate directions for the correction of the error. * * 
*"

[¶17.]    While the appellant is 
seeking a re-examination of the prior opinion of this court, he obviously is not 
able to comply with the rules of this court relating to a rehearing. Rules 8.01 
through 8.03, W.R.A.P. My perception of the majority opinion is that the other 
members of the court did not discover in any way that the order entered in the 
district court failed to conform to the mandate of this court. A re-examination 
of the case in such an instance in which the district court exactly follows the 
mandate is violative of the principles of res judicata and finality. This court 
recognized in Potter v. Gilkey, Wyo., 
570 P.2d 449 (1977), the rule that a district court on remand has only such 
jurisdiction as the opinion and mandate of this court necessarily confers upon 
it. In the instant case, the district court was performing a ministerial act 
rather than a judicial function when it entered the order in accordance with the 
specific directions of this court. See Scates v. Arizona Corporation 
Commission, 124 Ariz. 73, 601 P.2d 1357 
(1979); Gaer v. Bank of Baker, 113 
Mont. 116, 122 P.2d 828 (1942); and the cases which are cited in Snell v. Ruppert, supra, 541 P.2d  at 1047, n. 6.

[¶18.]    The authority is overwhelming 
that this appeal should have been dismissed, and that would be in my judgment 
the correct disposition.