Case Title: Ellison v. Walter ex rel. Walter

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ellison v. Walter ex rel. Walter1992 WY 72834 P.2d 680Case Number: 91-275Decided: 06/24/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Barton ELLISON, 

Appellant 
(Respondent),

v.

Connie WALTER, ex rel. 
Rachele I. WALTER, 

Appellees 
(Petitioners).

Appeal from District 
Court, Sweetwater County, Kenneth G. Hamm, J.

Bart D. Ellison, 
pro se.

Frank D. Peasley 
and Kari Jo Gray of Gray & Associates, Douglas, for 
appellees.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., THOMAS, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and BROWN, J., 
Retired.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      Barton D. Ellison 
(Ellison) appeals from a district court's judgment and order which, among other 
things, adjudged him to be the biological father of Rachele I. Walter (Rachele), 
a minor child born July 15, 1976; awarded judgment against him in the amount of 
$9,150 for back support from the date of Rachele's birth; and ordered him to 
make future child support payments of $50 per month until Rachele reaches the 
age of majority or is otherwise emancipated. We will affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      The primary 
issues raised for our consideration are:

(1) Whether the evidence 
was sufficient to support a finding of paternity.

(2) Whether the petition 
to establish paternity was barred by the statute of limitations found in Wyo. 
Stat. § 14-2-104(a)(ii) or by the equitable doctrine of laches.

(3) Whether child support 
payments may be retroactively awarded to the date of the child's 
birth.

FACTS

[¶3]      Ellison met 
Connie Walter (Walter) at a bar in Miles City, Montana, in August of 1975. 
Ellison and Walter dated through October of 1975, during which time they engaged 
in sexual relations. Walter first believed that she was pregnant in October of 
1975, and subsequently informed Ellison of her suspected state. Ellison, who 
happened to be married, corresponded with Walter at various times during her 
pregnancy. Through the correspondence, Ellison generally acknowledged that he 
was the father of the expected child and expressed a desire to divorce his wife 
to be with Walter. Ellison and Walter apparently had contact only once following 
the birth of the child.

[¶4]      Rachele I. Walter 
(Rachele) was born in North Dakota on July 15, 1976. Walter and her daughter, 
Rachele, received public assistance from the state of North Dakota from July 
1976 through April of 1978. As a condition of receiving public assistance, 
Walter assigned all her rights to support of Rachele to the state of North 
Dakota. When Walter reapplied for public assistance in 1985, North Dakota 
initiated a paternity/support action against Ellison, a Wyoming resident, 
pursuant to its Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. The 
paternity/support action was duly certified to the district court of Sweetwater 
County, Wyoming, in October of 1985.

[¶5]      The 
paternity/support action proceeded slowly following its certification to the 
Wyoming district court. The procedural history of the case from October of 1985 
to February of 1990 is largely irrelevant and does not merit a full recital. 
Suffice it to state that Ellison was notified of the proceedings against him, 
that he denied paternity, and that he underwent a human leukocyte antigen (HLA) 
genetic test which established the probability of his paternity of Rachele at 
99.9174 percent.

[¶6]      In February of 
1990, an informal hearing was held at which Ellison again denied paternity and 
at which he requested a court appointed attorney. The district court 
subsequently appointed Ellison an attorney, and the parties prepared for what 
appeared to be an inevitable jury trial on the issue of paternity. Before trial, 
however, the parties stipulated to resolve the paternity issue with an 
additional genetic test. The stipulation, which was approved by the district 
court, provided that Ellison would be deemed the natural father of Rachele if a 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) genetic test failed to exclude him as a possible 
father and established a probability of paternity at 97 percent or greater. A 
DNA genetic test was then performed which failed to exclude Ellison as a 
possible father and which established a probability of paternity at 99.98 
percent. Pursuant to the terms of the stipulation, the district court entered an 
order in May of 1991 adjudging Ellison to be the biological father of 
Rachele.

[¶7]      Following the 
district court's paternity order, trial was set for September 23, 1991, on the 
remaining issues of support, visitation, and custody. Ellison "fired" his 
attorney before trial and proceeded to represent himself. A trial was then held 
on the issue of support, as Ellison did not request custody of or visitation 
rights with Rachele. After the trial, the district court entered an order which, 
among other things, confirmed that Ellison was the biological father of Rachele; 
awarded judgment against Ellison in the amount of $9,150 for back support from 
the date of Rachele's birth; and ordered Ellison to make future child support 
payments of $50 per month until Rachele reaches the age of majority or is 
otherwise emancipated. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

1. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence

[¶8]      Ellison first 
contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the district court's 
determination that he is the biological father of Rachele. Ellison asserts that, 
due to a vasectomy performed in the spring of 1975, he was sterile at the time 
of Rachele's conception. We find Ellison's contention to be without 
merit.

[¶9]      When faced with a 
sufficiency of the evidence question, this court assumes all evidence of the 
successful party is true, leaves out entirely consideration of the unsuccessful 
party's evidence in conflict therewith, and gives the evidence of the successful 
party every reasonable and favorable inference. Burns Rathole, Inc. v. 
Inter-Mountain Agency, Inc., 829 P.2d 823, 825 (Wyo. 1992). Applying this 
standard of review, we find no error in the district court's determination that 
Ellison is the biological father of Rachele. The evidence upon which the 
district court based its finding of paternity was both substantial and 
persuasive. It included:

1) HLA and DNA genetic 
tests which established the probability of Ellison's paternity at 99.9174 and 
99.98 percent, respectively.

2) A stipulation entered 
into by Ellison whereby he agreed to be deemed the biological father of Rachele 
in the event that a DNA genetic test established a probability of paternity at 
97 percent or greater.

3) Several letters 
written by Ellison to Walter before the birth of Rachele wherein Ellison 
acknowledged paternity.

4) Sworn testimony of 
Walter that she had sexual relations with Ellison and no one else at the time of 
conception.

2. Statute of 
Limitations or Laches

[¶10]   Ellison also contends that the 
trial court erred by failing to dismiss the paternity/support action as barred 
by the statute of limitations contained in Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-104(a)(ii) (Supp. 
1991). Specifically, Ellison asserts that "[t]his Court has made a big mistake 
as W.S. 14-2-104 states that action must be brought within a reasonable time 
after obtaining knowledge but no later than five (5) years after the birth of 
said child." We disagree. 

[¶11]   Section 14-2-104(a)(ii) provides, 
and has provided at all times relevant to this paternity/support action, as 
follows:

(a) A child, his natural 
mother or a man presumed to be his father * * * may bring action:

     (ii) For the purpose 
of declaring the nonexistence of a father and child relationship presumed under 
W.S. 14-2-102(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) only if the action is brought within a 
reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of relevant facts, but in no event 
later than five (5) years after the child's birth.

Section 
14-2-104(a)(ii) is not applicable to the facts of this case. It applies to bar 
only actions to establish the nonexistence of paternity where there is a 
presumed father under the provisions of § 14-2-102(a)(i), (ii), or (iii). 
Ellison is not a presumed father under § 14-2-102(a)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
nor was the paternity/support action initiated to establish the nonexistence of 
paternity. Rather, this case was brought by North Dakota on behalf of Rachele to 
establish paternity for the purpose of obtaining a support order. The facts of 
this case are governed by § 14-2-104(c), which gives a state standing to bring a 
paternity/support action on behalf of a child with no presumed father within the 
time frame set forth in § 14-2-105(a). Section 14-2-105(a) provides, and has 
provided at all times relevant to this paternity/support action, that such 
actions must be initiated within three years after the child reaches the age of 
majority.1 The present proceedings, which were 
initiated when Rachele was nine years old, fall well within the time frame 
established by § 14-2-105(a).

[¶12]   Ellison contends alternatively that 
the district court erred by not employing the equitable doctrine of laches to 
bar the paternity/support action. Ellison asserts that the nine-year delay 
between Rachele's birth and the initiation of these proceedings prejudiced his 
defense of sterility. Specifically, Ellison claims that he could not obtain 
records to verify the date of his vasectomy because they were destroyed after 
five years according to hospital policy. We find no merit to Ellison's laches 
argument. Nothing in the record substantiates Ellison's assertion that hospital 
policy is to destroy vasectomy records after five years or that Ellison's 
records were in fact destroyed. Moreover, evidence of paternity contained in the 
record contradicts Ellison's sterility claim. Particularly noteworthy is 
Ellison's own handwritten letter in which it is stated "when you told me about 
the baby I felt bad. So bad I had an operation to make me impotent, called it 
visectomy [sic]."

3. 
Retroactive Support

[¶13]   Ellison's final contention is that 
the district court erred by awarding back support to the date of Rachele's 
birth. We find no error in the district court's order.

[¶14]   In Vigil v. Tafoya, 600 P.2d 721 
(Wyo. 1979), this court was faced with determining whether the statute of 
limitations contained in the Uniform Parentage Act of 1977 (UPA) could be 
applied retroactively to children born before the effective date of the UPA. In 
the context of deciding the issue in the affirmative, this court commented upon 
the purpose of the UPA and on the duty of a father to support his minor child as 
follows:

     Although there was no 
legal obligation to support one's illegitimate child at common law, the moral 
obligation has always existed. The purpose of legislation creating a paternity 
action is to convert a moral obligation into a legal right. Cessna v. 
Montgomery, 63 Ill. 2d 71, 344 N.E.2d 447, 456 (1976); Roe v. Doe, [59 Haw. 259] 
581 P.2d [310, 314 (Haw. 1978)]. The duty of a natural father to support his 
child begins when the child is born.

Id. at 
725.

[¶15]   Consistent with the view expressed 
in Vigil, we now hold that the duty of a natural father to support his child 
begins at birth. The establishment of paternity by judicial decree is merely a 
procedural prerequisite to enforcement of the duty of support owed to the child: 
it does not create, but only defines the preexisting duty. See Tidwell v. 
Booker, 290 N.C. 98, 225 S.E.2d 816, 827 (1976).

[¶16]   Having determined that a father's 
duty of support begins at his child's birth, we next examine whether the 
district court was statutorily authorized to award child support retroactive to 
the date of Rachele's birth. The Vigil opinion again provides this court with 
some guidance. The court there stated that the UPA, being remedial in nature, 
"should be interpreted with reasonable liberality, that the benefits * * * [it 
was] intended to secure may be accomplished." Vigil, 600 P.2d  at 724 (quoting 
McConnell v. Murphy Bros., 45 Wyo. 289, 293, 18 P.2d 629, 630, 88 A.L.R. 376 
(1933)).

[¶17]   Applying a fair and reasonable 
interpretation to the UPA, we find that the legislature intended the retroactive 
collection of child support under the circumstances of this case. One of the 
foundational premises underlying the UPA is that a father of a minor child 
receiving public assistance ought to reimburse the public fisc for the support 
of his child. See Vigil, 600 P.2d  at 724. To further this policy, the UPA grants 
standing to a state to initiate a paternity action on behalf of a child 
receiving public assistance within three years after the child reaches the age 
of majority. Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-105(a). The objective of the paternity/support 
action in this context is, of course, to ultimately obtain a support order 
payable on behalf of the minor child to the state. See Wyo. Stat. §§ 20-2-106 
& 107 (Supp. 1991). Since a father's duty of support is generally only 
coextensive with the child's minority, the logical inference to be drawn from 
the fact that § 14-2-105(a) allows paternity/support actions to be initiated 
after a child reaches the age of majority is that the legislature contemplated 
the collection of back support.

[¶18]   The inference that the legislature 
anticipated the retroactive collection of child support is enforced by reference 
to § 14-2-113(c), which addresses the scope of a judgment in a paternity 
action:

     The judgment or order 
may contain any other provision directed against the appropriate party to the 
proceeding concerning the duty of support, the custody and guardianship of the 
child, visitation privileges with the child, the furnishing of bond or other 
security for the payment of the judgment or any other matter in the best 
interest of the child. The judgment or order may direct the father to pay the 
reasonable expenses of the mother's pregnancy and confinement.

Wyo. Stat. § 
14-2-113(c) (Supp. 1991).

[¶19]   As is evident from § 14-2-113(c), 
the legislature anticipated that the trial court could, in a paternity action, 
reach back to expenses incurred during the "mother's pregnancy and confinement" 
and provide for such in its judgment and order. It logically follows that the 
district court should also have the authority to provide for expenses incurred 
to support the product of the pregnancy, the child, following the mother's 
"pregnancy and confinement." Subsection (d) of § 14-2-113 supports this 
interpretation by directly addressing the district court's role as it relates to 
back support. Section 14-2-113(d) provides in relevant part: "The court, as it 
deems just, may limit the father's liability for past support of the child to 
the proportion of the expenses already incurred."

[¶20]   From our review of relevant 
statutory provisions, we conclude that a district court possesses the authority 
to issue support orders retroactive to the date of a child's birth in 
paternity/support actions initiated by a state for the reimbursement of public 
assistance. The guiding principles in each instance are to promote the welfare 
of the child and to serve the ends of justice. We are persuaded that neither 
principle is generally served by failing to acknowledge a father's duty to 
support his child from the date of birth. Consequently, retroactive child 
support orders should be the rule, rather than the exception. The burden is 
accordingly placed upon the father to demonstrate to the district court why a 
retroactive child support order should not issue in a particular case.2

[¶21]   In light of the foregoing, the only 
remaining issue is whether the district court abused its discretion under the 
circumstances of this case by awarding $50 per month child support retroactive 
to the date of Rachele's birth. The district court's back support award totaled 
$9,150. It was premised upon findings that Ellison is the father of Rachele, 
that he had not contributed to her support, that he had an average monthly 
income of $600, and that the state of North Dakota had contributed over $16,000 
to Rachele's welfare since her birth. Based upon these facts, we hold the 
district court did not abuse its discretion.

DISPOSITION

[¶22]   The judgment and order of the 
district court is affirmed in all respects.

FOOTNOTES

1 The version of Wyo. 
Stat. § 14-2-105 effective in 1985 was not broken into subsections. 1978 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 25, § 1. An amendment to § 14-2-105, effective June 8, 1989, 
rewrote the first and second sentences so as to combine them and designate them 
as subsection (a), and designated the former third sentence as subsection (b). 
1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 168, § 1. Since the substance of § 14-2-105 as it 
relates to this appeal was not changed by the 1989 amendment, we cite to the 
statute in its amended form.

2 For a sampling of recent 
cases which recognize a father's duty to pay child support retroactive to the 
date of his child's birth, see, e.g., State ex rel. Coleman v. Clay, 805 S.W.2d 752 (Tenn. 1991); J.A.W. v. D.M.E., 591 A.2d 844 (D.C.App. 1991) & W.M. v. 
D.S.C., 591 A.2d 837 (D.C.App. 1991) (retroactive child support should be the 
rule rather than the exception); Mason v. Reiter, 564 So. 2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1990); Weaver v. Chester, 195 Ga. App. 471, 393 S.E.2d 715 (1990); State v. 
Johnican, 830 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Ct. App.); Goheen v. Koester, 794 S.W.2d 830 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (writ of error denied).