Case Title: In re: Estate of Amy F. Morris

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1101530

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:5/4/12
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012
____________________
1101530
____________________
Ex parte Trust Company of Virginia
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Estate of Amy F. Morris a/k/a Amy Falcon Morris)
(Montgomery Probate Court, No. 11-236)
MALONE, Chief Justice.
The Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach,
Virginia, appointed the Trust Company of Virginia ("TCVA") the
conservator of property owned by Amy Falcon Morris ("Ms.
Morris") 
when 
that 
court 
declared 
Ms. 
Morris 
to 
be
incapacitated on February 29, 2008.  Ms. Morris died on March
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25, 2011, in Montgomery, Alabama, and her will was admitted to
probate in the Montgomery County Probate Court ("the probate
court"). The probate court entered orders compelling TCVA to
turn over funds in the conservancy estate to the estate opened
in the probate court and enjoining TCVA from expending funds
without prior approval. TCVA moved to vacate those orders, and
the probate court denied the motion. TCVA then petitioned this
Court for a writ of prohibition or other appropriate writ
directing the probate court to vacate those orders on the
basis that it lacked jurisdiction to enter those orders.  We
conclude that in this case a writ of mandamus is the
appropriate remedy by which to order a vacatur of the probate
court's orders. Because we have no reason to conclude that the
probate court will not comply, we decline to issue a writ of
prohibition. Because we conclude that TCVA was never properly
served with process or provided adequate notice of the
proceeding before the probate court, we direct the probate
court to vacate the contested orders concerning the assets as
to which TCVA is the conservator.
Facts and Procedural History
1101530
3
On April 7, 2011, the probate court entered a judgment
admitting to probate a May 25, 2007, will executed by Ms.
Morris ("the 2007 will") and appointing Ms. Morris's son
Thomas W. Morris, Jr. ("Mr. Morris"), personal representative
of Ms. Morris's estate.  On April 28, 2011, TCVA filed a
complaint for interpleader in the Virginia Beach Circuit Court
requesting that court to resolve the competing demands on Ms.
Morris's assets in the conservatorship created by the probate
court's action, specifically requesting that it supervise the
final administration, accounting, and settlement of the
conservatorship.  On May 16, 2011, Mr. Morris filed a
"Petition to Compel Release of Trust Funds" ("the petition")
in the probate court; TCVA was not named as a party or served
with notice of the hearing on the petition.  On May 19, 2011,
the probate court entered an order directing TCVA to release
to Mr. Morris, in his capacity as personal representative of
Ms. Morris's estate, any funds it was holding on behalf of Ms.
Morris. On June 1, 2011, TCVA filed a motion in the probate
court, asking the probate court to vacate its prior order
directing it to release the conservatorship funds to Mr.
Morris.  On August 16, 2011, the probate court held a hearing
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on TCVA's motion to vacate and the next day issued an order
denying TCVA's motion, directing TCVA to turn over all
conservatorship funds to Mr. Morris and enjoining TCVA from
expending funds without the probate court's prior approval.
Then, on August 28, 2011, the Virginia Beach Circuit Court
admitted to probate a 1998 will executed by Ms. Morris,
appointed attorney Karen Loulakis as administratrix of that
estate, and ruled that the 2007 will had been rendered void
when Ms. Morris was declared incapacitated by that same court
in 2008.  
On September 27, 2011, TCVA petitioned this Court for a
writ of prohibition or other appropriate writ directing the
probate court to vacate its orders of May 16, 2011, and August
17, 2011, or prohibiting the probate court from otherwise
exercising jurisdiction over the conservatorship. As stated
earlier, we are treating the petition as one seeking mandamus
relief.  On October 27, 2011, the Virginia Beach Circuit Court
held a final hearing on the interpleader action and granted
TCVA leave to expend $83,173.63 in payment of legal fees
incurred relating to the conservatorship account.
Standard of Review
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" ' " M a n d a m u s  
i s  
a n
extraordinary remedy and will be
granted only where there is '(1)
a 
clear 
legal 
right 
in 
the
petitioner to the order sought;
(2) an imperative duty upon the
r e s p o n d e n t  
t o  
p e r f o r m ,
accompanied by a refusal to do
so; (3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and (4) properly
invoked 
jurisdiction 
of 
the
court.'"
"'Ex parte Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB, 872 So.
2d 810, 813 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte
Alfab, Inc., 586 So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala.
1991)). Mandamus will lie to direct a trial
court to vacate a void judgment or order.
Ex parte Chamblee, 899 So. 2d 244, 249
(Ala. 2004).
"'Like mandamus, prohibition is an
extraordinary writ, "and will not issue
unless there is no other adequate remedy."
Ex parte K.S.G., 645 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala.
Civ. 
App. 
1992) 
(citing 
Ex 
parte
Strickland, 401 So. 2d 33 (Ala. 1981)).
"Prohibition is proper for the prevention
of a usurpation or abuse of power where a
court undertakes to act in a manner in
which 
it 
does 
not 
properly 
have
jurisdiction." Ex parte K.S.G., 645 So. 2d
at 299. A writ of prohibition will issue
"[o]nly if the pleadings show on their face
that 
the 
lower 
court 
does 
not 
have
jurisdiction." Ex parte Perry County Bd. of
Educ., 278 Ala. 646, 651, 180 So. 2d 246,
250 (1965). "In such instances, the act of
the usurping court is wholly void, and will
not support an appeal." Id.'
1101530
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"Ex parte Sealy, L.L.C., 904 So. 2d 1230, 1232-33
(Ala. 2004). We conclude that under the facts of
this case a writ of mandamus is the appropriate
remedy by which to order a vacatur of the circuit
court's void order."
Ex parte Scrushy, 940 So. 2d 290, 293-94 (Ala. 2006).
Analysis
TCVA argues that the probate court lacked personal
jurisdiction over TCVA because TCVA was not named as a party
in the probate proceeding and was not served with notice of
the proceeding in the probate court.  We observe that TCVA
maintains that it was never served with process of the
proceeding in the probate court or provided with proper notice
of that proceeding. 
This Court has held:
"The existence of personal jurisdiction depends
on the presence of (1) perfected service of process
giving notice to defendant of the suit being
brought, Mullane v. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
313-314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 656-657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950),
and (2) sufficient minimum contacts between the
forum state and the defendant so as to render it
just and reasonable to force the defendant to come
to the forum state to defend the suit. Kulko v.
California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91, 98 S.Ct.
1690, 1696, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1977). There being no
dispute concerning the requisite minimum contacts of
VWAG with Alabama, the only issue before us is
whether the first prong of the test for personal
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jurisdiction has been satisfied in this case. Has
VWAG been given notice of the suit against it by
perfected service of process?
"When the service of process on the defendant is
contested as being improper or invalid, the burden
of proof is on the plaintiff to prove that service
of process was performed correctly and legally."
Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d 880,
884 (Ala. 1983).  TCVA has alleged that the conservatorship
was never served with process or provided proper notice of the
proceeding in the probate court.  Mr. Morris, as administrator
of the estate opened in the probate court, has not alleged any
facts before this Court that would prove that he served the
conservatorship, nor has he contested TCVA's allegation as to
the absence of service of process.  It is axiomatic that a
court does not obtain personal jurisdiction over a party upon
which service of process has not been perfected and proper
notice has not been provided.  Because there is no evidence
before this Court that the conservatorship ever received
service of process or proper notice, the probate court does
not have personal jurisdiction over the conservatorship, and
its orders directed to the conservatorship are void and due to
be vacated.
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Conclusion
Because the probate court lacked personal jurisdiction
over TCVA, as conservator of Ms. Morris's assets, we hereby
direct the probate court to vacate its orders requiring TCVA
to transfer the conservatorship assets to Mr. Morris, as
personal representative of Ms. Morris's estate, and enjoining
it from disbursing certain of those assets without the probate
court's approval.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Woodall, Murdock, and Shaw, JJ., dissent. 
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WOODALL, Justice (dissenting).
A petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus must
comply with Rule 21, Ala. R. App. P.  In my opinion, TCVA's
petition does not comply with Rule 21.  Therefore, I
respectfully dissent.
Rule 21(a)(1)(E) requires a party applying for a writ of
prohibition or mandamus to attach to its petition "[c]opies of
any order or opinion or parts of the record that would be
essential to an understanding of the matters set forth in the
petition."  (Emphasis added.) However, TCVA has not attached
to its petition a copy of the only pleading it filed in the
probate court, namely, its motion to vacate the order entered
on May 19, 2011.  Therefore, there is no way for this Court to
know, as it must,  what arguments were presented to the
probate court. See Ex parte M & F Bank, 58 So. 3d 111, 117
(Ala. 2010).
TCVA concedes that "there are matters which a probate
court can dispose of ex parte" but argues that the orders
entered in this case "far exceed[] any authority of the
probate court to act ex parte."  Petition, at 9.  However,
TCVA cites no authority in support of this argument.  Rule
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21(a)(1)(D) requires a petition for a writ of prohibition or
mandamus to include "[a] statement of the reasons why the writ
should  issue, with citations to the authorities and the
statutes relied on."  (Emphasis added.)  It is now well
established that "[a] failure to cite authority supporting an
argument 'provides this Court with an ample basis for refusing
to consider th[e] argument[], and [a] petition could properly
be denied on that basis.'  Ex parte Showers, 812 So. 2d 277,
281 (Ala. 2001)."  Ex parte Price, 47 So. 3d 1221, 1225 (Ala.
2010). In my opinion, the Court should not overlook TCVA's
failure to adhere to what the Court has described as  the
"compelling" requirement of citation to authority in Rule 21.
Ex parte Showers, 812 So. 2d 277, 281 (Ala. 2001).
Murdock and Shaw, JJ., concur.