Case Title: Keser v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86-167

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1987-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Keser v. State1985 WY 139706 P.2d 263Case Number: 84-198Decided: 09/13/1985RANDOLPH EUGENE KESER, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming

RANDOLPH EUGENE KESER, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, R.M. Forrister, 
J.

 
 

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, and K. 
Leslie Delk, Asst. Public Defender, Wyoming Public Defender Program, for appellant; oral argument by Martin 
J. McClain.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Michael A. Blonigen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee; oral argument by Michael 
A. Blonigen.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN, and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from a 
criminal conviction for child abuse. Appellant was sentenced to a term of not 
less than one nor more than two years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary; the 
sentence was suspended and appellant ordered to serve six months in the 
NatronaCounty jail with a 
subsequent supervised probation of one year. We affirm.

[¶2.]     Appellant raises a 
single issue:

"Whether Section 6-2-503 
W.S. 1977, June 1983 Replacement, as written by the legislature, violates the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution."

In essence it is 
claimed that the statute is violative of due process in that (1) it is so vague 
that one cannot know what conduct constitutes child abuse, and (2) it does not 
contain a provision excepting from child abuse reasonable parental discipline. 
The State raises an additional issue of whether appellant has standing to raise 
the latter issue since he is a stepfather rather than a parent.

[¶3.]     Appellant, Randy Keser, 
is the stepfather of fourteen-year-old Kevin Padilla. During December 1983, 
Kevin's mother was visiting relatives in Honduras. 
Appellant had made arrangements for Kevin to stay with neighbors while he was 
out of town on business. When appellant returned, he discovered that Kevin had 
taken the bus to school but had not arrived and that he had been absent from his 
classes. Appellant called the neighbors around 10:30 p.m. to see if Kevin had 
been found and discovered that they had picked him up around 8:30 p.m. When 
appellant sought to take Kevin home, he refused to leave. Appellant called the 
sheriff's office, then called Kevin, and advised him that the sheriff's office 
required that he return home with him. Appellant drove to the neighbors; Kevin 
entered the car, and they started traveling to appellant's house.

[¶4.]     Kevin testified that 
while they were in the car his stepfather hit him three or four times with a 
metal spatula used to scrape ice off the window, backhanded him on the mouth, 
called him names, and threatened to kill him. After they arrived home, he was 
hit on his bare bottom and thighs with a leather belt fourteen or fifteen times 
as hard as appellant could hit, four or five times on the face, and at least 
once on the arm.

[¶5.]     Appellant conceded that 
Kevin was disciplined. He testified, however, that Kevin was hit with the window 
scraper only twice and that it was not metal but a flat piece of plastic; that 
Kevin preferred the belt to having his privileges withdrawn, and that he only 
hit Kevin with the belt four to six times; that he was afraid Kevin would run 
away; that he suspected an involvement with drugs and sex; and that he was 
worried about Kevin's school work.

[¶6.]     The morning after Kevin 
was "disciplined," he saw the school nurse who reported the incident to the 
Department of Public Assistance and Social Services. Kevin was examined by an 
emergency room physician who later testified to the existence of bruises on 
Kevin's face and posterior. Subsequently charges were brought against appellant 
for child abuse. At the beginning of the trial, appellant's attorney moved for a 
dismissal of the case contending that the child abuse statute with which he was 
charged was unconstitutional. At the end of the State's case, the court ruled 
the statute constitutional.

[¶7.]     The statute in 
question, § 6-2-503, W.S. 1977, reads as follows:

"Except under 
circumstances constituting a violation of W.S. 6-2-502, any adult who intentionally or in 
reckless disregard of the consequences causes physical injury or mental trauma to a 
child under the age of sixteen (16) years * * * is guilty of child abuse * * 
*." (Emphasis added.)

STANDING

[¶8.]     The State contends that 
appellant, because of a lack of parental relationship, does not have standing to 
contest the constitutionality of the statute. The importance of the family is 
firmly entrenched in American law. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S. Ct. 549, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1978); Cleveland Board of Education v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S. Ct. 791, 39 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1974); Prince v. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944). We have frequently extolled the importance of 
the family group and the joys and corresponding responsibilities involved in 
living with and bringing up children. See, DS v. Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, Wyo., 607 P.2d 911 (1980). A biological 
relationship is not the exclusive determination in finding an existence of 
family. Smith v. Organization of Foster 
Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 97 S. Ct. 2094, 53 L. Ed. 2d 14 (1977). This child's family consisted of his mother 
and stepfather. He was residing with them. The child had been left by his mother 
in the care and custody of appellant. In this circumstance, appellant has 
standing to raise the question of the constitutionality of the statute. See, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 
supra. The State further contends that appellant lacks standing because his 
conduct was outside the scope of parental discipline. "A party has standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only so far as it has an adverse 
impact on his own rights." County Court of Ulster 
County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 2223, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1979). See also, Armijo v. State, Wyo., 678 P.2d 864, 868 
(1984). Although we abhor cruelty to children, we do not find appellant's 
version of the incident to be so totally outside the ambit of discipline as to 
foreclose his right to raise these questions.

VOID FOR 
VAGUENESS

[¶9.]     The applicable 
constitutional standards are not disputed by the parties.

"The constitutional 
requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give 
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is 
forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held 
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to 
be proscribed.

"On the other hand, if 
the general class of offenses to which the statute is directed is plainly within 
its terms, the statute will not be struck down as vague even though marginal 
cases could be put where doubts might arise. [Citations.] And if this general 
class of offenses can be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable 
construction of the statute, this Court is under a duty to give the statute that 
construction." United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S. Ct. 808, 812, 98 L. Ed. 989 (1954). See also, Armijo v. State, supra, and Dover v. State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 536 
(1983).

[¶10.]  An ordinance or statute is void for 
vagueness if it fails to give a person of ordinary sensibility fair notice that 
the contemplated conduct is forbidden. Part of the rationale for this rule is 
that vagueness encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972). Wyoming has followed the constitutional 
guideline that a criminal statute violates an essential principle of due process 
if

"[m]en must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." Sanchez v. State, Wyo., 567 P.2d 270, 274 
(1977). See also, State v. Laude, 
Wyo., 654 P.2d 1223, 1228 (1982).

[¶11.]  We have previously defined the principles 
of due process.

"In approaching a problem 
involving a decision which is concerned with whether a statute is constitutional 
or not, we do so with certain well-established rules in mind. The law in this 
regard was summarized in State v. 
Stern, Wyo., 526 P.2d 344, 346-347, when we said that in determining the 
constitutionality of a statute, "`* * * the plain, ordinary, and usual meaning 
of words used in a statute controls in the absence of clear statutory provisions 
to the contrary, [citation]; that where there is plain, unambiguous language 
used in a statute there is no room for construction, and a court may not 
properly look for and impose another meaning, [citation]; that where legislative 
intent is discernible a court should give effect to that intent, [citation]; 
that every law must be presumed to be constitutional, with all reasonable doubt 
resolved in its favor, [citation]; and that while generally speaking penal 
statutes are to be strictly construed, they need not be given overnarrow meaning 
in disregard of the obvious purpose of the legislative body, 
[citation].'

"Since no other states 
have statutory provisions similar to ours, we must determine the 
constitutionality of this section on the basis of the general requirements of 
due process." (Footnote omitted.) Sanchez 
v. State, supra at 274 (1977).

[¶12.]  Appellant contends that the phrases 
"physical injury" and "mental trauma" contained in the child abuse statute are 
vague and not defined in the statute. We have not hesitated to declare child 
protection statutes unconstitutional because the language was vague and 
indefinite. State v. Gallegos, Wyo., 384 P.2d 967 (1963). A statute, however, is not 
considered vague to the extent of being unconstitutional merely because a 
reviewing court believes the statute could have been drafted with greater 
precision.1 Sorenson v. State, 
Wyo., 604 P.2d 1031 (1979). 

"[W]ords of common usage 
should be given their usual, ordinary and natural meaning, or signification, 
according to approved usage, unless there is some indication to the contrary in 
the statute itself." (Footnotes omitted.) Crawford, The Construction of 
Statutes, § 186 (1940).

[¶13.]  The statute, § 6-2-503, W.S. 1977, is 
concerned with abuse. It is not fatal to the statute that child abuse is defined 
in general terms. Abuse is something other than normal parental action. State v. Coe, 92 N.M. 320, 587 P.2d 973 
(1978). Criminal statutes should be as explicit as is possible and still 
accomplish their intended goals. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 1538, 91 L. Ed. 1877 (1947).

"The relationship between 
parents or guardians and children is a delicate and complex one, and standards 
designed to regulate this relationship must necessarily provide some flexibility 
while at the same time effectuating the state policy of protecting children from 
abuse." People v. Jennings, Colo., 
641 P.2d 276, 280 (1982).

In upholding the 
constitutionality of child neglect statutes, it has been stated:

"Other courts have found 
similar language adequate to inform those subject to it of the kind of behavior 
which will render them liable to criminal sanctions. See People v. Ewing, 72 Cal. App. 3d 714, 140 Cal. Rptr. 299 
(1977); People v. Harris, 239 Cal. App. 2d 393, 48 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1966); People v. Beaugez, 232 Cal. App. 2d 650, 
43 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1965) (upholding a statute punishing `whoever, having the care 
of custody of any child, * * * wilfully causes or permits such child to be 
placed in such situation that its person or health may be endangered, * * *'); 
Hunter v. State, 172 Ind. App. 397, 
360 N.E.2d 588, cert. denied 434 U.S. 906, 98 S. Ct. 306, 54 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1977) 
(`cruelty to a child shall consist of * * * exposing a child to unnecessary 
hardship, fatigue or mental or physical strains that may tend to injure the 
health or physical or moral well-being of such child'); State v. Sammons, 58 Ohio St.2d 460, 391 N.E.2d 713 (1979) (`no person, being the parent * * * of a child under eighteen 
* * * shall create a substantial risk to the health or safety of such child, by 
violating a duty of care, protection or support * * *'). A California court noted: 
`[T]he type of conduct which this portion of the statute seeks to reach defies 
precise definition. In number and kind the situations where a child's life or 
health may be imperiled are infinite.' People v. Beaugez, supra, 43 Cal. Rptr. 
at 32. The Indiana court reasoned: `[T]he statute need only inform the 
individual of the generally proscribed conduct, it need not list with itemized 
exactitude each item of conduct prohibited.' Hunter v. State, supra, 360 N.E.2d  at 
595. CompareState v. McMasters, supra: `[W]e would hope 
that in the case of the McMasters, or any parents, there is no need for an 
explicit statute to "spell out" how poorly they can treat their child before 
risking loss of their parental rights.' 259 Or. at 299, 486 P.2d 567." 
(Footnotes omitted.) State v. Mills, 
52 Or. App. 777, 629 P.2d 861, 863-864 (1981).

[¶14.]  Florida has upheld statutory language making 
it a crime to knowingly or with culpable negligence permit physical or mental 
injury stating that the language is simpler, more straight forward and more 
readily understood by a man of common intelligence than the previous statutory 
language. State v. Riker, 
Fla., 376 So. 2d 862 (1979). Willful abuse and torture 
were not considered vague and indefinite in Chambers v. State, 
Ala.Cr.App., 364 So. 2d 416 (1978). "Cruelly and unlawfully punishes" was not 
considered unconstitutionally broad or impermissibly vague in People v. Jackson, 140 Mich. App. 283, 364 N.W.2d 310 (1985). The distinctions made in that statute between lawful 
discipline and unlawful punishment did not give such unfettered discretion to 
the jury or judge as to render the statute void for vagueness. People v. Shelton, 138 Mich. App. 510, 360 N.W.2d 234 (1984). 
California 
held that the phrases "unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering" and 
"cruel or inhumane corporal punishment or injury resulting in a traumatic 
condition" were not so uncertain as to be invalid. This language provides notice 
of the proscribed activities as well as guidance to the courts. People v. Smith, 35 Cal. 3d 798, 201 Cal. Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886 (1984).

[¶15.]  These statutes are basically protective 
in nature. Consequently, they are designed to cover a broad spectrum of conduct. 
There is an infinite variety of conduct which may be involved in order to 
safeguard the welfare of the children. The statutes must be broadly drawn and 
reasonably definite in the area of legislation involved so that an ordinary 
person would know the conduct proscribed. Commonwealth v. Marlin, 452 Penn. 380, 305 A.2d 14 
(1973).

[¶16.]  In this case, the statute, § 6-2-503, 
supra, provides that child abuse is the causing of physical injury or mental 
trauma intentionally or in reckless disregard of the consequences. "Physical 
injury" has been defined by Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) as "[b]odily 
harm or hurt * * *"; "mental" has been defined as "[r]elating to or existing in 
the mind; intellectual, emotional, or psychic, as distinguished from bodily or 
physical," Id.; and "trauma" is defined as a "* 
* * psychologically damaging emotional experience," Id. We do not find these 
phrases to have such esoteric meanings as to be unintelligible.

[¶17.]  Physical injury is harm to the body. It 
is a term of common usage generally understood by the average person. It 
includes the bruises and welts and trauma of the kind suffered by the victim in 
this case. "Mental trauma" is harm to the mind or spirit. It is also a commonly 
understood term. The statute is violated upon the occurrence of physical injury 
and mental trauma - what society would consider child abuse. Appellant here 
should have known that his conduct was violative of the statute; and, if the 
definition of child abuse is not as precise as he would like it, that, in 
itself, does not render the statute unconstitutional. The right to have children 
does not include a corresponding right to abuse them by omission or commission. 
People in Interest of CL, S.D., 356 N.W.2d 476 (1984). Children need protection. This statute accomplishes that 
purpose and is sufficiently definite to satisfy constitutional 
requirements.

PARENTAL 
DISCIPLINE

[¶18.]  Appellant contends that this statute 
fails to separate discipline from child abuse and, since it does not make a 
provision for recognizing and honoring fundamental rights of a parent to 
discipline his child, it is unconstitutional. Appellant contends that the 
judge's instruction referring to reasonable parental discipline being an 
affirmative defense did not cure the unconstitutionality of the statute, stating 
that requiring a parent to prove that

"* * * the force used was 
reasonable and appropriate increases the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a 
fundamental right and violates due process."

The State 
concedes that parents have a right to raise and reasonably discipline their 
children as they see fit, arguing however that no adult has a protected right to 
severely beat or abuse a child. The child abuse statute, together with the 
common-law defenses available to one charged, are complete and fairly apprise 
one of prohibited acts and conduct. We do not easily impute "to the legislature 
an intention to include innocent acts as criminal felonies." Nimmo v. State, Wyo., 603 P.2d 386, 390 
(1979).

[¶19.]  Section 6-1-102, W.S. 1977, abolishes 
common-law crimes but retains common-law defenses. Many defenses to criminal 
actions are not specifically contained within the specific criminal 
statute.

"Possible bars to 
conviction include alcoholism, alibi, amnesia, authority to maintain order and 
safety, brainwashing, chromosomal abnormality, consent, convulsion, custodial 
authority, defense of habitation, defense of others, defense of property, de 
minimis infraction, diplomatic immunity, domestic (or special) responsibility, 
double jeopardy, duress, entrapment, executive immunity, extreme emotional 
disturbance, hypnotism, immaturity, impaired consciousness, impossibility, 
incompetency, insanity, intoxication (voluntary and involuntary), involuntary 
act defenses, judicial authority, judicial immunity, justification, law 
enforcement authority, legislative immunity, lesser evils, medical authority, 
mental illness (apart from insanity), military orders (lawful and unlawful), 
mistake (of law and fact), necessity, official misstatement of law, parental 
authority, plea bargained immunity, provocation, public duty or authority, 
reflex action, renunciation, self-defense, somnambulism, the spousal defense to 
sexual assaults and theft, statute of limitations, subnormality, testimonial 
immunity, the unavailable law defense, unconsciousness, and withdrawal." 1 
Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, p. 70, fn. 1 (1984).

Some of these 
defenses are statutory but many are common-law defenses. Some are not recognized 
in Wyoming. 
The question to be answered is whether we recognize the parental-authority 
defense.

[¶20.]  Over half of American jurisdictions have 
a parental-authority-justification defense either by statute or common law. The 
defense arises from the necessity of parental or benevolent custodial authority 
and has been defined as:

"Parental and Benevolent Custodial 
Authority. Conduct constituting an offense is justified if:

"(1)(a) the actor is a 
parent, guardian, or other person similarly responsible for the general welfare 
of a minor or incompetent, or is acting with the specific authorization of such 
parent, guardian, or other person similarly responsible; and

"(b) there arises a need 
for conduct to promote or safeguard the welfare of the minor or incompetent, 
including the prevention or punishment of misconduct; and

"(2) consistent with his 
authority, the actor engages in conduct, constituting the offense,

"(a) when and to the 
extent necessary to promote or safeguard the welfare of the minor or 
incompetent,

"(b) that is reasonable 
in relation to the gravity of the harm or evil threatened and the importance of 
the interest to be furthered." 2 Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 144(a) 
(1984).

It is further 
stated that:

"The burden of production 
for the defense of parental or benevolent custodial authority is always on the 
defendant. The burden of persuasion is nearly always on the state, beyond a 
reasonable doubt." (Footnotes omitted.) Id. at p. 162.

[¶21.]  Wyoming has previously addressed the question 
of parental authority, stating:

"Courts are agreed that 
since parents, or those standing in their place, are charged with the duty of 
educating their children and bringing them up in accordance with certain 
standards, they have the right to exercise such control and restraint and to 
adopt such disciplinary measures as will enable them to discharge their parental 
duty; that accordingly it is not an assault and battery for a parent, or one 
standing in such place, to strike a child in punishment for disobedience or 
other misconduct, but is in the exercise of a legal right in doing so. 2 R.C.L. 
541. Courts are not agreed as to the extent of punishment. In 2 R.C.L. 542, the 
rule is stated as follows:

"`The decided 
preponderance of authority, however, is that a parent in punishing his children 
must act in good faith with parental affection, must not exceed the bounds of 
moderation, and must not be cruel or merciless, and that any act of punishment 
in excess of such limits is unlawful. * * * Whether in any case punishment 
exceeded the bounds referred to is a question of fact for the jury, and they may 
determine it from the injuries inflicted.'" State v. Spiegel, 39 Wyo. 309, 270 P. 1064, 64 
A.L.R. 289 (1928).

[¶22.]  It is well established that the 
legislature enacts existing statutes with knowledge of pre-existing statutes and 
common law. Common-law defenses do not necessarily have to be set forth within 
the applicable statutes. Civic Ass'n of 
Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 57 
Wyo. 213, 116 P.2d 236 (1941). We are not prepared to state that the legislature was unaware 
of State v. Spiegel, supra. The child 
abuse statute, § 6-2-503, supra, when considered in light of the common-law 
defense of parental discipline available and here accorded to appellant, was 
sufficiently clear to apprise appellant of the prohibited conduct and is, 
therefore, constitutional.

INSTRUCTIONS

[¶23.]  Appellant contends, however, that the 
parental discipline instruction to the jury augmented the statute in an 
unconstitutional manner; that this judicial amendment was within the province of 
the legislature and not the courts. The court instructed the jury upon the 
affirmative defense of reasonable and appropriate discipline as 
follows:

"You are instructed that 
the use of reasonable and appropriate physical force is an affirmative defense 
to the crime of child abuse when it is employed by one entrusted with care of 
the child for the purpose of maintaining discipline."

The prosecuting 
attorney read that instruction to the jury in closing argument and then 
stated:

"Again I don't see how 
any of us can disagree with that. That is our parental right to do that. We have 
to discipline children sometimes, and I would focus your attention primarily on 
the use of reasonable and appropriate physical force. Is it reasonable to be 
scarred for life? To be hit in the face? Is that appropriate to be bruised and 
bleeding, to not be able to sleep that night from the pain, to hide from your 
own stepfather a week afterward? Not at all, not at all."

The defense 
attorney reiterated this concept in his closing argument stating:

"As I told you at the 
beginning of this whole thing, it all boils down to reasonableness and justified 
actions. You have been instructed by the Judge [in] Instruction Number 6. The 
prosecution must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the discipline which Randy 
gave his son was not reasonable, was not justifiable. We again submit to you 
that this has not been shown."

All parties 
recognized the applicability of reasonable parental discipline; the defense was 
based upon the theory that although Kevin had been hit with an ice scraper and a 
belt, appellant's actions constituted justifiable discipline rather than abuse. 
The jury was advised that reasonable parental discipline was a defense. 
Appellant took the stand and testified that he beat Kevin and that he had also 
been beaten as a child. He testified to his concerns about Kevin's behavior, 
attitude and school work. The jury did not accept this action as reasonable. The 
defense asserted that the conduct charged was appropriate parental discipline. 
The trial court properly instructed the jury upon this defense, and the 
instruction given was a correct statement of the law. 

[¶24.]  Looking at the statute on child abuse and 
being mindful of the constitutional requirements and the applicable rules of 
statutory construction, we cannot find this statute unconstitutional. The 
statutory prohibition of child abuse encompasses a very difficult and nebulous 
area; it is not an easy task to clearly distinguish child abuse from parental 
punishment. This statute, in conjunction with the common-law defense of 
justifiable parental discipline, is adequate to apprise one of the unlawfulness 
of abusing children; and of the acts to be avoided. The legislature has coped 
with this problem in a reasonable way.

[¶25.]  The judgment from which this appeal is 
taken is, therefore, affirmed.

1 The statute governing 
child abuse, § 6-2-503, W.S. 1977, as amended subsequent to this incident, 
defines mental trauma and physical injury:

"(a) Except under 
circumstances constituting a violation of W.S. 6-2-502, a person is guilty of 
child abuse, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) 
years, if:

"(i) The actor is an 
adult or is at least six (6) years older than the victim; and

"(ii) The actor 
intentionally or recklessly inflicts upon a child under the age of sixteen (16) 
years:

"(A) Physical injury as 
defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(ii)(B); or

"(B) Mental injury as 
defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(ii)(A)."

Section 
14-3-202(a)(ii)(A) and (B), W.S. 1977, provides:

"(a) As used in W.S. 
14-3-201 through 14-3-215:

* * * * * *

"(ii) `Abuse' means 
inflicting or causing physical or mental injury, harm or imminent danger to the 
physical or mental health or welfare of a child other than by accidental means, 
including abandonment, excessive or unreasonable corporal punishment, 
malnutrition or substantial risk thereof by reason of intentional or 
unintentional neglect, and the commission or allowing the commission of a sexual 
offense against a child as defined by law:

"(A) `Mental injury' 
means an injury to the psychological capacity or emotional stability of a child 
as evidenced by an observable or substantial impairment in his ability to 
function within a normal range of performance and behavior with due regard to 
his culture;

"(B) `Physical injury' 
means death or any harm to a child including but not limited to disfigurement, 
impairment of any bodily organ, skin bruising, bleeding, burns, fracture of any 
bone, subdural hematoma or substantial malnutrition."