Case Title: In re Robinson Trust.

Citation: 110 Haw. 181

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

---000-

 

 

In the Matter of the

ELLEN K, AND WILLIAM T. ROBINSON TRUST,
Dated May 13, 1925.

 

No. 26786

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(TRUST NO. 04-1-0041)

z
z

 

MARCH 29, 2006

 

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, Ju.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.
The instant case involves the interpretation of a

corpus distribution provision in a trust created pursuant to a
deed of trust. Respondents-appellants Alan Robinson, Mary £.F.
Ciacci, Roselle R. Armitage, and Louis Robinson (hereinafter,
collectively, Appellants] appeal from the Circuit Court of the
First Circuit’s August 2, 2004 judgment, entered by the Honorable
Colleen K. Hirai pursuant to Hawai'i Probate Rules (HPR) Rule 34

(2003)* and Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 54

NPR Rule 34 provides in relevant part

(a) Eatry of Judgeent. All formal testacy orders
shall be reduced co judgnent and the judgvent shall be
(continued...)

oad
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(2003).? Therein, the circuit court granted a petition for

instructions filed by the trustees/petitioners-appellees First
Hawaiian Bank and Gordon M. Robinson (hereinafter, collectively,
Petitioners] and determined that, for purposes of distribution of
the corpus upon the termination of the trust, the corpus is to be
distributed equally among the sett lors’ grandchildren per capita,
with the issue of any deceased grandchild taking his or her
deceased parent's share per stizpes.

On appeal, Appellants contend that the circuit court
erred in determining that the corpus is to be distributed among
the grandchildren per capita. Appellants maintain that the
corpus is to be distributed among the grandchildren per stirpes.

Appellants do not contest the circuit court’s ruling that the

 

*.scontinuea)
‘filed with the clerk of the court. Such judgments shall be
final and immediately appesiable as provided by statute

qs

area ‘claim
Se ates. but a

es ‘of the Hawaii Rules of Givi
Procedure.

(Bold emphasis in original.) (Underscored emphasis added.)
* Hcp Rule 54 provides in pertinent part

(©) Sudgnent upon multiple claims or énvolving
multiple parties. when nore than one claim for relief is
presented in an action or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a Final juapeent
as to ond or more but fewer than all of the claims oF
Parties only upon an express determination that there ss no
just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the
entry of judgment. In the absence of euch deternination and
@irection, any... form of decision... which
Adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
Liabilities of fewer than all the parties ghall not
terminate the action as to any of the claine or parties[.]

 

 

(imphasis in original.)

 
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corpus is to be distributed to the issue of any deceased
grandchild taking his or her deceased parent’s share per stirpes.

For the reasons discussed more fully infra, we conclude
that Appellants’ contentions lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm
the cizcuit court's August 2, 2004 judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Zactual Backsround

on May 13, 1925, William T. Robinson (Me. Robinson) and
Ellen K. Robinson (irs. Robinson) [hereinafter, collectively, the
Robinsons], as husband and wife, executed a deed of trust,
creating the instant trust. The trust was established for the
benefit of the Robinsons and their ten children. The trust
Provides that, upon the death of the Robinsons, all of the net
income is to be distributed to their children “and the issue of
any deceased child of theirs born as aforesaid, such issue to
take by right of representation.” After the death of the
Robinsons, the Robinsons’ ten children each received a one-tenth
share of the trust incone. Currently, nine of the ten children
are deceased, one having died without issue, Thus, the sole

yed children with surviving

 

surviving child and the eight de

issue each have a one-ninth interest in the trust income

 

Accordingly, pursuant to the income distribution provision of the

ed child’s one-ninth share of the trust income

 

trust, each de

is being paid to that child’s issue by right of representation.
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‘The income distribution provision has not faced any legal
challenge.

under the terms of the trust, the trust is to terminate
five years after the death of the Robinsons’ last surviving
child, Ululani Collins (Ululani). In November 2004, Ululani was
ninety-four years old and is presumably still alive. The corpus
distribution provision of the trust states:

(Wipon its determination as aforesaid, the (trustee) or its
successor in trust is hereby directed and is hereby invested

with full power and authority to divide and distribute the

said trust estate between and anona the arandchildren of the

fnid-pareiee of the first and second carte [ure--fopineen
snd the iseue of any

St their. share and ahare alike, auch issue to take by

Hisht'of fepresentaciont.‘T
(emphasis added.)
B. Procedural History

on May 3, 2004, Petitioners! filed a petition for

 

instructions regarding the corpus distribution provision of the
trust with the circuit court. Therein, Petitioners sought
instructions from the circuit court as to the distribution of the
corpus with respect to the (1) grandchildren and (2) issue of any
deceased grandchildren. With respect to the grandchildren,
Petitioners asked the circuit court to determine whether the

corpus is to be distributed: (1) equally among the grandchildren

2 me trust defines Mra. Robinson as the
Mr. Robinson as the "party of the second pert-"

jarty of the first part and

 

+ as previously stated, Petitioners are Firet Hawaiian Bank and Gordon
M. Robinson (Gordon). Gordon is a grandchild of the Robineone and, thus, ie a
beneficiary of the trust, The trust presently has three co-trustecs: Firat
Mawaiian Bank, Gordon, and Ciacci. Ciacei, a grandchild of the Robinsons, 8
one of the four individuals conprieing Appellants

 

 

 
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per capita; or (2) to the Robinsons’ issue per stipes. With

respect to the issue of any deceased grandchildren, Petitioners

 

requested the circuit court to determine whether: (1) the corpus
is to be distributed equally among the grandchildren and the
issue of any deceased grandchildren per capita; or (2) the issue
of any deceased grandchildren are limited to their deceased
parent's share of the corpus, i.e., the share of any deceased
grandchild is distributed to the deceased grandchild’s isaue per
stirpes.

On June 7, 2004, Appellants and respondents Christopher
Martus, Tate Robinson, Adrienne Ferris, Leslie Laird, and Ululani
(hereinafter, Appellants and respondents are collectively
referred to as Beneficiaries] jointly filed a memorandum in
response to the petition for instructions. Therein,
Beneficiaries essentially maintained that the corpus is to be
distributed per stirpes rather than per capita. specifically,
Beneficiaries contended that: (1) the corpus is to be

distributed to the Robinsons’ issue per stirpes; and (2) the

 

4

 

jue of any deceased grandchildren are limited to their deceased

sed,

 

parent's share of the corpus, i.e., the share of any d
grandchild is distributed to the deceased grandchild’s issue per
stirpes. In addition, Beneficiaries claimed that extrinsic
evidence supports a per stirpes distribution of the corpus.

A hearing on the petition for instructions was held on

June 18, 2004 and was continued on June 25, 2004. At the June

 
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25, 2004 hearing, the circuit court orally ruled that it would
grant the petition for instructions and held that, when the trust
terminates, the corpus is “to be divided equally among the
grandchildren per capita and the distribution to the issue of any
deceased grandchild is limited to their deceased parent’s share.
In so ruling, the circuit court noted “that the distribution of
the income as [sic] per stirpes and that the same language could
have been used for the distribution of the corpus but it was
different.”

On August 2, 2004, the circuit court entered its
written order granting the petition for instructions. Therein,
the circuit court ordered, inter alia, that:

Because the trust wording differed between the
Aiseribution of the income and the distribution of the
corpus, upon termination of the [t]rust, the (e)rustee shall
Gistribute the Ce) rust ‘equally ssong the
grandchilaven per capita, vith the issue of any predeceased
Grandchila taking his or her deceseed parent's share, per
Seizes.

      

  

 

 

(Emphases in original.) Accordingly, the corpus is to be divided
into twenty-four equal shares, representing the twenty-one living
grandchildven and three deceased grandchildren with surviving
issue, with the issue of the three deceased grandchildren taking
his or her deceased parent’s share per stixpes.

On August 2, 2004, the cixcuit court entered a judgment
on the order granting the petition for instructions pursuant to
ERCP Rule 54(b) and HPR Rule 34. On the sane day, Petitioners

and Beneficiaries filed a “stipulation to Certification of order

 
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Granting Petition for Instructions, for Appeal.” Appellants
timely appealed on August 31, 2004.*

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The construction of a trust is a question of law which

this court reviews de nove.” In re Medeiros Testamentary Trust
and _Life Ins, Trust, 105 Hawai'i 264, 288, 96 P.3d 1098, 1102

(2004) (citation omitted).

nen construing @ trust, this court is guided by
principles relating to the interpretation of eruste as well
Re those relating to the interpretation of wills. A
fundamental Tule when construing truste ie that ch
[ntention of the settlor as expressed in a trust instrument
hell prevail unless dnconeiatent with sone positive rule of
{Ger_ hddieionally, in construing a trust document to
Actermine the settior's intent, the instrument ust be read
fs a whole, not in fragnents:

 

 

    

 

In-xe Lock Revocable Living Trust, 109 Hawai'i 146, 151-52, 123
P.34 1242, 1246-47 (2005) (internal quotation marke and citations
omitted) .
IIT. DISCUSSION

Appellants’ sole contention on appeal centers on the
interpretation of the corpus distribution provision in the trust
with respect to the grandchildren’s share of the corpus. As
previously mentioned, the corpus distribution provision states:

(tlhe erustee] or ite successor in trust is hereby directed
and is hereby invested with full pover and authority to

+ me August 31, 2004 notice of appeal did not include Louis Robinson
(Louis) ae an appellant, and, thus, the notice of appeal vas amended on
September 24, 2004 to include Louie an an appellant: The September 24, 2004
anended notice of appeal relates back to the August 32, 200s notice of appeal
and is considered to be filed on August 31, 2004 for purposes of Havai'i Rul
Of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule (a) (1) (relating to the tine of filing a
hotice of appeal in civil cases). See Enos . Pac, Transfer & Harehouse,
e., 80 Hawaii 245, 355-56, 920 P24 116, 226-27 996) (stating that ~an
amended notice of appeal relates back ¢o the notice of appeal it purports to
anend") (citation omitted)

 

 

 

 

   

 
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Givide and distribute the said trust estate between and
‘among the grandchildren of the said parties of the first and
Second pares. (Mee. Robinson and Me. Robinson) and the isece

Share and share alike,

 

 

  

 

Appellants maintain that the circuit court erred in
determining that the corpus is to be distributed among the
grandchildren per capita. Appellante contend that the phrases
“share and share alike’ and “by right of representation" in the
corpus distribution provision apply only to the issue of any
deceased grandchildren and not to the grandchildren themselves.
Appellants then argue that, inasmuch as the foregoing phrases
apply only to the issue of any deceased grandchildren, the
remaining phrase “divide and distribute” calls for the
grandchildren to take their share of the corpus by right of
representation or per stirpes.

Other jurisdictions have construed corpus distribution
provisions similar to the one in the instant trust. In Condee v,
Trout, 39 N.2.24 350 (I11. 1942), the Illinois Supreme Court (the

court) was faced with construing the following corpus

 

distribution provision in a wil!

Ae the ond of tiften 8)
Pe tect 2 Edie ASS,
Speyusee auth at sa saat nr ehlanen

Sa

 

Id. at 351 (emphases added). The appellants contended that the

foregoing provision clearly mandates a per capita distribution.

 
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Id. The appellees, on the other hand, argued that the foregoing
provision dictates that the testator “did not intend that his
grandchildren . . . take in competition with their living mothers

and plainly indicates an intent for a stirpital distribution.”

 

Id. The court noted that, standing alone, the phrase *in equal
parte to my children and grandchildren then living” indicates
“that a per capita distribution was intended. Id. at 352
(emphasis added). The court then stated that the latter phrase
“[iln case of the death of any one of my children leaving heirs
of their body or blood, such child or children shall take the
part or parts from my estate that would have gone to their mother
if living" was an “expressed intention that a child or children
of a deceased child of the testator shall take per stirpes the
share that would have gone to the mother if living at the time of
distribution.’ Id, The court went on to note that, “[i]f a per
capita distribution wae intended[,] there clearly could be no

 

ity for the provision for per stirpes distribution to the
grandchildren whose mother had deceased, nor would such have been
a fair and even distribution to them." Id. Consequently, the
court held that the corpus was to be divided equally among the
children, with the share of any deceased child going to his or
her issue per stirpes. Id. at 353.

In In-xe Craighead’s Estate, 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 301 (Pa.
Orph. 1955), the Orphans’ Court of Pennsylvania (the court) was

faced with two corpus distribution provisions in a will. Id. at

 

 
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302. The first provision, which was before the court for

interpretation, stated:
Immediately upon the death of my said daughter, Bertha, 1
@irect my trustees to pay over the balance of principal of
said trust fund, together vith any accrued and undistributed
Income thereon,
share alike.

Id. (emphasis added). At the time of Bertha’s death, the

dead.

testator had no living children but had living grandchildren,
great-grandchildren, and great-great-grandchildren. Id. Another

provision of the will, which was not before the court for

 

interpretation, state

In the event there shall be no issue then living of Horace
M. Craighead, Jr-,('] t direct ay trustees co convey and
Sivide the said thist principal among sy then livisa

fake the share their parest would have taxen if living.
Id. (emphasis added). The court stated that

[e)he use of the phrase, *
Lieu of the phrase, "mach i
parent would have taken if living,” shows that [ehe
Eestator] intended that in the cage of the trust for hie
Aaughter (Lie,, the firat provision) on distribution there
Should be an equal division of the estate per capita between
the children and iesue of deceased children

lly share and share alike," ia
jue to take the share chess’

 

   

 

 

 

 

Id. at 303 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also
observed that the testator “knew how to direct a per stirpes

@istribution when {he} #o intended[,]* id. (internal quotation
marks omitted), inasmich as the second provision included words
of otirpitai distribution. Finally, the court noted that, *in

the absence of other language disclosing an intention to

 

distribute stirpitally, the words ‘equally to be divided,

 

* Horace M. Craighead, Jr. appears to be the testator’s son.

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‘divided into equal parts,’ and the like, ordinarily favor
distribution per capita rather than per stipes." Id. at 303-04
(internal quotation marks omitted and citations omitted).
consequently, the court held that the first provision mandates an
equal division of the corpus per capita between the children and
the issue of deceased children. Id. at 304.

In this case, contrary to Appellants’ position, the
phrase “share and share alike” clearly applies to both the
grandchildren and the issue of any deceased grandchildren, as in
the trusts construed in Condee and Craighead’s Estate. However,
we agree with Appellants that the phrase “by right of
representation” applies only to the issue of any deceased
grandchildren and not to the grandchildren themselves. As such,
consistent with Condee and Craighead’s Eatate, we believe that
the phrase ‘between and among the grandchildren of [the
Robineone] and the issue of any deceased grandchild of theirs,

share and share alike,” standing alon«

 

indicates that a per

capita distribution wae intended for the grandchildren and the

 

issue of any deceased grandchildren. ‘Words such as ‘in equal
shares,’ ‘divided equally,’ and ‘share and share alike’ usually
import equal treatment, or a division per capita." In re Lopez,
64 Haw. 44, 57, 636 P.2d 731, 739 (1981) (citations omitted)

(emphasis added). However, the following phrase “such issue to

take by right of representation” clearly directs that the issue

of any deceased arandchild, not the grandchildren thenselves,

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takes his or her deceased parent’s share per stirpes.
Essentially, this latter phrase denotes that the Robinsons did
not intend the issue of any deceased grandchildren of theirs to
take in competition with their living grandchildren. Because
there is an absence of language disclosing an intention to
distribute the corpus stirpitally to the grandparents, a
veasonable construction of the trust dictates that the Robinsons’
grandchildren are to take per capita, that ie, each surviving
grandchild and each predeceased grandchild who left surviving
issue takes an equal share of the corpus upon the termination of
the trust.

B. Comparison of the Income and Corpus Distribution Provisions

Appellants next argue that, “even though the wording
lof the trust] differs between the distribution of the income and
corpus, both instructions lead to a per stirpes distribution.”
Appellants rely solely on In re Trust Estate of Dwight, 80
Hawai'i 233, 909 P.2d $61 (1995), in support of their argument
that “different wording does not necessarily mean a differing
distribution.”

Although Petitioners emphasize that “their position is
neutral in thie matter[,]* they point out that the Robinsons
“clearly knew how to effect a per stipes distribution with
respect to the incone interest, yet used different language with
respect to the distribution of the trust corpus.” Petitioners

note that, unlike the income distribution provision, the corpus

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distribution provision includes the phrase “share and share
alike[,]* which has the same meaning as “in equal shares.”
Petitioners further atate that, if the corpus distribution
provision was “construed in the same manner as the incone
distribution provision (which does not include the ‘share and
share alike’ clause), then the reference to ‘share and share
alike’ would be meaningless.‘ Petitioners conclude by stating
chat:

it is far more Likely that the (Robinsons) intended the

(share and share alike] clause to have meaning and that
ae to make it clear that the grandchildren were

‘an equal share of the trust e

‘iseribueion of their parent’

 

 

          

Fight of Yepresentation. Instead, they identified
Grandchildren ae the applicable generation to "share and
Share alike.”

In Dwight, the testator, Samuel Castle Dwight, executed
his last will and testament in 1926. Id. at 234, 909 P.2d at
862. In his will, Dwight created an inter vives trust that
provided, inter alia, that, after his death, income from the
trust was to be divided in three equal shares among his daughter
(Elsie) and his two grandchildren (Samuel and Harriette), whom
Dwight had adopted as his own children. Id. Specifically, the
income distribution provision of the trust stated in relevant
part

UPON TRUST to pay the net incone thereof to my daushter
{name} and my laweuily adopted children (names) who are
ny grandchildren in three equal shares during joint
Tver. =

 

 

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and on the death of any of them to pay the aaid net
income thereof in equal shares to the (two) survivors during
thelr Joint lives. =

 

Id. at 237, 909 P.2d at 565 (ellipses points in original). The
income distribution provision went on to state that:

[Alnd on the death of any one of the two survivors to pay

the whole of said net incone to the last survivor during her

Life provided. however if either of my said adopted chi idren

shall die». > leaving a child or children surviving her.

then and in every such case child or children ghall
ofthe dal ‘ncome of,

 

 

 

ihe-had continuea to dive.
Id, at 237-38, 909 P.2d at 565-66 (some emphases in original and
some added) (ellipses points in original). this court noted that
Dwight’s “intent was to leave the trust income equally to the two
separate families(, i.e., Samuel and Harriette’s respective
families]." Id, at 238, 909 P.2d at 566. The corpus

distribution provision, which was at the center of dispute in

 

Dwight, state

on the death of the last survivor of ay said daughter
and my said adopted children my Trustees shall convey all of

‘ny property to auch of the iague of my said adopted children
‘ae Shall then Be living in equal shares per stirpes:
Id. (emphasis added) (ellipses points in original). This court

determined, inter alia, that Dwight intended distribution of the

 

trust corpus to parallel income distribution and, therefore, held
that the corpus distribution provision mandated distribution of
the corpus to one-half to Samuel's issue and one-half to
Harriette’s iseue. Id.

Although the court in Dwight did not specifically
articulate how the corpus distribution provision was parallel to
the income distribution provieion, a comparison of the two

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provisions shows that Dwight employed similar, rather than
differing, language in the two provisions to clearly indicate
that he intended a per stirpes distribution of the corpus as
well. This court has previously noted that a similar phrase,
“such last mentioned child, or children, shall . . . take the
share of the . . . income which his, her or their parent would
have taken{,]’ clearly effect (ed) a per stirpital distribution.
In other words, a child or children would take by
representation[’] through their parent." Lopez, 64 Haw. at 54
1.7, 636 P.2d at 738 n.7 (some ellipses in original and some
added). As such, the income distribution provision in Dwight,
which was nearly identical to the income distribution provision
in Lopez, clearly effected a per stirpes distribution,
specifically, income to the children of Dwight’s adopted children
per stipes. Thus, inasmuch as the corpus was clearly to be
distributed to the issue of Dwight’s adopted children per
stirpes, income and corpus were to be distributed in the sane

As previously stated, the income distribution provieion
in the instant trust states that, upon the death of the
Robinsons, all of the net income is to be distributed to “the

children of the said parties of the first and second parts [Mrs.

° mis court has consistently held that “by representation means “per
stixpes." See in xe fstate of Damon, No. 2526, s1ip op. at 32 (Hav. Feb. 26,
2006) (Damon ii) (etating that "per stirpes means by right of
representation"); in re uock, 109 Hawaii at 152,12) P.3d at 1247 (same);
Dulaht, 60 Hawai'i ‘at 23s, 909 P.2d at S63, (same)

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Robinson and Mr. Robingon] born as aforesaid and the issue of any
deceased child of theirs born as aforesaid, such issue to take by
right of representation.” (Emphasis added.) The foregoing
language has been construed by the parties “as meaning that the
children take an equal share of the income and, at a child's
death, his or her share of the income goes to his or her
descendants by right of representation.* The corpus distribution
provision, on the other hand, states that the corpus is to be
Aistributed “between and among the grandchildren of the said
parties of the first and second parte (Mrs. Robineon and Mr.
Robinson] and the issue of any deceased grandchild of theirs,

2 and , such issue to take by right of
representation.* (Bmphases added.) Unlike the trust in Dwight,
the instant trust, when read as a whole, does not indicate that
the Robinsons intended distribution of the trust corpus to wholly
parallel income distribution. Although the incone distribution

provision essentially states that income is to be distributed to

the issue’ of the Robinsons’ children by right of representation
* tm Danon If, this court reiterated the definition of issue":

inen the donor of property describes the beneficiaries

thereof ac ‘issue’ or “descendante’ of a designated person,

the primary meaning of such class gift term ie determined by

Substituting in place of the clase gift term the words

‘children’ and ‘ehildren of children’ and ‘children of

children of children,’ ete. of the designated person(.)*

Deight], 80 Havai'i at 235-361, 909 7.24 at 563-64)

(quoting'Rescatonent (Second) of Prop.:  Donative Transfers

$25.9 (1988)); nee algo 9 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real

Property £30.08 at 30-107 (2004) ("in a gift fo the ‘issue™

or ‘descendants’ of a certain person, these terns are

Understood by reference to the definition and constructional

rules for the term ‘children.’ Thus, the terms ‘children, ”
(Continued...)

 

 

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or per stirpes, the cozpus distribution provision states that
only the issue of any deceased crandchildren of the Robinsons are
to take by right of representation. Stated differently, while
the income distribution provision implicitly states that the
Robinsons’ grandchildren are to take income per stirpes, the
corpus distribution provision does not indicate that the
Robinsons’ grandchildren are to take corpus per stirpes. “If the
[settlors] intended a per stirpital distribution of the corpus,
(they] naturally would have used similar language as in the
income provision. The fact that [the settlors] failed to do so
is a significant indication of [their] intent for a per capita
distribution of the corpus. Lopez, 64 Haw. at 59, 636 P.2d at
741. Here, the Robinsons clearly knew how to effect a per
stirpes distribution with respect to their grandchildren as
evidenced by the income distribution provision. Had the
Robinsons intended their grandchildren to take corpus per
stirpes, they would have used similar language as in the income
distribution provision.

Moreover, unlike the income distribution provieion, the
corpus distribution provision includes the phrase “share and

"(. scontinuea)

“children of children,’ and so forth are substituted
jue? and “descendants.'*). Indeed, =(t}he te:

     

shorn of any and all judicial constructions and taken in ite

ordinary and popular

 

fg used in respect to pedigree
‘ia definively a general term synonymous with
children, progeny, offspring, descendants, etc.
Malker, 35°Haw. 106, 109° (3939)

Slip op. at 25-26 n.15 (quoting Medeiros, 105 Hawai'i at 290, 966 P.24 at
nes)

      

Orsrien v

 

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share alike." If the corpus distribution provision were to be
construed in the same manner as the income distribution
provision, then the reference to “share and share alike” would be
rendered meaningless. However, “[i]t is to be presumed that
every word is intended by the testator to have some meaning; and
no clause is to be rejected to which a reasonable effect can be
given[.J* Bookwalter v. Lamar, 323 F.2d 664, 668 (sth Cir. 1963)
see also Joyner v. Duncan, 264 S.E.2d 76, a6
(N.C. 1980) (“Effect must be given to each clause, phrase[,] and

(citation onitted)

 

word, if a reasonable construction of the will so permits. Each
string should give its sound.” (Citation omitted.)); In xe
Estate of Mank, 699 N.£.2d 1103, 1107 (111. App. 1998) (noting
that “a will must be construed as a whole and every word,

phrase(,] and clause given effect if possible) (citation

 

omitted). Thus, contrary to Appellants’ contention, “different

 

wording” does mean a ‘differing distribution.” Accordingly, we
hold that the circuit court correctly concluded that, *{blecaus

the trust wording differed between the distribution of the income
and the distribution of the corpus," corpus is to be distributed

differently from income.”

 

* appellants also contend that, inasmuch ae the corpus distribution
provision i ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be admitted to determine the
Robinsons’ intent. However, as discussed supra, the Robinsons’ intent can be
determined from the trust instrument itself, and that, therefore, the corpus
distribution provision is not ambiguous. Aa such, ve are preciuded frow
considering extrinsic evidence of the Robinsons’ invent.

Hawai'i at 253-84,

 

 

 

   
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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's

August 2, 2004 judgment.

on the briefs:

 

Darryl M. Taira and g 7

Barbara J. Wong (of beac Bbrieae—

The Pacific Lav Group)
for respondents-appellanta

Alan Michael Robinson, Mary Pesta Ore).
2. P. Ciacci, Roselle R.

Armitage, and Louis

Robinson

Rhonda L. Griswold (of Gan 6 Dratys

Cades Schutte), for
petitioners-appellees
First Hawaiian Bank and
Gordon M. Robinson

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