Case Title: P. v. Flores

Citation: 

Docket Number: S105762

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 6/12/03 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S105762 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/4 B148379 
STEVEN A. FLORES, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super.Ct.No. BA204550 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
Subdivision (b) of section 987.8 of the Penal Code (section 987.8(b))1 
provides that, upon the conclusion of criminal proceedings in the trial court, the 
court may, after giving the defendant notice and a hearing, make a determination 
of his present ability to pay all or a portion of the cost of the legal assistance 
provided him.  The subdivision further provides that the court may, in its 
discretion, “hold one such additional hearing within six months of the conclusion 
of the criminal proceedings.”  (Ibid.) 
 
Defendant contends, the People concede, and the Court of Appeal held that 
the reimbursement order in this case violated section 987.8(b) because it was made 
without the requisite notice and hearing.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeal 
remanded the case to the trial court to give it another opportunity to provide the 
notice and conduct the hearing required by the statute. 
                                             
 
1 
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references will be to the 
Penal Code.  
 
2
 
The question before us is whether, as defendant contends, the remand order 
was erroneous because it occurred more than six months after judgment was 
pronounced.  Defendant’s contention lacks merit.  Under section 1260, appellate 
courts have the power to remand a cause to a trial court “for such further 
proceedings as may be just under the circumstances,” and the language used in 
section 987.8 does not, on the face of it, suggest the Legislature intended to carve 
out an exception to section 1260 by placing a six-month time limit on the power to 
remand for the correction of errors of the sort made in this case.  Indeed, the 
legislative history of the 1978 amendment to section 987.8, which authorized the 
holding of “one such additional hearing within six months of the conclusion of the 
criminal proceedings,” clearly reveals defendant’s contention to be meritless. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
As defendant observes, the issue presented by this case does not turn on the 
facts of the offense, so we simply note that defendant was convicted of unlawfully 
driving or taking a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision 
(a), and was sentenced to prison for three years.   
 
At sentencing, without having given him the notice or hearing required by 
section 987.8(b), the trial court ordered defendant “to pay attorney’s fees of 
$5,000, significantly less than those services are worth, and less than the public 
defender schedule would indicate, just as a general rule for appointed counsel.  
That’s subject to his ability to pay, out of state prison or other funds.” 
 
The Court of Appeal remanded for notice and hearing under section 
987.8(b), holding that such a remand is the proper remedy when a defendant has 
been deprived of these statutorily required safeguards, and in all other respects it 
affirmed the judgment.  The Court of Appeal added that “[t]he defendant’s ability 
 
3
to pay must, of course, be determined with reference to his [] financial condition at 
the time of sentencing or not later than six months after sentencing.”2   
DISCUSSION 
 
Section 987.8(b) provides:  “In any case in which a defendant is provided 
legal assistance, either through the public defender or private counsel appointed by 
the court, upon conclusion of the criminal proceedings in the trial court, or upon 
the withdrawal of the public defender or appointed private counsel, the court may, 
after notice and a hearing, make a determination of the present ability of the 
defendant to pay all or a portion of the cost thereof.  The court may, in its 
discretion, hold one such additional hearing within six months of the conclusion of 
the criminal proceedings.  The court may, in its discretion, order the defendant to 
appear before a county officer designated by the court to make an inquiry into the 
ability of the defendant to pay all or a portion of the legal assistance provided.” 
 
Recoupment statutes such as section 987.8(b) reflect a legislative concern 
for “ ‘replenishing a county treasury from the pockets of those who have directly 
benefited from county expenditures.’ ”  (People v. Amor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 20, 27, 
quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager (1966) 384 U.S. 305, 309.)  “ ‘Recoupment proceedings 
may protect the State from fraudulent concealment of assets and false assertions of 
indigency.  Many States, moreover, face expanding criminal dockets, and this 
Court has required appointed counsel for indigents in widening classes of cases 
and stages of prosecution.  Such trends have heightened the burden on public 
revenues, and recoupment laws reflect legislative efforts to recover some of the 
added costs.’ ”  (Amor, at p. 27, quoting James v. Strange (1972) 407 U.S. 128, 
141.) 
                                             
 
2 
Subdivision (g)(2)(A), (B) of section 987.8 defines “ ‘[a]bility to pay’ ” as 
including a defendant’s “reasonably discernible future financial position,” as well 
as his “present financial position,” but stipulates that “[i]n no event shall the court 
consider a period of more than six months from the date of the hearing for 
purposes of determining the defendant’s reasonably discernible future financial 
position.” 
 
4
 
To reiterate, defendant contends the remand order was erroneous under 
section 987.8(b) because, by the time it was made, more than six months had 
passed since the pronouncement of judgment.   
 
The rules governing statutory construction are well settled.  We begin with 
the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to 
ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.  (People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
237, 240; People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 621.)  To determine 
legislative intent, we turn first, to the words of the statute, giving them their usual 
and ordinary meaning.  (Trevino, at p. 241; Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 
280.)  When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further.  However, 
when the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we 
look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, 
the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous 
administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.  
(Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 744; People v. Woodhead 
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007-1008.) 
 
Defendant relies primarily upon People v. Turner (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 
1690 (Turner).  In Turner, as in this case, the People conceded that the trial court 
violated section 987.8(b) by ordering reimbursement of attorney fees without 
holding a hearing to determine the defendant’s ability to pay.  “The more difficult 
question,” in the Court of Appeal’s view, was “whether the trial court retain[ed] 
jurisdiction to modify its order, following the issuance of our remittitur.”  (Turner, 
at p. 1695.) 
 
In Turner, the Court of Appeal began by reciting “the general rule that 
‘[t]he filing of a valid notice of appeal vests jurisdiction of the cause in the 
appellate court until determination of the appeal and issuance of the remittitur’ 
(People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 554), thereby divesting the trial court of 
jurisdiction over anything affecting the judgment.  (People v. Lockridge (1993) 12 
Cal.App.4th 1752, 1757; People v. Schulz (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 563, 570.)  
 
5
Jurisdiction survives, however, where provided by statute.  (People v. Karaman 
[(1992)] 4 Cal.4th 335, 351-352; People v. Lockridge, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 
1757.)  In such cases, the jurisdictional period generally is not tolled during the 
pendency of an appeal.  (See People v. Lockridge, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
1755, 1757-1758.)”  (Turner, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1695.) 
 
In Turner, both parties agreed that “section 987.8 constitutes a statutory 
exception to the general rule.”  (Turner, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1695.)  The 
Court of Appeal agreed.  “Under the plain language of the statute at issue here, the 
ability-to-pay hearing need not be held on the date judgment is pronounced; rather, 
the statute empowers the court to hold such hearing within six months of the 
pronouncement of judgment. . . .  Since, from a practical standpoint, such reports 
could not always be prepared and filed on the day of judgment, it must be 
concluded that the Legislature intended the trial court to retain jurisdiction over 
the matter of attorney fees for a reasonable period of time—that is, a six-month 
period—following the pronouncement of judgment.  [¶]  A notice of appeal, 
however, must be filed within 60 days of judgment.  Hence, if we were to apply 
the general rule divesting the trial court of jurisdiction upon the filing of a notice 
of appeal, that provision of the statute providing for an additional hearing within 
six months of judgment would be effectively defeated in every case where an 
appeal was filed.  Such a result would frustrate the intent of the Legislature and 
render the provision surplusage.  Thus we agree with the parties that the trial court 
is not divested of jurisdiction to act on the question of attorney fees under section 
987.8 upon the filing of a notice of appeal.”  (Turner, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 
1696.)  
 
This brought the Court of Appeal “to the crucial question of whether the 
six-month period prescribed in the statute for the ability-to-pay hearings is 
jurisdictional—in other words, does the court lose jurisdiction to conduct further 
proceedings under section 987.8 once the six-month period has expired?”  
(Turner, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1696.)  An affirmative answer to this 
 
6
question, the Court of Appeal recognized, “would deprive the trial court of the 
opportunity to correct error in the imposition of attorney fees in virtually every 
case where an appeal is filed.”  (Id. at pp. 1696-1697.)  Nevertheless, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that “the Legislature intended the six-month period specified by 
the statute to be jurisdictional.”  (Id. at p. 1697.) 
 
Ordinarily, an appellate court has, among others, the power to remand a 
cause to the trial court “for such further proceedings as may be just under the 
circumstances.”  (§ 1260.)  In effect, defendant is contending, and the Turner court 
held, that in enacting the 1978 amendment to section 987.8, the Legislature 
intended to carve out an exception to the remand power of appellate courts by 
placing a six-month time limit on their ability to order the correction of errors of 
the sort made by the trial court in this case.  Indeed, as the Turner court conceded, 
the practical effect of so interpreting section 987.8 would be the nullification of 
the reimbursement statute in cases such as this because criminal appeals typically 
take more than six months.3   
 
If that is what the Legislature intended, it certainly does not appear on the 
face of the statute.  Moreover, nothing in the legislative history of section 987.8(b) 
suggests the Legislature intended the six-month time limit to be jurisdictional or to 
have any effect on the traditional power of an appellate court to remand to the trial 
court for a hearing following the finding of a due process violation.  To the 
contrary, the legislative history of section 987.8(b) clearly reveals the Legislature 
intended to increase the ability of the trial courts to order reimbursement, not to 
limit it, much less to nullify it.   
                                             
 
3 
For the fiscal year 2000-2001, in a criminal case, 440 days was the median 
time from the filing of the notice of appeal to the filing of the opinion by a Court 
of Appeal.  (Judicial Council of Cal., AOC, Rep. on Court Statistics: Statewide 
Caseload Trends 1991-1992 Through 2000-2001 (2002) p. 27 
 [as of June 12, 
2003].)  
 
7
 
Section 987.8 was originally enacted in 1971.  (Stats. 1971, ch. 744, § 1, p. 
1480.)  Again, the provision allowing a trial court to “hold one such additional 
hearing within six months of the conclusion of criminal proceedings” was added in 
1978.  (Stats. 1978, ch. 1134, § 1, p. 3488.)4  It was included in a bill the overall 
purpose of which was “to allow counties to recover additional money from 
indigents whose financial position will improve.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1807 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as introduced, p. 1.)  
Indeed, the author of the bill, Senator Bob Wilson of San Diego County, estimated 
that the changes made by the bill would enable his county to more than double the 
sum it recouped annually.  (Id. at p. 3.)  The operative changes made by the bill 
included amending “the term ‘ability to pay’ so that a defendant’s future earning 
potential can be considered.”  (Id. at p. 2.)  Senator Wilson’s concern was that “the 
current ‘present ability to pay’ standard does not reach a portion of criminal 
defendants who are seasonal workers (construction, farm workers, etc.) who are 
truly indigent at the time of the proceeding but who are likely to be employed after 
the proceeding has terminated.”  (Assem. Com. on Criminal Justice, Analysis of 
Sen. Bill No. 1807 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as introduced, p. 2.)  The provision for 
holding a second hearing, six months after the conclusion of criminal proceedings, 
was intended to permit the trial court to take such changed circumstances into 
consideration. 
 
In Turner, the Court of Appeal did not discuss the legislative history of the 
1978 amendment.  Instead, in seeking to support its conclusion that the trial court 
had lost jurisdiction under section 987.8(b), the Court of Appeal relied upon two 
opinions that it characterized as having “implied that the time period is 
jurisdictional.”  (Turner, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1697, italics added.)  In 
People v. Spurlock (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 323, the trial court sentenced the 
                                             
 
4 
This provision, which is now part of subdivision (b) of section 987.8, was 
originally enacted as part of subdivision (a) of the section.  (Stats. 1978, ch. 1134, 
§ 1, p. 3488.) 
 
8
defendant to a prison term, stayed execution of the sentence, and placed the 
defendant on probation, the terms of which included 15 months in county jail with 
credit for 38 days previously served.  The court reserved jurisdiction over the 
matter of attorney fees, stating that it would hold a section 987.8 hearing on the 
defendant’s ability to pay 60 days after his release from actual custody.  (Id. at pp. 
326-327.)  The trial court “erred in providing for a hearing 60 days after release 
from actual custody,” the Court of Appeal held, “since under any conceivable 
circumstances (short of a reduction in the confinement condition of the probation 
order, which the record does not show to have come about), such a hearing would 
have to take place over 6 months after the sentence.”  (Id. at p. 329.)  “This,” the 
Court of Appeal held, “the statute forbids.”  (Ibid.)  In distinguishing Spurlock, the 
Court of Appeal in the present case correctly observed:  “Spurlock clearly does not 
stand for the proposition that a reviewing court’s only option is to strike an order 
made in violation of Penal Code section 987.8.  Nor does it stand for the corollary 
that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to correct an error on remand on appeal.”   
 
The other case relied upon by the Turner court was one of its own earlier 
decisions—People v. Faatiliga (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1276.  (Turner, supra, 15 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1697.)  In Faatiliga, the trial court required reimbursement of 
attorney fees as one of the conditions of probation, and since such a condition is 
prohibited in California,5 the Court of Appeal struck it.  (Faatiliga, at p. 1280.)  It 
was too late, the Court of Appeal held, for the trial court to base its reimbursement 
order on an alternative ground by conducting a hearing under section 987.8, 
                                             
 
5 
“Imposing reimbursement of attorney fees as a condition of probation is 
absolutely prohibited in California courts.  (In re Elizabeth S. (1982) 138 
Cal.App.3d 450, 454; In re Allen (1969) 71 Cal.2d 388, 391-392.)  The Supreme 
Court so held in In re Allen, supra, 71 Cal.2d 388.  While the United States 
Supreme Court criticized that case when upholding an Oregon statute permitting 
collection of attorney fees from defendants who can afford to pay, In re Allen has 
not been overruled.  (Fuller v. Oregon (1974) 417 U.S. 40, 51-52; People v. Amor 
(1974) 12 Cal.3d 20, 25-26.)”  (People v. Faatiliga, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 
1280.) 
 
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“[s]ince more than six months have elapsed since the conclusion of the criminal 
proceedings . . . .”  (Faatiliga, at p. 1280.)  As it did in Turner, the Court of 
Appeal in Faatiliga relied on Spurlock.  (Faatiliga, at p. 1280.)6 
 
Finally, the Turner court found significance in the fact that section 987.8 
differs in certain respects from other recoupment statutes, particularly section 
1203.1b (cost of probation) and section 1203.1c (cost of local incarceration).  “In 
contrast to section 987.8, which refers to a defendant’s present ability to pay, 
section 1203.1b speaks only of an ‘ability to pay.’  In contrast to section 987.8, 
which imposes a six-month limitations period for the ability-to-pay hearing, 
section 1203.1b permits an additional hearing at any time during the probationary 
period.  Similarly, section 1203.1c . . . also speaks of the defendant’s ‘ability to 
pay,’ and provides for additional hearings any time within the probationary 
period.”  (Turner, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1697-1698, fn. omitted.)  The 
Turner court, in our view, read too much into the dissimilarities among the 
recoupment statutes.  While these dissimilarities may “evidence a particular 
                                             
 
6 
Defendant brings three other cases to our attention, although he 
acknowledges that the question presented here was not addressed in any of them.  
In In re Elizabeth S., supra, 138 Cal.App.3d 450, 455, as in People v. Faatiliga, 
supra, 10 Cal.App.4th 1276, the Court of Appeal struck a condition of probation 
requiring reimbursement for legal assistance.  Noting that the trial court had not 
imposed a fine on the minor, and that the reimbursement condition may have been 
in lieu of a fine, the Court of Appeal remanded the case “so that the trial court will 
have an opportunity to determine whether a fine should be imposed.”  (Elizabeth 
S., at p. 455.)  The question whether the trial court had lost jurisdiction to order 
reimbursement under section 987.8 was not discussed.  In People v. Heath (1989) 
207 Cal.App.3d 892, the Court of Appeal reversed “the imposition of attorney 
fees” because the defendant had not been given the notice required by section 
987.8.  (Heath, at pp. 902-903.)  Whether the case might have been remanded to 
give the trial court an opportunity to correct its error was not discussed.  In People 
v. Poindexter (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 803, the Court of Appeal struck the 
reimbursement order because the procedural safeguards embedded in section 
987.8 had not been observed in a number of respects, but again the question 
whether the case might have been remanded for correction of the errors was not 
discussed. 
 
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concern on the part of the Legislature to complete the proceedings conducted 
under section 987.8, and to limit the time within which a defendant’s financial 
status may be evaluated” (Turner, at p. 1698), they do not suggest that the 
Legislature intended the result in Turner—“depriv[ing] the trial court of the 
opportunity to correct error in the imposition of attorney fees in virtually every 
case where an appeal is filed.”  (Id. at pp. 1696-1697.) 
 
In summary, we conclude that the provision of section 987.8(b) in question, 
allowing a trial court to hold a second hearing within six months of “the 
conclusion of the criminal proceedings” to determine a defendant’s present ability 
to reimburse the cost of the legal assistance provided, was not intended to limit the 
authority of an appellate court to remand a case to the trial court for the correction 
of its error in failing to give a defendant the notice and hearing required by the 
statute.  People v. Turner, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th 1690, and People v. Faatiliga, 
supra, 10 Cal.App.4th 1276, are disapproved insofar as they are inconsistent with 
this conclusion. 
 
Defendant contends that even if the passage of more than six months since 
the pronouncement of judgment does not automatically deprive a trial court of 
jurisdiction under section 987.8 to correct its errors upon remand, remand would 
be pointless in the circumstances of this case because defendant has been 
sentenced to prison and is, therefore, obviously unable to comply with any 
reimbursement order. 
 
Defendant correctly notes there is a presumption under the statute that a 
defendant sentenced to prison does not have the ability to reimburse defense costs.  
Subdivision (g)(2)(B) of section 987.8 provides in pertinent part:  “Unless the 
court finds unusual circumstances, a defendant sentenced to state prison shall be 
determined not to have a reasonably discernible future financial ability to 
reimburse the costs of his or her defense.”   
 
Because it held no hearing into the matter, the trial court made no finding 
as to whether defendant’s circumstances were unusual.  In the Court of Appeal, 
 
11
the People argued that a showing of unusual circumstances was conceivable 
because, according to the probation report, defendant possessed $1,500 worth of 
jewelry at the time of sentencing.  The Court of Appeal was dubious as to whether 
such a showing could be made.  “This seems unlikely given that [defendant] has a 
child to support.”  On the other hand, the probation report does indicate that 
defendant was then “stable and employed.”  Defendant may not be able to pay the 
$5,000 ordered by the trial court, but he may be able to pay something, and if he 
can, he is obligated by the statute to do so.  In any event, as the Court of Appeal 
observed, whether defendant’s financial circumstances are unusual for someone 
sentenced to prison is not the issue on appeal, and rather than speculate about it, 
we affirm the Court of Appeal’s remand order so that the trial court may, after 
having conducted a hearing into the question, make an informed decision. 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal, remanding this matter for notice and 
hearing under section 987.8(b), is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
MORENO, J.
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Flores 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 96 Cal.App.4th 1081 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S105762 
Date Filed: June 12, 2003 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Dale S. Fischer 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Sharon Fleming, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. 
Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, David C. Cook, Mary Sanchez and David A. Voet, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Sharon Fleming 
P.O. Box 157 
Ben Lomond, CA  95005 
(831) 336-5920 
 
David A. Voet 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 576-1338