Case Title: ROY DEAN PIERCE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROY DEAN PIERCE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 182171 P.3d 525Case Number: 05-145Decided: 11/15/2007Modified: 11/19/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
ROY DEAN 
PIERCE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Marion 
Yoder, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant 
Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Yoder.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, 
Director, Jonathan Haidsiak, Student Director, and Orintha Karns, Student 
Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program.  Argument by Ms. 
Karns.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
C.J., delivers 
the opinion of the Court.  BURKE, 
J., files a dissenting opinion; and HILL, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      A Casper police officer 
arrested Roy Dean Pierce (the appellant) for two traffic violations and 
proceeded to search the vehicle the appellant had been occupying prior to the 
arrest.  The appellant later filed a 
motion in the district court to suppress the drug-related evidence that the 
officer seized from the vehicle.  
The district court denied the motion.  On appeal, the appellant claims that the 
officer's search violated both the Wyoming Constitution and the United States 
Constitution.  We agree that the 
search violated the Wyoming Constitution and, accordingly, reverse and remand 
this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Whether the search at issue in the 
instant case violated Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution?

 
 
           
2.   Whether the search 
at issue in the instant case violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Casper police officer 
Wesley Gudahl was patrolling a local park at 5:19 a.m. on September 4, 2004, 
when he observed the appellant sitting in a parked four-door Subaru station 
wagon.  The appellant was "laying 
back in the [driver's] seat" with one foot on the dashboard and when the officer 
illuminated the vehicle, the appellant "raised his head and then flopped it 
back."  Concerned for the 
appellant's welfare and because the park was closed,1 the officer knocked on the 
appellant's window.  The appellant 
rolled down the window and the two engaged in what the officer characterized as 
a "friendly" conversation.  The 
appellant, who was cooperative and did not appear to be in distress, indicated 
that he had just been "kicked out" of his residence and was moving to another 
locationthe vehicle was indeed full of boxes, luggage and "this and that." 
 He also stated that he had driven 
that morning to a convenience store for a newspaper and coffee, and was waiting 
in the park until daylight so as not to disturb the occupants of his new 
residence.

 
 
[¶4]      Officer Gudahl 
asked the appellant for his driver's license and proof of motor vehicle 
liability insurance.  The appellant 
produced a Montana driver's license and volunteered that 
the license was suspended.  He added 
that he did not have proof of insurance because he was in the process of 
transferring the insurance from another vehicle to the Subaru.  A dispatcher confirmed that the 
appellant's license was suspended, and Officer Gudahl decided to arrest the 
appellant for driving under suspension2 and for failing to maintain 
liability insurance.

 
 
[¶5]      While Officer 
Gudahl waited for a backup officer to arrive and assist him with the appellant's 
arrest, the officer checked the Subaru's temporary registration tag because the 
appellant had indicated that he owned the vehicle.  The registration tag stated that the 
vehicle was registered to a Ms. Currie.  
The officer asked the appellant about this, and the appellant responded 
that a Mr. and Mrs. Ritchie owned the vehicle.  When Officer Gudahl explained that 
neither of them was the individual named on the temporary registration tag, the 
appellant agreed that Ms. Currie owned the vehicle, stated that the Ritchies 
were her parents, and claimed that he had permission to use the vehicle.3

 
 
[¶6]      Meanwhile, the 
backup officer arrived.  Officer 
Gudahl asked the appellant to exit the Subaru, the appellant complied, and the 
officer handcuffed the appellant.  
Officer Gudahl conducted a "pat down" search of the appellant's person, 
which search produced no additional evidence or weapons.  The backup officer placed the appellant 
in the back of Officer Gudahl's patrol car, where the appellant remained while 
Officer Gudahl searched the Subaru.

 
 
[¶7]      Officer Gudahl 
proceeded to search the area of the Subaru in which the appellant had been 
sitting, including under and behind the driver's seat and between the driver's 
seat and the front passenger seat.4  The officer noticed an open black bag on 
the floorboard behind the driver's seat.  Just inside the top of the bag was a 
partially-closed eyeglasses case containing several syringes5the syringes were "coming out from 
the glasses case" and were visible once the officer opened the rear driver's 
side door without manipulating the case.6  When the officer searched the nylon bag, 
he discovered evidence of drug usethree baggies containing suspected 
methamphetamine residue, syringes containing suspected liquid methamphetamine, a 
spoon, and several "roach clips" (paraphernalia used to smoke drugs "to make 
sure that you get it all without burning your fingers").  The officer then searched other 
containers in the vehicle and found items with suspected methamphetamine 
residue, a glass cylinder pipe containing suspected marijuana, phone numbers and 
names of individuals later determined to be involved in the drug trade, and a 
diary with a recipe and ingredients list for manufacturing methamphetamine.7

 
 
[¶8]      The appellant was 
charged with three felonies:  1) 
possession of powder or crystalline methamphetamine, third or subsequent 
offense, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2007); 2) 
possession of liquid methamphetamine, third or subsequent offense, in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i); and 3) possession of a quantity of liquid 
methamphetamine exceeding .3 grams, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(c)(ii).8  He filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence Officer Gudahl seized from the Subaru because the officer's warrantless 
search of the vehicle violated both the Wyoming Constitution and the United 
States Constitution.  After a 
hearing, the district court denied the motion.  The appellant then entered a conditional 
guilty plea9 to one felony count of possession 
of methamphetamine, third or subsequent offense, and the State moved to dismiss 
the other two charges.  The district 
court sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for twenty-four to thirty-six 
months, and this appeal followed. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      Our standard of 
review is as follows:

 
 
            
"Findings on factual issues made by the district court considering a 
motion to suppress are not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994).  Since the district court conducts the 
hearing on the motion to suppress and has the opportunity to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary 
inferences, deductions, and conclusions, evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the district court's determination.  Id.  The issue of law, whether an 
unreasonable search or seizure has occurred in violation of constitutional 
rights, is reviewed de novo.  
Id.; Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1170-71 
(Wyo. 
1997)."

 
 

Grant v. 
State, 2004 
WY 45, ¶ 10, 88 P.3d 1016, 1018 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 
(Wyo. 
1999)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   The appellant asserts that Officer 
Gudahl's warrantless, non-consensual search of the Subaru incident to the 
appellant's arrest10 violated both the Wyoming 
Constitution and the United States Constitution.  We have said that neither the Wyoming 
Constitution, nor the federal constitution,

 
 
forbids 
all searches and seizures; rather, 
they prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  Guerra v. State, 897 P.2d 447, 452 
(Wyo. 
1995).  Warrantless searches and 
seizures are unreasonable per se, 
with but a few exceptions.  Gehnert v. State, 956 P.2d 359, 362 
(Wyo. 1998); Morris v. State, 908 P.2d 931, 935 
(Wyo. 1995). . 
. .

 
 

Lancaster 
v. State, 2002 
WY 45, ¶ 61, 43 P.3d 80, 102-03 (Wyo. 2002) (emphasis in original).  We are concerned in the instant appeal 
with the applicability of the search-incident-to-arrest exception.  "The question of whether an exception 
applies to support a search without a warrant is dependent upon all of the facts 
and circumstances viewed in their entirety" and if "a defendant properly objects 
to or moves for suppression of evidence seized, the State bears the burden of 
proving that one of the exceptions applies."  Moulton v. State, 2006 WY 152, ¶ 16, 148 P.3d 38, 43 (Wyo. 2006) (citations omitted).

 
 

Wyoming 
Constitution11

 
 
[¶11]   Citing Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1999), and O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, 117 P.3d 401 (Wyo. 2005), the appellant contends that Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution12 offers greater protection than its 
federal counterpart and requires that any search of the Subaru incident to the 
appellant's arrest must not only have been incident to a lawful arrest, but also 
reasonable under all the circumstances.  
The appellant emphasizes the following circumstances in claiming that the 
search at issue in the instant case was unreasonable:  1) there was no evidence that the 
appellant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs; 2) there was no 
reasonable possibility that additional evidence of the crimes for which the 
appellant was arrested, or any other crime, remained in the vehicle; 3) the 
officer's "pat down" search of the appellant's person revealed no weapons or 
evidence of criminal activity; 4) the officer did not testify that he was 
concerned for his safety and there was no basis for the officer to believe that 
the appellant was armed or that there were weapons in the vehicle; 5) there were 
no passengers in the vehicle; and 6) the appellant was arrested outside the 
vehicle and remained handcuffed in a patrol car prior to, and during, the 
search.  The appellant concludes 
that these circumstances did not provide the officer a reasonable justification 
to search the Subaru for evidence or to prevent the appellant "from reaching 
weapons or concealing or destroying evidence."

 
 
[¶12]   The State would limit our 
consideration to whether Officer Gudahl acted reasonably in opening the Subaru's 
rear door to examine the area behind the driver's seat, which area was within 
the appellant's immediate control prior to the arrest.  Citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969), and generally the dangers inherent in any 
arrest, the premise of the State's argument is that every arrest "always" 
provides a reasonable justification for an officer to search the area within an 
arrestee's immediate control, including the area of the Subaru that Officer 
Gudahl initially searched in this case.  
The officer's search was therefore reasonable because it had not exceeded 
the area within the appellant's immediate control when the officer discovered 
the syringes in plain view.  The 
State adds that it was "of no significance" that the appellant remained 
handcuffed in a patrol car during the search because "safety interests justify 
permitting officers to search after removing the suspect."

 
 
[¶13]   We have said that 
our

 

state 
constitution provides protection of individual rights separate and independent 
from the protection afforded by the U.S. Constitution.  The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear 
in that states at a minimum must comply with its interpretations of the federal 
constitution.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 
1691, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961).  
However, it also has made clear that states may separately interpret and 
apply their own constitutions.  
Id.  In interpreting their own constitutions, 
states generally have focused upon whether their particular state constitution 
provides greater protection than the 
federal constitution.  Mogard v. City of Laramie, 2001 WY 88, ¶ 
5, 32 P.3d 313, ¶ 5 (Wyo. 2001).  
However, using federal law as a guide, states may also conclude that the 
scope of the protection provided by their constitution is the same as and 
parallel to that provided by the federal constitution. . . 
.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 

. . . 
[T]his Court historically has 
interpreted 
Wyoming's 
search and seizure provision as forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures 
and has said the question of whether a search or seizure was reasonable was one 
of law to be decided from all the circumstances.  [Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 484.]  Beyond this general reasonableness 
standard, and the warrant requirement specifically mentioned in the text of 
article 1, § 4, this Court has not extensively considered the scope of 
Wyoming's 
provision independent of the protection guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.  Rather, this Court, like the majority of 
other state courts, generally has decided search and seizure cases on the basis 
of federal Fourth Amendment law. . . .

 
 
            
In Vasquez, however, we 
performed a separate state constitutional analysis and concluded that article 1, 
§ 4 provided greater protection than the Fourth Amendment under the particular 
facts presented.  Specifically, we 
held the vehicle search at issue was permissible:  1) under the Fourth Amendment because it 
was incident to a lawful arrest; and 2) under article 1, § 4 because it was 
incident to a lawful arrest and was 
reasonable under all the circumstances in that law enforcement had a reasonable 
suspicion that one of the occupants was armed.  It was this requirement that the search 
be reasonable under all the circumstances as we said in Vasquez that distinguished Wyoming constitutional 
law from Fourth Amendment law.

 
 

O'Boyle, ¶¶ 
23-26, 117 P.3d  at 408-09 (emphasis in original).  That being the case, we have eschewed 
bright-line rules in considering non-consensual vehicle searches conducted 
incident to an arrest, and instead favor an approach "that requires a search be 
reasonable under all of the circumstances as determined by the judiciary, in 
light of the historical intent of our [state's] search and seizure 
provision."  Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 489.  See also O'Boyle, ¶ 30, 117 P.3d  at 410 
(we apply "a narrower standard, one maintaining the requirement that a search be 
reasonable under all the circumstances" and in the context of "a vehicle search 
incident to an arrest . . . Wyoming's search and seizure provision 
provide[s] greater protection than the federal provision.")  

 
 
[¶14]   We cannot say that the search at 
issue in the instant case was reasonable.  
The general

 
 
rationale 
for permitting searches incident to arrest is to prevent the arrestee from 
reaching weapons or concealing or destroying evidence.  See [Commonwealth v.] White, [543 Pa. 45,] 669 A.2d [896,] 
905 [(1995)].  A search incident to 
arrest under our state provision for these reasons is reasonable.  The inherent mobility of automobiles in 
combination with officer and public safety concerns created when a driver or a 
passenger is arrested are exigent circumstances weighing in favor of not 
restricting the scope, timing, or intensity of such a 
search.

 
 

Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 489.  Such evidentiary and safety concerns are 
not articulable from the totality of the circumstances in the instant case, 
particularly considering that:

 
 
1.      The officer 
testified that he did not observe any signs that the appellant was under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs.

 
 
2.      There was no 
reasonable possibility that evidence of the crimes for which the appellant was 
arrested remained in the vehicle.  
There also was no evidence indicating that the appellant had committed 
any other crime.  

 
 
3.      The officer's 
"pat down" search of the appellant's person did not uncover anything of 
evidentiary value. 

 
 
4.      The State does 
not attempt in its appellate brief to justify the search for evidentiary 
reasons.

 
 
5.      Our analysis of 
the circumstances does not reveal any reasonable basis for the officer to 
believe the appellant was armed or that there were weapons in the vehicle.  The appellant was arrested for driving 
under suspension and failing to maintain liability insurance.  The 
officer's "pat down" search of the appellant's person did not uncover any 
weapons.

 
 
6.      There were no 
passengers in the vehicle, two officers were at the scene, and the officers and 
the appellant had already left the scene by the time the vehicle's owner 
retrieved the vehicle.

 
 
7.      The appellant was 
handcuffed and placed in a patrol car immediately prior to, and during, the 
search.  
Handcuffs are by no means foolproof (see Mackrill v. 
State,  2004 WY 129, ¶¶ 19-21, 100 P.3d 361, 368-69 (Wyo. 
2004)), but we must view this fact in light of all of the other facts in this 
case. 

 

8.      The appellant did not 
exhibit any furtive or suspicious activity, particularly with respect to the 
contents of vehicle.  

 
 
9.      The State does not 
contend in its appellate brief that considerations such as the time of day, the 
setting, the temporary registration tag issue, etc. contributed to any kind of 
safety concern in this case.  The officer did not refer to any specific 
officer safety concerns he had that would have arisen prior to the time he 
initiated the search.

 
 
10.    The officer admittedly had no 
other information about the appellant "as opposed to any other citizen."  By the officer's 
own account, he and the appellant engaged in a friendly conversation, the 
appellant was honest about his suspended license, and the appellant seemingly 
offered a reasonable explanation for his presence at the park (the vehicle's 
contents, to the extent they were visible to the officer, would seem objectively 
to support the appellant's explanation). 

 
 
11.    The appellant cooperated with the 
officer and did not resist arrest or become combative with the officer. 

 
 
This is not to say, of course, that any of these considerations might not be viewed 
differently if it were to arise in the context of different facts.  

 
 
[¶15]   It was the State's burden to prove that 
the search-incident-to-arrest exception applied, and the applicability of such 
an exception is "dependent upon all of the facts and circumstances viewed in 
their entirety."  
Moulton, 
¶ 16, 148 P.3d  at 43.  
The State's appellate analysis instead focused almost exclusively on the 
fact that the appellant was arrested and advocates for a bright-line approach 
similar to the approach that we rejected in Vasquez.  Our state 
constitution requires more in that regardthe search must not only be incident 
to a lawful arrest, but also reasonable under the circumstances.  In other words, we 
must be able to find a reasonable basis, articulable from the totality of the 
circumstances in each case, to justify such a search. 

 
 
[¶16]   We add that the instant case is clearly 
distinguishable from other cases in which we have upheld non-consensual searches 
under Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  For example, the 
following excerpt from Clark v. State, 2006 WY 88, ¶¶ 14-15, 
138 P.3d 677, 680-81 (Wyo. 
2006), aptly summarizes our analysis of the circumstances present in Vasquez:

 
 
[A]n officer stopped a vehicle after receiving a report it 
was weaving on the highway and almost hit another vehicle.  The officer 
confirmed the driver was intoxicated and arrested him for driving under the 
influence of alcohol.  
Other officers called to the scene noticed empty cartridges and shell 
casings in the bed and passenger compartment of the pickup truck.  They removed the 
passengers and searched the vehicle, finding cocaine in a fuse box next to the 
steering wheel.

 
 
            
Mr. Vasquez argued the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  
We held the search was reasonable under Article 1, § 4 because it was 
incident to a lawful arrest and law enforcement had reason to be concerned one 
of the occupants was armed.  We also re-affirmed prior case law holding 
that Article 1, § 4 allows reasonable vehicle searches incident to arrest for 
evidence related to the crime and to prevent the arrestee from reaching weapons 
or concealing or destroying evidence.  Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 488-89.  Specifically, we 
held "the arrest justified a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle 
and all containers in it, open or closed, locked or unlocked, for evidence 
related to the crime and for weapons or contraband which presented an officer or 
a public safety concern."  We concluded:

 
 
The shell casings and the presence of two adult passengers 
presented an officer safety and a public safety concern which permitted a search 
incident to arrest although Vasquez's arrest had been accomplished and he was 
secure inside a patrol car.  It appears from the record that the 
passengers were also arrested and, although we are not told, it would seem their 
arrest created the need for the officers to secure the vehicle if left on the 
roadside.

 
 

Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 489.

 
 
[¶17]   In Andrews v. State, 
2002 WY 28, ¶¶ 6-7, 11, 40 P.3d 708, 710-11 (Wyo. 
2002), a sheriff's deputy arrested Andrews for burglary and when the deputy 
informed Andrews that he was under arrest, Andrews "immediately removed his 
wallet from his back pocket and placed it on the kitchen counter directly in 
front of him."  
The deputy "handcuffed Andrews and retrieved the wallet.  Andrews told the 
deputy that he wanted to leave his wallet at the house, but the officer opened 
it and discovered some silver dollars and fifty-cent pieces.  The officer seized 
the wallet as evidence."  Id., ¶ 11, 40 P.3d  at 711. 

 
 
[¶18]   Andrews claimed that the deputy's 
search of the wallet violated both the federal constitution and Article 1, 
Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  Id., ¶ 29, 40 P.3d  at 714.  Our federal 
constitutional analysis was as follows:

 
 
Under the Chimel ruling, law enforcement officials are allowed to 
search the area which is within the immediate control of the arrested 
person.  Vasquez, 990 P.2d  
at 480.  This 
court quoted Chimel in Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 482 
(Wyo. 1988) as follows:

 
 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting 
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the 
latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.  Otherwise, the 
officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.  In addition, it is 
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any 
evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or 
destruction.  
And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon 
or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.  A gun on a table or 
in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting 
officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.  There is ample 
justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area 
"within his immediate control"construing that phrase to mean the area from 
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.

 
 

Id., ¶ 30, 40 P.3d  at 714-15 (emphasis in original; citations 
omitted).  
After summarizing our holding in Vasquez, we then analyzed the reasonableness of the 
search of Andrews' wallet under Article 1, Section 4:

 
 
            
In this case, Deputy Jenkins told Andrews he was under arrest, and 
Andrews removed the wallet from his pocket and laid it on the kitchen counter 
directly in front of him.  Consequently, at the time when Andrews was 
informed he was under arrest, the wallet was still on his person.  [The victim] had 
reported that cash and coins were stolen from her home.  Such items could, 
of course, be concealed in a wallet and easily lost or destroyed.  It was, therefore, 
reasonable and appropriate for the officer to seize the wallet and search it for 
weapons and/or evidence.

 
 
            
The fact that, after being placed under arrest, Andrews placed the wallet 
on the kitchen counter is irrelevant to the validity of the search and 
seizure.  The 
wallet was obviously still within Andrews' immediate area.  We agree with the 
trial court's observations on this matter:

 
 
THE COURT: . . . In this case the wallet clearly was on the 
person of the Defendant.  His attempt to distance himself from the 
wallet does not preclude the officer from searching it incident to the 
arrest.

 
 
The trial court correctly denied Andrews' motion to 
suppress the evidence seized from his wallet.

 
 

Id., ¶¶ 32-33, 40 P.3d  at 715.13  

 

[¶19]   The facts in Cotton v. State, 2005 WY 115, ¶¶ 4-5, 119 P.3d 931, 932 (Wyo. 
2005), were essentially as follows: 

 
 
            
On June 22, 2003, Deputy David Stevens of the Laramie County Sheriff's 
Department stopped the vehicle Mr. Cotton was driving in a residential 
neighborhood of Cheyenne, Wyoming for having a 
cracked windshield.  
Deputy Stevens asked to see Mr. Cotton's driver's license and discovered 
it was suspended.  
Because Mr. Cotton was from out of state, Deputy Stevens placed him under 
arrest for driving with a suspended license.  There was a passenger riding with Mr. Cotton 
and so, for safety reasons, Deputy Stevens called for back-up assistance.  Deputy Poteet 
arrived at the scene a few minutes later.

 
 
            
After placing Mr. Cotton under arrest, Deputy Stevens handcuffed him and 
performed a pat-down search.  As the deputy was escorting him to the patrol 
car, Mr. Cotton asked his passenger to retrieve a shirt from the back of his 
vehicle and take it home with him.  Deputy Poteet retrieved the shirt from the 
vehicle and before handing it to the passenger, checked it for weapons.  Inside the shirt 
pocket, he discovered a baggie containing crack cocaine.  The deputies then 
searched Mr. Cotton's vehicle and found a small scale inside the trunk.  They also searched 
Mr. Cotton and found $123 in cash.

 
 
We then considered these circumstances under Article 1, 
Section 4:

 
 
Deputy Stevens testified that he called for backup 
assistance after discovering Mr. Cotton's license was suspended because he was 
making an arrest and there was another person in the vehicle.  He stated:

 
 
The reasoning being officer safety; we call another officer 
when we make an arrest for the simple fact he did have another person with him 
in the passenger seat.  I was outnumbered in that respect so I had to 
call somebody else while I had that arrest with Mr. Cotton.   

 
 
Deputy Stevens further testified that he arrested Mr. 
Cotton, handcuffed him, patted him down for safety and was placing him in the 
patrol car when Mr. Cotton asked the passenger to get the shirt and take it home 
with him.  
Deputy Stevens testified at that point:  "we wanted to make sure nothing was in the 
shirt as far as a weapon that would jeopardize officer safety."  Deputy Poteet 
retrieved the shirt, patted it down and felt something in the pocket.  He removed a clear 
plastic bag containing five or six rocks of what appeared to be crack 
cocaine.  
Altogether, the rocks measured approximately three inches in diameter and 
weighed 4.5 grams.

 
 
            
Under all of the circumstances, we conclude the search of the shirt 
pocket was reasonable.  Mr. Cotton had been arrested.  The presence of an 
adult passenger presented a safety concern causing the arresting deputy to call 
for back-up assistance.  When Mr. Cotton asked the passenger to 
retrieve the shirt, the assisting deputy was justified on the basis of safety 
concerns in retrieving the shirt himself rather than allowing the passenger to 
go back to the vehicle.  He was further justified in checking the 
shirt for weapons before handing it to the passenger.  Once he discovered 
there was something in the pocket of some substance (measuring approximately 
three inches in diameter and weighing 4.5 grams), he also was justified in 
removing it from the pocket before handing the shirt to the passenger. 

 
 

Cotton, ¶¶ 21-22, 119 P.3d  at 935-36.

 
 
[¶20]   We similarly considered the 
reasonableness of a search in Clark, 
¶¶ 19-21, 138 P.3d at 682-83:

 
 
            
The record . . . shows, after a valid stop for an equipment failure, 
Officer Cornwell discovered Mr. Clark was driving with a suspended license, had 
a prior outstanding ticket in Wyoming for the same offense and had a warrant out 
for his arrest in Colorado for failing to appear on a domestic violence 
charge.  
Officer Cornwell recognized Mr. Kobbe [(the passenger)] from a prior 
arrest in Powell related to methamphetamine.  In addition, the officer observed suspicious 
behavior on the part of both individuals, including Mr. Kobbe disappearing from 
view momentarily inside the vehicle.  He also detected the odor of alcohol coming 
from the vehicle and saw the taped Nintendo box behind the driver's seat and did 
not know what might be inside.  Given the suspicious circumstances and the 
presence of an adult passenger, he called for back-up assistance.

 
 
            
When the search commenced, Mr. Clark had been lawfully arrested.  By the time Officer 
Cornwell began to assist with the search, he knew Mr. Kobbe was 
intoxicated.  
He also knew the Nintendo box had been partially covered by someone 
inside the vehicle after he first observed it.  Although Mr. Kobbe was out of the vehicle, he 
was not under arrest and was standing next to the vehicle.

 
 
            
Officer Cornwell testified the vehicle was a two-door Ford Probe and he 
and Officer Martinez searched the driver's side floorboard console area, 
passenger side floorboard seat area and directly behind the driver and passenger 
seat incident to Mr. Clark's arrest.  When the search commenced, the Nintendo box 
was located behind the driver's seat.  Officer Martinez picked it up and placed it 
on the center console where Officer Cornwell found it during his search of the 
passenger side of the vehicle.  The presence of an intoxicated, adult 
passenger presented an officer safety concern which permitted a search incident 
to arrest although Mr. Clark had already been arrested and was secure inside the 
patrol car.  
The presence of a box the size of a Nintendo, the contents of which were 
unknown and which had been partially covered up by someone inside the vehicle 
after the initial stop, presented further officer safety concerns justifying the 
warrantless search incident to arrest.  Paraphrasing what we said in Vasquez, Mr. 
Clark's arrest justified a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle 
and all containers in it, open or closed, locked or unlocked, for weapons or 
contraband which presented an officer safety concern.  Having carefully 
reviewed de novo 
the evidence before us in light of our precedent, we hold the search was 
incident to a lawful arrest and reasonable under all the circumstances because 
of officer safety concerns.

 
 
[¶21]   The concerns articulable from the 
totality of the circumstances in these cases are not present in the instant 
case.

 
 

United 
States Constitution

 
 
[¶22]   The appellant also argues that the 
search at issue in this case violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.14  However, we conclude that the search clearly 
falls within the purview of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2869 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981), which case "established . . . that arrest justifies the 
search of a [vehicle's] passenger compartment, including any open or closed 
container in it, without consideration of the privacy interest involved."  O'Boyle, ¶ 30, 117 
P.3d at  410.

 
 
[¶23]   One final comment seems 
appropriate.  
This opinion is founded in Article I, Section 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution, particularly as interpreted and applied in O'Boyle and Vasquez, 
passim.  
The dissent, to the contrary, relies almost entirely upon United States 
Supreme Court cases and the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  
It is little more than a plea for the adoption of a rule that officer 
safety always trumps a reasonableness analysis under the totality of the 
circumstances when an arrest is made, and it is a barely disguised plea that we 
abandon O'Boyle 
and Vasquez 
and adopt the Belton 
bright-line rule that we rejected therein.  And finally, United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973), cited twice in 
the dissenting opinion in support of the concept of searching a vehicle incident 
to the arrest of its driver, involved a search of the arrestee's person, not his 
vehicle.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶24]   Having found that the search in the 
instant case violated Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, we 
reverse the denial of the appellant's suppression motion and remand this matter 
to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 
BURKE, Justice, dissenting.

 
 
[¶25]   I respectfully dissent, and would 
affirm the district court's decision that this was a valid search incident to 
arrest and reasonable under all of the circumstances.  In my view, the 
majority reaches the opposite result by misapplying the standard of review, 
marginalizing officer safety as a factor to be weighed in the analysis, and 
overlooking the most meaningful difference between the state and federal 
standards.

 
 
[¶26]   As part of its standard of review, the 
majority recites that "evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 
district court's determination."  It then proceeds to view the evidence in Mr. 
Pierce's favor.  
As just one example, the majority cites this factor in finding the search 
invalid:

 
 
By the officer's own account, he and the appellant engaged 
in a friendly conversation, the appellant was honest about his suspended 
license, and the appellant seemingly offered a reasonable explanation for his 
presence at the park.

 
 
The record presents a rather different picture.  Mr. Pierce was in a 
municipal park in violation of a city ordinance.  When the officer initiated contact, Mr. 
Pierce "raised his head and then flopped it back," a reaction that caused the 
officer concern for Mr. Pierce's welfare.  Mr. Pierce admitted that his license was 
suspended, but attempted to mislead the officer by saying that he "did not have 
proof of insurance as it was in the process of getting transferred from his old 
car to the car he was driving now."  He also provided the officer with inaccurate 
and misleading information concerning ownership of the vehicle.  The majority 
portrays Mr. Pierce as a model citizen, when the facts of record, 
particularly viewed in the light most favorable to the district court's ruling, 
suggest otherwise.

 
 
[¶27]   It is the majority's weighing of 
officer safety, or rather its failure to weigh it properly in determining 
reasonableness, that I find most disturbing.  There is evidence in the record indicating 
that Mr. Pierce's arrest raised safety concerns.  For example, the 
officer called for backup and waited for it to arrive before arresting 
Mr. Pierce.  
Upon making the arrest, the officer placed Mr. Pierce in handcuffs and 
removed him to the police vehicle before initiating the search.  In addition, the 
officer testified that leaving an unattended vehicle in a public park raised 
concerns about community safety.  

 
 
[¶28]   The majority appears to ignore this 
evidence, and instead relies on the fact that the officer who arrested Mr. 
Pierce did not express concern for his safety.  However, "the test of officer safety is 
objective rather than subjective, and therefore the officer need not personally 
be in fear" to justify a search.  United 
States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d 1203, 1213 (10th Cir. 2005).  "[I]n judging the 
legality of a search, courts must apply an objective standard and will not be 
bound by the subjective beliefs of the arresting officer."  United States v. 
Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 72 (2d Cir. 1974) (internal punctuation omitted).  See also Brown v. 
State, 738 P.2d 1092, 1099 
(Wyo. 1987) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Whether or not the 
officer who arrested Mr. Pierce subjectively feared for his safety, the 
objective fact remains that he took routine safety precautions when arresting 
Mr. Pierce.

 
 
[¶29]   The majority also seems to adopt 
Mr. Pierce's suggestion that officer safety concerns arise only when the 
nature of the crime makes it reasonable to suspect the presence of weapons.  However, it fails 
to provide any guidance to help law enforcement officials determine which 
arrests present safety risks and which do not.  I agree with the United States Supreme Court, 
which has said it is not inclined, "on the basis of what seems to us to be a 
rather speculative judgment," to base the authority to search incident to arrest 
on the nature of the crime.  United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234, 94 S. Ct. 467, 476, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427, 440 (1973).15  As a practical matter, when making an arrest, 
a police officer should not be required to make fine distinctions about which 
crimes imply the presence of weapons and which do not.

 
 
[¶30]   Arrests are inherently dangerous.  "Every arrest must 
be presumed to present a risk of danger to the arresting officer."  Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7, 102 S. Ct. 812, 817, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778, 785 (1982).  For that reason, the "constitutionality of a 
search incident to an arrest does not depend on whether there is any indication 
that the person arrested possesses weapons or evidence.  The fact of a 
lawful arrest, standing alone, authorizes a search."  Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 
35, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2631, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343, 348 (1979); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
762-63, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 694 (1969).

 
 
[¶31]   It is well established that an officer 
is allowed to search an arrested person and the area within his or her immediate 
control.  
Clark v. State, 2006 WY 88, ¶ 16, 138 P.3d 677, 681 (Wyo. 
2006); Guzman v. 
State, 2003 WY 118, ¶ 13, 76 P.3d 825, 828 (Wyo. 
2003).  Vasquez v. State, 
990 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1999) 
says that such a search is allowed when there is reason to suspect the presence 
of evidence or weapons, but it does not say that a search is allowed only when there is 
evidence that weapons are present.  Although it would seem obvious that every 
arrest involves officer safety concerns, it will be the rare case indeed when 
the officer will find "empty gun cartridges or casings in the bed of the 
truck."  
Id. at 480.  There is no dispute 
that the officer validly arrested Mr. Pierce.  Under our prior 
precedent, the officer was then allowed to search Mr. Pierce and the area within 
his immediate control at the time of the arrest.  Surely, the officer must be allowed to 
conduct the search in a safe manner.

 
 
[¶32]   Under the majority opinion, however, 
the officer apparently lost the authority to search Mr. Pierce's vehicle 
because he removed Mr. Pierce from the vehicle, handcuffed him, and placed 
him in the patrol car.  The majority does not indicate at what point 
the officer lost the authority to conduct the search.  This fails to 
provide sufficient guidance to allow law enforcement officials to determine when 
a search is unconstitutional, and thereby "threaten[s] the stability that law 
enforcement expects and needs from the rules set forth by this Court governing 
officer conduct."  
Bailey v. 
State, 12 P.3d 173, 179 (Wyo. 
2000).  Must an 
officer, trying to comply with the majority's ruling, conduct the search while 
the arrested person is still in the vehicle, before he is placed in 
handcuffs?  It 
does not "make sense to prescribe a constitutional test that is entirely at odds 
with safe and sensible police procedures."  United 
States v. Fleming, 677 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 887-88 (9th Cir. 
1991). 

 
 
[¶33]   The fundamental purpose underlying the 
exclusionary rule is prevention of police misconduct.  As we recently 
observed:

 
 
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter law 
enforcement from obtaining evidence through illegal means.  However, the public 
has a vital interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them 
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the 
truth.  
[A]pplication of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its 
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. The penalties visited 
upon the Government, and in turn upon the public because its officers have 
violated the law, must bear some relation to the purposes which the law is to 
serve.

 
 

Hall v. State, 2007 WY 138, ¶ 11, 166 P.3d 875, 878 (Wyo. 
2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  Considering the 
actions of the officer who arrested Mr. Pierce, it is unclear what conduct the 
majority seeks to discourage.  The officer acted in accordance with 
established procedure, with due regard for the safety of himself, the other 
officers, the community, and Mr. Pierce. To the extent his safety 
precautions were routine police procedure, that underscores the point:  routine police 
procedure treats every arrest as dangerous.

 
 
[¶34]   A search incident to arrest may be 
lawfully performed only when a valid custodial arrest is made, and an arrest may 
be made only with probable cause.  "The search incident to arrest is reasonable 
. . . because the privacy interest protected by that constitutional guarantee is 
legitimately abated by the fact of arrest."  Robinson, 414 U.S.  at 237-38, 94 S. Ct.  at 477.  Further, under the 
Wyoming constitutional standard, as under the 
federal standard, a search incident to arrest must be conducted "as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest."  New 
York 
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 
101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 775 (1981).  Moreover, it is important to note that the 
occupant of a vehicle has a relatively low expectation of privacy.  Vasquez, 990 P.2d  
at 488.  
Wyoming law has long recognized that 
automobiles are less protected from warrantless searches than homes.  State v. Kelly, 268 P. 571, 572 
(Wyo. 1928).  Together, these factors establish that an 
officer's authority to perform a vehicle search incident to arrest does not 
unduly impinge on individual rights.

 
 
[¶35]   To be reasonable under all of the 
circumstances, a search incident to arrest must be reasonable in scope.  See Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 489.  
It is at this step in our analysis that the Wyoming standard varies most significantly 
from the bright-line Belton rule.   Under Belton, an officer 
may search the entire passenger compartment of a vehicle, including containers, 
open or closed, without further justification.  Under Vasquez, the officers were allowed to search the entire 
passenger compartment, including the inside of a closed fuse box, based on 
reasonable suspicion that weapons or evidence were present.  If the officer in 
Mr. Pierce's case had conducted such an intrusive search, it could well 
have violated Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  However, the 
officer in Mr. Pierce's case searched only the driver's seat and its vicinity, 
that area within Mr. Pierce's immediate control at the time of his 
arrest.  He 
opened the back door of the vehicle only to complete the search of the area 
immediately behind the driver's seat.  There, he saw the syringes in plain 
view.  The 
district court analyzed the evidence presented and concluded that the search was 
reasonable, stating:   

 
 
Additionally, I think I agree with [defense counsel] that 
under the Vasquez case, we need to look at a reasonableness type 
standard.  I 
think you articulated that very well.

 
 
It seemed to me from the testimony that I heard from this 
officer, who was very straightforward in my opinion, was that it was extremely 
reasonable for him to take a look at the interior of the vehicle.  I presume that he 
opened the front door.  And I think also in viewing the compartment 
area of the vehicle, his opening the back door was completely reasonable.  He described it as 
a four-door vehicle, so there would be four doors into the compartment.  And I would think 
opening any of the doors to undertake the search incident to arrest would be 
reasonable.  
And I think it would especially have application in this case given the 
area that he looked was right behind the front seat.  And clearly that 
would be within the wingspan area or the area of reach from the area the 
defendant was sitting when he made contact with law enforcement.  

 
 
I agree with the district court.

 
 
[¶36]   The majority concedes that the search 
was valid under the federal standard established in Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860.  We 
rejected the Belton bright-line rule in Vasquez, 990 P.2d 476, but with the 
reassurance that "[i]t will not be common that a search of an automobile 
incident to arrest will violate" the Wyoming Constitution, "and our decision 
should not raise new concerns for law enforcement."  Id. at 489.  In spite of this 
reassurance, the decision reached by the majority significantly alters the 
landscape for law enforcement.  There is nothing uncommon about the officer's 
actions in this case.  
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the procedures used were 
anything other than routine.  Simply put, this is not one of those rare 
cases that would justify different results under federal and state 
constitutional analyses. 

 
 

HILL, Justice, dissenting.

 
 
[¶37]   I agree with the material part of 
Justice Burke's 
dissent.  
However, I write separately to emphasize my concern that the narrow slot 
we carved out in the Vasquez case appears to be widened by the majority 
decision in this case, for reasons that I find unconvincing.  Vasquez himself did 
not reap the benefit of the Vasquez decision, so Pierce is the first to be accorded 
the enhanced protections it provides to Wyoming citizens.  Given all of the 
facts and circumstances detailed in both the majority opinion and the dissent, 
albeit with slightly different spins, I am convinced that the district court's 
decision to deny Pierce's motion to suppress was correct and consequently I 
would affirm both that decision, as well as the district court's judgment and 
sentence.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The park is apparently closed, pursuant to a city 
ordinance, between 12:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m.

 
 

2Such arrests are, according to the officer, a "common" 
police practice in Casper.

 
 

3Officer Gudahl requested that a dispatcher contact Ms. 
Currie, and at some point received confirmation that she owned the Subaru and 
had allowed the appellant to use it.  The officers did not impound the Subaru, but 
allowed Ms. Currie to retrieve it from the scene.  She arrived some time after the arresting 
officer and the appellant had left.

 
 
Officer Gudahl testified at the suppression hearing that it 
was his policy to take a "quick look through" a vehicle for dangerous items such 
as weapons before releasing the vehicle to another party.  The officer 
characterized this as a "community safety issue."  We decline to consider herein whether 
"community safety" may have provided a reasonable basis for searching the 
vehicle.  The 
record is vague as to the origin, and nature, of this policy, as well as the 
timing of the officer's search relative to when Ms. Currie retrieved the 
vehicle.  The 
focus of the suppression hearing was the applicability of the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception (the officer testified that his search of 
the Subaru was "incident to the [appellant's] arrest" and the district court 
stated that the "real issue presented [was] whether there was a legal or illegal 
search incident to arrest").  To the extent that a public safety concern 
might have been relevant, we note that the prosecutor ultimately did not argue 
the community safety issue as a basis to justify the search during his closing 
argument at the suppression hearing, and the district court did not rely on the 
community safety issue in denying the suppression motion.  On appeal, the 
State briefly referred to the officer's testimony in this regard while reciting 
the facts in its appellate brief, and also briefly mentioned the issue at oral 
argument.  
However, these references were never accompanied by any cogent argument 
or citation to pertinent legal authority.  Simply stated, the developed facts of this 
case are not sufficient for this Court to engage in an analysis of when 
community safety concerns would justify an officer's search of an arrestee's car 
that will be left at the scene, rather than impounded.  Furthermore, while 
the inventory search of an impounded vehicle has been recognized as reasonable 
by the United States Supreme Court, and by this Court, the law is not nearly so 
clear in regard to non-impounded vehicles.  See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S. Ct. 738, 
93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 
49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976); Johnson v. State, 2006 WY 79, ¶¶ 9-10, 137 P.3d 903, 905-06 (Wyo. 
2006); Jack E. Call, Defining the Community Caretaking Function, 
HeinOnline21 Policing Int'l J. Police Strat. & Mgmt. 269 (1998).  The most we can say 
is that, just as the inventory search concept has been used to create an 
exception to the constitutional warrant requirement, thereby allowing the search 
of an impounded vehicle, some reasonable articulable suspicion of a community 
safety issue, or the advancement of the officer's community caretaker function 
must be identified to create a similar exception to the warrant requirement, 
allowing the search of a non-impounded vehicle.

 
 

4According to the officer, these areas were "easily" within 
arm's reach of the appellant as he sat in the Subaru.

 
 

5The officer could see part of the bag when the appellant 
opened the Subaru's front driver's side door to exit the vehicle.  However, it was not 
until the officer opened the rear driver's side door that he actually saw the 
syringes.  The 
officer testified that he opened the rear door to get a better look at the bag 
so that he did not need to "stretch around" the driver's seat and "contort 
[himself]."

 
 

6Officer Gudahl "immediately" recognized that syringes are 
associated with methamphetamine use and according to his training, syringes also 
can be dangerous weapons.

 
 

7The appellant acknowledged to the backup officer that 
everything in the vehicle was his and that he wanted the contents released to 
the individual who retrieved the vehicle.

 
 

8Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (LexisNexis 2007) provides, in 
pertinent part, as follows:

 
 
(c)   It is unlawful for any person knowingly 
or intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was 
obtained directly from, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order of a 
practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except 
as otherwise authorized by this act.  Any person who violates this subsection:

(i)    And has in his possession a 
controlled substance in the amount set forth in this paragraph is guilty of 
a misdemeanor . . . .  
Any person convicted for a third or subsequent offense under this 
paragraph, including convictions for violations of similar laws in other 
jurisdictions, shall be imprisoned for a term not more than five (5) years, 
fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), or both.  For purposes of 
this paragraph, the amounts of a controlled substance are as follows:

. . . .

(B)    For a controlled substance in 
liquid form, no more than three-tenths (3/10) of a gram;

(C)    For a controlled substance in 
powder or crystalline form, no more than three (3) grams;

. . . .

(ii)   And has in his possession 
methamphetamine . . . in an amount greater than those set forth in paragraph 
(c)(i) of this section, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than seven (7) years, a fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars 
($15,000.00), or both;

. . . . 

 
 

9The appellant reserved the right to seek this Court's 
review of the district court's denial of his suppression motion pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2), which rule provides that with "the approval of the court and 
the consent of the attorney for the state, a defendant may enter a conditional 
plea of guilty . . . reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the 
judgment, to seek review of the adverse determination of any specified pretrial 
motion," and that a "defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to 
withdraw the plea."

 
 

10The lawfulness of the officer's initial contact with the 
appellant, of the appellant's arrest, and of the officer's search of the 
appellant's person incident to that arrest, are not at issue in this 
appeal.

 
 

11The State does not question the adequacy of the independent 
state constitutional analysis the appellant presented to the district court, or 
to this Court on appeal.

 
 

12Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution provides 
as follows:

 
 

            
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by 
affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched or the person or 
thing to be seized.

 
 

13The State claims that we "affirmatively applied" Chimel under 
Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution in Andrews and we are 
therefore bound to do the same in the instant case.  However, Andrews involved: 
1) the search of an item that was on Andrews' person at the time of his arrest; 
2) an item that Andrews then removed from his person in the officer's presence, 
but that clearly still remained within Andrews' immediate area; 3) a reasonable 
possibility that, under the circumstances, Andrews could still gain possession 
of the wallet; and 4) an evidentiary basis for the officer to search the 
wallet.

  

14The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides as follows:

 
 
            
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.

 
 

15"Although we are not bound by the Fourth Amendment 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in this case, we may certainly 
follow its lead when we find its reasoning persuasive."  Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 17, 146 P.3d 492, 497 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 309 
(Wyo. 1999)).