Case Title: State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. v. White

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-09-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. v. White1992 WY 122837 P.2d 1095Case Number: 91-191Decided: 09/25/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel. WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, Petitioner 
(Objector-Defendant)

 
 
v.

 
 
WESLEY M. 
WHITE, Respondent (Employee-Claimant).

 
 
Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General, 
and Joe MacGuire, Assistant Attorney General, for 
appellant.

 
 
George Santini of Graves, Santini 
& Villemez, Cheyenne, for appellee.  

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, 
CARDINE, URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, JJ.  

 
 
*Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument. 

 
 
CARDINE, Justice. 

 
 
[¶1.]     Wesley White, appellee, 
received a worker's compensation 51 percent permanent partial disability award 
as a result of an administrative agency contested case hearing. The State of 
Wyoming 
appeals the Order Awarding Permanent Partial Disability Benefits. 

 
 
[¶2.]     The award is modified 
and, as modified, affirmed. 

 
 
[¶3.]     The issue presented for 
our determination, as stated by appellant, is: 

 
 
Did the hearing examiner base his 
award of permanent partial disability on some evidence, or was it based purely 
on speculation? 

 
 
[¶4.]     White was employed by 
TCI Cablevision as a cable installer. He sustained a low back herniated disc 
injury in a accident in the course of his employment when a gust of wind caught 
a 28-foot ladder being unloaded. White was 28 years of age at the time [*2]  of the accident, a high school graduate, 
and was earning $ 6.49 per hour with TCI. His prior employment consisted of 
working as an apprentice electrician, cable installer, dock worker, and in 
construction work. His highest pay was $ 14 to $ 16 per hour as an apprentice 
electrician. His hourly pay at other work was: $ 4.00 with Fitch Electric; $ 
6.25 to $ 7.25 with Union Pacific Railroad; $ 6.00 to $ 9.00 with 
Wayne's Electric; and $ 9.50 
with Vandree Electric. 

 
 
[¶5.]     The parties agree that 
White's physical impairment was 11 percent. The amount of that award was paid by 
the State without objection. However, the State now claims that half of that 
award, or 5 1/2 percent, was mistakenly paid and should be recouped as a credit 
against any award for loss of earning capacity. The State concedes that it "does 
not take issue with the fact that the Appellee is entitled to an award for the 
vocational loss," but states its only objection is that the award is based upon 
speculation and not upon facts and evidence. 

 
 
[¶6.]     Wyoming Statute 
27-14-405(b)(xvi) provides in pertinent part the source for an award for loss of 
earning capacity as follows: 

 
 
One (1) factor to be considered is 
the ability of the employee [*3]  to 
continue to perform work for which he was reasonably suited by experience or 
training prior to the injury * * *.

 
 
The award in this case was for 
disability caused by impairment of earning capacity which is loss of the ability 
to perform work for which White was reasonably suited by experience or training. 
Impairment of earning capacity is determined by taking into consideration the 
following factors:

 
 
(a) Physical impairment -- the 
nature and extent of injury.

(b)The worker's age. 

(c) The worker's education. 

(d) Ability to continue pre-injury 
employment. 

(e) Post-injury employment 
prospects. 

(f) Pre-injury earnings. 

(g) Post-injury earnings. 

 
 
No single factor of those listed 
above is determinative of the extent or existence of loss of earning capacity. 
They are all evidence to be considered together with all of the other facts and 
circumstances in determining whether a loss of earning capacity in fact occurred 
and, if so, the percentage of loss. McCarty v. Bear Creek Uranium Co., 
694 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1985). 

 
 
[¶7.]     The State at first 
objected to White's claim for a permanent partial disability award for 
impairment of earning capacity.  
[*4]  Then, at the hearing on 
White's claim, it conceded an eight percent loss of earning capacity based upon 
the difference between earnings at the time of injury and evidence that he could 
be employed in a sedentary electrical job at $ 6 per hour. We have said that 
loss of earnings is evidence which may be considered, but such loss does not 
necessarily establish the loss of earning capacity which may be more or less 
than the loss of earnings. McCarty. 

 
 
[¶8.]     The struggle over 
compensation for impairment of earning capacity most often surfaces when the 
worker is trained and can work in occupations, some of which pay more and some 
less than the employment engaged in at the time of injury. For example, suppose 
that a worker can be employed in six different occupations. Because of physical 
injury he has lost the ability to work in four of those occupations. But he can 
earn more in the two occupations remaining than he could in any of the four no 
longer available. Has he suffered a loss of earning capacity? If only his pay 
when employed in one of the occupations remaining to him is considered, the 
answer must be no. But if his ability to be employed when the higher pay may not 
be available is [*5]  considered, 
then clearly there is a loss of earning capacity. It is this loss that is 
compensated pursuant to the provision of W.S. 27-14-405(b)(xvi), "ability of the 
employee to continue to perform work for which he was reasonably suited by 
experience or training * * *."

 
 
[¶9.]     The nature and extent 
of disability are factual determinations to be made by the hearing officer from 
the testimony and evidence adduced. Banda v. State ex rel. Workers' Comp. 
Div., 789 P.2d 124 (Wyo. 1990). The hearing officer's findings of 
fact as stated in the decision letter were:

 
 
Employee-Claimant is 30 years old. 
Employee-Claimant obtained his high school diploma in 1978.  His work history prior to the March 28, 
1989, compensable back injury included the cable installer position held at TCI 
Cablevision, where Employee- Claimant's ending wage rate was $ 6.49 per 
hour.  Prior to that, 
Employee-Claimant held employment as an apprentice electrician with various 
employers, earning hourly wage rates of approximately $ 4.00 (Fitch Electric), $ 
6.25 to $ 7.25 (Union Pacific Railroad), $ 7.50 (Texas Oil Electric), $ 6.00 to 
$ 9.00 (Wayne's Electric), and $ 9.50 
(Vandree Electric). Employee-Claimant's [*6]  employment as an apprentice electrician 
with these various employers spanned the period 1978 through 1987. At various 
times during this period, Employee-Claimant also held employment as a casual 
dock worker at Consolidated Freightways, earning an equivalent wage rate of 
approximately $ 7.81 per hour, a computer operator at First Wyoming Bank 
Corporation, earning approximately $ 6.00 per hour, various construction work 
with his father's business, and commercial electrical work in the Los Angeles, 
California, area, earning approximately $ 14.00 to $ 16.00 per hour. A majority 
of Employee-Claimant's pre-injury work experience was as an apprentice 
electrician. [footnote omitted]

 
 
[¶10.]  Judicial review of agency action, is 
governed by W.S. 16-3-114(c) which provides:

 
 
(c) To the extent necessary to make 
a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant 
questions of lab interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and 
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In 
making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial [*7]  error. The 
reviewing court shall: 

 
 
* * * * *

 
 
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings and conclusions found to be: 

 
 
* * * * *

 
 
(E) Unsupported by substantial 
evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute. 

 
 
[¶11.]  The standard of review to which we adhere 
is found in Hohnholt v. Basin Electric Power Co-op, 784 P.2d 233, 234 
(Wyo. 1989), 
wherein we state: 

 
 
We examine the entire record to 
determine if there is substantial evidence to support an agency's findings. If 
the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot properly 
substitute our judgment for that of the agency, and must uphold the findings on 
appeal.  Substantial evidence is 
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the 
conclusions of the agency. It is more than a scintilla of evidence. 

 
 

quoting Trout v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 721 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Wyo. 1986). 

 
 
[¶12.]  In State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Comp. Div. v. Colvin, 681 P.2d 269 
(Wyo. 1984), 
the worker lost part of his hand as a result of an injury while employed in a 
sawmill.  [*8]  He was trained and had previously been 
employed as a mechanical draftsman.  
An award for loss of earning capacity was affirmed. In State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Comp. Div. v. Borodine, 
784 P.2d 228 (Wyo. 1989), the worker was a trained, 
experienced geologist. She was injured while employed as a painter/sandblaster 
and could no longer perform that work. Her injury would not have prevented her 
from returning to the higher paying occupation as a geologist. An award for her 
loss of earning capacity was affirmed. 

 
 
[¶13.]  In this case the hearing officer awarded 
White a 40 percent permanent partial disability for impairment of earning 
capacity. Although the precise basis for the award is not apparent from the 
record, we do note that White's highest pre-injury pay for electrical work in 
the Cheyenne 
area was $ 9.50, and there was testimony that post injury he could probably be 
employed at $ 4.00 to $ 5.00 per hour. The wage differential approximates the 40 
percent award by the hearing officer. We have repeatedly said that wage 
differential alone is not determinative of the loss of earning capacity. Where, 
however, the loss of earning capacity is consistent with the [*9]  award, as in this case, and it, 
considered with all other evidence, is substantially in favor of the award, it 
is held sufficient. In this case there was substantial evidence to support the 
award of the hearing officer. 

 
 
[¶14.]  Finally, we note that the hearing officer 
did not give the State credit for the 5 1/2 percent physical impairment award 
mistakenly paid. Wyoming Statute 27-14-605(a) provides: 

 
 
If a determination is made in favor 
of or on behalf of an employee for any benefits under this act, an application 
may be made to the division by any party within four (4) years from the date of 
the last payment for additional medical and disability benefits or for a modification of the amount of 
benefits  on the ground 
of increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or fraud. 
 [emphasis added] 

 
 
[¶15.]  The term "mistake" in this statute refers 
to a mistake in the determination of a material fact that has been made by a 
fact finder. Conn v. Ed Wederski 
Const. Co., 668 P.2d 649, 653 (Wyo. 1983). Thus, where a hearing examiner 
erroneously granted benefits to a claimant who was later determined to be 
ineligible,  [*10]  the trial court acted properly on the 
claimant's petition by granting relief from the earlier order, terminating 
benefits and imposing a lien for repayment of the benefits. Mini Mart, Inc. 
v. Wordinger, 719 P.2d 206 (Wyo. 1986). 

 
 
[¶16.]  The State at the hearing in this case 
stated in its opening argument: 

 
 
Your Honor, the State's position in 
this case * * * is that Mr. White was injured and he was assessed as having an 
11 percent physical impairment. However, I'd like to bring to the Court's 
attention that a careful reading of the physical impairment as it was put forth 
by the physician indicated that he allocated half of the 11 percent to prior 
injuries and then half of the 11 percent to the current March 1989 injury. 

 
 
So in fact he should have had a 
five-and-a-half percent physical impairment for this particular case. Through an 
error made by the Division he was actually paid for the full 11 percent.  So our position is that he rightfully 
received five-and-a-half percent and he received an additional five-and-a-half 
percent which we are going to consider part of the vocational. 

 
 
A footnote to the hearing examiner's 
decision letter states: 

 
 
The evidence [*11]  indicates that the Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division awarded Employee-Claimant the entire 11% permanent 
impairment, despite prior notification that one-half of the impairment 
pre-existed Employee-Claimant's March 28,1989, compensable injury.  Accordingly, the Division now requests 
that the "overpayment" be applied to offset any amount of additional permanent 
disability compensation awarded Employee-Claimant. 

 
 
[¶17.]  Later in the opinion, however, when the 
hearing officer made the award, he did not give the State credit for the 5 1/2 
percent mistakenly paid. Instead, the decision letter simply states that: 

 
 
Employee-Claimant will be awarded a 
permanent partial disability of 51%, whole body.  This award is intended to be the total 
amount to be awarded for Employee-Claimant's compensable permanent disability 
and, accordingly, includes the 11% physical impairment previously awarded. The 
remaining 40%, whole body, is to he paid Employee-Claimant on a monthly basis 
over the next 24 months, at the monthly rate of $ 1,029.04.  

 
 
[¶18.]  It seems clear that the hearing officer 
was aware of the State's claim and agreed that 5 1/2 percent had been mistakenly 
awarded but neglected to give the State credit [*12]  against the total benefit award for the 
mistaken overpayment. The hearing officer explicitly broke the award into two 
components: the eleven percent already awarded and the forty percent newly 
awarded. This breakdown did not include credit for the 5 1/2 percent 
overpayment. 

 
 
[¶19.]  If the order were somehow ambiguous, or 
we could ascertain that credit was granted as part of the 51 percent award, we 
might hold differently. However, under the circumstances, the State is 
rightfully entitled to recoup the mistakenly-paid portion by repayment or credit 
against the future award.  
Accordingly, the order of award is modified by reducing the total amount 
to 45 1/2 percent. Eleven percent of the total having been paid, there is due 
appellee the balance of his permanent partial disability award of 34 1/2 percent 
to be paid over 24 months as ordered by the hearing officer. 

 
 
[¶20.]  The award, as modified, is 
affirmed.