Case Title: State v. Langlois

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016AP001409-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 73 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP1409-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Joseph T. Langlois, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 371 Wis. 2d 302, 901 N.W.2d 768  
PDC No:  2017 WI App 44 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 20, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 17, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Washington 
 
JUDGE: 
James K. Muehlbauer 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
R.G. BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed and an oral argument by Andrew J. Jarmuz and The Law 
Office of Andrew J. Jarmuz, LLC, Edina, Minnesota.   
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed and 
an oral argument by Donald V. Latorraca, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney 
general.
 
 
2018 WI 73
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2016AP1409-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2014CF43) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph T. Langlois, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Langlois, 
2017 WI App 44, 377 Wis. 2d 302, 901 N.W.2d 768, affirming the 
Washington County circuit court's1 judgment of conviction for 
Joseph T. Langlois ("Langlois") for homicide by negligent 
handling 
of 
a 
dangerous 
weapon, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.08(1) 
(2015-16),2 
and 
its 
denial 
of 
Langlois' 
postconviction motions.  
                                                 
1 The Honorable James K. Muehlbauer presided. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
On February 4, 2014, Langlois and his brother, Jacob, 
got into a fight.  The fight turned physical and Langlois, 
having picked up a fillet knife from a nearby nightstand, 
stabbed Jacob, fatally injuring him.  The State charged Langlois 
with first-degree reckless homicide by use of a dangerous 
weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.02(1), and, at trial, 
sought conviction on any one of three offenses: the offense 
charged, or either of two lesser-included offenses, second-
degree reckless homicide by use of a dangerous weapon, contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1), or homicide by negligent handling of 
a dangerous weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.08(1).  The 
jury found Langlois guilty of homicide by negligent handling of 
a dangerous weapon. 
¶3 
Post-conviction, Langlois filed two motions, both of 
which challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury 
instructions relating to Langlois' defenses of accident and 
self-defense.  Langlois argued that omissions in the jury 
instructions were reversible error on any one of three grounds: 
ineffective assistance of counsel, due process violation, or 
interest of justice.  The circuit court denied both motions, 
concluding that the evidence was sufficient and that the jury 
instructions were not erroneous.  Langlois appealed. 
¶4 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
affirmed. 
 
Langlois, 
377 
Wis. 2d 302, ¶¶1, 51.  It held that the circuit "court's 
instructions to the jury, when viewed in their entirety and not 
in isolation, were not erroneous."  Id., ¶36.  It therefore 
concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective because failure 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
3 
 
to object to correct instructions is not deficient performance; 
that there was no due process violation; and that Langlois was 
not entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice.  Id., 
¶¶36-37.  The court of appeals also concluded that the evidence 
was sufficient to support the verdict because a rational jury 
could have found that the knife was a dangerous weapon; that the 
way Langlois handled the weapon constituted criminal negligence; 
and that Langlois had not acted in self-defense where he had had 
the opportunity to leave the room without using force.  Id., 
¶¶48-49, 51.  Langlois petitioned for review. 
¶5 
On review, we consider two issues.  First, we consider 
whether the jury instructions were erroneous.  We conclude that 
they were not, because, taken as a whole, they accurately state 
the law.  Consequently, we conclude that there is no basis for 
Langlois' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, there is 
no due process violation, and reversal in the interest of 
justice is not appropriate.  Second, we consider whether there 
was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.  We 
conclude that there was, because the evidence, viewed most 
favorably to sustaining the conviction, supports a finding of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
¶6 
Thus, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
4 
 
¶7 
The events of February 4, 2014, are not subject to 
significant dispute.3  Langlois, then 17 years old, had stayed 
home from school that day, and Jacob, then 20 years old, was 
home packing some things before leaving for the military.4  When 
Karen, their mother, came home from work at about 1:40 p.m., 
they were both in their rooms.  She checked on Langlois first, 
who told her that Jacob was packing for boot camp and that he 
was packing some items that did not belong to him, including 
Langlois' Xbox and one of their father's fillet knives.5  This 
behavior was not atypical of Jacob, who had a tendency to take 
things that did not belong to him.6   
¶8 
Karen then went to check on Jacob, whose room was 
right next to Langlois'.  She asked him about taking things that 
did not belong to him and Jacob became agitated.  Langlois 
walked into Jacob's room at that point, picked up the Xbox, and 
                                                 
3 This recitation of the facts is based primarily on the 
testimony of Karen Langlois, the mother of both the victim and 
the defendant, who was an eyewitness to the altercation between 
her sons and testified for both the State and the defense at 
trial.  Her testimony was largely corroborated by the testimony 
of the defendant, the only other eyewitness, and any factual 
disputes do not affect our analysis. 
4 The record indicates that Jacob was packing both for a 
week-long trip up north with friends and for boot camp down 
south, which he would be leaving for right after his trip up 
north.   
5 A fillet knife is a knife used to fillet a fish in the 
process of cleaning it. 
6 All three remaining family members confirmed this. 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
5 
 
walked out.  Karen then asked Jacob to give her the fillet 
knife, which he did, and she set it down——in its sheath——on a 
nearby nightstand.  Langlois was heading back into the room at 
that 
point, 
but 
Jacob 
started 
pushing 
the 
door 
closed.  
Langlois, however, was able to push his way into the room and 
demanded to see what else Jacob had of his.  Jacob then jumped 
on Langlois from behind and put him in a chokehold; after a few 
seconds Langlois capitulated and Jacob let go.   
¶9 
Langlois came up with the fillet knife in his right 
hand——now unsheathed——held up near his right shoulder, pointing 
out.  Jacob and Langlois were yelling at one another and Jacob 
kicked Langlois.  Langlois fell back and Jacob moved forward; 
Langlois caught himself and collided with Jacob, piercing the 
upper left side of Jacob's chest with the knife.  Jacob stood up 
and stepped back, and Karen, seeing some blood on Langlois' leg, 
moved forward to check to see if Langlois was injured.  Jacob, 
now grabbing the side of his chest, said "No, mom, it's me."  
Karen turned, saw the wound, and rushed out of the room to call 
9-1-1.  Jacob walked out to the kitchen, at first standing by 
the counter, then sitting in a chair; when he fell unconscious, 
Langlois helped Karen lay Jacob on the floor and began CPR.   
¶10 Deputy Scott Nauman of the Washington County Sheriff's 
Department responded to the 9-1-1 call.  He arrived to the house 
approximately two minutes after the call, announced his presence 
as he entered through the open garage, and moved toward the 
kitchen where he saw Langlois administering CPR to Jacob, who 
was lying in a large pool of blood.  Nauman asked Langlois, 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
6 
 
"[w]ho did this to him," to which Langlois responded "I did."7  
Nauman placed Langlois under arrest, directed Karen to take over 
administering CPR, and escorted Langlois out to his squad car.   
¶11 On February 6, 2014, the State filed its criminal 
complaint charging Langlois with one count of first-degree 
reckless homicide, use of a dangerous weapon, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 940.02(1).  On July 16, 2014, the State filed an 
information alleging the same.  On August 27, 2014, Langlois 
pled not guilty and the case proceeded to trial.   
 
A.  Trial Testimony 
¶12 On July 14, 2015, trial began.  Over the course of 
three days, the jury heard testimony from 18 witnesses.   
 
1.  State witnesses 
¶13 Deputy Nauman, as noted above, was the first responder 
to the scene.  Nauman testified that, as he was taking Langlois 
out of the house, the second responding officer, Washington 
County Sheriff's Deputy Jesse Williams, was coming in with his 
medical kit.  After securing Langlois in the back seat of the 
squad car, Nauman returned to the house and helped Williams 
render aid to Jacob.  Nauman testified that there was a lot of 
blood on the floor, but no more blood was coming out of the 
puncture site, and that Jacob was having trouble breathing at 
that point.   
                                                 
7 The defense did not challenge the admission of any of 
Langlois' statements to the police.   
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
7 
 
¶14 Deputy Christopher Killey of the Washington County 
Sheriff's Department was the third officer to arrive to the 
scene and testified that he took up watching over Langlois, who 
was still seated in the back of Nauman's patrol car.  Observing 
the blood on Langlois' clothing, Killey asked Langlois if he was 
injured and Langlois replied that he was not.  Killey testified 
that he then asked Langlois for his name, to which Langlois 
responded: "what does it matter? I stabbed my brother.  I 
stabbed my brother."   
¶15 Detective 
James 
Wolf 
and 
Investigator 
David 
Klopfenstein, 
both 
of 
the 
Washington 
County 
Sheriff's 
Department, were also at the scene.  Wolf was tasked with 
processing the scene while Klopfenstein interviewed Karen.  
Klopfenstein testified that Karen appeared calm,8 that she agreed 
to accompany him to the Hartford Police Department to make a 
statement, and that she never used the term "accident" or "self-
defense" in either her oral or written statements.  Wolf 
testified that he did a walk-through of the house, observing "a 
large pool of blood" on the kitchen floor and blood drops on the 
floor in Jacob's bedroom.  Also on the floor in Jacob's bedroom 
were the fillet knife and knife sheath, which he collected as 
                                                 
8 On cross-examination, Klopfenstein agreed that there "was 
a lot of blood in that house," that Jacob "was hurt pretty 
significantly," and that was all "that was known to Karen."   
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
8 
 
evidence.9  Wolf testified that the knife had an approximately 
six-inch blade, and that the blade had blood on it.   
¶16 Dr. Zelda Okia, the medical examiner who conducted the 
autopsy on Jacob, testified that, to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty, the cause of death was a puncture wound, six 
inches deep, on the left side of his chest between his second 
and third ribs.  On cross-examination, Dr. Okia acknowledged 
that she could not tell from the autopsy whether the knife had 
been thrust into Jacob or whether Jacob had fallen onto it.   
¶17 Detective Joel Clausing of the Washington County 
Sheriff's Department——the State's final witness——conducted the 
interview of Langlois.  The interview was videotaped10 and 
proceeded in essentially three parts: a verbal interview, a 
written statement, and a reenactment.  Clausing testified that 
Langlois said he had grabbed the knife because he wanted to make 
Jacob feel "scared so he could back down"; and that Langlois 
said he was angry and that he had stabbed Jacob because "he 
kicked me and I just reacted.  I mean, there's no thinking about 
it.  It was just reaction."  Clausing also testified that during 
the reenactment, Langlois demonstrated a forward motion with his 
arm, and the State admitted photos showing a frame-by-frame 
capture of this part of Langlois' demonstration.   
 
                                                 
9 The sheath and the knife were admitted into evidence as 
Exhibits 28 and 29, respectively.   
10 A transcript of the interview was admitted into evidence 
as Exhibit 42.   
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
9 
 
2.  Defense witnesses11 
¶18 The first witness for the defense was the family 
attorney who helped the Langloises in the initial aftermath to 
understand the criminal process Langlois was subject to.  He 
testified that when he met with Karen a few weeks after the 
incident to go over the statements she and Langlois had made to 
the police, Karen told him that both statements were "really 
incomplete," and that the stabbing had been an accident.  He 
testified that he then arranged a second meeting with the 
police, 
during 
which 
Karen 
told 
Detective 
Clausing 
and 
Investigator Klopfenstein that Jacob had had "wild eyes" and 
that Langlois had jack-knifed forward after being kicked, which 
is what caused the stabbing.12   
¶19 Langlois testified next.  In addition to testifying to 
the facts of the altercation given above, Langlois corroborated 
the testimony of Nauman and Killey, confirming that he said "I 
did" in response to Deputy Nauman's question "who did this," and 
that he told Deputy Killey "I stabbed him."  Langlois also 
testified that he was aware of what a fillet knife is; that he 
knew the knife was sheathed because it was sharp; that he picked 
                                                 
11 At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Langlois moved 
to dismiss the charges.  The circuit court denied the motion, 
concluding that "the case is sufficient to go to the jury and 
that there's enough evidence . . . where the jury could decide, 
if it so chose, that the State has proven its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt."   
12 Detective Clausing and Investigator Klopfenstein both 
confirmed that they met with Karen a second time during their 
testimony.   
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
10 
 
the fillet knife up and unsheathed it; and that, when he 
collided with Jacob, the knife pierced Jacob's chest.  He 
testified that afterwards he grabbed two first aid kits and ran 
after Jacob to the kitchen where he saw "something that [he] 
won't be able to forget ever, the blood just squirting out of 
[Jacob] at a really high speed and really fast all in like one 
or two seconds."  Langlois testified that it was not his intent 
to physically hurt Jacob, but rather that he had picked up the 
knife "[t]o get him to stop and stop attacking me and my 
mom. . . . [Jacob] was really angry and I wanted him to stop 
being extremely angry towards me.  And I was pretty much just 
afraid of being put in another choke hold as well."  He said 
that what happened was an accident, but admitted on cross-
examination that nowhere in his statement to the police did he 
use the word "accident" or "self-defense," and that he could 
have walked out of the room but did not because he was 
"furious."   
¶20 The defense then called seven character witnesses, all 
of whom testified that Langlois was an involved and contributing 
member of the community.  Five also testified that Langlois was 
an intelligent individual.  The defense closed its case with the 
testimony of Karen and Steven Langlois——the parents of the 
victim and of the defendant. 
¶21 Steven testified that Jacob had an "explosive" temper, 
and that Jacob had, in the past, punched through windows and 
kicked walls and doors.  On one occasion, Jacob had even 
physically attacked Steven.  Steven testified that he had no 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
11 
 
such problems with Langlois, however; Langlois did his school 
work and was in advanced placement classes, had a job, was in 
scouts, was taking flying lessons, and generally did everything 
that was asked of him.  He further testified that, in general, 
the brothers had a typical sibling relationship——"Will you stop 
touching me, that kind of stuff. . . never [] any violent acts."  
Karen, in addition to testifying to the facts of the altercation 
given above, verified that Jacob had acted out aggressively——and 
in one instance, with Steven, physically——in the home and at 
school.   
 
3.  Rebuttal witnesses 
¶22 In rebuttal, the State called Sergeant Amy Swan, 
Jacob's recruiter from the National Guard.  She testified that 
Jacob had always been respectful in her interactions with him, 
but admitted on cross-examination that she had not spoken with 
Jacob's parents or reviewed his school disciplinary record in 
evaluating his fitness for service.   
 
B.  Jury Instructions 
¶23 At 
the 
close 
of 
evidence, 
the 
State 
requested 
instruction 
on 
the 
charged 
offense——first-degree 
reckless 
homicide by use of a dangerous weapon——and on two lesser-
included offenses——second-degree reckless homicide by use of a 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
12 
 
dangerous weapon13 and homicide by negligent handling of a 
dangerous weapon.14  It also requested the instruction regarding 
retreat.15  The defense requested instruction on both self-
defense16 and the defense of accident.17  The circuit court 
granted these requests and instructed the jury, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
 
The information in this case . . . charged the 
Defendant with first degree reckless homicide use of a 
dangerous weapon and you must first consider whether 
the Defendant is guilty of that offense.  
 
If you are not satisfied that the Defendant is 
guilty of first degree reckless homicide, you must 
consider whether or not the Defendant is guilty of 
second degree reckless homicide use of a dangerous 
weapon, which is a less serious degree of criminal 
homicide. 
 
If you are not satisfied that the Defendant is 
guilty of first degree reckless homicide or guilty of 
second 
degree 
reckless 
homicide, 
then 
you 
must 
consider whether or not the Defendant is guilty of 
homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, 
which is a less serious offense than either first or 
second degree reckless homicide. 
 
                                                 
13 See Wis JI——Criminal 1022 (2015).  This instruction is a 
combined instruction for first- and second-degree reckless 
homicide by use of a dangerous weapon for cases where, as here, 
second-degree reckless homicide is charged as a lesser-included 
offense of first-degree reckless homicide. 
14 See Wis JI——Criminal 1175 (2011). 
15 See Wis JI——Criminal 810 (2001). 
16 See Wis JI——Criminal 801 (2014). 
17 See Wis JI——Criminal 772 (2005). 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
13 
 
1.  First-degree reckless homicide, use of a  
dangerous weapon 
¶24 After defining first-degree reckless homicide per Wis. 
Stat. § 940.02(1), the circuit court discussed self-defense: 
 
Self defense is an issue in this case.  In 
deciding 
whether 
the 
Defendant's 
conduct 
was 
criminally 
reckless 
conduct 
which 
showed 
utter 
disregard for human life or was criminally negligent 
conduct, 
you 
should 
also 
consider 
whether 
the 
Defendant acted in lawful self defense. 
 
The law of self defense allows the Defendant to 
threaten or intentionally use force against another 
only if the Defendant believed that there was an 
actual or [imminent] unlawful interference with the 
Defendant's person and the Defendant believed that the 
amount of force the Defendant used or threatened to 
use 
was 
necessary 
to 
prevent 
or 
terminate 
the 
interference 
and 
the 
Defendant's 
beliefs 
were 
reasonable.   
 
The Defendant may intentionally use force, which 
is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily 
harm, only if the Defendant reasonably believes that 
the force used was necessary to prevent [imminent] 
death or great bodily harm to himself.  A belief may 
be reasonable, even though mistaken. 
 
In determining whether the Defendant's beliefs 
were reasonable, the standard is what a person of 
ordinary intelligence and prudence would have believed 
in the Defendant's position under the circumstances 
that existed at the time of the alleged offense. 
 
The reasonableness of the Defendant's beliefs 
must 
be 
determined 
from 
the 
standpoint 
of 
the 
Defendant at the time of the Defendant's acts and not 
from the viewpoint of the jury now. 
The court then gave the instruction on retreat: 
 
Let's talk about this issue of retreat.  There is 
no duty to retreat, however, in determining whether 
the Defendant reasonably believed the amount of force 
used was necessary to prevent or terminate the 
interference, you may consider whether the Defendant 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
14 
 
had an opportunity to retreat with safety and whether 
such retreat was feasible and whether the Defendant 
knew of the opportunity to retreat. 
After reciting the second element of first-degree reckless 
homicide——which includes a definition of "criminally reckless 
conduct" as "conduct [that] created a risk of death or great 
bodily harm to another person and the risk of death or great 
bodily harm was unreasonable and substantial"——but before 
reciting the third, the court further stated: 
You should consider the evidence relating to self 
defense in deciding whether the Defendant's conduct 
created . . . an unreasonable risk to another.  If the 
Defendant was acting lawfully in self defense, his 
conduct did not create an unreasonable risk to 
another. 
 
The burden is on the State to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the Defendant did not act 
lawfully in self defense.  And you must be satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt from all the evidence in the 
case that the risk was unreasonable. 
 
We'll talk about the concept of accident.  The 
Defendant contends that he did not act with criminally 
reckless conduct but rather, that what happened was an 
accident. 
 
If 
the 
Defendant 
did 
not 
act 
with 
criminally reckless conduct required for a crime, the 
Defendant is not guilty of that crime. 
The court then discussed the third and final element of the 
first-degree offense and concluded by instructing the jury to  
make every reasonable effort to agree unanimously on 
the charge of first degree reckless homicide before 
considering second degree reckless homicide.  However, 
if after full and complete consideration of the 
evidence you conclude that further deliberation would 
not result in unanimous agreement on the charge of 
first degree reckless homicide, you should consider 
whether the Defendant is guilty of second degree 
reckless homicide.  
 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
15 
 
2.  Second-degree reckless homicide, use of  
a dangerous weapon 
¶25 After defining second-degree reckless homicide per 
Wis. Stat. § 940.06, the court explained the difference between 
first-degree and second-degree reckless homicide——that "the 
first degree offense requires proof of one additional element; 
namely, that the circumstances of the Defendant's conduct showed 
utter disregard for human life"——and told the jury: 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that all the elements of first degree reckless 
homicide were present except [the additional element], 
you should find the Defendant guilty of second degree 
reckless homicide.   
The circuit court did not repeat the instructions for self-
defense or accident.  It then concluded: 
 
However, 
if 
after 
a 
full 
and 
complete 
consideration of the evidence you conclude that 
further deliberation would not result in unanimous 
agreement on the charge of second degree reckless 
homicide, 
then 
you 
should 
consider 
whether 
the 
Defendant is guilty of homicide by negligent handling 
of a dangerous weapon. 
 
3.  Homicide by negligent handling of a  
dangerous weapon 
¶26 After defining homicide by negligent handling of a 
dangerous weapon per Wis. Stat. § 940.08(1), the circuit court 
again discussed self-defense: 
 
Self defense is an issue in this case that also 
applies to the charge of homicide by negligent 
handling of a dangerous weapon.  In deciding whether 
the 
Defendant's 
conduct 
was 
criminally 
negligent 
conduct, 
you 
should 
also 
consider 
whether 
the 
Defendant acted lawfully in self defense. 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
16 
 
 
As I previously indicated, the law of self 
defense 
allows 
the 
Defendant 
to 
threaten 
or 
intentionally use force against another only if the 
Defendant believed that there was an actual or 
[imminent] unlawful interference with the Defendant's 
person and the Defendant believed that the amount of 
force the Defendant used or threatened to use was 
necessary to prevent or terminate the interference and 
the Defendant's beliefs were reasonable. 
 
The Defendant may intentionally use force which 
is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily 
harm only if the Defendant reasonably believed that 
the force [] used was necessary to prevent [imminent] 
death or great bodily harm to himself. 
 
And as I previously indicated, a belief may be 
reasonable even though mistaken.  In determining 
whether the Defendant's beliefs were reasonable, the 
standard is what a person of ordinary intelligence and 
prudence would have believed in the Defendant's 
position under the circumstances that existed at the 
time of the alleged offense. 
 
The reasonableness of the Defendant's beliefs 
must 
be 
determined 
from 
the 
standpoint 
of 
the 
Defendant at the time of the Defendant's acts and not 
from the viewpoint of the jury now. 
The court then reiterated its prior instruction on retreat:  
And as I previously indicated, there's no duty to 
retreat.  However, in determining . . . whether the 
Defendant reasonably believed that the amount of force 
used was necessary to prevent or terminate the 
interference, you may consider whether the Defendant 
had the opportunity to retreat with safety, whether 
such retreat was feasible and whether the Defendant 
knew of the opportunity to retreat. 
And, after reciting the definition of "criminal negligence"——
that "Defendant's operation or handling of a dangerous weapon 
created a risk of death or great bodily harm and the risk of 
death or great bodily harm was unreasonable and substantial [of 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
17 
 
which] the Defendant should have been aware"——the court again 
discussed the defense of accident: 
 
Once again, the Defendant contends that he was 
not aware of the risk of death or great bodily harm 
required for a crime but rather that what happened was 
an accident. 
 
If the Defendant was not aware of the risk of 
death or great bodily harm required for a crime, the 
Defendant is not guilty of that crime.  Before you may 
find the Defendant guilty of homicide by negligent 
operation of a dangerous weapon . . . the State must 
prove 
by 
evidence 
that 
satisfies 
you 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt that the Defendant should have been 
aware of the risk of death or great bodily harm. 
 
4.  General instructions 
¶27 In addition to these charge-specific instructions, the 
circuit court generally instructed the jury, in relevant part, 
as follows: 
 
Defendants are not required to prove their 
innocence.  The law presumes every person charged with 
the commission of an offense to be innocent.  This 
presumption requires a finding of not guilty unless in 
your deliberations you find it is overcome by evidence 
which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant is guilty. 
 
The burden of establishing every fact necessary 
to constitute guilt is upon the State.  Before you can 
return a verdict of guilty, the evidence must satisfy 
you beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is 
guilty. 
¶28 Defense counsel did not object to either the charge-
specific instructions or the general instructions.   
 
C.  Postconviction Motions 
¶29 On July 17, 2015, the jury returned its verdict: "We, 
the jury, find the defendant, Joseph Langlois, guilty of 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
18 
 
Homicide by Negligent Handling of a Dangerous Weapon."  Langlois 
moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the 
circuit court denied.  On September 28, 2015, the circuit court 
entered judgment of conviction18 and sentenced Langlois to five 
years probation.   
¶30 Langlois filed his first postconviction motion on 
September 9, 2015, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.02, moving for 
reconsideration of the denial of his motion for judgment 
notwithstanding 
the 
verdict. 
 
He 
argued 
that 
there 
was 
insufficient evidence to support the verdict because the State 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "a normally 
prudent person under the same circumstances" "should have been 
aware that his operation or handling of a dangerous weapon 
created the unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great 
bodily 
harm."19 
 
Relatedly, 
Langlois 
challenged 
the 
jury 
instructions, focusing on the accident instruction: 
                                                 
18 The original judgment of conviction was entered on 
September 28, 2015.  On November 24, 2015, an amended judgment 
of conviction was entered.  This amended judgment reflected 
changes only to the conditions of probation to accommodate 
Langlois' employment.  
19 In support of this motion, Langlois attached a screen 
shot of a text message received after the verdict by one of the 
jurors:  "Hi Karen!  I was one of the jurors on your son's case.  
He only received the guilty verdict because of a technicality in 
the law.  It was the phrase 'should have known' 'could cause 
severe bodily harm or death'.  That charge was one the da 
added."  We agree with the circuit court that this "juror text 
message does not indicate any jury concern regarding sufficiency 
of the evidence."  Rather, 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
19 
 
The instructions on accident should have directed the 
jury to consider whether the State proved by evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant should 
have been aware of the "unreasonable and substantial" 
risk of death or great bodily harm; not merely the 
"risk" of death or great bodily harm.  This omitted 
language created a lower standard for the State to 
meet in order for the jury to find the defendant 
guilty 
of 
Homicide 
by 
Negligent 
Handling 
of 
a 
Dangerous Weapon.   
On October 7, 2015, the State responded that the only element in 
dispute was whether Langlois acted with criminal negligence, and 
there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict because 
both his written statement and videotaped confession "show that 
a jury could have drawn the appropriate inferences."  The State 
also pointed out that Langlois' argument regarding the jury 
instructions was waived by defense counsel's failure to object,20 
but argued that, in any event, "the jury instructions as a whole 
did not mislead the jury."  The circuit court denied Langlois' 
motion by decision and order dated October 29, 2015, concluding 
that "[t]he undisputed evidence . . . was more than sufficient 
                                                                                                                                                             
[the juror's] statement that a "technicality in the 
law" required the jury to find [] Langlois guilty 
because he "should have known" that his handling of 
the knife created an unreasonable and substantial risk 
of death or great bodily harm clearly indicates that 
despite sympathy for [Karen], the jury understood and 
performed its sworn obligations correctly.  
20 Langlois argued that, to the contrary, defense counsel 
had objected to instruction on lesser-included offenses in 
general——which is confirmed by the record——and that even where 
an argument is not preserved by objection, a court may "grant a 
new trial in the interest of justice when it is of the opinion 
that justice has been miscarried or a verdict is returned based 
upon erroneous instructions of law."   
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
20 
 
to allow the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Langlois was criminally negligent," and that "there is not even 
a hint of any possible error in the instructions."   
¶31 Langlois filed his second postconviction motion on 
May 2, 2016, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(h), renewing his 
arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury 
instruction on accident, but now also challenging the jury 
instruction on self-defense and raising a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  He argued that the circuit court's 
failure to reiterate the State's burden to disprove self-defense 
when it instructed on homicide by negligent handling of a 
dangerous weapon had the effect of shifting the burden to him.  
The State's response, filed June 1, 2016, repeated its arguments 
in response to Langlois' first postconviction motion: the jury 
instructions as a whole were complete and did not mislead the 
jury; 
therefore, 
failure 
to 
object 
was 
not 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel, there was no due process violation, and 
the real controversy was tried.  Similarly, the State again 
pointed to Langlois' written statement and verbal interview as 
providing sufficient evidence to support the only disputed 
element——criminally negligent operation of a dangerous weapon.  
The circuit court denied this second motion by decision and 
order dated June 28, 2016, for the same reasons it denied 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
21 
 
Langlois' first motion: it concluded that the jury instructions 
were not erroneous21 and that the evidence was sufficient.   
¶32 On July 14, 2016, Langlois noticed appeal.  The court 
of appeals affirmed.  Langlois, 377 Wis. 2d 302, ¶¶1, 51.  It 
concluded that the circuit "court's instructions to the jury, 
when viewed in their entirety and not in isolation, were not 
erroneous."  Id., ¶36.  With regard to the self-defense 
instruction, the court of appeals held that the jury had no 
reason to infer that Langlois bore any burden because the 
circuit court gave an accurate self-defense instruction, told 
the jury that self-defense applied to all of the counts, and 
specifically 
referenced 
the 
self-defense 
instruction 
when 
instructing the jury on negligent homicide by handling of a 
dangerous weapon.  Id., ¶¶30, 32.  With regard to the accident 
instruction, the court of appeals held that the instructions 
were clear as to the requisite mental state because they 
referred the jury back to the immediately preceding definition 
of criminal negligence.  Id., ¶35.  The court of appeals 
therefore concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective 
because failure to object to correct jury instructions is not 
deficient performance, and that Langlois was not entitled to a 
new trial in the interest of justice because there is no denial 
of due process where correct jury instructions are given.  Id., 
                                                 
21 The 
circuit 
court 
did 
additionally 
find 
that, 
in 
retrospect, "there was no basis in the first instance for the 
court to have given a self-defense jury instruction."   
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
22 
 
¶¶36-37.  The court of appeals further concluded that the 
evidence was sufficient to support the verdict because a 
rational jury could have found that the knife was a dangerous 
weapon; that the way Langlois handled the weapon constituted 
criminal negligence; and that Langlois had not acted in self-
defense because he had had the opportunity to leave the room 
without using force.22  Id., ¶¶48-49, 51.   
¶33 On August 11, 2017, Langlois petitioned for review.  
On December 13, 2017, we granted Langlois' petition for review. 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶34 We consider first whether the jury instructions were 
erroneous.  "A circuit court . . . has broad discretion in 
instructing a jury.  A circuit court appropriately exercises its 
discretion in administering a jury instruction so long as the 
instructions as a whole correctly stat[e] the law and compor[t] 
with the facts of the case."  Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 67, ¶42, 
341 Wis. 2d 668, 816 N.W.2d 191 (citation omitted).  Whether a 
                                                 
22 Presiding Judge Reilly dissented.  In his view, counsel 
was deficient for failing to object to the jury instructions for 
homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon because 
they 
were 
incomplete, 
and 
this 
error 
was 
"clearly 
prejudic[ial]."  State v. Langlois, 2017 WI App 44, ¶61, 377 
Wis. 2d 302, 901 N.W.2d 768 (Reilly, P.J., dissenting).  He 
would have held that, although the self-defense and accident 
instructions for first- and second-degree reckless homicide were 
complete and correct, the instructions for negligent homicide 
were incomplete, and the jury cannot rely on the instructions 
given for crimes that are not under consideration when reaching 
a verdict.  Id., ¶¶52, 57, 60.   
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
23 
 
jury instruction correctly states the law is a question of law 
that we review de novo.  Id.   
¶35 We 
consider 
second 
whether 
there 
is 
sufficient 
evidence to sustain the conviction.  This too is a question of 
law that we review de novo, and we will "not overturn a jury's 
verdict unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to sustaining 
the conviction, 'is so insufficient in probative value and force 
that it can be said as a matter of law that no trier of fact, 
acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.'"  State v. Beamon, 2013 WI 47, ¶21, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 
N.W.2d 681 (quoting State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 
451 N.W.2d 752 (1990)). 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶36 On review, we consider two issues.  First, we consider 
whether the jury instructions were erroneous.  We conclude that 
they were not, because, taken as a whole, they accurately state 
the law.  Consequently, we conclude that there is no basis for 
Langlois' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, there is 
no due process violation, and reversal in the interest of 
justice is not appropriate.  Second, we consider whether there 
was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.  We 
conclude that there was, because the evidence, viewed most 
favorably to sustaining the conviction, supports a finding of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
24 
 
A.  Whether The Jury Instructions Were Erroneous 
¶37 We consider first whether the jury instructions were 
erroneous.  Langlois argues that the accident and self-defense 
instructions given for homicide by negligent handling of a 
dangerous weapon were erroneous.  He argues that the instruction 
for accident was erroneous because it misstated the State's 
burden to prove his mental state when it omitted "unreasonable 
and substantial" before "risk."  Similarly, Langlois argues that 
the instruction for self-defense was erroneous because it 
omitted the State's burden to disprove self-defense, thereby 
shifting the burden to him.  The State argues that the jury 
instructions were not erroneous.  It argues that the instruction 
for accident was not erroneous because, when viewed as a whole, 
the jury instructions established that the State had to prove 
Langlois was aware of a risk that was unreasonable and 
substantial.  Moreover, because accident is a negative defense, 
the State disproves accident if it proves all of the elements of 
the crime——which Langlois does not dispute were properly 
recited——beyond a reasonable doubt.  Similarly, the instruction 
for self-defense was not erroneous because, when viewed as a 
whole, the jury instructions informed the jury that the State 
had the burden of disproving self-defense.  Moreover, a review 
of the record reveals that Langlois was not entitled to 
instruction on self-defense.  We conclude that the jury 
instructions were not erroneous because, taken as a whole, they 
accurately state the law. 
 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
25 
 
1.  Error 
¶38 In determining whether a jury instruction correctly 
states the law, "[w]e review the jury instructions as a whole to 
determine whether the overall meaning communicated by the 
instructions was a correct statement of the law."  Dakter v. 
Cavallino, 2015 WI 67, ¶32, 363 Wis. 2d 738, 866 N.W.2d 656; see 
also State v. Hubbard, 2008 WI 92, ¶27, 313 Wis. 2d 1, 752 
N.W.2d 839 
("Jury 
instructions 
are 
not 
to 
be 
judged 
in 
artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the 
overall charge.").   
 
a.  Accident 
¶39 The jury instruction for accident was not erroneous.  
The circuit court gave the accident instruction for homicide by 
negligent handling of a dangerous weapon immediately after 
defining "criminal negligence": 
Criminal 
negligence 
means 
the 
Defendant's 
operation of handling of a dangerous weapon created a 
risk of death or great bodily harm and the risk of 
death or great bodily harm was unreasonable and 
substantial and the Defendant should have been aware 
that this operation or handling of a dangerous weapon 
created an unreasonable and substantial risk of death 
or great bodily harm. 
Once again, the Defendant contends that he was 
not aware of the risk of death or great bodily harm 
required for a crime but rather that what happened was 
an accident. 
¶40 Langlois argues that it was error for the circuit 
court to omit "unreasonable and substantial" before "risk" in 
the second paragraph——the accident instruction——because it had 
the effect of lowering the State's burden to prove Langlois' 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
26 
 
mental state from "awareness of an unreasonable and substantial 
risk" to simply "awareness of a risk."  This argument fails.  
"'The' is a definite article used as a function word to indicate 
that a following noun or noun equivalent refers to someone or 
something that is unique."  State v. Arberry, 2018 WI 7, ¶19, 
379 Wis. 2d 254, 905 N.W.2d 832.  Thus, the use of "the" before 
"risk" means that the instruction "contemplates only one unique, 
specified [risk]."  Id.   
¶41 Common sense compels the conclusion that the "one 
unique, specified risk" is the "unreasonable and substantial 
risk" discussed in the immediately preceding sentence.  Accord 
Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation 
of Legal Texts 144 (2012) (noting that "legalistic pronoun[s]" 
such as "the risk" should be understood as referring to the 
nearest clarifying antecedent).  This understanding is confirmed 
by 
the 
explanatory 
phrase 
that 
immediately 
follows 
this 
legalistic pronoun: "the risk of death or great bodily harm 
required for a crime." (Emphasis added.) 
¶42 In sum, although the type of risk at issue might be 
less clear if the challenged accident instruction is read in 
isolation, the context provided by the immediately preceding 
sentence and the explanatory phrase that immediately follows 
clearly convey that "the risk" referenced in the accident 
instruction is "an unreasonable and substantial risk."  Thus, 
the jury instruction given for accident on the charge of 
homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon is not 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
27 
 
erroneous because, viewed in context, it communicates a correct 
statement of law.23 
 
b.  Self-defense 
¶43 The 
jury 
instruction 
for 
self-defense 
was 
not 
erroneous.  Although the initial self-defense instruction was 
given after the statutory definition for first-degree reckless 
homicide, the first paragraph made it clear that the instruction 
applied generally to the case and specifically to criminally 
negligent conduct:  
Self defense is an issue in this case.  In 
deciding 
whether 
the 
Defendant's 
conduct 
was 
criminally 
reckless 
conduct 
which 
showed 
utter 
disregard for human life or was criminally negligent 
conduct, 
you 
should 
also 
consider 
whether 
the 
Defendant acted in lawful self defense. 
(Emphases added.)  Therefore, the jury was aware that the 
initial instruction it was receiving applied to the case 
generally and to criminally negligent conduct specifically.  
Langlois does not dispute that this initial instruction was an 
accurate statement of the law; thus, the jury was properly 
instructed on self-defense. 
                                                 
23 We recognize that the circuit court was reasonably 
concerned about the length of the jury instructions in this 
case. 
 
Although 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
abbreviated 
jury 
instructions given in this case were not erroneous, it is best 
practice to read the pattern instructions for each charge, 
except, of course, where the pattern instructions themselves are 
abbreviated.  See supra note 13.  In fact, had the circuit court 
taken the time at trial and not abbreviated the instructions as 
it did, this issue would not have existed to appeal. 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
28 
 
¶44 Additionally, however, the circuit court reiterated 
the self-defense instruction after it gave the statutory 
definition of homicide by negligent handling of a weapon.  
Although it did not re-recite the State's burden of proof, it 
twice incorporated by reference its initial instruction on self-
defense when it said, "As I previously indicated."  Thus, the 
jury was reminded that the initial instruction, recited in the 
context of reckless homicide, applied equally to the context of 
negligent homicide. 
¶45 Moreover, the circuit court gave the jury a general 
instruction on the State's burden to establish guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt: "The burden of establishing every fact 
necessary to constitute guilt is upon the State.  Before you can 
return a verdict of guilty, the evidence must satisfy you beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty."  Because self-
defense is a negative defense, the State disproves self-defense 
beyond a reasonable doubt if it proves the elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically criminal negligence.  
Therefore, the jury was aware that the State had to prove 
criminal 
negligence——the 
element 
that 
self-defense 
would  
negate——beyond a reasonable doubt. 
¶46 Langlois argues, however, that the error is evident 
because the jury found him not guilty on the two counts where 
the self-defense instruction included the State's burden——first- 
and second-degree reckless homicide——but guilty on the count 
where the State's burden was not reiterated——negligent homicide; 
he concludes, therefore, that the lack of reiteration of the 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
29 
 
State's burden is the reason that the jury found him guilty.  
This argument fails.  As an initial matter, the circuit court 
did not repeat the accident or self-defense instructions for 
second-degree reckless homicide, but the jury still found 
Langlois not guilty of that offense.  Additionally, inferring 
error from a verdict of guilt assumes that the evidence was 
otherwise insufficient to sustain the State's burden; but, as 
explained below, see infra ¶¶58-62, we conclude that the 
evidence was sufficient to find him guilty of negligent homicide 
by handling of a dangerous weapon beyond a reasonable doubt. 
¶47 In sum, although the State's burden might be less 
clear if the challenged self-defense instruction is read in 
isolation, the context provided by the prior instruction and the 
general instructions clearly convey that the State bore the 
burden to disprove self-defense.  Thus, the jury instruction 
given for self-defense on the charge of homicide by negligent 
handling of a dangerous weapon is not erroneous because, viewed 
in context, it communicates a correct statement of law.24 
 
                                                 
24 In so concluding, we agree with the court of appeals that 
Langlois' reliance on State v. Austin, 2013 WI App 96, 349 
Wis. 2d 744, 836 N.W.2d 833, is misplaced because, in Austin, 
the circuit court made no mention at all of the State's burden 
to disprove self-defense.  See Langlois, 377 Wis. 2d 302, ¶¶31-
32.  
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
30 
 
2.  Prejudice25  
¶48 An erroneous jury instruction warrants reversal only 
when the error is prejudicial.  Dakter, 363 Wis. 2d 738, ¶33.  
Langlois argues that the omissions in the jury instructions on 
accident and self-defense are reversible error on any one of 
three grounds: ineffective assistance of counsel, due process, 
or interest of justice.  The State argues that, because the jury 
instructions were not erroneous, trial counsel did not render 
ineffective assistance by failing to object; there was no 
violation of Langlois' due process rights; and Langlois is not 
entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice.  Because we 
conclude that the jury instructions were not erroneous, we also 
conclude that there is no basis for Langlois' claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, there is no due process 
violation, and reversal in the interest of justice is not 
appropriate. 
 
a.  Ineffective assistance of counsel 
¶49 Whether trial counsel's failure to object to an error 
in the jury instructions constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.  See State v. 
Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, ¶37, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93. 
The factual circumstances of the case and trial 
counsel's conduct and strategy are findings of fact, 
which will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous; 
                                                 
25 Although we recognize that we need not address prejudice 
because 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
jury 
instructions 
are 
not 
erroneous, we choose to fully address the prejudice argument 
raised for the sake of completeness. 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
31 
 
whether 
counsel's 
conduct 
constitutes 
ineffective 
assistance is a question of law, which we review de 
novo.  To demonstrate that counsel's assistance was 
ineffective, 
the 
defendant 
must 
establish 
that 
counsel's performance was deficient and that the 
deficient 
performance 
was 
prejudicial. 
 
If 
the 
defendant fails to satisfy either prong, we need not 
consider the other. 
Id. (citations omitted).  Whether trial counsel performed 
deficiently 
and 
whether 
any 
deficient 
performance 
was 
prejudicial are questions of law we review de novo.  Id., ¶¶38-
39.   
¶50 "[A] claim predicated on a failure to challenge a 
correct [jury instruction] cannot establish either" deficient 
performance or prejudice.  State v. Ziebart, 2003 WI App 258, 
¶14, 268 Wis. 2d 468, 673 N.W.2d 369; see also State v. Neumann, 
2013 WI 58, ¶141, 348 Wis. 2d 455, 832 N.W.2d 560.  Thus, 
because we conclude above that the jury instructions correctly 
stated the law, see supra ¶¶42, 47, we also conclude that there 
is no basis for Langlois' claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.   
 
b.  Due process violation 
¶51 Whether an error in the jury instructions constitutes 
a violation of a party's due process rights is a question of law 
that we review de novo.  See, e.g., State v. Badzinski, 
2014 WI 6, ¶27, 352 Wis. 2d 329, 843 N.W.2d 29.  "There are two 
types of jury instruction challenges: those challenging the 
legal accuracy of the instructions, and those alleging that a 
legally 
accurate 
instruction 
unconstitutionally 
misled 
the 
jury."  State v. Burris, 2011 WI 32, ¶44, 333 Wis. 2d 87, 797 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
32 
 
N.W.2d 430.  Langlois appears to raise a challenge that 
incorporates both types because he claims that the omission of 
certain language (i.e., a legally inaccurate instruction) has 
misled the jury.   
¶52 A jury instruction that incorrectly states the law 
violates due process if it has "the effect of relieving the 
State of its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every 
element of the offense charged."  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 
¶23, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.  A jury instruction 
misleads the jury in a way that violates due process if "there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the instruction was applied in a 
manner that denied the defendant 'a meaningful opportunity for 
consideration by the jury of his defense.'"  Burris, 333 
Wis. 2d 87, ¶50 (quoting State v. Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183, 
191, 556 N.W.2d 90 (1996)). 
¶53 Because we conclude above that the jury instructions 
correctly state the law, see supra ¶¶42, 47, we also conclude 
that there is no due process violation on the basis that legally 
inaccurate instructions effectively relieved the State of its 
burden of proof.  Similarly, because we conclude below that 
there is sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, see 
infra ¶¶58-62, we also conclude that there is no due process 
violation because there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
legally accurate instructions were applied in a manner that 
denied the defendant a meaningful opportunity for consideration 
by the jury of his defense.  See State v. Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, 
¶¶9, 45, 317 Wis. 2d 586, 767 N.W.2d 187 (citing Harvey, 254 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
33 
 
Wis. 2d 442, ¶46) (noting that an instructional error is 
harmless if "it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have [nonetheless] found the defendant 
guilty").  
 
c.  Interest of justice 
¶54 Whether an error in the jury instructions entitles a 
defendant to a new trial in the interest of justice requires us 
to consider Wis. Stat. §§ 752.35 and 751.06.  Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.35, the court of appeals has discretion to reverse a 
conviction and order a new trial where "it appears from the 
record that the real controversy has not been fully tried, or 
that it is probable that justice has for any reason miscarried." 
§ 752.35.  "We review a discretionary determination for an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.  The court [of appeals] 
erroneously exercises its discretion when it applies the wrong 
legal standard or makes a decision not reasonably supported by 
the facts of record."  State v. Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶23, 345 
Wis. 2d 407, 826 N.W.2d 60 (citation omitted).  Because we 
conclude above that the jury instructions correctly state the 
law, see supra ¶¶42, 47, and we conclude below that there is 
sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict, see infra ¶¶58-62, 
we also conclude that the court of appeals did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in declining to reverse Langlois' 
conviction and order a new trial in the interest of justice.  
¶55 Under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 751.06, 
we 
have 
independent 
discretionary authority to reverse a conviction and order a new 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
34 
 
trial where "it appears from the record that the real 
controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is probable 
that justice has for any reason miscarried."  The interpretation 
and application of a statute present questions of law that we 
review de novo.  Estate of Miller v. Storey, 2017 WI 99, ¶25, 
378 Wis. 2d 358, 903 N.W.2d 759.  In applying § 751.06, we 
exercise our discretion infrequently, judiciously, and only in 
exceptional cases.  Avery, 345 Wis. 2d 407, ¶38.  Because we 
conclude above that the jury instructions correctly state the 
law, see supra ¶¶42, 47, and we conclude below that there is 
sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict, see infra ¶¶58-62, 
we also conclude that this is not an exceptional case warranting 
an exercise of our discretion to reverse Langlois' conviction 
and order a new trial in the interest of justice. 
 
B.  Whether There Was Sufficient Evidence 
¶56 We consider second 
whether there was sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's verdict.  Langlois argues that 
there is insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction because 
the record establishes that he was acting in self-defense; thus, 
although his conduct created a risk, it was not an unreasonable 
one, and a properly instructed jury could not have found beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Langlois operated or handled a dangerous 
weapon in a manner constituting criminal negligence.  The State 
argues that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the 
conviction because the record establishes that a rational jury 
could have found that the State proved each element of homicide 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
35 
 
by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to 
sustain the conviction because the evidence, viewed most 
favorably to sustaining the conviction, supports a finding of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
¶57 The 
jury 
found 
Langlois 
guilty 
of 
homicide 
by 
negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.08(1).  Section 940.08(1) provides, in relevant part, that 
"whoever causes the death of another human being by the 
negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon . . . is 
guilty of a Class G felony."  In order to establish that 
Langlois was guilty of the crime of homicide by negligent 
handling of a dangerous weapon, the State had to prove three 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. 
The defendant operated or handled a dangerous 
weapon. 
2. 
The defendant operated or handled a dangerous 
weapon 
in 
a 
manner 
constituting 
criminal 
negligence. 
3. 
The 
defendant's 
operation 
or 
handling 
of 
a 
dangerous weapon in a manner constituting criminal 
negligence caused the death of [Jacob].  
Wis JI——Criminal 1175, at 1 (2011).   
¶58 As applicable here, "dangerous weapon" means "any 
device or instrumentality which, in the manner it is used or 
intended to be used, is likely to produce death or great bodily 
harm."  Wis JI——Criminal 1175, at 1-2 (2011).  At trial, 
Detective Wolf testified that the fillet knife had a six-inch 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
36 
 
long blade and Langlois testified that he knew the knife was 
sharp and that he held it with the point outward toward Jacob.  
This evidence is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the fillet knife was a "dangerous weapon."   
¶59 "Criminal negligence" means that (a) the defendant's 
operation or handling of a dangerous weapon created a risk of 
death or great bodily harm; (b) the risk of death or great 
bodily harm was unreasonable and substantial; and (c) the 
defendant should have been aware that his operation of a 
dangerous weapon created the unreasonable and substantial risk 
of death or great bodily harm.  Wis JI——Criminal 1175, at 2 
(2011).  At trial, Langlois testified that he picked up the 
fillet knife, removed it from its sheath, and held it at his 
shoulder with the blade pointing outward.  Langlois also 
testified that he had the opportunity to retreat but did not 
because he was "furious."  Detective Clausing additionally 
testified that Langlois never used the word "accident" or "self-
defense" in his statements and that he demonstrated a forward 
stabbing motion during his reenactment of what happened.  This 
evidence is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Langlois' handling of the fillet knife created a risk of 
death 
or 
great 
bodily 
harm 
that 
was 
unreasonable 
and 
substantial.   
¶60 Furthermore, at trial, five of the seven character 
witnesses for the defense testified to Langlois' intelligence, 
describing him as a "smart, very smart, smart kid," "very 
intelligent," a "smart young man," "very smart," and "extremely 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
37 
 
smart."  This evidence is sufficient to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Langlois should have known that holding a 
six-inch fillet knife so that it was pointed outward toward 
another created an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or 
great bodily harm. 
¶61 "Cause" 
means 
that 
"the 
defendant's 
act 
was 
a 
substantial factor in producing the death."  Wis JI——Criminal 
1175, at 1 (2011).  At trial, Deputy Nauman, Investigator 
Klopfenstein, Detective Wolf, and Langlois all testified that 
there was a large amount of blood on the kitchen floor.  
Langlois further testified that he saw "the blood just squirting 
out of [Jacob] at a really high speed and really fast all in 
like one or two seconds."  In addition, Dr. Okia testified that, 
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the cause of death 
was a puncture wound, six inches deep, on the left side of 
Jacob's chest between his second and third ribs.  This evidence 
is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Langlois' 
act was a substantial factor in producing Jacob's death. 
¶62 In sum, the evidence, viewed most favorably to 
sustaining the conviction, supports a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶63 On review, we consider two issues.  First, we consider 
whether the jury instructions were erroneous.  We conclude that 
they were not, because, taken as a whole, they accurately state 
the law and did not mislead the jury.  As a result, we also 
No. 
2016AP1409-CR   
 
38 
 
conclude that Langlois' counsel was not ineffective for failing 
to object to the jury instructions because it is not deficient 
performance to fail to object to jury instructions which are 
correct.  We further conclude that there is no violation of 
Langlois' due process rights and that Langlois is not entitled 
to a new trial in the interest of justice because the jury 
instructions were not erroneous.  Second, we consider whether 
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.  We 
conclude that there was, because a reasonable jury could have 
found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶64 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with Presiding Judge Paul Reilly, who correctly emphasized the 
illogic of "believ[ing] that a jury may utilize instructions for 
crimes not under consideration to fix erroneous instructions for 
the crime under consideration."1   
¶65 The majority incorrectly "fixes" the circuit court's 
self-defense instructions by irrationally assuming that the 
phrase "As I previously indicated" means "apply the self-defense 
instruction I gave for crimes of which you have found the 
defendant not guilty despite any differences the previous 
instruction might have when compared with the self-defense 
instruction I am giving now." 
¶66 In my view, the court of appeals decision in State v. 
Austin, 2013 WI App 96, 349 Wis. 2d 744, 836 N.W.2d 833, is on 
all fours with the facts of the instant case.  Austin rejected 
the very same illogic that the majority relies upon to fix the 
circuit court's erroneous instructions in the instant case. 
¶67 Moreover, following 
Austin, I conclude that the 
defendant is entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice 
regardless of whether he was prejudiced as a result of trial 
counsel's failure to object to the circuit court's erroneous 
jury instructions.  A Machner hearing is not necessary. 
¶68 Accordingly, I dissent.   
I 
                                                 
1 State v. Langlois, 2017 WI App 44, ¶52, 377 Wis. 2d 302, 
901 N.W.2d 768 (Reilly, P.J., dissenting). 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶69 The majority correctly states that jury instructions 
must be viewed as a whole,2 but the majority misapprehends what 
the "whole" is.   
¶70 The circuit court instructed the jury to consider each 
of three charges seriatim.  That is, the circuit court required 
the jury to first follow the instructions applicable to the 
charge of first-degree reckless homicide and determine whether 
the defendant was guilty of that charge.  If the jury found the 
defendant not guilty of first-degree reckless homicide, the 
circuit court instructed the jury to follow the instructions 
applicable to the charge of second-degree reckless homicide and 
determine whether the defendant was guilty of that charge.  
Third, and finally, if the jury found defendant not guilty of 
second-degree reckless homicide, the circuit court instructed 
the jury to follow the instructions applicable to the charge of 
homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon. 
¶71 Thus, in the context of the instant case, viewing the 
jury instructions as a whole means viewing all of the 
instructions applicable to a particular charge together to 
determine if the instructions for that charge correctly state 
the law.3 
¶72 The circuit court "could have given one complete, 
proper instruction on self-defense and told the jury that it 
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶34. 
3 Part of the "whole" would also include any generally 
applicable instructions that the circuit court told the jury 
apply to all three charges. 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
applied to all three crimes, but it did not do so.  Instead, the 
court gave an instruction on self-defense for first- and second-
degree reckless homicide and gave a distinctly different 
instruction for self-defense applicable to homicide by negligent 
handling of a dangerous weapon."4 
¶73 The court of appeals decision in State v. Austin 
directly supports the defendant's position that the self-defense 
instruction applicable to the charge of homicide by negligent 
handling of a dangerous weapon was erroneous. 
¶74 In Austin, the court of appeals dealt with a claim of 
erroneous jury instructions that was very similar to the 
defendant's claim in the instant case.  Austin was charged with 
first-degree recklessly endangering safety with a dangerous 
weapon.  At trial, but before the case was submitted to the 
jury, the State asked the circuit court to instruct the jury on 
the 
lesser-included 
charge 
of 
second-degree 
recklessly 
endangering safety with a dangerous weapon.  The circuit court 
granted that request and instructed the jury on charges of 
first- and second-degree recklessly endangering safety with a 
dangerous weapon.5 
¶75 Austin had presented sufficient evidence on the 
defenses 
of 
self-defense 
and 
defense-of-others. 
 
When 
instructing the jury on the first-degree charge, the circuit 
                                                 
4 Langlois, 377 Wis. 2d 302, ¶56 (Reilly, P.J., dissenting). 
5 State v. Austin, 2013 WI App 96, ¶2-3, 349 Wis. 2d 744, 
836 N.W.2d 833. 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
court provided instructions on the substantive law of self-
defense, the substantive law of defense-of-others, and the 
substantive law of the first-degree charge.  Although the 
circuit court instructed the jury that "[t]he state must provide 
[sic] by evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant did not act lawfully in defense of others[,]" 
the circuit court never instructed the jury on the burden of 
proof applicable to self-defense.6 
¶76 When instructing the jury on the second-degree charge, 
the circuit court noted that self-defense was an issue but did 
not repeat the self-defense instruction.  The defense-of-others 
instruction was also not repeated when the circuit court 
instructed the jury on the second-degree charge.7  Instead, the 
only mention of defense-of-others was that the jury "should 
consider the evidence relating to self-defense, as well as 
defense of others, in deciding whether the defendant's conduct 
created an unreasonable risk to another.  If the defendant was 
acting lawfully in self-defense or in defense of others, his 
conduct did not create an unreasonable risk to another."8 
¶77 Importantly, the circuit court did not mention the 
State's burden of proof as to either defense when it instructed 
the jury on the second-degree charge. 
                                                 
6 Id., ¶¶7-8. 
7 Id., ¶¶9-10. 
8 Id., ¶10. 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶78 Austin was acquitted of the first-degree charge, but 
convicted of the second-degree charge. 
¶79 Austin argued that he was entitled to a new trial 
based upon errors in the circuit court's jury instructions: 
Austin claims the instructions were erroneous because 
the self-defense instructions failed to tell the jury 
that the State had to disprove self-defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Further, he contends that this 
error was compounded by the juxtaposition of the first 
defense-of-others instruction, which did instruct the 
jury that the State had to disprove the defense.  That 
is, Austin suggests that the omission of the burden of 
proof for self-defense, contrasted with the inclusion 
of the burden of proof for defense-of-others, may have 
suggested to the jury that the State did not have the 
burden of proof on the self-defense claim.  Austin 
also claims that it was error for the circuit court to 
omit the instruction on defense of others from the 
second-degree instructions. 
Austin, 349 Wis. 2d 744, ¶11. 
¶80 As to the second-degree charge of which Austin was 
convicted, the court of appeals held that the jury instructions 
for both self-defense and defense-of-others were erroneous. 
¶81 Regarding the self-defense instruction, the court of 
appeals concluded that the instruction of the substantive law of 
self-defense, standing alone, without an instruction on the 
burden of proof, "implies that the defendant must satisfy the 
jury that he was acting in self-defense.  In doing so, the 
instruction removes the burden of proof from the State to show 
that the defendant was engaged in criminally reckless conduct."9 
                                                 
9 Id., ¶17. 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶82 Regarding the defense-of-others instruction, the court 
of appeals concluded as follows: 
With 
regard 
to 
the 
lack 
of 
defense-of-other 
instructions in the second-degree instructions, the 
State claims that the circuit court's instruction, 
though 
not 
identical 
to 
the 
defense-of-others 
instruction given for the first degree charges, was 
nevertheless proper.  However, the circuit court 
merely told the jury to "consider the evidence 
relating 
to . . . defense 
of 
others, 
in 
deciding 
whether defendant's conduct created an unreasonable 
risk. . . . If 
the 
defendant 
was 
acting 
lawfully . . . in defense of others, his conduct did 
not create an unreasonable risk to another."  We do 
not agree that this was adequate:  the instruction on 
the State's burden of proof is wholly omitted.  Thus, 
the instructions are erroneous. 
Austin, 349 Wis. 2d 744, ¶19. 
¶83 The majority asserts that Austin is distinguishable 
from the instant case because in Austin, there was no burden of 
proof instruction on self-defense at all.10  The majority's 
reasoning pays too little attention to how the court of appeals 
dealt with the defense-of-others instruction at issue in Austin 
and how the logic of that reasoning applies in the instant case. 
¶84 In Austin, with regard to the first-degree charge, the 
circuit 
court 
properly 
instructed 
the 
jury 
on 
both 
the 
substantive law applicable to the defense-of-others defense and 
the applicable burden of proof (i.e., the State bears the burden 
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Austin was not acting 
lawfully in the defense of others).  However, when instructing 
the jury on the second-degree charge, the circuit court did not 
                                                 
10 Majority op., ¶47 n.24. 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
repeat the instruction.  The court of appeals held that the 
defense-of-others instruction for the second-degree charge was 
inadequate because "the instruction on the State's burden of 
proof [was] wholly omitted."11  The court of appeals reached this 
conclusion despite the fact that the State's burden of proof 
related to defense-of-others was properly explained by the 
circuit court in its instructions on the first-degree charge. 
¶85 The similarities between Austin and the instant case 
are striking.   
¶86 In Austin, the jury was instructed to consider the 
second-degree charge only if it found Austin not guilty of the 
first-degree charge, and both charges had their own sets of 
applicable instructions.  In the instant case, the jury was 
instructed to consider the charge of homicide by negligent 
handling of a dangerous weapon only if it found the defendant 
not guilty of both first- and second-degree reckless homicide, 
and all three charges had their own sets of applicable 
instructions. 
¶87 In Austin, while instructing the jury on the first-
degree charge, the circuit court properly explained the State's 
burden of proof related to the defense-of-others defense, but it 
did not repeat the burden of proof applicable to that defense 
when instructing the jury on second-degree charge.  In the 
instant case, while instructing the jury on the charges of 
first- and second-degree reckless homicide, the circuit court 
                                                 
11 Austin, 349 Wis. 2d 744, ¶19. 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
properly explained the State's burden of proof related to self-
defense, but it did not repeat the burden of proof applicable to 
that defense when instructing the jury on the charge of homicide 
by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon.   
¶88 As was the case in Austin, the error in not repeating 
the burden of proof instruction when instructing the jury on the 
charge of homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon 
was compounded by the fact that the correct instruction was 
given when the circuit court instructed the jury on the first- 
and second-degree reckless homicide charges.  It is the 
juxtaposition between those instructions coupled with the fact 
that the jury was to consider each charge individually, moving 
to a lesser-included charge only if it found the defendant not 
guilty of the more serious charge, that creates confusion and 
results in erroneous instructions. 
II 
¶89 The majority asserts that because the circuit court 
stated "As I previously indicated" while repeating parts of the 
self-defense instruction applicable to the charge of homicide by 
negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, the circuit court 
"incorporated by reference its initial instruction on self-
defense," thereby "remind[ing]" the jury "that the initial 
instruction, recited in the context of reckless homicide, 
applied equally to the context of negligent homicide."12 
                                                 
12 Majority op., ¶44. 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶90 How could the majority have reached this conclusion?  
Simply reading the circuit court's statements in context reveals 
the absurdity of the majority's reasoning.  Ask yourself:  To 
what specifically is the circuit court referring when it says, 
"As I previously indicated"?   
¶91 The circuit court stated "As I previously indicated" 
on two occasions when instructing the jury on self-defense 
applicable to the charge of homicide by negligent handling of a 
dangerous weapon.   
¶92 The circuit court first stated, "As I previously 
indicated, the law of self defense allows the Defendant to 
threaten or intentionally use force against another only if the 
Defendant believed that there was an actual or [imminent] 
unlawful interference with the Defendant's person and the 
Defendant believed that the amount of force the Defendant used 
or threatened to use was necessary to prevent or terminate the 
interference and the Defendant's beliefs were reasonable."13  The 
underlined portion of the circuit court's statement is what was 
"previously indicated."  Nowhere does the circuit court mention 
the burden of proof.  The circuit court said nothing to indicate 
"that the initial instruction, recited in the context of 
reckless homicide, applied equally to the context of negligent 
homicide."14 
                                                 
13 Majority op., ¶26 (emphasis added). 
14 Majority op., ¶44. 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶93 The circuit court again stated, "And as I previously 
indicated, a belief may be reasonable even though mistaken.  In 
determining whether the Defendant's beliefs were reasonable, the 
standard is what a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence 
would have believed in the Defendant's position under the 
circumstances that existed at the time of the alleged offense."15  
Again, the underlined portion of the circuit court's statement 
is what was "previously indicated."  Again, nowhere does the 
circuit court mention the burden of proof or inform the jury 
that the previous self-defense instructions that applied to the 
charges of first- and second-degree reckless homicide "applied 
equally to the context of negligent homicide."16 
¶94 I agree with Presiding Judge Reilly that "[t]he 
majority's suggestion that the court's use of the phrase '[a]s I 
previously indicated' incorporated the court's instruction on 
the law of self-defense applicable to first- and second-degree 
reckless homicide is an erroneous invitation that juries may 
search out laws applicable to other crimes so as to convict on a 
crime under deliberation."  State v. Langlois, 2017 WI App 44, 
¶56, 377 Wis. 2d 302, 901 N.W.2d 768 (Reilly, P.J., dissenting). 
III 
¶95 The majority's erroneous conclusion hangs by one final 
thread.  The majority asserts that the general instruction on 
the State's burden to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
                                                 
15 Majority op., ¶26 (emphasis added). 
16 Majority op., ¶44. 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
corrected any possible confusion regarding the burden of proof 
applicable to self-defense on the charge of homicide by 
negligent handling of a dangerous weapon.17  The majority states: 
Because self-defense is a negative defense, the State 
disproves self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt if it 
proves the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt, specifically criminal negligence.  Therefore, 
the jury was aware that the State had to prove 
criminal negligence——the element that self-defense 
would negate——beyond a reasonable doubt 
Majority op., ¶45. 
¶96 The majority's reasoning is flawed for at least two 
reasons. 
¶97 First, if the majority's "negative defense" theory is 
correct, then it appears to follow necessarily that the circuit 
court did not need to instruct the jury on the burden of proof 
applicable to self-defense at all because the applicable burden 
of proof would be discernable from the circuit court's general 
burden-of-proof instruction and the instructions regarding the 
elements of the charged crimes, specifically the elements of 
recklessness or criminal negligence. 
¶98 But the fact remains that the circuit court did 
instruct the jury on the burden of proof for self-defense for 
the first- and second-degree reckless homicide charges, but not 
for the homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon 
charge.  Because each charge was to be considered independently 
from the other charges and each charge bore its own separate set 
                                                 
17 Majority op., ¶45. 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
of instructions, the juxtaposition of those different self-
defense instructions creates confusion. 
¶99 To avoid confusion (and assuming the majority's 
"negative defense" theory is correct), the circuit court should 
either have not instructed on the burden of proof for self-
defense applicable to any of the three charges, or it should 
have provided one complete and accurate instruction for self-
defense while telling the jury that the instruction applied to 
all three charges.  By inconsistently repeating certain elements 
of the self-defense instruction but not others, the circuit 
court created confusing and erroneous jury instructions. 
¶100 Second, the argument advanced by the majority was made 
and rejected by the court of appeals in Austin.  The circuit 
court in 
Austin also gave the general burden of proof 
instruction,18 and the State argued that because self-defense 
negated the "recklessness" element of the charges at issue, the 
fact that the circuit court wholly omitted an instruction on the 
burden of proof applicable to self-defense was not erroneous.19 
¶101 The Austin court of appeals, unpersuaded by the 
State's argument, held that "when a defendant successfully makes 
self-defense an issue, the jury must be instructed as to the 
                                                 
18 Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant at 14, State v. 
Austin, 2013 WI App 96, 349 Wis. 2d 744, 836 N.W.2d 833 (No. 
2012AP11-CR), 2012 WL 2420866, at *14 (Wis. Ct. App. June 6, 
2012). 
19 See Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 8-9, State v. 
Austin, 2013 WI App 96, 349 Wis. 2d 744, 836 N.W.2d 833 (No. 
2012AP11-CR), 2012 WL 4121196, *8-9 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 
2012). 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
State's burden of proof regarding the nature of the crime, even 
if the defense is a negative defense."  Austin, 349 Wis. 2d 744, 
¶16 (citing State v. Schulz, 102 Wis. 2d 423, 429-30, 307 
N.W.2d 151 (1981), and State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 640, 
492 
N.W.2d 633 
(Ct. 
App. 
1992)); 
see 
also 
Austin, 
349 
Wis. 2d 744, ¶17 (explaining that, by itself, Wis JI——Criminal 
801 "implies that the defendant must satisfy the jury that he 
was acting in self-defense").   
¶102 The 
majority 
does 
not 
overrule 
Austin 
or 
even 
acknowledge that its reasoning conflicts with Austin.  Can the 
majority square its reasoning in paragraph 45 with the court of 
appeals decision in Austin?  I do not think that it can, and 
Austin provides the more persuasive resolution of the issue. 
IV 
¶103 Finally, 
following 
Austin, 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
defendant is entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice 
regardless of whether he was prejudiced as a result of trial 
counsel's failure to object to the circuit court's erroneous 
jury instructions.20  In my view, a Machner hearing is not 
necessary. 
¶104 Similar to the instant case, the jury instruction 
issue in Austin was addressed in the context of Austin's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  However, instead of 
                                                 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 751.06 permits the court to order a new 
trial "if it appears from the record that the real controversy 
has not been fully tried, or that it is probable that justice 
has for any reason miscarried . . . ." 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
remanding the case to the circuit court for a Machner hearing or 
determining whether Austin had shown prejudice, the court of 
appeals instead ordered a new trial in the interest of justice. 
¶105 In reaching its conclusion that a new trial in the 
interest of justice was appropriate, the court of appeals 
discussed the differing bases upon which the jury might have 
relied in reaching its conclusion to acquit Austin of the first-
degree charge, but convict him of the second-degree charge.  The 
court of appeals stated that it "[did] not know what difference, 
if any, a proper instruction on self-defense would have made[,]" 
and "[g]iven these uncertainties regarding the verdict, [the 
court of appeals was] not confident that counsel's lack of 
objection [to the erroneous jury instructions] did not result in 
prejudice."21 
¶106 Under these circumstances, the court of appeals found 
it unnecessary to remand the case for a Machner hearing.  The 
court explained its reasoning as follows: 
It is undisputed that Austin stabbed both victims.  
The only real issue was whether Austin was properly 
acting in his or his cousin's defense.  By not 
properly instructing the jury, the circuit court 
failed to provide it with the proper framework for 
analyzing that question.  Thus, regardless of whether 
trial 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
prejudicial, 
we 
conclude this is one of those very limited instances 
in which we must reverse and remand for a new trial in 
the interests of justice. 
Austin, 349 Wis. 2d 744, ¶23. 
                                                 
21 Austin, 349 Wis. 2d 744, ¶22. 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶107 The logic and reasoning of the court of appeals in 
Austin applies with equal persuasive force in the instant case. 
¶108 As in Austin, it is not clear in the instant case how 
the jury reached its conclusion that the defendant should be 
acquitted of the first- and second-degree reckless homicide 
charges, but convicted of the charge of homicide by negligent 
handling of a dangerous weapon.  Indeed, it seems nigh 
impossible to know whether or not the jury would have reached a 
different result if it had been instructed properly.  Moreover, 
as in Austin, it is undisputed that the defendant stabbed his 
brother.  The only real issue is whether the defendant was 
acting properly in self-defense or whether the stabbing was an 
accident. 
¶109 By not properly instructing the jury, the circuit 
court failed to provide the jury with the proper framework for 
deciding the only disputed issues in the instant case.  Thus, I 
conclude that regardless of whether trial counsel's performance 
was prejudicial to the defendant, the instant case presents "one 
of those very limited instances" in which a new trial in the 
interest of justice is appropriate. 
V 
¶110 It is unwise to conclude "that a jury may utilize 
instructions for crimes not under consideration to fix erroneous 
instructions 
for 
the 
crime 
under 
consideration."22 
 
This 
reasoning was correctly rejected by the court of appeals in 
                                                 
22 Langlois, 
377 
Wis. 2d 302, 
¶52 
(Reilly, 
P.J., 
dissenting). 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
Austin, and Austin should be followed in the instant case.  
Consistent with the court of appeals decision in Austin, I would 
grant the defendant a new trial in the interest of justice 
because the nature of the circuit court's error is such that the 
error's prejudicial effect is effectively unknowable. 
¶111 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶112 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The State 
charged Jacob Langlois with first-degree reckless homicide while 
using a dangerous weapon, but at trial, the State asked the 
circuit court to also instruct the jury on two lesser-included 
offenses:  (1) second-degree reckless homicide while using a 
dangerous weapon; and (2) homicide by negligent handling of a 
dangerous weapon.  Langlois claimed he killed his brother by 
accident or in self-defense.  The circuit court chose to give 
separate self-defense instructions for first-degree reckless 
homicide and negligent homicide.  The self-defense instruction 
given for first-degree reckless homicide accurately stated the 
law, advising the jury that the State had the burden "to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act 
lawfully in self defense." 
¶113 The 
self-defense 
instruction 
given 
for 
negligent 
homicide, however, completely omitted the State's burden.  The 
instructions on negligent homicide left out the following 
paragraph: 
You should consider the evidence relating to self-
defense in deciding whether the defendant's conduct 
created an unreasonable risk to another. If the 
defendant was acting lawfully in self-defense, his 
conduct did not create an unreasonable risk to 
another.  The burden is on the state to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act 
lawfully in self defense.  And, you must be satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt from all the evidence in the 
case that the risk was unreasonable. 
(Emphasis added.)  The omission of this part of the instructions 
for negligent homicide means the court failed to inform the jury 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
that the State bore the burden of proving that Langlois was not 
acting in self-defense.  The majority holds that because this 
language appeared earlier in the instructions regarding first-
degree reckless homicide, the jury must have gone back to those 
earlier instructions, plucked the missing language out, and 
applied the proper burden when it convicted Langlois of 
negligent homicide.  I disagree.  Experienced lawyers may be 
capable of sifting and winnowing through erroneous instructions 
in order to assemble the correct ones when considering the third 
level of charges, but lay jurors certainly are not. 
I 
¶114 Here, the instructions were divided into three parts——
one part for each of the crimes for which Langlois could be 
convicted.  As Court of Appeals Judge Paul Reilly noted in his 
dissenting opinion, the circuit court could have chosen to give 
a single self-defense instruction and advised the jurors it must 
be considered when evaluating each of the three crimes.  See 
State v. Langlois, 2017 WI App 44, ¶56, 377 Wis. 2d 302, 901 
N.W.2d 768 (Reilly, P.J. dissenting) ("The court could have 
given one complete, proper instruction on self-defense and told 
the jury that it applied to all three crimes, but it did not do 
so.").  This court is left to evaluate what the circuit court 
did do. 
¶115 Part I of the jury instructions, which addressed 
first-degree reckless homicide, correctly stated the law and the 
burden of proof on self-defense.  The last two paragraphs within 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
the first-degree reckless homicide instructions directed the 
jurors as follows: 
If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant caused the death of Jacob Langlois 
by 
criminally 
reckless 
conduct 
and 
that 
the 
circumstances of the conduct showed utter disregard 
for human life, you must not find the defendant guilty 
of First Degree Reckless Homicide and you should then 
consider whether the defendant is guilty of Second 
Degree Reckless Homicide in violation of § 940.06 of 
the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, which is a lesser 
included offense of First Degree Reckless Homicide. 
You should make every reasonable effort to agree 
unanimously on the charge of First Degree Reckless 
Homicide before considering the offense of Second 
Degree Reckless Homicide. However, if after full and 
complete consideration of the evidence, you conclude 
that 
further 
deliberation 
would 
not 
result 
in 
unanimous agreement on the charge of First Degree 
Reckless Homicide, you should consider whether the 
defendant 
is 
guilty 
of 
Second 
Degree 
Reckless 
Homicide. 
¶116 In other words, the jurors were instructed that if 
they could not unanimously agree that Langlois committed first-
degree reckless homicide, they were to set that offense and its 
instructions aside and move on to the lesser-included offense of 
second-degree reckless homicide. 
¶117 Part II of the instructions addressed second-degree 
reckless homicide with substantively the same two paragraphs at 
the end of this part as well: 
If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant caused the death of Jacob 
Langlois by criminally reckless conduct, you must not 
find the defendant guilty of Second Degree Reckless 
Homicide and you should then consider whether the 
defendant is guilty of Homicide by Negligent Handling 
of a Dangerous Weapon in violation of § 940.08 of the 
Criminal Code of Wisconsin, which is a lesser included 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
offense of both First and Second Degree Reckless 
Homicide. 
You should make every reasonable effort to agree 
unanimously on the charge of Second Degree Reckless 
Homicide before considering the offense of Homicide by 
Negligent Handling of a Dangerous Weapon.  However, if 
after full and complete consideration of the evidence, 
you conclude that further deliberation would not 
result in unanimous agreement on the charge of Second 
Degree Reckless Homicide, you should consider whether 
the defendant is guilty of Homicide by Negligent 
Handling of a Dangerous Weapon. 
¶118 Thus, the jurors were directed to move on to the next 
lesser-included offense if they could not unanimously agree that 
Langlois was guilty of second-degree reckless homicide.  As 
Judge Reilly points out in his dissent:  "The jury found 
Langlois not guilty of both first- and second-degree reckless 
homicide, and therefore the instructions (the law) on those two 
charges were no longer before the jury."  Langlois, 377 
Wis. 2d 302, ¶53 (Reilly, P.J., dissenting). 
¶119 This left the jury to consider the instructions (the 
law) contained under the umbrella of the negligent homicide 
instruction, which was missing the paragraph setting out the 
burden of proof regarding self-defense.  Therein lies the 
problem. 
II 
¶120 It is important to note that Langlois' trial lawyer 
failed to object to this blatant error in the jury instructions, 
which places this case under an ineffective assistance of 
counsel framework of review.  See State v. Carprue, 2004 WI 111, 
¶¶36-47, 274 Wis. 2d 656, 683 N.W.2d 31 ("The absence of any 
objection warrants that we follow 'the normal procedure in 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.rgb 
 
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criminal cases,'" which is to address the alleged error "within 
the rubric of the ineffective assistance of counsel." (quoted 
and cited sources omitted)); see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 
U.S. 365, 374-75 (1986) (holding that in absence of objection, 
error should be analyzed under ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
standards, even when error is of constitutional dimension 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 688 (1984)). 
¶121 Generally, when a defendant's trial lawyer fails to 
object to an erroneous jury instruction, this court applies the 
harmless error test.  See State v. Gordon, 2003 WI 69, ¶5, 262 
Wis. 2d 380, 663 N.W.2d 765  (holding that the omission of 
element of crime from jury instruction subject to harmless error 
test (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999))); see 
also State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶¶47–49, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d 189. 
¶122 Neder explained that while a "limited class" of errors 
is deemed "structural," requiring "automatic reversal,"1 most 
errors, 
including 
constitutional 
ones, 
are 
reviewed 
for 
harmlessness.  Neder, 527 U.S. at 8.  Most jury instruction 
errors 
are 
"trial 
errors," 
which 
will 
not 
be 
presumed 
prejudicial.  See Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 
1994).  For example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in 
                                                 
1  Neder gave the following examples of errors resulting in 
automatic prejudice:  complete denial of counsel; a biased 
circuit court; racial discrimination in the selection of a grand 
jury; denial of self-representation at trial; denial of public 
trial; or a defective reasonable doubt instruction.  Neder v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999). 
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Scarpa lists instances of jury instruction errors falling into 
the 
"trial 
error" 
category, 
including: 
 
"overbroad 
jury 
instructions used during the sentencing stage of a capital case 
[and] jury instructions containing an erroneous (but rebuttable) 
presumption . . . ."  Id. at 14 (first citing Clemons v. 
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752 (1990); then citing Carella v. 
California, 491 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1989)). 
¶123 Jury instruction errors falling into the "structural 
error" category and requiring automatic reversal are rare.  I 
located only one——failure to give a constitutionally sufficient 
"reasonable doubt" instruction.  See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 
U.S. 275, 281-82 (1993).  Sullivan held that when there is a 
reasonable likelihood a jury does not believe it needs proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt to find the defendant guilty, the 
erroneous instruction is a "structural error" that may not be 
cured through a harmless error analysis.  Id. 
¶124 The jury instruction error here falls into the same 
category as the error in Sullivan——the jury was not told with 
respect to negligent homicide that the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act lawfully in 
self-defense. 
¶125 This case, therefore, presents a jury instruction 
error distinguishable from those in Neder, Gordon, and Harvey, 
and 
one 
that 
requires 
automatic 
reversal. 
 
This 
error 
"infect[ed] the entire trial process" and "necessarily render[ed 
the] trial fundamentally unfair."  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶37 
(quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 8).  Stated otherwise, this error 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.rgb 
 
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deprived Langlois of his "'basic protections' without which 'a 
criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle 
for determination of guilt or innocence . . . .'"  Id.  When the 
jury instruction error is structural, its harmfulness "can be 
conclusively presumed."  Scarpa, 38 F.3d at 14. 
¶126 It is a fundamental tenet of our criminal justice 
system that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty.  The 
State and the State alone bears the burden of proving a 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  As Justice Antonin 
Scalia explained in Sullivan, writing for a unanimous court: 
What the factfinder must determine to return a verdict 
of guilty is prescribed by the Due Process Clause. The 
prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements 
of the offense charged, see, e.g., Patterson v. New 
York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977); Leland v. Oregon, 343 
U.S. 790, 795 (1952), and must persuade the factfinder 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" of the facts necessary to 
establish each of those elements, see, e.g., In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); Cool v. United 
States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972) (per curiam).  This 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
requirement, 
which 
was 
adhered to by virtually all common-law jurisdictions, 
applies in state as well as federal proceedings. 
Winship, supra. 
508 U.S. at 277-78. 
¶127 The United States Supreme Court concluded in Sullivan 
that 
an 
erroneous 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
instruction 
constitutes a structural error requiring automatic reversal 
because "a misdescription of the burden of proof . . . vitiates 
all the jury's findings."  Id. at 281.  The Court explained that 
this type of instructional error cannot be evaluated under the 
harmless error test because, unlike a trial error, which can "be 
quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence 
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presented," the "precise effects" of the "[d]enial of the right 
to a jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" are 
"unmeasurable."  Id.  "The deprivation of that right, with 
consequences 
that 
are 
necessarily 
unquantifiable 
and 
indeterminate" renders the jury instruction error a structural 
one.  Id. at 281-82. 
¶128 The instructional error involved in Langlois' case is 
similar, if not more grievous, than in Sullivan.  The circuit 
court instructed the jury that the State had the requisite 
burden with respect to first-degree reckless homicide, but the 
jury was not told that the State had that burden with respect to 
negligent homicide.  The jury found Langlois not guilty on 
first- and second-degree reckless homicide, but convicted him of 
negligent homicide.  It is a juror's job to follow the law as 
instructed by the circuit court.  The circuit court here, 
however, failed to properly instruct this jury.  It told the 
jurors that the State had the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Langlois did not act in self-defense with 
respect to first-degree reckless homicide, but it did not give 
the basic, but critically important instruction on the burden of 
proof with respect to negligent homicide.  Perhaps those trained 
in the law could parse out these jury instructions, jump back 
through five pages of law, and import the missing part into the 
negligent homicide analysis, but the average juror could not and 
would not.  I agree with Judge Reilly that it is "disingenuous 
and illogical that the majority believes that a jury may utilize 
instructions for crimes not under consideration to fix erroneous 
No.  2016AP1409-CR.rgb 
 
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instructions for the crime under consideration."  Langlois, 377 
Wis. 2d 302, ¶52 (Reilly, P.J., dissenting). 
¶129 The jurors are told to follow the instructions, and we 
presume they do so.  See State v. Truax, 151 Wis. 2d 354, 362, 
444 N.W.2d 432 (Ct. App. 1989).  The instructions to the jurors 
in this case told them to move on to the next lesser-included 
offense if they could not agree as to guilt on the charged crime 
under consideration.  When the jury moved on to negligent 
homicide, it found a constitutionally deficient self-defense 
instruction.  Because the instruction wholly omitted the beyond-
a-reasonable-doubt standard, the jury could not properly assess 
whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Langlois 
did not act in self-defense.  Or, worse yet, the jury could have 
believed the State did not have any burden at all for disproving 
self-defense with respect to the negligent homicide charge. 
¶130 Although jury instructions rarely rise to the level of 
structural error, automatic reversal is warranted when the error 
was wholesale omission of the State's burden of proof as to 
self-defense for the lesser-included charge on which the jury 
convicted Langlois.  See State v. Austin, 2013 WI App 96, ¶¶12, 
23, 349 Wis. 2d 744, 836 N.W.2d 833 (ordering a new trial 
despite defense lawyer's failure to object to erroneous jury 
instruction because "[b]y not properly instructing the jury" 
that "the burden is on the State to disprove the [defendant's 
claim of self-]defense beyond a reasonable doubt" "the circuit 
court failed to provide it with the proper framework for 
analyzing that question"). 
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¶131 Because the trial court's faulty instructions to the 
jury constitute structural error requiring automatic reversal, I 
would reverse the court of appeals and remand for a new trial.  
I respectfully dissent.2 
 
                                                 
2  The accident instruction also was erroneous, but I need 
not address that error based on my conclusion that the erroneous 
burden of proof instruction warrants automatic reversal. 
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