Case Title: In re N.R.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S274943

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re N.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. 
 
 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
O.R., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S274943 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Five 
B312001 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
20CCJP06523A 
 
 
December 14, 2023 
 
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in 
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 
Evans concurred. 
 
 
1 
 
In re N.R. 
S274943 
 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
We granted review in this matter to decide two related 
issues associated with the exercise of dependency jurisdiction by 
the juvenile court.   
The first issue concerns the meaning of “substance abuse” 
as used within Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, 
subdivision (b)(1)(D) (hereinafter section 300(b)(1)(D)).1  The 
statutory scheme for dependency proceedings provides that 
jurisdiction over a child exists in various scenarios in which the 
“child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child 
will suffer, serious physical harm or illness.”  (§ 300, subd. 
(b)(1).)  These circumstances include situations in which serious 
physical harm or illness, or a substantial risk of serious physical 
harm or illness, results from an “inability of the parent or 
guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s 
or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or 
substance abuse.”  (§ 300(b)(1)(D).)  We must decide here 
whether substance abuse, in this context, requires either a 
diagnosis by a medical professional or satisfaction of the 
prevailing criteria for a substance use disorder as specified 
within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
 
1  
All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to 
the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
2 
 
Disorders (DSM), a text developed by the American Psychiatric 
Association.   
As to this issue, we hold that neither of these showings is 
essential under section 300(b)(1)(D).  We interpret section 
300(b)(1)(D) as assigning the term “substance abuse” its 
ordinary meaning — essentially, the excessive use of drugs or 
alcohol.  Although a professional diagnosis or satisfaction of the 
DSM criteria for the pertinent substance use disorder can be 
relevant to ascertaining the existence of substance abuse under 
this standard, we do not read the statute as requiring such 
proof.   
We caution, however, that for dependency jurisdiction to 
exist due to substance abuse pursuant to section 300(b)(1)(D), 
this abuse must render a parent or guardian unable to provide 
regular care for a child and either cause the child to suffer 
serious physical harm or illness or place the child at substantial 
risk of suffering such harm or illness.  These additional 
requirements function to limit the circumstances in which a 
parent’s or guardian’s substance abuse will support the exercise 
of dependency jurisdiction under this provision.   
The second issue before us relates to how these additional 
requirements may be established.  Some courts have held that 
the existence of substance abuse by a parent or guardian, by 
itself, amounts to prima facie evidence of both an inability to 
provide regular care for a child and a substantial risk of serious 
physical harm when the child is of “tender years,” a term that is 
sometimes used by courts to describe young children with 
limited ability to care for themselves.  We reject this tender 
years presumption as inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent, 
as manifested in the statutory text.  The age of a child may bear 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
3 
 
upon whether substance abuse renders a parent or guardian 
unable to provide that child with regular care, and whether the 
child is thereby placed at substantial risk of serious physical 
harm or illness.  But the statutory scheme does not allow courts 
to treat a showing of substance abuse as always being sufficient 
on its own to establish these other requirements for dependency 
jurisdiction under section 300(b)(1)(D), even when a young child 
is involved.   
Consistent with these conclusions, we reverse the 
judgment below and remand this matter to the Court of Appeal 
for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On November 19, 2020, police officers executed a search 
warrant at the residence of N.R.’s mother, S.H. (Mother).2  N.R. 
was 12 months old at the time.  Mother lived separately from 
N.R.’s father, appellant O.R. (Father), with the two parents 
sharing custody of N.R.   
During the execution of the search warrant, a social 
worker employed by the Los Angeles County Department of 
Children and Family Services (the Department) spoke with 
Mother and inspected the premises.  The social worker had 
safety concerns regarding N.R.’s living arrangements and asked 
Mother if N.R. could stay with Father while the investigation 
continued.  Mother agreed to contact Father, who soon arrived 
to pick up N.R.   
The social worker accompanied Father to his apartment 
and toured it with him.  The social worker’s assessment of 
 
2  
The search was directed toward weapons and drugs 
believed to be in the possession of Mother’s brother and her 
mother’s boyfriend.  
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
4 
 
Father’s residence was generally positive.  N.R. was observed to 
be “clean, neat and on target with all developmental 
milestones.”  In speaking with the social worker, Father denied 
that he abused substances, and he agreed to take a drug test.  
Father’s drug test, conducted that same day, came back 
positive for cocaine metabolite at a measured level of 1441 
nanograms per milliliter.  The social worker went to Father’s 
apartment to discuss the results with him.  Father said he had 
been scared to reveal his cocaine use in their earlier 
conversation.  He admitted he had used cocaine the weekend 
before the positive test.  He said he did not know how much of 
the substance he had used.  Father denied that he was an active 
user of cocaine.  He explained that he used the cocaine to 
celebrate his birthday and had not expected he would be asked 
to take care of N.R. soon thereafter, and that he had not used 
drugs since then.  
N.R. remained in Father’s care, with no concerns beyond 
those described above being noted by social workers, from 
November 19, 2020, until the execution of a removal order on 
December 8, 2020.  Pursuant to this order, N.R. was placed in 
the care of a maternal uncle.   
Shortly thereafter, a petition was filed in Los Angeles 
County Superior Court alleging that N.R. came within the 
dependency jurisdiction of the juvenile court.  Tracking 
language appearing within section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the 
petition alleged that N.R. had suffered, or there was a 
substantial risk he would suffer, serious physical harm or illness 
“as a result of the failure or inability of his . . . parent or legal 
guardian to supervise or protect [him] adequately,” “as a result 
of the willful or negligent failure of [his] parent or legal guardian 
to supervise or protect [him] adequately from the conduct of the 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
5 
 
custodian with whom [he] has been left,” and “by the inability of 
the parent or legal guardian to provide regular care for [him] 
due to the parent’s or legal guardian’s mental illness, 
developmental disability, or substance abuse.”   
The factual allegations in the petition alleged, first, that 
Mother had created a dangerous home environment by allowing 
her mother (N.R.’s maternal grandmother), who allegedly 
abused drugs, to reside with Mother and N.R.  According to the 
petition, Father failed to protect N.R. from this danger even 
though he knew or should have known of the grandmother’s 
substance abuse.  As a separate factual basis for the assertion 
of dependency jurisdiction, the petition alleged that Father “has 
a history of substance abuse and is a current abuser of cocaine,” 
noting Father’s positive toxicology result.  According to the 
petition, N.R. was “of such a young age as to require constant 
care and supervision and father’s substance abuse interferes 
with providing regular care” for him.  The petition further 
alleged that Mother had failed to protect N.R. from what it 
characterized as Father’s substance abuse.  
Both parents subsequently spoke to Department staff 
regarding Father’s drug use.  Mother initially said that although 
she had not known that Father used drugs, looking back, she 
realized that Father had been using cocaine from before N.R. 
was born until recently.  In a later interview, however, she said 
that Father used cocaine only before N.R. was born.  As for 
Father, he explained that he had celebrated his birthday by 
using cocaine from Thursday, November 12, through Sunday, 
November 15.  He stated, “All 4 days I used [cocaine].  Maybe it 
was a big amount throughout the 4 days, that’s why it came out 
positive.”  Asked how much cocaine he used, he said he and his 
“friends would pitch in 10 dollars each to get something small 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
6 
 
and that’s it.  I don’t know how much we got.  I had alcohol too 
all 4 days, maybe just 2 tall cans a day.”  Father, who was 
26 years old at the time of the interview, said he was 21 or 22 
when he first tried cocaine.  He elaborated, “I never had a 
problem with it, I never bought it myself, all these friends did it 
together.  I used to rave a lot, and when there were big parties, 
I’d do it with my friends.”  Father said that he used cocaine “once 
or twice every two weeks,” adding, “I don’t have an addiction, 
otherwise I’d be broke.”  
According to Father, N.R. had overnight visits with him 
on weekends, and both parents were working well on co-
parenting.  Father said that he did not take care of N.R. when 
high, and he would not “party” when N.R. was at his residence.  
As for the positive test result, Father said, “I’m so upset that 
they caught me!  My mom was upset too.  She was crying when 
I told her I tested positive.  This cocaine thing is not me!  I’m so 
upset!”  Father said that he formerly smoked marijuana, but no 
longer did so.  He also reported that he began to drink alcohol at 
age 16, but said, “It was never serious, never out of control.  I 
still go to work and school.”3   
A social worker explained to Father what a Child and 
Family Team was, as well as its potential benefits.4  Father said 
 
3  
Father had a barber’s license.  He had been working at a 
barber shop for approximately 20 hours per week until the 
COVID-19 pandemic struck, at which time he began working 
part-time at a warehouse.  He lived with his mother and older 
brother, and had no criminal record.  
4   
A Child and Family Team is “a group of individuals who 
are convened by the placing agency and who are engaged 
through a variety of team-based processes to identify the 
strengths and needs of the child or youth and their family, and 
 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
7 
 
that he did not want to participate in the program, explaining, 
“I just want the drug testing.  It’s too much.  It’s already a big 
deal I have two kids.  I just want it over with.”5  Regarding this 
testing, between January and March 2021 Father had three 
negative drug tests, two missed tests, and one leaked test.  After 
the first missed test, Father contacted a social worker to explain 
that he had missed the test due to his work schedule.  He asked 
that the drug tests occur on Mondays and Fridays, a request 
that was denied.  The other missed test, on February 23, 2021, 
was on a Tuesday.   
A combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing occurred 
in April 2021.  After hearing argument from counsel, the court 
dismissed the factual allegations involving conditions at 
Mother’s former residence6 but concluded that Father’s 
“substantial drug abuse history” warranted findings that N.R. 
came within the court’s dependency jurisdiction and should be 
removed from Father’s care and custody.  The court 
interlineated the dependency petition’s factual allegations to 
describe Father as a “recent abuser of cocaine,” rather than a 
“current” one.  N.R. was ordered home with Mother on the 
condition that she continue to comply with conditions specified 
by the court.  Father was given monitored visitation and ordered 
to participate in drug- and alcohol-related services, including 
random drug testing.  
 
to help achieve positive outcomes for safety, permanency, and 
well-being.”  (§ 16501, subd. (a)(4).) 
5  
Father had another child from a different relationship.  
6  
Mother had moved into her own apartment by the time of 
the hearing.  
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
8 
 
Father appealed.  In his briefing before the Court of 
Appeal, Father admitted that he had used cocaine, but he 
argued that this use did not amount to substance abuse that 
supported a jurisdictional finding.  Identifying a split of 
authority across the Courts of Appeal regarding the meaning of 
“substance abuse” as it appears in section 300, subdivision (b), 
Father urged the court to adopt the interpretation first 
articulated by In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754 (Drake 
M.), disapproved on another ground in In re D.P. (2023) 
14 Cal.5th 266, 283.  Drake M., after observing that 
“[d]ependency cases have varied widely in the kinds of parental 
actions labeled ‘substance abuse,’ ” concluded that “a workable 
definition is necessary to avoid any resulting inconsistencies.”  
(Drake M., at p. 765.)  The court then opined “that a finding of 
substance abuse for purposes of section 300, subdivision (b), 
must be based on evidence sufficient to (1) show that the parent 
or guardian at issue had been diagnosed as having a current 
substance abuse problem by a medical professional or 
(2) establish that the parent or guardian at issue has a current 
substance abuse problem as defined in the” current version of 
the DSM at the time of that decision.  (Id. at p. 766.)7 
Drake M. also concluded that a finding of substance abuse 
under this standard constituted “prima facie evidence of the 
inability of a parent or guardian to provide regular care 
resulting in a substantial risk of physical harm” to a child of 
“ ‘tender years.’ ”  (Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.)  
 
7  
At the time the Drake M. decision was rendered in 2012, 
section 300, subdivision (b) had not yet been parsed into its 
current subdivisions.  (See Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1; Stats. 2014, 
ch. 29, § 64.) 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
9 
 
Father’s briefing before the Court of Appeal criticized this aspect 
of Drake M., observing that the statutory scheme nowhere on its 
face treats sufficient proof of substance abuse as prima facie 
evidence of an inability to provide regular care or a substantial 
risk of physical harm.  In any event, Father argued, the evidence 
before the juvenile court rebutted any prima facie case that 
might have arisen.   
The Court of Appeal affirmed.  The court determined, first, 
that “[s]ubstantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction over very young N.R. because of Father’s 
abuse of cocaine.”  In so holding, the Court of Appeal did not 
discuss the split of authority regarding the meaning of the term 
“substance abuse.”  In upholding the juvenile court’s assertion 
of jurisdiction, the court noted Father’s initial denial of drug use, 
the high level of cocaine metabolites recorded in his positive test 
result, and his admission to using cocaine once or twice every 
two weeks over a four- or five-year period, concluding therefrom 
that the record contained substantial evidence of substance 
abuse.   
The Court of Appeal recognized that a “section 300, 
subdivision (b)(1) finding ‘cannot be based on substance abuse 
alone; jurisdiction [also] requires a substantial risk of harm to 
the child arising from the substance abuse.’ ”  But the court then 
invoked the tender years presumption, observing that “[w]here 
very young children like N.R. are concerned . . . ‘ “the finding of 
substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a 
parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a 
substantial risk of physical harm.” ’ ”  The Court of Appeal 
determined that Father had not rebutted the prima facie 
showing of a substantial risk of serious physical harm 
established by his substance abuse, perceiving Father’s reaction 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
10 
 
to the positive drug test and his refusal to participate in services 
beyond random drug testing as further evidence of such risk.  
Turning to the juvenile court’s disposition order, the Court 
of Appeal determined that this order was supported by 
substantial evidence establishing “both that N.R. would be at 
substantial danger if returned to Father’s unsupervised care 
and there were no reasonable means short of removal to 
mitigate the danger to N.R.”  The court found that Father’s 
“behavior — especially his initial effort to conceal his drug use 
and his steadfast denial that his drug use was a problem — 
demonstrate he was unable or unwilling to substantively engage 
with any efforts that might have prevented the need to remove 
N.R. from his custody so as to mitigate the substantial danger 
to the very young child from Father’s cocaine abuse.”   
We granted review to resolve the split of authority 
regarding the meaning of “substance abuse” as used in section 
300(b)(1)(D).  Some Courts of Appeal have adopted the definition 
crafted in Drake M. (see, e.g., In re L.C. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 
646, 652; In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 447, 
disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. 
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7), whereas others (see, e.g., In re 
K.B. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 593, 601) have followed In re 
Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210 (Christopher R.), in 
which the court “recognize[d] the Drake M. formulation as a 
generally useful and workable definition of substance abuse for 
purposes of section 300, subdivision (b),” but refused to accept 
the argument that substance abuse can be found only when 
someone “has been diagnosed by a medical professional or . . . 
falls within one of the specific [DSM] categories.”  (Christopher 
R., at p. 1218.)  In ordering review, we also agreed to decide 
whether substance abuse by a parent or guardian, when found 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
11 
 
to exist, should be treated as prima facie evidence of an inability 
to provide regular care and a substantial risk of serious physical 
harm to a young child.  This aspect of the Drake M. decision has 
found acceptance even among courts that have rejected its view 
that substance abuse requires a professional diagnosis or 
satisfaction of the relevant DSM criteria.  (See, e.g., Christopher 
R., at p. 1219.)   
II.  DISCUSSION 
Both issues before us present questions of statutory 
interpretation.  After reviewing the juvenile dependency 
scheme, we consider whether the Legislature intended for 
substance abuse to be recognized only upon evidence 
establishing either that the pertinent DSM criteria have been 
satisfied or that a parent or guardian has been diagnosed with 
a substance use disorder by a qualified professional.  We then 
address whether a finding of substance abuse is properly 
regarded as prima facie evidence of an inability to provide 
regular care to a young child and a substantial risk of serious 
physical harm to that child.  
A. The Statutory Scheme for Dependency 
Proceedings 
“The purpose of California’s dependency law is ‘to provide 
maximum safety and protection for children who are currently 
being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being 
neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, 
protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children 
who are at risk of that harm.’  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.2, 
subd. (a).)  In its effort to achieve this overarching goal, the law 
balances a number of vital interests:  children’s interests in safe 
and stable homes; parents’ interests in raising their children; 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
12 
 
families’ shared interests in each other’s companionship; and 
the state’s interest in protecting society’s most vulnerable 
members.”  (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 
623–624 (Michael G.).)   
“Dependency proceedings span up to four stages:  
jurisdiction, 
disposition, 
reunification, 
and 
permanency.  
[Citations.]  At the jurisdictional stage, the juvenile court 
determines whether to declare a child a dependent of the court 
because the child is suffering, or at risk of suffering, significant 
harm.”  (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 624.)  “ ‘A 
dependency adjudication is a preliminary step that allows the 
juvenile court, within specified limits, to assert supervision over 
the endangered child’s care.’  [Citation.]  After the juvenile court 
takes that preliminary step, the court may impose limitations 
on parental authority as necessary to protect the child.  
[Citations.]  It may also order that the child be removed from a 
parent’s physical custody if there is clear and convincing 
evidence that removal is necessary to protect the child from a 
substantial risk of harm.  [Citations.]  In some cases, a 
dependency adjudication may lead to termination of parental 
rights.”  (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 876 (I.C.).) 
Section 300 enumerates the various ways in which a child 
may come within the dependency jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court.  Our focus here is upon section 300, subdivision (b)(1), 
which provides that a juvenile may be adjudged a dependent of 
the court when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial 
risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, 
as a result of any of the following:  [¶]  (A)  The failure or 
inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately 
supervise or protect the child.  [¶]  (B)  The willful or negligent 
failure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
13 
 
or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom 
the child has been left.  [¶]  (C)  The willful or negligent failure 
of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate 
food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment.  [¶]  (D)  The 
inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for 
the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, 
developmental disability, or substance abuse.”  (Italics added.)  
Although we have previously considered other aspects of 
section 300 (see, e.g., I.C., supra, 4 Cal.5th 869; In re R.T. (2017) 
3 Cal.5th 622 (R.T.); In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766 (I.J.)), we 
have not previously interpreted the statute’s reference to 
substance abuse. 
B. Neither Satisfaction of the Relevant DSM 
Criteria nor a Professional Medical Diagnosis Is 
Required To Show Substance Abuse Under 
Section 300 
The first issue we address is whether a juvenile court may 
recognize substance abuse by a parent or guardian under section 
300(b)(1)(D) only in circumstances in which the evidence before 
it either (1) establishes that the relevant diagnostic criteria in 
the current edition of the DSM have been satisfied, as Father 
has argued before us, or (2) includes a professional diagnosis of 
a current substance use disorder, which the Drake M. court also 
contemplated as an alternative method of proving the existence 
of substance abuse.  We conclude that the Legislature did not 
impose either requirement when it added the substance abuse 
language to section 300 in 1987 as part of a broader overhaul of 
the dependency scheme.   
1. Statutory Language 
“ ‘ “When we interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur fundamental 
task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
14 
 
effectuate the law’s purpose.  We first examine the statutory 
language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning.  We do 
not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the 
statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope 
and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the 
enactment.  If the language is clear, courts must generally follow 
its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in 
absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.  If the 
statutory language permits more than one reasonable 
interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the 
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’  
[Citation.]  ‘Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in 
the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of 
which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, 
sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative 
purpose.’ ” ’ ”  (Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (2019) 
6 Cal.5th 844, 856–857 (Meza).)  
a. Applying 
standard 
principles 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, 
“substance 
abuse” 
bears 
its 
ordinary meaning here 
Beginning with the statutory text, we observe that neither 
section 300 nor any other provision within the statutory scheme 
relating to dependency proceedings defines “substance abuse,” 
although definitions are provided for other terms relevant to the 
exercise of dependency jurisdiction.  (E.g., § 300, subds. (b)(4) 
[defining “sexually trafficked” by reference to the definition 
provided in Pen. Code, § 236.1 and “sexual acts” by reference to 
Pen. Code, §§ 236.1 and 11165.1], (d) [explaining that the 
statute borrows the definition of “sexual abuse” found in Pen. 
Code, § 11165.1], (e) [defining “severe physical abuse”].)   
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
15 
 
The Legislature’s failure to define substance abuse 
suggests that legislators intended for this term to bear its 
ordinary meaning in this context.  (See Valley Circle Estates v. 
VTN Consolidated, Inc. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 604, 608–609 
[“ ‘Excepting when clearly otherwise intended or indicated, 
words in a statute should be given their ordinary meaning and 
receive a sensible construction in accord with the commonly 
understood meaning thereof’ ”]; County of Orange v. Santa 
Margarita Water Dist. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 189, 192 [“When a 
statute does not define its operative words, ‘courts should give 
to the words . . . their ordinary, everyday meaning’ ”]; cf. People 
ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 302 
(Lungren) [noting of text in an initiative statute that “because 
the term is not further defined, it can be assumed to refer not to 
any special term of art, but rather to a meaning that would be 
commonly understood by the electorate”].)8   
In this respect, dictionaries can provide a helpful resource 
for ascertaining the common meanings attached to a word or 
phrase.  (See People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1009.)  The 
definitions of “substance abuse” appearing within dictionaries 
vary to some degree in their specificity and particulars.  (See, 
e.g., Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (10th ed. 2000) p. 1170, 
col. 2 [defining “substance abuse” as “excessive use of a drug (as 
 
8  
The Legislature has defined “substance abuse” as it 
appears in a different provision of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code.  Section 746, subdivision (b) identifies “substance abuse” 
as among the factors that place a “minor at a significantly 
greater risk of becoming a chronic juvenile or adult offender,” 
and defines “substance abuse” in that context as including “any 
regular use of alcohol or drugs by the minor, other than 
experimentation.”  (Id., subd. (b)(3).) 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
16 
 
alcohol, narcotics, or cocaine):  use of a drug without medical 
justification”]; American Heritage Dict. of the English Language 
(3d ed. 1996) p. 1791, col. 2 [defining “substance abuse” as 
“Excessive use of addictive substances, especially alcohol and 
narcotic drugs”]; The Random House Dict. of the English 
Language (2d ed. 1987) p. 1897, col. 1 [defining “substance 
abuse” as “long-term, pathological use of alcohol or drugs, 
characterized by daily intoxication, inability to reduce 
consumption, and impairment in social or occupational 
functioning; broadly, alcohol or drug addiction”].)  These 
definitions are alike, however, in that they all associate 
substance abuse with the excessive use of drugs or alcohol.  We 
conclude that “substance abuse,” as it appears in section 
300(b)(1)(D), is most plausibly understood as bearing this 
ordinary meaning.  (See Bernard v. Foley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 794, 
808 [perceiving no indication within a statute “that would justify 
our presuming the Legislature intended a specialized or narrow 
usage rather than a general one”].)   
While this commonplace understanding of substance 
abuse may seem broad and potentially capable of inconsistent 
application if read in isolation, nearby language within the 
statute clarifies the kind of excessive drug or alcohol use that 
section 300(b)(1)(D) is concerned with and limits the 
circumstances in which substance abuse will allow for a 
jurisdictional finding under this provision.  Section 300(b)(1)(D) 
allows for dependency jurisdiction based on substance abuse 
only when this abuse leads to an “inability” on the part of a 
parent or guardian “to provide regular care for [a] child” 
(§ 300(b)(1)(D)) that causes the child to suffer, or creates “a 
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm 
or illness” (id., subd. (b)(1)).  Even if a parent’s or guardian’s 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
17 
 
excessive use of drugs or alcohol has other negative 
manifestations, it does not provide a basis for jurisdiction under 
section 300(b)(1)(D) unless it also has these effects.  (Ibid.)9   
b. The statutory scheme does not support defendant’s 
argument that the Legislature assigned substance 
abuse a technical meaning linked to the DSM 
Father reads the statutory text differently, but his 
interpretation is unpersuasive.   
Father asserts that “substance abuse,” as used in section 
300(b)(1)(D), “is best understood by consulting the dictionary of 
brain disorders:  the DSM.”  In essence, he contends that section 
300(b)(1)(D) uses “substance abuse” in a technical sense that 
makes it appropriate to consult the DSM as an authoritative 
text in its field.  (See In re Smith (1928) 88 Cal.App. 464, 467–
468 [“Technical words when relating to a trade, when used in a 
statute or ordinance, dealing with the subject matter of such 
trade, are to be taken in their technical sense and will be so 
construed unless the context or other considerations show a 
contrary intent”]; Mueller v. Psychiatric Security Review Bd. 
(Or. 1997) 937 P.2d 1028, 1032 [“Because the phrase 
 
9  
In certain circumstances a parent’s or guardian’s 
substance-related issues may contribute to a finding that 
dependency jurisdiction exists for another reason, such as a 
“failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to 
adequately supervise or protect the child.”  (§ 300, subd. 
(b)(1)(A).)  Although this case does not require that we construe 
section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A), this provision serves to show 
that an exercise of dependency jurisdiction that is in some 
measure premised on a parent’s or guardian’s involvement with 
drugs or alcohol does not necessarily require a judicial finding 
of substance abuse under some defined standard. 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
18 
 
‘personality disorder’ [under Oregon statutory law] is a term of 
art as to which the DSM-III was the definitive source, this court 
has referred to the DSM for guidance in cases involving 
individuals with mental diseases or defects”].)   
Some background information regarding the DSM is 
helpful in evaluating Father’s argument.  The DSM, now in its 
fifth revised edition (DSM-5-TR),10 “is a classification of mental 
disorders that was developed for use in clinical, educational, and 
research settings” (DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. 23).  The “primary 
purpose” of the DSM “is to assist trained clinicians in the 
diagnosis of mental disorders as part of a case formulation 
assessment that leads to an informed treatment plan for each 
individual.”  (Id. at p. 21.)   
The DSM-5-TR and prior editions of the DSM (including 
the DSM-III and the DSM-III-R, which were the most recent 
versions of the manual when the substance abuse language was 
 
10  
This version of the DSM was published in 2022.  (Am. 
Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (5th ed. text rev. 2022).)  The DSM was first published 
in 1952.  (Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (1952).)  A second edition was 
published in 1968 (Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (2d ed. 1968)); a third 
edition in 1980 (Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed. 1980) (DSM-III)); 
a third revised edition in 1987 (Am. Psychiatric Assn., 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d rev. 
ed. 1987) (DSM-III-R)); a fourth edition in 1994 (Am. Psychiatric 
Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(4th ed. 1994) (DSM-IV)); a fourth revised edition in 2000 (Am. 
Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (4th ed. text rev. 2000) (DSM-IV-TR)); and a fifth 
edition in 2013 (Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013) (DSM-5)).  
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
19 
 
added to § 300) have identified an array of disorders involving 
substance use and, beginning with the DSM-III, have included 
criteria for diagnosing these disorders.  The categorization and 
specific descriptions of these disorders have evolved over time.  
The DSM-III-R distinguished between “Psychoactive Substance 
Dependence” (involving the satisfaction of at least three of nine 
specified criteria) (DSM-III-R, supra, at p. 166) and a “residual” 
disorder, “Psychoactive Substance Abuse,” which would be 
diagnosed only if the criteria for substance dependence were not 
satisfied (id. at p. 169).  (See id. at pp. 165–169; see also DSM-
III, supra, at pp. 164–165 [distinguishing between “substance 
abuse” and “substance dependence,” with the latter being 
“generally . . . a more severe form of Substance Use Disorder”].)  
Within the DSM-5-TR, the previously recognized categories of 
substance abuse and substance dependence have been replaced 
“with an overarching new category of substance use disorders — 
with the specific substance used defining the specific disorders.”  
(DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. xxiv.)11   
According to the DSM-5-TR, which Father identifies as 
supplying the operative criteria at this time for ascertaining 
substance abuse under section 300(b)(1)(D), “The essential 
feature of a substance use disorder is a cluster of cognitive, 
behavioral, and physiological symptoms indicating that the 
individual continues using the substance despite significant 
substance-related problems.”  (DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. 544.)  
Within the array of substance use disorders described by the 
 
11  
Notwithstanding the DSM’s revision of its terminology for 
substance use disorders, we primarily use the term “substance 
abuse” within this opinion to remain consistent with the 
language used in section 300(b)(1)(D).   
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
20 
 
DSM-5-TR, stimulant use disorders are characterized as “[a] 
pattern of amphetamine-type substance, cocaine, or other 
stimulant use leading to clinically significant impairment or 
distress, as manifested by at least two” of 11 identified criteria 
over a 12-month period.  (Id. at p. 632.)12   
Upon review of both the statutory text and the DSM, it 
does not appear that the Legislature intended for the term 
“substance abuse,” as used in section 300(b)(1)(D), to bear the 
technical meaning that Father ascribes to it.  Neither 
section 300 nor any other provision within the statutory scheme 
 
12  
The DSM-5-TR criteria for a stimulant use disorder 
consist of the following:  “The stimulant is often taken in larger 
amounts or over a longer period than was intended”; “There is a 
persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control 
stimulant use”; “A great deal of time is spent in activities 
necessary to obtain the stimulant, use the stimulant, or recover 
from its effects”; “Craving, or a strong desire or urge to use the 
stimulant”; “Recurring stimulant use resulting in a failure to 
fulfill major role obligations at work, school, or home”; 
“Continued stimulant use despite having persistent or recurrent 
social or interpersonal problems caused or exacerbated by the 
effects of the stimulant”; “Important social, occupational, or 
recreational activities are given up or reduced because of 
stimulant use”; “Recurrent stimulant use in situations in which 
it is physically hazardous”; “Stimulant use is continued despite 
knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent physical or 
psychological problem that is likely to have been caused or 
exacerbated by the stimulant”; “Tolerance, as defined by 
either . . . :  [¶]  a.  A need for markedly increased amounts of 
the stimulant to achieve intoxication or desired effect.  [¶]  b.  A 
markedly diminished effect with continued use of the same 
amount of the stimulant”; and “Withdrawal, as manifested by 
either . . . :  [¶]  a.  The characteristic withdrawal syndrome for 
the stimulant . . . .  [¶]  b.  The stimulant (or a closely related 
substance) is taken to relieve or avoid withdrawal symptoms.”  
(DSM-5-TR, supra, at pp. 632–633.) 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
21 
 
mentions the DSM.  The absence of any such references counsels 
against Father’s position.  It would be unusual for the 
Legislature to have delegated to a specific body such as the 
American Psychiatric Association the authority to define such a 
consequential term appearing in a statute.  Had the Legislature 
placed such reliance upon a text developed and maintained by a 
nongovernmental entity, which could change its terminology or 
redefine the relevant criteria in a manner wholly outside of the 
Legislature’s control (see Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 
23 Cal.3d 219, 234, fn. 14 [observing that “the American 
Psychiatric Association frequently alters its definitions of what 
constitutes a mental disorder”]), one would expect to see some 
acknowledgement of that delegation on the face of the statute.  
(See, e.g., Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, former § 813 [specifying that 
the term “mental disorder,” as formerly used within the 
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (§ 5000 et seq.), was “limited to 
those disorders listed by the American Psychiatric Association 
in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders”]; 
cf. Pub. Resources Code, § 48620.2, subd. (a)(2) [referencing an 
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standard 
within a definition].)  Yet no such explanation appears here, 
suggesting that the Legislature did not intend for the meaning 
of “substance abuse” to hinge entirely upon the criteria 
articulated in the DSM.   
Nor can we infer, based on usage at the time of section 
300(b)(1)(D)’s enactment, that the Legislature regarded the 
term “substance abuse” as so obviously referring to the pertinent 
DSM criteria as to make any explanation unnecessary.  To the 
contrary, contemporaneously enacted statutes commonly 
assigned the term “substance abuse” a more conventional, 
nontechnical meaning.  (See, e.g., Stats. 1987, ch. 1291, § 1, 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
22 
 
p. 4618, adding Ed. Code, § 44049, subd. (b) [conferring limited 
immunity upon school principals and their designees who 
inform parents of instances in which a pupil engaged in “alcohol 
or controlled substance abuse”]; Stats. 1987, ch. 879, § 1, 
p. 2778, adding Pen. Code, § 1203.1ab [providing for “drug and 
substance abuse testing” of certain probationers]; Stats. 1986, 
ch. 1441, § 1, p. 5146, adding Welf. & Inst. Code, § 502, subd. 
(a)(4) [referencing “crimes of . . . substance abuse”].)   
It is notable too that the Legislature departed from the 
classification scheme and terminology that the DSM-III and the 
DSM-III-R applied to substance use disorders.  These 
departures also suggest that legislators did not intend to limit 
findings of substance abuse to situations in which the pertinent 
DSM criteria had been satisfied.  Section 300(b)(1)(D) avoids the 
distinction that the DSM-III and DSM-III-R drew between 
“Substance Dependence” and “Substance Abuse.”  (DSM-III-R, 
supra, at pp. 166, 169; DSM-III, supra, at pp. 164–165.)  In doing 
so, the statute does not explain whether the condition described 
as substance dependence in those editions of the DSM should be 
regarded as substance abuse for purposes of applying the 
statute.  Section 300(b)(1)(D) also departs from the DSM’s 
approach insofar as the statute distinguishes between 
“substance abuse” and “mental illness” (itself a term the DSM 
has long rejected, in favor of “mental disorder”), rather than 
treating the former as a subset of the latter.  Had the 
Legislature intended for the prevailing DSM criteria to provide 
the sole reference point for recognizing substance abuse by a 
parent or guardian, section 300 presumably would have 
reconciled or at least acknowledged these differences in 
terminology and categorization. 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
23 
 
We therefore do not perceive in the language of section 300 
any persuasive indication that the Legislature intended for the 
relevant DSM criteria to supply the exclusive definition of 
substance abuse.  This conclusion is not altered by section 
300(b)(1)(D)’s grouping of substance abuse together with 
“mental illness” and “developmental disability.”  Father asserts 
that the Legislature would have perceived all three of these 
circumstances as capable of being shown only through the 
satisfaction of professionally developed criteria.  His position 
relies upon the noscitur a sociis canon of statutory construction, 
whereby “ ‘ “[a] word of uncertain meaning may be known from 
its associates and its meaning ‘enlarged or restrained by 
reference to the object of the whole clause in which it is 
used.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Hernandez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 192, 200 
(Hernandez).)   
When applicable, the noscitur a sociis canon favors “ ‘ “ ‘a 
restrictive meaning of a listed item if acceptance of a more 
expansive meaning would make other items in the list 
unnecessary or redundant, or would otherwise make the item 
markedly dissimilar to the other items in the list.’ ” ’ ”  
(Hernandez, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 200, italics added.)  
There are some threshold hurdles to the application of this 
principle here.  It is not clear that section 300(b)(1)(D)’s 
recitation of “mental illness, developmental disability, or 
substance abuse” implicates this canon at all.  (See American 
Bankers v. National Credit Union Admin. (D.C. Cir. 2019) 
934 F.3d 649, 665 [terms in a list found within a statute may be 
treated differently when their “ ‘fit’ ” is neither tight nor self-
evident].)  Moreover, the case law casts doubt on the premise, 
essential to Father’s argument, that satisfaction of a specific 
professionally developed standard analogous to the DSM 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
24 
 
criteria for substance use disorders is required to show a mental 
illness or developmental disability in the dependency context.  
(See Laurie S. v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 195, 202 
(Laurie S.) [finding expert testimony unnecessary to assess, at 
the jurisdictional stage of dependency proceedings, whether a 
parent’s mental health issues placed her child at substantial 
risk of serious physical harm]; In re Khalid H. (1992) 
6 Cal.App.4th 733, 736 (Khalid H.) [noting that section 300, 
subdivision (b)(1) “does not contain a described formal procedure 
to determine if a parent suffers from a mental illness,” and 
declining to read such a procedure into the statute].)   
But Father’s argument would fail even if we were to 
regard the noscitur a sociis canon as relevant and further 
assume for sake of argument that the Legislature intended for 
findings of mental illness and developmental disability under 
section 300(b)(1)(D) to require the satisfaction of objective 
criteria commonly relied upon by professionals in the relevant 
fields.  It would not make mental illness and developmental 
disability on the one hand, and substance abuse on the other, 
“ ‘ “ ‘markedly 
dissimilar’ ” ’ ” 
(Hernandez, 
supra, 
10 Cal.App.5th at p. 200) if the same kind of showing were not 
strictly necessary to establish substance abuse.  The Legislature 
could well have grouped mental illness, developmental 
disability, and substance abuse together as circumstances that 
all may lead to an inability to provide a child with regular care, 
while at the same time appreciating that each could involve 
somewhat different kinds of proof.  (See Lungren, supra, 
14 Cal.4th at p. 308 [rejecting an invocation of the noscitur a 
sociis principle because when viewed in light of the relevant 
statute’s broader purpose, “the seeming dissimilarities between” 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
25 
 
two subjects of legislation “become less significant than their 
similarities”].)   
In short, the mere fact that the terms “mental illness,” 
“developmental disability,” and “substance abuse” are in close 
proximity to one another within section 300(b)(1)(D) does not 
establish that the Legislature intended that similar showings 
would be required to prove them. 
Father also argues that references to substance abuse 
treatment programs (§§ 300.2, subd. (a), 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A)) 
and substance abuse treatment facilities (e.g., §§ 366.21, subd. 
(e)(1), 366.22, subd. (a)(1)) appearing elsewhere within the 
statutory scheme connote a focus upon substance use severe 
enough to require treatment, and that the DSM criteria provide 
the appropriate framework for determining whether substance 
abuse exists under this standard.   
This argument reads too much into these provisions, 
which concern the significance to be accorded at different stages 
of the dependency process to a parent’s or guardian’s enrollment 
in a substance abuse treatment or facility (e.g., §§ 361.5, subd. 
(a)(3)(A), 366.21, subd. (e)(1), 366.22, subd. (a)(1)) or to the 
successful completion of, or failure to complete, a substance 
abuse treatment program (e.g., § 300.2, subd. (a); § 364, subd. 
(c) [referring to a “court ordered treatment program”]).  These 
scattered references to treatment in varied contexts do not 
establish that the Legislature regarded substance abuse as 
present under section 300(b)(1)(D) only when the relevant DSM 
criteria for a substance use disorder have been satisfied.  The 
Legislature could have recognized the existence of substance 
abuse treatment programs and facilities, and further sought to 
explain the relationship between enrollment in a program or 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
26 
 
facility and decisions that must be made at different stages of 
the dependency process, without also perceiving the close 
connections among substance abuse, treatment, and the DSM 
that Father advances in his interpretation of section 
300(b)(1)(D).  Indeed, as we have explained, the weight of 
evidence of legislative intent that can be gleaned from the 
statutory text indicates that these connections were not 
intended.  Instead, the term “substance abuse” carries its 
ordinary meaning as used in section 300(b)(1)(D), with other 
language within the statute harmonizing this definition with 
the overarching goals of the dependency scheme by clarifying 
that, to supply grounds for dependency jurisdiction, substance 
abuse must make the parent or guardian unable to provide 
regular care for a child and lead to serious physical harm to the 
child, or a substantial risk of such harm.   
2. Legislative History  
Although the lack of textual support for Father’s position 
is compelling, we also consider Father’s argument that his 
interpretation of section 300(b)(1)(D) is grounded in the 
legislative history of, and purposes behind, the dependency 
scheme.  We conclude this contention is no more persuasive than 
Father’s textual arguments.   
The legislative history materials surrounding the 1987 
amendments to the dependency scheme do not mention the DSM 
at all.  The absence of any such discussion provides a persuasive 
indication that the Legislature did not intend to restrict judicial 
findings of substance abuse to circumstances in which the DSM 
criteria have been satisfied.  (See, e.g., Larkin v. Workers’ Comp. 
Appeals Bd. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 152, 166 [assigning significance 
to the absence of discussion of an issue within legislative history 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
27 
 
materials]; Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 
42 Cal.4th 1158, 1169 [same].)   
Father nonetheless argues that linking findings of 
substance abuse to the prevailing DSM criteria for substance 
use disorders would advance the enacting Legislature’s goals of 
clarifying the grounds for dependency jurisdiction (see R.T., 
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 631) and distinguishing between 
substance use and substance abuse.  Our review of the pertinent 
legislative history materials, set out below, corroborates 
Father’s understanding that the Legislature had these general 
aims in mind when it added the substance abuse language to 
section 300 in 1987.  But we do not believe the Legislature 
implemented these goals by defining substance abuse in the 
manner Father proposes. 
As background, the legislation that added the substance 
abuse language to section 300 (Sen. Bill No. 243 (1987–1988 
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 243)) was developed by a task force 
that had been charged by statute with reviewing the laws 
relating to child abuse reporting, dependent children, and child 
welfare services, and had been directed to “identify problem 
areas in the law” and recommend “statutory revisions to 
strengthen and compliment the child welfare system in 
California.”  (Stats. 1986, ch. 1122, § 24, p. 3995.)  Among its 
findings, the task force determined that section 300, as it existed 
prior to 1987, provided “very little guidance to investigating and 
petitioning agencies, to judges, attorneys or to parents as to 
what actions or harms justify state intervention.  Existing law 
states that a child that comes within any of the following 
descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court:  is in 
need of proper and effective parental care and control; is 
destitute; is dangerous to the public; [or] lives in a home which 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
28 
 
is an unfit place for him or her.  Because there is little legislative 
guidance, different agencies and individuals employ different 
standards, and cases are inappropriately brought into the 
system.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 243 
(1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended April 27, 1987, p. 3.)  The 
Legislature hoped that legislation developed by the task force 
would “more clearly define the conditions under which a child 
could be removed from the family home.”  (Ibid.; see also Sen. 
Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of 
Sen. Bill No. 243 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 10, 
1987, p. 1 [describing the proposed legislation as “[c]learly 
defin[ing] the conditions under which a child can be removed 
from the family and/or the court can exercise jurisdiction”]; 
Legis. Analyst, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 243 (1987–1988 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended May 26, 1987, p. 1 [observing that the 
measure “[n]arrows the definition of abuse for purposes of 
dependency proceedings”]; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis 
of Sen. Bill No. 243 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 17, 
1987, pp. 1, 3.)   
As originally introduced in the Legislature, Senate Bill 
No. 243 provided for dependency jurisdiction in circumstances 
such as where “[t]he minor has suffered, or there is a substantial 
risk that he or she will imminently suffer, physical harm 
causing disfigurement, impairment of bodily functioning, 
protracted impairment of physical health, or other serious 
physical injury, as a result of . . . the inability of the parent or 
guardian to provide regular care for the minor due to the parent 
or guardian’s use of drugs or alcohol or mental illness or 
deficiency.”  (Sen. Bill No. 243 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as 
introduced Jan. 26, 1987, § 6, italics added.)  This language was 
amended soon after the bill’s introduction so that its last clause 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
29 
 
described an “inability of the parent, guardian, or primary 
caretaker to provide regular care for the minor due to the 
parent’s, guardian’s, or primary caretaker’s mental illness, 
developmental disability, or substance abuse.”  (Sen. Bill No. 243 
(1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 30, 1987, § 6, italics 
added; see also Sen. Bill No. 1195 Task Force, Minutes (Feb. 19–
20, 1987), p. 1 [recording the task force’s approval of this 
change].)  This “substance abuse” terminology was eventually 
codified.  (Stats. 1987, ch. 1485, § 4.5, p. 5606.)  Nothing within 
the legislative history materials before us specifically explains 
why the original “use of drugs or alcohol” language within the 
proposed legislation was replaced by the term “substance 
abuse,” or otherwise communicates a prevailing view regarding 
what the term “substance abuse” meant. 
It is apparent from these and other legislative history 
materials that the Legislature sought to clarify the grounds for 
assertion of dependency jurisdiction through the revisions to the 
dependency scheme that were enacted in 1987.  But it is also 
evident that the Legislature implemented its intent in a manner 
that would “provide maximum protection for children who are 
currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, 
being neglected, or being exploited, and to protect children who 
are at risk of that harm,” albeit also being mindful not to 
“disrupt the family unnecessarily or . . . intrude inappropriately 
into family life.”  (Former § 300; Stats. 1987, ch. 1485, § 4.5, 
p. 5608.)  Insofar as some bases for dependency jurisdiction 
could be precisely specified without depriving children of this 
protection, they were.  But as a matter of necessity, some 
grounds for jurisdiction had to be phrased in more general 
terms.  (See Sen. Bill No. 1195 Task Force, Child Abuse 
Reporting Laws, Juvenile Court Dependency Statutes, and 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
30 
 
Child Welfare Services (Jan. 1988) pp. 4–5 [“The task force spent 
a great deal of time on the wording of each section and several 
legislative committees reviewed the specific language in lengthy 
hearings,” and “it is not possible to give a highly specific 
definition of the phrase ‘serious’ [as used in § 300] without being 
too restrictive”].)   
For instance, section 300 has since 1987 provided for the 
exercise of dependency jurisdiction when a child “has been 
subjected to an act or acts of cruelty by the parent or guardian 
or a member of the child’s household.”  (§ 300, subd. (i); see 
Stats. 1987, ch. 1485, § 4.5, p. 5608.)  The Legislature did not 
further define “act or acts of cruelty” (§ 300, subd. (i)) due to the 
myriad forms such conduct may take.  Instead, what constitutes 
an “act or acts of cruelty” is a “factual determination that the 
juvenile court makes based upon the common meaning of the 
phrase and the totality of the child’s circumstances.”  (In re D.C. 
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017.)   
On balance, the available evidence of legislative intent 
indicates the Legislature took a similar approach insofar as 
substance abuse was concerned, and declined to recognize 
substance abuse only in situations involving the satisfaction of 
DSM criteria.  Nor did it otherwise limit the ordinary meaning 
of substance abuse when these constraints might fail to capture 
the various ways in which substance abuse can render a parent 
or guardian unable to provide regular care for a child and place 
a child at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.  
Meanwhile, the substitution of “substance abuse” for “use of 
drugs or alcohol” during the legislative process may have simply 
reflected an appreciation that, as a practical matter, only the 
excessive use of drugs or alcohol would lead to an “inability of 
the parent or guardian to provide regular care for [a] child.”  
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
31 
 
(§ 300(b)(1)(D).)  The legislative history therefore does not 
provide significant support for Father’s interpretation of the 
statute.   
3. Statutory Purpose and Public Policy 
Father, supported by several amici curiae, also argues 
that his interpretation of the statute is necessary to vindicate 
important policy interests that motivated the above-discussed 
changes to section 300.  Echoing the reasoning in Drake M., 
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at page 765, he asserts that the 
definition of substance abuse that he proposes is necessary to 
ensure consistency across dependency findings and guarantee 
they are premised on sufficient showings of substance abuse, as 
opposed to mere substance use.  Father describes the alternative 
approach, in which substance abuse is defined by reference to 
conventional understandings of the term, as “nothing more than 
‘you’ll know it when you see it.’ ”  These policy arguments do not 
persuade us to adopt Father’s interpretation of the statute. 
At the outset, it is unclear whether Father’s proposed 
definition of substance abuse would avoid the problems he 
perceives with assigning this term its usual meaning.  Recall 
again that Father regards the DSM-5-TR as the touchstone for 
the necessary analysis today, under the theory that the enacting 
Legislature intended for the meaning of substance abuse to 
evolve in step with developments in professional expertise.  The 
DSM-5-TR regards a diagnosis of a stimulant use disorder as 
appropriate upon satisfaction of two or more out of 11 identified 
criteria.  (DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. 632.)  Some of these criteria 
are susceptible to expansive and potentially inconsistent 
application, particularly in the hands of untrained laypeople, 
e.g., “[t]he stimulant is often taken in larger amounts or over a 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
32 
 
longer period than was intended”; “[t]here is a persistent desire 
or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control stimulant use”; “[a] 
great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain the 
stimulant, use the stimulant, or recover from its effects”; and 
“[c]raving, or a strong desire or urge to use the stimulant.”  
(Ibid.)  Connecting substance abuse under section 300(b)(1)(D) 
to the relevant DSM criteria is therefore not the obvious 
panacea that Father makes it out to be.13 
Nor are the findings required for dependency jurisdiction 
under section 300(b)(1)(D) as elastic as Father asserts.  
Significantly, as previously alluded to, the recognition of 
substance abuse by a parent or guardian does not by itself 
establish that the other requirements for the exercise of 
dependency jurisdiction under section 300(b)(1)(D) have been 
satisfied.  Even with sufficient proof of substance abuse, the 
government 
also 
bears 
the 
burden 
of 
proving 
by 
a 
preponderance of the evidence (see § 355, subd. (a)) that this 
abuse makes the parent or guardian unable to provide regular 
care for a child, and that this inability has caused a child to 
suffer serious physical harm or illness or places the child at 
substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.  (See, e.g., 
 
13  
Father asserts that premising findings of substance abuse 
on satisfaction of the relevant DSM criteria would comport with 
prevailing best practices among social workers.  Whatever 
relevance these practices may have to the central question of 
legislative intent, we do not perceive a significant tension 
between standards calling for social workers to stay abreast of 
current knowledge regarding substance use disorders and how 
we conclude “substance abuse” should be interpreted as it 
appears in section 300(b)(1)(D).  Such knowledge may be 
pertinent to an assessment of what amounts to excessive use of 
drugs or alcohol.  
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
33 
 
In re Destiny S. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 999, 1003 (Destiny S.) 
[jurisdiction under § 300 cannot be premised on drug use alone, 
without evidence of serious physical harm or illness or a 
substantial risk of such harm or illness].) 
On this subject, although we reject the Drake M. court’s 
interpretation of the term “substance abuse,” we agree with its 
conclusion that the facts before the juvenile court in that case 
did not support the exercise of dependency jurisdiction due to 
parental substance abuse.  The father in Drake M. used 
marijuana pursuant to a medical recommendation four or five 
times a week, mostly early in the day, to ease pain in his hands 
and knees.  (Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 760–761.)  
He smoked the substance in a detached garage, away from his 
young child, and otherwise kept it in a locked box that the child 
could not access.  (Ibid.)  When the father smoked marijuana 
with his wife, another adult watched over their child.  (Id. at 
pp. 758, 759.)  The father stated that at least four hours would 
pass between when he smoked marijuana and when he saw his 
child after day care, and that by that time he no longer felt any 
problematic effects of the drug.  (Id. at p. 761.)  No evidence was 
offered before the juvenile court, in the form of expert testimony 
or otherwise, to establish that the father would still be feeling 
such effects upon resuming supervision of the child (id. at 
pp. 761, 767–768), and no other substantial issues were reported 
in connection with the child’s care (id. at p. 758).  Viewing the 
record as a whole, even though Drake M.’s reasoning was flawed 
with respect to how it defined substance abuse, we believe that 
its ultimate conclusion rejecting the exercise of dependency 
jurisdiction under what is today section 300(b)(1)(D) was 
nonetheless correct.  (Drake M., at p. 768.)  The record before 
that court did not contain substantial evidence of substance 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
34 
 
abuse that made the father unable to provide regular care for 
his child and placed the child at substantial risk of serious 
physical harm or illness.   
Meanwhile, there are substantial countervailing policy 
considerations that counsel against regarding the DSM criteria 
for substance use disorders as providing the exclusive yardsticks 
for assessments of substance abuse for purposes of section 
300(b)(1)(D).  These include the fact that DSM criteria are 
designed for clinical application and assume the availability of 
information relevant to a diagnosis.  Several of the DSM-5-TR 
criteria for substance use disorders, such as the presence of 
cravings, tolerance, and withdrawal symptoms (e.g., DSM-5-TR, 
supra, at pp. 632–633), rely on information that might 
commonly be divulged by a patient interested in obtaining an 
accurate diagnosis, but may not be as readily forthcoming from 
a parent or guardian during the dependency process.  Courts 
therefore may lack the information necessary to apply the DSM 
criteria in their intended manner. 
Also, Father’s approach gives short shrift to the DSM’s 
warnings that its criteria should not be mechanically applied by 
laypeople and may not capture all of the considerations relevant 
to a legal question that may come before a court.  Cautionary 
statements regarding the DSM’s use have appeared in versions 
of the manual dating back to the DSM-III.14  The statement 
 
14   
DSM-5-TR, supra, at page 29; DSM-5, supra, at page 25; 
DSM-IV-TR, supra, at page xxxvii; DSM-IV, supra, at 
page xxvii; DSM-III-R, supra, at page xxix.  The statement in 
the DSM-III, which bore the title, “CAUTIONS,” provided in 
full:  “The purpose of DSM-III is to provide clear descriptions of 
diagnostic categories in order to enable clinicians and 
 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
35 
 
within the DSM-III-R, for example, advised that the proper use 
of the manual’s “criteria requires specialized clinical training 
that provides both a body of knowledge and clinical skills” and 
warned that the DSM-III-R’s inclusion, “for clinical and 
research purposes, of a diagnostic category such as Pathological 
Gambling or Pedophilia does not imply that the condition meets 
legal or other nonmedical criteria for what constitutes mental 
disease, mental disorder, or mental disability.”  (DSM-III-R, 
supra, at p. xxix.)  The statement within the DSM-5-TR 
acknowledges that, “Although the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria and 
text are primarily designed to assist clinicians in conducting 
clinical assessment, case formulation, and treatment planning, 
DSM-5 is also used as a reference for the courts and attorneys 
in assessing the legal consequences of mental disorders.  As a 
result, it is important to note that the definition of mental 
disorder included in DSM-5 was developed to meet the needs of 
clinicians, 
public 
health 
professionals, 
and 
research 
investigators rather than the technical needs of the courts and 
legal professionals.”  (DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. 29.)  Following 
additional warnings, the statement continues, “Use of DSM-5 to 
assess the presence of a mental disorder by nonclinical, 
nonmedical, or otherwise insufficiently trained individuals is 
not advised.”  (Ibid.)  Elsewhere, the DSM-5-TR warns that it 
should “not be applied mechanically by individuals without 
clinical training” and that the text’s diagnostic criteria “are not 
 
investigators to diagnose, communicate about, study, and treat 
various mental disorders.  The use of this manual for non-
clinical purposes, such as determination of legal responsibility, 
competency or insanity, or justification for third-party payment, 
must be critically examined in each instance within the 
appropriate institutional context.”  (DSM-III, supra, at p. 12.) 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
36 
 
meant to be used in a rigid cookbook fashion.”  (Id. at p. 23.)  Yet 
Father’s approach runs a high risk of exactly that type of 
application, even assuming the best efforts of judges and others 
involved in the juvenile dependency process to faithfully apply 
the manual.  
Rote application of the DSM criteria would be particularly 
inappropriate within a statutory scheme for dependency 
proceedings that is intended “to provide maximum safety and 
protection for children who are currently being physically, 
sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being 
exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and 
emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.”  
(§ 300.2, subd. (a).)  As the Department observes in its answer 
brief, as a diagnostic resource the DSM is not designed to “assess 
risk to a third party, much less a child.”  To identify one example 
of the disconnects that exist between the DSM criteria and the 
statutory scheme for juvenile dependency proceedings, if a 
parent or guardian engages in frequent stimulant use “resulting 
in a failure to fulfill major role obligations at work, school, or 
home” (DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. 632) that relate to the care of a 
child, it is unclear why another of the remaining 10 criteria for 
a stimulant use disorder enumerated within the DSM-5-TR — 
with any of these criteria sufficing — would also have to be 
satisfied 
to 
recognize 
substance 
abuse 
under 
section 
300(b)(1)(D).  And although the DSM-5-TR recognizes that a 
positive diagnosis may be rendered in some situations in which 
fewer than the normal number of required criteria are satisfied 
(DSM-5-TR, at p. 23), that allowance merely serves to 
underscore that the standard criteria-based requirements for 
diagnosis under the DSM do not and should not supply the 
definition of substance abuse in this setting. 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
37 
 
4. Our Interpretation Harmonizes with Prior Case 
Law Construing Section 300 
Our interpretation of the substance abuse language 
within section 300(b)(1)(D) as concerned with the excessive use 
of drugs or alcohol aligns with the analysis in our previous 
decisions that have declined to read implicit limitations into 
other grounds for the exercise of dependency jurisdiction.  In In 
re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610 (Ethan C.), we concluded that 
the Legislature intended for the word “ ‘neglect,’ ” as used in 
section 300, subdivision (f) to carry its “commonly understood 
meaning” (Ethan C., at p. 627), rather than describing only 
situations in which a parent or guardian acted with criminal 
negligence.  (Id. at pp. 627–631.)  Likewise, in I.J., supra, 
56 Cal.4th 766, we rejected the position that “scientific 
authority or empirical evidence” were required to establish a 
substantial risk of harm to a father’s sons based on sustained 
allegations that the father had sexually abused one of his 
daughters.  (Id. at p. 778; see id. at pp. 778–779.)  We held 
instead that “the juvenile court is supposed to use its best 
judgment to determine whether or not the particular 
substantial risk exists.”  (Id. at p. 779.)  Finally, in determining 
that the invocation of dependency jurisdiction under section 300, 
subdivision (b)(1)(A) due to the failure or inability of a parent or 
guardian to adequately supervise a child did not require a 
finding of parental culpability, our decision in R.T., supra, 
3 Cal.5th 622 noted, “Because the Legislature has made 
parental culpability (based on either willful or negligent 
conduct) a requirement in some, but not all, grounds for 
asserting dependency jurisdiction under section 300, we may 
conclude that the omission of a culpability requirement in the 
first clause of section 300(b)(1) ‘was purposeful.’ ”  (R.T., at 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
38 
 
p. 630.)  Similarly here, in contrast with the definitions that 
have been provided for other terms within the statute, there is 
no persuasive indication on the face of section 300 or otherwise 
that the Legislature intended to deviate from the ordinary 
understanding of the term “substance abuse.”  
5. Substance Abuse Under Section 300 Does Not 
Require a Medical Diagnosis in Lieu of a Showing 
That the DSM Criteria Have Been Satisfied 
Although Father’s briefing concentrates on the DSM 
criteria, he also acknowledges Drake M.’s position that a 
professional medical diagnosis of current substance abuse may 
suffice in lieu of a showing that these criteria have been 
satisfied.  (See Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 766.)  
Considerations similar to those discussed above also foreclose 
this interpretation of section 300’s substance abuse language.   
Just as we assigned significance to the absence of any 
reference to the DSM in the statutory scheme, we believe that 
had the Legislature intended to require a medical diagnosis of 
substance abuse, it would have said so.  (See Khalid H., supra, 
6 Cal.App.4th at p. 736.)  The Legislature certainly knew how to 
draw such a connection.  A different provision within the 
statutory scheme for dependency proceedings assigns special 
significance to testimony from professionals.  Under section 
355.1, subdivision (a), “Where the court finds, based upon 
competent professional evidence, that an injury, injuries, or 
detrimental condition sustained by a minor is of a nature as 
would ordinarily not be sustained except as the result of the 
unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of either parent, 
the guardian, or other person who has the care or custody of the 
minor, that finding shall be prima facie evidence that the minor 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
39 
 
is a person described by subdivision (a), (b), or (d) of Section 
300.”  (Italics added.)   
Other flaws with Father’s arguments regarding the DSM’s 
applicability also carry over to the position that substance abuse 
requires a medical diagnosis.  Among these shortcomings, there 
is no indication within the legislative history that legislators 
contemplated such a close connection between a medical 
diagnosis and judicial recognition of substance abuse.  With 
good reason; information that could be critical to a diagnosis by 
a medical professional 
may not be available at the 
prejurisdictional stage of a dependency proceeding, particularly 
given the limited powers of the court at that early stage of the 
dependency process.  (See Laurie S., supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 202 [“At the prejurisdictional stage, an allegation by the 
Department that a parent is mentally ill or the fact of mental 
illness alone does not justify a psychological examination of that 
parent”].)  Also, the considerations that may inform a medical 
diagnosis of substance abuse may be misaligned with legislative 
intent, in that these diagnostic criteria may not capture the 
aspects of abuse most relevant to a determination of whether a 
parent’s or guardian’s issues with drugs or alcohol render that 
person unable to provide regular care for a child and place that 
child at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.   
Consistent with the discussion above, we conclude that a 
professional medical diagnosis is not required, whether on its 
own or as an alternative to satisfaction of the relevant DSM 
criteria, in order to establish the existence of substance abuse 
under section 300(b)(1)(D).   
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
40 
 
6. Due Process Considerations Do Not Justify Father’s 
Interpretation of Section 300 
Finally, Father argues that unless his proposed definition 
of substance abuse is adopted, the term is so indefinite that it 
violates constitutional due process guarantees.  (See U.S. 
Const., 5th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).)   
“The vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of ‘ “a statute 
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so 
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess 
at its meaning and differ as to its application.” ’ ”  (In re Sheena 
K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.)  Yet “ ‘ “a statute is not void 
simply because there may be difficulty in determining whether 
some marginal or hypothetical act is covered by its language.” ’ ”  
(People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 606.)  “ ‘[F]ew words 
possess the precision of mathematical symbols, most statutes 
must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual 
situations, and the practical necessities of discharging the 
business of government inevitably limit the specificity with 
which legislators can spell out prohibitions.  Consequently, no 
more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded.  
Nor is it unfair to require that one who deliberately goes 
perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the 
risk that he may cross the line.’ ”  (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna 
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1117, quoting Boyce Motor Lines v. 
United States (1952) 342 U.S. 337, 340.) 
Due process considerations do not compel us to adopt 
Father’s interpretation of section 300(b)(1)(D) or else find the 
statute unconstitutional.  Section 300(b)(1)(D) provides 
adequate notice regarding the conduct that will support a 
jurisdictional finding based on a parent’s or guardian’s 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
41 
 
substance abuse.  As we have explained, the statute does not 
premise dependency jurisdiction on substance abuse alone, but 
requires that substance abuse, as commonly understood, makes 
a parent or guardian unable to provide regular care for a child 
and results in either serious physical harm or illness or a 
substantial risk of such harm or illness to the child.  (See, e.g., 
Destiny S., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1003.)  Even 
acknowledging the existence of borderline cases, this standard 
is sufficiently concrete and intelligible that it avoids due process 
concerns.  (See Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 570 
[rejecting a due process vagueness challenge to Pen. Code, § 272 
because Welf. & Inst. Code “[§] 300 provides guidelines 
sufficiently specific to delineate the circumstances under which 
a child will qualify for dependent status and thus to define the 
parental duty of care and protection that would prevent the 
occurrence of those circumstances”]; In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 
Cal.App.4th 428, 435–438 [rejecting the argument that the 
phrase “ ‘serious physical harm,’ ” as it appears in § 300, subd. 
(a), is unconstitutionally vague]; accord, Johnson v. United 
States (2015) 576 U.S. 591, 603–604 [“As a general matter, we 
do not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the 
application of a qualitative standard such as ‘substantial risk’ to 
real-world conduct”].) 
7. Conclusion 
For the reasons provided above, we hold that under section 
300(b)(1)(D), “substance abuse” bears its ordinary meaning of 
excessive use of drugs or alcohol, and that substance abuse by a 
parent or guardian may be established without a professional 
medical diagnosis of current substance abuse or satisfaction of 
the pertinent DSM criteria.  In so holding, we recognize that a 
professional diagnosis, or evidence bearing upon whether DSM 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
42 
 
criteria have been met, may be helpful in evaluating the 
existence of substance abuse at the jurisdictional stage of 
dependency proceedings or at another step in this process.  (See, 
e.g., Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322, 
1346 [concluding that the government failed to meet its burden 
of showing that returning children to their mother would create 
a substantial risk of detriment to their safety, protection, or 
physical or emotional well-being (see § 366.22, subd. (a)) for 
reasons including, but not limited to, the absence of a medical 
diagnosis of substance abuse or proof that the mother satisfied 
the DSM’s description of substance abuse].)  Our decision today 
is not intended to discourage the presentation or consideration 
of such evidence in appropriate circumstances.15   
Our holding also recognizes the significance of a 
jurisdictional finding.  Dependency adjudication “allows the 
juvenile court, within specified limits, to assert supervision over 
the endangered child’s care” (Ethan C., supra, 54 Cal.4th at 
p. 617), and is therefore a weighty determination with 
important consequences.  Yet it is also true that a jurisdictional 
finding is “a first step, and the system includes many 
subsequent safeguards to ensure that parental rights and 
authority will be restricted only to the extent necessary for the 
child’s safety and welfare.”  (Ibid.; see also R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th 
 
15  
As a matter of course, the Legislature remains free to 
redefine the term “substance abuse” as it appears within section 
300(b)(1)(D) if it finds Father’s arguments, or the arguments 
raised by amici curiae who have filed briefs in support of Father, 
to be compelling.   
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
43 
 
at p. 637; In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 410–411.)16  These 
safeguards apply to cases involving substance abuse, just as 
they extend to other dependency matters.   
Furthermore, as we have emphasized, dependency 
jurisdiction under section 300(b)(1)(D) requires more than just 
the identification of substance abuse by a parent or guardian.  A 
court must also find that the parent or guardian is unable to 
provide regular care for a child and that as a result, the child 
has suffered serious physical harm or illness or is at significant 
risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.  The second 
issue presented for review, which we turn to next, concerns the 
relationship between a finding of substance abuse and these 
additional requirements.   
C. The Tender Years Presumption Conflicts with 
Legislative Intent and Must Be Rejected 
We reject the position that a “finding of substance abuse 
is prima facie evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian 
to provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of physical 
harm” to a child of “ ‘tender years.’ ”  (Drake M., supra, 
211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.)17  Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) 
 
16  
These safeguards “include representation by counsel to 
assist parents at every stage of the proceedings [citation], notice 
of all hearings and rights [citations], clear and convincing 
evidence for removal from custody [citation], reunification 
services [citation], and review hearings at which services and 
progress are reviewed.”  (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 
307–308.) 
17  
The rule announced in Drake M. expanded upon a more 
generic discussion appearing in In re Rocco M. (1991) 
1 Cal.App.4th 814, abrogated on another ground by R.T., supra, 
3 Cal.5th at p. 629.  That earlier decision had observed, “Cases 
 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
44 
 
recognizes that substance abuse may make a parent unable to 
provide regular care, which in turn may create a substantial risk 
of serious physical harm or illness.  But the rule articulated in 
Drake M. improperly short-circuits this analysis insofar as it 
regards substance abuse by a parent or guardian as always 
amounting to sufficient, though not conclusive, evidence of an 
inability to provide regular care to a young child and a 
substantial risk of serious physical harm to that child. 
As a threshold matter, the parties’ briefing reflects some 
uncertainty regarding whether this judicially created principle 
amounts to an inference or a presumption.  To repeat, the 
relevant language in Drake M. provides that a “finding of 
substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a 
parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a 
substantial risk of physical harm.”  (Drake M., supra, 211 
Cal.App.4th at p. 767.)  “A statute providing that a fact or group 
 
finding a substantial physical danger [under section 300, 
subdivision (b)] tend to fall into two factual patterns.  One group 
involves 
an 
identified, 
specific 
hazard 
in 
the 
child’s 
environment — typically an adult with a proven record of 
abusiveness.  [Citations.]  The second group involves children of 
such tender years that the absence of adequate supervision and 
care poses an inherent risk to their physical health and safety.”  
(In re Rocco M., at p. 824, italics omitted.)  The Drake M. court 
explained that “in cases involving the second group [discussed 
in In re Rocco M.], the finding of substance abuse is prima facie 
evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian to provide 
regular care resulting in a substantial risk of physical harm.”  
(Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.)  Although there is 
no strict age cut-off after which a child is regarded as being 
beyond “tender years,” this presumption has generally been 
applied in cases involving children of ages six or younger at the 
time of a jurisdiction hearing.  (See, e.g., Christopher R., supra, 
225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219.) 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
45 
 
of facts is prima facie evidence of another fact establishes a 
rebuttable presumption” (Evid. Code, § 602), which is a kind of 
“assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from 
another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in 
the action” (id., § 600, subd. (a)), subject to rebuttal.  A 
“judicially created nonstatutory ‘inference,’ if it meets the test of 
a presumption, should be regarded as, and given the effect of, a 
presumption.”  (1 Witkin, Cal. Evid. (6th ed. 2023) Burden, 
§ 107.)  It follows from the above that, as articulated in Drake 
M., the tender years rule amounts to a presumption.   
To assess this presumption, we apply the standard 
approach to statutory interpretation and begin our review with 
the text of the statute.  (See Meza, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 856.)  
Nothing within the statutory scheme suggests that the 
requirements for the exercise of dependency jurisdiction under 
section 300(b)(1)(D) can be collapsed through a tender years 
presumption.  The statute does not provide that a “finding of 
substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a 
parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a 
substantial risk of physical harm” to a young child (Drake M., 
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767), or anything similar.  Rather, 
the relevant statutory text makes it clear that the government 
must establish, as separate elements, that (1) substance abuse 
(2) makes a parent or guardian unable to provide regular care 
for a child and (3) this inability has caused the child to suffer 
serious physical harm or illness or creates a substantial risk of 
such harm or illness.  Just as courts have routinely rejected the 
equation of mental illness with a significant risk of serious harm 
(see, e.g., In re A.G. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 675, 684; In re 
Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318), we find the 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
46 
 
tender years presumption adopted by Drake M. objectionable 
because it oversimplifies the necessary analysis.   
Significantly, at several other junctures within the 
dependency scheme the Legislature has expressly identified 
situations in which specific proof will constitute prima facie 
evidence of a particular fact.  For example, as previously 
observed, section 355.1, subdivision (a) provides that certain 
“competent professional evidence” shall be regarded as “prima 
facie evidence that the minor is a person described by 
subdivision (a), (b), or (d) of Section 300.”  Several other 
examples of a particular fact being cast as prima facie evidence 
of another fact appear elsewhere within the statutory scheme.  
(§§ 355.1, subd. (d), 361, subd. (c)(1), 364, subd. (c), 366.21, 
subds. (e)(1), (f)(1)(B), 366.22, subd. (a)(1), 366.25, subd. (a)(1).)  
The Legislature’s manifested ability to assign such significance 
to certain facts or evidence in proving another fact suggests that 
it did not intend for courts to presume a similar relationship 
when not expressly provided for within the statutory text.  (See 
R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 630.) 
The 
Department 
asserts 
that 
the 
tender 
years 
presumption is a commonsense rule based on the well-
understood needs of young children and still allows courts to 
fully consider all evidence presented on the question of whether 
a parent’s or guardian’s substance abuse places a young child at 
substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.   
This argument fails to fully grapple with the fact that the 
fundamental problem with the tender years presumption is not 
that it robs courts of discretion; it is that the presumption 
threatens to oversimplify the analysis required under section 
300(b)(1)(D).  It is reasonable for courts to infer that very young 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
47 
 
children require a substantial degree of close supervision.  But 
it is inappropriate to regard a parent’s or guardian’s excessive 
use of alcohol or an addictive drug as always being sufficient, by 
itself, to show that the parent or guardian is unable to provide 
regular care for a young child and that the child is therefore at 
substantial risk of serious physical harm.  Even granting that 
this presumption may be rebutted, it still distorts the necessary 
inquiry under section 300(b)(1)(D) by treating one established 
fact (a parent’s or guardian’s substance abuse) as always 
amounting to sufficient proof of other facts (an inability to 
provide regular care and a substantial risk of serious physical 
harm to a child of tender years) without any indication that the 
Legislature approved of such conflation.  We conclude that to 
uphold the Legislature’s intent, an inability to provide regular 
care and a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness 
must be established on the facts of each case, without relying on 
a categorical rule providing that a “finding of substance abuse is 
prima facie evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian to 
provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of physical 
harm” to a child of “ ‘tender years.’ ”  (Drake M., supra, 
211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.)   
In this respect, the basic task before the juvenile court is 
similar regardless of the age of the child involved.  Substance 
abuse, when shown to exist, should not be regarded as 
automatically amounting to prima facie evidence of the other 
facts required for dependency jurisdiction.  Courts must 
undertake a further inquiry to ascertain whether the 
government has met its burden as to each of the elements 
involved, without shifting the burden to a parent or guardian to 
rebut a presumption created by a finding of substance abuse.  
(See, e.g., In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 830, 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
48 
 
abrogated on another ground by R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
pp. 628–629 [even accepting the existence of substance abuse by 
a parent, the evidence before the juvenile court failed to show 
that this abuse led to a significant risk of serious physical 
harm].)  Courts may in appropriate circumstances discern an 
inability to provide regular care and a substantial risk of serious 
physical harm or illness from the evidence that has been 
introduced in a particular case, including evidence relating to 
substance abuse, and the reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from this evidence.  (See, e.g., In re L.W. (2019) 
32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848–850 [mother’s two arrests for driving 
under the influence, one of which led to a reckless driving 
conviction, adequately established a substantial risk of serious 
physical harm to her 13-year-old daughter].)  In this respect, a 
child’s youth and maturity level can bear upon the care that the 
child may require and whether a parent’s or guardian’s 
substance abuse places the child at substantial risk of serious 
physical harm.  Courts can properly take these facts regarding 
a child into account, together with all other relevant evidence, 
in deciding whether the government has met its burden at the 
jurisdictional stage.  But courts may not shortcut the inquiry 
envisioned by the Legislature by regarding substance abuse as 
constituting prima facie evidence of an inability to provide 
regular care to a young child and a substantial risk of serious 
physical harm to that child, and then look to the parent or 
guardian to rebut this presumption. 
For the foregoing reasons, we reject the tender years 
presumption and disapprove the Court of Appeal decisions that 
have relied upon it, along with the Court of Appeal decisions 
that have regarded a professional medical diagnosis or 
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
49 
 
satisfaction of the relevant DSM criteria as necessary for a 
finding of substance abuse under section 300(b)(1)(D).18 
D. Remand to the Court of Appeal  
Father argues that the evidence before the juvenile court 
did not support a jurisdictional finding based on his drug use.  
The Department argues that substantial evidence supported the 
juvenile court’s finding.  Rather than decide this question 
ourselves, the better course is to remand this case to allow the 
Court of Appeal to revisit its analysis in light of our decision.   
 
 
 
18  
We disapprove the following decisions insofar as each 
regarded a medical diagnosis of substance abuse or satisfaction 
of the relevant DSM criteria as necessary to a finding of 
substance abuse, recognized the tender years presumption, or 
both:  In re L.C., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th 646; In re Alexzander C., 
supra, 
18 Cal.App.5th 
438; 
In 
re 
Kadence 
P. 
(2015) 
241 Cal.App.4th 
1376; 
In 
re 
Christopher 
R., 
supra, 
225 Cal.App.4th 
1210; 
and 
In 
re 
Drake 
M., 
supra, 
211 Cal.App.4th 754.  We also disapprove In re K.B., supra, 
59 Cal.App.5th 593 insofar as its assertion that “[w]hen a child 
is of tender age, a parent’s substance abuse can be prima facie 
evidence of a risk of serious physical harm or illness” (id. at 
p. 603, italics added) might be read as broadly relieving the 
government of its full burden under section 300(b)(1)(D).   
In re N.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
50 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand the cause to that court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re N.R. 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 4/29/22 – 2d Dist., 
Div. 5 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S274943 
Date Filed:  December 14, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Martha A. Matthews 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Duke Law School, Allison E. Korn; UCLA School of Law and Alicia 
Virani for W. David Ball, Barton Child Law and Policy Center, Paul 
Bennett, Leo Beletsky, Taleed El-Sabawi, Matthew I. Fraidin, 
Stephanie K. Glaberson, Cynthia Godsoe, Crystal Grant, Josh Gupta-
Kagan, Julia Hernandez, Alex Kriet, Sarah Lorr, Laura Matthews-
Jolly, Jennifer D. Oliva, Dorothy Roberts, Shanta Trivedi and Vivek 
Sankaran as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Proskauer Rose, Jonathan M. Weiss, Justin B. Cohen, Michelle K. 
Moriarty and Bradley M. Presant for Association for Multidisciplinary 
Education and Research in Substance Use and Addiction and 
California Society of Addiction Medicine as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
Leslie A. Barry for Persons with Lived Experience in the Child Welfare 
System as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Martin Schwarz, Public Defender (Orange), and Brian Okamoto, 
Deputy Public Defender, for California Dependency Trial Counsel and 
California Appellate Defense Counsel as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Minouche Kandel; Elizabeth Gill, Faride Perez-Aucar; Brenda Star 
Adams and Jean Strout for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 
of Southern California, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 
of Northern California, the National Center for Youth Law and 
Children’s Rights, Inc. as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Kellen Russoniello for Drug Policy Alliance, Any Positive Change, 
Beyond Do No Harm Network, California Coalition for Women 
Prisoners, Children’s Defense Fund-California, CLARE Matrix, 
Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto, Elephant Circle, 
Immigrant Legal Resource Center, JMACforFamilies, Law For Black 
Lives, Legal Action Center, Legal Momentum, Women’s Legal Defense 
and Education Fund, Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, 
National Harm Reduction Coalition, National Health Law Program, A 
New Path (Parent for Addiction Treatment & Healing), Pregnancy 
Justice, San Francisco AIDS Foundation and Sidewalk Project as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
The Hill Law Firm and Tasha Alyssa Hill for Professor Alan J. Dettlaff 
and Professors of Social Work and Social Workers as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva and Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim 
Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Sarah Vesecky and David Michael 
Miller, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Jennifer Hearing; David Chiu, City Attorney (San Francisco), Kimiko 
Burton and Elizabeth McDonald Muniz, Deputy City Attorneys, for 
California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Respondent.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Sean Angele Burleigh 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 1976 
Cortaro, AZ 85652 
(415) 692-4784 
 
David Michael Miller 
Deputy County Counsel 
500 West Temple Street, Suite 648  
Los Angeles, California 90012 
(213) 808-8777