Case Title: Kirschbaum v. Anderson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-44

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Kirschbaum v. Anderson1998 WY 56957 P.2d 836Case Number: 97-44Decided: 04/20/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Norman KIRSCHBAUM, Appellant (Third-Party Plaintiff),

v.

Terry ANDERSON and Kim Anderson, d/b/a Anderson 
Paramedical Services, d/b/a Examination Services, Inc., Appellees (Third-Party 
Defendants).

 

Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, Dan 
Spangler, J.

 

Mark W. Gifford of Gifford 
& Bonner, Casper, for Appellant.

Bruce N. Willoughby of 
Brown, Drew, Massey & Sullivan, Casper, for 
Appellees.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

THOMAS, Justice.

 [¶1] The only question that the Court must resolve in 
this case is whether, on this record, Norman Kirschbaum (Kirschbaum) is to be 
prevented from collecting a judgment for wrongful interference with contract 
that he obtained against Terry Anderson and Kim Anderson, d/b/a Anderson 
Paramedical Services, d/b/a Examination Management Services, Inc. (Andersons). 
After judgment was entered against the Andersons, Kirschbaum collected a 
judgment in his favor against Examination Management Services, Inc. (EMSI) for 
wrongful interference with contract. The trial court ruled that EMSI and the 
Andersons were joint tort-feasors and that collection of the judgment against 
EMSI resulted in satisfaction of the judgment against the Andersons. Collateral 
questions are raised as to whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents 
the assertion by the Andersons that they were joint tort-feasors with EMSI, and 
whether the post-trial motion by the Andersons was improperly considered because 
it amounted to a belated attempt to assert the defense of res judicata. The 
Court is satisfied that the record in this case demonstrates that while the 
theory of recovery was the same, the contracts that EMSI disrupted are 
distinguishable from those contracts with which the Andersons interfered. The 
Order on Satisfaction and Release of Judgment is reversed with instruction to 
the trial court to reinstate the Judgment on Jury Verdict so that Kirschbaum can 
proceed with his efforts to collect that judgment.

 

[¶2]In the Brief of 
Appellant, filed on behalf of Kirschbaum, the issue is set forth as 
follows:

 

Did Kirschbaum's collection of the $125,000 judgment 
for intentional interference with contractual relationships against EMSI have 
the effect of satisfying a smaller $20,000 award for the same legal theory 
against the Andersons?

 

[¶3] In the Appellees' 
Brief, the Andersons state the issues as:

 

1. Appellant is entitled to only one recovery for his 
damages, and the District Court did not err when it set-off Appellant's damage 
award against Appellees where a prior judgment for the same tortious conduct had 
been previously entered and satisfied.

 

2. The doctrine of judicial estoppel does not 
preclude Appellees from asserting that they were joint tort [-]feasors with EMSI.

 

3. Appellees' post-trial motion was not a res 
judicata defense which was untimely filed.

 

[¶4] Kirschbaum and EMSI 
entered into a contract on September 5, 1990, pursuant to which Kirschbaum 
agreed to manage EMSI's medical services operation in Wyoming and Montana. 
Pursuant to the five year written contract, Kirschbaum, under EMSI's name, 
agreed to furnish medical and paramedical examination services to EMSI's 
approved customers. At that time, Kirschbaum had a network of about 25 
paramedical examiners. Under the contractual arrangement, Kirschbaum would 
employ one of his subcontractors to perform an examination for EMSI, and the 
charges for the examination would be billed through EMSI, with Kirschbaum and 
his subcontractor each receiving a percentage of the fee. During the three years 
following the making of the contract, 
Kirschbaum expanded his network of examiners to a total of 253, while increasing 
gross revenues in Montana and Wyoming more than ten fold.

 

[¶5] The business had grown 
sufficiently by 1992 such that Kirschbaum contracted with the Andersons for them 
to manage a branch office in Billings, Montana. The Andersons' responsibilities 
gradually were expanded to extend to supervision of all of Kirschbaum's 
examiners in the state of Montana.

 

[¶6] The critical date with 
respect to this litigation came on May 3, 1993. Without advising Kirschbaum in 
any way, Rita Weeks, an EMSI vice-president, went to the Andersons' office in 
Billings. Weeks told the Andersons that Kirschbaum's contract with EMSI was 
going to be terminated, and she asked the Andersons to begin managing the 
activities previously belonging to Kirschbaum directly for EMSI. A written 
contract between the Andersons and EMSI was made immediately, and on the 
afternoon of May 3, 1993, the tortious activities occurred. Again, without 
advising Kirschbaum, the Andersons, Weeks, and yet another EMSI vice-president 
made a concerted effort to take over all of Kirschbaum's subcontractors. With 
each of these individuals calling different subcontractors, the four went down 
Kirschbaum's list of subcontractors, advising each examiner whom they were able 
to reach, that Kirschbaum's contract with EMSI was being terminated. All were 
advised that the Andersons now had the contract with EMSI. As a follow-up, the 
Andersons sent a letter to each of the facilities through which the exams were 
routed advising them of the change. The ultimate result of that afternoon's 
activities was that Kirschbaum lost to the Andersons all but 6 of his 
subcontractors.

 

[¶7] It was not until the 
next day that Kirschbaum received a facsimile transmission from EMSI in which he 
was advised that his contract was terminated. A few days later, EMSI filed an 
action against Kirschbaum in which it sought to enforce a covenant not to 
compete and to collect sums allegedly owed to EMSI by Kirschbaum. Kirschbaum 
filed a counterclaim for breach of contract and intentional interference with 
the contractual relationships that previously had existed between Kirschbaum and 
his independent examiners. In that litigation, the jury returned a verdict for 
Kirschbaum on both claims, specifically awarding him $125,000 for intentional 
interference with contract. That verdict was affirmed by this court in 
Examination Management Services, Inc. v. Kirschbaum, 927 P.2d 686 (Wyo. 1996) 
(EMSI I).

 

[¶8] The Andersons assigned 
a $14,000 collection claim against Kirschbaum to Rocky Mountain Recovery, Inc. 
early in 1995.  Kirschbaum actually 
was served with process in that collection action during the course of the trial 
of his case against EMSI.  
Kirschbaum responded by an answer in which he denied the debt, and 
brought a third party action against the Andersons, in which he claimed, among 
other things, breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and 
intentional interference with contracts with his network of examiners because of 
the role played by the Andersons personally in taking over his network of 
examiners. In that case, the jury returned a verdict for Rocky Mountain 
Recovery, Inc. in the amount of $4,855.02 for its claim against Kirschbaum, and 
with respect to Kirschbaum's claims against the Andersons, he was awarded $5,000 
for breach of good faith and fair dealing and $20,000 for intentional 
interference with the contracts. On August 8, 1996, the trial court entered a 
judgment in favor of Kirschbaum on that verdict.

 

[¶9] The opinion of this 
Court affirming the verdict in EMSI I was filed on November 1, 1996. Kirschbaum 
proceeded to collect that judgment, and an Order Recognizing Satisfaction of 
Judgment was entered on November 19, 1996. The Andersons then filed a Third 
Party Defendant's Motion For An Order Finding Satisfaction and for Release of 
Judgment in Kirschbaum's case against them. The Andersons asserted that since 
they were joint tort-feasors with EMSI, a double recovery against the Andersons 
was precluded by the "one satisfaction" rule.

 

[¶10] The Andersons' motion 
was granted by the district judge to the extent of the $20,000 award for 
intentional interference with contract. In a decision letter, the district court 
explained the decision in this way:

 

A fundamental principle is that an injured person is 
entitled only to be compensated once for his loss. The Restatement Second of 
Torts, Section 885(3), provides that a payment by any person in compensation of 
a claim for a harm for which others are liable as tort feasors diminishes the 
claim against the tort feasors, at least to the extent of the payment 
made.

 

In these two cases, the basis for the judgments 
arises out of the same occurrence and is for the identical acts of interference 
with the same contract. The first judgment against EMSI for $125,000.00 having 
been satisfied, the Third Party Plaintiff would receive a double recovery if the 
Andersons were required to pay an additional $ 20,000.00.

 

We accept the fact that the 
ruling of the district judge would be sound if EMSI and the Andersons were joint 
tort-feasors.

 

[¶11] We have heretofore 
looked to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY to capture a definition of tort-feasor. Garner 
v. Hickman, 709 P.2d 407, 413 (Wyo. 1985); ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 934 (Wyo. 1981). In a similar vein we look to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
for its definition for "joint tort-feasors:"

 

Term refers to two or more persons jointly or 
severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property. Those 
persons who have acted in concert in their tortious conduct and are, 
accordingly, jointly and severally liable. Those who act together in committing 
wrong, or whose acts if independent of each other, unite in causing single 
injury. * * *

 

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 839 
(6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).

 

[¶12] The question of 
whether two actors are joint tort-feasors is usually perceived as a question of 
fact. Northern Utilities Div. of KN Energy, Inc. v. Town of Evansville, 822 P.2d 829, 834 (Wyo. 1991)("The right to contribution rests upon the question of 
whether the parties are joint tort-feasors and presents a question of fact for 
the jury to determine.") On the other hand, if uncontroverted facts exist that 
serve to demonstrate the relationship of the parties, we will resolve the 
question as a matter of law, and our review is accomplished under the de novo 
standard. See Murphy v. Housel & Housel, 955 P.2d 880 (Wyo. 1998); Hiltz v. 
Robert W. Horn, P.C., 910 P.2d 566, 569 (Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶13] In this appeal, 
Kirschbaum's essential contention is that the resolution by the trial judge was 
based on an invalid premise.  
Kirschbaum asserts that he had separate contracts with each of the 253 
examiners, and that the responsibility of the Andersons for intentional 
interference with those contracts would relate to those examiners that they 
called on May 3, 1993. He asserts that conversely, EMSI was only held liable for 
intentional interference with the contracts of those examiners that its 
vice-presidents contacted on May 3, 1993. The essence of that position is that 
the Andersons and EMSI were not joint tort-feasors because they interfered with different contractual 
relationships.

 

[¶14] We are satisfied that 
the record in this case sustains Kirschbaum's position. The jury was aware of 
the judgment entered against EMSI, and logic dictates that if the parties were 
joint tort-feasors the verdict against the Andersons should have been in the 
same amount as the verdict against EMSI. It was not, and this serves as a record 
demonstration that the jury in this case perceived a different injury having 
been inflicted by the Andersons. Kirschbaum testified about his recruitment of 
individual examiners over the years, and he explained that some examiners worked 
under written contracts, but that he preferred "hand shake" agreements. He 
testified that some of the examiners worked out of their own homes while others 
had offices that they owned individually, in a cooperative effort with 
Kirschbaum, and still others worked out of hospitals or clinics. Kirschbaum 
explained to the jury that he paid a higher percentage to examiners who would 
market themselves and bring in additional business. None of this testimony was 
disputed by the Andersons, nor did they provide any contrary 
evidence.

 

[¶15] Instead, they urged 
upon the trial court the proposition, which they also argue on appeal, that 
Kirschbaum really only had one contract with all of his 253 examiners across the 
two states. They assert that Kirschbaum suffered only one injury because of the 
interference with the contract, not 253 different injuries. The jury found to 
the contrary, and the disparity between the two verdicts establishes that the 
jurors in this case believed that the Andersons, by the telephone calls they 
made, had interfered with different contractual relationships than those 
interfered with by EMSI. The evidence would support Kirschbaum's theory and 
leads to the conclusion that there were separate contracts with each of the 
examiners resulting in a finding by the jury that the Andersons were liable for 
interference with the contracts of the examiners they individually contacted. 
The explanation by the district judge is clear, and he ruled that EMSI and the 
Andersons were jointly liable for "identical acts of interference with the same 
contract." The record does not support this conclusion by the district judge, 
and we hold it to be erroneous.

 

[¶16] We do not address 
Kirschbaum's alternative arguments dealing with judicial estoppel or a belated 
effort to assert res judicata.  
Kirschbaum is entitled to reinstatement of his judgment against the 
Andersons because it was for a different harm than those encompassed by the 
verdict against EMSI.

 

[¶17] The Order on 
Satisfaction and Release of Judgment is reversed, and the trial court is 
instructed to reinstate the Judgment on Jury Verdict in favor of Kirschbaum and 
to allow him to proceed to collect that judgment.