Case Title: State ex rel. DeMora v. LaRose

Citation: 2022-Ohio-2173

Docket Number: 2022-0661

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2022-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. DeMora v. LaRose, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2173.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-2172 
THE STATE EX REL. DEMORA ET AL., v. LAROSE ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. DeMora v. LaRose, 
Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2173.] 
Mandamus—Elections—Prospective candidates who filed a declaration of 
candidacy and petition 90 days before the August 2, 2022 primary election 
and those who filed a declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate 72 
days before the August 2 primary election have met the candidacy-filing 
deadlines under R.C. 3513.05 and 3513.041, respectively, and shall be 
certified to the August 2 primary-election ballots if they otherwise qualify—
The secretary of state has no clear legal duty to create a new filing deadline 
for prospective candidates to the August 2 primary election—Writ granted 
in part and denied in part. 
(No. 2022-0661—Submitted June 16, 2022—Decided June 24, 2022.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
_________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
2 
Per Curiam. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
{¶ 1} This expedited election case arises out of the efforts of eight 
prospective candidates to the August 2 primary-election ballot.  Relators William 
DeMora, Anita Somani, Elizabeth Thien, Leronda Jackson, Bridgette Tupes, and 
Gary Martin (“the original relators”), filed declarations of candidacy in May of this 
year to appear on the August 2 ballot as a candidate for a partisan nomination, as a 
candidate for a political-party central committee, or as a write-in candidate.  And 
intervening relators, Shafron Hawkins and Mehek Cooke (“the intervening 
relators”), filed declarations of candidacy and petitions in June of this year to run 
for partisan nominations for the Ohio House of Representatives. 
{¶ 2} In Directive 2022-34, respondent Ohio Secretary of State Frank 
LaRose instructed the county boards of elections that any candidate declarations 
filed after February were untimely and should be rejected.  The original relators 
brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Secretary LaRose to 
instruct respondents Franklin, Montgomery, and Licking County Boards of 
Elections to accept (1) any declarations of candidacy that were filed before 4:00 
p.m. on May 4, 2022, that are otherwise valid and (2) any declarations of intent to 
be a write-in candidate that were filed before 4:00 p.m. on May 23, 2022, that are 
otherwise valid and to certify their candidacies to the August 2 primary-election 
ballot. 
{¶ 3} For the reasons set forth herein, we grant the writ of mandamus 
requested by the original relators.  In addition, we order the boards to accept the 
declarations and petitions and to certify the candidates to the ballot if they satisfy 
the other requirements for ballot access. 
{¶ 4} The intervening relators seek a writ of mandamus compelling 
Secretary LaRose to rescind Directive 2022-34 and extend the deadline to file 
declarations until 4:00 p.m. on the tenth day after this court’s decision in this matter 
January Term, 2022 
3 
 
and to order respondents Franklin County and Cuyahoga County Boards of 
Elections to certify their candidacies to the August 2 ballot.  Alternatively, they 
seek a writ of mandamus compelling Secretary LaRose to postpone the August 2 
primary “until September 6, at the earliest” to allow time for prospective candidates 
to file their declarations.  For the reasons set forth herein, we deny the intervening 
relators’ request for a writ of mandamus. 
II. OHIO REDISTRICTING AND THE 2022 PRIMARY ELECTION 
A. Filing deadlines for the May 3, 2022 primary election 
{¶ 5} The General Assembly set May 3 as the date for Ohio’s 2022 primary 
election.  R.C. 3513.05 provides that a person who wishes to become a candidate 
for a party nomination at a primary election or for election to an office or position 
to be voted for at a primary election must file a declaration of candidacy and petition 
no later than “the ninetieth day before the day of the primary election.”  Therefore, 
the deadline to file declarations of candidacy for the May 3 partisan primary was 
February 2.  Prospective write-in candidates for elective office must submit a 
declaration of candidacy no later than “the seventy-second day preceding the 
election.”  R.C. 3513.041.  With respect to the May 3 primary, the deadline for 
write-in candidates was February 22.1 
B. The first General Assembly–district plan 
{¶ 6} Under Ohio law, 2021 was a redistricting year.  In November 2015, 
Ohio voters approved an amendment to the Ohio Constitution that established a 
new process for creating General Assembly districts.  The amendment created a 
 
1. The 72nd day, February 20, 2022, fell on a Sunday.  February 21, the third Monday in February, 
was a legal holiday.  See R.C. 1.14(C).  The deadline was therefore extended by statute to the next 
business day.  R.C. 1.14. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
4 
seven-member Ohio Redistricting Commission2 to draw the boundaries of the 99 
state House of Representatives districts and the 33 state Senate districts.  Ohio 
Constitution, Article XI, Section 1(C).  The Constitution requires the commission 
to “attempt” to draw a General Assembly–district plan “that meets all of the 
following standards”: 
 
(A) No general assembly district plan shall be drawn 
primarily to favor or disfavor a political party. 
(B) The statewide proportion of districts whose voters, based 
on statewide state and federal partisan general election results 
during the last ten years, favor each political party shall correspond 
closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio. 
(C) General assembly districts shall be compact. 
 
Article XI, Section 6. 
{¶ 7} The commission adopted its first General Assembly–district plan in 
September 2021 (“Map 1”).  On January 12, 2022, we held that Map 1 was invalid 
because the commission did not comply with the standards set out in Article XI, 
Section 6.  League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ 
Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 135 (“League I”).  We instructed 
the commission “to adopt a plan in conformity with the Ohio Constitution.”  Id. 
C. Map 2 and the February 2 filing deadline 
{¶ 8} As the February 2 deadline to file declarations of candidacy for a 
partisan-primary election approached, the General Assembly enacted, and 
Governor Mike DeWine signed, 2022 Sub.H.B. No. 93 (“H.B. 93”).  The bill 
 
2. The commission consists of the governor, the state auditor, the secretary of state, and one 
appointee each by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the House minority leader, the 
Senate president, and the Senate minority leader.  Ohio Constitution, Article XI, Section 1(A). 
January Term, 2022 
5 
 
addressed the problem that would arise if candidates whose home districts at the 
time they filed their declarations of candidacy were not the same under a revised 
map adopted by the commission.  See id. at Section 4.  Specifically, the bill 
established that a declaration of candidacy for the House, Senate, or a state central 
committee would not be invalid solely because it lacked a district number or 
included an incorrect district number, so long as the declarant took certain steps to 
correct the information.  Id. at Section 4(C)(1).  With respect to filing deadlines, 
the bill authorized the secretary of state to adjust any deadlines pertaining to the 
May 3 primary except for four specified deadlines, one of which was “[t]he deadline 
to file a declaration of candidacy, declaration of candidacy and petition, or 
declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate.” Id. at Section 4(G)(1). 
{¶ 9} On January 22, 2022, the commission adopted its first remedial 
General Assembly–district plan (“Map 2”).  On February 7, we held that the 
commission had again violated Article XI, Section 6 and invalidated Map 2 “in its 
entirety.”  League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio 
St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-342, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 67 (“League II”).  We again ordered 
the commission to adopt a new plan.  Id. at ¶ 68. 
D. Map 3 and the February 22 filing deadline 
{¶ 10} There was no General Assembly–district plan in place on February 
22, the deadline for prospective write-in candidates to submit a declaration of 
candidacy. 
{¶ 11} The commission approved a new plan on February 24 (“Map 3”).  
Secretary LaRose instructed the county boards of elections to certify the 
candidacies of prospective House, Senate, and state-central-committee candidates 
who had filed declarations by the February 22 deadline, based on Map 3.  See 
Secretary of State Directive 2022-28, Ballots and Candidates for May 3, 2022 
Primary Election for All Offices, available at https: // www.ohiosos. gov/ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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globalassets/ elections/ directives/ 2022/dir2022-28.pdf#page=1 (accessed June 19, 
2022) [https:// perma.cc/ 57YZ-JWMS]. 
{¶ 12} On March 16, we invalidated Map 3.  League of Women Voters of 
Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-789, ___ 
N.E.3d ___, ¶ 2 (“League III”).  Once again, we ordered the commission to 
reconvene and adopt a new plan.  Id.  The next day, Secretary LaRose issued 
Directive 2022-30, instructing county boards not to “alter[] or send[] ballots” until 
they received further direction.  Secretary of State Directive 2022-30, League of 
Women Voters of Ohio et al. v. Ohio Redistricting Commission, et al. Decision and 
Additional Instructions, available at https://www.ohiosos.gov/globalassets/ 
elections/directives/2022/dir2022-30.pdf#page=1 (accessed June 19, 2022) 
[https://perma.cc/7WGD-QE8P]. 
{¶ 13} On March 23, Secretary LaRose issued Directive 2022-31.  The 
directive declared that in light of League III’s invalidation of Map 3, “it is not 
possible to include the primary contests for the Ohio House, Ohio Senate, and State 
Central Committee on the May 3 Primary Election ballot.”  Secretary of State 
Directive 2022-31, Revised Form of Ballot for the May 3, 2022 Primary Election, 
available at https://www.ohiosos.gov/globalassets/elections/directives /2022/ 
dir2022-31.pdf#page=1 (accessed June 19, 2022) [https://perma.cc/BX6V-ARBK].  
The directive instructed the boards to proceed with preparations for the May 3 
primary without those offices appearing on the ballot. 
E. Map 4 
{¶ 14} On March 28, the commission adopted a new General Assembly–
district plan (“Map 4”).  League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting 
Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1235, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 2 (“League IV”).  
On April 14, we invalidated Map 4 “in its entirety,” id. at ¶ 78, and ordered the 
commission to approve and submit a new district plan by May 6, id. at ¶ 79. 
 
January Term, 2022 
7 
 
F. The readoption of Map 3 
{¶ 15} On May 5, the commission readopted Map 3, purportedly for use 
only in the 2022 election.  League of Women Voters v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., 
___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1727, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 3 (“League V”).  On May 
25, we again invalidated Map 3 and ordered the commission to submit a new plan 
by June 3.  Id. at ¶ 5-6.  The commission has yet to submit a new plan. 
G. The federal court reinstates Map 3, 
and the secretary of state issues Directive 2022-34 
{¶ 16} Meanwhile, in February 2022, a group of Ohio Republican voters 
and activists sued the commission and Secretary LaRose in federal court, 
complaining that they had no legislative districts in which to organize, campaign, 
and vote.  Gonidakis v. LaRose, ___ F.Supp. ___ , U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72172 
(S.D.Ohio 2022).  On April 20, a three-judge federal-court panel found, at the 
preliminary-injunction stage, that the plaintiffs were “likely to establish a violation 
of their rights if Ohio fails entirely to hold a state-legislative primary election.”  Id. 
at ___, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72172 at *49.  The panel majority announced that if Ohio 
did not pass a new General Assembly–district plan that satisfied federal law by May 
28, then the panel would order the primary election for General Assembly races to 
be moved to August 2 and would order Ohio to use Map 3 for the 2022 election 
cycle.  Id. at ___, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72172 at *8-9. 
{¶ 17} On May 27, the federal panel issued the following order: “Assuming 
no map is approved by midnight on Saturday, May 28, we order Secretary of State 
Frank LaRose to push back Ohio’s state primaries to August 2, 2022, and to 
implement Map 3 for this year’s elections only.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Gonidakis v. 
LaRose, S.D.Ohio No. 2:22-cv-0773, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95341, *5 (May 27, 
2022). 
{¶ 18} As of May 28, when the federal panel’s order imposing Map 3 took 
effect and set the primary for August 2, there were only 66 days until the primary.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
8 
On that date, Secretary LaRose issued Directive 2022-34 to set out a new, 
compressed elections calendar.  The directive stated: 
 
The federal court order did not alter the partisan candidate 
filing deadlines for the primary election.  The filing deadline for 
candidates for State Representative, State Senator, or Member of 
State Central Committee to file a declaration of candidacy was 4:00 
p.m. on February 2, 2022.  Write-in candidates for the primary 
election were required to file their declaration of intent to be a write-
in candidate by February 22, 2022.  If a declaration of candidacy or 
declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate was filed after those 
filing deadlines, the board must reject the candidacy. 
 
(Footnotes omitted.)  Secretary of State Directive 2022-34, Instructions for the 
August 2, 2022 Primary Election, available at https:// www.ohiosos. gov/ 
globalassets/ elections/ directives/ 2022/ dir2022-34.pdf#page=1 (accessed June 
19, 2022) [https://perma.cc/U6NW-HJ3D]. 
III. THE ORIGINAL RELATORS’ DECLARATIONS OF CANDIDACY 
A. The prospective state Senate candidates (Thien and DeMora) 
{¶ 19} Under Map 2, Thien resided in Senate District 16; that seat was not 
up for election in 2022.  Accordingly, she did not file a declaration of candidacy in 
February.  But under Map 3, Thien resides in Senate District 25.  On May 16, she 
filed a declaration of candidacy and petition to run as a write-in candidate for the 
Democratic nomination for Senate District 25. 
{¶ 20} DeMora filed a declaration of candidacy and petition on May 4 for 
the Democratic nomination for Senate District 25.  Under Map 2, DeMora resided 
in Senate District 15, which already had an incumbent Senate Democrat, but Map 
3 moved DeMora to District 25. 
January Term, 2022 
9 
 
B. The prospective Democratic House candidates (Somani and Jackson) 
{¶ 21} Under Map 2, Somani resided in House District 11, as did House 
Minority Leader Allison Russo.  Map 3 moved Russo to District 7, leaving District 
11 without a declared candidate.  On May 4, Somani filed her declaration of 
candidacy and petition for the Democratic nomination for House District 11. 
{¶ 22} On May 23, Jackson filed a declaration and petitions to run as a 
write-in candidate for the Democratic House nomination in District 39. 
C. The prospective central-committee candidates (Tupes and Martin) 
{¶ 23} On May 4, Tupes filed a declaration of candidacy and petition to be 
a candidate for the Democratic Party State Central Committee for Senate District 
15 at the August 2 primary.  Also on May 4, Martin filed a declaration of candidacy 
and petitions to be a candidate for the Democratic Party State Central Committee 
for Senate District 20 at the August 2 primary. 
{¶ 24} The original relators do not identify a specific date on which the 
boards rejected their declarations and petitions as untimely.  However, it is clear 
from the pleadings that the boards did follow Directive 2022-34 issued by Secretary 
LaRose and rejected the declarations and petitions as untimely. 
D. The prospective Republican House candidates (Cooke and Hawkins) 
{¶ 25} On June 7, Cooke submitted a declaration of candidacy and petition 
to run for the Republican nomination for House District 11.  The Franklin County 
Board of Elections rejected her declaration and petitions as untimely, based on the 
secretary’s instructions in Directive 2022-34. 
{¶ 26} On February 22, Hawkins filed a declaration of intent to run as a 
write-in candidate for the Republican nomination for House District 15.  However, 
on March 4, Hawkins withdrew his declaration of intent and ran for a congressional 
seat instead.  He appeared on the May 3 congressional-primary ballot but did not 
win the Republican nomination.  On June 3, Hawkins informed the Cuyahoga 
County Board of Elections of his intent to “reinstate” his candidacy for Ohio House 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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District 15.  The board rejected his request, stating that it did not have a mechanism 
by which to reinstate his declaration. 
E. The mandamus action 
{¶ 27} On May 31, 2022, the original relators filed a petition for a writ of 
mandamus.  They allege that their declarations of candidacy and petitions were 
timely filed based on the deadlines established by R.C. 3513.05 and 3513.041 and 
that Directive 2022-34 compels the boards to reject their filings in violation of the 
law. 
{¶ 28} We imposed an expedited briefing schedule, 166 Ohio St.3d 1521, 
2022-Ohio-1830, ___ N.E.3d ___, and the original relators and respondents 
submitted evidence and briefs.  On June 10, the intervening relators filed a motion 
for leave to intervene, which we granted.  See ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-
1995, ___ N.E.3d ___.  We denied the original relators’ motion for leave to file a 
new reply brief.  ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-2019, ___ N.E.3d ___.  Secretary 
LaRose and the Franklin County and Cuyahoga County Boards of Elections filed 
briefs and evidence in opposition to the intervening relators’ claims.  On June 15, 
the intervening relators filed a reply brief, at which point the case became ripe for 
decision. 
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of review 
{¶ 29} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, the original relators and the 
intervening relators must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (1) they 
have a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) Secretary LaRose and the boards 
have a clear legal duty to provide it, and (3) they do not have an adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of the law.  See State ex rel. Linnabary v. Husted, 138 Ohio 
St.3d 535, 2014-Ohio-1417, 8 N.E.3d 940, ¶ 13.  As to the third element, the 
original relators and the intervening relators lack an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law due to the proximity of the primary election, which is 
January Term, 2022 
11 
 
less than 60 days away.  See State ex rel. West v. LaRose, 161 Ohio St.3d 192, 2020-
Ohio-4380, 161 N.E.3d 631, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 30} The first two elements require us to determine whether Secretary 
LaRose or the boards engaged in fraud, corruption, or abuse of discretion or acted 
in clear disregard of applicable law.  See State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Republican Party 
Executive Commt. v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 427, 2010-Ohio-1873, 928 N.E.2d 
1072, ¶ 9.  Neither the original relators nor the intervening relators have alleged 
fraud or corruption.  They allege that the issuance of Directive 2022-34 constituted 
“an abuse of discretion and/or * * * clear disregard of applicable law” by the 
secretary of state.  “An abuse of discretion connotes an unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
unconscionable attitude.”  State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 78 Ohio 
St.3d 181, 183, 677 N.E.2d 343 (1997). 
B. The original relators’ claims 
1. The filing deadlines are set by the Revised Code 
{¶ 31} R.C. 3513.05 provides that candidates for partisan nomination in a 
primary election must file their declaration of candidacy and petition “no[] later 
than four p.m. [on] the ninetieth day before the day of the primary election.”  The 
90th day before the August 2 primary fell on May 4.  R.C. 3513.041 requires 
prospective write-in candidates to file their declaration “before four p.m. of the 
seventy-second day preceding the election at which such candidacy is to be 
considered.”  The 72nd day before the August 2 primary fell on May 22, which was 
a Sunday.  The original relators argue that those deadlines should apply and, 
therefore, the four declarations that were filed on May 4 and the declarations for 
write-in candidacy that were filed on May 16 and May 23 were timely. 
{¶ 32} Because this case involves a question of statutory interpretation, our 
analysis begins with the language of the statute.  See In re Application Seeking 
Approval of Ohio Power Co., 155 Ohio St.3d 326, 2018-Ohio-4698, 121 N.E.3d 
320, ¶ 29.  Both R.C. 3513.05 and 3513.041 tie the deadline for filing declarations 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
12 
of candidacy to the actual day when voting occurs.  By the plain language of the 
statute, then, the filings from the original relators were timely. 
{¶ 33} Secretary LaRose concedes this point as a general rule, writing in his 
merit brief that he 
 
recognizes that a change in the primary election date could operate 
to re-open the filing period under certain circumstances. Indeed, the 
Secretary’s office acknowledged (in other litigation) that the 
statutory deadlines are tied to the date of the primary election and 
can move by operation of law when the date changes. 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  However, Secretary LaRose contends that this general rule should 
not apply to the specific facts of this case. 
{¶ 34} Secretary LaRose argues that the original relators’ declarations are 
void because when they were filed in May, there was no primary election scheduled 
for August 2.  August 2 was not the primary date until May 28, when the federal 
court’s order imposing that date became effective.  Secretary LaRose asserts that 
“[a] person cannot file a valid declaration of candidacy and petition for an election 
date that does not legally exist.”  However, Secretary LaRose cites no authority—
statutory or judicial—for the proposition that a declaration of candidacy is void if 
it is filed before the primary date is officially set.  We reject this contention. 
{¶ 35} Alternatively, Secretary LaRose suggests in his merit brief that R.C. 
3513.05 and 3513.041 
 
make clear that the filing window would have re-opened if the 
primary election date was changed to a date more than 90 days out.  
But those statutes do not contemplate the unusual situation here, 
January Term, 2022 
13 
 
where a court ordered the Secretary to “push back” the election to a 
date that is less than 90 days away. 
 
Secretary LaRose accuses the original relators of adding words to the statute that 
are not there.  Secretary LaRose may be correct that in drafting these statutes, the 
General Assembly did not contemplate a situation in which the primary would be 
scheduled less than 90 days before it was to occur, but he is incorrect that this fact 
compels a different result under the statute.  By its plain language, the statute says 
that the filing deadline for partisan-primary candidates is 90 days before the 
primary.  To read the statute to say that that deadline applies only to certain 
primaries, depending on when they are formally scheduled, we would have to add 
words to the statute.  And it is settled that if the statutory language is clear and 
unambiguous, a court will apply the statute as written and will not add or delete 
words.  In re N.M.P., 160 Ohio St.3d 472, 2020-Ohio-1458, 159 N.E.3d 241, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 36} In State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch, 72 Ohio St.3d 581, 586, 651 
N.E.2d 995 (1995), we stated that “when an election statute is subject to two 
different, but equally reasonable, interpretations, the interpretation of the Secretary 
of State, the state’s chief election officer, is entitled to more weight.”  In his merit 
brief, Secretary LaRose relies on this statement to suggest that we should defer to 
his construction of the deadline statutes.  But our reliance on an administrative 
construction of a statute applies only when the statute is “truly ambiguous.”  State 
ex rel. Ferrara v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections, 166 Ohio St.3d 64, 2021-Ohio-
3156, 182 N.E.3d 1142, ¶ 21; see also R.C. 1.49(F).  In this case, Secretary LaRose 
has not identified an ambiguity in the statutory language that requires interpretation.  
See Wayt v. DHSC, L.L.C., 155 Ohio St.3d 401, 2018-Ohio-4822, 122 N.E.3d 92, 
¶ 15 (when a statute is plain and unambiguous, a court will apply the statute as 
written, and no further interpretation is necessary). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 37} The plain language of R.C. 3513.05 and 3513.041 supports relators’ 
claims.  Secretary LaRose has offered no compelling reason to disregard the 
statutory language. 
2. The original relators do not seek 
to compel Secretary LaRose to set new deadlines 
{¶ 38} Next, Secretary LaRose asserts that the original relators are seeking 
to compel him to retroactively reopen the filing period.  He argues that he does not 
have the authority to do so, noting that H.B. 93 expressly circumscribed his 
authority to set new deadlines for the primary.  Secretary LaRose’s argument 
misconstrues both the language of H.B. 93 and the relief the original relators seek. 
{¶ 39} Section 4(G) of H.B. 93 authorized the secretary to adjust “any 
deadlines pertaining to the administration of the May 3, 2022, primary election,” 
other than those expressly identified therein.  And Secretary LaRose correctly notes 
that among the deadlines excluded from his authority to adjust were those for filing 
declarations of candidacy, petitions, and declarations of intent to be a write-in 
candidate, see H.B. 93, Section 4(G)(1).  But the language in H.B. 93 makes plain 
that the law applied to deadlines only for the primary election held on May 3, 2022.  
This intent is clear from the language of Section 4(G), which states that the 
secretary could adjust deadlines as he deemed necessary “to accommodate the 
shorter timeframe to prepare to hold the election on May 3, 2022.”  In other words, 
unlike R.C. 3513.05 and 3513.041, which are not tied to any specific election date, 
the provisions of H.B. 93 apply only to preparations for a primary election on one 
specific date (May 3), and they became inapplicable once the federal court changed 
the date of the primary election for General Assembly and state-central committee 
candidates or nominations. 
{¶ 40} H.B. 93 is inapplicable for a second reason.  The original relators are 
not asking Secretary LaRose to order a new deadline for filing declarations (unlike 
the intervening relators who are making that demand).  Their theory is that the 
January Term, 2022 
15 
 
deadlines exist by statute and Secretary LaRose interfered with those statutory 
deadlines when he issued Directive 2022-34.  In other words, the remedy the 
original relators seek is not an order from Secretary LaRose setting new deadlines, 
but an order compelling his adherence to the deadlines that exist by operation of 
law. 
{¶ 41} Secretary LaRose argues that the federal court in Gonidakis, 
S.D.Ohio No. 2:22-cv-0773, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95341, although aware of the 
statutory deadlines, ordered the partisan-primary election for the General Assembly 
and state-central-committee nominations to be held on August 2 but that “[n]otably, 
the panel’s order did not discuss re-opening the filing periods.”  According to 
Secretary LaRose, the Gonidakis panel relied on a statement from the deputy 
attorney general that the candidate-filing deadlines would not reopen.  This 
argument assumes that the establishing of the candidate-filing deadlines required 
some affirmative act by the federal court, when in fact they are set by operation of 
the statutes. 
3. Our ruling need not disrupt the election 
{¶ 42} Finally, Secretary LaRose argues that we should not grant relief, 
because doing so will “endanger the orderly conduct of the August 2 primary 
election.”  Secretary LaRose invokes a principle outlined in Purcell v. Gonzalez, 
549 U.S. 1, 127 S.Ct.5, 166 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006), as an argument against granting relief 
in this case.  Purcell stands for the proposition that, ordinarily, courts should not 
grant injunctive relief altering election rules close to an election.  See Ohio 
Democratic Party v. LaRose, 2020-Ohio-4664, 159 N.E.3d 852, ¶ 82 (10th Dist.), 
citing Purcell at 4-5. 
{¶ 43} Purcell’s application to this case is questionable, at best, for 
procedural and substantive reasons.  As noted, Purcell forbids injunctive relief in 
certain election cases.  But we have never applied Purcell to preclude the issuance 
of a writ of mandamus, which, unlike the test for injunctive relief, requires a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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showing of a clear legal right, a clear legal duty, and the absence of an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  See Bryan v. Fawkes, 61 V.I. 416, 468-
469 (2014) (holding that Purcell is inapplicable when the relief sought is not 
injunctive).  Indeed, Bryan cited as authority a decision from this court in which we 
granted mandamus relief in an expedited election case over a dissenting opinion 
urging us to refrain from acting based on Purcell.  Bryan at 468, citing State ex rel. 
Owens v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 130, 2010-Ohio-1374, 926 N.E.2d 617. 
{¶ 44} Even if the Purcell principle were to play a role in our analysis of 
mandamus actions, it would not warrant the denial of a writ of mandamus.  Purcell 
stands for the proposition that “[w]hen an election is close at hand, the rules of the 
road should be clear and settled.”  Democratic Natl. Commt. v. Wisconsin State 
Legislature, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 141 S.Ct. 28, 30, 208 L.Ed.2d 247 (2020) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  It follows, then, that the applicability of Purcell 
depends on whether the original relators are attempting to alter or restore the status 
quo, i.e., the established “rules of the road.”  Here, rather than altering election rules 
as Secretary LaRose argues, the original relators seek the secretary of state’s 
adherence to the statutory deadlines.  In this circumstance, the Purcell principle 
should not bar a court from requiring the subject of the law here—the secretary of 
state—to do his duty and follow the law.  See Carson v. Simon, 978 F.3d 1051, 
1062 (8th Cir.2020). 
{¶ 45} Secretary LaRose contends that the boards cannot modify the ballots 
before June 17, which is the date on which they must have the Uniformed and 
Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”), 52 U.S.C. 20302, ballots 
ready for distribution.3  While we are mindful of the burdens it may place on a few 
boards to prepare a new ballot after the UOCAVA date has passed, we will not 
hesitate to order that a wrongly excluded candidate be added to the ballot, 
 
3. Ohio has incorporated UOCAVA into state law and requires overseas and absent-service-member 
ballots to be printed 46 days before an election.  See R.C. 3509.01(B)(1). 
January Term, 2022 
17 
 
notwithstanding the passage of the UOCAVA date.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Stevens 
v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Elections, 152 Ohio St.3d 584, 2018-Ohio-1151, 99 N.E.3d 
376, ¶ 11 (granting a writ of mandamus 40 days before the election (i.e., after the 
UOCAVA deadline), ordering that a candidate be placed on the ballot despite the 
board’s complaint that it would be costly to “reprint” the ballots). 
{¶ 46} We hold that the original relators’ right to have their declarations and 
petitions reviewed outweighs the burden this may place on the boards. 
4. The original relators are entitled to mandamus relief 
{¶ 47} Despite the complicated history, the original relators’ complaint 
presents a simple question of statutory construction: The deadline to file 
declarations for partisan nomination in a primary election is 90 days before the 
election, R.C. 3513.05, or 72 days before the election for write-in candidates, R.C. 
3513.041.  The primary election date is August 2.  All six of the original relators 
filed their declarations of candidacy and petitions for the August 2 primary within 
those timeframes.  We therefore hold that their declarations and petitions were 
timely filed.  We grant a writ of mandamus directing Secretary LaRose to instruct 
the boards that the original relators’ declarations and petitions were timely filed, 
and we order the Franklin, Montgomery, and Licking County Boards of Elections 
to accept the original relators’ declarations and petitions as timely and to certify the 
candidates to the ballot if they otherwise qualify. 
C. The intervening relators’ claims 
{¶ 48} The intervening relators argue, as did the original relators, that 
maintaining the February filing deadlines for the August 2 primary under Directive 
2022-34 is an error of law, and they ask us to order a new 10-day period for 
candidate filings for the August 2 primary.  Alternatively, they ask for an order 
postponing the primary until at least September 6.  However, they have not 
established that Secretary LaRose has a clear legal duty to undertake either of these 
actions. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
18 
{¶ 49} Even if Secretary LaRose acted in clear disregard of the applicable 
law by instructing the boards to adhere to the February deadlines through Directive 
2022-34, it does not follow that Secretary LaRose must create a new filing period.  
Essentially, the intervening relators are making an equitable argument: enforcing 
the February filing deadlines would be unfair because doubts about the ultimate 
shape of the maps precluded them from filing their declarations of candidacy 
earlier.  “But ‘subjective principles of equity and fundamental fairness’ do not 
dictate whether a writ of mandamus will issue; instead the question is whether there 
is a clear legal duty to perform the requested act.”  State ex rel. Save Your 
Courthouse Comm. v. Medina, 157 Ohio St. 3d 423, 2019-Ohio-3737, 137 N.E.3d 
1118, ¶ 43, quoting State ex rel. Schwaben v. School Emps. Retirement Sys., 76 
Ohio St.3d 280, 285, 667 N.E.2d 398 (1996). 
{¶ 50} Because the intervening relators cannot satisfy an essential element 
of mandamus—the existence of a clear legal duty—we deny their request for a writ 
of mandamus.  The second opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part asserts 
that allowing one group of prospective candidates to participate in the primary and 
not the other is arbitrary.  But contrary to that characterization, not granting a writ 
to the intervening relators is appropriate, because they have not established that 
Secretary LaRose has a clear legal duty to undertake either of the actions that they 
ask this court to order. 
V. CONCLUSION 
{¶ 51} We grant a writ of mandamus in favor of the original relators, 
compelling Secretary LaRose and the Franklin, Montgomery, and Licking County 
Boards of Elections to accept the original relators’ declarations of candidacy and 
petitions as timely and to certify them to the ballot if they otherwise qualify.  We 
deny the writ of mandamus requested by the intervening relators. 
Writ granted in part 
and denied in part. 
January Term, 2022 
19 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by 
FISCHER, J. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by 
FISCHER, J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 52} Ohio law set the primary for May 3, 2022.  But when no General 
Assembly–redistricting map was validated, the May 3 primary did not occur for the 
General Assembly and state-central-committee candidates who met all the statutory 
petition requirements and the February 2, 2022, filing deadline (or the February 22, 
2022, deadline for write-in candidates).  The inability of those candidates to stand 
for election was a direct result of the chaos the majority created by its overreach in 
the General Assembly–redistricting process.  See League of Women Voters of Ohio 
v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___, 
(“League I”); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ 
Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-342, ___ N.E.3d ___ (“League II”); League of Women 
Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-789, 
___ N.E.3d ___, (“League III”); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio 
Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1235, ___ N.E.3d ___ 
(“League IV”); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ 
Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1727, ___ N.E.3d ___ (“League V”). 
{¶ 53} Enter the federal three-judge panel formed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
2284.  With the Ohio Redistricting Commission and the Ohio Supreme Court at an 
“impasse,” some Ohio voters sought relief in the federal court.  See Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, Gonidakis v. LaRose, ___ F.Supp. ___, 2022 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72172 (S.D.Ohio 2022) (No. 2:22-cv-0773).  In granting the relief 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
20 
sought, the federal panel did nothing more than declare the commission’s third map 
(“Map 3”) valid for purposes of the primary and liberate the candidates who were 
legally qualified to appear on the May 3 primary ballot by setting a date for them 
to finish the May 3 primary.  It did not change what it took to qualify to be a 
candidate on the ballot, and no one intervened and asked the federal panel to change 
the qualifications to be named on the ballot. 
{¶ 54} The majority properly denies the request for a writ of mandamus of 
the intervenors, Mehek Cooke and Shafron Hawkins.  But the majority improperly 
grants a writ of mandamus to the relators, William DeMora, Anita Somani, 
Elizabeth Thien, Leronda Jackson, Bridgette Tupes, and Gary Martin, ordering the 
respondents, Secretary of State Frank LaRose and the Franklin, Montgomery, and 
Licking County Boards of Elections, to allow the relators to submit their 
nominating petitions after the February 2022 deadlines set by statute.  But the 
relators stand in the same position as the intervenors.  None of the relators filed 
legally conforming nominating petitions by the February 2 or February 22 deadlines 
to have his or her name placed on the May 3 primary ballot.  And because the 
relators did not comply with Ohio law, they have no clear legal right to the relief 
they seek, and the boards of elections have no clear legal duty to accept their 
declarations of candidacy and petitions for the split primary. 
{¶ 55} Because the majority properly denies the intervenors’ petitions for a 
writ of mandamus but improperly grants a writ of mandamus to the relators, I 
concur in part and dissent in part. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 56} To understand this case, one must begin from a vantage point of 
knowing what happened to some candidates who had lawfully qualified to be on 
the May 3 primary ballot and understanding what the federal court ordered, 
effective May 28, 2022.  Because of what occurred and what the federal court 
ordered, the intervenors and the relators have no legal right to have their 
January Term, 2022 
21 
 
declarations of candidacy and petitions accepted and reviewed by the boards of 
elections, and the boards have no legal duty to accept and review the declarations 
and petitions. 
What happened to some candidates who lawfully qualified 
for the May 3 primary ballot 
{¶ 57} R.C. 3501.01(E)(1) defines “primary election” as follows: 
 
“Primary” or “primary election” means an election held for 
the purpose of nominating persons as candidates of political parties 
for election to offices, and for the purpose of electing persons as 
members of the controlling committees of political parties and as 
delegates and alternates to the conventions of political parties.  
Primary elections shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first 
Monday in May of each year except in years in which a presidential 
primary election is held. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 58} By definition, Ohio’s primary election had to be held on May 3.  
Every element of eligibility for the ballot builds from that date.  Declarations of 
candidacy with supporting petitions are due 90 days before May 3.  R.C. 3513.05.  
Those petitions had to be open for public inspection through the 80th day before 
May 3; the boards of elections were required to verify signatures by the 78th day 
prior to May 3 and had to permit challenges to those petitions by the 74th day before 
May 3.  Id. 
{¶ 59} Those candidates running for General Assembly seats or positions 
on their parties’ state central committee faced uncertainty regarding the May 3 
primary—the boundaries of their districts were in flux.  On January 12, 2022, a 
majority of this court invalidated the first General Assembly–redistricting plan 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
22 
adopted by the commission.  League I, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-65, ___ 
N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 2.  A second redistricting plan was adopted by the commission on 
January 22, and a majority of this court struck that down on February 7.  League II, 
___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-342, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 67-68.  A third 
redistricting plan was submitted to this court on February 25, and a majority of this 
court struck that down on March 16.  League III, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-
789, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 2. 
{¶ 60} Between the commission’s adoption of the second and third 
redistricting plans, two significant things happened.  The General Assembly took 
action, and some Ohio voters filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern 
Division.  See Complaint at 3, Gonidakis, ___ F.Supp.___, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
72172 (No. 2:22-cv-0773). 
{¶ 61} Anticipating that district lines would change prior to the primary 
election, the General Assembly passed 2022 Sub.H.B. No. 93 (“H.B. 93”) to 
address the uncertainty regarding the district lines.  The governor signed it into law 
as an emergency measure on January 28, 2022.  It left firmly in place the February 
2 and February 22 dates for prospective candidates to file their declarations of 
candidacy for the Ohio House, Senate, and state central committees. 
{¶ 62} H.B. 93 authorized candidates who had filed by the February 2022 
deadlines to change the district in which they would seek election if they found 
themselves–after redistricting–living in a district different from the one in which 
they had declared their candidacy.  Id. at Section 4(B).  H.B. 93 provided the 
mechanism by which the candidates could change their districts once the district 
lines were in place for the primary election.  Id. at Section 4(C). 
{¶ 63} The General Assembly never changed the primary date.  H.B. 93 
remained a bill that addressed a May 3, 2022, primary date. 
January Term, 2022 
23 
 
{¶ 64} H.B. 93 attempted to prevent electoral chaos.  With its passage, the 
General Assembly gave protection to those candidates who were legally qualified 
to be on the primary ballot.  Even with shifting district lines, they would be able to 
easily change their district if they were drawn out of their original one.  Everyone 
knew that the primary date was not changing and that filing by the February 2 or 
February 22 deadlines created a safe harbor as long as the candidate had declared 
his or her candidacy by the applicable date.  H.B. 93 became effective on January 
28, leaving five days for any prospective candidate to gather the necessary 
signatures—just 50 for those running for House or Senate and a mere 5 for those 
running for state central committee, R.C. 3513.05. 
{¶ 65} With the commission and a majority of this court at an impasse, there 
were no General Assembly–district lines drawn in time for the May 3 primary.  
Without a General Assembly–redistricting plan, candidates whose nominating 
petitions were submitted by either of the February 2022 deadlines and approved by 
the boards of elections were severed from the May 3 primary because their districts 
were undefined.  Secretary of State Directive 2022-31, Revised Form of Ballot for 
the May 3, 2022 Primary Election, available at https:// www.ohiosos. gov/ 
globalassets/ elections/ directives/ 2022/dir2022-31.pdf#page=1 (accessed June 19, 
2022) [https://perma.cc/BX6V-ARBK]. 
{¶ 66} As a result, Ohio entered uncharted territory with its General 
Assembly and state-central-committee candidates excised from the scheduled 
primary ballot.  Those excised from the ballot were placed in Dante’s first Circle 
of Hell, Limbo, “ ‘desiring without hope.’ ”  The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri, 
Canto IV, at 18 (Charles W. Eliot, LL.D. ed., Henry F. Cary trans., P.F. Collier & 
Sons 1909).  Although there is no reprieve for those in Limbo in Dante’s Inferno, 
there was relief for candidates in Limbo in Ohio—in the form of the federal three-
judge panel. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
24 
What the federal court ordered 
{¶ 67} The Ohio voters who sought declaratory and injunctive relief in 
federal court asked that court to “declare that the current state legislative districts 
(or lack thereof) violate” the United States Constitution, Complaint at 3, Gonidakis, 
___ F.Supp.___ (No. 2:22-cv-0773), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72172, and to declare 
the second map adopted by the redistricting commission valid for the 2022 election 
cycle, id. 
{¶ 68} A three-member federal-district-court panel considered what to do if 
the commission was unable to meet this court’s requirements for a General 
Assembly–district plan.  The panel, though wary of acting, was very aware of 
Ohio’s election timelines and decided in an April 20, 2022, order that May 28, 
2022, would be the point of no return to announce an election date for those 
candidates who had been severed from the May 3 primary, see Gonidakis, ___ 
F.Supp. ___, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72172, at *8. 
{¶ 69} The federal panel was aware of the August 2 special election date 
already instituted by statute.  Id.  Working backwards from the general-election 
date of November 8, the court concluded that August 2 was the last day to finish 
the primary because of the deadlines and procedures in place for required reviews 
prior to the general election.  Id. at *63-64.  When May 28 arrived, the federal 
panel’s order was limited: a simple pushback of the remaining races to August 2 
and an implementation of the redistricting commission’s third plan. 
{¶ 70} The federal panel did not set a new date for the 2022 primary 
because, as set forth above, that date was already determined by Ohio statute.  The 
federal panel also did not explicitly or implicitly create new rights for people who 
never sought candidacy for the May 3 primary.  No one intervened in the federal 
action and asked the federal court to reopen the already closed nominating-petition 
timelines.  Instead, the federal three-judge panel merely closed a chapter of 
January Term, 2022 
25 
 
redistricting impasse and declared Map 3 valid in order for Ohio voters to be able 
to vote. 
{¶ 71} It made clear in its April 20 opinion and order that it wanted to do 
nothing to jeopardize the general election, the timeline for which was already under 
pressure due to the incomplete May 3 primary.  See Gonidakis, ___ F.Supp. ___, 
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *4-5.  The panel, citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 
127 S.Ct. 5, 166 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006), recognized that “judicial intrusion in elections 
is dangerous work.  Even under the best circumstances—and these are decidedly 
not those—‘[r]unning elections state-wide is extraordinarily complicated and 
difficult.’ ”  Gonidakis at *55-56, quoting Merrill v. Milligan, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 
142 S.Ct. 879, 880, ___ L.E.2d ___, (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  The court 
recognized the fragility of the election calendar and its interrelatedness.  Id. at *64.  
Based on all the evidence and knowledge of Ohio’s election laws, the federal court 
established that the last date to finish the primary was August 2.  Id. at *9-10. 
{¶ 72} The panel took a hands-off approach to all aspects of the Ohio 
election except determining the appropriate map to use and the appropriate date to 
finish the fractured primary election.  As the Gonidakis majority wrote, “ ‘Even 
seemingly innocuous late-in-the-day judicial alterations to state election laws can 
interfere with administration of an election and cause unanticipated 
consequences.’ ”  Id. at *56, quoting Democratic Natl. Commt. v. Wisconsin State 
Legislature, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 141 S.Ct. 28, 31, ___ L.E.2d ___ (2020) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  “And while we have no choice but to move the 
primary date, we should disturb state election deadlines and procedures as little as 
possible.”  Id. at *63. 
{¶ 73} The federal panel protected two classes of Ohioans.  First, the panel 
safeguarded Ohio voters’ right to vote for representation in the General Assembly 
and state central committees from among those candidates that were properly 
qualified to run for office in the May 3 primary.  Second, it preserved the ability of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
26 
people who met the prescribed requirements for candidacy for General Assembly 
and state-central-committee seats in the May 3 primary to stand for election.  The 
relators and intervenors fall into only one of those categories—they are Ohioans 
who have the ability to vote for representation in the General Assembly and in state 
central committees.  But since the relators and intervenors did not comply with 
Ohio law and submit nominating petitions by February 2, 2022, (or February 22, 
2022, for prospective write-in candidates) the limited order from the federal panel 
did not breathe new life into their would-be candidacies. 
ANALYSIS 
No clear legal right or clear legal duty 
{¶ 74} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, the relators must establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that (1) they have a clear legal right to the requested 
relief, (2) the boards of elections and/or the secretary of state have a clear legal duty 
to provide it, and (3) the relators do not have an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of the law.  See State ex rel. Linnabary v. Husted, 138 Ohio St.3d 535, 2014-
Ohio-1417, 8 N.E.3d 940, ¶ 13.  A failure to establish any of these elements will 
result in a denial of the petition for a writ of mandamus.  See Creasy v. Waller, 1 
Ohio St.3d 93, 93-94, 438 N.E.2d 414 (1982). 
{¶ 75} The relators have established no clear legal right to the relief they 
seek.  No one intervened in the federal case to ask for an extension of the February 
2 or February 22, 2022, deadlines, and the federal court did not extend those 
deadlines.  The federal court’s order only designated a map to be used and afforded 
Ohioans a date to finish the May 3 primary.  Only those candidates who had 
declared their candidacies by February 2 or February 22 and were severed from the 
May 3 primary ballot have the legal right to be on the August 2 ballot.  The relators’ 
opportunity to participate in the primary—regardless of how the redistricting map 
might end up—ended on February 2 or February 22.  By extension, the boards of 
elections have no legal duty to accept and review the relators’ petitions.  The 
January Term, 2022 
27 
 
deadlines have come and gone, and the federal court gave no relief from that fact.  
The fact that legally qualified candidates were severed from the May 3 primary 
ballot does not create a clear legal right for the relators or the intervenors or impose 
a clear legal duty on the boards of elections. 
{¶ 76} The primary date was set by statute, and that date was May 3, 2022.  
The federal court set the date of August 2 to give Ohio voters an opportunity to 
finish the May 3 primary and allow those candidates who were legally qualified to 
appear on that ballot to stand for election in hopes of obtaining their party’s 
nomination for the general election. 
{¶ 77} The relators and intervenors did nothing to preserve their right to 
participate in the May 3 primary.  But the majority allows people who made no 
effort to become eligible for the primary election to suddenly join the fray because 
the situation now appears more advantageous for their election.  The relators had 
the ability, like everyone else, to preserve their chance to seek office by complying 
with the filing rules for the statutorily defined primary election and enjoying the 
protection of the safe harbor created by H.B. 93.  The saving grace of the federal 
court rightly belongs only to those candidates who put themselves in a position to 
earn it. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 78} None of the intervenors or relators submitted nominating petitions 
for the May 3, 2022, primary election as required by law.  They have no clear legal 
right to submit nominating petitions now, and the local boards of elections have no 
clear legal duty to accept nominating petitions now.  Therefore, I concur in the 
majority’s judgment denying writs of mandamus to the intervenors, but I dissent 
from the majority’s granting writs of mandamus to the relators. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
28 
FISCHER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 79} Neither original relators, William DeMora, Anita Somani, Elizabeth 
Thien, Leronda Jackson, Bridgette Tupes, and Gary Martin, nor intervening 
relators, Shafron Hawkins and Mehek Cooke, are entitled to writs of mandamus, 
because they cannot demonstrate a clear legal right to the requested relief or a clear 
legal duty on behalf of any of the respondents, Secretary of State Frank LaRose and 
the Cuyahoga, Franklin, Licking, and Montgomery County Boards of Elections, to 
provide it.  Therefore, I agree with the majority opinion that intervening relators’ 
petition for a writ of mandamus must be denied.  I disagree, however, that a writ of 
mandamus should issue for original relators.  I agree wholly with the first and third 
separate opinions and join those opinions in full.  I write separately because the 
redistricting madness caused by a majority of this court cannot be overstated.  Thus, 
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 
Down the Rabbit Hole: League I, II, III, IV, and V create problems for 
Ohioans 
{¶ 80} Have we now finally made it to Wonderland?  Ohioans, especially 
the parties in this case, are now experiencing the chaos that has ensued from this 
court’s incorrect, unconstitutional, and unreasoned interpretation of Ohio 
Constitution, Article XI, Section 8(C)(1)(a) in League of Women Voters of Ohio v. 
Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___, 
¶ 280 (“League I”) (Fischer, J., dissenting); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. 
Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-342, ___ N.E.3d ___, 
¶ 150-152 (“League II”) (Fischer, J., dissenting); League of Women Voters of Ohio 
v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-789, ___ N.E.3d ___, 
¶ 195 (“League III”) (Fischer, J., dissenting); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. 
Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1235, ___ N.E.3d ___, 
¶ 109 (“League IV”) (Fischer, J., dissenting); and League of Women Voters of Ohio 
v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1727, ___ N.E.3d 
January Term, 2022 
29 
 
___¶ 45-46 (“League V”) (Fischer, J. dissenting).  Just as I predicted.  See League 
III at ¶ 151 (Fischer, J., dissenting); League IV at ¶ 114 (Fischer, J., dissenting); 
League V at ¶ 46 (Fischer, J. dissenting). 
{¶ 81} In response to the federal court’s order requiring Secretary of State 
Frank LaRose to set a new August 2, 2022 date for this year’s Ohio primary, 
Gonidakis v. LaRose, S.D.Ohio No. 2:22-cv-0773, 2022 WL 1709146, *1 (May 27, 
2022), the parties in this case are now attempting to sort out whether there are new 
filing dates for candidates who wish to run for their parties’ nominations in the 
primary.  The answer to the question whether there are new filing dates is not too 
much unlike an answer to a Mad Hatter riddle—“I haven’t the slightest idea.”  
Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, 84 (1865), available at 
https://www.google.com/books/edition/Alice_s_Adventures_in_Wonderland/hW
ByX5-c5SIC?hl=en&gbpv=1 (accessed June 23, 2022) [https://perma.cc/TX9S-
KEDP].  This state is in this nonsensical situation because the majority opinion in 
League I ignored the plain language of Article XI, Section 8(C)(1)(a), which 
precludes this court from reviewing a four-year district plan that is adopted pursuant 
to the impasse procedures in Article XI, Section 8.  And though we could have 
corrected course and turned back, the majority opinions of this court instead 
proceeded down the proverbial “rabbit hole” with League II, League III, League 
IV, and League V.  Now this state is left in this Wonderland-like position fraught 
with problems—the current case being a prime example.  The only clear resolution 
in this case, at least if we follow long-standing Ohio precedent establishing the 
standard for granting a writ of mandamus, is that relators’ petitions must be denied. 
{¶ 82} Neither original relators nor intervening relators can prove a “clear 
legal right” to the requested relief.  The order moving the date of the primary 
originates from a federal court and not the Ohio General Assembly.  That order is 
not based on any Ohio statute or the duties of any state elections official.  And this 
court, the Ohio Supreme Court, has neither constitutional nor statutory authority to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
30 
change the filing deadlines as the majority opinion does today.  Even assuming 
arguendo that the majority opinion is somewhat correct, I believe that the law is 
ambiguous or at best unclear, and this court does not issue writs of mandamus 
unless a relator has proven not only that they do not have an adequate remedy at 
law but also that there is a clear legal right to relief and a clear legal duty by a 
respondent to provide the requested relief.  State ex rel. Linnabary v. Husted, 138 
Ohio St.3d 535, 2014-Ohio-1417, 8 N.E.3d 940, ¶ 13; see also State ex rel. Manley 
v. Walsh, 142 Ohio St.3d 384, 2014-Ohio-4563, 31 N.E.3d 608, ¶ 26; State ex rel. 
McGarvey v. Zeigler, 62 Ohio St.2d 320, 321, 405 N.E.2d 722 (1980). 
{¶ 83} By issuing the writ of mandamus to original relators, the majority 
opinion undermines long-standing Ohio law to reach a desired result.  I can only 
hope that this case is the worst of it and that we are not left to fight the Jabberwock 
without the vorpal sword sometime in the future.  See Lewis Carroll, Through the 
Looking-Glass, 18-19 (1871), available at https://www.loc.gov/item/42000114/ 
(accessed June 23, 2022) [https://perma.cc/26SH-YHMU]. 
A Mad Tea-Party: original relators and intervening relators do not have a 
clear legal right to the requested relief 
{¶ 84} Original relators and intervening relators challenge Secretary 
LaRose’s Directive 2022-34 instructing county boards of elections to reject 
candidate declarations filed after February as untimely.  While original relators and 
intervening relators request different forms of legal relief, they base their relief on 
the same misunderstanding that when the federal court moved the date of the 
primary, other dates and deadlines related to primary filings were moved too.  
While I sympathize with the difficulties that original relators and intervening 
relators have faced in attempting to navigate the everchanging, unconstitutional 
maze brought on by the majority opinions in League I, II, III, IV, and V, no relator 
has demonstrated, by any evidentiary standard—and especially not by clear and 
January Term, 2022 
31 
 
convincing evidence—a clear legal right to the requested relief or a clear legal duty 
on behalf of respondents to provide it. 
{¶ 85} For a writ of mandamus to issue, relators must establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that (1) they have a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) 
Secretary LaRose or the boards have a clear legal duty to provide it, and (3) relators 
do not have an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  See Linnabary, 
138 Ohio St.3d 535, 2014-Ohio-1417, 8 N.E.3d 940, at ¶ 13.  The right to relief 
must be clear—rights that may exist but are muddled by other issues are not 
sufficient to sustain an extraordinary writ like a writ of mandamus.  See Manley, 
142 Ohio St.3d 384, 2014-Ohio-4563, 31 N.E.3d 608, at ¶ 26 (right to relief was 
unclear when the underlying factual question was in dispute); McGarvey, 62 Ohio 
St.2d at 321, 405 N.E.2d 722 (rights were not so clear as to justify the issuance of 
an extraordinary writ).  Therefore, to prevail, any legal right claimed by relators 
must be clear: unclouded, easy to perceive and understand, and free from obscurity 
or ambiguity, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 419 (2002) (defining 
the adjective “clear”). 
{¶ 86} Additionally, a writ of mandamus will issue if we determine that 
Secretary LaRose or the boards of elections engaged in fraud, corruption, or abuse 
of discretion by acting in a manner that “connotes an unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
unconscionable attitude,” State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 78 Ohio 
St.3d 181, 183, 677 N.E.2d 343 (1997), or acted in clear disregard of applicable 
law.  State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Republican Party Executive Commt. v. Brunner, 125 
Ohio St.3d 427, 2010-Ohio-1873, 928 N.E.2d 1072, ¶ 9.  Original relators and 
intervening relators made no allegations of fraud or corruption, so those subjects 
are not at issue.  Thus, original relators and intervening relators must prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that Secretary LaRose’s Directive 2022-34 constituted an 
abuse of discretion or was done in clear disregard of applicable law.  However, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
32 
because of the ambiguity and chaos surrounding the facts and law that govern this 
case, this cannot and has not been done. 
{¶ 87} The issue before us is whether the filing deadlines prescribed by R.C. 
3513.05 and 3513.041 moved when the federal court ordered the secretary of state 
to “push back Ohio’s state primaries to August 2, 2022” from May 3, 2022.  
Gonidakis, 2022 WL 1709146 at *1.  But before we get into issues of statutory 
interpretation, we need to acknowledge the elephant in the room—the question 
whether the secretary of state even has the authority to do what the federal court 
ordered.  In League IV, the court acknowledged that “the authority for setting the 
date for a primary election belongs to the General Assembly, not to the Ohio 
Supreme Court, the secretary of state, or a federal court.”  League IV, ___ Ohio 
St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1235, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 69; see R.C. 3501.40 and 
3501.01(E)(1).  This fact was acknowledged by the federal court in Gonidakis v. 
LaRose, S.D.Ohio No. 2:22-cv-0773, 2022 WL 1175617, *3 (April 20, 2022), 
noting that the secretary of state has the authority to oversee and implement the 
election—not to set the primary date.  But here we have a writ of mandamus 
premised on a decision that orders Secretary LaRose to push back the primary 
date—something that this court expressly determined was not possible.  For this 
court to find that there is a clear legal duty for the secretary of state to accept new 
filings based on an order that conflicts with our precedent is a bit bonkers. 
{¶ 88} But if we assume that the federal court has properly ordered 
Secretary LaRose to move the primary date, the next question is whether we can 
even address whether candidate filing deadlines were moved when the primary date 
was moved, because it appears that issue was already litigated in federal court.  This 
court should first determine whether res judicata or collateral estoppel bars the writ 
action given that the federal court has already considered the issue of candidate 
filing deadlines in determining the appropriate remedy for the lack of a legislative 
map.  The federal court contemplated these deadlines in its colloquy with the parties 
January Term, 2022 
33 
 
in Gonidakis, but it decided not to address the issue in its ruling.  Therefore, it is 
unclear whether this issue is properly before this court or is one that we can even 
rule on.  And, as astutely noted in the first separate opinion, not one of the relators 
intervened in the federal case to request an extension of the deadlines or 
clarification of the process if the primary date were to be moved.  This fact 
compounds this already problematic situation. 
{¶ 89} However, even presuming that there are no procedural hurdles, the 
statutory analysis for determining whether R.C. 3513.05 and 3513.041 support 
moving the filing deadlines for the August 2 primary is not as simple as the majority 
opinion makes it out to be.  The majority opinion concludes that the filing deadlines 
were changed by operation of law based on the plain language of R.C. 3513.05 and 
3513.041, which set forth certain criteria that a candidate must meet before a set 
number of days before a primary election.  Because the primary date changed, the 
filing deadlines in the statutes necessarily changed as well, under the majority 
opinion’s reasoning.  While this may not be an unreasonable reading of R.C. 
3513.05 and 3513.041 generally, there are other issues at play here that make the 
analysis less than clear. 
{¶ 90} We must acknowledge that original relators and intervening relators 
filed their documents well past the filing date for the primary election on May 3, 
2022.  Secretary LaRose argues that for that reason, the filings are void.  The 
majority opinion deems this fact inconsequential and specifically rejects the void 
argument because “Secretary LaRose cites no authority * * * for the proposition 
that a declaration of candidacy is void if it is filed before the primary date is 
officially set.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 34.  The majority opinion’s analysis is wrong 
because it shifts the burden from relators to respondents.  There is a real question 
about whether these filings are indeed void. 
{¶ 91} The General Assembly set the date for the primary as May 3, 2022.  
That date was the only date that mattered for purposes of R.C. 3513.05 and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
34 
3513.041.  Indeed, 16 days after this court’s decision in League I, with bipartisan 
support, the General Assembly enacted 2022 Sub.H.B. No 93 (“H.B. 93”), 
modifying the petition requirements for primary candidates and allowing filings to 
be considered valid even if the petitions were circulated or filed before new district 
plans were known.  H.B. 93 also relaxed requirements regarding the district 
number, the candidate’s residence address, the board of elections with which the 
documents are filed, the date of the petition signatures, and where the signers 
resided.  Id. at Section 4.  In relaxing these requirements, the General Assembly 
gave the secretary of state the authority to adjust certain deadlines but expressly 
exempted from that authority “[t]he deadline to file a declaration of candidacy, 
declaration of candidacy and petition, or declaration of intent to be a write-in 
candidate.”  Id. at Section 4(G)(1).  It is obvious that the General Assembly wanted 
the filing dates for candidates to remain the same, even with the uncertainty of the 
district lines.  The majority opinion peers through the looking glass and turns logic 
on its head to conclude that those filing dates did not mean anything, because they 
only applied to the May 3, 2022 primary date.  This conclusion is a head scratcher. 
{¶ 92} The General Assembly still has not changed the date of the primary.  
Had the General Assembly wished to change the filing deadlines and provide 
guidance to Ohioans, would it not have enacted a similar emergency relief bill 
between this court’s decisions in League II, III, IV, and V, or between April 20, 
when the federal court warned the state, Gonidakis, 2022 WL 1175617 at *30, and 
May 27, when the federal court reached its ultimate decision, Gonidakis, 2022 WL 
1709146 at *1?  The General Assembly was well aware that if it did not act on May 
28 to either shorten the time it takes to conduct an election or set a new primary 
date, then the federal court intended to order the new primary to be on August 2, 
Gonidakis, 2022 WL 1175617 at *30.  The General Assembly did not act.  It is not 
proper for the majority opinion to assume that the statutory filing deadlines move 
simply because the federal court set a new primary date, when the General 
January Term, 2022 
35 
 
Assembly—the only body with the authority to move the deadlines—has not done 
so.  It is just as probable that the General Assembly intended to keep the filing 
deadlines the same by enacting a law that forbade the secretary of state from 
changing those deadlines and not enacting another clarifying law in the midst of 
this litigation. 
{¶ 93} So again, we must ask, why are these petitions not void?  The 
General Assembly certainly did not move the filing deadlines, nor did the General 
Assembly give the secretary of state the ability to move those deadlines.  Those 
deadlines were the ones that were in place at the time relators filed their petitions, 
making the petitions untimely.  Original relators filed well before the federal court 
ordered the secretary of state to move the primary.  And the order issued by the 
federal court on May 27 neither created a look-back period nor moved or changed 
the filing deadlines.  So, looking at everything in context, original relators’ filings 
were certainly untimely and could be void.  The majority opinion points to no 
evidence presented by any of relators that would demonstrate an abuse of discretion 
by the secretary of state or the boards of elections or show that the secretary or 
boards acted in clear disregard of applicable law.  At best, this issue of whether the 
petitions are void is unclear.  The majority opinion’s conclusion therefore makes 
no sense; not only does it improperly shift the burden from relators to respondents 
to show why these filings are not void, but it provides no rationale for why the 
filings should be permitted even if the filing-deadline dates moved by operation of 
law, given that the filings were already untimely. 
{¶ 94} Simply put, the relevant statutes and case law and the procedural 
posture of this case illustrate that neither set of relators can prove a clear legal right 
to the requested relief or a clear legal duty on behalf of respondents to provide it.  
Much like a Mad Hatter’s tea party, the majority opinion too turns logic and reason 
on its head by concluding otherwise. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
36 
A Dream This Is Not: the ruling in the majority opinion will disrupt the 
primary election 
{¶ 95} The majority opinion casually dismisses Secretary LaRose’s 
concerns that ruling in favor of relators will disrupt the primary election.  The 
majority opinion alleges that it is mindful of the burden it places on boards and 
voters to prepare a new ballot after the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee 
Voting Act (“UOCAVA”), 52 U.S.C. 20302, deadline has passed but notes that this 
court previously has not hesitated to order a wrongly excluded candidate to be 
added to the ballot notwithstanding the passage of that date, citing State ex rel. 
Stevens v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Elections, 152 Ohio St.3d 584, 2018-Ohio-1151, 99 
N.E.3d 376, ¶ 11.  The majority opinion makes this statement without valid support.  
Stevens merely stands for the principle that any financial burden on a board of 
elections is irrelevant to a laches determination when the relator has acted with 
reasonable diligence—an issue that is not before this court.  It does not stand for 
the proposition that statutory filing deadlines are not important merely because a 
candidate may have a right to be on the ballot.  Instead, to evaluate this issue, we 
must look at the principle set forth in Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 127 S.Ct. 5, 
166 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006) (per curiam), which acknowledges that courts ordinarily 
should not alter state election laws in the period close to an election, Democratic 
Natl. Commt. v. Wisconsin State Legislature, 141 S.Ct. 28, 30, 208 L.Ed.2d 247 
(2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
{¶ 96} “When an election is close at hand, the rules of the road should be 
clear and settled.”  Id. at 31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  To meddle with these 
laws this late in the game can cause unanticipated consequences.  Id.  Indeed, the 
third separate opinion identifies many of the consequences that were identified by 
the secretary of state and places in context the problems with issuing this 
extraordinary writ so close to the election.  This is why these late decisions should 
be left to the General Assembly—the voice of the people—to sort out, not to this 
January Term, 2022 
37 
 
court.  See id. at 31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  There certainly could be a 
circumstance when changing the ballot this late in the game is appropriate, but this 
case is not that one. 
{¶ 97} Here, we have numerous relators asking this court to compel the 
secretary of state and various boards of elections to place relators’ names on ballots 
that have already been printed and sent overseas pursuant to UOCAVA in an 
election cycle that is contested and fraught with litigation.  The primary is less than 
40 days away.  The ballot process was finalized for a month and Ohioans had some 
consistency.  But now, as explained in detail by the third separate opinion, the 
majority opinion’s order will likely cause these boards of elections to begin 
procedures again—costing precious resources, including time and money.  Are we 
really going to turn the clocks back and insert chaos, along with some heavy 
financial burdens, back into the equation, all for a very muddled and unclear legal 
right asserted by original relators? 
{¶ 98} This is exactly the type of case in which the court should exercise 
judicial restraint to prevent further voter and election-administrator confusion.  If 
we are to follow the majority opinion’s logic that the filing deadlines changed by 
operation of law, who knows what can of worms that opens for other individuals 
who filed untimely petitions but filed before this new set of deadlines created by 
the majority opinion.  Additionally, there is a clear financial burden and a 
significant likelihood of confusion that the majority opinion overlooks in reaching 
its decision.  Even if mandamus were appropriate, the Purcell principle weighs 
against issuing a writ, because this case will have far more negative than positive 
outcomes across all of Ohio.  And the consequences of this decision will ensure 
that we never wake up from this nightmare.  This is yet another reason that the writ 
should not issue. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
38 
Return Home: neither original relators nor intervening relators should be 
granted a writ of mandamus 
{¶ 99} Unlike Alice, we cannot wake up from this convoluted dream world 
created by League I, II, III, IV, and V—the majority opinion ensures that.  By 
granting this writ of mandamus without a clear evidentiary basis, or any clear legal 
rights or duties, the majority opinion acts in a manner that is not only 
unconstitutional or extraconstitutional but that is also against the rule of law.  It is 
the antithesis of the rule of law in Ohio for an extraordinary writ of mandamus to 
be issued on anything less than clear evidence and clear lawful rights and duties.  It 
is unfortunate that this court today issues a writ of mandamus to relators who have 
not satisfied that clear standard. 
{¶ 100} The majority opinion could stop the mayhem.  If the majority 
opinion simply followed the rule of law in Ohio regarding writs of mandamus, the 
majority opinion would deny the writ and Ohio could wake up and leave 
Wonderland.  Instead, the majority opinion dreams a bit bigger, falls a bit deeper 
down the rabbit hole, and continues to drag Ohio constitutional, statutory, and case 
law far beneath their foundational strengths of reason and precedent, all to the long-
term detriment of all Ohioans.  The only clear answer to this riddled mess is that 
relators are not entitled to the extraordinary writs they seek.  And for that reason, I 
must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s judgment issuing a writ of 
mandamus to original relators. 
__________________ 
DEWINE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 101} The Ohio legislature is responsible for setting the dates of Ohio 
elections and associated filing deadlines.  Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 27 
and Article V, Section 7; R.C. 3501.40.  By statute, the legislature set this year’s 
primary election for May 3, 2022.  See R.C. 3501.01(E)(1).  It set February 2, 2022, 
January Term, 2022 
39 
 
as the filing deadline for candidates to the General Assembly to appear on the ballot, 
and February 22 for write-in candidates. 
{¶ 102} 2021 was a redistricting year.  See Ohio Constitution, Article XI, 
Section 1(C).  For reasons that are no doubt familiar to the reader, Ohio’s General 
Assembly–district map had not been set in time for the statutory primary-election 
date.  This failure to enact state legislative districts in time for an orderly election 
forced a federal court to intervene and dictate that Ohio hold state legislative 
elections on August 2, 2022.  Gonidakis v. LaRose, S.D.Ohio No. 2:22-cv-0773, 
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95341, *5 (May 27, 2022). 
{¶ 103} Relators, Williams DeMora, Anita Somani, Elizabeth Thien, 
Leronda Jackson, Bridgette Tupes, and Gary Martin, and intervenors, Shafron 
Hawkins and Mehek Cooke, are all prospective candidates who failed to meet the 
February filing deadlines.  They now ask this court to issue an extraordinary writ 
ordering respondent Secretary of State Frank LaRose and their county boards of 
elections to certify them to the August primary ballot. 
{¶ 104} Neither this court nor the secretary of state has the authority to alter 
the filing deadlines established by the legislature.  Under the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2, however, a federal-court order 
moving the filing deadlines would supersede those established by the state 
legislature.  Relators’ only hope of a remedy, therefore, is to establish that the 
federal court’s May 27 order moving the legislative primary election also moved 
the filing deadlines.  Nothing in the federal order, though, explicitly purported to 
move the filing deadlines.  For relators to prevail, then, they must clearly establish 
that the federal order somehow moved the filing deadlines by implication.  Because 
relators have not made this showing, I dissent from the majority’s decision to grant 
them relief. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
40 
I. Background 
A. An election cycle in flux 
{¶ 105} In Ohio, a seven-member “redistricting commission shall be 
responsible for” drawing the legislative districts “of this state for the general 
assembly.”  Ohio Constitution, Article XI, Section 1(A).  Despite the fact that the 
Constitution assigns the primary role in the redistricting process to the commission, 
this court has five times invalidated plans adopted by the commission.  See League 
of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-
Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___ (“League I”); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio 
Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-342, ___ N.E.3d ___ 
(“League II”); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ 
Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-789, ___ N.E.3d ___ (“League III”); League of Women 
Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1235, 
___ N.E.3d ___ (“League IV”); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio 
Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1727, ___ N.E.3d ___ 
(“League V”). 
{¶ 106} This protracted back-and-forth has thrown a wrench in the orderly 
administration of this year’s election cycle.  The machinery of an election starts 
with a long series of statutory deadlines well in advance of “Election Day.”  See 
League IV for an in-depth account of the “myriad laws that govern elections in Ohio 
and the constraints that they impose on the timing of elections,” id. at ¶ 152-153 
(DeWine, J., dissenting).  Central to this lawsuit are the laws establishing deadlines 
for individuals to declare their candidacy for offices in the General Assembly and 
state central committees.  To appear on the primary ballot, candidates must file their 
declarations and petitions 90 days “before the day of the primary election,” R.C. 
3513.05, and write-in candidates must file 72 days before the day of the primary 
election, R.C. 3513.041. 
January Term, 2022 
41 
 
{¶ 107} No general or primary election for state legislative office and state 
central committee can occur without a district map.  After the redistricting 
commission adopted its third plan (“Map 3”), Secretary LaRose directed election 
officials to begin implementing the plan while a legal challenge was pending in this 
court.  See Secretary of State Directive No. 2022-28, at 1.  On March 16, this court 
struck down Map 3, see League III at ¶ 2, making it evident that no plan would be 
finalized in time for the May 3 primary.  Thus, Secretary LaRose directed the 
boards of elections to proceed with the May 3 primary without the races for the 
Ohio House, Senate, and state central committees.  Secretary of State Directive No. 
2022-31, at 1. 
B. The legislature adopts emergency legislation to allow candidates to 
participate in the primary despite the uncertainty as to district lines, provided 
the candidates meet the February filing deadlines 
{¶ 108} In late January, following this court’s invalidation of the 
commission’s first redistricting plan, the General Assembly passed bipartisan 
emergency legislation—2022 Sub.H.B. No. 93 (“H.B. 93”)—under the authority 
granted to it by Article II, Section 1d of the Ohio Constitution.  This legislation 
enabled individuals who had filed prior to the February deadlines to be a candidate 
in the primary election, even though the districts had not yet been determined.  H.B. 
93, Section 4.  The emergency law instructed prospective candidates to file 
declarations of candidacy and petitions by the statutory deadlines and allowed for 
subsequent adjustments necessitated by new district boundaries.  In particular, the 
emergency law relaxed the statutory requirements that declarations of candidacy 
and petitions contain the correct district number, id. at Section 4(B), and the filer’s 
current address, id. at Section 4(C), and that the filer live in the district the filer 
seeks to represent, id. at Section 4(D).  The emergency law allowed candidates to 
adjust their declarations of candidacy, but only if they had filed by the statutory 
deadline.  The legislation was explicit that the secretary of state lacked the authority 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
42 
to adjust the filing deadlines.  Id. at Section 4(G)(1) (“the Secretary of State may 
adjust any deadlines pertaining to the administration of the May 3, 2022, primary 
election” except for (among other things) “[t]he deadline to file a declaration of 
candidacy, declaration of candidacy and petition, or declaration of intent to be a 
write-in candidate”). 
C. The federal court issues an order that moves only the date for the primary 
election of state legislative candidates 
{¶ 109} On May 27, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio “order[ed] Secretary of State Frank LaRose to push back Ohio’s 
state primaries to August 2, 2022, and to implement Map 3 for this year’s elections 
only.”  (Emphasis in original.)  Gonidakis, S.D.Ohio No. 2:22-cv-0773, 2022 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 95341, at *5.  This exceptional relief was necessary “as a last resort,” 
the federal court explained, “to protect the right to vote.”  Gonidakis v. LaRose, ___ 
F.Supp. ___, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72172, *4 (S.D.Ohio 2022).  The United States 
Constitution, in other words, compelled federal intervention. 
{¶ 110} The federal court explained its choice of remedy in terms of timing 
and map selection.  Both were selected to maximize the opportunity for Ohio 
political actors to fashion their own solution.  As for the date, the court noted that 
under Ohio’s statutory scheme, August 2 “is the last practicable date on which to 
conduct a primary election without disrupting the general election scheduled for 
November 8.”  Id. at ___, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72172 at *6.  The panel concluded 
that using the August 2 election date was “the least disruptive, costly, and confusing 
way for a federal court to preserve Ohioans’ right to vote in primary races required 
by state law.”  Id. at ___, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72172 at *9. 
{¶ 111} As to the remedy, the federal court concluded that the least 
disruptive plan was Map 3.  The court explained that “80 of 88 counties in the State 
had implemented Map 3 when the Ohio Supreme Court rejected that map.”  Id. at 
___, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72172 at *26.  Because the county boards of elections 
January Term, 2022 
43 
 
had already begun implementing Map 3, that plan gave election officials more than 
a five-week head start over any other plan.  Id. at ___, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72172 
at *10-11.  In contrast, had the court chosen any other map, April 20 would have 
been the latest practicable day to begin implementation.  Id. at ___, 2022 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 72172 at *69 (Map 3 “provides Ohio more than a month of additional time 
to fashion its own solution”).  The court chose Map 3 and August 2 to prioritize 
“provid[ing] Ohio with the most time * * * while minimizing disruptions and costs 
in administering the required primary election.”  Id. at ___, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
72172 at *76-77. 
D. Relators file an original action 
{¶ 112} Relators DeMora, Somani, Tupes, and Martin each filed 
declarations of candidacy and petitions on May 4—90 days before August 2.  
(Relators Thien and Jackson filed to be write-in candidates later in May.)  On May 
28—one day after the federal court formally ordered an August 2 primary to be 
conducted using Map 3—Secretary LaRose issued a directive instructing the county 
boards of elections to reject any declaration of candidacy filed after the original 
February filing deadlines.  Secretary of State Directive No. 2022-34, at 2.  “The 
federal court order did not alter the partisan candidate filing deadlines for the 
primary election,” explained the secretary.  Id. 
{¶ 113} Relators filed a complaint in mandamus three days later, asking this 
court to order Secretary LaRose and the county boards of elections to certify their 
names to the August 2 primary ballot.  Their theory is straightforward: by filing 
their declarations and petitions on May 4 (exactly 90 days before August 2) or their 
write-in-candidate declarations by May 23, relators had complied with their 
respective deadlines to run as candidates and write-in candidates in the primary. 
II. Analysis 
{¶ 114} The relief that relators seek, and that the majority awards—an order 
that the “chief election officer of the state,” R.C. 3501.04, add new names to the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
44 
ballot—is “extraordinary.”  See State ex rel. Dreamer v. Mason, 115 Ohio St.3d 
190, 2007-Ohio-4789, 874 N.E.2d 510, ¶ 11.  Relators must establish a clear legal 
right to their requested relief, a corresponding clear legal duty by respondents to 
provide that relief, and the lack of a remedy in the ordinary course of law.  Id. 
{¶ 115} It is doubly extraordinary to grant relators’ requested relief so close 
to the election day—39 days as of this writing.  Courts are generally loath to 
intervene in matters of election administration, as intervention risks “unanticipated 
second, third, and fourth order effects that might undermine the fundamental 
integrity of Ohio’s electoral process.”  Giroux v. LaRose, S.D.Ohio No. 1:22-cv-
309, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106519, *32 (June 14, 2022).  Recent experience 
confirms that “moving deadlines rarely ends with one court order.”  Thompson v. 
DeWine, 959 F.3d 804, 813 (6th Cir.2020) (per curiam).  “Even seemingly 
innocuous late-in-the-day judicial alterations to state election laws can interfere 
with administration of an election and cause unanticipated consequences.”  
Democratic Natl. Commt. v. Wisconsin State Legislature, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 141 
S.Ct. 28, 31, 208 L.Ed.2d 247 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  Judicial 
intervention on the eve of an election invites voter confusion, which stymies voter 
participation—the closer to the election, the greater that risk.  Purcell v. Gonzalez, 
549 U.S. 1, 4-5, 127 S.Ct. 5, 166 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006) (per curiam).  It is beyond 
judicial competence to account for these unintended political consequences. 
{¶ 116} Thus, the form (mandamus) and substance (late-breaking election 
intervention) both counsel caution before this court supplants the secretary of 
state’s judgment with its own. 
{¶ 117} Against this backdrop, I cannot conclude that relators are entitled 
to relief.  My starting point is Ohio’s statutory framework for the election.  The 
General Assembly set this year’s primary election for May 3.  See R.C. 
3501.01(E)(1).  The deadline to file declarations of candidacy and petitions, 
February 2 of this year, derives from the primary date—“person[s] desiring to 
January Term, 2022 
45 
 
become a candidate for a party nomination at a primary election * * * shall, not 
later than four p.m. of the ninetieth day before the day of the primary election, file 
a declaration of candidacy and petition.”  R.C. 3513.05; see also R.C. 3513.041 
(72-day deadline for write-in candidates). 
{¶ 118} Relators did not purport to comply with these statutory deadlines.  
See Amended Complaint, ¶ 64, 77, 94, 107, 123, 136.  The General Assembly did 
not adjust the filing deadlines, despite enacting emergency legislation addressing 
other primary deadlines.  See H.B. 93.  If anything, the emergency legislation 
supplied prospective candidates notice to file in time for the February deadlines.  
Id. at Section 4.  Relators failed to take advantage of the expanded opportunity to 
run for office that was offered by the emergency law.  And Secretary LaRose did 
not, for he could not, move the filing deadline.  Id. at Section 4(G)(1).  Filing 
deadlines were among the few dates that the General Assembly expressly 
prohibited the secretary of state from adjusting “to accommodate the shorter 
timeframe.”  Id. 
{¶ 119} Relators can be entitled to relief only if the federal court’s order 
clearly altered the declaration-of-candidacy filing deadline.  The federal court did 
not expressly adjust the deadline to file a declaration of candidacy.  The court was 
careful to limit the relief it ordered to setting the primary date and the applicable 
General Assembly–district plan.  See Gonidakis, S.D.Ohio No. 2:22-cv-0773, 2022 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95341, at *5. 
{¶ 120} Relators’ position, which the majority adopts, is that the federal 
court changed the filing deadline by implication.  I find that conclusion untenable.  
The federal court’s reasoning conclusively refutes the notion.  Respectful of 
“principles of federalism and comity,” the federal court adopted a remedy designed 
around “ ‘adherence to state policy’ ” where it “ ‘does not detract from’ ” securing 
Ohioans’ right to vote.  Gonidikas, ___ F.Supp. ___, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72172 
at *54, *61-62, quoting White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 37 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
46 
L.Ed.2d 335 (1973).  To that end, the federal court’s order, by its terms, “disturb[ed] 
state election deadlines and procedures as little as possible.”  Id. at ___, 2022 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 72172 at *63-64 (“we must leave the state electoral process intact as 
much as we can”).  The same motivation—“disrupting Ohio election laws, 
deadlines, and procedures as little as possible”—accompanied the federal court’s 
selection of Map 3.  Id. at ___, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72172 at *65. 
{¶ 121} Its own reasoning, then, gainsays any suggestion that the federal 
court implicitly altered any provision of Ohio law.  The court did not mince words 
when it said it intended its remedy to minimize disruption. 
{¶ 122} Aside from the federal court’s own representations, principles of 
federalism counsel that the secretary of state, the chief election officer of Ohio, 
pursue a narrow, rather than expansive, implementation of the court order.  See 
Wisconsin State Legislature, ___ U.S. at ___, 141 S.Ct. at 31, 208 L.Ed.2d 247 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“If a court alters election laws near an election, 
election administrators must first understand the court’s injunction”).  The Framers 
of the United States Constitution entrusted state actors to administer elections.  See 
U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section IV, Clause 1.  The federal court intervened 
because the United States Constitution guarantees the right to vote.  Setting August 
2 as the primary-election date and Map 3 as the district plan, the federal court 
explained, were necessary interventions to vindicate that federal right.  But ask 
yourself if a new filing deadline for candidates is necessary to secure citizens’ right 
to vote.  It’s not. 
{¶ 123} The General Assembly, not the federal court, was the appropriate 
body to provide the relators’ requested relief.  “It is one thing for state legislatures 
to alter their own election rules in the late innings and to bear the responsibility for 
any unintended consequences.  It is quite another thing for a federal district court 
to swoop in and alter carefully considered and democratically enacted state election 
rules when an election is imminent.”  Wisconsin State Legislature at ___, 141 S.Ct. 
January Term, 2022 
47 
 
at 31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  Only “the requirements of the Federal 
Constitution,” White, 412 U.S. at 795, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 37 L.Ed.2d 335, which the 
candidate-filing deadlines do not implicate, justified federal-court intervention.  
The federal court’s order did not—either expressly or implicitly—move the 
deadlines to file declarations of candidacy and petitions. 
{¶ 124} Relators’ counterargument is more simplistic.  By moving the 
primary election, they say, the federal court automatically moved the filing deadline 
by operation of law.  Their sole source of support is that R.C. 3513.05 tethers the 
deadline to “the day of the primary election.”  Relators assert that by moving the 
primary election, the federal court moved the entire election apparatus centered 
around the primary election.  Their position ignores that “the day of the primary 
election” is statutorily prescribed: “Primary elections shall be held on the first 
Tuesday after the first Monday in May * * *,” R.C. 3501.01(E)(1).  The first 
Tuesday after May 1 is “the day” to which R.C. 3513.05(E)(1) refers. 
{¶ 125} Relators did not prove that they are clearly entitled to have their 
names certified to the August 2 primary-election ballot when they filed their 
respective declarations of candidacy months after the statutory deadlines.  Nor did 
Ohio’s election officials—the secretary of state or respondent boards of elections—
have a clear legal duty to fashion that relief.  Although I believe the majority badly 
errs by issuing a writ of mandamus for relators, it correctly denies relief to the 
intervenors making a similar claim.  But one has to wonder about the arbitrariness 
of allowing one group of candidates who missed the statutory deadlines to 
participate in the August 2 primary election but not the other. 
{¶ 126} Time will tell what damage today’s extraordinary order will inflict 
on this year’s already-handicapped election cycle.  The majority blithely announces 
that “our ruling need not disrupt the election.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 41.  But it cites 
not a shred of evidence to support this assertion.  Indeed, the one official with 
expertise in administering elections—Ohio’s Secretary of State— has submitted 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
48 
testimony to the contrary.  The deputy assistant secretary of state and state elections 
director, Amanda Grandjean, cautioned in a sworn statement that the relief the 
majority orders 
 
creates significant, and potentially disastrous, risks to the election 
administration process and for the local boards of elections that are 
making their best efforts to administer an additional, unplanned, 
statewide primary election in 2022 in an accurate and secure 
manner, under intense scrutiny, on a compressed and expedited 
timeline. 
 
Grandjean Aff., ¶ 40 (June 8, 2022); see also Giroux, S.D.Ohio No. 1:22-cv-309, 
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106519, at *40.  Undeterred by these warnings, the majority 
proclaims that “relators’ right to have their declarations and petitions reviewed 
outweighs the burden this may place on the boards.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 46.  But 
the burden on election officials is not the issue here; the real concern is the 
disruption the majority’s order will have on the administration of an orderly 
election.  This is not a matter that this court has the institutional competence to 
determine; rather, it is a political calculation that our laws entrust to the General 
Assembly. 
{¶ 127} The majority is indifferent to the toll its order will take.  
“[E]lections require enormous advance preparations by state and local officials, and 
[they] pose significant logistical challenges.”  Merrill v. Milligan, ___ U.S. ___, 
___, 142 S.Ct. 879, 880, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  In 
Ohio, Director Grandjean reports, once the ballot is finalized, “boards must 
complete extensive proofing and testing processes to ensure the integrity of the 
election.”  Grandjean Aff. at ¶ 35 (June 8, 2002).  This onerous process requires 
county boards of elections to proof voter-registration systems, program election-
January Term, 2022 
49 
 
management systems, create ballots, preliminarily test the ballots before printing 
them, double-check voter-registration rolls, and program candidate information 
into the election-night reporting system consistent with R.C. 3505.27(C) and 
3505.33.  Boards of elections have already certified candidates based on the 
February 2 deadline.  See Secretary of State Directive No. 2022-25, at 3.  The 
court’s order will cause affected boards to start many of these procedures from 
scratch—a “significant, and potentially disastrous” setback.  Grandjean Aff. at ¶ 40 
(June 8, 2022). 
{¶ 128} Understand, too, that declaration-of-candidacy deadlines do not 
operate in a vacuum.  Those provisions are part of a network of interconnected 
statutory time controls.  Through the 80th day before the primary, for example, 
petition papers containing signatures associated with a declaration of candidacy 
must “be open to public inspection.”  R.C. 3513.05.  And 78 days before the 
primary, boards of elections must certify the signatures on candidates’ petitions.  
Id.  Through the 74th day before the primary, qualified electors may formally 
protest a candidacy, triggering a hearing before the boards of elections.  Id.  The 
list goes on: 70 days before the primary, the boards must “certify to each board in 
the state the forms of the official ballots to be used at the primary election, together 
with the names of the candidates to be printed on the ballots.”  Id.  Today’s order 
uproots not one discrete law but a litany of downstream deadlines that follow the 
declaration-of-candidacy filing.  See Grandjean Aff. at ¶ 35 (June 8, 2022).  These 
requirements are compulsory, not permissive.  See R.C. 3501.40 (“no public official 
shall cause an election to be conducted other than in the time, place, and manner 
prescribed by the Revised Code”).  Given this reality, I find the majority’s 
unsubstantiated assurance that its ruling will not disrupt the election disconcerting. 
{¶ 129} At minimum, the majority’s order directly contravenes R.C. 
3509.01(B)(1), which prescribes ballot preparation for overseas and absent 
uniformed-services voters to take place 46 days before the election.  Secretary 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
50 
LaRose, the majority holds, has a clear legal duty to violate the rights of this 
segment of the population. 
{¶ 130} The majority attempts to distract from Secretary LaRose’s real-
world concerns for this impending election—concerns the majority never 
addresses—by contesting the applicability of the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 127 S.Ct. 5, 166 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006).  
Majority opinion at ¶ 42.  Purcell, though, simply stands for the common-sense 
principle that judges—novices in election administration—should not meddle in 
elections at the last minute, id. at 5-6, because when they do, they are likely to do 
more harm than good.  The important thing for our purposes is not whether Purcell 
formally binds this court, but whether its rationale informs the present situation.  
Undoubtedly, it does. 
{¶ 131} The majority’s proffered reasons to ignore the unremarkable 
teaching of the Purcell principle are almost laughable.  First, it says, Purcell 
precludes injunctive relief, not mandamus relief.  But of course, it never bothers to 
tell us why that distinction matters.  And never mind that in the election context the 
two remedies function alike.  Both are “extraordinary remed[ies]” that “direct[] the 
conduct of a party,” with a court’s “full coercive powers.”  Nken v. Holder, 556 
U.S. 418, 428, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed. 2d 550 (2009) (injunction); see also State 
ex rel. Ferrara v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections, 166 Ohio St.3d 64, 2021-Ohio-
3156, 182 N.E.3d 1142, ¶ 7 (mandamus); R.C. 2731.01 (defining mandamus).  The 
factors courts consider for both remedies align, compare Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 
U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008), with majority opinion at ¶ 43, 
and both contain a “discretion[ary]” component “based upon all the facts and 
circumstances in the individual case,” State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 
Ohio St.2d 141, 143, 228 N.E.2d 631 (1967), paragraph 7 of the syllabus; accord 
Merrill v. Milligan, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 142 S.Ct. 879, 883, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2022), 
January Term, 2022 
51 
 
fn. 1 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (courts “sometimes give[] less attention to the merits 
in cases involving eleventh-hour election changes”). 
{¶ 132} Second, the majority flippantly asserts that its interjection into 
election affairs preserves, rather than erodes, the status quo.  But that’s simply 
untrue.  Adding new candidates to the ballot at the last minute obviously changes 
the status quo.  Before today, primary ballots were finalized, proofed, and in the 
case of overseas servicepersons, actually mailed out.  See Secretary of State 
Directive No. 2022-34.  Today’s order disrupts that progress, forcing election 
officials to try to figure out how to unwind and redo what they have already 
accomplished.  For the majority to claim that its order altering the chief election 
officer’s implementation of the election laws “restore[s] the status quo” is 
nonsensical.  Majority opinion at ¶ 44. 
{¶ 133} In effectively moving the filing deadline for a chosen group of 
prospective candidates, the majority does something that it has no authority to do.  
Neither a federal court order nor a General Assembly enactment sustains the 
extraordinary relief granted by the majority today.  The majority, once again, 
simply exercises raw political power.  See League IV, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-
Ohio-1235, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 130 (DeWine, J., dissenting). 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 134} I respectfully dissent from the part of the court’s order that grants 
relators extraordinary relief.  This court has already disrupted the election process 
by stepping outside of its judicial role and ignoring the limits that the Ohio 
Constitution places on its authority.  In doing so, it foisted a costly and confusing 
special election on the voters.  Today, the court compounds the problems it has 
created by arbitrarily granting relief to a select group of prospective candidates who 
failed to comply with the deadlines established by the General Assembly.  What a 
mess. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
52 
__________________ 
McTigue, Colombo, & Clinger, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, and Derek S. 
Clinger, for the original relators. 
Frankovitch, Anetakis, Simon, DeCapio, & Pearl, L.L.P., and Michael G. 
Simon, M. Eric Frankovitch, and Carl A. Frankovitch, for the intervening relators. 
Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, L.L.P., Larry J. Obhof Jr., Douglas G. 
Haynam, and Alia A. Kadri, for respondent Secretary of State Frank LaRose. 
William C. Hayes, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, and Carolyn J. 
Carnes and Mark W. Altier, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent Licking 
County Board of Elections. 
G. Gary Tyack, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, Amy L. Hiers, and 
Andrea C. Hofer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondent Franklin County 
Board of Elections. 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ward 
C. Barrentine and Nathaniel S. Peterson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
respondent Montgomery County Board of Elections. 
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mark 
R. Musson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent Cuyahoga County 
Board of Elections. 
________________________