Case Title: Schall v. Mondragon

Citation: 393 P.2d 457, 74 N.M. 348

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1964-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
393 P.2d 457 (1964) 74 N.M. 348 Thomas D. SCHALL, Administrator of the Estate of Phoebe B. Braswell, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joe A. MONDRAGON and Severiano Mondragon, d/b/a Coors Sand and Gravel, Defendants-Appellants. No. 7008. Supreme Court of New Mexico. May 18, 1964. Rehearing Denied July 20, 1964. *458 Modrall, Seymour, Sperling, Roehl & Harris, Frank H. Allen, Jr., Albuquerque, for appellants. Avelino V. Gutierrez, R.J. Matteucci, Albuquerque, for appellee. GARNETT R. BURKS, District Judge. This is an appeal from a judgment awarding Thomas D. Schall, administrator of the estate of Phoebe B. Braswell, deceased, the sum of $15,000, together with court costs. Plaintiff-appellee, Thomas D. Schall, administrator of the estate of Phoebe B. Braswell, deceased, filed a complaint on June 22, 1960, against Joe A. Mondragon, Severiano Mondragon and Raymond Maestas, d/b/a Coors Sand and Gravel. The complaint alleged that the deceased, Phoebe B. Braswell, was a passenger in a car being driven by Dora Edna Wilson in a southerly direction on Coors Boulevard in Bernalillo County; that at the same time near the intersection of Coors Boulevard and Arenal Road, the defendant Joe A. Mondragon, as servant and agent of the *459 two remaining defendants and acting in the course of his employment, was driving a dump truck easterly on Arenal Road in a negligent fashion so as to collide with the car being driven by Dora Edna Wilson. Answer was filed on June 29, 1960, by Raymond Maestas, together with a motion for summary judgment, denying any master-servant or agency relationship. The motion for summary judgment was granted, leaving the two remaining defendants, Joe A. Mondragon and his uncle Severiano Mondragon, who answered admitting the occurrence of the accident in question, but denying all other allegations. Alternative and affirmative defenses alleged by the defendants were contributory negligence of the passenger; negligence of the driver Dora Edna Wilson; assumption of risk by passenger Braswell; and the driver's contributory negligence imputable to deceased and her administrator. Prior to the time that the complaint was filed in the instant case, a complaint was filed by T.B. Wilson, as administrator of the estate of Dora Edna Wilson, against Joe A. Mondragon and Serve Mondragon, alleging negligence of defendant Joe A. Mondragon, agent, servant and employee of Serve Mondragon. Answer was filed, denying generally all allegations of this complaint, and affirmatively alleging the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and under the doctrine of last clear chance. Phoebe B. Braswell and Dora Edna Wilson died of injuries sustained in the collision. By order of September 8, 1960, the two cases were consolidated and tried together. The trial court filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding that Joe A. Mondragon, while acting as the servant of Severiano Mondragon, was negligent in running a stop sign at the intersection of Coors Boulevard and Arenal Road and in crossing the intersection at between five and fifteen miles per hour; that Dora Edna Wilson operated the car while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, failed to keep a proper lookout and drove at an excessive rate of speed, thus making her contributorily negligent and barring her administrator from recovery. Judgment was entered in favor of defendants Mondragon and against T.B. Wilson, administrator of the estate of Dora Edna Wilson, and in favor of Thomas D. Schall, administrator of the estate of Phoebe B. Braswell, against defendants Mondragon in the amount of $15,000. It is from this portion of the judgment that appeal is taken and is based upon the following findings of fact: and the resultant conclusions of law: Appellants rely on the following points for reversal: Appellants' first point begins with the definition of "joint venture" or "joint enterprise," as stated in Silva v. Waldie, 42 N.M. 514, 82 P.2d 282: Appellants contend that, from the above statement, two elements are necessary to create a joint enterprise: (1) The element of common purpose; and (2) the element of joint authority and right to control. They then argue that the first element, the element of common purpose, is shown to be present by the finding of fact No. XV: For the showing of the second necessary element, appellants cite from Knudson v. Boren (10 CCA 1958), 261 F.2d 15: Appellants argue that Phoebe Braswell was proved the owner of the car, making the above presumption controlling and thus barring her recovery. It is stated in 7 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, § 4335, pp. 198-200: New Mexico follows the former view, and in Clovis Finance Company v. Sides, 72 N.M. 17, 380 P.2d 173, we held that: Since New Mexico does not require an exclusive or mandatory method of transferring title to an automobile, it therefore follows that title and ownership pass when the parties intend it to pass. Everly v. Creech, 139 Cal. App. 2d 651, 294 P.2d 109; Transportation Equipment Co. v. Dabdoub, (La. App. 1954), 69 So. 2d 640. Evidence of the intent of the parties is shown by the admission of the certificate of title to the 1951 Buick automobile involved in the collision, in the name of one Mrs. Olson, and by the testimony of Victor Still, Phoebe Braswell's landlord and vendor of the car. Mr. Still testified that he purchased the car from Phoebe Braswell's former husband for $75, paying $50 down and owing $25. The car was then sold to Phoebe Braswell for the same price and terms. Mr. Still then testified: Mr. Still then testified that he had performed extensive repairs upon the automobile in question, even to the extent of adjusting the brakes. He testified that these repairs took about two weeks and, prior to that time, the deceased had not driven the car for several weeks because of injuries she had suffered when her former husband shot her. When asked: The evidence being substantial that the intent of the parties was not to transfer ownership, title and dominion, until full payment had been made by the deceased, Phoebe B. Braswell, we cannot say that the trial court was in error in finding that the legal ownership of the Buick automobile was in Victor Still at the time of the accident in question. Appellants' point I is without merit. Appellants' second point is that the trial court erred in finding that Phoebe B. Braswell was presumed to have used due care for her own safety. This point is based upon appellants' contention that they had introduced substantial evidence that Phoebe Braswell was not exercising due care for her own safety at the time of her death. Appellants, by attacking this conclusion, adroitly hope to discredit another conclusion of law and thus bring a reversal, to-wit: "XIII. That Phoebe B. Braswell was not contributorily negligent." But, if the finding of no contributory negligence is supported by substantial evidence, with every inference given in favor of the findings, State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Tanney, 68 N.M. 117, 359 P.2d 350, then, even if the finding of due care complained of by appellants was incorrect, it would be harmless error and the judgment below should be affirmed. Since we have held that the negligence of Dora Edna Wilson is not imputed to Phoebe B. Braswell upon a "joint enterprise" theory, and there is no evidence to support any other theory of imputed negligence, it follows that Phoebe B. Braswell must be found negligent for her own action if any. The court found, in its conclusions of law, regarding the negligent actions of Dora Edna Wilson: Phoebe B. Braswell's duty of care as a passenger is that duty of care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the circumstances. Silva v. Waldie, supra; 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, § 2391, p. 518; 61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 489. This same standard applies as to the duty of maintaining a lookout. Ford v. Etheridge, 71 N.M. 204, 377 P.2d 386; 4 Blashfield supra, § 2411, p. 543. The finding of fact that Dora Edna Wilson operated the car while under the influence of alcohol does not alone make Phoebe B. Braswell contributorily negligent as a matter of law. In Petrone v. Margolis, 20 N.J. Super. 180, 89 A.2d 476, the plaintiff's intestate was an invited passenger in the car of the defendant. There was testimony that both the intestate and the defendant had been drinking prior to the fatal accident. A jury trial was held and the jury specifically found that the plaintiff's intestate was contributorily negligent. An application for a new trial was made and denied. Appeal was taken on the question of whether there was evidence that the defendant was in such a state of intoxication that a person of ordinary caution, circumspection and foresight would conclude that the defendant was unfit to operate the vehicle with reasonable care and safety to a *463 passenger. In affirming the decision, the appellate court stated the rule to be: The finding of fact that Dora Edna Wilson drove at an excessive rate of speed does not alone make Phoebe B. Braswell contributively negligent as a matter of law. In 4 Blashfield supra, § 2414, pp. 571-572, the rule is stated: After reviewing the record, we cannot say that the evidence shows, as a matter of law, that Phoebe B. Braswell was contributorily negligent. Nor can we say that the court's findings of fact on the lack of contributory negligence of Phoebe B. Braswell are not supported by substantial evidence. There being no error, the judgment is affirmed. It is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and CHAVEZ, J., concur.