Case Title: Goody v. Goody

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-83

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Goody v. Goody1997 WY 79939 P.2d 731Case Number: 96-83Decided: 06/17/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

BARBARA 
B. GOODY,

 Appellant(Plaintiff), 

 

v. 

 

WILLIAM KEITH GOODY, 

 Appellee(Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court, Fremont County

The 
Honorable Kenneth E. Stebner, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Katherine L. Mead of Mead & Mead, 
Jackson.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

W. Keith Goody, pro se.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

LEHMAN, Justice.

 [¶1]      Appellee, W. 
Keith Goody (Father), petitioned to reduce his child support obligations 
assessed in his divorce. The district court found that Father's existing 
financial condition represented a change of circumstance and, premised on that 
change, reduced Father's child support obligations. Appellant, Barbara Goody 
(Mother), timely appeals.

 

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand.

 

[¶3]      From the five 
issues identified by Mother, we need state only two in resolution of this 
appeal:

1.         
Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it found that a change 
of circumstances had occurred warranting a reduction of [Father's] child support 
based on [Father's] self-created financial [condition].

2.         
Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the parties 
to pay their own attorneys fees.

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      From a Judgment, 
Order and Decree of Divorce entered on December 10, 1993, Father was ordered to 
pay $1,200 per month for the support of his two children. This amount was above 
the presumptive child support amount provided for in W.S. 20-6-304, however, the 
court found the deviation warranted because of the high cost of living in Teton 
County compared with other Wyoming counties. In addition, to equalize the 
property distribution, Father was ordered to pay as a property settlement the 
sum of $746.66 per month to Mother for a period of 60 months. Father did not 
appeal and made payments in accordance with the decree throughout 1994. In 
January 1995, Father made a $746.66 payment toward the property settlement, but 
no child support payment. On January 18, 1995, he presented a motion to the 
district court to reduce child support and to eliminate related payments, as 
well as to change custody.

 

[¶5]      At the time of 
the divorce, Father was left with $247,150 in assets (which included $89,250 in 
cash) and $34,100 of debt. At the time of the modification hearing, October 6, 
1995, Father represented his assets to be $482,000, with a corresponding debt of 
$443,000. The debt accumulated by Father primarily reflects mortgages on a lot 
he purchased in anticipation of building a home and the home he subsequently 
purchased instead of building, quarterly income tax payments accrued but not 
paid in 1994 and 1995, and an amount owed to his pension plan (which represents 
a loan from the pension plan to his current spouse).

 

[¶6]      Father's income 
also changed from the time of the divorce. Father's adjusted gross income in 
1993, the year of the divorce, was $49,253. In 1994, his adjusted gross income 
was $149,143 and his personal expenditures for 1994 totaled $152,379. In 
addition to the court ordered payments, those expenditures included $57,600 
towards the lot, architectural expenses, and the purchase of a home, $23,000 for 
a new truck, and $5,000 for a membership to the Teton Pines Country Club. 
Father's projected gross income for 1995 was $95,000.

 

[¶7]      Pursuant to the 
modification hearing, the trial court issued a decision letter. The court agreed 
with a calculation of presumptive support based on Father's income from January 
through August 1995, and Mother's imputed income for a 40-hour work week for the 
same period of time, relying on the custody arrangement provided for in the 
divorce decree. Father's share of the presumptive support amount equaled 
$1,187.36 per month, approximately $13.00 less than the support amount 
originally ordered. Therefore, the provision in W.S. 20-6-306(a) (1994) which 
creates a rebuttable presumption that an adjustment of child support orders is 
warranted when a party can establish that the presumptive child support will 
change by twenty percent or more per month did not apply. Nevertheless, the 
court found that a substantial change of circumstances, namely Father's 
precarious financial condition, justified a modification of the child support 
order. Accordingly, the court reduced Father's monthly child support obligation 
to $900 per month.1

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      Modification of 
the provisions of a divorce decree is appropriate only in limited circumstances. 
Smith v. Smith, 895 P.2d 37, 41 (Wyo. 
1995). The party seeking modification of a child support order must establish 
that there has been a material and substantial change in circumstances 
subsequent to the decree which outweighs the interests of society in applying 
the doctrine of res judicata. Id., Pinther v. Pinther, 888 P.2d 1250, 1253 
(Wyo. 1995), Nuspl v. Nuspl, 717 P.2d 341, 345 (Wyo. 1986); see also W.S. 
20-6-306(a). The district court's decision to modify a divorce decree is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rocha 
v. Rocha, 925 P.2d 231, 233 (Wyo. 1996) (citing Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo. 1994)). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court's decision 
exceeds the bounds of reason or constitutes an error of law. Id. (citing Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 (Wyo. 1993)).

 

[¶9]      Father contends 
that material and substantial changes in circumstances subsequent to the divorce 
decree warrant a reduction in his child support obligations. He asserts he is no 
longer able to pay $2,000 per month (which includes both child support and the 
property settlement payment), and contends he never was able to make those 
payments without placing himself and his law firm in financial jeopardy. Father 
also states that the nature of his law practice changed significantly in 1993 
and 1994 as a result of increased competition in the Jackson area and an 
increase in the percentage of time Father spends on public defender work as 
compared to his private practice. The remainder of Father's argument is focused 
on the fact that Mother does not work and that Father has paid for virtually all 
of the children's outside activities and medical expenses.

 

[¶10]   With respect to Father's argument 
that he has never been able to pay the ordered support amount, we can only say 
that any objection on that basis was lost by Father's failure to appeal from the 
original decree. "A modification hearing is not a time to reconsider the 
evidence and premises upon which the original judgment was entered but only to 
consider whether there has been such change of circumstances as to warrant a 
different decree." Lewis v. Lewis, 
716 P.2d 347, 351 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting 
Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1252 (Wyo. 1976)). "A modification cannot 
be granted just because the original decree resulted in what petitioner sees as 
a bad result." Lewis, at 351. Father 
also makes much of the fact that Mother is unemployed and that he pays all the 
medical and recreational expenses for the children. However, the record fails to 
support any contention that these facts represent a change in circumstances 
which has occurred since the original decree was entered; therefore, they do not 
justify a modification. 

 

[¶11]   Father's income increased from 
approximately $50,000 at the time of the divorce to approximately $150,000 in 
1994. At the time of the hearing, he projected his gross income for 1995 would 
be $95,000, still a significant increase over his 1993 income. While the 
evidence presented illustrates the fluctuating nature of Father's income, the 
testimony also reflects that 1993 was an unusually lean year. Despite any change 
in the nature of Father's practice, there has been no adverse impact to his 
income. On the contrary, his income has increased since the original 
decree.

 

[¶12]   On the other hand, Father's debt 
has increased significantly since 1993. However, this court has stated that 
debts acquired subsequent to the divorce decree do not necessarily constitute a 
change in circumstances sufficient to alter a support order. See Johnson v. Johnson, 717 P.2d 335, 
340 (Wyo. 1986). In Johnson, the 
father purchased a house for over $200,000 with a large mortgage and acquired an 
airplane for tax loss write-off purposes. We held that Wyoming law does not 
accommodate purchases of that nature as meeting the requirement of a material 
change of circumstance. See id.

 

[¶13]   Here, in an attempt to avoid 
capital gains on the sale of the marital home pursuant to the divorce, Father 
purchased a building lot for $88,000, for which he put down $30,000 in cash. He 
spent $10,000 in architectural fees, at which point he determined it was not 
feasible to build. He and his fiancée then purchased a home for $315,000, with a 
$200,000 mortgage. The down payment for that home consisted in part of a $52,000 
loan from Father's pension plan to his wife-to-be, which upon their marriage 
became taxable (which would appear to negate the savings in capital gains tax 
that drove the purchase of the home). Father also borrowed over $50,000 from his 
parents and, in return, they received the equity in the building lot (although 
Father and his wife continue to make the loan payments), a second mortgage on 
the house, and a security interest in a new truck which Father purchased in 1994 
for $23,000 in cash. In addition to the maze of mortgages and loans acquired by 
Father subsequent to the divorce, Father is over $40,000 in arrears on his 
income tax payments for 1994 and early 1995, which he attributes to the fact 
that he made the scheduled payments pursuant to the divorce decree, even though 
he could not afford them. Given the fact that Father paid out over $60,000 in 
cash on the building lot, in architect's fees, and on a new pickup truck, we can 
only attribute his failure to pay income taxes to the relatively low priority 
which he apparently placed on that obligation.

 

[¶14]   We have no doubt that Father has 
encountered financial difficulties. However, the debt accumulated by Father 
subsequent to the divorce, including the tax arrearage, is largely a result of 
voluntary choices he has made over the past two years. Father assumed these 
debts fully aware of his pre-existing, court-ordered obligation to pay child 
support and a property settlement. The non-custodial parent's desired standard 
of living cannot determine his ability to pay. See Nuspl, 717 P.2d  at 346; Edwards v. Edwards, 82 Nev. 392, 419 P.2d 637, 638 (1966) (relief denied due to father's evident lack of desire to 
cut his own family expenses). We hold steadfast in the position that the type of 
changes in a person's financial picture that have been presented by Father are 
not a proper basis on which a person can seek modification of a divorce 
decree.

 

[¶15]   The district court's order provided 
that each party was to be responsible for their own attorney fees. In view of 
the changed result, we remand to the district court for the purpose of 
determining whether attorney fees should be awarded to 
Mother.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶16]   We hold that appellee failed to 
meet his burden of proving a material or substantial change of circumstances 
which warranted the finality of the divorce decree provisions to be disturbed. 
In the absence of a material or substantial change of circumstances, the 
district court abused its discretion when it modified the divorce decree as 
requested by Father. Therefore, we reverse that portion of the district court's 
order which reduced Father's child support obligation and remand to the district 
court for reconsideration of attorney fees. In all other respects the district 
court's order stands as imposed.

 

Footnotes

1 In addition, the trial court reduced to 
judgment that portion of the property settlement and child support outstanding 
at January 1, 1996. Neither party appealed that ruling. The parties stipulated 
before the hearing that Father would withdraw his motion with regard to child 
custody and visitation.