Case Title: Wohl v. Swinney

Citation: 2008-Ohio-2334

Docket Number: 20070593

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Wohl v. Swinney, 118 Ohio St.3d 277, 2008-Ohio-2334.] 
 
WOHL ET AL; SLATTERY, APPELLEE, v. SWINNEY ET AL.; MOTORISTS MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT; AMERICAN STATES  
INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Wohl v. Swinney, 118 Ohio St.3d 277, 2008-Ohio-2334.] 
Motor vehicle insurance—Uninsured-motorist coverage—Definition of “insured” 
construed—Persons insured under other insurance policies excluded. 
(No. 2007-0593 — Submitted February 27, 2008 — Decided May 20, 2008.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Butler County, 
CA2006-05-123, 2007-Ohio-592. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This certified conflict from the Twelfth District Court of Appeals 
asks us to decide whether an insurance policy definition is ambiguous and thus 
properly construed against the insurer. The term “insured” is defined as including 
“[a]ny other person occupying your covered auto who is not a named insured or 
insured family member for uninsured motorists coverage under another policy.” 
We hold that this definition of “insured” is not ambiguous. 
Case History 
{¶ 2} This case arises out of a claim for uninsured/underinsured motorist 
(“UM”) coverage for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident.  
Appellee James Slattery and Linda Wohl were struck by a vehicle driven by Tyler 
Swinney.  When the accident occurred, Slattery was driving Wohl’s car, in which 
she was a passenger. 
{¶ 3} All parties involved were insured. Swinney was insured by 
Progressive Insurance Company, with a policy limit of $500,000 in liability 
coverage. Wohl had insurance with appellant Motorists Mutual Insurance 
Company (“Motorists”), with UM limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per 
accident.  Slattery had automobile insurance through appellee American States 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
Insurance Company, with UM limits of $12,500 per person and $25,000 per 
accident. 
{¶ 4} Progressive, the tortfeasor’s insurer, offered its policy limit of 
$500,000 to settle Wohl’s and Slattery’s claims. Wohl and Slattery agreed to 
allocate Progressive’s payment so that Wohl received $499,999 and Slattery 
received $1.  Because he received only $1 of the settlement, Slattery also 
instituted a claim against Motorists, the company insuring Wohl’s vehicle, for 
UM coverage.  Motorists denied Slattery’s claim, arguing that he was not 
considered “an insured” for UM coverage under Wohl’s Motorists policy. 
{¶ 5} Motorists, American States, and Slattery filed motions for 
summary judgment. The trial court granted American States’ and Slattery’s 
motions, ruling that R.C. 3937.18 as amended by 2001 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 97, 
effective October 31, 2001, required Motorists to cover Slattery as an insured for 
UM coverage under Wohl’s policy. Motorists appealed, and the Twelfth District 
Court of Appeals affirmed.  The court of appeals did not rely on the trial court’s 
reasoning, but instead held that for the purposes of UM coverage, the definition of 
“insured” in Motorists policy was ambiguous and should be strictly construed 
against the insurer. 
{¶ 6} The Twelfth District granted Motorists’ motion to certify a conflict 
with the Eighth District Court of Appeals’ decision in Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois v. 
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 8th Dist. No. 86124, 2006-Ohio-2063. The question 
certified is “Whether the definition of ‘insured’ as ‘any other person occupying 
your covered auto who is not a named insured or insured family member for 
uninsured motorist’s coverage under another policy’ is ambiguous and should be 
construed against the insurer to provide coverage for a permissive operator of a 
covered vehicle who is not a named insured or insured family member.”  We 
recognized the conflict but declined to accept jurisdiction over Motorists’ separate 
appeal of the trial court’s interpretation of R.C. 3937.18. 
January Term, 2008 
3 
Analysis 
{¶ 7} At issue in this case is the UM endorsement included as part of 
Motorists’ insurance policy, which, like the one in Safeco, defines “insured” for 
the purposes of UM coverage to mean: 
{¶ 8} “1. You or any family member. 
{¶ 9} “2. Any other person occupying your covered auto who is not a 
named insured or an insured family member for uninsured motorists coverage 
under another policy.” 
{¶ 10} The Twelfth District held that this definition was ambiguous, being 
reasonably subject to two different interpretations.  The court stated that it was 
unclear what the phrase “for uninsured motorists coverage under another policy” 
referred to.  Relying in part on the dissent in Safeco, the court of appeals 
determined that this phrase could modify “an insured family member” or “a 
named insured.” The court of appeals held: “ ‘It is quite clear that the qualifying 
prepositional phrase at the end of the policy sentence above modifies what 
immediately precedes it. It is not clear, however, that the qualifying tail reaches 
over and modifies what is on the other side of the “or.”‘ ” Wohl v. Swinney, 12th 
District No. CA2006-05-123, 2007-Ohio-592, at ¶ 20, quoting Safeco at ¶ 31 
(Karpinski, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 11} Unlike the dissent upon which the Twelfth District relied, the 
majority in Safeco did not discover any ambiguity in the definition of insured in 
Motorists’ UM endorsement. The Safeco majority had held that the interpretation 
advanced by the dissent was “not a reasonable construction of the contract and 
appears contrary to the intention of the parties.”  2006-Ohio-2063, at ¶ 19.  The 
Eighth District therefore rejected any suggestion that the definition of “insured” 
was ambiguous and held that phrase “for uninsured motorists coverage under 
another policy” applied both to “an insured family member” and “a named 
insured.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
{¶ 12} Slattery and American States, appellees, urge us to adopt the 
reasoning of the Twelfth District and the dissent in Safeco and hold that the 
definition of insured found in Motorists’ UM endorsement is ambiguous.  Their 
argument rests in part on the “last-antecedent rule.”  This rule of construction 
states, “ ‘[R]eferential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary 
intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent * * *.’ ” Indep. Ins. Agents of 
Ohio v. Fabe (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 310, 314, 587 N.E.2d 814, quoting Carter v. 
Youngstown (1946), 146 Ohio St. 203, 209, 32 O.O. 184, 65 N.E.2d 63.  
Appellees contend that the phrase “for uninsured motorists coverage under 
another policy” must be interpreted to modify only “an insured family member” 
and not any other portion of the definition of an insured. 
{¶ 13} However, in relying on the last-antecedent rule, appellees overlook 
the fact that the rule applies only when no contrary intention otherwise appears.  
Thus, if there is contrary evidence that demonstrates that a qualifying phrase was 
intended to apply to more than the term immediately preceding it, we will not 
apply the last-antecedent rule so as to contravene that intent.  Before applying the 
last-antecedent rule, we must therefore examine the contract as a whole to 
determine whether any contrary intent appears. See Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis 
(2003), 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 11 (“When 
confronted with an issue of contractual interpretation, the role of a court is to give 
effect to the intent of the parties to the agreement. We examine the insurance 
contract as a whole and presume that the intent of the parties is reflected in the 
language used in the policy.” [Citations omitted]). 
{¶ 14} When the Motorists policy in this case is viewed as a whole, it 
becomes clear that the intention of the parties was to narrowly define “insured” 
for UM coverage.  The term “insured” is defined three separate times in the 
Motorist policy: it is defined in the contested UM section; it is also defined in the 
policy’s liability and medical payment sections.  In both the liability and medical 
January Term, 2008 
5 
payment sections, the term “insured” is given a broad meaning.  In the liability 
section, “insured” is defined to include the following: 
{¶ 15} “1. You or any family member * * *. 
{¶ 16} “2. Any person using your covered auto.” 
{¶ 17} The definition in the medical payment section is similar and states 
that “insured” means: 
{¶ 18} “1. You or any family member 
{¶ 19} “* * * 
{¶ 20} “2. Any other person while occupying your covered auto.” 
{¶ 21} These two broad definitions stand in contrast to the more limited 
definition of “insured” found in the UM section.  The UM section is the only one 
that further restricts the category of persons occupying or using a covered auto.  
Interpreting the UM definition as appellees would have us do renders the 
language difference virtually meaningless. If the phrase “for uninsured motorists 
coverage under another policy” does not apply to “a named insured,” then the 
definition would not substantially differ from the definitions in the policy sections 
covering liability and medical payments, which define “insured” as including any 
other person either using or occupying a covered auto. Such an interpretation 
would also render superfluous the words “who is not a named insured,” since the 
term “other” already indicates that this portion of the definition applies to 
someone else rather than the named insured or a family member. 
{¶ 22} When interpreting a contract, we will presume that words are used 
for a specific purpose and will avoid interpretations that render portions 
meaningless or unnecessary. See State v. Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416, 2006-Ohio-
4853, 854 N.E.2d 150, ¶ 50, quoting Farmers’ Natl. Bank v. Delaware Ins. Co. 
(1911), 83 Ohio St. 309, 94 N.E. 834, paragraph six of the syllabus.  Appellees’ 
interpretation would render meaningless portions of the contract and require an 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
internally inconsistent interpretation. We decline to hold that the language is 
ambiguous. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 23} When the insurance policy at issue here is viewed as a whole, it 
becomes clear that the definition of insured in the UM portion of the policy is 
intended to narrowly define who is considered an insured under that section.  
Because we find the definition of insured under the UM endorsement to be clear 
and unambiguous, we need not rely on the last-antecedent rule to aid in our 
interpretation. To rely on the rule would only confuse the issue by creating 
ambiguity where none exists. 
{¶ 24} We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and hold 
that the phrase “for uninsured motorists coverage under another policy” is 
unambiguous and applies to “a named insured” as well as “an insured family 
member.”  As someone else who was occupying the covered auto but who was a 
named insured for uninsured motorist coverage under another policy (his own), 
Slattery was not an insured for UM coverage under Wohl’s Motorists policy. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 25} The majority opinion ignores the boldface terms in the policy 
language at issue.  Those boldface words have specific definitions within the 
policy.  The policy’s definition of “family member” turns the majority’s 
interpretation of the policy on its head. 
{¶ 26} The policy language at issue includes as an “insured” for 
underinsured motorist coverage: 
January Term, 2008 
7 
{¶ 27} “1. You or any family member. 
{¶ 28} “2. Any other person occupying your covered auto who is not a 
named insured or an insured family member for uninsured motorists coverage 
under another policy.” 
{¶ 29} “Family member,” as a boldface term, has a specific definition for 
use within the policy.  That definition reads: 
{¶ 30} “ ‘Family member’ means a person related to you by blood, 
marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household.  This includes a ward 
or foster child who is a resident of your household.” 
{¶ 31} Pursuant to the majority’s interpretation of the policy, Slattery 
would be insured under Wohl’s policy as long as another UM policy did not 
include him as a named insured or as an insured family member.  But that 
interpretation does not hold up under the definitional portion of the policy. 
{¶ 32} By definition, a “family member” is a member of Wohl’s family.  
Thus, only Wohl’s family members who are insured for UM coverage under 
another policy are excluded from UM coverage under Wohl’s Motorists policy. 
{¶ 33} So, the provision effectively defines “insured” as including: 
{¶ 34} “Any other person occupying your covered auto who is not a 
named insured or an insured member of the Wohl family for uninsured motorists 
coverage under another policy.” 
{¶ 35} Given the specificity of the definition of “family member,” the 
last-antecedent rule becomes even more powerful in this case.  The last-
antecedent rule states that “ ‘referential and qualifying words and phrases, where 
no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent * * *.’ ” Indep. 
Ins. Agents of Ohio v. Fabe (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 310, 314, 587 N.E.2d 814, 
quoting Carter v. Youngstown (1946), 146 Ohio St. 203, 209, 32 O.O. 184, 65 
N.E.2d 63.  A corollary to that rule is that “the presence of a comma before the 
qualifying phrase is evidence the qualifier is intended to apply to all antecedents 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
instead of only the immediately preceding one.” In re Sehome Park Care Ctr., 
Inc. (1995), 127 Wash.2d 774, 781-782, 903 P.2d 443. 
{¶ 36} The qualifying phrase at issue here is “for uninsured motorists 
coverage under another policy.”   The majority would have it modify not just 
“family member,” the last antecedent, but also “named insured.”  First, there is no 
comma before the phrase “for uninsured motorists coverage under another policy” 
to indicate that it applies to both “named insured” and “family member.”  Second, 
the majority assumes that “named insured” and “family member” are of the same 
generalizing character.  They are not.  “Family member” is a personalized, 
definitive set of people, members of the Wohl family, already recognized in other 
parts of the policy; “named insured,” under the majority’s interpretation, covers a 
limitless number of unknown potential occupants of the vehicle.  This is not an 
instance of like things being covered by the same qualifying phrase.  The 
majority’s interpretation of “named insured” and the policy’s definition of “family 
member” are of dissimilar character.  Thus, the sentence, in context, yields no 
reason not to apply the last-antecedent rule.  There is no grammatical or logical 
reason to believe that “for uninsured motorists coverage under another policy” 
modifies both “named insured” and “family member.” 
{¶ 37} We can also look to the rest of the policy for context.  Elsewhere in 
the policy, the term “family member” operates as a limiter of coverage.  For UM 
coverage, for instance, “uninsured motor vehicle” does not include any vehicle 
owned or operated by a family member.  Thus, an insured cannot recover under 
UM coverage if the accident involves an uninsured automobile driven by a family 
member.  Motorists sees the familial relationship as a reason to draw distinctions. 
{¶ 38} Also, the majority’s interpretation leaves the holder of the policy 
without knowledge of who actually is covered by UM coverage when riding in 
the policy holder’s vehicle.  The extent of a passenger’s UM coverage under the 
January Term, 2008 
9 
passenger’s own policy is unknown to Motorists’ insured.  However, a Motorists 
insured is aware of any other coverage a member of his own family might have. 
{¶ 39} Finally, the rest of the policy establishes that passengers are 
insured for liability coverage and for medical payment.  The policy clearly 
indicates a breadth of coverage beyond the vehicle’s owner, and the UM coverage 
does not clearly veer from that breadth of coverage. 
{¶ 40} The only interpretation of the policy language, given our rules of 
construction and the policy’s own definitional rules, is that paragraph 2 of the 
definition of “insured” excludes from “any other person occupying your covered 
auto” (1) the named insured, Wohl, and (2) Wohl family members who are 
insured under other UM policies.  Slattery fits under neither exclusion. 
{¶ 41} Since Wohl and her family members are already included under 
the first paragraph defining an insured for purposes of UM coverage as “[y]ou or 
any family member,” the limiting language of the second paragraph is without 
practical effect.  But there is no other way to interpret the policy without ignoring 
the contract term “family member.” 
{¶ 42} Our language has rules, and our courts have rules to interpret 
language.  Motorists urges us to forget those rules and to remember their own first 
rule of insurance contract interpretation: coverage denied.  The majority accepts 
that rule and applies it here. 
__________________ 
James J. Slattery Jr., pro se; and John H. Burlew, for appellee James J. 
Slattery. 
 
Freund, Freeze & Arnold, and T. Andrew Vollmar, for appellant, 
Motorists Mutual Insurance Company. 
Jenks, Pyper & Oxley Co., L.P.A., P. Christian Nordstrom, and Scott G. 
Oxley, for appellee American States Insurance Company. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
Gallagher, Gams, Pryor, Tallan & Littrell, L.L.P., and James R. Gallagher, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company. 
______________________