Case Title: Commonwealth v. Buckley

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12344

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12344 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROGELIO R. BUCKLEY. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     October 5, 2017. - February 14, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, 
Reasonable suspicion, Investigatory stop.  Search and 
Seizure, Threshold police inquiry, Reasonable suspicion, 
Consent, Motor vehicle.  Threshold Police Inquiry.  
Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 19, 2013. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by 
Cornelius J. Moriarty, II, J., and the cases were tried before 
Richard J. Chin, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Matthew Malm for the defendant. 
 
Mary E. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Ivan Espinoza-Madrigal, of New York, Oren M. Sellstrom, & 
Oren N. Nimni for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and 
Economic Justice & others. 
2 
 
 
Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & 
Derege B. Demissie for Committee for Public Counsel Services & 
another. 
 
Jeff Goldman, Vanessa M. Brown, Matthew R. Segal, Rahsaan 
D. Hall, Jessie J. Rossman, & Carlton E. Williams for American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts. 
 
Daniel F. Conley, District Attorney, & John P. Zanini, 
Cailin M. Campbell, & David D. McGowan, Assistant District 
Attorneys, for District Attorney for the Suffolk District. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  In this appeal we are asked to reconsider one 
tenet of our search and seizure jurisprudence:  that a traffic 
stop constitutes a "reasonable" "seizure" for purposes of art. 
14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights where a police 
officer has observed a traffic violation, notwithstanding the 
officer's underlying motive for conducting the stop.  See 
Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205 (1995).  For the sound 
legal and practical reasons discussed below, we decline to 
depart from that tenet as the general standard governing the 
validity of traffic stops under art. 14.  We affirm the denial 
of the defendant's motion to suppress, and we also affirm the 
judgment of conviction. 
 
Facts. We recount the facts found by the motion judge, 
supplemented by uncontroverted testimony at the motion hearing.  
Commonwealth v. Cordero, 477 Mass. 237, 238 (2017). 
On January 25, 2013, Whitman police Detectives Joseph Bombardier 
and Eric Campbell were conducting surveillance of a three-unit 
apartment building out of which they suspected drug activity was 
3 
 
being conducted.1  At approximately 10:50 P.M. that evening, the 
detectives observed a vehicle park nearby, and its two occupants 
enter the building.  Those same two individuals reemerged a few 
minutes later, returned to the vehicle, and drove away without 
the vehicle's headlights on.  Bombardier instructed fellow 
Officer Gary Nelson to stop the vehicle for suspected drug 
activity.   Nelson did so a few minutes later, upon observing 
the vehicle traveling above the speed limit along a road in 
Whitman.2  Nelson radioed Bombardier that he had stopped the 
vehicle. 
 
When the detectives arrived, Nelson was standing at the 
vehicle's driver's side.  Bombardier likewise approached the 
driver, and in doing so he noticed a strong odor of marijuana 
emanating from inside the vehicle.  Bombardier asked the driver 
if she had any marijuana in the vehicle.3  She told him that she 
                     
 
1 Detective Joseph Bombardier had received complaints from 
one of the apartment's residents concerning heavy foot traffic 
going in and out of the building at all hours.  Bombardier 
determined that another of the building's residents had 
previously been charged with drug-related offenses.  He 
therefore decided to conduct surveillance of the building, and 
suspected, based on his training and experience, that drug 
activity was being conducted out of the building. 
 
 
2 Officer Gary Nelson testified that he measured the vehicle 
traveling forty-two miles per hour in a thirty mile per hour 
zone.  There is no testimony indicating that the vehicle's 
lights were still off at the time of the traffic stop. 
 
 
3 This stop occurred after the decriminalization of 
marijuana possession under State law and this court's opinion in 
4 
 
did not think so, and said that he could check.  After 
instructing the driver to step out, Bombardier used his 
flashlight to search the interior of the driver's seat area.  
Finding nothing, he directed Campbell to ask the front seat 
passenger, the defendant, to leave the vehicle.  When the 
defendant stepped out, Campbell observed what he believed to be 
a firearm under the front passenger seat.4  The officers arrested 
the defendant and the driver, placed them in separate cruisers, 
and advised them of the Miranda rights.  Another officer later 
observed a plastic bag on the floor of the cruiser between the 
defendant's feet that appeared to contain "crack" cocaine.  The 
defendant was subsequently indicted for possession with the 
intent to distribute cocaine, as well as with firearm offenses 
and other offenses with enhanced penalties. 
 
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the 
evidence seized during the traffic stop.  The motion judge held 
an evidentiary hearing, and thereafter, he denied the 
defendant's motion.  In April, 2015, a jury convicted the 
defendant on the lesser included offense of cocaine possession, 
                                                                  
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459 (2011), which held that, in 
light of the changed status of marijuana, "the odor of burnt 
marijuana alone no longer constitutes a specific fact suggesting 
criminality."  Commonwealth v. Overmyer, 469 Mass. 16, 20 
(2014), citing Cruz, supra at 469-472. 
 
 
4 The defendant does not challenge the officer's testimony 
that he saw a firearm. 
5 
 
and he was sentenced to one year in jail.  The defendant timely 
filed this appeal from the judgment of conviction, and on 
appeal, he challenges only the denial of his pretrial motion to 
suppress. 
 
Discussion.5  The defendant challenges the denial of his 
motion to suppress on three grounds.  First, he argues that the 
evidence against him should be suppressed as the product of a 
pretextual stop, where the Whitman officers stopped the vehicle 
the defendant occupied not because it was speeding, but because 
the police suspected that its occupants were involved in drug 
activity.  The defendant contends that all such pretextual 
stops, which generally are legitimated on the basis of an 
observed civil traffic violation yet motivated by a desire to 
investigate suspected criminal wrongdoing as to which the police 
lack reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify an 
                     
 
5 We acknowledge the briefs submitted by the following amici 
curiae:  Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Economic 
Justice, Urban League of Eastern Massachusetts, Charles Hamilton 
Institute for Race and Justice, Massachusetts Law Reform 
Institute, Union of Minority Neighborhoods, Boston Police Camera 
Action Team, GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, MassEquality, 
The Network/La Red, Interact:  Advocates for Intersex Youth, 
Theater Offensive, Greater Boston PFLAG, Centro Presente, 
Brazilian Worker Center, Justice at Work, Justice Resource 
Institute, Jewish Alliance for Law and Social Action, 
Massachusetts Associate of Hispanic Attorneys, and Massachusetts 
Black Lawyers Association; Committee for Public Counsel Services 
and Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; 
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc.; and the 
District Attorney for the Suffolk District. 
 
6 
 
investigatory stop, violate art. 14 and its protection against 
unreasonable seizures.6  On this point, the defendant asks that 
we overturn our decision in Santana, 420 Mass. 205, which holds 
that an observed traffic violation is itself a lawful basis for 
the police to conduct a traffic stop regardless of the officer's 
underlying motive. 
 
Second, the defendant argues that the police impermissibly 
expanded the scope of the stop when detectives Bombardier and 
Campbell approached the vehicle during Nelson's traffic inquiry 
and asked the driver about the smell of marijuana.  Last, the 
defendant challenges the motion judge's finding that the 
driver's consent to the search of the vehicle was freely and 
voluntarily given. 
 
We review these arguments in turn.  In doing so, "we adopt 
the motion judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear 
error, but we independently determine the correctness of the 
judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts as 
found."  Commonwealth v. Catanzaro, 441 Mass. 46, 50 (2004). 
 
1.  Pretext.  The parties dispute, as a threshold matter, 
whether the defendant adequately raised this issue before the 
motion judge.  We conclude that he did.  The first section of 
                     
 
6 The Commonwealth conceded that the Whitman police did not 
have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying an 
investigatory stop.  We do not address whether this was a 
necessary concession and focus exclusively on the asserted legal 
basis for the stop, an observed traffic violation. 
7 
 
the defendant's memorandum of law in support of his motion to 
suppress asserted that "[t]he car stop was effectuated so that 
the occupants could be identified and the car searched."  The 
motion judge's written opinion likewise acknowledged "[t]he 
defendant['s] argu[ment] that the stop for the traffic offense 
was a pretext."  The fact that the defendant did not 
specifically state that he challenged the continued viability of 
Santana does not preclude our review of this issue, given both 
its treatment below and the fact that the motion judge was bound 
to apply Santana regardless of the defendant's position.  See 
generally Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 456 Mass. 350, 357-358 
(2010).7 
 
Article 14, like the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, guarantees "a right to be secure from all 
unreasonable searches[] and seizures."8  Because "[a] police stop 
of a moving automobile constitutes a seizure," Commonwealth v. 
                     
7 This is not to say that challenges to established law need 
not be raised during trial court proceedings in order for them 
to be entertained on appeal.  Such arguments still must be 
raised below.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnes, 399 Mass. 385, 
393-394 (1987) (appellate court not obliged to consider grounds 
argued on appeal but not raised in motion to suppress). 
 
 
8 Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution are 
distinct sources of this right to be free from arbitrary 
government action, and in some circumstances, "art. 14 provides 
more substantive protection to criminal defendants than does the 
Fourth Amendment in the determination of probable cause."  
Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 373 (1985). 
8 
 
Rodriguez, 472 Mass. 767, 773 (2015), that stop must be 
reasonable in order to be valid under the Fourth Amendment and 
art. 14.  A passenger in a vehicle may challenge the 
constitutionality of a stop.  See Commonwealth v. Quintos Q., 
457 Mass. 107, 110 (2010), citing Brendlin v. California, 551 
U.S. 249, 251 (2007). 
 
In Santana, 420 Mass. at 209, we articulated the current 
State constitutional standard for evaluating the validity of a 
traffic stop.  Under that rule, called the authorization 
approach, a traffic stop is reasonable for art. 14 purposes "so 
long as the police are doing no more than they are legally 
permitted and objectively authorized to do," regardless of the 
underlying intent or motivations of the officers involved.  
Santana, supra, quoting United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 
1041 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Cummins v. United 
States, 502 U.S. 962 (1991).9  Stated differently, under the 
authorization test, a stop is reasonable under art. 14 as long 
as there is a legal justification for it.  We have long held 
that an observed traffic violation is one such justification.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bacon, 381 Mass. 642, 644 (1980) 
("Where the police have observed a traffic violation, they are 
                     
 
9 One year after Santana, the United States Supreme Court 
decided Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-813 (1996), in 
which the Court adopted an identical test for evaluating the 
reasonableness of a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. 
9 
 
warranted in stopping a vehicle"); Commonwealth v. Amado, 474 
Mass. 147, 151 (2016) (valid stop where "unlit registration 
plate"); Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 445 Mass. 72, 75 (2005), 
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1187 (2006) (valid stop where inoperable 
headlight in daylight); Santana, 420 Mass. at 207 (valid stop 
where defective taillight).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Lora, 451 Mass. 
425, 436 (2008), quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 
810 (1996) ("the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable 
for Fourth Amendment purposes 'where the police have probable 
cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred'").  As 
Santana makes clear, the authority to conduct a traffic stop 
where a traffic violation has occurred is not limited by "[t]he 
fact that the [police] may have believed that the [driver was] 
engaging in illegal drug activity."  420 Mass. at 208. 
 
In the defendant's view, however, evaluating the 
reasonableness of a traffic stop on the basis of legal 
justification alone is not enough, because this creates the risk 
that the police might use an observed traffic violation as a 
pretext for investigating other suspected wrongdoing.10  In place 
                     
 
10 The defendant's general position against pretextual 
traffic stops mirrors that of the petitioners in Whren, 517 U.S. 
at 810, which the Supreme Court succinctly summarized:  "[The 
petitioners] argue . . . that 'in the unique context of civil 
traffic regulations' probable cause [to believe that a traffic 
violation has occurred] is not enough.  Since, they contend, the 
use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that 
total compliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly 
10 
 
of the authorization test, the defendant seeks a new art. 14 
standard for traffic stops that looks beyond objective legal 
justification in order to examine the police's underlying 
motives for conducting the stop.  Specifically, the defendant 
asks that when considering a motion to suppress a judge should 
examine whether a given traffic stop was only a pretext for the 
police's underlying "true" motive to investigate suspected 
criminal conduct, as to which the police lacked the requisite 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify a bona fide 
investigatory stop.  As the primary basis for this position, the 
defendant relies on a series of cases and academic articles 
discussing the connections between traffic stops and racial 
profiling.  He also argues that because Massachusetts courts 
have considered the issue of pretext when evaluating the 
reasonableness of inventory or administrative searches, so too 
should they consider pretext when analyzing the validity of 
traffic stops.  Before addressing these specific points, we 
examine the underpinnings of Santana's authorization test. 
 
Santana is predicated on the general constitutional 
principle, reflected in both art. 14 and Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, that "police conduct is to be judged 'under a 
                                                                  
impossible, a police officer will almost invariably be able to 
catch any given motorist in a technical violation.  This creates 
the temptation to use traffic stops as a means of investigating 
other law violations, as to which no probable cause or even 
articulable suspicion exist." 
11 
 
standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the 
underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved.'"  
Santana, 420 Mass. at 208, quoting Commonwealth v. Ceria, 13 
Mass. App. Ct. 230, 235 (1982).11  See Lora, 451 Mass. at 436, 
quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 ("Subjective intentions play no 
role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment analysis"); 
Ceria, supra, and cases cited.  Evaluating the validity of 
police conduct on the basis of objective facts and 
circumstances, without consideration of the subjective 
motivations underlying that conduct, is justified in part based 
on the significant evidentiary difficulties such an inquiry into 
police motives would often entail.  This would require that 
courts discern not only whether the police initially possessed 
some underlying motive that failed to align with the legal 
                     
 
11 We have applied this same standard of objective 
reasonableness when assessing, for instance, the validity of a 
Terry-type investigatory stop, Commonwealth v. Smigliano, 427 
Mass. 490, 493 (1998) ("Because the facts and circumstances 
known to the officer are sufficient to create a reasonable 
suspicion . . . in a reasonable police officer, a Terry stop is 
justified regardless of the officer's subjective state of 
mind"); the reasonableness of a search conducted pursuant to the 
emergency aid exception, Commonwealth v. Tuschall, 476 Mass. 
581, 584-585 (2017) (officers must possess "an objectively 
reasonable basis" for conclusion that intervention is necessary 
to save someone who is injured or in imminent danger); and the 
appropriate scope of a consent-based search, Commonwealth v. 
Gaynor, 443 Mass. 245, 255 (2005), quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 
500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (scope determined based on "objective 
reasonableness -- what would the typical reasonable person have 
understood by the exchange between the officer and the 
suspect?"). 
12 
 
justification for their actions, but also whether the police 
were acting on that "improper" motive (i.e., the pretext), as 
opposed to the "proper" motive, when engaging in the challenged 
action.  Both judges and legal commentators have questioned the 
ability of courts -- venues of limited insight -- to reach 
accurate and satisfactory answers to these questions, which may 
be more appropriately handled by psychologists or philosophers 
than lawyers.  See, e.g., United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 
845, n.12 (1st Cir. 1980) (one "problem" with this subjective 
approach is "the premium it would place on dissemblance," and 
that "it may be little more than guesswork for a court to 
determine what the true motivation was"); 1 W.R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 1.4(e) (5th ed. 2012) (there is "no reason to 
believe that courts can with any degree of success determine in 
which instances the police had an ulterior motive," and 
"[p]resence of an ulterior motive may show why an officer might 
want to depart from the usual procedure but does not show that 
he has done so"). 
 
The authorization test avoids this often-speculative 
probing of the police's "true" motives, while at the same time 
providing an administrable rule to be applied by both law 
enforcement in the field as well as reviewing courts.  Like its 
Federal counterpart, art. 14 must often "be applied on the spur 
(and in the heat) of the moment, and the object in implementing 
13 
 
its command of reasonableness is to draw standards sufficiently 
clear and simple to be applied with a fair prospect of surviving 
judicial second-guessing months and years after an arrest or 
search is made."  Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 
(2001).  The bright-line standard of legal justification 
achieves this by clarifying exactly when the police may conduct 
a traffic stop:  where an officer has observed a traffic 
violation.  "If this were not so, [a traffic stop's] validity 
could not be settled until long after the event; it would depend 
not only on the psychology of the arresting officer but on the 
psychology of the judge."  United States v. McCambridge, 551 
F.2d 865, 870 (1st Cir. 1977).12 
 
Moreover, this rule also ensures that the same 
constitutional protections under art. 14 are afforded to all 
Massachusetts drivers where the same factual circumstances are 
present.  As we observed in Santana, "the defendants' contention 
might yield the illogical result of allowing stops of nonsuspect 
drivers who violate motor vehicle laws, but forbidding stops of 
suspected criminals who violate motor vehicle laws."  Santana, 
                     
 
12 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
also noted that a rule of reasonableness that hinges on the 
purity of law enforcement intentions may be all too easily 
manipulated:  "As law enforcement personnel learn that a 
particular motivation is improper because it will render an 
otherwise valid search invalid, they may not have difficulty 
convincing themselves that their conduct was prompted not by the 
improper reason but the proper one."  United States v. Arra, 630 
F.2d 836, 845 n.12 (1st Cir. 1980). 
14 
 
420 Mass. at 210 n.3.  Application of the exclusionary rule in 
these circumstances, as the defendant requests, would be 
contrary to that rule's purpose, which is to "deter intentional 
unconstitutional behavior."  Lora, 451 Mass. at 439.  Its effect 
here would be to deter the police from carrying out one of their 
primary objectives:  investigating, within permissible legal 
boundaries, suspected criminal behavior. 
 
Beyond these legal and practical justifications, Santana's 
authorization test is grounded in sound policy.  We have noted 
that "allowing police to make [traffic] stops serves [the] 
significant government interest" of ensuring public safety on 
our roadways.  Rodriguez, 472 Mass. at 776.  As Rodriguez more 
fully explains: 
"[M]any of our traffic violation statutes regulate moving 
cars and relate directly to the promotion of public safety; 
even those laws that have to do with maintaining a 
vehicle's equipment in accordance with certain standards 
may also be safety-related. . . .  Permitting stops based 
on reasonable suspicion or probable cause that these laws 
may have been violated gives police the ability to 
immediately address potential safety hazards on the road.  
Thus, although a vehicle stop does represent a significant 
intrusion into an individual's privacy, the government 
interest in allowing such stops for the purpose of 
promoting compliance with our automobile laws is clear and 
compelling" (citation omitted). 
 
Id. at 776-777.  Therefore, the fact that a traffic law has been 
violated is, generally speaking, a legally sufficient basis to 
justify stopping a vehicle, irrespective of any additional 
suspicions held by the officer(s) conducting the stop.  See, 
15 
 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 465 (2011) ("officers 
validly 'stopped' the car for parking in front of a fire 
hydrant, a civil traffic violation . . . .  Thus, the officers' 
presence at the side of the car was appropriate" [citations 
omitted]); Santana, 420 Mass. at 210 ("By driving an automobile 
with a broken taillight, the defendants took the risk of being 
stopped").  In that sense a traffic stop cannot be "arbitrary," 
because it is predicated on a driver violating a traffic law.13 
 
Still, the defendant urges that we overturn Santana on the 
ground that the authorization test countenances pretextual stops 
-- and more specifically, stops motivated by the race of the 
driver (i.e., racial profiling).  In the defendant's view, this 
court's previous attempt to address the problem of racial bias 
in traffic stops, Lora, 451 Mass. at 444-447, has failed to 
provide a meaningful remedy.  Lora held that where a driver 
produces "sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable inference," 
id. at 442, that the stop at issue "is the product of the 
selective enforcement predicated on race," evidence seized in 
the course of that stop must be suppressed under the 
exclusionary rule.  Id. at 440.  The surest way to effectively 
remedy that issue now, the defendant contends, is simply to do 
away with Santana's authorization test, and instead hold that 
                     
 
13 We have also recognized that "[a]n arrest or prosecution 
based on probable cause is ordinarily cloaked with a presumption 
of regularity."  Lora, 451 Mass. at 437. 
16 
 
all pretextual stops, regardless of the particular motive 
(whether it be the race of a driver, or, as here, a desire to 
investigate suspected criminal wrongdoing) violate art. 14.  
There are at least two deficiencies in this argument. 
 
First, to the extent the defendant appeals to our 
consideration of the motivations underlying a traffic stop in 
the racial profiling context as a basis for doing so in this and 
similar cases, he ignores any distinction between art. 14 and 
the equal protection principles of arts. 1 and 10 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  In Lora we observed that 
racial profiling "is at base a claim that [the police] 
selectively enforced the laws in contravention of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and arts. 1 and 10."  Lora, 451 Mass. at 436.  We 
permitted inquiry into officers' subjective motives in that case 
because Lora, unlike Santana or Whren, "involved a challenge to 
[a] traffic stop[] based on equal protection grounds."  Lora, 
supra.  At the same time, we observed that "'[s]ubjective 
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth 
Amendment analysis.'  Our holding in [Santana] is not to the 
contrary."  Id., quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.  See Lora, 
supra, quoting Whren, supra ("the constitutional basis for 
objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is 
the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment").  Thus, 
Lora makes clear that to the extent we do consider the purpose 
17 
 
of a stop when assessing its validity, we do so pursuant to the 
equal protection principles of arts. 1 and 10 -- not art. 14's 
guarantee against unreasonable seizures -- and only where a 
driver has alleged that race was the reason for the stop. 
 
This brings us to the more obvious deficiency in the 
defendant's appeal to the racial profiling context:  the fact 
that racial profiling is not an issue in this case.  Unlike the 
Lora defendant, the defendant here has raised no allegation of 
impermissible discrimination, and he does not challenge the 
traffic stop on equal protection grounds.  To the contrary, he 
acknowledges in his brief that he is "is not arguing (and has 
never argued) that he was racially profiled"14 (emphasis added).  
Although we certainly do not dispute, as a general matter, the 
enormity or relevance of the problem of racial profiling, it is 
not an appropriate basis for overturning our general art. 14 
standard governing the reasonableness of traffic stops where the 
defendant has expressly disavowed any such argument that race 
was a factor in the stop at issue. 
 
At the same time, the defendant and the concurring Justice 
raise considerable, legitimate concerns regarding racial 
profiling and the impact of such practices on communities of 
color.  We share these sentiments, which echo those expressed by 
                     
 
14 The defendant is an African-American male; the driver is 
a Caucasian female. 
18 
 
past members of this court.  See, e.g., Lora, 451 Mass. at 444, 
and cases cited ("Justices of this court have expressed 
considerable concern about the practice of racial profiling in 
prior decisions").  We likewise acknowledge their valid 
questions regarding the lasting efficacy of Lora for addressing 
the issue of pretextual stops motivated by race, given that in 
the near-decade since that decision, we are not aware of a 
single reported case suppressing evidence under its framework.  
We take this opportunity to encourage lawyers to use the Lora 
framework in cases where there is reason to believe a traffic 
stop was the result of racial profiling.  To the extent we must 
review the adequacy of our decision in Lora, however, or address 
these issues in depth, we wait to do so in a case where a driver 
has actually alleged and laid a proper foundation for a claim 
under Lora.  We cannot evaluate the efficacy of the Lora 
framework without a record. 
 
As an alternative basis for his request that we overturn 
Santana, the defendant cites cases from "other areas of criminal 
law" where he contends Massachusetts courts "identify pretext" -
- namely, searches conducted for the purposes of inventory or 
administrative regulation.  But the defendant's conclusion that 
"there is no good reason for the distinction" between the 
constitutional analysis in these cases versus traffic stops 
ignores at least one reason.  Inventory and administrative 
19 
 
searches -- as distinct from traffic stops, which involve only a 
temporary seizure, see Rodriguez, 472 Mass. at 773 -- are unique 
in that they are conducted in the absence of probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion, for purely noninvestigatory reasons.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. 537, 550-555, cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 942 (2002).  In these contexts, the burden 
rests with the Commonwealth to demonstrate that the search "was 
conducted for some legitimate police purpose other than a search 
for evidence."  Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 219 
(1981), S.C., 389 Mass. 411 (1983).  From the start, then, 
consideration of an officer's "purpose" for conducting the 
search is relevant to an assessment of the lawfulness of the 
search itself.  Thus, where it appears that the "sole purpose" 
of that search was in fact criminal investigation, rather than 
inventory or administrative regulation, any evidence unlawfully 
seized must be suppressed.  See, e.g., Benoit, supra at 219 
("The record clearly reveals that the only purpose for the entry 
into this suitcase . . . was to seize evidence.  The search and 
seizure without a warrant was, therefore, illegal"); 
Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 576-577 (2015) 
(affirming suppression of evidence found in course of inventory 
search where officer testimony showed that "sole purpose of 
impounding and searching the defendant's vehicle and its 
contents" was to search "for evidence of drug activity without a 
20 
 
warrant").15  A traffic stop poses no such question regarding the 
actual legal authority for the police conduct at issue, because, 
as mentioned, "[w]here the police have observed a traffic 
violation, they are warranted in stopping a vehicle."  Bacon, 
381 Mass. at 644.  Cf. Whren, 517 U.S. at 811 (declining to 
import principles of cases "addressing the validity of a search 
conducted in the absence of probable cause" to cases involving 
"police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable 
cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred"). 
 
Having considered the defendant's arguments, we decline to 
disturb our general rule that the reasonableness of a traffic 
stop under art. 14 is evaluated according to the authorization 
test articulated in Santana.  Outside of the racial profiling 
context -- as this case is -- the reasonableness of a traffic 
                     
 
15 The defendant quotes extensively from Commonwealth v. 
Ortiz, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 576-577 (2015), to argue that we 
should consider pretext here.  In Ortiz, the defendant, who was 
the subject of surveillance as part of an investigation into 
cocaine trafficking, was stopped and arrested for switching 
lanes without signaling; a subsequent inventory search of his 
vehicle yielded cocaine.  Id. at 575.  The arresting officer 
testified that he would not have conducted either the stop or 
the arrest absent the intention "to employ the inventory policy 
to search [a] backpack for drugs."  Id. at 576-577.  The Appeals 
Court affirmed the trial judge's suppression of the evidence on 
the ground that the inventory search "was simply a pretext for 
using the inventory policy to conduct an investigatory search."  
Id. at 577.  Significantly, however, the Appeals Court made no 
such determination regarding the validity of the initial stop; 
to the contrary, it correctly acknowledged that "the 
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops 'does not depend 
on the actual motivations of the officer involved.'"  Id. at 575 
n.5, quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. 
21 
 
stop does not depend upon the particular motivations underlying 
the stop.  For the sound legal and practical reasons previously 
described, legal justification alone, such as an observed 
traffic violation, is sufficient. 
 
Applying that principle here, the motion judge credited 
Nelson's testimony that before conducting the traffic stop at 
issue, Nelson observed the vehicle traveling above the speed 
limit.  We therefore affirm the judge's conclusion that "the 
stop was warranted by the observed traffic violation."  "The 
fact that the [police] may have believed that the defendants 
were engaging in illegal drug activity does not limit their 
power to make an authorized stop."  Santana, 420 Mass. at 208. 
 
2.  Scope of the stop.  In addition to challenging the 
legality of the stop itself, the defendant argues that the 
Whitman police exceeded the permissible scope of the stop when 
the plainclothes detectives joined Nelson at the scene and asked 
the driver about the odor of marijuana emanating from the 
vehicle.  "In evaluating whether the police exceeded the 
permissible scope of a stop, the issue is one of proportion."  
Commonwealth v. Sinforoso, 434 Mass. 320, 323 (2001).  "The 
nature of the stop, i.e., for a traffic offense, defines the 
scope of the initial inquiry by a police officer."  Commonwealth 
v. Bartlett, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 468, 470 (1996).  See 
Commonwealth v. Cordero, 477 Mass. 237, 241 (2017) ("A routine 
22 
 
traffic stop may not last longer than reasonably necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop" [quotations and citation 
omitted]).  "Where an officer conducts an uneventful threshold 
inquiry giving rise to no further suspicion of criminal 
activity, he may not prolong the detention or expand the 
inquiry."  Feyenord, 445 Mass. at 78 n.5. 
 
As discussed, the stop at issue was justified based on 
Nelson's observation of the vehicle speeding.  This defines the 
permissible scope of the officers' inquiry.  The defendant fails 
to cite any authority suggesting that it was impermissible for 
the plainclothes detectives to join Nelson at the location of 
the stop.  The stop remained constitutional so long as the 
officers did not exceed its permissible scope.  There is nothing 
in the record to indicate that the "tasks tied to the traffic 
infraction . . . [were already] complete[]," Rodriguez v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015), by the time Bombardier and 
Campbell arrived, or that Nelson unnecessarily prolonged the 
stop to await the detectives' arrival.  See Cordero, 477 Mass. 
at 242 ("The police do not earn 'bonus time' to conduct 
additional investigations by an expeditious performance of the 
traffic-related investigation").  The motion judge found that 
the detectives arrived while "Nelson [was] standing at the 
driver's side of the vehicle."  Nelson testified that, after 
stopping the vehicle, he explained to the driver that he had 
23 
 
stopped her for speeding and requested her license and 
registration; she produced a registration certificate but was 
unable to produce a license.  Nelson recalled that he had been 
speaking with the driver for "[a]pproximately a minute," and had 
yet to confirm her name and date of birth, see id. at 242 (tasks 
during routine traffic stop reasonably include "confirmation of 
the identity of the driver"), when Bombardier and Campbell 
arrived and spoke to the driver about the smell of marijuana.  
At that point Nelson returned to his cruiser to confirm 
McGovern's information.  Contrast id. at 247 (continued 
detention of defendant unreasonable where "the investigation of 
the civil traffic violations" justifying stop "was complete"). 
 
We also reject the defendant's argument that Bombardier's 
question to the driver about the smell of marijuana fell beyond 
the permissible scope of the stop.  That argument is foreclosed 
by this court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459 
(2011).  Cruz was decided following the enactment of G. L. 
c. 94C, §§ 32L-32N, which "changed the status of the possession 
of one ounce or less of marijuana from a criminal to a civil 
offense."  Id. at 464.  In Cruz, an officer who had conducted a 
valid traffic stop detected an odor of burnt marijuana as he 
approached the driver's side window; we held that the officer's 
"asking the driver whether he had been smoking marijuana" did 
not constitute an impermissible expansion of the scope of the 
24 
 
stop, "because the officers could potentially have issued the 
driver a civil citation pursuant to G. L. c. 40, § 21D."  Id. at 
466.16  The stop at issue here took place in January, 2013 -- 
after the Cruz decision, while possession of marijuana remained 
a civil offense.17  As in Cruz, then, Bombardier did not exceed 
the scope of the stop when inquiring about the smell of 
marijuana emanating from the vehicle, given his authority to 
issue a civil citation.  "Once in the process of making a valid 
stop for a traffic violation," as here, "officers are not 
required to 'ignore what [they] see[], smell[] or hear[].'"  
Cruz, 459 Mass. at 466, quoting Bartlett, 41 Mass. App. Ct. at 
471. 
 
3.  Consent.  The defendant argues that the evidence should 
be suppressed because the driver did not voluntarily consent to 
the search of the vehicle.  See Commonwealth v. Podgurski, 386 
Mass. 385, 390-392 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1222 (1983) 
(passenger may object to validity of vehicle search).  A 
warrantless search such as this is presumptively unreasonable 
under both the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 unless one of the 
                     
 
16 See G. L. c. 94C, § 32N (directing police departments to 
"enforce [G. L. c. 94C, § 32L,] in a manner consistent with the 
non-criminal disposition provisions of [G. L. c. 40, § 21D]"). 
 
 
17 Effective December, 2016, the Regulation and Taxation of 
Marijuana Act states, in pertinent part, that adults shall not 
be penalized or sanctioned "under the laws of the commonwealth 
in any manner" for possessing an ounce or less of marijuana.  
See G. L. c. 94H, § 7 (a) (1). 
25 
 
"few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" to 
the warrant requirement apply.  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 
Mass. 44, 48 (2011), quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443, 455 (1971).  A search authorized by consent is one such 
exception.  See Commonwealth v. Buswell, 468 Mass. 92, 105 
(2014).  As with all warrantless searches, the Commonwealth 
bears the burden of proof that consent was "freely and 
voluntarily given," Commonwealth v. Krisco Corp., 421 Mass. 37, 
46 (1995), quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-
549 (1968), meaning it was "unfettered by coercion, express or 
implied."  Commonwealth v. Harmond, 376 Mass. 557, 561 (1978) 
quoting Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 548, 555, cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 943 (1976).  "Voluntariness of consent 'is a 
question of fact to be determined in the circumstances of each 
case.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Aguilar, 370 Mass. 490, 
496 (1976).  As a question of fact, "it should not be reversed 
absent clear error by the judge."  Commonwealth v. Gray, 465 
Mass. 330, 343, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 628 (2013), citing 
Commonwealth v. Carr, 458 Mass. 295, 303 (2010). 
 
We discern no error here.  The motion judge, who "was in 
the best position to assess the weight and credibility of the 
testimony given at the [suppression] hearing," Carr, supra, 
concluded that the driver freely and voluntarily consented to 
the search of the vehicle.  This was based in part on the 
26 
 
judge's finding that when Bombardier "asked [the driver] if she 
had any marijuana in the car.  She told him she did not think so 
and said that he could check."  The fact that the driver 
affirmatively offered the search naturally supports the judge's 
conclusion that her consent was voluntary.  See Commonwealth v. 
Sanna, 424 Mass. 92, 97-99 (1997) (concluding that "the police 
had properly entered the defendant's home on the consent given 
by the father").  Further, the record lacks any evidence to 
suggest that the officers' conduct during the vehicle stop was 
at all coercive.  See Commonwealth v. Cantalupo, 380 Mass. 173, 
177-178 (1980).  Contrast Carr, 458 Mass. at 302-303 (consent 
not voluntary where armed officers "completely blocked the only 
exit" from premises, officer who sought permission to search 
"signaled his distrust of the defendants," and request to search 
"sounded more like an order").  Finally, that the police did not 
inform the driver of her right to refuse does not, as the 
defendant argues, invalidate her consent.  "The fact that a 
person is not informed by the police that he has a right to 
refuse to consent to an entry or search is a factor to be 
considered on the issue of voluntariness, but is not 
determinative of the issue."  Sanna, 424 Mass. at 97 n.10.  
Given the absence of record evidence to the contrary, we 
conclude that the motion judge did not err in finding that the 
27 
 
driver freely and voluntarily consented to the search of the 
vehicle. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
denial of the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence 
against him.  We also affirm the judgment of conviction of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
BUDD, J. (concurring). I join the opinion of the court 
because I agree that it is unworkable to strike down the 
authorization rule articulated in Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 
Mass. 205 (1995).  However, I write separately because, although 
-- as the court points out -- the driver here was not stopped 
for "driving while black," it is important to highlight how 
pretextual stops disproportionately affect people of color, and 
to explore what can be done to mitigate the harm caused by this 
practice. 
 
Years of data bear out what many have long known from 
experience:  police stop drivers of color disproportionately 
more often than Caucasian drivers for insignificant violations 
(or provide no reason at all).  In 2017, the Stanford Open 
Policing Project found that police stopped African-American 
drivers more than Caucasian drivers, controlling for population 
makeup, both nationally and in Massachusetts.1  Stanford Open 
Policing, Stop Rates, 2017, https://openpolicing.stanford.edu 
/findings/ [https://perma.cc/F6HT-87WE].  See United States 
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, Special Report, Police Behavior During 
                     
 
1 I note that although most of the data focuses on people of 
color, other marginalized communities, i.e., groups of people 
who have historically experienced some form of oppression or 
exclusion, are also the target of heightened police attention.  
Transgendered people, for example, have reported facing 
disproportionate harm by encounters with law enforcement.  
Activists Say Police Abuse of Transgender People Persists 
Despite Reforms, New York Times, Sept. 6, 2015. 
2 
 
 
Traffic and Street Stops, 2011, at 3 (rev. October 27, 2016), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtss11.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2ML3-UWY9]. 
 
In effectuating traffic stops, most officers act in good 
faith.  Even where they do, to a Caucasian driver a traffic stop 
may be annoying or embarrassing, but for a driver of color, such 
a stop can be humiliating and painful.2  Commonwealth v. 
Feyenord, 445 Mass. 72, 88 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1187 
(2006) (Greaney, J., concurring).  Further, recent tragic events 
have shown that the fear people of color have of being stopped 
by police is justified:  African-Americans have been killed 
during routine traffic stops.3 
                     
 
2 In Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 540 (2016), when 
we discussed the related problem of racial profiling in Terry-
type stops, we noted "the recurring indignity of being racially 
profiled." 
 
 
3 The following are a few recent examples that have gained 
national attention.  A police officer in Minnesota stopped 
Philando Castile for a broken taillight.  During the encounter, 
the officer shot him four times, killing him in front of his 
fiancée and four year old daughter.  Woman Streams Aftermath of 
Fatal Officer-Involved Shooting, Cable News Network, July 8, 
2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/07/us/falcon-heights-shooting-
minnesota/index.html [https://perma.cc/4P5A-YY28].  In Ohio, the 
police stopped Samuel DuBose for failing to display a front 
license plate, and fatally shot him during the stop.  The 
Shooting of Samuel DuBose, New York Times, July 29, 2015.  The 
South Carolina police stopped Walter Scott for a broken 
taillight, and shot him to death as he fled.  Carbado, From 
Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: the Fourth 
Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 Cal. L. Rev. 125, 149 
(2017).  In Texas, a police officer stopped Sandra Bland for 
failing to signal a lane change.  Id. at 150.  She was found 
dead in jail three days later.  Id. 
3 
 
 
 
It goes without saying that this is not a new phenomenon.  
Almost twenty years ago, then-Associate Justice Ireland noted 
statistics from multiple jurisdictions showing that African-
American and sometimes Hispanic drivers were stopped more often 
than Caucasian drivers, even though Caucasian drivers were the 
majority group.  Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 670 
(1999) (Ireland, J., concurring). 
 
The reasons for pretextual stops of people of color stem 
from explicit bias (i.e., racial profiling), unconscious bias,4 
or a combination of both.  See Carbado, From Stopping Black 
                                                                  
 
Massachusetts is not immune from traffic stop violence.  
Wakeelah Cocroft, an African-American woman, was a passenger in 
a vehicle that the police stopped for speeding in Worcester.  
Cocroft v. Smith, 95 F. Supp. 3d 119, 123 (D. Mass. 2015).  
During the stop, an officer "forcefully threw Cocroft to the 
ground and scraped her face against the cement."  Id.  In a 
subsequent civil suit, a jury found that the officer had 
unlawfully seized Cocroft.  Id. at 122. 
 
It is also important to note that these examples are not 
meant to diminish the fact that police officers are at risk 
during traffic stops as well.  Auburn police officer Ronald 
Tarentino, for example, was shot to death during a traffic stop.  
Obituary for Fallen Police Officer Ronald Tarentino, Jr., Boston 
Herald, May 24, 2016, http://www.bostonherald.com/news/local_ 
coverage/herald_bulldog/2016/05/obituary_for_fallen_police_ 
officer_ronald_tarentino_jr [https://perma.cc/8GNT-KQRU]. 
 
 
4 Unconscious or implicit bias is a discriminatory belief or 
association likely unknown to its holder.  Multiple studies 
confirm the existence of implicit bias, and that implicit bias 
predicts real-world behavior.  See Kang & Banaji, Fair Measures:  
A Behavioral Realist Revision of "Affirmative Action," 94 Cal. 
L. Rev. 1063, 1071-1073 (2006).  That is, even people who do not 
believe themselves to harbor implicit bias may in fact act in 
ways that disfavor people of color. 
4 
 
 
People to Killing Black People:  The Fourth Amendment Pathways 
to Police Violence, 105 Cal. L. Rev. 125, 129-130 (2017); 
Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law:  Why "Driving 
While Black" Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 291-292 (1999); 
Ramirez, Hoopes, & Quinlan, Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-
September 11 World, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1195, 1197-1198 (2003).  
See also Greenwald & Krieger, Implicit Bias:  Scientific 
Foundations, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 945, 951 (2006); Lawrence, The Id, 
the Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 343 (1987).  Regardless of the 
cause, it is a persistent, pervasive problem that must be 
addressed. 
 
The solution, however, is not clear cut.  For the reasons 
outlined by the court, the answer is not to overrule the 
authorization rule articulated in Santana, 420 Mass. at 208-209.  
As the court has explained, inquiring into subjective police 
intent for traffic stops would lead to several practical 
difficulties, not least among them the question of how precisely 
to determine intent.  Ante at    . 
 
In Commonwealth v. Lora, 451 Mass. 425 (2008), the court 
reiterated that although "law enforcement officers enjoy 
considerable discretion in exercising some selectivity for 
purposes consistent with the public interest," that 
"selectivity" cannot be based on "an unjustifiable standard such 
5 
 
 
as race, religion or other arbitrary classification"5 (quotations 
and citations omitted).  Id. at 436-437.  The court concluded 
that to rebut the presumption that a stop was not undertaken as 
a result of an arbitrary classification, a defendant must 
present "credible evidence establishing a reasonable inference 
of impermissible discrimination."  Id. at 443.  The court 
further held that 
"[a]t a minimum, that evidence must establish that the 
racial composition of motorists stopped for motor vehicle 
violations varied significantly from the racial composition 
of the population of motorists making use of the relevant 
roadways, and who therefore could have encountered the 
officer or officers whose actions have been called into 
question." 
 
Id. at 442. 
Thus, the court attempted to provide a means of combatting 
pretextual stops based on race with statistics.  We noted that a 
similar approach had been somewhat successful in New Jersey.  
Id. at 440-441, citing State v. Soto, 324 N.J. Super. 66 (1996).  
As it happened, traffic stop statistics also were being 
collected in the Commonwealth.  Before Lora was decided, the 
Legislature had passed An Act providing for the collection of 
data relative to traffic stops (act), St. 2000, c. 228.  
Pursuant to the act, Northeastern University analyzed a year's 
worth of data collected on racial and gender profiling, and 
                     
 
5 As the court points out, the defendant did not bring a 
claim under the equal protection provisions of the Massachusetts 
Constitution, another fatal blow to mounting a challenge to 
pretextual stops.  Ante at    . 
6 
 
 
issued a report in 2004.  Lora, 451 Mass. at 448.  Despite the 
Legislature's focus on data collection in this act, the court 
acknowledged that the defendant's evidentiary burden was 
"daunting."  Id. at 445. 
In a concurring opinion, then-Justice Ireland pointed out 
some of the difficulties involved in collecting the necessary 
data, even with the act in place.  Id. at 449 (Ireland, J., 
concurring).  For example, although the act required law 
enforcement agencies that had racially profiled to continue to 
gather statistics, it did not contain provisions requiring those 
agencies to report the data to anyone or to analyze the data, 
severely undercutting any use that data might have had.  Id. 
(Ireland, J., concurring).  Moreover, almost one-half of the 
targeted agencies failed to follow the reporting guidelines of 
the act, for example by failing to track certain factors or 
failing to report at all.  Id. (Ireland, J., concurring). 
Justice Ireland's concerns were prescient:  the act 
required governmental data collection for only a limited amount 
of time, and the Legislature has not renewed the necessary 
funding.  See St. 2000, c. 228, § 8 (assigning financial 
responsibility to State agencies); id. at § 10 (requiring data 
to be transmitted for analysis after one year).  Statistics on 
traffic stops, thus, are now even more difficult to come by.  We 
are not aware of any traffic stop cases in which a defendant has 
7 
 
 
been able to gather and use statistics to prove that the stop 
violated equal protection principles; it appears that Lora has 
not provided the opportunity for defendants that we had hoped it 
would. 
 
Concerns about bias in pretextual traffic stops are well 
founded, as are concerns about the practical ability of 
defendants to show racial bias by way of statistics as suggested 
by Lora.  Because this is not a "driving while black" equal 
protection case, the issue is not squarely before us.  However, 
it is worth noting that it has been seventeen years since the 
Legislature required State agencies to collect data on racial 
profiling.  We are not aware of the data ever being used to 
mount a challenge under Lora, and it is now woefully outdated.  
The time has come for the Legislature to address the problem 
once more.  Publicly available data would not only assist 
litigants, but would also inform the public about this ongoing 
problem. 
 
In the meantime, our recent holding in Commonwealth v. 
Cordero, 477 Mass. 237 (2017), has added to our jurisprudence.  
There we held that a traffic stop may go no further than 
investigating the alleged traffic violation unless that 
investigation leads to information to support reasonable 
suspicion of a crime.  Id. at 247.  See Commonwealth v. Amado, 
474 Mass. 147, 151 (2016); Gonsalves, 429 Mass. at 663; 
8 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 158-159 (1997).  These 
cases are by no means a cure for racial profiling in traffic 
stops, but they may provide a means to lessen their impact on 
drivers and diminish the incentive to conduct pretextual stops.