Case Title: State ex rel. Maloney v. Sherlock

Citation: 2003-Ohio-5058

Docket Number: 20030171 and 20030172

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-09-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Maloney v. Sherlock, 100 Ohio St.3d 77, 2003-Ohio-5058.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. MALONEY, JUDGE, v. SHERLOCK ET AL., COMMRS. 
THE STATE EX REL. DELLICK, JUDGE, v. SHERLOCK ET AL., COMMRS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Maloney v. Sherlock, 100 Ohio St.3d 77, 2003-Ohio-5058.] 
Mandamus sought by court of common pleas court judge, probate division, and 
court of common pleas court judge, juvenile division, to compel 
Mahoning County Commissioners to comply with relators’ budget 
appropriation orders for 2003 — Writs granted, when — Mandamus 
sought to compel removal of the courts’ employees from county 
commissioners’ resolution ordering a payroll deduction of 10 percent of 
the health insurance premium for all county employees not covered by 
any collective bargaining agreement — Court lacks jurisdiction to 
consider claim — Judges’ request for award of fees denied, when. 
(Nos. 2003-0171 and 2003-0172 — Submitted August 26, 2003 — Decided 
September 25, 2003.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
In July 2002, Elizabeth Sublette, the Director of the Mahoning 
County Office of Management and Budget, issued a memorandum to the county 
“departments,” including the Probate and Juvenile Divisions of the Mahoning 
County Court of Common Pleas.  In the memorandum, Sublette forecast a 
general-fund revenue decrease of 18 percent to 20 percent for 2003 and advised 
these departments to “begin the process of reducing the cost of service.” 
{¶2} 
In August 2002, Sublette sent the departments a second 
memorandum in which she specified that budget papers for 2003 would be sent to 
them within the week and reminded them about the projected decline in revenue 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
for 2003 and the necessity for each department to reduce costs.  Sublette 
subsequently sent the budget forms to the departments, including the probate and 
juvenile courts, and instructed them to submit the forms by e-mail by September 
30, 2002.  Included with these materials, Sublette provided each department’s 
2002 budget as well as a target number for each department’s 2003 budget 
request.  The probate court’s 2002 budget was $907,912, and the target number 
for the court for 2003 was $715,000.  The juvenile court’s 2002 budget was 
$5,349,391, and the target number for the court for 2003 was $4,300,000. 
{¶3} 
Sublette and Mahoning County Administrator Gary Kubic set these 
initial 2003 target numbers based on department expenditures for 2000 because 
the county revenue projections for 2003 were comparable to the county’s 2000 
expenditures.  They provided the target numbers as department totals rather than 
line-item amounts to allow the various department heads to program their 
budgetary needs from the targets. 
{¶4} 
The county followed the practice that if the departmental budget 
request was within the target amount, the Mahoning County Board of 
Commissioners would appropriate all of the department’s line-item amounts.  If 
the budget request was not within the target amount, the board would appropriate 
only the target amount and give the noncomplying departments the opportunity to 
make their own changes of line-item amounts in order to stay within the 
appropriated amount. 
{¶5} 
Before December 2002, Sublette was notified by the county 
auditor of a new estimate of revenues for 2003 that was $2 million to $3 million 
higher than the previous total, which she had used to set the original target 
numbers for the county departments’ 2003 budget requests.  Sublette then 
adjusted the target numbers for the departments’ 2003 budgets to account for this 
additional revenue.  In setting and adjusting the target numbers for the county 
January Term, 2003 
3 
departments’ budgets for 2003, Sublette did not consider the particular programs 
of the various departments. 
Mahoning County Probate Court 
{¶6} 
In 1996, relator Timothy P. Maloney was elected judge of the 
Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, and he has held that 
office since February 1997.  In 1996, the probate court’s budget was $849,262 
and its actual expenditures were $790,173.  In 2002, the probate court’s budget 
was $907,912 and its actual expenditures were $875,511.  For 2002, 
administrative salaries accounted for $521,648 of the probate court’s budget and 
$520,074.79 of its actual expenditures. 
{¶7} 
Despite the county’s request that all county departments submit 
their 2003 budget requests by September 30, 2002, Judge Maloney did not fill out 
any of the forms provided and did not submit a request by that date.  Judge 
Maloney has never complied with the county’s request for budget forms; instead, 
he has always submitted his budget by court order. 
{¶8} 
On December 17, 2002, Judge Maloney entered a judgment 
ordering the Mahoning County Board of Commissioners to appropriate the sum of 
$922,196 for the probate court’s 2003 budget, including $557,742 for 
administrative salaries. Judge Maloney’s budget order exceeded the county’s 
initial target number of $715,000 and its adjusted target number of $750,000. 
{¶9} 
According to Judge Maloney, he increased the salaries for certain 
probate court employees for several reasons, including that they had not had 
raises the year before, that they may not have gotten raises during some other year 
in the previous six years, and that he thought the raises were reasonable and 
necessary to maintain the court’s status quo against the private sector.  Judge 
Maloney stated that “paying reasonable, though not excessive, wages is necessary 
in order to retain the services of qualified, professional employees in the Probate 
Court.”  Judge Maloney further claimed that the pay increases were justified 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
because of the level of multitask work they performed and a city income tax that 
had been increased an additional 0.5 percent. 
{¶10} On December 19, 2002, the board passed Resolution 02-524, 
which approved a total general-fund appropriation for 2003 of $47,669,845, with 
$750,000 of that sum appropriated for the probate court.  One of the three county 
commissioners believed that Judge Maloney’s $922,196 budget order was neither 
unreasonable nor unnecessary.  Another commissioner did not find anything 
about Judge Maloney’s budget order unreasonable or unnecessary except for one 
salary adjustment for Lucy Lovell, the probate court administrator. 
{¶11} Additionally, on December 19, 2002, the board adopted Resolution 
02-534, in which it ordered a payroll deduction of 10 percent of the health 
insurance premium for all Mahoning County employees not covered by any 
collective bargaining agreement.  The board based the deduction in part on the 
State Auditor’s recommendation.  Most probate court employees would be subject 
to this deduction.  Previously, all probate court employees had been offered health 
insurance coverage completely paid for by the county.  Judge Maloney refused to 
implement the 10 percent payroll deduction for probate court employees, and the 
board has not collected the ordered deduction. 
Mahoning County Juvenile Court 
{¶12} Relator Theresa Dellick was appointed judge of the Mahoning 
County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, and she took office in April 
2001.  In 2001, the juvenile court’s budget was $5,103,682 and its actual 
expenditures were $4,891,200.75.  In 2002, the juvenile court’s budget was 
$5,343,391 and its actual expenditures were $5,144,577.57. 
{¶13} In September 2002, the juvenile court requested and was granted 
an extension from the county to submit its 2003 budget request and forms.  On 
November 21, 2002, the juvenile court sent its budget request and forms to the 
county.  The juvenile court requested a 2003 budget of $6,923,499.22.  On 
January Term, 2003 
5 
November 26, 2002, Judge Dellick ordered the Mahoning County Board of 
Commissioners to appropriate the requested $6,923,499.22 for the juvenile court’s 
2003 budget.  Judge Dellick’s budget order exceeded the county’s initial target 
number of $4,300,000 and its final adjusted target number of $4,600,000.  
Included in Judge Dellick’s 2003 budget was a substantial increase in 
administrative and other salaries. 
{¶14} According to the Director of the Mahoning County Human 
Resources Department, excluding changes from part-time to full-time 
employment, juvenile court employees received an average salary increase of 
18.76 percent from 2001 to 2003.  The county commissioners and the director of 
the county office of management and budget all acknowledged that when 
compared to similarly situated employees in Mahoning and other counties, 
juvenile court employees were underpaid. 
{¶15} At the request of the county commissioners and the county 
administrator, the State Auditor conducted a performance audit of certain county 
offices, including the juvenile court.  In the Auditor’s January 9, 2002 report, he 
noted that the juvenile court detention center employees’ compensation was 21.7 
percent below peer averages in comparable counties and other juvenile court 
employees’ compensation was 5.1 percent below these averages. 
{¶16} Judge Dellick relied on her own records, which indicated that on 
average, her juvenile court employees were paid 22 percent less than their 
counterparts in Mahoning and other counties performing similar duties.  Judge 
Dellick increased salaries for juvenile court employees from 2001 to 2003 in 
order to rectify this inequity.  Judge Dellick did not rely on the State Auditor’s 
report, because it did not reflect the status of the juvenile court at the time she 
became judge and she thought that the report was inaccurate in some details. 
{¶17} When Sublette set the original and final 2003 budget target 
numbers for the juvenile court, she did not assess the specific operations or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
employees of the court.  She was, however, generally aware that the performance 
audit had concluded that at least some juvenile court employees were paid at rates 
substantially below other Mahoning County employees and juvenile court 
employees in other counties.  Kubic recommended that the commissioners reject 
Judge Dellick’s 2003 budget order because the wage increases were unreasonable.  
Kubic conceded that the wage increases “would be considered normal” in the 
private sector but concluded that given the county’s lack of funds, the increases 
were unreasonable.  Kubic did not advise the county commissioners that any 
aspect of the juvenile court’s 2003 budget was unnecessary. 
{¶18} On December 19, 2002, in Resolution 02-524, the board 
appropriated $4,600,000 of the requested $6,923,499.22 to the juvenile court for 
its 2003 budget.  One of the commissioners determined that the juvenile court’s 
2003 budget request was unreasonable because there was not enough money to 
fund the request rather than because juvenile court employees would be overpaid.  
This commissioner did not find any aspect of the budget request to be 
unnecessary.  A second commissioner’s decision not to appropriate the requested 
funds to the juvenile court had absolutely nothing to do with how Judge Dellick 
operated the juvenile court.  Instead, he concluded that the budget request was 
unreasonable and unnecessary simply because the county did not have sufficient 
funds and stated that if the county had the money, it would have been 
appropriated.  The remaining commissioner emphasized that she determined 
Judge Dellick’s budget request to be unreasonable because of “the number itself” 
and the fact that most other county offices, including some courts, had complied 
with the requested target numbers. 
{¶19} Like the probate court employees, juvenile court employees had 
historically been afforded health insurance paid for by the county as part of their 
compensation.  With Resolution 02-534, however, also passed on December 19, 
2002, the county commissioners authorized a payroll deduction of 10 percent of 
January Term, 2003 
7 
the health insurance premium for these employees’ wages.  Judge Dellick refused 
to permit this deduction because she believed that it would likely lead to 
employee turnover and a decline in efficiency and professionalism. 
2003-0171 and 2003-0172 
{¶20} On January 27, 2003, in case No. 2003-0171, Judge Maloney filed 
a complaint in this court for a writ of mandamus to compel respondents, Vicki 
Allen Sherlock, Edward Reese, and David Ludt, as Mahoning County 
Commissioners, to appropriate the entire $922,196 he had ordered for the 2003 
probate court budget and amend the board resolution regarding the payroll 
deduction for 10 percent of the health insurance premium to prevent its 
applicability to probate court employees.  Judge Maloney also requested an award 
of costs and fees, including attorney fees, to be assessed against the 
commissioners in their individual capacities. 
{¶21} On the same date, in case No. 2003-0172, Judge Dellick filed a 
complaint in this court for a writ of mandamus to compel the commissioners to 
appropriate the $6,923,499.22 she had ordered for the 2003 juvenile court budget 
and rescind the board resolution authorizing a 10 percent health insurance 
deduction insofar as it applied to juvenile court employees.  Judge Dellick further 
requested costs and fees against the commissioners in their individual capacities. 
{¶22} The commissioners filed answers to the judges’ complaints, and 
after mediation did not resolve the cases, they were returned to the regular docket 
in April 2003.  State ex. rel. Maloney v. Sherlock, 98 Ohio St.3d 1519, 2003-
Ohio-1742, 786 N.E.2d 468; State ex rel. Dellick v. Sherlock, 98 Ohio St.3d 1519, 
2003-Ohio-1742, 786 N.E.2d 468.  In May 2003, we granted alternative writs in 
both cases and denied the motions for leave to intervene of the Mahoning County 
Township Association.  State ex rel. Maloney v. Sherlock, 98 Ohio St.3d 1560, 
2003-Ohio-2242, 787 N.E.2d 1226; State ex rel. Dellick v. Sherlock, 98 Ohio 
St.3d 1560, 2003-Ohio-2242, 787 N.E.2d 1226. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
{¶23} These cases are now before us upon the parties’ evidence and 
briefs.  Because these cases raise similar legal issues and involve the same 
respondents and attorneys, we consolidate them for purposes of decision.  See, 
e.g., State ex rel. Carter v. Schotten (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 89, 90, 637 N.E.2d 
306; State ex rel. Maynard v. Corrigan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 332, 691 N.E.2d 
280. 
Mandamus:  Application, Burden of Proof, and Presumptions in Common Pleas 
Court Appropriation Cases 
{¶24} Judge Maloney and Judge Dellick request writs of mandamus to 
compel the commissioners to comply with their appropriation orders for 2003.  In 
resolving their claims, the following well-established standards govern our 
analysis. 
{¶25} “It is well settled that mandamus is an appropriate vehicle for 
enforcing a court’s funding order.”  State ex rel. Donaldson v. Alfred (1993), 66 
Ohio St.3d 327, 329, 612 N.E.2d 717.  Common pleas courts and their divisions 
have inherent power to order funding that is reasonable and necessary to the 
courts’ administration of their business.  State ex rel. Morley v. Lordi  (1995), 72 
Ohio St.3d 510, 511, 651 N.E.2d 937 (probate court); State ex rel. Lake Cty. Bd. 
of Commrs. v. Hoose (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 220, 221, 569 N.E.2d 1046 (juvenile 
court).  “In turn, the board of county commissioners is obligated to appropriate 
the requested funds, unless the board can establish that the court abused its 
discretion by requesting unreasonable and unnecessary funding.”  State ex rel. 
Wilke v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 55, 60, 734 N.E.2d 
811; State ex rel. Avellone v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 58, 
61, 543 N.E.2d 478. 
{¶26} In effect, the courts’ funding orders are presumed reasonable, and 
the board must rebut the presumption in order to justify its noncompliance with 
these orders.  State ex rel. Weaver v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1991), 62 Ohio 
January Term, 2003 
9 
St.3d 204, 205, 580 N.E.2d 1090.  “This presumption emanates from the 
separation-of-powers doctrine because courts must be free from excessive control 
by other governmental branches to ensure their independence and autonomy.”  
Wilke, 90 Ohio St.3d at 60-61, 734 N.E.2d 811. 
{¶27} With these standards in mind, we now consider the merits of the 
judges’ mandamus claims. 
2003 Probate Court Budget 
{¶28} In trying to meet their burden to rebut the presumed reasonableness 
of Judge Maloney’s funding order for the probate court for 2003, the 
commissioners assert that Judge Maloney abused his discretion by ordering wage 
increases for certain employees that were supported by “no evidence other than 
[the judge’s] own opinion.”  Judge Maloney abused his discretion if he acted in an 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable manner.  State ex rel. Pontillo v. Pub. 
Emp. Retirement Sys. Bd., 98 Ohio St.3d 500, 2003-Ohio 2120, 787 N.E.2d 643, 
¶35. 
{¶29} “In the absence of an abuse of discretion on the part of the judge of 
the Probate Court in making up the annual budget * * *, the Board of County 
Commissioners is obligated to appropriate annually such sum of money as will 
meet all the administrative expenses of such court which the judge thereof deems 
necessary, including such salaries of court appointees as the judge shall fix and 
determine * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Ray v. South (1964), 176 Ohio 
St. 241, 27 O.O.2d 133, 198 N.E.2d 919, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶30} The commissioners have not rebutted the presumption here. 
{¶31} The director of the county office of management and budget set the 
2003 budget numbers by a method that was not based on the programs or needs of 
the probate court.  The commissioners then relied on those numbers to assess the 
propriety of the court’s budget order.  This violates the precept that the 
reasonableness of a court’s funding request “must be determined ‘only from a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
consideration of the request in relation to the factual needs of the court for the 
proper administration of its business.’ ”  State ex rel. Milligan v. Freeman  (1972), 
31 Ohio St.2d 13, 18, 60 O.O.2d 7, 285 N.E.2d 352, quoting State ex rel. 
Moorehead v. Reed (1964), 177 Ohio St. 4, 5, 28 O.O.2d 409, 201 N.E.2d 594. 
{¶32} The commissioners treated the probate and juvenile courts in the 
same manner as nonjudicial offices.  They thereby failed to accord the courts the 
budgetary priority required by the constitutional doctrine that underlies the 
presumption that these courts’ funding orders are reasonable.  Wilke, 90 Ohio 
St.3d at 60-61, 734 N.E.2d 811. 
{¶33} Moreover, Judge Maloney’s 2003 budget order is supported by 
other evidence besides his own opinion.  The 2003 budget order was only about 
8.6 percent greater than the probate court’s 1996 budget and exceeded the court’s 
2002 budget by only about 1.6 percent.  Commissioner Ludt testified that Judge 
Maloney’s budget order was neither unreasonable nor unnecessary, and 
Commissioner Reese testified that except for one salary adjustment for the 
probate court administrator, he found nothing about Judge Maloney’s order to be 
unreasonable or unnecessary.  That probate court administrator had been 
promoted from assistant court administrator. 
{¶34} Finally, respondents cite no persuasive authority to support their 
argument that a judge’s opinion is insufficient to justify an increase in salaries.  
And, contrary to respondents’ claims, salary-comparison studies, while helpful in 
assessing the reasonableness of a court’s funding order, have never been held to 
be a prerequisite for a writ of mandamus to compel compliance with a court’s 
funding order.  See, e.g., Morley, Weaver, and Ray (writs of mandamus granted to 
compel compliance with court funding orders that included salary increases even 
though there was no evidence of any salary-comparison study). 
{¶35} Therefore, the board failed to rebut the presumed reasonableness of 
Judge Maloney’s 2003 budget order. 
January Term, 2003 
11 
2003 Juvenile Court Budget 
{¶36} The commissioners assert that Judge Dellick abused her discretion 
in her 2003 juvenile court budget because her requests for salary increases were 
not supported by the evidence upon which she relied and she ignored the State 
Auditor’s performance audit. 
{¶37} The commissioners’ assertion lacks merit.  In concluding that the 
juvenile court’s 2003 budget was unreasonable, they claim that salary increases of 
18 percent are not supported by the evidence that Judge Dellick relied upon, 
which they state supports increases of only 7.3 percent.  As Judge Dellick notes, 
however, the evidence that the commissioners cite is stipulated to be only “part of 
the documents” received by her to establish salaries for juvenile court employees.  
Further, the 7.3 percent figure that the commissioners specify is derived from only 
one portion of the submitted evidence, which involves only detention center 
employees and notes that unlike other employees in comparable counties, the 
juvenile court lacked an escalating scale for pay rates based on years of service, 
training, and work record. 
{¶38} Moreover, Judge Dellick’s budget order is supported by the record.  
The commissioners conceded that the juvenile court employees were underpaid.  
Judge Dellick’s determination that the employees were paid 22 percent less on 
average than similarly situated employees in Mahoning County and other counties 
is comparable to one of the calculations of the State Auditor, i.e., 21.7 percent, 
and is consistent with their average salary increase, which was calculated by the 
county human resources director to be 18.76 percent from 2001 to 2003.  
Commissioner Reese’s conclusion that the budget was unreasonable was not due 
to any overpayment of court employees, and he did not find any aspect of the 
budget unnecessary.  Commissioner Ludt stated that if the county had had 
sufficient funds, they would have appropriated all of Judge Dellick’s 2003 budget 
order. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
{¶39} Further, like the probate court target numbers, the county set the 
juvenile court budget numbers without regard to the needs of the court.  By 
mistakenly treating the juvenile court as another county department, the 
commissioners disregarded the court’s constitutional entitlement to budgetary 
priority. 
{¶40} Finally, Judge Dellick did not abuse her discretion by not relying 
on the State Auditor’s report.  She testified that some of the information contained 
in the report was either outdated or inaccurate.  Instead, she independently 
determined the ordered items reasonable and necessary for the operation of the 
juvenile court in 2003. 
{¶41} Consequently, the commissioners have failed to rebut the 
presumed reasonableness of Judge Dellick’s 2003 budget order. 
Impossibility and Undue Hardship 
{¶42} The commissioners next contend that the writs should not issue, 
because they do not have unencumbered funds sufficient to meet the judges’ 
demands, the requested performance is impossible, and funding the court orders 
would cause the collapse of county government. 
{¶43} Although “claims of governmental hardship, standing alone, are 
not determinative as to whether a court has committed an abuse of discretion in 
the budgetary process, * * * such claims are * * * one relevant factor.”  State ex 
rel. Britt v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 1, 3-4, 18 OBR 1, 
480 N.E.2d 77.  Thus, government hardship is insufficient by itself to establish an 
abuse of discretion in determining the required amount of court funding.  Weaver, 
62 Ohio St.3d at 206-207, 580 N.E.2d 1090. 
{¶44} The commissioners’ claim lacks merit.  The director of the county 
office of management and budget could have applied the $2 million to $3 million 
that was added to the initial budget to the probate and juvenile courts’ requests, 
January Term, 2003 
13 
but she did not, based on an arbitrary determination rather than any analysis of the 
needs and programs of the courts. 
{¶45} In addition, the alleged present unavailability of funds is not a 
viable defense to the judges’ mandamus actions, because of the availability of 
funds at the time of the judges’ budget orders and the commissioners’ duty to 
fund the courts’ reasonable and necessary requests: 
{¶46} “At the time the request for funds was made by relator the monies 
were neither appropriated nor encumbered.  The board had a mandatory duty at 
that time to comply with relator’s request so long as it was reasonable.  It cannot 
escape its duty by appropriating such funds to others[;] neither can it use such 
prior appropriation as a defense in an action such as this.  It had, and still has, a 
mandatory duty to comply with relator’s request.”  State ex rel. Foster v. 
Wittenberg (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 89, 91, 45 O.O.2d 442, 242 N.E.2d 884. 
{¶47} Nor is the commissioners’ duty to appropriate the ordered amounts 
vitiated by the fact that compliance with the court’s requests would work an 
undue hardship on other offices and agencies.  Weaver, 62 Ohio St.3d at 208, 580 
N.E.2d 1090; State ex rel. Moorehead v. Reed, 177 Ohio St. at 6, 28 O.O.2d 409, 
201 N.E.2d 594. 
{¶48} Furthermore, even assuming that impossibility remains a defense 
in mandamus actions for court appropriations, it would require at a minimum that 
the probate and juvenile courts’ reasonable and necessary expenses “could not be 
funded without taking money from other county offices and rendering them 
unable to perform their statutory duties.”  Weaver, 62 Ohio St.3d at 207, 580 
N.E.2d 1090, and fn. 3; State ex rel. Brown v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs. 
(1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 62, 50 O.O.2d 159, 255 N.E.2d 244, syllabus. 
{¶49} The commissioners did not submit credible evidence that funding 
the probate court’s 2003 budget order would render other county offices unable to 
perform their statutory duties. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
{¶50} Therefore, because the commissioners have not rebutted the 
presumption that the probate and juvenile court budget orders are reasonable and 
necessary, they “are required to fund [the courts’] operations even if it requires 
the return of previously appropriated or encumbered funds, or the shutting down 
of other unmandated county offices or services.”  State ex rel. Pike v. Hoppel 
(Nov. 13, 2000), Columbiana App. No. 00 CO 34, 2000 WL 1726522. 
Health Insurance Premium Copay 
{¶51} The parties agree that the probate and juvenile courts are 
authorized to set the compensation packages for their employees, but the 
commissioners assert that the courts’ failure to have their employees pay a 10 
percent health insurance premium copay constitutes an abuse of discretion.  
Despite the commissioners’ argument, two of them admitted that the judges acted 
within their legal authority by refusing to implement the commissioners’ copay 
resolution.  The copay resolution did not affect the courts’ 2003 budget 
appropriations. 
{¶52} Nevertheless, the judges’ decision to exempt their employees from 
the copay resolution is contrary to the State Auditor’s recommendation as well as 
the prevailing policy in state and private employment requiring an employee 
contribution and might be considered arbitrary and capricious. 
{¶53} We need not, however, resolve the judges’ claims.  “[I]f the 
allegations of a complaint for a writ of mandamus indicate that the real objects 
sought are a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction, the complaint 
does not state a cause of action in mandamus and must be dismissed for want of 
jurisdiction.”  State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 634, 
716 N.E.2d 704.  Although the allegations of the judges’ complaints are couched 
in terms of compelling affirmative duties, i.e., to amend the resolution and to 
remove the 10 percent copay for probate and juvenile court employees, the 
essence of their claims is declaratory judgment and prohibitory injunction.  That 
January Term, 2003 
15 
is, the true objects of their claims are (1) a declaratory judgment:  a judgment 
declaring that the 10 percent copay resolution may not be applied to probate and 
juvenile court employees, and (2) a prohibitory injunction:  an order enjoining the 
commissioners from so applying the 10 percent copay resolution.  Therefore, we 
lack jurisdiction to consider the judges’ claims.  See State ex rel. Satow v. 
Gausse-Milliken, 98 Ohio St.3d 479, 2003-Ohio-2074, 786 N.E.2d 1289, ¶ 13-14. 
Bad Faith 
{¶54} Judge Maloney and Judge Dellick further request that they be 
granted an award of various costs, including attorney fees, against the 
commissioners in their individual capacities because they acted in bad faith. 
{¶55} In Ohio, the general rule is that absent a statute allowing attorney 
fees as costs, the prevailing party is not entitled to an award of attorney fees 
unless the party against whom the fees are taxed acted in bad faith.  State ex rel. 
Chapnick v. E. Cleveland City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 449, 
452, 755 N.E.2d 883. 
{¶56} Judge Maloney and Judge Dellick are not entitled to an award of 
attorney and other fees here.  Although the commissioners did not present 
sufficient evidence to overcome the presumptive reasonableness of the judges’ 
2003 budget orders, the evidence establishes that they had good-faith reasons for 
believing otherwise.  As noted previously, the county’s fiscal difficulties were a 
relevant consideration.  Weaver, 62 Ohio St.3d at 206-207, 580 N.E.2d 1090.  
And other county courts had complied with the county’s budget targets for 2003.  
Further, Judge Maloney did not follow the prescribed budget procedure and 
instead issued an eleventh-hour order in December, only two days before the 
commissioners voted on the 2003 general-fund appropriation.  Although Judge 
Maloney’s actions do not preclude his entitlement to mandamus, they restricted 
the time for the commissioners to consider the propriety of his order.  Wilke, 90 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
Ohio St.3d at 63-64, 734 N.E.2d 811.  Finally, the judges did not prevail on their 
mandamus claim regarding the health insurance premium copay. 
{¶57} Therefore, we deny the judges’ request for an award of fees. 
Conclusion 
{¶58} Based on the foregoing, Judge Maloney and Judge Dellick did not 
act in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable manner by ordering the 
commissioners to appropriate the funds requested in their 2003 budget orders.  
Therefore, we  grant writs of mandamus to compel the commissioners to comply 
with their appropriation orders.  Nevertheless, we advise the parties that “ ‘the 
public interest is served when courts co-operate with executive and legislative 
bodies in the complicated budgetary processes of government.’ ”  Wilke, 90 Ohio 
St.3d 55, 63, 734 N.E.2d 811, quoting State ex rel. Giuliani v. Perk (1968), 14 
Ohio St.2d 235, 237, 43 O.O.2d 366, 237 N.E.2d 397. 
{¶59} Insofar as the judges request writs of mandamus removing their 
employees from the health insurance premium copay resolution, we deny their 
claims.  In addition, we deny the judges’ requests for fees. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR 
and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs separately. 
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in judgment. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring. 
{¶60} This case presents a difficult issue that requires us to determine 
whether a court’s request to county commissioners for an increased budget is 
reasonable when the county is faced with a severe revenue shortfall.  Although I 
concur with the decision mandating the commissioners to fund Judge Maloney’s 
January Term, 2003 
17 
operation, I am compelled to point out his unreasonableness when submitting his 
budget by court order instead of using the county’s budget forms. 
{¶61} I believe that Judge Maloney’s method of using a court order is 
unreasonable and merely leads to confrontation and a public perception of 
noncooperativeness.  We have stated that a court should make every reasonable 
effort, in the interests of intergovernmental cooperation, to adhere to the 
conventional legislatively promulgated budget process.  State ex rel. Arbaugh v. 
Richland Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 5, 6, 14 OBR 311, 470 
N.E.2d 880. 
{¶62} “We recognize that the power to control what a court spends, or to 
totally regulate the process of obtaining funds, ultimately becomes the power to 
control what the court does.  Such a principle is an anathema to an independent 
judiciary.  On the other hand a tripartite balance of power exists that must be 
respected.  To this extent it is axiomatic that a court should cooperate, whenever 
possible, with the legislative budget process.”  Id.  I do not believe that Judge 
Maloney’s method adheres to our admonishment in Arbaugh. 
{¶63} Nevertheless, the case law supports the request by Judge Maloney.  
Therefore, I concur with the decision to grant a writ ordering full compliance with 
the request from the probate court. 
__________________ 
 
Mary Jane Stephens and John B. Juhasz, for relators. 
 
Paul J. Gains, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, and Linette M. 
Stratford, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents. 
__________________