Case Title: Nettleton Sch. Dist. v. Owens

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
NETTLETON SCHOOL DISTRICT v. Pam OWENS

96-1083                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered July 14, 1997


1.   Motions -- directed-verdict motion waived -- appellant's
     contention meritless. -- Appellant school district's claim
     that the trial court erred in failing to grant its motion for
     directed verdict at the close of appellee's case was meritless
     where the district waived any reliance on its motion when it
     chose to go forward and put on its own case. 

2.   Appeal & error -- trial court gave different reason for ruling
     -- trial court's ruling affirmed if right result reached. --
     The supreme court will affirm the ruling of a trial court if
     it reached the right result, even though it may be for a
     different reason. 

3.   Schools & school districts -- majority vote required on truth
     of each reason given in support of recommended termination --
     trial court's ruling affirmed for different reason. -- Where
     the trial court found that appellee's termination was void
     because the school board failed to conduct a separate vote on
     the reasons or the truth of the reasons in support of the
     termination, and the supreme court concluded that the district
     did not strictly comply with Ark. Code Ann.  6-17-1510(c)
     when the board failed to obtain a majority vote with regard to
     the truth of each reason given appellee in support of the
     recommended termination, the trial court was found to have
     reached the correct result, even though the supreme court
     affirmed that result for a reason other than the one stated. 
 
4.   Schools & school districts -- district failed to give appellee
     notice that previous incidents would be considered at hearing
     in compliance with Ark. Code Ann.  6-17-1507 (c) -- decision
     to terminate appellee's contract void. -- Where appellant
     school district's notice of termination recommendation did not
     give appellee notice that previous incidents would be
     considered at the hearing, yet those incidents were presented
     and discussed, the district failed to comply with Ark. Code
     Ann.  6-17-1507(c); when considering the violation of this
     provision together with the district's violation of  6-17-
     1510(c), the supreme court held that the district's decision
     to terminate appellee's contract was void.  

5.   Appeal & error -- holding that termination void rendered
     appellee's argument moot -- supreme court does not usually
     discuss moot issues. -- Appellee's contentions that appellant
     school district failed to engage in remedial or rehabilitative
     measures and that the district did not strictly comply with 
     6-17-1507(c) were rendered moot by the supreme court's holding
     that the termination of appellee's contract was void due to
     the district's failure to strictly comply with   6-17-
     1510(c) and 6-17-1507(c); a district's termination of a
     teacher is void unless the district strictly complies with all
     provisions of the Act; with limited exceptions, the supreme
     court does not address moot issues. 

6.   Schools & school districts -- claim for attorney's fees
     procedurally barred -- issue not reviewed. -- Appellant was
     correct in asserting that appellee's claim for attorney's fees
     for circuit court representation was procedurally barred
     because she did not appeal the April 4 order; the issue of
     attorney's fees is a collateral matter; because no notice of
     appeal was filed from the April 4 fee order, the supreme court
     would not review the issue.

7.   Schools & school districts -- attorney's fee statute
     inapplicable -- trial court correctly denied appellee's
     request. -- Where neither the actions of the board nor the
     Employment Security Division representation was a civil
     action, the attorney's fees statute, Ark. Code Ann.  16-22-
     308 (Repl. 1994), did not apply, and the trial judge was
     correct in denying appellee's request for such fees in his
     March 12 order.  

 
     Appeal from Craighead Circuit Court; John N. Fogleman, Judge;
affirmed on direct appeal; affirmed on cross-appeal.
     Womack, Landis, Phelps, McNeill & McDaniel, by: Lucinda
McDaniel and Jeffrey W. Puryear, for appellant.
     Henry, Walden, Halsey & Mixon, by: Barbara Halsey, for
appellee.

     W.H."Dub" Arnold, Chief Justice.
     This case involves the interpretation of the Teacher Fair
Dismissal Act, codified at Ark. Code Ann.   6-17-1501 to -1510
(Repl. 1993).  The trial court found that appellant Nettleton
School District failed to strictly comply with the Act when it
terminated appellee and cross-appellant Pam Owens's contract for
the 1993-94 school year.  Both parties appeal the trial court's
order.  We affirm the trial court's ruling that the termination of
Ms. Owens's contract was void.  
     Ms. Owens entered into a contract with the district to serve
as a counselor at University Heights Elementary School for the
1993-1994 academic year.  At approximately 8:00 p.m. on January 11,
1994, Ms. Owens, accompanied by her three children, went to her
classroom.  According to Ms. Owens, prior to going to the school,
she had consumed one glass of wine and had taken one tablet of
prescription medication for anxiety and stress.  She became drowsy
while in the classroom and put her head down on her desk.  When the
children could not awaken her, they called their father, whom Ms.
Owens had served with a divorce complaint the previous day.  Mr.
Owens contacted principal Kay Darby, who in turn contacted
administrator Michael Johnson.  The three proceeded to Ms. Owens's
classroom.  According to Ms. Owens, she became upset and began
crying when her husband entered her classroom.  
     According to principal Darby, she found Ms. Owens asleep on
the floor of the classroom on the night in question.  It was Ms.
Darby's opinion that Ms. Owens was intoxicated, as she could smell
alcohol on her breath.  Mr. Johnson also observed that Ms. Owens
had been drinking.  Ms. Darby and Mr. Johnson helped Ms. Owens to
her car, and Mr. Owens drove the children home.
     When Ms. Owens reported to work the following morning,
principal Darby asked her to take some time off work.  Thereafter,
Ms. Owens checked herself into Green Leaf Hospital for treatment
for chemical dependency and anxiety.  On January 21, superintendent
John Sawyer hand delivered a letter to Ms. Owens notifying her that
she was suspended.  In the letter, Mr. Sawyer stated that, because
she had been under the influence of alcohol in her classroom on
January 11, he would recommend to the school board that she be
terminated due to her violation of the district's Drug Free Work
Policy.
     The school board conducted a hearing on February 24, 1994, at
which superintendent Sawyer distributed to each board member three
documents, which, according to him, led to Ms. Owens's suspension:
1) a memo from principal Darby to Mr. Sawyer dated January 19,
1994, which included not only a summary of the January 11 incident,
but reports that Ms. Owens had been suspected of drinking at school
activities on May 14, 1993, and September 21, 1993; 2) a letter
written by Mr. Johnson dated January 12, 1994, in which he related
that Ms. Owens had previously appeared on campus in an intoxicated
condition; and 3) Mr. Sawyer's January 21, 1994, notification
letter to Ms. Owens.  Ms. Owens and her treating physician at Green
Leaf, Dr. David Silas, testified at the hearing.  According to Dr.
Silas, while Ms. Owens had developed a dependency on alcohol, she
was not a chronic alcoholic.  Ms. Darby and Mr. Johnson also
testified at the hearing.  The board inquired about the January 11,
1994, incident, as well as the 1993 incidents.  At the conclusion
of the hearing, the board went into executive session for
approximately two hours, after which superintendent Sawyer
recommended in an open session that Ms. Owens be terminated.  The
board voted unanimously to accept Sawyer's recommendation.  No
other vote was taken.
     On March 3, 1994, Ms. Owens received a letter from board
president Lennie Hogan.  According to Mr. Hogan, the board
unanimously concluded that the following were the true reasons for
her termination: 1) she violated the district's Drug Free Work
Place Policy; 2) she violated the district's personnel policy; 3)
she failed to meet the expectations of an elementary counselor; and
4) her termination was in the best interests of the students.
     Ms. Owens filed suit in Craighead County Circuit Court,
alleging that the board's action was arbitrary and capricious.  The
trial court conducted a hearing, at which Ms. Owens testified on
her own behalf.  Following her testimony, the district moved for
directed verdict.  The trial court denied the motion, after which
the district presented the testimony of Ms. Darby, Mr. Johnson, Mr.
Hogan, and board member Richard Carvell.  At the conclusion of the
hearing, the trial court ruled that Ms. Owens's termination was
void due to the district's failure to conduct a separate vote on
whether the reasons in support of superintendent Sawyer's
recommendation for termination were true.  On March 12, 1996, the
trial court entered an order awarding Ms. Owens the balance of her
contract for the 1993-94 school year, but denying her request for
attorney's fees for representation at the board hearing and before
the Arkansas Employment Security Division.  On April 4, 1996, the
trial court entered an order denying Ms. Owens's claim for
attorney's fees for representation in the circuit court action.   
     On direct appeal, the district claims that the trial court
erred in failing to grant its motion for directed verdict at the
close of Ms. Owens's case.  Because the district waived any
reliance on its motion when it chose to go forward and put on its
own case, its contention is meritless.  See Willson Safety Prods.
v. Eschenbrenner, 302 Ark. 228,