Case Title: Hodgeman v. Jard Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1991-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 90-263


Patricia Hodgeman                            Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             Commissioner of Labor
                                               and Industry
Jard Company
                                             June Term, 1991




Jeanne Van Vlandren, Commissioner

David W. Lynch of Miller, Cleary & Faignant, Ltd., Rutland, for defendant-
   appellant



PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     GIBSON, J.    Defendant Jard Company, Inc. appeals an award of
attorney's fees to plaintiff Patricia Hodgeman by the Commissioner of Labor
and Industry in a workers' compensation proceeding.  Defendant argues that
the controlling statute, 21 V.S.A. { 678(a), violates Chapter I, Article 7
of the Vermont Constitution.  Alternatively, defendant argues (1) that
workers' compensation claimants must prevail on all claims in order to be
awarded attorney's fees, (2) that the commissioner abused her discretion in
awarding fees without finding that defendant was responsible for
unreasonable delay, and (3) that there was no evidentiary basis for the
award of fees.  We affirm.
     In 1984, plaintiff worked for defendant as a riveter, but was
transferred to the transformer room when defendant experienced an employee
shortage there.  The new job required heavy lifting and repetitive handwork.
After the transfer, a ganglion was discovered on plaintiff's right wrist and
was surgically removed.  Subsequently, plaintiff underwent further wrist
surgery, most recently in 1989.  Plaintiff also has received extensive
treatment for headaches and neck and shoulder pain caused by a cervical
spine injury.  Defendant paid plaintiff's medical expenses related to the
wrist injury, not including the 1989 surgery, but discontinued disability
compensation in 1987.
     After a workers' compensation hearing in 1989, the commissioner found
that plaintiff's wrist injury was caused by her work for defendant, and that
the work had caused or aggravated her back and neck problems.  The
commissioner did not find that plaintiff's headaches, related to a jaw
disorder, arose from her work.  The commissioner ordered defendant to pay
temporary total disability payments for the wrist injury and permanent
partial disability payments for the spine injury.  The commissioner also
awarded plaintiff attorney's fees totaling twenty percent of the award,
excluding payments related to the 1989 wrist surgery, not to exceed $3,000.
The award of attorney's fees is the basis of this appeal.
     Title 21 V.S.A. { 678(a) authorizes the commissioner to award
reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing claimants in workers' compensation
cases. (FN1) Defendant argues that this authorization violates Chapter I,
Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution because it creates an economic
preference to a specified group of individuals.  Article 7 provides "[t]hat
government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection
and security of the people . . . ."  This language offers citizens
protection from unjustifiable government discrimination in a manner similar
to that of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.  Defendant concedes that { 678(a) most likely would withstand
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, but urges a broader reading of
Article 7 that would strike down the statute as granting an unconstitutional
economic advantage to employee-claimants.  Defendant is correct that the
Vermont Constitution is freestanding and may require this Court to examine
more closely distinctions drawn by state government than would the
Fourteenth Amendment.  State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, Inc., 141 Vt. 261, 267-
68,