Case Title: Ehrlich v. Grove

Citation: 396 Md. 550

Docket Number: 54/06

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., et al. v. Robin D. Grove,
No. 54, September Term, 2006
Headnote:  An interlocutory appeal is appropriate under the extraordinary circumstance of
a discovery order being directed to a Governor of Maryland when the collateral order
doctrine’s four-part test is met.  We also hold that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
abused its discretion when it ordered expanded in camera review of documents protected
by attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine and that it abused its discretion
when it actively solicited the consent of third parties to the release of documents that it had
held were irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case # 24-C-03-006508
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 54
September Term, 2006
Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., et al.
v.
Robin D. Grove
Bell, C. J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed:   January 11, 2007
1 Grove also brought suit against then-Maryland Department of the Environment
Acting Secretary Kendl P. Philbrick.  We will refer to the defendants collectively as the
“Governor.”
2 On January 15, 2003, Robin Grove’s termination was discussed in a Washington Post
article, Lori Montgomery, Ehrlich Reverses Dismissal Letter; Highly Touted Motor Vehicles
Administrator Retains Job She Lost Day Before, Washington Post, January 15, 2003, at B1,
on the gubernatorial transition taking place in Annapolis and the effect it was having on State
employees who were replaced by the incoming Ehrlich Administration.  Grove was quoted
in that article as saying:  “‘It’s a wonderful part of the democratic process that allows for
wholesale change, and I respect that,’” and “‘I just wish they’d given me more than a day and
a half [notice].’”  Grove filed suit approximately eight months later.
3 The concept of in camera review is familiar to most in the legal profession, but
expanded in camera review is slightly more obscure.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines in
camera as:  “1.  In the judge’s private chambers.  2.  In the courtroom with all spectators
excluded.  3.  (Of a judicial action) taken when court is not in session.  –Also termed . . . in
chambers.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 775 (8th ed. 2004).  In camera inspection is defined as:
“A trial judge’s private consideration of evidence.”  Id.  Maryland’s cases generally use “in
camera review” and “in camera inspection” interchangeably.  For simplicity, we will use “in
camera review” herein.
It seems that the concept of expanded in camera review made its first appearance in
our case law in the criminal case of Zaal v. State, 326 Md. 54, 602 A.2d 1247 (1992), where
a defendant was attempting to obtain the confidential education records of a child when
(continued...)
This interlocutory appeal arises from a wrongful termination action brought by Robin
Grove, appellee, against Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., appellant.1  Since the suit’s
September 10, 2003, inception,2 the parties have been mired in a discovery dispute.  The
subject of this dispute, as it relates to this interlocutory appeal, is whether Grove is to be
granted access to information that the Governor claims is protected by executive privilege,
attorney-client privilege, and/or the work product doctrine.  On appeal we are directly
presented with two questions:
“I.
Did the Circuit Court abuse its discretion when it ordered expanded in
camera review[3] of documents protected by attorney-client privilege?
3(...continued)
accused of sexual abuse of that child.  Zaal was a relatively rare case involving the
applicability of a federal statute and State regulations adopted in an attempt to comply with
a federal statute: The Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C.A. §§
1221 et seq.
It involved a conflict between the privacy provisions of the federal statute and the
State regulations with a criminal defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him.  In the
case, the defendant only asserted that access to some of the records were necessary for him
to effectively cross-examine, i.e., confront, the victim/witness against him. There, in that
context, we addressed the issue of whether a defendant charged with child sexual abuse may
inspect the school records of the child he has allegedly abused.  After concluding that we did
not need to make a constitutional determination as to the validity of expanded in camera
review in that particular context, we introduced and explained the operation of the concept
of expanded in camera review albeit in a criminal case:
“When, in striking a balance between a victim’s [the position of a victim in a
criminal case is sometimes similar to that of a complainant or plaintiff in a
civil case] privacy interest and a defendant’s right to a fair trial, there is an
acceptable alternative to the defendant’s nonrestricted access to the victim’s
records, it is not necessary to require the trial court to perform that function
which is so foreign to its usual office.  An expanded in camera proceeding,
one in which counsel for the defense and the State participate or permitting the
review of the records by counsel in their capacity as officers of the court are
acceptable alternatives.
“In such proceedings, counsel for the parties could be given access to
the records, in the presence of the trial court, or alone, either as officers of the
court, or under a court order prohibiting disclosure to anyone, including the
defendant, of anything in the records unless expressly permitted by the court.
A well-prepared defense counsel–one who has spoken extensively with his
client, developed a strategy for the trial and is familiar, thoroughly, with the
State’s case–would then be able to bring the advocate’s eye to the review of
the records, thus, protecting the interest of the defendant in ensuring that
relevant, usable exculpatory or impeachment evidence is discovered.  On the
other hand, both by virtue of the court order restricting dissemination of the
information contained in the records and by proceedings to determine
admissibility of information defense counsel deems relevant and usable, the
victim’s right to privacy would be protected.  Moreover, by having the benefit
of counsel’s input on the critical questions of relevance and admissibility, the
court is enabled to rule more responsibly.  Finally, such proceedings could
potentially avoid unintentional, but harmful, disclosures.”
(continued...)
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3(...continued)
Zaal, 326 Md. at 86-87, 602 A.2d at 1263 (some emphasis added).  Zaal, thus, primarily
concerned issues related to privacy and even then the issue was related to a criminal
defendant’s right to confront, i.e., effective cross-examination of an alleged
victim/complaining witness/ plaintiff.
The parties did not bring to our attention any case which discussed expanded in
camera review in the context of the Governor of Maryland asserting executive privilege or
an assertion by the Governor of attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine.
Nor has our own research revealed such a case in this State.  As we discuss below, in camera
review and, necessarily, expanded in camera review may have additional constitutional
implications when these assertions are made by the head of the Executive Branch of this
State.
4 Blades v. Woods, 107 Md. App. 178, 667 A.2d 917 (1995).
5 As noted, infra, the trial court was complying with the directions of the Court of
Special Appeals.
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“II.
Did the Circuit Court abuse its discretion when it improperly applied
the procedure set forth in Blades v. Woods[4] to solicit the consent of
third parties to the release of documents it had ruled irrelevant and not
reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence?”
The Governor also raised executive privilege below and in both of his briefs to this Court
discussed issues relating to executive privilege.  We answer both specific questions above
in the affirmative and additionally hold that an interlocutory appeal is appropriate under the
extraordinary circumstance of a discovery order being directed to a Governor of Maryland
when the collateral order doctrine’s four-part test is met.  We also hold that the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City abused its discretion when it ordered expanded in camera review of
documents protected by attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine5 and that it
abused its discretion when it actively solicited the consent of third parties to the release of
documents that it had held were irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to
-4-
admissible evidence.
I. Facts
Immediately following the Governor’s inauguration in January of 2003, Grove, an at-
will employee or official, was removed as Director of the Maryland Department of the
Environment’s Technical and Regulatory Administration.  As mentioned above, Grove filed
suit against the Governor in September of that same year alleging wrongful termination.  At
the time he filed suit, Grove also served the Governor with document requests.  In addition
to information relating to Grove’s employment and termination, those requests sought access
to personnel records of State employees who are not parties to Grove’s suit and documents
created and used by Governor Ehrlich’s gubernatorial transition team.  The record reflects
that the total number of documents that might have initially been involved, was as high as
80,000 documents.  The Governor declined to produce some of the documents sought on the
grounds of executive privilege, attorney-client privilege, and/or the work product doctrine.
After several attempts by the parties to resolve the issue, Grove filed a motion to
compel production of documents on August 12, 2004.  On November 9, 2004, the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City issued an order requiring, among other things, that the Governor
produce a privilege log within 21 days or, alternatively, within 30 days make the documents
that would be listed in such a privilege log available to Grove for inspection and copying.
On November 24, 2004, the Governor filed a motion asking the Circuit Court to clarify or
reconsider its November 9, 2004, order.  Before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City ruled
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on the Governor’s motion and based on the Circuit Court’s November 9, 2004, order, the
Governor noted his first interlocutory appeal to the Court of Special Appeals on December
10, 2004.  On July 20, 2005, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals
dismissed that interlocutory appeal because the motion for clarification or reconsideration
of the Circuit Court’s November 9, 2004, order was still pending.  The timing of the filing
and the fact that the trial court had not ruled on the motion, according to the intermediate
appellate court, had the effect of depriving it of jurisdiction over the matter.
On July 28, 2005, the Governor sent a letter to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
seeking clarification of and a hearing on that court’s November 9, 2004, order.  On February
2, 2006, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City denied the Governor’s motion for clarification
or reconsideration and reinstated its November 9, 2004, order.  On February 10, 2006, the
Governor noted its second interlocutory appeal to the Court of Special Appeals and sought
to have all discovery stayed pending the outcome of the appeal.  On February 17, 2006, the
Court of Special Appeals issued an order staying the Circuit Court’s February 2 order.  Later,
on April 10, 2006, the Court of Special Appeals issued an order that read in relevant part:
“ORDERED that, while this appeal is pending, the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City shall resolve appellants’ pretrial discovery objections in
conformity with the procedures set forth in this Order; and it is further
“ORDERED that appellants’ counsel forthwith provide the circuit court
with two copies of (1) every document sought by appellee’s counsel that
appellants contend is privileged and/or confidential, regardless of why
appellants’ counsel claims the document should not be produced in discovery,
and (2) a concise written argument in support of whatever privilege and/or
confidentiality requirement is alleged to be applicable; and it is further
“ORDERED that, after making an in camera inspection of the
6 This is a direct appeal from the circuit court’s actions on remand, accordingly, we
are not directly presented with the issue of the propriety of the Court of Special Appeals
ordering the trial court to effectuate expanded in camera review.  Our holding, however, on
this issue resulting from the direct appeal is applicable to the issue.
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documents produced and the written arguments presented, the circuit court
shall determine whether a particular document (1) should not be disclosed to
appellee’s counsel of record, or (2) should be disclosed to appellee’s counsel
of record, in their roles as officers of the court, at an expanded in camera
hearing . . . .”[6]
On May 2, 2006, the Circuit Court convened an on-the-record conference with
counsel for each party to determine the manner in which the trial court would comply with
the Court of Special Appeals’s order.  At the hearing, the Governor asserted that 341
individuals fell within the category of individuals about which Grove was seeking
information and offered to provide the trial court with 30 of those files for in camera review
to demonstrate, by way of example, why the information contained therein was confidential
and/or privileged.  On May 8, 2006, the Circuit Court issued an opinion and order which
summarized the actions it was directing to be taken based on its review of the sample files.
The opinion and order read in relevant part:
“Based on its in-camera inspection of the thirty (30) ‘sample’ personnel
files, this Court believes that because these files represent individuals who
were terminated during the relevant time period, all documents representing
notice of termination by certified and regular mail, and all communications
generated by each employee pertaining 
to said termination, should be disclosed
to Appellee’s counsel of record, in their roles as officers of the Court.  This
Court further believes that all other documents contained within these thirty
(30) individual personnel files, when considered in light of Md. Rule 2-402
and the ‘sparse’ Maryland case law, should not be disclosed as they are not
relevant or likely to lead to admissible evidence.  This Court finds that
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disclosure of these documents would unnecessarily reveal confidential
information of each individual.
“. . . [T]his Court believes that the remainder of the three hundred forty one
(341) individual files requested for production by Appellee Grove should be
disclosed utilizing the same, precise methodology. . . .
“The Court assumes that counsel for Appellee Grove may wish to
contact all of these three hundred and forty one (341) individuals.  Counsel for
both parties shall meet on or before May 31, 2006 and draft a joint letter which
will thereafter be submitted to the Court for approval.  Counsel for Appellee
Grove may then utilize the approved letter in initially contacting the identified,
terminated individuals to determine whether those individuals would object to
further discussion of their personal situations with counsel for Appellee Grove
and/or whether they would be willing to waive any claims for confidentiality
of their personnel file which would allow counsel further opportunity to
review other aspects of the files not released herein. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
(Footnotes omitted.)
On May 24, 2006, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City issued a second order and
opinion.  In it, the court discussed the parties’ failure to agree on a letter to be sent to the 341
individuals in question.  The court then directed the parties to mail a letter drafted by the
court to those individuals.  The Circuit Court also ordered the Governor to make certain State
Agency documents and gubernatorial transition team documents available to Grove.  On June
8, 2006, the Governor filed a motion for reconsideration or clarification of the May 24, 2006,
order and asked the Circuit Court to amend its order to exclude expanded in camera review
of attorney-client and work product materials.  The Governor claimed that six of the
requested documents related specifically to the Attorney General’s efforts to defend the
Governor in Grove’s suit and another 29 documents related to other matters which were
allegedly privileged.  The Governor also produced a more detailed privilege log relating to
these 35 documents and produced, for expanded in camera review, documents to which it
7 Although claiming executive privilege, the Governor produced some of these
documents while noting an objection.  Others he produced after withdrawing a previously
noted objection.
-8-
had been previously claiming executive privilege.7  Grove’s June 16, 2006, opposition to the
Governor’s motion for reconsideration or clarification contained a waiver by Grove of his
request to view certain documents in the Governor’s possession specifically relating to the
instant litigation.  On June 23, 2006, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, based on Grove’s
waiver, issued an order to the effect that four of the six documents relating to this litigation
did not need to be disclosed.  But, as to the other documents, the court denied the remainder
of the Governor’s motion for reconsideration or clarification effectively ordering the
Governor to make them available for expanded in camera review.
On June 28, 2006, the Court of Special Appeals stayed the “communication and
disclosure provisions” of the Circuit Court’s May 24, 2006, order.  Meanwhile the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City continued to catalogue and file responses received from the 341
individuals who received letters from counsel at the direction of the Circuit Court.  The last
such entry in the record was dated August 28, 2006.  On August 29, 2006, prior to the court
of Special Appeals hearing arguments, this Court, on its own motion, issued a writ of
certiorari to address the above stated issues.  Ehrlich v. Grove, 394 Md. 307, 905 A.2d
842 (2006).
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II. Standard of Review
Maryland’s discovery rules were deliberately designed to be broad and comprehensive
in scope.  Baltimore Transit Co. v. Mezzanotti, 227 Md. 8, 13, 174 A.2d 768, 771 (1961).
The purpose of the rules is to expedite the disposition of cases, Home Indem. Co. v. Basiliko,
245 Md. 412, 415-16, 226 A.2d 258, 259 (1967), by eliminating, “‘as far as possible, the
necessity of any party to litigation going to trial in a confused or muddled state of mind,
concerning the facts that gave rise to litigation.’”  Kelch v. Mass Transit Admin., 287 Md.
223, 229, 411 A.2d 449, 453 (1980) (quoting Klein v. Weiss, 284 Md. 36, 55, 395 A.2d 126,
137 (1978)).  They are not designed or intended to “stimulate the ingenuity of lawyers and
judges to make the pursuit of discovery an obstacle race.”  Barnes v. Lednum, 197 Md. 398,
406-07, 79 A.2d 520, 524 (1951).  Consistent with the principles just expressed, Maryland’s
discovery rules are to be liberally construed.  Kelch, 287 Md. at 229, 411 A.2d at 453; Klein,
284 Md. at 55, 395 Md. at 137.  There are, however, limitations on the general proposition
that discovery rules are to be liberally construed.
With respect to discovery matters, it is long settled that the “trial judges ‘“are vested
with a reasonable, sound discretion in applying them, which discretion will not be disturbed
in the absence of a showing of its abuse.”’”  E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Forma-Pack,
Inc., 351 Md. 396, 405, 718 A.2d 1129, 1133-34 (1998) (quoting Kelch, 287 Md. at 229, 411
A.2d at 453 (quoting Mezzanotti, 227 Md. at 13-14, 174 A.2d at 771)).  Thus, we will review
the discovery dispute presently before us under an abuse of discretion standard.  In Dashiell
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v. Meeks, this Court recently stated:
“We have [] said that judicial discretion ‘is defined as the power of a court to
determine a question upon fair judicial consideration with regard to what is
right and equitable under the law and directed by reason and conscience to a
just result.’  Schneider v. Hawkins, 179 Md. 21, 25, 16 A.2d 861, 865 (1940)
(citing Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541, 51 S. Ct. 243, 247, 75 L.Ed 520
(1931). . . .  Generally, the standard is that absent a showing that a court acted
in a harsh, unjust, capricious and arbitrary way, we will not find an abuse of
discretion.”
Dashiell v. Meeks, ___ Md. ___ (2006) (No. 27, September Term, 2006) (filed December 14,
2006).
III.  Discussion
A.  Interlocutory Appeal
Prior to addressing the issues before us on appeal, we must first consider whether the
Governor is entitled to appeal from the Circuit Court’s discovery order.
Generally, the interlocutory nature of discovery orders requires that a potential
appellant must await the final judgment terminating the case in the trial court before noting
his appeal.  Montgomery County v. Stevens, 337 Md. 471, 477, 654 A.2d 877, 880 (1995)
(citing Dep’t of Social Services v. Stein, 328 Md. 1, 7, 18, 612 A.2d 880, 883, 888 (1992);
Public Service Comm’n v. Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. 200, 207, 477 A.2d 759, 763 (1984)).
This general rule is found in the Maryland Code, where it is said that a party may only
“appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court.”  Md.
Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  The
limited statutory exceptions to this general rule are found in § 12-303 of the Courts and
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Judicial Proceedings Article, but nothing in that section specifically permits the Governor to
note an interlocutory appeal in the present case.
“‘We have long recognized, however, a narrow class of orders, referred to as collateral
orders, which are offshoots of the principle litigation in which they are issued and which are
immediately appealable as “final judgments” without regard to the posture of the case.’”
Stevens, 337 Md. at 477, 654 A.2d at 880 (quoting Harris v. Harris, 310 Md. 310, 315, 529
A.2d 356, 358 (1987)).  See also Mandel v. O’Hara, 320 Md. 103, 134, 576 A.2d 766, 781
(1990) (holding that Governor Mandel, who was asserting absolute immunity, was entitled
to an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine because absolute immunity
permits the defendant to avoid trial altogether and a review after trial would not protect that
right for a defendant); Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 210, 477 A.2d at 764 (holding that “an
order in an action for judicial review of an administrative decision, requiring administrative
decision makers [who may be immune from suit] to stand for depositions, may be
immediately appealed by the agency itself or, if a party, by the government of which the
agency is a part.[]”).  This narrow class of orders falls under the umbrella of the collateral
order doctrine.
The collateral order doctrine “is based upon a judicially created fiction, under which
certain interlocutory orders are considered to be final judgments, even though such orders
clearly are not final judgments.”  Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 376 Md. 53, 64,
827 A.2d 115, 121 (2003).  The creation of the collateral order doctrine was based on the
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“perceived necessity, in a very few . . . extraordinary situations, for immediate appellate
review.”  Id. at 64, 827 A.2d at 121 (citation omitted) (quotation omitted).  An extraordinary
situation may arise when a discovery order is directed at “high level government decision
makers.”  Stevens, 337 Md. at 480, 654 A.2d at 881; Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 210, 477
A.2d at 764.
With respect to the operation of the collateral order doctrine, we have said:
“‘The “collateral order doctrine ‘treats as final and appealable a limited
class of orders which do not terminate the litigation in the trial court.’”
Bunting v. State, 312 Md. 472, 476, 540 A.2d 805, 807 (1988), quoting Public
Service Comm’n v. Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. 200, 206, 477 A.2d 759, 762
(1984).  The doctrine is a very limited exception to the principle that only final
judgments terminating the case in the trial court are appealable, and it has four
requirements.  As summarized by Judge Wilner for the Court in Pittsburgh
Corning v. James, 353 Md. 657, 660-661, 728 A.2d 210, 211-212 (1999), 
“[w]e have made clear, time and again, as has the United States
Supreme Court, that the collateral order doctrine is a very
narrow exception to the general rule that appellate review
ordinarily must await the entry of a final judgment disposing of
all claims against all parties.  It is applicable to a ‘small class’ of
cases in which the interlocutory order sought to be reviewed (1)
conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an
important issue, (3) resolves an issue that is completely separate
from the merits of the action, and (4) would be effectively
unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final
judgment.  See Peat & Co. v. Los Angeles Rams, 284 Md. 86,
92, 394 A.2d 801, 804 (1978); Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 213,
406 A.2d 922, 925 (1979); Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143,
725 A.2d 549 (1999).”’”
Dawkins, 376 Md. at 58-59, 827 A.2d at 118 (quoting In re Foley, 373 Md. 627, 633-34, 820
A.2d 587, 591 (2003)).  “The four elements of the test are conjunctive in nature and in order
for a prejudgement order to be appealable and to fall within this exception to the ordinary
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operation of the final judgment requirement, each of the four elements must be met.”  In Re
Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 327, 783 A.2d 673, 686 (2001).  “[I]n Maryland, the four
requirements of the collateral order doctrine are very strictly applied, and appeals under the
doctrine may be entertained only in extraordinary circumstances.”  In Re Foley, 373 Md. 627,
634, 820 A.2d 587, 591 (2003) (citing Pittsburgh Corning v. James, 353 Md. 657, 660-661,
728 A.2d 210, 211-212 (1999); Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 169, 725 A.2d 549, 563
(1999); Bunting v. State, 312 Md. 472, 476, 540 A.2d 805, 807 (1988)).  Thus, the collateral
order doctrine is a limited exception to the principle that only final judgments are appealable
and it may only be invoked in extraordinary circumstances when the conjunctive four-part
test is met.
The Governor urges this Court to find that the collateral order doctrine does apply
because the contested order “authorizes discovery into the decision-making processes of
senior level government decision makers, and consequently poses a threat to the public’s
interest in efficient and unimpeded government deliberations.”  Moreover, the Governor
asserts that if he were forced to delay his appeal until final judgment is entered, the excessive
probing of the executive’s decisional thought processes would already have taken place and
could not be undone.  The consequence of which would be to harm the public’s interest in
unimpeded deliberations by the executive branch.
Appellees argue that the collateral order doctrine does not apply in the present case
because the disputes over discovery orders currently before the Circuit Court for Baltimore
8 See note 3, supra and part D, below.
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City-the existence of attorney-client privilege and the scope of expanded in camera review-
do not conclusively resolve the remaining discovery disputes.  There are no “important
issues,” to be decided on appeal because, according to Grove, the Governor has waived
executive privilege and the issues addressed are not separate from the merits of the action
because they are essential to the action.  Moreover, even though documents have been made
available to Grove through expanded in camera review, there is no risk of public harm
because of a confidentiality agreement made between the parties.  We disagree.
The Governor of the State of Maryland has asserted executive privilege with respect
to certain documents sought by Grove in discovery and continues to do so in this Court.  As
such, separation of powers principles are implicated and we must address the application of
Maryland’s discovery rules when executive privilege is asserted as well as when a Governor
asserts attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine.  Thus, this is a different
context than that of Zaal8 and its progeny where expanded in camera review was applied
without these additional factors.  The additional factors of separation of powers, executive
privilege, attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine exist in the present case.
B.  Executive Privilege
With these principles in mind, we turn to the seminal case in Maryland addressing
executive privilege and discovery, Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 414 A.2d 914 (1980).
In that case, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland certified questions
9 See Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 12-603 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article which provides a statutory framework for certified questions.
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of law to this Court.9  One of the certified questions was “whether the doctrine of executive
privilege prevents the discovery and the in camera inspection by the court of a confidential
report prepared for and at the order of the Governor of Maryland.”  Id. at 546, 414 A.2d at
916.  Judge Eldridge, writing for this Court, thoroughly expressed the legal and historical
foundations of executive privilege:
“Our cases have recognized, however, that the Governor bears the same
relation to this State as does the President to the United States, and that
generally the Governor is entitled to the same privileges and exemptions in the
discharge of his duties as is the President.  Magruder v. Swann, Governor, 25
Md. 173, 212 (1866); Miles v. Bradford, Governor of Maryland, 22 Md. 170,
184-185 (1864).  In addition, we have observed, in various circumstances, that
the principles behind the constitutional separation of powers, Art. 8 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights, place limits on a court’s power to review or
interfere with the conclusions, acts, or decisions of a coordinate branch of
government made within its own sphere of authority.  See, e.g., Dep’t of Nat.
Res. v. Linchester, 274 Md. 211, 218, 223-225, 334 A.2d 514 (1975); Heaps
v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 45 A.2d 73 (1945); Magruder v. Swann, Governor,
supra; Miles v. Bradford, Governor of Maryland, supra; Green v. Purnell,
Comptroller of the Treasury, 12 Md. 329 (1858); Watkins v. Watkins, 2 Md.
341 (1852).
“Moreover, it is apparent from the very nature of government that a
legitimate necessity exists for the protection from a public disclosure of certain
types of official information.  Thus, at least as early as 1807, in the treason
trial of Aaron Burr, Chief Justice Marshall, sitting on the circuit court,
recognized the potential existence of an executive privilege from discovery for
official governmental information and confidential communications to the
executive.  United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187, 191-192 (C.C. Va. 1807)
(Fed. Cas. No. 14, 694).  The Chief Justice acknowledged that, as a matter of
public interest, President Jefferson might be able to prevent the disclosure by
a potential prosecution witness of a letter to the President which allegedly
contained state diplomatic secrets.  Chief Justice Marshall observed (id. at
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191-192):
‘That the president of the United States may be subpoenaed, and
examined as a witness, and required to produce any paper in his
possession, is not controverted.  I cannot, however, on this point,
go the whole length for which counsel have contended.  The
president, although subject to the general rules which apply to
others, may have sufficient motives for declining to produce a
particular paper, and those motives may be such as to restrain
the court from enforcing its production.  I do not think precisely
with the gentlemen on either side.  I can readily conceive that
the president might receive a letter which it would be improper
to exhibit in public, because of the manifest inconvenience of its
exposure.  The occasion for demanding it ought, in such a case,
to be very strong, and to be fully shown to the court before its
production could be insisted on.  I admit, that in such a case,
much reliance must be placed on the declaration of the
president; and I do think that a privilege does exist to withhold
private letters of certain description.  The reason is this: Letters
to the president in his private character, are often written to him
in consequence of his public character, and may relate to public
concerns.  Such a letter, though it be a private one, seems to
partake of the character of an official paper, and to be such as
ought not on light ground to be forced into public view.’
(Emphasis supplied.)
See also United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30, 37-38 (C.C. Va. 1807) (Fed.
Cas. No. 14, 692d).
“The necessity for some protection from disclosure clearly extends to
confidential advisory and deliberative communications between officials and
those who assist them in formulating and deciding upon future governmental
action.  A fundamental part of the decisional process is the analysis of different
options and alternatives.  Advisory communications, from a subordinate to a
governmental officer, which examine and analyze these choices, are often
essential to this process.  The making of candid communications by the
subordinate may well be hampered if their contents are expected to become
public knowledge. . . .”
Hamilton, 287 Md. at 556-58, 414 A.2d at 921-22 (footnotes omitted).  Thus, the necessity
and validity of executive privilege has been recognized for almost 200 years by the courts
10 Judge Raker, discussing the origins and purpose of executive privilege, cited to the
same Hamilton language in her dissent in Governor v. Washington Post Co., 360 Md 520,
759 A.2d 249 (2000) (Raker, J. dissenting) when she stated:  “‘. . . [T]here is a presumptive
privilege, with the burden upon those seeking to compel disclosure.’”  360 Md. at 594, 759
A.2d at 289 (quoting Hamilton, 287 Md. at 563, 414 A.2d at 925).  “We went on to hold [in
Hamilton] that this presumptive privilege extended even to ‘“the limited intrusion
represented by an in camera examination of the conversations by a court.”’”  360 Md. at 594,
759 A.2d at 289 (quoting Hamilton, 287 Md. at 563, 414 A.2d at 925 (quoting Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 730 (D.C. Cir.
1974))).
-17-
of this nation and although the recognition of the expansion of the concept to the decisional
process of the executive’s advisors acting in their advisory capacity has not been as long, it
is equally necessary and valid.  Both concepts are alive and well in Maryland.
With the exception of diplomatic or security matters, the privilege is not absolute,
rather, it attempts to:
“[A]ccommodate the competing interests of a just resolution of legal disputes
with the need to protect certain confidential government communications.
Nevertheless, when a formal claim of executive privilege is made for
confidential communications of the chief executive, or confidential
communications of other government officials of an advisory or deliberative
nature, there is a presumptive privilege, with the burden upon those seeking to
compel disclosure.  And such communications ‘are “presumptively
privileged,” even from the limited intrusion represented by an in camera
examination of the conversations by a court.’[10]
“The treatment accorded a claim of executive privilege has varied
somewhat depending on the circumstances.  In many situations the courts have
engaged in a balancing process, weighing the need for confidentiality against
the litigant’s need for disclosure and the impact of nondisclosure upon the fair
administration of justice.  This has been done where the privilege is asserted
for potential evidence at a criminal trial, or where there is an allegation of
government misconduct, or where the government itself is a party in the
underlying litigation.”
-18-
Hamilton, 287 Md. at 563-64, 414 A.2d at 924 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted) (some
emphasis added).
When, as is the situation in the present case, the government is a party to the litigation:
“[A] question of unfair litigation advantage may arise.  In other words, the
government may be in a position of asserting or defending a claim while at the
same time depriving its opponent of information needed to overcome the
government’s position.  In these circumstances, courts have weighed the
government’s need for confidentiality against its opponent’s need for
information.  See, e.g., [Stiftung v.] Zeiss, [] 40 F.R.D. [] [318,] 329, [(D.D.C.
1966)] and cases there collected; Olsen v. Camp, 328 F.Supp. 728, 731 (E.D.
Mich. 1970); Kaiser Aluminum[] [v. U.S.] [], 157 F.Supp. [] [939], 945 [(Cl.
Ct.1958)]. Cf. Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 896, 84 S. Ct. 172, 11 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1963).  Of course, in
this situation, a determination by a court that the government’s need for
confidentiality is outweighed by its opponent’s need for disclosure, does not
absolutely prevent the government from maintaining confidentiality.  The
government is then left with the choice of either producing the information or
having the issue to which the information relates resolved against it.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Reynolds,  [] 345 U.S. [1,] [] 5 [; 73 S. Ct 528, 530-31
(1953)]; Smith v. Schlesinger, 513 F.2d 462, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1975). . . .”
Hamilton, 287 Md. at 564 n.8, 414 A.2d at 925 n.8 (emphasis added).  In short, if the court
deems that the government’s opponent’s need for the confidential information is greater than
the government’s need to protect the information, the government may still keep the
information confidential at the risk of having those issues to which the matters relate decided
against it.
The Hamilton Court further explained in camera review as it relates to situations in
which executive privilege is invoked:
“It has repeatedly been stated that in camera inspection by the trial judge does
not automatically follow whenever a claim of executive privilege is made. . . .
-19-
[T]he in camera inspection itself is an intrusion upon the privilege.  Thus,
when a formal claim of executive privilege is made, with an affidavit stating
that the demanded materials are of a type that fall within the scope of the
privilege, they are presumptively privileged even from in camera inspection.
The burden is on the party seeking production to make a preliminary showing
that the communications or documents may not be privileged or, in those cases
where a weighing approach is appropriate, that there is some necessity for
production. . . .  Consequently, absent such a preliminary showing by the party
demanding disclosure, the claim of executive privilege should be honored
without requiring an in camera inspection.”
287 Md. at 566-67, 414 A.2d at 926-27 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
It does not appear from the record, with respect to the documents the Governor
claimed to be subject to executive privilege, that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, in its
November 9, 2004, opinion and order, or the Court of Special Appeals, in its April 10, 2006,
order, ever made an explicit determination under Hamilton that Grove had met his burden
of making a preliminary showing that “the communications or documents may not be
privileged or, in those cases where a weighing approach is appropriate, that there is some
necessity for production.”  287 Md. at 566, 414 A.2d at 926 (emphasis added).  Under
Hamilton, if Grove did not meet this burden then “executive privilege should [have] be[en]
honored without requiring an in camera inspection.”  287 Md. at 567, 414 A.2d at 927.
It is conceivable that Grove met his burden under Hamilton for every document to
which the Governor was asserting privilege and that the Court of Special Appeals’s order
was consistent with the next step therein, an in camera inspection.  We simply do not know
on this record, whether the trial court determined that Grove had met his burden under
Hamilton as to every document that was ordered to be viewed in camera.  Even if we did
11 There is an intrusion on executive privilege, if it exists, even when there is a court
order and/or a confidentiality agreement between the parties requiring opposing counsel, in
this case Grove’s attorney, to keep the information confidential even from his client.  The
(continued...)
-20-
know, there is no way for this Court to now undo the possible infringement on executive
privilege that may have occurred when an in camera inspection took place in a situation in
which Grove may not have made the appropriate showing for each document the court
viewed.
We went on to note in Hamilton that:
“[W]here a sufficient showing is made to overcome the presumption, the court
should order an in camera inspection.  Depending upon the issues and
circumstances, the in camera inspection may be utilized to determine whether
the material is privileged, to sever privileged from non-privileged material if
severability is feasible, and to weigh the government’s need for confidentiality
against the litigant’s need for production.”
287 Md. at 567, 414 A.2d at 927.  The above emphasized language encapsulates the basis for
granting the present interlocutory appeal.   Simply put, the need to avoid a confrontation with
constitutional implications between the Executive Branch and Judicial Branch over the
production of material to which the Executive is claiming privilege may, in certain
circumstances, necessitate that the Executive note an interlocutory appeal.  If, as we are
instructed it is above, an in camera inspection is an intrusion on executive privilege,
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, then, clearly, expanded in camera
review is a more serious intrusion on those privileges because opposing counsel is being
made privy to allegedly privileged information.11  Thus, in situations such as the instant case
11(...continued)
requirement that an attorney keep from his client documents he has received in the process
of representing his client, raises additional issues relating to an attorney’s duty to zealously
represent his client.  The issue of the appropriateness of the imposition of limitations by trial
courts on the relationship between attorneys and clients is being, with some frequency,
discussed.  See Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous Representation–Lying to
Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 771 (2006);
Stephen Gillers, Monroe Freedman’s Solution to the Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Trilemma
is Wrong as a Matter of Policy and Constitutional Law, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 821 (2006);
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Well Excuse Me!–Remorse, Apology, and Criminal Sentencing, 38 Ariz.
St. L.J. 371 (2006); see also Symposium, The Worcester County Bar Association Eighth
Annual Autumn Afternoon of Continuing Legal Education Presenting “Sentencing in the
State Courts” (2006) (P.A. Wimbrow, III, Moderator).  
-21-
in which executive privilege and the other privileges are asserted and the trial court orders
an expanded in camera review of the materials to which privilege is asserted, on a case-by-
case basis, the Executive may be able to note an interlocutory appeal so as to avoid a
constitutional collision between the Executive Branch and the Judicial Branch.
Returning to the four-part test for the permissibility of interlocutory appeals laid out
above and applying it to the instant appeal, the Governor easily meets the standard.  First, the
trial court’s order conclusively determined that the Governor was ordered to disclose
information which he was claiming was subject to privilege including executive privilege.
Second, a potential intrusion on executive privilege and the other privileges, especially when
asserted by a high governmental official, is an important issue.  Third, the propriety of a
potential intrusion on such privileges has nothing to do with the merits of Grove’s wrongful
termination claim.  Fourth, disallowing the Governor’s interlocutory appeal would be
inappropriate under the circumstances because of the potential disruption to the deliberative
12  This portion of our discussion treats the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine as being interchangeable for the purposes of clarity.  With that said, we are,
of course, aware of the differences between attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine as laid out in E.I. Dupont v. de Nemours & Co. v. Forma-Pack, Inc., 351 Md. 396,
718 A.2d 1129 (1998).
 Although the Governor does not specifically assert the protection of the work product
doctrine in his brief before this Court, he did assert it in pleadings related to the dispute
giving rise to this most recent interlocutory appeal.  In an effort to prevent confusion on
remand, the Governor is free to re-assert the protection of the work product doctrine, as it
relates to documents which are subject to the May 8 and May 24, 2006, orders, in order for
the trial court to make a determination of its applicability consistent with this opinion and
other relevant case law.  See, e.g., E.I. Dupont, supra.  
13 In Newman v. State, 384 Md. 285, 863 A.2d 321 (2004), Judge Battaglia
thoroughly explained the purpose and scope of the attorney-client privilege:
“The Supreme Court has recognized the attorney client privilege as ‘the
oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common
law.’  Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 682, 66
L.Ed.2d 584, 591 (1981).  
. . .
(continued...)
-22-
process of the Executive Branch, a harm which, once executive privilege and the attorney-
client privilege is broken, cannot be undone.  Thus, the collateral order doctrine’s four-part
test is met and an interlocutory appeal is appropriate under these extraordinary circumstances
involving discovery orders directed to a high government official.
C.  Expanded In Camera Review and Attorney-Client Privilege12
Maryland Rule 2-402(a) states in relevant part: “A party may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged . . . .”  (Emphasis added).  The type of privilege that is
relevant in this portion of our discussion is that which exists between an attorney and his or
her client.13  Practically speaking, “[o]nce the attorney-client privilege is invoked, the trial
13(...continued)
“We have stated that the privilege is an accommodation of the competing
public interests of the need to promote candor in communications between
attorneys and their clients and the general testimonial compulsion to divulge
relevant evidence in the pursuit of truth and justice.  See Harrison [v. State],
276 Md. [122,] [] 133, 345 A.2d [830,] [] 837 [(1975)].  It is so basic to the
relationship of trust between an attorney and client that, although it is not
given express constitutional protection, it is essential to a defendant’s exercise
of the constitutional guarantees of counsel and freedom from self-
incrimination.  Id.
“The privilege is understood to be ‘a rule of evidence that prevents the
disclosure of a confidential communication made by a client to his attorney for
the purpose of obtaining legal advice.’  See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Forma-Pack, Inc., 351 Md. 396, 414, 718 A.2d 1129, 1138 (1998), citing
Levitsky v. Prince George’s County, 50 Md. App. 484, 491, 439 A.2d 600, 604
(1982).  In Harrison v. State, supra, we adopted Professor Wigmore’s
definition of the attorney-client privilege:
[‘](1) Where legal advice of [any] kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his insistence permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by his legal adviser, (8) except
the protection [may] be waived.[’]
276 Md. at 135, 345 A.2d at 838, quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
§ 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed.1961) (footnote omitted).  The common
law privilege is codified in Section 9-108 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code, which states, ‘A person may not be
compelled to testify in violation of the attorney-client privilege.’  Md. Code
(1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 9-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article.
“The privilege, although essential to an effective attorney-client
relationship, is not absolute.  In re Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326
Md. 1, 11, 602 A.2d 1220, 1225 (1992).  We have observed that ‘[o]nly those
attorney-client communications pertaining to legal assistance and made with
the intention of confidentiality are within the ambit of the privilege.’  E.I. du
Pont de Nemours, 351 Md. at 416, 718 A.2d at 1138.  This Court in Lanasa v.
State, 109 Md. 602, 71 A. 1058 (1909), observed, ‘[T]o make the
communications privileged, they . . . must relate to professional advice and to
(continued...)
-23-
13(...continued)
the subject-matter about which the advice is sought.’  Id. at 617, 71 A. at 1064.
See also Morris v. State, 4 Md. App. 252, 255, 242 A.2d 559, 561 (1968),
quoting Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637, cert. denied 371 U.S. 951,
83 S.Ct. 505, 9 L.Ed.2d 499 (1963) (‘[T]he privilege extends essentially only
to the substance of matters communicated to an attorney in professional
confidence.’).”
Newman, 384 Md. at 300-03, 863 A.2d at 330-31. 
-24-
court decides as a matter of law whether the requisite privilege relationship exists, and if it
does, ‘whether or not any such communication is privileged.’”  E.I. DuPont, 351 Md. at 415,
718 A.2d at 1138 (quoting Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 136, 345 A.2d 830, 838 (1975)).
If that two-part test is met, then any communications which are subject to the privilege are
not discoverable.
In the unusual circumstances of the present case, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City,
in its May 24, 2006, order, acting pursuant to the Court of Special Appeals’s April 10, 2006,
order, effectively directed that certain documents which the Governor claimed were subject
to attorney-client privilege be made available to Grove’s counsel through expanded in
camera review.  After the Governor filed a motion for clarification or reconsideration,
asserting the attorney-client privilege specifically to certain documents, and Grove filed a
response, the Circuit Court, based on Grove’s waiver of his request, found that four
documents relating to Grove’s litigation were privileged and denied the remainder of the
Governor’s motion.  The consequence of which was to make some of the documents the
Governor was claiming were privileged available to Grove’s counsel for expanded in camera
14 We reject Grove’s argument asserting that the Governor waived attorney-client
privilege by producing documents similar to the ones for which he is asserting the privilege
(without making a judgment as to whether the Governor did produce documents similar to
the ones he is claiming are privileged) as being not on point.  Grove argues that attorney-
client privilege assertions must be consistent.  According to Grove, “a privileged party cannot
fairly be permitted to disclose as much as he pleases and then to withhold the remainder to
the detriment of the [opposing party].”  This language originated in Greater Newburyport
Clamshell Alliance v. Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 838 F.2d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 1988),
and came into Maryland when it was quoted in Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge, 359
Md. 671, 693, 756 A.2d 526, 538 (2000).  Both the First Circuit and this Court, in the two
cases, used “defendant” where Grove disingenuously inserted “[opposing party]” in his brief.
The cases were specifically directed at limitations on civil  plaintiffs, not defendants,
and correctly used the original language to refer to the express and implied waiver principle,
which has its basis in fairness and consistency, that a plaintiff may not use the attorney-client
privilege as both a sword (using such privileged information to assert his claim) and a shield
(while at the same time denying discovery to a defendant as to the balance of the privileged
information) against a defendant.  The present case is readily distinguishable from Greater
Newburyport and Parler & Wobber because the Governor is not a plaintiff and is not
asserting a claim against Grove based upon the use of privileged information.  The above
principle of fairness and consistency does not, in this particular context, apply to this
(continued...)
-25-
review.
The Governor argues that documents which are protected by the attorney-client
privilege should not be subjected to expanded in camera review.  He is correct.  If they are
protected by the privilege they are not subject to such expanded review.  Grove counters by
arguing that the Governor should not be allowed to assert the attorney-client privilege
because, according to Grove, the Governor had never before asserted the attorney-client
privilege with respect to the documents which are the subject of this appeal.  Grove also
argues that the Governor is asserting the privilege too broadly and that he has waived it by
producing similar documents.14
14(...continued)
defendant.  The principle of Parler & Wobber, to the extent previously applied in this State,
relates to civil plaintiffs in professional malpractice cases.  We said in Parler & Wobber:
“Maryland recognizes that the attorney-client privilege[s] . . . are
waived in any proceeding where the client challenges its hired professional’s
activity or advice. 
“These waiver rules are based, in part, on the premise that the client
cannot use the advice of a professional as sword to prove the client’s case . . .
while at the same time asserting the privilege as a shield to prevent disclosing
harmful information.”
359 Md. at 692-93, 756 A.2d at 537-38 (citations omitted).  Parler & Wobber simply has no
applicability in the context of the present case.
-26-
On or about April 5, 2004, in the Governor’s amended response to Grove’s request
for documents, the Governor clearly made a blanket statement protecting documents subject
to the attorney-client privilege.  It is only natural, as the discovery process unfolds, that the
scope of the Governor’s blanket statements covering privileged material narrowed from
many documents to fewer documents.  Although it is preferred that responses to document
requests be as accurate as possible and are complied with as soon as possible in the discovery
process, it is unrealistic to require an entity as large as the Executive Branch to know and to
name precisely what documents are protected by attorney-client privilege when they are
collecting and sorting tens of thousands of documents in the early stages of a litigation with
such broad discovery requests of this nature.  The discovery process is designed, in part, to
narrow the scope of information necessary to conduct a trial.  In the early stages of that
process lawyers may make blanket assertions to protect their clients and preserve the
protection until the discovery process narrows the scope of inquiry to relevant documents.
15  Documents covered by the attorney-client privilege may, and often do, individually
relate to matters of trial strategy.  Not only do such covered documents reflect their own
content but a consideration of numbers of them may, in addition, disclose the actual,
privileged, strategy of counsel.
-27-
Once that point is reached, the protection is tailored to specific communications.  The initial
action of the Governor in broadly asserting the attorney client privilege was no different than
the initial over-broad reach of Grove’s discovery requests.  
It is unclear from the court’s June 23, 2006, order whether the Circuit Court actually
determined that the documents were not subject to attorney-client privilege or whether,
irrespective of the applicability of the privilege, the Circuit Court felt bound to subject them
to expanded in camera review as a result of the Court of Special Appeals’s April 10, 2006,
order.  In either eventuality, documents which are subject to the attorney-client privilege,
generally, are not to be subjected to expanded in camera review because of the havoc such
a practice would play with one of the cornerstones of our judicial system-the protected
communication between an attorney and his or her client.  Simply because the Governor is
a government official does not make the protection of his communications with his attorney
any less important or less viable.  We conclude that the trial court acted improperly if it
ordered that documents subject to attorney-client privilege be made available for expanded
in camera review.15  If it did so, it abused its discretion.  Therefore, on remand any document
determined by the trial court to fall within the coverage of attorney-client privilege or the
work product doctrine shall not be made available to Grove or his attorney in any manner,
-28-
including through expanded in camera review.
D.  Third Party Letters
The trial judge granted Grove’s request to view some of the information in the
personnel files of 341 individuals and determined that the remaining information in those
files was irrelevant.  Then, the trial judge caused a letter to be sent to the 341 individuals,
whose information was in the files, asking them for permission to release the remaining
information (the content of which the trial judge had already determined was irrelevant) to
Grove’s counsel.  This was improper.
The court below relied on the balancing test laid out by the Court of Special Appeals
in Blades v. Woods, 107 Md. App. 178, 667 A.2d 917 (1995), to determine whether Grove’s
attorney should have access to information in the personnel files of 341 former State
employees.  The Blades balancing test was originally expressed in Zaal, supra, a criminal
case, but since Zaal it has been applied in factually or procedurally unique civil cases by this
Court.  The relevant elements of the Zaal test have appeared in three civil appellate opinions
of this State:  Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 713 A.2d 962 (1998), Dep’t. of
Social Services v. Stein, 328 Md. 1, 612 A.2d 880 (1992), and of course Blades which relied
on Stein and Zaal in formulating its test.  These cases are readily distinguishable from the
present case because they do not directly involve the Governor of Maryland and his assertion
of executive privilege, or the assertion by the Governor, or in fact an assertion by any party,
of attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine.
-29-
In Porter Hayden Co., we addressed the propriety of a trial court’s decision to rely on
confidential settlement agreements reached in a prior federal court litigation, in which not
all of the Porter Hayden Co. parties were involved, without disclosing those agreements to
such parties in a subsequent litigation before a court of this State.  We held that the
settlement agreements were to be disclosed, in a manner consistent with the procedures laid
out in Zaal, because it was inappropriate for the trial court to rely on the agreements as
evidence and then to deny a party affected by its decision access to that evidence.  Porter
Hayden Co., 350 Md. at 468-69, 713 A.2d at 970.  At no point was any form of privilege, to
include executive privilege, attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine, raised.
Therefore, Porter Hayden Co. is not applicable in the present case.
In Stein, the parents of Stephen Ray, in their own right and on his behalf, brought suit
against James Stein for physical, mental, and emotional injury allegedly caused by lead paint
poisoning suffered by Stephen while he was living in a home owned and managed by Stein.
Stein, seeking information regarding Stephen’s social environment that could offer
alternative reasons for his alleged injuries, served the Baltimore City Department of Social
Services (the “BCDSS”), a non-party, with a notice to take a deposition duces tecum
requiring the BCDSS’s director to produce the agency’s entire file on Stephen’s family.  The
BCDSS, relying in part on Maryland Code (1957, 1991 Repl. Vol.) Article 88A, § 6, resisted
the subpoena on the grounds that the records were (1) confidential and could only be released
pursuant to a court order, (2) that the records were protected by executive or governmental
-30-
immunity, (3) that executive or governmental privilege exempts the records from disclosure,
and (4) that the social worker, and/or psychologist/psychiatrist-patient, privilege potentially
applied to the requested portions of the record.  Stein, 328 Md. at 4-5, 612 A.2d at 881-82.
Stein filed a motion to compel and the trial court granted Stein’s motion giving him access
to any of BCDSS’s files on Stephen’s family.  The BCDSS noted an appeal based on the
collateral order doctrine.  We resolved the matter on the basis of the confidentiality provision
found in Art. 88A § 6 and did not reach the other claims of privilege.
The Stein Court found that the collateral order doctrine did not apply to the facts
before it because the BCDSS was not a party to the suit, 328 Md. at 12, 612 A.2d at 885, but
allowed an appeal anyway holding that:
“[A] discovery order directed to a governmental agency, a non-party to the
underlying action, requiring the disclosure of files which contain information
which, by statute, is confidential except when disclosed by the agency or by
court order, is immediately appealable by the agency.  The harm which will
occur to the agency and the public–the potential inability of the agency to
acquire information essential to its mission–were we to hold otherwise is much
greater than it would be for private individuals and entities.”
Id. at 20-21, 612 A.2d at 889.
In so holding, the Stein Court found the circumstances presented to it were similar to
the reasoning that the collateral order doctrine has permitted appeals in situations involving
government official immunity.  The Stein Court pointed out that if the BCDSS were forced
to wait to appeal until after the records were disclosed the purpose of Art. 88A § 6's
confidentiality protections would be frustrated just as the purpose of government official
-31-
immunity would be frustrated if that official were not able to take an interlocutory appeal
after a determination was made at the trial level regarding his or her immunity status.  328
Md. at 19, 612 A.2d at 889.  In making this analogy, the Stein Court’s purpose was to show
the necessity of allowing the interlocutory appeal.  Its purpose was not to imply that
government official immunity applied to the facts before it.
Turning to the merits of the case, the Court noted that because of the nature of
Stephen’s family’s (the plaintiffs in the underlying case) claim, the complete environment
in which Stephen was raised had been put at issue by them and, therefore, should be available
to the opposing parties.  328 Md. at 30, 612 A.2d at 894.  Thus, the Court, relying on Zaal,
determined that Stein, based on the reasonable possibility that reviewing the records would
lead to discoverable evidence, was entitled to examine the records without having disclosed
to him more of the documents than necessary, consistent with the confidentiality protections
in Art. 88A, § 6.  Stein, 328 Md. at 30, 612 A.2d at 894.  The Stein Court, however, did hold
that the trial court erred in ordering BCDSS to release all of its records pertaining to
Stephen’s family and remanded the matter to the trial court to proceed consistent with the
balancing test in Zaal.  Stein, 328 Md. at 30, 612 A.2d at 895.  The Stein case, albeit a civil
case, was very similar to the Zaal case.  It involved an underlying defendant attempting to
counter the allegations proffered by a plaintiff. 
In the Stein case, although the BCDSS asserted immunity and certain privileges,
including executive privilege, the Court decided the confidentiality issues presented to it
-32-
solely on the basis of the statutory requirements of Art. 88A, § 6 and never reached the
applicability of immunity or any type of privilege to include executive privilege, attorney-
client privilege or the work product doctrine.  Thus, Stein is additionally distinguishable from
the present case and does not apply here.
The Blades case, supra, involved the termination of a police officer who alleged he
was terminated for racial reasons.  It was determined in Blades that the police officer there
involved did not have “absolute immunity.”  That court was also not dealing with any claims
of executive privilege, attorney-client privilege, or the work product doctrine.  The only
issues discussed in that case concerned allegations that requests for interrogatories 
were over-
broad in scope and whether confidential information was discoverable based on privacy
concerns.  Separation of powers issues and other privilege issues were not extant in that case.
While we do not expressly adopt, or overrule, the application of the Zaal/Stein/Blades
balancing test in the context of a case involving executive privilege, attorney-client privilege
and/or the work product doctrine, even if it were to apply–it was misapplied here.
In its May 8, 2006, order, the Circuit Court determined that certain records and
communications pertaining to the termination of the 341 former State employees were
relevant to Grove’s claim and should be subjected to expanded in camera review:
“Based on its in-camera inspection of the thirty (30) ‘sample’ personnel files,
this Court believes that because these files represent individuals who were
terminated during the relevant time period, all documents representing notice
of termination by certified and regular mail, and all communications generated
by each employee pertaining to said termination, should be disclosed to
Appellee’s counsel of record, in their roles as officers of the Court.
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Then, in the same order, the trial court plainly stated that any additional information in those
341 individual’s personnel files was irrelevant to Grove’s claim:
“This Court further believes that all other documents contained within these
thirty (30) individual personnel files, when considered in light of Md. Rule 2-
402 and the ‘sparse’ Maryland case law [] [See Blades v. Woods, 107 Md.
App. at 183, 667 A.2d at 919-20], should not be disclosed as they are not
relevant or likely to lead to admissible evidence.  This Court finds that
disclosure of these documents would unnecessarily reveal confidential
information of each individual.” 
“. . .[T]his Court believes that the remainder of the three hundred forty one
(341) individual files requested for production by Appellee Grove should be
disclosed utilizing the same, precise methodology. . . .”  (Emphasis added.)
Despite this determination, the trial court then exceeded even the bounds of the Court of
Special Appeals’s finding in Blades by improperly assisting Grove in contacting the 341
individuals so that Grove might discuss their individual situations or obtain the release of
information, including information the trial court had already determined was irrelevant or
would lead to inadmissable evidence.  The M ay 8, 2006, order continued, in relevant part:
“The Court assumes that counsel for Appellee Grove may wish to
contact all of these three hundred and forty one (341) individuals.  Counsel for
both parties shall meet on or before May 13, 2006 and draft a joint letter which
will thereafter be submitted to the Court for approval.  Counsel for Appellee
Grove may then utilize the approved letter in initially contacting the identified,
terminated individuals to determine whether those individuals would object to
further discussion of their personal situations with counsel for Appellee Grove
and/or whether they would be willing to waive any claims for confidentiality
of their personnel file which would allow counsel further opportunity to
review other aspects of the files not released herein. . . .”  (Footnote omitted.)
Apparently, the parties advised the trial court that they were unable to agree on the
language of the letter to the 341 individuals.  Consequently, the court drafted a letter to the
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341 individuals and in its May 24, 2006, order, directed the parties to send it to the
individuals in question.  The letter read, in relevant part:
“We are writing to you to make you aware of a Court Order in the
above-captioned litigation which may have implications for you.  Pursuant to
an Order entered by the Court, which is enclosed, the State has been ordered
to make available to Mr. Grove’s counsel any notices of termination generated
by the State of Maryland or one of its agencies, which were served by certified
and regular mail and all communications generated by said employees
(recipients of said notices) pertaining to said termination.  As is clear from the
Court Order, these documents will not be released to anyone other than
counsel in this matter and will continue to be held confidential unless you
consent otherwise.
“Counsel for Mr. Grove has requested the right to contact you and
discuss further aspects of this matter with you.  You have the right to agree to
discuss these matters with the attorneys or object and refuse to do so.  You also
have the right to determine whether you would object to the release of any
information to anyone.  In the event you have questions regarding the contents
of this letter, you may contact the undersigned at the telephone numbers listed
below.
“Every effort has been made to protect all aspects of your
confidentiality with regard to this matter.  Additionally, it is hoped that this
matter will be of no inconvenience to you.  We request that you indicate below
whether you consent or wish to withhold consent to being contacted by
counsel.  We respectfully request that you sign and return this letter in the
enclosed self-addressed envelope which will go directly to the judge
overseeing the litigation.  A second copy of this letter is enclosed for your
file.”  (Emphasis added.)
In short, the trial court ordered the parties to send a letter it drafted to the 341 individuals in
order to obtain information, including the type of information it had already determined, in
its May 8, 2006, order, was not relevant to Grove’s claim.  Pursuant to the May 8, 2006,
order, Grove’s attorney already had access, and for the procedure to gain access,  to the
information potentially relevant to Grove’s claim–the documents and communications
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pertaining to the termination of those 341 former employees.  This further action by the trial
court far exceeded the actions prescribed even in Blades.  The trial court made itself an active
participant in aiding Grove.
We are troubled by the trial court’s actions in two respects.  First, the trial court’s May
8, 2006, order is inconsistent.  The trial court made a determination that only certain
information in the personnel files of the 341 individuals was relevant to Grove’s claim and
subject to expanded in camera review.  Then, in the same order the court determined that
Grove should be allowed to contact the 341 former state employees in order to discuss their
personal situations and their willingness to waive confidentiality with respect to their entire
personnel files-including the very information that the trial court determined was not relevant
to Grove’s claim.  The end result is that the trial court encouraged Grove to contact the
former employees about information it had already determined was irrelevant to Grove’s
claim and the order enabled Grove’s attorney to go on a “fishing expedition” for additional
claims against the Governor.  Second, and perhaps most troubling, the nature of the trial
court’s order and its authorship of the letter, put the trial court in a position where its orders
pro-actively assisted Grove in building his case to the detriment of the opposing party, i.e.
the Governor of Maryland.
We can perceive no proper reason why the trial court exceeded even the bounds of
16 We note again that we have neither previously adopted nor rejected the application
of the Zaal/Stein/Blades test in this context–the Governor of Maryland asserting executive
privilege or in the context of the Governor of Maryland, or any other person, asserting
attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine.  We do not do so now.  We merely
point out that the trial court erred in applying that test, even if it were applicable.
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Blades in this manner.16  Doing so was clearly an abuse of discretion.  We recognize,
however, that the letters to the 341 individuals cannot be “un-mailed” and that the attorneys
for Grove, to the extent that they have had contact with any of the 341 individuals, cannot
“un-contact” them.  Regardless, the information so gathered, consistent with the trial court’s
original determination that the information was irrelevant, is not to be put before the finder
of fact in any case.  Moreover, any information received by the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City in response to the letters mailed to the 341 former employees, is to be placed under seal
and is not to be shared with Grove, his counsel, or any other entities.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that an interlocutory appeal is appropriate under
the extraordinary circumstance of a discovery order being directed to a high government
official when the collateral order doctrine’s four-part test is met.  We also hold that the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City abused its discretion when it ordered expanded in camera
review of documents protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine.
The trial court also abused its discretion when it solicited the consent of third parties to the
release of documents it held were irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to
admissible evidence in Grove’s case.
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ORDERS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE CITY VACATED AND CASE
R E M A N D E D  
F O R  
P R O C E E D ING S
CONSISTENT 
WITH 
THIS 
OPINION.
COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY
THE APPELLEE.