Case Title: State v. Jackson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP002238-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2016-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
2016 WI 56 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2238-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Mastella L. Jackson, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 363 Wis. 2d 554, 866 N.W.2d 768) 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Published) 
PDC No.: 215 WI App 49 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 1, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 25, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie 
 
JUDGE: 
Mark J. McGinnis 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. and BRADLEY, A. W., J. dissent 
(Opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Andrew R. Hinkel, assistant state public defender.  Oral 
argument by Andrew R. Hinkel. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was briefed by 
Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.  Oral argument by 
Luke N. Berg, deputy solicitor general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 56
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2014AP2238-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2012CF147) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Mastella L. Jackson, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals reversing an order by the 
Outagamie County Circuit Court suppressing physical evidence as 
"fruit of the poisonous tree."1 
¶2 
The case arises out of a 2012 stabbing death at a 
hotel in the Town of Grand Chute, west of Appleton.  Police 
suspected that Mastella Jackson (Jackson), the victim's wife, 
                                                 
1 State v. Jackson, 2015 WI App 49, 363 Wis. 2d 554, 866 
N.W.2d 768. 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
2 
might have been involved in the death, so they brought her to 
the Grand Chute Police Department and interrogated her for more 
than six hours without giving her a Miranda warning.  Jackson 
made incriminating statements during the interrogation.  At the 
end of the interrogation, Jackson agreed to go with detectives 
to her residence, where officers were already conducting a 
search pursuant to a search warrant.  There, she revealed the 
location of the knife used in the stabbing and the bloody 
clothing she was wearing when she left the hotel. 
¶3 
After the State charged Jackson with first-degree 
intentional homicide, she moved to suppress all evidence 
obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.  The circuit 
court excluded not only Jackson's statements but also the 
physical evidence obtained from her house, which the circuit 
court deemed fruit of the poisonous tree.  The court of appeals 
reversed as to the physical evidence, concluding that the State 
had demonstrated that the officers searching the house would 
inevitably have discovered the knife and clothing during their 
search. 
¶4 
In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), the Supreme 
Court of the United States approved an inevitable discovery 
exception to the exclusionary rule.  This court has not applied 
the inevitable discovery exception since State v. Weber, 163 
Wis. 2d 116, 471 N.W.2d 187 (1991).  Since Weber, however, the 
court of appeals has decided a series of inevitable discovery 
cases.  See State v. Avery, 2011 WI App 124, 337 Wis. 2d 351, 
804 N.W.2d 216; State v. Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d 413, 559 N.W.2d 264 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
3 
(Ct. App. 1996); State v. Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d 487, 490 
N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1992). 
¶5 
Jackson now urges us to reassess the inevitable 
discovery doctrine.  She argues that the State should not be 
able to rely on the doctrine to defeat exclusion where the 
police intentionally engaged in the misconduct that provides the 
basis for exclusion. 
¶6 
Accordingly, we must determine whether the inevitable 
discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applies only when 
the State proves the absence of bad faith by the officers who 
committed the constitutional violation.  Like the Supreme Court 
of the United States, we conclude that the exception does not 
include such a requirement.  Furthermore, because in this case 
we reexamine inevitable discovery for the first time since our 
decision in Weber, we also review the doctrine's analytical 
framework.  We then apply the doctrine to the facts in this case 
and conclude that the State has proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence that officers inevitably would have discovered the 
physical evidence in dispute.  Consequently, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Murder at the Hotel 
¶7 
At about 1:25 in the afternoon on February 21, 2012, 
officers from the Grand Chute Police Department were dispatched 
to the Road Star Inn located west of Appleton.  The officers 
were advised that a male had been found in Room 114 lying face 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
4 
down and covered in blood.  When officers entered Room 114, they 
observed a bloody phone receiver detached from the phone near 
the door.  Large blood smears covered the far wall, beyond the 
beds.  Below the smears, officers found Derrick Whitlow lying 
prone against the wall.  He had already been pronounced dead by 
paramedics.  Whitlow had experienced significant injuries.  An 
autopsy 
performed 
the 
next 
day 
showed 
that 
he 
suffered 
approximately 25 stab wounds.  An eight-inch knife sheath 
bearing the word "Winchester" lay on the floor next to his body. 
¶8 
An employee on the hotel's cleaning staff told 
officers that she was doing the laundry in Room 111 between 1:00 
and 1:30 p.m.  She saw a person wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt 
knock on the door to Room 114.  Because the sweatshirt's hood 
covered the visitor's head and face, the cleaning employee could 
not tell whether the person was male or female.  After someone 
inside Room 114 let the person in, the employee heard a male 
voice screaming for help.  The employee also heard sounds that 
she thought were a person being hit.  She went to her manager to 
get help, and she subsequently saw the person in the sweatshirt 
leaving the hotel. 
¶9 
Based on the cleaning employee's report, the hotel 
manager entered Whitlow's room.  He found Whitlow surrounded by 
blood and immediately called 911.  When the officers arrived, 
the manager informed them that Whitlow had been staying at the 
hotel for a few days and that Whitlow's ten-year-old son, S.J., 
was staying at the hotel with him.  The manager also indicated 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
5 
to police that he understood Whitlow was having problems with 
his wife. 
¶10 A hotel guest staying in Room 115 provided additional 
information to police about the afternoon's events.  From his 
room, he heard a female voice yelling.  Thinking the voice was 
that of the cleaning employee, he walked down the hallway to 
investigate.  After seeing the cleaning employee and realizing 
that the yell came from someone else, he heard a loud scream 
near Room 114, followed by a male voice yelling "help me, help 
me."  The guest then went to the manager's office to report the 
incident.  Aside from the guest's comment about hearing a female 
voice yelling, neither the guest nor the manager nor the 
cleaning employee identified the sex or race of the person in 
the hooded sweatshirt. 
B.  Officers Contact Jackson and R.L.D.J. 
¶11 Shortly after 2 p.m., detectives from the Grand Chute 
Police Department began investigating the whereabouts of the 
child alleged to be staying with Whitlow.  Unsure whether they 
might be dealing with a missing child case, the detectives 
attempted to locate Jackson, whom they believed to be the 
child's mother.  They had received information indicating that 
Jackson resided at an address on Fourth Street in Appleton and 
that they might also find her at Harbor House.2  The detectives 
                                                 
2 Harbor House states its mission as "lead[ing] a community-
wide partnership in the prevention of domestic violence and 
abuse, and to offer safety and support to diverse families in 
crisis." 
 
History 
of Harbor House, Harbor House, http://www.harborhouseonline.org/
(continued) 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
6 
first went to Harbor House; there, they learned that Jackson had 
stayed overnight but left around 11 a.m. 
¶12 Around 2:30 p.m., officers informed the detectives 
that a secretary at a local elementary school had confirmed S.J. 
was present at school but his older brother, 11-year-old 
R.L.D.J., 
was 
absent. 
 
R.L.D.J.'s 
whereabouts 
remained 
undetermined as the detectives proceeded from Harbor House to 
the Fourth Street address.  They arrived between 2:30 and 3:00 
p.m.  Outside the residence, the detectives met with an officer 
from the Appleton Police Department who said he had not seen any 
people coming or going from the house.  Officers remained at the 
Fourth Street location to observe the premises, and the 
detectives left to investigate another address associated with 
Jackson. 
¶13 An officer arriving at the Fourth Street residence 
around 3:55 p.m. noticed the door to the residence begin to 
open.  A man emerged from inside.  The officer introduced 
himself to the man, who was working on the door's lock and 
identified himself as the building's landlord.  He told the 
officer that Jackson had asked him to change her locks and that 
she was currently present in the house.  Because the door 
remained ajar as the landlord worked, the officer observed 
Jackson and R.L.D.J. through the partially open door.  Upon 
                                                                                                                                                             
history.html (last visited June 23, 2016).  Harbor House's 
shelter 
program 
provides 
a 
safe 
space 
and 
emergency 
transportation for victims of domestic violence in the Appleton 
area. 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
7 
seeing Jackson, the officer asked her to come to the door to 
speak with him outside.  The detectives, returning to the Fourth 
Street residence shortly after 4 p.m., joined the officer at the 
door.  Jackson gave the detectives consent to search the 
residence to determine whether there were other people inside, 
and their search confirmed that R.L.D.J. was present and safe. 
¶14 Following the search, the detectives spoke briefly 
with Jackson outside before asking her to come with them to the 
Grand Chute Police Department.  The officers patted her down and 
then drove her to the police department in the back seat of a 
squad car.  In a separate car, officers also brought R.L.D.J. to 
the department.  Jackson and R.L.D.J. left the residence with 
officers around 4:30 in the afternoon.3 
C.  R.L.D.J.'s Interview 
¶15 Officers began interviewing R.L.D.J. around 5:30 p.m., 
approximately an hour after he arrived at the department.  An 
initial interview with R.L.D.J. lasted between 60 and 90 
minutes, after which he and S.J. ate dinner together at the 
police station.  A second interview ensued between 8 and 9 p.m. 
following a 60- to 90-minute dinner break. 
¶16 During 
the 
second 
interview, 
officers 
informed 
R.L.D.J. about his father's death and pressed him for answers 
regarding 
his 
mother's 
whereabouts 
during 
the 
afternoon.  
R.L.D.J. emphatically denied repeated suggestions that he went 
                                                 
3 Separately, an officer brought S.J. from his school to the 
police department between approximately 4:00 and 4:15 p.m. 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
8 
to the Road Star Inn that day.  When R.L.D.J. asked whether his 
mother would go to jail, officers told him that she would not.  
Over and over, the officers asked R.L.D.J. to tell them the 
truth and to "do the right thing" to help his father. 
¶17 Eventually, R.L.D.J. began providing information about 
the afternoon.  He acknowledged that his mother left the 
residence for 10 to 20 minutes at some point during the 
afternoon while he played video games.  According to R.L.D.J., 
his mother was angry with Whitlow because she discovered he had 
thrown away family photographs and other mementos.  Still 
playing video games when his mother returned home, R.L.D.J. 
heard the sound of a zipper and heard his mother take a shower 
immediately upon her arrival.  R.L.D.J. further indicated that 
his mother wore different clothes after her shower than she had 
worn earlier in the day.  He also disclosed that Jackson 
instructed him not to tell anyone that she had left the 
residence that afternoon. 
D.  Jackson's Interrogation 
¶18 Jackson waited alone for nearly two hours in a 
separate room before detectives began questioning her at 
6:24 p.m.  One of the detectives opened the questioning by 
telling Jackson that she was not under arrest, saying, "You 
know, you're not under arrest or, you know, you're free to go, 
you know."  When Jackson asked for clarification, the detective 
explained, "We just want to talk to you about some stuff that's 
going on.  We're investigating a couple things, OK, but like I 
said you're not under arrest or anything like that.  We just 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
9 
want to talk to you and get some information to help us out, 
OK?" 
¶19 The detectives began by questioning Jackson about the 
hours leading up to Whitlow's death.  Jackson explained that she 
had taken R.L.D.J. to spend the night at Harbor House after 
hearing noises outside their residence.  She mentioned that she 
had neither slept nor eaten much in recent days. 
¶20 Gradually, the questioning transitioned to Jackson's 
relationship with Whitlow.  In response to the detectives' 
questions about the effect that stress had recently had upon her 
appetite and sleep, Jackson told them, "[M]y um husband, we've 
just been havin issues, um in a sense . . . ."  She claimed that 
she had experienced psychological mistreatment at his hands.  
When the detectives asked whether "anything . . . happened in 
the last few days that has made this worse," she explained he 
had been with her at the house until four days before his death 
"cuz [she] was taking care of him" while his broken leg healed.4  
After the two of them got into an argument, however, he asked 
her to take him to the Appleton police station, and he 
eventually rented a room at the Road Star Inn.  Because of 
Whitlow's broken leg, S.J. went to stay at the hotel to help his 
father. 
                                                 
4 A few weeks before Whitlow's death, a vehicle operated by 
Jackson struck Whitlow, who suffered a broken leg as a result.  
Although officers from the Appleton Police Department were aware 
of this previous incident on the day of Whitlow's death, the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant for Jackson's 
residence made no mention of it. 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
10 
¶21 Around 6:54 p.m., the conversation moved back to 
Jackson's activities after leaving Harbor House.  Jackson told 
the detectives that she had gone to the hospital for a medical 
appointment but decided not to go inside because she arrived 
late and expected that the doctor would be unable to see her.  
Although she indicated that after going to the hospital she 
returned home and did not leave again, the detectives pressed 
her for more information about her afternoon.  As the detectives 
asked whether she was "sure" that she had not left the house 
again until officers arrived to speak with her, she responded, 
No, I, I mean I, like, the question that [you're] all 
asking to me, I'm like, I guess I'm still just 
exhausted from not having sleep and haven't eaten and 
I'm sitting here and I want a ciggy and that's the 
last, that the thing that's really bothering me the 
most like I really want a cigarette and my stomach is 
starting to hurt, well it's been hurting but it's 
getting worser, and I'm talking to y'all and it's 
like, ahh, I just, I don't know, can I, can we do this 
another time? 
(Emphasis added.)  Shortly thereafter, she left the room at 7:04 
accompanied by the detectives for a cigarette break. 
¶22 Jackson returned from the break at 7:12 p.m., and she 
began conversing with the detectives again at 7:22 p.m.  Video 
of the interrogation shows her sitting in her chair, doubled 
over in apparent pain while clutching her stomach as she waited 
for the detectives to return.  When the detectives entered the 
room, they asked whether Jackson needed assistance for her 
obvious pain and discomfort.  Jackson's response generated the 
following exchange: 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
11 
[Jackson]: Yeah, I'm be fine, I'm just ready to 
go, I'm sleepy.  Can I leave and we do this another 
time[?] 
[Detective Brad Kuehl]: Give me just one second, 
OK, just give me one second and I'll be right back 
with you. 
[Jackson]: OK[.] 
(7:23 p.m.) ([Det. Kuehl] leaves the room) 
[Jackson]: I'm still thirsty I want some water 
but it's gonna hurt[.] 
(7:23:51 p.m.) ([Det. Kuehl] re-enters the room) 
[Det. Kuehl]: I just got a couple things I want 
to ask you real quick and then we'll try and get you 
on your way here, OK? 
[Det. Kuehl]: Today when you were, when you left 
the Harbor House, is there anything else you can 
remember about anything else that you might have 
done[?] 
[Jackson]: My tummy, I can't do this right now, 
my stomach hurts, nothing else was done. 
(Emphasis added.)  After the detectives discussed acquiring 
medication for Jackson from her residence, another exchange 
occurred: 
[Det. Kuehl]: I know you're, I you're kind of 
having some kind of stomach pains.  We're gonna try 
and get you some . . .  
[Jackson]: Can I go home right now, please, I 
don't want to talk[.] 
[Detective Scott Callaway enters the room] 
[Det. Callaway]: Do you know where your purse 
[with the medication] is in the house[?] 
[Jackson]: Yeah it's on my bed, can I go with 
you, can I just go home or do I have to stay[?] 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
12 
[Det. Callaway]: Let me just make a phone call 
quick and I'll get right back to you[.] 
[Jackson]: OK, OK. 
(Emphasis added; ellipsis in original.)  This exchange occurred 
at 7:25 p.m. 
¶23 The questioning continued for a few more minutes until 
just after 7:30 p.m., when the detectives left the interrogation 
room with Jackson.  They took her back to her residence, where 
she ingested prescription medication for her pain.  On the way 
back to the police department, they stopped at a Burger King to 
pick up food for her.  Just after 8:15 p.m., Jackson returned to 
the interview room at the police department, and one of the 
detectives resumed questioning at approximately 8:30 p.m. 
¶24 Around 9:20 p.m., Jackson admitted being at the hotel 
in the afternoon and began describing the details of her 
interaction with Whitlow.  She said that Whitlow "came at [her]" 
when she entered the room.  Although she admitted that a 
confrontation occurred, she expressed an inability to recall the 
exact nature of what had happened.  When the detective asked 
about a knife, she conceded that she "may have" had one with 
her.  Jackson requested and was allowed to take additional 
medication around 9:37 p.m. 
¶25 Over the succeeding hours, Jackson slowly gave the 
detectives more incriminating information about the events at 
the hotel.  Shortly after 10 p.m., she described a physical 
altercation with Whitlow and her efforts to get him off her.  
She also confirmed that she took a shower and changed clothes 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
13 
upon returning home.  Throughout the 10 o'clock hour, a 
detective insisted that she provide him with details about the 
events at the hotel.  At 11:09 p.m., she responded to a question 
about a knife, saying, 
I don't . . . will you just do me a favor and tell my 
kids that I truly do love them and I'm sure they know 
that, but just tell them again, I truly do love them 
and I'm done.  Cause I don't, I don't want to talk no 
more, I don't want to say anything, cause I don't, I 
just whatever's gonna happen, gonna happen and I don't 
wanna see kids, I don't, I can't, cause I don't wanna 
force myself to think about things. 
(Emphasis added; ellipsis in original.)  Jackson repeatedly 
stated that she did not want to think about the events at the 
hotel, that doing so would "torture" her.  As she phrased it at 
11:17 
p.m., 
"[T]o 
know 
that 
I'm 
the 
reason 
he 
not 
here. . . .  No thank you, I'd rather not think about it." 
¶26 At 11:20 p.m., a detective began reviewing medical 
consent forms for R.L.D.J. and S.J. with Jackson and asked her 
to sign them.  At 11:45 p.m., detectives read her a search 
warrant5 and explained that they would extract blood and 
fingernail samples from her and that they would also take 
pictures of bruising on her body.  At 12:17 a.m., a detective 
                                                 
5 Officers obtained separate warrants to search Jackson's 
home and to search her person. 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
14 
told her she would be charged with first-degree reckless 
homicide.6 
¶27 Finally, at 12:39 a.m., a detective read a Miranda 
warning advising Jackson of her constitutional rights.  When 
Jackson, thinking the detective had already advised her of her 
rights, asked for clarification about the charge she faced, the 
detective responded: 
Can I, can I read this to you first because I 
technically can't get into a lot of stuff without 
until I advise you of these and you decide whether or 
not you want to talk to me anymore, OK because I can't 
violate your rights, do you know what I mean?  So can 
I read this to you and then you decide whether or not 
you want to talk to me because I can't really get into 
any in depth conversation with you until you either 
tell me yes or no that you're willing to talk to me.  
So let me read this to you and then you decide what 
you want to answer and we'll go from there and then 
anything I can answer for you I'll answer, presuming 
you want to talk to me.  Sound fair? 
(Emphasis added.)  The detective read a waiver-of-rights form to 
her and then explained each of her rights in detail.  To 
conclude the explanation, the detective said, "So say you decide 
to start talking to me but at some point you decide you don't 
want to talk to me, you can just tell me you don't want to talk 
to me anymore."  Jackson's first response to hearing that 
example was to begin asking, "So earlier, when you, when you 
wouldn't let me leave . . . ," then the detective cut her off.  
                                                 
6 The detective misstated the expected charge at 12:17 a.m.  
When giving Jackson the Miranda warning at 12:39 a.m., the 
detective correctly told her that she faced a charge for 
"[f]irst degree intentional homicide." 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
15 
Ultimately, Jackson continued talking with the detectives at the 
department until 2:01 a.m. on February 22. 
E.  Officers Obtain a Warrant and Search Jackson's Residence 
¶28 Around 6 p.m., an officer began preparing a warrant to 
search Jackson's residence.  The  affidavit that accompanied the 
warrant included information from officers responding to the 
hotel, from R.L.D.J.'s interview with officers, and, in a 
concluding paragraph, from Jackson's interrogation.  A judge 
signed the warrant at 11:32 p.m. 
¶29 Officers arrived at Jackson's residence after midnight 
to conduct the search and began searching around 12:50 a.m.  At 
least six officers were present.  Four officers began searching 
the basement, while others searched upstairs.  From the 
beginning, officers planned to search the entire house, followed 
by the garage.  The officers later testified that, because of 
the serious nature of the crime, they intended "to be very 
thorough" and "to search everywhere and anywhere that [they] 
could search looking for relevant items." 
¶30 Officers further testified that they searched in a 
systematic and "[e]xtremely thorough" manner, carefully sorting 
through boxes, bags, and drawers in each room.  They explained 
that the search was "time consuming" and "took quite a while" 
because "[t]here was a lot of stuff in the house," particularly 
a bedroom closet filled with large garbage bags packed with 
various items.  Because the garage contained numerous boxes and 
bins, the officers expected that searching the garage would 
require a significant amount of time as well. 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
16 
¶31 During the search, an officer in the basement received 
information from the detectives interrogating Jackson that a 
knife and bloody clothing might be in a garbage container in the 
garage.  The officer took a break from searching the basement 
and went to the garage, where he searched a garbage container 
inside the main door and another outside the door.  Unable to 
find anything of evidentiary value in those containers, the 
officer went back inside "to finish the searching of the 
basement to keep everything systematic and as thorough as 
possible." 
¶32 At approximately 2:15 a.m., detectives brought Jackson 
from the police department to her residence.  Before officers 
finished their methodical search of the premises, Jackson showed 
them a garbage can in the garage containing the knife and the 
clothing she wore at the hotel. 
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶33 On February 23, 2012, the State filed a criminal 
complaint against Jackson in Outagamie County Circuit Court.  
The complaint charged Jackson with one count of first-degree 
intentional homicide, domestic abuse, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.01(1)(a), 939.50(3)(a), and 968.075(1)(a), and one count 
of 
misdemeanor 
bail 
jumping, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 959.49(1)(a) and 939.51(3)(a). 
¶34 Jackson filed a motion to suppress all statements that 
she made to the officers and all physical evidence derived from 
those 
statements. 
 
She 
argued 
that 
her 
statements 
were 
involuntary and that law enforcement officers violated her 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
17 
constitutional rights by taking her statements at the police 
department without reading Miranda warnings to her.  Because 
officers procured the warrant to search her home based in part 
on the statements obtained in violation of her constitutional 
rights, she argued that any physical evidence at her residence——
particularly the knife and the clothing——was inadmissible fruit 
of the poisonous tree. 
¶35 At a series of hearings, the Outagamie County Circuit 
Court7 developed an extensive record as it considered Jackson's 
suppression motion.  The court heard testimony about the 
investigation from several officers and detectives, who provided 
detailed accounts of Jackson's interrogation and the search of 
her home.  Jackson presented testimony from a toxicologist and a 
psychologist, who testified about Jackson's state of mind during 
the interrogation and the effects of medication she was taking 
at the time.  Additionally, the court reviewed video and a 
transcript of Jackson's interrogation, as well as an audio 
recording of the interview with R.L.D.J. 
¶36 In a comprehensive ruling from the bench on June 16, 
2014, the circuit court ordered suppression of most of Jackson's 
statements, as well as suppression of the physical evidence 
obtained from her residence in the early morning hours on 
February 22, 2012.  Specifically, the court found that Jackson 
was in custody for Miranda purposes at 7:25 p.m.  The court 
                                                 
7 Mark J. McGinnis, Judge. 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
18 
leveled substantial criticism at the officers and detectives 
carrying out the investigation: 
There's been some variation of the officers' 
testimony that at that point in time [during her 
interrogation] Ms. Jackson was free to leave.  I find 
that incredible.  I find it difficult to believe, and 
I'm somewhat offended by officers who come into court, 
raise their hand to testify, and try to suggest that 
in a murder case where they put somebody in the back 
seat of the squad car and they take them to the police 
station and asking that they can leave and they're not 
answering her questions on that issue, that she was 
truly free to leave.  It reduces their credibility in 
my 
eyes 
in 
the 
overall 
grand 
scheme 
of 
things. . . .  [T]he officers' insistence on a theory 
and trying to maintain the standard that said at that 
point in time she could get up and walk out is just 
incredible. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . I'll never forget how appalled I was and 
how upsetting it was that this stuff happens in 
today's world. . . .  I've never seen a case, been 
part of a case, or heard of a case that's worse than 
this in terms of what the police officers did in that 
interrogation room. . . .  [T]his is just a clear 
violation of somebody's rights over a long period of 
time involving many different officers with lots of 
opportunities to have one of them step up and say, 
hey, this is not the way we need to do this. 
. . . . 
. . . [T]his is textbook interrogation of what 
not to do if you want to be doing good police work and 
get stuff admitted in during a hearing. 
 . . . [T]hese violations in my opinion were done 
intentionally, they were done flagrantly, they were 
done recklessly; and they were done without any 
concerns 
involving 
Ms. 
Jackson's 
rights, 
her 
constitutional rights, her statutory rights, and it 
was done in an effort to get something out of her 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
19 
before those rights were read, and that's exactly what 
happened eventually. 
¶37 Based on its finding that Jackson was in custody 
beginning at 7:25 p.m., the court suppressed all statements that 
Jackson made from that time until she received a Miranda warning 
at 12:39 a.m.  Relying on Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 
(2004), the court further suppressed all statements Jackson made 
after receiving the Miranda warnings, "includ[ing statements 
made during] the time when she was taken back to her home and 
pointed out to the officers where they would find both the 
weapon and the clothing associated with this case."  In 
addition, the court concluded that Jackson's statements were 
involuntary. 
¶38 Although the court expressed additional "concern[] 
about things that were done and said during th[e] interview" 
with R.L.D.J., the court declined to suppress any of R.L.D.J.'s 
statements.  The court noted that "there was nothing that Ms. 
Jackson [said] that was then used to get [R.L.D.J.] to talk." 
¶39 However, the court did suppress the physical evidence 
of the knife and the clothing as illegal fruit of the poisonous 
tree.  After striking Jackson's suppressed statements from the 
search warrant affidavit, the court concluded that the evidence 
from the hotel and R.L.D.J.'s statements did not create probable 
cause for a court to issue the warrant.  The court further 
determined that "even if the warrant had probable cause," the 
State had not proven that the officers conducting the search 
inevitably would have discovered the knife and clothing that 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
20 
Jackson ultimately revealed.  Emphasizing the deterrent purpose 
of the exclusionary rule, the court reasoned that "when officers 
are simply looking for evidence of the crime, it's not good 
policy to . . . provide them the benefit of the doubt when they 
violate somebody's constitutional rights." 
¶40 On appeal, the State did not challenge suppression of 
Jackson's statements but did seek reversal of the circuit 
court's decision suppressing the physical evidence.  The State 
argued that the untainted portions of the search warrant 
affidavit 
established 
probable 
cause 
to 
search 
Jackson's 
residence and that the officers conducting the search inevitably 
would have discovered the knife and clothing in Jackson's 
garage. 
¶41 The court of appeals agreed with the State and 
reversed the circuit court's decision with respect to the knife 
and clothing.  State v. Jackson, 2015 WI App 49, 363 
Wis. 2d 554, 866 N.W.2d 768.  In its penetrating analysis, the 
court of appeals first examined the search warrant affidavit and 
excised all facts derived from Jackson's suppressed statements.  
Id., ¶¶17-18.  Based on the remaining evidence from the hotel 
and from R.L.D.J., the court of appeals determined that the 
affidavit still "provided a substantial basis to conclude there 
was a fair probability a search of Jackson's residence would 
uncover evidence of wrongdoing."  Id., ¶¶19-20 (citing State v. 
Romero, 2009 WI 32, ¶3, 317 Wis. 2d 12, 765 N.W.2d 756). 
¶42 Given that the officers conducted the search pursuant 
to a valid warrant, the court of appeals next concluded that the 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
21 
officers 
inevitably 
would 
have 
discovered 
the 
knife 
and 
clothing.  Id., ¶¶22, 43.  Applying a framework set forth in its 
previous cases, the court of appeals conducted a three-pronged 
analysis 
for 
the 
inevitable 
discovery 
exception 
to 
the 
exclusionary rule: 
To establish that the evidence would have been 
inevitably discovered, the State must demonstrate, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) there is a 
reasonable probability the evidence in question would 
have been discovered by lawful means but for the 
police misconduct; (2) the leads making the discovery 
inevitable were possessed by the government at the 
time of the misconduct; and (3) prior to the unlawful 
search the government also was actively pursuing some 
alternative line of investigation. 
Id., ¶23 (citing State v. Avery, 2011 WI App 124, ¶29, 337 
Wis. 2d 351, 804 N.W.2d 216).  The court concluded that the 
State met the first prong because officers "intended to conduct 
a thorough and methodical search of Jackson's house and garage 
that 
would 
have 
entailed 
examining 
every 
container 
or 
compartment that might have contained evidence of the crime."  
Id., ¶¶25-32.  Jackson did not dispute the State's argument that 
it met the second prong——that it had leads making the discovery 
inevitable——so the court deemed the point conceded.  Id., ¶35.  
Finally, the court concluded that by actually "conducting a 
thorough and methodical search of [Jackson's] residence pursuant 
to a valid warrant," the officers met the third prong's 
requirement of active pursuit of another line of inquiry.  Id., 
¶39. 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
22 
¶43 Additionally, the court of appeals rejected Jackson's 
argument that the inevitable discovery doctrine should not apply 
in cases involving intentional constitutional violations.  Id., 
¶¶43, 48.  Jackson relied on this court's decision in State v. 
Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899, suppressing 
physical evidence obtained as a direct result of an intentional 
Miranda violation.  Jackson, 363 Wis. 2d 554, ¶43.  The court of 
appeals distinguished Knapp, observing that no evidence in that 
case indicated that officers had alternative means to discover 
the physical evidence.  Id., ¶45.  Suppression, moreover, would 
place the State "in a worse position than it would have been in 
absent the Miranda violation" because the officers would have 
obtained 
a 
warrant 
even 
without 
the 
unconstitutional 
interrogation.  Id., ¶47. 
¶44 Jackson filed a petition for review on June 18, 2015, 
which this court granted on October 8, 2015. 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶45 Application 
of 
constitutional 
principles 
in 
a 
particular case presents a question of constitutional fact.  
State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶13, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 
N.W.2d 97 (citing State v. Pallone, 2000 WI 77, ¶26, 236 
Wis. 2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568).  This court accepts the circuit 
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but 
application of constitutional principles to those facts is a 
question of law that this court reviews de novo.  Id. (citing 
Pallone, 236 Wis. 2d 162, ¶27). 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
23 
¶46 Exclusion is a judicial remedy that can apply when the 
government obtains evidence as a result of a constitutional 
violation.  See Dearborn, 327 Wis. 2d 252, ¶15 (citing State v. 
Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶¶39-45, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625).  
"The exclusionary rule . . . may apply to deter violations of 
the Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, or Sixth Amendment."  
State v. Scull, 2015 WI 22, ¶64, 361 Wis. 2d 288, 862 N.W.2d 562 
(Ziegler, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted); id., ¶¶64-65 
(citing examples under each Amendment from cases in the 
Wisconsin and United States Supreme Courts).  However, exclusion 
is 
not 
an 
absolute, 
automatic 
remedy. 
 
Dearborn, 
327 
Wis. 2d 252, ¶35 (first citing Herring v. United States, 555 
U.S. 135, 140-42 (2009); then citing Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 
1, 10-11 (1995)).  Courts exclude evidence only when the 
benefits 
of 
deterring 
police 
misconduct 
"outweigh 
the 
substantial costs to the truth-seeking and law enforcement 
objectives of the criminal justice system."  Id., ¶38. 
¶47 The Supreme Court approved the inevitable discovery 
exception to the exclusionary rule in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 
431 (1984).  Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, "evidence 
obtained during a search which is tainted by some illegal act 
may be admissible if the tainted evidence would have been 
inevitably discovered by lawful means."  State v. Lopez, 207 
Wis. 2d 413, 427, 559 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing State 
v. Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d 487, 499, 490 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 
1992)); see also 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 11.4(a), at 339 (5th ed. 2012) ("[T]he question is not whether 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
24 
the police did in fact acquire certain evidence by reliance upon 
an untainted source but instead whether evidence found because 
of a Fourth Amendment violation would inevitably have been 
discovered lawfully." (footnote omitted)). 
¶48 Although the court of appeals has decided multiple 
inevitable discovery cases, see, e.g., Avery, 337 Wis. 2d 351; 
Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d 413; Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d 487, this court 
has not conducted a comprehensive examination of the doctrine 
since the Supreme Court decided Nix.  The present case affords 
us an opportunity to evaluate the conditions that must exist for 
the 
State 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
it 
inevitably 
would 
have 
discovered evidence despite the fact that officers actually 
obtained the evidence as a result of a constitutional violation.  
Accordingly, we begin our analysis by examining the development 
and purposes of the doctrine. 
A.  The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine 
1.  Nix v. Williams 
¶49 Nix involved a suspect, Williams, who surrendered to 
authorities in Davenport, Iowa, after allegedly abducting and 
murdering a young girl in Des Moines.  Nix, 467 U.S. at 434-35.  
Two Des Moines detectives drove to Davenport to transport 
Williams back to Des Moines.  Id. at 435.  Counsel was not 
permitted to accompany Williams during his ride in the back seat 
of the detectives' car, but the detectives informed Williams's 
attorney that they would not question the suspect during the 
drive.  Id.  Nonetheless, as they drove, one of the detectives 
made comments encouraging Williams to reveal the location of the 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
25 
victim's unrecovered remains.  Id. at 435-36.  The detective 
insinuated that the little girl deserved a prompt "Christian 
burial" before an approaching winter storm made it impossible 
for searchers to find her body.  Id.  Eventually, the suspect 
agreed to lead officers to the body, which they found "next to a 
culvert in a ditch beside a gravel road"——"essentially within 
[an] area to be searched" by a nearby search party independently 
looking for the missing child.  Id. at 436. 
¶50 The Williams prosecution led to two trials, two 
appeals to the Supreme Court of Iowa, two collateral attacks in 
federal court, and two decisions from the Supreme Court of the 
United States.  See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); 
Nix, 467 U.S. 431.  After the second trial and appeal, the 
Eighth Circuit determined that Iowa authorities had erred by 
failing to suppress evidence of the little girl's body.8  The 
Supreme Court reversed.  In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, 
the Court discussed both the purpose of the exclusionary rule 
and the independent source doctrine, which allows "admission of 
evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent of 
any constitutional violation."  Nix, 467 U.S. at 443. 
¶51 The purpose of the exclusionary rule, the Court said, 
is to prevent the prosecution from being "put in a better 
position than it would have been in if no illegality had 
transpired."  Id.  However, it does not follow that the 
                                                 
8 Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1983). 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
26 
exclusionary rule should put the prosecution "in a worse 
position simply because of some earlier police error or 
misconduct."  Id.  The independent source doctrine allows 
evidence "wholly independent of any constitutional violation" to 
be admitted. 
¶52 The inevitable discovery doctrine is not the same as 
the independent source doctrine, the Court explained, but it is 
"closely related" because evidence that inevitably will be 
discovered is like evidence from an independent source.  "There 
is a functional similarity between these two doctrines in that 
exclusion of evidence that would inevitably have been discovered 
would also put the government in a worse position, because the 
police would have obtained the evidence if no misconduct had 
taken place."  Id. at 443-44.  Thus, the rationale of the 
independent source doctrine "is wholly consistent with and 
justifies . . . adoption of the ultimate or inevitable discovery 
exception to the exclusionary rule."  Id. at 444. 
¶53 Emphasizing the deterrence rationale underlying the 
exclusionary rule, the Court phrased its test for inevitable 
discovery as follows: "If the prosecution can establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or 
inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means . . . then 
the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence 
should be received."  Id. 
¶54 To support its use of a "preponderance of the 
evidence" 
standard, 
the 
Court 
relied 
on 
its 
previous 
determination 
that 
"the 
controlling 
burden 
of 
proof 
at 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
27 
suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof 
by a preponderance of the evidence."  Id. at 444 n.5 (quoting 
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 n.14 (1974)).  The 
Court added that it was "unwilling to impose added burdens on 
the already difficult task of proving guilt in criminal cases by 
enlarging the barriers to placing evidence of unquestioned truth 
before juries."  Id.  In any case, proving that discovery of 
evidence was truly inevitable "involves no speculative elements 
but focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready 
verification or impeachment."  Id. at 445 n.5 (emphasis added). 
¶55 Further, the Court rejected any notion that the 
government must prove the absence of bad faith by the police in 
order to qualify for the inevitable discovery exception.  Id. at 
445.  The Court emphasized the "enormous societal cost" that 
flows from "plac[ing] courts in the position of withholding from 
juries relevant and undoubted truth that would have been 
available to police absent any unlawful activity."  Id.  Seeing 
no merit in the argument that officers would deliberately 
violate Sixth Amendment rights if the inevitable discovery 
exception did not require proof of good faith, the Court 
observed that an "officer who is faced with the opportunity to 
obtain evidence illegally will rarely, if ever, be in a position 
to calculate whether the evidence sought would inevitably be 
discovered."  Id. at 445-46.  On the contrary, "[s]ignificant 
disincentives" always discourage officers from engaging in 
misconduct; 
officers 
might 
face 
not 
only 
suppression 
of 
illegally obtained evidence but also "departmental discipline 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
28 
and civil liability" when they violate suspects' constitutional 
rights.  Id. at 446. 
2.  Inevitable Discovery in Wisconsin 
a.  Wisconsin Cases After Nix 
¶56 This court first applied the Nix exception in State v. 
Weber, 163 Wis. 2d 116, 471 N.W.2d 187 (1991), where a defendant 
argued that police officers conducted an unreasonable search 
when they listened to a cassette tape containing the defendant's 
confession that they obtained while taking inventory of his 
car's contents.  Weber, 163 Wis. 2d at 121.  Conducting a short 
inevitable discovery analysis, this court began by stating that, 
under Nix, "if it can be shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the tape would have inevitably been discovered 
absent any constitutional violation, the tape may be admitted 
into evidence."  Id. at 140-41 (first citing Nix, 467 U.S. 431; 
then citing State v. Kennedy, 134 Wis. 2d 308, 318, 396 
N.W.2d 765 (Ct. App. 1986)).  The court then briefly recounted 
various pertinent facts and concluded that, even assuming the 
officers conducted an illegal search by playing the tape, the 
facts demonstrated that the police "would inevitably have 
obtained a warrant to play the tape" and discover its contents.  
Id.  Quoting from Nix, the court also reasoned that suppressing 
the evidence would place the prosecution in a worse position 
than it would have been in absent an illegal search.  Id. at 
142. 
¶57 Notably, in Weber this court did not conduct an 
extensive evaluation of Nix or of the reasoning underlying the 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
29 
Supreme Court's adoption of the inevitable discovery exception.  
Since Weber, this court has periodically cited Nix, but we have 
not expounded on the inevitable discovery exception and its 
proper application in Wisconsin. 
¶58 The court of appeals, however, has decided multiple 
inevitable discovery cases since Nix.  A few months after the 
Supreme Court decided Nix, the court of appeals decided State v. 
Washington, 120 Wis. 2d 654, 358 N.W.2d 304 (Ct. App. 1984).  As 
this court would later do in Weber, the Washington court used 
the Nix Court's phrasing of the test for the exception, stated 
relevant facts from the case, and then concluded that those 
facts demonstrated sufficient inevitability of discovery for the 
exception 
to 
apply. 
 
Washington, 
120 
Wis. 2d at 
664-65 
(determining that officers inevitably would have discovered 
evidence in back seat of defendant's vehicle when officers 
legally stopped the vehicle but illegally arrested defendant and 
searched his person).  Similarly, in Kennedy, the court of 
appeals cited Washington when phrasing the doctrine as follows: 
"[T]he fruits of an illegal search may be admitted if it can be 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the tainted fruits 
would 
have 
been 
inevitably 
discovered 
by 
lawful 
means."  
Kennedy, 134 Wis. 2d at 317 (concluding that a vodka bottle 
discovered in a vehicle would inevitably have been discovered 
during 
an 
inventory 
search 
even 
though 
it 
was 
actually 
discovered pursuant to a defective warrant).  The court added: 
"The defective search warrant does not compel exclusion of 
evidence that would otherwise have been lawfully discovered and 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
30 
admissible in evidence.  Individual rights are not controverted, 
nor is the public served, by excluding such evidence."  Id. at 
318 (citing Washington, 120 Wis. 2d at 664-65).  The opinion did 
not cite Nix. 
¶59 After this court applied Nix in Weber, the court of 
appeals decided State v. Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d 487, 490 
N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1992), which arose after a Waukesha County 
humane officer inspected a licensed horse-breeding operation 
when the owners were not present.  Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d at 
492-93.  A provision of the Waukesha County Code permitted 
inspection of licensed premises "at any time" by county humane 
officers.  Id. at 492.  The humane officer arrived at the 
premises and found the door to the barn partially ajar.  Id. at 
493.  She opened the door to conduct a routine inspection, as 
she had before, and discovered evidence of abuse of the horses.  
Id.  The following day, she returned with law enforcement 
officers, who seized the horses in the presence of the owners.  
Id. 
¶60 The court of appeals concluded that the warrantless 
initial search of the barn was illegal and rejected the State's 
argument that, despite the illegal search, the inevitable 
discovery doctrine defeated suppression of evidence from the 
barn.  Although the court cited the language from Kennedy quoted 
above, it established a new test for inevitable discovery: 
To [prove inevitable discovery], the prosecution must 
demonstrate: (1) a reasonable probability that the 
evidence in question would have been discovered by 
lawful means but for the police misconduct; (2) that 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
31 
the leads making discovery inevitable were possessed 
by the government at the time of the misconduct; and 
(3) that prior to the unlawful search the government 
also was actively pursuing some alternate line of 
investigation. 
Id. at 500 (citing United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1204 
(5th Cir. 1985)).  The court provided no explanation why it 
chose 
to 
apply 
the 
Fifth 
Circuit's 
test 
for 
inevitable 
discovery.  Neither the State nor the Schweglers cited Cherry's 
three-pronged test in their briefs to the court of appeals.  The 
State primarily relied upon Nix but cited Weber and Kennedy as 
well, and the Schweglers discussed both Nix and Kennedy.  The 
court of appeals has applied Schwegler's three-pronged analysis 
in 
subsequent 
inevitable 
discovery 
cases. 
 
Avery, 
337 
Wis. 2d 351, ¶29; Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d at 427-28. 
b.  The Active Pursuit Requirement 
¶61 Because our decision in Weber is this court's only 
precedent applying the inevitable discovery exception, we 
examine the Fifth Circuit test adopted by the court of appeals 
in Schwegler before determining whether the exception applies 
under the facts of this case.  The three-pronged Cherry analysis 
derived from the Fifth Circuit's pre-Nix precedent.  Cherry, 759 
F.2d at 1204.  Reasoning that in Nix "no attempt was 
made . . . to define the contours" of the exception, the Cherry 
court turned to "previous circuit case law, to the extent it 
[was] consistent with the principles enunciated" in Nix.  Id.  
Based on its own decision in United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 
1037 (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth Circuit in Cherry concluded that 
using the "three-prong" framework would be "fully consistent 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
32 
with Nix."  Id. (citing Brookins, 614 F.2d at 1042 n.2).  In 
United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984), the 
Eleventh Circuit——which had adopted the Fifth Circuit's Brookins 
rule in United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 
1982)——similarly concluded that "Nix is not inconsistent with 
the rule in this circuit that the police must possess and be 
actively pursuing the lawful avenue of discovery when the 
illegality occurred."  Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 847. 
¶62 Requiring the prosecution to prove active pursuit of 
an alternative line of investigation under the third prong of 
the Cherry test may apply the inevitable discovery exception 
more strictly than the Supreme Court required in Nix: 
While some courts have taken the position that the 
inevitable discovery doctrine applies only where "the 
government 
was 
actively 
pursuing 
a 
substantial, 
alternative line of investigation at the time of the 
constitutional violation," such an absolute limitation 
is unsound, as it "allows for the exclusion of 
evidence that inevitably would have been discovered." 
6 LaFave § 11.4(a), at 365-68 (footnote omitted) (first quoting 
United States v. Conner, 127 F.3d 663, 667 (8th Cir. 1997); then 
quoting United States v. Thomas, 524 F.3d 855, 862 (8th Cir. 
2008) (Colloton, J., concurring)).  A footnote in Professor 
LaFave's 
treatise 
explains 
the 
circumstances 
under 
which 
discovery might be inevitable despite the absence of active 
pursuit prior to the misconduct: "Even if the police were not 
actively pursuing an alternative line of investigation at the 
time of police error or misconduct, for example, the government 
may well be able to establish that the execution of routine 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
33 
police procedure or practice inevitably would have resulted in 
discovery of disputed evidence."  Id. § 11.4(a) n.164, at 368 
(quoting Thomas, 524 F.3d at 862 (Colloton, J., concurring)). 
¶63 To a degree, the Cherry court anticipated this 
critique by acknowledging a case in which, despite the fact that 
"the Brookins prerequisites were not met," the Fifth Circuit 
"held that the inevitable discovery exception applied since the 
alternate means for obtaining the evidence was an intervening 
and independent event occurring subsequent to the misconduct."  
Cherry, 759 F.2d at 1205 (citing United States v. Miller, 666 
F.2d 991, 997 (5th Cir. 1982)).  Indeed, the Fifth Circuit in 
Cherry concluded its analysis of the inevitable discovery 
exception by stating: 
In certain circumstances . . . , such as when the 
hypothetical independent source comes into being only 
after 
the 
misconduct, 
the 
absence 
of 
a 
strong 
deterrent interest may warrant the application of the 
inevitable discovery exception without a showing of 
active pursuit by the government in order to ensure 
that the government is not unjustifiably disadvantaged 
by the police misconduct. 
Id. at 1206.  Although the court of appeals in Schwegler applied 
the three-pronged framework set forth in Cherry, it did not 
acknowledge any exceptions to the active pursuit requirement. 
¶64 Other jurisdictions apply alternative, fact-intensive 
versions of the inevitable discovery exception that do not 
require proof of active pursuit in all cases.  See United States 
v. Howard, 729 F.3d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 2013) ("The government 
must demonstrate both (1) that 'it had, or would have obtained, 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
34 
an independent, legal justification for conducting a search that 
would have led to discovery of the evidence' and (2) 'that it 
would have conducted a lawful search absent the challenged 
conduct.' (quoting United States v. Marrocco, 578 F.3d 627, 637-
38 (7th Cir. 2009)); United States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862, 
864-65 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that "[t]he doctrine is best 
developed on a case by case basis" and that "[t]he existence of 
two independent investigations at the time of discovery is 
not . . . a necessary predicate to the inevitable discovery 
exception," 
but 
adding 
that 
"[a]bsent 
some 
overriding 
considerations . . . , the doctrine requires that the fact or 
likelihood that makes the discovery inevitable arise from 
circumstances other than those disclosed by the illegal search 
itself"); United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 744 (1st 
Cir. 1986) ("[T]here are three basic concerns which surface in 
an inevitable discovery analysis: are the legal means truly 
independent; are both the use of the legal means and the 
discovery 
by 
that 
means 
truly 
inevitable; 
and 
does 
the 
application of the inevitable discovery exception either provide 
an incentive for police misconduct or significantly weaken 
fourth amendment protection?"). 
¶65 Demonstrated historical facts proving active pursuit 
of an alternative line of investigation at the time of the 
constitutional 
violation 
certainly 
help 
the 
State 
to 
substantiate its claim that discovery of otherwise excludable 
evidence was inevitable.  However, requiring proof in all cases 
of active pursuit at the time of the constitutional violation 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
35 
risks exclusion of evidence that the State might demonstrate 
that it inevitably would have discovered.  For instance, a 
constitutional 
violation 
may 
occur 
so 
quickly 
after 
the 
commission of a crime that there has not been time to launch the 
kind of comprehensive investigation that would be normal 
operating procedure. 
¶66 Consequently, we think that the better approach is to 
follow the analysis applied by this court in Weber and by the 
court of appeals in Washington and in Kennedy: Has the 
prosecution met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it inevitably would have discovered the evidence 
sought to be suppressed?  Accordingly, the factors in Schwegler, 
Lopez, and Avery should be regarded as important indicia of 
inevitability rather than indispensable elements of proof. 
c.  Proof of the Absence of Bad Faith 
¶67 We also decline Jackson's invitation to articulate a 
rule 
prohibiting 
application 
of 
the 
inevitable 
discovery 
exception when the State fails to prove the absence of bad faith 
on the part of officers who committed the constitutional 
violation.  Although in Nix the Supreme Court expressly rejected 
the necessity for a good faith requirement, Nix, 467 U.S. at 
445, Jackson contends that the Wisconsin Constitution provides 
greater protections than does the federal constitution in this 
context, see State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶59, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 
700 N.W.2d 899 (citing State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 171, 254 
N.W.2d 210 (1977)). 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
36 
¶68 The Court's decision in Nix rejecting proof of absence 
of bad faith as a necessary condition for inevitable discovery 
has provided an avenue for criticism of the doctrine.  "Because 
one 
purpose 
of 
the 
exclusionary 
rule 
is 
to 
deter . . . shortcuts, there is much to be said for the 
proposition that the 'inevitable discovery' rule should be 
applied only when it is clear that 'the police officers have not 
acted in bad faith to accelerate the discovery' of the evidence 
in question."  6 LaFave § 11.4(a), at 344-46 (quoting Brian S. 
Conneely & Edmond P. Murphy, Comment, Inevitable Discovery: The 
Hypothetical Independent Source Exception to the Exclusionary 
Rule, 5 Hofstra L. Rev. 137, 160 (1976)).  In her brief, Jackson 
cites cases from other jurisdictions that have adopted rules 
precluding application of the exception when the prosecution 
fails to prove the absence of bad faith.  See Smith v. State, 
948 P.2d 473, 481 (Alaska 1997); Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 678 
N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (Mass. 1997); State v. Holly, 833 N.W.2d 15, 
33 (N.D. 2013). 
¶69 It gives us pause to consider the possibility that 
officers could intentionally violate constitutional rights as a 
"shortcut" to obtaining evidence when they know the State will 
be able to demonstrate inevitable discovery by other means.  We 
are particularly mindful of this possibility as we decide a case 
in which the circuit court and court of appeals, respectively, 
rebuked officers for "flagrant" and "reprehensible" violations 
of Jackson's rights——rebukes, we believe, that were warranted 
and appropriate. 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
37 
¶70 Nevertheless, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Jackson 
has 
not 
demonstrated that the Wisconsin Constitution requires proof of 
the absence of bad faith as a necessary condition for the 
prosecution to establish inevitable discovery of otherwise 
excludable evidence.  Because inevitable discovery is an 
exception to the exclusionary rule, it necessarily applies after 
some government misconduct has occurred that would otherwise 
justify the suppression of evidence as an appropriate remedy.  
See United States v. Alexander, 540 F.3d 494, 503-04 (6th Cir. 
2008).  In the exceptional case where the government meets its 
burden 
of 
proving 
inevitability, 
however, 
it 
will 
have 
demonstrated that suppression would place the State in a worse 
position than it would have been in absent the misconduct.  
Insisting on suppression of evidence obtained by intentional 
misconduct would redirect the exclusionary rule to a punitive 
purpose——punishing the State and the public for misconduct by 
some officers despite independent proof of inevitable discovery 
of the relevant evidence. 
¶71 We are not persuaded that allowing the State to prove 
inevitable discovery without proving the absence of bad faith 
will encourage officers to take unconstitutional shortcuts to 
accelerate the acquisition of evidence.  An officer who 
intentionally commits a constitutional violation always risks 
losing valuable evidence, and "[a] police officer who is faced 
with the opportunity to obtain evidence illegally will rarely, 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
38 
if ever, be in a position to calculate whether the evidence 
sought would inevitably be discovered."  Nix, 467 U.S. at 445.9  
Already, the exception applies only if the State proves that it 
inevitably would have discovered the disputed evidence without 
the misconduct.  As the Supreme Court explained in Nix, 
"When . . . the evidence in question would inevitably have been 
discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct, 
there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence 
is admissible."  Nix, 467 U.S. at 448.  Conversely, "If the 
State finds itself in any situation where it must prove that the 
evidence inevitably would have been discovered by other legal, 
independent means, and it fails to do so, the doctrine is not 
applied and the evidence is suppressed."  State v. Garner, 417 
S.E.2d 502, 511 (N.C. 1992). 
¶72 In declining to impose a good faith requirement in 
connection with inevitable discovery, we emphasize that the 
State has the burden of proof in satisfying this narrow 
exception to the exclusionary rule.  As the Seventh Circuit 
observed,  
Nix . . . speaks in terms of proof by preponderance of 
the evidence that the government would have discovered 
the challenged evidence through lawful means . . . .  
Inevitable discovery is not an exception to be invoked 
casually, and if it is to be prevented from swallowing 
                                                 
9 Cf. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 540 (1988) 
("[T]he officer without sufficient probable cause to obtain a 
search warrant [would not] have any added incentive to conduct 
an unlawful entry, since whatever he finds cannot be used to 
establish probable cause before a magistrate."). 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
39 
the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule, courts 
must take care to hold the government to its burden of 
proof. 
United States v. Jones, 72 F.3d 1324, 1334 (7th Cir. 1995).  
Proof of inevitable discovery turns upon demonstrated historical 
facts, not conjecture. 
¶73 With these principles of the inevitable discovery 
exception in mind, we now consider its application in this case. 
B.  Officers Inevitably Would Have Discovered the Evidence in 
Jackson's Residence 
¶74 On appeal, the State has not challenged the circuit 
court's determination that the detectives intentionally violated 
Jackson's constitutional rights during her interrogation and by 
subsequently bringing her to her home to locate physical 
evidence.  The officers failed to provide timely Miranda 
warnings, failed to respond timely to her physical condition, 
and failed to respond to her expressed desire not to continue 
talking, 
thereby 
raising 
obvious 
concerns 
about 
the 
voluntariness of her admissions.  Suppression of her statements 
to police was necessary and "inevitable" under the circumstances 
presented.  Thus, resolution of this case requires us to 
determine whether the State has established by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Jackson's knife and her bloody clothing 
would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means but for 
the police misconduct. 
¶75 After assessing the substantial evidence presented by 
the State regarding the search warrant and ensuing search, the 
demonstrated historical facts leave us reasonably certain that 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
40 
officers would inevitably have discovered the physical evidence 
in Jackson's garage without any of the information unlawfully 
obtained from her. 
¶76 Both the circuit court and the court of appeals in 
this case evaluated the search warrant affidavit——excised of 
information gained from the illegal interrogation of Jackson——to 
determine whether it provided probable cause to justify a search 
of Jackson's residence.  This court has held that "where an 
application for a warrant contains both tainted and untainted 
evidence, the issued warrant is valid if the untainted evidence 
is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause to issue 
the warrant."  State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, ¶44, 322 
Wis. 2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 1 (first citing Murray v. United States, 
487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988); then citing State v. O'Brien, 70 
Wis. 2d 414, 424-25, 234 N.W.2d 362 (1975)); see also United 
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984) ("[I]f sufficient 
untainted evidence was presented in the warrant affidavit to 
establish probable cause, the warrant was nevertheless valid." 
(citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 172 (1978)); State v. 
St. Martin, 2011 WI 44, ¶30, 334 Wis. 2d 290, 800 N.W.2d 858. 
¶77 Like the circuit court and court of appeals, we 
consider untainted portions of the search warrant affidavit.  A 
single paragraph at the end of the affidavit summarizes 
Jackson's incriminating statements indicating that she traveled 
to the hotel that afternoon and got into a confrontation with 
Whitlow while armed with a knife.  We examine the remaining 
portions of the affidavit, which is reproduced in the Appendix. 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
41 
¶78 The vast majority of factual information set forth in 
the affidavit accompanying the search warrant application was 
derived from untainted sources.  In the underlying opinion in 
this case, the court of appeals accurately and comprehensively 
summarized the information set forth in the untainted portions 
of the affidavit: 
• At 1:25 p.m. on February 21, 2012, officers were 
dispatched to the Road Star Inn in Grand Chute, 
where they found Whitlow's body in Room 114.  
Whitlow had suffered significant cut wounds to his 
neck, throat, upper chest, and right arm and hand. 
• There was substantial blood and blood spatter on the 
wall, bed, and floor of the hotel room.  Based on 
his 
training 
and 
experience, 
detective 
Renkas 
believed anyone who was in the room with Whitlow 
when he was stabbed would likely have a significant 
amount of blood on his or her clothing or shoes. 
• An eight-inch Winchester brand knife sheath was 
found next to Whitlow's body, but no knife was 
recovered. 
• [The hotel manager], who was working at the front 
desk of the Road Star Inn on February 21, reported 
that Whitlow had been staying in Room 114 since 
February 17.  [The manager] stated he knew Whitlow 
had been having problems with his wife. 
• [A] . . . Road 
Star 
Inn 
[cleaning] 
employee[] 
reported that she was doing the laundry in Room 111 
from approximately 1:00 to 1:30 p.m. on February 21, 
when she saw a person wearing a gray hooded 
sweatshirt knock on the door of Room 114.  The 
person's hood was pulled over his or her head.  The 
person was admitted into the room by someone inside, 
and [the cleaning employee] then heard a male voice 
screaming for help and heard what she thought was 
someone being hit.  [The cleaning employee] went to 
the manager to get help and briefly saw the person 
in the hooded sweatshirt leaving.  Hotel staff then 
entered the room, found Whitlow, and called police. 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
42 
• [A hotel guest], who was staying in Room 115 at the 
Road Star Inn, reported he was in his room when he 
heard a female voice yelling.  He thought it was the 
cleaning employee, so he left his room to see what 
was happening.  He then realized the yelling voice 
could not be the cleaning employee because he saw 
her in the hallway.  When [the guest] was just past 
Room 114, he heard a male voice yelling, "[H]elp me, 
help me."  [The guest] then went to get help. 
• Eleven-year-old R.L.D.J. was interviewed by police 
on the day of the stabbing and told them Whitlow was 
his father and Jackson was his mother.  R.L.D.J. 
reported that his family had been living together at 
their home until a few days earlier, when Whitlow 
left to stay at the Road Star Inn.  Police were 
aware from previous contacts with Whitlow and 
Jackson that they resided [on] . . . West Fourth 
Street in Appleton. 
• R.L.D.J. reported Whitlow had left the family home 
because he and Jackson "had been having issues that 
included 'adult conversations' that became loud." 
• R.L.D.J. told police he stayed home from school with 
Jackson on February 21, and in the early afternoon, 
Jackson became angry because Whitlow had destroyed 
some family pictures and keepsakes.  Jackson then 
left the house and was gone for about fifteen to 
twenty minutes. 
• When Jackson returned to the house, R.L.D.J. "heard 
a zipper sound and then heard [her] go directly into 
the bathroom" and take a shower.  When Jackson got 
out of the shower, "she was in different clothing 
than . . . what she had been wearing earlier in the 
day." 
• Jackson told R.L.D.J. not to tell anyone she had 
left the house that day. 
Jackson, 
363 
Wis. 2d 554, 
¶18 
(eleventh, 
fifteenth, 
and 
sixteenth alterations in original). 
¶79 Based on the untainted portions of the affidavit, we 
conclude that the search warrant application provided probable 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
43 
cause to conduct a search of Jackson's residence.  A search 
warrant affidavit provides probable cause for a search when, 
under the totality of the circumstances, it sets forth "a 
substantial 
basis 
for 
concluding 
that 
there 
was 
a 
fair 
probability that a search of the specified premises would 
uncover evidence of wrongdoing."  State v. Romero, 2009 WI 32, 
¶3, 317 Wis. 2d 12, 765 N.W.2d 756.   
¶80 The affidavit in support of the search warrant for the 
home on Fourth Street in Appleton sought  
clothing, 
including 
but 
not 
limited 
to 
hooded 
sweatshirts, any knives or knife sheaths, any weapons, 
any firearms, . . . ; any materials, clothing, towels 
or 
other 
items 
containing 
blood 
or 
bloody 
substances . . . ; any materials or items that may 
contain trace blood evidence; . . . a 2007 gray in 
color, Chevrolet Malibu, registered to a Mastella L. 
Jackson. 
¶81 Jackson was an obvious suspect in Whitlow's murder.  
Whitlow was staying in the hotel, not his home, because he was 
having problems with his wife.  Their son, R.L.D.J., said that 
Jackson was very angry with her husband that day and left the 
house in the afternoon about the time the homicide occurred.  
When she returned she told R.L.D.J. not to tell anyone that she 
had left the house. 
¶82 A witness at the hotel said he heard a female voice 
yelling near Room 114 where Whitlow's body was found, suggesting 
that a woman had killed Whitlow. 
¶83 Inside the room, police found the body and a room 
covered with blood.  The affiant disclosed that based on his 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
44 
training and experience, he believed any person who would have 
been in the room with Whitlow at the time of his injuries would 
likely have significant areas of blood or blood splatter on his 
or her clothing or shoes.  R.L.D.J. said his mother took a 
shower immediately after she got home and that she was in 
different clothing after the shower. 
¶84 Officers found a knife sheath in the hotel room, 
supporting evidence of a stabbing.  If Jackson was the culpable 
party, she might not have had time to dispose of the knife 
because she hurried home to shower and get out of her clothes. 
¶85 Aside from the statements derived from Jackson's 
illegal 
interrogation, 
officers 
independently 
acquired 
all 
information presented in the affidavit accompanying the warrant 
application.  Officers received information from the manager, 
guest, and cleaning employee at the hotel immediately after 
Whitlow's death and separate from the detectives' subsequent 
interactions with Jackson.  Moreover, the circuit court found 
that "there was nothing that Ms. Jackson [said] that was then 
used to get [R.L.D.J.] to talk," so his statements were also 
separate from her interrogation.  Although R.L.D.J. likely 
provided the information most probative of Jackson's actions 
after 8 p.m., officers possessed most information used in the 
affidavit before Jackson was even in custody for Miranda 
purposes at 7:25 p.m., and they had certainly begun conducting 
independent investigation before that time. 
¶86 Collectively, this information speaks to a fair 
probability that officers would uncover bloody clothing and the 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
45 
knife upon searching Jackson's residence.  Taken together, 
information derived from various people at the hotel, from 
R.L.D.J.'s interview, and from the affiant officer's experience 
indicate that the affidavit excised of Jackson's statements 
established a strong, independent legal justification for the 
search of Jackson's residence. 
¶87 Given 
that 
the 
officers 
began 
their 
search 
of 
Jackson's residence pursuant to a valid warrant based on 
probable cause, the State has presented considerable evidence to 
show 
that 
the 
searching 
officers 
inevitably 
would 
have 
discovered the knife and bloody clothing in the garage if 
officers had not brought Jackson back to her residence.  The 
officers searching Jackson's residence began inside the house 
and methodically searched all bags and other containers that 
they encountered.  Because the warrant allowed them to search 
both indoors and in the garage, the officers intended to 
carefully search the garage when they finished searching the 
house.  By searching every bag and container in the garage, the 
officers 
eventually 
would 
have 
searched 
the 
garbage 
can 
containing the knife and clothing. 
¶88 The search of Jackson's residence compares favorably 
to the search in Nix that the Supreme Court determined would 
inevitably have uncovered the victim's body.  Searchers in Nix 
had specific instructions "to check all the roads, the ditches, 
[and] any culverts" in their assigned zones.  Nix, 467 U.S. at 
448.  An investigator leading the search effort had obtained a 
map of the area where police eventually found the body, and the 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
46 
investigator would have developed a search grid on the map 
calling for a search of the area ultimately identified by the 
defendant.  Id. at 449.  When the suspect revealed the body's 
location, officers found the remains in a culvert near a road in 
the expected search area.  Id. 
¶89 In this case, officers involved in the search had a 
systematic and orderly plan first to search Jackson's residence, 
then to search the garage.  Their testimony proves that they had 
begun searching containers in a disciplined manner and that they 
would have continued that meticulous approach when searching the 
garage.  Absent Jackson's arrival on the premises with the 
detectives, the officers would have identified the incriminating 
evidence within a matter of hours.  Thus, the State has shown 
that the officers legally searching Jackson's residence had 
actively engaged in searching the premises before Jackson's 
arrival, and those officers would have continued the search and 
discovered the physical evidence without Jackson's involvement. 
¶90 Jackson contends that this court's decision in Knapp 
should control the outcome in this case.  In Knapp, this court 
held that physical evidence was inadmissible when "obtained as 
the direct result of an intentional Miranda violation."  Knapp, 
285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶82.  But the circumstances surrounding the 
State's acquisition of the incriminating evidence distinguish 
the two cases.  While serving an arrest warrant on the defendant 
in Knapp, the officer who obtained the evidence did so by asking 
a question without reading the defendant his Miranda rights.  
Id., ¶8.  The State provided no other evidence demonstrating 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
47 
that it would inevitably have obtained the physical evidence by 
legal means.  Here, in contrast, the State has presented 
testimony by multiple officers establishing an independent, 
legal basis by which officers would have obtained the knife and 
bloody clothing absent any involvement by Jackson.10 
                                                 
10 At oral argument, the Deputy Solicitor General, making 
that office's first appearance before this court, emphasized the 
importance of the proof of inevitability in this case: 
If Jackson had dumped the knife and clothes in some 
random garbage can, or if she had thrown it into the 
river as she drove home, or she had buried it in her 
backyard . . . , in any of those circumstances, the 
State wouldn't be able to argue inevitable discovery 
in this case.  When the police officers initially 
asked her, "Where's the knife," they did it in an 
unconstitutional interrogation.  They had no idea what 
the answer was going to be.  If it was, for instance, 
in the [random] garbage can, or it's in the river, 
then the evidence would be excluded, and the police 
would have lost very valuable evidence that they might 
have discovered some other way.  If it comes in——the 
only time it comes in——is when they inevitably would 
have had it anyway, so they haven't gained anything.  
But they have a lot that they can potentially lose, so 
there's 
just 
no 
advantage 
to 
violating 
the 
Constitution . . . and hoping to get something out of 
the inevitable discovery doctrine because there's 
little to gain through it. 
By dismissing the distinction between this case and State 
v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899, as only a 
"supposed difference," the dissent undervalues the State's 
burden of proving inevitability.  Dissent, ¶131.  The dissent 
suggests that "[t]he State in Knapp might have been able to 
argue that some chain of events or alternative line of 
investigation demonstrated that law enforcement would have 
inevitably discovered the physical evidence."  Dissent, ¶126 
n.30.  But Knapp contains none of the concrete indicia of 
inevitability present in this case.  Knapp involved a single law 
enforcement officer who illegally obtained physical evidence by 
asking a question that violated Miranda.  In contrast, this case 
(continued) 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
48 
¶91 Finally, we note that permitting admission of the 
knife and clothing does not leave Jackson without any recourse 
for the officers' illegal interrogation in this case.  The 
detectives' decision to detain and question Jackson in the 
manner seen here is unacceptable by any constitutional standard.  
The circuit court properly excluded Jackson's statements to 
deter law enforcement officers from imitating the detectives' 
unjustifiable methods.  At trial, Jackson will receive the 
benefit of that exclusion because the State will be barred from 
presenting the testimonial evidence obtained from her by illegal 
means.  Although proof of inevitable discovery saves the knife 
and clothing from exclusion in this case, suppression of 
Jackson's 
incriminating 
statements 
provides 
an 
entirely 
appropriate remedy for the Miranda violations. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶92 At its core, the exclusionary rule discourages law 
enforcement officers from violating suspects' constitutional 
rights by removing a key incentive——incriminating evidence——that 
might otherwise encourage officers to engage in illegal conduct.  
The rule seeks to deter misconduct, rather than to punish it 
when it occurs.  As a result, if the court were to insist upon 
suppression even when the State presents evidence proving that 
                                                                                                                                                             
involves a search warrant affidavit with untainted information 
demonstrating probable cause for a search, as well as officers 
independently conducting a methodical search of the premises.  
The exception turns upon evidence of inevitability, not merely a 
theory. 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
49 
it 
inevitably 
would 
have 
discovered 
evidence, 
we 
would 
improperly apply exclusion in a purely punitive manner.  Here, 
the State has demonstrated that, without any information 
illegally obtained from Jackson, officers had probable cause to 
search Jackson's residence, and they independently began a 
systematic and methodical search of the premises that would have 
revealed the physical evidence actually obtained by way of 
Jackson's suppressed statements.  Because the State has met its 
burden of proof with regard to its independent search of the 
premises, we conclude officers inevitably would have obtained 
the knife and clothing in Jackson's garage.  Therefore, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the 
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
50 
 
APPENDIX 
This Appendix reproduces the language of the Affidavit in 
Support of Search Warrant submitted for the search of Jackson's 
residence.  All personal identifying information and all 
information illegally obtained from Jackson has been redacted; 
all alterations are marked accordingly. 
 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT 
WHEREAS, Detective Renkas of the Grand Chute Police 
Department has this day complained to the said court upon oath 
that on the 21st day of February, 2012, in said County in and 
upon certain premises in the Town of Grand Chute in Outagamie 
County, Wisconsin there is located a residence at [] W Fourth 
Street in the City of Appleton, Outagamie County, Wisconsin and 
more particularly described as follows: 
A split level duplex residence located on the south 
side of 4th Street, with the duplex unit of [] located 
on the west end of the duplex facing 4th Street, with 
black address numbers [] above the main front door, 
gray vinyl siding with white trim, dark grayish/black 
shingles with an attached two car garage 
there are now located and concealed certain things, to-wit: 
clothing, 
including 
but 
not 
limited 
to 
hooded 
sweatshirts, any knives or knife sheaths, any weapons, 
any firearms, any paper documents tending to establish 
the identity of the parties residing at the location; 
any 
materials, 
clothing, 
towels 
or 
other 
items 
containing blood or bloody substances, cell phones; 
any materials or items that may contain trace blood 
evidence; 
any 
photographs 
at 
the 
home, 
any 
gravemarkers or funeral materials; shoes at the home; 
cell phone, car and/or house keys, cell phone records; 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
51 
any caller ID items; a 2007 gray in color, Chevrolet 
Malibu, registered to a Mastella L. Jackson with WI 
license place [], VIN [] 
which things were used in the commission of, or may constitute 
the evidence of a crime, to-wit: Violation(s) of Homicide and 
Reckless Injury contrary to §940 of the Wisconsin Statutes. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in the name of the State of Wisconsin, you 
are commanded forthwith to search said premises and persons on 
said premises for said things, and if the same or any portion 
thereof are found, to safely keep the property seized so long as 
necessary for the purpose of being produced as evidence on any 
trial or until further order of the court. 
The facts tending to establish the ground for issuing a 
search warrant are as follows: 
Affiant states that he has been a police officer for the 
past 5 years with the Grand Chute Police Department and in that 
capacity has knowledge of the following: 
Your affiant reports that on February 21, 2012, officers 
were dispatched to the Roadstar Inn, located at 3623 W. College 
Avenue, in the Town of Grand Chute, Outagamie County, Wisconsin, 
at 1:25 pm for a medical call.  Off. Jones reports dispatch 
advised the individual was face down, covered in blood.  Off. 
Jones reports when he arrived at room 114 of the Roadstar Inn 
the ambulance and fire departments were already there.  Off. 
Jones reports he was told by a paramedic the individual was 
deceased.  Off. Jones reports when he entered the room there was 
a bloody phone receiver that was detached from the phone near 
the door and walkway.  Off. Jones reports he walked into the 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
52 
room and saw blood smeared against the far wall beyond the beds 
and there was a black male laying prone against the wall.  
Affiant reports that during the investigation, officers did 
locate a WI ID card in the hotel room identifying the male party 
as Derrick J. Whitlow, dob: []. 
Affiant reports that he spoke with Jon Hagen, a deputy 
coroner who was called to the scene to make an initial 
assessment on Derrick Whitlow.  Affiant reports that Hagen did 
share with him some photos taken at the scene that included 
photos of Derrick J. Whitlow and it was apparent that he had a 
very large area of injury to his right hand that appeared to be 
a very deep cut to the hand.  Affiant also reports Jon Hagen 
reported that there is a significant area of injury to Whitlow's 
neck which includes a significant cut to his neck/throat area.  
Affiant also reports that in the upper left arm area Whitlow has 
a large laceration and large area of injury to his upper left 
chest area.  Affiant reports that he spoke with Off Schellinger 
at the Roadstar who had been processing the scene and indicated 
that a knife sheath was located next to Whitlow which was 
approximately 8 inches in length with the writing 'Winchester' 
located on it.  Affiant reports that within the hotel room were 
very significant areas of blood and blood splatter; that there 
was significant blood and blood splatter on the wall, bed and 
floor of the hotel room.  Affiant reports that based upon his 
training and experience any other party who would have been in 
the room with Whitlow at the time of his injuries would likely 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
53 
also have significant areas of blood and/or blood splatter on 
their clothing or shoes. 
Affiant reports that Off. Jones reports that he spoke with 
[the hotel manager], an employee who was working the front desk 
of the Roadstar Inn on 2/21/12.  [The manager] informed Off. 
Jones that the black male who was staying in Room 114 was 
Derrick Whitlow and that he had been saying at the Roadstar Inn 
since the 17th of February, 2012 with his son, who is 
approximately 10 years old.  He said he knew that Derrick 
Whitlow has been having problems with his wife. 
Affiant reports that he spoke with [a cleaning employee] 
who works at the Roadstar.  [The cleaning employee] reports that 
she was working on 2/21/12; that she was doing the laundry in Rm 
111 from approximately 1:00 to 1:30 pm when she heard and saw 
someone knock on Room 114, a party who was wearing a gray hooded 
sweatshirt with the hood pulled over their head.  [The cleaning 
employee] reports that the person was ultimately let into Room 
114 by someone in the room.  [The cleaning employee] reports 
that she then heard a male party screaming for help and she 
heard what she thought was someone getting hit.  [The cleaning 
employee] reports that she then went to the manager to get help 
and she did briefly see the person in the hooded sweatshirt 
leaving.  [She] reports that hotel staff then entered Room 114, 
located an injured male party and called the police. 
Affiant reports that he and Off. Jones reports that [a 
hotel guest] stated he is staying in Room 115 at the Roadstar.  
[The guest] stated that during the afternoon, he was in his room 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
54 
when he heard a female voice yelling.  [The guest] stated that 
he thought the female was the cleaning employee so he went to 
see what was happening.  [The guest] stated that he went down 
the hallway and saw the cleaning employee so he then realized it 
was someone else.  [The guest] reports that he was just past 
Room 114 when he heard a loud yell and then heard a male party 
yelling "help me, help me."  [The guest] stated that he then 
went by the manager's office and then went outside and saw the 
fire department arrive. 
Affiant reports that Det. Meyer of the Appleton Police 
Department did assist in the investigation and on 2/21/12 did 
Det. Meyer did speak with R.L.D.J. (DOB []), who stated his 
mother is Mastella Jackson and his father is Derrick Whitlow.  
He said his family had all been living together at their home, 
but his father left to stay at the Roadstar Inn a few days ago.  
Det. Meyer reports that based upon his previous contacts with 
Mastella Jackson and Derrick Whitlow in January of 2012, he knew 
they were residing at [] W Fourth Street in the City of 
Appleton, Outagamie County, Wisconsin.  RLDJ said when his dad 
went to stay at the hotel a few days earlier, his brother went 
with him to the hotel to help him because he had a broken leg.  
RLDJ reports that his dad had left because he and his mom had 
been having issues that included 'adult conversations' that 
became loud.  RLDJ reports that on 2/21/12 he did stay home from 
school and was with his mom.  RLDJ reports that during the late 
morning hours, he did ride with his mom to an appointment she 
had for an MRI; he stated when they arrived at the medical 
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
55 
location, his mom didn't leave the car and instead she stated 
she had sore feet and wasn't going in.  RLDJ reports they then 
went back to their house.  RLDJ reports that during the early 
afternoon, his mother became angry because his father had 
destroyed some pictures of her as a little child and other 
family pictures as well as his grandmother's grave marker.  RLDJ 
stated that his mother left the residence and was gone for 
approximately 15-20 minutes.  When his mother returned, he said 
he heard a zipper sound and then heard his mother go directly 
into the bathroom and she took a shower.  He said when she got 
out of the shower, she was in different clothing than she what 
she had been wearing earlier in the day.  After coming out of 
the shower, RLDJ said that his mom, Mastella told him not to 
tell anyone that she had left the house that day.  Det. Meyer 
reports that when RLDJ was asked what his mom might have in the 
house for protection, he stated that mom did have a gun, a 
shorter gun you would hold in your hand and that he saw the gun 
this morning when mom had it in the house. 
Affiant reports that on 2/21/12, Off. Schira of the 
Appleton Police Department did assist in making contact with 
Mastella Jackson at her residence at [] W Fourth Street in the 
City of Appleton, Outagamie County, Wisconsin.  Affiant reports 
that both RLDJ and Jackson were located at the home.  Off. 
Schira reports that located within the two car attached garage 
of the home is a 2007 Chevrolet Malibu, 4 door, gray in color, 
WI license place [], VIN[] registered to Mastella L. Jackson.  
No. 
  2014AP2238-CR 
56 
Off. Schira also reports at the residence on the curb area is 
located a garbage bin. 
Affiant reports that on 2/21/12 officers did speak with 
Mastella Jackson about where she had been earlier on that day.  
Jackson did inform officers that she and Dwight Jackson [sic] 
did have two children together and they had previously resided 
together.  Jackson did state that a few days earlier Whitlow had 
left 
the 
residence 
and 
was 
staying 
at 
the 
Roadstar 
Inn. . . .  Affiant reports that on 2/21/12 he did observe a 
vehicle in the garage at Mastella's residence. 
Affiant further reports that the statements of [the hotel 
manager, the hotel guest, the hotel cleaning employee], Jon 
Hagen and RLDJ are presumed truthful and reliable as citizen 
witnesses. . . .  Affiant, Off. Jones, Off. Schellinger, Det. 
Meyer and Det. Callaway are presumed truthful and reliable as 
they are sworn law enforcement officers. 
Wherefore, your affiant prays that a search warrant be 
issued to enter said premises to search for the items identified 
herein along with the items listed on the face sheet of the 
search warrant. 
Affiant - Det. Mike Renkas 
 
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶93 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  Unlike the 
majority opinion, I would suppress the physical evidence 
obtained at Mastella Jackson's home following law enforcement 
officers' deliberate violations of Jackson's Miranda rights.   
¶94 The majority decides this Miranda case in the same 
month as the fiftieth anniversary of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (June 13, 1966).1  Miranda is perhaps the best-known 
criminal law decision of the United States Supreme Court. 
¶95 The Miranda warnings are celebrated as a shield 
against compelled self-incrimination and violations of criminal 
suspects' constitutional rights.  Miranda warnings stem from the 
very constitution our law enforcement officers are sworn to 
protect and defend.2   
¶96 Moreover, Miranda warnings are "embedded in routine 
police practice" and "have become part of our national culture."3   
                                                 
1 The American Bar Association used the fiftieth anniversary 
of the Miranda decision as this year's Law Day (May 1) theme. 
Minnesota Judge Kevin S. Burke wrote in celebration of Law 
Day 2016 and the Miranda decision as follows:  "Our criminal 
justice system has faults, but the Miranda decision 50 years 
later is the embodiment of what President Eisenhower hoped for 
in creating Law Day:  a democracy that chooses not force, but 
the rule of law."  Judge Kevin S. Burke, Choosing the rule of 
law: a tribute to the Miranda decision, MinnPost (Apr. 29, 
2016), 
https://www.minnpost.com/community-
voices/2016/04/choosing-rule-law-tribute-miranda-decision.  
2 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000) 
("Miranda is a constitutional decision . . . .").   
3 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.    
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶97 Even fictional TV law enforcement officers like 
Dragnet's Detective Joe Friday and Law and Order's officers give 
Miranda warnings.  If you missed the warnings in the original 
series you will hear them again and again in the reruns.4  
 
¶98 The circuit court developed an extensive record about 
Jackson's 
interrogation, 
including 
testimony 
and 
audio 
recordings.5   
¶99 Jackson 
was 
brought 
to 
the 
Grand 
Chute 
Police 
Department shortly after 4:30 PM.  She was alone in a room for 
about two hours.  Grand Chute Police officers began questioning 
Jackson at about 6:30 PM, and the circuit court found Jackson 
was in custody (i.e., not free to leave) at 7:25 PM.  
Nevertheless, the interrogation continued for more than five 
hours before officers advised Jackson of her Miranda rights.6   
¶100 During the interrogation, Jackson was in pain and 
needed her prescription medication.  Several times during the 
officers' questioning, she asked "to leave," "to go home," "not 
to say anything," and "to talk at a different time."7  Despite 
the fact that Jackson was told at the outset, "[Y]ou're not 
                                                 
4 See George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of 
Miranda v. Arizona:  "Embedded" in Our National Culture?, 29 
Crime & Just. 203, 246 (2002) ("[I]t is because of these shows 
and the mass media more generally——not the police, the legal 
system, or Supreme Court doctrine——that Miranda has become so 
much a part of our national culture.").   
5 Majority op., ¶35. 
6 Majority op., ¶2. 
7 Majority op., ¶¶22, 25; see also ¶27.   
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
under arrest or, you know, you're free to go, you know,"8 
Jackson's requests to leave and not to speak went unheeded, all 
contrary to federal constitutional law. 
¶101 The circuit court issued a comprehensive ruling 
suppressing the statements made during the interrogation.9  The 
circuit court concluded that the failure to read Jackson her 
Miranda warnings was an intentional violation of Jackson's 
constitutional rights.  The circuit court strongly condemned the 
officers and detectives for giving incredible testimony10 and 
deliberately violating Jackson's rights.   
¶102 The circuit court judge stated that when he considered 
the 
interrogation 
he 
"became 
sick 
to 
my 
stomach 
literally . . . . [T]his is textbook interrogation of what not 
to do if you want to be doing good police work and get stuff 
admitted in during a hearing."   
¶103 The circuit court went on to denounce the officers' 
conduct as follows:  
I've never seen a case, been part of a case, or heard 
of a case that's worse than this in terms of what the 
police officers did in that interrogation room. . . . 
[T]his is just a clear violation of somebody's rights 
over a long period of time involving many different 
officers with lots of opportunities to have one of 
them step up and say, hey, this is not the way we need 
to do this. 
                                                 
8 Majority op., ¶18.   
9 Majority op., ¶36. 
10 Majority op., ¶36. 
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶104 Compounding the duplicity of the Miranda violation, 
when the officers finally read Jackson her rights, the detective 
assured Jackson that her rights would not be violated:  
Can I, can I read [Miranda warnings] to you first 
because I technically can't get into a lot of stuff 
without until I advise you of these and you decide 
whether or not you want to talk to me anymore, OK 
because I can't violate your rights, do you know what 
I mean?  So can I read this to you and then you decide 
whether or not you want to talk to me because I can't 
really get into any in depth conversation with you 
until you either tell me yes or no that you're willing 
to talk to me.  So let me read this to you and then 
you decide what you want to answer and we'll go from 
there and then anything I can answer for you I'll 
answer, presuming you want to talk to me.  Sound 
fair?11 
¶105 After hearing the Miranda warnings Jackson asked:  "So 
earlier, when you, when you wouldn't let me leave . . . ."  The 
detective cut her off.  
¶106 Contrary to what the detective told Jackson, Miranda 
warnings are not a technicality——they are a constitutionally 
required 
"shield 
that 
protects 
against 
compelled 
self-
incrimination."12  We have recognized that Miranda's shield 
against compelled self-incrimination is "made of substance, not 
tinsel," and "[a]ny shield that can be so easily . . . cast 
aside by the very people we entrust to enforce the law fails to 
serve its own purpose, and is in effect no shield at all."13   
                                                 
11 Majority op., ¶27 (emphasis added).   
12 State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶72, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 
N.W.2d 899.    
13 Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶72.   
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶107 The court of appeals branded "the officers' actions 
during the interrogation of Jackson [as] reprehensible."14  The 
majority opinion agrees that the circuit court's and court of 
appeals' condemnation of the police conduct was "warranted and 
appropriate."15   
¶108 Our society asks law enforcement officers to perform 
an extraordinarily difficult and dangerous job.  We rely on them 
to maintain public safety and defend the rule of law.  And most 
law enforcement officers perform admirably, placing themselves 
in harm's way to protect the rest of us.   
¶109 To enable them to do their important work, society 
entrusts law enforcement officers with enormous power.  The 
power of law enforcement officers, however, like the power of 
all government officials, is not unchecked.   
¶110 Our court has forcefully declared:  "Just as we will 
not tolerate criminal suspects to lie to the police under the 
guise of avoiding compelled self-incrimination, we will not 
tolerate the police deliberately ignoring Miranda's rule as a 
means of obtaining inculpatory physical evidence."16  Disregard 
for the rule of law, especially by those sworn to protect and 
defend it, breeds distrust, suspicion, and contempt in the 
                                                 
14 State v. Jackson, 2015 WI App 49, ¶48, 363 Wis. 2d 554, 
866 N.W.2d 768.   
15 See majority op., ¶69 ("[T]he circuit court and court of 
appeals, respectively, rebuked officers for 'flagrant' and 
'reprehensible' violations of Jackson's rights——rebukes, we 
believe, that were warranted and appropriate.").   
16 Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶72.   
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
community, 
and 
undermines 
the 
important 
and 
legitimate 
activities of law enforcement.17 
¶111 In 
the 
instant 
case, 
by 
intentionally 
flouting 
Jackson's 
rights, 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
obtained 
incriminating statements from Jackson and took a shortcut to 
accelerate the discovery of incriminating physical evidence in 
Jackson's home——bloody shoes, clothes, and a knife Jackson 
allegedly used to kill her husband.18  Although police searched 
Jackson's home for incriminating evidence pursuant to a warrant, 
the warrant was based in part on statements made during 
Jackson's unlawful interrogation, and the shoes, clothes, and 
knife were found only after officers brought Jackson (in 
custody) to her home at about 2:15 AM to point out the objects.  
¶112 The incriminating statements Jackson made before and 
after she was given Miranda warnings remain suppressed.  The 
suppression of Jackson's statements (including those statements 
made when she was in her home) is not challenged by the State.  
                                                 
17 "When 
a 
public 
official 
behaves 
with 
such 
casual 
disregard for his constitutional obligations and the rights of 
the accused, it erodes the public's trust in our justice system, 
and chips away at the foundational premises of the rule of law.  
When such transgressions are acknowledged yet forgiven by the 
courts, we endorse and invite their repetition."  United States 
v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., 
joined by four judges, dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc); see also Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶¶75, 79.   
18 See ¶134, infra (quoting Professor LaFave's criticism of 
a court's using the inevitable discovery doctrine under these 
circumstances). 
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
Rather, the State challenges only the suppression of the 
physical evidence seized at Jackson's home.   
¶113 The majority opinion agrees with the court of appeals' 
decision reversing the circuit court's suppression of the 
incriminating physical evidence.   
¶114 A court is clearly saddened and disappointed to 
observe and write about intentional police misconduct violating 
a constitutional right.  A court's expression of commitment to 
the Constitution rings hollow, however, if the court allows 
Miranda's shield against compelled self-incrimination to be cast 
aside without providing a remedy.  True, Jackson's incriminating 
statements remain suppressed, but the majority does not offer 
either Jackson or the people of the State a remedy for the 
intentional, unwarranted, and unconstitutional shortcut police 
took in discovering the incriminating physical evidence.  The 
remedy I propose, suppression of the physical evidence, has 
shortcomings, 
but 
suppression 
further 
deters 
intentional 
violations 
of 
Miranda, 
fulfilling 
"one 
purpose 
of 
the 
exclusionary rule[, which] is to deter such shortcuts . . . ."  
See 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 11.4(a), at 344-45 
(5th ed. 2012).  Not granting a remedy for this shortcut is not 
an acceptable option.  See ¶¶136, 138-143, infra. 
¶115 I conclude that to ensure that "those we entrust to 
enforce the law [do not] intentionally subvert a suspect's 
constitutional rights,"19 suppression of the physical evidence 
                                                 
19 Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶83. 
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
obtained at Jackson's home is necessary.  In concluding that 
suppression of the physical evidence is necessary, I adhere to 
the reasoning in State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 
700 N.W.2d 899, which held that physical evidence obtained as a 
direct result of an intentional violation of Miranda is 
inadmissible under Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.   
¶116 In refusing to suppress the physical evidence obtained 
at Jackson's home, the majority opinion applies the inevitable 
discovery doctrine, an exception to the exclusionary rule.20  I 
disagree with applying the inevitable discovery doctrine in the 
instant case.  I would hold, based on Knapp, that Article I, 
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution does not allow the State 
to rely on the inevitable discovery doctrine in cases of 
intentional police violations of Miranda. 
¶117 I also have concerns about the majority opinion's 
approach to the substantive aspects of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine.  I discuss these concerns in Part II of this dissent.   
¶118 For the reasons set forth, I dissent and write 
separately.   
I 
 
¶119 The physical evidence should be suppressed under 
Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which 
provides (in relevant part):  
                                                 
20 See majority op., ¶92.   
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
(1) No person . . . may be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself or herself. 
¶120 The text of the relevant portion of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution is similar: 
No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself . . . .  
¶121 Although the text of Article I, Section 8 and the 
Fifth Amendment are similar, we need not interpret our Wisconsin 
Constitution in lock-step with the interpretation of the United 
States Constitution.21   
¶122 In interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution, this court 
should take the position espoused by Wisconsin Supreme Court 
Justice Abram Smith in 1855:  
In view of the obligations imposed upon me, or rather 
voluntarily 
assumed 
by 
me, . . . in 
my 
present 
position, 
I 
have 
felt 
bound 
to 
sustain 
that 
fundamental 
law——the 
constitution 
of 
the 
state, 
according to its true intent and meaning.  That is the 
great charter of our rights, to which the humblest may 
at all times appeal, and to which the highest must at 
all times submit.   
Let us then look to that constitution, adopted by the 
people of Wisconsin, and endeavor to ascertain its 
true intent and meaning . . . .   
                                                 
21 See Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶¶59-62; see also Knapp, 285 
Wis. 2d 86, 
¶¶84-94 
(Crooks, 
J., 
concurring); 
William 
J. 
Brennan, 
Jr., 
State 
Constitutions 
and 
the 
Protection 
of 
Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 500 (1977) ("[W]hile 
this results in a divergence of meaning between words which are 
the same in both federal and state constitutions, the system of 
federalism envisaged by the United States Constitution tolerates 
such divergence where the result is greater protection of 
individual 
rights 
under 
state 
law 
than 
under 
federal 
law . . . .") (quoted source omitted). 
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
The people then made this constitution, and adopted it 
as their primary law.  The people of other states made 
for themselves respectively, constitutions which are 
construed by their own appropriate functionaries.  Let 
them construe theirs——let us construe, and stand by 
ours.     
Att'y Gen. ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567 (*567),  785 
(*757-58) (1855) (emphasis in original).  
¶123 I turn to Knapp, which interpreted Article I, Section 
8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The Knapp court broke from the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment, holding that when "physical evidence is obtained as 
the direct result of an intentional Miranda violation, we 
conclude that [Article I, Section 8 of] our constitution 
requires that the evidence must be suppressed."22   
¶124 Let's begin with the facts in Knapp.  The defendant, 
Knapp, was a parolee who was seen with a woman who was later 
murdered.23  Based on a parole violation, an officer went to the 
defendant's house to apprehend him.24  When the officer arrived, 
he told Knapp that he had to go to the police station, but never 
read him the Miranda warnings.25  Before leaving Knapp's house, 
the officer questioned him about what clothes he was wearing 
when he was seen with the victim.26  After Knapp pointed out the 
                                                 
22 Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶2 (emphasis added).   
23 Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶5.   
24 Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶¶6-7.   
25 Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶7.   
26 Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶8.   
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
clothes, the officer seized them and took Knapp to the police 
station.27  Police later discovered the victim's blood on the 
sleeve of Knapp's sweatshirt.28   
 
¶125 Knapp argued that the sweatshirt should be suppressed 
based on the officer's intentional violation of Miranda.  The 
court agreed, relying on Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution and the deliberate violations of Miranda at issue.  
Although the court recognized that the exclusionary rule is not 
absolute, the court concluded that the need to deter intentional 
violations of individuals' constitutional rights and preserve 
the integrity of the judicial system required the application of 
the exclusionary rule when physical evidence is obtained as a 
direct result of an intentional Miranda violation.29 
¶126 Knapp differs from the instant case in that no search 
warrant was issued in Knapp.30  The officer in Knapp was not 
pursuing other means of searching the defendant's house at the 
time the intentional violation of Miranda occurred.31  Thus, the 
Knapp court described the location of the physical evidence as a 
direct result of the Miranda violation.  In contrasting the 
                                                 
27 Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶8.   
28 Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶12.   
29 See Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶¶74-75, 79, 83.   
30 Jackson, 363 Wis. 2d 554, ¶45.  Knapp does not involve 
the inevitable discovery doctrine.  The State in Knapp might 
have been able to argue that some chain of events or alternative 
line of investigation demonstrated that law enforcement would 
have inevitably discovered the physical evidence.  
31 See Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶¶7-9.   
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
instant case with Knapp, the court of appeals stated that "the 
knife, clothes, and shoes [in the instant case] would have been 
inevitably discovered by lawful means, notwithstanding the 
police misconduct."32  The "lawful means" to which the court of 
appeals refers is the search of Jackson's home pursuant to the 
warrant.     
¶127 Like the court of appeals, the majority opinion 
concludes that the physical evidence inevitably would have been 
discovered pursuant to the search warrant.33  Perhaps.  But the 
search warrant was based in part on Jackson's suppressed 
statements obtained in violation of Miranda.   
¶128 To validate the search warrant, the court of appeals 
and majority opinion have to excise Jackson's suppressed 
statements.34  Furthermore, although law enforcement had a search 
warrant, the physical evidence was found only after the officers 
took Jackson to her home and asked her to show them where she 
discarded the clothes, shoes, and knife.  On these facts, the 
circuit court suppressed the physical evidence.   
 
¶129 Whether locating the physical evidence in the instant 
case fits the verbal formula in Knapp of a "direct" result of a 
Miranda violation, locating the physical evidence is very much 
related to and can be described as a direct outgrowth of 
                                                 
32 Jackson, 363 Wis. 2d 554, ¶45.   
33 See majority op., ¶75.   
34 See majority op., ¶¶75-76; Jackson, 363 Wis. 2d 554, 
¶¶17-18.   
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
Jackson's illegal interrogation before and after the Miranda 
warnings.  By the time Jackson was taken to her home it was 
about 2:15 AM, and Jackson had been in custody and subject to 
questioning for more than seven hours.  The circuit court 
suppressed Jackson's statements, including statements she made 
when the officers took her to her home and had her locate the 
physical evidence.   
¶130 In suppressing Jackson's statements, the circuit court 
relied on Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004),35 and 
concluded that Jackson's statements were involuntary under the 
circumstances.36  The direct causal connection between Jackson's 
illegally obtained (and properly suppressed) statements and the 
discovery of the physical evidence is clear and undeniable.      
 
¶131 I do not view any supposed difference between Knapp 
and the instant case as sufficient to depart from the reasoning 
and holding of Knapp.  Relying on the rhetorical distinction 
between evidence obtained as a "direct" (versus "indirect?") 
                                                 
35 In Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), the United 
States Supreme Court addressed whether suppression of evidence 
is necessary for statements made after Miranda warnings are 
given if, before the officers gave the suspect Miranda warnings, 
an unconstitutional interrogation had taken place.  The court 
held that such statements must be suppressed despite "the 
midstream 
recitation 
of 
warnings 
after 
interrogation 
and 
unwarned confession" in order to effectively comply with 
Miranda.  Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604.   
36 The State did not challenge these aspects of the circuit 
court's decision.  Indeed the State accepted for purposes of its 
brief that "Jackson's statements to the police were obtained in 
violation of Miranda and were involuntary, [and] that the police 
improperly relied on information obtained from Jackson to locate 
[the physical evidence]."  Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 11.  
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
result of a violation of Miranda distorts the facts of the 
instant case and the policy underlying Miranda and Knapp.  The 
majority opinion's decision allowing the use of the inevitable 
discovery doctrine to avoid suppression of evidence that was 
concededly obtained as a direct outgrowth of a coercive, 
deliberate, 
illegal 
interrogation 
allows 
the 
inevitable 
discovery doctrine to swallow Miranda, the exclusionary rule, 
and Knapp.      
¶132 Moreover, I disagree with the majority opinion's 
holding that good faith by law enforcement is not a prerequisite 
for relying on the inevitable discovery doctrine.  I view good 
faith in the instant case as an essential element for the 
application of the inevitable discovery doctrine.  
¶133 In disregarding the law enforcement officers' bad 
faith, the majority opinion relies on Nix v. Williams, 467 
U.S. 431 (1984), the famous (or "infamous"37) Christian Burial 
Case.  In Nix, the United States Supreme Court concluded that 
requiring "that the prosecution . . . prove the absence of bad 
faith would . . . withhold[] from juries relevant and undoubted 
truth that would have been available to police absent any 
unlawful police activity" and would "put the police in a worse 
position that they would have been in if no unlawful conduct had 
transpired."38     
                                                 
37 See Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶30. 
38 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 (1984); see also 
majority op., ¶¶71-72.   
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
 
¶134 Nix has spawned significant criticism.  For example, 
Professor Wayne LaFave's treatise on criminal law (referenced by 
the majority opinion) states:  
Because one purpose of the exclusionary rule is to 
deter . . . shortcuts, there is much to be said for 
the proposition that the "inevitable discovery" rule 
should be applied only when it is clear that "the 
police officers have not acted in bad faith to 
accelerate the discovery" of the evidence in question. 
6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure, § 11.4(a) at 344-46 (5th 
ed. 2012) (quoting Brian S. Conneely & Edmond P. Murphy, 
Comment, Inevitable Discovery: The Hypothetical Independent 
Source Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 5 Hofstra L. Rev. 
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
137, 160 (1976)).39  Professor LaFave does not consider 
compelling the argument that "'if we hadn't done it wrong, we 
would have done it right . . . .'"  6 LaFave, Search & Seizure, 
§ 11.4(a), at 347 (quoted source omitted).   
 
¶135 The 
majority 
asserts 
that 
the 
uncertainty 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
face 
over 
the 
applicability 
of 
the 
inevitable discovery doctrine when they intentionally violate an 
individual's rights justifies application of the inevitable 
                                                 
39 For 
criticism 
of 
and 
proposed 
limitations 
on 
the 
inevitable discovery doctrine, see also, e.g., Eugene L. 
Shapiro, Active Pursuit, Inevitable Discovery, and the Federal 
Circuits:  The Search for Manageable Limitations Upon an 
Expansive Doctrine, 39 Gonz. L. Rev. 295 (2003-04) (noting the 
expansiveness 
of 
the 
inevitable 
discovery 
doctrine 
and 
describing a significant split among the federal circuits 
concerning whether the inevitable discovery doctrine requires a 
separate and independent investigation be ongoing at the time of 
the constitutional illegality); William C. Heffernan, Foreword: 
The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional 
Remedy, 88 Geo. L.J. 799, 856-57 (2000) (exploring alternatives 
to the exclusionary rule and arguing that the inevitable 
discovery 
doctrine 
should 
require 
(1) 
an 
independent 
investigation be underway when a tainted chain of events is 
unfolding; and (2) a demonstration by the State by clear and 
convincing evidence that the independent investigation would 
produce the same information discovered were it not for the 
illegality); George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Balancing 
the Fourth Amendment Scales:  The Bad-Faith "Exception" to 
Exclusionary Rule Limitations, 45 Hastings L.J. 21, 57 (1993) 
(noting the "inherently speculative nature" of the inevitable 
discovery doctrine and suggesting there is less reason to engage 
in that speculation where evidence was obtained through a bad 
faith violation of a defendant's rights); John E. Fennelly, 
Refinement of the Inevitable Discovery Exception:  The Need for 
a Good Faith Requirement, 17 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1085, 1100-06 
(1991) (arguing that the courts should not favor intentional 
police 
lawbreaking 
by 
affording 
the 
misconduct 
the 
same 
treatment given honest mistakes). 
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
discovery doctrine.40  No empirical evidence supports this bare 
assertion.  We are in an era recognizing the importance of 
evidence-based decision making, but all the majority musters is 
conjecture.       
¶136 The majority also emphasizes the "societal costs" of 
applying the exclusionary rule in instances in which evidence 
inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.41  To be 
sure, there are such costs; however, other proposed remedies for 
law enforcement misconduct present other problems.42  But not 
granting a remedy in the instant case is not an acceptable 
option.  Nowhere in the majority's calculus is the cost to 
judicial integrity and deterrence of allowing the use of 
evidence 
obtained 
by 
flagrant 
and 
reprehensible 
police 
wrongdoing.   
¶137 In Knapp, two key factors led this court to conclude 
that Article I, Section 8 required the suppression of evidence 
obtained as a direct result of a violation of Miranda.  First, 
failing 
to 
suppress 
such 
evidence 
would 
"'minimize 
the 
seriousness of the police misconduct producing the evidentiary 
fruits, breed contempt for the law, and encourage the type of 
conduct that Miranda was designed to prevent, especially where 
                                                 
40 Majority op., ¶71 (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 445) 
(alteration in original).   
41 Majority op., ¶¶46, 55.   
42 See generally Heffernan, supra note 39, at 818-19, 848-
51, 854-58 (discussing the exclusionary rule's limitations and 
advantages as a remedy and exploring alternative remedies for 
constitutional violations).   
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
the police conduct is intentional, as it was here.'"43  Second, 
allowing the State to benefit from ill-gotten gains undermines 
the integrity of the judicial system.44   
¶138 I agree with those who have written that "the need to 
deter is greater when the illegal activity of the police is 
deliberate.  Society needs to make clear to the enforcers of our 
laws 
that 
when 
they 
deliberately 
violate 
constitutional 
principles a penalty must be paid."45     
 
¶139 Thus, three states, Alaska, Massachusetts, and North 
Dakota, each relying on a state law or constitution, have 
narrowed the inevitable discovery doctrine to cases in which 
police do not knowingly or intentionally violate a suspect's 
rights.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mattier, 50 N.E.3d 157, 167 
(Mass. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d 1184, 
1190 (Mass. 1997)); State v. Holly, 833 N.W.2d 15, 33 (N.D. 
2013) (citing State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 775 (N.D. 1980)); 
Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473, 481 (Alaska 1997); see also United 
States v. Madrid, 152 F.3d 1034, 1041 (8th Cir. 1998) (declaring 
that courts are not required to apply the inevitable discovery 
doctrine 
"without 
regard 
to 
the 
severity 
of 
the 
police 
misconduct"); but see State v. Garner, 417 S.E.2d 502, 510-11 
(N.C. 1992) (rejecting this view).   
                                                 
43 Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶75 (quoted source omitted).   
44 Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶79.   
45 Steven P. Grossman, The Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery: 
A Plea for Reasonable Limitations, 92 Dick. L. Rev. 313, 356 
(1988) (emphasis added).   
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
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¶140 As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court put it:  
We think the severity of the constitutional violation 
is critical in deciding whether to admit evidence that 
it 
is 
shown 
would 
inevitably 
have 
been 
discovered. . . .  Bad faith of the police, shown by 
such activities as conducting an unlawful search in 
order to accelerate discovery of the evidence, will be 
relevant 
in 
assessing 
the 
severity 
of 
any 
constitutional violation.   
Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 546 N.E.2d 336, 340 (Mass. 1989) 
(internal citations omitted).   
 
¶141 The concerns raised by these cases and commentators 
are echoed by our own decision in Knapp, and are as salient in 
the instant case as they were in Knapp.  The circuit court, the 
court of appeals, the majority opinion, and I all agree that the 
violations of Jackson's rights in the instant case were 
intentional, 
deliberate, 
unjustifiable, 
and 
profoundly 
troubling.  I am troubled that the majority opinion, despite its 
recognition of law enforcement's wrongdoing, minimizes the 
seriousness of the wrongdoing and in effect may encourage future 
violations by allowing law enforcement to fall back on the 
inevitable discovery doctrine even in unfortunate cases like 
this one.   
¶142 Justice Louis Brandeis got it right in Olmstead v. 
United 
States, 
277 
U.S. 
438, 
468 
(1928) 
(Brandeis, 
J., 
dissenting):  
Crime is contagious.  If the government becomes a 
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites 
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites 
anarchy.  To declare that in the administration of the 
criminal law the ends justifies the means——to declare 
that the government may commit crimes in order to 
secure the conviction of a private criminal——would 
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
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bring terrible retribution.  Against that pernicious 
doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.   
¶143 Accordingly, I would adhere to our reasoning in Knapp, 
not the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Nix, and hold 
that under Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
the State may not rely on the inevitable discovery doctrine in 
cases in which law enforcement officers acted in bad faith by 
deliberately failing to give Miranda warnings. 
II 
 
¶144 I have reservations about the majority opinion's 
discussion 
of 
the 
substantive 
aspects 
of 
the 
inevitable 
discovery doctrine.  The majority opinion reformulates the 
three-prong analysis of the inevitable discovery doctrine 
applied by the court of appeals.  Reformulating the analysis of 
the inevitable discovery doctrine was not an issue raised or 
discussed by the parties.  Instead of the normal progression of 
issues being narrowed or limited on appeal, the majority opinion 
expands the issues. 
¶145 True, as the majority opinion points out, some 
exceptions 
to 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
formulation 
of 
the 
inevitable discovery doctrine may be necessary, but the court of 
appeals' three-prong analysis (unlike the majority's free-
flowing inevitability analysis) provides important guidance to 
circuit courts and the court of appeals.46   
 
¶146 Additionally, given the focus of the inevitable 
discovery doctrine on whether evidence inevitably would have 
                                                 
46 See majority op., ¶¶62-66.   
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
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been discovered by lawful means, I question the majority 
opinion's reliance on the "preponderance of the evidence" burden 
of proof.47  "Proof by a preponderance of the evidence would 
require a mere showing that [an occurrence] is more likely than 
not . . . ."48      
¶147 An inevitability is defined as something that is "sure 
to happen."49  There is an obvious tension in requiring proof 
that an event is "more likely than not to happen" when the fact 
to be proved is that the event is "sure to happen."50       
¶148 I would follow the practice of other courts and hold 
the State to the heightened "clear and convincing evidence" 
burden of proof in inevitable discovery cases.  Increasing the 
burden of proof has both practical and symbolic significance, 
                                                 
47 See majority op., ¶66.   
48 In re Commitment of West, 2011 WI 83, ¶80, 336 
Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929. 
49 Merriam-Webster's 
Learner's 
Dictionary, 
Inevitable 
(2008).      
50 See United States v. Heath, 455 F.3d 52, 59 n.6 (2d Cir. 
2006) 
(describing 
the 
"semantic 
puzzle" 
of 
"using 
the 
preponderance of the evidence standard to prove inevitability" 
and  concluding that it was sufficient to "note the difference 
between proving by a preponderance that something would have 
happened and proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 
something would inevitably have happened.") (quoted source 
omitted; 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.4(a) at 
359-61 (5th ed. 2012) ("A 'majority of the courts that have 
utilized the exception have tended to define the necessary 
probability in terms of 'would,' which is the constitutional 
standard . . . .' 'It is not enough to show the evidence 'might' 
or 'could' have been otherwise obtained.'") (internal citations, 
footnotes, and quotation marks omitted). 
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
22 
 
impressing upon the factfinder the importance of the decision 
and 
reducing 
the 
chance 
that 
hypothetical 
findings 
of 
inevitability will swallow the exclusionary rule.  See, e.g., 
State v. Rodrigues, 286 P.3d 809, 823 (Haw. 2012) (quoting State 
v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889, 907 (Haw. 1995)); State v. Smith, 54 
A.3d 772, 786-87 (N.J. 2012) (citing State v. Sugar, 495 
A.2d 90, 104 (N.J. 1985)); Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473, 479 
(Alaska 1997); see also Nix, 467 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that proof of the inevitability of 
discovering evidence by lawful means should be shown by clear 
and convincing evidence).   
¶149 For the reasons set forth, I dissent and write 
separately. 
¶150 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
No.  2014AP2238-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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