Case Title: State v. Mccarthy

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1989-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 88-636


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

      v.                                     On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont
John J. McCarthy, Jr.                        Unit No. 3, Orleans Circuit

                                             November Term, 1989


Shireen Avis Fisher, J.

Jane Woodruff, Orleans County State's Attorney, Newport, and Gary Kessler,
  Rosemary S. Hull and Pamela Hall Johnson, Department of State's Attorneys,
  Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

Vincent Illuzzi, Orleans, for defendant at trial, Gensburg Axelrod & Adler,
  St. Johnsbury, for defendant-appellant on appeal


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Dooley and Morse, JJ., and Barney, C.J. (Ret.),
          Specially Assigned


     DOOLEY, J.  In this appeal from his conviction for lewd or lascivious
conduct with a child, 13 V.S.A. { 2602, defendant makes numerous challenges
to the admissibility of the child's videotaped testimony and the evidence to
impeach his character witnesses.  Although defendant failed to preserve his
claims of error, we find plain error in the admission of evidence about an
unrelated incident with another child and reverse the conviction and remand
for a new trial.
     On November 20, 1987, the child-complainant was invited to stay with
the mother of a friend  after she complained that her mother was beating and
slapping her.  While present at the friend's home, complainant told her
friend's mother that "her father had touched her private parts with his
hands."  Thereafter, the Vermont Department of Social and Rehabilitation
Services (SRS) and the Vermont State Police became involved, along with
various professionals, and the complaint led to this prosecution for one
count of sexual abuse during the period between June and December of 1987.
     Defendant denied that the alleged incident occurred.  He was supported
by his ex-wife and his numerous sons and daughters.  The position of the
family members was that the alleged incident could not have occurred as it
was reported by the complainant and did not occur.
     The complainant did not testify before the jury at the trial.  Instead,
her videotaped testimony was admitted pursuant to V.R.E. 807 based on a
finding by the trial court that requiring the child to testify would
"present a substantial risk of trauma to the child."  V.R.E. 807(c).  In
her videotaped testimony, she answered simple, direct, leading questions
after failing to answer open-ended ones.  She did not elaborate on any of
her responses.  Her rigid posture, flat affect, and soft speaking voice
conveyed her anxiety.  When first asked about the alleged abuse, complainant
stopped answering altogether.  Only after repeated solicitation did she
whisper and gesture answers to the questions.
     The remaining testimony from the State came from two doctors who had
examined the complainant, a social worker who had interviewed and treated
the complainant at the regional mental health clinic, the complainant's
teacher, and her friend's mother.  Defendant took the stand and, in
addition, presented a character defense consisting largely of testimony by
his ex-wife, his sons, and his daughters.  Many of these witnesses also
testified to events during the period covered by the information.

     Although defendant raises a number of issues on appeal, we address only
one relating to the admission of certain evidence in the cross-examination
of defendant's witnesses.  The issue arose in the cross-examination of
defendant's first witness, his daughter P.M.  On direct examination, P.M.,
who was twenty-five years old when she testified, described her father as
honest, very caring, a good father, very modest, and not obscene or
seductive.  Before commencing cross-examination of P.M., the state's
attorney stated to the court that he had a good faith basis to believe that
another of defendant's daughters, H.M., had reported to authorities that she
had seen defendant have oral sex with his minor son, S.M., in 1985 and the
circumstances were known to the family.  He indicated that he knew of the
incident because it was mentioned in local mental health agency records.
     The prosecutor indicated his intent to cross-examine P.M. about this
incident to determine her knowledge of it and its effect on her opinion of
defendant.  There was no formal objection to the questioning although
defendant's counsel did express concerns that the questioning went beyond
the direct examination.  The prosecutor then asked P.M. whether she was
aware of the report and whether it affected her opinion of defendant's
character.  P.M. answered that she was aware of the report but it was
unfounded and did not affect her opinion of defendant.
     After using the incident in this way in cross-examining one more
character witness, the prosecutor changed tactics with defendant's former
wife.  Here, the prosecutor attempted to elicit through the witness the
exact details of the reported sexual acts.  The witness refused to answer,
requiring the court to intervene to order her to answer at least a modified
question.  In the argument to the court, the prosecutor made clear that he
did not believe that the report was unfounded, transmitting the opinion of a
mental health worker that "[H.M.] is unlikely to make up the kind of details
that she had conveyed, and that it was the very details itself that
indicated that something had happened."  From that point forward, his
questioning showed that he believed the incident had occurred, that it had
been covered up within defendant's family, and that he wanted to demonstrate
this to the jury.  Rather than focusing on how the report might affect the
former wife's opinion of defendant's character, the prosecutor's questions
probed her conduct on hearing the report and the delay between the report
and the statements given to SRS.  He never even asked the ex-wife what
impact the report had on her opinion of defendant's character.
     The issue arose again when defendant took the stand.  The prosecutor
asked whether defendant had ever sexually abused H.M. and then whether he
had ever sexually abused his son.  He cross-examined in detail on the
report, insisting on the right to present the nature of the sexual conduct
to the jury, and on defendant's actions in response to it.  On redirect,
defendant responded to the cross-examination by denying he ever abused his
son.  His son also testified and denied the incident.
     The prosecutor made clear where he was going in his rebuttal argument
to the jury:
            What we began to do was ask witnesses to test their
          opinion. . . .  Weren't you aware that two years ago his
          other daughter [H.M.] reported having seen something,
          reported graphic details of oral sex?  Did you consider
          that when you were forming your opinion that Mr.
          McCarthy is a decent, hardworking person?

            Well, yes those weren't true.  They didn't pan out.
          We didn't believe her when it first came up.  Couldn't
          believe it.  Now, a child who is even younger than [the
          complainant] now . . . was confronted by a family who is
          disbelieving the minute they hear it.  She isn't
          questioned until a couple of months later.

            For whatever reason, which is not for your concern,
          this is not a case about that, but at that time she
          doesn't talk about it.  No charges are brought.  Mr.
          Illuzzi has mentioned that.  Is it surprising that a
          four-year-old after a couple of months with a family
          that doesn't believe her at all, who's later questioned,
          didn't report anything?

The point of this argument is clear.  In the prosecutor's view, defendant's
family failed to follow up on H.M.'s report and as a result H.M. failed to
repeat what she saw.
     Defendant argues here that the cross-examination on H.M.'s report of
seeing defendant sexually abuse S.M., together with the closing argument,
was improper and requires reversal.  Although the law bearing on the issue
before us is relatively clear, we have not examined it since we adopted the
Vermont Rules of Evidence.  Pursuant to V.R.E. 404(a)(1), the accused in a
criminal proceeding can to introduce evidence of a pertinent character
trait, and when the accused does so, the prosecution can offer evidence in
rebuttal.  Where, as here, a character trait is not an essential element of
the charge, this method of proving character is governed by Rule 405(a).
That rule allows proof of character only by evidence of reputation. (FN1)
However, it goes on to say:  "On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable
into relevant specific instances of conduct."  The State relies solely on
this authorization to support the validity of the cross-examination evidence
about the alleged report of sexual acts between defendant and his son.
     The authorization to inquire about "relevant specific instances of
conduct" is solely to allow impeachment of the character witness.  The
rationale is addressed in the leading case of Michelson v. United States,