Case Title: HUISH v. SULENTA

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-7

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
HUISH v. SULENTA2002 WY 13954 P.3d 748Case Number: 02-7Decided: 09/23/2002
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

DAN 
HUISH,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

GRACE 
E. SULENTA and

JOHN 
A. SULENTA,

 

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sublette County

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Mark W. Gifford, Casper, Wyoming; and Elizabeth Greenwood, Pinedale, 
Wyoming  

 

Representing 
Appellees:

Gerald 
R. Mason and Douglas J. Mason of Mason & Mason, P.C., Pinedale, Wyoming  

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument

 

 

            
KITE, Justice.

 

[¶1]      In 1978, the 
owner of servient property granted a temporary easement to neighboring 
landowners John M. and Grace E. Sulenta, which they used for more than twenty 
years to access their property.  In 
1999, Dan Huish acquired the servient property and obstructed the temporary 
easement, thereby cutting off the Sulentas' access.  Mrs. Sulenta filed suit seeking a 
determination that the temporary easement had become permanent or, in the 
alternative, an order requiring Mr. Huish to provide a reasonable permanent 
substitute easement.  Just prior to 
trial, Mr. Huish filed a partial confession of judgment admitting some of the 
Sulentas' claims.  The trial court 
entered judgment against Mr. Huish as to all the claims and ordered him to 
restore access to the temporary easement and provide the Sulentas with a 
permanent equivalent easement.  We 
hold the judgment void and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Mr. Huish states 
the issues as follows:

 

            
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it entered a judgment 
against Appellant without (1) a trial on the merits; (2) Appellant's confession 
to said judgment; or (3) Appellant's consent to said 
judgment?

 

The 
Sulentas present the following issues:

 

            
1.  What 
is the effect of a confession of judgment?

 

            
2.  Did the District Court abuse its discretion by granting 
Appellees (plaintiffs) judgment for the relief sought in their Complaint, after 
Appellant (defendant) confessed judgment?

 

            
3.  Did the District Court abuse its discretion when, upon a 
confession of judgment by defendant, it defined the term "reasonable" as 
requested in plaintiffs' Complaint seeking a declaratory judgment of the 
respective parties' rights under an easement?

 

We 
view the pertinent issue as being whether the trial court abused its discretion 
in entering judgment on all claims after Mr. Huish filed a confession of 
judgment to part of the claims.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      In 1978, the 
owner of land in the Half Moon Lake Lot Division in Sublette County granted to 
the Sulentas a temporary right of way easement across his property to allow them 
to build a road accessing their property.  
The third paragraph of the temporary right of way easement 
provides:

 

The 
Right of Way Easement hereinabove set forth shall be a temporary easement only 
and shall terminate when the owner of such land grants to Grantees a permanent 
substitute easement, at which time Grantees agree to restore at their sole 
expense the easement herein above described, to it[]s original condition and 
topography as near as may be possible.

 

The 
Sulentas used the temporary easement for over twenty years to get to their 
property.  In 1999, Mr. Huish 
acquired the servient property and began various construction projects which had 
the effect of obstructing the Sulentas' access.  Although he allegedly offered to grant a 
substitute easement, the parties were apparently unable to agree on an 
acceptable alternative location.  

 

[¶4]      On September 1, 
2000, Mrs. Sulenta filed a complaint against Mr. Huish asserting claims for 
trespass; quiet title; breach of contract; waiver, estoppel, or laches; and 
declaratory judgment.1  She sought judgment requiring Mr. Huish 
to restore the access road and quieting title in her or, in the alternative, 
declaring that any substitute easement be limited to a location "similar in 
nature, length, terrain covered, and access point" to the original temporary 
easement.  Mrs. Sulenta also sought 
actual and punitive damages for trespass and interference with the easement plus 
actual damages for breach of contract. 

 

[¶5]      Mr. Huish 
answered the complaint, asserting his right under the written easement to 
terminate the temporary easement by granting a permanent substitute 
easement.  He alleged he granted a 
substitute easement to Mrs. Sulenta by recording it with the county clerk on 
September 8, 2000.  Mr. Huish 
contended he was not required under the terms of the original easement to 
substitute an easement of any particular character or location.  He also filed a counterclaim for damages 
arising from the Sulentas' failure to restore the temporary easement to its 
original condition after he granted the substitute easement as required by the 
written right of way easement.

            

[¶6]      On October 20, 
2000, Mrs. Sulenta filed a motion for partial summary judgment asking the court 
to enter judgment as a matter of law as follows: Mr. Huish's right to terminate 
the temporary easement is void by operation of the rule against perpetuities, 
the substitute easement recorded by Mr. Huish is unacceptable, and Mr. Huish's 
counterclaim is without lawful basis.  
The court held a hearing on December 22, 2000, and on January 11, 2001, 
entered an order denying Mrs. Sulenta's motion.  It held:  The right to terminate the temporary 
easement does not violate the rule against perpetuities, any substitute easement 
granted by Mr. Huish must be reasonable for the purposes for which it was 
intended, and the duty to restore the temporary easement to its original 
condition has not arisen.  The court 
granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of Mr. Huish as to the 
applicability of the rule against perpetuities and denied summary judgment on 
the issues of reasonableness and the duty to restore, finding genuine issues of 
material fact existed.

 

[¶7]      The court held a 
pretrial conference on March 7, 2001, at which time it set the matter for jury 
trial to commence on October 2, 2001.  
On July 10, 2001, Mr. Huish filed a motion offering to modify the 
September 2000 substitute easement or submit an alternative in an effort to 
satisfy the Sulentas' reasonableness objections.  On August 1, 2001, Mr. Huish also filed 
a motion for partial summary judgment on the Sulentas' fourth cause of action 
for waiver, estoppel, or laches.  By 
order filed August 30, 2001, the court denied Mr. Huish's motion to modify or 
submit an alternative easement, finding modifications or alternative proposals 
were not relevant to the issues presented.  
The court's order expressly prohibited Mr. Huish from introducing 
testimony, exhibits, argument, or inference of proposals to alter the September 
2000 substitute easement.2

 

[¶8]      Over the course 
of the next few weeks, the parties filed pretrial memoranda, jury instructions, 
and various motions in preparation for the October 2nd trial date.  At some point during this time frame, an 
unreported telephone conference took place between counsel for the parties and 
the court in which Mr. Huish's counsel indicated his client would confess 
judgment to some or all of the Sulentas' claims.  No transcript appears in the record, and 
the parties disagree as to what was said during the conference.  In any event, on September 26, 2001, the 
court entered an order stating it had been advised Mr. Huish would admit the 
permanent substitute easement was not reasonable and judgment would be entered 
for the Sulentas on that issue.  The 
order also denied Mr. Huish's motion for summary judgment on the waiver, 
estoppel, or laches claim.  The 
following day, September 27, 2001, the Sulentas moved for entry of judgment in 
their favor on their complaint, stating the court had been advised Mr. Huish 
elected to confess judgment resulting in the trial date being vacated and the 
parties would resolve the amount of damages and costs between themselves or, 
failing that, present the issue to the court for 
resolution.

 

[¶9]      On October 5, 
2001, Mr. Huish filed a partial confession of judgment in which he admitted the 
substitute easement filed September 8, 2000, was unreasonable.  He further admitted the trespass and 
breach of contract claims and that the Sulentas suffered nominal damages as a 
result of his obstruction of the temporary easement.  However, Mr. Huish expressly denied any 
intention to confess judgment to the Sulentas' right to a substitute easement of 
any specific description or location and to the claims for waiver, estoppel, or 
laches and punitive damages.  Along 
with the partial confession of judgment, Mr. Huish filed an objection to the 
Sulentas' motion for entry of judgment in which he reiterated his intent to 
confess judgment only to the unreasonableness of the September 2000 substitute 
easement and nominal damages for trespass and breach of contract.  Additionally, Mr. Huish again stated it 
was not his intent to confess judgment to the Sulentas' entitlement to a 
permanent substitute easement in any particular location or of any particular 
description.

 

[¶10]   The trial court entered judgment on 
November 30, 2001, finding:  (1) Mr. 
Huish confessed judgment "for the relief sought by plaintiffs," (2) the 
allegations in the Sulentas' complaint are taken as established and Mr. Huish's 
allegations to the contrary are rejected, and (3) the Sulentas are entitled to 
entry of judgment "for the relief sought" in their complaint. The trial court 
ordered Mr. Huish to restore the temporary access road and provide the Sulentas 
with a substitute easement in a location "similar in nature, length, terrain 
covered and access point" to the temporary easement.  The court awarded actual and punitive 
damages for trespass and willful interference with the temporary easement plus 
actual damages for breach of contract.  
Upon stipulation of the parties, the court entered judgment on December 
12, 2001, in the amount of $5,000 in actual damages for breach of contract and 
trespass plus $5,926.50 in costs.  
No punitive damages were awarded.  
Mr. Huish timely appealed. 

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶11]   Denial of the application to enter 
a judgment by confession rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.  46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 233 
(1994).  We conclude the grant of an 
application to confess judgment likewise rests in the trial court's 
discretion.  The ultimate question 
in determining whether an abuse of discretion has occurred is whether the trial 
court reasonably could have concluded as it did.  GGV v. JLR, 2002 WY 19, ¶14, 39 P.3d 1066, ¶14 (Wyo. 2002); Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998).  Our review for abuse of 
discretion entails evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
trial court's decision.  Reavis 
v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998).  A finding is clearly erroneous when the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.  Polo Ranch Company v. City of 
Cheyenne, 969 P.2d 132, 136 (Wyo. 1998).  The burden is on the appellant to show 
an abuse of discretion.  MTM v. 
LD (Adoption of KJD), 2002 WY 26, ¶21, 41 P.3d 522, ¶21 (Wyo. 
2002).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶12]   Mr. Huish contends the trial 
court abused its discretion in entering a judgment that goes beyond the matters 
admitted in his confession of judgment.  
Specifically, he claims the judgment goes too far because he did not 
admit the Sulentas had a right to a permanent substitute easement "in a location 
which is similar in nature, length, terrain covered and access point as the 
original temporary easement" as ordered by the trial court.  Rather, Mr. Huish contends he confessed 
judgment to only the general unreasonableness of the September 2000 substitute 
easement and not to any particular location or characteristic of the substitute 
easement referred to in the right of way easement.  Mr. Huish asserts that, by entering 
judgment requiring him to provide the Sulentas with a permanent substitute 
easement satisfying specific criteria, the trial court in essence granted a 
mandatory injunction without an evidentiary basis and contrary to the parties' 
express agreement as set forth in the written right of way 
easement.

  

[¶13]   The Sulentas claim the judgment 
entered by the trial court as to all their claims and all the relief sought in 
the complaint is consistent with the confession of judgment made by Mr. Huish 
through his counsel during the telephone conference.  They claim the written confession of 
judgment Mr. Huish filed later is different from what was admitted during the 
conference call.  They also assert 
that, upon Mr. Huish's confession, the trial court properly entered judgment in 
their favor as to all claims made in the complaint because Wyoming law 
authorizes confession of judgment in full.  
The confession of judgment, they assert, cut off all defenses available 
to Mr. Huish and amounted to full proof against him for all claims raised in the 
complaint.

 

[¶14]   A defendant's right to confess 
judgment is recognized in Wyoming as follows:  "A person indebted or against whom a 
cause of action exists, may personally appear in a court of competent 
jurisdiction and with the assent of the creditor or person having such cause of 
action, confess judgment, whereupon judgment shall be entered accordingly."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-201 (LexisNexis 
2001).  A partial confession of 
judgment is also authorized under Wyoming law:

 

            
The defendant in an action for the recovery of money may offer in court 
to confess judgment for part of the amount claimed, or part of the causes 
involved in the action.  If the 
plaintiff, being present, refuses to accept such confession of judgment in full 
satisfaction of his demands in the action . . . and, on the trial, does not 
recover more than was offered to be confessed, with interest from the date of 
the offer, the plaintiff shall pay all costs of the defendant incurred after the 
offer was made.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-10-104 (LexisNexis 2001).  
The law does not generally favor confession of judgment.  49 C.J.S. Judgments § 138 
(1997).  Statutes authorizing 
confession of judgment have been strictly construed.  46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 231 
(1994).

 

The 
general rule constraining the power to confess judgment is that such authority 
must be clearly given and strictly followed, and a judgment entered in violation 
of this rule is void.  Any doubt as 
to the validity of [a] confessed judgment must be resolved against the party 
entering the judgment.  The policy 
underlying this rule of strict construction against the party in whose favor the 
power operates is based on the severity of the summary proceeding itself. 

 

Id. 
at 557.  When we apply the Wyoming 
statutory provisions governing confession of judgment together with the rule of 
strict construction, we conclude the trial court's judgment violates the rule 
and is void.

 

[¶15]   The written confession of judgment 
filed by Mr. Huish is captioned, "Partial Confession of Judgment."  It states in relevant part that Mr. 
Huish admits the permanent substitute easement is unreasonable, partially 
confesses judgment to the claims for trespass and breach of contract, and admits 
the Sulentas suffered nominal damages therefor. The written confession of 
judgment further specifically states Mr. Huish does not intend to admit 
liability or confess judgment to any claim of right to a permanent substitute 
easement of certain specifications or to the allegations of waiver, estoppel, or 
laches and punitive damages. 

  

[¶16]   In contrast to the confession of 
judgment, the trial court's judgment finds:  Mr. Huish has confessed judgment "for 
the relief sought by plaintiffs," the Sulentas' allegations in their first 
amended complaint "are taken as established," and the Sulentas are entitled to 
entry of judgment for the "relief sought" in the first amended complaint.  Based upon these findings, the court 
dismissed Mr. Huish's counterclaim with prejudice; ordered him to restore the 
temporary easement; ordered him to provide "a permanent easement in a location 
which is similar in nature, length, terrain covered and access point as the 
original temporary easement" and which is "not based upon use permits or other 
rights of less stature" than the original temporary easement; and awarded actual 
and punitive damages for trespass and willful interference with the easement 
plus actual damages for breach of contract.

 

[¶17]   In this summary manner, the 
judgment purports to resolve all claims alleged in the complaint in favor of the 
Sulentas.  Given the very specific 
language in the written confession of judgment limiting the confession to 
specified issues, we find Mr. Huish's intent was not to confess judgment in full 
but to confess judgment to only those claims specifically delineated in the 
written confession.  Applying the 
rule of strict construction against the party in whose favor judgment is 
entered, we hold the judgment void because it finds for the Sulentas on all 
issues, even those not expressly admitted in the written confession of 
judgment.  

 

[¶18]   The Sulentas claim that, prior to 
the written confession of judgment, there was no indication of a partial 
confession of judgment.  They 
contend their attorney received a telephone call from counsel for Mr. Huish on 
September 19, 2001, prior to the telephone conference call with the court, in 
which he indicated his client wished to confess judgment to all issues except 
damages and costs.  The Sulentas 
assert no mention was made during that telephone call of a "partial" 
confession.  According to the 
Sulentas, that telephone call led to the conference call in which the parties 
advised the court of Mr. Huish's intent to confess judgment.  Again, the Sulentas assert all 
indications were that the confession would resolve all remaining issues except 
the damage amount and there was no suggestion of a partial confession of 
judgment.

  

[¶19]   No transcript of these telephone 
calls appears in the record.  The 
only documentation we have of what occurred is found in the trial court's order 
and the submissions of the parties.  
We reiterate the guiding principles that confessions of judgment are to 
be strictly construed, authority for them must be clearly given, and they are to 
be construed against the persons in whose favor they are entered.  In light of these principles, we are 
compelled, in the absence of contrary evidence, to give great weight to the 
written confession of judgment itself in determining the scope of the 
confession.  Because it clearly and 
unambiguously states it is a "partial" confession of judgment to the 
unreasonableness of the September 2000 permanent substitute easement and the 
claims for trespass and breach of contract and specifically states it is not 
intended to constitute a confession to anything more, we conclude no confession 
was intended and no judgment can be entered as to any other 
claims.

  

[¶20]   This conclusion gains support from 
the trial court's order entered shortly after the conference call which 
states:  "Last week counsel advised 
Defendant would admit that the easement granted by Defendant to Plaintiffs was 
not reasonable' and judgment would be entered in favor of Plaintiffs on this 
issue."  The order also states 
genuine issues of fact exist on  the 
claim for waiver, estoppel, or laches lending further support to Mr. Huish's 
assertion he did not indicate during the conference call that he intended to 
confess judgment to all claims in the Sulentas' complaint.  Given its proximity in time to the date 
of the conference call, the September 26, 2001, order convinces us Mr. Huish 
intended his admissions to be limited to those stated in the written confession 
of judgment.

 

[¶21]   Given the express language of the 
written confession of judgment, the contents of the trial court's own order 
after the telephone conference call, and the absence of evidence in the record 
to support confession of judgment on all claims, we find the trial court could 
not reasonably have concluded as it did that Mr. Huish intended to confess 
judgment in full.  We hold the trial 
court abused its discretion in entering judgment for the Sulentas on all their 
claims on the basis of Mr. Huish's limited confession of judgment.  

 

[¶22]   In addition to finding that the 
judgment is too broad, we are concerned about it in two other respects:  First, it orders Mr. Huish to provide a 
permanent substitute easement, and, second, it dismisses Mr. Huish's 
counterclaim with prejudice.  
Neither of these rulings is supported by the terms of the original right 
of way easement which allows, but does not require, Mr. Huish to provide a 
permanent substitute easement and requires the Sulentas to restore the temporary 
easement if a permanent substitute easement is granted.  On remand, the trial court will need to 
consider these issues.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶23]   We reverse the November 30, 2001, 
judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  On remand, the trial court 
will have to determine those issues left unresolved by Mr. Huish's partial 
confession of judgment, including whether Mr. Huish has any obligation at all 
under the original right of way easement to grant a permanent substitute 
easement; whether Mr. Huish is barred by the doctrine of waiver, estoppel, or 
laches from asserting a right to grant a substitute easement; and whether any 
new permanent substitute easement granted by Mr. Huish is reasonable and, if so, 
whether the Sulentas are required at their sole expense to restore the original 
temporary easement.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1John A. Sulenta, 
Mrs. Sulenta's son, acquired an ownership interest in the property belonging to 
his mother in April of 2001.  On 
April 25, 2001, Mrs. Sulenta sought the trial court's approval to file an 
amended complaint adding her son as a plaintiff in this action.  The trial court granted her motion on 
May 1, 2001.

2While we question the reasoning behind this ruling, Mr. Huish did not 
appeal it, and it is not, therefore, an issue before us.  However, it would seem from the record 
before us that allowing Mr. Huish to address the Sulentas' concerns by 
submitting modifications to the proposed substitute easement or an altogether 
different proposal would have facilitated resolution of this action in one 
proceeding.