Case Title: Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. John & Jane Doe

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2018-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket Nos. 45363 and 45385 
 
 
IN 
THE 
INTEREST 
OF 
THE 
DOE 
CHILDREN, Children under eighteen (18) 
years of age 
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
WELFARE, 
  
           Petitioner-Respondent, 
v. 
 
JOHN DOE (2017-27) 
JANE DOE (2017-28), 
  
           Respondent-Appellants, 
and 
 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM, 
 
           Intervenor-Respondent. 
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Boise, January 2018 Term 
 
2018 Opinion No. 21 
 
Filed: March 6, 2018 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the Fourth Judicial District for the  
State of Idaho in and for Ada County. Hon. Cathleen MacGregor Irby,  
Magistrate Judge. 
 
The judgment of the magistrate court is affirmed. 
 
John R. Shackelford, Ada County Deputy Public Defender, Boise, for John Doe.  
 
 
Theresa A. Martin, Meridian, for Jane Doe. 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent.  
 
Elijah M. Watkins, Boise, for Intervenor. 
                      
BEVAN, Justice 
 
John Doe (2017-27) (“the father”) and Jane Doe (2017-27) (“the mother”) appeal judgments 
from the magistrate court terminating their parental rights to their daughters (“Z.W.” and “N.W.”). 
The magistrate court terminated the mother and father’s parental rights on the grounds of neglect, 
 
 
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abuse, inability to discharge parental responsibilities, and chronic abuse and/or neglect, and also 
found termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother only challenges the 
termination of her parental rights as to N.W., while the father challenges the termination of his 
parental rights as to both of the children. The sole issue the father asserts is that the magistrate court 
did not have substantial and competent evidence to find terminating his parental rights was in the 
best interest of both children. We affirm the magistrate court’s judgments. 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
 
On March 16, 2007, Z.W. was born prematurely in California.  Due to her premature birth 
she was placed in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (“NICU”) for over twenty-five weeks. At the 
same time Z.W. was born, the mother was diagnosed with a chronic kidney condition. The doctors 
discovered that the mother had only one kidney, which was abnormally small.   As a result of her 
condition, the mother was very weak and fatigued, often sleeping up to twelve hours a day. On July 
13, 2007, Z.W. was placed into foster care because her parents did not visit her consistently while 
she was in the NICU. The mother and father were separated at this time. The father was in 
Washington State with the intent to earn money to pay off medical bills. The father stated that the 
mother remained in California, which he assumed was to care for Z.W.  
When the father returned to California (three to four months after Z.W was born) child 
protective services had already declared that Z.W. was abandoned. At this point, the father learned 
the mother had left Z.W. in the hospital and was not visiting her. The father was eventually able to 
regain custody of Z.W. by working with child protective services in California, which required him 
to learn about Z.W.’s developmental needs and participate in her therapies. In March 2009, Ventura 
County Child Protective Services received referrals with concerns that Z.W. was not receiving 
appropriate services for her medical needs and had missed appointments with her medical providers.  
By this time, the mother and the father reconciled and were back together. The father then followed 
through with obtaining medical services for Z.W. in April 2009. 
In July 2009, the mother, father, and Z.W. moved to Kuna, Idaho. After moving to Idaho, the 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (“IDHW”) received six referrals regarding this family 
between January 2011 to December 2014.  The first referral was received in January 2011, with 
concerns that Z.W. (then age three) had bruising on her back and side. The father admitted he caused 
this bruising on Z.W. by spanking her with a wooden spoon. The father stated he felt ashamed and 
 
 
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embarrassed for harming Z.W. and stated it would never happen again. It was reported that the 
mother was not concerned with the harm done to Z.W. At this point, law enforcement did not declare 
that Z.W. was in imminent danger. Rather, both parents were told by social worker Stephens to 
obtain education regarding their reasonable expectations of Z.W. based on her developmental age 
rather than her chronological age. The father also agreed not to use physical discipline until he could 
get his emotions and frustrations under control and to complete an anger management evaluation. 
 
The second referral was received in February 2011, with concerns that Z.W. had marks down 
the back of her arms, a bruise under her chin, and a swollen jaw. Social workers responded by 
visiting the home. They observed the marks on Z.W.’s upper arms, which the father stated may have 
occurred when he forcefully grabbed Z.W. when directing her to go to the bathroom. Further 
bruising was then observed on Z.W.’s buttock, which the father admitted was from when he spanked 
Z.W. a couple of days prior. The father specifically stated he put Z.W. across his knee and spanked 
her five times with his hand because Z.W. was not eating her food. When asked if he would continue 
to spank Z.W., the father stated he would continue to spank her and that such method of discipline 
was “set in stone.” At this point, Z.W. was declared to be in imminent danger and placed in foster 
care because of the father’s physical abuse and the mother’s inability to protect Z.W. from such 
physical abuse.  
Z.W. was then examined by a pediatric nurse employed at St. Luke’s C.A.R.E.S. The nurse 
noted that Z.W. had significant bruising across her back. Specifically, the nurse noted Z.W. had deep 
tissue bruising and bleeding which was palpable, which meant that blood could be felt pooling under 
Z.W.’s skin. She concluded that Z.W. had experienced non-accidental physical trauma. The nurse 
also believed, given the location of Z.W.’s injuries, they could have been much more serious. 
However, the blood work did not reveal any bleeding or bruising in Z.W.’s kidneys or spine.  The 
father was arrested and pled guilty to misdemeanor injury to a child. 
The third referral was received in June 2011, because the mother was giving birth to her 
second child (N.W.) who could also be subject to abuse. N.W. was also born prematurely (weighing 
only three pounds) and put in the NICU. The mother and father regularly visited N.W. while she was 
in the NICU and N.W. was discharged into their care after one month with in-home nursing and 
family preservation classes recommended. This third referral was dismissed as unsubstantiated.  
During this time, IDHW allowed the parents to have unsupervised visits with Z.W. The 
parents were also provided with protective parenting education, domestic violence treatment, and 
 
 
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psychological services. In September 2011, Z.W. returned to her parents for an extended home visit. 
In a progress report dated January 31, 2012, a social worker noted that the mother had improved and 
completed her protective parenting classes, and the father stated he would not use spanking as a form 
of discipline with Z.W. because he recognized the emotional impact of physical discipline.  Z.W.’s 
case was vacated in February 2012.   
In April 2012, Z.W. (then age four) disclosed to a social worker that her parents punished her 
on two occasions by forcing her to take a cold shower because she soiled her pants. During a safety 
assessment, the parents denied giving Z.W. cold showers as a form of punishment. At this safety 
assessment, the social worker was also informed that the parents discontinued Z.W.’s developmental 
services. Prior to March 2012, Z.W. had received twenty hours per week of developmental services, 
but the father requested these services be terminated because he wanted to spend more time with 
Z.W.  
The fourth referral was received in May 2013, with concerns that Z.W. disclosed that the 
mother had put her in an ice cold bath as punishment for soiling her pants, and that the mother would 
hit Z.W. with a broom and lock her in the bathroom.  The referring party also reported that Z.W. 
often waited for her school bus outside in the dark by herself.  Another safety assessment was 
conducted, in which no injuries were observed on either Z.W. or N.W. The father admitted that he 
left Z.W. waiting outside for the bus one time but then realized she was too young. He denied using 
ice baths as a form of punishment and instead stated he used time outs, sent Z.W. to her room, and 
spanked Z.W. for punishment. This referral was then closed as unsubstantiated.  
The fifth referral was received in January 2014, with concerns Z.W. came to school wearing 
the same clothes and looked unkempt. The referral further stated Z.W. had poor toilet hygiene, 
missed a lot of school, and her parents did not walk her to the bus in the morning despite her age and 
significant developmental delays. Social workers responded to the home of the family, but were not 
allowed inside the home. Rather, the parents spoke to the social workers at the front door. The father 
stated Z.W. did not attend school because she had missed the school bus and that he bathed both 
children twice a week. The mother made no comments regarding the social worker’s concerns.  The 
social workers then advised the father to drive Z.W. to school if she missed the bus and to bathe the 
children every other day. 
The sixth referral was received on December 3, 2014, with concerns of physical injuries 
observed on Z.W. at school. Z.W. had welts and bruises on her back. Z.W. told the school resource 
 
 
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officer that her injuries were the result of her father spanking her with a shoe. The school resource 
officer then responded with a home visit, in which the father stated that Z.W. had been acting up in 
school the day prior and, therefore, he spanked her about ten times with a rubber shoe insole. The 
father further noted that it was normal practice to hit his children until it hurt, which was usually 
about three strikes; however, this time he hit her ten times. Apparently, the lack of response from 
Z.W., while the father was spanking her, seemed to incite him to spank her more. The father was 
reportedly surprised when the officer showed him photographs of Z.W.’s back and stated: “Yikes. If 
I did that I went a little overboard.” The mother was in the home when the father spanked Z.W. The 
mother stated that she heard Z.W. crying but was not concerned and, therefore, did not intervene. 
The officer noted that the mother was extremely quiet throughout the entire visit. The father further 
stated he would continue to spank the children. The officer then declared both children were in 
imminent danger and put them into foster care because of the physical abuse of Z.W. by her father, 
and the failure of the mother to protect the children. The father later pled guilty to felony injury to a 
child and was placed on probation.  As a condition of the father’s probation, a no contact order 
(which expires in 2022) was issued.  The order prohibited the father from having contact with Z.W. 
unless his visits were supervised by the IDHW.  
 
While the children were placed in foster care, both parents were ordered by the court to 
participate in identical case plans with the same goal: to have a safe, stable, and healthy home 
environment for the children to grow and develop and to meet their needs for safety, permanency 
and well-being.  While in foster care, the parents were allowed to have supervised visits with the 
children.  
Almost two years later, on November 23, 2016, IDHW filed a Petition for Termination of 
Parent Child-Relationship. The Petition alleged that both parent’s rights should be terminated due to 
neglect, abuse, inability to discharge parental responsibilities, and chronic abuse and/or neglect. The 
Petition further alleged that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate the rights of both 
parents.  On September 4, 2017, the magistrate court terminated the mother and father’s parental 
rights on the grounds of neglect, abuse, inability to discharge parental responsibilities, and chronic 
abuse and/or neglect, and also found termination was in the best interest of Z.W. and N.W. The 
mother only challenges the termination of her right to N.W., while the father challenges the 
termination of his rights to both the children. The father does not appeal the statutory ground for 
terminating his parental rights, but only claims the magistrate court did not have substantial and 
 
 
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competent evidence to find terminating his parental rights was in the best interest of both the 
children.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court has recently set forth the relevant standard of review in Idaho Department 
Health & Welfare v. Doe: 
Grounds for termination of parental rights must be shown by clear and convincing 
evidence because each parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a 
relationship with his or her child. Clear and convincing evidence is generally 
understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or 
reasonably certain. On appeal, this Court will not disturb the magistrate court’s 
decision to terminate parental rights if there is substantial, competent evidence in the 
record to support the decision. Substantial, competent evidence is such evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This Court is 
required to conduct an independent review of the magistrate court record, but 
must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the magistrate court’s judgment 
because the magistrate court has the opportunity to observe witnesses’ demeanor, to 
assess their credibility, to detect prejudice or motive and to judge the character of the 
parties. 
 
150 Idaho 36, 41, 244 P.3d 180, 185 (2010) (quotations and citations omitted). 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. 
The magistrate court had substantial and competent evidence to terminate the 
mother’s parental rights to N.W.  
 
A court may grant an order terminating parental rights where it finds that (1) termination of 
parental rights is in the best interest of the child; and (2) one or more of the conditions listed in Idaho 
Code section 16-2005 exists. I.C. § 16-2005. The conditions that allow for termination include the 
following: (1) abandonment; (2) neglect or abuse; (3) lack of a biological relationship between the 
child and a presumptive parent; (4) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities for a 
prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals or well-being of the child; and (5) the 
parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Id. The statutory 
conditions listed in section 16-2005 are “independent and if any one or more of the grounds for 
termination are found, termination may be granted.” Matter of Aragon, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 
310, 315 (1991). In this case, the mother’s parental rights were terminated (as to N.W.) on the 
conditions of neglect and inability to discharge parental responsibilities. The magistrate court had 
substantial and competent evidence to terminate the mother’s parental rights on these grounds. 
 
 
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1. 
The magistrate court had substantial and competent evidence to terminate the 
mother’s parental rights for neglect. 
 
The magistrate court found that the mother neglected N.W. “Neglected” is defined as either: 
(1) situations where the parent has failed to comply with the court’s order or case plan in a child 
protective act case, and IDHW had temporary or legal custody of the child for fifteen of the most 
recent twenty-two months and reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the 
fifteenth month; or (2) any condition defined in Idaho Code section 16-1602(31). I.C. § 16-
2002(3)(b). The magistrate court found the mother had neglected N.W. pursuant to both these 
definitions.  The magistrate court had substantial and competent evidence to find the mother 
neglected N.W. pursuant to both these definitions.  
a. There was substantial and competent evidence that mother failed to reunify with 
N.W. after an extended period. 
 
It is undisputed N.W. had been in continuous custody of IDHW for well over twenty-two 
months at the time of trial. IDHW gained custody of N.W. on December 5, 2014, and the trial began 
on June 12, 2017. Therefore, the time limitation set forth in section 16-2002(3)(b) was met. With 
regard to the failure to complete the case plan, the mother states “[t]here was an abundance of 
testimony regarding all the services in which Mother participated in and completed.” Nevertheless, 
the mother does not point to any evidence in the record to support this conclusory statement. “When 
issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be 
considered.” State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). “Even in an appeal from 
the termination of parental rights, [the Court] will not consider an issue which was not supported by 
cogent argument and authority.” In re Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 109, 320 P.3d 1262, 1268 (2014) 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
Even if we were to consider the mother’s argument, it is not persuasive based on this Court’s 
decision in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe (2016-47), 162 Idaho 236, 395 P.3d 
1269 (2017) (“Doe I”). In that case, a mother argued that termination was inappropriate because she 
“participated greatly” in her case plan. 162 Idaho at ___, 395 P.3d at 1278. This Court found this 
argument was unpersuasive and upheld the termination of her parental rights. Similarly here, even if 
the mother participated greatly in her case plan, she failed to complete her case plan pursuant to 
section 16-2002(3)(b). The goals of the mother’s case plan were to have a safe, stable, and healthy 
 
 
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home environment for the children to grow and develop. In order to accomplish these goals the 
mother was required to accomplish eight different tasks.1  
Ms. Baker-Jambretz (the IDHW case manager assigned to Z.W. and N.W.) testified as to the 
mother’s progress on each of the tasks. She concluded that the mother failed to accomplish several of 
the tasks and the overall goals of her case plan. Specifically, Ms. Baker-Jambretz noted that the 
mother:  1) failed to consistently or effectively implement any of the parenting techniques she was 
taught; 2) participated minimally; and 3) consistently lacked motivation in completing her case plan. 
The Guardian Ad Litem for both children (“GAL”) also testified about the mother’s failure to 
complete her case plan. There was substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate 
court’s determination that the mother failed to complete her case plan and that IDHW had legal 
custody of N.W. for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months without reunification.  As such, 
we affirm the magistrate’s judgment.  
b. Pursuant to the definition of “neglected” within Idaho Code section 16-1602(31), 
there was substantial and competent evidence the mother neglected N.W. for 
inability to parent. 
 
Under Idaho Code section 16-1602(31) a neglected child is one “[w]ho is without proper 
parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for h[er] well-
being because of the conduct or omission of his parents. . . .”  In making this determination the court 
may consider both past and current conduct. See Idaho Dep’t of Health and Welfare v. Doe (2011-
18), 152 Idaho 644, 648, 273 P.3d 685, 689 (2012).  
The magistrate court found the mother neglected the children because she “lack[ed] 
appropriate parenting and/or disciplinary skills . . . failed to demonstrate the ability to meet the 
children’s needs . . .  [and failed] to demonstrate any significant changes to [her] parenting 
strategies.” The magistrate court noted this was despite “the overriding consensus from every service 
provider, doctor, therapist and social worker” that the mother was provided with a tremendous 
amount of services and was not able to demonstrate any significant change to her parenting 
                                                 
1 The court ordered the mother to do the following: (1) participate in a parent-child comprehensive attachment 
assessment and follow all recommendations of the assessment; (2) sign releases of information; (3) address and meet the 
needs of the children consistently; (4) obtain an updated psychological evaluation and follow all recommendations; (5) 
complete a developmental disability application for Z.W.; (6) complete a developmental disability application for N.W.; 
(7) participate in parent education to learn how to parent the children’s developmental ages and demonstrate the skills 
learned during visits with the children, home visits with the Department and GAL, and interactions with others; (8) 
participate in PCIT with both children to improve their parenting skills and the quality of the parent-child relationship 
and demonstrate skills learned.  
 
 
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strategies. The magistrate court also found that the mother neglected N.W. because her “untreated 
mental health issues and/or physical health issues impair her ability to provide proper parental care 
and control.” The court noted: 
[The mother] is a meek, passive, submissive, medically fragile, emotionally 
compromised person who cannot live independently and had relied on [the father] to 
manage her life, attend to their needs and raise and parent their children. For years, 
[the mother] stood idly by while [the father] severely neglected and physically 
abused Z.W. on three separate occasions; resulting in two criminal convictions and 
years of involvement with child protective services. 
 
The mother first claims the magistrate court erred in finding her mental and physical 
conditions impair her ability to parent because she developed a safety plan in case the father ever 
started to physically abuse N.W. The mother primarily points to testimony of her therapist, in which 
the therapist states she felt the safety plan was adequate to protect the children and it seemed as if the 
mother would follow through with the plan because she showed increased confidence and self-
esteem. This Court was presented with a similar issue in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. 
Doe (2016-32), 161 Idaho 754, 390 P.3d 1281 (2017) (“Doe II”). In that case, IDHW initiated 
termination proceedings because the “[m]other lacked capacity to protect [the children] from harm 
and was endangering [the children] by routinely placing them with her abusive boyfriend.” Id. at 
760, 390 P.3d at 1287. Thereafter, the magistrate judge terminated the mother’s parental rights on 
the basis of neglect because of the mother’s inability to protect her children from the boyfriend, 
among other reasons. Id. Despite improvements in the mother’s behavior, this Court upheld the 
magistrate’s decision to terminate the mother’s parental rights. Id at 761, 390 P.3d at 1288. (“We 
find no error in the magistrate’s conclusion that Mother’s recent and modest improvements were 
insufficient to overcome her history of demonstrated unfitness.”). 
Similar to Doe II, because of the mother’s inability to protect her children from the father the 
magistrate court had substantial and competent evidence the mother neglected her children. 
Testimony suggests that the mother is not strong enough mentally to stand up to the father and 
enforce her safety plan. Dr. David Delawyer performed psychiatric evaluations of the mother. Dr. 
Delawyer is a licensed psychologist in the State of Idaho and had conducted over 2000 psychological 
examinations during his career. Dr. Delawyer concluded: 
As part of her previous case plan, [the mother] agreed to implement a safety plan and 
call law enforcement and Health and Welfare if her husband became physical with 
[Z.W.] and harmed her or might harm her. She said she did not intervene during the 
 
 
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recent incident and implement her safety plan after [Z.W.] was spanked by her 
husband because she didn’t know he had gotten “out of hand” and didn’t know there 
was bruising. When asked if she would implement the plan if she knew these things 
[the mother] said “probably” and then “most likely.” In the examiner’s opinion, she 
is highly unlikely to act protectively and implement a safety plan in the future when 
similar circumstances occur. Her husband makes the decisions in the family and [the 
mother] is passive and unassertive. She is extremely unlikely to go against his wishes 
and act protectively.  
 
(Emphasis in original). This conclusion is illustrated by two separate incidents observed where the 
mother unsuccessfully attempted to assert herself against the father during visitations with the 
children. In one instance a report submitted to the magistrate court noted: 
[O]n October 17, 2016, [the mother] attempted to protect [N.W.] by saying “Back” to 
the father when he was being aggressive with his words and action regarding the 
toothpaste and did not follow through with her effort because [the father] ignored 
[the mother] and [the mother] sat down. 
 
Testimony further supports the conclusion that if N.W. were to return to the mother’s custody, N.W. 
would likely be subject to physical abuse. This is because historically Z.W. was the scapegoat in the 
family and took the brunt of the father’s abuse. However, if Z.W. is no longer present (due to the no 
contact order between Z.W. and the father) N.W. would likely become the target of the father’s 
physical abuse and the mother would likely not deploy the safety plan or intervene. This is illustrated 
by the fact that the mother has failed to intervene on at least three documented instances in the past 
while the father was physically abusing Z.W.  
The mother also claims the magistrate court erred in finding her mental and physical 
conditions impair her ability to parent by pointing to testimony in the record that her self-esteem had 
improved and that she had become more actively engaged with her children. Although the mother 
may have made some improvements, this Court has held that despite improvements in a parent’s 
behavior, their rights can nonetheless be terminated when they have demonstrated they are unfit to 
be a parent. See Doe I, 162 Idaho at ___, 395, P.3d at 1278 (“[A]lthough Doe made occasional 
slight improvements, overall she demonstrated an inability to discharge parental responsibilities by 
failing to make progress with her visitation behavior, employment status, substance abuse, or mental 
health evaluations. Accordingly, Doe’s argument fails.”). 
Despite testimony regarding the mother’s improvements, she has shown an inability to parent 
because of her mental and physical conditions.  We hold the magistrate court had substantial and 
competent evidence that she neglected N.W. and we affirm the judgment.   
 
 
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2. 
The magistrate court had substantial and competent evidence that the mother had the 
inability to discharge her parental responsibilities. 
 
Idaho Code section 16-2005(1)(d) provides the Court with the authority to terminate parental 
rights when it finds “[t]he parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities and such inability 
will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period and will be injurious to the health, morals or well-
being of the child.”  The magistrate court found the mother had the inability to discharge her parental 
responsibilities because she “lacks the energy and/or ability and/or motivation to be an engaged and 
protective parent.” The mother claims the magistrate court erred in making this finding because 
testimony in the record shows her parenting abilities improved.  
 In Doe I, this Court was presented with a similar issue. 162 Idaho at ___, 395 P.3d at1278.  
In that case, the magistrate court terminated a mother’s parental rights in part “because [the 
mother’s] unresolved mental health issues rendered her unable to discharge her parental 
responsibilities.” Id. at ___, 395 P.3d at 1278. This Court upheld the magistrate’s decision noting 
“although [the mother] made occasional slight improvements, overall she demonstrated an inability 
to discharge parental responsibilities by failing to make progress with her visitation behavior, 
employment status, substance abuse, or mental health evaluation.” Id.   
Similar to Doe I, despite the mother’s slight improvements, there was substantial and 
competent evidence for the magistrate court to find the mother lacks the ability to discharge her 
parental rights. The GAL for both children noted that the mother cannot read the children’s cues 
concerning their basic needs. During supervised visits the mother appeared “zoned out” as if “the 
lights are on, but no one is home.” On one visit the mother left without telling anyone or ensuring 
someone else would be responsible for the children. The GAL further described that over the two 
years she observed that: during 20% of the visits with the children both parents seemed to have 
worked hard to use their skills they had been taught; during 70% of the visits the parents seemed to 
have been ambivalent about the process; and that during 10% of the visits the parents behaved 
inappropriately. Due to this, in part, the GAL noted that the children would not be safe if they were 
returned to the mother’s custody. The magistrate court explained the GAL’s (Ms. Walsh’s) 
testimony: 
Ms. Walsh described how PCIT classes were intended to teach [the parents] 
to use parenting techniques such as “labeled praises” with their children. She said 
that after attending the classes the [parents] used those techniques only sporadically. 
 
 
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Ms. Walsh noted that the [parents] had been using those techniques more recently 
during their visits but felt it was related to the upcoming court dates.  
 
Ms. Baker-Jambretz also testified regarding the mother’s parenting ability. The magistrate 
court described Ms. Baker-Jambretz’s testimony as: 
[The mother] has not displayed a greater understanding of what her children 
experienced and the repair work required by her to successfully reunify with them. 
Additionally she said that during visits with her children, [the mother] does not 
consistently use the tools she was taught in the many programs she participated in.  
 
Ms. Baker-Jambretz described [the mother] as an “observer” during visits 
with her children. She said [the mother] is removed from the visit activities and does 
not consistently participate or engage. She said, sometimes [the mother] will appear 
playful but the overall . . . quality of her visits is consistently poor.  
 
Ms. Baker-Jambretz further noted that the mother and N.W. appear to have a bond and that the 
mother has made some improvements in her parenting ability. However, Ms. Baker-Jambretz 
concluded that those improvements diminished over the three months prior to trial and that they were 
insufficient to warrant reunification.  
Accordingly, despite the mother’s improvements in her parenting abilities, the magistrate 
court had substantial and competent evidence that the mother lacked the energy and motivation to 
discharge her parental responsibilities. We affirm the magistrate’s judgment.   
B. 
The magistrate court had substantial and competent evidence to find termination of the 
mother and father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. 
 
          The only issue the father asserts as error in this case is the court’s determination that 
termination was in the best interests of the children.  The mother makes a similar claim as to N.W. 
Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the magistrate court must next 
determine: 
. . . whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child 
relationship. When considering the best interests of the child, a trial court may 
consider numerous factors. While a comprehensive list of factors a court must 
consider does not exist, this Court has considered the following: the stability and 
permanency of the home, unemployment of the parent, . . . improvement of child 
while in foster care, the parent’s efforts to improve his or her situation, and the 
parent’s continuing problems with the law. Additionally, this Court has considered 
the testimony from IDHW social workers, and guardians ad litem.  
 
 
 
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Doe I, 162 Idaho ___, 395 P.3d at 1277 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The magistrate 
court concluded that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate both the mother and 
father’s rights because they lack the appropriate parenting skills to protect their children. The 
magistrate court concluded: 
 
In conclusion [the mother and father] failed to demonstrate a sincere 
commitment to completing their case plan, they failed to make genuine improvement 
to their parenting skills and protective capacities and their children would not be safe 
in their care. 
 
 
Therefore, termination of [the mother and father’s] parental rights is in the 
children’s best interest. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
The father argues that the district court erred by concluding that he failed to internalize the 
parenting techniques he was taught. The father alleges the testimony of Ms. Baker-Jambretz (that the 
magistrate court relied on) was biased. Ms. Baker-Jambretz testified at length that the father did not 
internalize the parental training he received, is not invested in making necessary changes in his 
parenting, and that she was gravely concerned that he will revert to his past abusive behaviors. The 
father points to no evidence to prove bias, except the fact Ms. Baker-Jambretz had the opinion that 
the father’s rights should be terminated. “This Court must conduct an independent review of the 
magistrate court record, but must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the magistrate court's 
judgment, as the magistrate court has the opportunity to observe witnesses' demeanor, 
to assess their credibility, to detect prejudice or motive and to judge the character of the parties.” 
Doe I v. Doe II, 161 Idaho 532, 535, 387 P.3d 785, 788 (2016) (quotations and citations omitted). 
We will defer to the magistrate court’s determination of credibility. 
 
Second, the father claims the magistrate court relied on subjective, rather than objective 
evidence, and did not give enough weight to his own testimony (and that of other witnesses) that his 
parenting ability has improved. Father further claims that the court relied too much on past events 
and not on the progress the father ostensibly made.  This Court disagrees.  The father testified that he 
used the parenting techniques he was taught at “every opportunity” and was even able to explain 
these techniques at trial. The father also points to testimony from other witnesses stating that his 
parenting ability has improved.  Despite this evidence, “this Court does not reweigh evidence, but 
defer[s] to the trial court's unique ability to accurately weigh the evidence and judge the demeanor of 
the witnesses and take into account the trial court's ‘superior view of the entire situation.” Doe v. 
 
 
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Doe, 148 Idaho 243, 246, 220 P.3d 1062, 1065 (2009). The magistrate court heard testimony from at 
least four other witnesses that both parents’ parenting skills have diminished and/or they failed to 
internalize the parenting techniques they were taught.  The magistrate court explained: 
[The father and mother’s] parenting skills may have improved to the extent 
that they may know more about what is appropriate vs. inappropriate parenting or 
discipline and they may have developed more skills regarding various parenting 
techniques.  However, neither parent has internalized the information provided to 
them.  If [the parents] had truly internalized new parenting philosophies and 
discipline techniques it would have been obvious during visits with their children; 
gradual changes would have started to naturally appear without being forced. 
 
No matter how intensely [the parents] express that they want to change or 
have changed how they parent, there is simply no credible evidence to convincingly 
support their perceptions.  [Father] cannot let go of his need to control almost 
everything that has to do with his wife and children.  Even after two years of 
therapies and classes, [father’s] behaviors and moods are often still unpredictable, 
inconsistent and dysregulated and he continues to startle and frighten the children.   
 
(Emphasis added). 
The magistrate noted as well that the parents seem to view this case from a subjective lens of 
their own, rather than from an objective one.  The court concluded “Until [the parents] are able to 
see themselves through the ‘actual objective lens’ and gain the necessary insight into why they are 
not safe and protective parents, they will never be amendable [sic] to intervention or treatment; their 
circumstances will never change; and their children will always be at risk in their care.”  The court 
thus exercised objective judgment, based on substantial and credible evidence, to conclude that the 
children’s best interests favored termination of the father’s rights.  No witness other than the parents 
testified they thought the father could be a safe and protective parent. Accordingly, we defer to the 
magistrate court’s judgment in weighing the evidence.  There was substantial and competent 
evidence to find termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. 
The mother similarly claims the district court erred by failing to take into account her own 
testimony. The magistrate court found the mother’s testimony was disingenuous. For the same 
reasons as stated above, we will defer to the magistrate’s judgment in weighing the mother’s 
testimony. Second, the mother points to the testimony of Ms. Noggle (a social worker who testified 
at trial) that N.W. had a strong bond with the mother and that it would be detrimental for N.W. to 
lose her relationship with her parents. This Court was presented with a similar case in Doe I, 162 
Idaho 236, 395 P.3d 1269. In that case, the mother argued “it is not in the best interests of the 
 
 
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Children to terminate her parental rights because severing the parent-child relationship would be 
devastating to the Children.” Id. at ___, 395 P.3d at 1278. This Court dismissed that argument 
stating: “Doe fails to cite authority supporting her claim that the Children’s devastation should 
outweigh facts that suggest that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the Children’s best 
interest. Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate court’s judgment.” Id. at ___, 395 P.3d at 1269. Any 
claim that N.W. might be devastated from the termination of the mother’s rights alone does not 
override facts demonstrating termination was in the best interest of the child. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm the magistrate court’s judgments terminating the 
mother and father’s parental rights.  
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justice BRODY, Justice pro tem GRATTON and Justice pro tem 
MELANSON, CONCUR.