Case Title: People v. Miles

Citation: 

Docket Number: S086234

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JOHNNY DUANE MILES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S086234 
 
San Bernardino County Superior Court 
FSB09438 
 
 
May 28, 2020 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, 
Cuéllar, and Kruger concurred. 
 
Justice Liu filed a dissenting opinion. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
S086234 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
On March 17, 1999, a jury in San Bernardino County 
convicted defendant Johnny Duane Miles of burglary and first 
degree murder, first degree forcible rape, second degree robbery, 
and false imprisonment by violence of Nancy Willem.  The jury 
found true the special circumstances that Willem was killed 
during the commission of the burglary, rape, and robbery (Pen. 
Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17))1 and that the murder was 
intentional and involved the infliction of torture (§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(18)).  The jury also convicted defendant of 10 
additional counts related to two separate incidents and found 
true the enhancement allegations relating to those counts.  
Following the penalty phase, the jury reached a verdict of death.  
After denying defendant’s motion to modify the verdicts 
(§ 190.4, subd. (e)), the trial court sentenced defendant to death.  
This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the 
judgment.  
I.   FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase  
1. Prosecution Case  
 
This case arises from three separate incidents occurring in 
February 1992:  (1) the murder, rape, robbery, and false 
                                        
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise indicated.  
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
imprisonment by violence of Nancy Willem and the burglary 
preceding her death; (2) the rape, robbery, false imprisonment 
by violence, and penetration by a foreign object of Christine C.; 
and (3) the robbery and false imprisonment by violence of 
Melvin Osburn and the rape, robbery, false imprisonment by 
violence, and penetration by a foreign object of Carole D.   
a. Nancy Willem  
 
On February 4, 1992, Nancy Willem did not come home 
from work at the Behavioral Health Services Clinic in Rialto.  
That evening, her roommate, Kristen Schutz, started calling the 
clinic, but the clinic’s phone lines were busy.  When Schutz was 
not able to reach Willem, Schutz drove to the clinic.  After 
entering the building through an unlocked back door, she found 
the door to the clinic ajar.   
 
As she entered the clinic, she saw the reception area had 
been ransacked.  She followed the blood on the floor from the 
reception area into one of the offices.  There, she found Willem’s 
naked body between a couch and a coffee table.  There was a 
telephone cord tied to her wrist and a sweater wrapped around 
her neck.  There was also a handwritten note found on top of her 
abdomen that read:  “Feed the poor.  Down with the 
goverenment [sic].” 
 
Schutz tried to call the police but realized that the 
telephone cords were missing.  Once she reconnected one of the 
cords, she called 911.  The police arrived and pronounced Willem 
dead on the scene.  After securing the area and obtaining 
consent to search the clinic, the police collected blood and other 
bodily fluids from the reception area and office where Willem’s 
body was found.  The police also recorded a video depicting the 
crime scene, which was played for the jury.        
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
 
Dr. Nenita Duazo subsequently performed the autopsy on 
Willem’s body.  Willem’s injuries were extensive.  She had 
multiple lacerations of her scalp and forehead, a fractured jaw, 
a missing tooth, redness in her vagina, and a circular area that 
appeared to be a cigarette burn on her chest.  She had bruising 
of her face, chest, back, arms, and legs, which, according to Dr. 
Duazo, indicated that Willem was alive when her injuries were 
inflicted.  Internally, Willem had eight broken ribs, a tear in her 
left lung, two lacerations of her liver, and hemorrhage in her 
brain.  These injuries were likely caused by the application of 
substantial and multiple instances of force while Willem was 
still alive.  Willem also had hemorrhage in her eyes and neck, as 
well as a broken bone and broken cartilage in her neck, all of 
which indicated that she was manually strangled before her 
death.  Dr. Duazo testified that Willem was killed by a 
combination of blunt force injuries and manual strangulation.              
i. Physical evidence  
 
Several witnesses testified regarding the collection and 
analysis of blood and other bodily fluids found at the crime 
scene.  In particular, two criminalists from the San Bernardino 
County Sheriff’s Crime Laboratory, David Stockwell and Donald 
Jones, testified concerning their analysis.    
 
Stockwell testified that he conducted a serological analysis 
on items recovered from the crime scene.  He concluded that the 
nonvictim blood and semen from the crime scene came from an 
individual who was likely African-American and a type AB 
secretor, which he defined as someone whose blood type is 
secreted into other bodily fluids.  He testified that the genetic 
markers found in the nonvictim blood and semen would be 
expected in approximately one in 333 million African-American 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
men.  Following this analysis, he received a blood sample from 
defendant, who is African-American.  Stockwell testified that 
defendant is a secretor and his genetic markers matched the 
genetic markers found in the nonvictim blood and semen 
recovered from the crime scene.  
 
Next, Jones testified that he conducted a DNA analysis on 
the samples recovered from the crime scene.  He concluded that 
defendant’s DNA profile matched the DNA profile from the 
crime scene.  He testified that the DNA profile from the crime 
scene would be expected in approximately one in 180 million 
African-Americans (or one in 280 million African-Americans 
using his lab’s updated match criteria from around the time of 
the trial).         
ii. Other evidence   
 
On the night of Willem’s death, her ATM card was used to 
withdraw $1,160 from an ATM in Pomona and another $300 
from an ATM in Glendora.  An employee from the bank’s 
investigations unit testified that ATM surveillance photographs 
showed an individual wearing glasses and a “Red Dragon” hat 
at the time of the transaction in Glendora.  The individual’s 
features could not be discerned from the photographs.   
 
A couple of months after Willem’s death, the police briefly 
stopped an individual who identified himself as defendant and 
was walking no more than half of a mile from Willem’s office.  
During the stop, the police documented that defendant was an 
African-American man who was 25 years old, six feet, six inches 
tall, and 210 pounds.   
 
As to the handwritten note found at the crime scene, the 
prosecution offered testimony by expert Glen Owens.  He 
examined the note found on Willem’s body and certain inmate 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
forms written by defendant.  He concluded that there were some 
indications that the writer of the inmate forms may have written 
the crime scene note but it was not definitive.  An investigator 
testified that when defendant was served with a court order 
requiring him to provide a handwriting exemplar, he refused to 
comply.   
 
An officer at the Rialto Police Department testified that 
during a search of defendant’s car, the police found a note in it.  
That note read in part:  “We’ll be wiped out by the governement 
[sic].”  The note contained a misspelling of the word government, 
which was similar to the misspelling in the note found on 
Willem’s body.          
b. Christine C.  
 
Christine 
C. 
was 
working 
alone 
at 
the 
Desert 
Communities United Way office in Victorville on the evening of 
February 25, 1992 when a man forced his way into the office.  
Christine C. described the man as African-American, over six 
feet tall, in his twenties, and of “slim build.”2    
 
The man was wearing a ski-type mask and holding a silver 
handgun.  Pointing the gun at her, he demanded money.  She 
gave him cash from her purse and said that the office had no 
other money.  He then ordered her to lie down on the floor while 
he searched the office.  Once he returned, he directed her into a 
conference room, tied her arms behind her back with a telephone 
cord, and took her jewelry.  When she looked at him, he told her, 
“Don’t look at me.”  He also took an ATM card from her purse 
and asked her for the PIN, to which she said she did not know 
it.     
                                        
2  
Christine C. did not identify defendant in her testimony.   
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
 
After rummaging through the office, he returned to the 
conference room.  He proceeded to pull up Christine C.’s skirt 
and pull down her pantyhose, while she was lying on her 
stomach with her hands tied behind her back.  He penetrated 
her vagina from behind, initially with his fingers and then with 
his penis.  He ejaculated on her thighs and wiped her off with a 
tissue.  He then tied her feet and hands together and tied her to 
the conference table with telephone cords, and he left the office.  
She untied herself and called 911.  The police arrived on the 
scene, and she was taken to the hospital for a medical 
examination.  
 
The San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Crime Laboratory 
analyzed semen on tissues left at the crime scene.  Criminalist 
Stockwell testified that based on his serological analysis, the 
semen profile from the Christine C. crime scene matched the 
profile from the Willem crime scene and additionally matched 
defendant’s genetic markers.  Criminalist Jones testified that 
the DNA found on the tissues also matched defendant’s DNA 
profile and would be expected in approximately one in 180 
million African-Americans.     
c. Melvin Osburn & Carole D.  
 
Therapist Melvin Osburn was in his office in San 
Bernardino on the evening of February 26, 1992 when a man 
later determined by the jury to be defendant entered the office 
wearing a ski mask and holding a silver handgun.3  Defendant 
demanded Osburn’s wallet, threatening, “Don’t look at me or I’ll 
kill you.”  After taking money from his wallet, defendant ordered 
                                        
3  
Osburn did not identify defendant in his testimony, but he 
described the perpetrator as a Black man who was at least six 
feet, one inch tall and in his twenties. 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
Osburn to lie down on the floor.  Defendant then tied Osburn’s 
hands and feet with telephone cords and proceeded to rummage 
around the office, repeatedly asking whether there was a safe.  
Defendant also forced Osburn’s ring off his finger and asked 
Osburn about his ATM card, to which Osburn told him that 
there was no money on it.  When it appeared defendant was 
getting ready to leave, Osburn’s next client, Carole D., walked 
into the office.   
 
She was met by defendant pointing a silver gun at her.4  
He directed her into Osburn’s office, where he ordered her to lie 
down and not look at him.  He asked whether she had any money 
or an ATM card, to which she replied that she did not.  He took 
her wedding ring and tied her up with her purse strap and 
telephone cords.  Next, he pulled her pants and underwear down 
and penetrated her vagina from behind, initially with his fingers 
and then with his penis.   
 
Taking Osburn’s keys, defendant left the office and drove 
away in Osburn’s car, with his cellphone.  Osburn freed himself 
and Carole D., and because the telephone cords were torn, he 
triggered the burglar alarm and eventually used his next client’s 
phone to call the police.  The police arrived, and Carole D. was 
taken to the hospital for a medical examination.  The examining 
nurse testified that Carole D. showed signs of sexual assault.  
The police later found Osburn’s car abandoned in a nearby 
parking lot.  His cellphone bill showed calls that he had not 
made.     
                                        
4  
She did not identify defendant in her testimony, but she 
described the perpetrator as a Black man over six feet tall and 
in his twenties. 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
 
The San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Crime Laboratory 
analyzed semen found on Carole D.’s underwear.  Criminalist 
Stockwell testified that this sample contained less serological 
information than the samples obtained from the other two crime 
scenes, but that the detectable genetic markers from the sample 
matched the semen profiles from the Willem and Christine C. 
crime scenes.  He testified that the detectable genetic markers 
from the sample also matched defendant’s genetic markers.  As 
to the DNA, criminalist Jones was able to form only a partial 
DNA profile based on the sample, but he testified that the 
partial DNA profile matched defendant’s DNA and would be 
expected in approximately one in 920 African-Americans. 
2. Defense Case  
 
The defense called three witnesses.  First, the defense 
called Dr. Thomas Rogers, a pathology expert, who testified that 
it was not possible to determine whether Willem’s injuries were 
inflicted when she was conscious or unconscious or to determine 
from any autopsy whether a deceased individual was tortured.  
Second, the defense called Dr. Jonathan Koehler, a research 
methodology expert, who testified regarding errors and 
probability statistics in DNA analysis.  For the third witness, 
the defense called one of the investigating detectives, Detective 
Chester Lore.  He testified that the police did not recover stolen 
property, bloody clothing, or a “Red Dragon” hat (which the 
individual who used Willem’s ATM card in Glendora appeared 
to be wearing) when they searched defendant’s residences and 
vehicle.  Nor did the police recover any fingerprints from the 
crime scenes that matched defendant’s fingerprints.  Detective 
Lore also testified that the police previously investigated 
someone other than defendant in connection with a “Red 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
Dragon” hat, but that individual was eventually cleared as a 
suspect. 
B. Penalty Phase  
 
After the jury returned its guilt phase verdicts, the trial 
court declared a doubt as to defendant’s competency, suspended 
proceedings, and commenced a competency trial before a 
separate jury.  (The evidence presented in the competency trial 
is described further below [see pt. IV., post].)  Once defendant 
was found competent to stand trial, the trial proceeded to the 
penalty phase.      
1. Prosecution Evidence  
a. Defendant’s criminal activity and prior 
convictions    
 
The prosecution presented evidence in aggravation 
concerning defendant’s unadjudicated criminal activity and 
prior criminal convictions.   
i. January 6, 1992 incident   
 
Paula Yenerall testified that she was working alone at an 
accounting firm in Rialto on the evening of January 6, 1992 
when defendant broke the window and forced his way into the 
office.  He was wearing a stocking cap, jacket, and gloves and 
appeared “very calm.”  He pointed a chrome, semi-automatic 
gun at her and demanded money.  When she told him that she 
had some money in her purse at her desk, he held the gun to her 
head and pulled her to her desk to retrieve the money.  He 
repeatedly said, “Don’t look at me, bitch,” and at one point said, 
“I’m a murderer and I’ll kill you, too.”  After taking $1,200 from 
her, as well as two rings and a gold necklace, he tied her hands 
behind her back with a telephone cord.  He then instructed her 
to stay put and left.  
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
ii. January 21, 1992 incident  
 
Janet Heynen testified regarding a January 21, 1992 
incident in a psychologist’s office in Upland.  While she was 
working that evening, defendant appeared at the reception 
window.  She described him as calm and wearing a brown 
beanie, jacket, and gloves.  He pointed a chrome handgun at her 
face and demanded money.  He told her not to look at him and 
appeared to be “pulling the [telephone] cords out.”  After she 
gave him some cash, he briefly went into a back office for a 
couple of minutes and, once he returned, told her to not call the 
police and left.      
iii. February 19, 1992 incident  
 
John Kendrick testified about a February 19, 1992 
incident in Ontario.  That evening, he was working in his 
accounting office with his clients Paul and Mary Crawford, 
when defendant entered the office.  Defendant appeared “[v]ery 
calm” and was wearing a gray stocking cap on his head.  
Pointing a small chrome handgun at Kendrick, defendant 
demanded money.  Kendrick and the Crawfords gave defendant 
several hundred dollars in cash, while defendant repeatedly 
said, “Don’t look at me, man.”  Defendant then instructed them 
not to call the police for 30 minutes, and he left.           
iv. February 21, 1992 incident  
 
Arnold and Sharyn Andersen testified that they were 
working together in their insurance and investment office in 
San Bernardino on the evening of February 21, 1992.5  After 
they heard crashing and shattering sounds, defendant appeared 
                                        
5  
For clarity, we will refer to Arnold and Sharyn Andersen 
by their first names.  
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
in the office, pointing a small chrome, automatic gun at them.  
Defendant appeared calm and was wearing a beanie.  He 
demanded money and told the Andersens to lie down on the 
floor, repeatedly telling them not to look at him.  He then took 
some cash from Arnold’s wallet and Sharyn’s purse and, after 
Arnold went into his office to look for more money, defendant 
took a money clip with approximately $1,200 from him.  As he 
was leaving the office, defendant grabbed a bunch of Kleenex 
and dabbed his hands where he had cut them from breaking one 
of the windows to enter the office.    
v. June 16, 1992 crimes  
 
Bridget E. testified about defendant’s June 16, 1992 
crimes in Torrance.  She was working at an appraisal office that 
evening with her boss, Steve H., when defendant entered the 
office and pointed a gun at them.  Defendant was wearing a red 
bandana over his lower face.  He demanded money, so Bridget 
E. gave him some money from her purse.  He proceeded to search 
the office, asking for the location of a safe.  He repeatedly said, 
“Don’t look at me, man.  Don’t look at me, man.”    
 
Next, defendant tied Steve H. with telephone cords and 
computer cords, unzipped Bridget E.’s pants, and kicked Steve 
H. in the ribs a few times.  Pointing the gun at Bridget E.’s head, 
defendant ordered Bridget E. to orally copulate Steve H.  She 
told him that she was pregnant and asked him not to hurt her, 
so “[h]e said, just do what I say and you won’t get hurt — if you 
don’t want to get hurt.”  Bridget E. proceeded to orally copulate 
Steve H.  She could not recall whether she was tied up at that 
time.  Defendant then penetrated Bridget E.’s vagina, initially 
with his fingers and then with his penis.  Once he stopped, he 
told her to continue copulating Steve H.  She recounted that her 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
hands and feet were tied up with cords at that time.  After 
defendant eventually left the office, Steve H. and Bridget E. 
untied themselves and called the police.    
vi. Defendant’s other criminal convictions  
 
At the prosecution’s request, the trial court took judicial 
notice of 14 prior convictions, of which 13 were for first degree 
residential burglary and one was for second degree robbery.             
b. Victim impact testimony  
 
The prosecution’s penalty phase evidence also included 
victim impact testimony from Nancy Willem’s father, mother, 
and younger sister.  The family members described Nancy’s 
personality and interests, including her interest in singing and 
playing guitar.  During her mother’s testimony, the prosecution 
played a videotape for the jury depicting Nancy singing at her 
youngest sister’s wedding a couple of years before her death.  
The family members further described how Nancy’s death 
affected them as a family and as individuals.  The prosecution 
also offered a photograph of Nancy, which, according to her 
father, resembled how she looked around the time of her death.              
 
The prosecution additionally offered victim impact 
testimony from Bridget E.  She testified that after the June 16, 
1992 crimes, she was tested “right away” for any diseases, and 
she was diagnosed with and treated for chlamydia.  She also 
stopped working and by the time of the trial, had not had the 
opportunity to “get back into” the appraisal business.  She 
suffered from nightmares for “a long time” and became “more 
suspicious of people” and a “more serious person.” 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
2. Defense Evidence  
a. Defendant’s testimony  
 
Against the advice of counsel, defendant testified during 
the penalty phase, largely in a narrative form.  He began by 
describing a time when he approached two people who had 
supposedly killed his cousin and his neighbor.  He explained 
that the man who had killed his neighbor told him to testify 
about “Wilhelmena’s murder.”  Defendant testified that by 
“Wilhelmena,” he meant Nancy Willem, and that Wilhelmena 
was “able to reveal the things that happened at the time of the 
crime.”   
 
He then testified that ever since undergoing foot surgery 
when he was a teenager, he suffered from hallucinations and “ill 
angels,” which controlled his actions.  He said that he suffered 
from these “ill angels” at the time of Willem’s death.  As to her 
death, he said that “[t]here was one rape” and a beating of her 
head with an object, but there was no strangulation.  He said 
that after he took her money and bank information, he raped 
her because the voices in his head told him that she wanted it.  
He described that the voices then grew louder and, in order to 
stop them, he beat, kicked, and stomped her.  The voices next 
took over the left side of his body, causing him to write the note, 
saying, “Wake up goverenment [sic].”  He testified that since 
that night, “Wilhelmena” helped him to control the “ill angels” 
and intervened to “save the lives of other females that were 
involved in this case.”6   
                                        
6  
On cross-examination, defendant testified that the voices 
told him to rape Christine C. and Carole D. as well.  He said that 
the voices “were there continuously through the robberies,” and 
 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
b. Evidence regarding defendant’s mental health   
 
Much of the defense’s penalty phase evidence concerned 
defendant’s mental health.  Clinical psychologist Dr. Joseph 
Lantz testified that defendant’s intelligence fell within the 
borderline range, between mental deficiency and low-average, 
and in his opinion, defendant suffered from schizophrenia.  
Psychiatrist Dr. Richard Dudley testified that in his opinion, 
defendant suffered from schizo-affective disorder, which he 
defined as a combination of schizophrenia and a mood disorder.  
He further testified that defendant suffered from cognitive 
deficits and problems related to an invasive mass, which was 
near his brain and removed after his arrest.  A social worker 
also testified about defendant visiting a psychiatric clinic in 
1992.         
 
In addition, Dr. Joseph Wu testified regarding a positron 
emission tomography (PET) scan of defendant’s brain, of which 
photographs and a video were displayed to the jury.  Dr. Wu 
testified that while a PET scan cannot alone lead to a diagnosis, 
defendant’s brain exhibited abnormalities consistent with a 
schizophrenia diagnosis.  Dr. Ernie Meth testified regarding a 
SPECT (single-photon emission computed tomography) scan of 
defendant’s brain, of which photographs and a video were 
likewise displayed to the jury.  Dr. Meth testified that based on 
this scan, defendant’s brain exhibited abnormalities that were 
consistent with the results of Dr. Wu’s PET scan.  
                                        
when asked by the prosecutor about specific robberies, 
defendant recalled raping Bridget E., robbing Yenerall, and 
robbing the Andersens, although he denied robbing Heynen 
(and was not asked specifically about robbing Kendrick or the 
Crawfords).    
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
c. Other testimony   
 
One 
of 
defendant’s 
childhood 
friends, 
Dwayne 
Washington, described defendant as a “great kid” with a tough 
home life and a love for basketball.  He testified that defendant 
became depressed during his teenage years after he underwent 
foot surgery and was no longer able to play basketball.  He 
testified that on a few occasions around 1984 or 1985, defendant 
acted strangely and appeared to believe that people were trying 
to get him.  Washington’s mother, Sharon Mitchell, described 
defendant as a good kid with an “extremely negative” home life.  
She, too, recalled that defendant began suffering from 
headaches and memory lapses during his teenage years and 
recounted a few incidents in which defendant tried to hide under 
the table to prevent people from getting him.  Washington’s 
aunt, Serette Mitchell-Hughes, testified about one of those 
incidents as well.  These witnesses also testified about 
defendant later getting married and having a daughter.   
 
Defendant’s former girlfriend, Terry Sylvester, testified 
that defendant lived with her and her three children around the 
late 1980’s in Atlanta.  She said that during that time, 
defendant worked and participated in family activities, but one 
day, he left for work and never returned.  He later told her that 
he went back to California.   
 
A retired correctional officer testified that should 
defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment, he could function 
within the constraints of the prison facilities and be safely 
imprisoned.  
3. Prosecution’s Rebuttal  
 
In rebuttal, the prosecution offered testimony from two 
additional witnesses.  First, Deputy Jonathan Billings testified 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
about a videotape that he said reflected defendant’s “normal” 
behavior in jail.  The videotape, a portion of which was played 
for the jury, showed defendant watching television and playing 
chess with other inmates.  Second, psychiatrist Dr. Rajesh Patel 
testified that when defendant claimed to be suicidal in jail, Dr. 
Patel examined him and concluded that he was malingering 
mental illness.    
II.  PRETRIAL ISSUES 
A. Prosecutor’s Use of Peremptory Challenges 
 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly 
exercised peremptory challenges to excuse two prospective 
jurors, who were African-American, in violation of Batson v. 
Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 89 (Batson) and People v. Wheeler 
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276–277 (Wheeler).  The prosecutor’s 
exercise of these peremptory challenges, defendant argues, 
warrants close scrutiny because there are heightened concerns 
about racial discrimination in this case given that he was 
charged with raping and murdering a White woman.  We will 
examine the prosecutor’s exercise of the peremptory challenges 
in light of these and all other relevant circumstances.   
1. Background  
 
Jury selection for defendant’s trial began on November 18, 
1998.  Following hardships and other dismissals, the remaining 
prospective jurors filled out a 31-page questionnaire.  Based on 
the completed questionnaires, the parties questioned some of 
the prospective jurors on their views regarding the death 
penalty pursuant to People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543.  Once 
Hovey questioning concluded, and the trial court excused 
prospective jurors for cause or by stipulation, 72 prospective 
jurors remained.  The trial court called the first 12 prospective 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
jurors to the main panel.  They included three African-American 
jurors, three Hispanic jurors, five White jurors, and one 
“American Indian / Caucasian” juror. 
 
The parties then commenced general voir dire.  After the 
defense challenged an African-American prospective juror for 
cause and that prospective juror was replaced, the prosecutor 
proceeded to exercise peremptory strikes against Malinda M. (a 
Hispanic woman), Kevin C. (an African-American man), 
Michelle G. (a White woman), Simeon G. (an African-American 
man), and Ronald W. (a White man).  After the prosecutor twice 
passed on exercising any peremptory strikes and the defense 
exercised three peremptory strikes, the prosecutor next struck 
Isabella B. (an African-American woman).    
 
At this time, the defense raised a Batson/Wheeler 
objection and moved to quash the panel.  The defense noted that 
the prosecutor had used three of his six strikes up to that point 
on African-American prospective jurors.  The trial court found 
that a prima facie case had been established.  The court stated 
that it understood the basis for striking Isabella B. based on her 
answers during Hovey questioning, but asked the prosecutor to 
explain the basis for striking Kevin C. and Simeon G.  After 
hearing the prosecutor’s reasons, the court found, “As to [Kevin 
C.] and [Simeon G.], I think it’s certainly not as obvious, but I 
cannot say it is not legitimate.  [¶] So, at this point in time, I will 
make a finding that there have been valid reasons to justify 
excusing those three prospective jurors pursuant to a 
peremptory challenge.” 
 
After the court denied the motion, the 12 prospective 
jurors seated in the jury box included nine White jurors, two 
Hispanic jurors, and one “American Indian / Caucasian” juror.  
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
The prosecutor twice passed on exercising any peremptory 
strikes, and the defense exercised four peremptory strikes.  The 
prosecutor then exercised a peremptory strike against Mary B. 
(an African-American woman).  At this time, the defense 
renewed its Batson/Wheeler objection and motion to quash the 
panel, arguing that, although Mary B. expressed reservations 
about the death penalty, the prosecutor had exercised his 
peremptory strikes to compose an all-White jury panel.  The 
trial court denied the motion, finding that Mary B.’s 
reservations about the death penalty justified the strike.   
 
After the prosecutor peremptorily struck Richard L. (a 
Hispanic man), and the defense exercised one more peremptory 
strike, the parties accepted the main jury panel.  The panel 
included 10 White jurors, one Hispanic juror, and one “American 
Indian / Caucasian” juror.  The trial court then proceeded to the 
selection of six alternate jurors.  The prosecutor repeatedly 
declined to exercise any peremptory strikes, except to strike 
Lynia B. (a White woman).  The sworn alternate jurors included 
one African-American and five White individuals.  Before the 
penalty phase of the trial, the African-American alternate juror 
replaced an excused juror and served on the jury.  
 
On appeal, defendant renews his challenge to the 
prosecutor’s peremptory strikes of Kevin C. and Simeon G. from 
the main jury panel.  Defendant states that he “is not 
challenging” the peremptory strikes of Isabella B. or Mary B.  As 
we examine defendant’s Batson/Wheeler arguments with 
regard to Kevin C. and Simeon G., we bear the above record in 
mind.   
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
a. Prospective Juror Kevin C.   
 
Kevin C., who was African-American, was 32 years old at 
the time of jury selection.  He was divorced with three children 
and worked as a coach operator.  He had previously served in 
the military and had previously applied, but had not been 
selected, for other law enforcement positions.  His former spouse 
was a correctional officer.   
 
In his questionnaire, he revealed a degree of skepticism 
regarding the criminal justice system.  He believed that people 
accused of crimes were treated “leniently if you rich harshly if 
poor.”  He previously served as an alternate juror in a criminal 
case involving murder charges, and when asked how his jury 
service experience affected his views on the court system, he 
said, “It let me know that no matter the crime or defendant the 
community selected [as jurors] is both white and blue collar 
workers.”  He believed the biggest problem with the system was 
“racial coded prison[s] keep racism alive and create even larger 
bias.”  And when asked whether he, any relative, or any close 
friend had ever been mistreated by a law enforcement officer, he 
checked “yes” and said, “pull[ed] over several times no good 
reason given no ticket given.”   
 
Asked whether he was upset by the O.J. Simpson verdict, 
he checked “no” and commented, “To [sic] hard to believe one 
man did it all, I believe biases created a lot of the circumstance 
[sic] evidence.”  Also regarding the Simpson case, he said, 
“watch[ed] several days of the O.J. Simpson trial taught me [a 
lot] about law” in response to whether he had read about, 
watched, or listened to any testimony regarding DNA evidence.  
Asked about his opinion on using DNA evidence in criminal 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
cases, he said, “I think it’s like a polygraph not a for sure 
certain.”     
 
His questionnaire responses also suggested some 
hesitancy about the death penalty.  Asked his opinion on it, he 
said, “there are members of society who do bad things and don[’t] 
deserve to be here, can I kill them?  unknown at this time.”  
Asked whether he had a moral, philosophical, or religious 
objection to the death penalty, he checked “yes,” commenting, 
“God should decide life or death, but some don’t deserve[] life.”  
He identified himself as Christian and described his religion’s 
view as “thou should not kill.”  He said that he agreed with that 
view, although he added, “but if my child was being attack[ed] 
someone might die[].”  As to whether he would vote to keep or 
abolish the death penalty, he said that he would not vote and 
remarked, “I like to decide who could stay in society but not 
decide who stays on earth (I’d like to sleep).”  He believed that 
the death penalty was unfair but admitted, “mainly because I 
don’t know it completely.”   
 
In spite of this, he said that his views on the death penalty 
had changed in the last 10 years, commenting, “at first against 
but now feel it is needed in special circumstances.”  He identified 
himself as belonging to Group 3, which was defined as “I neither 
favor nor oppose the death penalty.”  He said that his views on 
the death penalty were not such that he would never be able to 
personally vote for the death of the defendant under any 
circumstance.  Nor would he be reluctant to vote for a sentence 
of death.  But he said that he would be reluctant to sign the 
verdict form or state the verdict in court, commenting, “to look 
at someone not knowing why he did it would be hard.”     
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
 
During Hovey questioning, the prosecutor asked Kevin C. 
about his moral, philosophical, or religious objections to the 
death penalty.  Kevin C. responded, “I feel where I live I should 
decide.  Where I’m a Christian.  I go to church, so I think, you 
know, I can’t.  I think God should decide.  But, you know, I think 
I should decide if I live in the community.”  Following up on this 
response, the prosecutor asked, “Then you made a comment, 
though, on the next page.  ‘I’d like to decide who could stay in 
society, but not decide who stays on earth.’  That means you feel 
comfortable [with] making a decision if somebody should be 
maybe incarcerated, but you feel less comfortable making a 
decision as far as life or death on an individual?”  Kevin C. 
responded, “Well, of course I feel uncomfortable about life or 
death, but incarcerated for the rest of their life, if they don’t 
believe, I would probably go that way, you know.  Just an 
assumption.  But, again, I don’t think I’d have a big problem, 
depending on evidence of what is in front of me.  If someone 
killed my daughter, then I could see it.”  The prosecutor clarified 
that “of course we have a victim that you weren’t acquainted 
with” and “[y]ou don’t know her at all.”  Kevin C. said, “Right, 
I’m just saying —”   
 
The prosecutor then defined aggravating and mitigating 
evidence and asked, “But you’re going to hear, like you may hear 
some bad evidence, and you may hear some good evidence.  But 
basically, if the bad outweighs the good — ”  Kevin C. responded,  
“If the bad outweighs the good, then I don’t have a problem doing 
my job.”  Asked “[w]hich means you could, you could vote for a 
death verdict,” Kevin C. responded, “Yeah.”    
 
When the trial court subsequently called the first 12 
prospective jurors, including Kevin C., to the jury box, the court 
and the parties asked a series of questions to the jurors as a 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
group.  Neither the prosecutor nor the defense asked Kevin C. 
any individual questions during general voir dire.   
 
Following defendant’s Batson/Wheeler objection, the 
prosecutor stated his reasons for striking Kevin C.:  “[Kevin C.] 
in his questionnaire compared DNA to a polygraph.  That it 
wasn’t a for sure thing.  His answers on the questionnaire 
regarding the death penalty were much more tentative.  He 
indicated questions like he wants to decide who is in society, but 
not [who’s] on earth.  He was very skeptical of the O.J. Simpson 
case.  He stated biases created the circumstantial evidence in 
the O.J. Simpson case.  This is a DNA case very much like that.  
It’s a circumstantial case.  It’s a DNA case.  Those, those are the 
main concerns that I had.”  The prosecutor added, “I think that 
in person his, his statements about the death penalty didn’t rise 
to a level for cause; but, however, I think when you take the 
totality of his responses, I think, I mean those are essentially 
the reasons that I’m stating.”  The court found that the 
prosecutor’s reasons for striking Kevin C. were legitimate and 
valid.  
b. Prospective Juror Simeon G.   
 
Simeon 
G. 
was 
an 
unmarried, 
24-year-old 
African-American man with no children at the time of jury 
selection for defendant’s trial.  He worked as a forklift driver.  
He had previously considered working in law enforcement to 
help others, and his father worked for the DEA. 
 
In his questionnaire, he described himself as a leader 
rather than a follower and remarked, “I like my opinion over 
other peoples [sic].”  He said that he had not previously worked 
with a group of people to make a decision, although he believed 
“it would be very interesting” to work with other jurors to reach 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
a verdict.  He had not previously served on a jury.  Asked 
whether he believed the jury system to be a fair method to judge 
a defendant charged with a crime, he replied affirmatively, 
commenting, “12 people have to come together to accuse 
someone.  That[’]s 12 different opinions.  Pretty impressive.”   
 
He considered the biggest problems with the criminal 
justice system to be “A. The Court Backlog.  B. Better ways of 
getting people through the judicial system.”  He believed he 
could be a fair and impartial juror, stating, “I’m open to 
objectively listening to evidence from both sides to decide a fair 
verdict.”  He did not believe that testimony by law enforcement 
officers would be more truthful or accurate than testimony by 
civilians; he would not automatically accept the opinion of a 
psychiatrist or psychologist; and he could follow an instruction 
that if a defendant does not testify, jurors are not supposed to 
draw any conclusions from that fact. 
 
 
Asked whether he could follow an instruction “that a 
defendant is presumed innocent unless proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” he checked “yes” but commented, “If I have 
any feeling that he might not have done it, hes [sic] innocent.”  
In that response, it appears that he crossed out the word “doubt” 
and replaced it with the word “feeling.”  Elsewhere, he indicated 
that he was not upset by the O.J. Simpson verdict (without 
providing any explanation); that people accused of crimes are 
treated fairly; and that he “really [didn’t] know anything about” 
DNA evidence in criminal cases.  He also favored the death 
penalty and said that he could vote for a death sentence.       
 
During general voir dire, Simeon G. and two other 
prospective jurors did not arrive at the courthouse that morning, 
possibly due to a miscommunication.  The defense insisted on 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
trying to locate these missing prospective jurors.  The prosecutor 
objected to doing so, arguing that other prospective jurors in 
their group were present in court and thus inferring that the 
missing prospective jurors “voluntarily absented themselves.”  
It appears that the trial judge, seeing from Simeon G.’s 
questionnaire that he worked for Kmart Corporation, “called 
information and got the numbers of two Kmart stores in the 
Ontario area and [called] to try to locate Simeon [G.].”  Simeon 
G. then called and spoke to the bailiff, and at the bailiff’s 
request, Simeon G. came to court that afternoon. 
 
That afternoon, the prosecutor explained to the 
prospective jurors who were seated in the jury box, including 
Simeon G.:  “[O]ne of the instructions you’re going to get in the 
case has to do with, essentially, reasonable doubt.  There will be 
a definition that you’re going to get at the end of the case.  It’s 
basically a doubt based on reason.  And the duty is that if the 
case has been proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable 
doubt, your duty is to return a guilty verdict.  There’s [sic] also 
other principles that are, I don’t know how deeply we touched 
on them in the questionnaire, but the presumption of innocence.  
Of course, everybody who is charged with a crime is entitled to 
the presumption of innocence, and that is in existence right now.  
[¶] The question is, is if it [sic] at the conclusion of the case if the 
case has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt whether we can 
expect everybody to come back with a guilty verdict.”   
 
Immediately following this explanation, the prosecutor 
asked Simeon G., “[I]n your questionnaire you mentioned 
something — and keep in mind I’m not intending to, you know, 
embarrass anybody or anything like that.  It’s just, like I said, 
this is the only way we can get information quickly is to kind of 
be in a group at this point.  [¶] You mentioned that if — [Simeon 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
G.], you mention in your questionnaire that if you had any 
feeling that maybe the defendant was [not] involved, then he’d 
be not guilty.”7  Simeon G. replied, “I’m sorry?”  The prosecutor 
explained, “In your questionnaire, you used the phrase that if 
you have a feeling that the defendant was [not] involved, that 
you’d find him not guilty.  And you used the word ‘feeling’ 
instead of the word ‘doubt.’  You’d written ‘doubt’ and crossed 
out and written the word ‘feeling.’  Do you remember that?”  
Simeon G. replied, “I don’t quite remember it, but I’m trying to 
understand your question.  You’re saying if I had a reasonable 
doubt?”   
 
The prosecutor responded, “Well, I’m not sure.  I’m trying 
to understand what you meant by that.  You indicated that if 
you had a feeling that he might not be involved, then he would 
be not guilty?”  Simeon G. replied, “Well, I think what I was 
trying to say, if I’m correct, is that if the evidence showed that 
there wasn’t — that there was some reasonable doubt, then I 
probably would not accuse him, because of the fact that, myself 
being in the same situation or anybody, I think that if the 
evidence didn’t totally prove that I did it, then there is some 
doubt.  You know what I’m saying?”  The prosecutor said, 
“Okay.”  Simeon G. added, “So it wasn’t so much a feeling as it 
was if the evidence didn’t show.”  When the prosecutor sought to 
clarify the answer, asking, “Okay.  So you would base it on 
evidence?”  Simeon G. replied, “Basically, yes.  I’m sorry.”  The 
prosecutor commented, “I wanted to make sure,” and Simeon G. 
                                        
7  
It appears that the prosecutor initially misspoke and 
meant to say “if you had any feeling that maybe the defendant 
was [not] involved, then he’d be not guilty.”  The prosecutor 
subsequently clarified his question.  
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
added, “I couldn’t tell you, tell you what I said, because I don’t 
have the paper to look at what I actually meant totally.”   The 
prosecutor concluded, “Okay.  Thank you.”    
 
Following defendant’s Batson/Wheeler objection, the 
prosecutor stated his reasons for striking Simeon G.:  “[Simeon 
G.] made statements on his questionnaire how he likes his 
opinions over others.  He did make a statement, although he 
explained it differently in court, he made a statement on his 
questionnaire basically saying if I have a feeling he didn’t do it, 
he’s not guilty.  And he had crossed out the word doubt, which 
led me to believe that he certainly wasn’t going to base it on 
evidence.  [¶] And I, also, would note that this is an individual 
who the Court personally tracked down this morning.  He didn’t 
have — he, unlike others in his group, didn’t show up for court 
this morning.  I would be concerned about his responses in light 
of the fact that he was, he was single-handedly hunted down to 
be here this afternoon.  So, I’m not sure that his responses in 
court should prevail over the answers he gave on his 
questionnaire.  But certainly those statements on his 
questionnaire cause me some significant concerns.”   
 
Seeking clarification, the court asked, “His answer being 
that if he had a feeling the defendant was not guilty, that was 
the answer that bothered you?”  The prosecutor responded, “Yes, 
based on — and he had crossed out the word doubt.  And to me 
that made it sound like he was going to be basically basing it on 
a hunch, or a feeling, which was, as the presenter of evidence, 
I’m powerless to overcome.  And that was the main concern on 
that.”  The prosecutor then added, “Also, he was not upset by 
the O.J. Simpson verdict.  If you’ll notice across the board, I’ve 
excused jurors I believe of Hispanic origin and Caucasian origin, 
and the common denominator, essentially, is that they were not, 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
were not upset by the O.J. Simpson verdict, which was a DNA, 
circumstantial case.  And I think those, those raise significant 
concerns in my mind as a guilt phase juror and the type of case 
that I’m dealing with.”   
 
Following the prosecutor’s reasons, defense counsel stated 
that Simeon G. misunderstood whether “he was supposed to be 
here today or tomorrow” and, once it was clarified, he appeared.  
Defense counsel continued, “[Simeon G.] checked on his 
questionnaire with regard to the death penalty that he’s a Group 
2, that he favors the death penalty, but would weigh and 
consider aggravating circumstances.  [¶] He really doesn’t give 
any answers that suggest that he couldn’t be fair and impartial.  
He indicates that his father was a D.E.A. agent.  [¶] With regard 
to DNA, he said he didn’t know anything about it.”   
 
The court responded, “Well, I understand that there’s 
certainly not enough there to excuse him for cause, but that’s 
not the test that I have to utilize in this situation.  I have to 
determine whether or not there are valid, legitimate reasons for 
the District Attorney dismissing three of the four Blacks that 
were called to the box.  [¶] As I indicated, as to [Isabella B.], I 
understand his concern there.  As to [Kevin C.] and [Simeon G.], 
I think it’s certainly not as obvious, but I cannot say it is not 
legitimate.  [¶] So, at this point in time, I will make a finding 
that there have been valid reasons to justify excusing those 
three prospective jurors pursuant to a peremptory challenge.  
But I don’t need to remind counsel that we’re treading on thin 
ice in this area, and the consequences of falling through means 
we start all over again.” 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
28 
2. Discussion  
a. Applicable law  
 
 
The United States and California Constitutions prohibit 
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.  (Batson, 
supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276–
277.)  A three-step inquiry governs the analysis of 
Batson/Wheeler claims.  “First, the defendant must make out a 
prima facie case ‘by showing that the totality of the relevant 
facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’  
[Citation.]  Second, once the defendant has made out a prima 
facie case, the ‘burden shifts to the State to explain adequately 
the racial exclusion’ by offering permissible race-neutral 
justifications for the strikes.  [Citations.]  Third, ‘[i]f a 
race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then 
decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved 
purposeful racial discrimination.’ ”  (Johnson v. California 
(2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168, fn. omitted.)    
 
“ ‘The proper focus of a Batson/Wheeler inquiry, of course, 
is on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons 
given for the peremptory challenge, not on the objective 
reasonableness of those reasons. . . . All that matters is that the 
prosecutor’s reason for exercising the peremptory challenge is 
sincere and legitimate, legitimate in the sense of being 
nondiscriminatory.’  ”  (People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 
975 (O’Malley).)  “ ‘At the third stage of the Wheeler/Batson 
inquiry, “the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds 
the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible.  
Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the 
prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, 
the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
29 
some basis in accepted trial strategy.” ’ ”  (People v. Jones (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 346, 360 (Jones).)   
“ ‘ “ ‘[T]he trial court is not required to make specific or 
detailed comments for the record to justify every instance in 
which a prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for exercising a 
peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court as 
genuine.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 848 
(Vines).)  However, “ ‘[w]hen the prosecutor’s stated reasons are 
either unsupported by the record, inherently implausible, or 
both, more is required of the trial court than a global finding 
that the reasons appear sufficient.’ ”  (People v. Gutierrez (2017) 
2 Cal.5th 1150, 1171 (Gutierrez).)     
 
Where, as here, the trial court ruled pursuant to the third 
stage of the analysis, we skip to that stage to examine whether 
the trial court properly credited the prosecutor’s reasons for the 
challenges.  “Review of a trial court’s denial of a Wheeler/Batson 
motion is deferential, examining only whether substantial 
evidence supports its conclusions.  [Citation.]  ‘We review a trial 
court’s determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor’s 
justifications for exercising peremptory challenges “ ‘with great 
restraint.’ ”  [Citation.]  We presume that a prosecutor uses 
peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give 
great deference to the trial court’s ability to distinguish bona 
fide reasons from sham excuses.  [Citation.]  So long as the trial 
court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the 
nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are 
entitled to deference on appeal.’ ”  (People v. Lenix (2008) 
44 Cal.4th 602, 613–614 (Lenix); accord, People v. Winbush 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 435 (Winbush).) 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
30 
 
Defendant, however, argues that the trial court’s findings 
are not entitled to deference here because the prosecutor’s 
reasons were “suspicious” and, after hearing them, the court 
credited them without much discussion on the record.  We 
disagree.  The trial court found that a prima facie case had been 
established and asked the prosecutor to explain the basis for 
striking Kevin C. and Simeon G.  The prosecutor’s stated 
reasons were largely self-evident:  It requires “little additional 
explication” 
(Gutierrez, 
supra, 
2 Cal.5th at 
p. 1171) 
to 
understand why an advocate would harbor a concern about a 
prospective juror’s stated preference for his own opinion over 
others’ or a prospective juror’s opinion on DNA evidence, the 
death penalty, or the O.J. Simpson verdict.  Moreover, the 
prosecutor articulated why, specifically, some of the prospective 
jurors’ responses concerned him.  The court also asked the 
prosecutor a question about one of his stated reasons for striking 
Simeon G.  (See ante, at p. 26 [“His answer being that if he had 
a feeling the defendant was not guilty, that was the answer that 
bothered you?”].)  And the court listened to defense counsel’s 
comments on the prosecutor’s striking of Simeon G.8  The trial 
                                        
8  
Disagreeing, the dissent argues that the prosecutor’s 
reasons were not self-evident and, in turn, that the trial court 
was required to do more than what it did here.  The dissent 
relies on Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th 1150.  (Dis. opn., post, at 
pp. 2–3.)  In Gutierrez, we found that it was not self-evident why 
a prospective juror’s mere unawareness of gang activity in a 
specific city  would indicate a bias against a witness who was a 
gang member in the city.  (Gutierrez, at p. 1169.)   
The dissent asserts that the trial court here “expressly 
acknowledged that the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for 
striking Kevin C. and Simeon G. were not self-evident.”  (Dis. 
 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
31 
court acknowledged that “there’s certainly not enough there to 
excuse [Simeon G.] for cause,” but the trial court accurately 
explained that “that’s not the test” and instead it must 
determine whether there were “valid, legitimate” reasons to 
justify the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges.   
The court then acknowledged that the prosecutor’s stated 
reasons for striking Kevin C. and Simeon G. were not as 
“obvious” (as the reasons for striking another prospective juror, 
Isabella B.).  The court, however, concluded that the prosecutor’s 
reasons for striking Kevin C. and Simeon G. were legitimate and 
valid.  The court added, “I don’t need to remind counsel that 
we’re treading on thin ice in this area, and the consequences of 
falling through means we start all over again.”  While the 
discussion was brief, and while the trial court could have done 
more to make a fuller record and itself acknowledged it was 
making a somewhat close call, the record shows that the court 
considered the prosecutor’s reasons and, as discussed below, 
those reasons were plausible and supported by the record.  In 
these circumstances, while a more detailed colloquy may well 
have been helpful, the prosecutor and the trial court adequately 
developed the record, and on this record, we conclude that the 
trial court’s findings are entitled to deference.  (See People v. 
                                        
opn., post, at p. 2.)  We disagree.  The fact that the trial court 
did not “understand” the strikes as to Kevin C. and Simeon G. 
— before the prosecutor provided his reasons for them — and 
asked the prosecutor to explain those strikes does not mean that 
the prosecutor’s reasons, once provided, were not self-evident.  
Nor do we require that the prosecutor’s reasons be “obvious.”  
Rather, the prosecutor’s reasons, once provided, “were either 
self-explanatory or were explained at the hearing.”  (People v. 
Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1162 (Smith).)  For this reason, 
Gutierrez’s reasoning is “inapplicable here.”  (Ibid.)  
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
32 
Hardy 
(2018) 
5 Cal.5th 56, 
76 
(Hardy) 
[“ ‘ “When 
the 
prosecutor’s stated reasons are both inherently plausible and 
supported by the record, the trial court need not question the 
prosecutor or make detailed findings” ’ ”].)    
i. Comparative juror analysis  
 
“Also relevant here, in light of defendant’s appellate 
arguments, are principles pertaining to comparative juror 
analysis, which, on a claim of race-based peremptory challenges, 
compares the voir dire responses of the challenged prospective 
jurors with those of similar jurors who were not members of the 
challenged jurors’ racial group, whom the prosecutor did not 
challenge.  [Citation.]  ‘[C]omparative juror analysis is but one 
form of circumstantial evidence that is relevant, but not 
necessarily 
dispositive, 
on 
the 
issue 
of 
intentional 
discrimination.’ ”  (O’Malley, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 975–976.)  
Comparative juror analysis is appropriately confined to the 
jurors defendant has specifically discussed in his appellate 
briefing.  (Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 442–443.) 
 
“Where, as here, the comparative analysis was not made 
at trial, ‘the prosecutor generally has not provided, and was not 
asked to provide, an explanation for nonchallenges.’  [Citation.]  
Therefore, ‘an appellate court must be mindful that an 
exploration of the alleged similarities at the time of trial might 
have shown that the jurors in question were not really 
comparable.’  [Citation.]  When a defendant asks for 
comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal, we have 
held that ‘such evidence will be considered in view of the 
deference accorded the trial court’s ultimate finding of no 
discriminatory intent.’ ”  (O’Malley, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 976.)  
We have also held that under these circumstances, “ ‘a 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
33 
reviewing court need not, indeed, must not turn a blind eye to 
reasons the record discloses for not challenging other jurors even 
if those other jurors are similar in some respects to excused 
jurors.’ ”  (Id. at p. 977.)   
 
In supplemental briefing, defendant takes issue with our 
approach to conducting comparative juror analysis for the first 
time on appeal.  He argues that we should ignore some of the 
Attorney General’s efforts to distinguish challenged prospective 
jurors from those purportedly similar jurors whom the 
prosecutor did not challenge.  Considering such distinctions, 
defendant argues, is inconsistent with recent decisions by the 
high court and “increases the risk that racial discrimination will 
persist in the criminal justice system.” 
 
Defendant’s argument rests primarily on Miller-El v. 
Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231 (Miller-El).  There, the high court 
made clear that “a prosecutor simply has got to state his reasons 
[for a peremptory challenge] as best he can and stand or fall on 
the plausibility of the reasons he gives.”  (Id. at p. 252.)  The 
high court also cited this portion of its opinion in a footnote 
criticizing the dissent for “focus[ing] on reasons the prosecution 
itself did not offer” when the dissent explained why the 
nonchallenged jurors “were otherwise more acceptable to the 
prosecution than [the challenged prospective juror].”  (Id. at 
p. 245, fn. 4.)  Relying on these two excerpts, defendant observes 
that, in response to his comparative juror analysis, the Attorney 
General offers “new reasons for why the white jurors were not 
discharged” and argues that this “approach is barred by Miller-
El’s stand or fall principle because it is simply the flip side of the 
same coin of offering new reasons for the discharge of the black 
jurors” and, moreover, is explicitly rejected by Miller-El’s 
footnote four.  Defendant further argues that this approach is 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
34 
inconsistent with Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472 
(Snyder) and Foster v. Chatman (2016) 578 U.S. ___ 
[136 S.Ct. 1737] (Foster) because the state in those cases offered 
new reasons for why the White jurors were not discharged and, 
without discussing those reasons, the high court concluded that, 
for a multitude of reasons, the peremptory strikes were 
motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.      
 
We have recognized that “in judging why a prosecutor 
exercised a particular challenge, the trial court and reviewing 
court must examine only the reasons actually given.  ‘If the 
stated reason does not hold up, its pretextual significance does 
not fade because a trial judge, or an appeals court, can imagine 
a reason that might not have been shown up as false.’ ”  (Jones, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 365, quoting Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. 
at p. 252.)  However, we have rejected the further argument that 
in conducting comparative juror analysis for the first time on 
appeal, “we may not consider reasons not stated on the record 
for accepting other jurors.”  (Jones, at p. 365.)  In rejecting that 
argument, we have observed that “no authority has imposed the 
additional burden [on the prosecution] of anticipating all 
possible unmade claims of comparative juror analysis and 
explaining why other jurors were not challenged.”  (Ibid.)     
 
Absent further explanation from the high court, we do not 
read Miller-El to require us when conducting comparative juror 
analysis for the first time on appeal, to turn a blind eye to 
reasons the record discloses for not challenging other jurors even 
if those jurors are similar in some respects to excused jurors.  
Reading Miller-El to restrict our review of the record in this 
manner would seem inconsistent with the high court’s 
subsequent statement that the high court in Miller-El “made it 
clear that in considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
35 
ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that 
bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted.”  
(Snyder, supra,  552 U.S. at p. 478.)  Nor do we read Snyder and 
Foster, supra, 578 U.S. ___ [136 S.Ct. 1737] to expressly prohibit 
us from considering such reasons the record discloses for not 
challenging other jurors in these circumstances.       
 
That said, we take the opportunity to clarify and to 
emphasize the following two points about our approach to 
comparative juror analysis.   
 
First, 
comparative 
juror 
analysis 
is 
a 
form 
of 
circumstantial evidence that is relevant on the issue of 
purposeful discrimination.  “If a prosecutor’s proffered reason 
for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-
similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence 
tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at 
Batson’s third step.”  (Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 241.)  
When a prosecutor states multiple reasons for challenging a 
juror, a comparison between the challenged juror and a similar 
nonchallenged juror in regard to any one of the prosecutor’s 
stated reasons is relevant, but not necessarily dispositive, on the 
issue of purposeful discrimination.  (See id. at p. 247, fn. 6 [“The 
dissent contends that there are no white panelists similarly 
situated to [the challenged jurors] because ‘ “ ‘[s]imilarly 
situated’ does not mean matching any one of several reasons the 
prosecution gave for striking a potential juror — it means 
matching all of them.” ’  [Citation.]  None of our cases announces 
a rule that no comparison is probative unless the situation of the 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
36 
individuals compared is identical in all respects, and there is no 
reason to accept one”].)9 
Second, when conducting comparative juror analysis for 
the first time on appeal, we need not turn a blind eye to reasons 
the record discloses for not challenging other jurors.  “This is so 
because a party legitimately may challenge one prospective 
juror but not another to whom the same particular concern 
applies.  [Citation.]  ‘Two panelists might give a similar answer 
on a given point.  Yet the risk posed by one panelist might be 
offset by other answers, behavior, attitudes or experiences that 
make one juror, on balance, more or less desirable.  These 
realities, and the complexity of human nature, make a formulaic 
comparison of isolated responses an exceptionally poor medium 
to overturn a trial court’s factual finding.’ ”  (People v. Chism 
                                        
9  
The dissent emphasizes that recent decisions by the high 
court found “single-issue comparisons among jurors to be highly 
probative of discrimination.”  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 16.)  As 
stated, we agree that a single-issue comparison among jurors is 
a form of circumstantial evidence that is relevant.  However, 
such comparisons are not necessarily dispositive on the issue of 
purposeful discrimination but rather, must be considered within 
all of the relevant circumstances.  (See Flowers v. Mississippi 
(2019) 588 U.S. __, __ [139 S.Ct. 2228, 2250] [“[i]n a different 
context, the [challenged juror’s] strike might be deemed 
permissible,” but “we must examine the whole picture” and the 
comparisons between the challenged and nonchallenged jurors 
“cannot be considered in isolation”].)  The fact that the high 
court found single-issue comparisons to be highly probative of 
discrimination within the circumstances of a particular case is 
not inconsistent with our analysis here, which, as discussed 
below, recognizes that such comparisons are relevant but 
ultimately concludes, within all of the relevant circumstances, 
that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s denial of 
defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motion.  
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
37 
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1319 (Chism); accord, People v. Krebs 
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 293–294.)   
However, “we bear in mind that comparative juror 
analysis is not simply an exercise in identifying any conceivable 
distinctions among prospective jurors.  ‘A per se rule that a 
defendant cannot win a Batson claim unless there is an exactly 
identical white juror would leave Batson inoperable; potential 
jurors are not products of a set of cookie cutters.’  [Citation.]  
Rather, because the ultimate question before us concerns the 
prosecutor’s motivations in exercising the challenge in question, 
we must ask whether there were any material differences 
among the jurors — that is, differences, other than race, that we 
can reasonably infer motivated the prosecutor’s pattern of 
challenges.”  (O’Malley, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 977.)  In 
determining whether there were any material differences 
among the jurors, we note that differences among the jurors 
generally will be more probative if they closely relate to reasons 
the prosecutor has stated for a peremptory challenge.  Because 
in this case we rely on differences among the jurors that closely 
relate to reasons the prosecutor has stated for a peremptory 
challenge, we need not opine on whether differences among the 
jurors can be material even if they are wholly unrelated to 
reasons the prosecutor has stated for a peremptory challenge.  
b. Prospective Juror Kevin C.  
 
As a preliminary matter, defendant accurately points out 
that the prosecutor questioned Kevin C. regarding the death 
penalty but did not question Kevin C. regarding DNA evidence 
or the O.J. Simpson verdict.  (See Smith, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 
p. 1152 [“an attorney’s failure to meaningfully examine a 
prospective juror about a subject about which the attorney 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
38 
claims to be concerned can constitute evidence of pretext”].)  The 
prosecutor’s failure to question Kevin C. about “each and every 
area of articulated concern,” however, does not necessarily 
demonstrate that those concerns were pretextual.  (People v. 
Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 451 (Cowan).)  That the 
prosecutor failed to engage Kevin C. in voir dire is also less 
significant where, as here, the prosecutor received before voir 
dire, Kevin C.’s responses to the 31-page written questionnaire 
containing 130 questions.  (See People v. Melendez (2016) 
2 Cal.5th 1, 19 (Melendez) [“ ‘plac[ing] little weight on the 
prosecutor’s failure to individually or more thoroughly question 
a prospective juror before exercising a peremptory challenge’ ” 
where the prosecutor reviewed a “detailed” jury questionnaire 
and heard defense counsel question the prospective juror]; 
Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 363.)  Indeed, the prosecutor’s 
concerns about Kevin C.’s views regarding DNA evidence and 
the O.J. Simpson verdict “arose from a pair of questionnaire 
responses that spoke for themselves; no additional clarification 
was needed to ascertain [Kevin C.’s] meaning.”  (Smith, supra, 
4 Cal.5th at p. 1152; cf. People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 970, 1018, fn. 14 [“One inference that may be drawn 
from any such decision to ask few or no questions is that the 
prosecutor had already properly determined that a challenge 
was warranted based on the questionnaire or existing voir dire 
answers, and that further questioning was unnecessary”].)  
 
Defendant also accurately points out that the prosecutor 
did not question other prospective jurors regarding DNA 
evidence or the O.J. Simpson verdict during voir dire.  
Defendant argues that this circumstance suggests that the 
prosecutor was not sincerely concerned about jurors’ views 
regarding these topics.  Our review of the record confirms that 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
39 
both the prosecutor and the defense asked very few questions 
during voir dire.10   
 
However, our review of the record also indicates that, 
contrary to defendant’s argument, the prosecutor appeared 
interested in jurors’ views regarding DNA evidence and the O.J. 
Simpson verdict.  For the questionnaire, the prosecutor 
proposed various questions regarding scientific evidence, even 
leading defense counsel to request modifications to those 
                                        
10  
This may have been in part due to the circumstances 
leading up to voir dire.  Before jury selection, defense counsel 
proposed that the parties should ask any questions of the 
prospective jurors — even questions that did not pertain to the 
death penalty — during Hovey questioning.  Defense counsel 
and the prosecutor had “some confusion or disagreement” in this 
regard because the prosecutor anticipated asking questions 
pertaining only to the death penalty or to confidential matters 
during Hovey questioning and thus was “only selecting 
[prospective jurors] for possible Hovey voir dire who have 
questionable answers that need further questioning as to [the] 
death penalty.”  The trial court ultimately agreed to follow the 
prosecutor’s approach for Hovey questioning and to provide the 
opportunity for the parties to question the prospective jurors 
regarding other matters during voir dire.  The court, however, 
expected that “there’s not going to be a lot of questions” during 
voir dire since the parties had received “most of the information 
from the questionnaire.”  Then, during Hovey questioning, the 
parties primarily questioned the prospective jurors regarding 
the death penalty but, at times, questioned the prospective 
jurors regarding other matters.  After Hovey questioning, the 
court said, “I’m gathering that there’s not going to be a whole lot 
of individual questioning of these jurors, that you’ve pretty 
much covered those that you — the questions that you had from 
the questionnaires.”  Defense counsel responded that he did not 
“have a need to ask any further questions at all,” but if the 
prosecutor planned to ask any further questions, defense 
counsel might “do a couple things.”           
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
40 
questions because defense counsel “really [didn’t] like having 
blood and semen, DNA, and all that stuff repeated over, and over 
again in the questions as though it’s an important thing for [the 
prospective jurors] to be worried about in the case before they 
even hear what the evidence is.”  During voir dire, the 
prosecutor also asked the prospective jurors as a group whether 
they would “have a problem applying basically the law, and 
finding circumstantial evidence is every bit as important as 
direct evidence.”  The prosecutor later explained that he 
considered O.J. Simpson’s case to be similar to defendant’s case 
given that both relied on DNA evidence and circumstantial 
evidence.  Keeping these and all relevant circumstances in 
mind, we proceed to examine each of the prosecutor’s stated 
reasons for striking Kevin C. 
 
Regarding the prosecutor’s first reason, the prosecutor 
stated, “[Kevin C.] in his questionnaire compared DNA to a 
polygraph.  That it wasn’t a for sure thing.”  The prosecutor’s 
case relied heavily on DNA evidence.  The prosecutor’s reason 
for striking Kevin C. is plausible, supported by the record, and 
race neutral.  However, defendant argues that five other jurors 
(Jurors Nos. 10 and 11 and Alternate Jurors Nos. 1, 4, and 5) 
expressed similar reservations about DNA evidence yet were 
neither questioned nor excused by the prosecutor.  Not so.    
 
Unlike Kevin C., these other jurors did not express a 
negative opinion on DNA evidence.  Rather, when asked about 
DNA evidence, Juror No. 10 replied, “should be admitted if can 
show + prove accuracy;” Alternate Juror No. 1 replied, “All 
evidence if more conclusive than not should be considered;” and 
Alternate Juror No. 4 replied, “No opinion.”  In addition, 
although Alternate Juror No. 5 replied, “It[’]s ok but shouldn’t 
be only evidence used” and stated elsewhere, “seems it could be 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
41 
accurate,” this response merely emphasized his preference to 
consider all evidence, a concept that he repeated elsewhere in 
his questionnaire.  Lastly, Juror No. 11 responded, “OK if it[’]s 
true evidence.”  This response might suggest that some DNA 
evidence may not be “true” evidence, but even if so, this response 
was less negative than Kevin C.’s response, which characterized 
all DNA evidence as “like a polygraph not a for sure certain.”  
Thus, the prosecutor “could plausibly have distinguished” 
among these views regarding DNA evidence in deciding to strike 
only Kevin C.  (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 183 (Mills) 
[comparative juror analysis unpersuasive where prosecutor 
distinguished among prospective jurors’ views on scientific 
evidence]; see also People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 
850 [discussing “the deep division in the scientific and legal 
communities regarding the reliability of polygraph evidence”].)   
 
As to the second reason, the prosecutor accurately 
characterized Kevin C.’s questionnaire responses regarding the 
death penalty as “tentative.”  “A prospective juror’s views about 
the death penalty are a permissible race- and group-neutral 
basis for exercising a peremptory challenge in a capital case.”  
(People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 970–971; see e.g., 
Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 436 [a juror’s religious 
reservations about the death penalty can justify a peremptory 
challenge]; People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706, 749 [a juror’s 
“mixed and vague” views about the death penalty can justify a 
peremptory challenge]; People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 
572 (Lomax) [a juror’s reluctance to impose the death penalty 
can justify a peremptory challenge].)   
 
Kevin C.’s questionnaire responses indicated that he was 
uncertain whether he could vote for a death sentence and that 
he had religious reservations about the death penalty.  He 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
42 
wrote, “there are members of society who do bad things and 
don[’]t deserve to be here, can I kill them?  unknown at this 
time.”  He believed that the death penalty was unfair and said 
that he would be reluctant to sign a verdict form for a sentence 
of death or state the verdict in court.  He identified himself as a 
Christian who generally agreed with his religion’s view that 
“thou should not kill.”  Asked whether he had a moral, 
philosophical, or religious objection to the death penalty, he 
checked “yes,” commenting, “God should decide life or death, but 
some don’t deserve[] life.”  He also wrote, “I like to decide who 
could stay in society but not decide who stays on earth (I’d like 
to sleep).”   
 
It is true that Kevin C. said during Hovey questioning that 
he could vote for a death sentence, and when asked about his 
religious objection to the death penalty, he explained, “I feel 
where I live I should decide.  Where I’m a Christian.  I go to 
church, so I think, you know, I can’t.  I think God should decide.  
But, you know, I think I should decide if I live in the 
community.”  But the prosecutor acknowledged this, stating, “I 
think that in person his, his statements about the death penalty 
didn’t rise to a level for cause; but, however, I think when you 
take the totality of his responses, I think, I mean those are 
essentially the reasons that I’m stating.”  Given “[t]he totality 
of” Kevin C.’s responses regarding the death penalty, the record 
amply supports the prosecutor’s stated concern.  (See Lomax, 
supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 572 [“[If] statements or attitudes of the 
juror suggest that the juror has ‘reservations or scruples’ about 
imposing the death penalty, this demonstrated reluctance is a 
race-neutral reason that can justify a peremptory challenge, 
even if it would not be sufficient to support a challenge for 
cause”].)    
 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
43 
 
Defendant nevertheless contends that the prosecutor’s 
reason was pretextual because Kevin C.’s reservations about the 
death penalty mirrored those of Jurors Nos. 2, 5, 6, 8, and 9 and 
Alternate Jurors Nos. 1 and 4, whom the prosecutor did not 
strike.  Unlike Kevin C., none of the jurors identified by 
defendant expressed a religious objection to the death penalty.  
(Cf. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 436 [upheld peremptory 
challenge where “[t]he trial court observed [the prospective 
juror’s] statement that only God can take a life expressed a 
‘startling and dramatic’ reservation about the death penalty 
based on what appeared to be the juror’s strongly held religious 
beliefs [and] [t]he court observed that no other juror had 
expressed such a strongly held view”].)   
 
Instead, most of these jurors merely expressed a degree of 
unfamiliarity or slight discomfort with the death penalty.  For 
example, Alternate Juror No. 4 appeared unfamiliar with the 
death penalty, indicating that she did not know whether the 
death penalty was used too often or too seldom or whether it was 
fair or unfair, and stating, “I would have to decide based on the 
evidence + the judge[’]s instructions regarding [the] death 
penalty.”  Juror No. 5 had “mixed emotions” about the death 
penalty, but she believed the death penalty was fair, she would 
vote to keep it “[j]ust in case,” and she would not be reluctant to 
vote for a sentence of death, sign the verdict form, or state the 
verdict in court.  Juror No. 9 stated, “I have mixed emotions.  I 
must know that someone is actually guilty, I feel the death 
penalty is fair.”  She also would vote to keep the death penalty, 
believed it was used too seldom, and would not be reluctant to 
vote for a sentence of death, sign the verdict form, or state the 
verdict in court.  And, while Alternate Juror No. 1 made clear 
that her opinion on the death penalty “depend[ed] on the crime,” 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
44 
she also confirmed that she believed the death penalty was fair 
and would not be reluctant to vote for a death sentence, sign the 
verdict form, or state the verdict in court.   
 
Some of the jurors identified by defendant, however, 
expressed more significant reservations about the death 
penalty.  Juror No. 6 commented, “insecure about my feelings.  I 
do believe in the death penalty but do not know how I feel about 
administering it.”  But, she, too, said that she would vote to keep 
the death penalty, that it was fair and used too seldom, and that 
she would not be reluctant to personally vote for a death 
sentence, sign the verdict form, or state the verdict in court.  She 
also identified with Group 2, which was defined as “I favor the 
death penalty, but will not always vote for death in every case 
of murder with special circumstances.”  During Hovey 
questioning, she said that she might be reluctant to sentence 
somebody to death, but asked whether “feeling guilty” in her 
“heart” might “affect the way [she] act[s] on the way [she] feel[s] 
in [her] head,” she confirmed, “No, I can truthfully say, no, I 
would not.  No.  It’s just my own feelings, I should say.”  She 
confirmed that she could follow the law, she could sign a verdict 
form for a death sentence, and although she “wouldn’t feel good 
about it,” she could state the verdict for a death sentence in 
court.    
 
In addition, Juror No. 8 identified with Group 4, which 
was defined as “I have doubts about the death penalty, but I 
would not vote against it in every case.”  He believed the death 
penalty was used too often and said that the death penalty 
“should be reserved for only the most heinous of crimes.”  But he 
characterized the death penalty as fair and would vote to keep 
it because it is a “necessary evil.”  He said that his views were 
not such that he could never vote for a death sentence, 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
45 
explaining, “if the situation proved to warrant such a 
punishment, I would vote for it.”  He also said that he would not 
be reluctant to personally vote for a death sentence, sign the 
verdict form, or state the verdict in court, although he “would 
not automatically seek the highest punishment.”  During Hovey 
questioning, Juror No. 8 said, “I used to really be for the death 
penalty, but since then I’ve changed my views to I’m not totally 
against it, but I’m not totally for it either.”  He acknowledged 
that he viewed life imprisonment as a more suitable 
punishment.  But, asked whether this view might cause him to 
favor that sentence regardless of the evidence, he replied, “Not 
necessarily.  That’s my personal view, you know, depending on 
the evidence, you know.  I would choose what I thought was 
right.”  He confirmed that he could follow the law and could vote 
for a death sentence.  
 
We find that Juror No. 6’s responses and Juror No. 8’s 
responses were not so similar to Kevin C.’s responses regarding 
the death penalty as to cast doubt on the trial court’s acceptance 
of the prosecutor’s reason for striking Kevin C.  While Juror No. 
6 expressed some discomfort and reluctance with voting for a 
death sentence, she made clear that she supported the death 
penalty and she ultimately confirmed that she could vote for a 
death sentence.  And while Juror No. 8 believed that the death 
penalty should be reserved for “only the most heinous of crimes,” 
he made clear that he supported the death penalty and could 
vote for it in those circumstances.  By contrast, among Kevin 
C.’s tentative and vacillating responses about both his view on 
the death penalty and his ability to vote for a death sentence, 
Kevin C. indicated that he had a religious objection to the death 
penalty and agreed with his religion’s view that “thou should not 
kill.”  These responses called into question the fundamental 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
46 
propriety of the death penalty and differed from Juror No. 6’s 
belief in the death penalty and Juror No. 8’s opinion that the 
death penalty was a “necessary evil” for the “most heinous of 
crimes.”    
 
Lastly, Juror No. 2 stated, “I am not in favor of the death 
penalty,” and believed that it was not fair and was used too 
often.  He believed the purpose of the death penalty was 
“supposedly to deter crime.”  Asked whether he had a moral, 
philosophical, or religious objection to the death penalty, he 
checked “yes” and elaborated, “I do not believe it deters crime.”  
He did not refer to any religious beliefs, and he subsequently 
said that he did not have a religious preference or affiliation.  
Although he initially said that he “[w]ould not vote” to decide 
whether or not to keep the death penalty, he subsequently said 
that he probably would vote to keep the death penalty.  In 
addition, he said that his views were not such that he could 
never vote for a death sentence, explaining, “I would and could 
follow the law.”  He said that he would not be reluctant to 
personally vote for a death sentence or personally sign a verdict 
form for a death sentence, although he would be reluctant to 
stand up in court, facing the defendant, and state the verdict for 
a death sentence.  He identified himself as belonging to Group 
4, which was defined as “I have doubts about the death penalty, 
but I would not vote against it in every case.”  During Hovey 
questioning, the prosecutor asked, “I think one of your concerns 
is you were kind of skeptical that maybe it doesn’t deter crime, 
if that’s the purpose of it . . . . [W]ould you be able to return, 
personally vote for a death verdict if you felt it was, if it felt [sic] 
the evidence supported, and the law supported it?”  Juror No. 2 
replied, “Yes.”  
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
47 
 
We find that Juror No. 2 made clear that he did not 
support the death penalty, and that Juror No. 2’s responses 
regarding the death penalty were similar in some respects to 
Kevin C.’s responses regarding the death penalty.  We agree 
with defendant that the comparison between Juror No. 2 and 
Kevin C. has some probative value.  That said, we also find that, 
unlike Kevin C., who gave tentative and vacillating responses 
about his view on the death penalty and his ability to impose it, 
Juror No. 2 was more clear and consistent in both respects:  
Juror No. 2 more clearly and consistently said that he did not 
support the death penalty, but Juror No. 2 also more clearly and 
consistently said that he could impose it.  When the prosecutor 
asked Juror No. 2 whether he would be able to personally vote 
for a death verdict even though he was “kind of skeptical that 
maybe it doesn’t deter crime,” Juror No. 2 replied, “Yes.”  Juror 
No. 2’s responses differed from Kevin C.’s more tentative and 
conflicted responses:  “there are members of society who do bad 
things and don[’]t deserve to be here, can I kill them?  unknown 
at this time” and “I like to decide who could stay in society but 
not decide who stays on earth (I’d like to sleep).”  In addition, 
unlike Kevin C., Juror No. 2 did not invoke a religious objection 
to the death penalty.  Thus, comparing the totality of their 
respective responses regarding the death penalty, we find some 
similarities as well as some differences, and we conclude that 
the comparison has probative value within our inquiry as to 
whether the prosecutor’s stated reason for striking Kevin C. was 
pretextual.  
 
We additionally note that, in stark contrast to Kevin C., 
who believed DNA evidence was “like a polygraph not a for sure 
certain” and who was not upset by the O.J. Simpson verdict 
because he found it “hard to believe” Simpson was solely 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
48 
responsible for the crimes and suggested “biases” created much 
of the evidence, Juror No. 2 believed that DNA evidence was 
“accurate” and was upset by the O.J. Simpson verdict because 
“[Juror No. 2] believe[d] it was proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt that [Simpson] was guilty.”  By noting these differences 
between Juror No. 2 and Kevin C., we do not intend to suggest 
that the similarities between Juror No. 2 and Kevin C. in regard 
to the death penalty are irrelevant within our analysis or that 
defendant must identify an exactly identical juror to prove 
purposeful discrimination.  (See ante, at pp. 35–37.)  Rather, 
“because the ultimate question before us concerns the 
prosecutor’s motivations in [striking Kevin C.], we must ask 
whether there were any material differences [between Kevin C. 
and Juror No. 2] — that is, differences, other than race, that we 
can reasonably infer motivated the prosecutor’s pattern of 
challenges.”  (O’Malley, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 977.)  
Considering these and all relevant circumstances, we ultimately 
find no adequate basis to overturn the trial court’s ruling.  
 
As to the prosecutor’s final reason, Kevin C. checked “no” 
when asked whether he was upset by the O.J. Simpson verdict 
and said, “To [sic] hard to believe one man did it all, I believe 
biases created a lot of the circumstance [sic] evidence.”  We have 
previously held that a prospective juror’s opinion of the O.J. 
Simpson trial is a nonbiased ground for a peremptory strike.  
(See Smith, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1153; Vines, supra, 
51 Cal.4th at pp. 851–852; Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 184.)    
 
The NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. 
(LDF), however, has filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that 
asking about a prospective juror’s opinion of the O.J. Simpson 
verdict is a proxy for race because most Black people support the 
verdict and most White people do not.  LDF refers to studies 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
49 
finding, in 1995, that approximately 22 percent of Black people 
and 79 percent of White people believed Simpson was guilty.  In 
response, the Attorney General argues, inter alia, that public 
opinion regarding the Simpson verdict is less clear than LDF 
suggests.  The Attorney General refers to studies finding that 
“the number of Blacks who believe Simpson was guilty more 
than doubled to 45% by 2007 and became a majority view of 57% 
by 2015,” and thus “selection of Miles’s jury occurred at a time 
when the percentage of Whites who believed Simpson guilty was 
decreasing and the percentage of Blacks who believed him guilty 
was increasing.” 
 
LDF’s argument that more Blacks than Whites support 
the Simpson verdict, “even if factually correct, does not establish 
that the criterion is not race neutral.”  (Melendez, supra, 
2 Cal.5th at p. 18.)  As we discussed in Melendez, the plurality 
opinion in Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352 
concluded that “ ‘[w]hile the prosecutor’s criterion might well 
result in the disproportionate removal of [prospective jurors of a 
specific ethnicity], that disproportionate impact does not turn 
the prosecutor’s actions into a per se violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.’ ”  (Melendez, at p. 17, quoting Hernandez, 
supra, 500 U.S. at p. 361.)  But “the plurality [in Hernandez] did 
find that a disparate impact would be relevant to the overall 
inquiry.”  (Melendez, at p. 17.)  Thus, if LDF’s argument that 
more Blacks than Whites support the Simpson verdict is 
factually correct, “this circumstance is relevant to the inquiry as 
to whether the reasons were sincere and not merely pretextual.”  
(Id. at p. 18.)  
 
We assume that LDF’s argument is factually correct, and 
we consider this circumstance to be relevant to our inquiry as to 
whether the prosecutor’s reason was sincere and not merely 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
50 
pretextual.  However, the record here does not show that the 
prosecutor’s reason was pretextual.  The voir dire in this case 
began in Southern California approximately three years after 
the Simpson trial in Los Angeles, making it likely that the 
prospective jurors were familiar with and had formed opinions 
about that case.  The prosecutor specifically expressed concern 
about the prospective jurors’ opinions of the Simpson verdict 
because the prosecutor considered Simpson’s case to be similar 
to defendant’s case given that both cases relied on DNA evidence 
and circumstantial evidence.  And it appears that the prosecutor 
was not alone in considering Simpson’s case to be similar in 
some respects to defendant’s case.  For example, while 
discussing the draft jury questionnaire regarding scientific 
evidence, the court commented, “I’m assuming part of [the 
prosecutor’s] concern is whether there’s a juror that just says, I 
absolutely would not believe anything that involved DNA 
evidence based on my daily watching of the O.J. Simpson trial 
or something of that nature.”  For another example, while 
questioning the prospective jurors about DNA evidence during 
voir dire, defense counsel twice referred to the O.J. Simpson 
case, including to comment that “there’s been a lot of publicity 
about [DNA] [and] most people are familiar, to some degree or 
another, with the O.J. Simpson case.”   
 
In addition, the prosecutor struck several non-African-
American prospective jurors who were not upset by the verdict, 
suggesting that the prosecutor’s concern was sincere and not 
merely a pretext for excusing African-American prospective 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
51 
jurors.  (Cf. People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 755.)11  The 
prosecutor 
struck, 
in 
total, 
five 
non-African-American 
prospective jurors.  Four of these five prospective jurors were 
not upset by the O.J. Simpson verdict:  Malinda M. (a Hispanic 
woman) was not upset with the O.J. Simpson verdict because “I 
think there was doubt in the case and some things were done 
improper that [led] to the not guilty verdict;” Ronald W. (a White 
man) was not upset with the O.J. Simpson verdict because 
“evidently they had weighed all the evidence and come to 
agreement;” Richard L. (a Hispanic man) was not upset with the 
O.J. Simpson verdict because “the D.A. did not prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt;” and Lynia B. (a White woman) was not upset 
with the O.J. Simpson verdict because “to[o] many unanswered 
questions was neither convinced of guilt nor innocence.”  After 
striking Malinda M. (a Hispanic woman) and Ronald W. (a 
White man), the prosecutor specifically said that he had excused 
jurors “of Hispanic origin and Caucasian origin, and the 
common denominator, essentially, is that they were not, were 
not upset by the O.J. Simpson verdict.”    
                                        
11  
Also, the prosecutor did not strike Alternate Juror No. 2, 
who was African-American and was not upset by the O.J. 
Simpson verdict.  The Attorney General argues that this fact 
tends to show that “the prosecutor was motivated by the jurors’ 
individual views instead of their race.”  Alternate Juror No. 2 
indeed checked “no” when asked whether she was upset by the 
Simpson verdict, but she explained, “The evidence was there 
which told me he was guilty.”  In light of Alternate Juror No. 2’s 
explanation, it appears possible that she simply checked the 
wrong box when asked whether she was upset by the Simpson 
verdict.  Because Alternate Juror No. 2’s answer could be 
interpreted in any number of ways on the cold appellate record, 
we find that it is of little help in analyzing the sincerity of the 
prosecutor’s reason.  
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
52 
 
Finally, contrary to defendant’s argument, comparing 
Kevin C.’s response to other jurors’ responses does not 
undermine the credibility of this reason.  Unlike Kevin C., who 
was not upset by the O.J. Simpson verdict because he found it 
“hard to believe” that Simpson was solely responsible for the 
crimes, and suggested that “biases” created much of the 
circumstantial evidence, Alternate Juror No. 5 simply checked 
“no” when asked whether he was upset by the verdict and 
expressed no further thoughts regarding it.  Similarly, while 
Juror No. 6 checked “no” to the same question but commented, 
“evidence not clear,” Juror No. 6’s response was more measured 
than and dissimilar to Kevin C.’s response.  (See Vines, supra, 
51 Cal.4th at p. 851 [responses by two prospective jurors 
“dissimilar” where one said, “the Simpson trial ‘restored’ his 
‘faith’ ” and the other said, “ ‘It raised my concerns on jury 
selection and impact of televising a trial’ ”].)  Neither Alternate 
Juror No. 5’s response nor Juror No. 6’s response resembled 
Kevin C.’s harsh rebuke of the prosecution’s evidence in the O.J. 
Simpson case, nor did they inject the concept of “biases” into the 
result.   
 
In short, each of the prosecutor’s reasons is supported by 
the record, and considered together, they provide ample, 
nonbiased grounds for striking Kevin C.  Substantial evidence 
therefore supports the trial court’s conclusion that the 
prosecutor struck Kevin C. for reasons other than his race.    
c. Prospective Juror Simeon G.  
The first reason offered by the prosecutor was that Simeon 
G. liked his own opinion over other people’s opinions.  In his 
questionnaire, Simeon G. described himself as a leader, rather 
than a follower, because he liked his opinion over other people’s 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
53 
opinions.  Although Simeon G. did not assert in this or other 
questionnaire responses that he would be unwilling or unable to 
deliberate with fellow jurors, the prosecutor reasonably could be 
concerned that Simeon G. might have difficulty considering 
other opinions and deliberating with fellow jurors — 
particularly given that Simeon G. had not worked with a group 
of people to make a decision before.  (Cf. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th 
at p. 623 [“[a]n advocate is entitled to consider a panelist’s 
willingness to consider competing views [and] openness to 
different opinions”]; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 
1125 [a prosecutor could feel concerned about a prospective 
juror’s comment that “he would not be influenced by anyone’s 
opinion but his own”].)   
The dissent does not attach any import to Simeon G.’s 
response, positing that “[e]veryone likes his or her opinion over 
other people’s.”  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 5.)  But the prosecutor was 
not required to interpret the response as the dissent does.  It is 
not only that Simeon G. said he liked his opinion over other 
people’s; it is also that he made this statement in order to 
explain why he would describe himself as a “leader” rather than 
a “follower.”  The prosecutor could reasonably have understood 
this response, in context, to suggest that if another person had 
a different opinion, Simeon G.’s view of leadership would cause 
him to prefer his own opinion “over” the opinion of the other 
person.  It was not unreasonable for the prosecutor to ascribe 
some significance to Simeon G.’s response.     
 
That said, we recognize that the prosecutor did not ask 
Simeon G. during voir dire about his stated preference for his 
own opinion over other people’s opinions.  The prosecutor’s 
failure to engage Simeon G. on each concern, however, is not 
conclusive in determining whether the prosecutor’s reasons 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
54 
were pretextual.  (See, e.g., Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 451 
[although a prosecutor’s failure to engage in meaningful voir 
dire can suggest the prosecutor’s stated reasons are pretextual, 
the prosecutor’s failure to question the prospective jurors “about 
each and every area of articulated concern does not undermine 
the conclusion that her stated race-neutral reasons for excusing 
these prospective jurors were genuine and not pretextual”]; 
Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 363.)  We are mindful that lawyers 
may refrain from asking questions for a variety of reasons.  (Cf. 
People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1018, fn. 14 
[recognizing that “lawyers must use their voir dire time 
judiciously”].)  Here, asking Simeon G. during voir dire — in 
front of the other prospective jurors — to elaborate on his 
questionnaire response would have forced him to explain why 
he believes that his opinion is preferable to the opinions of other 
people, such as those seated around him.  Considering these and 
all relevant circumstances, we find that the prosecutor’s first 
reason for striking Simeon G. is race neutral, plausible, and 
supported by the record.  
 
Despite this, defendant contends that a comparative juror 
analysis between Simeon G. and Juror No. 1 discredits the 
prosecutor’s reason.  It does not.  Juror No. 1 identified herself 
as a leader, rather than a follower, and elaborated, “I like to 
make my own decisions.”  Although Juror No. 1’s response was 
similar in some respects to Simeon G.’s response, the prosecutor 
could reasonably have found Juror No. 1’s response to be less 
concerning in context than Simeon G.’s response.  Jurors are 
expected to make their own decisions after deliberating with 
fellow jurors — which Juror No. 1 previously had done to reach 
a verdict in a separate case.  The prosecutor thus could have 
concluded that Juror No. 1’s statement that she liked to make 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
55 
her “own decisions” did not call into question her openness to 
considering other opinions before returning a verdict.  Simeon 
G.’s response, by contrast, could reasonably cause concern about 
his openness to considering other opinions, and unlike Juror No. 
1, he had not previously served on a jury or worked with a group 
of people to make a decision.  (See Chism, supra, 58 Cal.4th at 
p. 1321 [where a juror, similar to two challenged prospective 
jurors, lacked supervisory work experience, the fact that the 
juror had previously served on a separate jury in a capital case 
“substantially distinguishe[d] him from [the two challenged 
prospective jurors]”]; Vines, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 851, 852 
[comparative juror analysis rejected where answers were 
“dissimilar” and “significant differences in life experiences” 
existed between jurors].)12   
Thus, we find some similarities as well as some differences 
between Simeon G. and Juror No. 1 in regard to the prosecutor’s 
first reason for striking Simeon G., but we ultimately conclude 
that their respective responses were not so similar as to cast 
doubt on the trial court’s acceptance of the prosecutor’s reason 
for striking Simeon G.  We additionally note that Juror No. 1 did 
not raise any of the other concerns the prosecutor raised in 
explaining his reasons for the strike.  Unlike Simeon G., Juror 
                                        
12  
In his reply brief, defendant engages in an attenuated 
analysis concerning Juror No. 3 and Juror No. 4’s respective 
responses to the related question, “Have you ever worked with 
a group of people to make a decision?”  But defendant’s attempt 
to parse that question from the related question concerning 
whether a prospective juror is a leader, and why, misses the 
point.  Juror No. 3 and Juror No. 4 did not declare a preference 
for their opinion over other people’s opinions, making their 
responses fundamentally distinguishable from Simeon G.’s 
response. 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
56 
No. 1 expressed that she was upset with the O.J. Simpson 
verdict because she “believe[d] he was guilty,” and she did not 
suggest that she might rely on her feelings in reaching a verdict 
in the guilt phase.   
 
As to the second reason for striking Simeon G., the 
prosecutor expressed concern that Simeon G. might rely on 
hunches or feelings, rather than evidence, in reaching a verdict 
in the guilt phase since he replaced the word “doubt” with the 
word “feeling” and said in his questionnaire that if he had a 
feeling the defendant did not do it, the defendant was not guilty.  
The record shows that when asked whether he could follow an 
instruction that a defendant is presumed innocent unless 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, Simeon G. checked 
“yes;” commented, “If I have any feeling that he might not have 
done it, hes [sic] innocent;” and in this comment, replaced the 
word “doubt” with the word “feeling.”  
When asked about this response, Simeon G. did not “quite 
remember” replacing the word “doubt” with the word “feeling.”  
The dissent posits that Simeon G. “most likely” recognized a 
double negative in his original comment and replaced the word 
“doubt” with the word “feeling” in an effort to correct it.  (Dis. 
opn., post, at p. 8.)  This is a possible explanation.  But Simeon 
G. did not provide this explanation.  And had he intended to 
correct the double negative, he could have revised his comment 
in multiple ways, including, for example, by crossing out the 
word “not” or by replacing the word “doubt” with the word 
“belief.”      
But Simeon G. replaced the word “doubt” with the word 
“feeling,” and as revised, his statement read that if he had “any 
feeling” that the defendant “might” not have done it, the 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
57 
defendant was innocent.  The word “feeling” is ordinarily used 
to mean “[a]n idea, belief, or sense (especially a vague or 
irrational one) that a particular thing is true; an impression that 
something is about to happen or is the case; an intuition about 
something” or “[t]hat which a person feels in regard to 
something; attitude, esp. emotional attitude, sentiment; opinion 
or belief based on emotion or intuition and not solely on reason.”  
(Oxford 
English 
Dict. 
Online 
(3d 
ed. 
2015) 
 [as of May 22, 2020].)13  To the 
prosecutor, Simeon G.’s response that if he had “any feeling” 
that the defendant “might” not have done it, the defendant was 
innocent “made it sound like [Simeon G.] was going to be 
basically basing it on a hunch, or a feeling, which was, as the 
presenter of evidence, [the prosecutor was] powerless to 
overcome.”  
 
The prosecutor’s concern was plausible and supported by 
the record.  We acknowledge that Simeon G.’s questionnaire 
response may be interpreted in multiple ways and that his other 
questionnaire responses did not indicate that he would rely on 
his feelings in reaching a verdict in the guilt phase.  However, 
the prosecutor was not obliged to accept the most innocuous 
interpretation of Simeon G.’s questionnaire response and could 
be legitimately concerned about his response for the reasons the 
prosecutor specifically articulated.  (See People v. Mai (2013) 
57 Cal.4th 986, 1050, 1051 [where the prospective juror’s 
remarks “might be taken more than one way,” the prosecutor 
                                        
13  
All Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, 
docket 
number, 
and 
case 
name 
at 
.  
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
58 
“was 
not 
obliged 
to 
accept 
[the 
defendant’s] 
precise 
interpretation of [the juror’s] ambiguous remarks, and [the 
prosecutor] could reasonably be concerned about [these 
remarks]”].)   
It is true, however, that Simeon G. explained his 
questionnaire response differently during voir dire.  During voir 
dire, the prosecutor explained to the prospective jurors, 
including Simeon G., that “if the case has been proved by the 
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt, your duty is to return a 
guilty verdict” and the question is if “at the conclusion of the 
case if the case has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
whether we can expect everybody to come back with a guilty 
verdict.”  Immediately after this, the prosecutor asked Simeon 
G. about his questionnaire response.  Simeon G. did not “quite 
remember” his questionnaire response, but when asked what he 
meant by it, Simeon G. explained, “Well, I think what I was 
trying to say, if I’m correct, is that if the evidence showed that 
there wasn’t — that there was some reasonable doubt, then I 
probably would not accuse him, because of the fact that, myself 
being in the same situation or anybody, I think that if the 
evidence didn’t totally prove that I did it, then there is some 
doubt.  You know what I’m saying?”  Simeon G. added, “So it 
wasn’t so much a feeling as it was if the evidence didn’t show.”  
Asked whether he “would base it on evidence,” Simeon G. 
responded, “Basically, yes.  I’m sorry.”  He added, “I couldn’t tell 
you, tell you what I said, because I don’t have the paper to look 
at what I actually meant totally.”     
Reviewing this colloquy in the appellate record, the 
dissent views Simeon G.’s responses to have “left no ambiguity 
about the issue.”  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 9.)  To be sure, Simeon 
G. gave answers during voir dire that, from the prosecutor’s 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
59 
perspective, 
were 
less 
concerning 
than 
Simeon 
G.’s 
questionnaire response and helped to explain his questionnaire 
response.  However, in this colloquy, Simeon G. also said that he 
did not “quite remember” his questionnaire response, and 
because he did not have a copy of the questionnaire, he could not 
tell the prosecutor “what [he] actually meant totally” by it.  
Simeon G. referenced that if the evidence “didn’t totally prove” 
that the defendant did it, “then there is some doubt.”  And when 
asked whether he “would base [the verdict] on evidence,” he 
responded, “[b]asically,” yes.  These portions of Simeon G.’s 
answers may not have been entirely reassuring to the 
prosecutor, who was concerned that Simeon G. would rely “on a 
hunch, or a feeling, which was, as the presenter of evidence, [the 
prosecutor] was powerless to overcome.”  Thus, reviewing this 
colloquy in the appellate record — unaided by Simeon G.’s tone 
or demeanor — we do not conclude that Simeon G.’s responses 
“left no ambiguity” and necessarily mollified any prosecutorial 
concern about his questionnaire response.  (Dis. opn., post, at 
p. 9.)  
 
Moreover, when providing his reasons for striking Simeon 
G., the prosecutor acknowledged that Simeon G. explained his 
questionnaire response “differently in court.”  Nevertheless, the 
prosecutor told the trial court that Simeon G.’s explanation 
during voir dire did not eliminate the prosecutor’s concern about 
Simeon G.’s questionnaire response.  The prosecutor explained 
that he was still concerned about Simeon G.’s responses “in light 
of the fact that he was, he was single-handedly hunted down to 
be here this afternoon.  So [the prosecutor was] not sure that his 
responses in court should prevail over the answers he gave on 
his questionnaire.”  The dissent seems to contend that the 
prosecutor was obliged to abandon his concern about Simeon 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
60 
G.’s written response because Simeon G. explained that 
response differently in court under oath and “left no ambiguity 
about the issue.”  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 9.)  We disagree.  Faced 
with seemingly different responses, the prosecutor was not 
obliged to abandon his concern about Simeon G.’s written 
response, which was signed under penalty of perjury, in light of 
Simeon G.’s oral response — and in fact, the prosecutor made 
clear to the trial court that he did not.  (Cf. Vines, supra, 
51 Cal.4th at p. 850 [“That [the prospective juror] stated on voir 
dire that he could consider both penalties, and thus 
demonstrated he was not subject to removal for cause [citation], 
did not preclude the prosecutor from exercising a peremptory 
challenge when [the juror’s] questionnaire responses indicated 
a degree of reluctance to impose the death penalty with which 
the prosecutor was uncomfortable”].)    
 
The trial court was “ ‘best situated’ ” to assess Simeon G.’s 
responses in court and the prosecutor’s stated concern in light 
of those responses.  (People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, 
770 (Armstrong) [“the ‘trial court is best situated to evaluate 
both the words and the demeanor of jurors who are peremptorily 
challenged, as well as the credibility of the prosecutor who 
exercised those strikes’ ”].)  Having observed Simeon G. in court, 
the trial court could assess Simeon G.’s oral responses, and it 
was better positioned than our court to determine whether 
Simeon G.’s oral responses should have completely assuaged 
any potential concerns raised by his written response.  The trial 
court also could assess the credibility of the prosecutor’s stated 
concern about Simeon G.’s questionnaire response, as well as 
the prosecutor’s assessment that he was “not sure that [Simeon 
G.’s] responses in court should prevail over the answers he gave 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
61 
on his questionnaire.”14  The trial court specifically asked a 
question to the prosecutor about this concern, and after listening 
to the prosecutor’s explanation and defense counsel’s comments, 
the trial court accepted the prosecutor’s stated reasons for 
striking Simeon G.  (See Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 614 [we 
give “ ‘great deference to the trial court’s ability to distinguish 
bona fide reasons from sham excuses’ ”].)      
 
It is by no means clear from the record that if he had been 
selected, Simeon G. would have relied on his feelings in reaching 
a verdict in the guilt phase.  But “[o]ur task is not to determine 
whether we would have shared the prosecutor’s concerns; the 
only question before us is whether substantial evidence supports 
the court’s ruling that the prosecutor described legitimate 
reasons for the challenge and that he challenged [Simeon G.] for 
those reasons, not because of [his] race.”  (Smith, supra, 
4 Cal.5th at p. 1161.)   
 
We find that the prosecutor’s concern here is plausible, 
supported by the record, and race neutral.  Contrary to 
defendant’s argument, his comparative juror analysis between 
Simeon G. and Juror No. 5 does not undermine the sincerity of 
the prosecutor’s concern.  Asked whether she could follow a 
                                        
14  
The dissent states that “it is not clear why” the 
circumstances surrounding Simeon G.’s attendance in court 
would have caused the prosecutor to doubt Simeon G.’s 
responses in court.  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 11.)  The record shows 
that Simeon G. arrived in court only after the trial judge himself 
called his employer to try to locate him.  (See ante, at p. 24.)  By 
any measure, having a judge call your workplace to locate you 
and have you come to court is unusual.  Whether these unusual 
circumstances affected Simeon G.’s responses in court — as the 
prosecutor suggested they did — is an assessment that the trial 
court was best positioned to make.   
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
62 
presumption-of-innocence instruction, Juror No. 5 checked “yes” 
and wrote, “Try to follow instructions.”  Reading this statement 
to suggest that she could not or would not follow the instruction 
is strained, and we decline to do so.  The record therefore 
provides no adequate basis to overturn the trial court’s ruling.  
 
For the final reason, the prosecutor said that Simeon G. 
(like Kevin C.) was not upset by the O.J. Simpson verdict.  As 
discussed, a prospective juror’s opinion regarding the Simpson 
case can be a nonbiased ground for a peremptory challenge.  
Defendant and LDF, however, argue that this reason was a 
proxy for race or, alternatively, pretextual.  As discussed, we 
assume that LDF’s argument that more Blacks than Whites 
support the Simpson verdict is factually correct, and we consider 
this circumstance to be relevant to our inquiry as to whether the 
prosecutor’s reason was sincere and not merely pretextual.  In 
this particular case, however, it is plausible that the prosecutor 
— tasked with securing a conviction in San Bernardino County 
approximately three years after the Simpson trial took place in 
the adjacent Los Angeles County — was sincerely concerned 
about the prospective jurors’ opinions regarding the Simpson 
verdict because the prosecutor considered Simpson’s case to be 
similar to defendant’s case given that both cases relied on DNA 
evidence and circumstantial evidence.  Also as discussed, it 
appears that the prosecutor was not alone in considering 
Simpson’s case to be similar in some respects to defendant’s case 
because both the trial court and defense counsel referred to 
Simpson’s case at various points when discussing DNA 
evidence.  (See ante, at p. 50.)  In addition, four of the five non-
African-American prospective jurors whom the prosecutor 
struck were not upset by the O.J. Simpson verdict, suggesting 
that the prosecutor’s concern was sincere and not merely a 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
63 
pretext for striking African-American prospective jurors.  (See 
ante, at pp. 50–51.)     
That said, we find that the credibility of the prosecutor’s 
concern here is undermined to some degree by the prosecutor’s 
failure to ask Simeon G. or other prospective jurors about the 
O.J. Simpson verdict during voir dire.  In his questionnaire, 
Simeon G. indicated that he was not upset by the O.J. Simpson 
verdict but left blank the follow-up request to “[p]lease explain 
why or why not.”  To be sure, we recognize that one might infer 
from this response that Simeon G. was not upset by the O.J. 
Simpson verdict because he simply agreed with the verdict, 
requiring little explanation.  But we also recognize that a 
prospective juror may not be upset by the O.J. Simpson verdict 
for a variety of reasons.  While the prosecutor’s failure to 
question Simeon G. or other prospective jurors about the O.J. 
Simpson verdict does not necessarily demonstrate that the 
prosecutor’s concern was pretextual, we consider this 
circumstance to be relevant to our inquiry as to whether the 
prosecutor’s concern was pretextual here.  (See Smith, supra, 
4 Cal.5th at p. 1152 [“an attorney’s failure to meaningfully 
examine a prospective juror about a subject about which the 
attorney claims to be concerned can constitute evidence of 
pretext”].)           
 
When the prosecutor gave this reason for striking Simeon 
G., the prosecutor stated, “If you’ll notice across the board, I’ve 
excused jurors I believe of Hispanic origin and Caucasian origin, 
and the common denominator, essentially, is that they were not, 
were not upset by the O.J. Simpson verdict, which was a DNA, 
circumstantial case.”  Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s 
statement meant that “he had struck all prospective jurors who 
were not upset with the O.J. Simpson verdict” and “this is not 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
64 
what the record shows at all” because the prosecutor did not 
strike Juror No. 6 or Alternate Juror No. 5.15  Contrary to 
defendant’s argument, the prosecutor’s statement is fairly read 
to mean that the prosecutor had struck prospective jurors 
“across” different races, including a Hispanic prospective juror 
and a Caucasian prospective juror, who were not upset by the 
O.J. Simpson verdict.  And at the time of the statement, the 
prosecutor indeed had struck three non-African-American 
prospective jurors, two of whom — Malinda M. (a Hispanic 
woman) and Ronald W. (a White man) — were not upset by the 
Simpson verdict.          
 
Nevertheless, defendant’s comparative juror analysis 
between Simeon G. and Juror No. 6 and Alternate Juror No. 5 
has some probative value and is more convincing than it was 
with respect to Kevin C.16  As noted, Simeon G. checked “no” as 
                                        
15  
At the time of the prosecutor’s statement, Juror No. 6 was 
seated in the jury box, but Alternate Juror No. 5 was not.  
Although defendant does not discuss this additional fact in his 
briefing, we note that at the time of the prosecutor’s statement, 
others seated in the jury box had indicated that they were not 
upset by the Simpson verdict but had provided varying 
explanations that likely assuaged the prosecutor’s concern.   
16  
Although defendant does not raise these comparisons, the 
dissent additionally compares Simeon G.’s response to the 
responses by Juror No. 4, Juror No. 7, and Alternate Juror No. 
4.  (Dis. opn., post, at p. 14.)  Juror No. 4 was not upset by the 
O.J. Simpson verdict because “su[r]prised, based on media-given 
facts, but did not follow trial closely.”  Juror No. 7 was not upset 
by the verdict “since I can only judge from T.V. I cannot give an 
honest opinion.”  And Alternate Juror No. 4 was not upset by 
the verdict because “I did not hear the evidence.”  While a 
prospective juror’s response that he or she was not upset by the 
O.J. Simpson verdict may suggest that the prospective juror 
 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
65 
to whether he was upset by the Simpson verdict but did not 
explain why.  His response was thus identical to Alternate Juror 
No. 5’s response and less detailed than Juror No. 6’s response, 
which noted, “evidence not clear.”  We find that the credibility 
of the prosecutor’s concern regarding Simeon G.’s opinion on the 
O.J. Simpson verdict is undermined to some degree by 
defendant’s comparative juror analysis.  (See Miller-El, supra, 
545 U.S. at p. 241 [“If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking 
a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar 
nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to 
prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson’s 
third step”].)   
 
 
We recognize that jurors need not be identical in all 
respects for a comparison among them to be probative, and we 
continue to consider defendant’s comparisons to be relevant and 
probative on the issue of purposeful discrimination here.  (See 
ante, at pp. 35–37.)  However, we additionally consider as part 
of our inquiry into the prosecutor’s motivations for striking 
Simeon G. that Juror No. 6 and Alternate Juror No. 5 were 
dissimilar from Simeon G. in regard to the prosecutor’s other 
two stated reasons for striking Simeon G.  (See ibid.)   
Neither Juror No. 6 nor Alternate Juror No. 5 indicated 
that they might have difficulty considering the opinions of or 
deliberating with others when asked whether they considered 
themselves leaders or followers and why.  Juror No. 6 considered 
herself “[b]oth” a leader and a follower “depend[ing] on what 
                                        
agreed with that verdict, Juror No. 4, Juror No. 7, and Alternate 
Juror No. 4 explained that they were not upset by the verdict 
because they had limited information about the case.  These 
explanations likely assuaged the prosecutor’s concern.  
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
66 
interest” she had, and she had experience working with a group 
of people to make a decision.  Alternate Juror No. 5 considered 
himself a leader because “like to learn, intelligent, people tend 
to follow my lead.”  While his response reflected some self-
assuredness, he also said in his response that he “like[d] to 
learn,” and he had “daily” experience working with a group of 
people to make a decision and “fe[lt] that there would be no 
problem working with others.”  Additionally, neither Juror No. 
6 nor Alternate Juror No. 5 indicated that they might rely on 
their feelings in reaching a verdict in the guilt phase when asked 
whether they can follow an instruction that a defendant is 
presumed innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  By contrast, Simeon G.’s opinion on the O.J. Simpson 
verdict may have raised more concern about him as a guilt phase 
juror in this case given that he liked his opinion over other 
people’s opinions, had not previously worked with a group of 
people to make a decision, and said that if he had “any feeling” 
that the defendant “might” not have done it, the defendant was 
innocent.   
 
Considering these and all other relevant circumstances, 
we view the issue to be close but ultimately find no adequate 
basis to overturn the trial court’s ruling under the applicable 
standard of review.  We find that each of the prosecutor’s 
reasons for striking Simeon G. is plausible, supported by the 
record, and race neutral.  Considering the prosecutor’s reasons 
together and reviewing the trial court’s determination regarding 
the sufficiency of those reasons with great restraint (see Lenix, 
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613), we conclude that substantial 
evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the 
prosecutor struck Simeon G. for reasons other than his race.    
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
67 
 
In sum, we find substantial evidence supports the trial 
court’s denial of defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motion.  Although 
defendant argues that Kevin C. and Simeon G. were favorable 
prospective jurors for the prosecution, “the question is not 
whether a prosecutor should or should not have excused a 
prospective juror.  It is whether this prosecutor excused [them] 
for an improper reason.  The record provides no sufficient reason 
to so conclude or for this court to overturn the trial court’s 
ruling” here.  (Hardy, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 84.)  Moreover, the 
prosecutor’s acceptance of an alternate juror who was 
African-American further supports the prosecutor’s good faith 
in exercising the peremptory strikes.  (See, e.g., Jones, supra, 
51 Cal.4th at pp. 362–363.)    
B.  Excusal of Two Prospective Jurors for Cause  
 
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously excused 
two prospective jurors based on their views about the death 
penalty.  We disagree.   
 
“Under Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 
[83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844] (Witt), we consider whether the 
record fairly supports the trial court’s determination that [a 
prospective juror’s] views on the death penalty would have 
prevented or substantially impaired her performance as a 
juror.”  (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 357.)  
“ ‘ “Generally, a trial court’s rulings on motions to exclude for 
cause are afforded deference on appeal, for ‘appellate courts 
recognize that a trial judge who observes and speaks with a 
prospective juror and hears that person’s responses (noting, 
among other things, the person’s tone of voice, apparent level of 
confidence, and demeanor), gleans valuable information that 
simply does not appear on the record.’ ” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 358.)  
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
68 
“ ‘When the prospective juror’s answers on voir dire are 
conflicting or equivocal, the trial court’s findings as to the 
prospective juror’s state of mind are binding on appellate courts 
if supported by substantial evidence.’ ”  (People v. Wall (2017) 
3 Cal.5th 1048, 1062 (Wall).)     
 
As a preliminary matter, defendant contends that 
deferring to the trial court’s findings on jury selection issues is 
improper for two reasons.  First, he argues that such deference 
is inappropriate on direct appeal in light of the high court’s 
holding in Greene v. Georgia (1996) 519 U.S. 145, 146–147.  But 
Greene held that the Supreme Court of Georgia was mistaken 
when it believed itself bound by Witt’s standard of review:  It 
was “free to adopt the rule laid down in Witt for review of trial 
court findings in jury-selection cases, but it need not do so.”  
(Greene, at p. 147.)  In contrast, we have previously adopted 
Witt’s standard of review and accordingly rejected this 
argument because “[t]he law in California . . . is settled on the 
point.”  (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 132, fn. 6.)   
 
Second, defendant argues that deferring to the trial court’s 
resolution of inconsistencies or ambiguities is contrary to the 
high court’s holdings in Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38 
(Adams) and Gray v. Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648 (Gray).  We 
have rejected the contention that Adams and Gray “ ‘made clear 
that when a prospective capital case juror gives equivocal 
responses, the state has not carried its burden of proving that 
the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a juror.” ’ ”  (People v. Schmeck 
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 263 (Schmeck).)  We also have rejected 
the contention that Gray “suggests the high court intended to 
cast aside its view that ‘deference must be paid to the trial judge 
who sees and hears the juror.’ ”  (People v. Moon (2005) 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
69 
37 Cal.4th 1, 15 (Moon).)  “ ‘Furthermore, the high court has 
more recently reiterated its view that “[c]ourts reviewing claims 
of Witherspoon-Witt error . . . owe deference to the trial court, 
which is in a superior position to determine the demeanor and 
qualifications of a potential juror.” ’ ”  (People v. Bryant, Smith 
and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 400.)  These arguments 
therefore are meritless.    
1. Prospective Juror No. 44  
 
Prospective Juror No. 44’s (Number 44) responses to the 
approximately 31-page jury questionnaire signaled a degree of 
uncertainty and discomfort regarding the death penalty.  She 
said, “I don’t feel one way or another” on whether the death 
penalty is fair or unfair, and “I don’t have an opinion” on 
whether the death penalty is used too often or too seldom.  Asked 
whether the sentence of death or life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole was more severe, she responded, “Depends 
— for me Life w/o parole — for others — I don’t know.”  But she 
also said that she did not like the death penalty, that it made 
her “uncomfortable,” and that she would vote to abolish it.  She 
identified herself as belonging to Group 4, which was defined as 
“I have doubts about the death penalty, but I would not vote 
against it in every case.”     
 
She said that her feelings about the death penalty were 
not such that she “would refuse to find the defendant guilty of 
first degree murder and/or would refuse to find the special 
circumstance true, solely to avoid having to make a decision on 
the death penalty,” and that she was “willing to weigh and 
consider all the aggravating and mitigating factors that will be 
presented to [her] before deciding the penalty in this case.”  
However, she indicated that she would be reluctant to vote for a 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
70 
death sentence, to sign the verdict form for a death sentence, or 
to state that verdict in court before the defendant, commenting, 
“The day I am not reluctant to look a person in the face and 
sentence them to death will be the day I no longer belong to the 
human — or should I say humane — race.”  As to whether her 
feelings about the death penalty were such that she “would 
never be able to personally vote for the death of the defendant 
under any circumstances” and “would always vote for a sentence 
of life without [the] possibility of parole,” she declined to check 
either the yes or no box.  Instead, she commented, “I don’t know 
— I’ve done a few things I thought I would never do.”   
 
During Hovey questioning, the prosecutor asked whether 
her identification as belonging to Group 4 (that she has doubts 
about the death penalty but would not vote against it in every 
case) was accurate “about the way [she] feel[s] on the death 
penalty.”  She responded, “You know, it’s really hard to say 
exactly what you would do when you’re not in the situation.  I 
would have — I would never know exactly what I would do until 
I’m put in that situation.  So, yeah, I would have doubts.”  The 
prosecutor then explained that in the penalty phase, the court 
will provide an instruction listing mitigating and aggravating 
factors to consider and “essentially if you find the aggravating 
factors outweigh the mitigating factors, then death is the 
appropriate verdict, if you find that.”  The prosecutor asked, “Do 
you think that — can you say for sure, I guess is my question, 
that if placed in that position with the aggravating factors 
weighing more heavily, could you personally make the vote?”  
She responded, “I know, I know what you’re looking for, and I’m 
sorry.  I can’t help you with it, because I don’t know, because 
there have been too many — I’m 39, and there have been too 
many times that I’ve said I’d never do this, or I’d always do that, 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
71 
and then I’ve done the other.  So, I just cannot tell you, unless 
I’m placed in that situation, unless I’ve gone through it. . . . I 
just don’t make judgments until I’m in that situation.  I just 
don’t.”  Seeking to clarify her answer, the prosecutor asked if she 
found the aggravating factors weigh heavier than the mitigating 
factors, “you can’t guarantee me that you could step up to the 
plate, so to speak, and make a vote for death?”  She repeated, “I 
can’t guarantee anything.  I don’t deal in hypotheticals, and I 
just — no, I cannot guarantee you what I would do until I am in 
that situation, no.”  
 
Defense counsel subsequently explained, “[T]he Court at 
the end always gives instructions to jurors about what the law 
is, and how they’re supposed to carry out their duties. . . . And 
in a death penalty case, there are certain things that the law 
allows jurors to consider in deciding whether to select death or 
life, assuming you were in that position.  They’re called 
aggravating factors, mitigating factors.”  Defense counsel then 
asked, “if you’re selected and sworn as a juror, could you commit 
yourself under oath to follow what the Judge told you the law 
was?  Or do you think there’s something else that might 
interfere with your ability to do that?”  She responded, “I don’t 
think there’s anything that would interfere with my ability.  And 
I can’t tell you, and I don’t know if I could follow the law.  There’s 
— I’m — there’s just a good chance that I would or I wouldn’t.  
You’re going to have to pick me and have me sit here and see, 
because I just don’t know.”    
 
At the close of this questioning, the prosecutor challenged 
her for cause.  The trial court initially stated, “She technically 
comes within the Wainwright [v.] Witt standard.  She’s not 
saying her views are such that it would substantially interfere 
with her ability to follow the instructions and her duty, she just 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
72 
says she doesn’t know, because it’s such an emotional issue.”  
Citing two cases, the prosecutor argued that jurors who insist 
they do not know or cannot say if they could impose a death 
sentence are properly excused.  Defense counsel responded that 
Number 44 did not say that she could not or would never impose 
a death sentence; “[s]he just felt that she didn’t know under 
what circumstances.”  The trial court commented, “She was 
probably an extremely honest juror who really couldn’t give us 
a definite answer,” and took the challenge under submission.   
 
Later, after reviewing the record and the authority cited 
by the prosecutor, the trial court found, “[M]y memory is 
refreshed that her answers basically were that she could not say 
whether she would be able to impose the death penalty, and it 
was not just that she didn’t know whether in this case she could 
impose the death penalty, because obviously she wouldn’t know 
until she got — she heard the evidence and the law.  But in any 
situation, basically, she didn’t know until she was put in that 
situation whether she could do it, or whether she could follow 
the Court’s instructions in this area. . . . I would agree with [the 
prosecutor] that that’s sufficiently equivocal.  Her ‘I don’t know’ 
responses are sufficiently equivocal to warrant a challenge for 
cause, so I will order that she be excused.” 
 
The trial court did not err in excusing Number 44.  
Number 44 said in her questionnaire and during Hovey 
questioning that she did not know whether she could vote for a 
death sentence.  Certainly, a juror’s decision as to whether to 
vote for a death sentence can be weighty and difficult.  “[E]ven 
a juror who ‘might find it very difficult to vote to impose the 
death penalty’ is not necessarily substantially impaired unless 
he or she was unwilling or unable to follow the court’s 
instructions in determining the appropriate penalty.”  (People v. 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
73 
Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 53 (Merriman).)  Number 44, 
however, did not merely express uncertainty as to “her own 
views on the death penalty or the appropriateness of the death 
penalty in any particular case, but as to her ability to impose a 
death sentence.”  (Wall, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1063.)  When 
asked in her questionnaire whether her feelings about the death 
penalty were such that she would never be able to vote for a 
death sentence, she wrote, “I don’t know — I’ve done a few 
things I thought I would never do.”  She repeated during Hovey 
questioning that she did not know whether she could vote for a 
death sentence.  (See Wall, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1062 
[upholding the excusal of a prospective juror who “expressed 
hesitation about her ability to impose a death verdict” and “[i]n 
response to repeated questions by the trial court and the 
prosecutor as to whether she had the ability to impose the death 
penalty . . . said she did not know if she did”].)   
 
Number 44 further expressed uncertainty as to her ability 
to follow the trial court’s instructions regarding the 
consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors in deciding 
whether to impose a death sentence.  Although she said in her 
questionnaire that she was willing to weigh and consider all the 
aggravating and mitigating factors before deciding the penalty 
in this case, she then responded to a similar question during 
Hovey questioning by saying, “I don’t know if I could follow the 
law.  There’s — I’m — there’s just a good chance that I would or 
I wouldn’t.  You’re going to have to pick me and have me sit here 
and see, because I just don’t know.”  “Given the juror’s own 
recognition that [she] did not know whether [she] could follow 
the law or ever vote for the death sentence, the trial court did 
not commit Witherspoon/Witt error when it found the juror was 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
74 
substantially 
impaired.” 
 
(People 
v. 
Spencer 
(2018) 
5 Cal.5th 642, 659.)  
 
Nevertheless, defendant compares Number 44 to Juror 
White in the high court’s Adams opinion and argues that 
Number 44’s responses were insufficient to justify her excusal.  
“But using Adams as a reference point for evaluating the excusal 
of [Number 44] is inapt because Adams concerned the particular 
statutory scheme in Texas, whereby ‘ “[p]rospective jurors shall 
be informed that a sentence of life imprisonment or death is 
mandatory on conviction of a capital felony.  A prospective juror 
shall be disqualified from serving as a juror unless he states 
under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or 
imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any 
issue of fact.” ’  [Citation.]  As the Adams court explained, the 
statutory scheme is inconsistent with the standard demanded 
by the federal Constitution because ‘neither nervousness, 
emotional involvement, nor inability to deny or confirm any 
effect whatsoever is equivalent to an unwillingness or an 
inability on the part of the jurors to follow the court’s 
instructions and obey their oaths, regardless of their feelings 
about the death penalty.’ ”  (People v. Thompson (2016) 
1 Cal.5th 1043, 1068.)  Moreover, unlike Juror White and others 
who were improperly excluded under this statutory scheme 
“only because they were unable positively to state whether or 
not their deliberations would in any way be ‘affected’ ” (Adams, 
supra, 448 U.S. at p. 50; id. at p. 50, fn. 8), Number 44 was not 
merely “unable positively to state whether or not [her] 
deliberations would in any way be ‘affected,’ ” (id. at p. 50) but 
rather, she did not know whether she would be able to follow the 
court’s instructions in a death penalty case or vote for a death 
sentence.    
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
75 
 
Defendant additionally compares Number 44 to Juror 
Bounds in the high court’s Gray opinion.  “Although the voir dire 
of member Bounds was somewhat confused, she ultimately 
stated that she could consider the death penalty in an 
appropriate case and the judge concluded that Bounds was 
capable of voting to impose it.”  (Gray, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 653.)  
After further discussion, the judge, however, excused Bounds for 
cause.  (Id. at p. 655.)  The state court agreed that Bounds was 
“ ‘clearly qualified to be seated as a juror’ ” but concluded that 
excusing Bounds was harmless error.  (Id. at p. 657.)  The issue 
subsequently addressed by the high court “was not the standard 
for excusing a juror for cause, but whether the erroneous excusal 
of a juror for cause was subject to a harmless error test.”  (Moon, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 14.)  We find the comparison between 
Juror Bounds and Number 44 to be inapposite.  Unlike Juror 
Bounds, Number 44 did not confirm “that she could consider the 
death penalty in an appropriate case,” and the trial court did not 
conclude that she “was capable of voting to impose it;” rather, 
the trial court found that Number 44 “could not say whether she 
would be able to impose the death penalty.”17   
 
In short, we decline to find error in the trial court’s 
decision to excuse Number 44 for cause.  
2. Prospective Juror No. 63  
 
Prospective Juror No. 63 (Number 63) did not reveal much 
hesitation regarding the death penalty in his questionnaire 
                                        
17  
Defendant repeats these comparisons in arguing that 
Prospective Juror No. 63’s responses were insufficient to justify 
his excusal.  Those comparisons fare no better.  
 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
76 
responses, but he neglected to answer several questions on the 
topic.18  He said that he did not have any moral, philosophical, 
or religious objection to the death penalty and that he believed 
the death penalty was fair, noting in part, “If you kill you be 
killed.”  He said that his feelings about the death penalty were 
not “such that [he] would refuse to find the defendant guilty of 
first degree murder and/or would refuse to find the special 
circumstance true, solely to avoid having to make a decision on 
the death penalty;” that his feelings about the death penalty 
were not “such that [he] would never be able to personally vote 
for the death of the defendant under any circumstances” and 
“would always vote for a sentence of life without [the] possibility 
of parole;” and that he would not be reluctant to sign the verdict 
form for a death sentence or state that verdict in court.  
Inexplicably, however, he failed to respond to several other 
questions, including, among others, what his general feelings 
were about the death penalty, what he believed to be the 
purpose of the death penalty, whether the death penalty was 
used too often or too seldom, and whether he would vote to keep 
or abolish the death penalty.  Nor did he identify which one of 
five defined groups most accurately described his opinion 
regarding the death penalty.  
 
Separately, and without explanation, he checked “no” 
when asked whether he thought he could be a fair and impartial 
juror in this case and when asked whether he was “willing to 
                                        
18  
Regarding the questionnaire’s introductory paragraphs 
about the death penalty, he checked “no” when asked to 
acknowledge that he read and understood those paragraphs.  It 
is not apparent from the record whether he indeed failed to read 
or understand those paragraphs or simply checked “no” due to 
inadvertence.         
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
77 
weigh and consider all the aggravating and mitigating factors 
that will be presented to [him] before deciding the penalty in 
this case.”  
 
During Hovey questioning, Number 63 said that he did not 
have strong feelings about the death penalty, but that he would 
not feel comfortable voting for a death sentence and that he 
would be reluctant to do so.  The prosecutor asked, “Do you think 
your feelings about that might affect the way you judge the guilt 
or innocence of the defendant?”  He said, “It might.”  The 
prosecutor then asked, “Do you think that your feelings might 
also affect the way you look at the Court’s instructions about the 
death penalty?”  He again said, “It might.”  He also confirmed 
that sitting on this type of case might be difficult for him based 
on his feelings.   
 
The defense subsequently asked, “[D]o your feelings about 
the death penalty, are they based on a religious or ethical thing, 
or is it just your own personal feelings about it?”  Number 63 
responded, “You could say both.”  The defense then asked, “If 
you were to be asked to judge which penalty to impose, and the 
Court gave you what the rules are, here’s how you decide.  You 
look at all the aggravating factors, and they are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  You 
look at all the mitigating factors, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.  Whatever they 
are.  You decide whether the aggravating factors weigh more 
than the mitigating factors.  If they do, then you vote for death.  
If they don’t, you vote for life without possibility of parole.  
[¶] Would you be able to follow that instruction?”  Number 63 
responded, “I don’t know.”  The defense asked, “What gives you 
— what is your concern about following that instruction?”  
Number 63 responded, “The way I feel.”  To clarify, the defense 
asked, “Which is that you wouldn’t want to vote for death?”  
Number 63 responded, “Nope.”  Again seeking to clarify, the 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
78 
defense asked, “No, you wouldn’t want to vote for death?”  
Number 63 responded, “I don’t think so.  I’m saying, no, I’m not, 
but I don’t think so.”   
 
The prosecutor challenged Number 63 for cause “based on 
his answers,” and the defense said, “Submit it.”  The trial court 
excused Number 63 for cause. 
 
“Jurors are not required to like the law, but they are 
required to follow it.”  (Armstrong, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 750.)  
“[S]o long as prospective jurors can obey the court’s instructions 
and determine whether death is appropriate based on a sincere 
consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
they are not ineligible to serve.”  (Ibid.)  “A jury candidate who 
will not, or cannot, follow a statutory framework, is not qualified 
to serve.”  (Ibid.)   
 
 
Here, Number 63 said in his questionnaire that he did not 
have any moral, philosophical, or religious objection to the death 
penalty, his feelings were not such that he “would never be able 
to personally vote for the death of the defendant under any 
circumstances,” and he would not be reluctant to sign the verdict 
form for a death sentence or state that verdict in court.  But he 
said during Hovey questioning that his feelings about the death 
penalty were based both on “a religious or ethical thing . . . and 
[his] own personal feelings,” he “[didn’t] think” he wanted to vote 
for a death sentence, and he would be reluctant and not feel 
comfortable doing so.   
 
As with Number 44, a generalized recognition that it 
would be difficult to impose a death sentence does not mean that 
a juror is necessarily substantially impaired.  (See Merriman, 
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 53.)  But Number 63 said more.  He 
indicated in his questionnaire that he was not “willing to weigh 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
79 
and consider all the aggravating and mitigating factors that will 
be presented to [him] before deciding the penalty in this case.”  
And when asked during Hovey questioning whether he would be 
able to follow the court’s instruction regarding considering and 
weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, he said that 
he “[didn’t] know” due to “[t]he way [he] feel[s].”19     
 
“ ‘[A prospective] juror’s inability to set aside his or her 
personal views and follow the law, need not be demonstrated 
with unmistakable clarity.’ ”  (People v. Jones, supra, 3 Cal.5th 
at p. 615.)  Here, Number 63’s written and oral responses could 
have left the trial court with “the definite impression that [he] 
would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.”  
(Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 426.)  That defense 
counsel merely submitted the question to the trial court20 
further “suggest[s] counsel concurred in the assessment that the 
juror was excusable.”  (People v. Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 
p. 735; cf. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 435 [where counsel did not 
question the juror or object to the trial court’s excusing her for 
cause, “it seems that at the time [the juror] was excused no one 
                                        
19  
Defendant notes that Number 63 was not directly “asked 
if he would be willing to set aside whatever personal views he 
had and follow the law given to him by the court.”  “We agree 
that the better practice is to ask such a question.  But the focus 
of our review is whether there is substantial evidence to support 
a conclusion that the juror would not be able to set aside his or 
her personal feelings and follow the trial court’s instructions 
concerning the imposition of the death penalty.”  (People v. Jones 
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 616.)   
20  
We have since held that similar statements do not suffice 
to preserve this objection on appeal.  (People v. McKinnon (2011) 
52 Cal.4th 610, 643.)  But this rule does not apply retroactively 
here.  (People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 734–735.)    
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
80 
in the courtroom questioned the fact that her beliefs prevented 
her from sitting.  The reasons for this, although not crystal clear 
from the printed record, may well have been readily apparent to 
those viewing [the juror] as she answered the questions”].)  After 
giving appropriate deference to the trial court’s determination 
regarding Number 63’s state of mind, we find substantial 
evidence supports the trial court’s ruling and conclude that the 
court did not err in excusing Number 63.   
C.  Standard for Excusing Prospective Jurors for 
Cause 
 
Defendant 
challenges 
the 
standard 
for 
excusing 
prospective jurors based on their views of the death penalty.  
“ ‘Under the applicable state and federal constitutional 
provisions, prospective jurors may be excused for cause if their 
views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of 
their duties.’ ”  (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 
1284–1285.)  We recently declined an invitation to revisit this 
standard and do so again here.  (See People v. Rices (2017) 
4 Cal.5th 49, 79–80 (Rices).) 
III.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A. Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress 
 
Pursuant to a search warrant, the police collected, among 
other items, a sample of defendant’s blood and the note from his 
truck.  Before trial, defendant moved to suppress this evidence.  
The trial court denied his motion.  Defendant contends the court 
erred 
because 
the 
search warrant 
affidavit 
contained 
misrepresentations and omissions that were intentionally false 
or made in reckless disregard for the truth.  The trial court did 
not err.   
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
81 
1. Background  
 
On June 16, 1992, the police received a report that a “black 
male wearing a white T-shirt armed with a small handgun” had 
just committed a robbery and rape at a nearby office building in 
Torrance.  (See ante, pt. I.B.1.a.v.)  Within minutes of the report, 
and in the general vicinity from which the suspect may have 
attempted to flee, two officers spotted defendant in his truck, 
appearing very nervous and matching the suspect’s general 
description.  The officers unsuccessfully attempted to stop 
defendant, a chase ensued, and the officers shot and arrested 
him.  Once Detective Lore learned about the arrest, he sought a 
warrant to search defendant, his residences, and his vehicle.  
a. Detective Lore’s affidavit in support of the 
search warrant 
 
Detective Lore’s 11-page affidavit, dated June 18, 1992, 
began by describing Willem’s death in Rialto and its apparent 
connection to other, similar rapes and robberies committed 
throughout San Bernardino and Riverside Counties.  He 
described two such similar incidents:  the Christine C. incident 
in Victorville and the Osburn and Carole D. incident in San 
Bernardino.  In both incidents, the suspect bound the victims 
with telephone receiver cords.  In the Christine C. incident, “a 
suspect was described as a tall Black male adult, late 20’s to 
early 30’s, armed with a small caliber handgun,” and in the 
Osburn and Carole D. incident, the description of the suspect 
“matched the description of the suspect in the Victorville crime.”  
Forensic specialist David Stockwell performed a chemical 
analysis for the three incidents and concluded that “the same 
suspect that committed the homicide/rape in the Rialto [sic], 
committed the rape in Victorville, [and] was also responsible for 
the robbery/rape in the City of San Bernardino.”  Based on 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
82 
Stockwell’s analysis, “the subject that was sought after in these 
series of crimes, is believed to be a Black male that is an ABO 
type, AB secretor.”  
 
Detective Lore next summarized a series of similar 
robberies.  “The robberies included professional business suites 
in the late evening hours on Mondays, Tuesdays and 
Wednesdays, very similar to that of the time of the rapes 
mentioned previously.  The robberies also included a male Black 
that matched the physical description of the one that was 
described in two of the rape incidents.  The subject was armed 
with a small caliber semi-automatic handgun at the time of 
these robberies.  During some of the robberies, the victims were 
bound with telephone receiver cords.  During the follow-up 
interviews with the victims in these cases, it was revealed that 
in most of the cases the suspect had made some specific 
comments.  The most prevalent being, ‘Don’t look at me.’ ”    
 
Elaborating with respect to a related robbery, Detective 
Lore said that Arnold and Sharyn Andersen were working at 
their business when they were “confronted by a tall Black male 
adult, armed with a small caliber handgun.”  “The suspect made 
both victims lie on the floor.  The subject robbed the victims of 
approximately $1,600.00 in cash and fled out the same door 
where he had forced entry.”  Detective Lore continued, “The 
investigation by San Bernardino Police Department revealed 
that the suspect smashed out a small window over the locking 
area of the door, which led into the rear portion of the business 
suite.  When doing this, the suspect cut himself on the glass and 
had grabbed a box of Kleenex that was sitting on a counter near 
the back door to stop some of the bleeding.  The Kleenex box was 
collected and linked to the suspect.”      
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
83 
 
Detective Lore then noted that four robberies in Riverside 
“had similar suspect descriptions.”  The San Bernardino County 
Sheriff’s Department also created a sketch of the suspect, which 
“seemed to be the consensus of most of the victims that saw the 
suspect during the robberies.”   
 
Next, Detective Lore explained that in June 1992, he 
learned that the Torrance Police Department had arrested 
defendant for committing a robbery and rape, during which “the 
suspect tied both victims with telephone receiver cords, had a 
chrome handgun, spoke very softly in a calm voice, and had 
made vaginal penetration with his finger and penis from behind.  
The suspect also said to the victims, ‘Where is the money’ and 
‘Don’t look at me.’ ”  According to Detective Lore, “All of the 
above M.O. traits are consistent with the crimes in the Inland 
Empire from January through March of 1992.”      
 
Detective Lore then proceeded to describe defendant.  
According to the Torrance Police Department, he has AB 
positive blood, which “is the same type of blood that the suspect 
in the Rialto homicide and the two other rapes in Victorville and 
San Bernardino [has].”  He “is further described as being very 
clean with virtually no body fat.  The physical description 
provided by his California Driver’s License is 6’6”, 210#, Black 
hair and brown eyes.”  “Mr. Miles criminal history from the 
State of California [citation] describes him also as being a Black 
male, 6’5”, 200#.”  In addition, Detective Lore listed his 
residences, noting that he listed with the DMV an address in 
Compton as of March 23, 1992 and that the “crime spree stopped 
in the Inland Empire on 3/8/92, before the suspect moved to 
Compton, CA.”  Detective Lore concluded, “[b]ased on my 
experience as being a policeman for approximately 20 years, Mr. 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
84 
Miles displays the physical characteristics as described by the 
majority of the victims in these cases.”     
 
Detective Lore added, “A photographic line-up with the 
suspect’s photograph in position #2 was tentatively I.D.’d by 
victim Heynen, one of the victim’s [sic] in the Upland robbery 
which occurred on 1/21/92.  The victim pointed to position #2 
(suspect Miles) and said, ‘It could be him.’ ”             
 
Near the end of the affidavit, Detective Lore summarized, 
“With the exception of the homicide, the suspect in each crime 
is described as articulate and soft spoken.  Witnesses to the 
robberies described the suspect as being Black male adult, 25-35 
years, 6’-6’4”, thin build, large dark eyes, dark hair, wearing a 
dark blue or black watch cap, dark blue or black Levi type pants, 
an[d] at times was described as having a thin moustache.  
Information derived from his driver’s license history, criminal 
history and booking information reveals his physical description 
of 6’6”, 210#, black hair and brown eyes.”  Detective Lore 
believed evidence from these crimes would be located during 
searches of defendant, his residences, and his vehicle and listed 
the items sought and described the places and person to be 
searched.  Judge Gunn issued the warrant.  
 
On appeal, defendant contends that the affidavit 
contained misrepresentations and omissions regarding the 
Kleenex box, Heynen’s identification, and the suspect 
descriptions.  Before trial, Detective Lore testified regarding his 
affidavit, the search warrant, and the searches conducted 
pursuant to the warrant.  As to the three purported 
misrepresentations or omissions challenged on appeal, he 
testified as follows.      
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
85 
 
First, Detective Lore testified twice about the Kleenex box 
statement.  Initially, the defense elicited the following 
testimony:  “Q. Then you state the Kleenex box was linked to the 
suspect; is that correct?  A. Yes, sir.  Q. In what way was the 
Kleenex box linked to Mr. Miles?  A. It was sent to the San 
Bernardino Crime Lab, but unfortunately the box had been 
wiped off, and there was nothing of use taken from the box.  
Q. The purpose of that statement was to assert to the 
Magistrate, again as a basis for probable cause, that somehow 
or another there was a scientific link that had been made 
between the substance on that box and Mr. Miles; is that 
correct?  A. Yes, sir.  Q. And that wasn’t true, was it?  A. No, sir.”  
 
The prosecutor subsequently recalled Detective Lore to 
testify about this statement again.  At this time, the prosecutor 
asked whether there were some things in his affidavit “which 
ultimately were found not to be correct” including “a Kleenex 
box alleged to have been analyzed and linked to the defendant 
through scientific evidence.”  Detective Lore replied, “Yes.”  
Asked whether he was aware that this statement was not true 
at the time of his affidavit, Detective Lore replied, “No.”  Asked 
whether he intentionally made this statement with the intent to 
deceive the magistrate judge, Detective Lore again replied, “No.”  
Asked to explain why he included this statement, he testified, 
“It was my belief at the time that [the] San Bernardino Police 
Department had collected the Kleenex box, along with the blood 
stained Kleenexes, that were placed into evidence and they were 
going to be shipped to the Crime Lab.”  He was not sure whether 
at the time of the affidavit, he anticipated that the items “were 
going to go [to the lab], or that they were already there.”  He 
acknowledged, though, that at the time of the affidavit, he did 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
86 
not have information that the box had been analyzed or that any 
comparison had been made.          
 
Second, Detective Lore testified that Heynen had 
identified another individual during an earlier photographic 
lineup, but he did not include this information in his affidavit.  
He said that he orally informed the magistrate judge that he had 
sought and obtained search warrants with regard to other 
suspects in this case and that the warrant sought here was 
“either the fourth or fifth search warrant” sought in this case.   
 
Third, 
Detective 
Lore 
testified 
that 
the 
suspect 
descriptions in his affidavit were based on the ATM photographs 
captured after Willem’s death, police reports, and victim 
interviews.  Regarding the ATM photographs, he explained that 
he had visited the same ATM camera, and by comparing himself 
to the photographed suspect, he had estimated that the suspect 
was approximately six feet, five inches tall or six feet, six inches 
tall.  As to the police reports, the defense pressed Detective Lore, 
asking him to confirm the height and weight descriptions 
reported by the victims.21  When the defense asked whether any 
                                        
21  
During this line of questioning, Detective Lore confirmed 
the following:  the Christine C. police report described the 
suspect as “Male — or black male.  25 to 27.  6 feet 1.  150 
[pounds]”; the Osburn and Carole D. police report described the 
suspect as “6 feet.  150 to 160 pounds.  I believe it’s brown hair.  
Brown eyes.  And skin was medium”; the Yenerall police report 
described the suspect as “Male black.  30’s.  6 feet.  Weight was 
medium”; the Heynen police report described the suspect as 
“Black male.  Brown eyes.  Height was 6 feet 1.  Weight was 180 
pounds”; the Kendrick and Crawfords police report described 
the suspect as “25 years.  Black male.  Hair was black.  Eyes 
were black.  Height was 6’4”.  Weight was 160”; and the 
Andersens police report described the suspect as “male black.  
20’s.  6 feet.  170 [pounds].”  
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
87 
of the victims described the suspect as six feet, six inches tall, 
Detective Lore testified that when he interviewed Arnold, he 
“said around 6’6”,” explaining that “[Arnold] was 6’4”, and that 
he actually had to look up to the suspect.”   
 
 
Asked by the defense whether he meant to imply “that 
basically all of these people had similar descriptions” by stating 
that the robberies “included a male black that matched the 
physical description” of the Christine C. and Osburn and Carole 
D. suspect, Detective Lore replied affirmatively.  The defense 
then asked whether, in his opinion, someone who is six feet, 150 
pounds “matches” defendant’s height and weight.  Detective 
Lore replied, “After 25 years of law enforcement, you begin to 
realize that people are not very good with heights and weights.”  
When the prosecutor subsequently questioned Detective Lore, 
he confirmed that by the word “matched,” he did not mean to 
suggest that each victim’s suspect description exactly mirrored 
defendant’s height and weight.  Rather, he meant that “[t]he 
descriptions given by the different witnesses and victims in this 
case, [were] within a couple of pounds or a couple of inches.  And 
when I say a couple of pounds, 10, 20, 30.”  He also confirmed 
that he included defendant’s height and weight in the affidavit 
to make the magistrate aware that discrepancies existed.   
b. Trial court’s ruling   
 
The trial court evaluated defendant’s contentions with 
respect to each of the three purported misrepresentations or 
omissions challenged on appeal. 
 
First, regarding the Kleenex box statement, the trial court 
reasoned that it could be interpreted in one of two ways.  The 
first possible interpretation was that the “blood on the box had 
been scientifically matched to the suspect’s blood.  In this case, 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
88 
Mr. Miles.”  By this interpretation, the statement would be false 
because no testing had in fact been done.  “Had the affiant 
known this at the time that he prepared the affidavit, there 
would be no question that he made a knowingly and 
intentionally false statement; and at the very least, he made a 
statement with a reckless disregard for the truth since he had 
no information that was the case.”  The second possible 
interpretation was “that the box being linked to the suspect 
merely meant that the authorities collected the evidence, [and] 
believed the blood on the box was that of the suspect when he 
forced entry into the building.”  Or put differently, the affiant at 
the time that he prepared the affidavit “believed there was a 
Kleenex box with blood on it, possibly the suspect’s blood; and 
that box was taken into evidence to be analyzed.  He did not 
mean to suggest that the analysis had been done and that the 
blood on the box was that of Mr. Miles.”  
 
The trial court found that this second interpretation was 
consistent with the surrounding facts in the affidavit and was 
consistent with Detective Lore’s testimony, in which he 
explained that he had later learned the Kleenex box could not 
be analyzed because it had been wiped off.  The trial court 
concluded, “[b]ased on the Court’s reading of the affidavit, and 
having heard the affiant testify on both occasions as to his 
intentions in including that information, the Court cannot say 
that he knowingly and deliberately included false information 
for the purpose of deceiving the Magistrate, nor can the Court 
find a reckless disregard for the truth on [the] affiant’s part.  At 
most, the Court would find a negligent mistake in drafting the 
affidavit in such a way that a Magistrate could mistakenly 
assume there was a scientific link, or failing to include the 
information that the box was to be analyzed later.”   
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
89 
 
Further, the trial court found that even if the Kleenex box 
statement were omitted from the affidavit, the affidavit would 
nevertheless establish probable cause.  “The affidavit contained 
substantial information that the same person likely committed 
the Willem, [Christine C.], [Carole D.]/Osburn crimes, including 
serological evidence.  There was also information presented that 
Miles has the same blood type as that found at the Willem crime 
scene.  And finally, there was information that Miles was 
arrested as a suspect in a similar robbery/rape in Torrance.”   
 
Second, as to the purported omission of Heynen’s earlier 
identification, the trial court found, “The identification by Miss 
Heynen is, at the very least, equivocal and falls short of a 
positive identification.  I can assume that the Magistrate came 
to the same conclusion, and that the additional information 
would not have led to a different result or have added anything 
of substance to the affidavit.” 
 
Third, regarding the suspect descriptions, the trial court 
“[did] not find this information to be misleading or false, and 
[did] not find that defendant ha[d] met his initial burden of 
showing a knowing or intentionally false statement, or reckless 
disregard for the truth.”    
 
Finally, the trial court found that “the affiant and the 
executing officers had an objective good faith reliance on the 
warrant, and the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
would apply in this case.”   
2. Discussion    
 
 
“ ‘In reviewing a search conducted pursuant to a warrant, 
an appellate court inquires “whether the magistrate had a 
substantial basis for concluding a fair probability existed that a 
search would uncover wrongdoing.”  [Citation.]  “The task of the 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
90 
issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense 
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit before him [or her], including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis 
of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there 
is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 
be found in a particular place.”  [Citation.]  The magistrate’s 
determination of probable cause is entitled to deferential review.  
[Citation.]’  [Citation.]  Probable cause sufficient for issuance of 
a warrant requires a showing in the supporting affidavit that 
makes it substantially probable that there is specific property 
lawfully subject to seizure presently located in the particular 
place for which the warrant is sought.”  (People v. Scott (2011) 
52 Cal.4th 452, 483 (Scott).)   
 
“A defendant has a limited right to challenge the veracity 
of statements contained in an affidavit of probable cause made 
in support of the issuance of a search warrant.  The trial court 
must conduct an evidentiary hearing only if a defendant makes 
a substantial showing that (1) the affidavit contains statements 
that are deliberately false or were made in reckless disregard of 
the truth, and (2) the affidavit’s remaining contents, after the 
false statements are excised, are insufficient to support a 
finding 
of 
probable 
cause. 
 
Innocent 
or 
negligent 
misrepresentations will not support a motion to traverse.  
[Citations.]  A defendant who challenges a search warrant based 
on omissions in the affidavit bears the burden of showing an 
intentional or reckless omission of material information that, 
when added to the affidavit, renders it insufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause.  [Citations.]  In either setting, the 
defendant must make his showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and the affidavit is presumed valid.”  (Scott, supra, 
52 Cal.4th at p. 484.)   
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
91 
 
On appeal, “[w]e defer to the trial court’s express and 
implied factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, 
but we independently determine the legality of the search under 
the Fourth Amendment.”  (People v. Eubanks (2011) 
53 Cal.4th 110, 133.)  We consider each of defendant’s 
contentions in turn.   
 
First, the trial court’s reading of the Kleenex box 
statement to mean “that the authorities collected the evidence, 
[and] believed the blood on the box was that of the suspect when 
he forced entry into the building” (but not to suggest “that the 
analysis had been done and that the blood on the box was that 
of Mr. Miles”) is supported by the record.  Indeed, the affidavit’s 
first several pages detailed the series of robberies and rapes, 
referring throughout to the “suspect” or the “subject” of those 
crimes, and made no mention of defendant or his arrest.  
Reading this statement’s reference to the “suspect” of the 
Andersens crime to mean defendant is thus strained, as the trial 
court found.       
 
That said, Detective Lore’s testimony about his own 
statement necessarily complicates the analysis.  At one point, 
Detective Lore confirmed that the purpose of his statement was 
to assert that there was a “scientific link” between the Kleenex 
box and defendant.  When later questioned by the prosecutor, 
however, Detective Lore said that he believed only that the “San 
Bernardino Police Department had collected the Kleenex box, 
along with the blood stained Kleenexes, that were placed into 
evidence and they were going to be shipped to the Crime Lab.”  
He also confirmed that at the time of his statement, he was not 
aware that the statement was untrue, and he did not make it 
with the intent to deceive the magistrate judge.  Faced with this 
inconsistent testimony, and with the opportunity to assess 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
92 
Detective Lore’s demeanor and credibility, the trial court found 
that his statement was not intentionally false or made with a 
reckless disregard for the truth.  Though the testimony is less 
than clear, there was certainly substantial evidence to support 
the trial court’s finding.  (See People v. Troyer (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 599, 613 [“on appeal from the denial of a motion to 
suppress, we are bound by the trial court’s resolution of disputed 
facts and inferences as well as its evaluations of credibility . . . 
where (as here) the findings are supported by substantial 
evidence”].)  Simply put, the trial court was entitled to credit 
Detective Lore’s clarification that he meant to convey in his 
affidavit that the Kleenex evidence was merely being shipped to 
the crime lab and that he in no way intended to deceive the 
magistrate.   
 
In any event, even assuming that this statement was 
intentionally false or made with a reckless disregard for the 
truth, and accordingly was excised from the affidavit, the 
affidavit would nevertheless establish probable cause.  The 
affidavit catalogued the similarities among the series of rapes 
and robberies, including that the crimes occurred on weekday 
evenings at professional offices, that several of the victims were 
bound with telephone cords, and that the suspect was described 
as a tall, Black man who was armed.  In addition, the affidavit 
described the consistencies between these incidents and the 
rape and robbery for which defendant was arrested and 
described defendant as a tall, Black man with AB blood, which 
was consistent with the suspect descriptions and the forensic 
analysis.      
  
Second, we turn to the affidavit’s statement about 
Heynen’s lineup identification.  The affidavit stated that 
Heynen “tentatively” identified defendant in a photographic 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
93 
lineup by saying “ ‘It could be him.’ ”  Although the affidavit did 
not state that Heynen had identified another individual during 
an earlier photographic lineup, Detective Lore testified that he 
orally informed the magistrate judge about prior warrants 
obtained during the investigation for other suspects.  It is 
conceivable that overstating the certainty of identifications 
made by victims or selectively including details about such 
identifications may be substantially misleading in some 
circumstances.  But here, the affidavit described Heynen’s 
identification of defendant as tentative and quoted her equivocal 
statement that “ ‘It could be him.’ ”  The omitted fact of Heynen’s 
earlier identification, when added to the affidavit, does not 
render the affidavit insufficient to support a finding of probable 
cause.  As described above, the affidavit contained ample 
information to establish probable cause, including but not 
limited to the similarities among the series of rapes and 
robberies and the consistencies between these incidents and the 
rape and robbery for which defendant was arrested.22   
 
Finally, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 
finding as to defendant’s third contention regarding the suspect 
descriptions.  The affidavit plainly stated the range of the 
suspect’s height as described by the victims, and in the 
immediately following sentence, set forth defendant’s actual 
height and weight.  The affidavit therefore made clear the 
discrepancies between the suspect descriptions and defendant’s 
                                        
22  
To the extent that defendant challenges any related 
omission concerning earlier suspects in the investigation, “[t]he 
fact that law enforcement had investigated other leads had no 
bearing on whether probable cause existed to issue the warrant 
to search [the defendant’s] home and car.”  (People v. Sandoval 
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 408.)   
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
94 
characteristics, as Detective Lore testified he intended to do.  
Considering this, the fact that he elsewhere in his affidavit 
summarized the suspect descriptions as similar or matching 
does not show that he made a false statement, much less made 
a false statement with an intent to deceive or a reckless 
disregard for the truth.  Similarly, his opinion that, based on his 
experience as a policeman, “Mr. Miles displays the physical 
characteristics as described by the majority of the victims in 
these cases” does not amount to an intentional or reckless 
falsehood, particularly since he testified that his experience as 
a policeman indeed taught him that victims were not always 
accurate in describing suspects.  Nor do we find an intentional 
or reckless omission of material information regarding the 
suspect descriptions that, when added to the affidavit, renders 
the affidavit insufficient to establish probable cause.23   
 
For these reasons, the trial court did not err.   
B.  Instruction Regarding Motive  
 
Pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.51, the jury was instructed as 
follows:  “Motive is not an element of the crime charged and need 
not be shown.  However, you may consider motive or lack of 
motive as a circumstance in this case.  Presence of motive may 
                                        
23  
Defendant also claims that Detective Lore previously 
detailed these suspect descriptions in earlier affidavits for two 
other suspects in the investigation and that Detective Lore’s 
inconsistent approach regarding the suspect descriptions within 
those affidavits and the affidavit here evidenced a lack of good 
faith in the affidavit here.  But how Detective Lore presented 
the suspect descriptions in earlier affidavits for two other 
suspects does not alter our conclusion that the affidavit here 
contained no false statement and omitted no material 
information regarding the suspect descriptions.   
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
95 
tend to establish the defendant is guilty.  Absence of motive may 
tend to show the defendant is not guilty.”  Defendant contends 
this instruction impermissibly lowered the prosecution’s burden 
of proof for the murder by torture charge and the penetration by 
a foreign object charges in violation of his federal constitutional 
rights because, according to defendant, motive was “effectively” 
an element of those crimes.  We disagree.  
1. Murder by Torture  
 
The trial court instructed the jury that murder by torture 
requires in relevant part “a willful, deliberate, and premeditated 
intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain upon a living 
human being for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion 
or for any sadistic purpose.”  Defendant argues that this 
“purpose” element was effectively negated by instructing the 
jury that motive was not an element of murder by torture.   
 
We previously rejected that precise argument in People v. 
Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 218.  In Whisenhunt, the 
defendant argued that CALJIC No. 2.51 “had the effect of 
negating the element of ‘sadistic purpose’ in the first degree 
murder by torture instruction, CALJIC No. 8.24.”  (Whisenhunt, 
at p. 218; see also id. at p. 219, fn. 11 [CALJIC No. 8.24 stated 
in relevant part, “for the purpose of revenge, extortion, 
persuasion or for any sadistic purpose”].)  We observed that the 
Court of Appeal had previously rejected that argument in People 
v. Lynn (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 715, and we concluded that Lynn 
“correctly decided this issue.”  (Whisenhunt, at p. 218.)  We 
explained, “ ‘[A]lthough malice and certain intents and purposes 
are elements of the crimes, . . . motive is not an element.’  
[Citation.]  ‘Motive describes the reason a person chooses to 
commit a crime.  The reason, however, is different from a 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
96 
required mental state such as intent or malice.’ ”  (Ibid.)  We see 
no reason to depart from Whisenhunt here.    
 
Nor does defendant’s reliance on People v. Maurer (1995) 
32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1125 compel a departure.  In Maurer, the 
trial court instructed the jury that misdemeanor child 
annoyance required that “ ‘[the] acts or conduct were motivated 
by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1125, 
italics added.)  The trial court additionally instructed the jury 
that motive was not an element of the crime charged and need 
not be shown.  Reasoning that “the question whether ‘motive’ is 
somehow different from ‘motivation’ or ‘motivated by’ is a 
question of some academic interest but of little practical 
significance,” the Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred 
by not excluding this misdemeanor child annoyance charge from 
the motive instruction of CALJIC No. 2.51.  (Maurer, at p. 1127.)  
Unlike the charge in Maurer, however, the murder by torture 
charge here did not reference or require motive, or any 
derivation of that term.  (Cf. People v. Hillhouse (2002) 
27 Cal.4th 469, 503–504 (Hillhouse) [distinguishing Maurer 
where motive was not element of crime].)  We find no error.   
2. Penetration by a Foreign Object  
 
The trial court instructed the jury that penetration by a 
foreign object under section 289, subdivision (a) requires in 
relevant part that “[t]he penetration was done with the purpose 
and specific intent to cause sexual arousal, gratification or 
abuse.”  The trial court further instructed the jury that “the 
‘specific intent to cause sexual abuse,’ as used in this 
instruction, means a purpose to injure, hurt, cause pain or to 
cause discomfort.  It does not mean that the perpetrator must 
be motivated by sexual gratification or arousal or have a lewd 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
97 
intent.”  Here, again, defendant argues that this “purpose and 
specific intent” element was effectively negated by instructing 
the jury that motive was not an element of this offense.  
 
We have made clear, however, that motive is not an 
element of an offense merely because the offense requires a 
particular purpose or intent.  (See, e.g., Hillhouse, supra, 
27 Cal.4th at pp. 503–504.)  Accordingly, motive was not an 
element of the penetration by a foreign object charges simply by 
virtue of the charges requiring a particular “purpose and specific 
intent.”  (Cf. People v. White (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 198, 
205–206 
[regarding 
the 
“ ‘purpose 
of 
sexual 
arousal, 
gratification, or abuse’ ” requirement of former section 289, 
subdivision (a), “it is the nature of the act that renders the abuse 
‘sexual’ and not the motivations of the perpetrator”].)  Defendant 
points to no authority suggesting otherwise.  We find no error.       
C.  Instruction Regarding Intent to Kill  
 
Defendant contends that the jury was not properly 
instructed regarding the intent-to-kill requirement of the 
torture-murder special circumstance and therefore the jury’s 
finding on this special circumstance violates state and federal 
law and must be reversed.  The trial court instructed the jury 
pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.80.1 that if it found defendant guilty 
of first degree murder, the jury must determine if one or more 
of the following special circumstances are true:  “the murder was 
committed by the defendant while in the commission of, or 
attempted commission of a robbery, rape or burglary; or the 
murder was intentional and involved the intent to inflict 
torture. . . . Unless an intent to kill is an element of a special 
circumstance, if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant actually killed a human being, you need not 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
98 
find that the defendant intended to kill in order to find the 
special circumstance to be true.”  
 
Regarding the torture-murder special circumstance, the 
trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.81.18, 
over the defense’s objection:  “To find that the special 
circumstance, referred to in these instructions as murder 
involving infliction of torture is true, each of the following facts 
must be proved:  [¶] 1. The murder was intentional; and; [¶] 2. 
The defendant intended to inflict extreme cruel physical pain 
and suffering upon a living human being for the purpose of 
revenge, extortion, persuasion or for any sadistic purpose.  
Awareness of pain by the deceased is not a necessary element of 
torture.” 
 
Defendant argues that CALJIC No. 8.81.18’s directive 
that “[t]he murder was intentional” did not adequately instruct 
the jury as to the intent-to-kill requirement of the 
torture-murder special circumstance.  He acknowledges that in 
some cases, CALJIC No. 8.81.18 may adequately instruct the 
jury as to this requirement.  But he argues that where, as here, 
the jury was presented with multiple theories of first degree 
murder — specifically, premeditation and deliberation, torture, 
and felony murder — and two of those theories did not require 
an intent to kill, CALJIC No. 8.81.18’s directive that “[t]he 
murder was intentional” did not necessarily require the jury to 
find that defendant intended to kill but rather required the jury 
simply to find that defendant intended to inflict torture or 
intended to commit the crime of rape, robbery, or burglary.  In 
support of this argument, defendant relies on People v. Pearson 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 306 (Pearson).   
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
99 
 
In Pearson, the trial court included torture in the list of 
felonies on which the jury could base a felony-murder special 
circumstance and as to which the jury needed to find only that 
defendant, if not the actual killer, acted as a major participant 
and with reckless indifference to human life.  (Pearson, supra, 
53 Cal.4th at p. 322.)  This instruction “incorrectly described the 
mental 
state 
element 
of 
the 
torture-murder 
special 
circumstance [citation], which requires the intent to kill.”  (Id. 
at p. 323.)  The trial court thus erred in its instructions on the 
intent-to-kill requirement of the torture-murder special 
circumstance.  
 
We were unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that “the court’s instructional error, the omission of an intent-
to-kill requirement for an accomplice’s liability under the 
torture-murder special circumstance, was harmless.”  (Pearson, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 323.)  The jury’s verdict form showed “its 
reliance on an aiding and abetting theory,” and the jury made 
no finding “as to whether defendant aided and abetted his 
accomplices’ fatal acts with the intent to kill or merely with 
reckless indifference to the victim’s life.”  (Ibid.)  The “confusing” 
language provided on the verdict form for the torture-murder 
special circumstance also “[fell] short of a finding defendant 
personally intended to kill.”  (Id. at p. 323, fn. 7 [“ ‘that the 
defendant . . . committed the murder [of the victim] was 
intentional and involved the infliction of torture’ ”].)  In those 
circumstances, we found that CALJIC No. 8.81.18 did not 
supply the missing intent-to-kill element because CALJIC 
No. 8.81.18 “required the jury to find ‘[t]he murder was 
intentional,’ but not necessarily to find [the aider and abettor] 
personally harbored the intent to kill.”  (Pearson, at p. 323.)   
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
100 
 
Defendant’s reliance on Pearson, however, is misplaced.  
Unlike in Pearson, the instructions here did not include torture 
in the list of felonies on which the jury could base a 
felony-murder special circumstance, or as to which the jury 
needed to find only that defendant acted with reckless 
indifference to human life.  In addition, Pearson addressed 
CALJIC No. 8.81.18 as it applied to an aider and abettor, not 
the actual killer.   
 
“In determining whether a legally inadequate theory was 
conveyed to the jury here, we must ask whether there is a 
‘ “reasonable likelihood” ’ that the jury understood the [relevant 
theory] in a legally impermissible manner.  [Citation.]  In doing 
so, we consider the instructions provided to the jury and 
counsel’s argument to the jury.”  (People v. Canizales (2019) 
7 Cal.5th 591, 613; see also Hardy, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 97.)  
 
The instructions here informed the jury that it need not 
find that defendant intended to kill in order to find a special 
circumstance to be true unless an intent to kill is an element of 
the special circumstance, and that in order to find the torture-
murder special circumstance to be true, it must find that “[t]he 
murder was intentional.”  Where, as here, defendant was the 
actual killer, CALJIC No. 8.81.18’s requirement that “[t]he 
murder was intentional” adequately instructed the jury as to the 
intent-to-kill requirement of the torture-murder special 
circumstance.  (Cf. People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 
1256 [“Further, defendant’s intent to kill was established by the 
jury when it found the torture-murder special circumstance 
true, as that allegation was that ‘[t]he murder was intentional 
and involved the infliction of torture.’ ”]; accord, People v. Leach 
(1985) 41 Cal.3d 92, 108, 110.)  In addition, the prosecutor 
correctly informed the jury that in order to find the torture-
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
101 
murder special circumstance to be true, the jury must find “an 
intentional murder.”24  Accordingly, there was no error in these 
circumstances. 
D.  Felony-Murder Special Circumstances 
 
 
Defendant contends that the felony-murder special 
circumstances are unconstitutional because they do not require 
a finding of a culpable mental state when the defendant is the 
actual killer.  “We have repeatedly held that when the defendant 
is the actual killer, neither intent to kill nor reckless 
indifference to life is a constitutionally required element of the 
felony-murder special circumstance.”  (People v. Jackson (2016) 
1 Cal.5th 269, 347; see People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 
1033–1034.)  We decline to revisit this issue here, particularly 
since the jury found for purposes of another special 
circumstance that Willem’s murder was indeed intentional.   
                                        
24  
The prosecutor argued as follows:  “Finally, we have a 
fourth special circumstance.  The murder was intentional.  
Again, it has to be an, an intentional murder.  Not an implied 
malice murder like with the first degree torture theory that we 
described earlier.  Now we’re into the torture special 
circumstance.  Again, I know there’s some overlapping words 
here, but to get to torture first degree murder, which is what I 
discussed a minute ago.  [¶] Remember, the murder, it has to be 
murder, but there doesn’t have to be an intent to kill.  To get to 
the special circumstance first you have to find that there was an 
intentional murder, and again we’ve established, through the 
method of death, the method of attack, the repetitive nature, 
again the strangulation, we know the murder was intentional.  
There’s no issue there.” 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
102 
IV. COMPETENCY PHASE ISSUES  
 
Admission of Defense Counsel’s Testimony 
Regarding Counsel’s “Strategies and Tactics”  
 
After the guilt phase, the trial court declared a doubt as to 
defendant’s competency, suspended proceedings pursuant to 
section 1368, and commenced a competency trial before a 
separate jury.  Defendant was appointed a different attorney 
from the public defender’s office, David Negus, to represent him 
in the competency trial.  At the competency trial, the defense 
argued that defendant was not able to rationally cooperate with 
his trial counsel, Joseph Canty, and thus was not competent to 
stand trial.  Canty testified on behalf of the defense, and over 
the defense’s objection, the prosecutor cross-examined him.  
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the 
prosecutor to cross-examine Canty about his “trial tactics and 
motive for seeking a competency hearing” because this 
testimony was irrelevant, prejudicial, and protected from 
disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and attorney work 
product doctrine.  We examine each of defendant’s contentions 
in turn.    
1. Competency Trial    
a. Defense evidence  
 
Five doctors testified on behalf of the defense.  Dr. Dudley 
testified that defendant suffered from schizo-affective disorder 
and cognitive deficits and was not able to rationally cooperate 
with his counsel.  Dr. Wu testified that defendant’s PET brain 
scan showed abnormalities that were consistent with 
schizophrenia, and Dr. Meth testified that defendant’s SPECT 
brain scan showed abnormalities, which were consistent with 
those shown in the PET scan.  Dr. Shoba Sreenivasan, a clinical 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
103 
psychologist, testified that defendant was not able to rationally 
cooperate with his counsel.  Dr. Lantz testified that he 
diagnosed 
defendant 
as 
schizophrenic 
undifferentiated, 
determined defendant’s intelligence to be below average, and 
did not believe that defendant was able to rationally cooperate 
with his counsel as a result of his mental illness. 
 
In addition to these doctors, Canty testified.  Before he did, 
the trial court evaluated whether he could testify without 
obtaining an attorney-client privilege waiver from defendant 
and to what extent the prosecutor could cross-examine him.  The 
trial court concluded that Canty could testify without obtaining 
a waiver since it was not clear that defendant was capable of 
waiving the privilege.  The trial court refrained, however, from 
defining the scope of permissible cross-examination at the 
outset, suggesting instead that counsel request to approach the 
bench should the testimony near Canty’s “strategy, motive, trial 
tactics.”   
 
Canty began his direct testimony by describing his 
experience with capital cases and his relationship with 
defendant.  He proceeded to chronicle his concerns about 
defendant’s decision-making in the case, detailing, among other 
things, defendant’s refusal to consider a potential plea deal, his 
desire to testify in the guilt and penalty phases, and his wish to 
present no mitigating evidence during the penalty phase.  Canty 
testified that he did not believe defendant could rationally 
cooperate with him.   
 
On cross-examination, Canty acknowledged that his 
obligation in representing defendant was to exhaust every legal 
remedy that avoids the death penalty.  The prosecutor then 
inquired into prior occasions on which Canty had voiced 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
104 
concerns about defendant’s competency in this case.  With 
respect to one occasion, earlier in this case, Canty confirmed 
that defendant ultimately waived his right to a competency jury 
trial and that “a number of factors” went into that decision, 
including a “tactical” consideration in seeking to avoid pretrial 
publicity.  
 
The prosecutor next asked whether the guilt phase jurors 
were “in limbo” pending the outcome of this competency trial, to 
which Canty confirmed that they were told to “potentially” come 
back later that month.  The prosecutor asked, “And the effect of 
a finding of incompetency in this particular trial would mean 
that that jury would be discharged, would it not?”  Canty 
responded, “That would be up to the Judge.”  When the 
prosecutor directed Canty’s attention to a statutory provision 
(section 1368) — which, according to the prosecutor, provided 
that the jury would be discharged upon a finding of 
incompetency — Canty said he was not familiar with that 
provision.25  The prosecutor then asked, “Well, if there is a 
finding of incompetency, I’m sure you would be arguing that the 
jury should be discharged, would you not?”  Canty replied, 
“That’s hard to know, because you have to know what the 
proposed treatment plan is going to be.  And I don’t know what 
the Judge will feel about keeping the jury.”  The prosecutor 
followed up, asking, “Frequently there’s a, there’s a tactical 
advantage in death penalty cases to have a second, separate jury 
                                        
25  
Later in his testimony, Canty acknowledged that he 
subsequently reviewed the provision and that the prosecutor 
had accurately recited it.  Canty testified that he did not recall 
the provision until the prosecutor had recited it, but 
acknowledged that he previously had discussed the impact of a 
finding of incompetency with his colleagues and the press.   
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
105 
impaneled for the penalty phase that did not hear the guilty 
phase; is that correct?” 
 
The defense immediately asked to approach the bench.  
Outside the presence of the jury, the defense stated, “It sounds 
like we’re getting into Mr. Canty’s tactical decisions.  I realize 
thus far it’s been expressed just in the abstract, but [it would] 
appear that we’re starting to focus in on it in this particular 
case.”  The defense objected to the line of questioning as 
irrelevant and prejudicial.  In response, the prosecutor 
explained that he intended to show that Canty’s motive for this 
competency trial was to obtain a new penalty phase jury.  The 
trial court took the matter under submission.  It ultimately 
ruled that the prosecutor could bring before the jury “this 
question of motivation” for the competency trial.  The trial court 
instructed the prosecutor, however, that he otherwise should 
probably “stay away” from asking about “what’s going on in 
[Canty’s] mind.”     
 
Back in the presence of the jury, the prosecutor returned 
to his question as to whether “[f]requently it’s a defense tactic in 
capital cases to seek a new jury for the penalty phase.”  Canty 
testified, “I can’t answer that yes or no.  I would think that 
depending upon the status of the case and a given case, I could 
conceive that counsel might wish to have another jury handle 
the penalty phase, and there would be a variety of reasons for 
that.”  Asked about another capital case where he had tried the 
penalty phase before a jury, Canty confirmed that he had moved 
for a new penalty phase jury in that case.  The prosecutor’s 
remaining, and relatively extensive, questioning regarded 
Canty’s concerns about defendant’s decision-making in the case.   
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
106 
 
On a brief recross-examination, Canty confirmed that in 
determining defendant’s sentence, the penalty phase jury would 
consider evidence it had heard during the guilt phase.  In the 
event of a new penalty phase jury, he explained that the 
witnesses who testified in the guilt phase would either be 
recalled, or counsel would stipulate as to their testimony.  
Finally, the prosecutor asked whether Canty had previously told 
the prosecution in this case that he may move for a new penalty 
phase jury.  Canty responded, “I — if I — I don’t remember 
making that statement.  I wouldn’t say that I didn’t.  I don’t 
remember saying that.”  The prosecutor followed up, asking, 
“It’s possible?  And by that I mean, motion for a separate penalty 
phase jury?”  Canty responded, “Yes.  If that’s — that’s the 
question I’m answering, yes.”  The parties subsequently 
stipulated that Canty “has not made a motion for separate juries 
for guilt and penalty phase in this case.”  
b. Prosecution evidence  
 
A forensic psychologist, Dr. Lee Guerra, testified that 
defendant was competent to stand trial and that he suspected 
defendant was malingering mental illness.  A psychiatrist, Dr. 
Jose Moral, likewise testified that defendant was competent to 
stand trial and that he, too, suspected defendant was 
malingering mental illness.26   
 
An investigator testified that when he served defendant 
with a court order for a handwriting exemplar, defendant 
refused to comply.  The investigator believed that defendant 
understood the request but considered it to not be in his best 
                                        
26  
In rebuttal, the defense offered testimony from Dr. Ronald 
Roston to refute portions of Dr. Moral’s testimony. 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
107 
interest to comply with it.  A videotape showing defendant 
watching and playing chess with other inmates in jail was also 
played for the jury, and Deputy Billings testified that 
defendant’s behavior on the tape was generally consistent with 
his behavior in jail.27      
2.   Discussion   
a. Whether the testimony was irrelevant and 
unduly prejudicial  
 
Only relevant evidence is admissible.  (Evid. Code, § 350.)  
Relevant evidence is defined as “evidence, including evidence 
relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, 
having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.”  
(Evid. Code, § 210.)  “The court in its discretion may exclude 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue 
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue 
                                        
27  
The prosecutor’s closing argument discussed Canty’s 
possible motivations for the competency trial, in approximately 
two transcript pages of the total 32-page closing argument.  In 
relevant part, the prosecutor argued that Canty’s “role is to use 
every legal means to insure [sic] that Miles escapes the death 
penalty,” and reminded the jury that Canty previously moved 
for a new penalty phase jury in another capital case and that a 
finding of incompetence in this trial would guarantee the same 
result.  The prosecutor urged the jury, “make no mistake that 
the competency issue is played as a tactic,” that Canty used that 
tactic earlier in this case, and that “it is a tactic that gets 
played.”  The prosecutor later repeated, “[c]onsider that 
[defendant’s] attorneys are doing the best they can and they’re 
going to use every legal means so that he avoids the death 
penalty.”  The defense did not object during the prosecutor’s 
closing argument.    
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
108 
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”  
(Evid. Code, § 352.)  “ ‘Prejudice,’ as used in Evidence Code 
section 352, is not synonymous with ‘damaging.’  [Citation.]  
Rather, it refers to evidence that uniquely tends to evoke an 
emotional bias against the defendant as an individual, and has 
little to do with the legal issues raised in the trial.”  (People v. 
McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1095.)   
 
“A trial court has ‘considerable discretion’ in determining 
the relevance of evidence.  [Citation.]  Similarly, the court has 
broad discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude 
even relevant evidence if it determines the probative value of 
the evidence is substantially outweighed by its possible 
prejudicial effects.  [Citation.]  An appellate court reviews a 
court’s rulings regarding relevancy and admissibility under 
Evidence Code section 352 for abuse of discretion.”  (Merriman, 
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 74.)  “ ‘We will not disturb a trial court’s 
exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352 “ ‘except 
on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an 
arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in 
a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Mora and 
Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 480.)    
 
Here, defendant argues that the testimony about Canty’s 
“strategy and tactics” was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.  
Defendant “recognizes that in many cases, evidence of a 
testifying witness’s motivation might be useful to assessing the 
credibility of the witness,” but he argues, with little explanation, 
that Canty “was a sworn officer of the court [and] testifying 
under penalty of perjury.”  Defendant additionally argues that 
“the prosecutor’s theory that Mr. Canty’s state of mind would 
shed light on [defendant’s] mental health required the exact 
type of speculative inference condemned by this court.”  In 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
109 
response, the Attorney General argues that Canty’s testimony 
was relevant both to Canty’s credibility and to show “the 
potential benefits of faking incompetence” since the prosecutor 
argued that defendant was faking incompetence for an ulterior 
purpose.        
 
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion under Evidence Code section 352 when it permitted 
the prosecutor to cross-examine Canty about his possible motive 
for seeking a competency trial.  As noted, Canty was a witness 
during the competency trial and did not represent defendant for 
purposes of that trial.  Whether the guilt phase jury would be 
discharged upon a finding of incompetence, whether there were 
advantages to impaneling a new penalty phase jury, and 
whether Canty previously considered seeking a new penalty 
phase jury in this case is evidence relevant to his credibility as 
a witness in this competency trial.  (Cf. People v. Turner (2004) 
34 Cal.4th 406, 430 [where “defendant’s trial attorneys were 
percipient witnesses during the competency hearing,” the 
prosecutor was “free to attack their credibility based on the 
evidence in the record” and did not commit misconduct by 
suggesting that defendant’s trial attorneys raised the 
competency issue only due to “their emotional involvement in 
the case”].)  To be sure, we recognize the suggestion that Canty 
harbored ulterior motives in testifying at the competency trial 
had possible prejudicial effects.  In the circumstances here, 
however, we cannot say that on balance, the trial court abused 
its discretion in permitting this testimony.  (See People v. Dalton 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 237 [“ ‘ “Evidence is substantially more 
prejudicial than probative” ’ under Evidence Code section 352 
‘ “if, broadly stated, it poses an intolerable ‘risk to the fairness 
of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome.’ ” ’ ”].)   
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
110 
 
As to Canty’s testimony that he previously sought a new 
penalty phase jury in another capital case, defendant did not 
raise a timely and specific objection to this particular testimony.  
Although we acknowledge that defendant objected to the 
prosecutor’s overall efforts to show that Canty’s motive for the 
competency trial was to obtain a new penalty phase jury in this 
case, we find that defendant forfeited any claim of error as to 
this particular testimony regarding the other capital case.  Even 
if we assume for the sake of argument that this portion of his 
claim was preserved and admitting this testimony was error, 
however, we would find any such error harmless in light of 
Canty’s other, properly admitted testimony, including his 
testimony that he “could conceive that counsel might wish to 
have another jury handle the penalty phase, and there would be 
a variety of reasons for that” and that it was “possible” that he 
told the prosecution that he may move for a new penalty phase 
jury in this case.  
b. Whether the testimony was protected by the 
attorney-client privilege and attorney work 
product doctrines   
 
The attorney-client privilege protects from forced 
disclosure “a confidential communication between client and 
lawyer.”  (Evid. Code, § 954.)  The Evidence Code defines 
“confidential communication between client and lawyer” as 
“information transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer 
in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means 
which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to 
no third persons other than those who are present to further the 
interest of the client in the consultation or those to whom 
disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the 
information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
111 
lawyer is consulted, and includes a legal opinion formed and the 
advice given by the lawyer in the course of that relationship.”  
(Evid. Code, § 952.)  The “ ‘fundamental purpose’ ” of the 
attorney-client privilege is “ ‘to safeguard the confidential 
relationship between clients and their attorneys so as to 
promote full and [frank] discussion of the facts and tactics 
surrounding individual legal matters.’ ”  (Los Angeles County 
Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282, 292.)      
 
Defendant contends that admitting Canty’s testimony 
regarding his “tactical decisions” violated the attorney-client 
privilege.  Canty’s challenged testimony, however, did not 
violate the attorney-client privilege because it related primarily 
to general legal principles and publicly available facts.  For 
example, his testimony about the procedural effects of an 
incompetence finding or the potential advantages in impaneling 
a new penalty phase jury spoke to legal concepts in nonspecific 
terms and did not disclose the content of any confidential 
communications between Canty and defendant.  (Cf. People v. 
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 603 [privilege not violated where 
expert witness testified regarding general legal concepts and 
“did not disclose any actual communication between defendant 
and his attorney”].)28  Similarly, his testimony about section 
1368 or about moving for a new penalty phase jury in another 
case did not violate the attorney-client privilege since those facts 
were publicly available.  (See People v. Combs (2004) 
34 Cal.4th 821, 865–866 [privilege not violated by eliciting 
information contained in public record].)   
                                        
28  
Nor did it disclose the content of any legal opinions formed 
in the course of representing defendant, as defendant contends.   
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
112 
 
Admittedly, a couple of the prosecutor’s questions came 
closer to potentially eliciting privileged information.  First, the 
prosecutor asked whether Canty would argue for a new penalty 
phase jury upon a finding of incompetency in this case (putting 
aside any applicable statutory provision).  Although this 
question moved beyond the more general line of questioning, 
Canty’s noncommittal response to this hypothetical question 
that it was “hard to know” and that he did not know “what the 
Judge [would] feel about keeping the jury” fell short of revealing 
any privileged information.  Second, the prosecutor asked 
whether Canty previously told the prosecution that he was 
considering moving for a new penalty phase jury in this case, 
again going beyond the abstract and into the specifics of this 
case.  However, information communicated to the prosecution 
would not have remained privileged.  And in any event, Canty 
testified that, although it was possible, he did not recall whether 
he in fact told the prosecution that.  Thus, despite these closer 
calls, none of his testimony ultimately disclosed any privileged 
information.     
 
As to the attorney work product doctrine, section 1054.6 
currently provides in relevant part that “[n]either the defendant 
nor the prosecuting attorney is required to disclose any 
materials or information which are work product as defined in 
subdivision (a) of Section 2018.030 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, or which are privileged pursuant to an express 
statutory provision, or are privileged as provided by the 
Constitution of the United States.”29  Code of Civil Procedure 
                                        
29  
When defendant committed his crimes and his trial took 
place, “Penal Code section 1054.6 referred to Code of Civil 
 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
113 
section 2018.030, subdivision (a) in turn provides:  “A writing 
that reflects an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or 
legal research or theories is not discoverable under any 
circumstances.”  Code of Civil Procedure section 2018.030, 
subdivision (b) separately provides that “[t]he work product of 
an attorney, other than a writing described in subdivision (a), is 
not discoverable unless the court determines that denial of 
discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery in 
preparing that party’s claim or defense or will result in an 
injustice.”  The policy behind the work product doctrine is to 
“[p]reserve the rights of attorneys to prepare cases for trial with 
that degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare 
their cases thoroughly and to investigate not only the favorable 
but the unfavorable aspects of those cases [and to] [p]revent 
attorneys from taking undue advantage of their adversary’s 
industry and efforts.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2018.020.)  
 
Defendant contends that admitting Canty’s testimony 
regarding his “tactical decisions” not only violated the attorney-
client privilege but also violated the absolute attorney work 
product doctrine.  Defendant argues that admitting this 
testimony violated the attorney work product doctrine, 
regardless of whether the work product was reduced to writing 
or not, because “despite the arguably contrary language of 
California’s absolute work product statute, the privilege also 
applies to non-written work product.”  Disagreeing, the Attorney 
General argues that “[t]he prosecutor’s questions to Canty did 
                                        
Procedure former section 2018, subdivision (c), which then 
stated the absolute work product protection now stated in Code 
of Civil Procedure section 2018.030, subdivision (a).”  (People v. 
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 355, fn. 14.)   
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
114 
not relate to any writing reflecting his impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, legal research or theories and thus could not have 
impinged any valid work product privilege.”  The Attorney 
General further argues that “Canty was not asked to, and did 
not, 
divulge 
any 
otherwise 
privileged 
or 
confidential 
information;” instead, his testimony regarded matters disclosed 
to the prosecutor or in public records, and consisted of evasive 
responses that “did not disclose any unique impressions, 
conclusions, opinions, or theories.”   
 
We need not decide whether Canty’s oral testimony 
qualified as attorney work product or whether admitting it 
violated the attorney work product doctrine.  Even if we assume 
that error occurred, it was not reversible.  The Attorney General 
and defendant disagree as to which standard of prejudice 
applies here.  Regardless, we would find it harmless under 
either standard.  (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818; 
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.)  As Canty 
acknowledged, section 1368 itself provided that the jury would 
be discharged if defendant were found mentally incompetent.  In 
addition, Canty acknowledged that “depending upon the status 
of the case and a given case,” he “could conceive that counsel 
might wish to have another jury handle the penalty phase, and 
there would be a variety of reasons for that.”  Canty also 
acknowledged that it was “possible” that he told the prosecution 
that he may move for a new penalty phase jury in this case.  To 
the extent admitting other portions of Canty’s challenged 
testimony may have violated the attorney work product 
doctrine, we find any such error harmless in light of Canty’s 
properly admitted testimony.  We therefore find no reversible 
error.    
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
115 
V.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Admission of Evidence of Crimes Committed as 
a Juvenile  
 
Over the defense’s objection, the trial court took judicial 
notice of 14 of defendant’s prior convictions.  Eight of these 
convictions were for crimes that defendant committed when he 
was 17 years old.  Defendant contends that considering those 
convictions violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.  This contention fails.  
 
If a defendant committed an offense while under the age 
of 18, but was tried and convicted as an adult, “the conviction 
would be admissible at the penalty phase under section 190.3, 
factor (c).”  (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 462; 
People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 256–257.)  Defendant 
acknowledges this but urges us to reconsider the issue based on 
the high court’s decisions in Roper v. Simmons (2005) 
543 U.S. 551, Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, Miller v. 
Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, and Hall v. Florida (2014) 
572 U.S. 701.  We recently rejected a similar argument 
premised on those same four decisions and held that presenting 
evidence of a defendant’s violent juvenile misconduct under 
section 190.3, factor (b) did not violate the Eighth Amendment.30  
(See Rices, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 86–87.)  We likewise reject 
                                        
30  
Even where “[j]uvenile adjudications are inadmissible as 
evidence in aggravation . . . because they are not ‘prior felony 
convictions’ within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (c),” 
violent “conduct underlying the adjudication is relevant to the 
jury’s penalty determination and admissible as violent criminal 
activity under [section 190.3] factor (b).”  (People v. Taylor (2010) 
48 Cal.4th 574, 653.)  
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
116 
defendant’s argument here and find no error in admitting 
defendant’s prior convictions under section 190.3, factor (c).    
B.  Admission of Evidence of Unadjudicated 
Offenses  
 
The prosecution devoted part of its case in aggravation to 
unadjudicated criminal activity and presented testimony 
concerning four incidents involving Yenerall, Heynen, Kendrick, 
and Arnold.  Defendant, however, contends that permitting 
Yenerall, Heynen, Kendrick, and Arnold to testify violated his 
state and federal constitutional rights to a reliable penalty 
phase, due process, a fair trial, and confrontation, and to present 
a defense because the state lost or destroyed the following 
evidence relating to those four incidents:  information as to 
which suspect sketches Yenerall and Heynen saw; a photo 
lineup in which Yenerall recalled identifying defendant; the 
Steven Dyer photo lineup shown to Heynen; the Randy Winters 
photo lineup shown to Kendrick; and the Roger Egans photo 
lineup shown to Arnold.31  We disagree. 
1. Background  
a. Yenerall    
 
Following the January 6, 1992 incident, Yenerall viewed a 
photo lineup in which she identified a man named Orlando 
Boone.  That lineup was provided to the defense.  She 
subsequently attended a live lineup that included Boone, but 
she did not identify him.  After that, there is disagreement as to 
whether she viewed another photo lineup:  She recalled viewing 
                                        
31  
Although defendant initially contended that he also did 
not know whom Heynen identified in the Boone photo lineup, 
defendant conceded this point in his reply brief.    
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
117 
another one and identifying defendant in it, but the police had 
no record of any such lineup and believed she misremembered 
it.  
 
In addition, she viewed a sketch of the suspect.  The police 
composed several suspect sketches during the investigation, and 
it appears that those sketches were provided to the defense in 
this case.  As to which sketch she personally saw, she did not 
recall, but Detective Lore testified that she saw one of two 
specific sketches.  The defense argued, however, that “[a]lthough 
[Detective Lore] believed [Yenerall was shown] one of two 
composites in evidence, he did not know which one was shown 
to Yenerall and so that evidence is unavailable to the 
defendant.”  Later, she identified defendant during a live lineup 
and at the preliminary hearing. 
 
During the penalty phase of the trial, she identified 
defendant in the courtroom, testifying, “I’m certain” as to that 
identification.  She also testified about previously identifying 
defendant during the live lineup and during the preliminary 
hearing.  Regarding the live lineup, she explained that she did 
not write a number on the lineup identification card but instead 
directly informed one of the detectives about her identification 
and was “very certain” about it.  On cross-examination, she 
admitted that her hesitancy to write down a number on the card 
reflected “[s]ome” uncertainty but explained that she chose not 
to write down a number because she was not obligated to do so.  
 
Also on cross-examination, she confirmed that she 
previously viewed a photo lineup in which she identified an 
individual other than defendant and expressed “some great 
degree of certainty” as to that identification.  Asked whether she 
identified an individual named Orlando Boone, she testified that 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
118 
she did not recall the name of the individual but that this 
individual subsequently attended a live lineup, where she did 
not identify him or anyone else.         
b. Heynen  
 
Heynen testified that she saw at least four photo lineups 
after the January 21, 1992 incident.  She recalled possibly 
pointing to someone as close in three lineups but did not recall 
identifying anyone.  According to Detective Lore, Heynen later 
was not sure whether she actually saw that many lineups.   
 
Detective Lore testified that Heynen viewed three photo 
lineups and one book containing parolee pictures.  The first 
photo lineup, shown on March 12, 1992, included an individual 
named Steven Dyer.  Detective Lore testified that Heynen did 
not identify Dyer in this lineup, but Detective Lore’s notes 
indicated that Heynen said, “it could be him.”  This photo lineup 
was disassembled and not provided to the defense.  The 
prosecution, however, provided the defense with a picture of 
Dyer, although it was not the picture used in the disassembled 
lineup.  The same day as that lineup, she viewed a book of 
parolee pictures and said that an individual named Damon 
Cooper looked familiar.  The book was provided to the defense.  
The second photo lineup included Boone.  She identified another 
individual in that lineup, and the lineup was provided to the 
defense.  The third photo lineup included defendant, and 
Heynen said, “it could be” him.   
 
She also saw a suspect sketch and assisted the police in 
creating another sketch.  As noted, it appears that the sketches 
were provided to the defense.  The prosecutor declared that “all 
of the composites are available;” however, the defense argued 
that “like those shown to [Yenerall], the composites [shown to 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
119 
Heynen] are unidentifiable.”  Later, she identified defendant 
during a live lineup and at the preliminary hearing. 
 
During the penalty phase of the trial, Heynen identified 
defendant in the courtroom, testifying that she was “[v]ery 
certain” regarding her identification.  She testified that she had 
previously identified defendant during a live lineup and during 
the preliminary hearing as well.  On cross-examination, she said 
that she had previously viewed photo lineups on “[a]bout” four 
occasions.  Asked whether on two of those occasions she selected 
anyone in the lineup, she responded, “That appeared to be 
close.”  She explained that in those two selections, the 
individuals could have been the perpetrator, but she was not 
sure.  Asked whether she selected a picture of defendant and 
said it could be him, she testified that she was never told 
whether any of the pictures were of defendant.             
c. Kendrick 
 
After the February 19, 1992 incident, Kendrick recalled 
viewing two photo lineups.  He testified that he did not identify 
anyone in either of these lineups.  However, Detective Lore 
testified that in one of these lineups, on March 26, 1992, 
Kendrick identified an individual named Randy Winters with a 
certainty of eight out of ten.  This photo lineup was disassembled 
and not available to the defense.  The prosecution, however, 
provided the defense with a copy of Winters’s DMV picture, 
which was not the picture used in the disassembled lineup.  
 
In addition, Kendrick saw a sketch of the suspect and 
assisted the police in creating another sketch of the suspect, 
both of which were provided to the defense.  Later, Kendrick 
identified defendant during a live lineup and at the preliminary 
hearing.         
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
120 
 
During the penalty phase, Kendrick identified defendant 
in the courtroom and testified that he had previously identified 
defendant during the live lineup as well.  He further testified 
that he had previously viewed two photo lineups but did not 
identify anyone in them.  The defense did not cross-examine 
Kendrick.          
d. Arnold Andersen 
 
Arnold Andersen testified that he viewed photo lineups on 
several occasions after the February 21, 1992 robbery, but he 
did not recall identifying anyone in them.  Detective Lore 
testified that Arnold viewed two photo lineups.  As to one of 
these lineups, Detective Lore testified that Arnold did not 
identify anyone but said that one individual was close.  As to the 
other, Sergeant Howard Woods testified that Arnold said an 
individual named Roger Egans was the closest, with an 80 
percent certainty, on May 21, 1992.  Once Egans was eliminated 
as a suspect, this lineup was disassembled.  The prosecution 
gave the defense a copy of Egans’s DMV photo, but the photo 
was not the one used in the disassembled lineup.   
 
Arnold also saw a sketch of the suspect that his wife, 
Sharyn, assisted in creating.  He subsequently identified 
defendant during a live lineup and at the preliminary hearing 
as well.          
 
During their penalty phase testimony, both Arnold and 
Sharyn identified defendant in the courtroom.  They testified 
that they had previously identified defendant during a live 
lineup, too.  Regarding the photo lineups, Arnold testified that 
he had previously viewed two or three photo lineups but did not 
identify anyone in them.  The defense did not cross-examine 
either Arnold or Sharyn.  
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
121 
e. Trial court’s ruling  
 
The prosecution originally filed an information that 
included charges relating to the January 6, January 21, 
February 19, and February 21, 1992 incidents.32  Following the 
preliminary hearing, the defense moved to strike identification 
testimony by certain witnesses under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 
373 U.S. 83 (Brady) and California v. Trombetta (1984) 
467 U.S. 479 (Trombetta).  That motion was denied.  The 
defense also moved to dismiss the information under section 995 
on the ground, inter alia, that admitting the identification 
testimony violated defendant’s constitutional rights.  That 
motion, too, was denied.  The trial court agreed that the missing 
evidence — which the court characterized “generally as the lost 
either photographs, composites or photo spreads” — was 
important but found that there was no willful or malicious 
conduct by the state.     
 
Later, the defense moved to sever the counts involving 
eyewitness identifications from the Willem, Christine C., 
Osburn, and Carole D. counts on the ground, inter alia, that 
severance was an appropriate sanction under section 1054.5 due 
to the missing evidence related to the eyewitness counts.  The 
defense simultaneously moved again under Brady, supra, 
373 U.S. 83 and Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479 to preclude any 
pretrial or in-court identification testimony by, among others, 
Yenerall, Heynen, Kendrick, and Arnold.  The trial court 
                                        
32  
Even earlier in the case, the defense successfully moved to 
quash an indictment on the ground that evidence regarding 
earlier identifications made by some witnesses had not been 
presented to the grand jury.  At that time, the prosecutor 
acknowledged that certain exculpatory evidence indeed had not 
been presented. 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
122 
granted defendant’s motion for severance but denied his motion 
to exclude the identification testimony.  When the defense 
moved to have the severed eyewitness counts tried before the 
other counts, the court denied the motion. 
 
Before the penalty phase, the defense moved to exclude 
evidence 
of 
these 
severed, 
unadjudicated 
offenses 
or 
alternatively, to have them tried by another jury.  The trial court 
found that the “confusion that underlies” the identifications 
could be brought before the jury without the missing evidence.  
The court also found that there was no “willful, purposeful, 
malicious intent on the part of the police in destroying evidence 
that could have been helpful to Mr. Miles,” explaining that 
“these were line-ups that were put together early in the 
investigation, substantially prior to Mr. Miles being a suspect,” 
and in those cases where the police followed up on photo lineups 
shown to the victims and “found that the person could not have 
been the perpetrator,” the police “probably felt that there was 
no longer a need to keep those photo line-ups intact.”  The court 
denied the motion.    
2. Discussion    
The Attorney General frames defendant’s contentions 
regarding the lost or destroyed evidence under Trombetta, 
supra, 467 U.S. 479.  Defendant makes clear in his reply brief, 
however, that he does “not raise a Trombetta/Youngblood Due 
Process claim.”  Rather, he raises an Eighth Amendment claim 
based on the heightened reliability standard in capital cases and 
Gardner v. Florida (1977) 430 U.S. 349 (Gardner), and he 
additionally asserts violations of his state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, confrontation 
and to present a defense.  In light of defendant’s express 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
123 
clarification, we do not address his contentions under 
Trombetta.   
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the circumstances here 
are unlike those in Gardner, supra, 430 U.S. 349, on which 
defendant heavily relies.  In Gardner, the high court vacated a 
death sentence where the trial court sentenced the defendant to 
death due in part to information in a presentence investigation 
report, portions of which were provided to the trial court but not 
disclosed to the defendant.  (Id. at pp. 351, 353, 356, 362.)  By 
contrast, no evidence in this case was provided to and relied on 
by the trial judge, but not disclosed to the defense.  
Indeed, we have previously rejected an argument relying 
on Gardner, supra, 430 U.S. 349 in circumstances like those 
here.  In People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1160–1161, 
the defendant claimed that he was deprived of his right to a 
reliable sentencing determination and a fair opportunity to 
confront and rebut evidence against him because certain 
evidence related to an unadjudicated charge had been lost, 
including photos shown to the victim.  We held that despite this 
lost evidence, there was no unfairness in admitting evidence 
regarding the unadjudicated charge.  (Id. at pp. 1162–1163.)  
Here, as in Rodrigues, we conclude that the loss of evidence did 
not deprive defendant of a fair trial or a reliable sentencing 
determination.   
First, as to the suspect sketches viewed by Yenerall and 
Heynen, defendant argues on appeal that “although various 
composite sketches were available, since police could not recall 
which sketch had been shown to [Yenerall or Heynen], whatever 
value there was in the sketches was gone.”  The defense, 
however, implicitly acknowledged having received the suspect 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
124 
sketches, and the defense could ask Yenerall and Heynen about 
them.  Second, as to a photo lineup in which Yenerall recalled 
identifying defendant, the police did not believe any such lineup 
ever existed, and Yenerall recalled identifying defendant, not 
someone else, in it.  Although defendant suggests that this 
missing lineup may explain how she initially identified Boone 
yet later identified defendant, this theory, too, is speculative.  It 
also ignores that between her photo identification of Boone and 
her identification of defendant, she attended a live lineup where 
she did not identify Boone, making her later identification of 
defendant less sudden than defendant suggests.  Moreover, the 
defense cross-examined Yenerall about her earlier identification 
in a photo lineup of an individual other than defendant, and 
about her hesitancy to write down a number on the card when 
she identified defendant in a live lineup. 
As to the remaining missing evidence (the Dyer, Winters, 
and Egans photo lineups), defendant’s contentions pose a closer 
call but ultimately, too, fall short.  There is conflicting testimony 
as to whether Heynen, Kendrick, and Arnold made any 
identifications in the lineups, and the lineups took place before 
defendant was a suspect.  In addition, the prosecutor provided 
the defense with pictures of Dyer, Winters, and Egans, and 
while those pictures were not comparable to the missing lineups, 
the defense could ask Heynen, Kendrick, and Arnold about those 
pictures and about their identifications.  Indeed, the defense 
cross-examined Heynen about having viewed photo lineups on 
“[a]bout” four occasions and having selected persons who 
“appeared to be close” on two of those occasions; the defense had 
the opportunity but declined to cross-examine Kendrick or 
Arnold.  In these circumstances, we find no error and conclude 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
125 
that admitting the testimony of these four witnesses did not 
violate defendant’s state or federal constitutional rights.   
Even assuming for the sake of argument that admitting 
this testimony was error, it was not reversible.  “[E]rror in the 
admission of evidence under section 190.3, factor (b) is 
reversible only if ‘there is a reasonable possibility it affected the 
verdict,’ a standard that is ‘essentially the same as the harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California[, 
supra,] 
386 U.S. 18, 
24.’ ” 
 
(People 
v. 
Lewis 
(2008) 
43 Cal.4th 415, 527.)  Certainly, there was no reasonable 
possibility that admitting Arnold’s testimony affected the 
penalty verdict because his wife, Sharyn, testified about the 
same incident and identified defendant during her testimony.  
Defendant, too, acknowledged on cross-examination that he 
robbed the Andersens, as well as Yenerall.  There was no 
reasonable possibility that admitting the testimony of Yenerall, 
Heynen, and Kendrick affected the penalty verdict either, in 
light of the volume of other evidence presented, including the 
details of Willem’s brutal murder, the Christine C., Osburn, 
Carole D., Bridget E., and Steve H. crimes, defendant’s 14 other 
convictions, and the victim impact evidence.  There was no 
reversible error.     
C.  Admission of Victim Impact Evidence 
Regarding Prior Crime  
 
Over the defense’s objection, Bridget E. testified about the 
effects of the June 16, 1992 incident on her health, career, and 
personality.  Defendant contends that the trial court erred by 
admitting her testimony because, according to defendant, 
admitting victim impact evidence for prior crimes under section 
190.3, factor (b) is improper and unconstitutional.  Defendant’s 
argument relies on five out-of-state decisions, a textual 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
126 
distinction between section 190.3, factors (a) and (b), and People 
v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212 (Boyde). 
 
We have previously found unpersuasive the five out-of-
state decisions upon which defendant relies.  (See People v. 
Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 618.)  We have also disagreed that 
“the textual distinction between section 190.3, factors (a) and (b) 
compels the conclusion that the electorate intended to preclude 
victim impact testimony and argument relating to violent 
criminal activity other than the capital crime.”  (People v. 
Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 647.)  In addition, we have 
overruled Boyde, supra, 46 Cal.3d 212 “to the extent it concludes 
that victim impact evidence relating to factor (b) criminal 
activity is inadmissible, and reaffirm[ed] the unbroken line of 
authority 
beginning 
with 
People 
v. 
Benson 
[(1990)] 
52 Cal.3d 754, which has approved evidence and prosecutorial 
argument regarding the impact of the defendant’s factor (b) 
crimes on the victims of that criminal activity.”  (Johnson, at 
p. 648.)  We find no error here.  
D.  Admission of Victim Impact Evidence Related 
to Capital Crime 
Over defendant’s objection, the trial court admitted victim 
impact evidence related to Willem’s murder consisting of 
testimony from her family members, a short videotape depicting 
her singing, and a photograph of her that resembled how she 
looked around the time of her death.  We have previously 
permitted the admission of similar victim impact evidence (see, 
e.g., People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 577–579 [admission 
of family member testimony and four-minute videotape 
depicting 
victim 
at 
family 
celebration]; 
Vines, 
supra, 
51 Cal.4th at p. 888 [admission of videotape depicting victim 
singing and dancing]), and defendant does not argue that there 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
127 
was anything improper about the amount or content of the 
specific victim impact evidence here.  Defendant, however, 
argues that section 190.3, factor (a) has been improperly 
interpreted by this court to allow victim impact evidence in 
violation of state and federal law and accordingly calls for a 
wholesale reconsideration of existing precedent beginning with 
People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787.  We recently rejected 
the same statutory argument in People v. Seumanu (2015) 
61 Cal.4th 1293, 1366–1368.  We see no reason to reconsider it 
now and thus find no error here.           
E. Asserted Juror Misconduct  
 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it 
declined to discharge Juror No. 12 after he saw newspaper 
headlines about defendant’s competency trial.  We disagree.  We 
conclude that there was no substantial likelihood of juror bias 
and there was no violation of defendant’s federal or state 
constitutional rights.   
1. Background  
 
After the trial court declared a doubt as to defendant’s 
competency and suspended proceedings, the trial court met 
individually with each of the guilt phase jurors and informed 
them that there was an issue — about which the court could not 
reveal the details — that would cause a significant delay before 
beginning the penalty phase.  The court individually 
admonished each of the jurors to avoid discussing or reading 
about the case in the interim.  When the court met individually 
with Juror No. 12, the court instructed Juror No. 12, “[P]lease 
don’t discuss what we’ve talked about with any of the other 
jurors.  And if there’s anything in the newspaper about this case, 
please don’t read that.”        
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
128 
 
Several months later, the guilt phase jurors returned for 
the penalty phase.  At the defense’s request, the jurors filled out 
a supplemental questionnaire concerning whether they had 
read, heard, or discussed anything about the case since 
rendering the verdict.  The first question asked, “Have you read 
anything in a newspaper about this case since rendering your 
verdict on March 18, 1999?”  Juror No. 12 checked “yes” in 
response to this question and commented, “I have read the 
headlines, but not the article itself.”  Juror No. 12 checked “no” 
in response to the remaining two questions, indicating that he 
had not heard anything about the case from any other source or 
discussed the case with any of the other jurors since rendering 
the verdict.       
 
The trial court and counsel inquired further into Juror No. 
12’s responses.  Juror No. 12 explained that he had seen 
“[p]robably like two or three” newspaper headlines.  Asked 
whether he “[j]ust saw the headlines, recognized it was about 
the case, and then didn’t read anything further?” he replied, 
“That’s right.”  He said that there was not anything about what 
he had read that caused him to come to any opinions or 
conclusions or that would affect or influence his ultimate 
decision in this case.  He acknowledged, however, that from 
these headlines, he knew that a competency trial took place and 
knew its result.  Asked about his reaction to this information, 
he responded, “All I knew is that I would be coming back.  That’s 
about all I thought about it.”  Asked to explain, he said that he 
had assumed he probably would not be returning if the 
competency trial had ended differently because the competency 
trial “was a part of the sentencing or whatever.”  He confirmed 
that he had not discussed any of this information with anybody 
else.     
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
129 
 
The defense moved to excuse and replace Juror No. 12.  
The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that Juror No. 12 
had neither violated the court’s order by seeing the newspaper 
headlines nor formed any opinions or conclusions based on 
them.  The trial court found, “The impression I get was that in 
going through the newspaper, naturally in skimming the 
headlines you can see that this is something about the case, and 
at that point he stopped reading and did not read the 
content. . . . I didn’t tell them not to read the papers.  I just told 
them not to read anything about the case.  I don’t think he 
violated the Court’s order.”  The trial court continued, “I didn’t 
get the impression from anything that he said that he had 
formed any opinions or conclusions.  In fact, he said he didn’t, 
and that it wouldn’t affect his decision in this case.”   
2. Discussion   
 
“A defendant accused of a crime has a constitutional right 
to a trial by unbiased, impartial jurors.”  (People v. Nesler (1997) 
16 Cal.4th 561, 578 (Nesler).)  “Juror misconduct, such as the 
receipt of information about a party or the case that was not part 
of the evidence received at trial, leads to a presumption that the 
defendant was prejudiced thereby and may establish juror bias.”  
(Ibid.)  Even a juror’s “inadvertent receipt of information that 
had not been presented in court falls within the general category 
of ‘juror misconduct.’ ”  (Id. at p. 579.)   
 
“[W]hen misconduct involves the receipt of information 
from extraneous sources, the effect of such receipt is judged by 
a review of the entire record, and may be found to be 
nonprejudicial.  The verdict will be set aside only if there 
appears a substantial likelihood of juror bias.  Such bias can 
appear in two different ways.  First, we will find bias if the 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
130 
extraneous material, judged objectively, is inherently and 
substantially likely to have influenced the juror.  [Citations.]  
Second, we look to the nature of the misconduct and the 
surrounding circumstances to determine whether it is 
substantially likely the juror was actually biased against the 
defendant.  [Citation.]  The judgment must be set aside if the 
court finds prejudice under either test.”  (In re Carpenter (1995) 
9 Cal.4th 634, 653.)  “We emphasize that before a unanimous 
verdict is set aside, the likelihood of bias under either test must 
be substantial.”  (Id. at p. 654.)  “Jurors are not automatons.  
They are imbued with human frailties as well as virtues.  If the 
system is to function at all, we must tolerate a certain amount 
of imperfection short of actual bias.  To demand theoretical 
perfection from every juror during the course of a trial is 
unrealistic.”  (Id. at pp. 654–655.)    
 
In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, “[w]e accept the trial 
court’s credibility determinations and findings on questions of 
historical fact if supported by substantial evidence.  [Citations.]  
Whether prejudice arose from juror misconduct, however, is a 
mixed question of law and fact subject to an appellate court’s 
independent determination.”  (Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at 
p. 582.)   
 
We need not decide whether juror misconduct occurred 
here because, in any event, we find no substantial likelihood of 
juror bias.  (See People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 819.)  
The headlines were not so prejudicial in and of themselves that 
they were inherently and substantially likely to have influenced 
a juror during the penalty phase.  Although the precise content 
of the headlines is not clear from the record, nothing suggests 
that they were inflammatory or biased in their presentation of 
the facts, or that they conveyed additional information about the 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
131 
competency trial such as the issues involved, the evidence 
presented, or the testimony heard.  The relevance of the 
competency verdict, or its potential for prejudice, was further 
diminished at the penalty phase since the task of jurors at the 
penalty phase was qualitatively different from that at the 
competency trial.  Learning only that a competency trial took 
place and that defendant was found competent was therefore 
“not akin to a bell that could not be unrung.”  (In re Boyette 
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 866, 893; id. at p. 892 [contrasting extraneous 
information in case to “a suppressed confession or evidence of 
other crimes that the trial court had excluded as too 
prejudicial”]; cf. People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 520–522 
[newspaper accounts of trial were not inherently prejudicial and 
did not prejudice the verdict].)     
 
Nor was it substantially likely that Juror No. 12 was 
“actually biased” against defendant.  Defendant does not 
contend that Juror No. 12 was actually biased, and nothing in 
the record suggests such bias existed.  Mindful of the trial 
court’s admonitions to avoid news coverage of the case, Juror 
No. 12 did not read any newspaper articles about the case but 
promptly informed the trial court that he had seen a few 
headlines.  He made clear that he did not form any opinions or 
conclusions based on the headlines, nor did he discuss them with 
anyone.  His only reaction to the information was that he “would 
be coming back.  That’s about all [he] thought about it.”  The 
trial court found his representations credible, and substantial 
evidence supports this finding.  (See People v. Stanley (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 913, 951 [accepting credibility determinations 
regarding juror’s recollection of newspaper article]; see also In 
re Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 657 [juror not discussing 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
132 
information with other jurors tends to negate inference of 
bias].)33   
 
Having found no substantial likelihood of juror bias, we 
reject defendant’s assertion that Juror No. 12’s exposure to 
these headlines impeded his ability to fairly weigh defendant’s 
mitigating evidence in violation of his federal constitutional 
rights.  Defendant characterizes Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 
472 U.S. 320 as instructive.  In Caldwell, the high court vacated 
a death judgment where the prosecutor had “urged the jury not 
to view itself as determining whether the defendant would die, 
because a death sentence would be reviewed for correctness by 
the State Supreme Court.”  (Id. at p. 323.)  The high court has 
“since read Caldwell as ‘relevant only to certain types of 
comment[s] — those that mislead the jury as to its role in the 
sentencing process in a way that allows the jury to feel less 
responsible than it should for the sentencing decision.’ ”  
(Romano v. Oklahoma (1994) 512 U.S. 1, 9; see also In re 
Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 649 [discussing Romano as 
limiting Caldwell].)   
 
Here, there was no evidence to suggest that Juror No. 12 
was unable to consider defendant’s mitigating evidence or felt 
any less responsible for making a penalty determination after 
seeing these headlines — much less that he was misled to 
believe himself to be so.  (See People v. Montes (2014) 
                                        
33  
Defendant asserts that the trial court did not admonish 
Juror No. 12 to disregard the headlines, but the Attorney 
General accurately points out that the court incorporated its 
guilt phase jury instructions into its penalty phase jury 
instructions, including, “You must decide all questions of fact in 
this case from the evidence received in this trial and not from 
any other source.” 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
133 
58 Cal.4th 809, 896 [even assuming the juror committed 
misconduct by consulting religious passages, “those passages 
did not lessen the juror’s personal sense of responsibility by 
shifting the decision to some other entity”].)  We thus conclude 
that the trial court did not err.   
F.  Instruction to Alternate Jurors 
 
The trial court excused two of the seated guilt phase jurors 
and replaced them with two alternate jurors before the penalty 
phase began.  The court then instructed the jury that “[f]or the 
purposes of this penalty phase of the trial, the alternate jurors 
must accept as having been proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
those guilty verdicts and true findings rendered by the jury in 
the guilt phase of this trial.”34  Defendant objected to having the 
two alternate jurors try the penalty phase but did not object to 
this specific instruction.  He now contends that this instruction 
violated his federal and state constitutional rights to a fair 
                                        
34  
In full, CALJIC No. 17.51.1 provided as follows:  
“Members of the Jury:  [¶] Two jurors have been replaced by 
alternate jurors.  [¶] The alternate jurors were present during 
the presentation of all of the evidence, arguments of counsel, 
and reading of instructions, during the guilt phase of the trial.  
However, the alternate jurors did not participate in the jury 
deliberations which resulted in the verdicts and findings 
returned by you to this point.  For the purposes of this penalty 
phase of the trial, the alternate jurors must accept as having 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, those guilty verdicts 
and true findings rendered by the jury in the guilt phase of this 
trial.  Your function now is to determine, along with the other 
jurors, in light of the prior verdict or verdicts, and findings, and 
the evidence and law, what penalty should be imposed.  Each of 
you who now compose the jury must participate fully in the 
deliberations, including any review as may be necessary of the 
evidence presented in the guilt phase of the trial.”     
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
134 
penalty trial, reliable sentencing decision, equal protection, due 
process, and effective assistance of trial counsel.   
 
Assuming defendant’s claim was not forfeited, it fails on 
the merits.  (See § 1259 [preserving claims of instructional error 
affecting substantial rights despite lack of objection below].)  We 
have made clear that “[a]s a matter of law, the penalty phase 
jury must conclusively accept [the guilt phase jury’s] findings” 
as to the defendant’s guilt and the truth of the special 
circumstance allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. 
Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 256 (Harrison).)  We have also 
rejected the suggestion “that anytime a juror is replaced at the 
penalty phase, the jury should engage in guilt phase 
deliberations anew.”  (People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 
548.)  And, most notably, in People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1 
(Cain), we found no constitutional defect in the trial court 
instructing the jury, including a new juror who replaced an 
excused juror, that it must accept the guilt phase verdicts and 
findings at the penalty phase.  (Id. at pp. 64, 66.)  
 
Nor do we find People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 708 
to be inconsistent, as defendant contends.  In Kaurish, the 
defendant claimed that a replacement juror should have been 
instructed at the penalty phase that she “was not bound by the 
other jurors’ earlier determination of guilt, but could vote 
against the death penalty if she doubted defendant’s guilt.”  
(Ibid.)  We rejected this claim, finding that the replacement 
juror was instructed about considering lingering doubt as a 
mitigating factor, that instruction “made it clear that she could 
vote against the death penalty if she disagreed with the guilt 
phase verdict, and no further instruction was necessary.”  (Ibid.)  
This concept of lingering doubt, however, is distinct from and 
consistent with the jury’s obligation to accept the guilt phase 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
135 
verdicts and special circumstance findings as proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt at the penalty phase.  (Harrison, supra, 
35 Cal.4th at p. 256 [jurors may consider lingering doubt as 
mitigating circumstance but cannot relitigate or reconsider 
matters resolved at guilt phase]; Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 67 
[same].)35   
 
In short, we discern no error in the trial court’s 
instructions here.   
VI.  OTHER ISSUES 
 
A. Challenge to California’s Death Penalty Law as 
Not Adequately Narrowing the Class of 
Death-Penalty Eligible Defendants 
 
Defendant urges that California’s death penalty law 
violates the Eighth Amendment because it does not sufficiently 
narrow the class of death-eligible defendants, based on statistics 
drawn primarily from published decisions of this court and the 
Court of Appeal, as well as unpublished decisions of the Court 
of Appeal, First District, between 1988 and 1992.  We have 
repeatedly rejected similar statistics-based arguments claiming 
that the multiplicity of the statute’s special circumstances fails 
to sufficiently narrow the class of death-eligible defendants.  
(See, e.g., People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 934; People v. 
Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 303–304; People v. Jones (2003) 
30 Cal.4th 1084, 1127–1128.)  Defendant offers no persuasive 
reason to reconsider this issue.   
                                        
35  
The trial court in this case gave CALJIC No. 8.85, which 
we have held to sufficiently cover the concept of lingering doubt.  
(See People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 767–768.)  
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
136 
B.  Other Challenges to California’s Death Penalty 
Law 
Defendant raises numerous challenges to California’s 
death penalty law that we have repeatedly rejected and continue 
to reject as follows.   
Section 190.3, factor (i) (the age of the defendant) is not 
unconstitutionally vague.  (Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 
512 U.S. 967, 977; People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 358.)  
The death penalty statute as construed by this court does not 
fail to perform the narrowing function required by the Eighth 
Amendment.  (Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 304.)  “Penal 
Code sections 190.2 and 190.3 are not impermissibly broad, and 
factor (a) of Penal Code section 190.3 does not make imposition 
of the death penalty arbitrary and capricious.”  (People v. 
Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 487.)  Other than the penalty 
verdict itself, the jury need not achieve unanimity.  (Ibid.)  The 
trial court did not “violate defendant’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or 
Fourteenth Amendment rights in failing to instruct the jury 
that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
aggravating 
factors 
outweigh 
the 
mitigating 
factors.”  
(Schmeck, at p. 304.)  The trial court’s instructions need not 
delete inapplicable sentencing factors, delineate between 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, or specify a burden 
of proof either as to aggravation (except for section 190.3, 
factor (b) or (c) evidence) or the penalty decision.  (Schmeck, at 
p. 305.) 
 
“Nor 
are 
potentially 
mitigating 
factors 
unconstitutionally limited by the adjectives ‘extreme’ and 
‘substantial’ . . . .”  (Ibid.)  The sentencing factors are not vague 
and ill-defined.  (Ibid.)  “California’s use of the death penalty 
does not violate international law.”  (Sánchez, at p. 488.)  
Allowing the jury that adjudicated the defendant’s guilt to weigh 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
137 
and consider his uncharged crimes in determining the penalty 
is constitutional.  (People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 77.)  
C.  Cumulative Prejudice   
 
Defendant contends the combined errors require reversal 
of his convictions and death sentence even if the errors are not 
prejudicial when considered individually.  We have assumed 
errors but found no prejudice.  Considering these assumed 
errors altogether, we conclude that reversal is not warranted.   
VII.  DISPOSITION 
 
We affirm the judgment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
S086234 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
Defendant Johnny Duane Miles, a black man, was 
sentenced to death for raping and murdering Nancy Willem, a 
white woman.  During jury selection, the prosecutor removed 
the first three black jurors available for peremptory challenge.  
Miles objected to the strikes as racially motivated under Batson 
v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson) and People v. Wheeler 
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 258.  The prosecutor gave reasons for each 
strike, and the trial court rejected Miles’s Batson claim. 
At the time of the ruling, the prosecutor had used three of 
his first six peremptory strikes to remove every black juror in 
the jury box who had not been excused for cause.  At the end of 
jury selection, no black juror was seated on the main panel.  
Among the six alternate jurors, only one was black.  As a result, 
the black defendant in this case, charged with raping and 
murdering a white woman, was tried and convicted by a jury 
that included no black member. 
On appeal, Miles challenges the prosecutor’s strikes of two 
black prospective jurors, Kevin C. and Simeon G.  I agree that 
Miles has not shown purposeful discrimination with respect to 
the strike of Kevin C. in light of his ambivalent responses 
regarding the death penalty and the two other reasons given for 
his excusal.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 37–52.)  But the record 
shows that each of the prosecutor’s stated reasons for striking 
Simeon G. was implausible or unsupported by the facts.  I would 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
2 
thus conclude “it was more likely than not that the challenge 
was improperly motivated.”  (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 
U.S. 162, 170 (Johnson).)  Because the “[e]xclusion of even one 
prospective juror for reasons impermissible under Batson and 
Wheeler constitutes structural error,” the judgment must be 
reversed.  (People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1158 
(Gutierrez).) 
I. 
Today’s opinion accords deference to the trial court’s 
ruling on the Batson motion, but it is unclear what this court is 
deferring to.  “A trial court’s conclusions are entitled to 
deference only when the court made a ‘sincere and reasoned 
effort 
to 
evaluate 
the 
nondiscriminatory 
justifications 
offered.’ ”  (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1159.)  A “reasoned” 
attempt requires the trial court to “reject [the prosecutor’s] 
reason or ask the prosecutor to explain further” when the reason 
is “not borne out by the record.”  (Id. at p. 1172.)  Where “the 
prosecutor’s reason[s] for [the contested] strike[s are] not self-
evident and the record is void of any explication from the court, 
we cannot find . . . that the court made a reasoned attempt to 
determine whether the justification was a credible one.”  (Ibid.) 
Here, the trial court expressly acknowledged that the 
prosecutor’s proffered reasons for striking Kevin C. and Simeon 
G. were not self-evident.  During discussion of the Batson 
motion, the trial judge told the prosecutor:  “I don’t understand 
[the strikes] as to [Kevin C.] and as to [Simeon G.].  You’ll [have 
to] explain those.”  After hearing the prosecutor’s reasons, the 
court concluded:  “As I indicated, as to [another struck juror], I 
understand [the prosecutor’s] concern there.  As to [Kevin C.] 
and [Simeon G.], I think it’s certainly not as obvious, but I 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
3 
cannot say it is not legitimate.”  That was the extent of the trial 
court’s explanation for upholding the strikes. 
At one point, the court did ask the prosecutor to clarify his 
explanation for striking Simeon G.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 26 
[“ ‘His answer being that if he had a feeling the defendant was 
not guilty, that was the answer that bothered you?’ ”].)  But the 
court did not probe any of the prosecutor’s stated reasons for the 
strikes, even though they were difficult to reconcile with the 
record, as discussed below.  Nor did the court explain why it 
credited the prosecutor’s justifications.  It merely made a global 
finding that the stated reasons were “valid” and “legitimate.”  
(See maj. opn., ante, at p. 31 [“the trial court could have done 
more to make a fuller record and itself acknowledged it was 
making a somewhat close call”].) 
Our requirement of a “ ‘sincere and reasoned effort to 
evaluate 
the 
nondiscriminatory 
justifications 
offered’ ” 
(Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1159) demands more than 
what is apparent from the record here.  I do not doubt that the 
trial court was sincere and listened to the parties’ arguments.  
But because the record does not indicate whether it engaged in 
a reasoned evaluation of the prosecutor’s explanations for the 
strikes, I see no basis for deference to the trial court’s ruling. 
II. 
In addressing Miles’s Batson claim, our task is to 
determine whether “it was more likely than not” that the 
prosecutor’s strikes were racially motivated.  (Johnson, supra, 
545 U.S. at p. 170.)  It is important to keep in mind the 
applicable standard of proof.  The “more likely than not” 
standard does not require a fact to be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt, nor does it call for “a finding of high 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
4 
probability” as required by the clear and convincing evidence 
standard.  (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 919.)  It 
“ ‘simply requires the trier of fact “to believe that the existence 
of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” ’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 918.) 
“The function of a standard of proof is to instruct the fact 
finder concerning the degree of confidence our society deems 
necessary in the correctness of factual conclusions for a 
particular type of adjudication, to allocate the risk of error 
between the litigants, and to indicate the relative importance 
attached to the ultimate decision.”  (Conservatorship of 
Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 546.)  In the Batson context, 
the “more likely than not” standard reflects the “inherent 
uncertainty present in inquiries of discriminatory purpose.”  
(Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 172.)  The standard “is not 
designed to elicit a definitive finding of deceit or racism.  
Instead, it defines a level of risk that courts cannot tolerate in 
light of the serious harms that racial discrimination in jury 
selection causes to the defendant, to the excluded juror, and to 
‘public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.’ ”  
(Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1182–1183 (conc. opn. of Liu, 
J.), quoting Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 87.)  Miles has met this 
standard with respect to the strike of Simeon G. 
At the time of jury selection, Simeon G. was a 24-year-old 
forklift driver.  He had studied business for three years in 
college and had plans to continue his education in the future.  
Simeon G. had characteristics that might be considered 
favorable to the prosecution.  On the questionnaire, he wrote 
that his father was a Drug Enforcement Administration agent 
and that he had considered becoming a police officer.  He 
indicated that he “favor[ed] the death penalty” and would have 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
5 
been willing to personally impose it.  He believed the purpose of 
the death penalty was “to match the seriousness of a crime with 
a life for a life” and thought it “should be an option” for serious 
crimes.  He considered the death penalty law in California to be 
fair and wrote that he would vote to keep the death penalty 
because “it may be an appropriate punishment” in some cases.  
He also indicated that he had no moral, philosophical, or 
religious objections to the death penalty. 
The prosecutor gave several reasons for striking Simeon 
G.  The first was that Simeon G. “made statements on his 
questionnaire how he likes his opinions over others.” 
When asked on the questionnaire whether he would 
describe himself as a leader or a follower, Simeon G. wrote that 
he thought of himself as a “leader” because “I like my opinion 
over other people’s.”  In People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 
1083, we said that a juror’s comment that “he would not be 
influenced by anyone’s opinion but his own” gave rise to a 
reasonable concern that the juror “would not be able to consider 
the opinions of his fellow jurors.”  (Id. at p. 1125.)  But Simeon 
G. said that he liked his opinion over other people’s, not that he 
would not consider other people’s views.  His statement is 
actually somewhat of a tautology:  Everyone likes his or her 
opinion over other people’s; to have an “opinion” is to prefer that 
view to other views.  Just because a person favors one view does 
not mean he or she “might have difficulty considering other 
opinions and deliberating with fellow jurors.”  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 53.)  Indeed, Simeon G.’s other responses on the 
questionnaire indicate that he was interested in working with 
other jurors to reach a verdict.  When asked how he felt about 
working with 11 other jurors to make a decision, he wrote:  “I 
believe it would be very interesting.”  When asked whether he 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
6 
believed the jury system was a fair way to determine a 
defendant’s guilt, he checked “yes” and explained:  “12 people 
have to come together to accuse someone.  That[’s] 12 different 
opinions.  Pretty impressive.” 
The prosecutor did not ask Simeon G. about these 
responses, nor did the prosecutor question him or any other 
jurors about their ability to work with others.  As the high court 
has observed, “ ‘[t]he State’s failure to engage in any meaningful 
voir dire examination on a subject the State alleges it is 
concerned about is evidence suggesting that the explanation is 
a sham and a pretext for discrimination.’ ”  (Miller-El v. Dretke 
(2005) 545 U.S. 231, 246 (Miller-El).)  Today’s opinion speculates 
that the prosecutor might have refrained from questioning 
Simeon G. about this topic because “asking Simeon G. during 
voir dire — in front of the other prospective jurors — to elaborate 
on his questionnaire response would have forced him to explain 
why he believes that his opinion is preferable to the opinions of 
other people, such as those seated around him.”  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 54.)  But I see no reason why such inquiry would have been 
unproductive or more awkward than questioning on the death 
penalty, race relations, or other sensitive yet routine topics that 
call on jurors to explain their views and, at least implicitly, 
disapprove or cast doubt on the views of fellow jurors. 
The prosecutor’s explanation is even more suspicious in 
light of the fact that he accepted Juror No. 1, who also described 
herself as a “leader” and wrote, “I like to make my own 
decisions.”  Today’s opinion attempts to distinguish “decisions” 
from “opinions” in parsing the responses of Juror No. 1 and 
Simeon G.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 54–55.)  But the key point is 
that Juror No. 1’s response gave no more indication than 
Simeon G.’s response that she would consider other people’s 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
7 
views in making a decision.  Both “opinions” and “decisions” can 
be and often are informed by other people’s points of view, and 
a juror who “likes my opinion over other people’s” seems just as 
likely to consider other people’s views as a juror who “like[s] to 
make my own decisions.”  It is true that Simeon G., unlike Juror 
No. 1, indicated that he had not previously served on a jury or 
worked with a group to make a decision.  But that was not the 
prosecutor’s stated reason, and in any event, Simeon G.’s other 
questionnaire responses suggested he was interested in and 
willing to do both. 
The prosecutor’s second reason for striking Simeon G. was 
that “he made a statement on his questionnaire basically saying 
if I have a feeling he didn’t do it, he’s not guilty.  And he had 
crossed out the word doubt, which led me to believe that he 
certainly wasn’t going to base it on evidence.” 
When asked on the questionnaire whether he could follow 
the reasonable doubt instruction, Simeon G. checked “yes” and 
wrote:  “If I have any doubt feeling that [the defendant] might 
not have done it, he[’s] innocent.”  During the Batson hearing, 
the prosecutor noted that Simeon G. originally wrote “doubt” on 
his questionnaire response, then crossed it out and replaced it 
with “feeling.”  According to the prosecutor, this suggested that 
Simeon G. would have relied “on a hunch, or a feeling” instead 
of evidence to decide Miles’s guilt.  While acknowledging that 
Simeon G. “explained [his questionnaire response] differently in 
court,” the prosecutor said he was “not sure that [Simeon G.’s] 
responses in court should prevail over the answers he gave on 
his questionnaire.”  The prosecutor said he was especially 
concerned about those responses in light of the fact that Simeon 
G. “didn’t show up for court” that morning and appeared in the 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
8 
afternoon after being “single-handedly hunted down” by the 
trial judge. 
Considering the record as a whole, I do not find the 
prosecutor’s stated concern very plausible.  Simeon G. first 
wrote on the questionnaire:  “If I have any doubt that [the 
defendant] might not have done it, he[’s] innocent.”  On a 
moment’s reflection, it is clear that the double negative makes 
no sense:  If a juror had doubt that the defendant might not have 
committed the crime, then the juror’s inclination would be to 
find guilt, not innocence.  It is unsurprising that Simeon G., 
most likely recognizing the error, crossed out “doubt” and 
replaced it with a different word, “feeling”:  “If I have any feeling 
that [the defendant] might not have done it, he[’s] innocent.”  To 
draw an inference that Simeon G. intended this to convey that 
he would rely on his feelings as opposed to evidence to decide the 
defendant’s guilt seems like a stretch. 
But even assuming Simeon G.’s response was ambiguous, 
the prosecutor probed this issue during voir dire, and Simeon 
G.’s answers clarified any ambiguity.  The prosecutor said:  “In 
your questionnaire, you used the phrase that if you have a 
feeling that the defendant was [not] involved, that you’d find 
him not guilty. . . .  You’d written ‘doubt’ and crossed out and 
written the word ‘feeling.’ . . .  I’m trying to understand what 
you meant by that.”  Simeon G. responded:  “Well, I think what 
I was trying to say, if I’m correct, is that if the evidence showed 
that there wasn’t — that there was some reasonable doubt, then 
I probably would not accuse him, because of the fact that, myself 
being in the same situation or anybody, I think that if the 
evidence didn’t totally prove that I did it, then there is some 
doubt. . . .  So it wasn’t so much a feeling as it was if the evidence 
didn’t show.”  The prosecutor asked:  “Okay.  So you would base 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
9 
it on evidence?”  Simeon G. responded:  “Basically, yes.  I’m 
sorry.”  The prosecutor had no further questions on this topic. 
Today’s opinion says that when faced with inconsistent 
responses, the prosecutor is not obligated to accept the least 
objectionable one.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 57–58.)  That is true, 
but it is not the situation here.  At voir dire, the prosecutor 
expressly said that his questioning of Simeon G. was intended 
to clarify the “doubt feeling” issue, and Simeon G. — in response 
to an open-ended, non-leading question posed by the prosecutor 
(“I’m trying to understand what you meant by that”) — clarified 
that he would make decisions based on “the evidence,” not a 
“feeling.”  His voir dire answers, given under oath, left no 
ambiguity about the issue.  The court makes much of Simeon 
G.’s comments that he did not “quite remember” his 
questionnaire response and could not tell the prosecutor “what 
[he] actually meant totally” by it.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 59.)  But 
what those statements show is that he was attempting to be a 
scrupulous juror.  When asked to explain the “doubt feeling” 
issue, Simeon G. was careful to qualify that he did not recall his 
exact response on the questionnaire because he did not have a 
copy to review during voir dire.  These comments in no way 
undermined Simeon G.’s clear and consistent assertions that he 
would rely on evidence rather than his feelings to reach a 
verdict. 
Moreover, the rest of Simeon G.’s questionnaire indicated 
that he would have carefully considered the evidence presented 
in the case.  When asked whether he could be a fair and 
impartial juror, he wrote:  “I’m open to objectively listening to 
evidence from both sides to decide a fair verdict.”  When asked 
if he could follow the instruction that jurors should not draw any 
conclusions from the fact that a defendant does not testify, he 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
10 
checked “yes” and explained that he would “[j]ust deal with the 
facts and other testimonies.”  When asked whether he believed 
the testimony of law enforcement officers would be more 
truthful or accurate than civilian testimony, he checked “no” and 
wrote that “[n]obody’s testimony should be more or less due to 
the fact that they are all under oath.”  When asked whether he 
would automatically accept the opinion of a psychiatrist or 
psychologist, he checked “no” and explained that “[w]hat they 
say would have to make sense.”  All of these responses, like 
Simeon G.’s answers during voir dire, show that he would have 
been a conscientious juror who makes decisions on the basis of 
facts and evidence, not hunches or feelings.  The prosecutor’s 
fixation on one questionnaire answer, to the exclusion of all of 
Simeon G.’s other relevant and consistent answers, is 
suspicious. 
Today’s opinion says the prosecutor was not required to 
accept Simeon G.’s sworn voir dire responses at face value.  At 
the Batson hearing, the prosecutor said “this is an individual 
who the Court personally tracked down this morning. . . .  I 
would be concerned about his responses in light of the fact that 
he was single-handedly hunted down to be here this afternoon.”  
In evaluating this statement, today’s opinion explains that 
“[t]he trial court was ‘ “best situated” ’ to assess Simeon G.’s 
responses in court and the prosecutor’s stated concern in light 
of those responses.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 60.) 
But what exactly is the court deferring to?  The trial court 
made no specific findings regarding Simeon G.’s responses or 
demeanor when it denied the Batson motion.  Nor did it ask the 
prosecutor to explain why Simeon G.’s tardiness to court would 
cast doubt on the credibility of his voir dire answers.  The court 
only asked the prosecutor, “His answer being that if he had a 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
11 
feeling the defendant was not guilty, that was the answer that 
bothered you?”  I have no doubt that the trial court “listen[ed] to 
the prosecutor’s explanation and defense counsel’s comments” 
before “accept[ing] the prosecutor’s stated reasons for striking 
Simeon G.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 61.)  But because its ruling is 
not accompanied by any reasons or analysis, there is nothing to 
defer to. 
As to Simeon G.’s tardiness, a bit of context is important.  
The record shows there had been a miscommunication in the 
jury room, which may have caused several jurors not to appear 
in court that morning.  After the court called Simeon G.’s 
workplace, he immediately called back and explained that he 
was confused and thought he was supposed to come the next 
day.  Simeon G. then appeared in the afternoon for voir dire.  
The prosecutor was aware of this mix-up at the time of the 
Batson hearing, and there was no suggestion that the incident 
resulted from willful conduct by Simeon G.  Nor was there 
anything in his background or questionnaire that suggested 
untrustworthiness.  To be sure, “having a judge call your 
workplace to locate you and have you come to court is unusual.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 61, fn. 14.)  And it would be natural to 
infer that Simeon G. perhaps felt embarrassed when he 
appeared in court.  But it is not clear why the incident would 
have cast doubt on the veracity of Simeon G.’s statement at voir 
dire that he would reach a verdict based on “the evidence” and 
not a “feeling,” especially in light of the consistent responses on 
his juror questionnaire. 
The prosecutor’s third reason for striking Simeon G. was 
that “he was not upset by the O.J. Simpson verdict.”  Simeon G. 
indicated on the questionnaire that he was not upset by the O.J. 
Simpson verdict but did not explain why.  He also wrote that he 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
12 
“really [didn’t] know anything about” DNA evidence.  At the 
Batson hearing, the prosecutor said:  “If you’ll notice across the 
board, I’ve excused jurors I believe of Hispanic origin and 
Caucasian origin, and the common denominator, essentially, is 
that they were not, were not upset by the O.J. Simpson verdict, 
which was a DNA, circumstantial case.  And I think those, those 
raise significant concerns in my mind as a guilt phase juror and 
the type of case that I’m dealing with.” 
In evaluating this reason, it must be said at the outset that 
exercising peremptory strikes based on jurors’ attitudes toward 
the O.J. Simpson case — in the capital trial of a black man 
accused of murdering a white woman, occurring just three years 
after the Simpson verdict — seems like playing with fire.  At the 
time of Miles’s trial, it would have been hard to think of any 
recent case in the American justice system more sensational and 
racially polarizing than the Simpson trial.  (See O.J.: Made in 
America (ESPN Films 2016); Toobin, The Run of His Life: The 
People v. O.J. Simpson (1996).)  Amicus curiae NAACP Legal 
Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF) cites a poll taken in 
1995, when the Simpson case was decided, finding that 22% of 
black Americans and 76% of white Americans believed Simpson 
was guilty of murder.  (See De Pinto et al., Poll: Only 27 Percent 
of Americans Think O.J. Simpson Will Regain Celebrity Status 
(Sept. 29, 2017) CBS News.)  The Attorney General argues that 
the racial disparity was not so significant by the time of Miles’s 
trial and cites a different poll finding that 45% of black 
Americans in 2007 and 57% in 2015 believed Simpson was 
guilty.  (See Ross, Two decades later, black and white Americans 
finally agree on O.J. Simpson’s guilt, Wash. Post (Mar. 4, 2016).)  
But the figures cited by LDF are more relevant because jury 
selection in this case occurred in 1998.  Those figures are 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
13 
actually corroborated by the poll cited by the Attorney General, 
which shows that 31% of black Americans and 82% of white 
Americans in 1997 thought Simpson was guilty.  (See ibid.) 
Thus, at the time of Miles’s trial, a practice of striking 
jurors who said they were not upset by the Simpson verdict 
would have resulted in disproportionate removal of black jurors.  
Although such disparate impact “does not turn the prosecutor’s 
actions into a per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause” 
(Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 361), it can be 
considered “evidence that the prosecutor’s stated reason 
constitutes a pretext for racial discrimination” (id. at p. 363).  
There is nothing wrong with probing prospective jurors’ views 
about DNA or circumstantial evidence in a murder trial.  But 
surely there are less racially charged ways of doing so. 
Also relevant is the fact that the prosecutor did not 
question Simeon G. or any other prospective juror about the 
Simpson verdict during voir dire.  (Cf. maj. opn., ante, at p. 63 
[“the credibility of the prosecutor’s concern here is undermined 
to some degree by the prosecutor’s failure to ask Simeon G. or 
other prospective jurors about the O.J. Simpson verdict during 
voir dire”].)  The prosecutor’s lack of questioning is especially 
suspicious as to Simeon G.  When asked on the questionnaire 
whether he was upset by the Simpson verdict, Simeon G. simply 
checked “no” without explanation.  At the Batson hearing, the 
prosecutor said his main concern with this response was that it 
indicated Simeon G. might be skeptical about DNA evidence.  
But the prosecutor never asked Simeon G. whether his response 
to the O.J. Simpson question was related to his views on DNA 
evidence.  Nor did he ask Simeon G. or any other prospective 
juror about DNA evidence.  
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
14 
Comparative juror analysis also supports an inference of 
pretext.  (Cf. maj. opn., ante, at p. 65 [“We find that the 
credibility of the prosecutor’s concern regarding Simeon G.’s 
opinion on the O.J. Simpson verdict is undermined to some 
degree by defendant’s comparative juror analysis.”].)  Like 
Simeon G., eight seated and alternate jurors indicated that they 
were not upset about the O.J. Simpson verdict.  Some of those 
jurors provided explanations that might have been more 
acceptable to the prosecutor.  But Alternate Juror No. 5, like 
Simeon G., did not explain why he was not upset about the 
verdict.  Juror No. 4, Juror No. 7, and Alternate Juror No. 4 
wrote that they were not upset because they did not know 
enough about the details of the case, which seems just as neutral 
as Simeon G.’s response.  Juror No. 6 wrote that the “evidence 
[was] not clear” in the O.J. Simpson case, which if anything 
seems less favorable to the prosecution than Simeon G.’s 
response.  In sum, the plausibility of the prosecutor’s 
explanation “is severely undercut by [his] failure to object to 
other [jurors] who expressed views much like [Simeon 
G.’s]. . . .  The fact that [the prosecutor’s] reason also applied to 
these other [jurors], most of them white, none of them struck, is 
evidence of pretext.”  (Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 248.) 
Today’s opinion finds these comparisons “relevant and 
probative” but ultimately downplays their importance by 
pointing out differences between the comparator jurors and 
Simeon G.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 65.)  The court notes that Juror 
No. 6 and Alternate Juror No. 5, while similar to Simeon G. on 
the O.J. Simpson question, did not indicate that they might have 
difficulty considering other people’s opinions or that they might 
rely on their feelings to reach a verdict.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 65–66.) 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
15 
This line of reasoning — undercutting the probative value 
of juror comparisons by identifying other traits on which the 
jurors differed — is a frequent maneuver in our Batson 
jurisprudence.  (See, e.g., maj. opn., ante, at pp. 55–56; People v. 
Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 83 (Hardy); People v. Winbush (2017) 
2 Cal.5th 402, 443–446; People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 
1318–1322.)  To be sure, the issue of how similar two jurors must 
be to yield a probative comparison is not reducible to a simple 
formula.  But this court’s approach of changing the relevant 
point of comparison for each of the prosecutor’s stated reasons 
cannot be the right one.  The court’s reasoning suggests that 
significant weight cannot be assigned to comparative juror 
analysis unless an accepted juror matches the struck juror with 
respect to all of the prosecutor’s stated concerns.  Indeed, despite 
statements to the contrary, that seems to be what the court 
actually holds in this case.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 55–56, 65–
66.) 
But the high court has expressly rejected this view.  (See 
Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 247, fn. 6 [“None of our cases 
announces a rule that no comparison is probative unless the 
situation of the individuals compared is identical in all respects, 
and there is no reason to accept one. . . .  A per se rule that a 
defendant cannot win a Batson claim unless there is an exactly 
identical white juror would leave Batson inoperable; potential 
jurors are not products of a set of cookie cutters.”].)  In several 
cases addressing Batson claims, “[t]he high court has repeatedly 
drawn inferences of discrimination from comparative juror 
analysis without regard to whether the comparator jurors 
matched the struck juror in every respect identified by the 
prosecutor.”  (Hardy, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 119 (dis. opn. of Liu, 
J.) [citing cases].) 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
16 
In Miller-El, for example, the prosecution gave three 
reasons for striking a prospective black juror:  he was 
ambivalent about the death penalty, his brother-in-law had a 
prior conviction, and the prosecution still had 10 peremptory 
challenges left and could be liberal in using them.  (Miller-El, 
supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 247–250.)  The high court first compared 
the death penalty views of the struck juror to those of three 
accepted jurors.  (Id. at p. 248.)  It found the similarities among 
the jurors’ views to be probative (ibid.), even though the 
dissenting justices noted that the accepted jurors were not 
similarly situated to the struck juror with respect to the other 
reasons given by the prosecutor (id. at p. 290 (dis. opn. of 
Thomas, J.)).  The high court then conducted comparative juror 
analysis with respect to the other two stated reasons, again 
considering each reason separately.  (Id. at pp. 249–250.)  In 
subsequent Batson decisions, the high court has consistently 
followed this approach to comparative juror analysis.  (See 
Flowers v. Mississippi (2019) 588 U.S. __, __ [139 S.Ct. 2228, 
2248–2249]; Foster v. Chatman (2016) 578 U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 
1737, 1750–1754]; Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 
483–484.)  All of these decisions found single-issue comparisons 
among jurors to be highly probative of discrimination; none used 
the pivoting frames of comparisons that this court employs to 
mitigate inferences of pretext. 
Today’s opinion says “[t]he fact that the high court found 
single-issue 
comparisons 
to 
be 
highly 
probative 
of 
discrimination within the circumstances of a particular case is 
not inconsistent with our analysis here, which . . . recognizes 
that such comparisons are relevant but ultimately concludes, 
within all of the relevant circumstances, that substantial 
evidence supports the trial court’s denial of defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
17 
Batson/Wheeler motion.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 36, fn. 9.)  But 
that assertion begs the crucial question:  What is it about “the 
circumstances” of Flowers, Foster, Snyder, and Miller-El that 
makes single-issue comparisons highly probative in all of those 
cases, but not in the case before us?  The court does not say — 
and thus leaves unexplained how its approach can be reconciled 
with high court precedent.  (See Hardy, supra, 5 Cal.5th at 
p. 119 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.).) 
III. 
With today’s decision, this court extends its record of not 
having found Batson error involving the peremptory strike of a 
black juror in more than 30 years — despite the fact that “[t]he 
high court’s opinion [in Batson] responded specifically to the 
pernicious history of African Americans being excluded from 
jury service, calling such exclusion ‘a primary example of the 
evil the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to cure.’ ” 
(Hardy, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 124 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.), 
quoting Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 85; see People v. Johnson 
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 534–536 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.).) 
Like this case, several of our recent cases had “definite 
racial overtones” that “ ‘raise[] heightened concerns about 
whether the prosecutor’s challenge was racially motivated.’ ”  
(Hardy, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 78 [black man convicted of raping 
and murdering a white woman]; see People v. Armstrong (2019) 
6 Cal.5th 735, 765 [same]; People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 
804,  863 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [same]; People v. Johnson, supra, 
8 Cal.5th at p. 507 [black man convicted of murdering a white 
man and raping a white woman].)  Like this case, some of our 
recent cases involved peremptory strikes that resulted in no 
black jurors serving on the main panel.  (See Hardy, at p. 78; 
PEOPLE v. MILES 
Liu, J., dissenting 
 
18 
People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 456 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.); 
see also People v. Bryant (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 525, 535.)  And 
like this case, our recent cases have upheld quite tenuous or 
implausible explanations for the removal of black jurors.  It is 
past time to ask whether the Batson framework, as applied by 
this court, must be rethought in order to fulfill the constitutional 
mandate of eliminating racial discrimination in jury selection.  
(See Bryant, at p. 544 (conc. opn. of Humes, J.) [highlighting 
“the serious shortcomings with the Batson framework” as 
interpreted by this court and “calling for meaningful reform”].) 
Here, the prosecutor’s reasons for striking Simeon G. do 
not withstand scrutiny.  Although I cannot be certain that the 
prosecutor struck Simeon G. because of his race, certainty is not 
the standard.  Considering all relevant circumstances, I believe 
it was more likely than not that the strike was improperly 
motivated.  Because the trial court erred in denying Miles’s 
Batson claim, his convictions must be reversed. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Miles 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S086234 
Date Filed:  May 28, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  San Bernardino 
Judge:  James A. Edwards 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Cliff Gardner and Catherine A. White, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Samuel Spital, Kristen A. Johnson, Christopher Kemmitt and Daniel S. Harawa for 
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens, Ronald A. Jakob and Seth M. 
Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Cliff Gardner 
1448 San Pablo Avenue 
Berkeley, CA 94702 
(510) 524-1093 
 
Christopher Kemmitt 
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. 
700 14th Street, NW, Suite 600 
Washington, DC 20011 
(202) 682-1300 
 
Seth M. Friedman 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 645-3199