Case Title: Idaho v. Garnett

Citation: 

Docket Number: 45282

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2019-02-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 45282 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
  
               Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
MARK TRAVIS GARNETT, 
  
               Defendant-Appellant. 
 
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Boise, December 2018 Term 
 
Filed:  June 10, 2019 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 
 
SUBSTITUTE OPINION. THE 
OPINION PREVIOUSLY 
RELEASED FEBRUARY 20, 
2019 IS HEREBY 
WITHDRAWN. 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Kootenai County. John T. Mitchell, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.  
 
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 
Jason C. Pintler argued. 
 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Mark W. 
Olson argued. 
_____________________ 
 
BRODY, Justice. 
This appeal arises from the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence found 
in a backpack during a probation search of a residence. Mark Garnett was an overnight guest in 
the residence of an absconded felony probationer. Probation officers searched the residence, 
including an attached storage room, and found Garnett’s locked backpack containing a stolen 
firearm. Garnett, a felon, was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a firearm. He 
sought to suppress the evidence found in the backpack, but the district court denied his motion 
because it determined that while he had standing to challenge the search of the backpack, the 
officer had reasonable suspicion that the absconded probationer owned, possessed, or controlled 
the backpack. Following a jury trial, Garnett was found guilty. Garnett appealed his conviction, 
arguing that the district court should have applied a reasonable belief standard and that had it 
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done so the motion to suppress would have been granted. We affirm the district court’s decision 
and the judgment of conviction.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Tamara Brunko, a woman on felony probation, drew the attention of her probation officer 
when she became non-compliant with the terms and conditions of her release on probation. 
Because one of the terms of her probation was consenting to searches of her residence, Brunko’s 
probation officer, Jason Haines, decided to conduct a welfare check and perform a search of her 
residence.  
Bringing along other officers, Haines arrived at Brunko’s single-wide trailer where she 
reportedly resided. Andrew Soy, Brunko’s boyfriend who also resided at the residence, answered 
the door of the trailer. When asked, Soy told Haines that Brunko was still living at the residence 
but that he had not recently seen her. Soy stepped aside and allowed the officers into the 
residence. Another individual by the name of Mark Garnett was found lying on a sofa in the 
living room. Garnett was known by one of the probation officers who had supervised him during 
a recent parole stint; however, Garnett was not on probation or parole at the time of the search. 
Garnett and Soy both silently waited on the couch while the officers searched the residence for 
any signs of Brunko. 
After failing to find Brunko in the residence, Haines began to search for evidence of 
Brunko’s parole violations that could include drug-related items or a urinalysis-tampering kit. He 
made his way to a ramshackle storage room built onto the side of the trailer. The make-shift 
storage room featured an assortment of miscellaneous items in bags and in plastic drawers that 
appeared to be used by various members of the residence. Haines moved a large empty box off a 
shelf and found a hidden camouflage backpack with a lock on it. Believing that the backpack 
belonged to Brunko—probationers sometimes conceal contraband by using locks and safes in an 
attempt to dissuade officers from searching—Haines bypassed the lock and found a Glock 19 
pistol, two magazines, and ammunition. Mail addressed to Garnett was also found inside of the 
backpack.  
 
It was soon determined that the pistol was stolen and Garnett was arrested. He was 
charged with unlawful possession of a firearm and grand theft. Before his trial, Garnett filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence found in his backpack, arguing that the search violated his 
reasonable expectation of privacy. The district court held a motion hearing and ultimately denied 
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Garnett’s motion to suppress evidence, finding that while Garnett had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in his backpack as an overnight guest, Haines had the requisite reasonable suspicion to 
believe that the backpack was owned, possessed, or controlled by Brunko. The basis for this 
decision rested upon the officer’s reasonable grounds to believe that Brunko had violated the 
terms of her probation by “walking away from treatment at the [drug rehabilitation] Center, 
being dishonest with her probation officer of her failure to complete treatment, missing drug 
tests, submitting an altered [urine] sample, testing positive for heroin, and her child not showing 
up for school.” Additionally, the locked backpack, lacking any indicia of ownership and found 
concealed in a shared storage room, could have contained evidence of Brunko’s violations.
 
Thereafter, a jury found Garnett guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm and he was 
sentenced to a fixed term of five years of incarceration. Garnett now appeals, arguing that the 
district court employed the wrong standard in denying his motion to suppress evidence.  
II. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence using 
a reasonable suspicion standard.  
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When this Court reviews a district court’s grant or denial of a motion to suppress 
evidence, the standard of review is bifurcated: the Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact 
unless clearly erroneous, but freely reviews the application of constitutional law to the facts. 
State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 720, 404 P.3d 659, 662 (2017).  
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
This case centers upon a single question—by what standard? By what standard ought the 
district court assess whether an officer performing a search of a probationer’s belongings had the 
requisite assurance that an item was owned, possessed, or controlled by the probationer in 
determining the proper scope of a search? Garnett does not challenge the officers’ authority to 
search the residence, but challenges the permissible scope of the officers’ search into what was 
ultimately determined to be a backpack that belonged to Garnett, an overnight guest. The district 
court in this case held that, based on the totality of the circumstances, an officer must have had a 
reasonable suspicion that a probationer had control of an item. However, Garnett contends that 
the Supreme Court of the United States requires use of a reasonable belief standard instead, and 
therefore the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Appellant further 
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argues that the State failed to produce enough evidence for the district court to hold that the 
officer possessed a reasonable belief that Brunko possessed common authority over the 
backpack. 
Before probing into the case law at issue in this case, this Court must determine whether 
Garnett has preserved this matter for appeal. The State argues that while Garnett argued that 
evidence should be suppressed, he did not argue the specific legal theory that a reasonable belief 
standard should be used rather than a reasonable suspicion standard. The State’s position is 
untenable. This Court has held that fresh substantive issues may not be raised for the first time on 
appeal, but that specific legal arguments in support of a position may evolve. Ada Cnty. Highway 
Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, 142 n.2, 395 P.3d 357, 361 n.2 (2017). Since this case 
focuses only on the appropriate legal standard to be used in deciding whether a probationer has 
ownership, possession, or control of an item, and not on a new substantive issue, the issue is 
properly before the Court.  
Unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable 
unless conducted under a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Barker, 136 
Idaho 728, 730, 40 P.3d 86, 88 (2002). Consenting to a search is a well-recognized exception to 
the warrant requirement, and Idaho law has made it clear that a probationer can consent to a 
search of all their property as a condition of probation. State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 345, 256 
P.3d 750, 753 (2011). A probationer’s consent to search as a condition of probation constitutes a 
waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. Id. Yet, “[t]he burden is on the State to show that the 
consent exception applies.” Id. at 346, 256 P.3d at 754.  
The person consenting to a search must have either actual authority to consent to a 
search, or authority that is reasonably apparent. Id. Actual authority to consent to a home search 
rests upon “mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for 
most purposes.” Id. (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)). 
“A warrantless search can still be upheld if the person consenting does not actually have 
authority as long as the police officer reasonably believes that the person giving consent has the 
authority to do so.” Id.  
This case does not involve a dispute concerning the initial entrance of a home prior to a 
search, but rather involves a dispute regarding the correct legal standard by which to determine 
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the permissible bounds of a search of a probationer’s belongings that has already begun. The 
district court correctly relied upon this Court’s opinion in State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 728, 40 P.3d 
86 (2002), in determining that the officer needed to possess “reasonable suspicion” that Brunko 
owned or controlled or possessed the camouflage backpack in order to search it.  
 
Barker’s holding concerned the proper legal standard to be used when determining the 
objective reasonableness of the search of an item during a search of a probationer’s belongings; 
the trial court must determine “whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had a 
reasonable suspicion that the item was owned, possessed, or controlled by the occupant who 
consented to the search.” Barker, 136 Idaho at 731–32, 40 P.3d at 89–90. The facts in Barker 
involved a search of a fanny pack found in a shared master bedroom. Id. Tate, a parolee and 
cohabitant of the bedroom, had consented to a search of his residence as a condition of parole. Id. 
at 730, 40 P.3d at 88. The black fanny pack was found on a counter in a shared bedroom, and a 
police K-9 alerted to the possible presence of drugs. Id. Even though Tate’s cohabitant, who was 
not on parole, said that the pack was hers, police nevertheless searched it and found drugs. Id. 
This Court held that the search was valid because the officers had “reasonable suspicion” that, 
even though the female cohabitant claimed sole ownership, Tate had joint possession or control 
over the pack: 
We hold that under the totality of the circumstances the officer had reasonable 
suspicion to believe that Tate had common authority over the fanny pack. Tate 
was on parole for the charge of possession of a controlled substance. Prior to 
absconding from supervision, he had submitted a urine sample to his parole 
officer that tested positive for a controlled substance. His parole officer could 
certainly reasonably believe that Tate had resumed using controlled substances. 
The fanny pack was located in the bedroom which was occupied jointly by Tate 
and [the female cohabitant]. It was sitting on a counter near the adjoining 
bathroom, where it was readily available. There was nothing about its location or 
appearance that would indicate that it was owned, possessed, and controlled 
exclusively by [the female cohabitant]. A drug dog alerted to the fanny pack, and 
there is no evidence that the officer had any reason to believe that [the female 
cohabitant] was using controlled substances. Under these facts, the officer could 
reasonably have suspected that Tate had at least joint possession or control of the 
fanny pack.   
 
Id. at 732, 40 P.3d at 90. Thus, this Court has specifically held that the proper legal standard to 
use in analyzing the scope of the search of items during a search of a probationer’s belongings is 
reasonable suspicion.  
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The reasonable suspicion standard used in Barker was gleaned from the 9th Circuit case 
United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1991). The Davis court held that “[t]he 
permissible bounds of a probation search are governed by a reasonable suspicion standard.” Id. at 
758. In Davis, police searched a safe found in a closet during a warrantless search of a 
probationer’s apartment. Id. at 755. The safe was found in a closet of a master bedroom, but 
police were able to open the safe only because of a combination they found scribbled on a note 
found on a person they had arrested earlier. Id. The arrestee argued that the initial probation 
search of the residence was valid, but it became improper when police opened the safe using the 
combination found in his pocket—the combination being in his possession meant that the 
officers could not reasonably suspect the safe was owned, possessed, or controlled by the 
probationer. Id. at 759. The 9th Circuit reasoned that the police could have reasonably suspected 
the safe was jointly owned, possessed, or controlled by the arrestee and the probationer, because 
the arrestee had a significant connection with the probationer’s apartment that included having 
his car parked in the front of the residence. Id. at 759. The Ninth Circuit is in agreement with this 
Court’s precedent that the reasonable suspicion standard ought to be used in determining the 
permissible bounds of a search of a probationer’s belongings.  
 
In this appeal, Garnett points to United States Supreme Court authority to argue that 
Davis and Barker crafted and used an impermissible standard: namely, officers must have a 
reasonable belief that a probationer owns, possesses, or controls an item before searching it, 
rather than a mere reasonable suspicion. We disagree with Garnett’s assertion. 
Specifically, Garnett contends that Illinois v. Rodriguez has established the reasonable 
belief standard for determining the permissible bounds of a search of a probationer’s belongings. 
497 U.S. 177 (1990). In Rodriguez, a woman notified police that she had been assaulted by 
Rodriguez and that she would take the police to “our” apartment where he was sleeping and 
unlock the door so that they could make an arrest. Id. at 179. Rodriguez was thereafter arrested 
and the police found drugs and paraphernalia in plain view in the apartment. Id. at 180. He 
moved to suppress all evidence, arguing that the woman had no actual authority to consent to 
police entering his apartment because she had vacated the apartment weeks earlier. Id. The Court 
held that while she possessed no actual authority to consent to entrance of the residence, police 
could have reasonably believed that she did have such authority, and accordingly, their entrance 
was reasonable. Id. at 186. The Court’s holding was summed up in the following rule statement: 
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As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, 
determination of consent to enter must “be judged against an objective standard: 
would the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . ‘warrant a man of 
reasonable caution and belief’” that the consenting party had authority over the 
premises? If not, then warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless 
authority actually exists.  
 
Id. at 188–89 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968)). Thus, in cases centering upon 
authority to consent to the entrance of a dwelling, police must possess an objectively reasonable 
belief that the person authorizing entry has actual authority over the premises.  
 
Garnett appears to be blending the case law regarding consensual searches with case law 
regarding probation searches. The Supreme Court of the United States has expressly held that 
probation searches may use a reasonable suspicion standard. U.S. v. Knight, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
In Knight, a probationer’s apartment was searched by a sheriff’s deputy who suspected the 
probationer was engaging in illegal activity. Id. at 115. The probationer argued that the search 
was not conducted as part of his terms of probation, but was instead an investigatory search. Id. 
at 116. The U.S. Supreme Court, in assessing the reasonableness of the search, balanced the 
government’s interest against the probationer’s expectation of privacy. Id. at 118–21. It 
explained that the government has an interest in supervising probationers because probation is a 
form of criminal sanction imposed by a court that is designed to curtail an offender’s freedoms; 
accordingly, probationers are more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law and to 
conceal criminal activities because of the risk they face with possible incarceration. Id.  While 
probationers enjoy many more freedoms than they would if they were incarcerated, “they do not 
enjoy the absolute liberty every citizen is entitled.” Id. at 119 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). The Court, after balancing these considerations, held that no more than 
reasonable suspicion is required to conduct a search of a probationer’s house when a probationer 
is subject to a search condition in his or her probation terms. Id. at 121. If the entrance of a 
probationer’s home requires only a reasonable suspicion that authority to enter exists, it is not a 
stretch to infer that the scope of a search of a probationer’s belongings is constrained by the same 
standard. 
The State and the district court supported their use of the reasonable suspicion standard 
using Barker and Davis. The reasonable belief standard that Garnett asserts has no application in 
this case because the issue is not whether the officers had authority to enter and search the 
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premises subject to a consensual search, but rather whether the probation officer’s search of the 
backpack was within the lawful scope of a probation search. The Supreme Court of the United 
States’ holding in Rodriguez addresses the authority to enter dwellings based on consent, not the 
scope of a probation search based on the terms of probation. The proper legal standard to be used 
in determining the permissible scope of a search of a probationer’s belongings is reasonable 
suspicion, not reasonable belief. 
 
Using the reasonable suspicion standard, the district court properly concluded that the 
probation officer in this case had reasonable suspicion that the camouflage backpack was owned, 
controlled, or possessed by Brunko. Brunko had violated the terms of her probation by failing a 
drug program for a heroin addiction, and she had provided an altered urine sample. Evidence of 
these violations could be secreted in a locked and hidden backpack, such as the one found behind 
an empty box in the common storage room of Brunko’s residence. Additionally, there were no 
external markings of ownership on the backpack and neither Garnett nor Soy notified the 
searching officers that the backpack was theirs, even though they knew the officers were 
searching the residence for evidence of a probation violation.  The district court did note that if 
the backpack had been near where Garnett was lying on the couch, then perhaps the analysis 
would have been different. But, this unmarked pack was found locked and concealed in a storage 
room used by multiple individuals. Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances, the 
probation officer could have possessed reasonable suspicion that Brunko owned, controlled, or 
possessed the backpack, making the search reasonable and permissible. The district court did not 
err in denying Garnett’s motion to suppress.  
V. 
CONCLUSION 
In consideration of the foregoing, the district court’s denial of Garnett’s motion to 
suppress was proper. The judgment of conviction is affirmed.  
 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices BEVAN, STEGNER, and HORTON CONCUR.