Case Title: Young v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 071436

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
ANGELA L. YOUNG 
             OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
v.  Record No. 071436  
           April 18, 2008 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
This appeal requires us to determine whether the evidence 
at trial was sufficient to support a conclusion, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant, while in possession of a 
controlled substance, was aware of its nature and character. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
The facts will be stated in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.  See e.g., 
Parker v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 150, 155, 654 S.E.2d 580, 583 
(2008).  In the pre-dawn hours of November 24, 2005, Officer 
S. Blystone, of the Portsmouth Police Department, stopped the 
driver of a maroon Oldsmobile for failing to stop at an 
intersection in Portsmouth.  The driver and sole occupant was 
Angela L. Young, the defendant.  She was cooperative with 
Blystone, who gave her a warning and told her she was free to 
leave.  Blystone then told her that she was in a “high-crime, 
high-drug area” and asked for her permission to search her car 
before she left.  She consented to the search.  Blystone 
searched the car and found the defendant’s purse.  Among the 
contents of the purse, he found a prescription bottle labeled 
with the name of Stephanie Woody.  The label identified the 
contents of the bottle as “OxyContin,” which Blystone knew to 
be a controlled drug.  The bottle contained two blue tablets 
and six white tablets.  Blystone could not determine the 
nature of the pills, but nevertheless handcuffed the defendant 
and asked her about the bottle and its contents.  She 
responded, but the trial court subsequently granted the 
defendant’s motion to suppress her statements because she had 
received no Miranda warnings before making them.  
Subsequently, the blue tablets were identified as morphine, a 
Schedule II substance, and the white tablets were identified 
as Trazodone, a Schedule VI substance.  No “OxyContin” or its 
generic equivalent, oxycodone, was found in the pill bottle, 
notwithstanding its label. 
 
The defendant was indicted for possession of a Schedule I 
or Schedule II controlled substance in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-250.  At a bench trial, she entered a plea of not 
guilty but was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for two 
years, with six months suspended conditioned on supervised 
probation.  The Court of Appeals granted her an appeal but 
affirmed her conviction.  We awarded her this appeal. 
 
At the trial on the merits, the only witnesses to testify 
about the events of November 24, 2005 were Officer Blystone 
 
2
and Stephanie Woody.  The latter stated that she lived with 
her uncle, Andre Gatewood, who was the owner of the maroon 
Oldsmobile the defendant was driving, and that the defendant 
was Gatewood’s girlfriend and would have had permission to 
drive his car.  Stephanie Woody also testified that the pills 
were hers, that she had inadvertently left them in her uncle’s 
car when they had fallen out of her purse, and that the 
defendant had called her, telling her that she had them.  She 
stated that she carried different pills in one bottle so that 
she would not have to carry multiple bottles with her.  She 
surmised that the defendant “must have picked them up to bring 
them to me.”  The court received in evidence an exhibit 
showing that Stephanie Woody had prescriptions for morphine, 
trazodone and oxycodone, along with a large array of other 
prescription drugs that she said she took for chronic migraine 
headaches. 
 
The trial court found from the evidence that the 
defendant was in possession of the morphine at the time of her 
arrest.  The court accepted Stephanie Woody’s testimony that 
the pills were hers and that she had valid prescriptions for 
them, but refused to accept her speculation as to how the 
pills came into the defendant’s possession.  The court stated 
that the finding of guilt was based upon the defendant’s 
undisputed possession of the morphine, coupled with the facts 
 
3
that she had no prescription for it, that it belonged to 
someone else, and that it was contained in a bottle labeled 
with a different drug that was also a controlled substance. 
 
The Court of Appeals noted that the defendant did not 
contest the issue of her actual possession, dominion and 
control over the drugs at the time of her arrest, and 
concluded that the dispositive question was whether she was 
aware of the nature and character of the morphine found in the 
pill bottle.  In affirming the conviction in an unpublished 
opinion, the Court of Appeals held that possession of a 
controlled drug gives rise to an inference that the defendant 
was aware of its character. 
Analysis 
 
On appeal, great deference is given to the factfinder 
who, having seen and heard the witnesses, assesses their 
credibility and weighs their testimony.  Thus, a trial court’s 
judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly 
wrong or without evidence to support it.  Walton v. 
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 426, 497 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1998). 
 
In a prosecution for possession of a controlled 
substance, the Commonwealth must produce evidence sufficient 
to support a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant’s possession of the drug was knowing and 
intentional.  Burton v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 711, 713, 213 
 
4
S.E.2d 757, 758 (1975).  Actual or constructive possession 
alone is not sufficient.  Id. at 713, 213 S.E.2d at 759.  “The 
Commonwealth must also establish that the defendant 
intentionally and consciously possessed it with knowledge of 
its nature and character.”  Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added).  That knowledge is an essential element of the crime. 
 
Such knowledge may be shown by evidence of the acts, 
statements or conduct of the accused.  Garland v. 
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 182, 184, 300 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1983).  
Other circumstantial evidence may also support a finding of a 
defendant’s knowledge of the nature and character of the 
substance in his possession, such as the drug’s distinctive 
odor or appearance, or statements or conduct of others in his 
presence that would tend to identify it. 
 
The issue in the present case is whether the record 
contains evidence from which any “rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 
(1979).  The Court of Appeals, in affirming the conviction, 
relied on its decision in Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 
87, 390 S.E.2d 491 (1990), in which the court held that 
“[p]ossession of a controlled drug gives rise to an inference 
of the defendant’s knowledge of its character.”  Id. at 101, 
390 S.E.2d at 498-99.  In Josephs, the defendant was a 
 
5
passenger in the back seat of a stolen rental car travelling 
through Virginia en route from Florida to New York.  When the 
car was searched, her luggage was found in the trunk, 
surrounded by 130 pounds of marijuana packed in closed garbage 
bags.  The marijuana nearly filled the trunk, leaving little 
room for her luggage.  Id. at 90-91, 100-01, 390 S.E.2d at 
492, 498.  When the trunk was opened, there was “a strong odor 
of marijuana.”  Id. at 91, 390 S.E.2d at 492. The defendant, 
when asked about the marijuana by the arresting officer, 
responded, according to the officer’s notes in evidence:  
“Said she didn’t know about drugs.  1st time I’ve driven with 
that stuff.”  The Court of Appeals held that statement to be a 
proper basis for the trial court’s conclusion that the 
defendant knew the marijuana was present in the trunk.  Id. at 
100, 390 S.E.2d at 498. 
 
In Josephs, there was ample circumstantial evidence to 
support the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant was 
aware of the nature and character of the drugs that she 
jointly possessed, and it was unnecessary for the Court of 
Appeals to rely on an inference of guilty knowledge based on 
possession alone.  We do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ 
statement in Josephs that “[p]ossession of a controlled drug 
gives rise to an inference of the defendant’s knowledge of its 
character,” insofar as that statement can be read to imply 
 
6
that bare possession, without more, may furnish proof, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, of the essential element of guilty 
knowledge.  Countless scenarios can be envisioned in which 
controlled substances may be found in the possession of a 
person who is entirely unaware of their nature and character.  
We adhere to our holding in Burton, quoted above, that actual 
or constructive possession alone is not sufficient.  To the 
extent that the holding in Josephs is inconsistent with our 
holding here, i.e., that possession alone, without more, is 
insufficient to support an inference of guilty knowledge, we 
overrule that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
 
In the present case, after the trial court granted a 
motion to suppress the defendant’s statements on Miranda 
grounds, the record is devoid of evidence of any acts, 
statements or conduct tending to show guilty knowledge on her 
part.  Unlike the odoriferous contents of the trunk in 
Josephs, the contents of the pill bottle in this case gave no 
indication of their character.  Officer Blystone, after 
examining the pills, could not determine their nature without 
submitting them for laboratory analysis, and there is no 
reason to infer that the defendant was any better informed.  
The ambiguous circumstantial evidence concerning the 
appearance of the bottle and its contents is as consistent 
with a hypothesis of innocence as it is with that of guilt.  
 
7
 
8
It is thus insufficient to support the conviction in this 
case.  See Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 215, 218, 441 
S.E.2d 342, 344 (1994) (evidence must establish guilt of the 
accused beyond a reasonable doubt and exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence). 
Conclusion 
 
Because we find the record devoid of evidence sufficient 
to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant possessed morphine with knowledge of its nature and 
character, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and dismiss the indictment. 
Reversed and dismissed.