Case Title: PHYLLIS A. DRURY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0250

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-10-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
PHYLLIS A. DRURY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 130194 P.3d 1017Case Number: S-07-0250Decided: 10/23/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
PHYLLIS 
A. DRURY,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; John D. King, 
Faculty Director, Grant Curry and Jon Aimone, Student Interns, of Defender Aid 
Program.  Argument by Messrs. Aimone 
and Curry.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Phyllis 
A. Drury requests that we overturn her conviction because she claims that a 
witness inappropriately vouched for the credibility of other witnesses and 
impermissibly commented on Appellant's credibility during her trial.  Appellant also claims that the district 
court committed reversible error when it failed to suppress statements regarding 
taped interviews with law enforcement because the tapes of those interviews were 
destroyed and were not available to the defense at trial.  We affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Did the district court abuse its 
discretion when it allowed a law enforcement officer to testify regarding his 
ability to gauge credibility, behavior he considered indicative of credibility, 
and his impressions of the credibility of Appellant and other suspects, and when 
the court denied a subsequent motion for mistrial based on that same 
testimony?

 
 
           
2.   Did the district 
court abuse its discretion in failing to exclude the testimony of a law 
enforcement officer regarding his interviews with Appellant and other witnesses 
even though tapes of those interviews were not provided to Appellant in 
discovery?

 
 
           
3.   Did the district 
court err when it determined that Appellant's due process rights were not 
violated although the investigating officer destroyed tapes of interviews with 
Appellant and various witnesses?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Appellant worked 
for a company dealing with collections in medical billing from January to 
September of 2005.  In approximately 
April of 2005, deposits at the company began to go missing.  The problem was not discovered until 
June when the company reconciled its books.  The company, with the help of an 
accounting firm, spent several months investigating in order to confirm that the 
problem was internal and identify which specific deposits were missing.  The company then used payroll and 
vacation records to eliminate from suspicion any employees who were not in the 
office on at least one day when a deposit went missing.  Three employees were identified who had 
been present in the office on every day a deposit 
disappeared.

 
 
[¶4]      Managers called 
the three employees who were still under suspicion into individual interviews 
with law enforcement present.1  The interviews were recorded on audio 
tape but the recording was unintelligible because of poor sound quality.  All of the employees denied involvement 
in the theft.  At the end of the 
three interviews, the managers asked Appellant to clean off her desk and law 
enforcement escorted her from the premises.

 
 
[¶5]      Officer Phil 
Brown investigated the thefts.  Officer Brown interviewed nine employees 
in connection with his investigation.  
Officer Brown recorded those interviews and used the recordings to 
prepare his reports but he reused the tapes for other purposes and did not 
preserve the recordings.  Appellant 
was the last employee Officer Brown interviewed.  Officer Brown taped Appellant's 
interview as well, but both the audio and video tapes ran out approximately 
halfway through the interview.  
Officer Brown testified that Appellant confessed and signed a statement 
after the tape ran out.  Appellant's 
written statement was admitted at trial.

 
 
[¶6]      The State charged 
Appellant with felony larceny under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(a)(c)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2003).  The jury found Appellant 
guilty but the district court deferred its judgment and sentencing until both 
sides could submit materials related to a mistrial motion the defense brought 
during Officer Brown's testimony.  
The district court denied the motion on June 26, 2007, and entered a 
Judgment and Sentence on August 21, 2007.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed a law enforcement 
officer to  testify regarding his 
ability to gauge credibility, behavior he considered indicative of credibility, 
 and his impressions of the 
credibility of Appellant and other suspects, and when the court denied a 
subsequent motion for mistrial based on that same testimony 
?

 
 
[¶7]      Appellant 
contends that the district court committed error per se when it permitted testimony 
regarding Appellant's guilt.  
However, we recently abandoned the "error per se" standard for such 
testimony.  Large v. State, 2008 WY 22, ¶ 30, 177 P.3d 807, 816 (Wyo. 2008).  Since 
Appellant objected to the testimony at trial, we will review the admission of 
this testimony for abuse of discretion and determine whether the error, if any, 
was harmless.  Id., 2008 WY 22, 
¶ 30, 177 P.3d  at 816; W.R.A.P. 9.04.

 
 
[¶8]      We review the 
denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion.  Martin v. State, 2007 WY 2, ¶ 11, 149 P.3d 707, 710 
(Wyo. 2007).  An abuse of discretion 
occurs where the district court could not reasonably have concluded as it 
did.  Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 10, 131 P.3d 348, 352 
(Wyo. 2006).  "Granting a mistrial 
is an extreme and drastic remedy that should be resorted to only in the face of 
an error 
so prejudicial that justice could not be served by proceeding with trial."  Warner v. State, 897 P.2d 472, 474 (Wyo. 1995).  Appellant has the burden of showing that 
she was prejudiced by the district court's denial of the motion for 
mistrial.  Yellowbear v. State, 2008 WY 4, ¶ 67, 
174 P.3d 1270, 1295 (Wyo. 2008).  

 
 
[¶9]      The testimony at 
issue was certainly inappropriate.  
Officer Brown testified that he had extensive training in interviewing 
techniques, including training in how to determine if a subject is lying during 
an interview.  The officer also 
testified as to specific things for which he had been trained to look in making 
that determination.2  He then made several comments about 
Appellant's credibility, about his opinion of her guilt, and about the 
credibility of the other suspects he interviewed during the investigation.  At various points in his testimony, the 
officer made the following statements:

 
 
But 
they sent me to a specialized school which basically supplied me with an outline 
[for interviews] that I could work with, an outline that psychologists and 
hundreds of cops have decided works pretty much all of the 
time.

 
 
 . . . .

 
 
They 
didn't really go into the exact questions, but they did have an outline of a 
certain amount of questions that you should follow in the same -- same order 
that would elicit responses both physically and verbally that would lead the 
detective to think that the person they're talking to is either being deceptive 
or is trying to be helpful with the cops.  
Like a witness or, a, um, somebody that's not guilty could act entirely 
different than people that have some involvement in the 
crime.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Just 
in the initial phase what I'm looking for is changes in body behavior that would 
indicate deception.  I'm not really 
listening to the answers of the questions.  
I'm watching her body for movement, twitches, anything that is 
abnormal.  You know, I sit there for 
about half an hour, and I watch what's normal.  Then when I start to ask her just 
slightly stressful questions, and I watch what happens to her body.  If I hit a chord during one of my 
questions, I know that something is up there; and I know that I need to ask more 
questions in that area.  And it also 
gives me confidence that the person I'm talking to is lying to 
me.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
I'm 
looking for twitching legs, covering the mouth, inappropriate coughing, all of 
these things that I was taught that would indicate that somebody is trying to 
hide somebody [sic].  Witnesses -- 
all of the other women in this office 
didn't give me any of that. 

 
 
. 
. . . 

 
 
And 
during that short phone interview [Appellant] told me some things that were 
not normal for an innocent person.  

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Three 
seconds later she sat down -- well, she was sitting down, but she said 
okay.  So I knew that most normal people that have 
just been accused of -- 

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
The 
first part of the interview I'm watching body language.  What they're saying is not necessarily 
as important as what their body's saying in regard to the deception or 
truth.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Okay.  In my opinion the nine women that I talked 
to did not exhibit any -- 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added).

 
 
[¶10]   Officer Brown testified as a lay 
witness.  However, it is 
impermissible for either a lay witness or an expert to vouch for the credibility 
of another witness, or to comment on the guilt of the accused.  Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, ¶ 22, 98 P.3d 143, 150 (Wyo. 2004).  The 
question becomes whether the error3 requires reversal or whether the 
error was harmless under W.R.A.P. 9.04.  

 
 
We 
must ascertain whether the error affects any substantial rights of the accused, 
providing grounds for reversal, or whether it is harmless. The harmless error 
standard is set out in W.R.A.P. 9.04:  "Any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the 
reviewing court."  See also 
W.R.Cr.P. 52(a).  An error is 
harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to 
the defendant had the error never occurred.  To demonstrate harmful error, the 
defendant must show prejudice under "circumstances which manifest inherent 
unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair 
play."  Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo. 1990).  Under our harmless error analysis, we 
must judge whether the jury's verdict might have been different but for the 
witnesses' testimony.

 
 

Wilks 
v. State, 
2002 WY 100, ¶ 21, 49 P.3d 975, 984 (Wyo. 2002).  "Among the factors to be considered are 
the nature and gravity of the error, the prosecutor's duty to do justice and 
refrain from improper methods, the likely impact on the average juror, the 
quality of the prosecution's case, and the closeness of the case."  Warner v. State, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 23, 
28 P.3d 21, 29 (Wyo. 2001).  

 
 
[¶11]   The defense objected to each 
instance of vouching and of improper opinion as to guilt.  The district court initially overruled 
or ignored those objections but did issue a limiting instruction at the end of 
Officer Brown's direct testimony.  
The district court instructed the jury:

 
 
In 
regard to some of the testimony you heard from this witness, I want you to keep 
in mind that it is the exclusive province of the jury to determine whether or 
not a witness is telling the truth.  
It is not proper for a witness to vouch, as [Defense Counsel] has used 
that term in this trial, for the credibility of some other witness.  And so whatever Officer Brown said about 
what his perception was about some witness, a witness's veracity or telling the 
truth or lack of truth, you're to totally disregard his testimony insofar as 
he's testified along those lines.

 
 
[¶12]   Several of the witness's improper 
comments came after the district court gave that instruction.  A number of those attempts by the 
witness to insert prejudicial statements were cut off by objection or 
interrupted by defense counsel.  The 
prosecutor interrupted several of the statements made on direct examination and 
attempted to redirect testimony into safer waters.  It is evident from the record that 
defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the district court all had difficulty 
controlling this witness.4  

 
 
[¶13]   The district court also instructed 
the jury before deliberations as follows:

 
 
The 
jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and of the weight to 
be given to their testimony.  You 
should take into consideration their demeanor upon the witness stand, their 
apparent intelligence or lack of intelligence, their means of knowledge of the 
facts, the interest, if any, which any witness may have in the outcome of this 
trial, the prejudice or motives, or feelings of revenge, if any, which have been 
shown by the evidence.  In so doing, 
you may take into consideration all of the facts and circumstances in the case 
and give such weight as you think the same are entitled to, in the light of your 
experience and knowledge of human affairs.

 
 
Another 
jury instruction read, in pertinent part:

 
 
It 
is your duty to determine the facts and to determine them from the evidence 
produced in open court.  You are the 
sole judges of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to 
be given their testimony.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
The 
evidence which you are to consider consists of testimony of the witnesses and 
the exhibits offered and received.  
The production of evidence in court is governed by rules of law.  From time to time it has been my duty as 
Judge to rule on the admissibility of evidence.  You must not concern yourself with the 
reasons for these rulings.  You are 
not to consider testimony which was ordered stricken.

 
 
[¶14]   In deciding whether Appellant was 
prejudiced by the district court's admission of the above-quoted testimony and 
by the district court's decision to deny the motion for a mistrial, we consider 
the improper testimony in light of the trial as a whole.  Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 36, ¶ 11, 
180 P.3d 212, 216 (Wyo. 2008).  
Here, it was evident that the prosecutor and defense counsel both 
struggled to control this witness.  
Either the prosecutor or defense counsel interrupted almost every 
statement Officer Brown made regarding credibility.  The prosecution did not emphasize the 
improper testimony during its examination of the witness or in closing 
argument.  The district court, while 
at first leaving the prosecutor and defense to wrangle with the witness, 
eventually sustained several objections to the witness's testimony and offered 
both a corrective instruction during Officer Brown's testimony, and several 
final jury instructions in an attempt to mitigate the damage.  We consider jury instructions in our 
analysis and we assume that the jury followed the instructions given by the 
district court.  Id. at ¶ 18, 180 P.3d  at 218.  The district court 
repeatedly instructed the jury to determine credibility independently and to 
disregard any improper witness testimony on that subject. 

            

[¶15]   We also consider the strength of 
the evidence against Appellant in order to determine whether there is a 
possibility that the jury could have found differently in the absence of the 
improper testimony.  Warner, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 23, 28 P.3d  at 
29.  Employees of the company and an 
accounting firm testified as to the dates on which deposits were stolen.  Payroll and vacation records admitted 
into evidence showed that only three employees were present on all of the dates 
on which thefts took place.  There 
was no dispute that the stolen deposits were kept in an unlocked drawer directly 
behind Appellant's desk.  Several 
employees and Officer Brown testified that Appellant often spoke of her 
financial difficulties and that she had taken pay advances several times.  Officer Brown testified that Appellant 
confessed to stealing the money and that she provided him with details of her 
crimes.  He testified that Appellant 
said she initially planned to replace the deposits if the theft were 
discovered.  One of Appellant's 
supervisors testified that she found blank deposit slips for some of the 
accounts from which money was stolen in Appellant's pencil drawer and that there 
was no business-related reason for Appellant to have deposit slips for any 
account.  The jury had a signed 
statement by Appellant that was read into the record as 
follows:

 
 
In 
the matter of Affinity Professional Systems, I realize that my actions have not 
only hurt financially but also emotionally.  I can say I'm sorry, but that still does 
not change the situation.  I made an 
awful error in judgment that has snowballed out of control before I was able to 
rectify the situation.  There is no 
reason for my actions other than financial desperation.  The opportunity presented itself, and 
without rational thought I left behind all moral and self-respect.  I hurt a lot of people who trusted and 
respected me, and for that I will always be sorry.  I can some -- I can someday make good 
financially, but emotionally I will live with this mistake for life. 

 
 
[¶16]   In light of the overwhelming 
evidence against Appellant, including her own confession, we cannot say that the 
jury could have found differently in the absence of the improper testimony as to 
credibility.  We have also given 
weight to the fact that the prosecutor did nothing to increase the prejudicial 
effect of the vouching testimony.  
The district court went to great lengths to instruct the jury to 
disregard Officer Brown's testimony on credibility and to make its own 
determination as to the credibility of each witness.  We find that it would have been quite 
evident to the jury that the witness was acting inappropriately, and we are 
confident that the jury would have had no difficulty understanding which 
portions of the testimony to disregard.  
We find that Appellant was not prejudiced by the testimony and that the 
error was harmless.  For the same 
reasons, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Appellant's motion for mistrial.  

 
 
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in failing to exclude the testimony of a 
law enforcement officer regarding his interviews with Appellant and other 
witnesses even though tapes of those interviews were not provided to Appellant 
in discovery?

 
 
            
Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion 
of the trial court.  Urbigkit v. 
State, 2003 WY 57, ¶ 39, 67 P.3d 1207, ¶ 39 (Wyo. 2003). We will not disturb such rulings absent a clear 
abuse of discretion.  Id.  An abuse of discretion occurs when it is 
shown the trial court reasonably could not have concluded as it did.  Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 320, ¶ 13 
(Wyo.2004). Factual findings made by a trial court considering a motion to 
suppress will not be disturbed unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶ 8, 37 P.3d 1279, ¶ 8 
(Wyo. 2002).

 
 

O'Boyle 
v. State, 
2005 WY 83, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d 401, 407 (Wyo. 2005).  

            

[¶17]   Appellant phrases this issue as a 
question of whether or not the State should have been compelled to produce 
evidence and whether, failing that, the district court should have suppressed 
the evidence because the State failed to produce it.  However, there does not appear to be a 
dispute as to whether the tapes of the various interviews were available for 
production.  Appellant admits that 
production of these recordings was impossible.  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit considered this question in United States v. Gomez, 191 F.3d 1214 
(10th Cir. 1999) and determined that the issue was more properly one of due 
process to be decided under Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963) and its 
progeny.  We agree, and will address 
the issue as one of due process below.

 
 
Did 
the district court err when it determined that Appellant's due process rights 
were not violated although the investigating officer destroyed tapes of 
interviews with Appellant and various witnesses?

 
 
[¶18]   Appellant contends that her due 
process rights were violated when Officer Brown destroyed the recordings of 
Appellant's and other witnesses' interviews.  Appellant does not point to any 
exculpatory value those tapes would have had, but merely contends that the tapes 
were potentially useful to her defense.  
Therefore, the standard to be applied is that of Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S. Ct. 333, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1988).  Under Youngblood, Appellant must show that the 
State acted in bad faith in destroying the evidence.  Whitney v. State, 2004 WY 118, ¶ 59, 99 P.3d 457, 477 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 
[¶19]   Our inquiry into bad faith under Youngblood follows a somewhat circular 
process.  A showing of bad faith is 
required where an appellant cannot show that the destroyed evidence had 
exculpatory value that would have been apparent before its destruction.  Id.  However, in order to determine whether 
the State acted in bad faith in destroying the evidence, we must take into 
account the State's knowledge of the potentially exculpatory nature of the 
evidence.  Id.  In this case, Appellant has failed even 
to allege that the tapes could have had exculpatory value, let alone that 
Officer Brown should have been aware of that value before he destroyed the 
tapes.  Officer Brown testified that 
the only information regarding Appellant contained in the tapes of the witnesses 
was reference to innuendo and speculation that Appellant had committed the 
crime.  Each of the interviewed 
employees testified at Appellant's trial.  
Defense counsel did not question any of the witnesses about the substance 
of the interviews, nor did he ask about the contents of the tapes.  Appellant does not allege that Officer 
Brown's testimony was inaccurate, even with respect to his description of 
Appellant's interview.

 
 
[¶20]   Our analysis of due process goes to 
the fundamental fairness of the underlying trial.  Whitney, 2004 WY 118, ¶ 58, 99 P.3d  at 
476.  Officer Brown testified that 
he used the tapes to collect information for his reports.  Appellant had access to those 
reports.  Appellant also had access 
to every witness who was the subject of an interview and yet she does not 
contend that any of the tapes contained anything that would contradict Officer 
Brown's testimony.  There is no 
evidence that the tapes had any possible exculpatory value, let alone that 
Officer Brown was aware of any exculpatory value before he destroyed the 
recordings as part of his routine procedure.  Therefore, there was no violation of 
Appellant's right to the due process of law.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion when it denied Appellant's motion for a mistrial.  The district court's instructions to the 
jury were well-designed to mitigate any possible prejudice resulting from 
improper testimony.  Any error in 
admitting the testimony was harmless in light of the compelling evidence 
presented against Appellant.  
Appellant also failed to show that her due process rights were violated 
when tapes of witness interviews were destroyed.  There was no dispute as to the content 
of the tapes, no showing of their having been exculpatory, and Appellant had 
access to all the witnesses as well as the interviewing officer and his reports 
of the interviews.  The judgment and 
sentence of the district court are affirmed. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
company requested a law enforcement presence at the interviews as a civil 
standby.  The officers did not 
directly participate in the interviews.

 
 

2Appellant 
did not object to this testimony, and does not take issue with it on 
appeal.  The State concedes that it 
elicited this testimony, and seems to find nothing wrong with having a witness 
testify to the jury about specific behaviors that would indicate that a person 
lacks credibility or is lying.  We 
must emphasize that one of the key purposes of a jury is to determine the 
credibility of each witness based on that jury's common experience with such 
matters.  See 89 C.J.S. Trial § 677 (2001).  Testimony on how to gauge credibility is 
completely inappropriate, and constitutes an unacceptable invasion of the 
province of the jury.

 
 

3It is 
difficult to say that the trial court "admitted" this testimony, when the record 
reflects that everyone involved went to considerable lengths to prevent the 
witness from testifying improperly.  
However, since the comments were made in the presence of the jury, we 
must examine the record to determine if Appellant was prejudiced as a result of 
the failure of all parties to control this witness.    

 
 

4At one 
point, the district court called a recess so that the prosecutor could direct 
the witness not to discuss Appellant's history with Alcoholics Anonymous, which 
history the witness used to create a bond with Appellant during the 
interview.  Appellant had apparently 
confessed to the witness that she spent most of the stolen money on 
alcohol.  Even after strict 
out-of-court instruction, the witness still managed to slip in a comment when 
asked whether Appellant gave some of the money to her mother that, "[s]he gave 
all of it to a different thing.  I 
can't -- I was told not to tell you what."