Case Title: McCULLOH F/K/A/ DRAKE v. DRAKE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 99-316

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
McCULLOH F/K/A/ DRAKE v. DRAKE2001 WY 5624 P.3d 1162Case Number: 99-316, 99-317Decided: 06/15/2001

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                            

        
GERRI E. McCULLOH, f/k/a    

GERRI 
E. DRAKE,

Appellant(Plaintiff),

v.

JOHN 
W. DRAKE,

Appellee(Defendant).

                                      
JOHN W. DRAKE,           
                           

Appellant(Defendant),

v.

GERRI 
E. McCULLOH, f/k/a

GERRI 
E. DRAKE,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

Appeals 
from the District Court of Sheridan County:

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

Representing 
Gerri McCulloh:

C. 
John Cotton, Gillette, WY.  Argument 
by Mr. Cotton.

 Representing 
John Drake:

Ann 
M. Rochelle of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, WY, and John 
D. Ward, Sheridan, WY.  Argument by 
Ms. Rochelle.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS,* MACY,** GOLDEN, and HILL, 
JJ.

 *Concurred 
prior to retirement.

**Retired 
June 2, 2000.

  
            
LEHMAN, Chief Justice.

 [¶1]      The marriage of 
Gerri E. McCulloh (the wife) and John W. Drake (the husband) endured for 
approximately three and a half years before the wife sought a divorce.  One son was produced by the 
marriage.  The parties' divorce 
proceedings involved tort allegations in addition to the usual issues regarding 
child custody, child support, alimony, and property division.  Neither party was completely satisfied 
with the way the trial court decided the various issues, and they both filed 
appeals.

[¶2]      We affirm in 
part, reverse in part, and remand.

ISSUES

[¶3]      The wife presents the following issues for our 
review:

            
Issue No. 1:  Did the 
Court err in ordering divided custody, and in granting divided custody and 
primary decision making authority to a known perpetrator of domestic 
abuse?

            
Issue 
No. 2:  Did the Court err in connection with 
child support calculations?

            
Issue 
No. 3:  Did the Court err in connection with 
property settlement issues?

            
Issue 
No. 4:  Did the Court err in sua sponte denying 
Plaintiff a jury trial on tort issues?

            
Issue 
No. 5:  Did the Court err in failing to apply 
controlling Wyoming law in connection with the determination of punitive 
damages?

            
Issue 
No. 6:  Did the Court err in ordering payment to 
the GAL directly from the parties, instead of out of the marital estate 
generally, prior to distribution?

The 
husband seeks our review of issues pertaining to the tort 
claims:

            
1.  As to Wife's tort claims, 
Husband is only contesting the tort claim findings and rulings as to the 
September, 1997 pillow incident.  
Husband specifically raises the following issues:  (a) While Wyoming has abrogated 
interspousal immunity and has adopted the tort of emotional distress, does 
Wyoming recognize the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in a 
marital context?  (b) If the tort 
does exist in a marital setting, Husband's conduct with regard to the pillow 
incident in September, 1997 was not outrageous; Husband did not act with the 
requisite intent; Wife did not suffer severe emotional distress; and Husband's 
alleged conduct of inflicting . . . emotional harm did not proximately 
cause[] Wife's damages.

            
2.  As to punitive damages, 
Husband asserts that Wife failed in the first instance to make a prima facie 
case and/or prove her claim for punitive damages by a preponderance of the 
evidence.

            
3.  If this case is remanded 
as to the tort issues, Husband should be allowed to have Wife's counseling, 
psychological, psychiatric and medical records prior to marriage so as to 
demonstrate Wife's condition prior to the marriage.  The Trial Court improperly limited 
Husband's access to Wife's medical, psychological, psychiatric and counseling 
records to those since the date of the marriage.

            
4.  If this case is remanded, 
Husband should be allowed to take the deposition of Cody McCulloh-Cabe, Wife's 
son from her first marriage.

FACTS

[¶4]      The husband and 
the wife were married on March 5, 1994.  
The wife had one son from a prior marriage, and the couple had another 
son in October of 1994.  During the 
marriage, the family lived on a ranch that the husband purchased prior to the 
marriage.  After moving to the 
ranch, the couple commenced the operation of a Morgan horse 
business.

[¶5]      The wife asserts 
that, beginning shortly after the marriage, the husband began a pattern of 
physical and sexual abuse.  She 
maintains that various incidents of abuse led up to an encounter where the 
husband held a pillow over her face, which ultimately caused her departure from 
the relationship.  The wife left her husband on October 4, 1997, and 
filed for divorce on December 31, 1997.  
On October 29, 1998, the wife filed the complaint wherein she asserted 
the various tort claims and requested a jury trial.  The trial court denied the jury trial 
request and, from July 26, 1999, through July 30, 1999, heard evidence 
pertaining to child custody, child support, property division, alimony, attorney 
and guardian ad litem fees, the tort claims, and punitive 
damages.

[¶6]      At the conclusion 
of the trial, the trial court awarded shared physical custody of the child but 
gave primary decision-making power regarding medical and educational issues to 
the husband.  It also awarded $1,200 
per month to the wife for child support.  
Regarding the property that was acquired before and during the marriage, 
the trial court made the following finding:

Prior 
to the marriage Father was worth about 3.9 million and at the time of separation 
he was worth about 4.9 million (EX. YYYY-2).  The 1 million in increased worth during 
this marriage was primarily due to more inheritance - not earned 
appreciation.  Very little evidence 
supports the proposition that Father's holdings appreciated as a result of 
Plaintiff's efforts.  The horse 
business pursued by both parties lost considerable amounts during this 
marriage.

The 
wife was allowed to keep the $100,000 she withdrew from the parties' joint bank 
account in October of 1997 as well as the $50,000 the husband was ordered to pay 
her.  She was also awarded $200,000, 
the financial contributions made by the husband to her son from a previous 
marriage, her personal bank accounts and investment portfolio, four horses, two 
miniature donkeys, a pickup and horse trailer, a house in Sheridan, and items 
personal to her.  The trial court 
awarded the husband his bank accounts and investment portfolio that included his 
inheritance from his parents and grandmother, fifteen horses, his interest in 
the various properties he owned before the marriage, the ranch that the couple 
and the boys lived on during the marriage, several vehicles and trailers, and 
items personal to him.

[¶7]      The trial court 
allowed the wife to keep the temporary spousal support of $1,400 per month she 
was given from March 1998 through August of 1999 but ruled that she was not 
entitled to any future alimony, finding the property division took into account 
any entitlement to future alimony.  
Finally, the trial court ordered the husband and the wife to split the 
guardian ad litem fees and to bear the responsibility for their own 
attorney fees and costs. 

[¶8]      In 
addressing the various tort claims, the trial court found, regarding the claims 
of negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (except for the pillow incident), outrageous conduct, and 
sexual assault, that the wife failed "to state a claim for which relief can be 
granted; to prove the claim by a preponderance of the evidence; to present 
sufficient evidence on damages; and/or to timely file some allegations."  Specifically with regard to the sexual 
assault claim, the trial court found that the wife "failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a tortious sexual assault occurred."  

[¶9]      The trial court 
found that the wife did prove a tort occurred in September of 1997 when the 
husband briefly held a pillow over her face and concluded that, although she did 
not currently suffer a disability, there was some proof she suffered emotional 
distress as a result of the incident.  
Accordingly, the trial court awarded damages of $4,250 and $750 in 
punitive damages, using the following rationale to arrive at the latter 
figure:

            
Given the incompatibility of these parties, conflict was inevitable.  Happily, there were no stitches nor 
broken bones.  Still, court 
decisions must reflect society's disdain for domestic abuse of any type.  Hence, the Court finds punitive damages 
are appropriate.

            
. . . The Court finds the September 1997 incident where Defendant covered 
Plaintiff's head briefly with a pillow most closely resembles a battery under 
W.S. 6-2-501(b).  The maximum 
criminal fine for violating this statute is $750.00.

[¶10]   Neither party was satisfied with 
the trial court's final decision, and they each filed an appeal.  In the 
wife's appeal, she takes issue with the divided custody order, the award of 
primary decision-making authority to the husband, the child support award, and 
the property settlement.  The wife 
also claims that the trial court should not have denied her request for a jury 
trial on the tort issues and it failed to apply controlling Wyoming law with 
regard to the punitive damages.  She 
lastly complains that the trial court ordered each party to pay half of the 
guardian ad litem fees rather than requiring payment from the marital 
estate prior to distribution.  The 
husband questions whether Wyoming recognizes the tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress in a marital context and, if so, whether the elements of 
that tort were satisfied with regard to the pillow incident.  He also asserts that the wife failed to 
prove her claim for punitive damages by a preponderance of the evidence.  Finally, he requests discovery of the 
wife's psychological records from prior to the marriage and seeks to take the 
deposition of the wife's son from a previous marriage if the case is 
remanded.

DISCUSSION

[¶11]   The wife asserts that the trial 
court erred when it ordered divided custody and gave primary decision-making 
authority to a perpetrator of domestic violence.  The husband responds that the trial 
court properly applied the best-interests-of-the-child 
standard.

[¶12]   After the parties' oral arguments 
in this court, the wife filed a Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce 
to Place Primary Custody With Petitioner (Mother) as Child's Historic Primary 
Care Provider with the trial court.  
The trial court found that the circumstances since the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce had substantially changed and ordered custody of the parties' 
son to be changed to the wife.  The 
husband has appealed from that order.  Because the circumstances surrounding 
this issue have changed so significantly and because the trial court's order 
which pertains to the most recent facts has been appealed since the case at bar 
was heard, we have decided to reserve our discussion on this issue for our 
opinion in that case.

[¶13]   The wife claims that the trial 
court erred when it divided the property.  
She contends that the husband's inheritance from his parents and 
grandmother should be divided so she can maintain a comparable standard of 
living, arguing that his entire estate was used to support the family and 
maintain the family's standard of living.  
The husband replies that the trial court's property division was fair and 
equitable and the wife is not entitled to any of the wealth he inherited or 
brought into the marriage.

[¶14]   When the parties married, the 
husband's net worth was approximately $3.9 million.  During the marriage, he continued to 
receive substantial monetary gifts from his mother.  At the time of the parties' separation, 
the husband was worth approximately $4.9 million.  After the wife left her husband but 
shortly before she filed for divorce, the husband's mother died, and he became a 
vested beneficiary of both his mother's and grandmother's trusts/wills.  By the time of trial, the husband's net 
worth had increased to approximately $10 million.  This increase in his wealth was due 
solely to the gifts and inheritance from his mother rather than to the parties' 
efforts given that their horse business lost money.

[¶15]   In analyzing property division 
awards, we are guided by the following principles:

"We 
apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing divisions of marital 
property and, recognizing that property settlements present complex problems 
requiring the trial court to assess the respective merits and needs of the 
parties, we will not disturb the result absent a manifest abuse of that 
discretion.  France v. 
France, 902 P.2d 701, 703 (Wyo. 1995); Neuman v. Neuman, 842 P.2d 575, 578 (Wyo. 1992); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 456 P.2d 243, 247 (Wyo. 
1969).  We will find an abuse of 
discretion when the disposition shocks the conscience of the court and appears 
so unfair and inequitable that reasonable persons could not abide it.  France, 902 P.2d  at 703.  In applying these standards, we review 
the evidence on appeal in the favor of the successful party below, ignoring the 
evidence of the unsuccessful party, and granting the successful party every 
reasonable inference that can be drawn from the record.'  Id. at 
703-04."

Carlton 
v. Carlton, 
997 P.2d 1028, 1030-31 
(Wyo. 2000) (quoting Mann v. Mann, 979 P.2d 497, 500 (Wyo. 1999)).  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 (LEXIS 1999) (amended 2000) required a trial court to 
distribute property in a just and equitable manner:

            
In granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the 
property of the parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the 
respective merits of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by 
the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens 
imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and children.  

This 
court has held that a just and equitable division of property is as likely as 
not to be unequal.  France v. France, 902 P.2d 701, 704 (Wyo. 1995).  Relying on our rule that "property which 
is subject to division under our statute consists of property which is the 
product of the marital union and was acquired during the course of the marriage 
by the joint efforts of the parties," we have held that gifted or inherited 
property can be properly awarded to the party by whom it was inherited or 
given.  902 P.2d  at 704, 
706.

[¶16]   In this case, the husband's wealth 
was acquired and increased by gifts and inheritance from his parents and 
grandmother rather than from the couple's efforts during their marriage.  Although the wife testified that one of 
her counselors thought she was going through too much with her divorce case to 
be able to hold down a job, she did not present any medical or other reason why 
she could not or should not find gainful employment.  She has three and one-half years of 
college credit, operated computers, and worked in the radio industry for many 
years, and, although the wife had been thinking about employment options she 
would like to pursue, she testified that she was waiting until her case was 
resolved before acting on any of those ideas.  We conclude that the factors set out in 
our statute as well as prior case law support the trial court's decision to 
divide the property as it did.  We, 
therefore, affirm this portion of the trial court's order.  

[¶17]   The wife also complains that the 
trial court required her to pay one-half of the fees for the child custody 
evaluator and for the guardian ad litem as well as to reimburse the 
husband for medical expenses and a charge for household items she incurred 
during the marriage.  She also 
challenges the trial court's decision to allow the husband to use the couple's 
child as a deduction on his federal income tax return.

[¶18]   It is a well established rule that 
the trial court's determination with respect to the allocation of costs will not 
be overturned on appeal unless the record demonstrates a clear abuse of 
discretion.  Carlson v. Carlson, 888 P.2d 210, 216 (Wyo. 1995).  Additionally, although a trial court 
should consider tax issues presented by the parties, it is not required to 
consider potential tax ramifications not raised by the parties.  Sellers v. Sellers, 775 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Wyo. 1989).   

[¶19]   It is rare when a marriage 
dissolves for either party to be satisfied with the trial court's final 
decision.  It is for this reason 
that trial courts impress upon the parties the benefits to coming to a mutual 
decision between themselves rather than leaving the property division decisions 
to the trial court.  The parties in 
this case did not follow this advice, and neither is completely happy with the 
disposition.  The wife, however, has 
failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion.  Consequently, we decline to alter the 
final property distribution with regard to the property division order or with 
regard to the assessment of fees and costs.

1.  Should the Tort Be Adopted in a Marital 
Setting?

[¶20]   The husband claims that the wife's 
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim should have been dismissed 
because this court has not recognized the tort in a marital context.  Although 
Wyoming has abrogated interspousal immunity and has adopted the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, we have not had the opportunity to 
address whether the tort is available in a marital context.  Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065, 
1069 (Wyo. 1987); Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1065 (Wyo. 
1986).  When this court adopted the 
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress cause of action, we adopted the 
definition provided by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965).  Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 1065.  To recover under an 
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, "a plaintiff must prove that 
the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous and that the defendant 
intentionally or recklessly caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional 
harm."  Anderson v. Solvay 
Minerals, Inc., 3 P.3d 236, 241 (Wyo. 2000). 

[¶21]   Courts and legislatures have 
historically tried to remain uninvolved in regulating behavior within a marriage 
in an effort to preserve domestic harmony.  
Meredith L. Taylor, Comment, North 
Carolina's Recognition of Tort Liability for the Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress During Marriage, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1261, 1267 
(1997).  Recently, however, courts 
have begun to acknowledge claims for civil relief in the marital context, 
reasoning that a tort claim may provide a better remedy than a divorce action 
does.  Id.  Indeed, judicial recognition of 
emotional distress claims in the context of marriages has been described as a 
"national trend."  Id.  

[¶22]   Those who oppose recognizing civil 
relief among married persons worry that (1) it will open the floodgates to a 
host of frivolous litigation; (2) because married persons share an intensely 
personal and intimate relationship, when discord arises, it is inevitable they 
will suffer emotional distress, often severe; and (3) the inquiry into whether a 
spouse's conduct is extreme and outrageous constitutes too great an intrusion 
into the marital relationship.    

[¶23]   We acknowledge and have seriously 
contemplated these concerns.  In 
many marriages, and undoubtedly in most troubled marriages, a high level of 
emotional antagonism exists between the spouses, and it is likely that volatile 
circumstances will often be perceived as extreme and outrageous.  We have questioned whether legal 
intrusion into behavior which occurs within a marriage is appropriate and 
whether legal relief in addition to a divorce is justified for an 
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim in light of this fact.  We conclude they are.  Emotional distress is as real and 
tormenting as physical pain, and psychological well-being deserves as much legal 
protection as physical well-being.  
Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1139 (Me. 1993).  Although the preservation of marital 
harmony is a respectable goal, behavior which is truly outrageous and results in 
severe emotional distress should not be protected in some sort of misguided 
attempt to promote marital peace.  
Id.  

[¶24]   In coming to this decision, we also 
identified the responsibility to guard against frivolous litigation.  Only situations involving atrocious and 
outrageous behavior should be compensated; conduct which is merely insulting or 
offensive should not.  Taylor, 
supra, at 1264.

[M]ost 
marriages do not include conduct that will support an action for emotional 
distress.  While most marriages 
ending in divorce see their share of insults, indignities, threats, annoyances 
and petty oppressions as well as transient and trivial mental anguish, the 
Restatement expressly excludes such things from forming the basis for 
liability.

Bradley 
A. Case,  Note,  Turning Marital Misery into Financial 
Fortune:  Assertion of Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims by Divorcing Spouses, 33 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 101, 115 
(1994).  

[¶25]   We emphasize that a high standard 
for recovery shall exist and direct trial courts to be especially cautious when 
handling such claims.  The focus of 
such claims must be on the element of outrageousness, and the scrutiny must be 
stringent enough so that the social good which comes from recognizing the tort 
in a marital setting will not be undermined by an invasive flood of meritless 
litigation.  Henriksen, 622 A.2d  at 1139.  The plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was so "extreme and outrageous" that it 
exceeded "all possible bounds of decency."  
Restatement, 
supra, § 46 cmt. d.  
In addition:

It is 
for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's 
conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit 
recovery, or whether it is necessarily so.  
Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the 
control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct 
has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in 
liability.

Id., at 
cmt. h.  Accordingly, we intend for 
motions for summary judgment to be carefully considered in an effort to protect 
defendants from the possibility of long and intrusive trials on frivolous 
claims.  Henriksen, 622 A.2d  
at 1139-40.  

[¶26]   We are convinced that extreme and 
outrageous conduct by one spouse which results in severe emotional distress to 
the other spouse should not be ignored by virtue of the marriage of the victim 
to the aggressor and hold that such behavior can create an independent cause of 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  In making this decision, we set the 
threshold of outrageousness high in hopes it will adequately defend against a 
flood of frivolous litigation.

[¶27]   The wife complains that the trial 
court's decision to hear the tort issues along with the divorce issues deprived 
her of her right to have a jury decide her tort claims.  Relying on W.R.C.P. 38(a), the husband 
replies that the wife was not entitled to a jury trial because her action did 
not exclusively involve the recovery of money.

[¶28]   A civil action in tort is 
fundamentally different from a divorce proceeding.  Henriksen, 622 A.2d  at 1141.  The issues involved in each are entirely 
distinct, and the procedure involved in divorce actions, which are purely 
equitable, makes joining tort claims impracticable.  Id.

"The 
purpose of a tort action is to redress a legal wrong in damages; that of a 
divorce action is to sever the marital relationship between the parties, and 
where appropriate, to fix the parties' respective rights and obligations with 
regard to alimony and support, and to divide the marital 
estate."

Id. 
(quoting Heacock v. Heacock, 520 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Mass. 1988) (citations 
omitted)).  

[¶29]   A most basic procedural difference 
between tort and divorce actions is the right to a jury trial in tort 
actions.

"[D]ivorce 
actions will become unduly complicated in their trial and disposition if torts 
can be or must be litigated in the same action.  A divorce action is highly equitable in 
nature, whereas the trial of a tort claim is at law and may well involve, as in 
this case, a request for a trial by jury.  
The administration of justice will be better served by keeping the 
proceedings separate."

Simmons 
v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602, 604 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288, 
1291 (Utah 1983)).  Moreover, 
joining the actions risks unacceptable delays: 

"Resolution 
of tort claims may necessarily involve numerous witnesses and other parties such 
as joint tortfeasors and insurance carriers whose interests are at stake.  Consequently, requiring joinder of tort 
claims in a divorce action could unduly lengthen the period of time before a 
spouse could obtain a divorce and result in such adverse consequences as delayed 
child custody and support determinations."

Stuart 
v. Stuart, 
421 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Wis. 1988) (quoting Stuart v. Stuart, 410 N.W.2d 632, 638 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)).

[¶30]   The goal to promote judicial 
economy should not be sought at the expense of fair and proper consideration of 
the parties' issues.  "Jurors, many 
of whom are themselves married, are in the best possible position to determine 
what behavior between spouses is atrocious and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized community,' [Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965)], and what 
behavior is within the ebb and flow' of married life." Henriksen, 622 A.2d  at 1139.  

            
3.  Res 
Judicata

[¶31]   Because our holding precludes tort 
issues from being joined with marital dissolution issues, we feel compelled to 
address how the doctrine of res judicata affects this situation.  The doctrine of res judicata prohibits 
the relitigation of claims upon which there has been a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate in a court of competent jurisdiction.  RKS v. SDM by TY (Paternity of 
SDM), 882 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Wyo. 1994).  
"Res judicata can be described generally as that rule which precludes the 
presentation by parties or those in privity with them of the same claim that was 
resolved by an earlier judgment."  
Id.  Res judicata 
avoids inconsistent decisions, limits parties to one opportunity to try their 
cases on the merits, and prevents the legal system from becoming 
unmanageable.  
Id.

The 
criteria used to determine res judicata's applicability to a situation 
are:  "(1) the parties were 
identical; (2) the subject matter was identical; (3) the issues were the same 
and related to the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons were 
identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues between 
them."

Newell 
v. Trumper, 765 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting Swasso [v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Division], 751 P.2d [887,] 890 [(Wyo. 
1988)]).

Osborn 
v. Painter, 909 P.2d 960, 964 (Wyo. 1996).

[¶32]   Under the doctrine of res judicata, 
a final judgment on the merits in a prior action is conclusive and bars all 
subsequent actions between the same parties, or their privies, as to all matters 
which were or might have been litigated in the prior action.  State, Department of Family Services 
v. PAJ, 934 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Wyo. 1997).  Before res judicata will act as a bar to 
subsequent claims, the claims in the subsequent action must be identical to 
those in the first proceeding.  
Osborn, 909 P.2d  at 964.  We, therefore, must analyze the two 
types of actions involved in this case.  

[¶33]   As we stated above, the purpose of 
a divorce is to dissolve a marriage, which includes consideration by a judge of 
issues such as child custody, child support, and alimony.  A tort action is brought to recover 
compensation for injuries suffered as a result of a civil wrong and is normally 
decided by a jury.  
Henriksen,  622 A.2d  
at 1141.  These types of actions are 
fundamentally different, and the issues involved in each are completely 
unrelated.  Id.  Consequently, the requisite identical 
subject matter for the doctrine to bar the subsequent action does not 
exist.  The fact that Wyoming allows 
fault to be considered in divorce proceedings does not convince us 
otherwise.  Section 20-2-114.  The two actions simply do not involve 
the same claim.

[¶34]   We conclude that the efficient 
administration of divorce actions requires their separation from actions at law 
and such separation of the claims will not trigger the res judicata 
doctrine.  The wife's tort claims 
were improperly joined with the divorce action.  We reverse the trial court's decision to 
join the causes of action together in one proceeding and remand for a 
determination by a jury.  

[¶35]   Among the tort claims the wife 
asserted was an allegation of sexual assault and battery.  The trial court, however, found that she 
failed "to state a claim for which relief can be granted; to prove the claim by 
a preponderance of the evidence; to present sufficient evidence on damages; 
and/or to timely file some allegations."  
Specifically with regard to the sexual assault claim, the trial court 
found that the wife "failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
tortious sexual assault occurred."  
The husband maintains that there was no sexual assault and this claim is 
barred by the statute of limitations.

[¶36]   The husband attempts to argue that 
the statute of limitations for civil sexual assault is one year despite the fact 
that the statute specifically states civil sexual assault cases should not be 
included in the one-year limitation period.  He bases this argument on the assumption 
that the elements for tortious sexual assault are the same as for assault and 
battery, citing two Connecticut cases wherein the elements for tortious sexual 
assault were held to be the same as for assault and 
battery.

[¶37]   The applicable statute provides in 
pertinent part: 

(a)  Civil 
actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within 
the following periods after the cause of action accrues:

                        
. . .

                        
(iv)  Within four (4) years, an action 
for:

                                    
. . .

(C)  An 
injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not herein 
enumerated; and

                                    
. . . .

                        
(v) Within one (1) year, an action for:

                                    
. . .

(B) 
Assault or battery not including sexual assault[.]

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a) (LEXIS 1999).

[¶38]   Following the statute's plain 
language, we conclude that the statute of limitations for civil sexual assault 
is four years.  Because some of the 
allegations in this case occurred more than four years prior to the filing of 
this claim, to the extent that the incidents complained of fall within the 
appropriate period of time, we reverse and remand the trial court's decision on 
this issue for a jury determination.  

E.        
DiscoveryThe Wife's Past Records and Deposition of Her Oldest 
Son

[¶39]   The husband requested the 
production of the wife's medical, counseling, psychiatric, and psychological 
records from prior to the marriage.  
He also expresses the desire to depose the wife's oldest son.  The wife argues that the husband had 
access to volumes of information and he was not entitled to go on a fishing 
expedition into records dated before the marriage.  She opposes our consideration of the 
issue of the deposition of her son because the husband did not bring this issue 
to the trial court's attention.  She 
insists that, if the case is remanded and the husband wants to conduct a 
deposition of her son, issues associated therewith can be addressed by the trial 
court then.

[¶40]   We agree with the wife that the 
trial court can address the issue of the requested deposition of her oldest son 
on remand.  Regarding the past 
records issue, however, we side with the husband.  Requests for depositions and for the 
production of documents are controlled by W.R.C.P. 26, which provides in 
pertinent part:

(b) 
Discovery Scope and Limits.  Unless 
otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the 
scope of discovery is as follows:

(1)(A) 
In General.  Parties may obtain 
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or 
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other 
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and 
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and 
location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.  It is not ground for objection that the 
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought 
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence.

(B) 
Limitations.  The frequency or 
extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in subdivision (a) may be 
limited by the court if it determines that:  (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably 
cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery 
has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information 
sought; or (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into 
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the 
parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the 
litigation.  The court may act upon 
its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under 
subdivision (c).

[¶41]   Some of the issues in this case 
raise questions about the wife's mental health.  The evidence at trial demonstrated that 
she had endured some emotionally stressful events prior to her marriage, and the 
husband's expert requested the complete file of her mental health records.  The wife argues that to allow the 
husband access to counseling records dated ten to fifteen years earlier would 
result in an impermissible fishing expedition.

[¶42]   The child custody dispute in this 
case involved allegations by the husband that the wife has been emotionally 
erratic and explosive in front of their child, and he presented evidence to that 
effect.  In the wife's tort issues, 
she asserted that she suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the 
husband's outrageous behavior.  We 
conclude that a mental health expert should be given a complete record of 
relevant facts to be able to adequately evaluate the issues and make an 
intelligent decision.  We, 
therefore, reverse the trial court's denial of the husband's request to discover 
a complete version of the wife's mental health records. 

            

[¶43]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded in accordance with this opinion.