Case Title: In re Estate of Schlenker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96402

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 96402-Agenda 12-January 2004.
In re ESTATE OF LEVI E. SCHLENKER, Deceased (Imogene
Rodgers, Appellee, v. Troy Schlenker, Ex'r, et al. (Troy Schlenker, 							Appellant)).
Opinion filed April 1, 2004.
	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	Imogene Rodgers filed a petition in the circuit court of Union County
pursuant to section 8-1 of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/8-1
(West 2002)) to contest the validity of her father's will. The executor of
the father's estate moved to dismiss Imogene's petition under 2-619(a)(9)
of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2002))
based on lack of standing. The motion to dismiss was granted. The
appellate court reversed and remanded. 338 Ill. App. 3d 761. We
granted the executor's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. For
the reasons that follow, we now affirm the appellate court's judgment.
	The pertinent facts are undisputed. The father, Levi E. Schlenker,
died on July 16, 2001. His wife, Blanche, had predeceased him, as had
two of the couple's four children, Darrell and Johnnie. The father was
survived by his remaining two children, a daughter named Imogene
Rodgers and a son named Troy, both of whom were adults. The father
was also survived three grandchildren, Bradley Schlenker and Ashley
Schlenker Funk, who were the offspring of his deceased son Darrell, and
Brian Rodgers, who was Imogene's child.
	Prior to his death, the father had allegedly executed four separate
wills. The first was dated February 14, 1990. The last bore the date
January 4, 2001. Only three of the wills have been found. These include
both the February 14, 1990, and the January 4, 2001, wills, as well as a
will dated September 16, 1998.
	Following the father's death, a petition was filed in the circuit court
of Union County to have the January 4, 2001, will admitted to probate.
See 755 ILCS 5/6-2 (West 2002). On August 22, 2001, the court
entered an order admitting that will to probate and issuing letters
testamentary to the executor. The person appointed executor was Troy,
the father's surviving son.
	Had the father died intestate, Imogene and Troy, his two surviving
children, would each have inherited a one-third share of his real and
personal property under the Illinois rules of descent and distribution. The
remaining one-third share would have been divided equally between
Bradley and Ashley, the two surviving children of his deceased son
Darrell. 755 ILCS 5/2-1(b) (West 2002). Under the January 4, 2001 will
admitted to probate, Imogene, Bradley and Ashley received nothing. They
were expressly excluded from the will, as was Imogene's son, Brian.
	Within the period prescribed by statute, Imogene filed a petition
under section 8-1 of the Probate Act (755 ILCS 5/8-1 (West 2002)) to
contest the will's validity. As grounds for her petition, Imogene asserted
that her father had been impaired by a variety of physical and mental
conditions, including severe and chronic illnesses, and lacked the mental
capacity to make decisions regarding the disposition of his property.
Imogene further asserted that her brother Troy had breached fiduciary
duties he owed their father and exerted undue influence over him.
	Acting in his role as executor, Troy moved to dismiss Imogene's
petition pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure
(735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2002)). Troy's motion argued that
Imogene lacked standing to contest the January 4, 2001, will because a
ruling on the will's validity would not affect her position. Even if Imogene's
allegations proved true and the January 4 will were declared to be invalid,
there was still the matter of her father's three prior wills. According to
Troy, Imogene stood to receive nothing under those wills just as she stood
to receive nothing under the January 4, 2001, will. As a result, the only
possible way Imogene could ever claim a legally cognizable interest in her
father's estate is by showing that all of the prior wills were invalid too.
Imogene's present petition, however, made no attempt to do that. It was
concerned exclusively with the January 4 will. The prior wills were not
challenged.
	The circuit court found Troy's position to be meritorious and granted
his motion to dismiss. Imogene appealed. The appellate court reversed
and remanded for further proceedings. It held that because Imogene was
an heir who would inherit from her father's estate if it was determined that
the estate should be distributed under this state's laws of intestacy,
admission of the January 4, 2001, will to probate would have a
detrimental effect on her pecuniary interests. In the appellate court's
opinion, that was sufficient to confer on her the right to bring this will
contest. Validity of the previous wills, which have not yet been submitted
or proved, did not have to be resolved first. "While judicial economy may
be best served if the 2001 will and all prior wills are considered
successively in a single action," the court observed, the parties were not
required to follow that approach. 338 Ill. App. 3d at 764.
	Troy, as executor of his father's estate, petitioned our court for leave
to appeal from the appellate court's judgment. We allowed that petition
(177 Ill. 2d R. 315), and the matter is now before us for review. As
indicated earlier in this opinion, the appeal arises in the context of an order
dismissing Imogene's will contest petition pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9)
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 2-619(a)(9) permits involuntary
dismissal where "the claim asserted *** is barred by other affirmative
matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim." 735 ILCS
5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2002). The phrase "affirmative matter" refers to
something in the nature of a defense that negates the cause of action
completely or refutes crucial conclusions of law or conclusions of material
fact contained in or inferred from the complaint. The affirmative matter
asserted by Troy in this case is Imogene's lack of standing. Our precedent
makes clear that lack of standing qualifies as "affirmative matter" within the
meaning of section 2-619(a)(9) and may properly be challenged through
a motion to dismiss under that statute. Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1999).
	Under Illinois law, a plaintiff need not allege facts establishing
standing. Rather, it is the defendant's burden to plead and prove lack of
standing. Where standing is challenged in a motion to dismiss under
section 2-619, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in
plaintiff's complaint and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn in
plaintiff's favor. The court should grant the motion only if the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts that would support a cause of action. Chicago
Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Board of Education of the City of
Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d 200, 206 (2000). An order granting a motion to
dismiss based on lack of standing presents a question of law which we
review de novo. Lyons v. Ryan, 201 Ill. 2d 529, 534 (2002).
	The right to contest the validity of a will is purely statutory. It must be
exercised by the person or persons, in the manner, and within the time
prescribed by the Probate Act. Handley v. Conlan, 342 Ill. 562, 565
(1931). Section 8-1 of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/8-1 (West
2002)) provides that a petition to contest the validity of a will may be filed
by "any interested person." An "interested person" is defined by the
Probate Act as
			"one who has or represents a financial interest, property right
or fiduciary status at the time of reference which may be affected
by the action, power or proceeding involved, including without
limitation an heir, legatee, creditor, person entitled to a
spouse's or child's award and the representative." (Emphasis
added.) 755 ILCS 5/1-2.11 (West 2002).
	The text of this statute specifically includes heirs in the definition of
"interested persons." "[T]he word 'heir' in its primary meaning designates
the person appointed by law to succeed to the estate in case of intestacy."
McCormick v. Sanford, 318 Ill. 544, 547 (1925). Stated another way,
it refers to anyone who would take from a person's estate under the
statute of descent and distribution if that person died without leaving a will.
See 6 Ill. Jur. Probate, Estates & Trusts §2.02 (2001). Imogene is such
a person. As noted earlier in this opinion, had her father died intestate, she
would have inherited a one-third share of his real and personal property
under the Illinois rules of descent and distribution. Imogene therefore
meets the statutory definition of "interested person" and is entitled to file
a petition to contest the validity of her father's will under section 8-1 of
the Probate Act (755 ILCS 5/8-1 (West 2002)).
	That Imogene's father may have executed other, earlier wills does not
disqualify her from petitioning to contest the January 4, 2001, will. That is
so for several reasons. First, whether any of the prior wills will prove to
be valid is speculative. At this stage of the proceedings, there is no
evidence to support their validity, and no rule of law authorizes us to
presume that Troy, the executor, will succeed in establishing that they are
valid. See In re Estate of Knowlson, 154 Ill. App. 3d 249, 252-53
(1987). To the contrary, our presumption must be that none of those wills
have any legal effect. The will dated January 4 declared that it was
revoking all prior wills. The wills dated September 16, 1998, and
February 14, 1990, contained the same declaration. Such declarations are
one of the means authorized by statute for revoking prior wills. See 755
ILCS 5/4-7(a) (West 2002). Where a prior will has been totally revoked,
as the earlier wills here were, it
			"is not revived other than by its re-execution or by an
instrument declaring the revival and signed and attested in the
manner prescribed by [the Probate Act] for the signing and
attestation of a will." 755 ILCS 5/4-7(c) (West 2002).
There is no indication that the father reexecuted any of the prior wills or
executed the instruments necessary to revive them. At this stage of the
proceedings, we must therefore regard all of the prior wills as void.
Because they are void, they have no force or effect. It is as if they never
existed. Accordingly, they cannot be used to assess Imogene's right to
challenge her father's fourth and final will.
	Troy's challenge to Imogene's standing to challenge the fourth will is
flawed for another reason as well. It assumes that Imogene would be no
better off under any of the earlier wills than she is under the one dated
January 4, 2001. The materials before us, however, do not substantiate
that claim. The second will, dated December 9, 1993, has never been
produced. Troy's motion to dismiss states that neither he nor his attorney
has a copy of it.
	Troy was able to produce what purports to be the father's first will.
In contrast to the fourth will, however, the first will did not exclude
Imogene. To the contrary, it established a trust to provide a home for
Imogene and her son and to pay for their support, education, and medical
expenses. Although the present record suggests that the real estate that
was to be placed into this trust was no longer owned by the father at the
time of his death, whether that is so and how it would affect disposition of
the father's estate if the will's provisions were implemented remains
undetermined.
	Troy attempts to sidestep these deficiencies by shifting the burden of
pleading and proof to Imogene. He contends that he had no obligation to
substantiate his claims that she lacked standing. In his view, the burden
was on Imogene to allege and establish sufficient facts to show that the
requisite standing existed. That is precisely opposite of what the law
demands. We made the point earlier in this disposition and we will repeat
it here. Because lack of standing is an affirmative defense, a plaintiff is not
required to plead and prove that standing is proper. Rather, it is the
defendant's burden to plead and prove lack of standing. Chicago
Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Board of Education of the City of
Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d  at 206.
	Troy's contention that the intervening wills deprive Imogene of
standing must fail for a final and more fundamental reason: it imposes
limitations on standing that section 8-1 of the Probate Act (755 ILCS
5/8-1 (West 2002)) does not require. Under Troy's analysis, the right of
an heir to contest the validity of a will is qualified by the provisions of other
wills. Whenever an earlier will had been executed, Troy's analysis would
preclude an heir from contesting a subsequent will unless the heir could
show that the testator treated him more generously in the prior will.
	The statute itself includes no such requirement. Under the plain and
unambiguous language of the Probate Act, one's status as an heir is
sufficient, in itself, to confer standing to contest a will's validity. If you are
an heir, you qualify as a matter of law as an "interested person" (755
ILCS 5/1-2.11 (West 2002)) entitled to bring a petition under section
8-1 of the Act (755 ILCS 5/8-1 (West 2002)). What you stand to
receive under the challenged will or any prior wills is irrelevant.
	That an heir's right to challenge a will is not dependent on the
provisions of prior wills is implicit in the very definition of what constitutes
an heir. As noted earlier in this disposition, who qualifies as an heir is
determined not by the contents of a decedent's will, but by whether a
person would inherit under the laws of descent and distribution if the
decedent had died intestate, i.e., if no will existed at all. Because the
relevant measure of an heir's eligibility to contest a will is based on his
status in the absence of a will, it would be incongruous to condition an
heir's right to file a petition under section 8-1 of the Act based on what,
if anything, he stood to receive under a prior will's provisions.
	In urging a contrary result, Troy relies on In re Estate of Keener,
167 Ill. App. 3d 270 (1988). That case, however, is inapposite. The
petitioner whose standing was challenged there was the wife of one of the
testator's surviving grandchildren. Under section 2-1 of the Probate Act
(755 ILCS 5/2-1 (West 2002)), which sets forth this state's rules of
descent and distribution, she would not have been entitled to any portion
of the testator's estate had the testator died without leaving a will. Unlike
the petitioner in this case, she therefore did not qualify as an heir. Her only
status was as a legatee under a will that had been superceded by four
subsequent wills. Because a legatee's status is determined by testamentary
disposition, that case is of no usefulness in assessing the standing of an
heir, whose status is determined by whether the person would inherit in the
absence of a will.
	Troy argues that administration of estates would be more stable,
orderly and timely if heirs were required to plead and prove their
entitlement to recover under a prior will as a condition to challenging a
subsequent will. Such issues, however, are for the General Assembly to
consider. Under the law as it is presently drafted, heirs such as Imogene
are deemed to be "interested persons" and have the right to petition to
challenge a will without regard to whether or how much they might inherit
under a prior will. That is the end of our inquiry. Where a statute is clear
and unambiguous, we cannot restrict or enlarge its meaning. Rather, we
must interpret and apply it in the manner in which it was written. We
cannot rewrite a statute to make it consistent with the court's idea of
orderliness and public policy. Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 394-95 (1998).
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE GARMAN, specially concurring:
	I agree that Imogene has standing to contest Levi's most recent will,
regardless of her status under the prior wills. I would reach that result for
different reasons than the majority. I write separately because I believe
that the majority's analysis is flawed.
	The majority premises its conclusion that Imogene has standing on the
Probate Act's "plain and unambiguous language" that "one's status as an
heir is sufficient, in itself, to confer standing to contest a will's validity." Slip
op. at 6. The majority notes that the Probate Act provides that " 'any
interested person' " may contest a will. Slip op. at 4, quoting 755 ILCS
5/8-1 (West 2002). Then the majority quotes the Probate Act's definition
of "interested person," which states that an interested person is:
			" 'one who has or represents a financial interest, property
right or fiduciary status at the time of reference which may be
affected by the action, power or proceeding involved, including
without limitation an heir, legatee, creditor, person entitled to
a spouse's child or child's award and the representative.'
(Emphasis added.)" Slip op. at 4, quoting 755 ILCS 5/1-2.11
(West 2002).
The majority reads the italicized language to mean that heirs have standing
as a matter of law and concludes that Imogene, as an heir, has standing
regardless of prior wills. Slip op. at 4, 6. For the following reasons, I
believe the quoted language is ambiguous and the majority's interpretation
is an improper way to resolve the ambiguity.
	First, the majority's reading renders the first part of the
definition-"one who has or represents a financial interest, property right,
or fiduciary status *** which may be affected"-completely superfluous
when heirs, legatees or creditors are at issue. In other words, the majority
believes the definition means that an heir is an "interested person"
regardless of whether there is any effect on her interests. Surely, an
"interested person" should actually have an affected interest. If the
legislature really intended to say that heirs are interested persons as a
matter of law, it would have said an interested person is an heir, legatee,
creditor or a person who has or represents a financial interest which may
be affected. The legislature did not utilize that definition. A more rational
reading of what the legislature said is that heirs, legatees and the others are
examples of those who will typically have an interest affected by a
probate proceeding. Since the language can be read in at least two
different ways, the definition of "interested person" is ambiguous.
	The majority's interpretation of the definition fails for at least two
reasons. First, under the majority's reading, creditors are also interested
persons as a matter of law, because the definition of "interested person"
lists creditors along with heirs. As the majority notes, " 'any interested
person' " has standing to contest a will. Slip op. at 4, citing 755 ILCS
5/8-1 (West 2002). It is hard to believe the legislature intended to grant
creditors standing to contest wills regardless of whether they have an
interest actually affected by the will. Consider the following example. A
creditor has a claim, but the amount is in dispute. He says to the executor,
"Pay me the amount I say is owed, or I will tie up the estate by filing a will
contest." If creditors are "interested persons" as a matter of law, his threat
may have to be taken seriously even if what he gets paid has nothing to do
with the validity of the will.
	Second, even if the majority could somehow escape the consequence
that creditors have standing as a matter of law, it is problematic to grant
heirs standing as a matter of law. Slip op. at 6. Consider the following
possibility. Testator T has three heirs, A, B and C. T's will gives half to A
and B each, and nothing to C. Under intestacy each gets a third.
According to the majority, the Probate Act not only allows C, but also A
and B, to contest the will. Why would A, for example, do so? Perhaps A
feels C has been wronged through B's undue influence on T. Perhaps A
always said T was crazy and is now glad to pay for the opportunity to
prove it in a court of law. In general, a party has standing only if he suffers
some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest. Glisson v. City of
Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221 (1999), citing Greer v. Illinois Housing
Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 492 (1988). It is an odd view
of standing, to put it mildly, that lets a private person litigate just to right a
wrong done entirely to someone else or just to make a point. The
majority's view of the Probate Act's definition of "interested person"
reads this anomaly into the statute.
	The majority offers another reason why the prior wills cannot affect
Imogene's standing. The majority contends that, because the most recent
will revokes all prior wills, the prior wills are void and therefore we cannot
refer to them to determine whether Imogene has standing. Slip op. at 5.
The majority correctly points out that a subsequent will may revoke a prior
will. A will, however, is not effective for any purpose until it is admitted to
probate. Crooker v. McArdle, 332 Ill. 27 (1928). An order admitting a
will to probate is not final as to the validity of the will until the time for filing
a will contest has run, and if a contest is timely filed the order has no force
or effect for purposes of the contest. Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co., 394 Ill. 452, 459 (1946). Thus in this case the prior wills have not
been not revoked by the present will for purposes of the will contest
because the present will's admission to probate is currently without effect.
	Moreover, if the majority were correct that the prior wills are void,
then a plaintiff in a will contest could not be an interested person based on
his status as legatee under a prior will revoked by the present will. The
prior will would be void and therefore could not be considered for
purposes of standing. However, the law in Illinois has long been to the
contrary. See, e.g., Kelley v. First State Bank of Princeton, 81 Ill. App.
3d 402, 413 (1980); Wilson v. Bell, 315 Ill. App. 418, 425 (1942). The
majority's reasoning overrules longstanding precedent sub silentio. There
is no reason to do so to resolve this issue.
	The appellate court, in a published opinion that the majority's analysis
ignores, reasons that the current will contest would benefit Imogene if
successful, because it is the first step toward her avowed goal of
challenging and voiding all the wills and taking as an heir. 338 Ill. App. 3d
at 764. In other words, because there is nothing remote or speculative
about Imogene's interest in voiding all four wills, her interest in taking the
first step by voiding this will is not remote or speculative. The majority fails
to explain why it does not adopt the appellate court's reasoning. I find it
persuasive.
	The appellate court cites In re Estate of Malcolm, 234 Ill. App. 3d
962 (1992). 338 Ill. App. 3d at 764. Malcolm involved three legatees
who would each take approximately $200,000 under the testator's first
will, while the second and third wills only gave each of them $10,000.
They sought to contest the third will. Similar to this case, the executor
argued that the plaintiffs were not "interested persons" because their
position under the second will was no better than under the third.
Malcolm held the plaintiffs were interested persons, reasoning that if the
necessity of challenging more than one will before realizing a gain were to
defeat standing, a wrongdoer could insulate fraud from judicial scrutiny by
creating two wills in succession. Malcolm, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 966,
quoting In re Estate of Keener, 167 Ill. App. 3d 270, 274 (1988)
(Heiple, J., dissenting). Likewise, if it were the law that Imogene lacks
standing because the next three wills in line also give her nothing, that
would provide a way to insulate overreaching from judicial scrutiny. We
have held that the will contest provisions of the Probate Act should not be
interpreted in a way that would work to protect fraud. Williams v.
Crickman, 81 Ill. 2d 105, 116-17 (1980).
	In sum, I find that the appellate court's opinion, Malcolm and
Crickman provide good reasons to reach the same result the majority
reaches for the wrong reasons. Therefore, I agree that the judgment of the
appellate court should be affirmed, but I respectfully decline to join the
majority opinion.