Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. James C. Ritland

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018AP001832-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2021-04-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 WI 36 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1832-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against James C. Ritland, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent-Cross-
Appellant, 
     v. 
James C. Ritland, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST RITLAND 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 22, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Per Curiam. ROGGENSACK, C.J. dissents, joined by ZIEGLER and 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ. 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-cross-respondent, there were 
briefs filed by James C. Ritland, Black River Falls.  
 
For the complainant-respondent-cross-appellant, there was a 
brief filed by Kim M. Kluck and Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
Madison.  
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 36
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2018AP1832-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against James C. Ritland, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent-Cross- 
          Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
James C. Ritland, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Cross- 
           Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 22, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   This disciplinary matter comes to the 
court on Attorney James C. Ritland's appeal and the Office of 
Lawyer 
Regulation's 
(OLR) 
cross-appeal 
of 
a 
report 
and 
recommendation of Referee Allan Beatty.  After holding an 
evidentiary hearing, the referee concluded that the OLR had 
proven the sole misconduct charge asserted in its complaint; 
namely, that Attorney Ritland's conduct resulting in convictions 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
2 
 
for two counts of attempted adultery and one count of disorderly 
conduct reflected adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, and 
fitness as a lawyer in other respects.  See Supreme Court Rule 
(SCR) 20:8.4(b).1  As a sanction, the referee recommended that 
the court suspend Attorney Ritland's Wisconsin law license for 
three months and order him to pay the full costs of this 
disciplinary matter, which total $21,017.24 as of March 2, 2020.  
Restitution is not at issue; because this case solely concerns 
Attorney Ritland's sexual misconduct, there are no funds to 
restore.   
¶2 
Both Attorney Ritland and the OLR have appealed the 
referee's report and recommendation.  In his appeal, Attorney 
Ritland generally contests the sufficiency of the evidence 
against him and claims his behavior merits, at most, a public 
reprimand.  In its cross-appeal, the OLR argues that a six-month 
suspension——not 
a 
three-month 
suspension, 
as 
the 
referee 
recommended——is warranted.   
¶3 
After reviewing this matter and considering Attorney 
Ritland's appeal and the OLR's cross-appeal, we accept the 
referee's factual findings, and we agree with the referee that 
Attorney Ritland committed the charged SCR 20:8.4(b) violation.  
We 
deem 
the 
referee's 
recommended 
three-month 
suspension 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:8.4(b) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on 
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects." 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
3 
 
insufficient:  Attorney Ritland's conduct and our case law call 
for a two-year suspension.  We impose full costs. 
¶4 
The OLR initiated this disciplinary proceeding with 
the filing of a one-count complaint in September 2018, alleging 
an SCR 20:8.4(b) violation.  Attorney Ritland filed an answer in 
which he denied any misconduct.   
¶5 
The case proceeded through discovery and to an 
evidentiary hearing in August 2019, which featured testimony 
from thirteen witnesses.   
¶6 
In October 2019, the referee filed his report.  The 
following factual summary is drawn from that report.    
¶7 
Attorney Ritland has held a Wisconsin law license 
since 1978, and has an otherwise clean disciplinary history.  
The wrongdoing involved in this case centered on his sexual 
misconduct with two women:  Z.H. and M.F.   
¶8 
In 2013, Attorney Ritland met Z.H. while in the 
checkout line at a Walmart.  After Z.H. exited the store, 
Attorney Ritland invited her into his car, gave her his business 
card for his law office, and told her to contact him if she 
needed help or money.  Several months later, Z.H. called 
Attorney Ritland, and he invited her to come to his law office 
after regular business hours.  Upon luring Z.H. to his office 
and isolating her as he was the only one present, he gave her 
$40, touched her breasts outside of her clothing, and received 
oral sex from her.  On another occasion, Z.H. again called 
Attorney Ritland and went to his office.  He gave her $40, after 
which she displayed her breasts and then left, promising to 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
4 
 
return to complete the sexual encounter.  Subsequent to these 
two incidents, Attorney Ritland visited Z.H. in jail, at a time 
when she was represented by a different attorney.  Attorney 
Ritland informed jail personnel that he was visiting Z.H. as her 
attorney. 
¶9 
Attorney Ritland knew the other woman involved in this 
case, M.F., through his representation of her in numerous 
criminal matters.  Attorney Ritland knew that M.F. had substance 
addiction problems.  Attorney Ritland also knew that M.F. had 
financial troubles, as she consistently did not have the 
resources to pay modest bail amounts.   
¶10 Attorney Ritland occasionally paid M.F.'s bail.  For 
example, in January 2015, Attorney Ritland signed a surety bond 
form and posted a $100 cash bail for M.F. in a matter in which 
he represented her.  The following day, Attorney Ritland revoked 
his surety bond but informed the clerk of court that the $100 
belonged to M.F.   
¶11 Attorney Ritland ceased representing M.F. in February 
2015, after the district attorney warned him that he may have a 
conflict of interest in continuing to represent her given that 
his personal checkbook was found amongst items believed to be 
stolen by M.F.   
¶12 Attorney Ritland admitted at his deposition in this 
matter that after he withdrew from representing M.F., he had 
sexual contact with her at his office on a number of occasions.  
The sexual contact included Attorney Ritland touching M.F.'s 
breasts, and, in one instance, M.F. performing oral sex on him. 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
5 
 
¶13 After he withdrew from representing M.F., Attorney 
Ritland continued to provide money and other benefits to her.  
In March 2015, Attorney Ritland posted a $250 cash bail for M.F. 
in a criminal matter.  In May 2015, Attorney Ritland and M.F. 
went to a casino together, where Attorney Ritland provided M.F. 
with money.  In August 2015, Attorney Ritland told law 
enforcement that he did not want to pursue charges against M.F. 
even though she had altered a check originally made payable to 
him by making herself the payee.  In March 2016, Attorney 
Ritland posted $300 cash bail for M.F. in a criminal matter; 
visited her in jail, identifying himself on the jail visitor log 
as an attorney even though he did not represent her; and gave 
her a note, received as a hearing exhibit, that said:  "I still 
want 6 free ones.  I got you out of jail."  The referee found 
that the phrase "6 free ones" referred to sexual interactions.   
¶14 As of September 2016, M.F. owed Attorney Ritland 
hundreds or perhaps thousands of dollars in legal fees.  After 
Attorney Ritland learned he would be charged with criminal 
offenses pertaining to his sexual contacts with M.F., he removed 
information pertaining to M.F. from his office's billing 
records.  
¶15 In 2017, the State charged Attorney Ritland with four 
counts of solicitation of prostitution, two counts of attempted 
adultery, four counts of prostitution, one count of disorderly 
conduct, and one count of maintaining a drug trafficking place.  
Attorney Ritland ultimately pled no contest to, and was 
convicted of, one count of attempted adultery related to his 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
6 
 
conduct with Z.H., another count of attempted adultery related 
to his conduct with M.F., and one count of disorderly conduct.  
See State v. Ritland, Jackson County Case No. 2016CF177.  The 
remaining counts were dismissed and read-in for sentencing 
purposes.   
¶16 The circuit court withheld sentence for Attorney 
Ritland, placed him on probation for twelve months, and required 
him to serve twenty-five days in jail.  According to the 
sentencing transcript included in the record before us, the 
circuit court commented at sentencing that Attorney Ritland's 
conduct "behind closed doors" made him "a totally different 
person" than the one the public knew.  The circuit court 
observed that Attorney Ritland's "character is sort of split 
down the middle" between his "public persona and [his] secret[] 
life." 
¶17 This disciplinary case followed.  The OLR alleged a 
single count in its complaint: 
By engaging in conduct which included paying money to 
M.F. and Z.H. to perform sex acts and being convicted 
on two counts of attempted adultery and one count of 
disorderly 
conduct 
for 
that 
underlying 
conduct, 
[Attorney] Ritland violated SCR 20:8.4(b).  
¶18 In his report, the referee determined that "[b]y 
evidence which is clear, satisfactory and convincing," Attorney 
Ritland "has committed the violation alleged in the Complaint."  
Briefly summarized, the referee determined in his report that 
Attorney Ritland abused his professional status as a lawyer in 
committing his criminal acts, which consisted of cajoling 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
7 
 
vulnerable women into having adulterous contact with him at his 
law office.  His actions showed a lack of trustworthiness and 
reflected poorly on his professional judgment and ability. 
¶19 In evaluating the appropriate level of discipline, the 
referee weighed various aggravating and mitigating factors.  On 
the aggravating side of the scale, Attorney Ritland's victims 
were vulnerable because they were burdened with substance abuse 
and/or financial problems.  He engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct.  He did not appreciate the wrongful nature of his 
conduct, notwithstanding having been criminally convicted of 
three offenses.  He showed no remorse.  On the mitigating side 
of the scale, the referee noted that Attorney Ritland has no 
prior discipline, and he has contributed to the community 
through 
volunteer 
efforts 
in 
his 
church 
and 
with 
youth 
organizations.  Ultimately, the referee recommended that this 
court suspend Attorney Ritland for three months and impose full 
costs against him. 
¶20 As mentioned above, both Attorney Ritland and the OLR 
have appealed from the referee's report.  We turn first to the 
arguments in Attorney Ritland's appeal.   
¶21 Attorney Ritland has taken a scattershot approach to 
his appeal, raising seven separate issues, one of which has 
seven subparts.  We address the minimally developed claims as 
best we can, grouping like contentions where possible.  Some 
arguments, however, are too inadequately developed to warrant a 
response.  See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646–47, 492 
N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).  
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
8 
 
¶22 Generally speaking, Attorney Ritland challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence against him.  He dismisses Z.H.'s 
testimony as not credible and unsupported by physical evidence.  
He argues that "no facts concerning [M.F.] should be considered 
since she did not testify at the [disciplinary] hearing" (all 
caps removed).  He claims that he never pressured M.F. into 
unwanted sexual contact.  He suggests that M.F., and not he, 
wrote the note recovered by jail authorities that stated, "I 
still want 6 free ones.  I got you out of jail."  He claims that 
it was appropriate for him to visit M.F. in jail and sign the 
jail visitor log as an attorney, even though he did not 
represent M.F. at the time.  He claims that there is no factual 
connection between his convictions for attempted adultery and 
disorderly conduct and his fitness to practice law.  Ultimately, 
Attorney Ritland argues, "the Court should find that there was 
no ethical violation which would warrant discipline in this 
case."   
¶23 Attorney Ritland alternatively argues that, if he did 
commit an ethical violation, the referee's recommended three-
month suspension is excessive.  Attorney Ritland claims that the 
referee gave insufficient weight to certain alleged mitigating 
factors; e.g., his volunteer work within the community.  He also 
claims that this court should be closely guided by two cases 
arising out of a shared set of facts, In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Butler, 2012 WI 37, 340 Wis. 2d 1, 811 
N.W.2d 807, and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Addison, 
2012 WI 38, 340 Wis. 2d 16, 813 N.W.2d 201.  The Butler and 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
9 
 
Addison cases held that discipline identical to that imposed in 
Illinois——30- 
and 
60–day 
suspensions, 
respectively——was 
warranted as reciprocal discipline for convictions pursuant to 
Attorney Butler's and Attorney Addison's negotiated no contest 
pleas to one felony count of second-degree reckless endangerment 
and, in Attorney Addison's case, two additional misdemeanor 
counts of sexual gratification in public, related to their 
close-in-time sexual activity with the same woman.  Attorney 
Ritland argues that Attorney Butler's and Attorney Addison's 
conduct was far worse than his, for at most, "the disputed 
testimony may have established that I paid [Z.H.] for sex on one 
occasion.  This act of prostitution, although illegal, and 
involves taking advantage of her financial weakness using my 
money, is far different" than the conduct at issue in Butler and 
Addison, Attorney Ritland claims.  Attorney Ritland argues that 
because Attorney Butler and Attorney Addison received "brief 
suspensions, my discipline should be far less:  I suggest a 
public reprimand."   
¶24 In its appellate response and cross-appeal, the OLR 
criticizes Attorney Ritland's appellate arguments as amorphous 
and insufficiently developed.  It submits that Attorney Ritland 
failed to show that any of the referee's factual findings are 
clearly erroneous.  The OLR also argues that the referee 
properly determined that Attorney Ritland's criminal acts 
reflect poorly on his fitness as a lawyer.  Finally, the OLR 
insists that the referee's recommended three-month suspension is 
inadequate, and that a six-month suspension is appropriate so 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
10 
 
that, before resuming practice, Attorney Ritland will need to 
demonstrate all of the fitness criteria in SCR 22.29 and 
SCR 22.31 to the satisfaction of the court. 
¶25 The matter is now before this court to review the 
referee's report and recommendation, informed by the parties' 
arguments made in their briefs.  When reviewing a referee's 
report and recommendation, we affirm the referee's findings of 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we review the 
referee's conclusions of law on a de novo basis. In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 
Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We determine the appropriate level 
of discipline to impose given the particular facts of each case, 
independent of the referee's recommendation, but benefiting from 
it.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 
¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶26 To begin, we reject Attorney Ritland's challenges to 
the referee's factual findings.  We may overturn a referee's 
factual findings only if those findings are clearly erroneous.  
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle, 2015 WI 110, ¶41, 
365 Wis. 2d 649, 872 N.W.2d 637.  Here, the referee chose to 
believe the version of events to which Z.H. testified:  that 
Attorney Ritland gave her his business card in a Walmart parking 
lot and said she should call him if she needed help or money, 
and that on two occasions in the months following this 
encounter, he paid her money to engage in sexual activity at his 
law office.  The referee also chose to believe evidence showing 
that Attorney Ritland provided money or benefits to M.F. in 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
11 
 
exchange for engaging in sexual activity.  It is not our place 
to reappraise the evidence unless it plainly fails to support 
the findings of the referee——and that is not the case here.2 
¶27 We also reject any attempt by Attorney Ritland to 
argue that the outcome of his criminal case, which included the 
dismissal of the most serious charges against him, requires this 
court to close its eyes to what the OLR proved Attorney Ritland 
had done.  Supreme Court Rule 20:8.4(b) provides that it is 
professional misconduct to "[c]ommit a criminal act that 
reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or 
fitness as a lawyer in other respects."  (Emphasis added.)  The 
rule does not require that an attorney actually have been 
convicted of a crime for the rule to apply; we discipline for 
conduct, not convictions.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶47 n.12, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 
N.W.2d 125 
("[A]n 
attorney's 
criminal 
act 
can 
support 
a 
SCR 20:8.4(b) violation even if the attorney is never charged or 
convicted.")  Thus, an SCR 20:8.4(b) violation may be found——
even 
absent 
a 
conviction——if 
the 
record 
contains 
clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that the attorney engaged 
in criminal acts that reflect adversely on his or her fitness to 
                                                 
2 Contrary to Attorney Ritland's argument, the fact that 
M.F. did not testify at the disciplinary hearing does not mean 
that 
"no 
facts 
concerning 
[M.F.] 
should 
be 
considered."  
See, e.g., Guillaume v. Wisconsin-Minnesota Light & Power Co., 
161 Wis. 636, 639, 155 N.W. 143 (1915) (Facts in a civil case 
may be established by circumstantial evidence alone, where the 
circumstances lead fairly and reasonably to the conclusion 
sought to be established.) 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
12 
 
practice.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Peterson, 2006 WI 41, 290 Wis. 2d 74, 713 N.W.2d 101 (affirming 
an SCR 20:8.4(b) violation where the sole factual basis was an 
attorney's use of cocaine).  Relatedly, we have held that a 
conviction alone——even a very serious one——does not necessarily 
demonstrate an attorney's unfitness to practice.  See In re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Johns, 
2014 
WI 
32, 
353 
Wis. 2d 746, 847 N.W.2d 179 (finding no SCR 20:8.4(b) violation 
despite an attorney's conviction for the vehicular homicide of 
his brother in light of evidence showing the exceedingly 
anomalous nature of the attorney's conduct and his full 
acceptance of responsibility for its tragic consequences).   
¶28 Thus, whether Attorney Ritland's conduct violated 
SCR 20:8.4(b) is a "fact dependent inquiry," driven by the facts 
established in this disciplinary proceeding.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Horsch, 2020 WI 10, ¶11, 390 
Wis. 2d 99, 937 N.W.2d 925.  To the extent that Attorney Ritland 
believes 
that 
the 
State's 
dismissal 
of 
certain 
charges 
automatically 
immunizes 
the 
conduct 
proven 
here 
from 
professional discipline, he is mistaken.  
¶29 We are also unpersuaded by Attorney Ritland's argument 
that there is no factual connection between his convictions for 
attempted adultery and disorderly conduct and his fitness to 
practice law.  It is true, as Attorney Ritland points out in his 
briefs, that the American Bar Association ("ABA") Comment [2] to 
ABA's Model Rule 8.4, upon which SCR 20:8.4 was based, states: 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
13 
 
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on 
fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving 
fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an 
income tax return.  However, some kinds of offenses 
carry 
no 
such 
implication. 
 
Traditionally, 
the 
distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving 
"moral turpitude."  That concept can be construed to 
include offenses concerning some matters of personal 
morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, 
that have no specific connection to fitness for the 
practice of law.   
(Emphasis added.)  Seizing on the highlighted language, Attorney 
Ritland argues that adultery necessarily is not an offense that 
reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness to practice law.   
¶30 This argument ignores the record before us.  While 
Attorney Ritland asks us to look the other way because, in his 
view, his conviction was for an offense that has no connection 
to his fitness to practice law, we refuse to ignore the 
overwhelming evidence that bears squarely on his fitness to 
practice law; namely, evidence that he engaged in coerced or 
quid pro quo sexual relationships with vulnerable women.  
Attorney Ritland used his standing as an attorney and his law 
office to lure, isolate, and access Z.H. and M.F.; as the 
referee observed in his report, Attorney Ritland: 
[d]irectly involved his practice of law in his 
interactions with both [women] by giving [Z.H.] his 
business card, by hosting both of them at his law 
office and engaging in sexual activities with them 
there, [and] by visiting both of them at the [county] 
jail using his status as an attorney for access. 
Furthermore, Attorney Ritland knew that both Z.H. and M.F. had 
financial troubles and, in M.F.'s case, substance abuse and 
legal troubles.  Z.H.'s testimony——that Attorney Ritland paid 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
14 
 
her to perform sex acts at his law office——is essentially 
undisputed; although Attorney Ritland claims her testimony was 
not credible, the referee decided otherwise, and we decline to 
second-guess him.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Nunnery, 2009 WI 89, ¶40, 320 Wis. 2d 422, 769 N.W.2d 858 ("The 
referee 
is 
best 
situated 
to 
judge 
the 
credibility 
of 
witnesses.")  As for Attorney Ritland's conduct with M.F., it 
was clearly exploitive of M.F.'s subordinate and vulnerable 
position; his jailhouse note that he expected "six free ones" 
from her in exchange for paying her bail says it all.  On these 
facts, we have no hesitation finding that an ethical violation——
here, a violation of SCR 20:8.4(b)——has occurred.  
¶31 In sum, then, based on the non-clearly-erroneous facts 
found by the referee, we hold that Attorney Ritland's behavior 
fell well below the standards of honesty, trustworthiness, and 
integrity required of all attorneys.  We therefore adopt the 
referee's recommendation and hold that Attorney Ritland violated 
SCR 20:8.4(b). 
¶32 We now turn to the question of the appropriate 
discipline to be meted out.  As noted above, Attorney Ritland 
argues that, at most, a public reprimand is warranted, citing as 
support the relatively light suspensions (30 and 60 days) 
imposed in Butler and Addison.   
¶33 We are not persuaded.  Butler and Addison are not 
helpful authorities, as they were presented to us in the context 
of reciprocal discipline matters.  In reciprocal discipline 
matters, our rules require that we impose the identical 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
15 
 
discipline rendered by the other jurisdiction unless one of the 
three exceptions listed in SCR 22.22(3)3 applies.  The OLR did 
not assert that any of these exceptions applied to Attorney 
Butler's or Attorney Addison's conduct, and thus we imposed 
discipline reciprocal to that imposed in Illinois.  See Butler, 
340 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24; Addison, 340 Wis. 2d 16, ¶24.  Here, we are 
not constrained by the rules governing reciprocal disciplinary 
proceedings. 
¶34 The OLR argues that the referee's recommended three-
month suspension is too light, and insists that a six-month 
suspension is in order.  It cites two cases that it claims are 
particularly analogous to the facts of this case.  In In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ridgeway, 158 Wis. 2d 452, 462 
N.W.2d 671 (1990), we suspended an attorney for six months for 
having initiated and engaged in sexual contact with a client he 
                                                 
3 SCR 22.22(3) provides: 
(3) The supreme court shall impose the identical 
discipline or license suspension unless one or more of 
the following is present: 
(a) The procedure in the other jurisdiction was 
so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to 
constitute a deprivation of due process.  
(b) There 
was 
such 
an 
infirmity 
of 
proof 
establishing the misconduct or medical incapacity that 
the supreme court could not accept as final the 
conclusion in respect to the misconduct or medical 
incapacity.   
(c) The 
misconduct 
justifies 
substantially 
different discipline in this state.   
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
16 
 
was representing as a public defender, where the client was 
facing probation revocation after absconding from a halfway 
house, and where the attorney furnished her with alcohol 
contrary to the terms of her probation.  In In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Gamino, 2005 WI 168, 286 Wis. 2d 558, 707 
N.W.2d 132, we suspended an attorney for six months for having 
engaged in a sexual relationship with a client in one matter and 
a sexual relationship with a juvenile client's mother in another 
matter, and for making false representations about his conduct 
to a court and to the OLR investigators in that matter.  In both 
cases, we noted that the disciplined attorneys had taken 
advantage of individuals in a vulnerable position for their own 
personal gratification.  Ridgeway, 158 Wis. 2d at 453; Gamino, 
286 Wis. 2d 558, ¶56.  So too here, the OLR says. 
¶35 We agree with the OLR that Ridgeway and Gamino are 
instructive cases.  But we also note that these cases are 31- 
and 16-years-old, respectively.  Over the ensuing years, we have 
applied increasing scrutiny to attorneys' sexual misconduct. 
¶36 For example, in 2007, we adopted SCR 20:1.8(j), which 
deems sexual relations between an attorney and a current client 
to be professional misconduct, unless the sexual relationship 
predates the attorney-client relationship.  The comments to this 
rule specifically address the fiduciary nature of the attorney-
client 
relationship 
and 
the 
professional 
boundaries 
this 
fiduciary relationship necessitates: 
 
[17]  The relationship between lawyer and client 
is a fiduciary one in which the lawyer occupies the 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
17 
 
highest position of trust and confidence.  The 
relationship is almost always unequal; thus, a sexual 
relationship between lawyer and client can involve 
unfair exploitation of the lawyer's fiduciary role, in 
violation of the lawyer's basic ethical obligation not 
to use the trust of the client to the client's 
disadvantage. . . . [T]his Rule prohibits the lawyer 
from having sexual relations with a client regardless 
of 
whether 
the 
relationship 
is 
consensual 
and 
regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client.  
¶37 We 
have 
very 
recently 
reiterated 
these 
same 
principles, making it exceedingly clear that attorneys who 
engage in sexual misconduct do so at their professional peril: 
We have traveled a far way from tolerance of sexual 
misconduct in the workplace and in our profession.  We 
recognize 
the 
psychological 
damage 
that 
can 
be 
inflicted on the victims of sexual abuse, who silently 
suffer and do not complain because they feel powerless 
to do so.  The sexual abuse of a client is 
unacceptable in any profession and in any business 
setting, and cannot be tolerated in our profession, 
which holds as sacred the dignity of the individual.   
 . . . Attorneys who commit sexual crimes against 
their clients take from their victims something more 
profound than money or goods; they take from their 
victims their dignity and psychological well-being.  
Such 
conduct 
is 
grossly 
incompatible 
with 
the 
standards of professionalism expected of attorneys.   
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hanes, 2020 WI 89, ¶31, 
394 Wis. 2d 585, 951 N.W.2d 426 (quoting In Re Gallo, 178 N.J. 
115 (2003).   
¶38 These principles are reflected and reinforced by the 
lengthy suspensions imposed in recent years on attorneys who 
engaged in sexual misconduct with either clients or non-clients.  
For example: 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
18 
 
 In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss, 2011 
WI 2, 331 Wis. 2d 1, 795 N.W.2d 415, we suspended an 
attorney for a period of four years, eight months, 
based on the attorney's sexual relationship with a 
client who had a history of mental illness and alcohol 
abuse, and the attorney's subsequent attempts to 
intimidate and discredit the client and her family.  
The 
attorney 
had 
one 
public 
reprimand 
on 
his 
disciplinary record.  We criticized the respondent-
attorney for "repeatedly [taking] advantage of his 
position of power and victimiz[ing] a very vulnerable 
person for his own selfish motives," and we warned 
that the "egregious nature of [his] conduct caused us 
to give serious consideration to the sanction of 
revocation."  Id., ¶39.   
 In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Evenson, 
2015 WI 38, 361 Wis. 2d 629, 861 N.W.2d 786, we 
imposed a 30-month suspension on an attorney based on 
criminal conduct with a non-client that resulted in 
two misdemeanor convictions for fourth-degree sexual 
assault and one felony count of delivery of a 
controlled substance.  The attorney, who already had a 
public reprimand on his disciplinary record, engaged 
in two acts of sexual intercourse with an obviously 
intoxicated woman after providing her with ecstasy and 
alcohol.   
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
19 
 
 In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Baratki, 
2017 WI 89, 378 Wis. 2d 1, 902 N.W.2d 250, we imposed 
a six-month suspension on an attorney who, among other 
things, made sexual comments to a client and on one 
occasion lifted her shirt and kissed her abdominal 
area.  The attorney had been privately reprimanded 
twice before and, in the case at hand, had also failed 
to act with reasonable diligence and failed to 
cooperate with the disciplinary investigation, among 
other things.  We chastised the lawyer for his 
"efforts to leverage his position of trust for 
personal gratification," and we quoted with approval a 
previous case in which we described an attorney's 
sexual misconduct with a client as "'egregious'" 
behavior that "'perverts the very essence of the 
lawyer-client relationship.'"  Id., ¶32 (citation 
omitted).   
 In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hanes, 2020 
WI 89, 394 Wis. 2d 585, 951 N.W.2d 426, we imposed a 
four-year suspension on an attorney based on criminal 
conduct 
with 
a 
non-client 
that 
resulted 
in 
a 
misdemeanor 
criminal 
conviction 
for 
fourth-degree 
sexual assault and three felony criminal convictions 
for 
second-degree 
recklessly 
endangering 
safety, 
fleeing/eluding an officer, and bail jumping.  The 
attorney, who had no disciplinary history, twice 
sexually assaulted a woman (first while she was asleep 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
20 
 
and later when she awoke), and later engaged in a 
high-speed car chase with police while released on 
bail in his sexual assault case.  We warned that 
"severe 
sanctions 
are 
appropriate 
when 
attorneys 
engage in predatory sexual misconduct against a 
vulnerable individual."  Id., ¶29. 
¶39 The disconnect between the above-cited authorities and 
Attorney Ritland's and the referee's recommendations——calling 
for a public reprimand or a three-month suspension——gives us 
pause.  Both are wholly inadequate given the seriousness with 
which we view acts of attorney sexual misconduct and the 
egregious nature of Attorney Ritland's behavior, which included, 
in the referee's words, "preying on vulnerable people" with 
financial or substance abuse problems.  At the risk of 
redundancy, we emphasize that sexual misconduct by attorneys, 
whether with clients or non-clients, is not taken lightly.   
¶40 Even giving Attorney Ritland credit for his otherwise 
clean disciplinary history and his consistent engagement in 
community 
service, 
we 
conclude 
that 
a 
lengthy, 
two-year 
suspension appears necessary to impress upon him the seriousness 
of his professional misconduct, particularly in light of the 
referee's observation——which we have no reason to doubt——that 
Attorney Ritland "has not shown any remorse or even recognition 
of how wrong his behavior is."  Importantly, too, a two-year 
suspension 
will 
require 
Attorney 
Ritland 
to 
successfully 
complete the formal reinstatement procedure set forth in 
SCRs 22.29 through 22.33. 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
21 
 
¶41 We turn next to the issue of costs.  They are 
considerable:  $21,017.24 as of March 2, 2020.  We impose them 
fully on Attorney Ritland, in part because he has not stated an 
objection to them, and in part because his litigation approach 
no doubt helped drive them.   
¶42 Attorney Ritland fought tooth and nail to avoid 
discipline, deploying sometimes questionable litigation tactics.  
As just one example, even though the misconduct charge against 
him was founded on his sexual misbehavior, he refused to answer 
any of the OLR's deposition questions on this topic, claiming 
they were irrelevant.  The OLR was forced to file a motion to 
compel, and after a hearing, the referee ordered Attorney 
Ritland to appear for a second deposition and answer the OLR's 
questions, which he ultimately did.  We note, too, the referee's 
observation in his report that "[d]uring this proceeding 
[Attorney Ritland] appeared to be disingenuous when he claimed 
to not remember matters of importance to him personally."  The 
referee additionally pointed out in his report that Attorney 
Ritland attempted to disavow at the disciplinary hearing a 
concession he made in his own letter to the referee, in which he 
wrote that "I certainly violated the law; I would not attempt to 
minimize that."  At the disciplinary hearing, Attorney Ritland 
pivoted away from this statement, claiming he "didn't draft" the 
letter, but rather "a friend" had, and "I thought I edited that 
[statement] out, but I guess not."  These examples are not 
exhaustive but illustrate the type of recalcitrant litigation 
No. 
2018AP1832-D   
 
22 
 
tactics that Attorney Ritland has engaged in during this 
disciplinary matter.   
¶43 Attorney Ritland had every right to vigorously contest 
the misconduct charge against him.  But SCR 22.24(1m) makes 
clear that when a lawyer ultimately found guilty of misconduct 
imposes costs on the disciplinary system, he or she must expect 
to pay them.  Throughout this case, Attorney Ritland has proven 
to be a difficult litigant, prone to obstinate conduct and 
obfuscation.  Such litigation practices come at a cost; Attorney 
Ritland will pay it in full. 
¶44 IT IS ORDERED that the license of James C. Ritland to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of two 
years, effective June 3, 2021. 
¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that James C. Ritland shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, James C. Ritland shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are 
$21,017.24 as of March 2, 2020. 
¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.29(4)(c). 
 
 
 
No.  2018AP1832-D.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶48 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (dissenting).  I 
dissent because the discipline imposed for sexual misconduct is 
not consistent with our past disciplinary decisions for lawyers 
who had no prior misconduct of any type. 
¶49 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
No.  2018AP1832-D.pdr 
 
 
 
1