Case Title: McWhorter v. Clark

Citation: 342 So. 2d 903

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1977-02-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
342 So. 2d 903 (1977)
Jimmy Lee McWHORTER
v.
A. B. CLARK, as Administrator of the Estate of Henry C. Henderson, Deceased.
SC 1877.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 18, 1977.
*904 Alan C. Livingston, Lee & McInish, Dothan, for appellant.
Joel W. Ramsey, Ramsey & Baxley, Dothan, for appellee.
ALMON, Justice.
Alex Van McWhorter, the eight-year-old son of the appellant-plaintiff, Jimmy Lee McWhorter, while riding a bicycle, was struck and killed by Henry C. Henderson, now deceased. Appellee-defendant A. B. Clark is the administrator of the Henderson estate. Appellant brought an action for wrongful death against appellee. A jury rendered a verdict for appellee.
Appellant claims that a police officer should not have been allowed to testify as to the speed of Henderson's vehicle, that the issue of contributory negligence should not have been submitted to the jury, and that testimony that the bicycle Alex was riding did not have a headlight was not germane to the case.
Over the appellant's objection, Officer Smith, who had previously investigated 300 to 350 automobile accidents, testified on cross-examination that in his opinion the Henderson vehicle was traveling 30 to 35 miles per hour at the time of the accident. The foundation for his opinion was scuff marks believed to have been made at the point of impact, torn up gravel believed to have been made at the point of impact, the measured distance of 115 feet from the point of impact and the Henderson car, and a booklet from the Traffic Institute of Northwestern University.
The question is not whether Officer Smith is a qualified expert who may give his judgment as to the speed of a car, but rather, whether even an expert may give his judgment based on the information Officer Smith had before him. The law on this question is stated in Maslankowski v. Beam, 288 Ala. 254, 264, 259 So. 2d 804, 813 (1972):
In this case Officer Smith's judgment as to the speed of the Henderson car was based entirely on the distance between the point of impact and the distance to the car after it came to a halt. The car was not even shown to have come to a skidding halt. Nor did Officer Smith establish where Henderson initially applied his brakes. He may have applied his brakes some distance before the accident. Given the facts before Officer Smith, the court erred in admitting his judgment as to the speed of the Henderson car.
The appellee points to the case of Maslankowski v. Beam, supra, that a properly qualified witness may base his opinion on facts derived from events occurring after the accident. The expert in Maslankowski was a "professional Accident Reconstruction Consultant" with extensive qualifications. His detailed reconstruction of the accident is in no way analogous to this case. The situation before us was specifically excepted from the situation before the court in Maslankowski.
The judge charged the jury:
The judge concluded his charge with the following remarks:
The appellant does not contend that the charge was an incorrect statement of the law (see Cedar Creek Store Co. v. Stedham, 187 Ala. 622, 65 So. 984 (1914)), but rather that the judge erred in submitting the question of contributory negligence to the jury because not a scintilla of evidence existed tending to show that the deceased boy possessed the maturity and sensibility of a fourteen-year-old.
The appellee does not argue that such evidence exists, but rather, attempts to raise arguments that were not before the trial court, namely that we should adopt the "same age standard" (see "Contributory Negligence of Children," 77 A.L.R.2d 917, § 6), or if we decline, that we should still allow the charge because the damages claimed are punitive under the Wrongful Death Statute and the reasons for protecting minors therefore fail. Regardless of the merits of appellee's contentions, we shall not review questions not decided by the trial court. Cox v. Howard Hall Co., 289 Ala. 35, 265 So. 2d 580 (1972).
We have read the record and agree that the evidence completely failed to address the maturity and sensibility of the deceased child. If upon re-trial the facts remain the same, we are of the opinion that the trial judge should not submit to the jury the issue of contributory negligence of the deceased child.
The third issuewhether testimony regarding the absence of a light on the front of the bike was admissiblemay also *906 arise on remand. The appellant objected to the testimony on the basis that it had no bearing on the case because the boy had been hit from behind. The appellant further argues that the appellee was actually seeking to establish the contributory negligence of the child, which could not be properly considered until the presumption against his contributory negligence was overcome (see issue II).
The appellee argues that whether the bike had a front headlight is relevant to the initial negligence of the appellee's testate, as distinct from the contributory negligence of the child or his father.
Conceivably, a light on the front of the bike could be noticed by a car approaching from the rear, especially if the light swung back and forth as the bike was peddled. Consequently, we believe the judge was within his discretion to admit the testimony as to the absence of the bike headlight.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
BLOODWORTH, JONES and EMBRY, JJ., and SIMMONS, Retired Circuit Judge, sitting by designation of the Chief Justice, concur.