Case Title: Gleason v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 111956

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, 
Powell, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
ROBERT CHARLES GLEASON, JR., 
a/k/a CHARLES R. FLYNN 
 
v. 
Record No. 111956 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 OPINION BY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 7, 2012 
ROBERT CHARLES GLEASON, JR., 
a/k/a CHARLES R. FLYNN 
 
v. 
Record No. 111957 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WISE COUNTY 
John C. Kilgore, Judge 
 
Robert Charles Gleason, Jr., received two death sentences 
following pleas of guilty to capital murder in the killings of 
Harvey Grey Watson and Aaron Cooper.  Although Gleason has 
waived his appeals of right, Code § 17.1-313 mandates that we 
review the death sentences.  In this review, we consider 
whether the sentences were imposed "under the influence of 
passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor" and whether 
the sentences are "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty 
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the 
defendant."  Code § 17.1-313(C). 
I.  Background 
 
On May 8, 2009, Harvey Watson was murdered at Wallens 
Ridge State Prison.  His cellmate, Robert Gleason, was charged 
 
2 
with the "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any 
person by a prisoner confined in a state or local correctional 
facility," a capital offense under Code § 18.2-31(3).  On 
December 21, 2010, following an evaluation to confirm his 
competency, Gleason pled guilty to the murder of Watson in the 
Circuit Court of Wise County.  Gleason confessed under oath, 
stating that he planned the murder to occur on the two-year 
anniversary of a previous homicide that he had committed. 
 
Gleason admitted to binding Watson with torn bed sheets, 
beating him, taunting him about his impending death, shoving a 
urine sponge in his face and a sock in his mouth, and finally 
strangling him with fabric from the sheet.  According to 
Gleason, he concealed the body in his cell for fifteen hours, 
making excuses for Watson's failure to emerge.  Gleason further 
stated that he planned, once rigor mortis had passed, to 
dispose of the body in the garbage that was circulated to pick 
up food trays.  Gleason was unsuccessful in disposing of the 
body before Watson was discovered by prison personnel. 
Throughout the circuit court proceedings, Gleason 
consistently repeated that he had no remorse.  Rather, knowing 
that the premeditated murder of an inmate and more than one 
murder within a three-year period was punishable by the death 
penalty in Virginia, he commented to the court that he "already 
 
3 
had a few [other] inmates lined up, just in case I didn't get 
the death penalty, that I was gonna take out." 
Following Watson's death, Gleason had been moved to 
solitary confinement in Virginia's "supermax" Red Onion Prison. 
On July 28, 2010, Gleason was in a solitary recreation pen that 
shared a common wire fence with that of Aaron Cooper.  Gleason 
asked Cooper to try on a "religious necklace" that Gleason was 
making.  Gleason proceeded to strangle Cooper through the wire 
fence, repeatedly choking Cooper "'til he turned purple," 
waiting "until his color came back, then [going] back again" 
until Cooper finally expired.  Gleason described himself 
laughing at the reaction of the other inmates.  He then watched 
and mocked the prison staff attempting to revive Cooper. 
Gleason was charged in the capital murder of Cooper under 
Code § 18.2-31(8) for "[t]he willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated killing of more than one person within a three-
year period."  On April 22, 2011, Gleason pled guilty to the 
murder of Cooper.  He informed the court that he had 
deliberately targeted Cooper so as to make a point to the 
prosecutor and as a favor to another inmate who was to be 
released soon, so that the inmate would owe Gleason, and 
Gleason would then have someone outside the prison to do his 
bidding. 
 
4 
After accepting both guilty pleas, the court conducted a 
multi-day joint sentencing proceeding, considering evidence and 
argument by counsel and Gleason.  The court also reviewed a 
pre-sentence report, Gleason having waived a post-sentence 
report.  The court fixed Gleason's sentences at death, finding 
the aggravating factors of both vileness and future 
dangerousness in both cases beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
concluding that these factors were not outweighed by mitigating 
facts.  Although Gleason was found competent to waive appeal 
and did so, we must proceed with the required statutory review. 
II.  Statutory Review 
A.  Passion, Prejudice, or Other Arbitrary Factors 
We first consider whether the death sentences were imposed 
"under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other 
arbitrary factor."  Code § 17.1-313(C)(1). 
 
We find no evidence to suggest that this was the case.  
Counsel for Gleason have conceded that they cannot point to any 
evidence in the record that would indicate that the circuit 
court was influenced by passion, prejudice, or any other 
arbitrary factor.  The circuit court, hearing the case without 
a jury, was meticulous in ensuring that Gleason was competent, 
and the record makes clear that Gleason consistently had advice 
from stand-by counsel throughout the proceedings.  The court 
took great pains to explain to Gleason the procedure, the law, 
 
5 
and his rights.  Gleason was permitted to change his plea in 
the Watson case from not guilty to guilty to not guilty, and 
back again to guilty.  The court granted each of Gleason's 
requests for a continuance, appointed every expert he 
requested, and granted all accommodations within its power to 
grant. 
 
The circuit court also explicitly stated that, while 
Gleason had asked the court to consider a variety of reasons 
why Gleason should be sentenced to death on either or both 
charges, "the only things that I am allowed to consider and the 
only things that I have considered throughout this case, 
regardless of what testimony has been offered or regardless of 
what opinions have been given, are the statutory factors that a 
fact-finder in Virginia [may] appropriate[ly] consider":  
whether the Commonwealth has proved vileness or future 
dangerousness in either of the two cases beyond a reasonable 
doubt, as well as whether mitigating facts outweigh these 
proofs. 
 
Gleason points to no portion of the record that suggests 
that the sentences were issued as a result of passion or 
prejudice, or that they were arbitrary in any way.  Our review 
of the record likewise has revealed no such bias. 
 
 
 
6 
B.  Proportionality Review 
The statutory mandate against excessive or 
disproportionate sentencing in Code § 17.1-313(C) is not to 
" '[e]nsure complete symmetry among all death penalty cases,' " 
but rather " 'to determine if a sentence of death is 
aberrant.' "  Prieto v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 149, 188-89, 721 
S.E.2d 484, 507-08 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 267, 661 S.E.2d 415, 448 
(2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1189 (2009)). 
The two crimes share several features relevant to our 
review.  The murders were both clearly premeditated and 
accomplished by means of ligature strangulation, a very 
deliberate and personal method of killing.  They both involved 
taunting or torture indicative of a particularly high level of 
cruelty:  Watson was tied up, beaten, taunted, given his last 
cigarette and then had a urine sponge stuffed in his face, 
while Cooper was repeatedly strangled and permitted to catch 
his breath before he was killed. 
We are required by Code § 17.1-313(C) to consider not only 
the crime itself but the defendant.  In both instances, Gleason 
was dispassionate after the killing:  Watson's body remained in 
his cell with him for fifteen hours as he plotted attempts to 
hide the body, and Gleason mocked officers attempting to revive 
Cooper.  Gleason was very clear to the court that he had "no 
 
7 
remorse for it, zero."  Gleason presented witnesses testifying 
to the fact that, even from prison, he was a danger to both the 
prison population and the population at large.  He has shown 
from his actions that he is capable of orchestrating a murder 
in Virginia's most secure prison.  He himself stated to the 
court:  "You guys can lock me 24/7, take everything out of my 
cell . . . .  Sooner or later, I'm gonna be the nice little 
man, and get out there" and kill again. 
In the course of this review, we have considered similar 
cases for which a death sentence was imposed involving capital 
murders committed by inmates.  See, e.g., Remington v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 551 S.E.2d 620 (2001), cert. denied, 
535 U.S. 1062 (2002), Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 544 
S.E.2d 299, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1003 (2001), Payne v. 
Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 357 S.E.2d 500, cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 933 (1987).  We have also considered similar cases for 
which a death sentence was imposed for more than one murder 
within three years.  See, e.g., Andrews v. Commonwealth, 280 
Va. 231, 699 S.E.2d 237 (2010), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 
S.Ct. 2999 (2011) (death penalty vacated on other grounds by 
our Court); Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 619 S.E.2d 
16 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1136 (2006); Walker v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 515 S.E.2d 565 (1999), cert. denied, 
528 U.S. 1125 (2000).  We have additionally reviewed similar 
 
8 
cases in which, after a finding of both aggravating factors of 
future dangerousness and vileness, a death sentence was imposed 
for a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing by means of 
ligature strangulation.  See, e.g., Bramblett v. Commonwealth, 
257 Va. 263, 513 S.E.2d 400, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952 (1999); 
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 393 S.E.2d 609 (1989), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 
Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 
(1990); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 384 S.E.2d 785 
(1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990); Spencer v. 
Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 384 S.E.2d 775 (1989), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 1036 (1990); Clanton v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 41, 286 
S.E.2d 172 (1982).  Finally, we have reviewed capital murder 
cases in which life imprisonment was imposed rather than the 
death penalty.  After reviewing these cases and Gleason's 
actions as admitted to under oath before the circuit court, we 
are convinced that Gleason's death sentences are neither 
excessive nor disproportionate. 
III.  Conclusion 
In sum, we determine that the death sentences were not 
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other 
arbitrary factor and are not excessive or disproportionate.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgments of the circuit court. 
Record No. 111956 – Affirmed. 
Record No. 111957 – Affirmed.