Case Title: State of New Jersey v. Richard A. Ravotto

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-45-00

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Verniero, J., writing for a majority of the Court. The issue in this appeal is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the police used unreasonable force in obtaining the defendant's blood sample to determine whether he was intoxicated. Defendant consumed alcohol at a friend's house in the early morning hours of January 18, 1997. A police officer discovered the defendant about 6:00 a.m. lying inside his car. Defendant had overturned the car in a one-car accident, and it was entangled in a chain-link fence. The officer asked the defendant whether he was all right and whether anyone else was in the car. Defendant responded that he was all right and that he was alone in the car. When the ambulance arrived, however, defendant insisted that they hurry up because there's three of us in here. When defendant came out of the car, he explained that he was joking about the presence of others in the car. Another officer arrived at the accident scene, and both officers smelled a strong odor of alcohol on defendant's breath. Although he had no visible injuries and refused medical treatment, police and other emergency workers forced defendant onto a backboard to transport him to a nearby hospital. Defendant resisted vigorously. The officers placed defendant under arrest for driving while intoxicated, after which an officer accompanied defendant to the hospital for the purpose of obtaining a blood sample. At the hospital, defendant continued his resistence and tried to punch an attending physician who was attempting to take his blood pressure. The officer requested that medical personnel take a blood sample from defendant to test for drug and alcohol content. No warrant was obtained authorizing the taking of blood. Before the hospital could take the blood, a police blood kit had to be delivered from police headquarters, which took an hour. Defendant, who had been placed in restraints, was held down by two officers as the nurse obtained the sample. Defendant screamed and struggled to free himself. He purportedly said repeatedly that he was afraid of needles and would give a Breathalyzer sample if they would refrain from taking his blood. At no time was the defendant offered a Breathalyzer test as an alternative. The nurse took eight vials of blood, four for the police and four for the hospital's diagnostic uses. The record is not clear as to whether the hospital would have extracted the blood absent police involvement. Defendant was kept restrained for about six hours, and then released. He received no other treatment at the hospital. Defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated. He moved before the municipal court to suppress the results of the blood test, which revealed a blood alcohol content nearly three times the legal limit. The court denied the motion, holding that the police were under no obligation to give him the option of taking a Breathalyzer test and that no search warrant was required to take the blood sample because of the evanescent nature of the evidence. The court found nothing improper about the police conduct in taking the blood sample. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty and appealed the denial of his suppression motion to the Law Division. The Law Division reversed the municipal court, holding that the police should have obtained a telephonic warrant. In a published opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the Law Division's determination, 333 N.J. Super. 247, reasoning from federal and State court opinions that 1) a driver arrested for driving under the influence has no legal right to refuse chemical testing, 2) the police are not required to obtain consent, and 3) the driver may be restrained in order to take a blood sample. The court also held that the police officers were not required to seek a telephonic search warrant simply because there was a time lag at the hospital while awaiting the blood kit. HELD: Applying the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, the force used by the police to extract defendant's blood was unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances. 1. The State's taking of blood from a suspect constitutes a search. Under the State and federal constitutions, a search must be reasonable, measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances. Police must obtain a warrant to conduct the search unless it falls under one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. With or without a warrant, police may not use unreasonable force to perform a search of a person. In assessing unreasonable force claims, courts consider whether the officers' actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. Pursuant to Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), courts employ a balancing test that considers facts and circumstances such as the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. (pp. 8-10). 2. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that police, who had not used force, had been justified in requiring a defendant to submit to a blood test to determine intoxication because of the evanescent property of alcohol, the test's accuracy and its minimal intrusiveness. However, the Schmerber Court suggested that compulsory blood tests may not be permissible when a defendant objects on the grounds of fear, concern for health, or religious scruple and might prefer some other means of testing such as the Breathalyzer test. Opinions of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, have implied that, at some level of force or coercion, police conduct in pursuit of a blood sample is impermissible. (pp. 10-17). 3. Pursuant to Graham, the Court employs a balancing test that considers all relevant facts and circumstances, including the defendant's reaction to law enforcement officials, the nature of the offense under investigation by police, and the existence of other proofs apart from blood evidence. Here, the Court balances defendant's manifest fear of needles, his violent reaction to the bodily intrusion engendered by the search, and his willingness to take a Breathalyzer test against the State's interest in prosecuting the defendant on a quasi-criminal charge in respect of which there existed considerable proofs apart from the blood evidence. In striking the balance, the Court finds that the forced extraction of blood in this instance offended the State and federal constitutions. (pp. 17-22). 4. The Court rejects the State's argument that it should sustain the results of the blood test as the fruits of the search because the police ultimately would have obtained the test results from the hospital itself. The Court could not conclude from the record that the hospital staff would have taken a blood test absent the police request. Even if the hospital had required its own blood sample for diagnostic purposes, once the State assisted in the forced taking of those samples it could no longer acquire them under the independent source doctrine. (pp. 22-26). 5. The Court declines to remand the matter to afford the State the opportunity to clarify or develop the record on the availability of the Breathalyzer and other issues. Such a remand would not result in an alteration of this disposition in light of the uncontested facts. (pp. 26-30). 6. The police had probable cause to arrest the defendant and, due to exigency, they were not required to obtain a search warrant authorizing the blood sample. Moreover, the police acted properly in transporting defendant to a hospital and seeking the blood test in a medically reasonable manner. The Court concludes, however, that the police used unreasonable force to acquire the blood sample from the defendant against whom they already had considerable evidence. On that basis, the fruits of the search cannot be sustained. (pp. 30-34). The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. On REMAND to the municipal court, the evidence of defendant's blood alcohol content will be suppressed and defendant's not-guilty plea will be reinstated. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, dissenting, disagrees with the Court's reliance on the State Constitution and its interpretation of the opinions of the United States Supreme Court, is of the view that the record is inadequate to assess properly the totality of circumstances, and would remand the matter for a full hearing. JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE VERNIERO's opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a separate dissenting opinion in which CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ joins. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RICHARD A. RAVOTTO, Defendant-Appellant. Argued May 1, 2001 -- Decided July 26, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 333 N.J. Super. 247 (2000). Ronald K. Chen argued the cause for appellant (Mr. Chen, Robert J. Bates and J.C. Salyer, Staff Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Mr. Chen, Mr. Bates and Mr. Salyer, on the briefs). Susan W. Sciacca, Deputy First Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (William H. Schmidt, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney). Linda K. Danielson, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by VERNIERO, J. This case implicates defendant's right to be free of unreasonable searches under the federal and State Constitutions. The police arrested defendant for driving while intoxicated. Thereafter, they transported defendant to a hospital where an officer requested that medical personnel take samples of his blood to test for drug and alcohol content. Over defendant's strenuous objections, his legs and his left arm were strapped to a table, and several persons, including two police officers, held him down as a nurse drew eight vials of blood. The Law Division disallowed the use of that evidence on constitutional grounds. On leave to appeal granted to the State, the Appellate Division reversed, finding no constitutional violation. We disagree. We hold that under the totality of the circumstances the police used unreasonable force in obtaining defendant's blood sample. In view of that holding, we conclude that the Law Division properly suppressed defendant's blood alcohol content level as evidence of intoxication. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RICHARD A. RAVOTTO, Defendant-Appellant. __________________________ LaVECCHIA, J., dissenting. The majority concludes, ante at ___ (slip op. at 34-35), that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant, and due to exigency, they were not required to obtain a search warrant authorizing the blood sample. Moreover, the police acted properly in transporting defendant to a hospital and seeking the blood test in a medically reasonable manner. Yet, the majority decides that application of the objectively reasonable test nonetheless requires that the results of the blood test must be suppressed because excessive force was employed to obtain the blood samples. The majority's basis for its holding seems to be the lack of proof in the record that less intrusive means to test for blood alcohol content were unavailable. I disagree with the majority. Although the availability of less intrusive testing means is certainly a factor to be considered in weighing the totality of circumstances under the objectively reasonable test, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the record speaks with clarity on that issue. At best it is ambiguous. In my view, to assess properly the totality of circumstances that unfolded in the early morning hours of January 18, 1997, a remand is necessary. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the Court. In Nelson, the Ninth Circuit similarly held that [w]hen an arrestee has agreed to submit to a breath or urine test which is available and of similar evidentiary value, the government's need for a blood test disappears. 143 F.3d at 1207 (emphasis added). Instead of deciding the matter then, the Ninth Circuit stated that [f]actual development at trial may affect the ultimate determination whether the plaintiffs' requests for alternative forms of testing, which the police refused to respect, were in fact reasonable under the circumstances. Ibid. The majority here notes that the police were reasonable in their insistence that defendant go to the hospital as a precautionary measure after the accident. And, it is uncontroverted that there were no Breathalyzers at the hospital, although there was a Breathalyzer available at the Edgewater Police Headquarters. What is unclear from this record is whether any portable Breathalyzers were available or whether it was possible to have transported defendant to a Breathalyzer. Unlike the majority, I am unwilling to conclude that the police acted unreasonably without knowing the answers to those questions. But if the alternative of a Breathalyzer was truly unavailable, and considering the evanescent nature of the evidence, then the defendant's offer to take the Breathalyzer is meaningless. NO. A-45 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RICHARD A. RAVOTTO, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED July 26, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz