Case Title: State v. Smith

Citation: 2000-Ohio-166

Docket Number: 19980552

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Smith, 89 Ohio St.3d 323, 2000-Ohio-166.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SMITH, N.K.A. MAHDI, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Smith (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 323.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 98-552 — Submitted March 7, 2000 — Decided July 26, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-94-093. 
 
On the evening of May 26, 1993, defendant-appellant, Vernon Smith, 
n.k.a. Abdullah Sharif Kaazim Mahdi, and Herbert Bryson robbed the Woodstock 
Market located at the corner of Woodstock and Avondale in Toledo.  During the 
robbery, Smith fired a single shot at the upper chest of Sohail Darwish, causing 
his death.  Approximately two weeks later, Smith was arrested and then indicted 
on one count of aggravated murder with a firearm specification, and a death 
penalty specification alleging that Smith was the principal offender in committing 
aggravated murder during an aggravated robbery.  Smith was also indicted on 
three counts of aggravated robbery.  Subsequently, Smith was found guilty as 
charged by a jury and sentenced to death. 
 
During the afternoon of May 26, 1993, Smith met up with Herbert Bryson 
and Lamont Layson at a dirt basketball court in a park at Highland and 
Maplewood in Toledo.  The trio discussed “hitting a lick,” i.e., committing a 
robbery.  The group got in Bryson’s car, and Smith directed them to the corner of 
Woodstock and Avondale, where the Woodstock Market was located.  Layson 
remained in the car while Smith and Bryson headed toward the carryout.  
Jeremiah Bishop, who was two houses down from the Woodstock Market at that 
time, saw Smith and another person enter the carryout. 
 
Bryson testified that after he and Smith entered the carryout, they noticed 
only two people in the store, both of whom were behind the counter.  Bryson 
asked about a type of beer, and the storeowner, Sohail Darwish, came around the 
 
 
2 
counter and walked over to the cooler to assist him.  Darwish retrieved a forty-
ounce beer bottle from the cooler and placed it on the counter.  Bryson did the 
same.  As Darwish was ringing up the sale on the cash register, Smith brandished 
a black gun and ordered Darwish to “[o]pen the cash register, motherfucker.” 
 
Darwish, who was standing next to Bryson, put his hands up in the air and 
did not resist.  Bryson went behind the counter and hit several buttons on the cash 
register, trying to open it.  Bryson then ordered Darwish to open the cash register, 
which he did.  Darwish then put his hands back up in the air. 
 
Osand Tahboub, a former co-worker who was visiting Darwish at the 
carryout at that time, testified that the gunman then told Darwish to “[m]ove and 
empty your wallet, motherfucker.”  As Darwish was reaching for his wallet, 
Smith fired a single shot, hitting Darwish in the chest.  Smith then ordered 
Tahboub to empty his wallet as well, and the two assailants then fled the scene.  
Darwish was able to push the alarm button before he fell to the floor.  As a result 
of the single gunshot wound to the upper left side of his chest, Darwish bled to 
death. 
 
After Smith and Bryson left the carryout, Layson, who was waiting in 
Bryson’s car, noticed Smith holding a gun in his hand when he and Bryson 
climbed back into the automobile.  According to Layson, Smith exclaimed, 
“[D]ang, I forgot the beer.”  When Bryson asked Smith “why did he do it,” Smith 
replied that he shot the man “in the arm” because “he moved too slow,” and that 
“[h]e took too long * * * [o]pening the cash register.” 
 
According to Layson, Smith then said, “[F]uck him, he in our 
neighborhood anyway.  He shouldn’t be in our neighborhood with a store no 
way.”  Later, Smith and Bryson split the money taken in the robbery, which was 
apparently over $400.  They also gave Layson all the stolen food stamps from the 
robbery plus $50. 
 
 
3 
 
On June 9, approximately two weeks after the murder, police detective 
Dennis Richardson received information that persons possibly involved in a 
homicide were incarcerated in the Sandusky County Jail.  Based on this and other 
information he received from sources, Richardson made up an eight-man photo 
array, including a photo of Herbert Bryson, to show to Tahboub.  The next day, 
upon viewing the array, Tahboub selected Bryson’s photo as “[n]ot the guy with 
the gun, but the other guy.”  Based on this information and the fact that computer 
records showed Smith as a known associate of Bryson, Richardson compiled a 
second photo array that included a picture of Smith.  Richardson showed Tahboub 
the second photo array, and Tahboub immediately selected Smith’s photo as that 
of the gunman. 
 
Consequently, Smith was arrested, and along with Bryson and Layson, 
was indicted by the grand jury in the Darwish murder.  In count one, Smith was 
charged with aggravated felony-murder during an aggravated robbery.  A death 
penalty specification attached to this count alleged that Smith was the principal 
offender in the aggravated murder during a robbery, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  The 
second count charged Bryson and Layson with aggravated felony-murder during 
an aggravated robbery.  Counts three through five charged all three defendants 
with aggravated robbery of the carryout, of Darwish, and of Tahboub 
respectively.  All five counts also carried firearm specifications. 
 
Prior to trial, defense counsel informed the trial judge that the prosecution 
had offered Smith a plea bargain to avoid the death penalty.  However, Smith 
declined the plea offer contrary to the advice of defense counsel.  At an in-
chambers conference, Smith reiterated his desire to decline the plea bargain and 
proceed to trial. 
 
A jury trial was held wherein both Bryson and Layson testified for the 
state as a result of plea agreements.  Bryson, who was in the carryout at the time 
of the shooting, testified that Smith fired the gunshot that caused Darwish’s death.  
 
 
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Layson testified that Smith exhibited no remorse when he admitted that he had 
shot the carryout owner.  Tahboub also testified and identified Smith as the 
murderer.  The defense presented no witnesses and made no closing argument at 
the conclusion of trial.  After deliberation, the jury found Smith guilty as charged. 
 
At the mitigation hearing, several witnesses testified on Smith’s behalf, 
including his wife, mother, and a psychologist, Robert Kahl, who evaluated 
Smith.  In Kahl’s opinion, Smith suffers from a mental illness, but Kahl was 
unable to identify it specifically, since he was unable to complete his evaluation 
due to Smith’s lack of cooperation during the interview process.  Smith’s mother 
testified that Smith’s biological father was never around during Smith’s 
childhood.  In addition, Smith’s stepfather physically abused the mother in front 
of the children, including Smith.  Smith’s wife, Grace Smith, testified that Smith 
broke down and cried one or two days after the murder and told her that it was an 
accident, and that he didn’t mean to do it.  The jury recommended death, and the 
court imposed the death sentence on Smith. 
 
Upon appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the convictions and death 
sentence in a split decision.  While agreeing with the decision to affirm the 
convictions, the dissenting appellate judge found substantial residual doubt as to 
Smith’s intent which, when combined with the other mitigating factors, 
“outweighs the aggravating circumstance proven.”  The dissent reasoned that it 
was “fundamentally unfair” to retroactively apply State v. McGuire (1997), 80 
Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112, syllabus, since Smith was tried before McGuire 
was announced, when residual doubt was still a legitimate mitigating factor.  The 
dissent further observed that “[t]he unfairness occurs because the defense 
withheld certain evidence going to [Smith’s] intent in the guilt phase, undoubtedly 
believing it to be more persuasive as going toward residual doubt in the penalty 
phase.” 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
 
5 
__________________ 
 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Craig T. Pearson, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, J. Joseph Bodine, Jr., Angela 
Greene and Richard J. Vickers, Assistant State Public Defenders, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J.  Appellant Smith raises ten propositions of law.  We have 
reviewed each one and have determined that none justifies reversal of Smith’s 
conviction for aggravated murder and the other crimes he committed.  Pursuant to 
R.C. 2929.05(A), we have also independently reviewed the record, weighed the 
aggravating circumstance against the mitigating factors, and reviewed the death 
penalty for appropriateness and proportionality.  For the reasons that follow, we 
affirm Smith’s convictions and death sentence. 
Inquiry on Racial Bias/Effective Assistance 
 
In his first proposition of law, Smith asserts that counsel were ineffective 
for failing to question the venire concerning religious or racial bias, since the 
crimes in issue were interracial in nature.  Smith contends that counsel’s 
ineffectiveness throughout trial, including the presentation of “racially charged 
evidence,” can be traced to counsel’s failure to examine the jurors on racial bias 
prior to trial. 
 
Since Smith failed to raise this issue before the court of appeals, we 
consider this issue to be waived.  State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 
O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
Smith argues, albeit in a footnote, that if his argument is considered 
waived, his appellate counsel gave him ineffective assistance.1  However, we find 
that Smith has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
 
Reversal of a conviction for ineffective assistance requires that the 
defendant show, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, that 
 
 
6 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of 
a fair trial.  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693.  Accord State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 
538 N.E.2d 373. 
 
Smith asserts many conclusions, one of which is that the trial was racially 
charged, since the murder was committed by a black man and the victim was “a 
man of Arabic descent who operated a grocery store in the inner city.”  
Characteristic of Smith’s arguments under this proposition is his conclusion that 
“[b]ecause the conflict between blacks and the immigrant newcomers envelops 
the overall debate on black/white relations, racism may have been a factor in the 
jury’s decision to convict [Smith] of aggravated murder.”  (Footnote omitted.)  
Other examples of Smith’s argument that the entire trial was fraught with racially 
charged evidence include trial counsel’s strategy during the mitigation phase to 
highlight the black “gangsta” movie “Menace II Society,” relying on the 
testimony of an Islamic jail counselor, citing the movie “Malcolm X,” and 
relating defendant’s story of life in the inner city. 
 
Smith relies on Turner v. Murray (1986), 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 
1683, 1688-1689, 90 L.Ed.2d 27, 37, for the proposition that a capital defendant 
accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have the venire questioned so as to 
reveal any possible racial bias.  Smith contends that, in the racially charged 
atmosphere of this case, competent counsel would have taken advantage of that 
entitlement. 
 
In our view, Smith’s arguments are purely speculative and unconvincing.  
We have held that “[t]he conduct of voir dire by defense counsel does not have to 
take a particular form, nor do specific questions have to be asked.”  State v. Evans 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 247, 586 N.E.2d 1042, 1056.  Moreover, as we noted 
in State v. Watson (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 1, 13, 572 N.E.2d 97, 108, under Turner 
v. Murray, the actual decision to voir dire on racial prejudice is a choice best left 
 
 
7 
to a capital defendant’s counsel.  Id., 476 U.S. at 37, 106 S.Ct. at 1688, 90 
L.Ed.2d at 37, and fn. 10. 
 
Here, the mitigation transcript indicates that counsel elicited testimony 
that Smith saw the movie “Menace II Society” earlier on the day of the shooting.  
In the beginning of the movie, a black man shoots and kills a nonblack 
storeowner.  However, this fact was evidently elicited to support the expert 
testimony that Smith suffered a mental defect that caused him to become 
psychotic for a temporary period of time.  In the defense psychologist’s 
professional opinion, it was no coincidence that, after seeing what occurred in the 
movie, Smith committed a similar crime later that day.  Clearly, counsel were 
attempting to portray Smith as someone who was unstable and prone to psychotic 
displays such as the murder of Darwish, which reprised a scene in the film Smith 
had seen earlier that day.  Far from creating a racially charged atmosphere, it 
appears that trial counsel attempted to explain Smith’s murder of Darwish in a 
way that could lead jurors to view Smith as less blameworthy for his actions. 
 
Counsel’s chronicling of Smith’s life story in the inner city does not 
indicate ineffective assistance.  It was likely designed to portray Smith as a victim 
of his background and upbringing, and thus not deserving of death.  The 
testimony of the Islamic jail counselor attempted to show Smith as a person who 
has now turned to religion.  The references to Malcolm X were raised by defense 
counsel during examination of the Islamic counselor.  As brought out in the trial 
transcript, such questions appear to have been designed to elicit testimony that the 
type of Islamic belief Smith was turning to was not the “nationalistic brand” of 
Islamic belief once espoused by Malcolm X.  Moreover, Smith’s troubled inner 
city background and his religious conversion are unquestionably valid mitigating 
factors, and it was not ineffective assistance to bring them to the jury’s attention. 
 
Counsel could have properly determined that the examination of jurors’ 
racial views during voir dire would be unwise, since the subject of racial prejudice 
 
 
8 
is sensitive to most people, and raising it during voir dire could cause some jurors 
to be less candid if confronted with direct questions attempting to discern any hint 
of racial prejudice.  In addition, our reading of the record leads us to conclude, 
contrary to Smith’s assertions, that racial issues were not “woven into the fabric 
of trial.” 
 
Yet, even if we viewed counsel’s trial strategy as questionable, such a 
strategy should not compel us to find ineffective assistance of counsel.  In these 
situations, we normally defer to counsel’s judgment.  State v. Clayton (1980), 62 
Ohio St.2d 45, 49, 16 O.O.3d 35, 37, 402 N.E.2d 1189, 1192.  Since we find no 
legitimate basis for Smith’s assertions that counsel were ineffective for not 
examining the venire on racial or religious bias, this proposition is not well taken. 
Competency Evaluation 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 5, Smith contends that the trial court erred in 
failing to order a competency evaluation sua sponte.  Smith claims that numerous 
incidents, when considered together, should have alerted the trial court that 
defendant was mentally incompetent.  Among the incidents cited are Smith’s 
refusal to heed counsel’s advice to accept a plea bargain prior to trial; his refusal 
to waive a jury trial in favor of a three-judge panel; his insistence on appearing at 
trial in jail clothes and a kuffa (prayer cap); his waiver of a potentially valid 
Batson claim; his declaration in chambers that he did not want any family 
members testifying at his mitigation hearing; his decision not to give an unsworn 
statement during the mitigation phase and his refusal to speak at his sentencing 
hearing; and his refusal to continue cooperating with the defense expert 
psychologist. 
 
It has long been recognized that “a person [who] lacks the capacity to 
understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with 
counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”  
Drope v. Missouri (1975), 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 903, 43 L.Ed.2d 103, 
 
 
9 
113.  “Fundamental principles of due process require that a criminal defendant 
who is legally incompetent shall not be subjected to trial.”  State v. Berry (1995), 
72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433, 438, citing Pate v. Robinson (1966), 383 
U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815. 
 
In Ohio, R.C. 2945.37(B) requires a competency hearing if a request is 
made before trial.  But “[i]f the issue is raised after the trial has commenced, the 
court shall hold a hearing on the issue only for good cause shown or on the court’s 
own motion.”  Id.  Thus, “the decision as to whether to hold a competency hearing 
once trial has commenced is in the court’s discretion.”  State v. Rahman (1986), 
23 Ohio St.3d 146, 156, 23 OBR 315, 325, 492 N.E.2d 401, 410.  The right to a 
hearing “rises to the level of a constitutional guarantee where the record contains 
‘sufficient indicia of incompetence,’ such that an inquiry * * * is necessary to 
ensure the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”  State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d at 359,  
650 N.E.2d at 439, citing Drope and Pate, supra. 
 
However, the record in this case does not reflect “sufficient indicia of 
incompetence” to have required the trial court to conduct a competency hearing.  
During the mitigation hearing, defense psychologist, Robert Kahl, testified that 
Smith suffers a mental illness, but he was not certain how to categorize it.  Yet, 
Kahl also opined that Smith was competent to stand trial.  “The term ‘mental 
illness’ does not necessarily equate with the definition of legal incompetency.”  
Berry, supra, 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 650 N.E.2d 433, syllabus.  “A defendant may be 
emotionally disturbed or even psychotic and still be capable of understanding the 
charges against him and of assisting his counsel.”  State v. Bock (1986), 28 Ohio 
St.3d 108, 110, 28 OBR 207, 209, 502 N.E.2d 1016, 1018. 
 
In addition, we note that defense counsel did not enter an insanity plea or 
suggest that Smith lacked competence.  Counsel had ample time to become 
familiar with Smith, since they represented him from their appointment in June or 
July 1993, through the March 1994 sentencing.  While Smith may have lacked 
 
 
10 
judgment in rejecting his attorneys’ advice, his competence was never an issue, 
either before, during, or after trial.  If counsel had some reason to question 
Smith’s competence, they surely would have done so.  See State v. Spivey (1998), 
81 Ohio St.3d 405, 411, 692 N.E.2d 151, 157. 
 
It is true that defense counsel twice requested in-chambers conferences: 
(1) prior to trial they informed the court that Smith rejected their advice to accept 
a plea agreement to avoid a possible death sentence, and (2) during the mitigation 
phase when they informed the court that Smith did not want to present mitigation 
witnesses.  However, at neither time did counsel or the trial judge think that 
Smith’s behavior raised any question as to his competence.  See State v. Cowans 
(1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 68, 84, 717 N.E.2d 298, 313. 
 
Accordingly, neither Smith’s behavior at trial nor the expert testimony 
proffered on his behalf provided “good cause” or “sufficient indicia of 
incompetence.”  Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
declining, sua sponte, to direct such a hearing.  See Berry, supra, 72 Ohio St.3d 
354, 650 N.E.2d 433; Rahman, supra, 23 Ohio St.3d at 156, 23 OBR at 323, 492 
N.E.2d at 410.  Deference on such issues should be granted to those “who see and 
hear what goes on in the courtroom.”  Cowans, supra, 87 Ohio St.3d at 84, 717 
N.E.2d at 312.  Therefore, we overrule Proposition of Law No. 5. 
Jury Instructions 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 3, Smith argues that the trial court erred in 
refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of involuntary 
manslaughter.  Smith asserts that the fact that the jury struggled with intent during 
deliberations fortifies the conclusion that the evidence “reasonably supported” the 
defense request for the lesser included offense instruction. 
 
Involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of aggravated 
murder.  State v. Thomas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286, paragraph 
one of the syllabus.  The difference between the two offenses is that aggravated 
 
 
11 
murder requires a purpose to kill, while involuntary manslaughter requires only 
that a killing occurred as a proximate result of committing or attempting to 
commit a felony.  State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 218, 15 OBR 311, 
357, 473 N.E.2d 264, 310. 
 
However, “[e]ven though an offense may be statutorily defined as a lesser 
included offense of another, a charge on such lesser included offense is required 
only where the evidence presented at trial would reasonably support both an 
acquittal on the crime charged and a conviction upon the lesser included offense.”  
Thomas, supra, 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286, paragraph two of the 
syllabus; State v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 562, 687 N.E.2d 685, 702.  
In making this determination, the court must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the defendant.  State v. Wilkins (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 382, 388, 18 
O.O.3d 528, 532, 415 N.E.2d 303, 308; State v. Campbell (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 
38, 47-48, 630 N.E.2d 339, 349. 
 
While the trial record indicates that the jury twice submitted questions to 
the court during deliberations regarding purpose and intent, Smith’s assertion that 
the jury must have struggled with such terms is purely speculative.  A more 
reasonable explanation for these specific inquiries was the fact that the trial judge 
did not give a copy of the jury instructions to the jurors during deliberations 
because of “the hen scratching that’s all throughout them.” 
 
Here, we believe the evidence presented at trial did not compel an 
involuntary manslaughter instruction.  Smith helped plan the robbery and directed 
his accomplices to Woodstock Market to achieve that goal.  Once inside the 
carryout, Smith brandished a loaded weapon, pointed it at Darwish, and shot him 
once in the chest.  According to eyewitnesses to the shooting, Darwish was totally 
cooperative with Smith and offered no resistance whatsoever.  Smith never 
claimed during trial that the shooting was accidental or unintentional, although he 
did tell Bryson and Layson that he shot Darwish “in the arm.”  Moreover, when 
 
 
12 
his accomplices asked him why he shot Darwish, Smith displayed no hint of 
remorse in replying that Darwish took too long opening the cash register, and 
“fuck him, * * * [h]e shouldn’t be in our neighborhood with a store no way.” 
 
This evidence is clearly at odds with Smith’s assertion that evidence of 
purpose or intent to kill was lacking.  Smith’s claims that the evidence 
“reasonably supported” an involuntary manslaughter instruction do not withstand 
scrutiny.  See State v. Raglin (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 253, 258, 699 N.E.2d 482, 
488, and State v. Sheppard (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 230, 236-237, 703 N.E.2d 286, 
293, where we upheld similar refusals by a trial court to instruct on involuntary 
manslaughter. 
 
In view of the evidence presented during the trial phase, even when 
viewed in a light most favorable to Smith, the trial court did not err in refusing to 
instruct on involuntary manslaughter.  No specific evidence submitted at trial 
raised the issue of involuntary manslaughter.  We believe that under any 
reasonable view of the evidence proffered during the trial phase, the killing of 
Darwish was purposeful.  Raglin, supra, 83 Ohio St.3d at 257-258, 699 N.E.2d at 
488.  Accordingly, we reject Smith’s third proposition of law. 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 9, Smith argues that the jury instructions on 
reasonable doubt, patterned after the language of R.C. 2901.05, allowed the jury 
to find him guilty based on a degree of proof below that required by due process.  
This issue was waived because Smith failed to object to the instructions, State v. 
Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus, and 
because Smith failed to raise it before the court of appeals.  Williams, supra, 51 
Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph two of the syllabus.  
Even if we were to consider the issue, we have rejected similar arguments in a 
number of cases.  See, e.g., State v. Van Gundy (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 230, 232-
233, 594 N.E.2d 604, 606; State v. Stojetz (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 452, 467, 705 
N.E.2d 329, 343. 
 
 
13 
SENTENCING ISSUES 
Jury Instructions/Sentencing Opinion 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 2, Smith contends that the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury to weigh the aggravating circumstance against each mitigating 
factor, instead of all the mitigating factors raised at the mitigation hearing.  Smith 
further asserts that the trial court committed the same error in parts of its 
sentencing opinion.  Smith also claims that the trial court incorrectly identified the 
aggravating circumstance by stating at trial that Smith was the “principal offender 
in the aggravated robbery” rather than principal offender in the aggravated 
murder. 
 
Smith is correct in asserting that the jury instructions were erroneous 
under R.C. 2929.03(D)(2) and R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  However, Smith failed to 
object to either instruction at trial.  Moreover, he failed to complain about the 
defective instructions before the court of appeals as well.  Smith thus waived any 
error unless, but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been 
otherwise.  Underwood, supra, 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, 
syllabus; Williams, supra, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  (Smith also failed to object to the incorrect use of 
the plural “aggravating circumstances” on the verdict form, and thereby waived 
that error as well.) 
 
The errors Smith alleges were not outcome-determinative, and hence did 
not amount to plain error.  State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 
372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph two of the syllabus.  In fact, the record indicates that 
the trial court corrected its erroneous instruction concerning the weighing process 
by providing the correct standard when it reread the sentencing instructions at the 
outset of the second day of deliberations upon a specific request by the jury.  
Moreover, the verdict form signed by all the jurors set forth the correct weighing 
standard. 
 
 
14 
 
The error in the specification instruction given during the sentencing phase 
(“principal offender in the aggravated robbery”) did not appear on the verdict 
form signed by all the jurors at the close of guilt-phase deliberations.  Nor did any 
evidence at trial suggest that anyone else but Smith shot the victim.  Thus, the 
instructional error at the close of the sentencing phase was, under these 
circumstances, inconsequential, since the jury had already convicted Smith of the 
aggravating circumstance employing the correct language.  Overall, we believe 
that the jury understood the proper sentencing standard as well as its sentencing 
responsibility.  See State v. Hill (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 438, 653 N.E.2d 271, 
277-278. 
 
We therefore hold that none of these alleged errors resulted in a clear 
miscarriage of justice, State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 608, 605 N.E.2d 
916, 928, especially upon viewing the instructions in the context of the overall 
charge.  State v. Price (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 14 O.O.3d 379, 398 N.E.2d 
772, paragraph four of the syllabus.  They do not amount to plain error sufficient 
to defeat the waiver rule. 
 
With regard to Smith’s assertion that the trial court committed error in the 
weighing process in its sentencing opinion, that error was in fact raised and found 
to be well taken by the court of appeals.  However, the appellate court found it 
could cure this error by its own independent review.  This court has held that 
errors in the trial court’s weighing process may be cured by our own independent 
review.  See, e.g., State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 170, 555 N.E.2d 293, 
304; State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 211, 661 N.E.2d 1068, 1083.  
Likewise, errors in the court of appeals’ reweighing may also be cured by our 
own independent review.  State v. Frazier (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 343, 652 
N.E.2d 1000, 1017. 
 
The court of appeals also stated that “[o]ur independent analysis of the 
evidence leads us to find that the mitigating factors do not outweigh the 
 
 
15 
aggravating circumstance.”  This statement was erroneous.  The proper standard 
in capital cases is that the aggravating circumstance(s) must outweigh the 
mitigating factors before a death sentence may be affirmed.  R.C. 2929.05(A).  
However, independent review can also cure that error.  Id. 
 
In sum, the errors alleged by Smith were waived, and we find that these 
alleged errors were not outcome-determinative and, therefore, not plain error.  In 
addition, the errors in both lower court opinions are curable by independent 
review.  Accordingly, Proposition of Law No. 2 is not well taken. 
Sentence Appropriateness 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 8, Smith contends that his death sentence is 
inappropriate and disproportionate because the aggravating circumstance does not 
outweigh the cumulative effect of the mitigation present here.  We will consider 
Smith’s arguments during our independent review of the sentence. 
Effective Assistance 
 
Under Proposition of Law No. 6, Smith claims ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel.  In Proposition of Law No. 7, Smith asserts ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel before the court of appeals. 
 
With respect to the claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Smith 
cites five areas where counsel allegedly provided deficient representation.  
However, in no instance does Smith demonstrate deficient performance by 
counsel, or that the allegedly deficient performance prejudiced him so as to 
deprive him of a fair trial.  See Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 
104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693; Bradley, supra, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 
N.E.2d 373.  Moreover, in no instance does Smith demonstrate prejudice, i.e., “a 
reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the results of the trial 
would have been different.”  Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
The first instance listed by Smith (counsel’s failure to explore racial or 
religious bias during jury selection) is fully explored in our discussion under 
 
 
16 
Proposition of Law No. 1.  None of the instances raised by Smith constituted 
deficient performance by defense counsel.  The second instance Smith cites is 
trial counsel’s failure to object to erroneous jury instructions.  Yet, as discussed 
under Proposition of Law No. 2, none of these alleged deficiencies prejudiced 
Smith so as to deprive him of a fair trial. 
 
Likewise, the third and fourth instances in which Smith alleges deficient 
representation—failing to request a psychiatric evaluation for Smith, and failing 
to object to the reasonable doubt instruction—did not deprive Smith of a fair trial.  
As we discussed under Proposition of Law No. 5, Smith did not display sufficient 
“indicia of incompetence,” Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d at 359, 650 N.E.2d at 439, to 
warrant a competency hearing.  Counsel’s failure to object to the reasonable doubt 
instruction was of no consequence, since such an instruction based on the 
language of R.C. 2901.05 is proper.  State v. Stojetz, supra, 84 Ohio St.3d at 467, 
705 N.E.2d at 343. 
 
In the final instance of alleged ineffectiveness, Smith claims prejudice in 
trial counsel’s failure to assert a defense or to make a closing argument at the end 
of the guilt phase.  Yet it is plausible in this case that counsel’s trial strategy to 
forgo closing argument prevented the prosecution from making a strong rebuttal.  
The compelling evidence submitted during trial established that Smith was the 
killer, especially given the fact that two eyewitnesses to the murder and another 
accomplice testified that Smith shot Darwish during the robbery.  In the face of 
overwhelming evidence of Smith’s guilt, defense counsel apparently chose to 
concentrate on avoiding a death sentence and making a strong case for mitigation 
and residual doubt. 
 
By doing so, counsel did not fall below an objective standard of 
reasonable representation.  This case was tried in March 1994, more than three 
years prior to our decision in State v. McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 
N.E.2d 1112, syllabus, where we held residual doubt to be “irrelevant to the issue 
 
 
17 
of whether the defendant should be sentenced to death.”  Unfortunately for the 
defense, neither the jury nor the trial judge was persuaded that sufficient residual 
doubt existed to prevent imposing a death sentence.  Even assuming that defense 
counsel’s trial strategy was questionable, such a strategy did not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  See State v. Clayton, supra, 62 Ohio St.2d at 
49, 16 O.O.3d at 37, 402 N.E.2d at 1192. 
 
Smith’s claim that counsel failed to assert a defense to the charges does 
not appear to be totally accurate.  While counsel chose not to present any defense 
witnesses during the trial phase, they did vigorously cross-examine several key 
prosecution witnesses. Accordingly, we overrule Proposition of Law No. 6. 
 
Under Proposition of Law No. 7, Smith claims that appellate counsel were 
ineffective in failing to assign as errors (1) trial counsel’s failure to question the 
venire on any racial or religious biases (see Proposition of Law No. 1), (2) the 
court’s use of the reasonable doubt instruction patterned after R.C. 2901.05 (see 
Proposition of Law No. 9), and (3) the vagueness defect in Ohio’s death 
sentencing scheme (see Proposition of Law No. 10).  Given our rejection of all 
three claims elsewhere in this opinion, none of these alleged instances of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel compels reversal.  Moreover, as we 
have held in prior cases, “[c]ounsel need not raise all nonfrivolous issues on 
appeal.”  State v. Campbell (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 53, 630 N.E.2d 339, 353, 
citing Jones v. Barnes (1983), 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3312-3313, 77 
L.Ed.2d 987, 993.  In addition, “[t]his process of ‘winnowing out weaker 
arguments on appeal and focusing on’ those more likely to prevail * * * is the 
hallmark of effective appellate advocacy.”  Smith v. Murray (1986), 477 U.S. 527, 
536, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2667, 91 L.Ed.2d 434, 445, quoting Barnes, 463 U.S. at 751-
752, 103 S.Ct. at 3312-3313, 77 L.Ed.2d at 994.  Therefore, we reject Smith’s 
Proposition of Law No. 7. 
Constitutionality 
 
 
18 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 10, Smith asserts that Ohio’s death penalty laws 
are unconstitutional for various reasons, both facially and as applied.  However, 
these arguments lack merit.  See, e.g., Jenkins, supra, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 
311, 473 N.E.2d 264; State v. Zuern (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 56, 512 N.E.2d 585; 
State v. Carter (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 218, 594 N.E.2d 595; State v. Steffen 
(1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383; State v. Buell (1986), 
22 Ohio St.3d 124, 22 OBR 203, 489 N.E.2d 795; and State v. Lewis (1993), 67 
Ohio St.3d 200, 616 N.E.2d 921.  Therefore, we summarily reject them here.  
State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus. 
Appellate Review 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 4, Smith contends that the court of appeals’ 
refusal to consider residual doubt as a mitigating factor denied him two levels of 
meaningful appellate review, since the offense was committed prior to January 1, 
1995. 
 
While the jury was instructed on residual doubt, such a factor is no longer 
mitigating.  McGuire, supra, 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112, syllabus.  
Accord State v. Goff (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 131, 694 N.E.2d 916, 923; State 
v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 165, 694 N.E.2d 932, 954.  Moreover, we 
have specifically rejected the argument that it is error to apply McGuire 
retroactively.  State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 508-509, 709 N.E.2d 484, 
503.  Thus, Proposition of Law No. 4 is not well taken. 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND PROPORTIONALITY 
 
In Proposition of Law No. 8, Smith submits that his death sentence is 
inappropriate and must be vacated because the aggravating circumstance does not 
outweigh the mitigating factors in this case, especially the mitigating factor of 
residual doubt. 
 
The facts show that on the day of the murder and robbery, Smith and 
others discussed “hitting a lick.”  Smith then directed Bryson and Layson to the 
 
 
19 
Woodstock Market to accomplish their goal of committing a robbery.  When 
Smith and Bryson went into the store, only Smith possessed and produced a 
weapon.  Although Darwish and Tahboub fully cooperated with Smith during the 
robbery, Smith fired a single shot at Darwish because “he took too long * * * 
opening the cash register.”  After the robbery and shooting, Smith’s only 
expressed regret was that he had forgotten the beer he had intended to steal.  
When Smith’s two accomplices pressed him as to why he shot the store owner, 
Smith replied, “[F]uck him, he in our neighborhood anyway.  He shouldn’t be in 
our neighborhood with a store no way.” 
 
Even if defense counsel had attempted to contest the intent element of 
aggravated murder, it seems unlikely that the jury would have believed his 
witnesses (if any), as opposed to Smith’s accomplices, who participated in the 
criminal activity.  This conclusion would appear to be reasonable, especially since 
the testimony of Darwish’s friend, Tahboub, was largely corroborative of 
Bryson’s testimony as to the circumstances of the robbery and shooting. 
 
After independent assessment, we find that the evidence supports beyond 
a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance that Smith, as the principal 
offender, killed Darwish while committing aggravated robbery.  R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7). 
 
The nature and circumstances of the offense provide nothing in mitigation.  
Prison Islamic religious counselor, Jurry Taalib-Deen, testified that Smith 
confided with him that he was “nervous and scared and the trigger went off” when 
he shot Darwish.  Yet, such statements seem less credible than those given by 
Smith to his accomplices immediately after the shooting.  While Smith’s 
statements to his accomplices after the shooting could be characterized as street 
bravado, his statements to the religious counselor could be viewed as a jail house 
conversion, and thus lacking in credibility.  The fact remains that Smith helped 
plan and then specifically directed the robbery at the Woodstock Market.  He was 
 
 
20 
the only one of the three defendants who had a gun.  The robbery-murder of 
Darwish was a senseless, unprovoked, and tragic crime. 
 
Smith’s history, character, and background provide some mitigating 
features.  Smith’s wife, Grace, testified that she married Smith while he was in 
jail in October 1990.  At that time, Smith already had fathered a child, who was 
about three years old.  The couple moved to Texas because they wanted a 
different environment, but they struggled on welfare and thereafter moved back to 
Toledo.  Meanwhile, Grace became pregnant, and their baby was born after the 
murder.  Grace stated that Smith’s mother treated her well and showed her love.  
On the day of the murder, Grace and Smith went to the movie “Menace II 
Society,” which depicted a robbery and shooting similar to the crime Smith acted 
out later that evening.  One or two days later, Smith broke down and told Grace 
that he shot Darwish, but he added that it was an accident and that he didn’t mean 
to do it.  Grace pleaded with the jury to spare Smith’s life. 
 
Smith’s mother, Verna Smith, chronicled Smith’s childhood beginning 
with a biological father who was “not really” around, and who did not provide 
financial support.  Verna later married Willie Smith, Sr., who took Smith as his 
son, and whom she described as a good father to Smith and his younger brother.  
However, the elder Smith beat Verna on different occasions in front of the 
children, which left her with black eyes and bruises.  After several years, Verna 
separated from the elder Smith because of the physical abuse, but she felt that the 
separation “was devastating” to defendant Smith.  After the divorce, Verna 
supported her children while on welfare.  Smith and his brother occasionally 
visited the elder Smith until his death around 1989.  Verna further testified that 
Smith got suspended from school about six times for fighting when he was twelve 
or thirteen years old and that his experience at school was “not too good.”  Verna 
also asked the jury to spare her son’s life. 
 
 
21 
 
Smith’s aunt, Patricia Dickerson, felt that Smith had a “very hard life” in 
the ghetto and that he only knew about life in the streets and how to survive in 
that environment.  Dickerson stated that her sister, Verna, did the best she could 
in raising Smith given the circumstances of his upbringing.  She also asked the 
jury to spare Smith from a death sentence. 
 
Smith’s uncle, Ronald Dickerson, opined that Smith was a victim of 
society, who, like a lot of other young people, got cast to the side.  In spite of 
Smith’s hard life, Dickerson felt that Smith “always seemed like a nice young 
man.” 
 
Robert Kahl, the defense psychologist, interviewed and evaluated Smith to 
determine his emotional and psychological functioning.  He also administered 
several tests to Smith.  Kahl met and interviewed Smith’s wife and mother.  At his 
first session with Kahl, Smith was very cooperative.  However, at their third 
meeting, Smith became distant with Kahl and indicated he was not going to 
participate in further evaluations.  In one written exercise Kahl left at the jail for 
Smith to complete, an “Incomplete Sentences” test, Smith wrote in almost every 
answer that someone or something, usually Kahl, was “bothering” him.  Kahl 
described Smith as being of average intelligence and initially thought Smith was 
“fairly normal.”  According to Kahl, Smith knows right from wrong, but appeared 
to show signs of depression, which hampered his intellectual functioning.  In 
Kahl’s opinion, when Smith is confronted with situations that aroused intense 
feelings, Smith could lose contact with reality and be self-destructive. 
 
In reviewing Smith’s background, Kahl noted that Smith had been 
suspended from school for fighting a number of times, beginning at the age of ten.  
Smith fathered a child when he was fourteen and attended a great number of 
schools.  Kahl concluded that part of Smith’s problems was due to a lack of 
proper parenting and to the presence of significant physical violence in the home.  
In addition to having only a father substitute in the home, Kahl felt that Smith’s 
 
 
22 
mother lacked the skills to raise a child in terms of emotional functioning and how 
to handle feelings.  Kahl further opined that it is clear that Smith learned early on 
to solve any problems with people by physically intimidating them into doing 
what he wanted them to do. 
 
Kahl also noted that it was significant that Smith and his wife watched the 
movie “Menace II Society” on the day of the murder.  In Kahl’s opinion, what 
Smith saw in the movie was related to the similar crime he acted out later that day 
at the Woodstock Market.  Kahl opined to a reasonable degree of psychological 
certainty that Smith “has a defect in his ability to handle feelings and stress, and 
when he gets in situations where feelings are high and stress is high, * * * he 
becomes psychotic for a temporary period of time.” 
 
In Kahl’s view, Smith was not able to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law on the evening of the shooting.  Kahl also stated that Smith 
has a mental illness or some defect in personality, but he could not be more 
specific, since he was unable to complete his evaluations of Smith, due to Smith’s 
refusal to cooperate any further. 
 
With regard to the statutory mitigating factors of R.C. 2929.04(B), factor 
(3) would appear to be implicated, since the defense psychologist, Robert Kahl, 
stated that at the time of the shooting, Smith was unable to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of law.  However, we do not find that Kahl’s conclusion 
supports finding the (B)(3) mental disease/defect factor, since Kahl admitted that 
he was unable to complete his evaluation of Smith.  Kahl’s inability to define a 
specific mental disease or defect for Smith’s condition detracts from finding the 
presence of the (B)(3) statutory mitigating factor in this case.  Nevertheless, 
Kahl’s findings that Smith suffered from psychotic episodes, including an episode 
on the day of the murder, must be given some weight as a (B)(7) factor.  Yet, the 
weight we apply to this factor is tempered by the fact that Kahl’s evaluation was 
incomplete due to Smith’s refusal to cooperate further in the evaluation process. 
 
 
23 
 
Smith’s age of the time of the offense (twenty-one years old) is entitled to 
some weight under R.C. 2929.04(B)(4).  See, e.g., State v. White (1999), 85 Ohio 
St.3d 433, 454, 709 N.E.2d 140, 160.  No other specific statutory mitigating 
factors appear to be applicable except for those under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). 
 
In addition to Smith’s psychological problems discussed earlier, Smith’s 
upbringing where he witnessed physical violence inflicted on his mother is 
entitled to some mitigating weight under (B)(7).  See, e.g., State v. Getsy (1998), 
84 Ohio St.3d 180, 207, 702 N.E.2d 866, 891.  Also mitigating is the love and 
support Smith enjoys from his wife and family members.  See, e.g., State v. 
Mason (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 170, 694 N.E.2d 932, 957.  However, residual 
doubt would be entitled to very little weight in mitigation, even if we had not 
rejected it as an acceptable mitigating factor in McGuire, supra, 80 Ohio St.3d 
390, 686 N.E.2d 1112, paragraph one of the syllabus.  The testimony of the 
defense mitigation witnesses that Smith claimed the shooting was accidental or 
unintentional is not persuasive.  In our view, eyewitness testimony by Smith’s 
accomplices and Tahboub clearly negates the notion that Smith did not intend to 
kill Darwish. 
 
Upon independent weighing, we hold that the aggravating circumstance 
outweighs the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  The robbery-murder 
of Darwish was an unprovoked and senseless act.  The death penalty in this case 
is both appropriate and proportionate when compared to similar cases of murder 
combined with aggravated robbery where there was the same or even more 
evidence in mitigation.  See State v. Eley (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 174, 672 N.E.2d 
640 (devotion and care from family, remorse); State v. Raglin (1998), 83 Ohio 
St.3d 253, 699 N.E.2d 482 (eighteen years old, poor background, mild brain 
damage, remorse, cooperation with police); State v. Sheppard (1998), 84 Ohio 
St.3d 230, 703 N.E.2d 286 (close and religious family background, eighteen years 
 
 
24 
old, mental disease/defect); and State v. Goodwin (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 703 
N.E.2d 1251 (difficult childhood, nineteen years old, apology to victim’s family). 
 
Based on all the foregoing, we affirm Smith’s convictions and sentences, 
including the death sentence. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
DOUGLAS, WALTERS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
 
SUMNER E. WALTERS, J., of the Third Appellate District, sitting for 
Resnick, J. 
FOOTNOTE: 
 
1. 
This argument will be addressed under Smith’s Proposition of Law 
No. 6. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  Because I believe that the 
defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 
counsel due to counsel’s failure to voir dire the jury on racial issues, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
I agree with the majority’s proposition that “ ‘[t]he conduct of voir dire by 
defense counsel does not have to take a particular form, nor do specific questions 
have to be asked,’ “ quoting State v. Evans (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d  231, 247, 586 
N.E.2d 1042, 1056.  Further, I agree, in general, with the proposition that the 
decision to voir dire on racial prejudice is a choice best left to a capital 
defendant’s counsel.  See State v. Watson (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 1, 13, 572 N.E.2d 
97, 108, citing Turner v. Murray (1986), 476 U.S. 28, 37, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 1688, 
90 L.Ed.2d 27, 37, and fn. 10.  However, I believe that in situations where racial 
issues have the potential to permeate the entire trial, failure to voir dire the venire 
regarding racial issues can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
 
25 
  
The facts presented at trial demonstrate that racial issues did permeate this 
trial.  The defendant, an African-American from the inner city, was accused of 
shooting a man of Arabic descent who operated a grocery in the inner city.  When 
asked what defendant’s reasons were for shooting the victim, co-defendant 
Layson testified that after shooting the victim, the defendant told him, “[F]uck 
him, he in our neighborhood anyway.  He shouldn’t be in our neighborhood with 
a store no way.” 
 
During mitigation, defense counsel elicited testimony from defendant’s 
wife, Grace Smith, about the film “Menace II Society,” a movie about a group of 
inner city young men (referring to themselves as “black gangsters”) who enter a 
neighborhood grocery store in the inner city and shoot the non-African-American 
clerks.  Mrs. Smith, who had viewed the movie with her husband earlier on the 
day of the shooting, described the film as follows:  “Well, it was two guys, you 
know, who thought they were kind of bad * * *.  [T]hey was just going to buy 
some beer and the guy, the owners of the store * * * were looking at them very 
strange like you shouldn’t belong in here because they were black. * * * [O]ne of 
the boys in the carryout and the store man * * * had a little words or discrepancy 
* * * and * * * caused a shooting * * *.” 
 
The parallels between the movie and the facts of this case lead to 
unavoidable conclusions about racial hatred with regard to the shooting of this 
Arabic grocery store clerk.  Dr. Robert Kahl, a clinical psychologist who testified 
on behalf of defendant, opined that defendant was depressed and had a great deal 
of trouble talking about his feelings and that when confronted with situations that 
aroused intense feelings, he could get out of contact with reality.  Dr. Kahl 
believed that defendant “has a defect in his ability to handle feelings and stress, 
and when he gets in situations where feelings are high and stress is high, that he 
becomes psychotic for a temporary period of time.”  Regarding the movie 
“Menace II Society,” Dr. Kahl opined that “it cannot be coincidence.  That this 
 
 
26 
thing happened in the movie and this thing happened later.  It cannot — I cannot 
believe it is coincidence.” 
 
Also during the mitigation phase of the trial, defense counsel elicited 
testimony regarding another film, “Malcolm X.”  According to the testimony of 
an Islamic counselor at the Lucas County Jail, Jurry Taalib-Deen, “Malcolm X” 
highlights the Nation of Islam, an Islamic splinter group which, according to 
Taalib-Deen, preaches a “hatred doctrine of blacks being Gods and whites being 
devils.”  In addition, Taalib-Deen testified that “Malcolm X” was “nationalistic,” 
and testified that “before [defendant] came in [to the Lucas County Jail], he was 
into nationalistic.” 
 
Throughout the trial and mitigation phase, the defendant, a follower of the 
Islamic faith, wore a prayer cap.  Counsel attempted to make the jury aware that 
defendant no longer subscribed to the ideology of the Nation of Islam movement 
mentioned in the movie “Malcolm X,” but rather the peaceful tenets of the Islamic 
religion.  It is possible that defense counsel’s tactic of eliciting this religious 
testimony was an attempt to evoke the sympathy of the jurors by showing that 
defendant’s religious conversion made him a gentler, more peaceful man today. 
 
Further, the evidence regarding the racial aspects of the films, combined 
with the psychological evidence from Dr. Kahl, could have been an attempt to 
demonstrate that defendant’s psychological defects permitted him to be 
influenced by the films, causing him to act in conformity with the violence 
depicted in the films. 
 
But I believe that issues of race and religion so infected this trial that the 
failure to voir dire the jury venire on those issues made counsel’s performance so 
deficient that counsel were not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment, and that counsel’s errors prejudiced the defendant and deprived him 
of a trial whose result was reliable.  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 
668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693.  If counsel consciously 
 
 
27 
chose these tactics, they had a duty also to choose a jury free of prejudice so that 
such a tactic would not cause an unfavorable reaction. 
 
These topics, involving highly charged and controversial racial and 
religious issues, could evoke strong emotional reactions in a jury.  Without a 
careful voir dire of the venire’s views and biases on these issues, there is no way 
to know whether the violent imagery of these two movies (and whether, in fact, 
any jurors had ever seen them) prejudiced the jury’s verdict.  Some people 
believe, rightly or wrongly, that the tenets of the Nation of Islam urge militant 
violence, a powerful image that could have infected the jury’s deliberation.  
Without a careful rooting out of any potential juror who harbored prejudicial 
racial or religious views, or who had formed preconceived prejudices about either 
of the movies or the Islamic movement, there is no way to be sure that the jurors 
who deliberated were truly fair and impartial. 
 
“Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital 
sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate 
but remain undetected.”  Turner, 476 U.S. at 35, 106 S.Ct. at 1687, 90 L.Ed.2d at 
35.  Further, the “risk of racial prejudice infecting a capital sentencing proceeding 
is especially serious in light of the complete finality of the death sentence.”  Id. at 
35, 106 S.Ct. at 1688, 90 L.Ed.2d at 36. 
 
The standard is whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698.  I 
believe that evidence of guilt was so overwhelming that the verdict of guilt would 
not have been affected.  However, I cannot so find as to the sentence of death. 
 
No juror was questioned regarding his or her views on racial issues, ethnic 
issues, or the politics of the Nation of Islam, Muslims in general, or the Islamic 
religion itself.  With the evidence of mitigation present in this case, I do not 
believe that we can find a reasonable probability that the emotional issues of race, 
 
 
28 
both African-American and Arabic, suffused with religious overtones, did not 
affect the outcome of the sentencing phase of trial. 
 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would reverse in part the judgment 
of the court of appeals and vacate the sentence of death.