Case Title: State v. Economo

Citation: 1996-Ohio-426

Docket Number: 19950053

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State of Ohio, Appellant, v. Economo, Appellee. 
[Cite as State v. Economo  (1996),  ________ Ohio St.3d ________.] 
Criminal law -- Sexual imposition -- Evidence -- Corroborating evidence 
necessary to satisfy R.C. 2907.06(B) need not be independently 
sufficient to convict the accused and need not go to every 
essential element of the crime charged -- Corroboration 
requirement of R.C. 2907.06(B) is a threshold inquiry of legal 
sufficiency to be determined by trial judge. 
 
-- 
 
The corroborating evidence necessary to satisfy  R.C. 2907.06(B)  need 
not be independently sufficient to convict the accused, and it need not go to 
every essential element of the crime charged.  Slight circumstances or evidence 
which tends to support the victim’s testimony is satisfactory.   
 
(No. 95-53 -- Submitted February 20, 1996 -- Decided July 10, 1996.) 
 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 66408. 
 
2 
 
Nicholas Economo, M.D., was convicted of two counts of  sexual 
imposition,1 pursuant to R.C. 2907.06, for sexual contact with Bonnebell 
Doman, one of his patients.   Doman alleged that the sexual contact occurred 
during visits to Economo’s office on July 3 and 6, 1992.    Doman was twenty-
three years old when the incidents occurred, and she had been treated by 
Economo since age fourteen, first for injuries sustained in an accident and later 
for various medical conditions. 
 
On July 3 and 6, 1992, Doman went to Economo’s office to receive 
injections and ultrasound treatments.  Doman testified that during these two 
visits Economo inappropriately touched her; specifically she claimed he 
massaged her breast and vaginal areas and, through his pants, he brushed his 
erect penis against her arm.  The only other witness to testify at trial was 
Doman’s sister Ann Watt.  Watt testified that she accompanied Doman to 
Economo’s office on July 10, 1992, because Doman “was upset because he was 
touching her.”   Although Doman asked Watt to go into the examination room 
 
3 
with her,  Watt declined to do so.   Watt testified that when Doman left the 
examination room she was “on the verge of crying.”   
 
At the close of the evidence Economo moved for acquittal on the 
grounds that no corroborating testimony had been presented, as required by 
R.C. 2907.06(B).  The trial court overruled the motion and found Economo 
guilty on both counts.2   Economo appealed, and the court of appeals reversed 
the convictions, finding an absence of corroborating evidence. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
 
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
George J. Sadd, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Arthur P. Lambros and Thomas Paris, for appellee.  
 
COOK, J.  
 
I 
 
4 
 
R.C. 2907.06(B) states: “No person shall be convicted of a violation of 
this section [sexual imposition3] solely upon the victim’s testimony 
unsupported by other evidence.”   
 
With this opinion we answer the question of what quality of evidence 
will satisfy the “other evidence” or corroboration requirement of R.C. 
2907.06(B).  As addressed later, corroboration requirements such as the one in 
R.C. 2907.06(B) are rare.4 We are aware of no other sections of the current 
Ohio criminal code mandating corroboration of a victim’s testimony as a 
prerequisite to conviction.5  For guidance,  we look to this court’s interpretation 
of code sections (now amended or repealed) necessitating corroboration and 
the decisions of other states that have examined similar corroboration 
requirements. 
 
In State v. Pearson, a 1980 case dealing with the statutory demand for 
corroboration of accomplice testimony in complicity cases,6  this court stated: 
 
“[I]n order for the prosecution to satisfy the corroboration requirement of 
R.C. 2923.03(D), independent evidence must support an accomplice’s 
 
5 
testimony, and must tend to connect the accused with the alleged crime or must 
tend to identify the accused as a guilty actor.”  (Emphasis added.)  State v. 
Pearson (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 291, 295, 16 O.O.3d 332, 334, 405 N.E.2d 296, 
299. 
 
Seventy years earlier, when addressing an instruction cautioning the jury 
against convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, this court 
stated:   
 
“It is not necessary that the crime charged be proven independently of 
the testimony of the accomplice, or that the testimony of the accomplice be 
corroborated in every particular in order that it may be said to be corroborated, 
but only that there be circumstantial evidence, or testimony of some witness 
other then the accomplice, tending to connect the defendant with the crime 
charged and to prove some of the material facts testified to by the accomplice.”  
(Emphasis added.)  State v. Robinson (1910), 83 Ohio St. 136, 143, 93 N.E. 
623, 625.   
 
6 
 
Similarly, in a recent  Georgia case applying a statute requiring 
corroboration of a victim’s testimony in a statutory rape case, the court said: 
 
“[I]t is well settled that it is not necessary that the child be corroborated 
as to every essential element of the crime, or that it establish the defendant’s 
guilt, but only that the corroborating evidence tend to establish his guilt and be 
of  ‘“such a character and quality as tends to prove the guilt of the accused by 
connecting him with the crime.”’  Chambers v. State [1977], 141 Ga. App. 438, 
439 (233 S.E.2d 818), rev’d on other grounds, 240 Ga. 76 (239 S.E.2d 324). 
Moreover, the quantum of corroboration needed is not that which is in itself 
sufficient to convict the accused, ‘“but only that amount of independent 
evidence which tends  to prove that the incident occurred as alleged.  ***  
Slight circumstances may be sufficient corroboration, and ultimately the 
question of corroboration is one for the jury.”  [Emphasis added in part.]  (Cit.)’ 
Hill v. State (1981), 159 Ga.App. 489, 490, 283 S.E.2d 703.”  Timmons v. State 
(1987), 182 Ga.App. 556, 557, 356 S.E.2d 523, 524. 
 
7 
 
In a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape, the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence to satisfy a corroboration 
requirement, stating: 
 
  “To be legally sufficient,  the corroboration need only consist  of 
‘circumstances which tend to support the victim’s testimony.’ Evans v. United 
States, D.C.App., 299 A.2d 136, 139 (1939). *** 
 
“ ***   For example, reasonably prompt reporting of the incident to one’s 
family, friends or police is considered corroboration here.”  (Footnote omitted.) 
Fitzgerald v. United States (1982), 443 A.2d 1295, 1301-1302. 
 
The Fitzgerald case is a suitable example of the minimal evidence 
necessary to fulfill a victim-corroboration requirement.  In Fitzgerald, there 
was evidence that the victim ran to her room crying when she returned from a 
car ride with the defendant during which he allegedly attempted to rape her.  
The victim complained that her head hurt, which confirmed her testimony that 
her head had struck the sidewalk when she fell from the defendant’s car during 
 
8 
commission of the sexual offense.  The victim told her friend about the incident 
the next day.  This evidence was sufficient to satisfy the need for corroboration. 
 
These cases illustrate that a corroboration requirement does not mandate 
proof of the facts which are the very substance of the crime charged, as held by 
a majority of the appellate court in this case.  The corroborating evidence 
necessary to satisfy  R.C. 2907.06(B)  need not be independently sufficient to 
convict the accused, and it need not go to every essential element of the crime 
charged.  Slight circumstances or evidence which tends to support the victim’s 
testimony is satisfactory.  The corroboration requirement of R.C. 2907.06(B) is 
a threshold inquiry of legal sufficiency to be determined by the trial judge, not 
a question of proof, which is the province of the factfinder.  See State v. 
Robinson, 83 Ohio St. at 143, 93 N.E. at 625. 
 
We find that the corroborating evidence in the case before us satisfies 
R.C. 2907.06(B).  First, it is undisputed and supported by the medical records 
that Economo and Doman had a physician-patient relationship from 1986 
through July 10, 1992 and the medical records indicate that Doman was treated 
 
9 
by Economo on July 6, 1992.  Watt testified that when she and Doman arrived 
at Economo’s office on July 10, 1992, Doman was scared and upset and Doman 
asked Watt to come into the examination room so that Economo would refrain 
from touching her.  Watt also testified that when Doman left the examination 
room she was on the verge of crying.   
 
 
This other evidence, although independently insufficient to convict 
Economo, tends to support  Doman’s testimony.   The medical records 
evidence an opportunity for Economo to commit the offense, and Watt’s 
testimony shows that Doman was afraid of being alone with Economo.  The 
fact that Watt accompanied Doman to the doctor’s office on July 10, permits a 
reasonable inference that Doman  reported the alleged sexual activity to her 
within seven days of the first incident (July 3) and four days of the second (July 
6).   
 
Accordingly, we find that Watt’s testimony and the medical records 
constitute sufficient slight circumstances which tend to support Doman’s 
testimony.  Once the threshold of sufficient corroborative evidence was 
 
10 
crossed, it was up to the factfinder to determine whether there was proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt to support the sexual imposition charges.  Here 
there was a finding of sufficient evidence to support the charges, so the 
convictions should have been affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
II 
 
In its second proposition of law, the state asks us to “abolish” the 
corroboration requirement of R.C. 2907.06(B).  In its argument in support it 
gives no reason for striking down the requirement, only reasons for thinking it 
to be unwise legislation.  We therefore reject this proposition of law and do not 
strike down the corroboration requirement, even though we agree that it 
represents waning attitudes toward victims of sexual offenses.  The following 
portion of the dissenting opinion of Judge Nugent in this case so clearly 
expresses the view of this court that we adopt it: 
 
“[I]t is important to first note that an accused in Ohio can be convicted 
on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim in substantially all criminal 
cases, including rape, felonious sexual penetration, sexual battery, gross sexual 
 
11 
imposition, all forms of assault, etc.  So why did the Ohio General Assembly 
legislatively predetermine that a class of witnesses, that is, those people 
complaining of sexual imposition, is not entitled to the same credibility 
accorded a complainant testifying about a crime other than sexual imposition?  
 
“The Legislative Service Commission's comment to R.C. 2907.06 
specifically states that the corroboration rule is justified because of the ease 
with which this crime may be abused in prosecution. Although the 
commission's comment does not elaborate on just how or why this charge may 
be abused in prosecution any more than any other criminal charge in which it is 
the complainant's word against the defendant's word, it is safe to assume that 
this belief has its roots, at least in part, in the historical justifications given by 
other states for requiring corroboration in sex offense cases, that is,  (1) the 
ease of fabrication and the irreversible damage to the reputation of one falsely 
accused, and (2) the chance of conviction solely because of the emotional 
reaction of the factfinder to the alleged facts of the charge. See An Evaluation 
of Nebraska's Corroboration Requirement, 21 Creighton Law Review (1989) 
 
12 
601; The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 Yale L.J. 
(1972) 1365. These justifications, however, seem insubstantial in light of 
available evidence which indicates that it is more difficult to convict for sex 
crime charges than for other categories of crime. See People v. Rincon-Pineda 
(1975), [14 Cal. 3d 864, 123 Cal.Rptr. 119] 538 P.2d 247; Rape Corroboration 
Requirement, supra, at 1382-1384.  
 
“As to the first justification, there is no empirical evidence verifying that 
sex crime charges are frequently falsified or that complainants of sex crimes are 
an inherently unreliable category of complainants whose testimony should not 
be believed in the absence of corroboration. Rape Corroboration Requirement, 
supra, at 1373-1378; An Evaluation of Nebraska's Corroboration Requirement, 
supra, at 614-615.  
 
“As to the second justification, that corroboration is required, 
supposedly, because sex offenses are easier to prosecute because of the 
factfinder's sympathy for the victim, one must question the validity of this 
assertion given that the evidence reveals a tendency for juries to sympathize 
 
13 
more with the accused, especially if the defendant and the complainant were 
acquainted with each other prior to criminal charges being brought. *** Rape 
Corroboration Requirement, supra, at 1378-1379.  
 
“On the other hand, the rationale against a corroboration requirement, 
that it inhibits the successful prosecution of a sex crime, seems indisputable. As 
stated previously, due to the nature of sex crimes, eyewitnesses are rarely 
available. Additionally, as a charge of sexual imposition does not involve 
force, there is less of a chance that the victim will have bruises or torn clothing, 
which would otherwise corroborate the crime.  
 
“Moreover, elimination of the corroboration requirement hardly leaves 
defendants unprotected against unjust convictions. The defendant is entitled to 
all of the established safeguards of our criminal justice system, e.g., the 
presumption of innocence, the right not to incriminate oneself, the right to the 
effective assistance of counsel, etc. In addition, it is the trial judge's 
responsibility to charge the jury as to the government's burden of proving all 
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, protection 
 
14 
against unjust convictions on a case-by-case basis is afforded defendants by the 
general rule that judgments of acquittal or reversals of conviction must be 
granted where sufficient evidence does not exist to support a guilty verdict, 
whether or not independent corroboration is technically present. Crim.R. 29;  
State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, [574 N.E.2d 492]. Given these 
safeguards, which are adequate in virtually every other type of prosecution, *** 
[we] have no reluctance in advocating the abolishment of the corroboration 
requirement of R.C. 2907.06 and leaving to the trial court, whose paramount 
obligation is always to see that justice is done, the initial responsibility of 
ensuring that a conviction for sexual imposition is based on sufficient 
evidence.” 
 
 Based on our determination that there was sufficient corroborating 
evidence in this case to satisfy R.C. 2907.06(B), we reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and F.E. SWEENEY, J., concur. 
 
15 
 
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur separately. 
 
PAINTER and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
 
MARK P. PAINTER, J., of the First Appellate District, sitting for WRIGHT, 
J. 
Footnotes 
1.  Economo was originally indicted on two counts of gross sexual imposition, 
R.C. 2907.05, but following the trial court’s ruling that the state had failed to 
prove the necessary element of force, the case proceeded on the lesser included 
offense of sexual imposition. 
2.  Economo waived his right to a jury trial and his case was tried to the court. 
3.  R.C. 2907.06, Sexual Imposition, states:  
 
“(A) No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse of 
the offender; cause another, not the spouse of the offender, to have sexual 
contact with the offender; or cause two or more other persons to have sexual 
contact when any of the following applies: 
 
16 
 
“(1) The offender knows that the sexual contact is offensive to the other 
person, or one of the other persons, or is reckless in that regard. 
 
“(2) The offender knows that the other person's, or one of the other 
person's, ability to appraise the nature of or control the offender's or touching 
person's conduct is substantially impaired. 
 
“(3) The offender knows that the other person, or one of the other 
persons, submits because of being unaware of the sexual contact. 
 
“(4) The other person, or one of the other persons, is thirteen years of age 
or older but less than sixteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows 
the age of such person, and the offender is at least eighteen years of age and 
four or more years older than such other person. 
 
“(B) No person shall be convicted of a violation of this section solely 
upon the victim's testimony unsupported by other evidence. 
 
“(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of sexual imposition, a 
misdemeanor of the third degree.” 
 
17 
4.  “The rule that unsupported testimony of the victim is not sufficient to 
support a sexual assault conviction did not exist at common law. 7 J. Wigmore, 
Evidence § 2061, at 451 [Chadbour Re. Ed. 1978]. Rather, the corroboration 
requirement in Ohio is a legislatively created rule.”  State v. Economo (Dec. 8, 
1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 66408, unreported, at 6, fn. 1 (Nugent, J., 
dissenting).  
5.   R.C. 2923.01(H)(1) requires corroboration of  a  conspirator’s testimony in 
the prosecution of his coconspirator, and R.C. 2921.11(E) states that no person 
shall be convicted of perjury “where proof of falsity rests solely upon 
contradiction by testimony of one person other than the defendant.”  
6.    That requirement was repealed and replaced with language mandating a 
cautionary jury instruction explaining that the “complicity of a witness may 
affect his credibility and make his testimony subject to grave suspicion.”  R.C. 
2923.03(D). 
 
18 
 
Alice Robie Resnick, J., concurring.  I concur in the syllabus and the 
judgment, but write separately in order to more fully discuss the issue of 
corroboration as found in R.C. 2907.06. 
 
When reviewing appellate court cases that have applied the 
corroboration requirement of R.C. 2907.06(B), it becomes readily apparent that 
the courts throughout the state have been applying drastically varying 
standards.  In fact, four distinct standards are discernible: 
• Corroborating evidence must “go to the very substance or foundation 
of the crime--in effect, the corpus delicti.”  State v. Morris (Dec. 30, 1994), 
Lake App. No. 93-L-157, unreported, at 12, citing State v. Fawn (1983), 12 
Ohio App.3d 25, 27, 12 OBR 111, 113, 465 N.E.2d 896, 900; State v. Ervin 
(Aug. 25, 1987), Jackson App. No. 551, unreported.  See, also, State v. Jacobs 
(Mar. 29, 1996), Geauga App. No. 95-G-1930, unreported, at *4; State v. 
Economo (Dec. 8, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 66408, unreported, at 5-6; State 
v. Krause (May 28, 1993), Columbiana App. No. 92-C-25, unreported. 
 
19 
• Corroborative evidence must be eyewitness testimony concerning the 
actual sexual acts alleged.  State v. Leeper (Dec. 30, 1993), Harrison App. No. 
446, unreported; State v. Gardner (Apr. 24, 1985), Hamilton App. No. C-
840522, unreported. 
• Corroborative evidence need only tend to lend some credence to the 
victim’s accusations or to at least connect the defendant with the alleged crime.  
State v. Talbert (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 282, 287, 515 N.E.2d 968, 973.  See, 
also, State v. Boyer (Mar. 25, 1994), Lucas App. No. L-93-176, unreported 
(Although the court did not detail just what evidence it found to be 
corroborative, in its summary of the evidence presented at trial, there is no 
evidence other than the victim’s testimony that would directly establish the 
sexual acts.). 
• The victim’s testimony need only be corroborated in “some material 
respect.”  State v. Pelok (Mar. 25, 1994), Fulton App. No. 93FU000009, 
unreported, at 8 (The court held that because the factual issue of whether the 
lights in the room were on or off was a material issue of great dispute, 
 
20 
testimony which corroborated the victim’s testimony that the room was dark 
was sufficient corroboration.).  See, also, Economo, Cuyahoga App. No. 66408, 
unreported (Nugent, J., dissenting); State v. Artman (Oct. 13, 1981), Lake App. 
No. 8-124, unreported; State v. Arnold (July 25, 1979), Summit App. No. 9226, 
unreported. 
 
After considering the diverse interpretations of the corroborative-
evidence requirement being applied throughout the state, I agree with the 
syllabus.  It never was the intention of the legislature to require, in addition to 
the victim’s testimony, proof independently sufficient to convict an accused.  
Rather, any evidence which supports the victim’s testimony is sufficient, no 
matter how slight.  Evidence which tends to make it more reasonable to believe 
the testimony of the victim will suffice. 
 
Having made the foregoing observation, however, I firmly believe that 
corroboration is unnecessary.  There are many crimes that “may be particularly 
susceptible to abuse in prosecution,” in the words of the Legislative Service 
Commission’s comment, yet the General Assembly has seen fit to require 
 
21 
corroboration only for this crime.  The criminal justice system contains many 
safeguards to protect against such abuses.  It is not necessary to create such an 
artificial protection.  It cannot be said more clearly and accurately than Judge 
Nugent stated in his dissent: 
 
“Moreover, elimination of the corroboration requirement hardly leaves 
defendants unprotected against unjust convictions.  The defendant is entitled to 
all of the established safeguards of our criminal justice system, e.g., the 
presumption of innocence, the right not to incriminate oneself, the right to the 
effective assistance of counsel, etc.  In addition, it is the trial judge's 
responsibility to charge the jury as to the government's burden of proving all 
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Finally, 
protection against unjust convictions on a case-by-case basis is afforded 
defendants by the general rule that judgments of acquittal or reversals of 
conviction must be granted where sufficient evidence does not exist to support 
a guilty verdict, whether or not independent corroboration is technically 
present.  Crim.R. 29;  State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 [574 N.E.2d 
 
22 
492].  Given these safeguards, which are adequate in virtually every other type 
of prosecution, but see R.C. 2923.01(H)(1), I have no reluctance in advocating 
the abolishment of the corroboration requirement of R.C. 2907.06 and leaving 
to the trial court, whose paramount obligation is always to see that justice is 
done, the initial responsibility of ensuring that a conviction for sexual 
imposition is based on sufficient evidence.”  State v. Economo (Dec. 18, 1994), 
Cuyahoga App. No. 66408, unreported, at 8-9 (Nugent, J., dissenting).  
 
I strongly recommend that the General Assembly eliminate this 
requirement of corroboration from R.C. 2907.06.  There already exist many 
safeguards to prevent abuse of prosecution, and the requirement of 
corroborative evidence is simply confusing and is an unnecessary protection. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion. 
 
PAINTER, J., dissenting.  R.C. 2907.06(B) states: “No person shall 
be convicted of a violation of this section solely upon the victim’s 
testimony unsupported by other evidence.”  We must follow the law as 
 
23 
written by the legislature, whether we like it or not.  The majority 
decision in effect removes this section from the books. 
 
The state agrues that R.C. 2907.06(B) requires only that the other 
evidence must tend to prove some material element of the offense, 
citing State v. Maranda (1916), 94 Ohio St. 364, 114 N.E. 1038.  In 
contrast, Economo argues that the other evidence must go to the nature 
or foundation of the crime.  State v. Fawn (1983), 12 Ohio App.3d 24, 
12 OBR 111, 465 N.E.2d 896.  We always must be guided by R.C. 
2901.04(A), which requires that “[s]ections of the Revised Code defining 
offenses or penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and 
liberally construed in favor of the accused.”  The majority opinion 
construes R.C. 2907.06(B) strictly against the accused, by construing it 
out of the law altogether.  By the standard promulgated today, it is 
difficult to imagine a case where the legislature’s enactment would be 
viable. 
 
24 
 
I would hold that if any evidence exists that in some way connects 
the defendant with the crime charged, then the R.C. 2907.06(B) 
threshold is crossed and the trier of fact can make a determination 
based on the credibility of the witnesses.  See, e.g., State v. Allsup 
(1980), 67 Ohio App.2d 131, 21 O.O.3d 439, 426 N.E.2d 499.  Here, the 
other evidence merely connects the defendant with his patient in a 
perfectly normal setting -- a clinical visit for treatment.  It no more 
connects the defendant with the crime of sexual imposition than an 
almanac would connect a defendant to a crime that happened in the 
daytime. 
 
Because the majority decision changes the statutory law by 
judicial fiat, I respectfully dissent. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.