Case Title: State v. Loop

Citation: 477 N.W.2d 40

Docket Number: 

State: south-dakota

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1991-10-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
477 N.W.2d 40 (1991) STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Gary Lynn LOOP, Defendant and Appellant. No. 17252. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Argued April 22, 1991. Decided October 30, 1991. *41 Mark Barnett, Atty. Gen., Pierre, Frank E. Geaghan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee. Cynthia Howard, Minnehaha County Public Defender, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellant. BERNDT, Circuit Judge. Gary Lynn Loop (Loop), was convicted of sexual contact with a minor child, (SDCL 22-22-7), and being an habitual offender. We affirm. In late October 1989, Loop met P.B., victim's mother. During the course of their brief relationship, Loop was introduced to the ten-year-old victim. On the evening of October 31, 1989, Loop went with P.B.'s family on their Halloween trick-or-treat rounds and accompanied the family to its home. Upon returning home that night, P.B. instructed the victim to take a bath and ready herself for bed. Before going to bed the victim went into the kitchen for a piece of candy. After she found the candy, she went into the living room where Loop was seated on the couch. Victim offered Loop some candy and then sat on his lap. While holding victim on his lap, Loop inserted his hand under the victim's nightshirt and fondled her breast. Because P.B. was talking on the telephone, the victim was not able to tell her what had happened. It was only after Loop left that victim approached her mother and explained he had touched her inappropriately. This matter was referred to law enforcement authorities; Loop denied all allegations of impropriety. Loop was arrested on a charge of sexual contact with a minor. A grand jury indictment was returned and Loop was arraigned on the principal charge and a Part II Habitual Offender Information. When the matter came on for trial Loop filed a number of motions in limine. Included among these was a motion to preclude evidence regarding his prior felony criminal record. The trial court ruled that the evidence of Loop's prior criminal convictions was more prejudicial than probative and thus, not admissible, subject to a later motion. During the course of the trial, Loop took the witness stand and denied ever having sexually molested the victim. At the close of defense counsel's direct examination of Loop, the following discourse took place: At that point, prior to the commencement of cross-examination of Loop, the state asked to approach the bench. The jury was excused and a brief recess was taken. While outside the presence of the jury, the state urged the court that it be allowed to question Loop concerning the specific nature of his prior felony convictions. In granting the state's request, the court found that: Pursuant to the court's holding, the state then cross-examined Loop: Loop contends on appeal that the trial court committed error based on the unduly prejudicial nature of the court's rulings relating to Loop's prior felony convictions. SDCL 19-14-12 states: See Rule 609(a), Fed.R.Evid. In this case, Loop took the witness stand and testified on direct examination that "[a] ten-year-old child wouldn't sexually gratify me." By way of this testimony, Loop represented to the trial court and the jury that he did not hold any affection or attraction toward young children. Accordingly, state's evidence about Loop's prior felony convictions was admissible to attack his credibility. In effect, Loop "opened the door" to this type of impeachment. State v. Byrum, 399 N.W.2d 334 (S.D.1987); State v. Thomas, 381 N.W.2d 232 (S.D.1986). "Rulings made under SDCL 19-14-12 are discretionary and the standard of review on appeal is that an abuse of discretion is required for reversible error." State v. Shult, 380 N.W.2d 352, 355 (S.D.1986); State v. King, 346 N.W.2d 750 (S.D.1984); State v. Dickson, 329 N.W.2d 630 (S.D.1983); State v. Cochrun, 328 N.W.2d 271 (S.D.1983); State v. Sahlie, 245 N.W.2d 476 (S.D.1976). The passage cited earlier from the trial court's ruling on this issue clearly shows that the trial court balanced the probative value of Loop's prior felony convictions against their prejudicial effect and made a finding that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighed the prejudice. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the trial court's admission of Loop's prior felony convictions.[*] Loop argues that there was simply no credible evidence from which the jury could have reasonably found that he was guilty of sexual contact with a minor. We do not agree. There was ample evidence to support his conviction. The victim in this case testified and the jury clearly found that the victim's testimony was more credible than that of Loop. We do not pass on the credibility of witnesses. State v. Blakey, 332 N.W.2d 729 (S.D.1983). We affirm the conviction. MILLER, C.J., and WUEST, HENDERSON and SABERS, JJ., concur. BERNDT, Circuit Judge, for AMUNDSON, J., disqualified. [*] Loop places great emphasis on State v. Chapin, 460 N.W.2d 420 (S.D.1990), in support of the proposition that his prior felony convictions should not have been admitted into evidence since they were "prior bad acts" and therefore inadmissable under SDCL 19-12-5. (404(b) Fed.R.Evid.) Defendant's reliance on Chapin is misplaced. This is not a 404(b) case because the evidence of Loop's prior felony convictions was clearly admissable under SDCL 19-14-12 to impeach his credibility.