Case Title: STATE v BRADFORD

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1978-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
No- 13828 I N THE S U P R M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- K E N N E T H W E N D E L L BRADFORD, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l District, Honorable H. W i l l i a m Coder, Jduge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For Appellant: Thomas A. Baiz, Jr. argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mike McCarter arqued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Fontana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana Randy Gray argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: January 30, 1978 Decided: FE6 2 2 1978 M r . Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court : Defendant was charged with three counts of aggravated assault i n the District Court, Cascade County. Two of the counts were dismissed by the District Court prior t o submission of the case t o the jury. The jury found the defendant guilty on the remaining count. Following denial of defendant's motion f o r a new t r i a l , he appeals t o t h i s Court. The county attorney, i n a single Information, charged de- fendant with three separate counts of aggravated assault involving use of a s m a l l automatic pistol, i n violation of section 94-5-202 i ( l ) ( c ) , R.C.M. 1947. The alleged offenses occurred on November 6, 1976, a t Calhoun's Saloon i n Black Eagle, Montana. Count I charged defendant with assaulting Steven Katsilas, the bartender, inside ~ a l h o u n ' s . Count I1 charged defendant with assaulting Devon Ladd, a customer, inside the saloon, by placing the barrel of the p i s t o l against Ladd's ribs. Count I11 charged defendant with assaulting Devon Ladd outside the saloon by f i r i n g three shots into Ladd's car as he was driving away. Defendant was t r i e d i n the District Court on March 7, 1977. The evidence pertaining t o Count I was direct evidence. Eye witnesses, including the victim, described the assault. Their testimony was that Steven Katsilas came around the bar t o help h i s wife, who was on the floor and being beaten by several other women. When he did t h i s , defendant came over t o Katsilas, h i t him i n the faee, put a small p i s t o l between h i s eyes and told him that i f he attempted t o interfere, he would be shot. A t the time of t r i a l , Devon Ladd, the victim of the other two assaults, could not be located t o appear and t e s t i f y . With- out h i s testimony, the State introduced no evidence on Count 11. The State's evidence on Count 111 was circumstantial. Witnesses who were in the bar that night testified Ladd was in the bar during the assault on Katsilas and left as it ended. The testimony indicated defendant followed Ladd out the door of the bar and within seconds, two witnesses, still inside the bar, heard three shots. Two witnesses, who had observed Devon Ladd's car earlier in the evening, testified there were no nicks or holes on the driver's side of the car. These witnesses and a sheriff's deputy testified that following the incidents at Calhoun's three bullet marks were found on the car. The deputy took photographs of the marks and these photogrqhs were admitted into evidence. The investigating officers found three .25 caliber shell casings in the parking lot and they were admitted into evidence. Witnesses testified that when Ladd returned to the bar with the police, approximately ten minutes after leaving, he appeared shaken, flushed, and his hair was messed up. Tom Whitehead, Calhoun's swamper, testified that he was just regaining consciousness after being knocked out when Ladd re-entered the bar with the police and, as he came in, Ladd told him that someone had shot at his car. Defendant's objections to the introduction of the photographs and shell casings into evidence and to White- head's testimony concerning Ladd's statement to him were all overruled. ~efendant's objection to the admission of Whitehead's testimony on Ladd's statement was that the statement was hearsay. The District Court admitted the testimony as falling within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. Defendant objected to the admission of the photographs and shell casings, arguing there was a lack of proper foundation for their admission. He further argued that t h i s physical evidence was inadmissible under section 93-1301-7(32), R.C.M. 1947, which he claims s t a t e s that a thing once shown t o e x i s t relates forward but not backward i n time. A t the close of the s t a t e ' s case-in-chief, defendant moved f o r a mistrial, which was denied. He then moved that a l l counts be dismissed. Defendant argued that the s t a t e , on Counts I1 and 1 1 1 , failed t o prove reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury on the part of the victim, Devon Ladd, an element of the crimes charged. Regarding Count I, defendant argued the s t a t e failed t o prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The District Court, a f t e r hearing the arguments of counse1,dismissed Counts I1 and 1 1 1 on the grounds there was insufficient evidence t o prove reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury on the part of Ladd . Defendant then res ted . Count I was submitted t o the jury. The jury was admonished t o disregard the photographs and s h e l l casings (which related only t o Count I I I ) , a s though they were never admitted into evidence. The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated assault on Count I. After the verdict was entered, defendant moved for a directed verdict, i.e. judgment notwithstanding the verdict, on the ground that the jury verdict w a s contrary t o the weight of evidence. In the alternative, defendant moved f o r a mistrial on the grounds that the physical evidence and testimony admitted under Count 1 1 1 w e r e highly prejudicial and misled the jury on Count I. These motions were denied. Defendant then f i l e d a motion f o r a new t r i a l , which was argued on April 7, 1977. The motion was denied. O n April 8, 1977, the court imposed sentence on defendant of three years imprisonment, with a l l but s i x months suspended. Defenaant was ordered t o serve the s i x months i n the Cascade County j a i l , with credit for time already served. Execution of the sentence has been stayed pending t h i s appeal. The sole issue on appeal i s whether the s t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o dismiss Counts I1 and 1 1 1 prior t o the beginning of the t r i a l , when they knew Devon Ladd, the victim, would not be present t o t e s t i f y , denied defendant a f a i r t r i a l . Defendant' s contention is that the evidence which was admitted on Count I11 misled the jury on Count I. H e argues that when the prosecution knew Devon Ladd would not be present a t the t r i a l , i t should have dismissed Counts I1 and 1 1 1 . According t o defendant its failure t o do so was prejudicial error. Finally he argues that certain evidence on Count I11 was inadmissible. The rule applicable i s that before a judgment i n a criminal case w i l l be reversed, prejudice must be shown. State v. Totterdell, (1959), 135 Mont. 56, 336 P.2d 696; State v. Hay, (1948), 120 Mont. 573, 194 P.2d 232. Prejudice i n a criminal case w i l l not be presumed, but rather must appear from the denial o r invasion of a substantial right from which the law implies prejudice. The defendant must demonstrate prejudice from the record. State v. Schleining, (1965), 146 Mont. 1, 403 P.2d 625. The defendant i n a criminal case has the right t o a f a i r t r i a l . It is axiomatic that prejudice can be implied from the denial o r invasion of that right. However, the defendant must show that h i s right t o a f a i r t r i a l was denied or invaded. W e hold, i n the instant case, that defendant's right t o a f a i r t r i a l was neither denied nor invaded. Defendant has not convinced us the s t a t e ' s failure t o dismiss Counts I1 and I11 prior t o t r i a l prejudiced him on Count I. W e might agree with defendant that the prosecution should have dismissed Count I1 when they knew that Devon Ladd would not be a t the t r i a l , however, since no evidence was introduced on t h i s count, w e f a i l t o see how defendant was prejudiced by the s t a t e ' s failure t o dismiss prior t o t r i a l . W e believe that the evidence admitted on Count 1 1 1 could not have misled the jury on Count I. The alleged assault i n Count I occurred inside the bar, with the bartender a s the victim; the alleged assault i n Count 1 1 1 occurred outside the bar with Devon Ladd a s the victim. Thus, the evidence on each of these counts was d i s t i n c t and independent of the other. The jury could easily keep the incidents and the evidence separate. Furthermore, the s t a t e had a right t o attempt to prove Count 1 1 1 by circumstantial evidence. This Court has held that whatever may be established by direct evidence i n a criminal case may also be established by circumstantial evidence. State v. Cor, (1964), 144 Mont. 323, 396 P.2d 86. The photographs, s h e l l casings, and testimony of Whitehead a s t o Ladd's statement a r e circumstantial evidence. Defendant argues t h a t , even i f circumstantial evidence can be used i n a criminal case, t h i s evidence was inadmissible and, therefore, prejudicial. The v i t a l i t y of t h i s contention i s l o s t i n our holding that the evidence was admissible. Circumstantial evidence, to be admissible, must be relevant, competent and material. State v. Fitzpatrick, (1973), 163 Mont. 220, 516 P.2d 605. The evidence the state offered and had admitted on Count I11 was relevant, material and competent as to that count. Whitehead's testimony about Ladd's statement to him was admissible under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. State v. Medicine Bull, Jr., (1968), 152 Mont. 34, 445 P.2d 916. The photographs of Ladd's car and shell casings were also admissible. Defendant' s reliance on section 93-1301-7(32), R . C . M . 1947, as construed in Doran v. United States Building and Loan Assn., (1933), 94 Mont. 73, 20 P.2d 835, is misplaced. That statute and case deal with disputable presumptions. Here, we are dealing with circumstantial evidence tending to prove that an assault was committed upon Devon Ladd. The admission of the evidence relating to Count 111 did not prejudice defendant on Count I even though Count I11 was subsequently dismissed. The court instructed the jury to disregard this evidence, which we believe sufficient under the facts of this case. An error in the admission of evidence can sometimes be cured by an admonition to disregard the evidence. Brown v. United States, (1967), 380 F.2d 477, cert. den. 390 U . S . 962, 8 8 S.Ct. 1062, 1 9 L ed 2d 1158. The striking of erroneously admitted evidence and admd.shing the jury to disregard it serves to cure the error. United States v. Rojas, (1976), 537 F.2d 216. Such is the case here. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. Justice We Concur: - Justices.