Case Title: State v. Comer

Citation: 2003-Ohio-4165

Docket Number: 20020351 and 20020422

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463, 2003-Ohio-4165.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. COMER, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463, 2003-Ohio-4165.] 
Criminal procedure — Penalties and sentencing — Pursuant to R.C. 
2929.14(E)(4) and 2929.19(B)(2)(c), when imposing consecutive 
sentences, trial court required to make its statutorily enumerated 
findings and give reasons supporting those findings — Pursuant to R.C. 
2929.14(B), when imposing a nonminimum sentence on a first offender, 
trial court required to make its statutorily sanctioned findings at 
sentencing hearing. 
(Nos. 2002-0351 and 2002-0422 — Submitted March 12, 2003 — Decided 
August 27, 2003.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-
99-1296, 2002-Ohio-233. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 2929.19(B)(2)(c), when imposing 
consecutive sentences, a trial court is required to make its statutorily 
enumerated findings and give reasons supporting those findings at the 
sentencing hearing. 
2.  Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B), when imposing a nonminimum sentence on a 
first offender, a trial court is required to make its statutorily sanctioned 
findings at the sentencing hearing. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J. 
{¶1} 
In July 1999, a jury convicted appellant, Jerry Comer Jr., for 
murder and aggravated robbery, both committed in November 1997.  The trial 
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court imposed consecutive sentences of 15 years to life for the murder and 7 years 
for the aggravated robbery.  Rather than state its findings or reasons for the 
sentences at the sentencing hearing, the court later explained in a journal entry: 
{¶2} 
“The Court finds pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B) that the shortest 
prison term possible will demean the seriousness of the offense AND will not 
adequately protect the public and therefore imposes a greater term. 
{¶3} 
“* * * 
{¶4} 
“Being necessary to fulfill the purposes of R.C. 2929.11, and not 
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct or the danger the 
offender poses and the Court FURTHER FINDS:  the harm caused was great or 
unusual.”  (Capitalization sic.) 
{¶5} 
Initially, appellant filed an appeal from his convictions, raising a 
single issue concerning jury instructions.  The appellate court rejected his 
argument and affirmed his convictions.  This court denied jurisdiction.  State v. 
Comer (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 1428, 741 N.E.2d 892.  Thereafter, appellant filed a 
motion in the court of appeals to reopen his appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B) and 
State v. Murnahan (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204.  The appellate 
court granted appellant’s application for reopening. 
{¶6} 
On appeal, appellant argued that appellate counsel was ineffective 
for failing to raise the trial court’s error in sentencing him to consecutive and 
nonminimum prison terms without making the necessary findings on the record at 
the sentencing hearing.  The court of appeals rejected appellant’s argument, 
finding that a trial court may make the requisite findings either at the sentencing 
hearing or in its judgment entry on sentencing. 
{¶7} 
The court of appeals considered the oral statements made by the 
trial court at the sentencing hearing and the written journal entry.  Taking these 
statements together, the appellate court concluded that the trial court had made the 
appropriate findings to justify the imposition of consecutive sentences and a 
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3 
nonminimum prison term.  Therefore, the appellate court found that appellate 
counsel was not deficient in the performance of her duties.  However, the court 
certified its decision as being in conflict with State v. Williams (2000), 136 Ohio 
App.3d 570, 737 N.E.2d 139. 
{¶8} 
This cause is now before the court upon our determination that a 
conflict exists and pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
{¶9} 
This appeal presents two separate issues concerning appellant’s 
sentences.  Appellant challenges (1) the imposition of consecutive sentences and 
(2) the imposition of a nonminimum sentence for the aggravated robbery count.  
Appellant further asserts that his appellate counsel was ineffective because of her 
failure to raise these issues in his first appeal.  We decline to hold that appellate 
counsel was deficient in the performance of her duties.  The law in Ohio was 
unsettled on these issues, and the sentences pronounced by the trial court were in 
line with case law in the appellate district at the time this appeal was argued.  
Counsel cannot be faulted for failing to predict that the law would change.  
However, we find appellant’s arguments concerning his sentences meritorious.  
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the matter 
to the trial court for resentencing. 
{¶10} R.C. 2929.14 and 2929.19 are the statutes we are asked to 
construe.  These laws were originally enacted as part of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 in 
1996.  S.B. 2, which represents the first major criminal reform bill since 1974, 
was signed into law on August 10, 1995, and became effective in 1996.  Griffin & 
Katz, Ohio Felony Sentencing Law (2002) 1.  This comprehensive bill changed 
the definitions of crimes and the sentencing system.  Id.  The law now provides 
precise guidance for criminal sentencing within clearly defined constraints.  
Painter, Appellate Review Under the New Felony Sentencing Guidelines:  Where 
Do We Stand?  (1999), 47 Cleve.St.L.Rev. 533, 537-538.  Pursuant to R.C. 
2929.11 through 2929.19, the trial court must follow an articulated process when 
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determining a sentence.  The individual provisions of the sentencing scheme may 
not be read alone.  Painter, supra, 47 Cleve.St.L.Rev. at 538.  Additionally, the 
law accords meaningful review of these sentencing decisions by the appellate 
courts.  “Meaningful review” means that an appellate court hearing an appeal of a 
felony sentence may modify or vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the 
trial court for resentencing if the court clearly and convincingly finds that the 
record does not support the sentence or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to 
law.  R.C. 2953.08; Griffin & Katz, Ohio Felony Sentencing Law, supra, 791-796, 
Sections 9.19-9.20. 
{¶11} When imposing a felony sentence, the trial court must consider the 
overriding purposes of felony sentencing, which are to protect the public from 
future crime and to punish the offender.  R.C. 2929.11(A).  To achieve these 
purposes, a court “shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, 
deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, 
and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.”  Id. 
{¶12} Additionally, the law requires that a sentence imposed for a felony 
shall be reasonably calculated to achieve the purposes of felony sentencing, 
“commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s 
conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for 
similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”  R.C. 2929.11(B).  Finally, a trial 
court shall not impose a sentence based on the race, ethnicity, gender, or religion 
of the offender.  R.C. 2929.11(C). 
{¶13} The trial court must consider the factors found in R.C. 2929.12(B) 
and (C) to determine how to accomplish the purposes embraced in R.C. 2929.11.  
A court may not impose consecutive sentences for multiple offenses unless it 
“finds” three statutory factors.  R.C. 2929.14(E)(4).  First, the court must find that 
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime or to 
punish the offender.  Id.  Second, the court must find that consecutive sentences 
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are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the 
danger the offender poses to the public.  Id.  Third, the court must find the 
existence of one of the enumerated circumstances in R.C. 2929.14(E)(4)(a) 
through (c).1 
{¶14} A trial court must also comply with R.C. 2929.19(B) when 
imposing consecutive sentences.  R.C. 2929.19 is the statute governing the 
sentencing hearing.  R.C. 2929.19(B)(2) provides that the sentencing court “shall 
impose a sentence and shall make a finding that gives its reasons for selecting the 
sentence imposed in any of the following circumstances: 
{¶15} “* * * 
{¶16} “(c)  If it imposes consecutive sentences under [R.C.] 2929.14 * * 
*.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶17} Appellant contends that according to R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 
2929.19(B)(2)(c), the trial court’s findings and reasons for consecutive sentences 
must be given at the sentencing hearing.  The state contends, and the court of 
appeals found, that the findings and reasons can be made orally at the sentencing 
hearing or in written form in the journal entry. 
{¶18} There is a split of authority in the lower courts on this issue.  See  
State v. Perkins, Cuyahoga App. No. 81547, 2003-Ohio-656, 2003 WL 303090; 
State v. Martin (1999), 136 Ohio App.3d 355, 362, 736 N.E.2d 907; State v. 
                                          
 
1. 
{¶a} 
The criteria to be considered by a sentencing court before imposing consecutive 
prison terms are listed in R.C. 2929.14.  In 1997, when the crimes were committed, R.C. 
2929.14(E)(4) provided: 
{¶b} 
“(a) The offender committed the multiple offenses while the offender was 
awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to * * * [R.C.] 2929.16, 
2929.17, or 2929.18 * * *, or was under post-release control for a prior offense. 
{¶c} 
“(b) The harm caused by the multiple offenses was so great or unusual that no 
single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of a single course of conduct 
adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct. 
 
{¶d} 
“(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive 
sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.”  147 Ohio Laws, 
Part I, 468-469. 
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Williams, 136 Ohio App.3d 570, 737 N.E.2d 139 (findings and reasons must be 
stated on the record at the sentencing hearing).  Compare State v. Blackman, 
Lucas App. No. L-01-1349, 2003-Ohio-2216, 2003 WL 2007105; State v. Koch 
(Dec. 21, 2001), Lake App. No. 97-L-142, 2001 WL 1647214 (findings and 
reasons can be made at the sentencing hearing or in the journal entry).  For the 
following reasons, we adhere to those decisions which hold that the court must 
orally make its findings and state its reasons on the record at the sentencing 
hearing. 
{¶19} Lower courts have correctly and consistently found that the 
requirement that a court give its reasons for selecting consecutive sentences is 
separate and distinct from the duty to make the findings.  State v. Grider (2001), 
144 Ohio App.3d 323, 326-327, 760 N.E.2d 40; State v. Zwiebel (Aug. 29, 2000), 
Franklin App. No. 00AP-61, 2000 WL 1221017; State v. Winland (Jan. 26, 2000), 
Wayne App. No. 99CA0029, 2000 WL 113052. 
{¶20} Turning now to the statutes at issue, we hold that R.C. 2929.19 
clearly prescribes what a trial judge must do and say at a felony sentencing 
hearing.  The statute specifies what can be considered at a hearing and what a trial 
court must do before sentencing the defendant.  Moreover, it is at the sentencing 
hearing that the court “shall impose a sentence and shall make a finding that gives 
its reasons for selecting the sentence imposed” for consecutive sentences under 
R.C. 2929.14.  R.C. 2929.19(B)(2) and (B)(2)(c).  We find the intent of the statute 
to be clear.  Thus, we hold that pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 
2929.19(B)(2)(c), when imposing consecutive sentences, a trial court is required 
to make the statutorily enumerated findings and give reasons supporting those 
findings at the sentencing hearing. 
{¶21} Moreover, requiring the court to make these findings and give its 
reasons at the sentencing hearing comports with case law and with the purposes 
and intent of S.B. 2.  Consecutive sentences are reserved for the worst offenses 
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and offenders.  State v. Boland (2002), 147 Ohio App.3d 151, 162, 768 N.E.2d 
1250.  Consistency and proportionality are hallmarks of the new sentencing law.  
Griffin & Katz, Sentencing Consistency:  Basic Principles Instead of Numerical 
Grids:  The Ohio Plan (2002), 53 Case W.Res.L.Rev. 1, 12.  While consecutive 
sentences are permissible under the law, a trial court must clearly align each 
rationale with the specific finding to support its decision to impose consecutive 
sentences.  These findings and reasons must be articulated by the trial court so an 
appellate court can conduct a meaningful review of the sentencing decision. 
Griffin & Katz, Ohio Felony Sentencing Law, supra, at 458-459, Section 1.21. 
{¶22} Finally, our holding has a practical application as well.  All 
interested parties are present at the hearing.  Thus, an in-court explanation gives 
counsel the opportunity to correct obvious errors.  Moreover, an in-court 
explanation encourages judges to decide how the statutory factors apply to the 
facts of the case.  If these important findings and reasons were not given until the 
journal entry there is the danger that they might be viewed as after-the-fact 
justifications.  See, e.g., State v. Riggs (Oct. 11, 2000), Summit App. No. 19846, 
2000 WL 1507914 (Whitmore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
{¶23} Our review of the record reveals that the trial court neither made its 
mandatory findings nor gave its reasons for imposing the consecutive sentences 
on the record at the sentencing hearing.  Therefore, we reverse the court of 
appeals’ decision, vacate the consecutive sentences, and remand this cause to the 
trial court for resentencing. 
{¶24} Appellant also contends that the sentence imposed by the trial 
court for the aggravated robbery count did not accord with R.C. 2929.14(B) 
regarding minimum sentences. 
{¶25} The offense of aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree 
(R.C. 2911.01[C]) calls for a range of sentences.  With certain exceptions not 
relevant here, R.C. 2929.14(A)(1) mandates a definite term of imprisonment of 
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three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, or ten years for a felony of the first 
degree.  At the time of the offense, R.C. 2929.14(B) provided that “if the offender 
previously has not served a prison term, the court shall impose the shortest prison 
term authorized for the offense pursuant to division (A) of this section, unless the 
court finds on the record that the shortest prison term will demean the seriousness 
of the offender’s conduct or will not adequately protect the public from future 
crime by the offender or others.”  147 Ohio Laws, Part I, 465. 
{¶26} Here, appellant, a first-time offender, was given a seven-year 
sentence; clearly, this is not the minimum sentence for aggravated robbery.  While 
this term fit within the range of sentences permissible under the law, R.C. 
2929.14(B), now (B)(2), required the court to make certain findings “on the 
record.”  Appellant argues that “on the record” means that the trial court was 
required to make its findings at the sentencing hearing.2  We agree.  In State v. 
Edmonson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326, 715 N.E.2d 131, we interpreted this 
phrase “to mean that unless a court imposes the shortest term authorized on a 
felony offender who has never served a prison term, the record of the sentencing 
hearing must reflect that the court found that either or both of the two statutorily 
sanctioned reasons for exceeding the minimum term warranted the longer 
sentence.”  (Emphasis added.)  Also, we hold that the rationale supporting our 
holding that findings and reasons must be given by the court before imposing 
consecutive sentences at the sentencing hearing applies with equal force to the 
length of sentences.  Therefore, we construe “on the record” to mean that oral 
findings must be made at the sentencing hearing.  Accordingly, we hold that 
pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B), when imposing a nonminimum sentence on a first 
                                          
 
2. 
R.C. 2929.14(B) does not require that the court give its reasons for finding that the 
seriousness of the offense will be demeaned or the public not adequately protected if a minimum 
sentence is imposed.  State v. Edmonson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 715 N.E.2d 131, syllabus. 
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offender, a trial court is required to make its statutorily sanctioned findings on the 
record at the sentencing hearing. 
{¶27} Here, the trial court did not make its statutory findings on the 
record at the sentencing hearing.  We reverse the judgment of the appellate court, 
vacate the sentence for aggravated robbery, and remand the cause to the trial court 
for resentencing. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., CARR and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
GRADY, LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., dissent. 
 
DONNA J. CARR, J., of the Ninth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, J. 
 
THOMAS J. GRADY, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for COOK, 
J. 
__________________ 
 
GRADY, J., dissenting. 
{¶28} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision.  Neither R.C. 
2929.14(E)(4), which is wholly silent on the matter, nor R.C. 2929.19(B)(2), 
which is at most ambiguous, evidences an intent on the General Assembly’s part 
to require a sentencing court, at the sentencing hearing, to orally pronounce the 
findings those sections require the court to make and its reasons for certain of 
those findings.  Rather, as the court of appeals held, the sentencing court may 
comply with those statutory mandates either at the sentencing hearing by oral 
pronouncement or in the court’s journalized judgment of conviction, the latter 
being both the preferred and the better method of compliance. 
{¶29} R.C. 2929.14 and 2929.19 are among those sections of the Revised 
Code that the General Assembly enacted in 1995 in Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, upon the 
recommendation of the Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission.  146 Ohio Laws, 
Part IV, 7464, 7485.  The commission’s charge, as set out in R.C. 181.24(A), was 
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to recommend a comprehensive sentencing structure “designed to enhance public 
safety, to assist in the management of prison overcrowding and correctional 
resources, to simplify the sentencing structure of the state that is in existence on 
August 22, 1990, and to result in a new sentencing structure that is readily 
understandable by the citizens of the state, to simplify the criminal code of the 
state, to assure proportionality, uniformity, and other fairness in criminal 
sentencing, and to provide increased certainty in criminal sentencing.”  R.C. 
181.24(B) sets out a set of more specific goals consistent with those purposes.  
None of the provisions of R.C. 181.24 can reasonably be construed as intended to 
confer substantive rights on offenders.  Its object is economy, and the mechanisms 
the General Assembly ultimately enacted into law on the commission’s 
recommendations are wholly procedural. 
{¶30} Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution confers on the 
Supreme Court the power to prescribe rules of practice and procedure, and further 
provides that “[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or 
effect after such rules have taken effect.”  This court has generally required a 
direct conflict before holding a statute void pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV.  
That narrow application may have encouraged the General Assembly to enact 
procedural requirements governing matters for which the rules of practice and 
procedure do not expressly provide.  Some would argue for a broader 
interpretation of the conflict analysis.  Even if one is not adopted, the separation-
of-powers principle underlying Section 5(B) should incline the courts against 
finding an intent on the General Assembly’s part to enact a procedural 
requirement unless that intent is plainly expressed.  A more relaxed standard can 
readily thwart the careful distribution of powers between the branches of 
government set out in the Constitution by the people of Ohio, who, after all, are 
sovereign. 
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{¶31} Crim.R. 43(A) specifically mandates the defendant’s presence at 
the sentencing hearing.  Crim.R. 32(A) requires the court to impose sentence at 
the hearing and sets out procedures the court must follow.  None of those 
procedures requires the court to orally pronounce the particular findings and 
reasons that R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 2929.19(B)(2) now require the court to make 
with respect to the sentence the court imposes. 
{¶32} Crim.R. 32(C) requires the court to state the “verdict or findings” 
on which a criminal conviction is founded in its written judgment of conviction 
and sentence.  The rule further provides: “A judgment is effective only when 
entered on the journal by the clerk.” 
{¶33} R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) requires a court to make certain findings when 
consecutive sentences are imposed, but it does not specify in what phase of the 
criminal proceeding or where on the record the court must state its findings.  The 
word “findings,” as it appears in Crim.R. 32(C), might comfortably permit the 
court to employ its written judgment of conviction and sentence to state the 
particular findings and reasons that R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) requires the court to 
make.  Indeed, as between the journalized entry and the court’s spoken opinion, 
preference should be given to the journalized judgment, because the court speaks 
only through its journal.  Andrews v. Bd. of Liquor Control (1955), 164 Ohio St. 
275, 58 O.O. 51, 131 N.E.2d 390, paragraph three of the syllabus.  On that same 
rationale, there is no sound basis instead to require the court to state its findings 
and reasons in its spoken opinion, and no reason at all to read that requirement 
into R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) when it is wholly silent on the matter. 
{¶34} The majority finds support for the requirement it imposes in the 
terms of R.C. 2929.19(B)(2), which states:  “The court shall impose a sentence 
and shall make a finding that gives its reasons for selecting the sentence imposed 
in any of the following circumstances,” identifying five.  Notably, that section 
omits the directive preamble, “[a]t the sentencing hearing,” which appears in 
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paragraph (B)(1), immediately preceding.  Nor does it require the court to notify 
the defendant of certain things, as does paragraph (B)(3) of R.C. 2929.19, 
immediately following, expressly and in multiple subparagraphs. 
{¶35} A positive inference cannot be drawn from legislative silence.  The 
canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing suggests the 
exclusion of others) supports a negative implication that the General Assembly 
instead intended not to require a sentencing court to orally pronounce the findings 
and/or reasons which R.C. 2929.19(B)(2) mandates, at the sentencing hearing, 
when the General Assembly enacted other paragraphs of R.C. 2929.19(B) 
pertaining to that hearing that impose that very form of requirement in direct and 
express terms. 
{¶36} The only potential basis for requiring a court to orally pronounce 
its findings and/or reasons from the bench at the sentencing hearing is the title 
given to R.C. 2929.19 as it appears in published versions of the Revised Code.  
The caption typically reads: “Sentencing hearing.”  However, such captions are 
not a part of the legislation enacted by the General Assembly creating sections of 
the Revised Code.  R.C. 1.01.  They are mere topical references added by the 
publishing houses to guide the reader about what the section concerns.  The 
heading is therefore of no guidance in discerning the intent of the General 
Assembly when it enacted R.C. 2929.19(B)(2). 
{¶37} The General Assembly’s intent is evident from the portion of R.C. 
181.24(A) quoted above, identifying the goals of the Ohio Criminal Sentencing 
Commission.  In both R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 2929.19(B)(2), the General 
Assembly adopted the commission’s recommendations by devising a regime to 
guide the court’s exercise of its discretion in the circumstances concerned by 
requiring the court to articulate its calculus with respect to those matters.  The 
General Assembly expressed no preference for where and how that must be done, 
just that it be done in relation to the sentence the court imposes, and on the record.  
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However, and in view of the long-standing rule that a court speaks only through 
its journal, as well as the fact that the judgment is effective only when it is 
journalized, it is reasonable to infer that the General Assembly assumed that the 
required findings and reasons could be stated in the court’s journalized judgment 
of conviction and sentence, and not necessarily at the sentencing hearing by way 
of an oral pronouncement, as the majority has held. 
{¶38} The majority finds that requiring oral pronouncements at the 
sentencing hearing also has certain practical benefits.  With all due respect, I 
believe that those benefits are outweighed by the resulting impracticalities.  If the 
sentencing court then repeats its findings or reasons in the journalized entry, any 
conflict between the two must be resolved in favor of the journal, and the spoken 
opinion disregarded.  Andrews v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 164 Ohio St. 275, 58 
O.O. 51, 131 N.E.2d 390, paragraph three of the syllabus.  That result would 
effectively nullify the requirement imposed here.  In all likelihood, courts will 
therefore wholly abandon the practice of stating findings and reasons in the 
judgment entry, making appellate review pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G) of these 
and other sentencing issues, which is likewise a product of the Ohio Criminal 
Sentencing Commission’s recommendations, more problematic.  And more 
appeals will be likely; the recitations these sections require are complex, and 
verbal fumbles are not uncommon, as anyone who has read his or her own 
remarks in a transcript can attest.  If a “substantial compliance” doctrine then 
comes to be applied, the General Assembly’s ultimate purpose, which is to require 
a form of substantiation that promotes conformity with the policies and purposes 
of sentencing which the General Assembly has set out by statute, will be 
undermined. 
{¶39} R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 2929.19(B)(2) merely require the court to 
make the mandated findings and to state its reasons for certain of those findings 
on the record.  The court’s principal record is its journal; its spoken opinion is but 
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secondary, a point of reference available to resolve any ambiguity in the 
journalized judgment.  Andrews.  The General Assembly’s policy and purposes 
are wholly satisfied when the required findings and reasons are set out in the 
judgment entry of conviction.  Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals, which held that the required statements may be made either 
orally, at the sentencing hearing, or in the written judgment of conviction, in order 
to satisfy the requirements that those sections impose.  That holding would render 
the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in appellant’s second proposition of 
law moot, and I would reject it on that basis. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur in the foregoing 
dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Craig T. Pearson, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
__________________