Case Title: MacPherson v. DAS

Citation: 

Docket Number: S52875

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  February 21, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
HECTOR MACPHERSON;
BANNOCKBURN FARMS, INC.; CLACKAMAS COUNTY FARM BUREAU;
LINN COUNTY FARM BUREAU; WASHINGTON COUNTY FARM BUREAU;
MARION COUNTY FARM BUREAU; YAMHILL COUNTY FARM BUREAU;
DAVID T. ADAMS; MARK TIPPERMAN; JAMES D. GILBERT;
NORTHWOODS NURSERY, INC.; DAVID A. VANASCHE;
KEITH FISHBACK; FISHBACK NURSERY, INC.; JACK CHAPIN
and 1000 FRIENDS OF OREGON,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES,
Risk Management Division,
by and through Laurie Warner, its Acting Director;
LAND CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION,
Department of Land Conservation and Development,
by and through Lane Shetterly, its Director;
and THE STATE OF OREGON DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
by and through its Attorney General, Hardy Myers,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
CLACKAMAS COUNTY;
MARION COUNTY;
and WASHINGTON COUNTY,
Defendants,
and
BARBARA PRETE;
EUGENE PRETE;
DOROTHY ENGLISH;
HOWARD MEREDITH;
and JACKSON COUNTY;
Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants.
(CC No. 05C10444; SC S52875)
En Banc
On direct review of the General Judgment and Order dated
October 24, 2005, filed in Marion County Circuit Court, Mary
Mertens James, Judge.
Argued and submitted January 10, 2006.
Russell L. Baldwin, Lincoln City, argued the cause and filed
the briefs for appellant Howard Meredith.
Michael D. Jewett, Jackson County Counsel, Medford, argued
the cause and filed the brief for intervenor-appellant Jackson
County.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for appellants Department of Administrative Services, Land
Conservation and Development Commission, and The State of Oregon
Department of Justice.  With her on the briefs were Hardy Myers,
Attorney General, Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, Stephanie
Striffler, Special Counsel to the Attorney General, Erika Hadlock
and Kaye E. McDonald, Assistant Attorneys General.
James L. Huffman, pro hac vice, Tigard, argued the cause for
intervenor-appellants Barbara Prete, Eugene Prete, and Dorothy
English.  With him on the brief were Ross A. Day and David J.
Hunnicutt.
Todd S. Baran, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondents.
John M. Groen, of Groen Stephens & Klinge, LLP, Bellevue,
Washington, and Russell C. Brooks, Andrew C. Cook, Pacific Legal
Foundation, Bellevue, Washington, filed a brief on behalf of
amicus curiae Pacific Legal Foundation.
David B. Smith, Tigard, filed a brief on behalf of amici
curiae Dennis Rasmussen, Harvey Kempema, and Charles Hoff.
David J. Hunnicutt, Tigard, filed a brief on behalf of amici
curiae Oregon Cattlemen's Association, Oregon State Grange, and
Oregonians in Action.
Edward H. Trompke, of Jordan Schrader PC, Portland, filed a
brief on behalf of amici curiae National Association of Home
Builders and Oregon Home Builders Association.
Glenn Klein, of Harrang Long Gary Rudnick, PC, Eugene, filed
a brief on behalf of amicus curiae League of Oregon Cities.
Jason T. Elder, of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, Hong
Kong, and Carter G. Phillips, Jay T. Jorgensen, and Brian R.
Matsui, of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, Washington, DC, and
Scott A. LaGanga, Property rights Alliance, Washington, DC, filed
a brief on behalf of amici curiae Property Rights Alliance,
American Association of Small Property Owners, Americans for Tax
Reform, American Land Rights Association, Bluegrass Institute for
Public Policy Solutions, Citizens Against Government Waste,
Citizens' Alliance for Property Rights, Defenders of Property
Rights, Illinois Policy Institute, National Center for Public
Policy Research, National Taxpayers Union, Oregon Livestock
Producers Association, Small Business and Entrepreneurship
Council, and The American Family Business Institute.
Dorothy S. Cofield, Cofield Law Office, Lake Oswego, filed a
brief on behalf of amicus curiae Washington Legal Foundation.
Richard M. Stephens, of Groen Stephens & Klinge LLP,
Bellevue, Washington, and William H. Mellor, Jeffrey T. Rowes,
Institute for Justice, Arlington, Virginia, and William R.
Maurer, Institute for Justice, Washington Chapter, Seattle,
Washington, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Institute
for Justice.
Edward J. Sullivan and Carrie A. Richter, of Garvey Schubert
Barer, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amici curiae Oregon
Chapter of the American Planning Association and the American
Planning Association.  With them on the
brief was Lisa Gramp.
Charles F. Hinkle, ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc.,
Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae ACLU
Foundation of Oregon, Inc.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case
is remanded for entry of judgment in favor of defendants and 
intervenors.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
In this case, we are required to determine the
constitutionality of Ballot Measure 37 (2004), a statutory
enactment that the people approved at the 2004 General
Election. (1) The measure requires government to either
compensate landowners for reductions of real property fair
market value due to certain "land use regulation[s]" or modify,
remove, or not apply such regulations. (2)  Plaintiffs filed
the present declaratory judgment action in circuit court pursuant
to ORS 28.020 and ORS 250.044, (3) seeking to invalidate
Measure 37 on various state and federal constitutional grounds. 
The trial court agreed with plaintiffs, concluding that Measure
37 (1) impermissibly intruded on the legislature's plenary power;
(2) violated the equal privileges and immunities guarantee of the
Oregon Constitution; (3) impermissibly suspended the laws in
violation of the Oregon Constitution; (4) violated the separation
of powers principles of the Oregon Constitution; and (5) violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.  As a result, the trial court declared
Measure 37 invalid and entered judgment for plaintiffs. 
Defendants and intervenors appealed to this court pursuant to ORS
250.044(5).  After considering all the parties' arguments on
appeal, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.  
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In general, Measure 37 requires state and local
governments to compensate private property owners for the
reduction in the fair market value of their real property that
results from any land use regulations of those governmental
entities that restrict the use of the subject properties.  As an
alternative to the requirement of compensation, however, Measure
37 allows state and local governments to "modify, remove or not *
* * apply the land use regulation or land use regulations to
allow the owner to use the property for a use permitted at the
time the owner acquired the property."  ORS 197.352(8).  Measure
37 limits compensation and relief from land use regulations to
property owners who acquired their property prior to the
enactment of the land use regulations that provide the basis for
their claims.  The people enacted Measure 37 through the
initiative process at the 2004 General Election, and the measure
became effective on December 2, 2004.
On January 14, 2005, plaintiffs filed the present
action, pursuant to ORS 28.020 and ORS 250.044, challenging the
validity of Measure 37.  Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the
measure was unconstitutional based on several provisions of both
the Oregon Constitution and the United States Constitution.
Plaintiffs named as defendants the Department of Administrative
Services, the Land Conservation and Development Commission, and
the Department of Justice (collectively, "defendants"). (4) 
Five parties also intervened as defendants in the action,
including the chief petitioners for the initiative petition that
ultimately was certified to the ballot as Measure 37
(collectively, "intervenors"). (5)
Before the trial court, the parties moved for summary
judgment respecting plaintiffs' constitutional challenges. 
Intervenors also raised arguments regarding plaintiffs' standing
to challenge Measure 37 and other aspects of justiciability. 
Following a hearing on September 13, 2005, the trial court issued
a written opinion granting plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment and denying the summary judgment motions filed by
defendants and intervenors; the trial court also rejected
intervenors' arguments regarding standing and justiciability.  In
so ruling, the trial court accepted certain of plaintiffs'
constitutional arguments and entered a judgment on October 24,
2005, declaring that Measure 37 was unconstitutional and invalid. 
Pursuant to ORS 250.044(5), see ___ Or at ___ n 3 (slip op at 1 n
3), defendants and the intervenors appealed that judgment
directly to this court.
II.  JUSTICIABILITY
We first address the various justiciability issues that
certain intervenors have raised.  Intervenor English contends
that the trial court erred in holding that plaintiffs have
standing to assert their claims because none of the plaintiffs
can show an actual, concrete impact stemming from Measure 37.  We
reject Intervenor English's standing argument for the reasons
described below.
As noted earlier, plaintiffs brought this action under
ORS 28.020, Oregon's declaratory judgment statute.  To establish
standing under ORS 28.020 in a case in which there are multiple
plaintiffs, only one plaintiff must show "some injury or other
impact upon a legally recognized interest beyond an abstract
interest in the correct application or validity of a law." 
League of Oregon Cities v. State of Oregon, 334 Or 645, 658, 56
P3d 892 (2002). 
Plaintiff Adams meets that criterion.  Plaintiffs
allege in their complaint that Adams owns residential property in
Clackamas County.  Adams's neighbor filed a Measure 37 claim,
seeking to subdivide his property for residential construction. 
Under applicable land use regulations, the neighbor could not
subdivide his property for that purpose.  Prior to the trial
court's decision in this case, the Department of Land
Conservation and Development decided not to apply the applicable
land use regulations and granted permission to the neighbor to
subdivide his property.  Plaintiffs allege that Adams will suffer
the following concrete harms stemming from his neighbor's
successful Measure 37 claim: (1) diminished water quantity and
quality available to Adams's property; (2) increased traffic; (3)
an increased tax burden due to increased enrollment in the local
school system; and (4) increased pollution.  We conclude that
plaintiffs' allegations concerning Adams are sufficiently
plausible and concrete to support standing.  See League of Oregon
Cities, 334 Or at 661 (concluding that plaintiffs who submitted
evidence regarding "plausible, concrete ramifications" of
implementation of ballot measure at issue had satisfied standing
requirement of ORS 28.020). 
Intervenor Meredith argues that this case is not
justiciable for another reason.  He contends that plaintiffs'
claims are not ripe because their facial challenge to Measure 37
does not present an actual controversy.  According to Meredith,
an actual controversy does not arise until after a claimant can
bring an action for compensation under Measure 37, which,
according to the measure, is after 180 days have elapsed
following a written demand for compensation.  ORS 197.352(6).  We
disagree.
This court has explained that a ripe claim for
declaratory judgment under ORS 28.020 "must involve present facts
as opposed to a dispute which is based on future events of a
hypothetical issue."  Brown v. Oregon State Bar, 293 Or 446, 449,
648 P2d 1289 (1982).  Plaintiffs' claims involve present facts. 
Measure 37 became effective on December 2, 2004.  As previously
explained, plaintiff Adams's neighbor is a Measure 37 claimant. 
The Department of Land Conservation and Development has decided
not to apply the applicable land use regulations in response to
the neighbor's claim, thereby allowing the neighbor to subdivide
his property.  Those facts are "present facts" giving rise to a
justiciable controversy, not hypothetical future events. (6)  
Intervenor Meredith also contends that plaintiffs'
claims are not justiciable because plaintiffs failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies.  According to Meredith, plaintiffs
were required to comply with procedures outlined in the Oregon
Administrative Procedures Act, ORS 183.310 to 183.750, before
filing an action to challenge the validity of Measure 37.  That
argument has no merit for the simple reason that Meredith has not
identified any administrative scheme -- and we know of none --
that, either inherently or by statutory directive, requires 
plaintiffs to proceed through any administrative steps before
challenging the constitutionality of Measure 37 under ORS
250.044. 
In sum, we conclude that none of intervenors' arguments
respecting justiciability of plaintiffs' claims is well taken. 
We turn to the merits.
III.  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MEASURE 37
As noted, the trial court declared Measure 37 to be
unconstitutional on five grounds. In this court, in addition to
supporting the five grounds that the trial court identified,
plaintiffs also renew two constitutional challenges to Measure 37
that the trial court rejected: (1) Measure 37 impermissibly
waives sovereign immunity; and (2) Measure 37 violates separation
of powers principles by encroaching on executive power and by
improperly delegating legislative power without adequate
safeguards.  We discuss plaintiffs' constitutional challenges
below, beginning with plaintiffs' arguments under the Oregon
Constitution.  See, e.g., Sealey v. Hicks, 309 Or 387, 397, 788
P2d 435 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Smothers v.
Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 23 P3d 333 (2001) ("As is our
normal practice, we consider * * * state constitutional
challenges before moving on to federal issues.").
A. Oregon Constitution
1. Intrusion on the Plenary Power to Legislate
We begin with the trial court's conclusion that Measure
37 is invalid because it unconstitutionally "imposes limitations
on government's exercise of plenary power to regulate land use in
Oregon[.]"  For the reasons set forth below, we disagree with
that conclusion.
At its outset, Measure 37 provides:
"If a public entity enacts or enforces a new land
use regulation or enforces a land use regulation
enacted prior to December 2, 2004, that restricts the
use of private real property or any interest therein
and has the effect of reducing the fair market value of
the property, or any interest therein, then the owner
of the property shall be paid just compensation."
ORS 197.352(1).  In lieu of providing just compensation, the
measure alternatively allows "the governing body responsible for
enacting the land use regulation [to] modify, remove, or not * *
* apply the land use regulation or land use regulations."  ORS
197.352(8).
In the trial court's view, the foregoing provisions of
Measure 37 required the government either to "pay to govern," if
it wished to enforce a particular land use regulation, or to
refrain from enforcing the regulation in some manner.  Based on
that reading of the measure, the court held that the measure so
eviscerated the legislature's plenary power to regulate land use
that the fact "that a later legislature could decide to repeal
[the measure's] condition on enforcement [did] not make it
permissible." 
In our view, the trial court misunderstood the nature
of the plenary legislative power.  In Oregon, the Legislative
Assembly and the people, acting through the initiative or
referendum processes, share in exercising legislative power.  See
Or Const, Art IV, §§ 1(1), (2)(a), (3)(a) (vesting in both bodies
the power to propose, enact, and reject laws).  Respecting the
nature of that power, this court previously has explained that
"[p]lenary power in the legislature, for all purposes
of civil government, is the rule, and a prohibition to
exercise a particular power is an exception.  It,
therefore, is competent for the legislature to enact
any law not forbidden by the constitution or delegated
to the federal government or prohibited by the
constitution of the United States."
Jory v. Martin, 153 Or 278, 285, 56 P2d 1093 (1936).  Thus,
limitations on legislative power must be grounded in specific
provisions of either the state or federal constitutions.  See,
e.g., State v. Hirsch/Friend, 338 Or 622, 639, 114 P3d 1104
(2005) ("any constitutional limitations on the state's actions
must be found within the language or history of the constitution
itself" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
Plaintiffs argue that constitutional limits on
legislative power need not be express, but can be implied.  We
agree with that general proposition.  As this court previously
has stated:  
"Our constitution, like all other state
constitutions, is not to be regarded as a grant of
power, but rather a limitation upon the powers of the
legislature.  The people[,] in adopting it, committed
to the legislature the whole law making power of the
state, which they did not expressly or impliedly
withhold."
Wright v. Blue Mt. Hospital Dist., 214 Or 141, 144-45, 328 P2d
314 (1958) (emphasis added).  However, even implied limitations
must find their source in some constitutional provision.  That is
so because, "without such a conflict with a written
constitutional provision, there is no basis for any general
judicial power to invalidate a law if it is 'bad' enough."  Hans
Linde, Without "Due Process:  Unconstitutional Law in Oregon," 49
Or L Rev 125, 130 (1970).  A treatise that plaintiffs themselves
cite recognizes that same principle:
"The inhibition of a Constitution may be either
express or implied; that is[,] the Constitution may
expressly prohibit any specified act of the
legislature, or the Constitution by its inherent terms
may of necessity prohibit certain acts of the
legislature by reason of inherent conflict that would
arise between the terms of the Constitution and the
power claimed in favor of the legislature."
Thomas M. Cooley, 1 A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations
176 n 4 (8th ed 1927) (emphasis added).  Here, however,
plaintiffs cite no constitutional provision -- and we know of
none -- that either expressly or impliedly limits the power of
the Legislative Assembly or the people, exercising their
initiative power, to authorize state or local entities to decide,
in accordance with Measure 37, whether to pay just compensation
or to modify, remove, or not apply certain land use
regulations. (7)
Not only have plaintiffs failed to ground their
argument in the Oregon Constitution, but the premise of their
argument is also mistaken.  Contrary to the assumption underlying
their argument, Oregon's legislative bodies have not divested
themselves of the right to enact new land use regulations in the
future.  Nothing in Measure 37 forbids the Legislative Assembly
or the people from enacting new land use statutes, from repealing
all land use statutes, or from amending or repealing Measure 37
itself.  Simply stated, Measure 37 is an exercise of the plenary
power, not a limitation on it. (8)  The measure does not impair
the plenary power of the Legislative Assembly or the people's
exercise of their initiative power.  The trial court's contrary
conclusion was error.
2. Violation of Equal Privileges and Immunities
As noted earlier, Measure 37 limits application of its
compensation and relief provisions to those landowners who
acquired their property prior to enactment of the land use
regulations that they wish to avoid.  Based on that provision,
the trial court held that Measure 37 violated Article I, section
20, of the Oregon Constitution because the measure favored what
the trial court characterized as a "true class" comprised of
property owners who obtained their properties before the relevant
land use regulations became effective (the "preowners").  The
measure, according to plaintiffs and the trial court, therefore
disfavored property owners who obtained their properties after
the relevant land use regulations became effective (the
"postowners").  After concluding that Measure 37 implicated "true
classes," the trial court applied a so-called "rational basis"
review and concluded that Measure 37 was not rationally related
to any legitimate government interest that would justify treating
those "classes" differently.  For the reasons set forth below, we
disagree with that analysis.
Article I, section 20, provides:  
"No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or
class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which,
upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens."  
Article I, section 20, guarantees equality of privileges to each
individual citizen as well as to "classes" of citizens. 
See State v. Clark, 291 Or 231, 239, 63 P2d 810 (1981) (Article
I, section 20, is a guarantee against unjustified denial of equal
privileges as much as against unjustified differentiation among
classes of citizens).  Some litigants seeking the protection of
Article I, section 20, claim -- as do plaintiffs here -- that a
particular "class," of which they are not a member, unlawfully
has been accorded a special privilege or status.  Other litigants
claim that they are members of a "class" suffering disparate
treatment without legitimate reason.  In either situation, this
court consistently has held that the protection that Article I,
section 20, affords is available to only those individuals or
groups whom the law classifies according to characteristics that
exist apart from the enactment that they challenge.  See, e.g.,
Sealey, 309 Or at 397 (classes that the challenged law itself
creates are not considered "classes" for purposes of Article I,
section 20).  That is so because, "every law itself can be said
to 'classify' what it covers [as distinct] from what is
excludes."  Clark, 291 Or at 240.
Indeed, this court consistently has rejected challenges
to statutes under Article I, section 20, when the statutes
themselves have created the alleged classes.  For example, in
Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or 508, 525, 783 P2d 506 (1989),
overruled in part on other grounds by Smothers, 332 Or 83, this
court rejected an Article I, section 20, challenge to the Oregon
Tort Claims Act (OTCA) because the alleged disfavored class
(victims of governmental torts) existed as a class only by virtue
of the statutory scheme.  Similarly, in Greist v. Phillips, 322
Or 281, 292, 906 P2d 789 (1995), this court held that a statute
capping noneconomic damages in wrongful death actions at $500,000
did not violate Article I, section 20.  The court explained that
the challenged law itself created the distinction between persons
who could receive more than $500,000 and persons who could not,
and that Article I, section 20, did not bar the legislature from
creating such distinctions.  Id.   
It is true that, before the adoption of Measure 37,
certain property owners had acquired their property prior to the
enactment of certain relevant land use regulations, while others 
had acquired their property after the enactment of certain
relevant land use regulations.  That distinction between 
preowners and postowners, however, is significant only by virtue
of Measure 37 itself.  In other words, the date that an owner
acquired property has no significance apart from Measure 37.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs contend that the classes that  
Measure 37 creates are "fixed" or "closed" and, for that reason,
Measure 37 violates Article I, section 20.  In so arguing,
however, plaintiffs misconstrue this court's precedents in that
regard.  Plaintiffs correctly note that this court has stated
that "[l]aws which are left open for individuals voluntarily to
bring themselves within a favored class do not violate Article I,
section 20."  Wilson v. Dept. of Rev., 302 Or 128, 132, 727 P2d
614 (1986).  However, plaintiffs go on to argue that the converse
of that proposition also is true; i.e., they assert that a law
that provides a privilege or immunity to a "fixed" or "closed"
class must be invalid.  
This court's decisions in Sealey, Hale, and Greist all
demonstrate that that assertion is incorrect.  The statutes at
issue in those cases all involved classes that were "closed";
that is, the persons allegedly disfavored by the statutes at
issue could not "bring themselves within" the classes of persons
who were favored.  In Hale, for example, victims of governmental
torts whose damages were limited under the OTCA could not alter
the identity of the alleged tortfeasor to evade that limitation. 
308 Or at 524-25.  Similarly, in Sealey, persons injured in
products liability actions could not alter the sources or timing
of their injuries to avoid the applicable statute of repose, ORS
30.905.  Sealey, 309 Or at 397-98.  Yet, neither statutory scheme
violated Article I, section 20.  
A moment's reflection illustrates that the foregoing
refutation of plaintiff's theory must be correct.  Were it not,
plaintiffs' theory would mean that the legislature would be
precluded from enacting a law benefitting, for example, Vietnam
veterans or Gulf War veterans, both closed classes.  Here, the
postowners' inability to "bring themselves within" the class of
preowners does not render Measure 37 invalid.  We conclude that
Measure 37 does not offend Article I, section 20, as plaintiffs
contend.
3. Impermissible Suspension of the Laws
Article I, section 22, of the Oregon Constitution
provides that "[t]he operation of the laws shall never be
suspended, except by the Authority of the Legislative Assembly." 
(Emphasis added.)  The trial court accepted plaintiffs' view that
Measure 37 had the effect of suspending land use regulations, but
only for certain property owners -- that is, those who acquired
their property before the land use regulations in question had
become effective.  As already explained, the trial court then
held that "suspending" the laws in that manner violated Article
I, section 20.  In the trial court's view, Measure 37 therefore
also violated Article I, section 22, because the suspension
clause set out in that constitutional provision "must not [be
used] to provide a privilege or immunity that is not available to
all."   
According to defendants, the trial court's conclusion
is wrong in two respects.  First, they argue that Measure 37 does
not constitute a "suspension of laws"; second, they argue that,
even if Measure 37 did effect a "suspension of laws," Article I,
section 22, does not operate as a limit on the legislature.  In
response, plaintiffs echo the trial court's conclusion that, by
allowing only certain property owners to avoid land use
regulations, Measure 37 effects only a limited suspension of the
land use regulations.  And, because Article I, section 22,
authorizes only general suspensions of the laws, plaintiffs
argue, it follows that Measure 37 is unconstitutional.  As
described below, we disagree with plaintiffs and conclude that
Article I, section 22, does not operate to invalidate Measure 37. 
We first address the wording of the suspension clause
of Article I, section 22, which has remained unchanged since the
adoption of the Oregon Constitution in 1859.  See Charles Henry
Carey, The Oregon Constitution and Proceeding and Debates of the
Constitutional Convention of 1857 403 (1926) (citing original
constitution).  A nineteenth-century dictionary defines
"suspend," for our purposes here, as "to interrupt; to intermit;
to cause to cease for time"; "to stay, to delay; to hinder from
proceeding for a time"; or "to cause to cease for a time from
operation or effect."  Noah Webster, 1 An American Dictionary of
the English Language, s.v. "suspend" (Johnson 1828); see also
Rico-Villalobos v. Guisto, 339 Or 197, 206, 118 P3d 246 (2005)
(when analyzing terms in original Oregon Constitution, court
examines meanings of terms as framers would have understood
them).  Applying those definitions, it is clear that Measure 37
does not "cause to cease for a time," "delay," or "interrupt" any
land use regulation.  Instead, it authorizes a governing body to
"modify, remove, or not * * * apply" certain such regulations in
specific situations.  The measure is, in effect, an amendment of
the land use regulations in those particulars.  No law is
"suspended"; all laws not amended remain in effect.  
Nothing in the history of the adoption of Article I,
section 22, (9) or this court's case law contradicts the
foregoing reading of the text of that provision. (10)  See
Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 414-15, 840 P2d 65 (1992)
(describing methodology for analyzing constitutional provision). 
The trial court's  conclusion that Measure 37 unconstitutionally
suspended land use regulations was error.
4. Violation of Separation of Powers Principles
Article III, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution
provides:
"The powers of the Government shall be divided
into three seperate [sic] departments, the Legislative,
the Executive, including the administrative, and the
Judicial; and no person charged with official duties
under one of these departments, shall exercise any of
the functions of another, except as in this
Constitution expressly provided."
The trial court held that Measure 37 violated Article III,
section 1, to the extent that the measure 
"purports to permit the legislature to delegate to
public entities a limit on the legislature's plenary
power, the authority to treat a class of property
owners * * * differently from other property owners   
* * *, and the suspension of land use regulations for a
specified group of property owners."  
As stated, the trial court's separation of powers holding 
explicitly relied on its earlier conclusions that Measure 37
impermissibly intruded on the legislature's plenary power,
violated Article I, section 20, and violated Article I, section
22.  We already have concluded that Measure 37 does none of those
things.  It follows that the trial court's stated reasons for
holding that Measure 37 violated Article III, section 1, were
also incorrect.
Plaintiffs, however, raise two additional separation of
powers arguments in support of the trial court's ruling. 
Specifically, plaintiffs contend that Measure 37 violates Article
III, section 1, because it (1) intrudes on the executive power;
and (2) fails to provide adequate safeguards to prevent improper
use of the power conferred.  
Because the roles of governmental actors frequently
overlap, this court has held that the separation of powers
doctrine does not require an "absolute separation between the
departments of government."  Rooney v. Kulongoski, 322 Or 15, 28,
902 P2d 1143 (1995).  Instead, a separation of powers analysis
under the Oregon Constitution involves two inquiries:  (1)
whether one department of government has "unduly burdened" the
actions of another department where the constitution has
committed the responsibility for the governmental activity in
question to that latter department; and (2) whether one
department has performed functions that the constitution commits
to another department.  Id. (citations omitted). 
Plaintiffs focus on the second inquiry.  Measure 37
provides that "the governing body responsible for enacting the
land use regulation may modify, remove or not * * * apply" that
land use regulation.  ORS 197.352(8).  Plaintiffs contend that,
in so providing, Measure 37 improperly allows legislative bodies,
rather than the executive, to determine whether and when to
enforce a general law.  Specifically, plaintiffs appear to argue
that, because "enacting" a land use regulation is a legislative
function, the "governing body" deciding whether to modify,
remove, or not apply a particular regulation cannot be the same
body that enacted the legislation.  Plaintiffs' argument,
however, rests upon two assumptions:  (1) the "governing body"
referred to in the measure can be only a legislative body; and
(2) the decision to pay compensation or to modify, remove, or not
apply a land use regulation can be only an executive function. 
As explained below, plaintiffs' assumptions do not support the
type of separation of powers violation required for plaintiffs'
argument to succeed.
As noted, Measure 37 directs "the governing body
responsible for enacting the land use regulation" in question to
decide whether to pay compensation to property owners who
acquired their property prior to the enactment of that regulation
or to "modify, remove or not * * * apply" that regulation.  ORS
197.352(8) (emphasis added).  That provision does not concentrate
executive power in the legislative branch.  Indeed, if the
"governing body" in question is a state agency that is itself
part of the executive branch, then Measure 37 removes no
executive function from the executive branch and devolves none on
its legislative counterpart.  
The flaw in plaintiffs' argument becomes even more
clear when the "governing bodies" in question are comprised of
local city or county officials.  Such bodies are not solely
legislative, executive, or judicial.  As this court has
explained, 
"members [of local general-purpose governing bodies]
are politically elected to positions that do not
separate legislative from executive and judicial power
on the state or federal model; characteristically they
combine lawmaking with administration that is sometimes
executive and sometimes adjudicative."  
1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco Co. Court, 304 Or 76, 82, 742 P2d
39 (1987); see also Fasano v. Washington Co. Comm., 264 Or 574, 
580, 507 P2d 23 (1973) ("Local and small decision groups are
simply not the equivalent in all respects of state and national
legislatures.").  Plaintiffs' argument fails to undermine the
constitutional permissibility of the "combined functions"
performed by local government bodies.  In our view, plaintiffs
have not demonstrated -- as they must to prevail on their
separation of power argument -- that Measure 37 improperly
delegates executive power to legislative bodies.
Plaintiffs also assert that Measure 37 delegates
legislative authority without providing adequate safeguards
against "arbitrary and deleterious exercise of the power" so
delegated.  We continue to take the following view, first
expressed by this court nearly a half century ago:  "There is no
constitutional requirement that all delegation of legislative
power must be accompanied by a statement of standards
circumscribing its exercise."  Warren v. Marion County, 222 Or
307, 313, 353 P2d 257 (1960).  Rather, the procedure established
for the exercise of that power must furnish adequate safeguards
against the arbitrary exercise of the delegated power.  Id. at
314.  Measure 37 does just that.  The measure provides a cause of
action for claimants seeking compensation.  ORS 197.352(6). 
Further, avenues exist for both claimants and interested third
parties, such as plaintiffs, to obtain judicial review of the
decisions that local governing bodies make in accordance with the
measure.  Those avenues provide adequate safeguards against the
arbitrary exercise of power, as Warren requires.  We therefore
hold that Measure 37 does not violate the separation of powers
principles encompassed in Article III, section 1.
5. Impermissible Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Article IV, section 24, of the Oregon Constitution
authorizes the state to waive its sovereign immunity, as follows:
"Provision may be made by general law, for
bringing suit against the State, as to all liabilities
originating after, or existing at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution; but no special act
authorizeing [sic] such suit to be brought, or making
compensation to any person claiming damages against the
State, shall ever be passed."
Plaintiffs contend that ORS 197.352(6) impermissibly waives
sovereign immunity.  That section authorizes a Measure 37
claimant to bring an action for compensation, including
reasonable attorney fees, expenses, and costs, if a challenged
land use regulation continues to apply to the subject property
more than 180 days after the claimant filed a written Measure 37
claim.  ORS 197.352(6). (11)  Plaintiffs assert that Article
IV, section 24, does not extend to liabilities for economic
consequences of regulation.  As explained below, we disagree.
Article IV, section 24, allows the state to waive
immunity "as to all liabilities originating after, or existing at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution."  Or Const, Art
IV, § 24 (emphasis added).  That section neither creates nor
limits sovereign immunity.  As this court discussed in Hale,
Article XVIII, section 7, of the Oregon Constitution incorporated
sovereign immunity from the Oregon Territory's pre-existing law. 
Hale, 308 Or at 514-15; see also Or Const, Art XVIII, § 7
(declaring that territorial laws continued through adoption of
Oregon Constitution).  "Sovereign immunity originated in the rule
that the English King could not be sued in his own courts." 
Hale, 308 Or at 513.  Article IV, section 24, in turn, allocates
the power to waive sovereign immunity, within specified limits,
to the legislature.  Id. at 516.  
Plaintiffs contend that neither the Legislative
Assembly nor the people exercising their initiative power are
permitted to waive sovereign immunity simply to "subject the
state to suit for purely consequential economic harm caused by
past or prospective regulation."  However, plaintiffs point to
nothing in Article IV, section 24, itself, or in case law
interpreting that section, that so limits the legislative
authority. (12)  
Nothing in Article IV, section 24, or, so far as we are
aware, in any other state constitutional provision, forbids the
state from deciding that it will compensate property owners for
the economic consequences of the state's land use regulations,
including waiving the state's sovereign immunity to permit those
owners to assert their claims in court.  We conclude that Article
IV, section 24, does not bar Oregon's legislative bodies from
waiving immunity as the people have chosen to do in enacting
Measure 37. (13)
B. United State Constitution: Due Process Clause
Having rejected all plaintiffs' state constitutional
arguments, we turn to plaintiffs' arguments based on the United
States Constitution.  Plaintiffs' federal constitutional
arguments are limited to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. (14)  Plaintiffs' due process claim raises both the
procedural and substantive components of due process.  
As to the procedural component, the trial court held
that Measure 37 violated the procedural due process rights of
affected nonclaimant property owners because the measure failed
to provide predeprivation procedures for those property owners to
challenge governmental actions that adversely would affect their
property interests.  The trial court held that, because nearby
property owners may suffer "irreparable harm" as a result of a
governmental decision to modify, remove, or not apply a land use
regulation, property owners so affected "must be given notice and
an opportunity to be heard before a public entity decides the
Measure 37 claim."  (Emphasis in original.) (15)
In so ruling, the trial court asked more of Measure 37
than the measure was required to deliver.  While it is true that
Measure 37 does not expressly provide the predeprivation
procedures that the trial court outlined, it does not follow that
that omission renders Measure 37 unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment.  The foregoing is true because, at least
for purposes of this case, plaintiffs are asserting only a facial
challenge to Measure 37.  Plaintiffs therefore must demonstrate
that Measure 37 affirmatively permits the government to deprive
plaintiffs of their property without affording procedural due
process.  See United States v. Salerno, 481 US 739, 745, 107 S Ct
2095, 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987) (plaintiffs asserting facial
challenge bear "heavy burden" to demonstrate that statute cannot
be constitutionally applied under any circumstance).  
Nothing in Measure 37 denies predeprivation procedures
to individuals such as plaintiffs who may wish to challenge
particular governmental actions that may harm individual property
interests.  Neither does Measure 37 preclude responsible
governmental entities from implementing such predeprivation
procedures.  To the contrary, Measure 37 contemplates that a
"metropolitan service district, city, or county, or state agency
may adopt or apply procedures for the processing of claims under
this act[.]"  ORS 197.352(7).  And, as the trial court noted, for
claims that a state entity must decide, the state has adopted
rules that provide for notice and an opportunity to be heard to
affected third parties.  See OAR 125-145-0080 (outlining
procedures).  Plaintiffs do not contend that those procedures are
insufficient or that similar procedures adopted by local
officials would be insufficient.  Therefore, even assuming that
predeprivation procedures are constitutionally required for
Measure 37 claims in the manner that plaintiffs contend -- an
issue that we do not decide here -- many circumstances exist in
which applying the statute would not violate the constitution. 
See Salerno, 481 US at 745 (to succeed in a facial challenge
under Due Process Clause, "the challenger must establish that no
set of circumstances exists under which [the statute] would be
valid").  We therefore conclude that Measure 37, on its face,
does not violate plaintiffs' procedural due process rights.
The trial court also concluded that Measure 37 violated
the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.  The trial court explained that, although the
measure did not implicate a fundamental right, "the government,
through the initiative process, could not have had a legitimate
reason for enacting Measure 37, because, as described earlier,
the compensation provision of Measure 37 impedes the exercise of
the plenary power."  (Emphasis in original.)  On appeal,
plaintiffs argue that the trial court correctly held that Measure
37 was unable to withstand rational basis review, i.e., that the
measure was not reasonably related to a legitimate state
interest.  
The trial court's express reasons for declaring that
Measure 37 offends principles of substantive due process were
erroneous, because, as we already have explained, the premises on
which that court relied were themselves incorrect.  Plaintiffs,
however, offer an additional rationale for the trial court's
ruling that that court did not address.  Plaintiffs assert that
compensating persons who suffer economic loss due to governmental
regulation furthers "private interests," which is not a
legitimate state interest.  We address that argument below.  
As was true respecting their waiver-of-sovereign-immunity arguments, plaintiffs assert in this argument that,
before the enactment of Measure 37, no law required governments
to offer such compensation.  Plaintiffs reason from that fact
that it would be "manifestly destructive" to society to burden
the public with compensating individuals when the government has
enacted land use regulations for the public good.  Additionally,
according to plaintiffs, Measure 37 allows claimants to demand
payment for the economic impact of a regulatory scheme that did
not rise to the level of a taking under the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution; such an allowance would be
"reverse extortion," according to plaintiffs.  
We find none of those arguments persuasive.  When a
statute does not implicate a fundamental right, (16) a party
challenging that statute on substantive due process grounds must
show that the statute bears no reasonable relation to a
legitimate state interest.  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 US
702, 722, 117 S Ct 2258, 138 L Ed 2d 772 (1997) (stating
principle).  Plaintiffs cannot meet that burden.  Although it is
true that neither the state nor the federal constitution requires
compensation to individuals who suffer any loss in property value
as a consequence of land use regulation, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 US 393, 413, 43 S Ct 158, 67 L Ed 322 (1922); Kroner
v. City of Portland, 116 Or 141, 152, 240 P 536 (1925), it is
equally true that neither constitution forbids requiring such
compensation in the manner provided for in Measure 37.  The
people, in exercising their initiative power, were free to enact
Measure 37 in furtherance of policy objectives such as
compensating landowners for a diminution in property value
resulting from certain land use regulations or otherwise
relieving landowners from some of the financial burden of certain
land use regulations.  Neither policy is irrational; no one
seriously can assert that Measure 37 is not reasonably related to
those policy objectives.
And, that determination is the only one that this court
is empowered to make.  Whether Measure 37 as a policy choice is
wise or foolish, farsighted or blind, is beyond this court's
purview.  Our only function in any case involving a
constitutional challenge to an initiative measure is to ensure
that the measure does not contravene any pertinent, applicable
constitutional provisions.  Here, we conclude that no such
provisions have been contravened.
IV.  CONCLUSION
In sum, we conclude that (1) plaintiffs' claims are
justiciable; (2) Measure 37 does not impede the legislative
plenary power; (3) Measure 37 does not violate the equal
privileges and immunities guarantee of Article I, section 20, of
the Oregon Constitution; (4) Measure 37 does not violate the
suspension of laws provision contained in Article I, section 22,
of the Oregon Constitution; (5) Measure 37 does not violate
separation of powers constraints; (6) Measure 37 does not waive
impermissibly sovereign immunity; and (7) Measure 37 does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  The trial court's contrary conclusions under the
state and federal constitutions were erroneous and must be
reversed.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the
case is remanded for entry of judgment in favor of defendants and
intervenors.
APPENDIX
Measure 37, codified at ORS 197.352, provides:
"The following provisions are added to and made a
part of ORS chapter 197:
"(1) If a public entity enacts or enforces a new
land use regulation or enforces a land use regulation
enacted prior to the effective date of this amendment
that restricts the use of private real property or any
interest therein and has the effect of reducing the
fair market value of the property, or any interest
therein, then the owner of the property shall be paid
just compensation. 
"(2) Just compensation shall be equal to the
reduction in the fair market value of the affected
property interest resulting from enactment or
enforcement of the land use regulation as of the date
the owner makes written demand for compensation under
this act. 
"(3) Subsection (1) of this act shall not apply to
land use regulations:
"(A) Restricting or prohibiting activities
commonly and historically recognized as public
nuisances under common law. This subsection shall be
construed narrowly in favor of a finding of
compensation under this act; 
"(B) Restricting or prohibiting activities for the
protection of public health and safety, such as fire
and building codes, health and sanitation regulations,
solid or hazardous waste regulations, and pollution
control regulations; 
"(C) To the extent the land use regulation is
required to comply with federal law; 
"(D) Restricting or prohibiting the use of a
property for the purpose of selling pornography or
performing nude dancing. Nothing in this subsection,
however, is intended to affect or alter rights provided
by the Oregon or United States Constitutions; or 
"(E) Enacted prior to the date of acquisition of
the property by the owner or a family member of the
owner who owned the subject property prior to
acquisition or inheritance by the owner, whichever
occurred first.
"(4) Just compensation under subsection (1) of
this act shall be due the owner of the property if the
land use regulation continues to be enforced against
the property 180 days after the owner of the property
makes written demand for compensation under this
section to the public entity enacting or enforcing the
land use regulation.
"(5) For claims arising from land use regulations
enacted prior to the effective date of this act,
written demand for compensation under subsection (4)
shall be made within two years of the effective date of
this act, or the date the public entity applies the
land use regulation as an approval criteria to an
application submitted by the owner of the property,
whichever is later. For claims arising from land use
regulations enacted after the effective date of this
act, written demand for compensation under subsection
(4) shall be made within two years of the enactment of
the land use regulation, or the date the owner of the
property submits a land use application in which the
land use regulation is an approval criteria, whichever
is later.
"(6) If a land use regulation continues to apply
to the subject property more than 180 days after the
present owner of the property has made written demand
for compensation under this act, the present owner of
the property, or any interest therein, shall have a
cause of action for compensation under this act in the
circuit court in which the real property is located,
and the present owner of the real property shall be
entitled to reasonable attorney fees, expenses, costs,
and other disbursements reasonably incurred to collect
the compensation. 
"(7) A metropolitan service district, city, or
county, or state agency may adopt or apply procedures
for the processing of claims under this act, but in no
event shall these procedures act as a prerequisite to
the filing of a compensation claim under subsection (6)
of this act, nor shall the failure of an owner of
property to file an application for a land use permit
with the local government serve as grounds for
dismissal, abatement, or delay of a compensation claim
under subsection (6) of this act. 
"(8) Notwithstanding any other state statute or
the availability of funds under subsection (10) of this
act, in lieu of payment of just compensation under this
act, the governing body responsible for enacting the
land use regulation may modify, remove, or not to [sic]
apply the land use regulation or land use regulations
to allow the owner to use the property for a use
permitted at the time the owner acquired the property.
"(9) A decision by a governing body under this act
shall not be considered a land use decision as defined
in ORS 197.015(10).
"(10) Claims made under this section shall be paid
from funds, if any, specifically allocated by the
legislature, city, county, or metropolitan service
district for payment of claims under this act.
Notwithstanding the availability of funds under this
subsection, a metropolitan service district, city,
county, or state agency shall have discretion to use
available funds to pay claims or to modify, remove, or
not apply a land use regulation or land use regulations
pursuant to subsection (6) of this act. If a claim has
not been paid within two years from the date on which
it accrues, the owner shall be allowed to use the
property as permitted at the time the owner acquired
the property.
"(11) Definitions - for purposes of this section:
"(A) 'Family member' shall include the wife,
husband, son, daughter, mother, father, brother,
brother-in-law, sister, sister-in-law, son-in-law,
daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, father-in-law, aunt,
uncle, niece, nephew, stepparent, stepchild,
grandparent, or grandchild of the owner of the
property, an estate of any of the foregoing family
members, or a legal entity owned by any one or
combination of these family members or the owner of
the property.
"(B) 'Land use regulation' shall include:
"(i) Any statute regulating the use of
land or any interest therein;
"(ii) Administrative rules and goals of
the Land Conservation and Development
Commission;
"(iii) Local government comprehensive
plans, zoning ordinances, land division
ordinances, and transportation ordinances; 
"(iv) Metropolitan service district
regional framework plans, functional plans,
planning goals and objectives; and
"(v) Statutes and administrative rules
regulating farming and forest practices.
"(C) 'Owner' is the present owner of the property,
or any interest therein.
"(D) 'Public entity' shall include the state, a
metropolitan service district, a city, or a county.
"(12) The remedy created by this act is in
addition to any other remedy under the Oregon or United
States Constitutions, and is not intended to modify or
replace any other remedy.
"(13) If any portion or portions of this act are
declared invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction,
the remaining portions of this act shall remain in full
force and effect."
1. Measure 37 is codified at ORS 197.352.  Throughout this
opinion, when necessary to refer to specific sections of the
measure, we cite to the codification.  The full text of Measure
37 is set out in the Appendix.
2. Measure 37 defines the term "land use regulation" as
follows:
"(i) Any statute regulating the use of land or any
interest therein;
"(ii) Administrative rules and goals of the Land
Conservation and Development Commission;
"(iii) Local government comprehensive plans,
zoning ordinances, land division ordinances, and
transportation ordinances;
"(iv) Metropolitan service district regional
framework plans, functional plans, planning goals and
objections; and
"(v) Statutes and administrative rules regulating
farming and forest practices."
ORS 197.352(11)(B).  In this opinion, we use the term "land use
regulation" as Measure 37 defines that term.  
3. ORS 28.020 provides, in part:
"Any person * * * whose rights, status or other
legal relations are affected by a * * * statute * * *
may have determined any question of construction or
validity arising under any such * * * statute * * * and
obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal
relations thereunder."
ORS 250.044 provides, in part:
"(1)An action that challenges the
constitutionality of a measure initiated by the people
* * * must be commenced in the Circuit Court for Marion
County if:  
"(a) The action is filed by a plaintiff asserting
a claim for relief that challenges the
constitutionality of a state statute * * * initiated by
the people or referred to the people under section 1(1)
to (4), Article IV of the Oregon Constitution; [and]
"(b) The action is commenced on or after the date
that the Secretary of State certifies that the
challenged measure has been adopted by the electors and
within 180 days after the effective date of the
measure[.]
"* * * * *
"(5) If a judgment in an action subject to the
requirements of this section holds that a challenged
measure is invalid in whole or in part, a party to the
action may appeal the judgment only by filing a notice
of appeal directly with the Supreme Court within the
time and in the manner specified in ORS chapter 19 for
civil appeals to the Court of Appeals."
4. Also named as defendants were Marion County, Clackamas
County, and Washington County.  They are not parties to
this appeal.
5. The intervenors are (1) the chief petitioners Dorothy
English, Barbara Prete and Eugene Prete (collectively,
"English"); (2) Howard Meredith; and (3) Jackson County.  
6. Meredith also challenges the trial court's decision,
under ORCP 23, to allow plaintiffs to amend their pleadings to
conform to certain aspects of their evidence.  This court will
reverse that decision only on a showing of abuse of discretion. 
See Engelcke v. Stoehsler, 273 Or 937, 944-45, 544 P2d 582 (1975)
(stating principle under former ORS 16.390, repealed by Or Laws
1979, ch 284, § 199).  We find no abuse of discretion here.
7. Plaintiffs do mention Article IV, section 1, of the
Oregon Constitution, but that section merely vests legislative
power in the Legislative Assembly and the electorate.  The
section neither expressly nor impliedly limits the scope of the
legislative power; it simply states where that constitutional
power resides. 
8. Plaintiffs cite to and rely upon a number of cases, but
those cases are inapposite.  Generally, the cases involved public
contracts that purported to contract away state or local
governments' ability to enact legislation.  See, e.g., Northern
Pacific Railway v. Duluth, 208 US 583, 596, 28 S Ct 341, 52 L Ed
630 (1908) ("the right to exercise the police power is a
continuing one [that] cannot be contracted away"); Stone v.
Mississippi, 101 US 814, 817, 25 L Ed 1079 (1879) ("the
legislature cannot bargain away the police power of a State");
Morris v. City of Salem, 179 Or 666, 675, 174 P2d 192 (1946)
(authority to exercise police power is implied in a public
contract); see also County Mobilehome Positive Action Com., Inc.
v. County of San Diego, 62 Cal App 4th 727, 73 Cal Rptr 2d 409
(1998) (state cannot abdicate police power by contract; contracts
are subject to further exercise of police power); City of New
Albany v. New Albany St. R. Co., 172 Ind 487, 87 NE 1084 (1909)
("a city council cannot bargain away or divest itself of the
right to make reasonable laws").  Here, Measure 37 does not
contract away the plenary power to enact legislation.  
9. As the parties acknowledge, Article I, section 22, was
not the subject of any reported debate during Oregon's
constitutional convention.  Claudia Burton and Andrew Grade, A
Legislative History of the Oregon Constitution - Part I (Article
I & II), 37 Willamette L Rev 469, 539-40 (2001).  
10. In Holden v. James, 11 Mass 396, 403-05 (1814) -- a
case that plaintiffs cite here -- the Massachusetts Supreme Court
explained that state constitutional "suspension of laws" clauses
sought to correct abuses of regal authority and were rooted in
the Magna Charta and the English Bill of Rights of 1689.  Id. 
The English Bill of Rights enumerated "the oppressive acts of
James 2," the first of which was "the assuming and exercising
[of] a power of dispensing with and suspending the laws, * * *
without consent of parliament."  Id. at 404.  The first article
of the Bill of Rights provided that "the exercise of such power,
by regal authority, without consent of Parliament, is illegal."
Id. 
11. ORS 197.352(6) provides:
"If a land use regulation continues to apply to
the subject property more than 180 days after the
present owner of the property had made written demand
for compensation under this section, the present owner
of the property, or any interest therein, shall have a
cause of action for compensation under this section in
the circuit court in which the real property is
located, and the present owner of the real property
shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees,
expenses, costs, and other disbursements reasonably
incurred to collect the compensation."
12. Instead, plaintiffs cite cases that note, generally,
that states are not obligated to compensate for losses sustained
by virtue of the exercise of governmental power.  See, e.g.,
Branson v. City of Philadelphia, 47 Pa 329 (1864) ("no obligation
at law requires [the Commonwealth] to repair the mere
consequences collaterally falling upon those who suffer from the
exercise of a great reserved power of acting for the general
good"); The Western College of Homeopathic Medicine v. City of
Cleveland, 12 Ohio St 375, 377-78 (1861) ("It is not the policy
of governments to indemnify individuals for losses sustained,
either from the want of proper laws, or from the inadequate
enforcement of laws made to secure the property of
individuals.").  But, even assuming that the state is not
obligated to compensate for economic losses stemming from
regulation, it does not follow that the state is forbidden from
doing so.  
13. To the extent that plaintiffs also argue that Measure
37 unconstitutionally waives sovereign immunity because the
measure impermissibly limits the plenary legislative power, we
reject that argument as well, for the reasons stated in our
discussion of plenary legislative power.
14. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides:
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]"
Plaintiffs' brief on appeal mentions two other federal
constitutional provisions -- the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Plaintiffs raised neither claim in their complaint or
their motion for summary judgment below, however, and neither
theory is well developed in their brief to this court.  We
therefore limit our discussion to plaintiffs' Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause arguments.
15. The trial court's holding appears to have been, in
part, specific to the procedures utilized in deciding the claim
of plaintiff Adams's neighbor.  Those facts might have been
relevant if plaintiffs had asserted an "as applied" challenge to
Measure 37, but they are irrelevant to plaintiffs' facial
challenge to Measure 37.   
16. The trial court concluded that Measure 37 did not
implicate plaintiffs' fundamental rights, and the parties do not
contest that conclusion.