Case Title: STATE EX REL STEPHENS v DISTRICT C

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13282 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A THE STATE O F M O N T A N A ex re1 ROBERT L. STEPHENS, JR. , Relator, T H E DISTRICT C O U R T O F THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A F T A , I N AND F O R T H E C O U N T Y O F B I G HORN, HON. N A T ALLEN PRESIDING; and THE C O U N T Y COMMISSIONERS O F B I G HORN COUNTY, M O N T A N A , Respondents. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel of Record: For Rela t o r : Robert L. Stephens, Jr. argued, Billings,' Montana For Respondents : Hon. Nat Allen argued, Roundup, Montana James Seykora argued, County Attorney, Hardin, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Smith, Smith and Sewell, Helena, Montana Robert Sewell argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: March 19, 1976 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Relator a p p l i e d t o t h i s Court f o r a w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l t o review a reduced award of a t t o r n e y f e e s and expenses i n connection with h i s s e r v i c e s a s c o u r t appointed a t t o r n e y f o r an i n d i g e n t defendant i n a c r i m i n a l case. Relator is Robert L. Stephens, Jr., a B i l l i n g s a t t o r n e y , who was appointed by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Big Horn County t o r e p r e s e n t Gary Radi, charged with t h e crimes of d e l i b e r a t e homi- c i d e , aggravated kidnapping, and robbery. Respondents a r e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Hon. Nat Allen, d i s t r i c t judge p r e s i d i n g , and t h e county commissioners of Big Horn County. Radi was t r i e d by j u r y with four o t h e r defendants. Follow- i n g t r i a l , r e l a t o r submitted a claim f o r h i s s e r v i c e s and expenses t o Judge Allen. R e l a t o r ' s c l a i m a s submitted was $5,806.50, f o r 1 9 4 1 / 2 hours s e r v i c e s a t $25 per hour and miscellaneous out-of- pocket expenses. Judge Allen approved t h e claim f o r $2,746 only. H e re- fused t o approve a $200 claim f o r i n v e s t i g a t i v e s e r v i c e s ( n o t i n i s s u e h e r e ) , but t h e p r i n c i p a l disallowance was $2,860 i n a t t o r - ney f e e s . The judge's o r d e r explained t h e disallowance i n t h i s language : "The reason f o r c u t t i n g t h e c l a i m f o r s e r v i c e s down $2,860.00 is because M r . Stephens, i n s p i t e of many admonitions by t h e c o u r t , i n s i s t e d on asking p u r e l y educational q u e s t i o n s t o t h e jury on v o i r d i r e . Since e i g h t days w e r e consumed on v o i r d i r e with f i v e paid a t t o r n e y s p a r t i c i - p a t i n g t h e r e i n f o r t h e defense, M r . Stephens c o n s e r v a t i v e l y used more than one f o u r t h of t h e t i m e , o r over two days asking educational ques- t i o n s over p r o t e s t s of t h i s c o u r t . M r . Stephens a s k s 286.00 per day f o r t h e t r i a l , m u l t i p l i e d by 5 equals $1430.00 per day, and f o r two days t h e t o t a l sum wasted by M r . Stephens i s $2,860.00." The Big Horn County commissioners paid o n l y t h e sum approved by Judge Allen. Thereafter r e l a t o r f i l e d a n o r i g i n a l proceeding i n t h i s Court seeking a w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l o r o t h e r a p p r o p r i a t e w r i t t o review t h e reduction i n h i s claim f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , he seeks payment of t h e disallowed $2,860 f o r h i s s e r v i c e s a t t h e t r i a l , $1,250 a s a t t o r n e y f e e s i n t h i s proceed- i n g , and h i s c o s t s and disbursements h e r e i n . Following ex p a r t e p r e s e n t a t i o n , r e l a t o r ' s a p p l i c a t i o n w a s set f o r adversary hearing and heard on A p r i l 8 , 1976. Re- l a t o r and Judge Allen appeared pro se; J a m e s E. Seykora, county a t t o r n e y , appeared on behalf of t h e county commissioners, and Robert J. Sewell appeared on behalf of t h e Montana Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, amicus c u r i a e . The m a t t e r w a s taken under advisement following b r i e f s and o r a l argument. Two i s s u e s a r e before t h e Court: (1) Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t abuse its d i s c r e t i o n i n d i s - allowing $2,860 i n a t t o r n e y f e e s ? ( 2 ) Should r e l a t o r be awarded a n a d d i t i o n a l a t t o r n e y f e e of $1,250 i n t h i s proceeding? On t h e f i r s t i s s u e , t h e g i s t of r e l a t o r ' s c o n t e n t i o n is t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s r e d u c t i o n i n h i s a t t o r n e y f e e was un- l a w f u l l y imposed a s punishment f o r h i s conduct a t t h e t r i a l . H e argues t h a t t h i s a c t i o n by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t breached an express agreement between c o u r t and counsel on a t t o r n e y f e e s ; amounted t o a "taking" of h i s property without due process of l a w ; had a " c h i l l i n g e f f e c t " on h i s c l i e n t ' s r i g h t t o t h e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s - t a n c e of counsel i n v i o l a t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantees; and w a s a r b i t r a r y , c a p r i c i o u s and beyond t h e power of t h e c o u r t . Respondents, on t h e o t h e r hand, contend t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d n o t abuse its d i s c r e t i o n i n i t s award of a t t o r n e y f e e s t o r e l a t o r . They deny t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t exceeded its j u r i s d i c t i o n o r t h a t t h e c o u r t breached any agreement on allowance of a t t o r n e y f e e s . A t t h e o u t s e t w e a r e confronted with f a c t u a l d i s p u t e s concerning r e l a t o r ' s v o i r d i r e examination of prospective j u r o r s and whether he was repeatedly admonished by t h e c o u r t . W e cannot r e s o l v e t h e s e d i s p u t e s without a verbatim t r a n s c r i p t of t h e v o i r d i r e . W e have but a p a r t i a l t r a n s c r i p t before u s , con- t a i n i n g only excerpts of t h e v o i r d i r e with r e s p e c t t o motions by counsel f o r t h e prosecution and t h e defense. Under t h e s e circumstances w e r e l y on t h e presumption t h a t t h e c o u r t order c o r r e c t l y s t a t e s t h e f a c t s on which it i s based. Jones v. Continental O i l Co., 130 Mont. 267, 300 P.2d 518, and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n ; S t a t e ex r e l . Elakovich v. Zbitnoff, 142 Mont. 576, 386 P.2d 343. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s order i s presumed t o be c o r r e c t , and r e l a t o r must c a r r y t h e burden t o overcome t h i s presumption. S t a t e ex rel. Elakovich v. Zbitnoff, supra; Nissen v. Western Construction Equipment Co., 133 Mont. 143, 320 P.2d 997. W e f i n d nothing i n t h e abbreviated record t o overcome t h i s presumption. Accordingly, w e accept t h e statements i n t h e c o u r t order t h a t r e l a t o r consumed over two days time asking educational questions on v o i r d i r e over repeated admonitions and p r o t e s t s of t h e c o u r t . Montana's s t a t u t e governing payment f o r s e r v i c e s of c o u r t appointed counsel f o r i n d i g e n t s i n c r i m i n a l c a s e s , provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "Remuneration of appointed counsel. Whenever, i n a criminal a c t i o n o r proceeding, an a t t o r n e y a t law r e p r e s e n t s o r defends any person by order of t h e c o u r t , on t h e ground t h a t t h e person i s f i n a n c i a l l y unable t o employ counsel, such a t t o r - ney s h a l l be paid f o r h i s s e r v i c e s such sum as a d i s t r i c t c o u r t o r j u s t i c e of t h e s t a t e supreme c o u r t c e r t i f i e s t o be a reasonable compensation t h e r e f o r and s h a l l be reimbursed f o r reasonable c o s t s incurred i n t h e criminal proceeding. Such c o s t s s h a l l be chargeable t o t h e county i n which t h e proceeding a r o s e [ s u b j e c t t o exceptions n o t p e r t i n e n t here] . I' (Bracketed phrase supplied. ) Section 95-1005, R.C.M. 1947. "Reasonable compensation" t o r e l a t o r is required by t h i s s t a t u t e . The determination of "reasonable compensation" is a d i s c r e t i o n a r y function of the judge under the statute. The exercise of a judge's discretion will not be disturbed absent abuse thereof. Luebben v. Metlen, 110 Mont. 350, UOP.2d 935. We hold Judge Allen did not abuse his discretion to the extent that he refused to compensate relator for what the judge considered to be two days wasted time in "asking purely educa- tional questions" of prospective jurors on voir dire "in spite of many admonitions by the court" and "over protests by the court". Even the abbreviated transcript before us indicates instances in which relator's voir dire examination was conducted to establish "rapport" with the prospective jurors, to "educate" them, and to point out the disparity of investigative resources available to the state in comparison to the defendant. This type of question- ing is extraneous to the legitimate objects of voir dire. See Commentary to § , 7.2(c), p. 263, ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecuting Function and the Defense Function, Approved Draft. The purpose of voir dire is simply to enable counsel to determine the existence of bias and prejudice on the part of prospective jurors and to enable counsel to exercise intelligently his peremptory challenges. State v. Smith, 57 Mont. 563, 190 P. 107; ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, 5 2.4, pp. 325, 326. We consider it well within a proper exercise of the judge's discretion to disallow compensation for substantial amounts of time consumed in improper, unnecessary or useless services. Reasonable compensation within the meaning of the statute does not require payment for such services. To the extent the judge refused to compensate relator for such services, his action does not constitute an unlawful punishment of relator for his conduct at the trial. There is nothing unlawful in refusing payment of compensation that is not reasonable, as the judge did here. Such refusal does not constitute punishment i n a l e g a l sense, nor is t h e r e any i n d i c a t i o n t h a t it was imposed a s a n a l t e r n a t i v e t o a f i n e i n a contempt pro- ceeding. Relator f u r t h e r argues t h e a c t i o n of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t breached an express agreement between c o u r t and counsel t o pay him $25 per hour f o r h i s s e r v i c e s . H e p o i n t s o u t t h a t counsel f o r t h e o t h e r defendants w e r e paid on t h i s b a s i s , y e t h i s c l a i m f o r s e r v i c e s a t t h i s r a t e w a s disallowed i n p a r t . W e do n o t consider t h a t a general agreement t o pay counsel a t t h e r a t e of $ 2 5 per hour i s breached by r e f u s a l t o pay f o r s e r v i c e s t h a t a r e improper, unnecessary o r u s e l e s s . To hold otherwise would render t h e s t a t u t o r y l i m i t a t i o n of "reasonable compensation" meaningless. R e l a t o r ' s contention t h a t r e f u s a l t o pay adequate compen- s a t i o n f o r h i s s e r v i c e s amounts t o a "taking" of h i s property without due process of law cannot be s u s t a i n e d . It has been held t h a t t h i s i s n o t a d e p r i v a t i o n of t h e a t t o r n e y ' s property without j u s t compensation i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e due process c l a u s e of t h e F i f t h Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . United S t a t e s v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, cert.den. 382 U.S. 978, and c a s e s c o l l e c t - ed i n Appendix a t p. 637. The same reasoning and r e s u l t a p p l i e s under t h e Fourteenth Amendment due process c l a u s e t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and under t h e due process c l a u s e of Montana's C o n s t i t u t i o n , Art. 11, Sec. 17. There i s simply no t a k i n g of property i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l sense. Relator a l s o claims t h e a c t i o n of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t had a " c h i l l i n g e f f e c t " on h i s c l i e n t ' s r i g h t t o t h e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s - t a n c e of counsel guaranteed by t h e S i x t h Amendment t o t h e United States Constitution. It i s d i f f i c u l t t o see how t h i s could be here, a s r e l a t o r apparently proceeded much i n h i s own f a s h i o n i n any event. Considering t h e broad q u e s t i o n o f whether inadequately compensated counsel d e n i e s t h e defendant adequate r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h e r e appears t o be a s p l i t of a u t h o r i t y . It has been s t a t e d t h a t t h e c o u r t s generally have r e j e c t e d t h i s contention. ABA Standards Relating t o Providing Defense Services, Approved Draft, Commentary t o B 2 . 4 ( c ) , p. 33; S t a t e v. Rush, 46 N . J . 399, 217 A.2d 4 4 1 . Other cases hold t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s an impairment of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t of a s s i s t a n c e of counsel. S t a t e ex rel. Brundage v. Eide, 83 Wash.2d 676, 521 P.2d 706; Bradshaw v. B a l l , K y . (1972), 487 S.W. 2d 294. Be t h a t a s it may, w e do not con- s i d e r t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantee of e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel impaired by d e n i a l of compensation t h a t is not reasonable. W e a f f i r m t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s reduction of r e l a t o r ' s claim f o r s e r v i c e s by two days t i m e a t $286 per day o r a t o t a l of $572, a s a reasonable e x e r c i s e of d i s c r e t i o n . However, t h e order of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a l s o reduced re- l a t o r ' s claim f o r s e r v i c e s by an a d d i t i o n a l $2,288 t o cover wasting t h e t i m e of four o t h e r a t t o r n e y s f o r 2 days. This was an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n and must be set a s i d e . The disallowance of t h e a d d i t i o n a l $2,288 was imposed i n t h e nature of l i q u i d a t e d damages a g a i n s t r e l a t o r f o r h i s conduct a t t h e t r i a l . I t bore no r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e remaining s e r v i c e s a c t u a l l y performed by r e l a t o r . I t denied r e l a t o r reasonable com- pensation f o r t h e s e s e r v i c e s . It v i o l a t e d t h e compensation s t a t - u t e , s e c t i o n 95-1005, R.C.M. 1947. It exceeded by more than f o u r times t h e maximum f i n e f o r contempt. Section 93-9810, R.C.M. 1947. On r e l a t o r ' s second i s s u e , we d e c l i n e t o g r a n t r e l a t o r $1,250 o r any o t h e r sum a s a t t o r n e y f e e s f o r t h i s o r i g i n a l pro- ceeding. There i s no s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y f o r granting a t t o r n e y f e e s i n an a c t i o n t o recover an a t t o r n e y ' s claim f o r s e r v i c e s under s e c t i o n 45-602, R.C.M. 1947. Neither is t h e r e a u t h o r i t y f o r granting a t t o r n e y f e e s on a w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l . I f w e p i e r c e form and consider t h i s an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r w r i t of mandate f o r which a t t o r n e y f e e s can be awarded i n t h e c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n , w e d e c l i n e t o award them i n t h i s i n s t a n c e a s r e l a t o r ' s own conduct was t h e fountainhead of t h i s proceeding. I n summary, t h e o r d e r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s vacated. This cause i s remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t w i t h d i r e c t i o n s t o approve r e l a t o r ' s claim i n t h e a d d i t i o n a l sum of $2,288 and o r d e r payment f o r t h w i t h . Each p a r t y s h a l l bear h i s own c o s t s . J u s t i c e A Chief J u s t i c e Mr. Justice Gene R . Daly dissenting: I do not agree that "reasonable compensation" as required by the statute ever envisioned the extraction of summary penalties by the judge from the fees and costs of public paid lawyers in lieu of imposing the generally recognized sanction of contempt -- if the situation requires a penalty for misconduct at trial. The real mischief that I perceive here is that in allowing this kind of procedure under the guise of "discretionf' f t in allowing reasonable fees" smaclcs of class discrimination because it can only be applied against the economically disadvantaged who are compelled to accept state paid counsel. If a lawyer is representing a economically advantaged person at the same trial and was equally guilty, the court could not impose summary penalties against him because his fee is not in the hands of the state. Therefore, the judge would have to resort to contemp proceedings, designed to apply to all who appear before his bench. I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O F M O N T A N A No. 13282 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A ex rel. R O B E R T L. STEPHENS, J R . , Relator, VS. T H E DISTRICT C O U R T O F THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , i n and f o r t h e COUNTY O F B I G HORN, HON. NAT ALLEN presiding, e t a l . , Respondents. O R D E R PER CURIAM: A p e t i t i o n f o r rehearing having been f i l e d by respon- d e n t s herein, I T IS ORDERED: (1) That paragraph 3 and t h e f i r s t sentence of para- graph 4 of t h e o r i g i n a l opinion be d e l e t e d and t h e following s u b s t i t u t e d t h e r e f o r : "Relator submitted t h r e e claims f o r h i s s e r v i c e s p r i o r t o t r i a l i n t h e t o t a l amount of $5,528.59 which Judge Allen c u t t o a t o t a l of $4,618.89. Costs t o t a l l i n g $516 i n t h e s e t h r e e claims w a s approved. None of t h e s e claims o r allowances is contested i n t h i s proceeding. "Radi was subsequently t r i e d by jury with four o t h e r defendants. Following t r i a l , r e l a t o r sub- mitted a f o u r t h claim f o r h i s services and ex- penses t o Judge Allen. This c l a i m as submitted w a s f o r $5,806.50 f o r 194 1/2 hours of s e r v i c e s a t $25 per hour and miscellaneous o u t of pocket expenses. It is t h i s c l a i m which i s t h e s u b j e c t of t h i s proceeding. "Judge a l l e n approved t h i s f o u r t h claim f o r $2,746 only." (2) That with t h e foregoing s u b s t i t u t i o n , t h e p e t i t i o n f o r rehearing is denied. DATED t h i s 4th day of June, 1976.