Case Title: Wheeler & Lewis v. Slifer

Citation: 577 P.2d 1092

Docket Number: C-1282

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1978-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
577 P.2d 1092 (1978) WHEELER & LEWIS, Petitioner, v. Cecil S. SLIFER, Respondent. No. C-1282. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. April 24, 1978. Rehearing Denied May 15, 1978. Margaret Bates Ellison, Denver, for petitioner. Fischer & Wilmarth, Elery Wilmarth, G. William Beardslee, Fort Collins, for respondent. ERICKSON, Justice. We granted certiorari to review Slifer v. Wheeler & Lewis, Colo.App., 567 P.2d 388 *1093 (1977). We reverse and remand with directions. On July 14, 1969, Wheeler & Lewis (Architects), the petitioners, and Poudre School District # R-1 (District) executed a contract for various services required in connection with the planning and construction of several buildings in the Fort Collins area. The Architects designed a new high school building pursuant to the contract, and the District, thereafter, engaged the G. E. Johnson Construction Company as the general contractor for the project. The general contractor, in turn, subcontracted with Rocky Mountain Prestress, Inc. for the fabrication and erection of all structural members of the high school building. Cecil Slifer, the respondent, was employed by Rocky Mountain Prestress, Inc., as a welder-carpenter on the high school project. On June 3, 1972, Slifer suffered severe injuries to the heels of his feet when the section of roof upon which he was working collapsed. The evidence presented at trial established that the accident resulted from insufficient bracing and shoring of the roof. Slifer subsequently initiated this action against the Architects to recover damages for the injuries which he sustained. Trial to a jury resulted in a verdict in Slifer's favor. The trial court thereafter entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the Architects. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that the Architects owed a duty to Slifer and asserted that the record contained sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the duty had been breached. The Architects' liability in this case was premised upon the breach of a contractual duty owed by the Architects to the workmen engaged at the construction site. Slifer contended, and the court of appeals held, that the contract between the Architects and the District and the contract between the District and the general contractor imposed the duty upon the Architects "to see that reasonable precautions were taken in protecting the workmen on the site from unsafe conditions." We disagree. A split of authority exists among the jurisdictions which have considered whether an architect, contractually responsible for supervision of a construction project, is liable for injuries sustained by workmen as a result of unsafe working conditions. See Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 869 (1974); AIA, Legal Citator of Building and Construction Contracts; AIA, Architects Handbook of Professional Practice; K. Davidson, The Liability of Architects, 13 TRIAL 20 (June 1977). Several courts have held that architects have extensive supervisory duties and have imposed liability. Swarthout v. Beard, 33 Mich.App. 395, 190 N.W.2d 373 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 388 Mich. 637, 202 N.W.2d 300 (1972); Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967). We however, believe the better rule is found in those jurisdictions which have refused to impose liability absent a clear assumption of duty. Krieger v. J. E. Greiner Co., Inc., Md., 382 A.2d 1069 (Court of Appeals # 48, announced February 9, 1978); Walters v. Kellam & Foley, Ind.App., 360 N.E.2d 199 (1977); Brown v. Gamble Construction Co., Inc., 537 S.W.2d 685 (Mo.App.1976); Vonasek v. Hirsch And Stevens, Inc., 65 Wis.2d 1, 221 N.W.2d 815 (1974); Seeney v. Dover Country Club Apartments, Inc., Del., 318 A.2d 619 (1974); Jackson v. Sergent, Hauskins & Beckwith Engineers, Inc., 20 Ariz.App. 330, 512 P.2d 862 (1973); Reber v. Chandler High School District #202, 13 Ariz.App. 133, 474 P.2d 852 (1970); Walker v. Wittenberg, Delony & Davidson, Inc., 241 Ark. 525, 412 S.W.2d 621 (1966), reh. granted, 242 Ark. 97, 412 S.W.2d 621, 626 (1967); Day v. National United States Radiator Corp., 241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660 (1961). The relevant contractual provisions in this case provided: "Architects-District Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The court of appeals concluded that the contracts imposed the duty upon the Architects to stop the work if necessary to enforce the provisions of the contract between the district and the general contractor. Since the duty to "take all necessary precautions for the safety of employees on the work" was included in the provisions of the general contractor's contract, the court held that the architect had the duty "to supervise erection of the building so as to ensure that the same would be accomplished in a reasonably safe manner." *1095 We conclude, as a matter of law, however, that the terms of both contracts are unambiguous and insufficient to support a conclusion that the parties intended the Architects have the duty of supervising the method and manner of construction to insure that the work be performed safely. The provisions, when considered in the context of the entire contract, merely evidence an intention that the Architects exercise such supervision as is necessary to assure that the work comply with the plans and specifications prepared by the Architects. The court in Walker v. Wittenberg, Delony & Davidson, Inc., supra, considered similar contractual provisions and concluded: The analysis found in Walker v. Wittenberg, Delony & Davidson, Inc., supra, is applicable to this case and is consistent with the respective duties imposed upon the Architects and general contractor. Additional evidence of the parties' intent is found in the contractual provisions that the Architects did not guarantee the performance of contracts for work and would not be responsible for a contractor's failure to carry out the construction work in accordance with the contractual documents. These provisions negate the contention that the Architects agreed to supervise and ensure the performance of each detailed provision of the contractor's contract. The Architects' authority to stop the work whenever necessary to ensure the proper execution of the contracts, in the context of the entire contract, is, therefore, inconsistent with the imposition of a duty to supervise and stop construction if the method of construction might be unsafe. Courts in other jurisdictions, however, have held that the right to stop work imposes a duty upon the supervising architect to stop the work if the safety of workmen might be endangered. Miller v. DeWitt, supra. We reject the Miller v. DeWitt interpretation and agree with the court's discussion of such cases in Reber v. Chandler High School District #202, supra: The limited nature of the Architects' duty of supervision is supported by the express contractual provision that the Architects were not required to provide the detailed supervision that would have been necessary had a "clerk-of-the-works" been required. The general rule applicable to the Architects' contractual duty in this case was stated in Day v. National United States Radiator Corp., supra: The contractual provisions in this case, considered in the context of the entire contract, do not support a conclusion that the Architects had the duty to supervise the methods and details of construction to ensure the safety of the workmen on the site. The duty of supervision in this case is more consonant with the intention that the Architects exercise such supervision as is necessary to ensure that the contractor's work complies with the plans and specifications prepared by the Architects. Before an architect will be held to have agreed to exercise direct control over a contractor with respect to day-to-day safety precautions, the duty must clearly appear in the contract. Since the Architects, as a matter of law, had no duty to supervise the construction precautions taken for the safety of the workmen, the trial court properly entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. C.R.C.P. 50(b). Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals with directions to reinstate the trial court's judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict. GROVES, J., does not participate. CARRIGAN, J., dissents.