Case Title: People v. Bell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89520

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 89520-Agenda 9-January 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.								TERRELL W. BELL, JR., Appellant.
Opinion filed May 24, 2001.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	In this appeal, we determine the proper test for ascertaining
whether offenses arise from an unrelated course of conduct for
purposes of imposing extended-term sentences under section
5-8-2(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections. 730 ILCS
5/5-8-2(a) (West 1998).
BACKGROUND
	Evidence produced at trial established the following facts. On
August 20, 1996, defendant and two friends, Ronald Smith and
Andre Anderson, visited Chuck and Charlie's Tavern in Quincy,
Illinois. Terry Powell, an acquaintance of defendant, was also
present at the tavern. When Powell left the tavern, defendant,
Smith, and Anderson followed him into an alley and attacked him.
The men hit and kicked Powell, and defendant struck him several
times with a pool cue stick or a mop handle. At some point during
the beating, defendant took money from Powell's trousers. The
men then continued to hit and kick Powell. The entire beating
lasted approximately 15 minutes.
	Defendant was subsequently apprehended and charged with
armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 1998)), robbery (720
ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 1998)) and two counts of aggravated battery
(720 ILCS 5/12-4(a), (b)(1) (West 1998)).(1) On January 14, 1998,
a jury in the circuit court of Adams County convicted defendant of
one count of armed robbery, one count of robbery and two counts
of aggravated battery. At defendant's sentencing hearing on
February 20, 1998, the State sought a total sentence of 30 to 50
years' imprisonment. Defendant requested leniency, due to his age
of 24 years and his rehabilitative potential. The circuit court
sentenced defendant to a term of 20 years' imprisonment for the
armed robbery conviction. The circuit court also imposed an
extended-term sentence of 10 years' imprisonment pursuant to
section 5-8-2(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS
5/5-8-2(a) (West 1998)) for the aggravated battery conviction.
The sentences were ordered to run concurrently pursuant to section
5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS
5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998)) because the court found that the armed
robbery and aggravated battery were the result of a "single course
of conduct."
	Defendant appealed. On appeal, defendant argued that: (1) the
trial court's sentences were an abuse of discretion in light of
defendant's rehabilitative potential; and (2) the trial court erred in
imposing an extended-term sentence for defendant's aggravated
battery conviction. With respect to his second argument, defendant
contended that, because his convictions arose from a single course
of conduct, he was eligible to receive an extended-term sentence
only on the more serious class offense of armed robbery.
	The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when sentencing defendant. 313 Ill. App. 3d 280, 283.
The appellate court also rejected defendant's argument that he was
ineligible to receive an extended-term sentence for the aggravated
battery conviction. 313 Ill. App. 3d at 286. The appellate court
stated that, according to this court's decision in People v. Jordan,
103 Ill. 2d 192 (1984), a defendant convicted of multiple offenses
may be sentenced to an extended-term sentence, pursuant to
section 5-8-2(a), only on those offenses within the most serious
class. 313 Ill. App. 3d at 283. The appellate court further noted,
however, that under section 5-8-2(a), extended-term sentences
may be imposed on differing class offenses that arise from
"unrelated courses of conduct." 313 Ill. App. 3d at 283, citing
People v. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247, 257 (1995). In this case, the
appellate court determined that defendant's armed robbery and
aggravated battery convictions arose from an "unrelated course of
conduct," and, therefore, he was eligible to receive an extended-term sentence for the aggravated battery conviction pursuant to
section 5-8-2(a). 313 Ill. App. 3d at 286.
	In holding that defendant was eligible to receive an extended-term sentence, the appellate court reasoned that there were two
possible tests for determining if a defendant's offenses arise from
an "unrelated course of conduct." 313 Ill. App. 3d at 285. One test
is derived from section 5-8-4(a) of the Code (730 ILCS
5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998)), which controls the imposition of
consecutive sentences for multiple convictions. Section 5-8-4(a)
states:
		"The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for
offenses which were committed as part of a single course
of conduct during which there was no substantial change
in the nature of the criminal objective, unless, one of the
offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class
X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe
bodily injury, or where the defendant was convicted of a
violation of Section 12-13, 12-14, or 12-14.1 of the
Criminal Code of 1961 ***." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West
1998).
Therefore, generally, under section 5-8-4(a) consecutive
sentences will not be imposed where a defendant commits
offenses that were part of a "single course of conduct during which
there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal
objective." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998). This test is
frequently referred to as the "independent motivation" test. See,
e.g., People v. Kagan, 283 Ill. App. 3d 212, 220 (1996); People v.
Fritz, 225 Ill. App. 3d 624, 629 (1992); People v. Harris, 220 Ill.
App. 3d 31, 32 (1991); People v. Ingram, 84 Ill. App. 3d 495, 498
(1980); People v. Siglar, 18 Ill. App. 3d 381, 383 (1974).
	The second test considered by the appellate court was the
"multiple acts test" (313 Ill. App. 3d at 285), which was originally
discussed in the context of extended-term sentences in a special
concurrence by Justice Cook in People v. Keene, 296 Ill. App. 3d
183, 191 (1998) (Cook, J., specially concurring).(2) Under the
"multiple acts test," offenses arise from an "unrelated course of
conduct" when the offenses are supported by more than one
physical act, unless one offense is an included offense. 313 Ill.
App. 3d at 284-85.
	Examining the two tests, the appellate court concluded that
the section 5-8-4(a) test-whether there was a "substantial change
in the nature of [a defendant's] criminal objective"-"has potential
for confusion and gives less guidance to trial courts." 313 Ill. App.
3d at 285. The court rejected that test and, instead, adopted the
multiple acts test for the purpose of determining whether multiple
offenses arise from an "unrelated course of conduct" under section
5-8-2(a).
	Applying the multiple acts test to the case at bar, the appellate
court held that defendant's offenses of armed robbery and
aggravated battery were supported by more than one physical act
and, therefore, were part of an "unrelated course of conduct." 313
Ill. App. 3d at 285. The court noted that the evidence showed
defendant struck and kicked Powell before reaching into his
trousers and taking money. Defendant then struck and kicked
Powell again. Based on these facts, the court found that
"[d]efendant's act of armed robbery, taking money from Powell's
pants while armed with a dangerous weapon, was a separate and
distinct act from defendant's act of striking and kicking [the
victim]. The act of reaching into Powell's pants and taking his
money was a separate act from the act of striking and kicking [the
victim]." 313 Ill. App. 3d at 285-86. The court held that, although
the "acts had some connection to each other, *** [defendant]
committed two separate acts and two separate crimes." 313 Ill.
App. 3d at 286. The appellate court concluded that defendant was
eligible for an extended-term sentence for aggravated battery and,
therefore, was properly sentenced. 313 Ill. App. 3d at 286.
	We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.
2d R. 315(a).
ANALYSIS
	Before this court, defendant contends that he was not eligible
for an extended-term sentence under section 5-8-2(a) of the
Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a) (West 1998))
because his offenses of armed robbery and aggravated battery were
not part of an "unrelated course of conduct."
	Section 5-8-2(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections governs
the imposition of an extended-term sentence and provides:
			"A judge shall not sentence an offender to a term of
imprisonment in excess of the maximum sentence
authorized by Section 5-8-1 for the class of the most
serious offense of which the offender was convicted
unless the factors in aggravation set forth in paragraph (b)
of Section 5-5-3.2 were found to be present." 730 ILCS
5/5-8-2(a) (West 1998).
In Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, we interpreted section 5-8-2(a) to
mean that a defendant who is convicted of multiple offenses may
be sentenced to an extended-term sentence only on those offenses
that are within the most serious class. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d  at 205-06. However, extended-term sentences may be imposed "on
separately charged, differing class offenses that arise from
unrelated courses of conduct." (Emphasis added.) Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d  at 257.
	This court has not yet adopted a test to determine whether
multiple offenses arise from an "unrelated course of conduct" for
purposes of extended-term sentencing under section 5-8-2(a).
Defendant argues that we should adopt the section 5-8-4(a) test,
used to determine whether offenses arise from a "single course of
conduct," for purposes of consecutive sentencing, to determine the
similar question of whether multiple offenses arise from an
"unrelated course of conduct" for purposes of extended-term
sentencing under section 5-8-2(a). Generally, under section
5-8-4(a), consecutive sentences will not be imposed "for offenses
which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during
which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal
objective." Thus, defendant contends that the section 5-8-4(a)
test-whether there was a "substantial change in the nature of
[defendant's] criminal objective"-should be used to determine
whether multiple offenses are part of an "unrelated course of
conduct" under section 5-8-2(a). According to defendant, the
adoption of a different test to interpret "unrelated courses of
conduct" and "single courses of conduct" will lead to confusion in
the trial courts. Defendant thus contends that the appellate court
erred in adopting the multiple acts test to determine whether
offenses are part of an "unrelated course of conduct."
	The State, in response, argues that the appellate court
correctly adopted the multiple acts test to determine whether
multiple offenses arise from an "unrelated course of conduct."
Under the multiple acts test, when two or more offenses are
supported by more than one physical act, the offenses arise from
an "unrelated course of conduct," unless one offense is an included
offense. 313 Ill. App. 3d at 284-85. The State argues that the
multiple acts test provides courts with more guidance and less
confusion than the section 5-8-4(a) test by giving courts a "clear
standard" to determine whether multiple offenses arise from an
"unrelated course of conduct." In addition, the State contends that
whether offenses arise from a "single" or separate course of
conduct for purposes of consecutive sentencing under section
5-8-4(a) is a separate issue from whether the offenses arise from
an "unrelated course of conduct" for purposes of extended-term
sentencing under section 5-8-2(a). According to the State, the
legislature's decision to draft two separate provisions for a
consecutive sentencing determination and an extended-term
sentencing determination indicates that the two sentencing
determinations require different standards. We disagree with the
State's contentions.
	We hold that the section 5-8-4(a) test-whether there was a
"substantial change in the nature of [defendant's] criminal
objective"-is the proper test for determining whether multiple
offenses arise from an "unrelated course of conduct" pursuant to
section 5-8-2(a). We do so for two reasons.
	First, in adopting the section 5-8-4(a) test to determine
whether offenses arise from an "unrelated course of conduct," we
minimize any confusion that may result in the trial courts if two
different tests were required to determine whether offenses are part
of a "single" or separate course of conduct under section 5-8-4(a)
and whether they are part of an "unrelated course of conduct"
under section 5-8-2(a). As we discuss below, if we were to adopt
the multiple acts test, a court could find that a defendant's offenses
were part of a "single course of conduct" and impose consecutive
sentences pursuant to section 5-8-4(a), and then find that those
same offenses were part of an "unrelated course of conduct" and
impose an extended-term sentence on a lesser class offense
pursuant to section 5-8-2(a).
	The case at bar provides an example of the confusion that
could result. Here, the trial court specifically found that
defendant's offenses were part of a "single course of conduct" and,
accordingly, sentenced him to concurrent sentences under section
5-8-4(a). The trial court then sentenced defendant to an extended-term sentence for the lesser class offense of aggravated battery.
Although neither defendant nor the State contested the trial court's
finding that defendant's offenses were part of a "single course of
conduct" under section 5-8-4(a), defendant did appeal the trial
court's imposition of an extended-term sentence. On appeal, the
appellate court applied the multiple acts test to determine whether
defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence and found
that defendant's offenses were part of an "unrelated course of
conduct." Thus, under the appellate court's reasoning, defendant's
offenses were, at the same time, part of a "single" yet "unrelated"
course of conduct. In adopting the same test to determine whether
offenses were part of a "single course of conduct" and whether the
same offenses were part of an "unrelated course of conduct," we
avoid the possibility of such an absurd result.
	Second, under the multiple acts test, virtually all offenses will
be "unrelated," because different offenses generally require proof
of different physical acts. Indeed, the State conceded at oral
argument that, under the multiple acts test, it is "a possibility" that
any two crimes would be considered unrelated, such that an
extended-term sentence would be appropriate in nearly every
situation. The only example the State could offer as to when a
court would be prohibited from imposing an extended-term
sentence on a lesser class offense would be a case in which a
defendant shoots a bullet into one person, and the bullet exits the
body of that person and enters another person, thereby killing both
persons.
	We do not believe that 5-8-2(a) should or was intended to
address such limited situations, especially because, even under the
State's "single bullet" scenario, an extended-term sentence would
not be possible. In People v. Segara, 126 Ill. 2d 70 (1988), we held
that " 'if exactly the same physical act does form the basis for
more than one offense, a defendant may still be prosecuted for
each offense, but only one conviction and sentence may be
imposed.' " Segara, 126 Ill. 2d  at 77, quoting H. Eisenberg,
Multiple Punishments for the "Same Offense" in Illinois, 11 S. Ill.
U. L.J. 217, 237 (1987). Thus, where two offenses result from the
same physical act, there would be no need to determine whether
those offenses are part of an "unrelated course of conduct,"
because only one conviction and sentence will be imposed. It
appears then that an extended-term sentence would be permissible
in essentially every situation under the multiple acts test. However,
as we have held, imposition of an extended-term sentence on a
lesser class offense is not appropriate in every situation but, rather,
is appropriate only where offenses arise from an "unrelated course
of conduct."
	The State relies upon People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551 (1977), in
which this court found problematic the use of the section 5-8-4(a)
test to determine whether a defendant convicted of multiple
offenses may have concurrent sentences imposed. King, 66 Ill. 2d 
at 564. In King, we adopted the multiple acts test for determining
whether concurrent sentences are appropriate. King, 66 Ill. 2d  at
566. However, we observed a "distinction" between the imposition
of consecutive and concurrent sentences and held that a defendant
is prejudiced if he receives "consecutive sentences for crimes
arising from multiple acts motivated by essentially the same
criminal objective." King, 66 Ill. 2d  at 565. We noted that a
defendant's criminal objective is relevant in determining whether
consecutive sentences may be imposed. King, 66 Ill. 2d  at 565.
The issue in the case at bar, whether a defendant is eligible for an
extended-term sentence, is more akin to a determination of
whether a defendant can receive consecutive sentences than it is
to a determination of whether multiple convictions and concurrent
sentences may be imposed. Indeed, we have previously relied on
section 5-8-2(a), which governs extended-term sentencing, in
construing section 5-8-4(a), which governs consecutive
sentencing. See People v. Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d 178, 229 (1989)
("Although the statute we are discussing authorizes the imposition
of consecutive sentences, rather than extended terms of
imprisonment, it too concerns a sentence of 'imprisonment' ").
Therefore, the State's reliance on King is misplaced.
	We hold that, in determining whether a defendant's multiple
offenses are part of an "unrelated course of conduct" for the
purpose of his eligibility for an extended-term sentence under
section 5-8-2(a), courts must consider whether there was a
substantial change in the nature of the defendant's criminal
objective. If there was a substantial change in the nature of the
criminal objective, the defendant's offenses are part of an
"unrelated course of conduct" and an extended-term sentence may
be imposed on differing class offenses. If, however, there was no
substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, the
defendant's offenses are not part of an unrelated course of
conduct, and an extended-term sentence may be imposed only on
those offenses within the most serious class.
	Having adopted the section 5-8-4(a) test for determining
whether multiple offenses are part of an "unrelated course of
conduct" pursuant to section 5-8-2(a), we apply that test to the
case at bar. Here, the trial court found that defendant's offenses of
armed robbery and aggravated battery were the result of a "single
course of conduct" under section 5-8-4(a). Because this finding
was not contested by either party, we accept it for the purpose of
this appeal. Based on the trial court's finding that defendant's
offenses were part of a "single course of conduct," those offenses
cannot be part of an "unrelated course of conduct." Consequently,
defendant is eligible for an extended-term sentence only on the
most serious class offense. Aggravated battery is a Class 3 felony
and is a less serious class of offense than armed robbery, a Class
X felony. 720 ILCS 5/12-4(e), 18-2(b) (West 1998). Therefore,
the trial court erred in imposing an extended-term sentence on
defendant's aggravated battery conviction.
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is reversed. We vacate the circuit court's imposition of an
extended-term sentence for defendant's aggravated battery
conviction. We remand the matter to the circuit court with
directions to resentence defendant for the aggravated battery
conviction pursuant to section 5-8-1(a)(6) of the Unified Code of
Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(6) (West 1998)).
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment vacated in part;
cause remanded with directions.
	JUSTICE GARMAN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
1.      1Defendant was also charged with one count of failure to register a
change of address as a child sex offender. 730 ILCS 150/6 (West 1998).
However, this charge was later severed upon defendant's motion. 

2.     2The multiple acts test originally was formulated by this court to
determine whether multiple convictions and concurrent sentences may
be imposed. See People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 560-66 (1977).