Case Title: Cooke v. Delaware

Citation: 

Docket Number: 519,2012

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
JAMES E. COOKE,   
§ 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendant-Below, 
§ 
Case Nos:  519, 2012 & 526, 2012 
 
Appellant,  
§ 
 
 
 
Consolidated 
 
 
§  
 
 
v. 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
§  
of the State of Delaware, in 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
and for New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0506005981 
 
Plaintiff-Below, 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  May 7, 2014 
Decided:  July 24, 2014 
 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, and RIDGELY, Justices, 
and JACOBS, Justice (Retired),∗ constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Anthony A. Figliola, Jr., Esquire, Figliola & Facciolo, Wilmington, Delaware; 
Peter W. Veith, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Appellant. 
 
 
Maria T. Knoll, Esquire, Andrew J. Vella, Esquire, Department of Justice,  
Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Appellee. 
 
 
STRINE, Chief Justice: 
 
 
                                                 
∗ Sitting by designation under Del. Const. art. IV, § 38 and 29 Del. C. § 5610(a)(2). 
1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
James E. Cooke was convicted of, among other things, raping and murdering 
Lindsey Bonistall, a 20-year-old University of Delaware student.  Cooke now seeks to 
have the judgment of convictions and the death sentence that were entered against him in 
the Superior Court vacated and to receive a new trial, or at least a new penalty hearing.  
Cooke has raised ten claims of error on appeal that defy brief summary.  But what is 
common to all of Cooke’s arguments is that none of them provides a basis for reversing 
the judgment of convictions and the death sentence that were entered against him.  The 
Superior Court took painstaking efforts in the face of Cooke’s continuous provocations 
and contemptuous behavior to respect his legitimate constitutional rights and to ensure 
that he received a fair trial and sentencing. 
What is also common to many of Cooke’s arguments is that they are grounded in 
the contention that he should be relieved of punishment because of his own inexcusable 
and incorrigible conduct.  For example, Cooke’s contumacious and disorderly behavior 
resulted in him forfeiting his right to continue to represent himself at trial.  A criminal 
defendant may forfeit his constitutional rights by disruptive and unacceptable conduct.  
The Constitution protects citizens from having our government deprive them of their 
constitutional rights, but it does not protect a citizen where his own obstreperous conduct 
impairs his interests.  
 
2 
 
II.  BACKGROUND1 
On April 30, 2005, Lindsay Bonistall was a 20-year-old student at the University 
of Delaware.  That night, Bonistall went to her friend Nicole Gengaro’s dorm room and 
watched Saturday Night Live with Gengaro, Katie Johnson, and Isabel Whiteneck (née 
Rivero).2  When the show ended at 1:00 a.m. on May 1, 2005, Bonistall left, telling her 
friends that she might stop at a convenience store along the way home to pick up some 
food because she was hungry.3  After Bonistall came home, someone broke into the 
apartment that Bonistall shared with her roommate, Christine Bush.4  Bush was out of 
town that weekend.  The intruder attacked Bonistall in her bedroom, tied her hands with 
an iron cord, and shoved a t-shirt into her mouth as a gag.5  The intruder beat Bonistall, 
striking her above her eye and on her chin, and raped her.6  The intruder then knelt on 
Bonistall’s chest and strangled her to death,7 using another t-shirt that had been tied and 
knotted around her neck like a ligature.8 
The intruder scrawled messages on the walls and countertops of the apartment.9  
The intruder wrote “KKK” at multiple locations around the apartment.  In the kitchen 
area, the intruder wrote, “WHITE Power.”  On a wall in the living room, the intruder 
                                                 
1 These facts are drawn from the Superior Court’s sentencing decision, this Court’s decision in 
Cooke’s previous appeal, Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803 (2009), and the record below. 
2 Sentencing Decision, Exhibit B to Cooke’s Opening Br. (Sept. 17, 2012) at 21-23. 
3 Sentencing Decision, Exhibit B to Cooke’s Opening Br. (Sept. 17, 2012) at 21-23. 
4 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B215-216. 
5 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B154, B168-170, B208. 
6 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B164-166. 
7 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B172-173. 
8 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A204, App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B168-170. 
9 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B279. 
3 
 
wrote, “We Want Are [sic] weed back” and “Give us Are [sic] drugs back.”  The intruder 
also wrote, “More Bodies Are going to be turn in [sic] up Dead.”10   
To eliminate evidence of the crime, the intruder doused Bonistall’s body in 
bleach.11  The intruder then dragged her body to the bathtub, put it in, covered it with 
flammable items, and set it on fire.12  The fire burned until it set off the hallway smoke 
alarm and other residents began to evacuate the apartment building.  The fire department 
was called at 2:49 a.m. and the Newark volunteer fire department responded.13  After 
putting out the fire, the firefighters discovered Bonistall’s burned body in the bathtub, 
still bound and gagged.14  The Fire Marshal determined that the fire had been 
intentionally set, and testified that the fire would have had to burn for at least an hour 
before it was put out to cause the damage it did.15  An autopsy determined that the cause 
of Bonistall’s death was strangulation, and that Bonistall was dead before the fire was 
started.16  In other words, the fire would have been set at around 1:45 a.m. at the latest, 
meaning that Bonistall was killed less than an hour after she left her friends at around 
1:00 a.m. 
                                                 
10 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A173-174; App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B205-207. 
11 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B160, B210-211. 
12 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A539; App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B171. 
13 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A538; App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B280. 
14 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A188-190; App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B155-162. 
15 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A539; Trial Transcript (Mar. 29, 2012), docket 476 (Q. “[C]an 
you please tell the jury approximately, in your opinion, approximately how long it took that fire 
to burn before the smoke reached the hallway to set off the hallway alarm?  A. I would say 
probably over an hour . . . maybe even longer . . . .”).  Cooke’s counsel confirmed the time 
estimate during cross-examination.  Trial Transcript (Mar. 29, 2012), docket 476 (“Q. And you 
believe . . . the fire may have been burning or smouldering for at least an hour?  A. It would 
almost have to be at least that long . . .”). 
16 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A204. 
4 
 
Following the murder, an anonymous person who was attempting to disguise his 
voice made at least three calls to the Newark Police Department’s 911 call center.  In the 
first call on May 2, 2005, the caller said that Bonistall’s murder was related to two break-
ins that had occurred at nearby apartments during the week before Bonistall’s murder.17  
The phone call led the Newark Police to investigate connections between Bonistall’s 
murder and the break-ins at the nearby apartments.   
The first break-in occurred four days before Bonistall was murdered.  Around 1:00 
a.m. on April 26, 2005, Cheryl Harmon returned to her apartment.  Harmon discovered 
that someone had written “I WHAT [sic] My drug Money,” “DON’T Mess With My 
Men,” and “we’ll be back” on the walls of her apartment with red fingernail polish.18  
Harmon noticed that she was missing several DVDs and two personalized rings.19  The 
point of entry was a living-room window with a pried-off lock.20  
The second break-in occurred three days later, on April 29, 2005 — the evening 
before Bonistall was murdered.  Amalia Cuadra woke up in the middle of the night 
because someone was shining a flashlight in her face.  Cuadra called out to see if it was 
her roommate, and the intruder responded, “Shut the fuck up or I’ll kill you” and “I know 
you have money.  Give me your fucking money.”21  Cuadra gave the intruder $45 in cash, 
                                                 
17 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B256-257. 
18 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A527-528. 
19 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B229. 
20 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B230-231. 
21 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A297-298. 
5 
 
but the intruder said, “Give me your fucking credit cards or I’ll kill you.”22  Cuadra gave 
him an American Express card and a VISA card.  The intruder then demanded, “Take off 
your fucking clothes or I’ll kill you.”23  Cuadra screamed for her roommate and dialed 
911 on her cell phone.  The intruder fled, taking Cuadra’s backpack, which had her name 
on it and contained an iPod and some diet pills in a tin container.24  
The anonymous caller made two additional calls to the 911 call center on May 7, 
2005.  In those calls, the anonymous caller gave detailed information about the three 
crimes, including information that had not been released to the public.25  The calls 
convinced the Newark Police that the crimes were linked and had been committed by the 
same person.  Evidence also emerged that focused the investigation on James E. Cooke.  
Cooke lived with Rochelle Campbell, his girlfriend and the mother of three of his 
children.  Campbell was pregnant with a fourth child by Cooke at the time.26  Harmon, 
Cuadra, and Bonistall’s apartments were all within a quarter mile of Cooke’s residence 
and could be seen from his back door.27  Campbell saw Cooke with the backpack from 
the Cuadra robbery in the early morning hours of April 30, 2005.28  Cooke told Campbell 
that he got the backpack from some college kids who had gotten into a car accident and 
                                                 
22 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B236-239. 
23 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B240-43. 
24 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A530-535; App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B245-248. 
25 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A542-546; App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B257, B264. 
26 Cooke has a total of fourteen children by ten different women.  Sentencing Decision, Exhibit B 
to Cooke’s Opening Brief (Sept. 17, 2012) at 29, n.22. 
27 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B282-283. 
28 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B265-66. 
6 
 
had left it outside their house.29  Cooke showed Campbell the credit cards and told 
Campbell that he was going to try to use them.  Cooke tried to use Cuadra’s VISA card at 
a nearby ATM, but it did not work because Cuadra had already cancelled the card.30  
Cooke then returned home without the backpack or the credit cards.31  
But Cuadra’s credit card company noticed that someone tried to use her stolen 
credit cards.  The Newark Police retrieved the ATM surveillance video of the person who 
tried to use the card.32  Cuadra had described the intruder as a light-skinned black male 
with bumps or freckles on his face and puffy cheeks.33  That general description matched 
Cooke.  Cuadra also said the intruder was wearing a gray hoodie, a hat, knitted gloves, 
and light blue pants.34  When Cuadra was shown the surveillance video from the ATM, 
she was fairly sure that it was the intruder,35 but when the Newark Police showed Cuadra 
a photo array including Cooke, Cuadra did not pick out Cooke’s photo.36  
The Newark Police used the ATM surveillance video from the Cuadra robbery to 
create a wanted poster for Bonistall’s murderer, which was displayed around Newark, 
including at the Payless shoe store where Cooke worked part-time.37  Campbell, Cooke’s 
coworkers from the Payless shoe store, and a woman who recognized Cooke from seeing 
                                                 
29 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B267. 
30 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A536; App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B249-251, B267, 
B270. 
31 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B267. 
32 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A536-37. 
33 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A300. 
34 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A300. 
35 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A303. 
36 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A305. 
37 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B252. 
7 
 
him playing basketball in nearby Dickey Park, all identified Cooke as the man in the 
posters.  They based their identification in part on the distinctive way the man in the 
poster stood on his toes and the type of gloves he was wearing.  Both the distinctive foot 
position and the gloves were characteristics these witnesses associated with Cooke.38  
The gloves contained small grips on the inside of the hand in a dotted pattern.39  The 
same dotted grip pattern from the gloves was found on the balcony railing outside 
Bonistall’s apartment, on a CD cover in her living room, and on her bed sheets.40  
Campbell also later testified that she was 100 percent certain that the voice on all of the 
911 calls was Cooke.41   
Cooke quit his job without notice after the murder, left Newark, and went to 
Atlantic City.42  Cooke then committed four more violent crimes, including three home 
invasions.43  In one, Cooke entered the apartment through a second floor window, and 
when the victim woke up she saw Cooke sitting on her bed.  Cooke started to choke the 
victim before taking several of her credit cards and a necklace.  As Cooke was leaving, he 
tugged at the victim’s underwear, but then did not go further.  The victims from those 
four crimes identified Cooke as the perpetrator, and Cooke admitted to committing those 
four crimes. 
                                                 
38 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A540-541  
39 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B262. 
40 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B209, B212-213. 
41 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A325-327. 
42 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B269. 
43 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B269, B297-304; Sentencing Decision, Exhibit B to 
Cooke’s Opening Brief (Sept. 17, 2012) at 38-41. 
8 
 
Cooke was arrested on June 7, 2005 in connection with the murder of Bonistall.  
Cooke was then charged with Murder First Degree (2 counts – the second count being 
felony murder); Rape First Degree; Burglary First Degree; Arson First Degree; Reckless 
Endangering First Degree; Burglary Second Degree (2 counts); Robbery Second Degree; 
and Misdemeanor Theft (2 counts).  After Cooke was arrested, he was interrogated by 
Detective Andrew Rubin of the Newark Police Department for four to six hours.  Cooke 
told Detective Rubin that he did not know Bonistall.44  But when Cooke was arrested at 
his sister’s house, a hoodie was discovered at the house that had Bonistall’s hair on it.45  
Investigators analyzed the handwriting of the messages left on the walls in Bonistall’s 
and Harmon’s apartments and determined that Cooke could have written both.46  
Investigators analyzed the scrapings recovered from Bonistall’s fingernails and 
determined that they matched Cooke’s DNA, as did the sample of semen taken from 
Bonistall’s vagina.47  After the evidence showed that Cooke had contact with Bonistall, 
Cooke did a one-eighty.  Cooke then said that he not only knew Bonistall, but also 
claimed that they had smoked marijuana together and had consensual sex on the evening 
of Friday, April 29, 2005, more than 24 hours before Bonistall’s death and the same night 
Cooke broke into Cuadra’s apartment and stole her backpack and credit cards.  But 
Cooke said that he did not kill Bonistall.48 
                                                 
44 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A365. 
45 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B275. 
46 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A285. 
47 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A204-206; App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B284. 
48 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A369-71. 
9 
 
Cooke’s first trial began on February 2, 2007.  Although Cooke insisted that he 
was innocent and wished to plead not guilty, Cooke’s first set of counsel pursued a 
defense of guilty but mentally ill.  The jury found Cooke guilty of all charges on March 
8, 2007, and did not accept the contention that Cooke was mentally ill when he 
committed the crimes.  The jury unanimously recommended death at the penalty phase.  
The Superior Court sentenced Cooke to death on June 6, 2007.49  Cooke was then 
assigned a second set of counsel, who filed an appeal arguing that the guilty but mentally 
ill plea that was entered over Cooke’s objections by Cooke’s first set of counsel violated 
Cooke’s constitutional right to direct his own defense and plead not guilty.50  This Court 
agreed, and we reversed and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a new trial on 
August 17, 2009.51  The new trial was scheduled to begin in February 2011.52 
The success of Cooke’s second set of counsel in obtaining a reversal of his 
convictions and death sentence did not satisfy him.  Cooke filed multiple actions under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against his second set of counsel and a host of others in December 
                                                 
49 State v. Cooke, 2007 WL 2129018 (Del. Super. June 6, 2007). 
50 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 247 (2008) (right to plead not guilty is a 
fundamental right that a criminal defendant must waive personally and that an attorney alone 
cannot waive); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004) (“[C]ertain decisions regarding the 
exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be made for the 
defendant by a surrogate.  A defendant . . . has the ultimate authority to determine whether to 
plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
51 Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009) (defense counsel’s pursuit of a verdict of guilty but 
mentally ill despite Cooke’s repeated protestations that he was innocent and not mentally ill 
infringed Cooke’s right to plead not guilty, negated Cooke’s right to testify in his own defense, 
deprived Cooke of the right to an impartial jury, and denied Cooke the assistance of counsel).  
52 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A41. 
10 
 
2010, alleging violations of his constitutional rights.53  As a result, the Superior Court 
granted Cooke’s second set of counsel’s motion to withdraw, and the trial was 
rescheduled.  Then, due to a Supreme Court Rule change, the case was reassigned to a 
new Superior Court judge on February 24, 2011.54   
Cooke’s third set of counsel was appointed on March 7, 2011.  Cooke, however, 
became discontented with his third set of counsel too.  Therefore, on November 10, 2011, 
Cooke requested to represent himself.  A hearing on that application was held on 
November 30, 2011.  At the hearing, the Superior Court conducted a colloquy with 
Cooke to ensure that his choice to represent himself was knowing and voluntary.  The 
Superior Court made it clear that if it granted Cooke’s request to represent himself, it 
would not grant a continuance to allow Cooke more time to prepare, because Cooke was 
already familiar with the evidence against him.55  After assuring itself that Cooke 
understood the choice he was making, the Superior Court granted Cooke’s request to 
represent himself.  The Superior Court also appointed standby counsel to help Cooke 
prepare his defense, and directed standby counsel to prepare for trial in case Cooke was 
no longer able to represent himself or forfeited his right to do so. 
                                                 
53 See, e.g., Cooke v. Goldstein, 2011 WL 2119347 (D. Del. May 26, 2011); Cooke v. Herlihy, 
2011 WL 2119351 (D. Del. May 26, 2011); Cooke v. Wood, 2011 WL 1542825 (D. Del. Apr. 21, 
2011).  Nearly all of Cooke’s claims were dismissed as frivolous.  
54 Supreme Court Rule 82(b) was amended on January 6, 2011 to provide that “[i]n a Class A 
felony tried without a jury or a capital first degree murder case that is reversed and remanded by 
the Supreme Court to the Superior Court for a new trial or penalty hearing, the President Judge 
shall assign a different judge to preside over the case.” 
55 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A107-108, A115-116. 
11 
 
Cooke represented himself during the selection of the jury, and then Cooke’s 
second trial began on March 7, 2012.  But Cooke would not follow the Superior Court’s 
orders and was repeatedly disruptive and disrespectful.  Thus, on March 9, 2012, the third 
day of the State’s case-in-chief, the Superior Court determined that Cooke had forfeited 
his right to represent himself.  After a continuance to give standby counsel more time to 
prepare, standby counsel took over Cooke’s defense and completed the trial.  The jury 
found Cooke guilty of all charges except one charge of misdemeanor theft.  At the 
penalty phase, the jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of 11-1 as to felony 
murder and by a vote of 10-2 as to intentional murder.  The Superior Court sentenced 
Cooke to death on September 17, 2012.   
III.  ANALYSIS 
Cooke has raised ten different claims of error on appeal, which are not organized 
in his briefs in any thematic way.  For the sake of coherence, we analyze Cooke’s claims 
by grouping those raising common themes together.  We begin by analyzing Cooke’s 
claims that involve, in various forms, a contention that he was denied the ability to 
effectively defend himself at trial.  We next address Cooke’s contentions that the 
Superior Court’s rulings regarding the admissibility of certain evidence were erroneous.  
We then address Cooke’s contention that various issues relating to the jury’s composition 
compromised his right to an impartial jury.  We conclude by addressing Cooke’s 
contention that his death sentence fails the proportionality review required by 11 Del. C. 
§ 4209(g). 
12 
 
A.  Cooke’s Contentions That He Was Denied His Constitutional  
Right To Counsel Are Without Merit 
 
Cooke claims that his constitutional right to counsel was violated in several ways.  
First, Cooke argues that he was not afforded a fair opportunity to consult with his 
attorneys and to spend time with the record in his case during his incarceration by the 
Department of Correction before his second trial.  Second, Cooke argues that after his 
motion to represent himself was granted on November 30, 2011, he was denied the ability 
to represent himself effectively because the Superior Court did not also grant his request 
for a continuance, giving him only three months between that ruling and the start of his 
second trial on March 7, 2012 to prepare his defense.  Third, Cooke makes two mutually 
inconsistent arguments in support of his contention that his constitutional right to 
representation was denied.  In his opening brief, Cooke argues that the Superior Court 
erred by concluding on the third day of trial that Cooke had forfeited the right to 
represent himself by engaging in repeated misconduct, and would be represented by 
standby counsel for the remainder of his trial.  In his Reply Brief, Cooke changes 
position, abandoning his argument that the Superior Court erred by relieving him of the 
right to represent himself, and arguing instead that the Superior Court erred by failing to 
do so sooner.  In other words, because his own conduct was so egregious, Cooke now 
contends that the Superior Court should have relieved him of his right to self-
representation earlier, and given his standby counsel more time to play the leading role 
on his behalf.  Finally, Cooke argues that his death sentence should be vacated because, 
in the face of his ambiguous and shifting positions, his standby counsel presented 
13 
 
mitigation evidence to convince the jury to recommend and the Superior Court to give 
Cooke a life, rather than death sentence at the penalty phase.  Although Cooke sought to 
escape a death sentence, he at times opposed the presentation of mitigation evidence on 
his behalf.  Because standby counsel presented mitigating evidence, Cooke argues that 
his constitutional right to control his case was violated and that his death sentence should 
be lifted.  We now address these related arguments. 
1.  The State of Delaware Did Not Violate Cooke’s Right To Counsel 
During The Pre-Trial Preparatory Process 
 
Cooke argues that the State of Delaware, in particular the Delaware Department of 
Correction, interfered with his access to counsel by limiting the time, place, and date of 
visitation with counsel.  Cooke claims that this lack of access caused him to lose trust in 
his third set of counsel, which is why he decided to represent himself.  This Court 
reviews the alleged violation of a constitutional right de novo.56  A criminal defendant 
has a right to the effective assistance of counsel.  Denying a criminal defendant access to 
counsel “is a denial of due process of law, under both the federal and Delaware 
Constitution[s].”57  But the record demonstrates that the State did not impede Cooke’s 
access to counsel or the preparation of his defense.  Instead, the record shows that the 
State made substantial efforts to facilitate Cooke’s ability to prepare for trial, and that any 
lack of access was attributable to Cooke’s own misconduct.  To explain why that is so, 
we detail the key facts regarding this claim. 
                                                 
56 Bentley v. State, 930 A.2d 866, 871 (Del. 2007); Jones v. State, 940 A.2d 1 (Del. 2007).  
57 Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1083 (Del. 1987). 
14 
 
To begin with, it is critical that all of Cooke’s denial of representation claims be 
placed in proper context.  Cooke had a key advantage in terms of his ability to prepare for 
his trial in March 2012, because that was to be his second trial.  During the first trial in 
2007, Cooke saw the State’s case against him and amassed large files on his case.  
Furthermore, given Cooke’s situation, he had plenty of time available to ponder his case.  
Of course, Cooke’s decision to fire two sets of counsel was his own and made it 
necessary for yet another set of counsel to get up to speed.  But, that was Cooke’s own 
decision, and successor counsel also had the advantage of the files, prior briefs, and 
judicial decisions in the matter.  This context is critical to understanding the weakness of 
Cooke’s argument regarding his ability to confer with his third set of counsel in advance 
of his second trial.  That feebleness begins to emerge from the early stages of preparation 
for the second trial. 
On March 17, 2010, Cooke’s counsel requested that Cooke be moved from the 
James T. Vaughn Correctional Institution (the “Vaughn Correctional Center”) in Smyrna 
to the Howard R. Young Correctional Institution (“Gander Hill”) in Wilmington.58  The 
Superior Court granted this request on May 7, 2010, because “it is necessary to place Mr. 
Cooke in a position where counsel is more readily able to get to him without the 
restrictions imposed on counsel visits to the Vaughn Correctional Center.”59  Thus, the 
Superior Court facilitated Cooke’s access to counsel.  After his transfer, Cooke was 
placed in the disciplinary unit at Gander Hill; where he had regular access to the key files 
                                                 
58 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A41. 
59 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A43. 
15 
 
regarding his case.60  On May 21, 2010, Cooke asked to talk to the warden about moving 
into general population, but the warden was not available because it was Saturday.  
Cooke began kicking the door of his cell and screaming.61  Officers tried to subdue him, 
but Cooke continued kicking the door of his cell and screaming.  Disciplinary charges 
were brought against Cooke as a result of the incident.62 
Cooke continued to misbehave.  As noted, to facilitate Cooke’s ability to prepare 
for trial, Cooke was allowed to keep a substantial amount of legal files at hand.  But, in 
September 2010, Cooke and other inmates were seen weight-lifting 40-50 pounds of 
Cooke’s legal mail that had been wrapped in sheets.  That was a violation of prison rules 
and the mail was confiscated.63  In another incident in December 2010, Cooke remained 
in bed masturbating rather than standing at the front of his cell as required for a head 
count.  Cooke was found guilty of sexual misconduct by the prison disciplinary system.64  
Cooke claimed that the officer filed a false report and called the hearing officer a racist.65  
Because of these problems at Gander Hill, Cooke himself requested to be transferred 
back to the Vaughn Correctional Center.  Cooke’s own request was granted.   
But Cooke’s behavior did not improve.  In August 2011, Cooke was found guilty 
of another instance of sexual misconduct when he stood on his toilet and masturbated so 
                                                 
60 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B291. 
61 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B292. 
62 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B293.  
63 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B287-90. 
 
64 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B293a, B293b. 
65 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B294. 
16 
 
he could be seen by a female officer.66  Due to his disciplinary problems, and for his own 
protection, Cooke was placed in the Segregated Housing Unit (the “SHU”) and not the 
general population at the Vaughn Correctional Center.67  Because the SHU houses 
inmates who pose special dangers because of their conduct and other factors, access to 
the SHU is understandably more restrictive in order to protect prison staff, other 
prisoners, visitors, and the public at large.68  Consistent with that reality, there are 
corresponding difficulties for attorneys who are representing prisoners housed in the 
SHU, as compared to prisoners in the general population.69  On October 20, 2011, 
Cooke’s third set of counsel filed a motion to compel the State to relocate Cooke back to 
Wilmington, where the trial was being held, to increase their access to him.  Despite the 
fact that Cooke’s own behavior earned his assignment to SHU, the Superior Court 
granted the motion to transfer Cooke back to Gander Hill on November 10, 2011 to 
facilitate his access to counsel.  Notably, Cooke told the Superior Court that he did not 
want to be transferred.70  The Superior Court explained that: “[M]y first concern is are 
you afforded effective assistance of counsel and I’ve taken the steps to answer a 
complaint by two experienced counsel that they had difficulties.”71  In response to the 
                                                 
66 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B305-307. 
67 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B8. 
68 Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (“[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ 
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests” such as institutional security considerations); see also State v. Red Dog, 1993 WL 
144866 (Del. Super. Mar. 2, 1993) (applying the standard set in Turner). 
69 See App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B8 (describing the difficulties for an attorney who is 
advising a client housed in the SHU because of the increased security measures). 
70 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A78. 
71 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A79. 
17 
 
Superior Court’s efforts to assure that his attorneys could prepare the best defense 
possible for him, Cooke fired his attorneys and insulted the Superior Court.72 
Despite Cooke’s opposition, he was transferred back to Gander Hill on December 
5, 2011, ten weeks before jury selection.73  The Superior Court spoke with the warden 
and visited Gander Hill to view Cooke’s living arrangements and the law library.74  The 
Superior Court also issued an order regarding Cooke’s conditions of confinement.75  
Cooke was granted access to the law library and the technology needed to review video 
evidence.  The rule limiting the amount of materials that could be kept in Cooke’s cell 
was also waived, despite his prior misuse of legal materials.  Cooke was housed alone in 
a cell that would normally hold three people, so that he would have sufficient space to 
review the record.76  Cooke acknowledges that the Superior Court took “appropriate” 
ameliorative action — by having Cooke transferred to Gander Hill over his objections 
and by ordering special conditions for his confinement — but Cooke claims that the 
Superior Court did not take that ameliorative action until “far too long after the damage 
was administered.”77 
This record makes clear that the State of Delaware did not in any manner impair 
Cook’s ability to have adequate access to his counsel or to files necessary for trial 
                                                 
72 A80 (“[COOKE]: I’m just going to fire them . . . . They fired, period.  These attorneys is fired. 
. . .  They fired, because I don’t want them. . . .  Judge Toliver is not going to rule me.  You rule 
them, you don’t rule me.  Ha, ha, that’s it.  THE COURT: Okay -- [COOKE]: I find you to be a 
slave master and an Uncle Tom at the same time.”). 
73 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A53. 
74 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A109, A120-121. 
75 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A52-54. 
76 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A120-21. 
77 Cooke’s Opening Brief at 52. 
18 
 
preparation.78  “Situations involving interference with the assistance of counsel are 
subject to the general rule that the remedy should be tailored to the injury suffered and 
should not unnecessarily infringe society’s competing interest in the administration of 
criminal justice.”79  Here, the record shows that in order to secure Cooke’s constitutional 
rights, the Superior Court, and the Department of Correction at the Superior Court’s 
direction, granted Cooke indulgences that exceeded what he was entitled to in view of his 
own repeated misconduct.  To the extent that Cooke’s time with counsel or files was 
diminished, his own behavior was the cause.80  And, despite Cooke’s behavior, the 
amount of time he was given with counsel and his files was more than sufficient to enable 
him to present an effective defense.81  Thus, Cooke’s claim has no merit.   
                                                 
78 See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
79 Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1084 (Del. 1987). 
80 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979) (“[I]n addition to ensuring the detainees’ 
presence at trial, the effective management of the detention facility once the individual is 
confined is a valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial 
detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment.”); Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) (“[Institutional security] considerations are peculiarly 
within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of 
substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to 
these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.”). 
81 Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589-90 (1964) (“There are no mechanical tests for deciding 
when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be 
found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial 
judge at the time the request is denied.”); see also Jones v. Walker, 540 F.3d 1277, 1283 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (affirming life sentence where trial court denied continuance after defendant in 
murder case fired counsel and elected to proceed pro se on August 8 and trial began on August 
20, and trial had already been rescheduled twice due to the defendant’s conflicts with appointed 
counsel). 
19 
 
2. The Superior Court’s Denial Of Cooke’s Request For A  
Continuance Was Not An Abuse Of Discretion 
 
Cooke next argues that the Superior Court should have granted his repeated 
requests for a continuance after he fired his third set of counsel and began to represent 
himself pro se.  Cooke’s argument focuses on the fact that he only had three months from 
the date the Superior Court granted his request to represent himself until the trial began, 
and Cooke claims that approximately 90 days was not enough time to review all the 
evidence and prepare a defense in a capital murder trial.  We review the Superior Court’s 
denial of a request for a continuance for abuse of discretion.82  Requests for a continuance 
“are left to the discretion of a trial judge whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless that ruling is clearly unreasonable or capricious.”83   
Again, Cooke’s argument ignores important context and the several advantages 
that he had going into his second trial.  The hearing on Cooke’s request to represent 
himself was held on November 30, 2011, and Cooke was aware that jury selection for his 
trial was scheduled to begin on February 20, 2012.  By that time, Cooke essentially had 
been in continuous case preparation mode since his arrest in 2005.  Cooke saw the State’s 
case and all of the evidence against him at his first trial in 2007.  Cooke knew that he 
would receive a second trial when this Court reversed his convictions on August 17, 
2009, and the Superior Court issued an order on March 10, 2010 that scheduled the 
                                                 
82 Weber v. State, 971 A.2d 135, 157 (Del. 2009); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1018 (Del. 1985); 
see also United States v. Valladares, 544 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2008); Jackson v. United 
States, 330 F.2d 445, 446 (5th Cir. 1964). 
83 Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1088 (Del. 1987); Hicks v. State, 434 A.2d 377, 381 (Del. 
1981). 
20 
 
second trial for February 22, 2011.  That trial was postponed because Cooke filed a 
lawsuit only two months before the trial against the attorneys who had won his appeal 
and overturned his conviction, thereby forcing them to withdraw from the case.  
Thereafter, Cooke worked with his third set of counsel from when they were appointed 
on March 8, 2011 until he fired them on November 10, 2011.  As previously discussed, 
the Superior Court made special efforts to guarantee that Cooke could have access to all 
materials and his third set of counsel while he was preparing for the next trial.  Cooke’s 
decision to fire the third set of counsel was his own, of course, and may have been 
unwise.  But, Cooke had as a result received advice and input from three sets of 
experienced defense counsel during the lengthy period since his arrest.  
Thus, on November 30, 2011, when engaging in a colloquy with Cooke about his 
request to represent himself, the Superior Court made clear that it would not grant a 
continuance to allow Cooke more time to prepare if the request was granted, and Cooke 
indicated that he understood.84  Before the Superior Court ruled on Cooke’s request, 
Cooke’s third set of counsel suggested that if Cooke were going to represent himself, 
then the Superior Court should continue the case for one year to allow him to prepare.85  
The Superior Court responded that “whether or not [Cooke] can be prepared is one of the 
                                                 
84 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A90-91 (“THE COURT: Do you also understand there will be 
no continuance of the trial date if you represent yourself?  THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I 
understand.”). 
85 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A106. 
21 
 
pitfalls of self-representation.”86  The Superior Court also pointed out that Cooke had 
already had an opportunity to see all the evidence against him during the first trial.87  
Nonetheless, as soon as the Superior Court granted his request to represent himself, the 
first thing Cooke did was to ask for a continuance, which the Superior Court denied.88  
The Superior Court explained to Cooke that merely not being ready to proceed is not a 
basis for a continuance.89   
Then, on January 27, 2012, before the trial started, Cooke again requested a 
continuance, arguing that he did not have sufficient time to review all of the materials and 
prepare his defense.90  The Superior Court denied Cooke’s request, noting that he had 
been advised about the challenges of representing himself.91  Despite these rulings, 
Cooke continued to make requests for a continuance.92  The Superior Court denied those 
requests.93  On March 7, 2012, the first day of trial, Cooke requested both a mistrial and 
that the Superior Court judge recuse himself.  The Superior Court denied those requests 
and added: 
                                                 
86 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A107; see also A115 (“Now, if he doesn’t wish to use you, 
that’s one of the pitfalls of representing yourself.”). 
87 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A107-108 (“There’s been one trial and he’s had counsel go 
over the records and knows what has to be duplicated. . . .  But I have no intention, quite 
honestly, of continuing the trial of this matter.  This offense took place in 2005.  It’s six years 
past.  This has been known for a while.”); A115-116 (“It’s been tried once.  The evidence is -- 
whatever exists, exists.  And I am more than willing to facilitate whatever you need to have 
copied or transferred.”). 
88 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A110-119. 
89 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A117-118. 
90 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A120. 
91 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A120-126; App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B20-21. 
92 See, e.g., App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A56 (motion for continuance on Feb. 1, 2012). 
93 See, e.g., App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B30-32 (order denying motion for continuance 
on Feb.10, 2012). 
22 
 
I will not continue the trial.  I told you that at the start, when you assumed 
responsibility for your own defense, you would have to meet the same 
deadlines that I imposed upon counsel.  I know of no conspiracy.  I have no 
bias against you, one way or the other.  I have decided each issue in 
accordance with my understanding of the law and arguments of counsel, 
stand-by, State’s counsel, your own argument.94 
 
Cooke had four-and-a-half years after his first trial to prepare for his second trial, 
after having already seen the evidence presented during that first trial.  Cooke also 
knowingly and voluntarily accepted the difficulties of representing himself in his 
colloquy with the Superior Court, after being informed of the risks inherent in going 
forward without counsel, including that the Superior Court would not grant him a 
continuance.  When Cooke then decided on November 30, 2011 to fire yet another set of 
counsel and represent himself, he was thus fairly told by the Superior Court that there 
would be no continuances.95  The trial had already been postponed once because of an 
issue with Cooke’s representation.96  As it was, Cooke had another three months to 
                                                 
94 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A155-156. 
95 See Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1321 (8th Cir. 1991) (“Trial judges must be wary of 
defendants who employ complaints about counsel as dilatory tactics or for some other invidious 
motive.”); Bass v. Estelle, 646 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1983) (“The freedom to have counsel of 
one’s own choosing may not be used for purposes of delay.”); U. S. ex rel. Davis v. McMann, 
386 F.2d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 1967) (“[A] defendant may not through a deliberate process of 
discharging retained or assigned counsel whenever his case is called for trial subvert sound 
judicial administration by such delaying tactics.”). 
96 See Stevenson v. State, 709 A.2d 619, 631 (Del. 1998) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 
409 F.2d 1210, 1214 (3d Cir. 1969) (“The calendar control of modern criminal court dockets . . . 
is a sophisticated operation constantly buffeted by conflicting forces.  The accused’s rights—
such as those relating to a speedy trial, to an adequate opportunity to prepare the defense, and to 
confront witnesses—are constantly in potential or real conflict with the prosecution’s legitimate 
demands for some stability in the scheduling of cases.  The availability of prosecution witnesses 
is often critically dependent on the predictability of the trial list.  That delays and postponements 
only increase the reluctance of witnesses to appear in court, especially in criminal matters, is a 
phenomenon which scarcely needs elucidation.”); Carletti v. State, 2008 WL 5077746, *5-6 
23 
 
prepare for his second trial, a period during which the Superior Court made certain that 
Cooke was afforded special privileges — such as a cell to himself to work with his files 
and special law library access.  The Superior Court’s refusal to grant a continuance was 
amply justified by the evidence of record, and there is no plausible basis for Cooke’s 
contention that he was denied an adequate opportunity to prepare for trial.97 
3. Cooke Had A Constitutional Right To Represent Himself, But Cooke  
Forfeited That Right Through His Contumacious Behavior 
 
As discussed, Cooke elected to exercise his constitutional right to represent 
himself at his second trial.  But on the third day of the State’s case-in-chief, the Superior 
Court terminated Cooke’s self-representation and ordered standby counsel to take over 
Cooke’s defense because Cooke had repeatedly defied the Superior Court’s instructions 
to cease his disruptive and inappropriate behavior.  Cooke argued in his Opening Brief 
that the Superior Court deprived him of his constitutional right to represent himself when 
it terminated his self-representation, because — although Cooke acknowledged that he 
had been disruptive — “the disruption was caused by the State’s interference with his 
right to prepare, the [Superior] Court’s denial of his continuance request[] to properly 
prepare[,] and the appointment of unwanted stand-by counsel.”98   
Then, in his Reply Brief, Cooke’s argument changed.  Cooke now concedes that 
the Superior Court acted within its discretion when it revoked his right to represent 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Del. Dec. 3, 2008) (finding that the Court’s interest in the need for calendar control, as well as 
the efficient and effective administration of criminal justice, weighed against a continuance). 
97 Secrest v. State, 679 A.2d 58, 64 (Del. 1996) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589-90 
(1964)); Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1088 (Del. 1987). 
98 Cooke’s Opening Brief at 54. 
24 
 
himself.99  But, Cooke argues, the Superior Court unreasonably delayed by not revoking 
his right to represent himself fast enough, and that the Superior Court should have 
substituted standby counsel earlier in the proceedings to minimize the prejudice to him 
that was caused by his own misbehavior.  In other words, Cooke’s “right of self 
representation should have been terminated long before it ultimately was” because 
“Cooke’s behavior early in the stages of his self representation would have amply 
justified the right being revoked at that time.”100  Cooke also claimed in his Reply Brief 
that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel, because during the jury selection 
and the first three days of the State’s case-in-chief, Cooke’s disruptive behavior had 
already caused so much harm to his own case that his standby counsel was unable to 
represent him adequately. 
This Court reviews the alleged violation of a constitutional right de novo.101  The 
United States and Delaware Constitutions guarantee a defendant the right to represent 
himself in a criminal proceeding.102  This Court has described the right to represent 
oneself as “fundamental.”103  But, as we have also explained, that right is “not 
                                                 
99 Cooke’s Reply Brief at 12.  The Reply Brief also said that, “[t]he record before this Court is 
replete with examples of Cooke’s inappropriate behavior prior to opening statements that would 
justify revocation of his self representation rights. . . .  The record also reflects several instances 
of Cooke directing disrespectful, derogatory remarks toward the trial judge when rulings were 
not in his favor.  Similar remarks were directed toward the State.”  Cooke’s Reply Brief at 13 
(internal citations omitted).  
100 Cooke’s Reply Brief at 15. 
101 Williams v. State, 56 A.3d 1053 (Del. 2012); Stigars v. State, 674 A.2d 477, 479 (Del. 1996); 
Grace v. State, 658 A.2d 1011, 1015 (Del. 1995). 
102 U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Del. Const. Art. I, § 7; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 812-19 
(1975); Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 197 (Del. 1980). 
103 Stigars v. State, 674 A.2d 477, 479 (Del. 1996). 
25 
 
absolute.”104  The Superior Court “may terminate self-representation by a defendant who 
deliberately engages in serious and obstructive misconduct.”105  In fact, even the defense 
recognized the Superior Court’s “right to terminate pro se representation if a defendant 
refuses to follow court rules or makes it impossible for the proceedings to continue.”106   
The record shows that Cooke demanded to represent himself, and the Superior 
Court scrupulously respected his right to do so.  On November 30, 2011, the Superior 
Court held a hearing on Cooke’s request to represent himself.107  Cooke’s counsel said 
that they had explained to Cooke that they did not believe it was in his best interest to 
represent himself.  Despite that advice, Cooke said that he wished to represent himself.108  
In granting Cooke’s request, the Superior Court followed the requirements that this Court 
has articulated to govern requests of this kind.  “[B]efore accepting or rejecting a 
defendant’s motion to proceed pro se, the trial judge must determine (1) ‘if the defendant 
has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of right to counsel’ and (2) ‘inform the 
                                                 
104 Zuppo v. State, 807 A.2d 545, 547 (Del. 2002); see also Martinez v. Court of Appeal of 
California, Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000) (“A trial judge may also terminate 
self-representation or appoint ‘standby counsel’—even over the defendant’s objection—if 
necessary. . . .  [T]he government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at 
times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.”); Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 
382, 395 (2d Cir. 2008) (“As it stands, the right to self-representation is not without limits.  The 
right is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
105 Payne v. State, 367 A.2d 1010, 1017 (Del. 1976) (quoting United States v. Faretta, 422 U.S. 
806, 834 (1975)). 
106 Cooke’s Opening Brief at 53 (citing U.S. v. Brock, 159 F.3d 1077, 1079 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
107 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A85. 
108 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A86. 
26 
 
defendant of the risks inherent in going forward without the assistance of legal 
counsel.’”109 
To make the required finding, the Superior Court conducted a lengthy colloquy 
with Cooke regarding self-representation.110  The Superior Court informed Cooke that he 
would have to conduct his defense in accordance with the Rules of Evidence and 
Criminal Procedure, even if he was unfamiliar with those Rules.111  The Superior Court 
explained that it would be difficult for Cooke to do that, and that Cooke’s defense might 
be hampered by his lack of legal training.112  Cooke said that he understood.  The 
colloquy between Cooke and the Superior Court continued: 
THE COURT: Do you understand that the right of self-representation is not a 
license to be disruptive and interrupt trial proceedings and that your behavior 
and conduct during trial will be held to the same level as that of an attorney? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand. 
THE COURT: You must also follow the Court’s directions and orders. Do 
you understand that and agree? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand. 
THE COURT: Do you also agree? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand and agree. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that the right of self-representation entails 
a degree of civility and courtesy that must be shown towards the Court and 
opposing counsel during trial proceedings and that any unsolicited disruptive 
remarks made or actions taken during the course of the trial will constitute a 
forfeiture of your right of self-representation? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I understand. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that the Court does not have to advise you 
of this again and that no further warning need be provided to you?  Any 
disruptive remarks made or actions taken during the course of the trial 
                                                 
109 Williams v. State, 56 A.3d 1053, 1055 (Del. 2012) (quoting Zuppo v. State, 807 A.2d 545, 547 
(Del. 2002)); Stigars v, State, 674 A.2d 477, 479 (1996). 
110 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A86-102; App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B9-18. 
111 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A92. 
112 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A92-93. 
27 
 
proceedings could constitute a forfeiture of your right to self-representation?  
Do you understand that this will serve as your last warning, Mr. Cooke? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand.113 
 
 
After the colloquy, the Superior Court granted Cooke’s request to represent 
himself.114  But the Superior Court also appointed standby counsel to help Cooke prepare 
his defense and instructed them to be prepared to take over the case if future events 
necessitated.  To ensure that the pro se defendant’s constitutional rights are secured as 
much as possible given his choice to act as his own attorney, many courts, including our 
own, routinely appoint standby counsel to advise the pro se defendant if he chooses to 
listen.115   
Cooke’s effort to act as his own advocate did not proceed smoothly.  On March 7, 
2012, Cooke made improper comments during his opening statement about his first trial 
and the Superior Court had to send out the jury.116  The Superior Court gave Cooke 
additional instructions, then brought the jury back in and allowed Cooke to finish his 
opening statement.117  Cooke also had difficulty cross-examining one of the State’s 
witnesses, but he did accept guidance from the Superior Court and completed his 
                                                 
113 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A95-96. 
114 See Hartman v. State, 918 A.2d 1138, 1140 (Del. 2007) (“[O]nce a defendant has invoked the 
right to self-representation that decision must be honored”). 
115 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 184 (1984) (trial judge did not violate defendant’s right 
to self-representation by appointing standby counsel over defendant’s objection); Clark v. Perez, 
510 F.3d 382, 395 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A] judge may qualify it by appointing stand-by counsel, 
with or without the defendant’s consent, to aid the accused if and when the accused requests 
help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant’s 
self-representation is necessary.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
116 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A157. 
117 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A157-160.  
28 
 
questioning of the witness.118  Later, Cooke became frustrated when the Superior Court 
informed him that he could not cross-examine one of the State’s witnesses as an expert 
without first qualifying that witness as an expert.119  After Cooke began to argue with the 
Superior Court, the Superior Court released the jury for the day and said: 
THE COURT: I will give you a second admonition, I have instructed you to 
stop doing certain things, you continued, you will add things which are, at 
best untrue, concerning whatever it is you said or heard, or whatever you 
said, it has got to stop.  If it does not stop, you will, in the first instance, 
waive any right to continue to represent yourself, given the egregious nature 
that been exhibited thus far, you are going a little bit further, you will, 
perhaps, forfeit that right, which is a second problem.   
… 
I have given you as much leeway as I can.  I have told you how to get past 
certain objectionable questions, certain run-on sentences, certain use of 
certain language that no one but you understand, and that’s all I can do.  If 
you don’t stop continuing to go past what I have told you to do, then you are 
going to forfeit that right, as well as waive the right to represent yourself, and 
that would be unfortunate, given the fact that you made that request.  If you 
don’t stop, it is going to happen.  
… 
Now, if you want to represent yourself, you have to follow the rules of 
evidence, and rules of Superior Court.  When you don’t do that, that creates a 
problem.  Then you want to add argument beyond that.  I told you to stop 
that.  So if you continue, then I will revoke your right to represent yourself, 
and I am telling [counsel] and [counsel], if this continues, then they will 
become counsel for the defendant . . . .  I have gone as far as I can go.  There 
is no rancor here.  You have made some intelligent, raised some intelligent 
issues and questions, but then again, you go further and beyond what the 
Court has said you can do, consistently said you could do.  You called into 
question the integrity and credibility of the Court, counsel, and anyone who 
has been involved in this, who has done something you don’t like. . . .  You 
have to behave and obey the rules of the court. 
… 
I told you where the boundaries are.  If you go beyond that, continue to go 
beyond that, then I will determine that you can no longer represent yourself.  
                                                 
118 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A161-165. 
119 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B147. 
29 
 
You will have forfeited the right.  If you go further, you will waive the right 
to be present, or forfeit the right to be present.  I will make the appropriate 
findings if and when you continue.  Please stop, it is unnecessary, and I think 
we reached a point where you have to do some serious thinking about how 
you wish to proceed, if you wish to proceed under what circumstances.120 
 
On March 8, 2012, Cooke informed the Superior Court that he wished to continue 
to represent himself and resumed his cross examination of the State’s second witness.  
Cooke’s questioning exceeded the scope of the direct, and the State objected.121  The 
Superior Court explained that if Cooke had other questions for the witness, then he could 
call the witness back during his presentation of his case.  But Cooke continued to exceed 
the scope of the direct examination, and the Superior Court sent the jury out.122  At this 
point, Cooke told the Superior Court that it was going to hell, and Cooke said that he 
knew the Superior Court meant to harm him.123  Cooke also said, “I believe you need to 
recuse yourself because you’re evil, you got so much hatred in you.  It’s sad.”124  The 
Superior Court terminated the cross examination of the witness, but decided that it would 
not revoke Cooke’s right to represent himself until there was an opportunity to give the 
matter more thought, because “what we’re trying to do here is to make sure that you get 
as fair a trial as possible under the circumstances, even if you disagree.”125  The Superior 
Court warned Cooke, “[i]f your conduct persists in refusing to follow the dictates of the 
                                                 
120 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B147-148. 
121 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A177-179. 
122 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A192-194. 
123 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A197. 
124 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A198-199. 
125 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A199. 
30 
 
Court, then I will have to act accordingly.”126  The Superior Court took a short recess to 
allow Cooke to calm down, and the day continued without another incident.  
On March 9, 2012, Cooke immediately began to argue with the Superior Court.127 
Later that day, Cooke attempted to cross examine the State’s third witness.128  Cooke 
continued to make factual arguments and various statements instead of asking the witness 
questions.129  The Superior Court sent the jury out, and warned Cooke that:  
THE COURT: The Court . . . has determined that we need to stop these 
proceedings at this point.  Mr. Cooke, I am going so because it appears that 
you do not wish to abide by the rules and guidelines of this Court.  Now, I’m 
not in a position to argue[] with you, I would like to have you continue to 
represent yourself, but if you wish not to do so, based upon the guidelines 
and the instructions given, then I’m going to have no choice but to 
determine that you forfeited that right.  Now, again, and for the last time, I 
ask you: Do you wish to follow the instructions and guidelines of the Court? 
MR. COOKE: I have always been, Your Honor.  I’m just telling the truth.  
And I believe you hate the truth.130 
 
 
When Cooke continued to argue with the Superior Court, the Court said, “It does 
not appear to me that you wish to follow those rules and guidelines.  Now, that leaves us 
with what to do next. . . .  If you forfeit this right then, it’s gone for the balance of the 
trial.  Do you understand that?”131  Cooke responded, “I understand, Your Honor, you 
                                                 
126 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A199-200. 
127 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A207-212. 
128 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A214. 
129 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A214-215. 
130 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A217-217a. 
131 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A220. 
31 
 
forcing me.  I understand you threatening me.  You threatening me not to get a fair 
trial.”132  The exchange continued: 
MR. COOKE: Every time I cross-examine every witness and you see that I 
do the good job, you hear me, either the State jumps up and says objection, 
argumentative, and you step in, you coach along with them, and I’m shut 
down every time.  I’m going to cross-examine the witness, that’s all I can do. 
THE COURT: You going to do it your way, I assume? 
MR. COOKE: My way is not the Court way.  I didn’t come here as parties.  
I’m not part of the party.  I’m not part of this party.  I’m not a Republican, 
I’m not a Democrat. 
THE COURT: What does that have to do with it? 
MR. COOKE: That’s mainly what sits up there, don’t it? 
THE COURT: I’m sorry, sir, I don’t understand that. 
MR. COOKE: Figure it out.133 
 
The Superior Court asked standby counsel whether they would be able to proceed 
for the rest of the day, but Cooke objected, saying, “they are not working for me.  I fired 
them. . . .  They are not going to represent me.  I fired them.  I’m going to represent 
myself.”134  The Superior Court took a half hour recess, and then it asked for the views of 
the State, standby counsel, and Cooke.  Cooke again argued:  
I still deserve to represent myself.  It’s nothing I done wrong.  But if you 
chose to overlook that, then I have no choice.  But anything they do is still 
against my will.  I fired them. . . . I do believe I deserve to[] still finish out 
my representation.  And if I do wrong then snatch it.  If I do one more 
thing, then take it from me, but at least allow me to proceed.135   
 
Despite Cooke’s objections, the Superior Court determined that Cooke had forfeited his 
right to represent himself, and instructed standby counsel to take over, saying: 
                                                 
132 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A220. 
133 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A220-221. 
134 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A222-223. 
135 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A242-243. 
32 
 
And I told you before, rudeness and lack of civility would not be tolerated 
nor would the failure to comply with the rules and dictates of this Court, be 
tolerated. . . .  I do not wish to do this, but I also believe that unless I do it 
and reinstate some orderly processes, then this case will get out-of-hand. . . .  
I find that in the first instance that you forfeited your right to proceed. . . .  I 
have no -- any other way to get around it.  You have been warned 
repeatedly.  You have been disrespectful to the Court and counsel.136   
 
After a six-day continuance to give standby counsel additional time to prepare, standby 
counsel assumed control of Cooke’s defense. 
Because there is ample evidence in the record of Cooke’s disorderly conduct, the 
Superior Court’s determination that Cooke had forfeited his right to represent himself 
through his inappropriate behavior did not violate Cooke’s constitutional rights.137  
Cooke refused to follow the Superior Court’s orders regarding cross-examining the 
State’s witnesses and did not behave in a civil and courteous manner.138  After each 
instance of Cooke’s misconduct, the Superior Court sent the jury out and patiently tried 
to explain the legal basis for its decisions, while warning Cooke that he risked forfeiting 
his right to represent himself because the Court would not tolerate disrespectful behavior.   
Furthermore, Cooke’s new arguments in his Reply Brief — that the Superior 
Court waited too long to revoke Cooke’s right to represent himself and that Cooke could 
not receive effective assistance of counsel because of the damage he had already done — 
                                                 
136 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A244-248. 
137 United States v. Faretta, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (“[T]he trial judge may terminate self-
representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist 
misconduct.”); see also Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 758, 765 (Del. 2006) (“If a defendant’s 
behavior is sufficiently egregious, it will constitute forfeiture.”). 
138 Payne v. State, 367 A.2d 1010, 1017 (Del. 1976) (“Standards required of members of the Bar 
must be adhered to by defendants undertaking their own defense, and gross deviations from these 
standards constitute a waiver of the right of self representation.”). 
33 
 
are not fairly raised, because they were not made in Cooke’s Opening Brief and so the 
State has had no opportunity to respond to them.139  But even if this Court were to 
consider these new arguments, the record is clear that the Superior Court did not violate 
Cooke’s constitutional rights.  The Superior Court did not, as Cooke suggests, 
“unreasonably delay[]” in revoking Cooke’s right to represent himself;140 rather, the 
Superior Court demonstrated tremendous patience and restraint in the face of extremely 
challenging circumstances, and tried to respect Cooke’s right to represent himself for as 
long as it could.  The Superior Court also repeatedly confirmed that Cooke wanted to 
continue representing himself, and Cooke insisted that he did. 
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “trial judges confronted with 
disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient 
discretion to meet the circumstances of each case.”141  Here, Cooke’s conviction and 
sentence had already been overturned once for not respecting Cooke’s constitutional 
rights regarding his wish to plead not guilty, and the Superior Court was understandably 
chary of a similar outcome in Cooke’s second trial by failing to respect Cooke’s desire to 
represent himself.  Thus, the Superior Court repeatedly confirmed that Cooke wanted to 
continue representing himself, took extra time to explain its legal rulings, gave Cooke 
additional instructions, and sent the jury out to minimize any potential prejudice to him.  
                                                 
139 Supreme Court Rule 14(b)(vi)(A)(3) (“The merits of any argument that is not raised in the 
body of the opening brief shall be deemed waived and will not be considered by the Court on 
appeal.”). 
140 Cooke’s Reply Brief at 16. 
141 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). 
34 
 
But, at the same time, the Superior Court noted that Cooke seemed to be playing a “cat 
and mouse game” in which he was intentionally trying to disrupt the trial to further delay 
the proceedings against him.142  The Superior Court’s apt description applies equally to 
Cooke’s arguments to this Court, which involve both the notion that the Superior Court 
erroneously took away Cooke’s right to represent himself and the opposite notion that the 
Superior Court erred by failing to take away that right earlier.  This approach is 
Kafkaesque — but with the twist that it is the citizen who is seeking to ensnare the 
government in a capricious web of unfair illogic.143  Cooke’s attempt to benefit from his 
own outrageous and capricious behavior is both inequitable and without basis in the 
Constitutions of our nation and our state, particularly where the Superior Court so 
conscientiously respected his rights.  To the extent that Cooke did not optimally represent 
himself or standby Counsel was compromised in doing so, Cooke’s own voluntary 
decisions were the cause, not any conduct of the State of Delaware.144  Indeed, despite 
Cooke’s repeated misbehavior, the record reflects that the State of Delaware took 
                                                 
142 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A244-248 (“And interestingly enough, Mr. Cooke, you have 
kind of played -- and this is my view of it, but I do so find -- kind of a cat and mouse game 
where you would go, well, I’ll do what you want, yeah, and then something else will happen and 
then you’ll do something else. . . .  And what it appears to me, for purposes of delay or 
disruption, you will say yes one minute, then go back and do something else and the next time a 
witness comes through.”). 
143 Cf. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (1925). 
144 United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577, 1578 (10th Cir. 1990) (“The right to make a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel does not grant the defendant license to play a ‘cat 
and mouse’ game with the court, or by ruse or stratagem fraudulently seek to have the trial judge 
placed in a position where, in moving along the business of the court, the judge appears to be 
arbitrarily depriving the defendant of counsel.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
35 
 
expensive, patient, and time-consuming measures to secure Cooke’s right to effective 
representation. 
4. The Superior Court’s Order That Standby Counsel Should Present  
Mitigating Evidence Did Not Violate Cooke’s Rights Because Cooke’s  
Waiver Of That Right Was Ambiguous And Any Error Was Harmless 
 
Also odd is Cooke’s final argument relating to his representation.  Cooke argues 
that his death sentence should be vacated because his attorneys introduced mitigation 
evidence in an attempt to convince the jury and judge that Cooke should receive a life, 
not a death sentence.  Cooke claims that he unequivocally expressed a desire not to 
present a mitigation case and not to oppose the State’s arguments in favor of a death 
sentence.  As relief for his counsel’s supposed disregard of his desire that his counsel not 
try their best to preserve his life, Cooke now seeks to have his death sentence lifted.  
On appeal, Cooke claims that he waived his right to present mitigating evidence, 
and that the Superior Court’s order directing his standby counsel to present a mitigation 
case over his objections therefore violated his constitutional right to control his case.  
Cooke uses as the foundation of his argument the straightforward and logical proposition 
that in a death penalty case, a defendant has a constitutional right to present mitigating 
evidence to convince the sentencing authority not to give a death sentence.  Lockett v. 
Ohio and many other cases so hold.145  As this Court has also noted, the right to present 
mitigating evidence may be waived.146  Several federal Courts of Appeal have held that 
                                                 
145 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 495 (Del. 2000). 
146 Taylor v. State, 32 A.3d 374, 389 (Del. 2011). 
36 
 
the right to present mitigating evidence may be waived by a defendant,147 and this Court 
found those decisions to be “authoritative and persuasive.”148  But the State argues that 
Cooke did not waive his right clearly and unambiguously.149  This Court reviews the 
alleged violation of a constitutional right de novo.150   
To begin with, we are not convinced that a pro se criminal defendant who pleads 
not guilty and is facing a possible death sentence has suffered any cognizable 
constitutional violation where counsel presents mitigating evidence over his objection.  
At the very least, we doubt that such an argument can be made by a defendant who is not 
asking the appellate court to remedy that supposed violation by ordering its logical 
remedial corollary: that he be subjected to execution as an (admittedly morbid and 
unusual) form of relief.  Where a defendant instead argues that his death sentence should 
be vacated, the basis for holding that his constitutional rights were violated because 
mitigating evidence was introduced on his behalf to help him avoid a death sentence 
seems non-existent and illogical.  In this case, the only plausible effect of the mitigation 
evidence Cooke’s counsel submitted was to make it less — not more — likely that Cooke 
received a death sentence.  Because by his appeal Cooke seeks vacation of the death 
                                                 
147 Tyler v. Mitchell, 416 F.3d 500, 504 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Constitution does not prohibit a 
competent capital defendant from waiving the presentation of mitigation evidence.”); Singleton 
v. Lockhart, 962 F.2d 1315, 1322-23 (8th Cir. 1992) (“If a defendant may be found competent to 
waive the right of appellate review of a death sentence, we see no reason why a defendant may 
not also be found competent to waive the right to present mitigating evidence that might forestall 
the imposition of such a sentence in the first instance.”). 
148 Taylor v. State, 32 A.3d 374, 389 (Del. 2011). 
149 State’s Answering Brief at 92. 
150 Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507, 515 (Del. 2006); Hall v. State, 788 A.2d 118, 123 (Del. 
2001). 
37 
 
sentence, Cooke essentially admits that by presenting mitigation evidence in an attempt 
to convince the jury and Superior Court he should not receive the death penalty, standby 
counsel sought to comply with Cooke’s most fundamental wish, namely, to receive the 
more merciful sentence.  
We therefore are unable to fathom the notion of the supposed violation, and even 
less able to divine how any failure to follow Cooke’s ambiguous wishes could have 
resulted in harm to be remedied.  Where a defendant’s right to present mitigation 
evidence is denied, and the defendant receives a death sentence, the harm is obvious.151  
Where, by contrast, the defendant’s counsel do their utmost to submit mitigating evidence 
to obtain a life sentence for a defendant who has pled not guilty, there is no logic to 
remedying counsel’s good faith effort to protect the defendant by vacating his death 
sentence.   
Even if this Court were ever to hold that a defendant in a capital case had a 
constitutional right to demand that no mitigation evidence be presented on his own 
behalf, that would first require an unequivocal and unvarying waiver of the defendant’s 
right to present mitigation evidence.  A waiver of such a life-determinative right cannot 
shake or move, or — to draw on the Superior Court’s impression of Cooke’s behavior — 
                                                 
151 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393 (2000) (Reversing and remanding a case because “[the 
defendant] had a right—indeed, a constitutionally protected right—to provide the jury with the 
mitigating evidence that his trial counsel either failed to discover or failed to offer.”); Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (“To meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute 
must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors.”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 
104, 113-14 (1982) (“[T]he state courts must consider all relevant mitigating evidence and weigh 
it against the evidence of the aggravating circumstances.”). 
38 
 
be part of a game of cat and mouse. Where a defendant has forfeited his right to represent 
himself, he has no constitutional right to direct his counsel how to perform every aspect 
of their duties.152  A great deal of professional discretion remains for counsel, and if the 
client’s fundamental goal is to avoid a death sentence, counsel is required to pursue that 
end with professional zeal and skill.153   
Here, Cooke did not unequivocally and unvaryingly waive his right to present 
mitigation evidence.  Admittedly, the record reflects that Cooke repeatedly stated that he 
did not wish to present any mitigation evidence at a penalty hearing if he was 
convicted.154  Cooke refused to meet with the mitigation specialist, refused to be tested by 
any psychologists or psychiatrists, and initially instructed his family not to help with the 
                                                 
152 New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 115 (2000) (“[D]ecisions by counsel are generally given 
effect as to what arguments to pursue, what evidentiary objections to raise, and what agreements 
to conclude regarding the admission of evidence.”) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 
(1983); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965); and United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 
223, 226-227 (1st Cir. 1993); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988) (“The adversary 
process could not function effectively if every tactical decision required client approval.”); see 
also Am. Bar Ass’n, Criminal Justice Section Standards on Defense Function, Control and 
Direction of the Case § 5.2(b), available at www.americanbar.org/publications/ 
criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_dfunc_blk.html (“Strategic and tactical 
decisions should be made by defense counsel after consultation with the client where feasible 
and appropriate. Such decisions include what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct 
cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be made, and what 
evidence should be introduced.”). 
153 Am. Bar Ass’n, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in 
Death Penalty Cases § 10.11, Commentary (rev. ed. 2003) (emphasis added), reprinted in 31 
Hofstra L.Rev. 913, 1024 (2003), available at www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_representation/2003guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf (“Counsel 
at every stage of the case should take advantage of all appropriate opportunities to argue why 
death is not suitable punishment for their particular client.”); Am. Bar Ass’n, Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility, Canon 7-1 (2008) (“The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and the 
legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.”). 
154 See, e.g., App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A255, A394-395, A520, A524. 
39 
 
preparation of a mitigation case.155  Standby counsel stated multiple times that Cooke told 
them that he did not want them to present mitigation evidence.156  At one point, Cooke 
requested the death penalty.157  But, when the Superior Court pointedly asked Cooke if he 
was admitting that he had committed Bonistall’s rape and murder, Cooke responded, “I 
didn’t commit anything.  I am an innocent man.  Just give me the death penalty, plain and 
simple, Your Honor.”158  Cooke’s answers implied that he did not want to present 
mitigation evidence because he thought the proceedings thus far had been unfair, and he 
did not think that he could get a fair penalty phase either.159  That falls short of 
manifesting an unequivocal desire to receive a death sentence.  
                                                 
155 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A398-399, A411. 
156 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A522.  
157 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A397 (“THE DEFENDANT: I am waiving that mitigation.  I 
told you I waived it.  It is not going to be a fair hearing regards how I look at it.  THE COURT: 
You don’t wish to participate and present any witnesses or evidence?  THE DEFENDANT:  I 
waive it, because it is not going to mean anything to me.  THE COURT:  I understand you don’t 
wish to participate . . .  THE DEFENDANT:  I am not going to participate.  As a matter of fact, I 
want the death penalty, Your Honor.  Just give me death.  That’s what I deserve.  That’s what 
you want to give me.”). 
158 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A397. 
159 See, e.g., App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A394 (“THE COURT: Will you cooperate with 
[mitigation] witnesses?  MR. COOKE: No.  THE COURT: Sorry?  MR. COOKE: No, sir. I am 
not cooperating.  I don’t.  I didn’t do this crime, State know I didn’t do this crime.  Those 
attorneys know I didn’t do this crime.  They have full documents, everything.  You denied to 
hear everything I had to bring in front out of.  Why should I corroborate?  THE COURT: You 
mean cooperate?  MR. COOKE: Why should I corroborate now to please the State?”); A396 
(“THE COURT: Let me ask you a question, Mr. Cooke, because I need to understand.  Basically 
your position is I don’t see any use and any utility in having a penalty phase because the case has 
been stacked against me from the start.  THE DEFENDANT: Yes.  THE COURT: Let me finish, 
because I want to make sure I understand this.  And this has been an unfair prosecution and I 
didn’t do it.  I maintain my innocence.  And this jury only convicted me, because I’m innocent, 
because this was a corrupted function based upon activities, myself, [the original Superior Court 
judge], the prosecutors, and defense attorneys did.  Correct?  THE DEFENDANT: Yes.  Because 
I pointed these issues out.  THE COURT: I just want to make sure that’s what you’re saying.”). 
40 
 
Therefore, the Superior Court engaged in a lengthy colloquy with Cooke regarding 
the presentation of mitigation evidence, and Cooke objected to the presentation of 
mitigation evidence even though he was informed that it might have negative 
consequences for his sentence.160  But the Superior Court ordered counsel to present 
mitigation evidence because Cooke’s objections to the presentation of mitigation 
evidence appeared to be a result of Cooke’s belief that the trial was unfair, rather than a 
deliberate, merit-based decision to refrain from presenting mitigation evidence.161  The 
Superior Court said: 
[T]he defendant has maintained, and I think said it clearly in my estimation, 
that he did not get a fair trial.  He said the same thing consistently.  And 
that as a result of not having had a fair trial he sees no point in presenting 
the mitigation case, which is far different from . . . recognizing that the 
State can meet its burden and admitting -- and/or admitting, conceding that 
the imposition of the death penalty is warranted based upon the facts and 
circumstances of the case.162 
 
Thus, as Cooke acknowledged, “[t]he [Superior Court] held Cooke’s desire not to present 
a mitigation case was born out of frustration for his perceived belief that he did not get a 
fair trial.  Additionally, the [Superior Court] held that his main desire was not to 
participate in the mitigation case, not that he did not want to present a case.”163  In other 
words, the Superior Court was not confronted by a genuine acknowledgment by Cooke of 
                                                 
160 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A416. 
161 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A394 (noting that “this is further continued implementation 
of [Cooke’s] choice of strategy or decision to plead not guilty.”). 
162 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A398. 
163 Cooke’s Opening Brief at 86. 
41 
 
actual guilt and a corollary wish to die, rather than spend his life in prison, as 
punishment. 
Consistent with the Superior Court’s conclusion that Cooke had not unequivocally 
and unvaryingly decided to waive his right to present mitigating evidence during the 
penalty phase of his case, on April 26, 2012, standby counsel informed the Superior 
Court that Cooke had agreed to have two of his sons testify and that Cooke was “okay 
with the majority of the evidence” that standby counsel planned to present during 
mitigation.164  Standby counsel also represented that Cooke was “amenable at this point 
to letting us get into Joyce Johnson’s [Cooke’s social worker] testimony on Tuesday . . . 
as well as the DYFS records and Ms. Connors [the mitigation expert].”165  Two of 
Cooke’s children testified that day, and prior testimony by two of his other children was 
read into the record.166  On May 1, 2012, Johnson testified to instances of physical abuse 
perpetrated on Cooke when he was growing up.167  That same day, Connors testified to 
instances of physical abuse as well as Cooke’s family, educational, and medical history 
up to age 18.168  Then, Cooke again changed his mind and objected to the testimony from 
Connors, but stated that he wished to testify and also to use his opportunity for 
                                                 
164 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A418-419. 
165 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A419. 
166 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B308-14. 
167 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B321-329. 
168 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B330-345. 
42 
 
allocution.169  On May 2, 2012, Cooke testified and said that the mitigation evidence was 
presented against his wishes.170 
Because Cooke supported the presentation of mitigation evidence on his behalf 
during a key period of the penalty proceedings, he effectively nullified his prior 
opposition to the presentation of mitigating evidence.171  That Cooke then shifted again 
and objected to parts of the mitigating evidence after the fact simply illustrates his lack of 
consistency and clarity.  The erratic nature of Cooke’s statements regarding the 
mitigation evidence demonstrates that the Superior Court did not err in concluding that 
Cooke had not unequivocally and unvaryingly waived his right to have mitigation 
evidence presented on his behalf.172  By contrast, at all times, Cooke maintained his 
innocence, claimed he was being treated unfairly, and sought to be found not guilty.  And 
at this stage, Cooke is asking this Court to lift his death sentence, a fundamental 
expression of his desire to obtain a more favorable sentence.  Indeed, had counsel elected 
not to present mitigation evidence, we have little doubt that Cooke would now be raising 
                                                 
169 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B346.  
170 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B347. 
171 Cf. Wilson v. Walker, 204 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Once asserted, however, the right to 
self-representation may be waived through conduct indicating that one is vacillating on the issue 
or has abandoned one’s request altogether.”); Williams v. Bartlett, 44 F.3d 95, 100-01 (2d Cir. 
1994) (“The purpose of requiring that a criminal defendant make an ‘unequivocal’ request to 
waive counsel is twofold.  First, unless the request is unambiguous and unequivocal, a convicted 
defendant could have a colorable Sixth Amendment appeal regardless of how the trial judge 
rules: if his request is denied, he will assert the denial of his right to self-representation; if it is 
granted, he will assert the denial of his right to counsel.  Second, the requirement of an 
unambiguous and unequivocal request inhibits any ‘deliberate plot to manipulate the court by 
alternatively requesting, then waiving counsel.’) (internal citations omitted). 
172 See Kostyshyn v. State, 2004 WL 220321, *2 (Del. Jan. 30, 2004) (finding a series of 
disruptive, dilatory outbursts was not a “genuine, unequivocal request to proceed pro se”). 
43 
 
a claim under Strickland v. Washington173 for ineffective assistance of counsel, and 
would support that claim by pointing to the same changes of heart that we highlight here. 
Although it was not error for the Superior Court to direct standby counsel to 
present mitigation evidence, we reiterate that any arguable error in having mitigation 
evidence presented over Cooke’s objections was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.174  
Cooke’s standby counsel and the Superior Court were at a peril because of Cooke’s 
shifting position on whether and which types of mitigation evidence to present.  When 
faced with ambiguous directions from a defendant who claimed to be innocent, the 
Superior Court properly leaned in favor of preserving the defendant’s constitutional right 
to present mitigation evidence to help him avoid a death sentence.175  Faced with a 
defendant who had forfeited his right to represent himself though his behavior and who 
was unclear about his wishes, the prudent course was for counsel to do their utmost to 
obtain the most favorable sentence possible for their client.  The only possible effect of 
admitting the mitigation evidence over Cooke’s objection was to make it less likely that 
the aggravating factors would outweigh the mitigating circumstances, and thus less likely 
Cooke would receive the death penalty.  Therefore, Cooke suffered no prejudice from 
any alleged error. 
                                                 
173 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
174 See Van Arsdall v. State, 524 A.2d 3, 10-11 (Del. 1987) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967). 
175 Cf. Stigars v. State, 674 A.2d 477, 479 (Del. 1996) (“When faced with an ambiguous request 
for self-representation, a trial court should lean in favor of the right to counsel.”). 
44 
 
B.  Cooke’s Contentions That The Superior Court’s Rulings Regarding The 
Admissibility Of Certain Evidence Were Erroneous Are Without Merit 
 
1.  The Superior Court Properly Excluded Certain Evidence  
About Bonistall’s Prior Sexual Conduct 
 
At trial, Cooke sought to introduce evidence regarding Bonistall’s prior sexual 
history.  That evidence did not involve any prior sexual relationship with Cooke himself.  
Out of respect for Bonistall and the purposes served by Delaware’s Rape Shield 
Statute,176 we do not detail the evidence Cooke proffered.  Suffice it to say that even if 
that evidence were true, nothing in the evidence would distinguish Bonistall from tens of 
millions of other American college students in recent history.  The reasons Cooke gave 
for seeking to introduce this mundane evidence had a clear purpose: Cooke was 
attempting to show that because Bonistall had consensual sexual relations with other 
people in the past, that she had consented to sex with Cooke on the night before she was 
murdered.177 
But the Superior Court excluded the evidence that Cooke sought to introduce 
regarding Bonistall’s sexual history, finding among other things that the evidence was 
inadmissible under Delaware’s Rape Shield Statute, and apparently also that it failed the 
basic test of relevance under Delaware Rule of Evidence 401.178   Cooke challenges the 
                                                 
176 11 Del. C. § 3508 and § 3509. 
177 Cooke’s Opening Brief at 65 (“The defense argued that the sex between Bonistall and 
defendant was consensual.”); see also App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A263-264, A370-371. 
178 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A265 (“I would deny it under 3508, but I don’t even need to 
reach 3508, at least as to the prior sexual conduct, because it’s simply not relevant.  Then, if I go 
to 3508, what is proffered in the affidavit, isn’t relevant again, nor is it in any way assisting. . . .  
[I]t’s not relevant, and therefore, it’s not admissible, with or without 3508, but in the alternative, 
with 3508.”). 
45 
 
Superior Court’s decision to exclude this evidence, on the ground that the Rape Shield 
Statute does not apply where the alleged victim of the rape is dead and therefore cannot 
testify at trial.179  The Superior Court’s rulings about whether to admit certain evidence 
are reviewed for abuse of discretion.180  For the following reasons, we reject Cooke’s 
arguments and conclude that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by excluding 
the evidence. 
As noted, Cooke’s reason for introducing this evidence was to buttress his 
contention that he did not rape and then kill Bonistall, but instead had consensual sex 
with her on Friday, April 29, 2005, over 24 hours before her murder.  Cooke therefore 
sought to introduce evidence for a purpose that was impermissible as a matter of statute.  
In a case involving the prosecution of any degree of rape, 11 Del. C. § 3509 provides that 
evidence of a victim’s sexual reputation or specific instances of the victim’s prior sexual 
conduct with a person other than the defendant “is not admissible by the defendant in 
order to prove consent by the complaining witness.”181   
Cooke does not contend that our State’s Rape Shield Statute, which is similar to 
that which exists in many American states, is unconstitutional.182  Rather, Cooke argues 
that the Rape Shield Statute does not apply because Bonistall was murdered, and a dead 
                                                 
179 Cooke’s Opening Brief at 65; Cooke’s Reply Brief at 18. 
180 Richardson v. State, 43 A.3d 906, 911 (Del. 2012) (citing Harris v. State, 991 A.2d 1135, 
1138 (Del. 2010). 
181 11 Del. C. § 3509(a).  
182 Cooke’s Reply Brief at 18 (“Cooke never challenged the statute itself . . .”).  “In cases 
involving the validity of rape shield statutes, the courts have been confronted with a number of 
different constitutional issues, but, almost without exception, have upheld the particular statute 
involved.”  Joel E. Smith, Constitutionality of “rape shield” statute restricting use of evidence of 
victim’s sexual experiences, 1 A.L.R.4th 283 (1980). 
46 
 
victim cannot be a “complaining witness” under the Statute.  That off-putting argument 
uses as its premise one of the fundamental purposes of a Rape Shield Statute, which is to 
ensure that victims of rape are not discouraged from coming forward by facing a threat 
that intimate details of their prior sexual history will be exposed to the community in a 
public trial.183  Cooke claims that because a dead victim cannot testify, there is no reason 
to apply the statute to exclude the evidence in that circumstance.  In other words, Cooke 
argues that so long as the person alleged to have been a victim of rape has been killed, the 
defendant accused of the rape may use evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct or 
reputation to prove that the deceased consented to having sex with him. 
Cooke’s argument lacks merit.  First and most important, Cooke ignores the 
statutory definition of a “complaining witness,” which is clear on its face.  A 
“complaining witness” is defined as “the alleged victim of any degree of rape . . .” and its 
                                                 
183 Jenkins v. State, 2012 WL 3637236, at *2-3 (Del. Aug. 23, 2012) (quoting Scott v. State, 642 
A.2d 767, 771 (Del. 1994)) (the purpose of Delaware’s Rape Shield Law is “to allow defenses 
based on the complainant’s credibility while protecting [the complainant] from unnecessary 
humiliation and embarrassment” thus “ensur[ing] the cooperation of victims of sexual 
offenses”); see also Vance v. State, 384 S.W.3d 515, 519 (Ark. 2011) (“The purpose of the rape-
shield statute is to shield victims of rape or sexual abuse from the humiliation of having their 
sexual conduct, unrelated to the charges pending, paraded before the jury and the public when 
such conduct is irrelevant to the defendant’s guilt.”); State v. Alberts, 722 N.W.2d 402, 409 
(Iowa 2006) (“[T]he purpose of the rape-shield law . . . is to protect the victim’s privacy, 
encourage the reporting and prosecution of sex offenses, and prevent the parties from delving 
into distractive, irrelevant matters.”); State v. Garron, 827 A.2d 243, 254 (N.J. 2003) (“The 
overarching purpose of the Rape Shield Statute is to protect the privacy interests of the victim 
while ensuring a fair determination of the issues bearing on the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant.”); State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1035 (R.I. 2004) (“The rape shield statute was 
enacted to encourage victims to report crimes without fear of inviting unnecessary probing into 
the victim’s sexual history.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
47 
 
applicability is not limited to living victims.184  The statutory language is itself dispositive 
and defeats Cooke’s argument.185  But, even if the statutory language were ambiguous, 
we would not embrace Cooke’s reading of the Rape Shield Statute.  There is no reason to 
believe that the General Assembly’s concern that alleged rape victims should not be 
subjected to general character assassination extends only to living victims and not to 
those who also paid the ultimate price of losing their life.  As a policy matter, Cooke’s 
argument would create a perverse incentive, whereby a rapist who killed his victim would 
be advantaged over one who let his victim live.  For these reasons, arguments like 
Cooke’s have been largely rejected by other state courts, which have found that their 
Rape Shield Statutes apply regardless of whether the alleged victim of the rape is alive or 
dead.186  We agree with those well-reasoned decisions.  Cooke’s own counsel repeatedly 
                                                 
184 11 Del. C. § 3508(b); see also 11 Del. C. § 3509(e) (defining “complaining witness” as “the 
alleged victim of the crime charged, the prosecution of which is subject to this section”). 
185 Kelty v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 73 A.3d 926, 929 (Del. 2013) (“When interpreting 
a statute, we attempt to determine and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent.  We give 
unambiguous statutory language its plain meaning unless the result is so absurd that it cannot be 
reasonably attributed to the legislature.”).  
186 See, e.g., Hobson v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1090, 1093 (Ind. 1996) (“[A] victim’s death does not 
abrogate the public policy advanced by the Rape Shield Statute, inter alia, encouraging victims 
to report rape.”); Jenkins v. State, 627 N.E.2d 789, 795 (Ind. 1993) (“If the statute is not applied 
to victims who ultimately are murdered, then perpetrators of sex crimes will be encouraged to 
kill their victims, thus enabling them to defend the charges through exploitation of evidence of 
the victim’s prior sexual activity.”); Holland v. State, 587 So. 2d 848, 863 (Miss. 1991) (“[The 
defendant] contends that [the rape shield law] has nothing to do with relevancy because it was 
‘designed [solely] to protect the privacy of a [living ] victim’—not a dead victim . . . .  Common 
sense dictates that [the defendant’s] contention is meritless.”); State v. Clowney, 690 A.2d 612, 
619 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (“We find nothing in the language of the statute, or its 
underlying purposes, to suggest a deceased victim’s prior sexual conduct is less protected than a 
living victim’s.  Beyond that, we find it irrational and illogical to suggest that the rape shield law 
should be made inapplicable when the victim is killed after a rape.  The statutory goals of 
protecting the privacy of the victim and seeking to avoid character assassination are no less 
48 
 
acknowledged that the purpose of the evidence was to demonstrate the Bonistall had 
consented to sex with Cooke.  The Superior Court’s exclusion of the evidence was 
therefore proper under § 3509, as it was being offered for the improper purpose of 
proving consent.187 
On a related point, the Superior Court’s ruling may also fairly be read as grounded 
in, not only § 3509 itself, but also a more general determination that the evidence Cooke 
sought to admit was not relevant.188  We say that not only because the Superior Court’s 
ruling is somewhat ambiguous on the point, but also because § 3509 is fundamentally a 
legislative determination of relevance.189  The basic test of relevance is whether the 
                                                                                                                                                             
consequential when the rape victim is killed.  A deceased rape victim’s life is entitled to the same 
privacy as a surviving victim’s.”); State v. Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621, 636 (Ohio 2006) (“No part of 
the rape shield law suggests that a deceased victim’s sexual history is less protected than that of a 
living victim. . . . [T]he state interests underlying the rape shield law are not eliminated when the 
victim has died.”); State v. Turner, 2001 WL 605153 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2001) (The fact 
that the victim died does not affect the application of [Tennessee’s rape shield law].”); Hoke v. 
Com., 377 S.E.2d 595, 599 (Va. 1989) (applying Virginia’s Rape Shield Law to preclude the 
admission of evidence about the past sexual history of a victim who was murdered after a rape). 
187 See, e.g., Ketchum v. State, 1989 WL 136970, at *2-3 (Del. Oct. 17, 1989) (holding that 
evidence about the victim’s prior sexual conduct, including affidavits from three men stating that 
the victim would have sex while intoxicated and wake up disoriented and unaware of the events 
of the previous night, was inadmissible under § 3509 if proffered to show consent.”). 
188 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A264. 
189 See, e.g., Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A 
Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 798 (1986) (“More compelling . . . was 
the claim by rape-shield proponents that the changing moral climate in this country simply 
invalidated the underpinnings of the common-law doctrine, rendering unchastity evidence 
irrelevant for its stated purposes.”); Tanya Bagne Marcketti, Rape Shield Laws: Do They Shield 
the Children?, 78 IOWA L. REV. 751, 754 (1993) (“Rape shield statutes evolved from society’s 
recognition that a rape victim’s prior sexual history is irrelevant to issues of consent . . . .”).  
Other commentators have considered statutes like § 3509 to constitute a legislative determination 
that this evidence, if possibly of marginal relevance, is barred under a balancing test akin to 
exclusion under Rule of Evidence 403.  See, e.g., Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, Credibility, and 
the Constitution: Evidence Relating to A Sex Offense Complainant’s Past Sexual Behavior, 44 
CATH. U. L. REV. 709, 722 (1995) (“Such legislation represents a legislative judgment that 
49 
 
proffered evidence has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence.”190  At its most mundane level, § 3509 recognizes that 
sex is a common part of human life.191  That a person consented to sex with someone 
other than the defendant on a prior occasion is a human act so ordinary that it cannot be 
regarded as making it more likely than not that she consented to having sex on a 
particular occasion with the defendant now accused of her rape. 
In an attempt to avoid exclusion by § 3509, Cooke submitted a motion and 
affidavit requesting to admit the evidence of Bonistall’s sexual history under § 3508.  
Evidence of a complaining witness’s prior sexual history may be admitted “to attack the 
credibility of the complaining witness,” but “only when the statutory procedure in 
[§ 3508] is followed and the court determines that the evidence proposed to be offered by 
the defendant regarding the sexual conduct of the alleged victim is relevant.”192  Cooke’s 
affidavit contained no rational articulation of how the proffered evidence compromised 
                                                                                                                                                             
evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct is only marginally relevant and that, barring 
unusual circumstances, it tends to confuse the issues, unduly harass witnesses, and may also be 
unfairly prejudicial to the prosecution.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
190 Delaware Rule of Evidence 401. 
191 See The Kinsey Institute, Frequently Asked Sexuality Questions, www.iub.edu/~kinsey/ 
resources/FAQ.html (last updated July 21, 2012) (90% of men and 86% of women surveyed 
reported having had sex in the last year); Delaware Rule of Evidence 201(b) (judicial notice may 
be taken of a fact “not subject to reasonable dispute”). 
192 Wright v. State, 513 A.2d 1310, 1314-15 (Del. 1986).  11 Del. C. § 3508 requires a defendant 
to “make a written motion to the court and prosecutor stating that the defense has an offer of 
proof concerning the relevancy of evidence of the sexual conduct of the complaining witness 
which the defendant proposes to present, and the relevancy of such evidence in attacking the 
credibility of the complaining witness” and accompany it with “an affidavit in which the offer of 
proof shall be stated.” 
50 
 
Bonistall’s credibility, or why her credibility was even at issue.  The Superior Court did 
not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence under § 3508.  
2.  The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Allowing  
Lay Opinion Testimony From A Police Officer That It Was  
Cooke’s Voice On The 911 Calls 
 
Following the murder, an anonymous person made three calls to the police 911 
call center.  In the first call on May 2, 2005, the caller said that the Harmon, Cuadra, and 
Bonistall crimes were all related.193  In two additional calls on May 7, 2005, the caller 
gave detailed information about the three crimes, including information that had not been 
previously released to the public.194  The calls convinced the police that the crimes were 
linked and had been committed by the same person.  Recordings of these 911 calls were 
admitted into evidence.  
After listening to the tapes, Cooke’s girlfriend, Rochelle Campbell, testified that 
she was 100 percent certain that the voice on all of the 911 calls was Cooke.195  But the 
State also wanted Detective Rubin to present lay opinion testimony that he recognized the 
voice on the calls as Cooke’s voice.  Detective Rubin had interviewed Cooke, face to 
face, for four to six hours after he was arrested, and throughout the investigation and 
during the extensive proceedings before the second trial, Detective Rubin had heard 
Cooke speak in person for tens of hours, and thus was familiar with Cooke’s voice.196  
                                                 
193 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B256-57. 
194 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A542-46; App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B257, B264. 
195 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A325-27. 
196 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A337. 
51 
 
Cooke’s counsel objected to Detective Rubin’s lay opinion testimony about the identity 
of the voice on the 911 calls, but the Superior Court decided to allow it. 
The Superior Court’s rulings about whether to admit certain evidence are reviewed 
for abuse of discretion.197  Delaware Rule of Evidence 701 permits lay witness testimony 
in the form of opinions that are: “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and 
(b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a 
fact in issue and (c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge 
within the scope of rule 702.”198  Thus, Rule 701 “permits a lay witness to testify about 
his own impressions when they are based on personal observation.”199  But the ultimate 
question of the identity of the voice remains one for the jury to decide,200 and lay opinion 
testimony will not be helpful to the jury “when the jury can readily draw the necessary 
inferences and conclusions without the aid of the opinion.”201   
Cooke argues that Detective Rubin was no better suited than the jury to make the 
judgment at issue.  The jury had listened to the recordings of the calls, watched a 
videotaped portion of Cooke’s post-arrest interview, and heard Cooke speak in court.  
The State contends that Detective Rubin was much more familiar with Cooke’s voice 
                                                 
197 Richardson v. State, 43 A.3d 906, 911 (Del. 2012) (citing Harris v. State, 991 A.2d 1135, 
1138 (Del. 2010). 
198 Delaware Rule of Evidence 701.  Additionally Delaware Rule of Evidence 901(b)(5) permits 
the “[i]dentification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or through  mechanical or electronic 
transmission or recording, by opinion based upon hearing the  voice at any time under 
circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker.” 
199 Washington v. State, 945 A.2d 1168 (Del. 2008). 
200 Vouras v. State, 452 A.2d 1165, 1169 (Del. 1982). 
201 United States v. Sanabria, 645 F.3d 505, 515 (1st Cir. 2011). 
52 
 
than the jury, and that his testimony was therefore helpful.202  Because there was a basis 
in the record for the Superior Court to find that Detective Rubin was more familiar with 
Cooke’s voice than the jury because of, among other things, his extensive face-to-face 
interview with Cooke, and thus, that his testimony would be helpful, the Superior Court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony.203   
In any event, the admission of Rubin’s lay opinion testimony was harmless.204  As 
explained, the jury was required to and was instructed to make its own determination 
about this factual question, and there is no rational basis to believe that the jury did not do 
that here, or that the jury was somehow unduly influenced by Detective Rubin’s brief 
testimony on this point.  Furthermore, an error in admitting evidence may be deemed to 
be “harmless” when “the evidence exclusive of the improperly admitted evidence is 
sufficient to sustain a conviction.”205  Putting aside the jury’s own ability to listen to the 
calls and decide that it was Cooke’s own voice on them, the jury also had other lay 
opinion evidence besides that provided by Detective Rubin.  Campbell — Cooke’s 
girlfriend and mother of four of his children — also testified that she was 100 percent 
sure that the voice on the 911 calls was Cooke’s.  Because Campbell’s testimony 
provided a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that Cooke had made the 911 calls 
                                                 
202 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A321. 
203 See, e.g., United States v. Cruz-Rea, 626 F.3d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Gholikhan, 370 F. App’x 987, 991 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d 
1213, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007). 
204 Van Arsdall v. State, 524 A.2d 3, 10 (Del. 1987) (“[T]his Court has consistently refused to 
reverse convictions for errors found to be harmless.”). 
205 Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 77 (Del. 1993) (quoting Johnson v. State, 587 A.2d 444, 451 
(Del. 1991)). 
53 
 
even without Detective Rubin’s lay opinion testimony any error by the Superior Court in 
admitting the evidence was harmless.   
C.  Cooke’s Right To An Impartial Jury Was Not Compromised 
 
1.  The Superior Court’s Refusal To Declare A Mistrial Because Of  
Inappropriate Comments By A Potential Juror Who Was  
Not Selected Was Not An Abuse Of Discretion 
 
Cooke also argues that his right to an impartial jury was compromised because the 
Superior Court did not declare a mistrial when evidence came to light that a potential 
juror had made racist statements to other potential jurors at lunchtime during the jury 
selection process.  The issue surfaced when another potential juror, Joan Reeder, told her 
neighbor about hearing the inappropriate remarks.  The neighbor was employed as a 
bookkeeper at a law firm, and the neighbor told an attorney at the law firm what Reeder 
had said, and the attorney reported it to the Superior Court on February 29, 2012.206   
The Superior Court investigated to determine whether juror misconduct had 
occurred.  Reeder had been excused from jury service on February 21, 2012, the second 
day of jury selection, and the potential juror who made the comments was excused that 
day as well.  The Superior Court brought the attorney and the neighbor in to testify about 
what they had been told.207  The Superior Court also brought Reeder back to testify about 
what she had heard and try to determine the identity of the potential juror who had made 
the comments.  Reeder stated: 
                                                 
206 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B83-84. 
207 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B93-94. 
54 
 
MS. REEDER: Yes. We were in the cafeteria and he spouted off and 
everybody at the table got up and left and went and sat at other chairs.  And 
he was just -- that’s all, to me, he was doing was spouting off. 
THE COURT: When you say he was spouting off, what did he say? 
MS. REEDER: He was saying how prejudiced he was and I’m going to tell 
that judge that since the guy is black and he did it anyway -- and that’s all I 
meant was spouting off.  And I thought to myself . . . how dumb are you?208  
 
Reeder added: 
 
MS. REEDER: And he sat and boasted about how he was prejudice[d].  
And he has a daughter and, you know, it was just unnecessary remarks. 
THE COURT: He didn’t say anything about the merits of the case, just that 
he thought that the defendant did it? 
MS. REEDER: He was going to say he did it anyway. 
THE COURT: Just to get out from -- just to -- 
MS. REEDER: Yeah.209 
 
Reeder identified the potential juror as William Wilson.  At Cooke’s request, Wilson was 
brought in to answer questions regarding his comments.210  Wilson said that he could not 
remember exactly what he said but admitted it was possible that he had said something.211  
Cooke moved for a mistrial, and the Superior Court denied the motion.212  The Superior 
Court said that when the jury was empaneled, it would “make sure that no one has had 
any conversations and ask[] them if they have had any conversations with anyone or there 
have been any expressions of a predetermination of guilt of the defendant or any 
indication of ethnic or [racial] bias or prejudice against this defendant.”213 
                                                 
208 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A131. 
209 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A134. 
210 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A137-38. 
211 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A143. 
212 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A135; A152. 
213 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A152. 
55 
 
This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of a request for a mistrial based on 
alleged juror misconduct for abuse of discretion.214  This Court also reviews the Superior 
Court’s “decision on the ‘mode and depth of investigative hearings into allegations of 
juror misconduct’ and on the remedy for such misconduct for abuse of discretion.”215  “In 
the juror misconduct context, however, a defendant is entitled to a new trial ‘only if the 
error complained of resulted in actual prejudice or so infringed upon defendant’s 
fundamental right to a fair trial as to raise a presumption of prejudice.’”216  “A trial judge 
should grant a mistrial only where there is ‘manifest necessity’ or the ‘ends of public 
justice would be otherwise defeated.’”217   
Cooke argues that Wilson’s inappropriate statements “may have influenced 
potential jurors” and tainted the entire process.218  But, a claim of juror misconduct must 
focus on the jurors who were actually seated, not those who were excused.219  Both 
Reeder and Wilson were excused, so the misconduct was not committed by a seated 
                                                 
214 Durham v. State, 867 A.2d 176, 177 (Del. 2005) (citing Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169, 
1171 (Del. 1997)). 
215 Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1058 (Del. 2001) (quoting Massey v. State, 541 A.2d 1254, 
1257 (Del. 1998); see also Lovett v. State, 516 A.2d 455, 475 (Del. 1986) (“The Trial Judge has 
very broad discretion in deciding whether a case must be retried or the jurors summoned and 
investigated due to alleged exposure to prejudicial information or improper outside influence.”). 
216 Durham v. State, 867 A.2d 176, 179 (Del. 2005) (quoting Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d 1034, 
1043 (Del. 1985)); see also Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 645 (Del. 2001) (quoting Massey v. 
State, 541 A.2d 1254, 1255 (Del. 1988) (“To impeach a jury verdict because of juror misconduct, 
‘a defendant must establish actual prejudice unless defendant can show that the circumstances 
surrounding the misconduct were so egregious and inherently prejudicial as to support a 
presumption of prejudice to defendant.’”)). 
217 Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998) (quoting Fanning v. Superior Court, 320 A.2d 
343, 345 (Del. 1974). 
218 Cooke’s Opening Brief at 47. 
219 Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988). 
56 
 
juror.  Furthermore, there is no evidence of record that any of the seated jurors were 
improperly influenced by Wilson’s comments, which were of a generically offensive 
racist kind and did not involve statements suggesting that Wilson possessed case-specific 
evidence about Cooke’s culpability.  Perhaps for that reason, Cooke has not even alleged 
that he suffered any actual prejudice as a result of the comments.  Thus, the Superior 
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cooke’s motion for a mistrial.  
2.  The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Dismissed  
Juror #10 For Inappropriate Conduct 
Cooke next contends that the Superior Court abused its discretion by removing a 
juror, Juror #10, for repeated misbehavior.  Cooke claims that the Superior Court’s real 
reason for removing Juror #10 was because of her views about the evidence presented, 
and that in excusing Juror #10, the Superior Court “stripped [Cooke] of a juror of his 
choosing.”220  This Court reviews the Superior Court’s decision to excuse a juror for 
abuse of discretion.221   
The record does not support Cooke’s argument.  On March 26, 2012, Juror #10 
arrived late, and her tardiness delayed the start of the trial.  Juror #10 had been late 
several times before.222  When Juror #10 arrived, the Superior Court reprimanded her and 
instructed her to be on time in the future.223  Later that morning, the State pointed out that 
Juror #10 “doesn’t seem to be totally engaged in the process and at times is literally 
                                                 
220 Cooke’s Opening Brief at 49. 
 
221 Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 644 (Del. 2001); Johnson v. State, 311 A.2d 873, 874 (Del. 
1973); see also United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1392 (3d Cir. 1994). 
222 App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B258. 
223 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A319. 
57 
 
looking away and seems agitated.”224  That afternoon, the State said that they had noticed 
that Juror #10 was “muttering under her breath” during sidebars and “rocking back and 
forth.”225  Cooke’s counsel said that “[t]he only thing I’ve noticed, Your Honor, is I don’t 
think she’s buying the State’s case and that’s why the State wants to get rid of her.”226  
The Superior Court took no action at that time because it did not think it had a basis to, 
but would “continue to watch it.”227 
On March 29, 2012, the jurors went on a site visit to see the apartments in 
Newark, Delaware that had been burglarized.  During the visit, Juror #10 yelled and 
cursed at one of the bailiffs because she thought he was treating her unfairly when he 
would not let her smoke.228  The State raised other concerns about Juror #10, including 
that she would not follow the bailiff’s instructions to stay with the group during the site 
visit, and that she had attempted to ask the investigating officer a substantive question, 
which was against the Superior Court’s explicit instructions.229  The State then asked for 
                                                 
224 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A320. 
225 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A328; App. to the State’s Answering Br. at B272. 
226 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A328. 
227 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A328. 
228 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A339-340 (“She got all mad.  Fuck, you know, all kind of 
curse words, stomping her feet, waving her hands, totally upset. . . .  Then once we got off the 
elevator on the eighth floor, she was “F” this and “F” that.  This is bullshit, waiving her hands in 
the air. . . .  She started yelling at me, saying this was bullshit. . . . And . . . she apparently called 
me a fucking idiot.”); A341 (“She started stomping her feet, waving her hands, saying this is 
bullshit and, you know, I want to fucking smoke.  This is -- just ranting and raving basically 
about not being able to smoke all the way. . . .  But as she was going in, I believe she was like, 
well, I’ll just be late for everything then.  She’s been consistently late pretty much every day.”). 
229 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A340. 
58 
 
Juror #10 to be removed.  After hearing testimony from the bailiff and Juror #10 about 
the incident, the Superior Court excused Juror #10.230 
Because there is ample evidence in the record to support its conclusion that Juror 
#10 should be excused due to her inappropriate conduct and not because of her views of 
the evidence, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing her.  
Furthermore, when the Superior Court questioned each of the remaining jurors to 
determine whether Juror #10’s behavior or her excusal would affect their ability to give 
fair and impartial consideration to the issues in the case, the remaining jurors indicated 
that they would be able to proceed unaffected.231 
3. The Superior Court’s Refusal To Declare A Mistrial For Inaccurate Answers Given 
By Juror #3 During Voir Dire Was Not An Abuse Of Discretion 
 
Cooke’s final argument relating to the composition of the jury is that the Superior 
Court erred by failing to excuse a juror who gave inaccurate information in response to 
voir dire questions.  Cooke says that had that juror given accurate answers, he would 
have attempted to strike her, and that the juror’s failure to answer accurately thus 
deprived him of a fair jury.  To address this claim fairly, the factual background must first 
be recited in some detail. 
                                                 
230 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A346 (“[S]he has been late, consistently late.  And that in and 
of itself doesn’t bother me.  But I just see a disruptive influence.  And her behavior and conduct 
is such that I wouldn’t take it from an attorney and I wouldn’t take it from a party and I’m not 
going to take it from her.  I, therefore, reluctantly and over your objection and Mr. Cooke’s 
objection . . . I’m going to excuse her.”). 
231 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A346-53. 
59 
 
During the jury selection process, the Superior Court asked ten preliminary 
questions to the jury array.  Then individual voir dire questioning began.  When Luz 
Rodriguez (who eventually became “Juror #3”) presented on February 21, 2012, she was 
asked, “Have you, a relative, or close friend ever been a witness of, or a victim of a 
violent crime?”232  Juror #3 responded that two of her nephews had been killed ten years 
ago in Philadelphia.  Further questioning revealed that the perpetrators had been 
convicted and sentenced to life in prison.  Juror #3 was also asked, “Have you, a relative, 
or close friend ever been charged with, or convicted of a criminal offense?”233  Juror #3 
said no.  Juror #3 was also asked, “Are you, a relative, or close friend presently under 
investigation or prosecution by any law enforcement agency for any criminal offense?”234  
Juror #3 said no.  Juror #3 said that on a scale from one to ten, she was a seven in favor of 
the death penalty.235  Juror #3 also disclosed that she had been a juror twice before, in a 
robbery trial and an attempted murder trial, and both juries had given guilty verdicts.236  
Neither Cooke nor the State challenged Juror #3 for cause or used a peremptory challenge 
to strike her, and she was seated as a member of the jury.  
After the jury returned guilty verdicts against Cooke on all but one misdemeanor 
theft charge, the penalty hearing began on April 18, 2012.  During the penalty hearing, on 
April 25, 2012, Juror #3 received a notice in the mail that she had been summoned as a 
                                                 
232 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A129. 
233 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A129. 
234 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A129. 
235 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A128. 
236 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A129. 
60 
 
witness in a Family Court hearing that was scheduled for May 7, 2012.  The next day, on 
April 26, 2012, Juror #3 told the bailiff about the summons.237  The bailiff brought the 
issue to the attention of the Superior Court.   
The Superior Court questioned Juror #3, and she explained that on December 18, 
2011, she witnessed an altercation between her husband, Jose Acevedo (the “Husband”), 
and her twenty-year old daughter, Valerie Cotto (the “Daughter”), who lived with them.  
The Husband made a negative comment to the Daughter, the exchange escalated to name-
calling, and then the Daughter threatened the Husband with a kitchen knife.238  The 
grandchildren were present, so Juror #3 took them upstairs.  A few minutes later, Juror #3 
heard the Husband calling her name.  When Juror #3 returned to the kitchen, she saw the 
Daughter on the floor and the Husband holding the Daughter by the neck.  Juror #3 told 
the Husband to let the Daughter go, and when he did, the Daughter called the police.  The 
Husband told Juror #3 that after she left, the Daughter hit him twice with a frying pan.239  
The Husband said that he had grabbed the Daughter only to prevent her from hitting him 
again.  Juror #3 believed him and felt that he had only held the Daughter by the neck in 
order to stop her from assaulting him. 
Nonetheless, the police arrested the Husband, and he spent the night in jail, but 
Juror #3 posted his bail the next day.240  The Husband was initially charged with 
strangulation, menacing, and three counts of endangering the welfare of a child.  Those 
                                                 
237 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A420. 
238 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A424. 
239 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A425. 
240 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A425. 
61 
 
charges were reduced to two misdemeanors for offensive touching and menacing.  But 
the Daughter repeatedly informed Juror #3 that she had dropped all charges 
voluntarily.241 
On April 11, 2012, the day the jurors were to be sequestered, the Husband carried 
Juror #3’s luggage to the courthouse and told her that he had to go to a hearing that 
day.242  Juror #3 went with him to the hearing because the Husband does not speak much 
English, and she discovered that the charges had not been dropped.  Juror #3 called the 
Daughter to ask what was going on, and the Daughter said that she “told them [she] 
didn’t want to press charges against him.”243  Juror #3 told the Superior Court that she did 
not inform it about the situation at that time because, after talking to the Daughter, she 
thought that the charges would be dropped.  Juror #3 did not know that the charges had 
not been dropped until she received the witness summons in the mail. 
The Superior Court asked Juror #3 whether the incident created any problems with 
her participation in the case, and whether it would cause her to treat the State differently 
than the Defense.  Juror #3 answered “no” to both questions.244  After discussion with 
counsel, the Superior Court concluded that it did not have enough information to make a 
determination about whether the incident had impaired or would impair Juror #3’s ability 
to be impartial.  The Superior Court called Juror #3 back for a hearing on April 27, 2012.  
Juror #3 provided additional information about the incident and answered questions from 
                                                 
241 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A425-426. 
242 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A426. 
243 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A427. 
244 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A421. 
62 
 
the Superior Court.  The Superior Court asked Juror #3 multiple times whether the 
incident affected her vote in the case or negatively affected her ability to be fair and 
impartial, and Juror #3 answered, “Not at all.”245 
The Superior Court asked Juror #3 why she did not say during voir dire that she 
had been a witness to a violent crime.  Juror #3 responded that the question did not cause 
her to think about the incident with the Daughter, “[b]ecause based on what I saw I never 
felt that he tried to kill her.  The way that I saw it, he [was] just trying to stop her from 
hitting him with a frying pan.”246  The Superior Court asked Juror #3 why she did not say 
during voir dire that a relative had been charged with a criminal offense.  Juror #3 said 
that “because my daughter had told me that she withdraw the charges against him, my 
answer was no” and that she considered the charges by her daughter to be “a false 
claim.”247  The Superior Court asked Juror #3 why she did not say during voir dire that a 
relative was under investigation.  Juror #3 said that “because [the Daughter] had already 
told me that she withdr[e]w the charges, then I thought there was no investigation going 
on.”248  The Superior Court asked whether Juror #3 thought that hitting the Husband was 
a violent act.  Juror #3 said, “No.  I mean, it’s violence, but I wasn’t thinking about that 
incident when I answered that question” because “[i]t was a family thing.”249   
                                                 
245 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A428-29. 
246 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A427. 
247 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A431. 
248 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A431. 
249 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A431. 
63 
 
The Husband’s case was prosecuted by the Family Division of the Delaware 
Department of Justice, and the prosecutor represented to the Superior Court that the 
Family Court unit was entirely separate from the unit tasked with prosecuting felony 
trials in the Superior Court.250  Juror #3 did not know the prosecutor or defense attorney 
involved in the Husband’s case and had not met them.251   
Cooke’s counsel then moved for a mistrial,252 which the Superior Court denied 
after hearing arguments.253  The Superior Court remarked that “I don’t have someone 
who’s being disingenuous”254 and then concluded: 
I did find her -- she was inaccurate [i]n her answers, but she was honest.  I do 
not believe she meant to deceive.  I think, in her mind, she explained why she 
answered what she answered.  The [Defense] has a view of whether she 
would have been struck or not have been struck, but at this point I do not find 
the error, A, to be intentional and, B, to be of such a dimension that it would 
result in a fundamental injustice to the defendant.255 
 
The Superior Court then had to determine whether to remove Juror #3 and replace her 
with an alternate for the sentencing hearing.  The State argued that Juror #3 should be 
removed because it was concerned that she would be biased against the State.256  But the 
defense argued that Juror #3 should remain on the panel, stating that “if you find that she 
was fair enough to render a verdict of guilty, she’s fair enough to sit on the penalty 
                                                 
250 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A432. 
251 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A427. 
252 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A433. 
253 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A440. 
254 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A434. 
255 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A440. 
256 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A440-41. 
64 
 
phase.”257  The State noted that the next alternate juror said that on a scale from one to 
ten, he was a ten in favor of the death penalty, whereas Juror #3 was only a seven.258  The 
Superior Court determined that Juror #3 would stay on the panel and would not be 
excused.  On May 21, 2012, the defense filed a motion for a new trial, based on the 
grounds of juror bias and misconduct, specifically the issue with Juror #3’s inaccurate 
answers to the voir dire questions.259  On July 24, 2012, the Superior Court issued a 
38-page decision denying the motion for a new trial.260 
 
Cooke now claims that if Juror #3 had answered the voir dire questions accurately, 
then he would have challenged her for cause or exercised a peremptory challenge.261  
Cooke also claims that the Superior Court’s failure to remove Juror #3 or to declare a 
mistrial deprived him of trial by an impartial jury, and that he should be entitled to a new 
trial as a result.  This Court reviews the Superior Court’s refusal to grant a motion for a 
new trial for abuse of discretion.262 
The Constitutions of our nation and our state guarantee a criminal defendant the 
right to have his case heard by an impartial jury.263  The right to challenge a potential 
juror during voir dire is an important safeguard of the right to trial by an impartial jury, 
                                                 
257 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A441-42. 
258 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A442. 
259 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A467. 
260 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A478; see also State v. Cooke, 2012 WL 3060956 (Del. 
Super. July 24, 2012). 
261 Cooke’s Opening Brief at 42. 
262 Taylor v. State, 685 A.2d 349, 350 (Del. 1996); Massey v. State, 541 A.2d 1254, 1257 (Del. 
1988). 
263 U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Del. Const. Art. I, § 7; Flonnery v. State, 778 A.2d 1044, 1052 (Del. 
2001).  
65 
 
and that right can be compromised when a juror fails to disclose material information.264  
The purpose of voir dire is to provide the Superior Court and the parties with “sufficient 
information to decide whether prospective jurors can render an impartial verdict based on 
the evidence developed at trial and in accordance with the applicable law.”265  This Court 
has held that “if only one juror is improperly influenced, a defendant in a criminal case is 
denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.”266   
In addressing what consequences should follow when jurors have failed to answer 
material questions during voir dire accurately, the law distinguishes between situations 
where a juror’s failure to answer accurately was deliberate, rather than inadvertent.  
Where a juror deliberately fails to answer honestly a material question during voir dire, 
that dishonesty is considered to be, in itself, sufficient evidence of bias to require that the 
defendant be afforded a new trial.267  By contrast, to determine whether a new trial must 
be held in cases involving inadvertent non-disclosure by a juror, this Court has adopted 
the standard set by the United States Supreme Court in McDonough Power Equipment 
Inc. v. Greenwood.268  McDonough held that to obtain a new trial, a defendant must 
demonstrate both that “a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire,” 
and that “a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for 
                                                 
264 Jackson v. State, 374 A.2d 1, 2 (Del. 1977). 
265 Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d 1041 (Del. 1985) (citing Parson v. State, 275 A.2d 777, 780 (Del. 
1971)). 
266 Hall v. State, 12 A.3d 1123 (Del. 2010).  
267 Schwan v. State, 65 A.3d 582, 591 (Del. 2013); Jackson v. State, 374 A.2d 1, 2 (Del. 1977). 
268 464 U.S. 548 (1984); Banther v. State, 783 A.2d 1287, 1290-91 (Del. 2001). 
66 
 
cause.”269  This Court has held that “[d]uring jury selection in a capital murder case, the 
answer to a question about violent crime is material.”270  Thus, Cooke has established that 
the relevant questions posed to Juror #3 were material.  
The Superior Court’s assessment of a juror’s honesty during voir dire is entitled to 
“special deference.”271  This deference is “based upon the judge’s ability to assess the 
veracity and credibility of the potential juror.”272  Here, the Superior Court concluded that 
Juror #3’s answers to the voir dire questions were inadvertently inaccurate, rather than 
purposefully untrue.273  The Superior Court also found that Juror #3’s explanations were 
“candid and credible,”274 and that Juror #3’s voir dire answers were an “honest statement 
or belief made in good faith.”275  
The record adequately supports the Superior Court’s conclusion that Juror #3’s 
incomplete answers to the voir dire questions resulted from an honest mistake.  Juror #3 
plausibly explained why the Superior Court’s question about witnessing a violent crime 
                                                 
269 Schwan v. State, 65 A.3d 582, 591 (Del. 2013); Banther v. State, 783 A.2d 1287, 1290–91 
(Del. 2001). 
270 Banther v. State, 783 A.2d 1287, 1291 (Del. 2001), see also Sampson v. United States, 724 
F.3d 150, 165 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[A] voir dire question is material if a response to it ‘has a natural 
tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing,’ the judge’s impartiality determination.”). 
271 Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984); DeShields v. State, 534 A.2d 630, 636 (Del. 
1987) (“Determinations of juror impartiality are the responsibility of the trial judge who has the 
opportunity to question the juror, observe his or her demeanor, and evaluate the ability of the 
juror to render a fair verdict.”). 
272 Schwan v. State, 65 A.3d 582, 589 (Del. 2013); Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d 1034, 43 (Del. 
1985) (“[I]t is the judge who is best situated to determine competency to serve impartially.”). 
273 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A507 (“There is no indication that Juror No. 3 was 
intentionally deceptive at any point in her responses to the voir dire, in bringing the matter to the 
attention of the Court or in testifying before Court about her involvement in the . . . matter.”). 
274 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A508. 
275 App. to Cooke’s Opening Br. at A438. 
67 
 
did not cause her to think about the ambiguous event between the Husband and the 
Daughter.  Juror #3 testified that she viewed her Husband as defending himself against 
the Daughter’s attacks with a knife and a frying pan.  Juror #3 also explained that she did 
not think that the Husband was charged with, or was under investigation for, a crime 
because she believed that the Daughter had dropped the charges.  Although Cooke argued 
that the Superior Court erred by accepting Juror #3’s explanation, the Superior Court’s 
decision to do so was within its discretion and resulted from a very thorough factual 
inquiry.  Supporting its finding was the fact that Juror #3 herself surfaced the issue, 
belying the notion that Juror #3 had somehow purposely hid the issue so as to further 
some desire on her part to serve as a juror in Cooke’s trial.  
Because the Superior Court had a sufficient basis to conclude that Juror #3’s 
answers were not intentionally false, we need not reach the second prong of McDonough 
— the question of whether the record also supports the Superior Court’s conclusion that 
Cooke would not have had a basis to strike Juror #3 for cause even if she had more 
accurately answered the voir dire questions.  Put simply, Juror #3’s honest but mistaken 
answers to the voir dire questions do not amount to a violation of Cooke’s constitutional 
rights that would entitle him to a new trial.276  As the United States Supreme Court 
                                                 
276 See Smallwood v. State, 2002 WL 31883015 (Del. Dec. 26, 2002); see also United States v. 
Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 441 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Generally, we will not invalidate a jury’s verdict 
because of a juror’s mistaken, though honest, response at voir dire.”); United States v. Ortiz, 942 
F.2d 903, 909 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Moreover—and much more important—[the juror]’s post-verdict 
dialogue with the district court suggests that he answered the voir dire query honestly yet 
inaccurately, something McDonough Power Equipment Co. expressly permits.”); Arreola v. 
Choudry, 533 F.3d 601, 608 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting McDonough). 
68 
 
explained in McDonough, “[t]o invalidate the result of a [multi]-week trial because of a 
juror’s mistaken, though honest response to a question, is to insist on something closer to 
perfection than our judicial system can be expected to give.”277 
D.  Imposition Of The Death Penalty Does Not Fail A Proportionality Review 
This Court is statutorily mandated to conduct a specific form of judicial review 
following the imposition of a death sentence.  Under 11 Del. C. § 4209(g), this Court 
must review a sentence of death to determine whether: (1) the evidence supports, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the jury’s finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance; 
(2) the sentence was arbitrarily or capriciously imposed or recommended; and (3) the 
sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.278 
Cooke argues that his death sentence in this case fails a proportionality review, 
because it is “disproportionate to the penalty recommended in similar cases.”279  Cooke 
also claims that “the trial process and the penalty phase were so flawed as to deny him 
Due Process so that a proportionality review for this case would be impossible.”280  
Cooke claims that the conviction and sentence are “manifestly unjust and [] so lacking in 
reliability that it renders such analysis useless.”281  As explained above, Cooke’s 
complaints about the trial process and the penalty phase do not have merit, and thus they 
do not render the required proportionality review impossible or useless.   
                                                 
277 McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 555 (1984). 
278 Sykes v. State, 953 A.2d 261, 273 (Del. 2008), Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1992).  
279 Cooke’s Opening Brief at 95 (citing 11 Del. C. § 4209(g)(2)(a)). 
280 Cooke’s Opening Brief at 97. 
281 Cooke’s Opening Brief at 98. 
69 
 
We also conclude that Cooke’s alternative argument that the sentence entered 
against him does not survive the statutory review process lacks merit. 
First, the evidence in the record supports the jury’s finding that there was no 
reasonable doubt that a statutory aggravating factor existed because Bonistall’s murder 
was committed while Cooke was engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, 
one of the enumerated felonies in 11 Del. C. § 4209(e)(1)(j).  The jury convicted Cooke 
of first degree rape and first degree burglary.  Because Cooke was properly convicted of 
those crimes by the jury on sufficient evidence, the statutory aggravating circumstance 
was established as a matter of law.282  
Next, the Superior Court did not arbitrarily or capriciously impose the death 
penalty.  A trial court’s decision is arbitrary and capricious only if the decision is not “the 
product of a deliberate, rational and logical deductive process.”283  Here, the Superior 
Court set out its rationale for the sentencing decision in a detailed 70-page written 
opinion.284  The Superior Court identified several nonstatutory factors alleged by the 
State, including the gruesome circumstances of Bonistall’s murder, the other home 
invasions and violent crimes that Cooke committed in Newark and in Atlantic City 
around the same time as Bonistall’s murder, and Cooke’s 25-year criminal history.  In 
reaching its decision, the Superior Court also carefully considered the mitigating 
evidence presented by Cooke’s standby counsel, including the abandonment and abuse in 
                                                 
282 Dawson v. State, 627 A.2d 57, 66 (Del. 1994).  
283 Manley v. State, 918 A.2d 321, 329 (Del. 2007) ((quoting Red Dog v. State, 616 A.2d 298, 
310 (Del. 1992)). 
284 See Sentencing Decision, Exhibit B to Cooke’s Opening Brief (Sept. 17, 2012). 
70 
 
his childhood, Cooke’s affection for his family, and the impact his execution would have 
on his children.  Then, after reviewing these factors, the Superior Court made a reasoned 
determination that the mitigating factors were outweighed by the aggravating factors.  
Because the Superior Court’s decision was the result of rational thinking that cannot be 
described as arbitrary and capricious, we are bound to defer to it.285 
Finally, Cooke’s sentence is not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar 
cases.  To determine if a death sentence is disproportionate, the Court reviews the 
universe of cases,286 which is comprised of those First Degree Murder cases that have 
included a penalty hearing and in which a sentence of either life or death has become 
final,287 without or following a review by this Court.288  A definitive comparison of cases 
is “almost impossible.”289  “The fact that there is only one statutory aggravating factor in 
this case does not make imposition of the death penalty disproportionate.”290   
The task of conducting a proportionality review under § 4209(g) has a necessarily 
uncomfortable quality, because determining whether a crime that ended in someone’s 
death is more or less condemnable involves a decisionmaking process that can never be 
wholly objective or untroubling.  But this is not a close case.  Burglarizing an occupied 
                                                 
285 Red Dog v. State, 616 A.2d 298, 309 (Del. 1992). 
286 See Appendix A. 
287 Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 677-78 (Del. 2001). 
288 Sykes v. State, 953 A.2d 261, 273 (Del. 2008). 
289 Clark v. State, 672 A.2d 1004, 1010 (Del. 1996).  
290 Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 677-78 (Del. 2001). 
71 
 
home in the early morning hours is more than sufficiently terrorizing to the victim.291  
Binding,292 brutally beating, raping, and strangling the innocent and defenseless victim,293 
and then dousing her dead body in bleach and burning it in an attempt to destroy evidence 
of the crime is — by any minimal standard of human decency — horrific and depraved 
conduct, which renders the perpetrator eligible for a sentence of death under clear 
precedent interpreting the Constitutions of our state and our nation.294  Therefore, the 
Superior Court was justified in finding that “[t]he evidence presented at trial leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that the murder of Lindsey Bonistall was committed in an 
unusually cruel and depraved fashion.”295  Accordingly, this case easily fits the pattern of 
cases where the death penalty has been upheld as proportionate. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For all of these reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
                                                 
291 See, e.g., Swan v. State, 820 A.2d 342, 360 (Del. 2003) (“[T]he home [is] one place where a 
person should feel secure from the elements that may place their family at risk.”).  
292 See, e.g., Dawson v. State, 637 A.2d 57, 68 (Del. 1994) (noting that “Dawson’s murder 
victim, like those of Red Dog and Pennell, was rendered helpless by binding before her death” 
when concluding that Dawson’s death sentence was proportionate).  
293 See, e.g., Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5, 14 (Del. 1998) (affirming death sentence where 
defendant attacked, strangled, and raped his helpless victim). 
294 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437-38 (2008) (distinguishing between 
intentional first-degree murder and other serious violent crimes, and determining that although 
the death penalty is constitutional for murder, “the death penalty should not be expanded to 
instances where the victim’s life was not taken”) Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) 
(death penalty is constitutional in a felony murder case where the defendant was a major 
participant in the felony committed and the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human 
life); Dawson v. State, 637 A.2d 57, 67-68 (Del. 1994) (death penalty was constitutional where 
the defendant “was found guilty of committing an unprovoked, cold-blooded murder of a person 
who lacked the ability to defend herself”).   
295 Sentencing Decision, Exhibit B to Cooke’s Opening Brief (Sept. 17, 2012) at 48. 
 
 
 
A-1 
APPENDIX A* 
 
Name: 
 
 
Robert Ashley 
Criminal ID: 
 
9605003410 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment (following retrial and second penalty  
 
 
 
 
hearing) 
Decision on appeal: 
2006 WL 797894 (Del. Mar. 27, 2006) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Meri-Ya C. Baker 
Criminal ID: 
 
90011925DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1993 WL 557951 (Del. Dec. 30, 1993) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Jermaine Barnett 
Criminal ID: 
 
9506017682 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment (following second penalty hearing) 
Decision on appeal: 
749 A.2d 1230 (Del. 2000) (remanding for new  
 
 
 
 
sentencing) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Hector S. Barrow 
Criminal ID: 
 
9506017661 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment (following second penalty hearing) 
Decision on appeal: 
749 A.2d 1230 (Del. 2000) (remanding for new 
sentencing) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Tyreek D. Brown 
Criminal ID: 
 
9705011492 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1999 WL 485174 (Del. Mar. 1, 1999) 
 
                                                 
*The universe of cases prior to 1991 is set forth in appendices to prior opinions by this 
Court, and those appendices are incorporated herein by reference. See, e.g., Lawrie v. 
State, Del. Supr., 643 A.2d 1336, 1352-56 (1994). 
 
 
 
A-2 
 
Name: 
 
 
Justin L. Burrell 
Criminal ID: 
 
9805012046 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
766 A.2d 19 (Del. 2000) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Luis G. Cabrera 
Criminal ID: 
 
9703012700 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
747 A.2d 543 (Del. 2000) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Luis G. Cabrera 
Criminal ID: 
 
9904019326 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death 
Decision on appeal: 
840 A.2d 1256 (Del. 2004) 
 
Name: 
 
 
James B. Clark, Jr. 
Criminal ID: 
 
9406003237 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death (judge only) 
Decision on appeal: 
672 A.2d 1004 (Del. 1996) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Charles M. Cohen 
Criminal ID: 
 
90001577DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
No direct appeal taken 
 
Name: 
 
 
Donald Cole 
Criminal ID: 
 
0309013358 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment 
Decision on appeal: 
922 A.2d 364 (Del. 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-3 
 
Name: 
 
 
James T. Crowe, Jr. 
Criminal ID: 
 
9508008979 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1998 WL 736389 (Del. Oct. 8, 1998) 
 
Name: 
 
 
David F. Dawson 
Criminal ID: 
 
88K00413DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle (venue changed) 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death 
Decision on appeal: 
637 A.2d 57 (Del. 1994) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Byron S. Dickerson 
Criminal ID: 
 
90011926DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1993 WL 541913 (Del. Dec. 21, 1993) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Cornelius E. Ferguson 
Criminal ID: 
 
91009926DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
642 A.2d 772 (Del. 1994) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Donald Flagg 
Criminal ID: 
 
9804019233 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
No direct appeal taken 
 
Name: 
 
 
Freddy Flonnory 
Criminal ID: 
 
9707012190 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment (following second penalty hearing) 
Decision on appeal: 
893 A.2d 507 (Del. 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-4 
 
Name: 
 
 
Sadiki J. Garden 
Criminal ID: 
 
9912015068 
County: 
 
 
New Castle  
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment ordered on appeal  
Decision on appeal: 
844 A.2d 311 (Del. 2004) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Robert J. Garvey 
Criminal ID: 
 
0107010230 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Appeal: 
 
 
873 A.2d 291 (Del. 2005) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Robert A. Gattis 
Criminal ID: 
 
90004576DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death (death sentence commuted in 2012) 
Decision on appeal: 
637 A.2d 808 (Del. 1994) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Arthur Govan 
Criminal ID: 
 
92010166DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1995 WL 48359 (Del. Jan. 30, 1995) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Tyrone N. Guy 
Criminal ID: 
 
0107017041 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
913 A.2d 558 (Del. 2006) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Jason Anthony Hainey 
Criminal ID: 
 
0306015699 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Appeal: 
 
 
878 A.2d 430 (Del. 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-5 
 
Name: 
 
 
Ronald T. Hankins 
Criminal ID: 
 
0603026103A 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
976 A.2d 839 (Del. 2009) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Akbar Hassan-El 
Criminal ID: 
 
010701704 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
911 A.2d 385 (Del. 2006) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Robert W. Jackson, III 
Criminal ID: 
 
92003717 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
684 A.2d 745 (Del. 1996) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Larry Johnson 
Criminal ID: 
 
0309013375 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
878 A.2d 422 (Del. 2005) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Shannon Johnson 
Criminal ID: 
 
0609017045 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
983 A.2d 904 (Del. 2009) 
 
Name: 
 
 
David Jones 
Criminal ID: 
 
9807016504 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
798 A.2d 1013 (Del. 2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-6 
 
Name: 
 
 
Michael Jones 
Criminal ID: 
 
9911016309 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
940 A.2d 1 (Del. 2007). 
 
Name: 
 
 
Michael Keyser 
Criminal ID: 
 
0310021647 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
893 A.2d 956 (Del. 2006) 
 
Name: 
 
 
David J. Lawrie 
Criminal ID: 
 
92K03617DI 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
643 A.2d 1336 (Del. 1994) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Thomas M. Magner 
Criminal ID: 
 
9509007746 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1998 WL 666726 (Del. July 29, 1998) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Michael R. Manley 
Criminal ID: 
 
9511007022 
County: 
 
 
New Castle  
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
918 A.2d 321 (Del. 2007) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Frank W. Moore, Jr. 
Criminal ID: 
 
92S03679DI 
County: 
 
 
Sussex 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1994 WL 202289 (Del. May 9, 1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-7 
 
Name: 
 
 
Adam Norcross 
Criminal ID: 
 
0002006278A 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
816 A.2d 757 (Del. 2003) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Juan Ortiz 
Criminal ID: 
 
0107004046A 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
869 A.2d 285 (Del. 2005) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Darrel Page 
Criminal ID: 
 
9911016961 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
934 A.2d 891 (Del. 2007) 
 
Name: 
 
 
James W. Perez 
Criminal ID: 
 
93001659 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
No. 207, 1993, Moore, J. (Del. Feb. 3, 1994) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Gary W. Ploof 
Criminal ID: 
 
0111003002 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
75 A.3d 840 (Del. 2013) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Derrick Powell 
Criminal ID: 
 
0909000858 
County: 
 
 
Sussex 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
49 A.3d 1090 (Del. 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-8 
 
Name: 
 
 
James Allen Red Dog 
Criminal ID: 
 
91001754DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death (judge only) 
Decision on appeal: 
616 A.2d 298 (Del. 1992) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Luis Reyes 
Criminal ID: 
 
9904019329 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
819 A.2d 305 (Del. 2003) 
 
Name: 
 
 
James W. Riley 
Criminal ID: 
 
0004014504 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment (following retrial)  
Decision on appeal: 
2004 WL 2085525 (Del. Oct. 20, 2004) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Jose Rodriguez 
Criminal ID: 
 
93001668DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment 
Decision on appeal: 
1994 WL 679731 (Del. Nov. 29, 1994) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Richard Roth, Jr. 
Criminal ID: 
 
9901000330 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
Life imprisonment 
Decision on appeal: 
788 A.2d 101 (Del. 2001) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Reginald N. Sanders 
Criminal ID: 
 
91010161DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle (venue changed) 
Sentence: 
Life imprisonment (following 1992 resentencing) 
Decision on appeal: 
585 A.2d 117 (Del. 1990) (remanding for new  
 
 
 
 
sentencing) 
 
 
 
 
 
A-9 
 
Name: 
 
 
Nelson W. Shelton 
Criminal ID: 
 
92000788DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
652 A.2d 1 (Del. 1995) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Donald J. Simmons 
Criminal ID: 
 
92000305DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
No direct appeal taken 
 
Name: 
 
 
Chauncey Starling 
Criminal ID: 
 
0104015882 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death (on two counts) 
Decision on appeal: 
903 A.2d 758 (Del. 2006) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Brian David Steckel 
Criminal ID: 
 
9409002147 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
711 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998) 
 
Name: 
 
 
David D. Stevenson 
Criminal ID: 
 
9511006992 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
918 A.2d 321 (Del. 2007) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Willie G. Sullivan 
Criminal ID: 
 
92K00055 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
636 A.2d 931 (Del. 1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-10 
 
Name: 
 
 
Ralph Swan 
Criminal ID: 
 
0002004767A 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
820 A.2d 342 (Del. 2003) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Ambrose L. Sykes 
Criminal ID: 
 
04011008300 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
953 A.2d 261 (Del. 2008) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Antonio L. Taylor 
Criminal ID: 
 
9404018838 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
685 A.2d 349 (Del. 1996) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Emmett Taylor, III 
Criminal ID: 
 
0708020057 
County: 
 
 
Sussex 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
28 A.3d 399 (Del. 2011) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Milton Taylor 
Criminal ID: 
 
0003016874 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
822 A.2d 1052 (Del. 2003) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Desmond Torrence 
Criminal ID: 
 
0205014445 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
2005 WL 2923501 (Del. Nov. 2, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-11 
 
Name: 
 
 
Charles H. Trowbridge 
Criminal ID: 
 
91K03044DI 
County: 
 
 
Kent 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
1996 WL 145788 (Del. Mar. 4, 1996) 
 
Name: 
 
 
James W. Virdin 
Criminal ID: 
 
9809015552 
County: 
 
 
Kent  
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
780 A.2d 1024 (Del. 2001) 
 
Name: 
 
 
John E. Watson 
Criminal ID: 
 
91008490DI 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
No direct appeal taken 
 
Name: 
 
 
Dwayne Weeks  
Criminal ID: 
 
92010167 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
653 A.2d 266 (Del. 1995) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Joseph Williams 
Criminal ID: 
 
9809018249 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
2003 WL 1740469 (Del. Apr. 1, 2003) 
 
Name: 
 
 
Roy R. Williamson 
Criminal ID: 
93S02210DI 
County: 
 
 
Sussex 
Sentence: 
 
 
Life imprisonment  
Decision on appeal: 
669 A.2d 95 (Del. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-12 
 
Name: 
 
 
Craig A. Zebroski 
Criminal ID: 
 
9604017809 
County: 
 
 
New Castle 
Sentence: 
 
 
Death  
Decision on appeal: 
715 A.2d 75 (Del. 1998)