Case Title: State v. Colleen E. Hansen

Citation: 2001 WI 53

Docket Number: 1999AP001128-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 53 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Colleen E. Hansen,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 30, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
January 5, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis P. Moroney 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Dissented: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
CROOKS, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by 
Pamela Pepper and Cubbie & Pepper, Ltd., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Pamela Pepper. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Gregory M. Posner-Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2001 WI 53 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-1128-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Colleen E. Hansen,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
APPEAL from judgment and order of the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, Dennis P. Moroney, Circuit Court Judge.  
Reversed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case is before us on 
certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
(Rule) § 809.61 (1997-98).  The defendant, Colleen E. Hansen 
(Hansen), asserts that Wis. Stat. § 961.45 (1995-96)1 bars a 
state prosecution under Chapter 961 for the same conduct upon 
which a prior federal conviction is based.  We agree and 
conclude that her prosecution for the state crime of possession 
                     
1  All subsequent statutory references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 1995-96 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 
  
FILED 
 
MAY 30, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
2 
of cocaine with intent to deliver is barred by § 961.45, because 
a prior federal conviction based on the same conduct constitutes 
a conviction for the "same act" under § 961.45.2  Accordingly, we 
reverse the circuit court's order denying Hansen's motion for 
post-conviction relief and the judgment of conviction.   
¶2 
The facts are undisputed.  On September 29, 1997, 
state narcotics agents arrested Hansen after cocaine was found 
on her person, in her vehicle, and in her apartment.  The State 
issued a complaint charging Hansen with possession with intent 
to deliver cocaine. 
¶3 
The complaint alleged that after observing Hansen on 
September 29, a state narcotics agent approached her and asked 
if she was in possession of any contraband.  Hansen responded by 
admitting that she was carrying cocaine in her pocket, which was 
later determined to weigh 0.2 grams.  The complaint noted that a 
subsequent search of Hansen's vehicle revealed more cocaine with 
a total weight of 0.8 grams and other contraband, including drug 
paraphernalia and cutting agents.  Finally, the complaint 
alleged that a subsequent consent search of the defendant's 
Milwaukee residence revealed 84 grams of cocaine.   
                     
2 Hansen appeals from a judgment of conviction entered in 
the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Judge Dennis P. Moroney, 
presiding, and the circuit court's order denying post-conviction 
relief.   
Hansen also challenged the circuit court's exercise of 
sentencing discretion on appeal.  However, because we reverse 
her judgment of conviction, we need not address the issue of 
sentencing discretion.   
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
3 
¶4 
While the state prosecution was pending, a federal 
grand jury indicted Hansen under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 846 
(1994) for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to 
distribute cocaine.3  In May 1998, Hansen pled guilty in the 
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin to 
the federal conspiracy charge.   
¶5 
At the plea hearing the Assistant U.S. Attorney 
explained the factual basis for Hansen's plea.  He informed the 
court that the evidence that would be presented at trial would 
include testimony from witnesses regarding Hansen's involvement 
with other individuals in the sale of cocaine.  Included as part 
of the factual basis for the plea was evidence of the cocaine 
found on Hansen's person, in her vehicle, and at her apartment: 
 
On September 29, 1997, . . . Ms. Hansen was surveilled 
by various officers in the late afternoon.  She left 
the Blue Ribbon Pub, she went to another bar briefly. 
 She then went to a different residence and picked up 
[a friend] and then they went to a third bar briefly. 
 Ms. Hansen was confronted and questioned in the 
parking lot of that bar.  She admitted that she had 
                     
3 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994) states, in pertinent part: 
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be 
unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally – 
(1) 
to manufacture, 
distribute, 
or dispense, or 
possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, a controlled substance . . . . 
 
21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994) states: 
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any 
offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to 
the same penalties as those prescribed for the 
offense, the commission of which was the object of the 
attempt or conspiracy.   
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
4 
cocaine on her person which turned out to be true.  
She was searched and had .2 grams of cocaine on her.  
She consented to a search of the trunk of her 
automobile.  The trunk contained eight-tenth's of a 
gram of cocaine in a safe.  It also contained a number 
of scales of a type commonly used for the weighing of 
cocaine.  It contained a shotgun and containers of 
various powdered chemicals that were sometimes used as 
cutting agents to dilute cocaine.  Ms. Hansen admitted 
at the time that all the materials found in the trunk 
were hers.  
She also consented to a search of her residence. 
 At that time she was living in a residence on South 
61st Street in Milwaukee.  And she admitted that . . . 
the agents would find cocaine there.  They did search 
her residence.  They found 84 grams of cocaine along 
with a derringer pistol.   
The federal district court accepted Hansen's plea of guilty and 
sentenced her to a prison term of forty-six months.   
¶6 
Following the federal conviction, Hansen moved for 
dismissal of the state charge.  She argued that Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.45 barred a controlled substance prosecution in Wisconsin 
where the defendant has already been convicted for the "same 
act" under federal law or the laws of another state.  The 
circuit court denied the motion on the grounds that § 961.45 
required application of the "elements only" test of Blockburger 
v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), to determine whether the 
prior conviction was for the same act.  Because the state 
offense in this case required proof of different elements than 
the offense for which Hansen was convicted in federal court, the 
circuit court concluded § 961.45 was not applicable.   
¶7 
Following the denial of her motion to dismiss, the 
defendant pled guilty to the violation of § 961.41(1m)(cm)4.4  
                     
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 961.41(1m) states in pertinent part: 
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
5 
Using the criminal complaint as the factual basis for the plea, 
the circuit court accepted Hansen's guilty plea and sentenced 
her to five years imprisonment.  Hansen then pursued a motion 
for post-conviction relief, again arguing that § 961.45 barred 
her Wisconsin prosecution.  The circuit court denied that 
motion. 
¶8 
Hansen appealed the judgment of conviction and the 
order denying her post-conviction relief.  The court of appeals 
certified the following question for our review: 
 
Does Wis. Stat. § 961.45 bar prosecution for the state 
crime of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, 
where a defendant previously has been convicted, based 
on the same conduct, for the federal crime of 
conspiracy 
to 
possess 
cocaine 
with 
intent 
to 
distribute?  Stated differently, is the term "same 
act" under § 961.45 defined by the elements of the 
state and federal crimes, or by the conduct for which 
a defendant is convicted?   
                                                                  
(1m) 
Possession 
with 
intent 
to 
manufacture, 
distribute or deliver.  Except as authorized by this 
chapter, it is unlawful for any person to possess, 
with intent to manufacture, distribute or deliver, a 
controlled 
substance 
or 
a 
controlled 
substance 
analog. . . .  Any person who violates this subsection 
with respect to: 
 . . .  
    (cm) Cocaine or cocaine base, or a controlled 
substance analog of cocaine or cocaine base, is 
subject to the following penalties if the amount 
possessed, with intent to manufacture, distribute or 
deliver, is: 
 . . .  
    4. More than 40 grams but not more than 100 grams, 
the person shall be fined not more than $500,000 and 
shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years nor more 
than 30 years. 
 
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
6 
¶9 
As the certified question indicates, resolution of 
this 
case 
requires 
an 
examination 
and 
interpretation 
of 
§ 961.45.  Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we 
decide independently of the determination rendered by the 
circuit court.  State v. Sprosty, 227 Wis. 2d 316, 323, 595 
N.W.2d 692 (1999).  The goal of statutory interpretation is to 
discern the legislative intent underlying a statute.  State v. 
Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d 395, 411, 572 N.W.2d 845 (1998).  
¶10 As a general matter, § 961.45 provides a form of 
statutory double jeopardy protection that applies in the context 
of controlled substance offenses under Chapter 961.  The statute 
reads: 
 
If a violation of this chapter is a violation of a 
federal law or the law of another state, a conviction 
or acquittal under federal law or the law of another 
state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this 
state. 
Wis. Stat. § 961.45.  The effect of § 961.45 is to abrogate the 
"dual sovereignty doctrine" in the context of controlled 
substance prosecutions.  State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 358, 
548 N.W.2d 817 (1996).  Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, 
there is no constitutional bar to successive prosecutions for 
the same offense by different sovereigns.  United States v. 
Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); Petty, 201 Wis. 2d at 358.  
Section 961.45 thus operates as a limitation on the State's 
power to prosecute where no constitutional limit exists.  Our 
inquiry today addresses the scope of the statutory protection 
against successive prosecutions.  
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
7 
¶11 The court of appeals and the parties correctly 
conclude that our interpretation of the statutory phrase "same 
act" is determinative of our inquiry into the scope of the 
§ 961.45 double jeopardy protection.  Hansen argues that "same 
act" must be construed to mean "same conduct."  She asserts that 
under this interpretation, the state prosecution would be barred 
because the prior federal conviction is premised in part on the 
same conduct: her possession of the cocaine found on her person, 
in her vehicle, and in her residence.  
¶12 The State asserts that "same act" must be construed to 
mean the crime as defined by its statutory elements.  In other 
words, the State maintains that § 961.45 is intended to 
incorporate the "same elements" test of Blockburger v. United 
States.5  This test is recognized in most jurisdictions, 
including Wisconsin, as the controlling test in determining 
whether multiple prosecutions are for the "same offense" in 
contravention 
of 
the 
double 
jeopardy 
protection. 
 
Under 
Blockburger, successive prosecutions are barred "unless each 
offense necessarily requires proof of an element the other does 
not."  State v. Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d 502, 524, 509 N.W.2d 712 
(1994). 
¶13 If we interpret § 961.45 to incorporate the "elements 
only" 
test, 
the 
statute 
would 
not 
bar 
Hansen's 
state 
                     
5 The test we refer to as the Blockburger "elements only" 
test has several names, including the "same evidence" test and 
the "same in law and fact" test.  Whatever label is used, the 
focus of any Blockburger inquiry is the crime as defined by its 
statutory elements. 
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
8 
prosecution. 
 
The 
federal 
offense 
requires 
proof 
of 
a 
conspiracy, which the state offense of possession with intent to 
deliver does not.  The state offense requires proof of 
possession, which the federal offense of conspiracy does not.  
Compare 
21 
U.S.C. 
§ 841(a) 
and 
§ 846 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.41(1m)(cm)4; see also United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 
378, 389 (1992) ("[A] substantive crime and a conspiracy to 
commit that crime are not the 'same offence' for double jeopardy 
purposes.").6 
¶14 Our initial inclination is to conclude that Hansen's 
interpretation of "same act" as meaning "same conduct" is more 
consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term.  See 
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 17 
(1992) (defining "act" as "[s]omething done or performed").  
However, we stated in a footnote in Petty, 201 Wis. 2d at 361 
n.13, that in the absence of any documented statements of 
legislative intent, the structure of § 961.45, and the goals of 
the uniform act in which it originated, required reading the 
statute consistent with Blockburger.  Id.   
¶15 Although the State's interpretation of § 961.45 is 
seemingly inconsistent with the common definition of "act," 
neither the State's nor Hansen's interpretation is unreasonable. 
 Accordingly, we consider the statute to be ambiguous.  See 
                     
6  While Blockburger would not bar conviction for both as a 
constitutional matter, Wis. Stat. § 939.72(2) would bar a state 
conviction for both the inchoate crime of conspiracy and the 
substantive offense that is the objective of the conspiracy.  
Wis. Stat. § 939.72(2) (1999-2000).   
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
9 
State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 406, 565 N.W.2d 506 (1997). 
 As a result of this ambiguity and the lack of any documented 
statements of legislative intent, we will seek to determine the 
legislative intent underlying § 961.45 through an inquiry into 
the legislative history of the statute viewed in light of double 
jeopardy jurisprudence as it existed at the relevant times.   
¶16 We begin by examining the legislative history of 
§ 961.45.  Of primary importance to this inquiry is the fact 
that § 961.45, as part of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
(UCSA), did not originate with the Wisconsin legislature.  The 
UCSA is a product of the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).  Where, as here, the legislature 
makes a verbatim enactment of a uniform act provision, we must 
be concerned with the intent of the drafters of the uniform law, 
and will presume the intent of the drafters is the intent of the 
legislature in the absence of evidence to the contrary.  See 2B 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 52:05 (6th ed. 2000).   
¶17 Section 961.45 began as § 405 of the original UCSA, 
approved by NCCUSL in 1970.  Unif. Controlled Substances Act 
(1970) § 405, 9IV U.L.A. 684 (1997).  The original UCSA was 
promptly adopted by the Wisconsin legislature, and § 405 became 
Wis. Stat. § 161.45.  § 16, ch. 219, Laws of 1971; Wis. Stat. 
§ 161.45 (1971-72).  In 1994, NCCUSL revisited the UCSA and 
promulgated a revised version.  No substantive changes were made 
to the provision at issue today.  Unif. Controlled Substances 
Act (1994) § 418, 9III U.L.A. 561 (1997).  Our legislature 
adopted the 1994 version of the UCSA in 1995, and in the process 
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
10
renumbered § 161.45 to its current § 961.45.  1995 Wis. Act 448, 
§ 272.   
¶18 While the precise language of § 961.45 is directly 
traceable to the 1970 uniform act, similar language is found in 
a predecessor uniform act, also adopted by the Wisconsin 
legislature.  Section 21 of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act (UNDA) 
stated:   
 
No person shall be prosecuted for a violation of any 
provision of this act if such person has been 
acquitted or convicted under the Federal Narcotic Laws 
of the same act or omission which, it is alleged, 
constituted a violation of this act.   
Unif. Narcotic Drug Act § 21, 9B U.L.A. 518 (1966) (footnote 
omitted).7  This UNDA provision was approved by NCCUSL in 1932 
and was adopted by the Wisconsin legislature in 1935.  § 1, ch. 
306, Laws of 1935.  Section 21 was codified as Wis. Stat. 
§ 161.21 (1935).  From 1935 to 1971, Wis. Stat. § 161.21 
operated as an abrogation of the dual sovereignty doctrine in 
                     
7 Earlier drafts of the UNDA would have provided protection 
even more extensive than that ultimately adopted by NCCUSL: 
No person shall be prosecuted for a violation of any 
of the provisions of this act if such person shall 
have been prosecuted and duly acquitted or convicted 
under the Federal Narcotic Act for the same, or 
substantially the same act or omissions which, it is 
alleged, constitute a violation of this act. 
 
Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws and Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual Conference 
401-02 (1931). 
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
11
the narcotics context, barring a Wisconsin prosecution following 
a federal prosecution for the "same act or omission."8  
¶19 Although we have been able to trace the historical 
roots of § 961.45 with some precision, we agree with the parties 
that there is frustratingly little in the drafting records of 
the Wisconsin legislature or NCCUSL to guide our interpretation 
of the term "same act" as used in § 961.45 or its predecessor.9  
Despite that fact, the statutory history that we have presented 
above provides important historical background.  Absent direct 
evidence of the legislature's or NCCUSL's intent, we turn to the 
context in which the language of the statute was adopted.  In 
particular we turn to the use of the phrase "same act" in the 
UCSA and the UNDA in the context of the well-developed body of 
double jeopardy jurisprudence in existence at the time of the 
passing, adoption, and revision of those uniform acts.  "'[A]ll 
                     
8  The UNDA provision contains a reference to "omission" 
because the UNDA created criminal omission liability.  See 
generally Wis. Stat. Ch. 161 (1935).  The UCSA, on the other 
hand, creates liability only for affirmative acts (i.e., 
possession, manufacture, distribution, and delivery).  See 
generally Wis. Stat. Ch. 961 (1999-2000).   
9  Other than the language of the provisions as drafted, the 
only indicia of legislative intent to be found in NCCUSL's 
records are passing references in the materials concerning the 
UNDA.  For example, the prefatory note to the UNDA states that 
"a section was inserted providing against double jeopardy."  
Unif. Narcotic Drug Act (1932), 9B U.L.A. 8 (1987).  The 
prefatory note to an early draft of the UNDA states "[the draft] 
has also tried to eliminate any double jeopardy which might be 
incurred by persons violating the state law and the Harrison 
Act."  Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws and Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Annual 
Meeting 323 (1928).   
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
12
legislation must be interpreted in the light of the common law 
and the scheme of jurisprudence existing at the time of its 
enactment.'"  In re Custody of D.M.M., 137 Wis. 2d 375, 389-90, 
404 N.W.2d 530 (1987) (quoted source omitted).  
¶20 While we can glean little from the recorded history as 
to the intended scope of "same act," we cannot ignore that as 
§ 961.45 and its precursor were created and revised there was an 
ongoing dialogue in the country as to the scope of the state and 
federal double jeopardy protections.  In that dialogue courts 
consistently used a common lexicon that includes the terms "act" 
and "offense" to explain double jeopardy principles.   
¶21 Having reviewed double jeopardy case law as it existed 
at the relevant time, including Blockburger and the cases of 
this court, we find the term "act" and "same act" to be used 
with remarkable consistency to describe the underlying conduct 
which comprises an offense.  Likewise, we find that the term 
"offense" is used to describe the crime as defined by its 
statutory elements.   
¶22 By asking us to construe "same act" to mean the crime 
as defined by the statutory elements, the State is asking us to 
translate "same act" as "same offense."  However, the State's 
interpretation conflicts with the marked distinction between 
"act" and "offense" found in the case law.  The terms are often 
juxtaposed, and this distinction has been described as the "act-
offense dichotomy."  Otto Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and 
Double Jeopardy, 58 Yale L.J. 513, 513 (1949).  Given this 
dichotomy in the double jeopardy context, we conclude that 
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
13
NCCUSL intended the term to have the meaning commonly ascribed 
to it in that context: "same act" meant "same conduct." 
¶23 As evidence of this dichotomy, we observe that 
Blockburger itself draws the distinction between acts and 
offenses that belies the State's interpretation of § 961.45.  
While the State argues that "same act" should be construed to 
incorporate the Blockburger test, that position cannot be 
reconciled with the language of Blockburger.  In the oft-quoted 
formulation 
of 
the 
test 
to 
determine 
whether 
multiple 
convictions constitute convictions for the "same offense" in 
contravention of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, 
the Blockburger Court explained: 
 
The applicable rule is that, where the same act or 
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct 
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 
determine whether there are two offenses or only one 
is whether each provision requires proof of an 
additional fact which the other does not.   
284 U.S. at 303 (emphasis added).  The Court also stated: "Here 
there was but one sale, and the question is whether, both 
sections being violated by the same act, the accused committed 
two offenses or only one."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶24 The Blockburger Court thus used the term "same act" to 
describe the conduct which formed the basis of an offense.  When 
describing a crime as defined by its elements, the Blockburger 
Court uses the term "offense," thereby tracking the language of 
the Fifth Amendment, which defines the protection against double 
jeopardy by reference to the "offence."  U.S. Const. amend. V.   
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
14
¶25 Since 1932, innumerable federal and state courts 
quoting Blockburger have carefully distinguished between acts 
and offenses, with acts describing the conduct which forms the 
basis of an offense.10  Blockburger is notable, not only because 
of its subsequent prevalence, but also because it was decided in 
January 1932, ten months before NCCUSL approved the UNDA and the 
use of the language "same act or omission" in its statutory 
double jeopardy protection.  
¶26 We also note the Court has drawn the same act-offense 
distinction in numerous cases regarding the dual sovereignty 
doctrine.  See generally Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 
189-95 (1959); Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382 ("The defendants thus 
committed two different offenses by the same act . . . .").  
                     
10 In recent years, this court in particular has constructed 
its double jeopardy jurisprudence around Blockburger v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), often drawing the act-offense 
distinction.  See, e.g., State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶28, 236 
Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833 ("In other words, because double 
jeopardy protection prohibits double punishment for the 'same 
offense,' the focus of the inquiry is whether the 'same offense' 
is actually being punished twice, or whether the legislature 
indeed intended to establish separate offenses subjecting an 
offender to separate, although cumulative, punishments for the 
same act."); State v. Vassos, 218 Wis. 2d 330, 335, 579 N.W.2d 
35 (1998) (quoting Blockburger); see generally State v. Kurzawa, 
180 Wis. 2d 502, 509 N.W.2d 712 (1994) (discussing Blockburger 
extensively).  
Blockburger, as codified in § 939.66(1), is a mainstay of 
our lesser-included offense jurisprudence.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.66(1) (1999-2000); State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 405, 
576 N.W.2d 392 (1998).  Blockburger is also codified at Wis. 
Stat. § 939.71 as a statutory bar to subsequent prosecutions.  
Vassos, 218 Wis. 2d at 335. 
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
15
¶27 In addition to the Supreme Court precedent, we find 
the act-offense dichotomy drawn most prominently in state court 
decisions.  While Blockburger predominates today under the Fifth 
Amendment as extended to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the state constitutions and state common law formerly 
provided protection coextensive with Blockburger.11  State courts 
similarly drew the distinction between acts and offenses and 
consistently used the term "act" and "same act" to describe the 
conduct comprising the offense.  This distinction was drawn 
before the creation of the 1932 uniform act and up to and beyond 
adoption of the UCSA. 
¶28 For example, at an early date the Ohio Supreme Court 
explained that the term "same offense" is not the equivalent of 
"same act": 
 
The words 'same offense' mean same offense, not the 
same transaction, not the same acts, not the same 
circumstances or same situation. 
State v. Rose, 106 N.E. 50, 51 (Ohio 1914).  Other state supreme 
courts would later use the same language.  E.g., Burton v. 
State, 79 So. 2d 242, 247 (Miss. 1955); State v. Goodson, 217 
P.2d 262, 264 (N.M. 1950); State v. Taylor, 293 N.W. 219, 225 
(N.D. 1940); State v. Winger, 282 N.W. 819, 821 (Minn. 1938).  
The Florida Supreme Court further explained:   
 
The words 'same offense' mean same crime or omission; 
not 
necessarily the 
same 
acts, 
circumstances or 
                     
11  The Fifth Amendment double jeopardy protection was 
extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).   
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
16
situation out of which the crime or omission arises.  
Driggers v. State, 137 Fla. 182, 188 So. 118; State v. 
Corwin, 106 Ohio St. 638, 140 N.E. 369; State v. 
Winger, 204 Minn. 164, 282 N.W. 819, 119 A.L.R. 1202. 
 The test is whether the defendant has been twice in 
jeopardy for the same identical crime, not whether he 
has 
been 
tried 
before 
upon 
the 
same 
acts, 
circumstances or situation the facts of which may 
sustain a conviction for a separate crime.   
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
17
State v. Bowden, 18 So. 2d 478, 480 (Fla. 1944).12 
                     
12 Other examples of state cases drawing the act-offense 
distinction are too numerous to cite.  However, we offer the 
following selection of cases from the courts of last resort of 
numerous states decided over the past century that pointedly 
draw the distinction:  State v. Stewart, 363 N.W.2d 368, 372 
(Neb. 1985) ("The constitutional prohibition against double 
jeopardy has no application where two separate and distinct 
crimes are committed as the result of one and the same act, 
because the constitutional proscription is directed to the 
identity of the offense and not to the act.");  State v. La 
Porte, 365 P.2d 24, 26 (Wash. 1961) ("Double jeopardy does not 
exist where a defendant stands charged with different offenses, 
even though they arise out of the same act.");  State v. 
Bradbury, 110 A.2d 710, 712 (Vt. 1955) ("It is not second 
jeopardy for the same act, but a second jeopardy for the same 
offense that is prohibited."); People v. Garman, 103 N.E.2d 636, 
639 (Ill. 1952) ("Where the offenses, though arising from the 
same act, are separate and distinct in law, the defense of 
former jeopardy is not available regardless of how closely they 
are connected in point of fact."); Orcutt v. State, 3 P.2d 912, 
914 (Okla. Crim. App. 1931) ("'The same act may constitute two 
or more offenses which are distinct from each other.  In such 
cases the accused may be separately prosecuted and punished for 
each, and a conviction or acquittal or prosecution for one will 
not constitute an acquittal and a bar for the other.'" (quoted 
source omitted)); State v. Wasinger, 298 P. 763, 764 (Kan. 1931) 
("It was within the power of the Legislature to create two or 
more 
distinct 
offenses 
growing out 
of a 
single act or 
transaction, each punishable by itself, and a conviction or 
acquittal on one would be no bar to a conviction under the 
other. . . . 'Hence the crimes, although committed by the same 
act, are different crimes, and a prosecution for one is no bar 
to a prosecution for the other.'" (quoted source omitted); State 
v. Mills, 150 S.E. 142, 143 (W.Va. 1929) ("The courts generally 
refuse to sustain the plea of former jeopardy on the ground that 
there are two offenses arising from the same act."); Duvall v. 
State, 146 N.E. 90, 92-93 (Ohio 1924) ("It is therefore our 
conclusion that  . . . when the same facts constitute two or 
more offenses, and the facts necessary to convict on a second 
prosecution would not necessarily have convicted on the first, 
the first prosecution will not be a bar to the second, although 
the offenses were both committed at the same time and by the 
same act."); State v. Farnham, 112 A. 258, 259-60 (Me. 1921) 
("If 
the 
same 
acts 
constitute 
another 
and 
different 
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
18
¶29 In addition, this court was one of many state courts 
signifying the distinction between acts and offenses by stating: 
"'The test is not whether the defendant has already been tried 
for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for 
the same offense.'"  State v. Brooks, 215 Wis. 134, 140, 254 
N.W. 374 (1934) (quoting Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 
434 (1871)).13  The same distinction between acts and offenses 
has long been noted by scholars and treatise writers addressing 
the double jeopardy questions posed by multiple prosecutions.  
E.g., I Wharton's Criminal Law 509 (11th ed. 1912) ("Same act 
may constitute two or more offenses which are distinct from each 
other.").  
¶30 Given 
the 
marked 
distinction between 
"acts" and 
"offenses" in the national double jeopardy discourse ongoing 
when the UNDA was created and persisting up to and beyond the 
                                                                  
offense, . . . the respondent may be punished for the other 
offense."). 
13  See also Schroeder v. State, 222 Wis. 251, 260, 267 N.W. 
899 (1936).  
This maxim, which originated in the 1871 case of Morey v. 
Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871), has been repeated 
often.  The United States Supreme Court quoted the phrase with 
approval in Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911). 
 The following state court cases contain the same or similar 
language: State v. Cox, 339 So. 2d 1374, 1377 (Miss. 1976); 
State v. Calvo, 121 So. 2d 244, 249 (La. 1960); State v. 
Barefoot, 86 S.E.2d 424, 427 (N.C. 1955); State v. Smith, 95 
A.2d 789, 790 (N.H. 1953); Hamblen v. State, 191 S.W.2d 537, 539 
(Tenn. 1945); Bingaman v. State, 24 S.W.2d 969, 970 (Ark. 1930); 
 State v. Kingsbury, 266 P. 174, 176 (Wash. 1928); State v. 
Marchindo, 211 P. 1093, 1098 (Mont. 1922). 
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
19
passage of the UCSA, we conclude that NCCUSL intended the phrase 
"same act" to share the meaning attributed to it in the case law 
and secondary materials.  We impute to NCCUSL, a learned body of 
lawyers, 
judges, 
and 
scholars, 
a 
familiarity 
with 
the 
fundamentals of double jeopardy jurisprudence.  We do not 
believe those familiar with these concepts at that time would 
use the phrase "same act" in this context to mean anything other 
than "same conduct."  Because the legislature adopted § 961.45 
from the UCSA without revision or any other indication of a 
contrary legislative intent, we attribute the intent of NCCUSL 
to the legislature.   
¶31 We recognize that we previously addressed the scope of 
§ 961.45 in a footnote in State v. Petty.  After noting the 
dearth of proffered authority to the contrary, the Petty court 
advanced at footnote 13 that "the statutory language tracks the 
Blockburger test as it expressly requires an identity of law 
(between the violation of 'this chapter' and the federal law or 
that of another state) as well as an identity of fact (the 'same 
act')."  201 Wis. 2d at 361 n.13.  The State relies on this same 
argument in support of its construction of § 961.45 and asserts 
that under stare decisis we are bound by the brief discussion in 
footnote 13 of the Petty opinion.   
¶32 Like the court of appeals in its memorandum certifying 
this case for our review, we decline to treat footnote 13 as 
binding precedent because it is inconsistent with a preceding 
footnote in that same opinion.  The issue in Petty was whether 
§ 961.45 barred a state prosecution which preceded the federal 
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
20
prosecution.  In footnote 10, the Petty court specifically 
stated that it would not reach the issue before the court in the 
present case, stating "we need not reach the issue of whether 
the two prosecutions were for the 'same act.'"  Id. at 360 n.10. 
 Nevertheless, the court proceeded to address the issue three 
footnotes later, providing the non-essential commentary with 
which today's opinion conflicts.  Id. at 361 n.13.   
¶33 It is unclear which footnote the Petty court intended 
to embrace and which it intended to delete.  What is clear, 
however, is that because of the internal inconsistency, no 
judicial precedent was established in the first instance.  The 
State urges us not merely to heed footnote 13, but to elevate it 
to the status of controlling judicial precedent, sufficient to 
permanently dictate the interpretation of the statute.  Such a 
position 
ignores 
Petty 
footnote 
10, 
which 
disavows 
the 
discussion in Petty footnote 13.   
¶34 If, as the State asserts, footnote 13 resolves the 
question before the court today, there would be no need for the 
court of appeals to certify the question to us.  Instead, it 
could merely decide this case on settled law.  Yet, the court of 
appeals 
certified 
the 
case, 
noting 
that 
"[a]n 
important 
difference in the chronology of Petty's prosecutions, however, 
ultimately led the [Petty] court not to decide the issue Hansen 
now presents."  In concluding its certification memorandum, the 
court of appeals again emphasized that the Petty court did not 
decide the issue before us today.  It stated that the "Petty 
[court], however, not needing to resolve the issue Hansen now 
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
21
presents, did not define 'same act'."  Thus, we agree with the 
court of appeals that this case presents the first time that we 
address this legal question.   
¶35 In addition to the internal inconsistency that defeats 
the precedential value of footnote 13, we also note that the 
brief discussion of the statute in Petty footnote 13 did not 
have the benefit of a review of the historical context in which 
the language of the statute was adopted.  In footnote 13, the 
Petty 
court 
emphasized 
that 
the 
"defendant 
offer[ed] 
no 
authority" and that the "defendant has failed to provide any 
authority" to support his reading of the statute.  Petty, 201 
Wis. 2d at 361 n. 13.  The court then engaged in a four-sentence 
inquiry into the legislative intent in Petty footnote 13.  This 
inquiry was incomplete.  The court did not fully examine the 
statute or its predecessor in the proper historical context.  It 
referenced only the UCSA drafter's intent to provide "an 
interlocking trellis of drug laws" between state and federal 
governments.  Id.  Such a statement of intent cannot justify a 
construction of the statute contrary to that called for by the 
language of the statute as properly construed.   
¶36 Moreover, Petty footnote 13's reliance on this intent 
is undermined by the realities of federal prosecution.  It is a 
long-standing policy of the federal Department of Justice to 
avoid 
duplicating 
prior 
state 
prosecutions 
"based 
on 
substantially the same act(s) or transactions" except under 
certain circumstances.  This policy was formulated in 1959 and, 
as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Petite v. United 
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
22
States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960), it would have been well known to 
the drafters of the UCSA.14  We fail to see how the goal of an 
"interlocking trellis" is served through an interpretation of 
§ 961.45 that leads to a wholly disjointed set of prosecutorial 
restrictions on each side of the federal-state divide.  Rather, 
the interpretation of § 961.45 that we adopt today advances the 
goal of an "interlocking trellis" by further harmonizing federal 
and state practice.   
¶37 Contrary to the discussion in Petty footnote 13, 
§ 961.45 does not require identity in law between the prior 
                     
14 See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 531 (1960) 
(explaining formulation of policy in 1959); see also Rinaldi v. 
United States, 434 U.S. 22, 28 (1977) (explaining that "Petite" 
policy arose as a result of two 1959 Supreme Court decisions).  
The United States Attorney's Manual explains the "Petite 
policy" as follows: 
This policy precludes the initiation or continuation 
of a federal prosecution, following a prior state or 
federal prosecution based on substantially the same 
act(s) or transaction(s) unless three substantive 
prerequisites are satisfied: first, the matter must 
involve a substantial federal interest; second, the 
prior 
prosecution 
must 
have 
left 
that 
interest 
demonstrably unvindicated; and third, applying the 
same 
test 
that 
is 
applicable 
to 
all 
federal 
prosecutions, the government must believe that the 
defendant's conduct constitutes a federal offense, and 
that 
the 
admissible 
evidence 
probably 
will 
be 
sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction by an 
unbiased trier of fact. In addition, there is a 
procedural prerequisite to be satisfied, that is, the 
prosecution must be 
approved by 
the 
appropriate 
Assistant Attorney General.  
 
United States Department of Justice, United States Attorney's 
Manual § 9-2.031 (1997). 
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
23
conviction or acquittal and the alleged violation of Chapter 
961.  The phrase in § 961.45 referring to "a violation of this 
chapter" is merely the language necessary to limit the scope of 
the provision to Chapter 961.  Indeed, in the absence of that 
language, § 961.45 would apply to the entire statutory code.  
Nothing in the statute indicates a directive to employ the 
Blockburger "elements only" analysis.  
¶38 At oral argument, the State emphasized the rule of 
statutory construction that legislative inaction following a 
judicial interpretation of a statute may give rise to a 
presumption of legislative acquiescence in that interpretation. 
 The State advances that we must infer acquiescence from the 
five years of inaction since Petty was decided.  While the 
presumption that arises from legislative inaction may carry the 
day in some cases, this rule of statutory construction has also 
been characterized as a "'weak reed upon which to lean.'"  Green 
Bay Packaging, Inc. v. DILHR, 72 Wis. 2d 26, 36, 240 N.W.2d 422 
(1976) (quoted source omitted).  Reliance on this canon is even 
weaker when we are asked to infer acquiescence from the 
legislature's inaction in response to a footnote which is not 
precedential and reaches issues unnecessary to the determination 
of a case.  We therefore refuse to give the legislative inaction 
any conclusive effect. 
¶39 The parties also dispute the precedential value and 
interpretations of the courts of other states.  We have found no 
case law from other jurisdictions that examines the historical 
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
24
context of NCCUSL's intent in drafting the provision at issue.15 
 Because we believe that inquiry to be determinative, we rest 
our decision on our own inquiry into the legislative intent as 
evidenced by NCCUSL's choice of language understood in light of 
the existing jurisprudential framework.  We acknowledge that our 
interpretation is contrary to that of a New Jersey appellate 
court in cases cited by the parties.  See State v. Ableman, 342 
A.2d 228 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); State v. Krell, 311 
A.2d 399 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973).  Concededly the goal 
of any uniform act is uniformity.  However, we will not 
acquiesce for the sake of uniformity to an interpretation with 
which we do not agree.    
¶40 We conclude our discussion of statutory interpretation 
by observing that while not necessarily indicative of the intent 
of the drafters of the UCSA, our construction of § 961.45 avoids 
                     
15 We note that the parties have offered case law from 
states with vastly different statutes than § 961.45.  For 
example, there was discussion in the briefs of the New York 
decision in People v. Abbamonte, 371 N.E.2d 485 (N.Y. 1977).  
Although Abbamonte concerned successive federal and state drug 
prosecutions, the parties misconceive the provision at issue in 
that case.  The statute was not the New York analog to § 961.45; 
that is, it was not a statutory double jeopardy provision 
specific to controlled substances offenses.  The New York 
statute at issue in that case was the New York analog to 
§ 939.71, a general statute of criminal procedure that prevents 
subsequent prosecutions following conviction or acquittal in 
another jurisdiction.  See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 40.20 
(McKinney 1992).  The provision was adopted by the New York 
legislature in 1970.  1970 N.Y. Laws 996.  New York did not 
adopt the UCSA until 1972.  1972 N.Y. Laws 878.  New York's 
analog to § 961.45 is N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3396(3) (McKinney 
1992).   
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
25
several incongruities with other provisions of the Wisconsin 
Statutes that define the relationship between acts and offenses 
and that codify double jeopardy principles.  We have construed 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.66(1) 
and 
§ 939.71 
to 
incorporate Blockburger.  State v. Vassos, 218 Wis. 2d 330, 335, 
579 N.W.2d 35 (1998) (§ 939.71); State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 
392, 405, 576 N.W.2d 912 (1998) (§ 939.66(1)).  Because the 
language of § 961.45 is so vastly different from either of those 
statutes, construing § 961.45 to incorporate Blockburger would 
lead to inconsistent construction of our statutes.   
¶41 Also, the State's asserted interpretation of "same 
act" conflicts with the word "act" as used in § 939.65 and 
§ 939.71.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 939.65 & 939.71 ("if an act forms 
the basis for a crime punishable under more than one statutory 
provision").  In both of those provisions "act" signifies the 
conduct which constitutes a criminal offense.  
¶42 Finally, our construction avoids a reading of § 961.45 
that would render it largely superfluous.  Were § 961.45 read to 
incorporate Blockburger, it would provide a protection against a 
successive Wisconsin prosecution to a large degree duplicative 
of the protection provided in § 939.71.  Section 939.71, as 
interpreted by this court, requires application of Blockburger 
to determine whether a conviction or acquittal "under the laws 
of another jurisdiction" bars a conviction for the same offense 
in Wisconsin.  Wis. Stat. § 939.71.  The statutes differ of 
course in that § 961.45 applies to prosecutions and § 939.71 
applies to convictions. 
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
26
¶43 Having concluded 
that § 961.45 bars 
a 
Wisconsin 
prosecution where the defendant has previously been acquitted or 
convicted for the same conduct under federal law or the laws of 
another state, we now apply the statute to the facts of this 
case.  We note that the State fails to argue that the successive 
state and federal prosecutions were not for the same conduct.  
The 
factual 
basis 
of 
the 
federal 
conviction 
included 
a 
description of Hansen's conduct on September 29, 1997 that 
mirrored the conduct described in the state complaint.  The 
conduct of which the federal prosecution consisted included 
Hansen's conduct in possessing cocaine on her person, in her 
automobile, and at her home.  This same conduct was the sole 
basis for the conviction in state court.  As such, we must 
conclude that the state prosecution was for the same conduct for 
which Hansen has previously been convicted in federal court.  By 
failing to raise an argument in this regard, we presume the 
State recognizes that the interpretation of § 961.45 we adopt 
today compels this result.   
 
¶44 In sum, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 961.45 bars a 
Wisconsin prosecution under Chapter 961 for the same conduct on 
which a prior federal conviction is based.  Recognition of the 
context in which the language "same act" was chosen requires 
this construction of the statute.  Because Hansen's state 
conviction is for the same conduct for which she was previously 
convicted 
in 
federal 
court, 
we 
reverse 
the 
judgment 
of 
conviction and the circuit court's order denying her post-
conviction relief.   
No. 
99-1128-CR 
 
 
27
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
are reversed. 
 
 
No. 99-1128.ssa 
 
1 
¶45 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  I 
join the majority opinion.  I write separately to address the 
Petty16 issue set forth in the dissent. 
¶46 I wholeheartedly acknowledge the importance of stare 
decisis in a system based on a rule of law.  The dissent cites a 
few of a plethora of opinions (some written by me) to highlight 
the high hurdle that courts must overcome when they seek to 
revisit past precedent. 
¶47 My point of disagreement with the dissenting opinion 
lies not in its reverence toward stare decisis, nor in its 
explanation of its precepts, but rather in its application of 
these important principles to a footnote in Petty. 
¶48 It is improper to erect the high bar of stare decisis 
until one has successfully cleared the high bar of showing that 
Petty note 13 is a judicial precedent in the first instance.  
The dissent ducks the bar, ignoring the blatant conflict between 
Petty note 10 (declaring that the opinion "need not reach the 
issue of whether the two prosecutions were 'for the same act'") 
and Petty note 13 (apparently addressing whether the two 
prosecutions were for the same act based on the defendant's 
failure to offer authority, reasoning, or explanation for his 
position).  If Petty note 10 disavows Petty note 13, why should 
this court now be bound by Petty note 13?  
                     
16 State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 360 n.10, 361 n.13, 548 
N.W.2d 817 (1996). 
No. 99-1128.ssa 
 
2 
¶49 I agree with the majority opinion and the Court of 
Appeals that the Petty opinion did not reach the issue presented 
in the case at bar, that is, whether the federal and state 
prosecutions were for the "same act." 
¶50 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
 
No. 99-1128.jpw 
 
1 
¶51 JON P. WILCOX, J. (dissenting).  The majority opinion 
reinterprets Wis. Stat. § 961.45 (1995-96), which this court 
first interpreted five years ago in a unanimous decision.  
Majority op. at ¶¶15-42; State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 354-
62, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996).  In so doing, the majority repudiates 
our recent Petty 
decision, 
but ducks 
the 
high bar for 
overturning precedent on a point of statutory construction.  The 
majority's unwillingness to engage in the appropriate analysis 
is understandable; its opinion contains little justification to 
underpin its departure from our controlling precedent.  Because 
the majority opinion oversteps its judicial role in the face of 
controlling precedent, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶52 The basic problem pervading the majority's troubling 
opinion is its failure to engage in the analysis necessary to 
overturn an earlier decision of this court.  Rather than 
answering the certified question under our controlling Petty 
decision, which directly addressed the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.45, the majority launches into a de novo statutory 
interpretation of § 961.45, thereby ignoring the longstanding 
rule that this court "is bound by its own precedent."  Petty, 
201 Wis. 2d 354-62; majority op. at ¶15; Rose Manor Realty Co. 
v. City of Milwaukee, 272 Wis. 339, 346, 75 N.W.2d 274 (1956). 
¶53 The de novo statutory interpretation in which the 
majority indulges is only appropriate when we are confronted 
with a case that presents an unresolved point of statutory 
construction.  In such a case, we will engage in statutory 
No. 99-1128.jpw 
 
2 
interpretation to discern the legislative intent.  State v. 
Sprosty, 227 Wis. 2d 316, 323, 595 N.W.2d 692 (1999).  This is 
in accord with the United States Supreme Court.  As Justice Hugo 
Black 
observed, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
engages 
in 
statutory 
construction "not because the Court has any special ability to 
fathom the intent of Congress, but rather because interpretation 
is unavoidable in the decision of the case before it."  Boys 
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 257 (1970) 
(Black, J., dissenting).  Similarly, we have no special ability 
to fathom the intent of the Wisconsin legislature, but we must 
engage in statutory interpretation when a particular case 
demands it.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) 
("[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to 
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that 
rule.").  That is our adjudicative role, which is grounded in 
the Wisconsin Constitution, Article VII, Section 2.  
¶54 But once this court has spoken on a point of statutory 
construction, it is bound by that interpretation absent a 
special justification.  Even if a subsequent majority believes 
that this court's previous construction was wrong, the earlier 
ruling 
should 
be 
remedied 
by 
the 
legislature 
in 
its 
No. 99-1128.jpw 
 
3 
constitutionally defined legislative capacity.17  This court's 
subsequent belief that its previous ruling on a point of 
statutory construction was unreasonable, or perhaps even wrong, 
is legislative in nature, not adjudicative.18  At that point, we 
no longer have the legitimacy of adjudicative necessity to rule 
on that point of statutory construction. 
 
¶55  Staying within our adjudicative role does not stifle 
all development in the law.  This court has acknowledged that if 
the law "is to keep pace with social developments and progress, 
[it] 
cannot 
remain 
static, 
and 
precedents 
consisting 
of 
decisions of this court rendered in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century sometimes are outmoded and should not be 
                     
17 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-
73 (1989) (holding that absent a "special justification," the 
Court declines to overrule a point of statutory interpretation, 
leaving it to Congress to alter what the Court has done); 
Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (ruling that "any 
departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special 
justification."); Wis. Const., art. IV, § 1 ("The legislative 
power shall be vested in a senate and assembly."). 
18 As the Supreme Court explained in Patterson, a party 
asking a court to overrule a previous decision on a point of 
statutory construction bears a greater burden than a party 
asking 
a 
court 
to 
overrule 
a 
previous 
decision 
on 
a 
constitutional question.  491 U.S. 164, 172.  This higher burden 
stems from the fact that overruling a previous decision on a 
point of statutory construction implicates legislative power, 
whereas overruling a previous decision on a constitutional 
question is squarely within the province of the judiciary.  Id.; 
see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803)("[i]f, then, 
the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution 
is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the 
constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to 
which they both apply."). 
No. 99-1128.jpw 
 
4 
blindly followed."  Leach v. Leach, 261 Wis. 350, 359, 52 N.W.2d 
896 (1952).  The tension between this vitality of the law and 
adherence 
to 
our 
precedent 
is 
resolved 
through 
a 
third 
principle: 
 
A court's decision to depart from precedent is not to 
be made casually.  It must be explained carefully and 
fully to insure that the court is not acting in an 
arbitrary or capricious manner.  A court should not 
depart 
from 
precedent 
without 
sufficient 
justification. 
 
Justification 
for 
departure 
from 
precedent could include changes or developments in the 
law that undermine the rationale behind a decision; 
the need to make a decision correspond to newly 
ascertained facts; or a showing that the precedent has 
become detrimental to coherence and consistency in the 
law.  No change in the law is justified by 'a change 
in the membership of the court or a case with more 
egregious facts.' 
State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 442, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994) 
(Abrahamson, J. concurring) (citations omitted).  Accordingly, 
we must engage in careful analysis when repudiating our 
precedent on a point of statutory construction in order to 
remain within our constitutionally defined adjudicative role.  
In this case, the majority resorts to judicial lawmaking rather 
than engaging in the appropriate analysis, thereby overstepping 
the court's adjudicative role. 
II 
 
¶56 In reinterpreting Wis. Stat. § 961.45, the majority 
fails to present a special justification for its departure from 
our precedent.  The majority acknowledges that the State's 
reading of § 961.45 as tracking Blockburger is reasonable.  
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).  Majority op. 
No. 99-1128.jpw 
 
5 
at ¶15.  Because the State merely advances our Petty reading of 
§ 961.45, I consider it controlling. 
¶57 The facts in Petty are strikingly similar to the case 
at hand.  There, a federal court convicted Petty of conspiracy 
to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and a state court 
convicted him of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) 
with intent to deliver while armed.  Petty, 201 Wis. 2d at 343-
44.  As in the present case, the charges at issue arose from the 
same 
course 
of 
conduct 
or 
criminal 
transaction——Petty's 
possession of cocaine with intent to deliver on August 1, 1991. 
 Id.  The second issue raised in Petty was the same as the issue 
present here:  whether the conviction in state court must be 
vacated in light of the federal conviction because it violated 
Wis. Stat. § 161.45 (renumbered § 961.45).  Id. at 354.  To 
avoid conviction for the same course of conduct or criminal 
transaction, Petty argued that the legislature intended Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 161.45 
to 
provide 
a 
broader 
analysis 
than 
the 
Blockburger test of whether the offenses are identical in law 
and fact.  201 Wis. 2d at 361 n.13, 362.  In response to this 
argument, we wrote: 
 
[Petty] offers no authority for this proposition, 
which 
seemingly contradicts the 
language 
of the 
statute.  As the State recognizes, there is no support 
in the legislative history to substantiate a claim 
that either the drafters of the Uniform Acts or the 
successive Wisconsin legislatures intended to deviate 
from prevailing double jeopardy law concerning what 
constitutes the same offense for purposes of the 
statutory bar to prosecution. 
 
Rather, 
the 
statutory 
language 
tracts 
the 
Blockburger test as it expressly requires an identity 
No. 99-1128.jpw 
 
6 
of law (between the violation of 'this chapter' and 
the federal law or that of another state) as well as 
an identity of fact (the 'same act').  Moreover, the 
fact 
that 
a 
primary 
purpose 
of 
the 
Controlled 
Substances and Narcotics Act is to achieve uniformity, 
while providing an interlocking trellis of drug laws 
among the state and federal jurisdictions, strongly 
supports the State's assertion that § 161.45 bars a 
subsequent state prosecution only when the offenses 
are substantially the same in fact and law.  See 
generally 
Prefatory 
Note, 
1970 
Handbook 
of 
the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, at 223.  The defendant has failed to provide any 
authority 
to 
bolster 
his 
alternative 
reading of 
§ 161.45, relying instead on an unsupported assertion 
that the legislature simply intended to broaden double 
jeopardy analysis in this state without explanation.  
We do not agree with this novel reading of the statute 
in question. 
Id.  The Petty court, then, unambiguously concluded that the 
words "the same act" in § 961.45 refer to a violation of Chapter 
961 and clearly rejected the "novel reading" that the word 
"act"——in singular form——referred to a course of conduct or a 
criminal transaction, which forms the basis of a single 
violation or act.  Id. at 361 n.13.  These phrases——a course of 
conduct or criminal transaction——could have been included by the 
legislature in the five years that have followed Petty if it 
intended to extend double jeopardy analysis beyond Blockburger. 
¶58 Rather 
than 
acknowledging 
that 
the 
language 
in 
§ 961.45 barring prosecution for "the same act" refers to a 
violation of chapter 961, the majority strains to adopt Petty's 
novel reading of "act" as encompassing the multiple facts, the 
course of conduct, or the criminal transaction that formed the 
No. 99-1128.jpw 
 
7 
basis of the act or violation in the present case.19  In an 
attempt to buttress its reinterpretation, the majority conducts 
a profitless search for legislative intent, reaching back to 
1932 when the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws adopted the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, which was the 
precursor to the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, upon which 
the Wisconsin Controlled Substances Act is based.  Still lacking 
direct support for its novel reading of § 961.45, the majority 
cites "national double jeopardy discourse ongoing when the UNDA 
was created and persisting up to and beyond the passage of the 
UCSA."  Majority op. at ¶30.  Such discourse does not provide 
                     
19 As noted above and in Petty, a commonsense reading of 
Wis. Stat. § 961.45 indicates that "the same act" refers to a 
single violation rather than multiple facts, a course of 
conduct, or a criminal transaction, which forms the basis of a 
violation.  State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 361 n.13, 548 
N.W.2d 817 (1996).  Attempting to avoid this controlling reading 
of "the same act" and our discussion of § 961.45 in Petty, the 
majority opinion asserts that our footnote 10 "disavows the 
discussion in Petty footnote 13."  Majority op. at 33.  However, 
the defendant in Petty argued for the majority's reading of 
§ 961.45 in order to have his state charge vacated.  We 
specifically rejected his reading (and the majority's reading) 
of § 961.45 in footnote 13.  Footnote 10, on the other hand, 
explained that we did not have to engage in "the same act" or 
Blockburger test because we had determined that the federal 
prosecution had not followed the state prosecution, which is a 
necessary prerequisite for the § 961.45 bar to prosecution.  
While footnote 10 stopped short of applying the Blockburger test 
as established in response to Petty's argument, it does not 
"disavow" or cast doubt on footnote 13.  It may be that the 
majority disagrees with the Blockburger test, but it is well-
settled law in Wisconsin.  See State v. Moffett, 2000 WI 130, 
¶16, 239 Wis. 2d 629, 619 N.W.2d 918 (employing the Blockburger 
test to determine if the offenses are identical).  In light of 
the unequivocal statutory analysis in footnote 13, I believe 
§ 961.45 tracks the Blockburger test and should be followed. 
No. 99-1128.jpw 
 
8 
justification to overrule a five-year-old unanimous opinion of 
this court. 
¶59 Instead, I find our construction of § 961.45 in Petty, 
bolstered by the Wisconsin Legislature's inaction since Petty 
was decided, more compelling than whatever may be gleaned from 
the vague "discourse ongoing when the UNDA was created" in 1932. 
 The legislature had an opportunity to make any desired policy 
changes when it adopted § 961.45 in 1997, after Petty was 
decided.  The legislature's refusal to make any changes in 
§ 961.45 evidences acquiescence to our previous interpretation 
of the statute.20  State v. Johnson, 207 Wis. 2d 239, 248, 558 
N.W.2d 375 (1997) (concluding that legislature has acquiesced to 
this court's interpretation of a statute).  The legislature not 
only had the opportunity, but it had examples from other 
                     
20 The majority seems to suggest that the legislature was 
not cognizant of our holding in Petty regarding § 961.45 because 
part of our discussion was in a lengthy footnote rather than in 
the body of the opinion.  Majority op. at ¶38.  The majority 
fails to cite——and I am unaware of any authority——that supports 
the majority's intimation that the legislature refuses to read 
footnotes in legal opinions.  For a discussion of the role of 
footnotes in judicial opinions and their precedential effect, 
see Robert A. James, Are Footnotes in Opinions Given Full 
Precedential Effect?, 2 Green Bag 2d 267 (1999); Thomas R. 
Haggard, In Defense of the Lowly Footnote, 10-APR S.C. Law. 12 
(1999); Judge Edward R. Becker, In Praise of Footnotes, 167 
F.R.D. 283 (1996); Herma Hill Kay, In Defense of Footnotes, 32 
Ariz. L. Rev. 419 (1990).  For a deconstructive discussion of 
the footnote in general coupled with an analysis of Justice 
Harlan Fiske Stone's footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene 
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), one of the most significant 
footnotes in the history of constitutional law, see J.M. Balkin, 
The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 275 (1989).  After reviewing 
this discussion, in my view, there is no valid or widely 
accepted basis to disregard footnotes in judicial opinions. 
No. 99-1128.jpw 
 
9 
jurisdictions if it intended to broaden Wis. Stat. § 161.45 
beyond Blockburger.21  Accordingly, the majority's decision to 
extend § 961.45 is for the legislature, not this court.  By 
extending § 961.45 beyond the well-settled Blockburger analysis, 
absent a special justification, the majority has engaged in 
judicial lawmaking. 
III 
 
¶60 In sum, I would rule that our decision in Petty 
controls and that the subsequent inaction by the legislature in 
declining to alter the language of § 961.45 evidences a 
legislative intent to keep § 961.45 in line with the well-
settled Blockburger test.  I am disturbed by the majority's 
                     
21 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 961.45 
bars 
prosecution 
for 
"a 
conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another 
state for the same act."  As noted, the legislature could have 
added course of conduct or criminal transaction after the 
singular "act" to broaden the double jeopardy analysis beyond 
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) in the five 
years following our Petty decision, but evidently declined to do 
so.  This "criminal transaction" language is the distinguishing 
feature of a New York statute that goes beyond § 961.45 and the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
of 
New 
York 
interpreted 
the 
"criminal 
transaction" language after "the same act" to bar prosecution 
for the same conduct.  People v. Abbamonte, 371 N.E.2d 485, 488-
89 (N.Y. 1977).  Similarly, Pennsylvania has "based on the same 
conduct" instead of "the same act" in a comparable statute and 
courts there have interpreted the word "conduct" as barring 
prosecution by dual sovereigns where there is one criminal 
transaction.  Commonwealth v. Abbott, 466 A.2d 644, 652 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1983).  The only other state that has confronted a 
statute 
that 
tracks 
§ 961.45 
is 
New 
Jersey, 
which 
has 
interpreted the "same act" language as referring to acts 
prohibited in the preceding statutory sections, in accord with 
our Petty decision.  State v. Ableman, 342 A.2d 228, 230 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); State v. Krell, 311 A.2d 399 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973). 
No. 99-1128.jpw 
 
10
willingness 
to 
jettison 
Petty, 
without 
engaging 
in 
an 
appropriate analysis and without sufficient justification, while 
simultaneously conceding that our earlier reading of § 961.45 in 
Petty is reasonable.  Majority op. at ¶15.  The majority's 
disregard for our precedent casts a long shadow over our past 
decisions 
while 
providing 
spongy 
ground 
for 
our 
future 
decisions.22  Therefore, rather than repudiating our controlling 
                     
22 The concurrence contends that "[i]t is improper to erect 
the high bar of stare decisis until one has successfully cleared 
the high bar of showing that Petty note 13 is a judicial 
precedent in the first instance."  Concurrence at ¶48.  However, 
assuming 
that 
footnote 
13 
in 
Petty 
was 
unnecessary 
to 
disposition of the case, we nevertheless have stated that "when 
a court of last resort intentionally takes up, discusses, and 
decides a question germane to, though not necessarily decisive 
of, the controversy, such decision is not a dictum but is a 
judicial act of the court which it will thereafter recognize as 
a binding decision."  Chase v. American Cartage Co., 176 Wis. 
235, 238, 186 N.W. 598 (1922) (cited with approval in State v. 
No. 99-1128.jpw 
 
11
precedent, I would answer this certified question under our 
recent Petty decision.   
¶61 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this dissent.   
 
                                                                  
Kruse, 101 Wis. 2d 387, 392, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981)).  In Petty, 
footnote 13 was clearly germane to the controversy as to whether 
§ 961.45 barred the defendant's state prosecution.  Moreover, 
the parties argued whether § 961.45 tracked Blockburger or 
extended beyond Blockburger to this court.  Accordingly, we 
resolved that very issue properly presented to this court in 
footnote 13.  I would therefore recognize footnote 13 as a 
binding interpretation of § 961.45. 
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