Case Title: Charbonneau v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 253, 2004, 256, 2004

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
LINDA L. CHARBONNEAU,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 253/256, 2004 [Consolidated] 
 
 
Defendant Below Appellant, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Sussex County 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  CR. ID No. 0207003810 
 
 
Plaintiff Below Appellee. 
 
)  CR A. Nos. IS02-07-0308 through 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  IS02-07-0312 
 
Submitted:  November 7, 2005 
Decided:  March 1, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the court en banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED. 
 
 
Craig A. Karsnitz (argued), Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, 
Georgetown, Delaware and Thomas A. Pederson, Georgetown, Delaware, for 
appellant. 
 
 
Kim E. Ayvazian (argued), Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware 
and John Williams, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice, for the Majority: 
 
2
 
The State indicted Linda Charbonneau, her daughter, Mellisa Rucinski, and 
Willie Tony Brown for criminal offenses arising out of the murders of John 
Charbonneau and William Sproates.1  The State entered into plea agreements with 
Mellisa and Brown contingent on their providing truthful proffers and truthful 
testimony at Linda’s trial.   
Twelve days before opening statements at Linda’s trial, the prosecutors 
produced a potential witness list for voir dire that included both Brown and 
Mellisa.  The prosecutors knew that there were inconsistencies in Mellisa’s and 
Brown’s proffered versions of the critical events at least six months before Linda’s 
trial.  Despite that knowledge the prosecutors waited until four days into jury 
selection and four days before scheduled opening statements to notify the trial 
judge and the defense that they would not be calling Brown as a witness because 
they believed Mellisa’s proffered version of the facts, but not Brown’s.  Linda’s 
counsel, however, had extensively prepared their defense at trial on the assumption 
that Brown would be called as a witness to testify.  Because the state’s thirteenth 
hour decision not to call Brown would essentially eviscerate their defense 
strategies, defense counsel sought two forms of relief:  (i) a “missing witness” 
instruction, and (ii) an in limine order admitting Brown’s plea and proffer into 
                                                 
1  
We refer to Linda Charbonneau as “Linda,” Willie Tony Brown as “Brown,” Mellisa 
Rucinski as “Mellisa,” John Charbonneau as “John,” and William Sproates as “Sproates” 
throughout this Opinion. 
 
3
evidence for the purposes of impeaching Mellisa and creating reasonable doubt 
about the State’s case.  The trial judge denied the missing witness instruction, 
ruling that it was “not natural” for the State to call Brown so long as the State 
“believed” that Brown was lying.  In addition, the trial judged ruled that the fact 
that Brown had pleaded guilty to first degree murder and the facts stated in 
Brown’s proffer that formed the basis of Brown’s plea bargain were inadmissible 
as evidence at the trial because they were irrelevant and because any probative 
value that evidence might have was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice or misleading the jury.  By so ruling, the trial judge essentially 
determined as fact the State’s unilateral determination about Brown’s and 
Mellisa’s respective credibility, and removed that credibility issue from the 
ultimate fact finder.   
The defendant has appealed, asserting six claims of error, including these 
two rulings.  We determine that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying 
Linda’s motion in limine because the exclusion of evidence relevant to the 
credibility of one of the State’s two primary fact witnesses removed from the jury, 
as ultimate finder of fact, the opportunity to consider and decide which of the two 
State’s witnesses was more credible.2  The result was to undermine confidence that 
                                                 
2  
That determination makes it unnecessary to decide Charbonneau’s claim regarding the 
trial judge’s denial of her request for a missing witness instruction.  We find no error in any of 
the other rulings of the trial judge.  
 
4
the defendant received a fair trial.  Therefore, although we uphold the trial judge’s 
other rulings challenged on this appeal, we reverse the conviction on the ground 
that the trial judge’s denial of the motion in limine fatally undermined the fairness 
of the trial.  Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and remanded for a new trial.     
 
I.  FACTS 
 
The facts of this case are complex.  We summarize at this point the facts that 
are relevant to our holding.  Other sections of this Opinion addressing the specific 
issues on appeal discuss those facts, where relevant, in more detail. 
Linda was married to John, and later, to Sproates.  Linda remained 
romantically involved with both men in varying degrees and had moved between 
the residences of John and Sproates several times.3  In the fall of 2001, John and 
Sproates were reported missing.  Sproates’s body was eventually found in John’s 
backyard.  A murder investigation ensued.  Linda became a primary suspect.  The 
investigation ultimately suggested that Linda, Mellisa, and Mellisa’s boyfriend, 
Brown, participated in John’s and Sproates’s murders.  All three were eventually 
indicted and the State began to prepare for trial.   
In April of 2003, the State began to discuss a plea bargain with Brown.  On 
April 10, 2003, the State sent a letter to Brown discussing the terms under which it 
                                                 
3  
John and Sproates lived in Bridgeville, Delaware and Magnolia, Delaware, respectively. 
 
 
5
would allow Brown to plead guilty.  The State offered Brown a plea of guilty to 
two counts of First Degree Murder.  Brown would be required to provide the State 
with a truthful written proffer, a truthful formal videotaped statement, and truthful 
testimony at Linda’s and Mellisa’s trials.  In return for Brown’s cooperation, the 
State promised to recommend life in prison at his sentencing.4  Brown accepted the 
State’s offer and sent a written proffer to the State on April 22, 2003 outlining his 
version of how the murders took place.  Brown’s proffer implicated himself, Linda, 
and Mellisa in the murders.  In his proffer, Brown suggested that the motive to kill 
John resulted from pornographic pictures of Mellisa’s oldest daughter found on 
John’s computer.  Brown further proffered that Mellisa had actively participated in 
Sproates’s murder:  Mellisa stabbed Sproates while Brown beat him with a 
homemade weapon.  The State and Brown agreed to the deal and Brown pleaded 
guilty to two counts of Murder in the First Degree on April 24, 2003.  Under the 
terms of the agreement, sentencing was deferred until his codefendants’ cases were 
resolved. 
On October 8, 2003, approximately six months after Brown’s plea, the State 
began plea discussions with Mellisa.  Armed with Brown’s proffer implicating 
                                                 
4  
Further, the agreement also provided that a nolle prosequi be entered on two charges of 
Conspiracy in the First Degree and one charge of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the 
Commission of a Felony. 
Brown, as a prior violent felon, faced a designation as a habitual criminal pursuant to 11 
Del. C. § 4214(b) and a mandatory life sentence if convicted of either murder.  Thus, the best 
Brown could hope for was a life sentence. 
 
 
 
6
Mellisa in the murders, the State offered Mellisa a plea to Second Degree Murder 
for John’s death, and to Conspiracy in the First Degree for Sproates’s murder.  The 
terms of the plea agreement required Mellisa to provide a truthful written proffer 
and truthful testimony at her codefendants’ trials.  Mellisa accepted the State’s 
offer and sent the State a proffer outlining her version of the murders.  Mellisa’s 
account of the murders differed substantially from Brown’s.   
The two proffers differed in the following ways: 
 
• Brown suggested in his proffer that Mellisa was actively involved in 
Sproates’s murder.  Mellisa, however, proffered that she was miles 
away when the murder occurred, and that Brown had committed the 
murder alone at Linda’s request.  
 
• Brown claimed that the motive behind killing John originated from 
pornographic pictures of Mellisa’s oldest child found on John’s 
computer. Mellisa proffered that the motive to kill John stemmed 
from constant battles between Linda and John over material 
possessions.  
 
• Brown proffered that Linda killed John and that all he (Brown) did 
was bury John’s body.  Mellisa, however, proffered that she witnessed 
Brown beating John.  Mellisa also claimed that after the beating, 
while John was still alive, she drove Brown and John to a secluded 
area where Brown killed John with a blunt object and buried him.  
 
Despite the obvious inconsistencies in the proffers (both plea agreements were 
predicated on each defendant telling the truth), the State permitted Mellisa to plead 
guilty to Second-Degree Murder and First Degree Conspiracy.  Mellisa’s 
agreement, like Brown’s, deferred sentencing until her codefendants’ trials were 
completed. 
 
7
 
Linda and the State never reached a plea agreement, and the Superior Court 
set her trial for March 8, 2004.  On February 26, 2004, approximately a week 
before trial, the State provided the defense a “two and one-half inches thick” 
notebook of documents with “both exculpatory and potential inculpatory 
information.”  Within this voluminous set of documents was a handwritten 
statement by Mellisa taking issue with Brown’s “truthful” proffer.  This 
development compelled Linda’s counsel, who had already cleared a four-week 
period from their calendars,5 to request a continuance.  The trial judge granted the 
request and set a new trial date of March 22, 2004. 
 
Twelve days before opening statements, the State filed a “potential” witness 
list which included both Brown and Melissa as witnesses whom the State would 
call.  Therefore, almost one year before the sole remaining codefendant’s trial 
                                                 
5  
Defense counsel was reluctant to make the request but felt they had no other option.  A 
day before the request for the continuance, defense counsel, in a letter to the trial judge, stated: 
We do not know why the last set of documents took until February 18 to 
get into the hands of the police.  They were identified at least by December 17.  
Whatever the reason for the late disclosure, the defense has been placed in an 
untenable position.  It will be impossible to fully review and analyze the 
documents in question.  Of course, the effect of this is magnified in a capital case. 
[My co-counsel] and I plan to meet with Ms. Charbonneau tomorrow at 
Baylor Women’s Prison.  Obviously, we plan to discuss the issue with her.  We 
will be discussing that a request for a continuance be made, and will notify the 
Court as soon as a final decision is made.  It is with great reluctance that any 
request for a continuance be made.  We all understand the commitment the Court 
and the prosecution have made to move this case to trial.  From defense counsel’s 
perspective we have already cleared a four week period from our calendars which 
could never be appropriately refilled at this date.  However, our commitment to 
our client requires this letter and any subsequent request. 
 
 
8
began, the State had openly and publicly represented to the Superior Court that 
Brown had agreed to plead guilty and to testify truthfully and consistently with a 
written proffer accepted by the State and disclosed to the Superior Court about the 
crimes for which Linda was to be tried.  Six months before Linda’s trial was to 
begin, the State had accepted Melissa’s plea, the proffer on which it was based, and 
her agreement to testify truthfully about the crimes for which Linda, the sole 
remaining codefendant, would be tried before a jury. 
 
Although the State generally has no obligation to disclose its trial witnesses, 
its plea agreements with Brown and Mellisa renders that point irrelevant as to 
them, because a key condition of the pleas was that both witnesses would:  (a) 
testify; and, (b) testify truthfully.  The State so represented to the Superior Court in 
open court at the time of their pleas – one year before and six months before, 
Linda’s trial was to begin.  Defense counsel knew the terms of the pleas and, 
therefore, reasonably could expect, in the absence of State action to the contrary 
that Brown and Mellisa would testify.  Under these circumstances, defense 
counsels’ reasonable reliance on their expectation that Brown would be called was 
buttressed by the State’s failure to give timely notice that he would not be called, 
despite months to do so.  Defense counsel and the trial judge had no reason to 
believe that because the prosecutors questioned Brown’s veracity, they were not 
going to call Brown.  The State’s list of potential witnesses for voir dire purposes, 
 
9
did not, as the dissent points out, obligate the State to call all those listed, but the 
list, coming only twelve days before opening statements confirmed the 
reasonableness of defense counsels’ expectation.  The State further exacerbated its 
forthcoming self-made “ethical dilemma” by not revoking Brown’s plea agreement 
during the six months prosecutors knew that Brown and Mellisa could not both be 
expected to “testify truthfully.” 
The case began with jury selection on March 22, 2004.  Four days into jury 
selection and four days before the scheduled opening statements, the prosecutors 
requested a conference with the trial judge. 6  At that conference the prosecutors, 
for the first time, disclosed an “ethical dilemma.” 7  Specifically, the prosecutors 
professed that they believed Brown was lying about Sproates’s murder.  The 
prosecutors told the trial judge that they did not believe Brown because they 
credited Mellisa’s statement that she was miles away when the murder occurred.  
In other words, the prosecutors, taking upon themselves the jury’s fact finding 
                                                 
6  
The prosecutors requested a conference on Thursday March 25, 2004.  The Superior 
Court had scheduled opening statements to begin on Monday March 29, 2004. 
 
 
7  
The State claims that it was obvious that they believed Brown was lying about Sproates 
because they allowed Mellisa to plead guilty to a Conspiracy charge alone.  Mellisa entered her 
plea approximately six months before Linda’s trial.  Thus, the State knew or should have known 
of its “ethical dilemma” at least six months before characterizing it as such.  Inexplicably the 
dilemma remained obscured, since the State included Brown on its potential witness list on 
March 17, 2004. 
 
 
10
prerogative, found Mellisa to be the more credible witness.8  According to the 
State, the “ethical dilemma” resulting from their belief left the prosecutors with 
few viable options:  (i) call Brown and “ask him about [John’s] death and maybe 
either don’t ask him anything about the Sproates death or just ask him a general 
question, ‘Did you participate in the killing and transportation of the body and 
burial of Sproates?,’ and sit down and let the defense have at him,” or (ii) not call 
Brown at all.9  The State ultimately decided not to call Brown, despite having listed 
him as a potential witness twelve days before opening statements were to begin 
and despite having waited until four days before scheduled opening statements to 
disclose its so-called “ethical dilemma.” 
Linda’s counsel had reasonably relied upon the State’s representations that it 
would call Brown as a witness, and upon their knowledge that for at least six 
months before trial the State had known of Brown’s and Mellisa’s inconsistent 
statements yet had taken no action.  Accordingly, Linda’s counsel sought a missing 
witness instruction and an order admitting Brown’s plea and proffer into evidence.  
Indeed, defense counsel had prepared for months based on the reasonable 
assumption that Brown would be called as a witness and that there were 
                                                 
8  
The prosecutors stated “[i]t is, on the one hand, I think obvious to everybody concerned 
that we believe Mellisa Rucinski because we allowed her to plead basically to the murder count 
involving Charbonneau and conspiracy on Sproates.”   
 
9  
A-56. 
 
 
11
inconsistencies in Mellisa’s and Brown’s proffers that defense counsel would be 
able to exploit at trial.  Linda’s counsel sought to use the proffered facts supporting 
Brown’s plea to “test Ms. Rucinski’s credibility and to support an argument that 
the State does not have confidence in the strength of its case.”10   
Rejecting Linda’s counsels’ position, the trial judge declined to admit 
Brown’s plea and proffer into evidence, holding that any probative value of 
Brown’s plea agreement was substantially outweighed by “unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, and also by considerations of waste 
of time.”  The trial judge reserved ruling on the missing witness instruction.  
Because the ruling on Linda’s motion in limine excluded evidence of Brown’s plea 
and the facts supporting his proffer, Linda’s counsel was precluded from 
presenting the theory they had spent months developing – that the inconsistencies 
in Mellisa’s and Brown’s proffers created a reasonable doubt about Linda’s guilt, 
because the State’s key witnesses could not agree on the details of their own 
involvement in the murders.   
Mellisa testified as the State’s primary witness.  Her testimony provided a 
substantially uncontradicted basis for the jury to convict Linda on all counts.11  
                                                 
10  
A-124 
 
11  
Linda was convicted of two counts of First Degree Murder, two counts of Conspiracy in 
the First Degree, and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony. 
 
 
12
After a penalty hearing, the trial judge sentenced Linda to death by lethal injection 
for the murders of John and Sproates. 
 
II.  THE SIX CLAIMS OF ERROR 
We turn next to Linda’s six claims of error. 
A.  The Trial Judge’s Refusal to Admit Brown’s Plea and Proffer 
 
 
As earlier noted, four days before opening statements were scheduled and 
four days into jury selection, the prosecutors notified the trial judge that they 
would not call Brown.  Understanding that Brown would likely assert his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination if they called him, Linda’s counsel 
sought a ruling admitting into evidence the fact that Brown had pleaded guilty to 
two counts of First Degree Murder and the facts proffered by Brown as part of his 
plea bargain.  The defense sought a ruling admitting the plea and proffer before 
trial, because counsel wanted to tell the jury in their opening statement that 
Brown’s and Mellisa’s proffers were inconsistent and would, therefore, create a 
reasonable doubt about Linda’s guilt.  Defense counsel also desired to admit 
Brown’s plea and proffer in order to enable the jury to compare both versions of 
the murders in judging Mellisa’s credibility.    
 
13
 
Citing Potts v. State,12 the State opposed the application, claiming that the 
facts of Brown’s guilty plea and the facts supporting Brown’s proffer were not 
admissible, because they were not relevant to Linda’s guilt or innocence.  Relying 
on Potts, the trial judge ruled Brown’s proffer and the fact of his plea irrelevant 
because “an accomplice plea does not exonerate a codefendant.”13  Citing Johnson 
v. State14 the trial judge also held that the admission of a codefendant’s guilty plea 
and proffer is governed by Delaware Rule of Evidence 403.15  Applying D.R.E. 
403, the trial judge concluded that any probative value of the fact of Brown’s plea 
and the facts proffered in support thereof was substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or wasting 
time.   
 
Linda has appealed these evidentiary rulings.  Because a determination of 
whether evidence is relevant falls within the discretion of the trial judge, we will 
not reverse a trial judge’s decision absent a clear abuse of discretion.16 Similarly, 
because the trial judge has discretion to determine whether the probative value of a 
                                                 
12  
458 A.2d 1165 (Del. 1983). 
 
13  
A-147-48. 
 
14  
604 A.2d 417 (1991). 
 
15  
A-148. 
 
16  
Lampkins v. State, 465 A.2d 785, 790(Del. 1983). 
 
 
14
particular piece of evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or wasting time,17 we 
review that finding for abuse of discretion.  Judicial discretion is the exercise of 
judgment directed by conscience and reason.  A trial judge has abused his 
discretion where the judge has exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the 
circumstances and has so ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to 
produce injustice.18  
 
Further, we have held that when:  
. . . the appeal is grounded on allegations that the [trial judge] erred as 
a matter of law or abused [his] discretion in submitting claims to the 
jury and in admitting certain evidence, [we] will first consider 
whether the specific rulings at issue were correct. If [we] find error or 
abuse of discretion in the rulings, [we] must then determine whether 
the mistakes constituted significant prejudice so as to have denied the 
appellant a fair trial.19 
 
 
We hold that the trial judge abused his discretion by endorsing as fact the 
State’s unilaterally held view that one witness’s version of the facts, purportedly 
offered truthfully in support of a plea agreement accepted by the State, was 
credible, while another witness’s version, similarly accepted by the State as 
                                                 
17  
Williams v. State, 494 A.2d 1237, 1241(Del. 1985); see also D.R.E. 401, 402, 403. 
 
18  
Chavin v. Cope, 243 A.2d 694, 695 (Del. 1968); Larrimore v. Homeopathic Hospital 
Ass'n of Del., 181 A.2d 573, 578 (Del. 1962); Pitts v. White, 109 A.2d 786, 788 (Del. 1954). 
 
19  
Strauss v. Biggs, 525 A.2d 992, 997 (Del. 1987). 
 
 
15
truthful, was not.20  Because that ruling overlaid the trial judge’s own personal 
endorsement of one proffered version over a different version and removed a 
critical credibility determination from the jury, it constituted error.  These errors 
resulted in significant prejudice that is sufficient to undermine our confidence that 
the defendant received a fair trial. 
 
Three issues are critical to the trial judge’s ruling on the defendant’s in 
limine motion:  logical relevance; outweighing prejudice to the State, and prejudice 
to the defendant.  We turn to those issues. 
                                                 
20  
The defense argued in this appeal that Brown’s statements are admissions of a party 
opponent under D. R. E 801(d)(2)(b).  In other words, the defense argued that the State adopted a 
belief in the truth of Brown’s plea by accepting it and not voiding the plea when it determined 
that Brown was lying.  D. R. E. 801(d)(2)(b) is an exception to the hearsay exclusion.  The trial 
judge did not exclude Brown’s plea agreement on hearsay grounds.  Brown’s proffer and plea 
agreement were not hearsay in this case because the defense was not offering the plea for the 
truth of the matter asserted.  The defense did not seek to offer Brown’s plea into evidence to 
show that Brown’s version of the murders was the truth.  Instead, the defense sought to introduce 
Brown’s plea so that it could attack the credibility of Mellisa’s version of the murders.  Thus, we 
need not address this argument. We  need only determine whether the trial judge abused his 
discretion in finding  that Brown’s plea agreement was irrelevant and that the plea agreement’s 
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, misleading the jury, or wasting time. 
 
Further, defense counsel argued that the trial judge’s refusal to allow the defense to argue 
that the State used conflicting theories against codefendants charged with the same crime 
violated Linda’s right to a fair trial.  The State properly characterizes the argument as a judicial 
estoppel argument.  While we need not address the issue because we reverse on other grounds, it 
is worth noting that the State has maintained one theory against Linda – that she was the 
mastermind of the murders and elicited the help of Brown and Mellisa.  This theory is discussed 
in more detail in Section II(D)  of this opinion. 
 
 
16
1. 
Relevance of Brown’s plea and proffer 
 
Under Delaware Rule of Evidence 401, the proffered evidence is relevant if 
it tends to make the existence of the defendant’s guilt more or less probable.21  In 
ruling the fact that Brown had pleaded guilty and the facts supporting Brown’s 
proffer logically irrelevant, the trial judge relied on Potts, a case where the police 
raided the defendant’s house pursuant to a search warrant.  During the course of 
the search, the police arrested Potts and four of his companions, who were later 
indicted for the same drug charges: Possession with Intent to Deliver Heroin; 
Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine; Possession with Intent to Deliver 
Marijuana; Possession of Hypodermic Needles and Syringes; Maintaining a 
Dwelling for the Keeping of Controlled Substances; and Conspiracy Second 
Degree.  Before Potts’s trial, two of his companions pleaded guilty to simple 
possession of drugs under a plea agreement with the State.  Potts sought to admit 
his codefendants’ pleas at his later trial on the basis that their statements were 
exculpatory because they corroborated his defense that the drugs seized did not 
belong to him.  In other words, Potts sought to admit his codefendants’ guilty pleas 
to possession of drugs to demonstrate that they -  and not he -  possessed the drugs.  
We agreed with the trial judge’s conclusion that the relevance of the codefendants’ 
pleas was tenuous at best.  We stated: 
                                                 
21  
Hoey v. State, 689 A.2d 1177, 1180  (Del. 1997). 
 
17
 
The two codefendants who entered guilty pleas did so only as to the 
 
charges against themselves. Defendant did not establish that his 
 
companions' pleas constituted confessions to exclusive possession of 
 
the drugs.  Hence, their pleas were not shown to exculpate defendant. 
 
In this case, the trial judge relied on Potts, stating:   
 
An accomplice being a person being charged to the same crimes with 
which a codefendant is charged, like a person in the position of Linda 
Charbonneau, is not relevant evidence.  As our Supreme Court 
observed in Potts… an accomplice plea does not exonerate a 
codefendant.  The innocence or guilt of a defendant, or of a person in 
Ms. Charbonneau’s position, must be settled only on the evidence 
produced during the trial.   
 
The trial judge’s reading of Potts and his application of Potts to this case 
was misplaced.  The trial judge concluded that Potts announced a categorical rule 
that an accomplice plea and proffered statements in support of the plea are always 
irrelevant because they do not exonerate a codefendant.  We did not announce any 
such rule in Potts.  In Potts, the defendant was attempting to establish, through the 
fact that his codefendants pleaded guilty, that he did not possess drugs. We held 
that the codefendants’ pleas were irrelevant because they did not independently 
establish that the codefendants’ exclusively possessed the drugs.  That is, in Potts, 
the codefendants’ guilty pleas did not make it more or less probable that the 
defendant also possessed drugs. 
Potts is distinguishable from this case.  Linda did not seek the admission of 
Brown’s plea and proffer to exonerate herself by seeking to establish that Brown, 
and not she, committed the murders.  Rather, Linda sought to introduce Brown’s 
 
18
plea and proffer to “test Ms. Rucinski’s credibility and to support an argument that 
the State does not have confidence in the strength of its case.”22   
We agree that Brown’s plea to two counts of First Degree Murder for a deal 
on his penalty did not, alone and without more, impeach Mellisa.  The mere fact 
that Brown pleaded guilty did not give Mellisa motive to lie.  But, Brown’s 
proffered statements in support of his plea were relevant to test Mellisa’s 
credibility on the degree of Linda’s involvement in the crimes with which Mellisa, 
Brown and Linda were charged. 
The trial judge recognized that “the State had good reason to believe Brown 
put too much of a finger of blame on Linda Charbonneau to get himself out of 
trouble and was less than truthful.”23  What the trial judge apparently failed to 
apprehend, however, is that the jury, after hearing the inconsistencies in the State’s 
witnesses’ versions of the events, might conclude that Mellisa had a similar motive 
to implicate Linda falsely.  Brown proffered that Mellisa was the primary actor in 
Sproates’s death.  Brown’s proffered statements gave Mellisa a motive to lie and to 
implicate falsely her codefendants.  Defense counsel wanted to use Brown’s 
proffer to demonstrate to the jury that Mellisa had a motive to lie both in her 
proffer and in her live testimony.  
                                                 
22  
A-124 
 
23  
A-111-12. 
 
 
19
The trial judge’s refusal to credit the relevance of Brown’s proffered 
statements to impeach Mellisa is best understood by focusing on the following 
question the trial judge posed to the defense:    
Brown has an axe to grind with Rucinski in falsely accusing her of 
 
killing Sproates.  How does this automatically translate into some 
 
interest, bias, or prejudice of Mellisa Rucinski to falsely accuse 
 
Charbonneau?  I’m asking the question because that’s the question the 
 
defense is going to have to answer.24 
 
That question illustrates that the trial judge did not understand how Brown’s 
proffered statements could impeach Mellisa.  The reason, in our view, is that the 
trial judge had unqualifiedly endorsed the State’s contention that it was Brown – 
and not Mellisa – who was lying.  We agree that if Brown lied, his statements 
would provide a motive for Mellisa to falsely implicate him but not necessarily 
Linda.  But, if Brown’s proffered statements created a reasonable doubt in the 
jurors’ minds about Mellisa’s credibility generally, that doubt might also have 
affected the jury’s analysis of the believability of Mellisa’s version of Linda’s 
involvement in the murders.   
It was error for the trial judge to accept the State’s contention (and 
essentially find as fact) that Brown (not Mellisa) was lying and then to remove that 
issue from the jury.  The prosecutors argued two reasons why they believed Brown 
was lying:  (1) his statements were substantially inconsistent with Mellisa’s; and, 
                                                 
24  
A-155-56. 
 
20
(2) no DNA was found on the knife that Brown claimed Mellisa used in killing 
Sproates.  These reasons alone could not justify the trial judge taking from the jury 
the issue of the credibility of Mellisa’s testimony about Linda’s involvement in the 
murder. 
First, the fact that Brown’s statements were inconsistent with Mellisa’s 
could not, without more, justify concluding that Brown was lying.  The State itself 
acknowledged that “there are always inconsistencies in people’s statements.”25  
Further, the State and the trial judge both knew Mellisa was an admitted liar.  At 
trial she admitted lying at every opportunity she had to speak about the case.26  
Certainly one could not reasonably conclude that Brown’s statements were false 
solely because they were inconsistent with statements from someone who openly 
admitted she herself was a liar. 
                                                 
25  
A-55. 
 
26  
See A-362.  Mellisa Rucinski testified: 
 
Q.   
Now do you remember when I started my examination of you, I 
ask you – you said you lied to the police in their investigation, you 
lied in your proffer, you lied in the statement following the proffer, 
and you lied on the stand, and you admitted to me that you lied in 
the investigation, but you denied the other three; do you recall that 
yesterday when I asked you that? 
 
A. 
Yes. 
 
Q. 
So now you are changing that story and telling us:  Yes, you lied 
all four times that you had an opportunity to speak about this case; 
is that correct? 
 
A.  
Yes. 
 
21
Therefore, the trial judge was left with the argument that there was no DNA 
on a knife that Brown alleged Mellisa used to stab Sproates.  But, to conclude that 
Brown must have been lying simply because there was no DNA on the knife is 
misguided.  The absence of DNA on the knife can be explained by any number of 
circumstances – including the possibility that someone cleaned the knife after the 
murder.27  Thus, we hold that the trial judge abused his discretion by accepting, as 
fact, the State’s contention that Brown was lying but that Mellisa was truthful and 
by removing from the jury the issue of who spoke truthfully and whether the 
inconsistencies resulting raised a reasonable doubt about Linda’s guilt. 
 
Mellisa provided all of the testimony necessary to convict Linda.  Because 
Mellisa’s testimony was the linchpin of the State’s case, we cannot be confident 
that any evidence that could impeach Mellisa’s credibility would not create a 
reasonable doubt about Linda’s guilt. 
Because the jury might possibly believe Brown, Brown’s proffered 
statements would be relevant to test Mellisa’s credibility.  In his proffer, Brown 
heavily implicated Mellisa.  Brown claimed that Mellisa assisted in John’s burial, 
and actively participated in Sproates’s murder.  The State itself, armed with 
                                                 
27  
We recognize that Brown contends Mellisa used a pocket knife when she allegedly 
stabbed Sproates and that to remove DNA from a pocket knife one probably would have had to 
disassemble the knife and remove any blood from inside the handle.  We do not contend that the 
knife was actually cleaned in this manner, but merely use it as an illustration of why the trial 
judge should have not accepted the State’s contention that Brown was lying simply because no 
DNA was found on the knife. 
 
22
Brown’s statements that were posited as truthful, leveraged a deal with Mellisa.  
Surely the State suggested to Mellisa that she was facing First Degree Murder 
charges and a possible death sentence if a jury believed Brown’s proffered 
statements.  Motivated to ensure that she received a favorable plea bargain and to 
avoid a possible death sentence based on Brown’s statements, Melissa had an 
interest in falsely implicating either or both of her codefendants and in exculpating 
herself.  Brown’s proffered statements were clearly relevant to challenge Mellisa’s 
truthfulness when she gave testimony implicating Linda.  The trial judge erred in 
holding otherwise.  
2.  
Whether the Probative Value of Brown’s Proffer was Substantially 
 
Outweighed by the Danger of Unfair Prejudice. 
 
The logical relevance of Brown’s guilty plea and proffer does not conclude 
the analysis.  A trial judge may exclude otherwise relevant evidence if “its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”28  As discussed 
above, we review for an abuse of discretion a trial judge’s ruling under D.R.E. 403 
for an abuse of discretion.29  
                                                 
28  
D.R.E. 403. 
 
29  
Williams, 494 A.2d at 1241; see also D.R.E. 403. 
 
 
23
Here, the trial judge found that any probative value of Brown’s proffer was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
misleading the jury, or wasting time.30  The trial judge stated: 
Brown’s plea agreement would likely poison the well for Linda 
Charbonneau as a jury would view the case as closed.  The jury’s 
focus must be solely on the evidence, and there would be a great deal 
of time wasted to explore matters.31 
 
 
In so holding, the trial judge abused his discretion.  Brown’s proffered 
statements were highly probative.  Mellisa was the State’s primary witness who 
provided the testimony that enabled the jury to find her mother guilty of two 
intentional murders.  Any evidence that would operate to impeach Mellisa’s 
credibility had probative value.  If the jury found Mellisa’s testimony generally 
incredible, then Linda would have had an opportunity to create a reasonable doubt 
in the jurors’ minds about the extent of her own involvement in the crimes charged.  
The trial judge held, however, that the jury would have viewed the “case as 
closed” if Brown’s plea and proffered statements were admitted.  We interpret that 
view to mean that if the jury was told that Brown had pleaded guilty to two counts 
of First Degree Murder and if the jury had accepted the facts underlying Brown’s 
proffer, the jurors would have concluded that Linda was guilty of two intentional 
                                                 
30  
A-148. 
 
31  
A-149. 
 
 
24
murders.  We do not agree.  The State’s theory, which the jury understood, was 
that Linda, Mellisa, and Brown all committed the murders.  Both Brown and 
Mellisa’s statements implicated themselves, each other, and Linda to some degree.  
Admitting Brown’s proffered statements, certainly would not give the jury any 
indication that the “case (against Linda) was closed.”  The trial judge should have 
admitted the proffered statements.  
Thus, we hold that the trial judge abused his discretion by holding that the 
probative value of the Brown statement was outweighed by the prejudice that 
evidence would occasion to Linda (on the theory it would “close” the case against 
her) or that it would be a waste of time to explore the inconsistency in the 
testimony of two eyewitnesses to two intentional murders.  There certainly, on the 
other hand, was no cognizable prejudice to the State in admitting statements that 
the State itself had procured as part of its plea bargain and that, by not rescinding 
its plea bargain with Brown, continued impliedly to endorse.   
3. 
Prejudice to the Defendant From Failure to Admit Brown’s Plea and 
 
Proffer. 
 
 
As discussed above, “if the court finds error or abuse of discretion in the 
rulings, it must then determine whether the mistakes constituted significant 
prejudice so as to have denied the appellant a fair trial.”32  We hold that the trial 
                                                 
32  
Strauss, 525 A.2d at 997. 
 
 
25
judge’s refusal to admit Brown’s proffered guilty plea and statements constituted 
prejudice so significant that it denied Linda a fair trial. 
 
As noted, Mellisa’s testimony was the linchpin of the State’s case.  She 
provided the State with all of the evidence necessary to convict her mother.  Surely 
Melissa’s testimony, if not contradicted by any other eyewitness, would strongly 
influence a jury, since Mellisa was implicating her own mother in two intentional 
murders.  By the same logic, any facts that would test Mellisa’s credibility could 
also significantly impact the outcome of the case.  Because Brown’s proffered 
statement gave Mellisa a motive to lie, that statement should have been admitted to 
impeach Mellisa’s credibility.  Because it was not, the jury’s inability to assess 
Brown’s proffered statements to support his plea, and the inconsistencies they 
created for the State’s case, denied her a fair trial. 
 
Moreover, the State’s tactics exacerbated the prejudice to Linda.  The State 
accepted Brown’s plea in April of 2003.  Six months later, in October of 2003, the 
State accepted Mellisa’s plea – a time that the State concedes its prosecutors 
believed Brown was lying.33  At the time that Mellisa entered her guilty plea – six 
months before Linda’s trial – the State’s prosecutors could have notified the 
defense and the trial judge of their “ethical dilemma,” but they did not.  Instead, 
                                                 
33  
The prosecutor stated: ““[i]t is, on the one hand, I think obvious to everybody concerned 
that we believe Mellisa Rucinski because we allowed her to plead basically to the murder count 
involving Charbonneau and conspiracy on Sproates.” 
 
 
26
the State included Brown on its potential witness list for voir dire twelve days 
before opening statements, and waited until four days before the scheduled 
opening statements before disclosing the “ethical dilemma.” 
 
The dissent seems to suggest that Linda’s plight at this point is no different 
than that of any codefendant who the State and Superior Court agree to try first.  
We disagree.  Here, both of Linda’s codefendants pleaded guilty and were not 
going to have a trial because each had made a deal in open court to testify 
truthfully against Linda.  When the prosecutors’ stated they would not be calling 
Brown, the trial judge sua sponte should have asked, “are you revoking Brown’s 
plea agreement?  If not, I will sentence Brown now and the defense can call 
Brown.”  Defense counsel had no “ethical dilemma” because they were not 
presenting Brown’s statements for their truth – just the opposite.  Defense counsel 
wanted to show Brown’s version’s inconsistency with Mellisa’s version and 
demonstrate that neither were credible.   
 
This case is, we think, unique because the trial judge allowed the State’s 
tactical trial decisions to control Brown’s sentencing date – whether the State 
called him or not – which in turn gave the State control over Brown’s availability 
to both the State and to the defense.34  Any experienced trial attorney would 
                                                 
34  
When the State admittedly realized six months before trial that either Brown, Mellisa or 
both lied in their proffers supporting their pleas and their promises to testify truthfully, the State 
knew that if it failed to revoke Brown’s plea agreement and decided not to call Brown that he 
 
27
quickly grasp the significant prejudice resulting from the State’s timing.  Defense 
counsel reasonably believed that the State would call both Brown and Mellisa to 
testify in accordance with the terms of their respective public plea agreements and 
the State’s representations to the Superior Court at the time of the pleas, and in 
reliance on that belief, defense counsel based their theory of Linda’s defense on the 
inconsistencies between Brown’s and Mellisa’s proffers.  The State’s strategy of 
                                                                                                                                                             
would, if called by the defense exercise his Fifth Amendment right to refuse to testify.  The 
State’s representation to Brown’s counsel that if Brown did so refuse to testify that the State 
would still honor its promise to recommend life imprisonment for an habitual offender who 
admitted to two intentional murders seals any reservation about the State’s tactics.  The State’s 
plan was designed to prevent the defense from introducing Brown’s live testimony or putting his 
written proffer in evidence. 
 
 
MR. CALLOWAY (quote from trial): 
 
 
As the Court is aware, Mr. Brown entered those pleas to murder in the first 
degree and capital homicide.  A part of our agreement was that Mr. Brown would 
testify truthfully.  The State would not be seeking a death penalty hearing in this 
matter, that the Court would then be permitted to sentence Mr. Brown to life 
without parole. 
 
 
There was a discussion concerning whether or not he would or would not 
testify as a defense witness.  It was determined and represented to the defense by 
the prosecution that Mr. Brown certainly would have his Fifth Amendment rights, 
irregardless (sic) of any agreement, and that if Mr. Brown were to exercise his 
Fifth Amendment rights, as a witness for the defense, that would not be a 
violation of our written agreement.” 
 
See B-148. 
 
 
 
Even if Calloway’s view of what the State promised was disputed by the State, the State’s 
professed stalemate over what to do with Brown “subject to a discuss[ion] with our superiors” 
lacks credibility given the six months before trial during which all the necessary discussions with 
the presumably elusive “superiors” could have been held. 
 
 
 
28
waiting until the thirteenth hour to disclose its “ethical dilemma” forced defense 
counsel to reformulate their entire trial strategy which they had spent six months 
preparing, four days before opening statements. 
Brown became unavailable to the defendant because Linda called him as a 
witness and he asserted his Fifth Amendment right.  But Brown was always 
available to the State.  The State had entered into an agreement with Brown that 
required Brown to testify if called by the State as a witness at the trial.  If the State 
pursued its agreement to call Brown, he would have been required to testify 
pursuant to his plea agreement.  If Brown refused to testify for the State and 
thereby breached the plea agreement, the State could have revoked its plea 
agreement with Brown. 
 
In this case, Brown remained unavailable to the defense because the State 
did not decide to honor its plea agreement with Brown until after Charbonneau’s 
trial, even though the State had already concluded Brown’s statements at the time 
of the plea agreement were untruthful.  If the State had immediately announced 
that it was not calling Brown as a witness but was nevertheless going to honor his 
plea agreement, Brown could have been sentenced promptly and would then have 
been available to testify for the defense at trial because Brown would no longer 
have been able to invoke his Fifth Amendment right not to testify.  Consequently, 
the State’s unilateral decisions not to call Brown as a witness and not to make a 
 
29
decision about honoring Brown’s plea agreement until after Charbonneau’s trial 
resulted in Brown’s unavailability as a witness for the defense.35 
 
Not surprisingly, defense counsels’ motion in limine sought relief from the 
trial judge, most relevantly, an order admitting Brown’s plea and proffer in order to 
impeach Mellisa and create reasonable doubt about the State’s case.  By denying 
that requested relief, the trial judge forced Linda to go to trial without the benefit 
of the strategy her counsel had spent months developing.  For these reasons, the 
trial judge’s erroneous exclusion of Brown’s proffered statements denied Linda her 
right to a fair trial.36 
 
As earlier discussed, the crux of the defense strategy, which Linda’s defense 
counsel spent months preparing, was to cross-examine Brown and Mellisa to 
                                                 
35  
The State’s trial tactics here raise serious doubts about the foundation of the prosecutors’ 
purported concerns.  The State’s prosecutors argued that they could not call Brown as a witness 
because they believed he was lying.  Despite believing that Brown was lying six months before 
the defendant’s trial, the prosecutors waited until four days before scheduled opening statements 
to disclose that they would not be calling Brown.  Further, they appear to have convinced the 
trial judge that while Brown must be lying about Sproates, he must be telling the truth about 
Linda.  Otherwise the trial judge would not have been so concerned about the case being 
“closed” against Linda should the jury hear the facts supporting Brown’s proffer. 
 
36  
While we hold the trial judge abused his discretion, we do recognize the short period of 
time the trial judge had to make a ruling.  The State, by waiting until four days before scheduled 
opening statements to disclose its dilemma, forced the trial judge into a very difficult position.  
Fortunately we have had ample time to review the entire record and all relevant aspects of the 
law in order to shape an appropriate remedy.  Had the State disclosed its “ethical dilemma” at the 
time it believed Brown was lying and made a timely decision not to call Brown or revoked the 
plea agreement or moved for Brown’s immediate sentencing, today’s result may have been 
different.  Had the State disclosed its dilemma even at the time of Mellisa’s plea, the trial judge 
would have had six months to determine a remedy fair to both the State and Linda. 
 
 
 
30
highlight to the jury the inconsistencies between the stories of both witnesses.  
Defense counsel believed that those inconsistencies might show that both 
witnesses were lying and create a reasonable doubt in the jurors’ minds about the 
extent of Linda’s involvement.  Defense counsel would also have been able to 
argue that the State had no firm view how the murders occurred because its own 
witnesses had given different accounts of the murders.  Put simply, the defense 
could have argued that the State had no coherent theory about Linda’s 
involvement.   
 
The State’s chosen tactic – waiting until only four days before opening 
statements to announce that the prosecution would not be calling Brown – 
eviscerated that defense strategy and, because of its timing, did so unfairly.  As 
previously held, the trial judge should not have allowed that to occur, but failing 
that, should have granted the relief Linda had requested in her motion in limine to 
preserve her ability to conduct a defense. 
4. 
Brown’s Guilty Plea and Proffer Admissible Under D.R.E. 804(b)(3). 
 
Brown’s guilty plea and proffer were admissible under Delaware Rule of 
Evidence 804 as declarations against penal interest that were made by an 
unavailable witness.37  D.R.E. 804(b)(3) provides:  
                                                 
37  
United States v. Dolah, 245 F.3d 98 105 (2d Cir. 2001).   
 
 
31
3.  Statement against interest.  A statement which was, at the time of 
its making, so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary 
interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal 
liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, 
that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have 
made the statement unless the declarant believed it to be true.  A 
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and 
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless 
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the 
statement.   
 
Such a statement is admissible if the witness is “unavailable.”  D.R.E. 804(a)(1) 
states that a declarant is unavailable who “is exempted by ruling of the Court on 
the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant’s statement.”  The State frequently invokes the “declaration against penal 
interest” exception to the hearsay rule as a basis for introducing statements by a 
non-testifying co-defendant who has asserted a Fifth Amendment right and is, 
therefore, unavailable.38   
In this case, the trial judge ruled that Brown was entitled to assert his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.39  Therefore, Brown was 
unavailable within the meaning of D.R.E. 804(a)(1) and Linda’s attorneys were 
entitled to introduce Brown’s guilty plea agreement and proffer under D.R.E. 
804(b)(3), the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest.  To be 
                                                 
38  
Swan v. State, 820 A.2d 342 (Del. 2003). 
 
39  
See United States v. Solerno, 937 F.2d 797, 805 (1991). 
 
 
32
admissible, Rule 804(b)(3) requires the statement to be made at a time when it was 
“so far contrary to the declarant’s best interests that a reasonable person would not 
make the statement unless the declarant believed it to be true,”40 e.g., a guilty plea 
to murder.  Once that determination is made, the inquiry ends unless the statement 
would simultaneously expose the declarant to criminal liability and exculpate the 
accused.41 
 
In this case, that should have been the end of the trial judge’s inquiry 
because Brown’s statements did not exculpate Linda.  The State’s action resulted 
in the guilty plea agreement and Brown’s proffer.  The State alone could compel 
Brown to testify at trial.  When the State refused to call Brown as a witness and the 
trial judge permitted Brown to assert his Fifth Amendment right not to testify for 
the defense, Linda’s motion in limine should have been granted.  It was reversible 
error not to admit Brown’s plea agreement and proffer into evidence under D.R.E. 
804(b)(3) as declarations against penal interest made by an unavailable witness.42  
The trial judge’s ruling denied Linda’s right to a fair trial and the effective 
assistance of counsel that are guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.   
                                                 
40  
U.S. v. Bahadar, 954 F.2d 821, 829 (2nd Cir. 1992).  See Smith v. State, 647 A.2d 1083 
(Del. 1994) and Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994).   
 
41  
Id.  
42  
Smith v. State, 647 A.2d 1083 (Del. 1994) and Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 
(1994).   
 
 
33
B.  The Testimony of John Rucinski 
Linda also claims that the trial judge erred by admitting the testimony of 
John Rucinski43 whom the State called to testify about a conversation that he had 
with Mellisa about Linda’s plan to kill John and a later conversation that John 
Rucinski had with Linda on the same subject.44  The defense claimed that 
statements attributed by John Rucinski to Mellisa during the conversation were 
hearsay that was inadmissible against Linda.  The State countered by arguing that a 
hearsay exception, Delaware Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), applied.  Accepting 
that argument, the trial judge ruled in favor of the State.  Linda has appealed the 
trial judge’s application of D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E).  A trial judge’s evidentiary rulings 
are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.45   
Under D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E), a statement is not hearsay if made “by a 
coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy; 
provided that the conspiracy has first been established by the preponderance of the 
evidence to the satisfaction of the court.”  The State argued, and the trial judge 
                                                 
43  
To avoid any confusion, we always refer to John Rucinski as “John Rucinski.”  Mellisa 
was married to John Rucinski until January of 2001. 
 
44  
The trial judge ruled that the defendant’s statements to John Rucinski were admissible as 
admissions of a party opponent under Delaware Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(a).  The defense has 
not challenged the admissibility of the defendant’s statements to John Rucinski.  Thus, we only 
need to address whether Mellisa’s statements to John Rucinski were admissible. 
 
45  
See Strauss, 525 A.2d at 992. 
 
 
34
agreed, that a conspiracy existed between Mellisa and Linda.  Mellisa’s statements 
to John Rucinski were in furtherance of the conspiracy.  Indeed, Mellisa’s 
statements were intended to solicit John Rucinski’s involvement in the conspiracy.  
Linda claims that by finding that the State established, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the existence of a conspiracy between the Linda and Mellisa, the trial 
judge abused his discretion.   
The trial judge’s ruling was based on the testimony of Officer Keith Collins 
and a lengthy voir dire examination of John Rucinski.46  Collins testified that he 
went to John’s Bridgeville residence on August 15, 2000 to help resolve a property 
dispute between Linda and John.  Collins told the parties “if there was any kind of 
dispute as to who owned what, it had to stay in the house.”  Collins further testified 
that he witnessed Linda and Mellisa leave John’s house in a van that was filled 
with possessions from the house. 
On voir dire, John Rucinski testified that within a month after the property 
dispute, Mellisa approached him: 
Q. 
Prior to her(Linda Charbonneau) moving in, or after she moved 
in, in August or September 2000, did you ever have any 
discussions with your wife and/or Linda regarding John 
Charbonneau? 
 
                                                 
46  
John Rucinski’s statements, which the defense argued were inadmissible, are partly what 
the trial judge relied upon in determining the existence of the conspiracy.  The defense correctly 
acknowledges that the trial judge did not err by relying on the challenged statement to establish 
the existence of the conspiracy.  In fact, we have held that an 801(d)(2) statement itself can 
establish the existence of the conspiracy.  See Swan v. State, 820 A.2d 342 (Del. 2003). 
 
35
A. 
Yes. My wife I had – I came home from work and usual thing.  
We – it was about bed time.  I was in bed.  Had brought John 
Junior in, put him down to sleep.  Got in bed.  She had asked 
me if I would listen to something she had to say.  She wanted – 
I am taking a guess she wanted my opinion on it, or I’m not 
sure exactly what her meaning of what the conversation was, 
but she told me that her and her mother had been talking 
about forcing John into a heart attack by taking away his 
pills, and you know, from like he said forcing him into a heart 
attack, putting him in a plastic tote, burying him in the 
backyard, so that she could get all of his stuff out of the house, 
and so she could have the house on top of that because she was 
afraid that if something ever happened to John she would get 
nothing.” 
 
Q. 
You say “she,” who are you referring to? 
 
A. 
Linda 
 
Q. 
Missy(Mellisa) was telling you this? 
 
A. 
Missy was telling me this.  My exact words well that it is a little 
more than I wanted to know about that situation and that you 
know I told Missy as long as she was with me, we would have 
no part in that, and then I mentioned something to Linda that 
night about it, and we talked more about it the next morning. 
 
John Rucinski testified that the next day he had a similar discussion with Linda 
about killing John. 
Q. 
What happened after that?  There wasn’t really much said about 
it in the morning.  Came home that evening, came from work, 
the kids were all put to bed, sat out in the living room and 
talked about – I told her(Linda) what Missy had told me.  
She(Linda) told me that that was just like one of the 
scenarios. 
 
Court: 
You have to be real clear when you say “she.” 
 
 
36
A. 
Linda. 
 
Court: 
You have to be clear.  I want to be certain the record is clear. 
 
A. 
Okay.  Me and Linda talked.  Linda said that was just one of the 
scenarios.  Another one was – 
 
Q. 
That was just one scenario? 
 
A. 
That, hiding his pills and forcing him into having a heart attack 
was just one of the scenarios.  The other one was faking a 
break-in, but she said she still might lose what was in the house, 
and I plain out told her that I don’t know if she was trying to 
solicit me into this or she wanted my opinion or what.  But I did 
tell her that I would have no part of that, and I did tell her that – 
I said that you know if you did do anything like this, the first 
person they are going to look at is you and me because of my 
record. 
 
 
 
We hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting the 
above testimony of John Rucinski and Collins.  The State presented purely 
circumstantial evidence about the conspiracy between Linda and Mellisa.  We 
draw no distinction, however, between circumstantial and direct evidence.47 
 
The circumstantial evidence could lead a reasonable juror to conclude that 
Linda and Mellisa, in August of 2000, had the common purpose and design to kill 
John.  Linda and John had a property dispute, shortly after which, Mellisa 
approached John Rucinski and told him of her discussions with Linda about killing 
John and burying him in the backyard.  The day after his discussion with Mellisa, 
                                                 
47  
Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 563 (Del. 1995).  
 
 
37
John Rucinski asked Linda about what Mellisa had said to him.  Linda 
acknowledged that she and Mellisa had discussed, as “just one of the scenarios,” 
killing John by taking away his pills. From the fact that Linda and Mellisa had 
discussions with each other, and with John Rucinski, about killing John, a fact 
finder could infer that it was more likely than not that Linda and Mellisa had 
conspired to kill John.  Thus, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by 
admitting Melissa’s statements to John Rucinski under D.R.E 801(d)(2)(E). 
C.  Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
 
 
Linda also appeals from the trial judge’s denial of her Motion for a 
Judgment of Acquittal.  Linda contends that:  (1) the evidence presented supported 
only a “rage killing” by Brown, and that (2) the State violated Linda’s due process 
rights by advancing different theories in Brown’s and Mellisa’s proceedings.  We 
review a denial of a defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal de novo.48  The 
test is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”49 
 
We hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the State’s theory that 
Linda, Mellisa, and Brown conspired and developed a plan to kill John and 
                                                 
48  
See Davis v. State, 453 A.2d 802 (Del. 1982). 
 
49  
Id. 
 
 
38
Sproates, and to support a jury finding that the conspiracy existed beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
The evidence showed that Linda had a motive to kill John:  throughout their 
relationship there were disputes concerning grandchildren, money, and material 
items.  The State established that during their dysfunctional relationship, Linda was 
developing a plan to murder John.  John Rucinski’s testimony established that 
Mellisa approached him to request his help in a plan to kill John.  Mellisa told John 
Rucinski that her mother had spoken with her about inducing John to have a heart 
attack.  John Rucinski also testified that he asked Linda what Mellisa had told him, 
and that Linda had confirmed she said that inducing a heart attack was “one of the 
scenarios.”  John Rucinski told both Mellisa and Linda that he would have no part 
in John’s killing.   
 
The State presented evidence that Mellisa and John Rucinski eventually 
divorced and that Mellisa met Tony Brown over the internet during the summer of 
2001.  Brown, an African American,50 began dating Mellisa.  During that same 
period, the tensions underlying the relationship between Linda and John had 
escalated.  Arguments ensued about John’s alleged abuse of his granddaughter and 
a visit by the Division of Family Services to John’s house investigating that alleged 
                                                 
50  
The State presented evidence that John and Sproates disliked Brown because of his race. 
 
39
abuse.  The evidence also established that John and Linda had an argument over a 
lawn ornament just before John’s death. 
 
Mellisa testified about the events that occurred on the night of John’s 
murder.  Mellisa testified that Brown followed her to John’s Bridgeville residence.  
Mellisa went into the house, and several minutes later she heard Linda say to John 
“someone is breaking in the house.”  Mellisa then witnessed Brown beating John, 
and then placing John in a van.  Mellisa drove Brown and John to a secluded area 
where Brown killed John and buried him.  On the drive back, Brown called Linda 
to report that everything was done.  By the time Mellisa and Brown returned, 
Linda had cleaned the residence.  
The State also presented evidence that the participants developed as a cover 
story that John was away on vacation or on jury duty.  To support the cover story, 
Linda had her son dispose of John’s car.  Linda then stripped John’s residence “to 
the bone,” taking things such as the kitchen cabinets, floors, and outdoor fences. 
The evidence further revealed that at the time Linda was moving all of 
John’s property to Sproates’s Magnolia residence, Sproates became suspicious 
because John had mysteriously disappeared.  Eventually, Sproates discovered a 
bloody box among the items that Linda had moved from John’s home.  Believing 
that box might be somehow related to John’s disappearance, Sproates became even 
more suspicious.  Sproates then began to show the bloody box to other people.  
 
40
Linda told Mellisa and Brown that something had to be done about Sproates.  
The State presented evidence to show that is exactly what happened:  Mellisa, 
Linda, and Brown coordinated Sproates’s death.  Mellisa testified that Linda lured 
Sproates to his Magnolia residence where Brown was lying in wait.  Brown then 
killed Sproates51 and drove Sproates’s body to the Bridgeville residence.  While 
Linda and Mellisa were present, Brown buried Sproates in the backyard.  All three 
then developed a cover story that Sproates had run off with a younger woman. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that a 
reasonable jury, based on that evidence, could find Linda guilty as an accomplice 
to the murders of John and Sproates, and guilty of the accompanying charges of 
Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony and 
Conspiracy.  A reasonable jury could also have found, based on the evidence, that 
John was “set up” for the kill by Mellisa and Linda, and that Brown was the killer.  
A reasonable jury could also have found that Mellisa, Linda, and Brown conspired 
to kill Sproates to silence him because Sproates had become suspicious about the 
circumstances surrounding John’s disappearance. 
In support of her motion for judgment of acquittal, Linda also argued that 
the State violated her due process rights by advancing different theories in Brown’s 
                                                 
51  
The State presented evidence at trial indicating that Brown killed Sproates.  We base our 
decision on a motion for judgment of acquittal on the evidence produced at trial.  However, it is 
worth noting, that Brown’s proffer, which was not admitted into evidence, stated that it was 
Mellisa who had inflicted the fatal wounds that killed Sproates. 
 
 
41
and Mellisa’s proceedings.  Linda relied on a Ninth Circuit case -Thompson v. 
Calderon52 - in support of her argument that the prosecution cannot use 
inconsistent theories regarding the same crime to convict two defendants at 
separate trials.  In Calderon, a prosecutor used irreconcilably inconsistent theories 
in prosecuting two codefendants.  The codefendants, Leitch and Thompson, were 
both charged with murdering Ginger Fleischli.  At a preliminary hearing,53 the 
prosecutor argued that Leitch wanted Fleishli dead for having interfered with his 
attempts to reconcile with his wife, and that Leitch had solicited Thompson’s help 
to commit the murder.  At a preliminary hearing, the prosecutor represented that 
jailhouse informants would testify that Thomson had confessed to the killing, and 
that the jailhouse informants would testify that:  
Thompson had told him that on the night of the murder, he engaged in 
consensual sex with Fleischli. Then, when Leitch returned home, the two 
executed Leitch's plan, and killed Fleischli. 
 
Months later, Leitch successfully moved to sever his trial from Thompson’s trial.  
The State tried Thompson first.  At Thompson’s trial, the prosecutor used a totally 
inconsistent theory from that which had been advanced at the preliminary hearing, 
and did not call any of the jailhouse informants he had referred to at the 
preliminary hearing.  Instead, the prosecution called other informants who testified 
                                                 
52  
120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 
53  
At the preliminary hearing, Thompson and Leitch were joined as codefendants. 
 
42
that Thompson killed Fleischli after raping her because he feared that Fleischli 
would call the police.  Put simply, the prosecutor claimed that the motive for the 
murder was to cover up a rape.  Moreover, the prosecutor argued that Thompson 
was the only one present when Fleischli was murdered.  Thompson was convicted 
of the murder. 
 
Later, at Leitch’s trial, the prosecutor argued – inconsistently – that Leitch 
was the only person with a motive to kill Fleischli.  Leitch’s motive, the prosecutor 
claimed, was to prevent Fleischli from interfering with Leitch’s attempts to 
reconcile his differences with his wife.  Moreover, the prosecutor totally 
discredited any theory that Thompson committed the murder alone and argued that 
both men had committed the murder together.  The court held that the prosecutor’s 
use of inconsistent theories in different trials involving the same crime violated 
Thompson’s right to a fair trial.54 
 
The prosecutors did not engage in the tactics condemned in Calderon.  The 
State’s theory – that Linda masterminded the murders and elicited Brown’s and 
Mellisa’s help in her plan to kill John – never changed.  Brown’s and Mellisa’s 
account of what occurred certainly differ with respect to who inflicted the fatal 
blows, but for purposes of a Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal, the State cannot 
fairly be said to have used inconsistent theories merely because these two 
                                                 
54  
Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1059. 
 
43
witnesses gave different accounts of the murders.  Indeed, Mellisa’s and Brown’s 
pleas suggest that the State had one theory.  Although Brown stated that Linda had 
inflicted the fatal blows on John, and that Mellisa had inflicted the fatal blows on 
Sproates, the State obtained Brown’s plea to two counts of First Degree Murder for 
the deaths of both John and Sproates.  Brown’s guilty plea is consistent with 
Mellisa’s proffered statement that Brown had inflicted both John’s and Sproates’s 
fatal wounds.  Further, Mellisa was permitted to plead to a conspiracy charge 
involving Sproates’s death indicating that the State accepted her story about 
Sproates’s death.   
We hold that the trial judge did not err when he denied Linda’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal. 
D.  Evidence of What Sproates Told his Relatives Before his Death 
 
Linda next challenges the admission into evidence of several statements 
made by Sproates to his relatives several weeks before his death.  The statements 
concerned Sproates’s suspicion about John’s disappearance.55  Sproates told his 
relatives, among other things, that:  (1) Linda had brought a blood stained box 
from John’s Bridgeville residence, and that he (Sproates) was scared and 
                                                 
55  
Sproates made statements to the following relatives:  Jerriann Heath (See A-603-614 and 
A-567-602), Willard McCray(See A-868-873), William Sproates, Jr.(See A662-674), Patricia 
Blanchfield (See A702-708), and Roger Layton (See A-751-759). 
 
 
44
concerned about John’s disappearance;56 (2) Linda told Sproates that “if he had 
said anything of what happened, that she would no longer talk to him and the same 
thing would happen to him as it did Uncle John;”57 and, that (3) Linda had called 
and he was going to let her in his Magnolia residence.58   
 
The trial judge admitted Sproates statements as hearsay exceptions under 
D.R.E. 803(3) and D.R.E. 804(b)(6).  We review a trial judge’s evidentiary rulings 
for an abuse of discretion.59 
 
D.R.E. 803(3) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is: 
 
a statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, 
sensation or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, 
mental feeling, pain and bodily health), but not including a statement 
of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless 
it relates to the execution, revocation, identification or terms of 
declarant's will. 
 
 
Many of Sproates’s statements admitted into evidence consisted of 
statements, attributed to Sproates, that he was afraid.  The trial judge determined 
that: 
the statements as to mind as expressed to the witness are relevant, 
material, reflecting a mental state when made, were communicated in 
                                                 
56  
A- 604-607, 611, 665-667, 705-707, 754-759, 869-870. 
 
57  
A-633. 
 
58  
A-672-673.  
 
59  
Barnes v. State, 858 A2d 942, 944 (Del. 2004). 
 
 
45
a natural manner, made under circumstances dispelling suspicion, and 
contained no suggestion of sinister motives.60 
 
Sproates’s statements asserted his current state of mind – fear of Linda.  
Sproates’s statements were relevant and material because they were circumstantial 
evidence of Linda’s motive to conspire with Mellisa and Brown to commit murder.  
There was no evidence to suggest, nor does Linda claim, that the statements were 
made in an unnatural manner or unusual circumstance.  Thus, we hold that the trial 
judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting Sproates’s statements that he was 
afraid. 
Linda claims, however, that many of the statements admitted into evidence 
were not probative of Sproates’s then existing state of mind and are therefore not 
admissible.  That is incorrect.  Although some of the Sproates’s statements do not 
reflect his then existing state of mind, the trial judge correctly ruled that the 
statements were admissible under D.R.E. 804(b)(6).  Rule 804(b)(6) provides that 
“a statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing 
that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a 
witness” is not hearsay. 
In applying D.R.E. 804(b)(6), the trial judge found that Linda (i) was 
involved in killing Sproates as a coconspirator and an aider and abetter, and (ii) 
Linda acted with the intent of procuring Sproates’s unavailability as a potential 
                                                 
60  
A-89. 
 
46
witness at any trial concerning John’s murder.  The trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion in so finding.   
The evidence showed that Sproates had seen bloody boxes that Linda 
brought from Bridgeville to Magnolia.  Linda told Sproates to keep his mouth shut 
or he would “get what his uncle got.”  Sproates told his family members and Roger 
Layton about the boxes.  Layton was an experienced police officer who also saw 
blood on the boxes that appeared consistent with major trauma. 
Linda learned from her son, Willard McCrea, that Sproates was actively 
involved in questioning John’s disappearance and showing the bloody boxes to 
others.  Linda then decided, with Mellisa and Brown, to kill Sproates.  Linda told 
them that Sproates “was getting to close to finding out what had actually happened 
to dad, and something had to be done with him.”61  Mellisa testified that she 
understood that meant killing Sproates.  The evidence showed that Linda lured 
Sproates to his Magnolia residence where Brown murdered him. 
Based on this evidence, it was within the trial judge’s discretion to find that 
Linda had participated in Sproates’s killing in order to make him unavailable as a 
witness.  Thus, Sproates’s statements to his relatives that were both relevant and 
                                                 
61  
A-258 
 
 
47
passed a D.R.E. 403 balancing analysis, were admissible as probative of Sproates’s 
fear of impending harm under D.R.E 804(b)(6).62  
E.  Access to Juror Information 
 
Linda’s final claim is that her due process rights were violated because the 
State had access to the jurors’ criminal records, and that the trial judge improperly 
applied 11 Del. C. §8513(g) to bar her equal access.63  The defendant does not 
claim that she should have access to the information.  Rather, her claim is that if 
she cannot have access, then neither should the State.   
We cannot find that Linda’s due process rights were violated on this theory.  
Linda has articulated no prejudice resulting from the State’s exclusive possession 
of the information.  As a defendant, Linda was entitled to request that voir dire 
questions be directed to jurors to determine the extent of any juror’s involvement 
                                                 
62  
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in determining what evidence was relevant.  
Further, the trial judge properly weighed the probative value of Sproates’s statements against any 
danger of unfair prejudice.  See A72-89. 
 
63  
11 Del. C. §8513 provides:  
Notwithstanding any law or court rule to the contrary, the dissemination to the 
defendant or defense attorney in a criminal case of criminal history record 
information pertaining to any juror in such case is prohibited. For the purposes of 
this subsection, "juror" includes any person who has received notice or summons 
to appear for jury service. This subsection shall not prohibit the disclosure of such 
information as may be necessary to investigate misconduct by any juror. 
 
 
48
in past crimes.64  That opportunity, if exercised, would negate any prejudicial 
effect of the State having exclusive access to that information. 
F.  A Comment on the Dissent 
We respectfully disagree with the dissent’s summary of the record.  We 
acknowledge that the State’s timing of its revelation that it did not intend to call 
Brown and the fact that its late tender of a discovery response caused the defense 
to ask for a continuance complicated the issues for the trial judge.  Nevertheless, 
this is not a case where the trial judge’s exercise of his 403 discretion properly 
protected Linda from the efforts of her misguided defense counsel.  This is a case 
where the trial judge denied Linda’s constitutional right to present her defense 
theory with the effective assistance of counsel. 
The dissent states that “the trial judge allowed the credibility of the 
witnesses to be determined based upon fair cross-examination and evidence that 
would not be unfairly prejudicial to Linda Charbonneau.”65  Our reading of the 
record, however, reflects that defense counsel questioned Mellisa for a few minutes 
(representing about two pages of the record) about some of her disagreements with 
Brown’s statements, but the jury had no opportunity to see Brown’s statements in 
                                                 
64  
See 86 A.L.R.3d 571 (stating “the traditional common-law rule that, absent a statute or 
rule of practice providing otherwise, or other exceptional circumstances, defense counsel in a 
criminal case has no right of access to information in the possession of the prosecution”). 
 
65  
See Infra p. 53. 
 
 
49
context.  The record also reflects that the State continued to object to the use of 
Brown’s proffer.  The record reflects no circumstances, given the trial judge’s 
rulings and the State’s continuing objection, that would suggest that the trial 
judge’s initial ruling barring the proffer was tentative and subject to 
reconsideration. 
The dissent’s suggestion that the admission of Brown’s proffer would result 
in a reversal, or subject defense counsel to denigration in a putatively successful 
post conviction relief petition, seems farfetched at best.66  The proffer would have 
been introduced without objection, would have survived plain error scrutiny and, 
would have been admitted entirely consistent with sound defense strategy, and not 
subject to successful challenge by hindsight.67 
The dissent avoids discussing Potts in support of its argument, but cites 
Johnson v. State.68  Linda’s attorneys properly distinguished Johnson in their 
memorandum to the trial judge.  The standard for the defense using a guilty plea to 
                                                 
66  
See Infra p. 56 n. 80. 
 
67  
See e.g., Strickland v. Washington., 466 U.S. 668, 689 (U.S. 1984) (“…[T]he defendant 
must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy.”)  
 
68  
The dissent also cites Allen v. State [add citation to dissent] The facts in Allen are 
significantly different that the operative facts here.  In Allen, the State wanted to use the plea or 
proffer of a non-testifying codefendant to establish guilt.  As Allen explains, while that tactic is 
improper, the holding and analysis supporting it does not bar using the proffer for other 
purposes.  Here, Brown’s proffer should have been admitted for impeachment purposes with a 
limiting instruction. 
 
 
50
establish the defendant’s innocence was the issue in Johnson, but it is not the issue 
here.69 
The dissent suggests that the jury was fully aware that Brown’s and 
Mellisa’s statements were replete with inconsistencies. The jury, however, never 
had the benefit of Brown’s proffer.  Whether the trial judge agreed with defense 
counsel’s strategy or not, the defense wanted to show that the State accepted guilty 
pleas from two codefendants based on different operative facts.  Defense counsels’ 
chosen method for doing that would have shown the jury that Brown inculpated 
Linda directly, an admitted risk, but the defense’s point would be that the State 
wanted Linda, and both Brown and Mellisa would say anything to avoid the death 
penalty. 
                                                 
69  
The issue here was whether the State intentionally shielded Brown from testifying to gain 
a tactical advantage over the defense.  While we found no cases discussing a prosecutor’s unfair 
use of plea agreements to gain exclusive access to testimony, many cases discuss a prosecutor’s 
unfair granting of testimonial immunity to gain access to favorable testimony and at the same 
time shield the defense from testimony unfavorable to the State.  The State effectively 
accomplished the same unfair advantage here by manipulating its plea bargaining power to 
ensure that Mellisa would be heard but not Brown.  Like using immunity in a one sided manner, 
use of plea agreements in a prejudicial manner can result in a basic unfairness that rises to the 
level of a violation of a defendant’s due process rights.  See United States v. Dolah, 245 F.3d 98 
(2nd Cir. 2001)(recognizing “in some limited circumstances, using the immunity device in a one-
sided manner can result in a basic unfairness that rises to the level of a violation of procedural 
due process.”); Blissett v. Lefevre, 924 F.2d 434, 442 (2nd Cir. 1991)   (stating “only when a 
prosecutor has abused the government's ability to grant immunity by using it in a discriminatory 
fashion for the purpose of gaining a tactical advantage does due process require a grant of 
immunity for a defense witness.”);  United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 774 (2nd Cir. 1980) 
(stating “unfairness may inhere in some situations because the Government's grant of use 
immunity to its witnesses affords it an advantage over the defendant's ability to present a 
defense. Secondly, to the extent that a trial is viewed as a search for the truth, denial of defense 
witness immunity may in some circumstances unfairly thwart that objective.”). 
  
 
51
The dissent creates the impression that the State took the ethical “high road” 
by not calling Brown (despite an apparent fog hindering earlier disclosure for more 
than six months) and that this maneuver did not harm Linda, because her defense 
counsel could have made whatever points they wished about Brown by the 
structurally limited crossexamination of Mellisa the trial judge did allow.70  While 
we agree that neither side could have presented perjured testimony for its truth, the 
dissent fails to note that the defense could have used Brown’s proffer for other 
purposes; i.e., impeachment – a fact the trial judge recognized.  Ironically, the 
dissent finds no difficulty with the State introducing Mellisa’s confessed perjured 
testimony. 
We appreciate the dissent’s thoughtful position, but believe the trial judge’s 
rulings unfairly thwarted the defendant’s constitutional right to present her case in 
the way she and her counsel believed to be most effective. 
Conclusion 
 
For these reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is REVERSED.  The 
case is REMANDED for a new trial consistent with this Opinion.   
                                                 
70 
See Infra pp. 53-57. 
 
52
RIDGELY, Justice, dissenting: 
 
 
I respectfully disagree that the plea agreement with Brown served as a 
representation of any kind to Linda Charbonneau.  To be sure, it put Charbonneau 
on notice that Brown might be called as a witness, but there was no legal 
requirement for the prosecutors to call him to the witness stand or even to 
prosecute him.71  Furthermore, with three co-defendants involved, there is nothing 
unusual about trying one before another who can still exercise his Fifth 
Amendment privilege.  While the majority describes the prosecutors’ choice not to 
call Brown as a witness as a “13th hour decision,” the timing of that decision was 
relevant only to a defense application for a continuance of the trial, which was not 
made.  The State did identify Brown as a potential witness in response to the trial 
judge’s inquiry for purposes of preparing voir dire of the jury array, but the State 
had no obligation to disclose who would actually be called.72  Neither did the 
defense.   
 
I also disagree with the majority’s assessment that the trial judge endorsed 
any fact or that he removed a critical credibility determination from the jury.  The 
trial judge’s statement that it would not be “natural” for the State to call Brown as 
a witness was made in the context of whether a missing witness instruction was 
                                                 
71    
Seth v. State, 592 A.2d 436, 439 (Del. 1991) (“In the exercise of his [or her] official 
powers, the Attorney General has discretion in determining who shall be prosecuted and in what 
manner that prosecution shall take place.”). 
 
72    
Liket v. State, 719 A.2d 935, 937-938 (Del. 1998). 
 
53
required as a matter of law.  This Court has held that policy considerations of the 
State’s privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of an informant under D.R.E. 509 
justified the State’s failure to call an informant as a witness.73  Here, the policy 
considerations which preclude prosecutors from offering testimony they know to 
be false justified their failure to call Brown as a witness as a matter of law.74  
Instead of removing a credibility determination from the jury, the trial judge 
allowed the credibility of the witnesses to be determined based upon fair cross-
examination and evidence that would not be unfairly prejudicial to Linda 
Charbonneau.   
 
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that “the trial judge’s denial of the 
motion in limine fatally undermined the fairness of the trial.”75  To the contrary, the 
trial judge’s ruling under DRE 403 that Brown’s plea agreement and proffer was 
not admissible as substantive evidence was designed to protect Charbonneau’s 
right to a fair trial.  Brown’s full proffer, which would not have been subject to 
cross-examination, inculpated Charbonneau directly in the murders.  It specifically 
accused her of killing John Charbonneau and of being an accomplice to the murder 
                                                 
73    
Wheatley v. State, 465 A.2d 1110, 1112 (Del. 1983). 
 
74    
See DELAWARE LAWYERS RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, RULE 3.3 (A lawyer 
shall not knowingly offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.).  While the prosecutors 
believed, based upon the investigation, that Brown would lie about Rucinski’s involvement in 
the Sproates killing, there was no representation that they knew Mellisa Rucinski would testify 
falsely. 
 
75    
See supra p. 4. 
 
54
of Sproates.  The trial judge’s ruling under D.R.E. 403 was grounded upon 
precedent of this Court, which upheld the exclusion of a co-defendant’s guilty plea 
to avoid unfair prejudice to the defendant on trial.  In Johnson v. State76 this Court 
said:   
The standard for admission of a codefendant’s guilty plea is governed 
by Delaware Rule of Evidence 403, which states in part that “evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice…”  D.R.E. 403.  Determining whether 
the probative value of a particular piece of evidence is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is a matter that falls 
particularly within the discretion of the Superior Court, which has the 
first-hand opportunity to evaluate relevant factors.  Lynch v. State, 
Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1138, 1141 (1991); Williams v. State, Del Supr., 
494 A.2d 1237, 1241 (1985).  The Superior Court has broad discretion 
to admit or reject evidence, and absent an abuse of that broad 
discretion, the Superior Court’s ruling will be upheld by this Court.  
Diaz v. State, Del. Supr., 508 A.2d 861, 865 (1986).  
 
Relying on precedents from other jurisdictions, the Superior Court 
concluded that, even though Johnson was arguing for the admission of 
Burgos’ guilty plea, the prejudicial effect to Johnson of admitting the 
evidence substantially outweighed its probative value, especially since 
Burgos did not testify at trial.  (emphasis added).  See United States v. 
McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1464-65 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that, in 
most cases, the admission of a codefendant’s guilty plea will 
substantially affect the defendant’s right to a fair trial because the jury 
may regard the issue of the defendant’s guilt or innocence as settled); 
Rhode Island v. Parente, 460 A.2d 430, 435 (R.I. 1983) (recognizing 
that “evidence of a codefendant’s guilty plea is amenable to misuse”); 
State v. Stefanelli, 396 A.2d 1105, 1111-12 (N.J. 1979) (same).  The 
record in this case indicates that the Superior Court carefully 
considered arguments for and against the admission of Burgos’ guilty 
plea.  The record does not reflect that Superior Court abused its 
                                                 
76    
Del. Supr., 1991 WL 279843, 1991 Del. LEXIS 403 (Order). 
 
55
discretion in denying Johnson’s request to introduce evidence of 
Burgos’ guilty plea.77 
 
If a co-defendant’s guilty plea may be excluded under D.R.E. 403, after careful 
consideration, so also may a proffer of the co-defendant which he made in 
conjunction with that guilty plea, provided its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
 
While the majority reverses the convictions because of the impeachment 
value of Brown’s plea agreement and proffer, the record shows that the trial judge 
left the door open for the use of Brown’s proffer in the cross-examination of 
Mellisa Rucinski.  A trial judge is not required to make evidentiary rulings in 
advance of trial but rather, in his discretion, may defer a ruling on an evidentiary 
issue until the evidence is actually offered.78  Here the trial judge said: 
The scope, depth, and limitations of cross-examination of Mellisa 
Rucinski will be determined at the time she is called to the stand, and 
the defense will have to show the connection of bias, interest and 
prejudice between whatever Brown said or accused in Rucinski’s 
testimony, and I will make a decision at that time on those points.79   
 
                                                 
77    
Id.  
 
78    
Dawson v. State, 581 A.2d 1078, 1087 (Del. 1990).   
 
79    
A-156.  (emphasis added). 
 
 
56
During cross-examination of Mellisa Rucinski the defense did not seek to 
introduce Brown’s plea agreement or proffer.80  The record does not reveal why.  
Perhaps they recognized a better alternative.81  In any event, the defense 
successfully executed their strategy the majority says the trial judge prevented.  
The defense proved through the intrinsic evidence of Rucinski’s own testimony 
and her writings that she and Brown could not agree on the details of their own 
involvement in the murders.  Rucinski wrote six pages of comments disputing 
Brown’s proffer.  She was cross-examined about her comments and her writing 
was introduced as a defense exhibit during that cross-examination.82  She 
acknowledged that she went through what Brown said in detail and that he did not 
tell the truth.83  Brown’s accusation of her involvement in the Sproates murder was 
the subject of direct inquiry by the defense over the objection of the State: 
                                                 
80   
The cross-examination and re-cross-examination of Mellisa Rucinski is reported in 128 
pages of transcript.  A-281 to A-401 and A-442 to A-450.  There were two objections by the 
State relating to Brown’s proffer.  The first objection was withdrawn when the prosecutor 
realized defense counsel was not offering Brown’s proffer but Mellisa’s comments on Brown’s 
proffer into evidence.  A-321.  The second objection by the State was overruled when defense 
counsel questioned Mellisa Rucinski about Brown’s claim that Rucinski was with him when 
Sproates was killed.  A-442. 
 
81    
If the State had introduced Brown’s plea agreement and proffer, a reversal of 
Charbonneau’s conviction would be required.  See Allen v. State, 878 A.2d 447 (Del. 2005).  The 
challenges to defense counsel of defending during a post-conviction relief proceeding a tactic of 
introducing inculpatory evidence that the jury could use to convict their own client is self-
evident. 
 
82    
DX-2. 
 
83    
A-442. 
 
57
Q. 
In fact, he [Brown] said you were in Magnolia with him when 
Billy Sproates was killed? 
 
MS. RYAN:   
Objection 
 
THE COURT:   
Overruled.   
You can answer that question. 
 
BY MR. KARSNITZ: 
 
Q. 
That’s what he said? 
 
A. 
Yes. 
 
Q. 
Apparently, he didn’t take your advice to tell the truth? 
 
A. 
No.84 
 
Not only did defense counsel elicit testimony from Rucinski that Brown had lied, 
he skillfully obtained her admission that she had lied all four times she had an 
opportunity to speak about the case.85  Defense counsel had the opportunity to do 
what they told the trial judge they wanted to do, namely “to use certain statements 
made in the plea and proffer to test Ms. Rucinski’s possible bias and credibility.”86  
It is undisputed that the defense was not “seeking to have Mr. Brown’s plea and 
proffer admitted to show the truth of what is said therein.”87  Since defense counsel 
                                                 
84    
A-442. 
 
85   
A-362.  Although damaging, this evidence did not preclude the jury from accepting 
Rucinski’s trial testimony about Linda Charbonneau’s involvement as an accomplice.   
 
86    
A-125. (emphasis added). 
 
87    
Id.  
 
58
carefully selected the portions of Brown’s proffer that they wanted to use in cross-
examining Rucinski, I find no abuse of discretion in keeping the balance of 
Brown’s proffer from the jury’s consideration.  Given the cross-examination which 
happened, the probative value of the proffer to further show Mellisa’s bias was 
slight and the potential unfair prejudice to Linda Charbonneau was real.  The 
record shows that the jury was fully aware that Brown and Rucinski’s statements 
were replete with inconsistencies and that Brown accused Rucinski of being 
involved in the Sproates killing.  The foundation for an argument that Rucinski had 
a motive to lie because of Brown’s accusation was in front of the jury.  What the 
jury did not know, because of the trial judge’s ruling, is that Brown accused Linda 
Charbonneau of killing John Charbonneau. 
 
The trial judge carefully balanced the probative value of admitting the plea 
agreement and written proffer against the danger of unfair prejudice to Linda 
Charbonneau.  Ultimately, the trial judge permitted the defense to cross examine 
Rucinski, as they wanted, on the portions of Brown’s proffer they selected.  I 
cannot say that the trial judge’s decision to exclude the balance of Brown’s plea 
and proffer under these circumstances exceeded the bounds of reason.  Because the 
trial judge’s choices were matters within his broad discretion, I find no reversible 
error.   
 
I respectfully dissent.