Case Title: Kroner v. Oneida Seven Generations Corp.

Citation: 2012 WI 88

Docket Number: 2010AP002533

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2012-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 WI 88 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP2533   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
John N. Kroner, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Oneida Seven Generations Corporation, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 336 Wis. 2d 476, 801 N.W.2d 350 
(Ct. App. 2011 - Unpublished)     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 7, 2012   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown  
 
JUDGE: 
Donald R. Zuidmulder   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BRADLEY, J., join the 
opinion of CROOKS, J. 
PROSSER, J., concurs (Opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (Opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER and GABLEMAN, J.J., join the concurrence 
of ROGGENSACK, J.    
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Michael F. Brown, Peterson, Berk & Cross, S.C., 
Appleton, and oral argument by Michael F. Brown. 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Thomas L. Schober, Davis & Kuelthau, S.C., Green Bay, and oral 
argument by Thomas L. Schober.  
 
 
2012 WI 88
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP2533 
(L.C. No. 
2008CV2234) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John N. Kroner,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,   
 
 
v. 
 
Oneida Seven Generations Corporation,   
 
 
Defendant-Respondent   
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case concerns a Brown 
County Circuit Court's order to transfer to a tribal court a 
civil suit that was brought against a tribally owned entity by a 
nonmember of the tribe.1  The question before us is whether the  
                                                 
1 The court of appeals affirmed the order.  Kroner v. Oneida 
Seven Generations Corp., No. 2010AP2533, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. June 1, 2011). 
 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
2 
 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it 
transferred the action to tribal court.2   
¶2 
John Kroner, who is not a member of the Oneida Tribe 
of Indians, had served as chief executive officer of Oneida 
Seven Generations Corporation (Seven Generations), a tribally 
owned real estate and holding company, for approximately seven 
years before he was terminated from his position in 2008.  He 
sued Seven Generations in circuit court, claiming wrongful 
discharge and breach of contract.  The order to transfer that we 
review here was issued by the Brown County Circuit Court, the 
Honorable Donald R. Zuidmulder presiding, and deals with the 
threshold questions regarding which court should hear the case; 
it does not address the merits of Kroner's claims.    
¶3 
To determine whether the circuit court's granting of 
the motion to transfer was an erroneous exercise of discretion, 
                                                 
2 All seven justices agree to a reversal of the court of 
appeals and the circuit court and agree that this matter should 
be remanded to the circuit court.                      
Though their rationales differ, four justices, Justices 
Prosser, Roggensack, Ziegler, and Gableman, do not, upon remand, 
permit transfer of this case to the Oneida Tribal Court, but 
require the circuit court to proceed on the merits of the 
pending lawsuit. Justice Prosser has concluded that Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.54 should not be given retroactive effect.   
Three justices, Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justices 
Bradley and Crooks, would remand this matter to the circuit 
court and direct that the circuit court consider the issue of 
transfer, applying the § 801.54 factors, resolving questions in 
regard to concurrent jurisdiction of the circuit court and the 
tribal court, and also resolving the retroactivity questions in 
this case surrounding application of the rule. 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
3 
 
we must determine if the circuit court made "an error of law" or 
"neglect[ed] to base its decision upon the facts of the record."  
Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 2010 WI 44, ¶32, 324 
Wis. 2d 703, 783 N.W.2d 294.  Where a multi-factor test is 
required, a court "applie[s] an incomplete, and thus incorrect, 
standard of law" if it considers only one required factor and 
"neglect[s] to address any of the other statutory factors."  
LeMere v. LeMere, 2003 WI 67, ¶22, 262 Wis. 2d 426, 663 N.W.2d 
789.  Failure to apply "the proper statutory rigor" constitutes 
error.  Id. at ¶25.      
¶4 
We acknowledge that the circuit court faced difficult 
issues without the benefit of any appellate decisions providing 
guidance concerning the interpretation and application of Wis. 
Stat. § 801.54 (2009-10)3, which "authorizes the circuit court, 
in its discretion, to transfer [an] action to the tribal court" 
and sets forth the conditions for doing so.  Reviewing this case 
presents an opportunity to set forth the analysis and the 
governing legal principles that we hope will be useful to a 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
4 
 
circuit court that is considering a motion for discretionary 
transfer under the statute.4  The statute states, in part: 
Discretionary transfer. When a civil action is brought 
in the circuit court of any county of this state, and 
when, under the laws of the United States, a tribal 
court has concurrent jurisdiction of the matter in 
controversy, the circuit court may, on its own motion 
or the motion of any party and after notice and 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat § 801.54 states, "The circuit court must 
first 
make 
a 
threshold 
determination 
that 
concurrent 
jurisdiction exists."  Justices Roggensack, Ziegler and Gableman 
would have circuit courts make the threshold determination that 
transfer to a tribal court will not "abridge, enlarge or modify 
the substantive rights of litigants."  Justice Roggensack's 
concurrence, ¶¶70, 109.  That determination was made in 2008 by 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court when it passed Wis. Stat. § 801.54 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1), which provides that court-
promulgated "rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify the 
substantive rights of any litigant."  By virtue of the fact that 
a majority of this court created the rule, we settled that 
question.  (For a discussion of the statute preceding Wis. Stat. 
§ 751.12, see In re Constitutionality of Section 251.18, Wis. 
Statutes, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N.W. 717 (1931)).   
In effect, this court reaffirmed that determination in 2009 
and 2010.  In 2009, we granted the request of the Wisconsin 
Department of Children and Families "to create a narrow 
exception to the rule to facilitate transfer of post-judgment 
child support cases to tribes under certain circumstances."  S. 
Ct. Order 07-11A, 2009 WI 63, 316 Wis. 2d xiii (issued July 1, 
2009, eff. Jan. 1, 2010).  In 2010, we reviewed the rule and 
"the majority of the court concurred that the rule was operating 
as expected and that no action was required."  S. Ct. Order 07-
11B, 2011 WI 53, 334 Wis. 2d xv (issued July 1, 2011, eff. Jan. 
1, 2012).  It is not appropriate to require a circuit court to 
reexamine a question that this court resolved in 2008, 2009 and 
2010. 
Of course, as we recognized in publishing but not adopting 
the comment to Wis. Stat. § 801.54, "the circuit court shall 
give particular weight to the constitutional rights of the 
litigants and their rights to assert all available claims and 
defenses."  Supreme Court Note, 2008, Wis. Stat. § 801.54.        
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
5 
 
hearing on the record on the issue of the transfer, 
cause such action to be transferred to the tribal 
court. The circuit court must first make a threshold 
determination that concurrent jurisdiction exists.  
The statute thus requires a "threshold determination" by the 
circuit court.  It then provides that "in the exercise of its 
discretion the circuit court shall consider all relevant factors 
 . . . ."  It states that the factors a court shall consider 
include but are "not limited to" a series of facts, such as the 
tribal membership status of the parties, the timing of the 
motion to transfer, and the court in which the action can be 
decided most expeditiously.  Wis. Stat. §801.54(2).  The record 
in this case does not show that the circuit court made the 
necessary threshold determination and considered "all relevant 
factors" as required.  The circuit court proceeded to the second 
step without articulating a basis for concurrent jurisdiction.  
It then focused on one of the factors listed in the statute——the 
factor related to "[w]hether issues in the action require 
interpretation of the tribe's laws, including the tribe's 
constitution, statutes, bylaws, ordinances, resolutions, or case 
law"——without addressing the other relevant factors.  
¶5 
Where a court has not clearly discussed on the record 
the basis for a finding of concurrent jurisdiction and also the 
statutory factors it is required to consider, the record cannot 
be deemed adequate to support a decision to affirm.  Because the 
facts and the applicable law were not fully stated and 
considered together in making both the determinations that the 
statute requires, the order to transfer was an erroneous 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
6 
 
exercise of the circuit court's discretion.   We therefore 
reverse the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court for 
reconsideration in light of this opinion.  A court that is 
considering transferring a case to a tribal court under the 
tribal transfer statute must conduct a two-part analysis.  It 
must make a clear record of its findings and conclusions 
regarding concurrent jurisdiction, as well as an analysis of all 
of the rule's relevant factors on the facts presented.   
¶6 
In this case, the court must also make a record of its 
reasoning and conclusion concerning the separate question of the 
applicability of Wis. Stat. § 801.54 to this case.  That 
requires applying the principles set forth in Trinity Petroleum, 
Inc. v. Scott Oil, Inc., 2007 WI 88, ¶40, 302 Wis. 2d 299, 735 
N.W.2d 1.  This court held that the general rule concerning 
retroactive applicability of procedural rules adopted by the 
court had certain exceptions. The parties here were ordered by 
this court to address that question when the petition for review 
was granted, in light of the fact that the case was pending at 
the time Wis. Stat. § 801.54 became effective.5  Trinity 
Petroleum states that the ordinary rule of retroactivity for 
procedural statutes such as Wis. Stat. § 801.54 does not apply 
if the rule in question "diminishes a contract, disturbs vested 
rights, or imposes an unreasonable burden on the party charged 
                                                 
5 Wis. Stat. § 801.54 became effective on January 1, 2009.  
S. Ct. Order 07-11, 2008 WI 114, 307 Wis. 2d xvii, xxi (issued 
July 31, 2008, eff. Jan. 1, 2009).  Kroner had filed his claim 
in circuit court in this case in the fall of 2008.  The motion 
to transfer was granted on September 9, 2010. 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
7 
 
with complying with the new rule's requirements." Id., ¶7.  
Because there may be additional facts to be developed before the 
circuit court that would be relevant to determining if the 
exception to retroactivity applies, the parties and the court 
should address that issue on remand.    
¶7 
Upon remand the circuit court may reach the same 
conclusion concerning transfer, but only after a thorough 
process has been followed by the circuit court.  A reviewing 
court will then be in a better position to evaluate any appeal 
arising from a transfer because the record before it will 
necessarily 
contain 
an 
explicit 
determination 
concerning 
concurrent jurisdiction, analysis of all relevant factors, and 
the circuit court's holding on retroactive application.    
I. 
BACKGROUND 
A. 
Standard of review 
¶8 
A decision to transfer an action to tribal court 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.54, titled "Discretionary transfer 
of civil actions to tribal court," lies in the circuit court's 
sound discretion.  "A reviewing court will affirm the circuit 
court's exercise of discretion unless it was erroneous. The 
circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion if it makes 
an error of law or neglects to base its decision upon the facts 
of the record."  Ash Park, 324 Wis. 2d 703, ¶32.  We have made 
the following statements about the kind of discretionary rulings 
we will uphold:  "This court will uphold the circuit court's 
order if the circuit court applies a proper standard of law, 
examines the relevant facts, and reaches a conclusion that a 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
8 
 
reasonable court could reach, demonstrating a rational process."  
Luckett v. Bodner, 2009 WI 68, ¶31, 318 Wis. 2d 423, 769 N.W.2d 
504.  "[A] discretionary determination must be the product of a 
rational mental process by which the facts of record and law 
relied upon are stated and are considered together for the 
purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable determination."  
King v. King, 224 Wis. 2d 235, 248, 590 N.W.2d 480 (1999). 
B. 
Facts and procedural history 
¶9 
John Kroner was terminated from his job as chief 
executive officer of Seven Generations, a tribally chartered 
corporate entity that is controlled by the Oneida Business 
Committee on behalf of the Oneida Tribe of Indians.   After his 
termination, he brought this suit.  The first of Kroner's claims 
is that his termination from his job without cause was a breach 
of contract.  Kroner's second claim is for wrongful discharge in 
violation of Wisconsin public policy.  Both parties support 
their respective positions with reference to tribal documents.  
Kroner alleged that his termination without cause violated Seven 
Generations' stated policies and procedures, which Kroner argued 
constituted an employment contract.  Kroner argued that the 
Oneida Personnel Policy and Procedure book (also called the 
"OPPP" or the "Blue Book") as well as the By-laws of Seven 
Generations, both "indicate cause is required for a worker to be 
discharged."  Seven Generations' position was that a different 
document, the Oneida Seven Generations Corporation Employee 
Guidelines, is the document governing the terms of Kroner's 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
9 
 
employment, and it argues that this document shows that Kroner's 
employment was at-will and could be terminated without cause.   
¶10 On October 1, 2008, Seven Generations moved to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim, arguing that the Blue Book did not 
apply to Kroner, and that he was an at-will employee.  After a 
hearing on the motion to dismiss, the circuit court suggested 
that the parties ask the Oneida Tribal Judicial System to accept 
transfer of the case.  In response, the Oneida tribal court sent 
a letter, at the circuit court's suggestion, on April 29, 2009, 
stating that it would accept jurisdiction, but that it would 
prefer that the case be formally transferred under Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.54.  Seven Generations filed a motion to transfer pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 801.54 on August 9, 2010. 
¶11 At the hearing on the motion to transfer on August 31, 
2010, the circuit court granted Seven Generations' motion to 
transfer the case to the Oneida tribal court.  In ordering the 
transfer, the circuit court rejected Kroner's argument at the 
motion hearing that the first requirement of the transfer 
statute was not met because the tribal court did not have 
concurrent jurisdiction.  It can be inferred from the circuit 
court's response to Kroner's counsel at the hearing that the 
circuit court concluded that Kroner had essentially acquiesced 
to the tribe's jurisdiction:  "[T]he plaintiff chose to become 
employed by a wholly owned corporation of the Oneida Nation.  He 
fully knew that it was a corporation incorporated by the Oneida 
Nation." Mot. Hrg. Tr. 6, Aug. 31, 2010.  The circuit court's 
analysis focused on the documents relied on in support of 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
10 
 
Kroner's claims.  The circuit court concluded that based on the 
nature of Kroner's claims and the significance given to an 
employee manual created by the tribe, his claims would be better 
resolved by the tribe.  The circuit court also noted that the 
case was well developed and would be resolved more expeditiously 
in tribal court.  The court did not explicitly state and address 
all of the relevant factors in the statute, although it touched 
on some of those factors in its statements on the record.  The 
court made the following statements at the hearing explaining 
its conclusion that the tribal court was better equipped to 
resolve the case expeditiously, and made clear that the ruling 
was intended to give the plaintiff a forum where his claims 
would be adjudicated by those who knew the history and context 
of the governing documents: 
- "[B]ecause part of what the plaintiff was asserting 
was that there were tribal documents within the Oneida 
Nation that were material to his client's claim, it 
was the court's view on that argument partly that this 
matter should properly be heard by the Oneida Tribal 
Court assuming they would hear jurisdiction because 
they would be in a better position to interpret those 
documents, and hopefully the parties would be better 
able 
to 
determine 
what 
has 
been 
the 
past 
interpretation of those documents by the tribal court, 
and therefore make arguments to the tribal court with 
regard to consistency."  
- "[T]he plaintiff chose to become employed by a wholly 
owned corporation of the Oneida Nation. . . . [and] he 
invokes all the doctrines of the Oneida Nation as a 
basis upon which he would ask this court to find in 
his favor."   
- "I am well satisfied that the plaintiff himself by the 
manner in which he has pled this case and the issues 
that he has engaged provide this court with more than 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
11 
 
adequate basis to conclude that the proper forum is 
the Oneida Tribal Court because the plaintiff himself 
desires to have interpreted rights and rules and 
regulations of the Oneida Nation."   
- "I took time today to thoroughly go through the file 
and to refresh my memory with regard to the arguments 
that I've heard."  
- "[T]he critical issue that I emphasize on my record, 
and that is the arguments of the plaintiff and the 
pleadings of the plaintiff all require this court to 
interpret Oneida Nation rules, documents, legislation, 
tribal policies, all of those items."   
- "[The tribal court is] far better equipped to listen 
to and thoughtfully consider the arguments made by the 
plaintiff 
because 
it 
will 
affect 
not 
only 
the 
plaintiff but all members of the Oneida Nation and all 
the employees of the Oneida Nation and everything in 
the future."   
- "[Once the case is in the tribal court] there should 
be no obstacles or no – nothing put in the way of a 
resolution of this case whereas I'm satisfied if I 
were involved in this, I would be having to have – 
potentially invite testimony from various members of 
the tribal legislature and others about what the 
history of this was and who wrote it and what the 
whole idea of it was, and this is not the forum to do 
that."   
- 
"It simply needs to be submitted, and as I've 
said, as I understand the plaintiff's pleadings, 
 . . . they're based upon rights that the plaintiff 
says he has a result of rules and regulations and 
legislation of the Oneida Tribe."   
After Kroner brought a motion for reconsideration, which was 
denied, he appealed.   
¶12 The court of appeals affirmed.  The court of appeals 
discussed the appropriateness of the transfer under Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.54, 
first 
addressing 
the 
question 
of 
concurrent 
jurisdiction, recognizing that the circuit court did not 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
12 
 
explicitly and directly address the issue.  The court of appeals 
undertook its own analysis of the concurrent jurisdiction 
question and focused on the significance of two facts: that 
"Kroner consensually entered into employment with a tribal 
entity, on tribal lands" and that "Kroner himself asserts that 
relationship is governed by contract under the tribe's Blue 
Book." 
 
Kroner 
v. 
Oneida 
Seven 
Generations 
Corp., 
No. 
2010AP2533, unpublished slip op., ¶19 (Wis. Ct. App. June 1, 
2011).  Those facts were sufficient, it held, to satisfy the 
first Montana exception and to sustain the circuit court's 
finding of concurrent jurisdiction.  Id. (citing Montana v. 
U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981)).   
¶13 The court of appeals then addressed the circuit 
court's findings as to the statutory factors and held that the 
record developed was sufficient and that the circuit court did 
not err in ordering the transfer, even though the court of 
appeals acknowledged that "the circuit court ... did not discuss 
all of the statutory factors that it was required to consider."  
Id., ¶22.  It reasoned that the record showed that all the 
factors 
"were 
presented 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
for 
its 
consideration" and that the circuit court had stated on the day 
of the hearing, "I took the time today to thoroughly go through 
the file and to refresh my memory with regard to the arguments 
that I've heard."  Id., ¶¶22-23.  The court of appeals said that 
the circuit court had placed "primary emphasis" on one factor, 
id., ¶24; the court of appeals then reviewed the statutory 
factors that were not explicitly addressed by the circuit court 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
13 
 
and considered the remainder of the factors either neutral, 
irrelevant, or favored transfer.  It concluded that "the 
[circuit] court did consider all of the requisite factors and 
properly exercised its discretion." Id., ¶22.  It therefore 
affirmed.  Kroner petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted.  
C. 
The history of Wis. Stat. § 801.54 
¶14 This court adopted Wis. Stat. § 801.54,  pursuant to 
its rulemaking authority.6  The petition stated,  
The State-Tribal Justice Forum has received notice of 
a number of situations in which Tribal and State 
Courts are transferring cases in a discretionary 
manner as justice requires.  When considering the 
potential number of pro se litigants, especially in 
family matters, a user-friendly discretionary transfer 
mechanism is strongly supported by all of the State-
Tribal Justice Forum in an effort to provide guidance 
and to let judges know they have the discretion to do 
so when concurrent jurisdiction exists. 
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. §  751.12(1) states,  
The state supreme court shall, by rules promulgated by 
it from time to time, regulate pleading, practice, and 
procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts, for 
the purposes of simplifying the same and of promoting 
the 
speedy determination of litigation upon its 
merits. The rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or 
modify the substantive rights of any litigant. The 
effective dates for all rules adopted by the court 
shall be January 1 or July 1. A rule shall not become 
effective until 60 days after its adoption. . . .   
See also S. Ct. Order 07-11, 307 Wis. 2d at xviii ("creat[ing] a 
rule governing the discretionary transfer of cases to tribal 
court" and citing Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1)). 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
14 
 
The petition further noted that the Wisconsin Tribal Judges 
Association, the Committee of Chief Judges, the Wisconsin Joint 
Legislative 
Council's 
Special 
Committee 
on 
State-Tribal 
Relations, and the Wisconsin State Bar's Indian Law Section had 
reviewed the proposal.  The petition noted that this court had 
"addressed concurrent jurisdictional issues in civil cases in 
its Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians 
decisions."7  No. 07-11, In the matter of the petition to create 
a rule governing the discretionary transfer of cases to tribal 
court (filed July 24, 2008). 
¶15 The order adopting the rule gives a detailed history 
of process by which it was adopted.  The purpose of the rule was 
given in a comment that was published with the rule:  "The 
purpose of this rule is to enable circuit courts to transfer 
civil actions to tribal courts in Wisconsin as efficiently as 
possible where appropriate."  S. Ct. Order 07-11, 2008 WI 114, 
307 Wis. 2d xvii, xxii (issued July 31, 2008, eff. Jan. 1, 
2009).  The director of state courts petitioned this court on 
behalf of the State-Tribal Justice Forum, a joint committee 
consisting of circuit court judges, tribal judges, a tribal 
attorney, a legislative liaison, a district court administrator, 
                                                 
7 Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of 
Chippewa Indians (Teague II), 2000 WI 79, 236 Wis. 2d 384, 612 
N.W.2d 709) and Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe 
of Chippewa Indians (Teague III), 2003 WI 118, 265 Wis. 2d 64, 
665 N.W.2d 899.  The factors for determining when transfer is 
warranted are derived from a listing of factors set forth in the 
case that is known as Teague III.  Teague III, 265 Wis. 2d 64, 
¶71.    
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
15 
 
and the director of state courts.  Id. at xviii, n.2.  The clerk 
of the Supreme Court issued letters to 34 organizations and 
agencies requesting comment on the petition.  Id. at xviii.  The 
court heard from seven speakers, including representatives 
Wisconsin courts and tribal courts, at a public hearing held on 
January 8, 2008.  As the order notes, "No individual or 
representative of any group testified in opposition to the 
petition."  Id. at xix.  The court discussed the petition in 
open administrative conference on January 8, 2008, and on April 
15, 2008.  Between the two conferences, the clerk, at the 
direction of the court, requested that interested parties submit 
additional comment on issues that had arisen in the discussion, 
and further comments were received. Id. at xx.  On June 25, 
2008, the court voted to adopt the petition, as modified through 
the process in response to the comments and discussion.  Justice 
Roggensack dissented from the adoption of the petition and was 
joined by Justices Prosser and Ziegler.      
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶16 We now turn to the question of whether the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion when it transferred 
the case to the tribal court.  As stated above, "[A] 
discretionary determination must be the product of a rational 
mental process by which the facts of record and law relied upon 
are stated and are considered together for the purpose of 
achieving a reasoned and reasonable determination." King, 224 
Wis. 2d at 248.  We first clarify the proper two-step analysis a 
court must undertake when considering a motion to transfer 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
16 
 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.54.  Then, we address the 
exceptions to retroactive application of procedural statutes as 
discussed in Trinity Petroleum.  
A. 
Concurrent jurisdiction 
¶17 Where Wis. Stat. § 801.54 applies, the first question 
for the circuit court to address is whether there is concurrent 
jurisdiction.  Wisconsin Stat. § 801.54 (1) states, "In a civil 
action where a circuit court and a court or judicial system of a 
federally recognized American Indian tribe or band in Wisconsin 
("tribal 
court") 
have 
concurrent 
jurisdiction, 
this 
rule 
authorizes the circuit court, in its discretion, to transfer the 
action to the tribal court when transfer is warranted under the 
factors set forth in sub. (2)." (emphasis added).  The statute 
plainly charges the circuit court with the responsibility of 
"first mak[ing] the threshold determination that concurrent 
jurisdiction exists."  Wis. Stat. § 801.54(2).  
¶18 The first step of analysis required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.54 
is 
to 
determine 
whether 
there 
is 
concurrent 
jurisdiction because the statute authorizes transfer only where 
each court has jurisdiction.  "The extent to which tribes have 
civil adjudicative or regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers is 
a matter of federal common law."  Cohen's Handbook of Federal 
Indian Law 598 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005) (citing 
Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 
U.S. 845, 851-52 (1985)).  One commentator has provided the 
following summary of the Court's jurisprudence on the issue of 
tribal courts' subject matter jurisdiction thus: 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
17 
 
Unique to Indian law is a doctrine permitting a 
challenge to jurisdiction in tribal court based on the 
status of the parties before the tribal court. Even in 
a case in which the tribe clearly has personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant, the tribe may not 
have subject matter jurisdiction over a nonmember 
under a doctrine announced in Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Tribe 
[holding 
that tribal courts lack criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants] and developed 
in a series of cases narrowing tribal regulatory 
authority over non-Indians, especially Montana v. 
United States.  . . . Essentially this line of cases 
reverses the presumption in favor of tribal court 
authority 
over 
activities 
taking 
place 
within 
reservations involving nonmembers. . . . In Montana 
the court announced that the tribes could overcome the 
presumption against tribal authority in these cases in 
two circumstances, the now-famous Montana exceptions.  
Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of 
Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 Am. Indian L. Rev. 285, 326-27 
(1998). 
¶19 From those cases have come the following general 
principles to govern jurisdictional questions of this sort.  
First, the United States Supreme Court has established "the 
general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an 
Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of 
the tribe."  Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (addressing a tribe's 
power to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation 
land owned in fee by nonmembers).  Second, in that case, it 
noted two exceptions to that general rule, which have come to be 
known as "the Montana exceptions."  In a subsequent case, it 
briefly described the Montana exceptions in this way:  "The 
first exception relates to nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members; the second concerns 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
18 
 
activity that directly affects the tribe's political integrity, 
economic 
security, 
health, 
or 
welfare." 
 
Strate 
v. 
A-1 
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 446 (1997) (addressing the tribal 
court's jurisdiction over the tort claim of a widow of a tribal 
member against a nonmember arising from an accident on a public 
road on reservation land).  Third, the Court has noted the 
difference between regulating activities of nonmembers and 
adjudicating disputes involving nonmembers, and it stated that a 
tribe cannot adjudicate a case concerning an activity it could 
not 
regulate: 
 
"As 
to 
nonmembers, 
we 
hold, 
a 
tribe's 
adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative 
jurisdiction." Id. at 453.  That "limitation on jurisdiction" 
means that there cannot be adjudicative jurisdiction unless "the 
actions at issue in the litigation are regulable by the tribe."  
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367 n.8 (2001)(addressing a 
tribal court's jurisdiction over a tort claim arising from a 
game warden's execution of a search warrant on tribal land).  
Fourth, 
where 
a 
party 
seeks 
to 
establish 
tribal 
court 
adjudicative jurisdiction over a nonmember that it would not 
have under the general rule, it bears the burden of showing that 
at least one of the Montana exceptions applies.  Plains Commerce 
Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 330 (2008) 
(citing Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 654 
(2001)).   
¶20 In this case, the parties dispute whether the first 
Montana exception applies to Kroner and thus subjects him to the 
tribal court's jurisdiction.  Stated simply, under the first 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
19 
 
Montana exception, the questions central to the concurrent 
jurisdiction analysis are whether the nonmember involved entered 
a "consensual relationship[] with the tribe or its members,"8 and 
whether "the actions at issue in the litigation are regulable by 
the tribe."  As a federal court of appeals stated in a case 
applying Montana, "The starting point for the jurisdictional 
analysis is to examine the specific conduct the Tribe's legal 
claims 
would 
seek 
to 
regulate." 
 
Attorney's 
Process 
& 
Investigation Services, Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe, 609 F.3d 927, 
936 (8th Cir. 2010).   
B. 
Whether transfer to a tribal court is warranted 
                                                 
8 Personal jurisdiction, as distinct from subject matter 
jurisdiction, is determined using the due process-based "minimum 
contacts" 
test 
set 
forth 
in 
International 
Shoe 
Co. 
v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).  This due process 
limitation applies to tribal courts: 
In addition to the Montana line of cases limiting the 
legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction of Indian 
nations, the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) imposes a 
statutory version of the due process clause on tribal 
courts.  . . . The basic requirement is that a court 
may not make a binding judgment against an individual 
with whom the forum has 'no contacts, ties, or 
relations.' 
 . . . It 
is 
conceivable, 
although 
unlikely, that a tribal court could have subject 
matter jurisdiction over a case but lack personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.   
Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 604-605 (Nell Jessup 
Newton et al. eds., 2005) (citing possible cases under the 
second Montana exception where a party would lack the necessary 
minimum contacts).  In this case, the claimed jurisdiction is 
based on the first Montana exception, involving a consensual 
relationship.   
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
20 
 
¶21 If 
the 
circuit 
court 
finds 
that 
concurrent 
jurisdiction exists, and if there is no stipulation by all 
parties to a transfer of the case, the next step in the analysis 
is to determine whether transfer is warranted, considering  "all 
the relevant factors" including those set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.54.  The statute lists the following factors: 
(a) 
Whether 
issues 
in 
the 
action 
require 
interpretation of the tribe's laws, including the 
tribe's constitution, statutes, bylaws, ordinances, 
resolutions, or case law. 
(b) 
Whether 
the 
action 
involves 
traditional 
or 
cultural matters of the tribe. 
(c) Whether the action is one in which the tribe is a 
party, or whether tribal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or 
territory is an issue in the action. 
(d) The tribal membership status of the parties. 
(e) Where the claim arises. 
(f) Whether the parties have by contract chosen a 
forum or the law to be applied in the event of a 
dispute. 
(g) The timing of any motion to transfer, taking into 
account the parties' and court's expenditure of time 
and resources, and compliance with any applicable 
provisions of the circuit court's scheduling orders. 
(h) The court in which the action can be decided most 
expeditiously. 
(i) The institutional and administrative interests of 
each court. 
(j) The relative burdens on the parties, including 
cost, access to and admissibility of evidence, and 
matters of process, practice, and procedure, including 
where the action will be heard and decided most 
promptly. 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
21 
 
(k) Any other factors having substantial bearing upon 
the selection of a convenient, reasonable and fair 
place of trial. 
The retroactivity issue itself could be such a factor in 
determining whether transferring this case to the tribal court 
would result in the selection of such a place of trial. 
¶22 The published statute is followed by a comment.  The 
Comment includes the statement, "In considering the factors 
under sub. (2), the circuit court shall give particular weight 
to the constitutional rights of the litigants and their rights 
to assert all available claims and defenses." Supreme Court 
Note, 2008, Wis. Stat. § 801.54.  The comment was not adopted 
but "may be consulted for guidance in interpreting and applying 
the statute."  Id. 
¶23 Circuit courts are well practiced in applying multi-
factor tests and balancing tests to reach legal conclusions in 
the exercise of their discretion.  Such tests are common in 
widely divergent areas of law as family law, criminal law, and 
trademark law. See, e.g., State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶33, 327 
Wis. 2d 392, 768 N.W.2d 430 (six-factor test to determine 
voluntariness of consent to a warrantless search); Zellner v. 
Cedarburg Sch. Dist., 2007 WI 53, ¶28, 300 Wis. 2d 290, 731 
N.W.2d 240 (four-factor "fair use" exception to copyright 
infringement), and Wis. Stat. § 767.61 (3) (twelve-factor test 
for alterations to property division at divorce). 
¶24 Even in a discretionary decision that may be based on 
multiple factors, however, we have said that "the record must at 
least reflect the court's consideration of all applicable 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
22 
 
statutory factors before a reviewing court can conclude that the 
proper legal standard has been applied . . . ."  LeMere, 262 
Wis. 2d 426, ¶25.  Where such a test is required, a court 
"applie[s] an incomplete, and thus incorrect, standard of law" 
if it considers only one required factor and "neglect[] to 
address any of the other statutory factors." Id. at ¶22.  
Failure to apply "the proper statutory rigor" constitutes error.  
Id. at ¶25.  When considering statutory factors, however, a 
court is not "precluded from giving one statutory factor greater 
weight than another, or from concluding that some factors may 
not be applicable at all."  Id.  "[T]he circuit court may 
summarily conclude that certain of the statutory factors are 
irrelevant." Id. at ¶26.  Similar principles apply to another 
common multi-factor discretionary determination, the sentencing 
decision:   
[A]n abuse of discretion [by a sentencing court] might 
be found 
under the following circumstances: (1) 
Failure to state on the record the relevant and 
material 
factors 
which 
influenced 
the 
court's 
decision; (2) reliance upon factors which are totally 
irrelevant or immaterial to the type of decision to be 
made; and (3) too much weight given to one factor on 
the face of other contravening considerations. 
Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 179, 187, 233 N.W.2d 457, 462 
(1975).  "[S]entencing decisions of the circuit court are 
generally afforded a strong presumption of reasonability because 
the circuit court is best suited to consider the relevant 
factors and demeanor of the convicted defendant."  State v. 
Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197 (emphasis 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
23 
 
added) (internal citations omitted).  It is appropriate to 
indicate on the record that all the § 801.54 factors have been 
considered, and specifically to note on the record the relevant 
factors and the importance each is given.  This approach assists 
the appellate court in its review of the circuit court's 
exercise of discretion, and is consistent with the cases 
discussed herein.    
C. Retroactive application of the tribal transfer statute 
¶25 The above two-step analysis is prescribed by the 
statute in all cases involving such transfer requests, but in 
this particular case, there is an additional issue that requires 
separate consideration.   
¶26 In granting the petition for review for this case, 
this court ordered that the parties address whether the facts 
that "the case was pending in Brown County Circuit Court for 
nearly two years, and was pending at the time Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.54 became effective, have any bearing on the applicability 
of § 801.54."  Kroner has now argued that Wis. Stat. § 801.54 is 
not the applicable framework under which to analyze this case 
because it was not in effect at the time his claim was filed and 
does not apply retroactively.9  Of course, the effective date 
does not control the determination of whether a rule applies to 
a case.  As we have stated, "The establishment of effective 
                                                 
9 As noted previously, Wis. Stat. § 801.54 became effective 
on January 1, 2009.  S. Ct. Order 07-11, 307 Wis. 2d at xxi.  
Kroner had filed his claim in circuit court in this case in the 
fall of 2008.  The motion to transfer was granted on September 
9, 2010. 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
24 
 
dates 
does 
not 
determine 
whether 
a 
statute 
will 
apply 
retroactively.  All statutes have effective dates."  Trinity 
Petroleum, 302 Wis. 2d 299, ¶38 (quoting Salzman v. DNR, 168 
Wis. 2d 523, 530, 484 N.W.2d 337 (Ct. App. 1992)).  This case, 
like Trinity Petroleum and Mosing v. Hagen,10 the case the 
Trinity Petroleum court relied on, concerns a statute adopted by 
this court pursuant to its rulemaking authority under Wis. Stat. 
§ 751.12 (authorizing this court to promulgate rules that 
"regulate 
pleading, 
practice, 
and 
procedure 
in 
judicial 
proceedings in all courts, for the purposes of simplifying the 
same and of promoting the speedy determination of litigation 
upon its merits").  The question is then whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.54 is retroactively applicable to a case such as this, 
where the case was filed before the rule took effect but where 
the circuit court ruled on a transfer motion brought after the 
rule took effect.  Trinity Petroleum sets forth the governing 
rule.  It makes clear that even for procedural (and therefore 
presumed retroactive) rules, there are still exceptions where 
"the new rule diminishes a contract, disturbs vested rights, or 
imposes an unreasonable burden on the party charged with 
complying with the new rule."  Id.  As we stated in that case, 
citing precedent,  
                                                 
10 Mosing v. Hagen, 33 Wis. 2d 636, 148 N.W.2d 93 (1967) 
(holding that a new procedural statute should be applied 
retroactively because it did not impose an unreasonable burden 
on the party charged with complying with the procedural 
requirements and it did not disturb a vested right). 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
25 
 
This 
court's 
analysis 
in 
Mosing 
v. 
Hagen 
is 
particularly instructive in teaching that retroactive 
application of procedural rules is not absolute. 
Mosing held that a statute (that was adopted by the 
court through its rulemaking authority pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 751.12) applied retroactively unless it 
affected a vested or contractual right or imposed an 
unreasonable burden upon the party attempting to 
comply with the procedural requirements. 
Trinity Petroleum, 302 Wis. 2d 299, ¶54 (citations omitted). 
¶27 There is little evidence on this record that would be 
relevant to this determination.  An analysis regarding the 
rule's effect on any "vested or contractual right" or its 
imposition of any "unreasonable burden" is needed.  Because 
there are facts that may be relevant to this determination, we 
remand for the development of the facts and the arguments on 
this issue and a determination by the circuit court as to the 
retroactive applicability of the statute.    
D.  Application of the principles in this case 
¶28 The circuit court's ruling in this case did not set 
forth the facts and the law to support a conclusion that 
concurrent jurisdiction exists in this case.  Rather, the court 
appeared to presume that concurrent jurisdiction existed when it 
stated,  
. . . [T]here has been afoot in this country the 
acknowledgement that tribal courts serve a sovereign 
and I serve a sovereign, and if those two sovereigns 
have an amicable relationship that they can between 
the two of them work out cases that are more 
appropriately heard in one court versus the other 
court . . .[,] I believe it requires an analysis as to 
which of those two forums is better addressed – is 
better equipped to address the issues. 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
26 
 
The circuit court's reasoning focused then on that analysis.  
However, what is required here is an explicit determination of 
whether concurrent jurisdiction exists on the facts of this case 
and the applicable case law. 
¶29 The second question for the circuit court to address 
is whether, where Wis. Stat. § 801.54 applies and concurrent 
jurisdiction exists, the factors set forth in the statute favor 
transfer to the tribal court.  As the court of appeals noted, it 
is not disputed that there were relevant factors not considered 
by the circuit court in this case.  (It stated, for example, 
"The court did not address factor (b), regarding whether the 
action 
involved 
tribal 
cultural 
matters." 
 
Kroner, 
No. 
2010AP2533, unpublished slip op., ¶25 (Wis. Ct. App. June 1, 
2011).  And it supplied its own analysis of factors (c), (d), 
(e), (f), (g), (j), and (k), which the circuit court had not 
explicitly considered on the record.  Id. at ¶¶26-31.)    
¶30 Circuit 
courts 
have 
wide 
discretion, 
and 
their 
discretionary rulings will not be lightly disturbed. However, 
this record does not show that the "facts of record and law 
relied upon are stated and are considered together" in reaching 
the conclusion that the transfer to tribal court was warranted.  
Nor was there application of the principles of Plains Commerce 
Bank or Montana to the facts of record to determine whether 
concurrent jurisdiction, a requisite condition, existed prior to 
applying the statute.  It is true that facts of record that 
related to some of the factors from Wis. Stat. § 801.54 were 
cited by the circuit court, which was focused on the evidence on 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
27 
 
which Kroner was basing his claims.  The circuit court centered 
its analysis of the motion to transfer on the premise that the 
tribal court was in the best position to rule on a case where 
much of the evidence offered to support the contract claims 
would be tribal materials.  However, many statutory factors 
relevant to a transfer decision were not addressed, such as "the 
timing" of the motion and "matters of process, practice, and 
procedure." 
¶31 It is of great assistance for a reviewing court for a 
circuit court to acknowledge on the record that all the factors 
have been considered, and specifically note on the record the 
relevant factors and the importance each is given in making the 
determination whether to transfer. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
¶32 Where a court has not clearly discussed on the record 
the basis for a finding of concurrent jurisdiction and also the 
statutory factors it is required to consider, the record can not 
be deemed adequate to support a decision to affirm.  Because the 
facts and the applicable law were not fully stated and 
considered together in making both the determinations that the 
statute requires, the order to transfer was an erroneous 
exercise of the circuit court's discretion.  We therefore 
reverse the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court for 
reconsideration in light of this opinion.  A court that is 
considering transferring a case to a tribal court under the 
tribal transfer statute must conduct a two-part analysis.  It 
must make a clear record of its findings and conclusions 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
28 
 
regarding concurrent jurisdiction, as well as an analysis of all 
of the rule's relevant factors on the facts presented.   
¶33 In this case, the court must also make a record of its 
reasoning and conclusion concerning the separate question of the 
applicability of Wis. Stat. § 801.54 to this case.  That 
requires applying the principles set forth in Trinity Petroleum.  
This court held that the general rule concerning retroactive 
applicability of procedural rules adopted by the court had 
certain exceptions. The parties here were ordered by this court 
to address that question when the petition for review was 
granted, in light of the fact that the case was pending at the 
time Wis. Stat. § 801.54 became effective.  Trinity Petroleum 
states that the ordinary rule of retroactivity for procedural 
statutes such as Wis. Stat. § 801.54 does not apply if the rule 
in question "diminishes a contract, disturbs vested rights, or 
imposes an unreasonable burden on the party charged with 
complying with the new rule's requirements." Trinity Petroleum, 
302 Wis. 2d 299, ¶38.  Because there may be additional facts to 
be developed before the circuit court that would be relevant to 
determining if the exception to retroactivity applies, the 
parties and the court should address that issue on remand.    
¶34 Upon remand the circuit court may reach the same 
conclusion concerning transfer, but only after a thorough 
process has been followed by the circuit court.  A reviewing 
court will then be in a better position to evaluate any appeal 
arising from a transfer, because the record before it will 
necessarily 
contain 
an 
explicit 
determination 
concerning 
No. 
2010AP2533   
 
29 
 
concurrent jurisdiction, analysis of all relevant factors, and 
the circuit court's holding on retroactive application.   
¶35 Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY join this opinion.  
By the Court.—Reversed and remanded.   
 
 
No.  2010AP2533.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶36 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  Four years ago, 
the court adopted a rule authorizing Wisconsin courts to 
transfer civil cases to tribal courts.  Wis. Stat. § 801.54.  
The rule was controversial because it applied to parties who did 
not consent to the transfers and parties who were not members of 
the respective tribes.   
¶37 The history of the rule is summarized in Rule 07-11, 
In the matter of the petition to create a rule governing the 
discretionary transfer of cases to tribal court.  That history 
discloses some of the court's concerns about substantive legal 
questions involved in transfers such as: 
1. 
Under what circumstances is jurisdiction 
concurrent 
between 
tribal 
and 
state 
courts 
or 
exclusive in tribal or state court? 
2. 
Is there a right under the United States or 
Wisconsin constitution to have a case heard in state 
court rather than tribal court? 
3. 
How 
does the proposed rule impact the 
application of Wis. Stat. § 806.245 (full faith and 
credit)? 
But there were many more. 
I 
¶38 The rule was adopted on June 25, 2008, the same day 
the United States Supreme Court decided Plains Commerce Bank v. 
Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008).  The Court 
voted to adopt the rule without fully absorbing the import of 
the Plains Commerce Bank decision.  The vote was 4-3.  When the 
court's order was filed on July 31, 2008, it contained a 16-page 
dissent written by Justice Roggensack, joined by two other 
justices. 
No.  2010AP2533.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶39 Justice Roggensack's dissent to the rule raised 
several legal issues that were not answered by the majority in 
writing because of the timing and limits of the rulemaking 
process.  Some of these issues have surfaced in the present case 
but were not briefed. 
¶40 One of the issues that was not discussed in 2008 was 
the retroactive application of the rule.  The proponents of the 
rule did not seek application of the rule to cases filed before 
the rule took effect, and no member of the court advocated that 
the rule apply to cases filed before the rule took effect. 
¶41 The court decided that the effective date of the rule 
would be January 1, 2009.  Although court rules take effect on 
either July 1 or January 1, the court welcomed this six-month 
delay so that there could be time to draft a lengthy order, 
permit the writing of a dissent, and give interested parties the 
opportunity to prepare for the unprecedented new rule.  There 
was no discussion that the rule could be applied to cases that 
had been pending in Wisconsin courts for months or years, the 
moment the new rule took effect. 
II 
¶42 In the present case, John Kroner was terminated on May 
7, 2008.  He filed suit in Brown County Circuit Court on 
September 10, 2008.  Oneida Seven Generations Corporation (OSGC) 
responded on October 1, 2008, with a motion to dismiss. 
¶43 Although there was some discussion of transfer during 
subsequent proceedings, there was no motion by OSGC to transfer 
the case to tribal court until July 9, 2010. 
No.  2010AP2533.dtp 
 
3 
 
¶44 The circuit court did not order the case transferred 
to the Oneida Tribal Judicial System until August 31, 2010, ten 
days short of two years after the case was filed in Brown County 
Circuit Court. 
¶45 In my view, the court intended Wis. Stat. § 801.54 to 
apply prospectively to cases filed on or after January 1, 2009.  
Prospective application is simple and straightforward, and it 
avoids——at least for this case——extensive consideration of 
whether Wis. Stat. § 801.54 may fairly be characterized as a 
procedural rule; whether its retroactive application would 
disturb vested rights or impose an unreasonable burden on a 
litigant; whether the adoption of Wis. Stat. § 801.54 goes 
beyond pleading, practice, and procedure or abridges, enlarges, 
or modifies the substantive rights of any litigant; and whether 
the 
rule 
passes 
constitutional 
muster 
for 
all 
potential 
litigants, and for litigant Kroner in the manner applied. 
¶46 It appears that this court is confronted with a choice 
between invalidating all or part of the rule or determining that 
retroactive application of a rule authorizing discretionary 
transfer to a tribal court over the opposition of a non-tribal 
member, does not "abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive 
rights of any litigant."  Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1).   
¶47 This is not an easy choice.   
¶48 Although I voted against the adoption of Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.54 in 2008, I freely acknowledge that it appears to be 
working well and without difficulty in most cases.  It is the 
uncommon cases in which a litigant files suit in circuit court, 
No.  2010AP2533.dtp 
 
4 
 
because he or she prefers not to be in tribal court, that create 
controversy and produce substantive problems. 
¶49 Applying the rule prospectively would be fair to the 
litigants and would avoid the kind of decision that will 
undermine progress in state-tribal relations. 
III 
 
¶50 The rule approved by the court contains certain 
specific qualifications and limitations. 
 
¶51 First, "the rule does not apply to any action in which 
controlling law grants exclusive jurisdiction to either the 
circuit court or the tribal court."  Wis. Stat. § 801.54(1). 
¶52 Second, a circuit court may not transfer a case to 
tribal court under the rule unless the tribal court "has 
concurrent jurisdiction of the matter in controversy."  Wis. 
Stat. § 801.54(2).   
¶53 Third, the rule is not intended to "alter, diminish, 
or expand" "the rights" of parties under state or federal law.  
Wis. Stat. § 801.54(6).   
¶54 Fourth, the rule is followed by a Comment.  The 
Comment was not adopted by the court but it "may be consulted 
for guidance in interpreting and applying" the rule.  Sup. Ct. 
Order 07-11, 2008 WI 114, 307 Wis. 2d xvii (issued July 31, 
2008, eff. Jan. 1, 2009).  The Comment reads: 
 
Comment, 2008.  The purpose of this rule is to 
enable circuit courts to transfer civil actions to 
tribal courts in Wisconsin as efficiently as possible 
where appropriate.  In considering the factors under 
sub. (2), the circuit court shall give particular 
weight to the constitutional rights of the litigants 
No.  2010AP2533.dtp 
 
5 
 
and their rights to assert all available claims and 
defenses.   
(Emphasis added.) 
¶55 These qualifications and limitations reveal several 
serious problems with the rule.  For example, "the circuit court 
may, on its own motion . . . cause such action to be transferred 
to the tribal court."  Wis. Stat. § 801.54(2).  This means that 
the circuit court may itself initiate the transfer process, 
without a request from any party, and before receiving evidence 
or 
legal 
argument 
on 
such 
vital 
issues 
as 
exclusive 
jurisdiction, concurrent jurisdiction, the "rights" of the 
litigants, 
and 
all 
the 
factors 
set 
out 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.54(2).   
¶56 It is one thing for a circuit court to decide 
impartially a party's motion to transfer the case.  It is quite 
another thing for a court to decide multiple issues leading to a 
transfer, over the opposition of one of the parties, when the 
court is acting on its own motion. 
¶57 The party seeking to transfer a case from circuit 
court to tribal court has the burden of proof on concurrent 
jurisdiction and other key issues.  The rule does not seem to 
appreciate how a litigant opposed to the transfer will react 
when the decision on key issues is made by the same judge who 
initiated the transfer. 
¶58 It should be noted that cases filed in circuit court 
can be transferred to "a forum outside this state," Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.63, or removed to a United States District Court, 28 
U.S.C. § 1441 (Removal of civil actions).  In neither instance, 
No.  2010AP2533.dtp 
 
6 
 
however, does the circuit court initiate the transfer.  The 
judge in these situations retains his or her neutrality. 
¶59 In my view, the judge-initiation provision of the rule 
should be eliminated. 
¶60 Another 
concern 
flows 
from 
the 
emphasis 
on 
a 
litigant's "rights" in Wis. Stat. § 801.54(6), in the rule's 
Comment, and in Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1).  Section (2) of the rule 
fails to enumerate, in factors (a)-(k), any required discussion 
of a litigant's "rights" as a relevant factor.  The failure to 
enumerate this factor means that it could be overlooked or 
minimized in the circuit court's decision.  This would not be 
acceptable.   
¶61 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.63(1) asks the circuit court to 
find that transfer to a foreign forum "should" be effected "as a 
matter of substantial justice."  That consideration is lacking 
in this rule. 
¶62 The factors in § 801.54(2)(a)-(k) are largely derived 
from Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa 
Indians, 2003 WI 118, ¶71, 265 Wis. 2d 64, 665 N.W.2d 899, in 
the opinion authored by Chief Justice Abrahamson. 
¶63 Chief 
Justice 
Abrahamson's 
opinion 
explains 
the 
factors as follows: 
[C]ourts and scholars have developed a number of 
factors to help state and tribal courts determine, in 
the spirit of cooperation, not competition, which of 
two courts should proceed to judgment and which court 
should abstain and cede its jurisdiction. . . .  [T]he 
weight to be given each factor will vary from case to 
case. [14] 
No.  2010AP2533.dtp 
 
7 
 
 
[14] I have compiled these factors from a number 
of 
sources 
discussing 
comity, 
allocation 
of 
jurisdiction, and enforcement of judgments.  See, 
e.g., [Raymond L. Niblock & William C. Plouffe, 
Federal Courts, Tribal Courts, and Comity: Developing 
Tribal Judiciaries and Forum Selection, 19 U. Ark. 
Little Rock L. Rev. 219, 237-39 (1997)]; Tribal/State 
Protocol for the Judicial Allocation of Jurisdiction 
Between the Four Chippewa Tribes of Northern Wisconsin 
and the Tenth Judicial District of Wisconsin (2001). 
¶64 These factors are heavily influenced by considerations 
of comity.  But this case and others like it should not be 
viewed as comity cases where there is no competing case pending 
in tribal court.  This case and others like it should focus on 
the substantive rights of the litigants. 
¶65 Assuming without deciding that the Oneida Tribal 
Judicial System has concurrent jurisdiction in this case, the 
Brown County Circuit Court is not obligated to transfer the case 
to tribal court.  Focusing on factors like the "court's 
expenditure of time and resources," § 801.54(2)(g), "[t]he court 
in which the action can be decided most expeditiously," 
§ 801.54(2)(h), 
and 
especially 
"[t]he 
institutional 
and 
administrative interests of each court," § 801.54(2)(i), diverts 
attention from the interests of the litigants which should be 
paramount. 
¶66 It must be remembered that one of the parties in this 
case chose to file suit in Brown County Circuit Court and paid a 
filing fee to accomplish this objective.  Transfer deprives the 
party of that forum. 
¶67 Finally, under the rule, the party whose case is 
involuntarily transferred to tribal court must appeal the 
transfer decision to the court of appeals——and appeal on the 
No.  2010AP2533.dtp 
 
8 
 
issue of transfer.  Wis. Stat. § 801.54(4).  This will increase 
the party's costs because the merits of the case will not yet 
have been decided.  Immediate appeal is necessary because once 
the case goes to tribal court, the party loses the ability to 
appeal the tribal court's substantive decision to a Wisconsin 
court.  This may be uncorrectable in the rule, but it 
underscores the significance of a transfer.   
¶68 In sum, there is room for significant improvement in 
the transfer rule. 
¶69 This is not the case to decide all the serious issues 
implicated in the existing rule.  This is the case to determine 
that the rule should be applied prospectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶70 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   This is 
the first case to come before us based on a nonconsensual 
transfer of a nontribal member's lawsuit to tribal court 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.54.  We are asked to evaluate 
whether the transfer to tribal court was lawful.  I do not join 
the lead opinion of Justice N. Patrick Crooks, but rather 
conclude that the transfer to Oneida Tribal Court was not lawful 
because:  (1) § 801.54 was retrospectively applied in violation 
of John N. Kroner's vested substantive, constitutional rights, 
including, but not limited to, his right of access to Wisconsin 
courts granted by Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution; and (2) the supreme court's promulgation of 
§ 801.54, pursuant to the legislative delegation of rule-making 
authority in Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1), required the circuit court 
to make a threshold determination that the application of 
§ 801.54 would not abridge, enlarge or modify substantive rights 
of litigants.  Because our rule was not explicit on this point, 
the circuit court did not have reason to believe it must 
undertake this threshold determination; therefore, it was not 
accomplished.  Accordingly, given the additional opinions filed 
in this case today, the court of appeals is reversed, Oneida 
Seven Generations' motion to transfer to tribal court is denied, 
and the cause is remanded to the circuit court to proceed on the 
merits of the pending lawsuit.1   
                                                 
1 Although our rationales differ, four justices——Justices 
Prosser, Roggensack, Ziegler, and Gableman——do not, upon remand, 
permit transfer of this case to the Oneida Tribal Court, but 
require the circuit court to proceed on the merits of the 
pending lawsuit.   
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
2 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶71 John 
Kroner 
was 
employed 
by 
the 
Oneida 
Seven 
Generations Corporation, which is a real estate development and 
holding company solely owned by the Oneida Nation.  During the 
course of his employment, Kroner served as the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) for Seven Generations, both on and off the Oneida 
Nation's reservation.   
¶72 Kroner's 
employment 
was 
terminated 
by 
Seven 
Generations on May 7, 2008.  On September 10, 2008, Kroner sued 
Seven Generations in Brown County Circuit Court, claiming breach 
of his employment contract and wrongful discharge, in violation 
of public policy.   
¶73 The 
Oneida 
Nation 
utilizes 
two 
documents 
for 
employment-related concerns for tribal members:  the "Blue Book" 
and the "By-laws."  However, Kroner does not claim that either 
the Blue Book or the By-laws provides a basis for his claims 
because he is not a tribal member and he worked for Seven 
Generations, rather than the Oneida Nation.  Kroner asserts that 
the two Oneida Nation documents are relevant solely as evidence 
that, as the CEO of Seven Generations, he had the expectation 
that he would be terminated only for cause, as would tribal 
members, rather than being an employee-at-will.   
¶74 Seven Generations counters that its "Guidelines" set 
the terms and conditions of employment for their employees and 
that under the Guidelines, Kroner was an employee-at-will.   
¶75 On April 29, 2009, Oneida Tribal Judge Winnifred L. 
Thomas wrote the Brown County Circuit Court, saying that the 
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
3 
 
tribal court would accept jurisdiction of the pending case, if 
the case was transferred subsequent to the effective date of 
Wis. Stat. § 801.54.2  On July 8, 2010, almost two years after 
Kroner commenced the action in Brown County Circuit Court, Seven 
Generations moved to transfer the action to Oneida Tribal Court.   
¶76 Kroner objected to Seven Generation's motion to 
transfer, 
claiming 
that 
the 
tribal 
court 
did 
not 
have 
jurisdiction over this case.  However, on August 31, 2010, the 
circuit court ordered the transfer of Kroner's lawsuit to the 
Oneida Tribal Court.   
¶77 Kroner appealed the transfer; the court of appeals 
affirmed, and we granted review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶78 Statutory interpretation is a question of law for our 
independent review; however, we benefit from the discussions of 
the court of appeals and the circuit court.  Richards v. Badger 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶14, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581.   
¶79 Whether a statute is procedural or has substantive 
components is a question of law that we independently review, 
see Matthies v. Positive Safety Mfg. Co., 2001 WI 82, ¶¶15, 21, 
244 Wis. 2d 720, 628 N.W.2d 842, as is the question of whether a 
statute is to be applied retrospectively or prospectively, 
                                                 
2 The effective date of Wis. Stat. § 801.54 has been 
inconsistently stated as July 31, 2008, 307 Wis. 2d xvii, and 
January 1, 2009, 307 Wis. 2d xxi.  Given the date of the court's 
order, the January 1, 2009, date is correct. 
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
4 
 
Snopek v. Lakeland Med. Ctr., 223 Wis. 2d 288, 293, 588 N.W.2d 
19 (1999).   
¶80 Additionally, whether the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.54 affects a party's right of access to Wisconsin courts 
under Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution, and 
whether § 801.54 affects other substantive rights guaranteed by 
the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution 
are also legal questions for our independent review.  See Wiener 
v. J.C. Penney Co., 65 Wis. 2d 139, 150, 222 N.W.2d 149 (1974). 
B.  Retrospective Versus Prospective Application 
¶81 Whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.54 
should 
be 
applied 
retrospectively to claims that accrued prior to the effective 
date of § 801.54 remains a foundational question that was not 
addressed by the circuit court.  As a general rule, statutes are 
presumed to operate prospectively.  See Schulz v. Ystad, 155 
Wis. 2d 574, 597, 456 N.W.2d 312 (1990).  On the other hand, if 
a statute provides specific direction that it is to be applied 
to all claims, without regard to when the claim accrued, 
generally, we would apply it retrospectively.  See id. at 597-
98.   
¶82 When 
we 
consider 
whether 
to 
apply 
a 
statute 
retrospectively or prospectively, we also examine whether the 
statute is procedural or substantive.  See id. at 597.    
¶83 Procedural 
statutes 
address 
methods 
of 
enforcing 
rights or obligations.  Id.  If a statute is purely procedural 
or remedial in nature, we generally apply it to conduct that 
occurred before the effective date of the statute.  See Snopek, 
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
5 
 
223 Wis. 2d at 294.  However, this rule of retrospective 
application applies only if retrospective application would not 
impair or disturb vested rights.  See Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. 
Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, ¶40 n.24, 302 Wis. 2d 299, 735 N.W.2d 
1 (citing Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 17, 308 N.W.2d 403 
(1981)).   
¶84 In 
contrast 
to 
procedural 
statutes, 
substantive 
statutes are presumed to apply prospectively.  See Snopek, 223 
Wis. 2d at 294.  Substantive statutes create, define or regulate 
rights or obligations.  Betthauser v. Med. Protective Co., 172 
Wis. 2d 141, 147-48, 493 N.W.2d 40 (1992).  
¶85 Some statutes that may appear to be procedural have 
substantive components.  For example, in Schulz, we examined 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m) (1989-90),3 which addressed whether child 
support orders may be modified.  The custodial parents argued 
that § 767.32(1m) should be applied retrospectively because the 
statute was remedial or procedural, rather than substantive in 
nature.  Schulz, 155 Wis. 2d at 597.  They contended it was 
procedural and remedial because § 767.32(1m) prescribed the 
method that a circuit court was to employ when revising an order 
or judgment for child support.  Id.   
¶86 However, after a careful analysis of the effect of 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m), we concluded it was a substantive law, 
not subject to retrospective application.  Id. at 597-98.  We so 
concluded because, prior to the enactment of § 767.32(1m), "a 
                                                 
3 All further references to Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m) are to 
the 1989-90 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
6 
 
child support obligor had a long-standing and well-established 
right to petition a Wisconsin court for retroactive modification 
of the amount of child support due under an order or judgment 
for support," which the court in its discretion could grant.  
Id. at 598.  However, because § 767.32(1m) "eliminated a child 
support obligor's right to petition for retroactive modification 
of support and thereby redefined his or her obligation with 
respect to accumulated support arrearages," we concluded that 
§ 767.32(1m) was a substantive law.  Id.   
¶87 Kroner commenced this lawsuit in Brown County Circuit 
Court before the effective date of Wis. Stat. § 801.54; 
accordingly, Kroner's claim necessarily accrued prior to the 
effective date of § 801.54.  Furthermore, Kroner's lawsuit was 
pending almost two years before Seven Generations moved to 
transfer the action to Oneida Tribal Court.   
¶88 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.54 is silent in regard to 
whether courts should apply the statute retrospectively or 
prospectively.  However, litigants who come within the statutory 
provisions for subject matter jurisdiction for contract disputes 
have a statutory right to avail themselves of the Wisconsin 
court system.  See Wis. Stat. § 801.05(5)(a) and (b); see also 
§ 801.05(1)(d) (recognizing general jurisdiction over defendants 
"engaged in substantial and not isolated activities within this 
state").   
¶89 In addition, it has long been held that Article I, 
Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides a right of 
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
7 
 
access to Wisconsin courts.4  See New York Life Ins. Co. v. 
State, 192 Wis. 404, 412, 211 N.W. 288 (1927) (concluding that 
Article I, Section 9 "guarantee[s] to every suitor his day in a 
[Wisconsin] court of competent jurisdiction to which he may 
present his claim for judicial relief and in which he may either 
win a victory or suffer a defeat according to the strength or 
weakness of the case which he presents"); see also Penterman v. 
Wis. Elec. Power Co., 211 Wis. 2d 458, 474, 565 N.W.2d 521 
(1997) ("The right of access to the courts is secured by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendment[s].  It entitles the individual 
to a fair opportunity to present his or her claim.").   
¶90 Article I, Section 9 does not grant litigants the 
exact remedy they desire, but rather it guarantees access to 
Wisconsin courts to proceed on rights and remedies created by 
constitution, statute or common law.  See Doering v. WEA Ins. 
Group, 193 Wis. 2d 118, 130-31, 532 N.W.2d 432 (1995).  This 
constitutional 
right 
of 
access 
to 
Wisconsin 
courts 
is 
substantive in nature.  See Thomas v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, ¶122 
n.36, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 N.W.2d 523.  However, the manner in 
which it is exercised may be affected by statutes that have both 
procedural and substantive components.   
                                                 
4 Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  "Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the 
laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his 
person, property, or character; he ought to obtain justice 
freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and 
without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the 
laws." 
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
8 
 
¶91 It 
is 
not 
uncommon 
for 
statutes 
to 
have 
both 
procedural and substantive components.  For example, in Finnegan 
v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2003 WI 98, ¶31, 263 Wis. 2d 574, 
666 N.W.2d 797, we explained that Wis. Stat. § 893.55 had both 
procedural and substantive components in regard to limitations 
of medical malpractice actions.  A similar circumstance was 
addressed in our decision in Schulz, as explained above.   
¶92 In Wisconsin courts, civil litigants who bring an 
action at law have the right to a jury trial, according to 
Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution, if that 
right existed at common law at the time of the adoption of the 
constitution.  Village Food & Liquor Mart v. H&S Petroleum, 
Inc., 2002 WI 92, ¶12, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 177.  That 
constitutional provision is affirmed in Wisconsin statutes, 
which provide that the right to a jury trial "shall be preserved 
to the parties inviolate" when applicable legislative conditions 
are met.  Wis. Stat. § 805.01.   
¶93 Although 
the 
jury 
demand 
and 
fees 
payment 
are 
procedural mechanisms by which the right to a jury trial is 
executed, the right to a jury trial is a substantive right.  See 
State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 523, 261 
N.W.2d 434 (1978).  Transfer to the Oneida Tribal Court would 
terminate the substantive right to a jury trial because Oneida 
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
9 
 
Tribal Court does not provide jury trials.5  See Rules of the 
Oneida Tribal Judicial System, Judicial Code, Article I (2006).   
¶94 In addition, Wisconsin courts honor the United States 
Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution.  See Dep't of 
Admin. v. WERC, 90 Wis. 2d 426, 434-35, 280 N.W.2d 150 (1979).  
The two constitutions provide the framework in which all 
Wisconsin courts must operate.  See State v. Cockrell, 2007 WI 
App 217, ¶34 n.10, 306 Wis. 2d 52, 741 N.W.2d 267.  This 
constitutional 
framework 
includes 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution's Bill of Rights and the Wisconsin Constitution's 
Declaration of Rights.  Helgeland v. Wis. Municipalities, 2008 
WI 9, ¶13, 307 Wis. 2d 1, 745 N.W.2d 1 (explaining that when 
Wisconsin courts settle disputes brought before them, they must 
protect the litigants' rights under the Bill of Rights and the 
Declaration of Rights).   
¶95 However, as the United States Supreme Court has held, 
the United States Constitution is not binding on tribal courts.  
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 
316, 337 (2008) (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-83 
(1896)).  As separate sovereigns antedating the Constitution, 
Indian tribes have "historically been regarded as unconstrained 
by those [federal] constitutional provisions framed specifically 
                                                 
5 The record is not completely clear on whether the issue of 
a jury trial was determined before the circuit court ordered 
transfer.  However, if Kroner sought a jury trial after transfer 
to the Oneida Tribal Court, that mode of trial would be 
unavailable.  
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
10 
 
as limitations on federal or state authority."  Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).   
¶96 Accordingly, 
tribal 
courts 
are 
not 
required 
to 
undertake the protection of litigants' rights under the Bill of 
Rights or the Declaration of Rights.  For example, both the Bill 
of Rights of the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin 
Constitution guarantee the separation of church and state.  U.S. 
Const. amend. I; Wis. Const. art. I, § 18.  Separation of church 
and state is one of the basic tenets of our democracy; however, 
separation of church and state is not a tenet of all tribes.  
Instead, tribal courts may incorporate their religious values as 
custom and tradition that inform tribal courts' views of the 
law.6  
¶97 The incorporation of tribal religion into tribal court 
decisions may reasonably underlie objections from those who have 
chosen state courts to adjudicate disputes, when removal to 
tribal court has been sought.  For example, in In the Matter of 
the Adoption of B.G.J., 111 P.3d 651 (Ka. 2005), transfer to 
tribal court was sought for an adoption proceeding for an Indian 
child who was subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 
whereby transfer was possible under federal law.7  The child's 
                                                 
6 See Tribal Courts and the Administration of Justice in 
Indian Country:  Hearing on S. 576 Before the S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 110th Cong. 7 (2008) (statement of Roman J. Duran, Vice 
President, National American Indian Court Judges Association). 
7 The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) is federal legislation 
addressing the adoption and custody of Indian children.  It sets 
out criteria for tribal intervention and for the transfer of 
state adoption and custody actions to tribal courts.  See In the 
Matter of the Adoption of B.G.J., 111 P.3d 651, 656 (Ka. 2005); 
25 U.S.C. § 1903.  
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
11 
 
mother, a tribal member, objected to transfer to tribal court 
because she did not follow the customs and the traditions of the 
tribe.  For example, she did not practice the Drum Religion, 
which was practiced by most of the tribe.  Id. at 654.  The 
state court judge denied the requested transfer, and on 
appellate review, that exercise of discretion was upheld.  Id. 
at 655-59. 
¶98 In addition, Wisconsin appellate courts have no power 
to review the merits of tribal court decisions once a transfer 
to tribal court occurs because those decisions will be made by 
the courts of an independent sovereign.8  Even federal courts 
cannot review tribal court decisions in the usual course of 
federal appellate review.  Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 385 
(2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining that "there is no 
effective review mechanism in place to police tribal courts' 
decisions on matters of non-tribal law, since tribal-court 
judgments based on state or federal law can neither be removed 
nor appealed to state or federal courts").  Civil cases may be 
re-examined if a separate declaratory judgment action is brought 
in federal court that asserts that the tribal court had no 
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims made.  Id. at 357.  
However, because Wisconsin stands on different footing with the 
Indian tribes than does the federal government, there is no 
state authority to overturn a tribal court decision, even when 
that decision is clearly wrong under state law.   
                                                 
8 See also Wis. Stat. § 806.245 (according judgments of 
Indian tribal courts in Wisconsin full faith and credit).  
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
12 
 
¶99 This 
lack 
of 
appellate 
review 
of 
tribal 
court 
decisions is a significant deprivation of substantive rights for 
Wisconsin litigants.  As Justice Kennedy recognized, "[t]he 
political 
freedom 
guaranteed 
to 
citizens 
by 
the 
federal 
structure is a liberty both distinct from and every bit as 
important as those freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights."  
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214 (2004) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).   
¶100 By comparison with Justice Kennedy's comments, I 
conclude that the Wisconsin structure for appellate review is an 
important substantive right, as set out in the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  See art. VII, §§ 3 and 5.  The right of appellate 
review assures that litigants' rights are thoroughly protected 
by Wisconsin courts.  See Helgeland, 307 Wis. 2d 1, ¶13.  If 
Kroner's lawsuit were transferred to tribal court, he would lose 
the right of Wisconsin appellate review of the tribal court 
decision on the merits of his claim, and therefore, he would be 
denied a significant substantive right afforded by state law 
that he held when he filed his lawsuit.     
¶101 Accordingly, the transfer of Kroner's claims to tribal 
court would impair his vested substantive right of access to 
Wisconsin courts, guaranteed by Article I, Section 9 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution and the general statutory provisions of 
Wis. Stat. ch. 801.  See New York Life, 192 Wis. at 412.  Such a 
transfer also would preclude direct appellate review by federal 
courts, Hicks, 533 U.S. at 385, and all review by Wisconsin 
courts.  As Justice Kennedy explained, the right of access to 
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
13 
 
the appellate process is an important freedom, commensurate with 
those rights set out in the Bill of Rights.  Lara, 541 U.S. at 
214.   
¶102 Accordingly, Wis. Stat. § 801.54 cannot be applied 
retrospectively to transfer jurisdiction of Kroner's lawsuit to 
Oneida Tribal Court because doing so would deprive Kroner of 
substantive rights that were vested at the time he filed his 
suit in Brown County Circuit Court, nearly five months before 
§ 801.54 became effective and approximately two years before 
Seven Generations moved to transfer the case to tribal court.  
C.  Rule-Making 
¶103 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.54 was promulgated by this 
court's rule-making process.  S. Ct. Order 07-11, 2008 WI 114, 
307 Wis. 2d xvii (issued July 31, 2008, eff. Jan. 1, 2009) 
(promulgating Wis. Stat. § 801.54).  The rule-making process 
that we employed is based on a legislative delegation to the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court under Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1).  Section 
751.12(1) provides in relevant part: 
 
The 
state 
supreme 
court 
shall, 
by 
rules 
promulgated 
by 
it 
from 
time 
to 
time, 
regulate 
pleading, 
practice, 
and 
procedure 
in 
judicial 
proceedings in all courts, for the purposes of 
simplifying the same and of promoting the speedy 
determination of litigation upon its merits.  The 
rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify the 
substantive rights of any litigant.     
¶104 As Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1) explicitly provides, rules 
promulgated pursuant to § 751.12(1) "shall not abridge, enlarge, 
or modify the substantive rights of any litigant."  There are 
good reasons why the legislature specifically limited the 
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
14 
 
court's rule-making authority to procedural rules and prohibited 
substantive rule-making under § 751.12(1).  One reason is the 
separate constitutional functions that the legislature and the 
courts generally provide in Wisconsin's tripartite system of 
government.     
¶105 Although the concept of separation of powers is not 
explicitly stated in the Wisconsin Constitution, the concept is 
evident in the constitution's structure, as well as the specific 
provisions generally vesting legislative and judicial powers in 
separate branches of Wisconsin's government.  See State v. 
Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 42, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982).  As a general 
rule, the legislative power of the State is vested in the senate 
and the assembly, Wis. Const. art IV, § 1, while the judicial 
power is vested in the courts, Wis. Const. art. VII, § 2.  This 
separation of powers grants the courts of this state, and 
ultimately this court, the constitutional responsibility of 
interpreting the laws and, most fundamentally, of determining 
whether the laws pass constitutional muster.9  See id.; City of 
Milwaukee v. Wroten, 160 Wis. 2d 207, 217, 466 N.W.2d 861 (1991) 
(recognizing that "questions of constitutionality, like other 
questions of law, cannot finally be laid to rest until decided 
by final appellate adjudication").   
                                                 
9 Just as the United States Supreme Court is the final 
arbiter 
of 
what 
passes 
muster 
under 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, see Fulton Foundation v. Department of Taxation, 
13 Wis. 2d 1, 14d, 109 N.W.2d 285 (1961), the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court is the final arbiter of what passes muster under the 
Wisconsin Constitution, see State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, 
¶172, 
283 
Wis. 2d 
145, 
699 
N.W.2d 
110 
(Roggensack, 
J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part).   
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
15 
 
¶106 A very practical problem also may be presented by the 
"little guy" who has chosen to bring a civil claim in a 
Wisconsin circuit court, which claim may be subject to a 
transfer of jurisdiction to tribal court.10  Whenever a litigant 
may be subject to transfer to tribal court, the circuit court 
must make a threshold determination as to whether a transfer 
would abridge, enlarge or modify the litigant's substantive 
rights.   
¶107 Certainly, all seven members of this court should 
agree that a circuit court must first analyze whether a transfer 
under Wis. Stat. § 801.54 would abridge, enlarge or modify a 
substantive right of a litigant.  Indeed, in a comment to 
§ 801.54, which "may be consulted for guidance in interpreting 
and applying the statute," S. Ct. Order 07-11, 307 Wis. 2d at 
xxii, this court directs that a circuit court, prior to 
exercising its discretion to transfer, "shall give particular 
weight to the constitutional rights of the litigants and their 
rights to assert all available claims and defenses," id. at 
xxiii. If a litigant's substantive rights would be abridged, 
enlarged or modified by the application of § 801.54, then a 
transfer cannot occur absent a proper waiver of those rights on 
the 
record. 
 
Otherwise, 
§ 801.54 
will 
serve 
as 
an 
unconstitutional mandate, by which a circuit court could require 
a litigant to submit to the jurisdiction of tribal court without 
first apprising the litigant of the substantive rights he or she 
                                                 
10 Most litigants would have no reason to have had notice or 
knowledge of the rule-making process by which Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.54 was promulgated.  
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
16 
 
is giving up and without first obtaining the litigant's waiver 
of those rights.  Surely that was not the intention of this 
court when it promulgated § 801.54.  We all agree with the 
fundamental tenet that a litigant is vested with constitutional 
rights that he or she cannot be forced to relinquish.11   
¶108 When litigation is conducted in Wisconsin courts, this 
court expects judges to take great care in assuring that the 
constitutional and statutory rights of the litigants are 
protected.  Today I reaffirm both constitutional and statutory 
protections for Wisconsin litigants, and I counsel circuit 
courts affirmatively to ensure that those protections are not 
abridged, enlarged or modified by a transfer under Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.54.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶109 I conclude that the transfer to Oneida Tribal Court 
was 
not 
lawful 
because: 
 
(1) 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.54 
was 
retrospectively 
applied 
in 
violation 
of 
Kroner's 
vested 
substantive, constitutional rights, including, but not limited 
to, his right of access to Wisconsin courts that is granted in 
Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution; and (2) the 
supreme court's promulgation of § 801.54, pursuant to the 
                                                 
11 I do not mean to imply that transfers to tribal court 
should never be permitted.  Certainly, consensual transfers, as 
well as transfers under ICWA, to tribal courts have occurred 
numerous times to the satisfaction of all the litigants.  There 
is no question that tribal courts have much to offer.  See Brown 
Cnty. v. Marcella G., 2001 WI App 194, ¶2, 247 Wis. 2d 158, 634 
N.W.2d 140.  My primary concern is that litigants who have 
chosen to avail themselves of Wisconsin courts should not be 
deprived of their substantive rights.   
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
17 
 
legislative delegation of Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1), required the 
circuit court to make a threshold determination that the 
application of § 801.54 would not abridge, enlarge or modify the 
substantive rights of litigants.  Because our rule was not 
explicit on this point, the circuit court did not have reason to 
believe 
it 
must 
undertake 
this 
threshold 
determination; 
therefore, it was not accomplished.  Accordingly, given the 
additional opinions filed in this case today, the court of 
appeals is reversed, Oneida Seven Generations' motion to 
transfer to tribal court is denied, and the cause is remanded to 
the circuit court to proceed on the merits of the pending 
lawsuit.    
¶110 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
No.  2010AP2533.pdr 
 
 
 
1