Case Title: People v. Gonzalez

Citation: 

Docket Number: S189856

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2012-07-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 7/5/12 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S189856 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D055698 
PERLA ISABEL GONZALEZ, 
) 
 
) 
San Bernardino County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. FVA024527 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
 
Defendant Perla Isabel Gonzalez (Perla) recruited her brother and her 
boyfriend to assault Roberto Canas-Fuentes (Canas).1  After Canas fended off a 
knife attack and gained the upper hand in the fight, Perla handed the boyfriend a 
loaded rifle.  Canas wrested the rifle away and shot the boyfriend dead.  The jury 
convicted Perla of the attempted premeditated and deliberate murder of Canas and, 
based on the provocative act doctrine, the first degree murder of her boyfriend.2 
 
We recently held that similar circumstances could support a conviction of 
first degree murder if the defendant personally acted willfully, deliberately, and 
                                              
1  
We refer to members of the Gonzalez family by their first names to avoid 
confusion.  Consistent with the parties‘ briefing and the Court of Appeal decision, 
we have shortened Mr. Canas-Fuentes‘s name. 
2  
The provocative act doctrine does not define a crime.  (People v. Cervantes 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 867, fn. 10 (Cervantes).)  Rather, ―provocative act murder‖ 
is a descriptive term referring to a subset of intervening-act homicides in which 
the defendant‘s conduct provokes an intermediary‘s violent response that causes 
someone‘s death.  (Id. at p. 872, fn. 15.) 
 
2 
with premeditation during an attempted murder.  (People v. Concha (2009) 47 
Cal.4th 653, 658 (Concha).)  Here, substantial evidence supports Perla‘s 
conviction for the murder of her boyfriend.  As in Concha, the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury on the requirements for premeditated and deliberate first 
degree murder; however, we conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Joan Curiel and her husband, Canas, had a three-year-old daughter together.  
When they separated, Curiel moved into the residence of Ricardo Gonzalez 
(Ricardo).  Ricardo is defendant Perla‘s brother.  Curiel‘s two other children and 
her mother, Rosalba Osguera-Alvarez (Osguera), also moved into Ricardo‘s home.  
The relationship between Canas and Ricardo was volatile.  The two men had 
argued several times on the telephone and had fought physically at least once.  
Canas and Curiel shared custody of their daughter, but Canas typically picked up 
the child away from Curiel‘s residence in order to avoid encountering Ricardo.  
 
Canas worked as an emergency room technician.  On the evening of May 
21, 2005, Curiel called Canas, arranging to bring her mother to the hospital for 
treatment.  After Osguera returned home, Curiel and Ricardo began arguing about 
whether Curiel had lied to him about ―partying‖ with Canas while Ricardo was in 
Mexico.  During the argument, Canas called and spoke to Curiel.  According to 
Ricardo, Canas bragged that he and Curiel had been intimate while Ricardo was 
away.  Canas understood Curiel to say she did not want Ricardo in the home, and 
Canas could hear children screaming in the background.  Concerned for his 
daughter, Canas drove to the residence and arrived just as Curiel was driving away 
with the children.  Canas yelled at Ricardo, but Ricardo ignored him and went 
after Curiel in his own car.  Canas followed.  He drove between their two vehicles, 
blocking Ricardo‘s progress, and yelled at him, ―What . . . are you thinking?  The 
kids are in the car.  Knock it off.‖  Ricardo drove away in the opposite direction, 
 
3 
and Canas followed to make sure Ricardo did not resume his pursuit of Curiel and 
the children.  
 
Later that evening, after Ricardo and Curiel had both returned home, 
several members of Ricardo‘s family gathered to discuss the altercation.  In 
addition to Ricardo and Curiel, the group included Ricardo‘s mother and 
grandmother; his brother Jorge and Jorge‘s girlfriend; his sister Perla and Perla‘s 
boyfriend, Fernando Morales.  Perla, the defendant here, said that if anything 
happened to Ricardo, the family would ―kick [Canas‘s] ass.‖  Meanwhile, Canas 
continued to call the house and argue with Ricardo.  Finally, Jorge answered the 
telephone and agreed to fight Canas at a nearby street corner.  Jorge waited at the 
corner with his girlfriend, Perla, and Morales, the ultimate decedent.  Morales had 
brought a BB gun and shot it out the car window to pass the time.  They waited for 
15 or 20 minutes then left when Canas did not arrive.  
 
The next morning, Perla picked up Jorge at his house and told him they 
were going back to the street corner to ―beat up‖ Canas.  Curiel had told Perla that 
Canas would be picking up his daughter at the corner, and Perla wanted to 
intercept him there.  Jorge brought a baseball bat, with which he planned to break 
the windows of Canas‘s car.  When Jorge got in Perla‘s car, he saw a light brown 
rifle lying in the backseat area.  Perla then drove back to her house to pick up her 
boyfriend, Morales.  Jorge told Morales about the plan to assault Canas, and 
Morales agreed to help if Canas got the upper hand.  After a brief stop at Ricardo‘s 
house to confirm that Canas had not yet picked up his daughter, the group drove to 
the intersection where they had waited for Canas the night before.  They 
eventually decided to leave, but Perla‘s car would not start.  Jorge ran back to 
Ricardo‘s house for help, leaving Perla and Morales waiting at the car.  On the 
way, Jorge passed Osguera walking Canas‘s daughter to the corner to meet her 
father.  Curiel‘s 13-year-old daughter walked behind them.  When she joined them 
at the corner, she saw Perla and Morales standing next to a car with the hood 
 
4 
raised.  Perla approached Osguera and told her to leave, but the grandmother 
refused.  
 
After about 10 minutes, Canas arrived.  He noticed Perla and Morales 
standing next to a car with the hood up.  He had never seen them before and did 
not know them.  As a result, he had no reason to expect any difficulty.  When 
Canas opened his car door and beckoned for his daughter, Osguera hastily 
approached and told Canas to leave.  Morales walked up to the car at the same 
time and said, ―Hey, puto, I heard you had a problem.‖  When he realized Morales 
was not joking, Canas told Osguera to put his daughter in his car and leave.  As 
she did so, Morales began punching Canas.  
 
Canas fought back.  Morales then pulled a knife with a three- to four-inch 
blade from his waistband and lunged at Canas, stabbing him in the face.  Perla 
stood about 10 feet away, near the rear of her car, watching the fight.  When 
Morales advanced on him again, Canas ducked and grabbed Morales‘s legs from 
under him, hurling him onto his back.  Morales quickly rose and ran toward 
Perla‘s car.  Canas saw Perla reach inside the car and grab a rifle.  She met 
Morales near the back of the car, ―cocked‖ the rifle by pulling back the hammer, 
then handed it to Morales.3  
 
Seeing this, Canas ran at Morales, who had his back turned.  During the 
ensuing struggle, the rifle discharged several times.  Canas was hit in the hand, 
bicep, and thigh but managed to gain control of the rifle.  Perla ran away.4  
Morales also turned to run.  Afraid for his life, Canas fired the rifle in Morales‘s 
                                              
3  
As Osguera was preparing to drive off with Canas‘s daughter, she saw 
Perla pull from her car what looked like a long stick.  She testified that she 
realized it was a firearm when Perla began shooting at Canas.  The jury apparently 
rejected this testimony.  No other witness, including Canas, testified that Perla 
fired the weapon, and the jury found not true an allegation that Perla discharged a 
firearm during the attack on Canas.  
4  
Although the trial testimony indicates Perla ran after handing the rifle to 
Morales, it is unclear how far away she was when the lethal shots were fired. 
 
5 
direction at least three times, until it ran out of ammunition.  Morales fell to the 
sidewalk.  Canas went to Morales and, after ensuring he was unarmed, checked his 
pulse.  Canas still did not know his assailants or why they had attacked him.  
 
Curiel drove to the scene and found Canas sitting on the sidewalk near 
Morales‘s body.  When she asked what had happened, a shaken Canas yelled, ―He 
shot me, so I shot him back.‖  Curiel began driving home but soon returned to the 
scene with Jorge and Perla.  Perla screamed at Canas to help her carry Morales 
into the car.  He refused because Morales had ―just tried to kill [him].‖  Perla and 
Jorge pulled Morales into the car, and Curiel drove them to the hospital.  Morales 
died there from gunshot wounds to the chest and abdomen.  
 
Canas remained at the scene.  When police arrived, they recovered the rifle 
from him.  Several expended shell casings and a knife were found in the street.  
Perla‘s car was still at the location.  Its rear license plate was obscured with an 
―X‖ fashioned from red duct tape.  A roll of similar tape and a baseball bat were 
found inside the car.  Although Morales‘s sister testified that she saw a knife at the 
crime scene after the shooting, crime scene experts had found no second knife at 
the scene, and Canas testified that he was unarmed.5  
 
Perla was charged with the attempted murder of Canas and the murder of 
Morales.  (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187.)6  The information charged that she had 
personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm in committing the 
attempted murder.  (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c).)  The jury convicted her of the 
first degree murder of Morales and the attempted premeditated and deliberate 
murder of Canas, with personal use of a firearm.  It rejected the allegation that she 
                                              
5  
Morales‘s sister, Marlen, testified that four or five days after Morales‘s 
death, she went to the scene and discovered a 10-inch serrated knife with a long 
black handle.  She said she kicked it into the bushes.  Although a detective 
interviewed her eight days after the incident, Marlen did not mention finding this 
knife.  
6  
All statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
6 
had intentionally discharged a gun in connection with the attempted murder.  Perla 
was sentenced to prison for 25 years to life on the murder conviction, and a 
concurrent life term and 10-year firearm enhancement for the attempted murder.  
 
The judgment was affirmed.  The Court of Appeal unanimously concluded, 
inter alia, that Perla‘s conviction of the first degree murder of Morales was 
supported by substantial evidence.  The panel also unanimously determined that 
the jury had been erroneously instructed.  The jury was not told that to convict 
Perla of first degree murder under the provocative act doctrine it had to find that 
she personally premeditated and deliberated the attempted murder of Canas.  (See 
Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 666.)  The court disagreed about the effect of the 
error.  The majority held the error harmless while the dissenting justice found it 
prejudicial. 
 
We granted review limited to the issues of whether sufficient evidence 
supports the conviction for first degree murder and whether the instructional error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The evidentiary sufficiency question 
turns on the provocative act doctrine and its analytical place in the law of 
homicide, which we discuss in some detail.  We conclude the evidence here was 
sufficient and, although the jury was given a potentially misleading instruction on 
this topic, the error was harmless.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
Substantial Evidence Supports the Murder Conviction 
 
In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence challenge, we view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.   (Cervantes, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 866; People v. Caldwell 
(1984) 36 Cal.3d 210, 217.) 
 
It will be helpful in resolving this matter to bear in mind several general 
principles in the law of homicide.  A conviction for murder requires the 
 
7 
commission of an act that causes death, done with the mental state of malice 
aforethought (malice).  (§ 187.)  Malice may be either express or implied.  (§ 188.)  
Express malice is an intent to kill.  (People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 
102.)  Implied malice does not require an intent to kill.  Malice is implied when a 
person willfully does an act, the natural and probable consequences of which are 
dangerous to human life, and the person knowingly acts with conscious disregard 
for the danger to life that the act poses.  (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 
152.)  A person who acts intending to kill victim A but who accidentally kills 
victim B instead may be guilty of B‘s murder under the doctrine of transferred 
intent.  (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 320-321.) 
 
The law recognizes two degrees of murder.  The degrees are distinguished 
by the mental state with which the killing is done.  A person who kills unlawfully 
with implied malice is guilty of second degree murder.  (People v. Knoller, supra, 
41 Cal.4th at pp. 151-152.)  A person who kills unlawfully and intentionally is 
guilty of first degree murder if the intent to kill is formed after premeditation and 
deliberation.  (§ 189; see People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1069.)7  If 
the person kills unlawfully and intentionally but the intent to kill is not formed 
after premeditation and deliberation, the murder is of the second degree.  (People 
v. Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 102.) 
 
While implied malice murder does not require an intent to kill, attempted 
murder does require a specific intent to kill.  (People v. Guerra (1985) 40 Cal.3d 
377, 386.)8  The crime of attempted murder is not divided into degrees, but the 
                                              
7  
Section 189 also provides that murder is in the first degree if it is done by 
particular means, such as through poison or lying in wait, or under particular 
circumstances, such as in the course of a rape or robbery.  (§ 189.)  We do not 
discuss these other types of first degree murder here. 
8  
An accomplice can be guilty of attempted murder if the accomplice aids 
and encourages an attempted murder knowing of the direct perpetrator‘s intent to 
kill and intending to facilitate the killing.  (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 
624; People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 259.)  In other words, ―the 
 
8 
sentence can be enhanced if the attempt to kill was committed with premeditation 
and deliberation.  (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 740.)  In general, 
attempted murder is punishable by imprisonment for a term of five, seven, or nine 
years.  (§ 664, subd. (a).)  However, if either the defendant or an accomplice 
formed the intent to kill with premeditation and deliberation, punishment for the 
attempted murder is increased to life imprisonment with possibility of parole.  
(§ 664, subd. (a); People v. Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 624.) 
 
Under the felony murder doctrine, when the defendant or an accomplice 
kills someone during the commission, or attempted commission, of an inherently 
dangerous felony, the defendant is liable for either first or second degree murder, 
depending on the felony committed.  If the felony is listed in section 189, the 
murder is of the first degree; if not, the murder is of the second degree.  (§ 189; 
People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1140-1141.)  Felony murder liability 
does not require an intent to kill, or even implied malice, but merely an intent to 
commit the underlying felony.  (People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197.)  If 
the killing is not committed by the defendant or an accomplice, however, the 
felony murder doctrine does not apply.  (People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 
777, 781-783.) 
 
When someone other than the defendant or an accomplice kills during the 
commission or attempted commission of a crime, the defendant is not liable under 
felony murder principles but may nevertheless be prosecuted for murder under the 
provocative act doctrine.  The provocative act doctrine is to be distinguished from 
the felony murder rule.  ―A provocative act murder case necessarily involves at 
least three people—in our case, the perpetrator of the underlying offense, an 
accomplice, and a victim of their crime.  [Citation.]‖  (People v. Briscoe (2001) 92 
Cal.App.4th 568, 581.)  A variation on the law of transferred intent, the 
                                                                                                                                      
 
person guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor must intend to kill.‖  
(People v. Lee, at p. 624.) 
 
9 
provocative act doctrine holds the perpetrator of a violent crime vicariously liable 
for the killing of an accomplice by a third party, usually the intended victim or a 
police officer.  (Ibid.; see People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal.2d 690, 705 (Gilbert).)  
Under the felony murder rule, if an accomplice is killed by a crime victim and not 
by the defendant, the defendant cannot be held liable for the accomplice‘s death.  
(Gilbert, at p. 703; People v. Washington, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 781.)  The 
provocative act doctrine is not so limited.  Under the provocative act doctrine, 
when the perpetrator of a crime maliciously commits an act that is likely to result 
in death, and the victim kills in reasonable response to that act, the perpetrator is 
guilty of murder.  (Gilbert, at pp. 704-705; People v. Briscoe, at p. 581.)  ―In such 
a case, the killing is attributable, not merely to the commission of a felony, but to 
the intentional act of the defendant or his accomplice committed with conscious 
disregard for life.‖  (Gilbert, at p. 704.)9 
 
A murder conviction under the provocative act doctrine thus requires proof 
that the defendant personally harbored the mental state of malice, and either the 
defendant or an accomplice intentionally committed a provocative act that 
proximately caused an unlawful killing.  (Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 660-
661; People v. Briscoe, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 582.)  A provocative act is one 
that goes beyond what is necessary to accomplish an underlying crime and is 
dangerous to human life because it is highly probable to provoke a deadly 
response.  (CALCRIM No. 560; see People v. Lima (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 259, 
265.)  Although the doctrine has often been invoked in cases where the defendant 
initiates or participates in a gun battle (Cervantes, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 867), it is 
not limited to this factual scenario.  (People v. Lima, at p. 266; see Concha, at 
                                              
9  
The provocative act doctrine may support either first or second degree 
murder.  In order to return a first degree murder conviction, the jury must find that 
the defendant acted with express malice formed after deliberation and 
premeditation.  (Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 666.)  We discuss the mental state 
required for first degree provocative act murder at pages 18-19, post, in connection 
with Perla‘s instructional error claim. 
 
10 
p. 658 [knife attack].)  Malice will be implied if the defendant commits a 
provocative act knowing that this conduct endangers human life and acts with 
conscious disregard of the danger.  (People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 317; 
Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 704.) 
 
An important question in a provocative act case is whether the act 
proximately caused an unlawful death.  ―[T]he defendant is liable only for those 
unlawful killings proximately caused by the acts of the defendant or his 
accomplice.  [Citation.]  ‗In all homicide cases in which the conduct of an 
intermediary is the actual cause of death, the defendant‘s liability will depend on 
whether it can be demonstrated that [the defendant‘s] own conduct proximately 
caused the victim‘s death . . . .‘  [Citation.]  ‗[I]f the eventual victim‘s death is not 
the natural and probable consequence of a defendant‘s act, then liability cannot 
attach.‘  [Citation.]‖  (Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 661.)  When the defendant 
commits an inherently dangerous felony, the victim‘s self-defensive killing is 
generally found to be a natural and probable response to the defendant‘s act, and 
not an independent intervening cause that relieves the defendant of liability.  
(Ibid.; Cervantes, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 868-869; Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d at 
pp. 704-705.)  The question of proximate cause is ordinarily decided by the jury, 
unless undisputed evidence reveals ―a cause so remote that a court may properly 
decide that no rational trier of fact could find the needed nexus.‖  (People v. 
Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 320, fn. 11.) 
 
This record contains ample evidence to support a conclusion that Perla 
committed a provocative act that caused Canas to kill Morales.  The evening 
before the killing, Perla plotted with Ricardo and other members of the family to 
―kick [Canas‘s] ass.‖10  That night, Perla went with Morales and Jorge to meet 
Canas, anticipating a violent confrontation.  Morales brought a BB gun and shot it 
                                              
10  
Perla argues her acts before the confrontation cannot be considered 
―provocative acts‖ because Canas was unaware of them.  However, Perla‘s earlier 
conduct is highly relevant to prove her own state of mind. 
 
11 
out the car window several times while waiting for Canas.  As noted, Canas did 
not appear.  The next morning, Perla set events in motion.  She roused first Jorge 
and then Morales for another attack on Canas.  It was Perla‘s idea to ambush 
Canas at the corner where he routinely picked up his young daughter.  They 
stopped at Ricardo‘s house to make sure he had not yet done so.  She then drove to 
the corner with a loaded rifle in her car, and she tried to induce Osguera to leave 
the scene before their target arrived.  While Morales attacked Canas and stabbed 
him, Perla stayed near the car containing the rifle she had brought.  When Canas 
appeared to get the upper hand in the fight, Morales ran to Perla.  Perla got the 
rifle from her car, cocked it, and turned toward Canas.  Having made clear to 
Morales what she intended him to do, she handed him the rifle.  A struggle ensued 
during which Canas was shot three times.  He then managed to seize the gun and 
shoot his attacker.  
 
By bringing a loaded rifle to the scene, preparing it for firing, then handing 
it to her accomplice, Perla dramatically escalated the level of violence in the 
encounter.  Introducing a loaded firearm into the fight went beyond the acts 
necessary to ―kick [Canas‘s] ass.‖  In producing the rifle, turning it toward Canas, 
and putting it in the hands of Morales, who had just stabbed Canas in the face, 
Perla performed acts ― ‗fraught with grave and inherent danger to human life.‘ ‖  
(Taylor v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 578, 584, overruled on other grounds in 
People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, 92, fn. 12.) 
 
Perla argues her conduct was not sufficiently violent to support the 
conviction because some cases have stated that provocative act murder liability 
must be premised on a ―life-threatening act‖ that provokes a deadly response.  
(See, e.g., In re Joe R. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 496, 505; People v. Mai (1994) 22 
Cal.App.4th 117, 124, overruled on other grounds in People v. Scott (2009) 45 
Cal.4th 743, 749.)  However, read in context, the phrase ―life-threatening act‖ is 
essentially a shorthand definition that restates the proximate cause requirement of 
provocative act murder.  We have used the phrase, for example, in summarizing 
 
12 
People v. Gilbert‘s holding that provocative act murder requires an intentional act 
that is beyond what is necessary to commit the underlying felony and that 
provokes a lethal response from the victim or a police officer.  (See In re Joe R., at 
p. 502, citing Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 704.)  A provocative act is conduct 
that is dangerous to human life, not necessarily in and of itself, but because, in the 
circumstances, it is likely to elicit a deadly response.  The danger addressed by the 
provocative act doctrine is not measured by the violence of the defendant‘s 
conduct alone, but also by the likelihood of a violent response.  Thus, our cases 
have not required any particular level of violence to support provocative act 
murder liability.  For example, in People v. Caldwell, supra, 36 Cal.3d at 
page 218, we found sufficient evidence to support the provocative act murder 
conviction of a defendant who left a car after a high-speed chase while holding, 
but not pointing, a gun.  (See id. at pp. 226, 228 (dissenting opn. of Bird, C.J.) 
[noting that the gun was not pointed].) 
 
The evidence also establishes that Perla acted with malice.  She put the 
violent conduct in motion after a night of repose.  She recruited her brother and 
boyfriend to ambush Canas.  She confirmed the child had not been picked up.  She 
drove to the ambush location with her license plate obscured and with a loaded 
gun in her car.  She watched as Morales stabbed Canas.  The jury could infer from 
this evidence that Perla planned the assault on Canas and planned for either herself 
or her accomplices to use deadly force in the assault.  Indeed, she expressed a 
clear intent for Morales to shoot Canas when she faced Canas before handing the 
loaded, cocked weapon to her boyfriend.  This uncontested evidence about Perla‘s 
use of the gun, and the jury‘s finding that she used a firearm, supports the 
conclusion that she acted with malice.  (See Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 704; 
People v. Lima, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 267; see also post, at pp. 18-22 
[addressing whether malice here was express or implied].) 
 
Finally, substantial evidence demonstrates that Perla‘s provocative acts 
proximately caused Morales‘s death.  ―To be considered a proximate cause of [the 
 
13 
victim‘s] death, the acts of the defendant[] must have been a ‗substantial factor‘ 
contributing to the result.  [Citations.]‖  (People v. Caldwell, supra, 36 Cal.3d at 
p. 220.)  Morales stabbed Canas but then lost the fight and ran toward Perla.  It 
was in this context that she got the rifle, cocked it, and then handed it to her 
accomplice.  The death of one of the participants was a natural and probable 
consequence of Perla‘s conduct.  (See Cervantes, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 869; 
People v. Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 321.)  This was a classic example of 
bringing a gun to a knife fight, planning in advance to have deadly capacity 
available if an initial attack is unsuccessful.  Although Canas was the person who 
ultimately fired the shots that killed Morales, Canas‘s intervention was not a 
superseding cause of death because, as we have observed, it is reasonably 
foreseeable that a crime victim will use force in self-defense.  (Cervantes, at 
p. 871; Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 705.) 
 
This fact pattern is distinguishable from the one presented in Cervantes.  
Cervantes and other Highland Street gang members attended a large party thrown 
by the Alley Boys gang.  The two gangs were peaceful until Cervantes argued 
with a woman who was associated with the Alley Boys gang, leading one of its 
members to chide Cervantes for acting disrespectfully.  (Cervantes, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at pp. 863, 872, fn. 12.)  The conflict escalated, and Cervantes shot 
Richard Linares, an Alley Boys gang member who had intervened in an effort to 
defuse the situation.  (Ibid.)  A melee followed and gang challenges were 
exchanged.  A minute or two later, a group of Alley Boys shot and killed Hector 
Cabrera, whom they recognized as a member of the Highland Street gang.  (Ibid.)  
On appeal, we concluded Cervantes could not be held liable under the provocative 
act doctrine because his conduct was not a proximate cause of Cabrera‘s murder.  
(Id. at p. 872.)  Cervantes was not the initial aggressor in the incident that gave 
rise to the melee.  There was no evidence Cabrera‘s killers had seen Cervantes 
shoot Linares, and Cervantes had fled the scene by the time Cabrera was shot.  
(Ibid.)  Because the Alley Boys killers were not responding to Cervantes‘s act by 
 
14 
shooting back at him, or an accomplice, their killing of Cabrera could not be 
considered a ― ‗reasonable response to the dilemma thrust upon [them]‘ ‖ by 
Cervantes‘s conduct.  (Id. at p. 873, quoting Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 705.)  
Instead, the killers acted on their own initiative to avenge a situation in which 
neither they nor their victim had been involved.  Based on these facts, we 
concluded the willful and malicious murder of Cabrera was a product of the Alley 
Boys‘ independent criminal conduct and, thus, an intervening cause that absolved 
Cervantes of liability.  (Id. at pp. 872-874.) 
 
The circumstances here are quite different.  The jury rejected Perla‘s 
assertion that, when Canas killed Morales, Canas acted with malice and used force 
beyond that allowed for lawful self-defense.  The entire episode was thrust upon 
an unsuspecting Canas, who responded to Perla‘s provocative acts by disarming 
and killing Morales.  Under these circumstances, Canas‘s self-defensive actions 
were neither criminal nor an independent cause of death.  Thus, Cervantes is 
distinguishable.  Canas‘s subsequent conduct is also consistent with this 
conclusion.  Canas did not flee or try to dispose of the weapon.  Instead, although 
injured himself, he remained at the scene, surrendered the gun, and cooperated 
with police. 
 
Perla also asserts she cannot be held liable because Morales’s provocative 
acts led to his own death.  We have held that a defendant cannot be held 
vicariously liable for aiding and abetting an accomplice in criminal acts that led to 
the accomplice‘s death.  (People v. Antick, supra, 15 Cal.3d 79, disapproved on a 
related ground in People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1119-1120, 1123.)  In 
Antick, we stated that ―neither the felony-murder doctrine nor the theory of 
vicarious liability may be used to hold a defendant guilty of murder solely because 
of the acts of an accomplice, if the accomplice himself could not have been found 
guilty of the same offense for such conduct.‖  (People v. Antick, at p. 89, italics 
added.)  However, Antick was a case of pure vicarious liability.  Although Antick 
had aided and abetted in a crime that led the police to his accomplice, he was not 
 
15 
present when officers confronted the accomplice and shot him dead.  (Id. at 
pp. 83-84.)  Here, substantial evidence supports the murder conviction based on 
Perla‘s own provocative acts.  As we explained in People v. Caldwell, supra, 36 
Cal.3d at pages 220-221, when the conduct of two felons acting in concert 
provokes a deadly response, the question is only whether the defendant‘s acts were 
a substantial factor contributing to the resulting death.  If so, that defendant is 
guilty.  Accompanying provocative acts of the accomplice do not dissipate 
culpability.  Morales and Perla acted together to try to kill Canas.  Because Perla‘s 
own provocative acts were a substantial factor in causing the death of Morales, the 
Antick line of cases does not apply.  (Id. at p. 221.) 
 
Finally, Perla‘s persistence in pursuing a violent confrontation with Canas 
is significant.  The decision to abandon a conflict is an important one in the law.  
Doing so may indicate a lack of criminal intent.11  A refusal to do so may reflect 
the required mens rea.  Here, Perla had many opportunities to walk away from the 
conflict but relentlessly refused to do so.  After the ―family council‖ in which she 
raised the prospect of assaulting Canas, she went with Jorge and Morales to the 
place chosen for the fight.  She knew that Morales had a BB gun because he shot it 
several times out the car window.  When they left the scene because Canas did not 
arrive, there was a major break in the action.  But Perla refused to let matters lie.  
The next day, even after rounding up her accomplices and bringing a gun to the 
scene, she had several opportunities to turn away from the potential for violence.  
As noted, the trio had to wait for Canas‘s arrival.  Rather than leave, Perla stayed 
and tried to persuade Osguera to depart.  During the initial conflict between Canas 
and Morales, Perla did nothing to try to stop the fight.  When Morales ran to her, 
                                              
11  
For example, abandonment can be a defense to attempted crimes.  CALJIC 
No. 6.02 states:  ―If a person intends to commit a crime but, before committing 
any act toward the ultimate commission of the crime, freely and voluntarily 
abandons the original intent and makes no effort to accomplish it, that person has 
not attempted to commit the crime.‖  (See also CALCRIM No. 460.) 
 
16 
they could have withdrawn.  Instead, Perla raised the level of violence by 
introducing the rifle.  These facts reflect Perla‘s relentless pursuit of a violent 
confrontation, the deadly potential of which she ensured. 
II. 
Instructional Error Was Harmless 
 
As noted, Perla was convicted of the attempted premeditated and deliberate 
murder of Canas.  She did not challenge that conviction in the Court of Appeal or 
otherwise claim the jury was improperly instructed on that count.  She does assert 
error, however, in the instructions addressing the mental state required to convict 
her of the first degree murder of Morales. 
 
The jury instructions summarized the possible options for verdicts on the 
charged offenses.12  With respect to the crime against Canas (count 1), the jury 
was told it could find Perla guilty of either attempted murder or attempted 
voluntary manslaughter, or not guilty of any crime.  The jury was instructed 
accordingly on the required elements of attempted murder (CALCRIM No. 600) 
and attempted voluntary manslaughter, under the theories of heat of passion 
(CALCRIM Nos. 603) and imperfect self-defense (CALCRIM No. 604).  With 
respect to the death of Morales (count 2), the jury was told it could find Perla 
guilty of either first or second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter or not guilty 
of any crime.  It was instructed on the requirements for provocative act murder 
(CALCRIM No. 560), and on the lesser included offense of voluntary 
manslaughter (CALCRIM Nos. 570, 571).  
 
The jury received potentially confusing instructions about how to determine 
the degree of the Morales murder.  With regard to the provocative act murder of 
Morales, the jury was told:  ―If you decide that the defendant is guilty of murder, 
you must decide whether the murder is first or second degree.  [¶] To prove that 
the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, the People must prove that:  [¶] One, 
                                              
12  
The instructions also explained the various options and requirements for 
separate findings on the allegations related to these charges.  Because those 
instructions are not relevant to the issue before us, we do not discuss them. 
 
17 
as a result of the defendant’s provocative act, Fernando Morales was killed during 
the commission of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder; and [¶] 
Two, defendant intended to commit attempted willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated murder when she did the provocative act.  [¶]  In deciding whether 
the defendant intended to commit attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated 
murder and whether the death occurred during the commission of attempted 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, you should refer to the instructions I 
have given you on attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder.‖  
(CALCRIM No. 560, italics added.)13  The jury was instructed on the mental state 
for attempted murder pursuant to CALCRIM No. 601:  ―If you find the defendant 
guilty of attempted murder under Count 1, you must then decide whether the 
People have proved the additional allegation that the attempted murder was done 
willfully, and with deliberation and premeditation.  [¶] The defendant Perla 
Gonzalez acted willfully if she intended to kill when she acted.  The defendant 
Perla Gonzalez deliberated if she carefully weighed the considerations for and 
against her choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill.  The defendant 
                                              
13  
CALCRIM No. 560 sets forth two alternatives for defining what constitutes 
a first degree murder under the provocative act doctrine:  (1) the defendant‘s 
provocative act was a murder or attempted murder that the defendant personally 
committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation; or (2) the defendant‘s 
provocative act caused death during the defendant‘s intentional commission of one 
of the enumerated felonies in section 189.  The trial court instructed the jury with 
the second of these alternatives, cross-referencing the instruction on attempted 
murder.  However, attempted murder is not one of the enumerated felonies in 
section 189.  (Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 661, fn. 2.)  When a defendant‘s 
provocative act is committed in the course of an attempted murder, as occurred 
here, the jury should be instructed on first degree murder in accordance with 
CALCRIM No. 560‘s explanation of deliberation and premeditation.  In contrast 
to the ―enumerated felony‖ alternative, this instruction specifically cautions that a 
conviction of first degree provocative act murder requires a finding that the 
defendant ―personally . . . acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation 
when the (murder/attempted murder) was committed.‖  (CALCRIM No. 560, 
italics added; see Concha, at p. 666.) 
 
18 
Perla Gonzalez premeditated if she decided to kill before acting.  [¶] The 
attempted murder was done willfully and with deliberation and 
premeditation if either the defendant or Fernando Morales or both of them 
acted with that state of mind.‖  (All emphasis added.) 
 
These instructions properly informed the jury that, before Perla could be 
convicted of the provocative act murder of Morales, the prosecution had to prove 
Morales was killed during the commission of an attempted premeditated and 
deliberate murder.  Furthermore, the jury was instructed that a first degree murder 
conviction required a finding that Perla herself acted with an intent to kill formed 
after deliberation, and with premeditation, when she committed the provocative 
act.  The terms ―willful,‖ ―deliberate,‖ and ―premeditated‖ were properly defined 
and linked to Perla.  It is the last sentence of CALCRIM No. 601, set out in 
boldface above, that creates the potential for confusion.  That sentence is a correct 
statement of the mental state requirements for an attempted murder committed by 
a defendant and an accomplice.  When referred to in the context of defining a first 
degree provocative act murder, however, the sentence gives the incorrect 
impression that the defendant can be found to have acted with premeditation and 
deliberation if either the defendant or an accomplice harbored that mental state. 
 
We recently explained the circumstances in which liability for first degree 
murder may attach under the provocative act doctrine:  ―Where the individual 
defendant personally intends to kill and acts with that intent willfully, deliberately, 
and with premeditation, the defendant may be liable for first degree murder for 
each unlawful killing proximately caused by his or her acts, including a 
provocative act murder.  Where malice is implied from the defendant‘s conduct or 
where the defendant did not personally act willfully, deliberately, and with 
premeditation, the defendant cannot be held liable for first degree murder.‖  
(Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 663-664.)  The mens rea required for a first 
degree murder is thus different from that required for attempted murder.  Whereas 
an attempted murder conviction requires that either the defendant or a principal 
 
19 
acted with premeditation and deliberation, ―for a first degree murder conviction 
[under the provocative act doctrine], the jury must find that the individual 
defendant personally acted willfully, and with deliberation and premeditation 
during the attempted murder.  ([People v.] McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1118.)‖  
(Concha, at p. 666.)  Accordingly, when a provocative act theory is relied on, the 
jury should be instructed that first degree murder requires proof that the defendant 
personally premeditated and deliberated the attempted murder that provoked a 
lethal response. 
 
Here, the jury was properly instructed in detail about the mental state Perla 
was required to have in order to be convicted of the first degree murder of 
Morales.  However, because the court cross-referenced CALCRIM No. 601‘s 
instruction on attempted murder, they were also told that the mens rea requirement 
for this conviction could be satisfied if Morales acted with premeditation and 
deliberation in attempting to kill Canas.  The final sentence of CALCRIM No. 601 
is an incorrect statement of the mens rea required for first degree murder under the 
provocative act doctrine, as the Attorney General concedes. 
 
Both sides agree the instructions were deficient, but they disagree about 
whether the error requires reversal.  (See Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 666-667 
[remanding for determination of prejudice].)  The conflicting sentence in 
CALCRIM No. 601 had the potential to override, or cancel out, the otherwise 
correct instructions the jury received on first degree murder, making it conceivable 
that the jury could convict on first degree murder without deciding whether Perla 
acted with premeditation and deliberation.  The same potential for prejudice arises 
when jury instructions omit an element of an offense.  Accordingly, we consider 
the prejudicial effect of the error here in the context of cases dealing with the 
failure to instruct on all elements of an offense. 
 
―[A]n instructional error that improperly . . . omits an element of an 
offense . . . generally is not a structural defect in the trial mechanism that defies 
harmless error review and automatically requires reversal under the federal 
 
20 
Constitution.‖  (People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 502-503.)  Instead, an 
erroneous instruction that omits an element of an offense is subject to harmless 
error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.  (Neder v. United 
States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 15 (Neder); People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 
256.)  In general, the Chapman test probes ―whether it appears ‗beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained.‘  [Citations.]‖  (Neder, at pp. 15-16.)  The high court in Neder 
analogized instructional errors that arguably prevent the jury from finding an 
element of an offense to the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence.  (Id. at 
pp. 17-18.)  In such cases, ―the harmless-error inquiry must be essentially the 
same:  Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found 
the defendant guilty absent the error?‖  (Id. at p. 18.) 
 
The jury heard uncontroverted evidence that Perla personally premeditated 
and deliberated the attempted murder of Canas.  Perla came to her brother 
Ricardo‘s house the night of his dispute with Canas.  She plotted with others to 
assault Canas in retribution.  She went with her brother Jorge and Morales to the 
spot where they planned to fight Canas.  After that goal was thwarted because 
Canas did not arrive, Perla devised a new plan, which she launched the next 
morning.  With her license plate obscured and a loaded rifle in the back of her car, 
she rounded up her accomplices and checked to make sure Canas had not yet 
picked up his daughter.  She then drove to the planned ambush spot and waited for 
Canas.  She urged an adult witness (Osguera) to leave before the confrontation 
occurred.  During the ensuing fight initiated by her accomplice, Perla waited by 
the car, the rifle within reach.  When the fight turned against Morales, Perla 
immediately seized the loaded weapon, pulled back the hammer so that it was 
ready to fire, and handed it to Morales for him to use against Canas.  
 
In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27, we identified three 
categories of evidence relevant to determining premeditation and deliberation:  
(1) events before the murder that indicate planning; (2) a motive to kill; and (3) a 
 
21 
manner of killing that reflects a preconceived design to kill.  As we have 
repeatedly pointed out, and now reaffirm, ―[t]he Anderson guidelines are 
descriptive, not normative.  [Citation.]‖  (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 
1125.)  They are not all required (see People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 
1021), nor are they exclusive in describing the evidence that will support a finding 
of premeditation and deliberation.  (People v. Perez, at p. 1125.) 
 
Even so, the evidence here satisfies all three Anderson factors.  The jury 
could have fairly concluded the following:  (1) Perla planned to attack Canas when 
he was especially vulnerable, both because he did not expect the confrontation 
with people who were strangers to him and because he was in the presence of his 
three-year-old daughter.  Perla planned to use deadly force against Canas because 
she brought a loaded rifle to the ambush site and stood within grabbing distance of 
the weapon throughout the fight.  She obscured her license plate to thwart 
identification and apprehension.  (2) Perla had a motive to kill Canas because of 
his conflict with her brother.  (3) When Canas successfully fought off a knife 
attack, Perla deliberately escalated the violence of the encounter by handing her 
accomplice a loaded, cocked rifle.  Her orchestration of an armed assault on an 
unsuspecting, unarmed man, and her giving of a gun to a man she knew had just 
used deadly force, are acts that reflect a preconceived design to kill.  The incident 
could have ended when Morales ran from the fight toward Perla at the car.  Rather 
than permit cessation of the hostilities, Perla handed Morales the cocked and 
loaded rifle she had brought to ensure that Canas would be punished and, if 
necessary, killed.  From this evidence, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found Perla premeditated and deliberated the attempted 
murder of Canas.  (Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 18; People v. Concha (2010) 182 
Cal.App.4th 1072, 1089-1090.) 
 
The defense strongly contested Perla‘s intent to kill Canas, claiming instead 
that she acted in self-defense or defense of others.  Defense counsel argued that 
Perla handed Morales the gun because she wanted to help him protect himself, not 
 
22 
because she had maliciously intended that he use it to kill.  However, in finding 
Perla guilty of attempted murder, the jury necessarily determined that she 
personally intended to kill Canas.  ― ‗[T]he crime of attempted murder requires a 
specific intent to kill . . .‘ [Citation.]‖  (People v. Guerra, supra, 40 Cal.3d 377, 
386.)  Apart from disputing her intent to kill, Perla introduced no evidence or 
argument challenging the prosecution‘s case on the Anderson premeditation and 
deliberation factors.  As the Court of Appeal determined on remand in People v. 
Concha,14 here ―the evidence [Perla] introduced dealt with [her] participation in 
the murder and [her] intent to kill, and the jury found against [her] on those points.  
[She] did not contest the facts that go specifically to premeditation and 
deliberation . . . .‖  (People v. Concha, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1090.)  Thus, 
―[t]he facts supporting premeditation and deliberation were uncontradicted once 
the intent element was established.‖  (Ibid.) 
 
The evidence of Perla‘s planning and deliberation was quite strong.  
Conversely, the evidence that Morales alone intended a deadly outcome was 
weak.  Perla was clearly the driving force behind the attack.  She was the one with 
the motive and hostility toward Canas.  Morales did not even know Canas.  Perla 
recruited him to participate, and, when the fight turned against him, Perla urged 
him to shoot Canas with a loaded rifle.  Perla‘s brother Jorge said he would attack 
Canas with a baseball bat, and Morales agreed to help if Canas was besting Jorge.  
The evidence suggests Morales was thrust into a leading role only because Jorge 
left to secure help with Perla‘s disabled car.  When Perla handed Morales the 
loaded rifle, he had been disarmed and was losing the fight.  Morales may have 
believed he needed to shoot in self-defense, or he may have made an impulsive 
                                              
14  
We reversed the judgment in Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th at page 667, for the 
same instructional error that occurred here.  On remand, the Court of Appeal 
determined the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because evidence 
that the defendant personally premeditated and deliberated the attempted murder 
was uncontradicted.  (People v. Concha, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1089-
1090.) 
 
23 
decision to use the rifle and win the fight.  In contrast, Perla‘s life was never in 
danger, and there is no evidence suggesting her decision to retrieve and cock a 
loaded rifle that she brought to the fight was rash or unconsidered.  On this 
evidence, it is highly unlikely that a rational jury would have concluded Morales 
alone acted with deliberate deadly intent, and convicted Perla of first degree 
murder based on Morales‘s state of mind. 
 
Finally, Perla argues the instructional error cannot be considered harmless 
because, even if a hypothetical rational jury would have found she acted with 
premeditation and deliberation, there is an indication that this jury may have 
rendered a verdict tainted by the error.  Like the dissenting justice below, she finds 
it significant that the jury sent out a note during deliberations requesting an 
explanation of second degree murder.  In response, the court directed the jury to 
CALCRIM No. 560.  As noted, CALCRIM No. 560 directly and accurately 
described the state of mind Perla herself must have formed to be guilty of first 
degree murder.  However, the version of CALCRIM No. 560 given to this jury 
also referred to the instruction on attempted murder for an explanation of 
premeditation and deliberation. 
 
In light of the jury‘s question, Perla argues the appropriate test of prejudice 
is not whether a rational jury would have found she acted with premeditation and 
deliberation (Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 18), but whether circumstances make it 
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that this jury so found.  She argues Neder‘s 
harmless error test applies only when the omitted element is undisputed and 
supported by overwhelming evidence.  Because her mental state was a hotly 
contested issue at trial, Perla contends the appropriate harmless error test is 
furnished not by Neder, but by Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 404-405.  We 
disagree.  Yates articulated guidelines for determining when an erroneous 
mandatory presumption instruction is harmless.  The prejudicial impact of such an 
error is quite different from the omission of an instruction on a required element of 
an offense.  Presumptions narrow the jury‘s focus and may potentially cause jurors 
 
24 
to ignore evidence related to the matter presumed.  (See id. at pp. 405-406.)  
Although the Chapman test typically requires harmlessness to be judged from a 
review of the entire record (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 681), it 
cannot always be assumed that a jury instructed with an erroneous mandatory 
presumption did, in fact, consider all the evidence on the issue in question.  (Yates, 
at pp. 405-406.)  Thus, in this specific context, Yates held that ―the issue under 
Chapman is whether the jury actually rested its verdict on evidence establishing 
the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of the presumption.‖  
(Yates, at p. 404.) 
 
By contrast, Neder furnishes the appropriate harmless error test for 
instructions that erroneously omit an element of an offense.  (People v. Mil (2012) 
53 Cal.4th 400, 409-415.)  In this context, the Neder court concluded a 
demonstration of harmless error does not require proof that a particular jury 
―actually rested its verdict on the proper ground (Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at 
pp. 17–18), but rather on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error (id. at p. 18).  Although the 
former can be proof of the latter (see id. at p. 26 (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.)), the 
Neder majority made clear that such a determination is not essential to a finding of 
harmlessness (id. at p. 16, fn. 1), which instead ‗will often require that a reviewing 
court conduct a thorough examination of the record‘ (id. at p. 19).‖  (People v. 
Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 71, second italics added (conc. opn. of Baxter, J.).) 
 
We have exhaustively reviewed the trial evidence to determine ―whether 
the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with 
respect to the omitted element‖ of premeditation and deliberation.  (Neder, supra, 
527 U.S. at p. 19; see People v. Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 417.)  We have 
concluded no rational juror could find that Perla intended to murder Canas but did 
not personally act with premeditation and deliberation. 
 
Perla speculates that the jury‘s request for an instruction on second degree 
murder indicates it was focused on the issue of whether she could be held 
 
25 
vicariously liable for Morales‘s mental state.  However, other concerns may have 
just as easily prompted the request.  The jury‘s note first asked, ―Is [instruction] 
#39 for second degree murder?‖  It then stated, ―We need an explanation of 2nd 
degree murder.‖  Although the jury had received instructions on all the lesser 
included offenses of murder and attempted murder, and a specific instruction 
defining premeditated and deliberate attempted murder, it received no separate 
instruction explaining what constitutes a second degree murder.  The jury was 
simply told, as jurors have long been instructed in this state, that a murder that 
does not meet the requirements of first degree murder is murder in the second 
degree.  The jury may have believed it was missing a necessary instruction, or it 
may have been confused about the difference between lesser degrees of an offense 
and lesser included offenses.  The jury asked whether instruction No. 39 described 
second degree murder, but this instruction set forth the required elements of 
voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion, a lesser included offense of 
murder.15  Nor do we believe the court‘s response, referencing CALCRIM 
No. 560, necessarily renders the error prejudicial.  If that were the standard, any 
instructional error that elicits a related jury question would be reversible per se, 
without regard to the evidence.  That is not the law.  (Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at 
pp. 8-9; see also Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212, 218-221.) 
 
Because the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have found that Perla personally premeditated and deliberated the attempted 
murder of Canas, the absence of an instruction on this point was harmless.  
(Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 18.) 
                                              
15  
Instruction No. 39 was CALCRIM No. 570, ―Voluntary Manslaughter: 
Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense.‖  
 
26 
 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J.   
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Gonzales 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 190 Cal.App.4th 968 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S189856 
Date Filed: July 5, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: Michael Knish, Commissioner 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Laura G. Schaefer, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Steven T. Oetting, Gil Gonzalez and 
William M. Wood, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Laura G. Schaefer 
Boyce & Schaefer 
934 23rd Street 
San Diego, CA  92102-1914 
(619) 232-3320 
 
William M. Wood 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2202