Case Title: Ex parte Kenneth Eugene Smith. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Kenneth Eugene Smith v. State of Alabama) (Jefferson Circuit Court: CC-89-1149.61; Criminal Appeals: CR-2023-0594).

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC-2023-0934

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2024-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: January 12, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0934 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte Kenneth Eugene Smith 
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
 TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS  
 
(In re: Kenneth Eugene Smith  
 
v. 
 
 State of Alabama)  
 
(Jefferson Circuit Court: CC-89-1149.61; 
Court of Criminal Appeals: CR-2023-0594) 
 
SHAW, Justice. 
 
WRIT DENIED.  NO OPINION. 
SC-2023-0934 
2 
 
 
Parker, C.J., and Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, Stewart, and Mitchell, 
JJ., concur.  
 
Cook, J., concurs specially, with opinion.  
 
Wise, J., recuses herself. 
 
 
SC-2023-0934 
3 
 
COOK, Justice (concurring specially). 
I concur with denying Kenneth Eugene Smith's petition for a writ 
of certiorari. I write specially to explain (1) why I initially dissented when 
the State of Alabama asked this Court to set a second execution date to 
carry out Smith's death sentence and (2) why I now believe that Smith 
has failed to show that he is entitled to certiorari relief. 
Smith was originally convicted of capital murder and sentenced to 
death in 1989, but that conviction was reversed on appeal, and a new 
trial was ordered. See Smith v. State, 588 So. 2d 561 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1991), on return to remand, 620 So. 2d 727 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), on 
return to second remand, 620 So. 2d 732 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). 
Following his new trial in 1996, Smith was again convicted of capital 
murder and sentenced to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed 
Smith's conviction and sentence. See Smith v. State, 908 So. 2d 273 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 2000), cert. quashed, 908 So. 2d 302 (Ala. 2005). 
In 2006, Smith filed his first petition for postconviction relief 
pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., which was denied by the Jefferson 
SC-2023-0934 
4 
 
Circuit Court.1 The judgment denying that Rule 32 petition was later 
affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Smith v. State, 160 So. 
3d 40, 55 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). 
On June 24, 2022, the State filed a motion to set Smith's execution 
date. This Court granted that motion on September 30, 2022, setting 
Smith's execution for November 17, 2022.   
During that time, Smith raised and litigated in federal court a 
method-of-execution challenge to Alabama's use of lethal injection.  After 
considering Smith's challenge, the United States Supreme Court 
concluded that Smith's execution should go forward on November 17, 
2022. However, on that date, the execution could not proceed because the 
Alabama Department of Corrections was unable to set intravenous lines 
for the lethal injection.  
After that occurred, Smith filed a challenge to Alabama's continued 
use of lethal injection for his method of execution in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. As part of his prayer 
 
1Smith also sought relief in federal court, which was likewise 
denied. Smith v. Commissioner, Alabama Dep't of Corr., 850 F. App'x 726 
(11th Cir. 2021). 
 
SC-2023-0934 
5 
 
for relief in that case, Smith sought execution by means of nitrogen 
hypoxia, as authorized under Alabama law. See § 15-18-82.1, Ala. Code 
1975. The State ultimately agreed that it would use the nitrogen-hypoxia 
method for Smith's execution and that it would not attempt to execute 
him again by lethal injection. 
In May 2023, Smith filed a second Rule 32 petition in the circuit 
court in which he alleged that a second attempt to execute him, by any 
means, would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
the United States and Alabama Constitutions. Smith further alleged that 
he could not have raised this argument in his direct appeal or in his 
previously filed Rule 32 petition because, he said, the circumstances 
supporting such an argument had not occurred. The circuit court issued 
an order dismissing that petition, which Smith appealed to the Court of 
Criminal Appeals.   
While that appeal was pending before the Court of Criminal 
Appeals, the State asked this Court to set a second execution date for 
Smith. That request was granted on November 1, 2023. Because I 
believed that, before setting Smith's second execution date, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals -- and, perhaps, this Court -- should have the 
SC-2023-0934 
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opportunity to decide whether there was any legal basis for Smith's new 
argument that a second execution attempt would constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment, I dissented to the issuance of Smith's death 
warrant at that point.2  
Less than a month after this Court granted the State's request, the 
Court of Criminal Appeals issued an opinion unanimously affirming the 
 
2In particular, I believed that our courts should have had the 
opportunity to consider whether there was any authority that would bear 
on the original public meaning of the Eighth Amendment's text regarding 
"cruel and unusual" punishment as applied to a second execution 
attempt, including any historical evidence bearing on such original public 
meaning.  See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 33 (Thomson/West 2012) (explaining that a 
court should consider "how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the 
language, would have understood the text at the time it was issued"); Jay 
Mitchell, Textualism in Alabama, 74 Ala. L. Rev. 1089, 1092 (2023) 
(explaining that "the meaning of a law is its original public meaning"); 
see also New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 15-17, 
19 (2022) (explaining that the framework for analyzing a constitutional 
challenge includes "text, as informed by history"); id. at 79 (Kavanaugh, 
J., concurring) (summarizing the majority opinion's framework as "text, 
history and tradition"). For instance, I was aware that there were some 
commentators who had argued that there was scattered historical 
evidence indicating that if a defendant survived an execution attempt, 
there might be a choice not to attempt a second execution. See, e.g., Sara 
McDougall & David Perry, In the Middle Ages, Botched Executions Were 
a Sign, Slate, Dec. 4, 2022 (at the time of this decision, a copy of this 
article 
could 
be 
located 
at: 
https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2022/12/alabama-executions-kenneth-eugene-smith-history-
capital-punishment.html).  
SC-2023-0934 
7 
 
circuit court's dismissal of Smith's second Rule 32 petition after 
concluding that his petition was meritless and was insufficiently pleaded. 
See Smith v. State, [Ms. CR-2023-0594, Dec. 8, 2023] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 
Crim. App. 2023). In support of its decision, the Court of Criminal 
Appeals heavily relied on a factually similar case, State v. Broom, 146 
Ohio St. 3d 60, 51 N.E.3d 620 (2016), in which the Supreme Court of Ohio 
rejected a defendant's challenge under the Eighth Amendment and 
Ohio's constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment to a 
second execution attempt after the first had failed because intravenous 
lines could not be established. 
After his application for rehearing was overruled, Smith, on 
December 18, 2023, filed the instant petition seeking certiorari review of 
the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision.  
In his petition, Smith alleges, pursuant to Rule 39(a)(1)(D), Ala. R. 
App. P., that a conflict exists between the Court of Criminal Appeals' 
decision and decisions from the United States Supreme Court. He also 
alleges, pursuant to Rule 39(a)(1)(C), Ala. R. App. P., that a material 
SC-2023-0934 
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question of first impression exists in this case.3 As explained below, I do 
not believe that Smith has adequately demonstrated that he is entitled 
to relief under either of those grounds and, thus, concur with denying his 
petition. 
First, Smith alleges that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision 
"directly conflicts with multiple precedents governing … the scope of the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment." 
Petition at 3 (citing Rule 39(a)(1)(D), Ala. R. App. P.).  Specifically, he 
alleges: 
"[T]he Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion failed to 
acknowledge, much less apply, the correct legal test to Mr. 
Smith's Eighth Amendment claim: that a State's successive 
attempt to execute a condemned person after 'a series of 
abortive attempts or even a single, cruelly willful attempt' is 
prohibited. La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471 
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 
 
3Nowhere in his petition does Smith overtly mention the Court of 
Criminal Appeals' reliance on State v. Broom, 146 Ohio St. 3d 60, 51 
N.E.3d 620 (2016). However, he does allege in a footnote that the Court 
of Criminal Appeals' reliance on "a decision from the Ohio Supreme 
Court" was erroneous because, he says, the Supreme Court of Ohio failed 
to use the "correct test" in reaching its holding in that case. Petition at 7 
n.2. In making this argument, however, Smith does not allege any 
grounds for certiorari review or otherwise explain how the Court of 
Criminal Appeals' reliance on Broom was improper. I therefore see no 
reason to consider Smith's brief argument on this point as a basis for 
determining whether he is entitled to certiorari relief.     
SC-2023-0934 
9 
 
50 (2008) (plurality op.)." 
 
Petition at 4. 
Although Smith alleges that the Court of Criminal Appeals' 
decision conflicts with "multiple precedents," he cites only (1) Justice 
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. 
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), and (2) a plurality opinion in Baze v. Rees, 
553 U.S. 35 (2008), in support of his conflict ground. (Emphasis added.) 
Neither a lone concurring opinion nor a plurality opinion of the United 
States Supreme Court constitutes a "prior decision" for purposes of the 
conflict ground under Rule 39(a)(1)(D), Ala. R. App. P. See Ex parte 
Dearman, 322 So. 3d 5, 6 n.1 (Ala. 2020) (noting that, a plurality decision 
"is not a 'prior decision[]' of the Court of Civil Appeals for purposes of 
Rule 39(A)(1)(D), Ala. R. App. P."); Ex parte Ball, 323 So. 3d 1187, 1188 
(Ala. 2020) (Parker, C.J., concurring specially) (noting that "by allowing 
certiorari review of decisions that conflict with a 'prior decision' of an 
appellate court, Rule 39(a)(1)(D) provides a vehicle for this Court to 
ensure that the courts of appeals decide cases consistently with 
controlling precedent and for this Court to resolve inconsistencies 
between binding precedents of the courts of appeals.  Therefore, a 'prior 
SC-2023-0934 
10 
 
decision' is necessarily a prior case that constitutes binding precedent on 
a relevant point."); Peraita v. State, [Ms. CR-17-1025, Aug. 6, 2021] ___ 
So. 3d ___, ___ n.6 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021) (noting that "plurality opinions 
… are not binding 'prior decisions'"). Because Smith has failed to 
properly allege that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision conflicts with 
actual "prior decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States" as 
required by Rule 39(a)(1)(D), I concur with denying his petition on his 
asserted conflict ground.  
Even if the portions of Justice Frankfurter's special concurrence in 
Resweber and the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Baze on which 
Smith relies qualified as "prior decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States" for the purposes of Rule 39(a)(1)(D), Smith's allegation 
that they "directly conflict[]" with the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision 
is wrong. (Emphasis added.) For example, in Resweber, the United States 
Supreme Court examined whether the use of the same method of 
execution for a second time following an initial failed execution attempt 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment. In Baze, the United States Supreme Court examined 
whether a particular lethal-injection protocol was unconstitutional under 
SC-2023-0934 
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the Eighth Amendment. In both cases, the United States Supreme Court 
concluded that the challenged actions did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See 
Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463-64 (holding that a second attempt at execution 
was not cruel and unusual punishment); Baze, 553 U.S. at 41 (holding 
that a particular lethal-injection protocol was not unconstitutional). 
Here, Smith does not challenge the new method of execution. 
Instead, he alleges that an attempt to execute him for a second time by a 
different method of execution would constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. As stated previously, the 
Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that a second execution attempt 
under such circumstances would not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the United States and Alabama Constitutions 
-- a conclusion that is not contradicted by the Supreme Court's rulings in 
Resweber and Baze.  
This Court will grant certiorari review only if we conclude "that 
there is probability of merit in the petition." Rule 39(f), Ala. R. App. P. 
Because the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision does not appear to be 
contradicted by Resweber and Baze, this is a second reason not to grant 
SC-2023-0934 
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Smith's petition on his asserted conflict ground.   
Second, at the very end of his petition, Smith also alleges, pursuant 
to Rule 39(a)(1)(C), Ala. R. App. P., that a material question of first 
impression exists as to whether his execution is barred by Article I, § 15, 
of the Alabama Constitution. That provision provides that "excessive 
fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted." 
After quoting a portion of § 15, Smith alleges in a single paragraph: 
"[W]hether Article I, Section 15 of the Alabama Constitution 
also 
prohibits 
a 
second 
execution 
attempt 
in 
the 
circumstances alleged here is one of first impression. 
Accordingly, this Court should grant the writ of certiorari to 
address that question of first impression, which implicates a 
foundational right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment at the hands of the State." 
 
Petition at 15.  
 
Smith cites no Alabama caselaw to support this argument, and he 
cites no authority on the original public meaning of this provision of our 
Constitution.  Smith fails to explain why the Alabama Constitution 
would prohibit his execution in this case, whether the slightly differing 
language employed in the United States and Alabama Constitutions 
would change the analysis of the challenge he is raising, or how this 
constitutional provision should be applied differently from the Eighth 
SC-2023-0934 
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Amendment. In fact, other than quoting Article I, § 15, of the Alabama 
Constitution, he makes no attempt at all to discuss this Alabama 
constitutional provision. By failing to do so, Smith has not demonstrated 
any probability of merit as to this claim under Rule 39(a)(1)(C). It is for 
this additional reason that I concur with denying his petition.