Case Title: Dolence v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-52

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-08-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Dolence v. State1996 WY 109921 P.2d 1103Case Number: 96-52Decided: 08/16/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Robert Lee DOLENCE,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming,

 Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

Robert Lee 
Dolence, pro se.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Mark T. Moran, Assistant Attorney 
General, for Appellee.

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Robert 
Dolence appeals from the district court's order which declared that his sentence 
was legal.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellant did not 
include a statement of the issues in his brief as is required by W.R.A.P. 
7.01(d). We have discerned from his brief, however, that his primary contention 
is that the district court erred when it found that his sentence was legal. He 
also argues that he did not receive effective assistance of 
counsel.

[¶4]      In 1976, 
Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree rape and one count of 
assault with a deadly weapon. The district court ordered him to serve a term of 
not less than life in the state penitentiary on the rape conviction and a term 
of not less than seven years nor more than fourteen years on the assault 
conviction.

[¶5]      On January 18, 
1996, after he had spent approximately two decades in prison, Appellant filed a 
pro se motion in which he contested the legality of his life sentence. 
The district court denied his motion, and Appellant subsequently perfected an 
appeal to this Court.

[¶6]      Appellant argues 
that his life sentence was illegal because it did not comply with the 
indeterminate sentencing statute. Specifically, he contends that the district 
court erred by sentencing him to serve a life term on his first-degree rape 
conviction without specifying a minimum term.

[¶7]      Appellant was 
convicted of first-degree rape under § 6-63(A). That section 
stated:

(A) Whoever unlawfully 
has carnal knowledge of a woman or female child forcibly and against her will is 
guilty of first-degree rape, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for any 
term not less than one (1) year, or during life.

WYO. STAT. § 
6-63(A) (Supp. 1975). At the time when Appellant was sentenced, § 7-313 set 
forth the requirements for indeterminate sentencing:

When a convict is 
sentenced to the state penitentiary, otherwise than for life, for an offense or 
crime, the court imposing the sentence shall not fix a definite term of 
imprisonment, but shall establish a maximum and minimum term for which said 
convict shall be held in said prison.

WYO. STAT. § 
7-313 (1957).

[¶8]      In Jaramillo v. 
State, 517 P.2d 490 (1974), this Court considered a sentencing issue which was 
similar to that presented by Appellant in this case. Jaramillo received a life 
sentence after he was convicted of second degree murder under WYO. STAT. § 6-55 
(1957). 517 P.2d  at 490-91. That statute provided that "one guilty be imprisoned 
`for any term not less than twenty years, or during life.'" 517 P.2d  at 492 
(quoting § 6-55).

[¶9]      Jaramillo argued 
that his sentence was improper because it did not include a maximum term and a 
minimum term. The Court first noted that the sentencing judge has broad 
discretion in determining the length of a sentence. Id.; see also Candelaria v. 
State, 895 P.2d 434, 440 (Wyo. 1995). The Court went on to state that the 
requirement for setting maximum and minimum terms did not apply to life 
sentences because § 7-313 provided that it applied to sentences "`other wise 
than for life.'" Jaramillo, 517 P.2d  at 492 (quoting § 7-313) (emphasis 
omitted).

[¶10]   In this case, § 6-63(A) provided 
that a person who had been convicted of first-degree rape could be sentenced to 
life in prison. Since the district court determined that a life sentence was 
appropriate, it was not bound to set a minimum term under § 7-313. The district 
court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in this 
case.

[¶11]   Appellant also argues that his 
counsel provided ineffective assistance when he did not object at the sentencing 
hearing to the life sentence and did not file a motion to correct the illegal 
sentence. As we have already stated, Appellant's contention that his sentence 
was illegal has no merit; accordingly, his counsel cannot be faulted for 
refusing to pursue that matter.

[¶12]   Affirmed.