Case Title: Vargas v. City of Salinas

Citation: 46 Cal. 4th 1

Docket Number: S140911

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2009-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 4/20/09 (appx. follows counsel listing at end of document) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
ANGELINA MORFIN VARGAS et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S140911 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H027693 
CITY OF SALINAS et al., 
) 
 
) 
Monterey County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. M61489 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
Plaintiffs — proponents and supporters of a local ballot measure that 
proposed the repeal of a utility users tax imposed by the City of Salinas — filed 
this lawsuit against the City of Salinas (the City) challenging the validity of a 
number of actions taken by the City relating to the ballot measure.  In Stanson v. 
Mott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 206 (Stanson), we explained that because of potential 
constitutional questions that may be presented by a public entity’s expenditure of 
public funds in connection with a ballot measure that is to be voted upon in an 
upcoming election, there is a need to distinguish between (1) “campaign” 
materials and activities that presumptively may not be paid for by public funds, 
and (2) “informational” material that ordinarily may be financed by public 
expenditures.  We noted in Stanson that although there are some communications 
or activities that clearly fall within one of these categories or the other, under some 
circumstances it may be necessary to examine the “style, tenor, and timing” of a 
 
1 
communication (id. at p. 222 & fn. 8) in order to determine whether it should be 
characterized as permissible or impermissible. 
In the present case, the Court of Appeal concluded that in light of a 
statutory provision enacted subsequent to Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, a 
municipality’s expenditure of public funds on a communication relating to a ballot 
measure is permissible whenever the communication does not “expressly 
advocate” a position with regard to the ballot measure.  The appellate court held 
that so long as a communication avoids this prohibition on “express advocacy” — 
a term of art originating in the context of regulations relating to private campaign 
contributions and expenditures, and referring to a limited and narrowly defined 
category of statements — there is no need to consider the communication’s “style, 
tenor, and timing” in determining the validity of the use of public funds on the 
communication.  Because plaintiffs conceded that the materials challenged in the 
present case did not (within the meaning of the express advocacy standard) 
expressly advocate a position regarding the ballot measure, the Court of Appeal on 
that basis alone concluded that plaintiffs’ legal challenge lacked merit and 
consequently upheld the trial court’s order striking plaintiffs’ action under Code of 
Civil Procedure section 425.16, California’s anti-SLAPP statute.1 
                                              
1  
SLAPP is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.”  
(Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57 (Equilon).)  
In 1992, the Legislature, finding there had been “a disturbing increase in lawsuits 
brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom 
of speech and petition for the redress of grievances” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, 
subd. (a)), enacted the motion-to-strike procedure of Code of Civil Procedure 
section 425.16 to provide a remedy against such lawsuits.  (Hereafter, all 
references to section 425.16 or its subdivisions are to this section of the Code of 
Civil Procedure.) 
 
2 
We granted review primarily to consider whether the Court of Appeal 
correctly identified the legal standard applicable to publicly funded, election-
related communications made by a municipality, and further to determine whether, 
under the appropriate standard, plaintiffs’ legal challenge to the City’s expenditure 
of public funds in this case should have been permitted to go forward. 
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the statute relied upon 
by the Court of Appeal was not intended, and should not be interpreted, to displace 
the analysis and standard set forth in our decision in Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 
206.  We further conclude that a municipality’s expenditure of public funds for 
materials or activities that reasonably are characterized as campaign materials or 
activities — including, for example, bumper stickers, mass media advertisement 
spots, billboards, door-to-door canvassing, or the like — is not authorized by the 
statute in question, even when the message delivered through such means does not 
meet the express-advocacy standard.  At the same time, we also conclude that the 
challenged actions of the City, here at issue, as a matter of law do not constitute 
improper campaign materials or activities under the standard set forth in Stanson.  
Accordingly, although we disagree with the legal standard applied by the Court of 
Appeal, we conclude that it correctly upheld the trial court’s ruling in favor of 
defendants and thus that the judgment of the Court of Appeal should be affirmed. 
 
 
I 
 
 
A 
 The controversy that gave rise to this litigation relates to a local initiative 
measure — ultimately designated Measure O — that was drafted and circulated in 
2001 by residents of the City.  Measure O proposed the adoption of an ordinance 
that immediately would cut in half, and over a few years totally repeal, the City’s 
Utility Users Tax (sometimes referred to as UUT).  The UUT was a local tax that 
had been in place for more than 30 years and that, at the time the measure was 
 
3 
presented to the voters, generated approximately $8 million in annual revenue for 
the City, a figure that represented 13 percent of the City’s general fund budget.2 
After gathering signatures, the proponents submitted the initiative petition 
to the county registrar of voters on September 24, 2001, and on October 3, 2001, 
that official certified it had been signed by the number of voters required to qualify 
the initiative for the ballot.  Under the provisions of Elections Code section 9215, 
when a local initiative petition obtains the requisite number of signatures, the local 
legislative body must take one of three actions: (1) adopt the proposed ordinance 
itself without alteration, (2) submit the proposed ordinance without alteration to 
the voters, at either the next regularly scheduled municipal election or at a special 
election, or (3) direct the municipality’s staff to prepare a report — as authorized 
by Elections Code section 9212 — on the impact that the proposed ordinance 
likely would have on the municipality. 
On October 9, 2001, the Salinas City Council adopted the third of these 
alternatives.  Under the direction of the city manager, each of the municipal 
departments conducted an initial study of the measure’s potential impact on the 
respective department, and on November 6, 2001, the city manager submitted the 
requested report to the city council.  The report stated in part that “the initial 
analysis leads to the conclusion that the repeal of the Utility Users Tax will require 
substantial service level reductions to City residents.”  At its November 6, 2001 
meeting, the city council, declining to adopt the proposed ordinance itself, voted to 
submit it to the voters at the next regularly scheduled municipal election, to be 
held the following year on November 5, 2002.  At the same time, the council 
                                              
2  
Measure O proposed to reduce the UUT from 6 percent to 3 percent upon 
passage of the initiative, to further reduce the tax to 1 percent on January 1, 2004, 
and to repeal it entirely on January 1, 2005. 
 
4 
directed city staff to conduct further study of the proposed cuts that would be 
required were Measure O to be adopted by the voters. 
In the following months, each of the municipal departments reviewed its 
operations and prepared detailed reports and financial analyses discussing the 
reduction or elimination of specific services or programs that could be 
implemented in the event Measure O were adopted. 
Pursuant to its usual schedule, the city council considered the proposed 
annual city budget for the 2002-2003 fiscal year at its June 11, 2002 meeting.  
Because it was not known at that time whether Measure O would be adopted at the 
upcoming November 2002 election, the city manager submitted a proposed budget 
that was based on the assumption that the City would continue to obtain revenue 
from the UUT at its current rate throughout the 2002-2003 fiscal year.  At that 
meeting, the city council voted to approve and adopt the proposed budget for the  
2002-2003 fiscal year.  Although the budget adopted by the city council assumed 
the City’s retention of the UUT, the material accompanying the proposed budget 
briefly noted program and service reductions that could be required were the UUT 
to be repealed.  The city manager stated at the June 11 meeting that he anticipated 
a detailed alternative budget — setting forth program and service reductions that 
could be implemented should the UUT repeal be adopted — soon would be 
presented to the city council so that this body could consider such an eventuality at 
its July 16, 2002 meeting. 
Two weeks later, in a lengthy report dated June 24, 2002, the city manager 
specifically identified the individual program and service reductions recommended 
by the city staff should Measure O be adopted.  The report discussed in detail the 
financial implications of the passage of that measure, including recommended 
program and service reductions in each city department. 
 
5 
The report formally was presented to the city council at its July 16, 2002 
meeting, at which numerous city residents — some supporters of Measure O, and 
some opponents — expressed their opinions regarding the staff recommendations 
and the overall impact of Measure O.  After an extensive discussion at the July 16 
meeting, the city council voted formally to accept the city staff’s recommendations 
with regard to the city services and programs that would be reduced or eliminated 
should Measure O be approved at the November 2002 election.  The council’s 
resolution listed numerous city facilities that would be closed and specific 
programs and services that would be eliminated or reduced if Measure O were 
adopted. 
Thereafter, at four weekly meetings of the city council held throughout the 
month of August 2002, each of the city departments made an extensive slide 
presentation to the public describing the reductions in services and programs that 
would be implemented in the event UUT revenues were reduced and ultimately 
eliminated through the passage of Measure O. 
At numerous city council meetings as well as at other venues, the 
proponents of Measure O sharply criticized the service and program reductions 
that had been recommended by city staff and adopted by the city council, 
contending that the anticipated reduction in city revenue could and should be dealt 
with through more efficient municipal operations and reductions in management 
positions and in employee salaries and benefits.  At the August 20, 2002 city 
council meeting, the proponents of Measure O distributed a document that set 
forth their own analysis of the City’s financial condition and of the financial 
implications were Measure O to pass, and that described a number of alternative 
courses of action that the proponents suggested would be preferable to the service 
and program reductions approved by the city council in the event Measure O were 
to be adopted. 
 
6 
At the August 27, 2002 city council meeting, the proponents of that 
measure formally presented their alternative proposals to the city council and to 
the public.  At that same meeting, the city staff presented a report critically 
analyzing the financial assumptions underlying the position and alternatives 
submitted by the proponents.   
Pursuant to the City’s normal practice, detailed minutes of each city council 
meeting — summarizing the statements of each speaker — were posted on the 
official Web site maintained by the City.  In addition to these minutes, the City 
posted on its official Web site (1) the lengthy June 24, 2002 report of the city 
manager setting forth the city finance department’s analysis of the financial impact 
of Measure O and describing in detail the service and program reductions 
recommended for each department, (2) the slide presentations that had been made 
by each of the city departments at the August 2002 city council meetings, and 
(3) the city staff’s August 27 report responding to the alternative implementation 
plans advanced by the proponents of Measure O.  
After the city council formally voted on July 16, 2002, to specify the 
particular city facilities, services, and programs that the council would eliminate or 
reduce if the UUT were repealed, the City produced a one-page document — 
characterized by the proponents of Measure O as a “flyer” or “leaflet” — that 
briefly described the initiative measure and the background of the utility users tax 
and that then stated, “On July 16, 2002, the Salinas City Council unanimously 
identified the services that would be eliminated or reduced if the Utility Users Tax 
is repealed.”  The document then listed, in separate categories, the “Facilities To 
Be Closed,” “Programs/Services To Be Eliminated,” “Community Funding To Be 
Eliminated,” and “Programs/Services To Be Reduced.”  Finally, the document 
advised that detailed information concerning the potential elimination or reduction 
of programs and services was contained in the June 24, 2002 report of the city 
 
7 
manager, and that the report was available to the public at city hall as well as in all 
city libraries and on the City’s Web site.  Copies of the one-page document (in 
English and Spanish) were made available to the public in the city clerk’s office at 
city hall and in all city libraries.3 
In addition to producing and making available to the public this one-page 
document, the City also informed the public of the city council’s July 16, 2002 
action (identifying the services and programs that would be eliminated or reduced 
if the UUT were repealed) through a number of articles published in the fall 2002 
edition of the City’s regular quarterly “City Round-up” newsletter, a publication 
that was mailed to all city residents prior to October 1, 2002.4   An article on the 
first page of the eight-page newsletter, entitled “Community to Decide Fate of 
Utility Users Tax,” contained the same text as the one-page document described 
above.  Another item, on page 3 of the newsletter, contained answers to frequently 
asked questions concerning the UUT, and additional articles on pages 4 and 5 of 
the newsletter described the proposed cuts to police, fire, and recreation/park 
services that would be implemented should the UUT be repealed.  Other articles 
                                              
3  
A copy of the English version of the one-page document is set forth in 
appendix A. 
4  
Although a declaration of one of the plaintiffs filed early in the litigation in 
support of a request for a temporary restraining order asserted that “[i]t is apparent 
that [the newsletter in question] is not the usual quarterly issue of the newsletter 
because the issue and year, which are stamped in the upper corner of the regular 
quarterly newsletter is absent,” the city manager immediately filed a responsive 
declaration stating explicitly that “[c]ontrary to the allegations by the Plaintiffs, 
the City Round-Up Newsletter was not a special issue.”  In a declaration filed in 
support of the motion to strike the complaint under section 425.16, the city 
manager reiterated that the newsletter in question was “[t]he City of Salinas’ Fall 
2002 edition of the ‘Round-Up’ Newsletter, Volume 3.”  In their opposition to the 
motion to strike, plaintiffs did not contest the city manager’s description of the 
newsletter as a regular quarterly issue of the City’s newsletter.   
 
8 
appearing in the fall 2002 newsletter concerned a variety of subjects of local 
interest unrelated to either the UUT or Measure O, including articles on local 
highway improvements (p. 2), a new “Neighborhood Problem Solver” guide 
developed by the City (p. 7), and a “Salinas Quiz” posing questions about local 
birds (p. 6).5 
 
 
B 
On October 7, 2002, shortly after the city newsletter was mailed to and 
received by city residents, plaintiffs — a number of Salinas residents who 
supported Measure O — filed the underlying lawsuit against the City and various 
city officials, contending that the City and its officials had engaged in unlawful 
campaign activities in utilizing public resources and funds “to prepare and 
distribute pamphlets, newsletters and Web site materials.”  The complaint 
maintained that the materials in question — characterized by the complaint as 
“campaign materials” — “do not provide a balanced analysis of the arguments in 
favor of and against Measure O” and improperly were intended to influence voters 
against Measure O.  The complaint sought declaratory, injunctive, and equitable 
relief, as well as the recovery of the public funds alleged to have been unlawfully 
expended in the production and distribution of the challenged materials (which the 
complaint asserted to be in excess of $250,000). 
Concurrently with the filing of the complaint, plaintiffs filed an ex parte 
application for a temporary restraining order.  Defendants filed an opposition to 
the application.  The trial court denied the requested temporary restraining order 
and set a hearing on plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction for 
November 8, 2002, three days after the scheduled election.  Measure O was 
                                              
5  
A copy of the newsletter is set forth in appendix B. 
 
9 
defeated at the November 5, 2002 election.  The hearing on the preliminary-
injunction request went forward on November 8, 2002, and at the conclusion of 
that hearing the trial court denied the request. 
In April 2004, after the trial court had granted defendants’ motion for 
judgment on the pleadings as to several counts of the original complaint and 
thereafter had permitted plaintiffs to file a supplemental complaint,6 defendants 
filed a special motion to strike plaintiffs’ supplemental complaint pursuant to 
section 425.16.  In support of the motion to strike, defendants submitted 
declarations of numerous city officials and voluminous documentary materials, 
including the materials challenged by plaintiffs as improper campaign material.   
Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to strike, including a “statement 
of undisputed facts” and three supporting declarations by proponents of 
Measure O and their attorney.  The opposition asserted, among other matters, that 
                                              
6  
In December 2003, plaintiffs sought permission to amend their complaint, 
noting that the City recently had proposed the enactment of a new special tax 
(Measure P) that would be placed before the voters of Salinas in March 2004, and 
urging the court to presume that the City would engage in improper campaign 
activities with respect to Measure P.  Following a hearing in January 2004, the 
trial court permitted plaintiffs to supplement their complaint, and in early March 
2004 plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint that reiterated plaintiffs’ challenge 
to the City’s actions with regard to Measure O, and additionally alleged, on 
information and belief, that the City was “preparing campaign material to 
disseminate to Salinas voters at taxpayers expense” with respect to Measure P.  
The supplemental complaint sought damages and declaratory, injunctive, and 
equitable relief with regard to both measures.   
 
In its subsequent motion to strike the complaint, filed in April 2004, the 
City noted that, with respect to Measure P, plaintiffs had not identified any 
conduct or documents supporting the contention that the City illegally spent funds 
to campaign for Measure P.  Plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion to strike failed to 
challenge any activity taken by the City with regard to Measure P.  Accordingly, at 
this stage of the proceeding, the only actions of the City that are challenged by 
plaintiffs are those taken by the City with regard to Measure O.       
 
10 
the materials relating to Measure O that the City made available to the public 
failed to include the viewpoint and positions advanced by the proponents of 
Measure O, that the City had ignored offers by the proponents of Measure O to 
provide material supporting the proponents’ viewpoint, and finally that the 
proponents of Measure O would have utilized the City’s Web site and the City’s 
other publications, had they been offered access to those media. 
In May 2004, the trial court held a hearing on defendants’ motion to strike 
and thereafter granted the motion.  After the trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion 
for reconsideration, plaintiffs appealed from the trial court’s order granting 
defendants’ motion to strike. 
 
 
C 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment entered by the trial 
court.   
Because the appeal arose from an order granting a motion to strike under 
section 425.16, the appellate court undertook the two-step analysis called for by 
prior decisions of this court, considering first whether defendants had made a 
threshold showing that the challenged cause of action was one arising from 
“protected activity,” and second, if so, whether plaintiffs had made a prima facie 
showing of facts that would support a judgment in their favor if proved at trial.  
(See, e.g., Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th 53, 67; City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 
Cal.4th 69, 76.) 
With respect to the first step, the Court of Appeal rejected plaintiffs’ claim 
that defendants failed to make the required threshold showing, explaining that 
(1) past California decisions uniformly hold that government entities and public 
employees may invoke the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute, (2) the statements 
and communications of defendants challenged in this case clearly concern a matter 
of public interest, (3) the alleged illegality of defendants’ conduct does not render 
 
11 
the anti-SLAPP statute inapplicable but rather presents an issue to be addressed in 
the second step of the legal analysis, and (4) newly enacted Code of Civil 
Procedure section 425.17 does not exempt plaintiffs’ action from the anti-SLAPP 
statute. 
Having found that the communications of the City that gave rise to 
plaintiffs’ action fall within the potential protection of the anti-SLAPP statute, the 
Court of Appeal went on to consider whether plaintiffs had met their burden of 
making a prima facie showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits.  In 
evaluating this point, the court determined that the first matter to be addressed was 
the proper legal standard for evaluating whether the statements and other 
communications of the City challenged by plaintiffs constituted campaign 
materials or whether they constituted informational materials.  With respect to this 
issue, the Court of Appeal observed: “Defendants argue for an express advocacy 
standard.  Plaintiffs urge us to examine the materials’ style, tenor, and timing, 
asserting that such a standard is compelled by Stanson[, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206].”  
Relying upon the language of a statutory provision enacted subsequent to the 
Stanson decision that explicitly prohibits a local agency’s expenditure of funds 
with regard to “communications that expressly advocate the approval or rejection 
of a clearly identified ballot measure” (Gov. Code, § 54964, subd. (b)) and upon a 
state regulation that defines when a communication “expressly advocates” the 
election or defeat of a candidate or the passage or defeat of a ballot measure for 
purposes of campaign finance laws (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 18225, 
subd. (b)(2)),7 the Court of Appeal agreed with defendants’ position, concluding 
                                              
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
7  
The regulation in question provides in relevant part: “A communication 
‘expressly advocates’ the nomination, election or defeat of a candidate or the 
qualification, passage, or defeat of a measure if it contains express words of 
 
12 
that “[t]o be considered unlawful promotional materials, the challenged statements 
must expressly advocate the election outcome.”  Because it found that the 
statements challenged by plaintiffs did not meet the express-advocacy standard, 
the Court of Appeal concluded that the City’s statements were informational rather 
than campaign materials, and thus that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a prima 
facie case of likely prevailing on the merits.8 
We granted review primarily to determine (1) whether the Court of Appeal 
correctly determined that the “express advocacy” standard, rather than the 
standard set forth in Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, is the applicable standard, and 
(2) whether, under the appropriate standard, the trial court properly granted 
defendants’ motion to strike. 
 
 
II 
Before reaching the question of the proper standard under which publicly 
funded communications relating to a pending ballot measure should be evaluated, 
we briefly address the threshold question whether, as a general matter, the City 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
advocacy such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot,’ ‘vote against,’ 
‘defeat,’ ‘reject,’ ‘sign petitions for’ or otherwise refers to a clearly identified 
candidate or measure so that the communication, taken as whole, unambiguously 
urges a particular result in an election.”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 18225, subd. 
(b)(2); see also Federal Election Comm’n v. Furgatch (9th Cir. 1987) 807 F.2d 
857, 860-864.) 
8  
The Court of Appeal also rejected plaintiffs’ related argument that the 
City’s official Web site and newsletter constituted “public forums” from which the 
proponents of Measure O had been improperly excluded in violation of their free 
speech rights.  The court held that because the City had not permitted private 
individuals or groups to post material on its Web site or to publish articles in its 
newsletter, those modes of communication did not constitute public forums for 
First Amendment purposes.  
 
13 
and its officials are entitled to invoke the protections of the motion-to-strike 
procedure in California’s anti-SLAPP statute.  
Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) provides: “A cause of action against a 
person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of 
petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in 
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless 
the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that 
the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”  As already noted, past cases analyzing the 
proper application of this statute have explained that “in ruling on a section 425.16 
motion to strike, a court generally should engage in a two-step process: ‘First, the 
court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the 
challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. . . .  If the court 
finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has 
demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.’ ”  (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 683, 703, quoting Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.)   
Plaintiffs initially contend that both the Court of Appeal and the trial court 
erred in the first step of the required analysis, asserting that the communications 
challenged in this case — the materials on the City’s Web site, the one-page 
document, and the City’s newsletter — do not constitute “protected activity” 
within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute.  Plaintiffs contend that in view of 
the circumstance that the communications in question are those of a governmental 
entity rather than a private individual or organization, the communications cannot 
properly be viewed as “acts . . . in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or 
free speech under the United States or California Constitution” because, plaintiffs 
assert, government speech, unlike that of a private individual or organization, is 
not protected by the First Amendment of the federal Constitution or article I, 
section 2 of the California Constitution.  Although plaintiffs acknowledge that a 
 
14 
long and uniform line of California Court of Appeal decisions explicitly holds that 
governmental entities are entitled to invoke the protections of section 425.16 when 
such entities are sued on the basis of statements or activities engaged in by the 
public entity or its public officials in their official capacity (see, e.g., Bradbury v. 
Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1113-1116; Shroeder v. Irvine City 
Council (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 174, 183-184; San Ramon Valley Fire Protection 
Dist. v. Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2004) 125 
Cal.App.4th 343, 353; Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. Herrera (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 604, 
609; Santa Barbara County Coalition Against Automobile Subsidies v. Santa 
Barbara County Assn. of Governments (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1237-1238; 
Schaffer v. City and County of San Francisco (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 992, 1001-
1004 (Schaffer)), plaintiffs essentially contend that all of these decisions were 
wrongly decided and should be disapproved. 
We reject plaintiffs’ contention.  Whether or not the First Amendment of 
the federal Constitution or article I, section 2 of the California Constitution 
directly protects government speech in general or the types of communications of 
a municipality that are challenged here — significant constitutional questions that 
we need not and do not decide — we believe it is clear, in light of both the 
language and purpose of California’s anti-SLAPP statute, that the statutory 
remedy afforded by section 425.16 extends to statements and writings of 
governmental entities and public officials on matters of public interest and concern 
that would fall within the scope of the statute if such statements were made by a 
private individual or entity. 
 
As noted, plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary rests on the language of 
section 425.16, subdivision (b), which describes the type of cause of action that is 
subject to a motion to strike as “[a] cause of action . . . arising from any act . . . in 
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States 
 
15 
or California Constitution in connection with a public issue . . . .”  (Italics added.)  
Plaintiffs fail to take into account, however, that section 425.16, subdivision (e) 
goes on to define this statutory phrase in very broad terms.  Subdivision (e) 
provides in this regard:  “As used in this section, ‘act in furtherance of a person’s 
right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution 
in connection with a public issue’ includes:  (1) any written or oral statement or 
writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other 
official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing 
made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, 
executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; 
(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a 
public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any other 
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the 
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of 
public interest.”  Section 425.16, subdivision (e) does not purport to draw any 
distinction between (1) statements by private individuals or entities that are made 
in the designated contexts or with respect to the specified subjects, and 
(2) statements by governmental entities or public officials acting in their official 
capacity that are made in these same contexts or with respect to these same 
subjects.  Although there may be some ambiguity in the statutory language, 
section 425.16, subdivision (e) is most reasonably understood as providing that the 
statutory phrase in question includes all such statements, without regard to 
whether the statements are made by private individuals or by governmental 
entities or officials.  (See, e.g., Schaffer, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th 992, 1003-1004.) 
Furthermore, to the extent there may ever have been a question whether the 
anti-SLAPP protections of section 425.16 may be invoked by a public entity, that 
question clearly was laid to rest by the Legislature’s enactment of Code of Civil 
 
16 
Procedure section 425.18, subdivision (i), in 2005 — well after many of the Court 
of Appeal decisions noted above (ante, at p. 15) had expressly recognized the 
ability of public entities to bring a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute.  
Section 425.18, subdivision (i) — a provision of the 2005 legislation dealing with 
so-called SLAPPback actions — expressly recognizes that a “SLAPPback” action 
may be “filed by a public entity,” thereby necessarily confirming that a public 
entity may prevail on a special motion to strike under section 425.16.  (See Code 
Civ. Proc., § 425.18, subd. (b)(1) [defining “SLAPPback” as “any cause of action 
for malicious prosecution or abuse of process arising from the filing or 
maintenance of a prior cause of action that has been dismissed pursuant to a 
special motion to strike under Section 425.16”].) 
In addition to the language of the relevant statutory provisions, the purpose 
of the anti-SLAPP statute plainly supports an interpretation that protects 
statements by governmental entities or public officials as well as statements by 
private individuals.  In setting forth the purpose of the statute and the Legislature’s 
intent guiding its interpretation, section 425.16, subdivision (a) states in relevant 
part:  “The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to 
encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this 
participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process.  To this 
end, this section shall be construed broadly.”  (Italics added.)  Moreover, the 
legislative history indicates that the Legislature’s concern regarding the potential 
chilling effect that abusive lawsuits may have on statements relating to a public 
issue or a matter of public interest extended to statements by public officials or 
employees acting in their official capacity as well as to statements by private 
 
17 
individuals or organizations.9  In view of this legislative purpose and history, as 
well as the language of section 425.16, subdivision (e) and section 425.18, 
subdivision (i), discussed above, we conclude that section 425.16 may not be 
interpreted to exclude governmental entities and public officials from its potential 
protection.  Accordingly, we agree with the numerous Court of Appeal decisions 
cited above (ante, at p. 15) that have reached this same conclusion. 
Having determined that a lawsuit against a public entity that arises from its 
statements or actions is potentially subject to the anti-SLAPP statute, we conclude 
there can be no question but that the publications and activities of the City that are 
at issue in the present case constitute “protected activity” within the meaning of 
the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.  The published material in question 
encompasses statements made and actions taken in local legislative proceedings 
before the city council, and other communications describing the city council’s 
potential reduction or elimination of public services and programs — statements 
that unquestionably concern public issues and issues of public interest. 
                                              
9  
Section 425.16 was first enacted in 1992.  In 1997, in response to several 
Court of Appeal decisions that had narrowly construed the scope of the statute, the 
Legislature amended the measure to clarify its intent that the provisions of the 
statute are to be interpreted broadly.  (Stats. 1997, ch. 271, § 1 [amending 
§ 425.16, subd. (a)].)  A legislative analysis of this amendment approvingly quoted 
a passage from a then recent law review article that identified as “a typical SLAPP 
suit scenario” a situation in which an abusive lawsuit is brought against both 
public officials and private individuals.  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of 
Sen. Bill No. 1296 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 23, 1997, p. 2, 
quoting Sills, SLAPPS: How Can the Legal System Eliminate Their Appeal? 
(1993) 25 Conn. L.Rev. 547, 547 (Sills article); see also Sills article, supra, 25 
Conn. L.Rev. 547, 550 [“Just as SLAPPs filed against individuals have a ‘chilling’ 
effect on their participation in government decision making, SLAPPs filed against 
public officials, who often serve for little or no compensation, may likely have a 
similarly ‘chilling’ effect on their willingness to participate in governmental 
processes”].) 
 
18 
Accordingly, we conclude that the lower courts properly found that 
defendants satisfied their threshold burden of demonstrating that all of the causes 
of action here at issue arise from activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, 
and that plaintiffs then bore the burden, under the second step of the anti-SLAPP 
analysis, of establishing a prima facie case on the merits. 
 
 
III 
As we explained in Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 
811, 821: “In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim (§ 415.16, 
subd. (b)(1)), a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must ‘ “state[] and 
substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim.” ’  [Citation.]  Put another way, the 
plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and 
supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable 
judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’  [Citations.]  In 
deciding the question of potential merit, the trial court considers the pleadings and 
evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 415.16, 
subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative 
probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter 
of law, the defendant’s evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff’s 
attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim.  [Citation.]”  As we further 
elaborated on this point in Taus v. Loftus, supra, 40 Cal.4th 683, 714:  “[W]hen a 
defendant makes the threshold showing that a cause of action that has been filed 
against him or her arises out of the defendant’s speech-related conduct, the 
[anti-SLAPP] provision affords the defendant the opportunity, at the earliest stages 
of litigation, to have the claim stricken if the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate 
both that the claim is legally sufficient and that there is sufficient evidence to 
establish a prima facie case with respect to the claim.” 
 
19 
In the present case, plaintiffs’ action is based on the contention that the City 
acted unlawfully in expending public funds with regard to (1) the materials 
relating to Measure O posted on the City’s official Web site, (2) the one-page 
summary listing the programs and services that the city council had voted to 
reduce or eliminate should Measure O be adopted, and (3) the city newsletter 
mailed to city residents on or before October 1, 2002.  The question presented, at 
this second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, is whether plaintiffs established a 
prima facie case that any of the challenged expenditures were unlawful. 
In analyzing plaintiffs’ claim, we believe it is useful to begin with several 
statutory provisions that explicitly delineate a number of actions that a local entity 
may take in response to the certification and qualification of a local ballot 
measure. 
Elections Code section 9215 provides in relevant part that when a local 
initiative petition, proposing the adoption of an ordinance, qualifies for the ballot, 
“the legislative body shall do one of the following:  [¶] (a) Adopt the ordinance, 
without alteration, at the regular meeting at which the certification of the petition 
is presented . . . . [¶]  (b) Submit the ordinance, without alteration, to the voters [at 
the next regularly scheduled election or at a special election]. [¶]  (c)  Order a 
report pursuant to Section 9212 at the regular meeting at which the certification of 
the petition is presented.  When the report is presented to the legislative body, the 
legislative body shall either adopt the ordinance within 10 days or order an 
election pursuant to subdivision (b).” 
Elections Code section 9212, subdivision (a), in turn, provides that before 
taking action under section 9215, “the legislative body may refer the proposed 
initiative measure to any city agency or agencies for a report on any or all of the 
following: [¶]  (1)  Its fiscal impact.  . . .  [¶]  (4)  Its impact on funding for 
infrastructure of all types, including, but not limited to, transportation, schools, 
 
20 
parks, and open space. . . . .  [¶]  (5)  Its impact on the community’s ability to 
attract and retain business and employment. . . . . [¶]  (8)  Any other matters the 
legislative body requests to be in the report.”  (Elec. Code, § 9212, subd. (a).) 
Here, the City followed these statutes and obtained an initial report from 
the city agencies on the potential impact of Measure O.  After considering the 
report, the city council decided not to adopt the proposed ordinance itself but 
instead to submit the matter for a vote of the electorate at the next regular 
municipal election.  Plaintiffs do not contend that the City’s actions in this regard 
were improper. 
After the initiative measure was placed on the November 2002 ballot, city 
agencies, at the direction of the city council, continued to study the potential 
impact of the measure on city services.  Ultimately, in a lengthy report to the city 
council, the city manager identified the particular reductions and eliminations of 
city services that each agency recommended be implemented should Measure O 
be adopted.  The city council, after considering the report and receiving comment 
from supporters and opponents of Measure O at a public meeting, formally voted 
to adopt the recommended reductions and eliminations of city services that would 
take effect should Measure O be adopted. 
Although plaintiffs take issue with the scope and nature of the 
recommended cuts approved by the city council — maintaining that efficiencies 
were available in other areas and that the City chose to single out popular services 
and programs in order to influence the upcoming vote on the initiative measure 
and increase the likelihood that the initiative measure would be defeated — 
plaintiffs’ complaint does not contend that the city council lacked authority to 
adopt a legislative resolution that specifically identified the particular services and 
programs that would be reduced or eliminated if Measure O were approved.  In 
any event, even had plaintiffs advanced such an argument, we have no doubt that 
 
21 
the city council, pursuant to its general legislative power, possessed the authority 
to identify, with specificity and in advance of the November 2002 election, the 
particular services and programs that the council would reduce or eliminate should 
Measure O be adopted at the upcoming election.  Plaintiffs and other supporters of 
Measure O were free, of course, to challenge the necessity or wisdom of the 
proposed service and program reductions approved by the city council,10 and to 
urge voters to replace the current city council members with officeholders who 
would take different action should the voters approve the repeal of the UUT at the 
                                              
10  
Supporters of Measure O in fact advanced this position in an argument 
published in the county voter information pamphlet that was sent to voters in 
advance of the November 2002 election.  The “Rebuttal to Argument Against 
Measure O” contained in the ballot pamphlet (which was signed by a number of 
the named plaintiffs in this action, among others) stated in part: “The pro-tax 
advocates have threatened to cut services – but there are other choices.   [¶]  The 
problem is, the mayor and city council have refused to consider options like: 
[¶]  Reducing undisciplined spending, ending ineffective programs, and audits to 
expose waste [¶]  Cutting top-heavy administration.  Top 40 bureaucrats average 
cost is $148,466 each.  [¶]  Other areas that should be trimmed:  [¶]  Average 
city employee cost $87,195, over 30% more than an average county worker.  
Overtime averages four times as much for a city employee as for a county worker.  
These figures are based on general fund spending.  [¶]  Health club/cash benefits 
for most city employees.  [¶]  Several generous retirement plans, and up to 10 
weeks of paid time-off for city bureaucrats.  [¶]  Millions can be saved with these 
cost saving ideas, and more at: [¶]  www.cityofsalinas.com.”  (County of 
Monterey, Sample Ballot & Voter Information Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 2002) 
rebuttal to argument against Measure O, p. 27-529 [underlining and bold lettering 
in original].) 
 
The ballot pamphlet quoted in this footnote is not included in the record on 
appeal, but, as an official government document, is a proper subject of judicial 
notice.  (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).)  Prior to oral argument, we notified the 
parties that the court was considering taking judicial notice of this document and 
afforded them an opportunity to object.  (See Evid. Code, §§ 459, subd. (c), 455, 
subd. (a).)  No objection has been raised, and we take judicial notice of the ballot 
pamphlet. 
 
22 
November 2002 election.11  But it is clear that the city council had the authority to 
inform city residents, prior to the election, of the specific actions the current city 
council would take if the UUT were repealed. 
Although plaintiffs do not directly challenge the City’s adoption of a 
specific plan of action that would take effect in the event the proposed initiative 
were to be adopted, they maintain that the City acted improperly in utilizing public 
resources and funds to prepare and distribute “pamphlets, newsletters and Web site 
materials” — denominated “campaign materials” in the complaint — informing 
the public of the proposed service cuts that would be implemented if Measure O 
were approved by the voters.  The complaint objected that the materials in 
question “did not provide a balanced analysis of the arguments in favor of and 
against Measure O.”  In advancing their claim, plaintiffs relied upon Stanson, 
supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, arguing that the City’s communications, taking into account 
their “style, tenor, and timing,” properly should be characterized as campaign, 
rather than informational, materials or activities. 
As noted, the Court of Appeal did not resolve the question whether the 
communications in question constituted campaign or informational material under 
the standard set forth in Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, because the appellate court 
determined that the Stanson decision was not controlling.  Instead, that court found 
that the City’s challenged communications — regardless of their “style, tenor, and 
timing” — would be impermissible only if those communications “expressly 
advocate[d]” the approval or rejection of Measure O.  Because it found that the 
                                              
11 
Two seats on the Salinas City Council, including that of the mayor, were to 
be filled at the November 2002 election.  (See County of Monterey, Sample Ballot 
& Voter Information Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 2002) sample ballot for City of 
Salinas offices, p. 27-SB724.) 
 
23 
challenged communications did not meet the express-advocacy standard, the Court 
of Appeal held that plaintiffs’ claim lacked merit.  In light of the appellate court’s 
analysis, we turn first to the question whether the statutory provision relied upon 
by the Court of Appeal properly should be interpreted as modifying and displacing 
the standard set forth in Stanson.  We begin with a discussion of our decision in 
Stanson. 
 
 
A 
In Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, this court addressed a lawsuit alleging 
that the Director of the California Department of Parks and Recreation acted 
unlawfully in authorizing the department to expend more than $5,000 of public 
funds to promote the passage of a park bond measure that was before the voters in 
the June 1974 election.  In analyzing the claim in Stanson, we initially looked to 
an earlier decision of this court — Mines v. Del Valle (1927) 201 Cal. 273 — that 
considered whether a municipally owned public utility acted improperly in 
expending $12,000 on banners, automobile windshield stickers, circulars, 
newspaper advertisements and the like to promote the passage of a municipal bond 
measure.  The court in Mines, observing that the electors of the city who opposed 
the bond issue “had an equal right to and interest in the [public] funds . . . as those 
who favored said bonds,” went on to hold that the action of the utility’s board of 
commissioners in authorizing those expenditures “cannot be sustained unless the 
power to do so is given to said board in clear and unmistakable language.”  (201 
Cal. at p. 287, italics added.)  Because the board’s general authority to extend 
utility service did not meet this rigorous standard of specificity, the court in Mines 
concluded that the challenged expenditures were improper. 
In Stanson, after observing that a significant number of out-of-state cases 
decided in the years since the Mines decision uniformly had confirmed the validity 
of that decision (Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 216-217), and further explaining 
 
24 
that, as a constitutional matter, “the use of the public treasury to mount an election 
campaign which attempts to influence the resolution of issues which our 
Constitution leave[s] to the ‘free election’ of the people (see Cal. Const., art. II, 
§ 2) . . . present[s] a serious threat to the integrity of the electoral process” (17 
Cal.3d at p. 218), we ultimately concluded that we “need not resolve the serious 
constitutional question that would be posed by an explicit legislative authorization 
of the use of public funds for partisan campaigning, because the legislative 
provisions relied upon by defendant Mott certainly do not authorize such 
expenditures in the ‘clear and unmistakable language’ required by Mines.”  (17 
Cal.3d at pp. 219-220.)  Our decision in Stanson thereby reaffirmed the holding in 
Mines that in the absence of clear and unmistakable language specifically 
authorizing a public entity to expend public funds for campaign activities or 
materials, the entity lacks authority to make such expenditures. 
After determining that the defendant state official in that case “could not 
properly authorize the department to spend public funds to campaign for the 
passage of the bond issue” (Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, 220, italics added), we 
went on to explain that “[i]t does not necessarily follow . . . that the department 
was without power to incur any expense at all in connection with the bond 
election.  In Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Board of Education [(N.J. 1953)] 98 
A.2d 673 [a decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court, quoted and discussed 
approvingly in the Stanson decision], the court, while condemning the school 
board’s use of public funds to advocate only one side of an election issue, at the 
same time emphatically affirmed the school board’s implicit power to make 
‘reasonable expenditures for the purpose of giving voters relevant facts to aid them 
in reaching an informed judgment when voting upon the proposal.’  [Citation.]”  
(Ibid.)  Agreeing with this analysis, the court in Stanson concluded that although 
the applicable statutory provision did not authorize the department “to spend funds 
 
25 
for campaign purposes” (id. at pp. 220-221, italics added), the statute did afford 
the department authority “to spend funds, budgeted for informational purposes, to 
provide the public with a ‘fair presentation’ of relevant information relating to a 
park bond issue on which the agency has labored.”  (Id. at p. 221, italics added.) 
Acknowledging in Stanson that in some circumstances “[p]roblems may 
arise . . . in attempting to distinguish improper ‘campaign’ expenditures from 
proper ‘informational’ activities” (Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, 221), we 
explained that “[w]ith respect to some activities the distinction is rather clear; thus, 
the use of public funds to purchase such items as bumper stickers, posters, 
advertising ‘floats,’ or television and radio ‘spots’ unquestionably constitutes 
improper campaign activity [citations], as does the dissemination, at public 
expense, of campaign literature prepared by private proponents or opponents of a 
ballot measure.  [Citations.]  On the other hand, it is generally accepted that a 
public agency pursues a proper ‘informational’ role when it simply gives a ‘fair 
presentation of the facts’ in response to a citizen’s request for information 
[citations] or, when requested by a private or public organization, it authorizes an 
agency employee to present the department’s view of a ballot proposal at a 
meeting of such organization.  [Citations.]”  (Ibid.) 
After so explaining that in many instances the distinction between 
campaign activities and informational activities is quite evident, we also 
recognized in Stanson that at times “the line between unauthorized campaign 
expenditures and authorized informational activities is not so clear.  Thus, while 
past cases indicate that public agencies may generally publish a ‘fair presentation 
of facts’ relevant to an election matter, in a number of instances publicly financed 
brochures or newspaper advertisements which have purported to contain only 
relevant factual information, and which have refrained from exhorting voters to 
‘Vote Yes,’ have nonetheless been found to constitute improper campaign 
 
26 
literature.  (See 35 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 112 (1960); 51 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 190 
(1968); cf. 42 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 25, 27 (1964).)  In such cases, the determination 
of the propriety or impropriety of the expenditure depends upon a careful 
consideration of such factors as the style, tenor and timing of the publication;[12] 
no hard and fast rule governs every case.”  (Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, 222, 
italics added.) 
Finally, applying the campaign/informational dichotomy to the facts before 
it, the court in Stanson held that because the appeal was from a judgment entered 
after the sustaining of a demurrer to the complaint, “we have no occasion to 
determine whether the department’s actual expenditures constituted improper 
‘campaign’ expenditures or authorized ‘informational’ expenses.  The complaint 
alleges, inter alia, that defendant Mott authorized the dissemination of agency 
publications ‘which were [not] merely . . . informative but . . . promotional’ and 
sanctioned the distribution, at public expense, of promotional materials written by 
a private organization formed to promote the passage of the bond act.  If plaintiff 
can establish these allegations at trial, he will have demonstrated that defendant 
did indeed authorize the improper expenditure of public funds . . . .”  (Stanson, 
supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, 222-223.) 
                                              
12  
In a footnote at this point, the court in Stanson reviewed the circumstances 
involved in one of the cited Opinions of the California Attorney General.  (35 
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 112 (1960).)  In that instance, the trustees of the Madera Union 
High School District had placed a full-page advertisement in a general circulation 
newspaper, one day before a school board election.  The advertisement did not 
expressly advocate voters to “Vote Yes” on the bond issue, but stated in large 
letters, “A CLASSROOM EMERGENCY EXISTS NOW AT MADERA UNION 
HIGH SCHOOL,” and listed a number of reasons why additional funds were 
needed by the school district.  The Attorney General’s opinion concluded that, in 
light of the “style, tenor and timing” of the advertisement, it was impermissible to 
expend public funds for the advertisement.  (Id. at p. 114.) 
 
27 
Our court subsequently had occasion to apply the principles set forth in 
Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, in our decision in Keller v. State Bar (1989) 47 
Cal.3d 1152, 1170-1172 (Keller), reversed on other grounds (1990) 496 U.S. 1.  In 
the portion of the Keller decision that is relevant to the issue now before us, we 
addressed a challenge to actions taken by the State Bar of California prior to the 
November 1982 judicial retention election, in which the voters were to decide 
whether to confirm the continued service in office of six justices of the California 
Supreme Court.  During an inaugural speech delivered three months prior to the 
election, the incoming State Bar president had referred to the upcoming judicial 
retention election, criticizing the “ ‘idiotic cries of . . . self-appointed vigilantes . . . 
[and] unscrupulous politicians ’ ” (id. at p. 1171), describing “the history of the 
concept of judicial independence . . . and the role and philosophy of the bar” 
(ibid.), and presenting statistics concerning the Supreme Court’s review of 
criminal cases.  Although the court in Keller noted that the State Bar president’s 
speech “did not mention any justice by name, or urge the retention of any or all of 
the justices” (ibid.), we explicitly pointed out that the Stanson decision had 
explained that “it is not essential that [a] publication expressly exhort the voters to 
vote one way or another” in order for the publication to constitute improper 
campaign activity.  (Keller, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1171, fn. 22.) 
While observing that the State Bar president’s speech itself “cost the State 
Bar nothing” (Keller, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1152, 1171), the court in Keller went on to 
explain that the legal challenge before it concerned the State Bar’s expenditure of 
public funds in subsequently distributing an “educational packet” that included the 
speech along with other items.  The court in Keller described the distributed 
material as follows:  “The educational packet, sent to local bar associations and 
other interested groups, contained [the State Bar president’s] speech, a sample 
speech entitled ‘The Case for an Independent Judiciary’ (a quite restrained and 
 
28 
philosophical exposition), sample letters to organizations which might provide a 
speech forum, and a sample press release.  It also included fact sheets on crime 
and conviction rates, judicial selection and retention, and judicial performance and 
removal criteria.  It concluded with quotations concerning judicial independence 
from Hamilton, Madison, Jefferson, and others.”  (Id. at pp. 1171-1172.) 
In analyzing the validity of the State Bar’s use of public funds to prepare 
and distribute this educational packet, the court in Keller explained: “The bar may 
properly act to promote the independence of the judiciary; such conduct falls 
clearly within its statutory charge to advance the science of jurisprudence and 
improve the administration of justice.  In the present case, however, the nature and 
timing of the 1982 publication (see Stanson v. Mott, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, 222), 
indicate that it is a form of prohibited election campaigning.  The material was 
distributed approximately one month before an election in which six justices of 
this court came before the voters for confirmation.  It is the kind of material which 
a state election committee distributes to local committees to aid them in the 
campaign.  Its style and tenor is appropriate to that end; it is basically informative 
and factual, but without claim of impartiality, and includes such practical tools as 
a form letter to groups which might host a speaker.  While intended to educate the 
reader because its authors believed an informed campaigner would be a more 
effective campaigner, its primary purpose, we believe, was to assist in the election 
campaign on behalf of the justices.  We conclude that in preparing and distributing 
this material, the State Bar exceeded its statutory authority.”  (Keller, supra, 47 
Cal.3d 1152, 1172.) 
Accordingly, the decision in Keller, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1152, explicitly 
confirmed and reiterated this court’s conclusion in Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, 
that even when a publication or communication imparts useful information and 
does not expressly advocate a vote for or against a specific candidate or ballot 
 
29 
measure, the expenditure of public funds to prepare or distribute the 
communication is improper when the “style, tenor, and timing” (Stanson, supra, 
17 Cal.3d at p. 222) of the publication demonstrates that the communication 
constitutes traditional campaign activity. 
 
 
B 
As already noted, in the present case the Court of Appeal determined that 
there was no need to apply the principles set forth in Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 
206, and reiterated in Keller, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1152, in deciding whether the 
communications and activities of the City challenged in this case constituted 
campaign or informational materials.  The appellate court concluded instead that 
the validity of the City’s expenditures turned on the question whether the 
challenged materials “expressly advocated” the approval or rejection of 
Measure O.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal relied primarily upon 
the provisions of Government Code section 54964 (section 54964), a statutory 
provision enacted in 2000.  As we shall explain, we do not agree with the Court of 
Appeal’s view that section 54964 was intended (or properly may be interpreted) to 
displace the governing principles and standard set forth in Stanson. 
Section 54964, subdivision (a), provides that “[a]n officer, employee, or 
consultant of a local agency [13] may not expend or authorize the expenditure of 
any of the funds of the local agency to support or oppose the approval or rejection 
                                              
13  
“Local agency” for purposes of section 54964 is defined to include, among 
other entities, a county, city (whether general law or chartered), city and county, 
and town, or any board, commission, or agency of such entities, but to exclude a 
county superintendent of schools, an elementary, high, or unified school district, 
or a community college district.  (See Gov. Code, §§ 54964, subd. (b)(4), 54951.)  
The latter educational entities are subject to comparable restrictions under the 
terms of Education Code section 7054. 
 
30 
of a ballot measure, or the election or defeat of a candidate, by the voters.”  
Section 54964, subdivision (b)(3), in turn, defines “expenditure,” as used in this 
statute, to mean “a payment of local agency funds that is used for communications 
that expressly advocate the approval or rejection of a clearly identified ballot 
measure, or the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, by the voters.”  
(Italics added.)  At the same time, section 54964, subdivision (c), sets forth an 
exception to the prohibition contained in subdivision (a), providing that “[t]his 
section does not prohibit the expenditure of local agency funds to provide 
information to the public about the possible effects of a ballot measure on the 
activities, operations, or policies of the local agency, if both of the following 
conditions are met:  [¶]  (1) The informational activities are not otherwise 
prohibited by the Constitution or laws of this state.  [¶]  (2) The information 
provided constitutes an accurate, fair, and impartial presentation of relevant facts 
to aid the voters in reaching an informed judgment regarding the ballot measure.”  
Accordingly, under section 54964, subdivision (c), the expenditure of public funds 
for a communication that otherwise would violate section 54964, subdivision (a), 
does not violate subdivision (a) if both of the conditions set forth in subdivision (c) 
are met.14 
                                              
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
14  
Section 54964 reads in full:  “(a)  An officer, employee, or consultant of a 
local agency may not expend or authorize the expenditure of any of the funds of 
the local agency to support or oppose the approval or rejection of a ballot measure, 
or the election or defeat of a candidate, by the voters. 
 
“(b)  As used in this section the following terms have the following 
meanings: 
 
“(1)  ‘Ballot measure’ means an initiative, referendum, or recall measure 
certified to appear on a regular or special election ballot of the local agency, or 
other measure submitted to the voters by the governing body at a regular or special 
election of the local agency. 
 
“(2)  ‘Candidate’ means an individual who has qualified to have his or her 
 
31 
Relying upon the circumstance that subdivision (b)(3) of section 54964 
defines the term “expenditure” as used in subdivision (a) to refer to the payment of 
funds for communications that “expressly advocate” the approval or rejection of a 
ballot measure, the Court of Appeal reasoned that “section 54964 permits the 
expenditure of public funds by local agencies for communications, so long as they 
do not ‘expressly advocate the approval or rejection of a clearly identified ballot 
measure . . . by the voters.’ ”  (First italics added.) 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
name listed on the ballot, or who has qualified to have write-in votes on his or her 
behalf counted by elections officials, for nomination or election to an elective 
office at any regular or special primary or general election of the local agency, and 
includes any officeholder who is the subject of a recall election. 
 
“(3)  ‘Expenditure’ means a payment of local agency funds that is used for 
communications that expressly advocate the approval or rejection of a clearly 
identified ballot measure, or the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, 
by the voters.  ‘Expenditure’ shall not include membership dues paid by the local 
agency to a professional association. 
 
“(4)  ‘Local agency’ has the same meaning as defined in Section 54951, but 
does not include a county superintendent of schools, an elementary, high, or 
unified school district, or a community college district. 
 
“(c)  This section does not prohibit the expenditure of local agency funds to 
provide information to the public about the possible effects of a ballot measure on 
the activities, operations, or policies of the local agency, if both of the following 
conditions are met: 
 
“(1)  The informational activities are not otherwise prohibited by the 
Constitution or laws of this state. 
 
“(2)  The information provided constitutes an accurate, fair, and impartial 
presentation of relevant facts to aid the voters in reaching an informed judgment 
regarding the ballot measure. 
 
“(d)  This section does not apply to the political activities of school officers 
and employees of a county superintendent of schools, an elementary, high, or 
unified school district, or a community college district that are regulated by 
Article 2 (commencing with Section 7050) of Chapter 1 of Part 5 of the Education 
Code.” 
 
32 
In our view, the Court of Appeal’s reading of section 54964 is 
fundamentally flawed, because the statute does not affirmatively authorize (or 
permit) a municipality or other local agency to expend public funds on a 
communication that does not expressly advocate the approval or rejection of a 
ballot measure, but instead simply prohibits a municipality’s use of public funds 
for communications that expressly advocate such a position.  As indicated by the 
above quotation of section 54964, subdivision (a), the statute provides that “[a]n 
officer [or] employee . . . of a local agency may not expend or authorize the 
expenditure of any funds of the local agency to support or oppose the approval or 
rejection of a ballot measure.”  Nothing in section 54964 purports to grant 
authority to a local agency or its officers or employees to employ public funds to 
pay for communications or activities that constitute campaign activities under 
Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, so long as such communications do not “expressly 
advocate” the approval or rejection of a ballot measure or candidate. 
As we have seen, in Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, this court, after 
explaining that a “serious constitutional question . . . would be posed by an explicit 
legislative authorization of the use of public funds for partisan campaigning” (id. 
at p. 219, italics added), reaffirmed our earlier holding in Mines, supra, 201 Cal. 
273, that the use of public funds for campaign activities or materials 
unquestionably is impermissible in the absence of “ ‘clear and unmistakable 
language’ ” authorizing such expenditures.  (Stanson, at pp. 219-220.)  Section 
54964 does not clearly and unmistakably authorize local agencies to use public 
funds for campaign materials or activities so long as those materials or activities 
avoid using language that expressly advocates approval or rejection of a ballot 
measure.  Instead, the provision prohibits the expenditure of public funds for 
communications that contain such express advocacy, even if such expenditures 
have been affirmatively authorized, clearly and unmistakably, by a local agency 
 
33 
itself.  Although section 54964, subdivision (c) creates an exception to the 
statutory prohibition for communications that satisfy the two conditions set forth 
in that subdivision, subdivision (c) (like the other provisions of section 54964) 
does not purport affirmatively to grant authority to local entities to expend funds 
for communications that fall within its purview.   
Furthermore, the legislative history of section 54964 does not support the 
Court of Appeal’s conclusion that this statutory provision was intended to modify 
or displace the principles or standard set forth in our decision in Stanson, supra, 17 
Cal.3d 206.  A committee report — analyzing a version of the bill that included 
the relevant provisions that ultimately were enacted into law — states in relevant 
part:  “The amended bill is similar to decisions of the California courts that limit 
the expenditures of public agency funds for political purposes.  [¶]  As a general 
rule, a public agency cannot spend public funds to urge the voters to vote for or 
against a ballot measure, unless the expenditure is explicitly authorized by law 
(Stanson v. Mott (1976) 17 C.3d 206).  In the absence of clear and explicit 
legislative authorization, a public agency may not expend public funds to promote 
a partisan position in an election campaign (Stanson v. Mott).  [¶]  A public 
agency, however, can use public funds to provide educational information to the 
public about a ballot measure.  Frequently, the line between unauthorized 
campaign expenditures and authorized informational material is not always clear.  
Public agencies may generally publish a ‘fair representation of facts’ relevant to an 
election matter, but the determination of the propriety of the expenditure may turn 
upon such factors as the style, tenor, and timing of the publication; no hard and 
fast rule governs every case (73 Ops.[Cal.]Atty.Gen. 255 (1990)).  [¶] . . .  [¶]  The 
committee amendments prohibit an expenditure of local agency funds to advocate 
support or opposition of a certified ballot measure or a qualified candidate 
appearing on the local agency ballot.  The amendments permit the expenditure of 
 
34 
local agency funds to provide fair and impartial information to the public about the 
possible effects of a ballot measure when the informational activity is authorized 
under law.  This language generally tracks the limitations imposed by state law on 
the use of state resources by state agencies, and closely parallels similar existing 
limitations on the use of school district and community college district resources.”  
(Assem. Com. on Elections, Reapportionment and Const. Amends., 3d reading 
analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2078 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 15, 
2000, pp. 2-3, italics added.)  Nothing in this or any other committee analysis or 
report related to the legislation indicates that the statute was intended to depart 
from or modify the Stanson decision. 
In arguing in favor of the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that section 54964 
should be interpreted to substitute the “express advocacy” standard for the 
standard set forth in Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, the City notes that at one point 
in the bill’s progression through the Legislature the definition of “expenditure” in 
subdivision (b)(3) was revised to refer to a payment of funds for “communications 
that, either expressly or by implication, advocate the approval or rejection” of a 
ballot measure (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 2078 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) 
June 12, 2000, italics added), but that thereafter the “or by implication” language 
was removed from the bill (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 2078 (1999-2000 
Reg. Sess.) Aug. 25, 2000), and the legislation (as ultimately enacted) refers only 
to communications that “expressly advocate” the approval or rejection of a ballot 
measure.  This legislative history does indicate that the Legislature was persuaded 
by numerous objections it received criticizing the “or by implication” language as 
too broad and vague and arguing such language was inconsistent with the 
legislation’s stated intent not to preclude an agency from providing information to 
the public about the possible effects of a ballot measure because any such 
information plausibly might be viewed as advocating a measure’s rejection or 
 
35 
approval “by implication.”15  But this legislative history does not indicate the 
Legislature intended to repudiate or depart from the Stanson decision, or to 
approve the use of public funds for activities that would constitute campaign 
activities under Stanson so long as those activities avoid expressly advocating the 
approval or rejection of a ballot measure. 
In addition to the language and legislative history of section 54964, the 
constitutional concerns identified by this court in Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, 
also militate against the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the statute.  In 
Stanson, we noted that one of the principal dangers identified by our nation’s 
founders was that “the holders of governmental authority would use official power 
improperly to perpetuate themselves, or their allies, in office” (id. at p. 217), and 
we observed that “the selective use of public funds in election campaigns . . . 
raises the specter of just such an improper distortion of the democratic electoral 
process.”  (Ibid.)  Whatever virtue the “express advocacy” standard might have in 
the context of the regulation of campaign contributions to and expenditures by 
candidates for public office,16 this standard does not meaningfully address the 
                                              
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
15  
For example, a “floor alert” letter to legislators from the Planning and 
Conservation League — sent just prior to the vote that removed the “by 
implication” language from the pending legislation — stated in this regard: “While 
agencies are already prohibited from using public funds for campaigning (a goal 
with which we strongly agree), this bill goes much further.  Only a court will be 
able to determine whether an agency “expressly or by implication” advocated a 
ballot measure, and agencies will be told by their counsel that they should not 
even take a position on a ballot measure, let alone inform their voters what the 
measure actually does. . . .  [¶]  Later the bill allows ‘information’ dissemination, 
but it will be impossible for an agency to avoid the ‘or by implication’ prohibition 
. . . , so they will simply do nothing, and default on their responsibility to inform 
the voters about the actual impact of the measure on their lives.”   
16  
The United States Supreme Court first articulated the “express advocacy” 
standard in Buckley v. Valeo (1976) 424 U.S. 1, 41-44 and footnote 52, as an 
 
36 
potential constitutional problems arising from the use of public funds for 
campaign activities that we identified in Stanson.  If a public entity could expend 
public funds for any type of election-related communication so long as the 
communication avoided “express words of advocacy” and did not “unambiguously 
urge[] a particular result” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 18225, subd. (b)(2)), the 
public entity easily could overwhelm the voters by using the public treasury to 
finance bumper stickers, posters, television and radio advertisements, and other 
campaign material containing messages that, while eschewing the use of express 
advocacy, nonetheless as a realistic matter effectively promote one side of an 
election.  Thus, for example, if the City of Salinas, instead of taking the actions 
that are at issue in this case, had posted large billboards throughout the City prior 
to the election stating, “IF MEASURE O IS APPROVED, SIX RECREATION 
CENTERS, THE MUNICIPAL POOL, AND TWO LIBRARIES WILL CLOSE,” 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
ostensible means of distinguishing advertisements that are aimed at promoting the 
election or defeat of a candidate, on the one hand, from “issue” advertisements 
that simply express a speaker’s views on an issue, on the other.  More recently, 
however, in McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n (2003) 540 U.S. 93, the high 
court recognized that political experience since Buckley has demonstrated the 
ineffectiveness and artificial nature of the “express advocacy” standard.  As the 
court in McConnell explained: “While the distinction between ‘issue’ and express 
advocacy seemed neat in theory, the two categories of advertisements proved 
functionally identical in important respects.  Both were used to advocate the 
election or defeat of clearly identified federal candidates, even though so-called 
issue ads eschewed the use of magic words [such as ‘Elect John Smith’ or ‘Vote 
Against Jane Doe’].  Little difference existed, for example, between an ad that 
urged voters to ‘vote against Jane Doe’ and one that condemned Jane Doe’s record 
on a particular issue and exhorted viewers to ‘call Jane Doe and tell her what you 
think.’  Indeed, campaign professionals testified that the most effective campaign 
ads, like the most effective commercials for products such as Coca Cola, should, 
and did, avoid the use of the magic words.” (McConnell, supra, 540 U.S. at 
pp. 126-127, fns. omitted.) 
 
37 
it would defy common sense to suggest that the City had not engaged in campaign 
activity, even though such advertisements would not have violated the express 
advocacy standard.17 
                                              
17  
The hypothetical message just discussed neither contains “express words of 
advocacy” nor “unambiguously urges a particular result,” inasmuch as some 
voters might believe that the identified public facilities are unnecessary or that 
public funds would be better spent for other purposes. 
 
In addition to the hypothetical example discussed above, the facts presented 
in one relatively recent out-of-state decision provide a concrete illustration of why 
the express advocacy standard is inadequate to restrain a municipality’s improper 
use of public funds for campaign activities. 
 
In Dollar v. Town of Cary (N.C.Ct.App. 2002) 569 S.E.2d 731, the plaintiff 
challenged the defendant town council’s appropriation of $200,000 in public funds 
for a proposed campaign “to better inform citizens about growth management 
issues” by promoting the merits of “smart growth” or “managed growth” policies.   
The appropriated funds were to be spent for “direct mail, media buys, and 
contracted services” as part of “a coordinated print, radio and television 
campaign” to be run from September 6, 2001 through November 19, 2001, a time 
period coinciding with the upcoming town council elections.  (569 S.E.2d at 
pp. 732-733.)  Although no incumbents were running to retain their seats in the 
upcoming election, undisputed evidence established that the current town 
council’s “slow growth” or “managed growth” policies were an important issue in 
the campaign, with several candidates aligning themselves with the current 
council’s policies and others opposing those policies.  Taking into account the 
nature and timing of the proposed expenditures, the court in Dollar concluded that 
“[t]he advertisements, in the context of the Council elections, appear to be more 
than informational in nature and instead implicitly promote the candidacy of those 
Council candidates in sympathy with the Council’s position on the Town’s 
growth.”  (569 S.E.2d at p. 734.)  Accordingly, the court in Dollar affirmed the 
trial court’s ruling enjoining the council from using public funds in that manner. 
 
If a municipality’s election-related expenditures were constrained only by 
an express advocacy standard, as urged here by the City and held by the Court of 
Appeal, there would be no restriction upon a public entity’s expenditure of public 
funds in the manner described in the Dollar decision, even when the 
disbursements are made during a local election campaign and for such traditional 
campaign activities as newspaper, radio, and television advertisements. 
 
38 
Thus, when viewed from a realistic perspective, the “express advocacy” 
standard does not provide a suitable means for distinguishing the type of campaign 
activities that (as Stanson explains) presumptively may not be paid for with public 
funds, from the type of informational material that presumptively may be 
compiled and made available to the public through the expenditure of such funds.  
And, as we have seen, there is no indication that, in enacting section 54964, the 
Legislature intended to modify or displace the principles and analysis set forth in 
the Stanson decision. 
The City, and amici curiae supporting the City, contend nonetheless that the 
“express advocacy” standard is preferable to the standard adopted in Stanson, 
supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, asserting that because our opinion states that in some 
circumstances “the style, tenor and timing” of a communication must be 
considered in determining whether the communication is properly treated as 
campaign or informational activity (see id. at p. 222), the Stanson standard is 
unduly vague and imposes an unconstitutional chilling effect on a public entity’s 
right to provide useful information to the voters.  Putting aside the question 
whether a public entity possesses a constitutional right (under either the federal or 
the state Constitution) to provide information relating to a pending ballot 
measure — an issue that is a prerequisite to the City’s unconstitutional-chilling-
effect argument but one that we need not and do not decide — we reject the 
contention that the line drawn in Stanson between the use of public funds for 
campaign activities and the use of such funds for informational material is unduly 
or impermissibly vague.  As we have seen, the Stanson decision explicitly 
identified a number of materials and activities that unquestionably constitute 
campaign activities (without any need to consider their “style, tenor and 
timing”) — for example, the use of public funds to purchase bumper stickers, 
posters, advertising “floats,” or television and radio “spots” — and also identified 
 
39 
a number of activities that are clearly informational — for example, providing a 
fair presentation of facts in response to a citizen’s request for information.  (Id. at 
p. 221.)  The circumstance that in some instances it may be necessary to consider 
the style, tenor, and timing of a communication or activity to determine whether, 
from an objective standpoint, the communication or activity realistically 
constitutes campaign activity rather than informational material, does not render 
the distinction between campaign and informational activities impermissibly 
vague.  Since our decision in Stanson, numerous out-of-state decisions have cited 
that opinion and utilized a comparable analysis in evaluating the propriety of 
public expenditures for a variety of election-related material and activities (see, 
e.g., Anderson v. City of Boston (Mass. 1978) 380 N.E.2d 628, appeal dismissed 
for want of substantial federal question (1979) 439 U.S. 1060; Smith v. Dorsey 
(Miss. 1991) 599 So.2d 529, 540-544; Burt v. Blumenauer (Or. 1985) 699 P.2d 
168, 171-181; Dollar v. Town of Cary, supra, 569 S.E.2d 731, 733-734), and the 
City has failed to cite any authority that has concluded the Stanson standard is 
unconstitutionally vague.  (See Sweetman v. State Elections Enforcement Comm. 
(Conn. 1999) 732 A.2d 144, 160-162 [explicitly rejecting similar constitutional 
vagueness challenge].) 
Accordingly, we conclude the campaign activity/informational material 
dichotomy set forth in Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, 220-223, remains the 
appropriate standard for distinguishing the type of activities that presumptively 
may not be paid for by public funds, from those activities that presumptively may 
be financed from public funds.  The Court of Appeal erred in relying solely upon 
the circumstance that the challenged communications of the City did not expressly 
advocate the approval or rejection of Measure O, and in failing to evaluate the 
City’s activities under the Stanson standard.   
 
40 
  
 
C 
As discussed above, contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeal, 
section 54964 does not affirmatively authorize a local agency to expend funds for 
communications relating to a ballot measure, but instead simply prohibits the 
expenditure of public funds under some circumstances.  Consequently, the City’s 
expenditure of funds for the communications and activities here at issue must rest 
upon some other authority. 
From the record before us, it appears that the expenditures in question were 
made pursuant to the general appropriations in the City’s regular annual budget 
pertaining to the maintenance of the City’s Web site, the publication of the City’s 
regular quarterly newsletter, and the ordinary provision of information to the 
public regarding the City’s operations.  The record does not indicate that the city 
council approved any special measure that purported, clearly and unmistakably, to 
grant the City explicit authority to expend public funds for campaign activities 
relating to Measure O.  Accordingly, as was the case in Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 
206, 219-223, the question whether the City’s expenditures that are challenged in 
this case were or were not validly incurred turns upon whether the activities fall 
within the category of informational activities that may be funded through such 
general appropriations or, instead, constitute campaign activities that may not be 
paid for by public funds in the absence of such explicit authorization. 
As discussed above, plaintiffs challenge three groups of communications by 
the City that relate to Measure O:  (1) the material posted on the City’s official 
Web site, (2) the one-page document made available to the public at the city 
clerk’s office and in public libraries, and (3) the municipal newsletter mailed to all 
city residents on or before October 1, 2002.  The content of all of these 
communications relates to the reduction and elimination of city services, 
programs, and facilities that the city council voted to implement should Measure O 
 
41 
be approved at the November 2002 election.  None of these materials or 
publications constitute the kind of typical campaign materials or activities that we 
identified in Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, 221 (“bumper stickers, posters, 
advertising ‘floats,’ or television and radio ‘spots’ . . . [or] the dissemination, at 
public expense, of campaign literature prepared by private proponents or 
opponents of a ballot measure”), but the items listed in Stanson do not exhaust the 
category of potential campaign materials or activities.  Plaintiffs contend that 
when the “style, tenor, and timing” of the challenged communications are taken 
into account, the communications should be viewed as improper campaign 
materials rather than as permissible informational materials.  Plaintiffs’ principal 
argument in this regard is that the communications in question failed to include the 
views expressed by the proponents of Measure O in opposition to the action taken 
by the city council — views that challenged the necessity and wisdom of the 
proposed cutbacks in city services.  Plaintiffs contend that by failing to set forth 
these competing views, the communications in question improperly “took sides” 
on the ballot measure and should be viewed as improper campaign activity. 
In advancing this argument, plaintiffs appear to rely in significant part on a 
passage in Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, that cautioned against the government’s 
“taking sides” in an election contest.  The opinion in Stanson stated in this regard: 
“A fundamental precept of this nation’s democratic electoral process is that the 
government may not ‘take sides’ in election contests or bestow an unfair 
advantage on one of several competing factions.  A principal danger feared by our 
country’s founders lay in the possibility that the holders of governmental authority 
would use official powers improperly to perpetuate themselves, or their allies, in 
office [citations]; the selective use of public funds in election campaigns, of 
course, raises the specter of just such an improper distortion of the democratic 
electoral process.”  (17 Cal.3d at p. 217.) 
 
42 
A full reading of the Stanson decision reveals, however, that our opinion’s 
statement that the government “may not ‘take sides’ in election contests” (Stanson, 
supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, 217) properly must be understood as singling out a public 
entity’s “use of the public treasury to mount an election campaign” (id. at p. 218, 
italics added) as the potentially constitutionally suspect conduct, rather than as 
precluding a public entity from analytically evaluating a proposed ballot measure 
and publicly expressing an opinion as to its merits.  As we have seen, in Stanson 
we explicitly recognized that a governmental agency “pursues a proper 
informational role when it . . . authorizes an agency employee to present the 
department’s view of a ballot proposal at a meeting of [a private or public] 
organization” (Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 221), thus making it clear that it is 
permissible for a public entity to evaluate the merits of a proposed ballot measure 
and to make its views known to the public.  Accordingly, we agree with those 
Court of Appeal decisions rendered after Stanson that explicitly have held that 
Stanson does not preclude a governmental entity from publicly expressing an 
opinion with regard to the merits of a proposed ballot measure, so long as it does 
not expend public funds to mount a campaign on the measure.  (See, e.g., Choice-
in-Education League v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 
415, 429; League of Women Voters v. Countywide Crim. Justice Coordination 
Com. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 529, 560.) 
Indeed, upon reflection, it is apparent that in many circumstances a public 
entity inevitably will “take sides” on a ballot measure and not be “neutral” with 
respect to its adoption.  For example, when a city council or county board of 
supervisors votes to place a bond or tax measure before the voters, it generally is 
quite apparent that the governmental entity supports the measure and believes it 
should be adopted by the electorate.  Similarly, when a city council is presented 
with a local initiative petition that has been signed by the requisite number of 
 
43 
voters and declines to enact the measure into law itself but instead places the 
matter on the ballot, in at least most cases a reasonable observer would infer that a 
majority of the council does not support adoption of the measure.  Thus, the mere 
circumstance that a public entity may be understood to have an opinion or position 
regarding the merits of a ballot measure is not improper. (See also, e.g., Elec. 
Code, § 9282 [authorizing local legislative body to author a ballot pamphlet 
argument for or against any city measure].) 
The potential danger to the democratic electoral process to which our court 
adverted in Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, 217, is not presented when a public 
entity simply informs the public of its opinion on the merits of a pending ballot 
measure or of the impact on the entity that passage or defeat of the measure is 
likely to have.  Rather, the threat to the fairness of the electoral process to which 
Stanson referred arises when a public entity or public official is able to devote 
funds from the public treasury, or the publicly financed services of public 
employees, to campaign activities favoring or opposing such a measure. 
In the present case, the city council, faced with the possibility of a 
substantial reduction in revenue in the middle of the 2002-2003 fiscal year should 
Measure O be approved by the voters at the November 2002 election, had the 
authority to decide, in advance of the election, which services would be cut should 
the measure be adopted, and then to inform the City’s residents of the council’s 
decision.  In posting on the City’s Web site the detailed minutes of all the city 
council meetings relating to the council’s action, along with the detailed and 
analytical reports prepared by the various municipal departments and presented by 
department officials at city council meetings, the City engaged in permissible 
informational rather than campaign activity, simply making this material available 
to members of the public who chose to visit the City’s Web site.  Because the 
proponents of Measure O spoke and made presentations at a number of city 
 
44 
council meetings, summaries of the proponents’ positions were included in the 
minutes of those meetings, were posted on the Web site, and thus were available to 
persons who visited the Web site, but the City had no obligation to provide the 
proponents of Measure O with special access to enable them to post material of 
their own choosing on the City’s official Web site.  The declarations submitted in 
the trial court establish that this Web site is not a public forum on which the City 
permits members of the public to freely post items or exchange views; the City 
retains the authority to decide what material is posted on its official Web site.18  
We conclude that the City engaged in informational rather than campaign activity, 
within the meaning of Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, in posting the material in 
question on its Web site. 
Similarly, the City did not engage in campaign activity in producing the 
one-page document listing the service and program reductions that the city council 
had voted to implement should Measure O be adopted (see appen. A), or in 
making copies of the document available to the public at the city clerk’s office and 
at public libraries.  Not only does the document in question not advocate or 
recommend how the electorate should vote on the ballot measure, but its style and 
tenor is not at all comparable to traditional campaign material.  Viewed from the 
perspective of an objective observer, the document clearly is an informational 
                                              
18  
Although plaintiffs contend the City’s official Web site constitutes a public 
forum for constitutional purposes, to which equal access must be provided to all 
competing factions, the governing authorities do not support this assertion, 
because the City has not opened its Web site to permit others to post material of 
their choice.  (See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc. (2003) 539 U.S. 
194, 204-206; Arkansas Educ. TV v. Forbes (1998) 523 U.S. 666, 673-677; 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund (1985) 473 U.S. 788, 803-806; 
Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn. (1983) 460 U.S. 37, 46; Clark v. 
Burleigh (1992) 4 Cal.4th 474, 482-491.)      
 
45 
statement that merely advises the public of the specific plans that the city council 
voted to implement, should Measure O be adopted.  Furthermore, the 
informational nature of the document is reinforced by the circumstance that the 
City simply made it available at the city clerk’s office and in public libraries to 
members of the public who sought out the document. 
Finally, we also conclude the City did not engage in impermissible 
campaign activity by mailing to city residents the fall 2002 “City Round-Up” 
newsletter containing a number of articles describing the proposed reductions in 
city services that the city council had voted to implement, should Measure O be 
adopted.  (See appen. B.)  Although under some circumstances the mailing of 
material relating to a ballot measure to a large number of potential voters shortly 
before an upcoming election unquestionably would constitute campaign activity 
that may not properly be paid for by public funds, a number of factors support the 
conclusion that the City’s mailing of the newsletter here at issue constituted 
informational rather than campaign activity.   
First, it is significant that this particular newsletter was a regular edition of 
the City’s quarterly newsletter that as a general practice was mailed to all city 
residents, rather than a special edition created and sent to would-be voters, 
specifically because of the upcoming election regarding Measure O.  In this 
respect, the newsletter in question is clearly distinguishable from the special 
edition newsletter that was before the United States Supreme Court in Federal 
Election Com. v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (1986) 479 U.S. 238, 250-
251 (Massachusetts Citizens for Life).19   
                                              
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
19  
In Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra, 479 U.S. 238, the high court 
explained that the special edition of the organization’s newsletter at issue in that 
case “cannot be considered comparable to any single issue of the newsletter.  It 
 
46 
Second, the city council’s July 16, 2002, resolution — identifying a 
significant number of current city services and programs that would be reduced or 
eliminated, should Measure O be adopted — quite clearly was an obvious and 
natural subject to be reported upon in a city’s regular quarterly newsletter, and the 
style and tenor of the publication in question was entirely consistent with an 
ordinary municipal newsletter and readily distinguishable from traditional 
campaign material.  Like the one-page document discussed above, the front-page 
article of the newsletter relating to Measure O simply identified the specific city 
services and programs that the city council had voted to reduce or eliminate, 
should Measure O be adopted.  The additional articles that described in more 
detail the potential cuts in services affecting the police, fire, and park and 
recreation departments, although at times conveying the departments’ views of the 
importance of such programs, were moderate in tone and did not exhort voters 
with regard to how they should vote.   
Further, the article setting forth answers to frequently asked questions about 
the utility users tax provided city residents with important information about the 
tax — including the annual cost of the tax to the average resident — in an 
objective and nonpartisan manner.  The content of this newsletter clearly 
distinguishes it from the kind of blatantly partisan, publicly financed agency 
newsletter that the New York Court of Appeals held improper in Shulz v. State of 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
was not published through the facilities of the regular newsletter, but by a staff 
which prepared no previous or subsequent newsletters.  It was not distributed to 
the newsletter’s regular audience, but to a group 20 times the size of that audience, 
most of whom were members of the public who had never received the newsletter.  
No characteristic of the Edition associated it in any way with the normal MCFL 
publication.”  (Id. at p. 250.) 
 
47 
New York (N.Y. 1995) 654 N.E.2d 1226 (Schulz),20 or from the type of 
promotional campaign brochure that, on at least one occasion, has been mailed to 
voters by a California public entity in the past.21  Under these circumstances, we 
conclude that the City engaged in permissible informational activity, rather than 
impermissible campaign activity, in publishing and mailing the newsletter in 
question.22 
                                              
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
20  
In Schulz, the court considered a newsletter that had been published and 
mailed by the New York Governor’s Office of Economic Development in advance 
of the 1992 presidential election and that discussed welfare reform, an issue of 
primary interest in the presidential campaign.  In describing the newsletter, the 
court in Schulz observed:  “Although the newsletter contained a substantial 
amount of factual information which would have been of assistance to the 
electorate in making an educated decision on whose position to support on that 
issue, the paper [i]ndisputably ‘ “convey[ed] . . . partisanship, partiality . . . [and] 
disapproval by a State agency of [an] issue” ’ [citation.].  Thus, the newsletter 
states:  [¶]  ‘Led by the Bush Administration, Republicans in New York and across 
the nation are seeking to slash assistance to the needy. . . . The Republicans appear 
to have devised a strategy of using distortions and half-truths about Medicaid and 
welfare to divide the people in a key election year.’ ”  (Schulz, supra, 654 N.E.2d 
at p. 1231.)  The court in Schulz held:  “The conclusion is unavoidable that the 
latter portion of the newsletter is ‘patently designed to exhort the electorate to 
[make an avowed, public commitment] in support of a particular position 
advocated by [one political faction].’ ”  (Ibid.) 
21  
At the request of amicus curiae California Chamber of Commerce and other 
organizations, we have taken judicial notice of two brochures that were mailed to 
voters by the Solano Transportation Improvement Authority in relation to a local 
transportation measure (Measure M) that was before the voters in the November 
2006 election.   
22  
In addition to maintaining that the distribution of the fall 2002 “City 
Round-Up” newsletter constituted campaign activity, plaintiffs also argue, as they 
have with regard to the City’s official Web site, that the city newsletter constitutes 
a public forum and that the City had an obligation to offer the proponents of 
Measure O the opportunity to include in the newsletter their objections to the city 
council’s action.  As with the City’s official Web site, however, the City did not 
permit private persons or organizations to publish material in the city newsletter, 
and thus the newsletter did not constitute a public forum to which the proponents 
 
48 
In sum, a variety of factors contributes to our conclusion that the actions of 
the City that are challenged in this case are more properly characterized as 
providing information than as campaigning:  (1) the information conveyed 
generally involved past and present facts, such as how the original UUT was 
enacted, what proportion of the budget was produced by the tax, and how the city 
council had voted to modify the budget in the event Measure O were to pass; 
(2) the communications avoided argumentative or inflammatory rhetoric and did 
not urge voters to vote in a particular manner or to take other actions in support of 
or in opposition to the measure; and (3) the information provided and the manner in 
which it was disseminated were consistent with established practice regarding use 
of the Web site and regular circulation of the city’s official newsletter.  
Furthermore, we emphasize that the principles that we have applied in this setting 
are equally applicable without regard to the content of whatever particular ballot 
measure may be before the voters — whether it be a tax-cutting proposal such as 
that involved in this case, a “slow-growth” zoning measure restricting the pace of 
development, a school bond issue providing additional revenue for education, or 
any other of the diverse local ballot measures that have been considered in 
California municipalities in recent years.  (See, e.g., Cal. Elections Data Archive, 
Cal. County, City & School District Election Outcomes:  2004 Elections: City 
Offices and Ballot Measures, City Report, table 1.2, pp. 21-43 
 [as of Apr. 20, 2009].)  In any of these 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
of Measure O had a right of access.  (See, e.g., Arkansas Educ. TV v. Forbes, 
supra, 523 U.S. 666, 672-675; Clark v. Burleigh, supra, 4 Cal.4th 474, 482-491.) 
 
49 
 
50 
contexts, a municipality’s expenditure of public funds must be consistent with the 
standard set forth in Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206.  
In the present case, we conclude, on the basis of the facts established by the 
materials submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion to strike, that all 
of the activities of the City that are challenged by plaintiffs constitute permissible 
informational activities — and not inappropriate campaign activities. 
 
 
D 
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the City and the other 
defendants established that the communications that gave rise to plaintiffs’ action 
fall within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute, and that plaintiffs failed to meet 
their resultant burden of establishing a prima facie case that defendants’ actions 
were unlawful.  Thus, the trial court properly granted defendants’ motion to strike 
plaintiffs’ action under the anti-SLAPP statute. 
 
 
IV 
As explained above, although we conclude that the Court of Appeal applied 
an incorrect standard in evaluating the validity of the City’s conduct, we 
nonetheless conclude that the appellate court reached the correct result in 
upholding the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion to strike the 
supplemental complaint.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J.
 
1 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
 
I agree with the majority that the “express advocacy” standard does not 
fully capture the limitations on the public funding of communication in connection 
with political campaigns.  I also agree with the majority that the City of Salinas’s 
expenditures in the present case were lawful.  I write to further analyze the 
relationship between the relevant statute and case law.  I also write to explain why 
the majority’s holding, based on Stanson v. Mott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 206 (Stanson), 
a case that preceded dramatic changes in the structure of government financing 
that have occurred over the last 30 years, may not be the final word on the issue. 
As suggested by the majority, and by the court in Stanson, there are broadly 
speaking two types of limitations on public funding of government 
communications in connection with ballot initiative campaigns: (1) limitations on 
the content of communications that government agencies may fund; and (2) 
limitations on the means used by local governments to disseminate their 
communications. 
Government Code section 54964 (section 54964) is concerned with the first 
type of limitation — the contents of the communication.  Section 54964, 
subdivisions (a) and (b) prohibit the “payment of local agency funds that is used 
for communications that expressly advocate the approval or rejection of a clearly 
identified ballot measure, or the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, 
by the voters.”  (Italics added.)  Section 54964, subdivision (c), provides that 
“[t]his section does not prohibit the expenditure of local agency funds to provide 
information to the public about the possible effects of a ballot measure on the 
 
2 
 
activities, operations, or policies of the local agency, if both of the following 
conditions are met:  [¶]  (1) The informational activities are not otherwise 
prohibited by the Constitution or laws of this state.  [¶]  (2) The information 
provided constitutes an accurate, fair, and impartial presentation of relevant facts 
to aid the voters in reaching an informed judgment regarding the ballot measure.”  
Therefore, read together, section 54964 permits expenditures for communications 
that do not expressly advocate passage of a ballot measure and are informational 
in nature.  As the majority correctly notes, the Legislature considered and rejected 
a prohibition on advocacy “by implication.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 35-36.) 
As an initial matter, I note that plaintiffs would interpret section 54964 to 
require that the government limit itself to “undisputed factual information” and not 
weigh in on “debatable questions.”  But section 54964, subdivision (c) does not 
say that the government is obliged to inform the public regarding all sides of the 
debate about a given ballot measure, or that it must view all sides with equal favor.  
Rather, it is authorized to inform the public about the “possible effects of the 
ballot measure on the activities, operations or policies of the local agency.”  A 
government agency’s analysis and discussion of that topic may be controversial or 
not universally agreed upon, and it cannot be the case that section 54964, 
subdivision (c) would for that reason prohibit it.  “[A]ccurate, fair and impartial” 
implies a certain kind of objective and factual approach, not necessarily a 
noncontroversial outcome, rather like a judicial opinion that is firmly grounded in 
the facts and the law and established methods of legal reasoning, but which may 
be contested by a dissent similarly grounded.  On the other hand, the “undisputed 
factual information” standard would mean that the government could not 
communicate any information unless there was complete agreement about its 
truth, no matter how unreasonable the contrary position is — a virtually 
 
3 
 
impossible standard and doubtless not what the Legislature intended.  I therefore 
agree with the majority’s implicit rejection of plaintiffs’ interpretation of section 
54964, subdivision (c). 
Although section 54964 regulates the contents of the communications a 
government agency may fund in the course of a political campaign, it does not 
address the second prong discussed above, the means by which such 
communication can be disseminated.  This topic is covered substantially in 
Stanson.  Indeed, in its pivotal distinction between “improper ‘campaign’ 
expenditures” and “proper ‘informational’ activities” (Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at 
p. 221), Stanson focused in large part on the methods by which the government’s 
messages are communicated:  “With respect to some activities the distinction is 
rather clear; thus, the use of public funds to purchase such items as bumper 
stickers, posters, advertising ‘floats,’ or television and radio ‘spots’ 
unquestionably constitutes improper campaign activity [citations], as does the 
dissemination, at public expense, of campaign literature prepared by private 
proponents or opponents of a ballot measure.  [Citations.]  On the other hand, it is 
generally accepted that a public agency pursues a proper ‘informational’ role when 
it simply gives a ‘fair presentation of the facts’ in response to a citizen’s request 
for information [citations] or, when requested by a private or public organization, 
it authorizes an agency employee to present the department’s view of a ballot 
proposal at a meeting of such organization.  [Citations.]”  (Ibid., fn. omitted.)  
Stanson also critically refers to the “style, tenor and timing” of communications to 
determine whether they constitute improper campaign activity.  (Id. at p. 222.) 
I agree with the majority that the fact that section 54964 only addressed the 
permissible content of government-funded communications about ballot measures 
does not mean that it was intended to supersede Stanson’s statements 
 
4 
 
circumscribing the means of disseminating the communications.  Such a 
repudiation or modification of Stanson is neither evident in the language of the 
statute nor, as the majority points out, in the legislative history.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 34.)  Thus, in addition to the legislative command pursuant to section 54964 
that local government agencies not engage in “express advocacy” and that they 
fund only those communications about ballot measures that are informational in 
nature, such communications must also pass the Stanson test of not using methods 
that constitute campaign activity. 
With respect to those methods, it is noteworthy that today’s decision makes 
clear, in a way that Stanson did not, that a government agency’s informational 
activities with respect to ballot measures are not limited to responses to citizen 
requests, but can also entail proactive measures to inform citizenry about the 
probable effects of a ballot measure.  Municipalities are statutorily authorized to 
gather information about the impacts of proposed ballot measures (Elec. Code, 
§ 9212) and are often uniquely well positioned to disseminate such information.  
Nor do I understand the various methods used by the city in the present case, 
which the majority correctly concludes are lawful, to necessarily represent the 
outer limits of permissible publicly funded communications.  Precisely where such 
outer limits are to be drawn awaits other cases. 
It also remains to be seen whether the concept of prohibited “campaign 
activity” set forth in Stanson, and reaffirmed by the majority meets the current 
needs of governance.  Since Stanson was decided over 30 years ago, local 
government finance in California has undergone a sea change.  One aspect of that 
transformation is that after the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 and subsequent 
measures, the power to raise local revenues has shifted from the local legislatures 
— the city councils, boards of supervisors, school boards and boards of directors 
 
5 
 
of special agencies — to the electorate, which now must approve all revenue 
increases and increases in bonded indebtedness at the ballot box, usually by a 
supermajority vote.  (See Cal. Const., arts. XIIIA, XIIIC.)  In other words, the 
local government legislative power to finance government projects and services no 
longer resides with the local legislative body as it did when Stanson was written, 
but with the local electorate.  Thus, for example, whereas in the 1978 general 
election, one ballot initiative relating to local taxes and none to local bond issues 
were reported in Los Angeles County, in the 2008 general election 11 local tax 
initiatives and 21 bond initiatives were reported.  (County of Los Angeles, Off. of 
Registrar-Recorder, Official Election Returns, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978); County 
of Los Angeles, Dept. of Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk, Final Official Election 
Returns, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008).) 
In this context, local and regional agencies sometimes have been specially 
charged with the task of sponsoring ballot propositions to raise revenue to fund 
various infrastructure improvements and services that are deemed necessary.  The 
critical role of local governments in such sponsorship is illustrated by the recent 
case of Santa Barbara County Coalition Against Automobile Subsidies v. Santa 
Barbara County Assn. of Governments (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1229 (Santa 
Barbara County).  By statute, the county transportation authority (SBCAG), was 
“specifically empowered to impose a retail transaction and use tax of up to 1 
percent to fund transportation improvements and services in its county.  (Pub. Util. 
Code, § 180202.)  Before a sales tax may be imposed, however, the authority must 
adopt a ‘transportation expenditure plan’ for revenues ‘expected to be derived 
from’ the tax, approve an ordinance imposing the tax, and obtain approval of the 
ordinance by ‘a majority of the electors voting on the measure . . . at a special 
election called for that purpose by the board of supervisors, at the request of the 
 
6 
 
authority . . . .’  (Pub. Util. Code, §§ 180201, 180206.)”  (Santa Barbara County, 
supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1239-1240.) 
SBCAG proposed a ballot proposition, Measure A, for the November 2008 
ballot seeking to extend the .5 percent countywide sales tax to fund various 
transportation projects and services.  (Santa Barbara County, supra, 167 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1234.)  It was opposed by the Santa Barbara County Coalition 
Against Automobile Subsidies, a nonprofit corporation.  Plaintiff corporation filed 
a complaint against SBCAG, claiming it was engaging in illegal campaign 
activity.  As the court explained:  “SBCAG retained a private consultant to survey 
voter support for an extension of the sales tax.  The consultant determined the 
arguments in favor of extension that were received most favorably by the voters 
polled, potential arguments in opposition, and the best strategy to maximize voter 
support.  In addition, SBCAG staff and committee members attended public 
meetings with civic groups during which staff presented information regarding the 
transportation expenditure plan, and the importance of extending the 1989 sales 
tax to satisfying the county’s transportation needs.”  (Ibid.) 
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s grant of SBCAG’s motion to 
strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, 
holding there was no probability of plaintiff prevailing on the merits.  The Court 
of Appeal’s conclusion that SBCAG’s actions did not constitute unlawful 
campaign activity largely turned on the fact that all the activity at issue had 
occurred before the measure was placed on the ballot.  As the court explained: 
“SBCAG was performing its legislative duty to obtain financing for county 
transportation needs.  [¶]  Governments must provide facilities and services that 
require funding through taxation. The SBCAG is permitted and even required to 
expend public funds to determine the cost of the county’s transportation needs and 
 
7 
 
propose ordinances calling for elections to obtain the necessary revenue. When a 
government agency’s activity represents its ‘ “. . . judgment of what is required in 
the effective discharge of its responsibility, it is not only the right but perhaps the 
duty of the body to endeavor to secure the assent of the voters thereto.” ’ ”  (Santa 
Barbara County, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1240-1241.) 
Although the court’s decision rested on the fact that SBCAG’s activity 
preceded placement on the ballot, the case highlights the tension between on the 
one hand statutorily authorizing government agencies to propose revenue raising 
ballot initiatives (see also Elec. Code, §§  9140, 9222 [authorizing boards of 
supervisors and city councils to submit ballot questions to voters]), and on the 
other hand forbidding them from campaigning for those initiatives.  Under these 
circumstances, it would seem a government agency has a special role to play in 
informing the electorate about the reasons for enacting the measure it has 
proposed.  That information must be, to be sure, “an accurate, fair, and impartial 
presentation of relevant facts” (§ 54964, subd. (c)(2)), but it necessarily will 
involve some degree of advocacy, since the agency is itself sponsoring the ballot 
measure based on its assessment of local needs. 
The extent to which the funding of an active informational campaign to 
promote or defend a lawfully government-sponsored ballot measure would fit 
within Stanson’s and the majority’s informational/campaign activity dichotomy is 
not entirely clear.  Yet as the majority reaffirms, courts are not necessarily the 
final word on the matter.  Stanson’s and the majority’s holdings are limited to 
situations in which there is no “clear and unmistakable [legislative] language 
specifically authorizing a public entity to expend public funds for campaign 
activities or materials.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 25; see also Stanson, supra, 17 
Cal.3d at pp. 219-220.)  Indeed, one of the strengths of the majority opinion, and 
 
8 
 
of Stanson, is that they leave room for the possibility of legislative innovation in 
this area to respond to new or unique circumstances.   
Of course, any such legislation would have to conform to constitutional 
constraints so as to preserve “the integrity of the electoral process.”  (Stanson, 
supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 218.)  At the very least, such legislation must follow 
Professor Tribe’s dictum that “government may add its own voice to many it must 
tolerate, provided it does not drown out private communication.”  (Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988) § 12-4, p. 807.)   But at a time when 
government sponsorship of revenue raising ballot measures has become an integral 
part of local government finance, the blanket prohibition on government-funded 
“campaign activity” may be neither constitutionally required nor socially optimal.  
The Legislature may wish to clarify the extent to which an agency can engage in 
an active informational campaign decidedly in favor of or in defense of a measure 
it has been charged with sponsoring.  
With these provisos in mind, I concur in the majority opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
I CONCUR:  
 WERDEGAR, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Vargas v. City of Salinas 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 135 Cal.App.4th 361 
Rehearing Granted 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S140911 
Date Filed: April 20, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Monterey 
Judge: Robert A. O’Farrell 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Steven J. André for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Joseph T. Francke for California Aware as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Nick Bulaich as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Trevor A. Grimm, Jonathan M. Coupal and Timothy A. Bittle for Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association as 
Amicus Curiae. 
 
Nielsen, Merksamer, Parrinello, Mueller & Naylor, Steven A. Merksamer, James R. Parrinello and 
Christopher E. Skinnell for California Chamber of Commerce, California Taxpayers’ Association, 
California Business Roundtable and California Business Properties Association as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Anthony T. Caso and Deborah J. La Fetra for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Vanessa W. Vallarta, City Attorney, M. Christine Davi and Jessica K. Steinberg, Deputy City Attorneys; 
Law Offices of Joel Franklin and Joel Franklin for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Nossaman, Guthner, Knox & Elliott, Stephen N. Roberts, Stanley S. Taylor and Ciarán O’Sullivan for Self-
Help Counties Coalition as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Stephen P. Traylor for League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Remcho, Johansen & Purcell, Robin B. Johansen, Karen Getman and Margaret R. Prinzing for League of 
California Cities, California State Association of Counties and League of Women Voters of Salinas Valley 
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Steven J. André 
26540 Carmel Rancho Boulevard 
Carmel, CA  93923 
(831) 624-5786 
 
James R. Parrinello 
Nielsen, Merksamer, Parrinello, Mueller & Naylor 
591 Redwood Highway, #4000 
Mill Valley, CA  94941 
(415) 389-6800 
 
Joel Franklin 
Law Offices of Joel Franklin 
2100 Garden Road, Suite G 
Monterey, CA  93940-5316 
(831) 649-2545