Case Title: Washington v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARSHALL LOUIS WASHINGTON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 132Case Number: No. S-11-0041Decided: 09/20/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
MARSHALL 
LOUIS WASHINGTON,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County
The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Justin A. 
Daraie, Assistant Attorney General.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      The appellant, 
Marshall Washington, while working as a confidential informant for the Wyoming 
Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), was arrested after drugs were 
discovered in his vehicle.  In this 
appeal, he challenges the district court’s denial of discovery of the 
confidential informant agreement (CI agreement) between him and DCI, as well as 
DCI’s policy manual regarding procedures to be followed with confidential 
informants (CI policy manual).  The 
appellant further argues that the matter should be reversed and remanded 
inasmuch as the Modified Judgment and Sentence does not fully comply with 
W.R.Cr.P. 32.
 
[¶2]      Finding no 
reversible error, we affirm the conviction and remand to the district court to 
amend the Modified Judgment and Sentence for compliance with the Wyoming Rules 
of Criminal Procedure.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶3]      1.    Did the district court 
improperly deny discovery of the CI agreement and the CI policy 
manual?
 
            
2.    What is the 
effect of the noncompliance with W.R.Cr.P. 32 in the Modified Judgment and 
Sentence?
 
FACTS
 
[¶4]      The appellant 
was arrested on March 29, 2010, for shoplifting.  While in jail on that charge he indicated 
to the arresting officer willingness to serve as a confidential informant.  DCI agents contacted him later that same 
day to determine the extent of the information that the appellant would be able 
to provide.  The agents informed the 
appellant that he could assist them by participating in a “controlled buy”1 and that he should contact them 
when released from jail.
 
[¶5]      On March 31, 
2010, after his release on bond, the appellant met the agents at the DCI office. 
 At that time, the agents explained 
the terms of the CI agreement, which the appellant later signed.  The appellant was given a copy of the 
agreement to follow along as one of the agents read through and explained the 
items included in the agreement.  The appellant, however, was not allowed 
to keep this copy.  Of particular 
importance to this appeal was item number 4, which read as follows: “Do you 
understand that you are not to handle any contraband or illegal substances, at 
any time, unless specifically authorized to do so by an agent or officer of this 
agency?”  During this meeting, the 
agent explained to the appellant that he did not have authorization to buy drugs 
unless specifically instructed to do so.
 
[¶6]      On April 20, 
2010, the appellant returned to the DCI office to participate in a controlled 
buy operation.  After explaining 
their expectations to the appellant, the agents informed the appellant that they 
would need to search both his person and his vehicle because the vehicle would 
be used in the course of the operation.  At that point, the appellant appeared to 
become nervous and told the agents that they would find a marijuana cigarette, 
crack pipes, and a syringe in his vehicle.  While searching the appellant’s car, the 
agents also found a black sock under the driver’s seat containing crack cocaine, 
methamphetamine, marijuana, clonazepam, hydrocodone, methadone, and oxycodone. 
 The appellant was arrested and 
charged with seven counts of possession of a controlled substance pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (LexisNexis 2011).  He pled not guilty to those 
charges.
 
[¶7]      Prior to trial, 
the appellant moved to compel discovery of DCI’s CI policy manual.  The State refused to provide the 
appellant with the manual asserting lack of relevance.  At the hearing on the Motion to Compel 
Discovery, the district court conducted an in camera review of the CI policy 
manual.  Based on that review, the 
district court denied the appellant’s motion.  Both the CI policy manual and the CI 
agreement signed by the appellant were sealed for appellate purposes; however, 
the signed CI agreement was left available to the parties for use at 
trial.
 
[¶8]      At trial, the 
appellant’s defense was that he was under the mistaken belief that he had been 
authorized by the DCI agents to purchase drugs on his own.  The jury found the defendant guilty on 
all charges.
 
[¶9]      The district 
court’s Judgment and Sentence incorrectly stated that the appellant pled guilty 
to the charged offenses.  The 
parties entered a stipulated motion to modify the Judgment and Sentence to 
correct that inaccuracy to read that the appellant had been found guilty.  The parties, however, failed to notice 
that the Modified Judgment and Sentence did not comply with certain provisions 
of W.R.Cr.P. 32.2
 
[¶10]   The appellant timely 
appealed.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶11]   Discovery rulings will be reviewed 
by this Court under the abuse of discretion standard.  Ceja v. State, 2009 WY 71, ¶ 11, 208 P.3d 66, 68 (Wyo. 2009); Almada v. 
State, 994 P.2d 299, 303 (Wyo. 1999); Dodge v. State, 562 P.2d 303, 307 (Wyo. 1977).  “On review, our primary consideration is 
the reasonableness of the trial court’s decision.”  Nelson v. State, 2009 WY 37, ¶ 12, 202 P.3d 1072, 1075 (Wyo. 2009); Proffit v. 
State, 2008 WY 103, ¶ 12, 191 P.3d 974, 977 (Wyo. 2008).  The party challenging the district 
court’s decision, here the appellant, has the burden to prove an abuse of 
discretion.  Nelson, 2009 WY 37, ¶ 12, 202 P.3d  at 
1075; Person v. State, 2004 WY 149, ¶ 
11, 100 P.3d 1270, 1275 (Wyo. 2004).
 
[¶12]   Whether the district court’s 
Modified Judgment and Sentence complied with the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 32 
and the effects of any noncompliance are questions of law that are reviewed de novo.  Dunmire v. Powell Family of Yakima, LLC (In 
re Kite Ranch, LLC), 2008 WY 39, ¶ 17, 181 P.3d 920, 925 (Wyo. 
2008).
 
DISCUSSION
 
Did 
the district court improperly deny discovery of the CI agreement and the CI 
policy manual?
 
[¶13]   The appellant contends on appeal 
that he was improperly denied discovery of two documents: the CI policy manual 
and his signed CI agreement.  He 
generally argues that denial of discovery of both items “prevented his attorney 
from adequately preparing for trial and presenting his defense.”  His defense was that he was led to 
believe that the extent of his cooperation would be measured by the amount of 
drugs he could find.  He claims that 
these documents supported his belief and that they would have been useful in 
cross-examination of the DCI agents and establishing his 
defense.
 
[¶14]   The appellant’s argument is flawed 
for a number of reasons.  Regarding 
the signed CI agreement, nothing in the record indicates that the appellant was 
actually denied access to that document.  
The Motion to Compel Discovery did not specifically request access to the 
CI agreement and it appears that appellant always had access to the document, 
even prior to the hearing on the Motion to Compel Discovery, let alone prior to 
the trial itself.  The prosecutor 
informed the appellant before the trial that he intended to rely upon the 
agreement at trial.  The CI 
agreement was introduced by the State and available as an exhibit.  The appellant’s attorney clearly relied 
on her own copy of the agreement at trial; at one point in the trial testimony 
she makes reference to “my copy” of the agreement.  She also cross-examined one of the 
State’s witnesses from her copy of the agreement and made reference to its 
content in her closing argument.  
The evidence indicates that not only did the appellant have access to the 
agreement prior to trial, but he also was well prepared regarding the content of 
the agreement.  The record simply 
does not support the appellant’s contention that he was denied access to the CI 
agreement.
 
[¶15]   We turn now to the CI policy 
manual.  The district court clearly 
denied the appellant’s discovery request for that document.  We must determine whether this denial 
was an abuse of discretion.  The 
appellant’s primary contention on appeal is that the CI policy manual is a 
public document subject to the Wyoming Public Records Act (WPRA) and therefore 
should have been discoverable.  This 
issue is raised for the first time on appeal.  We have often said we will not address 
matters that were not raised below.
 
We 
strongly adhere to the rule forbidding us to consider for the first time on 
appeal issues that were neither raised in, nor argued to, the trial court, 
except for those issues which are jurisdictional or are fundamental in nature. 
 We follow this rule because it is 
unfair to reverse a ruling of a trial court for reasons that were not presented 
to it, whether it be legal theories or issues never formally raised in the 
pleadings nor argued to the trial court.
 
Erwin 
v. State, DFS, 
2010 WY 117, ¶ 15, 237 P.3d 409, 414 (Wyo. 2010) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted).  See also Whitten v. State, 2005 WY 55, ¶ 
24, 110 P.3d 892, 898 (Wyo. 2005); Kitzke 
v. State, 2004 WY 9, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 950, 953 (Wyo. 
2004).
 
[¶16]   Because the question of whether the 
CI policy manual was subject to disclosure under the WPRA and thus should have 
been admissible at trial was not raised below, we will not directly address that 
issue in this appeal.  See Mary's Bake Shoppe v. City of 
Cheyenne, 2008 WY 116, ¶ 31 n.5, 
193 P.3d 252, 259 n.5 (Wyo. 2008) (this Court disregarded appellate argument, 
made for the first time on appeal, that a document was discoverable under the 
WPRA noting that the “request for production, however, was made in the context 
of the instant civil litigation, making her [appellate] arguments 
inapt.”).
 
[¶17]   While we will not address the 
appellant’s new appellate arguments, we will examine the admissibility of the CI 
policy manual, generally.  Although 
there is no constitutional right to discovery, a defendant has a 
constitutionally protected right to present a defense.  Ceja, 2009 WY 71, ¶ 13, 208 P.3d  at 68; 
Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 5, 63 P.3d 875, 879 (Wyo. 2003).  A 
defendant may request discovery of certain items from the state, but the state 
is only required to provide such information as indicated by statute, rule or 
case law.  Ceja, 2009 WY 71, ¶ 13, 208 P.3d  at 
68.
 
[¶18]   At the hearing on the Motion to 
Compel Discovery, the appellant pointed to W.R.Cr.P. 16 as grounds for his 
claim that the State was required to provide the CI policy manual.  That rule provides, in part: “Upon 
written demand of the defendant, the state shall permit the defendant to inspect 
. . . documents . . . which are within the possession, custody or control of the 
state, and which are material to the preparation of the defendant’s defense . . 
. .”  W.R.Cr.P. 16(a)(1)(C).  The appellant contends that the CI 
policy manual should have been provided as it was material to his defense.  When considering the materiality of 
excluded evidence, we must determine whether “there is a reasonable probability 
that the outcome of the case would have been different” had the evidence been 
admitted.  Nelson, 2009 WY 37, ¶ 13, 202 P.3d  at 
1075 (quoting Vena v. State, 941 P.2d 33, 39 (Wyo. 1997), abrogated on other 
grounds by Vaughn v.State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998)).  Here, 
there is no such indication.
 
[¶19]   The appellant’s defense rested on 
the assertion that he was confused as to the point and circumstances at which he 
had the authorization of DCI to buy drugs.  
While the DCI agents indicate that he merely was to participate in a 
controlled buy operation under their direct supervision and guidance, the 
appellant contends that he was given the impression that his goal was to acquire 
drugs from drug dealers regardless of whether specifically directed to do so by 
the agents or whether he was performing under their supervision.  At the hearing on the Motion to Compel 
Discovery, the appellant argued that the CI policy manual was material to his 
defense in that failure by the agents to follow the protocol as set forth in the 
manual could have led to this confusion.  
The State responded by arguing that the CI policy manual was irrelevant 
and that divulging this information could put DCI agents in danger.  Following arguments of both parties and 
an in camera inspection of the CI 
policy manual, the district court ruled that it was not subject to 
discovery.
 
[¶20]   After reviewing the entire record, 
we agree with the district court’s refusal to allow discovery of the CI policy 
manual.  Much of what is contained 
in the CI policy manual is also present in the CI agreement, which was available 
to the appellant at trial.  Both the 
CI policy manual and the CI agreement specifically preclude a confidential 
informant from handling illicit drugs unless authorized to do so by DCI.  Nothing in the CI policy manual, 
explicitly or implicitly, gives DCI agents the power to permit confidential 
informants unilaterally to procure drugs, as the appellant 
suggests.
 
[¶21]   What is material to the appellant’s 
defense is the information actually conveyed to him by DCI, either in the form 
of the CI agreement that he signed or in the agents’ oral explanation of the 
terms of the agreement and their expectations for his participation in the 
controlled buy.  The record 
indicates that the agents adequately and clearly explained each item in the CI 
agreement and the appellant acknowledged his understanding of each item.  The testimony of the agents emphasized 
this fact: “Question: So in this case, did you explain to [the appellant] 
that he was not to go out and get drugs on his own?  Answer: 
Absolutely.  Several times.  It’s -- it’s hammered in.”  The appellant acknowledged his 
understanding of this instruction, as well as all other items included in the 
agreement, both orally and in writing.  The appellant presents no evidence to 
indicate that he was authorized or instructed to go off on his own and procure 
illegal drugs from as many drug dealers as possible.  One cannot simply infer from the fact 
that the appellant did not follow the instructions given to him that the 
instructions were necessarily inadequate or vague or that the appellant was 
misled.
 
[¶22]   In assessing whether the district 
court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the appellant access to the CI 
policy manual, we will look to the “reasonableness” of the trial court’s 
decision.  Person, 2004 WY 149, ¶ 11, 100 P.3d  at 
1275; Proffit, 2008 WY 103, 
¶ 12, 191 P.3d  at 977.  
“Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.”  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 Wyo. 1986)).  After 
considering all of the same evidence presented, we find that the district court 
reasonably denied discovery of the CI policy manual as that document was not 
material to the appellant’s defense. 

 
What 
is the effect of the noncompliance with W.R.Cr.P. 32 in the Modified Judgment 
and Sentence?
 
[¶23]   After discovering that the initial 
Judgment and Sentence incorrectly indicated that the appellant pled guilty 
rather than that he was found guilty, the parties entered a stipulated motion to 
correct the error.  The parties did 
not, however, recognize that the Judgment and Sentence as modified omitted 
certain required elements of W.R.Cr.P. 32(b).  See supra ¶ 9 n.2.  On appeal, the appellant contends both 
that the error should be corrected on remand and that the judgment should be 
reversed.
 
[¶24]   Both parties agree that the 
Modified Judgment and Sentence did not fully comply with W.R.Cr.P. 32(b).  Where an error or omission occurs in a 
lower court’s order, we must determine whether it was a clerical or judicial 
mistake.  Glover v. Crayk, 2005 WY 143, ¶ 9, 
122 P.3d 955, 958 (Wyo. 2005).3  Clerical errors are “all errors, 
mistakes, or omissions which are not the result of the exercise of the judicial 
function.”  Kearns v. State, 2002 WY 97, ¶ 27, 48 P.3d 1090, 1098 (Wyo. 2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  Judicial error, on the other hand, is 
“the deliberate result of judicial reasoning and determination.”  Id.  “The key factor is whether or not the 
court reached a decision in the intentional or purposeful exercise of its 
judicial function. If the pronouncement reflects a deliberate choice on the part 
of the court, the act is judicial; errors of this nature are to be cured by 
appeal.”  Spomer v. Spomer, 580 P.2d 1146, 1149 
(Wyo. 1978).  Where the error is 
clerical, W.R.Cr.P. 36 is designed to correct such mistakes.  Id; see supra n.3.  The goal “is to effectuate the 
contemporaneous intent of the court and to ensure that the judgment reflects 
that intent.”  Spomer, 580 P.2d  at 
1149.
 
[¶25]   We find that the failure to satisfy 
all the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 32 in this case is a clerical error.  There is no indication in the record 
that the omission was anything other than a mere accident.  This Court can glean no purpose in an 
intentional omission of the W.R.Cr.P. 32 requirements, as such would have no 
bearing on the appellant’s rights, the penalties he will face, the issues 
presented in the case, nor any collateral matters.  Nothing indicates that the district 
court was attempting to clarify the original Judgment and Sentence through the 
omission.  Finally, there is no 
reason to believe that if the omission had been noticed sooner and the parties 
had entered another stipulated motion to modify that such a motion would have 
been denied.
 
[¶26]   Most clerical errors are easily 
remedied, particularly when there is a “deviat[ion] from the instruments upon 
which [the judgments] were intended to be based.”  Eddy v. First Wyo. Bank, N.A.–Lander, 
713 P.2d 228, 234 (Wyo. 1986).  Such 
errors may be corrected at any time.  W.R.Cr.P. 36.  For example, this Court has held that a 
court could correct a judgment rendered with regard to a stipulation which did 
not accord with the parties’ stipulation.  
Midwest Ref. Co. v. George, 44 
Wyo. 25, 7 P.2d 213, 215 (1932).  
Here, the “instrument” at issue is the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.  The parties do not 
dispute the content of these terms nor do the parties dispute whether the terms 
ought to be included in the Modified Judgment and Sentence.  As such, there is no need to reverse, 
but rather we find that it would be appropriate to remand to the district court 
to amend the Modified Judgment and Sentence so that it will meet the 
requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 32 and the expectations of the parties and the trial 
judge.
 
[¶27]   The appellant mentions only one 
case in support of his position, Dickson 
v. State, 903 P.2d 1019 (Wyo. 1995).  
In that case, this Court reversed an order by the district court revoking 
probation because the defendant had been sentenced without the district court 
first imposing a judgment of conviction on the defendant’s entry of no contest 
in accordance with W.R.Cr.P 32(b)(1).  This Court held that “. . . an 
adjudication of guilt and conviction under the statute and an adjudication as to 
each offense is essential to the power of the court to impose sentence.”  Id. at 1026.  While the adjudication requirement in 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(b)(1) applies to situations where there has been an entry of nolo contendere, W.R.Cr.P. 32(b)(2) 
contains the same requirement in the case of convictions.  Here, however, although the Modified 
Judgment and Sentence does not include an adjudication as to each charged 
offense, it is clear from the record, unlike in Dickson, that there was actually such an 
adjudication, although not explicit in the Modified Judgment and 
Sentence.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶28]   No reversible error was committed 
by the trial court.  The appellant 
had access to the CI agreement prior to trial and referred to this document at 
trial.  Denial of the appellant’s 
Motion to Compel Discovery of DCI’s policy manual was not an abuse of 
discretion.  The omissions in the 
Modified Judgment and Sentence were simply clerical errors and will be corrected 
on remand to the district court.  We 
will affirm the conviction.
FOOTNOTES
1In the course of a controlled buy, a confidential informant purchases 
drugs from a source predetermined by a task force within DCI.  The confidential informant is provided 
the money to make the purchase and his person and vehicle are searched prior to 
the controlled buy to ensure that no unrelated drugs or weapons are used in the 
purchase.  The informant is wired 
and under surveillance during the course of the controlled buy to ensure his 
safety.
 
2The Modified Judgment and Sentence failed to include the 
following:
 
(A)   The plea and the 
verdict for each offense for which the defendant was 
tried;
(B)   A statement as to 
whether the defendant testified and whether or not the defendant was advised by 
the court with respect to the defendant’s right to testify or not to 
testify;
(C)   An adjudication as 
to each offense including the name and statute number for each convicted offense 
and whether such offense is a felony or a 
misdemeanor[.]
 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(b)(2)(A), (B), (C).
 
3Although Glover is a civil 
case and more directly relates to W.R.C.P. 60(a) (“Clerical mistakes in 
judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from 
oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own 
initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the 
court orders.”), it is appropriate to use the same analysis here because 
W.R.Cr.P. 36 (“Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the 
record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court 
orders.”) is a corollary to W.R.C.P. 60(a).  Moore v. State, 2009 WY 108, ¶ 15, 215 P.3d 271, 275 (Wyo. 2009).