Case Title: Rivera v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12682

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12682 
 
JOSE RIVERA  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
March 9, 2020. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Sentence, Double jeopardy, Trial by jury.  
Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Double jeopardy, Trial by 
jury. 
 
 
 
Jose Rivera has been indicted on two counts of armed 
assault with intent to murder in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 18 (b); two counts of assault by means of a dangerous weapon 
in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15B (b); and one count of 
illegal possession of a firearm in violation of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a).  Additionally, he has been charged as a subsequent 
offender pursuant to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (d), and as an armed 
career criminal pursuant to G. L. c. 269, § 10G (a), both of 
which would subject him to a sentencing enhancement on the 
firearm charge. 
 
 
In the Superior Court, Rivera filed a motion to dismiss the 
armed assault with intent to murder indictments on the basis 
that the integrity of the grand jury was impaired; and the two 
sentencing enhancement charges on the basis of double jeopardy.  
A judge in that court allowed the motion as to the subsequent 
offender enhancement but denied it as to the armed career 
criminal enhancement and the armed assault with intent to murder 
indictments.  Rivera then filed a petition in the county court 
for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking review of the 
judge's decision.  A single justice of this court denied the 
petition.  Rivera now appeals from that part of the single 
justice's judgment that relates to the armed career criminal 
enhancement and his double jeopardy claim. 
 
2 
 
 
Background.  During the grand jury proceedings that 
resulted in the indictments against Rivera, a single witness -- 
a police detective -- testified.  He testified regarding the 
incident that led to the various assault and firearm charges and 
also provided testimony relevant to the armed career criminal 
charge.  As to the latter, he testified that Rivera had been 
charged with murder in June 1986 and convicted of manslaughter 
in 1987.  The docket sheet from that earlier case was admitted 
as an exhibit and indicated that Rivera had pleaded guilty "to 
so much of the indictment charging manslaughter."  On the basis 
of the manslaughter conviction, the grand jury charged Rivera as 
an armed career criminal pursuant to G. L. c. 269, § 10G (a). 
 
 
Discussion.  General Laws c. 269, § 10G (a), provides in 
relevant part: 
 
"Whoever, having been previously convicted of a violent 
crime . . . as defined herein, violates the provisions of 
[G. L. c. 229, § 10 (a),] shall be punished by imprisonment 
in the state prison for not less than three years nor more 
than [fifteen] years." 
 
General Laws c. 229, § 10G (e), provides, in turn, that 
"'violent crime' shall have the meaning set forth in [G. L. 
c. 140, § 121]," which provides, as relevant here: 
 
"'Violent crime', shall mean any crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that: (i) 
has as an element the use, attempted use or threatened use 
of physical force or a deadly weapon against the person of 
another . . . ." 
 
The upshot of the statutory provisions is that to be sentenced 
as an armed career criminal, Rivera's prior manslaughter 
conviction must qualify as a "violent crime."  In other words, 
at the sentencing enhancement trial on the armed career criminal 
charge, the Commonwealth must prove that manslaughter, as Rivera 
committed it, constituted a violent crime. 
 
 
Rivera argues that at the time he pleaded guilty to 
manslaughter in 1987, manslaughter had several forms, including 
voluntary, involuntary, and unlawful-act.  Because not all of 
the forms of manslaughter required or amounted to a "violent 
crime," and because there was no need to specify which form of 
manslaughter he was pleading guilty to, the Commonwealth would 
be required to prove that the crime that Rivera committed was in 
fact a "violent crime" for purposes of the armed career criminal 
3 
 
statute.  Doing that, Rivera argues, would amount to a retrial 
for manslaughter, which would violate his double jeopardy 
rights.  If this were in fact what a trial on the armed career 
criminal enhancement would entail, Rivera might well be correct.  
The picture that Rivera paints, however, is inaccurate. 
 
 
His arguments are based on the premise that the armed 
career criminal statute defines an "offense," for double 
jeopardy purposes, rather than a sentencing enhancement.  We 
have previously, and definitively, stated the opposite, which 
the single justice thoroughly addressed in her decision.  She 
also thoroughly addressed the propriety of the Commonwealth's 
introducing additional evidence at a sentencing enhancement 
trial to prove that a prior conviction constitutes a "violent 
crime": 
 
"[A]s the full court has said many times, statutes 
providing for enhanced sentences are not independent 
crimes, see Commonwealth v. Richardson, 469 Mass. 248, 252-
253 (2014); Alicea v. Commonwealth, 466 Mass. 228, 230 n.6 
(2013), and the proof necessary to support application of a 
sentence enhancement therefore does not implicate double 
jeopardy concerns.  See Commonwealth v. Miranda, 441 Mass. 
783, 789 n.9 (2004); Bynum v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 705 
(1999); Plumbly v. Commonwealth, [2 Met.] 413, 415 (1841).  
See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burton, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 
355, 358-359 (1993). . . . 
 
"This principle extends to convictions where, as [Rivera] 
contends in this case, a bare certified record of 
conviction may be insufficient to support an enhanced 
sentence.  See Commonwealth v. Eberhart, 461 Mass. 809, 
815-816 (2012). . . . The defendant in [the Eberhart] case 
claimed that the 'evidence presented in support of one of 
his three prior convictions, assault and battery, failed to 
establish that he had committed a "violent crime" within 
the meaning of G. L. c. 140, § 121.'  Eberhart, supra at 
811.  That evidence consisted of a certified copy of the 
assault and battery conviction, but no substantive 
information about the commission of the crime other than 
testimony describing it as '[a]ssault and battery domestic 
and intimidation of a witness.'  Id. at 813.  The full 
court reasoned that, while a 'categorical approach' is 
sufficient to determine whether some prior offenses qualify 
as a predicate offense, that approach does not produce 
conclusive results when a defendant 'may have been 
convicted under a broad statute that encompasses multiple 
4 
 
crimes, not all of which are "violent crimes."'  Id. at 
816.  Both assault and battery and manslaughter are 
examples of crimes where a 'categorical approach' may be 
inadequate.  In such circumstances, additional proof is 
necessary to identify which definition formed the basis for 
the prior convictions.  See Commonwealth v. Colon, 81 Mass. 
App. Ct. 8, 16 n.8 (2011). 
 
"This additional procedure does not offend double jeopardy 
consideration because '[t]he prior offense is not an 
element of the crime for which a defendant is charged but 
[rather] concerns the punishment to be imposed' if he is 
convicted of the current offense, and the prior conviction 
is proved.  See Bynum, 429 Mass. at 709." 
 
 
Notwithstanding our law, Rivera continues to press the idea 
that any such procedure at a trial on the armed career criminal 
charge amounts to a trial on a new offense and, as such, would 
violate his double jeopardy rights.  None of his arguments, nor 
the Federal precedents that he relies upon, persuades us that 
our existing approach is in any way unconstitutional. 
 
 
He suggests, for example, that the single justice's 
"position" that G. L. c.  269, § 10G (a), is "merely" a 
sentencing enhancement cannot be reconciled with the United 
States Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. 
Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019).  The issue in that case, 
however, is not the same as the issue here.  The Haymond case 
involved a defendant who violated the conditions of his 
supervised release and a Federal statute that, based on the 
particular crime committed, compelled the imposition of a new 
and additional sentence as a result.  See id. at 2374-2375.  As 
the court stated, the statute "compelled a federal judge to send 
a man to prison for a minimum of five years without empaneling a 
jury of his peers or requiring the government to prove his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  As applied here, we do not hesitate 
to hold that the statute violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
[to the United States Constitution]."  Id. at 2373. 
 
 
No such violation would occur in the circumstances of 
Rivera's case under the existing, constitutionally sound, 
framework of Massachusetts law.  Rivera is unquestionably 
entitled to a separate trial by a jury on the armed career 
criminal enhancement.  See, e.g., Miranda, 441 Mass. at 787-788 
(discussing second and separate trial procedure pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 11A, for sentencing enhancement charges).  That 
does not mean, however, even if the Commonwealth presents 
5 
 
additional proof that his manslaughter conviction constitutes a 
"violent crime," that the armed career criminal statute defines 
a separate offense or is anything other than a sentencing 
enhancement.  The defendant, if found to be an armed career 
criminal, will receive but one sentence (albeit enhanced) for 
the charge to which the enhancement is attached.  The second 
trial by jury is not a trial for a second, separate offense.  
Moreover, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, and to be 
found guilty of crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt, is 
separate and apart from a Fifth Amendment right not to be tried 
twice for the same crime.  Rivera, if found to be an armed 
career criminal, will be guilty of just one crime and will 
receive just one sentence.  Indeed, the Haymond case did not 
even involve a question of double jeopardy. 
 
 
A second and subsequent trial on the armed career criminal 
sentencing enhancement, if Rivera is first convicted of the 
underlying firearm offense to which the enhancement applies, 
simply does not raise double jeopardy concerns.  The single 
justice therefore did not err in denying relief pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
Jessica LaClair for the petitioner. 
 
David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth.