Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Joseph W. Weigel

Citation: 2012 WI 71

Docket Number: 2010AP001523-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 WI 71 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP1523-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Joseph W. Weigel, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Joseph W. Weigel, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST WEIGEL 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 13, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (Opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by Terry E. 
Johnson, William F. Sulton and Peterson, Johnson & Murray, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Terry E. Johnson. 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief by Paul W. 
Schwarzenbart and Lee, Kilkelly, Paulson & Younger, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Paul W. Schwarzenbart. 
 
 
2012 WI 71
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP1523-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Joseph W. Weigel, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph W. Weigel, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   Attorney 
Joseph 
W. 
Weigel 
appeals 
Referee Christine Harris Taylor's report and recommendation that 
his license to practice law in Wisconsin be suspended, and that 
he should pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding.  
Attorney Weigel argues that the referee erroneously concluded he 
committed the misconduct alleged in the OLR's complaint.   
¶2 
On review, we accept the referee's factual findings 
and her conclusions with respect to the first two counts alleged 
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
2 
 
in the disciplinary complaint.  We dismiss the third count and 
we have concluded that a public reprimand is sufficient 
discipline for Attorney Weigel's misconduct.  Attorney Weigel 
shall pay the costs of this proceeding. 
¶3 
Attorney Weigel was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1960.  He is a personal injury attorney practicing 
in Milwaukee.  He was previously disciplined by private 
reprimand on January 26, 1979, for failing to promptly notify a 
client of the adverse result in her damages action against an 
opposing party and insurance company.   
¶4 
The background giving rise to this proceeding stems 
from the contentious dissolution of a Milwaukee law firm.  The 
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed a complaint against 
Attorney Weigel on June 21, 2010.  The complaint alleged that 
Attorney Weigel had: (1) entered into an impermissible non-
competition 
agreement 
contrary 
to 
former 
SCR 
20:5.6(a);1 
(2) misled clients and the public by continuing to use the firm 
                                                 
1 Effective July 1, 2007, substantial changes were made to 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys, SCR Chapter 20.  See S. Ct. Order 04-07, 2007 WI 4, 
293 Wis. 2d xv, 726 N.W.2d Ct.R-45 (eff. July 1, 2007); and 
S. Ct. 
Order 
06-04, 
2007 
WI 
48, 
297 
Wis. 2d xv, 
730 
N.W.2d Ct.R.-29 (eff. July 1, 2007).  Because the conduct 
underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 2007, unless 
otherwise indicated, all references to the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court Rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2007. 
Former SCR 20:5.6(a) provided that a lawyer shall not 
participate in offering or making "a partnership or employment 
agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice 
after termination of the relationship, except an agreement 
concerning benefits upon retirement; . . . ." 
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
3 
 
name "Eisenberg, Weigel, Carlson, Blau & Clemens, S.C." contrary 
to SCR 20:7.1(a)(1),2 SCR 20:7.5(a),3 and SCR 20:8.4(c);4 and (3) 
paid 
impermissible 
bonuses 
to 
a 
paralegal 
contrary 
to 
SCR 20:5.4(a)(3).5  The parties filed a partial stipulation of 
facts.  The referee conducted an evidentiary hearing on 
January 12, 2011.  
¶5 
On March 17, 2011, the referee issued a report 
containing extensive factual findings and concluding that the 
OLR had proven its case with respect to all three counts.  The 
                                                 
2 Former SCR 20:7.1(a)(1) stated: 
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading 
communication 
about 
the 
lawyer 
or 
the 
lawyer's 
services.  A communication is false or misleading if 
it: 
 
(1) contains a material misrepresentation of 
fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the 
statement 
considered 
as 
a 
whole 
not 
materially 
misleading; . . . . 
3 Former SCR 20:7.5(a) stated, in pertinent part, that "[a] 
lawyer shall 
not 
use a firm name, letterhead or other 
professional designation that violates Rule 7.1." 
4 Former SCR 20:8.4(c) stated it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation; . . . ." 
5 Former SCR 20:5.4(a)(3) provided as follows:  "A lawyer or 
law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except 
that . . . (3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer 
employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the 
plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing 
arrangement." 
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
4 
 
referee recommended a 60-day suspension and imposition of costs.  
Attorney Weigel appealed.6    
¶6 
A referee's findings of fact will not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are reviewed de 
novo.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 
2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  This court is 
free to impose whatever discipline it deems appropriate, 
regardless 
of 
the 
referee's 
recommendation. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶7 
Some background is necessary to assess the first two 
charges against Attorney Weigel.  In 1975 Attorney Alvin 
Eisenberg, already an experienced lawyer, organized the law firm 
                                                 
6 Attorney Weigel moved to stay briefing on the appeal and 
to reopen the record based on his claim that "new evidence" 
undermined the credibility of certain witnesses who testified 
against him at the evidentiary hearing.  This court remanded the 
matter to the referee.  On May 24, 2011, Referee Taylor 
recommended that the court deny Attorney Weigel's motion to 
reopen the record.  The referee found that the alleged newly 
discovered evidence was not material to and had no relation to 
any of the three claims for discipline.  On May 26, 2011, this 
court issued an order stating that Attorney Weigel would have 20 
days to appeal the referee's recommendation on the motion to 
reopen the record.  On June 24, 2011, Attorney Weigel requested 
an extension of time to appeal that recommendation.  On July 12, 
2011, this court issued an order denying the motion to extend 
the time, but stated that the parties could address the 
recommendation to deny the motion to reopen in their appellate 
briefs on the disciplinary matter. 
Attorney Weigel mentioned the motion to reopen the record 
in his Statement of the Case, but did not develop his argument.  
Accordingly, we accept the referee's recommendation and we deny 
Attorney Weigel's motion to reopen the record. 
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
5 
 
of Alvin H. Eisenberg, S.C., as a service corporation.  Attorney 
Eisenberg was the sole shareholder.   
¶8 
In 1990 six attorneys, including Attorney Weigel, 
acquired shares in the Eisenberg firm.  On March 1, 1999, 
Attorney Weigel became the president of the firm, which was 
known during the relevant period as Eisenberg, Weigel, Carlson, 
Blau & Clemens, S.C.   
¶9 
On March 11, 1999, Attorney Weigel, on behalf of the 
firm, entered into a Stock Redemption Agreement by which the 
firm redeemed all of Attorney Eisenberg's shares of stock.  As a 
condition of the redemption, the firm agreed to employ Attorney 
Eisenberg under an Employment Agreement on a month-to-month 
basis, with the right to terminate his employment on 30 days' 
written notice.7  The Employment Agreement contained a covenant 
                                                 
7 Paragraph 7 of the Stock Redemption Agreement defined 
Attorney Eisenberg's post-agreement relationship with the firm 
as follows:  
After 
Closing, 
the 
Corporation 
will 
employ 
Eisenberg strictly as an employee, pursuant to the 
terms of the Employment Agreement, a copy of which is 
attached to this Agreement as Exhibit "E," . . . .  
The Corporation may continue to include Eisenberg's 
name in the name of the Corporation, and use his name 
in advertising and/or promotional materials for so 
long as he remains an employee of the Corporation, 
subject 
always 
to 
the 
Rules 
of 
Professional 
Responsibility in effect.  At Eisenberg's option, the 
Corporation will list him "of counsel."  For so long 
as the Corporation uses Eisenberg's name in any manner 
(in the firm name, as "of counsel," in promotional 
material, in advertising, in public relations, or 
otherwise) Eisenberg will have the right to disapprove 
the placement and content of any advertising, public 
relations, and/or promotional material used by the 
Corporation, and the Corporation will comply. 
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
6 
 
against competition which specified that Attorney Eisenberg was 
prohibited from practicing law in the Greater Milwaukee area for 
a period of six months after he ceased to be employed by the 
firm.  As relevant here, paragraph 1 of the Employment Agreement 
provided:  
 
Employment.  The Employer hereby hires the 
Employee as an attorney and the Employee does hereby 
accept such employment upon the terms and conditions 
hereinafter set forth and agrees to perform the 
professional duties required of him to the best of his 
ability.  The parties agree that the Employee will 
spend most of his time on public relations, promotion, 
and advertising. The Employee will have managerial 
control over 
the Employer's programs for public 
relations, promotion, and advertising, and will have a 
reasonable 
budget to conduct such programs. The 
Employee will report directly to Joseph W. Weigel, 
President and Senior Partner, and no one else.   
¶10 The Employment Agreement stated Attorney Eisenberg was 
entitled to employee benefits "customarily received by other 
attorneys 
employed 
by 
Employer," 
including 
malpractice 
insurance, bar association dues, and payment for professional 
seminars.  It also required the firm to provide facilities, 
equipment, 
supplies, and personnel necessary for Attorney 
Eisenberg's performance of his "professional duties."  
¶11 The covenant at issue, in paragraph 11 of the 
Employment Agreement, states:   
Covenant against Competition.  During Employee's 
employment hereunder and for a period of six months 
after he ceases to be employed by Employer or March 1, 
2001, 
whichever 
is 
later, 
Employee 
shall 
not[] 
practice law in the Greater Milwaukee area (other than 
with Employer). It is agreed, however, that these 
restrictions 
shall 
not 
apply, 
should 
Employer 
terminate its business, cease to exist, or cause an 
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
7 
 
Event of Default as defined in the Stock Redemption 
Agreement calling for this Employment Agreement, or 
breach any of the agreements called for by the Stock 
Sale Agreement.   
¶12 In January 2005 the Firm, without giving prior notice 
to Attorney Eisenberg, moved its law office to a new location.  
A letter was left for Attorney Eisenberg saying there was no 
office space for him at the new location, that he should go 
home, and that his paychecks would be sent to him.   
¶13 For months after the firm moved, it caused a truck 
with a sign mounted on both sides to be parked on a public 
street near the old office.  The sign on the truck indicated the 
firm had moved and provided the new address.   
¶14 On January 31, 2005, the firm sent a letter to clients 
saying that the office had moved and stated that "everything 
remained the same" including the "same attorneys" and phone 
number.   
¶15 On February 8, 2005, Attorney Eisenberg's counsel 
delivered a letter to Attorney Weigel, terminating Attorney 
Eisenberg's employment with the Firm and requesting the Firm 
stop using the Eisenberg name.  The letter stated:   
Enclosed 
please 
find 
a 
letter 
I 
am 
hand 
delivering on behalf of Alvin H. Eisenberg.  Please 
note that your firm should immediately cease and 
desist using Mr. Eisenberg's name in the name of your 
firm and/or any advertising or promotional material.   
¶16 Enclosed with the February 8, 2005 letter was a letter 
to Attorney Weigel from Attorney Eisenberg stating:   
I am hereby giving you this notice of termination 
of my employment with the law firm of Eisenberg, 
Weigel, Carlson, Blau & Clemens, S.C.  Because I 
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
8 
 
regard the law firm as being in breach of both my 
Employment Agreement and Stock Redemption Agreement, I 
do not believe that this notice is necessary but I am 
nonetheless giving it to avoid future arguments as to 
my employment status. 
Also, please accept this letter as notice that 
you are to immediately cease and desist using the name 
"Eisenberg" and that it should be removed from the 
name "Eisenberg, Weigel, Carlson, Blau & Clemens, 
S.C."  I withdraw my consent and disapprove of any 
further use of my name in any advertising, public 
relations and/or promotional material used by your law 
firm. 
¶17 On February 9, 2005, Attorney Weigel executed and 
arranged for the Firm's counsel to deliver a proposed agreement 
to Attorney Eisenberg.  The proposed agreement made explicit 
reference to the covenant against competition in the Employment 
Agreement.  
¶18 On February 10, 2005, Attorney Eisenberg's counsel 
delivered a letter to the Firm's counsel stating, among other 
things, that:   
[w]hile Mr. Eisenberg is willing to enter into an 
agreement separating himself from the law firm, by 
presenting the enclosed draft, I do not want to cancel 
his previous instruction that the law firm immediately 
discontinue using his name.   
¶19 Attorney 
Eisenberg's 
counsel 
sent 
letters 
on 
February 11, 2005, and February 14, 2005, continuing to protest 
the firm using Attorney Eisenberg's name and asking the firm to 
cease and desist using "Eisenberg" in the firm's name.   
¶20 By letter dated February 16, 2005, the Firm's counsel 
asserted that under the Employment Agreement "the present 
ownership has the right to use the Eisenberg name until the 30 
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
9 
 
days has expired."  The firm asserted that if Eisenberg's 
resignation letter of February 8, 2005, was assumed to provide 
such notice, the 30 days would expire on March 10, 2005, and at 
such time "the present ownership would be legally required to 
cease using the name Alvin H. Eisenberg."   
¶21 By letters dated February 17, 2005, and February 28, 
2005, Attorney Eisenberg's counsel renewed his objections to the 
firm's continued use of the Eisenberg name.  
¶22 After the move to the new office and until March 2005, 
the firm continued to display in the client waiting area a 
framed photo of former Green Bay Packer football player Reggie 
White which contained the handwritten statement:  
Happy birthday Mr. Alvin Eisenberg.  Thank you for 
your caring heart.  You are a Humble man.  May our 
Lord Jesus the Son of Jehovah God Bless You.  Reggie 
White # 92[.] 1 Cor. 13. 
¶23 On March 3, 2005, the firm, still using the Eisenberg 
name, entered into an agreement with a lawyer named Donald S. 
Eisenberg.  At the time, Donald Eisenberg was engaged in an "of 
counsel" relationship with a Madison law firm and was not 
affiliated with the firm in any way.  Donald Eisenberg was never 
a shareholder or an employee of the firm.  Pursuant to the 
agreement, Donald Eisenberg was paid a flat sum of $1,500 per 
month, with no FICA deductions or tax withholdings from the 
payments, as long as he maintained a license to practice law, 
whether or not he did anything for the firm.  He spent little 
time in the firm's office. 
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
10 
 
¶24 The 
firm 
then 
affixed 
a 
name 
plate 
stating 
"Mr. Eisenberg" on an office door at the new office.  
¶25 Sometime after March 3, 2005, Attorney Weigel signed a 
letter for the firm and mailed it to certain clients.  The 
letter stated:   
We have MOVED our offices to 3732 West Wisconsin 
Avenue, Suite 300[,] Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53208[.]  
Everything else remains the same!  The same friendly, 
dedicated 
staff to help you——including the same 
attorneys; 
medical 
doctor, 
engineer, 
paralegals; 
specialists; investigators and support staff!  
Our "numbers" remain the same: phone numbers of 
(414) 342-1000 and (800) 486-0106[;] fax number of 
(414) 342-5060  
We all invite you to stop in and see our bright, newly 
remodeled (all on one floor) offices.  (Emphasis 
added). 
¶26 In March 2005 and for some time thereafter, the firm 
ran television advertisements referring to the move of its 
office location and stating that:   
Eisenberg, Weigel, Carlson, Blau and Clemens, injury 
attorneys.  We have moved to 3732 West Wisconsin 
Avenue.  Everything remains the same.  The same 
friendly, dedicated staff to help you, including the 
same attorneys, medical doctor, engineer, paralegals, 
specialists, investigators and support staff.  Our 
numbers remain the same, (414) 342-1000.  We all 
invite you to stop in and see our bright, newly 
remodeled offices.  (Emphasis added). 
¶27 On March 14, 2005, Attorney Weigel filed a grievance 
against Alvin Eisenberg, asserting that Attorney Eisenberg was 
contacting clients of the firm in violation of the supreme court 
rules.  The grievance referred to the restrictive covenant in 
the Employment Agreement.  
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
11 
 
¶28 On April 7, 2005, Attorney Eisenberg filed suit in 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court against the firm and its 
shareholders, including Attorney Weigel, asserting claims for 
breach of contract, unfair competition, contract interference, 
statutory false advertising, and theft.  The firm filed a 
counterclaim seeking to enforce the restrictive covenant against 
Attorney Eisenberg.8  Meanwhile, on May 12, 2005, Attorney 
Eisenberg filed a grievance against Attorney Weigel complaining 
of the firm's continued use of his name.  
¶29 In subsequent correspondence with the OLR, Attorney 
Weigel took the position that Attorney Eisenberg was retired and 
maintained that the firm was justified in continuing to use the 
name Eisenberg as part of the firm's name.  
¶30 The first count of the OLR complaint alleges that by 
executing an agreement with a "non-compete" clause, Attorney 
Weigel violated SCR 20:5.6(a).  Supreme court rule 20:5.6(a) 
provided that: 
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or 
making: 
 
(a) a partnership or employment agreement that 
restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice after 
                                                 
8 The civil action was resolved by a settlement pursuant to 
which the firm ceased using the name Eisenberg in the firm's 
name and letterhead.  In accordance with the settlement, the 
firm filed an amendment with the Wisconsin Department of 
Financial Institutions changing its name to Weigel, Carlson, 
Blau & Clemens, S.C.  The Of Counsel Agreement with Donald 
Eisenberg was terminated in December 2006 at the same time the 
firm reached the agreement to settle the civil action with 
Attorney Alvin Eisenberg. 
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
12 
 
termination of the relationship, except an agreement 
concerning benefits upon retirement; . . . . 
¶31 Attorney Weigel acknowledges that the Stock Redemption 
Agreement "restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice after 
termination of the relationship."  However, Attorney Weigel 
argues that the clause does not violate SCR 20:5.6(a) because it 
was 
an 
agreement 
"concerning 
benefits 
upon 
retirement."  
Attorney Weigel argues that "[e]ven though the Stock Redemption 
Agreement states that Eisenberg is to be employed as an 
attorney, that was not the intent of the parties to the contract 
and they clearly did not follow it."  Attorney Weigel points to 
various aspects of Attorney Eisenberg's testimony where Attorney 
Eisenberg 
described 
himself 
or 
was 
described 
as 
having 
"retired."  Attorney Weigel adds that the clause was added at 
Attorney Eisenberg's request and contends that this is a purely 
contractual dispute, citing SCR 20:1.17.   
¶32 The 
referee 
rejected 
Attorney 
Weigel's 
arguments 
finding that the Stock Redemption Agreement does not refer or 
conform to SCR 20:1.17.  The Agreement does not use the word 
"retire" and it did not provide that Attorney Eisenberg would 
cease to practice law.  Indeed, the referee found, and the 
record supports the finding, that Attorney Eisenberg continued 
to meet with clients and continued to serve as the face of the 
firm in the same manner as before the agreements were executed.   
¶33 We accept the referee's findings of fact and her 
conclusion that the non-competition clause in the Employment 
Agreement violated SCR 20:5.6(a).  We agree that while Attorney 
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
13 
 
Eisenberg may have wanted, for some purposes, to portray himself 
as retired or semi-retired, that does not turn the Employment 
Agreement into a "retirement agreement."   
¶34 Attorney Weigel has challenged the referee's finding 
that he was motivated by greed in entering into the non-compete 
agreement, emphasizing that the provision was inserted at the 
insistence of Attorney Eisenberg's attorney.  However, as the 
referee found, Attorney Weigel aggressively sought to enforce 
the non-compete clause against Attorney Eisenberg.  We accept 
the referee's findings, and we agree that the execution of and 
efforts 
to 
enforce 
the 
non-compete 
clause 
violated 
SCR 20:5.6(a).   
¶35 The second count of the OLR complaint alleged that 
Attorney Weigel misled clients and the public by continuing to 
use the firm name "Eisenberg, Weigel, Carlson, Blau & Clemens, 
S.C." contrary to SCRs 20:7.1(a)(1), 20:7.5(a), and 20:8.4(c).   
¶36 Supreme court rule 20:7.1(a)(1) provided:   
 
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading 
communication 
about 
the 
lawyer 
or 
the 
lawyer's 
services. A communication is false or misleading if 
it: 
 
(1) contains a material misrepresentation of 
fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the 
statement 
considered 
as 
a 
whole 
not 
materially 
misleading; . . . . 
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
14 
 
¶37 Supreme court rule 20:7.5(a)9 in turn provided, in 
pertinent part, that "[a] lawyer shall not use a firm name, 
letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 
7.1."  
¶38 Supreme court rule 20:8.4(c) provided that it is 
misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." 
¶39 The crux of this claim is that despite the abrupt 
termination of Attorney Eisenberg's relationship with the firm 
and his repeated demand that the firm cease using his name, 
Attorney Weigel implied to clients and the public that Attorney 
Alvin Eisenberg was still associated with the firm, as evidenced 
by, among other things, advertising that the "same lawyers" were 
with the firm, advertising that "everything remained the same," 
continuing to display Alvin Eisenberg's memorabilia in the new 
office, and affixing the nameplate "Mr. Eisenberg" on an office 
door. 
¶40 Attorney Weigel asserts that the firm "was free to 
employ Donald S. Eisenberg."  That is not the issue.  The issue 
is the firm using the "of counsel" relationship with Donald 
Eisenberg 
as 
a pretext for continuing to use the name 
"Eisenberg" as the lead name for a law firm founded by Alvin 
Eisenberg after the abrupt and contentious termination of Alvin 
                                                 
9 The caption of Count II of the complaint contained a 
scrivener's 
error 
identifying 
the 
rule 
at 
issue 
as 
SCR 20:7.5(c), but footnote 3 to the complaint correctly 
identified the operative rule as SCR 20:7.5(a).   
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
15 
 
Eisenberg's relationship with the firm.  Attorney Weigel 
continued to use "Eisenberg" in the firm name after March 10, 
2005, the date he concedes Alvin Eisenberg was no longer an 
employee of the firm.10    
¶41 The referee found, and we agree, that when faced with 
losing the name of the firm's founding member, Attorney Weigel 
entered into an agreement with another Mr. Eisenberg, Donald 
Eisenberg, to have a pretext for continuing to use Eisenberg in 
the firm's name.  Donald had no prior relationship with the firm 
and was not an employee, much less a shareholder, of the firm.  
This, coupled with advertising telling the public that "nothing 
had changed" was misleading, and we agree with the referee's 
conclusion that this conduct violated the aforementioned rules 
of professional conduct. 
¶42 The third count of the OLR complaint involves the 
payment of certain bonuses to a paralegal.  The paralegal has 
been employed by the firm since approximately 1990 and works in 
the personal injury practice as part of a group of lawyers and 
nonlawyer assistants referred to as the "Weigel Team."  She 
provides services at the file preparation and settlement stages 
of cases.  Attorney Weigel supervises the Weigel Team.   
¶43 Some of the nonlawyer personnel employed by the firm, 
including this paralegal, are compensated on an "incentive" or 
"bonus" system.  The paralegal is compensated for her services 
                                                 
10 On February 16, 2005, counsel for the firm conceded that 
as of March 10, 2005, "the present ownership would be legally 
required to cease using the name Alvin H. Eisenberg." 
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
16 
 
as follows: She is paid a base hourly wage ($7.00 or $7.50 per 
hour) plus overtime pay for work in excess of 40 hours per week 
and on weekends, as mandated by the Fair Labor Standards Act.  
¶44 In addition to her base pay, the paralegal receives 
two forms of bonus:  (1) thirty cents per thousand dollars 
(three-tenths of one percent) of the gross recoveries from 
personal injury cases she worked on; and (2) a quarterly bonus 
consisting of $1,500 plus $250 per thousand (25 percent) of the 
difference between a weekly average (computed quarterly, over 13 
weeks) of gross recoveries from personal injury cases she worked 
on and her weekly goal of $127,500 per week.  
¶45 The 
OLR 
contends 
that 
this 
bonus 
arrangement 
constitutes 
unlawful 
fee 
splitting 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 20:5.4(a)(3), which provided that a lawyer or law firm shall 
not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that "a lawyer or 
law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or 
retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in 
part on a profit-sharing arrangement." 
¶46 Supreme court rule 20:5.4 is based on the American Bar 
Association's Model Rule 5.4 which "clearly prohibits fee 
'splitting' with paralegals."  See ABA Model Guidelines for the 
Utilization of Paralegal Services (2004).  The underlying 
purpose of the fee-splitting rule is to guard the professional 
independence of a lawyer.11  It seeks to avoid the situation 
                                                 
11 Comment 
[1] 
to ABA's model rule 5.4, upon which 
SCR 20:5.4 was based, states:   
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
17 
 
where a nonlawyer with a financial stake in the outcome of a 
case could influence how that case is handled, for instance by 
pressuring the lawyer either to settle faster or to hold out for 
more, based on the nonlawyer's financial interest.  
¶47 As a practical matter, of course, a law firm's profits 
result almost entirely from legal fees.  So, in a sense, even 
paying nonlawyer employees a salary could, technically, be 
viewed as a sharing of fees, because fees are the firm's source 
of revenue.  See, e.g., Ethics Opinion 322 (D.C. Bar, Feb. 16, 
2004).   
¶48 However, it is well settled that a lawyer may 
compensate a nonlawyer assistant based on the quantity and 
quality of their work and the value of that work to the law 
practice.  Thus, in addition to regular compensation, paralegals 
and 
legal 
assistants 
routinely 
and 
properly 
receive 
discretionary merit-based bonuses or bonuses based on the 
overall success of the firm.  See, e.g., State Bar of Georgia 
Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-4.  The ethical issues arise when 
the nonlawyer's compensation is tied too directly to specific 
clients, cases or work performed by the nonlawyer such that the 
professional independence of the lawyer is compromised. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
The provisions of this Rule express traditional 
limitations on sharing fees.  These limitations are to 
protect the lawyer's professional independence of 
judgment.  Where someone other than the client pays 
the lawyer's fee or salary, or recommends employment 
of the lawyer, that arrangement does not modify the 
lawyer's obligation to the client.  . . .   (Emphasis 
added).   
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
18 
 
¶49 Attorney Weigel argues this bonus arrangement is 
permissible, asserting that it "is tied to the total performance 
of the firm in obtaining gross recoveries for all clients" and 
that it is "not based upon specific fees from specific cases." 
Attorney Weigel notes the OLR failed to show that any specific 
client was affected by this system.   
¶50 A 
Wisconsin 
case 
directly 
addressing 
the 
"fee 
splitting" 
aspect 
of 
SCR 
20:5.4 
is 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Van Cura, 178 Wis. 2d 612, 504 N.W.2d 610 
(1993).  There, we ruled that it was impermissible for a law 
firm to enter into an agreement whereby a consulting firm would 
finance a law firm's product liability litigation in return for 
half of the fees the law firm collected from any products 
liability litigation.  This case is factually distinguishable 
and provides minimal guidance to practitioners regarding whether 
this particular bonus system is permissible. 
¶51 A review of ethics decisions from other jurisdictions 
indicates that "the line between the prohibited sharing of legal 
fees with a nonlawyer and a permissible compensation plan based 
on profit-sharing is not clearly demarcated."  See Ethics 
Opinion 322 (D.C. Bar, Feb. 16, 2004).   
¶52 Generally, bonuses are deemed permissible where the 
bonus is not tied to fees generated from a particular case or 
class of cases from a specific client.  See, e.g., Philadelphia 
Bar Ass'n Prof. Guidance Comm., Op. 2001-7 (July 2001); Va. St. 
Bar Standing Comm. of Legal Ethics, Op. 885 (Mar. 11, 1987) (a 
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
19 
 
nonlawyer may be paid based on the percentage of profits from 
all fees collected by the lawyer). 
¶53 By contrast, a Florida ethics committee concluded that 
"[b]onuses to non-lawyer employees cannot be calculated as a 
percentage of the firm's fees or of the gross recovery in cases 
on which the non-lawyer worked."  See Florida Ethics Opinion 
89-4 (emphasis supplied); see also Matter of Struthers, 877 P.2d 
789 (Ariz. 1994) (an agreement to give to nonlawyer all fees 
resulting 
from 
nonlawyer's 
debt 
collection 
activities 
constitutes improper fee splitting); Florida Bar v. Shapiro, 413 
So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1982) (payment of contingent salary to 
nonlawyer based on total amount of fees generated is improper); 
State Bar of Montana, Op. 95-0411 (1995) (lawyer paid on 
contingency basis for debt collection cannot share that fee with 
a nonlawyer collection agency that worked with lawyer).  
¶54 The OLR contends the bonus arrangement in this case is 
problematic in several respects.  It involves the splitting of 
revenues and the OLR contends "that it has nothing to do with 
profits such that it does not fall within the profit-sharing 
safe harbor."  The OLR notes the paralegal is entitled to a 
bonus if she meets certain goals——whether or not the firm was 
profitable——and that the payment to the nonlawyer, although 
computed on the basis of a client's gross recovery, comes out of 
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
20 
 
the contingent fee earned by the firm.12  The OLR explains that 
if the distribution of the client's gross recovery is viewed as 
a pie chart, and if the firm is entitled to a one-third 
percentage 
of 
the 
gross 
recovery, 
which 
is 
typical 
in 
contingency cases, the nonlawyer gets an approximate one percent 
slice of the fee, off the top, before expenses, prior to any 
computation of "profit," that is, total revenues less total 
expenses on a firm-wide basis.  
¶55 We do not perceive a material ethical distinction 
between profit-sharing and revenue-sharing for purposes of this 
bonus calculation.  The ethical considerations are the same.  
¶56 The potential ethical concern here stems from the fact 
that the employee's bonus is based upon net profits of a 
specific law practice area, rather than upon the net profits of 
the law firm's entire practice.   
¶57 To determine whether this bonus system runs afoul of 
SCR 20:5.4 we consider the original intent of rule, which is to 
protect 
a 
lawyer's 
exercise 
of 
independent 
professional 
judgment.  Arguably, a paralegal always has some interest in 
maximizing the lawyer's fee income because the paralegal 
                                                 
12 There is a potential ethical concern if the paralegal 
bonus is viewed as coming directly out of the client's gross 
recovery and not out of the attorney's fee.  This could 
constitute facilitating a nonlawyer receiving a contingent fee 
from the client.  See Bergantzel v. Mlynarik, 619 N.W.2d 309, 
312-18 (Iowa 2000) (agreement entitling nonlawyer to contingent 
fee for negotiating an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim 
constituted unauthorized practice of law and could not be 
enforced). 
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
21 
 
indirectly receives compensation generated from attorney's fees 
which are, themselves, generated by recoveries by clients.  In 
that respect, however, the paralegal is no different than every 
nonlawyer employee of every law firm whose income is principally 
derived from contingent fee recoveries.  
¶58 We do not have specifics about the number of cases 
this paralegal works on, but the record indicates this is a high 
volume legal practice.  Based on the evidence presented we find 
no indication that the paralegal would be interfering with the 
lawyer's independent judgment.  We emphasize that the law firm 
has a general duty, and the paralegal's lawyer-supervisor has a 
specific duty, to ensure that the paralegal's conduct is 
compatible with the ethical obligations of lawyers.  However, we 
conclude that the rule, as drafted, does not preclude the bonus 
structure described in this case.  Accordingly, we dismiss the 
third count of the complaint related to the bonus structure used 
to compensate certain paralegals.   
¶59 We turn to the appropriate discipline for Attorney 
Weigel's 
misconduct. 
 
The 
referee 
recommended 
a 
60-day 
suspension based on her findings and conclusion that the OLR had 
proved all three of the counts alleged in the disciplinary 
complaint.  She noted this case included certain aggravating 
factors 
such 
as 
multiple 
violations, 
Attorney 
Weigel's 
substantial experience in the practice of law, and Attorney 
Weigel's refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing.  The referee, quite 
properly, did not consider the prior discipline because it was 
remote in time.  Upon our independent review of the record and 
No. 
2010AP1523-D   
 
22 
 
the specific facts of this case, we are persuaded that a public 
reprimand is sufficient to achieve the goals of attorney 
discipline.  Although we are persuaded a suspension is not 
necessary to protect the public and the judicial system in this 
instance, Attorney Weigel is admonished that a public reprimand 
should not be interpreted as indicating this court is untroubled 
by his misconduct.  We conclude further that Attorney Weigel 
should be required to pay the full costs of this disciplinary 
proceeding, which are $17,447.28 as of January 20, 2012.  No 
restitution was sought and none is ordered in this proceeding. 
¶60 IT IS ORDERED that Joseph W. Weigel is publicly 
reprimanded for his professional misconduct. 
¶61 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Joseph W. Weigel shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs 
are not paid within the time specified and Joseph W. Weigel has 
not entered into a payment plan approved by the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation, then the Office of Lawyer Regulation is authorized 
to move this court for a suspension of the license of Joseph W. 
Weigel to practice law in Wisconsin. 
No.  2010AP1523-D.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶62 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Today the 
majority interprets SCR 20:5.4(a) to allow fee splitting on 
particular cases with nonlawyer employees.  Because I believe 
that this interpretation is contrary to both the purpose of the 
rule and to the interpretation of similar or identical fee- 
splitting rules enacted in other states, I respectfully dissent. 
¶63 The court is asked to review three counts of alleged 
misconduct.  In regard to the first two counts set forth in the 
complaint, the majority accepts the recommendation of the 
referee 
and 
concludes 
that 
Attorney 
Weigel 
should 
be 
disciplined.  I agree. 
¶64 However, the majority further concludes that the third 
count, involving the bonus structure used to compensate certain 
nonlawyer employees, should be dismissed.  It determines that 
the compensation scheme used in this case does not violate the 
fee-splitting rule, SCR 20:5.4(a).  It is here that I part ways 
with the majority.  
¶65 Supreme court rule 20:5.4(a), which is based on an ABA 
model rule, prohibits lawyers or law firms from sharing legal 
fees with nonlawyers.  An exception allows, however, that they 
"may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement 
plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a 
profit-sharing arrangement."  SCR 20:5.4(a)(3).1 
                                                 
1 The language of SCR 20:5.4(a)(3) was not affected by the 
changes to Chapter 20 which became effective on July 1, 2007.  
See S. Ct. Order 04-07, 2007 WI 4, 293 Wis. 2d xv, 726 N.W.2d 
Ct.R-45 (eff. July 1, 2007). 
No.  2010AP1523-D.awb 
 
2 
 
¶66 The underlying purpose of the rule is to guard the 
professional independence of the lawyer.  As the majority 
correctly notes, "ethical issues arise when the nonlawyer's 
compensation is tied too directly to . . . work performed by the 
nonlawyer such that the professional independence of the lawyer 
is compromised."  Majority op., ¶48.  A person entitled to a 
portion of a lawyer's fees may attempt to influence the lawyer's 
activities so as to maximize those fees.  Restatement (Third) of 
The Law Governing Lawyers § 10 cmt. b (2000). 
¶67 A review of ethics opinions from other states with a 
similar or identical fee-splitting rule indicates that the rule 
permits certain bonuses to nonlawyer employees.  For instance, 
the State Bar of Georgia determined that lawyers may pay a 
monthly bonus to nonlawyer employees based on the overall 
success of the firm.  See State Bar of Georgia Formal Advisory 
Op. 05-4 (2007).  Another ethics committee determined that a law 
firm could compensate a nonlawyer based on a percentage of the 
firm's net profits of a specific law practice area.  See 
Michigan Ethics Op. RI-143 (1992).  
¶68 However, "compensating nonlawyer employees based on a 
percentage of the legal fees generated in the particular matters 
on which the nonlawyer worked has been held impermissible."  
Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 10 cmt. e.  
See, e.g. Utah State Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 02-07 (2002) 
(lawyers or law firms may not compensate nonlawyers with bonuses 
that are "tied to specific fees from a particular case"); 
Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Prof. Guidance Comm., Op. 2001-7 (2001)  
No.  2010AP1523-D.awb 
 
3 
 
(bonus is permissible "provided that the bonus is not tied to or 
contingent on the payment of a fee from a particular case or 
specific class of cases"); North Carolina State Bar, Op. RPC 147 
(1993) (nonlawyer bonus impermissible because it was "calculated 
based upon a percentage of the income the firm derives from 
legal matters on which the paralegal has worked"). 
¶69 The majority reflects that in addition to her base 
pay, the paralegal at issue received "thirty cents per thousand 
dollars (three-tenths of one percent2) of the gross recoveries 
from personal injury cases she worked on."  Majority op., ¶44. 
¶70 The 
OLR 
contends 
that 
this 
bonus 
arrangement 
constitutes unlawful fee splitting under SCR 20:5.4.  It 
explains: 
Whether or not the Firm was at any time profitable, 
[the paralegal] was entitled to receive three-tenths 
of one percent of the clients’ gross recoveries in the 
personal injury cases she worked on.  Weigel's 
assertion that the bonus is not based upon "specific 
fees from specific cases" is mere semantics . . . . 
¶71 In its argument, the OLR emphasizes that the payment 
to the nonlawyer, although computed on the basis of a client's 
gross recovery, comes out of the contingent fee earned by the 
firm.  It describes the fee as follows: ". . . viewing the 
distribution of the client's gross recovery as a pie chart, if 
the Firm is entitled to a one-third percentage of the gross 
recovery, the nonlawyer gets an approximate one percent slice of 
the fee, off the top, before expenses, prior to any computation 
                                                 
2 It is unclear from the record whether the percentage used 
by the majority opinion is correct.  However, for consistency we 
use the percentage as set forth by the majority. 
No.  2010AP1523-D.awb 
 
4 
 
of 'profit,' that is, total revenues less total expenses on a 
Firm-wide basis." 
¶72 I find the argument of the OLR persuasive.  It is 
consistent with the conclusions of the other jurisdictions 
referenced above which have interpreted similar or identical 
rules based on the ABA model code.  Therefore, I determine that 
a formula, as used here, that compensates nonlawyer employees 
based on a percentage of the legal fees generated in the 
particular matters on which the nonlawyer worked, violates both 
the purpose and the plain prohibition set forth in SCR 20:5.4.  
Accordingly, although I join the majority in finding violations 
as to counts 1 and 2, I respectfully dissent as to the dismissal 
of the third count.  
¶73 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
  
No.  2010AP1523-D.awb 
 
 
 
1