Case Title: State ex rel. Burch v. Sheffield-Sheffield Lake City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.

Citation: 1996-Ohio-304

Docket Number: 19951096

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State ex rel. Burch, Appellant, v. Sheffield-Sheffield Lake City School 
District Board of Education, Appellee. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Burch v. Sheffield-Sheffield Lake City School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn. (1996),   Ohio St.3d    .] 
Mandamus to compel board of education to pay teacher for the period of 
her employment as a learning disabled tutor according to either the 
R.C. 3317.13 minimum salary schedule for teachers or the teachers’ 
salary schedule adopted by the board in accordance with R.C. 
3317.14 -- Writ denied, when. 
 
(No. 95-1096 -- Submitted February 6, 1996 -- Decided March 5, 1996.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 94CA5832. 
 
Appellee, Sheffield-Sheffield Lake City School District Board of Education 
(“board”), employed appellant, Regina Burch, as an individual/small group 
instruction teacher for learning disabled (L.D.) students from February 1989 to 
June 1993.  Individual/small group instruction teachers, who provide 
supplementary instruction to handicapped children enrolled in regular school 
classes pursuant to Ohio Adm. Code Section 3301-51-03(C), are commonly 
referred to as “tutors” or “L.D. tutors.”  When Burch initially applied for 
employment with the board in December 1988, she specifically requested 
 
2
employment as an L.D. tutor.  In February 1989, Burch and the board executed a 
“temporary appointment contract” for Burch to serve as an L.D. tutor at a “per 
diem/hour rate.”  For the 1989-1990, 1990-1991, 1991-1992, and 1992-1993 
school years, the parties executed limited teaching contracts in which Burch 
agreed to work as an L.D. tutor at the specified hourly salary rates.   
 
In the 1992-1993 school year, Burch’s hours were reduced from 
approximately five hours per day to two hours per day, purportedly due to fewer 
handicapped students needing tutoring services.  Burch refused to accept 
additional work instructing home-bound students.  After Burch’s performance in 
the 1992-1993 school year was evaluated as unsatisfactory, the board gave her 
written notice that it would not reemploy her following the expiration of her 
limited contract for that school year.   
 
During the entire period in which the board employed Burch, the Sheffield-
Sheffield Lake Teachers Association (“union”) served as the collective bargaining 
representative for the certified teaching staff in the school district.  The collective 
bargaining agreements between the board and the union recognized the union as 
the exclusive representative for all certified teaching staff, including tutors.  The 
collective bargaining agreements further provided teachers’ salary schedules.  
 
3
However, the collective bargaining agreements expressly stated at Article 
XII(B)(7) that all “[f]ull or part-time tutors shall be compensated at an hourly rate 
of eighty eight percent (88%) of the hourly rate of a BA-O teacher on the salary 
schedule.”   
 
In 1994, Burch instituted an action in the Court of Appeals for Lorain 
County requesting a writ of mandamus to compel the board to, among other 
things, pay her for the period of her employment as an L.D. tutor, according to 
either the R.C. 3317.13 minimum salary schedule for teachers or the teachers’ 
salary schedules adopted by the board in accordance with R.C. 3317.14 and 
incorporated in the pertinent collective bargaining agreements.  The court of 
appeals entered summary judgment in favor of the board and denied the writ. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
____________________ 
 
Regina Burch, pro se. 
 
Pepple & Waggoner and Glenn D. Waggoner, for appellee. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Burch asserts that the court of appeals erred in granting 
summary judgment in favor of the board and denying the requested writ of 
 
4
mandamus.  In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Burch had to establish 
(1) a clear legal right to the requested back pay and related benefits, (2) a 
corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the board to grant her request for 
back pay and associated benefits, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 218-219, 631 N.E.2d 150, 152.  Summary 
judgment is appropriate when (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains 
to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and 
(3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one 
conclusion, and viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving 
party, that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party.  State ex rel. Rogers v. 
Cleveland City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 197, 199, 652 
N.E.2d 756, 758.   
 
As a preliminary matter, Burch did not comply with S.Ct.Prac.R. VII(1) 
when she failed to file her supplement at the same time as her initial appellate 
brief.  Instead, she filed what essentially constitutes her supplement as an 
“appendix” attached to her reply brief.  However, the rules do not specify 
dismissal or automatic affirmance based upon an appellant’s failure to comply 
 
5
with this particular provision. Further, the board failed to object to Burch’s 
noncompliance with the rule.  Thus, given the foregoing as well our general 
precept that cases should be decided on their merits, we consider the merits of this 
appeal.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Montgomery v. R & D Chem. Co. (1995), 72 Ohio 
St.3d 202, 204, 648 N.E.2d 821, 823. 
 
Although Burch asserts ten propositions of law, she principally contends 
that (1) under R.C. 3317.13 and 3317.14, she is entitled to be compensated at a 
higher rate than the hourly compensation specified in the collective bargaining 
agreements; and (2) she is entitled to full-time pay for the 1992-1993 school year, 
since the board violated R.C. 3319.12 by unlawfully reducing her salary. 
 
As to the first issue, the court of appeals relied on R.C. 4117.10(A), which 
provides: 
 
“An agreement between a public employer and an exclusive representative 
entered into pursuant to this chapter governs the wages, hours, and terms and 
conditions of public employment covered by the agreement.  If the agreement 
provides for a final and binding arbitration of grievances, public employers, 
employees, and employee organizations are subject solely to that grievance 
procedure ***.  Where no agreement exists or where an agreement makes no 
 
6
specification about a matter, the public employer and public employees are subject 
to all applicable state or local laws or ordinances pertaining to the wages, hours, 
and terms and conditions of employment for public employees.  Laws pertaining 
to *** the minimum educational requirements contained in the Revised Code 
pertaining to public education including the requirement of a certificate by the 
fiscal officer of a school district pursuant to section 5705.41 of the Revised Code, 
and the minimum standards promulgated by the state board of education pursuant 
to division (D) of section 3301.07 of the Revised Code prevail over conflicting 
provisions of agreements between employee organizations and public employers.  
*** [T]his chapter prevails over any and all other conflicting laws *** except as 
otherwise specified in this chapter or otherwise specified by the general assembly. 
***”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
“Except for laws specifically exempted, the provisions of a collective 
bargaining agreement entered into pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117 prevail over 
conflicting laws.”  State ex rel. Parsons v. Fleming (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 509, 
513, 628 N.E.2d 1377, 1381.  R.C. 3317.13 provides a minimum salary schedule 
for teachers, and R.C. 3317.14 provides that any board of education participating 
in funds distributed under R.C. Chapter 3317, the school foundation program, 
 
7
must annually adopt a teachers’ salary schedule based on training and years of 
service.  Here, the board adopted teachers’ salary schedules pursuant to R.C. 
3317.14 and incorporated them into the collective bargaining agreements.   
 
The pertinent collective bargaining agreements provided, in contrast to R.C. 
3317.13 and 3317.14, that tutors such as Burch would be paid the specified hourly 
rate of compensation.  Nevertheless, Burch claims that R.C. 4117.10(A) does not 
require that the provisions of the agreement relating to tutor compensation prevail 
over R.C. 3317.13 and 3317.14 because these latter statutes constitute “minimum 
educational requirements” which are exempted from R.C. 4117.10(A).  Yet as the 
court recently held in State ex rel. Johnson v. Cleveland Hts./Univ. Hts. School 
Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 189, 192, 652 N.E.2d 750, 752, teachers’ 
salary schedules under R.C. 3317.13 and 3317.14 do not constitute “minimum 
educational requirements” which are excepted from R.C. 4117.10(A)’s rule that 
the collective bargaining agreement prevails over conflicting laws.  See, also, 
State ex rel. Rollins v. Cleveland Hts.-Univ. Hts. Bd. of Edn. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 
123, 532 N.E.2d 1289, paragraph two of the syllabus (R.C. 3319.11, relating to 
teacher tenure, is a teacher-protection statute and not a law pertaining to minimum 
educational requirements under R.C. 4117.10[A]). 
 
8
 
Burch next contends that R.C. 3317.13 and 3317.14 apply due to R.C. 
4117.10(A)’s provision that R.C. Chapter 4117 “prevails over any and all other 
conflicting laws *** except as otherwise specified in this chapter or as otherwise 
specified by the general assembly.”  However, R.C. 3317.13 and 3317.14 do not 
specify that R.C. 4117.10(A)’s rule that the collective bargaining agreement 
prevails over conflicting laws is inapplicable. 
 
Further, to the extent that Burch relies on previous decisions of the court in 
which we granted writs of mandamus in favor of tutors, such reliance is misplaced 
since none of those cases involved tutors’ claims where they were bound by a 
collective bargaining agreement which specified tutors’ compensation separately 
from other teachers, with R.C. 4117.10(A) applicable.  See State ex rel. Brown v. 
Milton-Union Exempted Village Bd. of Edn. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 21, 531 N.E.2d 
1297 (R.C. 4117.10[A] inapplicable where pertinent language predated enactment 
of R.C. 4117.10); State ex rel. Tavenner v. Indian Lake Local School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn. (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 88, 578 N.E.2d 464.  In fact, in one of the cases relied 
on by Burch, State ex rel. Chavis v. Sycamore City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 
(1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 26, 641 N.E.2d 188, we noted that “‘[g]enerally, an hourly 
rate [for tutors] which is agreed upon in collective bargaining, and incorporated in 
 
9
the collective bargaining agreement, may be less than the rate of compensation 
provided by the salary schedule.’”  Id., 71 Ohio St.3d at 32, 641 N.E.2d at 194, 
quoting 1 Baker, Ohio School Law (1993) 334, Section 7.44.1.   
 
“By providing that the [collective bargaining agreement] governs conditions 
of employment, the General Assembly has indicated its preference for enforcing 
those terms of an agreement which were arrived at through open negotiation at the 
bargaining table, regardless of which party is advantaged.”  Rollins, supra, 40 
Ohio St.3d at 127, 532 N.E.2d at 1293-1294.  As a member of the collective 
bargaining unit, Burch was bound by the tutor compensation provisions of the 
collective bargaining agreements.  Burch is not entitled to a higher rate than the 
hourly compensation specified in the agreements. 
 
Burch further asserts that she is entitled to full-time pay for the 1992-1993 
school year because the board violated R.C. 3319.12 by unlawfully reducing her 
salary.  R.C. 3319.12 provides: 
 
“Each board of education shall cause notice to be given annually not later 
than the first day of July to each teacher who holds a contract valid for the 
succeeding school year, as to the salary to be paid such teacher during such year.  
Such salary shall not be lower than the salary paid during the preceding school 
 
10
year unless such reduction is a part of a uniform plan affecting the entire district.  
***” 
 
Contrary to Burch’s assertion, her “salary,” which was merely an hourly rate 
with no promise of a specific number of hours, was not reduced from the 1991-
1992 school year to the 1992-1993 school year.  Instead, it actually increased from 
$11.66 per hour to $13 per hour.  There was no violation of R.C. 3319.12.  In 
addition, to the extent that Burch claims that “reduction in force measures” in the 
collective bargaining agreement “should have been followed” if there was “a 
legitimate declin[ing need] for her services,” she possessed an adequate remedy 
through the agreement’s grievance and arbitration procedure.  See Johnson, supra, 
73 Ohio St.3d at 192-193, 652 N.E.2d at 752-753.   
 
The foregoing discussion moots Burch’s remaining claims on appeal, e.g.,  
entitlement to prejudgment interest and retirement benefits based upon any unpaid 
back pay to which she is entitled.  Finally, her propositions concerning her alleged 
obligation to accept the home-bound assignment for the 1992-1993 school year 
and the board’s alleged duty to maintain her employment records are irrelevant to 
her requested relief on appeal, i.e. payment of back pay in accordance with R.C. 
3317.13, 3317.14, and 3319.12. 
 
11
 
The court of appeals did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of 
the board and denying the requested extraordinary relief.  Accordingly, the 
judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., 
concur. 
 
WRIGHT, J., not participating.