Case Title: Andre Lavon Sheffield v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC00-720

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-720
____________
ANDRE LAVON SHEFFIELD,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[July 5, 2001]
LEWIS, J.
We have for review Sheffield v. State, 25 Fla. Ld. Weekly D754  (Fla. 1st DCA
March 21, 2000).  We have jurisdiction.  See  art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
The petitioner challenges his sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender
Act (the “Act”) on several grounds, many of which have been previously
addressed by opinions of this Court.  See Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla.
2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act
violates neither the single subject rule for legislation nor principles of equal
-2-
protection ); McKnight v. State, 769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 2000) (holding that a
defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does
not qualify for sentencing under the Act and to challenge the State’s evidence
regarding the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender);
State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000) (holding that the Act does not permit a
“victim veto” which would violate a defendant’s due process rights by precluding
application of the Act in some instances but not others, as well as holding that the
Act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual
punishment);  Ellis v. State, 762 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2000) (recognizing that
publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all citizens
constructive notice of the consequences of their actions).
Petitioner also asserts entitlement to relief pursuant to the United States
Supreme Court’s holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). 
First, the petitioner did not properly preserve the issue for appellate review.  Even if
he had, we would hold that an argument for relief under Apprendi lacks merit here. 
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court stated:
Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.  The petitioner now asserts that because sentencing under
1  Prior to the Act’s amendment in 1998, similar language appeared in
subsection (8)(a)(1).  
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the Act requires that a defendant “commit[], or attempt[] to commit” any of an
enumerated list of crimes “within 3 years of being released from a state correctional
facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor,” §
775.082(9)(a)1.,1 Fla. Stat. (1998), the reasoning in Apprendi requires that a
defendant’s release be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  We disagree.
In our view, Apprendi  did not overrule the Supreme Court’s previous
decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).  In McMillan, the
Supreme Court considered a statute which imposed a mandatory minimum
sentence in connection with an offense committed while a defendant possessed a
visible firearm and held that proof of the possession of the firearm was not required
because the possession did not alter the maximum penalty or create a separate
offense calling for a separate penalty.  The Apprendi Court made clear that it was
not overruling McMillan when it stated:
The principal dissent accuses us of today "overruling McMillan."  We
do not  overrule McMillan. We limit its holding to cases that do not
involve the  imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory
maximum for the offense established by the jury’s verdict—a
limitation identified in the McMillan opinion itself.  
Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2361 n.13.  The Apprendi Court reasoned that the statute  
2  We further reject the assertion that relief is warranted under the fundamental
error doctrine.
-4-
addressed in McMillan neither altered the maximum penalty for the crime
committed nor created a separate offense calling for a separate penalty.  The statute
was viewed solely as a limitation upon the sentencing court’s discretion to select
the penalty within the range already available. 
It is our opinion that the Act does not increase the maximum statutory
penalty.  Here the sentencing court’s discretion in selecting a penalty within the
statutory range is simply limited.  Accordingly, proof to the jury of a defendant’s
release which subjects a defendant to a sentence under the Act is not required.
We agree with the reasoning of the Fourth District in Kijewski v. State, 773
So. 2d 124 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), review denied, No. SC01-181 (Fla. Apr. 30,
2001).  We hold that Apprendi does not require that the petitioner’s release be
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  We also determine that the
petitioner’s related arguments based on Apprendi are similarly unavailing.2 
Moreover, it is important to note that we have previously reached a similar
conclusion in connection with sentencing under another recidivist statute.  See
Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219, 224 (Fla. 1980) (rejecting a petitioner’s due
process argument that particular facts required for his sentencing under a habitual
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offender statute were subject to standard of being proved beyond a reasonable
doubt to a jury).  Accordingly, we approve the decision of the district court to the
extent it is consistent with Grant, McKnight, Cotton, and Ellis.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., dissents.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Certified Great Public Importance
First District - Case No. 1D99-810 
(Union County)
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Carl S. McGinnes, Assistant Public
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau
Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant Attorney General,
Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent