Case Title: Leslie v. Board of Appeals of the County of Hawaii. S.Ct. Order of Amendment, filed 02/28/2006 [pdf].

Citation: 109 Haw. 384

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

=--000---

 

WAYNE LESLIE, Appellant /Appellant~Appellee
BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE COUNTY OF HAWAI'I; EVARTS FOX
in his capacity as Chairperson of the BOARD OF APPEALS
OF THE COUNTY OF HAWAI'I; CHRISTOPHER YUEN in his capacity

‘as Planning Director of the County of Hawai'i,
Appellees /Appellees-Appellants

KI'ILAE ESTATES, LLC, Applicant /Appellee/Appellee-Appellee
and

PROTECT KEOPUKA ‘OHANA; JIM MEDETROS;
JACK KELLY, Appellees /Appellees-Appellees

 

Wo. 26184

S2.wvr 90g

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO. 03-1-0050k)

   

JANUARY 25, 2006

61:2)

MOON, C.J, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.

We affirm the September 25, 2003 final judgment of the
circuit court of the third circuit (the court)? in favor of
Appellant/Appellant-Appellee Wayne Leslie (Appellee) and against

Appellees/Appellees-Appellants Board of Appeals of the County of

 

* the Honorable Ronald Ibarra presided,

noe
***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

 

Hawai'i (the Board), Evarts Fox (Fox), in his capacity as
Chairperson of the Board of Appeals of the County of Hawai'i,
Christopher Yuen (the Director), in his capacity as Planning
Director of the County of Hawai'i (collectively, Board
Appellants], and Applicant /Appellee/Appellee-Appellee Ki‘ilee
Estates, LLC (KEL), Appellants/Appellees-Appellees Protect
Keopuka “Ohana (PKO), Jim Medeiros (Medeiros), and Jack Kelly
(Kelly) [collectively, KEL Appellees].
I

Appellee is a native Hawaiian fisherman and
practitioner of Hawaiian medicine residing in Napo'opo'o, Hawai'i
County, Hawai'i. He engages in customary and traditional
Hawaiian practices on property located south of Pu'uhonua o
Honaunay National Historic Park (the Park), identified as TMK:
8-5-005:019. He fishes offshore from the ahupua'a’ of Kauleoli.
Appellant also gathers pilo? and uha loa‘ for medicinal purposes

from the ahupui

 

of Kauleoli and fishes and picks opihi,* 1imu,*

cRhupua'a” is a “land division usually extending from the uplands
to the sea, so called becsuse the Beundary was marked by a heap of stones
surmounted by an inage of » pig, cr because a pig or other tribute was laid on
the alter as tax to the chief.” M. Pura ¢ §. Elbert, Hawellan Dictionary ®
(rev. ed. 1966) (hereinafter, Hawaiian Dictionary)

 

 

* “PLlow is defined as “sone species of native shrubs.” Hawaiian

Dictionary at 391
+ __,ylha loa” is “a small, dowy American weed, with ovate leaves and
small, clustered yellow flowers." laualian Dictionary at 363.
+ opini axe defined as “Linpets." awaiian Dictionary st 292.

 

“Limo” is "a general pane for 911 kinds of plants Living under
ater, both fresh and salt, slso aigse groxing in any damp place in the sir,
a5 on the ground, on rocks, and on other plants) also mosses, liverwort

(conimied.)

 

 
***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

and a'ama’ from the Kauleoli shoreline.

In April of 2000, KEL obtained an interest in
approximately 803 acres of land including the subject property of
the instant case in the ahupua'a of Kauleoli and land situated
north in the ahupua'a of Ki'ilae. The Park is situated north of
Ki‘lae along the shoreline. Some time prior to KEL's
acquisition of this property, the National Park Service (the NPS)
had expressed an interest in expanding the Park. The NPS hoped
to acquire approximately 30 acres of land within Ki'ilae, which
is an area in the special management area along the shoreline.

KEL submitted an application for a subdivision covering
739 acres of the property it had acquired. It also had an
“archeological reconnaissance survey” (the survey) conducted of
the entire 603 acres of land. The survey showed that the maukat
portion of Ki‘ilae contained well-preserved archeological
features. The NPS then becane interested in acquiring
approximately 238 acres of the Ki'ilae ahupua‘a. The. 238 acres of
land within the Ki'ilae ahupua'a was then sold to the Trust for
Public Lands, which was to resell the land to the NPS for

expansion of the Park.

contin)
Aicnens."" Mawabian Dictionary at 207.

    

wwama” Se “a larg
rocks." Hawaltan Dictionary

black, edible crab that runs over shore
2

Mauka” {s defined as “inland.” Hawaiian Dictionary at 242.
3
***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

On October 23, 2001, KEL submitted an application to
the County of Hawai'i Planning Department for approval of a
subdivision of approximately 457 acres within the ahupua'a of
Kauleolt into $5 lots. The $5 lots were to be comprised of “40
lots of approximately 5 acres each, 3 lots of approximately @
acres each, 4 lots of approximately 17 acres each, one 74-acre

lot, one 64-acre lot, a remainder lot of 96 acres, and $ roadway

 

lots." This property is bordered on the mauka side by the
Mamalahoa Highway and extends to the shoreline. It is zoned by
the County of Hawai'i as “Agriculture § acres” (A-Sa), meaning
that the minimum permitted size of lots is $ acres.

By letter dated January 9, 2002, the Director granted
tentative approval of the subdivision. On January 10, 2002,
Appellee sent 2 letter to the Director informing him that
Appellee engaged in custonary and traditional practices on and
near the subject property. On February 7, 2002, the Director's
decision was appealed to the Board by Appellee PKO, Medeiros, and
Kelly. By stipulation of the parties, the Board appointed Colin
L. Love, Esq. (Love) to serve as the Hearing Officer.

On October 8, 14, 18, and 22, contested case hearings
were held. On January 13, 2003, Love submitted his proposed
“Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of the
Contested Case Hearing Officer” to the Board, recommending that
it affirm the Director's issuance of the tentative subdivision

approval.
 

***FOR PUBLICATION*
On February 14, 2003, the Board held a hearing and

voted to affirm the tentative subdivision approval. The Board
issued its “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and

Approval” on March 5, 2003.

 

On March 14, 2003, Appellee appealed the Board's
decision to the court. The court heard oral argument on
September 6, 2003. On September 24, 2003, the court issued ite
“Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law; and order Granting the
Appeal." On October 6, the Board and the Director filed a
“Motion to Seek Clarification and/or to Alter or Amend Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Lew, and Order Granting the Appeal, Filed
Septenber 24, 2003.”

The court granted the motion and issued an “Amended
Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law: and Order Granting the
Appeal” (the order) on November 12, 2003. In relevant part the

order state

 

This matter, having cone before the Court for oral
argunent on Septenber &, 200%, pursuant to Appellant's
Notice of Appeal filed March 14, 2003, with Appellant Wayne
Lesiiel,] .- - Appellant (sic) Kiilee Estates, LLCs ss
fang the’ County cf Hawaii. The courts... having heard
the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the record and
file of the case, find es follows:

If it should be aeternine
of Fact should have been set forth
then they shall be deened 9s such.

 

that any of these Findings
Conclusion(s] of Lew,

 

IK S-5-05:19 38 identified a¢ an exanple of natural
beauty in the Generel Plan. ROA! F¥3 p. 2040-49 and
ROR! FAS p.2660

 

i.” Aeortion of the subtest land ares is located within
Hie_spscial Managenent ares, FOF No, #7, ROK p. 2941,
3." the Board of Appeals cecision upheld the Planning

Director, Christopher Yuen’s tentative subcivieien
proval' dated envary 9, 2002, of Kiilae Estates
LLErs proposed subaivieion. Ld

 

5
***POR PUBLICATION***

 

Subiect to inuncst ion or store mater overflow tid. and

POA FT o. 1d information on the existing user of
ihe prover es por tasts. SOR FI
b Deon fOr 721, Information on the water syste to

 

Pane 2e0- POF Tah anton
rina prov sae usstewater’

Tear Feds e. 2000" Tor Te and ROA, PV-e Sol
ipfemmatiop fecerdine provisions for draitace of flood

SS Tehcs oh rater Sastassane clectrie Pees near rhe
‘Difatest ian -en-tasratenenta ee be ange By the
developer” BGA: FS oo. 260-811

Heo Hates Sabres ctl the prososed sazemeats
‘iletgat ion Solan sroneaed ta pe Gesteatede-mabhic

Hip. 235 end ea

3. The Planning Director dia not make any specific
inquiry inte the current exercise of trauitional
pative Hawaiian gathering rights on the proposed
Subdivision property prior te tentative subdivision
Spprovel.. (ROA: FOP#S pp. 2592"93, FOF 17)

10, The Planing Director dia net consider the objectives
Sng policies of (Hawaii Revised statutes (MRS) §)
20Sa-2 prior to approval. ROA: F#5 p. 26S.

21, The Planning Director acknowledged that the Ki'ilae
Estates subdivision “may adversely affect coastal
resources.” FOR: FHS p. 2658

32, The Planning Director dig not analyze the visual
Impacts of the project prior to approval. ROA FS, p.
2083.

 

 

SOUCLUSIONS OF LAH
If e should be determined that any of these
conclusions of Lax shoals nave Deen set forsh os Findings of
Fact, then they shall be deemed as such.
tandard of Review
i. Pursuant te (HRS) § 91-1419), in an appeal from an
gency decision the Court ay, upon review of the
Fecerd, sffizm the decision of the agency oF renand
the cave with instructions for further proceedings; or
[e'may reverse or mosify the decision and orger if the
substantial rights of the petitioners may have been
prejudiced because the acministrative findings,
Conclusions, or orders are
(ayn Violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions; or

 

 

 

ls] tede upon unlawful procedure; or
(4) Affected by other error of law. . . HRS §
1400)
Mandatory Requirezents of Hawai'i County Code for
Subdivision Approval
2. Where the Language of a statute is plain and
Unambiguous, and's specific requirement must be met,
itis mandatory and not merely directory.
LandUse Commission, 53 Kaw. $38, 543 (1974)

 
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***
3. Hawai'i County Cede, Chanter 23 (subdivision Contra)

So be sunsitted with r
‘dubnitied with an apelication fer subsivisien
4. Tne Subsivision control code requires, among other

information, the following information to be included

inva preliminary plat
(2) the 1ecation of and dixection of all water
Courses and approximate location of or areas
Subject to inundation or storm water overfiow:
cc §.23-64(5)
(2) Existing uses of property, including but not
limited to, Loestion of ail existing structures:
weils, cisterns, private sewage dispos
Systens, and utilities, Hots 22-618
(3) Exicting and proposed easements, showing
wigth and purposes nce § 23-652) 7
(4) Proposed Geed restrictions in outline form
Af anys Hee § 23-6602);
(5) "The approninate Location within the
subdivision anc in the edjeining streets and
Property of existing sexers ond water maine,
Culverts snd crain pipes, electric conauite or
Lines proposed to be Used on the property to be
subdivided and invert elevations of sewers. st
Pointe of proposed connections; HCC § 23-66(3)
(6) Statement regarding water systen to De
installed, including source, quality and
Guantity Of water; HCC $ 25-66(4);
7) Frovisions for sewage disposal, drainage and
Hood control which are proposed. "The drainage
‘map shall include the approximate location of
areas subject to inundation of storm water
Overflow and all areas covered by waterways,
including aitehes, gullies, streams and drainage
courses within or abutting the subdivisions Hee
§ 2-6e(5
(8) Parcels of land proposed to be dedicated to
Public use, and the Conditions of such
Gedication; Wee § 23-6606) 7
(3) Inprovenents to be nade by the developer and
the approximate tine such inprovenents are to be
Completed, HCC § 23-6617)

  

 

 

 

 

8. me Director omply
ase EEL
elicarien

Compliance with County General Plan, State Law, and

County Regulations

6. Section 23-23 of the Haw. County Code, Chap. 23 states

that:

Subdivisions shall conform to the County general
plan and shall take into consideration
preliminary plans mage in anticipation thereof.
Subdivisions shail conform to the requirenents
of State law, County department of public works,
State departsent of health, state departnent of
transportation, and County’ deparement of water
+***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

supply reguirenents ang the standards
‘establishes by this chapter. Ree $ 23-23.

7. Section 28-23, 18 unambiguous regarding the fact that
Subsivision aust comply with the County general plan,
State law, end County requirenents, es Well as the
Sobai vision Control Code:

&.  Seetion 23-73 of the kaw. County code states that the
final plat shall be “substantially simile” to the
approved preliminary plat. “sufficient detail
Fegerding proposed inprovenents shall be subnitted #0
that they may be checked for compliance with
objectives of these regulations, State laws, and other
Sppliceble County orainances."" cc’ § 25-667)

9. Section 23-73, read together with the Fest of Section
25, mandates thet Section 25-23 applies to preliminary
plate submitted for tentative approval

Special Management Ares Perait

z HRS § 2058

Sf hawar Fianning Connlssion Rule 9-
Thousand Friends v. Chev 4 County, 15 Haw. 237, 240
Tiss)

11, The fise step in determining whether a special
anagenent area use permit is required for
particular developaent, is to ascertain whether the
Sctivity is included in the definition of
Sdevelopnent” in Haw. Rev. Statutes § 205A-22. If the
activity tel. lsicl within one of the tive catecories

SLactivities described in this defingtion then she

 

    

Sn vista igh ties
tne definition ef ‘develosment™ onder HRs

12, Having found that the proposed subdivision is a
development, the next step is to determine whether the

gatenorise of excludes activities, TAS $ 2058-22
Gibtivisien ot tend inte lots areiter than teenty
Sores in size Te-an-eacloded uses MNS -¢ 20SK‘2 111)
Tat portion of the proposed Kitiae Estates

thus it (is)
Sn excluded ose

The thiza step is to determine whether, even if an

 

 

i on cis Hanagenent Area, that
4 = = o
7 s County of hawasd Planning

Connon Rules of Practice and Proceaure, Role 3-4 (10)0.
14, The Planning Director has already conciuded that the
Ki'ilee Estates proposed subcivision “may adversely
Bffect coastal resources.” FOR: #5 py 2654
35, The law requires an inquiry as to whether an overall
project gay have a significant environmental impact
75 Maw. at 249 (enghnsis

 

in original).

16, Under Hawaiii's thousand Friends, 75 aw, at 246-47,
 

 

 

***FOR PUBLICATION*

the “possible cumslative impacts” of the whole
project, not just the parcel located in the special
Ranagenent area, must be taken into consideration when
Sesessing the environmental or ecological effect cn

 

the special management orea, If the sroiest “nay have
2 significant enviroomental oc ecoloaical effect on.

= S
ietetiged ac Soeeeleenent’ ang snl] sensive = at use

The flanning Director should have required Ki'tlae
Estates, Lic, to apply for a SMA use permit and adhere
to the SA permitting process detailed in HRS chapter
205A and County of Hawai": Planning Connon Bules of
Practice and Procedure, Rule 3-17
11 I5 NEREBY ORDERED that the Appeal is Granted:

1S FURTHER ORDERED that the Wecieion of the Board

 

  

of Appeals 1s reversed:
‘2E_Ls FURTIER ORDERED thet this case is remanded 20
he piznning Departaent with instructions te the Planning:

 

ifcstion concly with Ace 86 72078. oth geet fate

Bitar to Srantine tentative aporoval for-ki'tiae barstar
ie nS

(Emphases added and in original.

te apply Zor ane obtain =

‘The “Subdivision Control

 

Code,” as referred to by the court, is Chapter 23 of the Hawai'i

County Code, hereinafter referred to as “the Code.” On Decenber

12, 2003, ¢

this court,

he Board Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal to

In.

On appeal, the Board Appellants and the KEL Appellees

argue that
of the Code,
information
mandatory,

lacks diser

“shall” can

the court erred in (1) concluding that the provisions
1 Chapter 23, Article 4, stating thet certain
“shall” be submitted with preliminary plat plans are
rather than directory, and that the Planning Director
etion in implenenting the Code because (a) the word

be interpreted as directory under certain
 

***FOR PUBLICATION*

circumstances according to Perry v. Planning Comm'n, 62 Haw. 666,
619 P.2d 95 (1980) and Jack Endo Elec, v, Lear Siegler, Inc., 59
Haw. 612, 585 P.24 1265 (1978), and (b) requiring strict
compliance with the Code would produce an absurd and unjust
result, and (2) concluding that a Special Management Area (SMA)
Use Permit is required before the Planning Director can issue
tentative subdivision approval. In conjunction with their first
issue on appeal, the Board Appellants and the Ki‘ilae Appellees
assert that the court erred in conclusions of law 2, 3, and 5.
In conjunction with their second issue on appeal, the Board
Appellants and the Ki'ilae Appellees assert that the court erred
in conclusions of law 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17.

In response, Appellee argues that (1) “the
informational requirements of the [Code] are mandatory,” (2) @
SMA use permit was required because (a) Ki'ilae Estates is
subdividing land within the SMa, (b) the project “will change the
intensity of use of the water, the ecology of the water, or
access to it within the SMA,” and (c) the subdivision will have
significant cumulative impacts, and (3) the court’s decision may
be affirmed on other grounds including that (a) Native Hawaiian
rights were not investigated or protected, (b) the General Plan
was ignored, (c} the requirements of the public trust doctrine
were disregarded, and (d) the Board’s decision was not supported

by substantial evidence.

10
***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

Neither the Board Appellants nor the Ki'ilae Appellees
submitted @ reply brief, They request that this court reverse
the final judgment of the court and affirm the decision of the
Board.

An amicus brief was submitted by the Pacific Legal
Foundation (PLF) in support of the arguments of the Board
Appellants and the KEL Appellees. PLF presents only the
following question: “When a property owner proposes no use
within the wa, does the Coastal Zone Management Act, [HRS] ch.
205K ({Supp.] 2001 & Supp. 2003) (C2MA) nonetheless require the
owner obtain a SMA Use Permit prior to subdividing the non-SMA
portion of its property?" PFL requests that this court reverse
the court’s final judgment in favor of Appellee.

un

“Review of a decision made by a court upon its review
of an administrative decision is a secondary appeal. The
standard of review is one in which this court must determine

whether the court under review was right or wrong in its

decision.’” Lanas ¢. us Yn, 105 Hawas's 296,
306-07, 97 P.3d 372, 382-83 (2004) (quoting Soderlund v. Admin
Dir, of th 1 96 Hawai'i 114, 118, 26 e.34 1214, 1218
(20013).

To determine if the decision under review is right or

wrong, we “apply the standards set forth in HRS § 91-14(g) to the

agency's decision.” Ke Pa'akai 0 Ka'aina v, Land Use Comm'n, 94

a
“***FOR PUBLICATION***
Hawai'l 31, 40, 7 P.3d 1068, 1077 (2000). HRS § 91-14(g) (2003)

provides that:

Upon review of the record the court say affire the
decision of the agency of remand the cose with instructions
fer further proceesings; or it may reverse o modify the
Gecisson and order if the substantial rights of the
Petitioners may have been prejudiced because the
Ecninistrative findings, conclusions, decisions, or orders

(2) 2a violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions or

(21th excess of the statutory authority or

ition of tne agency: oF
{3) Made upon unlawfal procedure; or

la) Agfected by other error of law; oF

{5} Clearly erfoneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(6) ‘arbitrary, oF capricious, or characterized by
abuse Of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
Sascretion

 

juris

   

 

 

wrt is well settled ‘that in an appeal from a circuit

court's review of an administrative decision the appellate court
will utilize identical standards applied by the circuit court.
‘The clearly erroneous standard governs an agency's findings of

fact{.]/* Lanai Co. 105 Hawai'i at 307, 97 P.3d at 383 (quoting
7 vieion~ 71 Haw.
419, 424, 794 P.2d 1125, 1218 (1990)). “*An agency's findings

nd will be upheld if supported by

 

are not clearly erroneous
reliable, probative and substantial evidence unless the reviewing

court is left with a firm and definite conviction that 2 mistake

has been made.’” foe v, Hawai'i Labor Relations Bd, 108 Hawai'i
97, 100, 94 P.34 682, 655 (2004) (quoting Kilauea Nesahborhood
Ass'n v, Land Use Comm'n, 7 Haw. App. 227, 229-30, 751 P.2d 1031,
2034 (1988).

12
***FOR PUBLICATION®**
“(t]he courts may freely review an agency’s conclusions

of Jaw." Lanai Us Yn, 105 Hawai'i at

307, 97 F.3d at 383 (quoting Dole Hawaiian Division-Castle &
Sooke, Ince, 71 Haw. at 424, 794 P.2d at 1118).
Ww.
A
As steted supra, in conjunction with their first point
on appeal, the Board Appellants and the KEL Appellees argue thet
(2) the word “shall” may be construed as directory, rather than
mandatory in certain circumstances and (2) requiring compliance
with the Code would produce an absurd and unjust result. The
Board posits the additional argunent that customary and
traditional practices have been considered and protected in the
Proposed subdivision, KEL further asserts that the Board’s
interpretation of the Code should be given deference.
8
The relevant provisions of the Code are Sections 23-63
(1975), 23-64 (1975), 23-65 (1978), and 23-66 (1975). Section
23-63, entitled “General information on preliminary plat,”
states:

‘The preliminary plat shall include the following general
infeenation.

(2) Proposed nane of the subdivision which shell not
duplicate nor resenble the nane of another subdivision in
tthe County. The proposed ane shai be subject to epproval
by'the director:

(2) Date, northpoint and scale of drawings

(31 Tax key nunber and’ other information to sufficiently
describe ané define the location end boundaries of the
Proposed subdivision according to the real property records
Sf the state tax offic

(4) Nones and addresses of the owner, eubdivider, and
engineer or surveyer who prepares the plets

 

 

 

1B
 

FOR PUBLICATION***

 

(5) The approximate lot layout snd the approxinate dimension
and area of each ist?

{e) Acreage of proposed subdivision and nusber of lots; and
(7) Rtitie report isesed by 6 Licensed title company in the
one of the owner of the lend, showing all parties whose
Consents sre necessary and cheir interests in the promise!
vehen required by the director.

 

 

(Emphasis added.) Section 23-64, entitled “Existing conditions
shown on preliminary plat,” states:

‘The preliminary plat ghal] include the following information
on existing conditions:

(2) "Location, width and nanes of #11 existing or platted
tteots within or adjacent to the trace, together with
Sasemence, other rights-of-way, and other important
features, such as comers, property boundary’ Lines, and
control of access lines adjacent te State highways;

[2] then required by the director, contours at vertical
intervals of five feet where the slope is greater than ten
Percent, Elevations shall be marked on the contours based
bn an established bench mark oF other datum approved by the
Sirector of public works. In addition, the contours a nay.
be required by the manager, State departnent of health, and
Girector of public works shall be shown:

(3) the location and direction of ail water courses and
approximate location of areas subject to inundation or storm
water overflow

TE) “Existing bees of property, including but not limited to,
location of all existing structures, wells, cisterns,
private sewage disposal systens, and utilities: and

5) Zoning on and adjacent to the tract

 

 

 

 

 

(Emphasis added.) Further, Section 23-65, entitled “Proposed
plan of land partitioning on preliminary plat,” states:

‘The preliminary plat plan shall. include the following lend
partitioning information:

[1] Streets showing location, widths, proposed nanes,
approximate radii or carves, The relationenip of ali
Streets to projected streets shown onthe County general
plan, or if' there is no complete County general plan,
Projected streets suggestes by the director to assure
Seequste traffic circulation in the area:

(2) Existing and proposed eagenents, showing width and
purposes

(3) Lote, showing approxinate dinensions, minimun lot size
and proposed lot and block numbers; ang

(4) Sites, if any, allocated for purposes other than single-
fantly dwellings

 

 

(Emphasis added.) Finally, Section 23-66, entitled “Explanatory

information on preliminary plat,” states:

u
***FOR PUBLICATION®**

 

‘The preliminary plat shall include the following explanatory
information: If it cannot be shown practicably on. the
preliminary plat, i shall be submitted in separate
Statements accompanying the preliminary plat:

(1) A vicinity ssp ata small scale, showing existing
subdivided Iand oknerships adjacent to the proposed
Subdivision, and showing how proposed streets nay be
Gytenced to connect with existing sereets)

(2) Proposed deed restrictions in outline form $f anys

(3) The approxinate lecation within the subgivision and in
the adjoining streets and property of existing sewers and
Water mains, culverts and Grain pipes, electric conasits. oF
Lines proposed to be used on the property to be subaividea
fang invert elevations of sewers at points of proposed

(a) Statenent regarding woter syste to be installes,
including seurce, quality and quantity of wate:

(S) Provisions for sewage Gisposal, drainage and flood
Control which are propesed, The drainage map shall include
the approvinate locaticn of aress subject te Anundation oF
Storm uater overflow and all areas. covered by watermaye,
Including itches, gullies, streams and drainage courses
within oF butting the subdivision:

\(é) Parcels of land proposed te be dedicated to public use,
and the conditions cf such dedications and

(7) Inprovenents to be sade by the developer and the
approximate tine such inprovenents are to be completed.
Sufficient detail regarding proposed inprovenents shall be
Subsitted so that they say be checked fer compliance With
objectives of these regulations, State laws and other
applicable County ordinances

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

(Emphasis added.)
c

Neither the Board Appellants nor the KEL Appellees
contest the court's finding of fact & which states that KEL's
preliminary plat did not contain information required by Sections
23-64(1), 23-64(4), 25-6612), 23-66 (3), 23-66(4), 23-66(5), 23
66(6), and 23-66(7). As the parties appear to agree that KEL did
not meet the requirements of the Code, this analysis is limited
to interpretation of the relevant language in the Code.

This court’s primary obligation in construing a statute
“is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the

legislature,” which “is to be obtained primarily from the

as
 

***FOR PUBLICATION*

 

language contained in the statute itself.” Franks v. City &
Sounty of Honolulu, 74 Haw. 328, 334, 843 P.2d 668, 671 (1993)
(quoting In re Hawaiian Tel. Co., 61 Haw, $72, $77, 608 P.2d 383,
387 (1980)). When construing a statute, “the fundamental
starting point is the language of the statute itself{ and] where
the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, [the appellate
courts"} sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious
meaning.” State v, Kalama, 94 Hawai'i 60, 64, 8 P.34 1224, 1228
(2000).

“Departure from the literal construction of a statute
is justified only if such a construction yields an absurd and
unjust result obviously inconsistent with the purposes and
polices of the statute.” Shin v. McLaughlin, 89 Hawai'i 1, 4,
967 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1998) (quoting Alvarez v, Liberty House,
Inc., 5 Hawai'i 275, 278, 942 P.2d $39, $42 (1997)). “When
interpreting a municipal ordinance, we apply the same rules of
construction that we apply to statutes.” Weinbero v, City ¢
County of Honolulu, 82 Hawai" 317, 322, 922 P.2d 371, 376
(2996) (quoting Bishop Square Assoc, v, City & County of
Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 232, 234, 673 P.2d 770, 772 (1994) (quoting
Haikiki Resort Hotel v. City & County of Honolulu, 63 Haw. 222,
239, 624 P.2d 1353, 1365 (1981))). “The purpose of the ordinance
may be obtained primarily from the language of the ordinance

itself[.J” Id.

16
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This court has said that “[wle may resort to legal or
other well accepted dictionaries as one way to determine the
ordinary meaning of certain terms not statutorily defined.”
Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 96 Hawai'i 408, 424,
32 P.3d 52, 68 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). See also, State v. Nomura, 79 Hawai'i 413, 416, 903
P.2d 718, 721 (App. 1995) (stating that “resort to legal or other
well accepted dictionaries is one way to determine the ordinary
meanings of certain terms not statutorily defined” (internal
quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted)). “Shall” is
defined as “will have to” or “must.” . we Int
Dictionary 2085 (1961). As to the meaning of “shall,” it is
further stated:

As uses in statutes, contracts, or the like, this word is

eneraily snperative or mandatory. ‘In commen or ordinary

parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term

Fghali” is'a word of command, and one which has always or

which must be given a compulsory meaning; as denoting

obligation. Zhe word in ordinary usace means “must” and is.

noonsistent wish 2 consept of aiseresion
Black's Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). In

 

light of this court’s obligation to give the Code its ordinary
meaning and the foregoing definition of “shall,” it is concluded
that the aforementioned provisions of the Code are mandatory and
not discretionary. See Voelimy v. Broderick, 91 Hawai'i 125,
128, 980 P.2d 999, 1003 (App. 1999) (stating that “(t]he word
‘shall’ ‘must be given a compulsory meaning . . . and is
inconsistent with a concept of discretion’” (quoting Black's Law

Dictionary at 1375)); Gray v, Admin, Dir, of the Court, state of

vv
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Hawai'i, 84 Hawai'i 138, 150, 931 P.2d 580, 592 (1997) (observing

that “[t]he word ‘shall’ is generally construed as mandatory in

legal acceptation” (quoting In re Adoption of Watson, 45 Haw. 69,
79, 361 P.2d 1054, 1059 (1961))). Accordingly, contrary to the

Board Appellants’ argument, the Director lacked “discretion to
accept @ subdivision spplication without strict compliance with
the code requirements.” As the provisions of the Code are not
ambiguous, this court need not look at legislative intent. The
argunent of the Board Appellants and the KEL Appellees that the

court erred in its conclusions of law 2, 3, and 5 is therefore

 

rejected.
D

In support of its argunent that reading the Code

Provisions as mandatory would produce “an absurd and unjust

result,” the Board states:

Plsnping bepartnent forever tai sen te

n ‘This would inelede internation which
Showed that the cise of the lets conform to the zoning,
adequacy of the filing fee, consent of landowners, and 20
fon. "However, information on water and wastewater’ aystens(,
fot example, ‘need not be submitted until after a review by
appropriste agencies such ss the Department of Water Supply
and what is now the Departwent of Environmental Managenent
‘The coments fron these departments az to what would be
Fequired are then incorporsted inte conditions which mist be
Kefied before final subdivision approval 18 given.

izing s1]sveh hens cre! ia) wa

= hee
Bractical matter alt such provisions cennot be prepared
luntil ell practical aepects of the proposal are settled by

jew of appropriate agencies.” Thus, construing the

 

 

 

    

 

 

 

“ the izout Towing tiene 7
ication of sos ie and efforts a a

18
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(Enphases added.) In Zexry, this court articulated a three-prong
test for determining when the word “shall” may be interpreted as
Girectory. First, “shall” can be read in a non-mandatory sense
when 2 statute’s purpose “confute[s] the probability of a
compulsory statutory design.” 62 Haw. at 676, 619 P.2d at 102.
Second, “shall” will not be read as mandatory when “unjust
consequences” result. Id, Finally, “the word ‘shall’ may be
held to be merely directory, when no advantage is lost, when no
Fight is destroyed, when no benefit is sacrificed, either to the
Public or to the individual, by giving it that construction.”
Ida at 677, 619 P.2d at 103.

‘The arguments of the Board Appellants and the KEL

 

Appellees are unavailing. Regarding the first and third prong

the following testimony was elicited before the Board:

 

UAppetiee’s Counsen) a ”
Directors ties, the subsivision
Tihe Director): The curpose is to ensure that when

 

Hunele Primarily, it's a question of physical, adequacy of
Physical infrastruccure rather than question of the use of
the property of lot sizes which are set by the Zoning Code,

 

9: Qo-vou tind that che public can hele vou and your
Devarthent sale Detter decisions by oroviding infomation to
the Departeent?

Ri Were often that’s true, In some cases though,
there is, there is not s statutory means to inplenent whet
people might want

Q: if the gublic had more information, could it then
Brovide belter infomation te the Deoartaent in aaking ite
Secisions:

 

 

[think cenerally. ves.
Q: Tethere s provision By which unen somebody
sutmits a prelininary\subdivisien application to the
Departnent, that notice of that application sa made
available to those who woul like to keep informed of the
Subdivision pro:

Ai There's two things. I think the Code requires us
to publish a list of subdivision applications received. And
Tievnot sure that there is, 1 know that there's a, people

 

 

1
***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

can request copies of agendas, but I'm not sure, I suppose
Ef someone requested as a, made a standing request for's,
List of subdivision applications, we could periodically send
that." Although I'm net cure that that's, st'e probably
covered by public information laws that we would de thet

‘Q: Sp you publish = list of applicstions receives
And publication of that, of that list is it fair to
gives the public notice’ so that if they have relevant
Snrormation, they can provide it to the bepartment?

Well, I'd be guessing what the purpose was,

because I"m, honestly there are a number of possibl
purposes. “One is simply to inform the public what's going
on. And 1m, I don't, I'm not aware of a, of s statement in
the Code that says why. It's published except that there 12
supposed to be a publication:

 

  

 

  

 

‘Gr But when it is published, that does regardless of
the purpose, the cublic then goas have the spsisty ta
Rrovide the Genarteent with information:
Ta
(Emphases added.) The first prong of this test ie not met. The

Director stated the purpose of the Code was to provide the Board
with information regarding drainage and water supply. In that
Light the purpose of Sections 23-64(3) and 23-66(4) and (5),
cited supra, is not inconsistent with a compulsory statutory
design. As to the third prong, the Director conceded that this
information was useful both to “inform the public what's going

and to provide the Board with better information in making
its decision. Such a consideration would be sacrificed, as
Appellee argues, if such information were lacking. Therefore,
the third prong of the test ie also not met.

AAs to the second prong, the Board Appellants’ argument
is essentially that strict compliance with the Code is “an
unnecessary waste of effort” and expense. This, however, does
not lead to the conclusion that construing the Code provisions as

mandatory leads to an “unjust consequence.” The argument that

requiring an applicant to provide information on water and

20
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wastewater systems, which would later be subject to comments and
conditions imposed by the Department of Water Supply and the
Department of Environmental Managenent would be “absurd” or
“unjust,” is not persuasive.

Even assuming that sone duplication of cost and effort
results, the process by which the preliminary plat is to be
submitted and the requirenents for it are within the province of
the legislative branch to prescribe. The Board Appellants have
not shown that “an unnecessary waste of effort” is “an absurd and
unjust result” that is “gbvicusly inconsistent with the purposes
and policies of the statute” in ight of the mandatory language
employed in the Code provisions. Shin, 89 Hawai‘ at 4, 967 P.2d
at 1062 (emphasis added). As stated in Town v. Land Use Comm'n,
55 Haw. 538, $43, 524 P.2d 84, 68 (2974),

ie esefuliy avok

‘Durboss and eitect of a statute which is {ree trom
AELGUIEY, nor will the courts be influences by the
Constroction placed upen a statute by the officials whose
Goty it 1s to execute it where such Construction 4
manifestly incorrect.

(Emphasis added.) The Board Appellants’ arguments are better
addressed to the legislative branch. Accordingly, the third

prong of the test is not satisfied. Therefore, the term “shall”
in Sections 23-63, 23-64, 23-65, and 23-66 cannot be construed as

merely directory.

 

‘The Board Appellants argue that an agreement has been

reached regarding a pedestrian easement to the shoreline on the

aL
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

subject property and that KEL must provide a “public pedestrian
access plan for approval by the Director” before final approval
of the subdivision can be granted. The Board Appellants also
reiterate that the original land acquired by KEL has been reduced
by the 238 acres that were sold for Park expansion. It would
appear that the Board Appellants contend that because of this
agreement and land sale for Park expansion, the Board and KEL
have attempted to satisfy cultural and community needs. But
these matters are wholly irrelevant to compliance with the
mandatory requirements of the Code.
F

Finally, the KEL Appellees argue that “[i]f an agency's

construction or usage is consistent with the purpose and effect

of @ statute or ordinance, and is not manifestly incorrect or

 

unreasonable, it is entitled to deference.” This argument is
also unpersuasive. As stated aupra, the Board’s interpretation
of the Code is contrary to the unambiguous language contained
therein. ‘Therefore, the Board's interpretation of the Code is
“manifestly incorrect” and “unreasonable.” Regarding deference
to agency interpretations of statutes, this court has stated that
“(tlhe rule of judicial deference, however, does not apply when
the agency's reading of the statute contravenes the legislature's
manifest purpose. . . . Consequently, we have not hesitated to
reject an incorrect or unreasonable statutory construction

advanced by the agency entrusted with the statute's

2
 

FOR PUBLICATION"

 

implenentation.” In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai'i
97, 145, 9 P.3d 409, 457 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
The Board's interpretation is not entitled to deference inasmuch

as it would contradict the plain language of the Code.

 

As to their second issue on appeal, the Board
Appellants and the KEL Appellees argue that KEL was not required
to obtain a SMA Use Permit because the proposed subdivision is

not a “development” within the SMA under HRS chapter 205A.* In

 

conjunction with th ert that the court

 

argumente, they a
erred in its conclusions of law 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17.

Pursuant to HRS § 205-26 (1993), entitled “Permit
required for development,” “[n]o development shall be allowed in
any county within the special management area without obtaining a
permit in accordance with this part.” The parties agree that the
SMA Use Permit requirement 1s governed by the three-step process
found in HRS § 208A-22 (1993) and deseribed by the court in

conclusions of law 11, 12, and 13. As set forth by Appellee,

 

* the Board Appellant's opening brief contains the following

passage:

The applicant has withdrawn the subdivision
application which is the subject matter of this appeal
Subsequently, the applicant subaitted s new subdivision
application. The new application consists of property mauka
(Of the Old Government Road (the elaica). Let 22 which
encompasses the entire shoreline management area [sic].
Located (sic] makal of the road, 1s not part of the new
application:

 

 

However, as the Board Appellants have not withdrawn their point on eppeal, the
issue 6 presented must be addressed.

“Makai” 1s defined a5 "on the seaside, toward the sea, in the
direction of the sea.” Hausiien Dictionary at 114

23

 

 
   
***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

this process is as follows:

ef bea
= ST the activity falls
thin one of the five categories of activities, then the

 

 

areuant son cateaories of
sctivitige, if tne activity 19 vexcloded,” The third step
Sto assets shether the activitv-may nave cumslatine inenct
‘Gecsignificent environmental or ecslocics! effect ana
‘moacial manacenent ares

(Emphases added.) HRS § 20SA-22 contains the following relevant

definitions:

arin or onder uster a

Management area that are included below:

 

‘Shance_in the density or intensity of use of

and. including but not Linited co the division

be esbaivieion of lang

(4) Change in the Intensity of use of water, ecology
related thereto, or of access thereto; and

Speveléoment” does not include the following:
ini)” “supdivieton of sat
twenty acres in sizer
roviase whenever the authority tins
‘peteni (icant anvisonental or eccleaicsl effect ara"
‘SBecial nenectnent ares, that use, activity,cr operation

cane

“special managenent ares” means the Land extendin
inland fron the shoreline a2 delineated on the sepe fi-
with the authority as of Jone §, 1977, of as amended
pursuant to section 208A-23,

   

    

The three-step process, then, allows for a proposal to fall
within the definition of “development,” be excluded from it, and
then be reinstated in the definition because of its impact on
SUR. Applying this three-step process to the instant case, it
cannot be concluded that the court was wrong in ruling that a SMA

Use Permit was required for the proposed subdivision.

24
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

A
Firet, neither the Soard Appellants nor the KEL

Appellees contest the court’s finding of fact 4, which states
that “a portion of the subject land area is located within the
ISMA].” The subdivision application lists a subdivision of a
487-acre parcel of land, which contains a 64-acre plot of land
within the SMA. The court was thus correct in concluding that a
portion of the subdivision was in the SMA.

‘The Board Appellants and the KEL Appellees argue that

 

the 64-acre plot of lend within the SMA is a separate “pre
existing lot,” and even if located in the SMA, it was not being
subdivided. They contend, then, that this lot should not be
considered in determining whether a SMA use permit is required.
This argument, however, is inconsistent with the subdivision
application submitted by KEL.

The application indicated that 487 acres were to be
subdivided into 55 lots, The $5 lots are comprised of “40 lots
of approximately 5 acres each, 3 lots of approximately 8 acres
each, 4 lots of approximately 17 acres each, one T4-acre lot, one
G4cacre lot, a remainder lot of 96 acres, and 5 roadway lots.”
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, the 64-acre lot, which is within
the SMA, was part of the entire subdivision application and was

not annexed from it.!" As the court concluded in conclusion of

* ae stated gunra, a new subdivision application was submitted

subsequent to the subdivision spplication filed sy KEL in the instant case
But Because the Board Appellants heve not withdrawn thie point on appeal, the
(coniaued_)

 

25
 

***FOR PUBLICATION’
SSS

jaw 11, “{sJubdivisions are included in the definition of
‘development.’ It may be noted, further, that in Sandy Beach
Def. fund v. City Council of the City & County of Honolulu, 70
Haw. 361, 364-65, 173 P.2d 250, 253 (1989), this court said that
“because @ portion of the project was located within the
boundaries of the ‘[SMA]’ established by the County pursuant to
the [Code], [the developer] was required to obtain an SMA permit.
HRS § 2058-28." In conjunction with HRS § 205A-28, which
Provides that “[n]o developnent shall be allowed in any county
within the special management area without obtaining a permit in
accordance with this part(,]” Sandy Beach can be read to require
‘such a permit in these circumstances.

The court decided in conclusion of law 12 that “the
activity” is an excluded use under HRS § 205A-22(11). HRS S
208A-22(11) excludes subdivisions of land “into lote greater than
twenty acres in size” from the definition of “development.” See
supra. According to the court that portion of the subdivision
within the SMA is 64 acres and, hence, larger than 20 acres, thus
it 1s an excluded use. The third step of the process, then,
applies.

c.

As to the third step, HRS § 205A-22 states that an

excluded use should be defined as 2 “development” if it “may have

(continued)
epplication is addressed 5 it is presented in the record. Ses sunra note 3.

26
 

***FOR PUBLICATION*

a cumulative impact, or a significant environmental or ecological
effect on a special managenent area.” (Emphasis added.) The KEL
Appellees argue that the court should not have reached the third
step because it only applies to excluded uses and because there
is no “development,” there can be no excluded use. The Board
Appellants argue that the court's reasoning in step three was
flawed as the soil type for the subject property will be
primarily bare pihoehoe"’ with relatively Little soil and “ground
disturbance” and, therefore, little surface water runoff into the
SMA. Therefore, the Board Appellants argue, the proposed
subdivision will not have a significant impact on the SMA and
should not be defined as a “development” under HRS § 205K-22.

‘The Board Appellants do not dispute that the Director
testified that the project may adversely affect coastal
resources. The Board Appellants, however, appear to argue that
the Director's entire testimony “indicates that he did not
believe that the subdivision at Ki'ilae would result in
significant environmental impact.” The testimony the Board

Appellants refer to is as follows:

 

setel Tes

(ihe Director]? Mav.nvas,
G:) bo" you believe the County has sufficient ability

 

to prevent runoff such s# has occurred at Hokulie at this

 

As’ i thank 1 can generally answer the question. T
think the, 7 can answer, Ly and speci fxcally,
Generally, the County, if, we think the grading ordinance

 

 

Dictionary at 200:

 

‘ancoth, unbroken type of lava." Hawaiian

2
***FOR PUBLICATION***
SSS

Reeds Eo be improved in the Departnent of Public Works has
issued, has # contract out to work on a grading ordinanc
& mE This site hee
Considerably less potential than Hokulia because of the
considerably lese soil involved, less, much less ground
disturbance in the subdivision because Woku1ie involved @
construction of 2 golf course, and also involved isporsation
of a considerable snount of scil,, I could get inte the
specifics of the soil type on this subdivision, but most of
Af is bare pahoehos. On the northern part of the site,

the where there's sone thin layer of soll over

he subdivision itself then etops, the
st point, T think, ie S00 feet from the water, that

 

 

 

  

 

there would be any grading activity fer the subsivision
steels.
(Emphases added.) Such testimony does not directly purport to

retract the Director’s earlier statenent that the subdivision may
adversely affect coastal resources. Accordingly, it cannot be
said, as a matter of law, that the court was wrong in its
conclusion of law 14, which states that the Director had
Concluded that the “proposed subdivision ‘may adversely affect
coastal resources."

In its finding of fact 11, the court found that “the
[Director] acknowledged that the Ki'ilae Estates Subdivision ‘nay
adversely affect coastal resources.’” Neither the Board
Appellants nor the KEL Appellees challenge this finding of fact.
Based on the Director's testimony it is not clearly erroneous.
This finding supports the court's conclusions of law 14, 15, 16,
and 17 and, hence, it cannot be said that the court was wrong in
arriving at the said conclusion. The court’s conclusion of law
13 merely states the third step of the three-step process which,

28 stated supra, is not disputed by the parties. Accordingly,

28
***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

KEL's proposed subdivision falls within the definition of
“development” found in HRS $ 208A-22.
>.

In ite amicus brief, PLF appears to argue that an
entire subdivision must be located within the SMA for a SHA use
permit to be required. As stated supra, an entire development
need not be within the SHA for a SMA use permit to be required.
For the foregoing reasons, the court was correct in determining
that a SMA use permit was required,

vi.

Based on the foregoing, the Septenber 25, 2003 final
judgment of the court in favor of Appellee and against the Board
Appellants and the KEL Appellees is affirmed.

On the brief,

Sot sean, esttheae-Fodd Gorin

 

Deputies corporation
Counsel, County of Hawei's, eee Pieeninne—
for Appellants Board of

Appeais of the County of Petts 6 esse rt

Hawai'i, Evarts Fox, and

Christopher Yuen. aa
Michael W. Moore and po

R, Ben Tsukazaki (Tsukazaki

Yeh & Moore), for Kone, Daeg
Appellee Ki'jlae Estates, LLC.

David Kimo Frankel (Legal
Aid Society of Hawai'i), for
Appellee Wayne Leslie.

Robert H. Thomas (Damon Key
Leong Kupchak Hastert), for
Anicus Curiae Pacific legal
Foundation.

29.