Case Title: Fall v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Fall v. State1998 WY 87963 P.2d 981Case Number: 97-191, 97-331, 97-198, 97-259Decided: 07/16/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Lewis 
FALL, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Clinton MORISON, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Kerry GARNICA, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Curtis Lee HUEBBE, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District Court, Sweetwater County, 
Jere Ryckman, J.

 

Sylvia L. Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Stephen I. Singer,* 
Faculty Director of the Defender Aid Program; and Jennifer L. Hansen and Dyan J. 
Davidson, Student Interns, for Appellant 
(Defendant).

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and Robin Sessions Cooley, Assistant Attorney 
General, for Appellee (Plaintiff).

 * Orders granting Singer's motions to withdraw as 
counsel on behalf of the Appellants entered on May 18, 
1998.

 

Before LEHMAN, 
C.J., MACY, GOLDEN & TAYLOR**, JJ., and DAN R. PRICE II, 
D.J.

 ** Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

 

MACY, Justice.

 [¶1] These cases involve the same issue and were 
consolidated by this Court for oral argument and decision. Appellants Lewis Fall 
and Clinton Morison appeal from the judgments and sentences which the district 
court entered after each of them entered a conditional guilty plea to battery 
against a household member under WYO. STAT. § 6-2-501(b), (e), and (f)(ii) 
(1997). Appellants Kerry Garnica and Curtis Huebbe appeal from the judgments and 
sentences which the district court entered after each of them entered a 
conditional plea of no contest to battery against a household member under § 
6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii).

 

[¶2] We 
affirm.

 

                                              
ISSUE

 

[¶3] The appellants present 
the following issue for our review:

 

Whether the district court erred in denying 
Appellants' motions to dismiss the charge of battery, third offense, under 
Wyoming Statute § 6-2-501(f)(ii) because there were no previous convictions, as 
required by that statute, to justify the charge.

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶4] Fall, Morison, and 
Garnica were charged with battery against a household member for battering their 
wives. Huebbe was charged for battering his live-in girlfriend. The appellants 
were charged under § 6-2-501(f)(ii) because these offenses were third or 
subsequent offenses, each appellant having had at least two prior battery 
convictions under § 6-2-501 (b).

 

[¶5] The appellants filed 
motions to dismiss the charges. The district court denied those motions, and the 
appellants entered conditional pleas, reserving their rights to appeal from the 
denials of their motions to dismiss. The district court sentenced all four 
appellants as repeat offenders under § 6-2-501(f)(ii) and ordered them to serve 
varying terms in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. It suspended the prison 
sentences and placed the appellants on supervised probation for different 
lengths of time. The appellants appeal from the judgments and sentences which 
the district court entered after it denied their motions to 
dismiss.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

[¶6] Appellee State of 
Wyoming contends that we should not review the appellants' issue because it was 
not explicitly presented to the district court for a determination. We agree 
that the appellants did not raise this issue with the district court. We 
believe, however, that this issue will present itself again in the near future 
and have, therefore, decided to consider it in the interest of judicial economy. 
YellowBear v. State, 874 P.2d 241, 245 (Wyo. 1994).

 

[¶7] The appellants claim 
that the district court erred in denying their motions to dismiss the charges 
against them because § 6-2-501(f)(ii) applies to defendants who have been 
previously convicted under subsection (f) and that none of them had been 
previously convicted under that particular subsection. The State responds that 
the plain language of § 6-2-501(f)(ii), along with the legislative intent behind 
the enactment of that provision, supports the district court's 
action.

 

[¶8] Section 6-2-501 defines 
the crimes of simple assault and battery, it describes the potential punishments 
for those crimes, and it provides for enhanced punishments for multiple offenses 
against household members:

 

(a) A person is guilty of simple assault if, having 
the present ability to do so, he unlawfully attempts to cause bodily injury to 
another.

 

(b) A person is guilty of battery if he unlawfully 
touches another in a rude, insolent or angry manner or intentionally, knowingly 
or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.

 

(c) Except as provided by subsection (e) of this 
section, simple assault is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than 
seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00).

 

(d) Except as provided by subsection (f) of this 
section, battery is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), 
or both. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the term of probation 
imposed by a judge under this subsection may exceed the maximum term of 
imprisonment established for the offense under this subsection provided the term 
of probation, together with any extension thereof, shall in no case exceed one 
(1) year.

 

(e) A household member as defined by W.S. 35-21-102 
who is convicted of a second or subsequent simple assault against any other 
household member is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars 
($750.00), or both.

 

(f) A household member as defined by W.S. 35-21-102 
who commits a second or subsequent battery against any other household member 
shall be punished as follows:

 

(i) A person convicted of a second offense under this 
subsection within five (5) years following the first conviction is guilty of a 
misdemeanor  punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than one 
thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both;

 

(ii) A person convicted of a third or subsequent 
offense under this subsection within ten (10) years following the first 
conviction is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
two (2) years, a fine of not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), or 
both.

 

WYO. STAT. § 6-2-501 (1997). 
The term "household member" is defined as:

 

          
(iv) "Household member" means:

 

          
(A) Persons married to each other;

 

          
(B) Persons living with each other as if married;

 

          
(C) Persons formerly married to each other;

 

          
(D) Persons formerly living with each other as if 
married;

 

          
(E) Parents and their adult children;

 

          
(F) Other adults sharing common living quarters; 
and

 

(G) Persons who are the parents of a child but who 
are not living with each other.

 

WYO. STAT. § 
35-21-102(a)(iv) (1997).

 

[¶9] To resolve this issue, 
this Court must interpret the language of § 6-2-501(f)(ii). We endeavor to 
interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's intent. State Department 
of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994). We begin 
by making an " 'inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words 
employed according to their arrangement and connection.' " Parker Land and 
Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 
1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We 
construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and 
sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari materia so 
that no part will be inoperative or superfluous. 845 P.2d  at 1042; see also 
Meerscheidt v. State, 931 P.2d 220, 223 (Wyo. 1997). Courts determine as a 
matter of law whether a statute is clear or ambiguous. Gunderson v. State, 925 P.2d 1300, 1304 (Wyo. 1996). If we determine that the statute is clear and 
unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the statute. 
Id.

 

[¶10] The appellants argue 
that the plain language of § 6-2-501(f)(ii) creates a new crime of "battery 
against a household member."  They 
maintain that the language "[a] person convicted of a third or subsequent 
offense under this subsection" means that, before an individual can be convicted 
under § 6-2-501(f)(ii), he must have previously been convicted one or more times 
under subsection (f).  They contend 
that, because their previous convictions were under § 6-2-501(b), they cannot be 
punished under § 6-2-501(f)(ii).

 

[¶11] If we were to accept 
the appellants' argument, we would be rendering § 6-2-501(f)(ii) meaningless 
because we would be ignoring the fact that subsection (f) cannot be applied to a 
first-time offender. Under this point of view, § 6-2-501(f)(ii) could never 
apply because the requisite first offense could never occur. After examining § 
6-2-501 as a whole, we conclude that it is not ambiguous.  Subsections (a) and (b) define the 
crimes of simple assault and battery. Subsections (c) and (d) enumerate the 
potential punishments which the crimes of simple assault and battery carry for 
first-time offenders and for second-time or subsequent offenders when the 
victims are not household members. Subsections (e) and (f) enhance the 
punishment for individuals who commit simple assault or battery two or more 
times against household members.

 

[¶12] We hold that § 
6-2-501(f)(ii) applies when the accused is presently accused of battering a 
household member and has previously been convicted one or more times of 
battering a household member. The phrase "offense under this subsection" merely 
means that the battery offenses being used to place the most recent charge 
within the enhancement provision must have all been against household members. 
It does not, as the appellants suggest, create a new offense. This determination 
that § 6-2-501(f) is merely a sentence enhancement provision rather than being a 
new independent "battery against a household member" offense is supported by the 
introductory paragraph of the assault and battery - domestic violence act: "AN 
ACT relating to crimes and offenses; providing enhanced penalties for assault 
and battery against household members; providing for an effective date." 1996 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 91 at 291 (emphasis added).

 

[¶13] Because all the 
previous convictions were for battering household members, the appellants were 
properly charged under § 6-2-501(f)(ii). The district court, therefore, did not 
err when it denied the appellants' motions to dismiss.

 

[¶14] 
Affirmed.