Case Title: Blankinship v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-271

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Blankinship v. State1999 WY 17974 P.2d 377Case Number: 97-271Decided: 02/24/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

John 
BLANKINSHIP, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

                                

Appeal from the District Court, 
Laramie County.

 

    Sylvia L. Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Monique McBride, 
Student Intern, Representing Appellant.

     
Gay Woodhouse, Chief Deputy Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy 
Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and 
Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Representing 
Appellee.

 

    Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY & GOLDEN, JJ.; and TAYLOR, RET. J.

 

    
MACY, Justice.

   
[¶1]    Appellant 
John Blankinship appeals from the judgment and sentence which was entered after 
he pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing a controlled substance to a 
minor and three counts of taking indecent liberties with a 
minor.

 

 [¶2]     We affirm but remand 
for the limited purpose stated in this opinion.

 

                               
ISSUES

 

[¶3]  Blankinship requests our review of the 
following issues:

 

    
ISSUE I

 

Whether the trial court violated the appellant's due 
process rights by failing to make a specific finding regarding controverted 
facts in the presentence investigation report in accordance with rule 
32(a)(3)(C), W.R. Cr. P. before using these in sentencing the 
appellant.

 

    
ISSUE II

 

Whether the district court abused its discretion by 
denying the appellant's motion to dismiss . . . two indecent liberties counts of 
the information because they were filed in violation of rule 5(c), W.R. Cr. P.[ 
]

 

  

                             
FACTS1

 

  [¶4]      Blankinship was initially charged with 
three counts of delivering marihuana and, by a separate information, two counts 
of taking indecent liberties with a minor. These charges resulted from an 
incident that occurred on November 25, 1995, which involved Blankinship, a 
fourteen-year-old boy, and a fifteen-year-old boy.

 

  [¶5]      Blankinship made his initial appearance 
on November 29, 1995.  A preliminary 
hearing was scheduled for December 5, 1995, but Blankinship waived that hearing, 
anticipating that he would enter into favorable plea negotiations with the 
prosecution.  Blankinship was 
released on bond.

 

  [¶6]      The prosecution subsequently informed 
Blankinship that the indecent liberties case was grossly undercharged and that 
new, more appropriate charges would be filed. It filed a motion to dismiss the 
indecent liberties case. Blankinship asserted that he had entered into an 
agreement with the prosecution wherein he agreed to plead guilty to one count of taking 
indecent liberties and one count of delivering marihuana in exchange for the 
dismissal of the remaining charges. The prosecution contested the existence of a 
plea agreement. On December 18, 1995, the district court granted the 
prosecution's motion to dismiss the indecent liberties 
charges.

 

  [¶7]      Blankinship filed a motion on January 5, 
1996, for specific performance of the alleged plea agreement. On February 2, 
1996, after holding a hearing on the matter, the district court found that an 
agreement had not been reached and remanded the delivery charges to the county 
court for a preliminary hearing.  It 
also rescinded the order dismissing the indecent liberties charges and remanded 
that case to the county court for "further disposition."

 

  [¶8]      A preliminary hearing on the indecent 
liberties case was scheduled for February 26, 1996, but, on February 23, 1996, 
the prosecution moved to dismiss the information because it intended to file 
more appropriate charges. The county court granted the motion and dismissed the 
charges without prejudice.  Blankinship objected to the dismissal, claiming that 
it should have been with prejudice because he had not been given a preliminary 
hearing within the twenty-day limit required by WYO. R.CRIM. P. 5(c). Following 
a hearing, the county court denied Blankinship's motion. Blankinship filed a 
motion for reconsideration, which the county court also 
denied.

 

  [¶9]      The prosecution filed a new criminal 
information on April 3, 1996, which charged Blankinship with two counts of 
delivering a controlled substance to a minor, two counts of second-degree sexual 
assault, and three counts of taking indecent liberties.  Blankinship was arrested, and he was 
released on bond after his initial appearance in the county court on April 9, 
1996. A preliminary hearing was held on April 16, 1996, and Blankinship was 
bound over to the district court on all seven counts.

 

  [¶10] 
  Blankinship filed various 
motions including one in which he reiterated his WYO. R.CRIM. P. 5(c) argument. 
The district court denied the motions, finding that the dismissal was properly 
without prejudice and that, therefore, the prosecution was free to refile the 
same charges.

 

  [¶11] 
  At Blankinship's May 31, 
1996, arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to each count, but, on March 10, 1997, 
he entered unconditional guilty pleas to the two counts of delivering a 
controlled substance to a minor and to the three counts of taking indecent 
liberties with a minor. The two counts of second-degree sexual assault were 
dismissed.2

 

  [¶12] 
  The district court 
sentenced Blankinship to serve three consecutive terms of not less than four and 
one-half years nor more than six years each in the Wyoming State Penitentiary 
for the three counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor. For the two 
counts of delivering a controlled substance to a minor, the district court 
sentenced Blankinship to serve two terms of not less than two years nor more 
than four years each. The delivery sentences were to be served concurrently with 
one another but consecutively to the sentences for the indecent liberties 
charges. Blankinship moved to reopen the sentencing hearing, but the district 
court denied his motion. Blankinship appeals to this 
Court.

 

                             
DISCUSSION

 

  A. 
Specific Findings

 

  [¶13] 
  Blankinship claims that the 
district court violated his due process rights by failing to make specific 
findings regarding controverted facts in the presentence investigation report 
pursuant to WYO. R.CRIM. P. 32(a)(3)(C). Specifically, he complains about the 
absence of findings regarding a victim impact statement by BN, who was not a 
victim in this case, and the inclusion of a charge of armed robbery, which he 
disputes ever occurred. The state counters than Blankinship's claim of error 
must fail because the district court did not rely on BN's statement or any 
controverted information in the presentence investigation report when it 
sentenced Blankinship.

 

    WYO. R.CRIM. P. 32(a)(3)(C) 
provides:

 

(C) If the comments of the defendant and the 
defendant's counsel or testimony or other information introduced by them allege 
any factual inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report or the summary of 
the report or part thereof, the court shall, as to each matter controverted, 
make:

 

        
                
(i) A finding as to the allegation; or

 

(ii) A determination that no such finding is 
necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in 
sentencing. A written record of such findings and determinations shall be 
appended to and accompany any copy of the presentence investigation report 
thereafter made available to penal institutions.

 

  [¶14] 
  The district court did not 
make specific findings regarding controverted facts in the presentence 
investigation report in accordance with WYO. R.CRIM. P. 32(a)(3)(C). Having 
demonstrated procedural error, however, Blankinship must also show prejudice 
under "circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or 
conduct which offends the public sense of fair play." Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo. 1990). See also Wayt v. State, 912 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Wyo. 
1996).  Furthermore, Blankinship 
carries the burden to "establish that the sentencing judge in fact rested the 
sentence on false or improper premises." Smallwood v. State, 771 P.2d 798, 802 
(Wyo. 1989).3

 

  [¶15] 
  Blankinship filed his 
objections to the presentence investigation report prior to the sentencing 
hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that it had read 
the presentence investigation report and had considered Blankinship's written 
objections to it. Before pronouncing a sentence, the district court enumerated 
the factors it considered to be important in sentencing 
Blankinship:

 

THE COURT: Well, the essential facts of the matter 
are, as both counsel have indicated, although they vary considerably to the, I 
guess, nature and extent of each of these offenses, that is, the State contends 
that they occurred in a more deliberate, egregious and extensive fashion than 
the defense does, which I understand to be a characterization of these incidents 
as certainly not of minimal importance. But that they do not rise to the level 
of egregiousness that the State contends, and I don't know that we would ever 
get a very clear picture of precisely what happened and in what chronology. But 
some of these essential facts, I think, are clear enough and actually not even 
in dispute. There isn't any dispute but what Mr. Blankinship provided what he 
thought was LSD to these young boys. He made alcohol available and that they 
did, in fact, ingest some quantity of both of those 
substances.

 

Now, they were, as has been pointed out, 14 and 15 
years old at the time. That is, of course, very young and that sort of thing. 
And since it's again against the law to possess or to use or to deliver LSD, 
that would be a serious enough offense no matter what the age of the 
participants. But in this case where 
they are 14 and 15 years of age respectively, it is particularly 
serious.

 

And then the three separate counts of indecent 
liberties with the minor boys. Now, again there seems to be some dispute as to 
exactly the nature and extent of that sexual contact and activity, but that it 
did occur, and that there were at least three separate incidents of it isn't 
really in dispute.

 

There is the defendant's background, of course, that 
is of concern. That is extensive. That is, his previous involvement with the 
criminal law.  And as in most cases 
it's difficult to tell from the amount of information available in the records 
what the facts were of the various offenses, what level of seriousness they 
attained, and in some of the cases even what the disposition is. Many of them 
were dismissed, so it's hard to know in reading the record like this whether 
they were dismissed because someone decided the charges weren't worth pursuing 
or there was insufficient evidence or perhaps there was - they were dismissed as 
part of a disposition of other charges. One just can't 
know.

 

But there are some of the prior incidents that are 
clear. There was the snatching of a woman's purse with a three-year sentence 
resulting. That happened in Nevada. That goes back some time, back to 1977. But 
there are numerous offenses after that, of course.

 

And the one that the State touched on here, of 
course, is important and unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor, which Mr. 
Blankinship pled guilty. According to this, 260 days in jail or - well, it says 
360 days jail suspended, I can't tell clearly what that sentence is. But the 
point is there was a guilty plea for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor in 
which it was alleged by the victim, at least the victim stated that the 
defendant forced her to have sex with him after she consumed alcohol and smoked 
marijuana which he gave to her. That, of course, is distressingly similar to the 
facts that we have here except that it involved a young girl rather than 
boys.

 

            . . . 
.

 

THE COURT: There was obstructing  resisting police 
officer. Disposition is unknown here. Public intoxication and disturbance in 
Cheyenne. Indecent liberties with a minor in '94, it was dismissed, it was 
dismissed March 10th of '95, so -

 

            . . . 
.

 

THE COURT: Three counts of delivery of marijuana in 
1995 dismissed. Then, of course, the current offense, the one that brings Mr. 
Blankinship here today, or the one for which his counsel pointed out he entered 
a plea of guilty.

 

So those are the things that I believe are important. 
I know there's considerable difference of opinion between counsel on the 
significance of some of this other material, but I think those are the essential 
points.

 

  [¶16] 
  Although we do not condone 
the failure to make specific findings under WYO. R.CRIM. P. 32(a)(3)(C), the 
record sufficiently reveals that the district court did not rely on the 
information with which Blankinship takes issue. Blankinship has not established 
abuse of discretion nor has he demonstrated prejudicial harm. Accordingly, the 
failure to attach specific findings requires only a limited remand. See Mehring 
v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1117-18 (Wyo. 
1993).

 

  

  B. 
Preliminary Hearing

 

  [¶17] 
  Blankinship contends that 
the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss two of 
the indecent liberties charges, arguing that they should have originally been 
dismissed with prejudice because he did not receive a timely preliminary hearing 
on them. The state insists that Blankinship waived his right to challenge the 
district court's denial of his motion by entering unconditional guilty pleas to 
those charges.

 

  [¶18] 
  By pleading guilty, a 
criminal defendant admits all essential elements of the charged crime, thereby 
waiving all nonjurisdictional defenses. Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359, 1361 
(Wyo. 1993). We have said that jurisdictional defenses and objections 
involve

 

"the very power of the State to bring the defendant 
into court to answer the charge against him." Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 
30, 94 S. Ct. 2098, 2103, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 636 (1974).  Jurisdictional defects include: 
unconstitutionality of the statute defining the crime pled to, 
failure of the indictment or 
information to state an offense, and double jeopardy.

 

Davila v. State, 831 P.2d 204, 205 (Wyo. 1992) (citation omitted). Blankinship does not assert that the 
indecent liberties statute is unconstitutional, he does not allege that a double 
jeopardy violation occurred, and he does not claim that the information failed 
to state an offense. Although Blankinship frames his WYO. R.CRIM. P. 5(c) 
argument in such a way as to assert a jurisdictional defect, the failure to 
afford a timely preliminary hearing does not involve the very power of the 
prosecution to bring him into court.

 

  [¶19] 
  WYO. R.CRIM. P. 48(a) 
allows the prosecutor to dismiss charges at any time before trial without 
preventing the refiling of the charges at a later date absent a clear showing of 
prejudice. Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632, 639-40 (Wyo. 1996).  Blankinship has not demonstrated that 
prejudice resulted. The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether 
probable cause exists to justify a restraint of liberty. Madrid v. State, 910 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Wyo. 1996). Although WYO. R.CRIM. P. 5(c) requires that this 
determination occur within a prescribed period of time, the failure to hold a 
timely hearing does not mandate dismissal of the charges with prejudice.  Rather, the proper remedy is dismissal 
of the charges and the discharge of the defendant from custody or from the terms 
of his bond release. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 14.2(g) (1984). The prosecution is not, however, precluded from 
refiling the charges when it is able to provide a timely preliminary hearing. 
Id.

 

  [¶20] 
  Blankinship has not 
provided authority which persuades us that the failure to provide a timely 
preliminary hearing mandates a dismissal of the charges with prejudice under 
WYO. R.CRIM. P. 5(c). Nor has he directed us to authority to support his 
argument that such a failure strips the district court of its jurisdiction to 
hear the case. By pleading guilty, Blankinship admitted all essential elements 
of the indecent liberties charges. We will not allow him to now complain that a 
timely probable cause determination was not made after he has admitted to the existence of probable cause by virtue 
of his guilty pleas.

 

"A guilty plea [should be] the end of a criminal 
case, not a gateway to future litigation. More than a confession, a guilty plea 
signals defendant's 'intention not to litigate the question of his guilt, and 
necessarily involves the surrender of certain constitutional rights.' "  People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, [154], 478 N.E.2d 755, 757 (1985), quoting People v. Lynn, 28 N.Y.2d 196, 201-02, 321 N.Y.S.2d 74, 269 N.E.2d 794 
(1971).

 

  Sword v. State, 746 P.2d 423, 426 (Wyo. 
1987). The district court properly dismissed the indecent liberties charges 
without prejudice.

 

  [¶21] 
  Affirmed but remanded for 
the district court to make specific findings pursuant to WYO. R.CRIM. P. 
32(a)(3)(C).

 

        

FOOTNOTES

1 Most of 
the court record, as it pertains to the original charges, was not included in 
the record which was transmitted to this Court. Instead, it begins with the 
filing of the information charging Blankinship with two counts of delivering a 
controlled substance to a minor, two counts of second-degree sexual assault, and 
three counts of taking indecent liberties.  
The issues in this case involve proceedings which occurred prior to the 
filing of this information. We, therefore, were forced to glean many important 
facts from memoranda filed by the parties instead of from official court 
documents. Given that the memoranda were generally congruous, we were able to do 
that in this case. It goes without saying, however, that this Court should 
obtain its information from the official documents rather than from memoranda 
wherein advocates draft facts which may be incomplete, inconsistent, and/or 
inaccurate. We, therefore, take this opportunity to admonish the parties for 
designating an incomplete record for appellate review.

 2 The 
judgment and sentence erroneously reflects the dismissal of counts IV and V 
rather than of counts III and VII.

 3 This 
Court has held that, although Johnson and Smallwood were decided prior to the 
adoption of the current Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, they apply in our 
review of due process challenges brought under the current WYO. R.CRIM. P. 32. 
Wayt, 912 P.2d  at 1109; Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1115 (Wyo. 
1993).