Case Title: JM v. Department of Family Services

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-13

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-08-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
JM v. Department of Family Services1996 WY 108922 P.2d 219Case Number: 96-13Decided: 08/16/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
JM,

 Appellant 
(Contestant),

v.

DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY 
SERVICES,

 Appellee (Respondent).

Appeal from The District 
Court, Sweetwater County, Jere Ryckman, J.

John M. 
Scorsine, Burns, and Andrew McConnell, Student Intern, Laramie, for 
Appellant.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and Cynthia L. 
Harnett, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant JM (the 
father) appealed to the district court from the decision entered by Appellee 
Department of Family Services.1 This Court accepted certification 
of this case pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

[¶2]      We reverse the 
department's decision.

ISSUES

[¶3]      The father 
presents the following issues for our review:

1.         When 
the Department of Family Services takes adverse action against an individual and 
provides the individual a "fair hearing" upon which party, the individual or the 
agency, do the burdens of persuasion and production fall?

2.         Are 
the Rules of The Department of Family Services, which provide that a "fair 
hearing" afforded a party aggrieved by Agency action is limited to the issue of 
whether or not the Agency acted in accordance with law and its rules, 
constitutional under the Federal and State Constitutions?

3.         
In a "fair hearing" what is the evidentiary standard, preponderance of 
the evidence or clear and convincing evidence?

4.         In 
this case, was the Final Decision of the Agency contrary to the evidence and to 
law?

FACTS

[¶4]      On October 19, 
1994, a report was made to the agency that the father had physically abused his 
four sons. The agency investigated the abuse allegations against the father and 
substantiated the reports as to all four boys. The father's name was placed on a 
central registry of persons who were the subjects of child abuse complaints. 
After receiving notice of the agency's determination, the father requested that 
a contested case hearing be held.

[¶5]      The contested 
case hearing was held in May 1995 before a hearing examiner from the Office of 
Administrative Hearings. In his recommended decision, the hearing examiner 
determined that the child abuse reports as to the three younger boys had not 
been substantiated but that it was more likely than not that the father had 
abused his eldest son. The hearing examiner concluded, however, that "there 
[was] a low likelihood of imminent harm to [the] children."

[¶6]      On August 21, 
1995, the department issued its final decision in the case, rejecting many of 
the hearing examiner's recommendations. The department concluded that the father 
bore the burden of proof and that its role in the case was limited to 
determining whether the agency had acted arbitrarily or capriciously, had abused 
its discretion, or had acted contrary to the law. The department ruled that all 
the abuse allegations against the father had been substantiated.

[¶7]      The father 
appealed to the district court from the department's final decision. The 
district court certified certain questions to this Court. We declined to answer 
the district court's certified questions but agreed to review the entire case 
under W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

DISCUSSION

A. Standard 
of Review

[¶8]      When we are 
reviewing cases which have been certified to us pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b), 
we apply the appellate standards which are applicable to a reviewing court of 
the first instance. Hepp v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division, 881 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Wyo. 1994). When we are conducting our 
review,

[o]ur task is to examine 
the entire record to determine whether substantial evidence supported the 
hearing examiner's findings. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the 
hearing examiner when substantial evidence supports his decision. Substantial 
evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of 
the agency's conclusions.

Latimer v. 
Rissler & McMurry Co., 902 P.2d 706, 708-09 (Wyo. 1995) (citations 
omitted).

We do not, however, defer 
to an agency's conclusions of law. "Instead, if the `correct rule of law has not 
been invoked and correctly applied, . . . the agency's errors are to be 
corrected.'" Thunder Basin Coal Company v. Study, 866 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Wyo. 
1994) (quoting Devous v. Wyoming State Board of Medical Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 
414 (Wyo. 1993)).

Celotex 
Corporation v. Andren, 917 P.2d 178, 180 (Wyo. 1996).

B. Burden of 
Proof

[¶9]      The hearing 
examiner determined that the agency had the burden of proof at the contested 
case hearing. When the case was submitted to the department for a final 
decision, the department ruled that the father bore the burden of proof. On 
appeal, the father argues that the department erred by determining that the 
burden of proof was on him.

[¶10]   "Allocation of the burden of proof 
is a matter of law." Corman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 1996). The general rule in administrative law 
is that, unless a statute otherwise assigns the burden of proof, the proponent 
of an order has the burden of proof. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.8 
(2d ed. 1984). "In general, an agency is the proponent of its orders, while an 
applicant for benefits or for a license is the proponent in eligibility 
determinations." 4 JACOB A. STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 24.02 at 24-21 
(1987).

[¶11]   We considered the complex 
burden-of-proof subject in Casper Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Unemployment 
Insurance Commission of Department of Employment of the State of Wyoming, 845 P.2d 387, 393 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting 1 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. 
MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 66 (1977)):

The general term, burden 
of proof, identifies two separate legal doctrines: the burden of persuasion; and 
the burden of production, also termed the burden of producing evidence or the 
burden of going forward with the evidence. The burden of persuasion is attached 
to the party who "runs the risk of nonpersuasion." During a trial, this means if 
the "party with the burden of persuasion has not sustained it by a fair 
preponderance of the evidence - if the evidence is in equipoise or the opposing 
party's preponderates - the party with the burden must fail." The burden of 
producing evidence is "the obligation of the party to present at the appropriate 
time . . . evidence on the issue involved of sufficient substance to permit the 
fact finder to act upon it." The burden of producing evidence shifts during the 
presentation of evidence. The burden of persuasion, which generally does not 
shift unless by the operation of a legal presumption, becomes operative only 
after all the evidence is submitted.

 

[¶12]   In determining which party bears 
the burden of proof, we consider the applicable substantive statutes. Id.; see 
also STEIN, supra, § 24.02 at 24-31 to 24-32. WYO. STAT. §§ 14-3-201 to -215 
(1994 & Supp. 1996) govern child abuse cases such as this one. Section 
14-3-201 relates the general purpose of the article:

The purpose of W.S. 
14-3-201 through 14-3-215 is to protect the best interest of the child . . ., to 
further offer protective services when necessary in order to prevent any harm to 
the child or any other children living in the home . . ., to protect children . 
. . from abuse or neglect which jeopardize their health or welfare, to stabilize 
the home environment and to preserve family life whenever possible.

This section 
clearly states that protecting children's well-being is the paramount purpose of 
the pertinent statutory provisions. Section 14-3-201 also states, however, that 
it is important to maintain family life whenever it is possible. Other sections 
within the article recognize that child abuse accusations are very serious and, 
therefore, seek to maintain confidentiality during investigations and to ensure 
that the names of those who have been improperly accused are cleared. See §§ 
14-3-212 to -214. We conclude that, in acknowledging the seriousness of child 
abuse accusations, the legislature intended for the general rule which places 
the burden of proof upon the agency to apply. The agency was the proponent of an 
order holding that the child abuse allegations against the father had been 
substantiated and, therefore, had both the initial burden of production and the 
ultimate burden of persuasion. The burden of producing evidence, of course, 
shifts as the evidence is being presented in the course of a contested case 
hearing. Casper Iron & Metal, Inc., 845 P.2d  at 393.

[¶13]   Public policy also supports placing 
the burden of proof upon the agency. The relationship between a parent and his 
children is an important fundamental right. Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 
1147 (Wyo. 1995); DS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services 
(Parental Rights to X, Y, and Z), 607 P.2d 911, 918 (Wyo. 1980). That 
fundamental right may not be infringed upon lightly. If the agency has truly 
substantiated the child abuse reports, it should not be reluctant to assume the 
burden of proof at the hearing.

[¶14]   The parties discussed the language 
of the various administrative rules that, they argue, apply in determining which 
party bears the burden of proof. Their analysis of the regulatory language is 
unavailing. The father looks to the rules which pertain to the Department of 
Family Services. Although those rules do include a section which addresses fair 
hearings, they do not address the burden-of-proof issue. RULES OF THE DEPARTMENT 
OF FAMILY SERVICES, DIVISION OF YOUTH SERVICES Chapter I, Section 9 
(1994).

[¶15]   Both parties refer to the 
procedures for conducting contested case proceedings promulgated by the 
Department of Health and Social Services. We have reviewed those rules and 
conclude that they do not affect our decision in this case. The rules pertain to 
cases in which the hearing examiner is an employee of the agency or is an 
individual who was specifically chosen by the agency to be the hearing examiner 
in a particular case. See PROCEDURES FOR THE CONDUCT OF CONTESTED CASE HEARINGS 
Chapter I, Section 4(g).

[¶16]   The hearing examiner in this case 
was not an employee of the agency, and he was not chosen by the agency. Instead, 
the case was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings, and that office 
appointed a hearing examiner to conduct the contested case hearing. The rules of 
the Office of Administrative Hearings state that they

shall apply to the 
conduct of administrative contested cases before the Office of Administrative 
Hearings, regardless of the identity of the particular agency whose action or 
inaction is being contested. These rules shall take precedence over all 
referring agency hearing rules. . . .

RULES FOR 
CONTESTED CASE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
HEARINGS Chapter 1, Section 4 (1995). The procedural rules for the Office of 
Administrative Hearings, therefore, applied in this case. Those rules do not 
affect our decision because they do not allocate the burden of proof. 

C. Standard 
of Proof

[¶17]   The hearing examiner determined 
that the appropriate standard of proof was the preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard. In its final decision, the department apparently applied the 
substantial evidence standard in deciding that the child abuse reports had been 
substantiated. The father argues that the proper standard of proof was either 
the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard or the clear-and-convincing-evidence 
standard.

[¶18]   The normal standard of proof in 
administrative hearings is the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. SCHWARTZ, 
supra, § 7.9 at 360-61; STEIN, supra, § 24.03 at 24-36; see also Martinez v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 917 P.2d 619, 621 (Wyo. 
1996) (applying the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in a worker's 
compensation case). In certain circumstances, such as in professional 
disciplinary hearings, the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard applies. See, 
e.g., Devous v. Wyoming State Board of Medical Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 416 
(Wyo. 1993). The substantial evidence standard does not apply in contested cases 
because it is the standard utilized during judicial review of administrative 
decisions. See WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E) (1990); see also Latimer, 902 P.2d  at 708.

[¶19]   Section 14-3-202(a)(xi) indicates 
that an abuse report is deemed to have been substantiated when the investigation 
reveals that credible evidence exists to support the allegations.

(k) "Credible Evidence" 
means that the available facts when viewed in light of surrounding circumstances 
would cause a reasonable person to believe that a child was abused or neglected. 
In mild cases, determination of abuse or neglect may hinge upon the objective 
degree of risk at which the child's well-being was placed, in addition to 
whether the trauma constituted an isolated incident or part of a 
pattern.

RULES OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES, supra, Chapter I, Section 4(k). Since the 
relevant statutory and regulatory language does not recite any of the 
traditional phraseology associated with the clear-and-convincing-evidence 
standard of proof, that standard does not apply. The rules imply that a weighing 
of the evidence is necessary. The traditional preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard is well suited to this type of weighing process and, therefore, was 
appropriate in this case.

D. The 
Department Rules

[¶20]   The father maintains that the 
Department of Family Services rules which limit the issues in a contested case 
hearing to a determination of whether the agency acted in accordance with law or 
its own rules are unconstitutional. Specifically, the father argues that, by 
limiting the issues at contested case hearings, the department does not provide 
due process of law.

[¶21]   The relevant rules are found in 
Section 9 of the Department of Family Services rules:

(a) Following a 
determination, . . . an alleged perpetrator of abuse and/or neglect who is 
aggrieved by said determination may request a fair hearing by the hearing 
officer provided by the Department if the individual thinks that the Department 
has acted contrary to law or the Division's child protective services rules . . 
.

. . . .

(c) Fair hearings shall 
be conducted in the same manner as other Department fair hearings, except that 
hearings shall be limited to the resolution of only those matters noted in 
Section 9(a).

RULES OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES, supra, Chapter I, Section 9(a), (c). We note that 
the department's final decision does not state that the department was relying 
upon Section 9(a) and (c) in deciding the case. Instead, the decision indicates 
that the department was deciding whether the agency's determination that the 
allegations of child abuse had been substantiated was arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. The department 
was applying the standard for judicial review of administrative decisions. In 
our previous discussion about the appropriate standard of proof, we stated that 
the department incorrectly applied that standard at the contested case hearing. 

[¶22]   In any event, we conclude that 
Section 9(a) and (c) does not comply with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act because it prevents the department from conducting a full review of the 
factual issues at the contested case hearing. The Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act contemplates that agencies will conduct full contested case 
hearings to determine all the relevant factual and legal issues. WYO. STAT. § 
16-3-101(b)(ii) (Supp. 1996) broadly defines a contested case as being "a 
proceeding . . . in which legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are 
required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing." 
Various provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act describe the 
broad scope of contested case hearings and indicate that such proceedings will 
include a determination of all factual and legal issues between the parties. See 
WYO. STAT. §§ 16-3-107 to -112 (1990 & Supp. 1996).

[¶23]   The department acted beyond the 
scope of its statutory authority when it unilaterally limited the issues for 
resolution at the contested case hearing. See Union Telephone Company, Inc. v. 
Wyoming Public Service Commission, 910 P.2d 1362, 1364 (Wyo. 1996). As is our 
practice, we will not address the constitutional issue since we have resolved 
this case on other grounds. State Highway Commission of Wyoming v. 
Sheridan-Johnson Rural Electrification Association, 784 P.2d 588, 591 n. 4 (Wyo. 
1989).

CONCLUSION

[¶24]   We hold that the department acted 
contrary to the law when it placed the burden of proof upon the father, 
determined that the substantial evidence standard applied, and improperly 
limited the issues for resolution at the contested case hearing.

[¶25]   Reversed.

FOOTNOTE

1           
The Department of Family Services had two different roles in this case. 
It was the investigating agency which substantiated the charges against the 
father and acted as the responding party at the contested case hearing. It was 
also the decision-making body that issued the final decision from which the 
father appealed to the district court. In order to avoid confusing the two 
separate roles which the Department of Family Services played in this case, we 
will refer to the Department of Family Services as "the agency" when we are 
discussing its investigating activities and its position as a party at the 
contested case hearing. When we are discussing the entity which issued the final 
decision in this case, we will refer to the Department of Family Services as 
"the department."