Case Title: People v. Corpening

Citation: 

Docket Number: S228258

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2016-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 12/29/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S228258 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D064986 
TORY J. CORPENING, 
) 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SCS258343 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Because our Penal Code is so expansive, the same conduct can violate more 
than one criminal statute.  When that happens, Penal Code section 654, 
subdivision (a),1 prohibits ―punish[ment] under more than one provision‖ for any 
―act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of 
law.‖  The defendant in this case was convicted of both carjacking and robbery 
based on the same forceful taking of a vehicle.  What we must decide is whether 
the forceful taking of this vehicle –– the same taking that, according to the 
prosecution, accomplished the crimes of both robbery and carjacking ––
 constitutes a single physical act subject to the prohibition on multiple punishment 
under section 654.  Since the same action completed the actus reus for each of 
these two crimes, we hold that section 654 forbids punishment under both 
provisions.  
                                              
1 
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The relevant facts are not in dispute, and provided the basis for defendant‘s 
guilty plea.  In the early morning hours of July 22, 2012, Walter Schmidt, Sr., and 
his son loaded their van with valuable coins they were planning to sell at a San 
Diego swap meet where Schmidt, a rare coin dealer, operated a booth.  The van 
was parked in the driveway in front of Schmidt‘s home and contained roughly 
$70,000 worth of coins.  With the van loaded, Schmidt‘s son went to lock up the 
house.  Schmidt meanwhile got into the driver‘s seat and prepared to pull away.  
At that moment, a man approached the vehicle pointing a gun at Schmidt‘s face 
and yelling, ―Get out of the car or I‘ll shoot you.‖  Schmidt complied.  But as the 
man climbed into the vehicle, Schmidt tried unsuccessfully to wrestle the gun 
away.  The man again pointed the gun at Schmidt, who began retreating from the 
van.  As the man climbed into the van a second time, Schmidt once again tried to 
stop the robbery, lunging for the gun.  This time, however, the man quickly threw 
the vehicle into reverse gear and began pulling away.  With the van rolling 
backwards, Schmidt grabbed onto the steering wheel.  He was dragged 
approximately 18 feet down the driveway before he lost his grip and fell to the 
pavement.  The man drove some 50 yards down the street before picking up a 
confederate.  Those two were then followed by several other accomplices to an 
apartment complex where the group began unloading the boxes of coins.  In one of 
the trailing vehicles was defendant Tory J. Corpening, Jr., who, according to one 
accomplice, had hatched the scheme to rob Schmidt after following him home one 
day from the swap meet.   
After Schmidt called the police, officers arrested some members of the 
group near the apartment complex.  Corpening, who had fled when the police 
arrived, eventually turned himself in.  Corpening pleaded guilty to carjacking 
(§ 215, subd. (a)), robbery (§ 211), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. 
3 
(a)(1)), receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), and witness intimidation 
(§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1)).  The basis for Corpening‘s plea on the first two charges, 
according to the record, were allegations that his accomplice ―did unlawfully take 
a motor vehicle in the possession of Walter Schmidt by force and fear,‖ and ―did 
unlawfully and by means of force and fear take personal property from the person, 
possession, and immediate presence of Walter Schmidt.‖  The record also 
indicates that the personal property in question was inside the vehicle at the time 
the vehicle was forcefully taken and was not removed from the vehicle before or 
during the incident that resulted in its forceful taking.   
In its sentencing brief, the prosecution recommended that the trial court 
stay the robbery sentence, because –– in the prosecution‘s view –– section 654 
barred punishment for the robbery charge in addition to punishment for the 
carjacking charge.  The trial court rejected this recommendation.  Without any 
elaboration, the court concluded based on the foregoing facts that ―[the robbery] is 
a separate offense [from] the carjacking.‖  The court sentenced Corpening to six 
years and eight months in prison — a term that included five years for carjacking 
plus a consecutive one-year term for robbery.  Corpening also received eight 
months for witness intimidation.  Pursuant to section 654, the court stayed the 
remaining punishments for assault with a deadly weapon and receiving stolen 
property.  
On appeal, Corpening argued that section 654 barred his consecutive one-
year term for robbery, because the robbery and carjacking comprised a single 
physical act.  The Court of Appeal was not persuaded.  Relying on Neal v. State of 
California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19 (Neal), the appellate court understood the 
inquiry to turn on the intent or objective of the actor — specifically, whether the 
defendant‘s course of conduct reflected but one objective.  The Court of Appeal 
then held that the trial court made an implicit finding that the robbery and 
4 
carjacking were separate acts with different objectives, even though, the appellate 
court acknowledged, the crimes ―arose out of the same transaction.‖   
Corpening petitioned for review.  He claimed that our more recent decision 
in People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350 (Jones), which the parties had failed to 
cite and the Court of Appeal apparently did not consider, required that the 
punishment for his robbery conviction be stayed.  Jones clarified that the inquiry 
into whether a defendant‘s criminal conduct reflects a single intent or objective, 
pursuant to Neal, is relevant only after it has been determined that such conduct 
involves more than ―a single act.‖  (Id. at pp. 359-360.)  We therefore granted 
review and transferred the matter back to the appellate court so it could apply the 
Jones framework.  The Court of Appeal again affirmed Corpening‘s sentence.  The 
court explained that Jones involved ―one act of possessing one firearm‖ but here 
there were ―several discrete physical acts‖ necessary to complete the crimes of 
robbery and carjacking:  ―forcing the victim out of the car, struggling with him as 
he attempted to resist, then again struggling with the victim, [and] then driving off 
with the van.‖  Having determined this to be a course of conduct case, rather than 
a single physical act case, the appellate court applied ―the multiple objectives test‖ 
from Neal.  The Court of Appeal then found ―sufficient evidence in this record 
from which the [trial] court could have concluded there were two intents, close in 
time‖ — one intent to steal the coins and a second to take the van for purposes of 
escaping the scene.  We granted review once more. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Section 654, subdivision (a), provides:  ―An act or omission that is 
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under 
the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in 
no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.‖  So 
5 
if the forceful taking of Schmidt‘s vehicle constitutes a single ―act,‖ then section 
654 forbids Corpening from being punished for robbery in addition to carjacking.2   
Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under 
section 654 requires a two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an ―act 
or omission‖ may include not only a discrete physical act but also a course of 
conduct encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective.  (See Neal, 
supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 19; People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639.)  We first 
consider if the different crimes were completed by a ―single physical act.‖  (Jones, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 358.)  If so, the defendant may not be punished more than 
once for that act.  Only if we conclude that the case involves more than a single act 
— i.e., a course of conduct — do we then consider whether that course of conduct 
reflects a single ―intent and objective‖ or multiple intents and objectives.  (Id. at 
p. 359; see also People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191, 199 (Mesa) [―Our case law 
has found multiple criminal objectives to be a predicate for multiple punishment 
only in circumstances that involve, or arguably involve, multiple acts‖].)  At step 
one, courts examine the facts of the case to determine whether multiple 
convictions are based upon a single physical act.  (See Mesa, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 
p. 196.)  When those facts are undisputed — as they are here — the application of 
section 654 raises a question of law we review de novo.  (See People v. Harrison 
                                              
2 
Section 215, subdivision (c), makes clear that a person may be charged and 
convicted under both the robbery and carjacking statutes.  It also emphasizes that 
―no defendant may be punished‖ under both laws ―for the same act which 
constitutes a violation of both.‖  (Ibid.)  In this way, the Legislature removed any 
doubt that section 654 applies to these two crimes when they arise from a single 
physical act.  We therefore analyze the multiple punishment issue in this case 
relying on the well-settled principles governing section 654.  (See People v. 
Dominguez (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 417-418 (Dominguez).) 
6 
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335 [―the applicability of [section 654] to conceded facts is 
a question of law‖]; accord, People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 552, fn. 5.) 
Precisely how to resolve whether multiple convictions are indeed based on 
a single physical act has often left courts with more questions than answers.  (See 
Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 358 [acknowledging ―that what is a single physical 
act might not always be easy to ascertain‖].)  Neither the text nor structure of 
section 654 resolves when exactly a single act begins or ends, for example, or how 
to take account of the fact that virtually any given physical action may, in 
principle, be divided into multiple subsets that each fit the colloquial definition of 
an ―act.‖   
Because we had to survey some of this terrain in Jones to address a related 
question, we look to that case for guidance.  The defendant in Jones had been 
sentenced concurrently for three crimes:  ―possession of a firearm by a felon,‖ 
―carrying a readily accessible concealed and unregistered firearm,‖ and ―carrying 
an unregistered loaded firearm in public.‖  (Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 352.)  
We held that possessing a particular firearm on a single occasion constituted a 
single physical act that ―may be punished only once under section 654.‖  (Id. at 
p. 357.)  We did so because, as the prosecutor had acknowledged, ― ‗the same 
exact conduct‘ ‖ accomplished the actus reus — or act requirement — for each of 
the relevant crimes.  (Id. at p. 359; see Black‘s Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 44, 
col. 1 [defining ―actus reus‖ as ―[t]he wrongful deed that comprises the physical 
components of a crime‖].)  In particular, it was the defendant‘s possession of a 
specific firearm on a specific date that, according to the charging document, 
completed the actus reus for all three crimes.  (See Jones, at p. 359 [―The record 
establishes that the jury convicted defendant of each crime due to his being caught 
with the gun in the car on May 26, 2008, not due to any antecedent possession.  
The amended information alleged that defendant committed all three crimes on or 
7 
about May 26, 2008, the day he was arrested, and the verdicts all found defendant 
guilty as charged.‖].)  In the absence of any distinct actions that could be 
associated with the actus reus for each of those crimes, we held that the 
defendant‘s concurrent sentences were improper.  (Id. at pp. 353, 360.) 
Jones expressly overruled In re Hayes (1969) 70 Cal.2d 604 (Hayes).  The 
defendant in Hayes had been sentenced for violating two different penal statutes:  
driving while intoxicated and driving with an invalid license.  (Id. at p. 605.)  We 
held that section 654 did not prohibit multiple punishment for the two crimes.  
(Hayes, 70 Cal.2d at p. 611.)  In Jones, however, we found Hayes contrary to the 
plain language of section 654, which bars multiple punishment for any ― ‗act . . . 
that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law.‘ ‖  (See Jones, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 356.)  Driving while intoxicated and driving while on an 
expired license, we explained, are a ―single physical act.‖  (Id. at p. 355.)  Because 
the same physical action — the defendant‘s driving — completed the actus reus of 
each charged crime, that action amounted to a single physical act under section 
654. 
A similar principle underlies our decision in Mesa, which is also 
instructive.  What we held is that section 654 did not permit punishment for active 
participation in a street gang in addition to the defendant‘s permissible 
punishments for assault with a firearm and possession of a firearm by a felon.  
(Mesa, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 201.)  We reached this conclusion because the crime 
of active participation in a street gang requires ―willful promotion, furtherance, or 
assistance in felonious conduct by members of the gang.‖  (Id. at p. 200.)  That 
crime was not completed until the defendant either shot the victims or possessed a 
firearm.  (Ibid. [explaining that mere active participation in a gang and knowledge 
of the gang‘s pattern of criminal activity ―do not complete the offense‖].)  The 
defendant‘s ―shooting the victims or possessing a firearm,‖ we explained, ―was the 
8 
only evidence that he promoted, furthered, or assisted felonious criminal conduct 
by members of the gang.‖  (Ibid.)  Because these actions separately accomplished 
the actus reus for active participation in a gang — and the charging document and 
evidence at trial demonstrated they had done so — shooting the victims and 
possessing the firearm were each treated as single acts barring multiple 
punishment.  (See ibid. [―the information alleged that defendant committed each 
assault and related gang participation offense on the same day; in other words, he 
committed both offenses simultaneously‖].) 
These decisions reflect a common idea:  Whether a defendant will be found 
to have committed a single physical act for purposes of section 654 depends on 
whether some action the defendant is charged with having taken separately 
completes the actus reus for each of the relevant criminal offenses.  (See Jones, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 359-360; Mesa, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 200.)  On these 
facts, the forceful taking of a vehicle on a particular occasion is a single physical 
act under section 654.  The forceful taking of Schmidt‘s van, and the rare coins 
contained therein, completed the actus reus for robbery — the felonious taking of 
another‘s personal property by force.3  Precisely the same action, not a separate 
but related one taken at a separate time or in a distinct fashion, was also the basis 
for the contention that the defendant completed the actus reus for carjacking — the 
felonious taking of another‘s motor vehicle by force.4   It was the same show of 
                                              
3 
―Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of 
another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, 
accomplished by means of force or fear.‖  (§ 211.)  A robbery conviction also 
requires that the defendant ―intend to deprive the victim of the property 
permanently.‖  (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 214.) 
 
4 
― ‗Carjacking‘ is the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the possession 
of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, . . . against his or her 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
9 
force — committed at the same time, by the same person — that yielded for 
Corpening and his coconspirators the rare coins contained within the carjacked 
van, giving rise to the robbery conviction.  Neither offense was accomplished until 
completion of the single forceful taking identified by the prosecution as the basis 
for conviction under the carjacking and robbery statutes.  These circumstances 
render it all but impossible to accept the contrary contention that the forceful 
taking in this case constitutes multiple physical acts for purposes of section 654.  
(Cf. People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 638 [holding that a defendant‘s prior 
felony convictions, ―one for robbery and one for carjacking,‖ did not qualify as 
separate strikes for purposes of sentence enhancement where they ―were based on 
the same act, committed at the same time, against the same victim‖].) 
Applying section 654 to similar facts, the Court of Appeal arrived at the 
same conclusion in Dominguez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 410.  The victim there had 
parked his van near a restaurant where he had planned to eat.  Suddenly, a man 
entered the van through the side sliding door.  The assailant then grabbed the 
victim, pressed what felt to the victim like a gun against the back of his neck, and 
demanded he relinquish everything he had.  After about five minutes, the victim 
handed over two rings and a chain before running away from the vehicle to call 
the police.  The van was missing when the police arrived at the scene; it was later 
recovered less than a mile away.  (Id. at pp. 414-415.) 
A jury then convicted the defendant of both robbery and carjacking.  
(Dominguez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 414.)  The trial court imposed a 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
will and with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person in 
possession of the motor vehicle of his or her possession, accomplished by means 
of force or fear.‖  (§ 215, subd. (a).) 
10 
concurrent sentence for the robbery after concluding, ― ‗out of an abundance of 
caution,‘ ‖ that section 654 barred the sentences from running consecutively.  (Id. 
at p. 416.)  On appeal, the defendant argued, inter alia, that he could be punished 
for only one of the offenses.  (Id. at pp. 416-417.)  The appellate court agreed, 
finding that because ―the carjacking and robbery here constituted ‗the same act,‘ ‖ 
punishment for both would run afoul of section 654.  (Id. at p. 420.)  The court 
explained that the defendant had ―placed a cold metallic object to the back of the 
victim‘s neck and demanded ‗everything he had . . . .‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  ―Simultaneously,‖ 
the court continued, ―the victim handed over his jewelry and van by handing over 
the jewelry and fleeing the van.‖  (Ibid.)  The court held that this specific forceful 
taking — which completed both the robbery and carjacking — was a single 
physical act for purposes of section 654.  (See ibid. [―The long-standing rule is 
that ‗. . . the theft of several articles at one same time constitutes but one offense 
[even where] such articles belong to several different owners.‘ ‖].)  Separate 
punishments were forbidden as a result.  (See ibid. [―the same act was essential to 
both offenses and thus is not separately punishable under Penal Code section 
654‖].)5 
So too here.  The forceful taking of Schmidt‘s van was a single physical act 
for purposes of section 654 because that act simultaneously accomplished the 
actus reus requirement for both the robbery and carjacking.  It matters not that this 
act, just like the acts in Hayes and Dominguez, can be broken down into 
constituent parts.  (See Black‘s Law Dict., supra, at p. 44, col. 1 [actus reus is 
                                              
5 
Because the trial court in Dominguez had also found section 654 applicable, 
the only correction the Court of Appeal made was to stay the robbery sentence, 
rather than allowing it to run concurrently.  (See Dominguez, supra, 38 
Cal.App.4th at p. 420.) 
11 
―[t]he wrongful deed that comprises the physical components of a crime‖ (italics 
added)].)  Indeed, any act can be so subdivided theoretically.  To commit the 
single physical act of driving in Hayes, supra, 70 Cal.2d 604, for example, the 
defendant would have had to enter the vehicle, turn on the ignition, put the car into 
gear, press the accelerator, and steer the vehicle for some distance.  The forceful 
taking in Dominguez, moreover, required the defendant to enter the victim‘s van, 
press a gun against the victim‘s neck, grab him, demand his belongings, wait five 
minutes while the victim removed his rings, collect the jewelry from him, and 
drive away.  But these were nothing more than components of a single physical act 
because none of these acts on their own completed the actus reus required for the 
relevant crimes.  In Dominguez, for example, simply entering the vehicle or 
grabbing the victim completed neither the robbery nor the carjacking.  In this case, 
the Court of Appeal found ―several discrete physical acts‖ were necessary to 
complete the crimes of robbery and carjacking — to wit, ―forcing the victim out of 
the car, struggling with him as he attempted to resist, then again struggling with 
the victim, [and] then driving off with the van.‖  But, as in Dominguez, none of 
these actions on their own completed the actus reus for either robbery or 
carjacking.  Only the forceful taking of the van –– and with it, of the rare coins 
contained therein –– did so.   
Nor does it matter that other criminal acts may have been committed in the 
course of this forceful taking.  For example, the accomplice‘s forcing Schmidt out 
of the vehicle at gunpoint could, alone, give rise to criminal liability.  Indeed, 
Corpening was also convicted of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. 
(a)(1)).  The trial court stayed this conviction under section 654.  But the question 
we must answer is specific to the crimes of robbery and carjacking:  whether both 
of these crimes were accomplished by means of a single forceful taking, thereby 
precluding multiple punishment.  That other crimes may also have been 
12 
accomplished by that act or one of its component parts simply means the 
punishments for such crimes, if any were charged, should be stayed as well.  
Neither is it relevant that, in some other case, the prosecution could conceivably 
have identified two separate physical acts — even if arguably related — that 
would have provided a basis for arguing that two separately punishable crimes had 
been committed.  The prosecution did not, because it could not, make any such 
allegation here. 
What is instead relevant in this case is that a single physical act served as 
the basis for convicting the defendant of two separate crimes.  As a result, we do 
not reach step two of the section 654 analysis:  whether the forceful taking 
involved multiple intents and objectives.  (See Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 359-
360; Mesa, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 199-200; see also People v. Louie (2012) 203 
Cal.App.4th 388, 397 [―A single criminal act, even if committed incident to 
multiple objectives, may be punished only once‖].)  Rather, we must conclude that 
Corpening‘s one-year robbery sentence, which was based on the same act as his 
carjacking sentence, cannot stand.  Section 654 requires that the robbery sentence 
be stayed.  (See Dominguez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 420.)6 
                                              
6 
Although the trial court thoroughly explained other aspects of its sentencing 
decisions, the court concluded, without explanation, that ―[the robbery] is a 
separate offense [from] the carjacking.‖  The court did so despite the prosecution‘s 
contrary recommendation.  To facilitate meaningful appellate review, the better 
practice is for trial courts to state on the record their reasons for concluding that 
multiple offenses are or are not separately punishable under section 654.  (See 
People v. Lewis (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1063-1064; see also People v. Williams 
(1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 507, 519 [explaining that a ―clear purpose‖ of requiring a 
statement of reasons ―is to permit appellate review‖].) 
13 
III.  CONCLUSION 
A defendant may not be punished more than once for a single physical act 
that violates multiple provisions of the Penal Code.  The charging document in this 
case identified the same forceful taking of a vehicle as the physical act completing 
the actus reus for both robbery and carjacking.  Where the same physical act 
accomplishes the actus reus requirement for more than one crime, that single act 
cannot give rise to multiple punishment.  Because that is precisely what happened 
here, Corpening‘s one-year robbery sentence must be stayed.  We reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR:   
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Corpening 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn filed 6/24/16 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S228258 
Date Filed: December 29, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Francis M. Devaney and Kathleen M. Lewis 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Cynthia M. Jones, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, and Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. 
Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steven T. Oetting, Deputy State Solicitor General, Charles C. 
Ragland, Scott C. Taylor, Robin Urbanski, Barry J.T. Carlton and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Cynthia M. Jones 
Avatar Legal 
19363 Willamette Dr., #194 
West Linn, OR 97068 
(858) 793-9800 
 
Christopher P. Beesley 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2567