Case Title: SAMI v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-156

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
SAMI v. STATE2004 WY 2385 P.3d 1014Case Number: 02-156, 02-234Decided: 03/12/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

ELSADIG 
FOUAD SAMI,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Donald 
J. Rissler, Riverton, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Daniel M. Fetsco, 
Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
Appellant 
Elsadig Fouad Sami challenges the sufficiency of the factual basis underlying 
his guilty plea to felonious restraint and the sufficiency of the evidence to 
revoke his probation.  We find that 
the factual basis was sufficient to support Sami's guilty plea and the evidence 
was sufficient to revoke his probation.

 

[¶2]           
The 
order of conviction is affirmed.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
Sami 
presents this statement of the issues for our review:

 

I.  Was there a proper factual basis 
presented at Appellant's July 12, 2002 change of Plea Hearing sufficient for the 
Court to enter a finding of Guilty?

 

II.  Was the evidence presented at the 
Revocation Hearing sufficient to revoke the Appellant's 
probation?

 

The 
State rephrases the issues as:

 

I. 
Was 
the factual basis presented at the July 12, 2000, change of plea hearing 
sufficient to support the Appellant's guilty plea and his conviction for 
felonious restraint?

 

II. 
Did the district court abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant's 
probation?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
Sami 
was originally charged with first degree sexual assault.  The probable cause affidavit alleged 
that Sami forced his victim to submit to anal intercourse, and preliminary 
medical reports indicated that the victim had blood on swabs taken of her 
anus.  In July 2000, pursuant to a 
plea agreement, the prosecutor filed an Amended Information charging Sami with 
battery, a misdemeanor, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501, and felonious 
restraint, a felony, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-202.  Sami pled guilty to both battery and 
felonious restraint.  The district 
court sentenced Sami for battery but deferred his guilty plea to felonious 
restraint, without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, pending Sami's 
successful completion of three years of supervised probation in accordance with 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301.1

 

[¶5]           
In 
March 2002, the State petitioned the district court to revoke Sami's probation, 
alleging that he violated a term of the "Probation/Parole Agreement" he had 
executed with the Department of Corrections, Division of Probation and 
Parole.  After an evidentiary 
hearing, the district court revoked Sami's probation, entered a judgment of 
guilt or conviction for felonious restraint and sentenced Sami for that 
offense.  Sami appealed from the 
district court's order revoking his probation and the district court's 
subsequent judgment and sentence for felonious restraint.  These appeals were consolidated for our 
review.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Sufficiency 
of Factual Basis

 

[¶6]           
Sami 
first argues that the district court failed to obtain a sufficient factual basis 
to support the felonious restraint guilty plea.  In particular, Sami contends that the 
factual basis developed at his change of plea hearing did not establish that he 
had restrained the victim under circumstances exposing her to a risk of serious 
bodily injury.  Sami does not claim 
any other error with respect to the entry of his guilty 
plea.

 

[¶7]           
The 
elements of felonious restraint are set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-202 
(LexisNexis 2003), which states:

 

(a)  A 
person is guilty of felonious restraint if he knowingly:

(i) 
Restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious 
bodily injury[.]

 

"Serious 
bodily injury" is defined as "bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of 
death or which causes miscarriage, severe disfigurement or protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(x) 
(LexisNexis 2003).  "Bodily injury" 
means "physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition."  § 6-1-104(a)(i).

 

[¶8]           
"The 
felonious restraint statute is violated when a risk of serious bodily injury 
occurs and the action causing that risk is an unlawful restraint."  Williams 
v. State, 2002 
WY 136, ¶9, 54 P.3d 248, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002).  
The statutory language "adopts that of the Model Penal Code," id., 
and 

 

requires 
proof that the accused acted knowingly, meaning he "must have been aware that he 
was restraining his victim, that the restraint was unlawful, and that it exposed 
the victim to [the requisite] physical danger."

 

Id., 
¶10 (quoting Model Penal Code § 212.2 cmt. 2, at 242 (Proposed Official Draft 
1962)).  It "does not require that . 
. . these results actually occur but only that the actor create a risk of such 
harm." Model Penal Code, supra, 
at 241.  "This formulation reaches 
the actor who is reckless with respect to [the requisite] physical harm by 
punishing one who is aware of the risk thereof."  Williams, 
¶10 
(quoting Model Penal Code, supra, 
at 243).  "That the actor unlawfully 
restrains another under circumstances creating risk of serious harm is 
sufficient to call for felony sanctions and thus to differentiate this offense 
from the misdemeanor of false imprisonment."  Model Penal Code, supra, 
at 
240.

 

 

 

[¶9]           
W.R.Cr.P. 
11(f) provides:

 

Determining 
accuracy of plea.  
Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a 
judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that 
there is a factual basis for the plea. 

 

This 
Court reviews the conduct of a hearing in which a guilty plea is entered as a 
whole. Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1106 (Wyo. 1993).  "Our inquiry determines if the district 
court sufficiently described the nature of the charges, including the possible 
penalties; informed the defendant of the right to representation; informed the 
defendant of the rights waived by a guilty plea; and obtained a factual basis 
for the plea."  Id.  The intent of the procedural 
requirements is to prevent the individual charged with a crime from being misled 
into a waiver of substantial rights.  
Id.  W.R.Cr.P. 11 
requires that the district court satisfy itself that a factual basis exists for 
the guilty plea before accepting such plea.  Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 15, 18 
(Wyo. 1993).  A sufficient inquiry 
includes a determination that the defendant understood his conduct, in light of 
the law, to be criminal.  Barnes 
v. State, 951 P.2d 386, 389 (Wyo. 1998).  Rule 11 does not require proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a defendant who pleads guilty is actually guilty nor does 
it require complete descriptions of the elements in accepting a plea.  Mehring, 860 P.2d at 1108-09; 
see W.R.Cr.P. 11(b).  

 

The 
courts of our land do not function with scripts requiring each participant to 
perform his or her specific part in the same manner on each occasion.  We should never mistake the presence of 
the printed or spoken word for comprehension.  A ritualistic expression of verbiage, 
complete with legal terminology and excess, may provide a comfortable layer of 
support for technically demanding members of the bar, but would provide little 
real assurance that the accused actually understands what is about to be 
accomplished.  

 

Mehring, 
860 P.2d  at 1108-09.   

 

[¶10]      A 
record composed of the defendant's testimony and admissions and/or the state's 
presentation of evidence discloses a factual basis.  The trial judge may properly draw 
inferences from the defendant's admissions or the evidence presented by the 
state to satisfy all elements of the crime to which the defendant is pleading 
guilty.  Rude, 851 P.2d  at 
18.  

 

 

 

[¶11]      At 
the change of plea hearing in the instant case, Sami was sworn as a witness, and 
the following colloquy occurred:

 

The 
Court:   Okay.  Mr. Sami, tell me about April 
5th, 
please.  Tell me about [the 
victim].  Maybe I can just make it 
easier.  Did you hit or push her or 
grab her in a rude or angry manner on that day?

 

Sami:  Yes, Your Honor.  I pushed down and lay on her 
top.

 

The 
Court:  
You--pardon?

 

Sami:  I lay on her top.  I push her down and lay on 
her.

 

The 
Court:  And was this on or about 
April 5, 2000?

 

Sami:  Yes, Your Honor.

 

The 
Court:  And where was this?  Was it in Riverton, 
Wyoming?

 

Sami:  Yes, Your Honor.

 

The 
Court:  Okay.  And so you pushed her on [sic] laid on 
her top?

 

Sami:  Uh-huh.

 

The 
Court:  On the top of her 
body?

 

Sami:  Yes, Your Honor.

 

The 
Court:  Okay.  And were you angry at her or 

 

Sami:  We kind of have a little bit, kind 

 

The 
Court:  Was it in a rude manner, an 
angry manner that you were on top of her?

 

Sami:  It was in anger, My 
Honor.

 

The 
Court:  Angry?

 

Sami:  Yes.

 

The 
Court:  Tell me again, Mr. Sami, 
about the felonious restraint.  
First of all, tell me where you were.  You were still in Riverton.  At your home; is that 
correct?

 

Sami:  No.  We were visiting in  I came from Fort 
Collins and we were at CWC Campus.  

 

The 
Court:  And that's in 
Riverton?

 

Sami:  And that's in 
Riverton.

 

The 
Court:  Okay.

 

Sami:  And then after I lay on top of her, then 
I touch her breast.

 

The 
Court:  Did you not let her get up, 
you unlawfully restrain her or 

 

Sami:  I didn't force her doing 
anything.[2]  I just 
touched her breast after lay on top of her.

 

The 
Court:  [Prosecutor's name], can you 
 You didn't let her get up, though, did you?

 

Sami:  No, Your Honor.

 

The 
Court:  Okay.  [Prosecutor's name]  I might  the 
Court might need some help.  Do you 
have anything to flesh out the unlawful restraint?  Mr. Sami admitting that he did not let 
her get up, that would satisfy that.  
But the  under circumstances exposing her to risk of serious bodily 
harm.  Is there anything in the 
reports or 

 

[Prosecutor:]  Yes, Your Honor.  The State's evidence would have been, 
had this case gone to trial, that the sexual contact and intercourse that was 
engaged in was not consensual, and it would be our position that in that case, 
and either through means of the contact that's had at the time or on the basis 
that a victim might resist and be faced with retaliation if they do, we think 
that meets the element of exposing her to a risk of serious bodily 
injury.

 

The 
Court:  Okay.  Based on your testimony, Mr. Sami, as 
well as the explanation by the county attorney, I am going to find that there's 
a factual basis for your guilty plea to the misdemeanor battery, and that there 
is also a factual basis to your guilty plea of felonious restraint. 

 

[¶12]      Sami 
contends that this factual basis does not establish that the restraint occurred 
under circumstances creating a risk of serious bodily injury, an element of the 
crime of felonious restraint.  
Specifically, he contends that this record does not show that he caused 
any bodily injury to his victim.  
However, the crux of the debate is whether Sami's behavior (angrily 
throwing the victim on a bed, laying on top of her and preventing her from 
getting up, touching her breast, and then performing nonconsensual sexual 
intercourse on the unlawfully restrained victim) knowingly exposed the victim to 
the risk of physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition which 
causes impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.  We think that a district court in 
seeking a factual basis for a guilty plea to felonious restraint can, without 
more, infer that the victim of restrained, forcible nonconsensual sexual 
intercourse was subjected to such violence from that particular act that the 
court could reasonably conclude that she had been exposed 
to a risk 
of 
serious bodily injury.  See 
Rude, 851 P.2d  at 18 (the element of premeditation can be inferred from all of the facts 
and circumstances).  Additionally, 
the prosecutor also reasoned that the defendant's criminal conduct exposed the 
victim to risk 
of 
serious bodily injury, as statutorily defined, if she tried to resist that 
conduct and the defendant in his angry state retaliated against her.  The risks 
of 
serious bodily injury are established by both the defendant's words and the 
prosecutor's words.  We hold that 
the factual basis was sufficient to support the defendant's guilty 
plea.

 

 

 

[¶13]      As 
part of his Section 301 probation agreement, Sami agreed to a number of terms 
including obeying all laws and truthfully reporting contacts with law 
enforcement.  On March 11, 2002, the 
State filed a petition to revoke Sami's Section 301 probation status for 
violations of these terms.  The 
petition was based on assertions that Sami had been investigated by the Laramie 
police for inappropriately touching a sixteen-year-old girl; that a protective 
order had been entered against Sami for committing acts of domestic abuse 
against the victim; and that Sami had failed to report his contact with police 
regarding the abuse allegations.  

 

[¶14]      After 
Sami denied the allegations, the district court held a hearing on the petition, 
received evidence and witnesses' testimony and ruled that Sami had willfully 
failed to report a police contact to his probation officer.  Sami's probation was revoked, and he was 
sentenced to a prison term that was suspended for five years of supervised 
probation.  Sami contends that the 
evidence presented at the hearing was insufficient for the district court to 
revoke his probation.  He further 
contends that his failure to report law enforcement contact was not willful and 
the district court abused its discretion in revoking his 
probation.

 

 

1.  Standard of 
Review

 

[¶15]      
A 
district court's decision to revoke probation is discretionary and will not be 
disturbed unless the record demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion.  Anderson v. State, 2002 WY 46, 
¶25, 43 P.3d 108, ¶25 (Wyo. 2002).  
"The district court is required to make a conscientious judgment that the 
alleged violation occurred after considering the reasons underlying the 
conditions of probation, the violation of those conditions, and the reasons 
leading to the violation."  
Id.  Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; is means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  Id.  "The district court's determination 
that the probation agreement has been violated must be based upon verified facts 
and must be made pursuant to due process protections."  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  "[I]n order to revoke 
probation for the violation of a condition of probation not involving the 
payment of money, the violation must be willful, or, if not willful, must 
presently threaten the safety of society." Id., 
¶26.

 

 

2.  Evidence of Willful 
Violation

 

[¶16]      At 
the hearing, Sami's probation officer testified that he had learned from police 
that Sami was under investigation for sexual assault on a minor.  That investigation did not result in any 
charges; however, a motion for a protective order was filed that resulted in a 
finding that Sami had committed an act of domestic abuse against the minor.  After the protective order was entered 
against him, Sami contacted an attorney who advised that the proceedings were 
civil in nature and should not have any effect upon Sami's Section 301 probation 
status.  Sami contended that he 
believed that he only had to report criminal proceedings to his probation 
officer and, based upon the legal advice that the protection order proceedings 
were civil, he did not feel he would violate the terms of his probation by not 
reporting the proceedings to his probation officer.  At his next meeting with his probation 
officer, Sami was required to complete a written questionnaire that asked 
whether Sami had been in contact with law enforcement since his last 
report.  Sami marked the box 
"no."  Sami's probation officer 
questioned Sami about the incident, and Sami then reported it to his probation 
officer.  Nevertheless, the 
probation officer filed an affidavit which led to the State's filing of a 
petition to revoke probation. 

 

[¶17]      The 
district court determined that it did not have to determine whether civil or 
criminal proceedings had occurred or whether Sami had committed an act of 
physical abuse against the minor.  
The court ruled:

 

But 
the simple issue before this Court is, did Mr. Sami obey the simple rules of the 
probation and parole agreement?  And 
about  out of those 12 rules, probably 8 of them could be boiled down to, you 
have to be truthful and honest with your probation 
officer.

The 
Court found it a little incredible  more than a little incredible  that you, 
Mr. Sami, would not mention this contact, and that you didn't understand to 
check the box.  You have been 
checking those boxes for a year and a half . . . .  And yet, you immediately took those 
papers and went running to see an attorney because you thought there might be 
some  there might be some problem.

 

The 
district court determined that Sami had intentionally failed to reveal contact 
with law enforcement and revoked his probation. 

 

[¶18]      Although 
the record adequately supports the district court's finding that Sami 
intentionally marked the box "no," Sami contends that the violation was not 
willful and was the result of communication problems he experienced because he 
does not speak English very well.  
The district court determined that Sami's testimony was not 
credible.  "Upon review, all that is 
necessary to uphold a district court's decision to revoke probation is evidence 
that it made a conscientious judgment, after hearing the facts, that a condition 
of probation had been violated."  
Mapp v. State, 929 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Wyo. 1996).  The record shows the district court 
properly concluded Sami's violation of his probation agreement was willful and 
we find no abuse of discretion.  The 
order revoking probation is affirmed.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶19]      
The 
district court could properly infer from the defendant's admissions and the 
State's presentation of evidence that Sami had exposed his victim to the risk of 
serious bodily injury by his unlawful restraint by nonconsensual sexual 
intercourse.  We uphold the district 
court's ruling that a sufficient factual basis existed for Sami's guilty 
plea.  The district court's ruling 
that Sami had willfully violated a term of his probation agreement is supported 
by a record showing Sami had intentionally stated that he had no law enforcement 
contact although he had been the subject of a police investigation for physical 
abuse of a minor.  The district 
court's order revoking Sami's probation is affirmed.

 

      
FOOTNOTES

       

1The 
relevant portion of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301 (LexisNexis 2003) states:  

 

(a)  If 
a person who has not previously been convicted of any felony is charged with or 
is found guilty of or pleads guilty or no contest to any misdemeanor except any 
second or subsequent violation of W.S. 31-5-233 or any similar provision of law, 
or any second or subsequent violation of W.S. 6-2-501(a) or (b) by a household 
member as defined by W.S. 35-21-102 against any other household member or any 
similar provision of law, or any felony except murder, sexual assault in the 
first or second degree, aggravated assault and battery or arson in the first or 
second degree, the court may, with the consent of the defendant and the state 
and without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further 
proceedings and place the person on probation for a term not to exceed five (5) 
years upon terms and conditions set by the court.   

 

2Sami does not argue that this statement--vis a vis the prosecutor's 
subsequent representation that he would have produced unspecified evidence at 
trial that Sami engaged in nonconsensual sexual intercourse with the 
victim--somehow transformed Sami's guilty plea into a plea pursuant to North 
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), the 
acceptance of which plea may require that there be "strong evidence of actual 
guilt."  Johnston v. State, 
829 P.2d 1179, 1181 (Wyo. 1992).