Case Title: State v. Chickering

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88-607

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1989-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 88-607


State of Vermont Environmental Board         Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal From
     v.                                      Windham Superior Court

Levi Chickering                              October Term, 1989



John P. Meaker, J.

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and William E. Griffin and Mark J.
  Di Stefano, Assistant Attorneys General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-
  appellant

Natt L. Divoll, Jr., Bellows Falls, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     ALLEN, C.J.   The State of Vermont appeals from an order of the Windham
Superior Court dismissing a civil action against defendant for violation of
the subdivision provisions of Act 250, following presentation of the State's
case.  We reverse.
     The State sued defendant in July 1986, alleging that he subdivided
properties in Westminster into ten or more lots within a continuous ten-
year period without an Act 250 permit, contrary to 10 V.S.A. { 6081(a). (FN1)
The action sought civil penalties under 10 V.S.A. { 6006, repealed by 1989,
No. 98, { 4(b), for defendant's intentional violation of Act 250.  It is not
necessary for the disposition of this appeal to detail every transaction.
Suffice it to say that the numerous transactions involved conveyances from
four original grantors to defendant, or to one or more of thirteen
corporations whose stockholders were either defendant himself or his close
relations.
     Of the eighteen lots recited in the State's complaint, four originated
from the first tract, and were conveyed to ultimate purchasers via two
corporations, Flagship Properties, Inc., and Sno-Valley Corporation.  Six
originated from the second tract, and were conveyed to ultimate purchasers
via three corporations:  Naturlich, Ltd., Shedd Brook Corporation, and
Forop, Ltd.  The third tract was sold as a single parcel successively to
the Shedd Brook Corporation and then to the Muffin Mountain Corporation, and
then from the Muffin Mountain Corporation to four ultimate purchasers via
the Olyea Corporation, the Malpeque Corporation and the Max Norm
Corporation.  The fourth tract was divided first between the Obi Corporation
and Flagship Properties, Inc., and then through three corporations (LesBeaux
Proprieties, Ltd., Inland Industries, Ltd., and Agri Resources, Inc.) and
individuals, including defendant, to four ultimate purchasers.
     Discovery commenced and the State requested that defendant produce
copies of his federal income tax returns and related schedules for the years
1980 through 1986, along with all work papers and other documents used to
prepare those returns and schedules.  Defendant produced all of the
documents for inspection but declined to allow photocopying of a portion of
the documents and papers.  The State filed a motion to compel, but the court
denied the State's motion.
     Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed in October and November,
1987.  The court denied both motions and set the matter for trial.  Defend-
ant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case, which the
court treated as a dismissal motion under V.R.C.P. 41(b)(2) and granted.
The court concluded that the State had demonstrated "control" of nine of the
eighteen parcels within the meaning of 10 V.S.A. { 6081(a) through eight
corporations in which defendant had a controlling interest, but did not make
a sufficient showing of requisite control of any of the other parcels, owned
by close family members through closely held corporations, to bring
defendant within the statutory proscription.  The present appeal followed,
and defendant cross-appealed the court's conclusions as to the nine parcels.
                          I. The State's Appeal.
A. Dismissal of the Complaint.
     The central issue in this appeal is the court's dismissal of the
complaint at the completion of the State's case.  As we stated in Blais v.
Blowers, 136 Vt. 488, 489, 394 A.2d 1124, 1124 (1978), a motion under
V.R.C.P. 41(b)(2) "serve[s] the function served by a motion for directed
verdict in a jury case."  On a motion for a directed verdict, this Court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
and exclude all modifying evidence.  A motion for a directed verdict, and
hence a motion under V.R.C.P. 41(b)(2), must not be granted "where there is
any evidence fairly and reasonably tending to justify a verdict in the
nonmoving party's favor."  Seewaldt v. Mount Snow, Ltd., 150 Vt. 238, 239,