Case Title: P. v. Rojas

Citation: 

Docket Number: S275835

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
FERNANDO ROJAS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S275835 
 
Fifth Appellate District 
F080361 
 
Kern County Superior Court 
BF171239B 
 
 
December 18, 2023 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred.  
 
1 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
S275835 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
In 2000, California voters adopted Proposition 21, the 
Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998 
(Proposition 21).  Proposition 21 added the gang-murder special 
circumstance, codified at Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision 
(a)(22) (section 190.2(a)(22)).  (All undesignated statutory 
references are to the Penal Code.)  Under this provision, a 
person convicted of first degree murder is subject to the death 
penalty or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if 
the jury finds “[t]he defendant intentionally killed the victim 
while the defendant was an active participant in a criminal 
street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, and 
the murder was carried out to further the activities of the 
criminal 
street 
gang.” 
 
(§ 190.2(a)(22), 
italics 
added.)  
Proposition 21 does not permit amendment of its provisions 
except by the voters or by legislative amendment passed with a 
two-thirds majority of each house.  (Voter Information Guide, 
Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) text of Prop. 21, § 39, p. 131.) 
The definition of a “criminal street gang” in section 186.22, 
subdivision (f) (section 186.22(f)) was first enacted in 1988 as 
part of the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention Act (STEP Act) (§ 186.20 et seq.), which created the 
offense of active participation in a gang and introduced 
sentencing enhancements for gang-related felonies.  (Stats. 
1988, ch. 1256, § 1, p. 4179; see Pen. Code, § 186.22, subds. (a), 
(b)(2).)  The Legislature has amended the definition of “criminal 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
street gang” a few times over the years, generally expanding its 
scope.  But in 2021, the Legislature substantially narrowed 
section 186.22(f)’s definition of “criminal street gang” and, by 
extension, what it means to “further the activities of the 
criminal street gang” for purposes of the special circumstance in 
section 190.2(a)(22).  (See Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 
Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333).) 
The issue before us is whether applying this recent 
legislative enactment, Assembly Bill 333, to the gang-murder 
special circumstance in section 190.2(a)(22) constitutes an 
unlawful amendment of Proposition 21.  The issue has divided 
the Courts of Appeal.  (Compare People v. Rojas (2022) 80 
Cal.App.5th 542, 557 [Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to 
§ 186.22 cannot be applied to the gang-murder special 
circumstance without taking away from the scope of conduct 
made punishable under Proposition 21] with People v. Lee (2022) 
81 Cal.App.5th 232, 245, review granted and briefing deferred 
Oct. 19, 2022, S275449 (Lee) [Assembly Bill 333 did not amend 
Proposition 21, which was intended to track any subsequent 
changes to § 186.22] and People v. Oliva (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 
76, 90, review granted and briefing deferred May 17, 2023, 
S279485 [same].)  We hold that the application of Assembly Bill 
333 to the gang-murder special circumstance does not violate 
the limitation on legislative amendment in Proposition 21. 
I. 
In 2019, Fernando Rojas and his codefendant Victor 
Nunez were found guilty of deliberate, premeditated murder 
(§ 187, subd. (a)) with true findings on the gang-murder special 
circumstance (§ 190.2(a)(22)), a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, 
subd. (b)(1)), and various firearm allegations (§§ 12022, 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
subd. (d),  12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)).  Nunez, a fellow gang 
member, “shot and killed an individual with whom [Rojas] had 
an altercation moments prior.”  (Rojas, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 546.)  Rojas and Nunez were also found guilty of active 
participation in a criminal street gang.  (§ 186.22, subd. (a).)  
Based on the special circumstance finding, the trial court 
sentenced Rojas to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole, plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement.   
In 2021, while Rojas’s appeal was pending, the Legislature 
passed Assembly Bill 333, enacting the STEP Forward Act of 
2021.  (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 1.)   “Assembly Bill 333 made the 
following changes to the law on gang enhancements:  First, it 
narrowed the definition of a ‘criminal street gang’ to require that 
any gang be an ‘ongoing, organized association or group of three 
or more persons.’  (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics added.)  Second, 
whereas section 186.22, former subdivision (f) required only 
that a gang’s members ‘individually or collectively engage in’ a 
pattern of criminal activity in order to constitute a ‘criminal 
street gang,’ Assembly Bill 333 requires that any such pattern 
have been ‘collectively engage[d] in’ by members of the gang.  
(§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics added.)  Third, Assembly Bill 333 also 
narrowed the definition of a ‘pattern of criminal activity’ by 
requiring that (1) the last offense used to show a pattern of 
criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date 
that the currently charged offense is alleged to have been 
committed; (2) the offenses were committed by two or more gang 
‘members,’ as opposed to just ‘persons’; (3) the offenses 
commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses 
establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones other than 
the currently charged offense.  (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1), (2).)  
Fourth, Assembly Bill 333 narrowed what it means for an 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring 
that any ‘common benefit’ be ‘more than reputational.’  
(§ 186.22, subd. (g).)”  (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 
1206 (Tran); see People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 738 
[same].) 
In Tran, we held that Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to 
section 186.22 apply retroactively to cases pending on appeal 
under the rule of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.  (Tran, 
supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1206–1207.)  In light of Tran, the 
Attorney General conceded below that Assembly Bill 333 applies 
here and that because a reasonable jury could conclude that the 
common benefit of the murder was based only on reputational 
evidence, all the gang-based findings must be vacated, except for 
the gang-murder special circumstance.  (Rojas, supra, 80 
Cal.App.5th at p. 546.)  Accepting this concession, the Court of 
Appeal reversed the gang enhancement and vicarious firearm 
findings on Rojas’s murder conviction and his conviction of 
active gang participation.  (Ibid.)  But the court also agreed with 
the Attorney General that Assembly Bill 333 could not be 
applied to the gang-murder special circumstance.  (Rojas, at 
pp. 550–558.) 
The Court of Appeal reasoned that Assembly Bill 333, as 
applied 
to 
the 
gang-murder 
special 
circumstance, 
is 
unconstitutional because it would “ ‘take[] away’ from the scope 
of conduct that Proposition 21 made punishable under section 
190.2” and was not passed by a supermajority vote.  (Rojas, 
supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 555.)  The court further explained 
that Proposition 21’s increase in the punishment for certain 
gang-related murders was “definitionally and conceptually 
inseparable” from the gang conduct defined in section 186.22.  
(Rojas, at p. 556.)  Therefore, applying Assembly Bill 333’s 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
revised definition of a criminal street gang to the gang-murder 
special circumstance would be unconstitutional, even though 
Assembly Bill 333 did not reduce the penalty established by 
Proposition 21’s gang-murder special circumstance.  (Rojas, at 
p. 556.)  The court concluded that “[t]he appropriate remedy is 
not to void Assembly Bill 333 in its entirety, but rather to 
disallow this unconstitutional application of Assembly Bill 333.”  
(Id. at p. 557.)   
Justice Snauffer dissented on this issue, observing that 
the voters who passed Proposition 21 were concerned only with 
“increasing the punishment for certain gang-related murders,” 
not with the underlying definition of any crime.  (Rojas, supra, 
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 561 (conc. & dis. opn. of Snauffer, J.).)  In 
his view, Proposition 21’s voters “ ‘got, and still have, precisely 
what they enacted — stronger sentences for persons convicted 
of [gang-related special-circumstance] murder.’ ”  (Rojas, at 
p. 560, quoting People v. Superior Court (Gooden) 42 
Cal.App.5th 270, 289 (Gooden).) 
We granted review to decide whether Assembly Bill 333’s 
application 
to 
the 
gang-murder 
special 
circumstance 
unconstitutionally amends Proposition 21. 
II. 
“The Legislature may not amend an initiative statute 
without subsequent voter approval unless the initiative permits 
such amendment, ‘and then only upon whatever conditions the 
voters 
attached 
to 
the 
Legislature’s 
amendatory 
powers.’ ”  (People v. Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 
564, 568 (Pearson); see Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c).)  “The 
purpose of California’s constitutional limitation on the 
Legislature’s power to amend initiative statutes is to ‘protect the 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
people’s initiative powers by precluding the Legislature from 
undoing what the people have done, without the electorate’s 
consent.’ ” 
 
(Proposition 
103 
Enforcement 
Project 
v. 
Quackenbush (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1484.) 
“We have described an amendment as ‘a legislative act 
designed to change an existing initiative statute by adding or 
taking from it some particular provision.’  [Citation.]  But this 
does not mean that any legislation that concerns the same 
subject matter as an initiative, or even augments an initiative’s 
provisions, is necessarily an amendment for these purposes.  
‘The Legislature remains free to address a “ ‘related but distinct 
area’ ” [citations] or a matter that an initiative measure “does 
not specifically authorize or prohibit.” ’ ”  (Pearson, supra, 48 
Cal.4th at p. 571.) 
“When we interpret an initiative, we apply the same 
principles governing statutory construction.  We first consider 
the initiative’s language, giving the words their ordinary 
meaning and construing this language in the context of the 
statute and initiative as a whole.  If the language is not 
ambiguous, we presume the voters intended the meaning 
apparent from that language, and we may not add to the statute 
or rewrite it to conform to some assumed intent not apparent 
from that language.  If the language is ambiguous, courts may 
consider ballot summaries and arguments in determining the 
voters’ intent and understanding of a ballot measure.”  (Pearson, 
supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 571.) 
A. 
California voters enacted Proposition 21 in 2000, 
increasing the penalties for certain gang-related felonies.  As 
relevant here, Proposition 21 created the gang-murder special 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
circumstance, codified at section 190.2(a)(22).  (People v. 
Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 65.)  Section 190.2(a)(22) 
provides:  “The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of 
murder in the first degree is death or imprisonment in the state 
prison for life without the possibility of parole if one or more of 
the following special circumstances has been found under 
Section 190.4 to be true: [¶] . . . [¶] (22) The defendant 
intentionally killed the victim while the defendant was an active 
participant in a criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision 
(f) of Section 186.22, and the murder was carried out to further 
the activities of the criminal street gang.”  By its terms, 
Proposition 21 established a new penalty for murder committed 
by an active participant in a criminal street gang in furtherance 
of the gang’s activities, while relying on an existing statutory 
provision — section 186.22(f) — to define “criminal street gang.”   
An uncodified provision of Proposition 21 states that the 
provisions of the initiative “shall not be amended by the 
Legislature except by a statute passed in each house by rollcall 
vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership of 
each house concurring, or by a statute that becomes effective 
only when approved by the voters.”  (Voter Information Guide, 
Primary Elec., supra, text of Prop. 21, § 39, p. 131.)  Assembly 
Bill 333 did not receive two-thirds support in either house (Sen. 
Daily J. (Sept. 1, 2021) p. 2284 [25 of 40 members voted in favor]; 
Assem. Daily J. (Sept. 8, 2021.) p. 2927 [41 of 80 members voted 
in favor]; see Cal. Const., art. IV, § 2, subd. (a)(1)–(2)), nor was 
the bill submitted to the voters for approval.  The Attorney 
General argues that Assembly Bill 333’s amendment of section 
186.22, incorporated by reference into section 190.2(a)(22), 
unconstitutionally amends Proposition 21 because the voters 
intended the enhanced punishment of death or life without 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
parole to apply to gang murders as defined at the time 
Proposition 21 was enacted.   
Although Proposition 21 amended section 186.22 by 
increasing the punishment of certain enhancements (§ 186.22, 
subds. (b), (c), (d)) and adding predicate offenses in determining 
“a pattern of criminal gang activity” (id., subd. (e)), the 2000 
initiative did not amend section 186.22(f)’s definition of 
“criminal street gang” and instead technically reenacted it 
without substantive change.  (See County of San Diego v. 
Commission on State Mandates (2018) 6 Cal.5th 196, 209–210 
[“Statutory provisions that are not actually reenacted and are 
instead considered to ‘ “have been the law all along” ’ [citation] 
cannot fairly be said to be part of a ballot measure”]; Gov. Code, 
§ 9605.)  It follows that the Legislature is free to revise section 
186.22(f) independent of the supermajority requirement in 
Proposition 21 itself unless the reenacted provision “is integral 
to accomplishing the electorate’s goals in enacting the initiative 
or other indicia support the conclusion that voters reasonably 
intended to limit the Legislature’s ability to amend that part of 
the statute.”  (County of San Diego, at p. 214; see also Lee, supra, 
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 242, rev.gr.; cf. Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, 
subd. (c); Voter Information Guide, Primary Elec., supra, text of 
Prop. 21, § 39, p. 131.) 
The Attorney General argues that applying Assembly Bill 
333’s amendment to section 186.22(f) to a special circumstance 
allegation would frustrate the voters’ intent to “lock in” the 
definition of “criminal street gang” as it existed at the time of 
the 2000 election and would “take away” from the purpose of 
Proposition 21.  We address these arguments in turn. 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
B. 
We begin with the text of the initiative statute.  We have 
said that “ ‘where a statute adopts by specific reference the 
provisions of another statute, regulation, or ordinance, such 
provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at 
the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified, and 
that the repeal of the provisions referred to does not affect the 
adopting statute, in the absence of a clearly expressed intention 
to the contrary.’ ”  (Palermo v. Stockton Theatres (1948) 32 
Cal.2d 53, 58–59 (Palermo); see generally Jam v. International 
Finance Corp. (2019) 586 U.S. __, __ [139 S.Ct. 759, 769] 
[referring to this principle of statutory construction as the 
“ ‘reference’ canon”].)  At the same time, “ ‘there is a cognate 
rule . . . to the effect that where the reference is general instead 
of specific, such as a reference to a system or body of laws or to 
the general law relating to the subject in hand, the referring 
statute takes the law or laws referred to not only in their 
contemporary form, but also as they may be changed from time 
to time . . . .’ ”  (Palermo, at p. 59.) 
While Palermo sets forth the general rule above, it also 
makes clear that the presence or absence of language referring 
specifically to a statutory or regulatory provision is not 
necessarily dispositive.  At issue in Palermo was the California 
Alien Land Act (Stats. 1921, p. lxxxiii, as amended by Stats. 
1923, p. 1021), which referred to “ ‘ “any treaty now existing” ’ ” 
at the time of the act’s enactment by the electorate.  (Palermo, 
supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 59.)  Palermo reasoned that “in view of the 
fact that there is grave doubt whether our Legislature could 
constitutionally delegate to the treaty-making authority of the 
United States the right and power thus directly to control our 
local legislation with respect to future acts [citations], we are 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
constrained to hold that the reference is specific and not 
general’ ” (id. at pp. 59–60), even though the act did not refer to 
any specific treaty.  We have observed that “[s]everal modern 
decisions have applied the Palermo rule, but none have done so 
without regard to other indicia of legislative intent.”  (In re 
Jovan B. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 801, 816, fn. 10 (Jovan B.); see id. at 
p. 816 [“ ‘the determining factor will be . . . legislative intent’ ”].) 
Our application of the Palermo rule in Jovan B. is 
instructive.  In that case, we considered legislation that 
incorporated by reference a provision of the Uniform 
Determinate Sentencing Act (§ 1170 et seq.), commonly referred 
to as the determinate sentencing law (DSL), into section 726 of 
the Welfare and Institutions Code as a basis for calculating a 
juvenile’s maximum time of confinement or commitment.  The 
question was whether the Legislature intended to lock in the 
provisions of the DSL in effect at the time.  (Jovan B., supra, 6 
Cal.4th at pp. 815–816.)  We concluded that it did not and held 
that a juvenile’s maximum time of confinement or commitment 
takes into account enhanced penalties incorporated into the 
DSL after Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 was 
enacted.  (Jovan B., at pp. 816, 820.)  We explained that 
although the statute referred to two specific provisions of the 
DSL (§ 1170, subd. (a)(2) and § 1170.1, subd. (a)) those 
provisions merely “stated the general rule that when sentencing 
a felon to prison, the court must impose either the upper, 
middle, or lower term provided for the offense at issue, plus ‘any 
other . . . additional term’ required or permitted by law in the 
individual case.”  (Jovan B., at p. 818.)  “Thus, in the language 
of Palermo, supra, 32 Cal.2d 53, 58–59, Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 726’s reference to Penal Code sections 1170, 
subdivision (a)(2) and 1170.1, subdivision (a) is not a ‘specific 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
reference [to] the provisions of another statute,’ but rather is a 
‘general’ reference ‘to a system or body of laws.’ ”  (Jovan B., at 
p. 819.) 
Jovan B. went on to consider the purpose of the 
amendment of Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, which 
“states a broad general rule that the ‘maximum term of 
imprisonment’ for juvenile confinement purposes includes 
‘enhancements’ if they are pled and proven.”  (Jovan B., supra, 
6 Cal.4th at p. 819.)  “The obvious purpose . . . was ‘to treat adult 
and juvenile offenders on equal footing as far as the [maximum] 
duration of their incarceration is concerned’ [citation], whatever 
that period might be at the moment.”  (Ibid.)  We concluded:  
“The Legislature cannot have anticipated that in order to 
preserve this equality over time, it would be forced to 
amend section 726 each and every time it altered the DSA.”  
(Ibid.)  In light of this determination, we held that the juvenile 
was subject to the special allegation under Penal Code section 
12022.1 that he had committed the offense in question while out 
of custody pending trial on a prior petition, even though that 
provision of the Penal Code was enacted five years after Welfare 
and Institutions Code section 726.  (Jovan B., at pp. 807–808, 
815.)  
Here, as in Jovan B., the words of the incorporating 
statute “do not make clear whether it contemplates only a time-
specific incorporation.”  (Jovan B., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 816.)  
The initiative’s uncodified findings and declarations state:  
“Gang-related crimes pose a unique threat to the public because 
of gang members’ organization and solidarity.  Gang-related 
felonies should result in severe penalties.  Life without the 
possibility of parole or death should be available for murderers 
who kill as part of any gang-related activity.”  (Voter 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
Information Guide, Primary Elec., supra, text of Prop. 21, § 2, 
subd. (h), p. 119.)  To that end, the electorate chose to impose a 
specific punishment for gang-related murder while relying on 
the generally applicable definition of “criminal street gang” in 
section 186.22(f).  The voters gave no indication in the statute 
that they intended to adopt the definition of “criminal street 
gang” in effect at the time.  Like the statutory references in 
Jovan B., the reference to section 186.22(f)’s definition of 
“criminal street gang” in Proposition 21 is readily understood as 
a reference “to the general law relating to the subject in hand,” 
and as such, “the referring statute takes the law . . . referred to 
not only in [its] contemporary form, but also as [it] may be 
changed from time to time.”  (Palermo, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 59.) 
The Attorney General argues that the provisions at issue 
in Jovan B. are “materially different” from those at issue here 
because Proposition 21 refers “to a specific code section and 
subdivision defining a particular term” in contrast to the 
“general incorporation of an entire body or system of laws as in 
Jovan B.”  But section 186.22(f) sets forth the definition of 
“criminal street gang” that is applied throughout the STEP Act 
and other parts of the Penal Code.  For example, the general 
definition of “ ‘[o]rganized crime’ ” in section 186.2, subdivision 
(d) was amended in 1996 to “also mean[] crime committed by a 
criminal street gang, as defined in” section 186.22(f).  (Stats. 
1996, ch. 844, § 1, p. 4465.)  The penalty for knowingly 
supplying, selling, or giving possession or control of a firearm 
with the knowledge that the person will use it to commit a felony 
for the benefit of a gang, enacted in 1992, also relies on the 
definition of “criminal street gang” in section 186.22(f).  
(§ 186.28, subd. (a)(1); see Stats. 1992, ch. 370, § 1, p. 1405.)  So, 
too, does the provision for motor vehicle forfeiture when a 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
member of a criminal street gang is convicted of the unlawful 
possession of a firearm while present in a vehicle, as amended 
in 1993.  (§ 246.1, subd. (a); see Stats. 1994, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 33, 
§ 1, p. 8659.)  Since 1994, the Welfare and Institutions Code has 
also relied on section 186.22 to define “criminal street gang” in 
providing for information-sharing among “members of a juvenile 
justice multidisciplinary team engaged in the prevention, 
identification, and control of crime, including, but not limited to 
criminal street gang activity.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 830.1; see  
Stats. 1994, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 24, § 1, p. 8597.)  Each of these 
provisions was in place prior to the enactment of Proposition 21, 
and we presume the voters were aware of the generally 
applicable nature of section 186.22(f)’s definition of “criminal 
street gang” when they enacted Proposition 21.  (Professional 
Engineers in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 1016, 1048 (Professional Engineers) [“The voters are 
presumed to have been aware of existing laws at the time the 
initiative was enacted.”].) 
Of course, it is the electorate’s prerogative to give the term 
“criminal street gang” a fixed meaning if it chooses, regardless 
of how the Legislature may subsequently define the term.  But 
the voters who enacted Proposition 21 did not specify that the 
cross-reference to section 186.22(f) was intended to lock in the 
contemporary definition, and this omission is particularly 
salient in light of other aspects of the same enactment that did 
just that.   
Sections 14 and 16 of Proposition 21 amended portions of 
the existing “Three Strikes Law.”  Section 14 added section 
667.1 to the Penal Code:  “Notwithstanding subdivision (h) of 
Section 667, for all offenses committed on or after the effective 
date of this act, all references to existing statutes in subdivisions 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
(c) to (g), inclusive, of Section 667, are to those statutes as they 
existed on the effective date of this act, including amendments 
made to those statutes by this act.”  (Voter Information Guide, 
Primary Elec., supra, text of Prop. 21, § 14, p. 123, italics 
omitted.)  Similarly, section 16 added section 1170.125 to the 
Penal Code:  “Notwithstanding Section 2 of Proposition 184, as 
adopted at the November 8, 1994 General Election, for all 
offenses committed on or after the effective date of this act, all 
references to existing statutes in Section 1170.12 are to those 
statutes as they existed on the effective date of this act, 
including amendments made to those statutes by this act.”  
(Voter Information Guide, Primary Elec., supra, text of Prop. 21, 
§ 16, p. 124, italics omitted.)   
Sections 14 and 16, by their terms, “change[d] the ‘lock-in’ 
date for determining the existence of qualifying offenses (such 
as violent or serious felonies) under the Three Strikes law.  
Thus, before the passage of Proposition 21, references to existing 
statutes, such as the law defining violent felonies, in Penal Code 
section 667 were ‘to statutes as they existed on June 30, 1993.’  
(§ 667, subd. (h).)  Section 14 of Proposition 21 provides that 
references to existing statutes in Penal Code section 667, for all 
offenses committed on or after the effective date of the initiative, 
are to those statutes as they existed on the effective date of 
Proposition 21 (March 8, 2000), including, but not limited to, 
amendments made to those statutes by this initiative.  (§ 667.1.)  
Section 16 of the initiative makes a corresponding change to the 
lock-in date for statutes referenced in Penal Code section 
1170.12.  (§ 1170.125.)”  (Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 537, 574–575.) 
The Attorney General says these provisions “were 
necessary to convey the electorate’s intent that sections 667 and 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
1170.12, which Proposition 21 did not directly amend, were to 
implement the initiative’s amendments to other statutes that 
sections 667 and 1170.12 referenced and which Proposition 21 
did amend.”  But if the voters’ intent was simply to ensure that 
the cross-referenced list of violent felonies included those 
updated by Proposition 21, then the phrase “including 
amendments made to those statutes by this act” in both section 
14 and section 16 would have sufficed.  Instead, the voters 
coupled that directive with a reference to “those statutes as they 
existed on the effective date of this act,” thus ensuring that 
future offenses would be classified in accordance with the 
scheme then existing.  The Attorney General’s explanation of 
sections 14 and 16 does not account for why those provisions are 
written as they are. 
In People v. Fletcher (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1374, 1379–
1382, review granted September 20, 2023, S281282, the Court 
of Appeal held that the narrower definition of “criminal street 
gang” in Assembly Bill 333 cannot be applied to determine what 
constitutes a serious felony for purposes of the Three Strikes 
Law without running afoul of the limits on legislative 
amendment set forth in both Proposition 21 and a 2012 
initiative, Proposition 36 (Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen. 
Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)).  We do not decide that issue here.  We 
simply observe that the text of Proposition 21 shows the voters 
understood that cross-referenced statutes may evolve, and they 
knew how to lock in the meaning of a cross-referenced statute.  
Yet the voters chose not to do so with respect to the gang-murder 
special circumstance.  (Cf. Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City 
of Pasadena (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564, 576 [“When the Legislature 
‘has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded it in 
another, it should not be implied where excluded.’ ”].)   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
C. 
The Attorney General’s primary argument is that 
application of Assembly Bill 333 would frustrate the voters’ 
intent by narrowing the scope of conduct covered by the gang-
murder special circumstance, thereby “taking away” from 
Proposition 21.  In this context, we have described an 
amendment as “a legislative act designed to change an existing 
initiative statute by adding or taking from it some particular 
provision.” (People v. Cooper (2002) 27 Cal.4th 38, 44.)  To 
determine whether Assembly Bill 333 impermissibly takes away 
from Proposition 21, “we must decide what the voters 
contemplated.”  (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 571; see 
Hodges v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 109, 114 [“the voters 
should get what they enacted, not more and not less”].) 
The Attorney General says application of Assembly Bill 
333 here conflicts “with the electorate’s manifest intent to 
substantially augment protections against violent gang crime, 
including by punishing more harshly ‘murderers who kill as part 
of any gang-related activity’ [(Prop. 21, § 2, subd. (h))].”  He 
adds, “It would be strange, in light of that intent, to conclude 
that the electorate also understood that the Legislature was free 
to narrow — in potentially significant ways — the scope of the 
protections that Proposition 21 established.”  But the phrase 
“any gang-related activity” in Proposition 21 simply begs the 
question of what the voters intended “gang-related activity” to 
mean; it does not indicate that the voters wanted to lock in the 
then-current definition.  The voters chose to define the term 
“criminal street gang” by reference to the existing statute, 
section 186.22(f), which had been amended several times by the 
Legislature before Proposition 21.  In so doing, the voters 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
incorporated a definition that they knew was both changeable 
and had been repeatedly subject to change. 
As originally enacted, the STEP Act defined “criminal 
street gang” to mean “any ongoing organization, association, or 
group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, 
having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or 
more of the criminal acts enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (7), 
inclusive, of subdivision (c), which has a common name or 
common 
identifying 
sign 
or 
symbol, 
whose 
members 
individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a 
pattern of criminal gang activity.”  (Former § 186.22, subd. (d), 
added by Stats. 1988, ch. 1256, § 1, p. 4181.)  That definition has 
been amended over the years, both before and after the 
enactment of Proposition 21.  After being recodified in 1991 at 
section 186.22(f), the definition of “criminal street gang” was 
expanded in 1993 and 1994 to incorporate additional 
enumerated predicate offenses.  (See Stats. 1993, ch. 601, § 1, 
p. 3161; Stats. 1993, ch. 1125, § 3, p. 6291; Stats. 1994, ch. 47, 
§ 1, p. 390, eff. Apr. 19, 1994.)  Similarly, Proposition 21 added 
two crimes to the list of predicate offenses and incorporated 
those into the definition of “criminal street gang.”  (Prop. 21, § 4 
[amending § 186.22, subds. (e), (f)].)  The definition of “criminal 
street gang” has continued to evolve after Proposition 21, in 
ways that both expand (see Stats. 2006, ch. 596, § 1, p. 4932 
[amending § 186.22(f) to incorporate an expanded list of 
enumerated offenses]) and contract (see Assem. Bill 333) that 
definition.  The voters who enacted Proposition 21 knew that the 
definition of “criminal street gang” was changeable (see 
Professional Engineers, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1048 [we 
presume voters are “aware of existing laws at the time the 
initiative was enacted”]), and there is no indication they 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
intended to foreclose future changes to the definition or to allow 
only expansion and not contraction of the definition. 
Rather, when the voters adopted Proposition 21 twelve 
years after the STEP Act was first enacted, they made clear that 
their purpose was to more severely punish crimes that are gang-
related as opposed to crimes that are not gang-related.  As noted, 
the text declares in relevant part that “[g]ang-related felonies 
should result in severe penalties.  Life without the possibility of 
parole or death should be available for murderers who kill as 
part of any gang-related activity.”  (Voter Information Guide, 
supra, text of Prop. 21, § 2, subd. (h), p. 119.)  The proponents of 
Proposition 21 emphasized its focus on stronger penalties for 
criminal activity by gangs and gang members, explaining that 
current law “must be strengthened to require serious 
consequences” in order to protect people “from the most violent 
juvenile criminals and gang offenders.”  (Voter Information 
Guide, argument in favor of Prop. 21, p. 48, italics omitted.)  
Proponents further argued that “Proposition 21 ends the ‘slap 
on the wrist’ of current law by imposing real consequences for 
GANG MEMBERS, RAPISTS AND MURDERERS who cannot 
be reached through prevention or education.”  (Ibid.)  Nowhere 
do the arguments in favor of the initiative suggest that the act 
would redefine or lock in the then-existing definition of 
“criminal street gang” rather than incorporate a definition that 
had been and continued to be subject to change. 
The purpose of Assembly Bill 333 further confirms that its 
application here poses no inconsistency with the voters’ intent 
in enacting Proposition 21.  By the time the Legislature took up 
Assembly Bill 333 in 2021, California had more than three 
decades of experience under the STEP Act.  The Legislature was 
motivated by that experience to narrow the definition of 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
criminal street gang in order to focus on “true gang-related 
crimes,” having determined that “in practice the original 
definition of a criminal street gang was not narrowly focused on 
punishing true gang-related crimes.”  (Lee, supra, 81 
Cal.App.5th at p. 245, rev.gr.)  Assembly Bill 333 did not change 
the punishment associated with gang crimes, including the 
punishment of death or life without the possibility of parole for 
individuals convicted of the gang-murder special circumstance.  
Instead, consistent with the intent of Proposition 21 to severely 
punish gang-related crimes, the Legislature in Assembly Bill 
333 “redefined the term ‘criminal street gang’ so as to truly 
target the population of criminals for which an enhanced 
punishment is warranted.”  (Lee, at p. 245; see Assem. Com. on 
Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill 333, as amended Mar. 30, 
2021, p. 4 [Assembly Bill 333 “ ‘ensur[es] gang enhancements 
are only used when necessary and fair’ ”].)   
The Attorney General argues that this case is similar to 
People v. Kelly (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1008, where we considered 
whether an aspect of the legislatively enacted Medical 
Marijuana Program (MMP) impermissibly amended the 
Compassionate Use Act enacted by the voters.  The 
Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5 
et seq.) permitted individuals to possess and cultivate limited 
quantities of marijuana reasonably for “personal medical 
purposes” 
(id., 
§ 11362.5, 
subd. (d)) 
and 
provided 
a 
corresponding affirmative defense to criminal prosecution, but 
it did not impose specific quantity limits.  (Kelly, at p. 1013.)  
The MMP did not amend the specific statutes enacted by the 
voters, but it did impose other restrictions, including quantity 
limits on the affirmative defense.  We found this to be an 
unconstitutional amendment of the voter initiative because the 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
Legislature would “take[] away from rights granted by the 
initiative statute,” which “guarantee[d] that a qualified patient 
may possess and cultivate any amount of marijuana reasonably 
necessary for his or her current medical condition.”  (Kelly, at 
p. 1043.) 
Unlike the legislation at issue in Kelly, Assembly Bill 333 
does not intrude upon the purpose of Proposition 21.  The 
purpose of Proposition 21 was to heighten the penalties for gang 
activity and other violent crimes.  While narrowing the 
definition of “criminal street gang,” Assembly Bill 333 does not 
change the punishment for those convicted of the gang-murder 
special circumstance.  (See Lee, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 244, 
rev.gr. [applying Assembly Bill 333 here “does not change the 
punishment for ‘murderers who kill as part of any gang-related 
activity,’ the relevant purpose of Proposition 21”].)   
 
Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th 270, is instructive on this 
point.  There, the Court of Appeal held that Senate Bill No. 1437 
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which amended the 
mens rea for murder was not an impermissible amendment of 
Proposition 7 (Prop. 7, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 
1978)) (Proposition 7), which increased the punishment for 
murder, or Proposition 115 (Prop. 115, as approved by voters, 
Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990)), which expanded the list of 
predicate offenses for the felony-murder rule.  Gooden rejected 
the Attorney General’s argument that Senate Bill 1437 
amended Proposition 7 by taking away from the scope of conduct 
that 
constitutes 
murder 
punishable 
by 
the 
increased 
punishments specified in the initiative.  (Gooden, at p. 281.)  The 
court emphasized that “the elements of an offense and the 
punishment for an offense plainly are not synonymous.”  (Ibid.)  
Whereas Proposition 7 addressed the punishment for murder, 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
Senate Bill 1437 addressed only the mental state required to 
commit murder.  (Gooden, at p. 282.)  “Senate Bill 1437 did not 
address the same subject matter” as Proposition 7; rather, it 
“presents a classic example of legislation that addresses a 
subject related to, but distinct from, an area addressed by an 
initiative.”  (Gooden, at p. 282; accord, People v. Nash (2020) 52 
Cal.App.5th 1041, 1059 [“While the class of individuals standing 
convicted of murder may be reduced in light of Senate Bill 
No. 1437’s changes to the felony-murder rule and the natural 
and probable consequences doctrine, the legislation does not 
change or take away from the sentences those convicted of 
murder are subject to, which is the mandate of Proposition 7.”].) 
Gooden’s distinction between the electorate’s focus on 
punishment and the Legislature’s focus on the substantive 
elements of an offense applies here.  The voters who enacted 
Proposition 21 wanted to harshly punish the members and 
activities of a “criminal street gang,” but there is no indication 
that the voters had in mind a fixed meaning of the term.  Murder 
committed by “an active participant in a criminal street gang” 
in order to “further the activities of the criminal street gang” 
(§ 190.2(a)(22)) is still punishable by death or life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole, as provided by Proposition 21.  
The statutory amendments enacted by Assembly Bill 333 ensure 
that punishment is not imposed in other circumstances. 
The Attorney General further notes that on several prior 
occasions in which the Legislature amended portions of section 
186.22, the Legislative Counsel advised that the amendment 
required approval by two-thirds of each house.  (See Legis. 
Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 444 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) 4 Stats. 
2005, ch. 482, Summary Dig., p. 235 [“Existing law authorizes 
the Legislature to amend these provisions with a 2/3 vote of each 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
house.”]; Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1222 (2005–2006 
Reg. Sess.) 6 Stats. 2006, ch. 596, Summary Dig., p. 333 [same].)  
But “the Legislature’s views regarding the legality of its 
enactments are not binding on the judiciary.”  (People v. Lopez 
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1, 21, fn. 5; see Western Security Bank v. 
Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 244.)  In any event, “ ‘[t]he 
Legislature remains free to address a “ ‘related but distinct 
area’ ” [citations] or a matter that an initiative measure “does 
not specifically authorize or prohibit.” ’ ”  (Pearson, supra, 48 
Cal.4th at p. 571.)  
Finally, we observe that the Attorney General does not 
argue against application of the amended definition of “criminal 
street gang” in all contexts, but only when applied to the gang-
murder special circumstance.  On this view, the narrower 
definition of Assembly Bill 333 would apply in all other 
circumstances, effectively making it easier to prove gang 
allegations for the purposes of imposing the death penalty or life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and more 
difficult to impose the less serious consequences that flow from 
violations of section 186.22 itself.  As one court has observed, 
“[i]t is difficult to discern a rational reason for such an 
anomalous choice.”  (Lee, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 242, 
rev.gr.) 
D. 
The Attorney General relies on three cases applying the 
Palermo rule, but none supports a different result here.  First, 
the Attorney General says the specific reference in Proposition 
21 to section 186.22(f) is comparable to the specific reference in 
Vehicle Code section 23152 to subdivisions (a) through (f) of 
section 835.6 of the Penal Code, which were held to be time-
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
specific in People v. Domagalski (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1380 
(Domagalski).  The Attorney General notes that Domagalski 
synthesized the following rule from intervening cases applying 
Palermo:  “ ‘Without exception, in each case where a statute, or 
some portion of it, was incorporated by reference to its section 
designation, the court found the reference to be specific and the 
effect was the same as if the adopted statute had been set out 
verbatim in the adopting statute, so that repeal or subsequent 
modification of the statute referred to [and] did not affect the 
adopting statute.  Only in those cases where an entire body of 
law relating to a particular subject was adopted by reference did 
the court find the reference to be general so that subsequent 
amendments to the incorporated statute affected the adopting 
statute.’ ”  (Domagalski, at pp. 1385–1386, fn. omitted.)   
It is true that Proposition 21, like the statute at issue in 
Domagalski, refers to a specific subdivision of section 186.22 to 
define “criminal street gang.”  That subdivision, however, 
contains the entirety of the Penal Code’s definition of “criminal 
street gang,” whereas the referenced subdivisions of section 
835.6 contain only a portion of the potentially relevant 
misdemeanor procedures that the Legislature could have chosen 
to incorporate into Vehicle Code section 23152 but did not.  
Domagalski also confirms that “the determining factor will be 
the legislative intent behind the incorporating statute,” which 
may be assessed through the legislative history.  (Domagalski, 
supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 1386.)  We endorsed the latter point 
in Jovan B., including Domagalski among other “modern 
decisions” that “have applied the Palermo rule” while noting 
that “none have done so without regard to other indicia of 
legislative intent.”  (Jovan B., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 816, fn. 10.)  
Domagalski is consistent with our analysis above. 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
The same is true of In re Oluwa (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 439 
(Oluwa), in which the Court of Appeal considered whether an 
inmate was subject to the custody credit calculation established 
by the voters through Proposition 7 or whether he was entitled 
to invoke more generous credit provisions later enacted by the 
Legislature.  Proposition 7 contained a statement that “ ‘[t]he 
provisions of Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 2930) of 
Chapter 7 of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Penal Code [article 2.5] shall 
apply’ ” in calculating custody credit for sentences like the 
inmate’s in Oluwa.  (Oluwa, at p. 442.)  As described in Oluwa, 
article 2.5 contained three sections governing custody credit 
calculation at the time Proposition 7 was passed; the custody 
credits at issue were enacted as separate sections of article 2.5.  
(Oluwa, at p. 443.) 
The Attorney General points to Oluwa’s statement that 
Proposition 7 was “not a reference to a system or body of laws or 
to the general law relating to the subject at hand,” but rather 
was “a specific and pointed reference to an article of the Penal 
Code . . . at the time Proposition 7 incorporated article 2.5 into 
section 190.”  (Oluwa, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 445.)  But 
Oluwa did not rest on a specific reference to article 2.5; rather, 
the court emphasized that the accompanying legislative 
analysis “advised voters that those persons sentenced to 15 
years to life in prison would have to serve a minimum of 10 years 
before becoming eligible for parole” as provided in article 2.5 at 
the time Proposition 7 was adopted.  (Oluwa, at p. 445.)  Oluwa 
explained that allowing inmates like Oluwa to benefit from 
subsequent amendments that would reduce that minimum 
specifically presented to the voters would frustrate the voters’ 
intent and constitute an impermissible legislative amendment 
of the initiative.  (Id. at p. 446.)  Here, by contrast, we have no 
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
similar representation in the ballot materials accompanying 
Proposition 21 that applies or even mentions a specific definition 
of “criminal street gang,” and thus no basis to infer that the 
voters intended to lock in such a definition. 
The Attorney General also cites People v. Anderson (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 767, which concerned the proper interpretation of 
section 26, a statute precluding duress as a defense to crimes 
“punishable with death.”  When section 26’s predecessor was 
first enacted, this category of crimes included all forms of 
murder.  The defendant argued that because only first degree 
murder with special circumstances is so punishable today, 
duress should constitute a defense to all forms of murder except 
first degree murder with special circumstances.  (Anderson, at 
p. 773.)  In other words, the defendant argued that the reference 
to crimes “punishable with death” in section 26 was general and 
therefore evolves with the changing nature of what constitutes 
a capital offense.  After considering various indicia of legislative 
intent and the “anomalous[]” and “random results” that would 
result from the defendant’s position, we held that duress is “not 
a defense to any form of murder” and that the reference in 
section 26 was specific.  (Anderson, at pp. 775, 780; see id. at 
pp. 774–778.)   
The Attorney General says “the reference [in Proposition 
21] is even more specific than the reference at issue in 
Anderson.”  This argument appears to draw the wrong lesson 
from Anderson.  Anderson illustrates that a statutory reference 
that appears to be general can, upon inquiry into legislative 
intent, turn out to be specific.  This case shows the reverse also 
can be true:  the statutory reference in section 190.2 may appear 
specific, but the relevant indicia of voter intent show that the 
reference is general.   
PEOPLE v. ROJAS 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
We conclude that applying Assembly Bill 333’s definition 
of “criminal street gang” to the gang-murder special 
circumstance does not unconstitutionally amend section 
190.2(a)(22).  Accepting, as did the Court of Appeal, the Attorney 
General’s concession below that the evidence presented at trial 
is not sufficient to sustain the gang allegations under Assembly 
Bill 333, we vacate the true finding on the gang-murder special 
circumstance in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment below and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Rojas 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 80 Cal.App.5th 542 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S275835 
Date Filed:  December 18, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Kern 
Judge:  John W. Lua 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Sharon G. Wrubel, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell and Susan 
Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorneys General, Dana Muhammad Ali, 
Idan Ivri, Louis M. Vasquez, Daniel B. Bernstein, Robert Gezi, 
Amanda D. Cary, William K. Kim and Stacy S. Schwartz, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee C. Stapleton for the Criminal 
Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
Gregory D. Totten for the California District Attorneys Association as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion):  
 
Sharon G. Wrubel 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1240 
Pacific Palisades, CA 90272  
(310) 459-4689 
 
Stacy S. Schwartz 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90013  
(213) 269-6099