Case Title: Spence v. Division of Family Services

Citation: 

Docket Number: 217, 2002, 224, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MELVIN SPENCE and  
 
) 
DEBRA SPENCE,  
 
 
)  No. 217/224, 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondents Below, 
) 
 
 
Appellants,  
 
)  Court Below:  Family Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES, )  File No. 00-08-ITK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  Petition No. 00-25529 
 
 
Petitioner Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  January 7, 2003 
Decided:  February 11, 2003 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 11th day of February, 2003, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
Debra Spence appeals from the Family Court’s Termination Of 
Parental Rights Order terminating her and Melvin Spence’s parental rights in their 
children Kimberly Spence, Heather Renee Spence, Matthew Edward Spence, and 
Priscilla Crystal Spence.1  Debra Spence also appeals the Family Court’s 
Dependency/Neglect Order denying her custody of her youngest child Skyven 
Spence, born December 7, 2000. 
                                                 
1 Pseudonyms were assigned to both Appellants by this Court’s Order dated April 29, 2000. 
 
2
(2) 
On March 30, 1999, Kimberly reported to Chief Kober of the 
Wyoming Police Department that her father had physically abused her.  Thereafter, 
Chief Kober contacted DFS social worker/investigator Schoenbeck, and they 
interviewed Kimberly.  Kimberly revealed that her father had physically abused all 
of the children, and sexually abused Kimberly. 
 
(3) 
Schoenbeck then interviewed the Spence family members and learned 
that: (i) Melvin Spence had a substance abuse problem; (ii) there had been 
concerns about sexual abuse in the family since 1994 in three states (Texas, New 
Jersey and Delaware); and (iii) Debra Spence knew of the abuse and did nothing to 
protect the children. 
 
(4) 
As a result of the disclosures of sexual abuse in New Jersey, 
Schoenbeck arranged for Detective Row of the New Jersey State Police to 
interview Kimberly and Heather.  Both children revealed in detail, and in separate 
interviews, that their father had sexually abused them on numerous occasions.  
Eventually, Melvin Spence confessed to Detective Row that he sexually abused his 
daughters on numerous occasions.  Detective Row told Debra Spence of the 
children’s allegations and Melvin Spence’s confession, but Debra Spence refused 
to believe any of the allegations. 
 
(5) 
The State of New Jersey charged Melvin Spence with Aggravated 
Assault, Sexual Assault, Criminal Sexual Contact, and Endangering the Welfare of 
 
3
a Child.  Melvin Spence entered a guilty plea to the felony of Endangering the 
Welfare of a Child.  In Delaware, Melvin Spence entered a guilty plea to the 
charge of Offensive Touching. 
 
(6) 
Schoenbeck filed a dependency/neglect petition and custody petition 
on behalf of DFS for the Spence children.  By April 1999, all of the children were 
in foster care.  The investigation continued after the children entered foster care.  
On August 23, 1999, Ralph Richardson, a forensic interviewer, interviewed 
Kimberly and Heather at the Child Advocacy Center.  The interviews were taped 
and played at trial.  Kimberly revealed that she witnessed specific incidents of 
sexual abuse by her brothers (Melvin Jr. and Martin) and father with her, her 
sisters and her younger brother.  Kimberly also stated that her mother “knew 
everything that was going on.”2 
 
(7) 
In April 1999, the DFS case was transferred to Linda Schimp.  
Schimp entered a case plan to target the problem areas in the Spence family so that 
the children could eventually return to their mother.  At this point, Melvin Spence 
remained incarcerated in New Jersey.  Schimp testified that Debra Spence failed to 
accomplish any of her case plan except for visitation. 
 
(8) 
In December 1999, the DFS case was transferred to Maryanne 
Edgison.  At this point, Melvin Spence was released pending related charges of 
                                                 
2 Appellee’s Appendix B-148. 
 
4
sexual abuse in Delaware.  Edgison developed a case plan for both parents, but two 
days after the plan was signed, Melvin and Debra Spence were arrested in 
Delaware on charges alleging sexual abuse of their children.  The goals of the case 
plan were never met. 
 
(9) 
Over the next year, Debra Spence refused to work with DFS, and 
visitation deteriorated.  The goal of the case was no longer reunification, and the 
Spences made no attempt to visit their children in foster care. 
 
(10) In December 2000, Debra Spence had a sixth child, Skyven.  Melvin 
Spence is not Skyven’s father.  Monica Morris, the children’s social worker, 
referred Skyven’s case to DFS.  Fearing that Skyven would be a target for abuse 
because of Debra Spence’s alleged role in facilitating the sexual abuse of her 
children and the pending release of Skyven’s older brother Martin from a sex 
offender program, a DFS investigator asked to speak with Debra Spence to verify 
that Skyven would be safe.  Debra Spence refused to speak to the investigator.  
Thereafter, DFS filed for and received custody of Skyven.   
 
(11) At trial, Kimberly, Heather and Matthew testified regarding sexual 
abuse by Melvin Spence, their older brothers and their uncles on numerous 
occasions over a period of six years.   They also testified that Debra Spence was 
aware of the abuse.  Debra Spence, through cross-examination, attempted to 
suggest that Kimberly had a motive to accuse her father falsely because he slapped 
 
5
her and threw her out of the house.  The trial judge, after observing the children, 
found them credible.   
 
(12) Debra Spence now appeals the Family Court’s judgment.  She asserts 
three claims of error in this appeal: (i) the trial judge erred in finding a statutory 
basis to terminate her parental rights under 13 Del C. § 1103(a)(5); (ii) assuming 
the existence of a statutory basis for terminating her parental rights, the trial judge 
erred in its analysis of the best interest of the child under 13 Del. C. § 722; and (iii) 
the trial judge erred when he found that Skyven would be dependent or neglected if 
returned to Debra Spence’s custody. 
 
(13) This Court’s review of appeals from the Family Court extends to a 
review of the facts and law as well as to a review of the inferences and deductions 
made by the judge.3  This Court will not disturb findings of fact unless they are 
clearly wrong and justice requires that they be overturned.4  If the Family Court 
has correctly applied the law, the standard of review is abuse of discretion.5  Errors 
of law, however, are reviewed de novo.6   
 
(14) A court may grant a termination of parental rights petition if two 
requirements are met: (i) facts exist that show proof of an enumerated statutory 
                                                 
3 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
4 Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983). 
5 Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 186 (Del. 1991). 
6 In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995). 
 
6
ground, and (ii) termination is in the best interests of the child.7  Debra Spence 
argues that the trial judge erred in finding a statutory basis to terminate parental 
rights under 13 Del. C. §1103(a)(5).  13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5) allows the court to 
terminate parental rights if the parent fails to plan adequately for her children’s 
physical needs or mental and emotional health.8  Debra Spence argues that she did 
not fail to plan adequately for her children’s physical needs or mental and 
emotional health because she was unaware that Melvin Spence sexually abused the 
children.  The record is replete with evidence that contradicts this assertion.  In 
addition, we cannot disagree with the trial judge’s conclusion that the children 
were credible unless that finding is clearly erroneous.  The overwhelming evidence 
in the record suggests that Debra Spence’s contention does not meet this burden.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial judge was not clearly erroneous when he 
concluded that Debra Spence knew of the abuse and failed to protect her children. 
(15) Debra Spence next argues that the Family Court Opinion is devoid of 
the required statutory analysis of the best interest of the child standard under 13 
Del. C. § 722.  13 Del. C. § 722 states that the Family Court must look to the best 
interests of the child when determining legal custody, by considering the following 
factors: 
                                                 
7 Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000). 
8 11 Del. C. §1103(a)(5). 
 
7
(a) The wishes of the child’s parents as to his custody and residential 
arrangements; 
(b) The wishes of the child as to his custodian and residential 
arrangements 
(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with other 
relatives with whom he lives; 
(d) The child’s adjustment to his home, school and community; 
(e) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved; 
(f) Past and present compliance by both parents with their rights and 
responsibilities to their child; 
(g) Evidence of domestic violence. 
 
(17) Although the trial judge did not list the applicable factors in the best 
interest of the child analysis, he clearly applied them.  In the Opinion, the trial 
judge stated that: (i) the children wished to remain in foster care or be adopted; (ii) 
the children are better adjusted to their foster homes, new schools and community; 
(iii) according to the testimony of experts at trial, the children are in better mental 
health than they were before; and (iv) there was obvious evidence of domestic 
violence.9  Accordingly, the trial judge considered the statutory factors in his 
analysis. 
(18) Debra Spence’s last argument is that the trial judge erred in finding 
that the infant child, Skyven, would be a dependant or neglected child if placed 
within her custody.  “Dependent child” means a child whose physical, mental or 
emotional health and well-being is threatened or impaired because of inadequate 
care and protection by the child’s custodian, who is unable to provide adequate 
                                                 
9 Division of Family Services v. (Spence), Del. Fam., No. 00-08-1TK, Nicholas, J. (March 22, 
2002) at 11.  
 
8
care for the child.10 Based on the overwhelming evidence of sexual abuse within 
the family, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that Skyven would 
be a dependant or neglected child if placed in Debra Spence’s custody and that 
custody should remain with the DFS pending any determination for placement it 
should make.    
The judgment of the Family Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__/s/ Myron T. Steele_______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
10 10 Del. C. § 901(8).  10 Del. C. § 901(1) provides “adequate care means a type and degree of 
personalized attention that will tend to advance a child’s physical, mental, moral, emotional, and 
general well-being.”