Case Title: Dolan Darling v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC94-691

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC94691
____________
DOLAN DARLING,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[January 3, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a
sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
MATERIAL FACTS
The victim in this case, Grazyna Mlynarczyk (“Grace”), was a thirty-three-
year-old Polish female living illegally in the United States.  The State’s first witness,
Zdzislaw Raminski (known as “Jesse”), had met the victim in Poland in 1990 or
-2-
1991.  Grace and Jessie developed a personal relationship, which continued when
Grace moved to Orlando on September 28, 1992.
Jesse owned and operated Able Transportation, which provided shuttle
service to and from the airport, and Grace was employed part-time with this
enterprise.  The last time Jesse saw Grace alive was on the morning of October 29,
1996, at around 9:30.  At that time she was wearing shorts and a small shirt, as she
was doing laundry in a facility at her apartment complex.  Jesse did not exit his
vehicle when talking with Grace only briefly that morning.  She told Jesse that she
had an appointment with a gynecologist later that day.  Jesse gave Grace an
AmSouth Bank envelope containing three hundred dollars cash in payment for
work she had performed for the company during the prior week.  Jesse drove away
from the apartment complex and proceeded to work.  Jesse again spoke with Grace
around 10:15 a.m. by phone, and she indicated that she was still doing laundry, and
would call him after she returned from her doctor’s appointment.  Although Jesse
continued to telephone Grace throughout the day, he was unable to reach her again. 
Around 4:10 p.m., Jesse called again and was still unable to reach Grace.  He
became concerned that she had not telephoned him after her doctor’s appointment,
so he returned to her apartment complex.  
-3-
Upon arriving there, he was surprised to find that the blinds to Grace’s
apartment--which she never closed during the daytime--were closed.  He used his
key to enter the apartment, where he found a basket with laundry in the living room,
and the door to the bedroom closed.  He recalled seeing no disturbed objects in the
apartment.  Upon entering the bedroom, however, he found Grace.  She was on her
back on the floor, naked from the waist down, with her face near the bed and her
legs inside the closet.  When she did not respond to him, Jessie moved Grace to
the bed, and discovered that she was cold, and had blood on her.  He proceeded
to call 911 for assistance and members of the fire department arrived shortly
thereafter.  They soon determined that Grace was dead.
Officers from the Orange County Sheriff’s Office responded to the scene
and secured items of evidence found in the bathroom, which included a lotion
bottle, a pair of panties, and a pink throw pillow.  The pillow had a blackened area
and a gunshot hole through the sides.  There was blood spatter on the door of the
closet, and blood present in the closet area.  Two AmSouth Bank envelopes were
found which contained cash totaling approximately twelve hundred dollars and a
shoe box was discovered which contained one thousand dollars.  There was also a
wallet which held fifty-eight dollars.  Jewelry located in boxes appeared to be
undisturbed.  
-4-
An officer who had canvassed Grace’s neighborhood to determine whether
there were witnesses with information regarding the murder testified that he had
contacted Darling on October 30, the day after the murder.  Darling’s apartment
was located just north of Grace’s apartment.  In response to the investigating
officer’s inquiry, Darling had said that “he was working and didn’t know anything
of the incident.”
Dr. William Robert Anderson of the Orlando Medical Examiner’s Office
testified at trial.  His testimony included a discussion concerning the “defect” in the
pillow, particularly the “cloud of soot” from the “burning gun powder” left on the
pillow as the “bullet comes out.”  The gun was fired at close range because he
observed “in the victim only a small amount of soot material.  But . . . on the pillow
there is a significant amount of that soot material.”  Dr. Anderson indicated that
“the end of the weapon was up against that pillow . . . fairly tightly.”  He also
testified that the “defect in the middle is consistent with a bullet passing through . .
., creating a tear.”  When the doctor first saw Grace, “[r]igor mortis was
complete,” and he estimated that she “was probably dead at least six hours from
the time we saw her, which was about seven.” 
Dr. Anderson testified that the bullet entered “the right back of the head.”
Grace had an abrasion there “consistent with something having been up against the
-5-
cloth transferring energy across to the skin and creating that.”  “That pillow” was
consistent with the abrasion.  The doctor found that Grace had “some vaginal
injuries, but nothing that would make her bleed significantly.”  There was “[a] lot of
bleeding . . . inside the brain,” but “she’s gonna die pretty quick.”  He stated that
“[c]onsciousness would probably not be more than a few seconds,” and that
“[s]he would have no motor activity” or any “ability to move anything at that
point.”  The doctor stated that “the rapidity [with] which she dies” is “one of the
reasons she probably didn’t bleed.” 
The doctor stated that there was “seminal purulent” in Grace’s vaginal area
and bruising on the “back of the elbows . . . consistent with some moving around.” 
There was “a hemorrhage,” which “means that took place when circulation was
alive.”  The vaginal area abrasions were “consistent with vaginal trauma from
penetration of some object, penial, digital, some other object.”  The doctor pointed
out that the “tear of the labia majora, which is a very sensitive area” was “quite
painful,” adding: “This would not be consistent with consensual sex, in that the
pain would interrupt the activity.  It would be painful enough that consensual sex
would not apply after that point.”  The doctor observed that “there wasn’t anything
1.  Dr. Anderson stated that he had “seen many, many sexual assault victims
that don’t have . . . defense wounds . . . .”  He observed, further, that in “[t]he
majority of the cases of sexual battery . . . they don’t put up a struggle.”
-6-
in the labia that would explain those abrasions other than trauma.”1  The victim’s 
“rectal area” had “some tears,” which were caused by “[d]igital penetration, penial
penetration, some trauma.”  The doctor opined that this, too, was painful.  He
further indicated that the “gunshot wound to the head with the injuries . . .
described” was the cause of Grace’s death.
Photographs and records of fingerprints found in Grace’s apartment were
developed and submitted to a comparison expert.  A photograph of fingerprints
from the lotion bottle was developed, and admitted into evidence as Exhibit 14.  At
trial, the State’s expert in the detection, enhancement, and recording of fingerprints
opined that the fingerprint on the lotion bottle had been there for less than one year.
 The State’s expert in the area of fingerprint comparison compared the fingerprints
on Exhibit 14 with fingerprints obtained from Darling.  He testified at trial that he
found a print on the lotion bottle which matched that of Darling’s right thumb. 
The State’s expert in the area of forensic serology tested vaginal swabs and a
rectal smear which were taken from the victim’s body, and found semen on them. 
A stain card containing Darling’s blood which had been prepared for examination
and comparison was admitted into evidence at trial without objection.
-7-
David Baer, a Senior Crime Laboratory Analyst in the DNA Section of the
Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Orlando Crime Laboratory, also
testified as an expert at trial.  He indicated that he had been with FDLE for some
nineteen years.  He had begun doing DNA work in the laboratory upon its inception
in 1991, and had continued to work there until the date of trial.  Upon Baer’s being
tendered as an expert by the State, defense counsel objected on the basis that “this
witness hasn’t indicated any qualification in the area of statistical analysis.” 
Baer stated that, although he did not “claim to be a statistician,” he was
“familiar with how statistics are used in this instance.”  He indicated that he relied
on the expertise of other statisticians in reaching his expert opinion.  However, he
also indicated that he had been qualified to render an expert opinion in the area of
statistical interpretation of DNA tests “just about any time I testify on DNA,”
having never been denied expert qualification in that area.  He stated that he had
been qualified as an expert in the performance and interpretation of DNA
allowances in Florida courts “fifty to sixty times.”  His training in the area of DNA
statistical analysis included completion of a 160-hour course which included “about
sixteen hours in statistics”; in addition, he had been educated in statistics in several
“other short courses,” including a statistics workshop in 1995.  
2.  The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy
of Sciences in 1916. 
3.  The FBI’s African-American population database was used, based on
“seven hundred to a thousand” samples “collected around the country.”  
4.  Baer testified that he did two statistical calculations for each database,
using the product rule in addition to the modified ceiling principle.  As we explained
in Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268 (Fla.1997):
The “product rule” is a traditional calculation used by statisticians and
population geneticists to calculate population frequency statistics.  It is
well explained in the 1992 NRC report.  A more detailed explanation
of the calculations performed in creating population frequency
statistics is set out in the 1996 NRC report.
Id. at 272 n.7.  In Brim, further, we specifically addressed the use of “multiple
-8-
Baer testified that he used the modified ceiling principal formula, which is a
variation of the product rule recommended by the National Research Council2 in its
1992 Report.  He acknowledged that there are “issues about the genetic variation
between different populations,” and to compensate for that, he did three
calculations in Darling’s case.  Each calculation utilized a different database: one
was based on African-American data,3 one was based on Caucasian data, and one
was based on Southeastern Hispanics from the Miami area, where there are racial
differences in DNA types.  In Baer’s opinion, use of the ceiling principal
compensated for any differences within the major ethnic groups, which he stated
are regarded as “very insignificant,” in any event.4
reasonable deductions” to satisfy the test established in Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923):
We may allow multiple reasonable deductions when all are based on
generally accepted principles of population genetics and statistics.   At
the time this case was tried, processes that did not utilize the "ceiling
principles" might not have satisfied the Frye test because those
calculations did not take into account the possibility of population
substructures.   A sizeable portion of the scientific community
speculated that failure to account for population substructures made
"product rule" statistics unreliable.   In 1996, that view changed and,
therefore, the "ceiling principles" are no longer necessary.   We do not
find, though, that they are unreliable.   While the results obtained
through the use of "ceiling principles" might be unduly conservative,
the scientific principles underlying the calculations are still generally
accepted.   By analogy, the fact that we now have calculators does not
make long-hand arithmetic unreliable.   If anything, calculators only
make such long-hand work unnecessary.   Necessity, though, is not
the concern of the Frye analysis.
695 So. 2d at 273 (footnote omitted).  
5.  The Caucasian database used--which had “been reviewed by a
statistician--was “based on a population study” including 166 samples, which was
done by FDLE in Orlando in 1990 or 1991.  In comparing his database numbers
with others globally, Baer found them to be comparable. 
6.  Baer did not have a DNA database for Bahamian people; when asked if
there were any, he replied: “I suppose there might be, I don’t know.”  He added
that he “believed” that the Broward County Lab did “a Bahamian study,” but he did
not have “those figures.”  When asked by defense counsel whether there were
-9-
Baer testified that “[t]here is no one formula for a sample size” for a DNA
database.  The Caucasian database used by Baer was one which he and FDLE had
produced in the Orlando laboratory.5  He used the FBI’s African-American6 and
“certain ethnic groups that have wildly different DNA than the rest of the population
of the Earth,” Baer replied that “where you might find that is if you have a very
inbred group, like an isolated Indian tribe where they have, just have certain markers
which they keep reproducing.  But generally found within the United States as a
whole--there’s a fairly good distribution of the major types within major ethnic
groups.”
7.  The FBI’s Eastern Hispanic database was used; this is “published by the
FBI actually based on samples from the Miami area.” Baer also had a Hispanic
database compiled from Arizona, California, and Texas.  The Hispanic database
had “seven- to eight-hundred” samples.  Baer testified that the FBI databases were
compiled at “around the same time” as the Orlando database.  
-10-
Hispanic7 databases.  Baer testified that the formula used by FDLE when “we do
the modified ceiling calculations . . . gives a ninety-five percent upper confidence
level.” 
After conducting voir dire of Baer, defense counsel objected to “the witness
being qualified to discuss analysis as an expert in that field.”  The trial judge found
Baer qualified to testify as an expert in DNA analysis, stating (outside the presence
of the jury):
I find the witness is qualified to conduct laboratory analysis
stipulated by both parties and qualified in the application of the
statistical formulas developed by others.  Although not a statistician
himself he is sufficiently trained and qualified to use those formulas
much as a person might make certain calculations using algebraic
formulas might not be qualified to testify as to the fundamental
mathematics underlying development of those formulas.  He’s not
required to be a statistician himself in order to use those formulas.
Baer then testified regarding the DNA examination which he had performed
-11-
on Darling’s blood and the vaginal swabs containing sperm.  He stated that the test
performed on the subject semen sample was one which had been used consistently
for the past nine years.  As a result of the testing, Baer concluded that the DNA
from Darling’s blood sample had both a strong band and a weak band which
matched the male fraction found on the vaginal swabs containing sperm from
Grace’s vagina.  Baer explained that a statistical analysis was performed using the
resultant data: “Once I determin[e] that a profile does match I’ll then do a statistical
interpretation of the profile to determine how common would this profile be in the
general population.”  In this case, after finding ten independent genetic markers,
Baer determined the frequency of each of them. 
Baer stated that he had computed numbers that varied depending upon which
of the different databases were used.  Based upon the Caucasian database, and
using the product rule with the plus or minus 1.735 bin window, Darling’s DNA
profile would have a frequency of about one out of 239 billion.  Using the modified
ceiling method, with “the larger match window,” the match frequency would be
“one out of ninety-nine billion Caucasians.”  
Applying the product rule with the plus or minus 1.735 bin window to the
FBI’s African-American population database, Darling’s DNA profile would have a
frequency of “one out of 104 billion” African-Americans.  Using the modified
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ceiling method, with “the larger match window,” the match frequency would be one
out of 101 billion African-Americans.
Using the California Hispanic database, and the product rule with the plus or
minus 1.735 bin window, Darling’s DNA profile would have a frequency of “one
out of 1.7 billion, eighty-one Hispanics.”  Using the modified ceiling method, with
“the larger match window,” the match frequency would be one out of 1.3 trillion
Hispanics.
At the close of the State’s case, Darling did not testify, and offered no
evidence.  The jury was instructed and, after deliberating, found Darling guilty of
capital murder and armed sexual battery. 
During the penalty phase proceeding, the State presented evidence of a prior
violent felony conviction.  Gerald Paul Daigneault, a self-employed taxicab driver,
testified that he had been robbed at gunpoint by Darling after having picked him up
as a passenger.  Daigneault stated that, although he had complied with Darling’s
demands, when he turned to give Darling his money, he was shot in the back of the
head.  The bullet shattered Daigneault’s jaw, destroying his eardrum and part of his
gum.  Daigneault survived by opening the car door, rolling out, and “playing dead”
until Darling drove off.  Darling’s conviction and sentence for these crimes were
entered into evidence without objection.  After Daigneault testified, victim impact
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evidence was also presented.
Darling then presented four penalty phase witnesses.  Bahamian Deshane
Claer testified that Darling was the father of her three-year-old daughter, Divinka. 
Claer stated that Darling had provided emotional support during her pregnancy,
although she had no contact with Darling from the time she first learned she was
pregnant until four or five months later.  Shortly thereafter, Divinka was born, and,
the next month, Darling left for the United States.  Claer stated that Darling had
maintained contact with her, sending Christmas, birthday, and Valentine’s cards
and other communications to her and their daughter, about whom he expressed
concern. 
Darling’s sister Verneki Butler, a computer teacher in the Bahamas, also
testified.  Butler stated that her parents, although not married, had lived together,
and were both employed outside the home.  The children had plenty of food, good
clothes, and other necessary provisions while growing up, and they attended
church.  Her father was considered “a good hard-working citizen and a success,”
who supported his family well, and helped Butler to go to college. 
However, Butler stated that she had suffered extreme emotional difficulties
related to her father, in part, because of embarrassment arising from his many
extramarital affairs.  Butler also testified that her father was “very verbally abusive”
8.  Darling had been on probation for shoplifting.
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to her, and that he was verbally, emotionally, and physically abusive to her mother
and Darling.  She stated that the abuse directed to her mother had started a little
before she left home to go to college (at age sixteen), and that most of it occurred
while she was gone.  However, she had heard reports from her mother and, upon
returning home after graduation from college, she “saw it again.”  The worst
incident she ever witnessed was when Darling was beaten with a P.V.C. pipe
because he had missed a meeting with his probation officer.8  In another incident,
Darling was beaten because their father had to wait for him.  At other times, Darling
was beaten when “he tried to separate a fight” between his parents.  Butler did not
think that Darling was like their father, because “[t]o me he shows more love.”
Darling’s mother, Eleanor Bessie Smith, testified.  She stated that Darling’s
father, Carlton, had provided for the children, and the two of them had built the
family’s middle class home together.  Smith stated that Carlton’s alcoholism “was
a problem” in the home.  She stated that Carlton “was abusive with [her]” and was
verbally abusive toward Verneki “when he drinks.” After Darling began college, his
father “never cared for him at all,” and Darling complained that he wanted Carlton
to “show some interest in him, not just to put food on the table.”  Smith said that,
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on many occasions, Darling would try to defend her from Carlton, and would
receive “bruises” as a result.  Smith believed that Carlton’s relationships with other
women were embarrassing for Darling.  She had brought Darling up to believe in
God, and she related that Darling had kept in touch and demonstrated concern for
her while he was in jail.  
Darling’s last witness was Dr. Michael Herkov, who was accepted without
objection as an expert in forensic psychology.  Dr. Herkov did a clinical interview
with Darling, reviewed some of the discovery provided by the State, and evaluated
Darling.  He also consulted with investigators, interviewed family members, and
read Carlton’s deposition.  Carlton indicated that his relationship with Darling had
deteriorated because “as he entered the teen years he got in trouble and was
difficult to discipline.”  Darling’s family members described him to Dr. Herkov as
“a very good person, very polite, very non-violent, loving to his children, and a
good domestic partner, caring, et cetera, et cetera.”   However, Dr. Herkov testified
that it was quite possible that Darling appeared one way to family members and was
still capable of committing murder.  Dr. Herkov also read the statement of Harlan
Deen (a headmaster at one of the Bahamian schools Darling attended), and spoke
with Darling’s probation officer, Debra Rolle.  Deen had reported to Dr. Herkov
that Darling (whom Deen described as a “bully”) could “appear to be very
9.  After the jury retired to deliberate, Darling addressed the court: 
I did not rape anyone. . . . Mr. Ashton [the prosecutor]
stated . . . that I didn't know Grace [Mlynarczyk] – I
never said I didn't know Grace Mlynarczyk.  I never
denied having a sexual relationship with Grace
Mlynarczyk.  So he was straying, had the jury off into a
different direction.
-16-
compliant and cooperative and friendly and then do a lot of things that were
inconsistent with that.” 
Dr. Herkov indicated that Darling’s I.Q. of 84 was “about a middle low
average range,” and that there was “some evidence to suggest a learning disability,”
but “no diagnosis.”  Dr. Herkov said that Darling’s “problems in school” were
“certainly consistent with somebody who’s been abused.”  Dr. Herkov said that
physically abused children “are much more likely to get in trouble with the legal
system, to have crimes that are violent,” and to engage in “antisocial” behaviors. 
Nonetheless, Dr. Herkov opined that, knowing everything that had happened to
Darling as a child, he could not “at all” say that it excused his behavior in this case,
nor did Dr. Herkov conclude that the abuse could lead Darling to do something that
he did not know he was doing. 
At the close of the penalty phase evidence, the jury retired to deliberate its
sentencing recommendation,9 following which, they recommended a death sentence
10.   Specifically, Darling raised the following issues in his initial brief: that
the trial court reversibly erred in (1) denying Darling’s motion for judgment of
acquittal; (2) admitting DNA evidence; (3) not allowing defense counsel to
comment on the State’s failure to exclude other suspects; (4) limiting Darling’s voir
dire examination during jury selection; (5) denying Darling’s requested instruction
regarding circumstantial evidence; (6) precluding defense counsel’s rebuttal closing
argument where the State had waived its closing argument; (7) refusing to allow
Darling to argue residual doubt as a mitigator; and (8) denying Darling’s requested
special penalty phase jury instructions.  Additionally, Darling asserted that (9) the
absence of a complete record on appeal deprived him of adequate appellate review;
(10) his death sentence is disproportionate; and (11) his death sentence violates the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (Dec. 24, 1969) (the
“Vienna Convention”).
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by eleven to one.  After conducting a hearing pursuant to Spencer v State, 615 So.
2d 688 (Fla. 1993), the trial judge found two aggravating factors, the statutory age
mitigator, and several nonstatutory mitigators.  He rejected as mitigators the fact
that Darling is a human being, and residual doubt.  After assigning appropriate
weight to the mitigation and considering all factors bearing on the sentencing
decision, the trial court found that “the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances present.”  Following the jury recommendation, he
imposed the death sentence for the capital murder, and sentenced Darling to 256.5
months for the armed sexual battery.  Darling raises eleven points on appeal. 10  We
turn first to the appellant's claims concerning the guilt phase of the trial.
APPEAL
Denial of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
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Darling argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of
acquittal because the State's evidence, which is wholly circumstantial, failed to
exclude the reasonable hypothesis that someone other than Darling killed the victim,
or that the killing was not premeditated.  Darling also argues that the State’s
evidence was legally insufficient to support a guilty verdict for sexual battery.  
In moving for a judgment of acquittal, a defendant “admits not only the facts
stated in the evidence adduced, but also admits every conclusion favorable to the
adverse party that a jury might fairly and reasonably infer from the evidence.” 
Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla.1974).  As explained in Lynch:  
The courts should not grant a motion for judgment of acquittal unless
the evidence is such that no view which the jury may lawfully take of it
favorable to the opposite party can be sustained under the law.  Where
there is room for a difference of opinion between reasonable men as to
the proof of facts from which the ultimate fact is sought to be
established, or where there is room for such differences as to the
inference which might be drawn from conceded facts, the Court
should submit the case to the jury for their finding, as it is their
conclusion, in such cases, that should prevail and not primarily the
views of the judge.  The credibility and probative force of conflicting
testimony should not be determined on a motion for judgment of
acquittal. 
Id.
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However, where a conviction is based wholly upon circumstantial evidence,
a special standard of review applies.  See Jaramillo v. State, 559 So. 2d 187
(Fla.1982).  As stated in State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1989):
Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly
the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be sustained
unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of
innocence.  The question of whether the evidence fails to exclude all
reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the jury to determine, and
where there is substantial, competent evidence to support the jury
verdict, we will not reverse. 
. . . .
. . . A motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted in a
circumstantial evidence case if the state fails to present evidence from
which the jury can exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of
guilt.  Consistent with the standard set forth in Lynch, if the state does
not offer evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant's
hypothesis, "the evidence [would be] such that no view which the jury
may lawfully take of it favorable to the [state] can be sustained under
the law."  293 So. 2d at 45. The state's evidence would be as a matter
of law "insufficient to warrant a conviction."  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.380.
It is the trial judge's proper task to review the evidence to
determine the presence or absence of competent evidence from which
the jury could infer guilt to the exclusion of all other inferences.  That
view of the evidence must be taken in the light most favorable to the
state.  The state is not required to "rebut conclusively every possible
variation" of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but
only to introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the
defendant's theory of events.  Once that threshold burden is met, it
becomes the jury's duty to determine whether the evidence is sufficient
to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. at 188-89 (citations and footnote omitted).
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 In this case, Darling’s theory of innocence was that he had a consensual
sexual encounter with the victim sometime prior to her death, after which she was
killed by someone else (possibly one of the maintenance men at the apartment
complex in which she lived, or her Polish husband, or her boyfriend Jesse). 
However, there is no record evidence to support such a consensual sexual
encounter with the victim.  First, the medical examiner was unequivocal in testifying
that the abrasions in the victim’s vaginal area were evidence of forcible sex.  While
he stated that the injuries could be indicative of “very violent sex,” he also testified
that, given the nature of the vaginal abrasions, the encounter would be so painful
that any continuation of the act beyond that point would not be consensual. 
Further, Darling’s theory that the victim scratched herself because of her cervical
inflammation was also inconsistent with the medical examiner’s testimony,
indicating both that, anatomically, the cervical inflammation would not cause vaginal
itching, and that the abrasions were several layers deep; thus, it would be very
painful to inflict them.
Second, the existence of a “relationship” between Darling and the victim is
not supported by the testimony of the witnesses.  Jesse stated that Grace was his
girlfriend, and that he was not aware that she had a relationship with anyone else. 
Further, the detective who canvassed the neighborhood stated that Darling told him
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he was at work during the time frame of the incident, and knew nothing about it. 
While Darling argues that he never denied knowing Grace, this is not a reasonable
conclusion, given this officer’s testimony.  Because the State presented competent,
substantial evidence which is inconsistent with Darling’s theory that he had a
consensual sexual relationship with the victim, and that someone else murdered her
afterwards, the trial court did not err in denying Darling’s motion for judgment of
acquittal.  See generally Law, 559 So. 2d at 188-89.
Competent, Substantial Evidence to Support the Verdict
Having determined that the record contains competent, substantial evidence
which is inconsistent with Darling’s theory of innocence as argued at trial, we must
next determine whether there is competent, substantial evidence to support the
jury’s verdict.  See Beasley v. State, 774 So. 2d 649, 657 (Fla. 2000) (citing Law,
559 So. 2d at 188 (observing that “[t]he question of whether the evidence fails to
exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the jury to determine, and
where there is substantial, competent evidence to support the jury verdict, we will
not reverse”)).  Here, such record evidence does exist. 
-22-
Initially, Darling argues that the semen evidence is not conclusive, because
the length of time that the semen was present in the victim’s body was not
established.  Because the record evidence does not support a theory that Darling
engaged in a consensual sexual encounter with the victim sometime prior to her
death, this argument is unpersuasive.  Additionally, Darling challenges the
fingerprint evidence as insufficient to support his conviction.  However, this
argument, which is premised on Darling’s position that the otherwise compelling
DNA evidence is “unreliable,” overlooks important distinctions between this case
and the cases relied upon by the appellant, Jaramillo v. State, 417 So. 2d 257 (Fla.
1982) and Shores v. State, 756 So. 2d 114  (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).  
In Jaramillo and Shores, the only evidence linking the defendants to the
crimes was fingerprint evidence appearing on items for which there was another
reasonable hypothesis presented by the defense.  In Jaramillo, the defendant himself
testified, providing an explanation for his fingerprints on a kitchen knife and on a
grocery bag located next to a chair in the dining room.  Significantly, although latent
prints were discovered in areas where the house had been ransacked and on the
handcuffs with which one of the two victims (each shot in the head three times) had
been bound, none of these prints belonged to Jaramillo.  Here, in contrast, the State
did not rely solely upon the fingerprint evidence on the lotion bottle to establish
-23-
Darling’s presence in the apartment at the time of the murder; it also presented
compelling evidence that the victim had been forcibly raped, coupled with equally
strong DNA evidence of semen taken from the victim’s vagina which matched
Darling’s DNA profile with respect to ten independent genetic markers.  
In Shores, similarly, the only evidence linking the suspect to the burglary was
a fingerprint on a box of ammunition in a drawer which had been ransacked by the
burglar.  There, the appellate court observed that, where fingerprints are found on
an object which is accessible to the public, such evidence, standing alone, will be
insufficient to sustain a conviction.  756 So. 2d at 116.  Here, however, the
fingerprint evidence was presented in addition to other compelling evidence that
Darling was the perpetrator of the victim’s sexual assault and murder.  Thus, both
Jaramillo and Shores are inapposite.
Lastly, Darling’s argument that the evidence does not support a finding of
premeditation is unconvincing.  On this record, the jury could reasonably conclude
that the victim, after being forcibly raped, was shot, execution-style, by a gunshot
wound purposefully inflicted by placing the gun tightly against a throw pillow held
directly next to the victim’s head.  This Court has upheld findings of premeditation
in other cases involving execution-style killings.  See Bruno v. State, 574 So. 2d 76,
82 (Fla. 1991) (observing--after making the initial observation that, from the
-24-
evidence presented, it was shown that the defendant first “administer[ed] his savage
beating which rendered the victim helpless,” and then “shot the victim twice in the
head at point blank range through a pillow”--that, as noted by the judge in his
sentencing order, “[t]his was especially cold, calculated and premeditated.  It was
essentially an execution.”); Parker v. State, 456 So. 2d 436, 444 (Fla. 1984)
(upholding a finding that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated, where
the evidence showed that the “victim had been pleading with defendant not to harm
his girl friend and, at the time he was murdered, was lying naked, face down, on a
bed,” and that, “[b]efore killing the victim by a gunshot blast into his back,
defendant accepted a pillow from his partner in order to muffle the shot”);
Lightbourne v. State, 438 So. 2d 380, 391 (Fla. 1983) (upholding a finding of
premeditation where the victim, who, during the course of a burglary, had been
forced into acts of oral sex and intercourse as she begged the defendant not to kill
her, had been murdered in an “execution-style killing using a pillow placed between
the murder weapon and the victim's head”).  Here, similarly, there is competent,
substantial record evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Darling committed
premeditated murder and felony murder (based upon sexual battery).  
Admission of DNA Evidence
-25-
Next, Darling argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Baer
to testify as an expert in this case.  Specifically, Darling claims that Baer, who was
not a statistician, was not qualified to testify regarding the statistical analysis which
was conducted, and argues further that, because Darling is Bahamian, a Bahamian
database (rather than the FBI’s African-American population database) should have
been employed here.  This Court, in its de novo review of a trial court’s Frye
determination (described by this Court in Brim as a question of law, 695 So. 2d at
274), may examine “‘expert testimony, scientific and legal writings, and judicial
opinions’ to decide whether the scientific principles and procedures relied upon to
create such evidence are generally accepted by a relevant scientific community both
at the time of trial and today.”  Brim v. State, 779 So. 2d 427, 428 (Fla. 2d DCA
2000) (citing Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 578 (Fla.1997)).
Applying that test, Darling’s challenges to the expert’s qualifications and
methodology lack merit.  As we stated in Brim, “[i]n utilizing the Frye test, the
burden is on the proponent of the evidence to prove the general acceptance of both
the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures used to apply that
principle to the facts at hand.  The trial judge has the sole responsibility to
determine this question.  The general acceptance under the Frye test must be
-26-
established by a preponderance of the evidence.”  695 So. 2d at 272 (alteration in
original) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (Fla.1995). 
Here, the expert testified regarding the general acceptance in the scientific
community of the methodology used, and demonstrated his knowledge and
experience regarding both the methodology and the databases employed.  The fact
that he was not, himself, a statistician is not a sound basis to exclude his expert
testimony regarding the statistical results.  Cf. Murray v. State, 692 So. 2d 157, 164
(Fla. 1997) (observing that “it is not absolutely necessary for an expert witness to
demonstrate practical experience in the field in which he will testify”; rather, the
expert must “demonstrate a sufficient knowledge of the database grounded in the
study of authoritative sources”); Lomax v. State, 727 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 5th DCA
1999) (rejecting a claim that the trial court erred in admitting DNA opinion evidence
even though the State’s expert witnesses did not personally compile the population
statistics used in formulating their conclusions); see also Fay v. Mincey, 454 So. 2d
587, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (observing that it is “well-established that an expert
does not need a special degree or certificate in order to be qualified as an expert
witness in a specialized area,” but “can be qualified by his ‘experience, skill and
independent study of a particular field.’”) (quoting Salas v. State, 246 So. 2d 621,
623 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)).
11.  Although there is a suggestion in the record that a “study” may have
been done in Broward County regarding a potential Bahamian database, the record
does not reflect that such a database actually existed at the time the DNA analysis
was conducted in this case.  
12.  The “variable numbers of tandem repeats” (VNTR) test is the DNA test
which was employed in Darling’s case.
-27-
Further, Darling’s challenge to the expert’s failure to use a Bahamian
database11 (to the extent preserved) also lacks merit.  In Government of the Virgin
Islands v. Penn, 838 F. Supp. 1054 (D.V.I. 1993), the court addressed a challenge
to the FBI’s assignment of the bin frequencies derived from the black United States
database to the DNA bands of the defendant, a black man from St. Thomas.  The
defendant “claimed that assigning bin frequencies derived from United States
blacks to the DNA profile of the defendant could have produced inaccurate
probability calculations that were biased against the defendant.”  Id. at 1070.  In
analyzing this issue, the court considered a study entitled “VNTR[12] Population
Data, A Worldwide Study,” a compilation of data reflecting bin frequencies on
population “substructures” around the world.  Id.  The court noted that Dr. Bruce
Budowle, the chief scientist at the FBI's DNA laboratory, had stated that the
differences in bin frequencies “do not have forensically significant effects on
VNTRs profile frequency estimates when subgroup reference databases from
13.  Kenneth K. Kidd, a professor of genetics, psychiatry, and biology at
Yale University, also testified in Penn.  He contrasted the genetic makeup of the
United States and St. Thomas populations with that of small isolated tribes, such as
those living in the Amazon or Papua, New Guinea, having “small communities with
languages that are mutually unintelligible,” observing that “[s]uch tribes live in small
geographic areas and rarely marry or breed out of the tribe.”  838 F.Supp at 1072. 
He cautioned against assigning the bin frequencies of these tribes to the bands of a
suspect from the United States or St. Thomas, suggesting that the suspect’s DNA
profile in such case might appear to be much rarer than it would be if the profile
were assigned the frequencies of the United States or St. Thomas populations.  Id. 
Here, too, Baer indicated that, if there is a very inbred group, like an isolated Indian
tribe, individuals may have certain markers which they keep reproducing.  Such
considerations would not apply to areas such as the Bahamas which are not
similarly geographically isolated.  
-28-
within a major population group are compared.”  Id. at 1071.13  Therefore, “the
inference on the rarity of the profile would not change with the various estimates.” 
Applying this to the case before it, the court observed that the “obvious implication
is that even though a jury will not hear exactly how rare the defendant’s DNA
profile is in St. Thomas’s black population, the jury can infer how rare the
defendant’s DNA profile would be in a database that reflects that population by
hearing how rare the defendant’s DNA profile is in the United States black
database.”  It concluded, in light of this phenomenon, that
any concern that the St. Thomas’ black population’s bin frequencies
are drastically different from those of the United States black
population is unwarranted.  Though the application of the United
States black bin frequencies to the defendant’s bands does not
produce the precise odds of finding a random match in the
defendant’s population, the danger of error in any such application is
14.  Indeed, in making this observation, the court opined that, accordingly, it
need “not decide whether the ‘ceiling principle method,’” described as a
“mathematical formula advocated by [one of the defense experts] as an adequate
means to remedy what he perceives to be a statistical error in applying the United
States black population’s bin frequencies to the suspect’s bands,” should be
admitted.  Id. & n.10.  In Darling’s case, Baer testified that the National Research
Council had formed a second committee specifically to address the statistical
question, and this had resulted in a recommendation that the ceiling principle
method went too far, and was too conservative.  Baer testified that, to compensate
for the differences within substructures, this second National Research Council 
committee “recommended one modification, which we have done when we do a
calculation, we open up our match window twice what we had normally done
before.  So instead of plus or minus 1.735 percent, they now say plus or minus 3 ½
percent.”
-29-
so small as to be practically nonexistent.
Id.14  A similar logic applies in this case.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
admitting the DNA evidence here, or in allowing Baer to testify as an expert
regarding the DNA testing, data, and resultant statistical analysis.  
Other Suspects
Next, Darling argues that the trial court erred in not allowing defense counsel
to comment further on the State’s failure to exclude other suspects.  However, the
record reflects that defense counsel did argue, repeatedly, that someone other than
Darling could have been the murderer.  Therefore, this argument lacks merit.
Limitation of Voir Dire Examination
Darling argues that the trial court erred in limiting defense counsel’s
-30-
questioning regarding capital case issues during voir dire examination of
prospective jurors.  As stated by the Court in Franqui v. State, 699 So. 2d 1312,
1322  (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1040 (1998), “[t]he scope of voir dire
questioning rests in the sound discretion of the court and will not be interfered with
unless that discretion is clearly abused.”  Based upon the record in this case, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of questioning during
voir dire.  Although the judge did not permit questioning about whether the
prospective jurors had seen stories about prisoners released from death row, or
about whether their “drive” to impose the death penalty would be lessened by the
fact that the alternative sentence was life without parole, defense counsel was able
to explore the potential jurors' concerns about the length of capital proceedings,
and their understanding of the alternative penalties which applied.  To the extent that
these objections were preserved, no abuse of discretion is shown. 
Failure to Give Guilt Phase Circumstantial Evidence Instruction
We similarly find no merit to Darling’s argument that the trial court erred in
denying his requested special instruction regarding circumstantial evidence.  As we
observed in Monlyn v. State, 705 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1997):
We have in fact expressly approved courts which have
exercised their discretion and not given the instruction:
-31-
In In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431
So. 2d 594 (Fla.1981), we found the instruction on
circumstantial evidence to be unnecessary and deleted it
from the standard instructions.  A trial court can, of
course, give such an instruction if, in the court's
discretion, it finds it necessary due to the particular facts
of any case.  Williams v. State, 437 So. 2d 133
(Fla.1983);  Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases. 
 The trial court did not find the circumstantial evidence
instruction necessary in this case, and we find no abuse
of discretion in his refusal to give such an instruction.  
Id. at 5 (quoting Rembert v. State, 445 So. 2d 337, 339 (Fla.1984)).  We find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to give the requested instruction.
Rebuttal Closing Argument
Darling argues that the trial court erred in not allowing defense counsel to
make a rebuttal closing argument in this case.  When defense counsel concluded
the initial closing argument, the prosecutor stood before the jury, thanked them, and
stated:
I don’t feel it’s necessary to do a closing argument.  We will ask the
jury to rely upon the evidence they’ve heard, the court’s instruction on
the law.  We’d ask the court to proceed to jury instruction.
Defense counsel then attempted to argue in rebuttal, and the prosecutor objected,
contending that, according to case law, his statement was not argument, and there
was nothing to rebut.  The trial court, agreeing with the State, proceeded to instruct
-32-
the jury on the law. 
In reviewing this argument, the case which most clearly applies is Dean v.
State, 478 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1985).  In Dean, the Court found “unconvincing” the 
petitioner's argument “that he was not allowed to make the concluding argument
before the jury as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.250,” id. at 44,
observing:
The record shows that petitioner's counsel opened final argument. 
Counsel for the co-defendant followed with his final argument.  Upon
the conclusion of co-defendant's argument, the prosecutor stood up in
open court, before the jury and asserted, "I think I can save the court
some time.  The evidence speaks for itself.  We rest."  The trial court
concluded that this did not constitute final argument on the part of the
state, and the district court affirmed.  We agree.  In Menard v. State,
427 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 434 So. 2d 888 (1983),
the fourth district court, when faced with a similar situation, stated: 
Every now and again, in the tragic world of
criminal appeals, comes a case that brings involuntary
smile to otherwise grim lips. This is one of those, though
it cannot be expected to afford any amusement to the
defendant.
At the end of the initial final argument presented by
the defense, the State's entire response was: 
The State of Florida is going to rely
on the evidence and testimony before the
court and juror's common sense, and we will
waive our argument. 
The defense, discomforted by this tactic, pressed for the
right to conclude on the basis that the comment "relying
on the evidence and common sense" did not constitute a
waiver and actually was final argument. (Cite omitted).
We disagree. The remark did [not] address the evidence
in particular nor any other testimony. Nor did they dwell
15.  Indeed, the transcript reflects that defense counsel knew that the State
was entitled to waive a closing statement, and “knew that might be coming.”
-33-
unnecessarily on the level of intelligent consideration to
be extended by the jury.  Moreover, unlike the discourse
in Andrews [v. State, 99 Fla. 1350, 129 So. 771
(Fla.1930)], supra, the comments were but a very few
words and in our opinion did not rise to the level of final
argument.
427 So. 2d at 400.
Similarly, the prosecution's waiver of final argument in the
instant case provided no reason for defense counsel's further argument
to the jury. Accordingly, we hold there was no error in the instant
case.
Dean, 478 So. 2d at 44.  Here also, the prosecutor merely referred generally to
reliance upon the evidence presented and the trial court’s instructions, without
further comment.15
Furthermore, even if preclusion of further closing argument was error here, it
has not been shown to be prejudicial.  Defense counsel made a contemporaneous
proffer, indicating that, had he been given the opportunity to make additional
closing comments, he would have questioned whether other persons whose names
were mentioned during the State’s case in chief--the maintenance men, Christopher
Powell and Jean Marcus--had been eliminated as suspects by DNA analysis or
other means.  However, in defense counsel’s initial closing remarks, he had already
attempted to direct attention to other potential perpetrators in the case, remarking
16.  Although this line of summation was successfully challenged by the
prosecutor, whose objection was sustained, the jury was not instructed to disregard
these remarks.
-34-
that “there were 75 unidentified prints,” and suggesting that “there’s some evidence
missing.”   Later, he admonished the jury to “[r]emember that Raminski told the
police that Grace’s husband threatened to kill her.  Think about the fact that
Raminski said Grace was afraid of the maintenance men.”  Lastly, this particular
line of summation--that “there was no evidence that these witnesses, Powell, and
Marcus was also mentioned, that their prints were checked,” had already been
alluded to by the defense in its initial closing statement, when counsel stated:
“There are a lot of things that you don’t know that are important.  Who is
Christopher Powell?  Why was he a suspect?  Where was his DNA?”16  Therefore,
here, as in Dean, even if the trial court erred in precluding further closing argument,
such error would be harmless. 
Rejection of Residual Doubt as a Mitigator
Darling argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow defense counsel to
present penalty-phase evidence to support an argument that residual doubt could be
considered as a mitigator.  This Court has followed the holding of the United States
Supreme Court that there is no constitutional right to present "lingering doubt"
evidence.  See Sims v. State, 681 So. 2d 1112, 1117 (Fla.1996); Franklin v.
-35-
Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1988) (rejecting the argument that the Eighth
Amendment requires a capital sentencing jury to be instructed that it can consider
lingering doubt evidence in mitigation).  We have repeatedly observed that residual
doubt is not an appropriate mitigating circumstance.  See Preston v. State, 607 So.
2d 404, 411 (Fla. 1992) (rejecting residual doubt as an appropriate mitigator); King
v. State, 514 So. 2d 354, 358 (Fla.1987) (same), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241
(1988).  Therefore, the trial court properly excluded this testimony.  
Failure to Give Special Penalty Phase Jury Instructions
Darling’s argument that he was entitled to requested special penalty phase
jury instructions (including an instruction on circumstantial evidence,  a
modification of the standard instruction on aggravating factors and mitigating
circumstances, and an instruction regarding victim impact evidence) also lacks
merit.  The record in this case does not support the conclusion that the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to give the requested instruction on circumstantial
evidence.  See In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So. 2d 594,
595  (Fla. 1981) (observing that “[t]he elimination of the current standard
instruction on circumstantial evidence does not totally prohibit such an instruction if
a trial judge, in his or her discretion, feels that such is necessary under the peculiar
-36-
facts of a specific case,” but that “the giving of proposed instructions on
reasonable doubt and burden of proof . . . renders an instruction on circumstantial
evidence unnecessary”).  Additionally, we have repeatedly held that further
clarifying instructions regarding mitigating circumstances are not required.  See,
e.g., Booker v. State, 773 So. 2d 1079, 1090 (Fla. 2000) (observing that the Court
has repeatedly held that clarifying instructions on mitigating circumstances are not
required); Elledge v. State, 706 So. 2d 1340, 1346 (Fla.1997) (finding that the trial
court did not err in refusing to give a special jury instruction addressing the nature
and functioning of mitigating circumstances where the trial court had given the
standard instruction on mitigating circumstances), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 944
(1998); Shellito v. State, 701 So.2d 837, 842 (Fla.1997) ("This Court has
repeatedly determined that the requested clarifying instructions on mitigating
evidence are not required."), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1084, 118 S.Ct. 1537, 140
L.Ed.2d 686 (1998).  Lastly, the instruction given by the trial court here regarding
victim impact evidence comported with the law as set out in Windom v. State, 656
So. 2d 432, 438 (Fla.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1012 (1995), and Bonifay v. State,
680 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1996). 
Absence of a Complete Record on Appeal
Darling argues that there are no records of certain pretrial hearings which
17.  The trial court found that the following aggravating factors had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant was previously convicted
of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person (carjacking with a
firearm, robbery, and aggravated battery), and (2) that the capital felony was
committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of the crime of
armed sexual battery.  The court found and weighed the following statutory and
nonstatutory mitigating factors: (1) the chronological and mental age of the
defendant (modest weight) (no other statutory mitigators were either requested or
found); (2) that the defendant exhibited acceptable behavior at trial (little weight);
(3) that the defendant has an IQ of 85 (some weight); (4) that the defendant believes
-37-
occurred in this case, precluding meaningful consideration of Darling’s claims. 
However, Darling has failed to demonstrate what specific prejudice, if any, has
been incurred because of the missing transcripts.  The missing portion of the
transcript has not been shown to be necessary for a complete review of this appeal. 
Cf. Velez v. State, 645 So. 2d 42, 44 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (concluding that the
appellant was not prejudiced in the review of his conviction and sentence,
“[c]onsidering the limited portion of transcript which is missing and the errors
alleged to have occurred in the trial court”). Therefore, this claim too lacks merit.
Proportionality
Darling argues that his death sentence is not proportionate.  Here, the trial
court applied the correct rule of law in making its findings regarding the
aggravators, and in according weight to those factors.  The record supports the
trial court’s findings regarding both the aggravating and the mitigating factors.17 The
in God (slight weight); (5) that the defendant was and is a caring son to his mother
(some weight); (6) that the defendant is a caring father to his daughter, who will
need his love and encouragement in her life (moderate weight); (7) that the
defendant was an abused child, beaten many times by his father (deemed “most
weighty”); (8) that the defendant had and has an alcoholic father (considered in
connection with the abuse factor); (9) that the defendant was never violent to his
mother or girlfriend (considered in connection with the defendant’s relationship to
his mother); (10) that the defendant had no father figure or male role model
(considered in connection with the abuse factor); (11)  that the defendant sends
cards for family holidays and birthdays (slight weight); (12) that the defendant was
and is a concerned brother (slight weight); (13) that the defendant’s child will have
no father if the defendant is executed (considered in connection with defendant’s
relationship to his daughter); (14) that the defendant has a good employment history
(slight weight); (15) that the defendant’s father was not faithful to his mother
(considered in connection with the abuse factor); (16)  that the defendant was
embarrassed because his mother and father never married (considered with the
abuse factor); (17) that the defendant is a human being (not a mitigator, although the
court found the defendant “equally entitled to our compassionate treatment and the
mercy of his maker as any person in equally grave circumstances”); (18) that the
defendant has the love and support of his family (slight weight); (19) that the
defendant has been unwavering in his declaration of innocence (slight weight); and
(20) that, if the defendant is sentenced to life in prison, he will be isolated from his
family and friends who reside in a foreign county (moderate weight).  No other
statutory or nonstatutory mitigating factors were found. 
-38-
trial court, after carefully considering and weighing these factors, concluded,
consistent with the jury’s recommendation, that “the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances present.” 
The cases cited by the appellant to support a disproportionality argument are
inapposite, involving defendants who were immature and suffering from far more
significant mental impairment, had no prior violent criminal history, or had a prior
-39-
violent felony which was not as egregious as the one committed here.  Cf. Larkins
v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla.1999) (finding death sentence disproportionate
where the trial court found extensive mitigation, including two statutory mental
mitigators, and this Court observed that the killing appeared “to have resulted from
impulsive actions of a man with a history of mental illness who was easily disturbed
by outside forces”); Snipes v. State, 733 So. 2d 1000, 1007-08 (Fla. 1999) (finding
death sentence inappropriate where the defendant, who voluntarily confessed to the
crime which had been arranged by older individuals, was only seventeen at the time
he committed the murder; was sexually abused for a number of years as a child;
abused drugs and alcohol beginning at a young age; had no prior violent history;
suffered childhood trauma, and was easily led by older persons); Johnson v. State,
720 So. 2d 232, 238-39 (Fla. 1998) (finding death sentence disproportionate where
the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance, although properly found to be
present, was not strong when the facts--that the aggravator was “based in part on
an aggravated assault committed by Calvin upon his brother, Anthony,” who
testified “that he was not injured in the confrontation with his brother and that the
entire incident occurred because of a misunderstanding”--were considered and
balanced against the statutory and nonstatutory mitigation established); Hawk v.
State, 718 So. 2d 159, 163 (Fla. 1998) (finding death penalty to be disproportionate
-40-
where the trial court had “found numerous nonstatutory mitigating circumstances,
including brain damage, mental and emotional disturbance, loss of hearing,
disadvantaged and abusive childhood, and lack of education and training,”);
Robertson v. State, 699 So. 2d 1343, 1347 (Fla.1997) (finding death sentence was
not proportionately warranted in light of the substantial mitigation present in the
case), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1136 (1998).  The record here does not support a
finding of such immaturity or mental deficiency.  When compared to other, more
analogous cases, the appellant’s death sentence is proportionate.  Cf. Shellito v.
State, 701 So. 2d 837 (Fla.1997) (finding death sentence proportionate where the
defendant was not a minor, had intellectual functioning in the low average range of
intelligence, had a prior violent felony conviction and was on probation at the time
he committed the murder, and had committed three robberies and an aggravated
assault on a police officer within days of the murder), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1084
(1998); Ferrell v. State, 680 So. 2d 390, 391-92 (Fla. 1996) (finding death sentence
commensurate to the crime in light of the similar nature of Ferrell’s prior violent
offense) (citing King v. State, 436 So. 2d 50 (Fla.1983) (death sentence affirmed
for shooting live-in girlfriend where prior conviction was for axe-slaying of
common-law wife), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 909 (1984)); Lemon v. State, 456 So. 2d
885 (Fla.1984) (death sentence affirmed for stabbing and strangling of girlfriend
18.  The record reflects that Darling filed a motion seeking this relief in the
trial court, in which he failed to state that he is a foreign national, or whether the
Bahamas is a signatory to that treaty.  Because the treaty speaks of “sending states”
and “receiving states,” it is questionable whether, as Darling argues, the United
States would incur obligations under the treaty to foreign nationals of non-signatory
states.  Further, the record does not reflect that Darling obtained a ruling on his
motion in the trial court.  Cf. Nelson v. State, 85 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1956) (holding
that the question of any irregularities in the information was “foreclosed and cannot
be raised on appeal” where the appellant had “failed to show that any ruling was
-41-
where prior conviction was for assault with intent to commit first-degree murder for
stabbing female victim), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985); Harvard v. State, 414
So. 2d 1032 (Fla.1982) (death sentence affirmed for shooting second ex-wife where
prior conviction was for aggravated assault arising from shooting attack on first
ex-wife and her sister), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1128 (1983) .
 The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
In his last claim, Darling, who is a foreign national and citizen of the
Bahamas, argues that, following his arrest, the police never informed him of his
right to seek contact with his consulate to arrange for legal representation. 
Although the authorities did not use any post-arrest statements obtained from
Darling, he submits that the death penalty should be precluded because of this
alleged violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, which provides that a
foreign national arrested in the United States has the right to be informed that he
may contact his consulate.18
ever made upon the Motion to Quash filed by him”); see also Ibarra v. State, 11
S.W.3d 189, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that the contention that Ibarra’s
conviction should be reversed because he was not informed of his rights under the
Vienna Convention was not preserved for review where the record failed to show
that “the complaint was timely made to the trial court, the grounds were specifically
stated or were readily apparent, the complaint complied with the rules of evidence
or appellate procedure, and the requirement of a ruling on the complaint” was
satisfied), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 828 (2000). 
19.  As observed by the Seventh Circuit in U.S. v. Lawal, 231 F.3d 1045
(7th Cir. 2000):
While some courts, including ours, have had the opportunity to decide
whether Article 36 creates individual rights enforceable in judicial
proceedings, all have sidestepped the issue.  See Breard v. Greene,
523 U.S. 371, 376, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 140 L.Ed.2d 529 (1998) (per
curiam); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616, 623-24
(7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d 1194,
1196 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); United States v.
Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc);
United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2000).  Likewise, we
need not decide the issue today because it does not affect our
disposition of this case.
Id. at 1048.
-42-
It is unclear that the Vienna Convention creates individual rights enforceable
in judicial proceedings.19  Cf. Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 959 (Fla. 2000)
(observing that Maharaj’s claim that the State had failed to comply with its
international obligation to inform the British Consul that a British citizen had been
charged with a capital crime, as required under the Vienna Convention, failed not
only because the issue was, in that case, procedurally barred, but also because
-43-
Maharaj had “failed to establish that he has standing, as treaties are between
countries, not citizens”) (citing Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th
Cir.1990)).  Indeed, the preamble to the treaty reflects the recognition "that the
purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure
the efficient performance of functions by consular posts on behalf of their
respective States."  Vienna Convention, preamble, 21 U.S.T. at 79.  
However, we need not reach that issue where, as here, Darling has failed to
show that he was prejudiced by the claimed violation.  As was stated in Breard v.
Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998), “it is extremely doubtful that the violation should
result in the overturning of a final judgment of conviction without some showing
that the violation had an effect on the trial.”  Id. at 372.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm Darling’s first-degree murder
conviction and sentence of death.  We also affirm Darling's conviction and
sentence for armed sexual battery.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., concur in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
-44-
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,
John H. Adams, Sr., Judge - Case No. CR97-7497
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Christopher S. Quarles, Assistant Public
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Judy Taylor Rush, Assistant
Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellee