Case Title: In re Vermont Verde Antique International, Inc.

Citation: 174 Vt. 208, 811 A.2d 181

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2002-09-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Vermont Verde Antique International, Inc. (2001-116); 174 Vt. 208;
811 A.2d 181

[Filed 06-Sep-2002]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

     	
                                No. 2001-116



  In re Vermont Verde Antique                    Supreme Court
  International Inc.	

                                                 On Appeal from
                                                 Environmental Board



                                                May Term, 2002


  Marcy Harding, Chair

  John D. Hansen, Rutland, for Appellant.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Rebecca M. Ellis, Assistant Attorney
   General, and Laura Wood, Law Clerk (On the Brief), Montpelier, 
   for Amicus Curiae State.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

        
       MORSE, J.   Vermont Verde Antiques International, Inc. (VVA) appeals
  from an Environmental Board decision upholding the jurisdictional opinion
  of its district coordinator that VVA's quarrying operation fell within the
  jurisdiction of Act 250 because it had undertaken a substantial change to
  its operations.  VVA contends the Board erroneously: (1) issued a  sua
  sponte jurisdictional opinion without statutory authority; (2) failed to
  provide an adequately detailed statement of the matters at issue in the
  case; (3) ruled against VVA in the absence of an adverse party or evidence
  of a substantial change; and (4) placed the burden of production of
  evidence showing 

 

  no substantial change on VVA instead of requiring the State to prove that
  there had been a substantial change.  We agree with the first contention,
  and therefore reverse.                      

       The underlying facts may be summarized as follows.  In 1993, VVA
  purchased a marble quarrying business that had been in operation for many
  years and thus qualified as an existing operation that did not require a
  permit under Act 250.  See 10 V.S.A. § 6081(b) (projects and subdivisions
  existing prior to June 1, 1970 do not require Act 250 permit).  In
  September 1999, the District No. 3 Environmental Coordinator sent a letter
  to VVA stating that she had received a complaint about the quarry and
  requesting a history of its operations.  VVA complied with the request.  In
  February 2000, the assistant environmental coordinator issued a
  jurisdictional opinion, finding that the quarry had undergone a
  "substantial change" in its operation that required an Act 250 permit.  See
  10 V.S.A. § 6081(b) (exemption for preexisting development does not apply
  "to any substantial change in such excepted . . . development");
  Environmental Board Rule 2(g) (substantial change is "any change in
  development . . . which may result in significant impact with respect to
  any of the [ten Act 250 criteria].")  The jurisdictional opinion stated
  that it was issued "in response to correspondence between [VVA] and [the
  coordinator] . . . which began with [the coordinator's] letter of September
  1, 1999." 
   
       VVA sought a reconsideration of the jurisdictional opinion with the
  district coordinator, who affirmed the decision.  VVA then petitioned the
  Board for a declaratory ruling.  In July 2000, following a pre-hearing
  conference attended only by VVA, the Board chair issued a pre-hearing
  conference report and order stating that the issue on appeal was "[W]hether
  there has been a 'substantial change' to the Project, a pre-existing
  development, that requires an Act 250 Permit pursuant to 10 V.S.A. 6081(b)
  and EBR 2(G)."  VVA objected to the report on several grounds, including: 
  (1) VVA should not have the burden of production in disproving an increase
  in the level 

 

  of quarrying activity; (2) the Board had not articulated a substantive
  legal standard by which the case would be adjudicated; and (3) the Board
  lacked the statutory authority to issue a jurisdictional opinion on its own
  motion.  These objections were referred to the full Board.  In a memorandum
  of decision issued in September 2000, the Board rejected VVA's objections
  but noted that VVA had not waived its right to an evidentiary hearing or
  its right to raise constitutional issues.     

       The Board conducted a hearing on VVA's petition in December 2000.  VVA
  was the only party to participate in the hearing, and offered no evidence,
  arguing that the Board lacked the statutory authority to issue a sua sponte
  jurisdictional order, and  that VVA did not have the burden of production
  to disprove a substantial change.  The Board nevertheless upheld the
  jurisdictional order and dismissed the petition because of VVA's "failure
  to meet its burden of producing  evidence."  This appeal followed.

       VVA essentially challenges the validity of Environmental Board Rule
  3(c), part of which authorizes disctrict coordinators to issue
  jurisdictional orders sua sponte.  See Envionmental Board Rule 3(c) ("In
  addition, district coordinators may issue Jurisdictional Opinions when, in
  their judgment, the applicability of Act 250, these rules or an order of
  the board needs to be determined.").  VVA argues that the rule is outside
  of the scope of authority conferred on the Board by 10 V.S.A. § 6007(c),
  which sets forth the procedures for obtaining a jurisdictional order.  It
  is, of course, axiomatic that an administrative body may promulgate only
  those rules within the scope of its legislative grant of authority.  See In
  re Agency of Admin., 141 Vt. 68, 76,