Case Title: State v. James E. Gray

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP003363-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3363-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
James E. Gray,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  216 Wis. 2d 114, 573 N.W.2d 900 
 
 
 
 (Ct. App. 1998-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 16, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
December 3, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Kremers 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Helen M. Mullison, Milwaukee. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Mary V. Bowman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-3363-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
James E. Gray,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
APR 16, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   The defendant, James Edward 
Gray (Gray), was convicted of attempting to obtain controlled 
substances by misrepresentation.  He requests that this court 
reverse the court of appeals’ decision that the circuit court 
properly admitted other acts evidence, and thereby reverse his 
conviction.  Because we conclude that the other acts evidence 
was relevant and its unfair prejudicial effect did not outweigh 
the probative value, the circuit court properly exercised its 
discretion in admitting the other acts evidence, and we affirm 
the court of appeals’ decision.  Gray also requests that we 
reverse the court of appeals’ decision that the circuit court 
had statutory authority to modify his probation sentence before 
the period of probation began, to include a one-year jail term. 
 We conclude that the plain language of the statute gives the 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
2 
circuit court the authority to modify the conditions of the 
defendant’s probation before the period of probation began. 
¶2 
The facts relevant to this appeal are these.  On July 
14, 1994, a pharmacy received a prescription for Hydrocodone, a 
narcotic in pill form.1  The pharmacist noticed that the 
handwriting on several prescriptions, including the July 14, 
1994, prescription, was similar.  He checked with the doctor’s 
office that had purportedly written the prescription and 
discovered that the July 14, 1994, prescription was not valid.  
The pharmacist then notified the local police of his discovery. 
¶3 
On September 26, 1994, someone called into the same 
pharmacy 
to 
request 
a 
refill 
for 
the 
July 
14, 
1994, 
prescription.  The pharmacist notified the police, then filled 
the 
prescription. 
 
The 
defendant, 
Gray, 
picked 
up 
the 
prescription and signed the pharmacy log, using his own name.  
As he was leaving the store, the police arrested him. 
¶4 
Gray was charged with one felony count for attempting 
to obtain a controlled substance by misrepresentation, as a 
party to the crime, in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 161.43(1)(a) 
and (2), 161.16(2)(a)7, 939.05 and 939.32, one felony count for 
obtaining a controlled substance by misrepresentation, as a 
party to the crime, in violation of §§ 161.43(1)(a) and (2), 
161.16(2)(a)7, 
and 
939.05, 
and 
one 
misdemeanor 
count 
of 
                     
1 Hydrocodone is, by statutory definition, a controlled 
substance. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 161.16(2)(a)7 
(1991-92). 
 
All 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1991-92 version 
unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
3 
attempting 
to 
obtain 
a 
controlled 
substance 
by 
misrepresentation, also as a party to the crime, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 450.11(7)(a)9, 161.18(5)(d), 939.32, and 939.05.  
Each count was based on activities occurring on different days. 
 Gray was also charged with habitual criminality based on his 
1992 conviction for the felony offense of attempting to obtain a 
controlled substance by misrepresentation.   
¶5 
Before trial, the State of Wisconsin (State) filed a 
motion to introduce other acts evidence pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2) 
(reprinted 
below).2 
 
Specifically, 
the 
State 
requested to introduce evidence of the defendant’s previous 
convictions 
for 
obtaining 
controlled 
substances 
by 
misrepresentation to show motive, knowledge, absence of mistake, 
plan, identity, and intent.3  As the trial proceeded, the State 
also 
sought 
to 
introduce 
evidence 
of 
uncharged 
forged 
prescriptions. 
¶6 
The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Judge Jeffrey A. 
Kremers presiding, granted the State’s motion.  The circuit 
                     
2  Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2) provides: 
(2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS.  Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that the person 
acted in conformity therewith.  This subsection does 
not exclude the evidence when offered for other 
purposes, 
such as 
proof 
of 
motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident.  
 
3 Although Gray had been convicted in both 1990 and 1992 for 
obtaining a controlled substance by misrepresentation, the State 
relied on the 1990 conviction as other acts evidence. 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
4 
court first found that the other acts evidence fit under the 
purposes 
for 
admissibility 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2), 
specifically to show identity, plan, motive, scheme, and 
potentially absence of mistake.  The circuit court also 
determined that the unfair prejudicial effect of the other 
crimes 
evidence 
did 
not 
outweigh 
its 
probative 
value.  
Therefore, the circuit court allowed the State to introduce 
other acts evidence consisting of uncharged forged prescriptions 
and Gray’s 1990 conviction for obtaining a controlled substance 
by misrepresentation. 
¶7 
The jury convicted the defendant of all three counts. 
 The circuit court sentenced him to 13 years in prison, 
consisting of three years on count three for the misdemeanor 
charge and 10 years on count two for obtaining a controlled 
substance by misrepresentation, running consecutively, followed 
by five years probation for count one for attempting to obtain a 
controlled substance by misrepresentation.   
¶8 
Gray filed a post-conviction motion, challenging his 
conviction on all three counts.  The circuit court upheld the 
conviction on count one.  The circuit court dismissed the jury 
verdict on count two with prejudice and granted a new trial on 
count three.  (The State does not challenge this decision.)  
Because 
partially 
granting 
Gray’s 
post-conviction 
motion 
frustrated the original sentencing scheme, the circuit court 
modified the defendant’s probation sentence for count one, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a), to include a one-year 
jail term. 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
5 
¶9 
Gray 
appealed 
his 
conviction 
on 
count 
one 
for 
attempting 
to 
obtain 
a 
controlled 
substance 
by 
misrepresentation.  He asserted that other acts evidence 
consisting of the uncharged forged prescriptions was not 
admissible because the jury could not conclude that he was the 
person who had forged those prescriptions.  He argued that the 
circuit court erred in admitting the other acts evidence, 
including the uncharged forged prescriptions and his prior 
conviction, because it did not meet the permissible purposes 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2) 
and 
its 
prejudicial 
effect 
outweighed the probative value.  Finally, Gray asserted that the 
circuit court erred in modifying the conditions of his probation 
to include a one-year jail term.   
¶10 In an unpublished decision,4 the court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and orders.  The court of 
appeals concluded that because Gray did not make a specific and 
contemporaneous objection to the other acts evidence, he waived 
his right to argue on appeal that the jury could not conclude 
that 
he 
was 
the 
person 
who forged 
the 
other 
uncharged 
prescriptions.  The court of appeals concluded that Gray did 
properly object to the other acts evidence on general relevancy 
grounds but nonetheless determined that the other acts evidence 
was 
admissible 
and 
its 
probative 
value 
outweighed 
the 
prejudicial effect.  Finally, the court of appeals concluded 
                     
4 State v. Gray, No. 96-3363-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1997).  
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
6 
that the circuit court had statutory authority to modify Gray’s 
sentence of probation. 
¶11 This court granted Gray’s petition for review of the 
court of appeals’ decision.  Two issues are presented by this 
case.  The first issue is whether the circuit court properly 
admitted other acts evidence consisting of the defendant’s prior 
conviction and uncharged forged prescriptions.  We hold that it 
did.  The second issue is whether the circuit court had 
statutory authority to modify the defendant’s probation before 
the period of probation began, to include a one-year jail term. 
 We hold that the circuit court had such authority.   
¶12 We now turn to the first issue: whether the circuit 
court properly admitted the other acts evidence.  This issue 
requires that we determine whether the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion.  State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 
780, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998).  “An appellate court will sustain an 
evidentiary ruling if it finds that the circuit court examined 
the relevant facts; applied a proper standard of law; and using 
a demonstrative rational process, reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach.”  Id. at 780-81 (citing Loy v. 
Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982)).  
¶13 Over the years this court has expounded the foundation 
necessary to introduce other acts evidence.  Generally evidence 
of other acts is not admissible because of the “fear that an 
invitation to focus on an accused’s character magnifies the risk 
that jurors will punish the accused for being a bad person 
regardless of his or her guilt of the crime charged.”  Sullivan, 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
7 
216 Wis. 2d at 783.  Other acts evidence may not be introduced 
to show that the defendant has a certain character trait and, in 
the present charge, acted in conformity with that trait.  Id. at 
781-82. 
¶14 Admission of other acts evidence is governed by Wis. 
Stat. §§ 904.04(2) and 904.03.  Section 904.04(2) sets forth 
exceptions to the general rule of not admitting other acts 
evidence.  Examples of the purposes for which other acts 
evidence may be admissible include “motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.”  § 904.04(2).  Even if the other acts evidence is 
being offered for one of these acceptable purposes, it must be 
relevant, Wis. Stat. § 904.01, and its probative value must 
outweigh its unfair prejudicial effect, § 904.03. 
¶15 The analysis of other acts evidence culminated in this 
court’s recent delineation of a three-step analytical framework 
for attorneys and courts to follow in determining whether other 
acts evidence is admissible.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772. 
 
(1) Is the other acts evidence offered for an 
acceptable 
purpose 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
904.04(2), such as establishing motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident? 
 
(2) Is the other acts evidence relevant, considering 
the two facets of relevance set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 904.01?  [footnote omitted]  The first 
consideration in assessing relevance is whether the 
other acts evidence relates to a fact or proposition 
that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action. 
 
The 
second 
consideration 
in 
assessing 
relevance is whether the evidence has probative value, 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
8 
that is, whether the other acts evidence has a 
tendency to make the consequential fact or proposition 
more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. 
 
(3) Is the probative value of the other acts 
evidence substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair 
prejudice, 
confusion 
of 
the 
issues 
or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence?  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.03. 
Id. at 772-73. 
¶16 We rely on this analytic framework to determine 
whether other acts evidence was properly admitted against the 
defendant in this case.  Two types of other acts evidence were 
admitted against Gray.  The first was evidence of Gray’s 1990 
conviction 
for 
obtaining 
a 
controlled 
substance 
by 
misrepresentation.  The second type of other acts evidence was 
several uncharged forged prescriptions.   
¶17 Gray argues that the circuit court erred in admitting 
evidence of his 1990 conviction because it is not sufficiently 
similar in fact to the present charge.  He also argues that the 
circuit court erred in admitting evidence of uncharged forged 
prescriptions because the State did not sufficiently show that 
he was connected to those prescriptions.  We will address both 
types of the evidence within the Sullivan analytical framework. 
¶18 The first task is to determine whether the other acts 
evidence was offered for an acceptable purpose under Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2).  See Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772.  The circuit 
court simply stated that it thought the evidence would be 
admissible under any of the exceptions of identity, plan, 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
9 
motive, scheme and potentially absence of mistake.  The circuit 
court provided no reasoning for its decision.  “When a circuit 
court fails to set forth its reasoning, appellate courts 
independently review the record to determine whether it provides 
a basis for the circuit court’s exercise of discretion.”  
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 781 (citing State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 
334, 343, 349 N.W.2d 498 (1983)).  Accordingly, we independently 
review the record to determine whether it provided a basis for 
the circuit court’s exercise of discretion in admitting the 
other acts evidence. 
¶19 The State sought to introduce other acts evidence to 
show identitythat it was the defendant and not some other 
person who handled the forged prescription that is the basis of 
the charged offense.  Other acts evidence is admissible to show 
identity if the other acts evidence has “such a concurrence of 
common features and so many points of similarity with the crime 
charged that it ‘can reasonably be said that the other acts and 
the present act constitute the imprint of the defendant.’”  
State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722, 746, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991) 
(quoting State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 263-64, 378 N.W.2d 
272 (1985)).  “The threshold measure for similarity with regard 
to identity is nearness of time, place, and circumstance of the 
other act to the crime alleged.  [citation omitted]  Whether 
there is a concurrence of common features is generally left to 
the sound discretion of the trial courts.”  Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 
at 746-47 (citing Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 264 n.7).  See also 
State v. Speer, 176 Wis. 2d 1101, 1117, 501 N.W.2d 429 (1993).   
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
10
¶20 Our independent review of the record indicates that 
the 1990 conviction is sufficiently similar to the present 
charge so as to indicate the “imprint of the defendant.”  The 
prescription marked exhibit 9, the basis for count one of 
attempting to obtain a controlled substance by misrepresentation 
which is the subject of this appeal, was the refill for the 
prescription marked exhibit 3.  Exhibit 3 had Gray’s fingerprint 
on it.  
¶21 The circumstances surrounding the present charge and 
the 1990 conviction are similar.  In both, the defendant told 
the arresting officer that he was picking up the prescription 
for a friend.  Gray then gave a residential address for the 
friend.  In both the present charge and the 1990 conviction, 
upon investigating the police discovered that the address did 
not exist and no one could be found with the name Gray had 
given. 
¶22 The defendant argues that the prior conviction is not 
near enough in time to the present charges to be similar.  
However, we agree with the circuit court that in the four years 
between the 1990 conviction and the present charge, Gray spent 
18 months in prison.  During that time, Gray did not have 
opportunities to repeat the acts.  See, e.g., Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 
at 747.   
¶23 Evidence of the uncharged forged prescriptions is also 
similar enough to the present charge to show identity.  All the 
prescriptions, 
the 
uncharged 
forged 
prescriptions and the 
prescription that is the basis of count one, are for the same 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
11
narcoticHydrocodone or Hycodan syrup.  Several of the patients’ 
and doctors’ names are the same.  All of these prescriptions 
were filled at the same pharmacy as was the prescription on 
which count one is based.  All the prescriptions were filled 
within a five-month period.  Given the similarities in the 
circumstances and short time frame, it can reasonably be said 
that the uncharged forged prescriptions and the charged offense 
“constitute the imprint of the defendant.”  Fishnick, 127 
Wis. 2d at 263-64.   
¶24 Upon our independent review of the record, we conclude 
that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in admitting the other acts evidence to show the 
defendant’s identity.  The prior conviction and the uncharged 
forged prescriptions are sufficiently similar to the present 
charges, and the delay in time between the present charges and 
the 1990 conviction is not actually so great because of the 
defendant’s time in prison. 
¶25 The State also sought to introduce the other acts 
evidence to show plan or scheme.   
 
The word “plan” in sec. 904.04(2) means a design or 
scheme formed to accomplish some particular purpose.  
. . .  Evidence showing a plan establishes a definite 
prior design, plan, or scheme which includes the doing 
of the act charged.  . . .  [T]here must be “such a 
concurrence of common features that the various acts 
are materially to be explained as caused by a general 
plan of which they are the individual manifestations.” 
  
State v. Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d 89, 99, 252 N.W.2d 94 (1977) 
(citing 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 304 (3d ed. 1940)).   
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
12
¶26 The State sought to introduce evidence of Gray’s prior 
conviction to show that he had taken deliberate steps to 
accomplish his purpose, obtaining prescription drugs by using 
forged prescriptions, and that he has done so in the past.  The 
State indicated that it would introduce evidence of the 1990 
conviction through the testimony of the officer who arrested 
Gray for that incident.  The State asserted that in 1990 Gray 
told the police officer the same type of story that he told the 
arresting officers regarding the current chargethat he was 
picking the prescription up for a friend, and then he gave a 
non-existing residential address.  Indeed, the arresting officer 
from the 1990 conviction gave testimony to this effect.  The 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
concluding that the concurrence of common features in the 
circumstances of the present charge and the prior conviction are 
materially to be explained as caused by a general plan of which 
the prior conviction and the current charge are the individual 
manifestations.    
¶27 Evidence of the uncharged forged prescriptions also 
carries a strong concurrence of common features, sufficient to 
show a plan.  The narcotic for the charged and uncharged forged 
prescriptions is the same; several of the patients’ and doctors’ 
names are the same; and the prescriptions were all filled or 
attempted to be filled at the same pharmacy and within a five-
month period.  There is such a concurrence of common features 
that the various forged prescriptions, charged and uncharged, 
can materially be explained as caused by a general plan of which 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
13
each 
forged 
prescription 
is 
an 
individual 
manifestation.  
Because our review of the record shows a common concurrence of 
features between the current charge and the other acts evidence, 
we conclude that there is a basis in the record for the circuit 
court to admit this other acts evidence to show a plan or 
scheme. 
¶28 The third purpose for which the State sought to 
introduce the other acts evidence was to show motive.  “Motive 
has been defined as the reason which leads the mind to desire 
the result of an act.  [citation omitted]  In other words, a 
defendant’s motive may show the reason why a defendant desired 
the result of the crime charged.”  Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 260 
(citation omitted).  “[A] motive in an earlier crime [may be] 
used to show a common cause for both the earlier and a later 
crime.  The same motive caused both the prior and the charged 
act.”  State v. Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d 583, 594, 493 N.W.2d 376 
(1992).   
¶29 In the present case, the charge against the defendant 
that is the subject of this appeal is count oneattempting to 
obtain a controlled substance by misrepresentation.  In the 1990 
conviction 
for 
obtaining 
a 
controlled 
substance 
by 
misrepresentation, the defendant was found guilty of forging a 
prescription and thereby deceiving a pharmacist.  The State 
asserts that the purpose of writing the forged prescription, 
both in 1990 and in the present charge, was to deceive the 
pharmacist to thereby obtain a controlled substance, probably to 
satisfy a drug addiction.   
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
14
¶30 During the trial, Gray himself admitted that, at least 
in the past, he had been addicted to methadone, also a 
controlled substance.  While not admitting to a current drug 
addiction, the circuit court could infer that just as Gray was 
found to be motivated in 1990 to forge prescriptions to deceive 
a pharmacist and thereby obtain controlled substances, so too 
was he motivated in regard to the present charge. 
¶31 Regarding the uncharged forged prescriptions, the 
State showed that the uncharged forged prescriptions and the 
charged prescription, all for the same narcotic, were filled at 
the same pharmacy within a five-month period.  The State proved 
that all the prescriptions were forged (which by their very 
nature shows an intent to deceive) and there was testimony that 
the same person wrote the printed portions of all the uncharged 
forged prescriptions.  The sequence of forged prescriptions 
shows a motive to deceive a pharmacist to obtain prescription 
drugs. 
¶32 Upon our independent review of the record, we cannot 
conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion in admitting the other acts evidence, neither the 
1990 conviction nor the uncharged forged prescriptions, to show 
the defendant’s motive. 
¶33 Finally, the State sought to introduce the other acts 
evidence to show absence of mistake because, the State asserted, 
the defendant knew such behavior was illegal, having been 
previously arrested and convicted for this type of conduct.    
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
15
¶34 “If a like occurrence takes place enough times, it can 
no longer be attributed to mere coincidence.  Innocent intent 
will become improbable.”  State v. Evers, 139 Wis. 2d 424, 443, 
407 N.W.2d 256 (1987).  The exception of absence of mistake is 
closely tied to intent.  “[I]ntent involves knowledge, hostile 
feeling, 
or 
‘the 
absence 
of 
accident, 
inadvertence, 
or 
casualtya varying state of mind which is the contrary of an 
innocent state of mind . . . .’”  Id. at 437 (quoting 2 Wigmore, 
Evidence § 300, p 238 (Chadbourn rev. 1979)).  Other acts 
evidence is properly admitted to show absence of mistake if it 
tends to undermine a defendant’s innocent explanation for his or 
her behavior.  Evers, 139 Wis. 2d at 437 (referring to Weinstein 
& Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence, p. 404-84 (1985)).  “‘[T]he 
oftener a like act has been done, the less probable it is that 
it could have been done innocently.’”  Evers, 139 Wis. 2d at 437 
(quoting Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence, p. 404-84 - 
404-87).   
¶35 In the present case, the 1990 conviction was for 
obtaining a controlled substance by misrepresentation.  The 
current charge is for attempting to commit the same crime.  The 
facts surrounding the defendant’s arrest and the explanation the 
defendant gave for why he was picking up the prescription were 
similar.  The similarity in events between the 1990 conviction 
and the present charge tends to undermine Gray’s innocent 
explanation.   
¶36 The 
facts 
surrounding 
the 
uncharged 
forged 
prescriptions are also similar to the facts surrounding the 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
16
presently charged crime.  The prescriptions were all for the 
same narcotic, several used the same patient and doctors’ names 
and they were all filled at the same pharmacy within a five-
month period.  Most telling is the document examiner’s testimony 
that there is a high probability that the same person wrote the 
printed portions of all the prescriptions making up the 
uncharged forged prescriptions.  The frequency and similarity of 
the forged prescriptions, one of which is the original for the 
refill 
prescription 
that 
forms 
the 
basis 
of 
count 
one, 
undermines Gray’s innocent explanation that he did not know that 
the prescription was forged.  Given our independent review of 
the 
record, 
we 
cannot 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting the other acts 
evidence to show absence of mistake. 
¶37 Having 
concluded 
that 
the 
other 
acts 
evidence 
presented by the State was admissible for the permissible 
purposes of showing identity, plan, proof of motive and absence 
of mistake, we now turn to the second step in the Sullivan test: 
whether the other acts evidence is relevant under Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.01 (reprinted below).5  “The first consideration in 
assessing relevance is whether the other acts evidence relates 
to a fact or proposition that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action.”  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772.  
                     
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.01 provides: “‘Relevant evidence’ 
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.” 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
17
The proponent of the evidence, here the State, must rely on the 
substantive law which defines the elements of the crime to 
articulate the fact or proposition that the other acts evidence 
is offered to prove.  Id. at 785-86.   
¶38 “The second consideration in assessing relevance is 
whether the evidence has probative value, that is, whether the 
other acts evidence has a tendency to make the consequential 
fact or proposition more probable or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence.”  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772.  The 
measure of probative value in assessing relevance is the 
similarity between the charged offense and the other act.  Id. 
at 786.  “The stronger the similarity between the other acts and 
the charged offense, the greater will be the probability that 
the like result was not repeated by mere chance or coincidence.” 
(Footnote omitted).  Id. at 786-87.  
¶39 The defendant does not argue that the State failed to 
show that the evidence relates to a fact or proposition that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action, or that the 
other acts evidence has probative value.  Rather, Gray argues 
that the State failed to produce any evidence to connect him 
with 
the 
other 
acts 
evidence 
of 
the 
uncharged 
forged 
prescriptions marked as exhibits 2 and 4 through 7.  Gray argues 
that the circuit court erroneously allowed testimony regarding 
these five exhibits because there was no proof of connection to 
the defendant. 
¶40 “It is not necessary that prior-crime evidence be in 
the form of a conviction; evidence of the incident, crime or 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
18
occurrence is sufficient.”  Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 
293, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967).  In other words, other acts evidence 
may consist of uncharged offenses such as the uncharged forged 
prescriptions in this case.  However, “[u]nder § 904.04(2), 
Stats., other acts evidence is relevant if a reasonable jury 
could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
committed the other act.”  State v. Bustamante, 201 Wis. 2d 562, 
570, 549 N.W.2d 746 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing State v. Landrum, 
191 Wis. 2d 107, 119-20, 528 N.W.2d 36 (Ct. App. 1995)).  
Whether a jury could determine that the defendant committed the 
other acts is a question of law which we review de novo.  
Bustamante, 201 Wis. 2d at 570. 
¶41 To determine the relevancy of other acts evidence 
which is conditioned on showing another fact, such as showing 
that the defendant is connected to the uncharged forged 
prescriptions, we turn to Wis. Stat. § 901.04(2) which provides 
as follows: 
 
(2) RELEVANCY CONDITIONED ON FACT.  When the relevancy of 
evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition 
of fact, the judge shall admit it upon, or subject to, 
the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a 
finding of the fulfillment of the condition. 
§ 901.04(2).  To determine whether the proponent of the evidence 
has introduced evidence sufficient to meet § 901.04(2), the 
court should neither weigh credibility nor determine whether the 
state proved the conditional fact.  See Huddleston v. U.S., 485 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
19
U.S. 681, 690 (1988).6  Rather, the circuit court must examine 
all the evidence presented to the jury and determine if a 
reasonable 
jury 
could 
find 
the 
conditional 
fact 
by 
a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Id.  In reaching its conclusion, 
the circuit court may allow admission of other acts evidence 
conditioned on later introduction of evidence to make the 
requisite finding.  Id.  If the proponent of the other acts 
evidence fails to provide sufficient evidence to allow the 
circuit court to conclude that a jury would find the conditional 
fact by a preponderance of the evidence, the circuit court must 
instruct the jury to disregard the other acts evidence.  Id.   
¶42 In 
Huddleston, 
the 
defendant 
was 
charged 
with 
possessing and selling stolen property, blank video cassette 
tapes, in interstate commerce.  Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 682.  
The defendant denied knowing that the property he possessed and 
sold was stolen.  Id. at 683.  To show that the defendant did 
know that the property was stolen, the United States sought to 
introduce other acts evidence that the defendant had sold stolen 
televisions in interstate commerce.  Although the defendant 
admitted to selling the televisions there was no proof that the 
televisions were stolen and again the defendant denied knowing 
                     
6  The Federal rules of evidence (FRE), including 104(b) and 
404(b) are substantially the same as the Wisconsin rules of 
evidence, including Wis. Stat. §§ 901.04(2) and 904.04(2).  To 
achieve uniformity between the federal and Wisconsin rules of 
evidence, we rely on federal case law regarding FRE 104(b) and 
404(b) to analyze §§ 901.04(2) and 904.04(2).  See State v. 
Schindler, 146 Wis. 2d 47, 54, 429 N.W.2d 110 (Ct. App. 1988). 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
20
that they were stolen.  Id.  The conditional fact was whether 
the televisions were stolen.  Id. at 690.  Considering all the 
evidence presented, the Court determined that the district court 
could conclude that the jury could find, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, the truth of the conditional fact, that the 
televisions which were the subject of the other acts evidence 
were stolen.  Id. at 691.  
¶43 The Huddleston analysis was adopted by the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals in State v. Schindler, 146 Wis. 2d 47, 54, 429 
N.W.2d 110 (Ct. App. 1988).  In Schindler, the conditional fact 
was whether it was the defendant or some other person who 
committed the other acts, namely causing the child homicide 
victim to have leg and rib fractures.  Considering all the 
evidence presented to the jury, the court of appeals concluded 
that there was sufficient evidence “to permit a reasonable jury 
to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant 
caused the victim’s leg and rib injuries.  The Huddleston test 
is met, and we therefore conclude that the trial court correctly 
permitted the jury to hear that evidence.”  Schindler, 146 
Wis. 2d at 55-56. 
¶44 In the present case, the State introduced, and the 
circuit court admitted, other acts evidence consisting of six 
uncharged forged prescriptions marked as exhibits 2 through 7.  
Gray argues that the State failed to prove the conditional 
factthat he was connected to the uncharged forged prescriptions 
marked as exhibits 2 and 4 through 7.  Because exhibit 3 
included Gray’s fingerprint, he does not argue that he is not 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
21
connected to this exhibit.  Count one, which is the subject of 
this appeal, is based on exhibit 9, the refill of the 
prescription marked as exhibit 3.  Finally, exhibit 11 is the 
forged prescription for which Gray was convicted in 1990.  It 
also included his fingerprint and was therefore directly 
connected to Gray.  We follow the Huddleston analysis and 
consider all the evidence presented to the jury to determine 
whether there is sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury 
could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
was connected to the uncharged forged prescriptions. 
¶45 To begin, exhibit 3 is undoubtedly connected to the 
defendant because his fingerprint is on it.  Although the 
prescriptions marked as exhibits 2 and 4 through 7 were for 
three different patients and the doctor’s names were different, 
the 
State 
introduced 
evidence 
that 
showed 
that 
all 
the 
prescriptions marked as exhibits 2 through 7 were for the same 
narcotic, mostly in the form of Hydrocodone and one in the form 
of Hycodan syrup.  The prescriptions were all presented to the 
same pharmacy.  Through the testimony of different doctors, the 
State 
showed 
that 
all 
the 
prescriptions 
were 
forgeries.  
Finally, through the testimony of a document examiner, the State 
showed that there was a high probability that the same person 
forged the printed portions of the prescriptions marked as 
exhibits 2 through 7.  Because of the similarities between 
exhibit 3, which includes the defendant’s fingerprint, and 
exhibits 2 and 4 through 7, we conclude that the State provided 
sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could find by a 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
22
preponderance of the evidence the conditional factthat Gray was 
connected to the prescriptions marked as exhibits 2 and 4 
through 7.  Because the State presented evidence sufficient to 
fulfill 
the 
conditional 
fact, 
the 
other 
acts 
evidence, 
consisting of exhibits 2 and 4 through 7, is relevant.7  
¶46 Having concluded that the other acts evidence is 
relevant, the defendant’s argument that his due process rights 
were violated is without merit.  See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 
U.S. 62, 70 (1991).   
¶47 At this point we have determined that the other acts 
evidence, the defendant’s 1990 conviction and the uncharged 
forged prescriptions marked as exhibits 2 and 4 through 7, were 
admissible to show motive, identity, plan or scheme, and absence 
of mistake.  We have also concluded that the other acts evidence 
was relevant, and the State presented sufficient evidence to 
fulfill the conditional fact that the defendant was connected to 
the prescriptions marked as exhibits 2 and 4 through 7.  We now 
turn to the final step in the Sullivan three-step analytical 
framework: whether “the probative value of the other acts 
                     
7 The State argues that the defendant waived his right to 
challenge the conditional fact that he was connected with the 
other acts evidence by not properly raising the objection at the 
circuit court.  “Although objections which are waived are not 
reviewable as a matter of right, this court may consider the 
merits of the objection if it chooses.”  State v. Giwosky, 109 
Wis. 2d 446, 451 n.3, 326 N.W.2d 232 (1982) (citing Manson v. 
State, 101 Wis. 2d 413, 417 n.2, 304 N.W.2d 729 (1981); State v. 
Wedgeworth, 100 Wis. 2d 514, 528, 302 N.W.2d 810 (1981)).  
Regardless of waiver, we chose to reach the issue of the 
relevancy of the conditional evidence.  
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
23
evidence [is] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence[.]  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.03.”  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772-73.  This test is “based 
upon the premise the accused is entitled to a procedurally and 
evidentially fair trial without making it impossible for the 
state to prosecute.”  Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 295.   
¶48 The circuit court determined both before and during 
the trial that the unfair prejudicial effect of the other acts 
evidence did not outweigh its probative value.  The circuit 
court stated that the testimony about all the prescriptions was 
inter-related, some having the same patients’ names and the same 
handwriting.  The circuit court reasoned that it would be 
difficult for the jury to understand all of the evidence without 
having the documents presented to them, from which they could 
draw their own conclusions. 
¶49 “Unfair prejudice results when the proffered evidence 
has a tendency to influence the outcome by improper means or if 
it appeals to the jury’s sympathies, arouses its sense of 
horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a 
jury 
to 
base 
its 
decision 
on something 
other 
than the 
established propositions in the case.”  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 
789-90 (citing State v. Mordica, 168 Wis. 2d 593, 605, 484 
N.W.2d 352 (Ct. App. 1992)).  In contrast, probative value 
“depends 
in part 
upon 
its 
nearness 
in time, 
place and 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
24
circumstances to the alleged crime or element sought to be 
proved.”  Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 294.   
¶50 The inquiry is not whether the other acts evidence is 
prejudicial but whether it is unfairly prejudicial.  We agree 
with the circuit court that it is not.  The other acts evidence 
is 
probative 
due 
to 
its 
nearness 
in 
time, 
place 
and 
circumstances to the charged crime.  Except for exhibit 11, the 
prescription 
for 
the 
defendant’s 
1990 
conviction, 
the 
prescriptions admitted as other acts evidence were for the same 
narcotic as the prescription for which the defendant was 
charged, and they were filled at the same pharmacy within a 
five-month period.  A document expert testified that although he 
could not conclude that it was the defendant who wrote the 
prescriptions, there was a high probability that the handwritten 
printed portions of the prescriptions making up the other acts 
evidence, including exhibit 3, were all written by the same 
person.  Exhibit 3 had the defendant’s fingerprint on it.  The 
charged crime was based on exhibit 9 which was a refill of the 
prescription marked as exhibit 3.  Finally, the circumstances 
surrounding the defendant’s 1990 conviction are very similar to 
the circumstances regarding the charged offense.  We cannot 
conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion in concluding that the probative value of the other 
acts evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.   
¶51 Additionally, the court properly gave the jury the 
cautionary instruction, Wis JICriminal 275.  This cautionary 
instruction warns the jury that it is to consider the other acts 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
25
evidence only for certain purposes and not to conclude that the 
defendant has a certain character and that he or she acted in 
conformity with that character.  A cautionary instruction can go 
“far to cure any adverse effect attendant with the admission of 
the [other acts] evidence.”  Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 262.   
¶52 In sum, our independent review of the record shows a 
proper basis for the circuit court’s exercise of discretion to 
admit the defendant’s 1990 conviction and the uncharged forged 
prescriptions for the permissible purposes of showing identity, 
plan, motive and absence of mistake.  We also conclude that the 
other 
acts 
evidence, 
particularly 
the 
uncharged 
forged 
prescriptions marked as exhibits 2 and 4 through 7, are 
relevant.  The State presented sufficient evidence to fulfill 
the conditional fact that the defendant was connected with these 
uncharged forged prescriptions.  Finally, we conclude that 
because of the nearness in time, place and circumstances of the 
other acts evidence with the charged offense, the circuit court 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion in determining that 
the probative value of the other acts evidence outweighed its 
unfair prejudicial effect. 
¶53 We now turn to the second issue presented by this 
case: whether the circuit court had authority under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(3)(a) to modify the defendant’s probation sentence 
before the period of probation began, to include a one-year jail 
term.  This is an issue of statutory construction which we 
review de novo.  State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 403-404, 
565 N.W.2d 506 (1997). 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
26
¶54 The State first argues that this issue is moot because 
the defendant has already completed his one-year jail term.  
Although an issue may be moot this court may nevertheless 
address it if the issue is of great public importance; if the 
constitutionality of a statute is involved; if the situation 
occurs so frequently that a definitive decision is necessary to 
guide circuit courts; if the issue is likely to arise again and 
a decision from the court would alleviate uncertainty; or if an 
issue will likely be repeated but evades appellate review 
because the appellate process cannot be completed or even 
undertaken in time to have a practical effect on the parties.  
State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Ct., 115 Wis. 2d 220, 
229, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983).  Because we determine that the issue 
of a circuit court’s authority under Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) 
to modify probation is an issue that will likely arise again and 
a decision from this court would alleviate uncertainty, we will 
address the issue as presented and briefed by this case.  
¶55 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) provides as follows: 
“Prior to the expiration of any probation period, the court, for 
cause and by order, may extend probation for a stated period or 
modify the terms and conditions thereof.”  We are asked to 
determine 
whether 
this 
statute 
gives 
circuit 
courts 
the 
authority to modify the conditions of probation before the 
period of probation begins.   
¶56 Questions of statutory interpretation require that we 
discern the intent of the legislature.  Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d at 
406.  We first consider the language of the statute.  If the 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
27
plain language unambiguously sets forth the legislative intent, 
we apply the statute without looking beyond the statutory 
language.  Id.  “A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of 
being understood in two or more different senses by reasonably 
well-informed persons.”  Id. (citing Wagner Mobil, Inc. v. City 
of Madison, 190 Wis. 2d 585, 592, 527 N.W.2d 301 (1995)).  If a 
statute is ambiguous we turn to extrinsic aids such as 
legislative history, scope, context, subject matter and object 
of the statute to determine the legislative intent.  Setagord, 
211 Wis. 2d at 397.   
¶57 The phrase at issue in this case is “prior to the 
expiration of any probation period . . ..”  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(3)(a).  The defendant asserts that this phrase means 
that the period of probation must have begun before the court 
can extend probation or modify the terms and conditions of 
probation.  In other words, the defendant asserts that a circuit 
court may modify the conditions of probation any time between 
the beginning of the probation period and the expiration of the 
probation period.  The State counters that the statute means 
that the circuit court can modify the conditions of probation at 
any time before the expiration of the period of probation, even 
if the period of probation has not yet started. 
¶58 We agree with the State.  The plain language of the 
statute, “prior to the expiration of any probation period,” 
allows the circuit court to modify the conditions of probation 
any time before the period of probation expires.  The plain 
language does not require that probation has already begun 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
28
before the court has authority to modify its conditions.  To 
require that probation has already begun before the court can 
modify its terms would require that we read additional language 
into the statute.  This is a task we will not undertake.  See, 
e.g., State v. Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 54, 82, 557 N.W.2d 778 (1997) 
(regarding saving the constitutionality of a statute: “where the 
meaning is plain, words cannot be read into [a statute] or out 
of it for the purpose of saving one or other possible 
alternative.”). 
¶59 Although we conclude that the plain language of the 
statute allows circuit courts to modify the conditions of 
probation at any time before the expiration of probation, even 
before the period of probation begins, our conclusion is also 
supported by the purpose of imposing probation.  The theory of 
the probation statute is to rehabilitate the defendant and 
protect society without placing the defendant in prison.  See 
State v. Hays, 173 Wis. 2d 439, 445, 496 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 
1992).  To accomplish this theory, the circuit court is 
empowered by Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a) to fashion the terms of 
probation to meet the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.  
Id.  Also, “inherent within the probation statute is the court’s 
continued power to effectuate the dual purposes of probation, 
namely, rehabilitating the defendant and protecting society, 
through the court’s authority to modify or extend probationary 
terms.”  State v. Sepulveda, 119 Wis. 2d 546, 554, 350 N.W.2d 96 
(1984).  When the grant of probation is premised on another 
condition, such as confinement, and the intent of probation is 
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
29
frustrated because that condition cannot be met, the circuit 
court has the authority to modify the conditions of probation.  
Id. at 556.  
¶60 As this case illustrates, it is possible that the 
intent of probation can be frustrated before the period of 
probation even begins.  Gray was sentenced to a total of 13 
years for counts two and three.  Pursuant to the defendant’s 
post-conviction motion, the circuit court dismissed count two 
with prejudice and granted a new trial on count three.  As a 
result of partially granting defendant’s post-conviction motion, 
the only portion of the sentence remaining was the period of 
probation for count one.  The circuit court was clear in 
initially fashioning the sentence structure, that it sought to 
provide 
not 
only 
a 
penalty 
for 
the 
defendant 
through 
incarceration, 
but 
also 
rehabilitation 
and 
long 
term 
supervision.  When only the period of probation remained without 
any period of incarceration, the penalty component of the 
circuit 
court’s 
sentencing 
structure 
was 
frustrated.  
Accordingly, the circuit court sought to modify the conditions 
of 
probation 
to 
include 
some 
period 
of 
confinement 
for 
punishment purposes.  This action is consistent with the plain 
language and purpose of Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a). 
¶61 In sum, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) allows 
circuit courts to modify conditions of probation at any time 
before the period of probation expires, even before the period 
of probation begins.   
No. 
96-3363-CR 
 
30
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
  
 
 
 
1