Case Title: State v. Sheppard

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88-568

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 88-568


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
Leonard Sheppard                             Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit

                                             May Term, 1990


Dean B. Pineles, J.

Robert M. Butterfield, Caledonia County Deputy State's Attorney, St.
  Johnsbury, for plaintiff-appellee

Walter M. Morris, Jr., Defender General, and Henry Hinton, Appellate
  Defender, Montpelier, and Mary T. Rogan, Public Defender, St. Johnsbury,
  for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     GIBSON, J.   Defendant appeals from the district court's denial of his
motion for a new trial on the ground of juror bias.  We affirm.
                                    I.
     On August 30, 1988, a jury convicted defendant of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI).  At the
commencement of the sentencing hearing conducted on September 22 to
determine whether he had been previously convicted of DUI, (FN1) defendant moved
for a new trial, claiming juror bias.  In support of his motion, defendant
submitted an affidavit of a third person stating that, prior to  voir dire,
one of the persons who was to be a juror in the case had said, "you know,
these poor people live like animals."  The affidavit also stated that,
following voir dire, the same juror had said that the trial "was not going
to take that long because the person had the Public Defender."  The State
contended that the motion was untimely, as it was not made within ten days
of the verdict, as required by V.R.Cr.P. 33.  With defendant's agreement,
the court postponed a decision on the motion and proceeded to sentencing,
imposing a nine-to-twelve-months sentence, all suspended except for three
days to serve, with terms of probation requiring alcohol treatment and
counseling.  The sentence was stayed pending the court's ruling on the
motion for a new trial.
     Following the parties' submission of memoranda on the motion, the court
ruled that defendant's claim of potential juror bias did not constitute
"newly discovered evidence" and, since it had not been filed within ten days
of the verdict, was not timely filed under V.R.Cr.P. 33.  Further, the
court determined that defendant had a remedy under the post-conviction
relief statutes, 13 V.S.A. {{ 7131-7137.  The court entered a judgment of
guilty and stayed the incarceration, but not the probationary portion of
the sentence, pending appeal.
     On appeal, defendant contends that (1) evidence of juror bias does
constitute "newly discovered evidence" under V.R.Cr.P. 33, and therefore,
his motion for a new trial was timely filed; and (2) the trial court abused
its discretion in violation of his constitutional right to a fair and
impartial jury by not granting him a new trial.
                                    II.
     Defendant argues that evidence of juror bias is "newly discovered
evidence" under V.R.Cr.P. 33, and may thus be the basis of a motion for a
new trial at any time within two years after final judgment.  We disagree.
     V.R.Cr.P. 33 provides:
            The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new
          trial to him if required in the interests of justice. .
          . .  A motion for a new trial based on the ground of
          newly discovered evidence may be made only before or
          within two years after final judgment . . . .  A motion
          for a new trial based on any other grounds shall be made
          within 10 days after verdict or finding of guilty or
          within such further time as the court may fix during the
          10-day period.
     Motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence are
not favored by the courts and are viewed with great caution; courts are
properly reluctant to grant a second trial once a defendant has had his or
her day in court and been fairly tried.  3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Criminal { 557, at 315 (2d ed. 1982); see State v. Jackson, 126
Vt. 250, 252,