Case Title: In re Estate of Gray

Citation: 

Docket Number: Pen-14-56

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2014-10-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2014 ME 119 
Docket: 
Pen-14-56 
Submitted  
   On Briefs: September 23, 2014 
Decided: 
October 30, 2014 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, 
JJ. 
 
 
ESTATE OF MARGARET C. GRAY 
 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
[¶1]  Elizabeth Tasker appeals from a judgment of the Penobscot County 
Probate Court (Bradford, M.R., J.) dismissing her claim against the estate of her 
mother, Margaret C. Gray.  Elizabeth contends that the usual time limitations for a 
claim against an estate established in 18-A M.R.S. § 3-803(b) (2013) do not apply 
to a claim for unjust enrichment.  We disagree and affirm the judgment.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The facts of this case were thoroughly discussed in our prior decision 
concerning this dispute.  Estate of Gray, 2013 ME 29, ¶¶ 2-6, 61 A.3d 747.  When 
Margaret C. Gray died on June 25, 2007, her will devised her estate in equal shares 
to Ernest L. Gray III and Elizabeth Tasker, her surviving children.  Id. ¶ 2.  
Margaret’s estate consisted of three parcels of real property located in Maine.  Id.   
 
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[¶3]  On April 28, 2010, almost three years after her mother’s death, 
Elizabeth filed Margaret’s will in the Penobscot County Probate Court and 
petitioned for appointment as the personal representative of the estate.  Id. ¶ 4.  
After Ernest objected to Elizabeth’s appointment, the court appointed Attorney 
Joel A. Dearborn Sr. as personal representative of the estate.  Id.   
[¶4]  On January 19, 2011, Elizabeth filed a claim against the estate for 
$40,871.25 seeking reimbursement for mortgage, property tax, electricity, and 
heating payments she made to maintain her mother’s properties since 2007.  
Id. ¶¶ 3, 5.  When Ernest objected to the claim, Dearborn petitioned the court for 
instructions.  Id. ¶¶ 5, 6.  
[¶5]  During the May 14, 2012, hearing on her claim, Elizabeth presented 
evidence of the payments she had made from 2007 to 2012 for expenses relating to 
the estate’s three properties.  She argued that her claims were not barred by the 
statute of limitations found in 18-A M.R.S. § 3-803(b) or, in the alternative, that 
she was entitled to recover under a theory of unjust enrichment.  On June 21, 2012, 
the court (Woodcock, J.) found that Elizabeth’s claim was not barred by the statute 
of limitations and ordered that the estate pay Elizabeth $45,419.46.  Id. ¶ 6.  
[¶6]  Ernest appealed that judgment and, on March 12, 2013, we concluded 
that the Probate Court erred by applying to Elizabeth’s claim the statute of 
limitations for claims arising before the death of the decedent.  Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.  We 
 
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remanded the case with instructions to apply 18-A M.R.S. § 3-803(b) (2013), 
which applies to claims arising after the decedent’s death, and to consider “all 
claims and defenses that are raised by the parties and found appropriate for 
consideration by the court.”  Id. ¶ 11.  
[¶7]  On remand, Elizabeth asserted that the court should allow her claim 
against the estate based on a theory of unjust enrichment, which she argued would 
fall outside of section 3-803(b).  The court disagreed; it concluded that a claim for 
unjust enrichment falls within the usual statute of limitations for claims against an 
estate and that Elizabeth’s claim was therefore time-barred pursuant to section 
3-803(b).  Elizabeth appealed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶8]  “Whether a claim is barred by the statute of limitations is a legal 
question subject to de novo review.”  Estate of Weatherbee, 2014 ME 73, ¶ 14, 
93 A.3d 248.  We strictly construe statutes of limitations.  Id.  
[¶9]  In this second appeal, Elizabeth argues that the Probate Court erred in 
holding that 18-A M.R.S. §3-803(b) applied to claims made against an estate 
pursuant to the theory of unjust enrichment.  Section 3-803(b) states: 
All claims against a decedent’s estate which arise at or after the death 
of the decedent, including claims of the State and any subdivision of 
the State, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, 
liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal 
basis, are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the 
 
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heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:  (1) A 
claim based on a contract with the personal representative, within four 
months after performance by the personal representative is due; or 
(2) Any other claim, within the later of 4 months after it arises, or the 
time specified in subsection (a), paragraph (2).  
 
In interpreting any statutory provision, we first look to its plain language to 
determine its meaning.  MaineToday Media, Inc. v. State, 2013 ME 100, ¶ 6, 
82 A.3d 104.  “If the language is unambiguous, we interpret the provisions 
according to their unambiguous meaning unless the result is illogical or absurd.”  
Id. (quotation marks omitted).   
 
[¶10]  The plain language of 18-A M.R.S. § 3-803(b) provides that “all 
claims against a decedent’s estate” arising at or after the decedent’s death are 
subject to its limitations period.  (Emphasis added.)  The specific use of the word 
“all” indicates that any claim—including an unjust enrichment claim, whether 
arising as a theory of recovery or as a separately pleaded cause of action—falls 
under the sweeping language of section 3-803(b). 
[¶11]  Contrary to Elizabeth’s argument, section 3-803(b)’s list of specific 
examples, introduced by the word “including,” do not suggest any intent to define 
the types of claims subject to the provision.  “[W]e do not read exceptions, 
limitations, or conditions into an otherwise clear and unambiguous statute.”  
Adoption of M.A., 2007 ME 123, ¶ 9, 930 A.2d 1088.  “The common definition of 
the word includes does not suggest it is a word of limitation.”  S.D. Warren Co. v. 
 
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Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME 27, ¶ 16, 868 A.2d 210, aff’d on other grounds sub 
nom. S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370 (2006).  Thus, 
according to the plain language, the types of claims listed are intended only as a 
limited set of specific examples.  
[¶12]  Furthermore, we have concluded that the Probate Code must define 
“claim” broadly, see Estate of Leavitt, 1999 ME 102, ¶ 6, 733 A.2d 348 
(concluding a claim contending ownership through equitable title was a “claim” 
under the Probate Code), and that creative labeling cannot exempt a “claim” from 
the requirements of the Probate Code.  Estate of Staples, 672 A.2d 99, 101 
(Me. 1996) (concluding that the Probate Court could not call a claim an “expense 
of sale” simply to avoid the statute of limitations).  
 
[¶13]  Elizabeth’s dependence on Estate of Miller, 2008 ME 176, ¶ 28, 
960 A.2d 1140, is not persuasive.  In that case, the personal representative of an 
estate filed a three-count complaint against the decedent’s son after the son gained 
control of several of the decedent’s bank accounts.  Id. ¶ 7.  The personal 
representative asserted that the son’s retention of the accounts constituted an unjust 
enrichment.  Id.  Because the case involved a claim by an estate, we applied the 
six-year statute of limitations to the unjust enrichment claim against the decedent’s 
 
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son.  See 14 M.R.S. § 752 (2013).1  Elizabeth’s claim, however, is a claim against 
an estate and is therefore subject to the Probate Code.  
 
[¶14]  Because section 3-803(b) applies to it, Elizabeth’s claim is 
time-barred.   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Marvin H. Glazier, Esq., Vafiades, Brountas & Kominsky, 
LLP, Bangor, for appellant Elizabeth Tasker 
 
Joel A. Dearborn, Esq., Joel A. Dearborn, Sr., Esq., P.A., 
Brewer, for the Estate of Margaret C. Gray 
 
Bryan M. Chabot, Esq., Scaccia, Bartlett & Chabot, Sanford, 
for appellee Ernest L. Gray III 
 
 
 
Penobscot County Probate Court docket number 2010-279 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                         
1  In Estate of Miller, we applied 14 M.R.S. § 752 (2007), which has the same language as the current 
version of section 752.