Case Title: Pachkofsky v. Pachkofsky

Citation: 192 Or. 627, 236 P.2d 320

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1951-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Affirmed as modified October 10, 1951.
*629 Clarence A. Potts argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Potts & Davidson, of Portland.
William K. Shepherd, of Portland, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Before BRAND, Chief Justice, and HAY, LUSK, LATOURETTE and TOOZE, Justices.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
TOOZE, J.
This is a suit for divorce brought by Margie H. Pachkofsky, as plaintiff, against Benjamin Pachkofsky, as defendant. The trial court entered a decree granting *630 a divorce to defendant, awarding the custody of a minor child to defendant's sister, fixing the property rights of the parties, and allowing attorney's fees to plaintiff. From this decree plaintiff appeals; from the provisions of the decree respecting property rights and attorney's fees, defendant cross-appeals.
Plaintiff and defendant were intermarried at Vancouver, Washington, February 10, 1944. One child, Donald Stephen, was born on March 13, 1946, as the issue of this marriage. As the issue of a prior marriage, there was born to plaintiff a daughter named Bonnie B. Lynch, aged seven years at the time this suit was commenced. Bonnie lived with plaintiff and defendant.
In her complaint plaintiff charges defendant with certain acts of cruel and inhuman treatment. By his answer defendant denies these allegations of wrongdoing on his part, and by way of cross-complaint charges plaintiff with cruel and inhuman treatment in certain respects as alleged, and by supplemental cross-complaint accuses her of adultery. By her reply plaintiff denies all such alleged misconduct on her part.
Upon the trial witnesses were called by both parties to substantiate their respective claims. Before us are 757 typewritten pages of testimony produced in the trial court. We have examined this transcript with care.
Upon the conclusion of the trial the court entered the following decree (omitting formal parts):
1. No useful purpose will be served by discussing the evidence in detail. Suffice it to say that with one important exception to be hereafter noted, there is substantial evidence in the record respecting some of the charges contained in the original answer which, if believed, will justify the decree entered by the trial court. The trial judge heard the testimony, observed the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while under examination and, by reason thereof, was in much better position to judge the truth than are we, confined as we are to the reading of the cold record before us. However, that does not mean that we are entirely free from doubt, because we are not; yet under all the circumstances of this particular case, we are of the *633 opinion that that doubt should be resolved in favor of the decree in so far as it is possible.
2. The part of the decree which has given us most concern is that respecting the custody of the minor child of the parties. It will be noted that such custody is awarded to defendant's sister. The evidence discloses beyond question that Esther Austad, wife of Lawrence Austad and the mother of two girls aged twelve and seven respectively, is a woman of splendid character, in every way a fit and proper person to have the custody of any child. But that does not mean she is entitled to or should have custody of the child involved in this litigation.
The evidence discloses that, at the time of trial this child was in poor health, then suffering from rheumatic fever. He had not been well for a considerable period of time prior to trial. The overwhelming weight of the evidence shows beyond any peradventure of doubt that plaintiff is devoted to this child and at all times has given it excellent care. The child has never been away from her since its birth. Although she labored under very trying circumstances at times, plaintiff never forgot her duty as a mother. No serious attempt was made to show any neglect of her child on her part; in fact, defendant himself admitted she gave him good care. Neighbors who were called as witnesses by defendant spoke well of the care bestowed upon her children by plaintiff. We quote briefly some of that testimony.
William Mauk, who lived within 400 feet of the home of plaintiff and defendant, testified:
Conrad Heinrich, another neighbor, testified:
The evidence also discloses that Esther Austad never visited in the home of plaintiff and defendant, nor did plaintiff ever visit in the Austad home, though all the parties lived either in or near Portland. Esther Austad is a perfect stranger to this little fellow.
3. We are not unmindful of the single act of misconduct charged against plaintiff as having been committed several months after this divorce suit was commenced. We have carefully read all of the evidence pertaining thereto. There was an explanation by plaintiff which is entirely consistent with innocence. She was corroborated. Yet it is unnecessary for us here to express an opinion whether her version of the incident or that of the defendant is true.
It is sufficient to say that, even if it be assumed the incident occurred just as claimed by defendant, it does not necessarily follow that by reason thereof plaintiff was automatically rendered unfit to have the custody of her child, nor that the child's welfare will be promoted by denying her custody.
*635 4-6. Our paramount consideration is the welfare of this baby. The evidence before us is conclusive that no act of plaintiff's ever had any injurious effects in so far as the welfare of this little boy is concerned. In all cases where misconduct on the part of a mother is claimed as reason for denying her custody of her child of tender years, the test is whether such wrongdoing had any direct bearing upon the welfare of the child and to its injury.
7. Can it be seriously contended that this child's welfare will be promoted by taking him from a devoted mother, whose love, care, companionship, and guidance he has enjoyed since birth, and turning him over to a comparative stranger, be such stranger ever so capable? We think not.
8. In the late case of Sakraida v. Sakraida, 192 Or. 217, 233 P.2d 762, 764, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice HAY, said:
See also Goldson v. Goldson, 192 Or. 611; Ruch v. Ruch, 183 Or. 240, 244, 192 P.2d 272.
9, 10. As to those provisions of the decree of the trial court fixing the property rights of the parties, we find substantial evidence in the record to support these. In Shields v. Bosch, Executor, 190 Or. 155, 159, 224 P.2d 560, we said:
We find no such abuse of discretion in this case.
Defendant objects to that portion of the decree allowing additional attorney's fees in the sum of $250.
On April 28, 1949, the trial court upon motion of plaintiff entered an order which, in part, reads as follows:
No other order respecting the allowance of attorney's fees was made or entered of record prior to final decree. During the course of the trial, just before plaintiff rested, the following stipulation was entered into between counsel:
Section 9-913, O.C.L.A., as amended by ch. 142, Oregon Laws 1945, provides, in part, as follows:
11. The divorce court, being a court of limited jurisdiction, can exercise no power other than that expressly conferred upon it by statute. The foregoing provision of the statute is the only authority the court, or judge thereof, has respecting the allowance of money necessary to enable the wife to prosecute or defend the suit; this includes the power to allow attorney's fees when necessary.
12. However, under the express wording of the statute, it is mandatory that whatever allowances are made must be made prior to final decree. They cannot be made for the first time in the final decree itself. If fixed by order duly made and entered of record prior to final decree, such sums may be incorporated into the final decree if at the time of the rendition thereof they remain unpaid. Carlton v. Carlton, 156 Or. 33, 37, 65 P.2d 1417; Aldrich v. Aldrich, 129 Or. 111, 113, 276 P. 267; Thomsen v. Thomsen, 118 Or. 614, 621, 228 P. 832, 245 P. 502, 247 P. 808; Hengen v. Hengen, 85 Or. 155, 164, 166 P. 525.
We see no reason for this requirement, but that is a legislative and not a judicial question. We have no authority to rewrite the statute.
The stipulation in question did not provide that the trial court might determine the amount reasonable as attorney's fee and incorporate the same into the final decree. It was no more nor less than an agreement that the court might fix the fee without any evidence being offered as to reasonable value of the services performed. It was in no sense a waiver of *638 the specific requirement of the statute that the court fix the fee by order before final decree.
13. It is true that the trial judge in a memorandum opinion respecting the issues in the case written prior to final decree, among other things, stated the following:
14. However, this memorandum was not an order of the court, nor filed as such. For us to interpret it as an order would be to establish a dangerous precedent.
That part of the decree providing for additional attorney's fees is void and of no effect.
It follows from what has been said that the decree of the trial court should be, and the same hereby is, modified by striking therefrom subdivisions numbered (2), (3), (4), and (5) thereof and substituting therefor the following:
The permanent care, custody, and control of Donald Stephen Pachkofsky, minor child of plaintiff and defendant, be, and the same is, awarded to plaintiff. Defendant shall have the right of reasonable visitation.
Defendant shall be, and he is, required to pay to plaintiff the sum of $50 per month toward the care and maintenance of said minor child and, in addition thereto, pay for all necessary medical care and attention rendered said child.
Except as herein modified, the decree is affirmed.
Plaintiff is entitled to costs and disbursements.