Case Title: ABKA Limited Partnership v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1999AP002306

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI App 223 
 
COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN 
PUBLISHED OPINION  
 
 
Case No.: 
99-2306  
 
 
Complete Title 
 of Case: 
†Petition for review filed 
 
ABKA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, AN ILLINOIS LIMITED  
PARTNERSHIP,  
 
                             PETITIONER-APPELLANT,† 
 
THE ABBEY HARBOR CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, LTD.,  
A WISCONSIN NONPROFIT CORPORATION,  
 
                             PETITIONER-CO-APPELLANT,† 
 
              V. 
 
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,  
GENEVA LAKE CONSERVANCY, INC., AND ONEIDA  
COUNTY,  
 
                             RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS. 
__________________________________ 
WISCONSIN REALTORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,  
 
                             PETITIONER-APPELLANT,† 
 
              V. 
 
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,  
 
                             RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.† 
 
__________________________________ 
ABKA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, AN ILLINOIS LIMITED  
PARTNERSHIP,  
 
                             PETITIONER-APPELLANT, 
 
THE ABBEY HARBOR CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, LTD.,  
A WISCONSIN NONPROFIT CORPORATION,  
 
                             PETITIONER-CO-APPELLANT, 
 
              V. 
 
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,  
 
                             RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. 
 
__________________________________ 
WISCONSIN ASSOCIATION OF LAKES, INC.,  
 
                             PETITIONER-APPELLANT, 
 
              V. 
 
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,  
 
                             RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. 
 
__________________________________ 
WISCONSIN REALTORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,  
 
                             PETITIONER-APPELLANT, 
 
              V. 
 
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,  
 
                             RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.  
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
August 22, 2001 
Oral Argument: 
May 1, 2001 
 
 
JUDGES: 
Nettesheim, P.J., Brown and Snyder, JJ.  
 
Concurred: 
       
 
Dissented: 
Brown, J.  
 
 
 
Appellant 
ATTORNEYS: 
On behalf of the petitioner-appellant ABKA Limited Partnership and the 
petitioner-co-appellant The Abbey Harbor Condominium Association, 
Ltd., there were joint briefs by Anthony S. Earl, Waltraud A. Arts and 
Brian W. Blanchard of Quarles & Brady, LLP of Madison; Alan 
Marcuvitz of Weiss, Berzowski, Brady & Donahue, LLP of Milwaukee; 
Lisle W. Blackbourn of  Godfrey, Neshek, Worth, Leibsle & Conover, S.C. 
of Elkhorn; and Thomas L. Shriner, Jr. of Foley & Lardner of 
Milwaukee.  There were oral arguments by Thomas L. Shriner, Jr. 
 
 
On behalf of the petitioner-appellant Wisconsin Realtors Association, 
Inc., there were briefs by Winston A. Ostrow and Donald L. Romundson 
of Godfrey & Kahn, S.C. of Green Bay.  There were oral arguments by 
Donald L. Romundson. 
 
 
On behalf of the petitioner-appellant Wisconsin Association of Lakes, 
Inc., there were briefs by William P. O’Connor and Mary Beth Peranteau 
of Wheeler, Van Sickle & Anderson, S.C. of Madison.  There were oral 
arguments by William P. O’Connor. 
 
Respondent 
ATTORNEYS: 
On behalf of the respondent-respondent Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources, there was a brief by John S. Greene, assistant 
attorney general, and James E. Doyle, attorney general.  There were 
oral arguments by John S. Greene. 
 
 
On behalf of the respondent-respondent Geneva Lake Conservancy, 
Inc., there was a brief and oral arguments by Peter B. King of Peter B. 
King, Attorney at Law, S.C. of Fontana. 
 
 
On behalf of the respondent-respondent Oneida County, there were 
briefs and oral arguments by Lawrence R. Heath, corporation counsel.   
 
 
 
2001 WI App 223 
COURT OF APPEALS 
DECISION 
DATED AND FILED 
 
August 22, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk, Court of Appeals 
of Wisconsin 
 
NOTICE 
 
This opinion is subject to further editing. If 
published, the official version will appear in the 
bound volume of the Official Reports. 
 
A party may file with the Supreme Court a 
petition to review an adverse decision by the 
Court of Appeals.  See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and 
RULE 809.62. 
 
 
No. 99-2306  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN 
IN COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
 
ABKA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, AN ILLINOIS LIMITED  
PARTNERSHIP,  
 
                             PETITIONER-APPELLANT, 
 
THE ABBEY HARBOR CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, LTD.,  
A WISCONSIN NONPROFIT CORPORATION,  
 
                             PETITIONER-CO-APPELLANT, 
 
              V. 
 
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,  
GENEVA LAKE CONSERVANCY, INC., AND ONEIDA  
COUNTY,  
 
                             RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS. 
__________________________________ 
WISCONSIN REALTORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,  
 
                             PETITIONER-APPELLANT, 
 
              V. 
 
No.  99-2306   
 
 
2 
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,  
 
                             RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. 
_________________________________ 
ABKA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, AN ILLINOIS LIMITED  
PARTNERSHIP,  
 
                             PETITIONER-APPELLANT, 
 
THE ABBEY HARBOR CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, LTD.,  
A WISCONSIN NONPROFIT CORPORATION,  
 
                             PETITIONER-CO-APPELLANT, 
 
              V. 
 
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,  
 
                             RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. 
__________________________________ 
WISCONSIN ASSOCIATION OF LAKES, INC.,  
 
                             PETITIONER-APPELLANT, 
 
              V. 
 
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,  
 
                             RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. 
__________________________________ 
WISCONSIN REALTORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,  
 
                             PETITIONER-APPELLANT, 
 
              V. 
 
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,  
 
                             RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. 
 
 
No.  99-2306   
 
 
3 
 
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Walworth County:  
MICHAEL S. GIBBS, Judge.  Reversed.   
 
 
Before Nettesheim, P.J., Brown and Snyder, JJ.   
 
¶1 
SNYDER, J.  This case is the result of five separate cases 
consolidated before the circuit court.  ABKA Limited Partnership (ABKA) and 
The Abbey Harbor Condominium Association, Ltd. (the Association) appeal from 
a circuit court order denying their joint petition for review of an administrative law 
judge’s (ALJ) decision regarding their WIS. STAT. ch. 30 (1999-2000)1 permit 
application to the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR).  ABKA 
owned a public marina and sought to convert ownership of all 407 boat slips to a 
condominium-style ownership called “dockominiums.”  The ALJ expressly 
limited the number of boat slips that ABKA can convert to dockominiums.  
ABKA and the Association challenge the DNR’s jurisdiction to require a new 
permit and to limit the number of dockominiums in the Marina.  In addition, 
ABKA and the Association argue that the ALJ’s decision to limit the number of 
dockominiums is arbitrary and unsupported by record evidence.   
¶2 
The Wisconsin Realtors Association, Inc. (WRA) also appeals the 
circuit court’s order, arguing that the DNR’s guidances, used by the DNR to arrive 
at the appropriate number of dockominiums, are illegal attempts to circumvent the 
rule-making requirements of WIS. STAT. ch. 227, that WIS. ADMIN. CODE § NR 
326.04(8) is invalid, that the change in ownership to condominium-style 
                                              
1 All statutory references are to the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise noted.   
No.  99-2306   
 
 
4 
ownership is allowed, and that the DNR did not have the authority to require a 
new WIS. STAT. § 30.12 permit.     
 
¶3 
In addition, the Wisconsin Association of Lakes, Inc. (WAL) 
appeals the circuit court’s order.  In contrast to ABKA and WRA, WAL argues 
that ABKA’s dockominium development violates the public trust doctrine by 
purporting to convey a perpetual exclusive right to a portion of Lake Geneva, 
exceeds reasonable riparian rights, and violates the provisions of WIS. STAT. 
§ 30.133.   
 
¶4 
We agree with WAL that the dockominium development proposed 
by ABKA and the Association violates the public trust doctrine.   
FACTS 
 
¶5 
In 1994, ABKA was the owner of the Abbey at Fontana at Lake 
Geneva; the Abbey Harbor (the Harbor) was created by the dredging of 
Potawatomi Creek pursuant to a permit issued in July 1962 by the Wisconsin 
Public Service Commission.  When issuing this permit, the PSC also authorized 
the construction of the first 200 boat slips of what would eventually become the 
407-slip Marina.  Additional permits were later issued, the most recent issued in 
1987 for the construction of additional piers and slips in the Harbor.     
 
¶6 
The Harbor consists of a man-made basin with 407 boat slips, a 
swimming pool, a parking area, and a Harbor House.  The Marina’s 407 boat slips 
were rented to boat owners on an annual basis with the option to renew.  In late 
1994, ABKA, the private owner of the Marina, decided to convert the Marina to a 
condominium form of ownership and began preparation of a condominium 
declaration.  ABKA’s proposal did not change the number, size or configuration of 
any structure in the Marina, but simply changed the ownership to condominium 
No.  99-2306   
 
 
5 
style.  During these preparations, the DNR contacted ABKA and asked to review 
the language of the proposed condominium declaration.   
 
¶7 
After reviewing the language of the proposed condominium 
declaration, the DNR insisted upon language changes in the declaration.  The 
DNR approved the revised language changes of the Abbey Harbor Condominium 
Declaration (Declaration), which was filed on February 28, 1995.    
 
¶8 
Under the revised terms of the Declaration, each unit is separately 
owned property held in fee simple title by the unit owner.  A dockominium unit is 
defined as a cubicle of space in a lock-box located within a building known as the 
Harbor House at the Marina.  Each unit/lock-box has a number which corresponds 
to an existing boat slip at the Marina.  Each unit owner has the right to use the 
space beside the pier or piers corresponding to the unit number.      
 
¶9 
In addition to the independent ownership of each unit, the unit 
owners own, as tenants in common with each other, all of the common elements of 
the condominium, including all of the real estate, the Harbor House, the parking 
lots, all docks and piers, and the swimming pool.  A unit owner is entitled to freely 
sell, lease, sublease, rent or license the unit, and is required to keep the structures 
adjacent to the unit in good repair.     
 
¶10 
Under the terms of the Declaration, each unit owner is required to be 
a member of the Association, which is responsible for the maintenance, repair and 
replacement of all common elements, dredging the Harbor and landscaping.  The 
Declaration also endows the Association with the authority to enforce compliance 
with its terms and to assess unit owners for the costs associated with the operation, 
maintenance and repair of the Marina.     
No.  99-2306   
 
 
6 
 
¶11 
After the language of the Declaration was changed, the DNR 
maintained that ABKA had to apply for a new WIS. STAT. § 30.12 permit to 
convert the Marina to condominium ownership.  The DNR maintained that under 
§ 30.12, a certain number of boat slips needed to be withheld from sale and set 
aside for seasonal rental to the public.  While ABKA challenged the DNR’s 
authority to require both a new permit and a certain number of set-asides, on 
March 13, 1995, ABKA filed an application for a new § 30.12 permit, requesting 
authorization for the conveyance of 407 boat slips to private owners under a 
condominium form of ownership and reserving the right to challenge the DNR’s 
jurisdiction in this matter.  The Association was subsequently made a co-applicant 
in the proceedings.  On April 5, 1995, Geneva Lake Conservancy, Inc. (Geneva 
Lake) objected to the permit application, which was then referred to the Division 
of Hearings and Appeals for a contested case hearing.  Pending a hearing on the 
permit application, the DNR and ABKA reached an agreement that ABKA could 
file the Declaration; that the current structures at the Marina were validly 
permitted; that a contested case hearing would determine how many boat slips, if 
any, needed to be set aside; and that ABKA could begin selling up to 282 units, 
setting aside at least 125 units until a hearing decision was rendered.     
 
¶12 
On November 13-17 and December 18, 1995, a contested case 
hearing was held before an ALJ regarding ABKA and the Association’s permit 
application.  Geneva Lake, WRA, WAL and Oneida County (Oneida) fully 
participated in the contested case hearing as intervening parties; WRA was in 
support of the condominium project, while Geneva Lake, WAL and Oneida were 
opposed.  On July 29, 1996, the ALJ issued his decision, finding that the DNR did 
have jurisdiction to require a new WIS. STAT. § 30.12 permit, and that 287 of the 
407 slips at the Marina must be set aside for seasonal rental.   
No.  99-2306   
 
 
7 
 
¶13 
On August 23, 1996, ABKA filed a petition for judicial review of 
the ALJ’s decision in both Walworth county and Dane county.  WRA also filed a 
petition for judicial review in Walworth and Dane counties.  WAL then filed a 
petition for review of the ALJ’s decision in Dane county.  By stipulation, on 
October 14, 1996, the Walworth County Circuit Court entered an order 
transferring the Dane county cases to Walworth county and consolidating all of the 
above actions.2   
¶14 
After briefing and oral argument, on June 4, 1999, the circuit court 
issued a decision affirming the ALJ’s decision and entered a final order denying 
the petitions for review on June 24, 1999.  ABKA, the Association, WRA and 
WAL filed notices of appeal.  Geneva Lake and Oneida filed separate petitions to 
intervene.  On October 19, 1999, ABKA filed a motion, with all parties agreeing 
to said motion, to consolidate the above appeals.  We determined that 
consolidation of the above actions was unnecessary because the cases were 
consolidated in the circuit court and were resolved in a single circuit court order; 
thus, the notices of appeal of the various appellants gave rise to a single appeal 
proceeding.  Furthermore, we denied Oneida’s and Geneva Lake’s petitions to 
intervene.  However, we held that because they were parties in the circuit court, 
and were adverse to some or all of the appellants, they were respondents who 
could defend the circuit court’s order against challenges made to it by the 
appellants.  
                                              
2 In addition, in October 1996, DFS Development, Inc., Charles E. Eklund and Chicago 
Title Insurance Company filed in the circuit court a proposed petition for judicial review by 
applicants for intervention as party petitioners.  This motion to intervene was denied by the circuit 
court on December 12, 1996; we ultimately affirmed this denial on December 10, 1997.   
No.  99-2306   
 
 
8 
 
¶15 
On September 20, 2000, we certified this matter to the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, as the matters at issue are ones of first impression and represent 
important public policy questions regarding riparian rights and the public trust 
doctrine.   We certified as to one issue:  Is a dockominium development, based 
upon condominium real estate law, that limits public access to navigable waters in 
favor of private riparian ownership a violation of the Wisconsin public trust 
doctrine and WIS. STAT. ch. 30?   After our request for certification, ABKA filed a 
motion for leave to file a supplemental brief.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
accepted certification on October 19, 2000.  
 
¶16 
On November 13, 2000, ABKA and the Association filed a motion 
to clarify the scope of the issues certified.  Following all parties’ numerous and 
varied responses to ABKA and the Association’s motion, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court rescinded and withdrew its order accepting certification, and this matter was 
returned to us.     
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶17 
This case involves an appeal from a circuit court order affirming the 
decision of an administrative agency.  In an appeal from such an order, we review 
the decision of the agency, not the circuit court.  Sea View Estates Beach Club, 
Inc. v. DNR, 223 Wis. 2d 138, 145, 588 N.W.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1998).  Review of 
an agency’s decision is confined to the record.  Sterlingworth Condo. Ass’n, 
Inc. v. DNR, 205 Wis. 2d 710, 720, 556 N.W.2d 791 (Ct. App. 1996). 
 
¶18 
A different standard of review for agency decisions is applied for 
questions of law and questions of fact.  Sea View Estates, 223 Wis. 2d at 148.  If 
presented with a question of fact, we employ the “substantial evidence” standard.  
Id.  Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would 
No.  99-2306   
 
 
9 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.  Id.  If the issue presents a question of 
law, we must set aside or modify the agency action if we find that the agency has 
erroneously interpreted a provision of law and a correct interpretation compels a 
particular action, or we shall remand the case to the agency for further action 
under a correct interpretation of the provision of law.  Id.  To this end, we apply 
one of three levels of deference to the conclusion of the agency:  “great weight,” 
“due weight” or “de novo.”  Id. 
 
¶19 
An agency’s interpretation or application of a statute may be 
accorded great weight deference, due weight deference or de novo review, 
depending on the circumstances.  UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 284, 
548 N.W.2d 57 (1996).  We accord great weight deference only when all four of 
the following requirements are met:  the agency was charged by the legislature 
with the duty of administering the statute; the interpretation of the agency is one of 
long standing; the agency employed its expertise or specialized knowledge in 
forming the interpretation; and the agency’s interpretation will provide uniformity 
and consistency in the application of the statute.  Id.  Under the great weight 
standard, we will uphold an agency’s reasonable interpretation that is not contrary 
to the clear meaning of the statute, even if we determine that an alternative 
interpretation is more reasonable.  Id. at 287.   
 
¶20 
We will accord due weight deference when “the agency has some 
experience in an area, but has not developed the expertise which necessarily places 
it in a better position to make judgments regarding the interpretation of the statute 
than a court.”  Id. at 286.  The deference allowed an administrative agency under 
due weight review is accorded largely because the legislature has charged the 
agency with the enforcement of the statute in question.  Id.  Under this standard, 
we will not overturn a reasonable agency decision that furthers the purpose of the 
No.  99-2306   
 
 
10
statute unless we determine that there is a more reasonable interpretation under the 
applicable facts than that made by the agency.  Id. at 286-87.  Finally, we will 
employ de novo review when the legal conclusion reached by the agency is one of 
first impression or when the agency’s position on the statute has been so 
inconsistent as to provide no real guidance.  Id. at 285. 
 
¶21 
While Oneida argues that the DNR’s decision should be accorded 
great weight, ABKA, the Association, WRA, WAL, the DNR and Geneva Lake all 
maintain that the agency’s decision should be accorded no weight and should be 
reviewed de novo.  The agency’s decision does not meet the “great weight” 
standard; although the legislature has charged the DNR with the duty of enforcing 
environmental laws, including the regulation of piers in navigable water, Sea View 
Estates, 223 Wis. 2d at 149, the issue of a public marina’s conversion to private 
property and condominium ownership is an issue of first impression.  This also 
precludes “due weight” deference, and thus de novo review is required.   
PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY OWNERSHIP,  
REAL AND RIPARIAN 
 
¶22 
The instant issue involves the conversion of real riparian property, a 
marina privately owned by a limited partnership, to another form of private 
property ownership.  Identification and definition of the pertinent legal terms and 
doctrines is necessary for a thorough understanding of the issues.   
 
¶23 
In 1995, ABKA privately owned the 407-slip Marina.  A “marina” is 
defined as “[a] boat basin that has docks, moorings, supplies, and other facilities 
for small boats.”  AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 766 (2d College ed. 1982).  
The ownership of land has often been referred to as a “bundle of rights.”  State ex 
rel. Wis. Edison Corp. v. Robertson, 99 Wis. 2d 561, 569, 299 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. 
App. 1980).  This “bundle of rights” real property theory asserts that the owner has 
No.  99-2306   
 
 
11
the right to enter it, use it, sell it, lease it, or give it away, as he or she so chooses.  
Id. at 569 n.11.  These rights are guaranteed by law but are also subject to certain 
governmental and private restrictions.  Id.   
 
¶24 
The Marina, because it borders Lake Geneva, is also riparian 
property, and thus ABKA is a riparian owner.  Riparian owners are those who 
have title to the ownership of land on the bank of a body of water.  Ellingsworth v. 
Swiggum, 195 Wis. 2d 142, 148, 536 N.W.2d 112 (Ct. App. 1995).  A riparian 
owner is accorded certain rights based upon title to the ownership of shorefront 
property.  Sea View Estates, 223 Wis. 2d at 157.  These rights are well defined 
and include the right to use the shoreline and have access to the waters, the right to 
reasonable use of the waters for domestic, agricultural and recreational purposes, 
and the right to construct a pier or similar structure in aid of navigation.  Id.  A 
riparian owner is entitled to exclusive possession to the extent necessary to reach 
navigable water and to have reasonable access for bathing and swimming.  Id.   
 
¶25 
In February 1995, ABKA filed a condominium Declaration to 
convert and sell the Marina boat slips to private owners as “dockominium” units; 
this dockominium scheme is, in essence, a condominium type of ownership of the 
Marina. Dockominium projects are typically premised on condominium law 
because a dockominium is similar to a condominium in that both involve the 
division and co-ownership of an asset previously owned by a single entity.  
Karin J. Wagner, Geneva Lake Dockominiums:  An Exercise of Riparian Rights in 
Violation of the Public Trust Doctrine, 4 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 243, 245 (Summer 
1997).   
¶26 
“Condominium” is defined as “property subject to a condominium 
declaration established under this chapter.”  WIS. STAT. § 703.02(4).  A 
No.  99-2306   
 
 
12
“declaration” is defined as “the instrument by which a property becomes subject to 
this chapter, and that declaration as amended from time to time,” § 703.02(8), and 
must contain all of the elements set forth at WIS. STAT. § 703.09.  A condominium 
“unit” is defined as  
a part of a condominium intended for any type of 
independent use, including one or more cubicles of air at 
one or more levels of space or one or more rooms or 
enclosed spaces located on one or more floors, or parts 
thereof, in a building.  A unit may include 2 or more 
noncontiguous areas. 
Sec. 703.02(15).    The “common elements” of a condominium are defined as “all 
of a condominium except its units,” § 703.02(2), while the “limited common 
elements” are defined as “those common elements identified in a declaration or on 
a condominium plat as reserved for the exclusive use of one or more but less than 
all of the unit owners.”  Sec. 703.02(10).   
¶27 
No similar statutory definition for “dockominium” exists.  While a 
dockominium can be considered, from the mere origin of its name, a 
condominium-style marina, a dockominium has been more precisely defined as a 
“dockside community of privately owned boats moored in slips that are purchased 
for year-round living….  A slip in such a community.”  AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000) at http://www.bartleby.com/61/53/D0315300.html.  A 
“slip” is defined as a “docking place for a ship between two piers.”  Id. at 
http://www.bartleby.com/61/54/S0475400.html.   
¶28 
Here, under the Declaration, a dockominium unit consists of 
that separate area of the condominium intended for 
independent, private use, comprised of a cubicle of space 
No.  99-2306   
 
 
13
defined by a “Lock Box” located within the Harbor House 
….  Each unit shall include as an appurtenance,3 standard 
riparian rights of owners of waterfront real estate under 
Wisconsin Law, and the use of an assigned boat slip 
corresponding to the unit designation as a part of the 
common elements …. 
The Declaration also states that the common elements do not include the above-
described individual units, but “[e]ach unit owner, as a limited common element 
appurtenant exclusively to his unit, shall have riparian rights to use of the space 
beside the pier or piers corresponding to his unit number … for use as a boat slip.”  
Each unit owner has a fee simple interest in his or her dockominium unit, and an 
undivided interest in the common elements and facilities and limited common 
elements as a tenant in common with all other unit owners.  A fee simple interest 
means “[a]n interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by 
law, endures until the current holder dies without heirs ....”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 630 (7th ed. 1999).  “Tenancy in common” is defined as “[a] tenancy 
by two or more persons, in equal or unequal undivided shares, each person having 
an equal right to possess the whole property but no right of survivorship.”  Id. at 
1478.     
 
¶29 
While riparian owners such as ABKA have certain well-established 
rights that are incidents of their ownership of property adjacent to the water, under 
the public trust doctrine, these rights are subject to the public’s right to use 
navigable waters.  State v. Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d 454, 469, 338 N.W.2d 492 (1983). 
The public trust doctrine has its roots in article IX, section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, under which the state holds the beds of navigable waters in trust for 
                                              
3 An “appurtenance” is defined as “[s]omething that belongs or is attached to something 
else.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 98 (7th ed. 1999).   
No.  99-2306   
 
 
14
public use.4  Borsellino v. DNR, 232 Wis. 2d 430, 443, 606 N.W.2d 255 (Ct. App. 
1999).  The regulation and enforcement of this public trust rests with the 
legislature and the DNR.  Id.   
 
¶30 
Although the public trust doctrine was originally designed to protect 
commercial navigation, it has been expanded to protect the public’s use of 
navigable waters for purely recreational and nonmonetary purposes.  Bleck, 114 
Wis. 2d at 465.  Public policy factors signifying the public interest include the 
wish to preserve the natural beauty of our navigable waters, to obtain the fullest 
public use of these waters, including but not limited to navigation, and to provide 
for the convenience of riparian owners.  Sea View Estates, 223 Wis. 2d at 159.  
Such public interest concerns also include maintaining the safe and healthful 
condition of the water, protecting spawning grounds and aquatic life, controlling 
the placement of structures and land uses, preserving shore cover and natural 
beauty, and promoting the general attractiveness and character of the community 
environment.  Id. at 160. 
 
¶31 
The common law also requires reasonable use by riparian owners.  
Sterlingworth, 205 Wis. 2d at 731.  “[E]very ... right which a riparian owner 
acquires, as such, to the waters ... by his land, is restricted always to that which is 
a ... reasonable use, and these terms are to be measured and determined by the 
extent and capacity of the [lake], the uses to which it has been put, and the rights 
that other riparian owners on the same [lake] also have.”  Id. (citation omitted).  
                                              
4 In fact, the public trust doctrine precedes our state constitution.  Borsellino v. DNR, 232 
Wis. 2d 430, 443 n.6, 606 N.W.2d 255 (Ct. App. 1999), citing to article IV of the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787.   
No.  99-2306   
 
 
15
¶32 
The legislature has charged the DNR with the duty of enforcing 
environmental laws, including the regulation of piers in navigable waters pursuant 
to WIS. STAT. §§ 30.12 and 30.13.  Both § 30.12 and WIS. STAT. ch. 30 generally 
codify a number of common law doctrines regarding the ownership of the beds of 
navigable waters.  State v. Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d 91, 101, 408 N.W.2d 337 
(1987).  Section 30.12 is a codification of the common law restriction against 
encroachments on publicly held lake beds, Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d at 102, and its 
function is to regulate the placement of fill or structures on the beds of navigable 
waters, but not to regulate the use and enjoyment of those waters.  Bleck, 114 
Wis. 2d at 467.  Section 30.12 is a rational way of accommodating both the public 
trust doctrine and the reasonable use doctrine, as it “recognizes the tradition of 
certain rights unique to riparian owners, yet ensures that riparians will not be able 
to place structures on the beds of navigable waters if they are detrimental to the 
paramount public interest.”  Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d at 469-70.  A § 30.12 permit will 
not be authorized if the structure proposed by the riparian owner materially 
obstructs navigation or if the structure infringes upon the public interest.  Bleck, 
114 Wis. 2d at 469.   
¶33 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated that  
[t]he title to the beds of all lakes and ponds, and of rivers 
navigable in fact as well, up to the line of ordinary high-
water mark, within the boundaries of the state, became 
vested in it at the instant of its admission into the Union, in 
trust to hold the same so as to preserve to the people 
forever the enjoyment of the waters of such lakes, ponds, 
and rivers, to the same extent that the public are entitled to 
enjoy tidal waters at the common law. 
Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d at 101 (citation omitted). 
No.  99-2306   
 
 
16
DISCUSSION 
 Jurisdiction of the DNR 
 
¶34 
ABKA5 first argues that the DNR lacked jurisdiction to require it 
and the Association to apply for a new WIS. STAT. § 30.12 permit.  Specifically, 
ABKA argues that § 30.12 does not provide a valid basis for the DNR to review 
its existing permit.   
¶35 
ABKA and the DNR reached an agreement wherein ABKA agreed 
to apply for a new permit, but reserved the right to contest the DNR’s jurisdiction.  
However, as both this agreement and the ALJ noted, we are not bound by this 
understanding.  In addition, while the ALJ provided a thorough and well-reasoned 
analysis of the reach of WIS. STAT. § 30.12 and the DNR’s authority, we hold that 
ABKA waived this argument by applying for the new permit in the first place.   
¶36 
The application filed by ABKA specifically states that the 
application is filed pursuant to WIS. STAT. ch. 30.  While ABKA asserts in the 
application that “the DNR has no jurisdiction to require a review or modification 
of” the permit, and that ABKA was not “waiving or limiting its rights to contest” 
the DNR’s jurisdiction, by applying for the permit it willingly placed itself under 
the DNR’s jurisdiction and the reach of ch. 30.  ABKA may have filed the 
application under protest, but the DNR did not force it to file the application.  
ABKA could have refused to file the application and risked an enforcement 
proceeding or the imposition of fines and penalties, wherein it could have 
                                              
5 ABKA submitted briefs and provided oral arguments on both its and the Association’s 
behalf.   
No.  99-2306   
 
 
17
challenged the DNR’s authority.  See Sterlingworth, 205 Wis. 2d at 726-27.  
Furthermore, ABKA could have filed a declaratory judgment action in circuit 
court under WIS. STAT. § 227.40, asking a circuit court to determine its rights and 
obligations under WIS. STAT. § 30.12.  Instead, it chose to file a ch. 30 permit 
application.  As both the agreement and the ALJ noted, any reliance on the 
agreement was the result of a calculated business gamble by ABKA, done at 
ABKA’s own risk.  As applicants, ABKA and the Association placed themselves 
under the DNR’s jurisdiction, thereby foreclosing the argument that the DNR had 
no jurisdiction over this project.   
Public Trust Doctrine 
¶37 
WAL argues that ABKA’s dockominium development violates the 
public trust doctrine by attempting to convey a perpetual exclusive right to a 
portion of Lake Geneva.  
¶38 
We pause to commend the ALJ for the careful, extensive and 
professional analysis that resulted in the agency decision under review.  As the 
ALJ noted in his comprehensive and in-depth analysis, this is a matter of first 
impression in Wisconsin and the law is silent on the issue of whether the 
dockominium form of ownership is permissible under the public trust doctrine.  It 
is clear that the dockominium concept represents a confrontation between a private 
claim in boat slip space and public interests in the water.  Mark Cheung, 
Dockominiums:  An Expansion of Riparian Rights that Violates the Public Trust 
Doctrine, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 821, 825 (Summer 1989).   
¶39 
The United States Supreme Court’s seminal decision on the public 
trust doctrine held that the state is directed to act as trustee of the waters within its 
borders and to protect the public’s right to use the waters.  Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. 
No.  99-2306   
 
 
18
v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).  The public trust doctrine is premised on the 
idea that private ownership of public resources is improper and provides the public 
with a right to the benefit of certain public resources.  Cheung, supra, at 830-31.  
This right supplants any private interests and imposes strict responsibilities upon 
the government as trustee of these public resources.  Id.  The government cannot 
relinquish its trust duties associated with any public property.  Id. at 831.   
¶40 
Regulation of private riparian uses is essential if the state is to fulfill 
its role of protecting state waters. Wagner, supra, at 247.  When conflicts occur 
over the use of the waters of the state, riparian rights must always surrender to the 
public interest.  Id. at 248.  Wisconsin has repeatedly acknowledged its obligation 
to safeguard the state’s navigable water resources for the use, enjoyment and 
benefit of the public.  Id. at 247.   
¶41 
Here, section 5 of the Declaration provides definitions and a 
description of the units; a dockominium unit is  
that separate area of the condominium intended for 
independent, private use, comprised of a cubicle of space 
defined by a “Lock Box” located within the Harbor House 
as shown in the Condominium Plat....  Each unit shall 
include as an appurtenance, standard riparian rights of 
owners of waterfront real estate under Wisconsin Law, and 
the use of an assigned boat slip corresponding to the unit 
designation as a part of the common elements of THE 
ABBEY HARBOR CONDOMINIUM. 
According to the Declaration, the common elements and facilities consist of the 
real property, and real property interests, improvements and appurtenances 
described in this Declaration, except the above-described individual units; the 
common elements and facilities  
shall include, without limitation, the land and real property 
interests described … herein including the buildings and 
improvements located thereon, the marina shoreline, sea 
No.  99-2306   
 
 
19
wall and sidewalk along said shoreline … all docks, 
boardwalks, piers and pilings contained within the marina, 
all as shown on the Condominium Plat ... the Harbor 
House, outdoor swimming pool, boat launching ramp, 
sidewalks, driveways and walkways, utility services, utility 
lines and conduits including those leading up to the utility 
pedestal boxes serving the respective boat slips, parking 
areas within the condominium Property, and those 
improvements, structures and facilities shown on the 
Condominium Plat as well as certain “Dock Boxes” located 
on the condominium Property, but not shown on the 
Condominium Plat, and any and all other parts or elements 
of the condominium Property as described in this 
Declaration and additions thereto in the future made by the 
unit owners or the Association of Unit Owners (hereinafter 
described).   
The limited common elements include the boat slips:   
Each unit owner, as a limited common element appurtenant 
exclusively to his unit, shall have riparian rights to use of 
the space beside the pier or piers corresponding to his unit 
number as shown in the Condominium Plat, for use as a 
boat slip.…  The placement of riparian structures in, and 
the use of, the waters of the marina as a part of THE 
ABBEY HARBOR CONDOMINIUM is subject to the 
rights of the members of the public and the State of 
Wisconsin under Wisconsin law and subject to permits 
issued by the State of Wisconsin.   
 
¶42 
Each unit owner owns a fee simple interest in his or her 
condominium unit and an undivided interest in the common elements and facilities 
and limited common elements as a tenant in common with all other unit owners.  
Unit owners can sell, lease, sublease, rent, license or otherwise contract for the 
usage of their respective boat slip, without restriction, subject to state permits, on a 
long-term or short-term basis, in their sole discretion.  Individual unit owners are 
required to maintain or provide all necessary insurance for their unit and its 
appurtenance.   
¶43 
Technically, the conveyance of the dockominium unit as defined by 
the Declaration fulfills the requirements of Wisconsin’s condominium law because 
No.  99-2306   
 
 
20
the unit is intended for independent use and is an enclosed space located within a 
building, a lock-box in the Harbor House. Wagner, supra, at 251.  However, 
unlike most condominium units, the lock-box itself has no inherent value; rather, 
the appurtenant rights attached to the conveyance are the valuable commodity.  Id.  
We agree with the ALJ that, to some degree, “the dockominium concept involves 
a legal fiction:  that ABKA is selling the lock-box condominium units, rather than 
the pier slips.” 
¶44 
By definition, a “dockominium” is a “dockside community of 
privately owned boats moored in slips that are purchased for year-round living….  
A slip in such a community.”  AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000) at 
http://www.bartleby.com/61/53/D0315300.html.  Here, while a dockominium unit 
is labeled a lock-box, appurtenant to the lock-box is the exclusive use of an 
assigned boat slip as part of the common elements.  As a common element, the 
boat slip is conveyed to the unit owners and the Association as tenants in common.  
But a boat “slip” is, by definition, a “docking place for a ship between two piers.”  
Id. at http://www.bartleby.com/61/54/S0475400.html.  In other words, a boat slip 
is the water and the lake bed under the water.  Thus, ABKA is attempting to 
convey a portion of the waters of Lake Geneva to the unit owners as tenants in 
common.  The ALJ’s decision acknowledges that under the Declaration, the “pier 
slip is [the individual owner’s] and cannot be considered to provide a public 
benefit.”  The public trust doctrine should not be manipulated to allow a 
conveyance of interest in the water as tenants in common.  Cheung, supra, at 852.   
¶45 
An examination of existing literature on dockominiums confirms 
this conclusion.  A dockominium does not adversely impact water quality, 
quantity or flow, but despite the dockominium’s creative manipulation of riparian 
rights, it does obstruct the public’s complete access to the waterways and creates a 
No.  99-2306   
 
 
21
claim of private ownership upon water owned by the public.  Id. at 825.  In fact, 
the dockominium concept is founded on the idea that individuals may own 
exclusive control of the water within a boat slip space.  Id. at 822.    
¶46 
Dockominium purchasers become riparian owners of the individual 
parcels of riparian rights and understandably expect that no other boater, or even a 
swimmer, can occupy the slip space.  Id. at 844.  This expectation suggests that 
the dockominium owner owns the water within the slip space.  Id.  As the ALJ 
noted, the use of the waters of Abbey Harbor, including the waters in the boat 
slips, is legally open to members of the public.  However, the ALJ also 
acknowledged that “there is an inherent conflict between the public’s use of these 
waters and the expectations of an exclusive property interest in the pier slips.”   
¶47 
ABKA’s marketing materials do nothing to dispel that expectation.  
One advertisement purporting to explain the dockominium program addresses the 
purchase price of a slip and the advantages of owning a slip versus renting one.  
This advertisement asserts that a dockominium can be sold, transferred or passed 
by inheritance at any time.  ABKA and the Association advised prospective buyers 
to “look into a permanent berth” at the Marina and stated that “individual slips can 
be owned and transferred by deed.”  The ALJ commented that without question 
the initial marketing of the dockominiums “sought to blatantly sell public waters 
for private benefit.”  As the ALJ noted, the marketing language was less blatant in 
more recent versions; however, “dockominium purchasers may still believe they 
are purchasing permanent rights in public waters as a result of the purchase of a … 
unit.”   
¶48 
ABKA argued before the ALJ that a dockominium conveyance is 
consistent with the public trust doctrine because the language in the Declaration 
No.  99-2306   
 
 
22
continues to subject dockominium slip holders to state regulation.  However, we 
agree with the ALJ that “[m]arketing of the pier slips … could give unit owners a 
false expectation of a property interest in public waters” and that any restrictions 
“could be rendered meaningless once the expectation of a property interest has 
been established.”6      
                                              
6 A recent United States Supreme Court opinion lends weight to this expectation.  
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. ___, 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001), could have an impact on 
whether a purchaser of a dockominium would have a future takings action against the state if his 
or her riparian real estate interest in a boat slip were later challenged.   
Palazzolo was a shareholder in a corporation that purchased a waterfront parcel in 1959, 
most of which is salt marsh subject to tidal flooding.  Id. at 2455.  In 1971, Rhode Island created 
an agency (Council) to protect coastal wetlands that included this wetland parcel.  Id. at 2456.  In 
1978, Palazzolo obtained sole ownership of the parcel after the corporation terminated.  Id.  In 
1983, Palazzolo asked permission to construct a wooden bulkhead and to fill in the entire 
marshland area.  Id.  Council denied this request.  Id.  In 1985, Palazzolo asked permission to fill 
in eleven of eighteen wetland acres to build a private beach club.  Id.  Council denied this request 
on the basis that no compelling public purpose would be served.  Id.  Palazzolo filed an inverse 
condemnation action, arguing that the wetlands regulation had taken his property without 
compensation even though the regulation had existed at the time he became the sole owner.  Id.   
In effect, Palazzolo indicates that a buyer’s acquisition of title, even after regulatory rules 
become effective, does not bar a takings claim:   
Were we to accept the State’s rule, the postenactment transfer of 
title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any 
action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or 
unreasonable.  A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an 
expiration date on the Takings Clause.  This ought not to be the 
rule.  Future generations, too, have a right to challenge 
unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land. 
 
Nor does the justification of notice take into account the effect 
on owners at the time of enactment, who are prejudiced as well.  
Should an owner attempt to challenge a new regulation, but not 
survive the process of ripening his or her claim ... under the 
proposed rule the right to compensation may not be asserted by 
an heir or successor, and so may not be asserted at all.  The 
State’s rule would work a critical alteration to the nature of 
property, as the newly regulated landowner is stripped of the 
ability to transfer the interest which was possessed prior to the 
regulation.  The State may not by this means secure a windfall 
(continued) 
 
No.  99-2306   
 
 
23
¶49 
Despite the use of the restrictive language in the Declaration, 
approval of ABKA’s application would give prospective unit owners the 
expectation that they would gain vested private rights in public waters.  ABKA’s 
plan purports to create permanent rights in an area of public water.  The ALJ aptly 
stated that “[c]onversion of all 407 slips to dockominium status would violate 
long-held notions of the reasonable use of public trust waters by a riparian.”  We 
fail to see how the conveyance of 407 separate private property interests in public 
waters is violative of the public trust doctrine, but the conveyance of 120 separate 
private property interests in public waters is not.  Put simply, the conveyance of 7 
or the conveyance of 407 boat slips in the manner proposed by ABKA violates the 
public trust doctrine.   
¶50 
In essence, a dockominium development attempts to offer a small 
class of boat owners the exclusive and permanent right to own and to occupy a 
portion of public trust waters and provides access to the waters to a select group of 
the public, which fails to satisfy the purpose of the public trust doctrine.  Catherine 
Robinson Hall, Dockominiums:  In Conflict with the Public Trust Doctrine, 
                                                                                                                                      
 
for itself....  The Takings Clause is not so quixotic.  A blanket 
rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right 
when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord 
with the duty to compensate for what is taken.     
 
Id. at 2462-63. 
Palazzolo suggests that a dockominium owner would have a ripened takings claim in the 
future if the state, exercising its public trust doctrine responsibility, ever tried to interfere with the 
owner’s entitlement to the appurtenant pier and boat slip.   
However, none of the parties in the case at hand have had a chance to address Palazzolo 
and develop arguments regarding its issues; thus, we do not rely on Palazzolo in making our 
decision.  We mention it only for its potential implications in cases such as this.   
No.  99-2306   
 
 
24
24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 331, 343 (Summer 1990).  A dockominium removes a 
portion of the public trust area from free availability for the citizens, which 
directly conflicts with the underpinning and careful limitations of the public trust 
doctrine.  Id.  Exclusive private ownership of water is completely contrary to the 
foundation of the public trust doctrine.  Id. 
¶51 
The DNR may allow individuals to place docks in the water for 
access and reasonable use of the water by issuing permits but may not allow the 
passing of title to the water. Cheung, supra, at 852.  Navigable waters 
unquestionably belong to the people, and to allow private individuals to claim the 
dockominium slip space or the water within the slip as a property interest is 
violative of the public trust doctrine.  Id.  By permitting the conversion of marinas 
to private dockominiums as ABKA proposed here, the DNR has allowed control 
over public trust lands to be vested in private individuals, in violation of the public 
trust doctrine.7    
CONCLUSION 
¶52 
A boat slip is by definition the water and lake bed between two 
piers; but no one but the state can own the water and the lake bed.  Riparian 
owners do not possess water in a lake, but only the right to reasonable use of the 
water in the lake; “[r]iparian owners acquire at most the usufructuary right to 
water based on possession or dominion, but not outright ownership of the water.” 
Id. at 839.  
                                              
7 Because our resolution of this issue disposes of the appeal, we need not address the 
remaining arguments.  Sweet v. Berge, 113 Wis. 2d 61, 67, 334 N.W.2d 559 (Ct. App. 1983). 
No.  99-2306   
 
 
25
¶53 
ABKA’s dockominium proposal allows ABKA and the Association 
to transfer ownership of public waters to private individuals and therefore is in 
direct conflict with the public trust doctrine.  We therefore reverse the order of the 
circuit court affirming the ALJ’s decision granting ABKA a WIS. STAT. ch. 30 
permit.  
 
By the Court.—Order reversed. 
 
 
 
No.   99-2306(D) 
 
¶54 
BROWN, J. (dissenting).  I join in the majority’s commendation of 
the ALJ’s work.8  Unlike the majority, however, I agree with the ALJ’s reasoning 
and conclusions.  I would affirm the circuit court which affirmed the ALJ’s 
decision. 
¶55 
At bottom, the engine powering the majority opinion is the thought 
that dockominiums are a marketing “scheme” or “creative manipulation” by which 
persons purport to sell the water within a boat slip space.  The factual predicate for 
this idea is that the purchaser is not really a riparian owner in the normal sense of 
the term, but the owner of a lock-box, a small metal enclosure that looks like a 
post office box.  The majority likens this to a ruse because the lock-box is absent 
any value without the ownership of the water within the slip.  What the majority 
opinion attempts to do is to outlaw this marketing concept as antithetical to the 
public trust doctrine. 
¶56 
The factual predicate is wrong and, once we understand the true 
facts at hand, then the conclusion that the concept violates the public trust doctrine 
must fall.  The purchasers here do not own simply a lock-box.  They own more 
and when we understand what they own, it is apparent that they are common 
owners of riparian land.  I quote the ALJ: 
                                              
8  The ALJ was Jeffrey Boldt. 
 
No. 99-2306(D) 
 
2 
     The individual “condominium unit” owners individually 
own only a lock-box, similar to a post office box, located in 
the Harbor House….  The lock-box constitutes “the unit” 
within the meaning of sec. 703.02(15), Stats.  The unit is 
separately and independently owned by each condominium 
owner and is intended for independent, private use.  In 
itself, the lock-box does not confer riparian status on 
condominium unit owners. 
     However, the Declaration provides that the unit owners 
are tenants in common with each other of all of the 
common elements including all of the riparian real estate 
and improvements such as the Harbor House, seawall, 
sidewalk, boat launch, parking lot, docks and piers and 
swimming pool….  The legal question is whether holding 
such property in the form of a common element of a 
Condominium Declaration constitutes “riparian” status 
under sec. 30.12, Stats.  Section 703.04, Stats., provides 
that:  “A unit, together with its undivided interest in the 
common elements, for all purposes constitutes real 
property.”  The individual lock-box condominium unit 
owners are tenants in common in the property subject to the 
Declaration, including approximately 20 acres of riparian 
property and nearly 4200 feet of riparian shoreline 
property….  Accordingly, riparian status vests from 
holding these lands in common under the terms of the 
Declaration. 
¶57 
From the above passage, it is clear that the purchasers are more than 
simply owners of a lock-box.  They are not bogus riparian owners.  They share 
ownership of more shoreline than most individual owners of riparian land in this 
state.  They also share twenty acres of total land.  They further share ownership of 
a swimming pool and a Harbor House.  Certainly, the owners do not live on the 
land.  But there is no law that says they have to before they can be considered 
riparian owners.  I think where the majority opinion goes wrong is that it considers 
the purchasers to be fake riparian owners.  They are not.  They are real owners, 
albeit sharing the property in common. 
 
No. 99-2306(D) 
 
3 
¶58 
The majority is disturbed by the marketing concept of the sellers.  
They are disturbed by the notion that the buyers will consider themselves owners 
of the water.  The ALJ spoke to that as well.  I quote the ALJ again: 
     There is no question that the initial marketing of the 
dockominiums sought to blatantly sell public waters for 
private benefit….  While the language has been less blatant 
in recent versions, dockominium purchasers may still 
believe they are purchasing permanent rights in public 
waters as a result of the purchase of a condominium unit.  
Section 7.2 of the Declaration states that each boat slip 
owner will have “as a limited common element appurtenant 
exclusively to his unit … riparian rights to use of the space 
beside the pier or piers corresponding to his unit number.”  
However, it is clear that riparian rights derive not from the 
purchase of a unit as such, but from the common elements 
which include riparian lands.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶59 
The ALJ had it correct.  The purchasers may believe they have 
bought ownership rights to the water.  However, this does not mean that they 
actually own it.  If ownership of the water is illegal, and it is, then they have 
bought only common ownership of the terra firma with right of access to the 
water.  If they think they got a raw deal because they bought something they are 
not entitled to buy, their recourse is to sue the developer or the seller or even the 
broker for selling an illusion.9 
                                              
9  The majority cites Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. ___, 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001), for 
the proposition that it “suggests that a dockominium owner would have a ripened takings claim in 
the future if the state, exercising its public trust doctrine responsibility, ever tried to interfere with 
the owner’s entitlement to the appurtenant pier and boat slip.”  Majority at ¶48 n.6.  I disagree with 
that characterization of Palazzolo. 
 
Palazzolo has owned eighteen acres of “coastal wetlands” adjoining uplands in Rhode 
Island since 1959.  Id. at 2455.  At that time, he subdivided this property into eighty lots.  He still 
owns seventy-four of them.  Id.  He desired to develop the land, but because most of it was 
marshland, he wanted to add dirt to raise the level of his lots and convert them to dry land capable 
(continued) 
 
 
No. 99-2306(D) 
 
4 
¶60 
There is nothing inherently wrong or illegal about taking a piece of 
riparian land and selling it in condominium form so that the end result is many 
owners of that land.  There is nothing inherently wrong with these owners sharing 
common access to the water and assigning between themselves who is going to get 
which boat slip.  It is not as if the riparian rights are increased by increasing the 
number of owners.  The riparian rights remain the same and those rights are 
regulated by the DNR.  I fail to see how that violates the public trust doctrine.  The 
bottom line is that the water is not sold because it cannot be sold.  Any marketing 
scheme purporting to sell the water within the slip is the selling of an illusion.  But 
we are not today faced with a question of whether the seller should be exposed to 
suit because it sold an illusion.  Our purpose is to ask whether the dockominium 
owners are real riparian owners.  If they are, then they have a right to put a pier in 
the water and sell the exclusive, perpetual right to have a pier in the water subject 
                                                                                                                                      
 
of development.  The applications were denied based on regulations in place before his purchase.  
Id. at 2456.  He appealed.  The case made its way to the United States Supreme Court. 
 
Three issues were before the Court:  (1) whether a regulatory takings claim is categorically 
barred whenever the enactment of the regulations predates the claimant’s acquisition of the 
property; (2) whether a landowner must file additional applications seeking permission for “less 
ambitious uses” in order to ripen a takings claim; and (3) whether the remaining permissible uses of 
regulated property are economically viable merely because the property retains a value greater than 
zero.  Id. at 2457-58.  The Supreme Court held that:  (1) the claims were ripe for adjudication, see 
id. at 2462; (2) acquisition of title after the effective date of the regulations does not bar a takings 
claim, see id. at 2464; and (3) since there was undisputed value of a portion of his land, he was 
precluded from making a claim that the denial deprived him of all economic use.  See id.  
 
Palazzolo was therefore about a person who owned terra firma; it was not about a person 
claiming to own a bed of water.  It was about whether a regulation in place before an owner’s 
purchase could bar his takings claim to land for which he had valid title.  It was his land.  He owned 
it.  The Supreme Court said that even if he bought valid title after a regulation was in place, he 
could still claim that a takings occurred.  The opinion says nothing about whether a person would 
have a takings claim for something he or she never validly owned in the first place.  In sum, 
Palazzolo is totally irrelevant to the issues in this case, both factually and analytically.   
 
 
No. 99-2306(D) 
 
5 
to DNR regulations.  The bottom line is that a change in ownership is not a 
violation of the public trust doctrine and that is all this is:  a change in ownership 
from one big hotel concern to many different persons who own big boats.   
¶61 
I add that I view the dockominium concept under the facts of this 
case as passing muster.  If the purchasers were to own no riparian land and were 
sold only the pier slips, I believe that this status would be illegal.  But this is 
because the purchasers would not be riparian owners, not because the purchasers 
believed they were purchasing ownership in the water appurtenant to a pier.  I can 
think of several other instances where the dockominium project would probably 
not get off the ground.  But this is not the time to discuss them.  Suffice it to say, 
each project must stand or fall on its own facts.   
¶62 
Before leaving this subject, I quote the ALJ once more: 
[C]ondominium ownership of the marina does not in itself 
violate the public trust doctrine.  Conversion of all of the 
pier slips to dockominium status would violate the public 
trust doctrine and would be detrimental to the public 
interest in maintaining public access to public waters.  
However, complete rejection of the proposed dockominium 
conversion would unfairly discriminate against the 
condominium form of ownership.  Riparian owners in 
Wisconsin, including riparians who gain such a status by 
holding land in common through the condominium form of 
ownership, have the limited right to place a reasonable 
number of pier slips in public waters to gain access to said 
waters.  The condominium unit-holders in this matter own 
riparian lands in common with other unit holders including 
ABKA….  Condominium unit-owning riparians are entitled 
to no more and no less access than other riparians. 
¶63 
I agree with the sentiments expressed by the ALJ.  The 
dockominium concept is simply a creative means by which to convey riparian 
land.  It does no violence, per se, to the public’s right to use the waters.  Riparians 
have always had rights of use to the water.  The dockominium concept does not 
 
No. 99-2306(D) 
 
6 
change that fact.  These rights of use are regulated by the DNR on behalf of the 
public.  This does not change with the advent of dockominiums. 
¶64 
If the public trust doctrine is not violated by the dockominium 
concept, then we get to the next two questions, whether the DNR had the power to 
reduce the number of slips that the condominium owners could enjoy and, if so, 
whether the exercise of that power was reasonable.  The parties briefed these 
issues voluminously and raised and argued subissues.  If this were the majority 
opinion, I would address each point made.  But in a dissent, it is unnecessary.  All 
I need to do is get my point across. 
¶65 
ABKA notes that it originally had a permit from the DNR to put up 
407 piers when it owned the property by itself.  Since all that has occurred is a 
change in ownership from one owner to multiple owners of riparian land, ABKA 
asserts that there is no justification for the DNR to regulate the conversion.  
ABKA observes that this was always a private dock, never a public dock.  It then 
reasons that the public trust doctrine is not violated by maintaining the status quo.  
ABKA argues that the riparian use is not changed and since it is not changed, the 
use of the waters is not changed and the DNR simply has no authority to come in 
absent a change in the use.  ABKA therefore asserts that its permit is still good. 
¶66 
I disagree.  As ABKA itself stated at oral argument, the docks in 
question here are meant to harbor big boats.  I now quote a statement made during 
oral argument by ABKA’s counsel:  “This case is really about one rich person who 
leases versus one rich person who owns, not the average little guy who wants to 
take his family out for an outing.  This is not a meaningful distinction relevant to 
the public trust doctrine.”  I agree that this case is about big boat owners who own 
riparian land versus big boat owners who lease slips on a seasonal basis.  But just 
 
No. 99-2306(D) 
 
7 
because we are not dealing with “the little guy” does not mean that the public trust 
doctrine is irrelevant. 
¶67 
The burning question is still access.   The person who can afford to 
own a big boat, but who does not have a riparian right, is entitled to access to the 
lake just as is the person with a similar size boat who does have riparian status.  
There are simply too few places in Wisconsin’s inland waters for people with big 
boats.  Lake Geneva is one lake where big boats can harbor.  The DNR’s concern 
here is about access to that lake.  If ABKA’s dockominium were to end up taking 
away all availability for leasing, the person who had a big boat but did not have 
riparian rights would have less access to the water.  I would ask:  where is that 
person going to go?  This is why, in my opinion, the conversion plan is the 
business of the DNR, because the DNR is in the business of assuring access to 
everybody, even wealthy people. 
¶68 
And when the DNR looked at the facts surrounding the conversion 
plan, this is what it found, as evidenced from the record before the ALJ.  There are 
three ways to access water:  (1) by being a riparian owner, (2) by renting a slip, 
and (3) by public access.  In the case of big boats, public access ramps are simply 
unfeasible.  It takes time and money to launch these big boats and time and money 
to get them out.  So, that leaves renting or riparian access. The ALJ cited 
testimony from a warden that ABKA’s conversion would reduce the number of 
slips available on Lake Geneva by almost half.   It stands to reason that if the 
number of available slips for big boats on Lake Geneva is reduced by half, access 
is compromised.  That is just common sense.  And that is what ultimately drove 
the DNR’s determination in this case. 
 
No. 99-2306(D) 
 
8 
¶69 
As the ALJ related, one witness testified how she and up to 100 of 
her friends were forced to leave the Abbey because of the high cost ($46,500) of 
purchasing a pier slip, paying taxes and meeting condominium assessments.  
Similar sentiments, along with a deep sense of regret, at having been forced off 
Lake Geneva because of the high costs were expressed by another witness.   
¶70 
The ALJ correctly observed that the public trust doctrine reflects an 
effort by the law to balance the rights of riparians with the rights of the public in 
waters held in public trust.  What constitutes reasonable use, under the common 
law test, is a factual determination, varying from case to case, which includes 
factoring the subject matter of the use and the occasion and manner of its 
application. The ALJ concluded that the “subject matter of the use” and the 
“occasion and manner of its application” at the Marina would be changed 
fundamentally if the entire Marina were converted to dockominium status and the 
boat slips were no longer regularly and consistently made available to the public 
by way of seasonal rental.  I agree.  I conclude that the DNR had the authority to 
step in to protect the owners of big boats who are not riparian owners.  As I 
expressed before, these people are members of the public and entitled to access 
just like anyone else.  The public trust doctrine is not irrelevant to these people as 
ABKA contends. 
¶71 
The only remaining question is whether the DNR’s determination 
that 287 of the 407 slips remain available to the public is reasonable.  Here, the 
DNR is accorded great discretion.  The facts and circumstances support this 
determination.  I would affirm the circuit court which affirmed the ALJ’s decision 
which upheld the DNR’s determination.