Case Title: In Re Estate of West

Citation: 522 A.2d 1256

Docket Number: 

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 1987-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
522 A.2d 1256 (1987)
In re the ESTATE OF Margaret A. WEST.

Supreme Court of Delaware.
Submitted: April 22, 1986.
Decided: March 23, 1987.
Joseph A. Hurley, Wilmington, for appellant.
George C. Hering, III (argued) and Kevin T. Peck, Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington, for appellee.
Before CHRISTIE, C.J., MOORE and WALSH, JJ.
*1257 MOORE, Justice:
David A. West appeals a post-trial decision of the Court of Chancery invalidating the last will and testament of his late mother, Margaret A. West, on grounds of undue influence. Suit was brought by the testatrix's daughter, Joan L. West, charging that her mother lacked testamentary capacity, or alternatively, that the will resulted from David's exertion of undue influence during their mother's last illness. The Vice Chancellor found that the mother had the requisite testamentary capacity, but sustained the claim of undue influence.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record, and must conclude from the independent undisputed evidence, and consideration of all the circumstances, that Joan West failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence her claim of undue influence. Levitt v. Bouvier, Del.Supr., 287 A.2d 671, 673 (1972). Accordingly, we reverse.
We begin with the undisputed objective facts of record. Margaret A. West died on April 12, 1984 at the age of seventy-eight. Her adopted son, David, was fifty-one, married, and had been employed as a refinery mechanic welder at the same company for nineteen years. Joan West was fifty years old, and is the testatrix's natural daughter. The life styles of Joan and David have been markedly different. Joan attended two bible colleges shortly after high school, but never completed her course of study. In 1977, she entered a mental institution for approximately six months. At the time of trial Joan worked as an office cleaner, and had difficulty supporting herself. Joan has lived in Florida since 1977, and the evidence at trial indicated that her relationship with her mother was rather distant. Her aimless life style, choice of friends, and apparent financial irresponsibility had been sources of deep concern to her mother and brother. For example, in 1967, Joan and David each inherited separate houses in the resort community of Lewes, Delaware from their grandmother. Joan later decided to sell her house, and David, in an effort to keep it in the family, offered Joan $25,000, or $1,000 above her best offer. Rather than accept her brother's offer, Joan sold the house in 1978 for $15,000, and then dissipated the proceeds. All of this greatly distressed her mother.
On the other hand, David and his wife have worked hard, raised a family, and their relationship with Mrs. West was always one of love and affection. She referred to David's wife as her "daughter-in-love," and her relationship with David's *1258 children obviously was close and loving. Over the years Mrs. West had relied on David to provide routine maintenance to her house, and to assist in minor chores.
Animosity has existed between Joan and David for most of their lives. David admitted that his relationship with his sister was rarely on good terms. In the past, he has referred to her as a "scrubwoman," the "town clown," and a "buffoon."
The challenged will was executed by Margaret West on April 10, 1984, two days before she died. It named David as sole beneficiary. This will superceded one dated September 6, 1977, which bequeathed a trailer to David, and placed the remaining assets in a residuary trust under which Joan was to receive the income for life, with the corpus to be distributed to various religious organizations upon Joan's death. It is undisputed that the mother was a very religious person. However, Mrs. West's religious focus apparently changed in her later years. She had regularly attended church and was active in its affairs, but her minister testified that although her faith remained spiritually secure, she stopped attending church in the last several months of her life.
The evidence clearly establishes that Mrs. West always was a very strong-minded and independent woman. She also had a total distrust of the medical profession. In her final months she limited her contacts with her minister, who on his last visit to her house, about a month before she died, was greeted by Mrs. West at the front door but not invited inside. About the same time she refused to permit acquaintances to discuss her condition with members of her family, and even threatened one person "never to speak" to her again if the subject was broached with David or Joan. Indeed, it was only after David found his mother collapsed on the floor of her house on April 4, 1984, that she even agreed to stay with David and his wife. The record, however, is absolutely clear that until this event Mrs. West lived at home, spurning all medical attention of any sort. For the next eight days, until her death on April 12, she lived at David's house, receiving constant care from David, his wife and family.
On April 6, Mrs. West first informed David that she wanted to change her will by naming him as her sole heir. At his mother's request, David contacted a lawyer to handle the matter. He first called his own attorney, who referred the matter to another member of the Bar, Aida Waserstein. Ms. Waserstein spoke with David briefly on the telephone, receiving general information from him. However, Ms. Waserstein never considered David as her client. Instead, the lawyer viewed herself as an independent advisor and counselor to Margaret West.
Thus, on April 9, Ms. Waserstein drafted a codicil to the 1977 will and spent about forty-five minutes alone with Mrs. West, in David's living room, reviewing the 1977 will and draft codicil. The precise circumstances of this interview are important and undisputed, although they were given scant attention by the trial court. Upon arriving at David's house, Ms. Waserstein found Mrs. West sitting on a couch in the living room. The lawyer introduced herself, asked to be left alone with her client, sat down next to her and began a discussion initially to ascertain Mrs. West's testamentary capacity. Thus, Ms. Waserstein testified:
During this interview, a significant event occurred. Ms. Waserstein asked to see Mrs. West's 1977 will. The latter then asked David to go to her house, and gave him clear, specific instructions about locating a copy. David then left on this errand. Thus, not only was Ms. Waserstein alone in *1259 the room with Mrs. West, but at his mother's direction David was out of the house. Ms. Waserstein specifically testified that during this time Mrs. West acted no differently than when David was at home but out of the room.
Upon David's return with the 1977 will, Ms. Waserstein discussed the earlier religious bequests with Mrs. West:
Ms. Waserstein testified that throughout the meeting she was alert to any signs of a disruption, impairment or impingement upon Mrs. West's mental faculties, and found none. Had any existed, Ms. Waserstein stated that she would not have let Mrs. West sign the codicil. Thus, Ms. Waserstein concluded:
Ms. Waserstein also testified regarding Mrs. West's decision to disinherit Joan:
Further, Ms. Waserstein testified about Mrs. West's feelings toward David:
Thereafter, the codicil was signed with certain handwritten additions and corrections made and initialed by Mrs. West. The use of a codicil was chosen by Ms. Waserstein because of the risk that Mrs. West would die before a will could be drafted and executed. However, Ms. Waserstein later conferred with her partner, Christine Dempsey, who suggested that a new will would be preferable in view of the radical changes effected by the codicil. After discussing the matter, Ms. Dempsey drafted a new will for execution by the testatrix.
Thus, at approximately seven o'clock p.m. on April 10, Ms. Dempsey called on Mrs. West, the new will was explained to her and then executed before three witnesses  David's wife, his daughter and his son-in-law. Ms. Dempsey testified that Mrs. West told her that Joan was being disinherited because she had squandered money through the years and also because she so loved her son. Ms. Dempsey was convinced that the testatrix understood all aspects of her estate's disposition.
Ms. Dempsey specifically testified about Mrs. West's testamentary capacity:
She then addressed Mrs. West's decision to disinherit Joan:
Finally, Ms. Dempsey related her impression of Mrs. West's love and affection for David and his family:
On the same day that she executed the new will, April 10, another significant event occurred. Mrs. West received a telephone call from her pastor. They spoke for about five minutes. During the conversation she told the minister that although she felt very weak, she knew that spiritually she was safe and secure. She also reaffirmed her strong faith in a hereafter, and had absolutely no fear of death, which she shortly expected. Regarding her mental state, the pastor testified that she was:
(Emphases added.)
The next day, April 11, Mrs. West evidently was bedridden, and for the first time David summoned the long-time family physician, Dr. Leroy R. Kimble, to check his mother, if she would permit, and to prescribe a wheelchair and bedside commode because of her weakened condition. Dr. Kimble arrived between six and seven p.m. and found Mrs. West in bed. Even though she had not consulted Dr. Kimble for about sixteen years, Mrs. West immediately recognized him, and without prompting called him by name. While agreeing to see the physician, she made it a condition that she neither be treated nor hospitalized. From a short examination it was obvious to the doctor that, although not in pain, Mrs. West was suffering from advanced metastatic cancer. Nonetheless, he found her lucid with her mental faculties intact.
Dr. Kimble suggested that David and his wife apply warm compresses to a particularly large mass on Mrs. West's side to facilitate its draining. They did so throughout the night, and in the early morning hours of April 12, Mrs. West died peacefully.
During this entire period of Mrs. West's final illness, Joan was absent in Florida. She has no personal knowledge of any of the foregoing events. Thus, her case depended strongly on the questionable testimony of her longtime and very close friend, Linda Fleetwood. Their relationship dated from 1956, when Mrs. Fleetwood was sixteen and Joan was twenty-one years old. According to Mrs. Fleetwood, Joan was like a "big sister," who began calling Linda on the phone, and thereafter, from 1956 to 1958, Mrs. Fleetwood spent weekends at the West house. While Mrs. Fleetwood remained close to Joan, and as will be seen was the catalyst of this litigation, she was erroneously described by the trial court as a "long-time" friend of Mrs. West. In fact, Mrs. Fleetwood did not stay in regular contact with Mrs. West until the latter part of the testatrix's life. The "long-time" friendship was with Joan, not Mrs. West.
From November 1983 until April 1, 1984, the last day Mrs. Fleetwood saw Mrs. West, the former observed a steady physical decline in the testatrix. She described her last visit to Mrs. West's house on April 1, 1984. On that day Mrs. West called and insisted that Mrs. Fleetwood, despite the latter's claim of illness, come to visit. She arrived about noon and was shocked by Mrs. West's appearance  dressed in shabby "bed clothes," her hair "like a wild woman," and her false teeth out. Prior to that, Ms. Fleetwood had always admired Mrs. West's neatness and careful attention to her personal appearance.
Mrs. Fleetwood wanted to call Joan or David, but Mrs. West was adamant that they not be told of her condition. Indeed, she became quite angry over Mrs. Fleetwood's attempted intervention. Mrs. Fleetwood also testified that she came on this visit with the specific intention of discussing Mrs. West's will and the disposition of her estate. There was such a discussion, and Mrs. Fleetwood apparently satisfied herself that Joan was the principal life beneficiary of Mrs. West's estate.
While Mrs. Fleetwood testified that they prayed together and parted as friends, shortly thereafter she received a letter from Mrs. West, dated April 4, stating in part:
Although Mrs. Fleetwood professed great concern for Mrs. West, she did not want to talk to her again, prior to receiving the April 4 letter, or even to learn if she was alive. She gave the curious explanations that "I have a very busy schedule, and I have many things to do" and that "I wanted to remember her the way I last left her"  i.e., unkempt, hair like a "wild woman," no teeth, and gravely ill.
After Mrs. West died, it is clear that Mrs. Fleetwood became the organizing force of this litigation with three other women who were "concerned about Joan *1262 getting protected." They encouraged Joan to seek legal counsel, and in fact, Mrs. Fleetwood took Joan to a lawyer (not her present counsel) and paid the initial attorney's fee. At trial Mrs. Fleetwood admitted that Joan had not repaid her for this expense.
Throughout her testimony Mrs. Fleetwood seemed to have total recall of any event she perceived as favorable to Joan, while failing to remember other things, or giving inconsistent statements respecting them. Thus, she testified on her deposition that she had not given copies of Mrs. West's 1977 and 1984 wills to anyone, when in fact she had done so to help Joan organize this litigation. Although she had professed close friendship with the Wests, she had never met David until Mrs. West's funeral and had spoken to him only once on the phone  on April 5 after receiving Mrs. West's April 4 "Linda, you are the biggest fake" letter. On her deposition she was quick to accuse David of holding his mother "incommunicado" and wanting to call the police because he would not let her speak with his mother after the "fake and hypocrite" letter. Yet, at trial she said, "It's his mother. He may do what he wishes with her."
Significantly, unlike four independent witnesses who saw or talked with Mrs. West between April 9 and 11  two lawyers, a clergyman, and a physician  Mrs. Fleetwood had no knowledge of Mrs. West's actions, her mental state, or the circumstances that led to the drafting and execution of the 1984 codicil and will.
In reviewing the factual findings of a trial judge, this Court may review the entire record and, when the findings of the court below are clearly wrong and the doing of justice requires their overturn, we are free to make contradictory findings of fact. Levin v. Smith, Del.Supr., 513 A.2d 1292, 1301 (1986); Levitt v. Bouvier, Del. Supr., 287 A.2d 671, 673 (1972). This is such a case.
The Vice Chancellor found that Mrs. West had sufficient testamentary capacity to execute her 1984 will, but ruled it invalid as the product of undue influence. In finding testamentary capacity, the trial court reasoned:
Matter of West, Del.Ch., No. 248, 1985, slip op. at 9-11 (June 20, 1985) (Berger, V.C.).
*1263 In finding that David exerted undue influence over Mrs. West's decision, the Vice Chancellor inferred:
Matter of West, slip op. at 11-13.
We first address Joan West's contention that her mother lacked testamentary capacity to execute the 1984 will. Here, the standard is that one who makes a will must, at the time of execution, be capable of exercising thought, reflection and judgment, and must know what he or she is doing and how he or she is disposing of his or her property. The person must also possess sufficient memory and understanding to comprehend the nature and character of the act. Thus, the law requires Mrs. West to have known that she was disposing of her estate by will, and to whom. Matter of Langmeier, Del.Ch., 466 A.2d 386, 402 (1983).
Delaware law presumes that the testatrix had sufficient testamentary capacity when executing her will, and the party attacking testamentary capacity bears the burden of proof. Matter of Langmeier, 466 A.2d  at 389. It is important to note that only a modest level of competence is required for an individual to possess the testamentary capacity to execute a will. Estate of Rasen, Me.Supr., 447 A.2d 1220, 1222 (1982).
We agree with the trial court's finding that Mrs. West possessed sufficient testamentary capacity to execute the 1984 will. The testimony of Ms. Waserstein and Ms. Dempsey, describing their lengthy discussions with the testatrix prior to execution of the 1984 codicil and will, balance any evidence that Mrs. West's advanced illness may have destroyed her testamentary capacity. Further, the testimony of other independent witnesses, who saw and/or spoke with Mrs. West during her final days, convince us that she was of sound mind. Dr. Kimble was immediately recognized and called by name, even though Mrs. West had not consulted him for over sixteen years. He noticed no unusual signs when he examined her less than twelve hours before her death, and Robin Pokoy, David's daughter, spent approximately four hours with her grandmother during her final days and did not notice any deviation from the testatrix's normal mental state. In addition, Mrs. West's pastor found her "rational and normal as ever" on the very day she executed her will.
Thus, we turn to the contention of undue influence. Delaware law recognizes that:
Matter of Langmeier, 466 A.2d  at 403.
The essential elements of undue influence are: (1) a susceptible testator; (2) the opportunity to exert influence; (3) a disposition to do so for an improper purpose; (4) the actual exertion of such influence; and, (5) a result demonstrating its effect. Nardo v. Nardo, Del.Supr., 209 A.2d 905, 912-13 (1965); Matter of Langmeier, 466 A.2d  at 403.
While ignoring the testimony of four independent witnesses, the trial court concluded from scant evidence, equally indicative of mutual love and affection between mother and son  Mrs. West's illness leading to her presence in David's house, the loving care he and his family gave her, David's hostility to Joan, and revocation of the 1977 will  that opportunity and motive had been established. However, Delaware law requires the party alleging undue influence to prove its actual exertion by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter of Langmeier, 466 A.2d  at 389. While relevant to the inquiry, opportunity and motive, standing alone, do not establish a charge of undue influence.
Both the attorneys, Waserstein and Dempsey, observed no signs that Mrs. West was under any undue influence when they spoke at length, and alone, with her during her last days. Neither attorney had any motive to ignore or suppress signs that Mrs. West was susceptible to David's alleged importunities. To the contrary, both testified that the testatrix exhibited an independent mind and clearly stated her reasons for changing the beneficiaries. Consistent with the high ethical standards required of them, they were bound, and acted, to ensure that Mrs. West's actions were the product of her own free will.
Another factor we have observed from the physical evidence is that the testatrix's signatures on the 1984 codicil and will show no signs of tremor or weakness. If anything, they are remarkably similar to her signature on the revoked 1977 will.
Joan's prior conduct, however, lends much credibility to Margaret's fears that her daughter would dissipate the inheritance originally contemplated in the 1977 will. Mrs. West's elimination of certain religious bequests is not fatal. The two independent lawyers, Ms. Waserstein and Ms. Dempsey both explained her wishes in this regard, and Reverend Cerrato, Mrs. West's pastor, testified to her changed religious focus.
The Vice Chancellor conceded that there is no direct evidence that David actually exerted any improper influence, but dismissed his testimony as self-serving and lacking in credibility. Normally, that is a proper exercise of discretion, but in reaching its conclusions of undue influence, the trial court did not undertake the required five step analysis mandated by Nardo and Matter of Langmeier.
Analyzing the elements of undue influence, we recognize the possibility that Mrs. West, being very ill, could have been a susceptible testator; that her presence in David's house provided an opportunity to exert influence; and that the alleged animosity between David and Joan could have been a motive for influencing the testatrix. However, the validity of a will does not turn on mere possibilities. Joan has not established an actual exertion of influence or any result demonstrating its effect. The disposition according to the 1984 will is consistent with a change of heart by Mrs. West, a change expressing her belief, communicated to two independent lawyers, and based on rational considerations, that her daughter did not deserve any part of the estate.
Furthermore, given the undisputed independent evidence, we cannot conclude that this record even supports a finding of susceptibility. In addition, there is simply no evidence that David actually exerted undue influence. In Conner v. Brown, Del.Super., 3 A.2d 64 (1938), the court correctly held that the mere opportunity to influence is insufficient:
Id. at 71.
That describes the situation here. Joan West had the burden of establishing undue influence, but failed to present evidence of David's exertion of any undue influence. Establishing the opportunity and motive for influencing an allegedly susceptible testatrix is simply insufficient to invalidate a will under Delaware law.
Thus, the trial court erred in halting its undue influence analysis after finding a susceptible testator; the opportunity to influence; and the disposition to do so for an improper purpose. With the record devoid of any evidence indicating the actual exertion of improper influence, the Vice Chancellor's conclusion, that opportunity and motive to influence a susceptible testatrix necessarily establishes the actual exertion of improper influence and a result demonstrating its effect, does not comport with Delaware law. While recognizing that Mrs. West may have had valid grounds to disinherit Joan, the trial judge somehow concluded that the testatrix's elimination of the religious bequests inescapably led to an inference of undue influence. Given the law and this record, any such conclusion does not meet the tests of review mandated by Levitt v. Bouvier. Mrs. West could have deleted the religious bequests for a host of valid reasons. In the absence of evidence indicating an actual exertion of undue influence, the mere fact that she eliminated the religious organizations from her new will does not lead to an "inescapable" conclusion of undue influence. Thus, from the evidence presented, and considering all the circumstances, Joan West did not sustain her burden of establishing the existence of undue influence.
The law disfavors invalidating a will absent strong evidence mandating such drastic action. This is especially so where, as here, two equally plausible reasons exist for the late change in beneficiaries. Based on this scant record the trial court found undue influence, but the same facts comport with the equally plausible conclusion that Mrs. West merely had a change of heart, and determined that her worldly belongings should pass to her son, who she always had held in the highest esteem and affection. Given the life-long loving relationship between David's family and Mrs. West, and David's loving care of her during her last dying days, who "is to say that under such circumstances wealth and fortune cannot assume a secondary role to the comfort derived from knowing that in your last days there is someone who truly seems to care?" Matter of Langmeier, 466 A.2d  at 398. As noted in Conner v. Brown:
3 A.2d  at 71.
In our opinion the 1984 will is valid, and for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Chancery must be REVERSED.