Case Title: Wilson v. Allday

Citation: 487 So. 2d 793

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1986-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
487 So. 2d 793 (1986) Romain WILSON v. James C. ALLDAY, et al. No. 56172. Supreme Court of Mississippi. April 16, 1986. Rehearing Denied May 21, 1986. *794 W. Harvey Barton, Arvis V. Cumbest, Cumbest, Cumbest & Hunter, Pascagoula, for appellant. John M. Kinard, Megehee, Brown, Williams & Mestayer, Pascagoula, for appellees. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ. ANDERSON, Justice, for the Court: This "slip and fall" case is appealed from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, wherein the appellant Romain Wilson sued National Food Stores for injuries sustained in a fall on appellee's parking lot. The jury returned a verdict for appellant and the trial judge granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for appellee. The facts in this case are basically undisputed. The appellee National Tea Company was doing business in Ocean Springs, Mississippi, as National Food Store, by operating a grocery store in a shopping center there. James C. Allday was manager of that store. National Food Store (lessee) leased the building from Chrisler Properties (lessor). The lease agreement itself contained the following provision regarding the parking lot. On August 18, 1980, the appellant, a business invitee, stopped at the National Food Store in Ocean Springs to shop. Her bagged purchases were placed in a shopping cart belonging to National Food Store. As appellant proceeded toward her car with the cart full of groceries, the front wheel of the cart hit a pothole in the parking lot causing it to overturn. When appellant held on to the cart in an attempt to keep it from falling, she injured her back as the cart pulled her to the ground. The appellant sustained bodily injuries resulting in back surgery, approximately 3 1/2 years later. She incurred medical bills totalling $13,596.73. The appellant filed an accident report with the manager of the store the day following the accident. Insurers for Chrisler Properties (lessor) paid $200 for appellant's medical bills. Appellant later learned that in April 1980, another patron of the store had fallen in the parking lot under similar circumstances and Chrisler Properties had paid medical expenses to that party also. The store had reported the accident to Chrisler Properties, who then assumed responsibility for repairing the holes in the parking lot at that time. Appellant subsequently filed an action against James C. Allday, individually, and as manager of the store, National Tea Company, d/b/a National Food Store of Ocean Springs, and Chrisler Properties, a Mississippi unincorporated partnership. The appellant sued on grounds of negligence and sought $175,000 damages for personal injuries. Appellant voluntarily dismissed Chrisler Properties as a defendant in the suit. Following the trial, the judge directed the verdict for James Allday individually and the case was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict of $32,000. The circuit court judge thereafter entered an order for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The appellant assigns the following errors: The main issue in this case is whether a lessee would be liable to a third party for injuries received on property incidental to (but not on) demised property (common area parking lot) which lessor had agreed to maintain in good repair. An examination of the relevant law would indicate that the liability of the lessee would depend on whether or not the lessee exercised control of the premises in question. In this case, National Food Store leased a building in the shopping center owned by Chrisler Properties and two adjacent buildings in the center were leased to other businesses. The lease agreement with National Food Store included free use of the parking lot to be maintained by the lessor for the use of the lessees and customers of the lessees. The judge in this case was of the opinion that the said parking lot was made available for the common use of all tenants and by contractual agreement was in the possession and under the control of the lessor. This being so, there would be no duty owing to invitees by the lessee. The established law in this state is that the owner, occupant or person in charge of premises owes to an invitee or business visitor a duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary care to keep the premises in reasonably safe and suitable condition or of warning invitee of dangerous conditions not readily apparent which owner knows or should know of in the exercise of reasonable care. Downs v. Corder, 377 So. 2d 603 (Miss. 1979); J.C. Penney Co. v. Sumrall, 318 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 1975); Jackson Ready-Mix Concrete v. Sexton, 235 So. 2d 267 (Miss. 1970); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 63 (45) (1966). However, the owner, occupant or person in charge of property is *796 not an insurer of the safety of an invitee where the invitee knows or should know of an apparent danger, no warning is required. J.C. Penney Co. v. Sumrall, supra; Jackson Ready-Mix Concrete v. Sexton, supra. A landlord/lessor has no obligation to make repairs to leased premises at all, even if they are necessary, in the absence of a contract to do so. Ford v. Pythian Bondholders, 223 Miss. 630, 78 So. 2d 743 (1955). Where the lessor reserves control over a designated area for common use of tenants and is negligent, lessor is liable for resulting injury. However, the lessor must have actual or constructive knowledge of the defect and a sufficient opportunity to repair the same. Turnipseed v. McGee, 236 Miss. 159, 109 So. 2d 551 (1959). Where the lessor is in legal possession of the premises to be kept in repair and has the right and privilege of entry for inspection, then notice of the defect by the lessee should not be a condition precedent to lessor's liability. See Hurst v. English, 357 So. 2d 132 (Miss. 1978). In the case sub judice, the lessor assumed the duty to maintain and was free to make inspections of the property as reasonably necessary. The contractual agreement to maintain the property was not contingent upon notice by lessee. A number of cases have held that in the absence of a controlling statute (as here) the lessee of a business establishment within a shopping center is not liable for injuries sustained by a patron on property not included in the leasehold, where a provision of the lease gave the lessor the duty to maintain the area in question. Underhill v. Shactman, 337 Mass. 730, 151 N.E.2d 287 (1958); Beaney v. Carlson, 174 Ohio St. 409, 189 N.E.2d 880 (1963); Howe v. Kroger, 598 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1980). Nevertheless, it is more generally held that liability runs with possession and control of the property. If the lessee's use of the premises was tantamount to possession and control, then the lessee owed a duty of ordinary and reasonable care to its invitees upon the premises. Whether there was a breach (notice, dangerous conditions, etc.) becomes a question of fact. Conversely, if lessee's use of the lot did not constitute control, there would be no duty owed and therefore no cause of action. In Stanley v. Morgan & Lindsey, Inc. 203 So. 2d 473 (Miss. 1967), a patron in a shopping center fell in the parking lot after exiting a Morgan & Lindsey store. The building and parking lot were owned by the defendant West Biloxi Realty Corporation. The Court addressed and resolved the issue on the basis of a failure to show negligence on the part of the lessor and lessee, apparently holding both liable for the injury. That Court obviously surmised that where a store maintains a sidewalk and parking lot for the use of its customers and invites the customers to use same, it owes a duty of care to those persons invited onto the premises. Whether or not there was a known obvious danger was a question to be resolved by the jury. Appellant argues that appellee did, in fact, have possession and exercised control of the parking lot in that appellee had erected a cart corral there and its employees went onto the lot at least twelve times each day to gather its carts. Further, it invited customers to park in the lot in front of the store and instructed its employees to park in other designated areas on the lot. Appellant contends that appellees' presence and activities on the lot put it in the position to know of dangers and thereby gave rise to a duty to at least warn its invitees of those dangers. Appellant relied heavily on Jackson v. K-Mart Corp., 182 N.J. Super. 645, 442 A.2d 1087 (1981), wherein defendant fell on a sidewalk in front of the store which connected it with a parking lot because of an accumulation of ice and snow. The court held that the store was not entitled to a summary judgment because its liability was concurrent with that of the owner. K-Mart leased the store, but another defendant was responsible for maintenance of *798 the sidewalk. In addressing the issue that court stated: It would appear that a tenant/lessee/occupier of premises owes a duty of reasonable care to its invitees for the demised property and such necessary incidental areas substantially under its control (as the parking lot) and which he invites the public to use, notwithstanding a maintenance agreement with the landlord. While such agreement may serve as the basis for recovery against the lessor, it does not absolve the lessee of his duty to his invitees under the circumstances. If the lessees occupied and controlled the premises in question, then there was a duty concurrent with both the lessee and lessor to repair the dangerous condition or to warn invitees coming onto the premises. The judge was correct in submitting this issue to the jury for determination. The jury apparently concluded that the store controlled the property and therefore owed a duty to the appellant. REVERSED AND JUDGMENT ENTERED HERE FOR APPELLANT IN THE AMOUNT OF $32,000. CROSS APPEAL DISMISSED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur.