Case Title: C. Coakley Relocation Systems v. City of Milwaukee

Citation: 2008 WI 68

Docket Number: 2006AP002292

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
2008 WI 68 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP2292 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
C. Coakley Relocation Systems, Inc. a Wisconsin  
corporation, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
City of Milwaukee a municipal corporation, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 209 
Reported at: 305 Wis. 2d 487, 740 N.W.2d 636 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 25, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 5, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Franke   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Donald J. Murn, Michelle E. Martin, Monica L. Walrath, John 
Bode, and Murn & Martin, S.C., Waukesha, and oral argument by 
Donald J. Murn. 
 
For the defendant-respondent the caused was argued by Gregg 
C. Hagopian, assistant city attorney, with whom on the brief was 
Grant F. Langley, city attorney. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 68
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP2292  
(L.C. No. 
2005CV8661) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
C. Coakley Relocation Systems, Inc.,  
a Wisconsin corporation, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Milwaukee, a municipal corporation, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 25, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published court of appeals' decision,1 which affirmed the 
decision of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, John A. Franke, 
Judge, 
to 
dismiss 
C. 
Coakley 
Relocation 
Systems, 
Inc.'s 
(Coakley) amended complaint that sought comparable replacement 
property and relocation assistance and benefits. 
¶2 
We must decide whether Coakley timely filed its 
complaint for relocation assistance and benefits under Wis. 
                                                 
1 C. Coakley Relocation Sys., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 
2007 WI App 209, 305 Wis. 2d 487, 740 N.W.2d 636.  
No. 
2006AP2292   
 
2 
 
Stat. §§ 32.19 and 32.195 (2003-04).2  We conclude that the two- 
year statute of limitations in Wis. Stat. § 32.20 bars Coakley's 
claims for relocation benefits because although the City of 
Milwaukee (City) took physical possession of the relevant 
property on October 14, 2002, Coakley did not file a notice of 
claim until December 13, 2004, and it first filed a formal 
complaint on September 29, 2005.  We further conclude that Wis. 
Stat. § 893.13(2) does not toll the two-year statute of 
limitations in this case. 
I 
¶3 
On January 30, 2002, the City acquired property from 
Roadster LLC.  The property at issue here was a parking lot that 
Roadster LLC leased to Coakley.  On March 28, 2002, the City 
sent Coakley a 30-day notice to vacate, but Coakley refused to 
leave, claiming it was a "displaced person" and thus entitled to 
comparable replacement property.  The City disagreed, and on May 
31, 2002, the City commenced an action against Coakley, which is 
referred to as the "Roadster" decision, seeking a writ of 
assistance pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8).3  On October 10, 
2002, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Michael D. Guolee, 
Judge, granted a writ to the City, which, in effect, ousted 
Coakley from the property.  The circuit court further concluded 
                                                 
2 The relevant statutory texts can be found in section III 
of this opinion.  All subsequent references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated.  
3 City of Milwaukee v. Roadster LLC, 2003 WI App 131, 265 
Wis. 2d 518, 666 N.W.2d 524. 
No. 
2006AP2292   
 
3 
 
that Coakley was not a "displaced person" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.19(2)(e).  Therefore, since Coakley was not deemed to be a 
"displaced person," the City was not statutorily required to 
make "a comparable replacement property" available to Coakley 
pursuant to § 32.05(8)(c).  On October 14, 2002, Coakley vacated 
the property and the City obtained physical possession. 
¶4 
Roadster LLC and Coakley appealed the circuit court's 
grant of the writ of assistance and its finding that Coakley was 
not a "displaced person."  On appeal, Coakley argued that it was 
a "displaced person" and thus, before the writ of assistance 
could be granted, Coakley should have had "a comparable 
replacement property [made] available" to it.  Coakley argued 
that the trial court erred in granting the writ without 
requiring the City to make available comparable replacement 
property under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8).  On May 13, 2003, the 
court of appeals reversed the circuit court.  It concluded that 
Coakley was a "displaced person" that was entitled to comparable 
replacement property before the writ was granted.  City of 
Milwaukee v. Roadster LLC, 2003 WI App 131, 265 Wis. 2d 518, 666 
N.W.2d 524, review denied, 2003 WI 126, 265 Wis. 2d 420, 668 
N.W.2d 559 (No. 02-3102) (August 13, 2003).  The case was 
reversed but not remanded to the circuit court. 
¶5 
Between late 2003 and early 2004, the City and Coakley 
apparently 
discussed 
Coakley's 
desire 
for 
parking, 
i.e., 
comparable replacement property.  On October 22, 2003, Coakley 
and the City entered into a stipulation to dismiss without 
prejudice the case——Roadster——that the City initiated in the 
No. 
2006AP2292   
 
4 
 
circuit court to obtain a writ of assistance.  On October 5, 
2004, the City made a $30,000 settlement offer to Coakley for 
the lease of comparable replacement property.  The offer letter 
stated, "[t]his payment would be the maximum under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.19(4m) 
for 
a 
tenant-occupied 
business 
replacement."  
However, Coakley rejected that offer. 
¶6 
On December 13, 2004, representatives from Roadster 
and Coakley signed a "Release of Claims."  In relevant part, 
both parties released the City "from any and all claims for 
attorney 
fees, 
appraisal 
and 
expert 
fees, 
costs 
and 
disbursements, and also from any and all litigation and other 
expenses claimable under Wis. Stat. § 32.28 and Wis. Stat. Ch. 
814, arising out of, or relating to," the Roadster decision.  
However, the release did "not include any relocation benefits 
under Wis. Stat. § 32.19 to which Coakley may be entitled under 
law as a result of" the Roadster decision.  
¶7 
Also on December 13, 2004, Coakley sent a letter to 
the City, which, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1), provided 
the City with an "Itemized Statement of Relief Sought."  In 
short, Coakley sought money for moving to a new location, 
building costs, relocation benefits pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.19(4m), 
compensation 
for 
wrongful 
loss 
of 
premises, 
compensation for interruption of business, and attorneys' fees.  
The City, however, did not acquiesce to this request. 
¶8 
On 
September 
29, 
2005, 
Coakley 
filed 
a 
formal 
complaint against the City.  In its complaint, Coakley sought 
the following: (1) declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 
No. 
2006AP2292   
 
5 
 
Wis. Stat. § 806.04; (2) damages for failure to provide 
relocation benefits; and (3) damages for wrongful ejectment.  On 
November 11, 2005, the City filed a motion to dismiss Coakley's 
complaint.  On January 18, 2006, the circuit court, in an oral 
decision, granted in part and denied in part the City's motion 
to dismiss. 
¶9 
The circuit court concluded that "[t]o the extent that 
the complaint asserts a claim for itemized damages under 
[§] 32.19 or [§] 32.195, such claims are barred by [§] 32.20."  
However, the circuit court determined that to the extent the 
complaint asserts damages pursuant to other statutes, e.g., Wis. 
Stat. § 32.25, which the circuit court concluded was not limited 
by Wis. Stat. § 32.20, the motion to dismiss was denied. 
¶10 On 
February 
3, 
2006, 
Coakley 
filed 
an 
amended 
complaint setting forth the following causes of action: (1) 
possession of the "Third Street Parcel," i.e., the parking lot, 
because the City violated Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8)(b) and (c); (2) 
damages for failure to make available a comparable replacement 
property within the meaning of § 32.05(8)(b) and (c); (3) 
damages for wrongful ejectment; (4) declaratory and injunctive 
relief pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 804.06 because no replacement 
property was made available and no relocation assistance and 
benefits were provided; and (5) declaratory relief in that the 
City should be estopped from asserting Wis. Stat. § 32.20 in 
order to bar Coakley's Wis. Stat. §§ 32.19 and 32.195 claims. 
¶11 On February 21, 2006, the City moved to dismiss the 
second complaint.  On April 28, 2006, the circuit court, in an 
No. 
2006AP2292   
 
6 
 
oral decision, granted the motion and dismissed the amended 
complaint.  Relying on City of Racine v. Bassinger4 and Dotty 
Dumpling's Dowry, Ltd. v. Community Development Authority of the 
City of Madison,5 the circuit court concluded that claims one 
through four attempted to assert rights that simply do not exist 
under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8).  The court stated,  
[T]he writ of assistan[ce] statute, grants no rights, 
no substantive rights, beyond what the legislature has 
authorized in the relocation assistance statutes that 
are a part of Chapter 32.   
This basic ruling was a part of my decision the 
first time around. . . . [T]he writ of assistance 
statute grants no rights in and of itself . . . . 
¶12 With regard to the fifth claim for declaratory relief, 
the circuit court rejected the claim and concluded that it was 
an attempt to revive the expired statute of limitations.  In 
addition, the court concluded that in the event the fifth claim 
asserted a different argument or claim for relief, it was also 
rejected.  Therefore, the circuit court determined that the 
amended complaint failed to state a claim that could survive the 
                                                 
4 City of Racine v. Bassinger, 163 Wis. 2d 1029, 473 
N.W.2d 526 (Ct. App. 1991). 
5 Dotty Dumpling's Dowry, Ltd. v. Community Dev. Auth. of 
the City of Madison, 2002 WI App 200, 257 Wis. 2d 377, 651 
N.W.2d 1. 
No. 
2006AP2292   
 
7 
 
"Bassinger rule"6 or a statute of limitations challenge.  Coakley 
appealed the circuit court's order. 
¶13 On August 14, 2007, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's decision to dismiss Coakley's entire amended 
complaint because "Coakley was entitled only to relocation 
payments authorized by Wis. Stat. ch. 32 and that the complaint 
seeking those payments was barred by the statute of limitations 
set out in Wis. Stat. § 32.20."  The court of appeals concluded 
that Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8) does not provide an independent right 
to compensation in addition to what the legislature has 
authorized 
in 
the 
relocation 
assistance 
law, 
i.e., 
Wis. Stat. §§ 32.19 and 32.195.  Moreover, it concluded that 
§ 32.20 bars claims under §§ 32.19 and 32.195 two years after 
the condemnor takes physical possession.  Because the City took 
physical possession on October 14, 2002, the court of appeals 
concluded that Coakley's claims were barred given the first 
claim, by way of notice, was not filed until December 13, 2004. 
II 
¶14 This case requires us to review the circuit court's 
decision to grant the City's motion to dismiss, and in so doing, 
we must undertake statutory interpretation.  Both are questions 
                                                 
6 In 
Bassinger, the court of appeals concluded that 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8) does not provide any substantive rights to 
have comparable replacement property made available independent 
of any other provision or requirement of law.  Bassinger 163 
Wis. 2d at 1041.  Rather, "the relocation assistance law, not 
condemnation law, determines the extent to which [a party is] 
entitled to have made available to [it] comparable replacement 
property . . . ."  Id.  
No. 
2006AP2292   
 
8 
 
of law, which we review de novo but benefiting from the lower 
courts' analyses.  Megal Dev. Corp. v. Shadof, 2005 WI 151, ¶8, 
286 Wis. 2d 105, 705 N.W.2d 645. 
III 
¶15 Coakley argues that after the Roadster decision, it is 
entitled to comparable replacement property since the court of 
appeals, in Roadster, concluded that it was a "displaced 
person."  Coakley further argues that the statute of limitations 
in Wis. Stat. § 32.20 should not bar its claims because the City 
did not satisfy a condition precedent in Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8), 
namely the City failed to provide a comparable replacement 
property.  Therefore, Coakley argues that the City never 
obtained a proper writ of assistance, and thus, the statute of 
limitations never began to run.  The City, on the other hand, 
argues: (1) section 32.05(8) are ouster provisions and not 
damage provisions; (2) section 32.05(8) does not give condemnees 
any new substantive rights; and (3) relocation benefits under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 32.19 and 32.195 in this case are barred pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 32.20.  While we may be sympathetic to Coakley's 
factual situation, the statute of limitations dictates that 
Coakley's claims are time barred. 
¶16 The case at hand requires us to interpret a number of 
Wisconsin Statutes.  "[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation 
is to determine what the statute means so that it may be given 
its full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  This court begins statutory interpretation with 
No. 
2006AP2292   
 
9 
 
the language of the statute.  Id., ¶45.  If the meaning of the 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry and give the 
language its "common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except 
that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given 
their technical or special definitional meaning."  Id.   
¶17 Context and structure of a statute are important to 
the meaning of the statute.  Id., ¶46.  "Therefore, statutory 
language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not 
in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language 
of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id.  Moreover, the 
"[s]tatutory language is read where possible to give reasonable 
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Id.  "A 
statute's purpose or scope may be readily apparent from its 
plain language or its relationship to surrounding or closely-
related statutes——that is, from its context or the structure of 
the statute as a coherent whole."  Id., ¶49. 
¶18 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(8), 
"Occupancy; 
writ 
of 
assistance; waste," provides the following: 
(a) In 
this 
subsection, 
"condemnor" 
has 
the 
meaning given in s. 32.185. 
(b) No person occupying real property may be 
required to move from a dwelling or move his or her 
business or farm without at least 90 days' written 
notice 
of 
the 
intended 
vacation 
date 
from 
the 
condemnor. . . . The 
condemnor 
has 
the 
right 
to 
possession when the persons who occupied the acquired 
property vacate, or hold over beyond the vacation date 
established by the condemnor, whichever is sooner, 
except as provided under par. (c).  If the condemnor 
is denied the right of possession, the condemnor may, 
No. 
2006AP2292   
 
10 
 
upon 48 hours' notice to the occupant, apply to the 
circuit court where the property is located for a writ 
of assistance to be put in possession.  The circuit 
court shall grant the writ of assistance if all 
jurisdictional requirements have been complied with, 
if the award has been paid or tendered as required and 
if the condemnor has made a comparable replacement 
property 
available 
to 
the 
occupants, 
except 
as 
provided under par. (c). 
(c) The condemnor may not require the persons who 
occupied the premises on the date that title vested in 
the condemnor to vacate until a comparable replacement 
property is made available.  This paragraph does not 
apply to any person who waives his or her right to 
receive relocation benefits or services under s. 
32.197 or who is not a displaced person, as defined 
under s. 32.19(2)(e), unless the acquired property is 
part of a program or project receiving federal 
financial assistance. 
¶19 The court of appeals interpreted the above statute in 
Bassinger.  Of relevance in Bassinger, as in this case, was the 
language that provides that a "displaced person" must have 
"comparable replacement property made available" to it.  The 
court of appeals concluded that the legislature's intent behind 
this language was "to provide, as one of the three conditions 
precedent to issuance of a writ of assistance, that a person 
displaced by a condemnation have comparable replacement property 
made available to the extent required by the relocation 
assistance law."  City of Racine v. Bassinger, 163 Wis. 2d 1029, 
1040, 473 N.W.2d 526 (Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis omitted); see 
also Dotty Dumpling's Dowry, Ltd. v. Community Dev. Auth. of the 
City of Madison, 2002 WI App 200, ¶¶13-17, 257 Wis. 2d 377, 651 
N.W.2d 1 (citing to Bassinger and reaffirming its conclusion 
with regard to relocation assistance); City of Janesville v. CC 
No. 
2006AP2292   
 
11 
 
Midwest, Inc., 2007 WI 93, ¶¶23-28, 34, 302 Wis. 2d 599, 734 
N.W.2d 428 (citing to Bassinger and Dotty and reaffirming their 
conclusions with regard to relocation assistance).  The court 
further stated that "[t]he [Legislative Reference Bureau's] 
analysis reveals that the language in question was added to 
[Wis. Stat. § 32.05] to clarify existing law——not to create in 
condemnees new substantive rights."  Bassinger, 163 Wis. 2d at 
1040 (emphasis omitted).  Rather than create new substantive 
rights, the language in subsection (8) "merely added a new 
condition, the substantive rights of which are found elsewhere 
in the statute."  Id. 
¶20 The court of appeals rejected Bassinger's reading of 
the statute that would have provided a new substantive right to 
have comparable replacement property made available independent 
of any other provisions or requirement of law.  Id.  The court 
of appeals concluded, "the relocation assistance law, not 
condemnation law, determines the extent to which [a party is] 
entitled to have made available to [it] comparable replacement 
property . . . ."  Id.  Accordingly, Coakley may not use 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8) to seek damages or now use that statute in 
an 
effort 
to 
have 
"comparable 
replacement 
property 
made 
available" to it.   
¶21 Rather than rely on Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8), Coakley 
must instead invoke the relocation assistance law, i.e., 
No. 
2006AP2292   
 
12 
 
Wis. Stat. §§ 32.19 and 32.195.7  However, a claim brought 
pursuant to §§ 32.19 and 32.195 must be brought within two years 
from 
when 
the 
City 
obtained 
physical 
possession. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 32.20.  Section 32.20, "Procedure for collection of 
itemized items of compensation," provides: 
Claims for damages itemized in ss. 32.19 and 
32.195 shall be filed with the condemnor carrying on 
the project through which condemnee's or claimant's 
claims arise.  All such claims must be filed after the 
damages 
upon 
which 
they 
are 
based 
have 
fully 
materialized but not later than 2 years after the 
condemnor takes physical possession of the entire 
property acquired or such other event as determined by 
the department of commerce by rule. . . .    
(Emphasis added.) 
¶22 "The bar created by operation of a statute of 
limitations is established independently of any adjudicatory 
process."  Colby v. Columbia County, 202 Wis. 2d 342, 350, 550 
N.W.2d 124 (1996).  Periods of limitation reflect various 
policies adopted by the legislature.  Id.  "It is [a] 
legislative expression of policy that prohibits litigants from 
raising claims——whether or not they are meritorious——after the 
expiration of a given period of time."  Id.  When the limitation 
period ends, it extinguishes the cause of action of the 
potential plaintiff, but it also creates a right for the would-
be defendant to insist on that statutory bar.  Id.  As a result, 
                                                 
7 While Coakley asserts that it is not seeking a new 
substantive right, it seeks a remedy under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8) 
despite the fact that precedent dictates that Coakley must 
invoke Wis. Stat. §§ 32.19 and 32.195 in order to obtain a 
remedy. 
No. 
2006AP2292   
 
13 
 
long ago we began to encourage plaintiffs to be vigilant and 
actively pursue claims against those who have potentially 
wronged them.  See Sheldon v. Rockwell, 9 Wis. 158 (*166), 162 
(*181) (1859).  While a plaintiff's right to access the court 
system is important, we must respect "a governmental entity's 
fundamental right to invoke a statute of limitations, as well as 
its legislatively mandated right to have a claim presented to it 
before it is forced into costly and expensive litigation."8  
Colby, 202 Wis. 2d at 349-50.    
¶23 Under Wis. Stat. § 32.20, the legislature specifically 
stated that the statute of limitations was to begin once the 
condemnor 
took 
"physical 
possession." 
 
This 
legislative 
directive is clear.  In the case at hand, it is undisputed that 
the 
City 
took 
physical 
possession 
on 
October 
14, 
2002.  
Therefore, Coakley should have filed its Wis. Stat. §§ 32.19 and 
32.195 claims within two years of October 14, 2002.  However, 
Coakley 
did 
not 
file 
a 
notice 
of 
claim, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80, until December 13, 2004.  Critically, it 
                                                 
8 Under the facts of this case, a government entity's right 
to have a claim presented before litigation could be satisfied 
through a notice of claim or by actual notice if the claimant 
shows that no prejudice to the government entity exists.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a).  
No. 
2006AP2292   
 
14 
 
did not file its first complaint until September 29, 2005.  As a 
result, Coakley's claims are time barred.9 
¶24 Coakley argues that possession should be defined as 
"correct" possession, and it argues, citing generally to Hansen 
v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983), 
that this court should create a court-fashioned remedy for those 
who will "undoubtedly find themselves in Coakley's predicament."  
We decline this opportunity to fashion a new remedy that would 
directly undermine the language of the statute.  The legislature 
utilized the phrase "physical possession" to set forth the 
expectations 
under 
these 
scenarios. 
 
Applying 
"physical 
possession" is a straightforward approach that is easily applied 
by litigants and the courts.  We will not insert the word 
"correct" or "lawful" into this plainly worded and easily 
                                                 
9 The court of appeals' decision, in this case, stated, "to 
stop this time limit from beginning to run, the condemnee must 
avoid giving physical possession of the property to the 
condemnor."  C. Coakley Relocation Sys., Inc., 305 Wis. 2d 487, 
¶19 (emphasis added).  However, this should not be interpreted 
as instructing parties to disobey a circuit court's order. 
No. 
2006AP2292   
 
15 
 
understood 
statute.10  Accordingly, Wis. Stat. § 32.20 bars 
Coakley's Wis. Stat. §§ 32.19 and 32.195 claims. 
¶25 During oral argument to this court, the applicability 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.13, "Tolling of statutes of limitation," was 
raised.  We subsequently ordered the parties to submit letter 
briefs addressing the applicability of § 893.13.  The parties 
chose to limit their discussion to § 893.13(2).  Thus, we limit 
our decision to that section of the tolling statute.  After 
further review and with the assistance of supplemental letter 
briefs from the parties, we conclude that § 893.13(2), as argued 
by the parties, does not apply given the particular facts of 
this case.  Section 893.13(2) provides: 
 
A law limiting the time for commencement of an 
action is tolled by the commencement of the action to 
enforce the cause of action to which the period of 
                                                 
10 See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
2004 WI 58, ¶39, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citing to the 
United States Supreme Court, Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 
503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992), asserting that "[w]e have stated 
time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says 
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 
there."); 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland 
Statutes and Statutory Construction (7th ed. 2007) (§ 46.3, 
"Expressed intent," stating "[w]hat a legislature says in the 
text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the 
legislative intent or will"; § 46.6, "Each word given effect," 
stating "it is also the case that every word excluded from a 
statute must be presumed to have been excluded for a purpose"; 
§ 47.23, "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius," stating "where 
a form of conduct, . . . there is an inference that all 
omissions 
should 
be 
understood 
as 
exclusions"; 
§ 47.38, 
"Insertion of words," stating "[i]n construing a statute, it is 
always safer not to add to or subtract from the language of a 
statute unless imperatively required to make it a rational 
statute") (internal punctuation and footnotes omitted). 
No. 
2006AP2292   
 
16 
 
limitation applies.  The law limiting the time for 
commencement of the action is tolled for the period 
from the commencement of the action until the final 
disposition of the action. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶26 We rely on the emphasized portion of the above argued 
statute for our conclusion: "A law limiting the time for 
commencement of an action is tolled by the commencement of the 
action to enforce the cause of action to which the period of 
limitation applies."   
¶27 In 
this 
case, 
the 
law 
limiting 
the 
time 
for 
commencement of an action is Wis. Stat. § 32.20.  Under § 32.20, 
claims pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 32.19 and 32.195 must be filed 
within two years after the condemnor takes physical possession.  
However, in this case, Coakley did not file a claim for 
relocation benefits under §§ 32.19 and 32.195 until after the 
two-year statute of limitations had expired.  Therefore, in this 
case, Wis. Stat. § 893.13(2) does not toll the limitations 
period.   
¶28 The appeal in Roadster does not toll the statute of 
limitations for Coakley.  The Roadster decision is of no 
relevance to Wis. Stat. § 893.13(2) because that appeal was of 
the circuit court's decision to grant the City a writ of 
assistance pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8).  In Roadster, the 
City filed a lawsuit to oust Coakley under § 32.05(8).  In 
response, Coakley argued, but did not formally plead, that it 
was a "displaced person" and thus the City was obligated to make 
available "comparable replacement property" in order to obtain a 
No. 
2006AP2292   
 
17 
 
writ.  Coakley defended against the issuance of the writ by 
arguing 
that 
since 
Coakley 
was 
not 
offered 
comparable 
replacement property from the City, the writ should not be 
issued.   
¶29 However, the record before this court is devoid of any 
indication that in Roadster, Coakley also initiated a claim for 
relocation 
assistance 
under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 32.20, 
32.19, 
or 
32.195. 
 
At 
most, 
in 
Roadster, 
Coakley 
received 
the 
determination that it was a "displaced person."  Here, Coakley's 
argument in defense to ouster is distinct from its duty to 
formally plead a cause of action for relocation assistance under 
§§ 32.20, 32.19, and 32.195 or formally defend on that basis.  
In fact, the release of claims document in Roadster specifically 
excluded § 32.19 claims for relocation benefits to which Coakley 
"may be entitled."  In Roadster, Coakley was deemed a displaced 
person, but it remained Coakley's responsibility to formally 
file a cause of action for relief under §§ 32.19 and 32.195.  
¶30 Coakley had two years from the time the City took 
physical possession to make its claim.  The City took physical 
possession of the property on October 14, 2002.  Coakley first 
filed a notice of claim on December 13, 2004.  It did not file 
its first complaint until September 29, 2005.  Therefore, Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.13(2) 
could 
not 
have 
tolled 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations because Coakley first filed a claim for relocation 
benefits under Wis. Stat. §§ 32.19 and 32.195 after the statute 
of limitations had already expired.  In Roadster, Coakley did 
not formally plead that it had a right to relocation benefits 
No. 
2006AP2292   
 
18 
 
pursuant to §§ 32.19 and 32.195.  Therefore, the Roadster case 
does not toll the time for Coakley to bring its action under 
§§ 32.20, 32.19 and 32.195.   
IV 
¶31 We conclude that the two-year statute of limitations 
in Wis. Stat. § 32.20 bars Coakley's claims for relocation 
benefits because although the City took physical possession of 
the relevant property on October 14, 2002, Coakley did not file 
a notice of claim until December 13, 2004, and it first filed a 
formal complaint on September 29, 2005.  We further conclude 
that Wis. Stat. § 893.13(2) does not toll the two-year statute 
of limitations in this case. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2006AP2292.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶32 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   I join 
the majority opinion in all respects.  However, I write 
separately to point out that, had Coakley either pled a defense 
or filed a counterclaim in the Roadster1 matter when the City 
originally sought the writ of assistance in Milwaukee Circuit 
Court, we might view differently the tolling issue presented 
here.  The tolling provisions in Wis. Stat. § 893.13 reference 
Wis. Stat. § 893.14, which provides that the assertion of a 
defense or counterclaim tolls the time limit for commencement of 
an 
action 
"until 
final 
disposition 
of 
the 
defense 
or 
counterclaim."  However, neither party has argued that § 893.14 
applies here; nor has either party provided the court with any 
pleading that reveals that Coakley either pled a defense or 
filed a counterclaim in the Roadster action.   
 
 
                                                 
1 City of Milwaukee v. Roadster LLC, 2003 WI App 131, 265 
Wis. 2d 518, 666 N.W.2d 524. 
No.  2006AP2292.pdr 
 
 
 
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