Case Title: 06/16/05

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96071

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 96071-Agenda 11-May 2004.
ALTERNATE FUELS, INC., Appellee, v. 
DIRECTOR OF THE 
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al., Appellants.\
Opinion filed October 21, 2004.-Modified on 
denial of rehearing June 16, 2005.
 
JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
The primary question in this appeal is whether a business 
which has been issued a violation notice under section 31(a) of the Illinois 
Environmental Protection Act (Act) (415 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2002)) 
for failure to secure a permit as allegedly required by the Act, and then ceases 
operations, may bring a declaratory action to test the validity of the alleged 
violation. Alternate Fuels, Inc. (AFI), filed such an action against the 
Director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (Agency) and the Agency 
itself. The circuit court of St. Clair County determined that the declaratory 
action was justiciable, found that the Act did not require AFI to secure a 
permit, and rejected AFI's claim for attorney fees; the appellate court 
affirmed. 337 Ill. App. 3d 857 (2003). For the following reasons, we affirm the 
appellate court.

BACKGROUND
David Wieties, a former Agency employee, was president of 
Resourceful Environmental Ideas, Inc. (REI), a company located in East St. 
Louis, Illinois, with the principal objective to produce and sell "alternate 
fuel." REI was the predecessor company to AFI. On June 14, 1994, Wieties sent a 
letter to the Agency to determine if AFI's product constituted waste under the 
Act and therefore required an Agency permit. The subject material consisted of 
various types of plastics generated by the shredding of empty agricultural 
chemical containers into chips approximately one inch in size. Prior to 
shredding, a company named Tri-Rinse, Inc., "triple rinsed" the containers 
according to United States Environmental Protection Agency and Department of 
Agriculture guidelines to remove residual agricultural chemicals. AFI would 
transport the resulting chips to Illinois Power for use as fuel at its Baldwin 
Power Station. On August 31, 1994, the Agency responded that all materials 
burned for energy recovery retained their classification as waste under the Act 
and that a facility receiving this material would require a permit from the 
Agency.
Following this response, REI filed an appeal with the 
Illinois Pollution Control Board (Board) on September 29, 1994. The Agency filed 
a motion to dismiss before the Board arguing that the letter was not a "final 
determination." On November 9, 1994, REI filed a motion to withdraw the appeal 
and the Board granted REI's motion.
Illinois Power subsequently requested a revision to its 
operating permit to burn the alternate fuel at the Baldwin plant. The Agency 
denied Illinois Power's application, contending that the alternate fuel was a 
"waste" pursuant to section 3.53 of the Act (415 ILCS 5/3.53 (West 1994)). 
According to the Agency, because the material was a "waste," Illinois Power 
would be functioning as a "pollution control facility" under section 3.32 of the 
Act (415 ILCS 5/3.32 (West 1994)). As a "pollution control facility," Illinois 
Power faced significant hurdles to secure a permit.
As part of the permitting process, a pollution control 
facility must obtain local siting approval. 415 ILCS 5/39.2(a) (West 1994). To 
obtain local siting approval, the county board or the governing body of the 
municipality must approve of the facility according to various criteria listed 
in section 39.2(a) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/39.2(a) (West 1994)). The governing 
body must hold at least one public hearing within 120 days of the application 
(415 ILCS 5/39.2(d) (West 1994)) and must generally take final action on the 
application within 180 days (415 ILCS 5/39.2(e) (West 1994)). Local siting 
approval expires at the end of two calendar years from the date upon which it 
was granted. 415 ILCS 5/39.2(f) (West 1994).
Illinois Power appealed the Agency's rejection of its 
permit application to the Board. The Board's decision, published January 23, 
1997, noted that the subject materials are "empty pesticide containers [which] 
present landfill problems due to their non-degradability" and that "the Illinois 
EPA has determined that the combustion of the subject material, pursuant to the 
above-listed conditions specified in the permit applications, will not result in 
a violation of the Illinois Pollution Control Board rules and regulations." 
Illinois Power Co. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, PCB Nos. 
97-37, 97-36 (January 23, 1997). The Board held, "Here, Illinois Power is simply 
receiving the alternate fuel after it has been processed and transformed by 
Tri-Rinse and using it in its boilers." Illinois Power, PCB Nos. 97-37, 
97-36. The Board noted that the material was "no longer" waste within the 
meaning of the Act. Illinois Power, PCB Nos. 97-37, 97-36. Therefore, 
Illinois Power was not a "pollution control facility," as defined by section 
3.32(a) of the Act, and therefore not required to obtain local siting approval.
Illinois Power, PCB Nos. 97-37, 97-36.
Soon after the Board's decision, Edwin Bakowski, a manager 
of an Agency permit section, prepared a memorandum concerning solid waste(1) permitting requirements for alternative fuel 
processing facilities. The memorandum noted that the Board's decision did not 
address the regulatory status of the alternate fuel prior to receipt by Illinois 
Power. The memorandum raised concerns about "the nuisances and speculative 
accumulation which may occur at alternative fuel processing facilities. The 
market for waste plastics is not very well established and in some instances 
these materials could even have a negative market value. The acceptance of 
unrinsed plastics could also result in the manufacture of unacceptable 
alternative fuel, onsite nuisances or contamination." The memorandum then noted 
that the "alternative fuel processing facilities do not appear to be recycling 
centers" and that the burning of alternative fuel was not recycling. The 
"proposed options" were to "require permits for alternative fuel processing 
facilities as solid waste treatment and transfer station facilities" or "require 
no [Bureau of Land] permits for facilities that only process alternative fuels 
and address problems with these facilities through enforcement."
The memorandum recommended the first option because "the 
permit requirements will provide a proactive approach to eliminate environmental 
problems before they occur by prescribing operating conditions for the facility. 
It should also be noted that it is difficult to enforce against permit exempt 
facilities that have nuisance or speculative accumulation problems."
Also after the Board's decision, Illinois Power and AFI, 
formerly REI, entered into a contract for the sale of alternate fuel, which 
consisted of the chips from the plastic containers with scrap wood as an 
additional component. AFI also began contracting with suppliers. Included in the 
record is an unsigned, undated form contract between AFI and a generic supplier. 
Under the agreement, the suppliers would make arrangements and bear all costs of 
transporting nonhazardous fuel-grade material, including wood and plastic, to 
AFI's facility. AFI would bill the supplier for receipt of the materials based 
on varying unit prices for the differing materials. Additionally, AFI warranted 
that it would comply with all laws and regulations and "in the event that the 
regulatory conditions under which any of the aforesaid requirements or permits 
change during the terms of this Agreement, and are beyond the control of AFI, 
AFI shall be released from its obligation to receive the volumes of Supplier's 
material *** [and] that AFI shall rigorously pursue the necessary modifications 
to its permit status so that it may continue to perform its obligations under 
this Agreement."
Four agency representatives inspected AFI's facility on 
May 7, 1998, and May 22, 1998, including Bakowski and Kenneth Mensing, an Agency 
manager who formerly supervised Wieties at the Agency. According to Bakowski, 
the facility was "not a nuisance" and Wieties "appeared to have done his 
homework. He related a lot of this to hazardous waste and what he thought 
U.S.E.P.A. meant and things like that." A May 8, 1998, inspection report 
described the facility as "clean and orderly" and "mainly an area to store 
plastic materials before and after granulation." An additional inspection on May 
22, 1998, yielded similar results.
In his deposition, Mensing described AFI's facility as a 
"big metal warehouse building" with a "relatively small piece of equipment that 
was a granulator or a shredder which was the only piece of equipment there to 
process the incoming material." The facility was a "clean looking area" with 
various piles or boxes of materials segregated by supplier or plastic type. 
Mensing prepared a memorandum of the visit, but his observations "didn't quite 
fit into, you know, a prepared type of checklist that we had." Mensing 
explained, "We don't really have a non-hazardous waste storage checklist." He 
did not mention any permitting violation in his memo. According to Mensing's 
memorandum, Wieties was "not opposed to a 'recycling permit' and would like to 
work with the Agency to develop and implement a new recycling permit system." 
Mensing stated, "If the health and safety *** were a non-issue, that a permit 
would still be required simply by the verbiage of the statute, that if this is a 
facility that's storing-you know, treating, storing, or disposing of it, then, 
you know, a permit should be obtained" regardless of whether the facility poses 
any sort of environmental threat. Mensing stated that he did not see "anything 
operationally that caused me any problem."
On July 8, 1998, the Agency issued a violation notice to 
AFI pursuant to section 31(a)(1) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/31(a)(1) (West 1998)). 
Under section 31 of the Act, an alleged violator may work with the Agency to 
correct violations without the involvement of a prosecuting authority such as 
the Attorney General or a State's Attorney. 415 ILCS 5/31 et seq. (West 
1998). Within 180 days of discovery of an alleged violation, the Agency shall 
serve a violation notice upon the alleged violator and a written response shall 
be required. 415 ILCS 5/31(a) (West 1998). This notice of violation initiates a 
series of opportunities for the alleged violator to meet with the Agency and 
resolve the issue. 415 ILCS 5/31(a) (West 1998). If the parties do not resolve 
the issue, section 31(b) requires that the Agency provide the alleged violator 
with notice of its intention to pursue legal action and an opportunity to meet 
prior to referral to the Attorney General or a State's Attorney. 415 ILCS 
5/31(b) (West 1998). If disagreements remain, the Attorney General or a State's 
Attorney shall serve a formal complaint upon the alleged violator. 415 ILCS 
5/31(c) (West 1998).
The instant section 31(a) notice alleged a violation of 
section 21(d)(1) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/21(d)(1) (West 1998)) because "[w]aste 
was stored and treated without a permit granted by the Illinois EPA." It also 
alleged a violation of section 21(e) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/21(e) (West 1998)) 
because "[w]aste was stored and treated at [AFI's] facility which does not meet 
the requirements of the Act and regulations thereunder." The notice stated, "Due 
to the nature and seriousness of the violations cited, please be advised that 
resolution of the violations may require the involvement of a prosecutorial 
authority for purposes that may include, among others, the imposition of 
statutory penalties." The suggested resolution was the submission of a permit 
application for a waste storage and waste treatment operation to the Agency's 
Bureau of Land Permit Section by September 30, 1998. To obtain a permit, AFI was 
required to obtain local siting approval pursuant to the Act. 415 ILCS 5/39.2 
(West 1998).
According to Wieties' affidavit, due to the issuance of 
the violation notice, AFI's primary investors withdrew their support, and its 
primary supplier withdrew from the agreement in July 1998. AFI thereafter halted 
its manufacturing operations.
The parties subsequently met on September 15, 1998. The 
Agency advised Wieties it deemed the alternate fuel materials as "waste" under 
section 3.53 of the Act (415 ILCS 5/3.53 (West 1998)). The Act defines "waste," 
in pertinent part, as follows: " 'Waste' means any garbage, sludge from a waste 
treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility 
or other discarded material ***." 415 ILCS 5/3.53 (West 1998). The Agency 
interpreted "discarded material" to refer to any material "which is not being 
utilized for its original purpose." As AFI was not utilizing the alternate fuel 
material in a manner which was consistent with its original use by the supplier, 
it was the Agency's position that such material had been "discarded" and was, 
therefore, a "waste." Wieties and the Agency were not able to resolve the 
matter.
AFI filed a two-count complaint on November 2, 1998, 
naming as defendants Mary A. Gade, Director of the Agency, and the Agency.(2) In count I, plaintiff requested a declaration 
that the materials used by AFI in its manufacturing process were not "wastes" 
because the materials were not discarded. Count II alleged that AFI was 
statutorily entitled to recoup all reasonable costs, including attorney fees, 
because the Agency's interpretation of "discarded material" constituted 
unauthorized rulemaking under the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 
100/1-1 et seq. (West 1998)). The complaint also alleged that an actual 
controversy existed and that the declaratory judgment statute vested the court 
with the power to hear the dispute. 735 ILCS 5/2-701 (West 1998). The Agency 
moved to dismiss, arguing that there was no actual controversy ripe for 
determination because AFI failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. The 
circuit court denied the motion to dismiss. The Agency then filed an answer, 
along with affirmative defenses in which it denied that the trial court had 
jurisdiction to hear the claim and that the complaint failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted.
AFI filed a motion for summary judgment against the 
Director and the Agency on count I. The trial court ruled that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact and granted AFI's motion, finding that the 
materials were not "wastes" because they were not discarded. Thereafter, the 
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on count II. The trial court 
granted the Agency's motion as to count II and denied plaintiff's motion. Both 
parties appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the rulings of the trial 
court. 337 Ill. App. 3d 857 (2003). We granted the Agency's petition for leave 
to appeal on count I. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. In its brief, AFI requested 
cross-relief, requesting that we reverse the appellate court and the trial court 
on count II. 155 Ill. 2d Rs. 315(g), 318(a). Because this appeal from a summary 
judgment ruling solely presents issues of law, our review is de novo.
First Bank of America, Rockford, N.A. v. Netsch, 166 Ill. 2d 165, 176 
(1995).

ANALYSIS
The Agency raises two issues on appeal: (1) this case was 
not justiciable because the declaratory judgment action was not ripe for review 
until the Agency had concluded its investigatory process, and (2) the Agency 
properly defined the materials processed by AFI as "discarded materials" which 
constituted "waste," thus requiring AFI to secure a permit before producing the 
alternate fuel. In its cross-appeal, AFI contends that the Agency's 
interpretation of "waste" and its subsequent application of the Act constituted 
impermissible rulemaking, thus making the state liable for AFI's reasonable 
costs in the instant action, including attorney fees.

Justiciability
The Agency argues that AFI's claim for declaratory 
judgment is not justiciable. The Agency specifically contends that because the 
Agency had not yet finished its investigative process under section 31 of the 
Act (415 ILCS 5/31 (West 2002)) the matter was not ripe for review. AFI responds 
that the matter is ripe for review because the Agency had completed its 
investigation, while AFI was forced to halt its operations and was left with no 
other avenue to resolve the dispute. We agree with AFI.
" 'Concepts of justiciability have been developed to 
identify appropriate occasions for judicial action. *** The central concepts 
often are elaborated into more specific categories of justiciability-advisory 
opinions, feigned and collusive cases, standing, ripeness, mootness, political 
questions, and administrative questions.' " Black's Law Dictionary 882 (8th ed. 
2004), quoting 13 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure §3529, at 278-79 (2d 
ed. 1984). Section 2-701 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-701 (West 
2002)) sets forth the general requirements of a justiciable declaratory action 
under Illinois law. This section provides that a court
"may, in cases of actual controversy, making binding 
declarations of rights, having the force of final judgments, whether or not any 
consequential relief is or could be claimed, including the determination, at the 
instance of anyone interested in the controversy, of the construction of any 
statute *** or other governmental regulation *** and a declaration of the rights 
of the parties interested. *** The court shall refuse to enter a declaratory 
judgment or order, if it appears that the judgment or order, would not terminate 
the controversy or some part thereof, giving rise to the proceeding." 735 ILCS 
5/2-701(a) (West 2002).
The declaratory judgment statute must be liberally 
construed and should not be restricted by unduly technical interpretations. 
Netsch, 166 Ill. 2d  at 174. This remedy is used to afford security and 
relief to the parties so as to avoid potential litigation. See, e.g.,
Netsch, 166 Ill. 2d  at 174. "Our courts have recognized that '[t]he 
mere existence of a claim, assertion or challenge to plaintiff's legal 
interests, *** which cast[s] doubt, insecurity, and uncertainty upon plaintiff's 
rights or status, damages plaintiff's pecuniary or material interests and 
establishes a condition of justiciability.' " Netsch, 166 Ill. 2d  at 
175, quoting Roberts v. Roberts, 90 Ill. App. 2d 184, 187 (1967).
Here, in the context of a challenge to an administrative 
action, we specifically consider ripeness, a component of justiciability. The 
ripeness doctrine is designed " ' "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of 
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in arbitrary disagreements 
over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial 
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its 
effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." ' " National 
Marine, Inc. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 159 Ill. 2d 381, 388 (1994), quoting Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor, 
68 Ill. 2d 540, 546 (1977), quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 
387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681, 691, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1515 (1967); see 
also National Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Department of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1017, 1024, 123 S. Ct. 2026, 2030 (2003). It is 
well settled that " '[t]he problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring 
us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the 
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.' " National 
Marine, 159 Ill. 2d  at 389, quoting Abbott Laboratories, 
387 U.S.  at 149, 18 L. Ed. 2d  at 691, 87 S. Ct.  at 1515; see also National 
Park Hospitality Ass'n, 538 U.S.  at 808, 155 L. Ed. 2d  at 1024, 123 S. Ct. 
at 2030.
As to the first factor, the issue presented is fit for a 
judicial decision at this time. In contention is the correct interpretation of 
"discarded material" in section 3.535 of the Act (415 ILCS 5/3.535 (West 2002)). 
Both sides have approached this matter in terms of statutory construction, and 
there is no dispute over the facts. Wieties' discussions with the Agency began 
in 1994 and involved a number of Agency employees over time. The record clearly 
demonstrates that the Agency had finished its investigation and had decided AFI 
stored and treated waste, requiring local siting approval and a waste permit, a 
stance that has not changed. The Agency performed two inspections of the 
facility in May 1998. Agency personnel continued their internal discussions 
regarding AFI and the waste issue, which then culminated in a violation notice. 
After the Agency issued the violation notice, Wieties responded to and met with 
the Agency in an unsuccessful attempt at resolving the stalemate concerning the 
definition of waste. As applied specifically to AFI, the Agency has little 
incentive to change its definition of "waste" as AFI has closed shop, obviating 
the need for a permit and potential prosecution. Thus, there is no prospect for 
further factual development to aid judicial resolution.
As to the second factor, the hardship upon AFI is more 
than sufficient to render judicial review appropriate at this stage. On June 14, 
1994, Wieties, on behalf of REI, sent a letter to the Agency for a waste 
determination. The Agency responded that REI was treating "waste." After Wieties' 
company filed an appeal before the Board, the Agency filed a motion to dismiss 
contending that the response letter was not a "final" decision. Thereafter, 
Wieties' company filed a motion to withdraw. The legal question with regard to 
Wieties' company, now named AFI, remained unanswered through 1998, when Wieties' 
meetings with the Agency continued unsuccessfully. The Agency's interpretation 
put AFI into a dilemma: secure an allegedly unnecessary permit with the 
requisite local siting approval, take a potentially more costly alternative of 
risking serious penalties by continuing and waiting for the ax of Agency 
prosecution to fall, or discontinue operations. When AFI chose the third option, 
the Agency had no incentive to refer the matter for prosecution because there 
was no longer a continuing violation. Indeed, the Agency has given no indication 
that it wished to issue a section 31(b) notice, much less prosecute the matter. 
We also note that AFI has not sought relief in this action to prevent the Agency 
from doing so.
The practical effect upon AFI of failing to allow judicial 
review at this time would be to foreclose all access to the courts for a 
determination of the legal question of whether AFI was processing "waste" under 
the Act-a question which Wieties has been pursuing for over 10 years. The 
parties do not dispute that AFI is a viable business entity which was directly 
affected by Agency action. The Agency's decision affected AFI in a concrete way; 
the notice of violation caused AFI to lose financing, lose its suppliers, and 
halt operations, thereby ending AFI's agreement with Illinois Power. Thus, AFI 
has already felt a direct and palpable injury and has an immediate financial 
stake in the resolution of the instant action.
We find the primary authority proffered by the Agency, 
National Marine, Inc. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 159 Ill. 2d 381 (1994), distinguishable. In National Marine, the Agency issued a 
notice informing the plaintiff that it could be potentially liable for a 
"release or a substantial threat of a release of a hazardous substance on the 
property" pursuant to section 4(q) of the Act. National Marine, 159 Ill. 2d  at 383; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 111½, par. 1004(q). This notice was 
based on the Agency finding "buried drums filled with unknown materials, buried 
tires and wood which had apparently been used as fill material, black-stained 
soil near an underground storage tank riser *** and an abandoned well house."
National Marine, 159 Ill. 2d  at 384. Plaintiff sought a declaration 
that section 4(q) of the Act was unconstitutional, an injunction enjoining the 
Agency from enforcement arising from the section 4(q) notice or relying on the 
factual findings found in the notice, and the issuance of a writ of 
certiorari to review the Agency's record and reverse and quash the section 
4(q) notice. National Marine, 159 Ill. 2d  at 384.
This court noted that "the complaint, in essence, sought 
to obtain judicial review of the Agency's issuance of the 4(q) notice prior to 
the Agency's initiation of cost-recovery/enforcement proceedings before the 
Pollution Control Board (Board) or the circuit court." National Marine, 
159 Ill. 2d  at 385. We found, "at this preliminary stage in the administrative 
process, it is not clear whether the Agency will even initiate a 
cost-recovery/enforcement proceeding against plaintiff before one of these 
bodies. Clearly, under the circumstances, plaintiff's complaint is premature."
National Marine, 159 Ill. 2d  at 390-91. We reasoned:
"To allow preenforcement judicial review of the Agency's 
mere issuance of the 4(q) notice would undermine the statutory scheme of the 
Act. Affording plaintiff judicial review at this preliminary stage in the 
administrative process could potentially open the door and enable parties 'to 
litigate separately every alleged error committed by an agency in the course of 
the administrative proceedings.' [Citations.]
In addition, preenforcement judicial review of the 
issuance of a 4(q) notice would substantially thwart the legislative purpose of 
providing expedient containment of environmental pollution. Allowing this type 
of judicial review prior to the final stage of the administrative process would 
substantially delay the quick, effective response action called for by the Act. 
The clean-up process could be delayed by months or even years at great cost to 
the environment and public health and safety. Such a result will not be 
countenanced by this court." National Marine, 159 Ill. 2d  at 392-93.
The concerns of National Marine are not evident 
in the record. The instant case does not "substantially delay the quick, 
effective response called for by the Act." The record contains no allegations of 
any environmental contamination. The salient hazard to the environment caused by 
the plastics exists only in the actual burning of the plastics, for which 
Illinois Power has received a permit, and the nonbiodegradable character of the 
agricultural containers, which AFI is potentially alleviating by processing the 
containers into alternate fuel. Furthermore, the accumulation of materials was 
only "speculative." After the Agency issued the notice of violations, AFI 
discontinued its operations and all further manufacturing of the alternate fuel 
ceased. This is a case where, as Mensing stated, the environmental hazard is a 
nonissue. Instead it involves only the "verbiage" of the statute. Indeed, by 
issuing a violation notice which led to the subsequent halting of operations, 
the Agency has been successful in abating any potential nuisance. It is 
difficult to conceive of a benefit to the environment of a continued 
investigation of a facility where inspections revealed no danger to the 
environment and where all operations had ceased. Thus, there was no thwarting of 
the Act's purpose to provide expedient containment of environmental risks.
Additionally, the present relief sought is not similar to 
that sought in National Marine. AFI did not seek the issuance of a writ 
of certiorari to review the Agency's record or to quash the section 
31(a) notice. AFI sought nothing precluding the Agency from continuing its 
investigation, issuing a notice under section 31(b), or referring the matter to 
a prosecutorial authority under section 31(c). Nevertheless, nothing in the 
record demonstrates that the Agency sought to further pursue its investigation 
of AFI. Additionally, nothing prevented the Agency from continuing its 
investigation under the Act which could have culminated in a counterclaim in the 
present action. AFI alleges that the only error the Agency committed was in its 
interpretation of the Act. Thus, the present action is not "preenforcement," as 
there is no allegation that AFI sought to evade Agency action, nor is there any 
indication that the Agency wished to refer a matter concerning a discontinued 
operation to a prosecutorial authority.
Further, unlike in National Marine, the Agency's 
action here constituted more than a merely preliminary step prior to an eventual 
final Agency action. As stated, once AFI discontinued its operations, there was 
no further incentive for the Agency to refer the matter for enforcement over a 
dispute concerning only statutory interpretation. Unlike in National Marine, 
there was not any alleged environmental contamination. Conceivably, there being 
no continuing production, AFI would have to wait until the Agency filed a 
complaint based upon a facility that was no longer in operation. As Mensing 
stated, it was "speculation" that the Agency would have filed a complaint. As 
stated by the Agency in its brief, AFI's declaratory judgment action was filed 
"at a time when it was unclear whether the Agency, through a State's Attorney or 
the Attorney General, would ever initiate an enforcement proceeding." 
Furthermore, Mensing stated in his deposition that "if he had just stopped doing 
it, I don't know if we would have pursued any further enforcement." It is not 
necessary for AFI to expose itself to further liability by continuing the 
disputed operations for the Agency to pursue administrative remedies entirely in 
its control until the Agency had deemed it "final."
Under the circumstances of this case, where Wieties has 
been attempting to get a formal determination of the definition of "waste" under 
the Act for now over 10 years, where there are no allegations of environmental 
hazard presented in the record, where the Agency had essentially obtained 
compliance with the Act, where the declaratory action did not additionally seek 
to enjoin the Agency from pursuing further action, where AFI had no further 
administrative recourse but to wait for prosecution on its halted operations, 
and where the resolution of the case depends entirely on a statutory 
interpretation, the concerns addressed in National Marine are not 
present. We therefore find that the record reveals an actual controversy resting 
on the parties' conflicting interpretations of the Act which affected 
plaintiff's pecuniary interest. This matter is ripe for review and thus 
justiciable.

Definition of "Discarded Material"
The Agency contends on appeal that AFI was receiving and 
processing "discarded material" within the plain meaning of the definition of 
"waste" within section 3.535 of the Act (415 ILCS 5/3.535 (West 2002)), thus 
requiring AFI to secure a permit. The Agency further argues that the term 
"discarded" should be construed from the perspective of the supplier, such that 
a material is considered discarded if it is used for purpose other than that 
originally intended by the generator of the material. AFI responds that when the 
phrase "discarded material" is read in conjunction with section 3.380 of the Act 
(415 ILCS 5/3.380 (West 2002)), it is apparent that the materials it receives 
are not "discarded" and, therefore, are not "waste" requiring a permit. The 
parties agree the Act does not define the term "discarded."(3)
The fundamental principle of statutory construction is to 
ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Michigan Avenue 
National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). The 
language of the statute is the most reliable indicator of the legislature's 
objectives in enacting a particular law. Hawes v. Luhr Brothers, Inc., 
212 Ill. 2d 93, 105 (2004). We give statutory language its plain and ordinary 
meaning, and, where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the 
statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction. Michigan 
Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504. We must not depart from the plain 
language of the Act by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions 
that conflict with the express legislative intent. Hawes v. Luhr Brothers, 
Inc., 212 Ill. 2d  at 105. Moreover, words and phrases should not be 
construed in isolation, but must be interpreted in light of other relevant 
provisions of the statute. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  
at 504.
Section 21 of the Act lists prohibited acts, stating, in 
relevant part, "[n]o person shall: *** (d) Conduct any waste-storage, 
waste-treatment, or waste-disposal operation: (1) without a permit granted by 
the Agency ***. *** (e) Dispose, treat, store or abandon any waste, or transport 
any waste into this State for disposal, treatment, storage or abandonment, 
except at a site or facility which meets the requirements of this Act and of 
regulations and standards thereunder." 415 ILCS 5/21 (West 2002).
The Agency issued a violation notice alleging a violation 
of section 21(d)(1) because "[w]aste was stored and treated without a permit 
granted by the Illinois EPA." It also alleged a violation of section 21(e) of 
the Act because "[w]aste was stored and treated at [AFI's] facility which does 
not meet the requirements of the Act and regulations thereunder."
The Act defines "waste" as:
"any garbage, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water 
supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility or other discarded 
material, including solid, liquid, semi-solid, or contained gaseous 
material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining and agricultural 
operations, and from community activities ***." (Emphasis added.) 415 ILCS 
5/3.535 (West 2002).
In this section, the Act uses the term "discarded" only as 
a modifier to the term "material." The Act does not elaborate as to who or what 
subject exactly performed the discard action. Rather, the focus remains on the 
object: "material." Given that the Act does not specify the subject, the 
Agency's proposition-that the modifier "discarded" should be construed from the 
perspective of the supplier-is not unequivocally erroneous. However, a look at 
another pertinent portion of the Act demonstrates that the Act retains its focus 
on the "material" itself as it passes between entities.
The Act uses the term "discarded" in section 3.380 of the 
Act (415 ILCS 5/3.380 (West 2002)), which reads as follows:
" 'Recycling, reclamation or reuse' means a method, 
technique, or process designed to remove any contaminant from waste so as to 
render such waste reusable, or any process by which materials that 
would otherwise be disposed of or discarded are collected, separated or 
processed and returned to the economic mainstream in the form of raw materials 
or products." (Emphasis added.) 415 ILCS 5/3.380 (West 2002).
Under this phrasing the legislature has categorized items 
that may be recycled, reclaimed, or reused into two main categories: (1) "waste" 
from which contaminants may be removed and (2) "materials." 415 ILCS 5/3.380 
(West 2002). "Materials" are further subdivided into those that are "discarded" 
and those "materials that would otherwise be disposed of or discarded [which] 
are collected, separated or processed and returned to the economic mainstream in 
the form of raw materials or products." 415 ILCS 5/3.380 (West 2002). While the 
legislature has not defined "discarded materials," the legislature has mentioned 
what it is not: "materials that would otherwise be disposed of or discarded 
[which] are *** returned to the economic mainstream in the form of raw materials 
and products." Thus, materials are "discarded" unless they are returned to the 
economic mainstream.
Here, AFI was not removing contaminants from the 
triple-rinsed containers or from wood. The contaminants had been removed by the 
triple-rinsing process before they arrived at AFI's facility and there is no 
indication in the record of proposed removal of contaminants from wood. 
Therefore, the solid at issue is a "material." We next consider whether this 
material was otherwise discarded or if it was "collected, separated or processed 
and returned to the economic mainstream in the form of raw materials or 
products." AFI processes the plastic containers and returns the materials as a 
"product" into the economic mainstream, as demonstrated by the contract with 
Illinois Power. Under the Act, the materials are, therefore, not discarded.
The comparison of AFI's facility to the statutory 
definitions for "recycling center" and "pollution control facility" reinforces 
this interpretation. Under the Act, " 'recycling center' means a site or 
facility that accepts only segregated, nonhazardous, nonspecial, homogenous, 
nonputrescible materials, such as dry paper, glass, cans or plastics, for 
subsequent use in the secondary materials market." 415 ILCS 5/3.375 (West 2002).
By contrast, a "pollution control facility" is "any waste 
storage site, sanitary landfill, waste disposal site, waste transfer station, 
waste treatment facility, or waste incinerator. This includes sewers, sewage 
treatment plants, and any other facilities owned or operated by sanitary 
districts organized under the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District Act." 415 
ILCS 5/3.330 (West 2002). The aim of AFI was not to store, landfill, dispose, 
transfer, treat, or incinerate waste. Rather, AFI shreds the plastic materials 
that have already been "triple rinsed" by Tri-Rinse, Inc., and sells the chips 
to Illinois Power. While AFI's facility does not neatly fit into the category of 
"recycling center" because it does more than simply "accept" materials, AFI's 
facility retained more characteristics of a "recycling center" than a "pollution 
control facility," chiefly because it handles "materials" rather than "waste."
In its petition for rehearing, the Agency argues that our 
interpretation here conflicts with the definition of "recycling" in Illinois 
Solid Waste Management Act (415 ILCS 20/1 et seq. (West 2002)). The 
Agency specifically refers to the definition of "recycling" in section 2.1, 
which provides:
"[T]he process by which solid waste is collected, 
separated and processed for reuse as either a raw material or a product which 
itself is subject to recycling, but does not include the combustion of waste for 
energy recovery or volume reduction." 415 ILCS 20/2.1 (West 2002).
This provision is inapplicable. As is obvious from its 
title, the Illinois Solid Waste Management Act governs the disposal of "solid 
waste." 415 ILCS 20/1 (West 2002). Though the plastic chips are eventually sold 
to Illinois Power for "energy recovery," we have held that AFI is not processing 
"waste" under the Act. Thus, the process creating the chips does not constitute 
"recycling" under this definition. Furthermore, our holding that AFI's facility 
is not a "pollution control center" is not to be read as a determination that 
the facility is a "recycling center" under the Act. Therefore, our 
interpretation of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act is consistent with 
the Illinois Solid Waste Management Act.
We therefore reject the Agency's contention that 
"discarded" is defined solely from the viewpoint of the supplier in that a 
material is putatively "discarded" as "any material which is not being utilized 
for its intended purpose" of the generator. There is nothing in the statute 
which would dictate this definition. Rather, the Act contemplates that materials 
that may otherwise be discarded by the supplier may be diverted from becoming 
waste and returned to the economic mainstream.
On rehearing, the Agency contends that this court's 
interpretation of the Act is out of step with a series of federal court 
decisions construing the term "discarded material" contained in a similar 
definition of "solid waste" in the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act of 1976 (RCRA). 42 U.S.C. §6901 et seq. (2000); 42 U.S.C. §6903(27) 
(2000) (defining "solid waste"). We disagree and find our application of the Act 
to AFI's facility is in harmony with the RCRA.
We initially note that under basic rules of statutory 
construction, we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, and, 
where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute without 
resort to further aids of statutory construction. Michigan Avenue National 
Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504. Because we find that the plain language of the 
Act does not require AFI to secure a permit, a review of decisions construing a 
similar statute is not necessary. Nevertheless, a review of the RCRA definition 
cited by the Agency and of cases construing it does not persuade us that a 
different result is warranted.
The RCRA establishes a regulatory structure overseeing the 
safe treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste. American Petroleum 
Institute v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 906 F.2d 729, 
732 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Congress' "overriding concern" in enacting the RCRA was to 
establish the framework for a national system to insure the safe management of 
hazardous wastes. United States v. ILCO, Inc., 996 F.2d 1126 (11th Cir. 
1993). Before the material can be a "hazardous waste" subject to the RCRA, it 
must first meet the RCRA's definition of "solid waste," as well as additional 
requirements pertaining to the hazardous nature of the waste. 42 U.S.C. §6903(5) 
(2000) (defining "hazardous waste"). Under the RCRA, the term "solid waste"
"means any garbage, refuse, sludge *** and other discarded 
material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material 
resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and 
from community activities ***." 42 U.S.C. §6903(27) (2000).
While this provision is virtually identical to the Act's 
definition in section 3.535 (415 ILCS 5/3.535 (West 2002)), the Agency's 
argument ignores our reliance on section 3.380 of the Act to determine whether 
the material at issue was "discarded material." 415 ILCS 5/3.380 (West 2002). 
Accordingly, the Agency's present argument on rehearing suffers from the failure 
to cite a parallel provision of the RCRA which would similarly guide our 
interpretation of the term "discarded material."
Furthermore, the RCRA grants the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) enforcement powers and authority to 
promulgate regulations establishing a comprehensive management system for 
hazardous wastes. 42 U.S.C. §§6921 through 6939b (2000). For instance, the USEPA 
has promulgated regulations under the RCRA, which further define the phrase 
"solid waste" as any "discarded material" and it further defines "discarded 
material." 40 C.F.R. Pt. 261.2 (2003). Notably, this definition of "discarded 
material" includes certain materials which are "[b]urned to recover energy" or 
are "[u]sed to produce a fuel or are otherwise contained in fuels (in which case 
the fuel itself remains a solid waste)." 40 C.F.R. Pt. 261.2(c)(2) (2003). 
Moreover, the USEPA has also expressly explained that this regulatory definition 
applies only to wastes that are hazardous. Section 261.1(b)(1) states:
"The definition of solid waste contained in this part 
applies only to wastes that also are hazardous for purposes of the regulations 
implementing subtitle C of the RCRA. For example, it does not apply to materials 
(such as non-hazardous scrap, paper, textiles, or rubber) that are not otherwise 
hazardous and that are recycled." 40 C.F.R. §261.1(b)(1) (2003).
Thus, the RCRA definition of "solid waste" is 
distinguishable from the case at bar because of it's a priori 
reflection of Congress' "overriding concern" with hazardous materials. There is 
no dispute that the materials that AFI processes are not "hazardous." When the 
plastic containers arrive at AFI's facility they have already been 
"triple-rinsed" by Tri-Rinse, Inc. Thereafter, the plastic containers are 
shredded into chips and then sold to Illinois Power. The remaining potential 
danger posed by the plastic derives from the burning of the plastic. However, 
that concern has been addressed by the Agency's permit issuance to Illinois 
Power.
The Agency's proffered cases are also inapposite because 
of their procedural posture. In each case, the courts reviewed USEPA regulations 
or orders that were made pursuant to the statute regarding facilities that 
handled hazardous wastes. Owen Electric Steel Co. of South Carolina, Inc. v. 
Browner, 37 F.3d 146 (4th Cir. 1994) (reviewing USEPA order concerning 
whether a slag processing area within a facility that treated, stored, or 
disposed of hazardous waste was a solid waste management unit); United 
States v. ILCO, Inc., 996 F.2d 1126 (11th Cir. 1993) (reviewing a USEPA 
regulation as applied to smelting of spent batteries to produce lead ingots 
which produced several specific hazardous wastes); American Mining Congress 
v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 907 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 
1990) (reviewing USEPA rule relisting as hazardous six wastes generated from 
metal smelting operation); American Petroleum Institute v. United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 906 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reviewing 
USEPA rule exempting the slag residues that result from the treatment of "KO61" 
in zinc smelters from the RCRA's restrictions on land disposal of hazardous 
wastes); American Mining Congress v. United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reviewing USEPA regulation that 
amended the definition of "solid waste" to establish and define the agency's 
authority to regulate secondary petroleum and mining materials reused within an 
industry's ongoing production process). In each case, the USEPA argued that its 
specific interpretation was entitled to deference under a Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984) analysis. In short, the courts determined if the 
USEPA regulations or orders were a "permissible" or "reasonable" construction of 
the definition of "discarded" under the RCRA which were entitled to deference 
under Chevron. Owen Electric Steel Co., 37 F.3d  at 150; 
ILCO, 996 F.2d  at 1130; American Mining Congress, 907 F.2d  at 
1186; American Petroleum Institute, 906 F.2d  at 740; American 
Mining Congress, 824 F.2d  at 1182. In contrast to the federal cases, the 
Agency does not argue that its interpretation of "discarded material" in this 
litigation is entitled to the same deference under the Chevron 
analysis. Furthermore, the Agency points to no regulation, federal or otherwise, 
that further defines "discarded materials" which would apply to the present 
nonhazardous material. Therefore, these cases are distinguishable.
We note that this may not be the final word on whether 
this type of industry may remain outside of the Agency's purview. As AFI's 
counsel stated at oral argument before this court, the Agency may deem this 
industry worthy of regulation through a properly promulgated regulation which 
further defines "discarded materials." Until such a clarifying regulation is in 
place, the plain meaning of the Act does not dictate that the present materials 
are "discarded" and therefore "waste." Hence, we find that AFI is not a 
"pollution control facility" requiring a permit which would further require 
local siting approval.

Attorney Fees
In its cross-appeal, AFI contends that the Agency's 
interpretation of "waste" constituted impermissible rulemaking, thus making the 
state liable for AFI's attorney fees in the instant action. The Agency responds 
that it was merely interpreting the statute as it applied to this particular 
case, rather than engaging in any formal rulemaking. We agree with the Agency.
Section 10-55(c) of the Illinois Administrative Procedure 
Act (5 ILCS 100/10-55(c) (West 2002)) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"In any case in which a party has any administrative rule 
invalidated by a court for any reason, including but not limited to the agency's 
exceeding its statutory authority or the agency's failure to follow statutory 
procedures in the adoption of the rule, the court shall award the party bringing 
the action the reasonable expenses of the litigation, including reasonable 
attorney's fees." 5 ILCS 100/10-55(c) (West 2002).
The Administrative Procedure Act further includes the 
following definition of a "rule":
" 'Rule' means each agency statement of general 
applicability that implements, applies, interprets, or prescribes law or policy, 
but does not include (I) statements concerning only the internal management of 
an agency and not affecting private rights or procedures available to persons or 
entities outside the agency, (ii) informal advisory rulings issued under Section 
5-150, (iii) intra-agency memoranda, (iv) the prescription of standardized 
forms, or (v) documents prepared or filed or actions taken by the Legislative 
Reference Bureau under Section 5.04 of the Legislative Reference Bureau Act. 5 
ILCS 100/1-70 (West 2002).
AFI has failed to demonstrate that the Agency's 
interpretation of "discarded material" as "any material which is not being 
utilized for its intended purpose" is "a statement of general applicability." 
AFI cites intraagency memoranda, and remarks taken from the depositions of Ed 
Bakowski and Kenneth Mensing that this interpretation was to provide "guidance" 
to the regulated community. Such statements do not affect private rights or 
procedures available to specific entities outside the Agency. 5 ILCS 100/1-70(I) 
(West 2002). AFI points only to the deposition testimony of Kenneth Mensing 
which states that a violation notice was issued to one business other than AFI, 
using the same interpretation of "discarded material." Mensing stated that this 
business elected to secure a permit rather than challenge the violation notice. 
However, further details of the Agency's application of this interpretation to 
this business are not available in the record. Given the paucity of information 
pertaining to the second business, as well as the lack of any information in the 
record concerning Agency action pertaining to the business community at large, 
we find the record is devoid of any indication that the Agency's interpretation 
of "discarded material" was a statement of general applicability.
Additionally, nowhere in the record has AFI demonstrated 
that the Agency exceeded its statutory authority in merely interpreting the Act 
and issuing a notice of violations premised upon that interpretation, nor could 
it. The Agency here was interpreting a statutory term, "discarded material," 
based on a particular set of facts, and it was entitled to do so. We further 
note that this interpretation was not manifestly erroneous, as the Board in the
Illinois Power decision (Illinois Power Co. v. Illinois 
Environmental Protection Agency, PCB Nos. 97-37, 97-36 (January 23, 1997)) 
noted that the material was "no longer" waste by the time it arrived at the 
Baldwin Power Plant. While the Agency's interpretation of the Act was ultimately 
incorrect, no statutory provision prevents the Agency from making a mere 
interpretation.

CONCLUSION
We find that plaintiff's claim was justiciable, that AFI 
was not processing "waste" in the form of "discarded material," and that AFI is 
not entitled to attorney fees because the Agency's interpretation was not one of 
"general application." Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court's judgment 
affirming the trial court's granting of summary judgment for plaintiff on count 
I and for defendant on count II.



Appellate court judgment affirmed.



JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
I express no opinion on the majority's resolution of the 
underlying issues of this case, because I do not agree with the threshold 
conclusion that we should be considering the case at all. Although the 
majority's reasoning to the contrary is not without some sympathetic appeal, I 
do not believe that the instant action is ripe.
The facts which I consider to be pertinent to the analysis 
may be stated succinctly. (1) AFI started up its operation. (2) The Illinois 
Environmental Protection Agency (Agency) issued AFI a "violation notice," under 
section 31(a) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/31(a) (West 1994)), in which the Agency 
alleged that AFI was treating and storing "waste" without a permit. (3) AFI 
voluntarily ceased its operations. (4) AFI filed the instant declaratory 
judgment action in the circuit court, arguing that the materials in question 
were not waste and requesting that the circuit court enter an order stating that 
"the allegation stated in the above-described violation notice issued to [AFI] 
are [sic] contrary to the law."
As the majority acknowledges, a section 31(a) violation 
notice carries no legal repercussions. For the Agency to have attempted to hold 
AFI liable for its alleged violation of law, the Agency would have had to issue 
AFI a notice of its intent to pursue legal action under section 31(b) (415 ILCS 
5/31(b) (West 1994)) and thereafter referred the case to the Attorney General or 
State's Attorney under section 31(c) (415 ILCS 5/31(c) (West 1994)). The 
Attorney General or State's Attorney would have had to file a formal complaint 
against AFI. 415 ILCS 5/31(c) (West 1994). There would have followed a 
proceeding before the Pollution Control Board. Only if the Board ruled against 
AFI would any legal consequences have attached.
The section 31(a) notice is merely the first step in this 
process. It is designed to put the recipient on notice that there may be a 
problem, nothing more. It is not a final determination of culpability-indeed, it 
is not even a formal complaint. And as this court has previously stated, "[a]n 
agency's preliminary, investigative action is not a final agency decision ripe 
for judicial review. [Citation.] Notifying a party that it is subject to an 
investigation which may potentially lead to the institution of an action against 
that party does not create a claim capable of judicial resolution." National 
Marine, Inc. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 159 Ill. 2d 381, 
389 (1994). Thus it would seem that AFI's complaint in this case ought to have 
been dismissed. But the majority distinguishes National Marine, thus 
affirming the ripeness doctrine in theory, but determining that it should not 
forestall AFI's suit in the instant case.
I find National Marine indistinguishable with 
regard to the relevant facts. In both National Marine and the instant 
case, the Agency issued a preliminary notice of potential liability for an 
environmental violation. In each case, the party to whom the notice was issued 
brought suit in the circuit court. Both alleged violators claimed that they were 
harmed by the mere issuance of the preliminary notices. But in National 
Marine, as here, the notice was not a final adjudication, and moreover it 
was "not clear whether the Agency will even initiate a cost-recovery/enforcement 
proceeding against plaintiff." National Marine, 159 Ill. 2d  at 390. 
Therefore, this court concluded that the dispute was not yet ripe because, I 
repeat, "[a]n agency's preliminary, investigative action is not a final agency 
decision ripe for judicial review. [Citation.] Notifying a party that it is 
subject to an investigation which may potentially lead to the institution of an 
action against that party does not create a claim capable of judicial 
resolution." National Marine, 159 Ill. 2d  at 389.
The majority raises several points in support of its 
conclusion that National Marine does not guide our result in the 
instant case. First, the majority contends that the "concerns" mentioned in 
National Marine are not implicated in the present case, because "[t]he 
instant case does not 'substantially delay the quick, effective response called 
for by the Act.' " Slip op. at 11. This is because, according to the majority, 
there are "no allegations of any environmental contamination" in the record. 
Here the majority comes perilously close to assuming what AFI is trying to 
prove, i.e., that AFI committed no environmental contamination. It is 
clear, however, that the section 31(a) notice charged AFI with, inter alia, 
storing "waste" without a permit. The fact that AFI voluntarily ceased its 
shredding operations does not permit us to conclude as a matter of law that the 
storage of waste has wholly ceased.(4) Thus, this 
allegation of environmental contamination might indeed be ongoing 
notwithstanding AFI's voluntary cessation of operations. The majority's 
speculation that the "salient hazard to the environment" consisted "only" of 
"the actual burning of the plastics" (slip op. at 12) ignores the fact that the 
Agency charged AFI with conduct unrelated to the burning of the plastics. 
Indeed, the majority appears to be telling the Agency, as a matter of law, what 
is and is not a "salient hazard to the environment." In my view, this is both 
extraordinary and unwarranted.
The majority also argues that this case is distinguishable 
from National Marine because
"AFI sought nothing precluding the Agency from continuing 
its investigation, issuing a notice under section 31(b), or referring the matter 
to a prosecutorial authority under 31(c). *** Thus, the present action is not 'preenforcement,' 
as there is no allegation that AFI sought to evade Agency action, nor is there 
any indication that the Agency wished to refer a matter concerning a 
discontinued operation to a prosecutorial authority." Slip op. at 12.
See also slip op. at 10 ("We also note that AFI has not 
sought relief in this action to prevent the Agency from" issuing a 31(b) notice 
or prosecuting AFI).
This argument is also unconvincing. Contrary to the 
majority's characterization, the instant action is clearly an attempt by AFI to 
evade Agency action. If not, what would be the point of their filing the 
declaratory judgment action? This point is underscored by the very relief AFI 
sought in its complaint: that the circuit court enter an order stating that "the 
allegation stated in the above-described violation notice issued to [AFI] are [sic] 
contrary to the law." Clearly, such an order-that the allegations in the section 
31(a) notice are contrary to law-would indeed preclude the Agency from 
attempting to prosecute AFI for the conduct alleged therein, now or ever. 
Indeed, as the Agency warns in its brief to this court, declaring the very 
allegations "contrary to law" could effectively insulate from prosecution not 
just AFI, but the entire industry of which AFI is a part-a possibility that this 
court ought not to ignore.
Finally, the majority contends that "unlike in 
National Marine, the Agency's action here constituted more than a merely 
preliminary step prior to an eventual final Agency action." Slip op. at 13. I 
must disagree. From the Agency's point of view, that is indeed all that it had 
done. The fact that AFI voluntarily ceased its operations does not somehow 
convert the Agency's action from a preliminary step to a final adjudication. As 
the majority itself noted in the paragraph immediately preceding, the Agency had 
yet to "continu[e] its investigation, issu[e] a notice under section 31(b), or 
refer[ ] the matter to a prosecutorial authority under section 31(c)." Slip op. 
at 12. The section 31(a) notice is clearly a mere preliminary step in the 
statutory scheme. The fact that the Agency might not ever have taken these 
subsequent steps does not distinguish this case from National Marine. 
See National Marine, 159 Ill. 2d  at 390 ("it is not clear whether the 
Agency will even initiate a cost-recovery/enforcement proceeding against 
plaintiff").
Thus, I conclude that the majority's attempted 
distinctions of National Marine are without a difference as far as the 
legal principles involved.
Moreover, even if I agreed with the majority that 
National Marine was distinguishable, and analyzed the case from first 
principles, I still would not join its conclusion. The majority's underlying 
concern is that a party who is the target of an administrative action must be 
allowed to have its day in court. I agree with the majority that a party must
at some point be able to seek redress in the courts for any 
administrative action against it. However, the ripeness doctrine does not 
deprive a litigant of access to the courts. Rather, it controls the timing 
of that access so as to avoid premature litigation and to avoid unnecessary 
abstract disagreements and entanglement by the courts in agency proceedings. See
National Marine, 159 Ill. 2d  at 388, quoting Bio-Medical 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor, 68 Ill. 2d 540, 546, 370 N.E.2d 223 (1977), 
quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681, 691, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1515 (1967) (" 'The basic rationale of the ripeness 
doctrine *** "is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of adjudication, from 
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, 
and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an 
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete 
way by the challenging parties" ' ").
The majority is concerned that if the ripeness doctrine 
were invoked to preclude the instant suit it might truly operate to bar AFI from 
court, however, because the Agency might never take the subsequent steps 
necessary to institute enforcement proceedings based on the violation notice. 
See slip op. at 10. This argument is not without some intuitive force. But in 
the end it proves too much, as the same argument could be made by any 
litigant to challenge an initial notification that an agency might institute 
proceedings against that litigant. It is never a foregone conclusion that an 
agency will seek to hold an offender accountable. Thus to accept this concern as 
a general exception to the ripeness doctrine would swallow that rule.
The majority suggests that this case is different from 
most, however, because "the Agency had no incentive to refer the matter for 
prosecution because there was no longer a continuing violation." Slip op. at 10. 
First, as I previously noted, I do not believe that it is possible to conclude 
as a matter of law that there was no continuing violation, in that among the 
allegations in the section 31(a) notice was storage of waste without a 
permit. But even assuming, arguendo, that we could conclude as a matter 
of law there was no continuing violation, I would question the significance 
which the majority attaches to this fact. According to the majority's reasoning, 
a party who will never have a final agency decision entered against it may 
utilize Illinois courts to challenge the basis of the abortive investigation 
against it-even though a party which is actually facing the possibility 
of legal action cannot. Such a result is incongruous. In addition to the 
question of ripeness, it is far from clear to me that a party would have 
standing to attack the content of a preliminary notice-which is, again, not 
even a formal complaint (see 415 ILCS 5/31(c) (West 2002))-in an investigation 
which has gone nowhere and never will go anywhere. I believe it is unwise to 
allow a party to use the courts of this state to challenge allegations in the 
investigative process of a proceeding which will never move forward to impose 
liability.
Notwithstanding the above, AFI is in a somewhat 
sympathetic position because even though the section 31(a) notice carried no 
legal consequences, there were real-world implications associated with its 
issuance. At least some of AFI's investors "pulled out," as did its primary 
supplier. AFI subsequently made the voluntary decision to terminate operations. 
However, the United States Supreme Court has specifically stated that such 
by-products of the institution of proceedings do not obviate the ripeness 
doctrine.
"The impact of the initiation of judicial proceedings is 
often serious. Take the case of the grand jury. It returns an indictment against 
a man without a hearing. It does not determine his guilt; it only determines 
whether there is probable cause to believe he is guilty. But that determination 
is conclusive on the issue of probable cause. As a result the defendant can be 
arrested and held for trial. [Citations.] The impact of an indictment is on the 
reputation or liberty of a man. The same is true where a prosecutor files an 
information charging violations of the law. The harm to property and 
business can also be incalculable by the mere institution of proceedings. Yet it 
has never been held that the hand of government must be stayed until the courts 
have an opportunity to determine whether the government is justified in 
instituting suit in the courts. Discretion of any official may be abused. Yet it 
is not a requirement of due process that there be judicial inquiry before 
discretion can be exercised. It is sufficient, where only property rights are 
concerned, that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and a 
judicial determination.
* * *
The determination of probable cause in and of itself had 
no binding legal consequence ***. It took the exercise of discretion on the part 
of the Attorney General, as we have pointed out above, to bring it into play 
against appellee's business. Judicial review of such a preliminary step in a 
judicial proceeding is so unique that we are not willing easily to infer that it 
exists." (Emphasis added.) Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598-602, 94 L. Ed. 1088, 1093-95, 70 S. Ct. 870, 872-74 (1950).
The majority notes that upon receipt of the section 31(a) 
notice, AFI was forced to choose between (a) getting a permit, (b) operating 
without a permit, or (c) shutting down.(5) Slip 
op. at 10. I believe that there is no question that if AFI had chosen option 
(b), and were still operating its business-even if investors and its main 
supplier had pulled out-this court would find National Marine 
indistinguishable and we would rule that the instant suit was unripe. The only 
difference between that case and the case at bar is the majority's guess that in 
this case the Agency will probably not advance the proceedings. It is certainly 
not impossible that the proceedings could continue in this case, however, just 
as there was no guarantee that they would continue in National Marine. 
In both cases, whether the suit would proceed would depend on the exercise of 
officials' discretion. But in the instant case, because of the majority's 
prognostication about the likelihood that the officials will exercise 
their discretion in favor of prosecution, the doctrine of ripeness is 
overridden. I do not agree, and accordingly I respectfully dissent.
CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW and JUSTICE KILBRIDE join in this 
dissent.




DISSENT ON DENIAL OF REHEARING

JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
I believe that rehearing ought to have been granted in 
this case, for two reasons. First, the membership of this court changed between 
the issuance of the original opinion and the disposition of the petition for 
rehearing. Justice Rarick, a member of the majority, retired and was replaced by 
Justice Karmeier. Because the six remaining participants in the original 
decision split 3-3 on what action to take on the petition, it was necessary for 
Justice Karmeier to vote on the petition for rehearing to break the deadlock. 
Given that a justice was required to begin participating in the case at the 
petition for rehearing stage, I believe we ought to have granted the petition, 
in order to have the benefit of full briefing and discussion of the issues in 
the case, and specifically those concerns raised in the petition for rehearing. 
I see no harm in at least requesting a response from AFI before taking 
action, but the majority declines to take even this minor step.
Second, this is not a case in which the petition for 
rehearing was of no weight, or raised concerns already adequately addressed by 
the original majority opinion. A comparison of the original disposition and the 
opinion as modified on denial of rehearing reveals that the majority extensively 
modified its opinion in response to the EPA's arguments upon rehearing. I do not 
intend to fault the majority for taking the petition for rehearing seriously; 
quite the contrary. But the fact that the majority found such extensive 
revisions and additions to be necessary serves to underscore my position that 
the better approach would have been to grant the petition for rehearing, in 
order to have the benefit of full briefing and discussion of the issues.
Finally, I note that the petition was filed more than six 
months ago-and thus, the majority's choice to foreclose additional briefing and 
argument cannot even claim the relatively minor virtue of speedy disposition of 
the petition.
The above observations would be true even if I agreed with 
the majority that the modifications adequately dealt with the petition. I do 
not. I feel compelled to note the flaws in the majority's modifications not only 
to the justiciability issue, upon which I originally dissented in this case, but 
also on the modifications to the majority's discussion of the merits of the 
case.
On the justiciability issue, the majority has inserted on 
denial of rehearing the suggestion that AFI and its predecessor have been 
"attempting to get a formal determination of the definition of 'waste' under the 
Act for now over 10 years" (slip op. at 13). This statement is at best 
misleading. AFI has known the Agency's position, that the materials it was 
processing are "waste," since 1994. AFI simply does not like the 
Agency's position, and has been berating the Agency to change its 
position, for 10 years. The majority's statement also fails to take into account 
that AFI's predecessor withdrew its 1994 appeal, rather than attempting to 
obtain a ruling from the Board, calling the 10-year mark further into question.
Regarding the merits of the case, the majority now simply 
assumes what it purports to have proven. The central question is whether the 
empty plastic fertilizer containers which AFI was processing are "waste" within 
the meaning of the statute. The majority concludes, and I agree, that the 
containers are "waste"only if they are "discarded materials." Slip op. at 15-16. 
The majority looks at the definition of "recycling, reclamation, or reuse," and 
determines that materials are not "discarded" if they are instead " 'collected, 
separated or processed and returned to the economic mainstream in the form of 
raw materials or products.' " Slip op. at 16, quoting 415 ILCS 5/3.380 (West 
2002). I also agree with this further step. Further, there is no question that 
AFI "collected" and "processed" the plastic containers. So the only 
issue, on the merits, is whether the materials in question are "returned to the 
economic mainstream in the form of raw materials or products."
But having finally reached the bedrock question, the 
majority replaces analysis with assumption. The majority simply states as fact, 
with no analysis whatsoever, that by shredding the plastic containers and 
selling the shreds to Illinois Power to be burned for energy recovery, AFI is 
returning the materials to the economic mainstream as a "product." Slip op. at 
16. The majority does not spare a moment's reflection on whether plastic chips 
sold solely for combustive fuel ought to be characterized as "products" in the 
"economic mainstream." The conclusion is far from obvious to me. On rehearing 
the EPA strongly disputed this conclusion, noting that combustion of waste for 
energy recovery is not recycling. See slip op. at 17, quoting 415 ILCS 20/2.1 
(West 2002). The EPA argues that if Illinois Power is not recycling when it 
performs the combustion of waste, neither can AFI be recycling when it 
processes what would otherwise be waste in order to make it more suitable
for combustion and sells it to Illinois Power for combustion. (If 
the containers AFI is processing are "returned to the economic mainstream in the 
form of raw materials or products," then AFI is recycling, by the 
definition upon which the majority relies. See 415 ILCS 5/3.380 (West 2002).) 
This is a forceful and logical point, but the majority sidesteps it via the 
circuitous logic of stating that it is irrelevant, because the majority has 
already concluded (one page before) that the materials in question are not 
"waste." 
In the original opinion, the majority did not analyze 
whether AFI was returning the materials to the economic mainstream as products 
because it mistakenly believed that the EPA did not dispute this fact. But now 
that the EPA has made it clear, on rehearing, that the majority was mistaken, 
and the EPA does indeed dispute this characterization of AFI's operations, some 
analysis must be undertaken. It is, after all, the only issue in the case.

It is worth recalling that this case comes before us on 
appeal from a summary judgment in a declaratory judgment action. Because the 
factual characterization of the materials is at issue, it might be appropriate 
to take additional-that is, any-evidence, which would require reversal and 
remand. This highlights, in my mind, the impropriety of allowing AFI to bring 
this action in the first instance. Because the EPA has never even brought an 
enforcement action against AFI, the case is still in the investigatory stages. 
EPA might not at this time have any evidence bearing on the question of whether 
the shredded plastic chips AFI sells to Illinois Power are "products," but since 
the EPA has never even bought formal charges against AFI, it can hardly be 
faulted for this state of affairs. It is like allowing a suspect to challenge 
the basis for his prosecution, when he has merely been brought in for 
questioning and asked not to leave town, and not even an indictment has yet been 
issued against him.
I still believe that this case-a challenge to a "violation 
notice," a mere precursor to a formal charging document-ought never to have been 
considered by an Illinois court, for the reasons set out in my original dissent 
and in this court's unanimous opinion in National Marine. I also 
believe, however, that if the case is to be taken, we must address the issues 
raised, rather than assuming them away. Finally, at the very least, we 
ought to have the issues fully briefed when a petition for rehearing raises 
serious points and a new member of the court is forced to participate in the 
case for the first time at the rehearing stage. Accordingly, I would vote to 
grant rehearing, and I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion to 
deny rehearing as modified.



JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this dissent on denial of 
rehearing.
1.  Under 
the Act "solid waste" means waste. 415 ILCS 5/3.82 (West 1994).
2.  Plaintiff also named St. Clair County as a defendant. Summary 
judgment was entered against St. Clair County, but it is not part of this 
appeal.

3.  We 
note revisions to the Illinois Administrative Code (35 Ill. Adm. Code 721 
(2003)), pertaining solely to identification and listing of hazardous 
waste. 27 Ill. Reg. 12760 (adopted June 5, 2003). Under the regulations, a solid 
waste is defined as discarded material. 27 Ill. Reg. 12769 (adopted June 5, 
2003). Discarded material is further defined as a solid waste if "it is 
abandoned in one of the following ways *** [i]t is accumulated, stored, or 
treated (but not recycled) before or in lieu of being abandoned by being 
disposed of, burned, or incinerated." 27 Ill. Reg. 12770 (adopted June 5, 2003). 
Other definitions of solid waste include: "a material is considered a solid 
waste if it is recycledor accumulated, stored, or treated before recycling *** 
if one of the following occurs with regard to the material *** 2) the material 
is burned for energy recovery." 27 Ill. Reg. 1277071 (adopted June 5, 2003). 
The present material does not constitute hazardous waste, nor do the parties 
argue that this provision could apply to this matter.
4.  The 
majority cannot justify such a conclusion by citing to its determination on the 
merits that the matter in question was not "waste." This would be equivalent to 
saying that the case is ripe simply because we decided the underlying issue 
against the agency. This would eviscerate the ripeness doctrine, as any litigant 
seeking to challenge any administrative agency's initial notice could argue that 
they should win as a matter of law. This court would be placed in the absurd 
position of having to decide the merits of a case in order to determine whether 
the case was ripe for adjudication.
5.  The implication that it was unfair to require AFI either to incur 
the expense of obtaining a permit or to "risk[ ] serious penalties by continuing 
and waiting for the ax of Agency prosecution to fall" (slip op. at 10) is 
ameliorated by noting that even if the "ax" had indeed fallen, and the Agency 
had succeeded in proving that AFI had violated the permit requirement, AFI still 
would have had the opportunity to "show that compliance with the Board's 
regulations would impose an arbitrary or unreasonable hardship." 415 ILCS 
5/31(e) (West 2002).