Case Title: Manning v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-7

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Manning v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div1997 WY 76938 P.2d 870Case Number: 96-7Decided: 06/16/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

TRESA 
MANNING, Employee;

 and 
DONALD L. PAINTER, Esquire, 

Appellants (Respondents), 

 

v. 

 

STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, 

 Appellee(Petitioner).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court, Natrona County

 The 
Honorabel Dan Spangler, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

 Donald L. Painter, Casper.

 Representing 
Appellee:

 William U. Hill, Attorney General, and Jennifer A. 
Evans, Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, and LEHMAN, JJ., and ROGERS, D.J.

 

LEHMAN, Justice.

 [¶1]      This case 
involves the question of when a hearing examiner acquires jurisdiction to 
appoint an attorney and award attorney fees in a worker's compensation case. The 
district court reversed the hearing examiner's orders awarding attorney fees, 
finding that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) acquires jurisdiction 
only when 1) an interested party files a written objection to a determination by 
the Division, and 2) the matter is properly referred to the OAH for resolution 
in a contested case proceeding. In addition, the district court denied attorney 
fees incurred in the appeal to that court.

 

[¶2]      We affirm in part 
and reverse in part.

 

[¶3]      Appellants Tresa 
Manning, the injured worker, and her attorney, Donald Painter, present the 
following issue for our review: 

1. Whether the Office of Administrative Hearings has 
the authority to enter an award of attorney's fees in this 
case.

 

[¶4]      Appellee Worker's 
Compensation Division (Division) states the issues in this 
way:

A. Whether the Office of Administrative Hearings 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter orders appointing an attorney and 
awarding attorney's fees where the Division had made no final determination 
denying a claim for benefits, no party had entered any type of objection or 
requested a hearing and the matter had not been referred to the Office of 
Administrative Hearings for hearing.

B. Whether the district court abused its discretion 
in denying Mr. Painter's application for attorney's fees incurred in defending 
the orders awarding attorney's fees entered by the Office of Administrative 
Hearings.

 

FACTS

 

[¶5]      In February 1993, 
Tresa Manning filed a report of injury due to problems she suffered with both 
wrists. The Division determined the injuries to be work related and compensable 
under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act (Act). Over the course of the next 
several months, the Division paid medical benefits covering extensive treatment, 
including two surgeries on Manning's wrists.

 

[¶6]      Manning's 
condition showed little or no improvement and, in October 1994, Dr. Brown, her 
doctor in Denver, proposed a third surgery. At that point, Manning contacted 
Painter. Manning wanted to rule out the possibility that she suffered from other 
conditions she felt may be contributing to her problems before she submitted to 
another surgery, and apparently had some disagreement with the Worker's 
Compensation Office in Cheyenne regarding a rule-out consultation. On December 
19, 1994, Manning submitted a motion for appointment of Painter as 
counsel.

 

[¶7]      On January 3, 
1995, Manning wrote the Division, expressing her desire for a rule-out 
consultation. The Division responded on January 11, 1995, informing Manning that 
a rule-out consultation would not be covered but the Division would pay for a 
second opinion if she obtained a referral from Dr. Brown. The record contains no 
further communications regarding a rule-out consultation.

 

[¶8]      On April 4, 1995, 
Manning informed Painter's secretary that she no longer needed Painter's 
representation, and Painter submitted a motion and affidavit for award of 
attorney fees in the amount of $173.78. The Division objected, and on May 15, 
1995, the Natrona County clerk of court prepared a contested case transmittal 
sheet on the issue of attorney fees, referring the case to the OAH. A contested 
case hearing on the issue of attorney fees was held before the hearing examiner 
on June 21, 1995. The Division argued that because there had been no denial of a 
claim for benefits or request for a hearing before the OAH on the rule-out 
consultation, the hearing examiner lacked subject matter jurisdiction to appoint 
an attorney and to award attorney fees. Painter argued that the language of W.S. 
27-14-602(d) permits a hearing examiner to appoint an attorney upon request, 
without limitation, and to allow fees at the conclusion of the 
proceeding.

 

[¶9]      The hearing 
examiner agreed with Painter and issued an order awarding attorney fees in the 
amount of $173.78. Manning subsequently submitted a motion for award of attorney 
fees incurred preparing for the contested case hearing, and the Division again 
objected. The hearing examiner issued an order awarding attorney fees in the 
amount of $112.34. The Division appealed to the district court. The district 
court reversed both of the hearing examiner's orders awarding attorney fees, 
agreeing with the Division that the hearing examiner lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to appoint an attorney prior to the initiation of a contested 
case.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶10]   When considering an appeal from a 
district court's review of agency action, we accord no special deference to the 
district court's conclusions. State ex 
rel. Workers' Compensation Div. v. Fisher, 914 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Wyo. 1996). 
Instead, we review the case as if it had come directly to us from the 
administrative agency. Id. The 
resolution of this case turns on the interpretation of the Worker's Compensation 
Act. Statutory interpretation is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State Board of 
Equalization, 918 P.2d 980, 983 (Wyo. 1996). This court shall set aside 
agency action found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law," or "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority or limitations or lacking statutory right." W.S. 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A), 
(C) (1990).

 

[¶11]   The governing law is that in effect 
on February 5, 1993, the date of Manning's injury. See State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div. 
v. Jacobs, 924 P.2d 982, 984 (Wyo. 1996); Seckman v. Wyo-Ben, Inc., 783 P.2d 161, 
166 (Wyo. 1989). We note the Act has been extensively amended in a piecemeal 
fashion in almost every year since Manning's injury. As a result, determining 
the precise statutory language in effect at any particular moment has become an 
exercise in frustration. In addition, the analysis we employ in any one case may 
very well be of limited prospective application.

 

[¶12]   Section 27-14-602(d) (Supp. 1992) 
provided:

Upon request, the hearing examiner may appoint an 
attorney to represent the employee or claimants and may allow the appointed 
attorney a reasonable fee for his services at the conclusion of the proceeding. 
. . . No fee shall be awarded in any case in which the hearing examiner 
determines the claim to be frivolous and without legal or factual 
justification.

The Act is silent as to when 
the right to appointed counsel attaches. We do not necessarily agree with the 
district court that the hearing examiner does not have jurisdiction prior to the 
initiation of a contested case proceeding. We recently held that an employee is 
entitled to paid legal representation when the Division issues a final 
determination regarding compensability of an injury or a claim, whether or not a 
formal request for a contested case is filed. Painter v. State ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 953, 955 (Wyo. 1997). The governing law in Painter was that in effect in December 
1994. The Act was significantly amended in July 1994, after Manning's injury but 
before the worker's injury in Painter. However, this case does not require us to 
decide the exact point in time when the right to counsel attaches under the 1993 
version of the Act. Here we easily conclude that the hearing examiner's 
appointment was premature because Manning had not yet filed a claim for the 
rule-out consultation, or even undergone the examination. She merely inquired 
beforehand as to the compensability of such an 
examination.

 

[¶13]   The Act requires the Division to 
make determinations on claims for 
benefits. See generally W.S. 
27-14-601 (1991). Section 27-14-602(d) prohibits the hearing examiner from 
awarding fees in any case in which the claim is frivolous or without legal or 
factual justification. The Division's rules state that "[a] person seeking an 
award of benefits under the Act must submit a claim for benefits." Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Rules, Regulations and Fee Schedules, ch. VI, § 1 (July 1993) 
(emphasis added). A "claim" is defined as "[a]n application for benefits under 
the Act using the forms provided by the division." Id., ch. I, § 4(a). An injury 
report is not a claim for benefits. Id., ch. VI, § 1. Nor can Manning's 
telephone call and inquiry letter to the Division be considered 
claims.

 

[¶14]   In order to be compensated under 
the Act for a rule-out consultation, Manning was required to submit a claim for 
benefits on a form provided by the Division. We note that Manning's actions 
appear to have been completely reasonable under the circumstances, and her 
reluctance to undergo a third surgery without ruling out other potential causes 
quite possibly saved the employer and the Division money in the long run. 
Nonetheless, we find no language in the Act to support the position that Manning 
is entitled to paid legal representation on the basis that she was not satisfied 
with the Division's responses to her inquiries regarding a proposed medical 
examination. The hearing examiner was without jurisdiction to appoint an 
attorney and award fees at that juncture. The district court's reversal of the 
hearing examiner's order awarding fees in the amount of $173.78 is 
affirmed.

 

[¶15]   Here, however, we part company with 
the district court. Both the district court and the Division fail to acknowledge 
that a contested case proceeding was initiated - on the issue of "attorney's 
fees." On April 20, 1995, the Division lodged an objection to Manning's motion 
for award of attorney fees, addressed to the OAH and filed in the Seventh 
District Court in Natrona County. On May 15, 1995, the Natrona County clerk of 
court referred the case to the OAH via a contested case transmittal sheet. The 
transmittal sheet indicated that the employee had been notified of her right to 
request an attorney pursuant to W.S. 27-14-602(d).

 

[¶16]   Once the case was transmitted to 
the OAH, the hearing examiner had jurisdiction to appoint an attorney, conduct 
the contested case hearing, and award attorney fees at the conclusion of the 
proceeding. Cf. Little America Refining 
Co. v. Witt, 854 P.2d 51, 55-56 (Wyo. 1993). Indeed, a contested case 
hearing was held on June 21, 1995, and both Manning and the Division were 
represented at that hearing. Although the Division objected to the jurisdiction 
of the hearing examiner to appoint an attorney to represent Manning prior to the 
initiation of a contested case, neither party objected to the jurisdiction of 
the hearing examiner to conduct the contested case hearing on the issue of fees. 
The hearing examiner properly granted Manning's motion for award of attorney 
fees of $112.34 incurred in preparing for the contested case, and we reverse the 
district court's order in that respect.

 

[¶17]   By its order dated December 13, 
1995, the district court denied Manning's motion for award of attorney fees 
incurred in the appeal to the district court. The order stated only that there 
was no statutory authority for appointment of an attorney. In light of our 
holding that the hearing examiner acted within his jurisdiction when he awarded 
attorney fees for the contested case portion of this dispute, we remand to the 
district court with instructions to reconsider the award of attorney fees 
incurred in the appeal to the district court pursuant to W.S. 27-14-615 (Supp. 
1996).

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶18]   We affirm that part of the district 
court's order denying Manning's attorney fees of $173.78 incurred in seeking a 
rule-out consultation. We reverse that part of the district court's order 
denying Manning's attorney fees of $112.34 incurred in the contested case 
proceeding on the issue of attorney fees. We remand the district court's order 
denying attorney fees incurred in the appeal to the district court for further 
consideration pursuant to W.S. 27-14-615.

 

THOMAS, J., filed a opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part.

 

THOMAS, Justice (concurring and 
dissenting).

 [¶19]   
I agree that the office of hearing examiners had no jurisdiction to 
appoint an attorney for Manning. Indeed, that is the point of my dissenting 
opinion in Painter v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 953, 956 (Wyo. 1997). I am still of the persuasion that the office of hearing 
examiners lacks jurisdiction to appoint counsel in the absence of a request by 
an interested party and the referral by the Division for a contested case 
hearing. Clearly, this instance is outside the authority of the office of 
hearing examiners to appoint an attorney.

 

[¶20]   I dissent from that portion of the 
majority opinion that reverses the order of the district court denying Manning's 
attorney fees that were incurred in the contested case proceeding on the issue 
of attorney fees. I would affirm the district court with respect to the 
disallowance of these attorney fees. The language in the applicable statute, 
WYO. STAT. § 27-14-602(d) (1991) is quite clear:

 

No fee shall be awarded in any case in which the 
hearing examiner determines the claim to be frivolous and without legal or 
factual justification.

 

If the hearing examiner had 
no jurisdiction to award attorney fees on the rule-out consultation, the claim 
that was heard had to be "frivolous and without legal * * * justification." The 
award of attorney fees for the contest of the initial claim for attorney fees 
was an abuse of discretion and action contrary to law by the hearing examiner. I 
would hold that there is no necessity to remand the case to the district court 
because its ruling on the issue of attorney fees was 
correct.

 

[¶21]   The language of Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-615 (Supp. 1996) affords the district court discretion with respect to the 
award of attorney fees, and I do not see how this Court could find an abuse of 
discretion if the district court decided not to award any fee. I suppose this 
court also will award attorney fees for the appeal. The result will be that in 
an instance in which there was no claim filed by an employee and the office of 
hearing examiners had no jurisdiction to appoint an attorney, the consolidated 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation account will be mulcted in the amount of $112.34 
plus a possible amount of $173.78 plus whatever this court awards for the 
appeal.

 

[¶22]   I believe that the majority 
resolution incorporates sophistry when it suggests that the statute was 
significantly amended between the time of Manning's injury and the law in effect 
for Painter. I can find no change in the pertinent and, I agree, critical 
language in WYO. STAT. § 27-14-602(d) that occurred between the date of 
Manning's injury and the date of the injury involved in Painter. It follows that 
either this case is wrong in holding that the hearing examiner had no 
jurisdiction to award attorney fees with respect to the rule-out consultation, 
or Painter is wrong in holding that the hearing examiner did have jurisdiction. 
Whether a claim was filed or the division had issued a final determination does 
not impact the jurisdiction of the hearing examiner in any logical 
fashion.

 

[¶23]   I reiterate what I argued in Painter:

 

An administrative agency has only the power granted 
to it by statute, and the justification for the exercise of any authority by the 
agency must be found in the statutes. E.g., Tri County Telephone Assoc., Inc. v. Wyoming 
Public Service Comm'n, 910 P.2d 1359 (Wyo. 1996); Kerr-McGee, Corp. v. Wyoming Oil & Gas 
Conservation Comm'n, 903 P.2d 537, 541 (Wyo. 1995); Union Pacific Resources Co. v. State, 
839 P.2d 356 (Wyo. 1992); Jackson v. 
State ex rel. Workers' Comp. Div., 786 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 1990). The 
jurisprudential principle applicable in this case was stated clearly by the 
court in LoSasso v. Braun, 386 P.2d 630, 631 (Wyo. 1963) (citations omitted):

If the legislature did in fact have such an 
intention, it failed to express it, and of course, we could not if we would act 
for the legislature by adding an exception which is clearly omitted. Such action 
would be in violation of the general rule that courts cannot supply omissions in 
a statute and will not read into a statute exceptions not made by the 
legislature. * * *

 As 
stated in State ex rel. Morrison v. 
Anway, 87 Ariz. 206, 349 P.2d 774, 776, it is a universal rule that courts 
will not enlarge, stretch, expand or extend a statute to matters not falling 
within its express provisions.

That is exactly what the court has done 
in the majority opinion. The decision enlarges, stretches, expands and extends 
the statute to approve the award of attorney fees that is not justified by the 
express provisions of the statute. It has supplied a perceived omission in the 
statute, by adding to the authority of the hearing examiner beyond that provided 
by the statute. It is bad jurisprudence, and my experience teaches me that 
normally bad jurisprudence results in bad law. The decision of the district 
court should be affirmed.

Painter, 
931 P.2d  at 958.

 

[¶24]   The rule now appears to be that the 
office of hearing examiners can appoint an attorney whenever a claim is filed 
with the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division whether a contested case 
proceeding ever is initiated or not. I cannot read the statute to encompass such 
a legislative intent, but the only recourse of the Division now must be to seek 
specific legislation setting forth when the office of hearing examiners has 
authority to appoint an attorney in worker's compensation 
matters.