Case Title: Ex Parte Burgess

Citation: 811 So. 2d 617

Docket Number: 1980810

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
811 So. 2d 617 (2000)
Ex parte Roy BURGESS, Jr.
(In re Roy Burgess, Jr. v. State).
1980810.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 21, 2000.
*618 Bryan A. Stevenson and J. Drew Colfax, Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, Montgomery, for petitioner.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen.; and Michael B. Billingsley and Kathryn D. Anderson, asst. attys. gen., for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
The opinion of January 28, 2000, is withdrawn and the following is substituted therefor.
Roy Burgess, Jr., was convicted of capital murder for the death of Kevin Gardner, under § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975 murder made capital because it was committed during the course of a robbery in the first degree. Both Burgess and his victim were age 16 at the time the murder was committed. The jury recommended by a vote of 10-2 that Burgess be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The trial court, overriding the jury's recommendation, sentenced Burgess to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Burgess's conviction and sentence. Burgess v. State, 811 So. 2d 557 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998). This Court granted certiorari review pursuant to Rule 39(c), Ala. R.App. P.
The Court of Criminal Appeals set forth the following detailed statement of the facts of the case.
811 So. 2d  at 564-66.
We have carefully reviewed the 25 issues raised by Burgess before this Court, and we conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals thoroughly and correctly addressed the issues that relate to Burgess's conviction.
We address certain issues concerning Burgess's sentencing. Under our statutes, *622 a defendant who is convicted of a capital offense is entitled to a sentencing hearing. §§ 13A-5-45 through -53, Ala. Code 1975. After the jury has returned an advisory verdict, as this jury did, the trial court must permit the parties to present arguments concerning the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. § 13A-5-47. The opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals sets out the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that the trial court found to exist in Burgess's case:
811 So. 2d  at 604.
The trial court, after conducting the sentencing hearing, is then required, pursuant to § 13A-5-47(e), to "determine whether the aggravating circumstances it finds to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances it finds to exist," and that statute provides that "in doing so the trial court shall consider the recommendation of the jury contained in its advisory verdict." Although the statute provides that the trial court must consider the jury's recommendation, that recommendation is not binding on the court. Section 13A-5-48 discusses the weighing process required of the trial court.
In its sentencing order, the trial court concluded that the one aggravating circumstance in Burgess's case outweighed all of the mitigating circumstances.
We first consider Burgess's contention that in sentencing him to death the trial judge improperly considered his juvenile record and his adjudications of juvenile delinquency. Burgess argues that after the jury voted 10-2 to recommend that he receive a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, the trial court improperly relied on his juvenile history to override the jury's recommendation and impose the death penalty. Burgess argues that the trial court erred by considering his history of juvenile adjudications to negate the statutory *623 mitigating circumstances of his lack of a significant criminal history and his age at the time the offense was committed. He contends that the trial court "deploy[ed] the prior delinquencies as if they were nonstatutory aggravation to effectively tip the balance in favor of death."
Section 13A-5-47(b), Ala.Code 1975, requires that the trial court order and receive a written presentence investigation report "[b]efore making the sentencing determination," and that "[t]he report and any evidence submitted in connection with it shall be made part of the record in the case." Rule 26.3(b), Ala. R.Crim. P., provides for what may be contained in such a presentence report. When a defendant has a significant juvenile record, his or her teenage difficulties will appear as part of the presentence report. However, under the Alabama capital-sentencing scheme, juvenile adjudications are not convictions and cannot be considered as prior criminal activity. Freeman v. State, 555 So. 2d 196, 212 (Ala.Crim.App.1988), aff'd, 555 So. 2d 215 (Ala.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912, 110 S. Ct. 2604, 110 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1990). Only convictions can negate the statutory mitigating circumstance of no significant history of prior criminal activity. § 13A-5-51(1), Ala.Code 1975; Freeman v. State, 651 So. 2d 576, 597-98 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994).
The fact that a trial court has access through the presentence report to the juvenile record of a defendant convicted of a capital crime, but cannot consider juvenile adjudications to negate the mitigating circumstance of the lack of any significant history of prior criminal activity, appears to be a contradiction. In discussing that issue, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that although juvenile adjudications cannot be used to negate the mitigating circumstance, the trial court can consider them when conducting the weighing process required in capital cases. The Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
811 So. 2d  at 606.
We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that a trial court may consider a defendant's juvenile adjudications to be a relevant consideration in deciding what weight to assign to the statutory mitigating circumstances of a defendant's lack of a significant prior criminal history and a defendant's age at the time of the offense. Other courts considering this dilemma have come to the same conclusion as did the Court of Criminal Appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Pretlow, 770 F. Supp. 239, 243 (D.N.J.1991) (applying New Jersey law); Scott v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1488, 1508 (S.D.Fla.1988), aff'd, 891 F.2d 800 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. Ct. 224, 112 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1990) (applying Florida law); State v. Bays, 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 33-34, 716 N.E.2d 1126, 1145 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1090, 120 S. Ct. 1727, 146 L. Ed. 2d 647 (2000); State v. Rodriguez, 656 A.2d 262, 277-78 (Del.Super.Ct.1993). Nevertheless, Alabama law explicitly precludes a trial court from using juvenile adjudications to negate the mitigating circumstance of no significant history of prior criminal activity. Ex parte Davis, 718 So. 2d 1166, 1178 (Ala.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1179, 119 S. Ct. 1117, 143 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1999). In other words, during the sentencing process in a capital case, the trial court may use a defendant's juvenile record to diminish the weight to be accorded the mitigating circumstance of that defendant's lack of a significant history of prior criminal activity, as well as the mitigating circumstance of that defendant's age at the time he or she committed the capital offense, but the trial court may not use the juvenile record as the basis for giving little or no weight to such mitigating circumstances.
We disagree, however, with the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that the trial court in this case did not improperly consider Burgess's juvenile adjudications to negate the mitigating circumstances it found to exist. The trial court's sentencing order shows that Burgess's juvenile record was a conspicuous and dominating factor in the trial court's weighing process. The trial court's sentencing order read, in pertinent part:
The statements contained in the trial court's painstaking written order in this very difficult case reflect that the trial court relied upon Burgess's juvenile adjudications to give nominal weight not only to the two statutory mitigating circumstances, but also to other mitigating circumstances, including the jury's recommendation. The trial court's use of Burgess's juvenile recorduse indicated by the court's numerous references to that recordto discount to inconsequentiality the numerous mitigating circumstances, in favor of the one aggravating circumstance, was an abuse of discretion.
We next consider Burgess's argument that the trial court erred in refusing to consider, as a mitigating circumstance, the extremely lenient treatment of Burgess's accomplices. He contends that the imposition of a death sentence is disproportionate when the state did not prosecute any of the older participants in this crime. Burgess reminds the Court that both Demetrius Stevenson and Richie Jones were in Kevin Gardner's car at the time of the robbery-murder. Both Stevenson and Jones admitted in their testimony at Burgess's trial that earlier on the day of the shooting they had participated in the discussion with Burgess concerning the plan to steal a car or a car stereo, and that they were in the car when Kevin Gardner was killed. These two men, along with Kevin Matthews, Will Hatton, and Larry Hays, all drove to Birmingham with Burgess in an attempt to sell Gardner's stolen car to a "chop shop" there. Stevenson removed and sold the stereo equipment from Gardner's car.
Section 13A-5-53(b)(3) requires that the sentence of death be neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalties imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. In Ex parte Henderson, 616 So. 2d 348 (Ala.1992), this Court treated the fact that the sentence imposed in the companion case was remitted from death by electrocution to life in prison without benefit of parole, as a factor the trial court must consider, and it remanded the cause for consideration of that factor. Id. at 350-51. Here, all of the other participants involved received complete immunity from prosecution, a factor to which the trial court assigned only "some mitigation." Given the fact that the defendant was the only one of six participants in this offense who was prosecuted, we conclude that the trial court should have given this factor greater weight.
Burgess further argues that the imposition of the death penalty in his case violates international law, because he was only 16 years old at the time of the commission of the capital offense. He contends *629 that Article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that a sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age. This Court thoroughly discussed an identical argument in Ex parte Pressley, 770 So. 2d 143 (Ala. 2000), wherein we concluded that the death penalty can legally be imposed upon a 16-year-old charged with a capital offense. We affirm in this case our reasoning in Ex parte Pressley.
The trial court provided a lengthy, written "Determination of Sentence by the Court," pursuant to § 13A-5-47, Ala.Code 1975. This Court has carefully studied this document, the record, the briefs filed in this case, the oral argument made on Burgess's behalf, and the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and has carefully considered all issues Burgess raised. We have searched the record of Burgess's trial for "plain error,"[1] i.e., error so obvious that the failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings. Rule 45, Ala. R.App. P. We find no error, "plain" or otherwise, that requires us to reverse Burgess's conviction.
However, for the reasons stated above, we remand this cause with instructions for the Court of Criminal Appeals to remand for the trial court to reevaluate Burgess's sentence and to consider whether, given Burgess's age, the treatment of the other participants, the jury's sentencing recommendation, and the fact that Burgess has no significant history of prior criminal activity, a death sentence is disproportionate in this case. The trial court should be instructed to resentence Burgess and, thereafter, to submit a written order including its findings and conclusions to the Court of Criminal Appeals within 90 days. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed as to the other issues presented by Burgess.
OPINION OF JANUARY 28, 2000, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; APPLICATION FOR REHEARING OVERRULED; AFFIRMED AS TO THE CONVICTION; REVERSED AS TO THE SENTENCE; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS AS TO SENTENCING.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, COOK, LYONS, and ENGLAND,[*] JJ., concur.
JOHNSTONE, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result in part, and concurs in the order overruling the application for rehearing.[**]
HOUSTON, J., concurs in the judgment affirming as to the conviction, reversing as to the sentence, and remanding, and concurs in the order overruling the application for rehearing.
SEE, J., concurs in the affirmance as to the conviction; dissents from the reversal as to the sentence; and dissents from the order overruling the application for rehearing.
BROWN, J., recuses herself.[***]
*630 JOHNSTONE, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result in part, and concurring in the order overruling the application for rehearing).
I concur with the main opinion except that I concur only in the result on the issue of the way to consider the statutory mitigating circumstance of "no significant history of prior criminal activity," § 13A-5-51(1), Ala.Code 1975, in the case of a young defendant with a record of adjudications of juvenile delinquency. This statutory mitigating circumstance presents a dilemma in this factual scenario. On the one hand, our law prohibits the court from considering the adjudications of juvenile delinquency to negate this statutory mitigating circumstance. Ex parte Davis, 718 So. 2d 1166, 1178 (Ala.1998) ("[J]uvenile adjudications could not properly be used to negate the mitigating circumstance of `no significant history of prior criminal activity.'"), and Freeman v. State, 555 So. 2d 196, 212 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 555 So. 2d 215 (Ala.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912, 110 S. Ct. 2604, 110 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1990). See also Baldwin v. State, 456 So. 2d 117, 125 (Ala.Crim.App.1983), aff'd, 456 So. 2d 129 (Ala.1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 372, 105 S. Ct. 2727, 86 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1985). On the other hand, this statutory mitigating circumstance really is intended for the person who has obeyed the criminal laws until he or she has committed the capital murder being tried. While our society makes many allowances for youthful immaturity, and indeed has devoted a specific statutory mitigating circumstance to youthfulness, § 13A-5-51(7), Ala.Code 1975, the statutory mitigating circumstance of no significant history of prior criminal activity increases in applicability and importance as the age of the defendant increases during the years when the defendant could have incurred adult criminal convictions.
Thus in the factual scenario before us a young capital-murder defendant with a record of prior adjudications of juvenile delinquencythe most accurate analysis and application of the statutory mitigating circumstance of no significant history of prior criminal activity would seem to be, first, that this circumstance is necessarily due only minimal weight for a juvenile tried as an adult, and then only to the extent that the law authorized the transfer or other treatment of juveniles as adults for prosecution before the defendant committed the capital murder being tried; and, second, the weight of this circumstance increases in direct proportion to the age of the defendant over the maximum age for a juvenile. Thus, in the case before us, the circumstance of no significant history of prior criminal activity is necessarily due only minimal weight.
HOUSTON, Justice (concurring in the judgment affirming as to the conviction, reversing as to the sentence, and remanding).
Article VI, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of the United States provides:
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this paragraph to mean what it says. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41, 88 S. Ct. 664, 19 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1968); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31, 62 S. Ct. 552, 86 L. Ed. 796 (1942) ("state law must yield when it is inconsistent with or impairs the policy or provisions of a treaty").
*631 On September 8, 1992, the United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"); Article 6(5) of this treaty provides: "Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women."
Roy Burgess was 16 years old when he committed the horrible crimes for which he has been sentenced to death.
The majority opinion indicates that the Justices concurring therein are satisfied that the United States Senate Reservation 1(2) relieves state justices from their constitutional obligation to be bound by this treaty.
The Senate Reservation begins with a clause reading: "The United States reserves the right...." This clause uses a singular verb. The following statement appears in Merriam Webster Dictionary of English Usage, p. 929 (1989): "[A]s the United States came to be thought of as a single entity, the singular verb came more and more into use." The Senate's reservation reads:
Federalism is alive and well. The United States Constitution binds me as a Supreme Court Justice of the State of Alabama to abide by the ICCPR, Article 6(5), and not to impose the sentence of death on Burgess for the crimes committed when he was 16 years of age. I am not persuaded that the Senate's reservation, if not invalid for other reasons, frees me as a state justice, as opposed to a federal justice or judge, from the treaty's restriction against the imposition of a sentence of death for a crime committed by a person below the age of 18 years.
In Domingues v. Nevada, 114 Nev. 783, 961 P.2d 1279 (1998), in a 3-2 decision, the Supreme Court of Nevada rejected the defendant's contention that the ICCPR prohibited the imposition of the death sentence for crimes committed by a 16-yearold. The Supreme Court of the United States denied the defendant's petition for certiorari review on November 1, 1999. 528 U.S. 963, 120 S. Ct. 396, 145 L. Ed. 2d 309 (1999). I am aware that an order of the Supreme Court of the United States denying a petition for certiorari review is not to be taken as an expression of an opinion on the merits of the case. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 70 S. Ct. 252, 94 L. Ed. 562 (1950); Carpenter v. Gomez, 516 U.S. 981, 116 S. Ct. 488, 133 L. Ed. 2d 415 (1995); however, I am also aware that when a petition raises a substantial question, the Court sometimes "points out those concerns which, although unrelated to the merits, justify the decision not to grant review." Carpenter v. Gomez, 516 U.S. 981, 116 S. Ct. 488. How much more substantial can a question be than whether a person can be executed for a crime committed in his youth, when the ICCPR, a treaty to which the United States is a signatory, makes such an execution facially illegal? However, the Court did not point out concerns justifying the decision not to grant review that were unrelated to the merits. Therefore, I do not believe it is a quantum leap for me to assume that certiorari review was denied based on the merits of the case.
In this present case, the defendant Burgess committed the capital crime when he was 16 years old; the jury recommended that he be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for that crime. The trial court overrode that recommendation and *632 sentenced him to death, which the trial court had every right to do under the Constitution of the United States, Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1004 (1995), and which the trial court may have had a right to do under the Constitution of Alabama of 1901. See Ex parte Giles, 632 So. 2d 577, 587-89 (Ala.1993) (Houston, J., concurring in the result); Ex parte Jackson, 672 So. 2d 810, 811-13 (Ala.1995) (Houston, J., concurring in the result); Ex parte Scott, 728 So. 2d 172, 191-92 (Ala.1998) (Houston, J., concurring specially).
Before I voted in this case, knowing that the State of Alabama is going to be named in a list with such countries as Iran, Iraq, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Pakistan, as jurisdictions approving death sentences for persons under age 18, I reread Clarence Darrow's summation in the Leopold and Loeb case. Attorney for the Damned: Clarence Darrow in His Own Words, pp. 16-88 (Simon and Schuster, Inc.1957). Like Darrow, I wonder if
Attorney for the Damned, p. 82.
Even though I am not persuaded that the Senate's resolution removes the ICCPR prohibition in State courts, I infer that the United States Supreme Court indicated that it did. I concur in the result, and I pray that in doing so I am not committing "an unforgivable act."
SEE, Justice (concurring in the affirmance as to the conviction; dissenting from the reversal as to the sentence; and dissenting from the order overruling the application for rehearing).
I would grant the State's application for a rehearing in this case. After further consideration, I believe the trial court properly considered Burgess's juvenile record in deciding what weight to accord the statutory mitigating circumstance of Burgess's lack of a significant criminal history, and I believe that in light of that juvenile record the trial court properly gave little weight to that statutory mitigating circumstance. I disagree with the conclusion that the trial court used Burgess's juvenile record to "negate" the statutory mitigating circumstance of Burgess's lack of a significant criminal history. The trial court found that that mitigating circumstance existed but had little weight. I agree with the trial court.
Further, I cannot conclude that the trial court erred in failing to give more weight than it did to the State's leniency toward Stevenson and Jones as a mitigating factor. While it appears undisputed that Stevenson and Jones were Burgess's accomplices in stealing the car and the music equipment, Burgess's testimony is the only evidence indicating that either of them participated in killing Gardner or had any prior knowledge of an intention to kill Gardner. The trial court did consider as a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance the fact that Burgess was not alone at the time of the crime, but Burgess's testimony and that of Stevenson and Jones conflicted with respect to whether Stevenson and Jones were accomplices to capital murder. The trial court could have found that Stevenson and Jones were not accomplices to capital murder. If it did, then comparing the sentencing leniency toward Stevenson and Jones with the sentence imposed on *633 Burgess is inapposite. I have found no authority requiring such a comparison. Although Stevenson and Jones, who were older than Burgess and who were with Burgess during and after the murder, were not punished at all, it is not clear that they were as culpable as Burgess was. Thus, on further consideration, I conclude that the trial court's failure to give more weight to the State's leniency toward Stevenson and Jones as a mitigating circumstance is not error warranting a new sentencing hearing.
[1]  This case was initially reviewed pursuant to procedures applicable before Rule 39, Ala. R.App. P., was amended. The amendment of Rule 39 was effective May 19, 2000, as to death-penalty cases.
[*]  Although Justice England was not a member of this Court when this case was orally argued, he has listened to the tape of oral argument.
[**]  Although Justice Johnstone did not sit for oral argument, he has listened to the tape of oral argument.
[***]  Justice Brown was a member of the Court of Criminal Appeals when that court considered this case.