Case Title: State v. Rush

Citation: 1998-Ohio-423

Docket Number: 19971778

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. RUSH, APPELLEE. 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. MITCHELL, APPELLANT. 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. TOLER, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Rush (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 53.] 
Statutory construction — Phrase “notwithstanding division (B) of Section 1.58 of 
the Revised Code” contained in Section 5 of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, as amended 
by Section 3 of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 269, cannot be construed as an attempt to 
amend R.C. 1.58(B) — Criminal law — Amended sentencing provisions of 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 apply only to these crimes committed on or after July 1, 
1996 — Section 5 of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, as amended by Section 3 of 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 269, does not violate constitutional prohibitions against ex 
post facto and retroactive legislation. 
1. 
The phrase “notwithstanding division (B) of section 1.58 of the Revised 
Code,” contained in Section 5 of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 (146 Ohio Laws, Part 
IV, 7136) as amended by Section 3 of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 269 (146 Ohio 
Laws, Part VI, 11099) cannot be construed as an attempt to amend R.C. 
1.58(B). 
2. 
Because the General Assembly has expressly stated that the amended 
sentencing provisions of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 are applicable only to those 
crimes committed on or after its effective date, R.C. 1.58(B) is inapplicable.  
The amended sentencing provisions of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 apply only to 
those crimes committed on or after July 1, 1996. 
3. 
Section 5 of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, as amended by Section 3 of Am.Sub.S.B. 
No. 269, does not violate the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto 
and retroactive legislation. 
(Nos. 97-1778, 97-2121, 97-2123 and 97-2266 — Submitted May 27, 1998 — 
Decided August 19, 1998.) 
 
2
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 96CA419. 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 
97APA03-351. 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-960835. 
 
The consolidated cases under consideration, though factually diverse, 
involve a single legal issue.  Johnnie D. Rush, Brian K. Mitchell, and Nathaniel 
Toler (“defendants”) committed offenses prior to the July 1, 1996 effective date of 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 (“S.B. 2”), 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136, for which they were 
sentenced after the effective date.  Each claims entitlement to be sentenced 
pursuant to the amended provisions contained in S.B. 2, rather than the sentencing 
guidelines in effect at the time he committed his offense. 
 
Courts throughout the state have rendered conflicting decisions regarding the 
applicability of S.B. 2’s amended sentencing provisions.1  Of the cases currently 
before this court, both the First and Fifth Appellate Districts have determined that 
the terms of S.B. 2 apply to those defendants awaiting sentencing as of July 1, 
1996.  The Tenth District Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion, 
holding the terms of S.B. 2 inapplicable to all defendants who committed crimes 
prior to July 1, 1996, regardless of their sentencing status as of that date. 
 
Case Nos. 97-1778 and 97-2121 are before this court upon the allowance of 
a discretionary appeal.  Case Nos. 97-2123 and 97-2266 are before this court upon 
our determination that a conflict exists. 
__________________ 
 
Robert D. Horowitz, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, Frederic R. Scott 
and Ronald Mark Caldwell, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant state of 
Ohio in case No. 97-1778. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Jill E. Stone, Assistant Public 
Defender, for appellee Johnnie D. Rush in case No. 97-1778. 
 
3
 
Ronald J. O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 
Taylor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee state of Ohio in case Nos. 97-
2121 and 97-2123. 
 
Judith M. Stevenson, Franklin County Public Defender, and Allen V. Adair, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant Brian K. Mitchell in case Nos. 97-2121 
and 97-2123. 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sherry Green, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant state of Ohio in case No. 97-2266. 
 
W. Michael Kaiser, for appellee Nathaniel Toler in case No. 97-2266. 
 
Kura & Wilford Co., L.P.A., and Barry W. Wilford, urging affirmance in 
case No. 97-1778 for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers. 
 
Maureen O’Connor, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paul 
Michael Maric, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal in case No. 97-
1778 for amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J.  Today we decide the following issue:  whether the amended 
sentencing provisions of S.B. 2 are applicable to those defendants who committed 
crimes prior to, but were convicted after, its July 1, 1996 effective date.  We 
conclude that the S.B. 2 sentencing provisions are inapplicable to those defendants. 
STATUTORY ANALYSIS 
 
With the passage of S.B. 2, the General Assembly effected significant 
changes in Ohio’s criminal code, modifying the classifications of criminal offenses 
and corresponding sentences.  See 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136; Legislative 
Service Commission Analysis of Sub.S.B. No. 2, Parts II and V (1995).  
Ostensibly, S.B. 2 reduces the terms of imprisonment for many offenses from those 
possible under the former statutory scheme.2  As a result, persons convicted of 
 
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crimes for which the term of imprisonment is seemingly reduced have attempted to 
obtain sentencing under what they consider the more favorable S.B. 2 terms. 
 
The defendants claim that R.C. 1.58(B) mandates that criminal offenders 
awaiting sentencing when S.B. 2 became effective on July 1, 1996, and whose 
potential sentences are reduced by S.B. 2, are entitled to the shorter sentence 
although their offenses were committed before S.B. 2’s effective date.  The instant 
dispute arises because the General Assembly specifically stated that all defendants 
who committed crimes before July 1, 1996, shall be sentenced under the law in 
existence at the time of the offense, “notwithstanding division (B) of section 1.58 
of the Revised Code.”  Section 3, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 269, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 
11099, amending Section 5 of S.B. 2. 
 
The defendants in the cases at bar maintain that R.C. 1.58(B) confers a 
vested right to elect sentencing under the new, more lenient statute, and that the 
“notwithstanding” language is an attempt to circumvent that right.3  That is, the 
defendants contend that the “notwithstanding” language is an attempted 
amendment of R.C. 1.58(B) that fails by virtue of its procedural shortcomings.  
Claiming that the General Assembly failed to comply with Ohio’s constitutional 
requirements in an unsuccessful attempt to limit R.C. 1.58(B) by amendment, the 
defendants argue that R.C. 1.58(B) governs this sentencing controversy. 
 
Contrary to the defendants’ assertion, R.C. 1.58(B) does not create a vested 
right to be sentenced according to amended laws:  it is a general rule of statutory 
construction.  R.C. 1.58(B) states: 
 
“If the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for any offense is reduced by a 
reenactment or amendment of a statute, the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment, if 
not already imposed, shall be imposed according to the statute as amended.” 
 
Prior to its effective date, the General Assembly amended Section 5 of S.B. 
2 to emphasize that its provisions apply only to crimes committed on or after July 
 
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1, 1996, “notwithstanding division (B) of section 1.58 of the Revised Code[.]”  
Section 3, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 269, 146 Ohio Laws Part VI, 11099 (“S.B. 269”).  The 
defendants contend that this “notwithstanding” language is an unconstitutional 
attempt to amend R.C. 1.58(B) by frustrating its purpose.  Because the defective 
language must be removed from the statute, the defendants argue that R.C. 1.58(B) 
applies to S.B. 2 despite the General Assembly’s articulation otherwise.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 145, 
149, 580 N.E.2d 767, 770 (the “offending portion” of the bill is severed to cure the 
defect).  See, also, Section 15(D), Article II, Ohio Constitution. 
 
The crux of this case, then, is whether the General Assembly’s addition of 
the “notwithstanding” language effects an amendment of R.C. 1.58(B).  It does not.  
Instead, it is a clarification of the General Assembly’s intent that the terms of S.B. 
2 be applied only to those persons committing crimes on or after July 1, 1996.  
Furthermore, it was in fact an unnecessary clarification. 
 
“It is axiomatic that the General Assembly is lodged with the power to 
define, classify and prescribe punishment for crimes committed within the state.”  
State v. Young (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 370, 392, 16 O.O.3d 416, 429, 406 N.E.2d 
499, 512 (Locher, J., dissenting).  See, also, State v. Morris (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 
101, 112, 9 O.O.3d 92, 98, 378 N.E.2d 708, 715.  It is the General Assembly, of 
course, that possesses authority to determine the effective dates of enactments 
passed pursuant to its legislative powers.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Ach v. Evans 
(1914), 90 Ohio St. 243, 247, 107 N.E. 537, 538; State ex rel. Clark v. Brown 
(1965), 1 Ohio St.2d 121, 125-126, 30 O.O.2d 478, 481, 205 N.E.2d 377, 381-382.  
In the instant case, the original language expressed the General Assembly’s intent 
that the provisions of S.B. 2 be applied only to crimes committed on or after its 
effective date.4  The “notwithstanding” language added by Section 3 of S.B. 269 is 
no more than a redundant expression of this aim. 
 
6
 
The language at issue does not alter or modify R.C. 1.58(B).  It eliminates 
uncertainty as to S.B. 2’s effective date by distinctly resolving any perceived 
conflict between Section 5 of S.B. 2 and R.C. 1.58(B).  The phrase 
“notwithstanding division (B) of section 1.58 of the Revised Code”  communicates 
the General Assembly’s proactive purpose by arresting R.C. 1.58(B)’s operation in 
this instance.  The language defines the time, as chosen by the General Assembly, 
at which the new provisions of S.B. 2 are to be applied and prior to which they are 
of no effect.  R.C. 1.58(B) remains operable and unchanged for future application. 
 
More important, however, this express statement by the General Assembly 
was unnecessary.  R.C. 1.51 provides that if the conflict between a special 
provision and a general provision of the code is irreconcilable, the special 
provision “prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general 
provision is the later adoption and the manifest intent is that the general provision 
prevail.”  See, also, R.C. 1.52 (if irreconcilable conflict exists, the later enacted 
statute prevails).  In this case, the irrefutable “manifest intent” is that S.B. 2 
prevail.  Thus, the original language of Section 5 of S.B. 2, a later enacted specific 
provision, was sufficient to ensure that the sentencing terms of S.B. 2 would apply 
only to crimes committed on or after its effective date despite R.C. 1.58(B), a 
previously enacted general rule of construction.  See, e.g., Bellian v. Bicron Corp. 
(1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 517, 519, 634 N.E.2d 608, 610; State ex rel. Dublin 
Securities, Inc. v. Ohio Div. of Securities (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 426, 429-431, 627 
N.E.2d 993, 996-997; State v. Chippendale (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 118, 120-123, 
556 N.E.2d 1134, 1136-1137.  The “notwithstanding” language later added to S.B. 
2 is a thorough, yet superfluous, elucidation of the General Assembly’s intent that 
the special provision control.5 
 
Based upon the foregoing, we hold that the phrase “notwithstanding division 
(B) of section 1.58 of the Revised Code,” contained in Section 5 of S.B. 2 as 
 
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amended by Section 3 of S.B. 269, cannot be construed as an attempt to amend 
R.C. 1.58(B). Because the General Assembly has expressly stated that the amended 
sentencing provisions of S.B. 2 are applicable only to those crimes committed on 
or after its effective date, R.C. 1.58(B) is inapplicable.  The amended sentencing 
provisions of S.B. 2 apply only to those crimes committed on or after July 1, 1996. 
EX POST FACTO AND RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
Mitchell and Rush also argue that the prospective application of S.B. 2’s 
sentencing provisions is a violation of the constitutional prohibitions against ex 
post facto and retroactive legislation.  See Section 10, Article I, United States 
Constitution; Section 28, Article II, Ohio Constitution.  Although not properly 
raised below, in criminal cases this court may “consider constitutional challenges 
to the application of statutes in specific cases of plain error or where the rights and 
interests involved may warrant it.”  In re M.D. (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 149, 527 
N.E.2d 286, syllabus.  Because Mitchell and Rush now present, albeit in tardy 
fashion, a constitutional argument in a criminal case that if correct would indicate 
that plain error occurred, we will address the issue.  That it is an argument without 
merit further supports consideration of the matter in the interest of judicial 
economy.  See State v. Campbell (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 41, 630 N.E.2d 339, 
345, fn. 2. 
 
Section 10, Article I of the United States Constitution forbids state 
legislatures from passing any “ex post facto Law.”  “[T]he Clause is aimed at laws 
that ‘retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for 
criminal acts.’ ”  California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales (1995), 514 U.S. 499, 
504, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 1601, 131 L.Ed.2d 588, 594, quoting Collins v. Youngblood 
(1990), 497 U.S. 37, 41-43, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 2718-2719, 111 L.Ed.2d 30, 39.  
Beazell v. Ohio (1925), 269 U.S. 167, 169-170, 46 S.Ct. 68, 68-69, 70 L.Ed. 216, 
217. 
 
8
 
Contrary to what Rush and Mitchell maintain, our ex post facto inquiry does 
not focus “on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of 
‘disadvantage[.]’ ”  Morales, 514 U.S. at 506, 115 S.Ct. at 1602, 131 L.Ed.2d at 
595, fn. 3.  Legislation violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it makes a previously 
innocent act criminal, increases the punishment for a crime after its commission, 
or deprives the accused of a defense available at the time the crime was committed.  
Collins at 42, 110 S.Ct. at 2719, 111 L.Ed.2d at 39. 
 
Rush and Mitchell contend that by creating an exception to R.C. 1.58(B) and 
thereby making the terms of S.B. 2 prospective only, the General Assembly 
engaged in unconstitutional retroactive legislation. Bearing in mind the Supreme 
Court’s clear explanation of what constitutes impermissible ex post facto 
lawmaking, however, the General Assembly’s prescript that S.B. 2 apply only to 
crimes committed on or after its effective date evades the prohibition.  See State v. 
Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 101, 684 N.E.2d 668, 683; State v. Wickline 
(1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 369, 371, 658 N.E.2d 1052, 1054 (applying ex post facto 
analysis to judicial precedent). 
 
The General Assembly did not increase the relevant criminal penalties by 
making S.B. 2 a prospective law.  The penalties applicable to Rush, Mitchell, and 
Toler remain unchanged from the time each committed his crime.  Accordingly, 
S.B. 2 does not, as Rush suggests, “inflict[ ] a greater punishment than the law 
annexed to the crime when committed.” 
 
The argument that prospective application of S.B. 2 violates the prohibition 
against retroactive legislation found in Section 28, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution is equally untenable.  As with their ex post facto argument, Rush and 
Mitchell claim that because S.B. 2 expressly applies only to crimes committed on 
or after its effective date, it retroactively extinguishes their R.C. 1.58(B) right to 
reduced sentences. 
 
9
 
“[T]he issue of whether a statute may constitutionally be applied 
retrospectively does not arise unless the General Assembly has specified that the 
statute so apply.”  Sturm v. Sturm (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 671, 673, 590 N.E.2d 
1214, 1215, fn. 2, citing Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio 
St.3d 100, 106, 522 N.E.2d 489, 495.  In this instance, the General Assembly has 
specified S.B. 2 to be a prospective law applicable only to those crimes committed 
on or after July 1, 1996.  This choice of a bright-line, prospective-only operation is 
not constitutionally prohibited retroactive legislation that takes away a vested right 
or imposes a new disability.  See State ex rel. Matz v. Brown (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 
279, 281-282, 525 N.E.2d 805, 807-808; Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d at 106, 522 
N.E.2d at 495.  “[T]o adopt defendant[s’] position would be to freeze law in time 
and to never allow amendments to the criminal justice system.”  State v. Smith, 80 
Ohio St.3d at 101, 684 N.E.2d at 682 (applying equal protection analysis to the 
constitutional amendment eliminating from the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals 
the review of capital appeals).  Simply put, the legislation at issue falls outside the 
defined parameters of prohibited retroactive legislation. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that Section 5 of S.B. 2, as amended by Section 3 of 
S.B. 269, does not violate the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto and 
retroactive legislation. 
DISPOSITIONS 
 
In case No. 97-1778 (Johnnie D. Rush), the judgment of the Stark County 
Court of Appeals is reversed and the original sentence imposed by the trial court is 
reinstated.  In case Nos. 97-2121 and 97-2123 (Brian K. Mitchell), the judgment of 
the Franklin County Court of Appeals is affirmed.  In case No. 97-2266 (Nathaniel 
Toler), the judgment of the Hamilton County Court of Appeals is reversed and the 
original sentence imposed by the trial court is reinstated. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
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MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs in the syllabus and judgment. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
See State v. Lawrence (Oct. 29, 1997), Summit App. No. 18298, unreported, 
1997 WL 775766; State v. Toler (Sept. 19, 1997), Hamilton App. No. C-960835, 
unreported, 1997 WL 603218; State v. Mitchell (Sept. 4, 1997), Franklin App. No. 
97APA03-351, unreported, 1997 WL 559463; State v. Mills (Aug. 29, 1997), 
Wood App. No. WD-97-012, unreported, 1997 WL 543067; State v. Rush (July 7, 
1997), Stark App. No. 96CA419, unreported, 1997 WL 930151; State v. Vance 
(June 27, 1997), Clark App. No. 96-CA-84, unreported, 1997 WL 351281; State v. 
Cox (Apr. 28, 1997), Warren App. Nos. CA96-07-069 and CA96-08-075, 
unreported, 1997 WL 208116; State v. Jenkins (Feb. 11, 1997), Lawrence App. No. 
96CA40, unreported, 1997 WL 66764. 
2. 
The state contends that the provisions of S.B. 2 do not necessarily result in 
reduced sentences.  While under the old sentencing scheme, a defendant might 
receive a longer term of incarceration, that longer term was often indefinite and 
could be reduced by “good time” credit.  See, e.g., former R.C. 2929.11 (143 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, 1433).  See, also, former R.C. 2929.01(C) (145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 
2088-2089) and 2967.19(A) (145 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6437) (reduction for good 
behavior).  Under the new provisions, although a defendant’s sentence may be 
shorter than the maximum indefinite sentence under the former scheme, it is a 
period of actual incarceration not subject to reduction for “good time” and subject 
to extension for bad behavior.  See, e.g., R.C. 2929.14 (extension for bad 
behavior).  See, also, R.C. 2929.01(B) and 2967.11(B), as enacted by S.B. 2; R.C. 
2967.19, repealed by S.B. 2 (reduction for good behavior).  Thus, the state 
persuasively asserts that these variables will in many instances make it difficult, if 
 
11
not impossible, to calculate whether a defendant’s sentence would truly be reduced 
under the terms of S.B. 2. 
3. 
Rush states that he and others like him should be able to elect which law 
they wish to be sentenced under.  Were we to hold R.C. 1.58(B) applicable in this 
case, the defendants would not be entitled to an “election.”  R.C. 1.58(B) does not 
provide for a choice by the defendant.  Rather, it states that the sentence “shall be 
imposed according to the statute as amended.”  (Emphasis added.)  As a result, the 
trial court would be required to impose sentences in accordance with S.B. 2 should 
the S.B. 2 terms constitute a reduction. 
4. 
In its original, unamended form, Section 5 of S.B. 2 read as follows: 
 
“The provisions of the Revised Code in existence prior to July 1, 1996, shall 
apply to a person upon whom a court imposed a term of imprisonment prior to that 
date and to a person upon whom a court, on or after that date and in accordance 
with the law in existence prior to that date, imposed a term of imprisonment for an 
offense that was committed prior to that date. 
 
“The provisions of the Revised Code in existence on and after July 1, 1996, 
apply to a person who commits an offense on or after that date.”  146 Ohio Laws, 
Part VI, 7810. 
5. 
Mitchell also contends that R.C. 2901.04(A), which states that criminal code 
sections defining offenses or penalties are to be construed strictly against the state 
and liberally in favor of the accused, requires us to hold R.C. 1.58(B) applicable.  
This codified rule of construction is pertinent where statutory language is 
ambiguous and requires further interpretation:  it is inapposite here.  See, e.g., State 
v. Flontek (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 10, 693 N.E.2d 767; Freedom Rd. Found. v. Ohio 
Dept. of Liquor Control (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 202, 205, 685 N.E.2d 522, 525, fn. 
1; State v. Quisenberry (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 556, 634 N.E.2d 1009.  In this case, 
 
12
there is no ambiguity.  To the contrary, we are faced with two unambiguous 
provisions that appear to be in direct conflict.