Case Title: People v. Foster

Citation: 

Docket Number: S248046

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2019-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JEREMY JOHN FOSTER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S248046 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division One 
D071733 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
SCD204096 
 
 
August 22, 2019 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. FOSTER 
S248046 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
The Mentally Disordered Offender Act (Pen. Code, § 2960 
et seq.) authorizes the Board of Parole Hearings to involuntarily 
commit individuals convicted of certain felony offenses for 
mental health treatment as a condition of parole.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 2962; all undesignated statutory references are to this code.)  
Commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) may 
continue even after an offender’s parole term has expired, so 
long as the district attorney makes a showing that the MDO’s 
mental disorder is not in remission and that the MDO, because 
of the disorder, represents a substantial danger of physical 
harm.  (§§ 2970, 2972.) 
In November 2014, California voters enacted Proposition 
47, which reclassified certain drug and theft-related offenses 
from felonies (or wobblers) to misdemeanors.  (People v. Valencia 
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 355.)  The initiative also authorizes 
individuals who have completed felony sentences affected by 
Proposition 47 to petition to redesignate the felony as a 
misdemeanor.  (§ 1170.18, subd. (f).)  Proposition 47 mandates 
that, with the exception of firearms restrictions, a redesignated 
conviction “shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes.”  
(§ 1170.18, subd. (k) (section 1170.18(k)).) 
In 2016, defendant Jeremy John Foster successfully 
petitioned to have a felony grand theft conviction redesignated 
as a misdemeanor.  Foster now argues that his commitment or 
PEOPLE v. FOSTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
recommitment as an MDO must be vacated because of the 
absence of a foundational felony.   
We conclude that the applicable statutes do not afford 
Foster the relief he seeks.  Under the MDO statute (§§ 2970, 
2972), the redesignation of Foster’s felony as a misdemeanor 
does not undermine the validity of his initial civil commitment, 
which was legally sound at the time the determination was 
made.  Nor does the redesignation alter the criteria governing 
Foster’s eligibility for recommitment as an MDO.  Equal 
protection principles do not compel a different result.  
Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment. 
I. 
On January 17, 2007, Foster entered a convenience store 
and grabbed merchandise from behind the counter.  Foster 
falsely told the store clerk that he was a police officer and that 
he “can do what he wants.”  The clerk attempted to physically 
stop Foster; Foster pushed the clerk away and fled.  Foster was 
arrested, and the merchandise was recovered at the scene. 
Foster pleaded guilty to one count of felony grand theft.  
(§ 487, subd. (c).)  The court sentenced Foster to 16 months in 
prison.  On September 14, 2010, after Foster had completed his 
sentence, he was admitted to a state hospital as an MDO as a 
parole condition under section 2962.  Foster’s commitment was 
extended several times, and he was released to an outpatient 
conditional release program for further treatment on October 
10, 2014.  Since his initial commitment, Foster has been 
recommitted as an MDO annually under section 2966, 
subdivision (c) and under sections 2970 and 2972. 
In 2016, after the voters approved Proposition 47, Foster 
successfully 
petitioned 
to 
have 
his 
felony 
conviction 
PEOPLE v. FOSTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
redesignated as a misdemeanor.  Foster then moved to dismiss 
his recommitment as an MDO on the basis that the 
redesignation of his theft offense meant he no longer had a 
qualifying offense for his MDO recommitment.  The trial court 
denied the motion.  
The Court of Appeal affirmed.  The court adopted the 
reasoning it set out in People v. Goodrich (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 
699, 709–711, which rejected an identical argument.  In 
Goodrich, the Court of Appeal concluded that Proposition 47 
does not apply to retroactively invalidate a properly imposed 
MDO commitment or to invalidate subsequent recommitments.  
The Goodrich court, interpreting the criteria for recommitment 
set forth in section 2972, subdivision (c), reasoned that 
recommitment “is not predicated upon [an individual’s] felony 
conviction; rather, it is predicated on his current mental state 
and dangerousness.”  (Goodrich, at p. 711.)  The Goodrich court 
further concluded that a challenge to an individual’s initial 
commitment as an MDO through Proposition 47 would amount 
to inappropriate retroactive relief “for the collateral purpose of 
invalidating an initial MDO commitment long after it was 
properly imposed.”  (Goodrich, at p. 711.)  Here, the Court of 
Appeal also rejected an equal protection claim premised on 
Foster’s asserted similarity to individuals committed under the 
Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVP Act; Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 6600 et seq.).   
We granted review. 
II. 
 
“Enacted in 1985, the MDO Act requires that an offender 
who has been convicted of a specified felony related to a severe 
mental disorder and who continues to pose a danger to society 
receive appropriate treatment until the disorder can be kept in 
PEOPLE v. FOSTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
remission.”  (People v. Harrison (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211, 1218 
(Harrison).)  The MDO Act provides for treatment at three 
stages of commitment: as a condition of parole (§ 2962), in 
conjunction with the extension of parole (§ 2966, subd. (c)), and 
following release from parole (§§ 2970, 2972).  (Lopez v. Superior 
Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1055, 1061–1062 (Lopez).) 
 
Section 2962 enumerates six criteria that must be met at 
the time of an offender’s initial commitment as an MDO: (1) the 
offender has a severe mental disorder; (2) the disorder is not or 
cannot be kept in remission without treatment; (3) by reason of 
the disorder, the offender represents a substantial danger of 
physical harm to others; (4) the disorder was a cause or 
aggravating factor in the underlying crime; (5) the offender was 
treated for the disorder for at least 90 days prior to his or her 
release; and (6) the underlying crime was either an enumerated 
felony or an unenumerated crime “in which the prisoner used 
force or violence, or caused serious bodily injury” or “expressly 
or impliedly threatened another with the use of force or violence 
likely to produce substantial physical harm.”  (§ 2962, 
subds. (a)–(e); Harrison, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 1229–1230.)  In 
Lopez, we characterized the latter three factors as “ ‘static’ or 
‘foundational’ factors in that they ‘concern past events that once 
established, are incapable of change.’ ”  (Lopez, supra, 50 Cal.4th 
at p. 1062.)  And we characterized the first three factors as 
“dynamic” or “capable of change over time” and observed that 
they “must be established at each annual review of the 
commitment.”  (Ibid.) 
 
Section 2966, subdivision (c) governs the second phase of 
an offender’s MDO commitment.  If an offender’s parole is 
continued for a one-year period under section 3001, the statute 
authorizes the Board of Parole Hearings to continue the 
PEOPLE v. FOSTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
offender’s treatment as an MDO.  Section 2966, subdivision (c) 
also authorizes procedures for an offender to challenge his or her 
recommitment as an MDO, but it explicitly limits that challenge 
to the three dynamic MDO criteria.  (§ 2966, subd. (c) [“[T]he 
procedures of this section shall only be applicable for the 
purpose of determining if the parolee [1] has a severe mental 
disorder, [2] whether the parolee’s severe mental disorder is not 
in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, 
and [3] whether by reason of his or her severe mental disorder, 
the parolee represents a substantial danger of physical harm to 
others.”]; see Lopez, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1062–1063.) 
 
Sections 2970 and 2972 govern the third and final phase 
of MDO commitment, which begins once the offender’s parole 
term has expired.  Section 2970 permits a district attorney, on 
the recommendation of medical professionals, to petition to 
recommit an offender as an MDO for an additional one-year 
term.  An offender will be recommitted if “the court or jury finds 
[1] that the patient has a severe mental disorder, [2] that the 
patient’s severe mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be 
kept in remission without treatment, and [3] that by reason of 
his or her severe mental disorder, the patient represents a 
substantial danger of physical harm to others.”  (§ 2972, 
subd. (c).)  An MDO may also be released on outpatient status 
during this third phase if the committing court finds such 
treatment can be provided “safely and effectively.”  (§ 2972, 
subd. (d).) 
Foster argues that he is no longer eligible for commitment 
as an MDO because the felony conviction that initially qualified 
him for commitment has been redesignated a misdemeanor.  
(§ 1170.18, subds. (f), (g).)  Specifically, Foster points to the 
provision of section 1170.18 added by Proposition 47 providing 
PEOPLE v. FOSTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
that “[a] felony conviction that is . . . designated as a 
misdemeanor under subdivision (g) shall be considered a 
misdemeanor for all purposes . . . .”  (§ 1170.18(k).)  The term 
“for all purposes,” Foster contends, necessarily includes the 
determination 
of 
his 
eligibility 
for 
commitment 
or 
recommitment as an MDO. 
As to Foster’s recommitment, the MDO Act indicates that 
the criteria for recommitment are solely comprised of the three 
factors Lopez characterized as “dynamic.”  Section 2972, 
subdivision (c), quoted above, sets forth the criteria for 
recommitment, and those criteria focus on the continued 
existence of the individual’s mental disorder and dangerousness 
to others.  (See also § 2966, subd. (c) [same “dynamic” criteria 
for continued commitment during a one-year continuation of 
parole]; Lopez, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1065 [“[O]nce that [initial 
one-year] period ends, the statutory language contemplates a 
challenge based only upon the dynamic factors justifying 
continued treatment.”].)  The statute offers no indication that 
the felony or misdemeanor character of the MDO’s underlying 
offense bears on the recommitment determination.  Legislative 
history instead suggests that the Legislature added the 
requirement that a qualifying offense be one “for which the 
prisoner was sentenced to prison” to describe the category of 
individuals subject to initial commitment.  (See Assem. Off. of 
Research, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1296 (1985–1986 
Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 30, 1985, p. 2 [“Purpose.  According 
to the author’s office, ‘there is no useful procedure for assuring 
mental health treatment for prisoners when their mental 
disorder was a factor in their committing a violent crime 
following their determinate sentence.’ ”].)   
PEOPLE v. FOSTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
It is true that Foster, if he had committed his theft offense 
today, would not be eligible for initial commitment as an MDO.  
(§ 2962, subds. (b), (e).)  But Foster’s present ineligibility for an 
initial commitment is not determinative of his eligibility for 
recommitment.  On this point, In re C.B. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 118 is 
instructive:  Two juveniles who had successfully petitioned for 
redesignation of certain felony convictions as misdemeanors 
under Proposition 47 argued that they were entitled to 
expungement of their DNA samples and profiles from the state’s 
DNA databank because their obligation to submit DNA was 
based on the felony violations now reduced to misdemeanors.  
(In re C.B., at pp. 122–123, citing §§ 296, 296.1 [requiring felony 
offenders to provide DNA sample].)  We rejected the argument 
on the ground that “submission and removal of samples have 
been governed by different standards.”  (In re C.B., at p. 126.)  
By statute, eligibility for expungement is confined to 
circumstances involving “lack of charges, acquittal, appellate 
reversal, or a finding of factual innocence” (id. at p. 128, citing 
§ 299, subd. (b)) and is not authorized “on the ground that 
conduct previously deemed a felony is now punished only as a 
misdemeanor” (In re C.B., at p. 128).  We held that “a showing 
of changed circumstances eliminating a duty to submit a sample 
is an insufficient basis for expungement of a sample already 
submitted.”  (Ibid.)  Similarly here, initial commitment and 
recommitment are “governed by different standards” (id. at 
p. 126), and “a showing of changed circumstances” eliminating 
eligibility for initial commitment “is an insufficient basis” for 
precluding recommitment of an individual who has already 
completed his initial commitment (id. at p. 128). 
Foster points to section 1170.18(k)’s directive that a 
redesignated felony “shall be considered a misdemeanor for all 
PEOPLE v. FOSTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
purposes.”  (Cf. People v. J.S. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 163, 171 
[“Even after the expiration of the initial commitment, . . . the 
initial determination of whether an offender qualifies as an 
MDO continues to have practical effects. . . .  Obviously, if an 
offender’s initial commitment is improper, any extended 
commitment would also be improper.”].)  But the redesignation 
of Foster’s underlying felony as a misdemeanor does not 
undermine the validity of his initial commitment as an MDO.  
Foster successfully petitioned for redesignation of his felony 
offense as a misdemeanor in 2016, six years after he was 
initially committed as an MDO.  In People v. Buycks (2018) 5 
Cal.5th 857 (Buycks), we examined the extent to which section 
1170.18(k) operated retroactively by applying “ ‘the principle 
[codified in Penal Code section 3] that, “in the absence of an 
express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied 
retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that 
the [lawmakers] . . . must have intended a retroactive 
application.” ’ ”  (Buycks, at p. 880.)  We found it “significant” 
that “subdivisions (a) and (f) of section 1170.18 both clearly 
reflect an intent to have full retroactive application, whereas 
subdivision (k) uses no similar language.”  (Id. at pp. 880, 881.)  
This disparity led us to conclude that “the default presumption 
applies to [section 1170.18(k)] so that its effect operates only 
prospectively.”  (Id. at p. 881.) 
We went on to recognize a limited exception based on In re 
Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada).  “The Estrada rule rests 
on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause 
providing only prospective relief or other clear intention 
concerning any retroactive effect, ‘a legislative body ordinarily 
intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend 
as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between 
PEOPLE v. FOSTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
sentences that are final and sentences that are not.’ ”  (Buycks, 
supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 881.)  Section 1170.18(k), we observed, 
“contains no savings clause indicating that it applies only 
prospectively, nor does it contain any language indicating that 
it otherwise limits or subsumes the ordinary presumption long 
established under the Estrada rule.”  (Buycks, at pp. 882–883.)  
We thus concluded that “the reduction of a felony conviction to 
a misdemeanor conviction under Proposition 47 exists as ‘a 
misdemeanor for all purposes’ prospectively, but, under the 
Estrada rule, it can have retroactive collateral effect on 
judgments that were not final when the initiative took effect on 
November 5, 2014.  [Citation.]  This construction comports with 
[section 1170.18, subdivision (n)], which explicitly states that 
‘[r]esentencing pursuant to this section does not diminish or 
abrogate the finality of judgments in any case that does not come 
within the purview of this section.’ ”  (Id. at p. 883, fn. omitted.)  
We applied this rule in Buycks to hold that the redesignation of 
a felony conviction to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 
operates retrospectively to ameliorate a sentence enhancement 
predicated on that felony conviction, so long as the judgment 
containing the sentence enhancement was not final when 
Proposition 47 took effect.  (Buycks, at pp. 890–891.) 
Section 1170.18(k), as construed in Buycks, does not aid 
Foster.  For one thing, it is not clear that an MDO commitment, 
which we have characterized as “not penal or punitive” (Lopez, 
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1061), is a type of judgment covered by 
Estrada’s limited rule of retroactivity as applied to section 
1170.18(k).  (Cf. In re C.B., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 131.)  In any 
event, the Estrada rule has no applicability to the circumstances 
here.  In Lopez, we explained that “the Legislature intended an 
MDO to be permitted to challenge the static factors justifying 
PEOPLE v. FOSTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
his or her commitment only during the initial one-year period of 
treatment.”  (Lopez, at p. 1065.)  Foster completed his initial 
year of treatment in 2011, well before the enactment of 
Proposition 47.  It is true that Foster, unlike the petitioner in 
Lopez, is challenging the validity of his initial commitment on a 
ground (i.e., redesignation of his qualifying felony as a 
misdemeanor) that could not have been raised during the one-
year period of his initial commitment.  (See Lopez, at pp. 1060–
1061, 1066–1067.)  But in this respect, Foster is no different 
than any defendant seeking to apply a felony redesignation to 
ameliorate a collateral consequence that already became final 
before Proposition 47 took effect.  Buycks made clear that the 
limited retroactivity of section 1170.18(k) based on Estrada does 
not extend that far. 
In sum, the redesignation of Foster’s theft offense as a 
misdemeanor does not undermine the continued validity of his 
initial 
commitment 
or 
preclude 
Foster’s 
continued 
recommitment as an MDO. 
III. 
Foster further contends that under the logic of In re Smith 
(2004) 42 Cal.4th 1251 (Smith), the redesignation of his 
qualifying felony as a misdemeanor eliminates the basis for his 
continued commitment and that a failure to so hold would 
violate equal protection principles.  In Smith, we construed the 
SVP Act, which requires a qualifying felony offense to support 
civil commitment of an offender determined to be a sexually 
violent predator.  (Smith, at p. 1257.)  We held that “if the People 
seek to continue SVP proceedings against someone whose 
present conviction has been reversed, it must retry and 
reconvict him.”  (Id. at p. 1270.)  Foster also argues that he is 
similarly situated to the defendants in In re Bevill (1968) 68 
PEOPLE v. FOSTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
Cal.2d 854 (Bevill) and In re Franklin (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 
386 (Franklin).  In Bevill, we held that a “mentally disordered 
sex offender” (now called an SVP) could no longer be 
involuntarily committed because he was convicted under a 
portion of a statute that did not prohibit his conduct.  (Bevill, at 
pp. 862–863, 856.)  In Franklin, the Court of Appeal held that 
an SVP petition was “fatal[ly] flaw[ed]” where the petition was 
filed after the reversal of the petitioner’s felony conviction and 
his resentencing as a misdemeanant.  (Franklin, at p. 392.) 
“ ‘ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the 
equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted 
a classification that affects two or more similarly situated 
groups in an unequal manner.”  [Citations.]  This initial inquiry 
is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, 
but “whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law 
challenged.” ’  [Citation.]  In other words, we ask at the 
threshold whether two classes that are different in some 
respects are sufficiently similar with respect to the laws in 
question to require the government to justify its differential 
treatment of these classes under those laws.”  (People v. McKee 
(2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1202.) 
Even assuming that SVPs and MDOs are similarly 
situated for present purposes, the cases Foster cites do not 
establish differential treatment of the two classes of civil 
committees.  In Smith, the reversal of the defendant’s felony 
conviction occurred while the SVP petition was “pending”; the 
defendant challenged his eligibility for SVP commitment “[a]fter 
his conviction was reversed, and before the SVP commitment 
proceedings progressed any further.”  (Smith, supra, 42 Cal.4th 
at p. 1256.)  It was in that context that we found the defendant 
ineligible for commitment due to the absence of a qualifying 
PEOPLE v. FOSTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
conviction.  Here, by contrast, the initial commitment 
determination occurred years ago, and there is no dispute that 
Foster had been validly convicted of a qualifying felony at the 
time that determination was made.   
In Bevill, we held that because of the invalidity of the 
petitioner’s conviction, his continued commitment as an SVP 
was also invalid.  (Bevill, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 862 [“[A] valid 
commitment must be based on a valid conviction.”].)  But that 
holding flowed from the structure of the statute governing 
commitment as a “mentally disordered sex offender,” under 
which a criminal proceeding was “suspended” for the duration 
of a civil commitment.  (Id. at p. 858; see Welf. & Inst. Code, 
former § 6302.)  We held that under that statute, “[w]hen the 
proceedings relating to commitment as a mentally disordered 
sex offender have run their course, the criminal case may be 
resumed and sentence imposed.”  (Id. at p. 858.)  Because “[t]he 
structure of the statute itself manifest[ed] the integral and 
continuing relation foreseen to exist between commitment and 
conviction” (id. at p. 861), we held that the invalidation of the 
petitioner’s conviction eliminates a court’s “jurisdiction to 
continue the criminal proceedings . . . , and the entire statutory 
edifice would become a shambles of meaningless alternatives” if 
commitment proceedings were allowed to continue (id. at 
pp. 861–862).  The distinctive structure of the commitment 
statute at issue in Bevill has no parallel here, and that case did 
not establish a rule applicable in Foster’s case.   
Franklin comes closer to Foster’s circumstances insofar as 
it involved the reduction of a felony conviction to a misdemeanor 
instead of an outright reversal.  (Franklin, supra, 169 
Cal.App.4th at p. 393.)  However, the reduction of the felony in 
Franklin became final before the district attorney filed an SVP 
PEOPLE v. FOSTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
petition against the petitioner; in other words, there was no 
valid qualifying felony to support the SVP proceeding from the 
outset.  (Ibid.) 
In sum, we reject Foster’s equal protection claim because 
we find no differential treatment in the commitment regimes 
governing SVPs and MDOs in light of Smith, Bevill, or Franklin.  
(See People v. Pipkin (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1151 
[discussing Smith and Bevill, and observing that “the 
distinguishing factor in . . . these cases is that the initial 
commitment was found to be legally improper from the outset” 
and thus “could not be viewed as supplying the requisite 
foundation for subsequent recommitments”].)  In so holding, we 
express no view on whether a different analysis or result would 
be required if an MDO’s qualifying offense were reversed on 
appeal after his one-year period of initial commitment had run.  
Whether such an individual could be validly recommitted under 
the criteria set forth in section 2966 or section 2972 is a question 
not presented by this case.  Nor are we confronted here with a 
felony redesignation that occurred during the pendency of an 
initial commitment proceeding or during an initial one-year 
commitment period.   
Finally, Foster argues that his continued commitment 
despite the reduction of his felony conviction to a misdemeanor 
violates due process of law insofar as it amounts to a 
commitment based solely on a diagnosis of mental illness and a 
prediction of dangerousness.  As discussed, the redesignation of 
Foster’s felony conviction does not undermine the continuing 
validity of his initial commitment.  Foster makes no argument 
that recommitment based on present findings of mental illness 
and dangerousness, following upon a valid initial commitment, 
violates due process of law. 
PEOPLE v. FOSTER 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C.J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Foster 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 2/27/18 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S248046 
Date Filed: August 22, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: David J. Danielsen 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michelle D. Peña, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, 
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Randall Einhorn, Stacy Tyler, Michael Pulos and Joy 
Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Michelle D. Peña 
3830 Valley Centre Drive, Suite 705, PMB 706 
San Diego, CA  92130 
(858) 275-3822 
 
Joy Utomi 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 738-9117