Case Title: State v. Talkington

Citation: 

Docket Number: 107596

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 107,596 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
CYRUS A. TALKINGTON, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
The factual underpinnings regarding a motion to suppress are reviewed for 
substantial competent evidence, but the legal conclusion drawn from those facts is 
reviewed de novo. When the State alleges an area is not within the curtilage, it has the 
burden of proving that point. 
 
2. 
 
The question of curtilage is a mixed question of fact and law. This court reviews 
the district court's factual findings for substantial competent evidence and reviews de 
novo the district court's legal conclusion whether a particular seizure occurred within the 
curtilage. 
 
3. 
 
Substantial competent evidence is legal and relevant evidence a reasonable person 
could accept to support a conclusion. This court normally gives great deference to the 
factual findings of the district court. The appellate court does not reweigh evidence, 
assess the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in evidence.  
  
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4. 
 
After Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. __ 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 
(2013), a search occurs under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
when:  (1) the government obtains information by physically intruding on a 
constitutionally protected area, i.e., persons, houses, papers, or effects; or (2) invades a 
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.  
 
5. 
 
When it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals. It is a 
basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. The Fourth Amendment does not 
extend to open fields because an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for 
activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the 
home.  
 
6. 
 
The area immediately surrounding and associated with the home is the curtilage, 
which is part of the home itself for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. It harbors the 
intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a person's home and privacies of life. The 
extent of the curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon whether an individual 
reasonably may expect that the area in question should be treated as the home itself.  
 
7. 
 
Factors to assess if an area is curtilage include:  (1) The proximity of the area 
claimed to be curtilage to the home, (2) whether the area is included within an enclosure 
surrounding the home, (3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and (4) the steps 
taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. These 
factors do not produce a finely tuned formula that when mechanically applied provide a 
3 
 
 
 
correct answer to all curtilage questions. Rather, they are useful analytical tools to the 
central question of whether the area is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should 
be placed under the home's umbrella of Fourth Amendment protection. 
 
8. 
 
This court must accept as true all inferences to be drawn from the evidence which 
support or tend to support the findings of the district court. 
 
9. 
 
In determining whether a defendant is able to show the violation of his or her—
and not someone else's—Fourth Amendment rights, the definition of those rights is more 
properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within 
that of standing. 
 
10. 
 
A defendant cannot object to the seizure of evidence without proper standing to 
challenge the validity of the search. On the issue of standing, the burden is on the 
defendant to show an expectation of privacy in the property searched. A defendant may 
testify at a suppression hearing to establish his or her standing to challenge a search 
without jeopardizing his or her defense at trial.  
 
11. 
 
Once standing is established, the State bears the burden on a motion to suppress of 
proving to the district court the lawfulness of the search and seizure by a preponderance 
of the evidence.  
 
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12. 
 
The physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the 
Fourth Amendment is directed. Fourth Amendment standing refers to whether the party 
challenging a search or seizure personally has a legitimate expectation of privacy that 
was implicated by the challenged governmental action. 
 
13. 
 
Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights that may not be vicariously asserted. 
A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction 
of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not 
had any of his or her Fourth Amendment rights infringed. 
 
14. 
 
As a social guest lacks the requisite property right in a residence or its curtilage, 
social guests must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence, under 
United States Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit social guest caselaw, in order to assert 
their Fourth Amendment rights. 
 
15. 
 
 
The status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show an expectation of privacy 
in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. One merely legitimately 
on the premises does not have the same legitimate expectation of privacy as an overnight 
guest. When evaluating a case somewhere in between, Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 
86-91, 119 S. Ct. 469, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998), considered the purely commercial 
nature of the transaction engaged in, the relatively short period of time on the premises, 
and the lack of any previous connection between respondents and the householder.  
 
5 
 
 
 
16. 
 
Even social guests who do not stay the night have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the host's home and may therefore challenge a search of the home on Fourth 
Amendment grounds. According to the Tenth Circuit, a social guest must show a degree 
of acceptance into the household or an ongoing and meaningful connection to the host's 
home to qualify for protection under the Fourth Amendment.  
 
17. 
 
Social guests have standing to assert a reasonable, subjective expectation of 
privacy that their host has in his or her residence. As the curtilage is treated as part of the 
home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes, a social guest standing in the shoes of his or 
her host has standing to assert a reasonable, subjective expectation of privacy in the 
residence, which includes the curtilage. 
 
18.  
 
Where a defendant, as a social guest, has demonstrated that he or she was entitled 
to the same Fourth Amendment protection afforded his or her host, the defendant has also 
demonstrated standing to assert a reasonable, subjective expectation of privacy in the 
backyard, i.e., curtilage, of the host's residence. 
 
19. 
 
When the State fails to demonstrate the lawfulness of a challenged search or 
seizure, the evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's rights under the Fourth 
Amendment may be suppressed through application of the exclusionary rule. One 
exception to the exclusionary rule is the doctrine of attenuation, which provides the 
poisonous taint of an unlawful search or seizure dissipates when the connection between 
the unlawful police conduct and the challenged evidence becomes attenuated. 
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20. 
 
Whether the taint of a prior illegality has been purged by sufficient attenuation 
between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of the challenged evidence is a question 
of fact reviewed by an appellate court under a substantial competent evidence standard. 
 
21. 
 
When evidence would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the 
police, the relevant question is whether the allegedly tainted evidence was discovered 
through exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to 
be purged of the primary taint. 
 
22. 
 
In determining whether law enforcement officers obtained allegedly tainted 
evidence through exploitation of an illegality, the following factors are considered:  (1) 
the time that elapsed between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence sought to 
be suppressed, (2) the presence of any intervening circumstances, and (3) the purpose and 
flagrancy of the official misconduct. But no one factor is controlling, and other factors 
also may be relevant to the attenuation analysis. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed April 26, 2013. 
Appeal from Lyon District Court; JEFFRY J. LARSON, judge. Opinion filed March 6, 2015. Judgment of 
the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Jonathon L. Noble, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Amy Aranda, acting county 
attorney, Vernon E. Buck, first assistant county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on 
the brief for appellant.  
 
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Stephen J. Atherton, of Atherton & Huth, of Emporia, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
MALONE, J.:   This interlocutory appeal concerns three issues:  whether a 
residential backyard constitutes part of the curtilage under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution; whether a social guest has standing to challenge the search of 
the curtilage at a host's residence; and whether drugs subsequently found on the 
defendant's person after an illegal search of the curtilage should be suppressed as fruit of 
the poisonous tree.  
 
Police searched the backyard of a residence that defendant Cyrus Talkington was 
visiting and discovered methamphetamine near the back door. Talkington was arrested, 
and marijuana was found on his person. Talkington was charged with possession with 
intent to distribute methamphetamine, felony possession of drug paraphernalia, 
possession of more than 1 gram of methamphetamine without an affixed Kansas drug tax 
stamp, trafficking contraband in a correctional institution, and possession of marijuana. 
The district court granted his motion to suppress, reasoning the methamphetamine was 
found in the curtilage of the home, that a social guest has standing to assert a host's 
Fourth Amendment rights in the curtilage, and that the marijuana found on Talkington 
was fruit of the poisonous tree. The State appealed. 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the backyard where the methamphetamine 
was found was not curtilage subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy, the standing 
issue was thus moot, and the subsequent search of Talkington's person following his 
arrest was lawful. State v. Talkington, No. 107,596, 2013 WL 1859215 (Kan. App. 2013) 
(unpublished opinion). We granted Talkington's petition for review which argued the 
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panel erroneously engaged in reweighing the evidence rather than determining if 
substantial competent evidence supported the district court's suppression order.  
 
Jurisdiction is proper under K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (review of Court of Appeals 
decisions upon timely petition for review). 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Around 4:30 p.m. on June 22, 2011, Lyon County Deputy Sheriff Cory Doudican 
and Emporia Police Officer D.J. Dragonas drove to a single-family residence in Emporia, 
Kansas. The officers were looking for Matthew Tucker to arrest on an outstanding 
warrant. The officers parked and exited their vehicle. As they approached the property, 
they observed Derric Joshua Garrison and Talkington, each with a leashed dog, walking 
from the south side of the house. Garrison lived at the residence, and Talkington was a 
long-time acquaintance who had come to the residence on numerous occasions to visit 
and to work on cars and mopeds.  
 
Each man dropped the leash he was holding, and the dogs ran toward the officers, 
while Garrison and Talkington ran to the back of the house. Shortly thereafter, the men 
returned to the front of the house and restrained the dogs. The officers had a brief 
conversation with them about their actions and asked if Tucker was at the residence. 
Talkington stated he did not know Tucker.  
 
Dragonas stayed with the men while Doudican walked to the backyard. Because 
there was no sidewalk to the back of the house, Doudican walked on an adjacent lot 
before walking back onto Garrison's property. Doudican was looking for Tucker or any 
weapons that could be used to ambush the officers. In the backyard, Doudican found a 
baggie of methamphetamine near a PVC pipe protruding from the ground. The baggie 
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was partially covered by insulation on the ground and was about 3 to 5 feet from the back 
door of the residence. The baggie was about 20 yards from the property line. Doudican 
did not realize what it was until he was 5 to 10 feet from it.  
 
Talkington and Garrison were arrested. Talkington was read his Miranda rights, 
see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), and 
was told he was being arrested for methamphetamine found in the backyard. He said he 
did not know anything about it. Talkington was transported to the Lyon County Jail 
where officials discovered a baggie of marijuana during an inventory search of his 
belongings.  
 
Talkington was charged with possession with intent to distribute 
methamphetamine, felony possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of more than 1 
gram of methamphetamine without an affixed Kansas drug tax stamp, trafficking 
contraband in a correctional institution, and possession of marijuana. The State also 
prosecuted Garrison for possession of methamphetamine. Both Garrison and Talkington 
filed motions to suppress in their respective cases.  
 
In Garrison's case, the district court suppressed the evidence after applying the 
factors set forth in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 94 L. Ed. 
2d 326 (1987). The court reasoned that the area where the methamphetamine was found 
was within the curtilage because the contraband was found in very close proximity to the 
house, Garrison had posted signs dissuading entry upon his property, and some sort of 
barrier had to be crossed to enter the property.  
 
The district court incorporated all of the testimony from Garrison's hearing into the 
record at Talkington's suppression hearing, and the parties stipulated that Talkington was 
Garrison's social guest. At the hearing, Talkington argued that he had a similar right to 
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privacy in the curtilage of the residence where he was a social guest, and the marijuana 
subsequently found on his person should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. 
Both hearings elicited testimony concerning the layout and characteristics of the house 
and surrounding property. 
 
Garrison's single-family home is located on 0.9 acres, with the majority of the land 
in the backyard. A sidewalk runs along the front of the house parallel to the street, but no 
path or sidewalk leads to the backyard. A short rock wall runs along the south side of the 
property. Doudican estimated it was 2 feet high; however from other evidence, the 
district court found it was no more than 1 foot high. Several trees line this wall but do not 
block the view to the backyard and side of the house. The north side of the property has a 
short wire fence, i.e., three posts connected by wire, which does not inhibit an onlooker 
from seeing the backyard from an adjacent property. An alleyway runs along the west or 
rear of the property. A "No Trespassing" sign and a "No Soliciting" sign are affixed to the 
front of the house. 
 
At Garrison's successful suppression hearing, the district court held the area in 
which the methamphetamine was found was within the curtilage of his property, and no 
applicable exception existed for the allowance of a warrantless search. The district court 
granted Talkington's motion to suppress, reasoning that as a social guest he was entitled 
to the expectation of privacy enjoyed by his host, Garrison. The court further found that 
the marijuana was discovered on Talkington at the jail within a short time of the illegal 
search and that no intervening circumstances existed. Accordingly, the district court held 
that the marijuana seizure was fruit of the poisonous tree and should be suppressed as 
well.  
 
The State filed an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded in Talkington, 2013 WL 1859215, at *1. Applying the Dunn factors, the panel 
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agreed the location of the methamphetamine near the back door weighed in favor of 
Talkington and little evidence was presented concerning the use of the property. 
However, the panel stated that the factors concerning whether the area was protected by 
an enclosure and whether steps were taken to protect the area from observation, i.e., the 
lack of enclosed fencing which did not obstruct the view or access to the backyard, 
weighed in favor of the State. Accordingly, the panel held the backyard was not part of 
the curtilage, and the subsequent search of Talkington when he was booked into jail was 
also lawful. Talkington, 2013 WL 1859215, at *3-7. Because of its decision that there 
was no illegal search, the panel did not address whether a social guest has standing to 
challenge the lawfulness of a search in the curtilage. 2013 WL 1859215, at *6. 
 
We granted Talkington's petition for review pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(b) and 
K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (review of Court of Appeals decisions upon timely petition for 
review). 
 
DID THE COURT OF APPEALS REWEIGH EVIDENCE WHEN REVERSING THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S FINDINGS THAT EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE BACKYARD SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED 
BECAUSE THE AREA WAS CURTILAGE? 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The factual underpinnings regarding a motion to suppress are reviewed for 
substantial competent evidence, but the legal conclusion drawn from those facts is 
reviewed de novo. State v. Campbell, 297 Kan. 273, 279, 300 P.3d 72 (2013). When the 
State alleges an area is not within the curtilage, it has the burden of proving that point. 
State v. Fisher, 283 Kan. 272, 284, 154 P.3d 455 (2007). 
 
The question of curtilage is likewise a mixed question of fact and law. This court 
reviews the district court's factual findings for substantial competent evidence and 
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reviews de novo the district court's legal conclusion whether a particular seizure occurred 
within the curtilage. 283 Kan. at 286. 
 
"Substantial competent evidence is legal and relevant evidence a reasonable 
person could accept to support a conclusion." State v. Bird, 298 Kan. 393, 399, 312 P.3d 
1265 (2013). This court normally gives great deference to the factual findings of the 
district court. State v. Hardyway, 264 Kan. 451, 456, 958 P.2d 618 (1998). The appellate 
court does not reweigh evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts 
in evidence. Campbell, 297 Kan. at 279.  
 
Analysis 
 
Talkington complains the Court of Appeals improperly reweighed the evidence in 
reversing the district court's conclusion that the area searched in Garrison's backyard was 
curtilage protected by the Fourth Amendment. He contends the district court's order 
suppressing the methamphetamine found in the backyard was supported by substantial 
competent evidence and should thus be affirmed. 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the "right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." Courts have used the reasonable expectation of privacy test from 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, 
J., concurring), to establish if the defendant had an actual, subjective expectation of 
privacy in the area searched and if that expectation was one society was prepared to 
recognize as reasonable. See United States v. Sweeney, No. 14-CR-20, 2014 WL 
2514926, at *2 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (unpublished opinion).  
 
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However, in 2013, the United States Supreme Court clarified that a traditional 
property rights baseline should be applied to Fourth Amendment cases as well. See 
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013) 
(quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951-52, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911 
[2012]) ("The Katz reasonable-expectations test 'has been added to, not substituted for,' 
the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment.").  
 
In Jardines, the United States Supreme Court held that police standing on the front 
porch with a drug sniffing dog entered the curtilage because "[t]he front porch is the 
classic exemplar of an area adjacent to the home and 'to which the activity of home life 
extends.'" 133 S. Ct. at 1415. Finding the officers had made an unlicensed physical 
intrusion onto Jardines' property, Justice Scalia did not apply the Dunn factors or 
consider whether Jardines had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the porch: 
 
 
"Thus, we need not decide whether the officers' investigation of Jardines' home 
violated his expectation of privacy under Katz. One virtue of the Fourth Amendment's 
property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy. That the officers learned what 
they learned only by physically intruding on Jardines' property to gather evidence is 
enough to establish that a search occurred." Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.  
 
After Jardines, a search thus occurs under the Fourth Amendment when:  (1) the 
government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected 
area, i.e., persons, houses, papers, or effects, 133 S. Ct. at 1414; or (2) invades "'a 
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.'" See Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001) (citing Katz, 389 
U.S. at 361).  
 
 
"[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals." 
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that 
14 
 
 
 
"'"searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively 
unreasonable."'" Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856, 179 L. Ed. 2d 
865 (2011) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. 
Ed. 2d 650 [2006]). The "Fourth Amendment does not extend to open fields because an 
individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in 
fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home." State v. Tinsley, 16 Kan. 
App. 2d 287, Syl. ¶ 2, 823 P.2d 205 (1991). 
 
The area "'immediately surrounding and associated with the home'" is the 
curtilage, which is "'part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.'" Jardines, 
133 S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 
80 L. Ed. 2d 214 [1984]). "It harbors the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a 
person's home and privacies of life." Fisher, 283 Kan. 272, Syl. ¶ 1. "[T]he extent of the 
curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably may 
expect that the area in question should be treated as the home itself." 283 Kan. at 286 
(citing Oliver, 466 U.S at 180). Those factors include: 
 
"[1] The proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, [2] whether the area is 
included within an enclosure surrounding the home, [3] the nature of the uses to which 
the area is put, and [4] the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation 
by people passing by." Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301.  
 
These factors do not produce a finely tuned formula that when mechanically 
applied provide a correct answer to all curtilage questions. Rather, they are useful 
analytical tools to the central question of whether the area is so intimately tied to the 
home itself that it should be placed under the home's umbrella of Fourth Amendment 
protection. 480 U.S. at 301; see Fisher, 283 Kan. at 286.  
 
15 
 
 
 
In this case, the district court applied these factors following Garrison's 
suppression hearing in concluding the area was curtilage in which Garrison possessed a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Garrison's ruling was not appealed, and it was 
incorporated into Talkington's suppression hearing. On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
applied the Dunn factors and did not address Jardines, which had been released just a 
month earlier. However, federal circuit post-Jardines cases apply both Jardines and the 
Dunn factors to curtilage analysis. See, e.g., Harris v. O'Hare, 770 F.3d 224, 240-41 (2d 
Cir. 2014), as amended (November 24, 2014); United States v. Bausby, 720 F.3d 652, 
656 (8th Cir. 2013).  
 
On petition for review, Talkington also does not address Jardines but argues the 
Court of Appeals improperly reweighed the evidence when considering the second and 
fourth Dunn factors. Thus, in determining if the area was curtilage, our analysis requires 
consideration of the Dunn factors.  
  
Proximity of the Area Claimed to Be Curtilage to the Home 
 
Talkington does not take issue with the panel's analysis concerning this factor. We 
have recognized there is no fixed distance at which curtilage ends. See Fisher, 283 Kan. 
at 288. The district court noted that Doudican found the bag of methamphetamine within 
a few feet of the house, just off the two-step stoop to the back door. As the contraband 
was found in close proximity to the house, the district court found this factor weighed in 
favor of Talkington.  
 
The Court of Appeals agreed, adding Doudican was 60 feet away when he spotted 
the bag, he did not recognize it contained drugs until he was within 5 to 10 feet of it, and 
the bag itself was only 3 to 5 feet away from the back steps. Compare Fisher, 283 Kan. at 
288-90 (trash bag found approximately 50 yards from residence in rural setting within 
16 
 
 
 
curtilage); State v. Mell, 39 Kan. App. 2d 471, 477, 182 P.3d 1, rev. denied 286 Kan. 
1183 (2008) (area was not far from residence's back door); Tinsley, 16 Kan. App. 2d at 
292 (70 feet is a short distance and could be in close proximity to house); State v. 
Waldschmidt, 12 Kan. App. 2d 284, 290, 740 P.2d 617, rev. denied 242 Kan. 905 (1987) 
(yard was immediately adjacent to house).  
 
Doudican's testimony and photographs of the backyard support these observations. 
The baggie was found in the center of the backyard a few feet from the back steps. See 
Brocuglio v. Proulx, 478 F. Supp. 2d 297, 303 (D. Conn. 2007), aff'd 324 F. Appx. 32 (2d 
Cir. 2009) ("[T]he undisputed immediate proximity of the back yard to the home strongly 
weighs in favor of a determination that the back yard was curtilage."). Substantial 
competent evidence supports the district court's factual findings concerning the proximity 
of the area, and caselaw supports the legal conclusion that this factor weighs in favor of 
Talkington, i.e., the area was curtilage.  
 
Whether the Area is Included Within an Enclosure Surrounding the Home 
 
"'[F]or most homes, the boundaries of the curtilage will be clearly marked; and the 
conception defining the curtilage—as the area around the home to which the activity of 
home life extends—is a familiar one easily understood from our daily experience.'" 
Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12). While not conclusive, 
"[f]encing configurations are important factors in defining the curtilage." 480 U.S. at 301 
n.4. In rural areas, natural boundaries such as thick trees or shrubbery may indicate an 
area "'to which the activity of home life extends.'" 480 U.S. at 302 (quoting Oliver, 466 
U.S. at 182 n.12). 
 
In this case, the district court found the enclosure factor did not weigh in favor of 
either side, reasoning: 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
"The area in which the contraband was found is not within the formal enclosure 
surrounding the home. There is a short wire fence on one side of the property with a very 
short rock wall with a few trees on the opposite side of the property. It is obvious neither 
barrier is intended to keep neighbors or passersby from viewing the back yard. Further 
the rear of the property is quite open with nothing preventing a full view of the backyard. 
Still it may be argued that the barriers on either side of the property are meant to dissuade 
others from physically entering the property. This factor does not weigh in either side's 
favor. The ability for one to clearly view the back yard tends to show it should not be 
considered curtilage, while the barriers, (wire fence, small rock wall, and trees) albeit not 
significant in stature, still serve to keep people out to some degree."  
 
The Court of Appeals held the facts favored the State, reasoning the house was 
devoid of a 6-foot-tall wooden fence, and the 1-foot-high rock boundary marker and 
remnants of the chain-link fence did not obstruct Doudican's view:   
 
 
"Several facts support the State's contention that Garrison's backyard was not 
surrounded by an enclosure. Garrison's backyard was not surrounded by a tall fence that 
blocked all visibility, nor was it well-kept or maintained. An alleyway also ran behind the 
home and was not visibly obstructed by any sort of fencing. Neither party disputed this 
fact at Talkington's suppression hearing, though appellate review is somewhat limited 
because the State's sole photograph of the backyard does not show the alleyway. 
Nonetheless, the lack of clearly enclosed fencing favors the State. See Mell, 39 Kan. App. 
2d at 478. Moreover, the State's testimony and photographs of the house, confirming the 
backyard was messy with household items and debris, suggest that Garrison undertook 
little effort to make private his affairs outside of his house. [Citation omitted.]" State v. 
Talkington, No. 107,596, 2013 WL 1859215, at *5 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished 
opinion). 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the panel distinguished this case from Fisher, 283 
Kan. at 289-90 (mowed and maintained area in rural environment might be considered 
18 
 
 
 
enclosure where it was surrounded by barbed wire fencing on three sides and highway on 
fourth), and compared it to Mell, 39 Kan. App. 2d at 478 (marijuana plants, outside the 
area enclosed by a fence, plants were visible from sidewalk, and area surrounding plants 
was not mowed or well maintained). The panel also cited three cases which found no 
reasonable expectation of privacy existed when warrantless arrests were made on the 
front porch. See State v. King, 293 Kan. 1057, 1062-63, 274 P.3d 599 (2012) (front porch 
partially screened, easily seen through, unlocked, provided access to front door, and 
anyone could see or hear persons on porch); State v. Riddle, 246 Kan. 277, 281, 788 P.2d 
266 (1990) (no expectation of privacy when arrested on porch); State v. Orr, No. 96,790, 
2008 WL 940778, at *4 (Kan. App. 2008) (unpublished opinion) (no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in glassed-in porch attached to front entrance—even where State 
conceded porch was part of curtilage).  
 
In this case, the baggie of methamphetamine was found just a few feet from the 
back porch steps. We presume the panel was citing these porch cases because of the 
drugs' proximity to the back porch and a comparison to the nature of the enclosure in 
King (partially screened, easy to see through) and Orr (glass enclosed). However, 
regarding proximity, the United States Supreme Court has subsequently found "[t]he 
front porch is the classic exemplar of an area adjacent to the home and 'to which the 
activity of home life extends.'" Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415.  
 
Because the Jardines Court did not apply the Dunn factors in suppressing the 
evidence or consider whether Jardines had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
porch, our cases involving porches as curtilage may be decided differently under the 
property rights test set forth in Jardines. 
 
 
Regarding the enclosure, Talkington argues the panel reweighed the evidence in 
finding the backyard was not surrounded by a tall fence blocking all visibility and was 
19 
 
 
 
not well maintained. The Court of Appeals does acknowledge the district court's factual 
findings concerning the existence of an alleyway bordering the west side of the property, 
a partial chain-link fence on the north side, and a rock wall or boundary marker on the 
south side. Indeed, substantial competent evidence, i.e., pictures and testimony, supports 
this description of the enclosure.  
 
The panel's recharacterization of the evidence concerning what the officers 
described as a rock wall was insignificant as its height and location were undisputed:  
"Also, a 1-foot-high rock boundary marker—it was described by the district court as a 
'wall' even though it would be more accurately described as a boundary marker because it 
was so low to the ground—surrounded Garrison's house . . . ." Talkington, 2013 WL 
1859215, at *2. In contrast, the panel's failure to address the district court's factual 
finding concerning the trees lining the rock wall/boundary marker is more significant 
because natural barriers may be considered part of an enclosure. See United States v. 
Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1277-78 (2d Cir. 1996) (wire fence on three sides of land that was 
partially fallen down, hedgerows on two sides, and thick woods on one side satisfied 
enclosure requirement—no need for artificial barriers, can be natural ones).  
 
The panel's main concern was the area was not enclosed by a tall fence and the 
backyard was visible through the partial fence and rock wall. While a 6-foot privacy 
fence would weigh in favor of curtilage as in Waldschmidt, 12 Kan. App. 2d at 290, 
"[t]here is no requirement that an area be completely invisible to those standing in the 
open fields in order to be deemed curtilage." Brocuglio, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 305 (officers 
could see vehicles over fence in backyard).  
  
Additionally, "[c]ourts have found an area to be curtilage where the area in 
question is only partially enclosed." See United States v. Cousins, 455 F.3d 1116, 1122 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied 549 U.S. 866 (2006). Indeed, two unpublished Court of Appeals 
20 
 
 
 
cases have also found backyards with partial or no fencing to be part of the curtilage. See 
State v. Frischenmeyer, No. 99,975, 2009 WL 400997, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2009) 
(unpublished opinion) (backyard with no fence and attached enclosed porch part of 
curtilage); State v. Wilson, No. 95,028, 2006 WL 2443710, at *7-8 (Kan. App. 2006) 
(unpublished opinion) (duplex backyard with only one fence separating it from property 
to north and no obstructions blocking area from street part of curtilage); see also Rivers v. 
State, 287 Ga. App. 632, 634, 653 S.E.2d 78 (2007) (curtilage included hedge area 
adjacent to side of house even if the backyard was exposed to an alley and not enclosed 
by a fence). 
 
Weighing these factual findings, the caselaw supports the district court's legal 
conclusion that this factor favored neither side. The ability to clearly view the backyard 
and its unkempt nature weighed against it being curtilage, while the fence, rock wall, and 
trees weighed in favor of a finding of curtilage. Accordingly, the panel exceeded its 
standard of review and reweighed the evidence in concluding this factor favored the State 
rather than being neutral.  
 
Nature of the Uses to Which the Area is Put 
 
An area is more likely to be within the curtilage of a home if it is used "'for 
intimate activities of the home.'" United States v. Noriega, 676 F.3d 1252, 1262 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (quoting Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302-03); see also Bleavins v. Bartels, 422 F.3d 
445, 452 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Areas that are 'intimately connected with the . . . activities' of 
the home include, for example, backyards."). Regarding this factor, the district court 
found:   
 
 
"There is no testimony for this court to rely upon to determine the nature of the 
uses to which the area is put. However, the photos of the area show it to be relatively un-
kept but otherwise a typical back yard. There are no indications the area was used for 
21 
 
 
 
outdoor entertaining, gardening or any other particular activity typically engaged in by 
homeowners."  
 
The panel agreed with the district court, pointing out the backyard was messy and 
littered with insulation and no testimony was offered concerning uses of the backyard. 
Accordingly, the panel concluded this factor slightly favors the State. Substantial 
competent evidence from the suppression hearings and photographs of the property 
support the district court's factual findings, and the caselaw supports the legal conclusion 
that this factor weighs in favor of the State.  
 
Steps Taken to Protect Area from Observation by People Passing 
 
The district court found this factor favored Talkington, reasoning: 
 
"Here, there is no sidewalk or path leading to the rear of the house. There are signs telling 
people they are not welcome on the property in the form of 'No Trespassing' and 'No 
Soliciting' signs. There was some effort to cover the baggie with a piece of housing 
insulation. While these things may not be the most effective ways to keep people from 
observing the area, they do show the defendant had some intent or expectation the rear of 
the house would be private. This factor weighs in favor of the defendant."  
 
The Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning: 
 
 
"The front of Garrison's house had both a no-trespass sign and a no-solicitation 
sign that suggest his desire to maintain a sense of privacy in his house and the 
surrounding area. See Fisher, 283 Kan. at 289-90. These were key facts bolstering the 
district court's decision. However, the house was not fully enclosed by a tall fence, and 
the 1-foot-high rock boundary marker and the remnants of a chain-link fence did nothing 
to obstruct the view of, or prevent entrance to, the backyard. See King, 293 Kan. at 1062. 
While it is true that Doudican could not see the bag of methamphetamine from a public 
vantage point, the record suggests that was due to the bag being partially obscured by 
22 
 
 
 
debris—some insulation—not because of his distance from the object. This factor favors 
the State." Talkington, 2013 WL 1859215, at *5. 
 
Talkington takes issue with the panel's holding for three reasons. First, Talkington 
argues the panel dismissed Garrison's efforts at privacy by posting "No Trespass" and 
"No Soliciting" signs on the residence. However, the panel did observe this was a key 
fact bolstering the district court's decision but concluded it was outweighed by the lack of 
privacy fencing. See State v. Fisher, 283 Kan. 272, 289-90, 154 P.3d 455 (2007).  
 
Second, Talkington persuasively argues the panel failed to acknowledge the 
district court's factual finding regarding the absence of a sidewalk or path leading to the 
backyard. This finding was significant because the lack of a sidewalk going to the area in 
question weighs in favor of a finding of curtilage. See Mell, 39 Kan. App. 2d at 479; cf. 
Cousins, 455 F.3d at 1122 (sidewalk on unenclosed area weighs against finding of 
curtilage); see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415-16, 185 L. 
Ed. 2d 495 (2013) (law enforcement officers enjoy limited invitation to approach home 
through ordinary routes of ingress and egress open to visitors). 
 
Third, Talkington argues the panel ignored evidence that the officers could not 
determine there was contraband on the property until they entered the property and closed 
to a short distance from the baggie. The panel acknowledged that Deputy Doudican could 
not see the baggie from a public vantage point but stated "the record suggests that was 
due to the bag being partially obscured by debris—some insulation—not because of his 
distance from the object." Talkington, 2013 WL 1859215, at *5. In our review of the 
record, Doudican testified he could not see the partially obscured object from 20 yards 
away. He had to enter the property and was able to identify the object only when he was 
5 to 10 feet from it. Doudican did not have to move the insulation to see the baggie of 
methamphetamine. As this court must accept as true all inferences to be drawn from the 
23 
 
 
 
evidence which support or tend to support the findings of the district court, the panel 
appears to have reweighed the evidence concerning the public visibility of the baggie by 
stating otherwise. See State v. Reiss, 299 Kan. 291, 296, 326 P.3d 367 (2014) (citing 
State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, 16, 251 P.3d 618 [2011]).  
 
We make two additional observations. First, the fact that an effort was made to 
conceal the baggie between the pipe and insulation also suggests an attempt to conceal 
the area around the baggie. The fact that the baggie could not be seen in open view from 
a public vantage point favors a finding of curtilage. Contrast Mell, 39 Kan. App. 2d at 
481 (plants in open view from public sidewalk and outside fenced enclosure weighed 
against curtilage finding). See also Walschmidt, 12 Kan. App. 2d 284, Syl. ¶ 9, 293 ("To 
invoke the plain view doctrine, the law enforcement officer must discover the evidence 
inadvertently while in a place where he has a right to be present."); Wilson, 2006 WL 
2443710, at *8 (defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy and did not knowingly 
share trash can in shared backyard/driveway with public because his neighbors did not 
constitute the "public"). Second, the panel also stated, contrary to the district court's 
findings, that the rock wall and partial fence did nothing to block the view or keep people 
out of the backyard. Talkington, 2013 WL 1859215, at *6. Again, the panel failed to 
accept as true the inference deduced by the district court that these barriers, including the 
treeline, served to keep people out to some degree.  
 
To summarize, while the lack of a privacy fence weighs somewhat in favor of the 
State, the no trespassing and no solicitation signs, the lack of a path leading to the 
backyard, the inability to see the area from a public vantage point coupled with the 
attempt to conceal the baggie, and the partial enclosure all weigh in favor of the district 
court's finding of curtilage. Accordingly, we hold the panel should have affirmed the 
district court's finding the factor favored Talkington.  
 
24 
 
 
 
Considering Dunn Factors as a Whole 
 
After weighing the four factors, the district court concluded the area was part of 
the curtilage:   
 
"Because the contraband was found in very close proximity to the house, because the 
defendant had posted signs dissuading entry upon his property and because there was 
some sort of barrier to be crossed to enter upon the property, this court finds the area is 
within the curtilage of the defendant's home and Fourth Amendment protections apply."  
 
The Court of Appeals disagreed: 
 
 
"In total, these four factors add up to the backyard not constituting part of the 
curtilage. While the bag of methamphetamine was found close to the back door, the State 
persuasively argues that the lack of enclosed fencing suggests the area was not curtilage 
as there was only a rock boundary marker and remnants of a chain-link fence which did 
nothing to obstruct the view of or access to the backyard. Moreover, the nature and uses 
of the backyard—admittedly there is little evidence on this point—appear to favor the 
State as the yard was messy and littered with insulation. While Garrison undertook some 
very limited efforts to assert some privacy in the front area with the placement of no 
trespassing and soliciting signage, the total lack of any fencing obstructing the view of or 
access to the backyard, coupled with the property's location in an urban area, vitiates any 
reasonable expectation of privacy Garrison may have had in the backyard." Talkington, 
2013 WL 1859215, at *6. 
 
As discussed above, the panel reweighed the evidence and failed to consider some 
of the factual findings relied on by the district court concerning each Dunn factor. These 
factual findings are significant because they weighed in favor of a finding of curtilage. 
While the panel was free to reach a de novo conclusion whether the factors individually 
and collectively suggested the area was curtilage, it needed to first apply a substantial 
25 
 
 
 
competent evidence standard to the district court's factual findings by accepting as true all 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence which support or tend to support the findings.  
 
While the unkempt nature of the backyard, the lack of enclosed fencing, and the 
lack of obstructions to view the backyard may suggest the area was not curtilage, the 
contraband's close proximity to the back porch steps, the partial enclosure by the rock 
wall/treeline and chain-link fence, the no trespassing/no solicitation signs on the house, 
the inability to see the area from a public vantage point, and the lack of a sidewalk or 
path leading to the backyard weigh in favor of a finding of curtilage. Accordingly, the 
panel erred in reversing because the district court's findings of facts were supported by 
substantial competent evidence, and caselaw supports its legal conclusion that the area 
was curtilage.  
 
We additionally observe that because officers garnered their information by 
physically intruding onto Garrison's property, we need not decide whether the officer's 
unlawful investigation of his curtilage violated Garrison's expectation of privacy under 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). See Florida 
v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013); United States 
v. Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d 1179, 1186 (9th Cir. 2012) (once carport was identified as part of 
curtilage under the Dunn factors, it was unnecessary to consider whether defendant had 
reasonable expectation of privacy in carport). However, the question remains whether 
Talkington, as a social guest of Garrison, must demonstrate his own reasonable 
expectation of privacy in order to challenge the unlawful search of his host's curtilage.  
 
26 
 
 
 
DOES A SOCIAL GUEST HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE A SEARCH OF THE CURTILAGE 
OF THE HOST'S RESIDENCE? 
 
Preservation Issue 
 
As we have concluded the officer unlawfully searched the curtilage, the question 
of a social guest's standing to challenge an unlawful search of the curtilage is once again 
relevant. However a preservation problem arises because this issue was raised by the 
State below, was found moot by the Court of Appeals, and was not raised in Talkington's 
petition for review. Under Supreme Court Rule 8.03(h)(1) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 77), 
a party must allege that an issue was decided erroneously by the Court of Appeals in 
order for the issue to be properly before the Supreme Court on petition for review. State 
v. Allen, 293 Kan. 793, 795-96, 268 P.3d 1198 (2012). The State could not appeal this 
issue because only a party that is "aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals" is 
eligible to file a petition for review. Rule 8.03(a) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 77).  
 
However, "in determining whether a defendant is able to show the violation of his 
(and not someone else's) Fourth Amendment rights, the 'definition of those rights is more 
properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within 
that of standing.'" See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S. Ct. 469, 142 L. Ed. 
2d 373 (1998) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 
387 [1978]). As this issue was raised below and may be considered part and parcel of the 
Fourth Amendment analysis, i.e., whether the area was curtilage and Talkington had a 
reasonable, subjective expectation of privacy in it, we elect to consider the issue rather 
than remanding to the Court of Appeals. See State v. Johnson, 299 Kan. 890, 892-93, 327 
P.3d 421 (2014) (if party's arguments to district court were sufficiently broad to 
encompass his or her appellate arguments, we will consider them for first time on 
appeal). 
 
27 
 
 
 
District Court/Court of Appeals Rulings 
 
Before the district court, Talkington testified that he had known Garrison for 7 to 8 
years and had been to the house numerous times to visit. Photographs of the backyard 
depict a brick driveway running alongside the south rock wall. Doudican testified that 
there was a car in the backyard that day, and Talkington testified that he would work on 
vehicles and mopeds sometimes when he visited Garrison. When asked where they would 
work on vehicles, Talkington responded:  "There was a car in the backyard, a 
Thunderbird, I'd helped him work on it before." Talkington would visit whenever he was 
in town, and he had last visited the week before the facts of this case occurred. On this 
day, he had come to visit around 12:30 to 1, and the officers arrived around 4:30 p.m.  
 
Before the district court, the State conceded that Talkington was a social guest of 
Garrison, who owned the residence. Kansas law provides that social guests have standing 
to assert a reasonable, subjective expectation of privacy that their host has in his or her 
residence, and the district court focused on whether a social guest had standing to 
challenge a search of the host residence's curtilage or simply the residence itself. See 
State v. Huff, 278 Kan. 214, 222, 92 P.3d 604 (2004). As the question of whether a social 
guest has standing to challenge a search of his or her host's curtilage is an issue of first 
impression in Kansas, the parties urged reliance on the following cases from other 
jurisdictions. 
 
Talkington relied on State v. Cuntapay, 104 Hawaii 109, 85 P.3d 634 (2004), 
where officers approached several males playing cards in a garage looking for the subject 
of a warrant. Cuntapay walked away into an open washroom in the garage and reached 
behind a washing machine. An officer followed him, moved the washing machine, and 
discovered a magnetic box containing methamphetamine. The Hawaii Supreme Court 
upheld the suppression of the evidence relying in large part on the dissent in Carter, 525 
28 
 
 
 
U.S. at 106 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Cuntapay court suppressed the evidence 
reasoning he had "demonstrated a subjective right to privacy when he walked out of the 
open garage, into the separate washroom and placed the key holder behind the washing 
machine, in a secluded location." 104 Hawaii at 117. Additionally, "society would 
recognize a guest's right to privacy in his host's washroom as reasonable." 104 Hawaii at 
117.  
 
The State relied on two cases. In United State v. Haynes, 108 Fed. Appx. 372 (6th 
Cir. 2004), police approached the defendant and two others sitting at a picnic table in the 
back or side yard of a friend's residence. Before approaching the officers, the defendant 
threw a gun behind the tire of a nearby car and was subsequently arrested. On appeal the 
Sixth Circuit rejected his argument that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
yard as a social guest. The court reasoned he failed to show any meaningful connection to 
the residence where he was only in town for 3 days and knew the friend only by his 
nickname. 108 Fed. Appx. at 374-75. In a footnote, the court noted that since the 
defendant personally did not have an expectation of privacy in the yard, it did not address 
whether anyone could have an expectation of privacy in the yard, i.e., whether the yard 
was curtilage. 108 Fed. Appx. 375 n.2. 
 
In United States v. Maestas, 639 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 2011), Maestas hid drugs 
and a gun in an outside garbage storage area which was shared by triplex residents. The 
Tenth Circuit assumed without deciding that Maestas was a social or overnight guest at 
his host's residence noting that it did not necessarily resolve whether Maestas, standing in 
the shoes of the tenant (his host), had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage 
storage area adjacent to the triplex. The court held that even if it assumed the area was 
curtilage, Maestas had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the area which was used to 
store garbage and was shared with other tenants who did not have a special or familial 
relationship with the host. 639 F.3d at 1039-40. 
29 
 
 
 
 
After examining these cases, the district court concluded: 
 
"Talkington has established to this court's satisfaction that he was a 'social guest' entitled 
to an expectation of privacy enjoyed by his host. This court has previously found the area 
in which the methamphetamine was found was within the curtilage of the property 
located at 109 S. State. The state has the burden to show either by fact or by law that 
evidence should not be suppressed. No case law has been presented to the court 
establishing under these facts that Mr. Talkington, as a social guest, had no right to 
privacy. Therefore, the evidence found at 109 S. State is suppressed."  
 
Before the Court of Appeals, the State argued the district court improperly 
required the State to provide authority that Talkington had no right to privacy. Relying 
again on Haynes and Maestas, the State asserted that the district court erred in 
determining that Talkington, as a social guest of Garrison, had the same expectation of 
privacy in a backyard in open view that he would have enjoyed inside Garrison's home. 
Talkington argued that as a social guest, he had standing to assert Garrison's reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the curtilage of his residence. The Court of Appeals found this 
issue was moot because it had concluded that Garrison had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his backyard. State v. Talkington, No. 107,596, 2013 WL 1859215, at *6 (Kan. 
App. 2013) (unpublished opinion). 
 
Standard of Review 
 
"[A] defendant cannot object to the seizure of evidence without proper standing to 
challenge the validity of the search. On the issue of standing, the burden is on the 
defendant to show an expectation of privacy in the property searched. A defendant may 
testify at a suppression hearing to establish his or her standing to challenge a search 
without jeopardizing his or her defense at trial." State v. Gonzalez, 32 Kan. App. 2d 590, 
593, 85 P.3d 711 (2004).  
30 
 
 
 
 
Once standing is established, the State bears the burden on a motion to suppress of 
proving to the district court the lawfulness of the search and seizure by a preponderance 
of the evidence. State v. Porting, 281 Kan. 320, 324, 130 P.3d 1173 (2006). 
 
Analysis 
 
The "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the 
Fourth Amendment is directed." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 
63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980). Fourth Amendment "standing" refers to whether the party 
challenging a search or seizure personally has a legitimate expectation of privacy that 
was implicated by the challenged governmental action. United States v. Thomas, 372 
F.3d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 2004).  
 
Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights that may not be vicariously asserted. 
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34. "'A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure 
only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third 
person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights 
infringed.'" See United States v. Rojas, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, No. CR14-4015-MWB, 
2014 WL 5106330, at *6 (N.D. Iowa 2014) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134).  
 
Recently, the Northern District of Oklahoma explained that the trespass doctrine 
enunciated in Jardines requires an existing constitutional property interest which social 
guests do not possess. United States v. Owen, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, No. 14-CR-0162-
CVE, 2014 WL 6750647, at *4-5 (N.D. Okla. 2014). As a social guest lacks the requisite 
property right in a residence or its curtilage, the court held social guests must have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence, under United States Supreme Court 
and Tenth Circuit social guest caselaw, in order to assert their Fourth Amendment rights. 
31 
 
 
 
2014 WL 6750647, at *4-5. See also Caskey, Cal. Search & Seizure § 2:14 Search in the 
curtilage; Jardines (2014) (to assert standing to challenge search of curtilage best 
approach is based upon expectation of privacy analysis). 
 
"The general rule in Kansas is that an individual must have a personal expectation 
of privacy in the area searched to have standing to challenge that search." Gonzalez, 32 
Kan. App. 2d at 593 (citing State v. Bartlett, 27 Kan. App. 2d 143, 146, 999 P.2d 274 
[2000]). To establish a legitimate expectation of privacy, a defendant must demonstrate a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched and that the expectation was 
objectively reasonable. State v. Robinson, 293 Kan. 1002, 1014, 270 P.3d 1183 (2012).  
 
"Where the subjective expectation of privacy and its objective reasonableness are 
both well established (for example, in a defendant's home), courts tend to state the 
conclusion of the analysis without distinguishing the two steps." State v. Case, No. 
109,339, 2014 WL 349605, at *7 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion); see Maestas, 
639 F.3d at 1035 ("Under the Fourth Amendment, it is axiomatic that people have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their own homes.").  
 
The "status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that [the guest] had an 
expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." 
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 109 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1990); see 
also Porting, 281 Kan. at 324-28 (overnight guest had expectation of privacy and 
standing to object to search of residence); State v. Yardley, 267 Kan. 37, 41, 978 P.2d 886 
(1999) (overnight guest had standing to challenge seizure of his duffle bag during search 
of residence where staying ); State v. Martinez, No. 107,995, 2013 WL 5925903, at *4 
(Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished opinion) (overnight guest had standing under Fourth 
Amendment to challenge search uncovering marijuana in bedroom he shared with renter 
of the house because he plainly had legitimate expectation of privacy in bedroom and 
32 
 
 
 
likely as to entire residence); cf. State v. Gonzalez, 32 Kan. App. 2d 590, Syl. ¶ 4 ("A 
person cannot establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel or motel room 
which is registered to another person absent a showing of a relationship with the 
registered guest.").  
 
In Carter, the United States Supreme Court observed that persons at an apartment 
for the purpose of packaging drugs did not have the same legitimate expectation of 
privacy as an overnight guest, reasoning: 
 
 
"If we regard the overnight guest in Minnesota v. Olson as typifying those who 
may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment in the home of another, and one 
merely 'legitimately on the premises' as typifying those who may not do so, the present 
case is obviously somewhere in between. But the purely commercial nature of the 
transaction engaged in here, the relatively short period of time on the premises, and the 
lack of any previous connection between respondents and the householder, all lead us to 
conclude that respondents' situation is closer to that of one simply permitted on the 
premises." 525 U.S. at 91. 
 
Further guidance is gleaned from Justice Ginsburg's often cited dissent in Carter:  
"[W]hen a homeowner or lessee personally invites a guest into her home to share in a 
common endeavor, whether it be for conversation, to engage in leisure activities, or for 
business purposes licit or illicit, that guest should share his host's shelter against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." 525 U.S. at 106 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She 
warned "that today's decision will tempt police to pry into private dwellings without 
warrant, to find evidence incriminating guests who do not rest there through the night." 
525 U.S. at 108 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 
Justice Ginsburg continued that "[t]hrough the host's invitation, the guest gains a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the home. [Olson, 495 U.S. 91], so held with respect 
33 
 
 
 
to an overnight guest. The logic of that decision extends to shorter term guests as well. 
[Citation omitted.] Visiting the home of a friend, relative, or business associate, whatever 
the time of day, 'serves functions recognized as valuable by society.' [Citation omitted.]" 
525 U.S. at 108-09. She concluded:  "[W]hen a homeowner chooses to share the privacy 
of her home and her company with a short-term guest, the twofold requirement 
'emerg[ing] from prior decisions' has been satisfied:  Both host and guest 'have exhibited 
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy'; that 'expectation [is] one [our] society is 
prepared to recognize as "reasonable."'" 525 U.S. at 109 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 
[Harlan, J., concurring]).  
 
"[E]ven social guests who do not stay the night have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the host's home and may therefore challenge a search of the home on Fourth 
Amendment grounds." Thomas, 372 F.3d at 1176 (nephew planning to sleep at relative's 
apartment on New Year's Eve considered social guest). According to the Tenth Circuit, a 
social guest must show a "'degree of acceptance into the household'" or an "'ongoing and 
meaningful connection to [the host's] home'" to qualify for protection under the Fourth 
Amendment. United State v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113, 1122 (10th Cir. 2009) (ex-boyfriend 
and former resident who visited often, had a key, invited guests in, and left alone without 
homeowner qualified as social guest) (quoting United States v. Rhiger, 315 F.3d 1283, 
1286-87 [10th Cir. 2003] [relying on Carter dissent in finding social guest status where 
he had known host for about 2 weeks, had regular presence at the home, stayed overnight 
at the house on few occasions when he was too intoxicated to drive, had receipts in house 
for items he had purchased, and entered residence unannounced to take nap]). 
 
Talkington's situation clearly falls somewhere in between an overnight guest and 
someone "merely 'legitimately on the premises.'" Carter, 525 U.S. at 91. Applying the 
Carter factors, no evidence was presented that Talkington and Garrison were involved in 
a commercial transaction. Talkington had been at the house for a few hours that afternoon 
34 
 
 
 
when the officers had arrived. Talkington and Garrison had been friends for 7 to 8 years, 
they worked on cars and mopeds together, and Talkington visited whenever he was in 
town, including the previous week. Accordingly, Talkington is entitled to Fourth 
Amendment protections under this analysis. Likewise applying Tenth Circuit analysis, 
Talkington establishes a "'degree of acceptance into the household'" and an "'ongoing and 
meaningful connection to [the host's] home'" by virtue of his 7- to 8-year relationship 
with Garrison, their working on vehicles together, and his regularly visiting whenever he 
was in town. See Poe, 556 F.3d at 1122.  
 
In 2004, we upheld the suppression of evidence after officers conducted an 
unlawful protective sweep of an apartment with several occupants inside, reasoning that 
"[s]ocial guests have standing to assert a reasonable, subjective expectation of privacy 
that their host has in his or her residence." Huff, 278 Kan. 214, Syl. ¶ 6. Assuming 
Talkington was a social guest with a reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence 
under United States and Tenth Circuit caselaw, no published Kansas cases have 
specifically considered whether a social guest has standing to challenge a search in the 
curtilage of his or her host's residence. In the absence of binding authority on this issue, 
we find it helpful to look at two unpublished Court of Appeals cases.  
 
In State v. Meeks, No. 90,782, 2005 WL 2076458, at *4 (Kan. App. 2005) 
(unpublished opinion), rev. denied 281 Kan. 1381 (2006), the Court of Appeals applied 
Huff in summarily concluding that a social guest did not have standing to object to a 
search, reasoning that even if he "had an expectation of privacy in the residence where he 
was staying, this expectation did not reasonably extend to the detached, padlocked 
garage." The Meeks panel did not extend the social guest's expectation of privacy as far 
as his host's expectation of privacy. In other words, it truly was not the social guest 
"standing in the shoes" of his host in making the reasonable expectation of privacy 
determination described by the Tenth Circuit. See Maestas, 639 F.3d at 1036. 
35 
 
 
 
 
In State v. Hawkins, No. 92,705, 2005 WL 217179 (Kan. App. 2005) (unpublished 
opinion), Hawkins was arrested in a shed being used as a methamphetamine lab 30 to 40 
yards from the residence on a rural property owned by Davis, and his standing to 
challenge the warrantless entry was raised on appeal. The panel did not address Huff in its 
analysis. Rather, it applied the Carter factors and found Hawkins had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the shed and standing to challenge the search because Hawkins 
and Davis worked together buying old cars, they repaired them in Davis' outbuildings, 
Hawkins kept tools on the property, and he had access to the shed and whole residence. 
Additionally, the panel found it significant that Hawkins had the ability to exclude others 
from the shed, citing Bartlett, 27 Kan. App. 2d at 147 (vehicle owner challenging the 
search of a loaned vehicle). Hawkins, 2005 WL 217179, at *4.  
 
Again, this case falls somewhere in between Meeks and Hawkins. Although the 
Meeks court did not extend the social guest's expectation of privacy to a padlocked 
garage, these facts are distinguishable because Talkington was clearly authorized to use 
the backyard. He and Garrison regularly worked on the car in the backyard, and they 
were tending to their dogs in the side and backyard when officers approached. Although 
no evidence was presented concerning his ability to exclude others or keeping tools on 
the residence, this case falls more in line with Hawkins where they likewise worked on 
cars on the host's property.  
 
We note that other jurisdictions have attributed a reasonable expectation of 
privacy to an overnight guest in the backyard or curtilage. See United States v. Houston, 
3:13-09-DCR, 2014 WL 259085, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (unpublished opinion) 
(overnight guest with familial relationship has standing to challenge video surveillance of 
his brother's curtilage); Lafave v. State, No. 16A01-1006-CR-271, 2010 WL 5395673, at 
*4 (Ind. App. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (overnight guest at underage drinking party 
36 
 
 
 
had reasonable expectation of privacy in home after officers unlawfully entered backyard 
which was part of curtilage). But see United States v. Butler, 06-CR-215, 2007 WL 
2220260, at *7 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (unpublished opinion) (although overnight guest had 
standing to object to search in his host's backyard, he did not have reasonable expectation 
of privacy in backyard because "[c]ommon sense dictates that a shared backyard would 
not fall within an area of privacy where an overnight guest could have an expectation of 
privacy").  
 
Likewise, other jurisdictions vary when attributing a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the backyard to a social guest. See, e.g., United States v. Dubose, No. 05-
0372(JDB), 2006 WL 1876999, at *8-9 (D.D.C. 2006) (unpublished opinion) (defendant 
who regularly visited and left belongings at his mother's house had reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his mother's backyard where he parked his car). But see State ex 
rel. K.M.K., No. 20010774-CA, 2002 WL 31600692, at *1-2 (Ut. App. 2002) 
(unpublished opinion) (where defendant was merely guest at backyard party with no 
ownership or control of the home, he has no standing to assert legitimate privacy 
interest). 
 
We find State v. Pierce, 226 Or. App. 336, 203 P.3d 343 (2009), the most 
analogous of these cases to our factual scenario. In Pierce, officers responding to a noise 
complaint walked down a driveway past the front of the house to a chain-link fence and 
observed Pierce, who was a social guest of the homeowner, in the backyard trying to 
conceal marijuana plants. Pierce moved to suppress the evidence as an unlawful search of 
his host's backyard, and the Oregon Court of Appeals agreed, noting in a footnote:  "It is 
not disputed that defendant, who was a guest at [homeowner's] house and was authorized 
to use [homeowner's] garage, had a protected privacy interest in the curtilage of 
[homeowner's] residence." 226 Or. App. at 339 n.2. Likewise in this case, Talkington was 
37 
 
 
 
a guest of Garrison, was authorized to use the yard, and the officer encroached on the 
curtilage to observe contraband hidden by the defendant in the backyard.  
 
We find the caselaw attributing a reasonable expectation of privacy to the 
backyard or curtilage more persuasive. As the curtilage is treated as "'part of the home 
itself for Fourth Amendment purposes,'" Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 
1409, 1414, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013), a social guest standing in the shoes of his or her 
host has standing to assert a reasonable, subjective expectation of privacy in the 
residence, which includes the curtilage.  
 
Accordingly, we hold Talkington has a reasonable expectation of privacy as a 
social guest in his host's residence under both the Carter factors and the Tenth Circuit's 
"'degree of acceptance into the household'" or an "'ongoing and meaningful connection to 
[the host's] home'" analysis. Poe, 556 F.3d at 1122. Considering whether the backyard 
falls under this protection, this case is more analogous to Hawkins (shed) and Pierce 
(hiding marijuana in backyard) than Meeks (locked detached garage) because 
Talkington's relationship with Garrison included authorization to be in Garrison's 
backyard. As Talkington has demonstrated that he was entitled to Fourth Amendment 
protections afforded his host as a social guest, he has also demonstrated standing to assert 
a reasonable, subjective expectation of privacy in the backyard, i.e., curtilage, of his 
host's residence. See Huff, 278 Kan. 214, Syl. ¶ 6.  
 
38 
 
 
 
WAS MARIJUANA FOUND ON TALKINGTON FOLLOWING HIS ARREST FRUIT OF THE 
POISONOUS TREE? 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The factual underpinnings regarding a motion to suppress are reviewed for 
substantial competent evidence, but the legal conclusion drawn from those facts is 
reviewed de novo. State v. Campbell, 297 Kan. 273, 279, 300 P.3d 72 (2013). 
 
"Whether the taint of a prior illegality has been purged by sufficient attenuation 
between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of the challenged evidence is a question 
of fact we review under a substantial competent evidence standard." State v. Williams, 
297 Kan. 370, 382, 300 P.3d 1072 (2013). 
 
Analysis 
 
After correctly concluding the search of the backyard was unlawful, the district 
court found the marijuana found on the defendant following his arrest should be 
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that 
because the search of the backyard and Talkington's arrest were lawful, the search of his 
person when being booked into jail was also lawful. Talkington, 2013 WL 1859215, at *7 
(citing State v. Copridge, 260 Kan. 19, 23, 918 P.2d 1247 [1996] [defendant taken into 
custody may have personal effects lawfully seized]). As we have reversed the Court of 
Appeals' conclusion that the search was lawful, our analysis turns to whether the district 
court properly suppressed the marijuana. 
 
When the State fails to demonstrate the lawfulness of a challenged search or 
seizure, the evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's rights under the Fourth 
Amendment may be suppressed through application of the exclusionary rule. Williams, 
39 
 
 
 
297 Kan. at 380. One exception to the exclusionary rule is the doctrine of attenuation, 
which provides "'the poisonous taint of an unlawful search or seizure dissipates when the 
connection between the unlawful police conduct and the challenged evidence becomes 
attenuated.'" 297 Kan. at 381 (quoting State v. Martin, 285 Kan. 994, 1003, 179 P.3d 457 
[2008]).  
 
"When evidence '"would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the 
police,"' the relevant question is whether the allegedly tainted evidence was discovered 
through '"exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to 
be purged of the primary taint."'" 297 Kan. at 381 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 
599, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 [1975]).  
 
In determining whether law enforcement officers obtained allegedly tainted 
evidence through exploitation of an illegality, the following factors are considered: 
 
"(1) the time that elapsed between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence 
sought to be suppressed, (2) the presence of any intervening circumstances, and (3) the 
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. [Citations omitted.] But no one factor is 
controlling, and other factors also may be relevant to the attenuation analysis." Williams, 
297 Kan. at 381. 
 
The district court applied these factors in determining whether the primary illegal 
search of the curtilage was so attenuated from the arrest and search of Talkington so as to 
purge the primary taint. Before the Court of Appeals, the State mistakenly focused on 
whether Miranda rights were given; however, this additional factor is only relevant when 
a confession is given following an unlawful arrest. See State v. Hill, 281 Kan. 136, 153, 
130 P.3d 1 (2006).  
 
40 
 
 
 
The first factor considers the time elapsed between the illegality and acquisition of 
the evidence sought to be suppressed. See Williams, 297 Kan. at 381. The district court 
found the arrest occurred just a few minutes after the illegal search. Doudican called for 
assistance after finding the methamphetamine in the backyard. One of those officers 
transported Talkington to the jail where marijuana was found on his person. The district 
court concluded this all occurred within a short time of the illegal search.  
 
At the suppression hearing, Doudican testified that they arrived at the residence 
around 4:30 p.m., and Detention Officer Tyler Pettigrew testified that Talkington arrived 
at the jail around 4:50 p.m. and his property was inventoried. See State v. Moralez, 297 
Kan. 397, 417, 300 P.3d 1090 (2013) (factor weighs heavily in favor of suppression 
because discovery of challenged evidence occurred within 16 minutes of Moralez' initial 
contact with officers); see also Hill, 281 Kan. at 154 (9 hours in police custody between 
unlawful arrest and interrogation weighs in favor of suppression). Given the very short 
period of time between the unlawful search and arrest, substantial competent evidence 
supports the district court's finding this factor weighs in favor of suppression. 
 
The second factor considers whether intervening circumstances occurred between 
the unlawful conduct and the discovery of the evidence. See Williams, 297 Kan. at 381. 
The district court found no intervening circumstances occurred between the arrest and 
Talkington's transportation to jail. Before the Court of Appeals, the State argued, without 
citing any authority, that the discovery of marijuana by jail officials who were not 
commissioned law enforcement officers and who perform ministerial duties unrelated to 
the events that led to the defendant's presence at the jail constitutes an intervening factor 
leading to attenuation of the taint of the search.  
 
We find this argument unpersuasive. Pettigrew and Rustan Dirks testified that they 
were detention officers employed by the Lyon County Jail and their duties included 
41 
 
 
 
supervision of inmates, detention of inmates, welfare, transporting prisoners, and 
inventory searches. See State v. Payne, 273 Kan. 466, 476, 44 P.3d 419 (2002) 
(defendant has no expectation of privacy when personal effects are lawfully seized and 
retained for safekeeping). A law enforcement officer brought Talkington to the jail, Dirks 
conducted an inventory search, and Pettigrew was advised to contact the arresting officer. 
Talkington continued to be in police custody at the jail when the custodial inventory 
search was performed by the detention officers. See Hill, 281 Kan. at 154 (no intervening 
circumstances during 9 hours of police custody).  
 
The State also argued that even if the entry into the backyard and discovery of 
methamphetamine was unlawful, its discovery, coupled with his running, provided 
probable cause to arrest Talkington. The State relied on State v. Boster, 4 Kan. App. 2d 
355, 606 P.2d 1035 (1980), in arguing the existence of probable cause for arrest is 
separate and distinct from the validity of the search that produced the evidence under the 
Fourth Amendment. But see Boster, 4 Kan. App. 2d at 357 (quoting State v. Addington, 
205 Kan. 640, 645, 472 P.2d 225 [1970]) ("'Unless a defendant's substantial rights are 
prejudiced as a direct result of an unlawful arrest, such as the use of evidence seized at 
the time, his arrest will not vitiate his subsequent conviction.'") (Emphasis added.).  
 
In this case, Doudican testified that Talkington ran to the backyard briefly. This 
was suspicious behavior. However, "courts have consistently recognized an individual's 
furtiveness or flight as contributing to reasonable suspicion, though not demonstrating 
probable cause." State v. Beltran, 48 Kan. App. 2d 857, 869-70, 300 P.3d 92, rev. denied 
298 Kan. __ (2013). In Beltran, a social guest's evasive action, walking to the kitchen 
against police directives, grabbing something from a table where marijuana was 
subsequently found, and putting it in his pocket, did not establish probable cause but at 
most reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 48 Kan. App. 2d at 874-75; see also State 
v. Beaver, 41 Kan. App. 2d 124, Syl. ¶ 6, 200 P.3d 490 (2009) (social guest's mere 
42 
 
 
 
presence in home and proximity to illicit drugs were insufficient to show probable cause 
to believe that defendant was in constructive possession of illicit drugs). 
 
Doudican did not see Talkington violate any law or throw anything to the ground; 
also he did not observe any weapons. Talkington denied knowing anything about the 
baggie, he was a social guest, and he did not know the person they were looking to arrest. 
Under these facts, the State has not established the officers had probable cause to arrest 
following the unlawful entry into the backyard. As the State has failed to establish any 
intervening circumstances representing a "potential break in the causal chain between the 
unlawful conduct" and the inventory search, this factor weighs in favor of suppression. 
See State v. Martin, 285 Kan. 994, 1004, 179 P.3d 457 (2008).  
 
The third factor considers the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. 
See Williams, 297 Kan. at 381. This factor focuses on the primary purpose of the 
exclusionary rule—deterrence. Moralez, 297 Kan. at 418. "To trigger the exclusionary 
rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter 
it." Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144, 129 S. Ct. 695, 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 
(2009). Factors that may be important to this inquiry are "'an officer's regular practices 
and routines, an officer's reason for initiating the encounter, the clarity of the law 
forbidding the illegal conduct, and the objective appearance of consent.'" Moralez, 297 
Kan. at 416 (quoting State v. Hummons, 227 Ariz. 78, 81-82, 253 P.3d 275 [2011]).  
 
The district court stated Doudican may have had legitimate reasons to enter the 
property, i.e., to look for Matthew Tucker (the subject of the arrest warrant) and to see if 
Talkington or Garrison had left any weapons in the back of the house to ambush the 
officers. However, the reasons were insufficient to obviate the need for a search warrant 
or consent to search. The court found Doudican's conduct was not extremely flagrant 
since no evidence established he was searching for any contraband or evidence to be used 
43 
 
 
 
against Talkington or Garrison. Additionally, the extent to which the curtilage reached 
was not obvious as demonstrated by the split of opinion between the district court and the 
Court of Appeals.  
 
We agree with the district court's reasoning that the marijuana should be 
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree:  "Although the purpose and flagrancy of the 
officers actions lean towards attenuation, the short time lapse and lack of intervening 
circumstances causes the court to conclude there is insufficient attenuation." Substantial 
competent evidence supports the district court's conclusion there was insufficient 
attenuation between the unlawful entry into the backyard and arrest and the discovery of 
marijuana on his person during an inventory search at the jail.  
 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The district court is affirmed. 
 
MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned.1 
                                                 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Senior Judge Malone was appointed to hear case No. 107,596 
under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616 to fill the vacancy on 
the court created by the appointment of Justice Nancy Moritz to the United States 10th 
Circuit Court of Appeals.