Case Title: Porter v. Harshfield

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Randy PORTER v. David HARSHFIELD, Jr., M.D.

96-940                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered June 23, 1997


1.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- standard of review -- burdens
     of proof. -- Summary judgment should only be granted when it
     is clear that there are no disputed issues of material fact;
     it is appropriate to sustain a grant of summary judgment if
     the evidence brought before the trial court by the moving
     party shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material
     fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
     matter of law; the party moving for summary judgment bears the
     burden of showing that there is no issue of material fact; all
     evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
     party resisting the motion and that party is also entitled to
     have all doubts and inferences resolved in his favor; however,
     once a movant makes a prima facie case for summary judgment,
     the respondents must then meet proof with proof by showing
     that there remains a genuine issue of material fact; even if
     there are disputed facts, if reasonable minds would not differ
     as to the conclusion to be reached, then a grant of summary
     judgment is proper; if a respondent to a motion for summary
     judgment cannot present proof on an essential element of the
     claim, the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter
     of law. 


2.   Master & servant -- theory of master-servant liability -- when
     master liable for servant's intentional tort. -- The theory of
     master-servant liability states that in order to render the
     employer liable, an act of an employee must pertain to
     something that is incident to the employee's duties and is his
     duty to perform or that is for the benefit of the employer;
     the master is subject to liability for his servant's
     intentional tort if the act was not unexpectable in view of
     the duties of the servant; an employer may be held liable for
     punitive damages for the acts of his employee if the employee
     was acting within the scope of his or her employment at the
     time of the incident; whether the employee's action is within
     the scope of the employment depends on whether the individual
     is carrying out the object and purpose of the enterprise, as
     opposed to acting exclusively in his own interest. 

3.   Master & servant -- employee's sexual assault of appellant
     unexpectable and not within scope of employment -- employer
     not liable for employee's actions -- appellee entitled to
     summary judgment. -- Where the employee's sexual assault of
     the appellant was unexpectable, and where he was not acting
     within the scope of his duties as a radiology technician when
     he assaulted the appellant, the appellee-employer could not be
     held liable for his employee's actions and was thus entitled
     to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
4.   Appeal & error -- negligence claims were tried by express or
     implied consent -- claims treated as if raised in appellant's
     complaint. -- Although appellant did not present claims for
     negligent hiring, retention, and supervision in his complaint,
     where appellee acknowledged in his brief in support of his
     motion for summary judgment that appellant had raised three
     theories of recovery: negligent hiring and retention;
     negligent supervision; and respondeat superior; the negligence
     claims were tried by the express or implied consent of the
     parties and thus were treated in all respects as if they had
     been raised in appellant's complaint. 

5.   Master & servant -- negligent-hiring claim without merit -- no
     evidence admitted to support claim. --  Appellant's negligent-
     hiring claim was without merit where appellee employer stated
     in his deposition that the employee had the highest ultrasound
     degree available, that he had known and worked with the
     employee for some eight years before appellee hired him as a
     technician and regarded him as very dependable, and where
     there was no evidence that, had appellee done a background
     check on the employee before hiring him, appellee would have
     discovered that the employee had a predisposition to commit
     sexual assault.  

6.   Master & servant -- negligent-retention claim without merit --
     appellant failed to meet proof with proof. --  Appellant
     failed to meet proof with proof on the issue of negligent
     retention where the fact that the employee had engaged in
     homosexual conduct in no way indicated that he would commit a
     sexual assault; appellee was unaware of the existence of a
     prior sexual-assault complaint against the employee concerning
     a breast exam; and the officer's affidavit did not address
     whether a complaint was made before the incident in question,
     much less whether appellee knew that such a complaint existed
     or whether the complaint had any validity. 

7.   Master & servant -- negligent-supervision claim unsupported by
     convincing argument or authority -- argument not considered. -
     - Where appellant offered no convincing authority or argument
     in support of his negligent-supervision claim, the argument
     was not considered on appeal; the supreme court does not
     consider assignments of error that are unsupported by
     convincing legal authority or argument. 


8.   Master & servant -- public-policy considerations argument
     without merit -- decision of trial court affirmed. --
     Appellant's assertion that public-policy considerations
     mandated reversal of the granting of summary judgment in his
     case was without merit; appellant claimed that the appellee,
     who made a profit from his clinic while being employed by the
     hospital, received an economic benefit by allowing his
     employee to be his own boss; thus, according to appellant,
     appellee must bear the risks that go along with the economic
     benefit; the supreme court found that the connection between
     the employee's authority as a radiology technician and the
     abuse of that authority to indulge in personal sexual
     misconduct was simply too attenuated to include within those
     risks allocated to his employer; the decision of the trial
     court was affirmed.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Third Division; John Ward,
Judge; affirmed.
     Gary Eubanks & Associates, by:  James Gerard Schulze, for
appellant.
     Michael Angel, for appellee. 

     W.H."Dub" Arnold, Chief Justice.
     The appellant, Randy Porter, brought suit against appellee
David L. Harshfield, Jr., M.D., d/b/a Riverside Radiology Group, to
recover damages for injuries sustained when Dr. Harshfield's
employee, Jerry Pearrow, a radiology technician, sexually assaulted
Porter while conducting a gallbladder ultrasound.  Porter's
separate suit against Pearrow resulted in a default judgment and a
subsequent award to Porter in the amounts of $15,000 in
compensatory damages and $15,000 in punitive damages.  In the
present appeal, Porter challenges the trial court's granting of
summary judgment in Dr. Harshfield's favor.  We affirm.
     The facts as set out in Porter's complaint are as follows.  On
October 4, 1993, Porter went to Riverside Radiology Group in North
Little Rock for an ultrasound for suspected gallbladder problems. 
Pearrow escorted him to an examining room and requested that he
partially disrobe, don a hospital gown, and lie on his back on the
examining table.  Pearrow put gel on Porter's stomach and proceeded
to examine his side several times.  He then unbuckled and unzipped
Porter's pants, pulled them down, and examined around his
testicles.  Feeling something on his penis, Porter looked down to
find Pearrow performing oral sex on him.  Porter immediately got
off the table, put on his clothes, and left the clinic.
     In his complaint, Porter claimed that Pearrow's actions were
within the course and scope of his employment and thus should be
imputed to Dr. Harshfield.  In his answer, Dr. Harshfield admitted
that Porter had been referred to his clinic on the date in
question, but denied any knowledge of the sexual assault.  He
pleaded affirmatively that, if Pearrow indeed committed the actions
alleged, his actions were outside the scope of his employment.  
     Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.  Attached to
Dr. Harshfield's motion was the affidavit of Dr. Joseph Calhoun,
the supervising radiologist at the clinic while Dr. Harshfield was
the acting Chief of Radiology at the Veterans Administration
Hospital.  Dr. Calhoun averred that he had been practicing
radiology in Little Rock since 1950.  "Eminently familiar" with the
standard of care in this area, Dr. Calhoun explained that it was
standard procedure to allow radiology technicians to perform
ultrasound tests unsupervised unless the examination was of an
unusual nature.  A routine gallbladder exam, according to Dr.
Calhoun, was not of an unusual nature.  
     Dr. Harshfield also presented his own affidavit in which he
stated that, at the time of the incident, he had no knowledge that
Pearrow had the intent to touch or physically contact Porter in an
inappropriate way, nor did he possess knowledge of any facts that
would have alerted him to the probability that Pearrow would engage
in such behavior.  He further averred that Pearrow's actions were
wholly outside his employment and beyond the duties and
responsibilities of a radiology technician at the clinic. 
According to Dr. Harshfield, Pearrow's actions did not benefit him
and were unexpectable.  
     In response to Dr. Harshfield's motion, Porter claimed that
Dr. Harshfield had conducted virtually no background check on
Pearrow.  He further complained that Dr. Harshfield failed to
supervise Pearrow; instead, he allowed Pearrow to "be his own
boss."  Porter also filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming
that Dr. Harshfield had knowledge of Pearrow's past misconduct.  In
support of this contention, Porter submitted the affidavit of
Little Rock Police Officer Sam Morshedi, who averred that he
interviewed Pearrow on October 6, 1993, at which time Pearrow told
him that he had previously engaged in homosexual conduct and had
had a prior complaint filed against him at the clinic for sexually
assaulting a female during a breast examination.  After considering
the pleadings, affidavits, discovery, and arguments of counsel, the
trial court granted summary judgment in Dr. Harshfield's favor.
     We have recently summarized our standards for summary judgment
review in O'Mara v. Dykema, 328 Ark. 310, 315-316, 942 S.W.2d 854
(1997):
     The standard of review for a grant of summary judgment is
     familiar.  Summary judgment should only be granted when
     it is clear that there are no disputed issues of material
     fact.  Franklin v. Osca, Inc., 308 Ark. 409,