Case Title: Dickey v. Inspectional Services Department of Boston

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12613

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12613 
 
JAMES DICKEY & another1  vs.  INSPECTIONAL SERVICES 
DEPARTMENT OF BOSTON. 
 
 
April 11, 2019. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Limited Liability Company.  Practice, Civil, Standing, 
Receiver. 
 
 
The petitioner James Dickey appeals from a judgment of a 
single justice of this court denying his petition for 
extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  Dickey, who 
is not represented by counsel, sought relief from an order of 
the Housing Court denying his motion to remove a receiver 
appointed with respect to real property owned by the other named 
petitioner, East Fourth Street, LLC, of which Dickey is 
apparently the sole member and manager.  We affirm. 
 
The underlying petition to appoint a receiver in the 
Housing Court named as defendants "East Fourth Street, LLC" and 
James S. Dickey, Manager."  Dickey appeared pro se to contest 
the appointment of a receiver.  The Housing Court rejected 
Dickey's arguments and appointed a receiver in an order dated 
May 25, 2018.  Dickey filed a motion to reconsider or to remove 
the receiver.  The Housing Court denied the motion in an order 
dated June 21, 2018, stating, "To the extent that Mr. Dickey 
filed the motion in his individual capacity, he is not a party 
and has no standing to appear before the court; if he has filed 
the motion in his capacity as manager of the East Fourth Street 
LLC, he must be represented by counsel." 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 East Fourth Street, LLC. 
 
2 
 
 
 
Dickey initially sought review of the latter order from a 
single justice of the Appeals Court pursuant to G. L. c. 231, 
§ 118, first par.  The single justice declined to grant relief.  
Dickey then filed a petition in the county court pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, again asserting his request to remove the 
receiver and arguing that he had standing to seek such relief.  
The single justice denied the petition, stating that "[r]elief 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is available only under exceptional 
circumstances, and generally is not available where there are 
alternative remedies. . . .  The petitioner has not demonstrated 
that such extraordinary relief is appropriate here."  Dickey now 
appeals. 
 
We affirm, for several reasons.  First, we agree with the 
Housing Court that Dickey, who is not an attorney, cannot 
present arguments on behalf of his limited liability company, 
which is the owner of the property that has been placed into 
receivership.  It is well settled under Massachusetts law that, 
with one very limited exception not applicable here, 
"corporations must appear and be represented in court, if at 
all, by attorneys."  Varney Enters., Inc. v. WMF, Inc., 402 
Mass. 79, 82 (1988).  Accord Rental Property Mgt. Servs. v. 
Hatcher, 479 Mass. 542, 549 n.7 (2018).  We have applied this 
rule both to business corporations, see Varney Enters., Inc., 
supra, and to limited liability companies.  See Kurbatzky v. 
Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 1008, 1008 n.1 (2018).  See also Laverty 
v. Massad, 661 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62 (D. Mass. 2009), citing First 
Taunton Fin. Corp. vs. Arlington Land Acquisition-99, LLC, Mass. 
Super. Ct., No. 034449BLS (Suffolk County Feb. 27, 2006) 
(applying Massachusetts law to conclude that "a member of [a 
limited liability company] cannot bring an action in his own 
name to enforce the rights or redress the injuries of the 
[limited liability company]").  This is appropriate because 
Massachusetts limited liability companies, like Massachusetts 
business corporations, are legal entities with the rights to sue 
and be sued separate and apart from their shareholders and 
members.  See G. L. c. 156C, § 55.  Also, as the name implies, 
limited liability companies limit the liability of their 
members, similarly to corporations with respect to corporate 
shareholders.  See Cook v. Patient Edu, LLC, 465 Mass. 548, 553 
& n.12 (2013).  Thus, our observation in Varney Enters., Inc., 
402 Mass. at 82, that "[t]here is no injustice in allowing 
natural persons to appear pro se, while requiring persons who 
accept the advantages of incorporation to bear the burden of 
hiring counsel to sue or defend in court," applies equally to 
persons who accept the advantages offered by organizing their 
businesses as limited liability companies.   
3 
 
 
 
 
Second, as a corollary, we hold that Dickey's ownership 
interest in East Fourth Street, LLC, does not give him standing 
to raise the claims of the company, pro se, in his individual 
capacity.  To hold otherwise would be to vitiate the principles 
that corporations and limited liability companies are entities 
that exist separate and distinct from the individuals who own 
them and that for purposes of suing and being sued they must 
therefore be represented by attorneys.     
 
Finally, even apart from the question of Dickey's lack of 
standing, we note that G. L. c. 211, § 3, is generally not an 
appropriate avenue to challenge an order appointing a receiver.  
Rather, such orders are immediately appealable to the Appeals 
Court under the doctrine of present execution.  See, e.g., Albre 
v. Sinclair Constr. Co., 345 Mass. 712, 712-713 (1963); Wax v. 
Monks, 327 Mass. 1, 2-3 (1951); New England Theatres, Inc. v. 
Olympia Theatres, Inc., 287 Mass. 485, 490 (1934), cert. denied 
sub nom. E.M. Loew's, Inc. v. New England Theatres, Inc., 55 
S. Ct. 509 (1935).  
 
For all of these reasons, the single justice did not err or 
abuse her discretion in denying the petition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
James Dickey, pro se. 
 
Robert S. Arcangeli, Assistant Corporation Counsel, 
& Stuart T. Schrier, for the respondent, were present but did 
not argue.