Case Title: Vanderpool v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Curtis F. VANDERPOOL, Jr. v. FIDELITY &
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY

96-1198                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 24, 1997


1.   Jurisdiction -- approval of settlement of damage claims against third party
     was within trial court's jurisdiction. -- In the circumstances of
     this case, approval of a settlement of damage claims against
     a third party was within the trial court's jurisdiction,
     because these matters were not included in the appeal that had
     been lodged in the supreme court; the rule that an appeal
     divests the trial court of jurisdiction applies only to
     matters necessarily or directly involved in the matter under
     review; it does not stay further proceedings with respect to
     rights not passed on or affected by the judgment or decree
     from which the appeal is taken; matters that are independent
     of, or collateral or supplemental, are left within the
     jurisdiction and control of the trial court.

2.   Statutes -- construction -- basic rule. -- In considering the meaning
     of a statute, the supreme court construes it just as it reads,
     giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning
     in common language; the basic rule of statutory construction
     to which all other interpretive guides defer is to give effect
     to the intent of the legislature; as a guide in ascertaining
     legislative intent, the supreme court often examines the
     history of the statutes involved, as well as the
     contemporaneous conditions at the time of their enactment, the
     consequences of interpretation, and all other matters of
     common knowledge within the court's jurisdiction; furthermore,
     in construing any statute, the supreme court will place it
     beside other statutes relevant to the subject matter in
     question, giving it meaning and effect derived from the
     combined whole.

3.   Workers' compensation -- purpose of workers' compensation statutes. -- The
     purpose of workers' compensation statutes was to change the
     common law by shifting the burden of all work-related injuries
     from individual employers and employees to the consuming
     public.

4.   Workers' compensation -- joint-petition settlement -- claimant's right to
     proceed is extinguished. -- The purpose in allowing an insurance
     carrier and an employer to pursue an action in tort against a
     third party is to ensure that the employee is not doubly
     compensated to the detriment of the employer and insurance
     carrier and, ultimately, the consuming public; for this
     reason, it is clear that the finality of a joint-petition
     settlement is viewed from the claimant's standpoint, and it is
     the claimant's right to proceed further that is extinguished.

5.   Workers' compensation -- joint-petition settlement -- insurance carrier
     reserves right to proceed against third-party tortfeasor. -- A third-
     party tortfeasor is not subject to the Workers' Compensation
     Act; for that reason, an insurance carrier can settle the
     claim with the claimant and reserve its right to proceed
     against the tortfeasor.

6.   Workers' compensation -- joint-petition settlement -- neither employee nor
     employer precluded from seeking compensation against third-party tortfeasor.
     -- Although the implication from the language in the joint
     petition and order was that appellant employee's claim was
     forever barred and precluded as against appellee insurance
     carrier and appellant's employer, the documents did not
     preclude appellant from seeking compensation against the
     third-party tortfeasor nor did they preclude appellee
     insurance carrier from doing the same.

7.   Workers' compensation -- joint-petition settlement -- third-party tortfeasor
     not party to petition -- appellant and appellee had right to proceed
     against her. -- A third-party tortfeasor is not a "party" to a
     joint petition covered under Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-805; thus,
     both the insurance carrier and the injured employee can take
     action against the third party; because the third-party
     tortfeasor in this case was not a party to the joint petition
     presented to and approved by the Workers' Compensation
     Commission, both appellant employee and appellee insurance
     carrier had the right to proceed against her.

8.   Workers' compensation -- joint-petition settlement -- trial court's
     conclusion that lien was not extinguished by settlement affirmed. -- The
     supreme court affirmed the trial court's conclusion in its
     order that the right to a statutory lien on sums recovered
     from the third-party tortfeasor granted to appellee was not
     extinguished by the joint-petition settlement approved by the
     Workers' Compensation Commission.

9.   Appeal & error -- failure to obtain ruling from trial court is procedural
     bar to appellate consideration of issue. -- The supreme court will
     not address the merits of an argument where the appellant has
     failed to obtain a ruling from the trial court.

10.  Jurisdiction -- subject-matter jurisdiction -- appellate court obligated to
     raise question. -- Where the question is one of subject-matter
     jurisdiction, it does not matter how it arises; the question
     may be raised for the first time on appeal or the appellate
     court may raise it on its own, but the parties to an action
     may not confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a court; the
     question of subject-matter jurisdiction is one that the
     appellate court is obligated to raise on its own, due to the
     fact that if the trial court lacked subject-matter
     jurisdiction, the appellate court also lacks subject-matter
     jurisdiction.

11.  Jurisdiction -- action in tort is action at law -- jurisdiction properly
     before circuit court. -- Under the Arkansas Constitution, circuit
     courts have original jurisdiction in all cases where
     jurisdiction is not expressly vested in another court; to
     successfully attack a circuit court's jurisdiction, a party
     must demonstrate that another court has been given exclusive
     jurisdiction; the statutory section under which both
     appellee's and appellant's actions were filed below, Ark. Code
     Ann.  11-9-410, places jurisdiction in the circuit courts, as
     it provides for the maintenance of an action in tort; circuit
     courts are courts of law, and an action in tort is an action
     at law; therefore, jurisdiction of this action was properly
     before the circuit court; further,  11-9-410(c) states that
     any settlement of a third-party action shall be approved by
     either the Commission or the court, indicating concurrent
     jurisdiction over such matters.

12.  Jurisdiction -- trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction. -- In this
     case, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction because
     circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all cases where
     jurisdiction has not been exclusively vested in another
     tribunal, and because Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-410 provides
     insurance carriers with the right to maintain an action in
     tort against third-party tortfeasors.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Sixth Division; David B.
Bogard, Judge; affirmed; Motion to Strike, to Dismiss Appeal, to
Stay Briefing Schedule, and for Sanctions denied.
     Dabbs, Graham & Pomtree, by: Jeffrey M. Graham, for appellant.
     Laser, Wilson, Bufford & Watts, P.A., by: Brian A. Brown and
Walter Kendel, Jr., for appellee.

     Ray Thornton, Justice.
     This is a second appeal following an appeal previously decided
by this court, Vanderpool v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 322 Ark.
308, 908 S.W.2d 653 (1995).  Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(11).  The
action arose after appellant Curtis F. Vanderpool, Jr., was injured
in an automobile accident in which his work vehicle collided with
a car driven by Vicki Kaiko.  Vanderpool and appellee Fidelity &
Casualty Insurance Company, his employer's workers' compensation
carrier, entered into a joint petition for approval of settlement
that was approved by the Workers' Compensation Commission.  He also
received a settlement from Kaiko.  The Pulaski County Circuit Court
ordered Vanderpool to pay $22,133.97, with interest, to Fidelity in
satisfaction of Fidelity's statutory lien against the settlement he
received from Kaiko.
     Vanderpool makes the following arguments on appeal: (1) the
joint-petition settlement extinguished any right Fidelity had to a
statutory lien; (2) a legal dispute existed as to whether the lump-
sum payment of $17,000.00 ordered pursuant to the joint-petition
settlement constituted "compensation" as used in Ark. Code Ann. 
11-9-410; (3) the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate the dispute as to the size and existence of a statutory
lien on benefits paid as workers' compensation.  The development of
the issues before us has been procedurally challenging, but we have
considered the issues raised by appellant, and we affirm the order
of the trial court.  We first review the procedural history of the
case.
Procedural History  
     On May 11, 1993, Vanderpool entered into the joint-petition
settlement with Fidelity under the terms of which Fidelity paid
Vanderpool's medical expenses, attorney's fees, and $17,000.00 in
exchange for a release of liability of Fidelity and its insured on
the workers' compensation claim.  The Workers' Compensation
Commission approved the petition.  See Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-805
(1987).  Nearly a year after the approval of the joint petition,
Fidelity sued Kaiko asserting subrogation rights to any recovery by
Vanderpool for injuries caused by Kaiko's negligence, and on May
25, 1994, Vanderpool filed a personal-injury action against Kaiko. 
The matters were consolidated by the trial court, and Vanderpool
moved for declaratory judgment that Fidelity's rights to a
statutory lien had been extinguished by the joint petition. The
trial court denied the motion on November 30, 1994, and on December
16, Vanderpool filed notice of appeal of the denial of the motion
for declaratory judgment.
     On March 14, 1995, the transcript was lodged with this court.
At that point, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction of the
case, as it then became a matter under review by this court.  Glick
v. State, 283 Ark. 412, 415,