Case Title: State v. Hall

Citation: 342 So. 2d 616

Docket Number: 

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
342 So. 2d 616 (1977) STATE of Louisiana v. Isaiah HALL. No. 58444. Supreme Court of Louisiana. January 24, 1977. Rehearing Denied March 2, 1977. *618 Laurence D. Rudman, Rudman & Howard, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant. William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Mamoulides, Dist. Atty., Abbott J. Reeves, Director, Research and Appeals Division, Gretna, for plaintiff-appellee. SANDERS, Chief Justice. The State charged Isaiah Hall with possession of heroin with the intent to distribute in violation of LSA-R.S. 40:966(A). After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as charged. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment. He appeals his conviction and sentence, relying upon fourteen assignments of error.[1] In these assignments, defendant asserts that his right to privacy was violated when the police officers entered into a private dwelling without a warrant. Amendment IV of the United States Constitution; Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. Defendant contends that without a warrant or probable cause for arrest, police officers entered his motel room, held him at gun point, searched his room, and found two plastic bags containing heroin and other narcotics paraphernalia. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the following evidence was adduced: Agent Richard Dennis of the Jefferson Parish Police Department Narcotics Division, acting upon information supplied by a confidential informant, whose reliability in the past led to narcotics arrests in Jefferson Parish, sent the confidential informant to Room 229 of the Sentry Motel in Gretna, Louisiana, to purchase three packets of heroin. Following standard police procedure, Agent Dennis searched the confidential informant but found no money or narcotics on his person. He then gave the informant thirty-six dollars with which to purchase the three packets of heroin. Agent Dennis proceeded to a place where he could observe the actions of the informant and there witnessed the informant knock on the door of Room 229 of the Sentry Motel and gain entrance. The agent then witnessed the informant exit that room and proceed to a pre-arranged meeting place where the informant produced three tin-foil packets. The agent conducted a field test and found the packets contained heroin. He searched the confidential informant and found no other narcotics or money. The informant told Agent Dennis that Isaiah Hall and James Lewis, also known as "Cadillac Slim" and "Slim," were in possession of a large quantity of heroin and that the heroin might be moved. A search warrant was secured for Lewis's residence, 1815 Joanne Place in New Orleans. Both New Orleans and Jefferson Parish Police Officers executed the warrant. Mrs. Lewis and her children were present. Certain non-contraband articles were seized along with $1,190 in cash and an envelope bearing the words: "Call Slim at 366-4551, Room 229." The officers traced this telephone number to the Sentry Motel in Gretna where the informant made the buy from Isaiah Hall with Lewis present. Fearing that the occupants of Room 229 would receive word of the search of Lewis's residence or that the occupants had already received word, the officers returned to the Sentry Motel at approximately 5 a.m. and *619 obtained a pass key from the manager. They knocked on the door of Room 229 and announced that they were police officers. Receiving no response, but hearing movements inside, they opened the door with the key and entered with guns drawn. The officers testified that they feared the contraband would be destroyed. The officers found defendant, a woman, and a small child in the bed. They ordered the occupants out of bed. Defendant was arrested and read his "Miranda rights." The officers explained the purpose of the entry to defendant and told him that they would obtain a search warrant before fully searching the room. A cursory "Chimel" search was conducted for weapons within the reach of the occupants. Within a few minutes Agent Dennis left the room "secured" and obtained a search warrant. Within approximately sixty minutes of the entry into the motel room, Agent Dennis returned with the search warrant. A full search was then conducted. There officers found two plastic bags containing a brown substance which they field tested and found to contain 9% heroin. The officers found the heroin above the tiles of the suspended ceiling, along with a small tin foil package of white powder. When tested, the white powder was found to contain three grams of procaine, a substance used to dilute heroin for sale on the street. The officers also seized two cans of shaving powder and a set of five measuring spoons which when tested disclosed procaine residue. In substance, defendant argues that the entry cannot be justified; that there was no necessity for "securing" the motel room. He contends that the police officers could have kept the room under surveillance and monitored the motel switchboard until the warrant was procured. Defendant concedes that he was arrested when the police officers entered the room and restrained him. Nonetheless, he argues that because he was not removed from the scene until an hour later, when the search warrant was executed and the contraband seized, the officers did not intend to hold him on the basis of their warrantless entry. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 213 authorizes an officer to arrest a person without a warrant when there is reasonable cause to believe that that individual has committed an offense, although not in the presence of the officer. Reasonable or probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge suffice to justify a man of average caution to believe that an offense has been committed. In determining whether reasonable cause for arrest exists, the rigorous proof required for conviction is unnecessary. Reasonable cause is something less and must be judged by the probabilities and practical considerations of everyday life on which average men, and more particularly, average police officers can be expected to act. State v. St. Amand, La., 274 So. 2d 179 (1973); State v. Williams, 260 La. 1167, 258 So. 2d 539 (1972); State v. Dell, 258 La. 1024, 249 So. 2d 118 (1971). Admittedly, defendant was arrested when the officers entered his motel and restrained his movement. The police officers actually placed defendant under arrest based upon their conclusion that defendant possessed heroin with the intent to distribute. We find that the police officers had reasonable cause to arrest defendant. Since the arrest was legal, the search for weapons within the reach of the occupants following the arrest was also proper. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969). We also find that exigent circumstances existed which justified the warrantless entry until a search warrant could be obtained. Once Lewis's residence in New Orleans was searched, the large amount of heroin at the motel was in danger of being destroyed. Officers could not have known whether the news of the search of Lewis's residence in New Orleans had reached the motel room in Gretna. The officers, therefore, acted reasonably in preventing the destruction of the evidence. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963); Warden *620 v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967). Assignments of Error Nos. 22, 24, and 25 are without merit. In these assignments, defendant again complains that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He argues specifically that the application for the search warrant was fatally defective in that it contained misrepresentations and uncorroborated hearsay evidence. Defendant contends that the confidential informant did not exist, and the purchase of three packets of heroin did not occur. The application for the search warrant recites: Under our jurisprudence, a search warrant may not be issued upon an affidavit reciting nothing more than the affiant has reasonable cause to suspect that the object of the search is on the premises. State v. Wells, 253 La. 925, 221 So. 2d 50 (1969). The affidavit must recite facts establishing to the judge's satisfaction that probable cause exists for the issuance of the search warrant. State v. Holmes, 254 La. 501, 225 So. 2d 1 (1969); State v. Wells, supra. In State v. Paciera, La., 290 So. 2d 681 (1974), we deduced the following rule: The present affidavit shows that the informant had furnished accurate reports in the past. It also describes in detail the informant's visit to the motel room, witnessed by the affiant, and the informant's personal observation of two bags of heroin in the room. It details the affiant's personal knowledge of the confidential informant's purchase of heroin. Finally, the affidavit reflects, that the affiant investigated and found that other members of the police also received the same information. As the search warrant was valid, the evidence seized pursuant to its execution is admissible. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress. Assignments of Error Nos. 22, 24, and 25 are without merit. In these assignments, defendant contends that because no warrant was issued for 1815 Joanne Place, any evidence obtained pursuant to this search, or any information obtained as a result of that search was tainted as the "fruit of the poisonous tree" and must be suppressed. He relies upon Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S. Ct. 679, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914). Defendant argues that because the State did not produce the search warrant for 1815 Joanne Place, none existed. He notes that Mrs. Lewis, the occupant present when the police searched the premises, testified that the police presented no warrant. The record reflects that although the search warrant could not be located for trial, it did exist. Officer Dabdoub testified that he had a warrant on the night the search was conducted and that he presented the warrant to Mrs. Lewis. Commissioner Nils Douglas testified that he remembered issuing a search warrant for Joanne Place. He specifically recalled that he was awakened two separate times that evening to sign warrants. Officer Kirkpatrick testified that he saw the search warrant. Officer McNeil testified that there was a search warrant and that he saw it. Although the State could not offer the search warrant into evidence, after hearing the testimony of numerous police officers, the trial court was satisfied that there was a search warrant and it was misplaced. LSA-R.S. 15:436, the best evidence rule, provides: The trial court, therefore correctly ruled that, despite the loss or destruction of the search warrant, parol testimony could be used to prove its existence. Therefore, as the police did obtain the information, that defendant could be reached by telephone at 366-4551, Room 229, pursuant to a valid search warrant, that evidence was properly obtained and could not taint the later arrest and search. In this assignment of error, defendant complains that the trial judge erred in denying the following requested jury charges:[2] In denying these special requested jury charges, the trial judge correctly stated in his Per Curiam: We agree with the trial judge that the special charges incorrectly state the law. Therefore, he properly rejected the charges. A requested special charge shall be given by the court if it does not require qualification, limitation, or explanation, and if it is wholly correct and pertinent. LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 807. Assignment of Error No. 35 is without merit. In these assignments defendant's basic contention is that the trial court erred in overruling all of his attempts to identify the confidential informant. Herein defendant raises Assignments of Error No. 10, 11, 13, 17, 27, and 28 which allege that the trial court erred in refusing to allow defendant to question Agent Dennis as to the time he went to the Sentry *624 Motel with the confidential informant; in overruling defendant's objection to testimony concerning the purchase of three papers of heroin by the informant; and by denying defendant information regarding the informant's identity in Bill of Particulars Nos. 13, 14, and 6. The informer privilege is a privilege of withholding the identity of an informant who supplies information to law enforcement officials concerning crime. The privilege is founded upon strong public policy, designed to encourage the reporting of crime. Disclosure of an informant's identity is warranted only under exceptional circumstances. The burden of showing exceptional circumstances is upon defendant. State v. Rhodes, La., 308 So. 2d 770 (1975); State v. Howard, La., 283 So. 2d 199 (1973); State v. Dotson, 260 La. 471, 256 So. 2d 594 (1971). We have held that a confidential informant's supplying information used by police officers in an affidavit for the issuance of a warrant is not of itself an exceptional circumstance warranting disclosure of the informant's identity. State v. Dabon, La., 337 So. 2d 502 (1976); State v. Santos, La., 309 So. 2d 129 (1975); State v. Howard, supra. Defendant's bare allegation that the confidential informant did not exist is insufficient to warrant the disclosure. The defendant has not satisfied his burden of showing exceptional circumstances. Assignments of Error Nos. 10, 11, 13, 17, 27, and 28 are without merit. For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. DIXON, J., concurs not agreeing with the treatment of the last group of assignments. DENNIS, J., concurs. [1] Although defendant filed thirty-six formal assignments of error, he notes only fourteen assignments in his brief and oral argument. The remaining twenty-two assignments, which were neither briefed nor argued, are considered abandoned. State v. Phillips, La., 337 So. 2d 1157 (1976); State v. Blanton, La., 325 So. 2d 586 (1976); State v. Carlisle, La., 315 So. 2d 675 (1975). This opinion will conform generally to the five basic groupings of assignments of error in defendant's brief and oral argument. [2] In defendant's formal assignments of error in the record, he complains of the trial court's refusal to give special jury charges Nos. 1-6. However, in brief, he complains only of the denial of this third through sixth requested jury charges. Therefore, special charges Nos. 1 and 3 are not considered.