Case Title: In re Worker's Compensation Claim of Keck

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-359

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Worker's Compensation Claim of Keck1999 WY 88985 P.2d 430Case Number: 97-359Decided: 06/24/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF JUDY KECK, AN 
EMPLOYEE OF RJB PROPERTIES, INC.

 JUDY KECK, Appellant 
(Employee/Claimant),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, ex 
rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY) AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee 
(Objector/Defendant).

 

Appeal from the W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certification from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable 
Edward L. Grant, Judge.

George Santini 
of Ross, Ross & Santini, Cheyenne, WY. Argument by Mr. Santini. 
Representing Appellant.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Robert 
L. Lanter, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Lanter. 
Representing Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired November 2, 1998.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Judy 
Keck, a food server, injured her knee at work when she twisted her body while 
carrying glasses. The Worker's Compensation Medical Commission (Commission) 
denied Keck's request for benefits, stating that Keck's injury was not 
compensable because twisting is an activity of day-to-day living. Keck appealed, 
and the matter was certified to this court. Because the Commission incorrectly 
applied the day-to-day living exclusion, we reverse.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Keck stated the 
issues for review:

1. Did the 
Medical Commission err in denying Appellant's claim for worker's compensation 
benefits in the absence of objective medical evidence that her injury resulted 
primarily from the natural aging process or the normal activities of day to day 
living?

2. Does § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(G), W.S. 1977 (1996 Repl.), violate Article 10, § 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution by exclusion of injuries arising from the normal activities 
of day to day living from the definition of "injury" for purposes of 
compensability under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Act?

[¶3]      The Division 
rephrases the issues:

1. [Were] the 
Medical Commission's decisions supported by substantial evidence and in 
accordance with the law?

2. Is the 
exclusion of injuries resulting primarily from the normal activities of 
day-to-day living from the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act's definition of 
"injury" constitutional?

FACTS

[¶4]      Keck, a food 
server, injured her knee at work on August 6, 1996, when she twisted her body 
while carrying glasses. The pain was not immediately apparent, and she finished 
working her shift. That afternoon, after the knee became painful and swollen, 
Keck reported the injury to her supervisor and project manager and filed an 
incident report.

[¶5]      Approximately one 
week after her injury, Keck sought medical treatment. Upon examination, her 
doctor discovered Keck's knee had a "possible loose body anteriorly" with a 
potential meniscal tear, and referred her to an orthopedic surgeon. On September 
3, 1996, the orthopedic surgeon examined Keck's knee and diagnosed inflammatory 
arthritis. On September 23, 1996, after examining Keck again, the orthopedic 
surgeon asserted Keck had suffered an aggravation of her underlying 
pathology.

[¶6]      Keck submitted 
her medical bills to the Worker's Compensation Division (Division) for payment. 
On October 10, 1996, the Division issued a Final Determination letter declaring 
that Keck's injury was covered and, if compensable, the medical or disability 
benefit claims would be paid. After further review, the Division denied Keck's 
claims, reasoning her inflammatory arthritis treatments were not related to her 
work injury. Keck filed an objection and requested a 
hearing.

[¶7]      At the Division's 
request, on October 28, 1996, a second orthopedic surgeon examined Keck as part 
of an independent medical evaluation (IME) and stated, "I believe the patient 
has an aggravation of underlying osteoarthritis versus inflammatory arthritis of 
her right knee. . . . [S]he has significant underlying disease and . . . her 
problems were only aggravated by her original injury and not a result of the 
injury [on August 6, 1996]." An MRI, done on November 12, 1996, indicated the 
lateral meniscus was in an abnormal position and evidenced degenerative changes 
in the periphery of the bone.

[¶8]      The Division 
referred the matter to the Worker's Compensation Medical Commission. The 
Commission conducted a hearing on June 12, 1997, ultimately denying Keck's 
claim. It reasoned that although her injury aggravated a preexisting condition, 
the injury was not compensable because twisting is an activity of day-to-day 
living and, thus, coverage was precluded by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1996). Keck sought review in the district 
court, which certified the case to this court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b).

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶9]      Wyoming Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 12.09(a) limits judicial review of agency action to matters 
specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (Michie 1997). Matter of Everheart, 
957 P.2d 847, 851 (Wyo. 1998). Section -114(c) states, in relevant 
part:

The reviewing 
court shall:

. . 
.

(ii) hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law[.]

[¶10]   When reviewing an administrative 
decision, we will not defer to an agency's conclusions of law, but will defer to 
the agency's findings of fact supported by the evidence. Nelson v. Sheridan 
Manor, 939 P.2d 252, 255 (Wyo. 1997). When the party charged with the burden of 
proof has failed to meet that burden, we review the case under the arbitrary, 
capricious, abuse-of-discretion, or otherwise-not-in-accordance-with-law 
standard. Pederson v. State, ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 740, 
742 (Wyo. 1997); City of Casper v. Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 1995); Stuckey 
v. State, ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 890 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wyo. 
1995).

DISCUSSION

[¶11]   A preexisting injury is not a 
compensable injury; however, aggravation of such condition by a subsequent work 
injury may be compensable. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G); Bright v. 
Sheehan Pipeline, 960 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Wyo. 1998); State, ex rel. Workers' 
Compensation Div. v. Fisher, 914 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Wyo. 1996). To receive 
coverage, the work injury must have aggravated, accelerated, or combined with 
the preexisting condition to produce the present injury. State, ex rel. Workers' 
Compensation Div. v. Roggenbuck, 938 P.2d 851, 853 (Wyo. 1997). There is no 
dispute that Keck has a preexisting condition and that her work injury 
contributed materially to the aggravation or acceleration of her preexisting 
problem. Therefore, the only question is whether Keck's injury is excluded from 
coverage by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G).

[¶12]   In 1994, the legislature amended § 
27-14-102(a)(xi) to exclude normal activities of daily living from the 
definition of injury and from coverage:

"Injury" means 
any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and includes 
damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in 
the course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used 
or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the 
employer's business requires the employee's presence and which subjects the 
employee to extra hazardous duties incident to the business. "Injury" does not 
include:

. . 
.

(G) Any injury 
resulting primarily from the natural aging process or from the normal activities 
of day-to-day living, as established by medical evidence supported by objective 
findings[.]

[¶13]   We recently discussed the 
day-to-day living exclusion in State, ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation 
Div. v. Sparks, 973 P.2d 507 (Wyo. 1999) and Sellers v. State, ex rel. Workers' 
Compensation Div., 979 P.2d 959 (Wyo. 1999) (1999 WL317452 (Wyo.)). In those 
cases we said that the right-of-control test is the proper standard to use in 
determining if the activity in question is an activity of day-to-day living. 
Thus, when an employee is engaged in activities over which the employer is 
vested with the right of control, these cannot be normal activities of 
day-to-day living because the employer has no such right with respect to the 
normal activities of day-to-day living." Sparks, 973 P.2d  at 
511.

[¶14]   We also have discussed the 
allocation of the burden of proof in this type of case. First, the claimant must 
prove all the essential elements of the claim. Martinez v. State, ex rel. 
Workers' Compensation Div., 917 P.2d 619, 621 (Wyo. 1996). Thereafter, the 
burden shifts, requiring the party opposing compensability of the injury to 
produce medical evidence, supported by objective findings, demonstrating that 
the claimant's injury resulted primarily from the normal activities of daily 
living as well as right-of-control evidence showing the employer had no control 
over the claimant's activity. Sparks, 973 P.2d at 510-11; Cabral v. Caspar 
Building Systems, Inc., 920 P.2d 268, 270 (Wyo. 1996).

[¶15]   Keck twisted and injured her knee 
while moving glasses, a job-related activity. Although the Division presented 
evidence that twisting is an activity of daily living, it failed to meet its 
burden of offering any right-of-control evidence establishing Keck injured her 
knee while engaged in an activity beyond her employer's control. The Commission 
acknowledged that Keck's work injury aggravated an underlying condition. It 
erred, however, in applying the day-to-day living exclusion, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(G), and by deciding Keck's injury was not compensable. We are, 
therefore, compelled to reverse the Commission's decision because it is not in 
accordance with law. Stuckey, 890 P.2d  at 1099.

Constitutionality of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G)

[¶16]   Keck failed to challenge the 
constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) before the Commission 
and raised it for the first time on appeal. We requested supplemental briefing 
from the parties to aid in our determination of whether that issue was properly 
before this court. Upon further review, it is clear this court should not hear 
Keck's challenge. In a recent Order of Dismissal published by this court, we 
stated W.R.A.P. 12.12 outlines the appropriate method to raise a constitutional 
challenge before an administrative agency. Riedel v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 586, 587 
(Wyo. 1999). Because Keck's constitutional claim was not properly raised, we 
will not address it.

CONCLUSION

[¶17]   Keck twisted and injured her knee 
while working, which aggravated a preexisting condition. The Division failed to 
produce evidence that this activity was one of day-to-day living, in accordance 
with the right-of-control test. The Commission, thus, erred in applying the 
exclusionary clause; and its decision was not in accordance with 
law.

[¶18]   
Reversed.