Case Title: Humane Society of the United States v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC92851

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2013-08-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The HUMANE SOCIETY of the UNITED   ) 
STATES, DOGWOOD ANIMAL  
     ) 
SHELTER, INC., and STRAY RESCUE      ) 
of ST. LOUIS, INC., 
      
 
     ) 
 
 
 
 
Appellants,      ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
No.  SC92851 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
STATE of MISSOURI and MISSOURI      ) 
DEPARTMENT of AGRICULTURE, 
     ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
 
 
 
 
Respondents.      ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY 
The Honorable Patricia Joyce, Judge 
 
Opinion issued August 13, 2013 
 
The Humane Society of the United States, Dogwood Animal Shelter, and Stray Rescue of 
St. Louis, Inc., appeal a judgment against them in their declaratory judgment action against the 
State of Missouri and the Missouri Department of Agriculture.1 The Humane Society’s petition 
sought a declaration that Senate Bill 795 (2010), repealing and reenacting section 273.327, 
violated the prohibition in article III, section 21 of the Missouri Constitution that a bill cannot be 
amended to change its original purpose.  The trial court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants based on its finding that the 
 
1 Appellants, the Humane Society of the United States, Dogwood Animal Shelter, and Stray 
Rescue of St. Louis, Inc., will be collectively referred to as “the Humane Society”.  Respondents, 
the State of Missouri and the Missouri Department of Agriculture, will be referred to collectively 
as “the state.” 
 
 
Humane Society’s cause of action was moot because the General Assembly repealed and reenacted 
section 273.327 in a subsequent legislative session, curing any procedural defects in SB795 (2010)’s 
passage.   
The Humane Society claims on appeal that the trial court erred in finding its cause of action is 
moot, relying on C.C. Dillon v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322 (Mo. banc 2000), because C.C. 
Dillon and the trial court’s ruling are contrary to this Court’s precedent that laws remain in force 
continuously throughout repeal and reenactment.  Alternatively, it urges this Court to reexamine its 
holding in C.C. Dillon because allowing the repeal and reenactment of a statute to cure procedural 
defects in the statute’s enactment thwarts the prohibition against changing the original purpose of a 
bill, found in article III, section 21 of the Missouri Constitution.  This Court has jurisdiction of the 
Humane Society’s challenge to the constitutional validity of section 273.327, RSMo Supp. 2010.  
Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.  Because any constitutional defect SB795 (2010) imparted to section 
273.327 was remedied by the General Assembly’s subsequent repeal and reenactment of that 
section, the judgment is affirmed.   
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
Section 273.327 was first enacted in 1992.  The 1992 version of section 273.327 required 
persons engaged in commercial animal care to obtain a license and established an annual licensing 
fee of $105 that could be amended at the discretion of the Missouri agriculture department’s 
director, as well as per-capita fees.  Section 273.327, RSMo Supp. 1992.  It also exempted 
“[p]ounds, dog pounds, and animal shelters” from paying those fees.  Id. 
On January 19, 2010, Senate Bill 795 (2010) was introduced and read for the first time in the 
Missouri Senate with the title “AN ACT to repeal section 319.306, RSMo, and to enact in lieu 
thereof one new section relating to blasting safety, with a penalty provision.”  As introduced, SB795 
(2010) made minor, non-substantive modifications to the language of section 319.306 and added an 
 
3
additional exception to the required blaster’s license for “[i]ndividuals using explosive materials 
along with a well screen cleaning device for the purpose of unblocking clogged screens of 
agricultural irrigation wells . . . .”  Section 319.306.18(15).   
On May 14, 2010, the 95th General Assembly passed SB795 (2010), with the new title: “AN 
ACT to repeal sections 196.316, 266.355, 270.260, 270.400, 273.327, 273.329, 274.180, 281.260, 
311.550, 319.306, 319.321, 393.1025, and 393.1030, RSMo, and to enact in lieu thereof thirty new 
sections relating to animals and agriculture, with penalty provisions, and an emergency clause for a 
certain section.”  The repealed and newly enacted statutes included section 273.327.  In the 
reenacted version of section 273.327, animal shelters were eliminated from the entities exempt from 
the payment of fees.  On July 9, 2010, Governor Jeremiah W. Nixon signed SB795 (2010) into law. 
On January 24, 2011, Senate Bill 161 (2011) was introduced.  SB161 (2011) was passed by 
the 96th General Assembly and signed into law by Governor Nixon on April 27, 2011, with an 
emergency clause applicable to section 273.327.  As passed, SB161 (2011) repealed and reenacted 
section 273.327.  As reenacted, the maximum license fee imposed by section 273.327 was raised 
from $500 annually to $2,500 annually.   
 
On May 13, 2011, the Humane Society filed a petition for declaratory judgment and 
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in the Cole County circuit court.  The petition sought a 
declaration that the amended version of section 273.327, enacted in SB795 (2010) as passed by the 
95th General Assembly on May 14, 2010, was unconstitutional and void.  Specifically, the Human 
Society claimed that SB795 (2010) was enacted in violation of article III, section 21 of the Missouri 
Constitution because SB795 (2010) was amended during its passage to change its original purpose.   
The Humane Society and the state subsequently filed cross motions for summary judgment.  
In its motion for summary judgment, the state sought a determination that the Humane Society’s 
 
4
claim was moot and asked that its petition be dismissed.  The trial court denied the Humane 
Society’s motion and sustained the state’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the 
Humane Society’s cause of action was moot as a result of the General Assembly’s repeal and 
reenactment of section 273.327 in SB161 (2011), citing C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 
S.W.3d 322, 325 (Mo. banc 2000). 
 
The Humane Society appeals.  It claims that the trial court erred in ruling that its cause of 
action regarding SB795 (2010) is moot because the repeal and reenactment of section 273.327 
through SB161 (2011) did not eliminate existing constitutional defects, and it requests that this 
Court reexamine its holding in C.C. Dillon.  It further asserts that this Court should grant it relief on 
the merits of its claim that SB795 (2010), as amended and enacted, unconstitutionally conflicts with 
the bill’s original purpose.  
 
 
Standard of Review 
 
This Court’s review of summary judgment is de novo.  ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-
Am Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993).  “Facts set forth by affidavit or 
otherwise in support of a party’s motion are taken as true unless contradicted by the non-moving 
party’s response to the summary judgment motion.”  Id.  A movant for summary judgment is 
entitled to summary judgment if the movant can demonstrate, on the basis of facts as to which there 
is no genuine dispute, a right to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. at 377.  A defending party can 
demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment by showing (1) facts negating any of the claimant’s 
necessary elements; (2) the claimant, after an adequate period of discovery, has been unable, and 
will not be able, to produce evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact to find the existence of any 
 
5
                                             
one of the claimant’s elements; or (3) there is no genuine dispute of the existence of facts required to 
support the defending party’s properly pleaded affirmative defense.  Id. at 381. 
 
The standard for determining if a cause of action is moot is set out in C.C. Dillon: 
A cause of action is moot when the question presented for decision seeks a judgment 
upon some matter which, if the judgment was rendered, would not have any practical 
effect upon any then existing controversy.  When an event occurs which renders a 
decision unnecessary, the appeal will be dismissed.  And where an enactment 
supersedes the statute on which the litigants rely to define their rights, the appeal no 
longer represents an actual controversy, and the case will be dismissed as moot. 
 
12 S.W.3d at 325 (quoting Bank of Washington v. McAuliffe, 676 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Mo. banc 
1984)). 
 
 
Humane Society’s Cause of Action is Moot 
 
The Humane Society’s first claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in ruling that its cause 
of action is moot.  The Humane Society asserts that the SB795 (2010) violates the prohibition in 
article III, section 21 of the Missouri Constitution that a bill shall not be amended in its passage to 
change its original purpose.2  It claims that the constitutional invalidity of section 273.327, enacted 
in SB795 (2010), should not have been rendered moot by the General Assembly’s subsequent repeal 
and reenactment of section 273.327 in SB161 (2011).  It argues that the unconstitutional removal of 
the animal shelter fee exemption by SB795 (2010) was undetectably embedded in the reinstated text 
 
2 Article III, section 21 of the Missouri Constitution provides that “no bill shall be so amended in its 
passage through either house as to change its original purpose.”  “Purpose” in article III, section 21 
means the general purpose of the bill, “not the mere details through which and by which that 
purpose is manifested and effectuated” and “[t]he restriction is against introduction of matter which 
is not germane to the object of the legislation or which is unrelated to its original subject.”  Lincoln 
Credit Co. v. Peach, 636 S.W.2d 31, 38 (Mo. banc 1982).  A bill’s original purpose is established at 
the time of its introduction.  Missouri Ass’n of Club Executive v. State, 208 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Mo. 
banc 2006).  A bill’s earliest title and content are examined to determine if there was a change to the 
bill’s purpose.  Legends Bank v. State, 361 S.W.3d 383, 386 (Mo. banc 2012). 
 
 
6
                                                                                                                                                                   
of SB161 (2011) and, as a result, the legislature and public were unaware of the exemption’s 
removal and the exemption was not brought before the legislature for consideration.  Therefore, it 
argues that SB161 (2011) is merely a continuation of the constitutional deficiencies contained in 
SB795 (2010).   
The Humane Society recognizes that its position is contrary to this Court’s holding in C.C. 
Dillon, cited by the trial court to determine the case was moot.  12 S.W.3d 322.  In that case, C.C. 
Dillon Co. sued the city of Eureka after the city denied C.C. Dillon’s billboard permit application.  
C.C. Dillon, 12 S.W.3d 322, 325.  The city’s denial was based on an ordinance passed pursuant to 
section 71.288, RSMo Supp. 1999, which allowed cities and counties to impose billboard 
regulations more restrictive than those in the Missouri Billboards Act, sections 226.500 to 226.600, 
RSMo 1994.  Id. at 324.  C.C. Dillon claimed section 71.288 was void because legislative 
amendments to Senate Bill 831 (1998), establishing and amending section 71.288, violated the 
Missouri Constitution’s ban on amending bills to conflict with their original purpose.  Id. 
 
This Court held that C.C. Dillon’s challenge to SB831 (1998) was moot.  Whatever SB831’s 
defects, 
[t]hat bill was repealed the following year by the enactment of Senate Bill 883.  Senate Bill 
883 repealed “former” section 71.288 and enacted in lieu thereof a “new” section 71.288.  
“The repeal of a law means its complete abrogation by the enactment of a subsequent 
statute.”  State ex rel. Peebles v. Moore, 339 Mo. 492, 99 S.W.2d 17, 19 (1936) (citation 
omitted).  
 
Id. at 325.  When an event renders a court’s decision unnecessary, such as where an enactment 
supersedes the statute on which the litigants rely to define their rights, an appeal no longer represents 
an actual controversy and should be dismissed.  Id. (citing Bank of Washington, 676 S.W.2d at 487).  
Therefore, “[o]nce the General Assembly repealed “former” section 71.288, this Court’s basis for 
 
 
 
7
deciding the constitutionality of that statute evaporated.  No relief can be granted concerning the 
validity of that statute, now repealed.”  Id. 
 
The Humane Society urges this Court to reexamine its holding in C.C. Dillon.  It claims that 
opinion failed to consider other cases holding that repealed and reenacted statutes are continuously 
in force.  In particular, the Humane Society argues that this Court should apply the principle of State 
v. Ward that “‘[a] subsequent act of the Legislature repealing and re-enacting, at the same time, a 
pre-existing statute, is but a continuation of the latter.’”  40 S.W.2d 1074, 1078 (Mo. 1918) (quoting 
Brown v. Marshall, 145 S.W. 810, 815 (Mo. 1912)).  The Humane Society concedes that this 
statement of law in Ward was not in the context of determining whether procedural defects follow a 
statute through repeal and reenactment.  Nevertheless, the Humane Society argues that Ward is a 
more reasoned decision than C.C. Dillon.   
The language in Ward on which the Humane Society relies was made in the context of 
resolving a claim that the authority of a statute was interrupted by the statute’s repeal and 
reenactment and not in the context of whether a procedural defect in the enactment of a statute 
survives the statute’s repeal and reenactment.  In Ward, a resident of Harrison County was convicted 
of killing a quail during a two-year closed season on quail that had been adopted by the county’s 
voters pursuant to a local option proviso in section 5596, RSMo 1919.  Id. at 1075.  That statute, 
authorizing approval of a two-year closed season on quail by a majority of a county’s voters, was 
repealed and reenacted as section 5596, RSMo 1929 between the approval of the closed season by 
Harrison County voters and the charged violation.  Id. at 1076.  No change to the local option 
proviso was made in the reenactment.  Id.  The Harrison County resident convicted of killing a quail 
during the closed season challenged his conviction, claiming, inter alia, that the repeal and 
reenactment of section 5596 rendered the Harrison County vote void.  Id. at 1078.  This Court 
 
8
                                             
rejected his claim because it found that the repeal and reenactment of a pre-existing statute “‘is but a 
continuation of’” the pre-existing statute.  Id. (quoting Brown v. Marshall, 145 S.W. 810, 815 (Mo. 
1912)). 
 
As clear from the facts of Ward, the principle relied on by the Humane Society was stated in 
the context of addressing whether a bill’s substantive provisions continually exist through repeal and 
reenactment.3  Conversely, C.C. Dillon addresses whether an alleged procedural defect in a statute 
may be remedied by repeal and reenactment.  Regarding Ward, there is no rationale for finding that 
the simultaneous repeal and reenactment of a statute interrupts its authority such that additional 
action becomes necessary to reactivate it.  The rationale underlying this Court’s decision in Ward 
has no application to a claim that there is a procedural defect in the enactment of a statute.  Because 
the present case regards an alleged procedural defect, C.C. Dillon, rather than Ward, controls.   
Alternatively, the Humane Society urges this Court to limit the holding of C.C. Dillon to 
circumstances where the newly reenacted section changed the language of the statute so that the 
reason for challenging the statute no longer exists.  See Bank of Washington v. McAuliffe, 676 
S.W.2d 483, 487 (Mo. banc 1984) (concluding that reenactment of procedurally defective statute 
with changed substantive provisions made challenge to repealed version of statute moot).  It argues 
that a broader application of C.C. Dillon would thwart the purposes of article III, section 21 to 
“facilitate orderly procedure, avoid surprise, and prevent ‘logrolling,’ in which several matters that 
would not individually command a majority vote are rounded up into a single bill to ensure passage” 
 
3 “The legislature has provided instruction on how reenactments are to be construed in section 1.120, 
RSMo . . . .”  Kelly v. Hanson, 984 S.W.2d 540, 544 (Mo. App. 1998).  Section 1.120, RSMo 2000, 
provides that “[t]he provision of any law or statute which is reenacted, amended or revised, so far as 
they are the same as those of a prior law, shall be construed as a continuation of such law and not as 
a new enactment.”  See also Citizens Bank and Trust Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 639 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 
1982). 
 
 
9
and to “keep individual members of the legislature and the public fairly apprised of the subject 
matter of pending laws.”  Missouri Ass’n of Club Executive v. State, 208 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Mo. banc 
2006) (quoting Stroh Brewery Co. v. State, 954 S.W.2d 323, 325-26 (Mo. banc 1997); Westin Crown 
Plaza Hotel Co. v. King, 664 S.W.2d 2, 5 (Mo. banc 1984).  Specifically, it asserts that because 
SB795 (2010) deprived individual legislators and the public of their constitutionally guaranteed right 
to notice of a bill’s subject and the possible loss of the fee exemption for animal shelters, those same 
legislators and members of the public had no reason to care about whether SB610 (2011) would 
reenact the language repealing the shelters’ fee exemption that SB795 (2010) had “sneaked” into the 
law the year before.   
The Humane Society’s position is rejected because it would produce an absurd result.  See 
Rourke v. Holmes St. Ry. Co., 166 S.W.272, 275 (Mo. banc 1914) (finding that a constitutional 
interpretation producing absurd result is unreasonable).   As urged by the Humane Society, a 
procedural defect in the enactment of a statute could never be corrected by repealing and reenacting 
the allegedly unconstitutional provision.  While this result would preserve the right of persons to 
challenge a defective enactment, it would obstruct the legislative process.  The only mechanism to 
correct a defective enactment would be a law suit rather than action by the legislature.  There is no 
reasonable purpose in perpetuating the existence of defective statutes until challenged in a law suit, 
and the language of article III, section 21 does not compel such result. 
The Humane Society’s position is also rejected because it is not compelling.  Applied to this 
case, the Humane Society’s reasoning is that the procedural defects in the enactment of SB795 
(2010) might have permitted section 273.327 to be reenacted with no exemption for animal shelters 
from the licensing fees without the knowledge of individual members of the legislature and the 
public or as improper “logrolling.”  The Humane Society’s argument assumes that the legislature 
 
10
would reenact a statute with provisions it would not want because it was unaware of a prior version 
of the statute.  Specifically, it argues that the General Assembly might not realize that it had 
previously eliminated the exemption for animal shelters when it repealed and reenacted section 
273.327 in 2011 and increased the maximum fee from $500 to $2,500.  
This assumption ignores that “‘[t]he legislature is presumed to know the existing law when 
enacting a new piece of legislation.’”  State ex rel. Nothum v. Walsh, 380 S.W.3d 557, 567 (Mo. 
banc 2012) (quoting Greenbriar Hills Country Club v. Dir. of Revenue, 47 S.W.3d 346, 352 (Mo. 
banc 2001)).  Additionally, at the time the allegedly unconstitutional section 273.327 was reenacted 
in this case, there was no procedural defect with respect to SB161 (2011) so there was notice to 
individual legislators and the public of the proposed statute and an opportunity to debate its content.  
C.C. Dillon, 12 S.W.3d at 326 (noting that the purpose of article III, section 21 is “‘to keep 
individual members of the legislature and the public fairly apprised of the subject matter of pending 
laws . . . .’” (quoting Stroh Brewery, 954 S.W.2d at 325-26)).  There is no claim that the legislative 
process during the adoption of SB161 failed to keep individual members of the legislature and the 
public fully apprised of the subject matter of SB161 (2011).   
To the contrary, the legislature and the public were properly informed when SB161 (2011) 
was pending that the text of proposed section 273.327 did not exempt animal shelters from payment 
of the licensing fees.  The language of section 273.327 in SB161 (2011) increased the maximum fee 
to $2,500 for the listed entities that were required to be licensed, which expressly included animal 
shelters.  The statute exempted only “[p]ounds or dog pounds” from payment of the fees, making it 
clear that animal shelters would be required to pay the license fees.  Section 273.327, RSMo Supp. 
2011.  Because the legislative process to repeal and reenact a statute allows sufficient consideration 
of the language of the statute proposed for reenactment, the legislators and interested members of the 
 
11
public are given sufficient notice and the purpose of article III, section 21 is not thwarted by 
allowing the repeal and reenactment of a statute to cure a claimed procedural defect. 
Applying the rule of C.C. Dillon, the repeal and reenactment of section 273.327 in SB161 
(2011) terminated the existence of section 273.327 as enacted in SB795.  The Humane Society’s 
petition challenges only that the enactment of section 273.327 in SB795 violated a procedural 
requirement in article III, section 21.  Its petition does not challenge the substance of section 
273.327, as enacted in SB795 (2010) or SB161 (2011).  “A cause of action is moot when the 
question presented for decision seeks a judgment upon some matter which, if the judgment was 
rendered, would not have any practical effect upon a then-existing controversy.”  Precision 
Investments, L.L.C. v. Cornerstone Propane, L.P., 220 S.W.3d 301, 304 (Mo. banc 2007).  The 
repeal and reenactment of section 273.327 in SB161 (2011) renders moot any decision as to whether 
SB795 (2010) was properly enacted, because any such decision would have no practical effect.  C.C. 
Dillon, 12 S.W.3d at 325.   
Because the Humane Society’s cause of action is moot, the Court does not address its second 
claim that SB795 (2010) violates article III, section 21 of the Missouri Constitution because the bill 
was amended during its passage to change its original purpose. 
Conclusion 
The Humane Society challenged in its petition the constitutional validity of section 273.327 
as enacted by the 95th Session of the Missouri General Assembly (2010) in SB795.  During the 96th 
Session of the Missouri General Assembly (2011) repealed section 273.327 and reenacted a section 
273.327, with a new fee provision, which was signed into law by Governor Nixon on April 27, 
2011, with an emergency clause.  Because the Humane Society’s petition does not challenge the 
current version of section 273.327, and it seeks no relief for any action taken under the repealed 
 
12
version of section 273.327, the relief the Humane Society seeks is no longer available and its claim 
is moot.  The judgment is affirmed.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE 
 
 
All concur.