Case Title: Mondt v. Cheyenne Police Dept.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-09-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mondt v. Cheyenne Police Dept.1996 WY 115924 P.2d 70Case Number: 95-240Decided: 09/09/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Linda 
M. MONDT,

 Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

CHEYENNE POLICE 
DEPARTMENT; and Cheyenne Police Civil Service Commission, Appellees 
(Respondents).

Appeal from District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Mitchell E. 
Osborn of Grant & Osborn, Cheyenne, for appellant 
(petitioner).

Wallace L. Stock 
of Bailey, Pickering & Stock, Cheyenne, for appellees 
(respondents).

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      A 
non-probationary police officer in the service of the City of Cheyenne, whose 
employment relationship is governed by the state's civil service law found in 
WYO. STAT. §§ 15-5-101 through 121, challenges her forty-hour suspension without 
pay by her police chief. Her challenge requires us to answer three important 
questions which lie at the heart of her public employment 
relationship:

1.         
Whether she has a constitutionally protected property interest in her 
continued public employment;

2.         If 
she does, whether a forty-hour suspension without pay from that employment 
constitutes a deprivation of that protected property interest; and

3.         If it 
does, what constitutionally required due process must the public employer afford 
the public employee when the deprivation occurs.

[¶2]      We hold that a 
non-probationary police officer in the service of the City of Cheyenne, whose 
employment relationship is governed by the state's civil service law found in 
WYO. STAT. §§ 15-5-101 though 121, has a constitutionally protected property 
interest in her continued employment; a forty-hour suspension without pay from 
that employment constitutes a deprivation of that protected property interest; 
and, when the deprivation occurs, the public employer must afford the public 
employee constitutionally mandated pre-deprivation and post-deprivation due 
process.

FACTS

[¶3]      On March 16, 
1995, Roy E. Pack, Chief of Police, Cheyenne Police Department, imposed a 
forty-hour suspension without pay on Police Officer Linda Mondt, a 
non-probationary police officer in the service of the Cheyenne Police 
Department. According to the police chief, his action was based upon his review 
of an internal affairs investigation into allegations that Officer Mondt's job 
performance had been unsatisfactory. Police Chief Pack's written notification to 
Officer Mondt of his action stated in pertinent part:

The reasons for this 
suspension have been discussed with you on March 16, 1995. Those reasons 
include, but are not limited to the following: Unsatisfactory Performance as 
outlined in our policy and procedures manual, Part I. Section 
12.

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

You are not 
entitled to a hearing on this suspension. You do, of course, have the right to 
consult with an attorney of your choosing at your expense.

A copy of Wyoming Statute 
15-5-112 is attached hereto for your convenience.

(Emphasis in 
original). Officer Mondt asserts that Police Chief Pack did not give her an 
opportunity to tell him her side of the matter. Thus, she contends he did not 
give her a predeprivation hearing. Officer Mondt's attorney made written request 
to the Cheyenne Police Civil Service Commission (Commission) for a hearing 
before that body. In that request she denied the allegations against her and 
alleged that the suspension violated her civil and constitutional rights to due 
process. The Commission denied that request. Thus, Officer Mondt contends that 
the Commission did not give her a post-deprivation hearing.

[¶4]      Officer Mondt's 
attorney then filed a petition for judicial review in the district court naming 
as respondents both the Cheyenne Police Department and the Cheyenne Police Civil 
Service System. In the petition, Officer Mondt's attorney stated in pertinent 
part:

The specific issues of 
law addressed to the District Court are whether the decision of the Respondent, 
attached hereto, is based upon substantial evidence and whether the decision was 
arbitrary, capricious and contrary to the law of the State of Wyoming, and 
further whether said denial of a hearing constitutes a denial of due process 
which is guaranteed under the Constitutions of the United States and State of 
Wyoming.

The facts relevant to the 
legal issues are concerning whether or not Petitioner's suspension was 
appropriate and with good cause and whether or not Petitioner was denied her 
guaranteed due process when she was refused a hearing to present her position as 
it relates to the suspension. Petitioner asserts that the denial of a review 
hearing is effectively denial (sic) her due process of law as she asserts a 
property right in her employment as a public employee.

[¶5]      The Cheyenne 
Police Department filed a motion seeking to have itself dismissed from the 
review proceeding, claiming that Officer Mondt's appeal was from the 
Commission's decision and not from any decision of the police department. The 
parties' appellate briefs inform us that the district court denied the police 
department's motion to dismiss. Although the record does not contain the 
district court's order denying that motion, it does contain the parties' 
pleading entitled STIPULATED FACTS AND QUESTIONS FOR CERTIFICATION TO SUPREME 
COURT PURSUANT TO W.R.A.P. RULE 12.09, which states, among other things, that 
the district court denied without prejudice the police department's motion to 
dismiss and "stated that the case should be certified to the Wyoming Supreme 
Court." The record contains the district court's ORDER OF CERTIFICATION OF 
QUESTIONS TO SUPREME COURT PURSUANT TO W.R.A.P. RULE 12.09. That order 
references the parties' aforementioned stipulation. Thus, this matter is before 
this Court upon the district court's certification.

[¶6]      In the parties' 
aforementioned stipulation, referenced in the district court's certification 
order, the parties have posed the following seven questions:

1.         Does 
the grievance procedure for the Cheyenne Police Department, taken in conjunction 
with the City of Cheyenne Police Department Civil Service Commission Rules and 
Regulations and the City of Cheyenne Wyoming Police Manual, Policies and 
Procedures, allow or grant the Petitioner the right to an appeal and/or hearing 
upon the merits of a grievance, specifically, a suspension for disciplinary 
purposes?

2.         Does 
Wyoming Statute 15-5-112 allow a Chief of Police for the Cheyenne Police 
Department to suspend an employee, specifically the Petitioner, for disciplinary 
purposes without a right of a hearing and, if so, does Wyoming Statute 
15-5-112(c) violate the Petitioner's constitutional rights to due 
process?

3.         Did 
the Cheyenne Police Department, in denying Petitioner a hearing, violate their 
own Policy and Procedure, and thereby violate Petitioner's rights? 

4.         Did 
the imposition of the suspension upon Petitioner for the stated offense violate 
the Cheyenne Wyoming Police Department's Manual and their Policy and Procedure 
provisions?

5.         Was 
the decision by the Commission to deny Petitioner's request for hearing in the 
case of a suspension for disciplinary purposes "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law"?

6.         Was 
the decision by the Commission to deny Petitioner's request for hearing in the 
case of a suspension for disciplinary purposes "contrary to constitutional 
right, power, privilege or immunity"?

7.         Was 
the decision by the Commission to deny Petitioner's request for hearing in the 
case of a suspension for disciplinary purposes "without observance of procedure 
required by law"?

[¶7]      At some variance 
from those seven questions contained in the parties' stipulation, Officer Mondt 
presents in her appellate brief the statement of a single broad 
issue:

Was Appellant Linda D. 
Mondt, a non-probationary police officer, deprived of her right to due process, 
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment, when she was suspended without pay 
for disciplinary reasons, pursuant to W.S. § 15-5-112, and was denied the 
opportunity for a hearing.

[¶8]      The appellate 
brief of the Cheyenne Police Department and the Cheyenne Police Civil Service 
Commission is also at some variance from the seven questions referred to in the 
parties' stipulation. Their brief states two issues:

I.          
Whether or not Linda Mondt, a non-probationary police officer, has a 
property right in her continued employment.

II.          
If W.S. § 15-5-112 and/or the Commission's regulations can be construed 
to grant a property right, has that right been taken from her without due 
process?

[¶9]      Having considered 
the seven issues contained in the parties' stipulation and the several issues 
stated in the parties' appellate briefs, as well as the arguments made in those 
briefs, we believe that the issues presented fairly reduce to the three 
questions of law we identified at the outset of this opinion.

DISCUSSION

1. 
General.

[¶10]   The parties agree that the terms 
and conditions of employment of a City of Cheyenne police officer, like Officer 
Mondt, are controlled by the Wyoming statutes governing civil service employment 
found in WYO. STAT. §§ 15-5-101 through 121 (1992 & Supp. 1996). The parties 
also call our attention to certain provisions contained in the police 
department's manual and certain rules adopted by the Commission. The pertinent 
provisions in the police department manual establish a grievance procedure which 
permits an employee to present a grievance and an appeal without restraint; a 
progressive discipline procedure which categorizes offenses and provides for 
different types of discipline; and an appeal procedure which expressly states 
that appeals of suspension, demotion, and removal will follow the Commission's 
rules. The pertinent Commission rules provide for a hearing before the 
Commission in cases of discharge or reduction of classification or compensation, 
but not in cases of suspensions for disciplinary purposes. It seems fairly clear 
that the provisions of the police department manual and the rules of the 
Commission are essentially procedural, not substantive, in nature. Even were 
they substantive in nature to some extent, however, we understand that they can 
not legally contravene the substantive content of the civil service statutes 
pursuant to which they are promulgated. State Dept. of Revenue and Taxation v. 
Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994); Tri County Telephone Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Wyoming Public Service Comm'n, 910 P.2d 1359, 1361 (Wyo. 1996); and see Graham 
v. City of Oklahoma City, Okla., 859 F.2d 142, 146 (10th Cir. 1988) (referring 
to Umholtz v. City of Tulsa, 565 P.2d 15 (Okla. 1977)). Accordingly, we are more 
interested in and shall examine the content of the Wyoming civil service 
statutes, rather than the provisions of the police department manual and the 
Commission's rules, as we proceed to determine the answers to the three 
questions before us. 

2. Property 
Interest.

[¶11]   The applicability of the 
constitutional guarantee of procedural due process depends in the first instance 
on the presence of a legitimate "property" or "liberty" interest within the 
meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. Several United States Supreme Court decisions provide us with the 
proper framework for analysis of whether Officer Mondt's public employment 
constituted a "property" interest as she claims. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972), the Court 
stated:

To have a property 
interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or 
desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, 
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. . . .

Property interests, of 
course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their 
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law - rules or understandings that secure 
certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those 
benefits.

The Court 
recognized that a property interest may be created by statute as well as by 
contract. Id. at 576-77, 92 S.Ct. at 2708-09; see also Abell v. Dewey, 870 P.2d 363, 370 (Wyo. 1994). In particular, the Court stated that a person may have a 
protected property interest in public employment if contractual or statutory 
provisions guarantee continued employment absent "sufficient cause" for 
discharge. Roth, 408 U.S.  at 576-78, 92 S. Ct.  at 2708-10.

[¶12]   This Court has previously applied 
this precedent in the public employment context to determine whether the 
legislature by statute has created a protected property interest in public 
school teachers, Seyfang v. Board of Trustees, Washakie County School Dist. No. 
1, 563 P.2d 1376, 1381 (Wyo. 1977); Board of Trustees, Laramie County School 
Dist. No. 1 v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1170 (Wyo. 1976); in a municipal judge, 
Town of Upton v. Whisler, 824 P.2d 545, 548-49 (Wyo. 1992); and in a deputy 
sheriff, Lucero v. Mathews, 901 P.2d 1115, 1119-20 (Wyo. 1995). See also Abell 
v. Dewey, 847 P.2d 36, 40-41 (Wyo. 1993), rehearing on other grounds, 870 P.2d 363 (Wyo. 1994) (state personnel rules conferred protected property interest on 
probationary employee).

[¶13]   In Cleveland Board of Education v. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985), the United 
States Supreme Court added an important additional feature to the Roth 
analytical framework. According to the Court, when a court analyzes a statute to 
determine whether the legislature has created a protected property interest, a 
court must remember that

[t]he categories of 
substance and procedure are distinct. . . . "Property" cannot be defined by the 
procedures provided for its deprivation any more than can life or 
liberty.

Id. at 541, 105 S. Ct.  at 1493. The Court made clear that a property interest is neither defined 
by nor conditioned on the legislature's choice of procedures for its 
deprivation. Id. Thus, the Court has clearly rejected the theory, on which the 
Court had been fragmented in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 40 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1974) (Justices Rehnquist and Stewart and Chief Justice Burger held 
the view that the procedural limitations were incorporated into the substantive 
interest; Justices Powell, Blackmun, White, Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas held 
the opposite view that the substantive interest was not defined by the 
procedural limitations), that where the legislature's grant of a substantive 
right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which 
are to be used in determining that right, a litigant seeking the sweet of that 
right must take the bitter of the procedural limitation. Loudermill, 470 U.S.  at 
540-41, 105 S. Ct.  at 1492. As Loudermill states:

In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 1263, 63 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1980), we pointed out that 
"minimum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law, they are not 
diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that 
it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official 
action." This conclusion was reiterated in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432, 102 S. Ct. 1148, 1155, 71 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1982). . . .

Loudermill, 470 U.S.  at 541, 105 S. Ct.  at 1492.

[¶14]   In sum, what process is due in 
Officer Mondt's case - once it is determined that a state statute confers a 
property interest in continued public employment and the Due Process Clause 
applies - is found, not in the Wyoming civil service statutes, but in federal 
constitutional law. City of Laramie v. Kreiling, 911 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Wyo. 1996) 
(citing Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9, 98 S. Ct. 1554, 1560, 56 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1978)); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 2700, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972). Loudermill teaches, then, that a court 
must discretely parse the statutory language to identify the substantive 
interest, if one exists, on the one hand, and the procedural mechanism for its 
enforcement, on the other hand.

[¶15]   Guided by the Roth-Loudermill 
analytical framework, we shall analyze the provisions of the civil service 
statutes, WYO. STAT. §§ 15-5-101 through 121, to determine whether they 
guarantee Officer Mondt a substantive interest in continued public employment 
absent "sufficient cause" for discharge. As we undertake this analysis, we are, 
of course, mindful of and shall be faithful to our statutory interpretation 
jurisprudence. See Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game & Fish 
Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-45 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶16]   Because the public employment 
relationship at issue in today's case arises out of the Wyoming legislature's 
efforts over time to establish a sound civil service system, we begin with a 
brief overview of the history and purpose of the civil service 
system.

[¶17]   With respect to the federal civil 
service system, case law and scholarly commentary have traced its beginnings and 
evolution. See, e.g., Arnett, 416 U.S.  at 148-51, 94 S.Ct. at 1641-43; Kathleen 
V. Buffon, Comment, Removal For Cause From the Civil Service: The Problem of 
Disproportionate Discipline, 28 AM. U.L.REV. 207, 210-12 (1979); Richard A. 
Merrill, Procedures For Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 VA. L.REV. 
196 (1973); William P. Berzak, Rights Accorded Federal Employees Against Whom 
Adverse Personnel Actions are Taken, 47 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 853 (1972); M.N. 
Chaturvedi, Legal Protection Available to Federal Employees Against Wrongful 
Dismissal, 63 NW. U.L.REV. 287 (1968); Developments in the Law - Public 
Employment, 97 HARV. L.REV. 1611 (1984); and Gerald E. Frug, Does the 
Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?, 124 PA. L.REV. 
942 (1976).

[¶18]   In Arnett, the Court treated the 
federal civil service statutory scheme found in 5 U.S.C. § 7501, subsection (a), 
of which provides that "[a]n individual in the competitive service may be 
removed or suspended without pay only for such cause as will promote the 
efficiency of the service." 416 U.S.  at 140, 94 S. Ct.  at 1637. Although 
Professor Merrill notes that the legislative history is silent as to the meaning 
of the quoted phrase, Merrill, supra, at 236, in Arnett the Court 
observed that Congress intended to confer "job protection rights on federal 
employees which they had not previously had. . . ." 416 U.S.  at 162, 94 S. Ct.  at 
1648. Professor Merrill states, "[c]learly, the phrase applies at least to 
inefficiency in the colloquial sense - inability to perform in the job." 
Merrill, supra, at 236. He further observes, "[w]ith growing frequency, 
the federal courts have insisted an agency show that some rational nexus [exist] 
between an employee's behavior and its legitimate needs as an employer that 
justify his removal." Id. In Arnett, the Court recognized that the phrase is 
directed "at employee behavior, including speech, which is detrimental to the 
efficiency of the employing agency." 416 U.S.  at 162, 94 S. Ct.  at 1648. 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that "Congress . . . with unmistakable clarity 
granted governmental employees security against being dismissed without `cause' 
. . . ." Id. at 154, 94 S. Ct.  at 1644. The Court said:

Congress sought to lay 
down an admittedly general standard . . . in order to give myriad different 
federal employees performing widely disparate tasks a common standard of job 
protection. We do not believe that Congress was confined to the choice of 
enacting a detailed code of employee conduct, or else granting no job protection 
at all.

Arnett, 416 U.S. 
at 159, 94 S. Ct.  at 1647.

[¶19]   With respect to Wyoming's civil 
service system, the legislative history, like the federal legislative history 
about the meaning of the standard "for such cause as will promote the efficiency 
of the service," is silent. Our case law, however, is not silent. Almost a 
half-century ago, Justice Blume explained that the purpose of the civil service 
legislation "is to have police officers appointed according to merit and 
efficiency." Fristam v. City of Sheridan, 66 Wyo. 143, 147, 206 P.2d 741 (1949). 
Justice Blume noted that civil service laws exist generally all over the United 
States. Fristam, 66 Wyo. at 152, 206 P.2d  at 744. See Norman B. Smith and 
Patricia Gebala, Job Security For Public Employees, 31 WASH. & LEE L.REV. 
545 and appendix (1974). Commenting on New Jersey's civil service law, the 
esteemed Chief Justice Arthur Vanderbilt wrote:

We must bear in mind that 
the primary object and purpose of the civil service law is to secure for 
government, state, county and municipal, efficient public service in all its 
many functions. The welfare of the people as a whole, and not specifically or 
exclusively the welfare of the civil servant, is the basic policy underlying the 
law; and to effectuate that policy it has long been recognized that the statutes 
must be liberally construed. . . .

Borough of Park 
Ridge v. Salimone, 21 N.J. 28, 120 A.2d 721, 729 (1956) (citations 
omitted).

[¶20]   As we examine WYO. STAT. §§ 
15-5-101 through 121 - in order to see the forest and not just the trees - to 
get a sense of the tenor of the legislation, we find credible evidence upon 
which to form such a sense. The legislature has provided that civil service 
employment in the police department shall be based upon impartial examinations 
which "relate only to matters which test the fitness of the persons examined to 
perform the services required in the class or schedule [based upon the nature of 
the service to be rendered or duties to be performed] covered by the 
examination." WYO. STAT. § 15-5-106(a) and (b) (1992). An examinee must attain a 
proficiency percentage of 75% or more to be certified for employment. WYO. STAT. 
§ 15-5-107 (1992). The employing governmental body seeks to fill positions from 
among applicants having the highest percentage of proficiency. WYO. STAT. § 
15-5-108 (1992). In the case of police departments, an employee's first eighteen 
months of employment or a period of not less than twelve months if up for a 
promotion is on a trial basis. WYO. STAT. § 15-5-109 (Supp. 1996). If the 
employee's conduct "has been satisfactory during the trial period, he may be 
regularly employed or promoted, as applicable." Id. Commissioners who serve on a 
police department civil service commission take an oath "that in no event will 
they appoint or remove any person because of his political opinions or for any 
reason other than the person's fitness or unfitness." WYO. STAT. § 15-5-103(b) 
(1992) (emphasis added). Promotion of an individual is to be on the basis of 
"merit, experience and good record." WYO. STAT. § 15-5-119(a)(i)(B) (1992). So 
far, from our survey of that part of the statutory forest in which the above and 
foregoing provisions stand, we can conclude that the tenor of the legislative 
scheme is obviously performance and fitness based.

[¶21]   We now turn to those statutory 
provisions on which the litigants have exclusively focused. In its entirety, 
WYO. STAT. § 15-5-112 (1992) provides:

§ 15-5-112. Retention of 
positions; discharge; grounds and procedure; retirement of firemen.

(a)       All persons 
occupying positions affected by this article may retain their positions until 
discharged under its provisions.

(b)       Discharge from a 
department, or reduction in grade or compensation, or both, may be made for any 
cause, not political or religious, which will promote the efficiency of the 
service, on written notice and specifications filed with the commission and 
served upon the person affected by the authority requesting the discharge or 
reduction. The person whose discharge or reduction is sought is allowed a 
reasonable time to answer the charges in writing and demand a hearing. The 
commission, after hearing or investigation, shall determine whether the reason 
for discharge is sufficient and established. Except as otherwise provided in 
subsection (c) of this section no person may be discharged or reduced in pay or 
rank without consent of the commission after a hearing, unless the action is 
pursuant to a classification program under W.S. 15-5-106. A copy of the 
specifications, notice, answer, consent and order of discharge or reduction are 
a part of the public records of the commission.

(c) In the case of a 
police department:

(i) A chief of police or 
his representative, after written notice, may suspend any regular employee 
without pay for disciplinary purposes. The chief or his representative shall 
file with the commission, on or before the effective date of the suspension, a 
written statement of the causes for such action;

(ii) A chief of police or 
his acting chief may discharge or reduce in grade any employee if he considers 
that the good of the service will be served thereby. Any employee who is 
discharged or reduced in grade has the right to answer in writing the statement 
of the chief as to the cause for his discharge or reduction in grade, as the 
case may be, and to file this and any other affidavits and exhibits in support 
of his statement with the commission.

(d) If any person in the 
fire department becomes sixty (60) years of age, the commission shall order that 
person retired from further service. However, if the person can pass annual 
mental and physical qualifications tests set by a physician chosen by the 
commission and governing body and given at no cost to the employee, he may be 
retained until he becomes sixty-five (65) years of age.

[¶22]   Parsing these provisions, we find 
that the legislature has divided civil service employees into two groups for job 
security purposes - police department employees on the one hand and non-police 
department employees on the other. In 112(b), the legislature addresses the job 
security of non-police department employees. Applying the lesson of Loudermill, 
we parse that subsection to identify its substantive and procedural elements 
and, thus, separate them from each other. We identify readily the phrase 
"[d]ischarge . . . may be made for any cause, not political or religious, which 
will promote the efficiency of the service. . . ." It is in that phrase that we 
will find the substantive interest if one exists. Obviously, that phrase closely 
resembles the federal civil service phrase mentioned earlier in our discussion 
of Arnett. In that case, the Supreme Court found a property interest - a "cause" 
standard of employee job protection. Arnett, 416 U.S.  at 154, 94 S. Ct.  at 1644. 
Leaving 112(b) for the moment, we find in 112(c) that the legislature addresses 
the job security of police department employees. Parsing that subsection, we 
readily identify two phrases which are the loci in which we will find the 
substantive interest, if one exists. In 112(c)(i), the legislature uses the 
phrase "suspend any regular employee without pay for disciplinary purposes. . . 
." In 112(c)(ii), the legislature uses the phrase "discharge . . . any employee 
if he considers that the good of the service will be served 
thereby."

[¶23]   As is to be expected, the litigants 
have diametrically opposite views about whether in these specific phrases the 
legislature has established a "cause" standard of police department employee job 
protection. The Commission and the Police Department are of the view that no 
language in either WYO. STAT. § 15-5-112(c)(i) or (ii) creates a property right. 
They maintain that the phrases "for disciplinary purposes" in 112(c)(i) and 
"good of the service" in 112(c)(ii) do not contain a "cause" requirement which 
creates a property interest. Foregoing an in-depth analysis of the forest of the 
civil service statutory provisions and a thorough exercise in statutory 
interpretation, they rely on Joyce v. Webber, 157 Me. 234, 170 A.2d 705 (1961), 
which was decided before Arnett, Roth, and Loudermill. In Joyce, the Maine court 
refused to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the City of Portland's Civil 
Service Commission either to grant an original hearing on or alternatively to 
hear an appeal of the five-day suspension without pay imposed by the city's 
police chief on a city police officer. One section of the city's civil service 
ordinance set forth the police chief's suspension powers for disciplinary 
purposes and the procedures attending the exercise of those powers. Two other 
sections of the ordinance set forth the more extensive suspension and removal 
powers vested in the civil service commission and the procedure attending the 
exercise of those powers. The procedures attending the police chief's suspension 
powers did not provide for notice, lodging of charges, or a hearing, while the 
procedures attending the commission's suspension and removal powers did. All of 
the sections provided, however, for the exercise of the adverse action power if 
"cause" existed. In the police chief's section, the language was 
detailed:

on account of violation 
of department rules, inefficiency, incompetence, misconduct, negligence, 
insubordination, disloyalty, or other sufficient cause. . . .

Joyce, 170 A.2d  
at 706. In the commission's sections, the language was substantially 
abbreviated: "for cause." Joyce, 170 A.2d  at 707. The suspended police officer 
contended that the phrase "or other sufficient cause" in the police chief's 
section inferentially provided for notice and hearing. Rejecting that view, the 
Maine court held that "the civil service employee has no protection against 
suspension and removal except as may be specifically provided by the civil 
service statute or ordinance in effect." Id. (emphasis added). Justifying the 
disparate procedural protections found in the several sections, the court 
explained, in relevant part:

A police department 
necessarily partakes of some of the attributes of a military establishment. 
Discipline and order must be maintained and a measure of unquestioned authority 
must be vested in the responsible commanding officer. The ordinance quite 
realistically takes this into account by vesting in the Chief of Police 
carefully limited powers of disciplinary action which he may employ without the 
necessity of notice, preferment of formal charges or hearing. From his exercise 
of these powers no appeal is provided.

Id. The 
Commission and the Police Department rely on the above-quoted passage as 
providing the best rationale for WYO. STAT. § 15-5-112(c)(i), which sets forth 
the police chief's power of suspension without pay and does not set forth any 
procedural protections. Going even further, the Commission and the Police 
Department take the position that, since 112(b) expressly excepts police 
officers from its procedural protection of a commission hearing ("Except as 
otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section no person may be discharged 
. . . without consent of the commission after a hearing. . . .), the legislature 
did not confer a property right by statute on any police officer in the 
state."

[¶24]   The reasoning of the Commission and 
the Police Department is wrong. They, and the Maine court which decided Joyce in 
1961, are erroneously relying on the "bitter-with-the-sweet" theory expressly 
rejected in Loudermill. Their reasoning is that the public employee's 
substantive interest is defined by the procedural protections conferred by the 
legislature. But, as we explained earlier and now apply to discredit such 
rejected reasoning, Loudermill requires us to identify and define the 
substantive interest without reference to the presence or absence or nature of 
procedural mechanisms which attend the statutory standard which informs the 
public employer of the boundaries of the exercise of its discretion in 
suspension or removal employment decisions. In Joyce, one looks in vain for any 
mention, let alone treatment, of the substantive interest created by the 
ordinance. Since the ordinance bases suspension and removal on "cause" grounds, 
it clearly creates a substantive interest in the police officer who was 
challenging the suspension action. In today's more enlightened legal climate 
after Loudermill, Joyce does not survive. See, e.g., Lucero, 901 P.2d  at 1120; 
Abell, 847 P.2d  at 39; Marvin v. King, 734 F. Supp. 346, 354 (S.D.Ind. 1990); 
Cain v. Larson, 879 F.2d 1424, 1426 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 992, 
110 S. Ct. 540, 107 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1989); and Fleury v. Clayton, 847 F.2d 1229, 
1232 (7th Cir. 1988).

[¶25]   Officer Mondt is of the view that 
the statutory language in question creates a property interest in her continued 
employment. Unfortunately, like her public employer and the Commission, she 
foregoes both an in-depth analysis of the civil service statutes and a thorough 
exercise in statutory interpretation in support of her view. Instead, with 
little explanation, she baldly asserts that the statutory provisions that govern 
her employment relationship are similar to the statutory provision, WYO. STAT. § 
18-3-611(b), which we found in Lucero to create a property interest in continued 
employment for a deputy sheriff. The statutory provision governing a deputy 
sheriff contains an express "for cause" requirement. The statutory provisions in 
question today do not contain those words.

[¶26]   Because neither litigant's 
presentation is particularly illuminating, we have largely fended for ourselves. 
Earlier in this opinion we surveyed the forest of the civil service statutory 
provisions, identifying various of those provisions which strongly suggest a 
merit and performance based tenor. We now narrow our focus to the phrases "for 
disciplinary purposes" contained in 112(c)(i) and "good of the service" 
contained in 112(c)(ii). The only case in which our Court has commented on a 
similar phrase was Gardner v. Nation, 522 P.2d 1281 (Wyo. 1974), in which this 
Court reviewed the predecessor statute of present-day WYO. STAT. § 15-5-112 in 
the course of determining whether a fireman was entitled to remain a member of 
the Cheyenne Fire Department after reaching the age of 65. While drawing a 
distinction between the subsection governing involuntary retirement upon a 
fireman's reaching age 65 and the subsection governing a fireman's discharge 
"for any cause, not political or religious, which will promote the efficiency of 
the service," this Court commented on that latter phrase as follows:

The very language itself 
connotes a charge that the person sought to be removed has in some way failed to 
carry out the functions of his employment. Simple justice requires that he have 
opportunity to know the charges and defend against them.

Gardner, 522 P.2d  at 1283.

[¶27]   The legislature has not defined the 
phrases "disciplinary purposes" and "good of the service." Therefore, we must 
consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used. The adjective 
"disciplinary" is defined in the dictionary as "designed to correct or punish 
breaches of discipline." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 330 (10th ed. 
1994). The noun "discipline" is defined as "[p]unishment . . . [;] control 
gained by enforcing obedience or order . . . [;] a rule or system of rules 
governing conduct or activity." Id.

[¶28]   In light of these definitions, the 
phrase "disciplinary purposes" connotes that the employee against whom the 
employer is taking adverse action has in some way failed to carry out the 
duties, functions, and responsibilities of her employment. It reflects a 
connection with unfitness, substandard performance, or misconduct on the 
employee's part.

[¶29]   The noun "good" is defined as 
"advancement of prosperity or well-being [as in the good of the community]." Id. 
at 502. The adjective "good" carries many definitions, including "of a favorable 
character or tendency;" "suitable, fit;" and "competent, skillful." Id. In light 
of these definitions, the phrase that characterizes an employee's discharge as 
serving the "good of the service" connotes, similar to the phrase "efficiency of 
the service" as mentioned above, a rational connection between an employee's 
performance and the employer's needs justifying adverse action against the 
employee.

[¶30]   In the context of the purpose of 
the state's civil service laws to employ and promote individuals on the 
objective bases of merit, proficiency and fitness, the meaning of the phrases 
"disciplinary purposes" and "good of the service" is clear. Under these 
standards an individual's status cannot be altered because of something that 
does not reasonably relate to the individual's performance and the functioning 
of the police department. These phrases clearly suggest that something about a 
police officer's performance lacks merit, proficiency, or fitness; that the 
police officer's performance is detrimental to the service. As one court has 
expressed it in holding that the standard "satisfactory" limits the discretion 
of a civil service commission and imposes a significant substantive element upon 
that commission's employment decisions:

[T]he Commission could 
not discharge a probationer or a permanent fire fighter because of, say, the 
color of his eyes, his interest in reading Mad magazine, his backing of the 
Chicago Cubs, or any other arbitrary matter upon which employers of at-will 
employees are free to base their employment decisions.

Marvin, 734 F. Supp.  at 354.

[¶31]   We hold that the standards of 
"disciplinary purposes" and "good of the service" as set forth in WYO. STAT. § 
15-5-112(c)(i) and (ii) are the equivalent of a "for cause" standard, limit the 
public employer's exercise of discretion, and are sufficient foundations upon 
which to base a property interest in continued employment. We hold, therefore, 
that Officer Mondt has a protected property interest in continued employment as 
a non-probationary police officer.

[¶32]   We now address whether the 
forty-hour suspension without pay constitutes a deprivation of Officer Mondt's 
protected property interest.

3. 
Deprivation.

[¶33]   Other courts have had occasion to 
examine the question of whether a temporary suspension from employment, as 
distinguished from a discharge from employment, is significant enough to trigger 
the protections of the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Gillard v. Norris, 857 F.2d 1095, 1098-1100 (6th Cir. 1988); Garraghty v. Jordan, 830 F.2d 1295, 1299 
(4th Cir. 1987); Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 690-91 (6th Cir. 1985); and Click 
v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 609 F. Supp. 1199, 1204 (D.C.Mo. 1985). These 
decisions guide us today in determining whether Officer Mondt's forty-hour 
suspension without pay is significant enough to trigger the protections of the 
Due Process Clause. These decisions are anchored by that said in Roth and Goss 
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975):

[I]n determining "whether 
due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the 
`weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake." Board of Regents v. 
Roth, [408 U.S.] at 570-71, 92 S. Ct.  at 2705-06. . . . The Court's view has been 
that as long as a property deprivation is not de minimis, its gravity is 
irrelevant to the question whether account must be taken of the Due Process 
Clause.

Goss, 419 U.S. 
at 575-76, 95 S. Ct.  at 737.

[¶34]   Officer Mondt's right to continued 
employment includes the right to the office and its emoluments such as rank and 
compensation. A police officer who is suspended for forty hours without pay 
loses those emoluments for the period of suspension. Five-day suspensions 
without pay are not de minimis deprivations. Garraghty, 830 F.2d  at 1299; 
Gillard, 857 F.2d  at 1098; Boals, 775 F.2d  at 697 (Wellford, J., concurring). A 
three-day suspension without pay was held not de minimis in Click. Click, 609 F. Supp.  at 1204. But cf. Carter v. Western Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation 
Center, 767 F.2d 270, 272 (6th Cir. 1985) (two-day suspension held de minimis). 
Officer Mondt was deprived of compensation for forty hours. We hold that her 
suspension was not de minimis and is significant enough to trigger the 
protections of the Due Process Clause.

[¶35]   We next consider the requisite 
process to which Officer Mondt was entitled.

4. Due 
Process.

[¶36]   Since we have determined that the 
Wyoming legislature has conferred on Officer Mondt a protected property interest 
in continued employment, we must follow Loudermill's holding that the Due 
Process Clause, not Wyoming's civil service law which created the property 
interest, prescribes the procedural minima. Loudermill, 470 U.S.  at 539-41, 105 
S.Ct. at 1491-93; and see Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 
1992); Miller v. City of Mission, Kan., 705 F.2d 368, 374-75 (10th Cir. 1983); 
and Fleury v. Clayton, 847 F.2d 1229, 1232 (7th Cir. 1988).

[¶37]   Officer Mondt claims due process 
violations with respect to both Police Chief Pack's suspension action and the 
Commission's action denying a post-deprivation hearing. She asserts particularly 
that Police Chief Pack did not let her tell her side of the matter before he 
suspended her. Therefore, we shall discuss what process was due Officer Mondt 
before Police Chief Pack suspended her as well as what process was due her 
before the Commission following that suspension.

A. 
Pre-deprivation Due Process.

[¶38]   The United States Supreme Court has 
considered the process due a discharged employee with the right to continued 
employment and the process due a suspended student with the right to education. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S.  at 542, 105 S. Ct.  at 1493; Goss, 419 U.S.  at 581, 95 S. Ct. 
at 740. In Goss, the Court determined that due process entitled a student facing 
suspension to oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he 
denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an 
opportunity to present his side of the story. Goss, 419 U.S.  at 581, 95 S. Ct.  at 
740. The Court did not require a delay between the time notice is given and the 
time of the hearing, meaning that in the great majority of cases due process was 
served by the disciplinarian informally discussing the alleged misconduct with 
the student minutes after it occurred. The Court held only "that, in being given 
an opportunity to explain his version of the facts at this discussion, the 
student first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the 
accusation is." Goss, 419 U.S.  at 582, 95 S. Ct.  at 740. Balancing the student's 
interest against the school's, the Court found that the student's interest in 
not being unfairly excluded from the education process did not require further 
formalizing the suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary 
nature. In its view it not only may make it too costly as a regular disciplinary 
tool, but also may destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching process. 
Goss, 419 U.S.  at 583, 95 S. Ct.  at 741.

[¶39]   In the discharge case of 
Loudermill, the Court employed the test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), of balancing the competing interests at 
stake. Loudermill, 470 U.S.  at 542, 105 S. Ct.  at 1493. Those competing interests 
are the employee's interest in retaining employment, the government's interest 
in expeditiously removing unsatisfactory employees and avoiding administrative 
burdens, and guarding against the risk of an erroneous deprivation. The Court 
determined that before termination, an employee with a protected property right 
is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation 
of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story 
before discharge. Loudermill, 470 U.S.  at 546, 105 S. Ct.  at 1495.

[¶40]   These cases teach that an employee 
facing suspension without pay is probably entitled to more due process than Goss 
afforded a suspended student and less due process than Loudermill afforded a 
discharged employee. Gillard, 857 F.2d  at 1099; Garraghty, 830 F.2d  at 1300. In 
determining what process is due Officer Mondt, the timing and content of the 
notice and the nature of the hearing depend on appropriately accommodating the 
competing interests involved. Goss, 419 U.S.  at 579-80, 95 S. Ct.  at 738-39. The 
competing interests here are claimed to be Officer Mondt's interest at stake in 
preserving her pay and other office emoluments from an unwarranted suspension; 
Cheyenne's claim that its police department has an interest in swiftly 
correcting misconduct in order to maintain discipline and integrity in a 
paramilitary type organization; and our perception that the risk of error is 
substantial because the action came upon the report and advice of others and 
Officer Mondt disputes the allegations.

[¶41]   In weighing these claimed interests 
we note that it is judicially recognized that law enforcement often relies on a 
paramilitary organizational structure to develop discipline, esprit de 
corps, and uniformity because of its substantial interest in insuring the 
safety of persons and property. Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407, 1419 (8th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023, 104 S. Ct. 1275, 79 L. Ed. 2d 680 (1984); see 
also Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 246-47, 96 S. Ct. 1440, 1445-46, 47 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1976). Decisions have recognized that a highway patrol organization has a 
substantial interest in regulating activities of its officers in order "to 
promote efficiency, foster loyalty and obedience to superior officers, maintain 
morale, and instill public confidence in the law enforcement institution," 
Gasparinetti v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311, 315-16 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903, 98 S. Ct. 2232, 56 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1978); Wilson v. Taylor, 658 F.2d 1021, 
1027 (5th Cir. 1981), and a fire department like a police department has greater 
than normal government interest in maintaining morale and discipline. Janusaitis 
v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dept., 607 F.2d 17, 26 (2nd Cir. 1979). We agree 
that the police department as a paramilitary force does have a significant 
interest in swift disciplinary action; however, this interest does not outweigh 
Officer Mondt's important property interest or our recognition that "policemen, 
like teachers and lawyers, are not [to be] relegated to a watered-down version 
of constitutional rights." Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500, 87 S. Ct. 616, 620, 17 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1967). The police department's interest is also 
subject to the substantial risk of error presented in this case. The record 
indicates that an internal affair's investigation report resulted in Mondt's 
suspension. The department's rules state that an internal affair's investigation 
will be initiated upon the police chief's assignment of a supervisor. The 
investigator must submit a detailed written report including all facts, all 
interviews, all evidence, a finding and a recommendation. The rules specifically 
require the investigation be "well documented" with a file that contains all 
reports, statements, and any other documentation and which confines the 
investigation to the issue at question. Review of this file is at the chief's 
discretion if ordered by a court, requested by the accused officer if given a 
disciplinary sanction or if facing disciplinary action by a convened board of 
inquiry. Cheyenne Wyoming Police Department Manual, Policy and Procedure, 
Section 12 (2-3-12) Internal Affairs Files. As noted by the Court in Goss, when 
a disciplinary action is taken based upon the reports and advice of others, 
errors are likely and a meaningful opportunity to respond is required. See Goss, 
419 U.S.  at 579-80, 95 S. Ct.  at 739.

[¶42]   Balancing these interests requires 
that risk-reducing procedures be afforded before a suspension. Little v. City of 
Jackson, 375 So. 2d 1031, 1035 (Miss. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 933, 100 S. Ct. 1325, 63 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1980). If a full evidentiary hearing is not provided 
until after suspension, the following risk-reducing procedures must be afforded 
before suspension: written notice of the charges against her, knowledge of the 
basis of those charges either by explanation or by reviewing the file containing 
the report of the internal affairs investigation conducted and, in the case of 
the denial of the allegations, an effective opportunity to respond either in 
person or in writing to an impartial decision maker. Little, 375 So. 2d  at 1035; 
Miller v. City of Mission, Kan., 705 F.2d 368, 372 (10th Cir. 1983). In this 
case, the disciplinary action does not appear to have resulted from a 
confrontation between Officer Mondt and the Police Chief for insubordination or 
a similar situation and he appears to qualify as an impartial decision 
maker.

B. 
Post-Deprivation Due Process.

[¶43]   A Cheyenne police department 
employee who denies the charges made against her is also entitled to a 
post-suspension hearing. Loudermill, 470 U.S.  at 547-48, 105 S. Ct.  at 1496. 
Loudermill requires a hearing which, at a minimum, determines whether reasonable 
grounds exist to believe that the charges against the employee are true and 
support the action. Loudermill, 470 U.S.  at 545-46, 105 S. Ct.  at 1495. Wyoming's 
civil service statute provides for a contested case hearing in accordance with 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act (APA). WYO. STAT. § 15-5-112(b) 
(1992); Rolfes v. State ex rel. Burt, 464 P.2d 531, 532 (Wyo. 1970). Under 
Wyoming's APA, a contested case hearing entitles one to a full evidentiary 
hearing and examination of witnesses. Conducted in this manner, a contested case 
hearing exceeds the constitutional requirements set out in Loudermill. The 
Commission must comply with the statutory mandate and afford Officer Mondt a 
contested case hearing if she is suspended.

CONCLUSION

[¶44]   The purpose of hearings is to 
prevent arbitrary disciplinary decisions and unfounded suspensions or 
terminations. Providing the pre-deprivation hearing described above will not 
constitute an unwarranted intrusion on the Cheyenne Police Department's interest 
in timely disciplining an employee's unsatisfactory performance. In the event a 
suspended officer denies the allegations against her, following suspension she 
is entitled to a contested case hearing before the Commission.

[¶45]   Officer Mondt has denied the 
allegations and is entitled to pre-deprivation and postdeprivation hearings. The 
record is unclear as to whether her suspension has taken place. If the 
suspension was stayed, the district court is directed to remand the case to the 
Chief of Police to afford Officer Mondt pre-deprivation due process consistent 
with this opinion. If the suspension has occurred, the district court is 
directed to remand the case to the Chief of Police to pay her the forty hours of 
pay denied her, remove the suspension from her record, and afford her a hearing. 
Should the suspension occur following this hearing, the Commission is ordered to 
provide her a post-suspension hearing in accordance with this 
opinion.