Case Title: Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors

Citation: 

Docket Number: S123808

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
Filed 12/13/07  
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
ZERLENE RICO et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S123808 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/2 E033616 
MITSUBISHI MOTORS  
) 
CORPORATION et al., 
) 
 
) 
San Bernardino County 
 
Defendants and Respondents, ) 
Super. Ct. No. RCV39233 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
Here we consider what action is required of an attorney who receives 
privileged documents through inadvertence and whether the remedy of 
disqualification is appropriate.  We conclude that, under the authority of State 
Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc. (1999) 70 Cal. App. 4th 644 (State Fund), an 
attorney in these circumstances may not read a document any more closely than is 
necessary to ascertain that it is privileged.  Once it becomes apparent that the 
content is privileged, counsel must immediately notify opposing counsel and try to 
resolve the situation.  We affirm the disqualification order under the circumstances 
presented here.   
 
 
2 
 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
Two Mitsubishi corporations1 (collectively Mitsubishi or defendants), and 
the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), were sued by various 
plaintiffs after a Mitsubishi Montero rolled over while being driven on a freeway.  
Subsequently, Mitsubishi representatives met with their lawyers, James Yukevich 
and Alexander Calfo, and two designated defense experts to discuss their litigation 
strategy and vulnerabilities.  Mitsubishi’s case manager, Jerome Rowley, also 
attended the meeting.  Rowley and Yukevich had worked together over a few 
years.  Yukevich asked Rowley to take notes at the meeting and indicated specific 
areas to be summarized.  The trial court later found that Rowley, who had typed 
the notes on Yukevich’s computer, had acted as Yukevich’s paralegal.  At the end 
of the six-hour session, Rowley returned the computer and never saw a printed 
version of the notes.  Yukevich printed only one copy of the notes, which he later 
edited and annotated.  Yukevich never intentionally showed the notes to anyone, 
and the court determined that the sole purpose of the document was to help 
Yukevich defend the case.         
 
The notes are written in a dialogue style and summarize conversations 
among Yukevich, Calfo, and the experts.  They are dated, but not labeled as 
“confidential” or “work product.”  The printed copy of these compiled and 
annotated notes is the document at issue here.2   
 
Less than two weeks after the strategy session, Yukevich deposed 
plaintiffs’ expert witness, Anthony Sances, at the offices of plaintiffs’ counsel, 
Raymond Johnson.  Yukevich, court reporter Karen Kay, and Caltrans counsel 
                                              
1  
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation and Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, 
Inc. 
2  
  Because the document was confidential, the court ordered it sealed along 
with relevant portions of the reporter’s transcript where the contents of the 
document were discussed.  The document has remained sealed since that time.       
 
3 
 
Darin Flagg were told that Johnson and Sances would be late for the deposition.  
After waiting in the conference room for some time, Yukevich went to the 
restroom, leaving his briefcase, computer, and case file in the room.  The printed 
document from the strategy session was in the case file.  While Yukevich was 
away, Johnson and Sances arrived.  Johnson asked Kay and Flagg to leave the 
conference room.  Kay and Flagg’s departure left only the plaintiffs’ 
representatives and counsel in the conference room.  Yukevich returned to find 
Kay and Flagg standing outside.  Yukevich waited approximately 5 minutes, then 
knocked and asked to retrieve his briefcase, computer, and file.  After a brief 
delay, he was allowed to do so.     
 
Somehow, Johnson acquired Yukevich’s notes.  Johnson maintained that 
they were accidentally given to him by the court reporter.  Yukevich insisted that 
they were taken from his file while only Johnson and plaintiffs’ team were in the 
conference room.  As a result, Mitsubishi moved to disqualify plaintiffs’ attorneys 
and experts.  The trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine how 
Johnson obtained the document.   
 
The court reporter was deposed and denied any specific recollection of the 
Sances deposition.  She could not testify what she had done with the deposition 
exhibits that night and could only relate her general practice.  She said she 
generally collects exhibits and puts them in a plastic covering.  She did not 
remember ever having given exhibits to an attorney.  She also testified that she 
had never seen the document in question.  If documents other than exhibits remain 
on a conference table, she leaves them there.  The trial court found that the Sances 
deposition took place over approximately eight hours.  It was a document-intense 
session and documents were placed on the conference table.     
 
Another member of plaintiffs’ legal team submitted a declaration 
supporting Johnson’s assertion that he received the document from the reporter.  
 
4 
 
The court ultimately concluded that the defense had failed to establish that 
Johnson had taken the notes from Yukevich’s file.  It thus ruled that Johnson came 
into the document’s possession through inadvertence.   
 
The court found the 12-page document was dated, but not otherwise 
labeled.  It contained notations by Yukevich.  Johnson admitted that he knew 
within a minute or two that the document related to the defendants’ case.  He knew 
that Yukevich did not intend to produce it and that it would be a “powerful 
impeachment document.”  Nevertheless, Johnson made a copy of the document.  
He scrutinized and made his own notes on it.  He gave copies to his cocounsel and 
his experts, all of whom studied the document.  Johnson specifically discussed the 
contents of the document with each of his experts.   
 
A week after he acquired Yukevich’s notes, Johnson used them during the 
deposition of defense expert Geoffrey Germane.3  The notes purportedly indicate 
that the defense experts made statements at the strategy session that were 
inconsistent with their deposition testimony.  Johnson used the document while 
questioning Germane, asking about Germane’s participation in the strategy 
session.   
 
Defense Counsel Calfo defended the Germane deposition.  Yukevich did 
not attend.  Calfo had never seen the document and was not given a copy during 
the deposition.  When he asked about the document’s source, Johnson vaguely 
replied that, “It was put in Dr. Sances’ file.”  Calfo repeatedly objected to the 
“whole line of inquiry with respect to an unknown document.”  He specifically 
said that, “I don’t even know where this exhibit came from.”     
 
Only after the deposition did Johnson give a copy of the document to Calfo, 
who contacted Yukevich.  When Yukevich realized that Johnson had his only 
                                              
3  
Johnson also used the document at the subsequent deposition of defense 
expert Dennis Schneider.   
 
5 
 
copy of the strategy session notes and had used it at the deposition, he and Calfo 
wrote to Johnson demanding the return of all duplicates.  The letter was faxed the 
day after Germane’s deposition.  The next day, defendants moved to disqualify 
plaintiffs’ legal team and their experts on the ground that they had become privy to 
and had used Yukevich’s work product.  As a result, they complained, Johnson’s 
unethical use of the notes and his revelation of them to cocounsel and their experts 
irremediably prejudiced defendants.   
 
The trial court concluded that the notes were absolutely privileged by the 
work product rule.4  The court also held that Johnson had acted unethically by 
examining the document more closely than was necessary to determine that its 
contents were confidential, by failing to notify Yukevich that he had a copy of the 
document, and by surreptitiously using it to gain maximum adversarial value from 
it.  The court determined that Johnson’s violation of the work product rule had 
prejudiced the defense and “the bell cannot be ‘unrung’ by use of in limine 
orders.”  Accordingly, the court ordered plaintiffs’ attorneys and experts 
disqualified.5     
Plaintiffs appealed the disqualification order.  The Court of Appeal affirmed.      
                                              
4  
The trial court also held that the document fell under the attorney-client 
privilege.  The Court of Appeal held to the contrary.  That issue is not before us 
and we express no view thereon.   
5  
The court continued the case to provide the plaintiffs an opportunity to 
retain new counsel.  The court noted that it did not appear that the plaintiffs were 
made privy to the document’s contents, so disqualification would be an effective 
remedy, because there was no issue about the plaintiffs providing new counsel 
with the information.  The court also imposed a gag order on all who attended the 
hearing on the motion to disqualify, specifically instructing plaintiffs’ counsel and 
experts to keep the contents of the document confidential and not reveal any 
information about the document to plaintiffs and their new attorneys.   
 
6 
 
DISCUSSION 
Attorney Work Product 
Plaintiffs contend that the Court of Appeal erred by holding that the entire 
document was protected as attorney work product.  We reject that contention. 
The Legislature has protected attorney work product under California Code 
of Civil Procedure6 section 2018.030,7 which provides, “(a) A writing that reflects 
an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories is 
not discoverable under any circumstances.  [¶]  (b) The work product of an 
attorney, other than a writing described in subdivision (a), is not discoverable 
unless the court determines that denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice the 
party seeking discovery in preparing that party's claim or defense or will result in 
an injustice.”   
The Legislature has declared that it is state policy to “[p]reserve the rights of 
attorneys to prepare cases for trial with that degree of privacy necessary to 
encourage them to prepare their cases thoroughly and to investigate not only the 
favorable but the unfavorable aspects of those cases.”  (§ 2018.020, subd. (a).)  In 
addition, the Legislature declared its intent to “[p]revent attorneys from taking 
undue advantage of their adversary’s industry and efforts.”  (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 2018.020, subd. (b).) 
                                              
6 
Unless otherwise indicated, further undesignated statutory references are to 
the Code of Civil Procedure.     
7  
We note that the Court of Appeal relied on former section 2018 in setting 
forth the work product rule.  Section 2018 was repealed.  (Stats. 2004, ch. 182, § 
22, operative July 1, 2005.)  The Legislature replaced it with sections 2018.010-
2018.080.  Section 2018.040 provides the Legislature did not intend to make any 
changes to the work product doctrine, referring to the new statutes as a 
“restatement of existing law” that are “not intended to expand or reduce the extent 
to which work product is discoverable under existing law in any action.” 
 
7 
 
Thus, the codified work product doctrine absolutely protects from discovery 
writings that contain an “attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal 
research or theories.”  (§ 2018.030, subd. (a); see Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. 
v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 110, 120.)  The protection extends to an 
attorney’s written notes about a witness’s statements.  (See Rodriguez v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 626, 649 (Rodriguez); see also 
Dowden v. Superior Court (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 126, 135.)  “[A]ny such notes or 
recorded statements taken by defendants’ counsel would be protected by the 
absolute work product privilege because they would reveal counsel’s ‘impressions, 
conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories’ within the meaning of [the 
work product doctrine.]”  (Nacht & Lewis Architects, Inc. v. Superior Court 
(1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 214, 217.)  When a witness’s statement and the attorney’s 
impressions are inextricably intertwined, the work product doctrine provides that 
absolute protection is afforded to all of the attorney's notes.  (Rodriguez, supra, 87 
Cal.App.3d at p. 648.) 
  Plaintiffs urge that the document is not work product because it reflects the 
statements of declared experts.  They are incorrect.  The document is not a 
transcript of the August 28, 2002 strategy session, nor is it a verbatim record of the 
experts’ own statements.  It contains Rowley’s summaries of points from the 
strategy session, made at Yukevich’s direction.  Yukevich also edited the 
document in order to add his own thoughts and comments, further inextricably 
intertwining his personal impressions with the summary.  (See Rodriguez, supra, 
87 Cal.App.3d at pp. 647-648.)  In this regard, the trial court found:  “As to the 
content of the document, although it doesn’t contain overt statements setting forth 
the lawyer’s conclusions, its very existence is owed to the lawyer’s thought 
process.  The document reflects not only the strategy, but also the attorney’s 
opinion as to the important issues in the case.  Directions were provided by Mr. 
 
8 
 
Yukevich as to the key pieces of information to be recorded, and Mr. Yukevich 
also added his own input as to the important details, by inserting other words in 
the notes.  The attorney’s impressions of the case were the filter through which all 
the discussions at the conference were passed through on the way to the page.”  
The court concluded, “[T]his court determines that the attorney’s directions to 
record only portions of the conference specific to the attorney’s concerns in the 
litigation are sufficient to support the finding that the notes are covered by the 
absolute work product [doctrine], as the choices in statements to record show the 
thought process and are too intertwined with the document.”     
Although the notes were written in dialogue format and contain information 
attributed to Mitsubishi’s experts, the document does not qualify as an expert’s 
report, writing, declaration, or testimony.  The notes reflect the paralegal’s 
summary along with counsel’s thoughts and impressions about the case.  The 
document was absolutely protected work product because it contained the ideas of 
Yukevich and his legal team about the case.  (§ 2018.030, subd. (a).)8 
Ethical Duty Owed Upon Receipt Of Attorney Work Product 
Because the document is work product we consider what ethical duty 
Johnson owed once he received it.  Plaintiffs rely on Aerojet-General Corp. v. 
Transport Indemnity Insurance (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 996 (Aerojet), to argue that 
because the document was inadvertently received, Johnson was duty bound to use 
                                              
8  
We also reject plaintiffs’ contention that defendants waived their right to 
assert the protection of the work product doctrine because they failed to make a 
proper objection at Germane’s deposition.  The record shows that at Germane’s 
deposition, defendants’ counsel, Calfo, did not know Johnson was using the 
document, so he could not raise a specific objection based on the work product 
doctrine.  In fact, when asked how Johnson obtained the document, Johnson told 
Calfo, “It was put in Dr. Sances’ file.”  Also, Calfo did make numerous objections 
to the document’s use, including those where he stated that he objected “to the 
exhibit as a whole” because it lacked foundation and  “to this whole line of inquiry 
with respect to an unknown document.”  Accordingly, there was no waiver. 
 
9 
 
the nonprivileged portions of it to his clients’ advantage.  This argument fails. 
Aerojet is distinguishable because there are no “unprivileged portions” of the 
document.   
A review of Aerojet, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th 996, demonstrates that it does not 
assist plaintiffs.  Aerojet’s insurance brokers had sent a package of materials to 
Aerojet’s risk manager.  The risk manager sent them on to Aerojet’s attorney, 
DeVries.  Among these documents was a memo from an attorney at an opposing 
law firm.  It was never ascertained how opposing counsel’s memo found its way 
into the package of documents.  The memo revealed the existence of a witness 
whom DeVries ultimately deposed.  When opposing counsel learned that DeVries 
had received the memo and thus discovered the witness, counsel sought sanctions.  
The trial court imposed monetary sanctions under section 128.5, subdivision (a).  
(Aerojet, at pp. 1001-1002.)  The Court of Appeal reversed the sanctions order.   
The Aerojet court first noted that DeVries was free of any wrongdoing in his 
initial receipt of the document.  The court also observed that the existence and 
identification of the witness was not privileged.  “Nor can ‘the identity and 
location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts’ be concealed under the 
attorney work product rule . . . .  [Citations.]”  (Aerojet, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1004.)  Defendants claimed no prejudice to their case as a result of the witness’s 
disclosure.  Indeed, they prevailed at trial.  (Ibid.)  Because counsel was blameless 
in his acquisition of the document and because the information complained of was 
not privileged, DeVries was free to use it.  (Id. at p. 1005.)  Plaintiffs’ reliance on 
Aerojet founders on the facts that distinguish it.  Here, Yukevich’s notes were 
absolutely protected by the work product rule.  Thus, Johnson’s reliance on 
Aeorjet is unavailing, particularly in light of the clear standard set out in State 
Fund, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 644.       
 
10 
 
In State Fund, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 644, the plaintiff sent defendant’s 
attorney (Telanoff) three boxes of documents that were identical to the documents 
provided during discovery.  Inadvertently, plaintiff also sent 273 pages of forms 
entitled, “Civil Litigation Claims Summary,” marked as “ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
COMMUNICATION/ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT,” and with the warning, 
“DO NOT CIRCULATE OR DUPLICATE.”  (Id. at p. 648.)  In addition, “[t]he 
word ‘CONFIDENTIAL’ [was] repeatedly printed around the perimeter of the 
first page of the form.”  (Ibid.)  When counsel discovered the mistake and 
demanded return of the documents, Telanoff refused.  The trial court, relying on 
American Bar Association (ABA) Formal Ethics Opinion No. 92-368 (Nov. 10, 
1992), imposed monetary sanctions. 
The Court of Appeal framed the issue as follows:  “[W]hat is a lawyer to do 
when he or she receives through the inadvertence of opposing counsel documents 
plainly subject to the attorney-client privilege?”  (State Fund, supra, 70 
Cal.App.4th at p. 651.)  After determining that the documents were privileged and 
that inadvertent disclosure did not waive the privilege, the court discussed an 
attorney’s obligation.  The Court of Appeal disagreed that the ABA opinion 
should regulate Telanoff’s conduct.  The court noted that the ABA Model Rules 
on which the opinion was based “do not establish ethical standards in California, 
as they have not been adopted in California and have no legal force of their own. 
[Citations.]”  (Id. at pp. 655-656.)  Likewise, the court held that an “ABA formal 
opinion does not establish an obligatory standard of conduct imposed on 
California lawyers”  (Id. at p. 656.)  Thus, under the circumstances “Telanoff 
should not have been sanctioned for engaging in conduct which has been 
condemned by an ABA formal opinion, but which has not been condemned by any 
decision, statute or Rule of Professional Conduct applicable in this state.”  (Ibid.)   
 
11 
 
The State Fund court went on to articulate the standard to be applied 
prospectively:  “When a lawyer who receives materials that obviously appear to be 
subject to an attorney-client privilege or otherwise clearly appear to be 
confidential and privileged and where it is reasonably apparent that the materials 
were provided or made available through inadvertence, the lawyer receiving such 
materials should refrain from examining the materials any more than is essential to 
ascertain if the materials are privileged, and shall immediately notify the sender 
that he or she possesses material that appears to be privileged.  The parties may 
then proceed to resolve the situation by agreement or may resort to the court for 
guidance with the benefit of protective orders and other judicial intervention as 
may be justified.”  (State Fund, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 656-657.)  To ensure 
that its decision was clear in setting forth the applicable standard in these cases, 
the court explicitly stated that it “declared the standard governing the conduct of 
California lawyers” in such instances.  (Id. at p. 657.) 
The existing State Fund rule is a fair and reasonable approach.9  The rule 
supports the work product doctrine (§ 2018.030), and is consistent with the state’s 
policy to “[p]reserve the rights of attorneys to prepare cases for trial with that 
degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare their cases thoroughly 
and to investigate not only the favorable but the unfavorable aspects of those 
cases” and to “[p]revent attorneys from taking undue advantage of their 
adversary’s industry and efforts.”  (§ 2018.020, subds. (a), (b).)   
                                              
9  
We also reject plaintiffs’ contention that State Fund, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 
644, only applies to materials protected by the attorney-client privilege.  The Court 
of Appeal held that there was no distinction “between the attorney-client privilege 
and the work product privilege in this context [because]. . . [t]he State Fund 
standard applies to documents that are plainly privileged and confidential, 
regardless of whether they are privileged under the attorney-client privilege, the 
work product privilege, or any other similar doctrine that would preclude 
discovery based on the confidential nature of the document.”  We agree.     
 
12 
 
The State Fund rule also addresses the practical problem of inadvertent 
disclosure in the context of today’s reality that document production may involve 
massive numbers of documents.  A contrary holding could severely disrupt the 
discovery process.  As amicus curiae The Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. 
argues, “Even apart from the inadvertent disclosure problem, the party responding 
to a request for mass production must engage in a laborious, time consuming 
process.  If the document producer is confronted with the additional prospect that 
any privileged documents inadvertently produced will become fair game for the 
opposition, the minute screening and re-screening that inevitably would follow not 
only would add enormously to that burden but would slow the pace of discovery to 
a degree sharply at odds with the general goal of expediting litigation.”   
Finally, we note that “[a]n attorney has an obligation not only to protect his 
client’s interests but also to respect the legitimate interests of fellow members of 
the bar, the judiciary, and the administration of justice.”  (Kirsch v. Duryea (1978) 
21 Cal.3d 303, 309.)  The State Fund rule holds attorneys to a reasonable standard 
of professional conduct when confidential or privileged materials are inadvertently 
disclosed.     
Here, it is true that Yukevich’s notes were not so clearly flagged as 
confidential as were the forms in State Fund, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 644.  But, as 
the Court of Appeal observed, “[T]he absence of prominent notations of 
confidentiality does not make them any less privileged.”  The State Fund rule is an 
objective standard.  In applying the rule, courts must consider whether reasonably 
competent counsel, knowing the circumstances of the litigation, would have 
concluded the materials were privileged, how much review was reasonably 
necessary to draw that conclusion, and when counsel’s examination should have 
ended.  (Id. at pp. 656-657.)   
 
13 
 
 The standard was properly and easily applied here.  Johnson admitted that 
after a minute or two of review he realized the notes related to the case and that 
Yukevich did not intend to reveal them.  Johnson’s own admissions and 
subsequent conduct clearly demonstrate that he violated the State Fund rule.  We 
note, however, that such admissions are not required for the application of the 
objective standard in evaluating an attorney’s conduct.       
Disqualification Of Counsel And Experts 
The court properly applied the State Fund rule and determined that Johnson 
violated it.  The next question is whether disqualification was the proper remedy.  
We review the court’s disqualification order for abuse of discretion.  (People ex 
rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 
1135, 1143.)     
The State Fund court held that “ ‘[m]ere exposure’ ” to an adversary’s 
confidences is insufficient, standing alone, to warrant an attorney’s 
disqualification.  (State Fund, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 657.)  The court 
counseled against a draconian rule that “ ‘[could] nullify a party’s right to 
representation by chosen counsel any time inadvertence or devious design put an 
adversary’s confidences in an attorney’s mailbox.’ ”  (Ibid.)  However, the court, 
did not “rule out the possibility that in an appropriate case, disqualification might 
be justified if an attorney inadvertently receives confidential materials and fails to 
conduct himself or herself in the manner specified above, assuming other factors 
compel disqualification.”  (Ibid.)   
After reviewing the document, Johnson made copies and disseminated them 
to plaintiffs’ experts and other attorneys.  In affirming the disqualification order, 
the Court of Appeal stated,  “The trial court settled on disqualification as the 
proper remedy because of the unmitigable damage caused by Johnson’s 
 
14 
 
dissemination and use of the document.”  Thus, “the record shows that Johnson 
not only failed to conduct himself as required under State Fund, [supra, 70 
Cal.App.4th 644,] but also acted unethically in making full use of the confidential 
document.”  The Court of Appeal properly concluded that such use of the 
document undermined the defense experts’ opinions and placed defendants at a 
great disadvantage.  Without disqualification of plaintiffs’ counsel and their 
experts, the damage caused by Johnson’s use and dissemination of the notes was 
irreversible.  Under the circumstances presented in this case, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by ordering disqualification for violation of the State Fund 
rule.  
Plaintiffs attempt to justify Johnson’s use of the document by accusing the 
defense experts of giving false testimony during their depositions.  Plaintiffs allege 
that the statements attributed to the experts in the document contradicted their 
deposition statements and that the experts lied about the technical evidence 
involved in the case.  As an initial matter, we are not persuaded that any of the 
defense experts ever actually adopted as their own the statements attributed to 
them.  The document is not a verbatim transcript of the strategy session, but 
Rowley’s summary of points that Yukevich directed him to note.  Yukevich then 
edited the document, adding his own thoughts and comments.  As the trial court 
observed, the document was an interpretation and summary of what others thought 
the experts were saying.10 
                                              
10 
While Johnson was testifying on direct examination at the hearing on the 
motion to disqualify, the court interjected:  “The difficulty with that concept [that 
Germane’s direct statement is contained in the document at issue] is that you’re 
assuming it’s a direct quote.”  Soon after the court further stated, “No, listen to me 
very carefully.  You’re assuming all along that this is a direct quotation from the 
so-called experts, the four that you recognize.  Whereas, in truth, it may be that it 
is an interpretation of what someone said through somebody else’s mind.”    
  
 
15 
 
Moreover, we agree with the Court of Appeal that, “when a writing is 
protected under the absolute attorney work product privilege, courts do not invade 
upon the attorney’s thought processes by evaluating the content of the writing.  
Once [it is apparent] that the writing contains an attorney’s impressions, 
conclusions, opinions, legal research or theories, the reading stops and the contents 
of the document for all practical purposes are off limits.  In the same way, once the 
court determines that the writing is absolutely privileged, the inquiry ends.  Courts 
do not make exceptions based on the content of the writing.”  Thus, “regardless of 
its potential impeachment value, Yukevich’s personal notes should never have 
been subject to opposing counsel’s scrutiny and use.”       
We also reject plaintiffs’ argument that the crime or fraud exception should 
apply to privileged work product in this civil proceeding.  Under the work product 
doctrine “[a] writing that reflects an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, 
or legal research or theories is not discoverable under any circumstances.  
(§ 2018.030 , subd. (a) italics added.)  With respect to such a writing, the 
Legislature intended that the crime or fraud exception only apply “in any official 
investigation by a law enforcement agency or proceeding or action brought by a 
public prosecutor . . . if the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to 
enable or aid anyone to commit . . . a crime or fraud.”  (§ 2018.050.)  By its own 
terms, the crime or fraud exception does not apply here.           
 
16 
 
DISPOSITION 
 
 
We affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J.   
 
 
 
 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Rico v. Mitsubishi Motor Corp. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 116 Cal.App.4th 51 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S123808 
Date Filed: December 13, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: Ben T. Kayashima 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Pine & Pine, Norman Pine, Beverly Pine; Law Offices of Raymond Paul Johnson, Raymond Paul Johnson, 
Robert A. Balbuena, Michelle M. West; Law Offices of Jack L Mattingly and Jack L. Mattingly for 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Yukevich & Sonnett, James J. Yukevich, Alexander G. Calfo, Stephanie A. Hingle; Bingham McCutchen, 
Leslie G. Landau, Claudia Y. Sanchez; Snell & Wilmer, Michael D. Zimmerman, Richard A. Derevan and 
Michael S. McIntosh for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Hugh F. Young, Jr., and Harvey M. Grossman for The Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Norman Pine 
Pine & Pine 
14156 Magnolia Boulevard, Suite 200 
Sherman Oaks, CA  91423 
(818) 379-9710 
 
James J. Yukevich 
Yukevich & Sonnett 
601 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 3801 
Los Angeles, CA  90017 
(213) 362-7777