Case Title: Matthews v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 20/11

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2012-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Elroy Matthews, Jr. v. State of Maryland, No. 20, September Term 2011
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL
SENTENCE – A Rule 4-345(a) motion to correct illegal sentence is the proper vehicle
through which to challenge a sentence imposed allegedly in excess of a binding plea
agreement.  The State indicated that it would recommend a sentence of “actual and
immediate incarceration” at the top of the guidelines, and the court agreed to “cap” the
sentence.  The term was ambiguous because there was no explicit exclusion from the plea
agreement of any suspended portion the court could impose.  Petitioner is entitled to have the
ambiguity resolved in his favor, and therefore, he received an illegal sentence.  
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. K02-2799
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 20
September Term, 2011
 
ELROY MATTHEWS, JR. 
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera,
Eldridge, John C.,
(Retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, J.
Harrell and Adkins, JJ., dissent
Filed:  January 26, 2012
Maryland Rule 4-345, “Sentencing–Revisory power of court,” provides, in pertinent
part, “(a) Illegal sentence.  The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.”  Elroy
Matthews, Jr., Petitioner, invoked Rule 4-345(a) to challenge the legality of the sentence he
received following his plea of guilty to certain charges, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County, as part of a plea agreement.  Petitioner argued that the sentence was illegal because
it exceeded the sentence to which the court had bound itself.  The Circuit Court denied the
motion without a hearing, and Petitioner appealed.  The Court of Special Appeals held that a
challenge to the legality of a sentence on the ground that it violates a binding term of a plea
agreement is not cognizable under Rule 4-345(a) and, even if it were, the sentence Petitioner
received was not illegal.
For the reasons that follow, we hold that Rule 4-345(a) is an appropriate vehicle for 
challenging a sentence that is imposed in violation of a plea agreement to which the sentencing
court bound itself.  We further hold that the sentence Petitioner is serving is illegal because
it exceeds the sentencing “cap” to which the Circuit Court agreed to be bound.
I.
Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to charges of attempted first-degree murder, two
counts of first-degree assault, and unlawful use of a handgun in the commission of a felony
or crime of violence.  In exchange for that guilty plea, the State agreed to:  (1) enter a nolle
prosequi to the remaining counts with which Petitioner was charged in that case; (2) enter a
nolle prosequi to the charges in a related case; and (3) argue, with respect to the charges to
which Petitioner was pleading guilty, “for incarceration within the – to the top of the
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guidelines range . . . [,] twenty-three to forty-three years.”  The State added that it would “be
asking for incarceration of forty-three years. . . .  That cap is a cap as to actual and immediate
incarceration at the time of initial disposition.”  The sentencing court stated that it “agreed to
cap any sentence.”  In addition, the court  advised Petitioner that “theoretically I can give you
anything from the mandatory minimum on the one count, which is five years without parole,
up to the maximum of life imprisonment.”
At the sentencing proceeding several months later, the State asked the court to “impose
a sentence of life imprisonment, suspend all but forty-three years of that.”  Petitioner requested
“a split sentence and a substantial period of incarceration” and argued that “ten years is
appropriate.”  The court sentenced Petitioner on the lead count of attempted first-degree
murder to life imprisonment, with all but thirty years suspended, with concurrent sentences
of twenty-five years for each of the two assault charges, and twenty years, with a mandatory
five-year minimum, for the handgun charge.  Petitioner thereby received a total sentence of
life imprisonment, with thirty years of it as executed time.
The postconviction proceeding
Approximately eighteen months later, Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction
relief, followed by an amended petition nearly twenty months later.  The amended petition
asserted ineffective assistance of counsel for, inter alia, failing to object to the State’s breach
of the plea agreement in requesting a life sentence with all but forty-three years suspended,
instead of a total sentence of forty-three years, inclusive of any suspended portion.
1 The record before us does not contain a transcript of the postconviction hearing but
does contain a transcript of the plea hearing.
2 The postconviction court found preliminarily that Petitioner had waived his
challenge to the State’s breach of the plea agreement by not raising the issue on direct
appeal, but that “special circumstances” existed to excuse the waiver.  The “special
circumstances” were that a defendant serving a sentence of forty-three years would be
eligible for parole after serving one half of his sentence, whereas a defendant serving a life
sentence, suspend all but forty-three years would be eligible for parole only with approval
from the Governor after serving fifteen years.
3 Maryland Rule 4-243(c) provides:  
Agreements of sentence, disposition, or other judicial action.
(1) Presentation to the court.  If a plea agreement has been reached pursuant
to subsection (a)(1)(F) of this Rule for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
which contemplates a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action,
the defense counsel and the State’s Attorney shall advise the judge of the
terms of the agreement when the defendant pleads.  The judge may then accept
or reject the plea and, if accepted, may approve the agreement or defer
decision as to its approval or rejection until after such pre-sentence
proceedings and investigation as the judge directs.  
(continued...)
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The postconviction court, evidently having reviewed the transcript of the plea hearing,1
made a finding that the Assistant State’s Attorney had said at the plea proceeding that he
would recommend “forty-three years,” but then, at sentencing, breached that term of the
agreement by recommending “life imprisonment, suspend all but forty-three years.”2  The
postconviction court therefore concluded that Petitioner was deprived of the benefit of his
bargain.  Evidently the parties did not raise, and the postconviction court did not address, what
the sentencing court meant by stating at the plea hearing that it had bound itself to “cap” the
sentence.  The postconviction court nonetheless stated in the order that the plea agreement was
“not presented as a binding plea under Rule 4-243(c)[3], [so] the trial court upon resentencing
(...continued)
(2) Not binding on the court.  The agreement of the State’s Attorney
relating to a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action is not
binding on the court unless the judge to whom the agreement is presented
approves it.  
(3) Approval of plea agreement.  If the plea agreement is approved, the
judge shall embody in the judgment the agreed sentence, disposition, or other
judicial action encompassed in the agreement or, with the consent of the
parties, a disposition more favorable to the defendant than that provided for
in the agreement.  
(4) Rejection of plea agreement.  If the plea agreement is rejected, the
judge shall inform the parties of this fact and advise the defendant (A) that the
court is not bound by the plea agreement; (B) that the defendant may withdraw
the plea; and (C) that if the defendant persists in the plea or guilty or nolo
contendere, the sentence or other disposition of the action may be less
favorable than the plea agreement.  If the defendant persists in the plea, the
court may accept the plea of guilty only pursuant to Rule 4-242(c) and the plea
of nolo contendere only pursuant to Rule 4-242(d).  
(5) Withdrawal of plea.  If the defendant withdraws the plea and pleads
not guilty, then upon the objection of the defendant or the State made at that
time, the judge to whom the agreement was presented may not preside at a
subsequent court trial of the defendant on any charges involved in the rejected
plea agreement.  
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shall be free to impose whatever sentence it feels appropriate.”  The postconviction court
issued an order granting Petitioner a new sentencing hearing.
The Re-sentencing
As is customary, the original sentencing judge presided at the re-sentencing. The
Assistant State’s Attorney informed the sentencing judge that the postconviction court had
“ultimately determined that when I [the State] said ‘Life suspend all but forty-three’ as
opposed to ‘forty-three,’ that somehow breached the plea agreement that had been reached.”
The State added that the postconviction court’s ruling had no bearing on the legality of the
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sentence the court originally imposed.  The State argued that the sentencing court could “turn
around and impose the same very sentence that you imposed before and there would be
nothing unlawful.”
Petitioner disagreed with the State’s understanding of the import of the postconviction
court’s ruling. Petitioner, represented by counsel, argued that the court was bound at re-
sentencing not to exceed a total sentence of forty-three years, with no more than thirty years
of executed time.  Petitioner reasoned that the court had indicated at the plea hearing that it
would “cap any sentence” in response to the State’s representation that the guidelines range
was “twenty-three to forty-three years” and the State would “argue for the top.”  Further, the
State’s agreement to recommend “forty-three years” was intertwined inextricably with the
court’s stated agreement at the plea hearing to “cap” Petitioner’s sentence.  And, given that the
postconviction court granted Petitioner a new sentencing proceeding because the State had
breached the plea agreement by recommending life imprisonment, suspend all but forty-three
years, it necessarily followed that the court’s sentence of life, all but thirty years suspended,
was likewise illegal in that it violated the agreed-upon “cap” of forty three years of both
executed and un-executed time.  Finally, because the court’s original sentence contained only
thirty years of executed time, the new sentence, capped at a total of forty-three years, could
not contain more than thirty years of executed time.
The court re-imposed the original sentence of life, suspend all but thirty years, on the
lead count of attempted murder, with concurrent sentences on each of the remaining three
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counts.  The court explained why it believed it could re-impose that sentence:  “[T]he Court
is of the opinion I was clear at the time I accepted this individual’s plea, I was clear at the time
I sentenced this individual, and that the sentence in this case that I could give [Petitioner]
would be life on the first count suspend all but thirty years . . . .” 
Petitioner thereafter filed, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(a), the  “Motion to Correct
Illegal Sentence” that is the subject of the present appeal.  We have mentioned that the motion
was denied without a hearing, and Petitioner appealed.  See State v. Wilkins, 393 Md. 269,
273, 900 A.2d 765, 767 (2006) (noting that the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence
is an appealable final order).
The Appeal
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Petitioner supported his argument that his
sentence was illegal with two recently decided cases from this Court, Cuffley v. State, 416 Md.
568, 7 A.3d 557 (2010), and Baines v. State, 416 Md. 604, 7 A.3d 578 (2010).  In those cases,
about which we shall say more infra, we held that, when the record of a plea proceeding
reflects that a defendant reasonably could have understood that the sentencing court agreed
to be bound to a certain maximum sentence, inclusive of any suspended portion, then the court
that imposes a sentence in excess of that maximum breaches the plea agreement.  In that
circumstance, the original sentence is illegal and the court must re-sentence the defendant, if
that is the defendant’s wish, in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement.  See Cuffley,
416 Md. at 586, 7 A.3d at 567; Baines, 416 Md. at 620, 7 A.3d at 588.  
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The State responded that Petitioner’s new sentence was not illegal.  The State also
argued preliminarily that Petitioner’s challenge could not be presented by way of a Rule 4-
345(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence.  The State asserted that Rule 4-345(a) is not a
proper vehicle for raising the type of sentencing illegality that Petitioner was claiming.
The Court of Special Appeals agreed with both of the State’s contentions and affirmed
the judgment of the Circuit Court.  Matthews v. State,  197 Md. App. 365, 387, 13 A.3d 834,
847 (2011).  The intermediate appellate court held that Petitioner’s challenge failed at the
threshold because his claim that the sentence violated the plea agreement was not cognizable
under Rule 4-345(a).  197 Md. App. at 375, 13 A.3d at 840.  That court further held that, in
any case, the sentence was not illegal.   Id. at 378, 13 A.3d at 841.  On that score, the Court
of Special Appeals saw the pertinent question as whether the sentencing court “complied with
the mandate of [the postconviction court]” to impose whatever sentence the court deemed
appropriate.  Id. at 386-87, 13 A.3d at 847.  The Court of Special Appeals concluded that life
imprisonment with all but thirty years suspended was a legal (and appropriate) sentence for
an individual guilty of attempted murder in the first degree.  Id. at 387, 13 A.3d at 847.
We granted Petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari, Matthews v. State, 419 Md. 646,
20 A.3d 115 (2011), to consider the following question:  “Whether a plea agreement,
conditioned on an agreed upon ‘capped’ term of years, results in an illegal sentence when the
trial court sentences the Defendant to life, but suspends a portion of the life sentence to make
the non-suspended portion not exceed the agreed upon ‘cap’?”
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II. 
“Illegal sentence” under Rule 4-345(a)?
Implicit in the question Petitioner presents is the threshold question of whether his
challenge to the sentence the court re-imposed following the grant of postconviction relief is
cognizable under Rule 4-345(a).  We have noted that, in the view of the Court of Special
Appeals, the answer to that question is “no.”  For the reasons that follow, we hold that the
answer is “yes.”
Petitioner and the State disagree about the meaning of our prior decisions on the issue.
Both recognize that Rule 4-345(a) provides a means to seek correction of an illegal sentence
whenever the illegality “inhere[s] in the sentence itself.”  The parties are at odds, though, as
to what is included within the meaning of an illegality that “inheres” in the sentence.
Petitioner asserts that our recent decisions make clear that sentences in excess of binding plea
agreements are illegal and therefore may be challenged pursuant to Rule 4-345(a).  The State
counters that prior caselaw stringently limits the category of sentences that may be deemed
“illegal” under Rule 4-345(a) to those that either exceed the statutory maximum or are
imposed where no conviction was entered.  We conclude that Petitioner presents the more
accurate view of our caselaw interpreting Maryland Rule 4-345(a).  
To begin, we agree with Petitioner and the State, as well as the Court of Special
Appeals in its opinion in this case, Matthews, 197 Md. App. at 375, 13 A.3d at 840, that, for
purposes of Rule 4-345(a), the illegality must inhere in the sentence itself, rather than stem
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from trial court error during the sentencing proceeding.  See, e.g., Montgomery v. State, 405
Md. 67, 74-75, 950 A.2d 77, 82 (2008) (“A motion to correct an illegal sentence ordinarily can
be granted only where there is some illegality in the sentence itself or where no sentence
should have been imposed.  On the other hand, a trial court error during the sentencing
proceeding is not ordinarily cognizable under Rule 4-345(a) where the resulting sentence or
sanction is itself lawful.” (quotation mark and citations omitted)); Randall Book Corp. v. State,
316 Md. 315, 322-23, 558 A.2d 715, 719 (1989) (explaining that “whether the trial judge was
motivated by . . . impermissible considerations in imposing sentence will be considered on
direct appeal.  However, while improper motivation may justify vacation of the sentence, it
does not render the sentence illegal within the meaning of Rule 4-345” (citations omitted)).
Accord Tshiwala v. State, No. 108, Sept. Term 2009, 2012 Lexis 9, *9-12 (Md. Jan. 23, 2012)
(collecting cases).
We have also made clear that,
[i]f a sentence is “illegal” within the meaning of [Rule 4-345(a)], the defendant
may file a motion in the trial correct to “correct” it, notwithstanding that (1) no
objection was made when the sentence was imposed, (2) the defendant
purported to consent to it, or (3) the sentence was not challenged in a timely-
filed direct appeal.  That is the thrust of Walczak [v. State, 302 Md. 422, 488
A.2d 949 (1985)], Goff [v. State, 387 Md. 327, 875 A.2d 132 (2005)], and a
dozen other cases.  The sentence may be attacked on direct appeal, but it also
may be challenged collaterally and belatedly, and, if the trial court denies relief
in response to such a challenge, the defendant may appeal from that denial and
obtain relief in an appellate court.  
Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 466, 918 A.2d 506, 509 (2007).
Consistent with the distinction between illegal sentences that are cognizable under Rule
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4-345(a) and those that are not, we have denied relief pursuant to Rule 4-345(a) because the
sentences imposed were not inherently illegal, despite some form of error or alleged injustice.
See, e.g., Pollard v. State, 394 Md. 40, 47, 904 A.2d 500, 504 (2006) (holding that the trial
judge’s failure to exercise discretion in sentencing did not render substantively illegal the life
sentence imposed); Wilkins, 393 Md. at 272, 900 A.2d at 767 (holding same); State v.
Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 185, 742 A.2d 508, 517 (1999) (holding that a sentence was not illegal
when the Parole Commission’s actions had the effect of denying the inmate parole
consideration to which he was statutorily entitled because the illegality was in the Parole
Commission’s conduct, not in the sentence).  See also Chaney, 397 Md. at 465-68, 918 A.2d
at 509-511 (concluding that probation conditions were permissible and not inherently illegal;
therefore, a challenge to the condition could be waived). 
We have deemed sentences inherently “illegal” pursuant to Rule 4-345(a) when the
sentences exceeded the limits imposed by law, be it statute or rule.  See, e.g., Solorzano v.
State, 397 Md. 661, 672-74, 919 A.2d 652, 658-59 (2007) (holding that the defendant was
entitled to vacatur of the sentence and re-sentencing in conformance with the sentencing term
of the plea agreement because the trial court had accepted the terms of the defendant’s plea
agreement, the defendant relied on that acceptance in pleading guilty, and the trial court had
refused to correct the sentence in accordance with the plea agreement pursuant to a Rule 4-
345(a) motion); Walczak, 302 Md. at 433, 488 A.2d at 954 (holding that a condition of
probation to pay restitution in connection with a crime of which the defendant was not
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convicted was illegal in that it exceeded the statutory authority to impose a requirement of
restitution).
We have said that the State, as well as the Court of Special Appeals, see Matthews, 197
Md. App. at 375, 13 A.3d at 840, are of the view that a sentence that exceeds the sentence
agreed upon as part of a binding plea agreement is not cognizable under Rule 4-345(a).  To
our knowledge, we have not had the occasion before now to respond directly to a fully briefed
argument to that effect.  So, we make clear with this opinion what we believe to be strongly
suggested by our opinion in Solorzano, and stated more plainly in Cuffley, that such an illegal
sentence is cognizable under Rule 4-345(a).
In Solorzano, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted murder and, in exchange, the
State agreed to “bind itself to the top of the guidelines, . . . believed to be twelve to twenty
years.”  397 Md. at 664, 919 A.2d at 654 (quotation mark omitted).  The court accepted the
plea based on the anticipated guidelines range, found Solorzano guilty, and ordered a pre-
sentence report, which confirmed the guidelines range of twelve to twenty years.  Id. at 665,
919 A.2d at 655.  At sentencing, however, the court indicated that “[t]he State has agreed not
to recommend more than twenty years . . . but the Court is not bound to that recommendation
and could in fact sentence up to life in prison.”  Id. at 666, 919 A.2d at 655.  After sentencing,
Solorzano filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence and a motion to vacate his guilty plea.
Id. at 667, 919 A.2d at 655.  The sentencing court denied both motions.  Id., 919 A.2d at 655.
We recognized that, although Rule 4-243(c)(1) imposes upon “a trial court . . . no
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obligation to accept any particular sentence agreed upon by the State and a defendant,” Rule
4-243(c)(3) requires the trial court, if it has approved the agreement, to “fulfill the terms of that
agreement if the defendant pled guilty in reliance on the court’s acceptance.”  Id. at 669-70,
919 A.2d at 657.  Applying the dictates of Rule 4-243, we held that the trial court had accepted
the plea agreement and Solorzano was entitled to specific performance of it.  Id. at 670, 919
A.2d at 657.  We recognized, in addition to the requirements of Rule 4-243, that, “[o]nce a
defendant enters a guilty plea and the plea is accepted by the court, due process requires the
plea bargain be honored.”  Id. at 673, 919 A.2d at 659 (citing Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 262 (1971)).  Relevant to the issue we consider here, we gave no indication that the
sentence imposed in breach of the binding plea agreement could not have been corrected by
review of the court’s denial of Solorzano’s Rule 4-345(a) motion.
Consistent with the holding of Solorzano, and more directly on point with the case at
bar, is our decision in Cuffley.  In Cuffley we considered “whether . . . a judge who agrees to
be bound to the terms of a plea agreement that calls for a sentence ‘within the guidelines’ may
impose a sentence that involves a term of incarceration that exceeds the guidelines but
suspends all but the part of the sentence that falls within the guidelines.”  416 Md. at 573, 7
A.3d at 560.  Cuffley pleaded guilty to robbery pursuant to a plea agreement that the State
would “recommend a sentence within the guidelines . . . [of] four to eight years.”  Id., 7 A.3d
at 560.  The trial court repeated its understanding of the agreement, that the court would
“impose a sentence somewhere within the guidelines.  The guidelines in this case are four to
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eight years.”  Id. at 574, 7 A.3d at 560.  The  court ensured that defendant’s guilty plea was
knowing and voluntary and then accepted the plea agreement and bound itself to its terms.  Id.,
7 A.3d at 560.  At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed a sentence of fifteen years,
suspend all but six.  Id., 7 A.3d at 560.  
Several years later, Cuffley filed a motion pursuant to Rule 4-345(a) to correct what he
believed was a sentence that violated the sentencing cap to which the court had bound itself.
Id. at 574-75, 7 A.3d at 561.  The sentencing court denied the motion, reasoning that
“suspended time and conditions of probation are within [the court’s] discretion,” and the
court’s discretionary powers were “alluded to . . . even if not specifically stated on the record.”
Id. at 576, 7 A.3d at 561 (first alteration in original).  We disagreed.  
Analyzing Rule 4-243(c), which mandates that a court that has accepted and approved
a plea agreement “shall embody in the judgment the agreed sentence” id. at 581, 7 A.3d at
565, we explained that, 
by its express terms, Rule 4-243 requires strict compliance with its provisions.
We further conclude, as the natural consequence of requiring strict compliance
with the Rule, that any question that later arises concerning the meaning of the
sentencing term of a binding plea agreement must be resolved by resort solely
to the record established at the Rule 4-243 plea proceeding.  The record of that
proceeding must be examined to ascertain precisely what was presented to the
court, in the defendant’s presence and before the court accepts the agreement,
to determine what the defendant reasonably understood to be the sentence the
parties negotiated and the court agreed to impose.
Id. at 582, 7 A.3d at 565.  
Applying that rule to Cuffley’s plea agreement, we concluded that a lay person in
4 Indeed, we noted that “[w]e have held that a sentence that exceeds the sentence to
which the parties agreed as part of a plea agreement is an illegal sentence within the meaning
of Rule 4-345(a).”  Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568, 575 n.1, 7 A.3d 557, 561 n.1.
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Cuffley’s position would not reasonably have understood the plea agreement term of “within
the guidelines” to include a suspended portion beyond the four to eight years.  Id. at 585, 7
A.3d at 567.  Ultimately, we held that “the court breached the agreement by imposing a
sentence that exceeded a total of eight years’ incarceration”; therefore, the sentence was
illegal.  Id. at 586, 7 A.3d at 567.  We viewed the illegality as inhering in the sentence itself;4
the sentence, in other words, was not merely the product of procedural or trial court error.
Consequently, “the Circuit Court should have corrected it to conform to a sentence for which
Petitioner bargained and upon which he relied in pleading guilty.”  Id., 7 A.3d at 567.
In the case sub judice, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that, because the issue
was not addressed specifically in our opinion in Cuffley, that decision did not resolve
conclusively whether Rule 4-345(a) is a proper vehicle through which to challenge a sentence
imposed allegedly in excess of a binding plea agreement.  197 Md. App. at 375-77, 13 A.3d
at 840-41.  The intermediate appellate court reasoned further that, if so interpreted, Cuffley
would “overrule the rationale that permeates [prior caselaw].”  Id. at 376, 13 A.3d at 840-41.
We disagree.
Cuffley adhered to our precedent limiting relief pursuant to Rule 4-345(a) to challenges
to inherently illegal sentences.  Cuffley’s sentence was imposed in violation of Rule 4-243(c),
which by operation of its terms establishes the maximum sentence a court lawfully can impose
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after approving a plea agreement.  Because Cuffley’s sentence exceeded the maximum
sentence the court had bound itself to impose, the sentence was not merely the product of
procedural error; rather it was inherently illegal and thereby subject to correction under Rule
4-345(a).
Cuffley adds further judicial gloss to the concept we recognized in Dotson v. State, 321
Md. 515, 583 A.2d 710 (1991).  Dotson came to this Court as an appeal of a sentence imposed
by a review panel.  Id. at 521, 583 A.2d at 713.  Dotson had pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to two counts for which the State agreed it would recommend a maximum total
sentence of 18 years.  Id. at 519, 583 A.2d at 712.  “[T]he court agreed that . . . the total
sentence imposed would be 15 years.”  Id., 583 A.2d at 712.  After the court imposed a
sentence of 15 years for each conviction, the sentences to run concurrently, Dotson sought
panel review.  Id. at 520, 583 A.2d at 712.  The review panel “vacated the sentence . . . and
imposed a sentence of 15 years on each conviction to run consecutively rather than
concurrently.”  Id. at 521, 583 A.2d at 713.  
It was in that context that we held illegal the sentence imposed by the panel.  Id. at 524,
583 A.2d at 714.  The court had accepted Dotson’s guilty pleas and bound itself to impose no
more than 15 years.  Id. at 524, 583 A.2d at 714.  The length of sentence to which the court
had bound itself became the “maximum permissible sentence” and the subsequent increase,
therefore, was illegal.  Id., 583 A.2d at 714.  
In short, we held in Dotson that, although generally the legislature determines the
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maximum sentence allowable by law, once a judge accepts a plea agreement, “the judge [is]
required under the dictate of Rule 4-243(c)(3) to embody in the judgment the agreed
sentence.”  Id. at 523, 583 A.2d at 714.  Pertinent here, we emphasized in Dotson that, because
the Maryland Rules “have the force of law,” the maximum sentence “allowable by law” was
dictated by the plea agreement.  Id. at 523, 583 A.2d at 714.  We concluded that “[Dotson’s]
plea agreement fixed the maximum sentence allowable by law” and, because a review panel
thereafter imposed a sentence in excess of the plea agreement, the sentence was illegal.  Id. at
524, 583 A.2d at 714.  As explained supra, that Dotson arrived in this Court via an appeal of
the sentence imposed by a panel review, as opposed to a Rule 4-345(a) motion, does not
undermine the applicability of its holding to the latter context.
We repeat what at this point should be self-evident:  whether a sentence illegality is
cognizable under Rule 4-345(a) depends solely on whether the illegality inheres in the
sentence itself, and not on the timing of the claim of illegality or the procedural posture of the
case.  If the sentence is inherently illegal, then correction of the illegality can be done by way
of a motion brought pursuant to Rule 4-345(a).  And, again to be clear, a sentence imposed in
violation of the maximum sentence identified in a binding plea agreement and thereby “fixed”
by that agreement as “the maximum sentence allowable by law,” is, as we held in Dotson, an
inherently illegal sentence.  321 Md. at 524, 583 A.2d at 714.
Before leaving our discussion of this issue, we address the State’s concern regarding
the finality of conviction, despite precedent recognizing that Rule 4-345(a) creates an
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exception to finality.  See State v. Griffiths, 338 Md. 485, 496, 659 A.2d 876, 882 (1995)
(“This Rule [4-345(a)] creates a limited exception to the general rule of finality, and sanctions
a method of opening a judgment otherwise final and beyond the reach of the court.”).  The
State argues that permitting a Rule 4-345(a) challenge to a sentence imposed allegedly in
excess of a plea agreement “runs afoul of the principles of ‘finality and cloture’” (quoting
Matthews, 197 Md. App. at 375, 13 A.3d at 840), because “a claim by the defendant is the
exclusive trigger for consideration of whether a sentence violates the terms of a plea
agreement.”  This is so, the State asserts, because,
unlike where a sentence is illegal because it is in excess of that allowed by
statute, or where it is cruel or unusual, or where one should not have been
imposed at all, all of which are transparent and obvious claims . . . only a
defendant knows whether he or she has been sentenced in conformity with what
he objectively and reasonably believed to be the terms of his plea agreement. 
(Citation omitted).  
This assertion by the State reveals a misreading of Cuffley.  What a defendant
“reasonably believe[s]” to be the maximum sentence bargained for and to which the court
agreed to be bound is ascertained by application of an objective test.  We explained in Cuffley:
The test for determining what the defendant reasonably understood at the time
of the plea is an objective one.  It depends not on what the defendant actually
understood the agreement to mean, but rather, on what a reasonable lay person
in the defendant’s position and unaware of the niceties of sentencing law would
have understood the agreement to mean, based on the record developed at the
plea proceeding.  
416 Md. at 582, 7 A.3d at 565 (emphasis added).  
III.
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It remains for us to consider whether the record of Petitioner’s plea hearing
demonstrates that the trial court bound itself to the agreement, and, if so, whether the
agreement allowed the court to impose a suspended sentence in excess of the upper limit of
the guidelines, forty-three years.  We make an independent determination of whether the trial
court breached the terms of Petitioner’s plea agreement.  See Cuffley, 416 Md. at 581, 7 A.3d
at 564. We do that by resort solely to the record of the plea hearing:
[A]ny question that later arises concerning the meaning of the sentencing term
of a binding plea agreement must be resolved by resort solely to the record
established at the Rule 4-243 plea proceeding.  The record of that proceeding
must be examined to ascertain precisely what was presented to the court, in the
defendant’s presence and before the court accepts the agreement, to determine
what the defendant reasonably understood to be the sentence the parties
negotiated and the court agreed to impose.
Id. at 582, 7 A.3d at 565. And, as we have mentioned, “[t]he test for determining what the
defendant reasonably understood at the time of the plea is an objective one,” dependent “not
on what the defendant actually understood the agreement to mean, but rather, on what a
reasonable lay person in the defendant’s position and unaware of the niceties of sentencing law
would have understood the agreement to mean, based on the record developed at the plea
proceeding.”  Id. at 582, 7 A.3d at 565.
Petitioner asserts that a reasonable defendant would have understood the trial court’s
agreement to “cap” the sentence to mean that the trial court had bound itself to a maximum
total sentence at the upper limit of the guidelines, forty-three years.  The State counters that
the trial court only bound itself to “forty-three years to be served,” and any suspended portion
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of the sentence remained within the trial court’s authority.  This is evident, the State asserts,
from the trial court’s advisement to Petitioner that “theoretically I can give you anything from
the mandatory minimum . . . up to the maximum of life imprisonment.”  
The following colloquy took place at Petitioner’s plea hearing on December 3, 2003:
STATE’S ATTORNEY:  . . . There have been plea negotiations in case ending
in 2799 which are as follows: The State is going to call count one of the criminal
information charging this defendant with attempted first-degree murder of
Christine Davis, count five charging the Defendant with first-degree assault of
Leroy Jackson, count six charging the Defendant with first-degree assault of
Marvin Davis, and count eleven charging this defendant with unlawful use of
a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.
The Defendant will tender a guilty plea to each of those counts.  In return
for the Defendant’s guilty pleas, the State, upon a finding of guilt, has agreed
to enter a nol pros . . . as to the balance of all remaining counts.  At disposition,
your Honor, the State is going to be arguing for incarceration within the --
to the top of the guidelines range.  
The guidelines range is twenty-three to forty-three years.
The State is going to be asking for incarceration of forty-three years.
Defense counsel is free to argue for whatever disposition they deem
appropriate.  That cap is a cap as to actual and immediate incarceration at
the time of initial disposition.
Prior to disposition, the State and the Defense are asking the Court to
order a presentence investigation, to order a presentence psychiatric report, and
to schedule the matter for approximately one-half day so testimony and
argument may be presented to the Court at the appropriate time.
THE COURT: [Defense Counsel] is that your understanding as well?
[Defense Counsel]: Yes, it is.
[Defense Counsel]: Yes, sir.  
And you understand that, Mr. Matthews; is that correct, sir?
THE DEFENDANT: Correct. 
***
THE COURT: You are entering a guilty plea to the first count of attempted first-
-20-
degree murder, that carries up to life imprisonment; count five, first-degree
assault, carries up to twenty years; count six, first-degree assault, that carries up
to twenty-five years; count eleven, use of a handgun in a crime of violence, that
carries twenty years with a mandatory minimum of five without parole. 
Your guidelines are twenty-three to forty-three years.  The State is
asking for a sentence of forty-three years to be served.  The Court has
agreed to cap any sentence and your defense attorneys are free to argue.
And theoretically I can give you anything from the mandatory minimum
on the one count, which is five years without parole, up to the maximum of
life imprisonment. 
Do you understand what the plea agreement is?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
(Emphasis added.)  The Court questioned Petitioner, satisfied itself that the pleas were
“knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently given,” and accepted Petitioner’s plea.  
In both Cuffley and Baines, filed on the same day, we considered whether a defendant
reasonably would understand a sentence “within the guidelines,” with no further explication,
to mean that the trial court had bound itself to impose a total sentence that would include both
the non-suspended and suspended, if any, portions.  416 Md. at 585-86, 7 A.3d at 567, 416
Md. at 620, 7 A.3d at 588.  We concluded that the record of the plea hearing in each of those
cases plainly supported that a reasonable lay defendant would not have understood the
agreement to allow the trial court to impose a suspended sentence beyond the upper limit of
the guidelines range.  Cuffley, 416 Md. at 585-86, 7 A.3d at 567, Baines, 416 Md. at 620, 7
A.3d at 588.  In both cases, we further concluded that, even if the sentencing terms, as
expressed at the plea hearings, were ambiguous, the ambiguities must be resolved in the
defendants’ favor.  Cuffley, 416 Md. at 586, 7 A.3d at 567; Baines, 416 Md. at 620, 7 A.3d at
-21-
588.  
The State and Petitioner agree that the court bound itself to the agreed-upon sentencing
“cap,” but they disagree about what was contemplated by the cap.  The State argues that the
court agreed only to cap the sentence at forty-three years of executed time, excluding any
suspended time.  Petitioner argues that there is some ambiguity in that regard and, by
application of our decisions in Cuffley and Baines, any ambiguity must be resolved in
Petitioner’s favor.  For the reasons that follow, we agree that the record of the plea hearing is
ambiguous on this point and the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of Petitioner. 
The State said that it “would be arguing within the – to the top of the guidelines range,”
and “[t]he guidelines range is twenty-to forty-three years.”  The State also said that it would
be arguing for incarceration of forty-three years, and the “cap is a cap as to actual and
immediate incarceration at the time of initial disposition.” The court then added: “Your
guidelines are twenty-three to forty-three years.  The State is asking for a sentence of forty-
three years to be served.  The Court has agreed to cap any sentence and your defense attorneys
are free to argue.  And theoretically I can give you anything from the mandatory minimum on
the one count, which is five years without parole, up to the maximum of life imprisonment.”
The State’s averments that it would “be arguing to the top of the guidelines range,” “be
asking for incarceration of forty-three years,” and “that cap is a cap as to actual and immediate
incarceration” may well have been clear to the State, defense counsel and the court.  But the
record of the plea hearing does not persuade us that Petitioner “reasonably understood” (as that
-22-
phrase is explicated in Cuffley) the maximum agreed-upon sentence to be.  No one mentioned,
much less explained to Petitioner on the record, that a sentence greater than the forty-three
year “cap” could be imposed, with a suspended portion of the sentence in excess of those
forty-three years.  Neither did the State, defense counsel, or the court explain for the record
that the words “guidelines range” referred solely to executed time.  We grant the possibility
that a lay defendant might reasonably understand the phrase “actual and immediate
incarceration” to include only the non-suspended portion of a sentence because a defendant
might never serve the suspended portion.  Yet, it is also possible that a lay defendant who, as
in the case at bar, has just heard the State inform the court that it would be “asking for
incarceration within the guidelines” might reasonably understand the State to be referring to
the total years of incarceration to which the defendant would be exposed, including any
suspended portion.
The trial court’s statements concerning the sentence cap embodied in the agreement,
when viewed through the prism of the objectively reasonable lay defendant, did not resolve
the ambiguity.  The court, after “agreeing to cap any sentence,” explained to Petitioner that
“theoretically I can give you anything from the mandatory minimum on the one count, which
is five years without parole, up to the maximum of life imprisonment.”  The court did not
explain that the cap to which it agreed to be bound concerned only a non-suspended portion
of the sentence.  And the court’s explanation of what “theoretically” could be imposed as the
sentence did not add clarity to the court’s statement that it would agree to the cap.  If anything,
-23-
the court’s mention of the “theoretical[]” maximum sentence of life imprisonment, without
clarification of the context in which that theoretical sentence was being mentioned, more likely
confused further what already was unclear.
We are left to conclude that the sentencing term of Petitioner’s plea agreement, as
placed on the record at the plea hearing, is ambiguous.  The ambiguity, moreover, is reflected
in the ruling of the postconviction judge.  That judge determined that the prosecutor had
breached the plea agreement because he had agreed to “incarceration of forty-three years,” but
at sentencing argued for a sentence of life, suspend all but forty-three years. The
postconviction judge’s view of the sentencing term of the plea agreement supports our
conclusion that a reasonable lay defendant in Petitioner’s place would not have clearly
understood what was contemplated by the agreed-upon sentence of “incarceration of forty-
three years.”
The ambiguity we discern in the sentencing term of the plea agreement must be
resolved in Petitioner’s favor.  Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to have the plea agreement
enforced, based on the terms as he reasonably understood them to be:  a maximum sentence,
including any suspended portion, of forty-three years.  The sentence he received at re-
sentencing following the grant of postconviction relief exceeded that agreed-upon term,
creating a substantive illegality that inheres in the sentence. We correct that illegality by
directing vacatur of the sentence and remand of the case for a new sentencing proceeding.  We
agree with Petitioner that, at the resentencing proceeding, the court is bound not to exceed a
5 We deny Petitioner’s request that the re-sentencing be conducted before someone
other than the original sentencing judge.
-24-
total sentence of 43 years, with all but 30 years suspended.5  See Md. Code (1974, 2006 Rep.
Vol.), § 12-702(b) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
VACATE THE SENTENCE AND REMAND
THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE 
COUNTY 
FOR 
RE-
SENTENCING CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID BY BALTIMORE COUNTY.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 20
September Term, 2011
                                                                             
ELROY MATTHEWS JR.
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
Eldridge, John C. (Retired,
Specially Assigned),
JJ.
                                                                             
Dissenting Opinion by Harrell, J.,
which Adkins, J., joins.
                                                                             
Filed:   January 26, 2012
I dissent, for the same reasons explained in my dissents in Cuffley v. State, 416 Md.
568, 587-602, 7A.3d 557, 568-577 (2010); and Baines v. State, 416 Md. 604, 621-28, 7 A.3d
578,  588-592  (2010).  By marking the present case thusly, I hope that, when a future Court
majority gets around to undoing the mischief of Cuffley and Baines, it will take-down the
majority opinion in the present case as well.
Judge Adkins authorizes me to state that she joins the views expressed here.