Case Title: Dudley v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC11-2292

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2014-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-2292 
____________ 
 
GILBERT DUDLEY, III,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[May 15, 2014] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal, sitting en banc, in State v. Dudley, 64 So. 3d 746, 747 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2011), which reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the criminal charges 
against the defendant, Gilbert Dudley, III, for sexual battery on a person defined by 
Florida statute as “mentally defective,” and ordered that the jury’s guilty verdicts 
be reinstated.  The Fifth District certified that its decision directly conflicts with 
the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Mathis v. State, 682 So. 2d 175 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1996), as to the proper interpretation of the statutory term “mentally 
 
 
 
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defective.”1
                                          
 
 
1.  In its analysis, the Fifth District conflated the statutory term “mentally 
defective” with the term “mentally deficient.”  The term “mentally deficient,” 
referenced by the Fifth District in its opinion, is not contained in the statute or in 
Mathis.  See § 794.011(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007); Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 751-52.  The 
Fifth District’s use of the incorrect term appears to have been inadvertent. 
  Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 752.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), 
Fla. Const.   
For the reasons we explain, we agree with the Fifth District in Dudley that 
the First District’s decision in Mathis improperly equated the term “mentally 
defective” with the distinct concepts of legal insanity and competence to testify.  
We also agree with the Fifth District that the statutory definition of “mentally 
defective” does not, as the First District’s decision in Mathis suggests, require “a 
total or complete lack of mental capacity or understanding.”  Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 
752.  We therefore approve the Fifth District’s decision in Dudley, consistent with 
the analysis we adopt in this opinion, and disapprove the First District’s statutory 
interpretation in Mathis.   
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The State charged Dudley in a two-count information with unlawful 
commission of a sexual battery on a “mentally defective” person over the age of 
twelve, in violation of section 794.011(4)(e), Florida Statutes (2007), which 
provides as follows: 
 
 
 
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(4)  A person who commits sexual battery upon a person 12 
years of age or older without that person’s consent, under any of the 
following circumstances, commits a felony of the first degree, 
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s. 
794.0115: 
. . . . 
After Dudley had been living in the home for some time, the victim told her 
mother that Dudley had been having sexual intercourse with her.  The victim 
testified that Dudley forced her to remove her clothes and threatened to punch her 
if she refused to comply.  She stated that Dudley had forced his “popsicle” into her 
vagina and anus while he touched her breasts.  She further testified that during 
intercourse, Dudley asked her, “Do you want to have a boyfriend?  Come on, baby, 
(e)  When the victim is mentally defective and the offender has 
reason to believe this or has actual knowledge of this fact. 
 
The term “mentally defective” is defined by section 794.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes 
(2007), as “a mental disease or defect which renders a person temporarily or 
permanently incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct.” 
During trial, the victim’s mother testified that she met Dudley while he was 
an assistant minister at her church.  Shortly after she separated from her husband, 
the victim’s mother and Dudley began dating, and Dudley subsequently moved 
into the mother’s home, where the victim, who was in her late teens, also resided.  
Dudley watched after the victim, took her to medical appointments, and drove her 
home from school.  Both the victim and her mother testified that the victim viewed 
Dudley as a father figure.  
 
 
 
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let me teach you how to do this.”  The victim also recounted another episode in 
which Dudley again placed his “popsicle” in her vagina and continued intercourse 
to the point of ejaculation.  When asked why she did not immediately inform her 
mother of the conduct, the victim testified that Dudley had promised to take her to 
the park if she kept these acts a secret.   
In addition, the victim’s mother testified that, at the request of an 
investigator, she met Dudley for dinner while wearing a recording device.  During 
dinner, Dudley admitted that he had engaged in intercourse with the victim twice, 
but claimed that the victim had made the sexual advances toward him.   
The State also presented a videotaped interview between an investigator and 
Dudley.  During the interview, Dudley’s recollection of the details of his sexual 
encounters with the victim varied greatly from those described in the testimony of 
the victim.  In particular, he characterized the victim as the sexual aggressor, who 
on multiple occasions attempted to perform oral sex on him either without his 
consent or against his direction.  On one occasion, Dudley claimed that he was 
awakened by the victim performing oral sex on him in his bedroom.  On another 
occasion, he contended that while watching television in the living room, the 
victim “all of the sudden . . . got on her knees and started pulling my pants back 
and started [performing oral sex].”  On this occasion, Dudley asserted that after he 
stopped the victim from performing oral sex, she led him into her bedroom and 
 
 
 
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forced him to engage in intercourse with her.  Despite initially claiming that he 
immediately removed his penis after inserting it into the victim’s vagina, Dudley 
later admitted during the interview that he ejaculated inside both the victim’s 
mouth and vagina.    
As to the victim’s mental limitations, the Fifth District set forth the pertinent 
testimony from trial as follows: 
First, the State presented testimony from the victim.  It is clear 
from this testimony that the victim, who was twenty-one years old at 
the time of trial, has a mental and developmental age far below her 
physical age, and that her ability to appraise the nature of many things 
is severely limited.  For example, the victim repeatedly referred to 
Dudley’s sexual organ as his “popsicle,” and testified to the times 
when Dudley put his “popsicle” inside her.  She explained that she did 
not want to do this but that “he told me if I don’t do it, he was gonna 
punch me.”  When asked why she did not immediately tell her mother 
about the incidents, she said that Dudley promised to take her to the 
park if she did not tell her mother.  The victim’s word choices and 
phraseology throughout the testimony reflect the mental ability of a 
young child. 
Second, the victim’s special education teacher, Ms. Hook, had 
worked with the victim for four or five years and also served as the 
victim’s Special Olympics coach.  Ms. Hook testified that the victim 
was in a class for the mentally disabled who have IQs lower than 
seventy.  Ms. Hook testified that her students, including the victim, 
need constant supervision as they are not capable of self-direction, 
and have significant cognitive limitations.  Ms. Hook recounted 
specific instances of the victim’s limitations.  For example, the victim 
does not understand the concept of differing valuations of money or 
the relative value of things.  Ms. Hook explained that if the victim had 
a $5 bill, the victim could not understand why she could not use the 
bill to purchase a $13 CD.  Similarly, Ms. Hook testified that the 
victim does not understand abstract concepts such as “in a little while” 
or “usual.”  She further testified that the victim could not rationally 
 
 
 
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process and express her emotions, but would simply cry or stomp her 
feet if she did not like something. 
Third, the victim’s mother testified that her daughter has mild 
cerebral palsy, has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder and was 
simply “not like everyone else.”  She explained that if the victim were 
ill, she would not know to take medication even if a doctor had 
provided her with it; that she cannot cook because she could burn the 
house down; that if she observed someone ill and incapacitated, she 
would not know to call “911” or otherwise seek help, but would 
probably just watch the person lie there.  The mother further described 
her daughter’s mind as “very childlike,” explaining that she does not 
know how to count money; does not understand the basics of personal 
hygiene; is afraid of the dark; and, cannot be left alone for any 
extended period of time because of her need for constant monitoring.  
She explained that the victim will never be able to drive due to her 
limited mental capacity, must generally be separated from other 
children due to the concern that they would pick on her or persuade 
her to do inappropriate things, and that she cannot take a bus by 
herself.  According to her mother, the victim is able to do laundry for 
the family, but only after much assistance, and is able to keep her 
room clean but needs prompting.  The victim likes to watch Disney 
videos; and, she likes to shop and dance.  The victim’s room is 
decorated in a Tinkerbell theme.  The victim has never had a paying 
job. 
The mother put the victim on birth control in the form of Depo-
Provera shots.  The mother began taking the victim to get these shots 
after an incident with an emotionally handicapped young man which 
caused the mother to worry about her daughter being taken advantage 
of and getting pregnant.  The victim has been committed to a mental 
institution four times. 
Finally, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Malcolm J. 
Graham, III, a psychologist who does evaluations for a number of 
different governmental agencies and who has been qualified as an 
expert witness in court many times.  He testified at length as to the 
victim’s mental limitations; opined that the victim is mentally 
retarded, in the moderate range; reported that the victim scored sixty-
one on her verbal IQ scale, fifty on her performance IQ, and fifty-one 
on her full scale, putting her at less than one percentile.  In other 
words, at least ninety-nine percent of the people who take the test 
scored at a higher intelligence level than the victim.  Dr. Graham 
 
 
 
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testified that the victim could not remember for five minutes even one 
of four words that he asked her to remember during a conversation; 
that she cannot name one single current event happening anywhere in 
the world; and, that she cannot perform even the simplest arithmetic 
calculations, such as 3 + 1.  He opined that the victim will always 
need to be in a highly structured environment where she will be cared 
for, as she will never be able to function independently.  Significantly, 
Dr. Graham testified that in his professional opinion the victim suffers 
from a mental defect that renders her “permanently incapable of 
appraising the nature of her conduct” in the context of engaging in 
sexual intercourse—the very definition of “mentally defective” 
contained in the statute pursuant to which the State prosecuted 
Dudley. 
It was undisputed that Dudley was fully aware of the victim’s 
mental condition.  After becoming romantically involved with the 
victim’s mother, Dudley moved in with the family and had become 
“like a father figure” to the victim.  At some point, Dudley lost his 
job, and then became the primary caregiver for the victim when her 
mother was at work.  It was Dudley who had taken the victim to her 
appointment with Dr. Graham for a disability benefits evaluation; and, 
it was Dudley who initially gave Dr. Graham a full background and 
factual explanation of the victim’s mental limitations, before Dr. 
Graham began his own testing and evaluation.  Dudley also admitted 
to his two sexual encounters with the victim, although he testified that 
the victim “came on to” him both times.  He also testified that he 
believes the victim can work and do some things for herself, and that 
he believes the victim to be more intelligent than most others 
recognize. 
 
Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 748-49 (footnote omitted). 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts 
of sexual battery on a person defined by statute as “mentally defective.”  Shortly 
thereafter, the trial court issued an order concluding that the State had not 
presented “sufficient credible evidence” to satisfy its burden of proving that the 
victim was “mentally defective” beyond a reasonable doubt, as defined by section 
 
 
 
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794.011(1)(b).  Specifically, the trial court explained that the Fifth District’s 
decision in State v. Torresgrossa, 776 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), “applied 
the statutory definition of mentally defective that this court believes is appropriate” 
in a situation with similar facts to conclude that the alleged victim was not 
“mentally defective.”  Because the trial court held that the State had failed to prove 
an essential element of the crimes charged under section 794.011(4)(e), the trial 
court set aside the guilty verdicts and dismissed the charges.   
On appeal, the Fifth District, en banc, unanimously reversed the trial court, 
reinstated the guilty verdicts, and directed the trial court to proceed with 
sentencing.  Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 747.  The Fifth District held that the evidence 
presented by the State during trial was “clearly sufficient to support a jury finding 
that the victim was mentally defective, as defined by the statute.”  Id.   
After reviewing the trial testimony as to the victim’s mental limitations, the 
Fifth District compared the facts of this case with five other Florida appellate cases 
and determined that the facts of this case more closely resembled those in Hudson 
v. State, 939 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Schimele v. State, 784 So. 2d 591 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2001); and Bowman v. State, 760 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), 
in which the mental defectiveness of the victims were held to be sufficiently 
established.  Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 750-51.  The Fifth District found distinguishable 
the facts in Torresgrossa, 776 So. 2d 1009, which was relied on by the trial court, 
 
 
 
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and Mathis, 682 So. 2d 175, cases in which the Fifth and First Districts held that 
the State had not provided sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim 
was “mentally defective.”  Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 751.   
Moreover, the Fifth District rejected the First District’s interpretation of the 
statutory term “mentally defective” in Mathis, explaining that “it suggests an 
unreasonably narrow reading” of the term.  Id.  The Fifth District’s concern 
stemmed from two aspects of the First District’s analysis in Mathis.  See id. at 751-
52.  First, the First District in Mathis found the similarities between the statutory 
definition of “mentally defective” and the definition of “insanity” used in Florida 
criminal proceedings to be “apparent.”  682 So. 2d at 180.  Second, in holding that 
the State had not presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim 
was “mentally defective,” the First District in Mathis relied heavily on the trial 
court’s finding that the victim was competent to testify.  See id. at 180-81.  
Specifically, the First District noted as follows in Mathis:  
No evidence was offered as to the correlation, if any, between IQ and 
“mental and developmental age,” and the ability to understand “the 
nature” of one’s “conduct.”  Children having a chronological age 
younger than the alleged victim’s “mental and developmental age” 
have been found to possess a sufficient understanding of the 
difference between the truth and a lie, and the moral obligation to 
relate the former rather than the latter, so as to be competent to testify 
in court.  In fact, in this case, the trial court concluded, we believe 
correctly, that the alleged victim was competent to testify. 
 
Id. (citations omitted).   
 
 
 
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The Fifth District interpreted the First District’s decision in Mathis as 
suggesting that if the victim was determined to be competent to testify, a finding of 
mental defectiveness was precluded as a matter of law.  See Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 
751-52.  The Fifth District disagreed with this analysis, explaining that the 
statutory definition of “mentally defective” cannot “reasonably be read to mean a 
total lack of mental capacity, as the trial judge in our case seems to have concluded 
based upon language in Mathis and Torresgrossa.”  Id. at 752.  
Explaining that the statutory definition of “mentally defective,” which 
includes the key phrase “incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct,”2
                                          
 
 
2.  Despite using the term “mentally deficient,” the Fifth District accurately 
recognized the operative phrase “incapable of appraising the nature of his or her 
conduct” that is part of the statutory definition of “mentally defective” provided in 
section 794.011(1)(b). 
 
indicates “significantly diminished judgment, but not a complete and total lack of 
mental awareness,” the Fifth District disagreed with, and then certified conflict 
with, Mathis “to the extent that Mathis can be read as equating ‘mental deficiency’ 
[sic] with competence to testify, or to mean a total or complete lack of mental 
capacity or understanding.”  Id.  The Fifth District also receded from its earlier 
panel decision in Torresgrossa to the extent that it had positively relied on Mathis.  
Id. 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
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The conflict presented to the Court in this case concerns a matter of statutory 
interpretation, which is a question of law that is subject to de novo review.  See 
Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Phillips, 126 So. 3d 186, 190 (Fla. 2013).  “A 
court’s purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to legislative intent, which 
is the polestar that guides the court in statutory construction.”  Larimore v. State, 2 
So. 3d 101, 106 (Fla. 2008).  “When considering the meaning of terms used in a 
statute, this Court looks first to the terms’ ordinary definitions[, which] . . . may be 
derived from dictionaries.”  Trinidad v. Fla. Peninsula Ins. Co., 121 So. 3d 433, 
439 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Metro Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tepper, 2 So. 3d 209, 214 (Fla. 
2009)).    
Originally enacted in 1974, section 794.011 is Florida’s sexual battery 
statute.  In this case, Dudley was convicted by a jury of violating subsection (4)(e) 
of the sexual battery statute, which provides as follows:  
(4)  A person who commits sexual battery upon a person 12 
years of age or older without that person’s consent, under any of the 
following circumstances, commits a felony of the first degree, 
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s. 
794.0115: 
. . . . 
§ 794.011, Fla. Stat.  The term “mentally defective,” which is the focal point of our 
analysis, is defined by section 794.011(1)(b) as “a mental disease or defect which 
(e)  When the victim is mentally defective and the offender has 
reason to believe this or has actual knowledge of this fact. 
 
 
 
 
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renders a person temporarily or permanently incapable of appraising the nature of 
his or her conduct.”  § 794.011(1)(b), Fla. Stat. 
 
In its decision below, the Fifth District rejected the First District’s prior 
interpretation of the term “mentally defective,” which equated the term with “legal 
insanity” and further suggested that anyone with a sufficient mental capacity to 
competently testify in a court cannot be found “mentally defective.”  Dudley, 64 
So. 3d at 751.  Specifically, in Mathis, 682 So. 2d at 180, the First District 
explained that the “similarity” between the statutory definition of “mentally 
defective” and the definition of legal insanity used in Florida criminal proceedings 
is “apparent.”  The First District further stated, in analyzing the legal sufficiency of 
the evidence of whether the victim in Mathis was “mentally defective,” that 
children having a “chronological age younger than the alleged victim’s ‘mental and 
developmental age’ have been found to possess a sufficient understanding of the 
difference between the truth and a lie, and the moral obligation to relate the former 
rather than the latter, so as to be competent to testify in court.”  Id. at 181.         
 
The Fifth District certified conflict with Mathis on two interrelated issues 
concerning the proper interpretation of the statutory term “mentally defective.”  
See Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 752.  First, the Fifth District certified conflict “to the 
extent that Mathis can be read as equating ‘mental deficiency’ [sic] with 
competence to testify.”  Id.  Second, the Fifth District certified conflict “to the 
 
 
 
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extent that Mathis can be read . . . to mean a total or complete lack of mental 
capacity or understanding” is necessary for a finding that the victim was “mentally 
defective.”  Id.  We address each conflict issue in turn. 
I.  Equating “Mentally Defective” with Competence to Testify 
 
The first conflict issue concerns the First District’s statutory interpretation in 
Mathis, which equated the term “mentally defective” in the sexual battery statute 
with the concept of competence to testify.  We agree with the Fifth District in 
Dudley that the First District’s statutory interpretation of this term was flawed.   
In Mathis, 682 So. 2d at 181, the First District held that “the evidence 
presented was legally insufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that the 
alleged victim was ‘mentally defective’ on the date of the alleged sexual battery.”  
In reaching this conclusion, the First District applied the facts of Mathis to a test 
for competence to testify, stating as follows: 
On appeal, the state argues that a reasonable juror might infer, from 
the alleged victim’s IQ and “mental and developmental age” some 
fifteen months before the date of the alleged sexual battery, that the 
alleged victim was “mentally defective” on the date of the alleged 
sexual battery.  We disagree.  No evidence was offered as to the 
correlation, if any, between IQ and “mental and developmental age,” 
and the ability to understand “the nature” of one’s “conduct.”  
Children having a chronological age younger than the alleged victim’s 
“mental and developmental age” have been found to possess a 
sufficient understanding of the difference between the truth and a lie, 
and the moral obligation to relate the former rather than the latter, so 
as to be competent to testify in court.  In fact, in this case, the trial 
court concluded, we believe correctly, that the alleged victim was 
competent to testify. 
 
 
 
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Id. at 180-81 (citations omitted).   
Competence to testify is an entirely different legal concept than the term 
“mentally defective,” as defined in the sexual battery statute.  In Florida, a person 
is disqualified to testify as a witness when the court determines that the person is 
“[i]ncapable of expressing himself or herself concerning the matter in such a 
manner as to be understood, either directly or through interpretation by one who 
can understand him or her,” or “[i]ncapable of understanding the duty of a witness 
to tell the truth.”  § 90.603, Fla. Stat. (2013).   
As recognized by the Fourth District in Bowman, 760 So. 2d at 1055, 
competence to testify and mental defectiveness are distinct concepts that are not 
properly equated.  In concluding that a finding that the victim was competent to 
testify was not inconsistent with a finding of the victim being “mentally defective,” 
the Fourth District stated as follows: 
We do not see a problem, as the Mathis court may have, with a 
victim being found able to understand the moral obligation to testify 
truthfully, and still being mentally defective under the statutory 
definition.  It is not unusual for a child who is actually or mentally 
five years old to sufficiently understand the moral obligation to tell 
the truth so as to be competent to testify.  Telling the truth is a basic 
value of our society which is drummed into the heads of children as 
soon as they are able to reason.  The fact that such a child is 
competent to testify, however, is not inconsistent with being mentally 
defective under section 794.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes.  Unlike telling 
the truth, the inappropriateness of the type of sexual activity occurring 
in Mathis or this case is not necessarily something which is normally 
discussed with a person who is mentally only five years old. 
 
 
 
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Id.  We agree with the Fourth District in Bowman, which was cited affirmatively 
by the Fifth District in its decision below, and conclude that the First District in 
Mathis erred in relying on the concept of competence to testify in analyzing 
whether a victim falls within the statutory definition of “mentally defective.”  We 
therefore disapprove the First District’s statutory interpretation in Mathis on this 
issue.   
 
We turn next to the second conflict issue certified by the Fifth District. 
 II.  An “Unreasonably Narrow Reading” of the Statutory Term  
“Mentally Defective”  
 
In addition to disagreeing with the First District’s decision in Mathis on the 
basis that the First District improperly equated the statutory term “mentally 
defective” with competence to testify, the Fifth District also disagreed with the 
First District’s interpretation of the term “mentally defective” to “mean a total or 
complete lack of mental capacity or understanding.”  Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 752.  
This conflict issue is premised on the Fifth District’s holding that the First 
District’s comparison in Mathis between “mentally defective” and the concept of 
“legal insanity” suggested an “unreasonably narrow reading of the term.”  Id. at 
751.   
The relevant criminal statute defining legal insanity in Florida provides as 
follows: 
 
 
 
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(1)  AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.—All persons are presumed to 
be sane.  It is an affirmative defense to a criminal prosecution that, at 
the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the 
defendant was insane.  Insanity is established when: 
(a)  The defendant had a mental infirmity, disease, or defect; 
and 
(b)  Because of this condition, the defendant: 
1.  Did not know what he or she was doing or its 
consequences; or 
 
2.  Although the defendant knew what he or she 
was doing and its consequences, the defendant did not 
know that what he or she was doing was wrong. 
Mental infirmity, disease, or defect does not constitute a 
defense of insanity except as provided in this subsection. 
§ 775.027, Fla. Stat. (2013).  By contrast, the term “mentally defective” in the 
sexual battery statute is defined as “a mental disease or defect which renders a 
person temporarily or permanently incapable of appraising the nature of his or her 
conduct.”  § 794.011(1)(b), Fla. Stat.   
Other than both statutory definitions including the words “mental,” 
“disease,” and “defect,” the definitions are noticeably different.  For example, the 
definition of “insanity” set forth in section 775.027 uses the verb “know” to 
describe the requisite mental state, whereas the definition of “mentally defective” 
uses the verb “appraise.”  Those different verbs also modify different objects—
“what [the defendant] was doing or its consequences” for insanity, versus “the 
nature of [the victim’s] conduct” for mentally defective.   
Moreover, not only are the two statutory definitions textually dissimilar, but 
the statutes also differ greatly in application.  “Insanity” is an affirmative defense 
 
 
 
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asserted by a defendant to avoid criminal responsibility, with the burden on the 
defendant to prove the defense by clear and convincing evidence.  § 775.027(2), 
Fla. Stat.  On the other hand, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, as 
an element of the offense, that the victim was “mentally defective” to impose 
criminal responsibility on a defendant for sexual battery on such a person.  
§ 794.011, Fla. Stat.    
 
We agree with the Fifth District’s conclusion that the term “mentally 
defective” cannot be equated with the definition of insanity, and that it “cannot 
reasonably be read to mean a total lack of mental capacity, as the trial judge in 
[this] case seems to have concluded based upon language in Mathis and [the Fifth 
District’s prior panel decision in] Torresgrossa,” which cited Mathis for the 
proposition that the definition of “mentally defective” is similar to the definition of 
insanity.3
                                          
 
 
3.  We note, once again, that the Fifth District inadvertently referenced the 
incorrect term “mentally deficient” in its analysis.  However, while the court 
utilized the wrong term, we nevertheless embrace the Fifth District’s underlying 
and well-reasoned conclusion on this issue.   
  Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 752; Torresgrossa, 776 So. 2d at 1011.  The word 
“defective” is defined as “a person who is subnormal physically or mentally”; 
“imperfect in form or function”; or “falling below the norm in structure or in 
mental or physical function.”  Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 302 (10th 
ed. 1999).  As stated by the Fifth District, the statutory definition of “mentally 
 
 
 
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defective”—that is, “incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct”—
thus “connotes significantly diminished judgment, but not a complete and total 
lack of mental awareness.”  Dudley, 64 So. 3d at 752. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the First District in Mathis erred to the extent it 
suggested that, in order to conclude that a victim was “mentally defective” under 
the sexual battery statute, the victim must display “a total or complete lack of 
mental capacity or understanding.”  Id.  To the contrary, we conclude that the Fifth 
District in Dudley properly construed the sexual battery statute to determine that 
the evidence in this case was “clearly sufficient to support a jury finding that the 
victim was mentally defective, as defined by the statute.”  Id. at 747.    
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we approve the Fifth District’s decision in 
Dudley, consistent with the analysis we adopt in this opinion, and disapprove the 
First District’s statutory interpretation in Mathis.   
 
It is so ordered.  
 
PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, C.J., concurs in result. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only, with an opinion.  
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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LEWIS, J., concurring in result only. 
I concur in result only because while I do agree with the result of the district 
court of appeal below, I cannot agree with the entirety of its reasoning.  In a similar 
fashion, I agree with the result of the majority, but not entirely with its reasoning or 
analysis.  In my view, the Legislature intended the applicable statutory provision to 
establish broad protections for victims of abuse in this area.  Yet, the words of 
limitation from the district court below and the limitations in the discussion of the 
protections afforded by the statute here do not provide a scope of protection to 
victims as established by the statutory provision.    
Instead of providing clarity to this area of law by specifically articulating the 
wide scope of protections afforded by the statute, the majority focuses its opinion 
on reaching the rather obvious conclusion that the term “mentally defective,” 
defined by section 794.011, Florida Statutes (2007), to mean that a “mental disease 
or defect which renders a person temporarily or permanently incapable of 
appraising the nature of his or her conduct,” does not equate to the legal definitions 
of either insanity or competency.  Furthermore, I cannot agree with the majority’s 
reliance on what the majority describes as the “well-reasoned conclusion” of the 
Fifth District that the term “mentally defective” means “significantly diminished 
judgment, but not a complete and total lack of mental awareness.”  See Majority 
 
 
 
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Op. at 17 n.3, 18; State v. Dudley, 64 So. 3d 746, 752 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).  That 
is far too limited.   
In fact, neither the majority nor the Fifth District has attempted to actually 
discuss the parameters of the statutory definition of “mentally defective.”  Both 
courts have skirted the issue, utilizing the dictionary definitions of the words 
“defective” or “deficient” to define a phrase that has already been defined by 
section 794.011(1)(b) to mean “incapable of appraising the nature of his or her 
conduct.”  Quite simply, by failing to even attempt to provide a field of operation 
for the statutory definition of “mentally defective” as it was articulated by the 
Legislature, the majority has emasculated the legislative design that was clearly 
intended to broadly protect certain persons from being taken advantage of and 
sexually abused.   
Accordingly, because I cannot ascribe to the majority’s limited interpretation 
of the statutorily defined term “mentally defective,” I concur in result only.       
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions  
 
Fifth District – Case No. 5D10-2863 
 
(Volusia County)  
 
Clyde M. Taylor, III of Taylor & Taylor, PA, St. Augustine, Florida,   
 
for Petitioner  
 
 
 
 
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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Wesley Heidt, Bureau 
Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Pamela Jane Koller, Assistant Attorney General, 
Daytona Beach, Florida,     
 
for Respondent