Case Title: Lawrence v. Clark County

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 32

Docket Number: 54165

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
m5

127 Nev., Advance Opinion 32.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS NEVADA
FILED

STATE LAND REGISTRAR,
Appellant,
vs JUL
CLARK COUNTY, oP att
Respondent. Sale

Appeal from a district court judgment on the pleadings in a

JAMES R. LAWRENCE, IN HIS | No. 54165
|
|
|

government land dispute action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
County; Mark R. Denton, Judge.

‘Reversed and remanded with instructions,
Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and K. Kevin Benson, Deputy

Attorney General, Carson City,
for Appellant.

David J. Roger, District Attorney, and Paul D. Johnson, Deputy District
Attorney, Clark County,
for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION
By the Court, SAITTA, J.

‘This appeal concerns whether state-owned land that was once
submerged under a waterway can be freely transferred to respondent
Clark County, or whether the public trust doctrine prohibits such a
transfer. Generally, under the public trust doctrine, a state holds the

banks and beds of navigable waterways in trust for the public and subject

— W B01s

 

 
 

‘to restraints on alienability. Although the public trust doctrine has never
expressly been adopted in Nevada, this court has previously applied some
of its tenets and its existence is implicit in Nevada law.

‘Thus, in this opinion, we clarify Nevada's public trust doctrine
jurisprudence by expressly adopting the doctrine and determining its
application in Nevada, given the public's interest in Nevada's waters and
the law's acknowledgment of that interest. In go doing, after setting forth
the facts and procedural history, we will discuss the development of the
public trust doctrine in general, and then its development in Nevada
specifically. Next, we will set forth Nevada's public trust doctrine
framework, under which we conclude that whether the formerly
submerged land is alienable, such that it can be transferred to Clark
County, turns on the unanswered questions of whether the stretch of
water that once covered the land was navigable at the time of Nevada's
statehood, whether the land became dry by reliction or by avulsion, and
whether transferring the land contravenes the public trust. We thus
reverse the district court judgment underlying this appeal, which
determined that the disputed land is transferable to Clark County, and we
remand this matter for determinations as to whether the disputed land

was submerged beneath navigable waters at the time of Nevada's

 

statehood, how it became dry land, and, if necessary, whether its transfer
accords with the public's interest in it.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
‘The Nevada Legislature originally enacted the Fort Mohave
Valley Development Law (FMVDL) to allow the Colorado River
Commission (CRC), an executive state agency, to acquire federal land in

the Fort Mohave Valley near Laughlin, within Clark County limits. The

 

 
mc

FMVDL was recently amended to require the CRC to transfer its Fort
Mohave Valley land to Clark County. To effectuate the transfer, the
Nevada State Land Registrar, appellant James R. Lawrence, deeded to
Clark County the CRC’s interest in the Fort Mohave Valley land, except
for approximately 330 acres of land adjacent to the Colorado River that he
believed was nontransferable under the public trust doctrine, pursuant to
which the state must hold the beds and banks of navigable waterways in
trust for the public.

In response, Clark County filed a complaint for declaratory
relief in district court, seeking an order declaring that Lawrence was
required by legislative mandate to transfor the land to Clark County.
Lawrence answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim for declaratory
relief, seeking a declaration that the disputed land was subject to the
public trust doctrine and therefore was not transferable. Clark County
filed its answer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing,
among other things, that the Legislature had already determined that the
transfer was in the public's interest and that nothing in the federal or
state constitutions prohibited the transfer.

Following a hearing on Clark County's motion for judgment on
the pleadings, during which the parties debated whether the public trust
doctrine applies in Nevada and, if it does, whether the disputed land fell
within its purview, the district court determined that the disputed land
‘was not subject to the public trust doctrine because it was not within the
current channel of the Colorado River. The district court, therefore,
granted Clark County's motion and ordered Lawrence to deed the disputed
land to Clark County within 30 days. Lawrence now appeals. The district
court granted a stay of its judgment pending the resolution of this appeal.

 

 
ne

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of review

Judgment on the pleadings is proper when, as determined
from the pleadings, the material facts are not in dispute and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bonicamp v. Vazquez,
120 Nev. 377, 379, 91 P.3d 684, 685 (2004). We review questions of law,
including questions of constitutional interpretation and statutory
construction, de novo, See ASAP Storage, Inc, v, City of Sparks, 123 Nev.
639, 644-45, 173 P.9d 734, 738 (2007); City of Reno v. Reno Gazette-
Journal, 119 Nev. 55, 68, 63 P.3d 1147, 1148 (2003),
Tl. The public trust doctrine’s emergence and development

‘As noted, whether the disputed land is transferable turns on
whether it is subject to the public trust doctrine and, if so, how that
doctrine applies in Nevada. To answer those questions, we begin with a
discussion of the public trust doctrine’s origins and development.

A. Origins

‘The public trust doctrine is an ancient principle thought to be
traceable to Roman law and the works of Emperor Justinian. See State v.
Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d 358, 361 (Iowa 1989), Justinian derived the
doctrine from the principle that the public possesses inviolable rights to
certain natural resources, noting that “[bly the law of nature these things
are common to mankind—the air, running water, the sea, and
consequently the shores of the sea.” The Institutes of Justinian, Lib. II,
Tit. I, § 1 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans. 5th London ed. 1876). He also
stated that “rivers and ports are public; hence the right of fishing in a

port, or in rivers, is common to all men.” Id. § 2.

 
a

‘The doctrine was thereafter adopted by the common law
itle in the
soil of the sea, or of arms of the sea, below ordinary high-water mark, is in
the King” and that such title “is held subject to the public right.” Shively
vy. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18 (1894).

B. ‘The development of the public trust doctrine in the United
States

Courts in this country have readily embraced the public trust

courts of England, which espoused the similar principle that “

 

doctrine. In 1821, in the first notable American case to express public
trust principles, the Supreme Court of New Jersey observed that citizens
have a common right to sovereign-controlled waterways:

‘The sovereign power itself... . cannot, consistently
with the principles of the law of nature and the
constitution of a well ordered society, make a
direct and absolute grant of the waters of the
state, divesting all the citizens of their common
right. It would be a grievance which never could
be long borne by a free people.

Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (NJ. 1821).

‘Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court similarly
recognized that “when the Revolution took place, the people of each state
became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute
right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own
common use.” Martin et al. v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842).

Fifty years later, in what has become the seminal public trust
doctrine case, the Supreme Court decided Illinois Central Railroad v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). In Illinois Central, the Court noted that
because the State of Illinois was admitted to the United States on “equal
footing” with the original 13 colonies, it, like the colonies, was granted title
to the navigable waters and the lands underneath them, Id. at 434. For

 
Ss

Illinois, that meant that upon its admission, it held title to its portion of
the waters of and lands beneath Lake Michigan. Jd, at 434, 452.
However, the waters and lands underneath Lake Michigan were not freely
alienable by the State of Ilinois—its title to those areas was “different in
character from that which the State holds in lands intended for sale.” Id.
at 452. More specifically, it possessed only “title held in trust for the
people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry
on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the
” Id, Asa result, the Court

 

obstruction or interference of private partie:
concluded that the Illinois Legislature's attempted relinquishment of such
trust property to the Illinois Central Railroad

is not consistent with the exercise of that trust
which requires the government of the State to
preserve such waters for the use of the public.
The State can no more abdicate its trust over
property in which the whole people are interested
than it can abdicate its police powers in the
administration of government and _—_the
preservation of the peace.

Ad, at 453.

While the Court noted that such lands need not, under all
circumstances, be perpetually held in trust, it recognized that in effecting
transfers, the public interest is always paramount, providing that “[tJhe
control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except
as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public
therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the
public interest in the lands and waters remaining.” Id.

C. Nevada’ ace of public tru ‘ne principles
Although Nevada has never expressly adopted the public trust

doctrine, our caselaw has adhered to several principles relevant to the

 

 
existence of the public trust doctrine in this state. The following three
cases illustrate that, while the doctrine was not formally adopted, this
state has previously embraced the tenets on which it is based.

1. State H y, Bros,, Ine,

‘The first case in which we recognized concepts foundational to

 

the public trust doctrine is a 1970 case, State En: Bros.
Inc., 86 Nev, 872, 478 P.2d 159 (1970). Cowles involved an application
with the State Engineer by the owner of “lands adjoining the dry bed of
Winnemucca Lake ...to drill a well on property located in the dry
Winnemucca Lake bed.” Id, at 873, 478 P.2d at 160, In determining
whether the State Engineer could permissibly grant such an application,
we noted that the state owns the waters and the beds beneath them, based
on their navigable status at the time of statehood, providing that

[w]hon a territory is endowed with statehood one
of the many items its sovereignty includes is the
grant from the federal government of all navigable
bodies of water within the particular territory,
whether they be rivers, lakes or streams. If the
body of water is classified as non-navigable at the
time of the creation of the state, the underlying
land remains the property of the United States,
but if it is navigable under the definition
hereinafter stated, the water and the bed beneath
it becomes the property of the state.

Lat 874, 478 P.2d at 160. Thus, Cowles set the foundation on which

 

future cases involving public trust doctrine principles rest, by recognizing
that navigable waterways are owned by the state.

2. State v, Bunkowski

We furthered the application of public trust doctrine principles
with respect to
y. Bunkowski, 88 Nev. 623, 503 P.2d 1231 (1972). In Bunkowski, we

 

ate-owned navigable waterways two years later in State

 

 

 
reiterated “[iJt is settled law in this country” that, by virtue of a state's
admission into the United States, “lands underlying navigable waters
within [the] State belong to the State in its sovereign capacity.” Id, at
627, 503 P.2d at 1233 (quoting United States v, Holt Bank, 270 U.S, 49, 54
(1926). Significantly, we then pointed out that the state holds those lands
in trust for its citizens, which prevents the transfer of those lands, absent
proper legislative determination:

Tt has been held, in what appears to be a majority
of cases, that the states hold title to the beds of
navigable watercourses in trust for the people of
their respective states. Titles to navigable water
beds are normally inalienable. In Alameda

Conservation Association v. City of Alameda, 70
Cal. Rptr. 264 (Cal. App. 1968), it was held that
while the state owns land under bays, such lands
can be transferred by the state free of trust upon
proper legislative determination, citing People v.

California Fish Co., 138 P. 79 (Cal. 1913).
Id, at 634, 503 P.2d at 1237-38 (citations omitted). In so recognizing, we
implicitly acknowledged the public trust doctrine, ultimately concluding
that “[t]he State holds the subject lands in trust for public use.” Id. at 635,
503 P.2d at 1238 (emphasis added). Although we recognized that under
certain circumstances the Legislature could alienate public trust lands
without breaking the public trust, we did not further elaborate on that

 

concept, apart from indicating that the Legislature must make an
“express” and “proper” determination. Id, at 634, 503 P.2d at 1237-38,

‘The cases we referenced, however, indicate that legislative conveyances of

trust lands must account for the public's interest in maintaining such
waterways for their public use. See, e.¢., California Fish Co,, 138 P. at 88.

 

 
3, Mineral County v. State, Department of Conservation

The most recent case dealing with issues connected to the
public trust doctrine, Mineral County _v, State, Department _of
Conservation, 117 Nev. 235, 20 P.3d 800 (2001), was an original writ
proceeding concerning rights to withdraw surface or groundwater from
Walker River and Walker Lake, Id. Although this court denied the
petition on procedural grounds, Justice Rose issued a concurring opinion

expr

 

ing his belief that this court should finally “affirmatively address
the existence and role of the public trust doctrine in the State of Nevada.”
Id, at 246, 20 P.3d at 807 (Rose, J., concurring). Citing the seminal
Supreme Court case, Illinois Central, Justice Rose emphasized that the
state holds all land beneath Nevada's navigable waters in trust for the

benefit of the stat statehood. Id.

 

's citizenry, as an incident of Nevad:

 

Justice Rose further asserted that the public trust doctrine in Nevada is
contained in NRS 533.025, which provides that “[t]he water of all sources
of water supply within the boundaries of the state whether above or
beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the public.” Id, at 247, 20
P.3d 808. Regarding NRS 533.025, he wrote:

This court has itself recognized that this public
‘ownership of water is the “most fundamental tenet
of Nevada water law.” Additionally, we have
noted that those holding vested water rights do
not own or acquire title to water, but merely enjoy
right to the beneficial uso of the water. This
right, however, is forever subject to the public
trust, which at all times “forms the outer
boundaries of permissible government action with
respect to public trust resources.” In this manner,
then, the public trust doctrine operates
simultaneously with the system of _ prior
appropriation.

 

 

 

 
oe ie

Id, (quoting Desert Irrigation, Ltd, v. State of Nevada, 113 Nev. 1049,
1059, 944 P.2d 835, 842 (1997), and Kootenai Environ, Alliance v,
Panhandle Yacht, 671 P.2d 1085, 1095 (Idaho 1983)),

Justice Rose noted that every Nevada citizen has a vested
interest in the water from Walker River and expects the state's natural
resources to be preserved. Id. at 248, 20 P.3d at 808. Finally, he described
this court's vital role of ensuring the continuance of this stewardship:

If the current law governing the water engineer
does not clearly direct the engineer to
continuously consider in the course of his work the
public's interest. in Nevada's natural water
resources, then the law is deficient. It is then
appropriate, if not our constitutional duty, to
expressly reaffirm the engineer's continuing
responsibility as a public trustee to allocate and
supervise water rights so that the appropriations
do not “substantially impair the public interest in
the lands and waters remaining.” “[TJhe public
trust is more than an affirmation of state power to
use public property for public purposes. It is an
affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the
people's common heritage of streams, lakes,
marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right
of protection only in rare cases when the
abandonment of that right is consistent with the
purposes of the trust.” Our dwindling natural
resources deserve no less.

Id, at 248-49, 20 P.3d at 808-09 (alteration in original) (quoting Illinois
Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892), and Nat, Audubon
Soc. v, Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1988).

1ur remaining case in the public trust realm, Pyramid Lake Paiute
‘Tribe_v. Washoe County, 112 Nev. 743, 918 P.2d 697 (1996), did not
continued on next page. .

 

 
III. The sources and functions of the public trust doctrine in Nevada

With the foregoing discussion in mind, we turn to the parties
arguments regarding the public trust doctrine in this matter. Lawrence
argues that this state has adopted the public trust doctrine and,
consequently, that the disputed land is not transferable, But as Justice
Rose recognized, although Nevada law embraces public trust doctrine

principles, this court has never expressly adopted that doctrine. Further,

 

as the caselaw noted above indicates and common sense dictates, the
public trust doctrine does not always prohibit the transfer of trust land,
Clark County argues that we should not adopt the public trust
doctrine to review the Legislature's conveyances of trust property, because
the public trust doctrine is rooted in common law and, thus, cannot
supersede legislation. See, e.g, Gwathmey v, State through Dept. of
Envir, 464 $.B.2d 674, 682-84 (N.C. 1995) (explaining that, in North
Carolina, the public trust doctrine has not been codified in the state
constitution, and thus, while the common law doctrine creates a

presumption that the state did not transfer public trust lands in a manner

‘continued

significantly advance the blueprint of the Nevada public trust doctrine and
therefore does not warrant extended discussion. Pyramid Lake is
noteworthy, however, in that Justice Springer dissented on the ground
that the manner in which the State Engineer was assessing water
applications violated the public trust doctrine. Id, at 762-63, 918 P.2d at
709 (Springer, J., dissenting). Although we do not necessarily subscribe to
Justice Springer’s vision of the public trust doctrine, his dissent further
demonstrates the existence of the doctrine in Nevada jurisprudence,

 

 
 

inimical to the public trust, the state legislature, as representatives of the

 

people, was free to do so without reservation of any public trust rights). In

 

addition, as it contended during oral argument, Clark County asserts that

adopting the public trust doctrine because, in Clark County's

 

unwis

 

estimation, the doctrine assigns to courts the allegedly impossible task of
determining if at any point a given parcel of land was beneath a navigable
waterway to

 

certain its trust status, In so arguing, however, Clark
County fundamentally misapprehends the sources and functions of the
public trust doctrine in Nevada and exaggerates the difficulty of
determining a land parcel's trust status.
A. Sources of the Nevada public trust doctrine

‘As an initial matter, we note that the public trust doctrine is
not simply a common law remnant. Indeed, in addition to the Nevada
caselaw discussed above, public trust principles are contained in Nevada's
Constitution and statutes and are inherent from inseverable restraints on
the state's sovereign power.

1. Public_trust doctrine principles _in_the Nev:

Constitution

Article 8, Section 9 of the Nevada Constitution prohibits the
gift or loan of public funds and credit: “The State shall not donate or loan
money, or its credit, subscribe to or be, interested in the Stock of any
company, association, or corporation, except corporations formed for
educational or charitable purposes.” Similar provisions in other state
constitutions are referred to as gift clauses, as they generally prohibit gifts
of taxpayer funds,

In considering Nevada's gift clause, we have stated that
transactions disbursing public funds must be struck down if not made for
a public purpose, State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 89 Nev. 330, 332-34,

12

 
on

 

512 P.2d 1921, 1822-23 (1973). We have also closely examined such
transactions to ensure that the state actually receives valuable benefit.
See Clark County v. Lewis, 88 Nev. 354, 357, 498 P.2d 363, 365 (1972).
Our caselaw stresses the importance of the dispensing state entity

and necessary information” when making a

 

reviewing “fall facts, figur
dispensation; when the entity has done 60, it will not be second-guessed by
the courts. Id,

Thus, the Legislature's ability to dispose of the public's
resources is expressly limited by the gift clause, at the core of which lays
the principle that the state acts only as a fiduciary for the public when
disposing of the public's valuable property. See Brennan, 89 Nev. at 332-
34, 512 P.2d at 1922-23; Lewis, 88 Nov. at 367, 498 P.2d at 365. The
public trust doctrine is based on that same principle upheld by the gift
clause: the state must carefully safeguard public trust lands by dispensing
them only when in the public's interest. Stated differently, the public
trust doctrine, like the gift clause, requires the state to serve as trustee for
public resources. We see no reason for treating public trust waterways
any differently than public money and credit, insofar as the state must act
as trustee to preserve the public's interest in that property. Therefore, we
conclude that the constitutional policy contained in the gift clause infers
the people's intent to constrain the Legislature's ability to alienate public
trust lands as well as public funds.

2. Public trust doctrine principles in Nevada statutes

Another source of Nevada law that evinces the public trust
doctrine is our statutory law, specifically, NRS 321.0005 and NRS
588.025.

NRS 321.0005 provides, in pertinent part:

13,

 
The Legislature declares the policy of this State
regarding the use of state lands to be that state
lands must_be used in the best interest of the
residents of this State, and to that end the lands
may be used for recreational activities, the
production of revenue and other public purposes.

(Hmphasis added.) Thus, by its express language, NRS 321.0005
contemplates fiduciary-type duties with regard to the state's
administration of state lands.

RS 633.025 provides that “[tJhe water of all sources of water
supply within the boundaries of the State whether above or beneath the
surface of the ground, belongs to the public.” Notably, NRS 533.025 does
not provide that Nevada's water belongs to the state; rather, it belongs to
the public. Thus, as Justice Rose proposed, NRS 533.025 provides
grounding for the Nevada public trust doctrine. See Mineral County v.
State, Dep't of Conserv., 117 Nev. 235, 247, 20 P.3d 800, 808 (2001) (Rose,
4J., concurring), So too does NRS 321.0005. Both provisions recognize that
the public land and water of this

 

tate do not belong to the stato to use for
any purpose, but only for those purposes that comport with the public's
interest in the particular property, exemplifying the fiduciary principles at
the heart of the public trust doctrine. In sum, NRS 321.0005 and NRS
583.025 effectively statutorily codify the principles behind the public trust

 

doctrine in Neva
3. Public _trust doctrine _principles _inherent__from

limitations on the state's sovereign power
The final underpinning of our formal adoption of the public
trust doctrine arises from the inherent limitations on the state's sovereign
power, as recognized in Illinois Central Railroad v, Illinois, 146 U.S. 387
(1892). In Illinois Central, the United States Supreme Court established

4

 
0 Be

 

the principle that “[t]he State can no more abdicate its trust over property
in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils

under them,...than it can abdicate its police powers in the

 

administration of government and the preservation of the peace.” Id, at
463. In other words, because the state holds such property in trust for the
ate is

 

public's use, th
property when it is not in the public's interest. See jd, (“A grant of all the
lands under the navigable waters of a State has never been adjudged to be

 

imply without power to dispose of public trust

within the legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would
be held, if not absolutely void on its face, as subject to revocation.”);
Kootenai Environ. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht, 671 P.2d 1085, 1088
(daho 1983) (‘{A] state, as administrator of the trust in navigable waters
on behalf of the public, does not have the power to abdicate its role as
trustee in favor of private parties.”); Coxe v, State, 39 N.E, 400, 402 (N.Y.
1895) (The title of the state to the seacoast and the shores of tidal rivers
is different from the fee simple which an individual holds to an estate in
lands. It is not a proprietary, but a sovereign, right; and it has been
frequently said that a trust is ingrafted upon this title for the benefit of
the public, of which the state is powerless to divest itself.”). Under the
public trust doctrine, the Legislature has the power only to act as a
fiduciary of the public in its administration of trust property. The public
trust doctrine is thus not simply common law easily abrogated by
logislation; instead, the doctrine constitutes an inseverable restraint on
the state's sovereign power.

Im sum, although the public trust doctrine has roots in the
common law, it is distinct from other common law principles because it is
based on a policy reflected in the Nevada Constitution, Nevada statutes,

16

 
 

and the inherent limitations on the state's sovereign power, as recognized
by Ilinois Central. Accordingly, in the words of Justice Rose, it is
‘appropriate, if not our constitutional duty,” to expressly adopt the
doctrine to ensure that the state does not breach its duties as a sovereign
trustee, and we do so here. Mineral County, 117 Nev. at 248, 20 P.3d at
808 (Rose, J., concurring). Thus, contrary to the County's position, any
legislation that purports to convey public trust lands is subject to judicial
review. See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199
(Ariz, 1999) (It is for the courts to decide whether the public trust

 

 

     

doctrine is applicable to the facts. The Legislature cannot by legislation
destroy the constitutional limits on its authority.”).
B. Determining whether land is public trust land

With regard to Clark County’s argument that adopting the
public trust doctrine unwisely assigns to courts the difficult task of
determining if, at any point, a given parcel of land was beneath a
navigable body of water in order to determine its trust character, we
disagree.

1. Establishing whether the land was submerged beneath

navigable waters

‘As an initial matter, the public trust doctrine is rooted in our
constitutional and statutory law and inherent limitations on the state's
power and, thus, cannot be relaxed simply because it may present courts
with difficult factual questions. And in any event, Clark County
overstates the complexity of determining the character of land for public
trust doctrine purposes.

Detormining whether land is held in trust for the public by the
state begins by reference to whether the land was submerged beneath
navigable water when Nevada joined the United States on October 31,

16

 
1864, as Nevada joined the United States on equal footing with other
states in every respect, State v, Bunkowski, 88 Nev. 623, 628, 503 P.2d
1281, 1234 (1972), and, consequently, obtained title to all land below the
high-water mark of Nevada's navigable waters on the date of its admis
to the Union, See Utah v, United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); Illinois
Central, 146 U.S. at 434; Bunkowski, 88 Nev. at 628, 503 P.2d at 1234.
‘Thus, determining whether land is subject to the public trust does not

 

jon

require consideration as to whether land was at any time underwater, as
Clark County claims, Rather, it requires consideration of whether the
land was beneath navigable waters on October 31, 1864, See Bunkowski,
88 Nev. at 628, 503 P.2d at 1234 (explaining that, for purposes of
determining state ownership, the factual question of whether the Carson
River is navigable is determined by reference to its condition October 31,
1864). Further, determining the navigability of a segment of a body or
channel of water, which under federal law refers to the “ordinary and
natural condition of the watercourse,” may be accomplished through
“expert testimony, historical surveys, and news clippings from the
relevant time,” as the Arizona Court of Appeals recognized in Arizona
Center for Law v, Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 164-65 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); see
also State Engineer v, Cowles Bros,, Inc,, 86 Nev. 872, 874, 478 P.2d 159,
160 (1970) (“A body of water is navigable if it is used or is usable in its
ordinary condition as a highway of commerce over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on
water.” (citing Brewer Oil Co, v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922))).
2. Establishing how the land became dry

If land was beneath navigable waters when Nevada joined the
United States, but is now exposed, whether that land remains subject to

7

 
one

 

the public trust doctrine generally depends on the manner in which it
became dry—whether by reliction? or avulsion.’ See Cowles, 86 Nev. at
875, 478 P.2d at 161. When the exposure is caused by reliction, the
gradual and imperceptible exposure of the land, title to the dry water bed
is passed to the adjoining shoreland owners. Id, The event causing the
exposure of the water bed may be considered reliction even when the
gradual changes to the water bed come about by artificial means:

When the exposure is due wholly or in part to
artificial causes and those causes are not the act of
the party owning the shoreland the rules that
prevail as to the ownership of the accreted or
relicted land are the same as in the case of
accretion or reliction solely by natural causes.

ld,

In contrast, when changes to the water bed occur by avulsion,
that is, by “sudden changes in the course of a stream,” title is not taken
away or bestowed. Peterson v, Morton, 465 F. Supp. 986, 997 (D. Nev,
1979) (applying Nevada state law), vacated in part on other grounds by

*Reliction is defined as “[a] process by which a river or stream shifts
its location, causing the recession of water from its bank.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1404 (9th ed. 2009). A companion concept is accretion,
However, reliction differs in that it “is applied to land made by the
withdrawal of the waters by which it is covered,” 93 C.J.8. Waters § 177
(2001) (emphasis added), whereas accretion is “[t]he gradual accumulation
of land by natural forces.” Black's Law Dictionary 23 (9th ed. 2009)
(emphasis added)

 

sAvulsion, as it relates to waterways in the instant context, is “the
sudden and rapid change of the channel of the stream which is the
boundary, whereby it abandons its old and seeks a new bed.” 93 C.JS.
Waters § 183 (2001) (footnote omitted).

18

 
oe

Peterson v. Watt, 666 F.2d 361, 364 (9th Cir. 1982). ‘Thus, because
artificial actions, such as draining, damming, or channeling a waterway,
may result in rapid exposure of the water bed, those events are often
appropriately considered avulsions. See id. at 1003 determining that
where the strip of land in question became dry “as a result of a sudden
deliberate and obvious engineering relocation of the waters within the
artificial banks of the permanently channelized river,” such an event was
considered an avulsion under Nevada law and therefore the state retained
title to the land); see also New Jersey v, New York, 628 U.S, 767, 770-71,
784 (1998) (holding that the federal government's filling of a portion of the

 

Hudson River was an avulsion, and, as a consequence, ownership of the
new dry land remained unchanged); Garrett v, State, 289 A.2d 542, 546,
548 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972) (the filling and rerouting of a tidal
stream constituted an avulsion, and accordingly, the state retained title to
the streambed).

In Cowles, we applied the doctrine of reliction in determining
that the state had lost its title to once-submerged land that had gradually
and imperceptibly become dry. 86 Nev. at 874-75, 478 P.2d at 161. In the
same way, the avulsion doctrine is useful for determining whether the
state retains its title to land held in trust for the public after it has become
dry. Applying these doctrines balances land gain and loss opportunities in
a fair manner and operates as a disincentive to artificially diverting water
from public trust lands in an effort to increase personal landholdings near
navigable waters. See id, at 876-77, 478 P.2d at 162.

Here, whether the disputed land became dry through reliction
or avulsion is critical. If it was through reliction, the public trust doctrine
does not apply to that land. But if the portion of the Colorado River

19)

 

 
one

 

covering the land was navigable at the time of Nevada's statehood, and
the land thereafter became dry through avulsion, the public trust doctrine
applies. And if the public trust doctrine applies, whether the disputed

land is transferable turns on whether the transfer serves the public's

   

interest in the land and comports with the state's trustee obligations,
discussed next.
C. Determining whether public trust land is transferable
Resolution of disputes over title to public trust land is a
matter of state law. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v, Mississippi, 484 U.S.
469, 484-85 (1988). Thus, state courts considering the public trust
doctrine have developed their own frameworks for examining the
administration of lands held in public trust. See District of Columbia v.
Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“In this country the
public trust doctrine has developed almost exclusively as a matter of state
law.”). Although several approaches to making a determination regarding
the transferability of public trust land exist, the approach taken by
Arizona deserves concerted attention, as its constitution contains a gift
clause nearly identical to Nevada's. Moreover, Arizona’s approach is

instructive because it faces many of the same challenges that this state

“Article 9, Section 7 of the Arizona Constitution provides, in relevant
part, that the state “shall {not} ever give or loan its credit in the aid of, or
make any donation or grant, by subsidy or otherwise, to any individual,
association, or corporation.” While we note that Arizona’s gift clause does
not include a reference to money like Nevada's gift clause, this textual
difference does not have any practical significance as it pertains to the
public trust doctrine because both clauses reflect a strong policy limiting
the state's ability to dispose of public resources.

20

 
on

 

faces in maintaining its public trust property, given its arid desert climate
and rapidly expanding urban population. See Tracey Dickman Zobenica,
‘The Public Trust Doctrine in Arizona's Streambeds, 38 Ariz, L. Rev. 1053,
1054 (1996).

In Arizona Center for Law v, Hassell, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz, Ct.
App. 1991), a case with facts and issues remarkably similar to those
presented here, the Court of Appeals of Arizona extensively considered the
relationship between the public trust doctrine and the Arizona gift clause.
In Hassell, the Arizona Legislature enacted legislation relinquishing,
through an uncompensated quitclaim, the state's claim to any “interest in
all watercourses other than the Colorado, Gila, Salt, and Verde Rivers and
in all lands formerly within those rivers but outside their current beds.”
Id. at 162. The legislation also allowed “record titleholder{s] of lands in or
near the beds of the Gila, Salt, or Verde Rivers” to obtain a quitclaim deed
for just $25 per acre. Id,

‘The Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest and several
individuals (collectively, Arizona Center) commenced a lawsuit against
Arizona Land Commissioner Milo J. Hassell, the state land department,
and the State of Arizona (collectively, Land Commissioner). Id. at 163.
Arizona Center sought to invalidate the legislation, alleging that it
“violated the gift clause of the Arizona Constitution ... and the state's
sovereign duty to protect the public [interest].” Id. (citations omitted).
The trial court granted the Land Commissioner summary judgment,
determining that “[e]ven if the rivers were navigable at statehood, .. . the
state could legally relinquish its claims to the riverbeds for the purpose of
‘unclouding title.” Id. Arizona Center appealed. Id,

21

 
Although the parti

 

public trust issues separately, the Arizona Court of Appeals considered
them in unison. Id, at 166. ‘The court explained, “Because the gift clause
of the Arizona Constitution explicitly limits governmental freedom to
dispose of public resources, it provides an appropriate framework for
judicial review of an attompt by the legislative and executive branches to
divest the state of a portion of its public trust.” Id, Relying upon
Arizona's gift clause jurisprudence, the Hassell court then fashioned the

 

following test for reviewing the validity of dispensations of trust property:

[When a court reviews a dispensation of public

trust property,... public purpose and fair
consideration| ] must be shown.
{Alny public trust dispensation must also satisfy
the state's special obligation to maintain the trust
for the use and enjoyment of present and future
generations.

Id, at 170. Applying this test, the Hassell court concluded that the

legislation being challenged was “invalid under the public trust doctrine

and [the gift clause] of the Arizona Constitution.” Id, at 173.

 

Because we find the reasoning enunciated in Hassell
persuasive and harmonious with our own gift clause and public trust
jurisprudence, we adopt the Hassell approach to reviewing dispensations
of public trust property. Accordingly, when assessing such dispensations,
courts of this state must consider (1) whether the dispensation was made
for a public purpose, (2) whether the state received fair consideration in
exchange for the dispensation, and (3) whether the dispensation satisfies
“the state's special obligation to maintain the trust for the use and
‘enjoyment of present and future generations.” Id, at 170. The first two

considerations are common to any dispensation of public trust property,

 

 
ee

 

see, e.g, State ex rel, Brennan v. Bowman, 89 Nev. 330, 332-34, 512 P.2d
1821, 1922-28 (1973); Clark County v. Lewis, 88 Nev. 854, 357, 498 P.2d
363, 365 (1972), while the third consideration is specific to navigable
waterways under the public trust, Hassell, 837 P.2d at 169-70. In
addition, cognizant of the fact that public trust land “may... undergo[]
such changes over time that it is no longer suitable for public trust
purposes,” id, at 170, when reviewing the third consideration, courts
should also evaluate the following factors to determine whether a given
conveyance comports with the stato's trustee duties:

“[The degree of effect of the project on public trust
uses, navigation, fishing, recreation and
‘commerce; the impact of the individual project. on
the public trust resource; the impact of the
individual project when examined cumulatively
with existing impediments to full use of the public
‘trust resource . . .; the impact of the project on the
public trust resource when that resource is
examined in light of the primary purpose for
which the resource is suited, ie. commerce,
navigation, fishing or recreation; and the degree to
which broad public uses are set aside in favor of
‘more limited or private ones.”

Id. at 170-71 (quoting Kootenai Environ, Alliance v, Panhandle Yacht, 671
P.2d 1085, 1092-93 (Idaho 1983)). Finally, we note that when the
Legislature has found that a given dispensation is in the public's interest,
it will be afforded deference. See id. at 171; Lewis, 88 Nev. at 357-58, 498
P.2d at 365-66. This is not to say that the courts of this state will merely
“rubber-stamp" the Legislature's finding. Hassell, 837 P.2d at 171.
Rather, while courts will give the Legislature due deference, they will

 

carefully examine whether the Legislature made an informed and
appropriate conveyance under the rubric set forth above.

23

 
CONCLUSION

‘We expressly adopt the public trust doctrine in Nevada, We

 

|decline, however, to consider in this appeal whether the amended portions
lof the FMVDL comport with the public trust doctrine, as that
determination would be premature.’ Specifically, whether the land is
transferable by the state to Clark County initially turns on whether it was
submerged beneath a navigable stretch of the Colorado River at the time
lof Nevada's statehood, and if it was, whether it became dry through
rreliction or avulsion. As the district court entered judgment on the
pleadings, those material questions of fact remain unanswered. We

therefore conclude that judgment on the pleadings was improper, and we

 

reverse the district court's judgment and remand this case to the district

"The County argues that the amended FMVDL is not within the
scope of the public trust doctrine because it does not directly convey the
[disputed land to a private entity. We cannot agree.

If we were to accept the County's argument, the state could easily
juse a government subdivision as a conduit to circumvent its trustee
lduties. See 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters § 131 (2010) (explaining that
although the state may generally grant public trust land to municipalities,
jsuch transfers must be made for a purpose that is consistent with the
public trust doctrine); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
[Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471, 490
(1970) CWhen a state holds a resource which is available for the free use
lof the general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon
Jany governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that
resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-
interest of private parties.”). We therefore conclude that legislation
conveying public trust property from the state to a government
subdivision is within the ambit of the public trust doctrine and must be
lanalyzed to determine whether such a conveyance results in a violation of
the public trust.

 

 

 
court with instructions to evaluate whether the disputed land was beneath
a navigable waterway at the time of Nevada's statehood and how it
became dry. If, on remand, the district court finds that the disputed land
was beneath navigable waters and became dry through avulsion, the
district court must then determine whether the portions of the FMVDL

conveying those lands to Clark County contravene the public trust.

ith

Saitta
We concur:
eA . Cd.
Douglas
Ory
Cherry,
» J,
Gibbons
I We » Jd.

weer

Parraguirre