Case Title: First Bank v. Transportation Commissioner

Citation: 

Docket Number: 010592

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
FIRST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY 
 
 
 
OPINION BY  
v.  Record No. 010592 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.  
 
 
 
March 1, 2002 
COMMONWEALTH TRANSPORTATION 
COMMISSIONER OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF BRISTOL 
Charles B. Flannagan, II, Judge 
 
 
The dispositive issue in this appeal in an eminent domain 
proceeding is whether the trial court erred in the per se 
disqualification of all customers of the landowner from serving 
as commissioners. 
I 
 
On November 24, 1997, the Commonwealth Transportation 
Commissioner of Virginia (the Commonwealth) condemned, as part 
of a project to improve an interstate highway, a 0.571-acre 
parcel of land owned by First Bank and Trust Company (the Bank) 
in the City of Bristol.  The trial court conducted a voir dire 
proceeding to select and empanel commissioners who would serve 
to determine just compensation for the condemned property, on 
which was located a branch office of the Bank.  Among the names 
of prospective commissioners submitted to the court were four 
customers of the Bank.  The voir dire examination revealed that 
none of these customers had any interest in the condemned 
property or in the outcome of the proceeding, that they knew 
nothing about the case, that they had not formed or expressed an 
opinion regarding the case, that they did not have any bias or 
prejudice for or against either party in the matter, and that 
they could make a fair and impartial award according to the law 
and the evidence presented.  Nonetheless, the trial court ruled, 
over the Bank's objection, that all Bank customers were per se 
disqualified from serving as commissioners. 
 
On August 3, 2000, following a trial to determine just 
compensation, the commissioners filed a report fixing just 
compensation of $475,000.  On August 10, 2000, the Bank filed an 
objection to and motion to set aside the commissioners' report 
on several grounds, including the court's per se 
disqualification of all Bank customers.  On January 10, 2001, 
the trial court entered a final order overruling the Bank's 
objection and motion and confirming the commissioners' report.  
This appeal ensued. 
II 
A 
 
We first determine what standard we will employ in 
reviewing the trial court's ruling.  Generally, a trial court is 
given discretionary authority to determine whether a prospective 
commissioner should be stricken for cause.  See, e.g., City of 
Virginia Beach v. Giant Sq. Shopping Ctr., 255 Va. 467, 471, 498 
S.E.2d 917, 919 (1998); Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r v. Chadwell, 
 
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254 Va. 302, 305, 491 S.E.2d 723, 725 (1997).  Relying upon this 
principle of law, both parties in the present case contend that 
our standard for reviewing the trial court's ruling is whether 
the court abused its discretion in striking the prospective 
commissioners because they were Bank customers.  We do not 
agree. 
 
In so ruling, the trial court did not exercise its 
discretion as to each of these prospective commissioners; 
rather, it simply adopted a per se rule.  Therefore, we will 
determine whether the ruling is erroneous as a matter of law. 
B 
 
In State Highway and Trans. Commr. v. Dennison, 231 Va. 
239, 241, 343 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1986), the trial court refused to  
strike for cause two prospective commissioners.  One of these 
prospective commissioners had sold to the landowner certain 
personal insurance policies, and the other had built for the 
landowner several additions to a tobacco warehouse located on a 
parcel of land adjacent to the condemned property.  Both 
prospective commissioners stated that they had no interest, 
direct or indirect, in the outcome of the case, they had not 
formed any opinion about the case, and they were capable of 
making a fair and impartial award according to the law and the 
evidence.  Id. at 241-42, 343 S.E.2d at 326.  
 
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In affirming the trial court, we observed that "[n]either 
[prospective commissioner] had any financial interest related to 
the issue they were called upon to decide" and that "[e]ach 
testified that he could serve impartially."  Id. at 243, 343 
S.E.2d at 327.  Consequently, we concluded that the court did 
not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike them for cause. 
Id. 
 
Shortly thereafter, we decided State Hwy. Comm'r v. 
Cardinal Realty Co., 232 Va. 434, 350 S.E.2d 660 (1986).  In 
Cardinal Realty, one of the prospective commissioners stated on 
voir dire that, four or five years earlier, he had "done utility 
work" for the landowner.  Id. at 435, 350 S.E.2d at 661.  A 
second prospective commissioner testified that he was a builder 
and that, six or seven years previously, he had built houses in 
a subdivision near the condemned property.  He also stated that, 
in the past, he had used a realty company owned by one of the 
landowner's principals to sell houses that he had built.  A 
third prospective commissioner testified that one of the expert 
witnesses in the case managed property owned by him, and a 
fourth prospective commissioner stated that he had leased land 
from the expert witness.  At the end of the voir dire, none of 
these prospective commissioners indicated any inability to give 
the parties a fair trial, and the trial court refused to strike 
them for cause.  Id. at 436, 350 S.E.2d at 661-62. 
 
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In affirming the trial court's ruling, we noted that two of 
the prospective commissioners had not had any dealings with the 
landowner; rather, they had had dealings with one of the expert 
witnesses.  Id. at 437, 350 S.E.2d at 662.  We also noted that 
"[a]ll that was established about [another of the prospective 
commissioners] was that in the past he had had business dealings 
with the landowner."  Id. at 438, 350 S.E.2d at 662.  Finally, 
with respect to the remaining prospective commissioner, we 
stated the following: 
[His] testimony suggests an ongoing business 
relationship with the landowner.  But, according to 
the cases relied on in Dennison, even an ongoing 
relationship does not always require that the court 
refuse to seat a commissioner.  The question is 
whether the ongoing relationship is such that the 
commissioner will have a financial interest related to 
an issue the commissioner is called upon to decide.
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
 
The existence of a financial interest is what distinguishes 
May v. Crockett, 202 Va. 438, 117 S.E.2d 648 (1961), from 
Dennison and Cardinal Realty.  In May, a prospective 
commissioner had interests in two parcels of land adjoining the 
property being condemned, and one of these parcels was the 
subject of a pending condemnation proceeding related to the same 
highway project.  Id. at 439, 117 S.E.2d at 648-49.  We held 
that the trial court should have stricken for cause the 
prospective commissioner.  Id. at 441, 117 S.E.2d at 650; accord 
 
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Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r v. Chadwell, 254 Va. 302, 305, 491 
S.E.2d 723, 725 (1997). 
 
In the present case, there was no evidence that the Bank 
customers had ongoing business relationships involving financial 
interests related to issues the commissioners would decide.  
Thus, we hold that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in 
applying a per se rule for striking the Bank customers. 
C 
 
The Commonwealth contends, however, that, even if the trial 
court erred, such error was harmless because the record shows 
that the parties had a fair trial on the merits.  The 
Commonwealth relies upon Code § 8.01-678, the so-called 
"harmless-error" statute.  That statute provides, in pertinent 
part, that, "[w]hen . . . the parties have had a fair trial on 
the merits . . . , no judgment shall be arrested or reversed 
. . . for any error committed on the trial." 
 
We have said that commissioners in an eminent domain 
proceeding perform the duties of jurors in an ad quod damnum 
proceeding, and, therefore, the same rule applies to both with 
regard to their qualifications to serve.  Commonwealth 
Transportation Comm'r v. DuVal, 238 Va. 679, 683, 385 S.E.2d 
605, 607 (1989); May, 202 Va. at 440, 177 S.E.2d at 649.  The 
proper selection of jurors and commissioners is the very 
foundation for a fair trial, and we are not aware of any cases, 
 
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and none have been cited by counsel, in which we have applied 
the harmless-error statute for errors committed in jury or 
commissioner selection.  Therefore, we reject the Commonwealth's 
harmless-error contention. 
III 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the trial court's judgment and 
remand the case for a new trial.∗
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
 
∗ We do not decide the Bank's other assignment of error 
because the situation could not arise upon retrial. 
 
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