Case Title: State ex rel. Crabtree v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health

Citation: 1997-Ohio-274

Docket Number: 19961094

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-01-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State ex rel. Crabtree, Appellant, v. Franklin County Board of Health, 
Appellee. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Crabtree v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health (1997),  Ohio St.3d   
.] 
Mandamus to compel Franklin County Board of Health to enact a tabled 
regulation governing tattooing -- Complaint dismissed, when. 
 
(No. 96-1094 -- Submitted November 12, 1996 -- Decided January 15, 
1997.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 96APD01-70. 
 
In 1992, Joseph P. Weaver, Director of Environmental Health Services of 
appellee, Franklin County Board of Health, drafted a regulation governing 
tattooing after receiving complaints from parents, school officials, and police.    
The proposed regulation would have created health and sanitary requirements for 
tattoo establishments.  The Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney subsequently 
issued an informal opinion advising Weaver that the board could regulate 
tattooing but could not prohibit it.  In 1993, the board tabled the proposed 
regulation.  Weaver stated that the board “would have been happy banning tattoos 
 
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altogether” and that the board felt that regulating tattooing would be tantamount to 
legitimating it.   
 
Appellee, Emily R. Crabtree, is a resident of the general health district 
governed by the board.  Crabtree is interested in obtaining a tattoo.  In January 
1996, Crabtree and her father attempted to intervene in an appeal in the Franklin 
County Court of Appeals instituted by other parties against the board concerning 
tattooing.  The court of appeals denied the motion to intervene.   
 
Instead of waiting to appeal to this court from a final judgment in the case in 
which she was denied intervention, Crabtree filed a complaint in the court of 
appeals.  Crabtree requested that the court of appeals issue a writ of mandamus to 
compel the board to adopt the tabled regulation and to restrain the board from 
withholding the tabled regulation.  The board moved to dismiss the complaint 
based on Civ.R. 12(B)(1) (lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter) and 
12(B)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted).  The court of 
appeals granted the board’s motion and dismissed the complaint.  The court of 
appeals later overruled Crabtree’s motions for reconsideration and relief from 
judgment.   
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
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____________________ 
 
Christopher King, for appellant. 
 
Michael Miller, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph R. 
Durham, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Crabtree asserts that the court of appeals erred in dismissing 
her complaint.  Crabtree’s complaint included claims for injunctive and mandamus 
relief.   
Injunctive Relief 
 
In her complaint, Crabtree contended that the court of appeals could 
“restrain the Franklin County Health Board from withholding fully drafted 
regulations that would benefit the entire Columbus area.”  The court of appeals 
concluded that “[t]o the extent that relator’s request for a writ of mandamus asks 
for injunctive relief, this court must dismiss appellant’s action for want of 
jurisdiction.”  Neither this court nor a court of appeals has original jurisdiction in 
prohibitory injunction.  State ex rel. Governor v. Taft (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 
640 N.E.2d 1136, 1137-1138; State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. (1967), 11 
Ohio St.2d 141, 40 O.O.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631, paragraph four of the syllabus.  
 
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Therefore, the court of appeals properly dismissed that portion of Crabtree’s 
complaint which requested injunctive relief. 
Mandamus 
 
The court of appeals dismissed Crabtree’s mandamus claim pursuant to 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6).  In order to dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it must appear beyond doubt 
from the complaint that the relator can prove no set of facts warranting relief after 
all factual allegations are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made in 
the relator’s favor.  State ex rel. Neff v. Corrigan (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 12, 14, 
661 N.E.2d 170, 173. 
 
Crabtree contends that she is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the 
board to enact the tabled tattoo regulation.  Public duties having their basis in law 
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus.  State ex rel. Levin v. Schremp (1995), 
73 Ohio St.3d 733, 735, 654 N.E.2d 1258, 1260.  R.C. 3709.21 provides that 
“[t]he board of health of a general health district may make such orders and 
regulations as are necessary for its own government, for the public health, the 
prevention or restriction of disease, and the prevention, abatement, or suppression 
 
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of nuisances.”  As conceded by Crabtree, R.C. 3709.21 vests the board with 
discretion to issue regulations concerning the public health.   
 
“The extraordinary writ of mandamus cannot be used to control the exercise 
of administrative or legislative discretion.”  State ex rel. Dublin v. Delaware Cty. 
Bd. of Commrs. (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 55, 60, 577 N.E.2d 1088, 1093.  “Absent an 
abuse of discretion, mandamus cannot compel a public body or official to act in a 
certain way on a discretionary matter.”  State ex rel. Veterans Serv. Office v. 
Pickaway Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 461, 463, 575 N.E.2d 206, 
207.  The term “abuse of discretion” implies an attitude that is unreasonable, 
arbitrary or unconscionable.  State ex rel. Bitter v. Missig (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 
249, 253, 648 N.E.2d 1355, 1358. 
 
Crabtree asserts that her complaint alleged an abuse of discretion by the 
board sufficient to withstand a motion for dismissal.  Crabtree claims that the 
board’s failure to enact the proposed tattooing regulation endangered the public 
health.  However,  the materials incorporated in Crabtree’s complaint1 indicate that 
                                          
 
1  Material incorporated in a complaint may be considered part of the complaint for 
purposes of determining a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.  State ex rel. 
 
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some states have declined to enact tattooing regulations due, in part, to the 
minimal public health risk associated with tattooing and the possibility that 
regulating the practice would drive it underground.  In addition, an article attached 
to Crabtree’s complaint noted that an epidemiologist employed by the Georgia 
Office of Infectious Disease stated that he doubted that regulating tattooing would 
be beneficial, since it would likely target those artists who already sterilize their 
equipment.  Finally, the attached materials also indicate that there have been no 
documented cases linking unregulated tattooing to transmission of the AIDS virus.    
Contrary to Crabtree’s contentions on appeal, the possibility that the board may 
have decided to table the regulation because it did not want to legitimate tattooing 
does not indicate bad faith.  Therefore, based on the evidence contained in articles 
incorporated in Crabtree’s own complaint, the board did not abuse its discretion in 
not adopting the proposed tattooing regulation. 
                                                                                                                                        
Edwards v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 106, 109, 
647 N.E.2d 799, 802; State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious (1996), 75 
Ohio St.3d 565, 569, 664 N.E.2d 931, 935, fn. 1; Civ.R. 10(C).   
 
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Furthermore, Crabtree’s complaint indicates that she instituted the action 
because the court of appeals denied her motion to intervene in a similar case.  A 
writ of mandamus will not be issued when there is a plain and adequate remedy in 
the ordinary course of the law.  R.C. 2731.05.  In order for an alternative remedy 
to constitute an adequate remedy at law, it must be complete, beneficial, and 
speedy.  State ex rel. Huntington Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Duryee (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 
530, 536, 653 N.E.2d 349, 355.  Crabtree alleged in her complaint that she brought 
her mandamus action rather than an appeal of the order denying intervention after 
a final judgment by the court of appeals in the other case because an appeal 
“would prove quite dilatory.”  However, “‘[w]here a constitutional process of 
appeal has been legislatively provided, the sole fact that pursuing such process 
would encompass more delay and inconvenience than seeking a writ of mandamus 
is insufficient to prevent the process from constituting a plain and adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law.’”  State ex rel. Newton v. Court of Claims 
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 553, 557, 653 N.E.2d 366, 370, quoting State ex rel. Willis 
v. Sheboy (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 167, 6 OBR 225, 451 N.E.2d 1200, paragraph one 
of the syllabus; see, also, State ex rel. Gillivan v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1994), 70 
Ohio St.3d 196, 200, 638 N.E.2d 74, 77 (argument that appeal is inadequate 
 
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because it is too time-consuming and expensive to pursue is generally insufficient 
to justify writ of mandamus). 
 
For the foregoing reasons, after construing the allegations of Crabtree’s 
complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom most strongly in her favor, it 
appears beyond doubt that she cannot prove a set of facts entitling her to the 
requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals dismissing her complaint. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.