Case Title: Alviani v. Dixon

Citation: 365 Md. 95

Docket Number: 132/00

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Dennis Alviani et al. v. Phyllis Dixon et al.
No. 132, September Term, 2000
Headnote:
The Board of Appeals of Anne Arundel County granted respondents’ application
for a special exception and three variances.  Two of the variances applied to the
criteria for the granting of the special exception.  We hold that the Board had the
authority to grant a special exception with variances when the Anne Arundel
County Code precluded variances from being applied to some sections of the
code and the special exception section was not one of those excluded sections.
We also hold that there is substantial evidence in the record to establish that the
Board made the necessary findings to grant the variances.
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
Case # C-97-43190AA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 132
September Term, 2000
DENNIS ALVIANI et al.
v.
PHYLLIS DIXON et al.
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed:   July 13, 2001
1 Petitioners changed question two in their brief to this Court to state:  
Whether the Board erred as a matter of law by failing to make the necessary
findings required in order to grant the special exception and variances in that
the board did not define in its opinion the limits of the neighborhood as it
relates to certain statutory standards for approval and whether the record
before the board contained evidence sufficient to support any such finding?
[Emphasis added.]
We will answer question two as it was submitted to us in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
The Board of Appeals of Anne Arundel County (hereinafter Board) granted an
application for a special exception to build an automotive service facility and variance requests
incident to the proposed automotive service facility made by Phyllis Dixon and Jonathan
Aaron, respondents.  Dennis Alviani, Fulvio Alviani, Maryann Alviani, Leonard Bender, and
William E. Neiman, petitioners, filed a request for judicial review with the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County.  The Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the Board.
Petitioners then filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  The Court of Special
Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed the decision.  Petitioners then filed a Petition for
Writ of Certiorari with this Court.  We granted the Petition.  Petitioners have presented two
questions in the Petition:
1.
Whether the Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals erred as a matter of
law in granting the special exception when the only way to approve the
special exception was by approving three (3) variances to the statutory
standards for the automobile filling station special exception use?
2.
Whether the Board erred as a matter of law by failing to make the
necessary findings required in order to grant a variance, and whether the
record before the Board contained evidence sufficient to support such
findings?[1]
We answer no to both questions and affirm the decision of the Court of Special Appeals.  We
2 Split zoned is a zoning phrase indicating that one parcel of land is encumbered with
two different zoning classifications; a portion of the parcel is zoned differently than the
remaining parcel.
3 The automotive service facility was to include six covered pump islands in three
parallel rows, a canopy, a 2,657 square foot convenience store, a drive-through car wash, and
a parking area.
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hold that the Board had the authority to grant a special exception with variances when the Anne
Arundel County Code precluded variances from being applied to some sections of the code and
the special exception section was not one of those excluded sections.  We also hold that there
is substantial evidence in the record to establish that the Board made the necessary findings
to grant the variances. 
I.  Facts
Respondents own a 1.2 acre parcel of land located on Old Mill Bottom Road at U.S.
Route 50 east in Annapolis, Maryland.  The property was originally part of a larger tract, but
in 1990 the State Highway Administration obtained 7.65 acres of that tract by threat of
condemnation for placement of an access ramp to Route 50.  After the access ramp was built
and various improvements were made to Route 50, the remaining parcel was an isolated,
circular plot of land that was surrounded by roads and access ramps.  As it currently sits, the
parcel is partially developed with an old service station that is in a state of disrepair.
Prior to 1995, the parcel of land was split zoned 40% C1-B (community retail) and
60% RLD (residential low density).2  In 1995, respondents, who hoped to develop an
automotive service facility
3 on the parcel, filed an application with the Anne Arundel County
Department of Planning and Code Enforcement requesting a zoning reclassification.  An
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automotive service facility could not be developed on that part of the parcel encumbered with
a RLD classification.  Respondents requested that the Department of Planning and Code
Enforcement reclassify the entire property as either C4 (highway commercial) or C1-B.  A C4
classification would permit an automotive service facility to be constructed without a special
exception, while a C1-B classification of the entire parcel would require a special exception
for the automotive service facility to be constructed.  Both zoning classifications would
require variances to permit the proposed development because of the circular shape of the
isolated parcel, a shape that resulted from the 1990 taking.  In their application, respondents
requested the variances and the special exception if the parcel was zoned C1-B.
In respect to the special exception, respondents requested variances from two of the
criteria required by Article 28, section 12-206(b) of the Anne Arundel County Code as
conditions for approval of the special exception.  Section 12-206(b) states, in relevant part,
that:
§ 12-206.  Automotive service stations.
.     .     .
(b) An automobile service station is permitted in a C1-B or C3 District,
provided:
(1) any lot used for a station has at least 150 feet of frontage
along each street, and a lot area of at least 22,500 square feet;
.     .     .
(8) pump islands are at least 20 feet apart . . . .
As a result of the extensive taking in 1990 by the State Highway Administration, the parcel was
4 The applicants apparently could have put each row of gas dispensers on one continuous
elevated island without the necessity of getting a variance.  The variance was required because
the applicants believed that it would be better for pedestrian movement, drainage, etc., to cut
up the islands so that people wanting to go between the pumps would not have to step up and
down.  In any event, it appears that the twenty-foot provision was intended to apply to the
distance between parallel lines of pump islands to enable two cars to be side by side – one at
each island.  Its wording, however, is not that specific.  Here, it was applied, perhaps
incorrectly, to a distance between two dispensers on the same dispenser line because the
operator desired to eliminate the elevated area between two dispensers.
-4-
left with only 143 feet of frontage along Old Mill Bottom Road.  Respondents, therefore, were
requesting a variance of seven feet from the 150 feet of frontage required by section 12-
206(b)(1).
Respondents also requested a variance from section 12-206(b)(8), which requires that
pump islands be at least twenty feet apart.  Respondents were proposing to operate six gasoline
dispensers at the site, with each dispenser located on a separate pump island.  The dispensers
would be located in three parallel rows, with two dispensers per row.  The rows would have
thirty feet of space between them and the two dispensers in each row, on their separate pump
islands, would be twelve feet apart.  Respondents were requesting a variance of eight feet from
the twenty feet distance that was required by section 12-206(b)(8).4
Respondents requested one other variance from Article 28, section 10-103(a) of the
Anne Arundel County Code, which covers general setback requirements for all uses located
on a dual, multi-lane, or divided highway.  Section 10-103 states, in relevant part, that:
§ 10-103.  General setback requirements.
(a) Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, each structure that is
located on a dual, multi-lane, or divided highway shall be setback at least 60 feet
-5-
from the existing right-of-way line.  An accessory use may not be permitted in
this setback.
The proposed overhead elevated canopy over the pump islands would roughly be located at the
site of the present dilapidated service station structure.  It was proposed that one corner of the
overhead canopy be setback thirty-five feet from the Route 50 access ramp.  Respondents
requested a variance of twenty-five feet from the sixty-foot setback requirement for this
corner of the edge of the elevated canopy.  Because it was elevated, it would not interfere with
ground level lines of sight across the edge of the property.
The Department of Planning and Code Enforcement for Anne Arundel County
recommended to the Hearing Officer that respondent’s application for the C1-B zoning option
and the special exception and variances, subject to certain conditions, be approved.  In its
Findings and Recommendations, the Department of Planning and Code Enforcement stated
that:
VARIANCE
Relative to the variance application, the Department has no major issues with the
granting of the setback, lot frontage and distance between pump islands.  The
canopy and pump islands are to be located in the general vicinity of the existing
building which is to be torn down.  Only a small corner of the canopy projects
into the setback area and the area at issue is oriented towards the ramps, not the
main highway.  The lot frontage issue was created by State action with the
resulting configuration limited by roadways.  There is no option to reconfigure
the property.  The distance between pump islands is almost a non-issue.  The
20 foot minimum distance between pump islands was established to allow
two cars side by side served from parallel pump islands.  The 12 foot break
between islands results in the splitting of a single island to enhance drainage and
pedestrian flow.
SPECIAL EXCEPTION
The site plan submitted as part of the application, appears to satisfy the specific
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design standards for a service station with the approval of the variances.  Though
the ability to access Ferguson Road is not yet resolved, Special Exception
approval should remain flexible to accommodate the general layout whether this
access point occurs or not.  Relative [to] the more general standards, the issue
of “need” should be addressed by the applicant to the satisfaction of the Hearing
Officer.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the reasoning as outlined herein, the Department of Planning and Code
Enforcement would recommend denial of the C-4 zoning option and in the
alternative support C-1-B, the variances and the special exception subject to:
1)
the upgrading of Old Mill Bottom Road to a 70 rating as outlined by
Public Works.
2)
the resolution of the Ferguson Road issue with the State Highway or the
modification of the plan to contain only one access point from Old Mill
Bottom Road.
3)
the showing of “need” to the satisfaction of the Administrative Hearing
Officer.  [Emphasis added.]
On March 7, 1996, a hearing was held by a Hearing Officer to consider respondent’s
application.  The Hearing Officer’s Findings and Recommendations of March 28, 1996
approved the C1-B reclassification but denied the C4 reclassification and also denied the
special exception and variances.  Respondents appealed to the Board of Appeals, seeking
reversal of either the Hearing Officer’s denial of the C4 reclassification or a reversal of the
denial of the special exception and variances.  The Board of Appeals made respondents either
appeal the denial of the C4 reclassification or the denial of the special exception and variances.
Respondents chose to appeal the denial of the C4 reclassification.  That appeal was denied by
the Board of Appeals.
Respondents filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
5 On remand respondents dropped their request for the parcel to be zoned C4 and
concentrated on the special exception and variances under the C1-B classification.
6 Article 3, section 2-107 of the Anne Arundel County Code states, in relevant part:
§ 2-107.  Standards for granting variance.
(a) The County Board of Appeals may vary or modify the provisions of
Article 28 of this Code when it is alleged that practical difficulties or
unnecessary hardships prevent carrying out the strict letter of that article,
provided the spirit of law shall be observed, public safety secured, and
substantial justice done.  A variance may be granted only after determining:
(continued...)
-7-
County.  The Circuit Court held that the Board of Appeals should have allowed respondents to
present evidence on the special exception and variances under the C1-B classification.  The
Circuit Court remanded the case to the Board of Appeals for the taking of testimony and a
determination on the issue of the special exception and the variances in a C1-B classification.5
On September 11, 1997, after the case was remanded, the Board of Appeals held a
public hearing on the special exception and variances.  The Board of Appeals then issued a
Memorandum of Opinion on December 2, 1997 in which the Board conditionally approved the
special exception and variances.  The Board stated that:
The Board finds from the testimony presented and its site visit, that,
except where a variance has been requested, the Petitioners meet the criteria set
forth in Section 12-206 of the Zoning Regulations.  The Board finds further that
the Petitioners have presented sufficient evidence to warrant the grant of the
three requested variances.
The Board then discussed the granting of the variances, stating that “[i]n order to grant the
variances requested, the Board must find that the Petitioners comply in all respects with the
relevant provisions of Section 2-107 of Article 3 of the Anne Arundel County Code.”6
6(...continued)
(1) that because of certain unique physical conditions, such as
irregularity, narrowness or shallowness of lot size and shape, or exceptional
topographical conditions peculiar to and inherent in the particular lot, there is
no reasonable possibility of developing the lot in strict conformance with this
article; or
(2) that because of exceptional circumstance other than financial
considerations, the grant of a variance is necessary to avoid practical difficulties
or unnecessary hardship, and to enable the applicant to develop such lot.
.     .     .
(c) A variance may not be granted under subsection (a) or (b) of this
section unless the Board finds that:
(1) the variance is the minimum variance necessary to afford
relief;
(2) the granting of the variance will not:
(i) alter the essential character of the neighborhood or
district in which the lot is located;
(ii) substantially impair the appropriate use or development
of adjacent property;
(iii) be contrary to acceptable clearing and replanting
practices required for development in the critical area; or
(iv) be detrimental to the public welfare.
-8-
The first variance examined by the Board was the seven-foot variance from the
requirement of having 150 feet of road frontage.  The Board stated that there was testimony
that the parcel was bound on three sides by State Highway Administration rights-of-way and
the remaining side was bound by Old Mill Bottom Road for 143 feet.  The Board then stated:
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The Board finds that requiring the Petitioners to strictly meet the requirement
of at least 150 of road frontage, where the property actually binds on all sides
by either unbuildable road rights-of-way or actual road bed, represents an
exceptional circumstance and an unnecessary hardship upon the Petitioners.
Since the Petitioners cannot change their amount of lot frontage, the request for
a 7 foot variance is the minimum necessary to afford relief to the Petitioners.
The Board then examined the eight-foot variance from the twenty-foot pump island
separation requirement.  Respondents were going to have three rows with two gasoline
dispensers in each row.  Instead of connecting the two dispensers in each row into one pump
island, respondents were going to make each dispenser its own pump island.  Respondents,
however, only wanted to leave twelve feet of space between each pump island in a single lineal
row of pump islands, not the twenty feet that is required to exist between adjacent parallel rows
containing multiple pumps.  The Board stated that:
The separation of each pump dispenser into a separate pump island will ease the
flow of runoff and pedestrian traffic under the canopy.  The Board finds that
requiring the Petitioners to include each row of pump dispensers in one pump
island would result in a practical difficulty to and an unnecessary hardship upon
the Petitioners and the community.  Pedestrian traffic should be as
unencumbered as possible.  Large raised islands would hinder the ability of
pedestrians, handicapped individuals, families with strollers and the like to move
freely under the canopy and to access the convenience store component of this
project.  The Petitioners are providing 30 feet of width between adjacent rows
of pump islands to create more than ample space for vehicles to access the
pumps.  The Board finds that the grant of a variance to this requirement will
increase the public welfare which represents an exceptional circumstance
worthy of the grant of a variance.  The request for a variance of 8 feet to the 20
foot required setback is the minimum necessary to afford relief to the
Petitioners while providing the maximum public accommodation. [Footnote
omitted.]
The last variance requested by respondents and approved by the Board was a twenty-five-
foot variance from the sixty-foot setback requirement for any structures on a dual, multi-lane,
7 Article 28, section 12-104 of the Anne Arundel County Code sets forth the general
criteria for the granting of a special exception.  Section 12-104 states:
§ 12-104.  Standards for granting.
A special exception use may be granted only if, in the opinion of the
hearing authority:
(1) the use will not be detrimental to the public health, safety, and
welfare;
(2) the location, nature, and height of each building, wall, and
fence, the nature and extent of landscaping on the site, and the location, size,
nature, and intensity of each phase of the use and its access streets will be
compatible with the appropriate and orderly development of the district in which
(continued...)
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or divided highway.  The Board found that the circular shape of the property and its proximity
to Route 50 and its service ramps would leave respondents with “no reasonable possibility of
developing the lot with a canopy over the pump islands which meets the requirements of the
Zoning Regulations.”  The Board found the canopy to be reasonable in size and that the canopy
would not harm the public welfare by blocking sight lines for drivers.
The Board then determined that the three variances would not alter the essential
character of the area as the neighborhood is mixed with residential and commercial uses and
is impacted by its proximity to Route 50.  The Board also stated that the variances would not
impair the use or development of adjacent properties and would not even be noticed by the
public.  It then concluded that there was ample evidence to grant the requested variances,
noting, however, that the respondents also were required to meet the general criteria for a
special exception.7
7(...continued)
it is located;
(3) operations related to the use will be no more objectionable
with regard to noise, fumes, vibration, or light to nearby properties than
operations in permitted uses;
(4) the proposed use will not conflict with an existing or
programmed public facility, public service, school, or road;
(5) if electric, sewer, storm drainage, or water service is available,
the service will be adequate to service the proposed use and will have suitable
access;
(6) the proposal will not overburden existing facilities as
proposed in the master plan of water and wastewater for development of the
surrounding areas;
(7) on-site water supply, sewerage treatment, storm drainage
disposal, or power plant proposals will be adequate to service the proposed use;
(8) the proposed use has the written recommendations and
comments of the Health Department, the Department of Public Works, and the
Department of Utilities;
(9) the applicant has presented sufficient evidence of public need
for the use;
(10) the applicant has presented sufficient evidence that the
applicant meets and will be able to maintain adherence to the criteria specified
in Subtitle 2 of this title for the specific use;
(11) the application will conform to the critical area criteria for
sites located in the critical area; and
(12) the site plan demonstrates the applicant’s ability to comply
with the requirements of the Landscape Manual by its designation of the area
necessary for screening, buffering, landscaping, and off-street parking.
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The Board then discussed its finding that respondents had presented sufficient evidence
-12-
to satisfy the twelve criteria for the granting of a special exception listed in section 12-104.
The Board went through each of the twelve criteria, explaining the evidence that the Board felt
satisfied each criterion.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County seeking a reversal of the Board’s conditional approval of the special exception and
variances.  On August 12, 1998, the Circuit Court filed a Memorandum Opinion in which the
Circuit Court affirmed the Board’s decision.  Petitioners appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals also affirmed the decision of the Board.
II.  Standard of Review
A proceeding on a special exception is subject to a full judicial review.  Mossburg v.
Montgomery County, 329 Md. 494, 506, 620 A.2d 886, 892 (1993).  We examined the
correct standard of judicial review in White v. North, 356 Md. 31, 44, 736 A.2d 1072, 1079-
80 (1999), when we stated that:
In judicial review of zoning matters, including special exceptions and
variances, “the correct test to be applied is whether the issue before the
administrative body is ‘fairly debatable,’ that is, whether its determination is
based upon evidence from which reasonable persons could come to different
conclusions.”  Sembly v. County Bd. of Appeals, 269 Md. 177, 182, 304 A.2d
814, 818 (1973).  See also Board of County Comm’rs v. Holbrook, 314 Md.
210, 216-17, 550 A.2d 664, 668 (1988); Prince George’s County v.
Meininger, 264 Md. 148, 151, 285 A.2d 649, 651 (1972); Zengerle v. Board
of County Comm’rs, 262 Md. 1, 17, 276 A.2d 646, 654 (1971); Gerachis v.
Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 261 Md. 153, 156, 274 A.2d 379, 381
(1971).  For its conclusion to be fairly debatable, the administrative agency
overseeing the variance decision must have “substantial evidence” on the record
supporting its decision.  See Mayor of Annapolis v. Annapolis Waterfront Co.,
284 Md. 383, 395, 396 A.2d 1080, 1087 (1979); Montgomery County v.
Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 706, 376 A.2d 483, 495 (1977),
-13-
cert. denied sub nom. Funger v. Montgomery County, 434 U.S. 1067, 98 S. Ct.
1245, 55 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1978); Agneslane, Inc. v. Lucas, 247 Md. 612, 619,
233 A.2d 757, 761 (1967).
In Annapolis v. Annapolis Waterfront Co., 284 Md. 383, 398, 396 A.2d 1080, 1089 (1979),
we defined the substantial evidence test as “‘whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have
reached the factual conclusion the agency reached,’ Insurance Comm’r v. Nat’l Bureau, 248
Md. 292, 309, 236 A.2d 282 (1967), or as ‘“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion,”’ Bulluck v. Pelham Apts., 283 Md. 505, 390 A.2d
1119 (1978); Snowden v. Mayor & C.C. of Balto., supra, 224 Md. at 448.”  In applying the
substantial evidence test:
The question for the reviewing court is . . . whether the conclusions
“reasonably may be based upon the facts proven.”  The court may not substitute
its judgment on the question whether the inference drawn is the right one or
whether a different inference would be better supported.  The test is
reasonableness, not rightness.
Annapolis Waterfront Co., 284 Md. at 399, 396 A.2d at 1089, quoting 4 K. Davis,
Administrative Law, § 29.05, 137, 139 (1958). 
When we review an administrative agency’s order, we make sure that it is not premised
upon an error in the law.  Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Commissioners of Queen Anne’s County,
307 Md. 307, 338, 513 A.2d 893, 909 (1986).  “Generally, a decision of an administrative
agency, including a local zoning board, is owed no deference when its conclusions are based
upon an error of law.”  Belvoir Farms Homeowners Association, Inc. v. North, 355 Md. 259,
267, 734 A.2d 227, 232 (1999), citing Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md.
560, 569, 709 A.2d 749, 753 (1998).
8 The Board granted respondents’ three variances; however, only two of the variances
were for criteria necessary for the special exception.  Only the two variances that relate to the
special exception are expressly relevant to this part of our discussion.  The two variances from
criteria for the granting of a special exception are the seven-foot variance from the
requirement of having 150 feet of frontage along each street and an eight-foot variance from
the requirement of having the pump islands twenty feet apart.  In any event, there was sufficient
evidence to support the granting of all three variances.
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III.  Discussion
We hold a special exception with variances may be granted by a zoning agency when the
applicable code contains provisions excluding certain areas of the code from being subject to
variance relief, but does not exclude the section covering the relevant special exception from
being modified by variances.  In so holding, we answer the question first raised by the Court
of Special Appeals in Chester Haven Beach Partnership v. Board of Appeals for Queen
Anne’s County, 103 Md. App. 324, 653 A.2d 532 (1995).  We also find that there is sufficient
evidence in the record to support the Board’s findings.
A. Granting of Special Exception With Variances
Petitioners contend that the Board erred as a matter of law in granting the special
exception because the criteria for the granting of a special exception must be met without a
variance.8  In support of its proposition that the criteria for a special exception must be
satisfied without a variance, petitioners rely on Chester Haven, supra, and Umerley v.
People’s Counsel for Baltimore County, 108 Md. App. 497, 672 A.2d 173 (1996).  Although
neither Chester Haven nor Umerley decided the issue before this Court, petitioners point to
language in Chester Haven, that was cited in Umerley, to support the idea that variances cannot
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be used to avoid meeting the expressed criteria required for the grant of a special exception.
In Chester Haven, the Court of Special Appeals stated:
The 
attempt 
to 
follow 
this 
procedure 
creates 
fundamental 
and
conceptional problems with the generally accepted proposition that, if the
express conditions necessary to obtain a conditional use are met, it is a
permitted use because the legislative body has made that policy decision.  Does
the legislative intent that the use be permitted remain if the conditions are not
met but are eliminated by an administrative body granting a variance?  Upon such
an occurrence, the application for a conditional use becomes dependent upon
the granting of the variances.  Under those circumstances, the presumption that
a conditional use is permitted may well fall by the wayside.  The policy that
establishes certain uses as permitted is predicated upon the satisfaction, not
avoidance, of conditions.  Conditions the legislative body attaches to the
granting of a conditional use normally must be met in accordance with the
statute–not avoided.  In any event, even if such a procedure would pass muster,
if the variance process fails, the entire application fails.
Chester Haven, 103 Md. App. at 336, 653 A.2d at 538.  While the Court of Special Appeals
in Chester Haven realized that this could be an issue, it did not resolve the issue; it decided
the case based upon the failure of the variance process itself.
The Anne Arundel County Code provides the standards for granting a variance and when
variance procedures cannot be utilized.  The Code, Article 3, section 2-107, states in relevant
part:
§ 2-107.  Standards for granting variance.
(a) The County Board of Appeals may vary or modify the provisions
of Article 28 of this Code when it is alleged that practical difficulties or
unnecessary hardships prevent carrying out the strict letter of that article,
provided the spirit of law shall be observed, public safety secured, and
substantial justice done.  A variance may be granted only after determining:
(1) that because of certain unique physical conditions, such as
irregularity, narrowness or shallowness of lot size and shape, or exceptional
9 Both Title 1B and section 15-104A of Article 28 concern the Parole Town Center
Growth Management Area and section 2-107 does not apply, facially, to the area at issue in this
case.  The Parole Town Center Growth Management Area, as far as we have been informed, is
not relevant to the parcel of land in the case sub judice.
-16-
topographical conditions peculiar to and inherent in the particular lot, there is
no reasonable possibility of developing the lot in strict conformance with this
article; or
(2) that because of exceptional circumstances other than financial
considerations, the grant of a variance is necessary to avoid practical difficulties
or unnecessary hardship, and to enable the applicant to develop such lot.
.     .     .
(d) This section does not apply to Title 1B or § 15-104A of Article 28
of this Code.[9]  [Emphasis added.]
The Code grants the Board the authority to grant variances from sections within the code,
except for the titles and sections enumerated in section 2-107(d) aforesaid.  
The local legislative body clearly knew that it could except certain parts of the Code
from the application of the variance provisions.  The section relating to the granting of a
special exception for an automotive service station, located in Article 28, section 12-206, the
special exception provision at issue here, was not one of the sections that was excepted.  We
have held that when there is an express exception to a statute, additional exceptions should not
be implied.  See Taylor v. Friedman, 344 Md. 572, 581, 689 A.2d 59, 63 (1997) (“Taylor’s
position is reinforced by the rule of statutory construction dealing with statutes that express
a general rule, followed by one or more specific exceptions to the general rule.  Under those
circumstances, a court ordinarily cannot add to the list of exceptions.”); Pennsylvania Nat’l
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Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 156, 416 A.2d 734, 737 (1980) (“Where a
statute expressly provides for certain exclusions, other should not be inserted.”).  Accordingly,
in an ordinance in which certain matters are excluded from the applicability of variance relief,
it can be inferred that the legislative body’s intent is that all other areas are susceptible to
variance relief.  The concerns about the intention of the legislative body, expressed in Chester
Haven, are thus resolved.  The legislative body has, by excluding portions of the code from the
variance provisions, while not excluding others, expressed an intent that variance provisions
be applied to all areas not excluded.  That includes the special exception provision at issue
here. 
We discussed the granting or denial of a special exception in Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md.
1, 432 A.2d 1319 (1981), when we stated that:
This Court has frequently expressed the applicable standards for judicial
review of the grant or denial of a special exception use.  The special exception
use is a part of the comprehensive zoning plan sharing the presumption that, as
such, it is in the interest of the general welfare, and therefore, valid.  The special
exception use is a valid zoning mechanism that delegates to an administrative
board a limited authority to allow enumerated uses which the legislature has
determined to be permissible absent any fact or circumstance negating the
presumption.  The duties given the Board are to judge whether the neighboring
properties in the general neighborhood would be adversely affected and
whether the use in the particular case is in harmony with the general purpose and
intent of the plan.
Whereas, the applicant has the burden of adducing testimony which will
show that this use meets the prescribed standards and requirements, he does not
have the burden of establishing affirmatively that his proposed use would be a
benefit to the community.  If he shows to the satisfaction of the Board that the
proposed use would be conducted without real detriment to the neighborhood
and would not actually adversely affect the public interest, he has met his
burden.  The extent of any harm or disturbance to the neighboring area and uses
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is, of course, material.  If the evidence makes the question of harm or
disturbance or the question of the disruption of the harmony of the
comprehensive plan of zoning fairly debatable, the matter is one for the Board
to decide.  But if there is no probative evidence of harm or disturbance in light
of the nature of the zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the
operation of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special
exception use is arbitrary, capricious, and illegal.   Turner v. Hammond, 270
Md. 41, 54-55, 310 A.2d 543, 550-51 (1973); Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v.
Board of Appeals of Gaithersburg, 257 Md. 183, 187-88, 262 A.2d 499, 502
(1970); Montgomery County v. Merlands Club, Inc., 202 Md. 279, 287, 96
A.2d 261, 264 (1953); Anderson v. Sawyer, 23 Md. App. 612, 617, 329 A.2d
716, 720 (1974).  These standards dictate that if a requested special exception
use is properly determined to have an adverse effect upon neighboring
properties in the general area, it must be denied.
Id. at 11-12, 432 A.2d at 1325.  We discussed the granting of a special exception in Board of
County Commissioners for Cecil County v. Holbrook, 314 Md. 210, 550 A.2d 664 (1988),
when we stated, after discussing the standard for judicial review of the grant or denial of a
special exception stated in Schultz, that:
In summary, where the facts and circumstances indicate that the
particular special exception use and location proposed would cause an adverse
effect upon adjoining and surrounding properties unique and different, in kind
or degree, than that inherently associated with such a use regardless of its
location within the zone, the application should be denied.  Furthermore, if the
evidence makes the issue of harm fairly debatable, the matter is one for the
Board’s decision, and should not be second-guessed by an appellate court.
The Schultz test accords with the general standard for judicial review of
the ruling of an administrative agency, which we have defined as “whether a
reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency
reached; this need not and must not be either judicial fact-finding or a
substitution of judicial judgment for agency judgment.”  Supervisor of Assess.
v. Ely, 272 Md. 77, 84, 321 A.2d 166 [, 170] (1974).
Id. at 217-18, 550 A.2d at 668.
In Stacy v. Montgomery County, 239 Md. 189, 210 A.2d 540 (1965), we examined the
10 The Zoning Code required that the building be twenty-five feet from the property
lines.  Mr. Kendall’s building was 24.42 feet from the property line and the building had a
porch that was 21 feet from the property line.  Mr. Kendall offered to remove the porch if he
was required to by the Board.  The Court, in Stacy, was not presented, and did not address, the
combination variance – special exception nature of the applications as they evolved.
11 The recent Supreme Court case of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, ___ U.S. ___, ___ S.
Ct. ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___, 2001 U.S. Lexis 4910 (June 28, 2001), stands for the proposition
that a purchaser of realty that is already subject to particular regulations is not foreclosed from
constitutionally challenging that regulation or statute as an impermissible “taking.”  Justice
Kennedy, for the Court, wrote:
(continued...)
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granting of a special exception and a variance.  Ernest Kendall purchased a piece of property
with the intention of applying for a special exception to open a child care home.  The special
exception was granted by the County Board of Appeals for Montgomery County.  This ruling
was appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, which reversed the decision of the
Board of Appeals on the ground that the building failed to meet the requirements of the zoning
ordinance as to distance.10  While his case had been pending on appeal, Mr. Kendall realized
that the building did not meet the distance requirement so he applied for a variance from the
distance requirement.  His application for the variance was granted by the Board of Appeals.
The Board of Appeals’ decision to grant the variance was appealed to the Circuit Court, which
affirmed the decision.  Appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The appellants first contention on appeal was “that where one purchases realty with the
intention to apply for a variance from restrictions imposed by a zoning ordinance, he may not
contend that such restrictions caused him peculiar hardships that entitle him to the special
privileges he seeks.”11  Id. at 192, 210 A.2d at 541-42.  The Court of Appeals found that Mr.
11(...continued)
When title was transferred to petitioner . . . the wetlands regulations were in
force.  The state court held [that] . . . . [a] purchaser or a successive title holder
like petitioner is deemed to have notice of an earlier-enacted restriction and is
barred from claiming that it effects a taking.
.     .     .
The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean
bundle . . . .  Were we to accept the States rule, the postenactment transfer of
title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting
land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable.  A State would be allowed, in
effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause.  This ought not to be the
rule.  Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations
on the use and value of land. [Citations omitted.]
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Kendall did not know he was going to need a variance when he bought the property and that the
need for the variance was not determined until after the special exception had been granted.
The Court went on to state that:
There is a marked distinction between “variance” and “special exception” in
Montgomery County.  A special exception within the meaning of the zoning
ordinance is one which is controlled and which is expressly permissible in a
given zone.  It is granted by the Board, after a public hearing, upon a finding that
conditions of the zoning ordinance are satisfied.  A variance is authorized under
the terms of the zoning ordinance where the literal enforcement of its terms
would result in unnecessary hardships.  By Section 104-22(a)(1) of the
Montgomery County Code, the County Board of Appeals is authorized to
“[g]rant variances from the strict application of this chapter when by reason of
exceptional narrowness, shallowness, or shape of specific parcels of property
* * * or by reason of exceptional topographical conditions or other
extraordinary situations or conditions of specific parcels of property, the strict
application of these regulations or amendments thereto would result in peculiar
and unusual practical difficulties to, or exceptional or undue hardship upon, the
owner of said property; provided that such relief or variances can be granted
without substantial impairment of the intent, purpose, and integrity of the
general plan * * *.”  It is further provided that this provision shall not be
construed to permit the Board “under the guise of a variance, to change the use
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of land.”  See Montgomery County v. Merlands Club, 202 Md. 279, 96 A.2d
261.
The Board heard the testimony of Clinton Frey, Jr., a surveyor, who, after
having been qualified as an expert, testified as to the unusual shape of the
property.  The Board exercising its discretion in accordance with its expertise
in zoning matters, determined from all of the evidence that all criteria had been
met by the applicant to sustain the granting of the variance.  We find that the
court below was not in error in affirming the decision of the Board in granting
the variance as provided in Section 104-22 of the Montgomery County
ordinance under the circumstances presented in this case.
Id. at 193, 210 A.2d at 542 (alteration in original).  While the facts in Stacy are slightly
different from the facts in the case sub judice, and the question raised for the first time in
Chester Haven and squarely presented in the case sub judice was not presented, nor addressed
in Stacy, the Court, in that case, nonetheless affirmed the granting of a variance in a special
exception case.    
The Anne Arundel County Code, while prohibiting the application of variances from
applying to certain sections of the Code, does not restrict Article 28, section 12-206, which
contains the criteria for the granting of a special exception for an automotive service facility.
The drafters of the Code obviously understood that they could restrict the application of
variances as to certain sections within the Code.  They chose to not restrict the application of
variances to special exceptions.
We hold that the Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals may grant a special exception
and, at the same time, also may grant area variances from the specific criteria provided in
section 12-206 (b) of Article 28 (Zoning Ordinance) of the County Code.
In the case sub judice, respondents substantially satisfied the criteria for the granting
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of a special exception.  The two variances granted by the Board were for modifications of
criteria that did not cause adverse effects upon the neighborhood or allow a use for the parcel
that was outside of the special exception provisions of the general zoning plan.  The two
variances did not change the objectives of the Code to make the special exception satisfy
certain criteria; the variances only allowed a slight modification that still enabled the special
exception to fall into the comprehensive zoning scheme of that area.  As utilized in this case,
the variance procedure did not change the essential nature of the special exception use sought
by the applicants.  The Board did not err as a matter of law by granting the two minor variances
that enabled respondents to satisfy the criteria for the granting of a special exception.
B.  Granting the Variances
In their Petition for Certiorari, petitioners contended that the Board failed to make the
necessary findings required in order to grant a variance and that the record does not contain
evidence sufficient to support such a finding.  Specifically, petitioners allege that the Board
failed to properly define the relevant neighborhood that was considered when the Board found
that the variances would not affect the neighborhood.  We disagree with petitioners and find,
after examining the record, that the Board established the relevant neighborhood and that the
findings made by the Board were supported by substantial evidence.
Respondents were granted three variances by the Board.  The three variances are the
seven-foot variance in respect to frontage on one street from the requirement of having 150
feet of frontage along each street, an eight-foot variance from the requirement of having the
12 The matter of the ground level crossovers between dispensers on the same line of
dispensers probably did not need a variance in the first instance.  It appears evident that the
provision of distance separation between pump islands was intended to apply as to the distance
between parallel pump islands, not to the distance between dispensers on one of the parallel
lines of dispensers.
At the hearing on the special exception and variances held before the Board of Appeals,
Larry Burkins represented the Department of Planning and Code Enforcement.  Mr. Burkins,
discussing the requested eight-foot variance from the requirement of having the pump islands
twenty feet apart, stated that:
Section 12-206 (b) (a), a variance was sought to this action by the
applicant, and I think I had indicated before at the previous hearing that
personally I do not believe this is required, but the applicant did apply.
But this standard requires 20 feet between pump islands, and the pump
islands in this case are basically parallel to one another.  And they do have at
least 20 feet between those pump islands so that two cars can fit in between, one
served by each pump island.
However, in this instance – and it’s quite common in the modern service
stations – they split the pump islands, the linear pump islands so that it doesn’t
disrupt the flow of water in hosing down the pumps and so forth.
In this situation, they’ve split those linear islands to help free up drainage
and that sort of thing, a necessity in cleaning up, and people crossing will – to
go inside the store or anything from the pump islands will not trip over the curb.
They have the spacing of only 12 feet from that linear split, so they asked for an
8-foot variance to allow that to occur.
The code isn’t real clear and isn’t up to the current technology, and the
standards have changed slightly, but if I were reviewing the plans, I would not
even require that because I think we’re all aware of what the basic intent of that
provision is, and there is no need for a car to go through that 12-foot slot.
They fit between the islands.  They do not go at right angles to those
pumps.  So I think that basically summarizes the variance issue, and of course
(continued...)
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pump islands twenty feet apart,12 and, in respect to one corner of an overhead canopy, a twenty-
12(...continued)
the special exception addresses the service station operation.
-24-
five-foot variance from the sixty-foot setback requirement from a dual, multi-lane, or divided
highway.  The standard for granting a variance is codified in Article 3, section 2-107 of the
Code, which states in relevant part:
§ 2-107.  Standards for granting variance.
.     .     .
(c) A variance may not be granted under subsection (a) or (b) of this
section unless the Board finds that:
(1) the variance is the minimum variance necessary to afford
relief;
(2) the granting of the variance will not:
(i) alter the essential character of the neighborhood or
district in which the lot is located . . . .  [Emphasis added.]
In its Memorandum of Opinion and Order dated December 2, 1997, the Board examined
each variance and determined that each variance satisfied the requirements of section 2-107(a)
and (c).  Addressing section 2-107(c)(i), the Board stated:
The granting of the three requested variances will not alter the essential
character of this area.  This neighborhood is developed with a mix of
residential and commercial uses and is heavily impacted by its close
proximity to Route 50 and its access ramps.  The commercial uses are
clustered along Route 50, as is the subject property, while the residential
properties are further from the highway.  The subject property is within the
C1B district and is permitted to accommodate commercial uses.  It is also
immediately adjacent to Route 50 and a commercially developed property.  The
canopy will not encroach on the required setbacks to residential property, but
rather, the [setback from the] Route 50 right-of-way. [Emphasis added.]
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We find the description of the neighborhood stated by the Board to be sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of section 2-107(c)(i).  The Board’s description is precise enough to enable a
party or an appellate court to comprehend the area that the Board considered when deciding
to grant the variances.  Furthermore, we cannot foresee how a more specific description of a
larger or smaller neighborhood would have led the Board to determine that the three variances
that were granted would alter the essential character of the neighborhood.  The Board’s
Memorandum and Opinion clearly explains the Board’s reasoning behind the granting of the
variances, and its explanation of the considered neighborhood properly led to an understanding
of the area the Board considered when granting the variances.
We agree with the Court of Special Appeals’s discussion when addressing the cases that
petitioners have cited to show that the Board failed to properly define the neighborhood.  The
Court of Special Appeals, in its opinion, stated:
The cases cited by appellants [petitioners] in support of their contention
that that Board failed to define the surrounding neighborhood with sufficient
particularity are inapposite.  See Prince George’s County Council v. Prestwick,
Inc., 263 Md. 217 (1971); Chevy Chase Village v. Montgomery County
Council, 258 Md. 27 (1970); Templeton v. County Council, 21 Md. App. 636
(1974).  In those cases, the property owners sought to vary use restrictions
imposed by the zoning ordinance through a zoning map amendment.  By contrast,
appellees seek to vary the Code’s area restrictions, not its use restrictions.  The
standards applied to area variances are more relaxed than those applied to use
variances because “the impact of an area variance is viewed as being much less
drastic than that of a use variance.”  Anderson v. Board of Appeals, 22 Md. App.
28, 39 (1974); see also McLean v. Soley, 270 Md. 208, 215 (1973); Cromwell,
102 Md. App. at 695 n.1.  Consequently, the cases cited by appellants do not
support their contention that the surrounding “neighborhood” must be defined
with the same precision in approving area variances as is required in approving
use variances.
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The description given by the Board of the neighborhood sufficiently defined the relevant
neighborhood for variance purposes so that the Board could make a determination about
whether the variance would alter the essential character of that neighborhood.
IV.  Conclusion
  
We hold that in certain circumstances, a zoning body  may grant a special exception
together with area variances to what otherwise would be specific standards or requirements
applicable to such special exception. The special exception, however, must be in a section of
the local code for which variances are not excluded.  Moreover, the granting of the variances
may not so substantially alter the criteria for the granting of the special exception so that the
criteria of the special exception would be swallowed by the variance to the extent that the
special exception would not be a use that was contemplated in the comprehensive zoning
scheme in respect to any particular special exception.
In the case at bar, the Board properly granted the special exception and the variances.
The variances granted only slightly modified the specific area standards for the special
exception and did not enable a special exception use to be granted that would be outside of the
scope of the special exception provisions of the general zoning scheme for that area. 
We also hold that the Board made the appropriate findings in order to grant the
variances and that there was substantial evidence on the record to support those findings.  The
Board established the relevant neighborhood in enough detail to enable the Board to determine
that the essential character of the neighborhood would not be altered.  It was, thus, in
13 As we have indicated at the beginning of this opinion, petitioners, in their brief,
modified one of the questions for which we had granted certiorari, attempting to add the
special exception to what, in their petition, had been termed as solely a variance issue as to
“findings.”  That is inappropriate, and, accordingly, we have not specifically addressed that part
of our opinion to the matter of the special exception.  However, had we done so, we would still
have upheld the granting of the special exception as well as the variances.
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compliance with section 2-107(c)(i).13  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED;
COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONERS.