Case Title: Profits Plus Capital Mgmt. v. Podesta

Citation: 

Docket Number: 39964

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2014-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 39964 
 
PROFITS PLUS CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT, LLC, a Delaware limited 
liability company; DOLLARS AND SENSE 
GROWTH FUND, LP, a Delaware limited 
partnership; ROBERT COLEMAN, an 
individual, 
 
       Plaintiffs-Counterclaimants- 
       Respondents, 
 
v. 
 
JEFFREY PODESTA, an individual; and 
STREET SEARCH, LLC, a New Jersey 
limited liability company, 
 
       Defendants-Counterdefendants- 
       Appellants. 
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Boise, February 2014 Term 
 
2014 Opinion No.  65 
 
Filed:  July 8, 2014 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho 
in and for Ada County.  Hon. Richard D. Greenwood, District Judge. 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.  Attorney fees and costs to Coleman on  
appeal.  
 
Clark & Associates, Eagle, for appellants.  Eric R. Clark argued. 
Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, Boise, for respondents.  Kimbell D. Gourley 
argued. 
 
 
 
BURDICK, Chief Justice. 
 
This case arose out of a contract dispute when Robert Coleman, Profits Plus Capital 
Management, LLC (“Profits Plus”), and Dollars and Sense Growth Fund Limited Partnership 
(“Dollars and Sense”) filed a claim for declaratory judgment against Jeffrey Podesta and Street 
Search, LLC. Coleman, Profits Plus, and Dollars and Sense sought a judgment declaring that 
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they did not have a contract with either Podesta or Street Search. Podesta and Street Search then 
counterclaimed seeking damages for breach of contract, fraud, constructive fraud, and breach of 
fiduciary duties. Ultimately, only Podesta and Street Search’s breach of contract and breach of 
fiduciary duty claims went to the jury, which decided those claims in favor of Coleman, Profits 
Plus, and Dollars and Sense. Podesta and Street Search now appeal a number of the district 
court’s decisions made before, during, and after trial. We affirm the district court’s decisions.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Respondent Robert Coleman resides in Idaho and is the sole member and manager of 
Profits Plus. Profits Plus serves as the sole general partner for Dollars and Sense, an investment 
fund that purchases, sells, and stores precious metals. Both Dollars and Sense and Profits Plus 
are organized in Delaware. The precious metals purchased by Profits Plus are stored in facilities 
located in Idaho. As a general partner, Profits Plus is only entitled to a management fee and some 
incentive fees from Dollars and Sense. All other profits, losses, and revenues Dollars and Sense 
generates are distributed solely to the limited partners based upon their investments.  
Appellant Jeffrey Podesta is a resident of New Jersey and the sole member and manager 
of Street Search, a New Jersey limited liability company. Operating as Street Search, Podesta 
locates investors and raises capital for investment opportunities for which Street Search usually 
charges a monthly fee along with a percentage of the money raised.  
In May 2008, Coleman contacted Podesta to discuss marketing Dollars and Sense. 
Podesta was interested in the concept of the precious metals market and felt that he, with his 
experience in raising capital, and Coleman, with his knowledge of the precious metals market, 
would make a great combination.  
In late April or early May of 2009, Coleman and Podesta traveled to New York to meet 
with various individuals, including an attorney, to discuss the formation of a new entity, an open-
ended mutual fund consistent with the limited partnership, but not limited by the same securities 
regulations. Following these meetings, the parties agreed that the new fund idea was too 
expensive to pursue. From here, the parties disagree as to what form of agreement, if any, was 
reached between them.  
Podesta and Street Search contend that because Coleman could not afford Street Search’s 
fees, Coleman offered Street Search a fifty percent ownership interest in Dollars and Sense in 
exchange for Podesta’s services. Podesta and Street Search also claim that Coleman amended the 
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name of Dollars and Sense to Street Search Dollars and Sense as consideration for the offer of 
ownership interest and Podesta’s agreement to act as President and CEO. In contrast, Coleman 
asserts that he only entered into an independent contractor agreement with Street Search and 
never promised an ownership interest in Dollars and Sense to either Podesta or Street Search. He 
asserts that the name of the fund was only amended to Street Search Dollars and Sense upon 
Podesta’s claim that it would better enable Street Search and Podesta to market Dollars and 
Sense. Coleman also points out that while the name of Dollars and Sense was changed, no 
substantive alterations were made to the limited partnership agreement.  
Although the parties now dispute the terms of any agreement between them, Podesta and 
Street Search worked with Coleman marketing Street Search Dollars and Sense throughout 2009 
until their falling-out in March 2010. The dispute arose on March 2, 2010, when Coleman 
emailed Podesta expressing his displeasure in Podesta’s performance at raising capital and 
stating that they needed to talk. Podesta responded that same day declaring that Coleman’s 
attempts to steal his portion of the fees were illegal. The parties’ subsequent emails devolved 
from there, with Podesta’s attorney contacting Coleman on March 5, 2010, to assert an 
ownership interest in Dollars and Sense. Podesta asserted that the agreement between the parties 
was not a consulting agreement, but a contract promising Street Search a fifty percent ownership 
interest in Dollars and Sense in exchange for Podesta’s services.  
On July 22, 2010, Coleman, Profits Plus, and Dollars and Sense [collectively “Coleman”] 
filed a complaint for declaratory judgment. Podesta and Street Search filed a notice of special 
appearance in accordance with I.R.C.P. 4(i) on September 27, 2010, and a motion to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction on October 12, 2010. On December 17, 2010, the district court 
issued its decision denying Podesta and Street Search’s motion. Podesta and Street Search then 
filed their answer and counterclaim seeking damages for breach of contract, fraud, constructive 
fraud, and breach of fiduciary duties. Coleman filed three motions for summary judgment and 
succeeded in dismissing Podesta’s claims as an individual for breach of contract, constructive 
fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty.  
After seven days of trial, the court ultimately instructed the jury on the claims by Street 
Search against Coleman for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duties. The jury was 
further instructed on Coleman’s equitable estoppel defenses. The jury returned a special verdict 
finding that no contract existed.  
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Street Search then filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and an 
alternative motion for new trial following a jury trial—both of which the district court denied. 
Coleman timely moved for an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3) and 
I.R.C.P 54. While disallowing some fees related to expert witnesses and other fees associated 
with the status of Podesta’s securities licenses, the court awarded Coleman the majority of his 
requested attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) as the prevailing party. On March 17, 2012, Street 
Search filed its first notice of appeal, which was subsequently amended twice following the two 
amendments to the judgment.  
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over Podesta and Street Search. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Podesta and Street Search’s 
motion for a new trial. 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence as settlement 
negotiations. 
4. Whether the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on fraud and constructive 
fraud. 
5. Whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on 
promissory estoppel. 
6. Whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow Podesta and Street 
Search to present evidence of tort damages. 
7. Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.  
 
III. ANALYSIS 
Podesta and Street Search appeal a number of the district court’s decisions made before, 
during, and after trial. These decisions include denying Podesta and Street Search’s motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, denying their motion for new trial, dismissing their 
fraud and constructive fraud claims, excluding certain evidence, and refusing to instruct the jury 
regarding promissory estoppel. Because the issue of jurisdiction could be dispositive, it will be 
addressed first. 
A. Personal Jurisdiction 
 
Podesta and Street Search [collectively “Street Search”] claim that the district court 
incorrectly held that it had personal jurisdiction over them when neither conducted business in 
Idaho as required by Idaho’s long arm statute. Coleman argues that the district court properly 
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exercised jurisdiction and that this issue is moot because Street Search acquiesced to jurisdiction 
by filing counterclaims in Idaho.  
The question of the existence of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is 
one of law, which this Court reviews freely. Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 
726, 152 P.3d 594, 597 (2007) (quoting Knutsen v. Cloud, 142 Idaho 148, 150, 124 P.3d 1024, 
1026 (2005)). When reviewing a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction, this 
Court applies the same standard as when reviewing appeals from summary judgment orders; “we 
construe the evidence presented to the district court in favor of the party opposing the order and 
accord that party the benefit of all inferences which might be reasonably drawn.” Knutsen, 142 
Idaho at 150, 124 P.3d at 1026. Accordingly, in reviewing the district court’s denial of Street 
Search’s motion to dismiss, we construe the evidence in favor of Coleman. 
 
There are two requirements for an Idaho court to properly exercise jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants: (1) the non-resident’s actions must fall within the scope of Idaho’s long-arm 
statute; and (2) jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant must not violate the defendant’s due 
process rights. Id.  
1. Filing compulsory counterclaims is not a voluntary appearance. 
After Coleman filed his complaint, Street Search filed a Notice of Special Appearance to 
contest personal jurisdiction in accordance with I.R.C.P. 4(i) on September 27, 2010. Street 
Search then filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under I.R.C.P. 13(b)(2) on 
October 12, 2010. The district court denied this motion, and issued its Memorandum Decision on 
December 17, 2010. Two months later, Street Search filed an answer and counterclaims. Street 
Search properly and timely objected to personal jurisdiction in this case, the only question is 
whether the counterclaims filed with its answer constitute a waiver of jurisdiction. 
Street Search contends that its filing of counterclaims did not constitute a voluntary 
appearance because the counterclaims were compulsory. In support of this argument, Street 
Search points to Nelson v. World Wide Lease, Inc., 110 Idaho 369, 716 P.2d 513 (Ct. App. 1986), 
where the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the respondent did not waive its jurisdictional 
objection by filing a compulsory counterclaim.   
The holding in Nelson comports both with Rule 4(i) and the prevailing view among other 
jurisdictions. See Hillis v. Heineman, 626 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2010); 5C Charles Alan 
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1397 (3d ed. 2004) (“[T]he trend 
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in more recent cases is to hold that no Rule 12(b) defense is waived by the assertion of a 
counterclaim, whether permissive or compulsory....The same result has been reached by several 
courts with regard to the effect of interposing cross-claims (Rule 13(g)) and third-party claims 
(Rul2 14). This approach seems sound.”). Under Rule 4(i), “[i]f, after a motion under Rule 
12(b)(2), (4), or (5) is denied, the party pleads further and defends the action, such further 
appearance and defense of the action will not constitute a voluntary appearance under this rule.” 
I.R.C.P. 4(i)(2). Filing a compulsory counterclaim is exactly the type of further pleading to 
which this rule refers.   
A counterclaim is compulsory “if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the 
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.” I.R.C.P. 13(a). 
Coleman’s initial complaint sought a declaratory judgment stating that he did not have a contract 
with either Podesta or Street Search and that neither Podesta nor Street Search had any 
ownership interests in Dollars and Sense or Profits Plus. Street Search’s counterclaims arose out 
of the same business transactions as Coleman’s claims and in fact sought to establish a breach of 
the alleged contract that Coleman sought to have declared nonexistent. Therefore, Street Search’s 
counterclaims were compulsory. Because Street Search comported with the requirements of Rule 
4(i), Street Search did not waive its jurisdictional challenge. 
 
2. Idaho’s long-arm statute provides jurisdiction. 
 
The district court held that its exercise of personal jurisdiction over Podesta and Street 
Search was proper under Idaho’s long-arm statute, which provides for the exercise of jurisdiction 
over claims arising out of the “transaction of any business within this state.” I.C. § 5-514(a). 
Transacting business is defined as “the doing of any act for the purpose of realizing pecuniary 
benefit or accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, transact or enhance the business purpose 
or objective or any part thereof of such person, firm, company, association or corporation.” I.C. § 
5-514(a). This Court has held that I.C. § 5-514 should be liberally construed. Purco Fleet Servs., 
Inc., v. Idaho State Dep’t of Fin., 140 Idaho 121, 124, 90 P.3d 346, 349 (2004). “However, the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction by the courts of this state over those who do any of the acts 
enumerated in I.C. § 5-514 extends only as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any 
of said acts.” Knutsen, 142 Idaho at 151, 124 P.3d at 1027 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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Here, the district court determined that it had jurisdiction because Podesta transacted 
business in Idaho when he visited Idaho to view facilities that would be used to store precious 
metals owned by Dollars and Sense. Street Search argues that jurisdiction was improper because 
none of the entities involved in this case are Idaho entities and Coleman provided no facts 
connecting the alleged independent contractor agreement to Idaho. Further, Street Search claims 
that merely maintaining an office or storing precious metals in depositories fall under activities 
that are expressly identified in I.C. § 53-2-903 as not constituting the transaction of business in 
Idaho.  
First, I.C. § 53-2-903 expressly states that it does not “apply in determining the contacts 
or activities that may subject a foreign limited partnership to service of process, taxation, or 
regulation under any other law of this state.” Thus, Street Search’s argument that this section 
somehow proves that jurisdiction was improper is without merit. 
Turning to whether Street Search transacted business in Idaho, the district court correctly 
denied its motion to dismiss. To determine whether Street Search transacted business in Idaho 
within the meaning of I.C. § 5-514(a) we look to the facts asserted in Coleman’s affidavits in 
opposition to the motion to dismiss along with Podesta’s affidavit in  support of this motion. 
Additionally, we construe these facts in favor of Coleman, the party opposing dismissal. 
Knutsen, 142 Idaho at 150, 124 P.3d at 1026. The following facts are important to our analysis:  
(1) Coleman is an Idaho resident and the sole member and manager of Profits 
Plus, a Delaware limited liability company. Profits Plus is a registered investment 
advisor with the Idaho Department of Finance. 
(2) Profits Plus is the sole general partner of Dollars and Sense, a limited 
partnership organized in Delaware that purchases, sells, and stores precious 
metals.  
(3) The principal place of business of Dollars and Sense is Idaho, where its only 
physical activity takes place – the storage of precious metals.  
(4) Podesta is a resident of New Jersey and the sole member and manager of 
Street Search, a New Jersey limited liability company.  
(5) Coleman contacted Podesta in May 2008 about raising investors for Dollars 
and Sense. From May 2008 until early 2010 Podesta and Coleman were in a 
business relationship, the exact nature of which is in dispute in this case.   
(6) Podesta travelled to Idaho on one occasion, which he asserts was in his 
capacity as President and CEO of Dollars and Sense. On this trip Podesta 
inspected two potential vault sites for the storage of precious metals, met with 
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Corky Gowans, the owner and potential landlord of the properties, inspected 
Dollars and Sense’s current vault site, and communicated with potential investors.   
(7) Podesta and Street Search asserted a fifty percent ownership interest in Dollars 
and Sense with Podesta also claiming to be the President and CEO of Dollars and 
Sense.  
(8) In addition to the communications Podesta had with Coleman, Podesta 
initiated business communications with individuals in Idaho on behalf of Dollars 
and Sense. These communications include December 2009 communications with 
Nick Barber at the Idaho Banking Company regarding the purchase of property 
for a potential vault site and continuing communications with Corky Gowans after 
his trip to Idaho regarding the purchase of property for Dollars and Sense.  
Here, both Street Search and Podesta engaged in business in Idaho. Podesta, operating as 
Street Search, entered into a business relationship with Coleman. According to Podesta, the 
nature of this relationship was a partnership in which he became President, CEO, and fifty 
percent owner of Dollars and Sense in exchange for his services in marketing Dollars and Sense. 
While Dollars and Sense is organized in Delaware, its principal place of business is in Idaho. 
Street Search claims that the fact that Dollars and Sense’s principal place of business is in Idaho 
is of no significance, citing this Court’s opinion in Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 
72, 803 P.2d 978 (1990). Street Search is taking this Court’s language in Houghland Farms out 
of context.  
In Houghland Farms, this Court held that it did not have personal jurisdiction over a Utah 
loan broker in a breach of contract case. 119 Idaho 72, 803 P.2d 978 (1990). The broker in 
Houghland prepared a loan proposal for Houghland Farms, Inc. (HFI), whose principal place of 
business was Idaho. While the broker visited both HFI’s properties in Idaho and Arizona, the 
loan proposal he prepared, which was the basis of the lawsuit, only sought to secure the loan 
with assets in Arizona. Id. at 82, 803 P.2d at 988. Thus, the fact that HFI’s principal place of 
business was Idaho was indeed irrelevant to that case. The same is not true in this case. Street 
Search asserted a fifty percent ownership interest in a company whose only physical activity is 
storage of precious metals, which takes place entirely in Idaho. While not sufficient on its own to 
establish jurisdiction, Podesta also travelled to Idaho, in his capacity as CEO and President of 
Dollars and Sense, where he inspected Dollars and Sense’s vault, visited other potential vault 
sites, and spoke with Idaho residents concerning the purchase of property in Idaho on behalf of 
Dollars and Sense. He had both email and phone conversations with Idaho residents on behalf of 
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Dollars and Sense. Taken together, these activities amount to the transaction of business in Idaho 
as defined in I.C. § 5-514(a).  
The next question is whether the claims for relief asserted in this case against Podesta and 
Street Search arise from that business. The main contention in this case is whether Street Search 
has an ownership interest in Dollars and Sense. Street Search points out that any alleged 
agreement and associated negotiations did not occur in Idaho. However, this case arises out of a 
claimed ownership interest in a company whose principal place of business is Idaho and the 
alleged consideration for that ownership interest are the very services Podesta performed that 
constitute the transaction of business in Idaho. Therefore, Idaho’s long arm statute provided the 
district court with jurisdiction.  
3. The district court’s exercise of jurisdiction does not violate due process.  
Next, Street Search contends that its contacts with Idaho were insufficient under the Due 
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution to permit personal jurisdiction in this case. The 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution permits a state to exercise personal jurisdiction 
over a non-resident defendant when that defendant has certain minimum contacts with the state 
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). In determining the 
existence of minimum contacts, a court must focus on the relationship among the defendant, the 
forum, and the litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). “The minimum contacts 
required by International Shoe are supplied if the defendant purposefully directs his activities at 
residents of the forum state and the litigation arises out of or relates to those activities.” Saint 
Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Washington, 123 Idaho 739, 744, 852 P.2d 491, 496 (1993) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Once a court finds the requisite minimum contacts, it must 
then proceed to determine whether its assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 
(1985). 
This case involves a contract dispute; however, a contract between a resident of the 
forum state and a non-resident does not automatically establish purposeful availment. Id. at 478.  
Rather, prior negotiations, contemplated future consequences, the terms of the contract, and the 
parties’ actual course of dealing must be evaluated in determining whether the defendant 
purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum. Id. at 479. Thus, where a party 
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reaches out beyond one state and creates “continuing relationships and obligations with citizens 
of another state,” that party is subject to regulation and sanctions in the other state for the 
consequences of their activities. Id. at 473 (quoting Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 
643, 647 (1950)). Here, Street Search entered into a business relationship with Coleman, a 
resident of Idaho, that lasted for over a year. The business relationship was based on an 
agreement, which Street Search contends involved an exchange of its services for an ownership 
interest in Coleman’s limited partnership, whose principal place of business was in Idaho.  The 
services Podesta provided included multiple communications with Idaho residents along with 
one visit to Idaho in furtherance of the partnership’s business objectives. Therefore, the dispute 
in this case arose out of the claimed existence of “a contract which had substantial connection 
with [Idaho].” McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). As the district court 
correctly held:  
Had the relationship continued, and if, as alleged, Podesta is indeed a 50% owner 
of Dollars and Sense, he would, and will, of necessity have ongoing contact with 
Idaho. If he was to be President and CEO of the fund, he is certainly purposefully 
availing himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum where the 
only tangible assets and activities of the fund are located.  
Accordingly, we hold that both Podesta and Street Search have purposefully availed themselves 
of the privilege of conducting activities within Idaho.  
 
After a court determines that the requisite minimum contacts with the forum state exist, 
the next step of the due process analysis requires the court to consider those contacts in light of 
other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Smalley v. Kaiser, 130 Idaho 909, 913, 
950 P.2d 1248, 1252 (1997). Under this analysis the court may consider:  
[1] the burden on the defendant, 
[2] the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, 
[3] the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, 
[4] the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient 
resolution of controversies, and 
[5] the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive 
social policies. 
Id. (quoting W. States Equip. Co. v. Am. Amex Inc., 125 Idaho 155, 158–59, 868 P.2d 483, 486–
87 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where “a defendant who purposefully has 
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directed his activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a 
compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction 
unreasonable.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. 
Street Search argues that the exercise of jurisdiction over it is unreasonable because it 
will be a financial burden for it to defend the case in Idaho, Idaho has no interest in a case 
involving only Delaware and New Jersey companies, and the most efficient resolution of this 
dispute would be where the companies are located.  
Street Search has claimed ownership of a business owned by an Idaho resident with its 
principal place of business in Idaho. Podesta claims entitlement to the office of President and 
CEO of that business. Podesta and Street Search’s “conduct and connection” with Idaho are such 
that they “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court [here].” World–Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).  
In sum, neither the Idaho long-arm statute nor the Due Process Clause preclude the 
district court from exercising personal jurisdiction over Podesta and Street Search and entering a 
binding judgment against them in this case. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying 
their motion to dismiss. 
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Street Search’s motion for a 
new trial.  
 
Street Search argues that it is entitled to a new trial according to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) and (6) 
because Coleman purposefully withheld relevant evidence requested through discovery and then 
lied about it during trial. The discovery request at issue reads:  
Please provide a copy of each and every document relating to the issuance of any 
professional broker and/or securities licenses to Robert Coleman or Profits Plus 
the revocation and/or suspension of any such licenses and the reinstatement if 
applicable of any such licenses. 
In response to this request, Coleman produced his Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (“FINRA”) Report from the Idaho Department of Finance (“IDOF”).1 Believing that 
an IDOF witness at trial had reviewed documents that Coleman had not produced during 
discovery, Street Search made a public records request with IDOF. In response to this request, 
Street Search received copies of emails Coleman had sent to IDOF requesting a copy of his 
                                                 
1 Specifically, Coleman provided his FINRA Snapshot Report, which includes additional details on disciplinary 
actions not generally available to the public through a public records request. A FINRA Broker Check Report is 
available through a public records request. Thus, Coleman argues that a FINRA Snapshot Report is more inclusive 
than a FINRA Broker Check Report, which was all Podesta provided in response to a similar discovery request.   
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entire file and asking who had access to his file. Coleman then apparently withdrew this request. 
Street Search alleges that this correspondence was responsive to his discovery request as was 
information contained in Coleman’s IDOF file. Further, Street Search claims that by verifying 
that he had provided all documents responsive to Street Search’s discovery requests, Coleman 
knowingly made a false statement.  
The district court considered Street Search’s arguments and ruled from the bench that the 
issue was more properly framed as a discovery dispute. Although the court stated that it likely 
would have compelled production had Street Search come to the court before trial and articulated 
that Coleman’s correspondence with IDOF was responsive and not provided, the court also 
criticized the broad nature of the discovery request at issue. Specifically, the court noted that 
“it’s not the kind of request that I would order sanctions for failing to produce it,” reasoning that 
given the broad nature of the request, there was an argument to be made both for an order 
compelling Coleman to respond and for a finding that the information complained of was beyond 
the scope of the written request.  
1. Standard of Review 
The decision to grant or deny relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Maynard v. Nguyen, 152 Idaho 724, 726, 274 P.3d 589, 591 (2011). 
The decision will be upheld if it appears that the trial court (1) correctly perceived 
the issue as discretionary, (2) acted within the boundaries of its discretion and 
consistent with the applicable legal standards, and (3) reached its determination 
through an exercise of reason. A determination under Rule 60(b) turns largely on 
questions of fact to be determined by the trial court. Those factual findings will be 
upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. If the trial court applies the facts in a 
logical manner to the criteria set forth in Rule 60(b), while keeping in mind the 
policy favoring relief in doubtful cases, the court will be deemed to have acted 
within its discretion. 
Id.  
2. Motion for New Trial under Rule 60(b)(3) 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) provides that a court may relieve a party from a 
final judgment if there was “fraud, (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.” Street Search has the burden of 
proving each element of fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker 
Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 250, 245 P.3d 992, 1002 (2010). Furthermore, “[f]or the 
purposes of subdivision (3) of the rule, fraud will be found only in the presence of such 
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tampering with the administration of justice as to suggest a wrong against the institutions set up 
to protect and safeguard the public.” Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709, 117 P.3d 120, 123 (2005) 
(quoting Win of Mich., Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 754, 53 P.3d 330, 337 (2002)). 
Street Search claims that Coleman committed fraud by verifying that he had provided all 
documents responsive to Street Search’s discovery requests when he knowingly withheld 
portions of his IDOF file. Even if Coleman’s statement was false, it does not constitute such 
tampering with the administration of justice as to suggest a wrong against the institutions set up 
to protect and safeguard the public. See Suitts, 141 Idaho at, 709, 117 P.3d at 123. 
Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Street 
Search’s motion for new trial based on Rule 60(b)(3). 
3. Motion for New Trial under Rule 60(b)(6) 
Next, Street Search argues that Coleman’s purposeful withholding of relevant evidence 
requested through discovery constitutes unique and compelling circumstances that warrant a new 
trial under Rule 60(b)(6). Street Search argues that because the district court would have granted 
a motion to compel if it was brought before trial, the subsequent denial of its new trial motion is 
contrary to I.R.C.P. 26(e). Street Search also asks this Court to look to a Montana Supreme Court 
case that reversed a denial of a new trial motion due to discovery abuses.  
Rule 60(b)(6) provides that the court may grant relief from a judgment for “any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Relief can be granted under 
subsection six “only on a showing of ‘unique and compelling circumstances’ justifying relief.” 
Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 349, 924 P.2d 607, 611 (1996). Street Search does not explain 
how the alleged discovery abuses amount to unique and compelling circumstances, but simply 
argues that anything less than granting a new trial in his case would condone such abuses.  
This Court has infrequently granted relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Berg v. Kendall, 147 
Idaho 571, 578, 212 P.3d 1001, 1008 (2009). We have recognized that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) 
may be appropriate where the district court granted relief that is inconsistent with the pleadings 
and evidence in the case or is beyond what was sought in the complaint. Dawson v. Cheyovich 
Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 380–81, 234 P.3d 699, 704–05 (2010). This Court has also found 
that the complete absence of meaningful representation in a post-conviction proceeding may be 
“unique and compelling circumstances” warranting relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). Eby v. State, 
148 Idaho 731, 737, 228 P.3d 998, 1004 (2010). Additionally, this Court has affirmed the grant 
14 
 
of relief where defense counsel’s representations to an unrepresented plaintiff constituted 
overreaching. Hopkins v. Troutner, 134 Idaho 445, 447–48, 4 P.3d 557, 559–60 (2000). Street 
Search does not point to any of these cases for authority, but rather asks this Court to follow the 
Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Richardson v. State, 130 P.3d 634, 648 (Mont. 2006). 
In Richardson, the court held that default judgment was an appropriate sanction because 
the State’s “willful and bad faith conduct” amounted to a “blatant and systemic” abuse of the 
discovery process, which “undermined the integrity of the entire proceeding.” Id. at 648–49. The 
State had knowingly “concealed the evidence ... until the eve of trial by asserting baseless 
objections” to plaintiff’s discovery requests, and the evidence was highly relevant and probative. 
Id. at 640. The court also noted that the State further compounded its initial impropriety by using 
the lack of knowledge its discovery abuses created against the plaintiff. Id. The court justified 
default judgment as a sanction in part on Montana’s strict policy of non-leniency toward 
discovery abuse and its rule “that punishment for discovery abuses must be made unbearable in 
order to thwart the inevitable temptation which zealous advocacy inspires.” Id. at 648.  
Street Search has not alleged any discovery abuses that rise to the level of abuse present 
in Richardson. Indeed, while the district court stated it would have likely granted a motion to 
compel if one had been brought before trial, it also stated that it would not have ordered 
sanctions. The district court also criticized the overly broad nature of the discovery request, 
noting that arguments could be made that the withheld documents did not fall within the request.  
Upon review, the district court recognized this issue as one of discretion, ruled within the 
outer boundaries of its discretion, using applicable legal standards, and with the exercise of 
reason. Therefore, the decision to deny Street Search’s new trial motion was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence under I.R.E. 408 as 
settlement negotiations.  
 
Street Search argues that the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of 
email communications between Podesta and Coleman as settlement negotiations when the emails 
were really an attempt on Coleman’s part to modify their existing contract. Street Search argues 
that I.R.E. 408 should only apply where parties are concluding their relationships and not when 
parties are negotiating terms for a continuing relationship.  
15 
 
 
The email communications at issue here began on March 2, 2010, with Coleman writing 
to Podesta expressing his displeasure in Podesta’s performance at raising capital and stating that 
they needed to talk. Podesta responded that same day at 6:23 p.m. as follows: 
Call me in the morning. Read sentence # 4. Illegal, Illegal, illegal. And then some. 
Remember it is “we” not “I”. You are 50% and I am 50%. That is the agreement 
NOT an arrangement. Stealing MY portion of the fees for your personal use is 
against the law. I am your partner not a hired worker. 
Coleman then responded the next day, stating that he was not stealing anything and their 
agreement had nothing to do with ownership of the fund. He also proposed a new agreement 
“terminating our current relationship,” which “calculated the management fee owed to you.” 
This proposed agreement is what Street Search refers to as “Exhibit E” in its brief and what the 
district court excluded in granting Coleman’s motion in limine.  
 
Coleman filed a motion in limine to exclude this email chain between himself and 
Podesta before trial on the grounds that they constituted settlement negotiations. The district 
court ruled on this motion from the bench holding that the emails following Podesta’s initial 
response are attempts to settle a dispute and so constitute settlement negotiations.  Specifically, 
the court found that Podesta’s March 2nd email sent at 6:23 p.m. was not yet settlement 
negotiations, but signaled the start of a dispute. The court ruled that what followed after that 
email “appears to be discussions of how we are going to resolve this dispute.” As to the new 
contract Coleman proposed and attached to his March 3rd email, the court concluded that 
“[Coleman’s] offer of, ‘Here is a new contract, sign it,’ is just that. It’s an offer that’s rejected 
and it’s—therefore would not be admissible.”  
 
1. Standard of Review 
 
The trial court has wide discretion when ruling on a motion in limine. Gunter v. 
Murphy’s Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 25, 105 P.3d 676, 685 (2005). “This Court reviews the 
trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine under an abuse of discretion standard.” 
Id. Under that standard, “this Court considers whether the district court’s exercise of discretion 
was within the bounds of its authority, consistent with legal standards, and based on an exercise 
of reason.” Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 767, 86 
P.3d 475, 481 (2004). An incorrect ruling only warrants a new trial if the error affected a 
substantial right of a party. Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138, 144, 937 P.2d 1212, 1218 (1997) 
(citing I.R.C.P. 61 and I.R.E. 103).  
16 
 
 
2. Coleman’s proposed new agreement constitutes a settlement offer.  
A settlement offer or agreement may not be admitted into evidence to prove liability. 
I.R.E. 408. The rule does not require exclusion, however, “if the evidence is offered for another 
purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness.” I.R.E. 408. This Court has noted that 
Rule 408 is grounded upon two theories: “(1) that the offer is of dubious relevance on the issue 
of liability since it may merely imply a desire for peace and not a concession of wrong-doing and 
(2) the policy of promoting settling of disputes would be discouraged if offers of compromise 
were admitted in evidence.” Rojas v. Lindsay Mfg. Co., 108 Idaho 590, 592, 701 P.2d 210, 212 
(1985). Accordingly, this Court has also held that Rule 408 “should be given a broad, not 
narrow, interpretation in order to encourage settlement negotiations.” Saint Alphonsus 
Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 495, 224 P.3d 1068, 1084 (2009). 
Here, Street Search does not argue that it offered Exhibit E to show bias or prejudice, but 
rather to show that a contract existed, which Coleman was attempting to change. Thus, it sought 
to use the exhibit to prove liability. The question then is whether Exhibit E is an offer to settle. 
Street Search argues that Coleman’s offer of a new agreement cannot constitute a settlement 
negotiation because Coleman and Podesta were not yet concluding their relationship. This is not 
the standard applied; rather the standard is whether a dispute has arisen as to the validity or 
amount of a claim. See I.R.E. 408.   
 
Both the timing of the offer and the existence of a disputed claim are relevant to the 
determination of whether an offer is made “in compromising or attempting to compromise a 
claim” so that the offer would be subject to exclusion under Rule 408. I.R.E. 408; See Cassino v. 
Reichhold Chemicals, 817 F.2d 1338, 1342–43 (9th Cir. 1987). In interpreting F.R.E. 408, the 
rule on which I.R.E. 408 is based, courts have generally held that a dispute need not “crystallize 
to the point of threatened litigation” for exclusion under Rule 408 to apply. Weems v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., 665 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Affiliated Mfrs. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 
56 F.3d 521, 527 (3d Cir. 1995)); accord Dallis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 768 F.2d 1303, 1307 (11th 
Cir. 1985). “A dispute exists for Rule 408 purposes so long as there is ‘an actual dispute or 
difference of opinion’ regarding a party’s liability for or the amount of the claim.” Weems, 665 
F.3d at 965 (quoting Affiliated Mfrs., 56 F.3d at 527). Thus, an offer of a severance pay package 
in exchange for a release of all potential claims contemporaneous with the termination is 
17 
 
admissible because it is made before any dispute has arisen; it is merely an attempt to secure a 
release of potential claims.  Cassino, 817 F.2d at 1343.  
In ruling on Coleman’s motion in limine, the district court held that Podesta’s email 
claiming that he was a fifty percent owner of Dollars and Sense and that Coleman was breaking 
the law marked the commencement of a dispute. This is an accurate assessment as two disputes 
arose—one as to the amount owed to Podesta, and the other as to whether Podesta had any 
ownership interest in the company. Furthermore, Podesta’s statements of “Illegal, Illegal, illegal” 
and “Stealing MY portion of the fees for your personal use is against the law” are essentially a 
threat of litigation. Given these statements threatening litigation and his assertion of an 
ownership interest in Dollars and Sense, Coleman’s response and his proposed agreement are an 
attempt to settle their disputes. This conclusion is also in line with the directive that Rule 408 
“should be given a broad, not narrow, interpretation in order to encourage settlement 
negotiations.” Saint Alphonsus, 148 Idaho at 495, 224 P.3d at 1084. 
Street Search next argues that Coleman’s proposed contract does not fall under Rule 
408’s exclusion because Coleman does not offer any consideration. Coleman’s proposed contract 
terminated any previous agreements, required Podesta to disavow any ownership interest in 
Dollars and Sense, and agreed to pay Podesta “the remainder portion of management fees owed.” 
While the fees contemplated appear to be only an offer to pay Podesta what he is already owed, 
the agreement provides other valid consideration like requiring Profits Plus to obtain written 
consent before it can use Street Search in any sales brochures. Moreover, Coleman makes clear 
in the accompanying email that signing the proposed agreement will allow them to move forward 
and continue working together, which could also constitute consideration. See Weisel v. Beaver 
Springs Owners Ass’n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 526, 272 P.3d 491, 498 (2012) (“Consideration 
‘must have some value in the eyes of the law; but in the absence of fraud or overreaching, the 
promisor, if competent, can fix on anything not in itself unlawful as a consideration and put his 
own value on it, and whether it is equivalent’ to the benefit bargained for is a matter left to the 
determination of the parties.”).  
The conditions concerning the use of the Street Search name coupled with the offer to 
continue the business relationship is sufficient consideration. Therefore, we hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in finding Coleman’s proposed contract to be a settlement offer 
inadmissible under IRE 408.  
18 
 
D. Street Search has not shown error in the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on 
fraud and constructive fraud.  
 
There is no record that Street Search ever proposed a jury instruction on fraud or 
constructive fraud. However, Coleman proposed an instruction on fraud and constructive fraud in 
his first proposed jury instructions, which were filed on January 18, 2012. Street Search then 
filed his objections and non-objections to Coleman’s proposed instructions as well as a proposal 
of additional instructions. Street Search did not object to Coleman’s instructions on fraud and 
constructive fraud nor did it propose any further instructions on these causes of action. On 
January 30, 2012, Coleman filed proposed amended and supplemental jury instructions. Because 
these proposed amended instructions are not in the record, we do not know whether they 
included instructions on fraud or constructive fraud. Street Search then filed two supplemental 
proposed jury instructions, the second of which is in the record on appeal and does not include 
instructions on fraud or constructive fraud.   
Street Search concedes that it never proposed instructions on either fraud or constructive 
fraud, but contends that any failure on its part was due to the district court telling the parties in a 
jury instruction conference that it was refusing to give fraud and constructive fraud instructions. 
A transcript from this conference or when exactly this conference took place is not in the record 
and no attempt to make a record of this conference was made until approximately fifteen months 
later.2  
Following the close of the evidence at trial, the district court provided the parties with the 
final jury instructions and an opportunity to voice objections. While Coleman objected to the 
court’s refusal to give the instruction on his affirmative defense of fraud, Street Search made no 
objections to the lack of instructions on fraud and constructive fraud. In response to Coleman’s 
objection, the district court explained that there was insufficient evidence to present the jury with 
                                                 
2 Almost fifteen months after the parties first proposed jury instructions and six months after the filing of the second 
amended final judgment, Street Search filed a motion to augment the record regarding what it deemed was a 
dismissal of its fraud and constructive fraud claims. Specifically, Street Search sought a written order memorializing 
what transpired in the jury instruction conference with regard to its fraud and constructive fraud claims. A hearing 
on this motion was held on April 10, 2013. At that hearing, the district court stated, “It wasn’t a dismissal. It was an 
‘I’m not instructing on them,’ as I recall.” The district court denied Street Search’s Motion for a Written Order of 
Dismissal as untimely under Idaho Appellate Rule 29. Street Search does not appeal this ruling. The court did allow 
Street Search to augment the record to include its second supplemental proposed jury instructions noting that these 
instructions were provided to and considered by the court and the only reason they were not filed with the Clerk’s 
office was due to the court’s oversight. Neither these supplemental instructions, nor any of the previously filed 
instructions, include a proposal on Street Search’s part of a fraud or constructive fraud instruction. 
 
19 
 
an affirmative claim of fraud on Coleman’s part. When asked if it had any objections to the 
court’s jury instructions, Street Search’s counsel stated that he “would have preferred that the 
court give us the promissory estoppel instruction,” but “other than that, we’re happy.”  
Street Search acknowledges its failure to object to what it deems was a dismissal of its 
fraud and constructive fraud claims arguing that this dismissal was plain error. As to its failure to 
propose jury instructions on either fraud or constructive fraud, Street Search argues that “[i]t 
would be nonsensical to require a party to offer jury instructions and object to the refusal to give 
jury instructions related to a dismissed claim.” Street Search contends that a ruling that the 
evidence does not support an element jury instruction is essentially a directed verdict and that 
I.R.C.P. 51(b) is unconstitutional when applied to assert that a trial court possesses authority to 
weigh evidence and subsequently dismiss a claim by refusing to give a jury instruction.  
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 51(a) requires a trial court to rule on requested jury 
instructions at the close of the evidence at trial, either “verbally indicat[ing] its ruling on the 
record” or by indorsing “upon the duplicated copy of each requested instruction the court’s 
ruling as to such request.” Section (b) of this rule further requires a party to object on the record 
to the failure to give a requested jury instructing stating, “No party may assign as error the giving 
of or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to 
consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to which that party objects and the grounds 
of the objection.” I.R.C.P. 51(b). Thus, we will not consider challenges to a jury instruction on 
appeal that were not objected to below. Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC v. Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 716, 725, 291 P.3d 399, 408 (2012).  
Street Search contends that the district court violated I.R.C.P. 51(a) by failing to make a 
record of its refusal to instruct the jury on its fraud and constructive fraud claims. However, 
because the record on appeal does not include Coleman’s amended proposed jury instructions, it 
is not clear whether fraud and constructive fraud instructions were before the court when it 
ultimately ruled on the final jury instructions. Moreover, Street Search concedes it never 
proposed instructions on fraud and constructive fraud, arguing that this failure to propose 
instructions was due to the district court’s dismissal of these claims in a jury instruction 
conference. 
The trial transcript does not include the jury instruction conference between the court and 
counsel. No party asked that the conference be reported. Consequently, we do not know whether 
20 
 
the instruction in question actually was requested at the conference; nor do we know whether a 
ruling was obtained. “It is the litigant’s duty to not only clearly state its contentions to the trial 
judge, but to make such contentions, and the rulings thereon, of record so they may be reviewed 
on appeal.” Van Velson Corp. v. Westwood Mall Assocs., 126 Idaho 401, 406, 884 P.2d 414, 419 
(1994). Therefore, if the claims were indeed dismissed, it was incumbent upon Street Search’s 
counsel to object to the dismissal and to request that the court record the objection or direct the 
reporter to record what had transpired. Annau v. Schutte, 96 Idaho 704, 710, 535 P.2d 1095, 1101 
(1975). This Court “will not review a trial court’s alleged error on appeal unless the record 
discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for the assignment of error.” State v. Fisher, 
123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993). Under these circumstances, any questions relating 
to the failure to instruct on fraud or constructive fraud have not been preserved adequately for 
appellate review. Accordingly, we need not address Street Search’s argument that the failure to 
instruct on fraud or constructive fraud essentially amounted to a directed verdict.  
E. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on 
promissory estoppel. 
 
Street Search next argues that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to give its 
instruction regarding promissory estoppel. Street Search argues that the proposed instruction was 
a correct statement of the law, not adequately covered by other instructions, and supported by the 
facts of the case. Coleman responds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to give the instruction because the existence of a definite agreement was at issue, not 
consideration.  
 
The district court gave the following explanation for declining to give the promissory 
estoppel instruction:  
I considered the request to give an instruction on promissory estoppel. I did not 
believe it would be appropriate in this case. It would do nothing more than 
confuse the jury. I think the issues are well laid out for them, and the issue of 
consideration in this case I don’t believe is going to revolve on promissory 
estoppel. In any event, that request I will deem as being -- well, it’s overruled. 
 
If a party’s theory of the case is supported by any reasonable view of the evidence, the 
party is entitled to a jury instruction on that theory. Vanford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 
555, 165 P.3d 261, 269 (2007). The determination of whether the instruction is supported by the 
facts is committed to the discretion of the district court. Craig Johnson Const., LLC v. Floyd 
Town Architects, PA, 142 Idaho 797, 800, 134 P.3d 648, 651 (2006).  
21 
 
 
This Court has described promissory estoppel as: “A promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance on the part of a promisee or a third person 
and which does induce such action or forebearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by 
enforcement of the promise.” Smith v. Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 67, 625 P.2d 
417, 421 (1981) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 901(1) (1973)). The elements 
required to support such a claim are: “(1) one party’s reliance on a promise creates a substantial 
economic detriment, (2) the reliance was or should have been foreseeable, and (3) the reliance 
was reasonable and justified.” Grover v. Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 64, 205 P.3d 1196, 1200 
(2009). “Promissory estoppel is simply a substitute for consideration, not a substitute for an 
agreement between parties.” Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass’n, 141 Idaho 362, 367, 109 P.3d 
1104, 1109 (2005). Thus, where there is evidence of adequate consideration, the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel is of no consequence. Id. at 368, 109 P.3d at 1110. 
 
Coleman is correct that consideration was not at issue in this case nor does Street Search 
claim that consideration was at issue. Instead, Street Search focuses on the “promise of 
ownership” and Podesta’s reliance on that promise. The problem with Street Search’s promissory 
estoppel argument is that Street Search was attempting to recover an alleged bargained for 
consideration through its breach of contract claim. In the facts section of its amended 
counterclaim Street Search states, “Coleman offered 50% of Profit Plus’ ownership in the limited 
partnership that owned the fund in exchange for Podesta’s assistance.” Where there is an 
exchange of mutual promises, there is no lack of consideration. Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 
397, 400, 49 P.3d 402, 405 (2002). Thus, as in Lettunich, the issue in this case was not whether 
there was sufficient consideration, but whether there was sufficient evidence of an agreement.  
Because there was clearly consideration in the alleged agreement between Street Search 
and Coleman, there is no need to apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Therefore, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a jury instruction on promissory 
estoppel.  
F. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow evidence of tort 
damages.  
 
Street Search argues that because the court instructed the jury regarding damages for 
breach of fiduciary duty, it should have been allowed to present evidence of its claimed tort 
damages. Specifically, Street Search argues that the court should have allowed it to present 
exhibits attempting to show Street Search’s lost profits. Street Search argues that the refusal to 
22 
 
allow it to present this evidence affected its substantial rights by conveying to the jury that the 
court did not believe its breach of fiduciary duty claim. Coleman argues that this issue is 
irrelevant because Street Search was unable to establish a contract between the parties, the 
existence of which was the only basis for finding a fiduciary duty, a breach thereof, or damages.  
 
At trial, Street Search attempted to present evidence of the valuation of the Dollars and 
Sense fund on December, 31, 2011, in order to show profits lost due to Coleman’s alleged 
breach. Coleman objected to this evidence arguing that it was not relevant because contract 
damages are measured at the time of breach and the alleged breach occurred in 2010. The district 
court sustained the objection, stating: 
[F]rom my memory of the law, we measure contract damages at the time and 
place of the breach of the contract. I think the Supreme Court said so fairly 
recently. And I don’t know that it would be any different from the breach of 
fiduciary duty or for fraud or other causes of action alleged. 
Street Search is correct that breach of fiduciary duty is a tort claim for which lost profits 
may constitute damages. See Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 646, 39 P.3d 577, 586 
(2001). However, Coleman is correct that this argument is irrelevant. Street Search failed to 
prove liability under any of its claims and it does not appeal from the jury verdict or from the 
decision on its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. “In order for the issue of 
damages testimony to be relevant, a party must be able to establish liability.” City of Meridian v. 
Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 454, 299 P.3d 232, 261 (2013). Therefore, Street Search’s claim 
regarding tort damages is not relevant, and we decline to address it on appeal.  
G. Coleman is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.  
 
Both parties seek an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). Idaho Code Section 
12-120(3) provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on “any 
commercial transaction.” Commercial transactions are all transactions except for personal or 
household purposes. I.C. § 12-120(3). Whether there is a commercial transaction is a question of 
law over which this Court exercises free review. Great Plains Equip. v. Nw. Pipeline Corp., 136 
Idaho 466, 470, 36 P.3d 218, 222 (2001). “Where a party alleges the existence of a contractual 
relationship of a type embraced by section 12-120(3) ... that claim triggers the application of 
[I.C. § 12-120(3)] and a prevailing party may recover fees even though no liability under a 
contract was established.” Farmers Nat’l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 73, 878 P.2d 762, 772 
(1994).  
23 
 
 
In this case neither party disputes the applicability of section 12-120(3). Rather, both 
parties simply ask that they be awarded attorney fees if they are the prevailing party. Coleman 
has prevailed on every claim raised by Street Search; therefore, he is prevailing party on appeal 
and entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3).  
IV. CONCLUSION 
We hold that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over both Podesta and 
Street Search. Additionally, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Street Search’s new trial motion, granting Coleman’s motion in limine, or refusing to give a jury 
instruction on promissory estoppel. Attorney fees and costs to Coleman on appeal.  
Justices EISMANN, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.