Case Title: State v. Coley

Citation: 2001-Ohio-1340

Docket Number: 19981474

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-10-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Coley, 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 2001-Ohio-1340] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. COLEY, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Coley (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 253.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 98-1474 — Submitted June 20, 2001 — Decided October 3, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County, No. CR97-1449. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J.  On December 23, 1996, defendant-appellant Douglas 
Coley, assisted by Joseph Green, kidnapped, robbed, and attempted to murder 
David Moore in Toledo.  Then, on January 3, 1997, Samar El-Okdi was shot 
between the eyes and left to die in an alley in Toledo.  On January 7, 1997, 
Toledo police stopped a Pontiac sedan that was owned by El-Okdi and being 
driven by Green.  Coley was a passenger.  A three-judge panel convicted Green of 
El-Okdi’s murder as well as other offenses.1  See State v. Green (2000), 90 Ohio 
St.3d 352, 738 N.E.2d 1208. 
 
In May 1998, a jury convicted Coley of the kidnapping, robbery, and 
attempted murder of Moore, and the kidnapping, robbery, and aggravated murder 
of Samar El-Okdi.  Coley received a death sentence, and his case is now on direct 
appeal to this court. 
Facts 
Offenses Against David Moore 
 
On December 23, 1996, around 7:30 p.m., David Moore parked his light 
blue, four-door Ford Taurus at his residence in Toledo.  While Moore was 
unloading his car trunk, a man he later identified as Green asked for directions.  
                                                          
 
1. 
The three-judge panel originally sentenced Green to death.  On appeal, this court 
affirmed the conviction but found irregularities in sentencing.  On remand, the three-judge panel 
reconsidered its opinion and sentenced Green to life in prison without parole.  Toledo Blade, April 
7, 2001. 
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2 
As he gave directions, another man appeared, whom Moore later identified as 
Coley.  Moore started to leave, but Green and Coley stood in front of him and 
displayed small-caliber, shiny, semiautomatic pistols.  Coley then told Moore, 
“Give me your keys.”  Moore complied, and Coley told Moore, “Get in the car.”  
Coley then climbed in behind the wheel, Green got in back behind Moore, and 
Coley drove the Taurus towards the art museum. 
 
While in the car, Moore asked them to let him go, but neither Green nor 
Coley responded.  Green did tell Moore to “cough up the cash,” and Moore 
handed Coley $112, which Coley threw on the front seat.  Moore noted that Coley 
was calm and never appeared excited, aggravated, confused, or unsure of himself.  
After approximately fifteen minutes, Coley pulled into a dark, isolated field and 
told Moore to get out of the car. 
 
As Moore backed out of the car, Coley shot him in the stomach.  After 
Moore ran away, he heard a car door open and the car wheels spinning, “trying to 
get out of the mud.”  Moore heard somebody chasing him.  Other shots were 
fired, and Moore fell down.  Then Moore heard another shot and felt a bullet hit 
him in the head.  He pretended that he was dead, but as his assailant walked away, 
Moore looked back and thought that Green, who was heavier and taller than 
Coley, was the one who had just shot him. 
 
Eventually, Moore struggled to his feet, went to a nearby house, and 
summoned assistance.  Police and a medical team responded and took Moore to a 
hospital.  Moore had been shot in the head, stomach, and arms, and twice in the 
hand.  During one operation, a surgeon removed a .25 caliber bullet from Moore’s 
wrist. 
 
In addition to the bullet from Moore’s wrist, police found two .25 caliber 
shell casings on Green Street near where Moore had been shot.  Evidence 
established that a gun identified as Coley’s gun had ejected the shell casings 
found on Green Street and fired the bullet removed from Moore’s wrist. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
 
On an evening shortly before Christmas 1996, Tyrone Armstrong, a cousin 
of both Coley and Green, saw Coley and Green driving a light blue, four-door 
Ford Taurus.  The Taurus, which Armstrong knew did not belong to either of 
them, was overheating, so Armstrong helped put water in the car.  Before his 
abduction, Moore had purchased but not installed a new replacement radiator 
because his Taurus tended to overheat. 
 
That same evening, Armstrong saw Coley and Green with the same .25 
caliber semiautomatic pistols that Armstrong had seen each of them previously 
carry.  Armstrong identified State Exhibit 32, a brown-handled pistol with gray 
duct tape, as the weapon Coley had previously carried, and State Exhibit 33, 
which had a pearl handle, as Green’s pistol.  That evening, Green made up a rap 
song with the words “I shot him five times and he had dropped.”  At one point, 
Green pointed his gun at Coley and said, “You better never snitch on me.”  Coley 
mimicked the action; pointing his gun at Green, and repeating, “Better never 
snitch on me.”  Penne Graves, Coley’s girlfriend, also recognized State Exhibit 32 
as a gun she had seen around her house. 
 
After a few days, Coley and Green abandoned Moore’s Taurus.  On 
December 27, 1996, police recovered Moore’s car in an area near the residence of 
a girlfriend of Coley.  When police found the Taurus, it bore plates that had been 
stolen from a Mercury Topaz. 
Murder of Samar El-Okdi 
 
Samar El-Okdi was found dead in an alley on January 7, 1997.  She had 
last been seen on January 3, 1997.  The police traced El-Okdi’s movements on 
Friday, January 3, 1997, from around 5:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m., but no evidence 
firmly established exactly where or when she had been abducted.  Sometime after 
5:00 p.m. that day, El-Okdi left work and told coworkers that she planned to 
spend the evening at home.  She drove her Pontiac 6000 to her apartment, a block 
from Moore’s residence.  Raymond Sunderman, her landlord, saw El-Okdi arrive 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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home sometime between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m.  El-Okdi’s brother, Samir El-Okdi, 
recalls that El-Okdi stopped by late that afternoon at the family-owned 
convenience store for thirty to forty-five minutes.  Around 8:00 p.m., El-Okdi 
dropped film off at the Blue Ribbon Photo store at Westgate Shopping Center. 
 
That same Friday, around 8:45 p.m., Rosie Frusher left a friend’s house at 
West Grove Place, near the Toledo Art Museum, to use a pay telephone.  As 
Frusher walked outside the house at which she was staying, she heard two 
gunshots.  After she had passed by the house, she saw a car to her left in an alley.  
The car had “long taillights” (similar to those on a Pontiac 6000) and a license 
plate number with a zero (unlike El-Okdi’s license number).  Frusher saw a black, 
stocky “man outside the car bending over that had bushy hair.”  Another man was 
sitting in the driver’s seat.  Then Frusher walked to the pay phone and talked to 
her friend for thirty minutes or so, but she did not return the same way she had 
come earlier.  Ameritech records establish that Frusher made this call at 8:41 p.m. 
 
On Saturday, January 4, Christopher Neal, El-Okdi’s boyfriend, 
discovered that El-Okdi was missing and notified police.  El-Okdi’s friends and 
relatives searched for El-Okdi, hired a private detective, and distributed missing-
person flyers.  These flyers described El-Okdi, included her photograph, 
described her car, including the bumper stickers, and listed her last known 
whereabouts. 
 
That same weekend in Toledo, Armstrong saw Coley driving a gray 
Pontiac 6000 that he later identified as El-Okdi’s car.  On the night his cousins 
were arrested, Armstrong bought some cigars and two bottles of Alize (an 
alcoholic beverage) for Green and Coley, which police later found in that Pontiac.  
Armstrong admitted that Green and Coley had keys and used those keys to drive 
both the Taurus and the Pontiac. 
 
Later that night, Monday, January 6, Megan Mattimoe, El-Okdi’s friend 
and coworker, was parked on Scottwood waiting for another friend to distribute 
January Term, 2001 
5 
the missing-person flyers about El-Okdi.  Around 11:15 p.m., Mattimoe saw El-
Okdi’s car drive by, which she identified by its dented rear fender and a 
distinctive bumper sticker, although the license plate was different.  While 
following the Pontiac, Mattimoe used a cellphone to call a friend, who in turn 
called the police.  Mattimoe followed the Pontiac until the driver parked at an 
apartment complex and two men got out. 
 
After talking with police, Mattimoe and a Toledo detective returned to 
where the stolen Pontiac was parked.  It bore an Ohio license plate, number YRT 
022, which had been stolen from another Pontiac 6000 some time before 6:00 
p.m. on January 4, 1997.  Police staked out the car, using five undercover police 
vehicles. 
 
After midnight, Green, Coley, and a woman with a baby got into the 
Pontiac and drove away.  Police followed in undercover vehicles and, assisted by 
marked police cars, forced the Pontiac to stop.  Despite being surrounded, Green 
rammed one car and spun his wheels in an effort to escape.  Green and Coley also 
resisted arrest, and police forcibly removed each of them from the car.  Police 
found a loaded pistol in Green’s coat.  When one policeman approached the car, 
he noticed that Coley, who was sitting in the back seat, had a metallic object in his 
hand.  On the Pontiac’s rear floor, police found a loaded, .25 caliber, brown-
handled pistol (Exhibit 32) near where Coley had been sitting. 
 
Inside the trunk, police found a black crochet purse that El-Okdi had with 
her on January 3 when she disappeared.  However, police never found her red 
wallet and credit cards, which she always carried with her inside the black purse.  
Police found one of El-Okdi’s license plates underneath the stolen rear plate, and 
they found her other license plate in the car trunk. 
 
On the afternoon of January 7, police found El-Okdi’s body in an alley 
behind West Grove Place, where Frusher had heard shots and had seen two men 
in a car four days earlier.  El-Okdi was wearing the same white shirt, black shoes, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
and black trousers that she wore to work on January 3.  At the scene, police found 
a live .25 caliber bullet and a .25 caliber shell casing near El-Okdi’s body. 
 
The deputy coroner found that El-Okdi had died from a .25 caliber bullet, 
which the deputy coroner removed from the back of her cerebellum.  The bullet 
had struck her between the eyes and had been fired from a muzzle distance of 
approximately twelve to eighteen inches.  The deputy coroner concluded that El-
Okdi did not die immediately. 
 
David Cogan, a firearms expert, examined the .25 caliber bullet removed 
from El-Okdi’s brain, the .25 caliber bullet removed from Moore’s wrist, three .25 
caliber shell casings from the two crime scenes, and Coley’s .25 caliber 
semiautomatic pistol recovered from the rear floor of El-Okdi’s Pontiac.  Cogan 
concluded that Coley’s pistol was in operating condition and had fired the bullets 
into Moore and El-Okdi and had ejected the three crime-scene shell casings.  
After police searched Green’s residence on January 7, 1997, they found an empty 
box that had contained .25 caliber Remington ammunition. 
 
On January 7, 1997, Coley and Green were arraigned on charges relating 
to El-Okdi’s stolen Pontiac and the stolen plates.  That arraignment was shown on 
television, and Moore immediately recognized Green and Coley from the 
television newscast as the men who had kidnapped, robbed, and shot him. 
 
That same week, Coley, Green and their cousin Armstrong were all in jail, 
although Armstrong was being held on unrelated charges.  While Armstrong and 
Coley were together, Coley hugged him and told him, “I did it but Joe [Green] 
shouldn’t have snitched on me.”  By this comment, Armstrong understood Coley 
to mean that Coley had shot El-Okdi.  Coley also asked Armstrong to lie for him 
by claiming that Coley had obtained his weapon and the Pontiac from someone 
named Denny. 
 
On January 16, 1997, a grand jury heard allegations relating to El-Okdi, 
and returned an indictment of murder, without death-penalty specifications.  
January Term, 2001 
7 
Coley was reindicted on March 10, 1997, with the grand jury returning an eight-
count indictment for the following offenses: Count I, the kidnapping of David 
Moore, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2); Count II, the aggravated robbery of 
David Moore, in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1); Count III, the attempted murder 
of David Moore, in violation of R.C. 2923.02; Count IV, the aggravated murder 
of Samar El-Okdi, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A); Count V, the aggravated 
murder of Samar El-Okdi, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B); Count VI, the 
aggravated murder of Samar El-Okdi, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B); Count VII, 
the kidnapping of Samar El-Okdi, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2); and Count 
VIII, the aggravated robbery of Samar El-Okdi, in violation of R.C. 
2911.01(A)(1).  Each count included a firearm specification in violation of R.C. 
2941.145.  Count III also had a firearm specification under R.C. 2941.146.  Each 
murder count included a specification under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) that the murder 
was committed during a kidnapping or robbery. 
 
Coley pleaded not guilty to the charges, and was convicted as charged, and 
the jury found both that Coley was the principal offender in the aggravated 
murder and that he committed the offense with prior calculation and design.  The 
trial court later merged the three aggravated murder Counts (IV, V, and VI).  
After a sentencing hearing, the jury recommended, and the trial judge imposed, a 
death sentence for the aggravated murder of Samar El-Okdi.  In addition to the 
death sentence, the trial court sentenced Coley to ten years on each of Counts I, II, 
III, VII, and VIII, to be served consecutively, and sentenced him on the firearm 
specifications. 
 
We have considered each of the twelve propositions of law.  We have also 
independently reviewed his death sentence, as R.C. 2929.05(A) requires, by 
reweighing the felony-murder aggravating circumstance against the mitigating 
factors and measuring the sentence in this case against sentences imposed in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
similar cases.  We conclude that Coley’s convictions and death sentence should 
be affirmed. 
I.  Pretrial Issues 
A.  Change of Venue 
 
In proposition I, Coley argues that publicity about his case was so 
pervasive that prejudice must be presumed.  He also argues that the voir dire 
reinforced his claim that this pervasive publicity prejudiced his right to a fair trial. 
 
“[T]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by 
a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.”  Irvin v. Dowd (1961), 366 U.S. 717, 
722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751, 755.  However, “pretrial publicity—
even pervasive, adverse publicity—does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.”  
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart (1976), 427 U.S. 539, 554, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2800, 
49 L.Ed.2d 683, 695. 
 
Changes in venue help protect fair trial rights.  A trial court may change 
venue “when it appears that a fair and impartial trial cannot be held” in that court.  
Crim.R. 18; R.C. 2901.12(K).  “A change of venue rests largely in the discretion 
of the trial court * * *.”  State v. Fairbanks (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 34, 37, 61 
O.O.2d 241, 243, 289 N.E.2d 352, 355.  See, also, State v. Montgomery (1991), 
61 Ohio St.3d 410, 413, 575 N.E.2d 167, 171.  However, “ ‘a careful and 
searching voir dire provides the best test of whether prejudicial pretrial publicity 
has prevented obtaining a fair and impartial jury from the locality.’ ” State v. 
Davis (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 107, 111, 666 N.E.2d 1099, 1104, quoting State v. 
Bayless (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 73, 98, 2 O.O.3d 249, 262, 357 N.E.2d 1035, 1051. 
 
Coley’s claims of error based on prejudicial pretrial publicity fail for 
several reasons.  First, Coley never moved for a change of venue and thus waived 
his right to complain on this basis.  State v. Campbell (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 
336, 738 N.E.2d 1178, 1197; State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 
O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
January Term, 2001 
9 
 
Second, the record contains little direct evidence of media interest, 
articles, or commentary on the trial.  A defense motion (which did not seek a 
change of venue) included a brief news article and a Toledo Blade editorial dated 
January 24, 1997.  It would be presumed in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary that any effect from that publicity would have dissipated by the time the 
case was tried in May 1998.  Thus, the record does not support claims of 
prejudicial pretrial publicity.  Moreover, evidence of such publicity cannot be 
introduced now.  See State v. Ishmail (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 8 O.O.3d 405, 
377 N.E.2d 500, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
Third, the trial court conducted individual voir dire of prospective jurors 
as to pretrial publicity.  Seven of the seated jurors had never read or heard 
anything about the case.  Two seated jurors had heard only news accounts that a 
jury was being selected.  Three other actual jurors had heard or read about the 
case, but each promised to decide the case solely on the evidence at trial.  Coley 
never challenged any of these jurors.  Moreover, the court excused those 
prospective jurors who indicated in individual voir dire that they had been 
affected by pretrial publicity. 
 
Fourth, the trial court repeatedly cautioned jurors during the trial not to 
read or listen to media reports.  Thus, there was no evidence that publicity about 
the case compromised the impartiality of any juror. 
 
Fifth, a decision not to change venue will not be reversed unless it is 
clearly shown that the trial court has abused its discretion.  State v. Lundgren 
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 479, 653 N.E.2d 304, 313, citing State v. Maurer 
(1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 250, 15 OBR 379, 388-389, 473 N.E.2d 768, 780.  In 
view of the voir dire, which revealed no prejudice, and the paucity of evidence as 
to pretrial publicity, Coley has not clearly shown an abuse of discretion.  See State 
v. White (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 16, 21, 693 N.E.2d 772, 777-778; State v. Bies 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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(1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 320, 324, 658 N.E.2d 754, 759.  Accordingly, we reject 
Coley’s first proposition. 
B.  Joinder of Offenses 
 
In proposition XI, Coley argues that the trial court erred by joining for 
trial, over defense objection, unrelated offenses, namely the December 1996 
offenses against Moore and the January 1997 charges relating to the aggravated 
murder of Samar El-Okdi. 
 
“The law favors joining multiple offenses in a single trial under Crim.R. 
8(A) if the offenses charged ‘are of the same or similar character.’ ”  State v. Lott 
(1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 163, 555 N.E.2d 293, 298, quoting State v. Torres 
(1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 340, 343, 20 O.O.3d 313, 315, 421 N.E.2d 1288, 1290.  
Under Crim.R. 8(A), offenses that are based on acts “connected together or 
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or are part of a course of criminal 
conduct” may also be joined. 
 
Nonetheless, “[i]f it appears that a defendant * * * is prejudiced by a 
joinder” a court may grant a severance under Crim.R. 14.  However, the 
defendant bears the burden to prove prejudice and that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying severance.  State v. Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 340, 20 O.O.3d 
313, 421 N.E.2d 1288, syllabus. 
 
“A prosecutor can use two methods to negate such claims of prejudice,” as 
noted in State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 163, 555 N.E.2d at 298.  First, if one 
offense would have been admissible under Evid.R. 404(B), no prejudice could 
have resulted from joinder.  “To be admissible to prove identity through a certain 
modus operandi, other-acts evidence must be related to and share common 
features with the crime in question.”  State v. Lowe (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 527, 
634 N.E.2d 616, paragraph one of the syllabus.  See, also, State v. Smith (1990), 
49 Ohio St.3d 137, 551 N.E.2d 190. 
January Term, 2001 
11 
 
Here, the Moore offenses were admissible under Evid.R. 404(B) to prove 
Coley’s identity as El-Okdi’s killer.  The similarities between the offenses were 
remarkable.  The carjack victims, El-Okdi and Moore, lived within a block of 
each other, and both were abducted within two weeks of each other at roughly the 
same time of day, between 7:30 and 8:15 p.m.  Both victims were driven to a 
nearby secluded area, robbed of money, shot using the same gun, and then left to 
die alone.  Green and Coley drove each car for several days after placing plates 
stolen from a similar car on the stolen car. 
 
The court has upheld the use of similar other-acts evidence in comparable 
cases.  See, e.g., State v. Green (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 369, 738 N.E.2d 1208, 
1228 (same facts, Coley’s accomplice Joseph Green); State v. Bey (1999), 85 
Ohio St.3d 487, 490, 709 N.E.2d 484, 491 (businessmen stabbed in chest with 
knife, and shoes and trousers removed); State v. Woodard (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 
70, 73, 623 N.E.2d 75, 77-78 (carjacking attempt to prove identity as to later 
carjacking and murder); State v. Jamison (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 183-187, 552 
N.E.2d 180, 182-185 (similar strong-arm robberies of stores).  See, also, State v. 
Watson (1971), 28 Ohio St.2d 15, 19-22, 57 O.O.2d 95, 97-98, 275 N.E.2d 153, 
156-157 (proof of other criminal acts allowed to prove possession of murder 
weapon); State v. Martin (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 122, 127, 19 OBR 330, 334, 483 
N.E.2d 1157, 1162 (proof of theft of victim’s weapon allowed to prove possession 
of murder weapon). 
 
Furthermore, the state can separately negate prejudice by showing that 
“evidence of each crime joined at trial is simple and direct. * * * Thus, when 
simple and direct evidence exists, an accused is not prejudiced by joinder 
regardless of” whether the evidence is admissible as other-acts evidence.  Lott, 51 
Ohio St.3d at 163, 555 N.E.2d at 298.  See, e.g., State v. Johnson (2000), 88 Ohio 
St.3d 95, 109-110, 723 N.E.2d 1054, 1068 (assaults against female neighbors); 
State v. Franklin (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 123, 580 N.E.2d 1, 6 (burglaries in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
same neighborhood).  In Coley’s case, the proof of each offense was separate and 
distinct.  The jury was not likely to be confused as to which evidence proved that 
Coley had attempted to murder Moore and which proved that he had murdered El-
Okdi. 
 
Here, the state satisfied both tests, either of which was sufficient to negate 
Coley’s claims of prejudice.  “Simple and direct” evidence was involved, and the 
evidence was admissible in any event as other-acts evidence.  In comparable 
circumstances the court has approved joinder of offenses.  In State v. Williams 
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 153, 158, 652 N.E.2d 721, 727, the court allowed a single 
trial of different robberies when the same gun was apparently used to kill a cab 
driver and assault a truck driver.  In State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 362, 
582 N.E.2d 972, 979, the court approved joinder for separate robberies, three 
months apart, against different bank branches.  See, also, State v. Lott, 51 Ohio 
St.3d at 163, 555 N.E.2d at 298. 
 
Finally, the trial court provided a limiting instruction to the jury during the 
guilt phase on the limited use of the Moore evidence to prove Coley’s identity as 
El-Okdi’s killer.  The trial court also instructed the jury in the penalty phase 
regarding the specific aggravating circumstances that the jury was to consider in 
imposing punishment for El-Okdi’s aggravated murder.  Cf. State v. Waddy 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 428, 588 N.E.2d 819, 824.  Moreover, Coley never 
objected to the instructions, nor did he claim that the jury was confused about the 
relevance of the Moore offenses.  Accordingly, we find no merit to Coley’s 
eleventh proposition of law and overrule it. 
C.  Disclosure of Grand Jury Minutes 
 
In proposition XII, Coley argues that the trial court erred in not disclosing 
grand jury minutes because Coley demonstrated a particularized need for records 
of those proceedings.  We disagree. 
January Term, 2001 
13 
 
Coley recognizes that “[g]rand jury proceedings are secret, and an accused 
is not entitled to inspect grand jury transcripts either before or during trial unless 
the ends of justice require it and there is a showing by the defense that a 
particularized need for disclosure exists which outweighs the need for secrecy.”  
State v. Greer (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 139, 20 O.O.3d 157, 420 N.E.2d 982, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  Also, “[w]hether particularized need for disclosure 
of grand jury testimony is shown is a question of fact * * *.”  Id., paragraph three 
of the syllabus.  Moreover, whether to release grand jury testimony “is within the 
discretion of the trial court.”  Id., paragraph one of the syllabus.  A decision to 
deny release will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.  State v. Brown 
(1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 308, 528 N.E.2d 523, 530. 
 
Coley argues that he demonstrated a particularized need because the grand 
jury indicted Coley for the Moore and El-Okdi offenses in a noncapital indictment 
issued in January 1997.  In March 1997, the prosecutor resubmitted the case, and 
another grand jury issued a capital indictment against Coley.  Coley was then tried 
on those new charges. 
 
However, the trial court rejected Coley’s argument that a capital 
indictment had improperly replaced the earlier noncapital indictment.  At the trial 
court hearing on the issue, Coley agreed that the fact that he had been reindicted 
did not show a particularized need.  Further, Coley agreed that he did not claim 
that prosecutorial vindictiveness was involved. 
 
At the hearing Coley showed that some police officers were unhappy that 
the first indictment was for noncapital offenses and expressed their thoughts to a 
newspaper reporter.  Thereafter, a Toledo Blade editorial questioned why Coley 
and Green had not been indicted on capital offenses.  Police investigated further 
and secured additional evidence, which was presented to a second grand jury.  A 
second indictment is not an uncommon procedure, as evidence frequently comes 
to light after an initial indictment. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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This new evidence presented to a second grand jury demonstrated that El-
Okdi had been kidnapped and robbed.  Three witnesses who had not testified 
before the first grand jury testified before the second grand jury.  Among the three 
was Frusher, who had heard shots and had seen El-Okdi’s car, along with two 
suspects, near West Grove Place at about 8:35 p.m. on January 3.  At that 
location, police found El-Okdi’s body on January 7.  Also, new evidence showed 
that El-Okdi’s purse was missing. 
 
Thus, Coley failed to show a particularized need for the grand jury 
testimony.  The subsequent capital indictment was based on additional 
investigation and new evidence, not on improper motives such as placating a 
newspaper or police department. 
 
In previous cases, this court has rejected similar generalized claims 
attempting to violate the sanctity of grand jury secrecy.  For example, in State v. 
Benge (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 136, 145, 661 N.E.2d 1019, 1028, Benge argued that 
something improper occurred in the grand jury because “he was bound over on 
charges of murder and theft but indicted” on capital charges.  The Benge court 
ruled, however, that his indictment “on elevated charges” did not show any 
particularized need and thus rejected arguments similar to those that Coley makes. 
 
In State v. Brown, 38 Ohio St.3d at 308, 528 N.E.2d at 530, the court held 
that a trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found no particularized need 
based on defense claims that the indictment was issued on insufficient evidence.  
See, also, State v. Mack (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 502, 508, 653 N.E.2d 329, 334 
(claims that a witness “fabricated his story to conceal his own involvement” were 
not sufficient); State v. Davis (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 361, 365, 528 N.E.2d 925, 
929-930 (claims that indictment was based on “illegal and incompetent evidence” 
did not establish particularized need).  See, also, State v. Stojetz (1999), 84 Ohio 
St.3d 452, 459-460, 705 N.E.2d 329, 337-338; State v. Webb (1994), 70 Ohio 
St.3d 325, 336-337, 638 N.E.2d 1023, 1034. 
January Term, 2001 
15 
 
Finally, a presumption of regularity supports prosecutorial decisions such 
as the decision in this case to present additional evidence to another grand jury.  
See United States v. Armstrong (1996), 517 U.S. 456, 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 1486, 
134 L.Ed.2d 687, 698; Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978), 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 
S.Ct. 663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604, 611.  In sum, Coley has not demonstrated that the 
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to release a record of grand jury 
proceedings.  Accordingly, we overrule Coley’s twelfth proposition. 
II.  Guilt-Phase Issues 
A.  Sufficiency of Evidence 
 
In proposition II, Coley challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the jury’s finding of prior calculation and design and argues that the 
finding of guilt as to Count IV must be set aside. 
 
In reviewing a record for sufficiency, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, 
after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 
N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 
443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.  “[T]he weight to be given the 
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the 
facts.”  State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 
212, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
As to “prior calculation and design,” no “bright-line test” exists that 
“emphatically distinguishes between the presence or absence” of “prior 
calculation and design.”  State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 20, 676 N.E.2d 
82, 89.  Yet “ ‘prior calculation and design’ is a more stringent element than the 
‘deliberate and premeditated malice’ * * * required under prior law.”  State v. 
Cotton (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 10 O.O.3d 4, 381 N.E.2d 190, paragraph one of 
the syllabus.  “Instantaneous deliberation is not sufficient * * *.”  Id., paragraph 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
two of the syllabus.  “ ‘[P]rior calculation and design’ requires ‘a scheme 
designed to implement the calculated decision to kill.’ ”  State v. D’Ambrosio 
(1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 185, 196, 616 N.E.2d 909, 918, quoting State v. Cotton, 56 
Ohio St.2d at 11, 10 O.O.3d at 6, 381 N.E.2d at 193. 
 
In this case, the facts are sufficient to show that Coley “adopted a plan to 
kill.”  See State v. Toth (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 206, 213, 6 O.O.3d 461, 465, 371 
N.E.2d 831, 836.  Green and Coley probably kidnapped El-Okdi from the street in 
front of her home, one block from where Moore was also kidnapped.  El-Okdi 
planned to spend the evening at home alone.  She had no reason to be at the 
secluded location where her body was later found.  From whatever location Coley 
and Green abducted El-Okdi, they drove her to a dead-end alley.  They had no 
reason to drive her to this out-of-the-way spot except to kill her, a fact that shows 
prior calculation and design.  Cf. State v. Ballew (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 244, 250, 
667 N.E.2d 369, 377 (victim abducted and taken to remote location). 
 
The evidence supports the jury’s finding that when Coley and Green 
arrived at this dead-end alley, Coley personally shot El-Okdi between the eyes, 
execution style, and thus was the principal offender.  Coley’s gun was the murder 
weapon.  No evidence suggests that El-Okdi, a small woman, resisted or that she 
posed a threat to Coley or Green, who were armed.  After Coley shot her, Coley 
and Green used El-Okdi’s car for several days, knowing that she could not report 
it as stolen, which is further evidence of a plan to kill.  Finally, just twelve days 
earlier, Coley, assisted by Green, had kidnapped and robbed David Moore, drove 
him to a similar deserted area, shot him several times, and left him to die. 
 
Moreover, prior calculation and design can be found even when the killer 
quickly conceived and executed the plan to kill within a few minutes.  See, e.g., 
State v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 567-568, 687 N.E.2d 685, 706 (road-
rage double homicide that quickly occurred after traffic accident); State v. Taylor, 
January Term, 2001 
17 
78 Ohio St.3d at 20-23, 676 N.E.2d at 89-91 (chance encounter in bar between 
rivals for another’s affections). 
 
In any event, the death penalty in this case does not hinge on a finding of 
prior calculation and design.  The jury found Coley guilty of two counts of 
aggravated murder based on felony-murder, and the jury also found that Coley 
was the principal offender in the murder.  The alternative of felony-murder with 
prior calculation and design was not put before the jury in the penalty phase.  
Therefore, we reject Coley’s second proposition. 
B.  Double Jeopardy 
 
In proposition IV, Coley argues that his rights against double jeopardy and 
due process were violated.  Coley argues that he “was punished three times for 
aggravated murder,” was “punished again for kidnapping and aggravated 
robbery,” and “was thus punished various times for one indivisible act.” 
 
Coley misreads the record.  The trial court merged the three murder 
charges against Coley into a single offense.  The trial jury verdict referred to one 
death penalty, and the trial court imposed only a single death penalty. 
 
Also, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy does not 
preclude a defendant from being separately punished for an aggravated murder 
and for felonies involved in that murder.  In order to commit murder, neither 
aggravated robbery nor kidnapping need be committed.  This court has repeatedly 
rejected similar double-jeopardy claims and held that aggravated murder is not an 
allied offense of similar import to an underlying aggravated robbery.  State v. 
Reynolds (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 681, 687 N.E.2d 1358, 1371; State v. Smith 
(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 117, 684 N.E.2d 668, 694.  See, also, State v. 
Bickerstaff (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 62, 10 OBR 352, 461 N.E.2d 892, syllabus. 
 
As to kidnapping, this court has also found that “aggravated murder and 
kidnapping are not allied offenses of similar import under R.C. 2941.25.”  State v. 
Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 154, 689 N.E.2d 929, 948.  See, also, State v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
Reynolds, 80 Ohio St.3d at 682, 687 N.E.2d at 1371; State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio 
St.3d 22, 32, 559 N.E.2d 464, 474; State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 
261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191, 198-199. 
 
The aggravated robbery and the kidnapping were also separate offenses 
under the facts.  Coley and Green abducted El-Okdi and drove with her to a 
secluded location.  Such prolonged restraint and substantial movement of the 
victim demonstrates a “separate animus” sufficient to permit punishment of the 
kidnapping in addition to the robbery.  State v. Logan (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 
14 O.O.3d 373, 397 N.E.2d 1345, syllabus.  Neither offense was merely 
incidental to the other offense.  Cf. State v. Reynolds, 80 Ohio St.3d at 682, 687 
N.E.2d 1358; State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 198, 15 OBR 311, 340, 
473 N.E.2d 264, 295.  Accordingly, we reject Coley’s fourth proposition. 
C.  Gruesome Photographs 
 
In proposition V, Coley argues that the trial court erred in admitting 
gruesome photographs of the victim that had “little probative value” and were 
“highly prejudicial.”  However, Coley fails to specify which photographs were 
objectionable or exactly why they were inadmissible.  The trial court admitted, 
without objection, five crime-scene photos of El-Okdi’s body and one autopsy 
photo. 
 
Since the defense counsel did not object to these photographs at trial, he 
thereby waived all but plain error.  State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d at 26, 676 
N.E.2d at 93; State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 
1364.  No outcome-determinative plain error resulted from admitting these 
exhibits in view of the other compelling evidence of guilt, including the forensic 
evidence showing that Coley’s gun was the murder weapon. 
 
Moreover, no error occurred.  In capital cases, nonrepetitive photographs, 
even if gruesome, are admissible if relevant and of probative value, as long as the 
probative value of each photograph outweighs the danger of material prejudice to 
January Term, 2001 
19 
an accused.  State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768, 
paragraph seven of the syllabus; State v. Morales (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 252, 257, 
513 N.E.2d 267, 273.  Decisions on the admissibility of photographs are “left to 
the sound discretion of the trial court.”  State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 
601, 605 N.E.2d 916, 923; State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d at 264, 15 OBR at 401, 
473 N.E.2d at 791. 
 
The five crime-scene photographs portray El-Okdi’s body in relation to 
her surroundings and from different angles and distances.  Although arguably 
gruesome, Exhibits 50 and 65 simply show El-Okdi’s clothed body in a partly 
curled position, and she appears as though she were asleep, aside from traces of 
blood.  The photographer took Exhibits 63 and 64 from a much greater distance, 
and one cannot even clearly discern that a body is shown in those photos.  
Exhibits 66 (crime scene) and 72 (coroner), which are gruesome, portray El-
Okdi’s face and clearly show the gunshot wound both before (Exhibit 66) and 
after (Exhibit 72) the wound was cleaned. 
 
These photos illustrated the testimony of detectives and the deputy coroner 
who saw the crime scene, portrayed El-Okdi’s body in relation to her 
surroundings, and Exhibits 66 and 72, portraying the wound, helped to prove the 
killer’s intent and the lack of accident or mistake.  See State v. Goodwin (1999), 
84 Ohio St.3d 331, 342, 703 N.E.2d 1251, 1261; State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio 
St.3d 144, 158-159, 694 N.E.2d 932, 949.  These photos also gave the jury an 
“appreciation of the nature and circumstances of the crimes.”  State v. Evans 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 251, 586 N.E.2d 1042, 1058.  The photos were limited 
in number, had substantial probative value and relevance, and, while some were 
gruesome, none were particularly inflammatory.  In other cases involving even 
more gruesome photographs, the court has found no abuse of discretion.  See, 
e.g., State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d at 108, 684 N.E.2d at 687; State v. Biros 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
(1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 444, 678 N.E.2d 891, 907; State v. Joseph (1995), 73 
Ohio St.3d 450, 460, 653 N.E.2d 285, 294. 
 
Finally, in addition to not objecting at the trial, Coley never objected to the 
photos that were introduced at the penalty phase.  No outcome-determinative 
plain error resulted from any penalty-phase carryover effect from these photos 
due to the insufficiency of mitigating evidence.  Thus, we reject Coley’s fifth 
proposition. 
D.  Guilt-phase Instructions 
 
In propositions III, VI, VII, and IX, Coley argues that the trial court’s 
guilt-phase jury instructions contained various deficiencies.  Coley, however, 
failed to object at trial or request specific instructions and thus waived all but 
plain error.  Crim.R. 30(A); State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 
360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus; State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 
98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, syllabus.  No alleged deficiency caused a different trial 
result or created a manifest miscarriage of justice.  State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio 
St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804.  Thus, these propositions could be 
rejected on the basis alone that no plain error was involved. 
 
Moreover, Coley’s challenges to the court’s jury instructions lack merit.  
In discussing proposition III, Coley argues that “the trial court defined prior 
calculation as the offender’s purpose to cause death.”  However, the court’s 
instructions did not equate purpose with prior calculation and design, nor did the 
instructions confuse these separate elements.  For example, the court stated: 
 
“Purpose is a decision of the mind to do an act with a conscious objective 
of producing a specific result or engaging in specific conduct.  To do an act 
purposefully is to do it intentionally and not accidentally.  Purpose and intent 
mean the same thing.  The purpose with which a person does an act is known only 
to himself unless he expresses it to others or indicates it by his conduct.” 
January Term, 2001 
21 
 
In contrast, the court explained and defined prior calculation and design 
differently.  The court instructed: 
 
“Prior calculation and design means that the purpose to cause the death 
was reached by a definite process of reasoning in advance of the homicide, which 
process of reasoning must have included a mental plan involving studied 
consideration of the method and the means and/or instrument with which to cause 
the death of another. 
 
“To constitute prior calculation, there must have been sufficient time and 
opportunity for the planning of an act of homicide and the circumstances 
surrounding the homicide must show a scheme designed to carry out the 
calculated decision to cause the death.  No definite period of time must lapse * * 
*, but acting on the spur of the moment or after momentary consideration of the 
purpose to cause the death is not sufficient.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The trial court used separate terms to explain prior calculation and design, 
such as “a definite process of reasoning in advance,” a “mental plan involving 
studied consideration of the method and the means,” “planning of an act of 
homicide,” and a “scheme designed to carry out the calculated decision.”  The 
court also noted that acting on the “spur of the moment” was not sufficient. 
 
These instructions, consistent with Ohio Jury Instructions, did not confuse 
these separate elements.  See 4 Ohio Jury Instructions (1997 and Supp. 2000), 
Section 503.01.  Nor did these instructions serve to direct a verdict on prior 
calculation and design as Coley claims.  Coley’s claim that the trial court 
confused purpose or intent with prior calculation and design lacks merit.  
Moreover, this court has previously rejected such claims.  See State v. Jones 
(2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 348, 744 N.E.2d 1163, 1178; State v. Campbell 
(2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 341, 738 N.E.2d 1178, 1200-1201.  Accordingly, we 
reject Coley’s third proposition. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
In proposition VI, Coley argues that the trial court’s jury instructions 
shifted “the burden of proof from the state by instructing the jury to deliberate on 
the innocence of the accused.”  Coley’s claim of error rests on the following guilt-
phase instruction:  “You may not discuss or consider the subject of punishment.  
Your duty is confined to the determination of the guilt or innocence of the 
Defendant * * *.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Coley’s claim of plain error from the above instruction lacks merit.  At 
most, the use of the phrase “guilt or innocence” in this limited context relating to 
punishment is totally inconsequential.  “A single instruction to a jury may not be 
judged in artificial isolation but must be viewed in the context of the overall 
charge.”  State v. Price (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 14 O.O.3d 379, 398 N.E.2d 
772, paragraph four of the syllabus, following Cupp v. Naughten (1973),  414 
U.S. 141, 146-147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368, 373. 
 
The trial court had already repeatedly instructed the jury that the state had 
the burden of proof as to each element of each offense and that if the state failed 
to meet that burden the jury must acquit.  Even considering this evidence standing 
alone, no juror would have believed that this incidental reference to “guilt or 
innocence” in this context shifted the state’s burden of proof to the accused. 
 
Moreover, this court has previously rejected complaints of prejudicial 
error arising from the use of the term “guilt or innocence” in this limited context.  
See State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 348-349, 744 N.E.2d 1163, 1179; State v. 
Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d at 341, 738 N.E.2d at 1200.  We therefore reject Coley’s 
sixth proposition. 
 
In proposition VII, Coley suggests that the trial court created an 
“unconstitutional, conclusive presumption of the mens rea element from the use 
of a deadly weapon.”  Coley argues that the court erred by not instructing that 
“any inference of intent to kill from the manner and commission of the offense is 
nonconclusive.”  Coley points to R.C. 2903.01(E), which then stated: 
January Term, 2001 
23 
 
“If a jury in an aggravated murder case is instructed that a person who 
commits or attempts to commit [a felony-murder] may be inferred, * * * because 
the offense and the manner of its commission would be likely to produce death * 
* *, to have intended to cause the death of any person who is killed * * * during 
the commission of * * * the offense, the jury shall also be instructed that the 
inference is nonconclusive, that the inference may be considered in determining 
intent, that it is to consider all evidence * * * in determining whether the person 
specifically intended to cause the death of the person killed * * *, and that the 
prosecution must prove the specific intent of the person to have caused the death * 
* * by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Emphasis added.)  147 Ohio Laws, 
6237. 
 
In fact, the trial court did instruct the jury that the inference was not 
conclusive: 
 
“If a wound is inflicted upon a person with a deadly weapon in a manner 
calculated to * * * destroy life or inflict great bodily harm, the purpose to cause 
the death may be inferred from the use of the weapon.  However, the use of a 
deadly weapon is not conclusive evidence of a purpose to cause the death of 
another.  Whether or not you draw the inference of purpose to kill from the use of 
the deadly weapon is entirely up to you.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The trial court’s instruction fully satisfied the statutory requirement that 
the jury be told that any “inference is nonconclusive.”  The court said “inferred,” 
not “presumed,” and the word “may” is permissive, not mandatory.  Further, the 
court specifically instructed the jury that “use of a deadly weapon is not 
conclusive evidence of a purpose to cause” death and “[w]hether or not you draw 
the inference of purpose to kill from the use of the deadly weapon is entirely up to 
you.”  Also, the court repeatedly advised the jury that Coley “may not be 
convicted of aggravated murder unless” the jury found “beyond a reasonable 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
doubt [that] Douglas Coley specifically intended to cause the death of Samar El-
Okdi.” 
 
Finally, this court has repeatedly rejected arguments similar to those Coley 
makes.  See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d at 342, 738 N.E.2d at 1200; 
State v. Stallings (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 291, 731 N.E.2d 159, 172; State v. 
Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 196, 702 N.E.2d 866, 883.  See, also, State v. 
Coleman (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 286, 290, 525 N.E.2d 792, 797.  We therefore 
reject Coley’s seventh proposition. 
 
In proposition IX, Coley challenges the court’s guilt-phase reasonable 
doubt instruction, which incorporated the statutory definition contained in R.C. 
2901.05.  It is our practice to rule summarily on well-settled points of law.  Thus 
we summarily overrule Coley’s ninth proposition of law on authority of State v. 
Jones (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 403, 417, 739 N.E.2d 300, 316; State v. Van Gundy 
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 230, 594 N.E.2d 604; State v. Nabozny (1978), 54 Ohio 
St.2d 195, 8 O.O.3d 181, 375 N.E.2d 784, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
III.  Penalty Instructions 
 
In proposition VIII, Coley argues that his constitutional rights were 
violated “when the legal issue of relevance is left to the jury regarding sentencing 
considerations.”  Coley argues that “the jury’s discretion was improperly guided” 
because the jury was not told exactly “what trial evidence was relevant to the 
weighing process.” Thus, Coley argues that the trial court erred by instructing the 
jury: 
 
“For purposes of this proceeding, only that testimony and evidence which 
was presented in this [first] phase that is relevant to the two aggravating 
circumstances * * * and to any of the mitigating factors * * * are to be considered 
by you.” 
 
However, Coley did not object to this instruction or request another 
instruction.  Thus, Coley waived all but plain error.  State v. Underwood (1983), 3 
January Term, 2001 
25 
Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus.  Neither plain error nor 
any other error was involved. 
 
Contrary to Coley’s complaint, the trial court focused the jury’s attention 
in the sentencing phase.  First, the court admitted only eleven exhibits from the 
guilt phase into the penalty phase.  Cf. State v. Lindsey (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 479, 
484-485, 721 N.E.2d 995, 1003 (trial court has “duty to determine the evidence 
relevant for consideration”).  The trial court admitted photos of El-Okdi without 
objection, but those were arguably relevant to the penalty phase.  See State v. 
Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 653 N.E.2d 253, syllabus; State v. DePew 
(1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 528 N.E.2d 542, paragraph one of the syllabus; State 
v. Woodard, 68 Ohio St.3d at 78, 623 N.E.2d at 81.  The trial court also admitted 
photos of the gun that killed El-Okdi; however, if this was in error, it was 
certainly harmless. 
 
Second, in the penalty phase the trial court instructed the jury that some 
“evidence and testimony” considered earlier at the guilt phase was “no longer 
relevant” for purposes of sentencing.  The court instructed the jury to consider 
only “evidence * * * presented in [the guilt] phase that is relevant to the two 
aggravating circumstances” proved earlier or to mitigating factors raised by 
Coley. 
 
Third, the trial court carefully instructed the jury regarding the aggravating 
circumstances.  The court also instructed that “the aggravated murder itself is not 
an aggravating circumstance. * * * Rather, the aggravating circumstances * * * 
are all that you will consider on the aggravation side of the scale.” 
 
Fourth, the significance to be given the evidence or exhibits was a matter 
for the jury.  “[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the 
witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.”  State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 
230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Viewing the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
penalty instructions as a whole, we therefore find that the trial court adequately 
guided the jury as to the evidence to consider in the penalty phase. 
 
Finally, this court has previously rejected similar complaints of prejudicial 
error relating to penalty-phase instructions as to “what trial evidence was relevant 
to the weighing process.”  See State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d at 349-350, 744 
N.E.2d at 1179-1180. 
IV.  Settled Constitutional Issues 
 
In proposition X, Coley challenges the constitutionality of Ohio’s death 
penalty statute, but that claim can be summarily rejected.  State v. Carter (2000), 
89 Ohio St.3d 593, 608, 734 N.E.2d 345, 358; State v. Clemons (1998), 82 Ohio 
St.3d 438, 454, 696 N.E.2d 1009, 1023; State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 
1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus.  Coley’s challenge based on international law can 
also be summarily rejected.  State v. Bey, 85 Ohio St.3d at 502, 709 N.E.2d at 
499; State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 103-104, 656 N.E.2d 643, 671.  
This international law challenge was also waived, since Coley never raised 
international issues before the trial court.  State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 
120, 22 OBR 199, 489 N.E.2d 277, syllabus; State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio 
St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
V.  Independent Sentence Evaluation 
 
In addition to ruling on Coley’s propositions of law, R.C. 2929.05(A) 
requires us to review Coley’s death sentence independently.  We must determine 
whether the evidence supports the jury’s finding of aggravating circumstances, 
whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors, and 
whether the death sentence is proportionate to those we have affirmed in similar 
cases.  Id. 
A.  Penalty-Phase Evidence 
 
Several of Coley’s relatives testified for the defense, including Karen 
Armstrong, the sister of Coley’s mother; Douglas Bell, Coley’s father; and Willie 
January Term, 2001 
27 
Austin and Martha Davis, Bell’s sisters and Coley’s aunts.  Additionally, Dr. 
Wayne Graves, a clinical psychologist, testified concerning Coley’s mother, 
Victoria Coley.  The testimony of these witnesses and the extensive documentary 
evidence confirming their testimony establishes that Coley’s upbringing can be 
described as a chaotic nightmare. 
 
Victoria Coley, Coley’s mother, was one of nine sisters.  Victoria Coley 
was hospitalized in state mental hospitals some fifteen times between 1977 (when 
Coley was two years old) to 1991.  Victoria also had extensive outpatient 
treatment when she was not institutionalized.  Victoria, who had an IQ in the 65-
68 range, was a chronic paranoid schizophrenic.  She also suffered from mixed 
substance abuse and borderline personality disorders.  When out of institutions, 
Victoria used street drugs, drank heavily, and engaged in prostitution to obtain 
money for drugs.  In 1989, Victoria was found not guilty by reason of insanity for 
the aggravated arson of her home that endangered her children. 
 
Her sister-in-law, Martha Jean Davis, described Victoria as an “oversexed 
mental patient * * * [who] wouldn’t keep her clothes on.”  She “would strip and 
run down * * * the street with no clothes on.  * * * [S]he would have sex with 
anyone, anybody, anywhere * * *.”  Victoria had sex with Davis’s ten-year-old 
son, and reportedly had sex with her own children.  When Victoria was 
institutionalized, her children stayed with relatives.  However, Coley and his older 
brother, Victor, were neglected and malnourished, whether they were with 
Victoria or relatives.  In referring to both Victoria’s family and Bell’s family, 
Davis characterized them as “all alcoholics and drug addicts.”  Children’s Service 
Bureau and other social service records concerning Victoria and her family date 
from 1975 and document the family’s horrific problems and neglect of the 
children, including Coley. 
 
Douglas Bell, Coley’s father, was not a positive father figure.  Bell went to 
prison for five years when Coley was just a few months old.  Bell lived with 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
Victoria at various times, but Bell agreed that he has served about six or seven 
prison terms and had been convicted of burglary, robbery, felonious assault, drug 
trafficking, and other offenses.  After Coley was born, Bell was usually in prison 
or involved with drugs. 
 
Karen Armstrong, Coley’s aunt, testified that Victoria’s life went downhill 
after she became involved with Bell and his family because she used drugs more 
frequently and engaged in prostitution. 
 
Willie Louise Austin, Bell’s sister, stated that her entire family of six 
brothers and four sisters was not stable.  Austin testified that she had been a 
prostitute and drug addict and that everyone in the family had been drug addicts 
or alcoholics at some point.  The children (Coley and Victor) were forced to fend 
for themselves, which is “where the panhandling and stealing and selling dope 
comes in.” 
 
Marquita Armstrong, Victoria’s sister, testified for the state and identified 
a letter Coley had written to her acknowledging that he had been taught the 
difference between right and wrong.  Coley stayed with Marquita at times in his 
childhood and attended church when he did.  Marquita admitted that her 
boyfriend sold drugs when Coley lived with her.  She also agreed that she had 
shot her boyfriend but “[n]ot for selling drugs.” 
 
Douglas Coley did not testify or make an unsworn statement to the jury.  
Although the defense presented evidence about Coley’s parents and relatives, the 
defense presented little or no direct evidence as to Coley’s character, schooling, or 
employment history.  Coley was born on August 24, 1975, and was twenty-one 
years old at the time of these offenses. 
 
Although Coley did not speak to the jury, he made an unsworn statement 
at the sentencing hearing.  Coley told the trial court that because of his upbringing 
and life, “[s]ometimes there’s no way to control how you get caught up in things * 
* *.”  Coley also sent his “condolences to the El-Okdi family for what happened 
January Term, 2001 
29 
to their daughter * * * your sister, your friend—but I’m not that monster that was 
in that alley that night.  * * * I ain’t that monster * * *.” 
B.  Sentence Evaluation 
 
After independent assessment, we find that the evidence is sufficient to 
prove the aggravating circumstances, i.e., that Coley committed aggravated 
murder, as the principal offender, in the course of committing kidnapping and 
aggravated robbery. 
 
The nature and circumstances of the offense reveal nothing of mitigating 
value.  Coley, assisted by Green, kidnapped and robbed El-Okdi, an innocent 
young woman, and then drove with her in her own car to a deserted area, where 
Coley shot her between the eyes.  Then Coley and Green left her to die, alone and 
uncared for, on a January night. 
 
Upon a review of the evidence presented in mitigation, we find that 
Coley’s background is entitled to some weight in mitigation.  The defense 
presented strong, credible evidence that Coley’s history and background involved 
a chaotic, nightmarish upbringing by a mother with very serious mental problems 
and a father who was in prison most of the time.  Moreover, the extended family 
of Victoria and Bell, who cared for Coley and his brother when his mother and 
father were institutionalized, offered no better care.  Coley’s history and 
background are worthy of mitigating value because he faced overwhelming 
obstacles throughout his childhood and youth.  No evidence was presented as to 
Coley’s character. 
 
Coley’s age of twenty-one at the time of the offenses is a mitigating factor 
under R.C. 2929.04(B)(4).  No evidence in the record supports other statutory 
mitigating factors. 
 
Once again, as we have been in a number of death penalty cases, we are 
presented with a record that contains evidence of unrelenting, shocking abuse of a 
child by adults, including a parent.  However, after weighing the aggravating 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
circumstances against the mitigating evidence, we find that the aggravating 
circumstances of murder in the course of robbery and kidnapping outweigh the 
mitigation evidence of Coley’s young age and deprived childhood. 
 
The death penalty imposed against Coley is also appropriate and 
proportionate when compared with other aggravated murders involving either 
kidnapping or aggravated robbery.  See, e.g., State v. Moore (1998), 81 Ohio 
St.3d 22, 44, 689 N.E.2d 1, 20; State v. Henness (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 53, 69, 
679 N.E.2d 686, 700; State v. Cook (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 531, 605 N.E.2d 
70, 85; and State v. Roe (1989), 41 Ohio St.3d 18, 28-29, 535 N.E.2d 1351, 1363. 
C.  Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions.  Finding the death 
penalty appropriate and proportionate, we affirm the sentence of death. The 
judgment of the court of common pleas is hereby affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, Dean P. Mandross, 
Eric A. Baum and Gary G. Cook, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
Joseph A. Benavidez, for appellant. 
__________________