Case Title: Ogunde v. Prison Health Services

Citation: 

Docket Number: 061121

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
OLUDARE OGUNDE 
 
v.  Record No. 061121     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
June 8, 2007 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES,  
INC., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENSVILLE COUNTY 
Samuel E. Campbell, Judge 
 
 
Prison Health Services, Inc. (PHS) provides medical 
services to persons incarcerated at certain state correctional 
centers, including Greensville Correctional Center, pursuant 
to a contract with the Virginia Department of Corrections 
(VDOC).  In 2005, Oludare Ogunde was an inmate at Greensville 
Correctional Center.  Acting pro se, Ogunde filed a motion for 
judgment against PHS and its employees Katie M. Hamlin, 
Benjamin Ellis, Joan Hill, RN, and Doctors Amjad Mughal and 
Nagash Tesemma (the Employees or the PHS Employees).1  In his 
complaint, Ogunde alleged that he suffered from a skin 
condition diagnosed as "severe acne cysts and acne 
keloidalis," and that this condition was aggravated by 
shaving.  According to the complaint, PHS and the Employees 
denied Ogunde proper medical treatment for his skin condition 
                     
1 Ogunde also brought a claim against a "Dr. Stephens."  
Dr. Stephens was never served and is not a party to this 
appeal. 
 
2
and failed to issue him an exemption from VDOC's inmate 
grooming policy.2 
 
Ogunde's complaint identified seven claims for relief 
against PHS and the Employees:  negligence or gross 
negligence; intentional infliction of emotional distress; 
medical malpractice; breach of contract; cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of Section 9, Article I of the 
Constitution of Virginia; and a violation of his 
constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.  Ogunde sought, inter alia, compensatory 
damages and an injunction requiring PHS and the Employees to 
provide him medical treatment and to issue him an exemption 
from the inmate grooming policy. 
The trial court dismissed Ogunde's negligence, gross 
negligence and medical malpractice claims, finding that PHS 
and the Employees were employees or agents of the 
Commonwealth, not independent contractors, and as such were 
entitled to sovereign immunity.  The trial court also 
dismissed the breach of contract claim finding that there was 
                     
2 VDOC's Operating Procedure prohibits male inmates from 
wearing goatees or beards.  It provides, however, that if an 
inmate "has a medical condition that is aggravated by shaving 
or complete removal of facial hair, the offender must receive 
a 'no shave' medical order from the institutional medical 
authority.  Offenders who have a 'no shave' medical order must 
continually trim all facial hair to not exceed 1/4" in 
length." 
 
3
no privity; sustained PHS's and the Employees' demurrer to the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action; 
and dismissed Ogunde's state and federal constitutional 
claims.  In addition, the trial court denied Ogunde's motions 
to amend his motion for judgment and to add the Commonwealth 
and another PHS physician as party defendants.  We awarded 
Ogunde an appeal and, for the reasons stated below, we will 
affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial 
court and remand the case for further proceedings. 
I.  DISMISSED CLAIMS 
A.  Medical Malpractice 
 
We begin by reviewing the trial court's dismissal of 
Ogunde's claims of medical malpractice based on its 
determination that PHS and the Employees were entitled to 
sovereign immunity because they were not independent 
contractors.3 
 
In Epperson v. DeJarnette, 164 Va. 482, 486, 180 S.E. 
412, 413 (1935), we defined the term "independent contractor" 
as 
a person who is employed to do a piece of work without 
restriction as to the means to be employed, and who 
employs his own labor and undertakes to do the work 
according to his own ideas, or in accordance with plans 
                     
3 The trial court concluded that Ogunde's claims of 
negligence were in fact medical malpractice claims, and thus 
limited Ogunde's negligence claim to "medical negligence."  
Ogunde has not appealed this determination. 
 
4
furnished by the person for whom the work is done, to 
whom the owner looks only for results. 
 
If a person meets this definition, an independent contractor 
relationship exists and sovereign immunity is unavailable.  
Atkinson v. Sachno, 261 Va. 278, 283-84, 541 S.E.2d 902, 904-
05 (2001). 
We have previously recognized "that there are abundant 
tests and criteria that can be used to determine whether the 
relationship between the individual and the Commonwealth is 
that of an independent contractor or an employee."  Id. at 
284, 541 S.E.2d at 905.  In each case, however, "the 
individual circumstances . . . play an important part in 
answering the query."  The Texas Co. v. Zeigler, 177 Va. 557, 
566, 14 S.E.2d 704, 707 (1941).  In determining whether 
physicians are employees or independent contractors, we have 
included the following four factors:  (1) selection and 
engagement; (2) payment of compensation; (3) power of 
dismissal; and (4) power to control the individual's work.  
See, e.g., Atkinson, 261 Va. at 284-85, 541 S.E.2d at 905; 
Hadeed v. Medic-24, Ltd., 237 Va. 277, 288, 377 S.E.2d 589, 
594-95 (1989); Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 418-19, 290 
S.E.2d 825, 832 (1982).  Although all these factors are 
relevant, the fourth factor, "the power of control" is 
determinative.  Atkinson, 261 Va. at 284-85, 541 S.E.2d at 
 
5
905; Naccash, 223 Va. at 418-19, 290 S.E.2d at 832.  We apply 
this analysis to the facts of this case.4 
 
PHS and the Employees provided medical services to Ogunde 
and other Greensville inmates pursuant to a contract with 
VDOC.5  The contract required PHS to "provide all medical, 
dental, and mental health services" at several Virginia 
correctional centers including Greensville.  PHS was to render 
these services in accordance with certain policies set forth 
by VDOC, including the inmate grooming policy.  PHS and the 
Employees argue the trial court correctly held that they were 
not independent contractors under Atkinson, because the 
contract did not allow them to control the "means and methods 
used . . . to exercise [their] required professional skill and 
judgment."  Atkinson, 261 Va. at 283, 541 S.E.2d at 904.  
Specifically, PHS and the Employees rely on provisions of the 
contract that they contend allow VDOC to pre-approve all 
personnel employed or subcontracted by PHS to deliver care, 
and require PHS to remove any of its employees with whom VDOC 
is dissatisfied if attempts to reach a resolution are 
                     
4 The PHS and the Employees agree that they are not 
employees of VDOC but maintain that they are VDOC's agents.  
We make no distinction between employees and agents in the 
application of this test to determine independent contractor 
status. 
5 At oral argument, Ogunde abandoned his argument that the 
trial court inappropriately relied on the contract, and agreed 
 
6
unsuccessful.  They also argue that the contract specifies the 
"circumstances and conditions under which PHS may authorize 
overtime hours for its employees [and] dictates the number of 
personnel that must be employed to prevent shortages," and 
sets forth where inmates may be hospitalized for inpatient 
care, the methods of delivering off-site medical care, and 
where PHS must purchase medications and the medications to be 
prescribed for certain illnesses. 
Many of the contract provisions which PHS and the 
Employees recite relate to issues of security attaching to 
penal institutions, not to the provision of medical services.  
The pre-approval of PHS's employees, for example, involves 
clearance from VDOC based on a background investigation 
including a criminal records check.  Furthermore, in this 
context, restrictions such as location for the provision of 
medical treatment are not dispositive in resolving the 
question whether PHS and the Employees are independent 
contractors.  The provisions cited for restricting the 
medications that can be prescribed are in an amendment to the 
contract, which sets forth a list of 25 medications for use in 
the treatment of HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis C.  This amendment, 
                                                                
the contract is dispositive of whether PHS and the Employees 
are independent contractors. 
 
7
however, is not applicable to treatment at Greensville 
Correctional Center. 
 
What is crucial to the independent contractor analysis is 
that the contract specifically charges PHS with supervising 
the work of its own employees and any subcontractors: 
The Contractor [PHS] shall be responsible for 
completely supervising and directing the work under 
this contract and all subcontractors that he may 
utilize, using his best skill and attention.  
Subcontractors who perform work under this contract 
shall be responsible to the prime Contractor.  The 
Contractor agrees that he is as fully responsible 
for the acts and omissions of his subcontractors 
and of persons employed by them as he is for the 
acts and omissions of his own employees. 
 
Thus, as set forth in this provision, the actual work to be 
performed under the contract – the rendering of medical 
services to inmates – remains under the control of PHS.  The 
contract provisions related to staffing cited by PHS and the 
Employees do not undermine this control.  For instance, 
although the contract sets forth staffing requirements, PHS 
has the responsibility to "manage its workforce so that there 
is sufficient staffing on each and every shift at each 
institution in order to assure the delivery of both routine 
and emergency health care services to all inmates at all 
times."  In short, PHS supervises and directs its employees, 
not VDOC. 
 
8
The contract to provide medical services was executed in 
response to VDOC's request for proposals under the Virginia 
Public Procurement Act, and was the result of a competitive 
bidding process.  Based on that fact and on our review of the 
contract, we hold that PHS and the Employees are independent 
contractors.  Therefore the trial court erred in concluding 
that PHS and the Employees were entitled to sovereign 
immunity.  Accordingly, we will reverse that portion of the 
trial court's judgment dismissing Ogunde's medical malpractice 
claims on this basis.6 
B.  Breach of Contract 
 
Ogunde also assigns error to the trial court's dismissal 
of his breach of contract claim because he was not in privity 
with PHS.  Ogunde argues that he is an intended third party 
beneficiary of the contract between PHS and VDOC and, as such, 
entitled to sue for breach of the contract. 
It is well established that "under certain circumstances, 
a party may sue to enforce the terms of a contract even though 
he is not a party to the contract."  Levine v. Selective Ins. 
                     
6 Ogunde also assigns error to the trial court's dismissal 
of his gross negligence claim, which was apparently dismissed 
as a result of the trial court's determination that PHS and 
the Employees were entitled to sovereign immunity.  Reversal 
of that holding and reinstatement of the medical malpractice 
claim necessarily reinstates Ogunde's claim of gross 
negligence and we therefore need not address Ogunde's 
assignment of error on this issue. 
 
9
Co. of Am., 250 Va. 282, 285, 462 S.E.2d 81, 83 (1995); Code 
§ 55-22.  "The essence of a third-party beneficiary's claim is 
that others have agreed between themselves to bestow a benefit 
upon the third party but one of the parties to the agreement 
fails to uphold his portion of the bargain."  Copenhaver v. 
Rogers, 238 Va. 361, 367, 384 S.E.2d 593, 596 (1989).  In 
accordance with this principle, we have allowed third parties 
to sue on contracts where "the third party . . . show[s] that 
the parties to the contract clearly and definitely intended it 
to confer a benefit upon him."  Ward v. Ernst & Young, 246 Va. 
317, 330, 435 S.E.2d 628, 634 (1993) (quoting Professional 
Realty Corp. v. Bender, 216 Va. 737, 739, 222 S.E.2d 810, 812 
(1976)). 
The contract between PHS and VDOC states that its purpose 
is to "provide cost effective, quality inmate health care 
services for up to approximately 6,000 inmates (initially) 
housed at four correctional center facilities," including 
Greensville.  The contract then sets forth the scope of health 
care services to be provided to the inmates.  Ogunde is one of 
these inmates and PHS's performance under the contract renders 
a direct benefit to Ogunde.  The contract thus "clearly and 
definitely" indicates that PHS and VDOC intended to provide a 
benefit to, among others, Ogunde.  Bender, 216 Va. at 739, 222 
S.E.2d at 812. 
 
10
 
PHS and the Employees argue that Ogunde is not an 
intended beneficiary but merely an "incidental" beneficiary of 
the contract because if he ceases to be an inmate at 
Greensville, the contract, and the duties imposed on PHS, will 
remain intact.  As an incidental beneficiary, Ogunde does not 
have standing to enforce the contract according to PHS and the 
Employees. 
We disagree with the proposition that Ogunde is an 
incidental beneficiary.  The status of an intended third party 
beneficiary does not depend upon permanent membership in the 
class of persons entitled to receive the benefit of the 
contract.  In Moorman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 207 Va. 
244, 148 S.E.2d 874 (1966), we held that a person injured 
while riding as a passenger in a motor vehicle was entitled to 
recover pursuant to an insurance policy held by the owner of 
the vehicle, which obligated the insurer to pay for medical 
expenses incurred by any person "while occupying" the insured 
vehicle.  We reasoned that the insurance policy had the effect 
of placing the injured person "in the position of a third 
party beneficiary, and as such, [the injured person] has in 
Virginia a statutory right to maintain an action on the 
contract in his own name."  Id. at 248, 148 S.E.2d at 877.  We 
reached this conclusion despite the fact that once the injured 
person was no longer a passenger in the vehicle, she ceased to 
 
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be a member of the class of persons who would benefit from the 
contract, which would remain in force, subject to its other 
provisions.  Accord Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250-51 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979) (reversing dismissal 
of inmate's breach of contract claim because contract between 
prison and the county to provide transportation of prisoners 
"indicates that Owens, as a federal prisoner, was intended to 
benefit from the agreement"). 
Accordingly, we hold that Ogunde was a third party 
beneficiary of the contract between PHS and VDOC and the trial 
court erred by dismissing Ogunde's breach of contract claim. 
C.  State Constitutional Claim 
Ogunde alleged that the failure to provide appropriate 
medical treatment was cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of Art. I, § 9 of the Constitution of Virginia.  In 
response to this claim, PHS and the Employees originally 
asserted that the claim was barred by the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel.  PHS and the Employees 
subsequently withdrew their objections on these grounds.  The 
dismissal order does not recite the basis for dismissal of the 
constitutional claim. 
On appeal, PHS and the Employees argue that the trial 
court was justified in dismissing Ogunde's constitutional claim 
because Ogunde failed to comply with the Virginia Prisoner 
 
12
Litigation Reform Act (VPLRA), Code §§ 8.01-689, et seq.  PHS 
and the Employees assert that Code § 8.01-694 of the VPLRA 
requires a prisoner to submit documentation or affidavits to 
support his claim, and that failure to do so allows the trial 
court to dismiss the pleading sua sponte. 
Code § 8.01-694 does not require dismissal of a 
prisoner's claim if the prisoner has not attached all 
supporting documentation to the complaint.  Rather, the 
provision simply describes circumstances which "may" result in 
the dismissal of the claim.  Nothing in the VPLRA changes the 
rules governing pleadings and motions in Virginia.  The Act 
does not require the filing of additional documentation or 
affidavits with a pleading.  Regardless whether a trial court 
believes a claim brought by a pro se prisoner may ultimately 
fail, at the pleading stage the trial court is bound by the 
same procedures, rules and policies which apply to a party 
represented by counsel.  The VPLRA does not provide courts or 
defendants with a mechanism to disregard these procedures in a 
suit brought by a pro se prisoner, and we reject the 
application of the Act suggested by PHS and the Employees.  In 
this case, there is nothing in the record to support the 
dismissal of Ogunde's constitutional claim at the pleading 
stage, and we accordingly reverse that portion of the trial 
court's judgment. 
 
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D.  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Ogunde challenges the trial court's action sustaining 
PHS's and the Employees' demurrer to his claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  A demurrer tests the legal 
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint.  
Sanchez v. Medicorp Health Sys., 270 Va. 299, 303, 618 S.E.2d 
331, 333 (2005).  In reviewing a demurrer, a trial court must 
consider the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff and sustain the demurrer if it is clear that the 
plaintiff has not stated a valid cause of action.  Id.  To 
survive a demurrer as to the instant claim, a plaintiff must 
allege:  "1) the wrongdoer's conduct was intentional or 
reckless; 2) the conduct was outrageous or intolerable; 3) 
there was a causal connection between the wrongdoer's conduct 
and the resulting emotional distress; and 4) the resulting 
emotional distress was severe."  Almy v. Grisham, 273 Va. 68, 
77, 639 S.E.2d 182, 186 (2007). 
Ogunde alleged in his complaint that PHS and the 
Employees denied him treatment and refused to recommend he be 
exempted from the grooming policy because they believed the 
importance of Ogunde's compliance with the grooming policy 
outweighed any medical need for an exemption and because they 
erroneously believed "they lack[ed] authority to make such a 
recommendation."  Assuming the truth of the allegations, the 
 
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conduct is not so intolerable or outrageous such that it 
"offends against the generally accepted standards of decency 
and morality."  Jordan v. Shands, 255 Va. 492, 498, 500 S.E.2d 
215, 219 (1998)(quoting Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 
210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974)).  And, while Ogunde did allege 
that their conduct was both intentional and reckless, we are 
not bound to accept conclusory allegations in a review of a 
demurrer to an intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim.  Id. at 499, 500 S.E.2d at 219 (plaintiff failed to 
plead cause of action for emotional distress where her 
allegations were "merely conclusional" and did not set forth 
any specific conduct by defendants); Russo v. White, 241 Va. 
23, 28, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1991)(the court is not "bound by 
such conclusory allegations" in considering demurrer to 
infliction of emotional distress claim).  Accordingly, we find 
no error by the trial court in sustaining the demurrer. 
II.  DENIAL OF MOTIONS TO AMEND AND TO ADD NEW PARTIES 
 
Following the trial court's ruling sustaining the 
demurrer to Ogunde's intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claim, dismissing his breach of contract claim, and 
consolidating his negligence claims with his medical 
malpractice claim, discovery continued and PHS and the 
Employees filed their pleas of sovereign immunity.  In 
response, Ogunde filed two motions, one to add the 
 
15
Commonwealth as a party defendant and a second to amend his 
motion for judgment to "cure the imperfections" in his prior 
pleading and to add new counts and a claim for punitive 
damages.  Ogunde asserted the amendments resulted from matters 
arising in discovery and that PHS and the Employees would not 
be prejudiced by allowing the proposed amendments.  A copy of 
the amended motion for judgment was attached to the motions to 
amend.  PHS and the Employees did not file any written 
opposition to the proposed amendments.  Following a hearing, 
the trial court denied Ogunde's motions, granted the sovereign 
immunity plea, and dismissed Ogunde's motion for judgment.  
Ogunde has assigned error to the trial court's denial of his 
motions to amend. 
 
Ogunde's stated reason for adding the Commonwealth as a 
party and including a claim under the Virginia Tort Claims Act 
was in response to PHS's and the Employees' claim of sovereign 
immunity.  In light of our holding that PHS and the Employees 
are independent contractors and not entitled to sovereign 
immunity, these amendments are no longer necessary and we need 
not address Ogunde's arguments directed to that part of the 
trial court's ruling. 
 
PHS and the Employees raise a number of arguments in 
support of the trial court's exercise of its discretion in 
denying the remaining amendments.  They again assert that 
 
16
Ogunde did not satisfy the pleading requirements of the VPLRA 
because he did not provide "written documentation to support 
his claim."  We have already rejected that construction of 
Code § 8.01-694 and reject it again here as a basis for 
refusing the amendments sought.  PHS and the Employees also 
claim that certain counts were barred by the statute of 
limitations and that venue was improper.  These arguments may 
be defenses to the claims but were not resolved by the trial 
court, and thus are not appropriate as a basis for denying the 
amendments.  
 
Whether to grant leave to amend pleadings is a matter 
within the sound discretion of the trial court.  Kole v. City 
of Chesapeake, 247 Va. 51, 57, 439 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1994).  
"Leave to amend shall be liberally granted in furtherance of 
the ends of justice."  Rule 1:8.  Ogunde had not previously 
sought to amend his motion for judgment and filed this request 
in a timely manner, following the relevant rulings of the 
trial court and the conclusion of discovery.  Nothing in the 
amendments suggests that PHS and the Employees would have been 
prejudiced by allowing the amendments.  Under these 
circumstances, Ogunde provided good cause to seek to amend his 
complaint.  See Ford Motor Co. v. Benitez, 273 Va. 242, 252, 
639 S.E.2d 203, 208 (2007); Mortarino v. Consultant Eng'g 
Servs., 251 Va. 289, 295-96, 467 S.E.2d 778, 782 (1996).  
 
17
Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to allow Ogunde to file his amended 
motion for judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, we hold that the trial court erred in holding 
that PHS and the Employees were entitled to sovereign immunity 
and in dismissing Ogunde's medical malpractice and gross 
negligence claims on that basis, and in dismissing Ogunde's 
claims for breach of contract and violation of Article I, § 9 
of the Constitution of Virginia.  We further hold that the 
trial court abused its discretion by denying Ogunde leave to 
amend his complaint.  We find no error by the trial court in 
sustaining the demurrer to Ogunde's claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm in part and reverse in 
part the circuit court's judgment and remand the case for 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Affirmed in part,  
reversed in part,  
 
 
 
 
 
 and remanded.