Case Title: Scales v. Lewis

Citation: 

Docket Number: 000959

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-03-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
EDITH S. SCALES 
 
 
 
OPINION BY  
v.  Record No. 000959 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
 
March 2, 2001 
ALLEN N. LEWIS, JR., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
James B. Wilkinson, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we determine whether the trial court erred 
in granting (1) a plea of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
in favor of one defendant and (2) a plea of judicial estoppel in 
favor of two other defendants. 
I 
 
On August 13, 1998, Edith S. Scales filed an action against 
Allen N. Lewis, Jr., and also against Dwayne E. Spann and Cal-
Ark International, Inc., Spann's employer (collectively, Spann).  
Scales sought recovery for damages for personal injuries 
sustained in a motor vehicle collision that occurred on April 
10, 1997.  Lewis filed a plea of res judicata and/or collateral 
estoppel, and Spann filed a plea of judicial estoppel.  The 
trial judge granted both pleas and entered final judgments in 
favor of all defendants.  We awarded Scales this appeal. 
II 
 
Prior to the present case, Government Employees Insurance 
Company (GEICO), Scales' insurer, filed a subrogation action 
against Lewis on September 11, 1997, in the Henrico County 
General District Court.  Pursuant to Code § 38.2-207, the action 
was filed in Scales' name.  GEICO sought to recover from Lewis 
monies it had paid to Scales under the uninsured motorist 
provisions of its insurance policy issued to Scales. 
 
GEICO alleged that it had paid Scales $494.65 for property 
damages Scales had sustained in the April 10, 1997 collision.  
GEICO further alleged that Lewis, an uninsured motorist, had 
negligently operated his motor vehicle and that his negligence 
was a proximate cause of Scales' damages.  Lewis denied that he 
had been negligent and alleged that Scales was guilty of 
negligence which barred GEICO's recovery. 
 
In the trial of the present case, the defendants presented 
the following record from the general district court:  (1) the 
warrant in debt, (2) the bill of particulars filed by GEICO, and 
(3) the grounds of defense filed by Lewis.  The defendants did 
not present a transcript of the proceedings. 
 
The warrant in debt form offered in the present case, in 
the section entitled "Case Disposition," provided spaces for 
four possible decisions by the general district court.  The 
court could have, by marking the appropriate box, entered 
judgment for the plaintiff, entered judgment for the defendant, 
declared a non-suit, or dismissed the case.  The general 
district court did not enter judgment for either the plaintiff 
 
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or the defendant; instead, the court marked the case 
"DISMISSED." 
III 
 
We first consider whether the trial court erred in granting 
Lewis' pleas of res judicata and collateral estoppel.  The 
doctrine of res judicata precludes parties from relitigating the 
same cause of action when a valid, final judgment was previously 
entered.  Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 670-71, 202 S.E.2d 917, 
920-21 (1974).  The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes 
parties to a prior action from litigating in a subsequent action 
any factual issue that was actually litigated and essential to a 
valid, final judgment in the prior action.  For the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel to apply, the following requirements must be 
established: 
(1) the parties to the prior and subsequent 
proceedings, or their privies, must be the same, (2) 
the factual issue sought to be litigated actually must 
have been litigated in the prior action, (3) the 
factual issue must have been essential to the judgment 
in the prior proceeding, and (4) the prior action must 
have resulted in a judgment that is valid, final, and 
against the party against whom the doctrine is sought 
to be applied.  In addition to these elements, there 
also must be "mutuality," i.e., a litigant cannot 
invoke collateral estoppel unless he would have been 
bound had the litigation of the issue in the prior 
action reached the opposite result. 
Angstadt v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 249 Va. 444, 446-47, 457 
S.E.2d 86, 87 (1995) (citations omitted). 
 
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It is firmly established that the party who asserts the 
defenses of res judicata or collateral estoppel has the burden 
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim or 
issue is precluded by a prior judgment.  Bates, 214 Va. at 671, 
202 S.E.2d at 921.  In order to prove that a claim or issue is 
precluded by a former adjudication, "'the record of the prior 
action must be offered in evidence.'"  Bernau v. Nealon, 219 Va. 
1039, 1041, 254 S.E.2d 82, 84 (1979) (quoting Burk's Pleading 
and Practice § 357 at 675 (4thed. 1952)).  Thus, "consideration 
of facts outside of and not made a part of the record is 
improper."  Id. at 1041-42, 254 S.E.2d at 84. 
 
In the present case, Lewis asserted the defenses of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel, and, therefore, he had the 
burden of proving that the claim or question had been in issue 
and determined in the prior subrogation action.  See Feldman v. 
Rucker, 201 Va. 11, 18, 109 S.E.2d 379, 384 (1959).  Scales 
contends that Bernau required Lewis to offer into evidence a 
transcript of the proceedings in the general district court.  We 
do not agree.  While a transcript might be useful, it is not 
essential in every case.  For example, a general district court 
could enter an order that contains a detailed summary of the 
proceedings or, if requested by a party, sign a statement of 
facts. 
 
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Nevertheless, although Lewis offered into evidence the 
record of the general district court, we conclude that the 
record is insufficient to establish res judicata or collateral 
estoppel.  To the contrary, the record in the prior matter shows 
that the general district court did not enter a valid, final 
judgment against Scales, the party against whom the doctrines 
were sought to be applied in the present case.  Consequently, we 
hold that the trial court erred in ruling that Scales' action 
against Lewis is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
IV 
 
We next consider whether the trial court erred in granting 
Spann's plea of judicial estoppel.  Spann contends that, because 
GEICO elected to proceed only against Lewis in the general 
district court, Scales is "judicially estopped from alleging, 
inconsistently, that Spann . . . [was] a direct and proximate 
cause of the accident."  Spann further contends that, pursuant 
to Burch v. Grace Street Bldg. Corp., 168 Va. 329, 340, 191 S.E. 
672, 677 (1937), Scales is prohibited from "asserting 
inconsistent or mutually contradictory positions in the course 
of successive lawsuits with respect to the same fact or set of 
facts."  We do not agree that the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
applies in the present case. 
 
In the general district court, GEICO alleged in its bill of 
particulars that the damage to Scales' automobile was "a direct 
 
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and proximate result" of Lewis' negligence.  (Emphasis added.)  
GEICO did not claim, as Spann incorrectly asserts, that Lewis' 
negligence was the proximate cause of Scales' damages.  Thus, 
Scales has not taken inconsistent positions and is not precluded 
from proceeding against Spann in the present case.  See Code 
§ 8.01-443 ("A judgment against one of several joint wrongdoers 
shall not bar the prosecution of an action against any or all 
others, but the injured party may bring separate actions against 
the wrongdoers and proceed to judgment in each.")  Consequently, 
we hold that the trial court erred in ruling that Scales' action 
against Spann is barred by judicial estoppel. 
V 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the trial 
court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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