Case Title: People v. A Parcel of Property Commonly Known as 1945 North 31st Street, Decatur, Macon County, Illinois

Citation: 

Docket Number: 99941

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2005-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 99941-Agenda 16-September 2005.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. A

PARCEL OF PROPERTY COMMONLY KNOWN AS 1945

NORTH 31ST STREET, DECATUR, MACON COUNTY, 							
ILLINOIS (Moises Luna et al., Appellants).
Opinion filed December 15, 2005.
 
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Pursuant to the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (Forfeiture
Act) (725 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2002)), the State initiated civil
forfeiture proceedings in the circuit court of Macon County against
several parcels of real estate. Claimants, Moises and Ramona De
Luna, answered. At the close of a hearing, the circuit court entered an
order of forfeiture. A divided appellate court affirmed the order of the
circuit court. No. 4-03-0917 (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23). We allowed claimants' petition for leave to appeal
(177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and now affirm the judgment of the appellate
court.

BACKGROUND
	In January 2003, the State filed a complaint for forfeiture of a
single family residence at 1945 North 31st Street in Decatur, and two
vacant and unimproved lots, known as lots 214 and 215 in
Meadowlark Fourth Addition, Macon County. Claimants are the
owners of record of the property. However, the State alleged that this
real estate was actually owned by claimants' son, Miguel Luna, and
was related to felony drug offenses that he committed. According to
the complaint, Miguel provided $40,000 cash as a down payment on
the property at 1945 North 31st Street and was the true owner of the
premises. This property was placed in the name of claimants "in an
attempt to hide the identity of the true owner in the event that Miguel
Luna would be caught dealing drugs." Further, according to the
complaint: "Nearly all of Miguel Luna's property [was] held in the
name of [claimants] for the same reason." The State alleged,
therefore, that the real estate was subject to forfeiture under the
Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/12(a) (West 2002)) or the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/505(a) (West
2002)).
	Claimants filed a claim to the real estate, and each filed an answer
responding to the State's allegations. Claimants each stated that the
funds for their real estate came from a sale of property in Mexico and
from loans from several individuals. Ramona additionally claimed that
the 1945 N. 31st Street residence was the homestead of her and
Moises and that they held title as tenants by the entirety.
	The circuit court held a hearing on the complaint for forfeiture.
Both sides presented testimony, which the court heard for four days
interspersed between March and June 2003. The court did not make
any findings prior to hearing all of the evidence.
	At the hearing, Decatur police Detective David Dailey testified
that the Decatur police department began an investigation into the
suspected drug dealing of a man subsequently identified as Miguel
Luna. Dailey coordinated the investigation and oversaw a surveillance
team consisting of officers and detectives from the Decatur police
department.
	Detective Dailey's unit conducted surveillance on Miguel from
March to November 2002. The surveillance team followed Miguel,
observed his activities, checked the license plates of his vehicles, and
established an observation post near his residence. Pursuant to this
investigation, the team discovered that Miguel was using the name
Jose T. Cervantes and living in a mobile home at 2299 North 37th
Street in Decatur. A 1996 Nissan Altima was registered to a Jose T.
Cervantes of that same address. During the investigation, the
surveillance team also observed Miguel operate a 1995 Chevrolet
Lumina, which was registered to a Jose T. Cervantes. The address
listed in this registration was that of a mobile home next door to
where Miguel resided. The surveillance team also observed Miguel
operate a Chevrolet pickup truck registered to a Tina and Felipe
Herrera. In late October or early November 2002, Miguel moved into
the house in question in this case, at 1945 North 31st Street. The
surveillance team did not learn of Miguel's true identity until he was
arrested on November 20, 2002.
	Claimant Moises was first observed by the surveillance team on
November 19, 2002. On that day, at approximately 7 p.m., Moises
arrived at the 1945 North 31st Street home, driving the Nissan Altima.
He backed into the driveway, where the Chevrolet Lumina was
already parked, such that the trunks of the Altima and the Lumina
were back-to-back. Moises subsequently removed items from the
trunk of the Lumina and placed them in the trunk of the Altima. When
a member of the surveillance team drove past the house, Moises
quickly closed the trunk of the Altima. Police then followed Moises
as he drove the Altima to the mobile home at 2299 North 37th Street.
There, Moises removed from the trunk two white plastic bags from
the trunk of the car and carried them into the mobile home.
	On November 20, 2002, at approximately 2 p.m., Miguel left the
1945 North 31st Street home and drove the Lumina to the mobile
home at 2299 North 37th Street. Dailey testified that surveillance
team members saw Miguel "messing around" with items inside a small
storage shed located directly outside the front door of the trailer.
Miguel then entered the mobile home. A short time later, he exited the
mobile home carrying two white plastic bags that were consistent in
appearance with the white plastic bags that Moises had carried into
the mobile home the previous night. Miguel placed the bags in the
passenger compartment of the Lumina.
	After following Miguel for a while, the surveillance team
conducted a traffic stop of Miguel's vehicle. He presented an Illinois
driver's license in the name of Jose T. Cervantes with the address of
2295 North 37th Street. A search of the vehicle recovered a digital
scale and approximately 54 pounds of cannabis in the compartment
area and the trunk. Some of the cannabis was contained in a white
plastic bag similar to the bags Moises and Miguel had carried, and the
remainder was contained in a duffel bag. Police arrested Miguel and
placed him in the backseat of a squad car to be transported to jail.
After his arrival at the station, police searched the backseat of that
squad car and discovered 7.7 grams of cocaine in the backseat.
	During the arrest, officers asked Miguel where he resided. He
initially responded that he resided in the mobile home located at 2299
North 37th Street. However, upon further questioning, he stated that
he was Miguel Luna, that he lived at the 1945 North 31st Street
home, and that he was the son of Moises Luna. Miguel had keys to
both residences. Miguel admitted involvement in drug dealing.
	Dailey further testified that, on the date of Miguel's arrest, police
searched the 1945 North 31st Street house. They seized 2,400 grams
of cocaine, packaging materials consistent with drug distribution, a
handgun and ammunition, and various documents relating to Miguel.
The above-mentioned Chevrolet pickup truck was in the garage of the
residence. Miguel acknowledged that the truck belonged to him.
Moreover, Tina Herrera, whose name was listed on the registration
papers, told Dailey that the truck actually belonged to Miguel. She
further revealed that: Miguel was having difficulty obtaining credit to
buy a vehicle, Miguel chose the truck and gave her $5,000 cash to use
as a down payment to purchase it, and Miguel gave her money to pay
the $1,000 monthly payments on the truck.
	On that same day, police also searched the mobile home located
at 2299 North 37th Street. Dailey stated that prior to the
commencement of the search, Moises arrived at the trailer driving the
Nissan Altima. Dailey asked Moises whether he lived at the mobile
home, and Moises responded that he did. Because Moises was not
able to understand or speak English fluently, Dailey contacted a
Spanish translator. Upon the translator's arrival, Dailey asked for
Moises' consent to search the mobile home. Moises replied that he
would allow the officers to search, but he was not responsible for
anything in the trailer. Dailey responded that he could not provide any
guarantees regarding responsibility for items found in the trailer.
Moises consented to the search and completed the prescribed form.
Inside the trailer, in the rear bedroom closet, police recovered
approximately 180 grams of cannabis, a scale, and a handgun with
ammunition. Included among the numerous documents recovered
were titles to the Nissan Altima and the Chevrolet Lumina in the name
of Jose T. Cervantes; two resident alien identification cards, both
bearing photos of Miguel, but one bearing the name of Miguel Luna
and the other bearing the name of Jose T. Cervantes; and two social
security cards, one bearing Miguel's name and the other bearing the
name of Jose T. Cervantes. Inside the adjacent storage shed, police
recovered a duffel bag containing packaging materials consistent with
drug distribution.
	In the ensuing police interview, Moises told police that he had
been in Decatur for approximately seven or eight weeks. He was, at
that time, employed at a tree farm, earning approximately $8.50 per
hour. Moises planned to save money and eventually move his family
from California to Decatur. He lived in the 2299 North 37th Street
mobile home and was paying Miguel $260 per month in rent, although
he was one month behind on the rent. Dailey testified that upon being
shown Miguel's driver's license photograph, Moises at first denied
that Miguel was his son. Instead, Moises told police that he was
Miguel's uncle and that he had raised Miguel since Miguel was seven
years old. Moises subsequently acknowledged that Miguel was his
son.
	Detective Dailey also interviewed Miguel's girlfriend, Elizabeth
Kupish. At that time, she was residing at the 1945 North 31st Street
residence with Miguel. Detective Dailey related the following
statements of Kupish. Miguel had placed $40,000 down on the
residence, but that it was in the name of his father and mother. Kupish
believed that Miguel did this because he was a drug dealer and knew
that if he was arrested the property would be seized. Similarly, Miguel
also purchased Lots 214 and 215 for $6,500 cash and placed title in
his parents' names.
	Detective Dailey also testified to his formal training in drug
trafficking and his experience, including more than 200 of his own
drug investigations and hundreds of other drug investigations.
Without objection, Dailey testified as an expert in the field of narcotic
use and distribution. Dailey opined that it is common for people who
distribute illegal narcotics to place their assets in the names of other
people so that their properties would not be subject to seizure if they
were arrested. Dailey also testified that those involved in the
distribution of drugs commonly launder drug money by converting
cash to money orders.
	In furtherance of his investigation, Detective Dailey obtained
bank records for accounts in the names of Jose T. Cervantes, Miguel
Luna and Moises Luna. These records show that, on August 22, 2002,
Moises opened an account at National City Bank with $8,000 in the
form of 16 individual postal money orders-eight for $300 each and
eight for $700 each. Moises subsequently made deposits into the
National City account in the amounts of $10,500 and $3,500. Based
on all of his testimony, Detective Dailey opined that Moises was also
involved in drug dealing.
	Both Moises and Ramona testified at the hearing through an
interpreter. Both of them denied knowledge of Miguel's drug
activities. Both of them also denied that Miguel ever provided them
with money for the purchase of the real estate at issue.
	Prior to his testimony, Moises was advised of his fifth amendment
rights and he indicated that he understood them. Moises testified that
he has been a legal resident of the United States for 15 years. He lived
in California until August 2002. In California, he worked primarily as
a migrant worker on fruit farms and also did landscaping. He rented
an apartment in California and did not own property there. However,
he did own property in Mexico. In June 2001, he sold a piece of
property in Mexico for $35,000 and placed the proceeds in a safe-deposit box in Mexico. His wife also opened an account at
Earthmover Credit Union in Decatur. In February 2002, Moises gave
Miguel a power of attorney to purchase the vacant lots 214 and 215
in Macon County. The record shows that the purchase price for the
two lots was approximately $6,500.
	In August 2002, Moises moved from California to Decatur.
Moises came to Decatur by himself. At the time of Miguel's arrest,
Ramona continued to reside in California. Upon his arrival, Moises
lived at the 2299 North 37th Street mobile home with Miguel and
Kupish. In November 2002, Moises returned to Mexico, retrieved his
$35,000, and deposited it at National City Bank in Decatur. He also
received two personal loans of $4,000 and $8,000 from his daughter
and niece, respectively, which he deposited in the National City
account. Claimants then purchased the 1945 North 31st Street house.
Their down payment consisted of a $22,000 check drawn on the
National City account and a $17,000 check drawn on Ramona's
Earthmover Credit Union account. Also, claimants secured a
mortgage from Prairie State Bank and Trust for approximately
$22,993. According to Moises, these three financial instruments add
up to the purchase price of approximately $62,000. Moises denied
receiving money from Miguel for the purchase of the vacant lots or
the house.
	After Moises purchased the 1945 North 31st Street house, he
allowed Miguel and Kupish to move into the house. Moises explained
that Kupish was pregnant, was expected to soon give birth, and the
mobile home was not big enough for them and a baby. Miguel and
Kupish moved into the house approximately one week prior to
Miguel's arrest. Miguel had keys to the trailer and had access thereto
when Moises was absent.
	Moises admitted that on the night of November 19, 2002, he
backed the Nissan Altima into the driveway of the house, such that it
was back-to-back with the Chevrolet Lumina. He did so because he
was picking up bread and Miguel's dog, which liked to enter the
Altima through its open hatchback. According to Moises, this was the
only way the dog would cross over to the other vehicle. Claimants
also introduced into evidence two white paper bags. The bags
contained bread and were the actual bags he had carried into the
mobile home on November 19, 2002. The bread bags were on his
table when police searched the mobile home on November 20, 2002.
	Moises stated that he had no knowledge of the cannabis and
other items police found in the rear bedroom closet of the mobile
home. He had always slept in the living room of the mobile home. He
continued to do so after Miguel and Kupish moved into the house
because he could watch television.
	In her testimony, Ramona stated that she cannot read English or
Spanish. She had lived in California for 14 or 15 years. She had
worked for Home Depot, selecting and selling plants. She moved to
Decatur approximately one month prior to her testimony and resided
with Moises in the 1945 North 31st Street house. She and Moises
owned a house in Mexico, and they sold that house. However, she did
not remember how much they received for it. Ramona corroborated
Moises' testimony concerning the source of the funds for the purchase
of the house and the vacant lots. Ramona denied that Miguel gave
them money to buy the properties. Ramona, was also unaware that
Miguel was ever involved in possessing or distributing drugs.
	At the time of the hearing, claimants and their children were
living in, and making mortgage payments on, the 1945 North 31st
Street house. Claimants introduced into evidence the contract for the
sale of the property in Mexico, both in the original Spanish and
translated into English. The contract indicates a sale date of June 9,
2001, and a sale price of $35,000 in United States currency.
	Claimants also called Kupish to testify as an adverse witness in
their case in chief. After preliminary questions, Kupish stated that she
was facing criminal charges regarding these events. She invoked her
fifth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. V) rights precluding further
questioning. In the State's rebuttal case Decatur police Sargent
McElroy, a member of the surveillance team, testified that Moises'
Nissan Altima was not a hatchback vehicle, but rather was a midsize,
four-door vehicle with a regular trunk. On the night of November 19,
2002, Sargent McElroy did not see any dog with Moises when he
went into the mobile home. Also, the white bags that Sargent McElroy
saw Moises carry were not the bread bags that Moises introduced into
evidence. At the close of all the evidence, the circuit court took the
matter under advisement.
	The docket sheet reflects that on July 29, 2003, the circuit court
entered the following findings. First, the circuit court found that the
State established probable cause that the real estate at issue was
subject to forfeiture under the Cannabis Control Act or the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act. The court further noted that Moises had
not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the real estate
was not subject to forfeiture or that it was exempt from forfeiture.
The court, therefore, ordered that the interest of Moises in the three
pieces of property be forfeited to the State. On August 7, 2003, the
court entered a written forfeiture order memorializing these findings.
	By its terms, however, the original order forfeited only Moises'
interest in the real estate. The State filed a motion for an amended
forfeiture order, and claimants filed a motion for reconsideration. The
docket sheet reflects that on September 24, 2003, the circuit court
entered the following additional findings. The court, in finding that the
State established a prima facie case, did not rely on any of the
presumptions allowed under section 7 of the Forfeiture Act (725 ILCS
150/7 (West 2002)).(1) The court found that the homestead exemption
does not apply to a forfeiture case (see 735 ILCS 5/12-903.5 (West
2002)). Continuing its findings, the circuit court also found that the
three parcels of real estate were held by claimants only as nominees of
Miguel, whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture and whose illegal
drug sales activities were the source of most if not all of the cash
invested. The court also found that Moises participated in part in
Miguel's illegal drug sales activities by transporting some drugs from
one location to another. The circuit court also found claimants'
"explanation and evidence not credible and not sufficient to overcome
the State's prima facie case." The circuit court found that the evidence
did not establish Ramona was involved in Miguel's drug dealing.
However, the circuit court found that the evidence did establish that
Ramona stood to acquire substantial proceeds from Miguel's conduct
and that Ramona held the property for the benefit of or as nominee for
Miguel. On October 1, 2003, the circuit court entered an amended
order that forfeited the interests of Miguel and claimants in the real
estate.
	On appeal, a divided appellate court affirmed the forfeiture order
of the circuit court. No. 4-03-0917 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court majority concluded that
the State satisfied its burden of demonstrating the existence of
probable cause for the forfeitures in question. The majority further
concluded that claimants failed to meet their burden of establishing by
a preponderance of the evidence that the properties were not
purchased with the proceeds of illegal drug activities. Justice Appleton
dissented, reasoning in toto:
			"In opposition to the State's assertion that the properties
sought to be forfeited were purchased with the proceeds of
Miguel's illegal drug activity, Moises and Ramona produced
evidence of the source of the funds used by them to acquire
the properties. This evidence was not rebutted by the State.
I would agree that the manner of funding these transactions
does not comport with standard business practices but given
the language and cultural differences demonstrated by the
Lunas, such a deviation cannot be assumed to be unworthy
of belief."
Justice Appleton would have reversed the circuit court's forfeiture
order as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.
	Claimants appeal to this court (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). Additional
pertinent background will be discussed in the context of our analysis
of the issues.

ANALYSIS
	We preface our discussion of the issues raised in this cause with
a brief review of the forfeiture procedure set forth in the Forfeiture
Act. Our General Assembly has expressly found that civil forfeiture
has a significant beneficial effect in deterring the rising incidence of the
abuse and trafficking of substances prohibited by the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 2002))
and the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/1 et seq. (West 2002)).
725 ILCS 150/2 (West 2002). We note that claimants began oral
argument in this cause by stating that forfeitures are not favored in the
law and "therefore, we must construe the forfeiture statute strictly."
Courts have, of course, "stated that as a general rule forfeitures are
disfavored at law and that statutes authorizing them must be construed
strictly in a manner as favorable to the person whose property is
seized as is consistent with fair principles of statutory interpretation."
People v. United States Currency $3,108, 219 Ill. App. 3d 441, 446
(1991) (interpreting Controlled Substances Act); see People v. One
1986 White Mazda Pickup Truck, 251 Ill. App. 3d 79, 83 (1993)
(same). However, against this backdrop, the General Assembly has
declared its intent that the provisions of the Forfeiture Act "be
liberally construed so as to effect their remedial purpose." 725 ILCS
150/13 (West 2002).
	The General Assembly also expressly found that the federal
narcotics civil forfeiture statute "has been very successful in deterring
the use and distribution of controlled substances within this State and
throughout the country." 725 ILCS 150/2 (West 2002). Therefore,
the General Assembly based the Forfeiture Act on the federal civil
forfeiture statute and expressly declared its intent "that the forfeiture
provisions of this Act be construed in light of the federal forfeiture
provisions contained in 21 U.S.C. 881 as interpreted by the federal
courts, except to the extent that the provisions of this Act expressly
differ therefrom." 725 ILCS 150/2 (West 2002). See People ex rel.
Devine v. $30,700.00 United States Currency, 199 Ill. 2d 142, 149
(2002); People v. $1,124,905 U.S. Currency & One 1988 Chevrolet
Astro Van, 177 Ill. 2d 314, 325-26 (1997).
	If the State seizes real property, the Forfeiture Act provides for
a judicial in rem procedure. 725 ILCS 150/9 (West 2002). The State
brings the action against seized property pursuant to the legal fiction
that the property itself is guilty of facilitating a crime. See United
States v. Property at Route 1, Box 137, Randolph, 743 F. Supp. 802,
804 (M.D. Ala. 1990); United States v. One Rural Lot, 739 F. Supp. 74, 77 (D. Puerto Rico 1990). The State's Attorney initiates the
action by filing a verified complaint for forfeiture. 725 ILCS 150/9(A)
(West 2002). Only an owner or interest holder may file an answer
asserting a claim against the property. 725 ILCS 150/9(C) (West
2002). The answer must contain certain information, including the
circumstances surrounding the claimant's acquisition of the property.
725 ILCS 150/9(D) (West 2002).
	In a proceeding under the Forfeiture Act, the State has the initial
burden of showing the existence of probable cause for forfeiture of the
property. 725 ILCS 150/9(G) (West 2002). When the State satisfies
its burden of establishing probable cause, the burden shifts to the
claimant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the property
is not subject to forfeiture. 725 ILCS 150/9(G) (West 2002). A
claimant may satisfy this burden by establishing one of the innocent-owner defenses provided in section 8 of the Forfeiture Act. 725 ILCS
150/8 (West 2002). "If the State does show existence of probable
cause and the claimant does not establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the claimant has an interest that is exempt under Section
8 of this Act, the court shall order all property forfeited to the State."
725 ILCS 150/9(H) (West 2002). With these principles in mind, we
turn to claimants' contentions.

I. Statutory Exemption
	Claimants first observe that they hold title to the 1945 North 31st
Street property as tenants by the entirety. They also point to the
circuit court's additional finding that the evidence did not establish
that Ramona was legally accountable for the conduct giving rise to the
forfeiture, or that she solicited, conspired, or attempted to commit the
conduct giving rise to the forfeiture. Because the circuit court found
Ramona to be an innocent spouse, claimants contend that she qualifies
as an innocent owner under section 8 of the Forfeiture Act. Therefore,
according to claimants, the 1945 North 31st Street residence "was
exempt from forfeiture when Ramona was found to be an innocent
spouse."
	To resolve this issue, we turn to section 8 of the Forfeiture Act,
which provides for innocent-owner defenses. 725 ILCS 150/8 (West
2002). The controlling principles are familiar.
			"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. [Citation.]
The best evidence of legislative intent is the language used in
the statute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary
meaning. [Citations.] The statute should be evaluated as a
whole, with each provision construed in connection with
every other section. [Citation.] If legislative intent can be
ascertained from the statute's plain language, that intent must
prevail without resort to other interpretive aids." Paris v.
Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997).
Because the interpretation of a statute is a question of law, our review
is de novo. Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 444 (2002); In re
Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330 (2000).
	Section 8 of the Forfeiture Act provides in pertinent part:
			"§8. Exemptions from forfeiture. A property interest is
exempt from forfeiture under this Section if its owner or
interest holder establishes by a preponderance of evidence
that the owner or interest holder:
			(A)(i) ***
			(ii) in the case of real property, is not legally accountable
for the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, or did not solicit,
conspire, or attempt to commit the conduct giving rise to the
forfeiture; and
			(B) had not acquired and did not stand to acquire
substantial proceeds from the conduct giving rise to its
forfeiture other than as an interest holder in an arm's length
commercial transaction; and
			***
			(D) does not hold the property for the benefit of or as
nominee for any person whose conduct gave rise to its
forfeiture, and, if the owner or interest holder acquired the
interest through any such person, the owner or interest holder
acquired it as a bona fide purchaser for value without
knowingly taking part in the conduct giving rise to the
forfeiture; and
			(E) that the owner or interest holder acquired the interest:
			(i) before the commencement of the conduct giving rise to
its forfeiture and the person whose conduct gave rise to its
forfeiture did not have the authority to convey the interest to
a bona fide purchaser for value at the time of the conduct;
***
			(ii) *** and
			***
			(b) in the case of real estate, before the filing in the office
of the Recorder of Deeds of the county in which the real
estate is located of a notice of seizure for forfeiture or a lis
pendens notice." (Emphases added.) 725 ILCS 150/8 (West
2002).
If the claimant fails to establish an interest in the subject property that
is exempt under section 8, the circuit court shall order the property
forfeited to the State. 725 ILCS 150/9(H) (West 2002).
	During oral argument, claimants noted that the circuit court
found that Ramona satisfied section 8(A)(ii), i.e., she was not involved
in Miguel's drug dealing. We agree. However, claimants posited that
this finding, by itself, "takes precedence" over the remaining
conditions of section 8. Indeed, according to claimants: "That's where
the appellate court got hung up." Claimants argued that the appellate
court erred in applying all of the pertinent conditions of section 8 to
Ramona's interest in the residence. Claimants argued that the other
conditions of section 8 do not "override" Ramona's "actual
innocence."
	This contention lacks merit. The pertinent conditions of section
8 are plainly joined with the term "and." This court long ago observed
the obvious: "The conjunction 'and' *** signifies and expresses the
relation of addition." City of LaSalle v. Kostka, 190 Ill. 130, 137
(1901). Of course, the word "and" is sometimes considered to mean
"or," and vice versa, in the interpretation of statutes. However, "[t]his
is not done except in cases where there is an apparent repugnance or
inconsistency in a statute that would defeat its main intent and
purpose. When these words are found in a statute and their accurate
reading does not render the sense dubious they should be read and
interpreted as written in the statute." Voight v. Industrial Comm'n,
297 Ill. 109, 114 (1921). " 'As a general rule, the use of the
conjunctive, as in the word "and," indicates that the legislature
intended for all of the listed requirements to be met. [Citations.]'
(Emphasis in original.)" Byung Moo Soh v. Target Marketing Systems,
Inc., 353 Ill. App. 3d 126, 131 (2004), quoting Gilchrist v. Human
Rights Comm'n, 312 Ill. App. 3d 597, 602 (2000).
	In this case, the court found:
			"The evidence does not establish that Ramona DeLuna is
legally accountable for the conduct giving rise to the
forfeiture or that she solicited, conspired or attempted to
commit the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, but does
establish that she stood to acquire substantial proceeds from
the conduct other than as an interest holder in an arm[']s[-]
length commercial transaction and that she held the property
for the benefit of or as nominee for Miguel DeLuna."
Thus, the circuit court found that Ramona had satisfied section
8(A)(ii), but had failed to satisfy section 8(B) or 8(D). Because
Ramona was unable to satisfy all of the pertinent conditions of section
8, she was not an "innocent owner," within the meaning of the
Forfeiture Act, and the circuit court properly ordered the 1945 North
31st Street residence forfeited to the State. See, e.g., People ex rel.
Birkett v. 1998 Chevrolet Corvette, 331 Ill. App. 3d 453, 463 (2002)
(concluding that the claimant "did not prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that he qualified as an innocent owner" because he did
not satisfy all of the pertinent conditions of section 8); People v. 1515
Coolidge Avenue, 308 Ill. App. 3d 805, 812 (1999) (concluding that
the claimant failed to satisfy section 8(D) and, consequently, the
property was subject to forfeiture, where the claimant held the real
estate for the benefit of another, who purchased it with proceeds from
drug dealing). Because Ramona is not an "innocent owner" under
section 8 of the Act, this case does not present-and we expressly do
not discuss-the issue of whether property is subject to forfeiture
where an innocent spouse pursuant to section 8 of the Act holds title
to the subject property together with his or her spouse as tenants by
the entirety. See Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 201 Ill. 2d 134, 157
(2002) (noting that advisory opinions are to be avoided).

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
	Claimants next challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. They
first maintain that the State failed to establish probable cause for
forfeiture of the three parcels of property. Claimants further maintain
that, if this court should hold that the State established probable cause,
they, "by a preponderance of the evidence, overcame the proof of the
State and demonstrated the true source of the funds for the purchase"
of the real estate. We disagree.

A. State's Case in Chief
	Claimants' sufficiency of the evidence challenge to the circuit
court's finding of probable cause begins with a question regarding the
admissibility of Detective Dailey's testimony concerning Kupish's out-of-court statements. As earlier noted, Dailey testified during the
State's case in chief that Kupish told him that Miguel had placed
$40,000 down for the purchase of the single-family residence, had
paid $6,500 cash for Lots 214 and 215, and had placed title to these
properties in his parents' names. Dailey testified that Kupish told him
that she believed Miguel did this because he was a drug dealer and
knew that if he should be arrested, this property would be seized.
Claimants point out that they tried to refute this testimony by calling
Kupish to testify, but that she invoked her fifth amendment rights,
precluding further questioning. Claimants maintain, now for the first
time in the course of these proceedings, that the circuit court, sua
sponte, should have stricken from the record Dailey's earlier
testimony regarding Kupish's statement, and that without the benefit
of Kupish's out-of-court statement, the State's case in chief fails. In
support of this contention, claimants cite to Lee v. Police Board, 72
Ill. App. 2d 134 (1966), for the proposition that where a witness, in
this case, an out-of-court statement by a nonwitness, refuses to submit
to cross-examination, the witness' entire testimony should be stricken.
However, we express no opinion as to the application of this principle
to the circumstances present here because claimants did not properly
preserve the issue and, as a result, it is not properly before us.
	The record reveals that when Kupish refused to be questioned
regarding her hearsay statement introduced as part of the State's case
in chief, claimants neither objected to Dailey's earlier testimony
regarding Kupish's hearsay statement nor moved to strike it from the
record. "An issue not presented to the trial court is waived in nonjury
civil cases." Chandler v. Doherty, 299 Ill. App. 3d 797, 806 (1998);
see, e.g., In re Marriage of Winters, 160 Ill. App. 3d 277, 280 (1987)
(holding that failure to object to admission of evidence in bench trial
resulted in procedural default of the issue for review); Wanland v.
Beavers, 130 Ill. App. 3d 731, 734 (1985) (same); Illinois State Trust
Co. v. Southern Illinois National Bank, 29 Ill. App. 3d 1, 11 (1975)
(same); Hill v. Meister, 133 Ill. App. 2d 678, 682 (1971) (same). "No
duty rests upon the court to rule out evidence to which there might be
some objection; making appropriate objections is the function of the
party opposing its admission." Hill, 133 Ill. App. 2d at 682. If a party
wishes to challenge the admissibility of testimony, it is that party's
duty to object in apt time to obtain a ruling by the trial court. "Failure
to object must be considered as a waiver of the objection." Wanland,
130 Ill. App. 3d at 734; see, e.g., Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 34
(2003) (holding that any valid objection the defendant may have had
for admission of evidence "was waived by his failure to make specific
contemporary objections at trial so that any defect could have been
cured"); Winters, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 280 (same).
	Claimants suggest that their procedural default is irrelevant here
because of the fact that this was a bench trial. Claimants cite People
v. Soteras, 295 Ill. App. 3d 610 (1998), for the proposition that, in a
bench trial, the trial judge is presumed to consider only admissible
evidence. However, this presumption has never been used by a court
as a means of excusing a party from the type of procedural default at
issue here; indeed, in the absence of such an objection, an issue, even
in a criminal bench trial, has been consistently deemed procedurally
defaulted. See, e.g., People v. Pelegri, 39 Ill. 2d 568, 574-75 (1968);
People v. French, 33 Ill. 2d 146, 149-50 (1965).
	Accordingly, the circuit court properly included Detective
Dailey's testimony regarding Kupish's hearsay statement as part of the
State's case in chief. "It is well established that when hearsay evidence
is admitted without an objection, it is to be considered and given its
natural probative effect." Jackson v. Board of Review of the
Department of Labor, 105 Ill. 2d 501, 508-09 (1985) (collecting
authorities; observing that "the overwhelming weight of authority
supports" rule); King v. Ashbrook, 313 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1045 (2000)
(applying rule in bench trial); Buckingham Corp. v. Ewing Liquors
Co., 15 Ill. App. 3d 839, 843 (1973) (same; describing rule as
"elementary"). Having held that Kupish's out-of-court statement was
properly considered by the court, we necessarily reject any contention
that its absence should have caused the State's case to fall. We turn
now to assessing the sufficiency of the totality of the State's case in
chief.
	To satisfy the probable cause requirement under the Forfeiture
Act, a complaint for forfeiture must allege facts providing reasonable
grounds for the belief that there exists a nexus between the property
and illegal drug activity, supported by less than prima facie proof but
more than mere suspicion. See $1,124,905 U.S. Currency, 177 Ill. 2d 
at 336-38. Probable cause in this context requires only a probability
or substantial chance of the nexus and not an actual showing. See
United States v. Certain Real Property, 943 F.2d 721, 725 (7th Cir.
1991), quoting United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 390 (7th Cir.
1989); United States v. $364,960.00 in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Evidence sufficient to shift the burden
to claimants in a forfeiture proceeding need not provide conclusive
proof, however, but rather a reasonable ground for belief"). Also, the
government's evidence need not exclude other plausible hypotheses
of the source of the money used to purchase the subject property.
United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 921 F.2d 370, 377 (1st
Cir. 1990), citing United States v. $250,000, 808 F.2d 895, 899 (1st
Cir. 1987); $364, 960, 661 F.2d  at 324. Further, "it is the totality of
the circumstances, not a minute parsing of each item of information,
that leads to a finding of probable cause." United States v. One 1987
Mercedes 560 SEL, 919 F.2d 327, 331 (5th Cir. 1990); accord
Edwards, 885 F.2d  at 390. During the probable cause portion of the
proceeding, "the court must receive and consider, among other things,
all relevant hearsay evidence and information." During all other
portions of the proceeding, the law of evidence relating to civil actions
applies. 725 ILCS 150/9(B) (West 2002).
	The record in this case supports the circuit court's finding of
probable cause. It is undisputed that Miguel was actively involved in
drug activities and that the police discovered large quantities of
cocaine from the 1945 North 31st Street house and cannabis from the
2299 North 37th Street mobile home. The State presented evidence,
through the testimony of two officers, that Moises was involved in
Miguel's drug dealing on at least one occasion, when Moises
transported the drugs for Miguel on November 19, 2002. Detective
Dailey testified at the hearing as an expert witness in the field of
narcotics use and distribution. He explained that it is common for drug
dealers to place their assets in the names of other people so that their
properties would not be subject to forfeiture if they were to be
arrested. He also explained that converting cash into a postal money
order, which was how Moises initially deposited money into his
Decatur bank account, is a common way for drug dealers to launder
money.
	Also, claimants note that Detective Dailey referred to People's
Exhibit No. 1 in his testimony. Detective Dailey described the exhibit
as a time line containing a brief summary of account activities in
claimants' bank accounts. It also includes information regarding the
real estate transactions, money orders, and wire transfers made by
claimants in this case. Claimants contend that the exhibit was never
offered into evidence and cannot be considered as proof in this case.
Claimants point to a form on the last page of the common law record
that lists the exhibit and shows a checkmark in a box that indicates
identification, but an adjacent box that indicates admission into
evidence is blank. However, as reflected in the report of proceedings
for June 23, 2003, at the close of claimants' case, a colloquy between
the court, the prosecutor, and counsel for claimants clearly indicates
that claimants viewed the exhibit as already having been admitted into
evidence. Due to the sporadic nature of the trial, the court could not
remember whether all of the exhibits had been admitted into evidence.
The court suggested that both sides present their exhibits for
admission. After ruling on claimants' exhibits, the court asked counsel
for claimants whether there were any other exhibits the admissibility
of which the court had not yet ruled upon. Counsel responded: "I
believe that's it, Your Honor. The only one here is the People's
exhibit and that's been taken care of." Claimants may not now attack
a procedure to which they agreed. See In re Detention of Swope, 213 Ill. 2d 210, 217 (2004) (holding that party cannot complain of error
to which that party consented).
	After reviewing all of the State's evidence, we conclude that the
State demonstrated reasonable grounds for the belief that there exists
a connection between the subject property and Miguel's illegal drug
activity. We observe that the circuit court was sitting without a jury.
		"In a bench trial, the trial court must weigh the evidence and
make findings of fact. In close cases, where findings of fact
depend on the credibility of witnesses, it is particularly true
that a reviewing court will defer to the findings of the trial
court unless they are against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Chicago Investment Corp. v. Dolins, 107 Ill. 2d 120, 124 (1985). *** A decision is against the manifest
weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is
apparent or when the findings appear to be unreasonable,
arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Rhodes v. Illinois
Central Gulf R.R., 172 Ill. 2d 213, 242 (1996); Leonardi v.
Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 106 (1995);
Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 215 (1995). 'The court on
review must not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of
fact.' Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 144 Ill. 2d 425, 434
(1991)." Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 251-52 (2002).
Specifically, in a forfeiture case, the circuit court, as the trier of fact,
determines the credibility of the witnesses and evaluates their
testimony. Also, the court may draw reasonable inferences and reach
conclusions to which the evidence lends itself. Because the circuit
court bases its conclusion upon its assessment of the evidence, a
reviewing court will not reverse an order of forfeiture unless it is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. 1998 Chevrolet Corvette,
331 Ill. App. 3d at 459; People v. $5,970 United States Currency, 279
Ill. App. 3d 583, 588 (1996); People v. $52,204.00 United States
Currency, 252 Ill. App. 3d 778, 782-83 (1993). We cannot say that
the circuit court's finding of probable cause was against the manifest
weight of the evidence.(2)

B. Claimants' Case
	Alternatively, claimants contend that they established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the subject property was exempt
from forfeiture. They argue that the property was not purchased by
proceeds from illegal drug activities.
	Both the 1945 North 31st Street house and the vacant lots were
titled to claimants. Regarding the purchase of the vacant lots, Moises
testified that he and Ramona purchased the lots before he moved to
Decatur. Miguel executed the transaction and purchased the lots with
cash. Claimants assert that they did not yet have a bank account in
Decatur at the time of the purchase. However, claimants did not
present evidence that would confirm that they supplied Miguel with
the cash for the purchase.
	Regarding the purchase of the 1945 North 31st Street residence,
Moises explained that he purchased the house with a mortgage,
proceeds from his sale of real estate in Mexico, and personal loans
from family members. Claimants assert that the amounts from these
sources total the purchase price of the house. However, we agree with
the appellate court that, despite all of the above evidence, claimants
were not able to show that the money they had in their accounts did
not come from Miguel, even though claimants were the ones who had
exclusive control of their own financial information.
	In this case, the circuit court evaluated claimants' evidence and
assessed claimants' credibility. Based on its evaluation and
assessment, the court found that claimants failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the purchase money for the subject
property did not come from Miguel based on: (1) the State's
nonhearsay testimony that Miguel had a pattern of placing titles to the
properties that he actually owns in the name of other persons, and that
Moises was involved in at least one illegal drug activity with Miguel;
(2) inconsistencies in claimants' testimony; and (3) claimants' failure
to demonstrate the original source of the funds.
	We note that the appellate court dissent concluded that claimants
"produced evidence of the source of the funds used by them to acquire
the properties." It is true that the record contains some evidence that
supports claimants' position. However, the circuit court expressly
found that claimants' explanation and evidence were not credible and
not sufficient to overcome the State's prima facie case. It must be
remembered that it was the circuit court who saw the witnesses and
heard them testify. " 'It is axiomatic that a reviewing court may not
reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the trier of
fact. Findings of fact are entitled to deference, and this is particularly
true of credibility determinations.' " Eychaner, 202 Ill. 2d  at 270,
quoting Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 131 Ill. 2d 172,
180 (1989); accord Chicago Investment Corp. v. Dolins, 107 Ill. 2d 120, 129 (1985). Courts recognize that the trial judge, as the trier of
fact, is in a superior position to the reviewing court to observe the
conduct of the witnesses while testifying, to determine their
credibility, and to weigh and determine the preponderance of the
evidence. See, e.g., 1998 Chevrolet Corvette, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 459
(observing that trial court "is best suited to evaluate" testimony of
witnesses and to draw reasonable inferences therefrom); People v.
One 1982 Maroon Ford Mustang, 258 Ill. App. 3d 127, 132 (1994)
(same). A reviewing court may not overturn a judgment merely
because the reviewing court might disagree with the judgment, or, had
the reviewing court been the trier of fact, might have come to a
different conclusion. Eychaner, 202 Ill. 2d  at 270-71 (and cases cited
therein). After reviewing the entire record, we cannot say that the
circuit court's findings and determination were against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we uphold the forfeiture order
of the circuit court.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
1. ï»¿ Although the circuit court cited section 9 of the 
Forfeiture Act
("Judicial in rem procedures") (725 ILCS 150/9 (West 2002)), we
presume that the court meant to cite to section 7 of the Act
("Presumptions").
2. ï»¿ We note that some federal courts of 
appeals view the probable cause
determination in a forfeiture proceeding as a question of law subject to de
novo review. See, e.g., United States v. $250,000 in United States
Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 898 n.6 (1st Cir. 1987) (collecting cases).
However, other federal courts of appeals view the issue as a mixed
question of fact and law: the district court's factual findings are accorded
deference, but the probable cause determination itself is subject to de
ï»¿novo review. United States v. $39,873.00, 80 F.3d 317, 318 (8th Cir.
1996). The parties have neither briefed nor argued this issue and we do
not address it.