Case Title: DeCicco v. 180 Grant Street, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12831

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12831 
 
JACK DeCICCO & another1  vs.  180 GRANT STREET, LLC. 
 
 
May 11, 2020. 
 
 
Lis Pendens.  Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss, Appeal, 
Attorney's fees, Costs. 
 
 
 
Background.  The plaintiffs, Jack and Sandra DeCicco, 
offered to purchase property from the defendant, 180 Grant 
Street, LLC.  The parties executed a written offer to purchase, 
but discussions related to the purchase and sale agreement were 
unsuccessful and the defendant ultimately notified the 
plaintiffs that it could not" make [the] deal work."  The 
plaintiffs then commenced this action in the Superior Court, 
claiming breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith, and misrepresentation, and seeking specific 
performance.  The plaintiffs also applied for a memorandum of 
lis pendens, which a judge approved.  The defendant subsequently 
filed a motion to dissolve the lis pendens and a special motion 
to dismiss the action, pursuant to G. L. c. 184, § 15 (c).  A 
second judge denied the motion to dissolve the lis pendens but 
allowed the special motion to dismiss. 
 
 
The plaintiffs appealed from the allowance of the special 
motion to dismiss.  In a memorandum and order pursuant to its 
rule 1:28, the Appeals Court affirmed the judgment of dismissal 
but denied the defendant's request for appellate attorney's fees 
and costs.  DeCicco v. 180 Grant Street, LLC, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 
                                                 
 
1  Sandra DeCicco. 
2 
 
1113 (2019).  The case is now before this court on further 
appellate review on the issue of appellate attorney's fees.2, 3 
 
 
Discussion.  General Laws c. 184, § 15 (c), provides in 
relevant part that "[i]f the court allows the special motion to 
dismiss, it shall award the moving party costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees, including those incurred for the special 
motion, any motion to dissolve the memorandum of lis pendens, 
and any related discovery."  Although there is no question that 
the statute provides for attorney's fees and costs in the trial 
court (which the defendant here was properly awarded), there is 
a question whether this provision also applies to appellate 
attorney's fees.  We answer that question yes. 
 
 
As the defendant notes, the relevant statutory language 
governing a special motion to dismiss under G. L. c. 184, § 15, 
is almost exactly the same as the relevant statutory language 
governing a special motion to dismiss pursuant to the "anti-
SLAPP" statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  That statute provides, in 
relevant part, that "[i]f the court grants such special motion 
to dismiss, the court shall award the moving party costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees, including those incurred for the 
special motion and any related discovery matters." 
 
 
We have interpreted the anti-SLAPP statute's fee provision 
to apply to both trial and appellate court attorney's fees.  See 
McLarnon v. Jokisch, 431 Mass. 343, 350 (2000).  The McLarnon 
case involved an appeal by the plaintiff from the allowance, in 
the trial court, of the defendant's special motion to dismiss 
pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  See id. at 343.  The court 
affirmed the judgment and addressed the issue of attorney's fees 
both in the trial court and on appeal, concluding that the 
defendant was entitled to fees in both courts.  See id. at 350.  
As to the appellate attorney's fees, the court stated that 
                                                 
 
2 In denying the motion to dissolve lis pendens, the judge 
noted that upon filing, at the registry of deeds, the decision 
and order allowing the special motion to dismiss, the memorandum 
of lis pendens would be dissolved on expiration of the appeal 
period.  There is no indication in the record whether the 
memorandum was dissolved, but in any event, the issue is not 
relevant to the appeal before us. 
 
 
3 Our order allowing the defendant's application for further 
appellate review indicated that the issue to be considered would 
be that of appellate attorney's fees.  The parties address both 
attorney's fees and costs, and we address both as well. 
3 
 
"[t]he statutory provisions for . . . 'reasonable attorney's 
fee[s]' would ring hollow if it did not necessarily include a 
fee for the appeal."  Id., quoting Yorke Mgt. v. Castro, 406 
Mass. 17, 19 (1989).  See Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 525 
(2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9 (2004). 
 
 
The same rationale applies here.  Not only is the language 
of the two statutes almost exactly the same, but, importantly, 
the underlying policies are essentially the same.  Both the lis 
pendens statute and the anti-SLAPP statute provide for a special 
motion to dismiss that is designed to weed out groundless 
litigation early on, and both are designed to ensure that the 
successful defendant is made whole by being reimbursed for the 
legal fees it has incurred in its defense of the summarily 
dismissed case. 
 
 
We recognize that this court has held that certain other 
statutes that provide for attorney's fees in the trial court, 
but which are silent as to appellate attorney's fees, do not 
necessarily require an award of appellate attorney's fees.  See, 
e.g., Twin Fires Inv., LLC v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 
445 Mass. 411, 432 (2005), citing Patry v. Liberty Mobilehome 
Sales, Inc., 394 Mass. 270, 272 (1985).  In the Twin Fires case, 
for example, we noted that "[w]here a statute provides for the 
payment of reasonable attorney's fees, an award of attorney's 
fees on appeal is within the discretion of an appellate court."  
Twin Fires Inv., LLC, supra.  The statute at issue in that case 
was G. L. c. 93A, § 11, which provides for "reasonable 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred" in proving a violation of 
the statute. 
 
 
The difference between those cases and this one is the 
context in which they arise.  The lis pendens and anti-SLAPP 
statutes provide an expeditious means -- the special motion to 
dismiss -- to challenge an action and to protect certain rights.  
Where the Legislature has seen fit to provide a special and 
specific means to raise an early defensive challenge and has, as 
well, provided for an award of attorney's fees when that 
challenge is successful, it reasonably follows that the award of 
fees ought to apply at every stage, whether in the trial or 
appellate court.  The very nature of the special motion to 
dismiss, in other words, distinguishes these cases from cases 
where appellate attorney's fees are discretionary or based on 
whether an appeal is frivolous.4 
                                                 
 
4 Because we conclude that G. L. c. 184, § 15 (c), provides 
for appellate attorney's fees and costs, we need not consider 
4 
 
 
 
Conclusion.  We conclude that the defendant is entitled to 
an award of appellate attorney's fees and costs.  In the 
somewhat unique circumstances of this case, where the Appeals 
Court decided the substantive merits of the underlying appeal 
and we transferred the case to this court to decide only the 
question of the entitlement to fees and costs, the Appeals Court 
is in the better position to decide the appropriate amount of 
the fees and costs to be awarded; the Appeals Court is more 
familiar with the underlying legal issues, the work performed by 
the defendant's counsel on appeal, and the other considerations 
that go into a calculation of the appropriate amount.  The case 
is therefore remanded to the Appeals Court for consideration of 
the question of a reasonable and appropriate amount to be 
awarded.  The parties should be afforded a reasonable time to 
file the application, supporting documentation, and opposition 
if any.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
John J. Bonistalli & Jennifer M. Lee for the plaintiffs. 
 
Jon C. Cowen for the defendant. 
 
Dylan Sanders & Alessandra W. Wintergerter for Real Estate 
Bar Association of Massachusetts, Inc., & another, amici curiae. 
                                                 
whether, if the statute did not so provide, the defendant would 
nonetheless be entitled to appellate costs pursuant to Mass. 
R. A. P. 26 (a), as amended, 378 Mass. 925 (1979). 
 
 
5 With respect to fees associated with prosecuting the 
appeal in this court, the defendant may file, in this court, a 
request for fees with supporting documentation within thirty 
days.