Case Title: Ex parte Triad of Alabama, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC-2023-0395, SC-2023-0874

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2024-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: January 26, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0395 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital 
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
 
(In re:  Voncille Askew and Don Askew  
 
v.  
 
Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital)  
 
(Houston Circuit Court: CV-22-900177) 
 
SELLERS, Justice. 
Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital, the defendant 
below in a pending personal-injury action, petitions this Court for a writ 
SC-2023-0395 
 
2 
of mandamus directing the Houston Circuit Court to vacate its order 
granting a motion filed by the plaintiffs, Voncille Askew and Don Askew, 
striking Triad's affirmative defense under what the parties refer to as the 
Alabama 
COVID-19 
Immunity 
Act 
("the 
ACIA"), 
Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-790 et seq. For the reasons set forth below, we 
grant the petition and issue the writ. 
Factual Background 
Around 
August 
16, 
2021, 
Triad 
began 
providing 
monoclonal-antibody-infusion therapy at Flowers Hospital to patients 
infected with Coronavirus, which is commonly referred to as COVID-19. 
See, e.g., § 6-5-791(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975. According to Triad, it directed 
those patients to enter the hospital through a preexisting entrance 
designated as "Infusion entry" to help isolate those patients infected with 
COVID-19 from the hospital's general population. According to the 
Askews, that entrance had been created as part of a 2014 construction 
project and had been frequently used since its creation as an entrance 
and an exit for both hospital patients and employees. Furthermore, 
according to the Askews, neither the entrance nor the small, concrete 
ramp leading up to it had been modified since their creation. 
SC-2023-0395 
 
3 
Around September 21, 2021, Voncille Askew was diagnosed with 
COVID-19, 
and 
her 
physician 
scheduled 
her 
for 
monoclonal-antibody-infusion therapy at the hospital on the following 
day. At approximately 12:30 p.m. on September 22, 2021, Voncille 
proceeded through the "Infusion entry" for her appointment. After 
undergoing therapy for approximately two hours, Voncille was 
discharged and instructed to leave through the same "Infusion entry." 
According to the Askews, as Voncille exited, her foot caught the edge of 
the concrete ramp, causing her to fall and sustain serious injuries. 
Procedural History 
On May 10, 2022, the Askews sued Triad, alleging claims of 
negligence, negligence per se, wantonness, and loss of consortium. In its 
answers to both the complaint and the second amended complaint, Triad 
raised the affirmative defense of civil immunity under the ACIA. On 
February 16, 2023, the Askews moved to strike Triad's affirmative 
defense, averring that the immunity provisions of the ACIA had no 
applicability to their claims. Specifically, the Askews asserted that 
because their "claims ar[o]se from the hospital's negligence in 
maintaining a safe premises and [its] failure to comply with key safety 
SC-2023-0395 
 
4 
codes," such claims were not "health emergency claims" for which Triad, 
even as a covered entity under the ACIA, could be accorded immunity 
under § 6-5-792(a), Ala. Code 1975. Moreover, the Askews contended 
that, because "[n]o health care services or treatment were being 
performed on or provided to [Voncille] at the time of her fall," Triad was 
not entitled to immunity under § 6-5-794(a), Ala. Code 1975. 
On March 7, 2023, Triad responded to the Askews' motion to strike, 
arguing that, pursuant to the plain text of §§ 6-5-792 and 6-5-794, it was 
entitled to immunity under both provisions. Nevertheless, on April 20, 
2023, the trial court entered an order granting the Askews' motion to 
strike without having conducted a hearing and without explaining its 
rationale for granting the motion. Consequently, Triad petitioned this 
Court for a writ of mandamus. After ordering answers and briefs, we held 
oral argument on November 1, 2023. 
Standard of Review 
The standard for granting mandamus relief is well established: 
"The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary legal 
remedy. Therefore, this Court will not grant mandamus relief 
unless the petitioner shows: (1) a clear legal right to the order 
sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the trial court to perform, 
accompanied by its refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another 
SC-2023-0395 
 
5 
adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of 
the Court." 
 
Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 2005) (citations omitted). 
Moreover, this Court has recognized that "[a] trial court's disallowance of 
a party's affirmative defense is reviewable by a petition for a writ of 
mandamus." Ex parte Buffalo Rock Co., 941 So. 2d 273, 277 (Ala. 2006) 
(citing Ex parte Neely Truck Line, Inc., 588 So. 2d 484 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1991)).  
When a motion to strike an affirmative defense seeks "a dispositive 
ruling on the basis of evidence outside the pleadings, we construe it as a 
motion seeking the entry of a partial summary judgment."1 Ex parte 
Teal, 336 So. 3d 165, 167 n.3 (Ala. 2021) (citing Rule 56(a), Ala. R. Civ. 
P.). Because the order striking Triad's affirmative defense amounted to a 
partial summary judgment and because no genuine issues of material 
fact are in dispute, the standard of review is as follows: 
"'An order granting or denying a summary judgment is 
reviewed de novo, applying the same standard as the trial 
court applied. American Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. 
Underwood, 886 So. 2d 807, 811 (Ala. 2004). In addition, 
"[t]his court reviews de novo a trial court's interpretation of a 
statute, because only a question of law is presented." Scott 
 
1Included in support of the Askews' motion to strike were excerpts 
from a deposition of Triad's COO, Matthew Blevins. 
SC-2023-0395 
 
6 
Bridge Co. v. Wright, 883 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Ala. 2003). 
Where, as here, the facts of a case are essentially undisputed, 
this Court must determine whether the trial court misapplied 
the law to the undisputed facts, applying a de novo standard 
of review. Carter v. City of Haleyville, 669 So. 2d 812, 815 
(Ala. 1995). Here, in reviewing the ... summary judgment 
when the facts are undisputed, we review de novo the trial 
court's interpretation of statutory language and our previous 
caselaw on a controlling question of law.'" 
 
McKinney v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 33 So. 3d 1203, 1206 (Ala. 
2009) (quoting Continental Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Fields, 926 So. 2d 1033, 
1034-35 (Ala. 2005)). 
Discussion 
I. Lack of Another Adequate Remedy 
Triad contends that, "[b]ecause one of the purposes of immunity is 
to spare a defendant from the demands associated with defending a 
drawn-out lawsuit, a defendant wrongfully denied immunity protection 
has no adequate remedy on appeal if the case is erroneously permitted to 
go to trial." Petition at 25. This is so, Triad avers, even though it would 
not be entitled to immunity as to the wantonness claim against it, and 
thus would still have to litigate that claim, see § 6-5-792(b) and § 6-5-
794(a), noting that this Court has previously granted mandamus relief to 
a defendant, determining that that defendant was entitled to State-agent 
SC-2023-0395 
 
7 
immunity as to the claims against her even though the case would 
proceed on the claims against the other defendants. See Ex parte Mestas, 
371 So. 3d 220, 221-22 (Ala. 2022). 
Although we agree with Triad that it lacks another adequate 
remedy, we do not agree with its rationale. A review of our precedents 
reveals considerable tension between the immunity exception in our 
mandamus jurisprudence, see, e.g., Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794, 795 
(Ala. 1996), and the broader concept that mandamus relief is appropriate 
to permit a disallowed affirmative defense only when that affirmative 
defense, if successful, would be determinative of the entire action against 
a particular defendant, see, e.g., Ex parte Tahsin Indus. Corp., U.S.A., 4 
So. 3d 1121, 1123-24 (Ala. 2008). 
A. The Immunity Exception in Our Mandamus Jurisprudence 
This Court has long held that "the general rule is that denial of a 
summary-judgment motion is not immediately reviewable by an 
appellate court." Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002). There 
exists an important exception, however: The "denial of a motion for a 
summary judgment grounded on a claim of immunity is immediately 
reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus." Id. (citing Ex parte 
SC-2023-0395 
 
8 
Purvis, 689 So. 2d at 795) (emphasis added). Although this Court initially 
created this exception to apply to claims of sovereign (or State) immunity, 
see Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d at 795, we have since expanded the 
applicability of the exception to claims of State-agent immunity, see, e.g., 
Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000), qualified immunity, see, 
e.g., Ex parte Sawyer, 876 So. 2d 433, 439 (Ala. 2003), municipal 
substantive immunity, see, e.g., Ex parte City of Muscle Shoals, [Ms. SC-
2022-0524, Mar. 31, 2023] __ So. 3d __, __ (Ala. 2023), and statutory 
immunity, see, e.g., Ex parte Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Dep't, 181 So. 
3d 325, 327, 331 (Ala. 2015) (granting in part a mandamus petition based 
on a claim of immunity under the Volunteer Service Act); Ex parte Tenax 
Corp., 228 So. 3d 387, 390-91 (Ala. 2017) (granting a mandamus petition 
premised on a claim of immunity under the exclusive-remedy provisions 
of the Workers' Compensation Act); Ex parte City of Muscle Shoals, 257 
So. 3d 850, 852, 854 (Ala. 2018) (granting a mandamus petition based on 
a claim of municipal immunity under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975).  
Notably, we have reviewed by mandamus petition an order denying 
a motion for a summary judgment premised on an immunity defense even 
though that immunity defense, if successful, would not have resolved the 
SC-2023-0395 
 
9 
action in its entirety against the petitioner. For example, in Ex parte 
Kelley, 296 So. 3d 822, 826 (Ala. 2019), the petitioners sought mandamus 
relief from orders denying their motions for a summary judgment 
predicated on claims of parental immunity. This Court granted their 
petitions on the basis of parental immunity insofar as the "wrongful-
death claims against [them] [we]re based on allegations of negligence," 
notwithstanding the fact that the wrongful-death claims against them 
founded on allegations of wantonness would remain to be litigated. Id. at 
834. Thus far, however, we have granted mandamus relief in this manner 
only in the context of orders denying a motion for a summary judgment. 
When petitioners have requested mandamus relief from a trial court's 
order merely disallowing their affirmative defenses, however, we have 
employed a different approach. 
B. Mandamus Relief for the Disallowance of Affirmative 
Defenses 
 
As mentioned previously, this Court has acknowledged that "[a] 
trial court's disallowance of a party's affirmative defense is reviewable by 
a petition for a writ of mandamus." Ex parte Buffalo Rock Co., 941 So. 2d 
at 277. Thus, we permit mandamus review when a trial court either 
refuses a defendant's request to amend his or her pleadings to assert an 
SC-2023-0395 
 
10 
affirmative defense, see, e.g., Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 858 So. 
2d 950, 952 (Ala. 2003), or -- as relevant here -- when a trial court grants 
a plaintiff's motion to strike a defendant's affirmative defense, see, e.g., 
Ex parte Gadsden Country Club, 14 So. 3d 830, 832 (Ala. 2009). 
Although, in the context of a trial court's disallowing a party's affirmative 
defense, we have typically required that that affirmative defense, if 
successful, be determinative of the entire action against a particular 
defendant in order to support granting mandamus relief, see, e.g., Ex 
parte TruckMax, Inc. [Ms. SC-2022-0957, Feb. 17, 2023] __ So. 3d __, __ 
(Ala. 2023), the importance of addressing questions of immunity does not 
change depending on the context of how those questions are presented. 
Thus, we conclude that Triad has no other adequate remedy at law and 
is entitled to mandamus review. 
II. Clear Legal Right 
There are two immunity provisions relevant here: § 6-5-792(a) and 
§ 6-5-794(a). Triad states that it is insulated from liability under both 
sections of the ACIA; the Askews believe that neither section is applicable 
to Triad.  
A. Immunity Under § 6-5-792 
SC-2023-0395 
 
11 
The ACIA provides, in relevant part, that "a covered entity[2] shall 
not be liable for any damages, injury, or death suffered by any person or 
entity as a result of, or in connection with, a health emergency claim that 
results from any act or omission of the covered entity." § 6-5-792(a). The 
ACIA further defines a "health emergency claim" as follows: 
"Any claim that arises from or is related to Coronavirus. All 
such claims, no matter how denominated, shall be considered 
a health emergency claim for purposes of [the ACIA]. The 
term includes, but is not limited to, any cause of action that is 
related in any manner to either or both of the following: 
 
"a. The actual, alleged, or feared exposure to 
or contraction of Coronavirus from the premises of 
a covered entity or otherwise related to or arising 
from its operations, products, or services provided 
on or off-premises. 
 
"b. The covered entity's efforts to prevent or 
delay the spread of Coronavirus, including, but not 
limited to, any of the following: 
 
2A covered entity includes, among other things, "[a] health care 
provider." § 6-5-791(a)(5)b., Ala. Code 1975. Included within the ACIA's 
definition of "health care provider" is "[a]ny health care provider as that 
term 
is 
defined 
in 
... 
Section 
6-5-481(1)-(8)[, 
Ala. 
Code 
1975]." § 6-5-791(a)(11)a. Thus, a health-care provider encompasses 
"[s]uch institutions as are defined in Section 22-21-21[, Ala. Code 1975,] 
as hospitals." § 6-5-481(7). The reference to § 22-21-21 in § 6-5-481(7) 
appears to be a typographical error; it further appears that the correct 
reference should be to § 22-21-20(1), Ala. Code 1975. Section 22-21-20(1) 
defines hospitals as "[g]eneral and specialized hospitals." Therefore, and 
as both parties agree, Triad, which operates Flowers Hospital, is a 
covered entity for purposes of the ACIA. 
SC-2023-0395 
 
12 
 
"1. Testing. 
 
"2. 
Monitoring, 
collecting, 
reporting, tracking, tracing, disclosing, 
or investigating exposures or other 
information. 
 
"3. 
Using 
or 
supplying 
precautionary equipment or supplies 
such 
as 
personal 
protective 
equipment." 
 
§ 6-5-791(a)(13), Ala. Code 1975.  
The parties disagree as to the meaning and scope of the above 
language. Triad argues that because Voncille was at the hospital to be 
treated for COVID-19, the Askews' negligence claims "arise[] from or 
[are] related to Coronavirus," and resulted from Triad's actions, and, 
thus, that those claims were health emergency claims for which it cannot 
be liable. The Askews view this section much more narrowly. They 
contend that health emergency claims are only those that either relate to 
exposure to or contraction of COVID-19 or arise from a covered entity's 
efforts to prevent or delay the spread of the virus. Furthermore, they 
opine that any other reading of this section would render §§ 6-5-792(a) 
and 6-5-794(a) redundant. 
1. The Scope of § 6-5-792(a) 
SC-2023-0395 
 
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Incorporating the definition of "health emergency claim" into the 
language of § 6-5-792(a) results in the following unambiguous text: "[A] 
covered entity shall not be liable for any damages, injury, or death 
suffered by any person or entity as a result of, or in connection with, [any 
claim that arises from or is related to Coronavirus] that results from any 
act or omission of the covered entity." Both sides agree that Triad was 
providing monoclonal-antibody-infusion therapy to COVID-19 patients. 
Both sides further agree that Triad directed those patients seeking that 
treatment to enter and exit through an entrance designated "Infusion 
entry." Accordingly, both sides agree that Triad directed Voncille, in 
order to receive that treatment, to enter and exit through the "Infusion 
entry." Finally, both sides agree that Voncille fell and sustained injuries 
after exiting through the "Infusion entry." Factually, then, Voncille 
suffered an injury in connection with her seeking treatment for 
COVID-19 when Triad directed her to enter and exit through a specific 
entrance 
devoted 
exclusively 
for 
patients 
seeking 
monoclonal-antibody-infusion therapy for COVID-19.  
The Askews believe that we cannot reach this conclusion for two 
reasons. First, they assert that this conclusion relies on too broad an 
SC-2023-0395 
 
14 
interpretation of the language "[a]ny claim that arises from or is related 
to Coronavirus." § 6-5-791(a)(13). Instead, they aver that the only claims 
for which a covered entity may be immune are those claims -- or causes 
of actions that bear resemblance to those claims -- that are expressly 
listed under the ACIA's definition of "health emergency claim." 
Therefore, because, according to the Askews, their negligence claims bear 
"striking 
dissimilarity 
to" 
the 
types 
of 
claims 
described 
in 
§ 6-5-791(a)(13)a.-b., Triad cannot be immune as to those claims. Askews' 
brief at 7. What the Askews are asking us to do, in so many words, is 
apply the rule of ejusdem generis to the statute. Under that rule, "where 
general words or phrases follow or precede a specific list of classes of 
persons or things, the general word or phrase is interpreted to be of the 
same nature or class as those named in the specific list." Ex parte 
Mitchell, 989 So. 2d 1083, 1091 (Ala. 2008) (citing Ex parte McLeod, 718 
So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1997)). However, that rule applies only "if the provision 
in question does not express a contrary intent." Cintech Indus. Coatings, 
Inc. v. Bennett Indus., Inc., 85 F.3d 1198, 1202 (6th Cir. 1996). As noted 
earlier, the language preceding the specific examples contained in § 6-5-
791(a)(13)a.-b. states that a health emergency claim "includes, but is not 
SC-2023-0395 
 
15 
limited to," those listed examples. § 6-5-791(a)(13). "Numerous courts 
have found that the use of the words 'includ[es], but [is] not limited to,' 
as appear in this clause, reflect such a contrary intent." Cintech Indus. 
Coatings, 85 F.3d at 1202. Therefore, we reject the Askews' invitation to 
use the rule of ejusdem generis to narrow our interpretation of the ACIA, 
and we recognize the sweeping breadth of the language in 6-5-791(a)(13) 
as expressing the intent of the legislature to grant immunity for "[a]ny 
claim that arises from or is related to Coronavirus." The statute imposes 
no limitations on the chain of causation or on the relation between a claim 
and Coronavirus outside of those limitations inherent to the words 
"arises from" or "is related to."  
2. Potential Overlap Between §§ 6-5-792(a) and 
6-5-794(a) 
 
Second, the Askews appear to contest a broad interpretation of 
§ 6-5-791(a)(13) on the ground that such an interpretation would make 
the immunity under § 6-5-792(a) so far reaching in the context of health-
care providers as to render immunity under § 6-5-794(a) superfluous. 
Essentially, the Askews ask us to forgo a plain-language interpretation 
of the ACIA and to instead rely on the rule against surplusage -- a canon 
of statutory interpretation that "cautions against needlessly reading a 
SC-2023-0395 
 
16 
statute in a way that renders ... certain [provisions] superfluous," Barton 
v. United States Att'y Gen., 904 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2018) -- to 
narrow the scope of claims as to which a health-care provider is immune. 
However, "the usual 'preference' for 'avoiding surplusage constructions is 
not absolute' and ... 'applying the rule against surplusage is, absent other 
indications, inappropriate' when it would make an otherwise 
unambiguous statute ambiguous." Id. at 1301 (quoting Lamie v. United 
States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004), citing in turn Chickasaw Nation v. 
United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001)). Even assuming, for the sake of 
argument, that our interpretation of §§ 6-5-791(a)(13) and 6-5-792(a) 
renders § 6-5-794(a) superfluous, when "faced with a choice between a 
plain-text reading that renders a [provision] superfluous and an 
interpretation that gives every [provision] independent meaning but, in 
the doing, muddies up the statute," we "'should prefer the plain meaning 
since that approach respects the words of [our legislature].'" Id. (quoting 
Lamie, 540 U.S. at 536). Therefore, we also reject the Askews' invitation 
to employ the rule against surplusage to narrow our interpretation of the 
ACIA.  
SC-2023-0395 
 
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Accordingly, the plain language of §§ 6-5-791(a)(13) and 6-5-792(a) 
mandate Triad's entitlement to immunity as to the Askews' negligence 
claims. 
B. Immunity Under § 6-5-794(a) 
Because we resolve this dispute under § 6-5-792(a), we pretermit 
discussion of the question whether Triad is entitled to immunity under 
§ 6-5-794(a). 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we grant Triad's mandamus petition and 
issue the writ; the trial court is directed to vacate its order striking 
Triad's affirmative defense under the ACIA. 
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED. 
Mendheim, J., concurs. 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, and Stewart, JJ., concur in 
the result. 
Mitchell, J., concurs in the result, with opinion. 
Cook, J., recuses himself. 
 
 
SC-2023-0395 
 
18 
MITCHELL, Justice (concurring in the result). 
 
Although Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital is entitled 
to mandamus relief, I disagree with material parts of the main opinion's 
reasoning.  In particular, I believe that the adequate-remedy element of 
our mandamus test is satisfied on immunity grounds only, thus obviating 
the need to analyze affirmative-defense grounds.  And while I agree that 
Triad has a clear legal right to immunity on Voncille and Don Askews' 
negligence claims under what the parties refer to as the Alabama 
COVID-19 Immunity Act ("the ACIA"), §§ 6-5-790 to -799, Ala. Code 
1975, I believe we must acknowledge that the statutory phrase "arises 
from or is related to" imposes meaningful limitations on what claims are 
covered by immunity.  § 6-5-791(a)(13), Ala. Code 1975.  For these 
reasons, I concur in the result only. 
Adequate Remedy 
Unlike the main opinion, I see no tension between our Court's 
mandamus jurisprudence on immunity and the striking of affirmative 
defenses.  Our Court recognizes the denial of immunity as a standalone 
reason for seeking mandamus relief, so the procedural posture in which 
an immunity issue comes to us does not matter.  See, e.g., Ex parte 
SC-2023-0395 
 
19 
Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794, 795 (Ala. 1996) (granting mandamus review on 
the denial of a motion to dismiss on immunity grounds); Ex parte Smith, 
327 So. 3d 184, 187 (Ala. 2020) (granting mandamus review on the denial 
of a summary-judgment motion on immunity grounds).  That's because 
"a defendant wrongfully denied immunity protection has no adequate 
remedy if the case is erroneously permitted to go to trial," Ex parte 
Kelley, 296 So. 3d 822, 826 (Ala. 2019); indeed, the whole point of 
immunity is to "spare a defendant from … defending" against the claim 
at issue.  Id.  And, as the main opinion recognizes, the solicitude our 
Court gives to immunity is not limited to State or State-agent immunity; 
it extends to all kinds of common-law and statutory immunity.  See, e.g., 
id. (parental immunity); Ex parte Johnson, [Ms. SC-2023-0251, Dec. 15, 
2023] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2023) (self-defense immunity); Ex parte Tenax 
Corp., 228 So. 3d 387 (Ala. 2017) (Workers' Compensation Act immunity); 
Ex parte Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Dep't, 181 So. 3d 325 (Ala. 2015) 
(Volunteer Service Act immunity).  
Because we have recognized that immunity is a "well established" 
and independent ground for mandamus review, we need not address the 
circumstances in which the striking of an affirmative defense might also 
SC-2023-0395 
 
20 
justify such review.  Ex parte Gulf Health Hosps., Inc., 321 So. 3d 629, 
632 (Ala. 2020).  Therefore, in my view, immunity by itself is a sufficient 
ground for mandamus review here. 
Clear Legal Right 
Whether Triad has a clear legal right to mandamus rests on the 
ordinary meaning of the phrase "arises from or is related to" as found in 
the ACIA.  § 6-5-791(a)(13).  If the Askews' claim "arises from or is related 
to Coronavirus," id., then it is a "health emergency claim" and Triad 
would be entitled to immunity.  § 6-5-792(a), Ala. Code 1975.  The 
disagreement I have with the main opinion is that it does not indicate 
whether there is any real limit to what claims may be covered by 
immunity.  As I see it -- and as our cases suggest -- the phrase "arises 
from or is related to" incorporates substantive limitations; I believe we 
must acknowledge those limitations here. 
We have previously encountered phrases similar to "arises from or 
is related to" in our contract-law jurisprudence. In the context of a jury-
trial-waiver provision, we have held that the terms "'arising from' or 
'arising under' cover[] only claims requiring a reference to the terms of 
the contract."  Ex parte AIG Baker Orange Beach Wharf, L.L.C., 49 So. 
SC-2023-0395 
 
21 
3d 1198, 1203 (Ala. 2010).  But adding the phrase "is related to" broadens 
contracts to cover a wider range of circumstances.  See Ex parte Cupps, 
782 So. 2d 772, 776 (Ala. 2000); see also Beaver Constr. Co. v. Lakehouse, 
L.L.C., 742 So. 2d 159, 165 (Ala. 1999) (noting that "'relating-to' 
language" is "relatively broad").   
We have dealt with similar phrasing in arbitration clauses.  In that 
context, to rein in the far-reaching implications of those words, our Court 
has held that "'there must be some legal and logical nexus' between the 
dispute and the arbitration provision."   State v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 1 
So. 3d 1, 9 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Kenworth of Dothan, Inc. v. Bruner-Wells 
Trucking, Inc., 745 So. 2d 271, 275 (Ala. 1999)).  In other words, the 
phrase "arises from or is related to" incorporates a causal link, which a 
reasonable reader would understand to track traditional notions of 
foreseeability. 
 
Applying these lessons from our cases interpreting contracts, I 
believe that the phrase "arises from or is related to" in the ACIA carries 
with it limitations that foreclose immunity for extremely remote or 
attenuated claims.  § 6-5-791(a)(13).  That is, for a claim to qualify as a 
"health emergency claim," it must have some reasonably apparent "'legal 
SC-2023-0395 
 
22 
and logical nexus'" with Coronavirus.  Lorillard Tobacco Co., 1 So. 3d at 
9.  Here, the Askews' claims have easily satisfied that test.  As the main 
opinion explains, Triad's decision to designate the relevant entrance for 
use by Coronavirus patients to mitigate the spread of the illness directly 
led to Voncille Askew's use of the entrance and her subsequent injury and 
lawsuit.  Thus, the Askews' claims have an obvious "'legal and logical 
nexus'" with Coronavirus, id., and qualify as "health emergency claims."  
§ 6-5-791(a)(13).  Accordingly, Triad is entitled to immunity on the 
Askews' negligence claims.  § 6-5-792(a). 
 
Interpreting the ACIA without an eye to those limitations is 
dangerous.  As Justice Scalia once noted, the phrase "relate to" is so broad 
that applying it "according to its terms [is] a project doomed to failure, 
since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is 
related to everything else."  California Div. of Lab. Standards Enf't v. 
Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335 (1997) (Scalia, J., 
concurring).  Those limitations are especially important here.  Almost 
every claim made since March 2020 can be traced back to Coronavirus 
given that the virus and the governmental response affected the entire 
world for the better part of three years.   
 
SC-2023-0395 
 
23 
*** 
For these reasons, I concur only in the result granting the petition 
and issuing the writ of mandamus.