Case Title: Roy Lee Mcduffie v. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC05-587

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-587 
____________ 
 
ROY LEE MCDUFFIE,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[November 21, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Roy Lee McDuffie appeals his convictions of first-degree murder of 
Dawniell Beauregard and Janice Schneider, robbery with a firearm, and false 
imprisonment while armed and his sentences of death for the murders.  We have 
mandatory jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  We conclude that errors 
occurred during the course of the trial which, when viewed cumulatively, are not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Therefore, we reverse McDuffie’s 
convictions, vacate his sentences, and remand for a new trial.  Because we 
conclude that reversible error occurred in the guilt phase of the trial, we do not 
discuss the penalty phase issues. 
FACTS 
This case involves the October 25, 2002, murders of Dawniell Beauregard 
and Janice Schneider, two employees of the Dollar General store on Deltona 
Boulevard in Volusia County.  Several hours after 8 p.m., the normal closing time 
for the store, Beauregard and Schneider were found shot to death in the back office 
of the store after a family member reported Schneider missing.  The exact time that 
Beauregard and Schneider were shot is unknown, but popping sounds were heard 
from the vicinity of the Dollar General around 9:10 p.m.  Both victims died from 
close contact gunshots to the head, although each had cutting wounds on their 
necks.  Additionally, Schneider had a gunshot wound to her abdomen.  
Beauregard, whose mouth was taped, was bound with duct tape on her hands and 
feet.  It appeared that Schneider, who was not bound with tape, had been able to 
cut the duct tape on Beauregard’s feet before being killed.  The store was found 
with the lights on and the doors locked.  Cash from that day in the amount of 
$4,946.17, along with checks in the amount of $1,467.76, were missing.  The 
money, checks and bank bag were never recovered.  The murder weapon was also 
never found. 
Roy McDuffie was eventually charged with the murders but the only 
physical evidence linking him to the crimes was a partial palm print on duct tape 
taken from Beauregard’s wrists.  McDuffie, who was an employee of Dollar 
 
- 2 -
General at the time, testified at trial that he had used the tape earlier that day to 
assist a customer who needed some boxes assembled.  Other circumstantial 
evidence and an eyewitness identification linked McDuffie to the scene close in 
time to when the murders probably occurred.  The eyewitness identification, 
although admissible, was subject to challenge.  
We discuss the evidence in detail because, although there was competent, 
substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict, the State has not demonstrated 
that the errors that occurred were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
evidence at trial revealed that McDuffie, a local youth-league football coach, had 
been hired as an assistant manager trainee for Dollar General earlier that week and 
had been training at the Deltona store.  Because his second car had been 
repossessed, he and his wife, Troy, were carpooling.  McDuffie took his wife to 
her nursing assistant job Friday, October 25, and then went to The Coca-Cola 
Company offices where he filled out papers for a new job he had just accepted—a 
fact he had shared with his immediate supervisor, Linda Torres, but no one else.  
He planned to work just one week at Dollar General and then take the Coca-Cola 
job on the following Monday.  
McDuffie attended a Dollar General meeting at another location for most of 
the afternoon, then picked up his wife from her job at about 5:15 p.m. and drove to 
the Deltona Dollar General.  Troy McDuffie stayed in the store for a while and 
 
- 3 -
then went next door to the Winn-Dixie to buy a money order.  As closing time 
approached, she left the store and sat in the car to wait for McDuffie where she 
reclined in the seat and rested.   
Employee Carol Hopkins was working the cash register at the front of the 
store while McDuffie, Schneider, and Beauregard did the closing procedures.  This 
involved cleaning up the store, counting the cash in the cash register drawers and 
cash that had been placed in the safe during the day, and preparing the bank 
deposit bag into which the day’s cash and checks would be placed.  This nightly 
closing procedure usually took thirty to forty-five minutes to complete.   
After locking up the store at 8 p.m., Beauregard and McDuffie stayed mainly 
in the back office counting out the cash register drawers and filling out the 
paperwork for the bank deposit.  A tear off tag from the bank deposit bag—
something that is one of the last things done during closing—bore both 
Beauregard’s and McDuffie’s signatures, indicating McDuffie was still in the store 
at that point in the process.  Beauregard had banded the money, sealed and pulled 
off the tab from the bank deposit bag, and locked the bag in the safe.  They then 
left the office, locked the office door, and went to the front of the store to do a final 
register reading.   
 
Store policy required that there always be two people in the office with the 
cash, and that if three or fewer employees close the store, they must always leave 
 
- 4 -
together.  Because there were four employees in the store that evening, and cashier 
Carol Hopkins’ register had been counted, she clocked out at 8:34 p.m. and asked 
if she could leave for the day.   As she was leaving the Dollar General, she saw two 
men sitting on a bench outside the store, which she thought was suspicious.  She 
later gave law enforcement investigators descriptions of the men and composite 
drawings were created based on her descriptions.   
Olivia Sousa was working that night at her restaurant in the Deltona Plaza 
where the Dollar General is located.  Around 9:30 p.m., she walked to the Winn-
Dixie and on her way back to the restaurant, she saw a black man inside the Dollar 
General walking toward the back of the store.  She did not see his face but he was 
wearing a black shirt and tan pants, which was the Dollar General uniform.  Earlier 
in the week she had noticed a black man, who was a new employee, working in the 
store.  McDuffie was the only black employee working at the Deltona store that 
week.  Ms. Sousa could not say the man she saw on October 25 was that same 
man, but he appeared to have a similar build. 
At approximately 9:27 p.m., Alex Matias was standing next to his truck in 
the parking lot in the vicinity of the Dollar General and the Winn-Dixie talking on 
his cell phone.  He noticed the Dollar General store lights were still on.  This was 
unusual because the store closes at 8 p.m. and the lights are usually off by 8:45 
p.m., a fact known to him because he used to work at the Dollar General.  Matias 
 
- 5 -
testified that he saw a black male unlock the Dollar General door from the inside, 
open it, relock it, go to a dark-colored car in the parking lot, and open the car’s 
back door.  The man then shut the car door, returned to the store, unlocked the 
door, entered, and relocked it.  Each locking and unlocking procedure required a 
separate key.  This same process happened a second time.  Matias did not see 
anyone in the car and did not see the man carrying anything to the car.   
Matias was a friend of Dawniell Beauregard’s sister, Crystal, and spoke with 
her the day after the murders.  At her urging, he called the Sheriff’s office and met 
with investigators to report what he had seen.  Matias met with police and gave a 
composite description of a black male, between six feet and six feet three inches 
tall, mid-twenties to late-thirties, heavy build, darker than normal complexion, 
clean shaven, hair short on top with shaved sides, wearing a knit, collared, dark 
shirt over a white undershirt, and dark-colored long pants.  The man was about 
fifty feet away, but looked right at Matias.  In contrast, although McDuffie was in 
his late thirties, he was five feet seven inches tall, wearing a dark shirt and tan 
pants while working in the store that night.   
 
When McDuffie was arrested on December 17, 2002, Matias saw his picture 
on television and believed McDuffie was the man he saw that night at the Dollar 
General.  However, it was not until April 2003 that he told a Sheriff’s investigator 
that he thought the man he saw on television was the same man he saw October 25, 
 
- 6 -
2002, at the Dollar General.  Based on information given to him by the 
investigator, Matias wrote a letter requesting the $10,000 reward offered by Dollar 
General.  Matias agreed that it was likely that if he did not come to court and 
identify McDuffie, he would not get the reward.  He did receive the reward, 
however, prior to the time of the trial. 
 
Sheriff’s investigators interviewed McDuffie in the early morning hours 
after the murders were discovered and again some days later.  McDuffie told 
investigators he left the store that night shortly after Carol Hopkins left.  He said 
that he and his wife drove approximately forty-five minutes to an Aaron’s home 
furnishing rental center to put Troy’s money order payment in the night drop box.  
He said they arrived about 9:35 p.m. and then drove to a nearby McDonald’s for 
some food.  McDuffie estimated he arrived home by about 10:15 p.m., but the 
evidence established that he could not have reached Aaron’s before 10:30 p.m.  A 
videotape taken at McDonald’s showed McDuffie buying his food there at 10:34 
p.m.   
The only physical evidence linking McDuffie to the crimes was a partial 
palm print matching the upper portion of McDuffie’s right hand, which was found 
on a reconstructed strip of Dollar General duct tape taken from around 
Beauregard’s wrists.  The State’s latent print examiner testified that a palm print 
could, under certain circumstances, be transferred from one portion of duct tape to 
 
- 7 -
another if the tape was pressed together.  This was one hypothesis offered by the 
defense for how the print could have been located where it was on the tape.   
Evidence found at the scene also included: a box cutter blade with both 
victims’ blood found wrapped in bloody paper towels (Schneider’s blood) stuffed 
into Schneider’s purse; unidentified hair found in the same bloody paper towels; 
bloody scissors found on the floor under and between Schneider and Beauregard; a 
bloody screwdriver found in the office; a cardboard box by the office door with 
Schneider’s blood on it; another pair of scissors with the victims’ blood found on 
the desk; and unidentified female blood found on the inside handle of the restroom 
door and on the floor of the restroom.    
No hair, fiber, or DNA connected McDuffie to the crime.  A Pepsi bottle 
near the office had McDuffie’s DNA on it but no evidence indicated when 
McDuffie drank the soda or placed the bottle there.  The bullets that killed 
Schneider and Beauregard were .22 caliber subsonic sniper-type rifle bullets that 
can also be fired from a handgun, but the gun was never found and there was no 
evidence linking McDuffie to a gun.   
A substantial portion of the State’s case was devoted to establishing a 
motive by showing the dire financial condition in which McDuffie found himself 
in September and October 2002.  This evidence included these facts: McDuffie’s 
car had been repossessed; he had been unemployed for a month; he had been 
 
- 8 -
evicted from his rented residence; he owed back rent, current rent and a security 
deposit; and he was being dunned by creditors.  The State produced evidence that 
early on Saturday, October 26, McDuffie purchased three money orders totaling 
$1,450, which were later given to his new landlord for the rent and the security 
deposit due on McDuffie’s new rental residence. 
McDuffie testified in his own defense that he left the store shortly after 
Carol Hopkins and had nothing to do with the crimes.  The defense crime scene 
reconstruction expert testified that based on the number of weapons, the two open 
rolls of paper towels found in the storeroom, the differing wounds inflicted, the 
difficulty of handling two victims and binding one with duct tape, and the 
unidentified hair and female blood found at the scene, it was likely that there were 
two perpetrators.  The defense also presented the testimony of jail inmate Kevin 
Ingram who said another inmate, Michael Fitzgerald, a white male, had confessed 
to involvement in the crimes.  Michael Fitzgerald testified, denying involvement in 
the crimes and claiming that while he was in jail he heard McDuffie confess to the 
crimes.   
  
The jury found McDuffie guilty of the first-degree murders of Janice 
Schneider and Dawniell Beauregard, robbery with a firearm, and false 
imprisonment with a firearm.  The case proceeded to the penalty phase after which 
the trial court sentenced McDuffie to death for each of the murders.  McDuffie was 
 
- 9 -
also sentenced to life in prison for his conviction of robbery with a firearm and to a 
term of fifteen years for his conviction of false imprisonment while armed. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
McDuffie raises ten issues on appeal.1  We discuss three of these issues in 
detail—the exclusion of Wiggins’ testimony, the limitation on cross-examination 
of witnesses Matias and Hopkins, and the Pederson voice mail testimony.  We do 
so because we conclude that the trial court’s rulings on these issues constitute 
reversible error in the guilt phase.  We also discuss sufficiency of the evidence.   
Defense Richardson Violation 
                                          
 
1.  The claims on appeal are: (1) the trial court erred in failing to conduct an 
adequate inquiry under Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971), regarding 
a defense discovery violation and by excluding witness Wiggins’ testimony and 
exhibit; (2) the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress identification of 
McDuffie by Alex Matias and in restricting cross-examination of Matias and Carol 
Hopkins; (3) the trial court erred in restricting presentation of “reverse Williams 
rule” evidence (Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959)); (4) the trial court 
erred in admitting testimony of witness Pederson concerning a voice mail message; 
(5) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of collateral bad acts that became a 
feature of the trial; (6) the evidence is insufficient to support McDuffie’s 
convictions; (7) the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of the “heinous, 
atrocious or cruel” (HAC) aggravator as to both murders; (8) Florida’s capital 
sentencing statute and standard jury instructions violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments by establishing a presumption that death is the 
appropriate penalty and by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to 
establish mitigating factors and to show that mitigation outweighs aggravation; (9) 
error occurred in the penalty phase because the jury heard argument and instruction 
regarding the “cold, calculated and premeditated” (CCP) aggravator which the trial 
court later rejected; and (10) Florida’s capital sentencing statute violates the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 
 
- 10 -
McDuffie’s first issue on appeal is his claim that the trial court erred in 
excluding the testimony of defense witness Wiggins based on a Richardson 
violation committed by the defense.  The defense called McDuffie’s friend, 
Anthony Wiggins, to testify during the guilt phase that Wiggins had, in the weeks 
before the murders, sent McDuffie two Western Union money transfers totaling 
$340.  McDuffie and his wife had testified that a number of individuals loaned or 
gave them money in mid-October, which could account for some of the cash 
McDuffie had on the day after the murders and help rebut the State’s contention 
that McDuffie was desperate over his poor financial condition.  Wiggins was the 
only non-family member who could testify that he loaned money to McDuffie in 
October. 
The State objected to Wiggins’ testimony because he had been listed only as 
a penalty-phase witness and not as a guilt-phase witness, and because the defense 
had just that morning produced Wiggins’ $40 Western Union transfer receipt dated 
October 18, 2002, which the State had not had time to explore or verify.  Defense 
counsel explained that Wiggins was inadvertently listed only for the penalty phase 
and that Wiggins had just given counsel the $40 Western Union receipt that day.  
Defense counsel offered to call Wiggins later or the next day.  
The prosecutor responded:  “I mean, I’m totally unaware of what this person 
is going to say and I’m sure that I can probably deal with it at this point in time.  
 
- 11 -
But the problem is it is a surprise.”  (Emphasis added.)  The trial court announced 
that the defense had committed a Richardson discovery violation which prejudiced 
the State and that Wiggins’ testimony would be excluded.   
On proffer, Wiggins, a barber, testified that he had been a friend of 
McDuffie for nine or ten years and used to cut his hair in Jacksonville.  Wiggins 
said he wired $40, for which he had a Western Union transfer receipt, to McDuffie 
on October 18, 2002.  He testified that he also loaned McDuffie $300 via Western 
Union earlier that same week, for which he did not have a receipt.  
The court, finding that a Richardson violation had occurred and concluding 
that the State was prejudiced, excluded both the Western Union receipt and 
Wiggins’ testimony without exploring any alternatives, such as a short delay for a 
deposition, a continuance, or presentation of the witness later in the week as 
suggested by the defense.  Importantly, the State never specifically asked the court 
to exclude the witness, nor did the State request any lesser remedy, such as a short 
delay to depose Wiggins.  During closing argument, the State stressed that the 
purported undocumented loans to McDuffie were from “just the family” and were 
not credible.   
Where exclusion of evidence or other sanction is sought because of a 
discovery violation, Richardson holds that the trial court’s discretion can be 
properly exercised only after an adequate inquiry is made into three areas:  (1) 
 
- 12 -
whether the discovery violation was willful or inadvertent; (2) whether it was 
trivial or substantial; and (3) whether it had a prejudicial effect on the opposing 
party’s trial preparation.  246 So. 2d at 775.  Prejudice in this context means 
procedural prejudice significantly affecting the opposing party’s preparation for 
trial.  See, e.g., Scipio v. State, 928 So. 2d 1138, 1146 (Fla. 2006).  This Court will 
review the record to determine if this full inquiry was made and if the trial court’s 
actions pursuant to the inquiry were proper.  The same rules apply and the same 
procedure must be followed regardless of which party commits the discovery 
violation, but additional constitutional considerations are involved when a defense 
witness is excluded.  This is because “[t]here are few rights more fundamental than 
the right of an accused to present witnesses in his or her own defense.”  Alexander 
v. State, 931 So. 2d  946, 950 (Fla. 4th DCA) (quoting Jenkins v. State, 872 So. 2d 
388, 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)) (alteration in original), review denied, 944 So. 2d 
988 (Fla. 2006).  
  In this case, defense counsel explained that Wiggins’ name had been 
inadvertently listed as only a penalty-phase witness and not as a guilt-phase 
witness.  The trial court did not find the violation to be willful and never inquired 
into whether the violation was substantial or trivial.  The trial court made only a 
limited inquiry into whether the violation prejudicially affected the State’s ability 
to prepare for trial.  Here, the State, as the aggrieved party, failed to assert that it 
 
- 13 -
would suffer any substantial procedural prejudice if Wiggins were allowed to 
testify.  Instead, the prosecutor tempered his mild claim of prejudice by stating, 
“I’m sure that I can probably deal with it at this point in time.  But the problem is it 
is a surprise.”  Notwithstanding that concession, the trial court immediately 
excluded Wiggins’ testimony and evidence without exploring what substantial 
procedural prejudice would accrue to the State if he testified.   
We are mindful that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(n)(1) 
authorizes a trial court to exclude evidence as a sanction for a violation of the 
discovery rules, but this sanction should only be imposed when there is no other 
adequate remedy.  Furthermore, where as here the violation has not been found to 
be willful or blatant, this sanction is generally too severe “when the only prejudice 
to the State is its inability to obtain evidence for impeachment of the witness.”  
Grace v. State, 832 So. 2d 224, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); cf. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 
U.S. 400, 415 (1988) (holding that if the failure to disclose a defense witness was 
“willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage that would 
minimize the effectiveness of cross-examination and the ability to adduce rebuttal 
evidence, it would be entirely consistent with the purposes of the Compulsory 
Process Clause simply to exclude the witness’s testimony”).  In this case, the trial 
court did not make a finding that the defense discovery violation was willful or 
intended to gain a tactical advantage, but the court excluded otherwise admissible 
 
- 14 -
evidence based on the State’s surprise and asserted difficulty in obtaining evidence 
with which to impeach Wiggins.  Even if the inability to obtain impeachment 
evidence by the State were considered a substantial procedural prejudice, the trial 
court’s required inquiry does not stop there. 
“First, the judge must decide whether the discovery violation prevented the 
aggrieved party from properly preparing for trial.  Second, the judge must 
determine the appropriate sanction to invoke for the violation.”  Smith v. State, 372 
So. 2d 86, 88 (Fla. 1979); see also Snelgrove v. State, 921 So. 2d 560, 567 (Fla. 
2005) (“Richardson mandates that once a discovery violation is revealed, the trial 
court must conduct an inquiry to determine the sanctions that should be imposed 
on the violating party.”).   
Where the issue involves possible exclusion of defense evidence, the 
“extreme sanction of excluding [defense] evidence . . . should be used only as a 
last resort” and “it is incumbent upon the trial court . . . to determine whether any 
other reasonable alternatives can be employed to overcome . . . possible prejudice,” 
including declaration of a mistrial.  Casseus v. State, 902 So. 2d 294, 295 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2005) (quoting State v. Eaton, 868 So. 2d 650, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); see 
also Tomengo v. State, 864 So. 2d 525, 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (stating that 
exclusion of a defense witness because of a defense disclosure violation is a severe 
sanction that should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated 
 
- 15 -
circumstances); Livigni v. State, 725 So. 2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) 
(stating that the severe sanction of defense witness exclusion for witness list 
violation should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances).  
When, as in this case, the discovery violation is committed by the defense, 
special importance attaches to the trial court’s inquiry into alternative sanctions 
because exclusion of exculpatory evidence implicates the defendant’s 
constitutional right to defend himself or herself.  See Alexander, 931 So. 2d at 950; 
see also McBride v. State, 913 So. 2d 696, 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding that a 
criminal defendant has a due process right to present evidence and that exclusion 
of evidence for a defense discovery violation should be imposed only if no other 
remedy suffices).  In this case, the trial court did not consider whether another 
course of action could remedy or mitigate any procedural prejudice to the State, 
even though the defense offered to call the witness later.  The trial court could have 
allowed a brief delay for a deposition or Wiggins’ testimony could have been 
postponed until the end of the defense case.   
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred when it failed to conduct 
an adequate Richardson inquiry and excluded the testimony of the defense witness 
without considering less extreme alternatives.  The failure to consider less extreme 
alternatives is of even greater significance here because the prosecutor actually 
stated that he could deal with the witness.  Although we no longer adhere to a strict 
 
- 16 -
standard of per se reversible error and a harmless error analysis is proper, Scipio, 
928 So. 2d at 1146, we will analyze this error cumulatively with the other errors 
that we conclude also occurred.  
Restrictions on Cross-Examination 
McDuffie’s second issue on appeal relates to the trial court’s restriction on 
cross-examination of witnesses Carol Hopkins and Alex Matias concerning 
photographs of two men, Steve Absalon and Michael Fitzgerald, who resembled 
the two men sitting outside the store at closing.  Carol Hopkins, the last cashier to 
leave the store that evening, reported that two “suspicious” men were sitting 
outside the Dollar General when she left.  She assisted investigators in preparing 
composite drawings of the men.  The defense attempted to cross-examine Hopkins 
concerning a photograph of Absalon, a black male who resembled McDuffie and 
had a prior association with the same shopping plaza in which the Dollar General 
is located.  Hopkins testified on proffer that she was “fairly certain” that the 
photograph of Absalon depicted the black male who was sitting with a white male 
outside the Dollar General.   
The defense also attempted to cross-examine Hopkins concerning a 
photograph of Fitzgerald.  She testified on proffer that the man in the photograph 
looked like the white male who was also sitting on the bench outside the Dollar 
General.  Jail inmate Kevin Ingram later testified that Fitzgerald had confessed to 
 
- 17 -
being involved in the Dollar General crimes.  Evidence also established that 
Fitzgerald used to date Dawniell Beauregard’s sister, Tammy, and is the father of 
her two children.  He had been to the Dollar General store in the past when 
Beauregard was working there as a cashier.  Fitzgerald testified that on the night of 
October 25, 2002, he had ridden in a dark blue car with two black males and had 
been buying and smoking crack cocaine.  He admitted lying to police concerning 
his whereabouts that night when questioned about an unrelated incident because, 
he said, he did not want the police to know he had been smoking crack cocaine.  At 
the time he testified, Fitzgerald was in prison for armed robbery. 
The defense attempted, unsuccessfully, to cross-examine Alex Matias about 
Absalon’s photograph.  Matias testified for the State that he saw a black male 
leaving and re-entering the Dollar General about 9:27 p.m. on the night of the 
murders.  Matias assisted investigators in preparing a composite drawing of the 
man he saw that night, but portions of the face in the drawing were left blank.  He 
described the man as being in his mid-twenties to late-thirties, over six feet tall, 
and wearing a dark shirt and dark-colored pants.  (McDuffie was thirty-nine years 
old, approximately five feet seven inches tall, and was wearing tan pants that 
night.)   In December 2002, Matias saw a photograph of McDuffie on television 
news and believed him to be the man he saw at the Dollar General on October 25.  
 
- 18 -
Matias did not report this information to law enforcement officers until April and 
he collected a $10,000 reward for his information in July 2003.   
The State argues that the restriction upon cross-examination concerning the 
photographs of Absalon and Fitzgerald was proper because the trial court had 
previously ruled that the defense could not present reverse Williams rule evidence 
that Absalon had committed an armed robbery in the same shopping plaza and that 
Fitzgerald had committed several armed robberies.2  The trial court ruled that the 
defense could not present, as reverse Williams rule evidence, the fact that in June 
2003 Michael Fitzgerald committed several robberies of convenience stores that 
were open for business by displaying but not discharging a firearm, because the 
facts of those robberies were not sufficiently similar to the crimes for which 
McDuffie was on trial.   For this same reason, the trial court also ruled that the 
defense could not present evidence that Steve Absalon and an accomplice, while 
wearing masks and displaying but not discharging a firearm, had previously robbed 
                                          
 
2.  The “Williams rule” takes its name from Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 
654 (Fla. 1959), and is codified at section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (2005).  This 
rule allows introduction of similar fact evidence of other crimes or acts by the 
defendant that are relevant to prove a material matter in the prosecution.  “Reverse 
Williams rule” evidence is evidence of a crime committed by another person that a 
defendant offers to show his or her innocence of the instant crime.  See Rivera v. 
State, 561 So. 2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1990).  The defendant must demonstrate a “close 
similarity of facts, a unique or ‘fingerprint’ type of information” for the reverse 
Williams rule evidence to be admissible.  White v. State, 817 So. 2d 799, 806 (Fla. 
2002) (quoting State v. Savino, 567 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. 1990)).  Exclusion of 
reverse Williams rule evidence is subject to abuse of discretion review.  Huggins v. 
State, 889 So. 2d 743, 761 (Fla. 2004).  
 
- 19 -
a bank in the same shopping plaza where the Dollar General is located.  The trial 
court concluded that evidence of the crimes committed by Fitzgerald and Absalon 
was inadmissible as reverse Williams rule evidence because it was not of such 
nature that it would be admissible if either of those people were on trial for the 
present offenses.  See State v. Savino, 567 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. 1990) (“If a 
defendant’s purpose is to shift suspicion from himself to another person, evidence 
of past criminal conduct of that other person should be of such nature that it would 
be admissible if that person were on trial for the present offense.”).  We conclude 
that the trial court did not err in prohibiting the presentation of this reverse 
Williams rule evidence because the prerequisites for reverse Williams rule 
evidence were not present.  However, the inadmissibility of evidence for one 
purpose—here, as reverse Williams rule evidence—does not dictate inadmissibility 
for another proper purpose, specifically cross-examination.  See § 90.107, Fla. Stat. 
(2005); Consalvo v. State, 697 So. 2d 805, 813 (Fla. 1996).   
We begin with the premise that limitation on cross-examination of witnesses 
is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Boyd v. State, 910 So. 2d 167, 185 (Fla. 
2005).  A trial court’s discretion in this area, however, is constrained by the rules 
of evidence, Johnston v. State, 863 So. 2d 271, 278 (Fla. 2003), and by recognition 
of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.  “The right of a criminal 
defendant to cross-examine adverse witnesses is derived from the Sixth 
 
- 20 -
Amendment and due process right to confront one’s accusers.  One accused of 
crime therefore has an absolute right to full and fair cross-examination.”  
Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 337 (Fla. 1982).  As the United States Supreme 
Court explained in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974): 
Cross-examination is the principal means by which the 
believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.  
Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude 
repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is 
not only permitted to delve into the witness’ story to test the witness’ 
perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally 
been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.  
 
The scope of cross-examination is not without bounds, but “where a criminal 
defendant in a capital case, while exercising his sixth amendment right to confront 
and cross-examine the witnesses against him, inquires of a key prosecution witness 
regarding matters which are both germane to that witness’s testimony on direct 
examination and plausibly relevant to the defense, an abuse of discretion by the 
trial judge in curtailing that inquiry may easily constitute reversible error.” 
Coxwell v. State, 361 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 1978).  In this case, the proffered 
cross-examination of both Matias and Hopkins constituted legitimate inquiry into 
matters both germane to their direct testimony and plausibly relevant to the 
defense’s theory in which McDuffie was attempting to show that Matias’s 
identification of McDuffie was faulty.   
 
- 21 -
We have long recognized the right of a defendant in a capital case to fully 
cross-examine those witnesses called by the prosecution: 
It is too well settled to need citation of authority that a fair and 
full cross-examination of a witness upon the subjects opened by the 
direct examination is an absolute right, as distinguished from a 
privilege, which must always be accorded to the person against whom 
the witness is called and this is particularly true in a criminal case 
such as this wherein the defendant is charged with the crime of 
murder in the first degree.  For the sake of emphasis we make the 
observation that at the time of the proposed cross-examination 
appellant stood in jeopardy of being convicted of such capital offense.  
Cross-examination of a witness upon the subjects covered in his direct 
examination is an invaluable right and when it is denied to him it 
cannot be said that such ruling does not constitute harmful and fatal 
error.  Moreover, the right of cross-examination stems from the 
constitutional guaranty that an accused person shall have the right to 
be confronted by his accusers.  
 
Coco v. State, 62 So. 2d 892, 894-95 (Fla. 1953).  “[C]ross-examination is not 
confined to the identical details testified to in chief, but extends to its entire subject 
matter, and to all matters that may modify, supplement, contradict, rebut or make 
clearer the facts testified to in chief . . . .”  Boyd, 910 So. 2d at 185 (quoting Coco, 
62 So. 2d at 895).   
The proffered cross-examination of Hopkins was directly related to her 
testimony on direct examination about two men she saw sitting outside the store 
that night.  She further testified on cross-examination that she was so concerned 
about their presence that, as she was leaving, she told her co-workers to call 911 if 
anything happened to her on the way to her car.  She testified during her proffer 
 
- 22 -
that she was “fairly certain” the photograph of Absalon depicted one of the men 
she saw sitting on the bench after closing time at the Dollar General.  The 
photograph of Fitzgerald, a man with known ties to the shopping plaza and to 
Beauregard, closely resembled the composite drawing of the white male which 
Hopkins helped create.  Cross-examination concerning photographs of these two 
men, one whose face resembled McDuffie’s and one who was said to have 
confessed to involvement in the crimes, was both within the scope of direct-
examination of Hopkins and relevant to McDuffie’s theory of defense, including 
the theory that Matias misidentified McDuffie as the man he saw that night leaving 
and re-entering the Dollar General.   
Cross-examination of Matias concerning the photograph of Absalon was 
also relevant to Matias’s testimony identifying McDuffie.  Matias’s 
contemporaneous description of the man he saw that night varied substantially 
from McDuffie’s physical description, and Matias was never confronted with a 
photographic or live line-up from which to identify any suspect as the person he 
saw at the Dollar General.   The face of the composite that was prepared based on 
Matias’s description was left incomplete due to Matias’s inability to find 
composite components that matched his recollection of the man.   His sole 
exposure to possible suspects was by way of the televised photograph of McDuffie 
who, at the time, was already under arrest for the crimes.  
 
- 23 -
We have long held that it is “fatal error for the trial court to deny defense 
counsel the right of cross-examination for the purpose of laying a predicate for 
impeachment.”  See Coco, 62 So. 2d at 896.  Here, cross-examination of Matias 
with a photograph of a man who Carol Hopkins was “fairly certain” was sitting on 
the bench outside the store at closing time on the night of the crimes could have 
formed the basis for impeaching or testing the accuracy of Matias’s identification 
of McDuffie.  Therefore, cross-examination of Matias regarding the Absalon 
photograph was relevant to the credibility of his in-court identification of 
McDuffie as the man he saw at the Dollar General and was relevant to McDuffie’s 
theory of defense.   
Our review of the record convinces us that the trial court abused its 
discretion in restricting cross-examination in these areas, and in so doing 
committed error.  Although this error standing alone might be considered harmless 
(although the State has not argued that it is harmless), we conclude that this error 
should be considered cumulatively with the other errors we have identified and 
considered in light of the remaining evidence, which was largely circumstantial.  
Voice Mail Evidence 
Next, McDuffie contends that the trial court committed reversible error 
when it admitted testimony of the detailed contents of a threatening and vulgar 
message McDuffie left on the voice mail of attorney David Pederson on October 
 
- 24 -
22, 2002.  Pederson, an attorney whose father had previously rented a home to the 
McDuffies, had filed an eviction suit against McDuffie in which he claimed back 
rent and fees, including attorney’s fees.  The voice mail was left after McDuffie 
received the eviction suit.  The actual voice mail was subsequently erased but 
Pederson was allowed to testify, over defense objection, as to the contents of the 
message:  
He said that he hoped myself and my father would go to Baltimore, 
Maryland, and get our asses shot off.  At that time the sniper was 
there.  Also, he said you can go suck your father’s dick, fuck your 
mother, things along that nature.  It’s just - - it was a nasty, hardcore 
message. 
 
The trial court admitted this detailed testimony based on the State’s argument that 
it showed McDuffie’s state of mind and desperation over his financial situation. 
We hold that admission of the contents of the voice mail message was error.   
The standard of review of a trial court’s evidentiary rulings is abuse of 
discretion.  Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So. 2d 495, 514-15 (Fla. 2005).  The trial 
court’s discretion is limited, however, by the rules of evidence, Johnston, 863 So. 
2d at 278, and by the principles of stare decisis.  Cf. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 
So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980) (“Judges dealing with cases essentially alike should 
reach the same result.”).  A trial court also abuses its discretion if its ruling is based 
on an “erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the 
evidence.”  Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990).  We will, 
 
- 25 -
therefore, examine the rules of evidence which govern and the assessment of the 
evidence presented in this case. 
Section 90.402, Florida Statutes (2005), a provision within the Florida 
Evidence Code, provides that all relevant evidence is admissible except as 
provided by law.  “Relevant evidence is defined as ‘evidence tending to prove or 
disprove a material fact’ [but] . . . ‘[r]elevant evidence is inadmissible if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.’”  Sliney v. State, 944 So. 2d 270, 286 (Fla. 2006) (quoting §§ 90.401, 
90.403, Fla. Stat.).  “[P]roper application of section 90.403 requires a balancing 
test by the trial judge.  Only when the unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the 
probative value of the evidence must the evidence be excluded.”  Alston v. State, 
723 So. 2d 148, 156 (Fla. 1998).   
  “Unfair prejudice” has been described as “an undue tendency to suggest 
decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional 
one.”  Brown v. State, 719 So. 2d 882, 885 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Old Chief v. 
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997)).  This rule of exclusion “is directed at 
evidence which inflames the jury or appeals improperly to the jury’s emotions.”  
Steverson v. State, 695 So. 2d 687, 688-89 (Fla. 1997).  In performing the 
balancing test to determine if the unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of 
 
- 26 -
the evidence, the trial court should consider the need for the evidence, the tendency 
of the evidence to suggest an emotional basis for the verdict, the chain of inference 
from the evidence necessary to establish the material fact, and the effectiveness of 
a limiting instruction.  Taylor v. State, 855 So. 2d 1, 22 (Fla. 2003).  The trial court 
is obligated to exclude evidence in which unfair prejudice outweighs the probative 
value in order to avoid the danger that a jury will convict a defendant based upon 
reasons other than evidence establishing his guilt.  
The Second District’s decision in Coverdale v. State, 940 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2006), is a case in point.  Coverdale involved a prosecution for aggravated 
stalking, in which the trial court admitted evidence that Coverdale threatened a 
detective, saying he was going to hunt her down and would like to see her head 
blown off.  Id. at 561.  The prosecution argued the threatening statement was 
probative of Coverdale’s state of mind concerning the crime of stalking the victim 
in the case.  Id.  The Second District reversed, explaining that  
[the detective’s] testimony that Coverdale was acting irate do[es] 
address Coverdale’s state of mind.  But, the additional testimony 
about Coverdale’s threat to hunt down the detective and that she 
would look good with a bullet in her head or that it would be nice to 
see her head blown off was unduly prejudicial.  Thus, the trial court 
abused its discretion in allowing the testimony. 
 
Id. at 562.    
In Davis v. State, 718 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), in a prosecution for 
exploitation of the elderly, the trial court admitted a videotaped interview with the 
 
- 27 -
victim that was marginally relevant to show the victim’s state of mind to 
corroborate her incompetence.  Id. at 876.  The district court reversed because the 
unfair prejudice to Davis outweighed the tape’s probative value, noting that the 
tape’s principal effect was to show the victim’s loathing of the defendant and the 
attitude of the interviewer that the defendant was a threat.  Id. at 877.  The district 
court said that showing the marginally relevant tape “lobbed the proverbial skunk 
into the jury box, and deprived the defendant of a fair trial.”  Id.  
Similar to Coverdale and Davis, in this case the details of the statement that 
McDuffie hoped Pederson and his father would go to Baltimore and “get [their] 
asses shot off” was unnecessary to prove what the State asserted was the relevant 
fact—that McDuffie was in a desperate state of mind.  The vulgar portion of the 
voice mail only showed that he was extremely irate at having been served with a 
suit for eviction claiming attorney’s fees he thought were unconscionable.  Nor 
were the details of the voice mail, which occurred days before the murder and bore 
no relationship to the crimes, probative of whether McDuffie committed robbery 
and murder.  On the other hand, those details tended to prove quite effectively 
several irrelevant, highly prejudicial facts—that McDuffie was vicious, nasty, and 
of questionable moral character.  In addition, the reference to the sniper incidents, 
 
- 28 -
which involved random shootings by black men of primarily white victims, could 
only serve to inflame the jury’s emotions.3      
 We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 
detailed contents of the threatening and obscene voice mail.  Any purported 
probative value is marginal at best as it simply shows McDuffie was angry over 
being evicted, a fact that did not require the objectionable details of the voice mail 
to prove.  Any marginal probative value relative to McDuffie’s state of mind is 
substantially outweighed by the highly inflammatory contents of a voice mail 
depicting McDuffie as a person with a vicious temper who wishes on another 
individual a fate similar to that of the victims of the Washington, D.C./Baltimore 
area snipers. 
The trial court erred in admitting this evidence over McDuffie’s objection.  
Improper admission of this evidence, over objection, is subject to a harmless error 
analysis as set forth in State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986); see 
also Floyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 564, 573 (Fla. 2005).  Because of the other errors 
that occurred, all of which were also preserved, we have determined that a 
cumulative harmless error analysis is appropriate.  
Cumulative Error 
                                          
 
3.  The sniper attacks occurred in the Washington, D.C., Virginia, and 
Maryland area during the period September 5, 2002, to October 22, 2002.  See 
Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 619 S.E. 2d 16, 24 (Va. 2005).  
 
- 29 -
Harmless error analysis places the burden upon the State, as beneficiary of 
the errors, to prove there is “no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to” 
McDuffie’s conviction.  DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1138.  It is well-established that 
the harmless error test “is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct result, a not 
clearly wrong, a substantial evidence, a more probable than not, a clear and 
convincing, or even an overwhelming evidence test” but the “focus is on the effect 
of the error on the trier-of-fact.”  Id. at 1139.  
Where multiple errors are discovered in the jury trial, a review of the 
cumulative effect of those errors is appropriate because “even though there was 
competent substantial evidence to support a verdict . . . and even though each of 
the alleged errors, standing alone, could be considered harmless, the cumulative 
effect of such errors [may be] such as to deny to defendant the fair and impartial 
trial that is the inalienable right of all litigants in this state and this nation.”  Brooks 
v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 202 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181, 
189 (Fla. 1991)); accord Penalver v. State, 926 So. 2d 1118, 1137 (Fla. 2006). 
 
Although this case was not entirely circumstantial, the evidence asserted by 
the State to be “direct evidence” was not unassailable.  Matias’s identification of 
McDuffie was potentially impeached by his receipt of the $10,000 reward, which 
he said he probably would not have received had he not identified McDuffie at 
trial.  Matias’s contemporaneous description of the perpetrator did not match 
 
- 30 -
McDuffie in several important respects.  The testimony offered by the jail 
inmates—Ingram claiming Fitzgerald confessed and Fitzgerald claiming McDuffie 
confessed—was less than compelling.  Because the evidence was largely 
circumstantial, any defense evidence that would support McDuffie’s hypothesis of 
innocence and rebut the State’s evidence of motive would have been critical to the 
defense. 
 
We conclude that the errors that occurred in this case, when viewed 
cumulatively, cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  By 
excluding defense witness Wiggins, the trial court deprived the defense of the only 
non-family member who could testify to the loans made to McDuffie.  Further, the 
failure to allow full cross-examination of the witnesses who were actually on the 
scene at or near the times of the crimes prevented the defense from further casting 
doubt on the reliability of the Matias eyewitness identification.  Lastly, the effect 
on the jury created by the violent and vulgar contents of the voice mail cannot be 
underestimated.  With just two sentences, an image of McDuffie as a potentially 
violent human being capable of wishing death on another—one who is not even a 
victim in the case—emerged.  For all these reasons, we conclude that the State 
cannot establish that the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
- 31 -
Finally, before reversing and remanding for a new trial we analyze the 
sufficiency of the evidence because if there is insufficient evidence on which to 
convict McDuffie of these murders, it is our obligation to reverse the convictions 
with directions to grant judgments of acquittal.  The trial court denied the defense 
motions for judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of the State’s case-in-
chief and at the conclusion of all the evidence.  We must review the evidence to 
determine if either of these rulings was error.  A de novo standard of review 
applies.  See Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002).   
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdicts in this 
case, McDuffie characterizes substantially all the evidence presented by the State 
as circumstantial, requiring the special standard of review applicable to wholly 
circumstantial cases.  The State counters that the evidence cannot be considered 
wholly circumstantial because the “eyewitness” testimony of Matias placed 
McDuffie at the Dollar General at 9:27 p.m., which is inconsistent with 
McDuffie’s testimony that he left the store before 9 p.m.   The State also argues 
that McDuffie essentially waived the circumstantial nature of the case by calling 
Michael Fitzgerald to testify, during which Fitzgerald said that while in jail he 
heard McDuffie confess to the crimes.   We have held, however, that if the State 
fails to present a prima facie case and the defendant makes a sufficient motion for 
judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case, the issue of the sufficiency of 
 
- 32 -
the evidence at that point is not waived by later introduction by the defense of 
evidence which supplies the missing element.  State v. Pennington, 534 So. 2d 393, 
395-96 (Fla. 1988); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.380(b).  For this reason, we first 
review the evidence as it stood at the close of the State’s case to determine if, at 
that time, the State had carried its burden of presenting sufficient evidence upon 
which the jury could convict McDuffie.  
McDuffie contends that the State’s evidence should be reviewed under the 
special standard applicable to wholly circumstantial cases, as set forth in Reynolds 
v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 943 (2007): 
“[W]here a conviction is based wholly upon circumstantial evidence, 
a special standard of review applies.”  Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 
145, 155 (Fla. 2002).  As stated in Darling: 
 
Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter 
how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a 
conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is 
inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence.  The question of whether the evidence fails to 
exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the 
jury to determine, and where there is substantial, 
competent evidence to support the jury verdict, we will 
not reverse. 
 
Id. at 1145-46.  However, even in a purely circumstantial case 
[the court’s] view of the evidence must be taken in the light 
most favorable to the state. The state is not required to rebut 
conclusively every possible variation of events which could be 
inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce competent evidence 
which is inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of events.  Once that 
threshold burden is met, it becomes the jury’s duty to determine 
 
- 33 -
whether the evidence is sufficient to exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258, 262 (Fla. 1996) (quoting State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 
187, 189 (Fla. 1989)) (alterations in original).  For purposes of our review, we will 
first consider the sufficiency of the State’s evidence at the close of its case-in-chief 
as if wholly circumstantial, and will apply the special standard for such cases.  We 
will then review the sufficiency of the evidence as it stood at the conclusion of the 
trial. 
A.  Sufficiency of the Evidence at Conclusion of the State’s Case  
We are aware that no physical evidence of hairs, fibers, or DNA was found 
to link McDuffie to the robbery and murders.  The gun was never recovered.  The 
money, checks and bank bag were never located.  Although McDuffie’s DNA was 
found on a Pepsi bottle sitting on a box that also bore a spot of Schneider’s blood, 
no evidence indicated when the bottle was placed there, and the fact that McDuffie 
worked in the store all week militates against that DNA on the Pepsi bottle being 
probative of these crimes.  
At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, evidence had been presented 
that McDuffie’s palm print was found on the duct tape binding Beauregard’s 
wrists.  The duct tape was identical to that sold at the Dollar General store.  The 
State presented no evidence as to when the print was placed there, but did submit 
forensic evidence that the print was in a location on the tape which the jury could 
 
- 34 -
reasonably find would not have resulted from McDuffie simply handling the roll of 
duct tape in the course of his employment.  Marta Strawser, Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement senior crime lab microanalyst, testified that the cut and torn 
pieces of tape taken from Beauregard’s hands were microscopically reconstructed 
into a continuous strip.  Ms. Strawser found that McDuffie’s palm print was 
located no closer than thirty inches to one end of the reconstructed strip and forty-
one inches from the other.  The rolls of duct tape sold at Dollar General were at 
most seventeen inches in circumference.  The State’s latent fingerprint specialist 
did concede, however, that a print can be transferred from one location on a piece 
of tape to another when the tape is pressed together, as it had been in this case.  
The State also presented the testimony of Alex Matias.  He identified 
McDuffie as the man he saw going into and out of the Dollar General around 9:27 
p.m. on the night of the murders.  This was important testimony because McDuffie 
had previously told investigators that he left the store around 8:45 p.m. and drove 
directly to the Aaron’s rental center to make a payment in the drop-off box, a trip 
that takes about forty minutes.  A videotape of the Aaron’s rental center driveway 
shows no cars entering between 9:10 p.m. and 10:30 p.m., when headlights are first 
seen.  McDuffie also told investigators that he proceeded directly from Aaron’s to 
a nearby McDonald’s restaurant and was there about 9:35 p.m.  However, a 
videotape from the McDonald’s that night showed McDuffie inside McDonald’s at 
 
- 35 -
10:34 p.m.  This evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s rejection of 
McDuffie’s reported timeline of events that evening and to rebut the suggestion of 
a reasonable hypothesis of innocence that the defense sought to establish during 
the State’s case-in-chief.  
The State also presented evidence demonstrating that McDuffie had serious 
financial troubles, which the State argued provided a motive for the crimes.  
McDuffie had recently been evicted and had to rent a new home; he owed back 
rent, current rent and fees; he had been unemployed for a period of time; and one 
of his cars had been repossessed.  The jury heard that on October 23, 2002, 
McDuffie advised his new landlord that he did not have the $1,450 that was due, 
but would have it soon.  The landlord picked up the rent and security deposit from 
McDuffie’s home on October 27, 2002.  The payment of $1,450 was in the form of 
three money orders that McDuffie purchased early on October 26, 2002, the day 
after the crimes.   
Even if this case were entirely circumstantial, the State would not be 
required to rebut every possible variation of events, but must only present evidence 
inconsistent with the defendant’s reasonable hypothesis of innocence.  Delgado v. 
State, 948 So. 2d 681, 690 (Fla. 2006).  We conclude that the State met its 
threshold burden of presenting evidence during its case-in-chief which is 
sufficiently inconsistent with McDuffie’s version of events, and with the 
 
- 36 -
hypothesis of innocence suggested by the defense during the State’s case-in-chief, 
to create a jury question.  See Law, 559 So. 2d at 188-89.  Because the State 
presented prima facie evidence of inconsistency as to McDuffie’s theory of events 
in its case-in-chief, “the question is for the finder of fact to resolve.”  Orme, 677 
So. 2d at 262.  Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for 
judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief. 
B.  Sufficiency of the Evidence at Conclusion of the Defense’s Case 
McDuffie presented evidence during the defense’s case in an attempt to 
rebut the inconsistencies disclosed by the State’s evidence and to further attempt to 
prove his reasonable hypothesis of innocence.  We will review the sufficiency of 
the evidence as it stood after the defense presented its case to determine if, at that 
point, the trial court erred in denying the renewed motion for judgment of acquittal.   
McDuffie testified in his own defense, denying commission of the crimes 
and insisting that he left the store shortly after Carol Hopkins.  He explained the 
inconsistency in the timeline by testifying that traffic and road construction must 
have caused his trip to take longer than expected that night.  He demonstrated for 
the jury his hypothesis of how his palm print could have been placed innocently on 
the duct tape while he handled the tape that day helping a customer tape up some 
boxes.  He presented evidence of money innocently received in October to account 
for the money he had shortly after the murders.  His expert testified that the 
 
- 37 -
number of weapons used in the crimes, the difficulty of one man handling two 
victims, and the unidentified blood and hair on the scene pointed to two 
perpetrators, not one.  
The defense also presented jail inmate Kevin Ingram, who testified that 
another inmate, Michael Fitzgerald, had confessed that Fitzgerald and a black male 
(not McDuffie) were responsible for the robbery and that the black male had 
“taken care of” the employees at the Dollar General after Fitzgerald left the store 
with the money.   The defense, however, also presented the testimony of jail 
inmate Michael Fitzgerald who, during cross-examination, denied involvement in 
the crimes and said that while in jail he heard McDuffie confess to the murders.  At 
this point, direct evidence was presented upon which the jury could find McDuffie 
guilty.   
Appellate courts review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal 
under the de novo standard, and must consider the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to the State.  Fitzpatrick, 
900 So. 2d at 507.  Where the State has presented competent, substantial evidence 
of the crimes charged, the trial court does not err in denying a motion for judgment 
of acquittal and submitting the case to the jury.  Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 
943 (Fla. 2003).  We conclude that the totality of the evidence, including evidence 
elicited in the defense’s case, was sufficient to overcome the motion for judgment 
 
- 38 -
of acquittal made at the conclusion of all the evidence and to support the verdicts 
of the jury.    
CONCLUSION 
Although we find the evidence sufficient to support the verdicts in this case, 
as we explained above, the harmless error test is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
test.  The ultimate question is “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the 
error affected the verdict.”  DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1139.  Notwithstanding the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we have concluded that cumulative error occurred that 
is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby necessitating a new trial.     
 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse McDuffie’s 
convictions and sentences and remand for a new trial. 
 
It is so ordered.  
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County,  
S. James Foxman Judge - Case No. 2002-02115 CFAWS 
 
Todd G. Scher, Miami Beach, Florida 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
 
- 39 -
 
- 40 -
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Barbara C. Davis, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee