Case Title: Fabick v. Evers

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020AP001718-OA

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2021-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 WI 28 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1718-OA 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Jeré Fabick, 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
Tony Evers, in his Official Capacity  
as the Governor of Wisconsin, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 31, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 16, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., joined.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DALLET and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner, there were briefs filed by Matthew M. 
Fernholz and Cramer, Multhauf & Hammes, LLP, Waukesha. There was 
an oral argument by Matthew M. Fernholz. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Derek Lindoo, 
Brandon Widiker, and John Kraft by Richard M. Esenberg, Anthony 
LoCoco, Luke Berg, and Wisconsin Institute for Law and Liberty, 
Inc., Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Richard M. 
Esenberg. 
 
 
 
2 
An Amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Legislature by Ryan J. Walsh, John D. Tripoli, and Eimer Stahl 
LLP, Madison.  
 
For the respondent, there was a brief filed by Hannah S. 
Jurss, assistant attorney general; with whom on the brief was 
Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by 
Hannah S. Jurss.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Legislature by Jessie Augustyn and Augustyn Law LLC; with whom 
on the brief was Steve Fawcett, counsel for the assembly 
speaker.  
 
 
 
2021 WI 28 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP1718-OA 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jeré Fabick, 
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Tony Evers, in his Official Capacity as the 
Governor of Wisconsin, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 31, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., joined.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DALLET and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined. 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION for declaratory judgment.  Declaration of 
rights; relief granted. 
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   Over the last year, a dangerous 
new virus has spread throughout the world, disrupted our 
economy, and taken far too many lives.  In response, Governor 
Tony Evers declared multiple states of emergency under Wis. 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
2 
 
Stat. § 323.10 (2019-20),1 triggering a statutory grant of 
extraordinary powers to the governor and the Department of 
Health Services (DHS) to combat the emergent threat.  The 
question in this case is not whether the Governor acted wisely; 
it is whether he acted lawfully.  We conclude he did not. 
¶2 
Wisconsin Stat. § 323.10 specifies that no state of 
emergency may last longer than 60 days unless it "is extended by 
joint resolution of the legislature," and that the legislature 
may cut short a state of emergency by joint resolution.  The 
statute contemplates that the power to end and to refuse to 
extend a state of emergency resides with the legislature even 
when the underlying occurrence creating the emergency remains a 
threat.  Pursuant to this straightforward statutory language, 
the governor may not deploy his emergency powers by issuing new 
states of emergency for the same statutory occurrence. 
¶3 
After declaring a state of emergency related to COVID-
19 in March 2020, Governor Evers issued executive orders 
declaring additional states of emergency in July and again in 
September.  In this original action, petitioner Jeré Fabick asks 
that 
we 
declare 
these 
second 
and 
third 
COVID-19-related 
emergencies unlawful under Wis. Stat. § 323.10.  We agree that 
they are unlawful and so declare. 
¶4 
Since this case was argued, the Governor has declared 
new states of emergency on an ongoing basis, each declared as or 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
3 
 
before the prior one expired.  And the declaration now in 
effect, Executive Order #105, was declared the same day the 
legislature revoked the then-existing state of emergency by 
joint resolution.  Subsequent motions relating to these orders 
have been filed while the court deliberated on this case.  Among 
them, we have also been asked to determine whether Executive 
Order #105 was issued in compliance with the law.  After 
receiving briefing on these requests, we conclude that the state 
of emergency proclaimed in Executive Order #105 exceeded the 
Governor's powers and is therefore unlawful. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
On March 12, 2020, Governor Evers issued Executive 
Order #72 proclaiming "that a public health emergency, as 
defined in Section 323.02(16) of the Wisconsin Statutes, exists 
for the State of Wisconsin."  In the order, the Governor 
explained that "a novel strain of the coronavirus was detected, 
now named COVID-19," and that "Wisconsin must avail itself of 
all resources needed to respond to and contain the presence of 
COVID-19 in the State."  The order expired on May 11, 2020, 60 
days after it was issued.  It was not extended by the 
legislature. 
¶6 
On July 30, 2020, Governor Evers issued Executive 
Order 
#82, 
once 
more 
proclaiming 
"that 
a 
public 
health 
emergency, as defined in Section 323.02(16) of the Wisconsin 
Statutes, exists for the State of Wisconsin."  The Governor 
again cited the COVID-19 pandemic as justification for the 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
4 
 
declaration of a public health emergency.  On September 22, 
2020, before Executive Order #82 expired, Governor Evers issued 
Executive Order #90 also proclaiming a "public health emergency" 
as defined by Wis. Stat. § 323.02(16) due to further challenges 
from the COVID-19 pandemic. 
¶7 
In November, before Executive Order #90 expired, 
Fabick petitioned for an original action challenging the 
validity of Executive Orders #82 and #90 under Wis. Stat. 
§ 323.10.  We granted the petition. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶8 
The question presented is whether Governor Evers 
exceeded his authority under Wis. Stat. § 323.10 when he 
proclaimed states of emergency related to COVID-19 after a prior 
state of emergency, also for COVID-19, had existed for 60 days 
and was not extended by the legislature.2  We begin with the 
Governor's challenge to the justiciability of this claim, and 
then address the substance of Fabick's challenge.3 
                                                 
2 In addition to the statutory argument, the court also 
asked the parties to address the following:  "If Executive Order 
#82 and Executive Order #90 are authorized by Wis. Stat. 
§ 323.10, whether that statute is an unconstitutional delegation 
of legislative power to the executive branch."  Because we 
resolve this on statutory grounds, we do not reach this issue. 
3 Executive Order #90 expired in November.  Governor Evers 
stated and followed through on his intention to continue 
declaring states of emergency under similar theories.  It is 
proper that this court provide clarity on an issue that is of 
statewide significance, especially when the 60-day limitation on 
these 
orders 
renders 
timely 
appellate 
review 
difficult.  
Therefore, even if a mootness concern could be raised, review 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
5 
 
 
A.  Justiciability 
¶9 
Fabick seeks a declaration that Governor Evers acted 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 323.10.  To obtain declaratory 
relief, a justiciable controversy must exist.  Loy v. Bunderson, 
107 Wis. 2d 400, 409-10, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).  A controversy 
is justiciable when four conditions are met:  (1) "A controversy 
in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an 
interest in contesting it"; (2) "The controversy must be between 
persons whose interests are adverse"; (3) "The party seeking 
declaratory 
relief 
must 
have 
a 
legal 
interest 
in 
the 
controversy——that is to say, a legally protectable interest"; 
and (4) "The issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for 
judicial determination."  Id. at 410; see also Milwaukee Dist. 
Council 
48 
v. 
Milwaukee 
County, 
2001 
WI 65, 
¶37, 
244 
Wis. 2d 333, 627 N.W.2d 866 (noting all four conditions must be 
satisfied).  Governor Evers argues that Fabick fails to satisfy 
the first and third conditions.4 
¶10 To satisfy the first condition——a claim of right 
against one with an interest in contesting it——the claim must 
assert "present and fixed rights" rather than "hypothetical or 
                                                                                                                                                             
satisfies generally recognized exceptions to the mootness 
doctrine.  See Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶19, 390 
Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901 (listing the five mootness doctrine 
exceptions). 
4 The second and fourth conditions——adversity and ripeness—— 
are not challenged by the Governor and are clearly satisfied 
here. 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
6 
 
future rights."  Tooley v. O'Connell, 77 Wis. 2d 422, 434, 253 
N.W.2d 335 (1977).  The Governor contends Fabick does not have a 
claim of right because Wis. Stat. § 323.10 creates only a single 
remedy——legislative action by joint resolution.  We agree the 
legislature has a substantive right protected by § 323.10, but 
this does not mean a citizen challenge is off the table.  This 
is not a hypothetical matter; it is a real contest over legal 
authority 
being 
claimed 
and 
exercised 
right 
now. 
 
The 
Declaratory Judgments Act allows litigants to seek a declaration 
of the "construction or validity" of a statute.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.04(2).  That is what Fabick is doing.  As a taxpayer, 
under our well-established law, he has a legal interest (should 
taxpayer standing be satisfied) to contest governmental actions 
leading to an illegal expenditure of taxpayer funds.  And the 
Governor is the proper party with an interest in defending the 
lawfulness of his actions.  The first condition is satisfied.  
¶11 Under the third condition, Fabick also asserted a 
legally protected interest, a requirement often voiced in terms 
of standing.  See Tooley, 77 Wis. 2d at 438.  In this case, 
Fabick is not challenging any particular orders issued pursuant 
to the declared states of emergency.  Rather, he argues he has 
taxpayer standing to challenge the state of emergency itself, 
and we agree.  "In order to maintain a taxpayer's action, it 
must be alleged that the complaining taxpayer and taxpayers as a 
class have sustained, or will sustain, some pecuniary loss."  
S.D. Realty Co. v. Sewerage Comm'n of the City of Milwaukee, 15 
Wis. 2d 15, 21, 112 N.W.2d 177 (1961).  During oral argument, 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
7 
 
the Governor's counsel confirmed that the National Guard had 
been deployed pursuant to the emergency declarations.5  This 
expenditure of taxpayer funds gives Fabick a legally protected 
interest to challenge the Governor's emergency declarations. 
¶12 We therefore conclude Fabick's action is justiciable 
and turn to the merits of his claim. 
 
                                                 
5 When the initial orders were challenged before us, it 
appears the then-existing federal-state funding placed upon 
Wisconsin taxpayers the responsibility to fund 25 percent of the 
National Guard forces deployed in response to COVID-19.  See 
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/ 
memorandum-extension-use-national-guard-respond-covid-19-
facilitate-economic-recovery/ (noting the federal government 
funded 75 percent of the cost).  As the dissent notes, it 
appears the federal government may now be choosing to fund 100 
percent of the National Guard expenditures.  See Dissent, ¶98.  
The dissent suggests that this change means Fabick has lost the 
standing he had earlier in the case.  However, a century's worth 
of precedent makes clear that threatened, as well as actual, 
pecuniary loss can be sufficient to confer standing.  See Warden 
v. Hart, 162 Wis. 495, 497, 156 N.W. 466 (1916) (noting a 
taxpayer has standing when the taxpayer is "threatened with or 
suffers a pecuniary loss"); see also, Krier v. Vilione, 2009 
WI 45, ¶20, 317 Wis. 2d 288, 766 N.W.2d 517 ("the plaintiffs 
must show that they suffered or were threatened with an injury 
to an interest that is legally protectable"); State ex rel. 
First Nat. Bank of Wis. Rapids v. M & I Peoples Bank of Coloma, 
95 Wis. 2d 303, 308, 290 N.W.2d 321 (1980) (same); Marx v. 
Morris, 2019 WI 34, ¶35, 386 Wis. 2d  122, 925 N.W.2d 112 
(same).  If National Guard funding may be altered by the stroke 
of the President's pen, as President Biden has apparently done, 
this status quo can certainly be altered again.  Taxpayer funds 
have already been spent in support of National Guard deployments 
pursuant to these emergency powers.  The imminent threat of 
unreimbursed costs, past and future, is sufficient to confer 
taxpayer standing on Fabick under the circumstances of this 
case. 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
8 
 
B.  Interpreting Wis. Stat. § 323.10 
¶13 Fabick's petition asks us to declare that Executive 
Orders #82 and #90 proclaimed states of emergency contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 323.10's duration limitations. 
¶14 At 
the 
outset, 
we 
must 
remember 
that 
our 
constitutional structure does not contemplate unilateral rule by 
executive decree.  It consists of policy choices enacted into 
law by the legislature and carried out by the executive branch.  
Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶31, 393 
Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35.  Therefore, if the governor has 
authority to exercise certain expanded powers not provided in 
our constitution, it must be because the legislature has enacted 
a law that passes constitutional muster and gives the governor 
that authority. 
¶15 Some may wish our analysis would focus on ensuring the 
Governor has sufficient power to fight COVID-19; others may be 
more concerned about expansive executive power.  But outside of 
a constitutional violation, these policy concerns are not 
relevant to this court's task in construing the statute.  
Whether the policy choices reflected in the law give the 
governor too much or too little authority to respond to the 
present health crisis does not guide our analysis.  Our inquiry 
is simply whether the law gives the governor the authority to 
successively declare states of emergency in this circumstance.6 
                                                 
6 The dissent, in contrast, spends considerable space 
discussing outcome-focused concerns.  But our role is not to 
rule in favor of outcomes we like; it is to interpret and apply 
the law, whether we like it or not. 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
9 
 
 
1.  Statutory Structure 
¶16 The legislative policy choice that decides this case 
is found in the text of Wis. Stat. § 323.10 along with its 
incorporated definitions.  When interpreting statutory text, our 
assignment "is to determine what the statute means so that it 
may be given its full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  To find this meaning, we interpret 
the text "in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46; see also Wis. 
Stat. § 990.01(1). 
¶17 Here is the full text of Wis. Stat. § 323.10: 
The governor may issue an executive order declaring a 
state of emergency for the state or any portion of the 
state if he or she determines that an emergency 
resulting from a disaster or the imminent threat of a 
disaster exists.  If the governor determines that a 
public health emergency exists, he or she may issue an 
executive order declaring a state of emergency related 
to public health for the state or any portion of the 
state and may designate the department of health 
services as the lead state agency to respond to that 
emergency.  If the governor determines that the 
emergency is related to computer or telecommunication 
systems, he or she may designate the department of 
administration as the lead agency to respond to that 
emergency.  A state of emergency shall not exceed 60 
days, unless the state of emergency is extended by 
joint resolution of the legislature.  A copy of the 
executive order shall be filed with the secretary of 
state. The executive order may be revoked at the 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
10 
 
discretion of either the governor by executive order 
or the legislature by joint resolution. 
¶18 The first sentence gives the governor authority to 
"issue an executive order declaring a state of emergency."  Wis. 
Stat. § 323.10.  The governor may declare the state of emergency 
"for the state or any portion of the state."  Id.  And the 
condition enabling the governor to declare a state of emergency—
—the "enabling condition," as we will call it——is the governor's 
determination "that an emergency resulting from a disaster or 
the imminent threat of a disaster exists."  Id.  A "disaster" is 
specifically defined in Wis. Stat. § 323.02(6).  It "means a 
severe or prolonged, natural or human-caused, occurrence that 
threatens 
or 
negatively 
impacts 
life, 
health, 
property, 
infrastructure, the environment, the security of this state or a 
portion of this state, or critical systems, including computer, 
telecommunications, or agricultural systems."  § 323.02(6). 
¶19 The second sentence of Wis. Stat. § 323.10 describes a 
state of emergency related to public health.  It is similar, but 
contains 
key 
distinctions. 
 
The 
governor 
first 
has 
to 
"determine[] that a public health emergency exists."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 323.10.  The enabling condition here is a "public health 
emergency," a phrase that is separately defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 323.02(16)——a definition we'll turn to shortly.  When that 
enabling condition is satisfied, the governor "may issue an 
executive order declaring a state of emergency related to public 
health for the state or any portion of the state."  § 323.10. 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
11 
 
¶20 As the Governor reads it, the first sentence of Wis. 
Stat. § 323.10 
is the operative, overarching, authorizing 
sentence allowing a state of emergency to be declared in the 
event of a disaster.  In his telling, the next two sentences 
simply state which agency leads the response for certain types 
of emergencies——DHS serving as the lead agency for public health 
emergencies.  This reading is incorrect. 
¶21 The first two sentences of Wis. Stat. § 323.10 contain 
parallel but distinct authorizing language.  If the second 
sentence merely clarifies that DHS may be the lead agency, the 
first half of that sentence (the governor "may issue an 
executive order declaring a state of emergency related to public 
health for the state or any portion of the state") would be 
meaningless.  It is only the second half of the sentence that 
empowers the governor to "designate [DHS] as the lead state 
agency to respond to that emergency."  Id.  Nor would a "public 
health emergency" be a separately-delineated enabling condition.  
The legislature could have just defined a public health 
emergency as another kind of "disaster."  It did not.  The 
enabling condition for a state of emergency related to public 
health is a "public health emergency," not a "disaster," each 
term having its own separate definition. 
¶22 Moreover, the public health emergency authorization is 
different than the language that follows it in Wis. Stat. 
§ 323.10:  "If the governor determines that the emergency is 
related to computer or telecommunication systems, he or she may 
designate the department of administration as the lead agency to 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
12 
 
respond to that emergency."  Here, the reference to computer or 
telecommunication 
systems 
explicitly 
ties 
back 
into 
the 
definition of a disaster in Wis. Stat. § 323.02(6), which 
specifies that a disaster can be an "occurrence that threatens 
or negatively impacts . . . critical systems, including computer 
[and] telecommunications."  Notably, this sentence contains no 
separate authorizing language. 
¶23 In short, the governor's emergency powers under Wis. 
Stat. § 323.10 describe two types of emergencies, each with its 
own enabling condition:  a "disaster" as defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 323.02(6), and a "public health emergency" as defined in 
§ 323.02(16).7 
¶24 The executive orders under review here8 declared states 
of emergency related to public health due to ongoing challenges 
                                                 
7 The dissent suggests the word "occurrence" rather than the 
phrase "enabling condition" is the more appropriate lens through 
which 
we 
should 
read 
the 
statute. 
 
However, 
the 
word 
"occurrence" is nowhere to be found in Wis. Stat. § 323.10.  
Rather, the governor's powers in § 323.10 are framed as a type 
of if-then statement (albeit without an explicit "then").  That 
is, if and only if the governor finds a condition met may he 
declare a certain type of emergency.  We use the phrase 
"enabling condition" to explain what the statute clearly says.  
It requires the condition be satisfied in order to enable, or 
trigger, the ability to declare a state of emergency and deploy 
emergency powers.  The dissent's focus instead on the term 
"occurrence" ignores that a "public health emergency" may be 
declared upon either "the occurrence or imminent threat of an 
illness or health condition."  Wis. Stat. § 323.02(16) (emphasis 
added).  Therefore, the dissent's attempt to tie Wis. Stat. 
§ 323.10's duration limitations solely to the term "occurrence" 
misses the mark. 
8  Executive Order #105, which was issued and raised after 
initial briefing had been completed, is separately discussed 
below. 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
13 
 
in responding to COVID-19.  All three proclaimed "that a public 
health emergency, as defined in Section 323.02(16) of the 
Wisconsin Statutes, exists for the State of Wisconsin."  When 
exercising this power, Wis. Stat. § 323.10 contains additional 
relevant limits on the governor:  the enabling condition and 
duration limitations. 
 
2.  Enabling Condition 
¶25 Wisconsin Stat. § 323.02(16) defines the enabling 
condition for a state of emergency related to public health as 
follows: 
"Public health emergency" means the occurrence or 
imminent threat of an illness or health condition that 
meets all of the following criteria: 
(a) Is believed to be caused by bioterrorism or a 
novel 
or 
previously 
controlled 
or 
eradicated 
biological agent. 
(b) Poses a high probability of any of the following: 
1. A large number of deaths or serious or long-term 
disabilities among humans. 
2. A high probability of widespread exposure to a 
biological, 
chemical, 
or 
radiological 
agent 
that 
creates a significant risk of substantial future harm 
to a large number of people. 
¶26 No one disputes that COVID-19 meets this definition.  
COVID-19 is an "illness or health condition" caused by "a 
novel . . . biological agent" that poses a high probability of 
death, a risk sadly realized for thousands of Wisconsinites, 
hundreds of thousands Americans, and millions more worldwide.  
Even if it were a close call——and it's not——Wis. Stat. § 323.10 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
14 
 
leaves the determination that a public health emergency exists 
to the governor ("If the governor determines").  In any event, 
COVID-19 presents a public health emergency that enables the 
governor to declare a state of emergency related to public 
health under § 323.10.  That however, does not end the analysis 
because § 323.10 imposes a second set of limitations on the 
governor's power. 
 
3.  Duration Limitations 
¶27 This brings us to the duration-related limitations in 
Wis. Stat. § 323.10.  The statute provides that a state of 
emergency "may be revoked at the discretion of either the 
governor by executive order or the legislature by joint 
resolution," and a "state of emergency shall not exceed 60 days, 
unless the state of emergency is extended by joint resolution of 
the legislature."  § 323.10.  These directives can be distilled 
into three statutory commands.  First, the initial duration of a 
state of emergency is determined by the governor, but it "shall 
not exceed" 60 days.  Second, a state of emergency may be cut 
shorter than the initial duration by either the governor through 
executive order or by the legislature through joint resolution.  
Finally, a state of emergency may be extended longer than 60 
days by the legislature alone. 
¶28 These are clear statutory commands, plainly stated.  
They compel the conclusion that the legislature enacted Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 323.10's 
time-limiting 
language 
to 
meaningfully 
constrain the governor's authority to govern by emergency order.  
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
15 
 
The plain language of the statute explains that the governor 
may, for 60 days, act with expanded powers to address a 
particular emergency.  Beyond 60 days, however, the legislature 
reserves for itself the power to determine the policies that 
govern the state's response to an ongoing problem.  Similarly, 
when the legislature revokes a state of emergency, a governor 
may not simply reissue another one on the same basis.  
Therefore, where the governor relies on the same enabling 
condition for multiple states of emergency, or declares a new 
state of emergency to replace a state of emergency terminated by 
the legislature, the governor acts contrary to the statute's 
plain meaning.  If it were otherwise, § 323.10's duration-
limiting provisions would cease to perform any meaningful 
function.  These limitations would be no more than perfunctory 
renewal requirements and would serve as merely a trivial check 
on indefinite emergency executive powers.  The text of § 323.10 
therefore must be read to forbid the governor from proclaiming 
repeated states of emergency for the same enabling condition 
absent legislative approval.9 
                                                 
9 See 
Midwest 
Inst. 
of 
Health, 
PLLC 
v. 
Gov. 
of 
Mich.,     N.W.2d    , 2020 WL 5877599, *6-8 (Mich. 2020) 
(interpreting similar time-limiting language in a Michigan 
statute empowering the governor to declare states of emergency 
to impose meaningful time constraints on the governor's power). 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
16 
 
¶29 This straightforward reading of Wis. Stat. § 323.10 is 
further confirmed by related provisions and statutory context.10  
Its statutory neighbor, Wis. Stat. § 323.11, outlines a similar 
emergency declaration power for local governments.11  If certain 
conditions support it, a local government may declare an 
emergency by the "governing body 
of any local unit of 
government."  § 323.11.  But notably, "The period of the 
emergency shall be limited by the ordinance or resolution to the 
time during which the emergency conditions exist or are likely 
to exist."  Id.  This unmistakably shows that when the 
legislature wishes to authorize an emergency response that is 
coextensive with the emergency conditions, it knows how to say 
so.  And quite conspicuously, it did not say so in the 
immediately 
preceding 
section, 
§ 323.10, 
discussing 
the 
governor's ability to declare a state of emergency.  The most 
reasonable way to read these provisions together, as we must, is 
that the governor's power is more circumscribed.  The governor's 
power to act unilaterally on an emergency basis is limited by 
both a 60-day limit and by the legislature's power to terminate 
the emergency declaration. 
                                                 
10 See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("[S]tatutory 
language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not 
in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language 
of surrounding or closely-related statutes."). 
11 The emergency powers of local governments are described 
in Wis. Stat. § 323.14(4). 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
17 
 
¶30 Statutory history supports this interpretation as 
well.12  The original predecessor to modern-day Wis. Stat. 
§ 323.10 was enacted in the 1950s during an escalating Cold War.  
It authorized the governor to proclaim a state of emergency 
"[w]hen the governor finds that a disaster due to an act of war 
is imminent or has occurred."  Wis. Stat. § 21.02(2) (1955-56).  
This statute contained no time limit at all, stating:  "The 
governor shall revoke the proclamation by order, or the 
legislature may revoke the proclamation by joint resolution, 
whenever either shall deem it appropriate."  Id.  However, it 
also required the governor to "call the legislature into special 
emergency session."  Id.  The natural expectation was that the 
legislature would have something to say about how Wisconsin 
should respond to ongoing threats. 
¶31 In 1959, the law was amended.  Ch. 628, Laws of 1959.  
It expanded the circumstances under which an emergency may be 
declared to when "an emergency resulting from enemy action 
                                                 
12 "By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over 
the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at 
the meaning of a statute."  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 
2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (citing Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶69).  Statutory history, which "encompasses 
the previously enacted and repealed provisions of a statute," 
"is part of a plain meaning analysis."  Id.; see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.001(7) ("A revised statute is to be understood in the same 
sense as the original unless the change in language indicates a 
different 
meaning 
so 
clearly 
as 
to 
preclude 
judicial 
construction."); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  
The 
Interpretation 
of 
Legal 
Texts 
256 
(2012) 
("If 
the 
legislature amends or reenacts a provision other than by way of 
a consolidating statute or restyling project, a significant 
change in language is presumed to entail a change in meaning."). 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
18 
 
exists" or when "an emergency growing out of natural or man-made 
disaster, except from enemy action, exists."  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 22.01(4)(e), 22.02(1) (1959-60).  The legislature removed the 
requirement that the legislature be called into session, 
however.  Instead, it imposed time limitations on emergency 
declarations.13 
 
For 
enemy-action-related 
disasters, 
the 
legislature added:  "The period of the state of emergency shall 
not extend beyond 60 days unless extended by joint resolution of 
the legislature."  § 22.01(4)(e) (1959-60).  And for natural or 
man-made disasters, "The period of the state of emergency shall 
not extend beyond 30 days unless extended by joint resolution of 
the legislature."  § 22.02(1) (1959-60).  This basic framework 
remained for decades, albeit with some reorganization and other 
minor changes. 
¶32 Then in 2002, the legislature adopted portions of a 
Model State Emergency Health Powers Act ("MSEHPA") that had been 
                                                 
13 Chapter 628, Laws of 1959, was initially proposed to the 
legislature by the Office of Civil Defense.  In its initial 
form, the proposal did not contain a time limitation.  Citing 
constitutional concerns with the mandatory legislative session 
call in the 1955 law, the proposal eliminated the requirement 
that the governor call a special session after declaring a state 
of emergency.  Through the legislative process, the legislature 
agreed to eliminate the requirement to call a legislative 
session, but it added the time limit, replacing one constraint 
on emergency power with another. 
Although we tread carefully when drawing inferences from 
legislative history, the evidence from the drafting process here 
supports reading Wis. Stat. § 323.10's time-limiting language to 
meaningfully check the governor's emergency powers.  See Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51 (noting that legislative history may be 
consulted to confirm a plain meaning interpretation). 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
19 
 
proposed in the wake of 9/11.14  These revisions, adopted in 2001 
Wis. Act 109, added the public health emergency to Wisconsin 
law.  2001 Wis. Act 109, §§ 340j, 340L.  The legislature 
borrowed extensively from the model act in drafting these 
provisions, including its definition of a "public health 
emergency."  MSEHPA § 104(m) (Ctr. for L. and the Pub.'s Health 
at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Univs., Proposed Official Draft 
Oct. 23, 2001); 2001 Wis. Act 109, § 340j.  But the legislature 
did not adopt every model provision.  Notably, it did not adopt 
the proposal to allow the governor to renew the public health 
emergency declaration every 30 days.  MSEHPA § 405(b).  Rather, 
it 
incorporated 
this 
language 
into 
its 
already-existing 
emergency declaration language with its already-existing time 
limitations.  2001 Wis. Act 109, § 340L. 
¶33 In 2009 Wis. Act 42, the legislature renumbered the 
statute as Wis. Stat. § 323.10 and added emergencies related to 
computer or telecommunications systems.  2009 Wis. Act. 42, 
§ 72.  It also eliminated the 30- and 60-day distinction and 
adopted a universal 60-day limit for all states of emergency.  
Id. 
¶34 Viewing this history as a whole, it confirms the plain 
meaning of the statutory language.  The initial time-unlimited 
                                                 
14 The September 11, 2001 attacks were "the deadliest 
terrorist attacks on American soil in U.S. history."  Nineteen 
terrorists undertook a series of airline hijackings, crashing 
the hijacked aircraft into occupied buildings.  Tragically, 
nearly 
3,000 
people 
lost 
their 
lives 
in 
the 
attacks.  
https://www.britannica.com/event/September-11-attacks. 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
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state of emergency with a call for a legislative session was 
restructured, creating a time-limited set of emergency powers, 
extendable 
only 
by 
the 
legislature 
and 
subject 
to 
the 
legislature's termination.  The governor——and, in a public 
health 
emergency, 
DHS——are 
given 
some 
time 
to 
exercise 
extraordinary powers when an emergency occurs.  This is the 
nature of an emergency; it is an unplanned event that warrants 
immediate attention and may not lend itself to a timely 
legislative response. 
¶35 In this context, it makes sense that the legislature 
would allow the executive branch to exercise emergency powers 
only on a temporary basis.  During a state of emergency, the 
statutes give the governor expanded powers, including the 
ability to: 
 Prioritize 
some 
emergency-related 
contracts 
over 
others, Wis. Stat. § 323.12(4)(a); 
 Issue 
orders 
"for 
the 
security 
of 
persons 
and 
property," § 323.12(4)(b); 
 Enter into contracts to respond to the emergency, 
§ 323.12(4)(c); 
 Suspend administrative rules, § 323.12(4)(d); and 
 Waive 
fees 
for 
certain 
permits, 
licenses, 
or 
approvals, § 323.12(4)(e). 
A 
state 
of 
emergency 
related 
to 
public 
health 
triggers 
additional statutory powers.  For example, DHS is given 
temporary 
power 
to 
purchase 
vaccines, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 250.042(2)(a), to order individuals to be vaccinated, Wis. 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
21 
 
Stat. § 252.041(1)(a), and to isolate or quarantine individuals 
who are unable or unwilling to be vaccinated, § 252.041(1)(b).  
Also, under Wis. Stat. § 252.06, certain expenses incurred 
during a state of emergency related to public health may be paid 
from specific appropriations, meaning a declared public health 
emergency can require state taxpayers to pay for certain 
expenditures.  See § 252.06(10)(c).15 
¶36 The statutory language suggests the legislature gave 
the executive branch expansive, but temporary, authority to 
respond to emergencies.16  When the governor employs those powers 
beyond the time limits imposed by the legislature, or after 
revocation of those powers by the legislature, he wields 
authority 
never 
given 
to 
him 
by 
the 
people 
or 
their 
representatives.  We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 323.10's 
duration-limiting language forbids the governor from declaring 
successive states of emergency on the same basis as a prior 
                                                 
15 We cite and perfunctorily summarize these powers to 
illustrate the expanded authority reflected in the statutory 
design.  We do not interpret these provisions here, nor do we 
opine on the constitutionality of any of these or other related 
provisions. 
16 The dissent finds it an absurd result that a governor's 
power to act on an emergency basis would be temporary and 
terminable by the legislature when a threat like the present 
virus exists for an extended period of time.  Quite the 
contrary.  It is not only not absurd, it is eminently reasonable 
to think that the legislature drafted a law that conferred 
limited executive power to act unilaterally, but reserved for 
itself the power to enact or not enact laws to guide the state 
through a prolonged crisis.  Legislative, rather than executive, 
policy-making is how our constitutional design ordinarily works. 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
22 
 
state of emergency, and that the governor may not reissue a new 
emergency declaration following legislative revocation of a 
state of emergency declared on the same basis. 
 
C.  Application 
¶37 In support of the challenged emergency declarations 
before us, the Governor argues the 60-day limit is no bar to 
multiple declarations of emergency based on the same public 
health 
emergency. 
 
Our 
analysis 
above 
forecloses 
this 
interpretation.  But the Governor makes an alternative argument.  
He asserts that each declaration was supported by differing on-
the-ground conditions related to COVID-19.  In essence, he 
argues the ups and downs of COVID-19 have created independent 
enabling conditions thereby renewing his power to declare a new 
state of emergency with each new front in the fight against 
COVID-19.  The dissent agrees.  It argues that a new emergency 
may be declared as long as the governor drafts "a new set of on-
the-ground facts."  Dissent, ¶116. 
¶38 This 
approach, 
however, 
does 
what 
a 
proper 
consideration of the entire statute does not permit——it reads 
the duration limitations right out of the law.  A governor will 
surely have little difficultly drafting a new emergency order 
stating that the challenges or risks are a little different now 
than they were last month or last week.  So long as the 
emergency 
conditions 
remain, 
the 
governor 
would 
possess 
indefinite emergency power under this atextual theory.  The more 
reasonable reading is that the 60-day time limit and legislative 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
23 
 
revocation power are real limitations that constrain the 
governor's power to deploy emergency powers with regard to that 
emergency.  Statutory restrictions on executive power cannot be 
avoided by modest updates to the "whereas" clauses of an 
emergency declaration. 
¶39 We recognize that determining when a set of facts 
gives rise to a unique enabling condition may not always be 
easy.  But here, COVID-19 has been a consistent threat, and no 
one can suggest this threat has gone away and then reemerged.  
The threat has ebbed and flowed, but this does not negate the 
basic reality that COVID-19 has been a significant and constant 
danger for a year, with no letup.  In the words of the statute, 
the occurrence of an "illness or health condition" caused by a 
"novel . . . biological agent" has remained, unabated. 
¶40 In this case, we conclude that Governor Evers relied 
on the same enabling condition for the states of emergency 
announced in Executive Orders #72, #82, and #90.  The states of 
emergency proclaimed in Executive Orders #82 and #90 therefore 
reached beyond the power given to the governor under Wis. Stat. 
§ 323.10, impermissibly extending the use of emergency powers in 
violation of the time limitations explicit in the statute.  It 
matters not that the legislature did not take action to revoke 
these emergency declarations initially challenged by Fabick.  
Whether the legislature exercises its authority to terminate an 
unlawfully declared state of emergency has no bearing on whether 
it was lawful. 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
24 
 
¶41 Several times in briefing before this court, and at 
oral argument, the Governor suggested Wis. Stat. § 323.10's 
provision giving the legislature authority to revoke a state of 
emergency supported his reading of the 60-day time limit as 
permitting renewals precisely because the legislature had an 
effective check.  Since this case was argued, however, the 
legislature did revoke the state of emergency declared in 
Executive Order #104, only to have a new one——in Executive Order 
#105——immediately declared by the Governor.  In post-argument 
motions and briefing, Fabick asks that we declare Executive 
Order #105 invalid as well.  This case has come to us on a 
petition for original action and, somewhat atypically, it 
touches subsequent and evolving orders on the same matters.  
Therefore we believe the ongoing emergency orders are properly 
before us.  After hearing from both parties, we conclude it is 
appropriate for us to address Executive Order #105.17 
¶42 As we have discussed, Wis. Stat. § 323.10 provides 
that an emergency declaration order "may be revoked at the 
discretion of . . . the legislature by joint resolution."  In 
order to have any effect, this provision must mean that the 
governor may not simply reissue an emergency declaration revoked 
                                                 
17 The dissent focuses on Fabick's more limited request for 
a temporary injunction of Executive Order #105, but he did 
request permanent relief as well.  Fabick plainly seeks a 
decision from this court making clear that Executive Order #105 
was issued in excess of the Governor's powers.  The declaratory 
relief we choose to grant in this case is appropriate. 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
25 
 
by the legislature.18  Any other interpretation would render the 
legislature's statutory power to revoke an emergency declaration 
illusory.  The statute gives the legislature the power to 
override a governor's declaration of emergency, not the other 
way around. 
¶43 The Governor defends Executive Order #105 as different 
than Executive Order #104 on something he says is new——the 
purported loss of federal nutrition benefits——along with updates 
regarding the current threats presented by COVID-19.  However, 
if an emergency declaration is a prerequisite to receiving these 
funds, this was no less true during the operation of Executive 
Order #104, which the legislature revoked.  The Governor cannot 
make an end run around legislative revocation simply by 
itemizing a previously unidentified justification for the state 
of emergency.  Reading the statute to encourage a game of whac-
a-mole between the governor and legislature would defeat Wis. 
Stat. § 323.10's explicit legislative check on the governor's 
emergency power.  The legislature has exercised its statutory 
                                                 
18 In its original merits briefing, the Governor repeatedly 
assured the court that the legislature had the power to end a 
state of emergency.  For example, the Governor argued, "Wis. 
Stat. § 323.10 explicitly empowers the Legislature to determine 
the propriety of an executive order declaring a state of 
emergency. 
 
If 
the 
Legislature 
concludes 
Governor 
Evers 
improperly issued Executive Order 90, the Legislature may revoke 
it at will."  And again, "If the Legislature believes the 
Governor has issued an improper state of emergency order, it can 
take immediate action to end it." 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
26 
 
power to revoke Executive Order #104.  Accordingly, we declare 
Executive Order #105 unlawful.19 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶44 Read according to its plain language, in context, 
along with surrounding statutes, and consistent with its 
purpose, the best reading of Wis. Stat. § 323.10 is that it 
provides the governor the authority to declare a state of 
emergency related to public health when the conditions for a 
public health emergency are satisfied.  But when later relying 
on the same enabling condition, the governor is subject to the 
time limits explicitly prescribed by statute.  Therefore, we 
declare that Executive Orders #82 and #90——both of which declare 
a public health emergency in response to COVID-19——were unlawful 
under Wis. Stat. § 323.10. 
¶45 We also received a motion and briefing on the 
lawfulness of Executive Order #105.  Based on the legislature's 
revocation of Executive Order #104, a power specifically granted 
to the legislature in Wis. Stat. § 323.10, we declare Executive 
Order #105 unlawful as well.20 
                                                 
19 As a necessary consequence, all executive actions and 
orders issued pursuant to the powers triggered by the emergency 
declaration are likewise void. 
20 In addition, Fabick asked us to take judicial notice of 
Executive Orders #95 and #104.  We have already taken judicial 
notice of Executive Order #95, and we also take judicial notice 
of Executive Order #104.  Fabick also sought a temporary 
injunction of Executive Order #105, which is denied as moot. 
No. 
2020AP1718-OA   
 
27 
 
By the Court.——Rights declared; relief granted. 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶46 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  "[W]e have 
a government of laws and not of men."1  Governor Tony Evers' 
successive declarations of emergency——each stemming from the 
COVID-19 pandemic——violate the law, specifically Wis. Stat. 
§ 323.10's express temporal limitation:  "A state of emergency 
shall not exceed 60 days unless the state of emergency is 
extended by joint resolution of the legislature."  Because the 
Wisconsin Legislature never extended Governor Evers' declared 
state of emergency, it ended on May 11, 2020.  Any exercise of 
executive power in the name of the COVID-19 pandemic beyond that 
date is unlawful unless the people consent, through their 
elected representatives in the legislature.   
¶47 Governor Evers' interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 323.10 
as a license to unilaterally decree consecutive states of 
emergency based upon the same underlying cause would violate the 
structural separation of powers embedded in the Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
rendering 
the 
statute 
an 
unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative power to the executive branch.  In 
preservation of the people's inherent right to liberty, the 
Framers of the United States Constitution devised a system of 
separate and distinct powers among the three branches of 
government.  "To the Framers of the United States Constitution, 
the 
concentration 
of 
governmental 
power 
presented 
an 
extraordinary threat to individual liberty:  'The accumulation 
of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the 
                                                 
1 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (citing Part the First, Article XXX, of the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780). 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
2 
 
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, . . . may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.'  The Federalist No. 
47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)."  
Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶4, 376 
Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384 (alterations in original).  The 
Framers were inspired by the wisdom of Montesquieu:  "There can 
be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are 
united in the same person."  The Federalist No. 47, at 302 
(quoting Baron de Montesquieu, XI The Spirit of the Laws 216 
(John Nourse and Paul Vaillant eds., 1758)).  The people of 
Wisconsin adopted the same separation of governmental powers in 
our state constitution.  
¶48  We 
sustain 
this 
separation 
of 
powers 
without 
exception, even in a pandemic.  Accordingly, this court does not 
consider the prudence of particular measures to address the 
pandemic; such policy decisions rest with the legislature, not 
the judiciary.  This case is about who has the power to make 
those decisions.  The Wisconsin Constitution answers that 
question——it is the legislature's duty to make the laws that 
govern our lives, the governor's duty to execute them, and the 
judiciary's duty to ensure they comport with the constitution.  
The legislature enacted a law empowering the governor to respond 
to a public health emergency within a period prescribed by the 
legislature, after which his authority expires unless extended 
by the people's representatives in the legislature.  The 
majority 
opinion 
reaffirms 
the 
principle 
established 
in 
Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm last year:  "in the case of a 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
3 
 
pandemic, which lasts month after month, the Governor cannot 
rely on emergency powers indefinitely."2  
I 
¶49 While this case may be resolved by applying the plain 
language of the statute, the constitutional infirmities of 
Governor Evers' interpretation of the law warrant discussion.  
An understanding of the structure of our government is a 
prerequisite to grasping the constitutional flaws in the 
Governor's analysis.   "Like its federal counterpart, '[o]ur 
state constitution . . . created three branches of government, 
each with distinct functions and powers,' and '[t]he separation 
of powers doctrine is implicit in this tripartite division.'"  
Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶11 (quoted source omitted; alterations 
in original).  "Three clauses of the Wisconsin Constitution 
embody this separation [of powers]:  Article IV, Section 1 
('[t]he legislative power shall be vested in a senate and 
assembly'); Article V, Section 1 ('[t]he executive power shall 
be vested in a governor'); and Article VII, Section 2 ('[t]he 
judicial 
power . . . shall 
be 
vested 
in 
a 
unified 
court 
system')."  Id. (citation omitted).   
¶50 Elected officials on whom the people have conferred 
powers may not circumvent the constitutional confines of their 
authority even if "they believe that more or different power is 
necessary."  A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935).  This fundamental principle underlying 
the foundation of our government prevails even in an emergency 
                                                 
2 2020 WI 42, ¶41, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900. 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
4 
 
because "[e]xtraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge 
constitutional power."  Id. at 528.  Even in a pandemic, the 
government "cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the 
authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be 
maintained."  Id. at 530.  
¶51 The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
prohibits 
unlawful 
delegations of power among the branches as a bulwark for the 
people.  "By vesting certain powers exclusively within each of 
the three co-equal branches of government, the drafters of the 
Wisconsin Constitution recognized the importance of dispersing 
governmental power in order to protect individual liberty and 
avoid tyranny."  League of Women Voters of Wis. v. Evers, 2019 
WI 75, ¶31, 387 Wis. 2d 511, 929 N.W.2d 209 (citation omitted).  
In specifying the powers of each branch, the constitution 
prohibits one branch from assuming the powers of another and 
also forbids one branch from ceding its own powers to another.  
"The co-ordinate branches of the government . . . should not 
abdicate or permit others to infringe upon such powers as are 
exclusively committed to them by the Constitution."  Rules of 
Court Case, 204 Wis. 501, 514, 236 N.W. 717 (1931).  "Each 
branch's 
core 
powers 
reflect 
'zones 
of 
authority 
constitutionally established for each branch of government upon 
which any other branch of government is prohibited from 
intruding.  As to these areas of authority, . . . any exercise 
of 
authority 
by 
another 
branch 
of 
government 
is 
unconstitutional.'"  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶31 (quoting State 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
5 
 
ex rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 155 Wis. 2d 94, 100, 454 
N.W.2d 770 (1990)) (ellipsis in original; emphasis omitted).  
¶52 Because Wisconsin adopted a tripartite division of 
powers between the executive, legislature, and judiciary modeled 
after the United States Constitution, founding era principles 
"inform our understanding of the separation of powers under the 
Wisconsin Constitution."  Id., ¶11.  "The Founders designed a 
Constitution to safeguard individual rights and liberty."  
Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶56, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 
N.W.2d 600 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, concurring).  William 
Blackstone——who "profoundly influenced" the Founders' conception 
of the separation of powers——"defined a tyrannical government as 
one in which 'the right both of making and of enforcing the 
laws, is vested in one and the same man, or one and the same 
body of men,' for 'wherever these two powers are united 
together, there can be no public liberty.'"  Dep't of Transp. v. 
Ass'n of Am. Railroads, 575 U.S. 43, 73 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (quoting 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England 129, 134, 137-38 (1765)).  "The Founders 
recognized that maintaining the formal separation of powers was 
essential to preserving individual liberty."  Koschkee, 387 
Wis. 2d 552, ¶51 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, concurring). 
This devotion to the separation of powers is, in part, 
what supports our enduring conviction that the Vesting 
Clauses are exclusive and that the branch in which a 
power is vested may not give it up or otherwise 
reallocate it.  The Framers were concerned not just 
with the starting allocation, but with the "gradual 
concentration of the several powers in the same 
department."  The Federalist No. 51, at 321 (J. 
Madison). 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
6 
 
Ass'n of Am. Railroads, 575 U.S. at 74 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
¶53 The Framers "believed the new federal government's 
most dangerous power was the power to enact laws restricting the 
people's liberty."  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 
2134 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  With this in mind, the 
Framers enshrined the separation of powers in our Constitution 
in order to "preserve individual freedom."  Olson, 487 U.S. at 
727 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Ass'n of Am. Railroads, 
575 U.S. at 75 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("At the center of the 
Framers' dedication to the separation of powers was individual 
liberty.").  "No political truth is certainly of greater 
intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more 
enlightened patrons of liberty" than the separation of powers.  
The Federalist No. 47, at 301; see also The Federalist No. 51, 
at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[The] 
separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of 
government . . . is admitted on all hands to be essential to the 
preservation of liberty.").  Renouncing England's monarchical 
rule, the Framers adopted a structure under which the government 
was accountable to the people; power would not go unchecked; and 
citizens 
could 
"readily 
identify 
the 
source 
of 
legislation . . . affect[ing] their lives."  See Ass'n of Am. 
Railroads, 575 U.S. at 57 (Alito, J., concurring).  Absent this 
structural separation of powers, Madison feared there would be 
"gradual concentration of the several powers in the same 
department."  The Federalist No. 51, at 321-22.  
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
7 
 
¶54 Acknowledging the dangers of accumulated power, the 
Framers precluded each branch of government from delegating its 
own vested powers.  "By careful design," the Framers designed a 
framework under which "[w]hen the Government is called upon to 
perform a function that requires an exercise of legislative, 
executive, or judicial power, only the vested recipient of that 
power can perform it."  Ass'n of Am. Railroads, 575 U.S. at 61, 
68 (Thomas, J., concurring).  In other words, given that "each 
of these vested powers had a distinct content," the Framers 
contemplated that each respective department——and only that 
department——could 
carry 
out 
its 
constitutionally-conferred 
powers.  See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting). 
¶55 This case concerns the legislative function, and the 
legislature's authority to transfer it to another branch of 
government.  "The people bestowed much power on the legislature, 
comprised of their representatives whom the people elect to make 
the laws."  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶60.  Safeguarding 
constitutional limitations on the exercise of legislative power 
is particularly important in light of its awesome sweep.  "When 
it came to the legislative power, the framers understood it to 
mean the power to adopt generally applicable rules of conduct 
governing future actions by private persons——the power to 
'prescrib[e] the rules by which the duties and rights of every 
citizen are to be regulated,' or the power to 'prescribe general 
rules for the government of society.'"   Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 
2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing The Federalist No. 78 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
8 
 
(Alexander Hamilton) and Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 136 
(1810)).  In the Constitution, the "people had vested the power 
to prescribe rules limiting their liberties in Congress alone"——
not the executive.  Id. (citation omitted).  As expressed by 
John Locke, whose political philosophy greatly influenced the 
Framers' formation of our Republic, "[t]he legislative cannot 
transfer the power of making laws to any other hands; for it 
being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it 
cannot pass it over to others."  John Locke, Second Treatise of 
Civil Government § 141, at 71 (John Gough ed., 1947) (emphasis 
added).   
¶56 Because the people gave the legislature its power to 
make laws, the legislature alone must exercise it.  Our 
constitutional structure confers no authority on any branch to 
subdelegate any powers the sovereign people themselves delegated 
to particular governmental actors.  After all, "when the people 
have said we will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made 
by such men, and in such forms, nobody else can say other men 
shall make laws for them."  Id.  Any laws prescribed beyond the 
constitutional lines of authority drawn by the people are 
illegitimate:  "nor can the people be bound by any laws but such 
as are enacted by those whom they have chosen and authorised to 
make laws for them."  Id. 
II 
¶57 Although conflict between Governor Evers and the 
legislature over the State's COVID-19 pandemic response is often 
presented as partisan in nature, this court's review is not.  
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
9 
 
This court does not referee partisan battles; our duty is to 
ensure 
that 
each 
branch 
of 
government 
respects 
the 
constitutional limits of its authority.  "[E]nforcing the 
separation isn't about protecting institutional prerogative or 
governmental turf.  It's about respecting the people's sovereign 
choice to vest the legislative power in Congress alone.  And 
it's about safeguarding a structure designed to protect their 
liberties, minority rights, fair notice, and the rule of law."  
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2135 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).   
¶58 Just 
like 
the 
federal 
framework, 
Wisconsin's 
Constitution protects against any of the three branches of 
government 
abdicating 
their 
constitutionally-vested 
powers.  
"[I]t is . . . fundamental and undeniable that no one of the 
three branches of government can effectively delegate any of the 
powers which peculiarly and intrinsically belong to that 
branch."  Rules of Court Case, 204 Wis. at 503.  "Core powers," 
as this court has recognized, "are not for sharing."  Tetra Tech 
EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶47, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 
N.W.2d 21.  Nevertheless, this court has upheld delegations of 
legislative power to the executive, provided there are "adequate 
procedural safeguards" in place to limit executive overreach.3  
¶59 Relying on the procedural safeguard embodied in Wis. 
Stat. § 323.10, which empowers the legislature to revoke the 
governor's declared state of emergency by joint resolution, 
                                                 
3 Watchmaking Examining Bd. v. Husar, 49 Wis. 2d 526, 536, 
182 N.W.2d 257 (1971); Westring v. James, 71 Wis. 2d 462, 468, 
238 N.W.2d 695 (1976); Gilbert v. State, Med. Examining Bd., 119 
Wis. 2d 168, 186, 349 N.W.2d 68 (1984). 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
10 
 
Governor Evers initially argued that "[i]t cannot possibly be 
that when the Legislature explicitly has the final say on the 
matter, it has given away too much power."  Dismissing the 
petitioner's concern over the prospect of the governor promptly 
declaring a new state of emergency upon the legislature's 
revocation of the prior one as "rank speculation," the Governor 
himself acknowledged that "such a scenario" "may very well 
implicate separation of powers problems."  Citing Panzer v. 
Doyle,4 Governor Evers further conceded that declaring a new 
state of emergency after the legislature revoked the prior one 
"may be circumventing the procedural safeguards that insure that 
delegated power may be curtailed or reclaimed by future 
legislative action" warranting the successive declaration of a 
state of emergency "be struck down."   
¶60 That was the Governor's argument in November 2020.  On 
February 4, 2021, the legislature passed a joint resolution 
revoking Governor Evers' fifth order declaring a state of 
emergency related to the COVID-19 pandemic.  That very day, the 
Governor declared another one, casting aside the very procedural 
safeguard he invoked to validate the legislature's delegation of 
emergency management power.  In response to the petitioner's 
motion for injunctive relief, the Governor asserted a new basis 
for his latest emergency order——Wisconsin's potential loss of 
emergency FoodShare funds——the preservation of which ostensibly 
requires a state of emergency order.  Characterizing the 
deprivation of food assistance as a disaster distinct from the 
                                                 
4 2004 WI 52, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666. 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
11 
 
COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor neglects to explain how the 
face-covering mandate in his latest order bears any relationship 
to food assistance for Wisconsin citizens.  When the legislature 
passed a bill granting the Governor the power to declare a 
public health emergency for the sole purpose of preserving 
Wisconsin's entitlement to FoodShare funds as well as other 
emergency allotments, the Governor vetoed it.5  The Governor 
justified the veto, at least in part, based on the limits the 
bill imposed on the ability of his administration to control 
public gatherings.  The Governor's actions illustrate why this 
court "must be assiduous in patrolling the borders between the 
branches.  This is not just a practical matter of efficient and 
effective government.  We maintain this separation because it 
provides structural protection against depredations on our 
liberties."  Tetra Tech EC, 382 Wis. 2d 496, ¶45.   
III 
¶61 Although Governor Evers' violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 323.10's procedural safeguards suffices to strike down his 
declarations of successive states of emergency after May 11, 
2020, the procedural safeguards test is a judicial invention, 
existing in tension with the constitution's clearly demarcated 
separation of powers among the branches.  Over time, this court 
                                                 
5 Wis. Assem. 2, to Senate Am. 1, to Assem. Am. 1, to Senate 
Substitute Am. 1, to Assem B. (Jan. 28, 2021), available at 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2021/related/amendments/ab1/aa2
_sa1_aa1_ssa1_ab1. 
Governor Tony Evers, Governor's Veto Message (Feb. 5, 
2021), 
available 
at 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2021/
related/journals/assembly/20210205efe1/_70. 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
12 
 
has loosened the constitutional limits on delegating legislative 
power to the executive branch.  The constitutionally-grounded 
doctrine of nondelegation morphed into a doctrine of delegation 
within limits drawn by the judiciary, rather than the people.  
In this regard, Wisconsin's jurisprudence followed the federal 
path.  The history is readily traceable. 
¶62 In the early days of our Republic, the United States 
Supreme Court succinctly articulated the separation of powers:  
"the 
legislature 
makes, 
the 
executive 
executes, 
and 
the 
judiciary construes the law."  Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 22 
(1825).  By 1928, the Court discarded these first principles in 
favor of the "intelligible principle" test:  "If Congress shall 
lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which 
the person or body authorized to [exercise delegated power] is 
directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden 
delegation of legislative power."  J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. 
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).  Although this rule 
remains in place, see Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123, it is quite 
apparent that it supplanted the Constitution's separation of 
powers.   
¶63 The Constitution "contain[s] a discernible, textually 
grounded non-delegation principle that is far removed from the 
modern doctrine."  Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 
88 Va. L. Rev 327, 333 (2002).  "[T]he Constitution does not 
speak of 'intelligible principles.'  Rather, it speaks in much 
simpler terms:  'All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress.'"  Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
13 
 
Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring).  As 
some members of the current Court have recently recognized, 
"[i]f Congress could pass off its legislative power to the 
executive branch, the vesting clauses and indeed the entire 
structure of the Constitution, would make no sense."  Gundy, 139 
S. Ct. at 2134-35 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  If Congress could 
permissibly delegate its vested powers, "legislation would risk 
becoming nothing more than the will of the current President."  
Id. at 2135.  Departures from the nondelegation doctrine reflect 
each branch's willingness to "abandon openly a substantial 
portion 
of 
the 
foundation 
of 
American 
representative 
government."  Lawson, supra, at 332. 
¶64 In the early years of Wisconsin's statehood, this 
court understood that the three branches of government could not 
delegate their vested powers, imposing substantive limitations 
on the legislature's assignment of authority to the executive to 
carry out the legislature's policies.  In Dowling, this court 
declared "a law must be complete, in all its terms and 
provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the 
government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the 
electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature."  
Dowling v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 63, 65 N.W. 738, 741 
(1896) (emphasis added).  However, in the wake of the 
Progressive era, this court began to uproot substantive limits 
on 
the 
legislature's 
delegation 
of 
its 
constitutionally-
conferred powers, thereby damaging the "foundation of American 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
14 
 
representative government" that is the separation of powers.  
Lawson, supra, at 332.   
¶65 As is often the justification for casting aside 
constitutional 
principles, 
this 
court 
abandoned 
the 
nondelegation doctrine in the name of "necessity."  In 1928, 
conterminously with the United States Supreme Court, this court 
explained that "courts, Legislatures, and executives, as well as 
students of the law, agree, . . . that there is an overpowering 
necessity for a modification of the doctrine of separation and 
non-delegation of powers of government."  State v. Whitman, 196 
Wis. 472, 220 N.W. 929, 941 (1928).  Eviscerating the Wisconsin 
Constitution's separation of powers, the Whitman court held that 
the legislature "may delegate" to agencies "the authority to 
exercise such legislative power as is necessary to carry into 
effect the general legislative purpose."  Id.  Gone was any 
substantive limit on the legislature's delegation of authority; 
the legislature could now delegate its legislative powers so 
long as the court agreed it was necessary to carry out the 
legislative purpose.  Of course, neither branch sought nor 
obtained the people's consent to this brazen rewriting of the 
constitution.  
¶66 Whitman ushered in a new era for this court's ever-
evolving abandonment of non-delegation principles.  Forty years 
thereafter, this court approved any delegating statute merely 
"if the purpose of the delegating statute is ascertainable and 
there are procedural safeguards to insure that the board or 
agency acts within that legislative purpose."  Watchmaking 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
15 
 
Examining Bd. v. Husar, 49 Wis. 2d 526, 536, 182 N.W.2d 257 
(1971).  The court reiterated this position five years later, 
upholding "broad grants of legislative powers . . . where there 
are procedural and judicial safeguards against arbitrary, 
unreasonable, or oppressive conduct of the agency."  Westring v. 
James, 71 Wis. 2d 462, 468, 238 N.W.2d 695 (1976).  Over the 
ensuing decades, the court fortified its deviation from first 
principles, continuing to uphold "broad grants of legislative 
powers."  In Gilbert, this court acknowledged that throughout 
the 
"evolution 
of 
the 
delegation 
of 
legislative 
power" 
effectuated by the judiciary, it has "take[n] a more liberal 
attitude toward delegations of legislative authority."  Gilbert 
v. State, Med. Examining Bd., 119 Wis. 2d 168, 186, 349 
N.W.2d 68 
(1984). 
 
More 
accurately, 
the 
constitution's 
substantive limitations on delegating authority are all but 
dead.  In their place survives judicial complacence with 
transfers of legislative power, "[s]o long as there are adequate 
procedural safeguards" in place to limit executive overreach.  
Id.  
¶67 Proposals to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine 
are often met with warnings about the adverse impact on the 
government's ability to operate efficiently.  Governmental 
efficiency can never be allowed to trump the people's liberty.  
As Madison noted, "the separate and distinct exercise of 
government . . . [is] essential to the preservation of liberty."  
The Federalist No. 51, at 321 (emphasis added).  As reflected in 
Madison's enduring words, and consistent with the plain text and 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
16 
 
original 
meaning 
of 
the 
United 
States 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions, the legislature may not delegate its vested 
powers to the executive.    
¶68 Reviving the nondelegation doctrine would restore the 
original 
understanding 
of 
the 
constitutional 
grants 
of 
authority; they "'are exclusive,' which means 'only the vested 
recipient of that power can perform it.'"  Koschkee, 387 
Wis. 2d 552, ¶47 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, concurring) (citing 
Ass'n 
of 
Am. 
Railroads, 
575 
U.S. 
at 
67 
(Thomas, 
J., 
concurring)).  Following the Framers' model, the Wisconsin 
Constitution ensures this "separation of powers 'operate[s] in a 
general way to confine legislative powers to the legislature.'"  
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  "[E]ver vigilant in 
averting the accumulation of power by one body——a grave threat 
to liberty——the people devised a diffusion of governmental 
powers.  These powers may not be claimed by another branch."  
Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶60.   
IV 
¶69 In this case, the court appropriately applies the 
plain language of the statute to overturn executive overreach.  
Governor Evers' interpretation of his emergency management 
powers would render Wis. Stat. 
§ 323.10 unconstitutional.  
According to the Governor, the legislature gave the executive 
the unilateral authority to declare successive states of 
emergency, based upon the same underlying cause, with no 
prescribed end date, and without the approval (much less the 
input) of the legislature.  During a declared state of 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
17 
 
emergency, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 323.12 
gives 
the 
Governor 
the 
extraordinary power to "[i]ssue such orders as he [] deems 
necessary 
for 
the 
security 
of 
persons 
and 
property."  
§ 323.12(4)(b).  Under the Governor's reading, if the Governor 
wills it, then so it shall be——for as long as the Governor alone 
decrees a public health emergency exists.  Such a grant of 
plenary legislative power could not survive even cursory 
constitutional scrutiny.   
¶70 The people of Wisconsin gave the power to legislate to 
the legislature alone.  Accordingly, "a law must be complete, in 
all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative 
branch or the government, and nothing must be left to the 
judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the 
legislature."  Dowling, 92 Wis. at 65.  Governor Evers' 
construction of Wis. Stat. § 323.10 would leave the exercise of 
extraordinary power entirely to the judgment of the executive, 
unlimited in duration.  As the Governor would have it, so long 
as he alone thinks the cause of a public health emergency 
persists, he retains the unchecked power to keep Wisconsin in a 
perpetual state of emergency, leaving the individual liberties 
preserved by the people at the birth of our nation and at the 
founding of our state to the whim of a single executive.  
"Freedom of men under government," as John Locke wrote, "is to 
have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that 
society, 
and 
made 
by 
the 
legislative 
power 
erected 
in 
it . . . and not subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, 
arbitrary will of another man."  Ass'n of Am. Railroads, 575 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
18 
 
U.S. at 72-73 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting John Locke, 
Second Treatise of Civil Government § 22, at 13 (John Gough ed., 
1947)).  If the legislature had actually abdicated its vested 
powers to the executive, as the Governor would have it, the 
people of Wisconsin would be subject to the arbitrary will of a 
single man.  The Wisconsin Constitution does not countenance 
such a consolidation of extraordinary power.    
¶71  Under 
Governor 
Evers' 
interpretation, 
the 
constitutional separation of powers between the executive and 
legislative branches would collapse for the duration of any 
public health emergency.  Every 60 days, so long as the 
underlying cause of the emergency persists, the executive could 
declare another state of emergency, granting the Governor the 
extraordinary 
powers 
delineated 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 323.12——
indefinitely.  Such unilateral, unchecked power was anathema to 
the framers of our constitutions. 
By separating the lawmaking and law enforcement 
functions, the framers sought to thwart the ability of 
an individual or group to exercise arbitrary or 
absolute power. And by restricting lawmaking to one 
branch 
and 
forcing 
any 
legislation 
to 
endure 
bicameralism and presentment, the framers sought to 
make the task of lawmaking more arduous still. 
United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 670 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  While some may find the limitations 
on the Governor's power frustrating, particularly in the midst 
of a pandemic, those limitations exist to protect our liberty.  
"Admittedly, the legislative process can be an arduous one.  But 
that's no bug in the constitutional design:  it is the very 
point of the design."  Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.rgb 
 
19 
 
1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  Escaping 
the imposition of a single ruler's dictates on the people 
impelled the founding fathers to risk their lives, their 
fortunes, and their sacred honor in 1776.6   
* * * 
¶72 "In America THE LAW IS KING! For as in absolute 
governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought 
to be king; and there ought to be no other."  Thomas Paine, 
Common Sense (1776).  In Wisconsin, the legislature empowered 
the 
governor 
to 
respond 
to 
a 
public 
health 
emergency.  
Statutorily, those powers "shall not exceed 60 days, unless the 
state of emergency is extended by joint resolution of the 
legislature."  Wis. Stat. § 323.10.  In response to the COVID-19 
pandemic, Governor Evers declared a state of emergency on March 
12, 2020.  The legislature never extended it.  Accordingly, any 
orders issued by the Governor more than 60 days thereafter are 
unlawful and void.  While a pandemic will not follow the laws of 
men, the Governor must.  I respectfully concur. 
¶73 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence. 
                                                 
6 See Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776) ("And for the 
support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the 
protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each 
other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor."). 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
1 
 
¶74 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  This is no run-
of-the-mill case.  We are in the midst of a worldwide pandemic 
that so far has claimed the lives of over a half million people 
in this country.  And with the stakes so high, the majority not 
only arrives at erroneous conclusions, but it also obscures the 
consequence of its decision.1  Unfortunately, the ultimate 
consequence of the majority's decision is that it places yet 
another roadblock to an effective governmental response to 
COVID-19, further jeopardizing the health and lives of the 
people of Wisconsin. 
¶75 First, the majority errs by granting taxpayer standing 
to Fabick on a conjured justification neither briefed nor argued 
by any party.  In essence, the product of this new theory 
results in a standard so low that all that is needed for 
taxpayer standing in this court is a song and a whistle with an 
ability to produce a melody appealing to at least four justices. 
¶76 Such 
an 
institutional 
injury 
alone 
should 
be 
sufficient to cause the majority to pause.  Yet, in support of 
its new theory it proceeds to cause further institutional damage 
by sub silentio overruling more than a century of taxpayer 
standing cases. 
¶77 Second, the majority errs by purporting to engage in a 
straightforward statutory analysis.  Yet, it omits any analysis 
of an essential word in Wis. Stat. § 323.02(16) that is outcome 
determinative. 
 
Left 
unanalyzed 
is 
the 
statutory 
term 
                                                 
1 The majority's entire discussion of the consequence is 
tucked away in a one sentence footnote towards the end of the 
opinion.  See majority op., ¶43 n.19. 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
2 
 
"occurrence," which when included in the analysis, proves to 
undermine the majority's conclusion and mandates a contrary 
result.  
¶78 In a final flourish of judicial immodesty, the 
majority goes beyond the relief requested and declares Executive 
Order #105 unlawful with scant analysis and without candid 
justification.  Obscuring the fact that Fabick did not move for 
the relief it grants, the majority reaches out and strikes down 
Order #105 even though that order is not properly before the 
court.   
¶79 Contrary to the majority's conclusions, I determine 
that because Fabick and the State of Wisconsin suffer no 
pecuniary loss whatsoever, Fabick fails to meet the condition 
necessary for asserting taxpayer standing.  Without taxpayer 
standing, this case simply can no longer be maintained.  
¶80 Further, I conclude that Executive Orders #82 and #90 
are premised on statutory occurrences that are distinct from 
each other and from that relied upon for Executive Order #72.  
Therefore, they are permissible pursuant to the Governor's 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 323.10.   
¶81 Finally, I would deny Fabick's motion to temporarily 
enjoin Order #105.  In addition to Order #105 not being properly 
before the court and Fabick's lack of standing to challenge it, 
the majority's conclusion regarding Order #105 finds no textual 
support. 
¶82 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
3 
 
I 
¶83 Since its emergence in late 2019, COVID-19 has quickly 
and devastatingly enveloped the globe, and Wisconsin has been 
ravaged with high case counts and tragic deaths.  As of this 
writing, over 27,000 Wisconsinites have been hospitalized and 
over 6,500 have died.2  The emergencies presented by the arrival 
and spread of COVID-19 have spurred the Governor to issue 
several executive orders declaring various states of emergency.   
¶84 On March 12, 2020, recognizing the danger of the 
spread of COVID-19 around the world and seeing a need "to 
prepare for the impacts [the virus] may have on the state[,]" 
Governor Tony Evers issued Executive Order #72.  This order, 
among other things, declared a public health emergency in the 
state and designated the Department of Health Services (DHS) as 
the lead agency to respond. 
¶85 Neither the legislature nor the Governor revoked this 
order prior to its expiration 60 days later, on May 11, 2020.3  
Upon the expiration of Order #72, the Governor declared no state 
of emergency for the next 79 days despite the continuing 
presence of COVID-19 in Wisconsin. 
¶86 The Governor waited until July 30, 2020, and then 
declared a new state of emergency, in the form of Executive 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Health 
Services, 
COVID-19:  
Wisconsin 
Summary 
Data, 
https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/covid-
19/data.htm#summary (last visited Mar. 29, 2021). 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 323.10 ("The executive order may be 
revoked at the discretion of either the governor by executive 
order or the legislature by joint resolution."). 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
4 
 
Order #82, in response to a "new and concerning spike in 
infections."  Again, neither the Governor nor the legislature 
revoked Order #82, and it expired on September 28, 2020. 
¶87 However, six days before Order #82 was to expire, the 
Governor issued Executive Order #90 declaring a new public 
health emergency, this time in response to the significant 
increase in the spread of COVID-19 due to the beginning of the 
K-12 and collegiate school years.  Once again, the legislature 
did not revoke Order #90. 
¶88 With the legislature declining to act, and in so doing 
tacitly acquiescing to the Governor's orders,4 Fabick, a single 
Wisconsin resident, filed suit as a taxpayer.  He brought his 
suit as an original action before this court, arguing that the 
Governor lacks the statutory authority to declare successive 
states of emergency "arising from the same public health 
emergency." 
 
He 
acknowledges, 
however, 
that 
in 
certain 
circumstances, the Governor can make such a declaration for a 
different COVID-19 related public health emergency.  With regard 
to standing, Fabick contended that he has standing to maintain 
this action as a taxpayer because the Governor utilized 
government funds in drafting, promoting, and enforcing Orders 
#82 and #90. 
                                                 
4 Curiously, although it has the authority to act to end a 
state of emergency at any time, see Wis. Stat. § 323.10, the 
legislature chose not to do so with either Order #82 or Order 
#90 and instead filed an amicus brief in this court in support 
of Fabick's position. 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
5 
 
II 
¶89 Right off the bat, the majority makes a fundamental 
error, allowing Fabick to maintain this action despite his lack 
of standing. In doing so, it sub silentio overrules over a 
century of precedent requiring that there be some pecuniary loss 
in order for taxpayer standing to be established.   
¶90 Why is standing so important?  In answering that 
question, a review of the "cases and controversies" clause of 
the United States Constitution is informative.  See U.S. Const. 
art. 
III, 
§ 2. 
 
Although 
not 
binding 
on 
state 
court 
jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court has generally 
interpreted this provision to define the proper role of the 
judiciary as limited to deciding only "cases and controversies."5 
¶91 As this court has done, the United States Supreme 
Court has emphasized that courts are not to hand out advisory 
opinions on some future hypothetical case.  Chafin v. Chafin, 
568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013); State v. Grandberry, 2018 WI 29, ¶31 
n.20, 
380 
Wis. 2d 541, 
910 
N.W.2d 214. 
 
The 
cases 
and 
controversies must be actual. 
¶92 Likewise, Article III, Section 2 circumscribes who can 
maintain a court action.  Courts are not to entertain cases from 
parties who do not have a legally recognized interest in the 
                                                 
5 The Supreme Court has observed that "[n]o principle is 
more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of 
government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court 
jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies."  Raines v. Byrd, 
521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997).  The case-or-controversy requirement 
of Article III requires plaintiffs to establish their standing 
to sue.  Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 561 (1992)). 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
6 
 
case.  See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 
(2006).  That legally recognized interest is called "standing."  
Thus, standing is important both in federal court and Wisconsin 
courts because it reins in unbridled attempts to go beyond the 
circumscribed boundaries that define the proper role of courts. 
¶93 Fabick seeks standing here as a taxpayer.  He claims 
that he has standing simply because government employees thought 
about and implemented Orders #82 and #90 on government time.   
¶94 Taxpayer standing is broad, but it is not limitless.  
See S.D. Realty Co. v. Sewerage Comm'n of City of Milwaukee, 15 
Wis. 2d 15, 21-22, 112 N.W.2d 177 (1961).  It is well settled in 
Wisconsin that "[i]n order to maintain a taxpayer's action, it 
must be alleged that the complaining taxpayer and taxpayers as a 
class 
have 
sustained, 
or 
will 
sustain, 
some 
pecuniary 
loss . . . ."  Id. at 21.  Such a principle is not new.   
¶95 The lineage of the "pecuniary loss" requirement can be 
traced back over a century.  Acknowledging this settled 
requirement for taxpayer standing, the S.D. Realty court cited 
McClutchey v. Milwaukee County, 239 Wis. 139, 140, 300 N.W. 224, 
(1941).  S.D. Realty Co., 15 Wis. 2d at 21-22.  McClutchey, in 
turn, cites a long list of cases dating back to 1914.  See Kasik 
v. Janssen, 158 Wis. 606, 609, 149 N.W. 398 (1914) ("There is 
therefore no ground for the maintenance of a taxpayer's suit.  
Equity does not interfere with the rules or orders of an 
administrative officer at the suit of a taxpayer, unless the 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
7 
 
taxpayer and his class have sustained or will sustain some 
pecuniary loss therefrom.").6 
¶96 Fabick's argument contains no limiting principle at 
all and renders the doctrine of standing purely illusory.  Under 
Fabick's rationale, any person could challenge any governmental 
action.  This is not the law, nor should it be.  For standing 
requirements to have any meaning, Fabick's standing must be 
denied. 
¶97 Ignoring our long-established case law, the majority, 
however, determines that Fabick has standing to maintain his 
claim as a taxpayer despite his failure to establish any 
pecuniary loss whatsoever either to himself or to taxpayers as a 
whole.  Majority op., ¶11.  The majority arrives at its 
erroneous determination that Fabick has standing by conjuring 
its own justification, neither argued nor briefed by any party.  
Namely, it relies on state expenditures of taxpayer funds for 
deployment of the National Guard pursuant to the subject 
emergency 
declarations. 
 
Id. 
 
However, 
recent 
events 
significantly undermine the majority's summoned rationale.   
¶98 On 
January 
21, 
2021, 
the 
new 
presidential 
administration issued an executive order instituting full 
federal reimbursement to states for National Guard expenses due 
                                                 
6 See also Berger v. City of Superior, 166 Wis. 477, 166 
N.W. 36 (1918); Murphy v. Paull, 192 Wis. 93, 212 N.W. 402 
(1927); Milwaukee Horse & Cow Comm'n Co. v. Hill, 207 Wis. 420, 
241 N.W. 364 (1932); Stuart v. City of Neenah, 215 Wis. 546, 255 
N.W. 142 (1934). 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
8 
 
to COVID-19 going forward.7  Then on February 2, 2021, it 
extended such reimbursement to states for 100 percent of 
expenses incurred in mobilizing the National Guard to address 
COVID-19, both going forward and retroactively.8   
¶99 Full retroactive reimbursement makes the majority's 
reliance on state-incurred National Guard expenses to establish 
Fabick's taxpayer standing untenable.  Indeed, with this federal 
policy change, no state funds at all will be expended for 
National Guard deployment.  None.  Zero.  Thus, the majority 
cannot persuasively rely on such an expenditure to establish 
Fabick's standing.   
¶100 The majority recognizes this change in federal policy, 
but does not take it at face value, instead determining that 
"[t]he imminent threat of unreimbursed costs, past and future, 
is sufficient to confer taxpayer standing on Fabick . . . ."  
Majority op., ¶11 n.5.  It cites Warden v. Hart, 162 Wis. 495, 
497, 156 N.W. 466 (1916), for the proposition that a taxpayer 
                                                 
7 Memorandum to Extend Federal Support to Governors' Use of 
the National Guard to Respond to COVID-19 and to Increase 
Reimbursement 
and 
Other 
Assistance 
Provided 
to 
States, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-
actions/2021/01/21/extend-federal-support-to-governors-use-of-
national-guard-to-respond-to-covid-19-and-to-increase-
reimbursement-and-other-assistance-provided-to-states/ 
(Jan. 21, 2021). 
8 FACT SHEET:  President Biden Announces Increased Vaccine 
Supply, Initial Launch of the Federal Retail Pharmacy Program, 
and 
Expansion 
of 
FEMA 
Reimbursement 
to 
States, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/02/02/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-
increased-vaccine-supply-initial-launch-of-the-federal-retail-
pharmacy-program-and-expansion-of-fema-reimbursement-to-states/ 
(Feb. 2, 2021). 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
9 
 
has standing when the taxpayer is merely "threatened with" a 
pecuniary loss.   
¶101 But Warden, the only taxpayer standing case the 
majority cites in support, cannot be stretched this far.  In 
Warden, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the excavation of a 
public street that had been planned and permitted.  Id.  The 
threat of injury was real and immediate. 
¶102 In this case, however, there is no such real and 
immediate threat of pecuniary loss.  On what is this "imminent 
threat" based, other than the majority's whimsical musing that 
the federal government may not do what it has said it will do?  
Such rank speculation underscores the majority's tenuous search 
for a viable theory upon which to justify the continuation of 
this action.  Speculation of this ilk cannot, however, create an 
actual case or controversy and surely does not support Fabick's 
standing to maintain this case. 
¶103 A party may have standing at the beginning of a case 
and then lose it as the case progresses.  See, e.g., Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976); Kurtz v. Clark, 290 P.3d 779, 
784 (Okla. Civ. App. 2012).  The S.D. Realty court compared 
taxpayer standing to shareholder standing:  "[A] taxpayer does 
have a financial interest in public funds which is akin to that 
of a stockholder in a private corporation."  S.D. Realty Co., 15 
Wis. 2d at 22.  And Northern Air Services, Inc. v. Link, 2011 WI 
75, ¶83, 336 Wis. 2d 1, 804 N.W.2d 458, makes clear that if you 
no longer own shares of stock, you no longer have standing to 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
10 
 
maintain a shareholder action.9  The same principle should apply 
here. 
¶104 Accordingly, even assuming Fabick had standing to 
bring this action in the first instance, he certainly has lost 
it due to the new policy of 100 percent federal reimbursement 
for states' National Guard expenses.  In its quest to get its 
teeth into this dispute, the majority ignores this fundamental 
deficiency in allowing Fabick's case to proceed. 
¶105 The effect of the majority's standing analysis is not 
limited only to this and future taxpayer cases, but it 
necessarily affects the vitality of our past precedents.  
Indeed, what of the "pecuniary loss" requirement to which we 
have adhered for over a century?  Without saying a word about 
it, the majority appears to overrule a multitude of cases10 and 
ignores our well-established precedent which requires a taxpayer 
to establish some sort of pecuniary loss to maintain standing.  
Because Fabick is unable to meet this requirement, I conclude 
that he lacks standing to maintain this action.   
                                                 
9 See N. Air Servs., Inc. v. Link, 2011 WI 75, ¶83, 336 Wis. 
2d 1, 804 N.W.2d 458 ("On June 30, 2009, when Jay surrendered 
his shares in Link Snacks under the Buy-Sell Agreement, he was 
no longer a 'shareholder' in Link Snacks, as that term is 
defined 
by 
the 
Wisconsin 
Business 
Corporation 
Law.  
Consequently, Jay no longer has standing to maintain an 
oppression claim under Wis. Stat. § 180.1430(2)(b)."). 
10 See, e.g., Kasik v. Janssen, 158 Wis. 606, 149 N.W. 398 
(1914); Berger, 166 Wis. 477; Murphy, 192 Wis. 93; Milwaukee 
Horse & Cow Comm'n Co., 207 Wis. 420, Stuart, 215 Wis. 546; 
McClutchey v. Milwaukee Cnty., 239 Wis. 139, 300 N.W. 224 
(1941); S.D. Realty Co. v. Sewerage Comm'n of City of Milwaukee, 
15 Wis. 2d 15, 112 N.W.2d 177 (1961).   
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
11 
 
III 
¶106 The majority also errs in its interpretation of the 
plain 
language 
of 
the 
relevant 
statutes, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 323.02(16) and 323.10.  When properly focused on the actual 
words of these statutes, the plain language does not support the 
majority's interpretation.  Rather, a plain language analysis 
establishes that emergency declarations are permissible when, 
like the orders at issue here, they are based on separate 
statutory "occurrences," even if those occurrences share the 
same underlying cause. 
¶107 The majority misses the mark when it fails to 
recognize that the key word for analysis in this case lies in 
the statutory definition of a "public health emergency" provided 
by Wis. Stat. § 323.02(16).  That key word is "occurrence."  
Instead, the majority puts on blinders and does not engage with 
the term at all. 
¶108 Legally speaking, this case presents a straightforward 
issue of statutory interpretation.  "Statutory language is given 
its 
common, 
ordinary, 
and 
accepted 
meaning, 
except 
that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We interpret statutory language 
"in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as 
part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or 
unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46. 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
12 
 
¶109 There are two statutes relevant to the analysis, Wis. 
Stat. §§ 323.02(16) and 323.10.  Section 323.10 sets forth the 
Governor's authority to declare a state of emergency.  It 
provides in relevant part: 
If the governor determines that a public health 
emergency exists, he or she may issue an executive 
order declaring a state of emergency related to public 
health for the state or any portion of the state and 
may designate the department of health services as the 
lead 
state 
agency 
to 
respond 
to 
that 
emergency. . . . A state of emergency shall not exceed 
60 days, unless the state of emergency is extended by 
joint 
resolution 
of 
the 
legislature. . . . The 
executive order may be revoked at the discretion of 
either 
the 
governor 
by 
executive 
order 
or 
the 
legislature by joint resolution. 
¶110 As a starting point, the emergency declarations at 
issue in this case arise from a "public health emergency," as 
the majority agrees.  Majority op., ¶24.  Thus, my focus zeroes 
in on that term as we examine:  what is a public health 
emergency?   
¶111 This is where Wis. Stat. § 323.02(16) joins the 
equation.  Indeed, "public health emergency" is a defined term 
pursuant to that statute.  It means "the occurrence or imminent 
threat of an illness or health condition that . . . [i]s 
believed to be caused by . . . a novel or previously controlled 
or eradicated biological agent."  § 323.02(16).  The statute 
further defines a "public health emergency" as requiring that 
the occurrence or threat poses a high probability of either "[a] 
large number of deaths or serious or long-term disabilities 
among humans" or "[a] high probability of widespread exposure to 
a biological, chemical, or radiological agent that creates a 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
13 
 
significant risk of substantial future harm to a large number of 
people."  Id.   
¶112 Without further interpretation, the definition of 
public health emergency by itself does not resolve our inquiry.   
This statutory definition of "public health emergency" turns on 
whether there is an "occurrence" or a "threat" of an illness or 
health condition that fulfills the statutory criteria.  Thus, a 
"public health emergency" may be declared either upon the 
occurrence or upon the imminent threat of an illness or health 
condition. 
¶113 I focus on the term "occurrence" rather than "threat" 
because Orders #82 and 
#90 were issued in response to 
"occurrences" that have already taken place.  The new spike in 
infections drove Order #82 and Order #90 was issued because of 
the significant increase in the spread of the virus occasioned 
by the beginning of the school year.11 
                                                 
11 The majority mischaracterizes this dissent as "ignor[ing] 
that a 'public health emergency' may be declared upon either 
'the occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health 
condition.'"  Majority op., ¶23 n.7.  As explained above, I 
focus on the term "occurrence" rather than "threat" simply 
because Orders #82 and #90 were issued in response to 
"occurrences" that have already taken place.  If anything, the 
inclusion of "threat" in addition to "occurrence" broadens the 
circumstances under which a public health emergency may be 
declared. 
Further, the majority decries the fact that "occurrence" 
does not appear in Wis. Stat. § 323.10.  Id.  True enough.  But 
it does appear in Wis. Stat. § 323.02(16), and there is a 
straight line between the two statutes.  Section 323.10 includes 
the phrase "public health emergency," which is in turn defined 
by § 323.02(16) to include an "occurrence."  The connection is 
not hard to follow. 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
14 
 
¶114 In the absence of any statutory definition, and 
without any case law interpreting the term "occurrence" in the 
context of Wis. Stat. § 323.02(16), our task is to determine its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶45.  A dictionary may aid us in our interpretation, so that is 
where I begin.12 
¶115 A commonly accepted dictionary defines "occur" as "to 
take place" or "come about."13  We need not look far to find an 
application of a highly similar definition in our case law, as 
this court has previously stated that the "ordinary and common 
meaning 
of 
'occurrence' 
is 
'something 
that 
takes 
place; 
something that happens unexpectedly and 
without design.'"  
Kremers-Urban Co. v. Am. Emp.'s Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 741, 
351 
N.W.2d 156 
(1984); 
see 
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
¶45 
(explaining that statutory language is given "its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning").  Contrary to the majority's 
overly simplistic view, "occurrence" is a very broad term.  
Nothing about this definition leads to the conclusion that an 
"occurrence" coincides with the first appearance of a disease 
only.   
¶116 Applying our established definition of "occurrence" to 
Orders #82 and #90, it is apparent that each is based on a new 
                                                 
12 See State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 499, 573 N.W.2d 187 
(1998) 
("For 
purposes 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
or 
construction, the common and approved usage of words may be 
established by consulting dictionary definitions."). 
13 Occur, American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language, 
https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=occur 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2021).   
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
15 
 
set of on-the-ground facts, with each new set of facts posing a 
high probability of either "[a] large number of deaths or 
serious or long-term disabilities among humans" or "[a] high 
probability of widespread exposure to a biological . . . agent 
that creates a significant risk of substantial future harm to a 
large number of people."  See Wis. Stat. § 323.02(16).  Thus, 
the orders were issued in response to separate occurrences and 
are permissible under the plain language of §§ 323.02(16) 
and 323.10.   
¶117 Unlike Order #72, which was premised on preparing 
Wisconsin for the fight against COVID-19, Order #82 declared a 
new public health emergency in response to a "new and concerning 
spike in infections" that without quick intervention "will lead 
to 
unnecessary 
serious 
illness 
or 
death, 
overwhelm 
our 
healthcare system, prevent schools from fully reopening, and 
unnecessarily undermine economic stability . . . ."  Order #82 
detailed that "on June 1, 2020, there were 18,543 confirmed 
cases of COVID-19 in Wisconsin; on July 1, 2020, there were 
29,199 confirmed cases of COVID-19, a 57 percent increase from 
June 1; and on July 29, 2020, there were 51,049 confirmed cases 
of COVID-19, a 75 percent increase from July 1."   
¶118 Accordingly, Order #82 was issued in response to a 
specific and discrete occurrence.  The "new and concerning spike 
in infections" is certainly "something that takes place" that 
poses a high probability of widespread transmission risking 
future harm to a large number of people, i.e. an occurrence 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
16 
 
separate and apart from the need to prepare for COVID-19's 
impact that drove Order #72.  
¶119 Likewise, Order #90 was issued in response to a 
different specific and discrete occurrence.  It was premised on 
facts indicating that COVID-19's "exponential growth is being 
driven by new factors not present before, primarily the 
significant increase in spread due to the beginning of the K-12 
and collegiate school years, which all began on or about 
September 1, and the unprecedented number of infections among 
18-24 year-olds . . . ."  Again, the increase in spread due to 
the beginning of the school year is "something that takes place" 
that poses a high probability of widespread exposure that 
threatens broad swaths of Wisconsinites, i.e. an occurrence 
separate and apart from the occurrences cited in Orders #72 and 
#82. 
¶120 While COVID-19 may be the underlying cause of the 
conditions that gave rise to Orders #72, #82, and #90, the 
disease itself is not the statutory "occurrence" on which the 
orders 
are 
premised. 
 
In 
other 
words, 
the 
"occurrence" 
underlying each subject order is not the pandemic itself, but 
conditions that the pandemic has caused.   
¶121 At oral argument, Fabick acknowledged the correctness 
of such a proposition, undercutting his argument that there 
cannot be another public health emergency declared due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  In response to a question from the court 
regarding whether hospitals being overrun could constitute a 
separate 
occurrence 
under 
the 
statute, 
Fabick's 
counsel 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
17 
 
responded:  "The Governor could issue a separate order that is 
targeted to the specific problem."14  That is exactly what the 
Governor has done here. 
¶122 Wisconsin Stat. § 323.10 prohibits the Governor from 
extending a state of emergency past 60 days absent the approval 
of the legislature.  By issuing Orders #82 and #90, the Governor 
has not extended a pre-existing state of emergency, but instead 
has issued new emergency declarations based on new underlying 
occurrences.  Accordingly, I determine that under the plain 
language of the statutes Orders #82 and #90 are permissible 
exercises of the authority granted to the Governor in § 323.10.15 
                                                 
14 In more detail, the exchange proceeded as follows: 
The Court:  Let's just say, hypothetically, all of our 
hospitals are overrun . . . and we get to a point 
where there needs to be action taken, it's your 
position that because one emergency was issued, one 
state of emergency, based on an ongoing public health 
emergency or public health crisis, the Governor could 
do nothing in terms of declaring a state of emergency 
because the hospitals have been overrun, which could 
be another occurrence, correct? 
Fabick's counsel:  Well, if we're dealing with a 
targeted scenario, short supply of hospital equipment, 
the Governor could issue a separate order that is 
targeted to the specific problem.  
15 Because I determine that Orders #82 and #90 are 
permissible pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 323.10, I must reach the 
issue that the majority does not, i.e. the argument that 
§ 323.10 
constitutes 
an 
unconstitutional 
delegation 
of 
legislative power to the executive.  This argument can be 
quickly dispatched.   
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
18 
 
¶123 This interpretation is buttressed by the fact that an 
alternative "one and done" statutory interpretation, which in 
the main is advanced by Fabick, puts forth a position that leads 
to absurd or unreasonable results contrary to both common sense 
and 
recent 
practice. 
 
See 
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46 
(explaining that we must interpret statutes "reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results").16  
                                                                                                                                                             
This court has recently acknowledged that "[c]onstitutional 
law 
has 
generally 
permitted 
the 
Governor 
to 
respond 
to 
emergencies 
without 
the 
need 
for 
legislative 
approval."  
Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, ¶41, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 
942 N.W.2d 900.  Such a clear statement from this court 
indicates that emergency response is at the very least a shared 
power between the legislative and executive.   
In examining a nondelegation argument in the context of a 
shared power, this court "normally review[s] both the nature of 
delegated 
power 
and 
the 
presence 
of 
adequate 
procedural 
safeguards, giving less emphasis to the former when the latter 
is present."  Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, ¶55, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 
680 N.W.2d 666. 
Here, there is a safeguard in place in the form of the 
legislature's ability to revoke any state of emergency the 
Governor may declare.  See Wis. Stat. § 323.10 ("The executive 
order may be revoked at the discretion of . . . the legislature 
by joint resolution.")  Indeed, it must be asked how there could 
be an impermissible delegation of power when the legislature 
retains full authority to revoke any state of emergency the 
governor may issue.  
16 The majority mischaracterizes this dissent as arguing 
that the assertion "that a governor's power to act on an 
emergency basis would be temporary and terminable by the 
legislature" creates an absurd result.  Majority op., ¶36 n.16.  
This contention by the majority is simply a straw man set up 
only to be inexorably torn down.  Of course, it is not the 
statutory 
scheme 
that 
is 
absurd, 
but 
the 
majority's 
interpretation of limiting the governor to one emergency 
declaration per underlying cause. 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
19 
 
¶124 As 
an 
illustration 
of 
the 
absurdity 
of 
this 
alternative interpretation, consider an example taken from the 
Governor's brief.  Imagine heavy rains leading to a flood that 
two months later causes a dam to break.  If the governor 
declared a state of emergency because of the initial flooding, 
he could not issue another for the new flood caused by the dam 
failure because it shares an underlying cause with the previous 
state of emergency.  This simply could not be the legislature's 
intent.  
¶125 Such an interpretation would cause the Governor to 
engage in a perverse calculation regarding when to use an 
emergency declaration——should he issue it now or save it and 
wait to see how bad things get?  This undermines the very 
concept of an emergency:  something is happening right now that 
demands swift action without delay. 
¶126 To 
further 
illustrate 
that 
this 
alternative 
interpretation is unreasonable, I look to recent practice.  
Indeed, from the Fall of 2013 through the Winter of 2014, 
Governor Walker issued seven executive orders related to propane 
shortages and the resulting energy emergency.17  Then again from 
the Fall of 2016 through the Winter of 2017, Governor Walker 
declared two successive states of emergency to waive load limits 
for petroleum transportation due to a pipeline shutdown and long 
                                                 
17 Office of the Wisconsin Governor, Executive Order No. 120 
(Oct. 25, 2013); No. 121 (Nov. 7, 2013), No. 122 (Nov. 15, 
2013); No. 124 (Nov. 27, 2013); No. 128 (Dec. 23, 2013); No. 130 
(Jan 
25, 
2014); 
No. 
132 
(Apr. 
17, 
2014), 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/code/executive_orders/2011_scot
t_walker/. 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
20 
 
wait times at supply terminals.18  Fabick acknowledged at oral 
argument that, despite his purported concern for a governor 
overstepping his statutory authority, he did not challenge these 
emergency declarations.  Perhaps they went unchallenged because, 
as Fabick has implicitly acknowledged, it makes no sense to 
hamstring a governor's ability to meet the emergencies faced by 
the people of Wisconsin by limiting emergency power to only one 
underlying cause——regardless of whom is governor. 
¶127 Thus, in the recent past, a governor has declared 
numerous states of emergency premised on the same underlying 
causes.  Yet the majority reverses course from this established 
practice and common sense to arrive at its unreasonable result. 
¶128 An examination of the extreme consequences further 
highlights the conclusion that this alternative interpretation 
renders absurd or unreasonable results.  The majority in large 
part embraces this alternative interpretation, yet it attempts 
to obscure the consequences of its declaration that the Governor 
lacked authority to issue Executive Orders #82 and #90.  In a 
one sentence footnote towards the end of its opinion, the 
majority acknowledges the consequence of its declaration:  "[a]s 
a necessary consequence [of its decision], all executive actions 
and orders issued pursuant to the powers triggered by the 
                                                 
18 Office of the Wisconsin Governor, Executive Order No. 223 
(Nov. 
4, 
2016); 
No. 
227 
(Dec. 
30, 
2016), 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/code/executive_orders/2011_scot
t_walker/. 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
21 
 
emergency declaration are likewise void."  Majority op., ¶43 
n.19.19 
¶129 Yet, in spite of the astounding breadth of the 
asserted consequence of the majority's declaration, it takes 
this dissent to task for even discussing the absurdity or 
reasonableness of some of those consequences.  See id., ¶15 n.6.  
Surely, when enacted, the legislature could not have intended 
that Wis. Stat. §§ 323.02(16) and 323.10 would be interpreted to 
place such a roadblock to effective governmental response to a 
worldwide pandemic.  
¶130 Among the powers hamstrung by the majority are 
critical executive powers set forth by statute that may be 
exercised only in a public health emergency——powers that are 
essential to saving lives and getting a rapidly-spreading 
disease under control. 
¶131 As the majority acknowledges, during a public health 
emergency DHS is empowered to take critical steps to ameliorate 
the emergency.  See majority op., ¶35.  Yet, these steps can be 
                                                 
19 Both Order #82 and #90 set the stage for additional 
emergency measures necessitated by the spread of COVID-19.  
Specifically, pursuant to Orders #82 and #90, the Governor 
issued several emergency orders mandating the wearing of masks 
as a means of stemming the spread of COVID-19. 
For example, Governor Evers issued Emergency Order #1 
pursuant to Order #82 on July 30, 2020.  See Emergency Order #1, 
https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/COVID19/EmO01-FaceCoverings.pdf 
(July 30, 2020).  This emergency order required all individuals 
age five and older to wear a face covering in all indoor and 
enclosed spaces other than private residences when another 
person not a member of the individual's household is present in 
the same room or enclosed space. 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
22 
 
accomplished only "during the period under which the department 
is designated as the lead state agency," which in turn requires 
a declaration of a public health emergency.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 252.041(1).  Absent an emergency declaration, do these powers 
simply vanish? 
¶132 For example, during a public health emergency, DHS's 
power includes the essential steps of purchasing vaccine, 
antibiotics, and medical supplies.  Wis. Stat. § 250.042(2)(a).20  
Again, absent an emergency declaration, do these statutory 
purchasing powers simply vanish? 
¶133 Additionally, 
absent 
an 
emergency 
declaration, 
Wisconsin also risks losing significant federal allotments to 
mitigate the economic effects of this pandemic.  Section 
2302(2)(a) of the federal Families First Coronavirus Response 
Act conditions the receipt of emergency supplemental nutrition 
allotments on the declaration of states of emergency at both the 
federal and state levels.  The nonpartisan Legislative Fiscal 
Bureau indicated that Wisconsin risks losing nearly $50 million 
per 
month 
in 
FoodShare 
assistance 
absent 
an 
emergency 
declaration.21  An absurd result indeed.  Without such measures, 
what are we left with as we continue the battle against COVID-19 
                                                 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 250.042(2)(a) provides that as the 
public health authority pursuant to an emergency declaration, 
DHS may "[p]urchase, store, or distribute antitoxins, serums, 
vaccines, 
immunizing 
agents, 
antibiotics, 
and 
other 
pharmaceutical agents or medical supplies that the department 
determines are advisable to control a public health emergency." 
21 Alexandra Bentzen, Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Impact of 
Ending the State Public Health Emergency on Emergency FoodShare 
Allotments (Jan. 27, 2021).   
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
23 
 
and its fallout?  As Judge Rovner recently wrote, "Good luck and 
G-d bless, Wisconsin.  You are going to need it."  Democratic 
Nat'l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639, 656 (7th Cir. 2020) 
(Rovner, J., dissenting).   
IV 
¶134 Finally, abandoning any vestige of judicial restraint, 
the majority denies a motion that was actually made yet reaches 
out and grants a motion that was never made.  Fabick filed a 
motion 
for 
a 
temporary 
injunction 
on 
February 
9, 
2021, 
requesting that Order #105 be temporarily enjoined and Governor 
Evers filed a response to that motion on February 22, 2021.   
¶135 Although declared moot, Fabick's motion could never 
have been granted.  Fabick did not sufficiently allege, let 
alone 
attempt 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
he 
would 
suffer 
any 
particularized irreparable harm——a requisite showing in order to 
secure any temporary injunction.22  Faced with an inability to 
                                                 
22 A temporary injunction is not to be issued unless (1) the 
movant will likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an 
injunction; (2) the movant has no other adequate remedy at law; 
(3) a temporary injunction is necessary to preserve the status 
quo; and (4) the movant has a reasonable probability of success 
on the merits.  Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 
67, ¶93, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35.  Competing interests 
must be reconciled and the petitioner must satisfy the court 
that on balance equity favors issuing the injunction.  Pure Milk 
Prods. Co-op v. Nat'l Farmers Org., 90 Wis. 2d 781, 800, 280 
N.W.2d 691 (1979). 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
24 
 
grant the temporary injunction motion, what is the majority to 
do?  It reaches out and instead grants a motion for a permanent 
injunction of Order #105——a motion that was never made. 
¶136 Apparently the majority fails to recognize that the 
granting of a permanent injunction also requires a showing of 
irreparable harm.  Werner v. A.L. Grootemaat & Sons, Inc., 80 
Wis. 2d 513, 521, 259 N.W.2d 310 (1977) ("While standards for 
the granting of temporary and permanent injunctive relief 
differ . . . a showing of irreparable injury and inadequate 
remedy at law is required for a temporary as well as for a 
permanent 
injunction."). 
 
But 
with 
no 
irreparable 
harm 
sufficiently alleged and none whatsoever demonstrated, it is no 
surprise that the majority says nothing about it.  How could it?  
Perhaps the better question is how could the majority grant a 
permanent injunction without it? 
¶137 Nevertheless, 
the 
majority 
soldiers 
on. 
 
As 
justification for its reach, the majority appears to suggest 
that a permanent injunction motion was made "in post-argument 
motions . . . ."  Majority op., ¶41 (emphasis added).  That is 
incorrect.  There was but a singular post argument motion by 
                                                                                                                                                             
Yet nowhere in the majority's analysis are the factors 
necessary to grant either a temporary or permanent injunction 
even mentioned.  The factors likely aren't mentioned because 
Fabick plainly does not meet them.  Fabick has not established 
that he (or any Wisconsin taxpayer) will suffer any harm, much 
less irreparable harm.  In conclusory fashion, he asserts that 
taxpayers are harmed by "wasted public expenditures" due to 
staff time drafting, promoting, and enforcing Order #105.  But 
he does not make any argument that this supposed harm is 
irreparable, and we will not develop one for him. 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
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Fabick23 that requested any injunctive relief at all and it was 
for a temporary injunction.  Similarly the majority justifies 
its reach by suggesting that it makes its decision on a 
permanent injunction "[a]fter hearing from both parties . . . ."  
Id.  But to the extent that this artful drafting suggests that 
the court actually heard anything from the parties on the issue, 
it is misleading.  There was neither developed argument nor any 
analysis advanced by either party on the issue of a permanent 
injunction. 
¶138 Ultimately, 
as 
the 
sole 
justification 
for 
its 
overreach, the majority points to Fabick's "request [for] 
permanent relief."  Id., ¶41 n.17.  This "request [for] 
permanent relief" consists of a twice repeated sentence found in 
Fabick's brief in support of his motion for a temporary 
injunction in which he asks the court to "ultimately grant a 
permanent injunction as part of its final judgment."  If the 
majority is going to permanently enjoin an executive order of 
the Governor, it should do so based on more than a stray request 
tucked away in a brief that, in its very title, sets forth that 
it is filed in support of a motion for temporary injunction 
only.  Thus, with a complete failure of demonstrating the 
required irreparable harm, with unpersuasive justification and 
with scant analysis, the majority permanently enjoins Order #105 
and declares it unlawful.  See id., ¶¶42-43.   
                                                 
23 The Legislature filed a motion to participate as amicus 
in support of Fabick's motion for temporary injunction, but in 
its brief addressed the nondelegation doctrine only. 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
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¶139 Recognizing 
that 
a 
permanent 
injunction 
is 
functionally the equivalent of a declaratory judgment, the 
majority denominates its decision as one for declaratory 
judgment.  But merely changing the label does not remove the 
majority's 
problem 
with 
its 
overreach: 
 
no 
motion 
for 
declaratory judgment regarding Order #105 was made by Fabick. 
¶140 What makes the majority's reach even more untenable is 
that Fabick has no standing to maintain this action.  And if 
that is not sufficient to cause the majority to pause, add to 
the mix that Order #105 is not properly before the court.  It 
did not exist when this case was filed and thus could not have 
been included in the petition for original action Fabick filed. 
¶141 Reaching outside of the orders that were actually 
challenged in this case to decide an issue not raised in the 
petition for original action is unsound judicial practice.  It 
grants an end run around Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.70(1)(a), which 
requires that a petition for original action state the issues 
presented by the controversy.   
¶142 The consideration of Order #105 at this late juncture 
injects a new issue into this case that was not in existence 
when the case was filed, briefed, or argued.  Yet the majority 
allows Fabick to litigate what should be a wholly separate case 
as a motion for temporary injunctive relief.  And further, as 
set forth above, it is a wholly separate case that Fabick does 
not have standing to bring.  Accordingly, I would deny Fabick's 
attempt to backdoor a new claim into this court's consideration. 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
27 
 
¶143 The majority's scant analysis of Order #105 fares no 
better.   Despite purporting to strictly interpret the text of 
Wis. Stat. § 323.10, the majority's conclusion regarding Order 
#105 finds no textual support.  The text of § 323.10 grants the 
governor authority to issue an order declaring a state of 
emergency and the legislature the power to "revoke[]" that 
order.  Nowhere, however, does the statute's plain text endow 
the legislature with the power to prevent the governor from 
issuing such an order in the first place.  § 323.10.  The 
definition of "revoke" clearly limits the legislature's power as 
reactive, not preventative:  "To annul or make void by taking 
back or recalling; to cancel, rescind, repeal, or reverse."  
Revoke, Black's Law Dictionary 1580 (11th ed. 2019).  The 
Governor's issuing a new order after the legislature revokes a 
prior, different order is not an "end run" around the statute; 
it is a function of the statute as the legislature enacted it. 
¶144 If the statute's plain text results in those two co-
equal branches wielding their competing authority against one 
another in what the majority calls "a game of whac-a-mole 
between the governor and the legislature," majority op., ¶43, 
then so be it.   Generally, we have to take the statute's plain 
and clear text "as we find it."  Montello Granite Co. v. 
Schultz, 197 Wis. 428, 432, 222 N.W. 315 (1928).  Only by 
impermissibly "read[ing] words into the statute that the 
legislature did not write" could the majority reach the result 
it wants.  Cf. State v. Schultz, 2020 WI 24, ¶52, 390 Wis. 2d 
570, 939 N.W.2d 519.  Not only is Executive Order #105 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
28 
 
improperly before the court, the specific remedy Fabick seeks on 
that order is in the legislature's hands, not ours. 
¶145 I conclude with an observation about the application 
of the majority opinion to future emergency declarations.  
Despite all of its tough talk regarding the Governor's ability 
to declare public health emergencies and its declaration against 
Order #105, the majority acknowledges that "determining when a 
set of facts gives rise to a unique enabling condition may not 
always be easy."  Majority op., ¶39.  In making such an 
acknowledgement, the majority necessarily admits that this 
opinion may not be the final word on emergency declarations due 
to conditions caused by COVID-19.   
¶146 Although we are more than a year into this pandemic, 
we do not know what it will throw at us next.  Even under the 
majority's analysis, the threshold question remains whether a 
new "enabling condition" exists (I, of course, would phrase the 
question in the term the statute uses, "occurrence").   
¶147 In sum, the majority opinion sub silentio overrules 
over a century of precedent related to taxpayer standing and 
fails to discuss the essential statutory term "occurrence," 
while obscuring the consequences of its decision.  It further 
reaches out and, without any textual support, strikes down Order 
#105, which is not properly before the court in the first place.  
Ultimately, in the midst of public emergencies such as a global 
pandemic, it hampers the ability of governors to safeguard the 
health and lives of the people of Wisconsin. 
¶148 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
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¶149 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET and Justice JILL J. KAROFSKY join this dissent. 
 
No.  2020AP1718-OA.awb 
 
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