Case Title: P. Soria

Citation: 48 Cal. 4th 58

Docket Number: 

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 2/11/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S164796 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H031237 
MARCOS HIJINIO SORIA, 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. Nos. CC506587, 
 
 
) 
CC507417, CC508203 
 
____________________________________)  
 
 
The Penal Code requires the imposition of a restitution fine “[i]n every case 
where a person is convicted of a crime.”  (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b).)1  A 
suspended parole revocation restitution fine is also mandatory “[i]n every case 
where . . . [the] sentence includes a period of parole.”  (§ 1202.45.)  Here, the 
Court of Appeal held that when several separately filed cases are disposed of at a 
single hearing under a plea bargain, the cases have been “effectively consolidated” 
and only one set of fines may be imposed under sections 1202.4 and 1202.45.  We 
reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
 
In case No. CC506587, filed September 30, 2005, defendant was charged 
with two counts of vehicle theft, reckless driving, hit-and-run driving, resisting an 
                                              
1 
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
2 
officer, and driving without a license.  The complaint alleged that these crimes 
took place on or about September 28, 2005.  
 
Case No. CC507417 was filed October 11, 2005.  Defendant and a 
codefendant were charged with attempted premeditated murder, two counts of 
assault with a firearm, and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, all on 
September 20, 2005.  An amended complaint was filed March 16, 2006, in which 
enhancement allegations regarding use and possession of handguns were modified. 
 
In case No. CC508203, filed October 18, 2005, defendant was charged with 
stealing a vehicle on May 19, 2005. 
 
On March 16, 2006, before any preliminary hearing was held, defendant 
entered negotiated pleas in all three cases.  The premeditation allegation was 
stricken from the murder charge, and defendant agreed to a total sentence of 35 
years eight months.  The plea bargain reduced his maximum exposure by six years 
four months.  The court advised defendant that he was “subject to a restitution 
fund fine of not less than $200 nor more than $10,000 as to each case.”  Defendant 
said he understood. 
 
In taking defendant‟s pleas, the court disposed of each complaint 
individually.  Beginning with the amended complaint in docket No. CC507417, 
the court read each charge and allegation and asked defendant if he understood 
them.  After receiving affirmative answers, it accepted defendant‟s plea of guilty 
to the accusations in that complaint.  The court followed the same procedure in 
docket Nos. CC506587 and CC508203, each time reading the charges and 
confirming that defendant understood them before taking his plea.  
 
The court imposed the agreed-upon sentence on August 25, 2006.  The 
prison term included the following components:  in case No. CC507417, 
defendant was sentenced to nine years for the attempted murder, with a 20-year 
enhancement for firearm use.  He received one year for each of the two assaults, 
 
3 
with firearm enhancements of one year four months each.  A concurrent five-year 
term was imposed for shooting at a vehicle.  In case Nos. CC506587 and 
CC508203, defendant received eight months on each of the three vehicle theft 
charges.  Sentence was suspended on the misdemeanor charges in case No. 
CC506587. 
 
The court ordered restitution to the victims in case Nos. CC507417 and 
CC508203.  It also imposed restitution fines of $10,000 in case No. CC507417, 
$400 in case No. CC506587, and $200 in case No. CC508203, with matching 
suspended parole revocation fines.  Defendant did not object. 
 
On appeal, however, defendant claimed that imposing separate fines in each 
case was unauthorized.  The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the phrase “in 
every case” in sections 1202.4 and 1202.45 “may reasonably be construed to 
include multiple cases that are fully and completely resolved at the same time 
under a package plea bargain.”2  The court erred.  
DISCUSSION 
 
We are here concerned not with direct restitution payable by defendants to 
victims under section 1202.4, subdivision (a), but with fines payable to the state 
Restitution Fund under section 1202.4, subdivision (b) (section 1202.4(b)) and 
section 1202.45.  Section 1202.4(b) requires the court to impose “a separate and 
additional restitution fine” of not less than $200 or more than $10,000 “[i]n every 
case where a person is convicted of a crime,” absent “compelling and 
extraordinary reasons for not doing so.”  Section 1202.45 similarly requires “an 
additional parole revocation restitution fine in the same amount as that imposed 
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4,” “[i]n every case where a person is 
                                              
2 
The Court of Appeal also rejected the Attorney General‟s argument that 
defendant had waived his right to appeal.  That issue has not been raised in this 
court, and we express no view on it. 
 
4 
convicted of a crime and [the] sentence includes a period of parole. . . .  This 
additional parole revocation restitution fine . . . shall be suspended unless the 
person‟s parole is revoked.”   
 
The Court of Appeal found the statutory term “in every case” to be 
ambiguous as applied to a plea bargain resolving separately filed charges.  The 
court strayed off course at this initial step.  When separate pleas are entered in 
separately charged cases, “every case” plainly means each case filed against the 
defendant.   (See People v. Schoeb (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 861, 864; People v. 
Enos (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1049.)3 
 
In concluding otherwise, the Court of Appeal relied on a materially 
distinguishable case, People v. Ferris (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1272.  The defendant 
in Ferris was charged in separate informations on different dates, but the trial 
court granted the prosecution‟s motion to consolidate the cases for trial.  (Id. at pp. 
1274-1275.)  The defendant argued that because the two cases against him had 
been consolidated, the imposition of restitution fines in both cases was 
unauthorized.  (Id. at p. 1276.)  The court noted that the cases were “not formally 
consolidated.”  (Ibid.)  Apparently, this comment reflected the fact that the cases 
were not merged into a single action with one case number.  The jury returned 
verdicts under separate case numbers, and separate probation reports were 
                                              
3 
 We note that here, there was no confusion in the trial court as to the 
meaning of “every case.”  The court informed defendant that he would be subject 
to “a restitution fund fine of not less than $200 nor more than $10,000 as to each 
case.”  Defendant said he understood this advisement, and there was only one way 
to understand it.  The district attorney had presented the terms of the bargain by 
reference to the separate docket numbers, explaining that the premeditation 
allegation would be stricken in case No. CC507417, and that defendant would “be 
pleading as charged to his other two cases before the Court, docket ending 203 and 
docket ending 587.”  This is not a case where seemingly plain statutory language 
was ambiguous as applied.  (Compare In re Reeves (2005) 35 Cal.4th 765, 770.) 
 
5 
prepared for sentencing.  However, the Ferris court deemed it clear that the 
defendant “was substantively tried and sentenced in one joint case.”  (Id. at p. 
1277.) 
 
  The court noted that sections 1202.4(b) and 1202.45 “do not specify 
whether the phrase „every case‟ means every separately charged and numbered 
case or every jointly tried case.”  (Ferris, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277.)  It 
resolved the ambiguity by adopting the construction most favorable to the 
defendant, concluding that “ „every case‟ . . . includes a jointly tried case although 
it involves charges in separately filed informations.”  (Ibid.)4  Accordingly, the 
court modified the restitution order to include only one set of fines.  (Ferris, at pp. 
1277-1278.) 
 
Here, there was no motion to consolidate and no joint trial.  Nevertheless, 
the Court of Appeal extended the holding of Ferris to conclude that the resolution 
of multiple charges in a single plea bargain amounts to an “effective 
consolidation.”  The analysis in Ferris, however, was limited to jointly tried cases.  
The Ferris court distinguished People v. Smith (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1184, which 
held that separately filed cases resolved by guilty plea on the same date are 
nevertheless “brought and tried separately” for purposes of the enhancement 
provisions of section 667.5  (Smith, at p. 1193.)  It reasoned that Smith was 
                                              
4 
Ferris relied in part on an earlier case involving restitution imposed after 
the defendant pleaded guilty to separate charges at separate hearings.  (People v. 
McNeely (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 739, 742; see Ferris, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 
1277.)  However, the McNeely court applied a Government Code provision that 
did not include language equivalent to the “in every case” terminology of sections 
1202.4 and 1202.45.  (McNeely, at pp. 743-744; see Stats. 1988, ch. 975, § 1, pp. 
3151-3152.)  Therefore, it has no bearing on the question before us. 
5  
Section 667, subdivision (a)(1) authorizes a sentence enhancement for 
certain prior felony convictions “on charges brought and tried separately.”  The 
defendant in Smith argued, unsuccessfully, that this requirement was not met 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
6 
“inapposite because it involved separate case numbers and the separate cases were 
not consolidated or joined for trial, sentencing, or otherwise.”  (Ferris, supra, 82 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1278, fn. 11.)  Of these grounds for distinguishing Smith, only 
the absence of consolidation for trial was valid.  There were separate case numbers 
and joint sentencing proceedings in both Ferris and Smith.  (Ferris, at p. 1276; 
Smith, at pp. 1189-1190, fn. 4.)  Therefore, the consolidation of separate cases for 
trial was critical to Ferris‟s holding that only one set of restitution fines may be 
imposed in jointly tried cases. 
 
The rule applied in Smith is a settled one.  Unconsolidated cases resolved 
jointly by plea bargain remain formally distinct for purposes of sentencing under 
section 667.  (People v. Shea (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1272; People v. 
Wagner (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 729, 736-737; People v. Gonzalez (1990) 220 
Cal.App.3d 134, 140-144; see People v. Wiley (1995) 9 Cal.4th 580, 590.)  A 
similar rationale applies to restitution fines in separately charged cases.  In People 
v. Schoeb, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 861, and People v. Enos, supra, 128 
Cal.App.4th 1046, multiple restitution fines were imposed under sections 
1202.4(b) and 1202.45.  The courts declined to follow Ferris because the cases 
before them had not been consolidated, but merely disposed of at the same time by 
plea bargain.  (Schoeb, at pp. 863-865; Enos, at pp. 1048-1049.) 
 
The Court of Appeal here distinguished Schoeb and Enos on the ground 
that in those cases, the total fines did not exceed the $10,000 statutory limit.  The 
Schoeb and Enos courts reasoned that no prejudice could be shown in that 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
because his prior convictions were the product of pleas entered and sentences 
imposed on the same dates.  The record indicated that two sets of priors were 
resolved by plea bargain, and one set was simply resolved simultaneously.  (Smith, 
supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1189, fn. 4.) 
 
7 
circumstance.  (Schoeb, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 865; Enos, supra, 128 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1049.)  However, this was an alternative rationale.  Schoeb and 
Enos support the proposition that without consolidation, separately filed cases 
remain separate for purposes of the restitution statutes, even when they are jointly 
resolved at the plea and sentencing stages.  In the context of sections 1202.4(b) 
and 1202.45, a “case” is a formal criminal proceeding, filed by the prosecution and 
handled by the court as a separate action with its own number. 
 
The Court of Appeal, following Ferris, reasoned that ambiguity in a 
criminal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity, giving the defendant the 
benefit of every reasonable doubt on questions of interpretation.  But as we have 
frequently noted, “that rule applies „only if two reasonable interpretations of the 
statute stand in relative equipoise.‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Oates (2004) 32 
Cal.4th 1048, 1068; see also, e.g., People v. Farrell (2004) 28 Cal.4th 381, 394; 
People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 58.)  The Court of Appeal‟s construction of 
the “in every case” terms of sections 1202.4(b) and 1202.45 does not stand 
comfortably beside the commonsense approach of Schoeb and Enos.  When 
several cases are resolved by a single plea bargain in which the defendant enters 
separate pleas, it is plain that there is one bargain but multiple cases.  “Although it 
is the policy of this state to have courts construe penal laws as favorably to 
criminal defendants as reasonably permitted by the statutory language and 
circumstances of the application of the particular law at issue [citations], that 
policy generally comes into play only when the language of the penal law „is 
susceptible of two constructions‟ [citation], a situation not present here.”  (People 
v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 622; see also In re Derrick B. (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 535, 539 [“When the statutory language is clear, we need go no further”].) 
 
The Court of Appeal recognized that the Ferris rule “does not maximize the 
amount of money that could be collected from convicted felons for purposes of 
 
8 
restitution,” but concluded that the rule “is not inconsistent with the statutory 
purpose and does not frustrate or defeat it.”  We need not consider whether this 
reasoning is sound in the relatively unusual circumstances addressed in Ferris, 
which are not before us.  However, if routinely applied to the common situation of 
a plea bargain resolving multiple unconsolidated cases, the Ferris rule would 
considerably reduce restitution fines, with consequences inimical to the statutory 
plan.6 
 
The “in every case” terms of sections 1202.4 and 1202.45 may be traced 
back to the initiative measure adopting article I, section 28, subdivision (b) of our 
state Constitution.7  Although that measure was aimed at restitution paid directly 
                                              
6 
We note that defendants are free to negotiate the amount of restitution fines 
as part of their plea bargains. 
7 
The Court of Appeal accurately noted the origin of the statutory language 
before us:  “The phrase „in every case‟ was apparently taken from the 1982 voter 
initiative called the Victim‟s Bill of Rights.  The initiative added article I, section 
28, subdivision (b) to the California Constitution, which established the right of 
crime victims to receive restitution directly „from the persons convicted of the 
crimes for losses they suffer.‟  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b).)  The new 
provision stated, „It is the unequivocal intention of the People of the State of 
California that all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall 
have the right to restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes for losses 
they suffer.  [¶]  Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted persons in every 
case, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime victim 
suffers a loss, unless compelling and extraordinary reasons exist to the contrary.‟  
(Ibid., italics added.) 
 
“The new provision, which was not self-executing, also directed the 
Legislature to adopt implementing legislation, and one piece of responsive 
legislation was section 1202.4.  (People v. Narron (1987) 192 Cal. App.3d 724, 
732, fn. 4; see People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 651–654 [reviewing the 
history of California‟s restitution statutes].)” 
 
We need not repeat here the history set out in Giordano.  We note, 
however, that section 1202.4 was originally enacted in 1983, the year following 
passage of the Victim‟s Bill of Rights.  The “in every case” language of section 
1202.4(b) first appeared in a 1994 amendment.  Before then, the Legislature used 
the term “in any case.”  (Stats. 1994, ch. 1106, § 3, p. 6548; see Giordano, supra, 
(footnote continued on following page) 
 
9 
by defendants to victims, it remains the case that the legislative purpose of the 
entire statutory restitution scheme is to recoup from prisoners and parole violators 
some of the costs of providing restitution to crime victims.  (People v. Oganesyan 
(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1184; see also People v. Andrade, supra, 100 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 356-357.)  Restitution fines serve additional important 
objectives of rehabilitation and deterrence.  (People v. Jennings (2005) 128 
Cal.App.4th 42, 57; Stats. 1994, ch. 1106, § 1, pp. 6547-6548.) 8 
 
None of these goals is furthered by a rule that contravenes the statutory 
language by allowing only one set of fines to be imposed after a plea bargain, 
regardless of how many cases are resolved by the bargain.  Defendants who 
commit multiple crimes, and are consequently before the court in multiple cases 
when their pleas are taken, are properly subject to multiple fines.  This 
straightforward application of the requirement that fines be imposed “in every 
case” serves the purpose of the state Restitution Fund, as well as the rehabilitative 
and deterrent functions of restitution fines.  (§§ 1202.4(b), 1202.45.) 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
42 Cal.4th at p. 652.)  Section 1202.45 was added in 1995, with little 
documentation of its legislative history.  (Stats. 1995, ch. 313, § 6, p. 1758; People 
v. Andrade (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 351, 356.) 
8 
Section 1 of this 1994 enactment, which largely shaped the current version 
of section 1202.4, includes the following uncodified legislative findings and 
declarations: 
 
“(a) Section 28(b) of Article I of the California Constitution secures the 
right to restitution for „all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal 
activity.‟ 
 
“(b) Restitution is recognized to have a rehabilitative effect on criminals. 
 
“(c) Restitution is recognized as a deterrent to future criminality. 
 
“(d) The right of persons to receive restitution for losses suffered as a result 
of criminal activity shall be secured as provided in this act.”  (See Giordano, 
supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 653-654.) 
 
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DISPOSITION 
 
We reverse the Court of Appeal‟s judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Soria 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 163 Cal.App.4th 247 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S164796 
Date Filed: Febuary 11, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: Rodney J. Stafford 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Jeffrey A. Glick, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. 
Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan and Catherine A. Rivlin, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jeffrey A. Glick 
5715 Florence Terrace 
Oakland, CA  94611 
(510) 654-3993 
 
Catherine A. Rivlin 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5977