Case Title: Nathan v. State

Citation: 370 Md. 648

Docket Number: 42/01

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Circuit Court for Wicomico County
Criminal No. K990893
Criminal No. K990892
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
September Term, 2001
______________________________________________
No. 42
CORINTHIOUS JAMES NATHAN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
_______________________________________________
No. 61
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
HORACE SHAW, JR.
_______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
JJ.
______________________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
Bell, C.J. and  Eldridge, J. dissent
 ______________________________________________
Filed:   August  29, 2002
In this case, we again address the constitutional limitations on searches and seizures
conducted during the course of a traffic stop.  Petitioner Corinthious James Nathan and
respondent Horace Shaw, Jr. were convicted of multiple drug possession and importation
charges in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, following the court’s denial of their
motions to suppress evidence seized as the result of a traffic stop and search of the van that
Nathan was driving and in which Shaw was a passenger.  
The trial court denied the motions to suppress on the grounds that the scope of the
initial investigative detention was reasonable, that Shaw consented to the search of the van,
and that the officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion for the continued detention and
investigation of Nathan and Shaw and probable cause for the search of the van’s ceiling.
Because we agree that the initial traffic stop was valid and that the police had reasonable
suspicion for the continued detention of Nathan and Shaw and probable cause for the search
of the van’s ceiling, we shall hold that the search and seizure of the evidence from the
vehicle was lawful.
I.
On July 14, 1999, at approximately 8:15 p.m., Nathan was driving a 1988 Dodge van
owned by Shaw, who was a passenger in the van at the time.  Nathan and Shaw were
traveling south on U.S. Route 13 near Salisbury, Maryland, where Police Sergeant Mike
Lewis and Trooper First Class Robert Penny were parked in an unmarked police cruiser. 
While seated in the parked car, Sgt. Lewis heard what he described as the sound of
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1Defense counsel presented to the suppression court, as well as this Court, a videotape
of the traffic stop, recorded by the camera affixed to Sgt. Lewis’ cruiser.
a vehicle traveling at an apparent high rate of speed.  Sgt. Lewis and Tfc. Penny pursued the
vehicle along the Route 13 bypass, pacing it at approximately seventy miles per hour in a
marked sixty-miles-per-hour zone.  Sgt. Lewis testified that he observed the vehicle drift
across the shoulder of the roadway on two occasions and that he noted that the left brake
lamp was out on the van.1
Sgt. Lewis activated his emergency equipment and stopped the van.  While effecting
the stop, Sgt. Lewis noticed that there was a passenger in the rear of the vehicle who raised
and lowered his head.
Sgt. Lewis approached the vehicle on the passenger side and asked the driver,
Nathan, for his license and registration.  The officer testified that, when Nathan lowered the
passenger side window, the odor of air freshener coming from the interior of the vehicle was
overwhelming.  He testified that he observed a conversion ceiling in the roof of the van that
appeared to be lower than normal.  The blue fabric around the ceiling of the eleven-year-old
van appeared to be new and extremely tight, with no evidence of fading or sagging.
Sgt. Lewis observed the passenger in the back of the van, Shaw, lying beneath a
couple of light travel bags and a blanket.  Sgt. Lewis asked him to move to the front of the
van.  Sgt. Lewis testified that Shaw acted like he was asleep and that when asked if he had
identification, Shaw provided him with the vehicle registration, which was in Shaw’s name,
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2Because probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the search of Shaw’s
vehicle, the validity of the search did not depend upon Shaw’s purported consent.  See
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1323-24, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983).
and some additional documentation.
Sgt. Lewis asked Nathan to exit the vehicle and to move to the rear of the van.  Sgt.
Lewis testified that he noticed that Nathan’s carotid artery was pounding on both sides of
his neck, that his chest was palpitating, and that his hands were trembling.  He testified that
Nathan would not make eye contact with him and that he was unable to produce a driver’s
license or other form of identification.
Sgt. Lewis questioned Nathan about the origin of his trip.  Nathan first told him that
he was coming from New York, then said that he actually was coming from New Jersey.
Nathan said that he and Shaw were in New Jersey to pick up the van and that they were
taking it back to get the oil checked.  Sgt. Lewis testified that Nathan answered many of his
questions with questions, which in his experience indicated deception.
Sgt. Lewis then questioned Shaw concerning the origin of his trip.  Shaw responded
that he and Nathan were coming from New York and that they had driven to New York in
a rental vehicle to pick up the van.  Sgt. Lewis testified that he noticed Shaw’s hands
trembling while he was talking to him, his carotid artery pounding, and a nervous twitch
above his eye.  He asked Shaw if he would consent to a “quick check” of his vehicle for
guns and drugs.  Shaw agreed and stepped from the van.2  Sgt. Lewis patted Shaw down for
weapons.
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Sgt. Lewis entered the van on the driver’s side.  He hit the ceiling over the driver’s
seat with his hand and observed that it was solid and hard, with no flexibility.  Sgt. Lewis
testified as to his experience with false compartments and their significance to him.  The
Court of Special Appeals summarized his testimony as follows:
“He stated that the fact that the ceiling was solid and had no
‘give’ at all suggested that it had been reinforced by steel.  Sgt.
Lewis testified that, since 1995, he had searched approximately
nine to twelve hydraulically controlled false compartments in
van ceilings.  Although he found traces of narcotics in all of
these compartments, he found a quantity of narcotics only in
[Shaw]’s.  He located guns and currency in some cases, and he
stated that ‘many were empty.’  In Sgt. Lewis’ experience, this
type of construction is only used for hydraulic compartments,
and these compartments are only used for transporting
contraband.  Sgt. Lewis believed that no one would have a
legitimate reason to have such a reinforced ceiling put in a
conversion van.  Thus, once he had knocked on the ceiling of
the van, he became quite convinced that there was a
compartment.” 
Sgt. Lewis testified that some of the hidden compartments that he had searched concealed
guns and currency, and some were empty, but each one contained traces of narcotics.  He
attempted to shift the console and found that he was unable to pull it down.  He testified that
he believed that it was affixed permanently with steel plates or rods.
Sgt. Lewis testified that he left the van to get a flashlight to examine the ceiling.
Upon returning, he tried and failed again to move the console.  He left the van again and
returned with a screwdriver to attempt to pry open the console.  When he was unable to
move the console, he returned to his vehicle and called for backup and requested
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information on the vehicle and its occupants.
Sgt. Lewis went over to Nathan and Shaw to tell them that the tags on the van
indicated that it was stolen.  He handcuffed Nathan and Shaw and placed them in
“investigative detention.”  Sgt. Lewis admitted that he had no information that the vehicle
was stolen and that his only purpose in securing Nathan and Shaw was to prevent a physical
confrontation.  Once he had placed handcuffs on Nathan and Shaw, Sgt. Lewis told them
that he knew that there was a secret compartment in the van and asked them for the code to
open it.  He advised both men that, if they did not tell him the code, he would have to rip
open the ceiling.  Nathan and Shaw did not respond, and Sgt. Lewis then tore open the
ceiling where he subsequently discovered a secret compartment containing 4.8 kilograms
of cocaine and 193 grams of pure heroin wrapped in gray duct-taped packages.  At
approximately 8:34 p.m., nineteen minutes after stopping the vehicle, Sgt. Lewis placed
Nathan and Shaw under arrest, advised them of their Miranda rights, and transported them
to the Maryland State Police Barracks in Salisbury.
Prior to trial, Nathan and Shaw filed motions to suppress the physical evidence found
at the scene of the traffic stop on the grounds that it was seized illegally in violation of the
Fourth Amendment and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  The trial court
denied their motions to suppress on the grounds that the scope of the initial investigative
detention of Nathan and Shaw was reasonable, that Shaw freely and voluntarily consented
to the search of the van, and that the officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion for the
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continued detention of Nathan and Shaw in order to investigate possible criminal activity
at the time that Shaw was asked to exit the vehicle and probable cause to believe that
weapons and drugs were present in order to search the van’s ceiling.
Following separate jury trials, Nathan and Shaw were found guilty of ten counts
relating to the importation and possession of cocaine and heroin.  Both men noted appeals
to the Court of Special Appeals.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed Nathan’s convictions in an unreported
opinion. Judge Ellen Hollander, writing for the panel, found that, by the time the detention
had been prolonged beyond the permissible scope of the initial traffic stop, Sgt. Lewis had
the requisite reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to prolong his investigation, in light
of his observations and training, which led him to believe that he had detected a hidden
compartment that was being used for an illicit purpose.  The intermediate appellate court
also found, based on the totality of the circumstances, that Sgt. Lewis had probable cause
to believe that the roof of the van contained contraband, which rendered his warrantless
search of the van lawful.
A different panel of the Court of Special Appeals reached a contrary conclusion and,
in an unreported opinion, reversed Shaw’s convictions.  The intermediate appellate court
found that, by the time that Sgt. Lewis began his extensive questioning of Nathan and Shaw
regarding their travel plans, his focus had shifted from a traffic stop to a narcotics
investigation and that he did not possess the articulable suspicion required for their
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continued detention.  With regard to the search of the van, the court found that Shaw initially
had consented voluntarily to the search, but that, by the time Sgt. Lewis had begun to
dismantle the ceiling of the van, the consent had “expired” and Sgt. Lewis did not have the
necessary probable cause to continue without it.
In dissent, Judge Moylan wrote:
“[O]n the facts of this case based on the evidence before the
suppression hearing judge in this case, the discovery of a
hydraulically-controlled and reinforced hidden ceiling
compartment in the conversion van ipso facto generated
probable cause to believe that the van may have contained
contraband so as to justify a warrantless, and perhaps
painstakingly thorough, search of it under Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925).”
Although Judge Moylan would find probable cause based on the presence of this
“unexplained ‘vehicular hidden bank vault,’” he concluded by noting that, when he
considered the other factors surrounding this stop in addition to the hidden compartment,
his probable cause determination became even stronger. 
We granted certiorari in both cases primarily to determine whether the stop and
detention of Nathan and Shaw violated the Fourth Amendment and whether the police had
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that the occupants of the van were
trafficking in guns or drugs.  State v. Shaw, 365 Md. 266, 778 A.2d 382 (2001); Nathan v.
State, 364 Md. 534, 774 A.2d 408 (2001).  We shall affirm Nathan and reverse Shaw.
II.
Nathan and Shaw argue that Sgt. Lewis violated their Fourth Amendment rights by
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immediately suspending the ostensible traffic stop in favor of an investigatory detention.
They argue that the police clearly detained them beyond the permissible scope of a traffic
stop.  They also argue that the fact that their vehicle was a conversion van, when coupled
with other innocuous facts, did not give the police reasonable, articulable suspicion or
probable cause to believe that they were trafficking in guns or drugs.  Finally, they argue that
Shaw’s assent to Sgt. Lewis’ request to conduct a “real quick check” for guns and drugs did
not authorize him to rip open the ceiling of the van.
The State argues that Sgt. Lewis’ conduct during the initial traffic stop, including
ordering Nathan out of the vehicle and questioning Nathan and Shaw regarding their
destination and purpose, was reasonable.  The State also argues, based on the totality of the
circumstances after the initial conversations with Nathan and Shaw, that Sgt. Lewis had
reasonable suspicion to continue the encounter.  Finally, the State argues that, once Sgt.
Lewis had made an initial inspection of the van’s ceiling, he had probable cause to conduct
his more thorough search, and that Shaw’s consent to the search of the van was voluntary.
III.
Our review of the Circuit Court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence under the
Fourth Amendment is based solely upon the record of the suppression hearing.  See In re
David S., 367 Md. 523, 529, 789 A.2d 607, 610 (2002).  In Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554,
774 A.2d 420 (2001), we reiterated the standard of review of a ruling upon a motion to
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3The Fourth Amendment provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.”
suppress:
“In our review of the trial court’s denial of [a] motion to
suppress, we are limited to the record of the suppression
hearing.  We review the facts found by the trial court in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party . . . .  We extend great
deference to the fact finding of the suppression court and accept
the facts as found by that court unless clearly erroneous.  We
will review the legal questions de novo and based upon the
evidence presented at the suppression hearing and the
applicable law, we then make our own constitutional appraisal.”
Id. at 569, 774 A.2d at 429 (internal citations omitted).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures, including seizures that involve only a brief detention.3  See United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, ___, 122 S. Ct. 744, 750, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2002); United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1875, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980);
Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 369, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999).  Generally, seizures of persons
require probable cause to arrest, and investigative detentions violate the Fourth Amendment
in the absence of probable cause.  See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499, 103 S. Ct. 1319,
1325, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983).  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889
-10-
(1968), and its progeny created a limited exception to the probable cause requirement for
investigative detentions, because the balance between the public interest and the individual’s
right to personal security tilts in favor of a standard less than probable cause in those cases.
See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 750, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740; United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989).  Under Terry, certain seizures
are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion
that the person is involved in criminal activity.  See Royer, 460 U.S. at 498, 103 S. Ct. at
1324, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66
L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981); David S., 367 Md. at 532, 789 A.2d at 612; Quince v. State, 319 Md.
430, 433, 572 A.2d 1086, 1088 (1990).  For Fourth Amendment purposes, a police officer
who has reasonable suspicion that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is
about to commit a crime may detain that person briefly in order to investigate the
circumstances that provoked suspicion.  See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 751, 151
L. Ed. 2d 740; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L. Ed.
2d 317 (1984).
Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity warrants a temporary seizure for
questioning limited to the purpose of the stop.  See Royer, 460 U.S. at 499, 103 S. Ct. at
1325, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82, 95 S. Ct.
2574, 2580, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975).  The determination of whether reasonable suspicion
existed is made by looking at the totality of the circumstances in each case to see whether
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the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting illegal activity.  See Arvizu,
534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 749, 750, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18, 101
S. Ct. at 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621; Graham v. State, 325 Md. 398, 408, 601 A.2d 131, 136
(1992).  
The stop of an automobile and detention of the occupants inside constitute a “seizure”
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is limited
and the resulting detention is brief.  See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809, 116 S.
Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105
S. Ct. 1568, 1573, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985); Wilkes, 364 Md. at 571, 774 A.2d at 430;
Ferris, 355 Md. at 369, 735 A.2d at 497.  Thus, temporary detentions for traffic violations
must not be unreasonable under the circumstances.  See Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 116 S. Ct.
at 1772, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89.  In Ferris, we said:
“[T]he officer’s purpose in an ordinary traffic stop is to enforce
the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to investigate the
manner of driving with the intent to issue a citation or warning.
Once the purpose of that stop has been fulfilled, the continued
detention of the car and the occupants amounts to a second
detention.  Thus, once the underlying basis for the initial traffic
stop has concluded, a police-driver encounter which implicates
the Fourth Amendment is constitutionally permissible only if
either (1) the driver consents to the continuing intrusion or (2)
the officer has, at a minimum, a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”
355 Md. at 372, 735 A.2d at 499 (internal citations omitted).
In this case, it is undisputed that the initial traffic stop of Nathan and Shaw by the
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4A police officer may order a driver and occupants out of a lawfully stopped vehicle
incident to a traffic stop.  See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15, 117 S. Ct. 882,
886, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-11, 98 S. Ct. 330,
332-33, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977); Ferris, 355 Md. 356, 382 n.9, 735 A.2d 491, 505 n.9.
Maryland police for traveling in excess of the posted speed limit was justified.  See Wilkes,
364 Md. at 572, 774 A.2d at 431.  Nathan was speeding on the public highway, and Sgt.
Lewis had probable cause to stop the vehicle.
With the above principles in mind, we turn to the first question that we must address
—that is, whether the officer’s conduct during the traffic stop was sufficiently related to the
legal basis for the stop, namely the moving violation.  See Ferris, 355 Md. at 372, 735 A.2d
at 499.  It is clear that an officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver’s
license, vehicle registration, and insurance papers, run a computer check, and issue a citation
or a warning.  See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L. Ed.
2d 660 (1979); Wilkes, 364 Md. at 578, 774 A.2d at 434.4  
In order for the continued detention of Nathan and Shaw to be permissible, therefore,
there had to exist reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify
the seizure, and the limits of a Terry stop must not have been exceeded.  See Royer, 460 U.S.
at 498-99, 103 S. Ct. at 1324-25, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229; Ferris, 355 Md. at 384, 735 A.2d at 506.
Under Ferris, in order to justify a greater intrusion unrelated to the traffic stop, the totality
of the circumstances known to the police officer must establish reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to support the intrusion.  See United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3rd
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Cir. 1995); Wilkes, 364 Md. at 574, 774 A.2d at 432; Ferris, 355 Md. at 372, 735 A.2d at
499.  Absent consent, the officer may only detain the driver and conduct further questioning
if, during the traffic stop, the officer acquires an objectively reasonable and articulable
suspicion of further illegal activity supported by independent facts sufficient to justify the
additional intrusion.  See People v. Redinger, 906 P.2d 81, 85-86 (Colo. 1995); Caldwell v.
State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1047 (Del. 2001); Ferris, 355 Md. at 372-73, 735 A.2d at 499;
Commonwealth v. Torres, 674 N.E.2d 638, 642 (Mass. 1997).  This involves an objective
assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the
officer at the time.  See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8, 109 S. Ct. at 1585, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1; Terry,
392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889; Ferris, 355 Md. at 384, 735 A.2d at 506;
Derricott v. State, 327 Md. 582, 588, 611 A.2d 592, 595-96 (1992).  Fundamentally, in
determining whether the search and seizure of Shaw’s automobile was reasonable, our initial
inquiry is a dual one— whether Sgt. Lewis’ action was justified at its inception and whether
it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the
first place.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889.
Reasonable suspicion is more than a mere hunch but is “a less demanding standard
than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the
evidence.”  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675-76, 145 L. Ed. 2d
570 (2000).  The United States Supreme Court has most recently discussed the concept of
reasonable suspicion in Arvizu.  Noting that the concept is somewhat abstract and elusive,
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not finely tuned, the Court has deliberately avoided reducing it to a uniform set of legal
rules.  See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 751, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740; Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96, 116 S. Ct. at 1661, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996).  Nonetheless,
we do know that reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause.  See
David S., 367 Md. at 532, 789 A.2d at 612.  The Supreme Court has made clear that
otherwise innocent behavior may constitute reasonable suspicion when analyzed as part of
the totality of the circumstances.  See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9-10, 109 S. Ct. at 1586-87, 104
L. Ed. 2d 1; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2335 n.13, 76 L. Ed.
2d 527 (1983); Ferris, 355 Md. at 386, 735 A.2d at 507.  In this regard, the Court stated:
“When discussing how reviewing courts should make
reasonable-suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly
that they must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each
case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized
and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.  This
process allows officers to draw on their own experience and
specialized training to make inferences from and deductions
about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might
well elude an untrained person.’  Although an officer's reliance
on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood
of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for
probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a
preponderance of the evidence standard.”
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 750-51, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (internal citations omitted).
Even though each of a series of acts is innocent standing alone, taken together they
can constitute reasonable suspicion.  See id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 751, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740;
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9, 109 S. Ct. at 1586, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1.  Furthermore, a determination
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5In Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 735 A.2d 491 (1999), we cautioned against “placing
too much reliance upon a suspect’s nervousness when analyzing a determination of
reasonable suspicion.”  Id. at 389, 735 A.2d at 509.  Nonetheless, we also characterized
that reasonable suspicion exists need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.  See
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 753, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740; Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125,
120 S. Ct. at 677, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570.
In Arvizu, the Supreme Court also discussed the application of the totality of the
circumstances test to otherwise “innocent” conduct, stating:
“We think that the approach taken by the Court of Appeals here
departs sharply from the teachings of these cases. The court's
evaluation and rejection of seven of the listed factors in
isolation from each other does not take into account the ‘totality
of the circumstances,’ as our cases have understood that phrase.
The court appeared to believe that each observation by [the
border patrol agent] that was by itself readily susceptible to an
innocent explanation was entitled to ‘no weight.’ Terry,
however, precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis.
The officer in Terry observed the petitioner and his companions
repeatedly walk back and forth, look into a store window, and
confer with one another. Although each of the series of acts was
‘perhaps innocent in itself,’ we held that, taken together, they
‘warranted further investigation.’”
534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 751, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (internal citations omitted).  Thus,
Arvizu makes clear that courts must not view in isolation factors upon which police officers
rely to create reasonable suspicion.  
The fact that Nathan, the driver, was unable to produce identification, in combination
with Sgt. Lewis’ observations of Nathan and Shaw’s extreme nervousness,5 Shaw’s apparent
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Ferris’s nervousness as being “unexceptional.”  Id.  We concluded that “Ferris’s
unexceptional nervousness, in reaction to encountering Trooper Smith, was simply too
ordinary to suggest criminal activity.”  Id.  In the instant case, however, Nathan and Shaw’s
nervousness was characterized by Sgt. Lewis as extreme.  As indicated supra, the fact that
conduct may be innocent does not immunize it from consideration in determining reasonable
suspicion.  Nonetheless, we reiterate that a claim that ordinary nervousness indicates
complicity in criminal activity must be treated with caution.  Id.
pretense of sleep when the vehicle was initially stopped, Nathan’s evasive answers regarding
his travel plans, the inconsistent versions of the trip itinerary and purpose provided by
Nathan and Shaw, the “overwhelming” odor of air freshener, and the altered ceiling that led
the officer to believe that the van had a hidden compartment, as well as the police
observations prior to the traffic stop (the passenger’s head bobbing up and down in the rear
window), were sufficient grounds, taken together, reasonably to warrant an investigative
detention.  See Royer, 460 U.S. at 502, 103 S. Ct. at 1326, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229; United States
v. Kopp, 45 F.3d 1450, 1453-54 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Springer, 946 F.2d 1012,
1017 (2nd Cir. 1991); United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 758 (11th Cir. 1988).
Therefore, Sgt. Lewis had reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that Nathan and Shaw
were engaged in criminal activity, and that suspicion was sufficient to support their
continued detention.
We turn next to the question of whether the police had grounds to search the van.  As
we have indicated supra, we need not consider whether the police conduct exceeded the
scope of Shaw’s consent to search because we find that Sgt. Lewis had probable cause to
search the vehicle and the hidden compartment.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Police officers who have probable cause to believe that there is contraband or other
evidence of criminal activity inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road may
search it without obtaining a warrant.  See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67, 119
S. Ct. 2013, 2014, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999); Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 381, 104 S.
Ct. 1852, 1852-53, 80 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1984); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54,
45 S. Ct. 280, 285, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925).  If supported by probable cause, every part of a
vehicle that may conceal the object of the search may be searched.  See United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982); United States v.
Zucco, 71 F. 3d 188, 192 (5th Cir. 1995).  
The significance of a vehicle alteration or hidden compartment in a vehicle is an issue
of first impression for this Court.  Every court that has considered the question has
concluded that evidence of a hidden compartment can contribute to a finding of probable
cause to search.  See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1066 (10th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716, 723-24 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Martel-
Martines, 988 F.2d 855, 858-59 (8th Cir. 1993).  We need not decide in this case whether
a false ceiling or hidden compartment alone would constitute probable cause to believe that
drugs or contraband are secreted in a vehicle because, in the case sub judice, that factor is
only one part of the mosaic.
By the time Sgt. Lewis began his extensive search and dismantling of the van’s
ceiling, he had probable cause to believe that the van contained contraband and, therefore,
-18-
he was justified in searching it without a warrant under the well-established “automobile
exception” enunciated in Carroll.  267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S. Ct. 280, 285, 69 L. Ed. 543
(1925).  Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Sgt. Lewis’
observations of the van’s ceiling, in combination with Nathan and Shaw’s suspicious
behavior, were sufficient to constitute probable cause to search the van, including the
ceiling.  Before Shaw consented to any search, Sgt. Lewis had noticed that the height of the
ceiling in the van was lower than normal and that the fabric was new and taut, not as one
would normally expect in an eleven-year-old van.  The ceiling of the van was solid, hard,
with no flexibility, and the map lights would not move, indicating to the officer that there
was a false hydraulic compartment containing contraband similar to one that he found in a
conversion van four weeks earlier.  Sgt. Lewis testified that the console felt like it was
affixed with steel plates and that, in a normal van ceiling, the screws would be removable
in the center section to allow for the replacement of bulbs and vents dealing with air
conditioning and heating.  These factors, taken together, clearly amounted to sufficient
probable cause for his search of the van’s ceiling. 
The facts of the case sub judice are strikingly similar to those in United States v.
Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir. 1997).  In that case, a Kansas Highway Patrol officer
stopped Anderson’s vehicle because he was following the car in front of him too closely.
During the course of the traffic stop, the trooper made the following observations: the driver
of the car and his passenger gave slightly conflicting versions of their travel itinerary, the
-19-
trooper detected the scent of air freshener in the car, the driver was carrying a pager, the
car’s gas tank had been tampered with, and there appeared to be a hidden compartment in
the gas tank.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that those
factors together constituted sufficient probable cause to search the car’s gas tank.  Id. at
1066.
United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 1994), is likewise instructive.  In
that case, border patrol agents stopped a pick-up truck exiting a ranch after triggering
directional vehicular sensors set up to detect narcotics smugglers attempting to circumvent
checkpoints along a major drug smuggling artery.  See id. at 719-20.  When the agents
spotted the truck, several factors aroused their suspicions: they were unfamiliar with the
vehicle, it had no company logos, tools, or pipe racks typical of oil field trucks, the agents
were unaware of any oil activity in the area, and Reyes’ (the driver) clothes appeared to be
too clean for him to have been working in the oil field.  Id. at 720.  Based on their
suspicions, the agents stopped the truck for an immigration inspection.  While questioning
Reyes, one agent noticed signs of a false compartment in the bed of the truck— the back of
the truck was higher than normal, and there was fresh paint and undercoating around and
underneath the bed of the truck.  Following a search of the truck, the agents recovered
approximately 300 pounds of cocaine from a false compartment in the bed of the truck and,
as a result, they arrested Reyes.  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
reasonable suspicion for the immigration stop existed.  Id. at 723.  The court also concluded
-20-
that Reyes’ nervousness, conflicting statements explaining his presence on the ranch and his
inability to read oil charts and graphs, together with the agents’ observations regarding the
existence of a false compartment, created sufficient probable cause to search the vehicle.
Id. at 724.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reached a similar
conclusion in United States v. Martel-Martines, 988 F.2d 855, 858-59 (8th Cir. 1993).  In
that case, police stopped the truck that Martel-Martines was driving for speeding.  Id. at 856.
During the course of the traffic stop, Martel-Martines consented to allow the police to search
the truck.  Id. at 857.  While walking around the rear of the truck, the patrol officer observed
a custom-cut plywood board covering the length of the truck bed.  When he lifted the board,
he saw two lines of caulking in the metal bed.  Looking underneath the truck with his
flashlight, the trooper could observe that the truck bed recently had been reconstructed to
support a concealed compartment.  The officer had the truck taken to the police headquarters
garage where a small hole was made in the hidden compartment, through which the officers
could smell chemicals and observe cellophane wrapping around a brown object.  At that
point, the police arrested Martel-Martines, and the police ultimately discovered a large
quantity of cocaine during thorough searches of the vehicle.  Although the court found that
Martel-Martines had consented to the search of his truck, the court, assuming arguendo that
the search exceeded the scope of the consent given, held that, by the time that the officers
punched the hole in the truck compartment, they had sufficient probable cause to support a
warrantless search of the concealed compartment, based on Martel-Martines’s evasive and
inconsistent answers to routine questions and their visual observations of the hidden
compartment.  Id. at 858-59.
For all of the above stated reasons, we find that the search of the vehicle and the
seizure of the evidence from within were lawful.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS IN NO. 42 AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE
PAID BY PETITIONER NATHAN.  JUDGMENT OF
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS IN NO. 61
REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO CONSIDER REMAINING
ISSUES PREVIOUSLY RAISED BUT NOT DECIDED.
COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY
RESPONDENT SHAW AND COSTS IN THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO ABIDE THE RESULT.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
September Term, 2001
No. 42
CORINTHIOUS JAMES NATHAN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
_______________________________________________
No. 61
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
HORACE SHAW, JR.
_______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J., in which Eldridge, J.
joins.
Filed:    August 29, 2002
Bell, J., dissenting.
-2-
I agree with the conclusion reached by a divided Court of Special Appeals in its
unreported opinion in Horace Shaw, Jr. v. State, filed June 5, 2001, and most of the rationale
offered in the very perceptive majority opinion by Judge Kenney.    The opinion proceeded
on the premise that, subsequent to the traffic stop,  there was a second stop, as Ferris v. State,
355 Md. 356, 372, 735 A.2d 491, 499 (1999) recognized there could be and it applied Ferris,
its progeny, Charity v. State, 132 Md. App. 598, 753 A. 2d 556, cert. denied, 360 Md. 487,
759 A.2d 231 (2000), Snow v. State, 84 Md. App. 243, 578 A. 2d 816 (1990) and Whitehead
v. State, 116 Md. App. 497, 698 A. 2d 1115, cert. denied, 348 Md. 207, 703 A.2d 148
(1997), faithfully and forthrightly.    
Acknowledging that the traffic stop was valid, based on the speed of the defendants’
van, an equipment defect and the officers’ observations of the manner in which the van was
driven after it was signaled to pull over, the court analyzed whether, and if so, when, a
second stop, based on the shifting of the focus from the traffic violation to a criminal, and
more specifically, a narcotics, violation, occurred.    Notwithstanding  that Sgt. Lewis,  upon
approaching the defendants’ van, noticed, as the trial court reported, a “lowered ceiling,
conversion ceiling in the roof part of the van that appeared to be new fabric, blue, it wasn’t
faded at all in this eleven-year-old van” and the ceiling “was extremely tight or erect, there
was no sagging in the ceiling,” an observation likely to arouse Sgt. Lewis’s suspicion, given
his recent experience with a conversion van he discovered to have a hidden hydraulic
compartment in the ceiling directly above the driver and right front seat passenger, it
-3-
concluded that when the defendants were ordered out of the van, it was done pursuant to the
officer’s prerogative under Pennsylvania v. Mims, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333, 54
L. Ed.2d 331, 337 (1977) and Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411-12, 117 S. Ct. 882,
884-85, 137 L. Ed.2d 41, 46 (1997).    Although he might have been operating with a dual
motive, the court believed that Sgt. Lewis’s questions were proper, “even though they did not
appear to have much to do with whether Nathan had committed traffic violations, and that
Sgt. Lewis was “ostensibly obtaining information related to the traffic stop” when he
obtained Nathan’s particulars.   During the course of that interview, due to Nathan’s obvious
nervousness - according to Sgt. Lewis, his carotid pulse was “pounding in his neck, his chest
was palpitating, his hands were trembling”- his changing in mid-sentence his answer as to
the origin of the trip, the manner in which he answered a question with a question and his
refusal to look Sgt. Lewis in the eye, Sgt. Lewis became more suspicious.
It was when the Sergeant left Nathan to question Shaw “for the apparent purpose of
catching the men with inconsistent stories” that the focus of the stop shifted, the intermediate
appellate court determined.   It was during this questioning that Sgt. Lewis’s suspicions were
further raised as a result of Shaw’s behavior and response; Shaw displayed similar
nervousness to that displayed by Nathan: Sgt Lewis noticed that Shaw’s hands were
trembling, there was a nervous twitching just above and behind his right eye and, like
Nathan, his carotid pulse was racing in his neck.    Noting that the questions put to Shaw was
directed not to the traffic offences, but to the origination and, perhaps, the circumstances, the
1The most significant discrepancy, the court determined, was whether the defendants
went to New York in the van or in a rental car.
-4-
court determined that the focus of the stop had shifted to the narcotics investigation rather
than the traffic stop.   It, thus, proceeded to consider whether there was either a valid consent
or a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to support a further detention of the
defendants.
Although the court concluded that the defendants consented to the search of the van,
it, nevertheless, addressed whether Sgt. Lewis had reasonable suspicion.  It listed the
historical facts known to Sgt. Lewis: 
“Two African Americans pulled over by two Caucasian, Maryland State
troopers are nervous.
“The van contained air fresheners.
“The van, which turned out to be a 1988 model, had some recent work done
on the inside such that the ceiling covering seemed new and pulled tight; Sgt.
Lewis had found a hydraulic compartment containing a weapon in a
conversion van approximately four weeks earlier.                                           
                                                                                                                    
“Both the driver and the passenger had been cooperative and totally compliant
with all of his instructions despite initial cause for alarm, including the fact
that [Shaw] had been lying down in the back.
“Nathan, who did not own the van and was not related to [Shaw], gave a
different story than [Shaw] as to where they were coming from and why they
were there.[1]”
It then considered whether any of them or collectively, those factors provided the requisite
level of certainty that criminal activity was afoot. 
2In Snow v. State, 84 Md. App. 243, 261, 578 A. 2d 816, 824 (1990), the Court of
Special Appeals observed, as to air fresheners:
“Air fresheners are, as far as we know, a completely legitimate object;  some
are, undoubtedly, thought to be ornamental as well as functional.  Nor is the
fact that Snow had three air fresheners, as opposed to one, suspicious.  The
addition of a new freshener without removing the old one is not unusual.  As
with other cleaning products, when the consumer is uncertain regarding the
useful life of a product, the tendency is to keep the old one for a while longer.
3We were emphatic in Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 388, 735 A.2d 491, 508 (1999):
“The nervousness, or lack of it, of the driver pulled over by a Maryland State
trooper is not sufficient to form the basis of police suspicion that the driver is
engaged in the illegal transportation of drugs.  There is no earthly way that a
police officer can distinguish the nervousness of an ordinary citizen under
such circumstances from the nervousness of a criminal who traffics in
narcotics.  An individual's physiological reaction to a proposed intrusion into
his or her privacy cannot establish probable cause or even grounds to suspect.
Permitting citizen's nervousness to be the basis for a finding of probable cause
would confer upon the police a degree of discretion not grounded in police
expertise, and, moreover, would be totally insusceptible to judicial review.”
(Quoting Whitehead v. State, 116 Md. App. 497, 698 A. 2d 1115, cert.
denied, 348 Md. 207, 703 A.2d 148 (1997)). 
-5-
Discounting the air fresheners on the basis of Charity, 132 Md. App. at 639,  753 A.2d
578 (“The air fresheners, although they may have created a hunch, did not create an
articulable suspicion”) and Snow,2 the nervousness of the defendants on the strength of
Ferris3 and Snow,  84 Md. App. at 260, 578 A. 2d at 824 (nervousness is a “highly subjective
observation”) and  the inconsistent stories with Whitehead, 116 Md. App. at 504, 698 A. 2d
at 1119 (“There is nothing about not having their stories together, about just whom they
visited, or about the day that they left Baltimore, that somehow yields an inference of
possession of narcotics.  Or, put another way, there is nothing about narcotics laws violators
that police can recognize from an inability to agree upon these details of their journey to New
-6-
Jersey.”), the court held:
“These factors may certainly have given rise to a “hunch” on Sgt. Lewis’s
part, but we do not believe they add up to articulable suspicion in light of
Ferris and Charity.    We note further that, at this point, Sgt. Lewis had not
radioed in any information to his dispatch to determine the status of the van or
its occupants, and he also saw or smelled nothing other than air freshener that
would lead him to believe that the van contained contraband.”
Although “[h]e never conducted a thorough search of the interior of the van, did not
look under the seats, in the bags [Shaw] and Nathan had in the back of the van, or in the
glove box or other containers,” and never checked for weapons, despite an earlier profession
of concern arising from Shaw’s movements in the back of the van, the court observed that
Sgt. Lewis entered the van five times in an effort to locate, open and search the hidden
compartment he was convinced was there.  Based on his earlier experience with a conversion
van containing a hydraulic ceiling compartment, the court further pointed out, his focus was
on the front part of the van, where the map lights are located.  Quoting Sgt. Lewis, it
described the first entry: having hit the ceiling twice and checked the two map lights for
functionality and finding them to both be working, he tried to pry down that area, where the
entrance to the compartment in the earlier van was located, without success; “[a]t that point
in time I couldn’t budge it, it wouldn’t even pull down at all, it wouldn’t budge, it was like
it was permanently affixed with steel plates or steel rods.”
The second entry was with a flashlight, “to further inspect the area.”   When he still
could not gain entry, Sgt. Lewis obtained a screwdriver, which he concealed from the
defendants,  for assistance .   Even with that assistance, he failed to gain entry to any hidden
-7-
compartment.    The intermediate appellate court concluded, as to these search efforts:
“We believe that all of these actions were acceptable, although Sgt. Lewis
walked on the line of what a reasonable person would find acceptable pursuant
to a consent to search when he tried to pry the ceiling compartment open.” 
(footnote omitted).
After reviewing the testimony of Sgt. Lewis at the suppression hearing, the Court of
Special Appeals concluded that he was convinced that there was a hidden compartment once
he knocked on the ceiling of the van.   To the court, it was significant that, after the third
entry and attempt to find and search the compartment, Sgt. Lewis stopped and “advised
[Shaw] and Nathan that he was going to get them ‘right out of here’ and that he was going
to radio in that everyone was ‘all right,’” and did, in fact, call the dispatcher, but, rather than
wait for a response as to whether there were any outstanding warrants, he told the defendants
that the van was reported stolen, which he knew to be false.    It was also significant that,
after handcuffing them, Sgt. Lewis acknowledged that the van had not been reported stolen,
advised them for the first time of his belief that the van had a false hydraulically controlled
compartment in the ceiling and demanded that they provide him with the location.   When
neither defendant cooperated, indeed indicated that they did not know about what he was
talking, Sgt. Lewis “stated multiple times that he would tear into the ceiling of the van even
though he did not want to do so.”
Observing that, when he began to pry open the compartment, he was “looking for
narcotics more so than other contraband,” the Court of Special Appeals opined that, “[t]o the
-8-
extent that [Shaw] had previously consented to a search of his van, ... that consent had
expired by this point.”   Moreover, it rejected the State’s argument that the consent continued
because neither man instructed Sgt. Lewis to stop or in any way objected:
“Prior to radioing in to dispatch, Sgt. Lewis had indicated to appellant and
Nathan that he would have them on their way shortly, which, no doubt, any
reasonable person would interpret as a sign that the search was over.
Moreover, to the extent that Sgt. Lewis was asking for consent to rip into the
ceiling of the van, such consent was hardly voluntary in view of the fact that
he was threatening to do so anyway and both men were in handcuffs.”   
(Citing Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384,  401-02, 545 A. 2d 1281, 1289 (1988).
 Turning to the question of whether, at that time, Sgt. Lewis had probable cause to
believe that the van contained contraband, the court answered, “no.”    Its reasoning is clear
and logical.    Reviewing the definition of probable cause, as explicated in  Dixon v. State,
133 Md. App. 654, 678, 758 A.2d 1063, 1076 (2000), “a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place."  Illinois v. Gates,  462 U.S. 213,
238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); see State v. Lee, 330 Md. 320, 326, 624 A.2d
492 (1993), i.e., a  nontechnical conception of a reasonable ground for belief of guilt and
recognizing, as Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d
911 (1996) teaches, that: 
“The  principal  components  of  a  determination of..-probable cause will be
the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the
decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an
-9-
objectively reasonable police officer, amount to...probable cause,”
the court enumerated the historical facts in the case up to the point of the expiration of the
consent, with an eye toward determining whether they amounted to probable cause.  In
addition to those historical facts already identified, they were determined to be:
*     *     *     *
“The two men were driving a van with out of state license plates down
Route 13.
*     *     *     *
“Sgt. Lewis found that the ceiling of the van was hard.
 “There was a television mounted into a panel  extending  perpendicular  to   the ceiling, a
Sony Playstation mounted in that same panel,  and a VCR or   other component mounted
underneath the panel.
“Sgt.  Lewis  was  unable  to  find  any openings or wires suggesting the
presence of a hydraulic compartment, nor was he able to pry open the
panel containing the map lights,  the  site of a hydraulic container in [a]
van detained previously.
“There were containers in the car, such as bags, but Sgt. Lewis did not
look inside them.”
Then viewing the facts from the point of view of a reasonable police officer, as it was
required to do, see Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 700, 116 S. Ct. at 1664, 134 L. Ed.2d at 921, the
intermediate appellate court opined: 
“[T]he majority of the factors listed above do not rise to the level of
-10-
probable cause.   For example, air fresheners, only two of which were in
the front of the  van,  are  not  indicative  of  criminal  behavior,  nor  is
nervousness.   Suspicions might be aroused by the two men's differing
stories as to how they got to New York. but this gives rise to generalized
suspicion rather than objective proof of wrongdoing.  This leaves us with
some generalized suspicion along with a hard ceiling in the van.  Sgt.
Lewis certainly provided expert testimony regarding the uses of
hydraulically controlled compartments in conversion vans, yet we must
look at this from the point of view of an objectively reasonable police
officer with training and experience in narcotics trafficking.”
The court discounted the cases from other jurisdictions involving searches of hidden
compartments, noting “[i]n virtually all cases, there was something more than was present
in this case.”    It concluded:
“An objectively reasonable police officer might have suspected that the
van contained a hidden compartment, but, other than the fact that the
ceiling was hard, there was nothing else, i.e., wires or an obvious opening,
that would indicate the presence of a compartment.   We do not believe
that, in this case, the generalized suspicion tips the scale into the realm of
probable cause.   Both men were extremely cooperative and nothing was
present to indicate the presence of contraband.”
On the basis of this opinion, therefore, I would affirm the judgment in Shaw and
reverse the judgment in the companion case, Nathan, in which another panel of the
intermediate appellate court reached the opposite result.
To the majority,  sufficient grounds to justify an investigative detention have been
established by the following facts, taken together: 
“that Nathan, the driver, was unable to produce identification, in combination
4In Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 735 A.2d 491 (1999), we cautioned against “placing
too much reliance upon a suspect’s nervousness when analyzing a determination of
reasonable suspicion.”  Id. at 389, 735 A.2d at 509.   Nonetheless, we also characterized
Ferris’s nervousness as being “unexceptional.”  Id.  We concluded that “Ferris’s
unexceptional nervousness, in reaction to encountering Trooper smith, was simply too
ordinary to suggest criminal activity.”  Id.  In the instant case, however, Nathan and Shaw’s
nervousness was characterized by Sgt. Lewis as extreme.  As indicated supra, the fact that
conduct may be innocent does not immunize it from consideration in determining reasonable
suspicion.  Nonetheless, we reiterate that a claim that ordinary nervousness indicates
complicity in criminal activity must be treated with caution.  Id.
-11-
with Sgt. Lewis’s observations of Nathan and Shaw’s extreme nervousness,4
Shaw’s apparent pretense of sleep when the vehicle was initially stopped,
Nathan’s evasive answers regarding his travel plans, the inconsistent versions
of the trip itinerary and purpose provided by Nathan and Shaw, the
“overwhelming” odor of air fresheners, and the altered ceiling that led the
officer to believe that the van had a hidden compartment, as well as the police
observations prior to the traffic stop (the passenger’s head bobbing up and
down in the rear window),”
___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A. 2d ___, ___ (2002)[slip op. at 16-17], leading to the conclusion
that “Sgt. Lewis had reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that Nathan and Shaw were
engaged in criminal activity, and that suspicion was sufficient to support their continued
detention.”  Id. at 17, ___ A. 2d at ___.      The majority also holds that Sgt. Lewis had
probable cause to search the van, reasoning:
“Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Sgt. Lewis’s
observations of the van’s ceiling, in combination with Nathan and Shaw’s
suspicious behavior, were sufficient to constitute probable cause to search the
van, including the ceiling.  Before Shaw consented to any search, Sgt. Lewis
had noticed that the height of the ceiling in the van was lower than normal and
that the fabric was new and taut, not as one would normally expect in an
eleven-year-old van.  The ceiling of the van was solid, hard, with no
flexibility, and the map lights would not move, indicating to the officer that
there was a false hydraulic compartment containing contraband similar to one
-12-
that he found in a conversion van four weeks earlier.  Sgt. Lewis testified that
the console felt like it was affixed with steel plates and that, in a normal van
ceiling, the screws would be removable in the center section to allow for the
replacement of bulbs and vents dealing with air conditioning and heating.
These factors, taken together, clearly amounted to sufficient probable cause
for his search of the van’s ceiling.”
Id. at 18-19, ___ A. 2d at ___. 
In reaching the latter conclusion, the majority focuses heavily on Sgt. Lewis’s
observations of the van’s ceiling, the conclusions he drew from those observations and his
having discovered a false hydraulic compartment in a conversion van similar to Shaw’s four
weeks earlier.    It finds support for that focus in three cases involving hidden compartments,
United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1066 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Inocencio,
40 F.3d 716, 723-24 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Martel-Martines, 988 F.2d 855, 858-59
(8th Cir. 1993).    The “suspicious behavior” to which the majority refers relates back, I
surmise, to the “grounds” found sufficient to justify the defendants’ continued detention.
I am disturbed by the majority’s holding that the facts that the defendants were
nervous and gave inconsistent versions of the trip’s itinerary and purpose and that air
fresheners were present in the van are significant indicia of the existence of probable cause.
As we have seen, the appellate courts of this state have previously considered each of these
factors and determined that they are slender reeds on which to base reasonable suspicion, not
to mention probable cause.
In Ferris, this Court, as the majority itself acknowledges,  cautioned against “placing
too much reliance upon a suspect’s nervousness when analyzing a determination of
-13-
reasonable suspicion.”  Id. at 389, 735 A.2d at 509.   It cited a number of cases from other
courts to that effect.  United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 948 (10th Cir. 1997);
Gonzalez-Rivera v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 22 F.3d 1441, 1447 (9th  Cir.
1994);  Buffkins v. City of Omaha, 922 F.2d 465, 470  n. 13 (8th  Cir. 1990);  United States
v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563, 566 (6 th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Brooks v. United States,
444 U.S. 878, 100 S. Ct. 166, 62 L. Ed.2d 108 (1979);  State v. Washington, 623 So.2d 392,
398-99 (Ala. Crim. App.1993);  State v. Magner, 191 Ariz. 392, 956 P.2d 519, 524 (Ct.
App.1998);   State v. DeMarco, 263 Kan. 727, 952 P.2d 1276, 1283-84 (1998);  State v.
Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 1987).    We pointed out that characterizing  an individual
as nervous, even  unusually so, “is an extremely subjective evaluation.”  Ferris, 355 Md. at
389, citing  United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 879 (10th Cir. 1994).  That is especially
the case when the officer has had no prior interaction with the person whose behavior is
being characterized; under those circumstances, we noted, the officer  “could not reasonably
gauge [the person’s] behavior during the traffic stop with his usual demeanor.”  Id. citing,
for that proposition, United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1139 (8th Cir. 1998).  
To be sure, we characterized the “nervousness” in Ferris  as being “unexceptional,”
and, therefore, “simply too ordinary to suggest criminal activity.”  Ferris, 355 Md. at 389,
735 A.2d at 509  On the other hand, citing Whitehead, 116 Md. App. at 505, 698 A. 2d at
1119, with approval, we acknowledged:
“Permitting a citizen's nervousness to be the basis for a finding of probable
cause would confer upon the police a degree of discretion not grounded in
-14-
police expertise, and, moreover, would be totally insusceptible to judicial
review.”  
In the instant case, the majority finds solace in the fact that Nathan and Shaw’s
nervousness was characterized by Sgt. Lewis as extreme.  Unfortunately, it does not provide
a basis for differentiating between “ordinary nervousness,” which still must be treated with
caution and extreme nervousness, which does not and cannot be the basis for probable cause,
except by reference to the police officer’s characterization.  The majority, thus, seems to be
ceding the determination of the level of nervousness of a driver to the police, whom it has
already decided, because of lack of prior experience and expertise, as well as the
unreviewability of any conclusion thereby made, are ill-equipped to do so.    Moreover, this
analysis undermines the very forceful statement in Ferris, providing the road map for getting
around its proscription: simply characterize the nervousness as extreme.    This is particularly
distressing because that is precisely what the characterization will be in each succeeding
case, every police officer will become quite aware, and quite adept at discerning palpitations,
of the carotid pulse.  In Ferris, we accepted the admonition of the court in United States v.
Millan-Diaz, 975 F.2d 720,  (10th Cir.1992), against according too much weight to the State's
routine claim that garden variety nervousness accurately indicates complicity in criminal
activity: “This repetitive assertion by the Government in all cases of this kind must be
treated with caution.” United States v. Millan-Diaz, 975 F.2d at 722 .  355 Md. at 389, 735
A. 2d at 508-09.   No less caution should be shown when the routine claim is of extreme
nervousness.   
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The Court of Special Appeals, in Whitehead, addressed the effect on the probable
cause calculus of two or more persons giving inconsistent stories with regard to the trip’s
destination, purpose or origin during a traffic stop.   It held that an inability to agree upon
these details does not establish probable cause.  116 Md. App. at 504, 698 A.2d at 1119.  The
same conclusion was reached as to air fresheners in Charity; a hunch the presence of such
fresheners may provide, but certainly not probable or even reasonable suspicion.    In Charity,
it also must be remembered, there were 72 air fresheners on the rear view mirror.  In this
case, there were but four, two in the front of the van and two in the rear. It is also interesting
that the characterization of this effect, by the same officer, by the way, was the same –
overwhelming.
Whether the driver of the van produced a driver’s license adds little, if anything to the
inquiry.  To be sure, Maryland Code (1977, 1998 Repl. Vol.) § 16-112 (c) of the
Transportation Article requires every driver to have his or her driver’s license with him or
her and to display it on demand to any uniformed police officer.   Failure to have a license
in possession and, thus, to display it, is a misdemeanor punishable only by a fine.  See Md.
Code (1977, 1998 Repl. Vol.) § 27-101 (a) and (b) of the Transportation Article.   This is to
be contrasted with the requirement that every driver be licensed.   See Md. Code (1977, 1998
Repl. Vol.) § 16-101 of the Transportation Article.    No serious effort was made by Sgt.
Lewis to determine which it was, driving without license in possession or driving without a
license.    Nor does the driver’s evasiveness appreciably advance the inquiry.   In fact, it
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would seem to fall squarely within the ambit of the rule with respect to conflicting stories.
 Shaw’s pretense of sleep when Sgt. Lewis initially approached the van and the observations
of the police prior to the traffic stop (the passenger’s head bobbing up and down in the rear
window) may have had relevance early on, but it was dissipated by subsequent events - both
defendants were very cooperative and it was not deemed necessary by Sgt. Lewis  to even
search the area of the van where Shaw first was seen.
This leaves for consideration only Sgt. Lewis’s observations of the van’s ceiling.   At
the outset, I am offended by the suggestion that customization of, or an alteration to, a 1988
conversion van, or any older model vehicle, for that matter, provides a basis for reasonable
suspicion to justify a further detention or probable cause to support a search.   As far as I
know, there is no law against, and indeed no sound basis for discouraging, the owner of such
a vehicle from customizing it, repairing it and/or improving it, as an option to purchasing a
new one.    But the rule that the majority formulates, because it potentially subjects to search
all conversion vans so altered and perhaps all vehicles that have been customized and altered
from factory specifications, would burden the decision to customize and alter and, thus,
discourage its being done.
Nor does the inspection of the van’s ceiling justify the conclusion that there was
reasonable suspicion for detention or probable cause to search.    This is true notwithstanding
that Sgt. Lewis had an experience several weeks before which resulted in his discovery in a
5Indubitably, the hidden compartment found in the conversion van several weeks
earlier was not a prototype for the hidden compartment in this conversion van, as the
location of its entrance was different than the location of the entrance to this one, a fact that
Sgt. Lewis discovered after taking claw hammer to ceiling in the area where he located the
other compartment and finding nothing. 
6Sgt. Lewis’s testimony that other conversion vans had hidden compartments, in his
experience, and were used to conceal contraband is not probative.   Relevant in this regard
is the proffer made at the suppression hearing to the effect that “there is nothing unusual
about an older van being converted.   It’s much cheaper to spend five or six thousand dollars
in putting in all this equipment than spending forty or fifty thousand for a new van.   And it’s
done all the time.   And one person even said that by safety regulations they have to reinforce
the ceiling above the driver when they put in TV’s, et cetera, into such vans.   And that it
would be nothing unusual about this particular van.”
Also, As Nathan points out, Sgt. Lewis testified that in fifteen years, he had personally search
nine to twelve compartments of the type in this conversion van and in only one of them was
any quantity of contraband discovered.  In any event, that Sgt. Lewis has seen other hidden
compartments in which contraband was concealed is far from dispositive of probable cause.
   The police regularly find contraband in various parts of vehicles and, yet, those prior
discoveries  do not  provide probable cause to search the next car or another vehicle in the
location where the contraband was found.
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conversion van of a hydraulically operated  compartment.    Neither this experience,5 nor Sgt.
Lewis’s asserted extensive training and experience in drug interdiction6  suffices to establish,
with the requisite degree of certainty, without empirical data to support it, that this
conversion van, or any other, has a hidden compartment and, if so, that those compartments
are frequently used to conceal contraband.  Certainly, the likelihood that hidden
compartments in conversion vans will frequently or almost always be used to conceal
contraband is a matter of statistical fact, which is subject to proof.    The anecdotal testimony
of Sgt. Lewis simply does not suffice as such proof.    Indeed, as Nathan reminds us:
“It cannot fairly be disputed that automobiles are endlessly accessorized and
customized in perfectly innocent ways.    To say that the fact that a vehicle has
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had some customized improvement satisfies the requirement that there is a
‘fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place,’ would ... place all manner of innocent drivers at risk for
unwarranted governmental intrusion.   See Ferris v. State, 355 Md. at 386
(‘factual circumstances which “describe a very large category of innocent
travelers” cannot in of themselves justify a seizure.’ (Quoting Reid v. Georgia,
448 U.S. 438, 441, 100 S. Ct. 2752, 2754, 65 L. Ed.2d 890, 894 (1980))” 
The majority’s assertion that Anderson, Inocencio and Martel-Martines support the
result in this case is not persuasive.    Anderson is similar to the case, sub judice, insofar as
three of the factors relied upon for probable cause, the smell of air fresheners, conflicting
stories about the travel itinerary, the existence of a hidden compartment, are concerned. 
Two of them, the former two, do not suffice in Maryland to establish either reasonable
suspicion or probable cause.   As to the hidden compartment, there is a significant difference
between coming upon such a compartment inadvertently and surmising that there must be
one simply because work has been done on an older vehicle and because the officer recently
has come across a vehicle with one.    Moreover, there is a significant difference between a
hidden compartment in a gas tank and one suspected of being in the ceiling of a van, based
only on the fact that the older van was improved.
Inocencio involved a roving Border Patrol stop and, so, is subject to a different
analysis, that is guided by the principles enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975).  40
F. 3d at 722.  Those principles permit Border Patrol officers on roving patrol to detain
vehicles temporarily for investigation when they are “aware of specific articulable facts,
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together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion” that the
vehicle is involved in illegal activities.  Id. citing United States v. Cardona, 955 F.2d 976,
980 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 942, 113 S. Ct. 381, 121 L. Ed.2d 291 (1992)  (quoting
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884, 95 S. Ct. at 2581-82, 45 L. Ed.2d at 618 ) and noting that
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421-22, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed.2d 621 (1981)
expanded the Brignoni-Ponce “reasonable suspicion” test for alien smuggling to encompass
vehicle stops for any suspected criminal activity.    Factors have been developed to assess
whether a Border Patrol agent has acted with reasonable suspicion:
“(1) known characteristics of a particular area, (2) previous experience of the
arresting agents with criminal activity, (3) proximity of the area to the border,
(4) usual traffic patterns of that road, (5) information about recent illegal
trafficking in aliens or narcotics in the area, (6) the behavior of the vehicle's
driver, (7) the appearance of the vehicle,   and (8) the number, appearance and
behavior of the passengers.”
Id., citing United States v. Castaneda, 951 F.2d 44, 47 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing United States
v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 1984) (in turn citing 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. at 885)).   Notwithstanding the absence of the proximity factor, the court in Reyes
determined that Brignoni-Ponce applied, nonetheless, and that “[a] careful examination of
the facts creates a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity,” including  several of the Brignoni-
Ponce factors, Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 723, as follows:
“The agents testified at trial that Reyes [the driver] appeared nervous and
offered conflicting statements in explaining his presence on Helen Ranch
Road.  In addition, they testified that Reyes was unable to read certain graphs
and charts that he claimed he was working on while in the area [and] that the
bed of the vehicle was higher than normal, the discovery of fresh paint (on a
7Lest it be forgotten, Sgt. Lewis focused on the newness of the ceiling and its
incongruity with the age of the van from the very moment that he approached the van.  As
reported by the majority opinion:
“The officer testified that, when Nathan lowered the passenger side window,
the odor of air freshener coming from the interior of the vehicle was
overwhelming.  He testified that he observed a conversion ceiling in the roof
of the van that appeared to be lower than normal.  The blue fabric around the
ceiling of the eleven-year-old van appeared to be new and extremely tight,
with no evidence of fading or sagging.”
___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 2].
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brand new truck) around the fender wells and the fresh undercoating beneath
the bed of the truck.”
Id. at 723-24.    The court concluded that the cumulation of these factors amounted to
probable cause.    Thus, given the context, there was a good deal more in that case than in this
one.
The result in Martel-Martines is governed by the consent to search that the defendant
gave in that case.   The analysis based on a lack of valid consent is pure dicta. 
There was a time in America when a person with an older van or car could alter or
improve that vehicle, whether to save money or to make it more comfortable or attractive or
simply because he or she felt like doing so, by accessorizing and/or customizing it, and drive
it on any interstate highway, even one patrolled by police whose major focus is drug
interdiction, without fear of the improvement being the cause for suspicion of wrong-doing7
and, thus, the basis for him or her being subjected to the intrusiveness of a search of that
vehicle.  After today, I fear that time is no more.  Any alteration to an older vehicle that a
police officer, experienced in drug interdiction, says may contain a hidden compartment will
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suffice, so long as he or she also characterizes the occupants, or, I suspect, at least one of
them, as extremely nervous and the van has air fresheners, the odor from which, the officer
says, is overwhelming and, perhaps, there is not 100 percent identity in the reporting of the
itinerary.      
Moreover, the record does not demonstrate that Trooper Smith had any.  Furthermore,
the statement that an individual appeared unusually nervous is an extremely subjective
evaluation.  United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 879 (10 th Cir. 1994).
I emphatically dissent.
Judge Eldridge joins in the views expressed herein.