Case Title: Lipps v. Loyd

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lipps v. Loyd1998 WY 139967 P.2d 558Case Number: 98-43Decided: 11/25/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Gary 
A. LIPPS, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Devon Marie LOYD, f/k/a Devon Marie Lipps, a/k/a 
Devon M. Lipps, Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J.

 

Donna A. Murray, Cheyenne, 
for Appellant.

Ronald E. Triggs of Law 
Offices of Ronald E. Triggs, PC, Cheyenne, for 
Appellee.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Retired November 2, 1998.

 

MACY, 
Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant Gary Lipps (the husband) appeals from 
the district court's determination that the alimony provisions of a separation 
agreement entered into by the husband and Appellee Devon Loyd (the wife) were 
valid and enforceable.

 

[¶2] We 
affirm.

 

         
                                     ISSUE

 

[¶3] The husband presents a 
single issue for our review on appeal:

 

Did the district court err when it determined a 
property settlement agreement entered into in anticipation and settlement of a 
Colorado divorce, which divorce was deemed void by the district court, was a 
valid contract separate from the void divorce decree?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶4] The husband married the 
wife on December 23, 1989, and one child was born as issue of the marriage. In 
June 1992, the husband and the wife, who were at that time living in South 
Dakota, separated. The wife subsequently moved to Colorado, and she filed a 
petition for a divorce in a Colorado district court on August 18, 1992. The wife 
stated in her petition that she had been domiciled in Colorado for ninety days 
before she commenced the divorce action. The husband signed a waiver and 
acceptance of service, consenting to the Colorado court's 
jurisdiction.

 

[¶5] The parties entered 
into a separation agreement on April 12, 1993. They agreed that the wife would 
have sole custody of the child and the husband would have liberal visitation 
rights. The husband agreed to pay child support and spousal support to the wife. 
The separation agreement also addressed the division of the parties' property 
and the division of their debts and obligations. The magistrate of the Colorado 
district court approved the parties' separation agreement in the decree of 
dissolution of marriage nunc pro tunc that he entered on May 12, 1993. The 
husband subsequently remarried.

 

[¶6] On November 17, 1994, 
the husband filed the Colorado divorce decree and the separation agreement in 
the Wyoming district court. He also filed a petition for a modification of the 
decree, requesting that the district court modify the visitation and alimony 
provisions of the separation agreement. The district court did not resolve the 
modification issues.

 

[¶7] On April 10, 1995, the 
husband filed a complaint against the wife under a new docket number. He claimed 
that the Colorado divorce decree should be set aside because the wife had 
falsely and fraudulently obtained it. The husband maintained that the wife had 
falsely stated in her divorce petition that she had been domiciled in Colorado 
for ninety days before she commenced her divorce action. He argued, therefore, 
that the Colorado court did not have jurisdiction to enter the divorce 
decree.

 

[¶8] On December 1, 1995, 
the husband filed a motion for a summary judgment, maintaining that he was 
entitled, as a matter of law, to have the Colorado divorce decree set aside. 
After the district court held a hearing, it issued a decision letter and an 
order granting the husband's motion for a summary judgment in part and denying 
it in part. The district court determined that the Colorado divorce decree was 
void because the Colorado court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. 
Notwithstanding the invalidity of the divorce decree, the district court determined that the 
parties were bound by the separation agreement.

 

[¶9] The district court 
granted the wife leave to file a counterclaim for a divorce, and she filed her 
counterclaim on March 7, 1996. The wife also filed a motion for a summary 
judgment, requesting that the district court grant her a divorce from the 
husband. The district court issued a divorce decree on February 28, 1997, that 
incorporated all the terms of the separation agreement except for the child 
visitation provisions and the spousal support provisions. The district court 
modified the separation agreement by giving the husband the right to visit the 
child in accordance with the standard visitation order.

 

[¶10] The district court 
directed the parties to file briefs on the spousal support issue. After the 
parties filed their briefs, the district court held a hearing to consider the 
wife's right to receive spousal support. On December 17, 1997, the district 
court awarded spousal support to the wife in accordance with the parties' 
separation agreement. The husband appealed to this Court from the district 
court's alimony order.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

[¶11] The husband contends 
that the district court erred when it determined that he was bound by the terms 
of the separation agreement. The wife argues that the separation agreement was 
valid and enforceable. We agree with the wife; the district court correctly 
determined that the separation agreement was binding upon the 
parties.

 

[¶12]Spouses may define 
their obligations to one another in a written agreement. David v. David, 724 P.2d 1141, 1143 (Wyo. 1986); see also In re C.G.G., 946 P.2d 603, 606 
(Colo.Ct.App. 1997). The courts favor property settlement agreements that the 
spouses have entered into prior to commencing divorce actions. David, 724 P.2d  
at 1143. The divorce decrees usually recognize and incorporate these agreements. 
Id.; Prentice v. Prentice, 568 P.2d 883, 886 (Wyo. 1977). In defining the 
parties' relative obligations to one 
another, one spouse may agree to pay spousal support or alimony to the other 
spouse. Smith v. Robinson, 912 P.2d 527, 528 (Wyo. 1996). As long as it meets 
the requirements for a valid contract, an agreement for spousal support is 
enforceable as a contractual obligation. Id.

 

[¶13] We apply our well 
established rules of contract interpretation to determine the spouses' intention 
as articulated in their agreement. Crawford v. Crawford, 757 P.2d 563, 566 (Wyo. 
1988); see also Johnson v. Johnson, 717 P.2d 335, 338 (Wyo. 1986).  When a written agreement is clear and 
unambiguous, this Court derives the parties' intent from the plain language of 
the agreement and does not resort to extrinsic evidence to interpret the 
agreement. Crawford, 757 P.2d  at 566. We construe the language of a clear and 
unambiguous agreement as a matter of law. Id.

 

[¶14] The separation 
agreement stated: "It is the desire of the parties to settle all rights to each 
other's property and to agree on all issues which have arisen during their 
marriage." It also stated: "BOTH PARTIES REQUEST THE COURT TO ENTER A DECREE 
OF DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE IN THIS ACTION WITH OR WITHOUT THE APPEARANCE OF 
EITHER PARTY." The husband specifically takes issue with the alimony or 
spousal support provisions of the separation agreement. The pertinent spousal 
support provision stated:

 

4.2 The husband waives any and all rights to spousal 
support or maintenance. He understands this issue will not be raised by him at 
any time or in any court henceforth and forever. The wife is entitled to spousal 
support or maintenance.  The husband 
will pay directly to the wife maintenance payments in the amount of $365.00 per 
month. The payments will be made in two equal installments of $182.50, by the 
first and fifteenth days of each month commencing March 1, 1992. THE PARTIES 
SPECIFICALLY AGREE THAT THIS ISSUE IS CONTRACTUAL BETWEEN THEM AND WILL NOT BE 
MODIFIED BY ANY COURT AT ANY TIME HENCEFORTH AND 
FOREVER.

 

The husband contends that 
the consideration for the separation agreement was the Colorado divorce decree. 
He claims, therefore, that the separation agreement was not supported by 
consideration because the Wyoming district court declared that the Colorado 
divorce decree was void.

 

[¶15] An Illinois appellate 
court faced a similar situation in In re Marriage of Vella, 237 Ill. App.3d 194, 
177 Ill.Dec. 328, 603 N.E.2d 109 (Ill. App.Ct. 1992). In 1984, the parties in 
that case executed a marital settlement agreement in anticipation of being 
awarded a divorce. 177 Ill.Dec. 328, 603 N.E.2d  at 110. The parties' divorce 
action was subsequently dismissed for want of prosecution, and the parties 
attempted to reconcile. Id. Failing in their bid for reconciliation, the parties 
divorced several years later. Id. The Illinois appellate court held, in the 
later divorce proceeding, that the 1984 marital settlement agreement was valid 
and enforceable even though the parties 
had executed it in anticipation of the original divorce action. 177 Ill.Dec. 
328, 603 N.E.2d  at 112. The court determined that the agreement was valid 
because it "was not made expressly dependent upon the entry of a divorce decree" 
in the original divorce action. Id. See also Lindsay v. Lindsay, 91 Wn. App. 944, 957 P.2d 818, 822 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the effectiveness of 
the parties' separation agreement was not contingent upon a divorce 
proceeding).

 

[¶16] In the case at bar, 
the parties requested, in the separation agreement, that the Colorado court 
enter a divorce decree. The separation agreement did not state, however, that 
the agreement would not be operative unless the Colorado court entered a valid 
divorce decree. In fact, the plain language of the separation agreement 
pronounced that the husband and the wife sought to settle all the issues that 
had arisen between them during their marriage. Consistent with the other terms 
of the separation agreement, the emphasized language of the spousal support 
provision made it exceedingly clear that the spousal support obligation was 
contractual between the parties.

 

[¶17] The settlement of 
claims between parties is sufficient consideration to form a binding contract. 
Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 596 (Wyo. 1981). We conclude, therefore, 
that, once the parties executed the separation agreement, which settled all the 
outstanding issues between them, the agreement became an enforceable contract. 
The issuance of a valid divorce decree by the Colorado court was not required to 
make the separation agreement effective, and the invalidity of the divorce 
decree did not affect the parties' contractual obligations. 

 

[¶18] The husband also 
contends that the district court incorrectly ordered him to pay spousal support 
or alimony to the wife without determining the wife's need for support or his 
ability to pay the support. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-114 (1997) addresses a 
district court's right to award alimony. That statute 
states:

 

In 
granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the property of the 
parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits 
of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the 
party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the 
property for the benefit of either party and children. The court may decree to 
either party reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for 
the other's ability and may order so much of the other's real estate or the 
rents and profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either 
party for life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either 
party.

 

Section 20-2-114. In 
determining whether a spouse is entitled to be awarded alimony, the district 
court considers objective criteria including "the ability of the payor spouse to 
pay and the necessity of support for the payee." Sellers v. Sellers, 775 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Wyo. 1989). See also Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 435 (Wyo. 
1998).

 

[¶19] In arguing that the 
district court should have applied the objective criteria in determining whether 
the wife was entitled to be awarded spousal support, the husband ignores the 
fact that he expressly contracted to pay spousal support to the wife. The 
spousal support provision was just one part of the separation agreement that 
delineated the husband's and the wife's obligations to one another. Under the 
circumstances of this case, the district court properly deferred to the parties' 
judgment regarding their commitments to one another and correctly declared that 
the separation agreement was valid.1

 

[¶20] Finally, the husband 
asserts: "An award of alimony for life, to a healthy, young woman, based upon a 
Separation Agreement entered in a voided Colorado divorce action, and not based 
upon need or ability to pay, should shock the conscience of this Court."  The husband's argument does not have 
merit. We have already stated that the separation agreement was a valid, 
enforceable contract. The separation agreement does not appear, on its face, to 
be manifestly unfair or unjust. The district court's award of alimony on the 
basis of the separation agreement, therefore, does not shock the conscience of 
this Court.

 

[¶21] 
Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1We recognize that, in Wyoming, 
alimony can be modified even if it was originally established in a separation 
agreement. Dorr v. Newman, 785 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Wyo. 1990).