Case Title: In re J.W.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92116

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 92116-Agenda 7-May 2002.
In re J.W., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, 
 								v. J.W., Appellant).
Opinion filed February 21, 2003.
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	Respondent, J.W., a 12-year-old boy, was adjudicated
delinquent following his admission to two counts of aggravated
criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(b)(i) (West 1998)), and
was sentenced to a term of five years' probation. Among the
conditions of his probation, J.W. was ordered to register as a sex
offender. In addition, J.W. was prohibited from residing in or
going to the Village of South Elgin, Illinois, the community where
J.W. lived and where the aggravated criminal sexual assaults took
place.
	J.W. appealed two of the conditions of his probation
contending that: (1) requiring a 12-year-old child to register as a
sex offender is unconstitutional; and (2) prohibiting J.W. from
residing in or visiting South Elgin as a condition of probation is
overly broad and void. The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's order. Nos. 2-00-0360, 2-00-0432 cons. (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23). This court granted J.W.'s
petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315). We also granted
the motion of the Bluhm Legal Clinic of Northwestern University
Law School and the Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic of the
University of Chicago Law School for leave to file a brief as
amicus curiae.

BACKGROUND
	The State filed its petition for adjudication on November 10,
1999, alleging that J.W. had committed aggravated criminal sexual
assaults against two seven-year-old boys, R.We. and J.P. On
February 14, 2000, J.W. pled guilty to two counts of aggravated
criminal sexual assault in exchange for the State's agreement to
withdraw two other counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault.
There was no agreement among the parties as to sentencing.
Consequently, a sentencing hearing was held in February 2000.
	At J.W.'s sentencing hearing, Dr. Kevin Breen, a psychiatrist,
testified that he met with J.W. and his parents one time in
December 1999, for approximately one hour, to determine whether
J.W. was a danger to anyone else. Dr. Breen's report of this
examination was entered into evidence. The report indicated that
J.W. had admitted to five episodes where he convinced R.We. and
J.P. to have oral-genital contact with one another and with him.
J.W. denied that the boys were physically coerced, but admitted he
used verbal coercion. J.W.'s parents revealed to Dr. Breen that
J.W. also had exposed himself on one occasion to a five-year-old
boy. J.W. denied having been physically, sexually or emotionally
abused, but admitted that he had seen his father's sexually explicit
magazines.
	Dr. Breen concluded in his report that J.W. was minimizing
his sexual encounters with young boys, noting that J.W. had not
mentioned the incident with the five-year-old boy. According to
the report, Dr. Breen's diagnosis of J.W. was paraphilia, not
otherwise specified. Paraphilia is where a person engages in sexual
activity or sexual acts that are not sanctioned by society. The
diagnosis would have been pedophilia with a sexual attraction to
males, except that J.W. was not 16 years old, as required by the
standard criteria.
	Dr. Breen testified at J.W.'s sentencing hearing that he was
not aware of any incidents of anal sex or anal penetration between
J.W. and his victims, nor was he aware of allegations that J.W. had
introduced a dog into his sexual acts. Dr. Breen's
recommendations for the treatment of J.W. included medication,
cognitive behavioral therapy, and residential treatment. Dr. Breen
recommended residential treatment given the frequency of relapse
among individuals with sexual disorders. Dr. Breen testified that,
given the frequency of relapse, J.W. would present a risk to the
community if he was not placed in residential treatment.
	David Berg, an investigator with the Child Advocacy Center
of the Kane County State's Attorney's office, testified at the
sentencing hearing that he investigated the case concerning J.W.
Berg became involved in the case after the family of R.We. made
a police report alleging that J.W. had put his mouth on R.We.'s
penis and had R.We. put his mouth on J.W.'s penis. These
incidents took place under the deck of a neighbor's house and in
J.W.'s home. R.We. said the sexual contact occurred between 5
and 10 times. R.We. did not tell anyone about the incidents
because he feared retribution from J.W.
	Berg also interviewed the other victim, J.P. J.P. lived next
door to J.W. J.P. told Berg that J.W. had put his mouth on J.P.'s
penis and that J.W. had put his penis in J.P.'s mouth. J.W. also
touched the penises of both victims.
	In addition to the two victims, a five-year-old boy saw J.W.
expose himself, and R.We.'s six-year-old sister witnessed an
incident of oral sex between J.W. and R.We.
	Berg initially spoke with J.P.'s stepmother on November 5,
1999. In a follow-up conversation several days later, J.P.'s
stepmother told Berg that J.P. had forgotten to tell him something,
and indicated that J.W. had placed his penis in J.P.'s anus.
Subsequently, both J.P. and R.We. told Berg there were several
occasions where J.W. placed his penis in their anuses. J.P. told
Berg that he did not tell anyone about these incidents because J.W.
told him not to tell.
	Berg testified that approximately one week prior to the
sentencing hearing, he again met with R.We., who told Berg that
J.W. had his dog lick the penises of both boys. J.W. also told the
two victims to try to penetrate the dog's anus with their penises,
but they were unable to do so. The boys did observe J.W. penetrate
the dog's anus. The incidents with the dog took place in J.W.'s
home. In addition, both boys related that J.W. had directed them
to penetrate one another, but they were unable to do so. These
events took place under the deck of the neighbor's home and at
J.W.'s home.
	Therese Wrona, a therapist, testified that she had been
involved in the treatment of sexually abusive juveniles for 10
years. Wrona first saw J.W. on December 7, 1999, and in January
2000 began seeing him at least once a week. Wrona testified that
J.W. was a danger to the community "to a certain degree." Wrona
recommended probation for J.W., stating that "the longer the legal
system hangs on to individuals such as [J.W.], the better." In
addition, Wrona recommended a course of treatment specialized
for individuals that have problems with sexual aggression. Wrona
also stated that J.W. required 24-hour monitoring and supervision
by a person that understood the nature and seriousness of J.W.'s
problem. J.W.'s school should be informed concerning J.W.'s
history of sexually aggressive behavior so that the school could
monitor J.W. and protect other students. Wrona further said that
J.W. should not be around younger children, or even children his
own age, unless an adult who is aware of J.W.'s problems is
present. Wrona's opinion was that J.W. should be allowed to
remain in the community and should not be placed in residential
treatment. With regard to the protection of the community, Wrona
believed that J.W. could return to his home in South Elgin,
although given the publicity concerning the case, Wrona believed
it might not be in J.W.'s best interest to return to his home.
	Wrona testified that J.W. "groomed" his victims, meaning
that he approached the victims to assess his likelihood of
committing the sexual abuse. J.W. sought out his victims and
selected his victims based upon their youth and their trust in him.
Wrona said that J.W. initially did not feel any guilt, but she
believed J.W. was beginning to appreciate the seriousness of his
acts.
	J.W.'s parents testified at the sentencing hearing and indicated
their willingness to engage in intensive supervision and
monitoring of J.W. if he was allowed to return home. J.W.'s
parents also indicated that if J.W. was allowed to return home,
they intended to sell their home in South Elgin and move to a
different neighborhood.
	J.W.'s aunt, Monica Grant, testified on behalf of J.W. that she
resides with her husband in Elgin, Illinois. Grant stated that she
and her husband were willing to let J.W. live with them and would
take responsibility for his supervision.
	At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, J.W. made a
statement on his own behalf apologizing to the victims. The trial
court then noted that, because J.W. was under the age of 13, he
could not be committed to the juvenile division of the Department
of Corrections. See 705 ILCS 405/5-750(3) (West 2000). The trial
court also noted that, even though the State had recommended
residential treatment for J.W., the State had not determined
whether there was a treatment center willing and/or able to take
J.W. Accordingly, the trial court placed J.W. on five years'
probation and directed the probation officer to determine whether
placement was available for J.W. J.W. was to be placed in
residential treatment if such placement was available. If placement
was not available, J.W. was prohibited from going back to South
Elgin and was ordered to reside with his aunt, Monica Grant, until
his parents moved out of South Elgin. J.W. also was ordered to
register as a sex offender and to comply with AIDS/HIV testing
pursuant to section 5-710 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705
ILCS 405/5-710 (West 2000)).
	On March 1, 2000, the parties returned to court and informed
the trial court that residential treatment had been found for J.W.
Accordingly, an order was entered placing J.W. at the treatment
center. Thereafter, in anticipation of J.W.'s imminent release from
the treatment center, the trial court entered an order on August 22,
2000, providing that J.W. was to reside with Monica Grant upon
release, and would be allowed to reside with his parents once they
moved out of South Elgin.
	J.W. then appealed the conditions of his probation requiring
him to register as a sex offender and prohibiting him from entering
or residing in South Elgin. The appellate court stated that J.W. was
required to register as a sex offender for the rest of his natural life
because he was considered a sexual predator under the Sex
Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 et
seq. (West 2000)). The appellate court then rejected J.W.'s claim
that imposing a lifetime registration requirement on a 12-year-old
offender violates substantive due process. The appellate court also
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
prohibited J.W. from entering or residing in South Elgin, noting
that J.W.'s parents had concurred in the restriction. In this court,
J.W. again challenges the conditions of his probation requiring
him to register as a sex offender and banishing him from the
Village of South Elgin.

ISSUES
	As a preliminary matter, we must address the State's claim
that this Court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal because
J.W. did not comply with Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d
R. 604(d)). Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)),
provides, in pertinent part:
			"No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of
guilty shall be taken unless the defendant, within 30 days
of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial
court a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only the
sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea is being
challenged, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and
vacate the judgment." 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).
	Recently, this court held that Rule 604(d) applies to juvenile
proceedings. In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313 (2001). This court left
open, however, the issue of whether a juvenile's failure to file a
post-admission motion pursuant to Rule 604(d) serves as a
jurisdictional bar to an appeal. A.G., 195 Ill. 2d  at 322. The State
contends that this question must be answered in the affirmative,
maintaining that, if Rule 604(d) applies to juvenile proceedings,
its jurisdictional component also must apply to juvenile
proceedings.
	With regard to this case, the State notes that J.W. entered
admissions to the two counts of aggravated sexual abuse for which
he was adjudicated delinquent, and that an admission in juvenile
court is the equivalent of a guilty plea. See In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 316 (2001). J.W., however, did not file a motion to withdraw
his admissions or to reconsider his sentence prior to filing his
appeal. Because J.W. did not comply with Rule 604(d) prior to
filing his appeal, the State contends that this court has no
jurisdiction over J.W.'s appeal.
	In response, J.W. states that, even if the filing of a motion
pursuant to Rule 604(d) is a prerequisite to taking a delinquency
appeal, Rule 604(d) does not bar his appeal because he is not
seeking to challenge his plea or to reconsider his term of
probation. Rather, he is contesting the constitutionality of two of
the conditions of probation imposed by the trial court, namely, the
condition that he register as a sex offender for the rest of his life
and the condition barring him from entering the Village of South
Elgin. J.W. claims that because these conditions are
unconstitutional, they are void. J.W. maintains that a void sentence
may be attacked at any time, even following a guilty plea and in
the absence of a motion to vacate that plea.
	We need not decide here the issue left open in In re A.G. We
agree with J.W. that his challenge is to the constitutionality of two
of the conditions of his probation, not to the imposition of
probation itself. J.W. is not challenging his plea or his sentence of
probation. Consequently, Rule 604(d) does not bar J.W.'s appeal.
	The State then argues that, even if this court has jurisdiction
over this appeal, J.W. has waived any challenge to the conditions
of probation because he did not raise these issues in the trial court.
J.W., however, maintains that a constitutional challenge to a
statute may be made at any time.
	J.W. is correct that, in general, a constitutional challenge to a
criminal statute can be raised at any time. People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448, 454 (1989). Accordingly, J.W. has not waived his
constitutional challenges to the Registration Act even though he
first raised those challenges in the appellate court.
	J.W. first argues that the trial court's order requiring him to
register as a sex offender for the rest of his natural life violates
substantive due process and the proscription against double
jeopardy, and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the eighth amendment to the United States
Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII).
	It is well settled that statutes are presumed constitutional and
that a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the
burden of establishing its invalidity. People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2000). This court reviews de novo the constitutionality of a
statute. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000).
	At the outset, we must address the appellate court's finding
that J.W. shall register as a sex offender for the rest of his natural
life. In ordering J.W. to register as a sex offender, the trial court
did not specify the duration of registration. The appellate court
found that, given the nature of the charges for which J.W. was
adjudicated delinquent, J.W. is a "sexual predator" as defined by
the Registration Act, so that the duration of registration is for the
rest of J.W.'s natural life.
	In construing a statute, this court must ascertain and give
effect to the legislature's intent in enacting that statute. Collins v.
Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 110 (1993). To determine the intention of the
legislature, we first examine the language of the statute, which is
the most reliable indicator of the legislature's intent. In re C.W.,
199 Ill. 2d 198, 211 (2002). Where the statutory language is clear
and unambiguous, a court must give effect to the statute as written
without reading into the statute exceptions, limitations or
conditions that the legislature did not express. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d  at 211-12. In addition, a statute must be read as a whole, and no
word or paragraph should be interpreted so as to be rendered
meaningless. Collins, 155 Ill. 2d  at 111.
	With the foregoing principles in mind, we must examine the
definitions of "sexual predator" and "juvenile sex offender" as set
forth in the Registration Act. Section 2 contains the definitions for
purposes of that Act. Section 2(A) defines a "sex offender." 730
ILCS 150/2(A) (West 2000). Effective July 1, 1999, the
Registration Act was amended to add, inter alia, the definition of
a "juvenile sex offender." Section 2(A-5) of the Registration Act
now provides that:
			" 'Juvenile sex offender' means any person who is
adjudicated a juvenile delinquent as the result of the
commission of or attempt to commit a violation set forth
in item (B), (C), or (C-5) of this Section or a violation of
any substantially similar federal, sister state, or foreign
country law. For purposes of this Section, 'convicted'
shall have the same meaning as 'adjudicated.' " 730 ILCS
150/2 (A-5) (West 2000).
J.W. falls within the definition of a juvenile sex offender because
he was adjudicated delinquent as the result of the commission of
a violation of item (B) of section 2, namely, aggravated criminal
sexual assault. See 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1) (West 2000).(1)
	Also included within the definitions in section 2 is the more
specific category of sexual predators. A "sexual predator"
includes:
			"any person who, after the effective date of this
amendatory Act of the 91st General Assembly is:
				(1) Convicted of a violation of any of the following
Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961 and the
conviction occurred after the effective date of this
amendatory Act of the 91st General Assembly:
* * *
					12-14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault)[.]"
730 ILCS 150/2(E)(1) (West 2000).
	Reading section 2(A-5) together with section 2(E) so that no
word or paragraph is rendered meaningless, we conclude that J.W.
clearly qualifies as a sexual predator under the Registration Act.
Section 2 (A-5) provides that "convicted" has the same meaning
as "adjudicated," for purposes of section 2. Section 2 defines a
sexual predator as a person who has been "convicted" of
aggravated criminal sexual assault. This statutory language is clear
and unambiguous, so we give effect to the statute as written. J.W.
has been adjudicated delinquent, or "convicted," as the result of
the commission of aggravated criminal sexual assault. J.W.
therefore falls within the definition of a sexual predator.
	Section 3 of the Registration Act provides that sex offenders
and sexual predators have a duty to register as required by the
Department of State Police. 730 ILCS 150/3 (West 2000). With
regard to the duration of registration, section 7 of the Registration
Act provides, in pertinent part:
		"A sexually violent person or sexual predator shall
register for the period of his or her natural life after
conviction or adjudication if not confined to a penal
institution, hospital, or other institution or facility, and if
confined, for the period of his or her natural life after
parole, discharge, or release from any such facility. Any
other person who is required to register under this Article
shall be required to register for a period of 10 years after
conviction or adjudication ***." 730 ILCS 150/7 (West
2000).
	Generally, then, a juvenile sex offender would fall within the
portion of section 7 that requires registration for a period of 10
years after adjudication. However, with regard to juvenile sex
offenders who also are considered sexual predators, the duration
of registration is for natural life. Consequently, we find that the
appellate court correctly determined that J.W. is a sexual predator
so that the duration of J.W.'s registration is for the rest of his
natural life.
	In so holding, we note that J.W. has submitted as additional
authority a recent decision of the appellate court finding that
juvenile sex offenders are not required to register under the
Registration Act. In re Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d 497, 500
(2001). The Nicholas K. court based its finding on the fact that
section 3 of the Registration Act, concerning the duty to register,
does not specifically refer to juvenile sex offenders. Nicholas K.,
326 Ill. App. 3d at 500.
	The additional authority submitted by J.W. does not change
our holding in this case. Although section 3 of the Registration Act
does not specifically refer to juvenile sex offenders, section 3 does
provide that sex offenders and sexual predators shall register. 730
ILCS 150/3 (West 2000). Without addressing whether J.W. would
be required to register in any event because he is a sexual predator,
we note that a juvenile sex offender is a sex offender, albeit a
specific category of sex offender. Juvenile sex offenders therefore
are included within the larger category of sex offenders required
to register.(2)
	This conclusion is supported by the legislative debates
concerning House Bill 2721, which added the definition of
juvenile sex offender to the Registration Act. Specifically,
Representative Klingler explained to the House of Representatives
that the bill "requires juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent to
register." 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, March 10,
1999, at 143 (statements of Representative Klingler). Likewise,
Senator Klem explained to the Senate that the bill by adding the
definition of juvenile sex offender as well as other definitions
"imposes registration requirements of those persons." 91st Ill.
Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 26, 1999, at 52
(statements of Senator Klem).
	The conclusion that juvenile sex offenders are required to
register is further supported by examining the Registration Act in
conjunction with the corresponding Sex Offender and Child
Murderer Community Notification Law (Notification Law) (730
ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2000)). The Notification Law
provides that the Department of State Police is to establish and
maintain a sex offender database of those persons registered as sex
offenders under the Registration Act. 730 ILCS 152/115 (West
2000). The Notification Law expressly includes juvenile sex
offenders. See 730 ILCS 152/105, 120(e) (West 2000).
	Clearly, then, juvenile sex offenders do fall within the
purview of section 3 of the Registration Act and are required to
register. Accordingly, the appellate court properly concluded that
J.W. is required to register as a sex offender for the rest of his
natural life.
	We next address J.W.'s claim that an order requiring him to
register as a sexual offender for the rest of his natural life violates
substantive due process. When confronted with a claim that a
statute violates the due process guarantees of the United States and
Illinois Constitutions, courts first must determine the nature of the
right purportedly infringed upon by the statute. In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 302 (2001). Where the statute does not affect a
fundamental constitutional right, the test for determining whether
the statute complies with substantive due process is the rational
basis test. People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2000). To satisfy this
test, a statute need only bear a rational relationship to the purpose
the legislature sought to accomplish in enacting the statute. People
v. R.G., 131 Ill. 2d 328, 342 (1989). Pursuant to this test, a statute
will be upheld if it "bears a reasonable relationship to a public
interest to be served, and the means adopted are a reasonable
method of accomplishing the desired objective." People v. Adams,
144 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (1991).
	J.W. does not argue, nor do we find, that the statute at issue
affects a fundamental right. Accordingly, we analyze the statute at
issue using the rational basis test. In People v. Adams, we noted
that an earlier version of the Registration Act was passed "in
response to concern over the proliferation of sex offenses against
children" and was designed to aid law enforcement agencies by
requiring sex offenders to register with local law enforcement
authorities. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d  at 386. The intent of the legislature
in enacting the Registration Act was "to create an additional
method of protection for children from the increasing incidence of
sexual assault and sexual abuse." Adams, 144 Ill. 2d  at 387.
	In response to an adult defendant's claim that the Registration
Act violated his right to substantive due process, we held that the
public interest to be served by the Registration Act was the
assistance of law enforcement in the protection of children.
Adams, 144 Ill. 2d  at 390. We further held that the Registration
Act served that purpose by providing officers ready access to
information on known child sex offenders. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d  at
390. We concluded that there was nothing unreasonable in the
statute's method of serving its purpose given the direct
relationship between the registration of sex offenders and the
protection of children. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d  at 391. Accordingly, the
statute satisfied the requirements of substantive due process.
Adams, 144 Ill. 2d  at 391.
	Subsequently, we upheld a constitutional challenge to the
Notification Law. See People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 430
(2000). In Malchow, we held that the purpose of the Notification
Law, like the Registration Act, was the protection of the public
from sex offenders. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d  at 420.
	In the context of a 12-year-old sex offender, the public interest
to be served by the Registration Act remains unchanged. The
public interest is to assist law enforcement in the protection of the
public from juvenile sex offenders. The Registration Act as
applied to a 12-year-old child serves that public interest by
providing police officers ready access to information on known
juvenile sex offenders.
	J.W. acknowledges that the public interest the Registration
Act is intended to serve is the protection of the public from sex
offenders. J.W. argues, however, that in contrast to an adult
offender or even a juvenile that could be charged and tried as an
adult, requiring a 12-year-old child to register as a sex offender for
the rest of his life is not a reasonable method of accomplishing the
objective of protecting the public. J.W. observes that juveniles
traditionally have been viewed as less culpable than adults and as
more amenable to rehabilitation and treatment. J.W. argues that
imposing a lifetime registration requirement on a 12-year-old child
is at odds with the purpose and policy of the Juvenile Court Act
(705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2000)).
	J.W. maintains that it is not reasonable to hold a child that has
been treated in the juvenile court system, and could only be treated
in the juvenile court system, to an adult standard of reporting and
registration for the rest of his life. J.W. observes that among the
purposes and policies of the Juvenile Court Act are the protection
and the rehabilitation of minors. J.W. also cites In re Nicholas K.,
which in finding that juvenile sex offenders are not required to
register, concluded that requiring a delinquent juvenile to register
as a sex offender is inconsistent with the purposes of the Juvenile
Court Act. In re Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 500. The Nicholas
K. court observed that the overriding purpose of the Juvenile Court
Act is to promote the minor's best interest and to correct, not
punish. In re Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 500-01.
	It is true that one of the purposes of the Juvenile Court Act is
the rehabilitation of the minor. See 705 ILCS 405/5-101(1)(c)
(West 2000). However, effective January 1, 1999, the purpose and
policy section of the Juvenile Court Act was amended to provide,
in pertinent part:
			"It is the intent of the General Assembly to promote a
juvenile justice system capable of dealing with the
problem of juvenile delinquency, a system that will
protect the community, impose accountability for
violations of law and equip juvenile offenders with
competencies to live responsibly and productively. To
effectuate this intent, the General Assembly declares the
following to be important purposes of this Article:
				(a) To protect citizens from juvenile crime.
				(b) To hold each juvenile offender directly
accountable for his or her acts." 705 ILCS
405/5-101(1)(a), (1)(b) (West 2000).
	This court has recognized that the amendments to the purpose
and policy section of the Juvenile Court Act represent a
fundamental shift from the singular goal of rehabilitation to
include the overriding concerns of protecting the public and of
holding juveniles accountable for violations of the law. In re A.G.,
195 Ill. 2d 313, 317 (2001). Indeed, confronted with a similar
issue, the Supreme Court of Delaware recognized:
			"[A]lthough we are aware that the juvenile justice
system places emphasis on the best interests of the child,
sex offenders of any age present unique problems. The
General Assembly enacted the Sex Offender Registration
Statute in an effort to protect society from both the adult
and the youthful sex offender." Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1079 (Del. 2001).
	Given the shift in the purpose and policy of the Juvenile Court
Act to include the protection of the public from juvenile crime and
holding juveniles accountable, as well as the serious problems
presented by juvenile sex offenders, we find no merit to J.W.'s
claim that requiring him to register as a sex offender for life is at
odds with the purpose and policy of the Juvenile Court Act.
	Nonetheless, in support of his claim that the registration of a
12-year-old sex offender is not reasonable, J.W. also contends that
there are other less offensive but equally effective means of
protecting the public from juvenile sex offenders. For example,
J.W. notes that even though he could not be subject to
incarceration for more than 30 days due to his age (see 705 ILCS
405/5-710(1)(b) (West 2000)), his probationary period must be at
least five years (see 705 ILCS 405/5-715(1) (West 2000)). In
addition, J.W. observes that a trial court may impose conditions of
probation, including that: the minor obtain therapy and treatment;
the minor's contact with his or her victims and other children be
limited or prohibited; the minor be subject to a period of home
confinement; and the minor's parents be subject to monitoring or
supervisory conditions. See 705 ILCS 405/5-715(2), 5-110 (West
2000).
	 J.W. concedes that the considerations at issue might be
different if the registration was for a limited period of time, if
dissemination of the information was limited in scope, or if the
minor could be and was treated as an adult for purposes of
criminal prosecution. In advancing this argument, J.W. reads the
Notification Law as allowing the public unlimited access to
information concerning juvenile sex offenders, including access
via the Internet. J.W. maintains that requiring a 12-year-old child
to register for the rest of his life as a sex offender and allowing the
general public unfettered access to identifying information about
that child is not a reasonable means of accomplishing the
legislature's goal of protecting the public and is offensive to this
country's fundamental precepts of justice.
	We first observe that contrary to J.W.'s claim that the
Notification Law gives the general public "immediate, unlimited,
and permanent access to identifying information about him," the
Notification Law actually strictly limits the availability of
information with regard to juvenile sex offenders. Specifically, the
Notification Law provides:
			"The Department of State Police and any law
enforcement agency having jurisdiction may, in the
Department's or agency's discretion, provide the
information specified in subsection (b) [i.e., offender's
name, address, date of birth, offense], with respect to a
juvenile sex offender, to any person when that person's
safety may be compromised for some reason related to the
juvenile sex offender." 730 ILCS 152/120(e) (West 2000).
	Consequently, information concerning a juvenile sex offender
may be disseminated to a member of the public only if that
person's safety might be compromised for some reason and only
in the appropriate agency's or department's discretion.(3)
Information concerning juvenile sex offenders is not available
over the Internet. We find, therefore, that the extremely limited
dissemination of information concerning juvenile sex offenders
supports a finding that the registration of juvenile sex offenders is
a reasonable means of protecting the public.
	In addition, although J.W. suggests alternate means of
accomplishing the legislature's objective in this case, it is well
settled that the rational basis test does not require that the statute
be the best means of accomplishing the legislature's objectives.
People ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 117, 124 (1998). It
is best left to the legislature and not the courts to determine
whether a statute is wise or whether it is the best means to achieve
the desired result. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d  at 124. If there is any
conceivable basis for finding a rational relationship, the statute
will be upheld. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d  at 124.
	With the foregoing principles in mind, we must reject J.W.'s
claim that the statute at issue violates substantive due process.
Clearly there is a rational relationship between the registration of
juvenile sex offenders and the protection of the public from such
offenders. Requiring the registration of juvenile sex offenders,
even where the offender is only 12 years old and the duration of
registration is for life, is reasonable in light of the strict limits
placed upon access to that information. Whether there are better
means to achieve this result, such as limiting the duration of
registration for all juvenile sex offenders including juvenile sexual
predators, is a matter better left to the legislature.
	As a final matter, we note that the amici assert that the
lifetime registration and the notification requirements violate
procedural due process under the Illinois and United States
Constitutions. J.W., however, has not raised a procedural due
process claim and in fact expressly stated that he was not
challenging the Registration Act and the Notification Law on
procedural due process grounds. Amici also claim that enforcement
of the registration and notification requirements violate state and
federal constitutionally protected privacy interests. Neither the
State nor J.W., however, has raised a privacy issue in his brief to
this court.
	An amicus curiae is not a party to an action but rather is a
"friend" of the court. People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 234 (1991).
Consequently, the sole function of an amicus is to advise or make
suggestions to the court. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d  at 234. An amicus takes
the case as he finds it, with the issues as framed by the parties.
P.H., 145 Ill. 2d  at 234. This court need not pass on grounds of
invalidity solely urged by an amicus. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d  at 234;
accord Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268, 281 (1996).
Consequently, we decline to address the procedural due process
and privacy issues raised by the amici.
	J.W. next contends that requiring a 12-year-old child to
register as a sex offender and allowing the public access to
information concerning juvenile sex offenders violates the eighth
amendment and the proscription against double jeopardy. The
State argues that J.W. has waived this issue, noting that J.W. did
not raise this issue in the trial court or the appellate court, nor did
he raise this issue in his petition for leave to appeal to this court.
	The State is correct that J.W. did not raise these constitutional
challenges in the trial court or the appellate court or in his petition
for leave to appeal. As noted, however, a constitutional challenge
to a criminal statute can be raised at any time. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 
at 454. Accordingly, we find that waiver does not bar
consideration of these issues.
	J.W. concedes that this court has held that the Registration
Act and the Notification Law are not punitive and therefore do not
violate the eighth amendment. See People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413 (2000). J.W. distinguishes Malchow, however, on the ground
that the defendant in Malchow was an adult, and on the ground
that the version of the Notification Law at issue in Malchow
provided for limited dissemination of the information in question,
while the current version of the Notification Law provides that
anyone can access information on registered sex offenders at any
time, including through the Internet.
	We first address the claim that the Notification Law
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because it allows for
unlimited dissemination of information concerning juvenile sex
offenders. Both J.W. and the amici read the amendments to the
Notification Law as providing for dissemination of information
concerning juvenile sex offenders to anyone with access to the
Internet. J.W. and amici argue that providing such information
over the Internet without restriction clearly is punitive when the
sex offender is a 12-year-old boy.
	As discussed above, however, J.W. and amici are reading the
Notification Law incorrectly. The Notification Law specifically
addresses juvenile sex offenders and provides that information
concerning juvenile sex offenders is not available on the Internet
and public access to information concerning juvenile sex offenders
is limited to those whose safety might be compromised for some
reason related to the juvenile sex offender. See 730 ILCS
152/120(e) (West 2000). In fact, the debates concerning House
Bill 2721 reflect the limited dissemination of information
concerning juvenile sex offenders. House Bill 2721 amended the
Notification Law as well as the Registration Act to include
juvenile sex offenders. In discussing the registration of juvenile
sex offenders, Representative Klingler observed that "Notification,
however, is limited to schools and when public safety is at risk
then the juveniles would not be on the Internet." 91st Ill. Gen.
Assem., House Proceedings, March 10, 1999, at 143 (statements
of Representative Klingler).
	Public information concerning juvenile sex offenders thus is
much more restricted than information concerning adult sex
offenders. Given that the dissemination of information concerning
juvenile sex offenders is even narrower than the dissemination of
information at issue in Malchow, we disagree with J.W. that
Malchow is distinguishable and is not binding precedent.
	With regard to the fact that the defendant in Malchow was an
adult, J.W. analogizes the lifetime registration requirement in this
case to the imposition of the death penalty and observes that the
imposition of the death penalty on a child under the age of 16
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
	We find no merit to this argument. There is no question that
the death penalty is a punishment. In Malchow and Adams,
however, this court rejected claims that the Registration Act and
the Notification Law constitute punishment. We are not persuaded
that requiring a juvenile sex offender to register and allowing very
limited public access to notification concerning the juvenile's
status as a sex offender compels a different result. See In re Ayres,
239 Mich. App. 8, 608 N.W.2d 132 (1999) (given strict statutory
safeguards protecting confidentiality of juvenile sex offenders,
registration act as applied to juveniles neither punishes juvenile
nor offends premise that a reformed adult should not have to carry
stigma of youthful offense). We therefore reject J.W.'s claim that
the Registration Act and Notification Law as applied to juvenile
sex offenders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
	As the State observes, J.W.'s argument that requiring him to
register as a sex offender violates the proscription against double
jeopardy is based on his claim that the registration requirement
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Because we hold that
the registration requirement does not constitute punishment,
J.W.'s double jeopardy argument likewise must fail. See Malchow,
193 Ill. 2d  at 426 (given holding that Registration Act and
Notification Law are not punitive, defendant's claim that those
statutes violate double jeopardy also must fail).
	J.W.'s final argument is that the trial court's condition that he
not reside in or enter South Elgin during the term of his probation
is overly broad, unreasonable, and violates J.W.'s constitutional
rights. J.W. claims that banishing a 12-year-old child from the
entire town in which he and his family resided is not reasonably
related to the goals of rehabilitating the minor or protecting the
public. J.W. concedes that the Juvenile Court Act allows the trial
court to impose, as a condition of a minor's probation, the
requirement that the minor refrain from entering a specific
geographic area (see 705 ILCS 405/5-715(2)(r) (West 2000)), but
argues that the condition here which provides for no circumstances
under which J.W. can be present in South Elgin is too broad.
	Section 5-715(2)(r) of the Juvenile Court Act provides:
			"(2) The court may as a condition of probation or of
conditional discharge require that the minor:
* * *
				(r) refrain from entering into a designated
geographic area except upon terms as the court finds
appropriate. The terms may include consideration of
the purpose of the entry, the time of day, other persons
accompanying the minor, and advance approval by a
probation officer, if the minor has been placed on
probation, or advance approval by the court, if the
minor has been placed on conditional discharge."
(Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-715(2)(r) (West
2000).
	Thus, the Juvenile Court Act allows a court to impose, as a
condition of probation, certain restrictions on a minor's ability to
be present within a designated geographical area if the court
includes terms whereby the probationer can enter the restricted
area for legitimate purposes. The order in the case at bar, however,
goes further-it prohibits J.W. from residing in his own home in the
community where he had been living with his family. Moreover,
the order banishes J.W. from the Village of South Elgin without
providing any terms or exceptions to its application. Accordingly,
J.W. is prohibited, as a condition of probation, from entering
South Elgin for any purpose. Consequently, the condition of
probation imposed on J.W. in the case at bar is not one which is
explicitly provided for by statute.
	Although the banishment condition of probation is not
expressly provided for by statute, it may, nonetheless, be a
constitutionally valid condition of probation. It has been
recognized that courts have broad discretion to impose probation
conditions, whether expressly allowed by statute or not, to achieve
the goals of fostering rehabilitation and protecting the public. See
People v. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997); People v. Harris,
238 Ill. App. 3d 575, 581 (1992). Of course, the wide latitude
given to courts in setting conditions of probation is not boundless.
Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 580. The court's discretion is limited by
constitutional safeguards and must be exercised in a reasonable
manner. Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 581. "The constitutional
safeguards, which circumscribe a trial court's exercise of its
discretion to impose conditions, are the basic constitutional rights
of the probationer." Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 581-82.
	 In People v. Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d 456, 460 (1989), it was
recognized that probation conditions which impose geographic
restrictions on travel implicate liberty interests. Reference was
made in Pickens to People v. Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d 612, 621-22, 195 Cal. Rptr. 381, 386-87 (1983), wherein the court held:
		" 'A probationer has the right to enjoy a significant degree
of privacy, or liberty, under the Fourth, Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution
[citations].' [Citation.]
			 A citizen has a basic constitutional right to intrastate as
well as interstate travel. [Citation.] Many other
fundamental rights such as free speech, free assembly and
free association are often tied in with the right to travel.
[Citation.] The right to acquire, own, enjoy and dispose of
property is also a basic fundamental right guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. [Citation.]"
	Although the condition of probation imposed on J.W. in the
case at bar-barring J.W. from residing in or going to South
Elgin-implicates his constitutional rights, a condition of probation
which impinges on fundamental constitutional rights is not
automatically deemed invalid. Even fundamental constitutional
rights are not absolute and may be reasonably restricted in the
public interest. City of Chicago v. Morales, 177 Ill. 2d 440, 460
(1997) (personal liberties are not absolute and only governmental
actions which intrude upon personal liberties arbitrarily or in an
utterly unreasonable manner violate the due process clause);
Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 582; Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d  at 622,
195 Cal. Rptr.  at 387. Thus, when deciding the propriety of a
condition of probation imposed in a particular case, whether
explicitly statutory or not, the overriding concern is
reasonableness. In re M.P., 297 Ill. App. 3d 972, 976 (1998);
People v. Ferrell, 277 Ill. App. 3d 74, 79 (1995). To be
reasonable, a condition of probation must not be overly broad
when viewed in the light of the desired goal or the means to that
end. In re J.G., 295 Ill. App. 3d 840, 843 (1998). In other words,
" '[w]here a condition of probation requires a waiver of precious
constitutional rights, the condition must be narrowly drawn; to the
extent it is overbroad it is not reasonably related to the compelling
state interest in reformation and rehabilitation and is an
unconstitutional restriction on the exercise of fundamental
constitutional rights.' " (Emphasis omitted.) In re White, 97 Cal. App. 3d 141, 146, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 565-66 (1979), quoting
People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 768, 488 P.2d 630, 635, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 307 (1971).
	When assessing the reasonableness of a condition of
probation it is appropriate to consider whether the restriction is
related to the nature of the offense or the rehabilitation of the
probationer. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d  at 378; Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d at
460. Other considerations are: (1) whether the condition of
probation reasonably relates to the rehabilitative purpose of the
legislation, (2) whether the value to the public in imposing this
condition of probation manifestly outweighs the impairment to the
probationer's constitutional rights, and (3) whether there are any
alternative means that are less subversive to the probationer's
constitutional rights, but still comport with the purposes of
conferring the benefit of probation. Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 582;
In re J.G., 295 Ill. App. 3d at 843.
	In the case at bar, the requirement that J.W. not reside in
South Elgin is severe. At the time the condition was imposed, the
family residence was located in South Elgin and the restriction
prevented J.W. from living with his parents until they sold the
home and moved to another community. In a California case,
People v. Beach, a banishment order which required an elderly
woman to vacate the home she had owned and lived in for 24
years was held invalid. Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d  at 622, 195 Cal. Rptr.  at 387. The court found that the banishment served no valid
purpose, stating:
			"[T]he value to the public does not manifestly outweigh
any impairment of appellant's constitutional rights of
freedom of travel, speech, association, assembly and to
the possession and enjoyment of her property. Simply
causing appellant to move from one geographical area to
another is of minimal value to the public when compared
with the infringement of appellant's basic constitutional
rights." Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d  at 623, 195 Cal. Rptr.  at
387.
	The Beach court, when considering whether the banishment
order would promote the probationer's rehabilitation, found that
the condition might cause more damage due to the psychological
stress that would be associated with such a move. Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d  at 622, 195 Cal. Rptr.  at 387. Further, the Beach court
held that there were less subversive means that the court could
utilize to accomplish its goals.
	The situation in Beach is distinguishable from the case at bar.
Here, despite the harshness of the residency restriction, it is a
reasonable condition of probation. Clearly, this condition is related
to the offenses. The victims of the sexual assaults for which J.W.
was adjudicated delinquent were children living in J.W.'s
neighborhood. Further, due to the nature of the offenses and the
hostile public sentiment they engendered, removing J.W. from the
location where the offenses took place would be in his best interest
and a benefit not only to his rehabilitation, but to the rehabilitation
of his victims. In addition, the harshness of the residency
restriction in the case at bar is tempered to a large degree by the
fact that J.W.'s family expressed a willingness to move out of the
community. From the record it appears that the court's order that
J.W. not reside in South Elgin was not so much a restriction
imposed by the court as it was an affirmation of the parent's
expressed intent to leave the community. For all of these reasons,
barring J.W. from residing in South Elgin is a constitutionally
valid condition of probation and not unreasonable.
	At the same time, however, banishing J.W. from entering
South Elgin for any purpose is a condition of probation which is
not narrowly drawn and, thus, an unconstitutionally overbroad
restriction on J.W.'s exercise of his fundamental rights.
	As noted earlier, a condition of probation is constitutionally
valid if it is reasonable. However, a restriction on a probationer's
travel into a specified geographic area is reasonable and not
unconstitutionally overbroad only if (1) there is a valid purpose for
the restriction, and (2) there is a means by which the probationer
may obtain exemption from the restriction for legitimate purposes.
In People v. Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d 456 (1989), our appellate
court held:
		"A court may, as a condition of probation or other
sentence short of incarceration, bar a defendant from
certain areas if the penalty is reasonably related to the
offense, provided that, if the defendant has a legitimate
and compelling reason to go to that area or place, he may
apply to a specified authority for specific permission, as
here to the probation officer.
			We find the proviso to the condition imposed,
permitting the defendant to obtain specific written
permission from her probation officer to enter the
restricted area if she had a legitimate reason to go there,
removes the taint of banishment from the restriction and
substitutes in its stead supervised guidance for permissive
entry to the area." (Emphasis in original.) Pickens, 186 Ill.
App. 3d at 461-62.
	In the present case, banishing J.W. from going to South Elgin
was a condition imposed in an attempt to minimize the possibility
of J.W.'s contact with his victims. While this serves as a valid
purpose for the restriction, the limitation imposed in the case at bar
is too broad because it fails to make any provision for J.W. to
enter the area for legitimate purposes.
	Section 5-715(2)(r) of the Juvenile Court Act authorizes the
court, as a condition of probation, to require a juvenile to "refrain
from entering into a designated geographic area except upon terms
as the court finds appropriate." (Emphasis added.) This language
of the statute mirrors the constitutional requirement that the
condition of probation be narrowly drawn. For this reason, the trial
court, by failing to strictly conform the condition of probation to
the requirements of the statute, imposed an overly broad and
unconstitutional condition of probation. We therefore vacate the
portion of the trial court's order of probation imposing the
banishment condition as written, and remand the cause so that the
court may consider whether the geographic travel restriction is still
warranted and, if so, what appropriate terms for entering the
geographic area should be applied.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court,
affirming the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County, is
affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part and
vacated in part;
 cause remanded.
	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	In the case at bar, this court upholds the constitutionality of
the Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS
150/1 et seq. (West 2000)), which requires 12-year-old J.W., who
was adjudicated delinquent on two counts of aggravated criminal
sexual assault, to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life.
Although I believe this ruling to be legally correct, I write
separately to express my concern over the harshness of this
lifetime reporting requirement.
	J.W. contends that imposing a lifetime registration
requirement on juveniles, especially juveniles under the age of 13,
violates substantive due process and the proscription against
double jeopardy, and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the eighth amendment to the United States
Constitution.
	While I agree with the court that the registration requirements
mandated by the plain language of the Registration Act are
constitutionally valid, I recognize a certain tension between a
lifetime reporting requirement and the philosophical
underpinnings of our juvenile justice system.
	According to the provisions of our Juvenile Court Act, a
minor under the age of 13 can never be prosecuted under the
criminal laws of this State, nor can a minor under the age of 13 be
the subject of an extended juvenile prosecution. 705 ILCS
405/5-130, 5-805, 5-810 (West 2000). In my view, these
provisions reflect a legislative understanding that children under
the age of 13, no matter how serious the offense charged, "simply
are too immature as a matter of law to be tried as an adult." In re
Registrant J.G., 169 N.J. 304, 325, 777 A.2d 891, 904 (2001).
Children under the age of 13 have a diminished capacity to form
criminal intent. It seems incongruous, then, to make no distinction
in the treatment of juveniles under the age of 13 for purposes of
the Registration Act.
	I observe that, while all 50 states have adopted sex offender
registration and community notification laws, often referred to as
Megan's Laws (see State v. Misiorski, 250 Conn. 280, 292, 738 A.2d 595, 601-02 (1999) (providing historical explanation of
Megan's Laws and their adoption throughout the country)), the
implementation of these laws, particularly with respect to
juveniles, varies greatly from state to state. Some states do not
expressly include juveniles in their law (see, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann.
§775.21 (West 2000)), while others include only those juveniles
who have been tried and convicted as adults (see, e.g., Del. Code
Ann. tit. 11, §4121(a)(4)(b) (Supp. 2000)). In some instances,
although registration requirements are made applicable to
juveniles, the burden has been ameliorated by various means: by
making a jury trial a condition precedent to juvenile registration,
allowing the juvenile court the discretion to waive the registration
requirement, providing that the duty to register will terminate at a
certain age or by allowing the juvenile to petition for termination
of the registration duty upon a clear showing that the juvenile has
not reoffended and that registration is no longer necessary to
protect the public.
	I recognize that the laws in other jurisdictions which limit
registration and notification requirements with respect to juveniles
are the result of policy determinations made by the governing
bodies of those states. I further recognize that the authority to
determine appropriate public policy for this state is vested in our
legislature and not with this court. Thus, barring a constitutional
violation, this court is constrained to uphold the registration and
notification laws of this state as written.
	In the case at bar, this court holds that the requirements of the
Registration Act apply equally to adults and juveniles and that our
constitutional safeguards do not prevent the Registration Act's
lifetime registration provisions from being applied to minors of all
ages. While I am compelled to agree with this determination, I,
nevertheless, invite the legislature to reconsider the wisdom of
imposing such a burden on juveniles, particularly juveniles under
the age of 13. The public safety concerns which animate the
registration and notification laws should be harmonized with our
traditional understanding of the need to protect and rehabilitate the
young citizens of this state.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this special concurrence.
	I concur in the majority's holding that the condition of
probation barring J.W. from going to South Elgin fails to conform
strictly to the requirements of the statute and is an overly broad
and unconstitutional condition of probation. Although I agree with
the majority that adjudicated juvenile delinquent sex offenders are
required to register as sex offenders, I respectfully dissent in part
because I disagree with the majority's interpretation of the Illinois
Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS 150/1
et seq. (West 2000)) as requiring J.W. to register as a sexual
predator for the rest of his life. Moreover, I believe that an
interpretation requiring a 12-year-old child to register as a sexual
predator for the rest of his natural life offends principles of
substantive due process. Finally, I dissent because of the
majority's unnecessary factual description of the sexual conduct
between J.W. and the minor victims.
	The primary purpose of statutory construction is to determine
and give effect to the legislature's intent, while presuming the
legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust
results. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 418-19 (2001). The best
indication of legislative intent is the language of the statute. In re
D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000). If the language of the statute is clear
and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to other aids of
construction. D.L., 191 Ill. 2d  at 9. A statute is ambiguous if it is
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 543 (1997). In ascertaining legislative intent, it is
proper to compare statutes that concern the same subject matter
and to consider statutes on related subjects. See Anderson v. City
of Park Ridge, 396 Ill. 235, 244 (1947).
	The parties disagree on the interpretation of the Registration
Act as applied to juvenile sex offenders and acknowledge that the
Registration Act is subject to differing reasonable interpretations.
A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by
reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses.
People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282, 288 (1994). Here, the
Registration Act is clearly subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation and is thus ambiguous. See B.C., 176 Ill. 2d  at 543
(a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation). Accordingly, we must employ aids of statutory
construction to determine legislative intent, while avoiding absurd,
inconvenient, or unjust results. See D.D., 196 Ill. 2d  at 418-19.
	The legislature created two categories of sex offenders.
Section 2(A) of the Registration Act defines a "sex offender" and
section 2(E) defines a "sexual predator." Section 2(A-5) defines
"juvenile sex offender." An adjudicated juvenile delinquent sex
offender is a specific type of sex offender. In fact, the recent
amendments to the Registration Act deleting the "juvenile sex
offender" definition section 2(A-5) and adding a subsection (5) to
section 2(A) supports the inference that the legislature intended
adjudicated juvenile delinquent sex offenders to be a specific
category of sex offender. See Pub. Act 92-828, eff. August 22,
2002 (amending 730 ILCS 150/2, 3, 4, 5, 5-5, 6, 7, 8-5, 10 (West
2000)).
	Nonetheless, I agree with the majority that J.W. falls within
the definition of a "sex offender" because he was adjudicated a
juvenile delinquent as a result of committing aggravated criminal
sexual assault, an offense specified in section 2(B) of the
Registration Act. I disagree, however, with the majority that a
juvenile sex offender can be classified as a "sexual predator."
	A reading of section 2(A-5) of the Registration Act and
section 105 of the Sex Offender and Child Murder Community
Notification Law (Notification Law), together with section 2(E) of
the Registration Act, makes it clear that a "juvenile sex offender"
cannot be classified as a sexual predator. Both sections 2(A-5) of
the Registration Act and 105 of the Notification Law specifically
define a "juvenile sex offender" as one who commits any of the
offenses specified in items "(B), (C), or (C-5)" of the Registration
Act, and neither definition makes any reference to item (E) of the
Registration Act that would result in the classification as a
"juvenile sexual predator."
	Section 2(E), on the other hand, specifically defines a "sexual
predator" as one who is convicted of any of the offenses specified
in items (1), (2), or (5) of section 2(E), or certified as a sexually
dangerous person, or found to be a sexually violent person. 730
ILCS 150/2(E)(1), (E)(2), (E)(3), (E)(4), (E)(5) (West 2000).
Section 2(E) contains no reference to section 2(A-5) or any
indication that a "juvenile sex offender" may also be classified as
a "sexual predator." In fact, there are absolutely no references to
juveniles as "sexual predators" in either the Registration Act or the
Notification Law.
	Moreover, although the term "convicted" is given the same
meaning as "adjudicated" for purposes of section 2(A), section
2(E) contains no similar pronouncement. Based upon section
2(E)'s silence on adjudications, the legislature must have intended
that the term "sexual predator" apply only to persons who have
actually been "convicted" in adult court of a specified offense.
	Any other interpretation leads to unjust and absurd results. For
instance, the majority's interpretation would subject so called
"juvenile sexual predators" of any age to such reporting
requirements, while a sex offender or a sexual predator who is
convicted of first degree murder of a child must be at least 17
years of age to be subject to lifetime reporting requirements. See
730 ILCS 150/2(C-5), (E)(2) (West 2000). The legislature surely
did not intend consequences so inconsistent with reason, logic, and
common sense.
	Equally important, the State never has contended that and,
indeed, it concedes in its brief that J.W. should not be required to
register as a "sexual predator" and that his registration is limited
to a period of 10 years. The State itself expresses concerns over
the propriety of requiring a 12-year-old child to register as a sex
offender for the rest of his life, remarking that,
		"As a sex offender, the registration of the minor is limited
to 10 years. A 10-year requirement *** strikes a fair
balance between Respondent's desire for a limited
registration time and the People's concerns for protecting
the public."
The State further acknowledges in its brief that the trial court
ordered J.W. to register as a "sex offender," not as a "sexual
predator." The State also acknowledges that the appellate court
mistakenly determined, sua sponte, that J.W. must register as a
"sexual predator."
	J.W. was not convicted as an adult in a criminal court and
cannot be treated as an adult in every aspect of sex offender
registration and community notification. Juveniles convicted as
adults are classified as either "sex offenders" or "sexual predators"
based upon their specific convictions. Such convictions are
founded on determinations of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
subject to the protections of the fourth, fifth, and sixth
amendments to our federal constitution. However, under the
majority's statutory interpretation, a juvenile who was not treated
as an adult in criminal court but was adjudicated a juvenile
delinquent sex offender in juvenile court cannot have the
advantage of such protections. While some registration
requirements such as the 10-year limitation may be justified, a
juvenile delinquent sex offender can only be classified as a "sex
offender" and cannot be classified as a "sexual predator."
	This statutory interpretation is consistent with current practice
and the official guides that are widely disseminated by the Illinois
State Police. See A Guide to Sex Offender Registration in Illinois,
Prepared for: Illinois Criminal Justice Agencies, at 6, 31, 33
(October 1, 2002) ("Adjudicated juvenile delinquent sex offenders
are required to register effective July 1, 1999. Adjudicated juvenile
delinquent sex offenders are not predators" (emphasis added) and
"[a]djudicated juvenile delinquent sex offenders cannot be
classified as sexual predators (emphasis in original)"); see also A
Guide to Sex Offender and Child Murder Community Notification
Law in Illinois, Prepared for: Illinois Criminal Justice Agencies
(October 1, 2002).
	This interpretation of the statute is also consistent with the
fact that juveniles who engage in sexually inappropriate behavior
do not necessarily pose a long-term risk of reoffending. "In many
instances, sexually improper behavior by such young children
[under age 14] is more a reflection of inadequate adult
supervision, immaturity, inappropriate media exposure, or a prior
history of emotional abuse than it is of irremediable sexually
predatory inclinations." In re Registrant J.G., 169 N.J. 304, 340,
777 A.2d 891, 913-14 (2001). Accordingly, I believe that while the
trial court properly ordered J.W. to register as a juvenile sex
offender, this registration requirement is limited to 10 years from
the date of adjudication.
	I agree with the majority that information concerning J.W.
cannot be disseminated to the public, placed on the Internet, or
made available to the public except when public safety is
threatened. The majority does not make clear, however, that for
purposes of community notification, the adjudicated juvenile
delinquent sex offender should continue to be treated as a juvenile,
even though he or she reaches the age of 18.
	I further disagree with the majority's analysis that subjecting
a 12-year-old child to lifetime registration requirements as a
"sexual predator" comports with principles of substantive due
process. To comply with substantive due process, a statute must
bear a reasonable relationship to a public interest to be served, and
the means adopted must be a reasonable method of accomplishing
the desired objective. People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 390
(1991).
	In Adams, this court found that the State has an interest in
protecting the public from sexual offenders and that the
Registration Act bears a reasonable relationship to that interest.
Adams, 144 Ill. 2d  at 391. However, in Adams, this court only
reviewed the registration requirements in the adult context. The
majority fails to acknowledge that adjudicated juvenile delinquent
sex offenders do not enjoy the same panoply of rights and
safeguards as adults and juveniles prosecuted as adults in criminal
court. Requiring a 12-year-old child to register as a sexual predator
for the rest of his life is an unreasonable means of furthering the
State's interest. The majority misses this obvious conclusion and,
unfortunately, ignores the State's concession of that point.
	Although this court has recognized that recent amendments to
the Juvenile Court Act have resulted in juvenile proceedings that
are "similar" to adult criminal proceedings (In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 317-19 (2001)), there remain fundamental differences
between the juvenile and criminal justice systems that militate
against holding a 12-year-old child to an adult standard of
registration and reporting for the rest of his life. Children have
lesser levels of maturity and, because of their corresponding
inability to control their behavior or to comprehend fully the
consequences of their actions, their criminal acts are generally
considered less culpable than those of an adult, and they are seen
as more amenable to treatment and rehabilitation. Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835, 101 L. Ed. 2d 702, 718-19, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2698-99 (1988) (plurality op.). In fact, the Juvenile
Court Act of 1987 distinguishes between juveniles over and under
the age of 13. Under the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act, a
juvenile court judge may enter an order permitting a minor 13
years of age or older to be prosecuted under the criminal laws of
the state if the judge finds "that it is not in the best interests of the
public to proceed under this Act." 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(a)
(West 2000). There is no similar provision for the transfer of
minors under the age of 13. "It is clear that the purpose of a
transfer proceeding is to balance the best interests of a juvenile
offender, particularly as the offender's interests relate to his
potential for rehabilitation, against society's legitimate interest in
being protected from criminal victimization perpetrated by
minors." People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 424-25 (2001). The
transfer provisions of the Juvenile Court Act reflect a clear
legislative determination that a child under the age of 13 is simply
too immature as a matter of law to be tried as an adult, no matter
how serious the offense.
	It is indisputable that J.W. could not have been prosecuted as
an adult for his conduct. To treat him as an adult by requiring him
to comply with lifetime registration requirements cannot seriously
be considered a "reasonable" means of furthering the state's
interest. I can conceive of no legitimate rationale for subjecting a
juvenile delinquent under the age of 13 to lifetime registration
requirements. Accordingly, I believe that subjecting juvenile
delinquents to a lifetime registration requirement violates
principles of substantive due process as it is an unreasonable
method of accomplishing the state's desired objective, and is
therefore unconstitutional as applied to juvenile delinquents. See
Adams, 144 Ill. 2d  at 390 (to comply with substantive due process,
a statute must bear a reasonable relationship to a public interest to
be served, and the means adopted must be a reasonable method of
accomplishing the desired objective).
	This court now puts juveniles, regardless of age, on equal
footing with their adult counterparts without affording them equal
constitutional rights and protections. After today's decision,
children under the age of 12 who are adjudicated of certain sex
offenses will be forever labeled as "sexual predators" and
subjected to lifetime registration requirements.
	Finally, I am troubled by the majority's detailed description
of the sexual conduct between J.W. and his victims, including
identifying the minor victims by initials. This court should be
especially sensitive to protecting the identity of the juveniles and
respecting the privacy of the juvenile victims. It is apparent from
the record that many people in the community of South Elgin
already know the identity of J.W. and his involvement in sexual
conduct with other juveniles, but these people may not have
known the identity of the victims or the exact nature of the sexual
conduct. Given that J.W. pled guilty, such specific and graphic
details are unnecessary to the disposition of this case and are, in
my opinion, inappropriate.
	For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
	 
	 
	 
1.      1We note that the legislature recently amended the Registration Act
to delete the separate definition of "juvenile sex offender" and to
specifically provide that a "sex offender" means any person who is
"adjudicated a juvenile delinquent as the result of committing or
attempting to commit" certain specified acts, including aggravated
criminal sexual assault. Pub Act 92-828, eff. August 22, 2002 (adding
730 ILCS 150/2(A)(5)).

2.      2The recent amendments to the Registration Act also added the
requirement that a sex offender as defined in section 2 or a sexual
predator shall provide the Department of State Police with accurate
information when registering, including information concerning his
"school attended." Pub. Act 92-828, eff. August 22, 2002 (amending
730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West 2000)). A sex offender or sexual predator
further is required to register with the chief of police in each of the
municipalities in which he or she attends school and with the sheriff in
each of the counties in which he attends school. Pub. Act 92-828, eff.
August 22, 2002 (amending 730 ILCS 150/3(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2000)).

3.      3Section 120 of the Notification Law recently was amended to clarify
that "The Department of State Police and any law enforcement agency
having jurisdiction may, in the Department's or agency's discretion,
only provide the information specified in subsection (b), with respect to
an adjudicated juvenile delinquent, to any person when that person's
safety may be compromised for some reason related to the juvenile sex
offender." Pub. Act 92-828, eff. August 22, 2002 (amending 730 ILCS
152/120(e) (West Supp. 2001)).