Case Title: TUFFY'S, INC. v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 105705

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2009-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
TUFFY'S, INC. v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY  TUFFY'S, INC. v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY 2009 OK 4 212 P.3d 1158 Case Number: 105705 Decided: 01/20/2009 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA TUFFY'S, INC., an Oklahoma Corporation, and ELLEN CUNNINGHAM, president/owner of Tuffy's Corporation, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. THE CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, a municipal corporation, Defendant/Appellee, CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION III Honorable Barbara G. Swinton, Trial Judge ¶0 On November 9, 2007, Tuffy's, Inc. and its president, Ellen Cunningham, (collectively, the appellants) brought an action against the City of Oklahoma City (the City) seeking damages for negligence and tortious interference with a business relationship. The appellants' claims arose from an incident at a nightclub owned by the appellants. The appellants allege that Oklahoma City police officers entered the nightclub in an attempt to remove the customers and, using mace and dogs, attacked, harassed, and assaulted customers. The City moved to dismiss, arguing that: 1) the appellants lack standing; 2) under the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA), the City can not be liable for tortious interference with a business relationship; and 3) under the GTCA, the City is exempt from liability for a claim arising from the enforcement of a law. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. On certiorari, we hold that: 1) the appellants have standing to bring the claim; 2) a political subdivision is immune as a matter of law from a claim of tortious interference with a business relationship committed by its employees; and 3) a municipality's immunity from liability for claims resulting from the enforcement of a law does not extend to abuses of lawful power by its police officers. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED. Ari Varshosaz, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs/Appellants. Amanda Carpenter, Richard C. Smith, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee. KAUGER, J.: ¶1 The issue presented is whether the trial court erred by granting the City of Oklahoma City's motion to dismiss. We hold that it did and remand the cause. FACTS ¶2 On November 9, 2007, Tuffy's Inc. and its president, Ellen Cunningham (collectively, the appellants) filed a petition seeking an award of actual and punitive damages against the City of Oklahoma City (the City) and the Oklahoma City Police Department (OCPD) for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and tortious interference with a business relationship. The appellants' claims arose from a November 26, 2006, incident at City Nights, a south Oklahoma City nightclub owned by the appellants. The appellants allege that police officers ". . . physically and verbally attacked, harassed, and assaulted numerous customers (and) used mace on customers and ordered their dogs to bite customers inside the building." ¶3 On December 3, 2007, the City filed two motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, ¶4 On March 7, 2008, the trial court, without discussion, entered its journal entry of judgment granting the City's motion to dismiss with prejudice. ¶5 BECAUSE THE APPELLANTS HAVE PLED A CLAIM FOR WHICH RELIEF IS LEGALLY POSSIBLE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING THE CITY'S MOTION TO DISMISS. ¶6 An order dismissing a case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is subject to de novo review. ¶7 The GTCA is the exclusive remedy for an injured plaintiff to recover against a governmental entity in tort. ¶8 The GTCA defines a "tort" as a legal wrong involving a violation of a duty imposed by general law or otherwise resulting in a loss as the proximate result of an act or omission of a political subdivision or employee acting within the scope of employment. A. The Appellants Have Standing To Bring Their Claims. ¶9 The City first argues that the appellants lack standing to bring any claim on behalf of customers and employees of City Nights because the petition does not allege that either Tuffy's Inc. or Ellen Cunningham were harassed or attacked. The appellants respond that they are not bringing an action on behalf of employees or customers, but instead are bringing an action to recover for damages sustained by the corporation and its owner. ¶10 Standing is the legal right of a litigant to challenge the conduct of another in a judicial forum. ¶11 It is clear from the pleadings that the appellants do not seek to recover on behalf of employees or customers. Instead, the appellants seek recovery for financial injury to their business based on the allegedly malicious, intentional, or negligent actions of the police officers. B. Under the GTCA, the City is Immune from Liability for Claims of Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship Committed By its Employees. ¶12 The City argues that, under the GTCA, it is immune as a matter of law from liability for any claim of tortious interference with a business relationship because bad faith is a necessary element of the tort. The appellants respond that neither malice nor bad faith is a requisite element to the cause of action, and the City is not immune from claims of tortious interference with a business relationship. ¶13 When a tort cause of action sued upon requires proof of an element that necessarily excludes good faith conduct on the part of employees, there can be no liability against a political subdivision in a suit based on the GTCA. ¶14 One has the right to prosecute a lawful business without unlawful molestation or unjustified interference from any person, and any malicious interference with that business is an unlawful act and an actionable wrong. ¶15 The appellants argue that they are not bringing a claim of malicious interference, but instead a claim of tortious interference, which they cast as a tort that requires no showing of bad faith on the part of the tortfeasor. The appellants rely on Instruction 24.1, Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction-Civil, which provides the elements of "Interference with Contract or Business Relationship." C. A Municipality's Immunity from Claims Resulting Its Employees' Enforcement of the Law Does Not Extend to Tortious Actions Committed Within the Scope of Employment. ¶16 The City addresses the appellants' negligence claim by arguing that, under the GTCA, it is not liable for any allegedly negligent acts committed by its officers because the acts were committed while the employees were in the midst of enforcing the law. The appellants respond that a litigant can maintain a negligence claim against a municipality based on the actions of a police officer who was acting within the scope of employment. Section 155(4) of the GTCA provides that a political subdivision is not liable for claims resulting from enforcement of a law. ¶17 In Nail v. City of Henrietta, ¶18 However, this general rule does not apply when the act is one which is fairly and naturally incident to the business and is done while the employee is doing employer's business. ¶19 In Decorte v. Robinson, ¶20 To construe §155(4) as providing blanket immunity to political subdivisions for any claim arising from law enforcement would not conform to established precedent. We have consistently held that a municipality is liable for the tortious acts of police officers committed within the scope of employment as defined by the GTCA. Such tortious acts include abuses of lawful power by police officers. Whether a police officer's actions were taken within the scope of employment is a jury question unless only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from the facts alleged. In the instant cause, it is a jury question concerning whether the police officers were negligent when removing customers from the nightclub and, if so, whether the officers were acting within the scope of their employment. ¶21 In order to state a claim for negligence, a litigant must show the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant to protect plaintiff from injury, a breach of the duty, and an injury to plaintiff proximately resulting from the breach. CONCLUSION ¶22 Because they are alleging financial injury to their business, the appellants have standing to bring this action. However, because the elements of tortious interference with a business relationship require a showing of bad faith, the City is immunized from such a tort claim because bad faith action is explicitly excluded from the GTCA's definition of the scope of employment. The trial court did not err by dismissing the appellants' claim for tortious interference with a business relationship. The City is not immunized from a negligence claim based on its officers' actions in the midst of law enforcement if the tortious acts were committed within the scope of employment. The trial court erred by dismissing the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief might possibly be granted. The trial court's dismissal is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED. EDMONDSON, C.J., HARGRAVE, OPALA, KAUGER, WINCHESTER, COLBERT, and REIF, J.J. - concur. TAYLOR, V.C.J., WATT, J. - dissent. FOOT