Case Title: In the Matter of Board of Education of Bay Shore Union Free School District v. Thomas K.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2010-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 30  
In the Matter of Board of 
Education of Bay Shore Union Free 
School District,
            Appellant,
        v.
Thomas K., &c.,
            Respondent.
Christopher Venator, for appellant.
Joshua M. Jemal, for respondent.
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge:
This appeal presents two questions governed by section
3602-c of the Education Law:  (1) whether petitioner School
District is required to provide respondent student with an
individual aide at his nonpublic school and (2) whether an
individual aide falls within the definition of "services."  We
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find that, under these circumstances, the School District is
required to provide the aide at the student's private school and
that an individual aide is a service within the meaning of the
statute.  We therefore affirm.
Respondent child is a student at St. Patrick School, a
private school located within the Bay Shore School District. 
When he was in the first grade, he was diagnosed with attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and was classified as
"other health impaired."  The School District's Committee on
Special Education therefore established an Individualized
Education Program (IEP), recommending that the student receive
both 40 minutes a day in a resource room and an individual
classroom aide for three hours daily during his academic classes. 
The one-on-one aide was recommended in this case in order to
refocus the student and to keep him on task during class.  The
aide was considered necessary in order to help the child learn. 
Both sides agree that the student should receive the recommended
services, but disagree as to where the individual aide is to be
provided -- at the student's private school or at a Bay Shore
public school.
After the School District refused to provide the aide
at the child's school, his parents sought a hearing before an
Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO) pursuant to the federal
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA [20 USC §§ 1400
et seq.]) and the New York Education Law.  The IHO determined
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that, under the circumstances, it was not only reasonable to
provide the individual aide at the student's nonpublic school,
but that it was necessary in order for the student to receive a
free appropriate public education.  The IHO therefore directed
the School District to provide the services at St. Patrick.  The
IHO also determined that the individual aide fell within the
Education Law § 3602-c definition of "services."  The School
District appealed to the State Review Officer (SRO), who agreed
that, in order for the one-on-one aide to be effective and to
meet the child's individual educational needs, the aide must be
provided at the child's nonpublic school.  The SRO also rejected
the argument that the individual aide was not a "service[]"
within the meaning of the Education Law.
The School District brought an action in federal court,
under the IDEA, for review of the administrative determination
(see Bay Shore Union Free School Dist. v T. on behalf of his son
R., 405 F Supp 2d 230 [ED NY 2005]).  Observing that the parties
agreed the student was not entitled to receive services at his
nonpublic school under the federal act, the District Court
affirmed the SRO's decision "dubitante," finding that New York
law requires services to be provided based upon the educational
needs of the child and that, in this case, the services had to be
provided at the nonpublic school (see Bay Shore, 405 F Supp 2d at
250).  The Second Circuit vacated that determination and
dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
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concluding that the case raised only questions of state law (485
F3d 730 [2d Cir 2007]).
The School District then commenced this proceeding to
vacate the determination of the SRO.  Supreme Court denied the
petition and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the
location of the services depended upon the educational needs of
the individual child and that, based on this child's needs, the
School District was required to provide the services at the
student's nonpublic school (60 AD3d 851, 852 [2009]).  This Court
granted the School District leave to appeal and we now affirm.
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
in order to be eligible for federal financial assistance, a State
must show that a system is in place to ensure that a free
appropriate public education is made available to all of the
State's school-aged children with disabilities (see 20 USC § 1412
[a][1][A]).  New York thus requires that every school district
provide "suitable educational opportunities for children with
handicapping conditions" based upon the needs of the individual
child (Education Law § 4402 [2][a]).
Education Law § 3602-c, known as the dual enrollment
statute, requires the provision of special education programs "on
an equitable basis" to students who attend nonpublic schools
(Education Law § 3602-c [2][b][1]).  That statute also provides
that "[p]upils enrolled in nonpublic schools for whom services
are provided pursuant to the provisions of this section shall
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receive such services in regular classes of the public school and
shall not be provided such services separately from pupils
regularly attending the public schools" (Education Law § 3602-c
[9]).  Bay Shore argues that it does not have a statutory
obligation to provide such services to students at their
nonpublic schools.
In Board of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. School Dist.
v Wieder (72 NY2d 174 [1988]) we determined that the dual
enrollment statute requires neither that educational services be
provided at a student's nonpublic school, nor that they be
provided at the public school.  Rather, Wieder recognized that
the purpose behind the statute was to allow private school
students with disabilities "equal access to the full array of
specialized public school programs" and that, if the student
received those services in the public school, the student should
be integrated with, rather than separated from, other public
school students (Wieder, 72 NY2d at 184).  The Court recognized
that where the services must be provided should be determined
based upon the child's "individual educational needs in the least
restrictive environment" (Wieder, 72 NY2d at 188).
Although the dual enrollment statute does not mandate
that the School District provide services at a nonpublic school
for each student, that does not end the inquiry.  Applying Wieder
to this case, the pertinent question is what the educational
needs of this student require.  Both the IHO and the SRO
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essentially found that, in order for this child to receive a free
appropriate public education, the services of an individual aide
would have to be provided at his nonpublic school.  The fallacy
of the School District's position is that it advocates for the
student, under the tutelage of an aide, to be kept focused and on
task at a site removed from his own teacher and classmates, and
indeed, from his regular school.  As a practical matter, if the
School District's position were upheld, it would be necessary for
the child to withdraw from the school his parents selected for
him in order to receive the required services.  Under these
circumstances, the courts below properly determined that the
School District was required to provide the one-on-one aide at
the student's private school.
The School District also argues that a one-on-one aide
does not fall within the statutory definition of "services."  The
statute defines "services" as "instruction in the areas of gifted
pupils, career education and education for students with
disabilities, and counseling, psychological and social work
services related to such instruction . . ." (Education Law §
3602-c [1][a]).  The School District maintains that without
proper certification an aide is prohibited from providing
instruction.  However, "[e]ducation for students with
disabilities" is further defined as special education programs
designed to serve children with disabilities as defined in
Education Law § 4401 (1) (see Education Law § 3602-c [1][d]). 
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That statute, in turn, provides that a "child with a disability"
is one who "can only receive appropriate educational
opportunities from a program of special education," which
includes "special services or programs" such as appropriate
developmental or support services (see Education Law § 4401 [1],
[2]).
It is clear from this broad statutory language that the
definition of services was intended to include a wide range of
educational resources for students with disabilities.  One of the
purposes of a teacher's aide is to assist the teacher by
performing certain services, including "support teaching duties"
(8 NYCRR § 80-5.6 [a][3]; see also Education Law § 3009 [2][a]). 
While the aide is plainly facilitating the child's education and
providing services related to instruction, the aide is not
directly providing instruction.  However, the aide's
contributions to the individual child's education are an integral
part of his regular classroom experience.  It is only by an
overly narrow and restrictive reading of the statute that one
could conclude that the individual aide would not fall within the
statutory definition of "services."
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed, with costs.
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Order affirmed, with costs.  Opinion by Chief Judge Lippman.
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided March 30, 2010