Case Title: In Re: Estate of Sauers (concurring)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 2011-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[J-31-2010][M.O. - Baer, J.] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT IN RE: ESTATE OF PAUL J. SAUERS, III, DECEASED APPEAL OF: JODIE L. SAUERS : : : : : : : : : : : No. 78 MAP 2009 Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered on 4/17/09 at No. 1060 MDA 2007 affirming the order of York County Court of Common Pleas entered on 5/16/07 at No. 67-06-01327 ARGUED: May 11, 2010 CONCURRING OPINION MR. JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: November 23, 2011 I join the majority’s well-reasoned decision on the preemption issue. However, I question its separate holding that an estate administrator has the authority to attempt to redirect the proceeds of a life insurance policy from a named beneficiary to a named contingent beneficiary, see Majority Opinion, slip op. at 8-9, at least in the absence of exceptional circumstances. In this regard, I agree with Appellant’s position that a personal representative’s authority is circumscribed by statute, see 20 Pa.C.S. §3311, and generally would not include involvement in the resolution of disputes over non-estate assets, such as the proceeds of life insurance policies as to which the estate lays no claim. Accord Irwin v. Irwin, 307 S.W.3d 383, 386 (Tex. App. 2009) (holding that an estate lacked standing to pursue a claim against a deceased employee’s former wife for a constructive trust on life insurance proceeds); Deaton v. Cross, 184 F. Supp. 2d 441, 442 (D. Md. 2002) (explaining, similarly, that a [J-31-2010][M.O. - Baer, J.] - 2 personal representative had no standing to pursue redirection of life insurance proceeds outside an estate).1 Indeed, it seems incongruous that beneficiaries and/or creditors of an estate would be made to bear the expense of litigation not conducted for their collective interest. I also do not regard the decisions referenced by the majority as controlling as to capacity, authority, or standing of an administrator. Neither In re Henderson’s Estate, 395 Pa. 215, 149 A.2d 892 (1959), nor In re Shahan, 429 Pa. Super. 91, 631 A.2d 1298 (1993), concerned the authority of the personal representative of an estate to initiate judicial proceedings relative to non-estate assets to which the estate lays no claim. Rather, in relevant part, both concerned the jurisdiction of the orphans’ courts. See Henderson’s Estate, 395 Pa. at 229-32, 149 A.2d at 899-901; Shahan, 429 Pa. Super. at 96-98, 631 A.2d at 1301-02. On this separate matter, I do agree with the majority that the court’s jurisdiction was secure under Henderson’s Estate. 1 There is some lack of clarity here, because the question presented has been framed in terms of the “capacity” of the administrator, which has been distinguished from “standing,” albeit the distinction has been couched by some Justices at least as “metaphysical.” Witt v. Dep’t of Banking, 493 Pa. 77, 83 n.7, 425 A.2d 374, 377 n.7 (1981) (opinion in support of remand). In any event, Appellant’s brief makes clear that her treatment of capacity and standing overlaps. See Brief for Appellant at 22.