Case Title: Juarez v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Juarez v. State1990 WY 45791 P.2d 287Case Number: 89-122Decided: 04/30/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
BENJAMIN JUAREZ, 

APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J.

Public Defender 
Program: Mike Cornia, Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Kaylin D. Kluge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant 
Benjamin Juarez was convicted of felony assault on a peace officer. He 
challenges those portions of his sentence requiring him to repay both the public 
defender for costs of legal services and the district attorney for costs of 
prosecution. We find the trial court erred in the manner in which it imposed the 
requirements of repayment of these costs and declare the judgment and sentence 
void with respect to those aspects challenged by Juarez.

[¶2]      The issues raised 
by Juarez, as rephrased for clarity by the state, are whether:

I. the part of 
appellant's sentence requiring reimbursement of costs incurred by the public 
defender is constitutional?

II. the part of 
appellant's sentence requiring reimbursement of costs incurred by the public 
defender was proper if there was no finding of ability to pay?

III. the part of 
appellant's sentence requiring repayment of costs of prosecution is proper and 
constitutional?

FACTS

[¶3]      Juarez, 
represented by private counsel, was tried before a jury on January 16, 1989, and 
found guilty. He had been charged with felony assault on a peace officer in 
violation of W.S. 6-5-204(b) (June 1988 Repl.). On March 6, 1989, Juarez filed 
an affidavit for a court-appointed attorney. In his affidavit Juarez said that 
he had last worked in October, 1988; his last paycheck was $45.32; he was 
unemployed; he lived with his unemployed girlfriend; he had no money in either a 
checking account or a savings account; he did not own a vehicle; he did not own 
any property; his family and friends could not come up with any money to help 
him hire a lawyer; and he listed his debts as $5,000 owed to his trial lawyer 
and an unknown amount for child support. Relying on Juarez's affidavit, the 
court appointed a public defender on March 6, 1989, to represent Juarez in all 
future proceedings.

[¶4]      On March 24, 
1989, Juarez and the newly appointed public defender appeared for a sentencing 
hearing where, among other things, the public defender advised the trial court 
that Juarez worked and earned $12.90 an hour. The court's response was that it 
had to proceed on the basis of the representations made at the time of the 
public defender's appointment to the case. Because Juarez needed more time to 
discuss sentencing with his newly appointed lawyer, the sentencing hearing was 
continued to April 12, 1989. During that hearing the public defender stated that 
Juarez was currently employed in the construction trade making more an hour than 
the public defender. State's counsel pointed out that although Juarez was 
currently earning $14 an hour, he had paid only $80 against the amount of $3,000 
owed to an assault victim in an April 1988 incident. Other than the foregoing 
references, the transcript of this hearing does not contain information, 
discussion, or findings concerning Juarez's financial situation.

[¶5]      At the conclusion 
of the hearing the trial court orally pronounced judgment and sentence. Juarez 
was sentenced to one and one-half years, but not more than two and one-half 
years in the state penitentiary. His sentence was suspended, but he was required 
to serve a sixty-day jail term. He received credit of five days pre-sentence 
jail time against the sixty days term. The court then ordered two years 
probation following his release from the jail term, including terms and 
conditions of the probation. The trial court finished the sentencing 
pronouncement in these words: "There will be a requirement of reimbursement to 
the State for the cost of the public defender; a one hundred dollar contribution 
to the victim compensation fund." Nothing was said about a requirement that 
Juarez reimburse the state for the cost of prosecution.

[¶6]      Written judgment 
and sentence was filed on April 17, 1989, in which the court ordered Juarez to 
repay the state for all expenses and services provided by the public defender's 
office.1 The written judgment and sentence 
further ordered Juarez to repay the state the amount of $1,428.63 for all 
expenses incurred for the services of the prosecution.2 It is evident that the provision in 
the written judgment and sentence requiring Juarez to repay prosecution costs 
was not part of the April 12 sentencing hearing.

[¶7]      Counsel for 
Juarez approved the written judgment and sentence as to form, but never raised 
questions about the terms and requirements of the judgment and sentence at the 
April 12 sentencing hearing or thereafter until this appeal.

Constitutionality of W.S. 
7-6-106(d)

[¶8]      In W.S. 7-6-106, 
the legislature has provided the mechanism by which the trial court shall 
determine whether a criminal defendant is a "needy person" for purposes of the 
Public Defender Act. A "needy person" is one who is "unable to provide for the 
full payment of an attorney and all other necessary expenses of representation." 
W.S. 7-6-102(a)(iv). In determining the extent of the criminal defendant's 
inability to pay for legal services, the trial court shall consider the 
standards promulgated by the office of public defender. See W.S. 7-6-103(c)(vii) 
and 7-6-106(b). The criminal defendant shall certify in writing to the trial 
court "the material factors relating to his ability to pay as the court 
prescribes." W.S. 7-6-106(b). In making its order that the criminal defendant 
reimburse the state for the cost of legal services provided, the trial court 
"shall consider the financial resources of the [criminal defendant] and the 
expenses and services provided in light of the state public defender's standard 
fee schedule." W.S. 7-6-106(c).

[¶9]      The public 
defender's office promulgated standards, including a fee schedule for private 
counsel, which became effective July 21, 1989. The record in Juarez's appeal 
does not reveal what standards, if any, were in effect at Juarez's sentencing 
hearing, and the record does not reveal what fee schedule, if any, was in effect 
on that date.

[¶10]   Although Juarez asks this court to 
declare W.S. 7-6-106(d) unconstitutional, we need not address that issue because 
he raises this issue for the first time on appeal,3 and because we can dispose of the 
issue concerning the requirement of the repaying of the public defender's legal 
services on another ground. The assessment of costs of the public defender was 
improper.

[¶11]   The record fails to show that the 
trial court made findings with respect to Juarez's financial ability to pay for 
the public defender's legal services. When read together, as they must be, the 
provisions of W.S. 7-6-106 require that the trial court make express findings 
concerning the factors set forth in the statutory language. As those findings 
were not made here, we reverse that portion of the judgment and sentence without 
remand. Keller v. State, 771 P.2d 379, 387 (Wyo. 1989).

Constitutionality of W.S. 
7-11-505

[¶12]   Juarez challenges the 
constitutionality of W.S. 7-11-505, concerning repayment of the costs of 
prosecution. This issue was not raised in the trial court, although there was 
opportunity at the time counsel for Juarez approved the written judgment and 
sentence as to form. Neither did counsel attack the judgment and sentence as 
illegal under W.R.Cr.P. 36. We decline, therefore, to consider Juarez's 
constitutional challenge. Baum, 745 P.2d 877, 882 (Wyo. 1987).4

Assessing the Costs of 
Prosecution

[¶13]   Juarez claims that the trial court 
erred in requiring him to repay the costs of the prosecution. We agree. During 
the sentencing hearing, the prosecution offered no evidence to establish the 
costs of prosecution, and the trial court's oral imposition of judgment and 
sentence did not include these particular costs to be repaid by Juarez. When the 
costs appeared in the written judgment and sentence five days after the 
sentencing hearing, they appeared as a lump sum with no identification or 
itemization of specific costs. On review, we have no way of knowing what 
particular costs are being imposed and whether the lump sum includes improper 
institutional costs. Kaess v. State, 748 P.2d 698, 702-03 (Wyo. 1987). We find 
that the trial court erred in the manner in which it imposed costs of the 
prosecution as part of Juarez's sentence, and we strike those costs from the 
judgment and sentence without remand. Keller v. State, 771 P.2d  at 
387.

[¶14]   In summary, we decline to address 
Juarez's constitutional claims and reverse without remand those portions of the 
judgment and sentence requiring Juarez to repay the costs of both his public 
defender's legal services and his prosecution.

FOOTNOTES

1 These costs were to be 
repaid within the time period of Juarez's probation. The repayment plan was to 
be prepared by the Department of Probation and Parole and approved by the trial 
court in accordance with the public defender's standard fee schedule. W.S. 
7-6-106(d) (June 1987 Repl.).

2 Again, costs were to be 
repaid during Juarez's probation period and to follow the approved plan of both 
the Department of Probation and Parole and the trial court in accordance with 
the district attorney's standard fee schedule. W.S. 7-11-505 (June 1987 
Repl.).

3 Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 882 (Wyo. 1987).

4 In King v. State, 780 P.2d 943, 958 (Wyo. 1989), this court considered a similar constitutional 
challenge. There, as here, the criminal defendant asserted that W.S. 7-11-505 
operated to "chill" the right to plead not guilty. We stated that such statutes 
"have consistently been held constitutional as long as they are not construed to 
authorize assessment of institutional costs," and we rejected the constitutional 
challenge to that statute.