Case Title: Wyoming Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Allstate Indem. Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wyoming Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Allstate Indem. Co.1992 WY 180844 P.2d 464Case Number: 91-204Decided: 12/21/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming

WYOMING INSURANCE 
GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Appellant (Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
ALLSTATE 
INDEMNITY COMPANY and Allstate Insurance Company, Appellees 
(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal from 
District Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

 
 
Paul D. 
Schierer of Pence and MacMillan, Laramie, for appellant.

 
 
Robert G. 
Wright of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, Salt Lake City, UT, for appellees.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The Wyoming Insurance 
Guaranty Association (WIGA) was called upon to step into the shoes of Laramie 
Insurance Company by assuming the obligations of its automobile liability 
insurance policy when Laramie Insurance Company became insolvent. The vehicle 
involved in this accident was insured by Laramie Insurance Company. Ms. Herring 
was driving this non-owned vehicle with permission of the named insured. Ms. 
Herring was driving this non-owned vehicle with permission of the named insured. 
Ms. Herring was also an insured under a separate automobile liability insurance 
policy on an owned automobile with the appellee, Allstate Insurance Company 
(Allstate). WIGA sought to require Allstate to defend and indemnify in the 
lawsuit filed. Allstate refused. The district court entered judgment in favor of 
Allstate.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     WIGA expounds this 
summary of the issues:

 
 
     Did the trial court 
err in finding that Allstate Indemnity Company and Allstate Insurance Company 
(Allstate) was not the responsible insurer, not obligated to cover the loss in 
Eigenberger v. Herring and not required to indemnify the Wyoming Insurance 
Guaranty Association for sums paid in settlement and defense of that 
action?

 
 

[¶4.]     Allstate restyles the 
issue with this query:

 
 
     Did the trial court 
correctly rule that appellee Allstate Indemnity Company and Allstate Insurance 
Company ("Allstate") shoulders no obligation to indemnify the Wyoming Insurance 
Guaranty Association ("WIGA") for any liability, damages or expenses arising 
from the action entitled Christine A. Eigenberger v. Melina Herring, Civil No. 
23150, in the Second Judicial District In and For Albany County, State of 
Wyoming?

 
 
The 
stipulated facts are:

 
 
     The facts in this case 
are not in dispute. On or about August 31, 1989 at about 9:00 p.m., Melina Lee 
Herring was involved in an accident with Christine A. Eigenberger at the corner 
of Ninth 
Street and 
Ivinson Avenue, Laramie, 
Wyoming
. Eigenberger was 
traveling north on Ninth 
Street on a bicycle when she entered the 
intersection. At the same time, Herring was traveling south on Ninth Street in 
an 1982 Buick Electra owned by F. Otto Bolln and Leslie Gay Bolln, residents of 
Douglas, Wyoming. Herring was a permissive user of the Bolln vehicle at the time 
of the accident. An accident occurred when Herring attempted to turn East onto 
Ivinson. The bicycle and vehicle collided.

 
 
     Eigenberger filed a 
Complaint seeking $112,300.00 in damages from Herring in Civil Action No. 22844 
in the District Court, Second Judicial District, County of Albany, State of Wyoming. A copy of the complaint is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. Eigenberger's 
Complaint alleged that Herring was negligent in failing to yield the right of 
way to Eigenberger when Herring completed the left turn onto Ivinson, thereby 
causing the accident and injuries to Eigenberger. Herring filed an answer 
denying negligence and, alternatively, alleging comparative 
negligence.

 
 
     At the time of the 
accident, the Bolln vehicle was insured by Laramie Insurance Company, Policy No. 
LPA 11921, with liability limits of $100,00.00 each person and $300,000.00 each 
accident. A copy of the insurance policy with declarations page is attached as 
Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference. The Laramie Insurance Company 
was declared insolvent pursuant to Wyoming Statutes § 26-41-103(a)(iii) by a 
court of competent jurisdiction in Civil Action No. 22800, Second Judicial 
District, County of Albany, State of Wyoming on February 14, 1990. A copy of the 
Order Appointing Receiver and Directing Liquidation and Declaring Insolvency is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference. Pursuant to 
its statutory duty, Wyoming Statutes § 26-4-101 et seq., Plaintiff Wyoming 
Insurance Guarantee Association (hereinafter referred to as "WIGA") agreed to 
defend and indemnify Herring.

 
 
     During the course of 
said defense, Plaintiff WIGA learned that Herring was insured under Allstate 
Policy No. 017-171-172, 10/25, FC9-645479 issued to John and Janet Herring with 
liability limits of $100,000.00 each person, $300,000.00 each occurrence. A copy 
of the insurance policy with declarations page is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" 
and incorporated herein by reference. WIGA sent notice of the suit to Allstate 
with a request that Allstate defend the action. Allstate declined. There is no 
issue regarding the adequacy or timeliness of the notice. WIGA first made its 
demand for $14,912.48 by letter dated September 10, 1990. A copy of said letter 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated herein by 
reference.

 
 
     Civil Action No. 22844 
was settled prior to trial with a payment of $10,000.00 by WIGA to Eigenberger. 
A copy of the Release of All Claims and Order of Dismissal are attached hereto 
as Exhibits "F" and "G" respectively and incorporated herein by reference. WIGA 
incurred $4,912.48 as costs of defense. The settlement amount and attorney's 
fees paid to Pence and MacMillan by WIGA in defense of Civil Action No 22844 are 
reasonable. The sole issue to be determined is whether WIGA or Allstate was 
required to defend and pay the loss in Civil Action No. 22844. If Allstate was 
required to defend and pay, Judgment in the amount of $14,912.48 plus seven 
percent (7%) prejudgment interest from September 10, 1990 should be entered 
against Allstate. If WIGA was required to defend and pay, Plaintiff's Complaint 
should be dismissed.

 
 

[¶5.]     WIGA was created to 
assure that a policy holder would be protected in the event of the insolvency of 
an insurer. W.S. 26-31-101, -117 (1983); 19A John A. Appleman, Insurance Law and 
Practice § 10801 (1982); 2A Ronald A. Anderson, Couch on Insurance 2d § 22:27 
(Rev. ed. 1984). Operating funds are generated by member assessments. W.S. 
26-31-107 (1983). The duties and powers of WIGA are set out in W.S. 26-31-106 
(1983):

 
 
     (a) The association 
shall:

 
 
     (i) Be obligated to 
the extent of the covered claims existing prior to the determination of 
insolvency and arising within thirty (30) days after the determination of 
insolvency, or before the policy expiration date if less than thirty (30) days 
after the determination, or before the insured replaced the policy or causes its 
cancellation, if he does so within thirty (30) days of the determination, but 
the obligation includes only that amount of each covered claim which exceeds one 
hundred dollars ($100.00) and is less than one hundred thousand dollars 
($100,000.00), except that the association:

 
 
     (A) Shall pay the full 
amount of any covered claim arising out of a worker's compensation policy; 
and

 
 
     (B) Is not obligated 
to a policyholder or claimant in an amount exceeding the insolvent insurer's 
obligation under the policy from which the claim arises.

 
 
(ii) Be 
deemed the insurer to the extent of its obligation of the covered claims and to 
that extent has all rights, duties and obligations of the insolvent insurer as 
if the insurer were not insolvent;

 
 
(iii) As 
provided in W.S. 26-31-107 assess insurers' amounts necessary to pay the 
association's obligations under paragraph (i) of this subsection, subsequent to 
an insolvency, the expenses of handling covered claims subsequent to an 
insolvency, the cost of examinations under W.S. 26-31-112 and any other expenses 
authorized by this chapter;

 
 
(iv) 
Investigate claims brought against the association and adjust, compromise, 
settle and pay covered claims to the extent of the association's obligation and 
deny all other claims;

 
 
(v) Notify 
any persons as the commissioner directs under W.S. 
26-31-109(a)(iii);

 
 
(vi) Handle 
claims through its employees or through one (1) or more insurers or other 
persons designated as servicing facilities, whose voluntary accepted designation 
is subject to the commissioner's approval;

 
 
(vii) 
Reimburse each servicing facility for association obligations it pays and for 
expenses incurred while handling association claims; and

 
 
(viii) Pay 
any other association expenses authorized by this chapter.

 
 
(b) The 
association may:

 
 
(i) Appear 
in, defend and appeal any action on a covered claim or on a claim brought 
against the association;

 
 
(ii) Employ 
or retain any persons necessary to handle claims and perform other association 
duties;

 
 
(iii) 
Borrow funds necessary to effect the purposes of this chapter in accord with the 
plan of operation;

 
 
(iv) Sue or 
be sued;

 
 
(v) 
Negotiate and become a party to contracts necessary to carry out the purpose of 
this chapter;

 
 
(vi) Review 
settlements, releases and adjustments to which the insolvent insurer or its 
insureds were parties to determine the extent to which the settlements, releases 
and judgments may be properly contested;

 
 
(vii) 
Refund to the member insurers in proportion to the contribution of each member 
insurer, that amount by which the association's assets exceed its liabilities as 
the board of directors determines;

 
 
(viii) 
Perform any other acts necessary to carry out the purpose of this chapter. 
[emphasis added]

 
 

[¶6.]     Another provision of 
the act is also essential to resolution of the issues posed for our 
consideration, W.S. 26-31-111 (1983):

 
 
     (a) Any person having a claim against an insurance 
policy other than a policy of an insolvent insurer which is also a 
covered claim, shall first exhaust his right under the policy. Any amount 
payable on a covered claim under this chapter shall be reduced by the amount of 
any recovery under the insurance policy. [emphasis added]

 
 
No person 
has a claim against the Allstate policy until the Laramie Insurance Company 
limits are first exhausted. The Allstate policy specifically provides that its 
insurance "with respect to a temporary substitute automobile or a non-owned 
automobile shall be excess insurance over any other collectible insurance." (See 
p. 468, infra.) The existence of WIGA makes the Laramie Insurance co-policy 
collectible. Since this claim settled for less than the Laramie Insurance policy 
limits, there was never an obligation upon Allstate to defend or 
pay.

 
 

[¶7.]     Because WIGA relies 
almost exclusively upon cases which are concerned with uninsured motorist 
coverage, we also consider here Wyoming's statutes which treat the subject of 
uninsured motor vehicle insurance coverage. W.S. 31-10-101, -104 (1989). W.S. 
31-10-102 provides:

 
 
     For purpose of 
coverage under W.S. 31-10-101, the term "uninsured motor vehicle," subject to 
the terms and conditions of the coverage, includes an insured motor vehicle 
where the liability insurer thereof is unable to make payment with respect to 
the legal liability of its insured within the limits specified therein because 
of insolvency.

 
 
Wyoming 
Insurance Regulations, ch. XXI-II, § 4 (1989), provides:

 
 
     Section 4. "Other" Insurance Clauses. In all 
instances where the insured holds more than one policy of uninsured motorists 
insurance or is entitled to recover under more than one policy of uninsured 
motorists insurance, for which separate premiums have been paid, the extent of 
this coverage will be the combined coverages under all policies, and actual 
damages sustained by the insured will be recoverable to the full extent of the 
combined limits of all such policies. Such recovery, however, will not exceed 
the minimum requirements for coverage[1] under 
Section 31-9-102 - W.S. 1977, as to all other policies except the primary 
policy. The primary policy shall be construed to mean that policy which provides 
the coverage for the insured automobile involved in the 
accident.

 
 

[¶8.]     The parties agree that 
the claim at issue is a covered claim as defined in W.S. 26-31-103(a)(ii) (1983) 
and that WIGA had a general duty to pay the claim because the claim existed 
prior to the determination of insolvency. W.S. 26-31-106(a)(i). However, WIGA 
and Allstate disagree as to whether Allstate was required to defend and 
indemnify under the circumstances of this case.

 
 

[¶9.]     Allstate contends its 
policy would have been written differently if it had intended its policy to 
apply in an instance such as this and that the uninsured motor vehicle statutes, 
rules and regulations, and case law do not apply in this circumstance. We agree. 
The policy included these provisions:

 
 
Part 
1:

 
 
     Allstate will pay for 
an insured all damages which the insured shall be legally obligated to pay 
because of:

 
 
1. bodily 
injury sustained by any person, and 

 
 
2. injury 
to or destruction of property,

 
 
arising out 
of the ownership, maintenance or use, including loading and unloading, of the 
owned automobile or a non-owned automobile.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
If there is 
other insurance

 
 
     Allstate shall not be 
liable under this Part 1 for a greater proportion of any loss that the 
applicable limit of liability stated in the declarations bears to the total 
applicable limit of liability of all collectible insurance against such loss; 
provided, however, the insurance with respect to a temporary substitute 
automobile or a non-owned automobile shall be excess insurance over any other 
collectible insurance.

 
 
Part 
2:

 
 
     4. Non-duplication of Benefits; Other 
Insurance. No eligible injured person shall recover duplicate benefits for 
the same elements of loss under this or any similar insurance. In the event the 
eligible injured person has other similar insurance available and applicable to 
the accident, the maximum recovery under all such insurance shall not exceed the 
amount which would have been payable under the provisions of the insurance 
providing the highest dollar limit, and Allstate shall not be liable for a 
greater proportion of any loss to which this coverage applies than the limit of 
liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of 
this coverage and such other insurance.

 
 

[¶10.]  The Allstate policy included "Uninsured 
Motorist Insurance." That section of the policy included:

 
 
3. "uninsured automobile" 
means:

 
 
     (a) a motor vehicle 
with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of which there is, in at least 
the amounts specified by the financial responsibility law of the state in which 
the insured automobile is principally garaged, no bodily injury liability bond 
or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident with respect to any 
person or organization legally responsible for the use of such automobile, or 
with respect to which there is a bodily injury liability bond or insurance 
policy applicable at the time of the accident but the company writing the same 
either has denied coverage thereunder or is or becomes 
insolvent[.]

 
 

[¶11.]  Section 26-31-106(a)(ii) provides that 
WIGA was deemed to be the insurer of the insured once Laramie Insurance Company 
became insolvent. The uninsured motor vehicle statutes, supplementing rules and 
regulations, and case law cited by WIGA would operate to repeal or override W.S. 
26-31-106(a)(ii) if we were to give them the effect contended for by WIGA. The 
quoted provisions of the Allstate policy which provide coverage when the insured 
is driving a non-owned automobile apply only where there is no other collectible 
insurance. We hold that under the factual circumstance presented here W.S. 
26-31-106(a)(ii) furnishes a source of collectible 
insurance.

 
 

[¶12.]  Affirmed.

 
 

URBIGKIT, J., files 
a dissenting opinion in which 
THOMAS, J., joins.

 
 

THOMAS, J., files 
a separate dissenting opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 W.S. 31-9-102(a)(xi) 
provides:

 
 
     (xi) "Proof of 
financial responsibility" means evidence of ability to respond in damages for 
liability, resulting from accidents occurring subsequent to the effective date 
of the proof, arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor 
vehicle, in the amount of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00) because of 
bodily injury to or death of one (1) person in any one (1) accident, and subject 
to the limit for one (1) person, in the amount of fifty thousand dollars 
($50,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death of two (2) or more persons in 
any one (1) accident, and in the amount of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) 
because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one (1) 
accident[.]

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting, with which THOMAS, Justice, joins.

 
 

[¶13.]  I respectfully 
dissent.

 
 

[¶14.]  The problem I have with the majority 
opinion is that it employs a selective application of statutory language in 
total disregard of the Wyoming State Legislature's intended purpose when it 
adopted the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Association Act in 1971. Because it 
summarily concludes that the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Association (WIGA) 
"step[ped] into the shoes" of the Laramie Insurance Company pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. § 26-31-106(a)(ii) (1983), the majority derogates Wyo. Stat. § 
26-31-111(a) (1983) while at the same time ignoring an extensive body of related 
case law and the underlying policy considerations which support a different 
result. Those statutory provisions state in part: 

 
 
(a) The 
association shall:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
(ii) Be 
deemed the insurer to the extent of its obligation of the covered claims and to 
that extent has all rights, duties and obligations of the insolvent insurer as 
if the insurer were not insolvent[.]

 
 
Wyo. Stat. 
§ 26-31-106(a)(ii).

 
 
     (a) Any person having 
a claim against an insurer under an insurance policy * * * shall first exhaust 
his right under the policy. Any amount payable on a covered claim under this 
chapter shall be reduced by the amount of any recovery under the insurance 
policy.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. § 
26-31-111(a).

 
 

[¶15.]  To fully appreciate the path taken by the 
majority, a brief synopsis and critique of the majority opinion is in order. 
Following recitation of the appellate issues, stipulated facts, and statements 
concerning WIGA's purpose and source of operating funds, the majority quotes 
Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-106 (outlining WIGA's duties and powers) and the "exhaustion" 
provision in Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-111(a) ("Any person having a claim against an 
insurance policy * * * shall first exhaust his right under the 
policy.").

 
 

[¶16.]  Next, the majority summarizes the 
dispositive basis for its decision - since this case involved a borrowed 
automobile - the Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) policy only provides 
excess coverage "over any other collectible insurance." Further, the existence 
of WIGA makes the insolvent Laramie Insurance Company's policy "collectible" and 
Allstate thus had no obligation to defend or pay. In effect, the majority adopts 
Allstate's appellate argument in toto and without relying on any authority other 
than a literal application of Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-106(a)(ii) and the "other 
insurance" clause in the Allstate policy. The simple issue presented in this 
appeal is whether "drive other car" (DOC) coverage,1 in the case where the initial insurance carrier is 
insolvent, should be applied to a loss before the claimant's resort to the state 
guaranty fund is justified. The majority says "no" and I strongly 
disagree.

 
 

[¶17.]  The majority dismisses WIGA's appellate 
argument by characterizing it as relying "almost exclusively" upon "uninsured 
motorist" cases.2 Without discussion of or 
reference to the accumulated body of related case law3 and the wealth of other authority discussed by both 
sides in appellate briefing, the majority dismisses WIGA's argument by simply 
stating that the court agrees with Allstate that the uninsured motor vehicle 
statutes, rules, regulations and case law do not apply in this circumstance. 
Consequently, the majority summarily concludes that WIGA "furnishes a source of 
collectible insurance." By this linguistic adaptation, the majority elevates the 
"excess insurance over any other collectible insurance" clause in the Allstate 
policy in derogation of the statutory "exhaustion" provision in Wyo. Stat. § 
26-31-111(a).

 
 

[¶18.]  Although WIGA was enacted to provide a 
"last resort" source of insurance protection, the majority affirms that WIGA 
pays and Allstate does not. In this regard, the majority's statement that "WIGA 
was created to assure that a policy holder would be protected in 
the event of the insolvency of an insurer" is forgotten. (Emphasis added.) 
Allstate, a solvent insurance company paid by Herring to provide comprehensive 
liability insurance protection, ends up being the "protected" party as a result 
of this majority decision. By no stretch of the imagination does Allstate 
qualify as the "policy holder" that WIGA was created to protect from 
other-insurer insolvency. Ross v. Canadian Indem. Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d 396, 
191 Cal. Rptr. 99, 103 (1983) (quoting California Union Ins. Co. v. Central 
National Ins. Co., 117 Cal. App. 3d 729, 734, 173 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1981)) ("`The 
Legislature chose to provide a limited form of protection for the public, not 
a fund for the protection of other insurance companies from the insolvencies of 
fellow members.'") (Emphasis in original.) See 19A John Alan Appleman 
& Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 10801 
(1982).

 
 

[¶19.]  The real question presented is whether 
the state fund has been structured to be the insurance resource of last resort 
or a substitute for the primary carrier when the primary carrier becomes 
insolvent. This decision should be determined by clear statutory language and 
not interpretive application of insurance policy exclusion or priority 
terminology.

 
 

[¶20.]  There can be no argument that at the time 
and place of this accident, the tort feasor, Herring, was insured by, and the 
victim, Eigenberger, was protected by, an insurance policy that was operational 
and included operator coverage: DOC - unowned vehicle clause, Allstate insurance 
policy No. 017-171-172, FC9-645479. Actually there were three insurance 
resources in effect at that time as a requirement of the financial 
responsibility law of Utah, where the Allstate 
policy was written, and of the state of Wyoming where the driver was engaged in 
operating a motor vehicle.4

 
 

[¶21.]  In describing these three coverages, it 
should be recognized that they are not necessarily supplementary in amount, but 
are always in priority order for application. This is not primary and excess 
insurance as we shall subsequently discuss. This is stages or levels of 
insurance. The first is vehicle insurance which, by operation of financial 
responsibility acts, insurance codes and uniform policy provisions, is primary 
if it exists and to the extent of its 
coverage. (This is, of course, assuming that the state does not have PIP 
as first party insurance which would always apply as a first level). See 8C John 
Alan Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 5102.65, at 511 
(1981). The second level is the operator's coverage, DOC, or unowned vehicle 
(UV) coverage, which was actually provided in this case as primary insurance to 
the driver by Allstate.

 
 

[¶22.]  The third insurance resource is the first 
party uninsured motorist coverage, which is not involved in this case since the 
victim was on a bicycle rather than in a motor vehicle, or perchance under some 
policies, riding a motorcycle.

 
 

[¶23.]  The fourth insurance resource is WIGA. 
Consequently, the issue is whether the primary operator insurance, which is 
secondary in application, through the operator's policy DOC or UV clause, 
escapes liability by an assessed earlier priority against the state 
fund.

 
 

[¶24.]  Some basic facts require recognition. The 
subject with which this case becomes embodied is required insurance policy 
provisions within the Financial Responsibility Acts. The Allstate policy 
covering the tort feasor driver was a Utah policy. No evidence was provided in the 
record that Allstate used an essentially different policy for Utah than it issues in Wyoming. We do not know how long the driver 
had been in Wyoming, but reason suggests her status was as 
a college student. The regularity with which the driver may have driven the F. 
Otto and Leslie Gay Bolln vehicle is also undisclosed. In any event, the 
Utah policy complies with both the Wyoming 
Financial Responsibility Act, Wyo. Stat. § 31-9-405 (1989) (in particular 
subsection (c) - operator's policy provision) and, although phrased differently, 
with the Utah 
provision, Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-12(a)-402 and 31A-22-303 (1988) (in particular § 
31A-22-303(b)(ii), which establishes the same criteria).

 
 

[¶25.]  The Allstate policy provided a broad 
unowned operator coverage, "coverage AA - arising out of the * * * use of a non 
owned vehicle" which included a relative as an insured. By definition, Herring 
clearly complied. Her status as an insured under the policy to require defense 
and indemnity in the action is not at issue. Controversy was confined to the 
claim that the state fund, in replacement of the insolvent carrier on the motor 
vehicle, had to provide liability coverage first. Allstate argues that since a 
first level solvent carrier did not exist, the state fund should appear in 
replacement as the insurance written on the vehicle while the state fund sought 
escape in the required exhaustion of other insurance criteria of the statutory 
provisions in Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-111(a).

 
 

[¶26.]  The interesting facet of this litigation 
is the multitude of uninsured motorist cases (UM), and the dearth of DOC or UV 
clause cases.5

 
 

[¶27.]  A multitude of UM cases teach us, with 
the apparent exception of the state of Louisiana,6 Hickerson v. Protective Nat. Ins. Co. of Omaha, 383 So. 2d 377 (La. 1980), that UM coverage benefits are first applied before 
guaranty fund exposure develops. The Kansas court in Hetzel v. Clarkin, 244 Kan. 
698, 772 P.2d 800, 804 (1989) stated: "Louisiana appears to be the only reported 
jurisdiction which has not allowed the state guaranty insurance association 
credit for sums recovered from the plaintiff's own insurance [uninsured 
motorists coverage]." The court then recognized that: "The Louisiana Supreme 
Court's analysis in Hickerson, that uninsured motorist coverage was not 
contemplated in the `nonduplication' provision of its Guaranty Act, is not 
applicable to Kansas." Hetzel, 772 P.2d  at 804. Other cases 
cited therein, or otherwise sustaining the same view, include King v. 
Jordan, 601 P.2d 273 
(Alaska 1979); Witkowski v. Brown, 576 A.2d 669 
(Del.Super. 1989); Spearman v. State Sec. Ins. Co., 57 Ill. App.3d 393, 14 
Ill.Dec. 729, 372 N.E.2d 1008 (1978); Lucas v. Illinois Ins. Guaranty Fund, 52 
Ill. App.3d 237, 10 Ill. Dec. 81, 367 N.E.2d 469 (1977); McMichael v. Robertson, 
77 Md. App. 208, 549 A.2d 1157 (1988); Vokey v. Massachusetts Insurers 
Insolvency Fund, 381 Mass. 386, 409 N.E.2d 783 (1980); Wondra v. American Family 
Ins. Group, 432 N.W.2d 455 (Minn.App. 1988), overruled on other grounds sub nom. 
Garrick v. Northland Ins. Co., 469 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1991); State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Liability Ins. Co. v. Kiser, 168 N.J. Super. 230, 402 A.2d 952 (1979); 
Welch v. Armer, 776 P.2d 847 (Okla. 1989); 
Henninger v. Riley, 317 Pa. Super. 570, 464 A.2d 469 (1983); Sands v. 
Pennsylvania Ins. Guaranty Ass'n, 283 
Pa. Super. 
217, 423 A.2d 1224 (1980); and Virginia Property and Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. 
International Ins. Co., 238 Va. 702, 385 S.E.2d 614 
(1989).

 
 

[¶28.]  The UM cases demonstrate that application 
of benefits from the claimant's own carrier is required before the state fund 
becomes responsible. We move here to another stage: whether primary coverage on 
the operator of the offending vehicle should be applied before the state fund is 
faced with payment within the predicate exhaustion requirement provided by Wyo. 
Stat. § 26-31-111(a). Essentially, that question seems relatively simple under 
Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-111(a), as the statute being rephrased is, Herring, "[any 
person] having a claim against Allstate [an insurer] * * * shall first exhaust 
[her] right under the policy. Any amount payable on a covered claim under this 
chapter shall be reduced by the amount of any recovery under the insurance 
policy."

 
 

[¶29.]  There is a most recent Oklahoma case involving a 
complex sequence of insolvencies which uses the majority rule in UM cases as 
compelling authority for required exhaustion. In Welch, 776 P.2d 847, the 
Oklahoma court 
had earlier adopted the under insured motorist majority rule. In the current 
case, Oglesby v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 832 P.2d 834 (Okla. 1992), a claim 
against a third party's carrier on a products liability claim was the insurance 
policy exhaustion target of the guaranty fund. The Oklahoma court found a 
majority rule requiring exhaustion by citing ten cases. Id. at 843 n. 40. The 
court then held for worker's compensation offset and exhaustion purposes that 
the carrier for a third party products liability defendant must be first pursued 
before recovery from the guaranty fund was justified.

 
 

[¶30.]  I find that approach and majority policy 
of exhaustion of "other available insurance" equally applicable here to the 
vehicle driver's own insurance policy under the existent DOC coverage. See also 
Paul G. Roberts, Note, Insurance Company Insolvencies and Insurance Guaranty 
Funds: A Look at the Nonduplication of Recovery Clause, 74 Iowa L.Rev. 927 (1989). I 
agree with the concept stated in Oglesby that this court may not read an 
exception into a statute not made by the legislature.

 
 

[¶31.]  There is a triangular result which is 
created by this majority decision. At one corner point is Laramie Insurance 
Company with the automobile coverage and now insolvent. At the second corner is 
the driver coverage (DOC/UV), and at the third corner is UM first-party 
coverage. In determining priorities, it is a settled principle of law and policy 
language that if the vehicle is not insured, the driver's insurance is applied 
before the uninsured motorist first-party coverage will be applied. Furthermore, 
if UM coverage is available, it must be exhausted before the state fund assumes 
obligation. Since DOC coverage must be applied before UM applies, and UM 
exhaustion is required before the state fund accrues liability, it would 
consequently seem reasonable that even without UM coverage involvement, the DOC 
exhaustion would be required before the state fund obligation appears. In this 
case, since we have a bicyclist victim rather than a motor vehicle victim, 
sequences require a juxtaposition so that by the absence of a victim in a 
vehicle, the DOC coverage is claimed to change positions to then, for the first 
time, jump to a higher level than the second responsibility to step in after 
instead of before the state fund. Frankly, I find no justification for this 
magic movement either in logic, statute, or policy terminology. Where there is 
UM coverage, exposure to the DOC/UV coverage is the second level before the 
state fund; but, if there is no UM exposure or coverage, by this court's 
decision, the operator coverage can then move to last 
priority.

 
 

[¶32.]  One of the major difficulties in these 
cases comes from Allstate's utilization of a second inapplicable principle for 
decision which is the application of broad insurance terminology to the 
constrained and specific subject of private passenger automobile insurance. 
Initially, this is the differentiation between separate policies which may be 
classified as primary and excess and provisions in the same policies which 
provide for levels of application of the same carrier's responsibility. The 
automobile insurance policy constricted within the criteria of the Financial 
Responsibility Acts as required driver coverage does not encompass the broad 
concepts of a primary policy and another umbrella coverage insurer.7

[¶33.]  In the first place, DOC-UV coverage 
should not be conceptualized as excess insurance, it is primary insurance as a 
second level coverage to be applied only after the insurance on the described 
vehicle, if any, is exhausted. If there is no automobile coverage, the DOC-UV 
clause provides the primary coverage. UM, or its half brother - under insured 
motorist insurance (UIM) - is not conventional excess either, since it is not 
written on behalf of the tort feasor, it is substitute protection written for 
the victim in the similar sense that first person property damage insurance on 
your motor vehicle is not excess coverage to the property damage liability 
coverage hopefully provided by the tort feasor's insurance 
policy.

 
 

[¶34.]  Conventional primary and excess coverage 
definitions in this general application for umbrella, general liability, and 
floater coverage are defined by 16 Ronald A. Anderson, Couch on Insurance 2d § 
62:41, at 55-56 (Rev. ed. 1983 & Supp. 1992):

 
 
     Primary insurance 
coverage is insurance coverage whereby, under the terms of the policy, liability 
attaches immediately upon the happening of the occurrence that gives rise to 
liability. Excess or secondary coverage is coverage whereby, under the terms of 
the policy, liability attaches only after a predetermined amount of primary 
coverage has been exhausted. A secondary insurer thus greatly reduces his risk 
of loss and this reduced risk is reflected in the cost of the policy. An excess 
or secondary policy will not come into operation in the absence of primary 
coverage and excess coverage clauses in liability policies can only be obtained 
where there is other primary coverage available. Until such time as the limits 
of primary insurance coverage are exhausted, secondary coverage does not provide 
any collectible insurance. Thus, where insured failed to procure primary 
coverage, excess insurers could not be held liable on policies. Whitehead v. 
Fleet Towing Co. (1982) 110 Ill. App.3d 759, 66 
Ill Dec 449, 
442 N.E.2d 1362.

 
 

[¶35.]  None of this discussion fits the 
automobile policy relationship where the better designation is first level, PIP, 
if it exists, McMichael, 77 Md. App. 208, 549 A.2d 1157; second level, in 
non-PIP states, insurance on the specific vehicle; third level, operator 
insurance clause DOC-UV; and fourth level, UM or UIM.

 
 

[¶36.]  One form of explanation is to distinguish 
a general excess limits policy such as 
umbrella coverage from a policy with excess clauses which is 
the financial responsibility statutorily defined automobile insurance policy. 
That is what is involved here. See Washington Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Guaranty Nat. 
Ins. Co., 685 F. Supp. 1160 (W.D.Wash. 1988), and its extensive discussion of 8A 
John Alan Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4906, at 
348 and § 4909, at 385 (1981). Both the business concept and the underlying 
insurance structure is entirely different between genuine excess insurance 
policies and the automobile policy with its three (or four) levels of applied 
coverage. There is not only a classical difference in insurance protection 
character, but also a statutory control in the latter case for significant 
aspects of policy provisions. See, e.g., Bartee v. R.T.C. Transp., Inc., 245 
Kan. 499, 781 P.2d 1084 (1989), where the complexity of the case involved both 
financial responsibility statute driven policy requirements and concepts of 
umbrella and primary carrier coverage. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fowler, 480 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 1985), regarding Financial Responsibility 
Act primacy criteria.

 
 

[¶37.]  Having summarized my overall impressions, 
I now focus attention on several specific aspects of the majority opinion. 
First, although taken in context, there are three sentences in the majority 
opinion (which, in effect, embody the majority's attempt at legal analysis) that 
appear to be unrelated and, in my opinion, are unsubstantiated by available 
authority:

 
 
No person 
has a claim against the Allstate policy until the Laramie Insurance Company 
limits are first exhausted. The Allstate policy specifically provides that its 
insurance "with respect to a temporary substitute automobile or a non-owned 
automobile shall be excess insurance over any other collectible insurance." * * 
* The existence of WIGA makes the Laramie Insurance co-policy 
collectible.

 
 
I find 
these statements troublesome for several reasons. Initially, the statement that 
"[n]o person has a claim against the Allstate policy until the Laramie Insurance 
Company limits are first exhausted" reverses the legislative intent of Wyo. 
Stat. § 26-31-111(a) and essentially eliminates the "other than" language in the 
statute. In effect, the majority improperly combines the procedural elements in 
the "exhaustion" statute set forth in Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-111(a) with the 
unrelated proposition that a solvent 
Laramie Insurance Company would have been the primary insurer in this case 
and, thus, would need to be "exhausted" before other sources of insurance might 
become available. 

 
 

[¶38.]  Second - and of far greater significance 
- the majority balances the "excess insurance over any other collectible 
insurance" language in the Allstate policy against the legislature's underlying 
purpose in creating WIGA. The majority concludes that Allstate should prevail 
because the insolvent Laramie 
Insurance Company policy is "collectible" from WIGA. In doing so, I believe that 
the majority fails to recognize what this court said in Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Wyoming Ins. Dept., 672 P.2d 810, 816 (Wyo. 1983):

 
 
     While the parties to 
an insurance contract have the right to embody in the policy such lawful terms 
as they wish * * * the insurance agreement must not conflict with pertinent 
statutes or public policy. McKay v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the 
United States, Wyo.421 P.2d 166 (1966); Cincinnati Insurance Company v. 
Mallon, 409 N.E.2d 1100 (Ind. App. 1980).

 
 
Without 
question, Wyoming's insurance statutes supersede any 
contradictory insurance policy language that acts to circumvent the statutes. 
Just as Allstate is prohibited from using terms in its insurance contracts which 
conflict with public policy, this court should also refrain from construing 
insurance policy language so as to conflict with legislative intent. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 211 Va. 133, 176 S.E.2d 327 (1970); American Motorists Ins. 
Co. v. Kaplan, 209 Va. 53, 161 S.E.2d 675 
(1968).

 
 

[¶39.]  By simply concluding that WIGA provides a 
"collectible" source of insurance, the majority eliminates the 
statutorily-imposed procedural requirement that other "covered claim" insurance 
be exhausted pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-111(a). Although both sides in this 
case expend substantial energy and effort to discuss what is meant by 
"collectible insurance," the majority does not hesitate to decide without 
elaboration that WIGA is a source of "collectible insurance." Compare Deisch and 
Marion, P.C. v. 
International Ins. Co., 771 P.2d 19, 20 (Colo. App. 1989) ("Because of the 
insolvency of [the primary carrier], the underlying (primary) insurance coverage 
was not `collectible by the insured * * *.'") with Wurth v. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co., 
34 Ohio App.3d 
325, 518 N.E.2d 607, 612 (1987) ("`[C]ollectible' does not refer to the actual 
payment of a sum of money, but instead refers to the existence of other 
applicable insurance coverage based on the particular occurrence in question."); 
see also Wyoming Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 
487 P.2d 320 (Wyo. 1971).

 
 

[¶40.]  As I consider this case, I find that the 
central issue resembles the "conflicting statute" argument raised by WIGA and 
addressed by this court in West v. Wyoming State Treasurer, 822 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 
1991) (involving the question of whether the State Treasurer had a right of 
reimbursement for paid-out worker's compensation benefits following a third 
party wrongful death recovery by decedent's survivor beneficiaries). In West, 
this court paid homage to our well-established rules of statutory construction 
when two arguably conflicting statutes need to be 
"harmonized:"

 
 
     "`If the language of a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, we must abide by the plain meaning of the 
statute, but where a statute is ambiguous, the court will resort to general 
principles of statutory construction in an attempt to ascertain legislative 
intent. Furthermore, it is a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that 
all portions of an act must be read in pari materia, and every word, clause, and 
sentence must be construed so that no part is inoperative or superfluous.'" 
Matter of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1262-63 (Wyo. 1991), quoting Deloges 
v. State ex rel. Worker's Comp. Div., 750 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Wyo. 1988) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
Furthermore, 
"[l]egislative intent should be ascertained, as nearly as possible, from the 
language of the statute viewed in the light of its object and purpose." Moncrief 
v. Harvey, 816 P.2d 97, 105 (Wyo. 1991). See also 
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 1991). Statutes relating to the same subject are 
read together to ascertain legislative intent. Longfellow v. State, 803 P.2d 1383, 1387 (Wyo. 1991).

 
 
West, 822 P.2d  at 1272 (emphasis added).

 
 

[¶41.]  In complete disregard of our accepted 
rules of statutory construction, the majority in this case makes no attempt to 
harmonize Wyo. Stat. §§ 26-31-106(a)(ii) with 26-31-111(a). Instead, the 
majority redefines Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-106(a)(ii) by summarily concluding that 
WIGA furnished the source of collectible insurance when it "step[ped] into the 
shoes" of the Laramie Insurance Company. At the same time, the majority gives no 
consideration to whether or not Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-111(a) creates a procedural 
condition precedent that must be satisfied or "exhausted" before WIGA "step[s] 
in." A directly contrary result in a somewhat similar case can be found in 
Palmer by Diacon v. Montana Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 239 Mont. 78, 779 P.2d 61 (1989), 
where two funds were involved.

 
 

[¶42.]  Since this is a case of first impression 
in Wyoming, 
consideration of how courts in other jurisdictions have construed substantively 
identical statutory and insurance policy provisions is helpful. For example, in 
Bethea v. Forbes, 519 Pa. 422, 548 A.2d 1215 (1988), several 
automobile accident victims joined in a personal injury action against the 
tortfeasor driver of a second car who had become uninsured because of his 
liability carrier's insolvency. In view of the insolvency, the plaintiffs also 
filed claims under the uninsured motorist provision in the non-tort-feasor 
driver's automobile insurance policy. In resolving Bethea, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court examined the nearly identical Pennsylvania versions of Wyo. Stat. §§ 
26-31-106(a)(ii) and 26-31-111(a):

 
 
     The insolvency of [the 
tort-feasor's insurance company] brought into operation the provisions of The 
Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association Act ("Insurance Guaranty Act"), * * 
* of November 25, 1970, P.L. 716, as amended, 40 P.S. § 1701.101 et seq. That 
statute was enacted to give a measure of protection to policy holders and 
claimants who are faced with financial loss because of the insolvency of certain 
carriers of property and casualty insurance. Section 102(1) of the Act, 40 P.S. 
§ 1701.102(1). To implement that purpose, the statute established the 
Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association ("Association"), and charged it with 
the obligation of paying "covered claims" under property and casualty policies 
issued by insurers that become insolvent. Section 201 of the Act, 40 P.S. § 
1701.201. The Association becomes a statutory insurer in place of the insolvent 
carrier to the extent of its obligations on covered claims. 40 P.S. § 
1701.201(b)(1)(ii). [The functional equivalent of Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-106(a)(ii)] 
In that connection, the Association has "all rights, duties, and obligations of 
the insolvent insurer as if that insurer had not become insolvent." Id.

 
 
     The Association's duty 
to pay claims is, of course, subject to conditions, not the least of which is 
the requirement set forth in section 503(a) [identical to the language in Wyo. 
Stat. § 26-31-111(a)] of the Act. That provision states the 
following:

 
 
"Non-duplication 
of recovery

 
 
Any person 
having a claim against an insurer under any provision in an insurance policy 
other than a policy of an insolvent insurer which is also a covered claim, shall first be required to exhaust his right 
under such policy. Any amount payable on a covered claim under this act 
shall be reduced by the amount of any recovery under such insurance 
policy."

 
 
     40 P.S. § 1701.503(a) 
(emphasis added). In its general effect, the import of the first sentence in the 
above provision is clear: Even if a claim is one otherwise covered by the 
Insurance Guaranty Act, a person's right to obtain relief under the statute does 
not arise unless or until he has exhausted such rights as he has, with respect 
to the "covered claim," under an insurance policy other than the one issued by 
the insolvent. An obvious example of such a situation is where a person has been 
negligently injured in an automobile accident, and, being unable to obtain 
payment from the insolvent insurer of the tortfeasor, may look to the uninsured 
motorist provision in his own insurance policy or in some other applicable 
policy.

 
 
Bethea, 548 A.2d  at 1216 (emphasis in original).

 
 

[¶43.]  Justice Zappala, writing in concurrence 
with the Bethea majority opinion quoted above, gave additional thought to 
legislative intent:

 
 
Intending 
the Association to be a stop-gap measure, the legislature provided that a 
claimant who could seek recovery under a policy other than that of the insolvent 
insurer must first exhaust his right under such policy. 40 P.S. § 1701.503(a). 
This provision reflects the legislature's intent that fiscally solvent insurers, 
which are contractually obligated to pay a claim, be the primary source of 
payment.

 
 
     The Association's 
resources were not intended to be used unless the coverage provided by the 
solvent insurers was: (1) less than that provided by the insolvent insurer, and 
(2) inadequate to cover the damages sustained by the claimant. The 
legislative scheme provided that the Association would be the last resort for 
payment of a claim.

 
 
Bethea, 548 A.2d  at 1218 (emphasis added). See Hetzel, 244 Kan. 698, 772 P.2d 800 and 2A Ronald A. 
Anderson, Couch on Insurance 2d § 22:27, at 599 (Rev. ed. 
1984).

 
 

[¶44.]  An earlier California case, Ross, 
142 Cal. App. 3d 396, 191 Cal. Rptr. 99, involved an insolvent primary carrier and 
a solvent excess carrier. In reviewing the public policy considerations involved 
in the creation of the California Insurance Guaranty Association, the California court 
concluded:

 
 
     In our view, CIGA 
[California Insurance Guaranty Association] was created for the protection of 
the public. Thus, when a secondary insurer is available in the event of an 
insolvent primary insurer, the secondary insurer should be responsible in the 
absence of specific language to the contrary. The secondary insurer has received 
a premium for the risk, and thus the secondary insurer, and not CIGA, should be 
responsible for the coverage of the loss.

 
 

Id. 191 Cal. Rptr.  at 104. See also Palmer by Diacon, 779 P.2d  at 
64.

 
 

[¶45.]  Recognizing the statutory context of 
existing Wyoming law and reflecting on Bethea and Ross 
as I read the Allstate policy in this case, I fail to find "specific language" 
in the Allstate policy which would serve to absolve Allstate from defending and 
paying the Eigenberger claim. With the restructured priorities of obligation, we 
change the state fund from an instrumentality to protect the public, 19A 
Appleman, supra, § 10801 at 367, into a fund to underwrite solvent carriers from 
natural business risks of insolvency of other carriers. The covered claimants 
should not be other carriers with established liability. Palmer by Diacon, 239 
Mont. 78, 779 P.2d 61.

 
 

[¶46.]  This court prioritizes two statutes to 
determine state fund sequential obligation. In simplest terms, if Wyo. Stat. § 
26-31-106(a)(ii) is applied first (as it is by this majority), then the initial 
requirement of "exhaustion" is conveniently eliminated.8 WIGA was established as a "source of last resort" - 
and, by definition, there can be nothing left to "exhaust" (other than WIGA's 
finite resources) once you arrive at the "last resort." Herring, by majority 
decision, does not first exhaust her rights against her carrier, Allstate. 
Wyo. Stat. § 
26-31-111(a). Thus, when WIGA is deemed a source of "collectible insurance" by a 
literal application of Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-106(a)(ii), the majority operates "to 
repeal or override" Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-111(a). Contrary to our well-established 
rules of statutory construction, this majority opinion does not read all 
of the related statutes in order "to ascertain legislative intent." 
Longfellow v. State, 803 P.2d 1383, 1387 (Wyo. 1991); see also West, 822 P.2d  at 1272. 
On the other hand, it is possible to harmonize all of the statutory language and 
satisfy the legislative intent behind the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Association 
Act if the procedural "exhaustion" requirement in Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-111(a) is 
first applied. King, 601 P.2d 273. See also Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, 
Validity, Construction, and Effect of Statute Establishing Compensation for 
Claims Not Paid Because of Insurer's Insolvency, 30 A.L.R.4th 1110, 1139 (1984) 
and cases cited therein regarding first use of other insurance vehicle policy 
coverage.

 
 

[¶47.]  Because I would find that WIGA does not 
provide a source of "collectible insurance" under the express provisions in 
Section I of the Allstate policy and within the persuasive framework of existing 
statutory and case law, we should hold that the Allstate policy, which provided 
insurance for the liability protection of the injured bicyclist, should first be 
exhausted before resort to the state fund would be proper.

 
 

[¶48.]  I would reverse.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 For discussion of DOC 
and unowned vehicle policy coverage, see 6C John Alan Appleman and Jean 
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4455 (Buckley ed. 1979) and 12 Ronald A. 
Anderson, Couch 
on Insurance 2d § 45:239 (1981).

 
 

2 In this case, the 
uninsured motorist section of the Allstate policy (Section II - Protection 
Against Bodily Injury by Uninsured Motorists) was unavailable as a direct source 
of recovery for Christine A. Eigenberger since the policy only provides 
uninsured motorist coverage for bodily injuries sustained by the insured (Melina 
Lee Herring) and not for injured third persons (Eigenberger). Nonetheless, the 
majority quotes but does not discuss the "uninsured automobile" definition in 
Section II of the Allstate policy. It is noteworthy, however, that the uninsured 
motorist provision in the Allstate policy clearly anticipates Allstate having to 
provide insurance protection due to competitor insolvency (i.e., "the company 
writing the [insurance policy] * * * is or becomes 
insolvent").

 
 
Further, I compare the 
"other insurance" condition in Section I of the Allstate policy (which states 
that the Allstate policy "shall be excess insurance over any other collectible 
insurance" with respect to a non-owned automobile) (emphasis added), 
with the "other insurance" condition in Section II of the Allstate policy. The 
"other insurance" clause in Section II states:

 
 
With respect to bodily 
injury to an insured while occupying an automobile not owned by the named 
insured, the insurance under this coverage shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar 
insurance available to such insured and applicable to such automobile as primary 
coverage.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
I elaborate on this 
aspect of the Allstate policy for two reasons. First, I want to emphasize that 
Allstate seems to equate "collectible" insurance with "available" insurance. 
Black's Law Dictionary 135 (6th ed. 1990) defines "available" as "[s]uitable; useable; accessible; obtainable; present or 
ready for immediate use. Having sufficient force or efficacy; effectual; 
valid." (Emphasis added.) In this case, since the Laramie Insurance Company was 
insolvent, its insurance certainly was not "useable; accessible; obtainable; 
present or ready for immediate use."

 
 
Second, if the injured 
person in this case had been automobile driver Herring rather than bicycle rider 
Eigenberger, then, without question, Allstate would have been liable for 
insurance coverage and would not have been able to argue that the uninsured 
motorist coverage in the policy and the whole body of related case law relied 
upon by WIGA was inapplicable. I find no justification for conditioning the 
availability or unavailability of Allstate coverage for this type of accident 
solely on the basis of whether the injured party is a first or third-party 
claimant. Although Eigenberger would not have been able to claim coverage under 
the uninsured motorist portion of the Allstate policy (Section II), she clearly 
qualifies as someone who received bodily injury at the hands of an 
Allstate-insured driver permissibly operating a non-owned private passenger 
automobile under Part 1 of Section I of the Allstate policy - that portion of 
the policy governing Herring's personal liability protection. Herring and all 
others who purchase automobile liability insurance do so in part to protect 
themselves against exactly what happened here.

 
 

3 The case law on the 
subject is extended. See Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, 
and Effect of Statute Establishing Compensation for Claims Not Paid Because of 
Insurer's Insolvency, 30 A.L.R.4th 1110 (1984). For the associated subject, see 
Jane M. Draper, Annotation, Primary Insurer's Insolvency as Affecting Excess 
Insurer's Liability, 85 A.L.R.4th 729 (1991).

 
 

4 In many states, there 
would be a fourth resource which does not exist in Wyoming. It is no-fault 
insurance, usually designated personal injury protection benefit plan (PIP). See 
McMichael v. Robertson, 77 Md. App. 208, 549 A.2d 1157, 1158 (1988). For 
a clear recitation of the operative distinctions in theory and result between 
uninsured motorist and no fault first-party automobile insurance coverages, see 
Lomax v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 964 F.2d 1343 (3rd Cir. 
1992).

 
 

5 Some fringe or partly 
related concept cases can be found, but none of any direct relevant substance 
involving a DOC clause in either Wyoming or 
Utah. In fact, 
only one case has been unearthed which addresses this specific subject of the 
relationship between DOC-UV clause coverage after insolvency of the automobile 
insuring carrier and the state fund responsibility. I have considered the one 
relevant case carefully, although not cited in majority opinion. It is not 
logically or precedentially sound and clearly does not comply with Wyoming 
statutory language in required exhaustion of available insurance or the broad 
based UM cases although Pennsylvania insolvency fund law seems to be within the 
majority trend. See Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Long, 387 Pa. Super. 574, 564 A.2d 937 (1989), aff'd 597 A.2d 1124 (1991). Although that case was one of the two 
principal sources of argument by Allstate, its nonuse by the majority confirms 
my view of its logical inapplicability to this Wyoming statutory interpretation 
decision.

 
 

6 The Louisiana exception was further distinguished in the 
Pennsylvania case of Henninger v. Riley, 317 
Pa. Super. 
570, 464 A.2d 469 (1983) by explanation that the Louisiana law permitted subrogation by the UM carrier 
against the insured of the insolvent carrier, which most state statutes, 
including Wyoming, would not. See Wyo. Stat. § 
26-31-111(a).

 
 

7 For typical umbrella 
coverage, excess liability insurance where a drop down requirement versus a 
state guaranty fund application is presented, see Washington Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. 
Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co., 685 F. Supp. 1160 (W.D.Wash. 1988); Wurth v. Ideal Mut. 
Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App.3d 325, 518 N.E.2d 607 (1987); and 
Lechner v. Scharrer, 145 Wis.2d 667, 429 N.W.2d 491 (1988) (umbrella excess over 
a vehicular primary carrier). In these cases, statutory requirements regarding 
policy provisions were not at issue and the decision entirely resulted from an 
examination of the language of the excess insurance policy. Luko v. Lloyd's of 
London, 393 Pa. Super. 165, 573 A.2d 1139 (1990); Lechner, 
429 N.W.2d  at 492. This discussion can turn into the applied limits policy coverage versus amounts reasonably recoverable 
discussion Vickodil v. Lexington Ins. Co., 412 Mass. 132, 587 N.E.2d 777 (1992); 
Wurth, 518 N.E.2d  at 611. Those precepts resulting from policies defined as 
umbrella, general liability, floater, etc., that provide high level coverage 
based upon existence of a policy with primary underlying coverage, do not 
provide the same character of insurance relationships found with the private 
passenger automobile financial responsibility approved policies where the 
subjects are PIP coverage, if it exists, and, if not, the automobile insurance 
coverage, if any; the driver's coverage as third-party coverage; and then, 
finally, the first-party UM coverage. Use of terms generally applicable to 
umbrella and primary insurance concepts as primary and excess designations do 
not effectively fit the automobile policy relationship.

 
 

8 It is interesting to 
note that Section 12 of the Property and Liability Insurance Guaranty 
Association Model Act drafted by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners was entitled "Non-Duplication of Recovery." Although substantively 
identical to the equivalent statutory provision in Wyoming's version of the 
Model Act, in 1983 and again in 1990, the legislature saw fit to amend the title 
of Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-111 to reflect the explicit exhaustion requirement in Wyo. 
Stat. § 26-31-111(a). The title now reads: "Exhaustion of remedies under policy; 
claims recoverable from more than one association; claim limitation." See 1983 
House Bills - Part 2 - H.B. 111 at 904 and 1990 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 96.

 
 

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶49.]  I, too, would reverse the decision of the 
trial court in this case, and I agree with the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Urbigkit, in which I join. I am satisfied the case really is controlled by Wyo. 
Stat. § 26-31-111(a) (1991), and the major fallacy in the majority opinion is 
the conclusion that there is no claim against Allstate Insurance Company because 
of the adoption of the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Association Act (WIGA). 
Wyo. Stat. §§ 
26-31-101 to -117 (1991). The effect of the majority decision is to inject the 
provisions of the Allstate policy as a gloss upon the statute, rather than 
reading the statute as controlling the provisions of the insurance 
policy.

 
 

[¶50.]  This result is precisely the inverse of 
our usual rule.

 
 
The U.C.C. 
became a part of the contract as though written into its terms. Tri-County 
Electric Association v. City of Gillette, Wyo. 
1978, 584 P.2d 995; Application of Hagood, Wyo. 1960, 356 P.2d 135.

 
 
Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel 
Cattle Breeders of Canada, Ltd. v. Y-Tex Corporation, 590 P.2d 1306, 1309 
(Wyo. 
1979).

 
 
We have 
recognized that statutory provisions become a part of the bargain contemplated 
by the parties in Wyoming as though the statute actually were 
included in the terms. Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders of Canada Ltd. v. 
Y-Tex Corporation, 590 P.2d 1306 (Wyo. 1979); 
Tri-County Electric Association, Inc. v. City of Gillette, 584 P.2d 995 (Wyo. 1978).

 
 
Century 
Ready-Mix Company v. Lower & Company, 770 P.2d 692, 696 (Wyo. 
1989).

 
 
Contractual 
provisions cannot rise above constitutional and statutory 
law.

 
 
Tri-County 
Electric Association, Inc. v. City of Gillette, 
584 P.2d 995, 1004 (Wyo. 1978).

 
 
It is well 
settled that laws which subsist at the time and place of making of a contract, 
and where it is to be performed, enter into and become a part of it as though 
expressly referred to and incorporated in its terms. (Citations 
omitted.)

 
 
Application 
of Hagood, 356 P.2d 135, 138 (Wyo. 1960).

 
 

[¶51.]  For me, the correct analysis is to assume 
that the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Association Act is not available when 
analyzing the rights of the claimants and the insureds under the insurance 
policies. It is clear that, in the absence of WIGA, there would be a claim under 
the Allstate policy because of the insolvency of Laramie Insurance Company. WIGA 
does not expunge the insolvency of Laramie Insurance Company, but it does 
provide for certain results after the rights of the parties have been determined 
without reference to WIGA. That is exactly what Wyo. Stat. § 26-31-111(a) 
contemplates when it says:

 
 
     (a) Any person having 
a claim against an insurer under an insurance policy other than a policy of an 
insolvent insurer which is also a covered claim, shall first exhaust his right 
under the policy. Any amount payable on a covered claim under this chapter shall 
be reduced by the amount of any recovery under the insurance 
policy.

 
 
The 
statutory provision makes sense only if it is read to provide for exhaustion of 
the Allstate policy rights prior to turning to WIGA. This interpretation is 
buttressed by referring to the definition of a "covered claim" found in Wyo. 
Stat. § 26-31-103(a)(ii):

 
 
     (ii) "Covered claim" 
means an unpaid claim which arises out of and is within the coverage and does 
not exceed the applicable limits of an insurance policy to which this chapter 
applies issued by an insurer, if the insurer is an insolvent insurer and the 
claimant or insured is a resident of this state at the time of the insured event 
or the property from which the claim arises is permanently located in this 
state, but "covered claim" does not include:

 
 
(A) Any 
amount due any reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool or underwriting association as 
subrogation recoveries or otherwise; * * *.

 
 

[¶52.]  If the appropriate language is 
paraphrased to apply to this case the proposition is:

 
 
Christine 
A. Eigenberber having a claim against Allstate Insurance Company under an 
insurance policy other than a policy of Laramie Insurance Company which is also 
a covered claim, shall first exhaust her right under the Allstate Insurance 
Company policy. Any amount payable on a covered claim under this chapter shall 
be reduced by the amount of any recovery under the Allstate Insurance Company 
policy.

 
 
I am 
satisfied that to permit the policy language to control the application of the 
statute is fallacious both as a matter of correct law and as a matter of policy. 
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.