Case Title: Anderson v. Perry

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-46

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-08-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Anderson v. Perry1983 WY 83667 P.2d 1155Case Number: 83-46Case Number: 83-46Decided: 08/16/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHN W. ANDERSON AND 
LORRAINEI. 
ANDERSON, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

STEWART R. PERRY, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, TetonCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

Peter F. Moyer 
of Hartnett & Moyer, Jackson, for 
appellants.

Stewart R. 
Perry, pro se, submitted on 
brief.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In a subrogation 
action, plaintiffs sued to recover money which they claim was owed by defendant. 
Defendant, appellee, was a resident of the State of Minnesota. Appellee moved 
to dismiss, claiming lack of jurisdiction over his person. The court entered its 
order dismissing the case.

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

[¶3.]     The only issue on 
appeal is whether there was jurisdiction over the person of appellee. 

[¶4.]     On November 30, 1982, 
appellants initiated a civil action against appellee. The basic facts underlying 
this claim are not in dispute. In July 1979, appellants sold a condominium in 
Teton Village, Wyoming to the appellee and two other persons 
jointly and severally, as purchasers, under a contract for deed. Appellee 
defaulted on payments and the contract for deed was terminated by the appellants 
on June 1, 1982. A lien for unpaid homeowner assessments had been filed against 
the property due to defaults by the appellee occurring over a period of several 
years. Appellants paid the sum of $3,975.79 to the local homeowners association 
to remove this lien. Appellants now seek to recover this sum from the 
appellee.

[¶5.]     The defendant was in 
Wyoming 
looking at property before he bought the condominium. He bought the property as 
a rental investment. The contract for deed was signed in the State of Minnesota, and both 
parties are residents of that state. During the period of time he owned the 
property, he had dealings with a real estate company responsible for renting the 
condominium. He was under the protection of Wyoming law in connection with his ownership 
and rental of the condominium and his dealings with the homeowners association. 
The witnesses and the records concerning it are located in Wyoming. The original 
debt was owed to the homeowners association in Wyoming.

[¶6.]     On February 4, 1983, 
the district court granted appellee's motion to dismiss. The court predicated 
its action upon a finding that it lacked in personam jurisdiction over appellee. 
Although other issues were raised by the parties, the only question we need to 
decide is the issue of in personam jurisdiction.1

[¶7.]     We set forth the 
applicable standard for deciding when in personam jurisdiction exists in Markby v. St. Anthony Hospital Systems, 
Wyo., 647 P.2d 1068 (1982). Since we thoroughly discussed the development of the 
United States Supreme Court cases and the background of our own law, it is only 
necessary now to discuss the requirements which we have established. Along with 
the considerations listed in Ford Motor 
Company v. Arguello, Wyo., 382 P.2d 886 (1963), we determined that 
the present outer limits of personal jurisdiction, based on a single act, would 
be determined by three factors:

1. "* * * [T]he defendant 
must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or 
of causing important consequences in that state. * * *"

2. "* * * [T]he cause of 
action must arise from the consequences in the forum state of the defendant's 
activities. * * *"

3. "* * * [T]he 
activities of the defendant or the consequences of those activities must have a 
substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of 
jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable." Markby, supra at 
1073.

I

[¶8.]     Did appellee purposely avail himself of the 
privilege of acting in the forum state or cause important consequences in that 
state?

[¶9.]     A party purposely 
avails himself of the privilege of acting in a state for purposes of due 
process, if his suit is based upon a contact which had a substantial connection 
with the state or if he engages in extensive activity within the state. Del Monte v. Everett Steamship Corp., 
402 F. Supp. 237 (U.S.D.C.N.D.Cal. 1973).

[¶10.]  In Waterval v. District Court In and For El 
Paso County, Colo., 620 P.2d 5 (1980), cert. denied 452 U.S. 960, 101 S. Ct. 3108, 69 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1981), the court, using the same test, stated that 
although the defendant had never been in Colorado, he had purposefully availed 
himself of the privilege of acting within the state. His contacts consisted of 
telephone calls over a two-year period in which he gave investment advice. This 
court noted that these contacts adequately demonstrated a purposeful election to 
cause important consequences in the forum state. The court stated that his was 
not a single or isolated act which occurred accidentally in the state, nor was 
his contact with the state thrust upon him. Therefore, the exercise of in 
personam jurisdiction was reasonable.

[¶11.]  Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Cleveland 
Lumber Co., 228 Pa. Super. 12, 323 A.2d 11 (1974), involved a 
suit on a contract where the defendant corporation had no offices, property, 
agents, representatives or employees in the forum state and the contract had 
been signed in a different state. There were no business contacts with 
Pennsylvania 
other than this one transaction which gave rise to the suit. The court found 
that it was reasonable under the other circumstances involved that the defendant 
should have foreseen that the transaction would have consequences in the forum 
state. In Cook Associates, Inc. v. 
Colonial Broach & Machine Co., 14 Ill. App.3d 965, 304 N.E.2d 27 (1973), a 
single phone call was sufficient to uphold personal jurisdiction. The court 
noted that they were "dealing with a contractual situation and, therefore, with obligations voluntarily 
undertaken." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 32. The balancing of factors necessary 
to find personal jurisdiction must consider the kind of activities involving the 
defendant as well as the degree. Contractual agreements generally establish a 
clear, voluntary assent.

[¶12.]  In this case, appellee entered into an 
agreement under which he purchased real estate in Wyoming. He employed an 
agent in Wyoming to rent the property and collect 
rents. He incurred obligations to the homeowners association in Wyoming. Thus, he is 
within the first requirement of purposely availing himself of the privilege of 
acting in the forum state.

II

[¶13.]  Did the cause of action arise from 
consequences of appellee's activities in the forum 
state?

[¶14.]  Markby, supra, involved a personal injury 
suit against a hospital in another state which advertised a flying ambulance 
service in Wyoming. However, the suit did not arise in 
connection with this service. We held that the second requirement was a 
dispositive factor and that personal jurisdiction could not be maintained where 
the contacts were minimal and the cause of action did not have a connection with 
the transaction.

[¶15.]  In the present case the cause of action 
does arise from the contacts which the appellee had with this state. He employed 
a Wyoming real estate company to rent his real 
property in Wyoming. The rental was to generate income to 
pay homeowner's fees and expenses. It was a business, and the debt allegedly due 
the homeowners association (cause of action) arose from that business and his 
contacts in Wyoming.

III

[¶16.]  Did activities of appellee have a 
substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of 
jurisdiction reasonable?

[¶17.]  The third factor which must be considered 
is whether the activities or consequences had a substantial connection with the 
forum state. In Dwyer v. District Court, 
Sixth Judicial District, 188 Colo. 41, 532 P.2d 725 (1975), which concerned 
a contract involving real property, the court stated that of utmost importance 
was the fact that "the subject matter of the contract, the real estate, was 
located in Colorado thereby making Colorado the state with the greatest interest 
in the transaction." Id. at 727. In the present situation the 
contract concerns real property located in Wyoming and the covenants are recorded in Wyoming. We hold that 
this satisfies the "substantial connection" requirement of the 
test.

[¶18.]  The fact that the plaintiff is a 
non-resident is not a decisive factor. We have acknowledged the importance of 
furnishing a forum for nonresidents in other contexts, Lohman v. Jefferson Std. Life Insurance 
Co., Wyo., 525 P.2d 1 (1974), even though in that situation personal 
jurisdiction was not upheld because the cause of action did not arise from the 
transaction. Dart Transit Co. v. 
Wiggins, 1 Ill. App.2d 126, 117 N.E.2d 314 (1953), held that suits involving 
the use or operation of motor vehicles would be allowed by nonresidents because 
the state has as much interest in protecting their safety on the highway as it 
does its own citizens. Wyoming has an interest in protecting the 
interests of nonresidents in real property located within the 
state.

[¶19.]  We realize that the factors to be weighed 
must, of necessity, be somewhat subjective. However, under the circumstances of 
this case, we find that it is reasonable and fair to require defendant to submit 
to the jurisdiction of a Wyoming court.

[¶20.]  Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 5-1-107(a), W.S. 
1977, provides:

"(a) A Wyoming court may 
exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Wyoming or United States 
constitution."