Case Title: RAUSER v TOSTON IRRIGATION DIST

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 1 3 2 4 3 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O F MONTANA 1 9 7 7 GEORGE RAUSER and PHYLLIS A. RAUSER, husband and w i f e , P l a i n t i f f s and R e s p o n d e n t s , THE TOSTON IRRIGATION D I S T R I C T , MAURICE L . HUNSAKER, FRANK J. S L I F K A , and SAMUEL F. KIRSKEY, t h e m e m b e r s of t h e B o a r d of C o m m i s s i o n e r s of said TOSTON IRRIGATION D I S T R I C T , D e f e n d a n t s and A p p e l l a n t s . A p p e a l f r o m : D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , H o n o r a b l e P e t e r M e l o y , Judge presiding. C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For A p p e l l a n t s : C o r e t t e , S m i t h and D e a n , B u t t e , M o n t a n a K e n d r i c k S m i t h argued and G e r a l d A l l e n argued, B u t t e , Montana H o l t e r , H e a t h and K i r w a n , B o z e m a n , M o n t a n a For R e s p o n d e n t s : H a r r i s o n , L o e n d o r f and P o s t o n , H e l e n a , M o n t a n a J a m e s T. H a r r i s o n , Jr. argued, H e l e n a , M o n t a n a For A m i c u s C u r i a e : T h o m a s O l s o n , B i l l i n g s , M o n t a n a A l v i n E. B i e l e f e l d argued, B i l l i n g s , M o n t a n a S u b m i t t e d : M a r c h 1 7 , 1 9 7 7 D e c i d e d : bjUN -6 F i l e d : f 6 i$n M r . Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. George Rauser and Phyllis Rauser, husband and wife, brought t h i s action i n the d i s t r i c t court, Broadwater County, against the Toston Irrigation District and members of the Board of Commissioners of t h a t District. The complaint alleged a portion of Rausers' land was taken without compensation, and construction of the irrigation project with resultant seepage caused water t o stand stagnant on approximately forty acres of p l a i n t i f f s ' land situated along Warm Spring Creek. It alleged t h i s amounted t o the taking of a flood easement. Defendant's motion t o strike the individual board members a s parties was granted. T r i a l was had before a jury and a verdict returned i n favor of Rausers i n the amount of $100,000. The Toston Irrigation Project consists of the Crow Creek pump unit and a water delivery system b u i l t a s a part of the Missouri River Basin Project. The land t o be irrigated was t o serve a s a replacement for lands flooded by Canyon Ferry Reservoir. The pro- ject began i n 1955 with fewer than a thousand acres under irrigation. A t present it covers nearly five thousand acres. Plaintiffs are not members of the Toston Irrigation District but t h e i r land i s bounded one one side by land i n the District. The acreage alleged taken i s a t a lower elevation than land i n the District. Each party presented expert hydrological testimony and expert valuation testimony. Plaintiffs' hydrological expert t e s t i f i e d the source of the water on the Rauser property was t o the south and east, basing h i s opinion on well readings taken over a substantial number of years. Along with other factors, he took into consider- ation the extent of irrigation i n the District and the rainfall. H e also read into evidence from a United States Geological Survey document entitled "Geology and Occurrence of Ground Water i n Town- send Valley, Montana" the following statement : "The application of additional irrigation water t o the benchland flanking Warm Spring Creek w i l l increase the extent of waterlogging i n the bottom land unless provi- sion is made for more adequate drainage. In t h i s part of the valley the Tertiary sand and gravel deposits, which are mantled by permeable windblown s o i l , are underlain by beds of hardened clay, locally referred t o as 'hardpan. I I f water is applied t o these lands, a gradual r i s e i n the water table w i l l take place. This r i s e w i l l result i n the increased flow of existing springs i n the lower part of the valley, and new springs w i l l appear along the slope from the benchland to the valley bottom. In t h i s area the valley bottom is underlain by relatively impermeable fine- textured clay. The capillary fringe above the water table w i l l r i s e t o the surface i n much of the bottom land, saline s o i l w i l l develop, and the land w i l l eventually become unpro- ductive. Water logging w i l l become more extensive i f irri- gation water i s applied to the benchland that l i e s a t a higher elevation than the present irrigated land unless provision is made for more adequate drainage. This condi- tion w i l l exist not only i n the Crow Creek area but also i n other parts of the valley where additional irrigation i s planned .I1 The expert indicated h i s findings confirmed t h i s prediction, George Ranser t e s t i f i e d the diminution of value because of the "taking" totaled $100,000. Plaintiffs' expert valuation w i t - ness t e s t i f i e d the loss was i n the range of $35,000 basing his opinion on comparable sales of three nearby parcels. Defendant's hydrological expert t e s t i f i e d the cause of the flooding on p l a i n t i f f s ' land was the enlargement of p l a i n t i f f s ' own irrigation ditch which created a barrier t o the natural drainage of the land. Defendant's valuation expert placed the t o t a l loss a t $26,000. - 3 - The parcel affected by the water includes the land where p l a i n t i f f s ' home, shop and outbuildings are located. The United States government b u i l t and owns the physical assets of the irriga- tion system. Almost from the beginning of irrigation on the project, there have been negotiations between Rausers and the District about the flooding of the land and proposals t o drain it. The District went so f a r a s t o draw up plans and obtain bids for a drain system, but because the bid was substantially more than expected nothing further was done. The Toston Irrigation District appeals. W e summarize the issues a s these: (1) May an irrigation d i s t r i c t exercise the power of eminent domain on a project whose-.physical assets are owned by the federal government? (2) May there be a condemnation of property without a showing of negligent design, construction, o r operation of the project. (3) Was the action barred by laches? ( 4 ) Was the verdict supported by substantial credible evidence ? (5) A r e attorney fees allowable? ( 6 ) Was there an adequate description of the land here involved? Issue (1) The power t o condemn property i s granted t o irrigation d i s t r i c t s by Montana statute, section 89-1301(3), R.C.M. 1947, and states: "(3) The board * * * shall also have power and authority t o acquire by purchase, lease, contract, condemnation, o r other legal means, lands (and rights i n lands) for rights of way, for reservoirs, for the storage of needful waters, and for dam s i t e s , and necessary appurtenances, and such other lands and property as may be necessary for the construction, use, maintenance, repair, improvement, enlargement and operation of any d i s t r i c t system of irrigation works." That the physical assets are owned by the United States government does not l i m i t the power t o condemn. Section 89-1301(7) clearly indicates substantial federal involvement i s contemplated i n "construction, operation, and maintenance of the necessary works for the delivery and distribution of water therefrom * * *.'I De- fendant argues the t r i a l court lacked jurisdiction because the physical assets are owned-by the United States. This argument must f a i l for no e f f o r t s were made on the part of defendant t o remove the case t o federal court and no case authority is cited o r relied upon t o support defendant ' s position. While the District questions whether there was i n fact a taking here and the compensability of it, case law holds there can be a taking without a t o t a l physical appropriation of land. Here the District did not condemn the land, rather it caused the land to be permanently invaded by the percolation of water. Similar fact cases have been considered by the United States Supreme Court recog- nizing the rights of the damaged landowner. United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 70 S.Ct. 885, 94 L ed 1277; United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 23 S.Ct. 349, 47 L ed 539; 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Taking and Damage 56.32. Issue (2). Whether there may be a taking by the District without a showing of negligence i n design, construction, or operation of the District? I n actions for damage for seepage the rule a s stated i n Fleming v. Lockwood, 36 Mont. 384, 391, 92 P. 962, and quoted i n Rhodes v. Weigand, 145 Mont. 542, 549, 402 P.2d 588, is: "* * * I f , i n fact, the seepage occurred a s p l a i n t i f f contends, it must have been the result of negligence on ~ockwood's part, e i t h e r i n constructing o r operating the ditch, since it is not contended that it was the result of inevitable accident or was caused'by an.act of God; and therefore the plaintiff had the burden of proof, in the first instance, to show negligence on the part of the defendant." The District cites Fleming as authority for the fact that to have a recovery here there must be intentional or negligent acts. Fleming,a negligence case, provided for payment in the case of intentionally caused torts. The District cites Rhodes as authority, but there this Court provided for the issuance of an injunction, noting : "The record in this cause discloses with clarity that appellant in the year 1947, again in 1961 and again, after complaint had been made to him of flooding in the year 1962, persisted in his negligent and deliberate acts .I1 Montana's case law does not require a showing of negligence or a theory of negligence when faced with deliberate or intentional acts. In Calvert v. Anderson, 73 Mont. 551, 555, 236 P . 847, the Court held: "It is the rule in this state that the owner of an irrigating ditch is not an insurer thereof and is liable only for damages caused by his willful acts or by his negligence in constructing, maintaining or using his ditch." However, as we will discuss later, Fleming and Rhodes are not applicable to the facts of the instant case. In Rhodes the court found that the rule which requires a showing of negligence was met by deliberate acts, the flooding of plaintiff's land. The instant action is one for inverse condemnation. The 1972 Montana Constitution, Art. 11, Section 29, provides: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation to the full extent of the loss having been first made to or paid into court for the owner. In the event of litigation, just compensation shall include necessary expenses of litigation to be awarded by the court when the private property owner prevails." An early Montana case, Less v . City of Butte, 28 Mont. 27, 32, 72 P. 140, in construing this identical language in the 1889 Consti- tution "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensa-tion * * *I' said: "* * * Under constitutions which provide that property shall not be 'taken or damaged' it is universally held that 'it is not necessary that there be any physical invasion of the individual's property for public use to entitle him to compensation.' * * *'These easements are property, protected by the constitution from being taken or damaged without just compensation. ' * * * Moreover, it may frequently occur that 'the consequential damage may impose a more serious loss upon the owner than a temporary spoliation or invasion of the property. ' " In the ordinary condemnation case necessity, valuation and the like are the issues to be determined---fault or negligence are not considered authority. The rule stated in Fleming that an irrigation district is not an insurer of its ditches from damage as a result of acts of God or against occasional damage which occurs even though the district has exercised due care, does not apply to the facts here. Here the damage done by the project was foreseeable and foreseen. It was inevitable that Rausers' land would be damaged by the construction of the project, absent remedial work. Almost from the outset Rausers sought to have the damage remedied and as the amount of water used by the project increased, so did the Rausers' complaints. Where, as here, the damages are known or knowable and are an inevitable result of the intentional undertaking of the project, there is no need to show negligent design, construction or operation. It is enough to show the damages were proximately caused by the undertaking of the project and a reasonable foresee- able consequence of the undertaking. It is implicit in inverse con- demnation that the extent of the damage be of such a degree as to amount to a taking of an interest in the property damaged. Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 42 Cal.Rptr. 89, 96, 398 P.2d 129, 136; 20 Hastings Law Journal 431. Historically it appears inevitable t o each new irrigation project that certain unexplained and unplanned for problems a r i s e that damage adjacent property owners. In many instances there i s no negligence or other wrongful conduct or omission on the part of defendant. The injured property owners have sought redress for damages on the alternative theories of inverse condemnation and t o r t , as applied t o the facts. Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal.2d 276, 289 P.2d 1; Granone v. County of Los Angeles, 231 Cal.App.2d 629, 42 Outstanding i n the cases of t h i s type i s the holding of the California Supreme Court i n Albers: "From the foregoing analysis of the cases and other legal authorities it i s apparent that we are not required t o choose between two absolute rules, one of l i a b i l i t y and one of nonliability, but are faced with a more limited issue. The question is not whether i n a l l cases, a property owner should not be permitted t o recover i n an inverse condemnation action i f a private party would not be liable for damages similarly inflicted, but whether there i s o r should be a qualification or limitation of that rule t o the effect that the property owner may recover i n such an action where actual physical damage is proximately caused t o h i s property by a public improvement as deliberately planned and b u i l t * * *." 398 P.2d 136. The California Court concluded that such damages are compensable and adopted five factors for consideration. W e find t h i s case applicable to the instant case and adopt a s guides the five factors. 1) The damage t o t h i s property, i f reasonably foreseeable, would have entitled the property owners t o compensation; 2) the likelihood of public works not being engaged i n because of unforeseen and un- foreseeable possible direct physical damage t o real e s t a t e is remote; 3) the property owners did suffer direct physical damage t o t h e i r properties a s the proximate result of the works as deliberately planned and carried out; 4) the cost of such damage can b e t t e r be absorbed, and with infinitely less hardship, by the taxpayers a s a whole, than by owners of the individual parcels, and t5) t o quote from Clement v. State Reclamation Board, 35 Cal.2d 628,642, 220 P.2d 897, 905, "the owner of the damaged property i f uncompensated would contribute more than h i s proper share t o the public undertaking." The California Court then noted, quoting from an ea~rly opinion, Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 351, 144 P.2d 818, 823, quoting from Sedgwick on Constitutional Law: ""'The tendency under our system is too often t o sacrifice the individual t o the community; and it seems very d i f f i c u l t i n reason t o show why the State should not pay for property which it destroys or impairs the value, a s well a s for what it physically takes. * * ,*.""' a Issue 3. The District argues the action i s barred by laches. The project was begun i n 1955 and t h i s actions was not i n i t i a t e d u n t i l 1973. The evidence reveals that complaints were made t o the District almost from the outset and remedial action was discussed u n t i l sometime just prior t o the commencement of t h i s action. Laches is an equitable defense. This Court i n Davis v. Steingruber, 131 Mont. 468, 470, 311 P.2d 784, said: "Laches means negligence i n the assertion of a right, and exists where there has been a delay of such duration a s t o render enforcement of the asserted right inequitable ." there i s no unexplained delay which would j u s t i f y > , ths application of the doctrine of laches and there is no prejudice sufficient t o justify the application of. laches. Thus the action i s not barred by laches. The districtI1s actions lulled p l a i n t i f f s throughout the years between the beginning of the District and the f i l i n g of the action. Issue (4). Is the verdict supported by the evidence? This involves two questions. F i r s t , was the United States Geological report entitled "Geology and Occurrence of Ground Water i n the Townsend Valley,Montana1' admissible into evidence over a hearsay objection? This document contains a detailed description of the geography, geomorphology, geology, ground water, and chemical quality of the water and has a short summary and conclusion section. Plain- t i f f s ' hydrology expert used the data i n the nearly 50 pages of measurements of water level observation wells along with the general information i n the document, as an aid i n h i s analysis of the ~ a u s e r s ' probdkm. The expert t e s t i f i e d as foundation that (1) the information was available t o the public and others i n h i s profession; (2) the document and others like it were recognized a s authorities and relied upon by professionals i n t h e i r f i e l d of work, and (3) the document was prepared i n the normal course of business by the agency prior t o the building of the irrigation project. Section 93-1101-8, R.C.'M. 1947, states: "Historical works, books of science o r a r t , and published maps o r charts, when made by persons indifferent between the parties, are prima-facie evidence of facts of general notoriety and interest." I A n early case interpreting section 93-1101-8, Lynes v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 43 Mont. 317, 329, 117 P. 81, discussed t h i s section a s it related t o the admissibility of certain tables of results of t e s t s made on a i r brakes on trains of different tonnage. The tables were offered t o corroborate the expert's opinion and as independent evidence of the facts shown. The Court said: "* * * i f the proper preliminary proof is made, viz., that the book or chart offered i s by a person indifferent between the parties l i t i g a n t , is standard among the pro- fession, trade o r occupation t o which it relates, and is accepted and acted upon as accurate, it should be admitted, upon the theory that the matters which it contains are facts , , of ,general riotariety'and inte?est ." The document here involved is similar t o the one involved i n Lynes and was offered for substantially the same purposes. The foundation required for the admission, that it was prepared prior to l i t i g a t i o n by parties indifferent between the parties and that it i s accepted a s an authority and relied on a s such, is s u f f i c i e n t assurance of the t r u t h of the matters contained therein and thus excepts it from the requirement t h a t the speaker be available f o r cross-examination. W e note here t h a t the portion of the summary and conclusion read i n t o evidence does not speak t o the existence of present harm, only predicts such harm. It goes not t o the t r u t h of the issue, but t o the knowledge o r i n t e n t of the builders of the project. The D i s t r i c t argued the jury disregarded the evidence t h a t the D i s t r i c t was not responsible f o r any seepage past the point of delivery a t the headgates. The evidence of where the seepage came from was a matter f o r the jury t o decide and was decided against the contentions of the D i s t r i c t . There was considerable evidence t o support the jury' s decision. Second, a s t o the other challenges made t o the determination of cause and the valuation--is there substantial credible evidence t o support the verdict and judgment? That is the scope of t h i s Courts review, S t a t e Highway ~omrn'n v. Vaughan, 155 Mont. 277, 470 P.2d 967. A s t o cause, both p a r t i e s presented a number of witnesses, including two highly qualified and extremely convincing expert witnesses who gave conflicting explanations of the cause of the injury. There i s substantial credible evidence f o r the j u r y ' s findings of cause. As t o valuation, it is t r u e the amount the jury returned a s ~ t s verdict i s the highest amount t e s t i f i e d t o and t h i s testimony was by the landowner. This Court has permitted the landowner t o t e s t i f y a s t o the value of h i s land within c e r t a i n l i m i t s . I n S t a t e Highway Comm'n v. Barnes, 151 Mont. 300, 305, 443 P.2d 16, t h i s Court, quoting a p r i o r case, said: "we now restate the rule to be that an owner, upon prima facie proof of ownership, s h a l l be qualified t o estimate i n a reasonable way the value of h i s property for the use t o which he has been putting it. Such owner i s not qualified by virtue of ownership alone t o t e s t i f y a s t o its value for other purposes unless he possesses, a s any other witness a s t o value, "some peculiar means of forming an intelligent and correct judgment as t o the value of the property i n question beyond what i s presumed t o be possessed by men generally." '" Here, as i n Barnes, the landowner t e s t i f i e d t o the value of the land as it was being used. While the District argues that Rauser's value ..testimony i s incredible, it should be noted that within the 40 acres involved are a l l the buildings of the ranch. H e t e s t i f i e d the water problems began with the commencement of the project: that h i s two separate basements were flooded; the septic tank would not function; that land near the home i s inundated the year around; that he could not - use h i s calving area i n the winter and a new one had t o be b u i l t ; that he could not keep corrals clean because of the water; and that he had t o get out of the hog business a value t o the ranch operation. With that as a background, he went on t o t e s t i f y a s t o the value of h i s ranch before and a f t e r the taking. The t r i a l judge did not abuse h i s discretion i n allowing t h i s testimony. Issue (5). This issue involves attorney fees and consists of two questions. F i r s t , does the court have the power t o award attorney fees i n an inverse condemnation case? Second, were attorney fees properly awarded i n t h i s case? F i r s t . A r t . XI, Section 29, 1972 Montana Constitution provides: "Private property shall not be taken o r damaged for public use without just compensation t o the f u l l extent of the loss having been f i r s t made t o or paid into court for the owner. In the event of l i t i g a t i o n , just compensa- tion shall include necessary expenses of l i t i g a t i o n t o be awarded by the court when the private property owner pre- vails. I I The s t a t u t e implementing the l a s t sentence of A r t . 11, Section 29, is section 93-9921.1, R.C.M. 1947, which provides: h he condemnor, s h a l l within t h i r t y (30) days a f t e r an appeal i s perfected from the commissioner's award o r report, submit t o condemnee a written f i n a l o f f e r of judgment f o r the property t o be condemned, together with necessary expenses of condemnee then accrued. " I f any time p r i o r t o ten (10) days before t r i a l the condemnee serves written notice t h a t the o f f e r i s accepted, e i t h e r party may then f i l e the o f f e r and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and thereupon judgment s h a l l be entered. A n o f f e r not accepted s h a l l be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof i s not admissible a t the t r i a l except i n a proceeding t o determine costs. The f a c t t h a t an o f f e r i s made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. I n the event of l i t i g a t i o n , and when the private property owner prevails, by receiving an award i n excess of the f i n a l o f f e r of the condemnor, t h e court s h a l l award necessary expenses of l i t i g a t i o n t o the condemnee ." For future reference i n such controversies, we note here t h a t the 1977 Montana Legislature passed House B i l l No. 483, now Chapter 48, 1977 Session Laws. This i s an a c t t o define and provide a manner f o r computing the amount of necessary expenses of l i t i g a t i o n required by section 93-9921.1, R.C.M. 1947. While not e f f e c t i v e f o r the i n s t a n t case, a l l cases a r i s i n g a f t e r July 1, 1977, the e f f e c t i v e date of the a c t , w i l l come under t h i s a c t . I n S t a t e v. Olsen, 166 Mont. 139, 147, 531 P.2d 1330, the Court found the 1972 Constitution and the s t a t u t e implementing it required payment of expert witnesses and attorney fees. W e note t h a t section 93-9921.1, R.C.M. 1947, does not use the terms " p l a i n t i f f " and "defendant" a s do most of the p r i o r sections i n the eminent domain chapter, Chapter 99, T i t l e 93. I n Frustuck v. City of Fairfax, 41 Cal.Rptr. 56, attorney fees were denied i n an inverse condemnation case. There the court rested i t s decision on two factors (1) t h a t the word "defendant" was used in the eminent domain attorney's fee s t a t u t e indicating t h a t t h e attorneyFs fee statute applied only to the statutory procedure, and ( 2 ) there was no constitutional requirement that attorney fees be paid in an eminent domain action in California. However, in a recent case, Holtz v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, 131 Cal.Rptr. 646, 552 P.2d 430, 436, footnote the court notes : "It is asserted that since federal law makes it clear that litigation costs are not recoverable in an inverse condemnation if a 'tort' is alleged, section 1246.3 must be interpreted so as to prohibit the award of litigation costs in actions alleging damage to real property. Aside from the fact that no such limitation is made by section 1246.3 and that, as we conclude above, the loss of lateral support may be characterized as a taking of an interest in real property, this argument ignores the established principle that recovery in inverse condemnation is based on the constitutional pro- vision requiring just compensation,not on a theory of tort. (Reardon v. San Francisco, supra, 66 Cal. 492, 505, 6 P. 317.) We have consistently rejected the contention that the right to recover in eminent doxhafn .derives from'tort doetrine,'em- phasizing that as a matter of policy the owner of property taken or damagd for public use should not contribute a dis- proportionate share of the cost of a public undertaking. {Citing cases]" In Montana, precisely the opposite is true. "Condemnor" and 11 condemneel' are used in the attorney's fee statute in contrast to the rest of the chapter which speaks of "defendant1' and "plaintiff" . Further, there is a clear constitutional requirement that attorney fees be paid in condemnation cases where the landowner prevails. Attorney fees are permissible in inverse condemnation cases in Montana. Second. The District alleges no attorney fee is proper in this case because there was no final offer as required by statute. This same objection was discussed in Olsen where the Court said: "To adopt such a theory here would contravene the intent of the statute and would violate the constitutional mandate. Article 11, Section 29, 1972 Constitution requires that a landowner be compensated for necessary expenses of litigation if he prevails. This constitutional directive cannot be frustrated by inadvertent or intentional violations of statu- tory procedure." 166 Mont. 147. While it i s understandable the District i n t h i s inverse condemnation action did not wish t o follow the statutory condemnation procedure, that may not be used t o deny p l a i n t i f f s their attorney fees. In the instant case a $30,000 bid for work that would have cured the problem was rejected a s being too costly. The amount the project was expected t o cost was around $6,000. B y inference it seems clear the $100,000 verdict exceeded the "final offer" of the condemnor. Defendant next questions whether such fee may be awarded where no evidence was taken as required by Crncevich v. Georgetown Recreation Corp., 168 Mont. 113, 541 P.2d 56, 59, 32 St.Rep. 963 and F i r s t Security Bank of Bozeman v. Tholkes, Mont * - 9 547 P.2d 1328, 33 St. Rep. 341'. In Tholkes t h i s Court vacated the judgment on attorney fees and remanded the cause for an evidentiary hearing on attorney fees. Here, since the s t a t e or p o l i t i c a l sub- division must pay the attorney fees, there is even stronger reason t o remaidcl the instant case for consideration of the factors s e t out i n Crncevich and Tholkes. Under the 1889 Constitution fees i n condemnation cases were percentage contingency fees. In the private agreements the parties protected their own interests but where the fee i s t o be paid by the s t a t e there i s no incentive for the land- owner t o bargain t o keep the percentage reasonable. Clearly success is an important factor i n setting an attorney fee. The "result secured" is among the factors s e t out i n Crncevich and Tholkes, but it i s not the only factor and a l l must be considered and weighed t o arrive a t a reasonable fee. W e wish t o make clear that there i s absolutely no intent t o imply i n any way that the fee i n the instant case i s unreasonable, but only t o require that the reasonableness of the fee be shown by evidence. Often those unfamiliar with the difficulties and complexities involved in an action, especially such a one as the instant inverse condemnation action, see only the lump sum figure for attorney fees and think it unreasonable. By producing evidence as to the amount of time and effort involved, that simplistic judgment should disappear. Issue ( 6 ) . The sufficiency of the description of what was taken. It was clear to the jury,which had viewed the land,and the parties what land was involved, but as to third parties and subsequent takers a legal description of the land including a survey of metes and bounds should be furnished and made a part of the judg- ment. Judgment is affirmed in part, and remanded in part to the trial court for further hearings as directed by this opinion. We Concur: - - - Justices. M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell: I c o n c u r i n t h e r e s u l t .