Case Title: STATE EX REL WOODBURY v DIST COU

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1972-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12250 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1972 T H E STATE O F MONTANA ex re1 BRIAN EDWARD WOODBURY, Relator, THE DISTRICT C O U R T O F T H E THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , Respondent. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel of Record: For Relator: John L. Adams argued, Billings, Montana. For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Waodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana . David V. Gliko, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Hele nay Montana. Harold I ? . Hanser, County Attorney, argued, Billings, Montana. Submitted: April 10, 1972 Decided:AP~ 1 3 1972 M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an origina 1 proceeding seeking a post-conviction hearing under the terms of section 95-2601, R.C.M. 1947, by a defendant who claims sentence was imposed i n violation of the laws of t h i s s t a t e and seeks correction of t h a t sentence. Defendant, r e l a t o r here, on March 1, 1972, was convicted i n the d i s t r i c t court of the t h i r t e e n t h j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Yellowstone, of the crime of criminal s a l e of dangerous drugs. Such conviction arose out of the entry of a g u i l t y plea t o the charge by the defendant. The court ordered t h e imposition of sentence upon defendant be stayed f o r a period of two years upon a condition t h a t defendant s h a l l serve a term of t h i r t y days i n the Yellowstone county j a i l ; the j a i l sentence t o begin February 21, 1972. Defendant contends the court is without jurisdiction t o impose the condition of service of time i n the Yellowstone county j a i l based on the decision of t h i s Court i n S t a t e v. Drew, M o n t . , 490 P.2d 230, 28 St.Rep.930, decided November 3, 1971. Brian Woodbury, eighteen years of age, on January 21, 1972 was charged by Information i n the d i s t r i c t court of the t h i r t e e n t h j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Yellowstone, with the crime of criminal s a l e of dangerous drugs alleged t o have been committed on January 15, 1972; t h a t he sold c e r t a i n dangerous drugs, to-wit: Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Counsel was appointed for defendant and bond s e t a t $500. O n January 24, 1972, defendant appeared in court with h i s appointed counsel, Michael J. Whalen, and entered a plea of not g u i l t y . The bond was continued with the r e s t r i c t i o n t h a t i f de- fendant posted bond, he would be subject t o c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t i v e scheduling by the school a u t h o r i t i e s of School D i s t r i c t No. 2. He was released on bond subject t o the conditions which he signed on January 28, 1972. O n February 4, 1972, the case was s e t f o r t r i a l March 7, 1972. On March 1, 1972, defendant appeared i n court with h i s counsel John L. Adams, Jr., and withdrew h i s plea and entered a g u i l t y plea, a t which time t h e sentence now i n issue was imposed. The f a c t s r e l a t i n g t o t h i s charge a r e : On January 15, 1972, the Billings Police Department received telephone c a l l s from two parents i n Billings t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t they thought t h e i r daughters had on the previous night taken some type of drug. One of t h e g i r l s was placed i n the psychiatric ward a t Billings Deaconess Hospital. It was subsequently ascertained t h a t both g i r l s had taken LSD, which had been put i n Kool-Aid. They s t a t e d they had purchased the L S D from defendant. O n being questioned by the Billings Police Department, defendant admitted t h e s a l e of t h e LSD t o the two teen-age g i r l s and a l s o furnished the police with three additional "hits" of LSD t h a t he had cached i n a snowbank near h i s house. This information was available t o the court a t the time sentence was pronounced. This defendant i s presently under charge of s i x felony counts f o r criminal s a l e of dangerous drugs which includes LSD, Marijuana , Crys t a 1-Ma t h and Heroin. This charge arose almost immediately a f t e r the conviction here, t h a t i s , on March 17, 1972, Upon the g u i l t y plea, the court stayed the imposition of sentence for a period of two years and i n addition t o seven general conditions imposed i n t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n , an additional one was added---that the defendant would serve a term of t h i r t y days i n t h e Yellowstone county j a i l . The issue here involved is whether t h e t r i a l court can impose conditions on a deferred imposition of sentence under t h e terms of the Montana Dangerous Drug Act; more p a r t i c u l a r l y , whether those conditions can include a period of time i n a county j a i l . In S t a t e v. Drew, M o n t . - 9 490 P.2d 230, 28 St.Rep. 930, 932, we said: tt The only remaining issue f o r review i s whether a s i x month imprisonment is proper under the presump- t i o n of entitlement t o a deferred imposition of sen- tence, directed by section 54-133(c), R.C.M. 1947. W e think not. PI The s t a t e ' s principal argument is t h a t section 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947, ~ o n t a n a ' s sentencing s t a t u t e , provides : "'SENTENCE. Whenever any person has been found g u i l t y of a crime or offense upon a verdict o r plea the court may impose any of the following sentences: "'(1) Release the defendant on probation; "' (2) Defer t h e imposition of sentence for a period not t o exceed three (3) years; ' (3) Suspend the execution of the sentence up t o the maximum sentence allowed f o r t h e particular offense. However, i f any r e s t r i c t i o n s or condi- tions a r e violated, any elapsed time s h a l l not be a c r e d i t against t h e sentence, unless the court s h a l l otherwise order. ' I ' (4) Impose a f i n e as provided by law f o r the offense; "'(5) Commit t h e defendant t o a correctional in- s t i t u t i o n with o r without a f i n e a s provided by law f o r t h e offense; " ' ( 6 ) Impose any combination of the above. The court may a l s o impose any r e s t r i c t i o n s or conditions on the above sentence which it deems necessary. I "The s t a t e argues t h a t section 95-2206 read l i t e r a l l y authorized t h e combination of a deferred sentence and a ' a i l term. The defect i n t h i s argument l i e s i n the one <act which has been overlooked. Here, we a r e considering the sentencing mandate of a special sxatute under the Dangerous Drug Act, section 54-133 (c) , R.C .M. 1947. Under t h i s Act, once the presumption provided f o r i n section 54-133 (c) has been found by the t r i a l judge not t o have been overcome (State v. Simtob, 154 Mont. 286, 462 P.2d 873; Campus v. S t a t e , - Mont . - 9 483 P.2d 275, 28 S t . Rep. 339), then the court's discretion i s limited by t h i s Act t o defer the imposition of sentence a s pro- vided under section 95-2206(2), R.C.M. 1947. W e have other examples of special provisions which l i m i t the court's sentencing discretion such a s section 94-2505, R.C.M. 1947, which provides the mandatory penalty f o r murder i n the f i r s t degree. However, i n a l l cases when there a r e no special sentencing provisions t h e wide discretion of section 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947, applies. I I The s t a t e further argues with c i t a t i o n s on 'suspended I sentences', t h a t the purpose of suspended' and 'deferred1 is not dissimilar and conditions of probation can be attached. This is t r u e but not i n point with t h e issue presented i n t h i s appeal. "For c l a r i t y : Where the defendant is granted a sus- pended sentence, sentence i s imposed and kxecution of the sentence is-suspended i n whole or i n part up t o t h e maximum time of sentence allowed by law and the defendant can be released on probation during the time i n t e r v a l with the conditions of probation imposed by the court. Where the defendant i s granted deferred imposition o i sentence a s directed by section 54-133(c), R.C.M. 1947, it contempla tes t h a t the verdict o r plea w i l l be taken and t h e imposition of sentence deferred, o r i f you prefer, stayed, f o r a period not t o exceed three years. The court can impose conditions of probation during t h i s time of deferment which a r e not i n contradiction t o a stay of sentence or deferred sentence. This then means defendant w i l l not be sentenced,which includes a sen- tence t o a term i n j a i l . A t the termination of t h e time of deferment or stayed imposition, section 95-2207, R.C.M. 1947, authorizes the court t o accept a plea with- drawal or t o s t r i k e the verdict of g u i l t y and order the charge dismissed. "The passage of section 95-2207, R.C.M. 1947, demon- s t r a t e s t h e i n t e n t of the l e g i s l a t u r e i n regard t o de- ferred imposition of sentence. I f sentence were imposed o r executed i n any p a r t , then the end advantage t o t h e e n t i r e concept o f the deferred sentence could-not be a t - tained and section 95-2207 would become inoperative. "Accordingly, the judgment and sentence of the t r i a l court is vacated and t h i s cause remanded t o the t r i a l court with instructions t o enter judgment and deferred sentence not inconsistent with the s t a t u t e s controlling o r t h i s opinion. " (Emphasis supplied) Taken l i t e r a l l y , the foregoing quote i n the underlined portions appears t o be on " a l l fours". However, t h i s Court wishes t o c l a r i f y the holding. In Drew, t h e complete f l e x i b i l i t y of t h e powers of the sentencing judge were f i r s t referred t o under section 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947; then the Court held t h a t , under t h e proper circum- stance, a d i s t r i c t judge could not exercise h i s broad, f l e x i b l e sentencing powers since he was s t a t u t o r i l y r e s t r i c t e d t o ordering a deferred imposition of sentence f o r a f i r s t offender twenty-one years old o r younger, with no adverse record, and convicted under the Montana Dangerous Drug Act. Under t h a t rationale, with t h e circumstances of the i n s t a n t case, a sentencing judge would be limited t o t h e scope of a "deferred imposition of sentence". The question is: Does the concept of a "deferred imposition of sentence" allow a period of incarceration i n j a i l t o be ordered a s a condition thereof? The - Drew decision makes t h i s statement, as heretofore quoted, tl The court can impose conditions of probation during t h i s time of deferment which a r e not i n contradiction t o a s t a y of sentence or deferred sentence." So, "conditions of probationrt a r e allowed. Examples of making a j a i l term a condition of probation which a r e not considered a part of a "sentence" can be found i n numerous California cases. Ex parte Webber, 95 Cal.App.2d 183, 212 P.2d 540,541; Ex parte Goetz, 46 Cal.App.2d 848, 117 P.2d 47,49; Ex parte Martin, 82 Cal.App.2d 16, 185 P.2d 645,649. A quotation from an early California case, People v. Wallach, 8 Cal.App.2d 129, 47 P.2d 1071, 1072, is i n point: "The f a c t t h a t the defendant spent the f i r s t 30 days of her probationary period i n t h e county j a i l does not amount t o her having served a term of imprisonment i n a penal i n s t i t u t i o n . That period of detention was i m - posed not a s a sentence but a s a condition of probation, and the granting of probation suspended the execution of the 90-day sentence previously imposed, It cannot be s a i d t h a t the 30 days spent by the defendant i n the county j a i l was served under the sentence, where t h a t sentence had been suspended by the probation order." These Californa cases deal with a "suspended sentence"; however, the purposes of a "suspended sentence1' and a "deferred sentence" a r e not dissimilar. The "suspended sentence'' merely prevents a defendant from being exposed t o an i n f l u e n t i a l crimina 1 element by incarceration i n prison. A "deferred sentence" accomplishes the same thing, but grants a defendant the addi- t i o n a l benefit of leaving no record of any criminal conviction. Limited incarceration i n a county j a i l a s a condition t o a "deferred sentence" does not defeat t h e purpose of t h i s type o r sentencing power. This Court i n In r e Petition of Williams, 145 Mont. 45, 56,57,58, 399 P,2d 732, discussing a "suspended imposition of sentence" under old section 94-7832, R.C.M.1947, said: "It is t r u e t h a t the order of August 22 provides t h a t petitioner s h a l l be 'jail-based' and r e f e r s t o petitioner a s a 'prisoner1. These descriptive terms a r e , perhaps, an unfortunate choice of language but i n any event the substance of the order, not its form nor its descriptive terminology, determines its e f f e c t and meaning. And the substance o t the order is readily ap- parent---to withhold sentence and punishment o r p e t i t i o n e r f o r the crime of grand larceny and t o place petitioner on probation subject t o terms and conditions reasonably calculated t o subserve the purpose sought t o be accomplished, namely, the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of an alcoholic. , "The f a c t t h a t one of the terms of probation required p e t i t i o n e r t o be 'jail-based' in the county j a i l does not transform a probationary r u l e i n t o a term of imprisonment. That it is a probationary r u l e is readily determinable by other provisions i n the order of August 22 permitting p e t i t i o n e r t o have em- ployment outside t h e county j a i l , absolving the s h e r i f f from l i a b i l i t y i n permitting p e t i t i o n e r t o be absent from h i s custody without b a i l , and containing a re- quirement t h a t petitioner pay h i s own board a t the j a i l from h i s earnings. The s i m i l a r i t y of these provisions t o some of t h e provisions contained i n the s t a t u t e r e l a t i n g t o convicted misdemeanants serving county j a i l sentences (Sec. 94-7835 e t seq. R.C.M. 1947) likewise does not convert a condition of probation i n t o a term of i m - prisonment. The conditions of probation here were simply devised and tailored t o promote the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of an alcoholic a s an a l t e r n a t i v e t o sentencing him and punishing him ror the crime of grand larceny. These probationary provisions furnished him a place t o e a t and sleep regularly whether employed o r unemployed, permitted him t o seek and secure gainful employment i f a b l e t o do so, required him t o pay f o r h i s own board out of any earnings he received from gainful employment, limited h i s spending money from h i s earnings and preserved the balance f o r h i s future use, and provided f o r reasonably close super- vision over him and h i s a c t i v i t i e s during h i s i d l e hours. "The use of t h e county j a i l a s t h e f a c i l i t y and t h e use of the s h e r i f f and h i s deputies a s the personnel t o promote the alcoholism r e h a b i l i t a t i o n program a s conceived by t h e Judge does not convert h i s order i n t o a sentence or imprisonment nor c o n s t i t u t e imprisonment of petitioner. The Judge simply made use of existing l o c a l f a c i l i t i e s and personnel t h a t met the requirements of h i s r e h a b i l i t a t i o n program for alcoholics. The County j a i l was not used a s a j a i l a t a l l but a s a f a c i l i t y f o r the supervision and control of an alcoholic during t h e r e h a b i l i t a t i o n process. Expressing t h i s basic d i s t i n c - t i o n a r e these immortal words which, although spoken under somewhat d i f f e r e n t circumstances and from d i f f e r e n t motives, a r e equally appropriate here--- 'Stone walls do not a prison make, nor iron bars a cage'. (To Althea from Prison by Richard Lovelace. ) "Under t h e f a c t s and circumstances of t h i s case, the conditions of probation contained i n t h e order of August 22 a r e reasonable conditions reasonably related t o a lawful purpose and objective of probation, i. e . , the r e h a b i l i t a - t i o n of an alcoholic. A s such they a r e valid and lawful conditions of probation. "Neither was there any f i n a l i t y t o the order of August 22 which is an e s s e n t i a l element of a sentence. Among other things, t h i s order provides t h a t I upon the completion of one year of successful probation, the defendant may apply t o t h i s court f o r such other order herein a s may be j u s t and equitable'; the order a l s o authorizes any peace o f f i c e r t o apprehend petitioner i f he should v i o l a t e h i s probation, and i f such violation i s established a f t e r hearing, t o sentence defendant on the o r i g i n a l charge. Thus further proceedings were contemplated i n any event irrespective o t whether petitioner subse- quently adhered t o the provisions of probation or violated them. " In - Drew, it would appear t h a t the court sentenced Drew (1) t o a sentence of confinement i n the county j a i l i n Bozeman f o r one year, and (2) t h a t he was t o serve s i x months of the sentence and be allowed t o attend classes a t Montana S t a t e University; t h a t he serve t h e remainder of t h e s i x months a f t e r school, i n the county j a i l ; and t h a t he be released from the county j a i l a f t e r s i x months under delayed imposition o t sentence with the remainder o r h i s one year term. It would appear t h a t the d i s t r i c t judge i n - Drew a c t u a l l y imposed a sentence and deferred t h e imposition of part of t h a t sentence. There is a v a l i d d i s t i n c t i o n under the law i n granting a deferred imposition upon conditions, rather than imposing a j a i l sentence with conditions. There is a s u b s t a n t i a l difference i n the sentences imposed i n - Drew and the i n s t a n t case. I f service of a reasonable time i n t h e county j a i l cannot b e imposed a s a condition under a deferred imposition of sentence i n dealing with a drug offense, the necessary question is raised a s t o whether or not any condi- tions can be imposed under such a dererred imposition of sentence. W e hold t h a t such conditions, reasonable i n r e l a t i o n t o a lawful purpose and objective of probation, may be imposed. The funda- mental d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e deferred imposition of sentence and any other type of sentence imposed by t h e court is t h a t a defendant can, a t the expiration of the deferred time, come i n t o court and move t h e court t o withdraw h i s plea previously entered, and i f he has f u l f i l l e d the conditions and obligations, have the g u i l t y plea withdrawn and the record expunged of any conviction. Drew i s distinguishable on its f a c t s a s we have shown; - and t o the extent t h a t our language therein is i n c o n f l i c t with what is herein s t a t e d , it is c l a r i f i e d . Accordingly, the w r i t applied f o r herein is denied.