Case Title: Commonwealth v. Thomas

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12789

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12789 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DARRYL THOMAS. 
 
 
March 23, 2020. 
 
 
Firearms.  Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  
Practice, Criminal, Sentence. 
 
 
This matter comes before the court on further appellate 
review, limited to certain issues, detailed infra, concerning 
the defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm 
while in the commission of a felony under G. L. c. 265, § 18B.  
For the reasons stated infra, we affirm that conviction but on 
grounds different from those stated by the Appeals Court. 
 
A jury convicted the defendant of multiple offenses related 
to his participation in a fight outside a bar in Worcester.1  
After a subsequent bench trial on the sentencing enhancement 
portions of his indictments, the defendant was sentenced as a 
so-called "armed career criminal II"2 pursuant to G. L. c. 269, 
                                                          
 
 
1 The jury convicted the defendant of two counts of assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, see G. L. c. 265, 
§ 15A (b), and one count each of unlawful possession of a 
firearm, see G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), unlawful possession of 
ammunition, see G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h), unlawful possession of a 
loaded firearm, see G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), and unlawful 
possession of a firearm while in the commission of a felony, see 
G. L. c. 265, § 18B.  The jury acquitted the defendant of armed 
assault with intent to murder, see G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b). 
 
 
2 We have previously noted that the term "armed career 
criminal," which derives from the Federal Armed Career Criminal 
Act of 1984, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012), 
2 
 
 
 
§ 10G (b), with respect to two firearm violations,3 and as a 
habitual criminal pursuant to G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a), with 
respect to two counts of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon.  He received a separate sentence in connection 
with his conviction under § 18B. 
 
The defendant appealed from his convictions, and then filed 
a motion for a new trial.  After the motion for a new trial was 
denied, the defendant's direct appeal was consolidated with the 
appeal from the denial of that motion.  A panel of the Appeals 
Court reversed the judgments under G. L. c. 269, § 10G (b), and 
remanded for sentencing pursuant to G. L. c. 269, § 10G (a) (a 
so-called "armed career criminal I"), and it affirmed the 
remaining judgments and the denial of the motion for a new 
trial.  See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 1101 
(2019). 
 
With respect to the conviction under § 18B, the panel 
reviewed the defendant's unpreserved claim that the conviction 
could not stand because the indictment was not linked to any of 
the other charges, and all of the other charges were 
disqualified from serving as the "root" felony4 for the § 18B 
charge because of the prohibition on double jeopardy.  While 
agreeing with the defendant that his other charges could not 
provide the root felony for the § 18B charge, the panel 
concluded that there was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice because, in its view, § 18B does not require the root 
felony to be a charged offense, and in this case there was 
evidence of an "uncharged strike" of the victim that could have 
served as the root felony for the § 18B conviction. 
 
The defendant sought further appellate review from this 
court on a number of issues.  As noted supra, we granted his 
                                                          
 
is more appropriately used "only to characterize those with 
three prior convictions of a violent crime or serious drug 
offense who are sentenced under [G. L. c. 269,] § 10G (c)."  
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 461 Mass. 616, 626 n.10 (2012). 
 
 
3 After the verdicts, the Commonwealth entered a nolle 
prosequi on the charge under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), on the 
ground that it was duplicative. 
 
 
4 By "root" felony, we refer to the offense referenced in 
G. L. c. 265, § 18B, "in addition to" which the sentence for the 
§ 18B violation is imposed. 
3 
 
 
 
application limited to the issues concerning the conviction of 
unlawful possession of a firearm while in the commission of a 
felony under § 18B.5 
 
We begin our analysis with the language of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 18B, which provides in relevant part: 
 
"Whoever, while in the commission of or the attempted 
commission of an offense which may be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison, has in his possession or 
under his control a firearm, rifle or shotgun shall, in 
addition to the penalty for such offense, be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison for not less than five 
years . . . ." 
 
The crux of the defendant's argument is that his § 18B 
conviction must be vacated because the Commonwealth failed to 
indict him for and convict him of an appropriate root felony.  
The defendant's argument is twofold.  First, he argues that his 
convictions of assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon cannot serve as the root felony for his § 18B conviction 
because such an outcome would be contrary to legislative intent, 
and it would violate principles of double jeopardy.  Second, the 
defendant argues that, contrary to the Appeals Court's ruling, 
the prosecution may not rely on uncharged conduct as the root 
felony for a § 18B conviction.  We disagree with the defendant 
as to the first contention, and therefore, we do not reach the 
second. 
 
Here, the defendant was convicted of two counts of assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, either of which may 
serve as the root felony for his § 18B conviction.6  The 
defendant's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.  Nothing 
in § 18B prevents the Commonwealth from relying on a conviction 
of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon as the 
root felony for a § 18B charge.  Although a prior version of the 
                                                          
 
 
5 As to the other convictions and enhancements, the decision 
of the Appeals Court stands. 
 
 
6 After instructing the jury on the elements of G. L. 
c. 265, § 18B, the trial judge further instructed that "as a 
matter of law, assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon and assault with intent to murder are offenses punishable 
by imprisonment in the state prison."  The jury were previously 
instructed as to the elements of those two felonies. 
4 
 
 
 
statute stated that "[t]his section shall not apply in the case 
of any felony in which the offense consists in whole or in part 
of using a dangerous weapon" (see Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 21 
Mass. App. Ct. 766, 768 [1986]), the Legislature removed this 
restriction when it amended the statute in 1998.  See St. 1998, 
c. 180, § 56.  The restriction is thus no longer part of the 
statute.7 
 
We also find no merit to the defendant's argument, based on 
our opinion in Commonwealth v. Richardson, 469 Mass. 248 (2014), 
that a sentence under § 18B may not be "stack[ed]" on top of a 
sentence that has been subject to an enhancement under the 
habitual criminal statute, G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a).  Our opinion 
in Richardson dealt with the interplay between G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (d), and a provision of the so-called armed career criminal 
statute, G. L. c. 269, § 10G.  See id. at 251-253.  Those two 
statutes "do not create independent crimes, but enhance the 
sentence for the underlying crime."  Id. at 252, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 447 Mass. 1018, 1019 (2006).  As to 
those statutes, in the absence of a clear statement of 
legislative intent as to how the two were meant to interact, we 
declined to presume that the Legislature intended "to impose 
multiple sentencing enhancements to a single underlying 
offense."  Richardson, supra at 254. 
 
Section 18B stands in marked contrast to the statutes at 
issue in Richardson, as it creates an independent crime 
punishable by a separate sentence that the Legislature has 
required to be served "in addition to" the penalty for the 
underlying offense.  G. L. c. 265, § 18B.  Cf. Bynum v. 
Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 705, 709 (1999) (contrasting charge of 
subsequent drug offense under G. L. c. 94C, § 32A [d], which 
results in single, enhanced sentence for underlying crime, with 
                                                          
 
 
7 By removing this restriction, the Legislature brought the 
Massachusetts statute further into alignment with its Federal 
counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012), which had been amended 
in 1984 to specify that it would apply "regardless of whether 
the underlying felony statute 'provides for an enhanced 
punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous 
weapon or device.'"  United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 10 
(1997), quoting the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005(a), 98 Stat. 2138-2139.  See 
Gonzales, supra (observing that Congress's 1984 enactment 
"repudiated the result [the Court] reached in Busic v. United 
States, 446 U.S. 398 [1980]"). 
5 
 
 
 
charge of committing drug violation in school zone under G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32J, which results in "an additional consecutive 
sentence" to be served from and after sentence for underlying 
offense).8 
 
In addition, because the Legislature has clearly indicated 
that a sentence for a conviction under § 18B is to be served "in 
addition to" the sentence for the underlying felony, the 
imposition of both sentences does not violate principles of 
double jeopardy.  See Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 413 Mass. 224, 
232 (1992) (noting that "same evidence" rule expressed in Morey 
v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 [1871], is not 
constitutionally based and that "[w]here the Legislature has 
specifically authorized cumulative punishment under two 
statutes, even if the two statutes proscribe the same conduct 
under the Morey test, a court's job of statutory construction is 
terminated, and the intent of the Legislature is to be 
enforced").  Therefore, the defendant's conviction under § 18B 
did not give rise to a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
Because we conclude that the defendant's convictions of 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon may provide 
the root felony for his conviction under G. L. c. 265, § 18B, we 
need not, and do not, reach the further question whether the 
Commonwealth may ever rely on uncharged conduct as the root 
felony for a § 18B conviction, and we express no view on the 
reasoning contained in the Appeals Court's memorandum and order 
as to that issue.  Instead, we leave the question open in 
anticipation of a case that necessitates its resolution. 
 
                                                          
 
 
8 Although § 18B requires a second, separate sentence that 
is imposed "in addition to" the sentence for the root felony, it 
need not be a consecutive sentence.  The sentence for the § 18B 
offense can be concurrent with the sentence for the root felony 
and still be "in addition to" it.  Contrast G. L. c. 94C, § 32J 
(requiring separate consecutive sentence for certain controlled 
substance offenses committed within school zones; "such sentence 
shall begin from and after the expiration of the sentence for" 
underlying offense).  Nor does § 18B require a mandatory minimum 
sentence of five years for a first offense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Hines, 449 Mass. 183, 191-192 (2007).  A judge, for instance, 
may sentence a defendant to not less than two years and not more 
than five years; the maximum sentence, however, must be no less 
than five years. 
6 
 
 
 
Accordingly, with respect to the defendant's conviction 
under G. L. c. 265, § 18B, the judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
Madeline G. Blanchette (Barbara Munro also present) for the 
defendant. 
Nathaniel Beaudoin, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Christopher DeMayo, for Shaun O. Harrison, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief.