Case Title: Soukup v. Hafif

Citation: 

Docket Number: S126715

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
7/27/06 (this opinion should precede companion case, S128429, filed same date) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
PEGGY J. SOUKUP, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S126715 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/5 B152759 
LAW OFFICES OF HERBERT HAFIF et al., ) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Appellants; 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BC247941 
______________________________________) 
PEGGY J. SOUKUP, 
 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S126864 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
 
) 
Ct. App. 2/5 B154311 
RONALD C. STOCK, 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BC247941 
______________________________________) 
 
 
In this case, we determine whether a litigant whose action was dismissed 
under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) may, in turn, invoke that 
statute as a defense to a subsequent action for malicious prosecution and abuse of 
process. 1  Peggy J. Soukup was sued by her former employers.  She obtained 
dismissal of their action under the anti-SLAPP statute and then sued them for 
                                              
1   
“SLAPP” is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.”  
(Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 732, fn. 1.)  All 
further unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 
 
 
2
malicious prosecution and abuse of process.  Her former employers moved to 
strike Soukup’s action as a SLAPP.  The superior court denied the motion on the 
ground that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply under these circumstances.  The 
Court of Appeal reversed and we granted review. 
 
While this case was pending, the Legislature amended the anti-SLAPP 
statute to add section 425.18, which defines “any cause of action for malicious 
prosecution or abuse of process arising from the filing or maintenance of a prior 
cause of action that has been dismissed pursuant to a special motion to strike under 
Section 425.16” as a “SLAPPback.”  (§ 425.18, subd. (b)(1).)  The Legislature 
declared that SLAPPbacks “should be treated differently . . . from an ordinary 
malicious prosecution action because a SLAPPback is consistent with the 
Legislature’s intent to protect the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of free 
speech and petition by its deterrent effect on SLAPP . . . litigation and by its 
restoration of public confidence in participatory democracy.”  (§ 425.18, subd. 
(a).)  Section 425.18 exempts SLAPPbacks from certain procedures otherwise 
applicable to motions to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute and sets forth special 
procedures that apply only to SLAPPbacks.  Additionally, subdivision (h) of the 
new section precludes the use of the anti-SLAPP statute to dismiss SLAPPbacks 
“by a party whose filing or maintenance of the prior cause of action from which 
the SLAPPback arises was illegal as a matter of law.”  (§ 425.18, subd. (h).) 
 
As we explain, section 425.18 applies to pending cases like the one before 
us.  We must determine, therefore, the effect of the amendment, and particularly 
subdivision (h), on this case.2  We  conclude that the filing and maintenance of 
defendants’ underlying action cannot be characterized as “illegal as a matter of 
                                              
2   
The parties were given an opportunity to brief the applicability of section 
425.18 on the instant case. 
 
 
3
law” so as to exempt Soukup’s malicious prosecution action from the anti-SLAPP 
statute.  We further conclude that because, as demonstrated by its enactment of 
section 425.18, subdivision (h), the Legislature has decided against a categorical 
rule exempting SLAPPbacks from the anti-SLAPP statute, we are not at liberty to 
read such a broader exemption into the statute.  However, while we conclude that 
defendants are not barred from using the anti-SLAPP statute to attempt to strike 
Soukup’s action, there remains the question of whether Soukup has nonetheless 
demonstrated a probability of prevailing on her malicious prosecution claim so as 
to defeat defendants’ motion.  (See Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. 
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.)  On this question, we conclude, contrary to the Court of 
Appeal, that she has demonstrated a probability of prevailing.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the Court of Appeal. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY3 
 
A.  Events Leading to the Filing of the Underlying Action 
 
1.  Pension Plan Controversy 
 
Defendant Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (LOHH) is a professional 
corporation whose sole stockholder is defendant Herbert Hafif (Hafif).  Soukup 
was employed at LOHH from September 1989 until June 1993, first as a legal 
secretary and then as a paralegal. 
                                              
3   
Review of an order granting or denying a motion to strike under section 
425.16 is de novo.  (Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc. 
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1056.)  We consider “the pleadings, and supporting 
and opposing affidavits upon which the liability or defense is based.”  (§ 425.16, 
subd. (b)(2).)  However, we neither “weigh credibility [nor] compare the weight of 
the evidence.  Rather, [we] accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff 
[citation] and evaluate the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has 
defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.”  (HMS Capital, Inc. v. 
Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212.) 
 
 
4
 
Soukup was a participant in the firm’s employee pension plan.  In October 
1992, she and other employees of LOHH were informed that the plan was being 
terminated and its assets would be distributed.  A portion of the distribution was to 
be in the form of nonregistered privately-held  stock.  Soukup was advised by her 
stockbroker that this stock could not be deposited into her individual retirement 
account because it was not publicly traded and the value placed on the stock by the 
plan administrator could not be verified.  She refused to sign the documentation 
for the transfer of the stock.  This led to a confrontation with Hafif in which, 
according to Soukup, he told her “that if I did not sign . . . in the next two minutes, 
he would come across the desk and kick my ass.  I refused to sign the 
documentation and left Herbert Hafif’s office shaking and returned to my office 
downstairs.”4 
 
In June 1993, six weeks after her confrontation with Hafif, Soukup 
voluntarily terminated her employment with LOHH.  On August 31, 1993, she 
met with an investigator from the United States Department of Labor and 
explained her concerns about the distribution of the LOHH employee pension 
assets.  She provided the investigator with documents regarding the pension plan.  
The Department of Labor launched an investigation into LOHH’s pension plan but 
ultimately no action was taken against LOHH. 
 
In September 1995, Soukup filed an action in federal district court under 
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (29 U.S.C, § 1140) for 
recovery of pension benefits.  Similar actions were filed by other former LOHH 
employees.  LOHH filed motions to dismiss the actions, which the district court 
then converted into summary judgment motions and granted.  On appeal, however, 
                                              
4   
Hafif denied Soukup’s version of their exchange. 
 
 
5
the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment for LOHH on claims by Soukup 
and other employees for plan benefits.  Soukup and LOHH eventually settled the 
federal action. 
2. Phillip Benson’s Departure From LOHH and His Subsequent Wrongful 
Termination Claim 
 
Phillip Benson was employed at LOHH as an associate attorney during 
much of the time that Soukup worked there.  Soukup and Benson spoke on almost 
a daily basis.  Soukup became aware that Benson was concerned about certain 
business practices at the firm.  Soukup, too, was starting to question some of the 
firm’s procedures, including the billing of costs and fees.  She and Benson shared 
their concerns. 
 
In March or April 1993, Benson left LOHH, taking some clients with him.  
Relations between Benson and Hafif quickly deteriorated after he left the firm.  In 
January 1994, Benson telephoned Soukup and told her he had filed a cross-
complaint against Hafif alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy 
in litigation Hafif had brought against him.  He said his cross-complaint referred to 
two cases that Soukup had worked on while employed at LOHH.  Soukup became 
extremely upset with him because there were confidentiality agreements in those 
cases that, if breached prematurely, could put the settlements in jeopardy.  Benson 
assured her that he had not disclosed any of the confidential terms of the 
settlements.  It was not until January 1995 that Soukup became aware of the actual 
contents of Benson’s complaint.  She was upset to discover that he had named the 
clients in two cases and stated there had been settlements.  However, to her 
knowledge, there were no repercussions from Benson’s disclosure of this 
information. 
 
Soukup was served with a deposition subpoena by Hafif in connection with 
Benson’s wrongful termination claim.  She attended the deposition and answered 
 
 
6
Hafif’s questions regarding her knowledge of misconduct committed by Hafif or 
his son, Gregory Hafif, an attorney employed by LOHH.   
 
3.  Actions Against Hafif by His Former Clients 
 
Between June 1993 and February 1994, a number of former clients of Hafif 
filed a series of State Bar complaints and lawsuits against him generally alleging 
that Hafif had charged the former clients excessive costs and fees.  Among these 
former clients was Terrie Hutton, whom Hafif had represented in a sex 
discrimination case against GTE.  In June 1993, represented by a lawyer named 
Sasson Sales, Hutton sued Hafif, LOHH and others alleging causes of action for 
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and professional negligence.  Sales also filed 
actions against Hafif on behalf of Leo Barajas and Max Killingsworth, whom 
Hafif had represented in whistleblower suits against Northrup Corporation.  Terry 
Schielke and Clyde Jones, whom Hafif had represented in wrongful termination 
actions against Lockheed Corporation, also sued Hafif.  Schielke and Jones were 
not represented by Sales, but by another attorney.5 
 
On November 20, 1993, two newspaper articles appeared in the Orange 
County Register about Hafif.  One article was about the State Bar complaints and 
lawsuits.  It noted that the complaints and suits were based on allegations that 
Hafif had overcharged his former clients, and it reported Benson’s allegation that 
                                              
5   
Hafif successfully demurred to Terrie Hutton’s action.  It was dismissed 
without leave to amend and sanctions of $25,000 were imposed upon her and 
Sales for bringing a frivolous lawsuit.  On appeal, however, the judgment was 
reversed in part, as was the sanctions order.  Barajas and Killingsworth voluntarily 
dismissed their actions against Hafif without prejudice because they had been filed 
by Sales without their authorization.  Hafif prevailed against Schielke and Jones 
on their complaint and was awarded $31,196.60 on his cross-complaint.  
Represented by Benson, Schielke later filed a second action against LOHH, Hafif 
and attorney Ronald Stock for malpractice.  In November 2000, following a court 
trial, judgment was entered in favor of defendants. 
 
 
7
he had left the firm for that reason.  The article also noted that Hafif vehemently 
rejected the allegations.  The second article reported the Department of Labor’s 
investigation into LOHH’s employee pension plan.  The pension plan article 
quoted Soukup’s version of her confrontation with Hafif and Hafif’s denial that he 
had ever threatened Soukup. 
 
B.  The Underlying Action 
 
1. Hafif Files an Action for Malicious Prosecution and Other Claims 
 
Against Soukup and Others 
 
In July 1994, LOHH and Hafif filed an action in Orange County Superior 
Court against Soukup, Benson, Hutton, Killingsworth, Barajas, Sales, Schielke 
and Jones.  The second amended complaint alleged causes of action for fraud, 
malicious prosecution, defamation, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference 
with business relationships and invasion of privacy. 
 
In the fourth cause of action, for breach of fiduciary duty, it was alleged 
that Soukup had provided confidential information to Benson that he used to 
“make false and misleading allegations that the Hafif Office had intentionally 
charged contingent fees in excess of that to which the Hafif firm was entitled to by 
retainer agreement; charged excess and fictitious costs to clients to inflate the 
income received by the Hafif Office from contingent fee cases; failed to provide 
individual cost breakdowns to certain clients; and assessed arbitrary cost figures 
against clients’ cases.”  The complaint further alleged that Soukup told Benson she 
would “wrongfully assert” that Herbert Hafif had assaulted her, a charge she later 
“recanted.” 
 
The malicious prosecution claim, against all defendants, alleged that 
“Defendants Benson, Killingsworth, Hutton, Schielke, Barajas, and Jones, 
pursuant to their conspiracy to defame, extort, and unlawfully hurt the business 
and reputation of plaintiffs . . . conspired to file a series of unjustified civil actions, 
 
 
8
initiated without probable cause, and with malice, and with the specific intent to 
harm plaintiffs by initiating and publicizing several specious lawsuits under an 
apparent plan of ‘where there is this much smoke, there must be fire.’ ” 
 
The defamation claim, also alleged against all defendants, was based on the 
publication of the article in the Orange County Register described above in which 
“defendants . . . accused plaintiff of cheating them by overcharging them for costs 
incurred in their litigation matters.”  No allegations were made with respect to the 
second article involving the Department of Labor’s investigation into LOHH’s 
employee pension plan. 
 
The claim for tortious interference with business relationships alleged, in 
essence, that Benson stole clients from Hafif in part by representing that Hafif 
engaged in unethical practices, including charging clients inappropriate fees and 
costs.  It was further alleged that Killingsworth, Barajas, Schielke, Jones and 
Hutton with the assistance of Benson and Soukup “devised a ‘gameplan’ wherein 
each sought to personally benefit by presenting a united front against plaintiffs to 
demand unjustified reductions in the fees and costs they owed plaintiffs for their 
legal services.”6 
 
Within a week of being served with the original complaint, Soukup called 
Wylie Aitken, one of Hafif’s lawyers, and told him she should not have been 
named in the action because she had no involvement in the claims asserted in the 
action nor had she conspired with any of the codefendants.  She asked to be 
                                              
6   
Soukup later filed a cross-complaint for declaratory relief against LOHH 
and Hafif in the event that the underlying action resulted in suits by former clients 
against her based on allegations of misconduct by LOHH and Hafif in cases on 
which Soukup had assisted.  Hafif demurred to the cross-complaint and the 
demurrer was granted without leave to amend, but also without prejudice to 
refiling in the event that Soukup was sued by a former client. 
 
 
9
dismissed from the action.  He did not do so.  Later, she asked both Aitken and his 
son, Darren, why she had been named in the action.  They told her they would 
have to ask Hafif and would get back to her, but neither did.  In 1995, during the 
deposition of Sasson Sales, Soukup approached Ronald Stock, another attorney 
representing Hafif, and asked him, “What does Mr. Hafif want from me?”  Stock 
told her, “Well, he doesn’t want your money,” and added, “Mr. Hafif wants to 
make sure that you don’t make any trouble for him in the future.”7 
 
In discovery, Soukup obtained a seven-column chart prepared by Hafif 
entitled “Benson Related Litigation.”  The fifth column described the “Matter 
Filed Against LOHH” and the final column was captioned “Matter Defeated by 
LOHH.”  For Soukup, the “Matter Filed Against LOHH” stated “Claim for 
pension plan irregularities,” and the “Matter Defeated by LOHH” stated “Labor 
Department audits and investigates 20 years of records and LOHH is given a clean 
bill of health.  The investigation is concluded.” 
 
Responding to interrogatories propounded by Hafif in connection with the 
underlying action, Soukup stated she had had no contact with her codefendants 
Killingsworth, Jones, Barajas or Terrie Hutton between July 1992 and May 1994, 
which encompassed the time period within which they filed the lawsuits against 
Hafif that were the basis of his malicious prosecution cause of action.  She stated 
further she had had no contact with Terry Schielke after June 1993.  She also 
stated  that her communication with Benson after June 1993 had related either to 
the pension plan issue or Benson’s wrongful termination claim against Hafif.  In 
her interrogatory responses, she denied conspiring with Benson to “extort money 
or cases from Mr. Hafif.” 
                                              
7   
Stock denied having made this statement. 
 
 
10
 
In an April 1995 deposition of Hafif, Soukup asked him how she had 
assisted Hutton in filing her complaint against Hafif.  Hafif replied, “I don’t think 
you had anything to do with it.”  Similarly, when she asked him how she had 
assisted Clyde Jones, he testified, “You may not have been involved in the filing 
of the complaint.  You were involved in the general work of implementing the 
attack on me for whatever reason.”  When Soukup asked him whether he would 
“be producing any witnesses to testify to my assistance in the malicious 
prosecution,” Hafif testified, “No.”  In the same deposition, while again insisting 
that Soukup was part of the conspiracy to “extort money from [him] at the threat 
of [his] reputation,” he testified, “I have no idea in her case as to what motivated 
her.” 
 
2.  Soukup Files a Motion to Strike the Underlying Action as a SLAPP 
 
On August 15, 1996, Soukup filed a motion to strike the underlying action 
as a SLAPP.  Soukup argued that Hafif brought the action against her in retaliation 
for her complaint to the Department of Labor about LOHH’s employee pension 
plan, the department’s ensuing investigation, and her ERISA lawsuit.  She 
contended that pursuing a complaint to an administrative agency and filing a 
lawsuit were constitutionally protected activities.  She contended further that Hafif 
could not demonstrate a probability of prevailing against her on any of his claims 
based on a conspiracy theory because the evidence adduced during discovery 
demonstrated that she had had minimal or no contact with her codefendants in the 
timeframe during which the alleged conspiracy was planned and carried out. 
 
On December 17, 1996, the trial court granted Soukup’s motion to strike.   
 
Hafif appealed.  In an unpublished opinion filed on April 27, 2000, the 
Court of Appeal affirmed.  Preliminarily, the Court of Appeal concluded that the 
action fell within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute.  “Soukup’s allegedly 
actionable conduct consisted of her complaints to the Department of Labor.  
 
 
11
Again, such statements are within the protective purview of the statute.”  Next, the 
Court of Appeal considered whether Hafif had established a probability of 
prevailing.  It concluded he had not.  “The basis for the complaint’s allegations 
against . . . Soukup was the newspaper articles.  The articles accurately reflected 
that complaints had been made to . . . the Department of Labor and the contents of 
those complaints.  The only evidence potentially showing merit in Hafif’s claims 
came from [Terrie] Hutton’s diaries, which were prepared for transmission to her 
lawyer.  The trial court properly concluded they were inadmissible.  Hafif failed to 
meet their [sic] burden of establishing a probability of succeeding in the claims 
against . . . Soukup.”8 
 
C.  The Instant Action 
 
1.  Soukup Files the Instant Action 
 
On April 2, 2001, Soukup filed a complaint against LOHH, Hafif, Cynthia 
Hafif, an attorney employed by LOHH, the Law Offices of Wylie A. Aitken, 
Wylie A. Aitken, the Law Offices of Ronald C. Stock and Ronald C. Stock in 
which she alleged causes of action for abuse of process and malicious prosecution 
based on the underlying action.  According to Soukup’s complaint:  “The 
underlying litigation was filed in an effort to discourage or deter SOUKUP from 
the exercise of her legal rights as it related to both her communications with the 
U.S. Department of Labor, as well as her role as a witness to the questionable 
                                              
8   
The Terrie Hutton “diaries,” which figure prominently in this case, were 
hundreds of pages of handwritten and typed notes made by Hutton documenting 
her communications with other former clients of Hafif and with her attorney, 
Sassoon Sales, in the period prior to the filing of the former clients’ actions against 
Hafif.  The same Court of Appeal opinion that affirmed the order striking the 
underlying action as a SLAPP against Soukup also affirmed the order striking the 
underlying action as a SLAPP against Hutton. 
 
 
12
conduct of HAFIF, his son Greg, and the HAFIF OFFICE in connection with any 
pending or anticipated litigation against HAFIF or the HAFIF OFFICE.  The 
underlying litigation was continued for six years in an effort to punish, annoy, 
harass or injure SOUKUP because she had exercised her constitutional rights of 
freedom of speech and freedom to petition the government.”  Soukup 
subsequently amended the complaint to add Gregory Hafif as a defendant. 
 
2.  Defendants File Motions to Strike Soukup’s Action as a SLAPP 
 
All defendants except Stock joined Hafif’s motion to strike Soukup’s 
complaint as a SLAPP; Stock filed his own motion.  Defendants argued that 
Soukup’s action arose from the valid exercise of their constitutionally protected 
right of petition in filing the underlying action. 
 
Defendants maintained that the evidence demonstrated they had had 
probable cause to bring the underlying lawsuit against Soukup on a conspiracy 
theory.  They cited the following evidence: (1) the lawsuits filed by Hafif’s former 
clients to “coerc[e] [LOHH and Hafif] into waiving their right to fees and costs in 
the lawsuits they had previously worked on,” and Soukup’s filing of her cross-
complaint in the underlying action; (2) the Court of Appeal’s reference to Terrie 
Hutton’s diaries as showing potential merit in the underlying action; (3) the denial 
of Terrie Hutton’s motion for summary judgment in the underlying action in 
which the trial court found that her diaries provided evidence of her participation 
in the alleged conspiracy against Hafif; and; (4) the statement of decision in 
Schielke v. LOHH, Herbert Hafif and Ronald Stock, et. al., filed on November 8, 
2000 in which the trial court granted judgment for the defendants in Schielke’s 
malicious prosecution action based on a finding the underlying action was 
supported by probable cause as demonstrated by “the journals or diary of one 
Terri[ie] Hutton.” 
 
 
13
 
Among the exhibits attached to Hafif’s motion were hundreds of pages of 
the Hutton diaries.  In Hafif’s declaration in support of the motion to strike, he 
cited passages from the diaries as evidence of the alleged conspiracy between the 
defendants in the underlying action “to have me waive my fees and costs.”  Those 
passages documented phone calls between Terrie Hutton, Sasson Sales, Terry 
Schielke and Max Killingsworth regarding the filing of State Bar complaints and 
actions against Hafif and also asserted that Schielke and Clyde Jones had provided 
documents to the Orange Country Register reporter who wrote the article about 
Hafif that was the basis of his defamation claim in the underlying action.  None of 
passages cited by Hafif referred to Soukup. 
 
In her opposition, Soukup argued that defendants should not have the 
benefit of the anti-SLAPP statute given that the underlying action had itself been 
dismissed as a SLAPP because it was “by definition a lawsuit to chill [her] valid 
exercise of constitutional rights of freedom of speech [and] not brought for the 
valid redress of grievances and an abuse of judicial process.”  “Therefore, there 
can be no basis for the [defendants’] special motion to strike in the instant case 
since they are not capable of meeting the first prong of the statute which requires a 
showing that their underlying action was valid or legitimate.” 
 
Soukup alternatively contended that, even if the anti-SLAPP statute 
applied, defendants’ motions should be dismissed because she could demonstrate a 
probability of prevailing on the merits.  She averred in her declaration that she had 
had little or no contact with her codefendants during the timeframe in which Hafif 
had alleged in the underlying action she had conspired with them.  Barajas and 
Killingsworth filed declarations stating that they had never met Soukup prior to 
the filing of the underlying action.  Terrie Hutton filed a declaration that stated the 
only time she had met Soukup prior to the filing of the underlying action was 
when Soukup screened her as a client for Hafif.  All three denied that they had 
 
 
14
conspired with Soukup against Hafif or that she had encouraged them to file the 
lawsuits against him that were the basis of his malicious prosecution claim. 
 
In their reply, defendants argued: “In the present case, it is undisputed that 
defendants’ acts in furtherance of their constitutional right of petition consisted of 
nothing more than the filing and maintenance of the underlying civil action out of 
which Soukup’s malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims directly arise 
. . . .  Although Hafif’s claims were found to be potentially without merit, that 
does not mean that Hafif has done anything illegal or that those claims were 
brought without probable cause.” 
 
3.  Stock’s Motion to Strike Soukup’s Action 
 
Stock filed his own motion to strike Soukup’s claim under the anti-SLAPP 
statute.  In addition to repeating arguments advanced by Hafif, Stock argued that, 
as to him, the motion should be granted because he had “no role or participation in 
the decision to file, or the filing of the underlying action” nor had Soukup shown 
that “Stock had knowledge that the factual allegations of the underlying complaint 
were false.”  In her opposition, Soukup argued that the filing and prosecution of 
the underlying action was not a valid exercise of protected rights for purposes of 
the anti-SLAPP action and that Stock’s participation in the prosecution of the 
underlying action was more significant than he admitted. 
 
On July 27, 2001, the trial court denied Hafif’s motion to strike Soukup’s 
complaint and, on September 4, 2001, also denied Stock’s motion. 
 
Following denial of the motions to dismiss, the trial court sustained a 
demurrer to the cause of action for abuse of process without leave to amend. 
 
 
15
 
4.  Proceedings in the Court of Appeal and This Court 
 
Hafif and his fellow defendants appealed the denial of their motion to strike 
Soukup’s actions.  Stock separately appealed.  The Court of Appeal affirmed the 
denial of Hafif’s motion to strike.  In a separate opinion, the Court of Appeal also 
affirmed the denial of Stock’s motion to strike.  Hafif and Stock then sought 
review in this court.  We granted their petitions and held their cases for Jarrow 
Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche Industries, Inc., supra, 31 Cal.4th 728, which was 
then pending before this court.  Following our decision in Jarrow and Navellier v. 
Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 92, we dismissed review and transferred the cases back 
to the Court of Appeal to reconsider its decisions in light of Jarrow and Navellier.  
The Court of Appeal summarily reversed its earlier rulings and held that the 
motions to strike should have been granted.  Soukup petitioned for review and we 
granted her petition. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Are Defendants Barred From Using the Anti-SLAPP Statute to Strike 
 
Soukup’s Complaint? 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Section 425.16 provides in relevant part that:  “A cause of action against a 
person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of 
petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in 
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless 
the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that 
the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)  “The Legislature 
enacted section 425.16 to prevent and deter ‘lawsuits brought primarily to chill the 
valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the 
redress of grievances.’  (§ 425.16, subd. (a).)  Because these meritless lawsuits 
seek to ‘deplete the defendant’s energy’ and drain ‘his or her resources [citation], 
 
 
16
the Legislature sought to prevent SLAPPs by ending them early and without great 
cost to the SLAPP target.’  [Citation.]  Section 425.16 therefore establishes a 
procedure where the trial court evaluates the merits of the lawsuit using a 
summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation.”  (Varian 
Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192; Jarrow Formulas, 
Inc. v. LaMarche, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 737 [section 425.16 “is a procedural 
device for screening out meritless claims”].) 
 
“Section 425.16 posits . . . a two-step process for determining whether an 
action is a SLAPP.  First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a 
threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected 
activity. . . . If the court finds that such a showing has been made, it must then 
determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the 
claim.”  (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 88.)  “Only a cause of action 
that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute — i.e., that arises from 
protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit — is a SLAPP, 
subject to being stricken under the statute.”  (Id. at p. 89.) 
 
The Legislature’s purpose in enacting the anti-SLAPP statute is set forth in 
its findings and declarations.  “The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the 
public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public 
significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the 
judicial process.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (a).)  Furthermore, to accomplish this purpose 
the Legislature has directed that the statute “be construed broadly.”  (Ibid.)  To this 
end, when construing the anti-SLAPP statute, “[w]here possible, ‘we follow the 
Legislature’s intent, as exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual words of the 
law . . . .’ [Citation.]”  (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 
p. 733, quoting California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. Of Rialto Unified 
School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 632.)  Where this principle is applied, 
 
 
17
recourse to extrinsic material like legislative history is unnecessary but, in our 
prior cases interpreting section 425.16, we have more than once consulted that 
history and found in it material that has buttressed our construction of the statutory 
language.  (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 
1106, 1120; Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 
61; Jarrow, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 736.)  We apply these principles as we take up 
the question on which we granted review in this case involving the latest twist in 
anti-SLAPP law — the SLAPPback. 
 
The SLAPPback phenomenon is concisely explained in the legislative 
material accompanying Assembly Bill No. 1158, the bill ultimately enacted by the 
Legislature as section 425.18.9  A SLAPPback suit is an action, typically for 
malicious prosecution “filed by the target of a SLAPP suit against the SLAPP filer 
after the dismissal of the SLAPP suit as a result of the target’s appropriate use of 
the SLAPP statute.”  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1158 
(2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 22, 2005, p. 1.)  The purpose of a 
                                              
9   
Defendants request that we take judicial notice of the legislative history 
surrounding Assembly Bill No. 1158.  (Martin v. Szeto (2004) 32 Cal.4th 445, 
452, fn. 9.)  Soukup objects to the extent that some of the legislative history 
reflects the views of individual legislators or advocates of the legislation rather 
than the Legislature as a whole.  (See Kaufman & Broad Companies, Inc. v. 
Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 38-39.)  The legislative 
history in this case is relatively brief and our citation to it is limited to various 
versions of the legislation and committee reports, all of which are indisputably 
proper subjects of judicial notice.  (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. 
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 45, fn. 9.)  Therefore, we grant defendants’ request for 
judicial notice of the legislative history material.  Defendants also request that we 
take judicial notice of materials in the case of Hutton v. Hafif (May 11, 2004, 
B162572) (nonpub. opn.) review denied, July 28, 2004, S125728, including the 
Court of Appeal’s opinion in that case and in proceedings that followed our denial 
of review.  These materials are not relevant to any issue in this case and the 
request is denied. 
 
 
18
SLAPPback is to seek compensation for damages beyond the attorney’s fees and 
costs awarded to the defendant who prevails on the special motion to strike under 
the anti-SLAPP statute.  (See § 425.16, subd. (b)(3).)  “SLAPP victims . . . 
commonly experience stress-related health issues, strained family relationships, 
and financial distress or even insolvency.  The only way a SLAPP victim can 
recover for these damages is to pursue a legal claim against the person or entity 
that filed the original SLAPP.”  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill 
No. 1158 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 22, 2005, p. 4.) 
 
The filing of a SLAPPback does not end the roundelay of special motions 
to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute.  The SLAPPback defendant may in turn 
file such a motion arguing, as do defendants here, that the filing and maintenance 
of the underlying action that is the basis of the SLAPPback was itself activity 
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.  (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & 
Opportunity, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1115 [“ ‘ “[t]he constitutional right to petition 
. . . includes the basic act of filing litigation or otherwise seeking administrative 
action.” ’ ”].)  We granted review to examine whether permitting such defendants 
to avail themselves of the anti-SLAPP statute is consistent with the legislative 
intent behind section 425.16.  While the case was pending before us, however, the 
Legislature itself addressed the issue by enacting section 425.18, to which we now 
turn. 
 
2.  Section 425.18 
 
a.  Applicability of Section 425.18 to Pending Cases 
 
Before we substantively discuss section 425.18, we address the preliminary 
question of whether it applies to pending cases, like the one before us, that 
originated prior to section 425.18’s effective date.  The anti-SLAPP statute is a 
procedural statute, the purpose of which is to screen out meritless claims.  (Jarrow 
Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 737.)  It is well settled that 
 
 
19
“applying changed procedural statutes to the conduct of existing litigation, even 
though the litigation involves an underlying dispute that arose from conduct 
occurring before the effective date of the new statute, involves no improper 
retrospective application because the statute addresses conduct in the future.”  
(Brenton v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 679, 689; People v. 
Tapia (1953) 53 Cal.2d 282, 288-291; Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. 
(1947) 30 Cal.3d 388, 394.)  Both we and the Court of Appeal have applied this 
principle to hold that amendments to the anti-SLAPP statute apply to cases 
pending before the effective date of the amendments.  (Briggs v. Eden Council for 
Hope & Opportunity, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1119, fn. 7 [Language added to 
section 425.16, subdivision (a) requiring broad construction of the statute applies 
to pending cases because section 426.15 “is a procedural statute that properly is 
applied prospectively to an existing cause of action”]; Brenton v. Metabolife 
Internat., Inc., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 687-691 [Enactment of section 
425.17 exempting certain claims from the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute applies 
to pending cases]; accord, Metcalf v. U-Haul International (2004) 118 
Cal.App.4th 1261, 1265-1266; Physicians Com. for Responsible Medicine v. 
Tyson Foods (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 120, 125-130.) 
 
Section 425.18 creates different procedures for SLAPPbacks than those that 
ordinarily apply to motions to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute and also, like 
section 425.17, “amend[s] section 425.16 to except certain claims from 
applicability of the statutorily conferred remedy of the screening mechanism 
provided by section 425.16”  (Brenton v. Metabolife Internat., Inc., supra, 116 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 689-690.)  In neither event does section 425.18 “impose new, 
additional or different liabilities based on past conduct or deprive [defendants] of 
any substantive defense to the action.”  (Branton v. Metabolife Internat., Inc., 
 
 
20
supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 690.)  We conclude, therefore, that section 425.18 
applies to the case before us.10 
 
b.  Substantive Provisions of Section 425.18 
 
Section 425.18 defines a SLAPPback as “any cause of action for malicious 
prosecution or abuse of process arising from the filing or maintenance of a prior 
cause of action that has been dismissed pursuant to a special motion to strike under 
Section 425.16.”  (§ 425.18, subd. (b)(1).)  In its findings and declarations, the 
Legislature states “that a SLAPPback cause of action should be treated differently, 
as provided in this section, from an ordinary malicious prosecution action because 
a SLAPPback is consistent with the Legislature’s intent to protect the valid 
exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and petition by its deterrent 
effect on SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) litigation and by 
its restoration of public confidence in participatory democracy.”  (§ 425.18, subd. 
(a).) 
 
Section 425.18 treats SLAPPbacks differently from ordinary malicious 
prosecution actions in two ways.  First, it makes inapplicable to special motions to 
strike a SLAPPback certain procedures that would normally apply to such motions 
and sets forth different procedures.  Thus, the statute states that the “provisions of 
subdivisions (c) [prevailing defendants entitled to attorney’s fees and costs], (f) 
                                              
10   
The parties do not contend to the contrary, except for Stock who purports to 
find in the legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 1158 an indication that the 
Legislature considered, but rejected, prospective application of the section by 
deleting language that stated an intent “to apply this amendment to cases pending 
at the time this act is adopted.”  This language, however, was in the context of an 
amendment to section 425.16, subdivision (f), not to section 425.18.  (Assem. 
Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1158 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) as 
introduced, Feb. 22, 2005, p. 7.)  Therefore, it has no bearing on whether section 
425.18 applies to pending cases. 
 
 
21
[motion to strike ordinarily to be filed within 60 days of the service of complaint], 
(g) [discovery ordinarily stayed upon filing of notice of motion to strike], and (i) 
of Section 425.16 [providing for appeal of order granting or denying special 
motion], and paragraph (13) of subdivision (a) of Section 904.1 [appeal of order 
granting or denying special motion to strike], shall not apply to a special motion to 
strike a SLAPPback.”  (§ 425.18, subd. (c).)  Instead, section 425.18, subdivision 
(d) allows a motion to strike a SLAPPback to be brought within 120 days of the 
service of the complaint or, subject to the court’s discretion, as long as six months 
after the service of the complaint or, “in extraordinary cases” “at any later time.”  
(§ 425.18, subd. (d)(1)(A)-(C).)  Subdivision (e) permits the plaintiff opposing the 
special motion to strike to file an ex parte application for a continuance to obtain 
discovery.  (§ 425.18, subd. (e).)  Subdivision (f) allows the plaintiff to recover 
costs and attorney’s fees if the court finds that the motion to strike “is frivolous or 
solely intended to cause unnecessary delay,” but makes no provision for such costs 
and fees to be awarded to the prevailing defendants.  (§ 425.18, subd. (f).)  
Subdivision (g) limits appellate review of the denial of a motion to strike, in whole 
or part, to review by peremptory writ.  (§ 425.18, subd. (g).) 
 
The import of these provisions is to stack the procedural deck in favor of 
the SLAPPback plaintiff confronted with a special motion to strike.  They do so 
by providing the plaintiff with both a longer timeframe, and the means with which, 
to conduct discovery that might yield evidence to resist the motion to strike, 
exempting the plaintiff from fees and costs even if the plaintiff’s SLAPPback 
action is stricken and minimizing the delays and expense the plaintiff might 
otherwise incur while the case is on appeal by limiting the unsuccessful defendant 
to writ review.  (See Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 
p. 195 [because appeal of order denying special motion to strike stays all further 
 
 
22
trial court proceedings “some anti-SLAPP appeals will undoubtedly delay 
litigation even though the appeal is frivolous or insubstantial”].) 
 
The second way in which section 425.18 treats SLAPPbacks differently 
from ordinary malicious prosecution actions is to provide a limited exemption for 
SLAPPbacks from the anti-SLAPP statute in subdivision (h).  That subdivision 
provides:  “A special motion to strike may not be filed against a SLAPPback by a 
party whose filing or maintenance of the prior cause of action from which the 
SLAPPback arises was illegal as a matter of law.”  (§ 425.18, subd. (h).)  It is the 
applicability of this provision to the instant case that concerns us and it is that 
question we now address. 
 
3.  Applicability of Subdivision (h)  
 
Soukup’s malicious prosecution action fits the definition of a SLAPPback 
set forth in section 425.18.11  She contends that the filing and maintenance of the 
underlying action violated state and federal labor laws, specifically Labor Code 
section 1102.5 and 29 United States Code section 1140 and, therefore, subdivision 
(h) bars defendants from seeking to strike her action as a SLAPP.  Since a motion 
to strike a SLAPPback is prohibited only if the “prior cause of action from which 
the SLAPPback arises was illegal as a matter of law,” (§ 425.18, subd. (h)), we 
must determine the meaning of the phrase “illegal as a matter of law.”  As in our 
prior anti-SLAPP jurisprudence, we begin by construing the statute “strictly by its 
terms,” to ascertain the “ ‘Legislature’s intent, as exhibited by the plain meaning 
                                              
11   
Indeed, the legislative history reveals that early versions of Assembly Bill 
No. 1158 specifically stated that one object of the SLAPPback amendments to 
section 425.16 was to overrule the Court of Appeal’s opinion in Soukup v. Stock; 
this language did not survive into the final version of section 425.18.  (Assem. 
Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1158 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) as 
introduced Feb. 22, 2005, p. 7.) 
 
 
23
of the actual words of the law.’ ”  (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 59.) 
 
An illegal act is an act “[f]orbidden by law.”  (Black’s Law Dict. (7th ed. 
1999), p. 750.)12  By specifying that only those defendants whose filing or 
maintenance of the underlying action was illegal as a matter of law are barred 
from bringing a special motion to strike a SLAPPback, it is clear that the 
Legislature intended to require something more than that the underlying action 
was dismissed as a SLAPP before section 425.18, subdivision (h) applies.  Had the 
Legislature intended to create a categorical rule exempting all SLAPPbacks from 
the anti-SLAPP statute, it could have done so.  (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. 
LaMarche, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 735 [“The Legislature clearly knows how to 
create an exemption from the anti-SLAPP statue when it wishes to do so”].)  
Instead, it created the narrower exemption set forth in subdivision (h). 
 
Our conclusion is buttressed by the relevant legislative history surrounding 
Assembly Bill No. 1158, which shows the Legislature explicitly considered and 
rejected a categorical rule exempting all SLAPPbacks from section 425.16.  The 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary report on Assembly Bill No. 1158 noted that 
“[a]s passed by the Assembly, AB 1158 proposed to make the anti-SLAPP motion 
inapplicable in any SLAPPback action (any malicious prosecution claim or any 
other cause of action arising from the filing or maintenance of a prior cause of 
action that has been dismissed pursuant to the granting of an anti-SLAPP 
motion.)”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1158 (2005-2006 
                                              
12   
Stock asserts that the law in question must be a criminal statute but he fails 
to provide any support for his premise that “illegal” refers only to criminal acts or 
that the Legislature, in enacting section 425.18, intended to refer only to criminal 
violations. 
 
 
24
Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 25, 2005, p. 13.)  But, as the committee report 
explained, a number of concerns led to the rejection of a categorical exemption.  
First, referring to prior court decisions that had followed the Legislature’s mandate 
to broadly construe the anti-SLAPP statute, the report suggested that continued 
broad construction of the statute might “result in cases of first impression where 
the ‘little-guy’ plaintiff was truly not engaging in SLAPP litigation but is 
nonetheless found to be a SLAPPer.  That person would be precluded from using 
the anti-SLAPP law to defend himself or herself against the follow-up SLAPPback 
SLAPP suit. . . .  [¶]  . . .  [Thus] a categorical exemption seemed fraught with the 
risk of unintended consequences.  Can every future SLAPPback claim be 
presumed to not be a SLAPP case itself?”  (Id., p.15.)  Second, the report 
expressed the concern that a categorical exemption would abrogate our holding in 
Jarrow that malicious prosecution actions are not exempt from scrutiny under the 
anti-SLAPP law.  (Ibid.)  It was evidently in light of these concerns that the 
Legislature crafted the narrower exemption based on the illegality of the 
underlying action. 
The Legislature further narrowed the exemption in section 425.18, 
subdivision (h) by requiring that the illegality be established “as a matter of law.”  
In adding this proviso, the Legislature appears to have had in mind decisions by 
the Court of Appeal that have held that the anti-SLAPP statute is not available to a 
defendant who claims that the plaintiff’s cause of action arises from assertedly 
protected activity when that activity is illegal as a matter of law and, for that 
reason, not protected by the First Amendment.  (See, e.g., Paul for Council v. 
 
 
25
Hanyecz (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1356 (Paul), disapproved on other grounds in 
Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 68, fn. 5.)13 
In Paul, the plaintiff sued the defendants, alleging that they had interfered 
with his candidacy for city council by making illegal contributions to one of his 
opponents, in violation of the Political Reform Act of 1974 (Gov. Code, § 81000 
et seq.).  The defendants moved to strike the suit under the anti-SLAPP statute on 
the grounds that the campaign contributions were in furtherance of their free 
speech rights and thus protected by the statute.  Their moving papers, however, 
“show[ed] that they did in fact violate the Political Reform Act when they 
laundered campaign contributions to persons running for local and state offices.”  
(Paul, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 1361.)  In reversing the trial court’s order 
granting the motion to strike, the Court of Appeal held that because the 
“defendants have effectively conceded the illegal nature of their election campaign 
finance activities for which they claim constitutional protection . . . as a matter of 
law . . . such activities [were] not a valid exercise of constitutional rights as 
contemplated by section 425.16.”  (Id. at p. 1367.)  The court emphasized that 
“there was no dispute on the point” but “had there been a factual dispute as to the 
legality of defendants’ actions, then we could not so easily have disposed of 
defendants’ motion.”  (Ibid.) 
In Governor Gray Davis Com. v. American Taxpayers Alliance (2002) 102 
Cal.App.4th 449, the plaintiffs, a group organized to support the reelection of 
former Governor Davis, brought an action against defendant taxpayer group 
alleging that, by producing and running a television advertisement critical of the 
Governor, the taxpayer group had violated certain provisions of the Political 
                                              
13   
We address the viability of this exception in the companion to this case, 
Flatley v. Mauro (July 27, 2006, ___ Cal.4th ____, S128429). 
 
 
26
Reform Act.  The taxpayer group filed a special motion to strike the complaint as a 
SLAPP.  The trial court denied the motion.  On appeal, the plaintiffs argued, as 
had the plaintiff in Paul, that the defendant was not entitled to use the anti-SLAPP 
statute because the conduct for which it claimed constitutional protection was 
illegal.  The Court of Appeal distinguished Paul.  “Here in contrast, appellant 
neither has conceded nor does the evidence conclusively establish the illegality of 
its communications made during the course of debate on political issues.  
[Citations.]  Appellant claims its advertisement constitutes protected speech that 
cannot be regulated by the Political Reform Act, and consequently no violation of 
law occurred.”  (Id. at p. 459.)  Because the issue of the legality of the taxpayer 
group’s conduct was disputed, the Court of Appeal found that “the threshold 
element in a section 425.16 inquiry has been established” and the “asserted 
violation of the Political Reform Act . . . is an issue we must examine in the 
context of the respondent’s burden to construct a prima facie showing of the 
merits of its case.”  (Id. at p. 460; see also Chavez v. Mendoza (2001) 94 
Cal.App.4th 1083, 1090 [the Paul exception applies “where the defendant 
indisputably concedes the claim arose from illegal or constitutionally unprotected 
activity”]; Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 910-911 [“In short, 
conduct that would otherwise come within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute 
does not lose its coverage . . . simply because it is alleged to have been unlawful 
or unethical”].)  
Under these decisions, if a defendant’s assertedly protected constitutional 
activity is alleged to have been illegal and, therefore, outside the ambit of the anti-
SLAPP statute, the illegality must be established as a matter of law either through 
the defendant’s concession or because the illegality is conclusively established by 
the evidence presented in connection with the motion to strike.  Although the 
legislative history surrounding Assembly Bill No. 1158 does not expressly refer to 
 
 
27
these cases, nonetheless, a Senate Committee on the Judiciary analysis notes that 
an early version of the bill would have incorporated “indisputably illegal 
behavior” as the standard by which to evaluate whether the filing and maintenance 
of the underlying action was illegal as a matter of law.  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1158 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 25, 
2005, p. 10.)  In language echoing the Paul decision, the analysis states that “if 
there is a genuine issue of material fact that turns on the credibility of [a] witness 
or on proper inferences to be drawn from indisputable facts, then the matter is not 
indisputable.”  While the final version of section 425.18, subdivision (h) 
substituted the phrase “illegal as a matter of law” for “indisputably illegal 
behavior,”  there is no indication in the legislative history that a different meaning 
was intended.14 
 
In summary, section 425.18, subdivision (h) provides a narrow exception to 
the rule that malicious prosecution actions are subject to scrutiny under the anti-
SLAPP statute which applies only if (1) the malicious prosecution action is a 
SLAPPback and (2) the filing and maintenance of the underlying action was 
illegal as a matter of law.  The burden of establishing that the underlying action 
was illegal as a matter of law should be shouldered by the plaintiff in such cases.  
This is because the Legislature’s decision not to create a categorical exemption for 
SLAPPbacks demonstrates a legislative preference that the anti-SLAPP statute 
                                              
14   
Further support for our conclusion that the Legislature’s adoption of the 
phrase “illegal as a matter of law” referred to the Paul decision comes in the form 
of a subsequent Senate Committee on the Judiciary analysis of Assembly Bill No. 
1158 that explains that this concept was drawn in part from the amicus curiae brief 
filed by the Attorney General in Flatley v. Mauro (July 27, 2006, ___ Cal.4th 
____, S128429) wherein the Attorney General argues that the Paul exception is 
consistent with the Legislature’s intent in enacting section 425.16. 
 
 
28
operate in the ordinary fashion in most SLAPPback cases, subject, of course, to 
the special procedural rules applicable to all motions to strike a SLAPPback.  In 
the ordinary SLAPP case, the defendant’s initial burden in invoking the anti-
SLAPP statute is to make “ ‘a threshold showing that the challenged cause of 
action is one arising from protected activity.’ ”  (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. 
LaMarche, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 733.)  There is no further requirement that the 
defendant initially demonstrate his exercise of constitutional rights of speech or 
petition was valid as a matter of law.  (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 
94-95.)  Consistent with these principles, a defendant who invokes the anti-
SLAPP statute should not be required to bear the additional burden of 
demonstrating in the first instance that the filing and maintenance of the 
underlying action was not illegal as a matter of law.  Moreover, placing this 
burden on the defendant would be impractical and inefficient because it would 
require the defendant to identify and address every conceivable statute that might 
have had some bearing on the underlying action and then prove a negative – that 
the underlying action did not violate any of these laws. 
 
Accordingly, once the defendant has made the required threshold showing 
that the challenged action arises from assertedly protected activity, the plaintiff 
may counter by demonstrating that the underlying action was illegal as a matter of 
law because either the defendant concedes the illegality of the assertedly protected 
activity or the illegality is conclusively established by the evidence presented in 
connection with the motion to strike.  In doing so, the plaintiff must identify with 
particularity the statute or statutes violated by the filing and maintenance of the 
underlying action.  (See Paul, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1360-1361.)  This 
requirement of identifying a specific statute, violation of which the plaintiff 
contends is illegal as a matter of law, is consistent with the narrow nature of the 
exemption set forth in section 425.18, subdivision (h) because it prevents a 
 
 
29
plaintiff from advancing a generalized claim that a defendant’s conduct was illegal 
and therefore subject to the exemption.  In this same vein, the requirement of 
specificity provides notice to both the defendant and the court about the particular 
statute or statutes the defendant is alleged to have violated as a matter of law so as 
to allow the defendant to intelligibly respond to, and the court to assess, the claim.  
Additionally, as part of the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating illegality as a 
matter of law, the plaintiff must show the specific manner in which the statute or 
statutes were violated with reference to their elements.  A generalized assertion 
that a particular statute was violated by the filing or maintenance of the underlying 
action without a particularized showing of the violation will be insufficient to 
demonstrate illegality as a matter of law. 
 
In light of this analysis of section 425.18, subdivision (h), we turn to 
Soukup’s claim that defendants’ filing and maintenance of the underlying action 
was illegal as a matter of law because it violated Labor Code section 1102.5, 
subdivision (b) and 29 United States Code section 1140.  To reiterate our earlier 
discussion with reference to Soukup’s specific claim, she bears the burden of 
making a particularized showing that defendants’ initiation and maintenance of the 
underlying action violated these statutes as a matter of law.  For the reasons we set 
forth below, we conclude that she has failed to carry this burden. 
 
Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b) provides:  “An employer may 
not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information to a government or 
law enforcement agency, where the employee has reasonable cause to believe that 
the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation or 
noncompliance with a state or federal rule or regulation.” 
 
Labor Code section 1102.5 is a whistleblower statute, the purpose of which 
is to “encourag[e] workplace whistle-blowers to report unlawful acts without 
fearing retaliation.”  (Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 77.)  
 
 
30
“ ‘ “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that she 
engaged in protected activity, that she was thereafter subjected to adverse 
employment action by her employer, and there was a causal link between the 
two.” ’ ”  (Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 
52, 69.) 
 
Thus, it appears that a prerequisite to asserting a violation of Labor Code 
section 1102.5 is the existence of an employer-employee relationship at the time 
the allegedly retaliatory action occurred.  In this case, however, as Soukup’s 
counsel conceded at argument, Soukup was not an employee of LOHH at the time 
she complained to the Department of Labor about LOHH’s pension plan 
distribution nor when the underlying action was filed.  Accordingly, she fails to 
demonstrate how defendants’ filing and maintenance of the underlying action, 
even if it was in some broad sense retaliatory, violated the specific provisions of  
Labor Code section 1102.5, much less that the statute rendered defendants’ 
conduct illegal as a matter of law. 
 
29 United States Code section 1140 states in pertinent part that it is 
“unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or 
discriminate against a participant or beneficiary” of an employee benefit plan 
either for “exercising any right to which he is entitled” or “because he has given 
information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding” 
relating to such plans.15  “The latter part of [section 1140] is a whistleblower 
provision. . . designed to encourage individuals with knowledge of potential 
ERISA violations to share information in order that such violations may be 
redressed.  To this end, [section1140] prohibits employers from retaliating against 
                                              
15   
This section is part of the Employment Retirement Income Security 
Program (ERISA) statute.  (29 U.S.C. 1001 et. seq.) 
 
 
31
those who provide information or testimony in ‘any inquiry or proceeding related 
to [ERISA].’ ”  (Klein v. Banknorth Group, Inc. (D.Vt. 1997) 977 F.Supp. 302, 
304; Teumer v. General Motors Corp. (7th Cir. 1994) 34 F.3d 542, 550 [“A 
plaintiff seeking relief under [section 1140] must establish that the complained of 
action affecting his employment situation was taken by his employer with the 
specific intent of interfering with his benefit rights”].) 
 
Accordingly, it appears that a claim that this statute was violated can be 
made either by an employee-participant of an employee-benefit plan or a 
beneficiary of such plan.  For the same reason that Soukup is unable to show that 
defendants’ filing of the underlying action violated Labor Code section 1102.5 –
the absence of an employer-employee relationship at the time the allegedly 
retaliatory action was taken – she is unable to show a violation of the federal 
statute based on her status as an employee of LOHH.  Moreover, Soukup does not 
contend, much less demonstrate, that she can assert a violation of the federal 
statute as a beneficiary of the pension plan.  Here, too, then, she fails to show that 
defendants’ filing and maintenance of the underlying action violated the federal 
statute as to her, much less that defendants’ conduct was illegal as a matter of law 
for purposes of 29 United States Code section 1140.16 
 
Soukup alternatively argues that, even if the underlying action was not 
illegal as a matter of law, it was nonetheless a sham suit and on this ground 
defendants should be barred from recourse to the anti-SLAPP statute.  Soukup 
relies on United States Supreme Court decisions that, in various contexts, have 
                                              
16   
Soukup also argues that the illegality of the underlying action is established 
by the finding of the Court of Appeal that her complaint to the Department of 
Labor was the basis for the underlying action when it affirmed the dismissal of the 
action as a SLAPP.  This finding, however, is not the equivalent of a finding that 
the underlying action was illegal 
 
 
32
concluded that litigation undertaken without a reasonable basis, but merely to 
harass or hinder another party is sham litigation undeserving of the First 
Amendment protection that ordinarily immunizes petitioning activity.  
(Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (1993) 
508 U.S. 49, 60-61; Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (1983) 461 U.S. 
731, 743 (Bill Johnson’s Restaurants).)  This doctrine derives from decisions 
reached in the context of antitrust law and is often referred to as the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine.  (United Mine Workers v. Pennington (1965) 381 U.S. 657, 
670; Eastern Railroad Presidents’ Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. (1961) 
365 U.S. 127, 144.)  “The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, as refined and explained in 
Real Estate Investors, has two prongs.  First, . . . the challenged action must have 
been undertaken with an improper motive.  That is, it must have been done not 
with the hope of securing a favorable governmental result, but solely to harass and 
hinder another party.  The other prong of the doctrine is that the challenged action 
must have been objectively baseless.  Absent such a patent lack of merit, an action 
protected under the First Amendment by the right of petition cannot be the basis 
for litigation.”  (Ludwig v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 8, 22.) 
 
Invoking this doctrine, Soukup cites language from the Bill Johnson 
decision in which the Supreme Court stated that “baseless litigation is not 
immunized by the First Amendment right to petition.”  (Bill Johnson’s 
Restaurants, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 743).  Equating baselessness with lack of 
probable cause (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 
820), she contends that the absence of probable cause to support the underlying 
action renders it sham litigation unprotected by the First Amendment.  Therefore, 
she reasons, defendants were not entitled to avail themselves of the anti-SLAPP 
statute because the purpose of that statute is to promote the exercise of protected 
speech and petition rights. 
 
 
33
 
We disagree.  First, Bill Johnson’s Restaurants is not directly controlling, 
nor does Soukup argue that it is, because that case involved the National Labor 
Relations Act (NRLA) rather than a statute in any way analogous to the anti-
SLAPP statute.  In Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, the Supreme Court held that it is an 
“enjoinable unfair labor practice to prosecute a baseless lawsuit with the intent of 
retaliating against an employee for the exercise of rights” protected by the NRLA 
relating to union organizing.  (Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, supra,  
461 U.S. at p. 744.)  Second, the sham suit exemption urged upon us by Soukup 
would be significantly broader than that which the Legislature created in section 
425.18, subdivision (h).  Third, the legislative history surrounding the enactment 
of section 425.18, subdivision (h) demonstrates that the Legislature was aware of 
the principle articulated in the Bill Johnson’s Restaurants decision to which 
Soukup refers and adopted it only to the extent it supported the narrow exemption 
from the anti-SLAPP statute for SLAPPbacks set forth in subdivision (h). 
 
In a comment addressing subdivision (h) of section 425.18, the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary report states:  “In Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. 
National Labor Relations Board, 461 U.S. 731 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that ‘baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to 
petition.’  [¶]  AB 1158’s proposed Section 425.18(h) . . . adopts this principle in 
the SLAPPback context and provides that ‘a special motion to strike may not be 
filed against a SLAPPback by a party whose filing or maintenance of the prior 
cause of action from which the SLAPPback arises was illegal as a matter of 
law.’. . .  [¶]  Thus, where a person whose prior SLAPP lawsuit was illegal as a 
matter of law, as shown by being thrown out on a special motion to strike, and the 
SLAPP victim files a subsequent malicious prosecution action, that bad actor 
cannot use the anti-SLAPP law to defend against the lawsuit or to vex and harass 
the SLAPP victim.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1158 
 
 
34
(2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 15, 2005, pp. 11-12.)  Thus, the 
Legislature concluded that, for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute, underlying 
actions illegal as a matter of law are a species of “baseless litigation” undeserving 
of First Amendment protection, as that general principle was articulated in the Bill 
Johnson’s Restaurants decision, but it declined to apply that principle to fashion 
the kind of categorical exemption for SLAPPbacks that Soukup, citing the same 
principle, urges upon us.  Where the Legislature has spoken we are not at liberty to 
create a broader exception for sham litigation. 
 
We therefore conclude that Soukup has failed to show that the  filing and 
maintenance of the underlying action was illegal as a matter of law for purposes of 
section 425.18, subdivision (h).  Therefore, defendants are not barred from 
proceeding with their motions to strike Soukup’s action under the anti-SLAPP 
statute.  As such, the motions are subject to the usual analysis under which 
defendants are required to make a threshold showing that Soukup’s malicious 
prosecution claim arises from protected activity.  “By definition, a malicious 
prosecution suit alleges that the defendant committed a tort by filing a lawsuit.” 
(Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 735.)  The filing of 
lawsuits is an aspect of the First Amendment right of petition.  (Id., at p. 736, fn. 
5.)  Accordingly, defendants have fulfilled the required threshold showing.  This 
does not end our analysis, however.  “If the court finds such a showing has been 
made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of 
prevailing on the claim.”  (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., supra, 29 
Cal.4th at p. 67.)  The Court of Appeal concluded that Soukup had not done so.  
Soukup contends that the court erred.  We agree and on this ground reverse the 
Court of Appeal. 
 
 
35
B. Has Soukup Shown a Probability of Prevailing on Her Malicious 
 
Prosecution Claim? 
 
To establish a probability of prevailing, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that 
the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie 
showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the 
plaintiff is credited.”  (Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548 [46 
Cal.Rptr.2d 880]; accord, Rosenaur v. Scherer (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 260, 274 
[105 Cal.Rptr. 674].)  For purposes of this inquiry, “the trial court considers the 
pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant 
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or 
comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion 
if, as a matter of law, the defendant’s evidence supporting the motion defeats the 
plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim.”  (Wilson v. 
Parker, Covert & Chidester, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 821.)  In making this 
assessment it is “the court’s responsibility . . . to accept as true the evidence 
favorable to the plaintiff . . . .”  (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 
118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212.)  The plaintiff need only establish that his or her claim 
has “minimal merit” (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89) to avoid 
being stricken as a SLAPP.  (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, supra, 31 
Cal.4th at p. 738 [“the anti-SLAPP statute requires only ‘a minimum level of legal 
sufficiency and triability’ [citation].”], quoting Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 429, 438, fn. 5.)17 
                                              
17   
The parties made various evidentiary objections to each other’s affidavits 
and the attachments thereto in the trial court, but the trial court declined to rule on 
the objections and neither side pressed for a ruling.  Therefore, the objections are 
deemed to be forfeited. (Gallant v. City of Carson (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 705, 
710), and “in reviewing the trial court’s order denying the motion, we consider all 
(Footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
36
 
To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must show that 
the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and 
was pursued to a legal termination favorable to the plaintiff; (2) was brought 
without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.  (Sheldon Appel Co. v. 
Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 871.) 
 
The question of probable cause is “whether as an objective matter, the prior 
action was legally tenable or not.”  (Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, supra, 
47 Cal.3d. at p. 868.)  “A litigant will lack probable cause for his action either if 
he relies upon facts which he has no reasonable cause to believe to be true, or if he 
seeks recovery upon a legal theory which is untenable under the facts known to 
him.”  (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 164-165.)  “In a situation 
of complete absence of supporting evidence, it cannot be adjudged reasonable to 
prosecute a claim.”  (Mabie v. Hyatt (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 581, 597.)  Probable 
cause, moreover, must exist for every cause of action advanced in the underlying 
action.  “[A]n action for malicious prosecution lies when but one of alternate 
theories of recovery is maliciously asserted . . . . “  (Bertero v. National General 
Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 57, fn. 5; Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 
679, 695.) 
 
“The ‘malice’ element . . . relates to the subjective intent or purpose with 
which the defendant acted in initiating the prior action.  [Citation.]  The motive of 
the defendant must have been something other than that of bringing a perceived 
guilty person to justice or the satisfaction in a civil action of some personal or 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
the evidence presented by the parties.”  (Slauson Partnership v. Ochoa (2003) 112 
Cal.App.4th 1005, 1014, fn. 4.) 
 
 
37
financial purpose.  [Citation.]  The plaintiff must plead and prove actual ill will or 
some improper ulterior motive.”  (Downey Venture v. LMI Ins. Co. (1998) 66 
Cal.App.4th 478, 494; Albertson v. Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375, 383 [“The 
malice required in an action for malicious prosecution is not limited to actual 
hostility or ill will toward plaintiff but exists when the proceedings are instituted 
primarily for an improper purpose.”].)  Malice “may range anywhere from open 
hostility to indifference.  [Citations.]  Malice may also be inferred from the facts 
establishing lack of probable cause.”  (Grindle v. Lorbeer (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 
1461, 1465-1466.) 
 
The parties do not dispute that the underlying action in this case was 
terminated in Soukup’s favor when it was dismissed as a SLAPP.  With respect to 
the remaining elements of her malicious prosecution claim – lack of probable 
cause and malice — we conclude that Soukup’s evidentiary showing is sufficient 
to demonstrate a probability of prevailing for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. 
 
Soukup was named as a defendant in four causes of action in the underlying 
lawsuit; malicious prosecution, defamation, breach of fiduciary duty and tortious 
interference with business relationships.  To prevail on her malicious prosecution 
claim she is required to show only that defendants lacked probable cause for one 
of these causes of action.  Soukup can show that Hafif lacked probable cause for 
his malicious prosecution claim in the underlying action because her evidence 
demonstrates that she did not initiate any of the lawsuits against him that were the 
basis of that claim; that she had minimal or no contact with any of her 
codefendants in the time period during which those actions were filed; and that 
Hafif, while maintaining that Soukup was “involved in the general work of 
implementing the attack on me” conceded at his deposition that he would not be 
 
 
38
producing any witnesses to testify that she assisted her codefendants in filing their 
complaints.18 
 
Hafif’s defamation cause of action was based on the Orange County 
Register article in which his former clients accused him of overcharging them for 
costs and fees.  No allegations were made with respect to the second article 
involving the Department of Labor’s investigation into LOHH’s employee 
pension plan in which Soukup was quoted.  Again, Soukup presented evidence 
that she had had minimal or no contact with Hafif’s dissatisfied clients and Benson 
at the time the allegedly defamatory newspaper article appeared.  No evidence was 
presented that she was the source of the information provided to the reporter who 
wrote the first article. 
 
The breach of fiduciary duty cause of action was based on allegations that 
Soukup provided confidential information to Benson regarding certain cases on 
which she worked as a paralegal.  Soukup presented uncontroverted evidence that 
her discussions with Benson about cases at LOHH occurred while both of them 
were employed at LOHH and, she therefore argues, were privileged under the 
qualified privilege for communications between interested parties.  (Civ. Code, §  
47, subd. (c); Coastal Abstract Service v. First American Title (1999) 173 F.3d 
725, 735 [“California’s common interest privilege, Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c), 
immunizes a person’s statement to others on matters of common interest from 
liability in tort, provided that the person did not act with malice,” fn. omitted]; 
Kelly v. General Telephone Co. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 278, 285 
[Communications between a company’s employees may fall within the privilege].) 
                                              
18   
Defendants assert that Hafif “withdrew” his malicious claim against 
Soukup, but fail to show where in the record that cause of action was dismissed 
against her. 
 
 
39
Moreover, she also presented evidence that, to the extent he used this information 
in his wrongful termination actions against Hafif, it was without her knowledge or 
consent, and she denied having conspired with him to extort money or cases from 
Hafif.  No evidence was presented that the qualified privilege did not apply to 
Soukup’s communications with Benson during the course of their mutual 
employment at LOHH or that Soukup had disclosed confidential information to 
Benson after Benson had left LOHH in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy 
against Hafif.19 
 
Hafif’s cause of action for tortious interference with business relationships 
was premised on allegations that Soukup had conspired with other defendants to 
“devise[] a ‘gameplan’ [sic] wherein each sought to personally benefit by 
presenting a united front against plaintiffs to demand unjustified reductions in the 
fees and costs they owed plaintiffs for their legal services.”  Again, Soukup 
presented evidence that she had no or minimal contact with her codefendant in the 
timeframe during which the conspiracy was alleged to have been planned and 
carried out.  She also pointed out that she would not have personally benefited 
from the alleged conspiracy, a point seemingly conceded by Hafif who, during a 
deposition, while insisting Soukup was part of the conspiracy, acknowledged he 
had no idea why she was involved in it. 
 
As against this evidence tending to demonstrate lack of probable cause, 
defendants generally assert that probable cause existed to support their claims 
                                              
19   
Defendants cite a declaration from O.J. Freed, a mutual friend of Hafif and 
Benson, in which he states that Benson said Soukup had told him that Hafif had 
accepted bribes “to sell out clients.”  Even accepting the declaration at face value, 
it fails to set forth the time, place and circumstances of this conversation between 
Benson and Soukup nor does it, on its face, support the specific causes of action 
alleged against Soukup by Hafif. 
 
 
40
against Soukup without making a specific evidentiary showing as to each claim.20  
The general showing, moreover, consists primarily of rulings in other cases 
involving parties other than Soukup; for example, the denial of a summary 
adjudication motion brought by Terrie Hutton in the underlying action.  But 
Hutton was not named in the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.  Thus, 
even if the denial of her summary adjudication motion could be construed as a 
generalized finding of probable cause as to those counts in which both she and 
Soukup were named, Soukup could still prevail on her malicious prosecution 
claim based on the malicious prosecution of the cause of action for breach of 
fiduciary duty.  (Crowley v. Katleman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 695.)  Defendants cite 
other rulings as disparate as the judgment in favor of Hafif and Stock in Terry 
Schielke’s malicious prosecution action, and the order granting Stock’s motion to 
strike Terrie Hutton’s malicious prosecution action as a SLAPP.  But defendants 
do not contend, much less demonstrate, that these rulings have collateral estoppel 
effect on the issue of whether probable cause existed to support the four causes of 
                                              
20   
In their briefs, defendants also repeatedly purport to incorporate by 
reference arguments from briefs they filed in the Court of Appeal and here in this 
case and in the Hutton case.  They offer no authority that permits such 
incorporation and nothing in the California Rules of Court allows this practice.  To 
the contrary, the relevant rule requires briefs filed in this court to conform to rule 
14 which governs the content and form of briefs filed in the Court of Appeal.  
(Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 28.1(a).)  It is well settled that the Court of Appeal does not 
permit incorporation by reference of documents filed in the trial court.  (Colores v. 
Board of Trustees (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1301, fn. 2. [“[I]t is not 
appropriate to incorporate by reference, into a brief, points and authorities 
contained in trial court papers, even if such papers are made a part of the appellate 
record”]; Estate of Wiedemann (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 362, 370-371 
[incorporation by reference of points and authorities filed in the trial court violates 
California Rules of Court, rule 14].)  The same principle bars defendants’ attempts 
to incorporate by reference arguments advanced in other appellate briefs.  We 
therefore disregard these purported incorporations by reference. 
 
 
41
action in the underlying suit in which Soukup was named as a defendant.  Absent 
such effect, they are irrelevant to that issue.21  Equally irrelevant are the opinions 
of the Court of Appeal in this case as to which we have granted review, and are, 
therefore, no longer published or citable.  (Quintano v. Mercury Cas. Co. (1995) 
11 Cal.4th 1049, 1067, fn. 6; Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 976(d)).) 
 
Finally, defendants repeatedly argue that Terrie Hutton’s diaries 
demonstrate that they had  probable cause to proceed against Soukup in the 
underlying action.  Preliminarily, defendants did not obtain these diaries until after 
they had filed the underlying action and, therefore, the diaries could not have 
provided them with probable cause for filing the action and naming Soukup as a 
defendant in it.22  Even more crucially, in all the hundreds of pages of Hutton’s 
diaries that appear in the appellate record, defendants fail to cite a single passage 
that specifically would lend support to their theory that Soukup actively conspired 
with any of her codefendants in the underlying action. 
 
With respect to malice, Soukup argues that the fact the underlying action 
was dismissed as a SLAPP — that is, that it was brought primarily to chill the 
exercise of her constitutional rights of speech and petition — establishes a prima 
facie showing of malice because interference with the exercise of those rights is, 
                                              
21   
Accordingly we deny defendants’ request to judicially notice the statement 
of decision in the Schielke case.  (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 268, 
fn. 6 [reviewing court need not take judicial notice of irrelevant court records].) 
22   
Moreover, as the Court of Appeal concluded in the appeal affirming the 
dismissal of the underlying action as a SLAPP against Soukup and Hutton, 
however, those diaries were properly held to be inadmissible.  Defendants make 
no showing that these diaries would be admissible against Soukup on any theory 
of admissibility.  Therefore, no matter how often or insistently defendants attempt 
to rely on these diaries, the inescapable fact is that, as to Soukup, they are and 
remain inadmissible. 
 
 
42
by definition, an improper purpose to initiate and maintain litigation.  We do not 
agree with the premise of Soukup’s claim that an action eventually adjudicated to 
be a SLAPP was necessarily initiated and maintained with malice.  However, 
Soukup also cites evidence of attitudes ranging from “open hostility to 
indifference” (Grindle v. Lorbeer, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1465) that satisfies 
the requirement of a showing of minimal merit to her malicious prosecution claim 
so as to defeat defendants’ motions.  For example, she cites evidence that Hafif 
physically threatened her when she refused to accept unregistered stock as part of 
LOHH’s distribution of its pension plan, the event she alleges ultimately resulted 
in her having been named as a defendant in the underlying action; that Stock told 
her Hafif had named her in the underlying action to prevent her from making 
trouble for him in the future; that Hafif admitted at a deposition he had no 
witnesses to testify to her involvement in the malicious prosecution cause of action 
in the underlying action; that Gregory Hafif threatened the lawyer Soukup retained 
to look into the pension plan matter with lawsuits and attorneys fee claims; that 
Aitken failed to provide her with an explanation as to why she had been named a 
defendant in the underlying action and refused her request to be dismissed from 
the action; and that Stock refused to dismiss Hafif’s appeal of the dismissal of the 
underlying action after she prevailed on her anti-SLAPP motion.  Moreover, 
malice can also be inferred from the evidence that defendants lacked probable 
cause to initiate and maintain the underlying action against Soukup.  (See id., at 
p. 1366.)  We conclude that Soukup’s showing is sufficient to establish malice for 
the limited purpose of defeating defendants’ motions to strike.  
 
Stock separately argues that Soukup cannot show a probability of 
prevailing on her malicious prosecution claim as to him because his role in the 
underlying action was limited to that of appellate counsel and there is no tort of 
malicious prosecution of an appeal.  In the context of this case, we disagree. 
 
 
43
 
In Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, we held that “an attorney may 
held liable for continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable 
cause.”  (Id. at p. 960.)  Therefore, we concluded that the malicious prosecution 
plaintiff in Zamos, by demonstrating that the defendant attorneys continued to 
prosecute the underlying action after discovering it was without probable cause, 
had made a sufficient showing to defeat defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion to 
dismiss.  In so finding, we expressly distinguished Coleman v. Gulf Ins. Group 
(1986) 41 Cal.3d 782, on which Stock principally relies for the proposition that 
there is no malicious prosecution claim against an attorney who did not initiate the 
underlying action, but participated only in the appeal. 
 
“In Coleman, the underlying action was commenced by the plaintiffs in the 
malicious prosecution action.  Therefore, in order to establish their cause of action 
against the defendant’s insurer for malicious prosecution, the plaintiffs argued that 
the insurer, in maliciously causing the defendant to file a frivolous appeal, caused 
the initiation of a separate action.  This is the argument the Coleman court 
rejected.  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  The operative distinction . . . is between continuing a 
prosecution and continuing a defense.  In Coleman, the defendant in the malicious 
prosecution action had merely continued its defense of the underlying wrongful 
death action by causing the filing of the appeal in that action.  Here, according to 
the evidence presented in opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, defendants in the 
malicious prosecution action continued their prosecution of the underlying fraud 
action after learning it was baseless.”  (Zamos v. Stroud, supra, 32 Cal. 4th at 
pp. 968-969, fn. omitted.) 
 
The filing of an appeal is “ ‘the continuation of an action.’ ”  (Zamos v. 
Stroud, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 969.)  Under our reasoning in Zamos, therefore, the 
maintenance of an appeal by plaintiffs in an action discovered to lack probable 
cause may expose the plaintiff’s attorney to liability for malicious prosecution.  
 
 
44
We therefore agree with Soukup that Stock cannot insulate himself from such 
liability, as a matter of law, simply because he asserts that his role in the 
underlying action was limited to that of appellate counsel.  As we have observed 
in another context, the filing of such an appeal, which stays the litigation, may 
itself be a tactic that operates to the detriment of the defendant as to whom the 
action has been found to be a SLAPP.  (See Varian Medical Systems v. Delfino, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 195.)  Nor are we persuaded that the denial of Soukup’s 
request for sanctions against Stock in the appeal of the underlying action 
demonstrates that the underlying action was supported by probable cause; that 
denial merely represented a finding that the argument advanced on appeal – that 
the trial court abused its discretion by entertaining Soukup’s belated motion to 
strike – was not frivolous.  (§ 907.) 
 
Soukup also maintains that Stock’s participation in the underlying action 
was greater than simply appearing as appellate counsel.  The record appears to 
bear this out.  For example, in the declaration Stock filed in support of his motion 
to strike Soukup’s action, he states that he was involved in attempting to settle the 
action and personally communicated the settlement offer to her.  In an earlier 
declaration he stated he made appearances on behalf of Hafif in the underlying 
action and assisted in the preparation of motions including preparing “a demurrer 
to [Soukup’s] cross-complaint against Mr. Hafif.”  Soukup also presented 
evidence that Stock appeared in at least one deposition in the underlying action. 
 
Based on the respective showings of the parties, we conclude that Soukup 
has shown a probability of prevailing on her malicious prosecution claim.  
Accordingly, on this ground we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
45
III.  JUDGMENT 
 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with our opinion. 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Soukup v. Hafif/Soukup v. Stock 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 118 Cal.App.4th 1490 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S126715 
Date Filed: July 27, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Gregory C. O’Brien, Jr. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Ronald C. Stock, in  pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, Greg K. Hafif, Jeanne A. Sterba; Law Offices of James J. Moneer, James J. 
Moneer; Aitken Aitken & Cohn, Darren O. Aitken and Wylie A. Aitken for Defendants and Appellants 
Law Offices of Herbert Hafif et al. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Peggy J. Soukup, in pro. per.; Law Offices of Gary L. Tysch, Gary L. Tysch; Dell’Ario & LeBouef and 
Alan Charles Dell’Ario for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Ronald C. Stock 
Law Offices of Ronald C. Stock 
P.O. Box 5261 
Fullerton, CA  92838-0261 
(714) 381-9229 
 
James J. Moneer 
Law Offices of James J. Moneer 
1901 First Avenue, First Floor 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 544-9151 
 
Alan Charles Dell’Ario 
Dell’Ario & LeBouef 
201 Nineteenth Street, Suite 200 
Oakland, CA  94612 
(510) 763-7700