Case Title: MORGANFLASH v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-103

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
MORGANFLASH v. STATE2003 WY 12076 P.3d 830Case Number: 02-103Decided: 09/24/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            
      

 

RANDY 
MORGANFLASH,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Donna 
D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel, Public Defender's Program and *Mary B. Guthrie, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; and Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

*Order 
allowing counsel to withdraw entered on March 4, 2003.

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, Randy 
Morganflash (Morganflash), was convicted of one count of second-degree sexual 
assault,1 one count of third degree sexual 
assault,2 and one count of indecent liberties 
with a minor.3  He contends that the district court 
erred in determining that the five-year-old female victim (NR) was competent to 
testify, that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial, 
and that the district court erred in denying him a formal "taint" hearing with 
respect to NR's testimony.  We will 
affirm.

 

 

[¶2]      Morganflash 
raises these issues for our resolution:

 

I.          
Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that NR was competent to 
testify.

 

II.          
Whether the trial court erred when it denied [Morganflash's] motion for a 
new trial.

 

III.         
Whether the trial court erred by not conducting a formal "taint" 
hearing.

 

The 
State describes these issues:

 

I.  Did the district court correctly rule 
that NR was competent to testify, and was it proper to deny [Morganflash's] 
motion for a new trial based on that ground?

 

II.          
Did the district court properly deny [Morganflash's] motion for a 
separate "taint" hearing regarding NR?

 

 

[¶3]      The victims in 
this case are NR and her three-year-old brother (TR).  The mother of the victims met 
Morganflash in late January or early February of 2001.  After knowing him for about a week, she 
asked him to move in with her family.  
Mother was aware that Morganflash was unemployed and had only recently 
been released from prison where he had served time for a sex offense.  Mother worked two jobs that encompassed 
as much as 16 hours of her day, and Morganflash watched her children while she 
was at work.  The issues raised in 
this appeal do not necessitate a detailed description of the criminal conduct 
for which Morganflash was convicted.  
It suffices to note that Morganflash engaged the two victims in sexual 
conduct proscribed by Wyoming's criminal code.

 

[¶4]      The nature of the 
misconduct came to light because NR was not performing well at school and 
because of her poor performance, as well as some behavior problems, she was 
being evaluated to determine what the cause or causes might be.  In addition, an inquiry was made when a 
school employee observed Morganflash giving NR an open-mouthed "lingering" kiss 
when he dropped her off for school.  
This process was ongoing during the first five months of 2001.  In May 2001, NR revealed that both she 
and her little brother were the objects of sexual abuse by Morganflash.  NR testified at trial and repeated 
essentially the same information as that she had revealed to a Department of 
Family Services investigator and to a psychologist who was treating NR and TR 
during this time period.

 

[¶5]      The district 
court conducted a hearing to determine whether the two victims were competent to 
testify.  It found that NR was 
competent to testify, but that TR was not.  
In addition, Morganflash requested that the district court conduct a 
"taint" hearing to determine whether the questioning of NR had been so 
suggestive and leading as to undermine the accuracy of NR's memory of the 
crucial events.  The district court 
denied Morganflash's motion for a taint hearing on the basis that he did not 
meet the threshold requirement of presenting "some evidence" of 
taint.

 

 

[¶6]      Morganflash 
contends that NR was not competent to appear as a witness and that the district 
court erred in finding her to be competent.   Because this issue continues to 
appear with regularity, especially in appeals regarding child molestation cases, 
we repeat at length our seminal decision collecting and analyzing our 
jurisprudence with respect to competency hearings and the associated "taint" 
issue:

 

The 
Wyoming Rules of Evidence provide that "[e]very person is competent to be a 
witness except as otherwise provided in these rules."  W.R.E. 601.  "A person is generally competent to 
testify if he can understand, receive, remember and narrate impressions and is 
sensible to the obligations of the oath taken before testifying."  Simmers, 943 P.2d  at 1199; 
Larsen v. State, 686 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo.1984).  "Intelligence, not age, is the guiding 
criteria in determining the competency of a witness."  Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 879 
(Wyo.1987).  It is a 
well-established principle of law that competency of witnesses to testify is a 
question within the sound discretion of the trial court.  Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222, 
655 P.2d 342, 347 (1982); People v. Estorga, 200 Colo. 78, 612 P.2d 520, 
524 (1980); State v. Joblin, 107 Idaho 351, 689 P.2d 767, 771 (1984); 
State v. Howard, 247 Mont. 370, 806 P.2d 1038, 1039 (1991).  However, when children are called into 
the courtroom to testify, we have held that once the child's competency is 
called into question by either party, it is the duty of the court to make 
an independent examination of the child to determine competency, and that 
determination will 

not 
be disturbed unless shown to be clearly erroneous.  Burt v. Burt, 48 Wyo. 19, 41 P.2d 524, 525 (1935) (quoting 5 Jones Commentaries on Evidence 3958, 3959, § 
2107 (2d Ed.)).  See also Punches 
v. State, 944 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Wyo.1997); Trujillo v. State, 880 P.2d 575, 579 (Wyo.1994); Baum, 745 P.2d  at 879; and Larsen, 686 P.2d  
at 585.

 

            
We have directed the district courts to utilize a five-part test for 
determining the competency of child witnesses:

 

"(1) 
an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand; (2) 
the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is to 
testify, to receive an accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to 
retain an independent recollection of the occurrence; (4) the capacity to 
express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to 
understand simple questions about it."

 

            
Larsen, 686 P.2d  at 585 (quoting State v. Allen, 70 Wash. 2d 690, 424 P.2d 1021 (1967)).

 

      The New Jersey 
Supreme Court, prompted by its recognition that children can be susceptible to 
suggestive interview techniques and that such techniques can undermine the 
reliability of a child's account of actual events, adopted a procedure termed a 
"taint hearing."  Michaels, 
642 A.2d  at 1382-84.  

 

The 
[New Jersey] Supreme Court held that a pretrial "taint" hearing was the 
appropriate method of determining whether the investigatory interrogations and 
interviews "were so suggestive that they give rise to a substantial likelihood 
of irreparably mistaken or false recollection of material facts bearing on 
defendant's guilt."  * * *  The Court held that the initial burden 
of triggering the taint hearing is on the defendant, who must make a showing of 
"some evidence" that the victim's statements were the result of suggestive 
interview techniques.  * * *  

 

      The factors that 
should be considered in assessing the reliability of a complaint regarding 
sexual offenses are:  

"(1) 
the age of the victim; (2) circumstances of the questioning; (3) the victim's 
relationship with the interrogator; and (4) the type of questions asked." * * * 
Undue suggestiveness can occur when an interviewer has a preconceived notion of 
what has happened to a child, the interviewer uses leading questions, the 
interviewer is a trusted authority figure, the person accused of wrongdoing is 
vilified during the interview, or the interviewer uses threats or rewards to 
pressure the child.

 

            
State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 694 A.2d 196, 245-46, 
cert. denied, 151 N.J. 466, 700 A.2d 878 (1997) (summarizing and 
quoting Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1377-1383).

 

            
While we agree with the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court, we 
conclude that there is no void in Wyoming law which a "taint hearing" procedure 
would fill.  The Washington State 
Supreme Court considered the issue in Matter of Dependency of 
A.E.P.,  135 Wash. 2d 208,  956 P.2d 

297 
(1998), and found that the competency inquiry included the question of pretrial 
taint.  That court also utilizes the 
five-part test to determine the competency of child 
witnesses:

 

      "The true test of 
the competency of a young child as a witness consists of the following:  (1) an understanding of the obligation 
to speak the truth on the witness stand; (2) the mental capacity at the time of 
the occurrence concerning which he is to testify, to receive an accurate 
impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection 
of the occurrence; (4) the capacity to express in words his memory of the 
occurrence; and (5) the capacity to understand simple questions about 
it."

 

            
Id. at 304 (quoting Allen, 70 Wash. 2d 690, 424 P.2d 
1021).  Recognizing the overlap in 
competency and taint considerations, the Washington State Supreme Court 
said:

 

      We decline to 
adopt a pretrial taint hearing as a requirement for the reason that the existing 
state of the law adequately addresses Petitioner's concerns.  As to the reliability of a child's 
testimony, a defendant can argue memory taint at the time of the child's 
competency hearing.  If a defendant 
can establish a child's memory of events has been corrupted by improper 
interviews, it is possible the third Allen factor, "a memory sufficient 
to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence[,]" may not be 
satisfied.

 

            
Matter of Dependency of A.E.P., 956 P.2d  at 307 (quoting 
Allen, 70 Wash. 2d 690, 424 P.2d 1021).  
We similarly decline to adopt a separate pretrial "taint hearing" 
procedure as the concerns addressed by such a procedure can be adequately 
addressed during the competency hearing which we have required since 1935.  We do, however, endorse the use of the 
factors set out in the Michaels decision as they relate to the question 
of independent recollection.

 

English 
v. State, 
982 P.2d 139, 145-46 (Wyo. 1999) (alterations in original); and see Alicea v. 
State, 13 P.3d 693, 697 (Wyo. 2000); Billingsley v. State, 2003 WY 
61, ¶¶10-13, 69 P.3d 390, ¶¶ 10-13 (Wyo. 2003); Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 
93, ¶7, 74 P.3d 699, ¶7; and Seward v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶30, ___ P.3d 
____, ¶30 (Wyo. 2003).

 

[¶7]      Morganflash 
asserts that a careful examination of NR's testimony, both at the competency 
hearing and at trial, demonstrates that she was not competent to testify as a 
witness.  We do not agree.  Our searching examination of her 
testimony, which we do not feel the need to set out in detail here, obliges this 
Court to conclude that the district court's resolution of the factual elements 
of the standard of review set out above was not clearly erroneous and was within 
the sound discretion of the trial court.  
While NR's responses may have been at or near the margins of competency 
for a child of her age, she was able to adequately meet the minimum criteria set 
out in the standard of review quoted above.  The cases cited above demonstrate the 
need for more patient, focused, and thorough questioning of child witnesses, 
using terminology more readily understandable to children of tender years.  A useful guide is found at Manuel E. 
Nestle, Qualifying Child Witness to Testify, 35 Am.Jur. POF2d 665-689 
(1983 and Supp. 2001 at 147-77); also see Michael D. Pursell, Defense 
to Charges of Sex Offense, 24 Am.Jur. POF2d 515, §§ 27-31 (1980 and Supp. 
2001 at 122-28).

 

[¶8]      Morganflash also 
challenges the trial court's decision to deny his motion for a separate "taint" 
hearing.  As set out more fully 
above, such a "taint" hearing is required only if a defendant comes forward with 
"some evidence" that taint is present.  
Morganflash accepts that he did not come forward with information 
sufficient to meet the "some evidence" standard, but asserts that he was unable 
to do so because none of the sessions wherein NR was questioned or counseled 
were tape recorded or audio/video recorded.  The transcripts reveal that the sessions 
in which NR made her revelations were not recorded for good reasons, and in one 
instance the recording device failed to work properly.  Moreover, cogent argument or pertinent 
authority to the effect that failure to record such sessions is error, or is 
other than a defensible policy, does not support these contentions.  A comprehensive review of the 
transcripts "after the fact," discloses that those who interviewed NR did not 
taint her recollection of the crucial events, and that Morganflash's contentions 
were, indeed, speculation.  The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the separate "taint" 
hearing.

 

 

[¶9]      Morganflash 
contends that the "interests of justice" mandated that the district court grant 
his motion for new trial.  W.R.Cr.P. 
33 (emphasis added) provides:

 

(a)  In 
general. -- The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to that 
defendant if required in the interest of justice.  If trial was by the court without a 
jury, the court, on motion of a defendant for a new trial, may vacate the 
judgment if entered, take additional testimony, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment.

  

            
(b)  Any 
grounds except newly discovered evidence. -- A motion for a new trial based 
on any grounds, except newly discovered evidence, shall be made within 15 days 
after verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as the court may 
fix during the 15 day period; but the time for filing the motion may not be 
extended to a day more than 30 days from the date the verdict or finding of 
guilty is returned.  The motion 
shall be determined and a dispositive order entered within 15 days after the 
motion is filed and if not so entered shall be deemed denied, unless within that 
period the determination shall be continued by order of the court, but no 
continuance shall extend the time to a day more than 60 days from the date the 
verdict or finding of guilty is returned.

            
(c)  Newly discovered evidence. -- A motion for a new 
trial based on the grounds of newly discovered evidence may be made only before 
or within two years after final judgment but if an appeal is pending, the court 
may grant the motion only on remand of the case.  A motion for new trial based on the 
ground of newly discovered evidence shall be heard and determined and a 
dispositive order entered within 30 days after the motion is filed unless, 
within that time, the determination is continued by order of the court, but no 
continuance shall extend the time to a day more than 60 days from the date that 
the original motion was filed.  When 
disposition of a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is made 
without hearing, the order shall include a statement of the reason for 
determination without hearing.

 

[¶10]   The basis for the new trial motion 
was, in large part, an iteration of the contention that NR was not competent to 
testify and we will not repeat those assertions here, as they are well 
summarized above.

 

[¶11]   A trial court has discretion in 
determining whether to grant a motion for new trial.  In determining whether the trial court 
abused its discretion, we must decide whether the court could have reasonably 
concluded as it did.  Baumgartner 
v. State, 7 P.3d 912, 915 (Wyo. 2000) (internal citations omitted).  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  Anderson v. State, 2002 WY 46, 
¶25, 43 P.3d 108, ¶25 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 
151 (Wyo.1998)); also see State v. Vinson, 515 N.W.2d 314, 320-21 
(Wis.App. 1994).

 

[¶12]   Having concluded that the district 
court did not err in determining that NR was competent to appear as a witness, 
it follows that we must conclude that the denial of the motion for new trial on 
that same basis was not an abuse of discretion.

 

 

[¶13]   The district court did not err in 
determining that NR was competent to serve as a witness, nor did it err in 
denying a motion for new trial on that same ground.  The district court did not err in 
refusing to conduct a separate "taint" hearing.  For these reasons the judgment and 
sentence of the district court is affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

   1Wyo Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-303 (LexisNexis 2003) (emphasis added) 
provides:

 

§ 6-2-303. 
Sexual assault in the second degree.

            
(a)  Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim 
commits sexual assault in the second degree if, under circumstances not 
constituting sexual assault in the first 
degree:

(i)  The actor causes submission of the victim by threatening 
to retaliate in the future against the victim or the victim's spouse, parents, 
brothers, sisters or children, and the victim reasonably believes the actor will 
execute this threat.  "To retaliate" 
includes threats of kidnapping, death, serious bodily injury or extreme physical 
pain;

(ii)  The actor causes submission of the victim by any means 
that would prevent resistance by a victim of ordinary 
resolution;

(iii)  The actor administers, or knows that someone else 
administered to the victim, without the prior knowledge or consent of the 
victim, any substance which substantially impairs the victim's power to appraise 
or control his conduct;

(iv)  The actor knows or should reasonably know that the victim 
submits erroneously believing the actor to be the victim's 
spouse;

(v)  At the time of the commission of the act the victim is 
less than twelve (12) years of age and the actor is at least four (4) years 
older than the victim;

(vi)  The actor is in a position of authority over the victim 
and uses this position of authority to cause the victim to submit; 
or

(vii)  The actor inflicts sexual intrusion in treatment or 
examination of a victim for purposes or in a manner substantially inconsistent 
with reasonable medical practices.

            
(b)  A person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree 
if he subjects another person to sexual contact and causes serious bodily injury 
to the victim under any of the circumstances listed in W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i) 
through (iv) or paragraphs (a)(i) through (vi) of this 
section.

 

   2Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-304 (LexisNexis) (emphasis added) provides:

 

§ 6-2-304.  Sexual assault in the third 
degree.

            
(a)  An actor commits sexual assault in the third degree if, 
under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first or second 
degree:

(i)  The actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim 
and inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim under the age of sixteen (16) years; 
or

(ii)  The actor is an adult and subjects a victim under the 
age of fourteen (14) years to sexual contact without inflicting sexual intrusion 
on the victim and without causing serious bodily injury to the 
victim;

(iii)  The actor subjects a victim to sexual contact under any 
of the circumstances of W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i) through (iv) or 6-2-303(a)(i) through 
(vi) without inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim and without causing 
serious bodily injury to the victim.

 

 

   3Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-3-105 (LexisNexis 2003) provides:

 

§ 14-3-105.  Immoral or indecent acts; 
penalty.

            
(a)  Except under circumstance constituting sexual assault in 
the first, second or third degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, 
any person knowingly taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any 
child or knowingly causing or encouraging any child to cause or encourage 
another child to commit with him any immoral or indecent act is guilty of a 
felony.  Except as provided by 
subsection (b) of this section, a person convicted under this section shall be 
fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than one thousand 
dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten (10) 
years, or both.

            
(b)  An actor convicted under subsection (a) of this section 
shall be punished by life imprisonment without parole 
if:

(i)  The circumstances of the crime involve a victim who was 
under the age of sixteen (16) at the time of the offense and an actor who was at 
least four (4) years older than the victim;  and

(ii)  The actor has two (2) or more previous convictions for 
any of the following designated offenses, which convictions resulted from 
charges separately brought and which arose out of separate occurrences in this 
state or elsewhere:

(A)  A conviction under W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304 or a 
criminal statute containing the same or similar elements as a crime defined by 
W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304;

                                    
(B)  Repealed by Laws 1997, ch. 135, § 2, eff. July 1, 
1997.

            
(C)  A conviction under W.S. 14-3-105(a), or a criminal statute 
containing the same or similar elements as the crime defined by W.S. 
14-3-105(a), if the circumstances of the crime involved a victim who was under 
the age of sixteen (16) at the time of the offense and an actor who was at least 
four (4) years older than the victim.

            
(c)  As used in this section, "child" means a person under the 
age of eighteen (18) years.