Case Title: State v. Stearns

Citation: 

Docket Number: 91-543

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1992-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-543


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit

 John Stearns                                 May Term, 1992


 George F. Ellison, J.

 Gary Kessler, Supervising Appellate Prosecutor, Montpelier, for plaintiff-
   appellant

 Matthew F. Valerio of Abatiell & Wysolmerski, Rutland, for defendant-
   appellee


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   Defendant John Stearns was charged with driving under the
 influence (DUI) in violation of 23 V.S.A. { 1201(a)(2).  He filed a motion
 in limine to prevent the State from showing at trial that he refused to take
 a breath test, arguing that a contrary finding from an earlier civil
 license suspension proceeding was binding in the criminal case.  The trial
 court granted the motion, reasoning that the State was collaterally estopped
 from relitigating the refusal issue, and the State took an interlocutory
 appeal from that ruling.  We reverse and remand.
      Defendant was arrested for DUI on August 11, 1991, at which time he was
 asked to give a breath sample.  He indicated that he wished to consult with
 an attorney prior to deciding whether to take the breath test.  According to
 an affidavit prepared by the arresting officer, defendant was permitted to
 speak privately with an attorney, and thereafter refused to take the test.
 Defendant testified in a civil suspension hearing, however, that the officer
 failed to give him an opportunity to decide whether to take the test before
 recording that he refused.
      Pursuant to 23 V.S.A. { 1205(f), a civil license suspension proceeding
 was instituted against defendant in the district court.  In such a
 proceeding, one of the issues is "whether the person refused to permit the
 test."  Id. { 1205(g)(3).  A deputy state's attorney presented the State's
 case, which consisted of an affidavit of the arresting officer.  The
 affidavit stated that defendant refused to take the breath test but provided
 no details about the refusal.  Defendant appeared pro se and testified that
 he did not refuse to take the test.  The court accepted defendant's version
 of the incident, stating that defendant was not given enough time to decide
 whether to take the breath test after his conversation with the attorney.
 Judgment in the civil suspension hearing was entered for defendant, and the
 State did not appeal.
      One day prior to the judgment in the civil suspension proceeding, the
 State filed a criminal DUI charge against defendant.  In such criminal
 cases, refusal to take a breath test may be offered at trial as evidence
 against the defendant.  See 23 V.S.A. { 1202(d)(6).  Defendant moved to
 prevent the introduction of such evidence, arguing that collateral estoppel
 precluded the State from relitigating the issue after the district court's
 finding in the civil suspension hearing.  The trial court granted the
 motion.
      The trial court's decision was based on the doctrine of collateral
 estoppel, or issue preclusion.  The elements of issue preclusion are:
         (1) preclusion is asserted against one who was a party
         or in privity with a party in the earlier action; (2)
         the issue was resolved by a final judgment on the
         merits; (3) the issue is the same as the one raised in
         the later action; (4) there was a full and fair
         opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier action;
         and (5) applying preclusion in the later action is fair.

 Trepanier v. Getting Organized, Inc., 155 Vt. 259, 265, 583 A.2d 583, 587
 (1990); see also Berlin Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Stoneman, 3 Vt. L.W.
 198, 200 (June 19, 1992) (applying Trepanier elements).  We have never
 applied issue preclusion in a case of cross-over estoppel -- that is, where
 one party claims that an issue decided in a civil case is precluded in a
 subsequent criminal case.  See People v. Gates, 434 Mich. 146, 155,