Case Title: Scoggin v. Listerhill Employees Credit Union

Citation: 658 So. 2d 376

Docket Number: 1931435

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1995-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
658 So. 2d 376 (1995)
David SCOGGIN
v.
LISTERHILL EMPLOYEES CREDIT UNION.
1931435.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 13, 1995.
Rehearing Denied March 10, 1995.
*377 Lindsey Mussleman Davis of Holt, McKenzie, Holt and Mussleman, Florence, for appellant.
Carleton P. Ketcham, Jr. of Trimmier and Hayley, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.
COOK, Justice.
David Scoggin appeals a summary judgment in favor of Listerhill Employees Credit Union on his claims alleging fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of contract. His claims were based on his purchase of a used motor vehicle from the Credit Union. Specifically, Scoggin contends that when he purchased the vehicle, the odometer read 18,334 miles but that, in fact, the vehicle had 155,575 miles on it. He alleges that had he known the true mileage of the vehicle, he would not have paid for it as much as he did pay. He later traded it in on another vehicle before learning of the mileage discrepancy. We affirm.
In 1990, Scoggin bid $5000 on a used 1988 Dodge Dynasty automobile that had been repossessed by the Credit Union. In his deposition, Scoggin claimed that he spoke with a representative of the Credit Union and that that person told him that the vehicle had been burned and that, in order to get rid of the smoke smell, the Credit Union had replaced the interior of the car. Scoggin did not test drive the automobile before buying it. His deposition testimony described the incidents leading up to the purchase, in pertinent part, as follows:
C.R. 44-45. He further described the bidding process and the vehicle:
C.R. 46-50. With regard to warranties on the car, he testified as follows:
C.R. 65. Following this testimony, counsel for the Credit Union sought to obtain an overview of Scoggin's testimony:
C.R. 68-69.
After Scoggin purchased the car, he and his wife drove it until Scoggin traded it in toward the purchase of another vehicle. The trade-in allowance on the price of the second automobile was $6,600. Scoggin claims that it was only after he had traded the automobile that he discovered the odometer discrepancy. Although Scoggin alleges a breach of contract, the sales document he signed clearly states that the used vehicle was being sold "as is," and in his deposition testimony Scoggin admitted that he purchased the vehicle "as is." Thus, the trial court correctly entered the summary judgment as to the breach of contract claim.
The certificate of title, which Scoggin claims he did not read and did not receive a copy of, contained the following statement, printed in large letters:
In addition, although Scoggin claims not to have read the statement relating to the odometer discrepancy, he signed that statement, too. He also signed the same odometer disclosure statement in another place to certify that he had received a copy of it.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the Credit Union offered Scoggin's deposition testimony set out above, along with the supporting documents. That evidence made a prima facie showing that there was no genuine issue of material fact; the burden then shifted to Scoggin to present substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact and indicating that the Credit Union was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala.R.Civ.P.; § 12-21-12, Ala.Code 1975; Rudolph v. Lindsay, 626 So. 2d 1278, 1279 (Ala.1993).
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Scoggin submitted an affidavit stating in pertinent part:
C.R. 72-74. The court struck that affidavit. The Credit Union contends that the court properly struck Scoggin's affidavit, because, it says, that affidavit contradicted his deposition testimony given earlier. The conversation with the Credit Union representative, as related in the deposition, did not include the statement alleged in Scoggin's affidavit regarding the mileage reflected on the odometer. When specifically questioned during the deposition regarding other statements the Credit Union representative may have made *380 to Scoggin, Scoggin stated that there were none.
"When a party has given clear answers to unambiguous questions which negate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact, that party cannot thereafter create such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without explanation, previously given clear testimony." Van T. Junkins & Associates, Inc. v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir.1984); see Couch v. Woody Anderson Ford, Inc., 558 So. 2d 888 (Ala. 1989). The trial court properly struck Scoggin's affidavit. We must conclude that Scoggin did not offer substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. The summary judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, HOUSTON and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.