Case Title: Westgate Miami Beach, Ltd. v. Newport Operating Corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC09-1881

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-1881 
____________ 
 
WESTGATE MIAMI BEACH, LTD.,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
NEWPORT OPERATING CORPORATION,  
Respondent. 
 
[December 16, 2010] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Third District 
Court of Appeal in Westgate Miami Beach, Ltd. v. Newport Operating Corp., 16 
So. 3d 855 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), regarding an issue of prejudgment interest.  In its 
decision, the district court expressed concern about the current state of the law and 
certified to this Court three questions of great public importance.1  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
                                          
 
 
1.  The three questions as certified are: 
WHERE THERE HAS BEEN AN AGREEMENT ON, OR NO 
OBJECTION TO, A RESERVATION OF JURISDICTION TO 
AWARD PREJUDGMENT INTEREST, SHOULD THE 
 
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The certified questions essentially ask whether this Court should recede 
from its precedent in order to avoid the inadvertent waiver of prejudgment interest.  
In McGurn v. Scott, 596 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1992), this Court held that the 
reservation of jurisdiction to award prejudgment interest in an order purporting to 
be a final judgment is improper because prejudgment interest is an element of 
damages.  Id. at 1044.  The Court further held that although such a judgment is 
technically not a final order, it will be deemed to be final for purposes of appeal, 
because the order grants the plaintiff the right to execute against the defendant‟s 
assets.  Id. at 1044-45.  Further, under McGurn, once an appeal is taken, the trial 
court then lacks jurisdiction to rule on the issue of prejudgment interest and the 
                                                                                                                                        
RESERVATION BE UPHELD IN ORDER TO PREVENT AN 
INJUSTICE NOTWITHSTANDING THE RULE IN MCGURN V. 
SCOTT, 596 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1992)? 
 
WHERE A JUDGMENT CONTAINS A RESERVATION OF 
JURISDICTION TO AWARD PREJUDGMENT INTEREST, 
SHOULD THE APPEAL OF SUCH A JUDGMENT BE TREATED 
AS A PREMATURE APPEAL UNDER FLORIDA RULE OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE [9.110(l)], OR MUST THE APPEAL 
BE TREATED AS ACCOMPLISHING A WAIVER OF 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST PURSUANT TO MCGURN V. 
SCOTT, 596 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1992)? 
 
WHETHER A TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO 
RESERVE JURISDICTION TO AWARD PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST POST-APPEAL AS IT CAN WITH ATTORNEYS‟ 
FEES AND COSTS? 
 
Id. at 860-61. 
 
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plaintiff will be deemed to have waived the matter of prejudgment interest.  Id. at 
1045.  
The application of the McGurn rule has resulted in the inadvertent waiver of 
prejudgment interest where the trial court, often at the behest of the parties, enters 
a final judgment but reserves jurisdiction to award prejudgment interest.  Because 
we conclude that the trial court should be allowed to decide the issue of 
prejudgment interest separately, we recede from McGurn and answer the following 
rephrased certified question in the affirmative:2   
SHOULD A TRIAL COURT BE ALLOWED TO RESERVE 
JURISDICTION IN A FINAL JUDGMENT TO AWARD 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST? 
 
In answering this rephrased certified question in the affirmative, our intent is to 
promote judicial economy and prevent unfairness to either party.  We conclude that 
a final judgment reserving jurisdiction to award prejudgment interest is a final 
appealable order but that the trial court does not lose jurisdiction to determine 
prejudgment interest in a manner similar to that in which the trial court addresses 
attorneys‟ fees and costs. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
                                          
 
 
2.  Because we have determined that the most appropriate option in receding 
from McGurn is to treat prejudgment interest in a manner similar to attorneys‟ fees 
and costs, we do not need to address the first and second certified questions.  
 
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Petitioner, Westgate Miami Beach, Ltd., along with Marci Rochkind, sued 
Respondent, Newport Operating Corporation, along with Atlantic Resort 
Development, Ltd., and Five Seas Investors, Inc., for claims arising out of a series 
of commercial disputes involving timeshare agreements at the Newport Beachside 
Hotel, located in Sunny Isles Beach, Florida.  In an order entitled “Final Judgment” 
dated May 18, 2007, the trial court found in favor of Westgate and awarded 
$7,744,169 in damages.  The Final Judgment included the language “for which let 
execution issue.”  The Final Judgment further provided, “A separate order will be 
entered awarding prejudgment interest.” 
Westgate promptly filed a motion to assess prejudgment interest, which 
included Westgate‟s calculation of prejudgment interest on the $7.7 million 
damage award.  The motion stated: “Since the amount of the compensatory 
damages have been fixed in the Final Judgment and it is a ministerial act to 
calculate and assess the prejudgment interest, [Westgate] . . . requests an award of 
prejudgment interest consistent with the . . . Final Judgment and the applicable 
Florida law.”  
At a hearing on June 8, 2007, the trial court heard argument from Newport‟s 
counsel that the $7.7 million in damages was incorrect—that the amount should 
instead have been around $5 million.  The trial court stated that it needed to revisit 
the damages issue and that it might amend the amount of damages.  
 
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Newport‟s counsel also contended that Westgate was not entitled to 
prejudgment interest.  The trial court disagreed and stated that Westgate was 
entitled to prejudgment interest, but that the matter would need to be heard at a 
separate time, after the trial court determined the correct amount of damages.  
However, the trial court indicated that the hearing on prejudgment interest might 
be delayed until September.  Newport‟s counsel asserted that as long as the trial 
court had found entitlement, the final judgment was a final order that could be 
appealed and the amount of prejudgment interest could be calculated after the 
appeal.  Westport‟s counsel did not object or otherwise indicate that prejudgment 
interest could not be awarded after the appeal.  It appears that neither party nor the 
trial court was aware of the McGurn rule.3 
Subsequently, on June 13, 2007, the trial court issued an order amending the 
amount of damages in the Final Judgment from $7,744,169 to $5,000,867.  
Westgate then filed a Revised Motion to Assess Prejudgment Interest on June 19, 
2007.  The motion provided Westgate‟s calculation of prejudgment interest on the 
new damages award amount and requested that an order assessing prejudgment 
interest be entered. 
                                          
 
 
3.  In oral argument before this Court, counsel for respondent expressly 
acknowledged that although he was an experienced attorney, he was unaware of 
McGurn. 
 
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Although no order was entered regarding prejudgment interest, Westgate 
and Newport both filed separate appeals to the Third District Court of Appeal.  The 
appeals were consolidated, and the Third District affirmed the trial court in an 
unelaborated per curiam decision.  Newport Operating Corp. v. Westgate Miami 
Beach, Ltd., 982 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). 
After the Third District issued its mandate, Westgate again requested the 
trial court to assess prejudgment interest, asserting that Newport could not contest 
Westgate‟s entitlement to prejudgment interest because the final judgment had 
been affirmed.  Newport filed a response, arguing for the first time that the trial 
court was without jurisdiction to award prejudgment interest because Westgate had 
waived it by appealing, pursuant to the rule in McGurn v. Scott.  In a hearing on 
the motion, the trial court, although apologetic, agreed with Newport that the trial 
court had lost its jurisdiction and that Westgate had waived its right to prejudgment 
interest.  The trial court ultimately denied Westgate‟s motion to assess 
prejudgment interest, based on McGurn and its progeny.  The court also granted 
Newport‟s motion to release the letter of credit that had been executed in lieu of a 
supersedeas bond.4 
                                          
 
 
4.  In order to stay execution of the final judgment, Newport had posted a 
letter of credit for the approximately $5 million in damages, plus 22%, as required 
by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(b)(1).  Newport also had agreed to 
increase the letter of credit by around $2 million to include the prejudgment 
 
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Westgate appealed the order denying Westgate‟s motion to assess 
prejudgment interest to the Third District.  Based on McGurn, the Third District 
affirmed the trial court‟s order, but ultimately certified three questions of great 
public importance to this Court.  Westgate Miami Beach, Ltd., 16 So. 3d at 859-61.   
Judge Cope concurred, writing separately to express his view that the 
McGurn rule should be revisited.  Id. at 859-60 (Cope, J., concurring).  He noted, 
as a preliminary matter, that the McGurn decision seems “to rest on a theory that 
every civil case is litigated from a complaint to a final judgment with all issues 
decided except attorney‟s fees and costs.”  Id. at 860.  He pointed out that there are 
many exceptions to this rule, including bifurcated proceedings or severance of 
claims, immediate appeals in injunction cases, receivership matters, and rulings 
deciding the immediate possession of property.  Id. 
Judge Cope also likened prejudgment interest to attorneys‟ fees and costs, 
stating that “it is hard to see why such a reservation of jurisdiction should not be 
allowed.”  Id.  In Judge Cope‟s view, the more substantial problem with the 
McGurn rule is inadvertent waiver because, to the extent possible, procedural rules 
should operate so as to avoid the unintentional loss of substantive rights.  Id. 
ANALYSIS 
                                                                                                                                        
interest to which Westgate claimed it was entitled, without waiving any objection 
Newport had to Westgate‟s entitlement to, or the amount of, prejudgment interest. 
 
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In analyzing this issue, we will first discuss McGurn.  Then, we will discuss 
why we recede from McGurn and instead hold that a trial judge may reserve 
jurisdiction to award prejudgment interest, as with attorneys‟ fees and costs.  
Finally, we discuss this case. 
This Court’s Decision in McGurn 
In McGurn v. Scott, 596 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1992), this Court considered the 
issue of whether a trial court may issue a final appealable order while reserving 
jurisdiction to award prejudgment interest.  In that case, the trial court entered a 
judgment awarding damages to Scott, but reserving jurisdiction to award 
appropriate costs, prejudgment interest, and attorneys‟ fees upon proper motion of 
the parties.  Id. at 1043.  McGurn then appealed.  Id.  Scott filed a motion with the 
district court requesting that it relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court to consider 
his motion for award of prejudgment interest.  Id.  The district court dismissed the 
appeal, stating that the judgment being appealed was not final.  Id. 
In reviewing the issue, this Court first examined what constitutes a final 
judgment for purposes of appeal:  
It is well settled that a judgment attains the degree of finality 
necessary to support an appeal when it adjudicates the merits of the 
cause and disposes of the action between the parties, leaving no 
judicial labor to be done except the execution of the judgment.  Final 
judgments or orders determine the rights and liabilities of all parties 
with reference to the matters in controversy and leave nothing of a 
judicial character to be done. 
 
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Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  This Court noted, however, 
that the reservation of jurisdiction to award costs or attorneys‟ fees does not affect 
the finality of an underlying judgment for purposes of appeal.  Id. at 1044.  The 
rationale behind this is “that an award of attorneys‟ fees or costs is ancillary to, and 
does not interfere with, the subject matter of the appeal and, thus, is incidental to 
the main adjudication.”  Id.   
 
McGurn argued that the calculation of prejudgment interest is generally 
straightforward and ministerial and therefore a reservation of jurisdiction to award 
prejudgment interest should be treated similar to a reservation to award attorneys‟ 
fees and costs.  Id.  The Court disagreed, reasoning:  
This Court has previously held that prejudgment interest is 
awarded as just compensation to those who are damaged by having 
their property withheld from them or destroyed.  Argonaut Ins. Co. v. 
May Plumbing Co., 474 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985).  Thus, “prejudgment 
interest is merely another element of pecuniary damages.”  Id. at 214.  
An element of damages is not ancillary to the subject matter of the 
cause regardless of how straight-forward and ministerial the 
calculation of those damages may be.  Therefore, the determination of 
prejudgment interest is directly related to the cause at issue and is not 
incidental to the main adjudication. 
Id.  Thus, because the determination of prejudgment interest is directly related to 
the cause at issue, “[b]y reserving jurisdiction to address the issue of prejudgment 
interest, the instant trial court failed to dispose of all material issues in controversy 
and, therefore, the order was not final.”  Id.   
 
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In the event that a trial court wished to determine prejudgment interest 
separate from the determination of other damages, this Court recommended that 
“the trial court . . . issue an interlocutory order setting forth the damages already 
determined.  This would in effect liquidate those damages, if not already 
liquidated, and interest on those damages would start to accrue.”  Id. 
Although the Court held that the trial court‟s order was not final, it did not 
agree that the appeal was premature and should have been dismissed.  Id.  The 
Court stated that ruling that the appeal was premature would create a procedural 
quandary: 
The judgment‟s appearance as a final order upon which execution 
could have issued placed McGurn in a procedural quandary.  If the 
judgment were considered an interlocutory order, McGurn would be 
unable to exercise his right to both an appeal and a supersedeas to stay 
the enforcement of the judgment.  Yet, the order granted Scott the 
right to let execution issue against McGurn‟s property. 
Further, had McGurn not filed the appeal, he may have been 
precluded from doing so at a later date. 
Id. at 1044-45.  Therefore, the Court held: 
[I]f a trial court improperly renders such a judgment which appears to 
be, or has the attributes of a final judgment, the order will be deemed 
to have become a final judgment requiring review by immediate 
appeal.  Further, because an appellate court‟s jurisdiction is exclusive 
with respect to the subject matter of an appeal, once the appeal is 
taken the trial court will lack the jurisdiction to take any further action 
in the matter.  See Willey v. W.J. Hoggson Corp., 89 Fla. 446, 105 So. 
126 (1925).  Thus, the parties will be deemed to have waived any 
matter reserved for future adjudication by the trial court, with the 
exception of attorneys‟ fees and costs.  However, under Florida Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 9.600(b), the district court may in its 
 
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discretion direct the trial court to address matters improperly reserved 
if the district court decides it is equitable to do so. 
Id. at 1045.5  Because McGurn at the time was a case of first impression, this Court 
instructed the district court to direct the trial court under rule 9.600(b) to make a 
determination as to the amount of prejudgment interest.  Id. 
Receding from McGurn 
When considering whether to recede from precedent, this Court has 
explained: “The doctrine of stare decisis counsels us to follow our precedents 
unless there has been „a significant change in circumstances after the adoption of 
the legal rule, or . . . an error in legal analysis.‟ ”  Rotemi Realty, Inc. v. Act Realty 
Co., 911 So. 2d 1181, 1188 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Dorsey v. State, 868 So. 2d 1192, 
1199 (Fla. 2003)).  “Fidelity to precedent provides stability to the law and to the 
society governed by that law.  However, the doctrine does not command blind 
allegiance to precedent.  Stare decisis yields when an established rule of law has 
proven unacceptable or unworkable in practice.”  State v. Green, 944 So. 2d 208, 
217 (Fla. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  We conclude that 
McGurn has proven to cause an injustice in practice because it rests on an 
impractical legal fiction.  Under McGurn, an order that is non-final (because it 
                                          
 
 
5.  McGurn did not address what would constitute an equitable reason, other 
than a case of first impression, and thus did not provide guidance to the appellate 
courts as to when to grant relinquishment. 
 
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includes a reservation to award prejudgment interest) will nonetheless be treated as 
final and deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to award prejudgment interest; thus, 
the plaintiff will be deemed to have waived the right to prejudgment interest.  This 
impractical legal fiction has resulted in the inadvertent waiver of the valuable right 
to prejudgment interest, a result that procedural rules should operate to avoid.  As 
stated by Judge Cope in his concurring opinion in this case: 
To the extent possible, procedural rules should operate so as to avoid 
the unintentional loss of substantive rights. . . .   
Florida has a long standing public policy in favor of 
adjudication of disputes on the merits wherever possible.  See North 
Shore Hospital, Inc. v. Barber, 143 So. 2d 849, 852-53 (Fla. 1962).  It 
would better serve that policy to modify the McGurn rule to eliminate 
the automatic waiver. 
Westgate, 16 So. 3d at 860 (Cope, J., concurring).  From a common sense point of 
view, no plaintiff would ever intentionally waive the right to prejudgment interest 
to which he or she is entitled.  A review of the district court cases discussing the 
issue reveals that plaintiffs appear to have inadvertently waived the right to 
prejudgment interest on at least six occasions.6  Although inadvertent waiver does 
not appear to be a pervasive problem, the district court cases following McGurn 
                                          
 
 
6.  See Liberty Transp., LLC v. Banyan Air Servs., Inc., 7 So. 3d 1138, 1140 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2009); Avatar Dev. Corp. v. DeAngelis, 944 So. 2d 1107, 1108-09 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Wyatt v. Milner Document Prods., Inc., 932 So. 2d 487, 489 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Home Ins. Co. v. Crawford & Co., 890 So. 2d 1186, 1189-90 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Diaz v. Fla. Windstorm Underwriting Ass‟n, 802 So. 2d 386, 
386-87 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Emerald Coast Commc‟ns, Inc. v. Carter, 780 So. 2d 
968, 969 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). 
 
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are indicative of the problem caused by the current rule: inadvertent waiver of 
prejudgment interest, which can be a substantial sum of money—here, 
approximately $2 million—and which is intended to make the plaintiff whole by 
accounting for the time-value of money.  Accordingly, we recede from McGurn.  
In receding from McGurn, for the reasons explained below, we answer the 
rephrased certified question in the affirmative and hold that a trial court is allowed 
to reserve jurisdiction in a final judgment to award prejudgment interest in a 
manner similar to attorneys‟ fees and costs.  In other words, an appeal from the 
final judgment will not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to award prejudgment 
interest, thereby avoiding inadvertent waiver.  Because of the procedural quandary 
recognized in McGurn, we do not recede from McGurn‟s holding that a final 
judgment that authorizes execution but reserves jurisdiction to award prejudgment 
interest will be considered final for purposes of appeal.7  
In holding that a trial court is allowed to reserve jurisdiction to award 
prejudgment interest, we find it significant that for all practical reasons, 
prejudgment interest is more akin to attorneys‟ fees and costs than other elements 
                                          
 
 
7.  Because the final judgment will still be considered final for purposes of 
appeal, this avoids the procedural quandary by allowing the defendant to appeal a 
final judgment that appears final on its face and authorizes execution on the 
defendant‟s assets, while enabling the defendant to take steps to prevent execution 
by posting a supersedeas bond. 
 
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of damages.8  Attorneys‟ fees, costs, and prejudgment interest are all matters for 
the judge to calculate and award, rather than the finder of fact.  Also, prejudgment 
interest is calculated after a verdict liquidates the plaintiff‟s pecuniary losses; in 
other words, prejudgment interest cannot be determined until the conclusion of the 
case, when a verdict is rendered.  Attorneys‟ fees and costs are also calculated at 
the completion of the case.  Although prejudgment interest is not incidental to the 
final judgment like attorneys‟ fees and costs, the issue of prejudgment interest does 
not alter the substance of the underlying final judgment.  We conclude that 
allowing the trial court to treat prejudgment interest like attorneys‟ fees and costs 
will further, rather than impede, the administration of justice. 
We have also considered the alternative options posed by the other questions 
certified to us by the Third District and conclude that these options each have 
potential drawbacks.  The first option would be to allow reservation of jurisdiction 
based on agreement, or lack of objection, of the parties.  However, under this 
option, there is the concern that disputes over whether the parties agree or do not 
object would lead to further litigation.  Additionally, parties who do not know that 
they can agree to the trial court determining prejudgment interest at a later time 
                                          
 
 
8.  The practical similarities of prejudgment interest to attorneys‟ fees and 
costs may be the reason that parties have assumed that prejudgment interest can be 
treated like attorneys‟ fees and costs.  In fact, in this case, it appears that the parties 
and the trial court were all operating under this assumption.  
 
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may inadvertently waive their right to prejudgment interest—a problem that we 
seek to remedy.  As to this option, we conclude that it would be more prudent to 
treat all cases involving prejudgment interest alike rather than carving out an 
exception based on agreement or lack of objection by the parties. 
 The second option would be to treat an appeal from a final judgment 
reserving jurisdiction to determine prejudgment interest as a premature appeal 
under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(l).9  However, under this option, 
there remains the potential for inadvertent waiver if the parties and the district 
court do not recognize that the appeal is premature.  Further, the district courts are 
in disagreement as to whether an appeal from a judgment that authorizes execution 
upon a defendant‟s assets can be considered premature for purposes of appeal.10  
                                          
 
 
9.  We note that what is now Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(l) 
was not promulgated until after the McGurn decision.  See In re Amends. to the 
Fla. Rules of App. Pro., 609 So. 2d 516, 535-36 (Fla. 1992) (promulgating rule 
9.110(m), now rule 9.110(l)). 
 
10.  Compare Raymond James & Assocs., Inc. v. Godshall, 851 So. 2d 879, 
880-81 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (dismissing as premature an order that authorized 
execution but reserved jurisdiction to rule on a related claim of whether the 
plaintiff was entitled to further damages, and distinguishing McGurn as concerning 
only prejudgment interest), with Lombardo v. Haige, 971 So. 2d 1037, 1040 (Fla. 
2d DCA 2008) (“[W]e cannot fathom how one can wait to appeal an order upon 
which execution can enter.”), and Del Castillo v. Ralor Pharmacy, Inc., 512 So. 2d 
315, 319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (holding that because a final judgment fixing 
compensatory damages and ordering execution, but reserving jurisdiction to later 
consider punitive damages, although improper, had the “attributes of a „true‟ final 
judgment, it [was] deemed to have taken on the characteristic of such a judgment 
which requires review by immediate appeal.” (footnote omitted)). 
 
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Finally, under this option, the potential for the procedural quandary recognized in 
McGurn remains: the final judgment appears to authorize execution upon the 
defendant‟s assets, yet the defendant cannot appeal the judgment.  
After noting the practical similarities of prejudgment interest to attorneys‟ 
fees and costs and concluding that the other options posed to us have drawbacks, 
we have concluded that allowing trial courts to reserve jurisdiction in the final 
judgment to award prejudgment interest is the most appropriate course of action in 
receding from McGurn to avoid the inadvertent waiver of prejudgment interest. 
Newport asserts, however, that by allowing a trial court to reserve 
jurisdiction in a final judgment to award prejudgment interest, we would be 
receding from Argonaut Insurance Co., 474 So. 2d at 214-15, and thus from a 
hundred years of case law holding that prejudgment interest is an element of 
damages.  We disagree.  Although Argonaut recognized that prejudgment interest 
is an element of damages, it held that the issue of prejudgment interest is a discrete 
issue to be determined by the trial court, not the finder of fact.  We find nothing in 
Argonaut that is inconsistent with receding from McGurn and instead holding that 
prejudgment interest, although technically an element of damages, may be awarded 
separately from the main final judgment because it is solely dependent on the 
amount of other damages awarded in the final judgment and is a calculation to be 
done by the trial court.  
 
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Our decision to recede from McGurn should be interpreted not as a 
mandatory directive for trial courts to always reserve jurisdiction to award 
prejudgment interest when considering whether to enter a final judgment, but 
rather as a viable option available to the trial court.  Trial courts may still enter 
interlocutory orders, as recognized by McGurn, “setting forth the damages already 
determined.  This would in effect liquidate those damages, if not already 
liquidated, and interest on those damages would start to accrue.”  596 So. 2d at 
1044.  An interlocutory order would fix the amount of damages already determined 
and allow a trial court to wait until prejudgment interest is calculated before 
entering a final judgment.  
In most cases, the calculation of prejudgment interest is a ministerial 
calculation.  In such a scenario, we encourage the parties to include the amount in 
the final judgment, thereby saving judicial labor and avoiding the potential of a 
separate appeal of the prejudgment interest award.  However, where the amount or 
manner of calculation of prejudgment interest is contested (as it was in this case) or 
entitlement is disputed, and the trial court requires additional evidence or a hearing 
on the matter, we see no reason that the trial court cannot either enter an 
interlocutory order on the damages already determined or enter a final judgment 
that reserves jurisdiction to award prejudgment interest.  However, regardless of 
 
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whether the calculation is contested, we hold that a trial court may award 
prejudgment interest in a separate order, which is separately appealable.  
Finally, we note that when a trial court enters a final judgment reserving 
jurisdiction to award prejudgment interest, the final judgment should be clear as to 
whether entitlement to prejudgment interest has been determined and whether all 
that remains is the calculation of the amount.  This clarity is important because it 
will affect whether the issue of entitlement is reviewable on appeal from the final 
judgment.  
This Case 
In this case, the trial court entered a final judgment that authorized execution 
upon Newport‟s assets.  The order also retained jurisdiction for purposes of 
assessing attorneys‟ fees and costs and, with regard to prejudgment interest, stated: 
“A separate order will be entered awarding prejudgment interest.”  Accordingly, 
the trial court indicated in its judgment that it was reserving jurisdiction to award 
prejudgment interest.  
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons explained above, we answer the rephrased certified question 
in the affirmative.  We conclude that a final judgment reserving jurisdiction to 
award prejudgment interest is a final appealable order but that the trial court does 
not lose jurisdiction to determine prejudgment interest in a manner similar to that 
 
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in which the trial court addresses attorneys‟ fees and costs.  We quash the decision 
of the district court and remand this case to the district court with directions to 
remand to trial court for a calculation and award of prejudgment interest in this 
case.11 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D09-264 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
Dan R, Stengle of Hopping, Green and Sams, Tallahassee, Florida, and Robert P. 
Frankel of Robert P. Frankel and Associates, P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Franklin L. Zemel and John M. Cooney of Arnstein and Lehr, LLP, Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
 
                                          
 
 
11.  Whether the release filed by Newport in this Court has any effect on the 
prejudgment interest is an issue that we do not address because it was not 
presented to the trial court or the Third District.