Case Title: State v. Darby

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-51-01

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
On October 12, 1998, two masked men robbed The Rainbow Deli in Edison. An eyewitness described the men as one being taller and broader than the other and was apparently able to make out through the eye openings in the masks that they were black. The eyewitness also described how one of the men wielded a gun while the other emptied the cash register. Eleven days later, two masked men robbed a North Plainfield 7-11 store. A videotape system recorded the robbery. One of the 7-11 store perpetrators dropped his wallet, later identified as belonging to Basim Hobson. Following his arrest, Hobson gave the police a statement implicating himself and defendant in both the 7-11 store and Rainbow Deli robberies. Hobson pled guilty to both robberies and, as part of a plea agreement, agreed to testify against defendant, whom he identified as the gunman in each robbery. At defendant s trial, the prosecutor moved to introduce the videotape recording of the 7-11 store robbery as other-crime evidence. Because there was no clear and convincing evidence that defendant had committed another armed robbery, the prosecutor and the trial court agreed that the videotape was admissible as demonstrative evidence to corroborate Hobson s testimony that defendant was the gunman in the 7-11 store robbery, as well as other aspects of his testimony. Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the videotape, arguing that it was highly prejudicial and was probative of no material fact in issue in respect of the Rainbow Deli robbery. The videotape was played twice for the jury and Hobson identified defendant as the masked person holding a gun in the videotape. The jury found defendant guilty of the Rainbow Deli robbery and a number of weapons charges, including possession of a handgun by a previously convicted felon. The trial court sentenced defendant on the robbery to a mandatory extended term of life without parole eligibility. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court s opinion, although it agreed that defense counsel had objected to both Hobson s 7-11 store robbery testimony and introduction of the videotape. The Supreme Court granted defendant s petition for certification, initially limiting the issue to whether the videotape was admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b) and N.J.R.E. 403. The Court subsequently advised counsel that it would also address whether Hobson s 7-11 store robbery testimony was admissible. HELD: Evidence of a subsequent robbery was not admissible as other-crime evidence and was prejudicial to defendant, requiring a new trial. 1. Hobson s 7-11 store robbery testimony and the videotape are clear examples of other-crime evidence. The trial court failed to recognize this and consequently failed to apply the four-part test for determining whether such evidence was admissible. The trial court s decision is thus not entitled to deference or review under the abuse of discretion standard. This Court must therefore conduct a de novo review of whether the other-crime evidence was admissible. (Pp. 8-9) 2. N.J.R.E. 404(b) circumscribes the use of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts committed by an accused and, read in conjunction with N.J.R.E. 403, is a rule of exclusion rather than a rule of inclusion. Other-crime evidence is admissible when: 1) The evidence is relevant to a material issue genuinely in dispute; 2) The evidence is similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; 3) The evidence is clear and convincing; and 4) The probative value of the evidence outweighs its apparent prejudice. State v. Cofield, 127 N.J 328 (1992). (P. 9-12) 3. Ordinarily, other-crime evidence should not be admitted simply to bolster the credibility of a witness. Applying the four-prong test, Hobson s testimony in respect of the 7-11 store robbery was not relevant and therefore inadmissible. Similarly, the videotape was inadmissible other-crime evidence. The trial court inaccurately described the videotape evidence as demonstrative when in fact it did not demonstrate anything because the masked robbers were unrecognizable. The videotape was not relevant, had no probative value, and should have been excluded because the prejudicial effect far outweighed any probative value. In addition, introduction of the other-crime evidence was not harmless error. Without that evidence, the jury may well have disbelieved Hobson s testimony in respect of the Rainbow Deli robbery. (Pp. 12-15) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for a new trial. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, and JUDGE PRESSLER, J.A.D., temporarily assigned, join in Justice COLEMAN s opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RODERICK S. DARBY, Defendant-Appellant. Argued September 9, 2002 -- Decided November 19, 2002 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Alan I. Smith, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Peter A. Garcia, Acting Public Defender, attorney). Simon Louis Rosenbach, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Glenn Berman, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery of a deli that occurred on October 12, 1998. During the course of that trial, the State was permitted to introduce other-crime evidence of a subsequent robbery for the sole purpose of bolstering the credibility of Basim Hobson, a critical prosecution witness. He testified that he and defendant committed both robberies. The critical issue presented in this appeal is whether the admission of that evidence deprived defendant of a fair trial. The trial court ruled against defendant and the Appellate Division affirmed. We reverse the conviction because evidence concerning the subsequent robbery was not admissible and because the prejudicial effect of that evidence requires a new trial. Prior to introducing the videotape into evidence, the prosecutor made an application to have it admitted as other-crime evidence. His uncertainty in respect of whether the legal standard for admitting other-crime evidence could be satisfied is reflected in his admission that categorizing it as other-crime evidence might be a misnomer . . . because there is [no] clear and convincing independent evidence that, in fact, the defendant committed another armed robbery. Eventually, the prosecutor and the trial court agreed that the videotape was admissible as demonstrative evidence to corroborate Hobson s testimony that defendant was the gunman in the 7-11 store robbery and to corroborate his testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding Hobson s arrest. Despite agreeing that Hobson s 7-11 store robbery testimony was admissible, counsel for defendant objected to the introduction of the videotape depicting the 7-11 store robbery. He argued that I don t see why we have to bring out that armed robbery in this trial. Clearly, that is highly prejudicial. In addition, he argued that the videotape should be excluded from evidence because it was probative of no material fact in issue in respect of the Rainbow Deli robbery. The videotape was played twice for the jury while Hobson was on the witness stand. Hobson identified defendant as the masked person holding a gun in the videotape. The jury found defendant guilty of robbing the Rainbow Deli, conspiracy to commit robbery, and two charges of unlawful possession of a handgun. Subsequently, the same jury found defendant guilty of possession of a handgun by a previously convicted felon. After merging some offenses, the trial court sentenced defendant on the robbery to a mandatory extended term of life without parole eligibility. The Appellate Division noted in its opinion that the brief filed in that court by defendant s counsel had not argued that defense counsel had objected in the trial court to Hobson s 7-11 store robbery testimony. At oral argument in that court, however, defense counsel contended that trial counsel had objected to both the introduction of Hobson s 7-11 store robbery testimony and the videotape. The Appellate Division agreed that counsel had objected to both. Nonetheless, that court found no reversible error. We granted defendant s petition for certification, limited to whether the videotape was admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b) and N.J.R.E. 403. 170 N.J. 391 (2001). Subsequent to oral argument before this Court, we notified all counsel that we also intend to address whether Hobson s 7-11 store robbery testimony was admissible. Counsel have submitted supplemental briefs on that issue. [Ibid.] After many years of decisional law determining when other-crime evidence is admissible, a four-part test has been distilled. That test is designed to avoid the over-use of [such] evidence, State v. Marrero, supra, 148 N.J. at 483 (quoting State v. Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 338), because of its unique tendency to turn a jury against the defendant. State v. Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 302. The following four-part test has been established: 1. The evidence of the other crime must be admissible as relevant to a material issue; 2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; 3. The evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing; and 4. The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [State v. Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 338 (citations omitted).] Under the first prong of that test, the other-crime evidence must be relevant to a material issue genuinely in dispute. Generally, [r]elevant evidence means evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. N.J.R.E. 401. Relevancy is the hallmark of admissibility of evidence. In determining whether evidence is relevant, the inquiry should focus on the logical connection between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue. State v. Hutchins, 241 N.J. Super. 353, 358 (App. Div. 1990). If the evidence offered makes the inference to be drawn more logical, then the evidence should be admitted unless otherwise excludable by a rule of law. State v. G.V., 162 N.J. 252, 272-73 (2000)(Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(quoting State v. Covell, 157 N.J. 554, 565 (1999)). In other words, [t]o be relevant, evidence must have probative value, which is the tendency of the evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove. State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 480 (2001) (quoting State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4, 13 (1994)). Once it is determined that the other-crime evidence is relevant to establish a fact genuinely in dispute, the probative value of the proffered evidence [must] be carefully balanced against the danger that it will create undue prejudice against the defendant. State v. Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 302. Consequently, the primary focus of [N.J.R.E. 404(b)], when examined in conjunction with [N.J.R.E. 403], is to view it as a rule of exclusion rather than a rule of inclusion. State v. Marrero, supra, 148 N.J. at 482-83; State v. Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 337. NO. A-51 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RODERICK S. DARBY, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED November 19, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Coleman CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY