Case Title: Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Wayne Cty. Aud.

Citation: 2002-Ohio-2338

Docket Number: 20010451

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Wayne Cty. Aud., 95 Ohio St.3d 358, 2002-Ohio-2338.] 
 
 
RUBBERMAID, INC., APPELLEE, v. WAYNE COUNTY AUDITOR ET AL., 
APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Wayne Cty. Aud., 95 Ohio St.3d 358, 2002-Ohio-
2338.] 
Taxation — Complaint for reduction of taxable value — R.C. 5715.13 and 
5715.19 as amended by 1998 Sub.H.B. No. 694 violate Section 28, 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
(No. 2001-0451 — Submitted February 6, 2002 — Decided May 29, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 97-J-1119. 
__________________ 
 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. 5715.13 and R.C. 5715.19 as amended by 1998 Sub.H.B. No. 694 violate 
Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  (Cincinnati School Dist. 
Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision [2001], 91 Ohio St.3d 308, 
744 N.E.2d 751, followed.) 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J. 
{¶1} 
In early March 1997, a vice president of the home products 
division of appellee Rubbermaid, Inc. signed and filed a complaint with appellant, 
the Wayne County Board of Revision (“BOR”), seeking a reduction in the taxable 
value of certain of its properties for tax year 1996.  While the complaint was 
pending, this court decided Sharon Village, Ltd. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Revision 
(1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 479, 678 N.E.2d 932, where we held that since the 
preparation and filing of a valuation complaint by a nonattorney corporate officer 
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law, a board of revision does not have 
January Term, 2002 
 
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jurisdiction to consider that complaint under former R.C. 5715.19.  Despite that 
decision, the BOR proceeded to consider Rubbermaid’s complaint and granted a 
reduction in the valuation of Rubbermaid’s property. 
{¶2} 
Rubbermaid was dissatisfied with the amount of the reduction and 
filed an appeal with the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”).  The BTA then issued a 
show cause order based on Sharon Village, requiring Rubbermaid to demonstrate 
why its complaint should not be dismissed.  However, before the BTA decided 
whether to dismiss the case, the General Assembly enacted 1998 Sub.H.B. No. 
694 in response to Sharon Village.  Sub.H.B. No. 694, effective March 30, 1999, 
147 Ohio Laws Part III, 5373, permits some nonattorneys, including corporate 
officers, to file valuation complaints on behalf of a property owner.  On this basis, 
the BTA considered the appeal, and on February 8, 2001, it granted an additional 
reduction to Rubbermaid.  The BOR and the Wayne County Auditor appealed, 
and this cause is now before this court upon an appeal as a matter of right.1 
{¶3} 
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of R.C. 5715.13 and 
5715.19 as amended by Sub.H.B. No. 694.  As stated above, the amendments 
contained in Sub.H.B. No. 694 permit certain nonlawyers, such as corporate 
officers filing on behalf of their corporations, to file valuation complaints with a 
county board of revision.  R.C. 5715.13 and 5715.19(A)(1).  This legislation also 
states that if a board of revision dismisses a valuation complaint for the reason 
that the act of filing constituted the unauthorized practice of law, the complaint 
can be refiled by the individuals specified therein.  R.C. 5715.19(A)(3).  
Furthermore, Sub.H.B. No. 694 contains an uncodified Section 3, which provides 
that the amendment is “remedial legislation and applies to any complaint that was 
timely filed under either [R.C. 5715.13 or 5715.19] respecting valuations for tax 
                                          
 
1. 
Rubbermaid failed to timely submit a merit brief for this court’s consideration and as a 
result waived its oral argument. 
January Term, 2002 
 
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year 1994, 1995, 1996 or 1997, and to complaints filed for tax years 1998 and 
thereafter.”2 
{¶4} 
Appellants contend that Sub.H.B. No. 694 violates Section 28, 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution,3 which prohibits the General Assembly from 
passing laws that are retroactive in effect.4  Before determining whether a statute 
is unconstitutionally retroactive, we must first determine whether the General 
Assembly expressly intended the statute to apply retroactively.  R.C. 1.48; Van 
Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  If it did, we must next decide whether the statute is 
remedial, in which case it does not violate Section 28, Article II, or substantive, in 
which case the statute is unconstitutionally retroactive.  Van Fossen, supra, 
paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶5} 
With regard to the first determination, the uncodified Section 3 of 
Sub.H.B. No. 694 as amended specifically provides that its terms apply to any 
complaint filed for tax years 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997, and to tax years 1998 
and later.  Sub.H.B. No. 694 became effective on March 30, 1999, and an 
amendment to it became effective October 5, 1999.  1999 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 283, 
Sections 149 and 169.  It is clear that the legislation expressly applies to 
complaints that were filed before it became effective. 
                                          
 
2. 
This is the language of Section 3 as amended by Section 149 of 1999 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
283.  The amendment brought years 1994 and 1995 within the ambit of Section 3. 
3. 
Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution provides:  “The general assembly shall 
have no power to pass retroactive laws, or laws impairing the obligations of contracts; but may, by 
general laws, authorize courts to carry into effect, upon such terms as shall be just and equitable, 
the manifest intention of the parties, and officers, by curing omissions, defects, and errors, in 
instruments and proceedings, arising out of their want of conformity with the laws of this state.” 
4. 
In addition to the question that we resolve in this opinion, appellants also assert that 
Sub.H.B. No. 694 violates the Equal Protection Clause of Section 2, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution.  Furthermore, they assert that it violates Section 5, Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution because the General Assembly has sidestepped principles of separation of powers by 
enacting legislation infringing upon this court’s power to regulate the practice of law.  These 
assertions will not be addressed, since our decision renders them moot. 
 
January Term, 2002 
 
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{¶6} 
Having determined that the statute meets the threshold inquiry, we 
next consider the constitutionality of the intended retroactivity, by determining 
whether the retroactive statute is remedial or substantive.  A retroactive statute is 
substantive if it impairs vested rights, affects an accrued substantive right, or 
imposes new or additional burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as to a past 
transaction.  Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d at 106-107, 522 N.E.2d 489.  Remedial 
laws affect only the remedy provided, and include laws that “ ‘merely substitute a 
new or more appropriate remedy for the enforcement of an existing right.’ ”  
Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (2001), 91 
Ohio St.3d 308, 316, 744 N.E.2d 751 (the “Mirge” decision), quoting State v. 
Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 411, 700 N.E.2d 570. 
{¶7} 
Although the uncodified Section 3 of Sub.H.B. No. 694 refers to 
the amendment as remedial in nature, this court is not bound to accept that 
characterization but must instead undertake its own analysis.  In arguing that 
Sub.H.B. No. 694 is a substantive law, appellants urge us to apply the rationale 
set forth in our recent decision in Mirge, supra.  In Mirge, a corporation’s vice 
president had prepared, signed, and filed a valuation complaint with a county 
board of revision.  After that complaint was deemed defective because the filing 
by the corporate officer constituted the unauthorized practice of law, the 
corporation refiled the complaint pursuant to newly enacted Sub.H.B. No. 694.  
Under those facts, this court held that “R.C. 5715.19, as amended by Sub.H.B. 
No. 694, may not be constitutionally applied to permit the refiling of once-
dismissed R.C. 5715.19 complaints challenging valuations for tax years prior to 
the effective date of Sub.H.B. No. 694,” because that would violate Section 28, 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶8} 
In reaching our decision in Mirge, this court reasoned that 
Sub.H.B. No. 694 created a new right in property owners to refile certain invalid 
complaints.  At the same time, it also took away the legal right of county officials 
January Term, 2002 
 
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to have complaints dismissed that were not properly prepared and filed.  This 
court found that new burdens were imposed on county officials by requiring them 
to defend their valuation for a second time and leaving open the possibility that 
taxes would have to be refunded. 
{¶9} 
Although this case is distinguishable in that the complaint at issue 
is an original complaint rather than a refiled complaint, we agree with appellants 
that the rationale expressed in Mirge applies with equal force to the instant 
situation.  Regardless of whether the complaint is an original as opposed to a 
refiled complaint, Section 3 of Sub.H.B. No. 694, if upheld, would take away a 
legal right.  Prior to the enactment of this legislation, county officials had a vested 
legal right to have Rubbermaid’s complaint dismissed as invalid, since it was filed 
by an unauthorized individual.  The legislation strips county officials of this right.  
Furthermore, it imposes new and additional burdens on counties to defend against 
what would have been an invalid complaint in the absence of the new law.  
Therefore, under the rationale of Mirge, R.C. 5715.13 and R.C. 5715.19, as 
amended by Sub.H.B. No. 694, violate Section 28, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
{¶10} Accordingly, we find that the BOR was without jurisdiction to rule 
on Rubbermaid’s complaint.  The decision of the BTA is reversed. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in judgment. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶11} I believe that we should dismiss this case due to the lack of 
jurisdiction.  Appellants challenge the constitutionality of R.C. 5715.13 and 
5715.19 without having served the Attorney General.  The Attorney General had 
January Term, 2002 
 
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no notice of this action and no opportunity to participate in the case.  This is a 
jurisdictional requirement that must be met in order for this court to consider a 
constitutional challenge to a state statute.  George Shima Buick, Inc. v. Ferencak 
(2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 1211, 741 N.E.2d 138; Cicco v. Stockmaster (2000), 89 
Ohio St.3d 95, 728 N.E.2d 1066. 
{¶12} Assuming that jurisdiction does exist, I respectfully dissent from 
the majority’s determination that R.C. 5715.13 and 5715.19 are unconstitutional.  
For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in the Mirge case, I believe that 
Sub.H.B. No. 694 is remedial in nature.  Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. 
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 308, 317-318, 744 N.E.2d 
751, Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting.  Sharon Village, Ltd. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of 
Revision (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 479, 678 N.E.2d 932, and its progeny, and now 
Rubbermaid, effectively extinguish the rights of taxpayers who had complied with 
the law prior to Sharon Village but whose right to challenge a tax valuation was 
stripped away with the stroke of a pen.  I believe the result is unfair and unjust to 
the taxpayer and clearly a result not contemplated by the General Assembly. 
__________________ 
Rich, Crites & Wesp and Jeffrey A. Rich; and Martin Franz, Wayne 
County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellants. 
__________________