Case Title: Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co.

Citation: 1998-Ohio-388

Docket Number: 19971142

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUTOWSKI v. ELI LILLY & COMPANY, ET AL. 
[Cite as Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 347.] 
Products liability — Civil actions — Market-share liability is not an available 
theory of recovery in a products liability action. 
In Ohio, market-share liability is not an available theory of recovery in a products 
liability action. 
(No. 97-1142 — Submitted April 7, 1998 — Decided June 29, 1998.) 
ON ORDER CERTIFYING A QUESTION OF STATE LAW from the United States District 
Court, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, No. 1:97CV1283. 
 
This case comes before us as a certified question of state law from the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division.  
In its certification order, the federal district court recounted the following: 
 
“Petitioner June Sutowski filed the instant diversity action in federal district 
court naming 18 companies as party-defendants (‘respondents’ for purposes of this 
Order).  Sutowski claims to have suffered damage to her reproductive system due 
to her in utero exposure to diethylstilbestrol (DES).  Sutowski asserts that each of 
the named defendants is either a manufacturer, a distributor, or a parent or 
successor corporation to a manufacturer or distributor, of DES.  Her complaint 
includes counts consisting of strict liability under products liability, negligence 
under products liability, breach of warranty and market share liability. 
 
“In response, defendant/respondent Eli Lilly and Company (‘Eli Lilly’) filed 
a motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).  Among 
other things, Eli Lilly argues that judgment must be entered against Sutowski on 
her claim for relief under the market share theory of liability since Ohio has not 
recognized market share.  Eli Lilly relies upon the recent decision in Kurczi v. Eli 
Lilly & Co. [113 F.3d 1426 (6th Cir. 1997)], in which the Sixth Circuit announced 
 
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that if ‘directly presented with the issue, the Ohio Supreme Court would not adopt 
a market-share theory of liability in DES cases.’  Id. at [1435].” 
 
Immediately preceding release of the Kurczi decision, this court decided 
Carrel v. Allied Products Corp. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 284, 677 N.E.2d 795, 
holding that common-law causes of action survive enactment of the Ohio Products 
Liability Act unless specifically abrogated by that statute’s language.  The Sixth 
Circuit did not consider Carrel when deciding Kurczi.  The federal district court, 
believing that our decision in Carrel eroded the Kurczi analysis, certified the 
question presented. 
__________________ 
 
Amer Cunningham Brennan Co., L.P.A., Jack Morrison, Jr. and E. Marie 
Wheeler; and Gary L. Himmel, for petitioner. 
 
James J. Dillon and Kenneth A. Cohen; Squire, Sanders & Dempsey L.L.P., 
Robin G. Weaver and Paula B. Christ, for respondent Eli Lilly & Co. 
 
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Kim F. Bixenstine and Paul D. Koethe, for 
respondents Abbott Laboratories and McNeilab, Inc. 
 
A. Edward Grashof and Sheila AnnMarie Moeller; Roetzel & Andress and 
James R. Vaughn, for respondent Dart Industries, Inc. 
 
Nicola, Gudbranson & Cooper, Matthew T. Fitzsimmons and Thomas A. 
Gattozzi, for respondent Merck & Co., Inc. 
 
Frost & Jacobs, Frederick J. McGavran, Grant S. Cowan, Mina J. Jefferson 
and Jack B. Harrison, for respondent Pharmacia & Upjohn Company. 
 
Baker & Hostetler, LLP, and Mary M. Bittence; and Marc S. Klein, for 
respondent E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. 
 
Eric D. Statman; Brouse & McDowell and Sallie Conley-Lux, in support of 
respondents for amicus curiae, Emons Industries, Inc. 
 
3
 
James M. Beck; and Hugh R. Young, Jr., in support of respondents for 
amicus curiae, Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. 
 
Bricker & Eckler, LLP, Randolph C. Wiseman, Kurtis A. Tunnell, Sarah J. 
DeBruin and Matthew J. Arnold, in support of respondents for amicus curiae, The 
Ohio Alliance for Civil Justice. 
 
Linda S. Woggon, in support of respondents for amicus curiae, Ohio 
Chamber of Commerce. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J. 
 
Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. XVIII, the United States District Court certified the 
following question of law to this court: 
 
“Whether market share exists in Ohio as a viable theory of liability in a DES 
products liability action[?]” 
 
We respond in the negative:   In Ohio, market-share liability is not an 
available theory of recovery in a products liability action. 
MARKET-SHARE LIABILITY 
 
DES is a form of synthetic estrogen that gained widespread use in the early 
1940s.  Its uses include hormone replacement during menopause, and the 
treatment of both senile and gonorrheal vaginitis.  By the late 1940s,  DES was 
also being used for the treatment of certain complications of pregnancy.  
Researchers in the early 1970s, however, discovered a high incidence of clear cell 
adenocarcinoma, a rare form of cancer,  in women exposed to DES in utero.  As a 
result, use of DES during pregnancy ceased.  Other reproductive disorders such as 
a predisposition to miscarry, the injury Sutowski claims, have also been attributed 
to in utero DES exposure.  See, generally, Comment, Samuelson, DES, RU-486 
and Deja Vu (1993), 2 J. Pharmacy & L. 56; Note, Russell, The Causation 
 
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Requirement:  Guardian of Fairness or Obstacle to Justice? — Making Sense of a 
Decade of DES Litigation (1991), 25 Suffolk U.L.Rev. 1071.  See, also, Grover v. 
Eli Lilly & Co. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 756, 591 N.E.2d 696 (Petitioner’s deformed 
reproductive organs resulted in an inability to carry her son to full term.). 
 
Because DES was not patented, some two hundred to three hundred 
different drug companies produced DES in the years it was widely prescribed for 
use during pregnancy.  Due to the long interval between DES use and 
manifestation of its effects a generation later, the great number of possible 
manufacturer-defendants, and the primarily generic form of the drug, many DES 
plaintiffs experienced difficulty identifying the particular manufacturer of the drug 
taken by their mothers years earlier.  Note, 25 Suffolk U.L.Rev. at 1071-1072.  
Many manufacturers were no longer in business, medical and pharmacy records 
were lost or destroyed, and memories had dulled over time.  Strickland & 
Katerndahl, An Overview of the Development of Market Share Liability (1992), 
446 Practising Law Institute — Litigation 277, 281-282. 
 
In response to the DES plaintiff’s inability to establish causation, the 
California Supreme Court fashioned the market-share theory of liability in its 
benchmark decision, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (1980), 26 Cal.3d 588, 163 
Cal.Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924.  In Sindell, the trial court dismissed a DES plaintiff’s 
complaint because she was unable to identify the particular manufacturer of the 
drug prescribed for her mother.  The supreme court reversed, resolving in the 
plaintiff’s favor the conflict between the traditional causation requirement of tort 
law and the desire to insulate an innocent plaintiff from bearing the cost of injury. 
 
The California Supreme Court determined that the theory of alternative 
liability was inapplicable in light of the plaintiff’s inability to join all DES 
manufacturers in the action.  Sindell, 26 Cal.3d at 598-603, 163 Cal.Rptr. at 136-
 
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139, 607 P.2d at 928-931.  The court also rejected the theories of concert of action 
and enterprise liability.  Id. at 604-606, 609-610, 163 Cal.Rptr. at 140-141, 143,  
607 P.2d at 932-933, 935.  Rather than affirming dismissal of the action, the 
Sindell majority adopted the novel theory of market-share liability proposed in a 
Fordham Law Review student comment.  Id. at 611-613, 163 Cal.Rptr. at 144-146, 
607 P.2d at 936-938, citing Comment, Sheiner, DES and a Proposed Theory of 
Enterprise Liability (1978), 46 Fordham L.Rev. 963.  The court cited the following 
three policy considerations in favor of relieving the plaintiff of the burden of 
proving causation:  (1) the manufacturer should bear the cost of injury as between 
it and an innocent plaintiff, (2) manufacturers are better able to bear the cost of 
injury resulting from defective products, and (3) because manufacturers are in a 
better position to discover and prevent product defects and to warn consumers of 
harmful effects, imposing liability would further ensure product safety.  Sindell, 26 
Cal.3d at 610-611, 163 Cal.Rptr. at 144, 607 P.2d at 936. 
 
Recognizing that “there is a possibility that none of the five defendants in 
this case produced the offending substance,” the California Supreme Court 
nonetheless justified shifting the burden of proof of causation to the defendant.  Id. 
at 611, 163 Cal.Rptr. at 144-145, 607 P.2d at 936-937.  To this end, the market-
share plaintiff need only (1) identify an injury caused by a fungible product, and 
(2) join in the action a substantial share of the manufacturers of that product.  Id., 
26 Cal.3d at 610-612, 163 Cal.Rptr. at 144-145, 607 P.2d at 936-937.  The burden 
then shifts to each defendant-manufacturer to prove that it did not make the 
particular injurious product.  Id.  Market-share liability thus enables a plaintiff 
who cannot identify a particular tortfeasor to sustain a tort cause of action despite 
an inability to show proximate causation. 
 
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Any manufacturer unable to prove it did not produce the product at issue is 
held severally liable for the proportion of the plaintiff’s awarded damages that 
reflects the manufacturer’s total share of the product market.  Brown v. City & Cty. 
of San Francisco Superior Court (1988), 44 Cal.3d 1049, 1072-1076, 245 
Cal.Rptr. 412, 426-428, 751 P.2d 470, 485-487; Sindell, 26 Cal.3d at 611-612, 163 
Cal.Rptr. at 145, 607 P.2d at 937.  In support of this unique method of damage 
allocation, the court reasoned that a defendant-manufacturer’s percentage share of 
the total market for a product is proportional to the likelihood that the defendant-
manufacturer produced the specific product that injured the plaintiff.  Id.  The only 
causation a plaintiff need prove in order to recover under a market-share theory is 
the causal connection between exposure to, or use of, the product at issue and the 
injury sustained. 
 
This atypical theory of tort recovery has not gained wide acceptance outside 
California.  Of the courts that have examined market-share liability in the DES 
context, most have not considered it a plausible theory of recovery.1  Ohio may 
now be numbered among those that have considered and rejected the market-share 
theory in the DES context. 
OHIO TORT LAW 
 
Ohio common law has long required a plaintiff to prove that a particular 
defendant caused his or her injury through negligence.2  “ ‘The rule is elementary, 
that the defendant in an action for negligence can be held to respond in damages 
only for the immediate and proximate result of the negligent act complained of, 
and in determining what is direct or proximate cause, the rule requires that the 
injury sustained shall be the natural and probable consequence of the negligence 
alleged; that is, such consequence as under the surrounding circumstances of the 
particular case might, and should have been foreseen or anticipated by the 
 
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wrongdoer as likely to follow his negligent act.’ ”  Foss-Schneider Brewing Co. v. 
Ulland (1918), 97 Ohio St. 210, 218, 119 N.E. 454, 457, quoting Miller v. 
Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern RR. Co. (1908), 78 Ohio St. 309, 325, 85 N.E. 
499, 504.  See, also, Jeffers v. Olexo (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 140, 142-143, 539 
N.E.2d 614, 616-617 (Proximate cause requires that the defendant foresee the 
injury; foreseeability depends upon the defendant’s knowledge.).  The plaintiff 
must establish a causal connection between the defendant’s actions and the 
plaintiff’s injuries, which necessitates identification of the particular tortfeasor. 
 
Under the market-share theory, the plaintiff is discharged from proving this 
important causal link.  The defendant actually responsible for the plaintiff’s 
injuries may not be before the court.  Such a result collides with traditional tort 
notions of liability by virtue of responsibility, and imposes a judicially created 
form of industry-wide insurance upon those manufacturers subject to market-share 
liability.  In the end, “manufacturers are required to pay or contribute to payment 
for injuries which their product may not have caused.”  Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co. 
(Iowa 1986), 386 N.W.2d 67, 76.  This is not the law in Ohio:  “Manufacturers are 
not insurers of their products.”  State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Chrysler Corp. 
(1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 1, 8, 523 N.E.2d 489, 496. 
 
In Minnich v. Ashland Oil Co. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 396, 15 OBR 511, 473 
N.E.2d 1199, this court adopted the doctrine of alternative liability where the 
plaintiff  “allege[d] two negligent defendants and a single proximate cause.”  Id. at 
398, 15 OBR at 512-513, 473 N.E.2d at 1201.  John Minnich was injured in an 
ethyl acetate explosion while at work.  He alleged that the chemical was delivered 
to his employer in a defective condition, and that both the Ashland Oil Co. and the 
M.J. Daly Co. supplied all the ethyl acetate used by his employer.  Minnich was 
 
8
unable, however, to identify which of the two companies supplied the particular 
ethyl acetate that exploded the morning of his injury. 
 
In applying alternative liability to the facts in Minnich, this court did not 
relieve the plaintiff of the burden of identifying the tortfeasors.  See id. at 397-398, 
15 OBR at 512, 473 N.E.2d at 1200-1201.  Rather, Minnich had to show that both 
companies were negligent and that his injuries were caused by the negligence of 
one of the two.  Id.  Alternative liability relieved Minnich only from proving 
which of the two identified tortfeasors caused his injuries.  Id.  See, also, Summers 
v. Tice (1948), 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1. 
 
Three years after Minnich, this court decided Goldman v. Johns-Manville 
Sales Corp. (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 40, 514 N.E.2d 691, an asbestos-litigation case 
wherein the court rejected both alternative and market-share liability.  In rejecting 
application of alternative liability in Goldman, the majority stated: 
 
“The key point in alternative liability, then, is that the plaintiff must still 
prove that all the defendants acted tortiously.  * * * 
 
“ * * * In this case, it is clear that Goldman has not been able to show that 
any of the defendants acted tortiously, because she is unable to show that any of 
the defendants remaining in this case supplied any asbestos products to the 
Sherlock Bakery.  Alternative liability does not do away entirely with the burden 
of showing proximate causation; rather, this theory relaxes only the traditional 
requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate that a specific defendant (or defendants) 
caused the injury.  But the relaxation is only warranted where plaintiff shows that 
all defendants acted tortiously.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 45-46, 514 N.E.2d at 696. 
 
The Goldman majority also rejected application of the market-share theory 
of liability.  While in dicta the Goldman court presumed that DES litigation was 
better suited to application of market-share liability, it did not, as Sutowski 
 
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suggests, state that market-share liability is an available remedy in Ohio.  Citing a 
lack of fungibility, difficulty in defining the asbestos market, and the absence, due 
to bankruptcy, of the largest asbestos supplier in the world, the court explained 
that adoption of the market-share theory was a matter singularly suited for the 
legislature.  Goldman, 33 Ohio St.3d at 50-51, 514 N.E.2d at 700-701. 
 
“ ‘Plaintiffs request that we make a substantial departure from our 
fundamental negligence requirement of proving causation, without previous 
warning or guidelines.  The imposition of liability upon a manufacturer for harm 
that it may not have caused is the very legal legerdemain, at least by our long held 
traditional standards, that we believe the courts should avoid unless prior warnings 
remain unheeded.  It is an act more closely identified as a function assigned to the 
legislature under its power to enact laws.’ ”  Id. at 52, 514 N.E.2d at 702, quoting 
Mulcahy, 386 N.W.2d at 75-76. 
 
Codified in 1988, the Ohio Products Liability Act, R.C. 2307.71 et seq., 
provided: 
 
“Any recovery of compensatory damages based on a product liability claim 
is subject to sections 2307.71 to 2307.79 of the Revised Code.”  Former R.C. 
2307.72(A), 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1676.3 
 
Former R.C. 2307.71 et seq. provided that manufacturers were subject to 
liability under the Act only if the plaintiff established (1) that the product was 
defective at the time it left the control of its manufacturer, and (2) that the 
defective aspect of the product proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.  Former 
R.C. 2307.73(A), 2307.74, 2307.75, 2307.76, and 2307.77.  Although enacted 
after Sutowski filed her claim, the current version of R.C. 2307.73(A) is also 
instructive.  It provides: 
 
10
 
“A manufacturer is subject to liability for compensatory damages based on a 
product liability claim only if the claimant establishes, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, all of the following: 
 
“(1) * * * the product was defective * * * . 
 
“(2) * * * a defective aspect of the product * * * was a proximate cause of 
harm for which the claimant seeks to recover compensatory damages. 
 
“(3) The manufacturer designed, formulated, produced, created, made, 
constructed, assembled, or rebuilt the product.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Moreover, the General Assembly specifically stated that its purpose in 
enacting current R.C. 2307.791 was “to codify an essential requirement for the use 
of the alternative liability theory in actions brought under Ohio law, as enunciated 
by” this court in Minnich and Goldman.  Section 5(Q), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, 146 
Ohio Laws, Part II, 4028.  R.C. 2307.791 provides: 
 
“A manufacturer shall not be held liable for damages based on a product 
liability claim that asserts any of the following theories: 
 
“(A) Industrywide or enterprise liability * * * . 
 
“(B) Alternative liability, except when all possible tortfeasors are named 
and subject to the jurisdiction of the court.” 
 
Statutory language that is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and 
definite meaning, needs no interpretation.  State ex rel. Richard v. Bd. of Trustees 
of Police & Firemen’s Disability Pension Fund (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 409, 412, 
632 N.E.2d 1292, 1295.  In this instance, the 1988 version of the Products 
Liability Act applicable to Sutowski’s claim unmistakably required identification 
of a particular tortfeasor:  the successful plaintiff had to establish that the harmful 
product was defective when it left the manufacturer’s control.  While not applied 
 
11
retroactively, the 1997 amendments to the Act serve to conclusively reinforce this 
identification requirement. 
 
In Kurczi v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1997), 113 F.3d 1426, the Sixth Circuit 
reviewed both Ohio decisional law and the Ohio Products Liability Act.  The court 
based its conclusion that “the Ohio Supreme Court would not adopt a market-share 
theory of liability in DES cases,”  id. at 1435, on the following:  (1) Ohio common 
law embraces the fundamental principle of tort law that a plaintiff must prove that 
the negligence of a particular defendant caused injury, (2) the 1988 Ohio Products 
Liability Act “embodies the general common law principle that a plaintiff has to 
prove an injury proximately caused by a particular defendant,” id. at 1432, and (3) 
presuming the General Assembly was aware of the Minnich and Goldman 
decisions, alternative and market-share liability schemes are noticeably absent 
from the 1988 Act.  Kurczi, 113 F.3d at 1430-1434.  This analysis by the Sixth 
Circuit is unassailable, our decision in Carrel notwithstanding. 
 
The district court in Sutowski’s case perceived a possible conflict between 
Kurczi and the majority decision in Carrel v. Allied Products Corp. (1997), 78 
Ohio St.3d 284, 677 N.E.2d 795.  In Kurczi, the Sixth Circuit stated that “the 
Products Liability Act is clear:  it does not by its express terms provide for market 
share liability and it is by its express terms exclusive.  Thus, the Ohio Supreme 
Court would be precluded from adopting a new legal cause of action.”  Kurczi, 
113 F.3d at 1434.  In contrast, the Carrel court held that “ ‘all common-law 
products liability causes of action survive the enactment of R.C. 2307.71 et seq., 
the Ohio Products Liability Act, unless specifically covered by the Act * * * .’ ”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Carrel, 78 Ohio St.3d at 289, 677 N.E.2d at 800, quoting Byers v. 
Consol. Aluminum Corp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 51, 52, 652 N.E.2d 643, 644 
 
12
(Douglas, J., dissenting); and Curtis v. Square-D Co. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 79, 
652 N.E.2d 664 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 
Although Carrel and Kurczi are at odds in their analysis of the scope of the 
Ohio Products Liability Act, the Carrel decision does not undermine the validity 
of the Sixth Circuit’s ultimate conclusion in Kurczi.  The Ohio Products Liability 
Act does not provide for market-share liability.  Furthermore, based on the 
foregoing analysis, the market-share theory is not a part of Ohio common law that 
could be deemed, under Carrel, to survive the enactment of R.C. 2307.71 et seq.   
 
Accordingly, we hold that in Ohio, market-share liability is not an available 
theory of recovery in a products liability action. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We recognize that the DES plaintiff who, without fault, is unable to identify 
the manufacturer responsible for her injury engenders sympathy.  It is, however, 
the role of the court to interpret the law, not to legislate.  Cablevision of the 
Midwest, Inc. v. Gross (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 541, 544, 639 N.E.2d 1154, 1156.  
We believe the General Assembly should decide the policy question of whether 
Sutowski’s claims, or others like hers, warrant substantially altering Ohio’s tort 
law. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., QUILLIN and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
 
DANIEL B. QUILLIN, J., of the Ninth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, 
J. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
See Wood v. Eli Lilly & Co. (C.A.10, 1994), 38 F.3d 510 (applying 
Oklahoma law); Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co. (C.A.D.C.1988), 851 F.2d 418 (applying 
 
13
the law of both Maryland and the District of Columbia); Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co. 
(D.S.C.1981), 526 F.Supp. 589 (applying South Carolina law); Gorman v. Abbott 
Laboratories (R.I.1991), 599 A.2d 1364; Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1990), 137 
Ill.2d 222, 148 Ill.Dec. 22, 560 N.E.2d 324; Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co. (Iowa 
1986), 386 N.W.2d 67; Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co. (Mo.1984), 676 S.W.2d 241.  See, 
also, Braune v. Abbott Laboratories (E.D.N.Y.1995), 895 F.Supp. 530 (stating 
Georgia has not recognized market-share liability); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1984), 
418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164 (In recognizing the applicability of concert of 
action and alternative liability theories in DES cases, the court avoided adopting 
market-share liability; instead, the court held that DES plaintiffs must bring into 
court all actors who may have caused the injury, with those who are unable to 
exculpate themselves being held jointly and severally liable.); Namm v. Charles E. 
Frosst & Co., Inc. (1981), 178 N.J.Super. 19, 34-35, 427 A.2d 1121, 1128-1129 
(The court rejected alternative liability and enterprise liability as theories that 
would “distort or abando[n] altogether” traditional concepts of tort law.). 
2. 
See Shumaker v. Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 367, 
28 OBR 429, 504 N.E.2d 44 (The general rule is that a medical malpractice 
plaintiff must prove causation to establish that the injury was, more likely than 
not, caused by the defendant’s negligence.); Kuhn v. Banker (1938), 133 Ohio St. 
304, 10 O.O. 373, 13 N.E.2d 242 (A directed verdict is appropriate where plaintiff 
failed to prove defendant’s negligent actions were the proximate cause of injury.); 
St. Marys Gas Co. v. Brodbeck (1926), 114 Ohio St. 423, 151 N.E. 323 (Where res 
ipsa loquitur is inapplicable, negligence will not be presumed from fact of injury 
— plaintiff must prove defendant’s acts were the direct and proximate cause of 
injury.); Cleveland City Ry. Co. v. Osborn (1902), 66 Ohio St. 45, 63 N.E. 604 
 
14
(Plaintiff must show injury was proximately caused by an act of culpable 
negligence on the defendant’s part.). 
3. 
The Products Liability Act contains recent amendments, effective January 
27, 1997, that do not substantively change former R.C. 2307.72(A). 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.  The majority, by today’s decision, rings the death 
knell for most of the DES litigation in Ohio.  Specifically, the majority, in the 
syllabus, writes the following prescription for claimants who have been injured by 
DES and who, through no fault of their own, have been unable to identify the 
particular manufacturer of the product that caused their injuries:  “In Ohio, market-
share liability is not an available theory of recovery in a products liability action.”  
This prescription by the majority is the functional equivalent of saying:  “Take two 
aspirin and do not call us in the morning.”  I respectfully dissent! 
 
The majority’s holding in this case is not only contrary to general notions of 
fairness and equity, but it is also predicated on numerous misstatements and 
misapplications of law.  A reading of today’s decision should reveal to any 
interested person that the majority quite simply does not wish to recognize market-
share liability and, to that end, it has concocted a rationale to support its 
predetermined conclusion that market-share liability is not a viable theory of 
recovery in Ohio. 
 
The majority’s entire decision in this case is built upon the erroneous 
premise that market-share liability relieves a plaintiff of the obligation to prove 
proximate causation.  For instance, in the section of the opinion entitled 
“MARKET-SHARE LIABILITY,” the majority says that “[i]n response to the 
DES plaintiff’s inability to establish causation, the California Supreme Court 
fashioned the market-share theory of liability in its benchmark decision, Sindell v. 
 
15
Abbott Laboratories (1980), 26 Cal.3d 588, 163 Cal.Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924.”  
The majority further claims that the Sindell court “reliev[ed] the plaintiff of the 
burden of proving causation.”  The majority also asserts that “[m]arket-share 
liability thus enables a plaintiff who cannot identify a particular tortfeasor to 
sustain a tort cause of action despite an inability to show proximate causation.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The fallacy of this argument is demonstrated by a brief 
discussion of Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 40, 
514 N.E.2d 691. 
 
Goldman involved questions concerning the alternative liability theory and 
the market-share liability theory in the context of asbestos litigation.  At the outset 
of the Goldman decision, this court emphasized that “it is important to understand 
that both alternative liability and market-share liability are exceptions to the 
general rule that a plaintiff has to prove an injury was caused by the negligence of 
a particular defendant. * * * [B]oth theories merely relax the requirement that the 
plaintiff identify which one of a group of negligent tortfeasors caused the injury to 
the plaintiff.  In the context of asbestos litigation, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving exposure to asbestos-containing products.  A defendant is not liable under 
either theory if the evidence fails to establish that [the victim] was exposed to the 
type of product it produced.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 42, 514 N.E.2d at 693. 
 
In Goldman, a majority of this court determined that the alternative liability 
theory was not applicable to the facts of that case, holding that “[a]lternative 
liability theory in an asbestos litigation case will be rejected where the plaintiff is 
unable to prove that the injury was caused by the asbestos-containing products of 
any of the defendants before the court.”  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  The 
Goldman court also held that “[m]arket-share liability is inappropriate as a viable 
theory of recovery in an asbestos litigation case, especially where it cannot be 
 
16
shown that all the products to which the injured party was exposed are completely 
fungible.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
As Goldman clearly illustrates, market-share liability does not eliminate the 
need for proof of proximate causation.  Rather, the theory of market-share liability 
merely relaxes the requirement that the injured plaintiff identify which one of a 
group of tortfeasors caused the plaintiff’s injuries.  Id. at 42, 514 N.E.2d at 693.  
The plaintiff still must prove proximate causation, but need not identify the 
specific party that was actually responsible for the plaintiff’s particular injury.  
Today’s majority has gone to great lengths to distort that issue. 
 
Recognizing the fallacy of the argument that market-share liability 
dispenses with the need for proof of proximate causation, the majority then resorts 
to a shell game with the issues, hoping that the resulting confusion will carry the 
day. 
 
In the section of the opinion entitled “OHIO TORT LAW,” the majority 
states that “Ohio common law has long required a plaintiff to prove that a 
particular defendant caused his or her injury through negligence.”  Although this 
statement is undoubtedly true in a number of contexts, it is fundamentally untrue 
when it comes to the alternative liability theory and, of course, the market-share 
liability theory.  Both of these theories were specifically developed to eliminate 
that identification requirement.  Although the majority specifically recognizes that 
fact with respect to market-share liability, the majority ignores it with respect to 
alternative liability.  The majority states that “[u]nder the market-share theory, the 
plaintiff is discharged from proving this important causal link,” i.e., identification 
of the particular tortfeasor responsible for the injury.  (Emphasis added.)  The fact 
is that the same thing is basically true under the alternative liability theory. 
 
17
 
The majority then attempts to further isolate the theory of market-share 
liability by engaging in a blatantly distorted discussion of Minnich v. Ashland Oil 
Co. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 396, 15 OBR 511, 473 N.E.2d 1199, and the alternative 
liability theory.  The purpose of the majority’s discussion of Minnich should be 
obvious — the majority seeks to leave the reader with the mistaken impression 
that the alternative liability theory requires identification by the plaintiff of the 
particular tortfeasor that caused the plaintiff’s harm, whereas market-share theory 
does not.  However, with respect to alternative liability, this court, in Minnich, 
adopted 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 433B(3), which states 
that “[w]here the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that 
harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty 
as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he 
has not caused the harm.”  (Emphasis added.)  Minnich, syllabus.  We followed 
Minnich in Goldman, 33 Ohio St.3d 40, 514 N.E.2d 691, paragraph one of the 
syllabus, wherein we held that “[u]nder the alternative liability theory, plaintiff 
must prove (1) that two or more defendants committed tortious acts, and (2) that 
plaintiff was injured as a proximate result of the wrongdoing of one of the 
defendants.”  Clearly, under the alternative liability theory, the plaintiff need not 
demonstrate which of the tortfeasors caused the plaintiff’s harm.  See, also, Huston 
v. Konieczny (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 214, 556 N.E.2d 505.  Thus, identification by 
the plaintiff of the particular tortfeasor responsible for the injury is not necessary 
under the alternative liability theory, as is also the case in the context of market-
share liability. 
 
Next, the majority addresses the Goldman decision.  Prior to today, 
Goldman was the only case in which this court discussed the market-share theory 
 
18
of liability.  Goldman involved, among other things, the question whether market-
share liability should be recognized in the context of an asbestos case. 
 
In discussing Goldman, the majority says that “[t]hree years after Minnich, 
this court decided [Goldman], an asbestos litigation case wherein the court 
rejected both alternative and market-share liability.”  Thus, according to the 
majority, Goldman rejected both alternative and market-share liability as viable 
theories of recovery in Ohio.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  The 
alternative liability theory is alive and well in Ohio and has been addressed and/or 
applied in various contexts before and after Goldman was decided.  See, e.g., 
Minnich, 15 Ohio St.3d 396, 15 OBR 511, 473 N.E.2d 1199; Huston, 52 Ohio 
St.3d 214, 556 N.E.2d 505; and Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp. (1995), 73 Ohio 
St.3d 679, 653 N.E.2d 1196.  The truth is that Goldman rejected alternative 
liability on the facts of that case, and refused to apply market-share liability in 
asbestos litigation only.  The Goldman court disapproved of market-share liability 
in asbestos litigation not because of any disapproval of the market-share theory in 
general, but because the court determined that asbestos was not a fungible product.  
Goldman, 33 Ohio St.3d at 50-51, 514 N.E.2d at 700-701.  In contrast, DES is a 
fungible product, as the court in Goldman recognized.  Id.  In this regard, 
Goldman left for future consideration the question whether market-share liability 
is applicable in other contexts.  Id. at 51-52, 514 N.E.2d at 701-702.  Moreover, 
the Goldman court favorably discussed the development of, and the policy reasons 
behind, judicially created market-share liability for DES litigation, stating: 
 
“Market-share theory was developed by the California Supreme Court in 
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, supra.  In that case, the court was faced with a 
class-action suit brought by the daughters of women who had taken the anti-
 
19
miscarriage drug, DES.  This drug, ingested by pregnant women, had caused 
cancer in several of their daughters. 
 
“The Sindell court actually rejected all of the plaintiffs’ theories of 
recovery, including the alternative liability theory of Summers [v. Tice (1948), 33 
Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1].  The court, however, recognized the almost 
insurmountable problems of proof facing the DES plaintiffs, namely, the inability 
to identify which company or companies produced the DES ingested by their 
mothers while the plaintiffs were still in their mothers’ wombs.  The court then 
fashioned a variation of Summers alternative liability, on public policy grounds, to 
address the problem.  The court justified its rule in the following terms: 
 
“ ‘In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in science 
and technology create fungible goods which may harm consumers and which 
cannot be traced to any specific producer.  The response of the courts can be either 
to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such 
products, or to fashion remedies to meet these changing needs.  * * * 
 
“ ‘The most persuasive reason for finding plaintiff states a cause of action is 
that advanced in Summers:  as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent 
defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the injury.  Here, as in Summers, 
plaintiff is not at fault in failing to provide evidence of causation, and although the 
absence of such evidence is not attributable to the defendants either, their conduct 
in marketing a drug the effects of which are delayed for many years played a 
significant role in creating the unavailability of proof. 
 
“ ‘ * * * 
 
“ ‘Where, as here, all defendants produced a drug from an identical formula 
and the manufacturer of the DES which caused plaintiff’s injuries cannot be 
identified through no fault of plaintiff, a modification of the rule of Summers is 
 
20
warranted.  As we have seen, an undiluted Summers rationale is inappropriate to 
shift the burden of proof of causation to defendants because if we measure the 
chance that any particular manufacturer supplied the injury-causing product by the 
number of producers of DES, there is a possibility that none of the five defendants 
in this case produced the offending substance and that the responsible 
manufacturer, not named in the action, will escape liability. 
 
“ ‘But we approach the issue of causation from a different perspective:  we 
hold it to be reasonable in the present context to measure the likelihood that any of 
the defendants supplied the product which allegedly injured plaintiff by the 
percentage which the DES sold by each of them for the purpose of preventing 
miscarriage bears to the entire production of the drug sold by all for the purpose.  
Plaintiff asserts in her briefs that Eli Lilly and Company and five or six other 
companies produce 90 percent of the DES marketed.  If at trial this is established 
to be the fact, then there is a corresponding likelihood that this comparative 
handful of producers manufactured the DES which caused plaintiff’s injuries, and 
only a 10 percent likelihood that the offending producer would escape liability. 
 
“ ‘If plaintiff joins in the action the manufacturers of a substantial share of 
the DES which her mother might have taken, the injustice of shifting the burden of 
proof to defendants to demonstrate that they could not have made the substance 
which injured plaintiff is significantly diminished.  While 75 to 80 percent of the 
market is suggested * * *, we hold only that a substantial percentage is required. 
 
“ ‘The presence in the action of a substantial share of the appropriate market 
also provides a ready means to apportion damages among the defendants.  Each 
defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its 
share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the product 
 
21
which caused plaintiff’s injuries.’  (Emphasis added.)  Sindell, supra, 26 Cal.3d at 
610-612, 163 Cal.Rptr. at 144-145, 607 P.2d at 936-937. 
 
“Notwithstanding the policy reasons cited by the Sindell court, it is clear 
that the significant factual differences between the DES cases and asbestos 
litigation make market-share liability inappropriate to this case.  The foremost 
difficulty is the concept of fungibility.  Market-share liability is inappropriate as a 
viable theory of recovery in an asbestos litigation case, especially where it cannot 
be shown that all the products to which the injured party was exposed are 
completely fungible.  DES was a synthetic estrogen that was produced pursuant to 
a single formula.  Thus, while the drug was marketed by two hundred companies, 
there was no difference in the drug or its health risks.  In contrast, asbestos is not a 
‘product,’ but rather a generic name for a family of minerals. * * * 
 
“The courts that have considered the application of market-share liability to 
asbestos litigation have uniformly rejected the theory based on the lack of 
fungibility, as well as the difficulty in defining the market.  For example, a federal 
district court, sitting in California, refused to apply Sindell to an asbestos case, 
even though market-share liability had been recognized in California by Sindell. * 
* * 
 
“ * * * 
 
“While arguably the difficulties of applying market-share liability in this 
case are not so acute because the ‘product field’ is narrowed to [asbestos] tape, 
inherent difficulties remain. 
 
“ * * * In the case of DES, however, there is no difference among the 
products distributed by the various companies.  Crucial to the Sindell court’s 
reasoning was this fact:  there was no difference between the risks associated with 
the drug as marketed by one company or another, and as all DES sold presented 
 
22
the same risk of harm, there was no inherent unfairness in holding the companies 
accountable based on their share of the DES market.  This fundamental difference 
between DES and asbestos — indeed, asbestos tape alone — is enough to 
undercut the Sindell justification for market-share theory in this case. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“While we are not unmindful of the great difficulties faced by victims of 
asbestos exposure, the answer is not contained in a market-share theory that was 
advanced to address a situation with fewer complexities than those surrounding 
asbestos exposure [i.e., situations involving exposure to DES] and the litigation it 
has spawned. 
 
“We can perceive of no problem more in need of a legislative solution [i.e., 
the insurmountable problem of proof for victims of asbestos exposure]. * * * 
 
“ * * * 
 
“In conclusion, * * * [e]ven if we were to recognize market-share liability as 
a viable theory of recovery, this [asbestos case] is not the case in which to do so. * 
* * ”  (Emphasis sic.)  Goldman, 33 Ohio St.3d at 49-52, 514 N.E.2d at 699-702. 
 
Today’s majority concludes its discussion of Goldman by quoting a select 
passage from that case indicating that recognition of market-share liability is a 
function best addressed by the General Assembly.  In reality, the Goldman court 
had indicated that legislative action was needed to address the particular problems 
associated with market-share liability in asbestos litigation, as opposed to 
litigation involving DES exposure.  Apparently, today’s majority has selectively 
quoted from Goldman to create the impression that the General Assembly is the 
only appropriate body to recognize the market-share liability theory in DES 
litigation.  The majority then uses that misguided impression as a platform for 
 
23
launching into a tortured analysis of Ohio’s Products Liability Act.  It is here that 
the majority’s shell game becomes most deceptive. 
 
With respect to the 1988 version of Ohio’s Products Liability Act, the 
majority says that “[f]ormer R.C. 2307.71 et seq. provided that manufacturers were 
subject to liability under the Act only if the plaintiff established (1) that the 
product was defective at the time it left the control of its manufacturer, and (2) 
that the defective aspect of the product proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.”  
(Emphasis added.)  In making that statement, the majority is apparently once again 
asserting that there is no requirement under the market-share liability theory that 
the plaintiff satisfy the burden of proving proximate causation.  Similarly, the 
majority finds that the current version of R.C. 2307.73(A) is “instructive” on that 
issue, presumably because the statute indicates that a plaintiff in a product liability 
action has to show not only that the product was defective and that the defective 
aspect of the product was a proximate cause of the injury, but that the 
manufacturer designed, formulated, produced, created, made, constructed, 
assembled, or rebuilt the product.  However, it should be obvious to anyone that 
for DES claimants to recover against DES manufacturers under the market-share 
theory of liability, the plaintiff would be required to demonstrate that DES was a 
defective product at the time it left the control of DES manufacturers, and that 
DES proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.  Further, it bears repeating that 
market-share liability does not eliminate the need for proof of proximate causation 
as the majority has suggested — rather, it “merely relax[es] the requirement that 
the plaintiff identify which one of the group of negligent tortfeasors caused the 
injury to the plaintiff.”  Goldman at 42, 514 N.E.2d at 693.  Even the majority 
begrudgingly recognizes this when it admits, elsewhere in the decision, that “[t]he 
only causation a plaintiff need prove in order to recover under a market-share 
 
24
theory is the causal connection between exposure to, or use of, the product at issue 
[i.e., DES] and the injury sustained.” 
 
Moreover, the plaintiff in a DES case involving market-share liability must 
aver that the defendants assembled in the litigation are, for instance, DES 
manufacturers, as opposed to manufacturers of “Beanie Baby” toys, Barbie Dolls, 
or some other product or material that is unrelated to DES.  The common-law 
elements for market-share liability are as follows:  (1) the product at issue must be 
fungible, (2) the plaintiff is unable to identify the specific manufacturer, (3) there 
must be joinder of manufacturers representing a substantial share of the market, 
(4) the product is defective, and (5) the plaintiff was injured as a proximate result 
of the defective aspect of the product.  See, generally, Goldman, 33 Ohio St.3d 40, 
514 N.E.2d 691, and Jackson v. Glidden Co. (1995), 98 Ohio App.3d 100, 647 
N.E.2d 879.  The plaintiff in DES litigation who demonstrates the existence of 
these elements will have satisfied the burden of demonstrating that DES was 
defective at the time it left the control of DES manufacturers.  The fact is that the 
common-law theory of market-share liability for DES litigation is entirely 
consistent with the causation requirement of the Ohio Products Liability Act. 
 
The majority also directs our attention to R.C. 2307.791, and states: 
 
“Moreover, the General Assembly specifically stated that its purpose in 
enacting current R.C. 2307.791 was ‘to codify an essential requirement for the use 
of the alternative liability theory in actions brought under Ohio law, as enunciated 
by’ this court in Minnich and Goldman.  Section 5(Q), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, 146 
Ohio Laws, Part II, 4028.  R.C. 2307.791 provides: 
 
“ ‘A manufacturer shall not be held liable for damages based on a product 
liability claim that asserts any of the following theories: 
 
“ ‘(A)  Industrywide or enterprise liability * * * . 
 
25
 
“ ‘(B)  Alternative liability, except when all possible tortfeasors are named 
and subject to the jurisdiction of the court.’ ” 
 
I have absolutely no idea why the majority cites R.C. 2307.791 and the 
statement of legislative intention accompanying the enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 350.  The fact that R.C. 2307.791 indicates that a manufacturer cannot be held 
liable on the alternative liability theory unless all possible tortfeasors are named 
and subjected to the jurisdiction of the court has nothing to do with the market-
share theory of liability.  If the majority is somehow suggesting that market-share 
liability equates to “alternative liability,” or that market-share liability is 
“[i]ndustrywide or enterprise liability,” then the majority is just plain wrong.  The 
concept of market-share liability is different from the concept of alternative 
liability, and the concept of industrywide or enterprise liability is different from 
the concept of market-share liability and alternative liability.  Market-share 
liability comes into play, if at all, only where the theory of alternative liability is 
inapplicable.  Goldman, 33 Ohio St.3d at 48-49, 514 N.E.2d at 699 (recognizing 
that while market-share liability involves an assessment of damages, it is, 
fundamentally, a theory of assessing liability, and that the market-share liability 
theory applies only where the alternative liability theory does not).  Indeed, the 
discussion of Sindell in today’s majority decision demonstrates that even the 
majority is aware of the distinctions between industrywide or enterprise liability, 
alternative liability, and market-share liability. 
 
Further, the fact that the General Assembly, in R.C. 2307.791, mentions 
industrywide enterprise liability and alternative liability but says nothing 
regarding market-share liability speaks volumes on the General Assembly’s true 
intentions.  If the General Assembly had wished to exclude market-share liability 
as a theory of recovery for DES claimants in Ohio, it clearly would have included 
 
26
market-share liability in the list of excluded theories of liability in R.C. 2307.791.  
The fact that the General Assembly made no mention of market-share liability in 
R.C. 2307.791 indicates that the General Assembly viewed market-share liability 
as a matter for the courts to decide.  Indeed, the history of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350 
confirms that the General Assembly did not wish to exclude market-share as a 
viable theory of liability in Ohio.  As introduced in the 121st General Assembly, 
House Bill No. 350 contained provisions to exclude evidence of any of the 
following theories of liability in a claim against a manufacturer for product 
liability:  (1) industrywide enterprise liability, and (2) market-share liability, when 
a nonfungible product is involved.  Proposed R.C. 2307.73(C) in H.B. No. 350 as 
introduced.  In the course of the legislative process, the reference to market-share 
liability was removed.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, as subsequently enacted, made no 
mention of market-share liability.  Under these circumstances, it is far more likely 
than not that the General Assembly, which was unquestionably aware of the 
market-share theory of liability, had absolutely no intention whatsoever when it 
enacted Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350 to preclude market-share liability as a viable theory 
of recovery in Ohio. 
 
Nevertheless, the majority concludes its discussion of the Ohio Products 
Liability Act by determining, out of thin air, that the language of the Act reveals 
an unmistakable legislative intention to have excluded market-share liability as a 
viable theory of recovery in a products liability case.  Remarkably, the majority 
says: 
 
“Statutory language that is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and 
definite meaning, needs no interpretation. * * * In this instance, the 1988 version 
of the Products Liability Act applicable to Sutowski’s claim unmistakably required 
identification of a particular tortfeasor:  the successful plaintiff had to establish 
 
27
that the harmful product was defective when it left the manufacturer’s control.  
While not applied retroactively, the 1997 amendments to the Act serve to 
conclusively reinforce this identification requirement.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Most assuredly, the majority has not applied the “plain and unambiguous” 
language of any statute, and the majority has certainly not considered the history 
of the Act.  The 1988 version of the Product Liability Act says nothing whatsoever 
about market-share liability, and the 1997 amendments to the Act serve to 
“conclusively reinforce” nothing that the majority says.  What the majority has 
done in this case is to interpret (or, more appropriately, misinterpret) the Act.  The 
majority admits as much when it states, in the section of the decision entitled 
“CONCLUSION,” that “[i]t is, however, the role of the court to interpret the law, 
not to legislate.”  (Emphasis added.)  Is this a deathbed confession by the majority 
that it has interpreted the Products Liability Act as opposed to applying the “plain 
and unambiguous” language of the Act, or is this just one more example of the 
multitude of errors and inconsistencies contained within the majority’s decision? 
 
The majority also relies heavily on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kurczi v. 
Eli Lilly & Co. (1997), 113 F.3d 1426, while ignoring the teachings of Carrel v. 
Allied Products Corp. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 284, 677 N.E.2d 795.  In Kurczi, the 
Sixth Circuit predicted that this court would reject the market-share liability 
theory.  The court in Kurczi reasoned that by omitting any reference to market-
share liability in the 1988 Products Liability Act, the General Assembly rejected 
market-share liability by implication.  The court stated that “the Products Liability 
Act is clear:  it does not by its express terms provide for market share liability and 
it is by its express terms exclusive.  Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court would be 
precluded from adopting a new legal cause of action.”  Id. at 1434.  However, 
 
28
Kurczi did not address this court’s decision in Carrel, which was decided shortly 
before the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in Kurczi. 
 
Today’s majority, in its statement of the case, says that “[t]he Sixth Circuit 
did not consider Carrel when deciding Kurczi.”  This is undoubtedly true, since 
Carrel compels a different conclusion from the one reached by Kurczi and by 
today’s majority.  In Carrel, we recognized that “ ‘all common-law products 
liability causes of action survive the enactment of R.C. 2307.71 et seq., the Ohio 
Products Liability Act, unless specifically covered by the Act * * *.’ ”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  Id., 78 Ohio St.3d at 289, 677 N.E.2d at 800, quoting Byers v. Consol. 
Aluminum Corp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 51, 52, 652 N.E.2d 643, 644 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting); and Curtis v. Square-D Co. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 79, 652 N.E.2d 664 
(Douglas, J., dissenting).  Despite this holding, the majority now says that 
“[a]lthough Carrel and Kurczi are at odds in their analysis of the scope of the Ohio 
Products Liability Act, the Carrel decision does not undermine the validity of the 
Sixth Circuit’s ultimate conclusion in Kurczi.  The Ohio Products Liability Act 
does not provide for market-share liability.”  (Emphasis added.)  What the 
majority is missing is that neither the 1988 Products Liability Act nor the 1997 
amendments to the Act address market-share liability.  Thus, under Carrel, the 
common-law market-share liability theory must survive! 
 
The majority then goes on to say that “the market-share theory is not a part 
of Ohio common law that could be deemed, under Carrel, to survive the 
enactment of R.C. 2307.71 et seq.”  The majority reaches this conclusion based on 
the majority’s own analysis of Ohio law.  However, I do not buy any of the 
majority’s “analysis” in this case.  I also take particular exception to the majority’s 
statement that the “analysis by the Sixth Circuit [in Kurczi] is unassailable, our 
 
29
decision in Carrel notwithstanding.”  What the majority appears to be saying is 
that Carrel should be ignored. 
 
In the section of the majority’s decision entitled “CONCLUSION,” the 
majority states:  “We recognize that the DES plaintiff who, without fault, is unable 
to identify the manufacturer responsible for her injury engenders sympathy.  It is, 
however, the role of the court to interpret the law, not to legislate. * * * We 
believe that the General Assembly should decide the policy question of whether 
Sutowski’s claims, or others like hers, warrant substantially altering Ohio’s tort 
law.”  I have several observations concerning this section of the majority’s 
decision. 
 
I am certain that the majority’s expressions of sympathy for the victims of 
DES will be greeted with skepticism.  These expressions of condolences will ring 
hollow indeed, particularly when the victims of DES read the flummery set forth 
in the majority decision.  In the past, this court, when necessary and appropriate, 
has never hesitated to acknowledge or create fair and realistic remedies for injured 
victims under principles of the common law.  See, e.g., Gallimore v. Children’s 
Hosp. Med. Ctr. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 244, 617 N.E.2d 1052, and Minnich, 15 
Ohio St.3d 396, 15 OBR 511, 473 N.E.2d 1199.  The market-share theory of 
liability should be formally recognized and adopted by this court in the context of 
this case, and no one understands this better than the victims of DES. 
 
I also find it humorous to see the majority state in its conclusion that the 
General Assembly should decide the question whether Sutowski’s claim warrants 
“altering” Ohio’s tort law.  Is the majority conceding that the General Assembly 
has, to date, never decided against market-share liability?  This would be a 
peculiar (yet warranted) concession by the majority, since the majority has implied 
 
30
elsewhere in its decision that the General Assembly has already rejected the theory 
of market-share liability. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the members of today’s majority that have 
been elected to this court (Chief Justice Moyer and Associate Justices Cook and 
Stratton) say that it is the function of the General Assembly to decide the policy 
question of whether Ohio’s tort law should be altered to allow Sutowski’s claim.  
This is a strange claim given that we have decided other public policy questions 
that substantially alter Ohio tort and/or contract law, the most recent example 
being the case of Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 
696 N.E.2d 201 (also decided this day).  It would seem that one cannot have it 
both ways! 
 
Accordingly, I would answer the certified question by recognizing the 
viability of market-share liability in DES cases.  Because the majority does not do 
so, I respectfully dissent. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.  The right-to-remedy clause of the Ohio 
Constitution mandates that “every person, for an injury done him in his * * * 
person, * * * shall have remedy by due course of law.”  Section 16, Article I, Ohio 
Constitution.  In Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 59, 62, 609 
N.E.2d 140, 142, this court stated, “This court has previously identified a practical 
and essential element of the Constitution’s right-to-remedy clause:  ‘ “When the 
Constitution speaks of remedy and injury to person, property or reputation, it 
requires an opportunity granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.” ’  (Emphasis added.)”  Quoting Hardy v. VerMeulen (1987), 32 Ohio 
 
31
St.3d 45, 47, 512 N.E.2d 626, 628.  The majority appears determined to ensure 
that the plaintiffs do not receive their constitutional right to a remedy. 
 
I embrace the market-share liability theory outlined in Goldman v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp. (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 40, 514 N.E.2d 691.  It would allow a 
remedy in a meaningful manner, assuming its elements can be established, without 
trammeling the rights of defendants.  DES manufacturers can avoid liability by 
establishing that they did not distribute DES in Ohio. 
 
It is difficult to imagine a case better suited to market-share liability.  DES 
was fungible, virtually impossible to differentiate, and most important, it was all 
bad.  Nevertheless, the majority today essentially tells the injured women:  We 
know you have been injured and we know that certain companies manufactured 
and distributed a defective drug to you or your mother, but because you do not 
know which specific company is responsible for the DES specific to you, we will 
hold none of the offending drug manufacturers accountable for the devastating 
harm they caused.  Such a result does not comport with the constitutional mandate 
to provide a right to a remedy in a meaningful manner. 
 
It is unconscionable that any profoundly injured woman of the estimated 
four hundred thirty thousand Ohio women who took DES should be prohibited 
from successfully pursuing constitutionally protected compensation for injuries 
done simply because she can only trace the harm to a group of manufacturers of 
the same product.  The fungibility of DES makes it virtually impossible to 
pinpoint a specific defendant.  Applying market-share liability is the only avenue 
for DES-injured women to successfully pursue a meaningful remedy. 
 
With their answer to the certified question, the majority is more comfortable 
shielding the defendant drug companies than with applying a theory of recovery 
that would allow the plaintiffs to go forward with their case.  The majority’s 
 
32
decision has the perverse effect of protecting a defendant class that undeniably 
manufactured, released, and profited from a horribly defective product while 
denying a chance of recovery to a class of injured women that undeniably did 
nothing wrong, except suffer the consequences of the ingestion of the defendants’ 
defective drugs.  The right-to-remedy clause has been turned on its head and the 
majority has effectively given these defendants the equivalent of a common-law 
right-to-immunity.  DES-injured women will have to content themselves with 
knowing that they “engender sympathy.”  I dissent.