Case Title: Lucik v. Taylor

Citation: 596 S.W.2d 514

Docket Number: B-8774

State: texas

Court: Texas Supreme Court

Date: 1980-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
596 S.W.2d 514 (1980) Viola Gwendolyn LUCIK, Petitioner, v. Carolyn TAYLOR and Henry Fairley, III, Respondents. No. B-8774. Supreme Court of Texas. January 23, 1980. Rehearing Denied March 3, 1980. Carter, Jones, Magee, Rudberg, Moss & Mayes, Charles M. Wilson, III, Dallas, for petitioner. Erhard, Cox & Ruebel, Richard McSpedden, Alfred L. Ruebel and Robert C. Cox, Dallas, for respondent. STEAKLEY, Justice. The question here is whether the injunctive relief, under the circumstances later shown, related to a matter "incident to an estate," the issuance of which was within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court of Dallas County. The Court of Civil Appeals has ruled that the Probate Court lacked jurisdiction and that its injunction is void. 584 S.W.2d 503. Our view is otherwise and the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals will be reversed, and that of the trial court will be affirmed. John Richard Lucik is the deceased. He died on July 1, 1978. On July 3, his widow, Mrs. Viola Gwendolyn Lucik, made application to the Probate Court of Dallas County to probate a will of Lucik dated September *515 29, 1977, in which she was the principal beneficiary. On July 7, Henry Fairley, III, filed for probate a will of Lucik dated June 16, 1978, including a codicil dated June 19, in which Carolyn Taylor was the principal beneficiary. The two applications were consolidated in a single probate proceeding. Under date of August 22, 1978, the Probate Court appointed James J. Hartnett temporary administrator of the estate of Lucik. Prior thereto, on August 14, 1978, Mrs. Lucik filed an application against Carolyn Taylor and Henry Fairley to enjoin them from "changing the form or location of any assets in their possession constituting a part of the Estate of John Richard Lucik, Deceased, and contestant herein, and from using, disposing of, changing the form or location of any of the assets of the Deceased and contestant which came into their possession prior to or subsequent to the death of said Deceased and from making entry to or removing from safety deposit box No. 6599, in the name of Carolyn Taylor in the Preston State Bank at Dallas, Texas." The allegations of Mrs. Lucik are quoted in detail in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and will not be repeated. In response thereto, the Probate Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order under date of August 17, and a Temporary Injunction under date of August 30. The material portions of the injunctive order were in these terms: The injunctive order also included detailed restraints upon Carolyn Taylor from selling, disposing of, changing the form or location of, and from encumbering, specific items of jewelry and household furniture and effects that came into her possession from Lucik during his lifetime. Article 1970-31a (1951) Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. created the Probate Court of Dallas County. The jurisdiction and power of the court was defined as follows: Section 5(d) (1977) of the Texas Probate Code also provided at that time:[1] In the case of English v. Cobb, Tex., 593 S.W.2d 674 (1979) we reviewed the recent changes in the constitutional and statutory provisions prescribing the jurisdictional powers of courts sitting in probate. We there recognized that the obvious purpose of these changes was to increase the jurisdiction of such courts in "matters incident to an estate" so that a decedent's estate could be more efficiently settled in one proceeding. Here, as in English v. Cobb, the protection from dissipation or transfer of the potential assets of the estate of Lucik directly bears on the ultimate collection and distribution of such properties pursuant to his effective will. As such, the injunctive relief related to a matter "incident to an estate" and was within the injunctive powers of the Probate Court of Dallas County. Of course, the settlement, partition and distribution of the estate of Lucik will pertain only to the assets comprising his estate. However, under the allegations of the application for preliminary injunctive restraint it was necessary that the assets in question be protected and preserved until their status could be determined. Otherwise, the provisions of the successful will could be frustrated and the enforcement of the jurisdiction of the Probate Court defeated. Indeed, the Court of Civil Appeals wrote in this case [584 S.W.2d at p. 505] that "[s]uits `incident to an estate' include those specifically mentioned in the statute and also those further seeking to either to recover possession of, clear title to, or collect damage for the conversion of property or to determine whether the property was community." (Italics added). Cited were the cases of Parr v. White, 543 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.Civ.App.1976), writ ref'd, 559 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.1977); Potter v. Potter, 545 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Civ.App.1976, writ ref'd n.r. e.). In the latter case the court wrote that the amendments adding paragraphs (c)(d) to Section 5 of the Probate Code are remedial and should be liberally construed. *517 The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court is affirmed. GARWOOD, J., not sitting. [1] It is noted that Section 5(d) was amended, and Section 5A was added, by Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 1741, ch. 713, effective August 27, 1979.