Case Title: CONTINENTAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. Kimball

Citation: 21 Utah 2d 152, 442 P.2d 472

Docket Number: 

State: utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Date: 1968-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
442 P.2d 472 (1968) 21 Utah 2d 152 The CONTINENTAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Administrator, d/b/n with Will Annexed of the Estate of Walter D. Thomas, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Clisbee KIMBALL, Administrator of the Estate of Fern K. Thomas, Zions Savings & Loan Association; American Savings & Loan Association, Utah Savings & Loan Association, Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association; Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association, and State Savings & Loan Association, Defendants and Respondents. No. 11125. Supreme Court of Utah. June 12, 1968. *473 Dale E. Anderson, of Fabian & Clendenin, Salt Lake City, for appellant. Arthur H. Nielsen, of Nielsen, Conder, Hansen & Henriod, Joseph S. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for respondents. ELLETT, Justice: The appellant brought an action to bring into the estate of Walter D. Thomas some accounts in various savings and loan institutions standing in the joint names of Walter D. Thomas and Fern K. Thomas. The sole issue on appeal is whether the appellant can introduce evidence to alter the apparent contractual relationship in connection with those joint accounts. Mr. Thomas died September 27, 1965, and subsequently thereto, during the probate of his estate, his wife, Fern K. Thomas, died. She was a second wife and not the mother of his children. All of the accounts save one were opened prior to January 1, 1962. On that date a statute became effective providing as follows: Sec. 66 of Ch. 17, Laws of Utah 1961, provides: The trial court ruled that Sec. 38 above applied to the case and, therefore, dismissed the appellant's complaint with prejudice. The appellant claims error by the ruling and cites various cases of this court to the effect that joint tenancy bank accounts have been interpreted so as to permit an interested party to show that the true intent of the depositors was contrary to that effect which the law gives to joint accounts. Aside from the statute, we can see no reason to think that a joint account in a building and loan association would be different from one in a commercial bank. As to the account opened after the enactment of the statute above quoted, we think there can be no question but what a party claiming an interest in the account is precluded by the statute from offering any evidence tending to show that the joint tenants intended a result different from that stated therein. The statute provides that the opening of the account shall be conclusive, etc., and this would cause one to think the legislature did not intend to affect accounts which already had been opened. The wording of Sec. 66, supra, lends strength to this position. We, therefore, hold that Sec. 38, supra, is not controlling so as to prohibit the introduction of evidence regarding those accounts which were opened prior to the statute. It should be noted that Sec. 66 of the Act says that the obligation of the contract shall not be impaired by the provisions of the Act. It does not say that the interpretation thereof must ever remain the *474 same. In fact, the interpretation of the contract of joint tenancy in this State has fluctuated from time to time as is shown in the case of Beehive State Bank v. Rosquist et al., 21 Utah 2d 17, 439 P.2d 468, 471, recently decided by this court. We there said: We hold that the law is as above indicated. Since the appellant is not trying to reform the contract and is not claiming fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity, we think that it is conclusively bound by the contract as made and cannot show that the parties intended a result contrary to that which the law of joint tenancy relationship imposes. The ruling of the trial court is affirmed, with costs to respondents. CALLISTER, TUCKETT, and HENRIOD, J., concur. CROCKETT, C.J., concurs in the result.