Case Title: James S. Loveless v. State of Arkansas

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR05-227

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 05-227 NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION JAMES S. LOVELESS Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered February 2, 2006 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CLAY COUNTY, CR 2000-28, HON. DAVID RAY GOODSON, JUDGE REVERSED AND REMANDED PER CURIAM In May of 2000, James S. Loveless pleaded guilty to rape and incest and was sentenced to 240 months' imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction on each charge. In August of 2004, Mr. Loveless filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the trial court. The petition was denied, but, in the same order, the trial court found Mr. Loveless had received an illegal sentence on the charge of incest, and reduced that sentence to 120 months' imprisonment. Mr. Loveless now appeals that order, both as to the denial of the petition and as to the amendment of his judgment and commitment order to reduce his sentence on the incest charge. Appellant Loveless divides his argument into three points, although, as the State notes in its brief, appellant's argument is difficult to follow and the actual delineation between his points is not so clear. In fact, appellant devotes the majority of his brief to expounding upon his view of the inadequacies of Arkansas law as set forth in our opinions, and does very little to attempt to apply that law to the facts in this case. As designated by appellant, his three points would appear as follows:(1) that his plea was not voluntary because the trial court did not follow proper plea procedure while receiving and accepting the plea; (2) that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing; (3) that the order was ambiguous so as to constitute reversible error. Within his last point, appellant also contends the court improperly reduced his sentence, asserting the conviction should have been void rather than the sentence reduced. In those instances, as here, where the judgment of conviction was entered on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or the judgment of conviction was not appealed, the petition for writ of error coram nobis is filed directly in the trial court. Dansby v. State, 343 Ark. 635, 37 S.W.3d 599 (2001) (per curiam). Denial of a writ of error coram nobis is reviewed by appeal. Magby v. State, 348 Ark. 415, 72 S.W.3d 508 (2002) (per curiam). The standard of review of the denial of a writ of error coram nobis is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the writ. Id. at 420, 72 S.W.3d at 510. An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court acts arbitrarily or groundlessly. Cloird v. State, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (May 20, 2004). A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy, more known for its denial than its approval. Larimore v. State, 341 Ark. 397, 17 S.W.3d 87 (2000). The function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact which would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to the trial court and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward before rendition of judgment. Cloird, ___ Ark. at ___, ___ S.W.3d at ___. The writ is allowed only under compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to address errors of the most fundamental nature. Pitts v. State, 336 Ark. 580, 986 S.W.2d 407 (1999) (per curiam). We have recognized that a writ of error coram nobis was available to address certain errors that are found in one of four categories: insanity at the time of trial, a coerced guilty plea,material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or a third-party confession to the crime during the time between conviction and appeal. Pitts, 336 Ark. at 583, 986 S.W.2d at 409. Applying the foregoing standard to the facts asserted in appellant's petition, it is clear that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition. Appellant did not plead that the circumstances of his case fell within any of the four recognized categories of error upon which relief may be granted. Appellant does not allege that he was insane, that the prosecutor withheld material evidence, or that a third party has confessed to the crime. Nor has appellant alleged any behavior by the prosecution that he asserts was coercive, although his petition does contain a conclusory statement that his guilty plea must have been coerced. The only bases for appellant's claims of error in either his petition or his brief are allegations that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 24 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure in accepting his plea. Such allegations do not raise a claim of the type of error for which a writ of error coram nobis is available. Appellant argues that the writ should be granted under the rule of reason announced in Penn v. State, 282 Ark. 571, 670 S.W.2d 426 (1984). Yet appellant ignores the fact that Penn was strictly limited to the facts of that case, which concerned a confession by a third party, and that Penn did not deviate from the function of the writ. A writ of error coram nobis is appropriate only when an issue was not addressed or could not have been addressed at trial because it was somehow hidden or unknown and would have prevented the rendition of the judgment had it been known to the trial court. Echols v. State, ___ Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (January 20, 2005); Brown v. State, 330 Ark. 627, 955 S.W.2d 901 (1997); Penn, 282 Ark. at 574, 670 S.W.2d at 428 (citing Troglin v. State, 257 Ark. 644, 519 S.W.2d 740 (1975)). Appellant admits that the facts were known and it is clear that the issues were not hidden. Appellant further asserts the writ is necessary to fill a gap in the available procedures, but there was a remedy available for the errors alleged. Any irregularities in the procedures used to accept appellant's plea could have been addressed through a timely petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. A claim is not cognizable in a petition for writ of error coram nobis if it may be properly raised in a timely petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 or on direct appeal. See McArty v. State, 335 Ark.445, 983 S.W.2d 418 (1998). The circuit court correctly determined that appellant's petition was without merit. Because appellant did not state a claim that was cognizable in his petition, the circuit court did not err in dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing, as appellant argues in his second point. Nor was the court's order in any way ambiguous in finding the petition was without merit, as appellant argues in his third and last point. Again, because appellant stated no cognizable claim, the petition clearly was without merit. Appellant's last argument, as noted previously, also contains his assertion that his conviction was invalid and void because the trial court found that his sentence on the incest charge was incorrect. The circuit court did err in reducing appellant's sentence on the incest charge. However, there was error by the trial court in finding that appellant was improperly sentenced. The trial court, in its review of the record, found that appellant had received an illegal sentence and that appellant's sentence had exceeded the permissible range because incest was a class C felony. It then reduced appellant's sentence to the maximum sentence possible for such a charge. A circuit court has jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence even if it has been placed into execution. Harness v. State, 352 Ark. 335, 101 S.W.3d 235 (2003). If the sentence is not an illegal sentence, however, the court does not have jurisdiction to modify the sentence. The general rule is that a trialcourt may not revise a valid sentence after execution of the sentence has begun. Hodge v. State, 320 Ark. 31, 894 S.W.2d 927 (1995). We are not precluded from considering the issue of whether the trial court had jurisdiction to modify appellant's sentence, whether or not the parties raise the issue. Gavin v. State, 354 Ark. 425, 125 S.W.3d 189 (2003). The question of whether the trial court acted in excess of its authority becomes a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction and may be raised sua sponte. Id. at 429, 125 S.W.3d at 191. Here, the appellant raises the validity of the modified sentence, but does not question the trial court's jurisdiction to modify his sentence. The State has not questioned the trial court's authority, but it is clear to us that the original sentence was not an illegal sentence. Under the current version of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-202 (Supp. 2005), incest is indeed a class C felony. Yet, at the time appellant was convicted, on May 22, 2000, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-202 (Repl. 1997) still contained the language from Act 1321 of 1997, which created an exception that an act of incest was a class A felony if the victim was under sixteen years of age and the perpetrator was over twenty-one years of age at the time of the offense. It is clear from appellant's brief that both elements of that exception applied. During the plea hearing, appellant admitted he was guilty of sexual contact of various types with a child of less than fourteen years of age, and confirmed that he was thirty-two at the time of the hearing. Appellant's original sentence of 240 months for the charge of incest was within the statutory range for a class A felony, and the trial court erred by reducing the sentence. The amended judgment, as provided in the trial court's order, imposed an invalid sentence because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify the original valid sentence. This court has previously remanded a case with instructions that an amended sentence be vacated and that the original sentence bereinstated, where the trial court reduced a defendant's sentence in error. Pannell v. State, 320 Ark. 250, 895 S.W.2d 911 (1995). Accordingly, the order is reversed, only as to the reduced sentence, and remanded to the trial court with directions that the amended judgment be vacated and the original judgment, including the sentence for incest, be reinstated. Reversed and remanded.