Case Title: PAGE v. MOUNTAIN WEST FARM BUR. MUT. INS. CO.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
PAGE v. MOUNTAIN WEST FARM BUR. MUT. INS. CO.2000 WY 662 P.3d 506Case Number: 98-133, 98-134Decided: 04/03/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
GEORGE WAYNE PAGE and 
BENJAMIN CLIFFORD PAGE, Appellants (Defendants), v.MOUNTAIN WEST FARM 
BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation,) Appellee (Plaintiff). 
DAN INGALLS and JAMES INGALLS, Appellants (Defendants), v.MOUNTAIN WEST 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeals from the District 
Court of Fremont County The Honorable Nancy Guthrie, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellants:Mel C. Orchard, III 
of Meyer & Williams, Jackson, Wyoming; and John R. Hursh of Central Wyoming 
Law, Riverton, Wyoming.Representing Appellee:S. B. Freeman, III 
of Bormuth & Freeman, Cody, Wyoming.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] The issue 
in this case is whether an insurance carrier can invoke a household exclusion 
clause when the injured person is a member of the household of the purchaser of 
the policy, but is not a member of the household of another "insured" under the 
policy. The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of Mountain West 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Mountain West), ruling that the language 
and intent of the policy were clear. George Wayne Page (George Page), Benjamin 
Clifford Page (Ben Page), Dan Ingalls, and James Ingalls appeal from the summary 
judgment contending that the household exclusion clause is not applicable 
because, Ben Page, the injured person was not a member of the household of the 
insured who caused the injury (James Ingalls), or, at least, the policy is 
ambiguous and should be construed in favor of the insured. We agree with the 
trial court that the policy language is not ambiguous, and that the household 
exclusion clause is applicable in this instance. The Order Granting Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is affirmed.

[¶2] This 
statement of the issues is found in the Brief of the Appellants George Page and 
Ben Page and Dan and James Ingalls:

1. In light of the canons 
of construction applicable to insurance policies, when a ranch employee who 
qualified as an "insured" under the ranch liability and umbrella policy has been 
sued in negligence for shooting the rancher's son, can the insurer apply an 
exclusion for household members, even though the rancher's son is not a member 
of the ranch employee's family, when the policy contains a severability of 
interest clause extending separate liability coverage for all 
insureds?

2. Where the * * * 
liability insurance policy clearly provides coverage for an employee and certain 
provisions of the policy broadly define an "insured" as including the ranch 
employee, and the exclusions portion of the policy refers back to the same 
definitions of "insured," can the insurer use a different analysis for the same 
language in excluding coverage?

3. When an insurance 
policy is ambiguous and unclear and the terms excluding coverage are ambiguous 
and confusing may the insurance company rely on the policy language to deny 
coverage?

[¶3] This 
Statement of the Issues is found in the Brief of Appellee Mountain West Farm 
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company:

1. Does the "household 
exclusion" clause in the liability section of the insurance policy issued to 
George and Evelyn Page exclude from coverage the bodily injury sustained by 
Benjamin Clifford Page, regardless of the "insured" against whom a claim is 
brought?

2. Does the "household 
exclusion" clause in the umbrella section of the insurance policy issued to 
George and Evelyn Page exclude from coverage the damages for bodily injury 
sustained by Benjamin Clifford Page, regardless of the "insured" against whom a 
claim is brought?

[¶4] The facts 
here are not in dispute. Ben Page is a minor who lives with his parents, George 
and Evelyn Page. George Page is the former employer of Dan Ingalls and Dan's 
minor son, James Ingalls. In October of 1992, while George Page, Ben Page, and 
the two Ingalls were gathering cattle east of Jackson, James Ingalls 
accidentally shot Ben Page. Ben Page's injuries were life-threatening, and his 
treatment was extremely expensive. 

[¶5] A short 
time after the accident, in 1992, George Page filed a claim with Mountain West 
seeking coverage under his farm and ranch Country Squire Insurance Policy. 
Mountain West denied the claim, advising George Page that the policy did not 
cover the injuries sustained by Ben Page. In January 1996, Ben Page's attorney 
contacted Mountain West in an effort to revive the claim.

[¶6] In May of 
1997, Mountain West filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment, asking the 
district court to declare that the Page's policy did not provide any coverage 
for the injuries to Ben Page. In its petition, Mountain West alleged that the 
plain language of the policy excluded coverage for Ben Page's injuries. George 
and Ben Page filed an answer in which they alleged coverage under both the 
liability and umbrella sections of the policy. Dan and James Ingalls filed a 
separate answer presenting substantially the same allegations as the 
Pages.

[¶7] Mountain 
West and the Pages respectively moved for summary judgment. The trial court held 
a hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment on January 26, 1998. On 
March 3, 1998, the trial court issued its Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The trial court reasoned:

The language of the 
insurance policy in question excludes coverage for personal injury to the 
insured or family members of the insured. Benjamin Page is a family member of 
the insured, George Page, as defined by [the] insurance policy. The clear intent 
of the insurance policy is to prevent the policy from being used to cover 
personal injuries of the policy holder or his family. Benjamin Page is seeking 
exactly such coverage under the policy.

[¶8] From that 
order, George and Ben Page filed this appeal.

[¶9] The dispute 
of the parties in this case is over the application of the policy language, but 
there is no dispute as to what the policy provides. Neither is there any dispute 
as to the manner in which Ben Page was injured. In such an instance, in 
accordance with our protocol for reviewing summary judgments granted pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 56, we determine only whether the district court properly applied the 
law in ordering the summary judgment. Cities Service Oil and Gas Corp. v. State, 
838 P.2d 146, 151 (Wyo. 1992). Our review requires us to interpret the insurance 
policy under our usual rules of contract interpretation because we treat 
insurance policies as contracts. Doctors' Co. v. Insurance Corp. of America, 864 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Wyo. 1993). The rule we apply was articulated in Arnold v. 
Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., 707 P.2d 161, 166 (Wyo. 
1985):

If a contract is clear on 
its face, we must assume it reflects the intent of the parties. Schacht v. First 
Wyoming Bank, N.A. - Rawlins, Wyo., 620 P.2d 561 (1980). We are not free to 
rewrite contracts under the guise of interpretation. Adobe Oil & Gas Corp. 
v. Getter Trucking, Inc., Wyo., 676 P.2d 560 (1984). So long as there is no 
ambiguity, we are bound to apply the contract as it is written. Rouse v. Munroe, 
Wyo., 658 P.2d 74 (1983).

[¶10] George 
Page's insurance policy with Mountain West contains five sections, each 
describing a separate type of coverage. They are: Section I, Property Insurance; 
Section II, Liability Protection; Section III, Automobile; Section IV, Inland 
Marine; and Section V, Umbrella Coverages. George Page claims coverage under 
only Sections II and V, and the general policy language applicable to them, so 
we limit our analysis to those two sections in light of the general policy 
language.

[¶11] The policy 
includes two pages of definitions that apply to all sections except for Section 
III. Within those definitions, the following are significant in this 
case:

You and your mean the 
person named in the Declarations1 and that person's spouse if a 
member of the same household.

[¶12] 
Insured means you and if residents of your 
household:

1. Your relatives; 
and

2. Minors in the care of 
those named above. 

[¶13] Under 
Section II of this policy, insured also means a person while operating 
machinery, watercraft, or in charge of your domestic or farm animals with your 
permission in your operations covered by this policy.

(Emphasis in 
original.)

[¶14] Section II 
provides coverage to insureds for liability due to bodily injury or property 
damage. The Pages argue that both Dan and James Ingalls are insureds because 
they had charge over George Page's cattle, with George Page's permission, and in 
the operations covered by the policy. Therefore, the Pages contend Section II 
should apply to cover the liability of the Ingalls to Ben Page. In response, 
Mountain West asserts that even though the Ingalls are insureds under the 
policy, there is no coverage for Ben Page's injuries in this instance. Mountain 
West's premise for its argument is the household exclusion clause, found in the 
Exclusions Applicable to Section II, which provides:

Section II does not cover 
bodily injury or property damage:

13. Sustained by you or 
any insured as defined in paragraphs (1) and (2) of the definition of 
insured.

[¶15] (Emphasis 
in original.) Mountain West argues Ben Page, as a resident of George Page's 
household, is an insured under paragraph (1) of the definition of insured as a 
relative of George Page, and under paragraph (2) as a minor in the care of 
George Page, and for that reason Ben Page's injuries are excluded from 
coverage.

[¶16] The Pages' 
argument focuses on a sophisticated effort to avoid the household exclusion 
clause. The Pages contend that the policy should be construed to the end that 
the words "you" and "your" refer only to the insured who is claiming liability 
coverage under the policy. In other words, "you" means Dan Ingalls when Dan 
Ingalls is claiming coverage for his liability to Ben Page; "you" means James 
Ingalls when James Ingalls is claiming coverage for his liability to Ben Page; 
and "you" means George Page when George Page is claiming coverage for his 
liability to Ben Page. Under that construction of the policy language, Ben 
Page's injuries would not be excluded from coverage because Ben Page is neither 
a relative of either Dan Ingalls or James Ingalls nor a minor in their care, and 
Dan and James Ingalls would be covered for their liability to Ben 
Page.

[¶17] The Pages 
base their contention on the policy's severability of interest clause, which 
they claim limits the household exclusion clause to the household of the 
individual insured seeking coverage. The severability of interest clause reads: 
"[t]he insurance provided by this policy applies separately to each 
insured; however, this provision does not increase our liability limit 
for one occurrence." (Emphasis in original.) The Pages argue that their 
construction is supported by our decision in Barnette v. Hartford Ins. Group, 
653 P.2d 1375, 1376-77 (Wyo. 1982). In that case, the insurance policy contained 
a severability of interest clause that identified Barnette as an insured, and a 
cross-employee exclusion clause that excluded Barnette from the category of 
insureds. Id. After examining the reasons for each of the conflicting clauses, 
we resolved the inconsistent language of the Barnette policy in favor of 
coverage. Id. at 1383.

[¶18] The Page's 
reliance on Barnette is not well founded. In this case, there is no conflicting 
or ambiguous policy language that requires the penetrating analysis invoked in 
Barnette. In the absence of ambiguity, we must discern the contract's meaning by 
considering only the four corners of the document. Rouse v. Munroe, 658 P.2d 74, 
77 (Wyo. 1983). A careful reading of the policy leads to the ineluctable 
conclusion that the trial court's interpretation was correct. The fact that the 
declarations name specifically only George and Evelyn Page signifies that "you" 
and "your" refer only to those individuals. It follows that Ben Page, their 
minor child residing in their home, is an insured under both paragraphs one and 
two of the definition of "insured." Because Ben Page is so defined as an 
insured, the household exclusion clause clearly excludes the injuries he 
suffered from coverage under Section II, regardless of who is responsible for 
them.

[¶19] The Pages 
also claim coverage under the Umbrella Coverage in Section V. This claim must 
also fail because of an exclusion set forth in the policy. Exclusion number nine 
specifies there is no coverage for bodily injury "sustained by you or any 
insured." (Emphasis in original.) The Pages present the same argument 
which they invoked to avoid the household exclusion. We reject this argument for 
the same reasons.

[¶20] Ben Page 
merits sympathy because of the grievous injuries that he sustained from the 
gunshot wound. We cannot stretch our rules of law to grant him the relief he 
requests. The parties presented no material issues of fact, and the plain 
language of the policy shows that Mountain West was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. We therefore affirm the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment.

Footnotes

1 The policy contains 
seven pages of declarations; each one names only "Page, George & Evelyn." 
Throughout the policy, therefore, you and your refer only to 
George and Evelyn Page.