Case Title: In re Disqualification of Bruns

Citation: 2024-Ohio-1308

Docket Number: 24-AP-006

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2024-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Bruns, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2024-Ohio-1308.] 
 
 
 
 
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF BRUNS. 
IN RE D.G. 
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Bruns, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2024-Ohio-1308.] 
Judges—Affidavits of disqualification—R.C. 2701.03—Affiant had standing as a 
“party to the proceeding” under R.C. 2701.03(A) to seek judge’s 
disqualification from presiding over juvenile-court delinquency proceeding 
in which affiant’s child was the alleged delinquent child—Affiant failed to 
show that judge is interested in underlying case or “otherwise is 
disqualified” under R.C. 2701.03(A)—Disqualification denied. 
(No. 24-AP-006—Decided March 5, 2024.) 
ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Montgomery County Court of Common 
Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 23JC3115. 
____________ 
KENNEDY, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Robin Mapp, the mother of the alleged delinquent child in the 
underlying case, has filed an affidavit of disqualification pursuant to R.C. 2701.03 
seeking to disqualify Judge Julie Bruns of the Montgomery County Court of 
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, from presiding over the case.  Judge Bruns filed 
a response to the affidavit of disqualification. 
{¶ 2} This matter presents the threshold question whether Mapp, as the 
mother of the alleged delinquent child, has standing to seek Judge Bruns’s 
disqualification.  R.C. 2701.03(A) permits “any party to the proceeding or the 
party’s counsel” to file an affidavit of disqualification against a judge of the court 
of common pleas.  As explained below, because the applicable statutes and court 
rules give to or impose on parents certain rights and duties in juvenile-court 
delinquency proceedings, Mapp is considered a party to the underlying delinquency 
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case for the limited purpose of filing an affidavit of disqualification under R.C. 
2701.03.  Therefore, Mapp has standing to file the affidavit of disqualification. 
{¶ 3} Turning to the merits of the affidavit of disqualification, Mapp has not 
established that the judge should be disqualified.  Therefore, the affidavit of 
disqualification is denied.  The case shall proceed before Judge Bruns. 
Trial-Court Proceedings 
{¶ 4} On June 24, 2023, Mapp’s child, D.G., was charged with two counts 
of aggravated robbery, both felonies of the first degree, and was remanded to a 
detention facility.  On July 5, the complaint was amended to add two firearm 
specifications, one for each count of aggravated robbery. 
{¶ 5} On July 25, D.G.’s attorney withdrew from the representation. 
{¶ 6} On August 10, D.G.’s new attorney requested a competency 
evaluation for D.G.  After the court’s psychologist completed an evaluation, D.G.’s 
attorney requested a second competency evaluation, which Judge Bruns allowed.  
The court scheduled a competency hearing for November 15.  On request of D.G.’s 
attorney, the court rescheduled the hearing for November 29. 
{¶ 7} At the November 29 hearing, Judge Bruns found D.G. competent and 
scheduled a preliminary conference for December 8.  The judge later rescheduled 
the preliminary conference for December 12 because Mapp was unavailable on 
December 8. 
{¶ 8} During the December 12 conference, D.G.’s family requested 
removal of his attorney.  Based on the attorney’s representation that he had a 
breakdown in communication with Mapp, the judge granted that request. 
{¶ 9} On December 13, the court appointed a new attorney for D.G. and 
scheduled a conference for January 8, 2024. 
{¶ 10} On January 8, the state of Ohio requested that the court appoint a 
guardian ad litem for D.G. because of an alleged breakdown in communication 
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between D.G. and Mapp.  The court appointed a guardian ad litem for D.G. and 
scheduled another conference for January 24. 
{¶ 11} On January 12, Mapp filed this affidavit of disqualification. 
{¶ 12} Because the question of standing asks whether an individual is 
entitled to have a court hear a controversy, a threshold issue here is whether Mapp 
is qualified to file an affidavit of disqualification against Judge Bruns under R.C. 
2701.03(A). 
Standing to File an Affidavit of Disqualification 
{¶ 13} Standing to file an affidavit of disqualification is conferred by 
statute.  In re Disqualification of Gallagher, 173 Ohio St.3d 1201, 2023-Ohio-2977, 
228 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 26.  R.C. 2701.03(A) provides that “[i]f a judge of the court of 
common pleas allegedly is interested in a proceeding pending before the court, 
allegedly is related to or has a bias or prejudice for or against a party to a proceeding 
pending before the court or a party’s counsel, or allegedly otherwise is disqualified 
to preside in a proceeding pending before the court, any party to the proceeding or 
the party’s counsel may file an affidavit of disqualification with the clerk” of this 
court.  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 14} Under this plain and unambiguous language, only a “party to the 
proceeding or the party’s counsel” may file an affidavit of disqualification.  Id.  
Chief justices “have ‘strictly enforced’ this statutory language and have 
consistently found that ‘individuals who do not qualify as a “party” or “party’s 
counsel” do not have standing to file an affidavit of disqualification.’ ”  Gallagher 
at ¶ 26, quoting In re Disqualification of Grendell, 137 Ohio St.3d 1220, 2013-
Ohio-5243, 999 N.E.2d 681, ¶ 2; see also In re Disqualification of Leach, __ Ohio 
St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-4776, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 4.  For purposes of R.C. 2701.03(A), a 
“party’s counsel” includes counsel of record in the underlying case from which the 
judge’s disqualification is sought or an attorney retained by a party in the 
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underlying case to file an affidavit of disqualification in this court.  Gallagher at 
¶ 29-34. 
{¶ 15} “In general, a ‘party’ is defined as ‘[o]ne by or against whom a 
lawsuit is brought; anyone who both is directly interested in a lawsuit and has a 
right to control the proceedings, make a defense, or appeal from an adverse 
judgment.’ ”  In re Disqualification of Berhalter, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-
4881, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 21, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1350-1351 (11th 
Ed.2019).  Because the underlying delinquency complaint was not brought by or 
against Mapp, it would be unusual to consider her a party—at least in the traditional 
sense—to her child’s juvenile-delinquency proceeding.  However, Mapp has an 
interest in her minor son’s custody and care; as explained below, applicable statutes 
and court rules confer rights and duties on parents in delinquency proceedings. 
{¶ 16} For example, when a child is admitted to a place of detention, an 
informal detention hearing shall be held within 72 hours of admission to determine 
whether detention is required.  R.C. 2151.314(A).  Notice of the time, place, and 
purpose of the detention hearing must be given to the child’s parents.  Id.  If a parent 
is not notified and did not appear or waive appearance at the hearing, upon the filing 
of an affidavit stating these facts, the court shall rehear the matter without 
unnecessary delay.  Id. 
{¶ 17} After a complaint is filed, the court shall promptly issue a summons 
to the child and to “the parents * * * and any other persons that appear to the court 
to be proper or necessary parties to the proceedings, requiring them to appear before 
the court at the time fixed to answer the allegations of the complaint.”  R.C. 
2151.28(C)(1).  If the complaint alleges a child to be delinquent, “the court shall 
require the parent * * * to attend all proceedings of the court regarding the child.”  
R.C. 2151.35(A)(1).  And if the parent fails to so attend, “the court may find the 
parent * * * in contempt.”  Id. 
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{¶ 18} A child and “the child’s parents” are “entitled to representation by 
legal counsel at all stages of the proceedings under [Chapter 2151] or Chapter 2152 
of the Revised Code.”  R.C. 2151.352, held unconstitutional as applied in In re 
Adoption of Y.E.F., 163 Ohio St.3d 251, 2020-Ohio-6785, 171 N.E.3d 302.  And 
the child’s parents “shall be entitled to visit such child at any reasonable time, be 
present at any hearing involving the child, and be given reasonable notice of such 
hearing.”  Id.  Before a juvenile court conducts a hearing to transfer a child charged 
with delinquency to the adult division, the court “shall give notice in writing of the 
time, place, and purpose of any hearing * * * to the child’s parents * * * at least 
three days prior to the hearing.”  R.C. 2152.12(G).  Additionally, “when a child has 
been committed” by the authority of the juvenile court, the court “shall issue an 
order * * * requiring that the parent, guardian, or person charged with the child’s 
support pay for the care, support, maintenance, and education of the child.”  R.C. 
2151.36. 
{¶ 19} The Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure reflect the will of the General 
Assembly and expressly include in the definition of “party” a “child who is the 
subject of a juvenile court proceeding” and “the child’s parent or parents.”  Juv.R. 
2(BB).  The rules further require that a juvenile-court complaint contain the name 
and address of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian or state that the name or 
address is unknown, Juv.R. 10(B)(2), and that the court cause the issuance of a 
summons directed to the parents, Juv.R. 15(A). 
{¶ 20} Because parents must be served in juvenile-delinquency 
proceedings, lower courts have concluded that parents are necessary parties in 
delinquency cases.  See, e.g., In re Jordan, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2001-T-0067, 
2002-Ohio-2820, ¶ 7 (“Parents are considered to be necessary parties to any 
proceeding concerning their child and must be served”), citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 
1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); In re Brunner, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 
02CA2865, 2003-Ohio-2590, ¶ 13 (same); In re Taylor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 
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76429, 2000 WL 739457, *3 (June 8, 2000) (same); In re Koogle, 2d Dist. Greene 
Nos. CA-82-68 and CA-82-93, 1983 WL 2461, *2 (June 16, 1983) (same). 
{¶ 21} Because of a parent’s special status in juvenile-court delinquency 
proceedings, Mapp is considered a “party to the proceeding” for the limited purpose 
of filing an affidavit of disqualification under R.C. 2701.03. 
{¶ 22} Based on the foregoing, Mapp has standing to file the affidavit of 
disqualification in her child’s delinquency proceeding.  Therefore, I turn to the 
allegations in the affidavit of disqualification. 
Affidavit-of-Disqualification Proceedings 
{¶ 23} R.C. 2701.03(A) provides that if a judge of a court of common pleas 
“allegedly is interested in a proceeding pending before the court, allegedly is related 
to or has a bias or prejudice for or against a party to a proceeding pending before 
the court or a party’s counsel, or allegedly otherwise is disqualified to preside in a 
proceeding pending before the court,” then that party or the party’s counsel may 
file an affidavit of disqualification with the clerk of this court. 
{¶ 24} Under that statute, Mapp makes two allegations against Judge Bruns.  
Mapp alleges that Judge Bruns has a “vested interest” in the underlying case and 
that Judge Bruns should be disqualified for other reasons.  The judge denies that 
there are any grounds for her disqualification. 
Interest 
{¶ 25} In support of the allegation that the judge has an interest in the 
underlying case, Mapp points to statements made by the judge.  Mapp asserts that 
on December 12, 2023, the judge said that the court would not be releasing D.G. 
from detention “regardless of the evaluations or if he took a plea deal.”  Mapp also 
claims that on January 8, 2024, the judge threatened her because Mapp would not 
approve the plea agreement offered to D.G. by the state, and Mapp claims that the 
judge said that Mapp needs a translator to understand the terms of the proposed plea 
agreement. 
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{¶ 26} In response, Judge Bruns denies having any interest in the juvenile-
court proceeding.  The judge also denies prejudging any issue in the case, 
threatening Mapp in any way, and interfering with D.G.’s decision whether to 
accept a plea deal from the state. 
Otherwise Disqualified under R.C. 2701.03(A) 
{¶ 27} In support of the allegation that the judge is disqualified for other 
reasons, Mapp asserts that the judge has deprived D.G. of a quick and speedy trial 
and has violated his right to counsel by appointing ineffective attorneys.  Mapp also 
seeks the judge’s disqualification because Mapp named the judge in a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus that she filed on D.G.’s behalf in the Second District Court 
of Appeals.  Additionally, Mapp avers that an appearance of impropriety exists 
“because the alleged plaintiff was a fully ran corporation within the State of Ohio.” 
{¶ 28} In response, the judge states that although the right to a speedy trial 
is not applicable in the underlying juvenile-court proceeding, the court has been 
vigilant about attempting to move the case forward.  A trial date has not yet been 
scheduled because of the issues raised in the underlying proceeding. 
{¶ 29} D.G.’s former attorney sought two competency evaluations.  The 
matter was scheduled for a competency hearing when D.G.’s attorney requested a 
continuance of the proceeding.  Shortly thereafter, D.G.’s family requested the 
removal of D.G.’s attorney, which the judge granted, ordering the appointment of 
new counsel.  In January 2024, the state requested the appointment of a guardian 
ad litem for D.G. because of a breakdown in communication between the child and 
Mapp.  The judge granted the request and appointed a guardian ad litem for D.G.  
The judge also states that D.G. has been detained since his arrest based in part on 
the serious nature of the charges. 
{¶ 30} With respect to D.G.’s right to counsel, the judge states that she has 
appointed him two highly competent and experienced attorneys and a highly 
competent guardian ad litem. 
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{¶ 31} Lastly, the judge denies that any appearance of impropriety exists. 
Disqualification of a Common-Pleas-Court Judge 
{¶ 32} As set forth above, R.C. 2701.03(A) provides two specific grounds 
and a catchall provision for the disqualification of a judge of the court of common 
pleas.  Granting or denying an affidavit of disqualification turns on whether the 
chief justice determines that the allegations of interest, bias, prejudice, or 
disqualification set forth in the affidavit exist.  R.C. 2701.03(E). 
{¶ 33} The burden falls on the affiant to submit “specific allegations on 
which the claim of interest, bias, prejudice, or disqualification is based and the facts 
to support each of those allegations.”  R.C. 2701.03(B)(1).  Therefore, “[a]n 
affidavit must describe with specificity and particularity those facts alleged to 
support the claim.”  In re Disqualification of Mitrovich, 101 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-
Ohio-7358, 803 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 4. 
{¶ 34} Mapp alleges two bases for the disqualification of Judge Bruns—the 
judge has an interest in the case and the judge should be disqualified for other 
reasons. 
{¶ 35} The term “interest” is not defined in R.C. 2701.03.  The Code of 
Judicial Conduct requires a judge to disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding 
in which the judge “[h]as more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially 
affected by the proceeding,” Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(2)(c), or “the judge knows that 
he or she * * * has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a 
party to the proceeding,” Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(3). 
{¶ 36} A judge “otherwise is disqualified” under R.C. 2701.03(A) when 
one of the express bases for disqualification—interest, relation to a party, bias, or 
prejudice—does not apply but other grounds for disqualification exist.  See In re 
Disqualification of Schooley, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-4332, __ N.E.3d __, 
¶ 19.  For example, the statute speaks in terms of actual bias and prejudice; 
“[n]evertheless, even in cases in which no evidence of actual bias or prejudice is 
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apparent, a judge’s disqualification may be appropriate to avoid an appearance of 
impropriety or when the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judicial system 
is at issue,” In re Disqualification of Crawford, 152 Ohio St.3d 1256, 2017-Ohio-
9428, 98 N.E.3d 277, ¶ 6.  In addition, an ex parte communication between a judge 
and a party can be grounds for the judge’s disqualification when the communication 
either was initiated by the judge or addressed substantive matters in the pending 
case.  In re Disqualification of Calabrese, 100 Ohio St.3d 1224, 2002-Ohio-7475, 
798 N.E.2d 10, ¶ 2.  Jud.Cond.R. 2.11 sets forth additional circumstances under 
which a judge should be disqualified, including the economic interests of the 
judge’s family members and the judge’s likely being a material witness concerning 
the matter in controversy. 
{¶ 37} These examples are not exhaustive, but they illustrate that a judge 
may be “otherwise * * * disqualified” when the specific grounds for 
disqualification set forth in R.C. 2701.03(A) are not applicable. 
Analysis 
{¶ 38} As explained below, Mapp has not established that Judge Bruns’s 
disqualification is warranted. 
Interest 
{¶ 39} Mapp’s allegation of interest is based on one thing the judge would 
not do—release D.G. from detention—and one thing the judge allegedly did do—
threaten Mapp for not approving the plea deal.  But Mapp does not explain how 
either of these actions shows that the judge has a personal interest in the case. 
{¶ 40} Therefore, this allegation lacks merit. 
Otherwise Disqualified under R.C. 2701.03(A) 
{¶ 41} Mapp has also not proven that the judge is otherwise disqualified. 
{¶ 42} Mapp states that the judge should be disqualified because the judge 
has deprived D.G. of his constitutional rights to a speedy trial and to effective 
assistance of counsel.  Moreover, Mapp claims that the judge should be disqualified 
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because the judge is named in a habeas corpus case and “because the alleged 
plaintiff was a fully ran corporation within the State of Ohio.” 
{¶ 43} The chief justice’s authority in an affidavit-of-disqualification 
proceeding is limited.  The chief justice lacks authority “to resolve legal issues that 
are subject to appellate review.”  Schooley, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-4332, __ 
N.E.3d __, at ¶ 23.  The questions whether a juvenile is entitled to a speedy trial, 
whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated, and whether appointed counsel 
provided effective representation are matters for appellate review and therefore 
“not proper subjects in an affidavit of disqualification,” id. at ¶ 24. 
{¶ 44} Moreover, “[i]t is well established that a judge will not be 
disqualified solely because a litigant in a case pending before the judge has filed a 
lawsuit against that judge.”  In re Disqualification of Pokorny, 135 Ohio St.3d 1268, 
2013-Ohio-915, 986 N.E.2d 993, ¶ 4.  However, “it does necessarily follow that a 
judge should never be disqualified on the grounds that he or she is involved in an 
unrelated lawsuit with a litigant.  Each case must be determined on its own merits 
and based on the nature of the perceived conflict.”  In re Disqualification of 
Favreau, 145 Ohio St.3d 1212, 2015-Ohio-5666, 47 N.E.3d 862, ¶ 5. 
{¶ 45} In her petition for a writ of habeas corpus for D.G., Mapp cites the 
judge’s actions in the underlying case.  “The fact that a party has brought suit 
against a judge is especially unlikely to be deemed to provide a cognizable ground 
for seeking that judge’s disqualification * * * where the judge has been sued * * * 
as a result of her rulings in the case.”  Flamm, Recusal and Disqualification of 
Judges, Section 60.3, at 932-934 (2018); see also In re Disqualification of Saffold, 
155 Ohio St.3d 1272, 2018-Ohio-5258, 121 N.E.3d 387, ¶ 5.  Therefore, Mapp’s 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus for D.G. does not require Judge Bruns’s 
disqualification from the underlying juvenile-court case. 
{¶ 46} Lastly, “[t]he proper test for determining whether a judge’s 
participation in a case presents an appearance of impropriety is * * * an objective 
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one.  A judge should step aside or be removed if a reasonable and objective observer 
would harbor serious doubts about the judge’s impartiality.”  In re Disqualification 
of Lewis, 117 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2004-Ohio-7359, 884 N.E.2d 1082, ¶ 8.  Mapp’s 
only evidence to support the allegation that an appearance of impropriety exists is 
her statement that “the alleged plaintiff was a fully ran corporation within the State 
of Ohio.”  Judge Bruns maintains that she is fair and impartial. 
{¶ 47} All judges are accorded a “presumption of impartiality.”  In re 
Disqualification of Celebrezze, 101 Ohio St.3d 1224, 2003-Ohio-7352, 803 N.E.2d 
823, ¶ 7.  A judge’s subjective belief about his or her own impartiality is generally 
not a decisive factor in whether to grant an affidavit-of-disqualification request, but 
a judge’s personal assessment is entitled to some weight.  Lewis at ¶ 11, citing 
Flamm, Judicial Disqualification, 158, Section 5.6.2 (1996).  The question whether 
a judge’s impartiality can “reasonably be questioned” is resolved by considering 
the facts as they existed at the time of the judge’s statements or actions. 
{¶ 48} The affiant has the burden “to not only identify specific allegations 
of bias but to ensure the ‘allegations could be verified by the record.’ ”  In re 
Disqualification of Schroeder, 172 Ohio St.3d 1238, 2023-Ohio-3171, 225 N.E.3d 
1064, ¶ 49, quoting In re Disqualification of Sheward, 136 Ohio St.3d 1262, 2013-
Ohio-4244, 995 N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 6.  “When necessary, an affiant should submit 
evidence beyond the affidavit to support the allegations contained therein.”  In re 
Disqualification of Trimmer, 164 Ohio St.3d 1212, 2021-Ohio-2320, 172 N.E.3d 
192, ¶ 5.  “[I]t is not the chief justice’s duty in deciding an affidavit of 
disqualification to further investigate an affiant’s claims or obtain evidence on the 
affiant’s behalf.”  In re Disqualification of Knece, 138 Ohio St.3d 1274, 2014-Ohio-
1414, 7 N.E.3d 1213, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 49} Here, Mapp has failed to prove the allegation that the judge is 
otherwise disqualified to preside over the underlying case.  Her statement alone is 
insufficient to overcome the presumption of impartiality afforded to Judge Bruns. 
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{¶ 50} Therefore, this allegation lacks merit. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 51} The affidavit of disqualification is denied.  The case shall proceed 
before Judge Bruns. 
_________________