Case Title: State v. Henness

Citation: 1997-Ohio-405

Docket Number: 19960536

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HENNESS, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Henness (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 53.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 96-536 — Submitted February 19, 1997 — Decided June 18, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APA02-240. 
 
Warren Keith Henness, appellant, was convicted of aggravated murder with 
specifications and sentenced to death for the killing of Richard Myers, a fifty-one-
year-old lab technician from Circleville, Ohio. 
 
Myers was last seen alive on March 20, 1992.  That morning, Myers told his 
wife he had something to do before he reported to work at midnight.  Although 
Myers did not elaborate, his wife knew that he was an Alcoholics Anonymous 
volunteer and frequently traveled to Columbus to counsel others about drug and 
alcohol addictions.  Myers was not home that afternoon when his wife returned 
from her job, and he failed to report to work that night. 
 
That same morning, appellant’s wife, Tabatha, answered a telephone call at 
the residence where she and appellant were staying.  The caller identified himself 
as “Dick” and asked for appellant.  After the phone conversation ended, appellant 
told Tabatha he was going out.  A car arrived for appellant.  Tabatha recognized 
the driver as “Dick,” a man who had picked up appellant several times before in 
the same car.  Tabatha identified State’s Exhibit 2-B as a photograph of the car she 
saw.  The car belonged to Richard Myers. 
 
A few hours later, appellant returned to the house to pick up Tabatha.  He 
was alone and driving Myers’s car.  They drove to a car wash on Mound Street in 
downtown Columbus and smoked crack. 
 
In his possession, appellant had checks and credit cards belonging to 
Richard Myers.  Tabatha suggested that they involve Roland Fair, a drug dealer 
 
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acquaintance, to pose as Myers to “po[p] the checks” and “play on the credit 
cards.”  The next day, appellant and Tabatha drove to Fair’s apartment.  Appellant 
told Fair that the owner of the checks, credit cards, and car was in a motel room 
with two prostitutes who were keeping him drunk. 
 
While at Fair’s apartment, Tabatha saw appellant washing a butterfly knife 
in the bathroom sink.  Later, Fair noticed the knife soaking in the sink.  The knife 
had a dark stain on it.  Appellant told Fair that it was his knife. 
 
Appellant, Tabatha, and Fair traveled to several banks and check-cashing 
outlets that day and the next, uttering forged checks and getting cash advances 
with the credit cards.  With the money, they bought drugs.  They also used the 
credit cards to buy merchandise, which they then sold for more drugs. 
 
At some point Tabatha suggested that appellant tell Fair the truth about 
Myers.  According to Tabatha, appellant told Fair that the owner of the car, 
checks, and credit cards had pulled a gun on him, appellant shot him, “and the guy 
died.”  According to Fair, Henness never specifically said what he did to Myers, 
but he did say, “I did not want to do it.  He made me do it.” 
 
Later, appellant told Fair that the body was in the Nelson Road area in 
Columbus.  The three discussed possible ways to dispose of it.  According to Fair, 
Fair suggested a quarry.  According to Tabatha, appellant was the one who 
suggested a quarry and stated that the body would never be found there. 
 
Two or three days after March 20, Tabatha saw appellant with a gold 
wedding ring that was too big for him.  Appellant told her that it was Myers’s.  
According to Fair, appellant offered the ring to him, but Fair did not want it. 
 
On March 23, appellant sold Myers’s car to a sixteen-year-old drug dealer 
for $250.  Appellant wrote out a fake bill of sale and signed it “Richard Myers.”  
The next day, the police recovered the car and impounded it because its owner was 
 
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reported missing.  The police questioned the sixteen year old and his companion, 
who led them to appellant. 
 
On March 25, the police received an anonymous telephone call alerting 
them to the body of a dead man in an abandoned water purification plant on 
Nelson Road.  Upon investigation, police discovered the body of Richard Myers.  
His shoelaces were tied together, his mouth was gagged, and his hands were 
bound together behind his back with a coat hanger.  Police found four .25 caliber 
shell casings and one live .25 caliber round near his body.  The four casings were 
all ejected from the same weapon. 
 
An autopsy revealed that Myers had been shot five times in the head with 
.25 caliber bullets.  One bullet had penetrated his brain, killing him.  Myers had a 
large cut on his neck, which could have been inflicted with a butterfly knife such 
as State’s Exhibit 6.  Abrasions on his knees showed that his knees had struck a 
hard surface, and were consistent with being forced to kneel on a concrete floor.  
Myers’s left ring finger had been severed six to eight hours after death. 
 
Columbus police arrested appellant on an unrelated charge on April 8, 1992.  
At the police station, it was apparently discovered that he was wanted on forgery 
charges. He was also a suspect in Myers’s murder and homicide detectives 
questioned him.  During the interrogation, appellant claimed Fair approached him 
with the checks and credit cards.  Appellant suggested that Fair may have 
committed the murder.  Appellant also told detectives he had not owned a gun 
since December 1990.  However, Tabatha and Robert Curtis, at whose residence 
Tabatha and appellant were living, testified that appellant had a semiautomatic 
handgun, either a .22 or .25 caliber, in March or April 1992.  Appellant sold the 
gun to a drug dealer about two weeks after the murder. 
 
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On April 14, appellant was interrogated for a second time. He admitted he 
was with Myers on March 20 because Myers was helping him seek drug 
counseling and treatment for Tabatha.  He also admitted that Fair was not involved 
in the murder.  Instead, appellant blamed the murder on some Cubans who were 
trying to settle a score with him.  He stated Myers happened to be at the wrong 
place at the wrong time. 
 
Appellant was indicted for three counts of aggravated murder:  (1) murder 
with prior calculation and design, R.C. 2903.01(A); (2) aggravated robbery-
murder, R.C. 2903.01(B); and (3) kidnap-murder, R.C. 2903.01(B).  Each count 
carried two death-penalty specifications under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7):  aggravated 
robbery and kidnapping.  He was also charged with aggravated robbery, 
kidnapping, four counts of forgery, and having a weapon while under disability. 
 
Appellant pled guilty to the forgery counts and elected to try the weapons 
charge to the court (which found him guilty).  The jury found him guilty as 
charged on all the remaining counts.  After a mitigation hearing, the jury 
recommended death.  The trial court agreed and sentenced appellant accordingly.  
The court of appeals affirmed appellant’s convictions and sentence of death. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Ronald J. O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joyce 
Anderson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
David J. Graeff, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  In this capital case, appellant presents twenty-
five propositions of law for our consideration.  (See Appendix.)  Pursuant to R.C. 
2929.05(A), we have carefully reviewed all issues raised.  However, we summarily 
 
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reject several of these arguments on the grounds that they either were not 
preserved, involve settled issues, or our independent review cures the error, if any.  
(Propositions of Law Four, Five, Nine, Eleven, Thirteen, Fifteen, Sixteen, 
Seventeen, Eighteen, Twenty, Twenty-one, Twenty-two, Twenty-three,  Twenty-
four, Twenty-five [b].)  See, e.g., State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 
N.E.2d 568, syllabus; State v. Scudder (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 263, 643 N.E.2d 
524; State v. Bies (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 320, 658 N.E.2d 754.  We address, in 
opinion form, only those matters that merit discussion.  We also independently 
assess the evidence relating to the death sentence, balance the aggravating 
circumstances against the mitigating factors and review the proportionality of the 
sentence to sentences imposed in similar cases.  For the following reasons, we 
affirm the court of appeals’ judgment and uphold the sentence of death.   
TESTIMONY OF TABATHA HENNESS 
 
Appellant presents several propositions of law dealing with the testimony of 
the prosecution’s chief witness, his wife Tabatha Henness.  He claims that 
Tabatha’s testimony was incompetent (Proposition of Law One), that it violated 
the statutory marital privilege (Proposition of Law Two), that he had no 
opportunity to effectively cross-examine her (Proposition of Law Fourteen), and 
that the testimony contained hearsay (Proposition of Law Three). 
 
1. 
Competence to Testify 
 
Appellant contends that his wife Tabatha was not competent as a witness, 
since her election to testify was not intelligently made.  According to Evid.R. 
601(B)(2), “[e]very person is competent to be a witness except:  * * * [a] spouse 
testifying against the other spouse charged with a crime except when * * * [t]he 
testifying spouse elects to testify.”  Recently, we construed this rule in State v. 
Adamson (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 431, 650 N.E.2d 875, syllabus, and held that the 
 
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testifying spouse “remains incompetent * * * until she makes a deliberate choice 
to testify, with knowledge of her right to refuse.  The trial court must take an 
active role in determining competency, and must make an affirmative 
determination on the record that the spouse has elected to testify.” 
 
The court engaged in the following colloquy during its voir dire of Tabatha: 
 
“[THE COURT]:  The other exception that permits a spouse to testify 
against her husband * * * is if they elect to do so.  You have a right, therefore, not 
to elect to testify against your husband in this case * * *. 
 
“Now, the purpose of my asking these questions * * * is to make sure you 
understand your right under that rule * * *, you have [the] right to elect not to 
testify or to testify.  Do you understand that rule? 
 
“THE WITNESS:  Yes, I understand. 
 
“THE COURT:  Okay.  Now, the state * * * intends to call you as their next 
witness if you elect to testify in this matter. 
 
“THE WITNESS:  Yes, I do.” 
 
Additionally, Tabatha testified that she understood the rule, knew what 
“voluntarily” meant, and was testifying voluntarily.  She said defense counsel had 
previously told her she could elect whether or not to testify.  She did not fear 
punishment for not testifying, and she denied having told counsel otherwise. 
 
Adamson, a case decided after the trial of this case, requires “an affirmative 
determination on the record that the spouse has elected to testify.”  Id. at syllabus.  
However, Adamson is distinguishable.  There, the court never considered the 
applicability of Evid.R. 601.  Id., 72 Ohio St.3d at 431-432, 650 N.E.2d at 876.  
Here, counsel raised the issue, the court specifically explained Tabatha’s rights to 
her, and she expressly affirmed that she was testifying voluntarily.  Thus, our 
review of the record indicates that Tabatha’s election was voluntarily made. 
 
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Despite the record regarding Tabatha’s election, appellant further argues 
that Tabatha’s later conduct indicates that she did not understand her rights under 
Evid.R. 601. 
 
Tabatha’s direct examination concluded on the afternoon of November 22, 
1993.  She was scheduled to return the next day for cross-examination, but she did 
not appear.  Instead, without the prosecution’s knowledge, she fled to Texas.  
Tabatha did not return until November 29, 1993. 
 
Upon her return, Tabatha was again voir dired.  She stated that she failed to 
appear for cross-examination because she was “nervous” and “stressed-out,” and 
that “it is hard for me to testify against my husband.”  She also stated that her 
decision to return and give testimony was made, in part, because the prosecutor 
told her that she could be arrested on a bench warrant if she did not return.  
Tabatha never stated that she did not wish to testify or that she desired to revoke 
her election. 
 
Evid.R. 601(B)(2) states that a spouse is incompetent except when she 
“elects to testify.”  Thus, the decisive event is the spouse’s election to testify, 
which triggers the exception, and not any event (such as an attempted revocation) 
subsequent to that election.  The rule does not say that a competent spouse can 
become incompetent by changing her mind.  The word “elect” implies a choice 
between inconsistent alternatives.  Thus, a spouse cannot “elect” both to testify 
and not to testify in the same case.  Moreover, strong policy reasons militate 
against interpreting Evid.R. 601 to allow revocation.  In the search for the truth, 
exceptions to the allowance of relevant evidence should be construed narrowly.  
Further, since a defendant has a constitutional right to cross-examine a witness, a 
defendant’s spouse could force a mistrial by testifying for the state, then refusing 
cross-examination.  We reject appellant’s first proposition of law. 
 
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2. 
Marital Privilege 
  
R.C. 2945.42 creates a privilege for spousal acts and communications: 
 
“* * * Husband or wife shall not testify concerning a communication made 
by one to the other, or act done by either in the presence of the other, during 
coverture, unless the communication was made or act done in the known presence 
or hearing of a third party competent to be a witness * * *.” 
 
In his second proposition of law, appellant claims that “the vast majority of 
the testimony of Tabatha” breached this privilege.  Despite his wide-sweeping 
claim, appellant points to only two incidents for our review: 
 
a.  On March 20, 1992, at Bob Curtis’s house, Tabatha answered a phone 
call from “Dick,” who wanted to speak with appellant.  After speaking with 
“Dick,” appellant said, “I’m going out,” and he did. 
 
Tabatha testified that Curtis was in the kitchen, which was downstairs.  
According to Tabatha, Curtis’s house was smaller than the courtroom in which 
this case was tried, and “anything said downstairs can be heard * * * all over the 
house * * * downstairs.”  Though the record is not clear, it appears that the phone 
was downstairs.  Thus, it could be found that the conversation took place within 
Curtis’s hearing. 
 
b.  Tabatha testified that she advised appellant to tell Fair “what happened.”  
Appellant first said that “he d[id]n’t think he should,” but then told Fair “that he 
shot somebody, * * * and the guy died and that is whose car he had.”  According 
to Tabatha, Fair was in the car with her and appellant when this conversation 
occurred.  She testified that Fair “couldn’t hear me,” but he was still present.  She 
then testified to what appellant told Fair, which clearly was not privileged. 
 
Appellant did not specifically object to the above testimony.  However, he 
made “a continuing objection” to testimony regarding acts not done in the 
 
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presence of a third party.  At times, a continuing objection is enough to preserve 
error.  Brady v. Stafford (1926), 115 Ohio St. 67, 152 N.E. 188, paragraph two of 
the syllabus.  However, it was not sufficient in this case.  The existence of the 
marital privilege turns on the specific circumstances surrounding each allegedly 
privileged communication, e.g., whether a third party was present.  Thus, appellant 
had to object specifically so the circumstances could be determined.  This 
proposition of law is overruled. 
 
3. 
Effective Cross-Examination 
 
In his fourteenth proposition of law, appellant contends that the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to declare a mistrial following Tabatha’s 
disappearance. 
 
Appellant argues that the “extended delay” between direct and cross-
examination diminished the jury’s recall of Tabatha’s direct testimony, rendering 
cross-examination of her less effective.  This argument is speculative.  In fact, at 
trial, defense counsel argued the opposite, claiming prejudice because the jury had 
a week to “chew on and think about her direct testimony.”  Moreover, any 
prejudice stemming from “diminished recall” could be easily corrected; the 
defense could cross-examine in such a way as to remind the jury how Tabatha had 
testified on direct. 
 
Appellant also cites the “coercive nature of [Tabatha’s] situation”— that the 
prosecution paid for her flight back to Ohio, and prosecutors picked her up at the 
airport and, stayed with her at the hotel.  We find nothing wrong with the 
prosecutors’ taking proper steps to ensure that Tabatha would not flee again. 
 
Appellant also alleges that the prosecutors “coached” Tabatha.  One of the 
prosecutors admitted he told Tabatha that defense counsel would ask about her 
 
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prior record, and he (the prosecutor) “gave her a chance to look at her prior record 
so that she could intelligently answer his questions.” 
 
We find no reversible error.  No general rule absolutely forbids attorney-
witness contact between direct and cross-examination.  Perry v. Leeke (1989), 488 
U.S. 272, 288-289, 109 S.Ct. 594, 604, 102 L.Ed.2d 624, 639 (dissenting opinion); 
United States v. DeJongh (C.A.1, 1991), 937 F.2d 1, 3.  Trial courts may forbid 
such contact, and often do so, see Perry, 488 U.S. at 281-282, 109 S.Ct. at 600-
601, 102 L.Ed.2d at 634, but here, the court did not.  Such contact may create an 
appearance of impropriety, cf. State v. Fields (Aug. 9, 1993), Jefferson App. No. 
92-J-20, unreported, 1993 WL 307625, but does not necessarily prevent a fair 
trial.  Cf. Price v. Cleveland Clinic Found. (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 301, 306, 515 
N.E.2d 931, 936-937-. 
 
Here, the trial court found the contact nonprejudicial; it merely gave 
Tabatha “an opportunity to review [her] record so she could speak truthfully and 
honestly about that record.”  The defense was free to cross-examine Tabatha on 
these issues.  “The opposing counsel in an adversary system is not without 
weapons to cope with ‘coached’ witnesses.”  Geders v. United States (1976), 425 
U.S. 80, 89, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 1336, 47 L.Ed.2d 592, 600. 
 
Appellant also asserts that the court erroneously restricted his cross-
examination of Tabatha.  On cross-examination, the defense asked why she fled.  
Tabatha answered that she was “nervous” and “stressed” because it was hard to 
testify against her husband.  The defense wanted to ask her about other cases 
where she had failed to appear in court, to show that she was being untruthful 
about why she left the state.  The trial court refused to permit such an inquiry.  
This ruling was proper.  Counsel said he wanted “to show that this is a person who 
manipulates the court system.”  In other words, he wanted to use Tabatha’s “other 
 
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acts” to prove her bad character to show that her behavior here conformed to that 
character.  This would have violated Evid.R. 404(B). 
 
On redirect, Tabatha testified that part of the reason that she fled was 
because during her direct examination, appellant was looking at her and mouthing 
“I love you” and similar words.  On recross, defense counsel asked her, “You 
didn’t say anything to me about that when I was questioning you why you didn’t 
show up, did you?”  The state objected that the question was misleading because 
the defense had not asked Tabatha why she was stressed.  The trial court sustained 
the objection.  Appellant claims this ruling was prejudicial.  While the ruling was 
questionable, it was not unreasonable and, thus, did not amount to an abuse of 
discretion.  We overrule this proposition of law. 
 
4. 
Hearsay 
 
Tabatha testified that the person who phoned appellant on March 20 said, 
“This is Dick.”  In appellant’s third proposition of law, he contends the caller’s 
statement was hearsay.  We agree.  At trial, the state argued that it was not offering 
this out-of-court assertion to prove the truth of the matter asserted — that the 
caller’s name was “Dick.”  Yet, we find that the name the caller used was relevant 
for no other purpose.   However, we find no prejudice.  Appellant claims that, 
without this hearsay, the state could not have shown that appellant and Myers were 
together on March 20.  This is not true.  Tabatha testified that she saw appellant 
leave the residence with a person whom she knew as “Dick.”  She identified 
Myers’s car as the car she saw that morning.  Appellant returned without Myers, 
yet with Myers’s car and property.  The fact that someone named “Dick” phoned 
appellant adds only weak support to the already strong evidence that appellant was 
with Myers on March 20.  This proposition of law is without merit. 
OTHER ACTS/CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
 
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Tabatha and Fair testified about their activities with appellant the day of the 
murder and the days following the murder, which included taking drugs, forging 
checks, and using stolen credit cards.  In his sixth proposition of law, appellant 
argues that this was “character evidence,” barred by Evid.R. 404(A). 
 
We find this evidence was relevant for non-character purposes.  Appellant’s 
drug addiction and use show his need for money and, hence, his motive to steal 
and kill.  His use of stolen checks and credit cards shows he possessed Myers’s 
property the day after Myers disappeared, proving robbery and linking appellant to 
Myers’s death. 
 
We also reject appellant’s assertion that his use of the checks and credit 
cards was inadmissible because he had pled guilty to the forgery counts before 
trial.  Since he deferred sentencing on these crimes until the conclusion of this 
trial, he argues “evidence of this plea of guilt should not have been introduced.”  
Here, the state introduced evidence of the forgeries, not appellant’s guilty plea. 
GRAND JURY DISCLOSURE 
 
In his seventh proposition of law, appellant argues that he was entitled to a 
transcript of Roland Fair’s grand jury testimony.  We disagree. 
 
Grand jury proceedings in felony cases must be recorded pursuant to 
Crim.R. 22, and if the defendant demonstrates a particularized need that outweighs 
the reasons for grand jury secrecy, Crim.R. 6(E) gives him or her the right to 
inspect all relevant portions of that testimony.  State v. Benge (1996), 75 Ohio 
St.3d 136, 144-145, 661 N.E.2d 1019, 1028; State v. Grewell (1989), 45 Ohio 
St.3d 4, 543 N.E.2d 93; State v. Greer (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 139, 20 O.O.3d 157, 
420 N.E.2d 982. 
 
As to particularized need, appellant claims that Fair’s testimony has 
credibility problems because Fair’s bond was reduced after his grand jury 
 
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appearance.  Appellant asserts that “the prosecution [got] what it want[ed], and 
then release[d] Fair through a favorable bond.”  We fail to understand appellant’s 
argument.  If Fair’s release was a reward for pro-prosecution grand jury testimony, 
why would that lead one to suppose his grand jury testimony differed materially 
from his pro-prosecution trial testimony?  Thus, appellant’s claim that Fair’s grand 
jury testimony may have differed from his trial testimony is mere speculation, 
insufficient to show particularized need.  See State v. Webb (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 
325, 337, 638 N.E.2d 1023, 1034. 
 
Appellant also argues that the issue of secrecy was moot.  Fair’s 
participation in these crimes led to his indictment for forgery.  Under Crim.R. 
16(B)(1)(a)(iii), the state disclosed Fair’s own grand jury testimony to him.  Thus, 
appellant argues that, because the state had disclosed the testimony, it was no 
longer secret.  Again, we disagree. 
 
Fair’s testimony was never a secret from Fair himself.  Thus, giving him a 
transcript of it did not decrease its secrecy.  Information disclosed to a defendant 
under Crim.R. 16 does not thereby become a public record.  State ex rel. WHIO-
TV-7 v. Lowe (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 350, 673 N.E.2d 1360.  Hence, the testimony 
remained secret.  This proposition fails. 
INTERROGATION TAPES 
 
In his eighth proposition of law, appellant claims that his April 14, 1992 
statement to the police should have been suppressed because he had invoked his 
right to counsel during a prior interview which took place on April 8, 1992.  
Appellant believes that the police violated his rights by initiating a subsequent 
interrogation outside the presence of counsel. 
 
Appellant was interviewed by Columbus police detectives on April 8, 1992.  
This interrogation was recorded on videotape.  Prior to questioning, appellant’s 
 
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rights were explained to him and he waived his right to counsel by executing a 
standard waiver form.  Appellant was then questioned about the forgeries.  Over 
the course of approximately three hours, appellant freely answered questions.  
Sometime during the interrogation, the detectives began questioning appellant 
about the murder.  At this point, appellant stated, “I think I need a lawyer because 
if I tell everything I know, how do I know I’m not going to wind up with a 
complicity charge?”  When the videotape was played to the jury, the tape was 
turned off just before this statement was made.  At this interview, appellant 
insinuated that Fair may have been responsible for the murder. 
 
The second statement, recorded on audiotape, was made on April 14, 1992, 
after appellant had telephoned his friend, Teresa Thomas, from jail telling her that 
if the police came back he would talk to them.  Prior to recording this statement, 
the police read appellant his constitutional rights.  During this interrogation, 
appellant stated that a gang of Cubans, not Fair, was responsible for the homicide. 
 
If a suspect in a criminal investigation requests counsel at any time during 
questioning, he is not subject to further interrogation until a lawyer is provided or 
the suspect reinitiates the interrogation.  Arizona v. Roberson (1988), 486 U.S. 
675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704; Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 
484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386.  However, the invocation of 
the right to counsel requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be 
construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.  Davis v. 
United States (1994), 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362, 
371.  If the statement is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable police officer 
in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be 
invoking the right to counsel, the cessation of questioning is not required.  Id.  As 
its rationale for such a rule of law, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
 
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“We recognize that requiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel might 
disadvantage some suspects who — because of fear, intimidation, lack of 
linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons — will not clearly articulate their 
right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present.  But the 
primary protection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the 
Miranda warnings themselves.  ‘[F]ull comprehension of the rights to remain 
silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent 
in the interrogation process.’  A suspect who knowingly and voluntarily waives his 
right to counsel after having that right explained to him has indicated his 
willingness to deal with the police unassisted.  Although Edwards provides an 
additional protection — if a suspect subsequently requests an attorney, 
questioning must cease — it is one that must be affirmatively invoked by the 
suspect.”  (Citation omitted.)  Id. at 460-461, 114 S.Ct. at 2356, 129 L.Ed.2d at 
372. 
 
The court in Davis then concluded that the statement “Maybe I should talk 
to a lawyer” was insufficient to require that questioning cease.  Like the court of 
appeals, we find that appellant’s statement “I think I need a lawyer * * *” is just as 
ambiguous as the statement made by the defendant in Davis.  Thus, appellant’s 
prior written waiver was still effective when the officers resumed their 
interrogation of him on April 14, 1992.  Under these circumstances, the question 
whether the subsequent interrogation was initiated by appellant, through a third 
party (his friend Thomas), or police is irrelevant.  We overrule this proposition of 
law. 
OUTSIDE CONTACTS 
 
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In proposition of law nineteen, appellant contends that the trial court 
inadequately investigated the allegation that a friend of the victim’s communicated 
with jurors. 
 
Defense counsel Bodiker informed the judge that he had heard from some 
friends of appellant’s that a person claiming to be a friend of the victim had 
spoken to jurors during a recess and praised his character.  Bodiker also had 
witnessed someone talking to a juror, but he did not hear what was said.  Bodiker 
moved for a mistrial and also asked that “general inquiry be made of the jurors as 
to whether anybody talked to them about the case.” 
 
The prosecutor identified Myers’s friend as James Montgomery.  After 
Bodiker told the prosecutor about the incident, the prosecutor warned 
Montgomery not to talk to the jurors. 
 
The trial court assembled the jury and, as a whole, asked them if anyone had 
“tried to engage you in conversation about this case.”  Juror Clark responded.  The 
court then individually questioned her at sidebar.  She stated that someone had 
approached her and asked the defendant’s name, the lawyers’ names, and “what 
kind of case it was, and what was going on.”  The juror told him she was not at 
liberty to discuss the case and she then walked away.  She told the court she could 
be fair despite the incident.  The court tentatively overruled the motion for mistrial 
but agreed to hear defense evidence. 
 
Later in the trial, outside the presence of the jury, the defense produced two 
witnesses.  The first witness, Tamla Newman, was appellant’s friend.  She testified 
that Montgomery approached her and asked her if she was a juror or if she knew 
any jurors.  She stated that Montgomery told her that Myers “was like a father to 
him,” and he said that he had gone to the murder scene with some of the jurors.  
 
17
She also saw Montgomery in the courthouse cafeteria four or five feet from the 
jurors, but she “couldn’t swear” that he was talking to any of them. 
 
The second witness, Newman’s companion, testified that she saw 
Montgomery in the cafeteria.  He “looked like” he was talking to some people at 
another table wearing juror badges.  However, the witness was not sure that they 
were jurors in this case.  She did not pay much attention and did not hear what 
Montgomery had said. 
 
The prosecution called Montgomery.  Montgomery admitted asking 
someone, “[A]re you a juror?”  When the juror answered “Yes,” Montgomery 
stated he said nothing more.  He testified that he had gone to the murder scene 
before the trial began, but he did not tell anyone that he had gone with the jury.  
Montgomery also testified that he did not knowingly speak to or see any jurors in 
the cafeteria. 
 
Finally, the court let the jury see Montgomery, and asked the jury if “Mr. 
Montgomery ever approach[ed] any of you * * * and tr[ied] to engage you in any 
conversation about the trial?”  No juror responded.  The judge asked juror Clark if 
it was Montgomery who had spoken to her.  She answered in the negative.  The 
court then said: 
 
“As I understand it then, none of you recognize Mr. Montgomery, and * * * 
he never approached any of you in any way to discuss or try and engage you in any 
conversation with this trial?” 
 
Again, no juror responded. 
 
Appellant faults the court for failing to question each juror individually.  
However, he did not ask the court to do so.  Moreover, the scope of voir dire is 
within the trial court’s discretion, State v. Webb, 70 Ohio St.3d at 338, 638 N.E.2d 
at 1035, and we find no abuse of this discretion.  Apparently one juror failed to 
 
18
report his or her contact with Montgomery.  But Montgomery asked only if he or 
she was a juror.  The juror may have forgotten this brief, innocuous contact.  
Under these circumstances, the court could reasonably decline to interrogate the 
other eleven jurors individually.  We overrule this proposition of law. 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
 
In his tenth proposition of law, appellant contends that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying defense counsel’s motion to withdraw from the case 
before the mitigation hearing.  However, “[t]o discharge a court-appointed 
attorney, the defendant must show a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship 
of such magnitude as to jeopardize the defendant’s right to effective assistance of 
counsel.”  State v. Coleman (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 286, 525 N.E.2d 792, paragraph 
four of the syllabus.  The term of art “actual conflict” refers not to a personality 
conflict but to a conflict of interest.  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 
668, 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 696.  The Sixth Amendment does 
not guarantee “rapport” or a “meaningful relationship” between client and counsel.  
Morris v. Slappy (1983), 461 U.S. 1, 13-14, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1617, 75 L.Ed.2d 610, 
621. 
 
Appellant argues that “personal differences” between him and one of his 
attorneys prevented his attorneys from adequately preparing for the penalty phase 
and presenting mitigating evidence.  At trial, appellant claimed counsel had 
pursued strategies against his wishes, lied to him, given bad advice, and violated 
the attorney-client privilege.  Appellant called his lawyers “these clowns” and said 
he did not trust them.  Attorney Bodiker agreed that “hostility and tension” existed 
between counsel and client. 
 
Appellant claims that it was because of these differences that his counsel 
presented so little mitigation.  However, counsel investigated and prepared for the 
 
19
penalty phase.  Bodiker stated, “We did investigate and * * * do the things that we 
feel would be appropriate, and we did interview witnesses and we did talk to 
professional experts.”  However, appellant rejected those efforts.  A defendant 
may decide what evidence, if any, to present at a mitigation hearing and may 
decide to present no evidence at all, even against the advice of his counsel.  State 
v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 553 N.E.2d 576. 
 
Appellant’s counsel had filed a list of many witnesses, which included 
several members of appellant’s family that they intended to call at the mitigation 
hearing.  The court asked appellant if he wanted to call these witnesses.  Appellant 
stated he did not wish to do so.  Hence, we dismiss, as unfounded, appellant’s 
assertion that he did not know he could call these witnesses. 
 
This case is unlike State v. Johnson (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 87, 24 OBR 282, 
494 N.E.2d 1061, where this court found that the failure to investigate resulted in 
the dearth of mitigation evidence.  Here, defense counsel presented less evidence 
than they had discovered by investigation because appellant limited the evidence 
he would allow them to present. 
 
In sum, it is clear that hostility existed between appellant and attorney 
Bodiker even before the mitigation trial.  However, at no time did this personality 
conflict erode Bodiker’s representation of appellant to the point of  rendering it 
ineffective.  This proposition of law is without merit. 
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
 
In Proposition of Law Twenty-five (a), appellant asserts that the evidence 
was insufficient to support conviction.  He bases this claim on the incorrect 
premise that Tabatha’s testimony was inadmissible.  As previously discussed in 
this opinion, this contention is meritless. 
 
20
 
We find the evidence sufficient in all respects.  On the morning of March 
20, Tabatha saw appellant with Myers.  Appellant admitted that he was with 
Myers on this day.  This was the last day that Myers was seen alive.  Appellant 
returned later that day driving Myers’s car.  He was alone and had Myers’s credit 
cards and checks.  Appellant pled guilty to the forgery charges. 
 
Tabatha and Fair saw appellant with a wedding ring that did not fit him.  
Appellant told them that it had belonged to Myers.  Myers’s left ring finger was 
severed.  Appellant told Fair that he had shot someone.  Myers had been shot.  
Appellant told Fair that the body was in the Nelson Road area.  The body was 
discovered in an abandoned water purification plant on Nelson Road. 
 
Myers had been shot with a .25 caliber weapon, probably a semiautomatic.  
Appellant owned either a .22 or .25 caliber semiautomatic handgun, which he sold 
a few weeks after the murder.  Appellant was observed washing a butterfly knife 
which had a dark stain on it.  Appellant admitted the knife belonged to him.  
Myers was cut with a weapon consistent with a butterfly knife. 
 
The state also proved prior calculation and design.  The jury could infer that 
appellant brought a knife and loaded gun with him to the murder scene; it is 
unlikely that he found these weapons in an abandoned building.  Myers was tied 
up, forced to kneel, his neck was slashed, and he was shot twice from behind and 
three times from the front. 
 
We find that the evidence is sufficient to prove aggravated murder on 
counts one, two, and three, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and both felony-
murder death specifications, all beyond a reasonable doubt. 
PENALTY PHASE 
 
In his twelfth proposition of law, appellant contends that the trial court erred 
by admitting his criminal record in the penalty phase. 
 
21
 
In 1982, appellant was convicted of burglary, grand theft, and two counts of 
passing bad checks.  In 1984, appellant was convicted of receiving stolen property.  
In 1987, appellant was convicted of escape from a halfway house.  In his unsworn 
statement, appellant told the jury that he had been to prison three times.  The state 
then sought to introduce appellant’s prior convictions, arguing that he had drawn a 
misleading picture of his criminal history.  After the court overruled appellant’s 
objection, appellant stipulated to the convictions without conceding admissibility. 
 
In State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 528 N.E.2d 542, paragraph 
three of the syllabus, this court ruled that a prosecutor, in the penalty phase of a 
capital case, may rebut false or incomplete statements regarding the defendant’s 
criminal record.  This right is limited, however, to those instances where the 
defense offers a specific assertion, by a mitigation witness or by defendant, that 
misrepresents the defendant’s prior criminal history. 
 
Appellant did not misrepresent his past.  He merely made the statement that 
he had been to prison three times, and this was true.  To allow the state to rebut 
this statement is contrary to the holding of DePew.  
 
In DePew, this court also recognized that “the purpose of an unsworn 
statement is to avoid cross-examination, particularly about one’s prior criminal 
record.”  Id. at 286, 528 N.E.2d at 555.  It is only when the defendant falsely 
claims in his unsworn statement that he has little or no prior criminal history that a 
prosecutor can be permitted to demonstrate this inaccuracy.  Id.  Clearly, this was 
not the case here.  However, we find this error to be harmless.  Appellant admitted 
he was incarcerated on three separate occasions; his criminal record supports his 
statement.  We reject this proposition of law. 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE REVIEW 
 
22
 
Pursuant to R.C. 2929.05, we independently weigh the aggravating 
circumstances against the mitigating factors and determine whether appellant’s 
death sentence is disproportionate to sentences in similar cases. 
 
The evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant murdered 
Myers while committing aggravated robbery and kidnapping, and that appellant 
was the principal offender.  The facts show that the victim was taken to a secluded 
area where he was bound and gagged.  He was then knifed and brutally shot to 
death.  Sometime later, Myers’s finger was severed so that appellant could steal 
his wedding band.  Appellant used checks, credit cards, and a vehicle stolen from 
Myers in order to obtain money to buy drugs. 
 
In mitigation, appellant called his cellmate, two former cellmates, and two 
jail officers to testify about his character and conduct in the Franklin County Jail. 
 
Appellant’s cellmates testified that they never saw him threaten or assault 
others.  All three depicted him as a peacemaker and protector of smaller or weaker 
inmates.  They testified that appellant was a religious man and that he had 
counseled others on religious matters. 
 
One officer testified that appellant had been disciplined only once for 
fighting during his pretrial incarceration.  For this conduct, appellant had received 
a warning because he was protecting a newer, weaker inmate from having his food 
tray stolen, and the inmate was not the aggressor. 
 
Another jail officer testified that appellant informed on a fellow prisoner 
who had a sharpened piece of glass or plastic in his cell.  The officer testified that 
jailhouse informants risk their lives by informing, but sometimes inform “to look 
good.”  He also testified that a “pecking order” exists in jail, and an experienced 
inmate can run his cell if he can impress the younger inmates. 
 
23
 
Appellant also raised residual doubt.  A homicide detective and a forensic 
pathologist testified that Myers’s hands were not tested to see if he had fired a 
gun.  However, the detective testified that such tests are done only when a suspect 
is arrested immediately after a shooting.  The lapse of time between the murder 
and the discovery of the body would have made these tests worthless. 
 
Another detective testified that he had questioned Tabatha some years 
earlier in connection with a suspected homicide.  The detective had heard that 
Tabatha was claiming to know about a woman being beaten, murdered, and 
mutilated by Cuban drug dealers.  Checking the story out, the detective found 
evidence of violence where the murder supposedly occurred, but no body was ever 
discovered. 
 
A fingerprint examiner testified that he did not find appellant’s fingerprints 
in Myers’s car or the abandoned building.  He did find a few prints belonging to 
Tabatha in and on the car.  However, this evidence is of little value because 
appellant admitted taking the car. 
 
In his unsworn statement, appellant claimed he went to the abandoned 
building on March 20 to steal electrical motors.  He denied killing Myers, but 
cryptically admitted that “what happened was because of me, people I was 
involved with.”  He said, “it is my fault the man died.  He wouldn’t have been 
there.  Nobody else * * * would have been there.”  Appellant claimed he ran from 
the building when he “heard the shots that finished [Myers] off.”  He admitted 
stealing Myers’s car, wallet, and checks, but claimed he came back later to take 
the car, and found the wallet and checkbook in the glove compartment.  Appellant 
said he was “sorry for what happened, but by no means was Richard [Myers] a 
saint.”  He also claimed that “[in] one week’s time, I stopped two muggings up in 
the Short North.” 
 
24
 
Appellant’s attempts to establish residual doubt are unpersuasive.  His good 
record in pretrial confinement is a mitigating factor, but is entitled to little weight.  
His criminal record is significant and, thus, fails to qualify as a mitigating factor 
under R.C. 2929.04(B)(5).  The evidence proved him to be the principal offender, 
and his vague allegations about “people I was involved with” do not refute that 
evidence or establish a mitigating factor under R.C. 2929.04(B)(6).  No other 
mitigating factors apply. 
 
We find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Finally, R.C. 2929.05(A) requires us to consider whether the sentence 
imposed in this case was excessive or disproportionate to the sentence imposed in 
other similar cases.  State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 123, 31 OBR 273, 
283, 509 N.E.2d 383, 394.  In doing so, we find that this court has often upheld 
death sentences for aggravated murder coupled with aggravated robbery and 
kidnapping. See, e.g., State v. Cook (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 530-531, 605 
N.E.2d 70, 85; State v. Roe (1989), 41 Ohio St.3d 18, 28-29, 535 N.E.2d 1351, 
1363.  Indeed, it has frequently upheld death sentences based solely on a 
specification of murder during kidnapping, and has also upheld the imposition of 
death stemming solely from murder in the commission of aggravated robbery.  
State v. Scott (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 92, 26 OBR 79, 497 N.E.2d 55.  In Roe, the 
defense presented far stronger mitigation than that presented by appellant.  Id., 41 
Ohio St.3d at 28, 535 N.E.2d at 1351.  Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s 
convictions and death sentence. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
25
APPENDIX 
 
Proposition of Law One:  “The trial court commits prejudicial error in 
permitting the testimony of the wife of the accused, without an adequate finding of 
competency, pursuant to Evid.R. 601(B)(2), contra the Federal and Ohio 
Constitutions.” 
 
Proposition of Law Two:  “Prejudicial error occurs when the wife of the 
accused is permitted to testify to privileged marital communications contra R.C. 
2945.42 and Evid.R. 501.” 
 
Proposition of Law Three:  “The trial court commit[s] prejudicial error in 
permitting the wife of the accused to testify to hearsay declarations from a 
telephone conversation, contra the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution.” 
 
Proposition of Law Four:  “Where the jury instructions fail to narrow the 
offense classification as statutorily required and where the specification 
instruction given is improper, the verdict as to the specifications is invalid, contra 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.” 
 
Proposition of Law Five:  “Prosecutorial misconduct occurs in closing 
argument when the prosecutor denigrates defense counsel, comments improperly 
on the silence of the accused and appeals to the passions of the jury, contra the 
Federal and Ohio Constitutions.” 
 
Proposition of Law Six:  “Prejudicial error occurs when character evidence 
of the accused is presented through the testimony of two prosecution witnesses, 
when the issue of character is never raised by the defense, contra the Fifth, Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.” 
 
Proposition of Law Seven:  “The trial court commits prejudicial error when 
the Grand Jury transcripts of a crucial witness are requested by the defense and the 
 
26
court refuses to disclose them after the defense shows a particularized need, contra 
the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.” 
 
Proposition of Law Eight:  “The trial court commits prejudicial error in 
overruling a Motion to Suppress a statement of the accused, after his right to 
counsel had been invoked, contra the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution.” 
 
Proposition of Law Nine:  “Prosecutorial misconduct occurs during the trial 
when the prosecution attempts to introduce prejudicial evidence, and when the 
prosecution attempts to taint the testimony of a crucial witness.” 
 
Proposition of Law Ten:  “Where an actual conflict arises between defense 
counsel and the accused before the Mitigation Hearing begins, the trial court 
commits prejudicial error in overruling a Motion to Withdraw, contra the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.” 
 
Proposition of Law Eleven:  “The trial court commits prejudicial error in 
imposing the sentence of death when the aggravating circumstances the court 
relies upon as a basis for the sentence are flawed, contra the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution.” 
 
Proposition of Law Twelve:  “The trial court commits prejudicial error in 
allowing the prosecution to introduce the entire past criminal record of the 
accused, after his unsworn statement, contra the Ohio and Federal Constitutions.” 
 
Proposition of Law Thirteen:  “The trial court erred in refusing defendant’s 
request to instruct the jury in the Mitigation Hearing on the mitigating factor of 
‘residual doubt.’ ” 
 
Proposition of Law Fourteen:  “In denying defendant’s Motion for a 
Mistrial, the trial court committed an abuse of discretion that denied defendant the 
right to a fair trial and further denied defendant his right for a meaningful 
 
27
opportunity for cross-examination of State’s witness Tabatha Henness, in 
contravention of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section Ten of the Ohio Constitution.” 
 
Proposition of Law Fifteen:  “The trial court erred in admitting into 
evidence unredacted videotape and audiotape exhibits which contained prejudicial 
evidence of criminal offenses committed by defendant that were not relevant to the 
issues at trial.” 
 
Proposition of Law Sixteen:  “Defendant’s conviction and sentence of death 
resulted from a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct that pervaded the trial and 
sentencing phases, in contravention of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 
Nine and Ten of the Ohio Constitution.” 
 
Proposition of Law Seventeen:  “Defendant’s conviction and sentence of 
death resulted from a denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel, in 
contravention of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Sections Nine and Ten of the Ohio Constitution.” 
 
Proposition of Law Eighteen:  “A sentence of death must be vacated when 
duplicative aggravating circumstances are presented to the jury at the Mitigation 
Hearing and the trial court relies upon the duplicative aggravating circumstances 
in its decision, contra the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.” 
 
Proposition of Law Nineteen:  “Prejudicial error occurs when the trial court 
fails to hold an individual voir dire hearing regarding jury misconduct, when 
evidence is presented that jurors communicated with a friend of the victim’s 
family.” 
 
28
 
Proposition of Law Twenty:  “Prejudicial error occurs when gruesome 
photos, having no direct relevance to the offense, are allowed to be introduced.” 
 
Proposition of Law Twenty-one:  “The accused does not receive a fair trial 
when character evidence is introduced for the sole purpose of proving he acted in 
conformity on a particular occasion, contra Evid.R. 404(A) and the Federal and 
Ohio Constitutions.” 
 
Proposition of Law Twenty-two:  “The trial court commits prejudicial error 
in refusing to re-open the case, and the right to present witnesses in his behalf 
consistent with the Sixth Amendment is abridged, when the accused requests 
further witnesses testify at the Mitigation Hearing.” 
 
Proposition of Law Twenty-three:  “When alternate jurors are instructed to 
be present in the jury room during deliberation proceedings at the Mitigation 
phase, with no specific role instructions, prejudicial error occurs as a matter of 
law.” 
 
Proposition of Law Twenty-four:  “The trial court commits prejudicial error 
in denying a Motion to Suppress the statement of the accused on April 8-9, 1992, 
contra the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.” 
 
Proposition of Law Twenty-five:  “(a) The verdicts are insufficient as a 
matter of law to sustain a conviction.  (b) The imposition of the death penalty is 
cruel and unusual punishment, and constitutionally impermissible, contra the 
Federal and Ohio Constitutions.”