Case Title: HALBLEIB v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
HALBLEIB v. STATE2000 WY 1267 P.3d 45Case Number: 99-179Decided: 05/31/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
JEFFREY L. HALBLEIB, 
Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge. 

Representing 
Appellant: Sylvia Lee Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. Roden, Assistant 
Appellant Counsel. Argument by Mr. Roden.Representing Appellee: Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; T. Alan Elrod, Assistant 
Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Elrod.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1] Appellant 
Jeffrey L. Halbleib (Halbleib) appeals from the district court's order revoking 
his probation and imposing a judgment and sentence of not less than two years 
nor more than four years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Halbleib was 
originally given probation with a suspended sentence, but he violated his 
probation. He spent eleven days in the Laramie County jail awaiting his 
probation revocation hearing. His sentence did not include credit for those 
eleven days. Halbleib contends Wyoming law and the constitutional prohibition 
against double jeopardy require credit for any post-sentence time served as long 
as an escape charge would lie upon an unauthorized departure from 
confinement.

[¶2] We hold the 
district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied credit for time 
served in jail while awaiting a probation revocation hearing. In Smith v. State, 
988 P.2d 39, 40 (Wyo. 1999), we recently determined that a probationer is not 
entitled to credit for time served while awaiting a probation revocation 
hearing. Although Halbleib asks this Court to reconsider Smith, based on his 
double jeopardy argument, we decline to do so. This situation is distinguishable 
from the cases relied upon by Halbleib, and double jeopardy is not implicated 
when a probationer is awaiting a probation revocation hearing. Therefore, we 
affirm.

ISSUE

[¶3] In his 
initial brief, Halbleib presents the following statement of the 
issue:

Whether the trial court 
erred by denying Appellant credit for time served on his felony fraud sentence 
for time served in custody awaiting his probation revocation 
hearing?

[¶4] The State 
counters with this issue:

Did the district court 
abuse its discretion in denying Appellant credit for time served awaiting his 
probation revocation, given that this confinement would have persisted 
regardless of Appellant's financial ability to post bond?

[¶5] In his 
reply brief, Halbleib addresses the State's reliance on Smith, which was 
published the same day Halbleib filed his initial brief:

Whether Smith v. State, 
[968 P.2d 39 (Wyo. 1999)], which fails to address the prohibition against 
multiple punishments for the same offense, should be applied to the present 
case?

FACTS

[¶6] On May 15, 
1998, Halbleib pled guilty to felony check fraud, proscribed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-3-702(a)(b)(iii) (LEXIS 1999), and was sentenced to two to four years in the 
state penitentiary. The district court suspended that sentence and placed 
Halbleib on probation for four years. Halbleib violated his probation in several 
ways, and a petition for revocation of probation was filed in the district 
court. Halbleib was arrested in Pennsylvania and extradited to Wyoming. Halbleib 
was held in the Laramie County jail while awaiting his probation revocation 
hearing from his arrest on March 14, 1999, until the revocation hearing on March 
25, 1999, eleven days. The district court revoked Halbleib's probation and 
ordered execution of his previously suspended sentence. After the district court 
said Halbleib would be given credit for time served awaiting this sentence, the 
prosecution asked the district court to disallow any credit for time served 
outside the original twenty-six days he spent in jail prior to being sentenced 
in May of 1998.1 The district court complied with 
the State's request, and Halbleib appealed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶7] Trial 
courts have a broad discretion to determine the appropriate length and 
conditions of imprisonment in a variety of situations. We recognize that within 
the statutory limits, trial courts may give consideration to a wide range of 
factors relevant to their sentencing decisions, and that few of those factors 
are capable of precise quantification when translated into the final imposition 
of the term for incarceration. This court refrains from disturbing sentencing 
decisions absent a clear abuse of discretion.

[¶8] Jones v. 
State, 771 P.2d 368, 371 (Wyo. 1989). However, because of equal protection and 
double jeopardy concerns, we have held it is error for a trial court to refuse 
to credit a sentence for pre-sentence incarceration if the sole reason for the 
detention is the defendant's inability to post bond and for portions of 
sentences served as a condition of probation if a charge of escape will lie for 
leaving that detention. See Rosalez v. State, 955 P.2d 899, 900 (Wyo. 1998), and 
cases cited therein (equal protection); Prejean v. State, 794 P.2d 877, 879 
(Wyo. 1990) (double jeopardy).

DISCUSSION

[¶9] In his 
initial brief Halbleib correctly noted that this Court had not addressed credit 
for time served while awaiting a probation revocation hearing. In his reply 
brief, he also correctly concedes that Smith v. State, 988 P.2d 39 (Wyo. 1999), 
held a probationer is not entitled to credit for time served while awaiting his 
probation revocation hearing, but Halbleib argues the double jeopardy issue must 
not have been raised in Smith because we did not address the issue in the 
opinion.

[¶10] The double 
jeopardy clause, found in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and at Article 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution, protects an accused from 
multiple punishments for the same crime. Amrein v. State, 836 P.2d 862, 864 
(Wyo. 1992). Halbleib claims the trial court's refusal to credit time served 
while awaiting a probation revocation hearing increases the length of the 
previously suspended sentence, thereby violating the double jeopardy clause. In 
Yates v. State, 792 P.2d 187, 192 (Wyo. 1990), we noted:

[T]he punishment for a 
violation of probation is the imposition of the sentence for which the defendant 
was placed on probation and, further, as a general rule, any sentence imposed 
and then suspended during a period of probation may not be increased because of 
the conduct that serves as the basis for the revocation. The punishment for that 
conduct is the revocation itself. If the revocation is justified by the 
commission of a separate crime, the defendant may be convicted of that crime and 
then sentenced to the full extent permitted by law for it.

[¶11] In both 
his initial and reply briefs, Halbleib relies on Craig v. State, 804 P.2d 686 
(Wyo. 1991), to argue the district court's failure to credit his sentence 
violates the double jeopardy clause. However, Craig is distinguishable from the 
case at bar. In Craig, the trial court revoked Craig's probation and reinstated 
his sentence twice, resulting in his incarceration for the original charge for a 
period of ninety days in the Sheridan county jail and 199 days in the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary. Id. at 687. With the following holding, we reversed the 
trial court:

In Prejean, 794 P.2d  at 
877, we held that an individual who was again "incarcerated following a 
violation of parole, was entitled to credit for time that he served as a 
residential inmate in a community correctional facility." Just as the individual 
is entitled to credit for time served in a community correctional facility, so 
too is an individual entitled to credit for time served in a county jail and in 
the state penitentiary. "In Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491 (Wyo. 1990), this 
court held unequivocally that, when a sentence to a term of imprisonment is 
imposed, pre-sentence confinement must be credited against both the maximum term 
and the minimum term." Prejean, 794 P.2d  at 878. Although Renfro addresses 
entitlement of credit for presentence confinement and Prejean addresses 
entitlement for credit for time served in a community correctional facility 
prior to reincarceration for a parole violation, Renfro and its progeny rest 
upon a much deeper foundation. Central to those cases which radiate from Renfro 
is the double jeopardy constraint that punishment already exacted for an offense 
must be credited to the incarceration time occasioned by that offense. 
Accordingly, the time Craig spent in custody for the offense of grand larceny 
must be credited against the maximum and minimum terms to his original three to 
five year sentence.

[¶12] We 
understand Craig to have spent 270 days in custody prior to the final 
reinstatement of his original sentence. The 270 days are calculated by adding 
the fourteen days he was held in the Sheridan County jail before he was 
sentenced, fifty-seven days in the Sheridan County jail after his probation was 
revoked the first time, and 199 days in the state penitentiary after his 
probation was revoked the second time.

[¶13] We do not 
include in the 270 days those days Craig spent in the Pine Ridge Hospital. In 
Prejean, 794 P.2d  at 879, we indicated that in deciding whether time at a 
community correctional facility "counts" as time served when probation is 
revoked depends upon whether the defendant could be charged with escape from 
detention. In this case, Craig was at the Pine Ridge Hospital for treatment of 
his anti-social behavior caused by alcohol. He agreed to participate in an 
alcohol dependency treatment as a condition for his second chance at probation. 
Craig was not in custody at the Pine Ridge Hospital because he could not be 
charged with escape from official detention had he left the hospital. Because 
escape from detention would not lie, the time at the Pine Ridge Hospital does 
not count as time to be credited against his sentence.

Craig, 804 P.2d  
at 688 (footnotes omitted).

[¶14] Contrary 
to the contention in Halbleib's brief, Craig received credit for the time he 
spent incarcerated after his probation was revoked, not while he was awaiting a 
probation revocation hearing. Id. The opinion does not address credit for time 
served while awaiting his revocation hearing, and clearly the district court did 
not grant that credit. Id. 

[¶15] Because 
Halbleib was not being held in jail as a condition of his probation, but rather 
as a result of the violation of his probation, this case is also distinguishable 
from those Wyoming cases which have held that a defendant is entitled to credit 
for time served if a charge of escape would lie. See e.g., Prejean, 794 P.2d 878-89. Those cases hold a defendant is entitled to credit for confinement after 
the initial sentencing where that confinement both exposes him to a possible 
escape charge and is attributable to the conviction on the charge for which he 
was sentenced.

[¶16] This rule 
does not entitle a defendant to credit for confinement which is attributable to 
acts or omissions separate and apart from those for which he was originally 
convicted and received a sentence of probation. The time served while awaiting a 
revocation hearing is not directly attributable to a criminal charge. Rather, it 
is solely due to the violation of the conditions of 
probation.

[¶17] For the 
probationer awaiting a probation revocation hearing, until the trial court 
revokes the suspension of the execution of his sentence, the probationer is not 
serving time on that sentence. The time spent awaiting the revocation hearing is 
not the "punishment" which implicates double jeopardy concerns. Rather, it is 
time spent on an administrative hold because of the alleged probation 
violation.

[¶18] Upholding 
our decision in Smith v. State, 988 P.2d 39 (Wyo. 1999), which included a period 
of confinement while awaiting a probation revocation hearing, we hold that 
incarceration pending probation revocation proceedings is qualitatively 
different from pre-sentence incarceration and from incarceration which is a 
condition of probation. See Rosalez, 955 P.2d  at 900; Prejean, 794 P.2d  at 
878-89. Therefore, Halbleib's incarceration pending probation revocation does 
not generate the equal protection or the double jeopardy concerns previously 
addressed by this Court.

CONCLUSION

[¶19] Neither 
the equal protection clause nor the proscription against double jeopardy require 
the district court to credit a probationer awaiting a revocation hearing for the 
time he is held awaiting that hearing. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it refused to credit the eleven days Halbleib spent in jail on 
an administrative hold. Therefore, we affirm the judgment and sentence except 
for the limited remand mentioned earlier in the opinion.

Footnotes

1 The State 
concedes in its brief that Halbleib was actually incarcerated for thirty-one 
days prior to being sentenced, not the twenty-six days allowed by the district 
court. Therefore, we must order a limited remand to adjust the sentence to allow 
thirty-one days credit for time served prior to 
sentencing.