Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Klaas

Citation: 2001-Ohio-276

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Klaas, 91 Ohio St.3d 86, 2001-Ohio-276.] 
 
 
 
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. KLAAS. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Klaas (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 86.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — One-year suspension with six months of the 
suspension stayed with stayed part of suspension being a period of 
probation while working with a monitor — Secretly informing former 
client of upcoming drug raid — Engaging in illegal conduct involving 
moral turpitude — Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation – Engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on 
fitness to practice law. 
(No. 00-1109 — Submitted October 11, 2000 — Decided February 21, 2001.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 98-99. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  On December 7, 1998, relator, Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel, filed a complaint with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court against respondent, Monica Ann Hansen Klaas 
of Wooster, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0065095, alleging that she had 
violated the following Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility:  DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct involving moral 
turpitude), 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice), and 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely 
reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  Respondent answered, and the 
matter was heard by a panel of the board on March 31, 2000. 
 
The panel found that on August 20, 1997, respondent acquired information 
that the FBI and local law enforcement agencies would soon be conducting a drug 
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raid in Wooster, Ohio.  Upon receiving this information, respondent notified a 
former client about the upcoming drug raid.  Because she suspected her former 
client to be a drug dealer, she advised him to “clean up his act” or to be “squeaky 
clean,” which suggested to him that he dispose of any drugs in his possession 
before the drug raid.  The raid occurred on August 21, 1997, and respondent’s 
former client was arrested the following day.  At that time the former client 
agreed to cooperate with law enforcement authorities and testify against 
respondent.  As a result, respondent was convicted of attempted obstruction of 
justice, sentenced to six months in jail, and fined $1,000. 
 
The panel concluded that respondent’s actions violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 
1-102(A)(5), and 1-102(A)(6), but found that there was insufficient evidence to 
conclude that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(3).  In mitigation, the panel found 
that respondent cooperated with relator in its investigation.  It also noted that she 
served time in jail for her conduct and while incarcerated performed community 
service for a legal aid society.  The panel further found that respondent’s actions 
did not involve any malicious intent but that she had simply exercised poor 
judgment.  Observing that respondent was extremely remorseful, the panel 
recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for one year with six 
months stayed, during which time she would be on probation.  The panel also 
recommended that relator select a monitor to assist respondent in exercising 
proper judgment and maintaining professional distance from her clients.  The 
board adopted the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the panel. 
 
We adopt the findings and recommendations of the board.  However, in 
addition to the board’s conclusion that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-
102(A)(5), and 1-102(A)(6), we conclude that respondent’s conduct involved 
moral turpitude and violated DR 1-102(A)(3). 
 
In reaching this latter conclusion, we reject relator’s position that a 
conviction for obstruction of justice or attempted obstruction of justice is a per se 
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3 
violation of  DR 1-102(A)(3).  We have previously stated that “proof of a criminal 
conviction is generally not conclusive of the issue of moral turpitude * * *.  
Rather, where moral turpitude is disputed, an independent review of the 
circumstances underlying criminal convictions is necessary to determine if they 
manifest the requisite lack of social conscience and depravity beyond any 
established criminal intent.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Burkhart (1996), 75 Ohio 
St.3d 188, 191, 661 N.E.2d 1062, 1065. In other words, a conclusion that an 
attorney has violated DR 1-102(A)(3) is to be made on a case-by-case basis. 
 
We have held that acts of moral turpitude “must be measured against the 
accepted standards of morality, honesty, and justice prevailing upon the 
community’s collective conscience.”  Id.  Additionally, in determining whether 
the acts of an attorney constitute moral turpitude, we place special emphasis on 
the status of an attorney in relation to the public at large. Attorneys assume a 
“position of public trust” and are in a “position of responsibility to the law itself, 
and any disregard thereof by him is much more heinous than that by the layman.”  
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Shott (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 117, 131, 39 O.O.2d 110, 
119, 226 N.E. 2d 724, 733. 
 
The circumstances in this case indicate that by her conduct respondent 
disregarded the standards of morality, honesty, and justice to which an attorney 
must adhere.  Here, respondent attempted to undermine the effectiveness of a drug 
raid conducted by federal and local law enforcement officers by secretly 
informing a former client about the imminent raid.  Respondent thereby 
disregarded her duty to faithfully uphold the law and attempted to use her status 
as an attorney to obstruct justice.  This conduct did involve moral turpitude. 
 
Respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one 
year with six months of the suspension stayed.  Additionally, the stayed part of 
her suspension shall be a period of probation during which respondent shall work 
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with a monitor chosen by relator to assist her in maintaining professional 
relationships with her clients.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in judgment. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring in judgment.  I agree with the sanction imposed by 
the majority and therefore concur in judgment.  I disagree, however, with the 
majority’s conclusion that the respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(3) by engaging in 
illegal conduct involving “moral turpitude.”  I would adopt the board’s finding 
that there was insufficient evidence of a DR 1-102(A)(3) violation. 
 
Acts of “moral turpitude” are not precisely defined.  See Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Burkhart (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 188, 190, 661 N.E.2d 1062, 1064-
1065.  But we usually characterize them as involving “baseness, vileness, or the 
depravity in private and social duties which [a] man owes to his fellow man, or to 
society in general.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted), quoting State v. Adkins 
(1973), 40 Ohio App.2d 473, 475, 69 O.O.2d 416, 417, 320 N.E.2d 308, 310.  The 
respondent’s actions leading to her conviction for attempted obstruction of justice 
arguably fit this definition.  As the majority acknowledges, however, we 
undertake an independent review of the circumstances underlying a criminal 
conviction “to determine if they manifest the requisite lack of social conscience 
and depravity beyond any established criminal intent.”  Burkhart, 75 Ohio St.3d 
at 191, 661 N.E.2d at 1065. 
 
The majority finds moral turpitude based on its finding that the respondent 
“attempted to undermine the effectiveness of a drug raid conducted by federal and 
local law enforcement officers by secretly informing a former client about the 
imminent raid.”  The panel, however, made no such finding and instead 
January Term, 2001 
5 
recognized that the respondent “had no malicious intent and simply exercised 
very poor judgement * * *.”  The board concurred with the panel, apparently 
believing that what motivated the respondent was a desire to keep her client out of 
jail rather than an intent to undermine the entire large-scale drug raid.  This 
interpretation of the respondent’s conduct is certainly plausible: she tipped only 
one person out of approximately seventy who were arrested in the raid by federal 
and local law enforcement agencies. 
 
I agree that the sanction imposed today is warranted for violations of DR 
1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), and 1-102(A)(6).  But I would not depart from the 
board’s conclusion that this misconduct did not present a violation of DR 1-
102(A)(3). 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Kevin L. Williams, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Geoffrey Stern, for respondent. 
__________________