Case Title: CP 200 State, LLC v. CIEE, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13124

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-01-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13124 
 
CP 200 STATE, LLC  vs.  CIEE, INC. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 1, 2021. – January 18, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Summary Process, Appeal.  Contract, Settlement agreement.  
Practice, Civil, Summary process, Interlocutory appeal, 
Review of interlocutory action. 
 
 
 
Summary Process.  Complaint filed in the Superior Court 
Department on June 10, 2020. 
 
A motion to enforce a settlement agreement was heard by 
Michael P. Doolin, J. 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed in the Appeals Court by Gregory I. Massing, 
J., and questions of law were reported by him to the Appeals 
Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
John A. Woodcock, III, for the defendant. 
Joseph E. Ruccio, III, for the plaintiff. 
 
Jennifer A. Creedon, for Massachusetts Defense Lawyers 
Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse, for New England Legal 
Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  This case presents the question whether the 
doctrine of present execution permits an interlocutory appeal 
from a Superior Court judge's order denying a motion to enforce 
an alleged settlement agreement.  We conclude that it does not.1 
1.  Background.  The following facts are undisputed by the 
parties.  In June 2020, CP 200 State, LLC (CP 200), commenced 
this action in the Superior Court, asserting claims for summary 
process eviction and breach of contract against CIEE, Inc. 
(CIEE), regarding CIEE's lease of office space in Boston from CP 
200.  The parties' counsel engaged in settlement negotiations 
via e-mail.  CIEE contends that e-mail messages exchanged on 
August 25, 2020, resulted in a binding settlement agreement 
whereby CIEE agreed to pay CP 200 $245,000 to resolve the 
parties' dispute; CP 200 contends that the parties did not reach 
an agreement. 
Following the e-mail exchange, CIEE moved to enforce the 
alleged settlement agreement.  The motion judge denied the 
motion.  CIEE filed a petition for interlocutory review with a 
single justice of the Appeals Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 231, 
§ 118, first par., contending that its interlocutory appeal was 
permissible under the doctrine of present execution. 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association and the New England 
Legal Foundation. 
3 
 
The single justice determined that the "application of the 
doctrine of present execution in this context is an open 
question" deserving of appellate review.  The single justice 
reported the following questions: 
"Question one.  Does the doctrine of present execution 
permit an immediate appeal from the judge's order denying 
the motion to enforce the settlement agreement? 
 
"Question two.  If the doctrine of present execution 
applies, did the e-mail communications between the 
plaintiff and defendant create an enforceable settlement 
agreement?" 
 
This court transferred the case sua sponte from the Appeals 
Court. 
2.  Discussion.  The first reported question, whether the 
doctrine of present execution applies to allow an appeal from an 
interlocutory order denying a motion to enforce a settlement 
agreement, presents a question of law, which we consider de 
novo.  Johnson v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., 466 Mass. 779, 782 
(2014).  See, e.g., Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 779-781 
(1979) (examining de novo appropriateness of review of 
interlocutory order under doctrine of present execution). 
 
"As a general rule, there is no right to appeal from an 
interlocutory order unless a statute or rule authorizes it."2  
 
2 Of course, in connection with an appeal from a final 
judgment under Mass. R. Civ. P. 54, as amended, 382 Mass. 829 
(1981), an alleged error in an interlocutory order may be 
ventilated.  See G. L. c. 231, § 113.  Additionally, a party may 
appeal before the entry of a final judgment under Mass. R. Civ. 
4 
 
Maddocks v. Ricker, 403 Mass. 592, 597 (1988).  "The policy 
underlying this rule is that a party ought not to have the power 
to interrupt the progress of the litigation by piecemeal appeals 
that cause delay and often waste judicial effort in deciding 
questions that will turn out to be unimportant" (quotation 
omitted).  Marcus v. Newton, 462 Mass. 148, 151 (2012), quoting 
Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 521 (2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9 
(2004). 
The doctrine of present execution is a long-standing 
exception to this principle, applicable in limited 
circumstances.  Maddocks, 403 Mass. at 598.  See Vincent v. 
Plecker, 319 Mass. 560, 564 n.2 (1946) ("Though part of a single 
controversy remains undetermined, if the decree is to be 
executed presently, so that appeal would be futile unless the 
decree could be vacated by the prompt entry of an appeal in the 
full court, the decree is a final one").  "The doctrine is 
intended to be invoked narrowly to avoid piecemeal appeals from 
 
P. 64 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996), pursuant to which 
the party may ask the judge to report the interlocutory finding 
or order to the Appeals Court where the finding or order "so 
affects the merits of the controversy that the matter ought to 
be determined by the [A]ppeals [C]ourt before any further 
proceedings in the trial court."  And a party may seek 
permission to appeal from an interlocutory order pursuant to 
G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., which affords the single 
justice of the Appeals Court discretion to permit an appeal.  
See Patel v. Martin, 481 Mass. 29, 31-32 (2018) (discussing 
mechanisms available for appellate review of interlocutory 
orders). 
5 
 
interlocutory decisions that will delay the resolution of the 
trial court case, increase the over-all cost of the litigation, 
and burden our appellate courts."  Patel v. Martin, 481 Mass. 
29, 32 (2018). 
In civil cases, we have allowed an appeal before final 
judgment pursuant to the doctrine when the interlocutory order 
is "collateral to the rest of the controversy," Estate of 
Moulton v. Puopolo, 467 Mass. 478, 485 (2014), citing Maxwell v. 
AIG Dom. Claims, Inc., 460 Mass. 91, 106 n.12 (2011), and the 
order "interfere[s] with rights in a way that cannot be remedied 
on appeal from a final judgment."  Estate of Moulton, supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Al Saud, 459 Mass. 221, 227 n.15 (2011).  
We have allowed an immediate appeal under the doctrine "where 
protection from the burden of litigation and trial is precisely 
the right to which [a party] asserts an entitlement."  Patel, 
481 Mass. at 33, quoting Estate of Moulton, supra. 
In determining whether to allow an appeal under the 
doctrine, we must balance "the harm to cost-effective litigation 
arising from piecemeal interlocutory appeals against the harm 
that a litigant may suffer from a trial court order that is 
irremediable on postjudgment appeal."  Patel, 481 Mass. at 37.  
In applying this "balancing act," we have considered whether the 
"sheer volume of potential appeals" resulting if an immediate 
appeal is permitted, as well as the "inevitable adverse impact 
6 
 
on judicial efficiency, outweighs the intrinsic harm that 
potentially might be suffered by an aggrieved party who is 
denied an immediate right to appeal."  Id.  "[M]erely causing a 
party to be subjected to the delay and expense inherent in 
further litigation does not make such an order 'effectively 
unreviewable.'"  Mooney v. Warren, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 137, 139 
(2015), quoting R.J.A. v. K.A.V., 34 Mass. App. Ct. 369, 374 
(1993). 
Applying these guiding principles, we have concluded, for 
example, that defenses based on government and statutory 
immunities are immediately appealable.  See Estate of Moulton, 
467 Mass. at 485-486 (order denying motion to dismiss based on 
statutory immunity under exclusive remedy provision of Workers' 
Compensation Act, G. L. c. 152, § 24, is immediately 
appealable); Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 316-317 (2002) 
(doctrine of present execution applies to denial of motion to 
dismiss based on immunity under Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, 
G. L. c. 258); Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 686, 688 (1999) 
(same).  We have reasoned that these legislatively created 
immunities evince the express purpose of keeping the parties out 
of court.  See Lynch v. Crawford, 483 Mass. 631, 635-636 (2019) 
(describing immunities under various statutes).  They create a 
right to be free from suit -- a right that will be lost unless 
determined at the outset -- and reflect a significant public 
7 
 
interest in "protect[ing] public officials from the burden of 
litigation itself" and from the chilling effect of litigation 
itself.  Patel, 481 Mass. at 33. 
By contrast, we have concluded that a defense based on res 
judicata is not immediately appealable.  Matter of Hamm, 487 
Mass. 394, 402 (2021).  Similarly, we have held that a discovery 
order requiring disclosure of privileged matters is not 
immediately appealable.  See Patel, 481 Mass. at 37. 
 
CIEE maintains that the alleged settlement agreement, like 
a statutory immunity, created a right to be free from litigation 
and trial that cannot be remedied on appeal from a final 
judgment because CIEE will already have spent time and resources 
on the trial.3  But as the United States Supreme Court stated 
when declining a similar invitation to allow an immediate appeal 
from the denial of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement, 
"virtually every right that could be enforced appropriately by 
pretrial dismissal might loosely be described as conferring a 
'right not to stand trial.'"  See Digital Equip. Corp. v. 
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 873 (1994) (acknowledging 
that permitting immediate appeal of pretrial motions, such as 
 
3 We agree with CIEE that the issue whether a settlement 
agreement was reached between it and CP 200 is collateral to the 
underlying merits of CP 200's claim that CIEE committed a breach 
of its lease.  See Maddocks, 403 Mass. at 596 ("An issue is 
collateral to the underlying dispute if it is one that will not 
have to be considered at trial"). 
8 
 
those asserting that action is barred by claim preclusion, or 
that no material fact is in dispute and moving party is entitled 
to judgment as matter of law, or that complaint fails to state 
claim, would frustrate purpose of final judgment rule).  Rather 
than rely on such characterizations, we must be guided by the 
aforementioned balancing of interests. 
In this regard, we agree with CP 200 that the denial of a 
motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata and the denial of 
a motion for a protective order in a discovery dispute provide 
more apt analogies than the statutorily conferred immunities.  
We do not face here a situation where the absence of an 
immediate appeal has a chilling effect on public employees.  
Compare Estate of Moulton, 467 Mass. at 485-486; Kent, 437 Mass. 
at 316-317; Brum, 428 Mass. at 686, 688.  Instead, a party 
seeking to enforce a settlement agreement, like a party pursuing 
a defense of res judicata, contends that it has, in effect, 
"bought" the right to be free from litigation.  In regard to res 
judicata, the party has done so by virtue of having already 
litigated the claim, often at considerable expense, in a prior 
action; in regard to a settlement agreement, the party has 
negotiated a settlement of the dispute, creating a right to be 
free from liability in excess of that price. 
Significantly, as is the case for res judicata and a 
discovery order, each of which we have held is not subject to 
9 
 
the doctrine of present execution, there are alternative avenues 
of redress for a party seeking to enforce a settlement 
agreement.  Obviously, the party may appeal the issue of the 
settlement agreement after final judgment and, if successful, 
effectively have the judgment capped at the price negotiated in 
any valid agreement.  Additionally, the party could negotiate a 
prevailing party provision4 in connection with any agreement to 
settle, see Sea Breeze Estates, LLC v. Jarema, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 
210, 219 (2018), in order to ameliorate some, if not all, of the 
harm caused by being required to continue to litigate the matter 
through trial.  Further, the party could seek summary judgment, 
see Basis Tech. Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 71 Mass. App. Ct. 29, 
42-43 (2008), citing Correia v. DeSimone, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 
602 (1993), or pursue a breach of contract claim, see Thomas v. 
Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 39 Mass. App. Ct. 537, 540 n.6, 
544-545 (1995).  While imperfect, "this collection of 
alternative remedies will adequately protect the rights of 
litigants" under the settlement agreement while also preventing 
"the sheer volume of potential appeals that would be permitted 
by including [enforcement of settlement agreements] within the 
doctrine of present execution, and the inevitable adverse impact 
 
4 Such a provision could, for example, allow the prevailing 
party "to recover reasonable counsel fees, court costs and other 
direct litigation expenses" from the opposing party.  Sea Breeze 
Estates, LLC, v. Jarema, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 210, 219 (2018). 
10 
 
on judicial efficiency."  Patel, 481 Mass. at 37-38.  The delay 
and expense caused to CIEE by further litigation does not 
outweigh the interest in judicial efficiency.  Id. at 37.  See 
Mooney, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 139. 
 
We find instructive the Federal jurisprudence pursuant to 
which an immediate appeal from a settlement agreement is not 
permitted.5  See Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 884 (reasoning 
that "denying effect to the sort of [asserted] contractual right 
at issue [in connection with a settlement agreement] is far 
removed from those immediately appealable decisions involving 
rights more deeply rooted in public policy, and the rights . . . 
assert[ed] may, in the main, be vindicated through means less 
disruptive to the orderly administration of justice than 
immediate, mandatory appeal").  Courts in other States 
addressing the issue similarly have denied an immediate appeal.  
See, e.g., Herman Trust v. Brashear 711 Trust, 22 Neb. App. 758, 
 
5 "Our doctrine of present execution is similar to the 
Federal 'collateral order doctrine,' which permits full 
appellate review of a small class of collateral interlocutory 
decisions 'that are conclusive, that resolve important questions 
separate from the merits, and that are effectively unreviewable 
on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.'"  
Patel, 481 Mass. at 32-33, quoting Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. 
Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009).  Thus, we have often found 
the treatment of interlocutory orders under the Federal doctrine 
to be instructive.  See, e.g., Borman, 378 Mass. at 780 (noting 
treatment of interlocutory order as immediately appealable under 
Federal collateral order doctrine, "a doctrine closely analogous 
to our rule of present execution"). 
11 
 
767-770 (2015) (comparing private tolling agreement to 
settlement agreement and holding both not immediately 
appealable); Geniviva v. Frisk, 555 Pa. 589, 599 (1999) 
(concluding denial of motion to approve settlement not 
immediately appealable). 
 
Accordingly, we answer the first reported question "no."  
Having concluded that CIEE is not entitled to an interlocutory 
appeal under the doctrine of present execution, "[w]e can 
exercise our discretion under our superintendence authority to 
reach the merits of this appeal, where the issue 'has been 
briefed fully by the parties . . . [and] raises a significant 
issue' . . . 'and addressing it would be in the public interest' 
. . . [o]r we can dismiss the appeal."  Patel, 481 Mass. at 38, 
quoting Marcus, 462 Mass. at 153.  Because the question whether 
these particular private parties entered into an enforceable 
settlement agreement by virtue of the e-mail messages exchanged 
by their counsel does not raise an issue of public concern, cf. 
Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 879 (issues concerning right 
secured by private agreement generally are not of public 
importance), we decline to exercise our discretion to consider 
the merits and do not reach the second reported question.  
Accordingly, the defendant's appeal is dismissed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.