Case Title: Pietuszka and Gallucio Builders, Inc. v. McTaggart

Citation: 

Docket Number: 333-a-2d-164-3

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 1975-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Decided February 7, 1975. Wayne N. Elliott and John H. Small, Prickett, Ward, Burt & Sanders, Wilmington, for Pietuszka and Gallucio Builders, Inc., defendant below, appellant. William F. Taylor, Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, for Kershaw Excavating Co., defendant below, appellant. Sheldon N. Sandler, Bader, Dorsey & Kreshtool, Wilmington, and Allen J. Beckman, of Shuster & Beckman, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs below, appellees. Before HERRMANN, C. J., and DUFFY and McNEILLY, JJ. *165 DUFFY, Justice: In this personal injury action, defendants appeal from an order of the Superior Court denying their motions for summary judgment. I Judith McTaggart, a six-year-old child, was injured when she fell from a mound of earth fifteen feet high formed by Kershaw Excavating Co. (Kershaw) under a contract with Pietuszka and Gallucio Builders, Inc. (P & G), the owner and general contractor for development of the land. The Superior Court refused to grant summary judgment to P & G on either plaintiffs' claim based on negligence or on P & G's own claim against Kershaw based on an indemnity provision in the contract. P & G seeks a reversal of each ruling. II First, as to Judith's claim, P & G says that she was a trespasser and her claim is therefore barred by 25 Del.C. § 1421, which provides: "No person who comes onto premises occupied by another person as his guest without payment shall have a cause of *166 action for damages against the occupier of the premises unless such accident was intentional on the part of the occupier or was caused by his wilful or wanton disregard of the rights of others." The Superior Court concluded that the statute neither in terms nor purpose applies to trespassers.[1] Relying on case law under the analogous Automobile Guest Statute, 21 Del.C. § 6101, the Court ruled that the Landowners' Statute is similar in its application to minors, cf. Lynott v. Sells, Del.Super., 2 Storey 385, 158 A.2d 583 (1958), and shares the same purpose (the frustration of collusive lawsuits between host and guest). Since there are no ties of hospitality (to foster such collusion) between trespasser and landowner, the Court found that § 1421 was not intended to apply to a child-trespasser. We have recently considered the purposes and have approved the constitutionality of the Automobile Guest Statute, Justice v. Gatchell, Del.Supr., 325 A.2d 97 (1974). The Superior Court's finding as to purpose is consistent with the analysis in Justice and we approve its conclusion that § 1421 was not intended to apply to a child-trespasser. Compare Facciolo v. Facciolo Construction Co., Del.Supr., 317 A.2d 27 (1974). As in Johnson v. Delmarva Power and Light Company, supra, the Superior Court concluded that P & G's conduct is to be measured by the provisions of the Restatement of Torts (2d) § 339. We have recently approved the rule stated therein, Schorah v. Carey, Del.Supr., 331 A.2d 383 (1975), and do so again.[2] III As to Kershaw, P & G argues that it is entitled now to a judgment determining that, under the contract, Kershaw is obliged to indemnify it for any loss sustained as a result of plaintiffs' claim. Noting that P & G may be found liable to plaintiffs under the provisions of the Restatement, supra, the Trial Court concluded that, in such event, P & G may only be entitled to contribution. It therefore denied P & G's motion for summary judgment. As we read the Superior Court opinion, it did not determine any substantial question of law against P & G. It simply concluded that P & G is not entitled to judgment now, that is, any judgment in its favor would be premature. In this light, the appealability of this interlocutory order is questionable. It may be possible (and desirable) to determine P & G's contract right to indemnity independent of any tort obligation it may have to plaintiffs. But the facts are single and a separate basis for liability is asserted against P & G; under these *167 circumstances we cannot say as a matter of law that the Superior Court committed error in declining to decide the contract issue before trial. After all facts are determined at trial, the Court will then be in a position to determine what liability, if any P & G has to plaintiffs and what part thereof, if any, is included in the indemnity agreement running from Kershaw to P & G. Affirmed.