Case Title: State v. Oatney

Citation: 

Docket Number: S45850

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed: April 10, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
	v.
BILLY LEE OATNEY, JR.,							
Appellant.
(C973456CR; SC S45850)
	On automatic and direct review of the judgment of conviction
and sentence of death imposed by the Washington County Circuit
Court.
	Alan C. Bonebrake, Judge.
	Argued and submitted September 5, 2002.
	Eric Johansen, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for appellant.  With him on the brief
was David E. Groom, State Public Defender.
	Janet Klapstein, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent.  With her on the
brief were Erika L. Hadlock, Assistant Attorney General, Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.*
	BALMER, J.
	The judgment of conviction and sentence of death are
affirmed.
	Durham, J., dissented and filed an opinion.
	* Leeson, J., resigned January 31, 2003, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.
		BALMER, J.
		This case is before us on automatic and direct review
of defendant's convictions for eight counts of aggravated murder
and sentence of death.  Defendant challenges trial court rulings
in the pretrial, guilt, and penalty phases of his trial, seeking
reversal of his convictions or, in the alternative, vacation of
his sentence of death and remand for resentencing.  For the
reasons set out below, we affirm the convictions for aggravated
murder and the sentence of death.
I.  FACTS
	Because the jury found defendant guilty, we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the state.  State v.
Thompson, 328 Or 248, 250, 971 P2d 879 (1999).  
	The victim disappeared on August 27, 1996.  Her family
told police that defendant might have information about her
whereabouts because the victim had been planning to meet with
defendant to ask him to make some jewelry for her upcoming
wedding.  On September 2, 1996, the Tualatin police interviewed
defendant, who stated that he had not seen the victim for three
weeks.  Later that evening, a Milwaukie police officer, who had
no knowledge of the Tualatin police's questioning of defendant
regarding the victim's disappearance, stopped defendant because
the license plate light on his van was not working.  Defendant's
license check revealed no reason to detain him, but the police
determined that defendant's passenger, Johnston, had an
outstanding warrant for his arrest for a parole violation.  The
police arrested Johnston.  
	During the traffic stop and investigation of Johnston,
one of the police officers saw defendant and Johnston moving a
duffel bag inside the van as if to conceal it.  The officer asked
defendant for consent to look into the bag, and defendant
consented.  The police found, among other things, a replica of a
Colt .45, a stun gun, a dart gun, a large knife, a lock-pick set,
a pair of scissors, and a roll of duct tape.  The police
inventoried the items and returned them to defendant, but did not
detain him further.  
	On September 9, 1996, the victim's badly decomposed
body was found in Champoeg Park.  In a subsequent interview with
defendant, the Tualatin police learned of Johnston's September 2,
1996, arrest.  They listened to tapes of Johnston's telephone
conversations with defendant from jail and learned that defendant
might have been involved in the victim's disappearance. (1)  Over
the next few weeks, the Tualatin police interviewed defendant
several times.  They also searched defendant's apartment and
found blood matching the victim's blood on the carpet. (2)  The
Tualatin police continued to keep defendant under surveillance.  
After obtaining a search warrant, the police searched defendant's
van.  Among other items, they found the items from the duffel bag
that the Milwaukie police had found during the September 2, 1996,
stop.  
	Meanwhile, as a result of the continuing investigation
of the victim's death, the state charged Johnston with one count
of aggravated murder.  Johnston pleaded guilty to aggravated
murder, and, in exchange for his cooperation and testimony, the
state agreed not to seek the death penalty.   
	Defendant was ultimately charged with eight counts of
aggravated murder.  At trial, both defendant and Johnston
testified.  Johnston testified that, while he was staying with
defendant at defendant's apartment, defendant said that he had a
date with the victim, left the apartment, and brought the victim
back with him later that evening.  While Johnston was on the
telephone in another room, he heard defendant's stun gun being
used.  Johnston returned to the living room and saw the victim on
the floor with defendant holding his stun gun to her neck. 
Johnston and defendant then tied up the victim and took her to
the bedroom.  They cut off her clothes with scissors and both of
them raped and sodomized her.  After forcing her to give them the
personal identification number to her bank card, defendant sent
Johnston out to get some money from an ATM using the victim's
card.  When Johnston returned, he saw that the victim had blood
on her face and was not moving.  Johnston testified that
defendant had told him that defendant had hit and choked the
victim because she "just wouldn't [have sex with] me."  Defendant
said that he had tried to kill her, but "the [victim] just won't
die."  Defendant and Johnston then held a plastic bag over the
victim's head until she stopped breathing.  
	Defendant argued at trial that Johnston had lied in his
testimony to avoid the death penalty.  Defendant testified that
Johnston had killed the victim while defendant was away from the
apartment.  According to defendant, he had not learned of the
victim's murder until the following day.  He testified that he
had helped Johnston cover up the murder because he had been
afraid of being implicated in the murder because it had occurred
in his apartment.  
	The jury convicted defendant of all eight counts of
aggravated murder.  In a separate sentencing proceeding, the jury
determined that defendant had acted deliberately, that defendant
posed a continuing risk to society, and that defendant should
receive a death sentence.  The trial judge then entered a
sentence of death.  After defendant's conviction, the court
sentenced Johnston to life without the possibility of parole.
	Defendant now raises 43 assignments of error.  We have
examined each of those assignments of error, and we reject each
one.  Three of the assignments of error merit discussion, and we
now turn to them.
II.  GUILT-PHASE JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A.  Preliminary Discussion
	Defendant assigns as error the trial court's
"accomplice-witness" instructions and, in particular, the
instruction that stated that, "as a matter of law," Johnston was
"an accomplice witness in the commission of the crimes charged in
this indictment." (3)  The trial judge gave the jury the following
accomplice-witness instructions:
		"You are instructed that as a matter of law,
Willford Nathaniel Johnston, III, is an accomplice
witness in the commission of the crimes charged in this
indictment."  (The accomplice-witness-as-a-matter-of-law instruction.)
		"You should view an accomplice witness's testimony
with distrust."  (The credibility instruction.)
"The testimony of an accomplice in and of itself
is not sufficient to support a conviction.  There must
be, in addition, some other evidence, however slight or
circumstantial, other than the testimony of an
accomplice that tends to connect the defendant with the
commission of the crime.  This other evidence or
corroboration need not be sufficient by itself to
support a conviction, but it must tend to show
something more than just that a crime was committed. 
It must also connect or tend to connect the defendant
with the commission of the crime."  (The corroboration
instruction.) (4) 
		As noted, at trial, Johnston had testified that he and
defendant had committed the crimes together.  Defendant testified
that Johnston had committed the crimes alone, admitting his own
culpability only as to helping to dispose of some of the victim's
property, cleaning up his apartment to remove evidence of the
victim's murder, and related conduct after the victim had been
killed.  Defendant first argues that, when the trial court
instructed the jury that Johnston was an accomplice witness "as a
matter of law," the trial court, in effect, directed a verdict of
guilty by instructing the jury that defendant had committed the
crimes along with Johnston.  Second, defendant argues that, even
if that instruction did not amount to a directed verdict of
guilty, "the trial court effectively instructed the jury that the
crime was in fact committed," thus depriving defendant of his
right to a jury trial on each element of the offenses.  Third,
defendant argues that the accomplice-witness instructions invaded
the fact-finding role of the jury by improperly undermining his
assertion that Johnston alone had killed the victim.  Defendant
contends that it is reversible error for a trial court to give
the accomplice-witness instructions unless a defendant requests
them.
		As authority for his arguments, defendant relies on
State v. Simson, 308 Or 102, 775 P2d 837 (1989), in which a
criminal defendant objected to similar accomplice-witness
instructions.  In that case, three men had been convicted of the
theft of a truck that the defendant drove for his employer.  The
defendant also had been charged with the theft, but the trial
testimony of the three convicted witnesses did not implicate the
defendant, contrary to the prosecution's expectation.  Over the
defendant's objection, the trial court gave the accomplice-witness instructions, including the accomplice-witness-as-a-matter-of-law instruction, to the jury.  This court reversed the
resulting conviction on the ground that the instructions were
"inappropriate to give" under the circumstances: 
	"By instructing the jury that the witnesses were
accomplices in the crime as a matter of law, the trial
court effectively instructed the jury that the crime
was in fact committed.  This deprived defendant of his
right to a jury trial on all elements of the charge. 
Normally, the accomplice-as-a-matter-of-law instruction
presents no problem, because the instruction is
requested by the defendant.  A defendant will risk the
implication that a crime was committed in order to cast
doubt on the veracity of his accusers.  But, in this
case, it could serve to cast doubt only on the veracity
of those whose testimony favored him.  Defendant
received no trade-off." 
Id. at 109-10. (5)  The court also noted:
		"We think that, as a general rule, these
instructions ought not to be given unless requested by
the defendant."
Id. at 110 n 10.  Defendant points to that "general rule,"
arguing that the trial court should have followed it in his case. 
When the trial court gave the accomplice-witness instructions
over defendant's objection, defendant contends, the trial court
committed reversible error in the three respects described above. 
Before addressing defendant's arguments, it is helpful
to discuss the reason for giving the accomplice-witness-as-a-matter-of-law instruction and the appropriate situations in which
to give it.  The testimony of accomplices long has been viewed
with suspicion, both because of concern about the veracity of a
witness who, by his or her own admission, has committed a crime,
and because of concern that an accomplice might be induced to
testify falsely against the person with whom he or she committed
the crime by promises of leniency or immunity. (6)  Those concerns
are the basis for the statutory requirement, now contained in ORS
136.440, (7) that a defendant cannot be convicted solely on the
testimony of an accomplice witness; rather, other evidence must
corroborate the accomplice witness's testimony.  ORS 10.095(4) (8)
sets out the additional rule that a court should instruct a jury
that it should view with distrust the testimony of an accomplice. 
To implement those statutory requirements, a trial court
instructs the jury that it should view an accomplice's testimony
with distrust and that it cannot convict on the basis of
accomplice testimony alone.  
To make the credibility and corroboration instructions
meaningful, a trial court ordinarily also instructs a jury
regarding who is an accomplice witness, so that the jury will
understand whose testimony is to be viewed with distrust and must
be corroborated in order to convict to a defendant.  Subsection
(2) of ORS 136.440 provides that an "accomplice" is "a witness in
a criminal action who, according to the evidence adduced in the
action, is criminally liable for the conduct of the defendant
under ORS 161.155 and 161.165." (9)  ORS 161.155 provides that one
who solicits, commands, aids, or abets another person in the
commission of a crime is criminally liable for the acts of that
person.  Under those definitions, there can be no "accomplice"
unless another person has committed a crime.  As this court
stated in State v. Hull, 286 Or 511, 516, 595 P2d 1240 (1979), a
person is an "accomplice" for purposes of the corroboration
requirement if "the evidence is legally sufficient to justify an
indictment of or information against a witness as an accomplice
to the offense charged against the defendant, not necessarily to
convict the witness of it."
Having discussed the statutory grounds for credibility
and corroboration instructions and the definition of "accomplice"
for purposes of determining when such instructions should be
given, we next consider the appropriate roles of the judge and
jury in deciding whether a witness is an accomplice witness.  If
there is no dispute regarding whether a witness is an accomplice
witness -- that is, sufficient evidence exists to charge, but not
necessarily to convict, the witness of the crimes with which the
defendant is charged -- then the trial court may determine, as a
matter of law, that the witness is an accomplice.  Hull, 286 Or
at 517. (10)  If, however, the facts regarding whether a witness is
an accomplice are in dispute, then the jury decides, and the
defendant must prove that the witness is an accomplice in order
to require corroboration.  Id. at 515 (citing State v. Wong Si
Sam, 63 Or 266, 127 P 683 (1912)). (11) 
B.  Defendant's "Directed Verdict" Argument
		Turning to defendant's arguments, we first address his
argument that the trial court directed, in effect, a verdict of
guilty.  According to the state, Simson expressly rejected the
same argument that defendant makes here.  We agree.  In Simson,
this court rejected the defendant's argument that the accomplice-witness-as-a-matter-of-law instruction amounted to a directed
verdict: 
	"We believe that the jury would understand that the
determination of defendant's guilt was its to make and
we doubt that the jury would have understood the
instruction to be an order to find the defendant
guilty, given the instructions as a whole.  See
generally State v. Hull[, 286 Or 511]."
Simson, 308 Or at 109.  See also State v. Gibson, 252 Or 241,
244, 448 P2d 534 (1968) (erroneous instruction that witness was
defendant's accomplice, in context in which it was given, did not
amount to directed verdict that defendant was guilty).
		That reasoning applies here as well.  Viewing the
instructions as a whole, it is apparent that the trial judge did
not instruct the jury that it should find that defendant had
committed the crimes.  The trial court instructed the jury as to
the elements of each crime alleged in the indictment and the
relevant definitions of legal terms.  It instructed the jury that
the state had the burden of proving all elements of the crimes;
that the jury was not to take out of context or place undue
emphasis on any one instruction; that, as to each count, the jury
could find defendant guilty of the offense charged, guilty of a
lesser-included offense, or not guilty; and that defendant was
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  It went
on to tell the jury, "You have the sole responsibility to
determine what testimony or portions of testimony you will or
will not rely upon in reaching your verdict."  No reasonable
juror could have understood the accomplice-witness instructions
to mean that the jury was required to find that defendant was
guilty.
Defendant's reliance on Simson is misplaced for a more
fundamental reason: The "accomplice" testimony in that case
exculpated, rather than incriminated, the defendant.  The
accomplice-witness instructions in Simson, in other words, were
erroneous because they directed the jury to view with distrust
testimony that was favorable to the defendant, i.e., that the
defendant was not involved in the crimes alleged in the
indictment.  "Instructing the jury that they cannot convict
defendant upon uncorroborated accomplice testimony makes no sense
when the 'accomplice' testimony itself does not implicate
defendant in the crime."  Simson, 308 Or at 109.  Thus, in
Simson, the accomplice-witness instructions were both legally
inapplicable and harmful to the defendant. (12)  Here, in contrast,
Johnston's testimony directly implicated defendant.
		For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the accomplice-witness-as-a-matter-of-law instruction did not amount to a
directed verdict of guilty in defendant's case.
		Defendant's second argument -- that the accomplice-as-a-matter-of-law instruction "effectively instructed the jury that
the crime was in fact committed" -- is based on this court's
holding in Simson that the instruction deprived the defendant in
that case of his right to a jury trial on each element alleged in
the indictment.  The state argues that Simson is distinguishable
because, here, defendant's own testimony, while denying
responsibility for the crimes, confirmed that the crimes had
occurred.  Thus, according to the state, because defendant
concedes that a crime was in fact committed, the instruction did
not improperly deprive defendant of his right to a jury trial on
that issue.
		We agree.  In a criminal prosecution, the state has the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of a
charged offense, including the fact that the offense was
committed.  In Simson, this court held that giving the
accomplice-witness instructions over the defendant's objection
was error because the instructions "effectively instructed the
jury that the crime was in fact committed," thus "depriv[ing]
defendant of his right to a jury trial on all elements of the
charge."  308 Or at 109-10.  Here, in contrast, defendant
testified that Johnston had told him that Johnston had killed the
victim.  Defendant also admitted in his testimony that the victim
had been killed in his apartment and that he had aided Johnston
in cleaning up the apartment and destroying evidence, disposing
of the victim's property, and returning her vehicle to her
apartment.  Because defendant testified that those crimes had
occurred, he admitted that the crimes had been committed before
the court gave any instructions to the jury.  In those
circumstances, unlike in Simson, that element of the crime was
not a matter of dispute, and the accomplice-witness instructions
did not improperly instruct the jury that the crimes had been
committed.
		Defendant's third argument is that, even if the
accomplice-witness instructions did not amount to a directed
verdict, by instructing the jury that Johnston was an "accomplice
witness as a matter of law," the trial court, in effect, told the
jury that Johnston had solicited, commanded, aided, or abetted
someone in the commission of aggravated murder, and the only
other possible participant, based on the evidence at trial, was
defendant.  Defendant's theory of the case, however, was that
Johnston had committed the crimes alone.  According to defendant,
the trial court's accomplice-witness-as-a-matter-of-law
instruction was, therefore, error, because it undermined that
theory.
		Several of this court's cases discuss the circumstances
in which it may be error to instruct the jury that a witness is
an "accomplice" or an "accomplice witness" as a matter of law,
and we now turn to those cases.  As noted above, in Simson, this
court held that, based on the facts of that case, it was error to
give accomplice-witness instructions, including the accomplice-witness-as-a-matter-of-law instruction, and stated in a footnote
the "general rule" that accomplice-witness instructions should
not be given unless requested by a defendant.  308 Or at 110 n
10.  In Simson, however, as discussed above, the instruction was
error because it cast doubt on witnesses whose testimony favored
the defendant.  This court held "that the cautionary accomplice-witness instructions should only be given when the 'accomplice'
testimony implicates the defendant."  308 Or at 104.  Here, of
course, Johnston's testimony directly implicated defendant, and
thus Simson does not support defendant's claim of error.
		In Hull, this court discussed the respective roles of
the judge and jury in determining whether a witness is an
accomplice witness whose testimony must be corroborated.  As
noted above, the standard set out in Hull is not whether there is
sufficient evidence to convict the witness of being an accomplice
of the defendant, but "whether there is probable cause to charge
the witness with the offense for which [the] defendant is on
trial[.]"  286 Or at 516 (emphasis added).  Here, of course,
Johnston already had pleaded guilty to the murder for which
defendant had been charged.  More significantly, Johnston
testified that he and defendant had committed the crimes
together.  The trial court did not have to determine that
Johnston and defendant had acted together; it had only to
conclude that there was probable cause -- based on Johnston's
testimony -- that they did act together.  As this court stated in
Hull, "if no facts bearing on the elements needed to charge the
witness are in dispute, the issue of the potential liability of
the witness under ORS 161.155 is a question of law to be decided
by the court."  286 Or at 517 (emphasis added).  Here, sufficient
evidence existed for the trial court to determine, as a matter of
law, that Johnston was an accomplice witness, and that
determination by the trial court was consistent with Hull.
		In State v. Gibson, 252 Or 241, 448 P2d 534 (1969),
this court held that the trial court had erred in instructing the
jury that a witness was an "accomplice as a matter of law," but
that the error was harmless.  The defendant in Gibson was
convicted of robbery by force and violence.  The state alleged
that the defendant and an accomplice, Wright, had followed the
victim out of a bar and beaten and robbed him.  The defendant
admitted participating in the beating, but denied participating
in the robbery.  Before the defendant's trial, Wright was
convicted of both the beating and the robbery.  The trial judge,
after instructing the jury that the testimony of an accomplice
was to be viewed with distrust, stated that, "as a matter of law,
I instruct you in this case that Larry Wright is an accomplice of
the defendant Monte Gibson."  252 Or at 243-44.  This court held
that "[s]uch an explicit instruction would be erroneous in a
criminal trial, no matter how overwhelming the evidence of guilt
might be[,]" id. at 244, but went on to conclude that the error
was harmless.  
		In this case, however, the characteristics that made
the instruction in Gibson erroneous are not present.  In contrast
to the explicit instruction that Wright was "an accomplice of the
defendant Monte Gibson," the instruction in this case was that
Johnston was an "accomplice witness in the commission of the
crimes charged in this indictment."  Thus, the instructions here
focused on the kind of witness Johnston was, for purposes of the
corroboration and credibility instructions, rather than on the
relationship between Johnston and defendant.  Moreover, unlike
the Gibson instruction, the instruction here did not refer to
defendant by name or even as "defendant," but referred to only
the crimes alleged in the indictment -- crimes to which Johnston
had pleaded guilty.  The instruction in this case does not suffer
from the explicit statement that the witness and the defendant
were accomplices in the commission of the crimes that made the
Gibson instruction erroneous.
Having concluded that the instruction here was not
error for any of the reasons described in Simson, Hull, or
Gibson, we turn to defendant's argument that the instruction
nonetheless improperly intruded on the jury's fact-finding role
because, by calling Johnston an "accomplice witness," the
instruction suggested that Johnston was in fact an "accomplice"
and, therefore, it implied that defendant was culpable, as well. 
As noted in our discussion of Gibson, the instruction here stated
that Johnston was an "accomplice witness" as a matter of law,
rather than an "accomplice," and the instruction, unlike the
instruction in Gibson, did not mention defendant.  However,
defendant is correct in asserting that the facts regarding
whether Johnston acted alone in murdering the victim or acted
together with defendant as an "accomplice" were disputed at
trial.  Because those facts were disputed, defendant argues, the
trial court's statement that, as a matter of law, Johnston was an
"accomplice witness in the commission of the crimes charged in
the indictment" was error, because it told the jury that it must
conclude that Johnston and defendant had acted together.  For the
reasons that follow, we reject defendant's argument.
In determining whether it was error to give a
particular instruction, the instructions are read as a whole to
determine whether they accurately state the law.  State v.
Barnes, 329 Or 327, 334, 986 P2d 1160 (1999).  Defendant is
correct that the accomplice-witness-as-a-matter-of-law
instruction, viewed alone and as an abstract proposition, would
allow a juror to conclude, from the description of Johnston's
status as an "accomplice witness," that the trial court was
stating that another person necessarily had committed the crimes
with Johnston. (13)  However, the instruction itself was an accurate
statement of the law, because Johnston, as noted above, was an
accomplice witness as a matter of law.  The instruction still
might be error if, even when considered with the other
instructions, it somehow required the jury to accept the state's
theory that Johnston had acted together with defendant, rather
than defendant's theory that Johnston had acted alone.  The other
instructions that the trial court gave, however, made clear that
the jury was to determine whether the state had proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of each element of the
crimes charged in the indictment.  The judge instructed the jury
that it was the jury's "sole responsibility to make all the
decisions about the facts in this case" and that the jury was to
"evaluate the evidence to determine how reliable or how
believable the evidence was."  In addition to the accomplice-witness instructions at issue here, the trial court gave a number
of other instructions as to how the jury should evaluate the
testimony of witnesses, including testimony of hearsay statements
made by defendant and testimony by witnesses with criminal
convictions.  
The accomplice-witness-as-a-matter-of-law instruction
consisted of less than four lines out of the 40 pages of the
trial transcript devoted to instructions and the verdict form. 
It was followed immediately by the credibility and corroboration
instructions.  Both literally and in context, the accomplice-witness-as-a-matter-of-law instruction told the jury only that
Johnston was the kind of witness who was to be viewed with
distrust and whose testimony must be corroborated.  It did not
tell the jury that the jury must conclude that Johnston and
defendant had acted together.  Moreover, although the jury was
given standard instructions on aiding and abetting, it was not
instructed on the definition of "accomplice," and it was not
required to make any particular decision based on the meaning or
application of that term.  Finally, and immediately after the
accomplice-witness instructions, the trial court instructed the
jury that defendant was presumed innocent unless and until proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Considered as a whole, as they must be, the trial
court's instructions fairly apprised the jury of its role in
determining whether the state had met its burden of proving that
defendant was guilty of the crimes alleged in the indictment. 
The jury could not reasonably have understood the instructions to
remove from its consideration the question whether defendant and
Johnston had acted together.  Instead, the jury would have
understood, from the instructions as a whole, that, depending
upon its evaluation of all the evidence, it could accept
defendant's theory that Johnston had acted alone or it could
accept the state's theory that Johnston and defendant had acted
together. (14)  For that reason, the accomplice-witness-as-a-matter-of-law instruction did not improperly undermine defendant's
position at trial that Johnston had acted alone.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE INDICTMENT
		In two assignments of error, defendant asserts that the
trial court did not constitutionally impose a death sentence
because the indictment did not allege an offense that made him
eligible for the death penalty.  Before discussing defendant's
argument, it will be helpful first to examine Oregon's death-penalty sentencing scheme.  ORS 163.105 provides that a person
who is convicted of aggravated murder "shall be sentenced,
pursuant to ORS 163.150, to death, life imprisonment without the
possibility of release or parole[,] or life imprisonment."  ORS
163.150, in turn, specifies the procedures for determining the
sentence for a conviction for aggravated murder, including four
questions that the jury must answer affirmatively for a person to
receive a death sentence.  ORS 163.150(1)(b)(A) and ORS
163.150(1)(d) require that, for a death sentence to be imposed,
the state must prove and the jury must find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant acted "deliberately."  If a jury returns
a special verdict answering in the affirmative the question of
deliberateness and the three other questions set out in ORS
163.150(1)(b)(B) to (D), then the trial court sentences the
defendant to death.  Under that statutory scheme, a defendant
indicted for aggravated murder is on notice that, upon
conviction, the death penalty is one of the possible sentences.
		Defendant argues that, because he cannot receive a
death sentence unless the jury determines that he acted
deliberately, deliberateness is an element of the crime of
aggravated murder when the state seeks a death sentence.  As
such, he maintains, it must be pleaded in the indictment and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. (15)  If the state fails
to allege that "element" in the indictment, defendant argues,
then the trial court cannot properly submit to a jury the
question of deliberateness.  In this case, the indictment did not
allege that defendant's conduct that caused the victim's death
had been "committed deliberately."  Therefore, according to
defendant, the court improperly submitted the question of
deliberateness to the jury during the sentencing phase of his
trial.  It further follows, defendant argues, that he was not
eligible to receive the death penalty.  
		Defendant's argument is based on Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 US 466, 120 S Ct 2348, 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), and
Ring v. Arizona, 536 US 584, 122 S Ct 2428, 153 L Ed 2d 556
(2002).  As discussed below, this court previously has considered
and rejected the interpretation of Apprendi that defendant
advances here.  However, defendant asserts that Ring supersedes
this court's reading of Apprendi.  He further argues that Ring
extends Apprendi to support his position that the indictment in
this case cannot serve as a basis for a death sentence because it
did not allege that defendant's conduct that caused the victim's
death had been "committed deliberately." 
		Defendant relies upon Apprendi for the proposition that
any fact that increases the maximum penalty for a crime is a
functional element of that crime if the state seeks the increased
penalty.  In Apprendi, 530 US at 468, the defendant pled guilty
to a "second-degree" offense, which was punishable by five to 10
years in prison.  A separate statute extended the term of
imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum if the trial judge
found by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime had been
motivated by racial animus.  Id. at 468-69.  The Supreme Court
held that that "sentencing factor," because it increased the
maximum penalty for the crime, had to "be submitted to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. at 490.  As a basis for
that holding, the Court determined that a state's failure to
charge and prove an element necessary to impose an increased
punishment violated the Fourteenth Amendment and, with it, a
defendant's guarantee of notice and right to a jury trial.  Id.
at 476.  
		Defendant concedes that this court rejected his
argument under Apprendi, summarized above, in State v. Terry, 333
Or 163, 37 P3d 157 (2001).  In Terry, this court held that,
"[b]ecause a sentence of death is not an enhancement under the
aggravated murder scheme, [but instead is one of the statutory
penalties for that crime,] the state is not required to allege in
the indictment that the murder was committed deliberately."  333
Or at 189.  See also State v. Compton, 333 Or 274, 296, 39 P3d
833 (2002) (citing Terry for that proposition).  Defendant
argues, however, that the United States Supreme Court in Ring
expanded the rule announced in Apprendi. 
		Defendant concedes that he did not preserve that
argument for review.  He argues, however, that the error is
"apparent on the face of the record."  After the Supreme Court's
decision in Ring, defendant contends, it is beyond reasonable
dispute that, because deliberateness was not charged in the
indictment, he was sentenced to death without first being charged
with a death-eligible offense.  Defendant asks this court, on the
basis of Ring, to vacate his sentence, reverse the conviction,
and remand for entry of a judgment for the crime charged in the
indictment, which defendant asserts was aggravated murder not
punishable by death.  
		There is no reason to address the issue whether
allowing the jury to decide the unalleged issue of deliberateness
is error "apparent on the face of the record" without first
determining whether it was error at all.  We therefore turn to
the merits of defendant's argument. 
       	Ring concerned a defendant who had been found guilty of
felony murder occurring in the course of an armed robbery; the
jury, however, deadlocked on the charge of premeditated murder. 
Under the applicable sentencing statutes, a person convicted of
first-degree murder could not be sentenced to death unless the
trial court made additional findings of at least one of certain
statutory aggravating factors.  Following a sentencing hearing in
which new evidence was introduced, including testimony that the
defendant had been the person who had shot the victim, the trial
court made those additional findings and sentenced the defendant
to death.  The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed.  The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant's death
sentence violated the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee
because the maximum punishment that the defendant could have
received based on the jury's verdict was life imprisonment; the
judge alone found the aggravating factors that made the defendant
eligible for the death penalty.  Ring, 536 US at ___, 122 S Ct at
2443.
		Defendant admits that, under Oregon law, the jury, not
the court, determines whether the aggravating factors are present
that make an aggravated murder defendant eligible for the death
penalty.  For that reason, the specific holding in Ring that the
death sentence violated the defendant's right to a jury trial is
inapposite here.  Nonetheless, defendant argues that the Supreme
Court's determination on a preliminary issue in Ring undermines
the analysis that this court used in Terry to distinguish
Apprendi and requires that deliberateness be considered an
element of aggravated murder punishable by death that must be
charged in the indictment.  
		As noted, in Terry, this court rejected the argument
that "deliberateness" is an element of capital aggravated murder
that must be charged in the indictment.  The court distinguished
Apprendi by noting that the defendant in Terry had received a
sentence within the statutory range of punishments for the crime
while, in Apprendi, the defendant had been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment greater than the statutory maximum for the crime. 
Terry, 333 Or 188-89.  In Ring, the State of Arizona sought to
distinguish Apprendi using a similar analysis.  The Supreme Court
rejected that argument, stating:
	"This argument overlooks Apprendi's instruction that
'the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of
effect.'  In effect, 'the required finding [of an
aggravated circumstance] expose[d] [Ring] to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty
verdict.'  The Arizona first-degree murder statute
'authorizes a maximum penalty of death only in a formal
sense,' for it explicitly cross-references the
statutory provision requiring the finding of an
aggravating circumstance before imposition of the death
penalty.  If Arizona prevailed on its opening argument,
Apprendi would be reduced to a 'meaningless and
formalistic' rule of statutory drafting."
Ring, 536 US at ___, 122 S Ct at 2440-41 (alterations in
original; citations omitted).  
	Based on that passage from Ring, defendant argues that
"deliberateness" should have been charged in his indictment
because a finding of deliberateness exposed him to a greater
punishment than the punishment that could have been imposed based
on the guilty verdict alone.  Because "deliberateness" was not
charged in the indictment, defendant maintains, the question
whether defendant acted deliberately was not submitted properly
to the jury.  Without a proper submission to the jury, he
asserts, the jury had no authority to find that he had acted
deliberately.   
		We reject defendant's argument.  Ring does not require
that "deliberateness" be charged specifically in the indictment
before the question of deliberateness can be submitted to a jury. 
The Supreme Court did not discuss in Ring the proposition on
which defendant now relies, and the Court specifically noted that
"[the defendant] does not contend that his indictment was
constitutionally defective."  Ring, 536 US at ___, 122 S Ct at
2437 n 4.  Ring addresses the issue of a capital defendant's
right to a jury trial on the facts that make the defendant
eligible for a death sentence.  Under Oregon's sentencing scheme,
a jury makes those factual determinations.  Defendant admits
that, in his case, a jury made the factual determination that he
acted deliberately. 
		In summary, in this case, unlike in Ring, the trial
court did not impose on defendant any punishment that the jury's
answers in the special verdict in the penalty phase did not
require.  Neither does Ring support defendant's argument that the
indictment was defective.  Contrary to defendant's assertion,
Ring does not require revision of this court's analysis of
Apprendi that is set out in State v. Terry.  Defendant's sentence
of death, therefore, does not violate defendant's due process or
jury trial rights.  

IV. CONCLUSION
		Based on our review of the three assignments of error
discussed above and of each of defendant's other assignments of
error not discussed in this opinion, we conclude that there was
no reversible error in the guilt or penalty phases of defendant's
trial.
		The judgment of conviction and sentence of death are
affirmed.
	DURHAM, J., dissenting.
	I dissent from the majority's analysis and conclusion
respecting the accomplice-witness instruction that the trial
court gave to the jury.
	A statute, ORS 10.095(4), requires a trial court, "on all
proper occasions," to give an instruction that requires the jury
to "view[] with distrust" the testimony of an accomplice. (16)  ORS
10.095 provides in part:
		"The jury, subject to the control of the court, in
the cases specified by statute, are the judges of the
effect or value of evidence addressed to them, except
when it is thereby declared to be conclusive.  They
are, however, to be instructed by the court on all
proper occasions:
		"* * * * *
		"(4) That the testimony of an accomplice ought to
be viewed with distrust * * *[.]"
	This court has admonished trial courts to refrain from
giving an instruction under ORS 10.095(4) "unless requested by
the defendant."  State v. Simson, 308 Or 102, 110 n 10, 775 P2d
837 (1989).  The trial court, in contradiction to the general
rule set out in Simson, chose to deliver the instruction set out
in ORS 10.095(4), despite defendant's objection.  The problem
here arises because the trial court also chose to convey to the
jury an additional factual characterization of the witness -- the
identification of Johnston as an accomplice witness as a matter
of law -- that ORS 10.095(4) does not require.  As I discuss
below, that instruction interfered with the jury's role as
factfinder and undermined the policy embodied in ORS 10.095(4).  
	In State v. Gibson, 252 Or 241, 243-44, 448 P2d 534
(1969), this court recognized the distinction between the
statutorily required accomplice-witness instruction and an
additional jury instruction that explicitly identifies a witness
to the jury as an "accomplice," and referred to the latter as an
"addendum" to the statutory instruction. (17)  In this opinion, I
too will use the term "addendum" to refer to the extra-statutory
portion of the court's jury instruction in this case that
identified Johnston as an accomplice witness as a matter of law.
	As the parties agree, and as the majority observes, the
record of the guilt phase in defendant's trial presents a sharp
factual dispute about Johnston's role in the victim's murder. 
The state introduced evidence that, if believed, would establish
that Johnston and defendant had acted together in killing the
victim.  Defendant introduced evidence that, if believed, would
establish that Johnston had acted alone in killing the victim.
	When the parties rested, the court delivered the
following jury instructions that related to the testimony of an
accomplice:
		"You are instructed that as a matter of law,
Willford Nathaniel Johnston, the 3rd, is an accomplice
witness in the commission of the crimes charged in this
indictment.  You should view an accomplice witness's
testimony with distrust.  The testimony of an
accomplice in and of itself is not sufficient to
support a conviction.  There must be, in addition, some
other evidence, however slight or circumstantial, other
than the testimony of an accomplice that tends to
connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. 
This other evidence or corroboration need not be
sufficient by itself to support a conviction, but it
must tend to show something more than just that a crime
was committed.  It must also connect or tend to connect
the defendant with the commission of the crime."
(Emphasis added.)
	Defendant objected to the addendum embodied in the
first sentence of those instructions, emphasized above, asserting
that that instruction "cut the heart out of the defense" by
defeating the defense theory that "Mr. Johnston did this crime
alone and so he [Johnston] would not have been Mr. Oatney's
accomplice."  It is clear that the challenged instruction
identified Johnston, as a matter of law, as an accomplice witness
in the commission of the crimes charged in the indictment against
defendant.  Defendant argued that the instruction "assisted the
State in proving that Mr. Oatney was, in fact, at the scene of
the crime and helping out."
	At the outset, I wish to note that I agree with the
majority's stated view that a witness qualifies as an
"accomplice," as ORS 10.095(4) uses that term, if the evidence is
sufficient to indict the witness for the crimes charged against
the defendant.  As the following discussion demonstrates, my
concern centers on the fact that the court's instruction failed
to convey that distinctive legal meaning of "accomplice" to the
jury and, thus, required the jury to rely on the materially
different common meaning of that term.  I also join the
majority's suggestion that trial courts can avoid the problem
that arises from using the word "accomplice" in a jury
instruction simply by informing the jury that the law requires
the jury to view the witness's testimony with distrust and that
other evidence must corroborate the witness's testimony.  ___ Or
at ___ n 14 (slip op at 20 n 13).
	This court's cases demonstrate that an accomplice-witness instruction can interfere with the jury's responsibility
to determine the pertinent facts relating to guilt or innocence. 
That is so because an accomplice-witness instruction can permit
or require the jury to draw multiple inferences about the state's
evidence, one or some of which assist the state in establishing
the defendant's guilt.  For example, in Simson, the defendant, a
truck driver, was charged with theft when several people stole
his truck.  Three of the thieves testified at the defendant's
trial, but did not implicate the defendant in the crime.  The
trial court gave an accomplice instruction over the defendant's
objection.  This court held that giving the accomplice
instruction was a legal error:
	"By instructing the jury that the witnesses were
accomplices in the crime as a matter of law, the trial
court effectively instructed the jury that the crime
was in fact committed.  This deprived defendant of his
right to a jury trial on all elements of the charge. 
Normally, the accomplice-as-a-matter-of-law instruction
presents no problem, because the instruction is
requested by the defendant.  A defendant will risk the
implication that a crime was committed in order to cast
doubt on the veracity of his accusers.  But, in this
case, it could serve to cast doubt only on the veracity
of those whose testimony favored him.  Defendant
received no trade-off.10
	__________
		 "10  We think that, as a general rule, these
instructions ought not to be given unless requested by
the defendant."
308 Or at 109-10.
	In Simson, this court interpreted the accomplice
instruction in a common sense fashion.  Although the instruction
did not state literally that the crime in fact had been
committed, the court had no difficulty drawing that reasonable
inference from the statement in the instruction that the
witnesses were accomplices in the crime.  Simson teaches that,
when considering the propriety of accomplice instructions, the
court takes into account not only the words of the instructions
but also the reasonable inferences that the words convey.
	In Gibson, as already noted, this court examined
whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that
defendant's associate, Wright, "'is an accomplice of the
defendant Monte Gibson[]'" in Gibson's trial for robbery.  252 Or
at 244.  Gibson had admitted that he and Wright had been
accomplices in the lesser crime of assault and battery, and that
he was guilty of that crime.  This court concluded that the
addendum instruction, identifying Wright as Gibson's accomplice,
"was erroneous, but that the error was harmless."  Id. at 245. 
The Gibson court did not explain why, under the circumstances,
the error was harmless.  I discuss the harmless error conclusion
in Gibson later in this opinion.
	The problem created by the addendum instruction in this
case more closely resembles the problem addressed in Gibson than
that in Simson.  Unlike the facts in Simson, defendant conceded
that a crime had occurred and, consequently, the accomplice-witness instruction gave the state no undue assistance in proving
that aspect of its case.
	Gibson lends support to defendant's argument that,
under the facts of this case, delivery of an addendum instruction
identifying a purported accomplice witness as a matter of law
constitutes legal error.  As in Gibson, the instruction here
bound the jury to accept that the state's witness was an
"accomplice" in the crime charged against defendant.  The word
"accomplice" has the following commonly understood definition
that, we must assume, the jurors applied:
	"[O]ne associated with another in wrongdoing : one that
participates with another in a crime either as
principal or accessory * * *."
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 12 (unabridged ed 1993). 
The factual inference that the addenda in Gibson and this case
reasonably conveyed, in the context of the evidentiary record,
was that the witness had participated in the crime with another
actor and that the other joint actor had been the named
defendant.
	The majority attempts to distinguish Gibson by pointing
out that, in Gibson, the challenged instruction expressly
described Wright as an accomplice and linked Wright with the
defendant Gibson by name, whereas the instruction here stated
that Johnston was an accomplice witness and did not mention
defendant by name. (18)  The majority's argument is unavailing, in
my view, because it fails to acknowledge fully the reasonable
inferences that arise from the instructions' words.  There is
nothing magical about the phrase "accomplice witness."  It does
not appear in ORS 10.095(4), and the trial court gave the jury no
special definition for it.  The word "witness" in the phrase
"accomplice witness" does nothing to alter the phrase's
reasonable inference that Johnston was a witness who had
participated with another actor in committing the crimes charged
in the indictment.  Moreover, the fact that the addendum
instruction here did not mention defendant by name is not
significant.  On this record, only one person possibly could have
associated with Johnston in killing the victim:  defendant.  Only
one person is named in the "crimes charged in this indictment[],"
to which the instruction referred:  defendant.  Thus, although
some of the words of the addendum here differ from those in the
addendum in Gibson, the factual message in each is
indistinguishable.
	The majority's failure to acknowledge the full effect
of labeling Johnston as an accomplice in this case operates to
defeat rather than support the legislature's purpose in enacting
ORS 10.095(4). (19)  ORS 10.095(4) embodies a legislative policy
determination that a jury ought to view with distrust "the
testimony" -- that is, all the testimony -- of an accomplice.  On
this record, that policy choice means that, if Johnston had been
involved in the murder, then the court must not undermine the
jury's responsibility to view with distrust all of Johnston's
testimony, including his claim that he and defendant had acted
together in killing the victim.  The addendum instruction here
required the jury to accept the court's factual determination, in
contradiction to defendant's testimony, that the witness was an
accomplice and, consequently, had not acted alone.
	The majority states several reasons for concluding that
the delivery of the addendum instruction in this case was not an
error.  With respect, I do not accept those reasons.  The
majority acknowledges that the instruction, "viewed alone and as
an abstract proposition, would allow a juror to conclude, from
the description of Johnston's status as an 'accomplice witness,'
that the trial court was stating that another person necessarily
had committed the crimes with Johnston."  ___ Or at ___ (slip op
at 20) (emphasis added).  The majority asserts, however, that
other instructions told the jury about the state's burden of
proof, the jury's role as factfinder, and the like.  Id. at ___
(slip op at 21).  The majority also points to the fact that the
addendum instruction was just four lines in the transcript. 
Finally, the majority asserts that the addendum "told the jury
only that Johnston was the kind of witness who was to be viewed
with distrust and whose testimony must be corroborated.  It did
not tell the jury that the jury must conclude that Johnston and
defendant had acted together."  Id. at __ (slip op at 22)
(emphasis in original).
	I agree that we must examine all the jury instructions
together to determine whether they accurately state the law.  The
addendum instruction does convey the inference, as the majority
observes, that Johnston did not act alone in committing the
murder.  Id. at ____ (slip op at 21).  However, the addendum
instruction required the jury to accept that inference about
Johnston "as a matter of law."  It did not merely "allow" the
jury to agree with that inference, and the majority errs in
asserting that the addendum was only permissive in that regard. 
	None of the other jury instructions to which the
majority refers effectively negated the addendum instruction. 
The most that we can say about those other instructions is that
they spoke generally about the subjects of the state's burden of
proof and the jury's role as the factfinder.
	The majority's assertion that the addendum instruction
took up only four lines of the transcript is beside the point. 
Finally, I cannot agree with the majority's assertion that the
addendum instruction did not tell the jury that it must conclude
that Johnston and defendant had acted together.  As noted above,
if Johnston indeed had been involved in the murder, then
defendant was the only possible person with whom Johnston could
have acted in murdering the victim.  The majority disregards both
the text of the addendum and the factual record in asserting
that, notwithstanding the court's contrary instruction as a
matter of law, the jury still could have accepted "defendant's
theory that Johnston had acted alone * * *."  Id. at __ (slip op
at 22).
	I turn to the question whether the trial court's error
harmed defendant.  The court does not presume that an
instructional error is harmful to the defendant.  The record must
demonstrate that the error may have led the jury to convict
defendant due to a misstatement of law regarding the jury's
discretion to accept or reject inculpatory testimony.  See State
v. Rawls, 247 Or 328, 330, 429 P2d 574 (1967) (instruction on
conclusive presumption regarding intent was error, because jury
entitled to accept or reject all or part of a defendant's
testimony or state's evidence).
	In this case, as noted above, defendant testified that
Johnston had acted alone in killing the victim.  He did not
concede that he took any action to aid Johnston until after
Johnston had committed the murder.  However, by identifying
Johnston as an accomplice witness as a matter of law in the
commission of the crimes charged, the addendum instruction
restricted the jury's authority to conclude, in conformance with
defendant's testimony, that Johnston had acted alone in murdering
the victim.  The court in Rawls acknowledged that there might be
only a slight possibility of a different outcome from an
instructional error that misstated the jury's factfinding role,
but nevertheless remanded for a new trial.  The same result
should obtain here.
	In Gibson, as noted above, this court concluded that,
on the facts of that case, the trial court had erred in
delivering the addendum to the accomplice-witness instruction,
but that the error was harmless.  The court never disclosed its
reasoning for that conclusion.  However, I infer from the Gibson
court's discussion that the decisive facts were that the
defendant conceded that he and Wright had been accomplices in the
commission of the lesser charge of assault and battery, that the
robbery had occurred during the assault and battery of the
victim, that the addendum instruction had made no mention of the
crime or crimes for which the defendant and Wright had been
accomplices, and that the defendant had not objected to the form
of the addendum instruction. 
	Those unique aspects of Gibson are not present here. 
The court's identification of Johnston as an accomplice witness
as a matter of law may have led the jury to conclude that,
contrary to defendant's testimony, Johnston did not act alone. 
See State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355-56, 800 P2d 259 (1990) (lack
of instruction on causation may have led jury to convict without
necessary finding on motivation for murder; "[t]he prejudice to
defendant is profound, because the missing element makes the
difference between life and death.").  Nothing else in the record
demonstrates that the error was harmless.
	For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.



1. 	The police suspected that Johnston and defendant were
using a code to discuss plans to dispose of the victim's
property.  For example, the two men discussed their desire to
dispose of "camping stuff" and the possibility of having a
"garage sale."  Police were familiar with that type of code,
which they suspected that defendant and Johnston had learned
while in prison together for previous offenses.

2. 	Defendant had vacated the premises, and his former
landlord had consented to the search.  

3. 	Defendant's objection is to a group of three
instructions to which we refer, collectively, as the "accomplice-witness" instructions. 

4. 	Those instructions were based on the Uniform Criminal
Jury Instructions currently numbered as 1057(2), 1056, and 1055,
respectively.

5. 	Simson referred to the instruction at issue in that
case as the "accomplice-as-a-matter-of-law" instruction.  We
note, however, that the instruction at issue in that case was the
same as the one at issue here, which we refer to as the
"accomplice-witness-as-a-matter-of-law" instruction.  See Simson,
308 Or at 105 n 1 (quoting accomplice-witness instruction).

6. 	The origins of the common-law rules and the statutes
regarding the testimony of accomplice witnesses and the early
Oregon cases are discussed in Note, 17 Or L Rev 118 (1938).

7. 	ORS 136.440 provides:
		"(1)  A conviction cannot be had upon the
testimony of an accomplice unless it is corroborated by
other evidence that tends to connect the defendant with
the commission of the offense.  The corroboration is
not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the
offense or the circumstances of the commission.
		"(2) As used in this section, an 'accomplice'
means a witness in a criminal action who, according to
the evidence adduced in the action, is criminally
liable for the conduct of the defendant under ORS
161.155 and 161.165 * * *."	

8. 	ORS 10.095 provides, in part:
		"The jury, subject to the control of the court, in
the cases specified by statute, are the judges of the
effect or value of evidence addressed to them, except
when it is thereby declared to be conclusive.  They
are, however, to be instructed by the court on all
proper occasions:
		"* * * * * 
		"(4)  That the testimony of an accomplice ought to
be viewed with distrust."

9. 	ORS 161.165 relates to victims of crimes and persons
whose conduct is necessarily incidental to crimes and, thus, is
inapplicable to the issue discussed here.  ORS 161.155 provides:
		"A person is criminally liable for the conduct of
another person constituting a crime if:
		"* * * * *
		"(2)  With the intent to promote or facilitate the
commission of the crime the person:
		"(a)  Solicits or commands such other person to
commit the crime; or
		"(b)  Aids or abets or agrees or attempts to aid
or abet such other person in planning or committing the
crime; or
		"(c)  Having a legal duty to prevent the
commission of the crime, fails to make an effort the
person is legally required to make."

10. 	Of course, if the trial court determines, as a matter
of law, that a witness is not an accomplice, then the defendant
may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of that
witness, and none of the accomplice-witness instructions should
be given.  A number of this court's accomplice-witness cases
involve the defendant's assertion that the trial court erred in
concluding that a witness was not an accomplice, thus allowing
the defendant to be convicted even in the absence of
corroborating evidence.  See, e.g., State v. Coffey, 157 Or 457,
463-76, 72 P2d 35 (1937) (rejecting defendant's claim that
witness was accomplice and that conviction based on witness's
uncorroborated testimony should be reversed).

11. 	The reason for placing that burden on the defendant is
obvious: If the witness is an accomplice, then the defendant
receives the benefit of the statutory requirement that the state
present evidence that corroborates the testimony of the
accomplice, as well as the benefit of the credibility
instruction.

12. 	We note that Simson appears to be the only case in
which an Oregon court ever has reversed a conviction because the
trial court erroneously gave an accomplice-witness-as-a-matter-of-law instruction.  Simson involved the situation -- not present
in this case -- of testimony of an alleged accomplice of the
defendant that was introduced by the prosecution, but was highly
favorable to the defendant. 

13. 	The potential mischief that arises from the use of the
word "accomplice" in any formulation of the accomplice-witness
instructions can be avoided.  If the trial court determines that
a witness is an accomplice witness as a matter of law, then it
may instruct the jury that the testimony of that witness must be
viewed with distrust and must be corroborated, without telling
the jury that the witness is an "accomplice witness" as a matter
of law.

14. 	The dissent asserts that the trial court's instructions
"required the jury to accept the court's factual determination * * * that [Johnston] was an accomplice and, consequently, had
not acted alone," 335 Or ___, ___, ___ P3d ___ (2003) (Durham,
J., dissenting) (slip op at 9), and "bound the jury to accept
that [Johnston] was an 'accomplice' in the crime charged against
the defendant."  Id. at ___ (slip op at 7).  That is incorrect. 
As discussed in the text, the trial court did not make a "factual
determination" that Johnston acted with another person in
committing the murder, but only that there was sufficient
evidence to charge Johnston as the accomplice of defendant in the
commission of the murder.  Moreover, the instructions did not
bind the jury to accept either the dissent's asserted "factual
determination" that Johnston acted with another person or any
inference to that effect.  For the reasons discussed in the text,
the instructions only identified Johnston as the kind of witness
whose testimony was to be viewed with distrust and was in need of
corroboration.

15. 	In defendant's indictment for aggravated murder, counts
one through four charged defendant with "personally and
intentionally" causing the death of the victim.  In counts five
through eight, the indictment charged defendant with "unlawfully
and intentionally" causing the death of the victim.  

16. 	As the majority states, ORS 136.440 also prohibits
conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.  I
do not separately analyze the effect of ORS 136.440 on this case.

17. 	In Gibson, the state prosecuted Gibson for robbery
after Gibson and a drinking companion, Wright, beat and kicked
the victim, Landa.  One or both of the aggressors also took
Landa's billfold and money.  Gibson and Wright accused each other
of the robbery.  Addressing an assignment that the trial court
had erred by adding an explicit identification of the accomplice
to the statutory accomplice witness instruction, this court
stated:
		"Since a part of the state's evidence against
Gibson had been supplied by the testimony of Wright,
the court was required to instruct that the testimony
of an accomplice was to be viewed with distrust.  After
giving the instruction in the words of the statute, the
court then added, 'and as a matter of law, I instruct
you in this case that Larry Wright is an accomplice of
the defendant Monte Gibson.'
		"The defendant interprets the addendum to the
instruction as an instruction to the jury that if they
believed that Wright was guilty of the robbery then
they must also find the defendant guilty."
252 Or at 243-44 (emphasis added).

18. 	The majority asserts that Johnston met the legal
definition of an accomplice and that the addendum portrayed
Johnston as an accomplice witness to a crime, not as defendant's
accomplice.  In Simson, this court noted that the dissenting
opinion in the Court of Appeals had relied on the same
distinction, but ultimately rejected that dissenting opinion. 
308 Or at 107-08.

19. 	That concern arguably is more pronounced under the
facts of this case than in Gibson.  Here, unlike in Gibson,
defendant admitted no involvement or cooperation with the state's
witness in carrying out the crimes charged in the indictment.