Case Title: State v. Spaeth

Citation: 2014 WI 71

Docket Number: 2012AP002170

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 71 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2170   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the commitment of Joseph J. Spaeth: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
     v. 
Joseph J. Spaeth, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 13, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas J. Gritton 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., 
dissent. (Opinion filed.)  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant, the cause was argued by 
Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief by Shelley 
M. Fite, assistant state public defender, and oral argument by 
Shelley M. Fite. 
 
 
 
2014 WI 71
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP2170 
(L.C. No. 
2010CI1) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the commitment of Joseph J. Spaeth: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph J. Spaeth, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for 
Winnebago County, Thomas J. Gritton, Judge.  Reversed and cause 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This case is before the 
court on certification by the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 809.61 (2011-2012).  
¶2 
The question before us is whether a petition filed 
under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 ("Chapter 980") can be invalidated when 
the conviction recited in the petition is later reversed.  In 
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
2 
 
order to seek commitment of a sexually violent person under 
Chapter 980, the State must file a petition that meets the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 980.02 (2009-10).1  One such 
requirement is that the State allege the individual has 
committed a sexually violent offense, which we refer to as a 
"predicate offense."2  Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(a).  The central 
dispute between the parties in this case is what is necessary to 
satisfy this statutory requirement.  The State argues that if 
the petition met the statutory requirements in Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.02 at the time it was filed, it is irrelevant if the 
conviction for the predicate offense recited in the petition is 
later reversed.  Spaeth argues that, because his conviction for 
the predicate offense was later reversed, the State's Chapter 
980 petition is insufficient to support commitment.   
¶3  We hold that the sufficiency of a Chapter 980 petition 
should be assessed as of the time of filing.  At the time the 
State's petition was filed, the statutory requirements in Wis. 
Stat. § 980.02 were satisfied.  We therefore hold that the 
Chapter 980 petition to commit Spaeth should not have been 
dismissed.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's order to 
dismiss the petition, and we remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated.  
2 See State v. Gilbert, 2012 WI 72, ¶51, 342 Wis. 2d 82, 816 
N.W.2d 215 (adopting the term "predicate offense" to refer to 
the sexually violent offense recited in a Chapter 980 petition). 
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
3 
 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
The facts in this case are undisputed.  In 1993, the 
defendant, Joseph J. Spaeth ("Spaeth"), was convicted of first-
degree sexual assault of a child ("the 1993 conviction") in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (1991-92).  Spaeth was 
paroled on the 1993 conviction in 2004.  In February 2006, 
Spaeth submitted to an annual polygraph examination that was 
required under the terms of his parole.  During the examination, 
Spaeth admitted that, while wrestling and tickling his minor 
relatives, he had "touch[ed] or brush[ed] their buttocks, breast 
and vaginal areas."  As a result of these statements, Spaeth's 
parole in the 1993 conviction was revoked.   
¶5 
In addition to the revocation of his parole, Spaeth's 
statements during the polygraph examination and his subsequent 
statements to police also resulted in new charges in April 2006.  
In July 2007, a jury convicted Spaeth of four counts of sexual 
assault of a child under 13 years of age in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 948.02(1) (2005–06).3  On October 20, 2008, Spaeth's 
convictions were vacated by the circuit court due to prejudicial 
and extraneous information in the jury room.4  The State amended 
the charges from the 2007 case, and in March 2009, Spaeth pled 
no contest to four counts of child enticement contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 948.07(1) ("the 2009 convictions").   
                                                 
3 The Honorable Thomas J. Gritton presided.   
4 In June 2008, prior to the circuit court's October 2008 
vacatur of the 2007 jury convictions, Spaeth was discharged from 
his sentence for the 1993 conviction.  However, Spaeth remained 
in custody as a result of the April 2006 charges. 
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
4 
 
¶6 
On November 2, 2010, the State filed a petition to 
commit Spaeth as a sexually violent person pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 980.02.  The petition alleged, in pertinent part: 
The Respondent, Joseph J. Spaeth, has been convicted 
of a sexually violent offense(s).  Specifically, on or 
about July 3, 2007, in Winnebago County Circuit Court 
File No. 06CF350, the Respondent was convicted of four 
(4) counts of Child Enticement-Sexual Contact in 
violation of Wisconsin Statute Section 948.07(1). 
Although the petition refers to convictions occurring on July 3, 
2007, this appears to be an error, as Spaeth was convicted of 
the charges recited in the petition——four counts of child 
enticement——in March 2009.  As discussed above, the July 3, 2007 
convictions were for four counts of sexual assault of a child, 
and these convictions were vacated by the circuit court on 
October 20, 2008.  We assume for the purposes of this opinion 
that the State refers to the 2009 convictions in its petition.  
¶7 
At the time the State's petition was filed, Spaeth was 
scheduled for release from detention on the 2009 convictions on 
November 9, 2010.  In response to the State's petition, however, 
Spaeth was transferred to a Department of Health and Family 
Services facility.   
¶8 
In July 2012, this court reversed Spaeth's March 2009 
convictions, holding that they were derived from compelled 
testimony.5  The State dismissed the charges against Spaeth the 
following month.  Subsequently, the State informed the circuit 
                                                 
5 State v. Spaeth, 2012 WI 95, ¶79, 343 Wis. 2d 220, 819 
N.W.2d 769. 
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
5 
 
court that it intended to proceed with Spaeth's Chapter 980 
commitment, and the State sought to amend the Chapter 980 
petition to include Spaeth's 1993 conviction.6  Spaeth opposed 
this amendment and argued that the Chapter 980 petition must be 
dismissed. 
¶9 
In September 2012, the circuit court denied the 
State's proposed amendment and dismissed the petition.  The 
circuit court reasoned that, while there was "a legitimate basis 
for the State to bring this action" at the time the petition was 
filed, once the March 2009 convictions were reversed and the 
charges dismissed, the State could no longer rely on those 
convictions as a predicate offense to support its petition.  In 
addition, the circuit court concluded that amending the petition 
to include the 1993 conviction would not correct the deficiency, 
because Spaeth was not in custody for that offense at the time 
the 
petition 
was 
filed 
as 
required 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.02(1m).  
¶10 The State appealed the circuit court's ruling, and the 
court of appeals certified the appeal to this court.   
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶11 Under Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(3), by accepting a 
certified appeal, this court acquires jurisdiction of the entire 
                                                 
6 The record is unclear regarding whether the State intended 
to replace the 2009 convictions with the 1993 conviction as the 
predicate offense, or to simply include the 1993 conviction as 
an additional predicate offense.  However, in light of our 
holding, the distinction is irrelevant. 
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
6 
 
appeal, not merely the questions certified.  State v. Henley, 
2010 WI 97, ¶28, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 N.W.2d 350. 
¶12 This case requires us to interpret Chapter 980, which 
governs the civil commitment of sexually violent persons.  
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that this court 
reviews de novo.  Crown Castle USA, Inc. v. Orion Constr. Grp., 
LLC, 2012 WI 29, ¶12, 339 Wis. 2d 252, 811 N.W.2d 332.  While we 
interpret statutes independently, we benefit from the analyses 
of lower courts.  Id. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶13 The question before us is whether a Chapter 980 
petition that was sufficient at the time it was filed is 
invalidated when the conviction recited in the petition is later 
reversed.  The State argues that the validity of the petition 
should be assessed at the time of filing.  Later reversal of the 
conviction recited in the petition is irrelevant, according to 
the State, because pursuant to this court's decision in State v. 
Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995), and the court 
of appeals' decision in State v. Virlee, 2003 WI App 4, 259 
Wis. 2d 718, 657 N.W.2d 106, a court should consider only the 
facts that existed when the petition was filed.  The State 
maintains that its petition satisfied the statutory requirements 
of Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1m)-(2) because Spaeth was in custody for 
a sexually violent offense at the time the petition was filed.  
Therefore, the State contends that the circuit court improperly 
examined the petition based on the facts at the time the State 
moved to amend, rather than at the time the petition was filed.   
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
7 
 
¶14 Spaeth argues the circuit court properly considered 
the fact that his 2009 convictions were vacated, because if the 
predicate offense recited in the petition is no longer valid, 
there is no basis for Spaeth's commitment. 
¶15 We conclude that the State's petition satisfies the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 980.02 and was not invalidated by 
the reversal of Spaeth's 2009 convictions.   We begin in Part A 
by 
reviewing 
the 
statutory 
requirements 
for 
Chapter 
980 
commitment.  In Part B, we address whether the circuit court 
properly dismissed the State's Chapter 980 petition.  We 
conclude that if a Chapter 980 petition satisfies the statutory 
requirements in Wis. Stat. § 980.02 at the time it is filed, it 
will not be invalidated if the conviction recited in the 
petition is later reversed.  Consequently, we determine that the 
State's petition should not have been dismissed.7  
A. Requirements for Chapter 980 Commitment 
¶16 Chapter 980 provides the State with a mechanism to 
commit, for the purpose of treatment, individuals found to be 
"sexually violent person[s]" to the custody of the Department of 
Health and Family Services.  Wis. Stat. § 980.06.  The State 
                                                 
7 In holding that the State's petition meets the statutory 
requirements in Wis. Stat. § 980.02, we merely determine that 
the State's petition is sufficient to proceed to the next step 
in the Chapter 980 commitment process.  The State still bears 
the burden of establishing "probable cause to believe that the 
person named in the petition is a sexually violent person" at a 
probable cause hearing, Wis. Stat. § 980.04(3), and if it does 
so, the State must prove these allegations "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" at trial.  Wis. Stat. § 980.05(3)(a).   
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
8 
 
must seek this commitment by filing a petition pursuant to the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 980.02.  Among other things, Wis. 
Stat. § 980.02 explains that a valid Chapter 980 petition must 
"be filed before the person is released or discharged."8  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.02(1m).  In addition, Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(a) 
directs that a Chapter 980 petition must allege one of the 
following criteria: 
1. The person has been convicted of a sexually 
violent offense.  
2. The person has been found delinquent for a 
sexually violent offense.  
3. The person has been found not guilty of a 
sexually violent offense by reason of mental disease 
or defect. 
The petition must also "state with particularity essential facts 
to establish probable cause to believe the person is a sexually 
violent person."  Wis. Stat. § 980.02(3).   
                                                 
8 The dissent notes that in Gilbert, we explained that in 
addition to alleging a sexually violent offense in the petition, 
the petition must be "'filed before the person is released or 
discharged' 
from 
the 
sentence 
for 
that 
sexually 
violent 
offense."  Gilbert, 2012 WI 72, ¶51 (citing Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.02(1m)); dissent, ¶57.  We do not dispute that "the 
sexually violent offense that is a basis for the petition under 
§ 980.02 must be the same offense for which the person is 
confined at the time of the petition's filing."  Dissent, ¶57.  
However, the confinement requirement does not extend to the 
probable cause hearing under Wis. Stat. § 980.04 or trial under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05.  As discussed below, nothing in Chapter 980 
provides that the State may produce evidence at the probable 
cause hearing and trial only if that evidence was first recited 
in the petition.  Thus, the State may introduce additional 
evidence at these proceedings not connected to the individual's 
confinement at the time the petition was filed.   
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
9 
 
¶17 Once a Chapter 980 petition is filed, the circuit 
court "shall hold a hearing to determine whether there is 
probable cause to believe that the person named in the petition 
is a sexually violent person."  Wis. Stat. § 980.04(2a).  If 
probable cause is found, a trial must commence within 90 days 
after the probable cause hearing.  Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1).  At 
trial, the State "has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the person who is the subject of the petition is a 
sexually violent person."  Wis. Stat. § 980.05(3)(a).  "If a 
court or jury determines that [the individual] is a sexually 
violent person" under the statutory definition, then the court 
must order commitment pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.06. 
¶18 We now turn to the sufficiency of the State's Chapter 
980 petition and examine whether the petition was invalidated by 
this court's reversal of Spaeth's 2009 convictions.9  
B. The State's Chapter 980 Petition 
¶19 In its petition, the State explained Spaeth had been 
convicted of a sexually violent offense, and he was in custody 
for that offense at the time the petition was filed.  The 
circuit court nevertheless dismissed the State's Chapter 980 
petition because the 2009 convictions were later reversed and 
the case dismissed.  
¶20 We conclude that the circuit court erred in dismissing 
the Chapter 980 petition based on the fact that the underlying 
                                                 
9 As discussed supra ¶6, we assume the convictions recited 
in the petition are Spaeth's 2009 convictions.   
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
10 
 
predicate offense was later vacated.  To determine whether a 
Chapter 980 petition meets the statutory requirements in Wis. 
Stat. § 980.02, a court should consider the sufficiency of the 
allegations in the petition at the time the petition was filed.  
Subsequent facts that impact the status of the allegations in 
the petition may be relevant at trial under Wis. Stat. § 980.05, 
but 
they 
will 
not 
invalidate 
a 
petition 
that 
met 
the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 980.02 at the time of filing.  In 
reaching this conclusion, we examine the statute's plain 
language, 
relevant 
precedent, 
and 
finally, 
Chapter 
980's 
underlying purpose. 
1. Petitions Filed Under Wis. Stat. § 980.02 
¶21 We begin our analysis by examining the statutory 
requirements to file a Chapter 980 petition in Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.02.  Statutory interpretation "begins with the language of 
the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 
Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  In addition to the plain language 
of the statute, "scope, context, and purpose are perfectly 
relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous 
statute . . . ."  Id. at ¶48. 
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.02(1m) provides that a Chapter 
980 petition must "be filed before the person is released or 
discharged."  (Emphasis added).  To assess whether the custody 
requirement in Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1m) is satisfied, a court 
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
11 
 
must simply ask whether the petition was filed while the person 
was still in custody for the predicate offense.  Nothing in 
Chapter 980 suggests that a subsequent change in circumstances 
must render the petition invalid.10  Likewise, Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.02(2) provides that "[a] petition filed under this section 
shall allege" a predicate offense.  The provision does not state 
that later reversal of the conviction for the predicate offense 
will invalidate the petition, and we will not read requirements 
into a statute that do not exist.  If the statutory requirements 
are met, the State may proceed to a probable cause hearing, 
                                                 
10 On the contrary, various provisions in Chapter 980 
demonstrate that a subsequent reversal of the conviction recited 
in a petition does not automatically invalidate the petition.  
For instance, Wis. Stat. § 980.101 addresses the scenario where 
an individual has been committed under Chapter 980 and the 
conviction for the predicate offense recited in the petition is 
later reversed.  The statute explains that if "there are other 
judgments relating to a sexually violent offense committed by 
the person that have not been reversed, set aside, or vacated" 
and that were not recited in the State's initial petition for 
commitment, "the court shall determine whether to grant the 
person a new trial . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 980.101(2)(b).  
Although this provision does not apply here because Spaeth has 
not been committed at trial, it demonstrates that reversal of a 
conviction for a predicate offense will not conclusively 
terminate the State's petition.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110 ("statutory language is interpreted . . . not in 
isolation 
but 
as 
part 
of 
a 
whole . . . ."). 
 
Moreover, 
§ 980.101(2)(b) informs us this is especially true in cases such 
as Spaeth's, where the State can point to an additional 
conviction for a sexually violent offense to support commitment. 
Other provisions in Chapter 980 permit commitment of an 
individual who has never been convicted of a sexually violent 
offense at all.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 980.01(7), .02(2)(a)(3) 
(allowing Chapter 980 commitment for individuals found not 
guilty due to insanity, illness, or mental disease or defect).   
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
12 
 
where it must establish "probable cause to believe that the 
person named in the petition is a sexually violent person."  
Wis. Stat. § 980.04(2)(a).   
¶23 The dissent alleges that the petition is invalid 
because a vacated conviction cannot "support probable cause to 
believe the person is a sexually violent person" as required 
under Wis. Stat. § 980.02(3).  Dissent, ¶58.  We disagree.  The 
relevant inquiry is whether, at the time of filing, the facts 
recited in the petition satisfied the statutory requirements in 
Wis. Stat. § 980.02.  Here, the petition relied on a conviction 
for a sexually violent offense that was vacated nearly two years 
after the petition was filed.  Thus, at the time of filing, the 
petition recited sufficient facts to satisfy the probable cause 
standard in Wis. Stat. § 980.02(3).   
¶24 We further note that the requirements in Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.02 pertain to the petition only.  In asking whether a 
petition satisfies this statutory provision, we do not look 
ahead to the standard for a probable cause hearing under Wis. 
Stat. § 980.04 or a trial under Wis. Stat. § 980.05, which will 
necessarily contain testimony and other evidence that may differ 
from the bare bones allegations in the State's petition.  If the 
strength of the State's case has changed because the conviction 
in the petition was reversed, that becomes a matter to be 
considered by the trier of fact, beginning with the probable 
cause hearing.  Wisconsin Stat. § 980.04(2)(a) unequivocally 
states, "[w]henever a petition is filed under s. 980.02, the 
court shall hold a hearing to determine whether there is 
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
13 
 
probable cause to believe that the person named in the petition 
is a sexually violent person."  (Emphasis added).    
¶25 The dissent also asserts that "[t]he offense listed in 
the petition is the offense on which the state must defend its 
petition and then demonstrate probable cause."  Dissent, ¶61.  
To address the dissent's position, we will begin by briefly 
discussing the statutory history of Chapter 980.  In 2006, the 
legislature 
amended 
the 
proof 
requirement 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.05(3)(a).  Prior to this amendment, the statute provided: 
"At a trial on a petition under this chapter, the petitioner has 
the burden of proving the allegations in the petition beyond a 
reasonable 
doubt." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.05(3)(a) 
(2003-04).  
However, subsequent to the 2006 amendment, the State is now 
required to prove only "that the person who is the subject of 
the petition is a sexually violent person."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.05(3)(a).  The State is thus no longer limited to the 
facts in its petition in order to establish a case for 
commitment at trial.   
¶26 While the amendment of Wis. Stat. § 980.05(3)(a) 
pertained only to Chapter 980 trials, no parallel requirement 
ever existed for a probable cause hearing under Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.04 that would preclude the State from introducing evidence 
not recited in the petition.  Thus, the State is not foreclosed 
from producing additional evidence at either the probable cause 
hearing or at trial, or both, to support its petition.   
¶27 The dissent can point to no provision in Chapter 980 
that confines the State to its allegations in the petition 
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
14 
 
during later proceedings.  Indeed, such a restriction would 
unnecessarily inhibit the State by prohibiting the introduction 
of evidence that may emerge after the State's petition has been 
filed, such as additional sexually violent conduct.  Our role is 
to interpret statutes as they are written.  If the legislature 
wishes to amend the statute, it may do so, but unlike the 
dissent, we will not base our interpretation of unambiguous 
statutory language on what the legislature "suggest[ed]"11 or 
"impl[ied]."12  We are charged simply with determining whether 
the State's petition met the statutory requirements in Chapter 
980, and the answer is plainly, "yes." 13      
2. Application of Wis. Stat. § 980.02 in Prior Cases 
¶28 Our 
statutory 
interpretation 
of 
Chapter 
980 
is 
consistent with precedent concluding that a later change in 
circumstances will not invalidate a petition if it was valid at 
the time of filing.  For instance, in State v. Carpenter, 197 
Wis. 2d 252, the Department of Corrections ("DOC") recalculated 
the defendant's mandatory release date based on a court of 
                                                 
11 Dissent, ¶¶57, 59. 
12 Dissent, ¶56. 
13  We note this court has previously held that Spaeth's 
statements leading to the 2009 convictions constituted compelled 
testimony, the fruits of which are inadmissible at trial.  
Spaeth, 343 Wis. 2d 220, ¶¶58, 67.  Thus, the State must rely on 
other evidence to establish "probable cause to believe that the 
person named in the petition is a sexually violent person" at 
the probable cause hearing, and, if it is successful in so 
doing, to prove its allegations "beyond a reasonable doubt" at 
trial.  Wis. Stat. §§ 980.04(3), .05(3)(a).      
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
15 
 
appeals decision that was later reversed by this court.  We 
examined the facts as they existed "[a]t the time the petition 
was initiated" and concluded that the State's Chapter 980 
petition was valid even though, as in this case, the defendant's 
detention was predicated upon a decision that was later 
reversed.  Id. at 275.  We explained, "[t]he fact that this 
court ultimately reversed the court of appeals' decision does 
not render the DOC['s detention] 'illegal.'"  Id. 
¶29 Carpenter was subsequently applied by the court of 
appeals in State v. Virlee, 259 Wis. 2d 718.  In Virlee, the 
defendant was awarded a sentence credit that moved his mandatory 
release date to a date prior to when the State filed its Chapter 
980 petition.  Nevertheless, the court of appeals determined 
that the State satisfied the requirements in Wis. Stat. § 980.02 
because the petition was valid at the time it was filed.  The 
court reasoned that "the trial court's subsequent modification 
of Virlee's sentence does not change the fact the State filed 
the petition within ninety days14 of his actual release from 
prison."  Id., ¶18.  Likewise, our reversal of Spaeth's 2009 
convictions——which were the predicate offenses in the State's 
Chapter 980 petition——does not somehow immunize Spaeth from a 
potential Chapter 980 commitment when he was in custody for a 
sexually violent offense at the time the State filed its 
petition.   
                                                 
14  Chapter 980 was amended in 2006.  Prior to the 
amendment, the statute required a petition to be filed when 
"[t]he person is within 90 days of discharge or release . . . ."  
Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(ag) (2003-04).   
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
16 
 
¶30  As we explained in State v. Gilbert, there are only 
two means by which a court may dismiss a Chapter 980 petition: 
"1) failure to find probable cause 'to believe that the person 
is a sexually violent person' under § 980.04(3), or 2) failure 
to prove 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a 
sexually violent person' under § 980.05(5)."  State v. Gilbert, 
2012 WI 72, ¶29, 342 Wis. 2d 82, 816 N.W.2d 215.  Later reversal 
of the conviction for the predicate offense recited in the 
petition, without more, is simply not an appropriate ground for 
dismissal of the petition.15   
3. The Purpose of Chapter 980 
¶31 We may also look to a statute's purpose in examining 
its plain meaning.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶48 (A statute's 
"purpose 
[is] 
perfectly 
relevant 
to 
a 
plain-meaning 
interpretation of an unambiguous statute . . . .").  The primary 
goals of Chapter 980 are "1) the treatment of sexually violent 
persons, and 2) the protection of society from those persons."  
Gilbert, 342 Wis. 2d 82, ¶23.  Our reasoning is consistent with, 
and supports, the purpose of Chapter 980.   
¶32 The State is required to file its Chapter 980 petition 
"before the person is released or discharged."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.02(1m).  The State is aided in satisfying this requirement 
by Wis. Stat. § 980.015, which requires the agency with custody 
over a sexually violent offender to notify the State within 90 
                                                 
15 This is in part because, under Wis. Stat. § 980.04(2)(a), 
a probable cause hearing must be held "[w]henever a petition is 
filed . . . ."   
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
17 
 
days of the prisoner's impending discharge or release.  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.015(2)(a).  The practical effect of this provision 
is the State will generally have a 90-day window in which to 
file its Chapter 980 petition and pursue commitment of an 
individual that it believes is sexually violent.  It is 
therefore essential for the State to be able to rely on the 
facts as they exist at the time the petition is filed.   
¶33 As illustrated by Carpenter and Virlee, any number of 
conceivable circumstances may arise after a Chapter 980 petition 
has been filed that relate to its underlying allegations.  Under 
Spaeth's reasoning, if such circumstances arise after the 
individual has been released from custody, the State would be 
unable to pursue commitment of the individual even though it 
complied with all the statutory requirements in Chapter 980.  In 
other words, if a later change in circumstances could invalidate 
a petition that was otherwise valid at the time of filing, the 
State would be at risk of losing its ability to commit a 
sexually violent person through no fault of its own, and even 
though the State met all the statutory requirements to proceed 
to commitment.  Such an outcome would be contrary to the primary 
purpose of Chapter 980, which is "to treat sexually violent 
persons and to protect society from the dangers posed by those 
persons."  State v. West, 2011 WI 83, ¶27, 336 Wis. 2d 578, 800 
N.W.2d 929; see also Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (We must 
interpret statutes "reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results"). 
4. Application 
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
18 
 
¶34  Applying our reasoning to the facts of this case, we 
conclude 
that 
the 
State's 
petition 
met 
the 
statutory 
requirements at the time it was filed and should not have been 
dismissed.16  First, the petition was filed before Spaeth was 
"released or discharged" pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1m).  
In addition, Spaeth was "convicted of a sexually violent 
offense"——the 
2009 
convictions——pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.02(2)(a)(1).  The State filed a valid petition based on 
the facts as they existed at the time.  The fact that Spaeth's 
conviction was later overturned unquestionably impacts the 
strength of the State's case for his commitment, but this does 
not negate the validity of the State's petition at the time of 
filing. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶35 We hold that the sufficiency of a Chapter 980 petition 
should be assessed as of the time of filing.  At the time the 
State's petition was filed, the statutory requirements in Wis. 
Stat. § 980.02 were satisfied.  We therefore hold that the 
Chapter 980 petition to commit Spaeth should not have been 
dismissed.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's order to 
                                                 
16 The State makes the alternative argument that, even if 
the petition was insufficient because the 2009 convictions were 
reversed, the circuit court nevertheless erred in denying its 
motion to amend the petition and include the 1993 conviction.  
Because we conclude that the State's petition met the statutory 
requirements and should not have been dismissed, we need not 
address whether the State should have been granted leave to 
amend. 
No. 
2012AP2170   
 
19 
 
dismiss the petition, and we remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed, 
and the cause is remanded.  
 
 
 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶36 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  The question 
presented in this case is whether a petition filed pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 980.02 (Chapter 980 petition) for the civil 
commitment of a sexually violent person must be dismissed when 
the conviction for the predicate offense has been reversed and 
the charges dismissed.  The majority concludes that when 
assessing a Chapter 980 petition, a reviewing court may focus on 
the sufficiency of the petition solely at the time it was filed, 
Majority op., ¶35, enabling the State to prove a different 
sexually violent offense at the probable cause hearing and at 
trial, even if the different sexually violent offense could not 
have been listed in the original petition.  Because I strongly 
disagree with this conclusion and believe that a petition must 
remain viable in its original form or be amended to make it 
viable, I respectfully dissent. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶37 Joseph J. Spaeth (Spaeth) was charged with first-
degree sexual assault of a child1 in 1992 and convicted of the 
offense in 1993 (1993 conviction).  Twice, on January 9, 2003, 
and again on July 12, 2004, a Department of Corrections (DOC) 
evaluator determined that Spaeth did not meet the criteria for 
commitment under Wis. Stat. ch. 980; thus, on August 8, 2004, 
DOC released Spaeth on parole. 
¶38 Eighteen months later, on February 15, 2006, Spaeth 
was directed to meet with his parole agent to participate in a 
compulsory polygraph examination.  During the examination 
                                                 
1 Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (1991-92). 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
2 
 
process, he admitted to his agent that he "may have brushed up 
against his nieces and nephews [sic] vaginas or butts or breast 
area."  State v. Spaeth, 2012 WI 95, ¶11, 343 Wis. 2d 220, 819 
N.W.2d 769.  Inasmuch as Spaeth was prohibited from having 
unsupervised contact with minors and engaging in physical 
contact with minors, the agent immediately commenced parole 
revocation proceedings by asking Oshkosh police to take Spaeth 
into custody.  Id., ¶¶9-11. 
¶39 On May 8, 2006, the Wisconsin Division of Hearings and 
Appeals revoked Spaeth's parole for the 1993 conviction.  He was 
eventually discharged from the 1993 conviction in June 2008. 
¶40 It should be noted that the State could have filed a 
Chapter 980 petition against Spaeth before he was discharged in 
2008.  But the State had different plans. 
¶41 When Oshkosh police took Spaeth into custody on the 
parole revocation hold, they questioned him to provide grounds 
for new criminal charges.  After receiving a Miranda2 warning, 
Spaeth admitted to an Oshkosh detective that on February 11, 
2006, he started tickling his niece at his brother's house, and 
"his hand brushed up against her vagina, buttocks, and chest."  
He indicated that a similar incident took place on February 14, 
2006, with three of his nieces. 
¶42 On April 25, 2006, the State filed a complaint 
charging Spaeth with four counts of sexual assault of a child 
under 13 years of age as a persistent repeater contrary to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 948.02(1), 939.50(3)(b), 939.62(2m)(b)2.  On July 3, 
                                                 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
3 
 
2007, a jury found Spaeth guilty on all four counts, and a 
judgment of conviction was filed on July 5, 2007 (2007 
convictions). 
¶43 On October 20, 2008, the circuit court vacated 
Spaeth's 2007 convictions because it discovered that the jury 
had been exposed to prejudicial information regarding Spaeth's 
status 
as 
a 
convicted 
sex 
offender. 
 
See 
Spaeth, 
343 
Wis. 2d 220, ¶24. 
¶44 On March 13, 2009, Spaeth pled no contest to four 
counts of child enticement contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.07(1) 
(2005-06).  The court entered a judgment of conviction on those 
four counts on May 8, 2009 (2009 convictions).  The court 
sentenced Spaeth to five years of initial confinement and ten 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision 
for 
each 
count, 
to 
run 
concurrently with all other counts.  Because of the length of 
his custody before these convictions, Spaeth was eligible for 
1254 days of sentence credit. 
¶45 On October 22, 2010, a DOC evaluator created a report 
diagnosing Spaeth with paraphilia not otherwise specified3——a 
condition that the evaluator believed qualified as a mental 
disorder under Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  Thereafter, on November 2, 
                                                 
3 The evaluator stated, "The essential features of a 
Paraphilia are recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, 
sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving 1) nonhuman 
objects, 2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one's 
partner, or 3) children or other nonconsenting persons, that 
occur over a period of at least 6 months."  The "not otherwise 
specified" designation means that the person's presentation is 
consistent with the general guidelines for a mental disorder but 
that there are atypical or mixed symptoms. 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
4 
 
2010, the State filed a Chapter 980 petition to commit Spaeth as 
a "sexually violent person."  The petition alleged the 2009 
convictions as the "predicate offense"4 and noted that Spaeth was 
set to be released from the sentence imposed for these 
convictions on or about November 9, 2010.  In response to the 
Chapter 980 petition, the circuit court issued an order 
transferring Spaeth from DOC to a facility approved by the 
Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS). 
¶46 Spaeth had appealed his 2009 convictions.  On July 13, 
2012, this court reversed these convictions on grounds that they 
were derived from compelled testimony to his parole agent and 
therefore could not be used against Spaeth in a later criminal 
trial.  Spaeth, 343 Wis. 2d 220, ¶79.  When the case was 
remanded to Winnebago County, the district attorney dismissed 
the charges.  The reversal and the dismissal wholly vacated the 
2009 convictions. 
¶47 Despite the reversal of the predicate offense and the 
dismissal of those charges, the State filed a letter with the 
circuit court on August 15, 2012, asserting that the State 
intended to proceed with the Chapter 980 petition.  In the 
letter, the State said that it would rely on the 1993 conviction 
to prove that Spaeth is a sexually violent person. 
                                                 
4 For the predicate offense, the petition alleged that "on 
or about July 3, 2007, in Winnebago County Circuit Court File 
No. 06CF350, the Respondent was convicted of four (4) counts of 
Child Enticement-Sexual Contact in violation of Wisconsin 
Statute Section 948.07(1)."  Spaeth was actually convicted of 
the four counts of child enticement in 2009. 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
5 
 
¶48 On August 16, 2012, Spaeth responded to the State in a 
letter that was treated as a motion to dismiss.  Spaeth argued 
that the 2009 convictions were the only offenses listed in the 
Chapter 980 petition, and they could not form the basis for 
commitment 
because 
those 
convictions 
were 
reversed. 
 
In 
addition, Spaeth contended that since he had been discharged 
from the sentence for the 1993 conviction, that conviction could 
not be the predicate offense, as he was not in prison for that 
offense when the Chapter 980 petition was filed.  
¶49 The circuit court granted Spaeth's motion to dismiss 
in a written order on September 7, 2012.  The court agreed with 
Spaeth that the dismissed 2009 convictions could not be the 
predicate offense for the Chapter 980 petition, and the State 
could not amend the petition to use the 1993 case as the 
predicate offense because Spaeth was not in custody for that 
offense when the petition was filed.5  The court stayed its order 
pending appeal.  Thus, during this entire appeal, Spaeth has 
remained at Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center under the 
supervision of DHFS. 
INTERPRETATION OF CHAPTER 980 
¶50 This case requires an interpretation of Wis. Stat. ch. 
980.  "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language of 
the statute.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(citations omitted).  We interpret statutory language in context 
                                                 
5 See supra, paragraph 40. 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
6 
 
and "to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46 
(citations omitted). 
¶51 Chapter 980 allows the state to petition for the civil 
commitment of sexually violent persons.  See generally Wis. 
Stat. ch. 980; see also State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 
259, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995).  The term "sexually violent person" 
is defined in the chapter as follows: 
"Sexually violent person" means a person who has 
been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been 
adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, 
or has been found not guilty of or not responsible for 
a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or 
mental disease, defect, or illness, and who is 
dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental 
disorder that makes it likely that the person will 
engage in one or more acts of sexual violence. 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).   
¶52 As noted, the commitment process begins with the 
filing of a petition, under Wis. Stat. § 980.02.  Section 
980.02(2) reads in part: 
(2) A petition filed under this section shall 
allege that all of the following apply to the person 
alleged to be a sexually violent person: 
 
(a) The 
person 
satisfies 
any 
of 
the 
following criteria: 
 
 
1. 
The person has been convicted of a 
sexually violent offense.[6]  
 . . . . 
(b) The person has a mental disorder. 
                                                 
6 "Sexually violent offense" is defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.01(6), which lists qualifying offenses. 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
7 
 
(c) The 
person 
is 
dangerous 
to 
others 
because the person's mental disorder makes it likely 
that he or she will engage in acts of sexual violence. 
Notably, the elements that must be listed in the petition are 
the same elements needed to prove that someone is a "sexually 
violent person."  Compare Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(a)-(c), with 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7). 
¶53 Subsection (3) of § 980.02 then reads: 
 
A petition filed under this section shall state 
with 
particularity 
essential 
facts 
to 
establish 
probable cause to believe the person is a sexually 
violent person.  If the petition alleges that a 
sexually violent offense or act that is a basis for 
the allegation under sub. (2)(a) was an act that was 
sexually motivated as provided under s. 980.01(6)(b), 
the petition shall state the grounds on which the 
offense or act is alleged to be sexually motivated. 
¶54 Neither of these subsections——(2) or (3)——contains any 
temporal condition.  But subsection (1m) does: "A petition filed 
under this section shall be filed before the person is released 
or discharged."  Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1m). 
¶55 Subsection (1m) is linked to Wis. Stat. § 980.015(2), 
which reads in part: 
(2) If an agency with jurisdiction has control 
or custody over a person who may meet the criteria for 
commitment as a sexually violent person, the agency 
with 
jurisdiction 
shall 
inform 
each 
appropriate 
district attorney and the department of justice 
regarding the person as soon as possible beginning 90 
days prior to the applicable date of the following:  
 
 
(a) The anticipated discharge or release, 
on parole, extended supervision, or otherwise, from a 
sentence of imprisonment or term of confinement in 
prison that was imposed for a conviction for a 
sexually violent offense . . . .  
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
8 
 
¶56 The provisions quoted above imply that Wis. Stat. ch. 
980 follows a linear progression from notice that the person 
will be released from custody for conviction of a sexually 
violent offense to the filing of a petition to commit the person 
as a sexually violent person.  The petition must identify the 
sexually violent offense, stating "with particularity essential 
facts to establish probable cause."  Wis. Stat. § 980.02(3). 
¶57 Previously, 
this 
court 
interpreted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.02(1m) to mean that the petition must be filed before the 
person is released or discharged from the predicate offense 
listed in the ch. 980 petition.  See State v. Gilbert, 2012 WI 
72, ¶51, 342 Wis. 2d 82, 816 N.W.2d 215.  In Gilbert, the court 
stated that Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1m)-(2) "requires, inter alia, 
that the State prove that the person 'has been convicted of a 
sexually violent offense,' § 980.02(2)(a)1., and that the ch. 
980 petition must be 'filed before the person is released or 
discharged' from the sentence for that sexually violent offense, 
§ 980.02(1m)."  Id., ¶51 (emphasis added).  The statutory 
context and the court's statement in Gilbert strongly suggest 
that the sexually violent offense that is a basis for the 
petition under § 980.02 must be the same offense for which the 
person is confined at the time of the petition's filing.  
Moreover, to establish that the subject of the petition is a 
"sexually violent person," the state must show that the person 
has been convicted of the offense listed in the petition.  Id.   
¶58 As noted above, a Chapter 980 petition must allege 
that all of the following apply: 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
9 
 
(a) The person satisfies any of the following 
criteria:  
 
1. 
The person has been convicted of a 
sexually violent offense. 
 
 
. . . .  
 
(b) The person has a mental disorder.  
 
(c) The person is dangerous to others because 
the person's mental disorder makes it likely that he 
or she will engage in acts of sexual violence.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2).  Admittedly, § 980.02(2)(a)1. appears to 
require only an allegation that "[t]he person has been convicted 
of a sexually violent offense."  Id. (emphasis added).  However, 
the statute goes on to require that the "petition . . . shall 
state with particularity essential facts to establish probable 
cause to believe the person is a sexually violent person."  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.02(3).  Thus, the statute connects the allegation of 
the sexually violent offense in the petition to the probable 
cause 
determination 
at 
the 
hearing. 
 
Consequently, 
the 
allegations in the petition must support probable cause to 
believe the person is a sexually violent person.  If the 
predicate offense listed in the petition is not a valid 
conviction, the petition is insufficient under Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.02(3). 
¶59 After the Chapter 980 petition is filed, "the court 
shall review the petition to determine whether to issue an order 
for detention of the person who is the subject of the petition."  
Wis. Stat. § 980.04(1) (emphasis added).  Thus, the court's 
determination regarding detention is tied to the predicate 
offense listed in the petition.  The court must also "determine 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
10 
 
whether there is probable cause to believe that the person named 
in the petition is a sexually violent person."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.04(2)(a).  The requirement in Wis. Stat. § 980.02(3) that 
the petition allege facts to establish probable cause suggests 
that the probable cause determination must be based on the 
allegations in the petition.  It is unlikely that the court 
would approve going to a probable cause hearing on one offense 
and then make a probable cause finding on a completely different 
offense. 
¶60 Finally, at trial, "the petitioner has the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the person who is the 
subject of the petition is a sexually violent person."  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.05(3)(a).  If the fact finder determines that the 
person is a sexually violent person, "the court shall enter a 
judgment on that finding and shall commit the person as provided 
under s. 980.06."  Wis. Stat. § 980.05(5). 
¶61 Looking at the statute as a whole, it is evident that 
Chapter 980 centers around the sexually violent offense for 
which a person is confined at the time a Chapter 980 petition is 
filed.  The agency with custody of the person must give notice 
to the department of justice and the district attorney that the 
person is about to be discharged or released from that sexually 
violent offense.  Wis. Stat. § 980.015(2).  The statute 
contemplates the state using that offense as the predicate 
offense.  The offense listed in the petition is the offense on 
which the state must defend its petition and then demonstrate 
probable cause. 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
11 
 
¶62 The majority asserts that this reading of the statute 
is mistaken——that the petition is separate from the probable 
cause hearing and the trial and that the predicate offense in 
the petition may be completely abandoned at the probable cause 
hearing and the trial. 
THE PETITION TO COMMIT SPAETH 
¶63 The State's petition to commit Spaeth was valid at the 
time it was filed in November 2010 because, at that time, Spaeth 
had been convicted of a sexually violent offense (the 2009 
convictions) and he was in confinement for that sexually violent 
offense. 
¶64 The problem is that the listed predicate offense in 
the petition has been reversed and dismissed.  It was reversed 
and dismissed before the circuit court made any finding of 
probable cause, and, of course, Spaeth's case never went to 
trial.  Thus, however valid the petition was when it was filed, 
it will not be valid in a future probable cause hearing.  The 
State cannot meet its burden by showing that Spaeth was 
convicted of a sexually violent offense that has been vacated. 
¶65 Consequently, the State appears to have only two 
options in this case.  The State can amend the petition in a 
manner that complies with the requirements of the statute, or it 
can persuade a court to interpret the statute so that there need 
be no connection between the sexually violent offense named in 
the petition and the sexually violent offense established at 
some later hearing.  In short, either the petition must be 
amended so that the State can prove its essential elements, or 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
12 
 
the petition must be severed from future proceedings so that the 
State may prove a different offense. 
¶66 The majority has chosen the second option.  In my 
view, only the first option is permitted.  If the State is 
unable to amend the petition, the petition is deficient and must 
be dismissed. 
¶67 The reason the State's options are limited is obvious.  
The State cannot proceed on a petition that relies on a vacated 
sexually violent offense.  It is inconceivable that the State 
would ask a court to find probable cause that a person has been 
convicted of a sexually violent offense that has been reversed 
and dismissed.  If this were possible, the State could proceed 
on an offense that was reversed after the person was exonerated 
on the basis of DNA evidence or reversed because of other 
indicia of actual innocence. 
¶68 There are certainly situations in which an overturned 
conviction for a predicate offense may be retried.  In such a 
case, a Chapter 980 petition may be filed during the person's 
confinement if the person is again convicted of a sexually 
violent offense.  That was not possible in this case because the 
State had virtually no evidence with which to retry Spaeth, and 
thus it dismissed the charges against him. 
¶69 Hence, it is necessary to examine the other options. 
AMENDMENT 
¶70 The State should be able to amend its petition so long 
as it is able to comply with the terms of the statute.  This 
means that the State should be able to substitute a different 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
13 
 
sexually violent offense for the one in the petition so long as 
the person named in the petition was being "confined" for the 
substituted offense at the time the petition was filed. 
¶71 The confinement prerequisite is set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.015(2): 
(2) If an agency with jurisdiction has control 
or custody over a person who may meet the criteria for 
commitment as a sexually violent person, the agency 
with 
jurisdiction 
shall 
inform 
each 
appropriate 
district attorney and the department of justice 
regarding the person as soon as possible beginning 90 
days prior to the applicable date of the following:  
(a) The anticipated discharge or release, 
on parole, extended supervision, or otherwise, from a 
sentence of imprisonment or term of confinement in 
prison that was imposed for a conviction for a 
sexually violent offense, from a continuous term of 
incarceration, any part of which was imposed for a 
sexually violent offense, or from a placement in a 
Type 1 prison under s. 301.048(3)(a)1., any part of 
which was required as a result of a conviction for a 
sexually violent offense.  
(b) The anticipated release from a juvenile 
correctional facility, as defined in s. 938.02(10p), 
or a secured residential care center for children and 
youth, as defined in s. 938.02(15g), if the person was 
placed 
in 
the 
facility 
as 
a 
result 
of 
being 
adjudicated delinquent under s. 48.34, 1993 stats., or 
under s. 938.183 or 938.34 on the basis of a sexually 
violent offense.  
(c) The anticipated release of a person on 
conditional release under s. 971.17, the anticipated 
termination of a commitment order under 971.17, or the 
anticipated discharge of a person from a commitment 
order under s. 971.17, if the person has been found 
not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of 
mental disease or defect.  
(d) The anticipated release on parole or 
discharge of a person committed under ch. 975 for a 
sexually violent offense. 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
14 
 
Wis. Stat. § 980.015(2).7 
¶72 Paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) all deal with 
persons about to be released from confinement for a sexually 
violent offense.  Each person is confined for a sexually violent 
offense or for a sexually violent offense combined with one or 
more other offenses.  Paragraph (a) speaks of a person who is 
about to be discharged or released "from a continuous term of 
incarceration, any part of which was imposed for a sexually 
violent offense."  Wis. Stat. § 980.015(2)(a) (emphasis added).  
This language contemplates confinement for more than one 
sexually violent offense or confinement for a sexually violent 
offense and some other offense. 
¶73 There is a reason why a person's confinement for a 
sexually violent offense at the time a Chapter 980 petition is 
filed is essential to the statutory scheme.  Chapter 980 
commitment 
is 
a 
major 
departure 
from 
normal 
procedure.  
Normally, when a defendant completes the period of confinement 
required by his sentence, he is discharged or released into the 
community.  Release under supervision is part of a standard 
bifurcated sentence.  Outright discharge usually means that a 
person has "paid his debt to society" and is no longer under 
supervision. 
¶74 Chapter 980 was designed to deal with the relatively 
small number of persons who are considered so dangerous that 
they must remain in confinement.  The State asserts that these 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.015(2) was expanded substantially in 
2006 by 2005 Wisconsin Act 434, §§ 75-78. 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
15 
 
persons have a mental disorder that makes it likely that they 
will engage in additional acts of sexual violence.  The State is 
required to prove to a neutral fact finder that the subject of 
the petition is a sexually violent person beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Wis. Stat. § 980.05(3)(a). 
¶75 If the State has already released a person from 
confinement, it cannot easily contend that the person must still 
be confined.  The State's argument would be inconsistent with 
its action.  If a person has been released from state 
confinement, future state action must be grounded in what the 
person does in the community, not on predictions of what the 
person is likely to do.  The prerequisite of confinement for a 
sexually violent offense also assures that people are not 
subject to commitment many years after they have been released 
from confinement in connection with a sexually violent offense. 
¶76 In sum, Wis. Stat. § 980.015(2) requires that the 
sexually violent offense named in a Chapter 980 petition be a 
sexually violent offense on which the person was confined at the 
time of filing.  The statute sets a standard; it has been 
revised to allow some flexibility.  The State cannot disregard 
this statutory prerequisite because it does not like the result 
any more than it can disregard the fact that its authority to 
file a petition is fundamentally diminished once it releases a 
person from confinement. 
¶77 Once again, the State could have filed a Chapter 980 
petition while Spaeth was still in confinement for the 1993 
conviction.  It did not do so.  It could have retried Spaeth on 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
16 
 
the 2009 convictions if it had the ability to do so.  It didn't.  
The State's present predicament was created by the State and 
does not justify rewriting the statute. 
THE MAJORITY OPINION 
¶78 The majority disagrees and adopts the other option.  
It does not dismiss the petition or try to justify amending the 
petition.  It looks backward, concluding that "[a]t the time the 
State's petition was filed, the statutory requirements in Wis. 
Stat. § 980.02 were satisfied.  We therefore hold that the 
Chapter 980 petition to commit Spaeth should not have been 
dismissed."  Majority op., ¶3.  The case is remanded to the 
circuit court. 
¶79 What the majority opinion fails to do is to look 
forward and provide clear guidance to the parties and the court. 
¶80 The majority reports that "the State informed the 
circuit court that it intended to proceed with Spaeth's Chapter 
980 commitment, and the State sought to amend the Chapter 980 
petition to include Spaeth's 1993 conviction."  Id., ¶8 
(emphasis added).  In a footnote, the majority adds, "The record 
is unclear regarding whether the State intended to replace the 
2009 convictions with the 1993 conviction as the predicate 
offense, or to simply include the 1993 conviction as an 
additional predicate offense.  However, in light of our holding, 
the distinction is irrelevant."  Id., ¶8 n.6. 
¶81 The 
majority 
cannot 
duck 
the 
responsibility 
of 
determining whether the State can rely in any respect on the 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
17 
 
2009 convictions as it goes forward to a probable cause hearing 
and a trial.  The majority acknowledges: 
[T]his 
court 
has 
previously 
held 
that 
Spaeth's 
statements leading to the 2009 convictions constituted 
compelled 
testimony, 
the 
fruits 
of 
which 
are 
inadmissible at trial.  Thus, the State must rely on 
other evidence to establish "probable cause to believe 
that the person named in the petition is a sexually 
violent person" at the probable cause hearing, and, if 
it is successful in so doing, to prove its allegations 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" at trial. 
Majority op., ¶27 n.13 (citations omitted).  But it also 
interprets Wis. Stat. §§ 980.04(3) and 980.05(3)(a), saying that 
"the State is not foreclosed from producing additional evidence 
at either the probable cause hearing or at trial, or both, to 
support its petition."  Id., ¶26; see also id., ¶16 n.8 (stating 
that "the State may introduce additional evidence at these 
proceedings not connected to the individual's confinement at the 
time the petition was filed").  The majority has not absolutely 
prohibited all use of the 2007 and 2009 "convictions" at the 
probable cause hearing or trial. 
¶82 The majority should also discuss whether the petition 
can be amended or should be amended, so that the subject of the 
formerly valid petition has notice of what the State intends to 
prove. 
¶83 The majority clearly understands that there had been 
no probable cause hearing and no trial.  Looking forward, the 
State must show probable cause that Spaeth "has been convicted 
of a sexually violent offense."  That offense cannot be the 2009 
convictions, which were vacated.  The only other conviction is 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
18 
 
the 1993 conviction, but Spaeth was not in confinement for that 
conviction when the petition was filed. 
¶84 The court must be saying that the State can rely on 
the 1993 conviction at his probable cause hearing and at his 
trial.  This is completely abandoning the language relating to 
the probable cause hearing and the rationale of the statute.  It 
is saying that once the State gets to the probable cause 
hearing, it can rely on any sexually violent offense, no matter 
what the circumstances, no matter how old the offense.  Once the 
"conviction of a sexually violent offense" is cut from its 
statutory moorings, the State may prove any such offense that 
resulted in a conviction.  Unless the majority requires some 
valid charging document such as an amended petition, the State 
has not given notice of the basis for the commitment proceeding 
and arguably may abandon any allegations in the formerly valid 
petition that it no longer wishes to utilize in its effort to 
commit Spaeth. 
¶85 The majority attempts to justify this result by citing 
irrelevant authority.  For instance, the majority references 
Wis. Stat. § 980.101(2)(b) to suggest that a reversal of a 
conviction for the predicate offense and the dismissal of the 
charges do not necessarily invalidate the Chapter 980 petition.  
Majority op., ¶22 n.10.  Section 980.101(2)(b) reads: 
If the sexually violent offense was the sole 
basis for the allegation under s. 980.02(2)(a) but 
there are other judgments relating to a sexually 
violent offense committed by the person that have not 
been reversed, set aside, or vacated, or if the 
sexually violent offense was not the sole basis for 
the allegation under s. 980.02(2)(a), the court shall 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
19 
 
determine whether to grant the person a new trial 
under s. 980.05 because the reversal, setting aside, 
or vacating of the judgment for the sexually violent 
offense would probably change the result of the trial. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 980.101(2)(b). comes into play only after the 
state has complied with all sections of Wis. Stat. ch. 980 and 
obtained a commitment.8  In those circumstances, the vacatur does 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.101(2) reads: 
(2) If, at any time after a person is committed 
under s. 980.06, a judgment relating to a sexually 
violent offense committed by the person is reversed, 
set aside, or vacated and that sexually violent 
offense was a basis for the allegation made in the 
petition under s. 980.02(2)(a), the person may bring a 
motion for postcommitment relief in the court that 
committed the person. The court shall proceed as 
follows on the motion for postcommitment relief:  
(a) If the sexually violent offense was the 
sole basis for the allegation under s.  980.02(2)(a) 
and there are no other judgments relating to a 
sexually violent offense committed by the person, the 
court shall reverse, set aside, or vacate the judgment 
under s. 980.05(5) that the person is a sexually 
violent person, vacate the commitment order, and 
discharge 
the 
person 
from 
the 
custody 
of 
the 
department.  
(b) If the sexually violent offense was the 
sole basis for the allegation under s. 980.02(2)(a) 
but there are other judgments relating to a sexually 
violent offense committed by the person that have not 
been reversed, set aside, or vacated, or if the 
sexually violent offense was not the sole basis for 
the allegation under s. 980.02(2)(a), the court shall 
determine whether to grant the person a new trial 
under s. 980.05 because the reversal, setting aside, 
or vacating of the judgment for the sexually violent 
offense would probably change the result of the trial.  
(Emphasis added.)  This statute applies to a person who has 
been committed under Wis. Stat. § 980.06.  Spaeth has not 
been so committed. 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
20 
 
not render the state's ongoing efforts to advance a Chapter 980 
petition 
noncompliant 
with 
the 
statute. 
 
Instead, 
it 
acknowledges that the committed person may no longer fit the 
definition of a sexually violent person and allows the court to 
consider whether a new trial is necessary.  Thus, that section 
has no bearing here. 
 
¶86 The majority also cites Carpenter and State v. Virlee, 
2003 WI App 4, 259 Wis. 2d 718, 657 N.W.2d 106. 
¶87 In Carpenter, the defendant was paroled in 1993.  
Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 260, 275.  After the parole, the DOC 
recalculated Carpenter's mandatory release date based on a court 
of appeals decision and reincarcerated him.  Id.  This court 
later reversed that court of appeals decision and ordered that 
prisoners incarcerated due to that decision be released by July 
15, 1994; Carpenter was not released because the state filed a 
Chapter 980 petition on July 14, 1994.  Id. at 260.  Carpenter 
argued that his original release date in 1993 was the date that 
applied to the 90-day requirement for filing a Chapter 980 
petition and that the State filed the petition too late.  Id. at 
275.  This court determined that because DOC recalculated the 
parole date, Carpenter was within 90 days of discharge when the 
state filed the Chapter 980 petition even though this court 
ultimately reversed the court of appeals decision that justified 
DOC's recalculation.  Id.   
¶88 Similarly, in the Virlee case, Virlee was initially set 
to be released from imprisonment for a sexually violent offense 
on December 24, 1999.  Virlee, 259 Wis. 2d 718, ¶3.  The state 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
21 
 
filed a Chapter 980 petition on December 20.  Id.  The circuit 
court subsequently granted Virlee's motion for jail credit, 
which moved his mandatory release date up to November 14, over a 
month before the state filed the Chapter 980 petition.  Id., 
¶¶3-5.  The court of appeals cited Carpenter and determined that 
"the trial court's subsequent modification of Virlee's sentence 
does not change the fact the State filed the petition within 
ninety days of his actual release from prison."  Id., ¶18.  
Thus, it did not matter that Virlee had technically completed 
his sentence; the state complied with the statute by filing 
within 90 days of Virlee's release.   
¶89 These cases are persuasive authority that courts may 
look at the sufficiency of a Chapter 980 petition at the time it 
was filed when the issue involves timing.  In both cases, the 
state had no way of knowing that the time for filing the Chapter 
980 petition was going to change.  The petitions were valid when 
they were filed and when they were acted on. 
¶90 This case is materially different.  Action on any 
Chapter 980 petition for Spaeth is ahead of us, not behind us.  
The State must disregard its predicate offense because its 
original offense has been vacated.  It must prove its case in 
two future hearings.  It must prove a case that complies with 
the law. 
¶91 The majority cites policy to support its position: 
"[I]f a later change in circumstances could invalidate a 
petition that was otherwise valid at the time of filing, the 
State would be at risk of losing its ability to commit a 
No.  2012AP2170.dtp 
 
22 
 
sexually violent person through no fault of its own . . . ."  
Majority op., ¶33.  In this case, the majority cannot say with a 
straight face that the State is in its predicament "through no 
fault of its own."  We expect the State to follow the law.  It 
did not. 
¶92 The majority seems unmoved by the fact that Spaeth has 
been in the custody of DHFS since November 2010 without having 
been given any evidentiary hearing and that his confinement from 
June 2007 until the reversal of his convictions was based almost 
entirely on illegally obtained evidence. 
¶93 Chapter 980 has become a valuable component of 
Wisconsin law.  It should not be altered permanently because the 
government screwed up.   
¶94 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
 
¶95 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
 
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