Case Title: Pino v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92-82

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Pino v. State1993 WY 45849 P.2d 716Case Number: 92-82, 92-83Decided: 03/24/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jake PINO,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming,

 Appellee (Plaintiff). (Two 
Cases)

Appeal from District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Bert T. Ahlstrom 
and Daniel G. Blythe, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program, and 
Richard A. Erb, Jr., Student Intern, for appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, and GOLDEN, JJ., and URBIGKIT, J. 
Ret.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant 
challenges his conviction for delivery of marijuana. He contends that the jury 
should not have been allowed to play an audio recording during deliberations and 
that because of alleged perjured testimony, he should have been granted a new 
trial.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellant raises 
these issues:

I. Did the trial court 
err in allowing an audio tape and tape player into the jury room during 
deliberation?

II. Did the trial court 
err in allowing the prosecutor to present evidence of uncharged misconduct and 
did the court err in failing to grant a mistrial?

III. Did the court err in 
allowing the police officer to discuss the defendant's failure to cooperate and 
plead guilty like most criminal defendants do?

IV. Did the court err in 
failing to give defendant proffered instructions?

V. Did the court err in 
revoking appellant's probation?

VI. Did the district 
court err in failing to grant a new trial in this case?

[¶4]      In order to work 
off criminal charges of her own, Dara Kenney became an informant for the Laramie 
County Sheriff's Department. She agreed to make several undercover drug buys 
under police surveillance. On the morning of June 27, 1989, Dara Kenney met with 
officers. They placed a wireless transmitter on her person so that they could 
monitor the "buy" and supplied her with $40.00 in recorded "buy" 
money.

[¶5]      Dara Kenney had 
arranged to make the "buy" by purchasing marijuana from Jake Pino. Dara Kenney 
had dated Jake Pino for nine years. She lived with Pino on and off during that 
time, and he is the father of her child.

[¶6]      The officers took 
Ms. Kenney to a Cheyenne convenience store where the drug transaction was to 
take place. Officers then secured surveillance positions that would allow them 
to observe the buy while remaining out of sight. Jake Pino, appellant, arrived 
at about one o'clock in the afternoon. Appellant told Ms. Kenney to drive his 
car for him because he was hearing "something funny" from the car. Appellant 
instructed Ms. Kenney to drive to her mother's house. While they were stopped at 
Ms. Kenney's mother's house, appellant stated that something was wrong with his 
tire, and he needed Ms. Kenney to get a tire iron. Appellant asked whether her 
father or sister had a tire iron. When Ms. Kenney indicated reluctance about 
finding a tire iron, appellant indicated that he would look for it himself. Ms. 
Kenney said she would get her sister's keys, but told appellant to wait by the 
car because her sister was sunbathing and was not wearing much 
clothing.

[¶7]      Ms. Kenney 
proceeded inside the back fence, out of sight of the officers, and asked her 
sister for her car keys. While inside the fence, Ms. Kenney's sister asked 
whether Ms. Kenney had completed the buy yet. Ms. Kenney said she had not and 
was with Pino and needed the tire iron. Ms. Kenney leaned into the back door of 
the house and asked her niece to bring her the car keys. During the time that 
Ms. Kenney was inside the back fence, she was out of view of the officers but 
she could still be heard through the body mike.

[¶8]      After she 
obtained the keys, appellant and Ms. Kenney opened her sister's trunk and found 
a tire iron. Appellant tightened the lug nuts on the wheel of his car. Next, Ms. 
Kenney asked appellant if "he had brought the `weed.'" Ms. Kenney then gave 
appellant the buy money. Appellant pulled a quarter ounce of marijuana from his 
pants and gave it to Ms. Kenney and asked her who it was for. Ms. Kenney replied 
that it was for a friend of hers. Ms. Kenney asked appellant if the marijuana 
"was any good," to which appellant replied "Oh, yeah, it's `skunk.'" After 
appellant left, Ms. Kenney ran to the alley and met the officers where she 
turned the marijuana over to them. The officers conducted a field test on the 
substance Ms. Kenney gave them, and it tested positive for 
marijuana.

[¶9]      Appellant was 
arrested and charged with delivery of a controlled substance, marijuana, in 
violation of W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(ii) and W.S. 35-7-1014(d)(xiii). After hearing 
the evidence, the jury found appellant guilty of delivery of marijuana. The 
district court sentenced appellant to a term of not less than twenty-four months 
nor more than forty months in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.

[¶10]   At the time this transaction took 
place, appellant was serving probation for a previous controlled substance 
offense. Since appellant was convicted of an additional drug offense while on 
probation, the district court revoked his probation. The district judge imposed 
a sentence of not less than eighteen, nor more than thirty months for the 
probation revocation. The district judge ordered that the sentence for this 
offense and the prior offense be served consecutively.

TAPE AND TAPE PLAYER 
DURING DELIBERATIONS

[¶11]   During trial, the State played the 
audiotape of the drug transaction that was recorded from Dara Kenney's body mike 
for the jury. While the jury was deliberating, it sent this note to the district 
judge:

Please provide us with a 
tape player to review Exhibit 2.

You and the attorneys had 
transcripts. Is it possible for us to have a transcript of Exhibit 
2.

/s/ 
Foreman

In response to 
the jury's note, the district court had the bailiff provide the jury with a tape 
player. The district judge also informed the jury that the transcripts were not 
available for their consideration since they were never introduced into 
evidence. Appellant contends that it was error to allow an audiotape and tape 
player into the jury room during deliberations.

[¶12]   In general, the trial court has 
discretion over whether to permit nontestimonial exhibits into the jury room 
during deliberations. Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 70 (Wyo. 1989). See also 
Stone v. State, 745 P.2d 1344, 1349 (Wyo. 1987). Appellant urges, however, that 
allowing the jury to review testimonial materials in deliberations violates the 
common law rule against allowing testimonial evidence into the jury 
room.

[¶13]   Appellant correctly asserts that 
testimonial evidence is not allowed into deliberations in order to prevent the 
jury from emphasizing some testimony over all the other testimony. Appellant 
cites Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1986) and Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1986). However, the Schmunk and Chambers rules concerning testimonial 
evidence do not apply to this situation. The tape in question here is not 
testimonial, rather it is the recording of a drug transaction. It is the actual 
recording of a criminal transaction, not testimony about an act. Therefore 
Schmunk and Chambers are both distinguishable.

[¶14]   In Schmunk the tape was a videotape 
and contained a pre-arrest interview that was secretly recorded without the 
defendant's knowledge. Schmunk, 714 P.2d  at 728. Thus, Schmunk involved a 
testimonial statement, not the actual recording of a criminal transaction. 
Chambers can be distinguished in a similar fashion since the tape involved was a 
videotape of the victim's out-of-court testimony. Chambers, 726 P.2d  at 1272-75. 
The other cases appellant cites, Taylor and Stone, also involve testimonial 
exhibits and are not applicable here. Taylor v. State, 727 P.2d 274, 276 (Wyo. 
1986) (videotape of an interview with a victim of a sexual assault); Stone v. 
State, 745 P.2d 1344, 1348 (Wyo. 1987) (allowing taped confession to be reviewed 
in deliberations).

[¶15]   In discussing how an audiotape 
should be handled upon retrial, this court set out the general rule with regard 
to nontestimonial exhibits in Stephens:

If the court concludes 
that the audiotape is not testimonial, then it may permit the jury to have the 
tape in the course of its deliberations just as any other exhibit may be 
furnished to the jury. If, however, it is perceived as testimonial, then the 
approach described in Chambers must be pursued.

Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 70.

[¶16]   In discussing exhibits in the jury 
room, Louisell and Mueller note:

Quite sensibly, courts 
have had some reluctance to permit the jury to take with it documents of a 
testimonial character, lest they "act as a speaking, continuous witness * * * to 
the exclusion of the totality of the evidence taken at the trial which must be 
viewed in its entirety." * * *

But there is no rule of 
exclusion for tangible exhibits with verbal content. Nontestimonial exhibits 
with such content, such as contract documents or recordings of criminal 
acts which are verbal in nature, are generally allowed to go into the 
deliberations. Indeed, it would be highly peculiar to withhold such things from 
the jury's scrutiny, and somewhat inconsistent with the whole philosophy 
underlying the Best Evidence Rule[.]

(emphasis added) 
3 David W. Louisell and Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 390, pp. 
683-84 (1979) & (Supp. 1992). See also Stone, 745 P.2d  at 1349 (also quoting 
Louisell and Mueller).

[¶17]   The audiotape here was not a 
testimonial exhibit, rather it was a recording of a criminal act. The district 
court did not err when it allowed an audiotape player into the jury room. Since 
the law favors allowing a nontestimonial exhibit into the jury room, we find no 
error.

UNCHARGED 
MISCONDUCT

[¶18]   Appellant argues that the 
prosecutor was improperly allowed to present evidence of prior bad acts. Wyoming 
Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides:

(b) Other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts. - Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident.

[¶19]   We afford deference to district 
court determinations on the admissibility of evidence of other crimes under 
W.R.E. 404(b). Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933, 940 (Wyo. 1992) (citing Pena v. 
State, 780 P.2d 316 (Wyo. 1989); Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579 (Wyo. 1986); 
and Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985)). As long as there is a legitimate basis for 
the court's decision, there is no abuse of discretion. Rivera, at 940 (citing 
Pena; Trujillo v. State, 750 P.2d 1334 (Wyo. 1988)). See also Britton v. State, 
845 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Wyo. 1992). 

[¶20]   Appellant contends that the 
prosecutor introduced evidence that appellant had used marijuana while living 
with Dara Kenney. The prosecutor was asking direct examination questions of Dara 
Kenney, the State's witness. This testimony was heard by the 
jury:

Q. Miss Kenney, how often 
have you made purchases of marijuana for your own use?

A. Quite often when I was 
around fifteen and sixteen. When I was around sixteen I quit 
smoking.

Q. Okay. And after that, 
did you get involved in any other controlled substances?

A. Yes, I 
did.

Q. And what would that 
have been?

A. 
Cocaine.

* * * * * 
*

Q. In what amounts were 
you using it?

A. Anywhere from a gram a 
day to two grams a day.

Q. Okay. During any of 
the time that you were using either marijuana or cocaine, were you living with 
Mr. Pino?

A. 
Yes.

Q. All right. Have you 
ever used it in front of Mr. Jake Pino?

The testimony 
was stopped at this point by an objection from defense counsel. Defense counsel 
objected to the testimony because it related to uncharged misconduct. The 
district judge dismissed the jury while he considered the 
objection.

[¶21]   The district judge stated that the 
testimony so far had only been that Ms. Kenney lived with Mr. Pino and that she 
claimed to have taken drugs during that time. The judge inquired as to the 
prosecution's purpose in eliciting the testimony. The prosecution stated that 
the defense in opening statement directed their strategy at discrediting the 
State's witness, Ms. Kenney. Because the defense would be attacking Ms. Kenney's 
credibility, the prosecution wished to bring her prior drug use out on direct 
examination. The prosecution indicated that it would not be pursuing appellant's 
prior drug use further, and it would not be using it for any purpose beyond 
bringing Ms. Kenney's prior drug use out on direct. After the jury returned to 
the courtroom, the prosecutor did start by repeating the question he had asked 
before the objection. However, the question was not allowed because defense 
counsel objected, and the district court sustained the 
objection.

[¶22]   Ms. Kenney's testimony did not 
introduce prior bad acts or uncharged misconduct. After being asked by the 
court, the prosecution explained that its purpose was to bring out Ms. Kenney's 
prior drug use on direct in order to minimize the effect of that information in 
cross-examination. Ms. Kenney did not testify about appellant's prior drug 
use, rather she explained her prior drug use. Since it was her prior 
uncharged bad act and not appellant's, W.R.E. 404(b) is not implicated. The 
district court properly handled this matter, and we find no 
error.

OFFICER'S 
TESTIMONY

[¶23]   Appellant argues that the district 
court committed error when it allowed an officer to discuss the defendant's 
failure to cooperate and plead guilty like most criminal defendants do. 
Appellant's claim is stronger than the actual testimony.

[¶24]   A detective with the Laramie County 
Sheriff's Department was being questioned about his arrangements with the 
informant in this case, Dara Kenney.

Q. You heard Miss Kenney 
testify yesterday?

A. Yes, 
ma'am.

Q. Did you tell her that 
Jake Pino wouldn't be charged?

A. No, ma'am, I did 
not.

Q. Did you tell her 
anything that she could have interpreted as that?

A. She may have 
misinterpreted it. We discussed it at one point. She stated - when I first asked 
her who she could buy from, she said that she was a little hot in town right now 
because of our arresting her sister. I said, "Is there anyone that you know of 
right now that you could go out and purchase narcotics 
from?"

* * * * * * 

Q. What did you tell her 
with regard to Jake being charged?

A. She was very concerned 
about him being charged. I stated to her that as long as everything worked out 
fine, if Jake would cooperate at the end, that maybe we could work out a deal 
with him.

* * * * * 
*

Q. Did you tell Dara that 
she would not have to testify?

A. No, I did 
not.

Q. What did you tell her 
with regard to testifying?

A. In ninety percent of 
the cases that we take to court, prior to last fall 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 
Objection, 403. I guess I have a continuing objection on 403, but specifically 
on this, again 403. 

THE COURT: Overruled. Go 
ahead.

A. I stated that in 
general narcotics cases that we have worked, the majority of them are worked out 
and the informant doesn't testify. There is a possibility that if it does go to 
trial, that she would have to.

[¶25]   Appellant cites Stephens v. State, 
774 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1989) and Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879 (Wyo. 1990). He 
argues that this court has reversed convictions when a witness was allowed to 
express an opinion on the defendant's guilt.

[¶26]   The situation that concerned us in 
Bennett and Stephens is not present here. In Stephens, three expert witnesses 
gave their opinion that the child had been sexually abused and that the 
defendant had done it. Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 64-66. In Bennett a police officer 
gave his opinion that the defendant himself was a drug dealer and specifically 
linked the facts from his investigation to his conclusion that Bennett was a 
drug dealer. Bennett, 794 P.2d  at 883. See also Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1337-41 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶27]   The officer did not say "Jake Pino 
will plead guilty because we know that he is guilty." The officer merely 
indicated that very often criminal narcotics cases are resolved without the 
informant's testimony, although sometimes the informant's testimony is required. 
That information did not in any way link appellant to guilt but merely informed 
the State's witness of the likelihood that she might have to testify. The 
prosecutor was not attempting to prove its case by relying on this type of 
indirect inference. Rather, the prosecutor was rebutting Ms. Kenney's earlier 
testimony in which she claimed that the officer told her that she would not have 
to testify.

[¶28]   The other testimony appellant cites 
deals with undercover drug operations generally and never mentions appellant's 
name in the context of being a suspected drug dealer. The officer's testimony 
speaks to the procedure for undercover narcotics investigations in general and 
not to appellant's conduct or guilt. Appellant also complains of testimony 
elicited from the State's witness about names of suspected drug dealers she 
supplied to the police. The State's witness did not list appellant's name. 
Although that testimony was probably not helpful to appellant, it was not unduly 
prejudicial. W.R.E. 403. We find no error in admitting any of this 
testimony.

[¶29]   In this case the officer never 
testified or offered a conclusion about whether appellant had sold drugs or was 
a drug dealer. Instead the officer merely related the facts of his investigation 
and left the conclusion for the jury. Appellant correctly argues that, if 
circumstances and testimony similar to that in Bennett or Stephens were present 
in this case, it would be error per se. However, no error appears in the record 
from this testimony.

INSTRUCTIONS OFFERED BY 
DEFENDANT

[¶30]   Appellant argues that the district 
court improperly refused his tendered jury instruction. The tendered instruction 
read as follows:

INSTRUCTION NO. 
2

You have heard the 
testimony of a witness who has been promised that in exchange for testifying 
truthfully, completely, and fully, he will not be prosecuted for any crimes 
which he may have admitted either here in court or in interviews with the 
prosecutors. This promise was not a formal order of immunity by the court, but 
was arranged directly between the witness and the 
government.

The government is 
permitted to make these kinds of promises and is entitled as witnesses people to 
whom these promises are given. You are instructed that you may convict a 
defendant on the basis of such a witness' testimony alone, if you find that his 
testimony proves the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

However, the testimony of 
a witness who has been promised that he will not be prosecuted should be 
examined by you with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. You 
should scrutinize it closely to determine whether or not it is colored in such a 
way as to place guilt upon the defendant in order to further the witness' own 
interests; for, such a witness, confronted with the realization that he can win 
his own freedom by helping to convict another, has a motive to falsify his 
testimony.

Such testimony should be 
received by you with suspicion and you may give it such weight, if any, as you 
believe it deserves.

[¶31]   It appears that this proposed 
instruction was termed Proposed Instruction No. 3 at the instructions 
conference. As to proposed instruction no. 3, the following discussion took 
place:

THE COURT: Number 
three.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay, 
that one I do want.

THE COURT: I'm going to 
refuse it. Does the State have any objection to it?

[PROSECUTION]: Yes, Your 
Honor.

THE COURT: I think when 
you talk about the credibility of the witness, you have to take into account all 
the facts and circumstances. That's why I'm going to refuse 
that.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your 
Honor, there is testimony of a person that is testifying for a deal. They have 
been promised they won't be prosecuted. The jury should be instructed that these 
people are testifying specifically for that kind of interest. Dara, for example, 
she is testifying so that she doesn't go to prison.

THE COURT: I think that 
Instruction 12B takes care of that in more general terms. That's why I'm giving 
Instruction 12B, to take care of that.

[¶32]   This court has recently held that a 
trial court may properly refuse an instruction which is argumentative or unduly 
emphasizes one aspect of the law. Virgilio v. State, 834 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Wyo. 
1992) (citing Stapleman v. State, 680 P.2d 73, 75 (Wyo. 1984)). In addition, a 
trial court may refuse an instruction if the concept is covered by other 
instructions. Virgilio, at 1128 (citing Griffin v. State, 749 P.2d 246, 256 
(Wyo. 1988)). As the instructions conference indicates, the district court 
refused appellant's proffered instruction because the concept of a witness' 
testimony being biased because of a deal was already covered in instruction 
12B.

[¶33]   Instruction 12B, which was given at 
trial, provided:

The Jury is the sole 
judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and of the weight to be given their 
testimony. You should take into consideration their demeanor upon the witness 
stand, their apparent intelligence or lack of intelligence, their means of 
knowledge of the facts testified to, the interest, if any, which any witness 
may have in the outcome of this trial, the prejudice or motives, or feelings 
of revenge, if any, which have been shown by the evidence. In so doing, 
you may take into consideration all of the facts and circumstances in the case 
and give such weight as you think the same are entitled to, in the light of your 
experience and knowledge of human affairs.

(emphasis added) 
Instruction 12B instructed the jury on possible bias of informants and also left 
room for the defense to argue this issue in closing argument which they did. The 
court did not err in refusing appellant's proffered jury instruction. 

PROBATION 
REVOCATION

[¶34]   Appellant complains that his 
probation was revoked on the basis of this conviction and urges that if this 
conviction is reversed, then the probation revocation should be reversed since 
it rests upon this conviction. After considering appellant's claims of error 
with respect to this conviction, we have found no error. Since we affirm this 
conviction, the probation revocation was proper.

[¶35]   Appellant next alleges on appeal 
that the revocation, based on this conviction, was improper because there was no 
hearing. Here appellant, however, waived his opportunity to have a hearing or 
trial on the probation revocation.

[¶36]   The petition for revocation alleged 
that appellant had been convicted for delivery of marijuana in violation of his 
probation. The court specifically asked if appellant wished to have a trial on 
the petition for revocation of probation. Defense counsel responded: "No, Mr. 
Pino still denies the underlying facts, but it's difficult for him to deny the 
actual conviction. We were all in the courtroom." The district court 
found:

I think the fact is that 
he was convicted in this court of a crime, which was in violation of the terms 
of his probation in 19-35. As to that, I think there are adequate grounds for 
revocation.

We have said: 
"In order to revoke probation all that is required is the court's conscientious 
judgment after hearing the evidence to the effect that a violation of probation 
has occurred." Panesenko v. State, 706 P.2d 273, 275 (Wyo. 1985) (citing 
Longwell v. State, 705 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1985)). See also Swackhammer v. State, 808 P.2d 219, 224 (Wyo. 1991). The district court properly revoked appellant's 
probation.

FAILURE TO 
GRANT A NEW TRIAL

[¶37]   Appellant contends that the 
district court committed error by failing to grant a new trial. Appellant's 
chief accuser, Dara Kenney, testified at a suppression hearing several months 
after this trial. In the suppression hearing, appellant contends, Dara Kenney 
admitted that she lied in her testimony against appellant at his 
trial.

[¶38]   Initially we note that the decision 
of a district court on a motion for a new trial will be upheld absent an abuse 
of discretion. Keene v. State, 835 P.2d 341, 344 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Brown v. 
State, 816 P.2d 818, 822 (Wyo. 1991)). Evidence supporting a motion for new 
trial must satisfy four factors:

"(1) That the evidence 
has come to [appellant's] knowledge since the trial; (2) that it was not owing 
to the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner; (3) that it is so 
material that it would probably produce a different verdict, if the new trial 
were granted; and (4) that it is not cumulative, viz., speaking to facts in 
relation to which there was evidence at the trial."

Keene, 835 P.2d  
at 344 (quoting Opie v. State, 422 P.2d 84, 85 (Wyo. 
1967)).

[¶39]   The admission of perjury took place 
in the following exchange:

[PROSECUTOR]: Please 
listen to very carefully, Ms. Kenney, I want to make sure you understand me. Do 
you recall testifying under oath at both Pino trials?

A. Yes, I 
do.

Q. Do you recall 
testifying at both of those trials that you were searched both before and after 
each and every buy; do you recall that testimony?

A. Yes, I 
do.

Q. And now today you are 
saying that you only were searched before one of the buys?

A. 
Yes.

Q. So clearly you were 
committing perjury under oath at both Pino trials?

A. Yes, I 
was.

Q. Why did you say those 
things at those two prior trials, you lied under oath on those two occasions, 
why should we believe you today, Ms. Kenney?

[PROSECUTOR]: Nothing 
further, Your Honor.

[THE WITNESS]: Because 
Mark [an officer] asked me not to say anything about it.

 

Appellant argues 
that whether or not the officers searched Ms. Kenney prior to making the "buy" 
was crucial to their defense. Appellant claimed that Ms. Kenney set him up. 
Appellant's theory was that when Ms. Kenney was inside the high fence talking to 
her sister, out of sight of the officers, she got marijuana from her mother's 
house and gave that to the officers rather than obtaining the marijuana from Mr. 
Pino. Appellant insists that had the jury been aware of Ms. Kenney's later 
testimony that she was not searched, the jury would have returned a verdict in 
his favor.

[¶40]   We agree with the district court's 
decision not to grant a new trial. When the district court considered Ms. 
Kenney's testimony from the suppression hearing conducted prior to her trial, it 
noted that the evidence against appellant was not limited to the testimony of 
Dara Kenney. The jury heard the audiotape of the transaction which directly 
rebutted appellant's contention that Ms. Kenney had "planted" the marijuana on 
him in an effort to frame him.

[¶41]   This court has reviewed the 
entirety of the suppression hearing testimony. As the district court pointed 
out, at no point in the suppression hearing does Ms. Kenney recant the main 
substance of her testimony which was that appellant supplied the marijuana. 
Since Ms. Kenney only testified that the officers had not in fact searched her 
before each buy, the district court was "not convinced that a result other than 
conviction was probable." In addition, the district court properly viewed Ms. 
Kenney's suppression hearing testimony with suspicion since she had now been 
arrested and therefore was recanting portions of her earlier cooperation with 
the officers. The district court doubted the veracity of her statements at the 
suppression hearing.

[¶42]   We agree with the district court 
that Ms. Kenney's recantation would not have produced a different verdict. 
First, there is the audiotape recording of the transaction which establishes 
delivery by appellant. Second, Ms. Kenney went to her mother's house and into 
the backyard at appellant's urging. She did not have a pre-arranged plan to 
frame him with marijuana unless appellant could demonstrate that Ms. Kenney 
would be able to anticipate the fortuitous event of something being wrong with 
appellant's tire during the drug deal. What we said in Siegert is applicable 
here: "This type of `new evidence' is not sufficient to justify granting a new 
trial." Siegert v. State, 634 P.2d 323, 328 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶43]   This "new" evidence would not have 
produced a different result. Thus, this evidence does not satisfy the 
requirements for granting a new trial. Keene, 835 P.2d  at 344 (quoting Opie v. 
State, 422 P.2d 84, 85 (Wyo. 1967)). The district court properly refused to 
grant a new trial.

CONCLUSION

[¶44]   Appellant was not unduly prejudiced 
by the jury's use of an audiotape player in deliberations since the tape they 
reviewed was the tape of a criminal act and not testimonial. The district 
court's evidentiary rulings were correct on the uncharged misconduct issue and 
the officer's generic testimony about the probability of the informant 
testifying. The district court properly refused appellant's offered instruction 
about informants. Since we uphold this conviction, the probation revocation must 
also stand. After review of the additional materials made a part of this record, 
the district court's refusal to grant a new trial was correct. We find no error 
and affirm this conviction and revocation.

[¶45]   Affirmed.