Case Title: Alabama Power Co. v. Marine Builders, Inc.

Citation: 475 So. 2d 168

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1985-08-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
475 So. 2d 168 (1985)
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY, a corporation
v.
MARINE BUILDERS, INC., a corporation; and Bangor Punta Corporation, a corporation.
83-2.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 2, 1985.
*170 Carroll H. Sullivan of Gaillard, Little, Hume & Sullivan, Mobile, Edward S. Allen of Balch, Bingham, Baker, Ward, Smith, Bowman & Thagard, Birmingham, for appellant.
Peter V. Sintz and Frank G. Taylor of Sintz, Pike, Campbell & Duke, Mobile, for appellee Marine Builders.
Alex T. Howard, Jr. and Alan C. Christian, of Johnstone, Adams, Howard, Bailey & Gordon, Mobile, for appellee Bangor Punta Corp.
BEATTY, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict for plaintiffs and against Alabama Power Company in the amount of $3.5 million. We affirm.
The case is an outgrowth of a boating accident which occurred on Dog River, at the entrance to Halls Mill Creek, a navigable waterway in Mobile County, Alabama, on May 6, 1979. At that time and place, David Williams was operating a 1975 O'Day 25-foot sailing vessel, manufactured and sold by Bangor Punta Corporation (Bangor Punta), and subsequently purchased second-hand by Williams. Williams's wife, Jeri, and his daughter, Jennifer, were passengers. As the vessel was proceeding, its mast, which measured 33 feet, 8 inches above water level, came into contact with the standard 7,200-volt electric distribution line maintained by Alabama Power Company (APCo) and suspended across Halls Mill Creek. The ensuing electrical shock killed both Mr. and Mrs. Williams and injured their daughter, Jennifer.
On July 20, 1979, the administrators of the estates of Mr. and Mrs. Williams and the guardians of their surviving minor children, Jennifer, Pamela, and Lori, filed individual lawsuits, which were consolidated in state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1333,[1] pursuant to the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, claiming damages for the deaths of Mr. and Mrs. Williams and for the personal injuries sustained by Jennifer. The first count claimed compensatory damages on behalf of the administrators and the minor children for the death of David Williams proximately caused by the negligence of APCo. The second count claimed punitive damages under the wrongful death statute. The third count claimed compensatory damages on behalf of Jennifer Williams.
APCo by answer denied any culpability. APCo also filed a third-party complaint against the United States[2] seeking indemnity and contribution because of alleged misrepresentations by its representative, the Corps of Engineers, United States Army, which it claimed were the efficient cause of the accident. It also filed a third-party complaint against the Corps of Engineers and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric *171 Administration of the Department of Commerce, alleging their negligent failure to cause charts of the water area to depict the subject power line to be the efficient cause of the accident.
The United States appealed, seeking removal of the cause to federal court. Removal ensued; however, the cause was subsequently remanded to state court following a dismissal of the United States as a party. Following this remand, APCo moved to name Marine Builders, Inc. (Marine Builders), and Bangor Punta as third-party defendants. This motion was granted, whereupon APCo filed its third-party complaint against Bangor Punta and Marine Builders. In its claim seeking indemnity and contribution from Bangor Punta, APCo maintained that the Williams sailing vessel was defective and unreasonably dangerous because it was not grounded. APCo also charged that Bangor Punta should have warned the ultimate consumer of sailboat electrocution accidents of which it had prior knowledge, and of the dangers attendant to aluminum mast contact with overhead power cables. As against Marine Builders, APCo alleged that it was negligent and wanton in moving its newly constructed shrimp trawlers from their construction site down Halls Mill Creek so as to have their masts repeatedly collide with APCo's distribution line. This, according to APCo, entitled it to indemnity and contribution if APCo was found to be liable to plaintiffs.
Upon APCo's motion, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims under Alabama's wrongful death statute, thus effectively deciding that the case would proceed exclusively under admiralty jurisdiction and substantive law. See Kennedy Engine Company v. Dog River Marina and Boatworks, 432 So. 2d 1214 (Ala.1983). A later amendment by APCo to its third-party complaint was stricken on motion. Following trial, the jury returned five separate verdicts for the plaintiffs against APCo in the aggregate sum of $3.5 million. The jury also found in favor of the third-party defendants, Bangor Punta and Marine Builders. APCo's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, or remittitur, partially including grounds relating to its third-party claims, were denied. APCo paid the judgments and took this appeal from the judgments in favor of Marine Builders and Bangor Punta. The issues raised will be treated seriatim.
This issue pertains to a "mast warning" sticker which, beginning with the 1976 model of the O'Day 25-foot sailboat, Bangor Punta placed upon each boat it manufactured. This sticker contained language warning that contact with overhead power lines was dangerous, and restated the warning found in the operating and rigging instructions furnished with the vessel. This "mast warning" was not affixed to the 1975 model of the Williams sailboat, but, as stated above, was placed on later models. During the trial, APCo's attempts to introduce evidence of this warning were excluded on objection. The trial court also excluded evidence included in answers to interrogatories by and in the deposition of James H. Hunt, Bangor Punta's president, pertaining to such warnings.
APCo acknowledges in brief that the "mast warning" was first introduced after the 1975 sailboat of the Williamses had been sold by Bangor Punta and left its possession. APCo maintains that this evidence was, nevertheless, relevant on the issue of Bangor Punta's negligence, because the "mast warning" came into existence some three years before the accident. It is apparent that the trial court's refusal to admit this evidence was based upon its conclusion that it constituted an inadmissible subsequent remedial measure.
That rule, of course "is designed to protect the important policy of encouraging defendants to repair and improve their products and premises without the fear that such actions will be used later against *172 them in a lawsuit." Werner v. Upjohn Company, 628 F.2d 848, 855 (4th Cir.1980). To be sure, federal cases, under Federal Rule of Evidence 407, allow the introduction of subsequent remedial measures to prove the feasibility of such remedial measures, but only when feasibility is controverted. Werner at 853. That position is also followed by Alabama case law, which follows Werner. In Standridge v. Alabama Power Co., 418 So. 2d 84 (Ala.1982), this Court stated:
The same reasoning applies here. The exception to establish the feasibility of a "mast warning" was never controverted at trial by Bangor Punta; indeed, feasibility was conceded by it in its motion in limine filed before trial. For aught that appears, APCo's purpose in introducing such evidence was to show Bangor Punta's negligence in the first instance, i.e., in selling the sailboat without that warning, and not to controvert at trial the feasibility of such a warning.
APCo, however, argues that the absence of the "mast warning" was nevertheless admissible because Bangor Punta had knowledge of the danger of electrical shock from possible contact with lower power lines before this accident took place. In other words, APCo would have this evidence admitted against Bangor Punta, even though Bangor Punta's control over the sailboat had long since ceased, so long as Bangor Punta had knowledge of the danger before the accident. Alabama cases have focused on post-accident remedial changes to premises, facilities, or articles under the defendant's control which proximately causes injury. See Standridge, supra; Dixie Electric Co. v. Maggio, 294 Ala. 411, 318 So. 2d 274 (1975). Thus, had Bangor Punta controlled the sailboat in question at the time the "mast warnings" were placed upon 1976 models, perhaps an issue of negligence would have been made by its failure to incorporate that change in the 1975 model.[3] But, as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has commented on the subject of subsequent remedial measures in a products liability case, Grenada Steel Industries, Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir.1983):
See also Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala.1976) (to establish liability in a products liability case, plaintiff must show that he suffered injury by one who sold a product in a defective condition); and First National Bank of Mobile v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 365 So. 2d 966 (Ala. 1978) (the manufacturer's liability arises because he has placed the product on the market and having done so, if he still retains some measure of control, no sale having taken place, he should be liable).
A question on the relevancy of testimony is ordinarily a matter within the trial judge's discretion, and his ruling thereon will not be considered error on appeal unless that discretion has been grossly abused. Costarides v. Miller, 374 So. 2d 1335 (Ala.1979). See also Burbic Contracting Co. v. Cement Asbestos Products Co., 409 So. 2d 1 (Ala.1982) (exclusion of post-manufacture improvement in product line is not abuse of trial court's discretion). In this instance, that discretion was not abused.
One of the facts adduced at trial pertaining to the manufacture of the Williams sailboat was that it was not equipped with a lightning protection grounding system. It was APCo's position at trial that the presence of a grounding system on this boat would have greatly enhanced the Williamses' chances of surviving the electrical shock from contact with the power line. In support of this position, APCo presented the expert testimony of Dr. Norbert Schmitz. This witness conceded that a number of metallic alterations had been made to the sailboat by Mr. Williams after he purchased it (and after it had left Bangor Punta). These included an outboard motor on the stern, a metal gas can under the back seat, a metal steering wheel connected down to the rudder, and a metal throttle to the outboard motor. Dr. Schmitz testified that all of these would be required to be bonded to a grounding, or bonding, system with the aluminum mast in order to have lightning protection, and that had they been grounded together, the Williamses would have been "like birds on a power line," and would not have sustained such serious injuries. Dr. Schmitz also testified that without the additional bonding of the added items and with a factory-installed bonding system otherwise, with the voltage encountered, "there would have been sufficient [voltage] to have caused that kind of an injury, but it is not always a direct consequence of contact.... It's in a grey area which we simply don't know." His testimony followed:
In rebuttal of this testimony, Bangor Punta called Mr. Joe Kuncl. This witness testified to an accident he experienced in July 1967 when the mast of his sailboat came in contact with a 12,500-volt power line[4] on the Fon du Lac River near Fon du Lac, Wisconsin. Kuncl was operating a 25-foot New Horizons sailboat equipped with an inboard engine, when he reached for the metal reverse gear, and at that time the boat's mast contacted the power line, severely burning him about the body and head. Kuncl's sailboat was equipped with a lightning protection grounding system. Bangor Punta also produced Mr. Edward Grogan, who witnessed Kuncl's accident and described Kuncl's serious injuries. A photograph of Kuncl showing his severe injuries was also introduced by Bangor Punta.
APCo attacks the relevancy of this testimony as having no logical relationship to the issues, as being "too remote," as confusing to the jury, and as res inter alios acta. None of these objections is valid here, however. As evidence offered in rebuttal of Dr. Schmitz's opinion, it was clearly relevant. Dr. Schmitz's opinion was to the effect that the presence of a lightning grounding system on any sailboat would allow a person on that boat to have been "like a bird on a power line," without serious injury if the boat's mast struck a 7,200-volt power line. Thus, his testimony encompassed the entire field of possible serious injury from such a general condition, and thus it was proper rebuttal evidence to show, contrary to Dr. Schmitz's opinion, that serious injury could in fact result from such a condition. When evidence is offered for the purpose of establishing the impossibility of some point, it is proper rebuttal to show the possibility of that which the opponent claims is impossible. Cf. Watson Orchards v. New York Central Ry., 263 Ill.App. 397 (1931); Comment, 34 Ill.L.Rev. 210-11 (1939). Thus, when Dr. Schmitz's opinion was introduced showing the impossibility of serious injury or death on any sailboat equipped with grounding, it was allowable to rebut his opinion with real evidence of such an injury in a sailboat so equipped which struck a similar power line. Sims v. Callahan, 269 Ala. 216, 112 So. 2d 776 (1959). The admission of such evidence was within the discretion of the trial court, Gulf Refining Co. v. First National Bank of Mobile, 270 Ala. 351, 119 So. 2d 1 (1960); Raines v. Williams, 397 So. 2d 86 (Ala.1981), and, contrary to APCo's contention, was directed to a material issue, i.e., the effect of a lightning grounding system. See Cherry v. Hill, 283 Ala. 74, 214 So. 2d 427 (1968). The objection of remoteness was not made at trial; even so, such a question is likewise addressed largely to the trial court's discretion, subject to disturbance only for gross abuse, not present here. Ryan v. Acuff, 435 So. 2d 1244 (Ala.1983). The objection of res inter alios acta is also addressed to relevancy. Loftin's Rent-All, Inc. v. Universal Petroleum Services, Inc., 344 So. 2d 781 (Ala.Civ.App.1977).
We reach the same conclusion concerning the photograph displaying Mr. *175 Kuncl's injuries. This case concerns the possibility of incurring serious burns and death caused by electricity. The photograph of Kuncl discloses serious burns incurred under conditions substantially similar to those which the Williamses experienced. The fact that the photograph partook of that character did not make it irrelevant.
The photograph here met those requirements and thus its admission into evidence was not error. Thompson v. Magic City Trucking Service, 275 Ala. 291, 154 So. 2d 306 (1963).
Nor was it error for the trial court to disallow the introduction of certain other photographs into evidence. According to Dr. Schmitz's testimony, these were enlargements of smaller photographs which had been shown to him by someone else, and identified by that other person as photographs of Kuncl's sailboat. Dr. Schmitz himself had not seen the Kuncl sailboat itself and thus could not testify to the authenticity of the photographs as accurate reproductions of the object they displayed, having no actual knowledge of it. Smith v. Claybrook, 349 So. 2d 1087 (Ala.1977). The proper predicate not having been laid, the trial court correctly excluded the photograph.
That instruction follows:
In that connection, the trial court also gave as part of its oral charge the following:
The evidence referred to in these charges pertained first to the testimony of plaintiff's witness, Dr. Schmitz, through whom a copy of Volume 7 of a publication entitled "The National Fire Code" was introduced. Dr. Schmitz testified that that publication had been approved by the American National Standards Institute and contained provisions regarding the installation of grounding systems for cruising sailboats. Dr. Schmitz conceded that he did not know of any manufacturer who followed these standards, and also conceded that the provisions therein pertaining to grounding against lightning made no reference to protection from overhead power lines. We take note that the National Fire Code provisions themselves are "documents which have been judged [by their authors] suitable for legal adoption and enforcement." Indeed, Dr. Schmitz qualified his own testimony relative to their adherence by the boating industry at large:
Over defendant's objections, the trial court allowed this document into evidence, as well as a copy of "Safety Standards for Small Craft" and "Standards of the American Boat and Yacht Council." The trial judge at that time, as well as later when he charged the jury, announced that these publications would be admitted for whatever weight the jury would give to them.
This Court has examined each of the documents. Each publication is a recommended practice and standard for guidance, and is not shown to have been adopted by the sailboat industry itself. Moreover, none of the recommendations for the arrest of lightning referred to such a practice as a protection from contact with an overhead power line. Dr. Schmitz himself knew of no publication making grounding on sailboats protection from contact with overhead power lines or of any industry adoption of the recommendations in the proposed standards:
In rebuttal, Bangor Punta's president, Mr. Hunt, who had served as a member of the board of directors of the American Boat and Yacht Council (ABYC), testified that such recommendations were not related to contact with overhead power lines. Mr. Gorham Lippman, the executive director of the ABYC, called by Bangor Punta, testified likewise, and added:
*177 Several Alabama cases have dealt with the admissibility of safety regulations published by federal agencies under the authority of Congress. In City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264 (1939), this Court approved the admissibility of certain portions of the "Handbook of the Bureau of Standards, No. 10" dealing with "Safety Rules for the Installation and Maintenance of Electrical Supply and Communication Lines," but admonished that such rules, though admissible as expert opinion evidence (to be considered by the jury), were not regulations having the force of law whose violation was negligence per se. To the same effect is Knight v. Burns, Kirkley & Williams Construction Co., 331 So. 2d 651, 654 (Ala.1976), which held that certain safety requirements enacted within the terms of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and its regulations were admissible "for a jury to consider in determining the standard of care that a defendant should have followed." See also Meadows v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 392 So. 2d 825 (Ala.1981). We have been cited to no Alabama cases extending this principle to private proposals such as those admitted here, not governmental agency regulations adopted under governmental authority. Under the evidence, moreover, we cannot find that these recommendations were relevant to the inquiry, i.e., as protection from contact by a metal mast with an overhead power line; thus the trial court would not have been in error in excluding such evidence. However, APCo complains only that the trial judge erred in his instruction to the jury allowing them to consider this evidence along with other evidence on the issue of negligence. Thus, any error in admitting it was not prejudicial to APCo.
That portion of the trial court's lengthy instructions pertinent to this issue is as follows:
Additionally, and at APCo's request, the trial court also gave the following charge:
APCo based its claim against Bangor Punta on the basis of active-passive negligence. In fact, the trial court gave APCo's requested jury charges authorizing one guilty of only passive negligence to recover by way of indemnification from a party guilty of active negligence (under admiralty law). The entire oral charge, taken as a whole, places liability upon Bangor Punta if it manufactured a product "which may be reasonably anticipated to be dangerous if defectively made" because the manufacturer "owes a duty to exercise reasonable care in the manufacturing of his product so that it will be reasonably safe for its normal usage." This aspect of the instruction accords with our doctrine of manufacturer's liability. Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala.1976). The later reference in the court's oral charge that "although the third party defendant, Bangor Punta, used reasonable care in designing, making, inspecting, and testing the sailboat, Bangor Punta learned before it placed on the market of the defect" did not prejudice APCo in view of the language of the charge as a whole, which placed liability upon Bangor Punta as earlier stated.
Thus, we find no reversible error in the trial court's instructions. Wright v. Rowland, 406 So. 2d 830 (Ala.1981); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Griffin, 357 So. 2d 333 (Ala. 1978). If counsel had thought the entire charge misleading, he should have requested an explanatory instruction. Cf. Mobile County Gas District, v. National Cash Register Co., 295 Ala. 188, 326 So. 2d 105 (1976); and McLemore v. Alabama Power Co., 289 Ala. 643, 270 So. 2d 657 (1972).
It is APCo's contention that the "minimum clearance standard" of the Corps of Engineers was "pertinent on the issue of the manufacturer's foreseeability of mast contact" and thus that it was error to refuse a jury instruction on that standard.
The necessity for a permit over navigable waters arises from 33 U.S.C. § 403:
The list of prohibited obstructions is not exclusive, United States v. Illinois Terminal R. Co., 501 F. Supp. 18 (E.D.Mo.1980), but extends to "any type of obstruction." United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 80 S. Ct. 884, 4 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1960).
The evidence established that the Corps of Engineers of the United States Army was the regulatory agency responsible for issuing authorizations, or permits, for the installation of utility lines over navigable waters. The procedure incumbent in obtaining such a permit first required a minimum of 30.8 feet above maximum high (tide) water to apply for a permit. Nevertheless, officials of the Corps of Engineers testified that the elevation of the line over the water was governed by, and thus controlled by, the height or elevation expressed in the permit ultimately issued by the Corps, which in this case was 40 feet above mean low water. The evidence also established that this 40-foot elevation conformed to the original application for a permit submitted by APCo to the Corps of Engineers in 1936. This application was accompanied by a diagram of the proposed power line which proposed the location of the line as 40 feet above mean low water. Thus, while the minimum clearance standard of 30.8 feet was the minimum with which to support an application, it was the responsibility and within the authority of the Corps of Engineers to grant the final permit at a height deemed safe and feasible to the Corps. United States v. King Fisher Marine Service, 640 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1981) (permit issued by Corps of Engineers under 33 U.S.C. § 403 for dredging operations requires strict compliance). See also Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 207 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910, 91 S. Ct. 873, 27 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1971) (33 U.S.C. § 403 "is structured as a flat prohibition unless the unless being the issuance of approval by the corps").
Additionally, it is shown by the evidence that the minimum clearance requirement was dropped from the Corps regulations prior to the time this sailboat was manufactured. Thus, such former minimum requirement should have had no relevance to the foreseeability of mast contact with this power line. Furthermore, although APCo also argues that the trial court refused to permit evidence of the 30.8-foot standard, the record reflects that both the application standard height and the permitted height were testified to in substantial detail; hence no error can be predicated upon any such alleged error. Sweatman v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 418 So. 2d 893 (Ala. 1982). Having so ruled, we need not consider whether the duty of APCo to maintain the power line at the 40-foot level has not already been decided by the jury when it found in favor of the plaintiffs.
APCo's argument here is that "the jury should have been instructed that APCo had a right to recover punitive damages from *180 Bangor Punta and Marine Builders, in the event the evidence warranted it."[5] We disagree.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, Bangor Punta and Marine Builders moved for a partial directed verdict in their favor on the issue of whether either was guilty of wanton misconduct. The trial court granted this motion. Subsequently, the trial court instructed the jury on the issue of punitive damages by way of indemnity and contribution:
APCo's argument fails for several reasons. For one thing, it does not point to any evidence of wanton misconduct on the part of either Marine Builders or Bangor Punta warranting an award of punitive damages against either or both, and our reading of the record reveals none. For another, it is clear that the law does not allow punitive damages, as opposed to compensatory damages, by way of contribution or indemnity. Addressing the same problems which arose in the context of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the court in Davidson v. Dixon, 386 F. Supp. 482 (1974), aff'd without opinion, 529 F.2d 511 (3d Cir.1975), reasoned:
To the same effect is Gagnon v. Ball, 696 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.1982), concurred in by McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907 (2d Cir.N.Y.1983). These authorities are persuasive that allowance of punitive damages awards in such claims as the present ones under federal law rests upon individual culpability rather than upon liability based merely upon contribution and indemnity.
Finally, we note that the jury did not award any compensatory damages against either Bangor Punta or Marine Builders. Thus, APCo did not recover under its claims that the sailboat's manufacture was defective and that Marine Builders' actions in moving its shrimp boats under the power line were negligent. The jury's having found in favor of these third-party defendants on the question of liability, the issue of punitive damages became moot.
It appears from the record that the injection of the price of Marine Builders' shrimp *181 boats and Marine Builders' net worth occurred in the opening statement of APCo's attorney. That statement referred to Marine Builders' construction of "bigger" and "taller" shrimp boats (which were then sailed down Halls Mill Creek with "skids" on the masts to enable them to pass under APCo's power line). That statement continued:
Later, during APCo's cross-examination of Ed Horton, one of the owners of Marine Builders, the following took place:
Later in the trial, the attorney for plaintiffs called Mr. Ray Horton, vice-president of Marine Builders, as an adverse witness, and during his testimony on direct examination, he referred to his company's difficulties with APCo's low power lines and its repeated concerns about the safety of its men and others. He added:
We have referred to the financial condition of Marine Builders vis-a-vis the power line, as disclosed in the record, to show that the subject was first broached on cross-examination of a witness by APCo itself, and later by plaintiffs in cross-examination, not by Marine Builders. In Ray Horton's later testimony, APCo attempted to have him disclose the net worth of Marine Builders and the sales prices of their shrimp boats, but objection to this was sustained.
The obvious purpose of this line of questioning was to show that Marine Builders had the financial ability to raise the power line. This issue has been mooted by the jury's verdict for plaintiffs and in favor of Marine Builders and Bangor Punta on APCo's claims against them for negligence. The jury implicitly found that it was APCo's duty to maintain the lines at a 40-foot level and that it failed in this duty, and that its failure proximately resulted in the deaths and injuries. The jury's findings exonerating Marine Builders implicitly found that Marine Builders owed no duty to raise the lines. Thus, any evidence disclosing that Marine Builders had the financial ability to raise the lines was irrelevant if Marine Builders had no duty to do so.
Moreover, by arguing that the financial condition of Marine Builders was admissible by APCo to rebut evidence offered by Marine Builders, APCo, we respectfully suggest, has misconceived the order of the evidence. It was APCo, and then plaintiffs, who adduced this evidence, not Marine Builders. Hence, the Rule of Cities Service Oil Co. v. Griffin, 357 So. 2d 333 (Ala.1978) (permitting rebuttal of irrelevant evidence offered by opposing party) does not apply. The trial court did not err in disallowing this evidence.
We reiterate that this case is being reviewed under federal law, not Alabama law.
This requested charge follows:
Whether or not the giving of this instruction was error, we believe, must be considered in the framework of APCo's claim *183 for indemnity and contribution, and the trial court's other pertinent charges:
Insofar as indemnity is concerned, it has been stated that:
Delano v. Ives, 40 F. Supp. 672, 674 (E.D. Pa.1941). Or, as stated in Maritime Overseas Corporation v. Northeast Petroleum Industries, Inc., 706 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1983), quoting Araujo v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard, Nantucket Steamship Authority, 693 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1982):
The doctrine of contribution, on the other hand,
Anno. 53 A.L.R.3d 184, 190 (1973).
The instruction in question was tantamount to charging that if APCo was in a better position to appreciate the risk of injury and avoid the danger, particularly where the danger was within the control of APCo and its employees, APCo would not be entitled to indemnity. This principle has been recognized in negligence cases under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act and appears equally appropriate here. The evidence clearly established the control of APCo over the power line, and so, in view of the trial court's entire charge on APCo's right to indemnity, including the distinction between active and passive negligence, we find no error in the giving of this charge. Cf. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S. Ct. 1614, 68 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1981), and Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steam. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S. Ct. 232, 100 L. Ed. 133 (1956) (employing both the warranty theory and the negligence theory of liability to measure the right to indemnity of one best situated to avoid the injury). At most the charge might have been considered misleading, and if APCo so considered it, an explanatory instruction could have been requested. Authorities, supra.
Let the judgments be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES and SHORES, JJ., concur.
[1]  § 1333(1): "Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."
[2]  See 46 U.S.C. § 741 et seq.
[3]  APCo alleged that this sailboat was "designed, manufactured, and sold ... in a defective condition and was unreasonably dangerous to the ultimate users or consumers."
[4]  Such a power line, also known as a 12-KV line, was later explained in evidence as the same as a 7,200 volt line when measuring voltage between a conductor and the ground. On the day of this accident, the line in question was a 12-KV line.
[5]  Some 13 days prior to trial APCo filed a second amendment to its third-party complaint, alleging that Bangor Punta and Marine Builders were guilty of wanton misconduct. Upon motions and after hearing, this amendment was struck. APCo does not attack the exercise of the trial court's discretion in taking that action, but argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury on its right to recover punitive damages based upon the evidence.