Case Title: Yohn v. State

Citation: 476 So. 2d 123

Docket Number: 65,504

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1985-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
476 So. 2d 123 (1985)
Tura YOHN, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 65,504.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 11, 1985.
Rehearing Denied October 7, 1985.
Robert B. Staats of Staats, Overstreet & White, Panama City, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
ADKINS, Justice.
The First District Court of Appeal certified to this Court the following question:
*124 Yohn v. State, 450 So. 2d 898, 901 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
Petitioner was convicted of manslaughter for the shooting death of a woman who had been having an affair with petitioner's husband. In her appeal to the First District Court of Appeal, petitioner raised several points, but the district court only concerned itself with one, i.e., whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane. The district court concluded there was no error. We do not agree.
At the trial, petitioner raised the defense of insanity. The expert testimony received at trial regarding this issue was conflicting.
Petitioner's counsel requested the following special jury instructions relating to the defense of insanity:
Appellant's requested jury instruction No. 8:
Appellant's requested jury instruction No. 9:
Appellant's requested jury instruction No. 10:
Appellant's requested jury instruction No. 11:
The trial judge refused to give these instructions. Instead he gave the current Florida Standard Jury Instructions on the issue, Florida Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal) 304(b) and 2.03, as follows:
The district court concluded that even though petitioner's requested instructions correctly stated the law of Florida, the instructions given were adequate when all of the instructions given are considered as a whole. 450 So. 2d  at 901. The court then certified the question to this Court as one of great public importance.
The first part of the certified question, i.e., whether the state has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant was sane at the time of the offense when the defense of insanity has been raised, presumes that the law in Florida is unclear on where the burden of proof lies. Also, if it is presumed that the ultimate burden of proof is on the state to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, there is some confusion over whether Florida law allows the trial judge, as in federal law, or the jury to determine whether the presumption of sanity has been sufficiently rebutted to create a burden of proof upon the state to prove sanity. See Reese v. State, 452 So. 2d 1079, 1080 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (Anstead, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, we have stated unequivocally the law in Florida on this issue on a number of occasions. For example, in Holmes v. State, 374 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913, 100 S. Ct. 1845, 64 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1980), we stated:
Id. at 948 (quoting Jones v. State, 332 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1976), Sundberg, J., specially concurring). See also, Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974, 91 S. Ct. 1189, 28 L. Ed. 2d 322 (1971). It is clear then that Florida law differs from federal law on this point because in the federal courts the trial judge determines as a matter of law when insanity is in issue. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 587 F.2d 852, 854 (6th Cir.1978).
It is true, as the state argues in a companion case to the instant case, Reese v. State, 476 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1985), that the United States Supreme Court has held in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1977), that it is not unconstitutional to place the burden on a defendant to prove he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense. However, we have chosen not to place this burden of proof on the defendant in the state of Florida, but as we have said, to create a rebuttable presumption of sanity which if overcome, must be proven by the state just like any other element of the offense. We do not reconsider that policy in this decision.
With this law in mind, we turn now to the jury instructions which were given in this case to determine whether they accurately apprise the jury where the burden of proof lies. We hold that they do not inform the jury that once a reasonable doubt is created in its mind of the defendant's insanity, then the state must prove beyond every reasonable doubt the defendant's sanity.
We have pointed out before that our approval of the standard jury instructions does not relieve the trial judge of his responsibility of correctly charging the jury. Our approval of the standard jury instruction on insanity in Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924, 99 S. Ct. 1254, 59 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1979), is not determinative of the case before us because the focus in that case was upon the definition of insanity and not upon *127 where the burden of proof lies when the defense is raised. In In the Matter of the Use by Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So. 2d 594, 598, modified 431 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1981), we stated:
While the Standard Jury Instructions can be of great assistance to the Court and to counsel, it would be impossible to draft one set of instructions which would cover every situation. The standard instructions are a guideline to be modified or amplified depending upon the facts of each case.
The jury instructions given in this case do not adequately and correctly charge the jury of the substantive law in Florida applicable to this issue. The deficiencies of Standard Jury Instruction 3.04(b) were pointed out by Judge Anstead in his dissenting opinion in Reese as follows:
452 So. 2d  at 1081.
Since Florida law leaves to the jury the decision as to whether there has been sufficient evidence of insanity presented to rebut the presumption of sanity, it is crucial that the jury be clearly instructed on the state's ultimate burden to prove that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense. Instead, Standard Jury Instruction 3.04(b) stops after instructing the jury on the presumption of sanity and the requirement that the elements of insanity be shown sufficiently to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity. The instruction frames the issue as one of finding the defendant legally insane. This places the burden of proof on the defendant's shoulders since it will always be the defendant who will be showing his or her insanity. The jury is never told that the state must prove anything in regard to the sanity issue. This is not the law in Florida.
The general standard jury instructions on reasonable doubt and burden of proof in Standard Jury Instruction 2.03 do not rectify the failure of Standard Jury Instruction 3.04(b) to set forth the state's burden of proof as to the defendant's sanity. These instructions were general, whereas the instructions on insanity were specific. Also, the general instruction in 2.03 refers to the state's burden to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction on insanity in 3.04(b) says nothing about insanity being an element of the offense, which it clearly is. See Parkin v. State. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the erroneous specific instruction was cured by the general one.
In sum, the law in Florida provides for a rebuttable presumption of sanity, which if overcome by the defendant, puts the burden on the state to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt just like any other element of the offense. The standard jury instructions given in this case do not completely and accurately state that law. The defendant's requested instructions do. Therefore, we quash the decision of the district court affirming petitioner's conviction and sentence and remand with instructions to remand to the trial court for a new trial. The certified question is answered accordingly.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and McDONALD and SHAW, JJ., concur.
ALDERMAN, J., dissents, in which OVERTON and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
ALDERMAN, Justice, dissenting.
I would approve the decision of the First District Court which properly held that the giving of the present Standard Jury Instruction 3.04(b), along with the general reasonable doubt instruction, was sufficient and which affirmed Yohn's conviction and sentence for manslaughter. The instructions given, considered as a whole, correctly stated the law and fairly presented Yohn's theory of defense to the jury.
The First District accurately analogized the sufficiency of the present instructions relating to the defense of insanity with those given in Rotenberry v. State, 429 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), relating to the affirmative defense of entrapment. In Rotenberry, defendant requested a special instruction on the issue of entrapment similar to that requested by Yohn in the present case on the issue of insanity. Although Rotenberry requested that the court specifically tell the jury that the State must prove that defendant was not entrapped beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court, instead, gave the standard jury instruction on entrapment as well as the standard jury instruction on the State's burden of proof. The district court affirmed and held that the totality of the *129 instructions were adequate. It then certified the following question:
Rotenberry sought review here, and in our recent decision of Rotenberry v. State, 468 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1985), we approved the First District's affirmative response to this question. We explained:
468 So. 2d  at 974-75.
Consistent with our decision in Rotenberry, we should likewise find that the present instructions were sufficient and that the district court correctly affirmed Yohn's conviction.
OVERTON and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.