Case Title: Traynor v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 295, 2004

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
GRACE L. TRAYNOR,                      
           
Defendant Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
     
 
 
     
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
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   No. 295, 2004 
 
   Court Below---Superior Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for New Castle County  
   Cr. A. Nos. IN03-10-0693; 1406   
                      
 
Submitted: February 14, 2005  
   Decided: March 22, 2005    
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 22nd day of March 2005, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 
filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), her attorney’s motion to withdraw, 
and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Grace L. Traynor, was found guilty by a 
Superior Court jury of Felony Theft and Falsifying Business Records.  She was 
sentenced to a total of 2 years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended 
immediately for decreasing levels of probation.  The Superior Court also ordered 
restitution in the amount of $10,000.00.  This is Traynor’s direct appeal. 
 
(2) 
Traynor’s trial counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
 
 
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consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 
26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a 
conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could arguably 
support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its own review of the record 
and determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
 
(3) 
Traynor’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By letter, 
Traynor’s counsel informed Traynor of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided 
her with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying brief and the 
complete trial transcript.  Traynor also was informed of her right to supplement her 
attorney’s presentation.  Traynor responded with a brief that raises one issue for 
this Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to the position taken by 
Traynor’s counsel as well as the issue raised by Traynor and has moved to affirm 
the Superior Court’s judgment. 
 
(4) 
Traynor raises one issue for this Court’s consideration.  She claims 
that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support her convictions.2 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 
429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
2 This claim will be reviewed for plain error because it was not raised at trial in the form of a 
motion for acquittal.  Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
 
 
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(5) 
The evidence at trial established that, in June 2003, Traynor, a 
licensed real estate agent, sold a residential property of which she was a joint 
owner.  The buyers were represented by the Delaware law firm of DelCollo and 
Werb, P.A.  The property had two liens against it and one of the lienholders had 
moved to foreclose on the property.  In order to obtain the pay-out figure for the 
mortgage in foreclosure for purposes of settlement, Mr. Werb, one of the partners 
in DelCollo and Werb, contacted local counsel for the out-of-state law firm 
representing the lienholder.  He was told that, due to the firm’s privacy policy, no 
information on the lien could be divulged without the consent of Traynor.  Traynor 
never gave her consent.   
 
(6) 
Because he had a professional relationship with Traynor, Werb relied 
on information concerning the lien that she prepared and faxed to him.  The 
information had been typed on the letterhead of the out-of-state law firm, but the 
pay-out calculations were smudged and illegible.  Traynor had handwritten what 
purported to be the pay-out calculations to one side of the smudged calculations 
and had placed her signature on the document.  At settlement, Werb sent checks to 
the lienholders that reflected Traynor’s handwritten calculations and dispersed the 
remaining proceeds of the settlement to the other joint owner of the property, to the 
 
 
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buyers as reimbursement for having the pool cleaned, and to Traynor’s father, 
whom Traynor stated was authorized to receive a portion of the proceeds.         
 
(7) 
After Werb sent the check to the out-of-state law firm for payment of 
the mortgage lien, however, the law firm contacted Werb and informed him that 
the check was deficient by over $9,000.00.  DelCollo and Werb, P.A. immediately 
covered the deficiency by paying the out-of-state law firm from its operating 
budget.  When Werb contacted Traynor about the discrepancy, she initially told 
him there had been a problem with the title insurance.  Werb later learned that the 
pay-out to Traynor’s father exceeded what was owed by over $9,000.00 and that 
Traynor had cashed the check herself the day after settlement, thereby receiving 
over $9,000.00 to which she was not entitled.  Traynor never denied that she owed 
the money to DelCollo and Werb, P.A. and promised to repay it on several 
occasions.  She never did, however.    
 
(8) 
When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, this Court 
must determine whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.3  When the determination of facts turns on a 
                                                 
3 Williams v. State, 539 A.2d 164, 168 (Del. 1988). 
 
 
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question of credibility of the witnesses, this Court will not substitute its opinion for 
that of the trier of fact.4 
 
(9) 
In this case, the evidence adduced at trial clearly was sufficient to 
sustain Traynor’s convictions of Felony Theft and Falsifying Business Records.  
The prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Traynor “exercise[d] 
control over or obtain[ed] property of another person intending to deprive that 
person of it”5 and “with intent to defraud, . . . alter[ed], erase[d], obliterate[d] . . . a 
true entry in the business records of an enterprise.”6  There was no error, plain or 
otherwise. 
 
(10) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
Traynor’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 
issue.  We also are satisfied that Traynor’s counsel has made a conscientious effort 
to examine the record and has properly determined that Traynor could not raise a 
meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
5 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 841(a) (2001). 
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 871(2) (2001). 
 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to 
withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice