Case Title: Donaldson v. Buck

Citation: 333 So. 2d 786

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1976-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
333 So. 2d 786 (1976)
James F. DONALDSON
v.
Nellie Jean BUCK.
SC 939.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 11, 1976.
*787 J. Wm. Thomason, Bessemer, for appellant.
Rives, Peterson, Pettus, Conway, Elliott & Small, Birmingham, for appellee.
ALMON, Justice.
The appellant, James F. Donaldson, brought suit against Nellie Jean Buck, appellee, for damages resulting from an automobile collision.
The collision occurred on a bridge on Highway 52 in Shelby County. The bridge was approximately thirty feet long and the traveled portion was about seventeen feet wide. In lieu of side rails the bridge only had a small concrete curbing on either side. The highway leading to the bridge was paved and slightly wider than the bridge.
On a misty, rainy afternoon appellant approached the narrow bridge from one end at approximately twenty miles per hour. The appellee approached from the other end at approximately twenty-five miles per hour. The road was slippery and wet and the vehicles came into contact somewhere on the bridge. The appellant's vehicle came to rest in the creek off of the bridge on its side. The appellee steered her vehicle clear of the bridge and the vehicle came to rest on the highway about five car lengths from the end of the bridge.
The jury found for the defendant-appellee. Motion for new trial was overruled.
Appellant argues that it was reversible error for the trial court to allow comments by appellee's counsel during the closing arguments to the jury on the failure of appellant to call Dr. Wilson and Mr. Banderman as witnesses.
As to Mr. Banderman, the record shows:
"MR. ELLIOTT: I do not know it.
"THE COURT: Overruled.
"MR. THOMASON: We except to it.
It is the general rule that a party cannot comment in argument upon the failure of his opponent to call a particular witness if the witness is equally accessible to both parties. City of Birmingham v. Levens, 241 Ala. 47, 200 So. 888 (1941).
It was stipulated however that Banderman was a passenger in appellant's vehicle at the time of the accident and was injured. It was further stipulated that Banderman employed appellant's counsel to cause suit to be filed against appellee. The suit was settled for $2,000.00.
Thus, the question narrows to whether under these circumstances Banderman was *788 equally accessible, within the meaning of the law, to both parties.
In Carter v. Chambers, 79 Ala. 223 (1885), this court observed:
In Waller v. State, 242 Ala. 1, 4 So. 2d 911, the defendant was tried for the offense of robbery. The State attempted to show flight. To refute flight the defendant testified that on the night of the alleged offense he spent the night with his father in the neighborhood of the occurrence. The father did not testify at trial. In closing arguments to the jury the solicitor commented that it was significant that the defendant did not call his father. The court reasoned that
It can therefore be seen that being amenable to process is not the sole criterion for determining "equal availability" within the meaning of the rule.
This court in Alabama Power Co. v. Talmadge, 207 Ala. 86, 93 So. 548, addressed this subject as follows:
It would seem under the authorities cited that reversible error has not been *789 shown in allowing the argument in question. The witness had employed appellant's counsel to prosecute a suit against appellee. It is not unreasonable to conclude that the witness would be friendly toward appellant and unfriendly toward the appellee. Certainly, we cannot conclude otherwise on this scant record.
We see no need to address ourselves to the assertion of counsel that the witness was sick or the counter-assertion by opposing counsel seeming to contradict that fact. The trial judge was in a better position to weigh these claims than an appellate court. We cannot say that the witness was equally available as that term is used in our cases.
As for the comments concerning the failure to call Dr. Wilson as a witness, it appears that Dr. Wilson was equally available to both parties. Thus, it was error for the trial court to allow comment by appellee concerning the failure of appellant to call Dr. Wilson as a witness. However, the testimony of Dr. Wilson could only have gone to the question of damages. And error in the rejection or admission of evidence going merely to the extent of injury and damages will not work a reversal where there is a finding for the defendant. Reed v. L. Hammel Dry Goods Co., 215 Ala. 494, 111 So. 237 (1927); Millsap v. Williamson, 294 Ala. 634, 320 So. 2d 649 (1975). While the question in the instant case does not involve the admission of testimony as to damages, it does concern the prejudicial effect of comments concerning the failure of appellant to call a witness who would testify as to damages, and we conclude that the same principles should apply.
Appellant next alleges that the trial court erred in not permitting a physicist to answer hypothetical questions expressing his opinion as to whether the impact occurred on appellant's or appellee's side of the road.
Mr. Demetrius Zizzermann testified that he was employed at the U. A. B. Medical Center as a computer programmer; that he was studying for his doctoral degree in theoretical nuclear physics; and that at that time he held a bachelor and masters degree in physics. The record does not indicate that Mr. Zizzermann had any experience in automobile accident reconstruction.
We are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing the hypothetical questions. The rule is that hypothetical questions should not contain elements of fact not shown by the evidence. Mahone v. Birmingham Electric Co., 261 Ala. 132, 135, 73 So. 2d 378, 380 (1954); Salotti v. Seaboard Coast Line Railway Co., 293 Ala. 1, 299 So. 2d 695 (1974).
Among the facts not in evidence were the weight of the vehicles (based upon telephone calls by the witness to automobile dealerships), the angle of collision, and the speed of the vehicles (the hypothetical assumed the vehicles were going at equal speeds, while the evidence was to the contrary). Further, according to the preliminary questions, Mr. Zizzermann assumed that the drivers exercised no control over the movement of the vehicles. The evidence showed otherwise. He further testified that to make his calculation he would have "to know the speed of one of the vehicles after the accident." There was no evidence in the record which showed *790 the speed of either vehicle after the impact.[1]
The preliminary questions to the witness which we have referred to were asked outside the presence of the jury. At the conclusion the trial court made the following comment:
Finally, appellant maintains that the trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant, after being cross-examined concerning answers to three interrogatories, to testify as to how many questions were in the entire set of interrogatories (the answers were not offered) into evidence. This court fails to see the relevance of such evidence to any material issue in the case. Furthermore, determination of whether particular evidence is relevant is largely within the discretion of the trial court. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Humphres, 293 Ala. 413, 304 So. 2d 573 (1974). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
BLOODWORTH, FAULKNER and EMBRY, JJ., concur.
HEFLIN, C. J., concurs in the result.
[1]  Although we have mentioned several instances in which the facts in evidence differed from those assumed in the hypothetical questions, we do not say all these deficiencies must be satisfied in every case.