Case Title: Hermreck v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-128

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hermreck v. United Parcel Service, Inc.1997 WY 74938 P.2d 863Case Number: 96-128Decided: 06/12/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

STAN 
HERMRECK,

Appellant (Plaintiff)

 

v. 

 

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,

Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court, Sweetwater County

 The 
Honorable Jere Ryckman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Bernard Q. Phelan, of Phelan Law Offices, 
Cheyenne.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

Steven K. Sharpe and Stephen N. Goodrich, of Nicholas 
Law Offices, LLC, Cheyenne.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

THOMAS, Justice.

 [¶1]      The only issue to 
be resolved in this case is whether a public policy exception to the employment 
at will doctrine can be invoked to challenge the termination of an employee 
whose employment was subject to a collective bargaining agreement. Stan Hermreck 
(Hermreck) was discharged from his position as a driver for United Parcel 
Service (UPS) for dishonesty in filling out his time cards. Hermreck filed a 
grievance pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, and the grievance 
panel that heard the matter upheld the discharge. Hermreck then filed this 
action against UPS alleging that his discharge was wrongful because it was in 
retaliation for his reporting of violations of the Wyoming Occupational Safety 
& Health Act by UPS. He also sought to recover for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. The district court ruled that the wrongful discharge claim 
was foreclosed because a public policy exception to the employment at will 
doctrine cannot be invoked if the position is covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement, and Hermreck had not demonstrated the requisite degree of severe 
emotional distress to justify a trial on that claim for relief. The district 
court also ruled that the claim could not be maintained because Hermreck had 
failed to pursue other available remedies. A summary judgment was entered in 
favor of UPS, which we affirm.

 

[¶2]      In the Brief of 
Appellant, Hermreck states that the issues are:

1. Does the existence of a grievance process in a 
collective bargaining agreement provide "another remedy" precluding an action 
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy?

2. Does the existence of a complaint procedure 
contained in an administrative regulation provide "another remedy" precluding an 
action for wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy?

3. Is a state law claim for wrongful discharge in 
violation of the public policy stated in a case where the Surface Transportation 
Assistance Act sets forth public policy?

 

            
In the Brief of Appellee United Parcel Service, Inc., the issues to be 
resolved are stated in this way: 

1. Whether the district court properly granted 
summary judgment to Appellee United Parcel Service, Inc. on Appellant's claim of 
retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy, 
because:

A. 
The "public policy exception" to the at will employment doctrine has no 
application to employees, like Appellant, who are not at will and who are 
protected by the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement;

B. 
Even if the "public policy exception" applied regardless of employment status, 
the grievance and hearing remedy in the collective bargaining agreement provides 
"another remedy" to Appellant, precluding his cause of 
action;

C. 
The Wyoming Occupational Health and Safety Act, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970, and the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 also 
provide Appellant with "other remedies," precluding his cause of action; 
and

D. Appellant's retaliatory discharge claim is barred 
by a one year statute of limitations?

 

[¶3]      Hermreck was 
employed as a truck driver for UPS for nearly thirteen years. On January 7, 1994 
UPS terminated Hermreck's employment after it was discovered that Hermreck had 
manipulated his time cards from January 3, 1994 to January 6, 1994. When he was 
discharged, Hermreck was a member of a union, and his employment was subject to 
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between UPS and Hermreck's labor 
organization. The collective bargaining agreement provided Hermreck with the 
right to file a grievance and have a hearing to contest the decision by UPS to 
terminate him. Hermreck did file a grievance and sought a hearing on his 
discharge.

 

[¶4]      Approximately one 
month after Hermreck was discharged, a grievance panel, composed of both union 
and company representatives, held a hearing on the grievance that Hermreck 
filed. To support its claim that "just cause" existed for Hermreck's 
termination, UPS introduced evidence that Hermreck had been followed between 
January 3, 1994 and January 6, 1994 for the purpose of monitoring his work 
activities. The evidence established that Hermreck had been discharged after UPS 
discovered discrepancies between his time card and the time that UPS actually 
observed him performing his duties of employment. The evidence also demonstrated 
that Hermreck failed to record breaks during this time period. The hearing 
record contains nothing relating to a claim of retaliatory discharge. At the 
conclusion of that hearing, the grievance panel upheld the decision by UPS to 
terminate Hermreck, ruling that just cause did exist for his termination and 
that UPS had not violated the collective bargaining 
agreement.

 

[¶5]      The only claim 
that Hermreck argues in his brief is that the district court erred in granting a 
summary judgment to UPS on his claim of retaliatory discharge in violation of 
public policy. He does not challenge the dismissal of his claim for the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the absence of any claim of 
error, briefing or argument, we hold that the dismissal of the claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress has been conceded by Hermreck, and 
the district court's ruling on that action stands. Weston County Hosp. Joint Powers Bd. v. 
Westates Construction Co., 841 P.2d 841, 850 (Wyo. 1992); Epple v. Clark, 804 P.2d 678, 681 (Wyo. 
1991); Prazma v. Kaehne, 768 P.2d 586, 588 (Wyo. 1989), citing Zanetti v. 
Zanetti, 689 P.2d 1116, 1123 (Wyo. 1984).

 

[¶6]      The only issue 
for us to determine is whether any error was committed by the district court in 
granting a summary judgment to UPS. The summary judgment was premised upon the 
ruling by the district court that the claim for retaliatory discharge presented 
by Hermreck was foreclosed because a public policy exception based upon the 
employment at will doctrine is not available in an instance such as this in 
which the employment is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. In Brinkman v. State, 224 Mont. 238, 729 P.2d 1301 (1986), the Supreme Court of Montana, relying upon its earlier case of Small v. McRae, 200 Mont. 497, 651 P.2d 982 (1982), and federal cases, held that Brinkman's claim that he was 
discharged in violation of public policy did not further a state interest that 
would transcend the policy of supporting the employment contract (Brinkman was overruled to the extent 
"that it holds that a state-law claim is preempted merely because resolution of 
such a claim requires the same analysis of the facts as the contractual 
determination of just cause under the collective bargaining agreement." Foster v. Albertsons, Inc., 254 Mont. 
117, 835 P.2d 720, 726 (1992)). The Montana court pointed out that a contrary 
ruling would permit the employee to circumvent the remedies provided by the 
collective bargaining agreement. See Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc., 193 
Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781, 785 (1984).

 

[¶7]      Our standard of 
review on a motion for summary judgment is well established. Summary judgment is 
appropriate when there exists no genuine issues as to any material fact, and the 
prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Davis v. Black Hills Trucking, Inc., 929 P.2d 532, 533-534 (Wyo. 1996); Woodard v. 
Cook Ford Sales, Inc., 927 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Wyo. 1996); Fowler v. Westair Enterprises, Inc., 906 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Wyo. 1995); see also WYO. R. CIV. P. 56(c). We do not accord 
any deference to the decision of the district court on issues of law. Matter of North Laramie Land Co., 605 P.2d 367, 373 (Wyo. 1980); Griess v. 
Office of the Atty. Gen., Div. of Criminal Investigation, 932 P.2d 734, 736 
(Wyo. 1997). Our jurisprudential standard requires us to examine the record from 
the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we 
give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which fairly may be 
drawn from the record. Smith v. 
Throckmartin, 893 P.2d 712, 714 (Wyo. 1995), quoting Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341, 
342 (Wyo. 1989).

 

[¶8]      In Wyoming, a 
tort action for retaliatory discharge can be recognized even when the contract 
of employment is "at will." Dynan v. 
Rocky Mountain Federal Sav. & Loan, 792 P.2d 631 (Wyo. 1990); Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277 (Wyo. 1985). The tort remedy is justified by the proposition that permitting 
the discharge would result in allowing a violation of public policy to go 
unredressed. This dynamic requires us to recognize that we should not permit the 
infringement of a valuable social policy to occur without vindication. Griess v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of 
Delaware, 776 P.2d 752, 753 (Wyo. 1989), quoting Allen, 699 P.2d  at 
284.

 

[¶9]      We have held, 
however, that when another remedy exists to redress the violation of social 
policy that resulted in the employee's discharge, then no need exists for a 
court imposed separate tort action premised on the violation of public policy. 
Allen, 699 P.2d  at 284. Hermreck was 
employed pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. When such 
an agreement exists, Hermreck is not an "at will" employee, but his employment 
instead is subject to the terms of the contract. This collective bargaining 
agreement provided him with the opportunity to file a grievance and have a 
hearing to seek vindication of his rights because of an unlawful termination. As 
we stated in Dynan, 792 P.2d  at 640, 
quoting Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052, 1055 (E.D.Pa. 1977) (emphasis added):

"`It is clear then that the whole rationale 
undergirding the public policy exception is the vindication or the protection of 
certain strong policies of the community. If these policies or goals are 
preserved by other remedies, then the public policy is sufficiently served. 
Therefore, application of the public policy exception requires two factors: (1) 
that the discharge violate some well-established public policy; and (2) that there be no remedy to protect the 
interest of the aggrieved employee or society.'" Allen, 699 P.2d  at 
284.

When an employee, like 
Hermreck, enjoys a remedy pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, the 
societal interest can be protected by asserting retaliatory discharge in the 
grievance process, and we should not permit avoidance of the collective 
bargaining grievance process by an independent action.

 

[¶10]   Hermreck did have an available 
remedy to protect not only his interests, but also the interests of society with 
respect to an unlawful termination in violation of public policy. Under the 
circumstances, the invocation of an exception to the employment at will general 
rule would not be appropriate. Where an employment contract is present, there 
does not exist any necessity for invoking a separate action for the tort of 
retaliatory discharge as to vindicate public policy.1 We hold that no error was committed 
by the district court in its Order Granting Summary 
Judgment.

 

The Order Granting Summary 
Judgment entered in the trial court is affirmed.

 

Footnotes

1 UPS asserts that other state and 
federal statutes furnish Hermreck with alternative remedies to a claim of 
retaliatory discharge. In particular, UPS cites: (1) the Wyoming Occupational 
Health & Safety Act, WYO. STAT. §§ 27-11-101, et seq.; (2) the federal 
Occupational Safety & Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (1970); and (3) 
the federal Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C.App. §§ 2301 et seq. 
(1982). Since we hold that the collective bargaining agreement provided the 
appropriate alternative and available remedy to Hermreck for the alleged 
wrongful discharge, we do not address whether these statutes, or any of them, 
constitute an alternative remedy.