Case Title: Vaught v. Cleveland Clinic Found.

Citation: 2003-Ohio-2181

Docket Number: 20011970

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Vaught v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 98 Ohio St.3d 485, 2003-Ohio-2181.] 
 
 
VAUGHT, APPELLEE, v. CLEVELAND CLINIC FOUNDATION ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Vaught v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 98 Ohio St.3d 485, 2003-Ohio-
2181.] 
Civil procedure — Discovery — Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
granting a motion in limine to preclude expert testimony, when — Civ.R. 
26(E) and former Loc.R. 21.1 of the Court of Common Pleas of 
Cuyahoga County, General Division, applied. 
(No. 2001-1970 — Submitted January 8, 2003 — Decided May 7, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 79026. 
__________________ 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶1} 
In 1997, plaintiff-appellee Carolyn A. Vaught sought treatment at 
the Cleveland Clinic for chronic right-knee pain.  Defendant-appellant Dr. Peter J. 
Brooks, an employee of defendant-appellant the Cleveland Clinic, was her 
assigned physician.  After an initial examination and consultation, Dr. Brooks 
recommended total knee-replacement surgery to alleviate appellee’s pain and to 
improve function and mobility.  On December 10, 1997, Dr. Brooks performed 
the surgery, which required that he implant a tibial base plate. 
{¶2} 
After the surgery, appellee continued to experience pain in her 
right knee.  She informed Dr. Brooks of the pain during postoperative 
appointments.  According to him, appellee’s X-rays revealed that the pain was 
being caused by an overhang of the tibial base plate rubbing against appellee’s 
iliotibial band (tendons that run along the outside of the leg).  Dr. Brooks 
concluded that this overhang was the source of appellee’s pain; thus, he 
recommended a second surgery in which he planned to cut a “window” in 
appellee’s tendons to eliminate the rubbing and pain. 
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{¶3} 
The second surgery was performed on April 15, 1998; the pain, 
however, continued and even increased in appellee’s right knee and in the area of 
the window surgery.  Dr. Brooks recommended a third surgery to replace the 
tibial base plate with a smaller one, but appellee decided to obtain a second 
opinion. 
{¶4} 
Appellee’s new physician agreed that a correctly sized plate would 
remedy her pain.  On September 16, 1998, her new physician replaced the first 
plate.  During the surgery, the physician saw the overhang and noted that the first 
plate had been positioned incorrectly.  After the surgery, appellee experienced 
pain relief in all areas of her right knee except where Dr. Brooks had performed 
the window surgery. 
{¶5} 
Appellee 
filed 
suit 
against 
appellants, 
alleging 
medical 
malpractice.  In appellee’s interrogatories, appellants were asked to “[i]dentify 
any and all expert witnesses you intend to call at the Trial of this matter including 
the specialty area and anticipated area or subject matter of the testimony.”  Dr. 
Brooks responded, “Currently under consideration.  This Answer will be amended 
as required by the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, Local Rules of Court or Court 
Order.”  Dr. Brooks never supplemented his response. 
{¶6} 
The court established a deadline for the parties to file expert 
reports, with which appellee complied.  The Cleveland Clinic, however, asked for 
an extension, which the court granted.  Neither appellant ever submitted an expert 
report.  One week before trial, appellants filed a brief in which Dr. Brooks was 
listed as the treating physician and expert witness.  Appellee filed a motion in 
limine to preclude Dr. Brooks from testifying as an expert witness because he had 
not complied with Loc.R. 21.1 of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga 
County, General Division.  The court granted the motion.  At the close of 
testimony, the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee. 
January Term, 2003 
3 
{¶7} 
On appeal, appellants argued that the trial court abused its 
discretion in not allowing Dr. Brooks to testify as an expert witness.  The court of 
appeals disagreed and affirmed the decision of the trial court, reasoning: 
{¶8} 
“[A] party who also seeks to testify as an expert witness must be 
identified as an expert witness prior to trial and comply with all relevant 
provisions of Loc.R. 21.1. 
{¶9} 
“* * *  
{¶10} “Our finding that [Dr. Brooks] had the duty seasonably to identify 
himself as an expert witness and that the court did not abuse its discretion by 
forbidding [Dr. Brooks] from testifying as an expert necessarily means that [Dr. 
Brooks’s] argument that the court erred by failing to grant a new trial must be 
rejected on the grounds that no error occurred below.” 
{¶11} The cause is now before this court on the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
{¶12} The sole issue for determination by this court is whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in not allowing Dr. Brooks to testify as an expert 
witness in his own behalf, after he failed to file a written report and failed to 
supplement answers to interrogatories asking that expert witnesses be identified.  
Finding that there was no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals. 
{¶13} In Nakoff v. Fairview Gen. Hosp. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 254, 662 
N.E.2d 1, syllabus, this court held: “A trial court has broad discretion when 
imposing discovery sanctions.  A reviewing court shall review these rulings only 
for an abuse of discretion.”  As such, in order to have an abuse of discretion, “the 
result must be so palpably and grossly violative of fact or logic that it evidences 
not the exercise of will but the perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but 
the defiance of judgment, not the exercise of reason but instead passion or bias.”  
Id. at 254, 256, 662 N.E.2d 1, citing State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 
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222, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264.  Accordingly, we must look at the language of 
the local rule that was in place at the time this suit was commenced to determine 
whether the trial court abused its discretion. 
{¶14} Former Loc.R. 21.1 stated: 
{¶15} “(B) A party may not call an expert witness to testify unless a 
written report has been procured from the witness and provided to opposing 
counsel.  * * *  
{¶16} “* * * 
{¶17} “(C) All experts must submit reports.  If a party is unable to obtain 
a written report from an expert, counsel for the party must demonstrate that a 
good faith effort was made to obtain the report * * *.  In the event the expert 
witness is a treating physician, the Court shall have the discretion to determine 
whether the hospital and/or office records of that physician’s treatment which 
have been produced satisfy the requirements of a written report.  The Court shall 
have the power to exclude testimony of the expert if good cause is not 
demonstrated.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶18} Furthermore, Civ.R. 26(E) provides: 
{¶19} “Supplementation of responses.  A party who has responded to a 
request for discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no 
duty to supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired, except 
as follows: 
{¶20} “(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response 
with respect to any question directly addressed to * * * (b) the identity of each 
person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial and the subject matter on 
which he is expected to testify.” 
{¶21} Thus, the rules make clear that a party must make a good-faith 
effort to submit a written expert report once a court has established a deadline for 
filing expert witness reports.  Even when the treating physician is the expert 
January Term, 2003 
5 
witness, former Loc.R. 21.1 clearly stated that a trial court has the option of 
accepting hospital or office records in lieu of an expert report, should that court 
determine that to do so would adequately provide the requesting party with the 
information that it needs. 
{¶22} In the instant case, by requesting an extension, appellants led 
appellee and the trial court to believe that they would be filing an expert report.  
Once the extended deadline arrived, however, appellants did not submit a report.  
Instead, they notified the court and appellee in a brief, submitted one week before 
trial, that Dr. Brooks would be testifying as an expert witness.  Moreover, during 
the entire discovery phase of the proceedings, appellants did not identify Dr. 
Brooks as the expert witness; thus, when deposing Dr. Brooks, appellee did not 
ask questions typically asked of expert witnesses.  Appellants’ actions clearly did 
not comport with Loc.R. 21.1 or Civ.R. 26(E). 
{¶23} In Jones v. Murphy (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 84, 85, 12 OBR 73, 465 
N.E.2d 444, this court considered a similar issue when it was asked to decide 
“whether the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure permit the exclusion of expert 
testimony pursuant to a motion in limine as a sanction for the violation of Civ.R. 
26(E)(1)(b).” 
{¶24} Specifically, in Jones, the plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant 
for damages arising from an automobile accident allegedly caused by the 
defendant’s negligence.  In interrogatories, the defendant requested the name of 
any experts who would be testifying in the plaintiffs’ behalf; they responded, 
“Undetermined at present.”  Id. at 84, 12 OBR 73, 465 N.E.2d 444.  The plaintiffs 
did not comply with the scheduling order for discovery, nor did they respond to 
the defendant’s other requests for the identification of the expert witness.  Finally, 
12 days before trial, the defendant learned by telephone that the plaintiffs 
intended to call one of their treating physicians as an expert witness.  The 
defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude the physician’s expert testimony, 
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which the court granted, thereby permitting the physician to testify as a fact 
witness only. 
{¶25} The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and 
this court affirmed that judgment, reasoning, “One of the purposes of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure is to eliminate surprise.  This is accomplished by way of a 
discovery procedure which mandates a free flow of accessible information 
between the parties upon request, and which imposes sanctions for failure to 
timely respond to reasonable inquiries.  [Plaintiffs-appellants] argue that a 
continuance should have been requested and granted once the expert witness’ 
identity was discovered by [defendant-appellee].  An intentional violation of the 
rules should not be so easily disregarded, however.”  Id. at 86, 12 OBR 73, 465 
N.E.2d 444. 
{¶26} Applying the reasoning of Jones to the case at bar, appellee made a 
seasonable request in her interrogatories for appellants to identify anyone who 
would be testifying as an expert witness.  Appellants failed to name Dr. Brooks in 
their response.  Moreover, appellants not only missed the original deadline to 
identify all experts and file expert reports, but they also did not comply with the 
extended deadline granted by the trial court. 
{¶27} Appellants’ actions demonstrated a disregard for the orders of the 
trial court and for the rules and structure of our adversarial process.  Dr. Brooks’s 
belief that he should testify as an expert witness was premised only on his 
participation as a party to the action as appellee’s original treating physician.  To 
allow such would permit a party who acts as his or her own expert to utilize a 
different set of rules than those which are in place, leading to an unfair advantage 
for one party at the expense of the opponent.  In this case, the trial court had a 
responsibility to ensure that there was no unfair prejudice or surprise to appellee; 
granting the motion in limine ensured such a result. 
January Term, 2003 
7 
{¶28} Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in not allowing Dr. Brooks to testify as an expert witness in his own behalf, after 
he failed to file a written report and failed to supplement answers to 
interrogatories asking that expert witnesses be identified.  Consequently, we 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
Moyer, C.J., F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Brogan and O’Connor, JJ., concur. 
 
Lundberg Stratton, J., dissents. 
 
James A. Brogan, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for Cook, J. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶29} The majority holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
preventing Dr. Brooks from testifying as an expert in his own defense pursuant to 
former Loc.R. 21.1 and the Civil Rules.  I disagree.  I believe that former Loc.R. 
21.1 was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case.  I also believe that 
the sanction of excluding Dr. Brooks’s expert testimony for failing to timely 
comply with discovery was an abuse of discretion. 
A. Loc.R. 21.1 
{¶30} Former Loc.R. 21.1 required all expert witnesses to provide a 
written report to the opposing party and permitted the court to exclude an expert’s 
testimony if the expert failed to provide a report.  Consistent with the purpose of 
the Civil Rules, the written-report requirement in Loc.R. 21.1 was to prevent 
surprise.  However, I believe that preventing a party from providing expert 
testimony in his or her own defense solely because that party failed to provide the 
opposing party with a written report in effect deprives that party of his or her due 
process right to testify in his or her own behalf. 
{¶31} In a medical malpractice case, expert testimony is required to 
establish the standard of care and to establish whether the defendant  satisfied that 
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standard.  Bruni v. Tatsumi (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 127, 75 O.O.2d 184, 346 
N.E.2d 673.  Therefore, exclusion of expert testimony in a medical malpractice 
case precludes a defendant from presenting an effective defense. 
{¶32} However, when a party hires an expert to testify in his or her favor, 
that expert is unknown to the opposing party, and thus Civ.R. 26(B)(4) dictates 
that such experts are subject to discovery to prevent surprise.  But a party who 
provides his or her own expert testimony is, from the outset of the lawsuit, subject 
to the normal discovery mechanisms, e.g.,  interrogatories, depositions, etc.  In 
my experience as a trial lawyer and trial judge, a party who provided expert 
testimony in his or her own defense was never required to submit a written report.  
Therefore, when a defendant is prevented from offering expert testimony in his or 
her own defense in a medical malpractice case, pursuant to Loc.R. 21.1, solely 
because the defendant failed to provide the opposing party with a written report, 
the defendant is, in effect, deprived of his or her due process right to testify in his 
or her own behalf.  In fact, after the appellate decision in this case, the common 
pleas judges who drafted Loc.R. 21.1 amended it to make it explicit that it applies 
only to nonparty witnesses, clearly signaling that the rule was never intended to 
apply to a party who intends to testify as an expert in his or her own defense. 
{¶33} Accordingly, I believe that the trial court’s exclusion of Dr. 
Brooks’s expert testimony for failing to provide opposing counsel with a written 
report pursuant to former Loc.R. 21.1 was unconstitutional because it deprived 
him of his due process right to testify in his own behalf.   
B. Exclusion of Dr. Brooks’s Testimony Was an Abuse of Discretion 
{¶34} The appellate court and the majority opinion point to Dr. Brooks’s 
failure to timely comply with discovery requests, specifically his failure to name 
himself in response to appellee’s interrogatory asking for the names of his expert 
witnesses, as further justification for the exclusion.  I disagree. 
January Term, 2003 
9 
{¶35} A “trial court does not have unbridled discretion” to admit or 
exclude evidence.  Shumaker v. Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc. (1986), 28 Ohio 
St.3d 367, 370, 28 OBR 429, 504 N.E.2d 44, citing Schaffter v. Ward (1985), 17 
Ohio St.3d 79, 80, 17 OBR 203, 477 N.E.2d 1116, and  Calderon v. Sharkey 
(1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 218, 24 O.O.3d 322, 436 N.E.2d 1008.  It is an abuse of 
discretion if the court’s ruling is “unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”  
Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 5 OBR 481, 450 N.E.2d 
1140. 
{¶36} Exclusion of evidence is only one remedy for surprise.  Other 
remedies include continuing the case so that the party claiming surprise can 
depose the undisclosed witness, while another is to allow the party claiming 
surprise to renew its motion if and when the party is surprised by the witness’s 
testimony.  Nickey v. Brown (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 32, 34, 7 OBR 34, 454 
N.E.2d 177. 
{¶37} Admittedly, Dr. Brooks’s notification to appellee regarding his 
intention to testify as an expert was not timely pursuant to the trial court’s 
scheduling order, and I do not condone such delay.  However, Dr. Brooks did 
notify appellee of his intention to testify as an expert one week before trial, which 
is sufficient notice to preclude the harsh sanction of excluding his expert 
testimony, particularly in light of the fact that appellee had already conducted 
extensive discovery of Dr. Brooks.  See id. 
{¶38} Typically when a court excludes an expert witness from testifying 
due to surprise, the party claiming surprise has not even known the name, let 
alone had a chance to depose the witness.  This case is distinguishable in that 
regard.  Dr. Brooks is the defendant in this case. 
{¶39} Although Dr. Brooks was not expressly asked at deposition 
whether he comported with the standard of care in performing appellee’s knee-
replacement surgery, he was thoroughly cross-examined about the placement and 
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fit of the tibial plate, the complication caused by the tibial plate’s overhang, the 
iliotibial band resection, and the window procedure.  Dr. Brooks testified that due 
to the construction of the tibial plate, it seldom fits exactly, and thus there is 
usually overhang but usually does not cause discomfort or problems.  It was 
certainly no surprise to appellee that Dr. Brooks believed that he met the standard 
of care in performing the knee-replacement surgery at issue herein, or more 
precisely that he believed that an overhang of the tibial plate is normal and that it 
usually does not cause problems.  Therefore, any argument that appellee would 
have been surprised by the content of Dr. Brooks’s expert testimony is not 
credible. 
{¶40} Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, I believe that 
the trial court’s exclusion of Dr. Brooks’s expert testimony was unreasonable and 
unconscionable and therefore an abuse of discretion. 
C. Conclusion 
{¶41} There is a strong predisposition in the law that whenever possible, 
cases should be tried on their merits.  Natl. Mut. Ins. v. Papenhagen (1987), 30 
Ohio St.3d 14, 15, 30 OBR 21, 505 N.E.2d 980.  Preventing Dr. Brooks from 
testifying as an expert in his own defense effectively prevented this case from 
being decided on its merits and violated Dr. Brooks’s due process rights.  
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Timothy R. Pieper, for appellee. 
 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P, and Robin G. Weaver; Roetzel & 
Andress, R. Mark Jones and Douglas G. Leak, for appellants. 
 
Zavarello & Davis Co., L.P.A., and Rhonda Gail Davis, urging affirmance 
for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
__________________