Case Title: Triggs v. Triggs

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Triggs v. Triggs1996 WY 94920 P.2d 653Case Number: 95-195Decided: 06/28/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Ronald Eldon TRIGGS,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Carole Kincaid TRIGGS, 
n/k/a Carole Anderson-Kincaid, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from The District 
Court, Laramie County, Keith G. Kautz, J.

Georg Jensen, 
Cheyenne, for Appellant.

Carole 
Anderson-Kincaid, Cheyenne, pro se.

Rhonda Sigrist 
Woodard, Burke, Woodard & Bishop, P.C., Cheyenne, Guardian ad 
Litem.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The primary issue 
in this appeal by Ronald Eldon Triggs (husband) is a claim that the district 
court erred in awarding custody of the minor daughters of the parties to Carole 
Kincaid Triggs (wife). Additional claims of error are asserted relating to 
distribution of the marital property of the parties and calculation of child 
support. The wife contends this court should certify there was no reasonable 
cause for the appeal and award her costs, damages, and reasonable attorney fees 
in connection with the appeal. The husband's contentions all depend upon 
establishing an abuse of discretion by the trial court. We hold the record in 
this case does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion with respect to any of the 
claims of error, but we are unable to certify there was no reasonable cause for 
the appeal. The Supplemental Decree of Divorce entered in the trial court is 
affirmed in all respects.

[¶2]      In his 
Appellant's Brief, the husband states the issues on appeal as:

1.         Did 
the court err in awarding custody of the parties' minor daughters to the 
appellee (plaintiff below)?

2.         Did 
the court err in the equitable distribution of property?

3.         Did 
the court err in the calculation of child support under W.S. § 
20-6-304?

In her Brief of 
Appellee, the wife, while generally accepting the above statement of the issues, 
additionally sets out a fourth issue as:

IV.        
Should the Court certify that there was no reasonable cause for this 
appeal, that it was without merit, and find it was filed only to harass 
Appellee, delay resolution of the case, and add to the costs of the 
litigation?

The guardian ad 
litem submitted a brief addressing the single question of custody because the 
husband has disagreed with the recommendations made by the guardian ad 
litem.

[¶3]      The wife 
commenced this divorce action on November 30, 1993, after almost seventeen years 
of marriage. In addition to seeking a divorce, she requested temporary and 
permanent custody of the three minor children of the marriage, one son and two 
daughters. In his answer and counterclaim, the husband requested custody of the 
children, and he asserted the wife "is an unfit custodian of the minor children 
in that she has been emotionally, verbally and physically abusive towards all 
three children." Pursuant to a decision letter filed December 22, 1993, the 
trial court awarded the wife, during the pendency of the case, temporary custody 
of the children, temporary use of the marital home, and family support of $2,000 
per month and set up a visitation schedule for the husband.

[¶4]      The participation 
of the parties in this litigation was vigorous, and numerous pleadings, with 
supporting documentation, were filed by both the husband and the wife. In 
February 1994, the court appointed the guardian ad litem to represent the 
interests of the children in this dispute. At that time, temporary custody of 
the minor son was placed with the husband because the boy preferred to be with 
his father and was having difficulty with his mother. Following another exchange 
of motions and a hearing to consider them collectively, the trial court ordered 
visitation be suspended, unless requested by the children; counsel for the 
parties were not to communicate with the children without prior approval from 
the guardian ad litem; the parties were ordered to refrain from attempting to 
influence the position of the children with respect to custody and visitation; 
and the court concluded to appoint a custody evaluator after receiving advice 
from the guardian ad litem. In April, two experts on custody and visitation 
issues were appointed by the court.

[¶5]      On April 5, 1994, 
an absolute divorce was granted to the wife, with the court reserving decision 
on custody, child support, and property issues for a later determination. The 
parties continued to dispute their respective compliance with the orders of the 
court, and the trial was continued until November 7, 8, and 9, 1994 because the 
custody evaluations would not be finished until sometime in mid-September. 
Additional pleadings included pretrial memoranda and financial affidavits by 
both the husband and the wife. After the trial was held in November, closing 
statements were submitted in writing to the court. The court prepared a detailed 
decision letter which was sent to the attorneys for the parties and the guardian 
ad litem on December 13, 1994. The letter settled child custody, determined the 
income for each of the parties, computed the share for each party of presumed 
child support, settled health insurance obligations, made a division of the 
marital property and indebtedness of the parties, and awarded alimony to the 
wife.

[¶6]      Even though the 
decision letter had been entered, voluminous pleadings continued to be filed 
with the court. On March 22, 1995, the Supplemental Decree of Divorce, 
consistent with the decision letter and incorporating it by reference, was 
filed. The wife retained custody of the two daughters, and the husband continued 
to have custody of the son. The court required the parties to pursue counseling 
in an effort to have them accept responsibility for, and hopefully to relieve, 
the alienation each of the children felt toward the noncustodial parent. The 
court required the children to continue with counseling sessions, dividing costs 
between the parties. The order provided visitation between the noncustodial 
parent and the children was to begin only when the children's counselor believed 
the visits would be beneficial, rather than detrimental. The children were 
granted unrestricted access to each other at any time.

[¶7]      With respect to 
child support, the husband was ordered to pay $574 per month based upon the 
split custody and the amounts set forth in the presumed child support 
guidelines. The payments were to continue until each child reached the age of 
majority. The husband was to continue health and medical insurance coverage for 
the children, and the decree provided any medical expenses not covered by 
insurance would be divided between the parties equally. The court ruled the wife 
should generate some income, but awarded her $1,200 monthly alimony from the 
husband for a period of eight years. Each of the parties was required to submit 
yearly financial affidavits by April 15, and the husband was granted the federal 
income tax dependent deductions for all of the children for 1994, 1995, and all 
future years, subject to a change in the wife's income.

[¶8]      The marital home 
was awarded to the wife, subject to the mortgage, and the husband's law practice 
was awarded to him. The decree provided the wife should receive 40% of the 
husband's military retirement, and the husband's three retirement-type accounts 
were impressed with a trust to fund college educations for the children. The 
decree provided any life insurance coverage on either party was to be 
irrevocably designated for the benefit of the children. The wife was required to 
pay the appearance fee of the court reporter at the trial, and the husband was 
required to pay remaining fees for the guardian ad litem and the custody 
evaluators. The remainder of the personal property was divided between the 
parties.

[¶9]      The husband filed 
a Notice of Appeal on April 20, 1995. He contends there is error in the decree 
with respect to determination of custody, amount of child support, and 
distribution of property.

[¶10]   Our rule is that the determination 
of the trial court with respect to custody and visitation, the trial court's 
calculation of income for purposes of child support, and the trial court's 
division of the marital property, together with its allocation of attorney fees 
and costs, will not be overturned on appeal unless the record demonstrates a 
clear abuse of discretion. Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439 (Wyo. 1993); Love v. 
Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1993); Goff v. Goff, 844 P.2d 1087 (Wyo. 1993); 
Marquiss v. Marquiss, 837 P.2d 25 (Wyo. 1992). Reasonable conclusions of the 
trial court based upon the evidence are not to be disturbed on appeal, and 
reversal is mandated only when the judgment of the trial court exceeds the 
bounds of reason or constitutes an error of law under the circumstances. Combs 
v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50 (Wyo. 1993). Upon review, we evaluate the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's decision by affording 
to the prevailing party every favorable inference while omitting any 
consideration of evidence presented by the unsuccessful party. Cranston v. 
Cranston, 879 P.2d 345 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶11]   We deal initially with the claim of 
error concerning child custody because that seems to have been a major point of 
contention between the parties. As we have noted, the trial court's 
determination of custody and visitation issues is subject to an abuse of 
discretion standard. We have said abuse of discretion is present "when a 
material factor deserving significant weight is ignored." Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 996 (Wyo. 1993). The husband, on appeal, continues to assert the wife 
abused the three children, both physically and mentally, and he argues the 
custody evaluators and the guardian ad litem were derelict in failing to develop 
evidence of that abuse. In connection with custody of children, abuse is a 
material factor deserving significant weight, and a disclosure by the record of 
abuse by the wife could lead to the conclusion that the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding her custody of the two minor daughters. Clearly, an award 
of custody to an abusive parent is not to be considered in the best interests of 
the children. Fanning v. Fanning, 717 P.2d 346 (Wyo. 1986); Bereman v. Bereman, 
645 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1982). A conclusion that the trial court ignored such a 
critical factor, however, depends upon more than innuendo and 
allegations.

[¶12]   In this instance, two trained, 
professional custody evaluators were hired at the request of the husband, and 
the two of them worked as a team in preparing the report. At trial, one of the 
evaluators furnished the following information upon direct examination by the 
husband's attorney:

Q.        Now, in 
cases of abuse, isn't there also - I don't know if I can call it a principle, 
but perhaps a school of thought - and you can correct me and please do - where 
often an abused child will gravitate toward the abusing parent?

A.        
Identification with the aggressor. It's called a trauma bond in the 
current literature.

Q.        Well, isn't 
that something that very likely could happen with these artificial circumstances 
that have been created in this case, where the girls are with their mother - 
only with their mother - don't have any contact or are cut off from contact with 
their father, and if in fact there is abuse going on, that they then identify 
with their mother as the aggressor, that they have to take her side and become 
part of her emotions and her feelings and exert those outwardly to others, 
otherwise they themselves find a lack of any protection?

A.        I know what 
you're saying. I didn't feel that that was true because even in trauma bonding, 
you know, identification with the aggressor, there is an element of fear and 
anxiety that clinically you see coming through with the kids. And I didn't see 
and didn't assess any element of the children having fearfulness of their 
mother, frightened of her, fear about saying anything, of some kind of 
pathological need to deny feelings about her. They just didn't appear to me 
clinically to have that quality.

So in my opinion, I 
didn't see that that was true.

[¶13]   The following testimony was 
developed on cross-examination of the evaluator:

Q.        I want to 
ask you basically what - did you observe any evidence other than what Andy told 
you about any abuse that may have occurred rightfully or wrongly by the 
plaintiff on the children, by Mrs. Triggs on the children?

A.        Well, only 
clinical evidence, which would be Andy indicating that it happened, Mr. Triggs 
indicating it happened, Eldon Triggs [Mr. Triggs' son by a previous marriage] 
indicating it never happened, Mrs. Triggs saying it never happened, the girls 
indicating it never happened. So that's our diametric view.

Q.        All 
right. The girls never indicated, as I understand now, that - they have not 
indicated to you that they were abused by their mom?

A.        No. Eldon 
Triggs mentioned to me that on a couple of occasions other than the mother 
pulling the girls into a bedroom to have a heavy talk with them, that he never 
observed anything.

Q.        All right. 
The girls never indicated to you that they were abused, right?

A.        No, no. 
They spoke of no abuse.

The evaluator 
who so testified is a family and child psychologist who has performed over 300 
custody evaluations.

[¶14]   Other evidence was elicited upon 
direct examination by the wife's attorney from the clinical psychologist who 
worked with the two daughters. That witness had this to say:

Q.        During any 
of the counseling have you ever obtained any evidence that would indicate to you 
that Mrs. Triggs was physically abusive to the girls?

A.        
No.

Q.        Have you 
obtained any evidence or through your care and treatment of them - any evidence 
that she was emotionally or verbally abusive to the girls?

A.        
No.

Q.        Have the 
girls reported to you at any time that their mother is or has verbally or 
physically or emotionally abused them?

A.        I would say 
that this family, as a whole, is more verbally interactive than a lot of 
families. There are different norms from one family to the next, and so I would 
say that I have seen times when the girls or their mother were having, shall we 
say, spats or disagreements, conflicts, and these girls are teenagers. But I, at 
no time, have seen anything that concerned me. I've never felt that Mrs. Triggs 
was not a fit mother.

The trial court 
was confronted with opposing information. The husband and the son testified the 
wife was guilty of child abuse. The wife, her two daughters, and her stepson 
testified no abuse had ever occurred. The professionals, who were trained to 
uncover evidence of child abuse, were unable to find any was 
present.

[¶15]   There was significant evidence on 
the two sides with respect to alienation of the affection of the children. 
Again, the wife and the daughters were opposed to the father, and the father and 
the son to the mother. The following testimony is illustrative of the 
situation:

Q.        There has 
been some discussion in your report about the parents in this case possibly 
contributing to the alienation that the children have felt from the other 
parent.

Can you describe that for 
the Court? What did you find regarding that issue?

A.        Well, there 
are a couple ways of assessing it. One is just from what the children say and 
through the children's own reports of what they observed across the families. 
That was very evident through what Andy would say about his mother and it was 
very evident that he had talked with his father and knew his father's feelings 
about the mother.

The girls were aware of 
the father's feelings about mother. The girls were aware of mother's rejection 
of the father. The children are very aware of the parental hatred in this 
family. That's one way of assessing it.

The other way of 
assessing it is simply what the parents say about each other. In the clinical 
interview they were very demeaning and degrading of the other parent and had 
grave disrespect for them.

The third way of 
assessing it is when the children are in alienation, they will not find one 
thing good about their noncustodial parent. No matter what. And in this case, 
regardless, in the clinical interview the father attempts to connect with them, 
which at times they were sensitive and tuned in, they would never allow it. With 
Andy and his mother, despite her caring attempts to connect with him, he would 
never allow it.

When I saw these children 
alone, I purposefully exaggerated the negative qualities of each of their 
parents, the opposite parent. They agreed with them. Children who are 
involved in alienation of the other parent will agree with anything negative you 
say about that parent. Children who don't do that will be more hurt and they 
will correct your perception.

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

So, by most criteria that 
we know, these parents do not like each other or respect each other. The 
children know it and it's contributed to this major split in the families. 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶16]   The evaluator recommended the 
daughters remain in the custody of the mother and the son remain in the custody 
of the father. The evaluator also recommended the children be allowed to visit 
with each other whenever they wanted to, but any visitation between the mother 
and the son or the father and the daughters should not be undertaken at that 
time. Further, the evaluator recommended counseling for the entire family until 
such time as each of the children could begin to understand and accept the 
noncustodial parent. In the Supplemental Decree of Divorce, the trial court 
incorporated the suggestions of the experts from the record brought to us, 
including the evidence adduced at trial. We hold there was no abuse of 
discretion by the trial court in its determination of custody and 
visitation.

[¶17]   The second contention of error 
relates to the division of the property of the parties. A trial court is 
required to "make such disposition of the property of the parties as appears 
just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits of the parties and 
the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom 
the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the property for the 
benefit of either party and children." WYO. STAT. § 20-2-114 (1994). Our rule 
with respect to this decision by a trial court is that it is a determination 
subject to the exercise of discretion, and an abuse of that discretion is to be 
found only if the division of property appears so unfair, inequitable, or 
unconscionable that reasonable persons could not abide it. Neuman v. Neuman, 842 P.2d 575 (Wyo. 1992); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 
1984).

[¶18]   The husband complains, in attacking 
the distribution of property by the court, apart from the obligation imposed 
upon him to pay alimony for eight years, that "the court erred in not providing 
for a distribution of the equity in the marital residence, in allowing the 
plaintiff [wife] to continue to utilize the GI loan benefits of the defendant 
[husband], precluding him from buying another home until the age of 76 years." 
The husband was awarded a value attributed to his law practice, which included 
$57,414 for furniture and equipment, cash at the time of the divorce, and 
accounts receivable. The court considered the $57,414 was appropriate for 
division in the property settlement, and it also considered the equity of 
$40,900 in the marital home was subject to distribution.

[¶19]   Instead of requiring a partition of 
the law firm assets and the equity in the home, however, the court chose to 
award the home with its equity to the wife, subject to remaining indebtedness. 
The law practice with its assets and receivables was awarded to the husband. It 
would appear the time frame required for sale of the marital home and the 
collection of the law firm receivables so the proceeds could be divided between 
the parties would have simply prolonged the animosity and hostility between each 
of the children and the noncustodial parent. The husband is not foreclosed from 
buying a home for himself and his son at any time. It is true he may not be able 
to obtain a Veterans Administration insured loan, but we cannot discern an abuse 
of discretion by the trial court in this regard. Further, we see no apparent 
abuse of discretion as to the division of the property between the 
parties.

[¶20]   The third claim of error by the 
husband relates to the calculation of child support. In determining child 
support, because the income of the parties did fluctuate, the trial court 
invoked a five-year average to determine the monthly net income of both husband 
and wife. See Madison v. Madison, 859 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1993) (the court averaged 
the father's income over a four-year period). The statute incorporating 
Wyoming's child support guidelines defines the word "income" as: 

"Income" means any form 
of payment or return in money or in kind to an individual, regardless of source. 
Income includes, but is not limited to wages, earnings, salary, commission, 
compensation as an independent contractor, temporary total disability, permanent 
partial disability and permanent total disability worker's compensation 
payments, unemployment compensation, disability, annuity and retirement 
benefits, and any other payments made by any payor, but shall not include any 
earnings derived from overtime work unless the court, after considering all 
overtime earnings derived in the preceding twenty-four (24) month period, 
determines the overtime earnings can reasonably be expected to continue on a 
consistent basis. In determining income, all reasonable unreimbursed legitimate 
business expenses shall be deducted. Means tested sources of income such as Pell 
grants, aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) basic grants, general 
assistance (GA), food stamps and supplemental security income (SSI) shall not be 
considered as income. Gross income also means potential income of parents who 
are voluntarily unemployed or underemployed; * * *.

WYO. STAT. § 
20-6-301(a)(i)(1994).

[¶21]   The husband contends, under this 
definition, the court should have included in the calculation of the wife's 
monthly income gifts of cash and vehicles she had received from her parents. 
According to the husband's calculations, the vehicles had a value of $21,000, 
and the cash gifts amounted to $3,180 annually, or $265 of additional monthly 
income. The trial court refused to accept these assertions and found, from the 
evidence of gifts to the wife, that it "does not demonstrate them to be 
sufficiently certain in the future to include them as income for 
her."

[¶22]   In Maryland and Minnesota, the 
courts have ruled gifts must be considered in determining the amount of a 
parent's child support obligation. In 1994, the Maryland court held the value of 
noncash items given to a parent could be imputed as actual income for child 
support purposes. Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 648 A.2d 1016 (1994). In 
Minnesota, a husband who received $833 monthly from his father and $5,000 from 
his grandmother on every birthday, Easter, and Christmas was required to include 
those amounts as income. The court ruled a gift regularly received from a 
dependable party may be considered in determining a parent's child support 
obligation. Barnier v. Wells, 476 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).

[¶23]   An opposing view is found in other 
jurisdictions. There, the courts have refused to consider gifts as income to a 
parent for purposes of calculating child support obligations. The rationale for 
refusing to include gifts for this purpose is that the donors have no legal 
obligation to continue with the practice of making gifts. See In Re Marriage of 
Harmon, 210 Ill. App.3d 92, 154 Ill.Dec. 727, 568 N.E.2d 948 (1991); True v. 
True, 615 A.2d 252 (Me. 1992); Ikard v. Ikard, 819 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1991) (holding gifts cannot be considered as income to the recipient unless the 
donor has a legal obligation to make them). In a case very similar to this case, 
the Florida Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's imputation of income to 
the wife based upon historical gifts from her parents. Shiveley v. Shiveley, 635 So. 2d 1021 (Fla.Ct. App. 1994). A New York court ruled the testimony of a father 
that his wife's mother had given them annual gifts during the term of their 
marriage was not sufficient to impute income to the wife for purposes of 
calculating child support. Huebscher v. Huebscher, 206 A.D.2d 295, 614 N.Y.S.2d 524 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). The New York court noted that, since there was no 
legal obligation to continue with the gifts, there was no guarantee they would 
be made in the future.

[¶24]   Our legislature has not 
specifically defined "gift" as a source of income in calculating child support 
obligations. Instead, in WYO. STAT. § 20-6-302 (1994), our legislature 
specifically has authorized the court to deviate from the presumptive child 
support calculations. We conclude the intent of the legislature was to afford a 
trial court flexibility in considering any and all sources of income before it 
calculates support obligations. See Pauling v. Pauling, 837 P.2d 1073 (Wyo. 
1972) (holding trial court's deviation from support guidelines in modifying an 
existing order refuted proposition the legislature enacted guidelines to curb 
the court's discretionary authority). We conclude that, in Wyoming, the trial 
court is afforded discretion to include or not include historical gifts as a 
source of income, and we are limited on review to a consideration of whether the 
court abused its discretion in ruling the gifts to the wife were so uncertain as 
to preclude their inclusion in a calculation of monthly income.

[¶25]   We discern no abuse of discretion 
by the trial court in this regard. The cash gifts to the wife, valued at $265 
monthly by the husband, were voluntary transfers to the wife from her parents. 
There was no consideration furnished on her part, and the trial court had no way 
of determining the period of time the gifts would continue or what the level of 
giving would be. With respect to the value of $21,000 the husband ascribed to 
the vehicles given to the wife, that valuation does not account for 
depreciation, present condition, and marketability of the vehicles. Further, the 
vehicles were not liquid assets, and we perceive, again, no abuse of discretion 
on the part of the trial court in refusing to include their value as income in 
calculating the wife's portion of the joint child support.1

[¶26]   While not directly contesting the 
provision in the Supplemental Decree of Divorce that he pay $1,200 in monthly 
alimony, the husband contends this amount should be included in the wife's 
income for purposes of determining her share of the joint child support 
obligation. As a New Jersey superior court has held, the policy behind an award 
of alimony is to provide the dependent spouse with a standard of living 
comparable to what that spouse enjoyed during the term of the marriage, not to 
support the children. Koelble v. Koelble, 261 N.J. Super. 190, 618 A.2d 377 
(1992). The wife in the case before us received an award of rehabilitative 
alimony to permit her to continue her paralegal education. The alimony will 
cease after eight years and, at that time, the wife's new vocational skills 
should enable her to earn sufficient income to maintain a lifestyle commensurate 
with that she enjoyed during the marriage.

[¶27]   In Koelble, 618 A.2d  at 380, the 
court noted the New Jersey child support guidelines contemplated "that a 
noncustodial parent who receives alimony may be required to bear his or her fair 
share of the child support guidelines." The court went on to say, while spousal 
support from past relationships should be included in the child support 
calculations of a parent, "alimony is to be excluded if it is being received 
from the supporting spouse." Koelble, 618 A.2d  at 380 (emphasis added). In 
Indiana, the child support guidelines articulate the same concept in the 
definition of weekly gross income:

For purposes of these 
Guidelines, "weekly gross income" is defined as actual weekly gross income of 
the parent if employed to full capacity, potential income if unemployed or 
underemployed and imputed income based upon "in-kind" benefits. Weekly gross 
income of each parent includes income from any source, except as excluded below, 
and includes, but is not limited to, income from salaries, wages, commissions, 
bonuses, overtime, partnership distributions, dividends, severance pay pensions, 
interest, trust income, annuities, capital gains, social security benefits, 
workmen's compensation benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, disability 
insurance benefits, gifts, prizes, and alimony or maintenance received from 
other marriages.

IND. CODE ANN. 
Court Rules (Civil) Indiana Child Support Rules and Guidelines, Support 
Guideline 3., Determination of Child Support Amount (Burns 1996) (emphasis 
added). 

[¶28]   The policy reason behind the 
judicial decision in Maryland and the legislative decision in Indiana is 
persuasive. The trial court could reasonably conclude the monthly alimony 
payment should not be included in the wife's income for purposes of child 
support. The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to include 
it.

[¶29]   The husband's contention that the 
court should have attributed $600 in imputed income to the wife, based upon the 
minimum wage, was not appropriate. The $600 figure is not realistic because it 
is more than twice the earned income of $227 monthly. We cannot conclude the 
trial court abused its discretion in the computation of the wife's monthly 
income for child support purposes based upon a historical average of five years, 
rather than the imputed figure of $600 per month.

[¶30]   With respect to the wife's argument 
relating to a certification that the appeal is without merit and there were no 
reasonable grounds, we decline to make that determination. Consequently, we do 
not award attorney fees, costs, or damages as requested by the wife.

[¶31]   The husband has not carried his 
burden of persuasion with respect to abuse of discretion as to custody, 
distribution of marital property, or in calculation of appropriate child 
support. We affirm the district court's Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce.

FOOTNOTE

1 We do point out that, 
even if the court had imputed additional income of $265 per month to the wife, 
her share of the joint child support would be only forty cents a month more than 
the minimum of $50 she was ordered to pay by the trial court in December 1994. 
The trial court's monthly child support calculations resulted in a $624 
allocation to Mr. Triggs and the $50 minimum allocation, prescribed by the 
statute, to Mrs. Triggs. Under the trial court's calculations, the actual share 
Mrs. Triggs would pay, if there were no minimum, would have been $23.50. Adding 
the "gift" income of $265 monthly results in an allocation to Mrs. Triggs of 
$50.40. The minimum Mrs. Triggs would pay under Mr. Triggs' scenario is still 
"minimum," and Mr. Triggs would pay $619.15, a net decrease of 
$4.85.