Case Title: Dayton Bar Assn. v. O'Brien

Citation: 2004-Ohio-3939

Docket Number: 20040085

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Dayton Bar Assn. v. O'Brien, 103 Ohio St.3d 1, 2004-Ohio-3939.] 
 
 
DAYTON BAR ASSOCIATION v. O’BRIEN. 
[Cite as Dayton Bar Assn. v. O’Brien, 103 Ohio St.3d 1, 2004-Ohio-3939.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension — Attorney’s statement 
or implication that he is able to improperly influence a tribunal — DR 9-
101(C). 
(No. 2004-0085 — Submitted May 11, 2004 — Decided August 11, 2004.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 03-024. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} We are called upon to determine the appropriate sanction for an 
attorney who has told his client that the trial judge who presided over his criminal 
case and who was preparing to sentence him might be persuaded to grant a motion 
to withdraw the client’s guilty plea if the client had the money “to afford that kind 
of treatment.” 
{¶ 2} A three-member panel of the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline recommended a six-month stayed suspension and upon 
review, the entire board recommended a public reprimand.  We reject both 
recommendations.  For the following reasons, the conduct in question warrants an 
indefinite suspension from the practice of law. 
{¶ 3} Relator, the Dayton Bar Association, filed a complaint against 
respondent, attorney Daniel L. O’Brien, Attorney Registration No. 0070531, of 
Dayton, Ohio, after receiving a complaint from Kurtis Wallace, one of O’Brien’s 
clients.  O’Brien has been licensed to practice law in Ohio since 1999 and has 
previously represented Wallace in several legal matters. In the instant case, 
Wallace hired O’Brien to represent him in connection with criminal charges of 
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identity theft and forgery before Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas 
Judge Michael T. Hall.  O’Brien entered into plea negotiations with the 
prosecutor, and as a result, Wallace pled guilty to identity theft in exchange for 
the dismissal of the forgery charge.  The court continued the matter for 
sentencing. 
{¶ 4} On the day of sentencing, O’Brien met with the prosecutor in 
Judge Hall’s chambers, where the judge informed them that he declined to impose 
a sentence of community control and that he intended to incarcerate Wallace.  
O’Brien left the chambers and informed Wallace of the judge’s intentions.  Upset 
with the pending sentence, Wallace fled the courthouse and failed to appear in the 
courtroom for sentencing. 
{¶ 5} Several days later, Wallace contacted O’Brien by telephone and 
advised him that his brother could lend him $12,000 to pay for the withdrawal of 
his guilty plea.  Wallace called O’Brien a second time and made a secret tape 
recording of their conversation, in which O’Brien stated that with $12,000, he 
(O’Brien) might be able to find someone to whom Judge Hall owed a favor who 
could persuade the judge to permit the withdrawal of Wallace’s plea.  A transcript 
of the recorded conversation reveals that O’Brien stated: 
{¶ 6} “If you want a first class legal defense you gotta pay for a first 
class defense and if that means that I look around, then I say who does the judge 
owe a favor to, I’m walking around talking with the best of the best and I say I 
need you to come in on one favor, I need to withdraw the guilty plea and we need 
to show up there together and I need you to bring it.  If I don’t think I can bring it, 
I get somebody who does.  You know what I mean?  That’s the kind of thing that 
you pay for and that way once he’s got what we need done, we send him out, we 
come back in and we deal with the rest of it.  I mean if you want high priced stuff 
that’s how you get it and we’ve done big magic, big magic for people who had the 
money to be able to afford that kind of treatment.” 
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{¶ 7} Wallace never paid any money to O’Brien; instead, he hired 
another attorney to represent him and he filed a grievance against O’Brien with 
the Dayton Bar Association.  Wallace’s new counsel provided the tape to Judge 
Hall, who had the case transferred.  Following investigation, a panel of the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard O’Brien’s case.  The panel 
found that O’Brien violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and 9-101(C).  DR 1-102(A)(5) 
provides that a lawyer shall not “[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.”  DR 9-101(C) states that “a lawyer shall not state or 
imply that he is able to influence improperly or upon irrelevant grounds any 
tribunal, legislative body, or public official.”    EC 9-4 states the rationale for DR 
9-101(C): "Because the very essence of the legal system is to provide procedures 
by which matters can be presented in an impartial manner so that they may be 
decided solely upon the merits, any statement or suggestion by a lawyer that he 
can or would attempt to circumvent those procedures is detrimental to the legal 
system and tends to undermine public confidence in it." 
{¶ 8} The panel recommended a six-month suspension of O’Brien’s 
license to practice law with all six months stayed if O’Brien demonstrated no 
further disciplinary problems and if a mentor from the Dayton Bar Association 
monitored his caseload.  The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline accepted the panel’s findings of fact and conclusions of law but 
modified the recommended sanction to a public reprimand. 
{¶ 9} We have previously imposed an indefinite suspension on attorneys 
for similar actions.  In Columbus Bar Assn.  v. Benis (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 199, 5 
OBR 415, 449 N.E.2d 1305, we indefinitely suspended an attorney who offered to 
influence a government official.  He had intimated to the wife of a client that he 
might be able to use a member of the governor’s staff to get clemency for her 
husband if she provided him with $10,000.  We explicitly stated that a sanction of 
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indefinite suspension did not constitute unduly harsh punishment in light of the 
seriousness of the conduct. Id. at 202, 5 OBR 415, 449 N.E.2d 1305. 
{¶ 10} Further, we permanently disbarred an attorney who falsely 
represented to a client that he could bribe a federal judge presiding over his case.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Atkin (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 383, 704 N.E.2d 244.  There, 
we were “particularly disturbed by respondent’s suggestion that he could bribe 
United States District Judge George W. White, Jr.  Representations of this kind 
deserve the severest of sanctions. * * * Suggestions by an attorney, however 
untrue, that a judge might be bribed weaken the public’s respect for the judicial 
system and the faith of the people in a rule of law over men, and are intolerable.”  
Id. at 385, 704 N.E.2d 244. 
{¶ 11} In another matter, we indefinitely suspended an attorney for telling 
his client that if the client paid him $2,500, the attorney would pay other persons 
who, in turn, would use their influence to obtain shock probation for the client.  
Ohio State Bar Assn.  v. Consoldane (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 337, 4 O.O.3d 477, 
364 N.E.2d 279.  When called before the board, the attorney claimed that he had 
never intended to use the money as a bribe; rather, he said that he had fabricated 
the story as a means to secure payment of his fee for past services.  We 
commented that the serious nature of the violations warranted the indefinite 
suspension of Consoldane’s license to practice law.  Id. at 340, 4 O.O.3d 477, 364 
N.E.2d 279. 
{¶ 12} Thus, we have repeatedly stressed our disdain for any statements 
by an attorney that imply the corruptibility of the judicial system or that the 
attorney can improperly influence a judicial officer.  We have consistently 
imposed severe sanctions on attorneys who choose to engage in such misconduct.  
This case warrants a similar sanction.  The board’s recommendation of a public 
reprimand fails to consider the seriousness of O’Brien’s conduct.  His statements 
expressly suggested corruption in the court system, impugned the integrity of the 
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judiciary, and maligned the reputation of Judge Hall.  It is irrelevant that O’Brien 
failed to collect any money from Wallace or never acted on his statements.  The 
suggestion of improper influence to affect the outcome of a matter pending before 
Judge Hall constituted an egregious violation of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility and warrants a severe sanction. 
{¶ 13} Lawyers are officers of the court and, as such, they must strive to 
uphold the integrity of judicial officers before whom they appear.  By their oath, 
lawyers are charged with high ethical standards which, as professionals, they are 
expected to uphold at all times.  Lawyers who engage in errant behavior do so at 
their own peril.  O’Brien eroded and impugned the integrity of a judicial officer 
and intimated to a client that, for $12,000, he could improperly influence the 
outcome of a criminal case; in so doing, he falsely represented the judicial process 
to be corrupt and thereby risked diminishing the public’s perception of, and 
eroded its confidence in, the judiciary.  Accordingly, he is hereby indefinitely 
suspended from the practice of law. 
{¶ 14} Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., dissents and would suspend respondent for one year. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would suspend respondent for one year with six 
months stayed. 
__________________ 
 
Popp & Tuss and Mark A. Tuss, for relator. 
 
Bieser, Greer & Landis, L.L.P., and David C. Greer, for respondent. 
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