Case Title: State v. Moore

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2021AP000938-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2023-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
2023 WI 50 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP938-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Quaheem O. Moore, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 404 Wis. 2d 510, 979 N.W.2d 813 
(2022 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 20, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 19, 2023   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Wood   
 
JUDGE: 
Nicholas J. Brazeau, Jr.    
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
JJ., joined. DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Jacob J. Wittwer, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Jacob J. Wittwer, assistant attorney general.  
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Joshua Hargrove, Tracey A. Wood, Teuta Jonuzi, and Tracey Wood & 
 
 
2 
Associates, Middleton. There was an oral argument by Joshua 
Hargrove.  
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 50 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2021AP938-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2019CF711) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Quaheem O. Moore, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
JJ., joined. DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   After he was pulled over for 
speeding, officers searched Quaheem Moore based primarily on the 
smell of marijuana emanating from his vehicle.  The circuit 
court1 suppressed the results of that search, and the court of 
appeals affirmed.  The State contends this was error.  It argues 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Nicholas J. Brazeau, Jr., of the Wood County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2021AP938-CR   
 
2 
 
the officers had probable cause to arrest Moore, and thus, this 
was a lawful search incident to arrest.  We agree and reverse.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
On November 17, 2019, City of Marshfield Police 
Officer Libby Abel executed a traffic stop for speeding.  While 
attempting to make the stop, Officer Abel "observed some sort of 
liquid fly out of the driver's window" and noticed the vehicle 
hit a curb while turning onto a side street.  Officer Abel 
approached the vehicle, identified the driver and sole occupant 
as Quaheem Moore, and questioned him about the speeding and the 
liquid.  During this initial contact, Officer Abel "detected an 
odor of raw marijuana."  She called for back-up, and Officer 
Mack Scheppler arrived on the scene. 
¶3 
Both officers escorted Moore out the vehicle, in 
between his vehicle and Officer Abel's squad car.  Officer Abel 
performed an initial safety pat-down for weapons.2  She did not 
find any, but she did discover a vaping device.3  She asked Moore 
                                                 
2 During an investigative stop, officers are permitted to 
search a person's outer clothing for weapons if they have 
reasonable suspicion to believe that the person may be armed and 
dangerous. 
 
State 
v. 
McGill, 
2000 
WI 38, 
¶¶21-22, 
234 
Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795.  Moore does not challenge this 
search. 
3 A vaping device, commonly known as a "vape pen" or "vape," 
is a device that works "by heating and aerosolizing a liquid 
mixture" that "is inhaled as vapor."  Big Time Vapes, Inc. v. 
Food & Drug Admin., 963 F.3d 436, 439 n.11 (5th Cir. 2020). 
No. 
2021AP938-CR   
 
3 
 
if it was a THC (tetrahydrocannabinols) vape, and he responded 
that it was a CBD (cannabidiol) vape pen.4  
¶4 
Officer Abel proceeded to question Moore.  She first 
asked about the liquid, which she said she could still see on 
the side of the car and inside the window; but Moore denied 
throwing anything out of the window.5  He explained that the 
vehicle was his brother's rental, and that he had taken it to 
the car wash earlier in the day.  Officer Abel next asked Moore 
if he had been drinking, which he also denied.  Then, Officer 
Abel told Moore that she smelled marijuana coming from the 
vehicle, but he immediately expressed disbelief.  Officer 
Scheppler confirmed that he too smelled marijuana, and later 
described the odor as overwhelming.  Moore continued to express 
his disbelief and insisted that the officers could not smell 
marijuana 
on 
him. 
 
Officers 
Abel 
and 
Scheppler 
agreed, 
                                                 
4 The liquid in vape pens often contains "nicotine and 
sometimes flavoring."  Id.  However, the liquid mixture can also 
contain THC or CBD.  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
E-Cigarette, 
or 
Vaping, 
Products 
Visual 
Dictionary, 
17, 
available 
at 
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-
cigarettes/pdfs/ecigarette-or-vaping-products-visual-dictionary-
508.pdf.  "THC is the main psychoactive chemical in marijuana."  
Id. at 18.  And "CBD is the main ingredient in hemp and the 
second main ingredient in marijuana after THC," although it "is 
not a psychoactive substance."  Id. at 20.  Possession of THC is 
illegal; however, Wisconsin law permits possession of certain 
CBD products.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(3g)(e) (2021-22); 
961.14(4)(t). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2021-22 version. 
5 The officers never determined what this liquid was, but 
Officer Abel testified it was odorless. 
No. 
2021AP938-CR   
 
4 
 
indicating the smell was coming from the vehicle, not from 
Moore.   
¶5 
Eventually, the officers told Moore that they were 
going to search him based on the odor of marijuana.  Officer 
Scheppler found only cash at first.  Officer Abel then stepped 
away to search Moore's vehicle while Officer Scheppler and Moore 
chatted.6  Several minutes later, Officer Scheppler noticed 
Moore's "belt buckle was sitting a little higher on his pants" 
and decided to examine the zipper area.  Officer Scheppler 
testified, "I looked behind the belt buckle, I noticed that he 
had a bulge in his pants, and then in searching the zipper area, 
I felt a material that wasn't consistent to the pants fabric."  
He called Officer Abel back over, and she put Moore in 
handcuffs.  The officers then moved Moore closer to the squad 
cars for privacy.  Officer Scheppler ultimately found two 
plastic baggies containing cocaine and fentanyl in a false-
pocket behind Moore's zipper.    
¶6 
The State charged Moore with two crimes:  possession 
with intent to deliver narcotics and possession with intent to 
deliver more than one but less than five grams of cocaine——both 
as second and subsequent offenses and as a repeater.  Moore 
moved to suppress evidence of the cocaine and fentanyl found by 
Officer Scheppler, arguing the State lacked probable cause to 
arrest and therefore to search him.  The circuit court agreed 
                                                 
6 Moore does not challenge the search of the vehicle. 
No. 
2021AP938-CR   
 
5 
 
and granted the motion.  The court of appeals affirmed,7 and we 
granted the State's petition for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶7 
The United States Constitution provides:  "The right 
of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures, 
shall 
not 
be 
violated . . . ."8  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  "Warrantless searches 
are presumed to be unconstitutional."  State v. Denk, 2008 
WI 130, ¶36, 315 Wis. 2d 5, 758 N.W.2d 775.  But there are 
exceptions, and the State bears the burden to prove an exception 
applies.  Id. 
¶8 
One exception is a search incident to an arrest.  Id., 
¶38; see also Wis. Stat. § 968.11.  When conducting a search 
incident to arrest, the officer is not required to formally 
arrest before the search.  State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, ¶15, 279 
Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277.  The "search may be incident to a 
subsequent arrest if the officers have probable cause to arrest 
before the search."  Id. (quoting another source).  "Probable 
cause to arrest is the quantum of evidence within the arresting 
officer's knowledge at the time of the arrest which would lead a 
reasonable police officer to believe that the defendant probably 
                                                 
7 See State v. Moore, No. 2021AP938-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. July 28, 2022). 
8 The Wisconsin Constitution also provides, "The right of 
the 
people 
to 
be 
secure 
in 
their 
persons . . . against 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures 
shall 
not 
be 
violated . . . ."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 11. 
No. 
2021AP938-CR   
 
6 
 
committed or was committing a crime."  State v. Secrist, 224 
Wis. 2d 201, 212, 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999).  This requires more 
than a mere hunch or reasonable suspicion, but "does not require 
proof 'beyond a reasonable doubt or even that guilt is more 
likely than not.'"  State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶22, 294 
Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729 (quoting another source).  Probable 
cause is an objective test that "requires an examination of the 
totality of the circumstances."  State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96, 
¶20, 372 Wis. 2d 202, 887 N.W.2d 554.  In analyzing this 
question, we uphold the "circuit court's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous" but independently review whether 
there was probable cause to arrest.  Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d at 
207-08. 
¶9 
In a case similar to this, we observed that "when an 
officer smells the odor of a controlled substance," the "common 
sense conclusion" "is that a crime has probably been committed."  
Id. at 218.  In Secrist, the defendant pulled up to a police 
officer with his window down to ask for directions.  Id. at 204.  
The defendant was the only person in the car.  Id.  The officer, 
who had frequent contact with marijuana in his 23 years as a 
police officer, "immediately smelled a strong odor of marijuana 
coming from the automobile."  Id.  He asked the defendant to get 
out of the vehicle and placed him under arrest for possession of 
marijuana.  Id. at 205.   
¶10 The defendant argued before this court that the smell 
of marijuana alone was not sufficient to establish probable 
cause.  Id. at 213.  We disagreed.  Id. at 218-19.  We held,  
No. 
2021AP938-CR   
 
7 
 
the odor of a controlled substance may provide 
probable cause to arrest when the odor is unmistakable 
and may be linked to a specific person or persons 
because of the particular circumstances in which it is 
discovered or because other evidence at the scene or 
elsewhere links the odor to the person or persons. 
Id. at 217-18.  We further explained, "The strong odor of 
marijuana in an automobile will normally provide probable cause 
to believe that the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle is 
linked to the drug."  Id. at 218.   
¶11 Moore asks us to construe our holding in Secrist as 
creating a three-part test that requires:  (1) an unmistakable 
smell (2) linked to the suspect and (3) smelled by a trained and 
experienced officer who testifies accordingly.  This effort to 
establish bright-line rules and prerequisites misses the mark.  
Secrist stressed——and we agree——that it was conducting a 
"totality of the circumstances" analysis; it did not purport to 
design new, higher standards to govern every case with factual 
similarities.  Id.  Rather, Secrist acknowledged the rather 
obvious connections necessary to establish probable cause in 
this kind of circumstance.  Was the odor sufficiently identified 
as an illegal substance, most likely by someone (a law 
enforcement officer) who could make such an identification?  If 
so, it was reasonable to believe that some illegal activity had 
occurred or was occurring.  And therefore, the question is 
whether this illegal activity was sufficiently linked to the 
suspect such that a reasonable law enforcement officer would 
reasonably believe it was the suspect who was involved in the 
illegal drug activity.     
No. 
2021AP938-CR   
 
8 
 
¶12 Thus, the issue presented here is, examining the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, 
whether 
a 
reasonable 
law 
enforcement officer would believe Moore probably committed or 
was committing a crime.  The answer is yes.  When Officer Abel 
pulled Moore over, she watched his vehicle hit the curb and 
observed a "liquid fly out the driver's window"; she later saw 
the liquid on the side of the car as well.  And when she first 
approached the vehicle, she smelled raw marijuana.  Officer 
Scheppler smelled it too, and even called it overwhelming.  The 
circuit court found both officers' testimony regarding the smell 
credible, stating multiple times in its decision that the 
officers smelled a "strong" odor of marijuana.  Moore does not 
challenge this factual finding.  Critically, Moore was the sole 
occupant of the vehicle.  And he was in possession of a vape 
pen.  Taken together, a reasonable officer would believe it was 
Moore that was responsible for the overwhelming odor of a 
prohibited substance emanating from a vehicle with no other 
passengers.  The officers need not know with certainty that 
Moore was committing or had committed illegal activity, but they 
had more than enough to meet the modest bar that it was probably 
true.  Therefore, the officers had probable cause to believe a 
crime was or had been committed——at the very least, possession 
of THC.  See Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(e).   
¶13 Moore provides several counterarguments, none of which 
are persuasive.  First, he contends that the odor of marijuana 
was not sufficiently linked to him because the officers did not 
smell it on him, only in his vehicle.  While Moore is correct 
No. 
2021AP938-CR   
 
9 
 
that the officers did not smell marijuana on his person, he was 
the sole occupant of the vehicle that bore a strong and 
overwhelming smell of marijuana.  A reasonable law enforcement 
officer would believe Moore was probably connected with the 
illegal substance the officers identified.  As we said in 
Secrist, "The strong odor of marijuana in an automobile will 
normally provide probable cause to believe that the driver and 
sole occupant of the vehicle is linked to the drug."  224 
Wis. 2d at 218.   
¶14 That leads to Moore's second counterpoint:  the 
vehicle was not his, but his brother's rental.  While this could 
constitute an innocent explanation——albeit, a strained one——
Moore misses the legal standard.  Who owned the title or signed 
the rental lease does not change the analysis.  See, e.g., State 
v. Stewart, 2011 WI App 152, ¶¶8 & n.3, 27, 337 Wis. 2d 618, 807 
N.W.2d 15 (upholding a search incident to arrest of the 
defendant's daughter's car after police observed the defendant 
throw a bag into the trunk).  A reasonable law enforcement 
officer would still likely conclude, absent other facts not in 
the record, that the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle was 
probably connected to the illegal substance whose odor the 
officer clearly detected in the vehicle. 
¶15 Third, Moore contends that the odor of marijuana 
cannot be unmistakable when there are innocent explanations for 
it——such as the odor of CBD, a legal substance that Moore stated 
his vape pen was used for.  The circuit court referenced this as 
well: 
 
"The 
State 
notes 
that 
CBD 
and 
marijuana 
are 
No. 
2021AP938-CR   
 
10 
 
indistinguishable in their odor.  The Court didn't note 
testimony to that effect in the record, but it may exist there, 
and this Court will assume that is true."  The State responds 
that this statement was taken out of context and is not a 
factual concession.  Regardless of what the State said in its 
briefing to the circuit court, the circuit court found that the 
officers noticed "a strong smell of marijuana emanating" from 
the vehicle Moore was driving.  While the officers might have 
reasonably inferred that the smell from the vehicle was CBD, 
that was not the only inference they could draw——they also could 
infer (and they did) that the smell was THC.  It is black letter 
law that "an officer is not required to draw a reasonable 
inference that favors innocence when there also is a reasonable 
inference that favors probable cause."  State v. Nieves, 2007 
WI App 189, ¶14, 304 Wis. 2d 182, 738 N.W.2d 125; see also State 
v. 
Waldner, 
206 
Wis. 2d 51, 
60, 
556 
N.W.2d 681 
(1996).  
Therefore, while an innocent explanation may exist, we still 
conclude under the facts of this case, a reasonable law 
enforcement 
officer 
would 
infer 
that 
Moore 
had 
probably 
committed or was committing a crime.  
¶16 Finally, Moore notes that neither Officer Abel nor 
Officer Scheppler testified with respect to their training and 
experience to detect the smell of marijuana.  He asserts that 
without this testimony, the State failed to establish the odor 
was 
unmistakable. 
 
This 
argument, 
however, 
goes 
to 
the 
credibility of the officers.  And credibility of a witness is a 
question left to the fact-finder.  See State v. Burch, 2021 
No. 
2021AP938-CR   
 
11 
 
WI 68, ¶34, 398 Wis. 2d 1, 961 N.W.2d 314.  The circuit court 
acting as fact-finder here found the officers' testimony 
credible and stated repeatedly that the officers noted the 
"strong smell" and "strong odor" of marijuana coming from the 
vehicle.  It made this factual finding absent specific testimony 
regarding the officers' training and experience.  Moore does not 
challenge this factual finding; nor do we conclude this finding 
is clearly erroneous.  Furthermore, the fact that the officers 
testified 
to 
smelling 
marijuana 
suggests 
they 
know 
what 
marijuana smells like.  See United States v. Ludwig, 508 
F.2d 140, 142 (10th Cir. 1974) ("[I]nherent in the officer's 
statement that he smelled marihuana is the claim that he is 
familiar with that substance's odor.").  It could be that a 
fact-finder will not believe an officer's identification of 
marijuana absent an on-the-record statement of training and 
experience.  The changing legal status and ubiquity of marijuana 
could make the lack of such evidence vulnerable to attack.  But 
again, we do not see why such testimony would be required.  The 
relevant question is whether the testimony is sufficient to 
support a finding of fact.  There was enough here without 
testimony regarding the officers' training and expertise to 
support a finding that they smelled illegal raw marijuana.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶17 Examining the totality of the circumstances, we hold 
that officers Abel and Scheppler had probable cause to arrest 
Moore on the belief that he was committing or had committed a 
No. 
2021AP938-CR   
 
12 
 
crime.  Therefore, the search incident to arrest did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.  We reverse the court of appeals' decision 
to the contrary and remand to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.   
No.  2021AP938-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶18 REBECCA 
FRANK 
DALLET, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
After 
pulling Moore over for speeding, police officers removed him 
from his car to conduct a pat-down search.  They found no 
evidence that a crime had been committed, so Moore should have 
been free to go, perhaps with a speeding ticket.  Instead, the 
officers conducted a second, more thorough search of Moore and 
found baggies containing cocaine and fentanyl concealed in his 
pants.  The majority concludes that this second search was 
permissible because the officers had probable cause to arrest 
Moore on the basis that the car he was driving smelled like 
marijuana.  I disagree; because the officers lacked probable 
cause to arrest Moore, the evidence they found should be 
suppressed.   
I 
¶19 On the night of November 17, 2019, Officer Libby Abel 
pulled Quaheem Moore over for speeding on a residential street.  
She called for backup.  The sequence of events that followed was 
captured on the bodycam video.  The officers removed Moore from 
the vehicle to conduct a pat-down search.  While searching him, 
Officer Abel asked Moore if he had been drinking.  He said "no."  
Officer Abel then told Moore she saw him throw something out of 
the driver's side window while pulling over, "[s]ome sort of 
beverage . . . .  It's on the side of your car."  Moore 
expressed confusion and explained that it was his brother's car 
and had been through a car wash earlier that day.  Officer Abel 
asked Moore again if he had been drinking and when the last time 
was that he had an alcoholic drink.  Moore replied, "yesterday."  
No.  2021AP938-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
He did not appear intoxicated and was not asked to take field 
sobriety tests.  The only item the officers found during the 
pat-down search was a vape pen which Moore said was a "CBD 
vape."  There is nothing in the record to contradict this 
statement.   
¶20 Instead of letting Moore go with a speeding ticket, 
Officer Abel briefly paused and said for the first time, "Okay, 
okay, um . . . I also smelled mar——the odor of marijuana coming 
from the car."  The second officer chimed in that he could smell 
it too.  Later, at the suppression hearing, Officer Abel said 
that she had smelled "raw marijuana."  Moore expressed disbelief 
and pulled his sweatshirt outwards exclaiming "You don't smell 
that shit on me."  Officer Abel admitted, "I can't smell it 
right now."1   
¶21 At this point, Officer Abel told Moore that the second 
officer was going to search him.  That officer stated, "Just 
with the odor of marijuana, I'm going to be searching you."  The 
officer found nothing.  Several minutes later, the officer said 
that he had to search Moore's waistband.  This time, the officer 
found bags containing cocaine and fentanyl concealed behind 
Moore's pants zipper.  No marijuana was found on Moore and he 
was never charged with possession of marijuana.  
¶22 Moore contends that the officers lacked probable cause 
to arrest him, and thus to conduct a search incident to arrest. 
                                                 
1 The second officer seemingly agreed that Moore didn't 
smell like marijuana.  After Moore said "You don't smell it on 
me," the officer responded, "But, but it's coming out of the 
car." 
No.  2021AP938-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
An officer has probable cause to arrest when "[t]here are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or 
has committed a crime."  Wis. Stat. § 968.07(1)(d); see also 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990) (explaining the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment).  This 
standard demands "more than a possibility or suspicion that the 
defendant committed an offense, but the evidence need not reach 
the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even that guilt 
is more likely than not."  State v. Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201, 
212, 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999).  Probable cause is an objective test 
that 
"requires 
an 
examination 
of 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances."  State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96, ¶20, 372 Wis. 2d 
202, 887 N.W.2d 554.   
¶23 The majority concludes that under the totality of the 
circumstances, "the officers had probable cause to believe a 
crime was or had been committed——at the very least, possession 
of THC."  Majority op., ¶12.  The circumstances the majority 
cites for this conclusion are the following: 
 While coming to a stop, Moore's vehicle hit the curb;  
 Officer Abel saw an unknown liquid fly out of the driver's 
window; 
 Moore had a CBD vape pen; and  
 Officer Abel and a second officer testified that they 
smelled the "strong" odor of "raw marijuana" coming from 
Moore's vehicle.   
Id.   
No.  2021AP938-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
¶24 Almost none of these circumstances "would lead a 
reasonable police officer to believe" that Moore possessed THC.  
Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d at 212.  Hitting the curb while pulling 
over might be evidence the driver was impaired, but Moore was 
not arrested for operating while intoxicated and there is no 
evidence of impairment from the bodycam footage or the officers' 
reports.  Officer Abel's testimony about a liquid spraying out 
of the driver's side window is immaterial as well.  There is 
nothing in the record about what the liquid was or linking it in 
any way to THC.  Likewise there is nothing in the record that 
suggests Moore's vape pen was used for anything other than CBD——
a legal substance.   
¶25 That leaves only the smell of marijuana coming from 
the car Moore was driving——a fact the majority all but admits is 
the only support for probable cause to arrest Moore.  See 
majority op., ¶12.  In concluding that the smell of marijuana 
alone gave the officers probable cause to arrest Moore, the 
majority relies primarily on one 24-year old case decided when 
the use or possession of any amount of cannabis2 was illegal 
nationwide.  See Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201. 
II 
                                                 
2 Cannabis refers to a category of flowering plants which 
produce both hemp and marijuana.  Hemp is a type of cannabis 
that contains low levels of the intoxicating chemical delta-9 
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).  Marijuana is another type of 
cannabis known for its much higher concentration of THC.  In 
1996, both hemp and marijuana were illegal.  See Ryan LeCloux, 
Regulating Wisconsin's Hemp Industry, Wisconsin Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Wisconsin Policy Project, Vol. 2 No. 9, at 1-4 
(Aug. 2019), https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lrb/wisconsin
_policy_project/wisconsin_policy_project_2_9.pdf.   
No.  2021AP938-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
¶26 On a summer day in 1996, Timothy Secrist rolled down 
his window to ask a police officer for directions.  See Secrist, 
224 Wis. 2d at 204.  The officer was immediately struck by the 
strong odor of marijuana wafting from inside the vehicle.  Id.  
Secrist was ordered to pull over and get out of the car and was 
then placed under arrest.  Id. at 205.  We concluded that the 
evidence seized after Secrist's arrest did not need to be 
suppressed, holding that the officer had probable cause to 
arrest Secrist because the officer identified the "unmistakable 
odor of a controlled substance and [wa]s able to link that odor 
to a specific person."  Id. at 218.  Applying Secrist to Moore's 
case, I conclude that the officers lacked probable cause to 
arrest, and therefore to search, Moore.   
¶27 For starters, even if the officers smelled the 
"unmistakable" odor of marijuana coming from the car Moore was 
driving, the linkage between that smell and Moore was not 
particularly strong.  See id. (stating that probable cause to 
arrest based on the "unmistakable" odor of marijuana must also 
be linked to a specific person).  As Secrist explained, the 
likelihood that an occupant is linked to the smell of marijuana 
in a vehicle "diminishes if the odor is not strong or recent, if 
the source of the odor is not near the person, if there are 
several people in the vehicle, or if a person offers a 
reasonable explanation for the odor."  Id.  Here, it is true 
that Moore was the sole occupant of the car, thus increasing the 
probability that he was linked to the smell.  But that linkage 
is weaker than it initially appears, since neither officer 
No.  2021AP938-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
smelled marijuana on Moore once he was out of the car and 
because Moore explained that he was driving a vehicle his 
brother had rented——a fact the officers subsequently verified.   
¶28 More fundamentally, however, legal developments in the 
last 24 years may call into question a central premise of 
Secrist, namely that the odor of marijuana is "unmistakabl[y 
the] odor of a controlled substance."  Id.  Thirty-eight states 
have legalized medical marijuana and twenty-three of those have 
also legalized recreational marijuana.3  Additionally, Congress 
modified the Controlled Substances Act in 2018 to remove hemp 
and hemp-derived products from the definition of marijuana, 
which legalized certain hemp products nationwide.4  This means 
that virtually all adults can legally purchase hemp-derived 
                                                 
3 See National Conference of State Legislatures, State 
Medical 
Cannabis 
Laws, 
tbl. 
1, 
https://www.ncsl.org/health/state-medical-cannabis-laws. 
 
See 
also Joe Sonka, Kentucky Bill Legalizing Medical Marijuana 
Signed Into Law, Louisville Courier Journal (Mar. 30, 2023), 
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/2023/03/30/m
edical-marijuana-bill-passes-in-kentucky-heads-to-beshears-
desk/70062316007/ (identifying Kentucky as the 38th state to 
legalize medical marijuana);  Shawna Mizelle & Sydney Kashiwagi, 
Minnesota Becomes 23rd State to Legalize Recreational Marijuana, 
CNN 
Politics 
(May 
30, 
2023), 
https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/30/politics/minnesota-cannabis-
legalization-recreational-marijuana/index.html. 
4 See Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th 
Cong. § 12619.  The 2018 Farm Bill removed hemp from the legal 
definition of marijuana in the Controlled Substances Act.  This 
made some hemp-derived products with less than 0.3% THC 
federally legal.  
No.  2021AP938-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
products from local CBD stores.5  Hemp-derived products come in a 
variety of processed forms like gummies, oils, and creams, as 
well as in their unprocessed state as hemp flowers.6  And just 
like marijuana, hemp flowers can be smoked, vaped, or eaten.7  
Unlike marijuana, however, hemp contains only trace amounts of 
the psychoactive compound THC——the main psychoactive ingredient 
in marijuana.8   
¶29 Experts indicate that hemp flowers and marijuana are 
so similar in appearance and smell that even drug detection dogs 
can't tell the difference.9  If true, this means that when a 
police officer smells what they believe to be the distinctive 
                                                 
5 See Mike Sill, The Future of the CBD Industry in 2022 and 
Beyond, 
Forbes 
Business 
Council 
(Oct. 
21, 
2021), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesbusinesscouncil/2021/10/21/th
e-future-of-the-cbd-industry-in-2022-and-beyond 
(detailing 
the 
exponential growth of the CBD industry). 
6 See Elizabeth G. Dunn, They're Betting the Family Farm on 
Weed, 
N.Y. 
Times 
(Feb. 
17, 
2023), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/17/nyregion/hepworth-farms-
cannabis.html (explaining the process of growing hemp). 
7 See Phil Dixon, Hemp or Marijuana?, UNC Sch. of Gov't: 
N.C. 
Crim. 
L. 
Blog 
(May 
21, 
2019), 
https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/hemp-or-marijuana. 
8 See Elizabeth G. Dunn, supra note 6. 
9 See 
North 
Carolina 
State 
Bureau 
of 
Investigation, 
Industrial 
Hemp/CBD 
Issues, 
available 
at 
https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/default/files/doc_warehouse/NC%20S
BI%20-%20Issues%20with%20Hemp%20and%20CBD%20Full.pdf ("Hemp and 
marijuana look the same and have the same odor, both unburned 
and burned.  This makes it impossible for law enforcement to use 
the appearance of marijuana or the odor of marijuana to develop 
probable cause for arrest."); see also Cynthia Sherwood, 
Alexander Mills, & Davis Griffin, Even Dogs Can’t Smell the 
Difference: The Death of "Plain Smell," As Hemp Is Legalized, 55 
Tenn. Bar J. 14 (Dec. 2019). 
No.  2021AP938-CR.rfd 
 
8 
 
odor of either raw or burnt marijuana, they could just as easily 
be smelling raw or burnt hemp.  In light of the nationwide 
legalization of hemp, this raises the question:  Should the 
smell of marijuana alone still justify a warrantless arrest? 
¶30 Courts in jurisdictions that have legalized marijuana 
for medical or recreational purposes have answered "no," 
rejecting 
their 
Secrist-like 
cases 
in 
the 
process.  
Pennsylvania, for example, once had a rule that "where an 
officer is justified in being where he is, his detection of the 
odor of marijuana is sufficient to establish probable cause."  
Commonwealth v. Stainbrook, 471 A.2d 1223, 1225 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1984).  In 2016, after Pennsylvania legalized the possession and 
use 
of 
medical 
marijuana 
in 
limited 
circumstances, 
the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that change eliminated the 
"main pillar" of the state's prior rule regarding the smell of 
marijuana——that marijuana was illegal in all circumstances in 
Pennsylvania.  Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25, 41 (Pa. 2021).  
Accordingly, the court held that "the smell of marijuana alone 
cannot create probable cause to justify a search."  Id.  
Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that possession or use of 
marijuana remained illegal for those not qualified to possess 
medical marijuana.  Id.  For that reason, the court explained 
that "the smell of marijuana indisputably can still signal the 
possibility of criminal activity" and thus "may be a factor, but 
not a stand-alone one, in evaluating the totality of the 
circumstances for purposes of determining whether police had 
probable cause to conduct a warrantless search."  Id.  
No.  2021AP938-CR.rfd 
 
9 
 
¶31 States that have decriminalized possession of small 
quantities of marijuana have reached similar conclusions.  For 
example, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a search 
incident to arrest was invalid because "nothing in the record 
suggest[ed] that possession of a joint and the odor of burnt 
marijuana gave the police probable cause to believe [the 
defendant] was in possession of a criminal amount of that 
substance."  Pacheco v. State, 214 A.3d 505, 518 (Md. 2019); see 
also Lewis v. State, 233 A.3d 86, 99 (Md. 2020) (holding that 
the odor of marijuana alone doesn't indicate possession of a 
criminal amount of marijuana and police officers therefore 
lacked probable cause to arrest).  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
likewise explained that although the odor of burnt marijuana 
might provide probable cause to believe that a "non-criminal 
amount" of marijuana is present, it cannot provide the basis for 
probable cause to arrest because there is no reason to believe a 
criminal amount of marijuana is present.  State v. Ortega, 770 
N.W.2d 145, 149 n.2 (Minn. 2009).   
¶32 Although Wisconsin has not yet legalized medical or 
recreational 
marijuana, 
or 
decriminalized 
possession 
or 
consumption 
of 
marijuana, 
the 
reasoning 
in 
these 
cases 
demonstrates that marijuana's once-unique odor may no longer 
serve as the beacon of criminal activity it did a quarter-
century ago.  As discussed above, Wisconsinites can legally 
purchase, transport, and smoke or vape hemp products that 
experts indicate are identical to marijuana in look and smell.  
As such, officers who believe they smell marijuana coming from a 
No.  2021AP938-CR.rfd 
 
10 
 
vehicle may just as likely be smelling raw or smoked hemp, which 
is not criminal activity.  Moreover, in virtually all of 
Wisconsin's 
neighboring 
states——Illinois, 
Michigan, 
and 
Minnesota——recreational marijuana is now legal.  With that, 
Wisconsinites may travel to neighboring states and consume 
marijuana without violating any state laws.10  And experience 
teaches us that smells linger in cars, sometimes long after the 
item responsible for the smell is gone.  In sum, Secrist's 
reliance on the smell of marijuana as an unmistakable indication 
of illegal activity sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest 
may no longer ring true.11  
¶33  All things considered, the totality of the relevant 
circumstances here do not add up to probable cause to arrest and 
thus any evidence found during the search should be suppressed.  
Other than the officers' testimony that they smelled raw 
marijuana coming from the car Moore was driving, there was no 
reason to believe that Moore possessed THC.  The smell the 
officers identified was not sufficiently linked to Moore under 
                                                 
10 The Legislative Fiscal Bureau estimated that $36.1 
million of Illinois' cannabis tax revenues in fiscal year 2022 
were attributable to sales of cannabis to Wisconsin residents.  
Memorandum from Sydney Emmerich, Fiscal Analyst, Legislative 
Fiscal Bureau, to Senator Melissa Agard, at 2 (Mar. 10, 2023). 
11 For this reason, Secrist may be worth revisiting in a 
future case.  See State v. Johnson, 2023 WI 39, ¶20, 407 Wis. 2d 
195, 990 N.W.2d 174 (identifying several factors that we 
consider when deciding whether to overturn precedent, including 
when "the law has changed in a way that undermines the prior 
decision's rationale" and when "there is a 'need to make a 
decision correspond to newly ascertained facts'" (quoting 
another source)). 
No.  2021AP938-CR.rfd 
 
11 
 
the circumstances of this case.  See Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d at 
218.  And if experts are correct that there is no distinction 
between the odor of legal hemp products and marijuana, then a 
central premise of Secrist is called into question and further 
undermines 
probable 
cause. 
 
For 
all 
these 
reasons, 
I 
respectfully dissent.   
¶34 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this opinion.