Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Mahone

Citation: 398 Md. 257

Docket Number: 7ag/06

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mahone, Misc. Docket AG No. 7, September Term, 2006
HEADNOTE:
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – Our goal in matters of attorney discipline is to protect the
public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession rather than to punish the attorney.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – We protect the public by imposing sanctions that are
commensurate with the nature and gravity of the attorneys’ violations and the intent with
which they were committed.  The severity of the sanction depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case, taking account of any particular aggravating or mitigating
factors.  Under the circumstances, the appropriate sanction is a reprimand where the attorney
disrupted court proceedings in one instance; and, in another instance walked out during the
court proceedings to show his disdain for the trial judge.  The mitigating factors were that
the attorney’s clients were not prejudiced as a result of his misconduct and that there were
no prior disciplinary proceedings filed against the attorney.  In addition, by imposing a
reprimand in this case, we are able to send a clear message to the Bar that deliberately
disruptive behavior by attorneys in court proceedings will not be tolerated.
In the Circuit Court for M ontgomery County
Case No. 21070-M
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 7
September Term, 2006 
____________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
DANIEL Q. MAHONE
___________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, Specially
Assigned),
   JJ.
____________________________________
Opinion by Greene, J.
____________________________________
Filed: April 10, 2007
1Maryland Rule 16-751, in relevant part, provides:
(a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action.  (1) Upon approval of
Commission.  Upon approval of the Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for
Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals.
2MRPC 8.4(d) provides:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
* * * 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
3Rule 16-752(a) provides:
(a) Order.  Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the
Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any circuit court to hear
the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record.  The order of
designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar Counsel and the
attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the extent of discovery and setting dates
for the completion of discovery, filing of motions, and hearing.  
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Petitioner”), by Bar Counsel
acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,1 filed a Petition For Disciplinary or Remedial
Action in the Court of Appeals against Daniel Q. Mahone (“Respondent”).  The petition
charged that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d) (misconduct) 2 of the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct (“MRPC”), in his representation of clients, in three cases that were
pending in the Circuit Court for Washington County.  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a),3
we referred the matter to the Honorable Nelson W. Rupp, Jr., of the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, to conduct an evidentiary hearing and render findings of fact and
recommend conclusions of law.
After a two-day hearing on the merits, Judge Rupp filed on December 20, 2006, the
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following findings of facts and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
(1)
Respondent represented Christopher Abbott in the case
of Jennifer Abbott v. Christopher Abbott, case no. 21-C-04-
20231-CT, in the Circuit Court for Washington County.  This
matter arose from a child custody dispute.  A hearing was
scheduled on August 26, 2005, 9:30 a.m. before the Honorable
Donald E. Beachley.  The evening before the hearing the parties
reached a settlement regarding visitation.  When the case was
called at 9:38 a.m., Respondent was not present in court.  
Mr. Abbott testified that he expected Respondent to be
present to represent him.  Mr. Abbott testified that he and
Respondent had discussed the substance of the consent order the
night before the hearing.  Mrs. Abbott’s attorney prepared the
consent order.  On the morning of the hearing, Mr. Abbott was
left, without the benefit of counsel, to review the consent order
with opposing counsel in the hallway of the courthouse.  Mr.
Abbott signed the consent order, which was filed in open Court,
and the hearing concluded at 9:40 a.m. without Respondent
appearing.  Judge Beachley testified that he learned that
Respondent arrived after the hearing’s conclusion.  However,
there was no evidence that Respondent notified the Court upon
his arrival or apologized for his tardiness.  
Mr. Abbott testified that he was pleased with the
representation provided by Respondent.  Mr. Abbott further
testified that Respondent helped Mr. Abbott become a part of
his son’s life.  
Respondent was discourteous to the Court by failing to
timely appear for the Court hearing; by failing to notify the
Court that he would be tardy; and by failing to either explain his
tardiness or apologize once he arrived.  Moreover, Respondent
failed to be present to protect his client’s interests at the Court
hearing.
 (2)
Respondent represented Diana Sue Grimm in her divorce
proceedings in the case of Diana Sue Grimm v. Bodie Elwood
Grimm, case no. 21-C-04-18468 DA, in the Circuit Court for
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Washington County.  Respondent filed a Petition for Contempt
in that case on the grounds that Mr. Grimm allegedly violated
the pendente lite order that awarded Ms. Grimm use and
possession of the parties’ marital home.  On September 2, 2005,
a contempt hearing in that matter was held before the Honorable
Donald E. Beachley.  Upon disagreement with the Court’s
findings, Respondent engaged in an extensive pattern of
disruptive and disrespectful behavior, interrupting Judge
Beachley on several occasions.  During the initial stages of the
hearing, Judge Beachley advised Respondent that it was
impolite to interrupt the Court.  At another point during the
hearing, Respondent told Judge Beachley ‘if the Court made a
mistake, the Court ought to be big enough to admit that.’  In
addition, Judge Beachley had to ask Respondent to refrain from
packing up his materials while he was rendering his opinion
from the bench.
Subsequent to the Court’s decision to dismiss the Petition
for Contempt, there was a contentious exchange between
Respondent and opposing counsel.  Respondent interrupted
opposing counsel when opposing counsel tried to address the
issue of attorney’s fees.  Judge Beachley then accused
Respondent of being discourteous, at which point Judge
Beachley and Respondent engaged in an argument in regards to
Respondent’s tardiness at the August 26, 2005 hearing.  During
this exchange, Respondent repeatedly accused Judge Beachley
of demonstrating a lack of courtesy.  When opposing counsel
attempted to resume his argument, he walked towards
Respondent’s table and said to him: ‘If you stand up one more
[sic], I will not stand for that-you cut me off.’
Finally, Respondent once again told Judge Beachley that
he ought to be big enough to recognize when he makes an error.
Judge 
Beachley 
responded 
that 
such 
remarks 
were
condescending, and Respondent accused Judge Beachley of
having an ‘I can do no wrong’ attitude.
Ms. Grimm testified during the attorney grievance
proceedings that she was present during the September 2, 2005
hearing and was pleased with Respondent’s representation of
her interests.  Ms. Grimm testified that Respondent was an
effective advocate for her.  
At the Respondent’s request the Court listened to the
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recording of the September 2, 2005 hearing before Judge
Beachley.  It is Respondent’s position that the recording of the
September 2, 2005 hearing mitigates Respondent’s conduct as
it demonstrates a lack of courtesy and respect toward him by
Judge Beachley.  The Court concludes the opposite.  Judge
Beachley allowed Respondent to be fully heard.  It is clear that
Respondent repeatedly interrupted Judge Beachley and opposing
counsel and pursued a pattern of disrespectful behavior to the
bench.  The Court finds no mitigation to support Respondent’s
conduct.  
(3)
Respondent represented Diana Sue Grimm, the mother in
a CINA proceeding, In the Matter of George G., et al., case no.
21-I-04-50576-50583.  A lengthy hearing was held on May 5,
2005 before the Honorable Judge Frederick C. Wright, III.  At
the end of the hearing, while Judge Wright was rendering his
opinion, Respondent suddenly interrupted and accused Judge
Wright of performing a disservice to Ms. Grimm.  At that time,
Respondent informed Ms. Grimm that he was leaving the
hearing, and he invited her to accompany him.  Judge Wright
asked Ms Grimm if she wished to walk out of the courtroom
with Respondent.  Respondent advised Ms. Grimm that she
could stay but that he was going to leave.  While Judge Wright
was rendering his opinion from the bench, Respondent walked
out of the courtroom and abandoned his client, Ms. Grimm.
Elisha Elliott, Esquire was also present at this hearing.  Ms.
Elliott had been Ms. Grimm’s CINA counsel. After Respondent
left the hearing, Ms. Elliott came forward and Judge Wright
appointed her to represent Ms. Grimm for the remainder of the
hearing.  Ms. Grimm testified that she did not feel that
Respondent’s behavior prejudiced her in any way.
Respondent’s abandonment of his client in the course of
Judge Wright’s bench opinion was a violation of his duty to
represent her interests.  Respondent had an obligation  to
continue to represent Ms. Grimm.  Even though Ms. Elliott was
able to adequately continue to represent Ms. Grimm’s interests,
there was no evidence to suggest that Respondent knew that Ms.
Elliott would be able to continue with the representation of his
client. 
Respondent’s blatant interruption of Judge Wright was an
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overt and public display of disdain for the Court and constituted
disrespect for the administration of justice.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
It is undisputed that Respondent failed to appear for the
hearing held on August 26, 2005.  While Respondent’s absence
appeared unintentional, he failed to notify the Court that he
would be tardy; he failed to explain or apologize for his
tardiness to the Court; and he failed to be present to protect his
client’s interests.  On September 2, 2005, Respondent’s behavior
before Judge Beachley was disruptive and disrespectful to the
Court.  The Court had to address Respondent’s offensive and
disruptive conduct during the Court proceedings.  On May 5,
2005, Respondent interrupted Judge Wright and exited the
courtroom in the course of Judge Wright’s bench opinion, which
disrupted court proceedings.  Respondent abandoned his client
when he left the May 5, 2005 proceedings.  Respondent is a
zealous advocate on behalf of his clients.  However, his
aggressive tactics cause him to lose his perspective.  He has
displayed a pattern of disrespect toward the Court.  He has failed
to recognize that he is an officer of the Court and has a duty to
his clients, the Court and the public.  
Respondent’s conduct during each of the three
proceedings does not appear to have resulted in any actual
prejudice to his clients.  Moreover, each of the court
proceedings was concluded in spite of Respondent’s disruptive
behavior.  However, when taken as a whole, Respondent’s
conduct in failing to appear in court, interrupting the judge and
opposing counsel, and refusing to listen to the judge render his
opinion undermines the judicial system and the public’s faith in
the system.  It constitutes a lack of respect for the judicial
process.  For these reasons, Respondent’s conduct is prejudicial
to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
Respondent filed written exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law.  First, Respondent contends that the hearing judge failed to make
-6-
findings of mitigation on the basis of Respondent’s “Equitable Grounds Defense,” which
suggests that the complaints filed against him in these proceedings were a product of judicial
retaliation and resentment.  In support of this position, he claims that when Judge Wright
confronted him outside the courtroom in the hallway exclaiming, “his desire that Respondent
not practice law in Washington County, Maryland[,]” that the judge’s conduct, in that
instance, confirms that “the motivation of the persons who filed the complaints in the instant
case is guided by the desire to punish [him] rather than to vindicate the ‘administration of
justice.’” 
Secondly, Respondent excepts on the grounds that his lateness for court on one
instance hardly supports a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that he intended any
discourtesy to the Court.  In addition, he “excepts to the finding that his absence at the
hearing resulted in any disintegration of Mr. Abbott’s rights.”  Thirdly, he excepts to the
hearing judge’s failure to find that (1) Judge Beachley initiated the pattern of interruption of
counsel; (2) the court “goaded” Respondent during the hearing; (3) Judge Beachley was
discourteous to counsel; and (4) Judge Beachley lost control of the proceedings and “created
a hostile and oppressive court environment” because of his disdain and disrespect for
Respondent.  Finally, Respondent asserts that his conduct in walking out of the courtroom
during Judge Wright’s disposition of the case was a “speech protest” and not a “substantial
disruption” of the court proceedings.  Furthermore, he contends that Judge Wright could not
have thought that Respondent’s conduct was contemptuous because the judge did not hold
4Maryland Rule 16-758 provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Exceptions; recommendations.  Within 15 days after service of the notice required
by section (a) of this Rule, each party may file (1) exceptions to the findings and
conclusions of the hearing judge and (2) recommendations concerning the appropriate
disposition under Rule 16-759(c).  Only Respondent filed written exceptions. 
-7-
him in direct contempt and “did not file a complaint about [that] incident until four (4)
months later on September 15, 2005.” 
Either party may file post-hearing written exceptions to the findings and conclusions
of the hearing judge.  Maryland Rule 16-758.4  Specifically, Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2)(B)
provides: 
(B) If exceptions are filed.  If exceptions are filed, the Court of Appeals
shall determine whether the findings of fact have been proven by the requisite
standard of proof set out in Rule 16-757(b).  The Court may confine its review
to the findings of fact challenged by the exceptions.  The Court shall give due
regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of
witnesses. 
  
We accept a hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that they are clearly
erroneous.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50, 891 A.2d 1085, 1095
(2006).  As to the scope of our review, we take into consideration whether the findings of
fact have been proven by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 16-757(b).  This Rule
provides that Bar counsel has the burden of proving the averments of the petition by clear
and convincing evidence, and the attorney who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of
mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense or matter of mitigation or
extenuation by a preponderance of the evidence.  Guida, 391 Md. at 50-51, 891 A.2d at 1095
-8-
(citing Rule 16-757(b)).  “Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflict
in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder.”  State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750, 720
A.2d 323, 331 (1998).  With regard to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, our review is
de novo.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harrington, 367 Md 36, 49, 785 A.2d 1260, 1267-
68 (2001).
Respondent had a full opportunity to be heard as to his claim of mitigation.  The
hearing judge pointed out that he listened to the recording of the September 2, 2005 hearing
before Judge Beachley and concluded, contrary to Respondent’s assertions, that the record
of that hearing demonstrated that Respondent “repeatedly interrupted Judge Beachley and
opposing counsel and pursued a pattern of disrespectful behavior to the bench.”  In addition,
the hearing court specifically found “no mitigation to support Respondent’s conduct.”  This
is consistent with the hearing court’s other findings as to the case involving Judge Wright.
According to the hearing judge, “Respondent’s blatant interruption of Judge Wright was an
overt and public display of disdain for the Court and constituted disrespect for the
administration of justice.” 
The hearing judge made no findings as to whether Respondent proved by a
preponderance of the evidence any mitigating factors.  As to Respondent’s theory of
mitigation, based upon an “Equitable Grounds Defense,” the allegation that the trial judge
“goaded” Respondent or that the complaint filed against him was in retaliation are not
sufficient mitigating factors.  Assuming arguendo that Respondent was enticed by Judge
5From our review of the record filed in these proceedings it is undisputed that Elisha
Elliott, Esquire, initially represented Mrs. Grimm, but recommended that Respondent
represent Mrs. Grimm in the CINA case.  Approximately halfway through the hearing, Judge
Wright took a recess and entered the hallway wearing his robe.  He approached Ms.Elliott
shaking his finger and stating, referring to Respondent, “you know I don’t want you bringing
him up here.”  Respondent was present in the hallway when Judge Wright made this
comment and Ms. Elliott confirmed for Respondent what the judge had said.  Further, this
confrontation followed an earlier motion filed by Respondent in the Abbott case that Judge
Wright recuse himself from hearing the request for exceptions and the case on the merits.
Judge Wright did not rule on the motion for recusal, in effect denying it, because, in his
capacity as Administrative Judge, he had assigned the case to Judge Beachley. 
-9-
Beachley to react inappropriately or that the complaint filed against him was in retaliation
for his aggressiveness or that Judge Wright was biased against him 5, those factors could not
excuse Respondent’s obligation, as an officer of the court, to respect the legal system.
Notwithstanding Respondent’s apparent opinion regarding the individual occupying the
office of judge, Respondent owes a duty of respect to the office.  
In the present case, it is implicit, however, in the court’s finding of misconduct that
the hearing judge did not find in Respondent’s favor as to his “Equitable Grounds Defense.”
To be certain, we have never said that a hearing court must spell out every reason that
supports its decision or explain why every other hypothesis is inconsistent with its
conclusions.  Moreover, even if the hearing court had determined that Judges Beachley and
Wright were discourteous to Respondent or that the complaint against him constituted a
retaliation, under no circumstances, could this Court justify Respondent’s reactions as
appropriate.  It is elementary that Respondent’s disruption of court proceedings and walking
out of those proceedings did not constitute an appropriate response to what he has alleged
-10-
constituted judicial misconduct.  Thus, without any hesitation, we overrule Respondent’s
exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact.                    
Furthermore, we agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions of law that Respondent
violated MRPC 8.4(d).  Not only did Respondent violate the rules of professional
responsibility, his behavior which amounted to a pattern of disrupting the court proceedings
and culminating in walking out while the trial judge rendered his oral opinion from the
bench, constituted a direct contempt of court.  As indicated by Respondent at oral argument,
by walking out, he wanted the judge to know how he felt.  See Md. Rule 15-202(b); State v.
Roll and Scholl, 267 Md. 714, 733, 298 A.2d 867, 879-80 (1973) (noting that contempt of
court involves conduct which is directed against the dignity and authority of the court, or a
judge acting judicially, is an act which obstructs the administration of justice, and tends to
bring the court into disrepute or disrespect); Mitchell v. State, 320 Md. 756, 764, 580 A.2d
196, 200 (1990); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Alison, 317 Md. 523, 536, 565 A.2d 660,
666 (1989) (noting that an attorney’s failure to recognize that his misconduct which involved
a pattern of inappropriate, rude, vulgar, insulting and sometimes criminal acts was prejudicial
to the administration of justice and warranted a 90-day suspension from the practice of law).
Under the circumstances of this case, both trial judges showed remarkable restraint in not
finding Respondent in contempt.  We do not interpret the exercise of restraint by either judge
as an indication that Respondent’s conduct was not a substantial disruption of the
proceedings. 
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Having overruled Respondent’s exceptions and concluding that Respondent violated
MRPC 8.4(d), we next determine the proper sanction. Recently in Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Lee, 393 Md. 546, 563, 903 A.2d 895, 905-06 (2005), we reaffirmed that 
[t]he purpose of discipline under the MRPC is not to punish the lawyer, but to
protect the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession.  We
protect the public through sanctions against offending attorneys in two ways:
through deterrence of the type of conduct which will not be tolerated, and by
removing those unfit to continue in the practice of law from the rolls of those
authorized to practice in this State.  The public is protected when sanctions are
imposed that are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations
and the intent with which they were committed. The appropriate severity of the
sanction depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case, taking account
of any particular aggravating or mitigating factors.  
(Citations and quotations omitted.)
As to the mitigation standards to which we ordinarily adhere, we have said: 
The mitigating factors listed in the ABA Standards include: absence of
a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; personal
or emotional problems; timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to
rectify consequences of misconduct; full and free disclosure to disciplinary
board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; inexperience in the practice
of law; character or reputation; physical or mental disability or impairment;
delay in disciplinary proceedings; interim rehabilitation; imposition of other
penalties or sanctions; remorse; and finally, remoteness of prior offenses.
Lee, 393 Md. at 564, 903 A.2d at 906 (citations omitted).
The appropriate sanction in this case is a reprimand.  Petitioner recommends that we
impose a suspension “to send a clear message to the Bar that deliberately disruptive conduct
by attorneys in court cannot be tolerated.”  We can send that message, in the present case,
without disrupting Respondent’s practice of law.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
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O’Neill, 285 Md. 52, 57, 400 A.2d 415, 418 (1979) (stating, under the circumstances of that
case, that imposing a reprimand means it will forever appear in a reported Maryland case that
the attorney sanctioned has been found to be a liar); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tolar,
357 Md. 569, 585, 745 A.2d 1045, 1054 (2000) (holding that a public reprimand would
“serve the purpose of protecting the public just as well as a short suspension”); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Jaseb, 364 Md. 464, 475, 773 A.2d 516, 522 (2001) (concluding that
a reprimand was an appropriate sanction considering, among other factors, the attorney’s lack
of prior misconduct and the lack of prejudice to the client); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Lee, 390 Md. 517, 527, 890 A.2d 273, 279 (2006) (holding that a reprimand will serve notice
to the respondent and the Bar that “this Court considers an attorney’s lack of diligence and
lack of communication with his client, serious matters”). 
Even though we view counsel’s conduct as constituting a direct contempt of court,
we do not hold that every contempt of court committed by an attorney warrants the sanction
of suspension from the practice of law or disbarment.  The hearing judge noted that
Respondent is a zealous advocate.  The preamble to the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct encourages attorneys to act zealously in advocating their client’s causes.  See
Preamble: A lawyer’s responsibilities. MRPC (noting that an attorney is required to provide
zealous advocacy under the rules of the adversary system).  As noted by the hearing judge
in this case, Respondent’s “aggressive tactics cause[d] him to lose his perspective.”
Furthermore, at oral argument before this Court, Respondent conceded that his conduct of
6For example, in the Abbott case, Respondent filed exceptions to the Master’s Report
and Recommendation.  Before the case could be heard by a judge on the exceptions, Mrs.
Abbott requested and obtained an emergency hearing.  Over the objection of Respondent, the
Circuit Court proceeded with the emergency hearing.  In that proceeding,  Judge Wright
awarded physical custody of the minor child of the parties to the mother, pending the
exceptions hearing, with seven hours a week visitation, on Saturdays, to the father.
Respondent duly noted his objections to the proceeding and the judge’s Order, and filed an
appeal on behalf of Mr. Abbott.  In an unreported opinion, Abbott v. Abbott, No. 02531, filed
July 14, 2005, September Term 2004, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment
of the Circuit Court on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the trial
court’s custody and visitation decision.    
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walking out of the court while the judge was rendering his decision did nothing to enhance
the administration of justice or rectify what he perceived to be judicial unfairness.
Obviously, in the present case, Respondent, at the very least, again, could have noted an
objection and stated his reasons on the record as to any point that he wished to preserve for
appellate review.6   Instead, he chose to insult the trial judge and in one instance show his
disdain for the court by walking out during the judge’s explanation of his reasons for his
ruling.  Such behavior cannot be tolerated by the court and clearly violates the attorney’s duty
to his client and the court.
Fortunately, in this case, Respondent’s clients were not prejudiced as a result of his
misconduct, and there is no record of any prior disciplinary proceedings filed against
Respondent. 
An observation that we made in Alison, 317 Md. at 536, 565 A.2d at 666, bears
repeating here:
Nearly 100 years ago, Justice M itchell, on behalf of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, said: The bar have great liberty and high
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privileges in the assertion of their clients’ rights as they view
them, but, on the other hand, they have equal obligations as
officers in the administration of justice; and no duty is more
fundamental, more unremitting, or more imperative than that of
respectful subordination to the court.  The foundation of liberty
under our system of government is respect for the law as
officially pronounced.  The counsel in any case may or may not
be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may
tax his patience and his temper to submit to rulings which he
regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-restraint are as
necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to
the effectiveness of an army. 
 (Citations omitted.)
As we have said, the appropriate sanction is a reprimand.
  
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED
BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT;
INCLUDING 
COSTS 
OF 
ALL
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-715, FOR
WHICH 
SUM 
JUDGMENT 
IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE
A T T O R N E Y  
G R I E V A N C E
COMMISSION AGAINST DANIEL Q.
MAHONE.