Case Title: Commonwealth v. Cotto

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11761

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11761 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ERICK COTTO, JR. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     December 4, 2014. - April  , 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Constitutional Law, Plea, Conduct of 
government agents, Subpoena, Self-incrimination.  Due 
Process of Law, Plea, Disclosure of evidence, Presumption.  
Practice, Criminal, Plea, Conduct of government agents, 
Disclosure of evidence, Presumptions and burden of proof, 
Subpoena.  Evidence, Guilty plea, Certificate of drug 
analysis, Exculpatory, Disclosure of evidence, Presumptions 
and burden of proof, Testimonial privilege.  Witness, 
Subpoena, Self-incrimination, Privilege.  Privileged 
Communication. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 14, 2007. 
 
 
A motion to withdraw guilty pleas, filed on April 25, 2013, 
was heard by C. Jeffrey Kinder, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for the defendant. 
 
Katherine A. Robertson, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
2 
 
 
Luke Ryan, for Rafael Rodriguez, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
Glynis MacVeety, for Deon Charles, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  On June 14, 2007, a Hampden County grand jury 
indicted the defendant, Erick Cotto, Jr., on charges of 
trafficking in cocaine (twenty-eight to one hundred grams), 
G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b) (2); unlawful possession of ammunition 
without a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); 
and being an armed career criminal, G. L. c. 269, § 10G (b).  
Sonja Farak, then a chemist at the Department of Public Health's 
State Laboratory Institute in Amherst (Amherst drug lab), tested 
the substances in the defendant's case on June 8, 2007, and 
signed the certificates of drug analysis (drug certificates).1  
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pleaded guilty on 
April 13, 2009, to trafficking in cocaine (fourteen to twenty-
eight grams), and unlawful possession of ammunition.2   
                     
 
1 Sonja Farak was a chemist for the Department of Public 
Health from July, 2003, until January 19, 2013.  During the 
first year of her employment, she worked at the William A. 
Hinton State Laboratory Institute in the Jamaica Plain section 
of Boston.  After that, Farak worked at the Department of Public 
Health's State Laboratory Institute in Amherst (Amherst drug 
lab).  
 
 
2 With respect to the trafficking charge, the defendant was 
sentenced to from five years to five years and one day in State 
prison.  With respect to the ammunition charge, he was sentenced 
to one year in a house of correction, to be served concurrently 
with the sentence on the trafficking charge.  
3 
 
 
On April 1, 2013, a State grand jury indicted Farak on four 
counts of tampering with evidence, G. L. c. 268, § 13E; four 
counts of theft of a controlled substance (cocaine) from a 
dispensary, G. L. c. 94C, § 37; and two counts of unlawful 
possession of a class B substance (cocaine), G. L. c. 94C, § 34.  
Approximately three weeks later, the defendant filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), 
as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  He claimed that Farak 
was a government agent by virtue of her role at the Amherst drug 
lab, that her misconduct was widespread and egregious, and that 
such misconduct antedated his guilty pleas.  As a consequence, 
the defendant asserted that because his guilty pleas were based, 
in part, on an assumption that the drug certificates were 
truthful and accurate, his decision to plead guilty was not 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  The defendant further 
claimed that Farak's misconduct constituted newly discovered 
evidence that would have had a significant impact on his 
decision to plead guilty and cast serious doubt on the justice 
of his convictions.3  On October 30, 2013, a Superior Court judge 
                     
 
3 In an affidavit dated April 19, 2013, the defendant's 
trial counsel stated that, at the time she advised her client to 
plead guilty, she was not aware of Farak's misconduct.  If she 
had been aware of such misconduct prior to the defendant's 
pleas, she would not have advised him to plead guilty.  Instead, 
she would have advised the defendant to either negotiate for a 
better plea offer or go to trial.    
 
4 
 
denied the defendant's motion.  Farak pleaded guilty to all ten 
charges on January 6, 2014.   
 
The defendant appealed, and we granted his application for 
direct appellate review.  The defendant now contends that the 
judge abused his discretion by (1) failing to afford the 
defendant the benefit of the conclusive presumption articulated 
in Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 352-353 (2014), that 
egregious misconduct by Farak occurred in the defendant's case; 
(2) ignoring direct and circumstantial evidence of misconduct by 
Farak that antedated the entry of the defendant's guilty pleas; 
and (3) finding that the defendant would have pleaded guilty 
notwithstanding Farak's misconduct.  The defendant also claims 
that the judge erred by quashing a subpoena that had been issued 
to Farak's spouse, Nikki Lee, where she was a necessary witness 
for the defense.  For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the 
order denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas, and we conclude that, given the Commonwealth's failure to 
thoroughly investigate the matter of Farak's misconduct at the 
Amherst drug lab, the defendant is entitled to a measure of 
relief, as will be described in detail.4  We remand the case for 
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
                     
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Rafael 
Rodriguez and Deon Charles, defendants in two other Amherst drug 
lab cases whose motions to withdraw their respective guilty 
pleas were denied.  See note 5, infra.  Their appeals have been 
5 
 
 
1.  Background on the Amherst drug lab.5  The Amherst drug 
lab began operation in 1987 with the primary function of 
analyzing suspected controlled substances for law enforcement 
agencies involved in the prosecution of criminal cases in 
western Massachusetts.6  As of January, 2013, there were four 
employees at the facility, and each one could access the 
evidence safe by means of an electronic card or a key.  On 
January 17, 2013, the evidence officer at the Amherst drug lab, 
Sharon Salem, was attempting to match drug certificates with the 
corresponding samples when she realized that she was missing the 
samples in two cases.  Records reflected that Farak had 
completed testing on those samples earlier in the month and had 
confirmed that the substances were cocaine.  On January 18, 
                                                                  
stayed by the Appeals Court pending our decision in the present 
case.   
 
 
5 In the fall of 2013, the judge in the present case 
conducted an evidentiary hearing on postconviction motions filed 
by fifteen defendants who claimed that alleged criminal conduct 
by Farak rendered their guilty pleas to various drug charges 
unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary, and that this newly 
discovered evidence cast doubt on the justice of their 
convictions.  The evidence presented at the hearing was limited 
to (1) the timing and scope of Farak's alleged criminal conduct; 
(2) the timing and scope of conduct underlying negative findings 
in an October 10, 2012, quality assurance audit of the Amherst 
drug lab by the State police (see note 11, infra); and (3) the 
extent to which Farak's alleged criminal conduct and the audit 
findings might relate to the testing of drug evidence in the 
fifteen defendants' cases.    
 
 
6 On July 1, 2012, the responsibility for oversight of the 
Amherst drug lab was transferred from the Department of Public 
Health to the State police.    
6 
 
Salem reported the missing evidence to her supervisor, James 
Hanchett, who searched Farak's work station and discovered, 
among other items, a manila envelope containing the packaging 
for the two missing samples, which had been cut open.  Testing 
of the substances in the packaging was negative for cocaine, 
contrary to Farak's earlier analysis.    
 
Hanchett immediately contacted the State police, who shut 
down the Amherst drug lab and began an investigation.  They 
discovered two additional case envelopes in a temporary storage 
locker used by Farak, a location where evidence was not allowed 
to be stored overnight.  Although each envelope was supposed to 
contain suspected cocaine, neither did, and a search for those 
substances was unsuccessful.  Investigators also interviewed 
Farak's colleagues who said that, beginning in September, 2012, 
they observed a change in Farak's behavior, including frequent 
unexplained absences from her work station and a decrease in 
productivity.    
 
On January 19, 2013, the State police forensic services 
conducted an inventory of all drug evidence at the Amherst drug 
lab.  Only the four above-described samples were missing.  A 
similar inventory conducted approximately four months earlier 
had not uncovered any missing samples.  Also on January 19, the 
State police searched Farak's vehicle pursuant to a warrant and 
seized, among other items, manila envelopes bearing case 
7 
 
numbers, paperwork relating to the Amherst drug lab, a plastic 
bag containing a white powdery substance and a brown tar-like 
substance, a plastic bag containing assorted pills, and 
photocopies of three newspaper articles about individuals who 
had been investigated, charged, or sentenced for the illegal 
possession or theft of controlled substances.7  Attached to one 
of the articles was a handwritten note stating, "Thank [G]od I'm 
not a law enforcement officer" (emphasis in original).   
 
Farak was arrested at her home that same day.  She was 
charged by criminal complaint in the District Court with 
unlawful possession of a class A substance (heroin), unlawful 
possession of a class B substance (cocaine), and two counts of 
tampering with evidence.  On January 25, 2013, the State police 
searched a tote bag that had been seized from Farak's work 
station pursuant to a warrant.  The bag contained a variety of 
substances that could be used to dilute or replace cocaine 
(soap, baking soda, soy candle flakes, and oven-baked clay), 
                     
 
7 One of the newspaper articles, dated March 29, 2011, had 
been printed from a computer on September 20, 2011, and was a 
story about the illegal possession of steroids by law 
enforcement officers.  A second newspaper article, dated 
October 25, 2011, had been printed from a computer on 
October 28, 2011, and was a story about a Pittsfield pharmacist 
being sentenced to three years in prison for stealing OxyContin 
from her workplace.  The article mentioned that the pharmacist 
had replaced the OxyContin with other medications.  A third 
newspaper article, dated December 2, 2011, had been printed from 
a computer on December 6, 2011, and was a story about a former 
San Francisco police department drug laboratory technician who 
stole cocaine from her workplace.    
8 
 
other items commonly used in the drug trade (plastic laboratory 
dishes, waxed paper, and fragments of copper wire), and several 
evidence bags that had been cut open.  The evidence bags bore 
diverse dates from December 16, 2012, to January 6, 2013.   
 
On April 1, 2013, a State grand jury indicted Farak on four 
counts of tampering with evidence at the Amherst drug lab, four 
counts of stealing cocaine from that facility, and two counts of 
unlawful possession of cocaine.  While proceedings were ongoing 
in the Superior Court with respect to these charges, four 
additional cases surfaced in which it seemed, based on 
retesting, that Farak may have removed cocaine from samples that 
were submitted to the Amherst drug lab for analysis between June 
15 and October 10, 2012, and replaced at least some of the 
cocaine with a counterfeit substance.  It is not clear from the 
record why this particular evidence was selected for retesting.  
Nonetheless, it does appear that no charges were brought against 
Farak with respect to these four additional cases.  On January 
6, 2014, Farak pleaded guilty to all ten charges.8    
                     
 
8 With respect to the first count of tampering with evidence 
(Count I), Farak was sentenced to two and one-half years in a 
house of correction, with eighteen months to serve, and the 
balance suspended with probation for five years, with special 
conditions.  Farak was given the same sentence on the second and 
third counts of tampering with evidence, as well as on three 
counts of theft of a controlled substance, each sentence to run 
concurrently with the sentence on Count I.  With respect to each 
of the two counts of unlawful possession of a class B substance, 
Farak was sentenced to serve one year in a house of correction, 
each sentence to run concurrently with the sentence on Count I.  
9 
 
 
2.  Factual and procedural history.  In the spring of 2007, 
Springfield police Officer Thomas Nehmer discovered, through the 
use of a confidential informant, that the defendant was selling 
cocaine.  On May 4, 2007, based on information received from the 
informant regarding the defendant's involvement in an upcoming 
drug deal, the police established surveillance at the time and 
place of the transaction.  When the defendant arrived as 
predicted, he was secured by police and found to be in 
possession of two cellular telephones, ninety-one dollars, and 
what appeared to be approximately eight grams of cocaine.  He 
was placed under arrest and transported to the police station.  
Following a waiver of his Miranda rights, the defendant told 
officers that in his bedroom at his residence were packaging 
materials, scales, and approximately thirty grams of cocaine.  
Officer Nehmer applied for and was granted a search warrant.  
When officers searched the defendant's residence, they 
discovered fifty-eight rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, scales, 
cutting agents, and two bags containing substances that appeared 
to be cocaine and weighed approximately forty-four grams.  The 
substances were tested by Farak at the Amherst drug lab on 
                                                                  
With respect to the fourth count of tampering with evidence and 
the fourth count of theft of a controlled substance, Farak was 
sentenced to five years' probation, to run concurrently with her 
probation on the other charges.   
 
10 
 
June 8, 2007.  According to the drug certificates that she 
signed, each substance tested positive for cocaine.9  
 
On April 13, 2009, after engaging in a thorough colloquy 
with the judge and before Farak's misconduct had become known, 
the defendant pleaded guilty to trafficking in cocaine (fourteen 
to twenty-eight grams), and unlawful possession of ammunition.  
The bases for his subsequent motion to withdraw his guilty pleas 
were twofold.  First, the alleged criminal conduct by Farak at 
the Amherst drug lab rendered his guilty pleas unknowing, 
unintelligent, and involuntary.  Second, such misconduct 
constituted newly discovered evidence that cast real doubt on 
the justice of his convictions.  The judge considered each 
contention in turn.   
 
In deciding whether the defendant's pleas were knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent, the judge relied on the analysis 
articulated in Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 290 (1st 
Cir. 2006).10  He stated that a defendant seeking to set aside a 
guilty plea as involuntary must show that (1) the government or 
its agents committed some egregiously impermissible conduct that 
                     
 
9 According to the Commonwealth, the drugs seized from the 
defendant have been destroyed.    
 
 
10 At the time the judge ruled on the defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas, he did not have the benefit of our 
decision in Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336 (2014), which 
also relied on the analysis set forth in Ferrara v. United 
States, 456 F.3d 278, 290 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 
11 
 
antedated the entry of the plea, and (2) the misconduct was 
material to the defendant's choice to plead guilty.  See id.  
With regard to the first part of the inquiry, the judge 
concluded that, given Farak's role at the Amherst drug lab, she 
must be deemed to be an agent of the Commonwealth.  Next, the 
judge considered whether Farak's alleged misconduct antedated 
the defendant's guilty pleas on April 13, 2009.  The judge said 
that, although there was "powerful evidence" that Farak had 
engaged in egregiously impermissible conduct by stealing cocaine 
and replacing it with other substances, he was not persuaded 
that she was doing so at the time of the defendant's guilty 
pleas.  Therefore, the defendant failed to establish that 
Farak's misconduct antedated his guilty pleas.  Further, in the 
judge's view, the negative findings made during an October, 
2012, quality assurance audit of the Amherst drug lab were 
disconcerting, but there was no evidence that these general 
deficiencies had any bearing on the testing performed in the 
defendant's case.11  As such, the findings of the audit did not 
                     
 
11 On October 10, 2012, the State police conducted a quality 
assurance audit of the Amherst drug lab.  It was a routine 
matter in the sense that quality assurance audits are conducted 
at all State police laboratories every year, but this facility 
never had been audited.  See note 6, supra.  Among other 
purposes, the audit was designed to determine what steps the 
Amherst drug lab would have to take in order to meet 
accreditation standards required by the American Society of 
Crime Lab Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board.  The Amherst 
drug lab had not been accredited since it began operation in 
1987 and, in fact, all State police laboratories operated 
12 
 
amount to the kind of egregiously impermissible government 
conduct contemplated by the Ferrara case. 
 
The judge then considered the second part of the Ferrara 
inquiry, namely whether Farak's misconduct would have been 
material to the defendant's decision to plead guilty.  The judge 
stated that there was no evidence that the test results in this 
case were inaccurate, or that Farak was involved in any 
misconduct at the time of the defendant's guilty pleas.  
Moreover, he continued, there were good reasons for the 
defendant to accept the plea agreement.  Given the strength of 
the Commonwealth's case (including the defendant's own 
incriminating statements), the significant benefit the defendant 
received from the plea agreement, and the absence of any 
                                                                  
without accreditation prior to 2002.  The negative findings in 
the October, 2012, audit of the Amherst drug lab included the 
following:  chain of custody with respect to evidence kept in 
short-term overnight storage was not documented appropriately, 
and evidence retained in such storage was not sealed properly; 
evidence seals were initialed, but not dated, by the chemists; 
variances between weights of substances on arrival and weights 
at testing were not documented; and inventory discrepancies were 
not verified.  In addition, so-called "reagents" were not 
regularly tested, and known drug standards were not verified on 
a daily basis.  The audit team recommended steps to remediate 
each of these problems, and personnel at the Amherst drug lab 
took measures to address the negative findings.  Cathleen 
Morrison, a member of the audit team and an author of the audit 
report, testified at the evidentiary hearing, see note 5, supra, 
that the audit did not raise any questions regarding the 
reliability of the testing performed at the Amherst drug lab.  
The judge concluded that, although the negative findings in the 
audit "reflect[ed] a lax atmosphere in which theft of controlled 
substances could go undetected for a period of time, the audit 
did not reveal any unreliable testing."   
 
13 
 
evidence that Farak's misconduct affected the drug testing in 
the defendant's case, the judge concluded that Farak's 
misconduct would not have been material to the defendant's 
decision to plead guilty, even if such misconduct had antedated 
the defendant's pleas.  The judge also found that the negative 
audit of the Amherst drug lab failed to satisfy the threshold of 
materiality required to invalidate the defendant's guilty pleas.  
Accordingly, based on the totality of the circumstances, the 
judge concluded that the defendant had failed to establish that 
his guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily made.   
 
Finally, the judge considered whether Farak's misconduct at 
the Amherst drug lab constituted newly discovered exculpatory 
evidence that cast real doubt on the justice of the defendant's 
convictions.  The judge first determined that there was no 
evidence that the defendant or his attorney was aware of Farak's 
misconduct or the negative audit, or that either reasonably 
could have been discovered at the time of the defendant's pleas.  
Therefore, the judge continued, the evidence of Farak's 
misconduct, in particular, and the administrative problems at 
the Amherst drug lab, in general, qualified as "newly 
discovered."  However, for all of the reasons he already had 
articulated, the judge stated that this newly discovered 
evidence was "not sufficiently weighty, potent, or pertinent to 
14 
 
the fundamental issues of this case to be worthy of 
consideration at a new trial."   
 
3.  Standard of review.  A motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
is treated as a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 30 (b).  Commonwealth v. Furr, 454 Mass. 101, 106 
(2009).  "Under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), a judge may grant a 
motion for a new trial any time it appears that justice may not 
have been done.  A motion for a new trial is thus committed to 
the sound discretion of the judge."  Scott, 467 Mass. at 344.  
We review the allowance or denial of a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea to determine whether the judge abused that 
discretion or committed a significant error of law.  Id.  We 
accept the judge's findings of fact if they are supported by the 
evidence, because the judge who heard the witnesses testify is 
the "final arbiter [on] matters of credibility."  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Schand, 420 Mass. 783, 787 (1995). 
 
4.  Discussion.  Due process requires that a plea of guilty 
be accepted only where "the contemporaneous record contains an 
affirmative showing that the defendant's plea was intelligently 
and voluntarily made."  Furr, 454 Mass. at 106, citing Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and Commonwealth v. Foster, 368 
Mass. 100, 102 (1975).  "A guilty plea is intelligent if it is 
tendered with knowledge of the elements of the charges against 
the defendant and the procedural protections waived by entry of 
15 
 
a guilty plea."  Scott, 467 Mass. at 345.  See Commonwealth v. 
Duest, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 623, 630-631 (1991).  "A guilty plea is 
voluntary so long as it is tendered free from coercion, duress, 
or improper inducements."  Scott, supra.  Typically, a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea will allege a facial defect in the plea 
procedures, but a guilty plea "also may be vacated as 
involuntary because of external circumstances or information 
that later comes to light."  Id., and cases cited. 
 
We begin by reviewing the framework for analyzing the 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  In Ferrara, 
456 F.3d at 280, 284, 290-293, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit analyzed whether blatant 
misconduct by the government, discovered more than ten years 
after entry of the defendant's guilty plea, could render such 
plea involuntary.  The prosecutor in Ferrara deliberately 
manipulated a key witness, failed to disclose exculpatory 
evidence, and affirmatively misrepresented the nature of the 
witness's planned testimony.  Id. at 291-293.  The court 
concluded that when a defendant seeks to vacate a guilty plea as 
a result of underlying government misconduct, rather than a 
defect in the plea procedures, the defendant must show both that 
"egregiously impermissible conduct . . . by government agents 
. . . antedated the entry of his plea," and that "the misconduct 
influenced his decision to plead guilty or, put another way, 
16 
 
that it was material to that choice."  Id. at 290.  Relying on 
Ferrara, this court articulated in Scott, 467 Mass. at 346-358, 
a two-prong framework for analyzing a defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) in a 
case involving the misconduct of Annie Dookhan, a chemist at the 
William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute's forensic drug 
laboratory (Hinton drug lab) from 2003 to 2012.  Under the first 
prong of the analysis, a defendant must show egregious 
misconduct by the government that preceded the entry of the 
defendant's guilty plea and that occurred in the defendant's 
case.  Id. at 347-354.  Under the second prong of the analysis, 
a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that he or 
she would not have pleaded guilty had he or she known of the 
government misconduct.  Id. at 354-358. 
 
We recognized in Scott that, given the breadth and duration 
of Dookhan's malfeasance, it might be impossible for a defendant 
to show the required nexus between the government misconduct and 
the defendant's own case.  Scott, 467 Mass. at 351-352.  
Dookhan's "insidious" misconduct, "which belie[d] 
reconstruction, [was] a lapse of systemic magnitude in the 
criminal justice system."  Id. at 352.  Consequently, we 
established a special evidentiary rule whereby a defendant 
seeking to vacate a guilty plea under rule 30 (b) as a result of 
the revelation of Dookhan's misconduct, and proffering a drug 
17 
 
certificate from the defendant's case signed by Dookhan on the 
line labeled "Assistant Analyst," would be entitled to "a 
conclusive presumption that egregious government misconduct 
occurred in the defendant's case."  Id.  Application of this 
conclusive presumption in a particular case meant that a 
defendant's evidentiary burden to establish each element of the 
first prong of the Ferrara-Scott framework was satisfied.  Id. 
at 353-354.  We emphasized in Scott that this special 
evidentiary rule is unique in that it is "a remedy dictated by 
the particular circumstances surrounding Dookhan's misconduct as 
a chemist at the Hinton drug lab and is intended to apply only 
to this narrow class of cases in which a defendant seeks to 
withdraw his or her guilty plea after having learned of 
Dookhan's misconduct."  Id.  Further, we stated that "[s]hould 
the Ferrara analysis be applied in the case of a motion for a 
new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) that does not arise 
from the investigation of Dookhan, the defendant will have the 
burden to establish each element of the first prong of Ferrara, 
and the adequacy of the defendant's showing will be committed to 
the sound discretion of the motion judge" (emphasis added).  Id. 
at 354. 
 
a.  Prong one of the Ferrara-Scott analysis:  egregious 
misconduct by the government in the defendant's case.  In the 
present appeal, the defendant contends that Farak's misconduct 
18 
 
at the Amherst drug lab was egregious, and that Farak was a 
government agent such that her misconduct is attributable to the 
Commonwealth.  Moreover, in the defendant's view, Farak's 
misconduct was systemic in magnitude.  As a consequence, the 
defendant argues, he was entitled to the conclusive presumption 
articulated in Scott, 467 Mass. at 352-353, and, therefore, he 
was not required to prove that such misconduct occurred in his 
own case.  The defendant asserts that even if this court does 
not apply the conclusive presumption, it still should determine 
that, because there was direct and circumstantial evidence 
suggesting that Farak's misconduct antedated the entry of his 
guilty pleas, misconduct must have occurred in his case.  Given 
all of these circumstances, the defendant contends that the 
discovery of Farak's egregious misconduct after he had tendered 
his guilty pleas rendered those pleas unknowing, unintelligent, 
and involuntary.  As such, the defendant continues, the judge 
abused his discretion in denying the defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas.12  We agree with the defendant that 
                     
 
12 In Scott, the defendant argued that "relief [might] be 
available to him under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963), as a result of the prosecution's failure to disclose the 
potentially exculpatory evidence of Dookhan's misconduct to the 
defendant prior to his guilty plea."  Scott, 467 Mass. at 346 
n.5.  In the present case, the defendant has not raised such an 
argument, presumably because evidence of misconduct by Farak had 
not yet come to light at the time the defendant pleaded guilty 
on April 13, 2009.  As such, there was nothing for the 
Commonwealth to disclose. 
 
19 
 
Farak's misconduct was egregious and that it is attributable to 
the Commonwealth.  However, based on the evidence of her 
misconduct that has been uncovered thus far, we disagree with 
the defendant that he is entitled to the conclusive presumption 
articulated in Scott, or, alternatively, that he has shown that 
Farak's malfeasance antedated the entry of his guilty pleas.  
Nonetheless, given the absence of a thorough investigation into 
the matter by the Commonwealth, and the cloud that overshadows 
the integrity of drug analyses performed by Farak at the Amherst 
drug lab, we conclude that the defendant is entitled to a 
measure of relief, as will be described.  We turn to the 
Ferrara-Scott framework. 
 
i.  Egregious misconduct.  On January 6, 2014, Farak 
pleaded guilty to, among other offenses, four counts of 
tampering with evidence at the Amherst drug lab and four counts 
of stealing cocaine from that facility.  There is no dispute 
between the parties that this constituted "egregious misconduct" 
by Farak.  She was entrusted with analyzing purported drug 
samples, signing drug certificates that identified and set forth 
the precise weight of each sample, and testifying to the results 
of her analyses.  By tampering with evidence, Farak cast serious 
doubt on the integrity of this entire process.  Her misconduct 
could render a defendant's guilty plea involuntary by wholly 
undermining the evidentiary foundation of the Commonwealth's 
20 
 
case.  We conclude that Farak's misconduct constitutes the type 
of egregious misconduct that satisfies the first element of the 
first prong of the Ferrara-Scott analysis.  See Scott, 467 Mass. 
at 347-348.  See also Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 290-293. 
 
ii.  By the government.  The defendant contends that 
because Farak was a government agent, her misconduct is 
attributable to the Commonwealth.  In contrast, the Commonwealth 
argues that Farak's misconduct, while egregious, was an 
individual unlawful scheme and, as such, should not be 
attributable to the Commonwealth.  We agree with the defendant's 
position. 
 
In Scott, 467 Mass. at 348-350, we considered various 
circumstances where actions by a range of government agents 
might constitute misconduct "by the government" that could 
render a defendant's guilty plea involuntary.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 467 (4th Cir. 2013) (law 
enforcement officer's conduct in lying in search warrant 
affidavit in defendant's case, regardless of prosecutor's lack 
of actual knowledge of officer's wrongdoing, constituted 
impermissible government conduct).  In the related context of a 
prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the 
defense, we pointed out that, generally speaking, "the 
prosecutor's duty does not extend beyond information held by 
'agents of the prosecution team,'" Scott, supra at 349, quoting 
21 
 
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 451 Mass. 451, 454 (2008), but that 
"individuals other than prosecutors and police may be considered 
agents of the prosecution team."  Scott, supra.  See 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 427 Mass. 816, 824 (1998) (prosecutor's 
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence extends to information in 
possession of chemist at State police crime laboratory who "has 
participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and 
has reported to the prosecutor's office concerning the case"); 
Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 659, 679 (1998) (medical 
examiner considered to be agent of Commonwealth).  We concluded 
in Scott that Dookhan, in her role as a chemist at the Hinton 
drug lab, was an agent of the Commonwealth whose misconduct was 
attributable to the government for the limited purposes of the 
Ferrara analysis.  Scott, 467 Mass. at 349-350.  Significantly, 
it appeared from the record that Dookhan had engaged in 
egregious misconduct "to further what she perceived to be the 
mission of the Commonwealth" -- getting criminals off the 
streets -- and not to further her own "individual unlawful 
scheme."  Id. at 350, quoting Commonwealth v. Waters, 410 Mass. 
224, 230 (1991).  Contrast Commonwealth v. Campiti, 41 Mass. 
App. Ct. 43, 65-66 (1996) (defendant not entitled to new trial 
where State police officer involved in investigation of 
defendant embezzled money from district attorney's office to 
22 
 
support gambling habit, but where such activity did not taint 
voluminous evidence against defendant). 
 
Farak, like Dookhan, was an agent of the prosecution team, 
given that, where she was the analyst for a purported drug 
sample recovered from a defendant, she "participated in the 
investigation or evaluation of the case" and "reported to the 
prosecutor's office concerning the case."  Scott, supra at 349, 
quoting Martin, 427 Mass. at 824.  In addition, Farak was 
"expected to testify as [an] expert witness[] regarding the 
testing of samples in various criminal prosecutions."  Scott, 
supra at 350.  Admittedly, it appears from the record that Farak 
was tampering with evidence at the Amherst drug lab in order to 
support her own cocaine habit.  Nonetheless, the effect of her 
misconduct was to raise serious questions about the integrity of 
her work on behalf of the Commonwealth.  With respect to at 
least eight known cases, it seems apparent that Farak's actions 
tainted the drug analysis process which, in turn, raises 
concerns about the reliability of her analyses in other cases 
where she was the assistant analyst.  Such malfeasance goes 
right to the heart of the Commonwealth's ability to convict a 
defendant in a drug case and, therefore, is directly related to 
"the Commonwealth's interest in law enforcement."  Waters, 410 
Mass. at 230.  Farak's misconduct was not merely an "individual 
unlawful scheme," id., and, as such, is attributable to the 
23 
 
Commonwealth.  The defendant has satisfied the second element of 
the first prong of the Ferrara-Scott analysis.  See Scott, 467 
Mass. at 348-350.  See also Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 290-293. 
 
iii.  In the defendant's case.  Finally, the third element 
of the first prong of the Ferrara-Scott analysis requires the 
defendant to show that egregious misconduct by Farak antedated 
the entry of his guilty pleas and occurred in his own case.  See 
Scott, supra at 350-354.  See also Ferrara, supra at 290.  The 
defendant asserts that he was entitled to the conclusive 
presumption articulated in Scott, supra at 352-353, and, 
therefore, he was not required to prove that Farak's misconduct 
occurred in his case.  Further, the defendant continues, even if 
this court does not apply the conclusive presumption, it still 
should determine that, because there was both direct and 
circumstantial evidence suggesting that Farak's misconduct 
antedated the entry of his guilty pleas, misconduct must have 
occurred in his case.  We conclude that the evidence on which 
the defendant relies is not sufficient, at this juncture, to 
establish either that Farak's misconduct constituted a systemic 
problem warranting application of the conclusive presumption, or 
that her misconduct antedated the entry of the defendant's 
guilty pleas. 
 
In Scott, we determined that "furnishing a drug certificate 
signed by Dookhan as a primary or secondary chemist in the 
24 
 
defendant's case [was] sufficient to establish the requisite 
nexus between the defendant's case and Dookhan's misconduct."  
Scott, 467 Mass. at 354.  Our bases for establishing a 
conclusive presumption that "egregious government misconduct 
occurred in the defendant's case" were our reasonable certainty 
that Dookhan's misconduct "touched a great number of cases," and 
that it was a "lapse of systemic magnitude in the criminal 
justice system" that "belie[d] reconstruction."  Id. at 352.  In 
the present case, no such reasonable certainty exists. 
 
Unlike the circumstances in Scott where the State police 
detective unit of the Attorney General's office conducted a 
broad formal investigation into Dookhan and her practices at the 
Hinton drug lab, see Scott, 467 Mass. at 339, the Commonwealth's 
investigation into the timing and scope of Farak's misconduct 
has been cursory at best.  Nonetheless, based on the record 
before us, only eight cases thus far have surfaced in which it 
appears that Farak tampered with evidence at the Amherst drug 
lab, beginning perhaps in the summer of 201213 and continuing 
                     
 
13 The motion judge was not persuaded that it was reasonable 
to infer from Farak's possession of the newspaper articles that 
were printed in the fall of 2011, see note 7, supra, that she 
was stealing controlled substances at that time.  We conclude 
that the judge did not abuse his discretion in making this 
determination. 
 
25 
 
until January, 2013.14  It goes without saying that eight cases 
are eight cases too many.  However, the scope of Farak's 
misconduct does not appear to be, at this point in time, 
comparable to the enormity of Dookhan's misconduct at the Hinton 
drug lab.  Among other wrongdoing, Dookhan admitted to "dry 
labbing," contaminating drug samples (including converting 
negative samples into positive samples), removing drug samples 
from the lab's evidence locker in violation of protocol, failing 
to verify the proper functioning of lab equipment, and 
falsifying reports to hide her misconduct.  See Scott, supra at 
339-341.  In addition, Dookhan "acknowledged to investigators 
that she [might] not be able to identify those cases in which 
she tested the samples properly and those in which she did not," 
id. at 339, rendering it virtually impossible to ascertain the 
full extent of Dookhan's misconduct during her tenure at the 
Hinton drug lab, which spanned approximately ten years.  There 
is no indication on the record before us that Farak's misconduct 
presents a comparable situation.  Therefore, the defendant is 
not entitled to the benefit of the conclusive presumption 
articulated in Scott, supra at 352-353, that egregious 
misconduct by Farak occurred in his case. 
                     
 
14 As far as we can tell, Farak has not provided any details 
concerning the timing and scope of her misconduct, apart from 
pleading guilty to the ten indictments.   
 
26 
 
 
That said, the systemic nature of Dookhan's misconduct only 
came to light following a thorough investigation of the Hinton 
drug lab by the State police detective unit of the Attorney 
General's office.  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 339-341.  As far as 
we are able to discern, no such investigation of the Amherst 
drug lab has occurred.  In another case decided today concerning 
Farak's misconduct at that facility, Commonwealth v. Ware, 
ante    ,     (2015), we stated that "the Commonwealth ha[s] a 
duty to conduct a thorough investigation to determine the nature 
and extent of [Farak's] misconduct, and its effect both on 
pending cases and on cases in which defendants already had been 
convicted of crimes involving controlled substances that Farak 
had analyzed."  The Commonwealth's obligation to conduct an 
investigation is premised on a prosecutor's "duty to learn of 
and disclose to a defendant any exculpatory evidence that is 
'held by agents of the prosecution team,'" who include chemists 
working in State drug laboratories.  Id., quoting Commonwealth 
v. Beal, 429 Mass. 530, 532 (1999).  It is incumbent on the 
Commonwealth to perform this duty in a timely fashion.  The 
burden of ascertaining whether Farak's misconduct at the Amherst 
drug lab has created a problem of systemic proportions is not 
one that should be shouldered by defendants in drug cases.  See 
generally Scott, supra at 353.  At the same time, given what we 
know, we have no basis for concluding in the present case that 
27 
 
Farak's misconduct is a "lapse of systemic magnitude in the 
criminal justice system."  Id. at 352. 
 
In a related vein, when considering the nexus between the 
government misconduct and the defendant's case, we agree with 
the motion judge that, although there is compelling evidence 
that Farak was stealing cocaine and replacing it with 
counterfeit substances, the defendant has not shown that Farak's 
misconduct antedated the entry of his guilty pleas and, 
therefore, must have occurred in his case.  Farak analyzed the 
drugs in the defendant's case on June 8, 2007.  The defendant 
pleaded guilty to trafficking in cocaine (fourteen to twenty-
eight grams) and unlawful possession of ammunition on April 13, 
2009.  Farak was arrested on January 19, 2013, for misconduct 
that was alleged to have occurred the previous day.  The judge 
stated that powerful circumstantial evidence suggested that this 
was not the first time that Farak had tampered with drug samples 
at the Amherst drug lab.  The judge pointed out that the 
retesting of a small number of drug samples that originally had 
been analyzed by Farak indicated that she was tampering with 
evidence during the summer of 2012.  Moreover, during the fall 
of 2012, Farak's coworkers began to observe a change in her 
behavior, including frequent unexplained absences from her work 
station and a decrease in productivity.  From these facts and 
all of the physical evidence seized in connection with the 
28 
 
criminal investigation of Farak, the judge concluded that 
Farak's misconduct postdated the defendant's guilty pleas by 
almost three years.    
 
The defendant contends that the judge abused his discretion 
by not considering "strong circumstantial evidence of 
malfeasance" by Farak dating back to the start of her tenure as 
an analyst, suggesting a prolonged period of wrongdoing.  The 
defendant posits that Farak must have engaged in misconduct 
while she was working at the Hinton drug lab from the summer of 
2003 until the summer of 2004, see note 1, supra, because her 
high volume of drug testing rivaled that of Dookhan, who 
admitted to "dry labbing."  The defendant has offered no 
supporting evidence to substantiate this claim, and, in our 
view, it is wholly speculative.  With respect to Farak's work at 
the Amherst drug lab, her supervisor testified at the 
evidentiary hearing, see note 5, supra, that Farak's 
productivity was comparable to that of her colleague in the lab.  
The defendant also claims that there was evidence that Farak 
used cocaine in 2000.  Even if that were true, it does not 
support an inference that Farak must have been tampering with 
evidence in the Amherst drug lab prior to April 13, 2009.  We 
conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
determining that the defendant failed to show that egregious 
29 
 
misconduct by Farak antedated the entry of his guilty pleas and, 
therefore, must have occurred in his case.15   
 
Based on the Ferrara-Scott framework for reviewing a 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, the defendant 
here has not satisfied his burden of establishing each element 
of the first prong of the analysis.  That said, it is clear from 
the record that Farak engaged in egregious misconduct at the 
Amherst drug lab, and that any deficiencies in the evidence as 
                     
 
15 The defendant also directs our attention to other 
purported evidence of likely tampering that, in his view, 
demonstrates that Farak was engaged in misconduct at the Amherst 
drug lab long before the summer of 2012.  In the so-called Finch 
and Espinosa cases, a Springfield police detective on March 17, 
2012, submitted suspected Oxycodone pills to the Amherst drug 
lab for testing, but, after analysis, Farak concluded that the 
pills did not contain any controlled substances.  In 
Commonwealth vs. Berube, Hampden Super. Ct., No. 2011-00355 
(Oct. 30, 2013), a Springfield police officer testified that not 
all of the controlled substances presented at the trial were in 
the same condition as when the officer had seized them.  Farak 
analyzed the substances in that case on May 12, 2011.  
Similarly, in Commonwealth vs. Carter, Hampden Super. Ct., No. 
2010-00115 (Nov. 15, 2013), the evidence presented at the trial 
(whitish pills) appeared to be different from the evidence that 
was seized by the police (blue pills).  Farak analyzed the 
substances in that case on December 17, 2009.  Finally, 
photocopies of three newspaper articles about individuals who 
had been investigated, charged, or sentenced for the illegal 
possession or theft of controlled substances had been printed 
from a computer in the fall of 2011 and were found in Farak's 
vehicle.  See note 7, supra.  Farak tested the substances in the 
defendant's case on June 8, 2007.  Given that the defendant 
pleaded guilty on April 13, 2009, and that all of this purported 
evidence relates to activities that occurred thereafter, it does 
not support the defendant's contention that Farak's misconduct 
antedated the entry of his guilty pleas, which is the relevant 
inquiry under the Ferrara-Scott framework.  See Scott, 467 Mass. 
at 350-354.  See also Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 290. 
 
30 
 
to the scope and timing of her misconduct are attributable to 
the Commonwealth in light of its failure to conduct a thorough 
investigation of the matter.  Therefore, "it is incumbent upon 
us to exercise our superintendence power to fashion a workable 
approach" for giving defendants whose evidence samples were 
analyzed by Farak at the Amherst drug lab an opportunity to 
discover whether, in fact, their cases were affected by her 
misconduct.  Scott, 467 Mass. at 352.  Clearly, the scope of 
Farak's misconduct was wider than the ten charges to which she 
pleaded guilty, given that at least four additional cases have 
surfaced in which it appears that she tampered with evidence, 
but with respect to which no charges were filed. 
 
In the absence of a thorough investigation by the 
Commonwealth into Farak's misconduct, we conclude that the 
following procedures should be implemented.  In cases where a 
defendant seeks to vacate a guilty plea under Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (b) as a result of the revelation of Farak's misconduct at 
the Amherst drug lab, where the defendant proffers a drug 
certificate from the defendant's case signed by Farak on the 
line labeled "Assistant Analyst," and where the drug samples 
have not yet been destroyed, the defendant is entitled to retest 
those samples.  Drug samples that are part of a defendant's case 
are "tangible objects" subject to mandatory discovery under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (vii), as amended, 442 Mass. 
31 
 
1518 (2004).  See Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Mass. 857, 870-
871 (2010) ("The Commonwealth's responsibility to provide 
discovery to the defendant extends to material in its 
possession, custody, or control, and includes information in the 
possession of persons who have participated in the investigation 
or evaluation of the case and who report to the prosecutor's 
office concerning the case").  Cf. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 444 
Mass. 786, 795 (2005) (defendant has "unquestioned right, under 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, to obtain 
relevant evidence that bears on the question of his guilt or 
innocence or which otherwise will help his defense").  By such 
retesting, a defendant can ascertain definitively whether Farak 
tampered with the drug samples that were used to convict, 
thereby establishing the requisite "nexus between the government 
misconduct and the defendant's own case."16  Scott, 467 Mass. at 
351. 
 
More problematic are those cases, like the present one, 
where a defendant seeks to vacate a guilty plea under rule 
30 (b) as a result of the revelation of Farak's misconduct, but 
the defendant's drug samples have been destroyed.  See note 9, 
                     
 
16 General Laws c. 94C, § 47A, requires the Commonwealth to 
obtain a court order each and every time it wishes to destroy 
narcotics evidence.  Trial judges should be very cautious in 
allowing motions to destroy such evidence where the narcotics 
have been analyzed at the Amherst drug lab. 
 
32 
 
supra.  It is imperative that the Commonwealth thoroughly 
investigate the timing and scope of Farak's misconduct at the 
Amherst drug lab in order to remove the cloud that has been cast 
over the integrity of the work performed at that facility, which 
has serious implications for the entire criminal justice system.  
Within one month of the issuance of this opinion, the 
Commonwealth shall notify the judge below whether it intends to 
undertake such an investigation.  If so, the investigation shall 
begin promptly and shall be completed in an expeditious manner. 
 
As just stated, in our view, a thorough and timely 
investigation would be the appropriate course to follow in the 
circumstances.  In the absence of such an investigation, 
however, and where an individual defendant's drug samples have 
been destroyed, the judge, among other options, may entertain 
discovery motions to retest randomly selected drug samples that 
were tested by Farak and are still in existence in an effort to 
determine whether evidence of tampering can be identified and to 
establish the time frame of Farak's misconduct.  The results of 
the Commonwealth's investigation, or the evidence that can be 
gleaned from retesting, will dictate how the judge shall 
proceed, and we leave that matter to the judge's discretion. 
 
We reiterate that under the first prong of the Ferrara-
Scott analysis, a defendant must show egregious misconduct by 
the government that preceded the entry of the defendant's guilty 
33 
 
pleas, and occurred in the defendant's case.  See Scott, 467 
Mass. at 347-354.  See also Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 290.  In the 
absence of evidence suggesting a problem of systemic magnitude 
at the Amherst drug lab, but nonetheless indicating a serious 
problem of undefined proportions, we afford the defendant here, 
and others in a similar position, the opportunity to show, 
through the retesting of drug samples, that Farak's misconduct 
preceded the entry of his guilty pleas and occurred in his own 
case.  Satisfaction of the first prong of the Ferrara-Scott 
analysis is not, however, the end of the judge's inquiry 
regarding whether to allow the defendant's motion to withdraw 
his guilty pleas under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b).  We turn now to 
the second prong of the Ferrara-Scott analysis. 
 
b.  Prong two of the Ferrara-Scott analysis:  material 
influence on the defendant's decision to plead guilty.  The 
defendant contends that the judge erred in determining that, 
even if Farak's misconduct had antedated the defendant's guilty 
pleas, he still would have entered into the plea agreement.  In 
the defendant's view, the judge wholly minimized the scope of 
Farak's misconduct and, as a consequence, improperly assessed 
its impact on the defendant's decision whether to plead guilty 
or go to trial.  The Commonwealth acknowledges that the judge 
denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in 
significant part because there was no evidence that the drug 
34 
 
analyses in the defendant's case were inaccurate, or that Farak 
was involved in misconduct at the time the defendant pleaded 
guilty.  Notwithstanding evidence of misconduct by Farak, the 
Commonwealth contends that there were good reasons for the 
defendant to accept the plea agreement, including the strength 
of the Commonwealth's case (including the defendant's own 
incriminating statements), and the significant concessions made 
by the Commonwealth regarding the charges and defendant's 
sentence.   
 
In Scott, 467 Mass. at 354, this court pointed out that 
satisfaction of the first prong of the Ferrara analysis did not 
"relieve the defendant of his burden under the second Ferrara 
prong to particularize Dookhan's misconduct to his decision to 
tender a guilty plea."  See Commonwealth v. Chatman, 466 Mass. 
327, 333 (2013) ("The defendant has the burden of proving facts 
upon which he relies in support of his motion for a new trial"); 
Commonwealth v. Lewin, 405 Mass. 566, 584-585 (1989) (charges 
against defendant need not be dismissed where police misconduct 
was egregious but not prejudicial to fair trial).  The same 
principle is applicable here with respect to Farak's misconduct.  
"[E]vidence of the circumstances surrounding [a] defendant's 
decision to tender a guilty plea should be well within the 
defendant's reach."  Scott, supra at 354 n.11.  Accordingly, 
under the second prong of the Ferrara-Scott framework, "the 
35 
 
defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that he 
would not have pleaded guilty had he known of [Farak's] 
misconduct."  Scott, supra at 354-355.  See Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 
290, 294.  This court identified in Scott a number of factors 
that might be relevant to a defendant's showing under this 
second prong of analysis.  See Scott, supra at 355-356.  We 
emphasized in that case that "the full context of the 
defendant's decision to enter a plea agreement will dictate the 
assessment of his claim that knowledge of Dookhan's misconduct 
would have influenced the defendant's decision to plead guilty."  
Id. at 357.  See Ferrara, supra at 294.  Here, the same analysis 
is applicable. 
 
We recognize that the motion judge considered whether the 
defendant would have pleaded guilty even if Farak's misconduct 
had antedated his guilty pleas.  However, the judge did so 
without the benefit of our opinion in Scott, and without our 
assessment of the potential implications of the Commonwealth's 
cursory investigation of Farak's misconduct at the Amherst drug 
lab.  In significant part, the judge determined that Farak's 
misconduct would not have materially influenced the defendant's 
decision to plead guilty because there was no evidence that the 
drug analyses in the defendant's case were inaccurate, or that 
Farak was tampering with evidence at the time the defendant 
tendered his guilty pleas.  Given the absence of a thorough 
36 
 
investigation by the Commonwealth into Farak's misconduct, we 
cannot ascertain whether the foundation for the judge's 
resolution of this issue is solid.  Therefore, following his 
resolution of the first prong of the Ferrara-Scott analysis, the 
judge should reconsider the second prong of that analysis "to 
determine whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the 
defendant can demonstrate a reasonable probability that had he 
known of [Farak's] misconduct, he would not have [pleaded 
guilty] and would have insisted on taking his chances at trial."  
Scott, 467 Mass. at 358. 
 
c.  Subpoena to establish scope and timing of Farak's 
misconduct.  In an effort to develop the facts necessary to 
establish the timing and scope of Farak's misconduct, the 
defendant subpoenaed Farak's spouse, Nikki Lee, to testify at 
the evidentiary hearing.  See note 5, supra.  The defendant 
wanted to show that Farak had a history of cocaine use dating 
back to 2000, and he sought to question Lee about Farak's drug 
use before and during her employment at the Amherst drug lab.  
Lee's testimony, in the defendant's view, would be highly 
probative of when Farak became motivated to tamper with 
evidence.  In response, Lee filed a notice of her intent to 
invoke her privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as well as spousal 
37 
 
privilege under G. L. c. 233, § 20, Second.17  Construing Lee's 
notice of her intent to invoke certain privileges as a motion to 
quash the subpoena, the judge allowed the motion on the basis of 
spousal privilege.   
 
On appeal, the defendant contends that the judge erred in 
quashing the subpoena because the evidentiary hearing was not a 
criminal proceeding against Farak and, therefore, the spousal 
privilege was inapplicable.  The propriety of asserting a 
testimonial privilege is a matter of statutory interpretation, 
presenting a pure question of law that is subject to de novo 
review.  See Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 447 Mass. 88, 90 
(2006).  See also Bridgewater State Univ. Found. v. Assessors of 
Bridgewater, 463 Mass. 154, 156 (2012).  Based on our review, we 
agree with the defendant that the spousal privilege was not 
applicable in the circumstances of this case.  However, we 
affirm the judge's decision on other grounds.  See Commonwealth 
                     
 
17 In her notice of intent to invoke certain privileges, 
Nikki Lee also asked that she be excused from testifying at the 
evidentiary hearing because, among other reasons, her sworn 
testimony before the State grand jury investigating Farak's 
misconduct at the Amherst drug lab already had been provided to 
the defendant.  Lee testified before the grand jury that she had 
tried cocaine, and that she had observed Farak using cocaine in 
2000, although not since that time.  We note that the spousal 
privilege set forth in G. L. c. 233, § 20, Second, cannot be 
invoked in proceedings before a grand jury.  See Matter of a 
Grand Jury Subpoena, 447 Mass. 88, 99 (2006).  A spouse who 
testifies before a grand jury will not be deemed to have waived 
the spousal privilege at a later proceeding because "if there is 
no privilege not to testify before a grand jury, then no 
privilege has been waived by giving such testimony."  Id. at 98. 
 
38 
 
v. Va Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102 (1997) ("An appellate court is 
free to affirm a ruling on grounds different from those relied 
on by the motion judge if the correct or preferred basis for 
affirmance is supported by the record and the findings"). 
 
General Laws c. 233, § 20, Second, provides (with certain 
exceptions not relevant here):  "[N]either husband nor wife 
shall be compelled to testify in the trial of an indictment, 
complaint or other criminal proceeding against the other."  See 
Mass. G. Evid. § 504(a) (2014).  "The purpose of the spousal 
privilege is to protect the relationship of marriage from the 
potential harm of one spouse giving adverse testimony against 
the other."  Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 457 Mass. 858, 869 
(2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1494 (2011).  See Matter of a 
Grand Jury Subpoena, 447 Mass. at 96.  Because "[t]estimonial 
privileges 'are exceptions to the general duty imposed on all 
people to testify,'" they "must be strictly construed."  Three 
Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 359 (1983), cert. 
denied sub nom. Keefe v. Massachusetts, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 387 Mass. 1, 5 (1982).  See 
Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, supra at 90.  
 
When considering the meaning of a testimonial privilege, 
"we look first and foremost to the language of the statute as a 
whole."  Id.  Generally speaking, the spousal privilege applies 
to testimony that would be given by one spouse in a criminal 
39 
 
trial against the other spouse.18  See id. at 90-93.  Here, Lee 
would not be testifying at a criminal trial against Farak.  
Rather, the defendant sought her testimony at an evidentiary 
hearing pertaining to postconviction motions filed by fifteen 
defendants who claimed that alleged criminal conduct by Farak 
rendered their guilty pleas to various drug charges unknowing, 
unintelligent, and involuntary.  See note 5, supra.  Lee's 
testimony at such a proceeding cannot be barred by invocation of 
the spousal privilege under G. L. c. 233, § 20, Second.  
Accordingly, the judge erred in quashing the defendant's 
subpoena on this basis. 
 
That said, based on our review of the record, the judge 
properly could have quashed the defendant's subpoena on the 
basis of Lee's invocation of her privilege against self-
incrimination.19  "The proscription of the Fifth Amendment that 
                     
 
18 In Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 447 Mass. at 99, this 
court did not decide "whether, or to what extent, the spousal 
privilege may be invoked in pretrial (or posttrial) 
proceedings."  Given that the evidentiary hearing at issue in 
the present case was not a pretrial proceeding against Farak, we 
do not consider the scope of the spousal privilege beyond the 
plain language of the statute, which resolves the matter at 
hand. 
 
 
19 Lee's testimony before the grand jury did not constitute 
a waiver of her privilege against self-incrimination with regard 
to the evidentiary hearing.  "The waiver [of a testimonial 
privilege], once made, waives the privilege only with respect to 
the same proceeding; the witness may once again invoke the 
privilege in any subsequent proceeding."  Commonwealth v. King, 
436 Mass. 252, 258 n.6 (2002).  See generally Commonwealth v. 
40 
 
'[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself' may be invoked whenever a witness 
reasonably believes that the testimony could be used in a 
criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might 
be so used."  Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 827, 832 (2009), 
citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-445 (1972).  
See Commonwealth v. Baker, 348 Mass. 60, 62-63 (1964).  Because 
the privilege against self-incrimination is a "fundamental 
principle" of our judicial system, it "is to be construed 
liberally in favor of" the person claiming it.  Commonwealth v. 
Borans, 388 Mass. 453, 455 (1983).  "A witness may refuse to 
testify unless it is 'perfectly clear, from a careful 
consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the 
witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have 
such tendency' to incriminate (emphasis in original)."  
Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 289 (1979), quoting 
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951). 
 
By subpoenaing Lee, the defendant sought to elicit 
testimony at the evidentiary hearing regarding Farak's cocaine 
use before and during her employment at the Amherst drug lab.  
During her testimony before the grand jury, Lee stated that she 
herself had tried cocaine, that she had observed Farak using 
                                                                  
Martin, 423 Mass. 496, 500-501 (1996) (discussing so-called 
"waiver by testimony" rule). 
 
41 
 
cocaine in 2000, and that she had marijuana in her house when 
police officers arrived to search the premises as part of their 
investigation of Farak.20  To the extent that Lee testified about 
her own drug possession in relation to that of Farak, it is not 
"perfectly clear" that such testimony could not possibly have 
the tendency to incriminate Lee and subject her to criminal 
prosecution.  Therefore, Lee's invocation of her privilege 
against self-incrimination would have been a proper basis for 
the judge to quash the defendant's subpoena. 
 
5.  Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (b) is vacated, and we remand this case for further 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.  
                     
 
20 The enactment of G. L. c. 94C, § 32L, inserted by St. 
2008, c. 387, § 2, decriminalized only the possession of one 
ounce or less of marijuana.  A defendant still may be criminally 
charged with possession of more than one ounce of marijuana.  
See G. L. c. 94C, § 32L, third par.; Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
464 Mass. 758, 762 (2013).  Similarly, a defendant may be 
criminally charged with possession with intent to distribute 
marijuana, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a), even where 
the amount of marijuana possessed is one ounce or less.  See 
Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 508 (2012).