Case Title: State v. Moyer

Citation: 

Docket Number: S056990

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  April 29, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
THOMAS PAUL MOYER,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 0409-35104; CA A128796 (Control))
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
VANESSA COLLEEN STURGEON,
aka Vanessa Sturgeon, aka Vanessa Colleen Kassab,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 0409-35105; CA A128797)
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
SONJA R. TUNE,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 0409-35106; CA A128798)
(SC S056990)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 18, 2009.
Ronald H. Hoevet,
Hoevet, Boise & Olson P.C., Portland, argued the cause for petitioner on
review Vanessa Colleen Sturgeon.  With him on the joint briefs were Michael T.
Garone and David Axelrod, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, P.C., Portland; and
Janet Lee Hoffman and Shannon Riordan, Hoffman Angeli, LLP, Portland.
Erika L. Hadlock,
Deputy Solicitor General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. 
With her on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Jerome Lidz,
Solicitor General.
Linda K. Williams and
Daniel W. Meek, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amici curiae Policy
Initiatives Group, Joan Horton, Ken Lewis, Bryn Hazel, Francis Nelson, Tom
Civiletti, David Delk, and Gary Duell.
Thomas M. Christ,
Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae ACLU Foundation of
Oregon, Inc.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, John A. Wittmayer,
Judge.  225 Or App 81, 200 P3d 619 (2009).
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
Defendants are charged with violating
ORS 260.402 (2003),(1)
which provided, in part, that "[n]o person shall make a contribution to
any other person, relating to a nomination or election of any candidate or the
support or opposition to any measure, in any name other than that of the person
who in truth provides the contribution."  Defendants demurred to the indictment on the ground that the
statute, on its face, violates the free expression clauses of Article I,
section 8, of the Oregon Constitution and the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution.  The trial court agreed with defendants and sustained the
demurrer.  The state appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed.  State v.
Moyer, 225 Or App 81, 200 P3d 619 (2009).  We allowed defendants' petition
for review and, for the reasons that follow, affirm the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
Because the trial court sustained
defendants' demurrer, the only relevant facts on review are those alleged in
the indictment.  State v. Illig-Renn, 341 Or 228, 230 n 2, 142 P3d 62
(2006).  The first count of the indictment states:
"The said defendants THOMAS PAUL MOYER
and VANESSA COLLEEN KASSAB, on or about May 16, 2003, in the County of
Multnomah County, State of Oregon, did unlawfully and knowing[ly] make a
contribution to a candidate, in relation to his campaign for election to public
office, in a name other than * * * that of the person who in truth provided the
contribution, to-wit:  by making a contribution of $2,500 in the name of 'VANESSA
KASSAB' to Jim Francesconi in support of his campaign for the Mayor of
Portland, contrary to the statutes in such cases made and provided and against
the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon[.]"
(Boldface and uppercase in original.)  The second count
asserted the same charge against defendants Moyer and Tune, based on a $2,000
contribution in the name of "Sonja Tune."  Defendants demurred to the
indictment, contending that ORS 260.402 unlawfully restrains expression and
political association and also is impermissibly vague and overbroad.  Although
the trial court rejected the claim that the statute is unconstitutionally
vague, it sustained defendants' demurrer, agreeing with defendants that the
statute impermissibly restrains expression in violation of state and federal constitutional
free speech guarantees.
The state appealed, and defendants
cross-assigned error, asserting that the trial court erred when it concluded
that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague.  As noted above, the Court
of Appeals reversed, issuing a plurality opinion, two concurring opinions, and
a dissenting opinion.  The plurality applied the methodology for analyzing free
expression challenges under Article I, section 8, set out in State v.
Robertson, 293 Or 402, 649 P2d 569 (1982).  The plurality first concluded
that, because the only restriction ORS 260.402 imposes is that a person must truthfully
report the source of a campaign contribution, the statute is aimed at a
forbidden effect of the unlawful expression, not the content of expression, and
therefore must be analyzed under the second Robertson category.  Moyer,
225 Or App at 91-93.  According to the plurality, the legislature is entitled
to enact election statutes that impose penalties for misleading the public, and
the statute is not overbroad; therefore, the statute does not violate Article
I, section 8.  Id.  As an alternative holding, the plurality analyzed
the statute under the first Robertson category, assuming that ORS
260.402 is a restraint on the content of expression.  Id. at 93.  Under
that Robertson category, the plurality concluded that the statute did
not violate the free expression guarantee in Article I, section 8, because it
came within a historical exception for fraud or perjury.(2) 
Id. at 95.
With regard to defendants' First
Amendment argument, the plurality relied on Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1,
96 S Ct 612, 46 L Ed 2d 659 (1976), in which the United States Supreme Court
held that a statutory requirement that campaign contributors disclose their
identities does not violate the First Amendment.  Moyer, 225 Or App at
96-97.  The plurality reasoned that, under Buckley, a statutory
requirement that such a disclosure be truthful similarly did not violate the
First Amendment.  Id.
Finally, the plurality rejected
defendants' argument that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, concluding
that the statute does not permit arbitrary or unequal application, is not an
unlawful delegation of too much discretion to law enforcement, and provides
fair warning of the conduct it prohibits.  Id. at 97-98.
The dissent rejected the plurality's
Article I, section 8, analysis.  The dissent concluded that ORS 260.402
regulates the content of expression, because the statute regulates "the
making of a contribution."  Id. at 106 (Sercombe, J., dissenting). 
The dissent further concluded that ORS 260.402 does not fit within any
historical exception and therefore violates Article I, section 8, of the Oregon
Constitution.  Id. at 108-13 (Sercombe, J., dissenting).
On review, defendants assert that,
because the statute does not specify the forbidden effects to which it is directed,
and because the presumed forbidden effects are not identified in any related
statute and are not elements of the offense, the Court of Appeals mistakenly
categorized ORS 260.402 as a Robertson second-category statute. 
Instead, defendants argue that, because the statute regulates campaign
contributions, the statute directly restrains free expression and therefore is
a Robertson first-category statute.  According to defendants, the
statute also violates Article I, section 8, because it is not wholly confined
to any historical exception to Oregon's free expression guarantee.  Defendants
also reassert their claim that the statute similarly violates the free speech
guarantee of the First Amendment.
To provide a complete understanding
of the meaning and effect of ORS 260.402, we begin with an examination of its text
and statutory context.  The statute was originally passed by voter initiative
and became effective in 1908 as part of the Corrupt Practices Act (Oregon Laws
1909, chapter 3), an initiative to limit candidates' election expenses and to
define, prevent, and punish corrupt and illegal practices in nominations and
elections.  At that time, the statute provided:
"No person shall make a payment of his own
money or of another person's money to any other person in connection with a
nomination or election in any other name than that of the person who in truth
supplies such money; nor shall any person knowingly receive such payment or
enter or cause the same to be entered in his accounts or records in another
name than that of the person by whom it was actually furnished; provided,
if the money be received from the treasurer of any political organization it
shall be sufficient to enter the same as received from said treasurer."
(Emphasis in original.)  The Corrupt Practices Act required
candidates to report all contributions, and was intended to maintain the
"purity" of the ballot and to prohibit illegal practices in elections,
whether a measure or a candidate was involved.  Nickerson v. Mecklem,
169 Or 270, 277, 126 P2d 1095 (1942).  In an argument in support of the Act,
the People's Power League of Oregon stated that, among other things, 
"the secret use of money to influence elections [is]
dangerous to liberty, because [it is] always used for the advantage of
individuals or special interests and classes, and never for the common good. *
* * The primary purpose of this bill is, as nearly as possible, to prevent the
use of any means but arguments addressed to the voter's reason in the nominations
and elections of Oregon."
Official Voters' Pamphlet, General Election, June 1, 1908,
103.  Since then, the Corrupt Practices Act has required public disclosure of
campaign contributions and has prohibited false name contributions like those
alleged to be at issue here.  See, e.g., Oregon Code, title XXXVI, ch
XXIV, § 36-2418 (1930) ("No person shall make a payment of his own money
or of another person's money to any other person in connection with a
nomination or election in any name other than that of the person who in truth
supplies such money * * *.").
Currently, ORS 260.402 is a part of
ORS chapter 260, which addresses campaign finance regulation, reporting
requirements, election offenses, and enforcement.  ORS 260.055(1) provides that
all political candidates and treasurers for political committees must
"keep detailed accounts" of contributions received and expenditures
made by or on behalf of the candidate or the political committee.  At various
points during an election cycle, the candidates and political committees are
required to file statements of their contributions and expenditures with the
appropriate "filing officer."  ORS 260.058; ORS 260.063; ORS 260.068;
ORS 260.073; ORS 260.076; ORS 260.083.  Any contribution from a person or
campaign committee that "contributed an aggregate amount of more than
$50" must be listed in the statement individually, along with the
contributor's name, address, and occupation.  ORS 260.083(1)(a).(3) 
"The statement may list as a single item the total amount of other
contributions, but shall specify how those contributions were obtained."  Id.
The filing officer is required to
review the statements of contributions and expenditures and notify candidates
or committees who have failed to file statements or whose statements fail to
comply with all statutory requirements.  ORS 260.205; ORS 260.215.  Failure to
file a proper statement of contributions and expenditures can lead to a court
order compelling a proper filing, ORS 260.225(1); to the imposition of civil
penalties, ORS 260.232; or even to the removal of a candidate or measure from
the ballot, ORS 260.241(2).
The filing officer is also required
to preserve the filed statements and may be required to prepare before each
election a summary of the filed statements, which is to be made available to
the public.  ORS 260.255(1), (2).  Those summaries must list "all
contributions of more than $50."  ORS 260.255(3).
As noted, ORS 260.402 (2003) provided,
in part, that "[n]o person shall make a contribution to any other person,
relating to a nomination or election of any candidate or the support or
opposition to any measure, in any name other than that of a person who in truth
provides the contribution."    As defined by ORS 260.005(3)(a),
"contribution" includes:
"(A) The payment, loan, gift, forgiving of
indebtedness, or furnishing without equivalent compensation or consideration,
of money, services other than personal services for which no compensation is
asked or given, supplies, equipment or any other thing of value:
"(i) For the purpose of influencing an
election for public office or an election on a measure, or of reducing the debt
of a candidate for nomination or election to public office or the debt of a
political committee; or
"(ii) To or on behalf of a candidate,
political committee or measure; and
"(B) Any unfulfilled pledge, subscription,
agreement or promise, whether or not legally enforceable, to make a
contribution."
Thus, the text and context of ORS 260.402 make it clear that
the statute prohibits an actual or promised transfer of money, certain
services, or things of value, either to a political campaign or for purposes of
influencing an election for public office or an election on a measure, "in
any name other than that of the person who in truth provides the
contribution."  As noted, according to defendants, that statutory prohibition
impermissibly restrains expression in violation of Article I, section 8.  We
turn to that claim.
Article I, section 8, of the Oregon
Constitution, provides:
"No
law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting
the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every
person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right."
In
State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 163-64, 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den,
508 US 974 (1993), the court summarized the framework established in Robertson
to analyze free expression challenges under Article I, section 8.  First,
laws that are directed to the substance of any opinion or any subject of
communication violate Article I, section 8,
"'unless the scope of the restraint is wholly confined
within some historical exception that was well established when the first
American guarantees of freedom of expression were adopted and that the
guarantees then or in 1859 demonstrably were not intended to reach.'"
Plowman, 314 Or at 164 (quoting Robertson, 293
Or at 412).  Second, laws that focus on proscribing the pursuit or
accomplishment of forbidden results are divided further into two
categories:  (a) laws that focus on forbidden effects, but expressly prohibit
expression used to achieve those effects, which are analyzed for overbreadth;
and (b) laws that focus on forbidden effect, but do not refer to expression at
all, which are analyzed for vagueness or for as-applied unconstitutionality.  Plowman,
314 Or at 164.
Our
first task, then, is to determine whether the statute is "written in terms
directed to the substance of any 'opinion' or any 'subject' of communication." 
Robertson, 293 Or at 412.  As noted, ORS 260.402 is violated by an
actual or promised transfer of money, services, or thing of value, directly or
indirectly to a political campaign, "in any name other than that of the
person who in truth provides the contribution."
As
the Court of Appeals plurality observed in this case, describing the Robertson
framework is not difficult; however, determining "the line between a [Robertson]
first-category regulation (one that targets the content of speech) and a [Robertson]
second-category regulation (one that targets only the harmful effects of
speech) has proved somewhat elusive."  225 Or App at 89.  The debate over
whether ORS 260.402 is a Robertson category-one statute because it
restricts campaign contributions -- the dissenting view -- or whether the
statute is a Robertson category-two statute because it focuses on a forbidden
effect but prohibits expression used to achieve that effect -- the plurality
view -- was one of the issues (in addition to the disagreement over the
applicability of a historical exception) that splintered the Court of Appeals.
Much
of the debate in the Court of Appeals appears to have been prompted by
conflicting signals from this court in at least two respects.  First, the
parties and the judges of the Court of Appeals disagreed about the meaning,
effect, and application of certain statements by this court in Vannatta v.
Keisling, 324 Or 514, 523, 921 P2d 770 (1997) (Vannatta I).  We
acknowledge that this court's various statements in Vannatta I to the
effect that campaign contributions are constitutionally protected forms of
expression by the political contributors could be understood to mean that, in
every instance, the delivery to a candidate or campaign of a contribution is
constitutionally protected expression.  However, we recently clarified those
statements in Vannatta v. Oregon Government Ethics Comm., 347 Or 449,
465, 222 P3d 1077 (2009) (Vannatta II).  In Vannatta II we pointed
out that, Vannatta I had "assumed a symbiotic relationship between
the making of contributions and the candidate's or campaign's ability to
communicate a political message," for purposes of that case, however,  the
court had not decided that, "in every case, the delivery to a public
official, a candidate, or a campaign of money or something of value also is
constitutionally protected expression as a matter of law."  347 Or at 465.
Second,
the Court of Appeals plurality noted this court's statement in City of
Portland v. Tidyman, 306 Or 174, 185-86, 759 P2d 242 (1988), that, to
qualify as a Robertson category-two statute -- a statute that focuses
not on speech but on harmful effects -- the operative text must "specify
adverse effects" targeted by the legislature.  Moyer, 225 Or App at
89.  However, in Vannatta I, this court commented that,
"[e]ven when the statute does not, by its terms, target a harm, a court
may infer the harm from context."  324 Or at 536.  That statement
in Vannatta I was based on this court's analysis of the statute at issue
in State v. Stoneman, 323 Or 536, 545-47, 920 P2d 535 (1996).  In Stoneman,
this court stated that, in determining the nature of the harmful effect targeted
by a statute, the statute cannot be read in a vacuum:  "An examination of
the context of a statute, as well as of its wording, is necessary to an
understanding of the policy that the legislative choice embodies."  Id.
at 546 (emphasis in original).  Consistently with this court's statement in Tidyman,
the court's contextual analysis in Stoneman established that the statute
at issue in that case "prohibited the purchase of certain communicative
materials, not in terms of their communicative substance, but in terms
of their status as the products of acts that necessarily have harmed the
child participants."  323 Or at 548 (first emphasis in original;
second emphasis added).  In our view, Stoneman correctly states that a
statute should not be read in isolation, and that the legislature's policy
choice (the harm that is the target of the criminal prohibition) in some cases may
be determined not only from the statute's text, but also from its context. 
That said, we now analyze ORS 260.402 under the Robertson methodology.
As
noted, defendants are charged with "knowing[ly]" violating the part
of ORS 260.402 that states that "[n]o person shall make a contribution to
any other person, * * * in any name other than that of the person who in truth
provides the contribution."  In Vannatta I, this court observed that
not every law related to the regulation of political campaign contributions and
expenditures runs afoul of Article I, section 8:
"[L]awmakers [may] choose to impose requirements
distinct from contribution or expenditure limitations (e.g., requirements of
disclosure of financing sources and the extent of any gift) as well as
various sanctions (e.g., civil or criminal penalties, disqualification
from the ballot or Voters' Pamphlet, and the like) and their choice may not necessarily
offend the constitutional requirement."
Vannatta I, 324 Or at 523 (first emphasis added;
second emphasis in original).  On its face, ORS 260.402 seems more akin to the
kind of statutes described in Vannatta I that do not offend the Article
I, section 8, expression guarantee.  The statute imposes no restriction on what
any person may say, whether contributor, campaign agent, or candidate. 
Moreover, as we explained in Vannatta II, defendants' argument that the
delivery of gifts, money, or services is expression in every case is incorrect. 

Robertson makes it clear,
however, that statutes that impose criminal sanctions for deception that can be
accomplished only through expression violate Article I, section 8, unless they
fall within some well-established historical exception to free expression
guarantees.  Id., 293 Or at 412 (listing examples such as "perjury,
solicitation or verbal assistance in crime, some forms of theft, forgery and
fraud and their contemporary variants").  Here, ORS 260.402 prohibits
communicating a name to the recipient of the contribution when that name is not
the name of "the person who in truth provides the contribution."  In
other words, the falsity that the statute prohibits can only be achieved
through expression -- through one person's communication of a falsehood to
another person.  It is for that reason that the statute must be classified as a
Robertson category one law.(4) 
As a result, ORS 260.402 violates Article I, section 8, unless the statute
falls within a historical exception as described in Robertson.  We turn
to that question.
In Robertson, this court
recognized that historical exceptions to Article I, section 8, were not
restricted solely to the actual statutes or the common law in place when the
Oregon Constitution was adopted.  Instead, the court recognized that successive
legislatures would continue to revise crimes and other laws and create new
crimes and laws in the light of societal changes and needs:
"The legislature, of course, may revise these crimes
and extend their principles to contemporary circumstances or sensibilities.  If
it was unlawful to defraud people by crude face-to-face lies, for instance,
free speech allows the legislature some leeway to extend the fraud principle to
sophisticated lies communicated by contemporary means.  Constitutional
interpretation of broad clauses locks neither the powers of lawmakers nor the
guarantees of civil liberties into their exact historic forms in the 18th and
19th centuries, as long as the extension remains true to the initial principle."
Robertson, 293 Or at 433-34 (emphasis added).
Whether a statute that restrains
expression is "wholly confined within some historical exception" requires
the following inquiries:  (1) was the restriction well established when the
early American guarantees of freedom of expression were adopted, and (2) was
Article I, section 8, intended to eliminate that restriction.  State v.
Henry, 302 Or 510, 515-25, 732 P2d 9 (1987).
As with the question whether the
statute is a Robertson category-one or category-two law, the parties and
the Court of Appeals disagree whether ORS 260.402 qualifies as a contemporary
variant of some well-recognized restriction on expression at the time that
Article I, section 8, was adopted.  In that regard, the state takes the position
that ORS 260.402 is a contemporary variant of the historical prohibition
against fraud, forgery, and perjury involving false communication that preceded
the adoption of Article I, section 8.  Although defendants agree that such
restrictions were in place before the adoption of the Oregon Constitution, they
contend that ORS 260.402 cannot be considered a modern variant of common-law
fraud, because it "contains none of the traditional elements of
fraud."(5) 
According to defendants, unlike common-law fraud, ORS 260.402 does not require
that a representation be made in connection with the contribution; the statute does
not contain an intent-to-deceive element; the statute is not limited to
material misrepresentations; and the statute does not require reasonable
reliance or injury in fact.(6) 
We are not persuaded.  For the following reasons, we conclude that ORS 260.402
falls within a historical exception to Article I, section 8.
First, in his Commentaries
on the Laws of England, William Blackstone recognized that misrepresentations
that contributed to "public inconvenience" were actionable offenses. 
In the volume entitled "Of Public Wrongs," Blackstone wrote:
"The vice of lying, which consists (abstractedly taken)
in a criminal violation of truth, and therefore in any shape is derogatory from
sound morality, is not however taken notice of by our law, unless it carries
with it some public inconvenience, as spreading false news; or some social
injury, as slander and malicious prosecution, for which a private recompense is
given."
William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England
*41-42 (1769) (emphasis added).  At that time, the "public
inconvenience" associated with misrepresenting one's identity in court or
before a public official was considered grievous and was classified as a felony
under English law.  In his section on offenses against public justice,
Blackstone noted:
"Likewise by statute 21 Jac. I. c. 26 to acknowledge
any fine, recovery, deed enrolled, statute, recognizance, bail, or judgment, in
the name of another person not privy to the same, is felony without benefit of
clergy.  Which law extends only to proceedings in the courts themselves:  but
by statute 4 W. & M. c. 4 to personate any other person [before any]
commissioner authorized to take bail in the country, is also felony.  For no
man's property would be safe, if records might be suppressed or falsified, or
persons' names be falsely usurped in courts, or before their public officers."
Blackstone, 4 Commentaries
at *127 (emphasis added).  Given Blackstone's observations that providing false
identifying information to governmental officials or public bodies were
sanctionable offenses, it is unlikely that the framers of the United States
Constitution or the Oregon Constitution considered that kind of false
communication a form of constitutionally protected expression.
"If any person shall, with intent to injure
or defraud any one, falsely make, alter, forge or counterfeit any public record
whatever, or any certificate, return or attestation of any clerk, notary public
or other public officer, in relation to any matter wherein such certificate,
return or attestation may be received as legal evidence, or any note,
certificate or other evidence of debt issued by any officer of this state, or
any county, town or other municipal or public corporation therein, authorized
to issue the same, or any contract, charter, letters patent, deed, lease, bill
of sale, will, testament, bond, writing obligatory, undertaking, letter of
attorney, policy of insurance, bill of lading, bill of exchange, promissory
note, evidence of debt, or any acceptance of a bill of exchange, endorsement or
assignment of a promissory note, or any warrant, order or check, or money, or
other property, or any receipt for money or other property, or an acquittance
or discharge for money or other property, or any plat, draft or survey of land,
or shall, with such intent, knowingly utter or publish as true and genuine,
any such false, altered, forged or counterfeited record, writing, instrument or
matter whatever, such person, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the penitentiary, not less than two, nor more than twenty
years."
General Laws of Oregon, Crim Code, ch XLV, § 584, pp
545-46 (Deady 1845-1864) (emphasis added).
The 1864 statute prohibiting various
forms of false communication, consistent with Blackstone's observations, is a
further demonstration of the unlikelihood that the framers of the Oregon
Constitution -- many of whom were serving in the legislature when the 1864
statute was enacted -- considered false communication in connection with public
records and matters of legitimate governmental concern to be protected by
Article I, section 8's guarantee of the free expression of opinion.(8) 

Second, this court previously has upheld
campaign laws providing sanctions and penalties for political candidates who
mislead the public or engage in fraud.  Vannatta I, 324 Or at 544.  In Vannatta
I, this court upheld, as within a historical exception, a provision of a
ballot measure providing that, when a candidate reneges on a promise not to
exceed a specified amount of campaign expenditures, the Secretary of State is
required to publish in the Voters' Pamphlet a bold-print notice that the
candidate failed to abide by his or her promise.  The court described a
candidate who reneges on his or her promise as one who "has misled the
electorate" and stated that "[l]aws that are targeted at fraud do not
violate Article I, section 8, because they constitute a historical exception to
Article I, section 8."  Id.
Despite this court's observation in Vannatta
I, defendants argue strenuously that, because ORS 260.402 does not contain
an intent-to-deceive element, the statute cannot be considered a modern variant
of common-law fraud.  We have two responses.  First, we note that here the
indictment alleges that defendants "knowing[ly]" made "a
contribution to a candidate * * * in a name other than * * * that of the person
who in truth provided the contribution."  Necessarily, then, the state will be required to prove at trial
that defendants acted with an awareness that their conduct was of a
"nature so described or that a circumstance so described exists."  See
ORS 161.085(8) ("knowingly" or "with knowledge," when
used with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute
defining an offense, means that a person acts with an awareness that the
conduct of the person is of a nature so described or that a circumstance so
described exists).(9) 

Second, this court already has held
that a statute that prohibits fraud on the electorate need not include an intent
element to come within a historical exception.  Vannatta I upheld the
constitutionality of a provision requiring the public identification of
candidates who broke expenditure-cap promises, even though that provision did
not require that the deceit have been intentional:
"The fact that a candidate may have intended
to abide by expenditure limitations when he or she made the pledge, and only
later decided to ignore that promise, does not make the failure to abide by the
promise any less a fraud on the voters who have relied on the candidate's
Voters' Pamphlet statement to choose their candidate."
324 Or at 544 n 28.
In our view, there is no important
difference between statutes requiring the public identification of candidates
who violate expenditure-cap pledges, statutes prohibiting candidates from
making material misstatements during campaigns, and the statutory requirement in
ORS 260.402 that the identification of political contributors be truthful.  As
our cases establish, the elements of a modern statute need not be identical or
matched perfectly with historical prohibitions to fall within a historical
exception.  Prohibiting the concealment of the identity of the true provider of
a political contribution from either the recipient of the contribution, the
public, or both, is, we conclude, an extension or modern variant of the initial
principle that underlies the historic legal prohibition against deceptive or
misleading expression.  Thus, in our view, ORS 260.402 falls within a "historical
exception," whether the exception is described as one related to misleading
the electorate, as identified in Vannatta I, or simply is described
as a contemporary variant of the exception for common-law fraud.  Because the
restriction on making a contribution using another person's name in ORS 260.402
falls within a historical exception, the statute does not violate Article I,
section 8, of the Oregon Constitution.
We turn to defendants' other
arguments.  Defendants assert that the statute violates the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution because it is overbroad, in that it criminalizes
contributions made in another's name without requiring the intent to
deceive.
As we noted in Vannatta I, 324
Or at 521, the United States Supreme Court takes a different approach to
expression challenges under the First Amendment than this court does with
regard to expression challenges under Article I, section 8.  In Buckley v.
Valeo, the United States Supreme Court determined that political
expenditures and contributions were forms of expression under the First
Amendment, but also concluded that contributions were less central to core
First Amendment expression, and therefore could be subject to governmental
restriction through a balancing-of-interests analysis.  424 US at 28-29.  The
court in Buckley concluded that contributions are a less-protected form
of expression than are expenditures, based on two assumptions about
contributions:  (1) although contributions may result in speech, that speech is
by the candidate and not by the contributor; and (2) contributions express only
general support for a candidate and do not communicate the reasons for that
support.  Buckley, 424 US at 21.  Relying on those assumptions, the Supreme
Court concluded that a statutory requirement that campaign contributors
disclose their identities did not violate the First Amendment, because the
disclosure requirement was narrowly limited to those situations in which the
information sought had a substantial connection with the governmental interests
to be advanced; that is, "disclosure helps voters to define more of the
candidates' constituencies."  Id. at 81.  The Court explained that
"[t]he burden imposed by [disclosure] is no prior restraint, but a
reasonable and minimally restrictive method of furthering First Amendment
values by opening the basic processes of our federal election system to public
view."  Id. at 82.  See also Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, __ US __, 130 S Ct 876 (2010) (campaign expenditure disclosure
and disclaimer requirements do not unconstitutionally restrain speech; such
requirements provide the electorate with information and insure that the voters
are fully informed as to who is speaking).  A law that forbids making a
contribution using another person's name is not, in our view, more burdensome
than a law like the one at issue in Buckley, requiring disclosure of the
identity of the contributor in the first instance.  We therefore conclude that
ORS 260.402 does not violate the First Amendment.(10)
Finally, we turn to defendants' contention
that ORS 260.402 is unconstitutionally vague under Article I, sections 20 and
21, of the Oregon Constitution and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.  Defendants argue that the statute provides
insufficient notice of the criminalized conduct, delegates too much discretion
to law enforcement, and has a chilling effect on protected speech.
Regarding a vagueness challenge under
the Oregon Constitution, this court stated in State v. Graves, 299 Or
189, 195, 700 P2d 244 (1985), that:
"[A] criminal statute must not be so vague as to permit
a judge or jury to exercise uncontrolled discretion in punishing defendants,
because this offends the principle against ex post facto laws embodied
in Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution.  The equal privileges and
immunities clause is also implicated when vague laws give unbridled discretion
to judges and jurors to decide what is prohibited in a given case, for this
results in the unequal application of criminal laws.  A criminal statute need not
define an offense with such precision that a person in every case can determine
in advance that a specific conduct will be within the statute's reach. 
However, a reasonable degree of certainty is required by Article I, sections 20
and 21."
(Internal citations and footnote omitted.)
This court has also stated that
"absolute precision is not required to overcome a facial vagueness
challenge."  Illig-Renn, 341 Or at 243.  Here, defendants assert
that the statutory phrases "relating to" and "in truth provides"
are not adequately defined by common usage or context.  Defendants argue that,
as a result, the statute could reach any donation that "eventually serves
to benefit a measure or campaign."  According to defendants, the words
"relating to" are so broad that the statute criminalizes a person's
decision to pick up the dinner tab when the person and his or her friends
"decide if they should encourage a person to run for a local
office."  We disagree with defendants.  The phrase "relating to"
must be read in the context of the entire statute.  For the convenience of the
reader, we again set out the text of  ORS 260.402, which provided, in part:
"No person shall make a contribution to any other
person, relating to a nomination or election of any candidate or the support or
opposition to any measure, in any name other than that of the person who in
truth provides the contribution."
"Contribution" is defined
by ORS 260.005(3), which we quoted earlier.  (Exceptions to the definition of
"contribution" are set out in ORS 260.007.)  The phrase
"relating to" thus ties "contribution" to only transfers
made "[f]or the purpose of influencing an election for public office or an
election on a measure, or of reducing the debt of a candidate for nomination or
election to public office or the debt of a political committee," or payments
made "[t]o or on behalf of a candidate, political committee or measure[.]" 
ORS 260.005(3)(a)(A)(i), (ii).  In addition, by using the present-tense phrase
"relating to," the legislature established that the contribution must
relate to a candidate or measure at the time it is made.  See Martin v. City
of Albany, 320 Or 175, 181, 880 P2d 926 (1994) ("[t]he use of a
particular verb tense in a statute can be a significant indicator of the
legislature's intention").  Thus, contributions "relating to" a
candidate or measure are those that are made to the candidate or to the
campaign supporting a measure, or for the purpose of influencing an election.
Defendants also challenged the phrase
"in truth provides" as vague.  Again, we disagree.  ORS 260.402
provides that a person who makes a contribution "in any name other than
that of the person who in truth provides the contribution" violates the
statute.  Because the statute applies only to contributions made in the
name of a specific person, the statute applies only when money has been
contributed "in" someone's "name" -- that is, when the
contribution is attributed to a specific person.(11) 
When read as a whole, the statute provides adequate notice of what conduct is
proscribed, and thus is not impermissibly vague in violation the Oregon
Constitution.
In assessing a claim that a criminal
statute fails to give fair warning under the United States Constitution, we adhere
to the standard that federal courts have applied to criminal and quasi-criminal
statutes -- whether the statute would "'give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may
act accordingly.'"  Illig-Renn, 341 Or at 241 (quoting Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 108, 92 S Ct 2294, 33 L Ed 2d 222 (1972)). 
As we explained above, when read as a whole, the statute provides adequate
notice of what conduct is proscribed.  Accordingly, we conclude that ORS
260.402 gave adequate notice that it is unlawful to make a contribution using
another person's name.  Therefore, we reject defendants' vagueness challenge.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. ORS
260.402 (2003) provided:
"No person shall make a contribution to any
other person, relating to a nomination or election of any candidate or the
support or opposition to any measure, in any name other than that of the person
who in truth provides the contribution.  No person shall knowingly receive the
contribution or enter or cause it to be entered in accounts or records in
another name than that of the person by whom it was actually provided. 
However, if the contribution is received from the treasurer of any political
committee, it shall be sufficient to enter it as received from the treasurer."
The statute has been amended since defendants were charged in
this case.  However, the wording changes in the current statute are not
material to the issues in this case.  Unless otherwise noted, all references to
ORS chapter 260 in this opinion are to the 2003 version, which is the version
that applies to this case.
2. There
were two concurring opinions.  Chief Judge Brewer and Judge Edmonds agreed that
ORS 260.402 was a Robertson category-two law, because it focused on
harmful effects and not on speech.  Moyer, 225 Or App at 99 (Brewer, C.
J., concurring).  Judge Schuman, however, concluded that ORS 260.402 prohibits
expression but concurred with the conclusion in the lead opinion that the
statute is a contemporary variant of an historical exception to free expression
guarantees.  225 Or App at 99-100 (Schuman, J., concurring).
3. The
statute was amended in 2007 and now provides similar requirements for
contributors in "an aggregate amount of more than $100." 
4. The
Court of Appeals plurality concluded that the statute is directed, not at the
expression itself, but at the harmful effects of expression (concealing from
the recipient and the public the true identity of a contributor).  The
difficulty, however, is that, although the statute is directed against concealing
the identity of a contributor, the law is violated whether or not the recipient
of the contribution or the public actually is misled about the identity of the
contributor.  In other words, the statute is violated when the contribution is
made, whether or not any harmful effect occurs.  Because the targeted effects
are not expressed in the statute, and because, unlike the statute at issue in Stoneman,
the targeted harm need not occur to violate the statute, the statute cannot be
classified under the Robertson methodology as a category-two law.
5. Defendants
also argue that the statute is not a modern variant of perjury, false swearing,
or forgery achieved through false communication.  Because we conclude that ORS
260.402 is a modern variant of fraud and therefore is within a historical
exception, we need not address defendants' arguments regarding perjury, false
swearing, or forgery.
6. According
to defendants, proof of fraud requires a showing that (1) the accused falsely
represented a material fact; (2) the accused knew the representation was false;
(3) the representation was made with the intent to induce the recipient to act
or refrain from acting; (4) the recipient justifiably relied on the
misrepresentation; and (5) the recipient was damage by that reliance. 
7. Although
the term "defraud" was undefined within the 1864 statute, lawyers of
the day would have understood that a variety of meanings could be attached to
the term.  A contemporaneous legal dictionary of the period, defining
"fraud" and "to defraud" together in the same passage,
provided, among other meanings:
"4. 
Frauds may be also divided into actual or positive and constructive frauds.
"5.  An actual or positive fraud is
the intention and successful employment of any cunning, deception, or artifice,
used to circumvent, cheat, or deceive another. * * *
"6.  By constructive fraud is meant
such a contract or act, which, though not originating in any actual evil design
or contrivance to perpetrate a positive fraud or injury upon other persons, yet
by its tendency to deceive or mislead them, or to violate private or public
confidence, or to impair or injure the public interests, is deemed equally
reprehensible with positive fraud, and therefore, is prohibited by law, as
within the same reason and mischief as contracts and acts done malo animo."
John Bouvier, 1 Law Dictionary 547 (9th ed 1860)
(emphasis in original; internal citations omitted).
8. A
cursory review of the Oregon Revised Statutes reveals at least 150 statutes
that impose sanctions and punishments for various forms of false
communication.  In particular, many of those statutes involve the communication
of identifying information in one form or another to governmental entities. 
9. Whether
it would be permissible under Article I, section 8, to punish a contributor for
inadvertently making a contribution in the name of another person is a question
not presented in this case.
10. Defendants
also argue that the statute is overbroad, because it criminalizes speech that
would not deceive the electorate.  Defendants observe that ORS 260.402
criminalizes all contributions made in another person's name, regardless of the
dollar amount contributed.  Defendants assert, however, that ORS 260.083 does
not require statements of contributions and expenditures to report the identity
of contributors who contribute less than a specific dollar amount ($50 in
2003).  Therefore, defendants contend, ORS 260.402 criminalizes some speech
that could not deceive the public -- contributing $50 or less under a false
identity -- because the false identity would never be disclosed to the public.
Defendants'
reasoning misses an important point, however.  The $50 limit in ORS 260.083 is
not the amount of a single contribution -- it is the total dollar amount
contributed by a particular individual.  ORS 260.083 required the statement of
contributions and expenditures to "list the name, occupation and address
of each person * * * that contributed an aggregate amount of more than
$50."  (Emphasis added.)  By making the disclosure of the contributor's
identity turn on the aggregate amount contributed, the statute prohibits
contributors from concealing their identity by breaking contributions into
amounts of $50 or less.
One
cannot determine whether a contributor's aggregate contributions exceed $50
without knowing the identities of all contributors, including those who
contributed $50 or less.  To comply with ORS 260.083, then, the party required
to file the statement of contributions and expenditures must know the true
identities of all contributors, whether or not their individual contributions
exceed $50.  Thus, a false representation as to the identity of a contributor
-- regardless of the amount of the contribution -- deceives the filing party
and interferes with the proper operation of ORS 260.083.
11. Because ORS 260.402 applies only to those contributions that are made in
someone's name, it does not criminalize anonymous contributions.  However, ORS
260.083 requires that committees disclose the names and addresses of all
individuals and entities that contribute more than the threshold reporting
amount.  Accordingly, the Secretary of State's administrative rules require
campaigns to refuse or to disgorge contributions for which campaigns cannot
provide that information -- those funds that are donated anonymously.  See
2010 Campaign Finance Manual at 29 ("No committee shall accept an
anonymous contribution.  If a committee cannot identify a contributor, the
contribution must be donated to an organization that can accept anonymous
contributions."); OAR 165-012-0005 (designating Campaign Finance Manual
and associated forms "as the procedures and guidelines to be used for
compliance with Oregon campaign finance regulations").  This case does not
involve anonymous contributions, and we do not address whether Article I,
section 8, would prevent the legislature from prohibiting anonymous campaign
contributions.