Case Title: In re G.T.B.

Citation: 2011-Ohio-1789

Docket Number: 20102266

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re G.T.B., Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-1789.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-1789 
IN RE G.T.B.; VAUGHN ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. WYREMBEK, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re G.T.B., Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-1789.] 
Custody of children — Habeas corpus — Jurisdiction of courts of appeals — 
Section 3(B)(1)(c), Article IV, Ohio Constitution — R.C. 2151.23(A)(3) — 
Jurisdictional-priority rule. 
(No. 2010-2266 — Submitted April 6, 2011 — Decided April 19, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 10AP-1057. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Court of Appeals 
for Franklin County dismissing the petition of appellants, Jason and Christy 
Vaughn, the prospective adoptive parents of G.T.B., a minor child, for a writ of 
habeas corpus to compel the child’s biological father, appellee, Benjamin 
Wyrembek, to return physical custody of the child to the Vaughns.  We affirm the 
dismissal, albeit for different reasons than the rationale stated by the court of 
appeals. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 2} The court of appeals dismissed the Vaughns’ petition on the 
rationale that it lacked “jurisdiction over the child custody decisions and 
proceedings of the Common Pleas Court of Lucas County, Ohio, Juvenile Court 
Division.”  The court of appeals apparently credited Wyrembek’s argument in 
support of his unopposed motion to dismiss that the court lacked jurisdiction over 
the habeas corpus petition because under R.C. 2151.23(A)(3), the Lucas County 
Juvenile Court had “exclusive original jurisdiction under the Revised Code * * * 
[t]o hear and determine any application for a writ of habeas corpus involving the 
custody of a child.”  Courts of appeals, however, have been given original 
jurisdiction in habeas corpus actions by Section 3(B)(1)(c), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution.  “The General Assembly is without power to limit or alter the 
original jurisdiction of Courts of Appeals in habeas corpus actions.”  In re Black 
(1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 124, 65 O.O.2d 308, 304 N.E.2d 394, paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  Therefore, notwithstanding R.C. 2151.23(A)(3), “[a] Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving the 
custody of a child.”  Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus; see also Hughes v. 
Scaffide (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 85, 86, 7 O.O.3d 175, 372 N.E.2d 598, fn. 2. 
{¶ 3} In addition, although R.C. 2725.03 limits the jurisdiction over 
habeas corpus cases involving inmates of state benevolent or correctional 
institutions to “the courts or judges of the county in which the institution is 
located,” see Knecht v. Tate (Dec. 10, 1991), Franklin App. No. 91AP-207, 1991 
WL 268340, there is no comparable statutory limitation on child-custody habeas 
corpus cases. 
{¶ 4} Furthermore, the Vaughns’ habeas corpus petition was based on 
their institution of an adoption proceeding in Franklin County pursuant to R.C. 
3107.04(A) (“A petition for adoption shall be filed in the court in the county in 
which the person to be adopted was born * * * or in which the agency having the 
permanent custody of the person to be adopted is located”). 
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 5} Wyrembek argues on appeal that under the jurisdictional-priority 
rule, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over the habeas corpus case because 
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction was first invoked to decide the custody matter.  
But although the issues in the cases are similar, the cause of action in the court of 
appeals case—habeas corpus—is not the same as the cause of action in the 
juvenile court—custody in the context of a parentage proceeding.  See State ex 
rel. Brady v. Pianka, 106 Ohio St.3d 147, 2005-Ohio-4105, 832 N.E.2d 1202, ¶ 
13, quoting State ex rel. Shimko v. McMonagle (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 426, 429, 
751 N.E.2d 472 (“ ‘In general, the jurisdictional priority rule applies when the 
causes of action are the same in both cases, and if the first case does not involve 
the same cause of action or the same parties as the second case, the first case will 
not prevent the second’ ”). 
{¶ 6} Therefore, the Court of Appeals for Franklin County had general 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the Vaughns’ habeas corpus petition, and the 
court erred in not so holding. 
{¶ 7} Nevertheless, we will not reverse a correct judgment simply 
because it was based in whole or in part on an incorrect rationale.  State ex rel. 
Galloway v. Cook, 126 Ohio St.3d 332, 2010-Ohio-3780, 933 N.E.2d 807, ¶ 4. 
{¶ 8} First, the Vaughns have or had an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law by appeal from the Lucas County Juvenile Court’s orders granting 
custody of the child to Wyrembek.  “Like other extraordinary-writ actions, habeas 
corpus is not available when there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of 
law.”  In re Complaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Goeller, 103 Ohio St.3d 
427, 2004-Ohio-5579, 816 N.E.2d 594, ¶ 6.  “This principle applies equally to 
child custody motions, where habeas corpus relief is the exception rather than the 
general rule.”  Rammage v. Saros, 97 Ohio St.3d 430, 2002-Ohio-6669, 780 
N.E.2d 278, ¶ 9. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 9} Second, insofar as the Vaughns raise a jurisdictional claim that 
they either raised or could have raised in their previous, unsuccessful 
extraordinary-writ actions, see State ex rel. Vaughn v. Cubbon, 122 Ohio St.3d 
1487, 2009-Ohio-3830, 910 N.E.2d 1040; State ex rel. Vaughn v. Cubbon, 124 
Ohio St.3d 1471, 2010-Ohio-354, 921 N.E.2d 243; and State ex rel. Vaughn1 v. 
Cubbon, 126 Ohio St.3d 1577, 2010-Ohio-4542, 934 N.E.2d 351, res judicata 
“bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or 
occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.”  Grava v. Parkman 
Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 382, 653 N.E.2d 226.  “The previous action is 
conclusive for all claims that were or that could have been litigated in the first 
action.”  State ex rel. Schachter v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 121 Ohio 
St.3d 526, 2009-Ohio-1704, 905 N.E.2d 1210, ¶ 27. 
{¶ 10} Third, as we held in the Vaughns’ appeal from a judgment of the 
Lucas County Court of Appeals affirming the Lucas County Probate Court’s 
dismissal of their petition to adopt the child, “ ‘[w]hen an issue concerning 
parenting2 of a minor is pending in the juvenile court, a probate court must refrain 
from proceeding with the adoption of that child.’ ”  In re Adoption of G.V., 126 
Ohio St.3d 249, 2010-Ohio-3349, 933 N.E.2d 245, ¶ 8, certiorari denied, Vaughn 
v. Wyrembek (2011), 79 USLW 3512, __ S.Ct.__, __ L.Ed.2d ___, quoting In re 
Adoption of Pushcar, 110 Ohio St.3d 332, 2006-Ohio-4572, 853 N.E.2d 647, 
syllabus. 
{¶ 11} Finally, dismissal of the Vaughns’ habeas corpus petition was 
appropriate because they did not comply with the pleading requirements of R.C. 
2725.04.  See In re Bailey, 98 Ohio St.3d 309, 2003-Ohio-859, 784 N.E.2d 109, ¶ 
13; Holloway v. Clermont Cty. Dept. of Human Servs. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 128, 
                                                 
1 The case name is incorrectly reported as Edward v. Cubbon.  
 
2 The context manifestly indicates that the court intended “parentage.” 
January Term, 2011 
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132, 684 N.E.2d 1217.  Although the Vaughns’ petition challenges a Lucas 
County Juvenile Court order compelling them to transfer custody of the child to 
Wyrembek, they did not attach a copy of that order to their petition. 
{¶ 12} Based on the foregoing, dismissal of the Vaughns’ habeas corpus 
petition was appropriate, albeit for different reasons than those expressed by the 
court of appeals.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment dismissing the petition.  We 
deny Wyrembek’s motion for sanctions, however, because the Vaughns’ appeal 
was not frivolous insofar as the court of appeals’ rationale was incorrect.  See 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 14.5(A) (“An appeal * * * shall be considered frivolous is it is not 
reasonably well-grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law”). 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, 
CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
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Voorhees & Levy, L.L.C., and Michael R. Voorhees, for appellants. 
 
The McQuades Co., L.P.A., and Alan J. Lehenbauer, for appellee. 
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