Case Title: Lyle v. Warner Bros.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S125171

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 4/20/06 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
AMAANI LYLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S125171 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/7 160528 
WARNER BROTHERS TELEVISION 
) 
PRODUCTIONS et al., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. BC239047 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Plaintiff was a comedy writers’ assistant who worked on the production of 
a popular television show called Friends.  The show revolved around a group of 
young, sexually active adults, featured adult-oriented sexual humor, and typically 
relied on sexual and anatomical language, innuendo, wordplay, and physical 
gestures to convey its humor.  Before plaintiff was hired, she had been forewarned 
that the show dealt with sexual matters and that, as an assistant to the comedy 
writers, she would be listening to their sexual jokes and discussions about sex and 
transcribing the jokes and dialogue most likely to be used for scripts.  After four 
months of employment, plaintiff was fired because of problems with her typing 
and transcription.  She then filed this action against three of the male comedy 
writers and others, asserting among other things that the writers’ use of sexually 
coarse and vulgar language and conduct, including the recounting of their own 
sexual experiences, constituted harassment based on sex within the meaning of the 
 
 
2 
Fair Employment and Housing Act (the FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.; all 
further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated). 
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting summary 
judgment on plaintiff’s sexual harassment action.  We granted review to address 
whether the use of sexually coarse and vulgar language in the workplace can 
constitute harassment based on sex within the meaning of the FEHA, and if so, 
whether the imposition of liability under the FEHA for such speech would infringe 
on defendants’ federal and state constitutional rights of free speech. 
Here, the record discloses that most of the sexually coarse and vulgar 
language at issue did not involve and was not aimed at plaintiff or other women in 
the workplace.  Based on the totality of the undisputed circumstances, particularly 
the fact the Friends production was a creative workplace focused on generating 
scripts for an adult-oriented comedy show featuring sexual themes, we find no 
reasonable trier of fact could conclude such language constituted harassment 
directed at plaintiff because of her sex within the meaning of the FEHA.  
Furthermore, to the extent triable issues of fact exist as to whether certain 
offensive comments were made about women other than plaintiff because of their 
sex, we find no reasonable trier of fact could conclude these particular comments 
were severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to create a work environment that 
was hostile or abusive to plaintiff in violation of the FEHA.  Accordingly, we 
remand the matter with directions to affirm the summary judgment order insofar as 
it pertains to plaintiff’s sexual harassment action, without addressing the potential 
of infringement on defendants’ constitutional rights of free speech. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
After receiving a right to sue letter from the Department of Fair 
Employment and Housing, plaintiff Amaani Lyle filed this action against 
organizations and individuals involved in the production and writing of the 
 
3 
popular adult-oriented Friends television show, including Warner Bros. Television 
Production (WBTV), NBC Studios (NBC), Bright, Kauffman, Crane Productions 
(BKC), and producers-writers Adam Chase, Gregory Malins, and Andrew Reich.  
Her first amended complaint alleged causes of action under the FEHA for race and 
gender discrimination, racial and sexual harassment, and retaliation for opposing 
race discrimination against African-Americans in the casting of Friends episodes.  
The complaint also alleged common law causes of action for wrongful termination 
in violation of the public policies against race and gender discrimination and 
retaliation for complaining about race discrimination in violation of the FEHA. 
After engaging in discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment and 
summary adjudication.  The trial court granted the motion, ruling:  (1) NBC and 
BKC were not plaintiff’s employers and therefore were not liable on any FEHA 
cause of action; (2) plaintiff’s FEHA harassment claims were time-barred; (3) 
plaintiff could not, in any event, factually establish her FEHA claims of race and 
gender discrimination, retaliation, or harassment as to any defendant; and (4) 
plaintiff could not establish her common law causes of action for wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy.  The court entered judgment for all 
defendants and awarded them $21,131 in costs.  In a postjudgment order, the court 
awarded defendants $415,800 in attorney fees on grounds that plaintiff’s FEHA 
causes of action were “frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation.” 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in part and reversed it in part.  
Among other things, the court found defendants entitled to summary adjudication 
on plaintiff’s FEHA and common law causes of action for termination based on 
race, gender, and retaliation, but concluded triable issues of fact existed as to her 
FEHA causes of action for sexual and racial harassment against defendants 
WBTV, BKC, Chase, Malins, and Reich.  Accordingly, the court reversed the 
 
4 
attorney fees award and vacated the award of costs for recalculation by the trial 
court to reflect the partial reversal of the judgment. 
Both sides petitioned for review.  We denied plaintiff’s petition, but granted 
defendants’ petition and ordered briefing and argument limited to the following 
issues:  (1) Can the use of sexually coarse and vulgar language in the workplace 
constitute harassment based on sex within the meaning of the FEHA? and (2) 
Does the imposition of liability under the FEHA for sexual harassment based on 
such speech infringe on defendants’ rights of free speech under the First 
Amendment to the federal Constitution or the state Constitution? 
DISCUSSION 
A.  Sexually Coarse and Vulgar Language 
There is no dispute that sexually coarse and vulgar language was used 
regularly in the Friends writers’ room.  But the use of sexually coarse and vulgar 
language in the workplace is not actionable per se.  Rather, we must look to the 
specific facts and circumstances presented to determine whether the language at 
issue constituted harassment based on sex within the meaning of FEHA and 
whether such language was severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to create a 
work environment that was hostile or abusive to plaintiff because of her sex. 
1.  The Facts Presented in the Summary Judgment Proceeding 
Our first task is to determine whether the facts presented in the summary 
judgment proceeding were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of sexual 
harassment under the appropriate legal standards.  We begin by reviewing the 
rules governing the summary judgment procedure.1 
                                              
1  
In this opinion, we review the trial court’s order granting summary 
judgment only insofar as it pertains to plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims; we do 
not review the order with regard to her racial harassment claims.  Accordingly, our 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
5 
“A trial court properly grants a motion for summary judgment only if no 
issues of triable fact appear and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); see also id., § 437c, subd. (f) 
[summary adjudication of issues].)  The moving party bears the burden of showing 
the court that the plaintiff ‘has not established, and cannot reasonably expect to 
establish, a prima facie case . . . .’  [Citation.]”  (Miller v. Department of 
Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 460 (Miller).)  “[O]nce a moving defendant 
has ‘shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately 
pleaded, cannot be established,’ the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the 
existence of a triable issue; to meet that burden, the plaintiff ‘may not rely upon 
the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings . . . but, instead, shall set forth the 
specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of 
action . . . .’  [Citations.]”  (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476-
477.) 
“On appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment, we 
examine the record de novo, liberally construing the evidence in support of the 
party opposing summary judgment and resolving doubts concerning the evidence 
in favor of that party.  [Citation.]”  (Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 460.) 
Defendants’ summary judgment motion relied on declarations from 
defendants Chase, Malins, Reich, and others, and other facts developed during 
discovery.  These declarations and the deposition testimony of the parties and 
others disclosed that Chase, Malins, and Reich worked for defendant WBTV and 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
analysis addressing whether summary judgment was proper in this case should be 
understood in this context. 
 
6 
were writers on the sixth production season of Friends.  In June 1999, Malins and 
Chase, who also served as executive producers on the production, interviewed 
plaintiff, an African-American woman, for the position of writers’ assistant for the 
Friends production.  During the interview, they told plaintiff the show dealt with 
sexual matters and, as a result, the writers told sexual jokes and engaged in 
discussions about sex.  Plaintiff responded that sexual discussions and jokes did 
not make her uncomfortable, and she subsequently was hired as a writers’ 
assistant. 
In her deposition, plaintiff testified she had no recollection of any employee 
on the Friends production ever saying anything sexually offensive about her 
directly to her.  No one on the production ever asked her out on a date or sexually 
propositioned her.  Likewise, no one ever demanded sexual favors of her or 
physically threatened her. 
Plaintiff testified, however, that a number of offensive discussions and 
actions occurred in the writers’ meetings she was required to attend.  The writers 
regularly discussed their preferences in women and sex in general.  Chase spoke of 
his preferences for blonde women, a certain bra cup size, “get[ting] right to sex” 
and not “mess[ing] around with too much foreplay.”  Malins had a love of young 
girls and cheerleaders.  Some of the sex-based discussions occurred outside the 
writers’ room, that is, in the breakroom and in the hallways. 
Also during the writers’ meetings, Malins constantly spoke of his oral sex 
experiences and told the group that when he and his wife fought, he would “get 
naked” and then they would never finish the argument.  Malins had a “coloring 
book” depicting female cheerleaders with their legs spread open; he would draw 
breasts and vaginas on the cheerleaders during the writers’ meetings.  The book 
was left on his desk or sometimes on writers’ assistants’ desks.  Malins frequently 
used a pencil to alter portions of the name “Friends” on scripts so it would read 
 
7 
“penis.”  Malins also spoke of his fantasy about an episode of the show in which 
the Friends character “Joey” enters the bathroom while the character “Rachel” is 
showering and has his way with her.  And, during each of the four months plaintiff 
worked on the Friends production, some writers made masturbatory gestures. 
In addition, plaintiff heard the writers talk about what they would like to do 
sexually to different female cast members on Friends.  Malins remarked to Chase 
that Chase could have “fucked” one of the actresses on the show a couple of years 
before, and the two constantly bantered about the topic and how Chase had missed 
his chance to do so.  Chase, Malins, and Reich spoke demeaningly about another 
actress on the show, making jokes about whether she was competent in sexually 
servicing her boyfriend.  They also referred to her infertility once and joked she 
had “dried twigs” or “dried branches in her vagina.” 
In their depositions, Chase, Malins, and Reich gave testimony that 
corroborated portions of plaintiff’s allegations.  Chase acknowledged he had 
discussed, while in the writers’ room, his personal sexual experiences.  Chase also 
confirmed that he and other writers discussed anal sex, and that he had gestured on 
occasion as if he were masturbating, but could not recall having done so when 
plaintiff was present.  Malins and Reich admitted “blowjob stories” were told in 
the writers’ room.  Reich said he had pantomimed masturbation in the writers’ 
room, sometimes as a way of indicating something was a waste of time.  In the 
writers’ room and sometimes elsewhere, Reich and other writers discussed oral 
sex and anal sex, and writers discussed their personal sexual conduct.  Reich also 
acknowledged he and others altered inspirational sayings on a calendar, changing, 
for example, the word “persistence” to “pert tits” and “happiness” to “penis.” 
These writers and others also testified that, both before and after plaintiff 
was hired, sexually coarse and vulgar language was used in the writers’ room in 
group sessions with both male and female participants present, and both male and 
 
8 
female writers discussed their own sexual experiences to generate material for the 
show.  Episodes of the show often featured sexual and anatomical language, 
innuendo, wordplay, and physical gestures to convey humor concerning sex, 
including oral sex, anal sex, heterosexual sex, gay sex, “talking dirty” during sex, 
premature ejaculation, pornography, pedophiles, and so-called “threesomes.” 
In opposing defendants’ summary judgment motion, plaintiff likewise 
relied on the parties’ deposition testimony.  She also submitted two of her own 
declarations, in which she reiterated and more particularly described the graphic 
nature of the writers’ alleged comments and conduct.2  Her declarations also 
referred to incidents she did not mention in her deposition.  Most significantly, she 
                                              
2  
For example, plaintiff’s declarations stated:  Malins, Chase, and Reich 
“would say that what they liked was ‘a woman with big tits who could give a blow 
job’ ”; the writers “would for hours on end make lewd and offensive drawings of 
women”; they “would also commonly sit around and bang their hands on the 
bottom of the desk to make it sound as though they were masturbating”; Malins 
would say “he gets to hang out with them [two of the actresses], get rich, dream 
about fucking them and yet nobody bothers him when he’s out in public”; Malins 
told a story “about a woman that when she had his penis down her throat had a gag 
reflex” and Malins thought she “was going to throw-up” on it; the writers made 
plaintiff sit “around waiting to go home” while they “were sitting around 
pretending to masturbate and continually talking about schlongs”; Reich “said that 
[one actress’s] pussy was full of dried up twigs and said that if her husband put his 
dick in her she’d break in two”; Chase told plaintiff “he could have ‘fucked’ ” one 
of the actresses but said it’s “ ‘not like she asked me to bang her in the ass’ ”; 
Chase mentioned on at least two occasions that “he would have liked to have anal 
sex with [the same actress]”; Chase “once rhetorically asked the group, of [one 
actress and her then boyfriend], ‘do you think they fuck in the dressing room’ ”; 
and the “blatant use of obscene language and flagrant discussions about personal 
sex lives occurred at least four days per week while [she] worked on ‘Friends’ and 
continued up until at least two days before [her] termination.” 
 
 
9 
claimed for the first time that Chase, Malins, and Reich referred to women using 
gender-related epithets.3 
In this court, defendants argue the facts shown in the summary judgment 
proceeding do not establish actionable harassment under the FEHA because:  (1) 
use of sexual speech, standing alone, does not violate the FEHA’s prohibition 
against harassment because of sex; and (2) the conduct did not amount to severe or 
pervasive conduct that altered the terms or conditions of plaintiff’s employment. 
2.  The FEHA and its Prohibitions 
We now turn to a review of the FEHA and its prohibitions. 
With certain exceptions not implicated here, the FEHA makes it an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer, “because of the . . . sex . . . of any 
person, . . . to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment.”  (§ 12940, subd. (a).)  Likewise, it is an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer, “because of . . . sex, . . . to harass 
an employee.”  (§ 12940, subd. (j)(1).)  Under the statutory scheme, 
“ ‘harassment’ because of sex” includes sexual harassment and gender harassment.  
                                              
3  
In their reply brief on the merits, defendants urge us to disregard these 
particular “facts” because, among other things, plaintiff did not mention them in 
her deposition but first raised them in a declaration, dated December 20, 2001, that 
she filed in opposition to defendants’ summary judgment motion.  But defendants 
provide no information or record citations indicating what objections, if any, they 
made to that declaration or what evidentiary rulings the trial court made.  
Although defendants claim both the trial court and the Court of Appeal “properly 
disregarded” plaintiff’s December 20, 2001 declaration, they do so without 
reference to the record and without addressing the existence or significance of a 
second declaration plaintiff filed, dated March 19, 2002, in which she refers to the 
same “facts,” as well as others.  Because defendants’ evidentiary contentions in 
this court lack adequate argument and support, we shall not disregard the evidence 
concerning the reported use of gender-related epithets. 
 
10 
(§ 12940, subd. (j)(4)(C).)  These prohibitions represent a fundamental public 
policy decision regarding “the need to protect and safeguard the right and 
opportunity of all persons to seek and hold employment free from discrimination.”  
(Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 485; see also Mogilefsky v. 
Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1414.) 
As we recently explained, “the prohibition against sexual harassment 
includes protection from a broad range of conduct, ranging from expressly or 
impliedly conditioning employment benefits on submission to or tolerance of 
unwelcome sexual advances, to the creation of a work environment that is hostile 
or abusive on the basis of sex.”  (Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 461.)  Here, 
plaintiff does not contend defendants subjected her to unwelcome sexual advances 
as a condition of employment; rather, she alleges defendants created a hostile or 
abusive work environment.  For this type of claim, plaintiff need not show 
evidence of unwanted sexual advances.  (Id. at pp. 461-462.) 
According to regulations interpreting and implementing the FEHA, the 
prohibition against discrimination in employment because of sex is intended to 
guarantee that members of both sexes will enjoy equal employment benefits.  (Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7290.6, subd. (b).)  For purposes of the FEHA, an 
“employment benefit” specifically includes “provision of a discrimination-free 
workplace” (id., § 7286.5, subd. (f)), which in turn is defined as “provision of a 
workplace free of harassment” (id., § 7286.5, subd. (f)(3).) 
Like the FEHA, title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) 
(42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) prohibits sexual harassment, making it an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer, among other things, “to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex[.]”  (42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1).)  Because the workplace environment is one of the terms, 
 
11 
conditions, or privileges of employment, a plaintiff may establish a violation of 
Title VII by showing that discrimination because of sex has created a hostile or 
abusive work environment.  (See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986) 477 U.S. 
57, 64-66 (Meritor).)  Thus, while the wording of Title VII and the FEHA differs 
in some particulars, both statutory schemes regard the prohibition against sexual 
harassment as part and parcel of the proscription against sexual discrimination, 
and “the antidiscriminatory objectives and overriding public policy purposes of the 
two acts are identical.”  (Beyda v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 511, 
517.)4 
In light of these similarities, California courts frequently seek guidance 
from Title VII decisions when interpreting the FEHA and its prohibitions against 
sexual harassment.  (Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 463.)  For instance, we agree 
“with the United States Supreme Court that, to prevail, an employee claiming 
harassment based upon a hostile work environment must demonstrate that the 
conduct complained of was severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the 
conditions of employment and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile 
or abusive to employees because of their sex.  (See Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car 
                                              
4  
“Although the FEHA explicitly prohibits sexual harassment of employees, 
while Title VII does not, the two enactments share the common goal of preventing 
discrimination in the workplace.  Federal courts agree with guidelines established 
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency charged 
with administering Title VII, in viewing sexual harassment as constituting sexual 
discrimination in violation of Title VII.  [Citation.]  In language comparable to 
that found in the FEHA and in [Fair Employment and Housing Commission] 
regulations, federal regulatory guidelines define sexual harassment as including 
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature that has the ‘purpose or effect of unreasonably 
interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive working environment.’  (29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2004).)”  
(Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 463.) 
 
12 
System, Inc. [(1999)] 21 Cal.4th [121,] 130 [(Aguilar)], relying upon Harris v. 
Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993) 510 U.S. 17, 21 [(Harris)].)”  (Miller, supra, 36 
Cal.4th at p. 462, italics added.)  As the high court explained, a workplace may 
give rise to liability when it “is permeated with ‘discriminatory [sex-based] 
intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’ [citation], that is ‘sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive 
working environment[.]’ ”  (Harris, supra, 510 U.S. at p. 21.) 
Under Title VII, a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim 
requires a plaintiff employee to show she was subjected to sexual advances, 
conduct, or comments that were (1) unwelcome (see Meritor, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 
68); (2) because of sex (Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. (1998) 523 
U.S. 75, 80-81 (Oncale)); and (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
conditions of her employment and create an abusive work environment (id. at p. 
81; Meritor, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 67).  In addition, she must establish the 
offending conduct was imputable to her employer.  (Meritor, supra, 477 U.S. at 
pp. 69-73.)  California courts have adopted the same standard for hostile work 
environment sexual harassment claims under the FEHA.  (See, e.g., Fisher v. San 
Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 608 (Fisher).) 
Defendants argue the evidence shown in the summary judgment 
proceeding, even when liberally construed in plaintiff’s favor, was insufficient to 
establish either that the alleged offending conduct was undertaken because of 
plaintiff’s sex, or that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
conditions of her employment.  We address these two elements, and the 
sufficiency of the related facts, below. 
 
13 
a.  Harassment Because of Sex 
In Oncale, supra, 523 U.S. 75, the United States Supreme Court explained 
that “Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the 
workplace; it is directed only at ‘discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex.’ ”  
(Oncale, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 80.)  Consequently, the high court stated, 
“workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is [not] 
automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have 
sexual content or connotations.”  (Ibid.)  Rather, “ ‘[t]he critical issue . . . is 
whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions 
of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.’ ”  (Ibid., 
quoting Harris, supra, 510 U.S. at p. 25 (conc. opn. of Ginsburg, J.).)  This means 
a plaintiff in a sexual harassment suit must show “the conduct at issue was not 
merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted 
‘discrimina[tion] . . . because of . . . sex.’ ”  (Oncale, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 81.) 
For FEHA claims, the discrimination requirement has been phrased 
similarly:  “To plead a cause of action for [hostile work environment] sexual 
harassment, it is ‘only necessary to show that gender is a substantial factor in the 
discrimination, and that if the plaintiff “had been a man she would not have been 
treated in the same manner.” ’  [Citation.]”  (Accardi v. Superior Court (1993) 17 
Cal.App.4th 341, 348 (Accardi); see Birschtein v. New United Motor 
Manufacturing, Inc. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 994, 1001 [quoting Accardi].)  
Accordingly, it is the disparate treatment of an employee on the basis of sex—not 
the mere discussion of sex or use of vulgar language—that is the essence of a 
sexual harassment claim. 
The Fair Employment and Housing Commission (FEHC) is the agency 
charged with administering the FEHA.  Consistent with the FEHA’s public policy 
objective to safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to employment 
 
14 
“without discrimination or abridgement on account of . . . sex” (§ 12920), the 
FEHC declares:  “Employment practices should treat all individuals equally, 
evaluating each on the basis of individual skills, knowledge and abilities and not 
on the basis of characteristics generally attributed to [protected groups].”  (Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7286.3.)  According to the FEHC, “[t]he purpose of the law 
against discrimination in employment because of sex is to eliminate the means by 
which individuals of the female sex have historically been relegated to inferior 
jobs and to guarantee that in the future both sexes will enjoy equal employment 
benefits.”  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7290.6, subd. (b).) 
In the context of sex discrimination, prohibited harassment includes 
“verbal, physical, and visual harassment, as well as unwanted sexual advances.”  
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7291.1, subd. (f)(1).)  In this regard, verbal harassment 
may include epithets, derogatory comments, or slurs on the basis of sex; physical 
harassment may include assault, impeding or blocking movement, or any physical 
interference with normal work or movement, when directed at an individual on the 
basis of sex; and visual harassment may include derogatory posters, cartoons, or 
drawings on the basis of sex.  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7287.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), 
(B) & (C); see Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 461.)  Decisions interpreting Title 
VII are in accord.5 
                                              
5  
E.g., Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc. (9th Cir. 2001) 256 
F.3d 864, 869-870 (verbal abuse); Gregory v. Daly (2d Cir. 2001) 243 F.3d 687, 
692-693 (allegations of demeaning and sexually demeaning comments and 
unwelcome physical contact of a sexual nature); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia 
(3d Cir. 1990) 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (use of derogatory and insulting terms relating 
to women; posting of pornographic pictures in common areas and in the plaintiffs’ 
personal work spaces); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico (1st Cir. 1988) 864 
F.2d 881, 905 (sexually charged nicknames given to the plaintiff and other female 
residents; Playboy centerfolds displayed where residents took their meals and 
conducted meetings; misogynistic verbal attacks constantly made); Bennett v. 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
15 
Both FEHA and Title VII cases recognize that evidence of hostile, sexist 
statements is relevant to show discrimination on the basis of sex.  (See Accardi, 
supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at pp. 348-349; accord, Oncale, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 80 
[actionable hostile work environment may include harassment in such sex-specific 
and derogatory terms as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general 
hostility to the presence of women in the workplace]6; cf. Heyne v. Caruso (9th 
Cir. 1995) 69 F.3d 1475, 1479 [“conduct tending to demonstrate hostility towards 
a certain group” is relevant to show discrimination against an employee who is a 
member of that group].)  However, while the use of vulgar or sexually disparaging 
language may be relevant to show such discrimination, it is not necessarily 
sufficient, by itself, to establish actionable conduct. 
The FEHC concluded in a precedential decision that a FEHA hostile work 
environment sexual harassment claim may be established where, among other 
things, a male employee constantly referred to a female employee using 
demeaning, gender-specific terms.  (Dept. Fair Empl. & Hous. v. Nulton (Sept. 16, 
2003) FEHC Dec. No. 03-10 [2003 WL 22733897, *4, *7] [recognizing the male 
employee’s repeated use of “fucking bitch” and one-time use of “cunt” were 
severe, within the meaning of the FEHA, “given these sex-based terms’ inherently 
degrading and demeaning nature”].)  A number of Title VII decisions have 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
Corroon & Black Corp. (5th Cir. 1988) 845 F.2d 104, 105-106 (display of obscene 
cartoons bearing the plaintiff’s name). 
6  
Oncale suggested a couple of other ways to show that harassing conduct 
constituted discrimination because of sex:  (1) a plaintiff could offer evidence of 
“explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity”; or (2) a plaintiff could “offer 
direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of 
both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.”  (Oncale, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 80-81.) 
 
16 
reached similar conclusions.  (E.g., Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co. (9th Cir. 
1994) 25 F.3d 1459, 1463-1464 [“dumb fucking broads” and “fucking cunts”]; 
Burns v. McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc. (8th Cir. 1993) 989 F.2d 959, 964-
965 [such vulgar and offensive epithets are “ ‘widely recognized as not only 
improper, but as intensely degrading’ ”]; Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, supra, 
895 F.2d at p. 1485 [“pervasive use of derogatory and insulting terms relating to 
women generally and addressed to female employees personally may serve as 
evidence of a hostile environment”].)  In these cases, there was no suggestion that 
male coworkers had been subjected to comparable gender-related epithets and 
sexist insults.  (See Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., supra, 25 F.3d at p. 1463 
[while supervisor was indeed abusive to men, his abuse of women was different, 
relying on “sexual epithets, offensive, explicit references to women’s bodies and 
sexual conduct”]; see also Oncale, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 80-81 [discrimination 
may be shown by “direct comparative evidence” of alleged harasser’s disparate 
treatment of sexes in a mixed-sex workplace].) 
On the other hand, a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim is 
not established where a supervisor or coworker simply uses crude or inappropriate 
language in front of employees or draws a vulgar picture, without directing sexual 
innuendos or gender-related language toward a plaintiff or toward women in 
general.  (E.g., Brown v. Henderson (2d Cir. 2001) 257 F.3d 246, 250, 256 
[coworkers’ steady stream of obscene conversation and vile talk, posting of sexual 
pictures, and drawing of a vulgar picture, did not constitute harassment because of 
sex]; Moore v. Grove North America, Inc. (M.D.Penn. 1996) 927 F.Supp. 824, 830 
[male supervisor’s repeated use of offensive four-letter word to and in front of the 
plaintiff did not create a hostile work environment, where he also swore at her 
male counterparts and did not make sexual innuendos or use gender-related 
language toward the plaintiff or women in general].)  In this connection, it has 
 
17 
been cautioned the term “bitch” is not so sex-specific and derogatory that its mere 
use necessarily constitutes harassment because of sex.  (Galloway v. General 
Motors Service Parts Operations (7th Cir. 1996) 78 F.3d 1164, 1168, rejected on 
other grounds in National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan (2002) 536 
U.S. 101, 117, fn. 11; see Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co. (8th Cir. 2000) 223 
F.3d 721, 737 (opn. of Beam, C.J.) [“mere use of the word ‘bitch,’ without other 
evidence of sex discrimination, is not particularly probative of a general 
misogynist attitude”].) 
Moreover, “comments that have the ‘sexual charge of an Abbott and 
Costello movie’ and that ‘could [easily] be repeated on primetime television’ are 
not the type that trigger Title VII liability.  [Citation.]”  (Jackson v. Racine County 
(E.D.Wis. Sept. 19, 2005 Nos. 02-C-936, 02-C-1262, 02-C-1263) 2005 WL 
2291025, *7 [supervisor’s comment that employee was a “good girl” who earned 
her discipline might be mean or unkind, but was not comparable to the type of 
demeaning slurs giving rise to actionable claims].) 
b.  Conduct Sufficiently Severe or Pervasive to Create a Sexually 
Hostile Work Environment 
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he prohibition of 
harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the 
workplace; it forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the 
‘conditions’ of the victim’s employment” and create a hostile or abusive work 
environment.  (Oncale, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 81.)  “ ‘[W]hether an environment is 
“hostile” or “abusive” can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances 
[including] the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’  (Harris v. 
Forklift Systems, Inc., supra, 510 U.S. at p. 23.)”  (Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 
 
18 
462.)  Therefore, to establish liability in a FEHA hostile work environment sexual 
harassment case, a plaintiff employee must show she was subjected to sexual 
advances, conduct, or comments that were severe enough or sufficiently pervasive 
to alter the conditions of her employment and create a hostile or abusive work 
environment.  (Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 462; Fisher, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 610; accord, Oncale, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 81; Meritor, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 
67).  Although annoying or “merely offensive” comments in the workplace are not 
actionable, conduct that is severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively 
hostile or abusive work environment is unlawful, even if it does not cause 
psychological injury to the plaintiff.  (Harris, supra, 510 U.S. at pp. 21-22.) 
In determining the severity of harassment, “[t]he United States Supreme 
Court has warned that the evidence in a hostile environment sexual harassment 
case should not be viewed too narrowly:  ‘[T]he objective severity of harassment 
should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s 
position, considering “all the circumstances.”  [Citation.] . . .  [T]hat inquiry 
requires careful consideration of the social context in which particular behavior 
occurs and is experienced by its target. . . .  The real social impact of workplace 
behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, 
expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation 
of the words used or the physical acts performed.  Common sense, and an 
appropriate sensibility to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish 
between simple teasing or roughhousing . . . and conduct which a reasonable 
person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.’  (Oncale 
v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. (1998) 523 U.S. 75, 81-82; see also Beyda v. 
City of Los Angeles (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 511, 517-518.)”  (Miller, supra, 36 
Cal.4th at p. 462.) 
 
19 
With respect to the pervasiveness of harassment, courts have held an 
employee generally cannot recover for harassment that is occasional, isolated, 
sporadic, or trivial; rather, the employee must show a concerted pattern of 
harassment of a repeated, routine, or a generalized nature.  (Aguilar, supra, 21 
Cal.4th at p. 131, relying on Fisher, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 610; accord, 
Smith v. Northwest Financial Acceptance, Inc. (10th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 1408, 
1414 [“isolated incidents of harassment, while inappropriate and boorish, do not 
constitute pervasive conduct”].)  That is, when the harassing conduct is not severe 
in the extreme, more than a few isolated incidents must have occurred to prove a 
claim based on working conditions.  (See Herberg v. California Institute of the 
Arts (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 142, 150-153 [liability for sexual harassment may not 
be imposed based on a single incident that does not involve egregious conduct 
akin to a physical assault or the threat thereof]; Walker v. Ford Motor Co. (11th 
Cir. 1982) 684 F.2d 1355, 1359 [involving racial harassment consisting of racial 
slurs and racially offensive comments]; Minority Police Officers Ass’n of South 
Bend v. City of South Bend (N.D.Ind. 1985) 617 F.Supp. 1330, 1353 [same].)  
Moreover, when a plaintiff cannot point to a loss of tangible job benefits, she must 
make a “ ‘commensurately higher showing that the sexually harassing conduct 
was pervasive and destructive of the working environment.’ ”  (Fisher, supra, 214 
Cal.App.3d at p. 610, quoting Jones v. Flagship Intern. (5th Cir. 1986) 793 F.2d 
714, 720.) 
To be actionable, “a sexually objectionable environment must be both 
objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find 
hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.”  
(Faragher v. Boca Raton (1998) 524 U.S. 775, 787; see Harris, supra, 510 U.S. at 
pp. 21-22; Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 518-519.)  
That means a plaintiff who subjectively perceives the workplace as hostile or 
 
20 
abusive will not prevail under the FEHA, if a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s 
position, considering all the circumstances, would not share the same perception.  
Likewise, a plaintiff who does not perceive the workplace as hostile or abusive 
will not prevail, even if it objectively is so. 
One issue of particular relevance to this case concerns the parties’ 
disagreement over whether or not plaintiff was a “victim” of the defendant writers’ 
harassing conduct.  As set forth below, a plaintiff may be a victim of sexually 
harassing conduct, even though it is not directed at her and instead is aimed at 
other women in the workplace, but the absence of direct harassment affects the 
showing she is required to make. 
“To state that an employee must be the direct victim of the sexually 
harassing conduct is somewhat misleading as an employee who is subjected to a 
hostile work environment is a victim of sexual harassment even though no 
offensive remarks or touchings are directed to or perpetrated upon that employee.”  
(Fisher, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 610, fn. 8.)  Generally, however, sexual 
conduct that involves or is aimed at persons other than the plaintiff is considered 
less offensive and severe than conduct that is directed at the plaintiff.  (See 
Gleason v. Mesirow Financial Inc. (7th Cir. 1997) 118 F.3d 1134, 1144 [“the 
impact of ‘second-hand harassment’ is obviously not as great as the impact of 
harassment directed at the plaintiff”]; Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc. (6th Cir. 1997) 
104 F.3d 822, 826 [fact that most comments were not directed at the plaintiff 
weakened her harassment claim]; Jackson v. Racine County (E.D.Wis. 2005) 2005 
WL 2291025, *7 [comments made to the plaintiffs about the appearance of other 
female employees bear less weight than the comments directed toward the 
plaintiffs themselves].)  A hostile work environment sexual harassment claim by a 
plaintiff who was not personally subjected to offensive remarks and touchings 
requires “an even higher showing” than a claim by one who had been sexually 
 
21 
harassed without suffering tangible job detriment:  such a plaintiff must “establish 
that the sexually harassing conduct permeated [her] direct work environment.”  
(Fisher, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 610.) 
To meet this burden, the plaintiff generally must show that the harassment 
directed at others was in her immediate work environment, and that she personally 
witnessed it.  (Fisher, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 611.)  The reason for this is 
obvious:  if the plaintiff does not witness the incidents involving others, “those 
incidents cannot affect . . . her perception of the hostility of the work 
environment.”  (Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 519.)7 
In Fisher, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d 590, a case decided in the context of a 
demurrer, a plaintiff surgical nurse alleged a defendant physician had created a 
hostile work environment for her by his sexual harassment of other women 
employees in her presence.  Although her allegations described in general terms 
what acts occurred and their location,8 the Court of Appeal found them 
                                              
7  
Beyda v. City of Los Angeles found that “a reasonable person may be 
affected by knowledge that other workers are being sexually harassed in the 
workplace, even if he or she does not personally witness that conduct.”  (Beyda, 
supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 519, italics added.)  We need not address that 
conclusion in this case.  Because plaintiff represented under penalty of perjury that 
she has personal knowledge of the incidents described in her declaration, we shall 
not assume plaintiff did not personally witness those incidents. 
8  
In Fisher, the plaintiff’s allegations concerning the defendant’s acts 
included:  “ ‘[P]ulling nurses onto his lap, hugging and kissing them while 
wiggling, making offensive statements of a sexual nature, moving his hands in the 
direction of [a] woman’s vaginal area, grabbing women from the back with his 
hands on their breasts or in the area of their breasts, picking up women and 
swinging them around, throwing a woman on a gurney, walking up closely behind 
a woman with movements of his pelvic area.  [Ms. Fisher] saw him commit acts of 
sexual harassment against [three named] nurses.  The acts were committed in 
hallways, the operating room, and the lunch room . . . from 1982 to 1986.  None of 
the women welcomed the advances and indicated to [the defendant] they were 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
22 
insufficient to establish a cause of action for environmental sexual harassment 
because they were “most conclusionary” regarding what conduct the plaintiff 
actually observed.  (Fisher, at p. 613.)  As a matter of fairness given the ease with 
which these claims can be made despite their serious nature, the court concluded, 
“a plaintiff should be required to plead sufficient facts to establish a nexus 
between the alleged sexual harassment of others, her observation of that conduct 
and the work context in which it occurred.”  (Ibid.)  In explaining why it found the 
complaint deficient, the court observed the allegations gave no indication of the 
frequency, intensity, or timeliness with which the alleged acts occurred (e.g., “Did 
each alleged act occur once in four years” or “on a daily or weekly basis?”; What 
alleged incidents occurred “within the FEHA’s one-year statute of limitations 
(§ 12960)?”), and pled only a legal conclusion regarding the alleged lewd remarks.  
(Fisher, at pp. 613-614.)  In sum, the court concluded, the plaintiff did “not 
sufficiently plead [she] was subjected to a pattern of pervasive sexual harassment.”  
(Id. at p. 614.)  In so holding, the court nonetheless deemed it prudent to allow the 
plaintiff to amend her complaint because the law it announced concerned a matter 
of first impression.  (Id. at p. 622.) 
3. Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Factual Showing 
We now apply the governing legal principles to the record before us. 
As indicated, a defendant moving for summary judgment meets its burden 
of showing that a cause of action has no merit by establishing that one or more 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
offensive by moving away from him, avoiding him whenever possible, or telling 
him to stop.  [The plaintiff] also was forced to hear [the defendant] make lewd 
remarks about the breasts of anesthetized female patients.’ ”  (Fisher, supra, 214 
Cal.App.3d at pp. 612-613.) 
 
23 
elements of the cause of action cannot be established.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, 
subds. (a), (o)(1).) 
Here, defendants met that burden in their moving papers.  First, they 
pointed to plaintiff’s concessions that none of the three male writers’ offensive 
conduct involved or was aimed at her.  Second, considering the totality of the 
circumstances, especially the nature of the writers’ work, the facts largely forming 
the basis of plaintiff’s sexual harassment action—(1) the writers’ sexual antics, 
including their pantomiming of masturbation, their drawing in the cheerleader 
coloring book, their altering words on scripts and calendars to spell out male and 
female body parts, (2) their graphic discussions about their personal sexual 
experiences, sexual preferences, and preferences in women, and (3) their bragging 
about their personal sexual exploits with girlfriends and wives—did not present a 
triable issue whether the writers engaged in harassment “because of . . . sex.”  
(§ 12940, subd. (j)(1).) 
There is no dispute Friends was a situation comedy that featured young 
sexually active adults and sexual humor geared primarily toward adults.  Aired 
episodes of the show often used sexual and anatomical language, innuendo, 
wordplay, and physical gestures to create humor concerning sex, including oral 
sex, anal sex, heterosexual sex, gay sex, “talking dirty” during sex, premature 
ejaculation, pornography, pedophiles, and “threesomes.”  The circumstance that 
this was a creative workplace focused on generating scripts for an adult-oriented 
comedy show featuring sexual themes is significant in assessing the existence of 
triable issues of facts regarding whether the writers’ sexual antics and coarse 
sexual talk were aimed at plaintiff or at women in general, whether plaintiff and 
other women were singled out to see and hear what happened, and whether the 
conduct was otherwise motivated by plaintiff’s gender. 
 
24 
Here, the record shows that the instances of sexual antics and sexual 
discussions identified above did not involve and were not aimed at plaintiff or any 
other female employee.  It further confirms that such “nondirected” conduct was 
undertaken in group sessions with both male and female participants present, and 
that women writers on the Friends production also discussed their own sexual 
experiences to generate material for the show.  That the writers commonly 
engaged in discussions of personal sexual experiences and preferences and used 
physical gesturing while brainstorming and generating script ideas for this 
particular show was neither surprising nor unreasonable from a creative 
standpoint.  Indeed, plaintiff testified that, when told during her interview for the 
Friends position that “the humor could get a little lowbrow in the writers’ room,” 
she responded she would have no problem because previously she had worked 
around writers and knew what to expect.  Although plaintiff contends the writers 
“sorely understated the actual climate” of the writers’ room in her interview, these 
types of sexual discussions and jokes (especially those relating to the writers’ 
personal experiences) did in fact provide material for actual scripts.9  The fact that 
certain discussions did not lead to specific jokes or dialogue airing on the show 
merely reflected the creative process at work and did not serve to convert such 
nondirected conduct into harassment because of sex.10 
                                              
9  
Of course, explicit sexual references typically were replaced with 
innuendos, imagery, similes, allusions, puns, or metaphors in order to convey 
sexual themes in a form suitable for broadcast on network television.  For 
example, “motherfucker” was replaced with “mother kisser,” “testicles” with 
“balls,” and “anal sex” with “in the stern.” 
10  
In her brief on the merits, plaintiff refers to evidence that Reich “once” 
looked straight at her when he told a joke where a woman was the brunt of a 
tampon joke.  But the record discloses no facts indicating what the particular joke 
was or whether it was sexist, lewd, or degrading.  Without more, this evidence 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
25 
Moreover, although plaintiff contended in her deposition that much of the 
three writers’ vulgar discussions and conduct wasted her time, there was no 
indication the conduct affected the work hours or duties of plaintiff and her male 
counterparts in a disparate manner.  Accordingly, while the conduct certainly was 
tinged with “sexual content” and sexual “connotations,” a reasonable trier of fact 
could not find, based on the facts presented here, that “ ‘members of one sex 
[were] exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which 
members of the other sex [were] not exposed’ ” (Oncale, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 80), 
or that if plaintiff “ ‘ “had been a man she would not have been treated in the same 
manner” ’ ” (Accardi, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 348). 
The circumstances surrounding the nondirected sexual antics and sexual 
talk are plainly distinguishable from the circumstances concerning somewhat 
similar conduct found actionable in Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions, Inc. (4th 
Cir. 2003) 335 F.3d 325 (Ocheltree).  In Ocheltree, a case involving employees 
working at a costume production shop, the record showed that the plaintiff’s male 
coworkers engaged in a daily stream of sexually explicit discussions and conduct:  
they spoke in crude terms of their sexual exploits with their wives and girlfriends; 
they used a female-form mannequin to demonstrate sexual techniques; one sang a 
vulgar song to the plaintiff; and another showed the plaintiff a magazine with 
graphic photographs of men with pierced genitalia to get her reaction.  (Id. at pp. 
328-329.)  In that case, the appellate court affirmed an award of compensatory 
damages to the plaintiff because “[a] reasonable jury could find that much of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
fails to raise a triable issue of fact that the writers’ coarse sexual talk and conduct 
involved, or was aimed at, plaintiff because of her gender. 
 
26 
sex-laden and sexist talk and conduct in the production shop was aimed at [the 
plaintiff] because of sex—specifically, that the men behaved as they did to make 
her uncomfortable and self-conscious as the only woman in the workplace.”  (Id. 
at pp. 332-333; see id. at p. 327.) 
Unlike the situation presented in Ocheltree, the record here reflects a 
workplace where comedy writers were paid to create scripts highlighting adult-
themed sexual humor and jokes, and where members of both sexes contributed 
and were exposed to the creative process spawning such humor and jokes.  In this 
context, the defendant writers’ nondirected sexual antics and sexual talk did not 
contribute to an environment in which women and men were treated disparately.  
Moreover, there was nothing to suggest the defendants engaged in this particular 
behavior to make plaintiff uncomfortable or self-conscious, or to intimidate, 
ridicule, or insult her, as was the case in Ocheltree. 
During the discovery process, plaintiff testified her FEHA claim 
additionally was predicated on what the writers said they would like to do sexually 
to the different female cast members on Friends, and jokes that defendant Chase 
had missed a sexual opportunity with one of the actresses.  The writers also made 
demeaning comments about another of the actresses, asking whether she was 
competent in sexually servicing her boyfriend and remarking she probably had 
“dried twigs” or “dried branches” in her vagina. 
Unlike the writers’ nondirected conduct, these particular comments support 
at least an inference that certain women working on the production of Friends 
were targeted for personal insult and derogation because of their sex, while the 
men working there were not.  The question remains, however, whether the 
comments were sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a sexually hostile work 
environment. 
 
27 
The evidence in the summary judgment proceeding showed that plaintiff 
named the two actresses as the only women on the production about whom the 
writers specifically made these offensive sex-based comments.  As far as the two 
actresses were concerned, the conduct was not severe or pervasive:  no sexual 
assault, threat of assault, sexual propositioning, or unwelcome physical contact 
occurred; nor did the conduct amount to verbal abuse or harassment, inasmuch as 
the actresses were not even present to hear the writers’ offensive remarks and, 
apparently, had no awareness of what had been said. 
Because the derogatory comments did not involve plaintiff, she was 
obligated to set forth specific facts from which a reasonable trier of fact could find 
the conduct “permeated” her direct workplace environment and was “ ‘pervasive 
and destructive.’ ”  (Fisher, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 610.)  In this connection, 
plaintiff points to her deposition testimony that she was too appalled, mortified, 
and offended by these comments (and the other conduct complained of) to speak, 
and to her later declaration that the conduct caused her “severe distress.”  Other 
parts of her testimony, however, revealed she viewed the writers and their conduct 
as puerile and annoying, rather than extreme or destructive:  she testified the 
writers’ room was “like being in a junior high locker room” and described the 
writers as “pimply-faced teenagers” and “silly little boys” who engaged in “very 
juvenile, counterproductive behavior” when they “spen[t] their time doing 
drawings” in the cheerleader coloring book and “discussing lewd things.”  But 
even where seemingly contradictory testimony like this is offered regarding a 
plaintiff’s subjective perceptions, courts will not hesitate to find in favor of a 
defendant where the record does not establish an objectively hostile work 
environment.  (E.g., Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., supra, 104 F.3d at pp. 824-826 
[reversing a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff where fact that most of the 
 
28 
offensive comments at issue were not directed at her contributed to court’s 
conclusion that the conduct was not sufficiently severe].) 
Plaintiff acknowledged the writers made references to the one actress’s 
fertility and the “dried branches in her vagina” on only one occasion.  Plaintiff did 
not, however, offer specific facts regarding how often or on how many occasions 
the writers engaged in the graphic sexual jokes and talk about the other actress.  
Although plaintiff testified that, in the four months she worked on Friends, Malins 
and Chase constantly bantered about Chase’s missed sexual opportunity with that 
actress, her declarations indicated that some of more graphic comments were made 
only once or “at least twice.”  (See ante, fn. 2.)  Without more, a reasonable trier 
of fact could not conclude that these reported comments concerning the two 
actresses “permeated” plaintiff’s direct work environment, or that they were 
“ ‘pervasive and destructive of [that] environment,’ ” so as to allow recovery 
despite the fact plaintiff was not personally subjected to offensive remarks or 
touchings and did not suffer a tangible job detriment.  (Fisher, supra, 214 
Cal.App.3d at p. 610.) 
In opposing defendants’ summary judgment motion, plaintiff offered 
additional evidence of offensive gender-related language.  Specifically, she 
submitted two declarations in which she claimed to have heard defendants Chase, 
Malins, and Reich refer to women who displeased them or made them mad as 
“cunts” and “bitches.”  (See Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., supra, 25 F.3d at 
pp. 1463-1464; Burns v. McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc., supra, 989 F.2d at 
pp. 964-965; Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, supra, 895 F.2d at p. 1485.)  But 
plaintiff made no claim the writers ever referred to her by those terms, either to her 
 
29 
face or to others, and she gave no indication whether the writers used gender-
related epithets with reference to men in comparable situations.11 
Even when we consider this belated presentation of epithets in the 
workplace, we find it insufficient to warrant reversal of the summary judgment 
order.  Plaintiff made only three brief references to the topic in her declarations,12 
and those references failed to set forth “specific facts showing that a triable issue 
of material fact exists” as to the objective severity or pervasiveness of the 
incidents.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  Although plaintiff was 
reasonably specific in describing the one telephone reference to Marta Kauffman, 
she otherwise was not, merely indicating the writers used the epithets when they 
were displeased or mad.  The missing context is especially significant here, 
because one of the reported epithets (“bitch”) was not a term that was necessarily 
misogynistic (see Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co., supra, 223 F.3d at p. 737 
(opn. of Beam, C.J.)), or even unsuitable for broadcast television (see Jackson v. 
Racine County, supra, 2005 WL 2291025, *7).  Indeed, in one Friends episode, 
the character Chandler addressed the character Monica by that term.  Additionally, 
                                              
11  
Although plaintiff’s evidence also showed the writers regularly referred to 
women’s anatomies by certain vulgar terms, her evidence further disclosed the 
writers regularly referred to men’s anatomies with comparable vulgar terms.  No 
disparity of treatment on this point appears. 
12  
The three references consisted of the following:  “Greg Malins, Adam 
Chase and Andrew Reich would also use and refer to women as ‘cunts[,’] but 
Marta Kauffman didn’t approve of that word, so they wouldn’t use it when she 
was in the room.”  “Adam Chase once called Mar[t]a Kauffman a cunt in a phone 
conversation with me on a weekend while I was at home.”  “Throughout the time I 
worked on ‘Friends’ Greg Malins, Adam Chase and Andrew Reich regularly 
referred to women that had displeased them or made them mad as bitches or 
cunts.”  In her deposition testimony, Kauffman affirmed that she hated the word 
“cunt,” and that people did not use that term when she was in the room. 
 
30 
plaintiff asserted the three writers used epithets “regularly” when they were 
displeased or mad, but she did not specify the number of times or the frequency 
with which this happened.  Her vagueness about this point and the circumstances 
surrounding the incidents did not aid in showing that use of epithets contributed to 
an objectively abusive or hostile work environment. 
Plaintiff’s showing regarding her subjective perceptions of the epithet 
incidents also appeared deficient.  Specifically, she acknowledged the writers 
refrained from using the word “cunt” around one woman, Kauffman, who 
expressly disapproved its use.  Although Kauffman was an executive producer 
who wielded authority plaintiff did not have, plaintiff offered no facts showing 
that plaintiff (or others) ever complained about the epithets, or that she felt she 
could not complain (even to Kauffman), or that any complaint she made was 
ignored.  (Cf. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 684 F.2d at p. 1359, fn. 2 [fact 
that many of the racial epithets were not directed at the plaintiff was not 
determinative where such offensive language often was used in the plaintiff’s 
presence after he had voiced objections].)  Moreover, plaintiff made no mention of 
the epithets in her deposition when asked at that time to identify all instances of 
the writers’ conduct she claimed was harassing or offensive.  Her declarations 
provided no explanation whatsoever for their belated disclosure in the summary 
judgment proceeding. 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, whether we view the epithet 
evidence by itself, or in conjunction with the evidence of the actress-related 
comments, we are unable to conclude a reasonable trier of fact could, on the 
meager facts shown, find the conduct of the three male writers was sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment.  (See Kortan v. 
California Youth Authority (9th Cir. 2000) 217 F.3d 1104, 1110-1111 [plaintiff 
could not show her supervisor’s conduct was frequent, severe, or abusive enough 
 
31 
to interfere unreasonably with her employment where he occasionally directed 
sexual insults at other female employees in her presence and where his offensive 
conduct toward her was concentrated on one occasion following a work dispute].) 
In urging affirmance of the Court of Appeal judgment, plaintiff contends 
there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether the writers’ offensive conduct 
was part of the creative process leading to scripts and a necessary part of their 
work, or whether it was undertaken purely for their own personal sexual 
gratification.  In support of this point, she cites the evidence that defendants 
engaged in vulgar behavior outside of the writers’ room, for example, in the 
hallways or near her desk.  Additionally, some of the derogatory comments 
concerning the actresses occurred in the writers’ room.13  In this regard, the Court 
of Appeal concluded:  “to the extent defendants can establish the recounting of 
sexual exploits, real and imagined, the making of lewd gestures and the displaying 
of crude pictures denigrating women was within ‘the scope of necessary job 
performance’ and not engaged in for purely personal gratification or out of 
meanness or bigotry or other personal motives, defendants may be able to show 
their conduct should not be viewed as harassment.”14 
                                              
13  
Plaintiff points to evidence she was told to not take notes about these and 
the other discussions at issue, and the fact that none of her notes from the show 
reflects such discussions. 
14  
In support of this reasoning, the Court of Appeal relied on decisions that, in 
the specific context of determining who may be held liable for discrimination 
under the FEHA, described harassment as consisting “ ‘of conduct outside the 
scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal 
gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives.’ ”  
(Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 643, 646 [quoting Janken v. GM Hughes 
Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 63, and holding that the FEHA, like Title 
VII, allows plaintiffs to sue and hold liable their employers for discrimination, but 
not their supervisors as individuals].) 
 
32 
We agree with this passage insofar as it suggests the circumstances 
pertaining to an employer’s type of work and to the job duties and responsibilities 
of a plaintiff and her alleged harassers are properly considered in determining 
whether the harassers said or did things because of the plaintiff’s sex and whether 
the subject conduct altered the terms or conditions of employment.  But summary 
judgment was proper here because, as demonstrated above, none of the offensive 
conduct complained of meets both the “because of sex” and “severe or pervasive” 
requirements for establishing a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim.  
(See Oncale, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 81 [in emphasizing the importance of social 
context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced, the high court 
remarked in dictum that a professional football player’s working environment is 
not severely or pervasively abusive if the coach engages in the unnecessary act of 
“smack[ing] him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field”].)  That is, while the 
record conceivably reflects a triable issue of fact as to whether some of 
defendants’ offensive comments were directed at women because of their sex and 
hence unnecessary to the work (i.e., the reported gender-related epithets and the 
comments involving the actresses), the facts plaintiff offered simply are 
insufficient to establish that any such conduct was severe enough or sufficiently 
pervasive to be actionable.  Moreover, assuming arguendo the incidents taking 
place in the hallways somehow could be deemed unnecessary to the work 
generated inside the writers’ room, there is no indication these other incidents 
involved or were aimed at plaintiff or any other female employee, or that they 
appeared materially different from the type of sexual joking and discussions 
occurring in the writers’ room that actually led to material for scripts. 
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeal relied on a number 
of authorities for the proposition that evidence of misogynous, demeaning, 
offensive, obscene, sexually explicit, and degrading words and conduct in the 
 
33 
workplace is relevant to prove environmental sexual harassment.  (E.g., Kotcher v. 
Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc. (2d Cir. 1992) 957 F.2d 59; Lipsett v. 
University of Puerto Rico, supra, 864 F.2d 881; Robinson v. Jacksonville 
Shipyards, Inc. (M.D.Fla. 1991) 760 F.Supp. 1486; see also Ways v. City of 
Lincoln (8th Cir. 1989) 871 F.2d 750.)  We have no quarrel with that proposition, 
but those authorities do not support reversal of the summary judgment granted in 
this case.  To the extent the courts in those cases found evidence sufficient to 
sustain a claim of a hostile work environment sexual harassment, such evidence 
included incidents that were directed at the plaintiff and circumstances that were 
discernibly more severe or pervasive than those at issue here. 
Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., supra, 957 F.2d 59, 
for example, involved evidence that a male supervisor commented on one 
plaintiff’s bodily “equipment,” and made numerous comments about the breasts of 
another plaintiff and left bruises on her arm on one occasion when he grabbed her.  
He often also pretended to masturbate and ejaculate at the two plaintiffs behind 
their backs to express his anger with them, often in front of others at the 
workplace.  (Id. at p. 61.) 
Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, supra, 864 F.2d 881, found the 
plaintiff established a prima facie case of hostile work environment by presenting, 
inter alia, evidence of a barrage of commentary by male residents that women in 
general, and that the plaintiff in particular, should not be surgeons; repeated and 
unwelcome sexual advances made to the plaintiff by two doctors; the plastering of 
degrading pinups—including Playboy centerfolds, a sexually explicit drawing of 
the plaintiff’s body, and a list of sexually charged nicknames of female 
residents—on the walls of the male residents’ rest facility; and the sexually 
demeaning nickname given to the plaintiff.  (Id. at pp. 903-905 [relying on Title 
 
34 
VII law in action alleging violations of, inter alia, title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. § 1681)].) 
In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., supra, 760 F.Supp. 1486, the 
plaintiff, a shipyard worker, presented evidence that she suffered nonsexual 
harassing behavior, including verbal abuse and shunning, because she was a 
female; incidents of directed sexual behavior both before and after she lodged 
complaints about the posting of numerous sexually oriented and pornographic 
pictures of nude and partially nude women in various work areas; and visual 
assault from the posting of the pictures themselves, which were disproportionately 
offensive or demeaning to women and sexualized the work environment to the 
detriment of all female employees.  (Id. at p. 1523.) 
Finally, Ways v. City of Lincoln, supra, 871 F.2d 750, affirmed a finding of 
a racially hostile work environment where a plaintiff police officer offered a 
nonexhaustive list of 50 examples of specific racially offensive slurs, jokes, 
comments, and cartoons directed either to him or to Blacks and American Indians 
in general in his 16 years at a police department.  (Id. at pp. 753-755.) 
A case plaintiff relies on, White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections 
(1st Cir. 2000) 221 F.3d 254, is of the same ilk.  White expressly observed that 
“[t]he plaintiff pointed to numerous comments made by other employees either to 
or about her which were ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of 
[her] employment,’ ” including sexual remarks and innuendos accusing her of 
having a sexual affair with an inmate, as well as daily sexual conversations and 
jokes that involved and were directed to her.  (White, at pp. 260-261, italics 
added.) 
Nor does Fisher, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d 590, support reversal of the 
summary judgment.  As indicated, the Court of Appeal in that case held the 
plaintiff’s allegations insufficient to state a FEHA cause of action for 
 
35 
environmental sexual harassment, but allowed the plaintiff to amend her complaint 
because the requirements it announced concerned a matter of first impression.  
(Fisher, at p. 622.)  Plaintiff’s lack of specificity in the summary judgment 
proceeding here does not warrant similar leniency.  The standards governing the 
“because of sex” and “severe or pervasive” requirements for this type of action 
were not uncertain at the time of defendants’ motion.  (Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 
p. 462, and cases cited.)  Likewise, there was no confusion regarding the 
plaintiff’s burden in opposing a summary judgment motion to “set forth the 
specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists” as to her cause of 
action.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) 
B.  Constitutional Rights of Free Speech 
In affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, we 
have concluded plaintiff’s factual showing of the writers’ sexually coarse and 
vulgar language does not establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment 
sexual harassment.  In light of that conclusion, we have no occasion to determine 
whether liability for such language might infringe on defendants’ rights of free 
speech under the First Amendment to the federal Constitution or the state 
Constitution.  (Accord, DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n (5th Cir. 
1995) 51 F.3d 591, 596-597.) 
CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION 
When we apply the legal principles governing sexual harassment claims, 
and give plaintiff the benefit of the rules governing review of summary judgment 
orders, we conclude defendants have shown that plaintiff has not established, and 
cannot reasonably expect to establish, a prima facie case of hostile workplace 
environment sexual harassment. 
 
36 
In reaching this conclusion, we do not suggest the use of sexually coarse 
and vulgar language in the workplace can never constitute harassment because of 
sex; indeed, language similar to that at issue here might well establish actionable 
harassment depending on the circumstances.  Nor do we imply that employees 
generally should be free, without employer restriction, to engage in sexually 
coarse and vulgar language or conduct at the workplace.  We simply recognize 
that, like Title VII, the FEHA is “not a ‘civility code’ and [is] not designed to rid 
the workplace of vulgarity.”  (Sheffield v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Social 
Services (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 153, 161; accord, Oncale, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 
81.)  While the FEHA prohibits harassing conduct that creates a work environment 
that is hostile or abusive on the basis of sex, it does not outlaw sexually coarse and 
vulgar language or conduct that merely offends. 
We remand the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to affirm the 
summary judgment insofar as it pertains to plaintiff’s sexual harassment cause of 
action and for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.  In 
this regard, we observe the Court of Appeal concluded defendants’ challenges to 
plaintiff’s racial harassment cause of action were lacking in merit at least partly 
for the reasons it concluded their sexual harassment contentions were lacking in 
merit.  We direct the Court of Appeal to reconsider and decide all issues in a 
manner consistent with the instant opinion, including those related to the racial 
harassment cause of action and those respecting the attorney fees award. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J.
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
I agree that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of 
defendants under the relevant statutes.  I write separately to explain that any other 
result would violate free speech rights under the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and its California counterpart, article I, section 2, of the 
California Constitution (hereafter collectively the First Amendment). 
This case has very little to do with sexual harassment and very much to do 
with core First Amendment free speech rights.  The writers of the television show, 
Friends, were engaged in a creative process—writing adult comedy—when the 
alleged harassing conduct occurred.  The First Amendment protects creativity.  
(Winter v. DC Comics (2003) 30 Cal.4th 881, 888, 891.)  Friends was 
entertainment, but entertainment is fully entitled to First Amendment protection.  
“There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment 
protection.”  (Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. (1977) 433 U.S. 562, 
578; see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson (1952) 343 U.S. 495, 501-502 [First 
Amendment protects motion pictures].)  “ ‘[T]he constitutional guarantees of 
freedom of expression apply with equal force to the publication whether it be a 
news report or an entertainment feature.’ ”  (Gates v. Discovery Communications, 
Inc. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 679, 695.)  Scripts of the Friends show “ ‘are no less 
protected because they provide humorous rather than serious commentary.’ ”  
(Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 387, 406.) 
 
 
2
We have found that the First Amendment protects even threatening speech 
that does not rise to a criminal threat.  (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620 
[dark poetry in school].)  Similarly, we should protect the creative speech here.  I 
do not suggest that the First Amendment protects all sexually harassing speech.  
Just as criminal threats are beyond protection (In re George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th 
at p. 630; People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 228-229), so too may the state 
proscribe sexual harassment.  But the proscription must be carefully tailored to 
avoid infringing on First Amendment free speech rights in the creative process. 
Balancing the compelling need to protect employees from sexual 
harassment with free speech rights can, in some contexts, present very difficult 
questions.  For example, a potential, and sometimes real, tension between free 
speech and antiharassment laws exists even in the ordinary workplace.  (See, e.g., 
Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 131, fn. 3, 136-
137, fn. 5 (Aguilar); see also id. at pp. 147-169 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.); id. at 
pp. 169-176 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); id. at pp. 176-189 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.); 
id. at pp. 189-196 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.).)  Debating these issues has kept 
academia occupied.  (See, e.g., Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace 
Harassment (1992) 39 U.C.L.A. L.Rev.1791 (Volokh) [generally defending free 
speech against harassment laws unless the hostile speech is directed towards the 
plaintiff]; Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual 
Harassment and the First Amendment:  No Collision in Sight (1995) 47 Rutgers 
L.Rev. 461 [generally defending antiharassment laws against First Amendment 
attack and disagreeing with much of Professor Volokh’s argument]; Volokh, How 
Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech (1995) 47 Rutgers L.  Rev. 563 [Professor 
Volokh’s response to Professor Sangree]; McGowan, Certain Illusions About 
Speech:  Why the Free-Speech Critique of Hostile Work Environment Harassment 
Is Wrong (2002) 19 Const. Comment. 391 (McGowan) [generally defending 
 
 
3
antiharassment laws against First Amendment attack]; see also Aguilar, supra, at 
pp. 136-137, fn. 5.) 
But the issue here is quite different.  In Aguilar, supra, 21 Cal.4th 121, the 
workplace was a car rental company.  Creative expression was not the company’s 
product.  Here, by contrast, the product, a comedy show, was itself expression.  
Questions regarding free speech rights in the ordinary workplace—where speech 
is not an integral part of the product—can be difficult, as the five separate 
opinions in Aguilar attest.  I need not, and do not, go into these questions here, 
because this case presents an entirely different and, to my mind, rather 
straightforward constitutional question.  When, as here, the workplace product is 
the creative expression itself, free speech rights are paramount.  The Friends 
writers were not renting cars and talking about sex on the side.  They were writing 
adult comedy; sexual repartee was an integral part of the process. 
Lawsuits like this one, directed at restricting the creative process in a 
workplace whose very business is speech related, present a clear and present 
danger to fundamental free speech rights.  Even academics who generally defend 
antiharassment law against First Amendment attack recognize the importance of 
defending the First Amendment in a context like this.  (E.g., McGowan, supra, 19 
Const. Comment. at pp. 393, 425-431 [concluding, on p. 431, “In expressive 
workplaces that foster, support, and encourage debate, discussion, and plural 
opinions, the First Amendment insulates much more.”].) 
For example, Professor McGowan contrasts two workplace situations 
involving the display of Playboy Magazine centerfolds:  (1) at a shipyard where 
only one woman is employed as a welder, and (2) in a museum where centerfolds 
were displayed “to document changes in American visions of female beauty.”  
(McGowan, supra, 19 Const. Comment. at p. 391.)  McGowan argues that free 
speech rights must yield to antiharassment law in the first case.  But she agrees 
 
 
4
that the museum is an expressive workplace and, as such, is entitled to First 
Amendment protection.  This case is like the second situation, not the first.  As 
Professor Volokh explains, the free speech problem is especially serious “if the 
speech that creates the hostile work environment is an inherent part of the 
employer’s business.”  (Volokh, supra, 39 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. at p. 1853.)  “It seems 
clear that, say, a female employee of an art gallery—or a female employee of an 
adult bookstore—cannot claim that sexually explicit materials in the workplace are 
creating a hostile work environment.”  (Id. at p. 1861.) 
The writers here did at times go to extremes in the creative process.  They 
pushed the limits—hard.  Some of what they did might be incomprehensible to 
people unfamiliar with the creative process.  But that is what creative people 
sometimes have to do.  As explained in an amicus curiae brief representing the 
Writers Guild of America, West, Inc.; the Directors Guild of America; the Screen 
Actors Guild; and 131 named individuals representing a “who’s who” of television 
and motion picture writers and directors (hereafter the Writers Guild brief), “the 
process creators go through to capture the necessary magic is inexact, 
counterintuitive, nonlinear, often painful—and above all, delicate.  And the 
problem is even more complicated for group writing.”  “Group writing,” the brief 
explains, “requires an atmosphere of complete trust.  Writers must feel not only 
that it’s all right to fail, but also that they can share their most private and darkest 
thoughts without concern for ridicule or embarrassment or legal accountability.”  
The brief quotes Steven Bochco, cocreator of Hill Street Blues, L.A. Law, and 
NYPD Blue, and one of the individuals the brief represents, as explaining that a 
“certain level of intimacy is required to do the work at its best, and so there is an 
implicit contract among the writers:  what is said in the room, stays in the room.”  
The brief further explains that “with adult audiences in particular, the characters, 
dialogue, and stories must ring true.  That means on shows like Law and Order, 
 
 
5
ER, or The Sopranos, writers must tap into places in their experience or psyches 
that most of us are far too polite or self-conscious to bring up.” 
The creative process must be unfettered, especially because it can often 
take strange turns, as many bizarre and potentially offensive ideas are suggested, 
tried, and, in the end, either discarded or used.  As the Writers Guild brief notes, 
“All in the Family pushed the limits in its day, but with race rather than sex.”  The 
brief quotes Norman Lear, All in the Family’s creator, and another of the 
individuals on whose behalf the brief was filed, as saying, “We were dealing with 
racism and constantly on dangerous ground. . . .  We cleaned up a lot of what was 
said in the room, and some people still found it offensive.”  It is hard to imagine 
All in the Family having been successfully written if the writers and others 
involved in the creative process had to fear lawsuits by employees who claimed to 
be offended by the process of discovering what worked and did not work, what 
was funny and what was not funny, that led to the racial and ethnic humor actually 
used in the show. 
“[S]peech may not be prohibited because it concerns subjects offending our 
sensibilities.”  (Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) 535 U.S. 234, 245.)  We 
must not permit juries to dissect the creative process in order to determine what 
was necessary to achieve the final product and what was not, and to impose 
liability for sexual harassment for that portion deemed unnecessary.  Creativity is, 
by its nature, creative.  It is unpredictable.  Much that is not obvious can be 
necessary to the creative process.  Accordingly, courts may not constitutionally 
ask whether challenged speech was necessary for its intended purpose.  (Shulman 
v. Group W. Productions, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 200, 229.)  “The courts do not, 
and constitutionally could not, sit as superior editors of the press.”  (Ibid.) 
For this reason, it is meaningless to argue, as plaintiff does, that much of 
what occurred in this process did not make its way into the actual shows.  The 
 
 
6
First Amendment also protects attempts at creativity that end in failure.  That 
which ends up on the cutting room floor is also part of the creative process.  An 
amicus curiae brief representing, among others, the American Booksellers 
Foundation for Free Expression explains:  “To require the participants to justify 
after the fact the ‘necessity’ of minor segments of the creative process represents a 
misunderstanding of the creative process.  That process usually includes many 
dead ends that are not reflected in the final work.  But the dead ends are part of 
creating the final work; the fact that one approach or suggestion is not productive 
is part of the process of creatively reaching end result.  In that sense the dead ends, 
as well as everything else in the creative process, are necessary.” 
The Writers Guild brief explains it similarly.  “[T]he creative person tr[ies] 
one notion after another before coming up with the final product.  Writers are like 
scavengers and get their ideas wherever they can:  ‘Ninety percent of everything 
doesn’t work,’ says Lear, ‘That’s why it’s so hard, that’s why you spend so much 
time there.’ . . .  Lear puts it this way:  ‘There were things we said we would never 
print.  That’s true of racism or any touchy subject.  That’s what it takes to make a 
great show:  smart people sitting in a room, going wherever they want.”  As that 
brief notes, “It is impossible to imagine how writers, directors, and actors could 
work together if they had to worry about doing only what was ‘creatively 
necessary’ in order not to offend a worker on the set.” 
Does this mean that anything that occurs while writing a television show is 
permissible?  Do employees involved in that process receive no protection?  Of 
course not.  Just as criminal threats are not protected, just as no one has the right to 
falsely shout fire in a crowded theater, limits exist as to what may occur in the 
writers’ room.  I agree with Professor Volokh that, even in this context, speech 
that is directed, or “aimed at a particular employee because of her race, sex, 
religion, or national origin,” is not protected.  (Volokh, supra, 39 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 
 
 
7
at p. 1846.)  “The state interest in assuring equality in the workplace would justify 
restricting directed speech . . . .”  (Ibid.)  Speech directed towards plaintiff because 
of her sex could not further the creative process. 
Accordingly, I agree with the general test proposed in the amicus curiae 
brief of the California Newspaper Publishers Association et al.:  “Where, as here, 
an employer’s product is protected by the First Amendment—whether it be a 
television program, a newspaper, a book, or any other similar work—the 
challenged speech should not be actionable if the court finds that the speech arose 
in the context of the creative and/or editorial process, and it was not directed at or 
about the plaintiff.” 
This test presents the proper balance.  Often, free speech cases involve the 
very difficult balancing of important competing interests.  But here, in the creative 
context, free speech is critical while the competing interest—protecting employees 
involved in the creative process against offensive language and conduct not 
directed at them—is, in comparison, minimal.  Neither plaintiff nor anyone else is 
required to become part of a creative team.  But those who choose to join a 
creative team should not be allowed to complain that some of the creativity was 
offensive or that behavior not directed at them was unnecessary to the creative 
process. 
When First Amendment values are at stake, summary judgment is a favored 
remedy.  “ ‘[B]ecause unnecessarily protracted litigation would have a chilling 
effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights, speedy resolution of cases 
involving free speech is desirable.  [Citation.]  Therefore, summary judgment is a 
favored remedy [in such cases] . . . .’ ”  (Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 
supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 228.)  “ ‘To any suggestion that the outer bounds of liability 
should be left to a jury to decide we reply that in cases involving the rights 
protected by the speech and press clauses of the First Amendment the courts insist 
 
 
8
on judicial control of the jury.’ ”  (Ibid.)  “While the crucial test as to whether to 
grant a motion for summary judgment remains the same in free speech cases (i.e., 
whether there is a triable issue of fact presented in the case), the courts impose 
more stringent burdens on one who opposes the motion and require a showing of 
high probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the case.  In the absence of such 
showing the courts are inclined to grant the motion and do not permit the case to 
proceed beyond the summary judgment stage [citations].”  (Sipple v. Chronicle 
Publishing Co. (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1040, 1046-1047.) 
Indeed, cases like this, arising in a creative context, often can and should be 
decided on demurrer.  (Winter v. DC Comics, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 891-892.)  
Because even the taking of depositions could significantly chill the creative 
process, by destroying the mutual trust and confidentiality necessary to writing 
television shows like Friends, courts should independently review the allegations 
to ensure that First Amendment rights are not being violated.  (See In re George 
T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 631-632 [independent judicial review necessary when 
First Amendment interests are at stake].)  If the complaint does not allege that the 
offending conduct was pervasive and directed at the plaintiff, and include specific 
supporting facts that, if true, would establish those allegations, the court should 
grant a demurrer.  The threat of litigation must not be permitted to stifle creativity. 
We must “[a]lways remember[] that the widest scope of freedom is to be 
given to the adventurous and imaginative exercise of the human spirit . . . .”  
(Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents (1959) 360 U.S. 684, 695 (conc. opn. of 
Frankfurter, J.).)  We must not tolerate laws that “lead to timidity and inertia and 
thereby discourage the boldness of expression indispensable for a progressive 
society.”  (Ibid.)  The allegedly offending conduct in this case arose out of the 
protected creative process and was not directed at plaintiff.  Accordingly, the trial 
 
 
9
court properly granted summary judgment in defendants’ favor.  The First 
Amendment demands no less. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
 
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XX 117 Cal.App.4th 1164 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S125171 
Date Filed: April 20, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: David M. Horowitz 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Mark Weidmann and Scott O. Cummings for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Law Offices of Jeffrey K. Winikow and Jeffrey K. Winikow for California Employment Lawyers 
Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Russell K. Robinson for Law Professors Cynthia G. Bowman, Devon Carbado, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Laura 
Gomez, Cheryl Harris, Kenneth L. Karst, Charles J. Ogletree, Deborah L. Rhode, Dorothy E. Roberts, 
Russell K. Robinson, Leti Volpp, Adam Winkler, Kimberly A. Yuracko and Noah Zatz as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Patricia A. Shiu, Claudia Center, Shelley A. Gregory and Elizabeth Kristen for The Legal Aid Society-
Employnment Law Center, Asian Law Caucus, California Women’s Law Center and Equal Rights 
Advocates as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp, William L. Cole, Adam Levin, Douglas W. Bordewieck and Samantha C. 
Grant for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Loeb & Loeb, Douglas E. Mirell, Carla Feldman and Joseph Geisman for Feminists for Free Expression 
and Women’s Freedom Network as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Horvitz & Levy and Frederic D. Cohen for Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers, Center for 
Individual Rights, the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, Los Angeles Advertising Agencies 
Association, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., the National Association of Scholars, Rubin 
Postaer and Associates and the Student Press Law Center Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants 
and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 2 – counsel continued – S125171 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Marshall M. Goldberg for the Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., The Directors Guild of America, the 
Screen Actors Guild, Sybil Adelman, Kate Angelo, John Auerbach, Ron Bass, John Beck, Steven Bochco, 
John Bowman, Yvette Lee Bowser, Sally Bradford, Pam Brady, John Brancato, Adam Brooks, James L. 
Brooks, J. Stewart Burns, James Burrows, Jason Cahill, Frank Kell Cahoon, Larry Charles, Joel Cohen, Jon 
Collier, Kevin Curran, Carlton Cuse, Larry David, Elias Davis, Nastaran Dibai, Marc Dube, Ted Elliot, 
Diane English, Mike Ferris, Greg Fitzsimmons, Terry Curtis Fox, John Furia, Jr., Shannon Gaughan, Will 
Gluck, Gary David Goldberg, Carl Gottlieb, Jeff Greenstein, Rick Groel, Ellen Guylas, Karen Hall, Charlie 
Hauck, Alex Herschlag, Jeffrey Hodes, David Isaacs, Gary Janetti, Al Jean, Chip Johannessen, Irma Kalish, 
Kourtney Kang, Nick Kazan, Barry Kemp, Laura Kightlinger, Robert King, John Kinnally, David Koepp, 
Pang-Ni Landrum, Dale Launer, Bill Lawrence, Norman Lear, Peter Lefcourt, Gail Lerner, Ken Levine, 
Tim Long, Don Mankiewicz, Myles Mapp, Jhoni Marchinko, Jeff Martin, Craig Mazin, Jeff Melvoin, 
Aaron Mendelsohn, Carol Mendelsohn, George Meyer, Joan Meyerson, David Milch, Miles Millar, Jay 
Moriarty, Theresa Mulligan, Bob Nickman, Peter Noah, Bill Odenkirk, Lawrence O’Donnell, Tim 
O’Donnell, Carolyn Omine, Daniel Palladino, J. Stanford Parker, Don Payne, Daniel Petrie, Jr., David 
Pollock, Elaine Pope, Tracy Poust, Michael Price , Max Pross, Matt Pyken, Tad Quill, Mike Reiss, Adam 
Rodman, Howard Rodman, Fred Rubin, Diane Ruggiero, Jeff Schaffer, James Schamus, Stephen Schiff, 
Tom Schulman, Lisa Seidman, Matt Selman, David Seltzer, Tom Shadyac, Ed Solomon, Jonathan Stark, 
Mark Stegemann, Doug Steinberg, Gardner Stern, Matt Stone, Kathy A. Stumpe, Rob Thomas, Scott 
Thompson, Mike Tollin, Patric Verrone, David Walpert, Matt Warburton, Sonja Warfield, Eric Weinberg, 
David Weiss, John Wells, Mike White, Matthew Wickline, Larry Wilmore, Marc Wilmore, Terence 
Winter, Bill Wrubel and Elisa Zuritsky as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents 
 
Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, Michael A. Bamberger, Martin J. Foley and Mark T. Hansen for 
American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression, Association of American Publishers, Inc., Comic 
Book Legal Defense Fund, Freedom to Read Foundation and Publishers Marketing Association as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Davis Wright Tremaine, Kelli L. Sager, Rochelle L. Wilcox; Thomas W. Newton; Lucy A. Dalglish; 
Harold L. Fuson, Jr., Judith Fanshaw; Karlene W. Goller; Peter Scheer; Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, 
James E. Grossberg; Cohn and Marks and Kevin M. Goldberg for California Newspapers Publishers 
Association, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, The Daily Journal Corporation, The 
Copley Press, Inc., Los Angeles Times Communications LLC, California First Amendment Coalition, 
Freedom Communications, Inc., and The American Society of Newspaper Editors as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Pillsbury Winthrop, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, George S. Howard, Alicia I. Mead; Law Offices of 
Steven Drapkin and Steven Drapkin for The Employers Group and The California Employment Law 
Council as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Law Offices of Manuel S. Klausner and Manuel S. Klausner for Individual Rights Foundation, Reason 
Foundation and Libertarian Law Council as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
James E. Holst, Jeffery A. Blair and Christopher M. Patti for The Regents of the University of California as 
Amicus Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Scott O. Cummings 
1880 Century Park East, Suite 817 
Los Angeles, CA  90067 
(310) 201-9699 
 
Jeffrey K. Winikow 
Law Offices of Jeffrey K. Winikow 
1801 Century Park East, Suite 1520 
Los Angeles, CA  90067 
(310) 552-3450 
 
Adam Levin 
Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp 
11377 West Olympic Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA  90064-1683 
(310) 312-2000