Case Title: Koffman v. Garnett

Citation: 

Docket Number: 020439

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
ANDREW W. KOFFMAN, AN INFANT BY HIS 
FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND,  
RICHARD KOFFMAN, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 020439    OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 10, 2003 
JAMES GARNETT 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BOTETOURT COUNTY 
George E. Honts, III, Judge 
 
 
In this case we consider whether the trial court properly 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ second amended motion for judgment 
for failure to state causes of action for gross negligence, 
assault, and battery. 
 
Because this case was decided on demurrer, we take as 
true all material facts properly pleaded in the motion for 
judgment and all inferences properly drawn from those facts.  
Burns v. Board of Supvrs., 218 Va. 625, 627, 238 S.E.2d 823, 
824-25 (1977). 
 
In the fall of 2000, Andrew W. Koffman, a 13-year old 
middle school student at a public school in Botetourt County, 
began participating on the school's football team.  It was 
Andy's first season playing organized football, and he was 
positioned as a third-string defensive player.  James Garnett 
was employed by the Botetourt County School Board as an 
assistant coach for the football team and was responsible for 
the supervision, training, and instruction of the team's 
defensive players. 
 
The team lost its first game of the season.  Garnett was 
upset by the defensive players' inadequate tackling in that 
game and became further displeased by what he perceived as 
inadequate tackling during the first practice following the 
loss. 
 
Garnett ordered Andy to hold a football and "stand 
upright and motionless" so that Garnett could explain the 
proper tackling technique to the defensive players.  Then 
Garnett, without further warning, thrust his arms around 
Andy's body, lifted him "off his feet by two feet or more," 
and "slamm[ed]" him to the ground.  Andy weighed 144 pounds, 
while Garnett weighed approximately 260 pounds.  The force of 
the tackle broke the humerus bone in Andy's left arm.  During 
prior practices, no coach had used physical force to instruct 
players on rules or techniques of playing football. 
In his second amended motion for judgment, Andy, by his 
father and next friend, Richard Koffman, and Andy's parents, 
Richard and Rebecca Koffman, individually, (collectively "the 
Koffmans") alleged that Andy was injured as a result of 
Garnett's simple and gross negligence and intentional acts of 
assault and battery.  Garnett filed a demurrer and plea of 
sovereign immunity, asserting that the second amended motion 
 
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for judgment did not allege sufficient facts to support a lack 
of consent to the tackling demonstration and, therefore, did 
not plead causes of action for either gross negligence, 
assault, or battery.  The trial court dismissed the action, 
finding that Garnett, as a school board employee, was entitled 
to sovereign immunity for acts of simple negligence and that 
the facts alleged were insufficient to state causes of action 
for gross negligence, assault, or battery because the 
instruction and playing of football are "inherently dangerous 
and always potentially violent." 
In this appeal, the Koffmans do not challenge the trial 
court’s ruling on Garnett’s plea of sovereign immunity but do 
assert that they pled sufficient facts in their second amended 
motion for judgment to sustain their claims of gross 
negligence, assault, and battery. 
I. 
In Ferguson v. Ferguson, 212 Va. 86, 92, 181 S.E.2d 648, 
653 (1971), this Court defined gross negligence as "that 
degree of negligence which shows indifference to others as 
constitutes an utter disregard of prudence amounting to a 
complete neglect of the safety of [another].  It must be such 
a degree of negligence as would shock fair minded [people] 
although something less than willful recklessness."  Whether 
certain actions constitute gross negligence is generally a 
 
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factual matter for resolution by the jury and becomes a 
question of law only when reasonable people cannot differ.  
Griffin v. Shively, 227 Va. 317, 320, 315 S.E.2d 210, 212 
(1984). 
 
The disparity in size between Garnett and Andy was 
obvious to Garnett.  Because of his authority as a coach, 
Garnett must have anticipated that Andy would comply with his 
instructions to stand in a non-defensive, upright, and 
motionless position.  Under these circumstances, Garnett 
proceeded to aggressively tackle the much smaller, 
inexperienced student football player, by lifting him more 
than two feet from the ground and slamming him into the turf.  
According to the Koffmans' allegations, no coach had tackled 
any player previously so there was no reason for Andy to 
expect to be tackled by Garnett, nor was Andy warned of the 
impending tackle or of the force Garnett would use. 
 
As the trial court observed, receiving an injury while 
participating in a tackling demonstration may be part of the 
sport.  The facts alleged in this case, however, go beyond the 
circumstances of simply being tackled in the course of 
participating in organized football.  Here Garnett's knowledge 
of his greater size and experience, his instruction implying 
that Andy was not to take any action to defend himself from 
the force of a tackle, the force he used during the tackle, 
 
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and Garnett’s previous practice of not personally using force 
to demonstrate or teach football technique could lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that, in this instance, 
Garnett’s actions were imprudent and were taken in utter 
disregard for the safety of the player involved.  Because 
reasonable persons could disagree on this issue, a jury issue 
was presented, and the trial court erred in holding that, as a 
matter of law, the second amended motion for judgment was 
inadequate to state a claim for gross negligence. 
II. 
 
The trial court held that the second amended motion for 
judgment was insufficient as a matter of law to establish 
causes of action for the torts of assault and battery.  We 
begin by identifying the elements of these two independent 
torts.  See Charles E. Friend, Personal Injury Law in Virginia 
§ 6.2.1 (2d ed. 1998).  The tort of assault consists of an act 
intended to cause either harmful or offensive contact with 
another person or apprehension of such contact, and that 
creates in that other person's mind a reasonable apprehension 
of an imminent battery.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 
(1965); Friend § 6.3.1 at 226; Fowler V. Harper, et al., The 
Law of Torts § 3.5 at 3:18-:19 (3d ed. Cum. Supp. 2003). 
 
The tort of battery is an unwanted touching which is 
neither consented to, excused, nor justified.  See Washburn v. 
 
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Klara, 263 Va. 586, 561 S.E.2d 682 (2002); Woodbury v. 
Courtney, 239 Va. 651, 391 S.E.2d 293 (1990).  Although these 
two torts "go together like ham and eggs," the difference 
between them is "that between physical contact and the mere 
apprehension of it.  One may exist without the other."  
W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 10 at 46; see 
also Friend § 6.3. 
 
The Koffmans' second amended motion for judgment does not 
include an allegation that Andy had any apprehension of an 
immediate battery.  This allegation cannot be supplied by 
inference because any inference of Andy's apprehension is 
discredited by the affirmative allegations that Andy had no 
warning of an imminent forceful tackle by Garnett.  The 
Koffmans argue that a reasonable inference of apprehension can 
be found "in the very short period of time that it took the 
coach to lift Andy into the air and throw him violently to the 
ground."  At this point, however, the battery alleged by the 
Koffmans was in progress.  Accordingly, we find that the 
pleadings were insufficient as a matter of law to establish a 
cause of action for civil assault. 
 
The second amended motion for judgment is sufficient, 
however, to establish a cause of action for the tort of 
battery.  The Koffmans pled that Andy consented to physical 
contact with players "of like age and experience" and that 
 
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neither Andy nor his parents expected or consented to his 
"participation in aggressive contact tackling by the adult 
coaches."  Further, the Koffmans pled that, in the past, 
coaches had not tackled players as a method of instruction.  
Garnett asserts that, by consenting to play football, Andy 
consented to be tackled, by either other football players or 
by the coaches. 
Whether Andy consented to be tackled by Garnett in the 
manner alleged was a matter of fact.  Based on the allegations 
in the Koffmans’ second amended motion for judgment, 
reasonable persons could disagree on whether Andy gave such 
consent.  Thus, we find that the trial court erred in holding 
that the Koffmans’ second amended motion for judgment was 
insufficient as a matter of law to establish a claim for 
battery. 
 
For the above reasons, we will reverse the trial court’s 
judgment that the Koffmans’ second amended motion for judgment 
was insufficient as a matter of law to establish the causes of 
actions for gross negligence and battery and remand the case 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.*
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
 
* Because we have concluded that a cause of action for an 
intentional tort was sufficiently pled, on remand, the 
Koffmans may pursue their claim for punitive damages. 
 
 
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JUSTICE KINSER, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the majority opinion except with regard to 
the issue of consent as it pertains to the intentional tort of 
battery.  In my view, the second amended motion for judgment 
filed by the plaintiffs, Andrew W. Koffman, by his father and 
next friend, and Richard Koffman and Rebecca Koffman, 
individually, was insufficient as a matter of law to state a 
claim for battery.*
 
Absent fraud, consent is generally a defense to an 
alleged battery.  See Banovitch v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 210, 
219, 83 S.E.2d 369, 375 (1954); Perkins v. Commonwealth, 31 
Va. App. 326, 330, 523 S.E.2d 512, 513 (2000); People ex rel. 
Arvada v. Nissen, 650 P.2d 547, 551 (Colo. 1982); Bergman v. 
Anderson, 411 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Neb. 1987); Willey v. 
Carpenter, 23 A. 630, 631 (Vt. 1891); Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 13, cmt. d (1965).  In the context of this case, 
“[t]aking part in a game manifests a willingness to submit to 
such bodily contacts or restrictions of liberty as are 
permitted by its rules or usages.”  Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 50, cmt. b (1965), quoted in Thompson v. McNeill, 559 
                     
* Although the circuit court sustained the demurrer with 
regard to the alleged battery on the basis that an intention 
to batter and inflict injury on Andy could not be inferred 
from the alleged facts, the majority does not address that 
holding.  Since the majority discusses only the issue of 
consent, I confine my dissent to that question. 
 
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N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ohio 1990); see also Kabella v. Bouschelle, 
672 P.2d 290, 292 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).  However, 
participating in a particular sport “does not manifest consent 
to contacts which are prohibited by rules or usages of the 
game if such rules or usages are designed to protect the 
participants and not merely to secure the better playing of 
the game as a test of skill.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 50, cmt. b (1965) quoted in Thompson, 559 N.E.2d at 708; see 
also Kabella, 672 P.2d at 292. 
 
The thrust of the plaintiffs’ allegations is that they 
did not consent to “Andy’s participation in aggressive contact 
tackling by the adult coaches” but that they consented only to 
Andy’s engaging “in a contact sport with other children of 
like age and experience.”  They further alleged that the 
coaches had not previously tackled the players when 
instructing them about the rules and techniques of football. 
 
It is notable, in my opinion, that the plaintiffs 
admitted in their pleading that Andy’s coach was “responsible 
. . . for the supervision, training and instruction of the 
defensive players.”  It cannot be disputed that one 
responsibility of a football coach is to minimize the 
possibility that players will sustain “something more than 
slight injury” while playing the sport.  Vendrell v. School 
District No. 26C, Malheur County, 376 P.2d 406, 413 (Ore. 
 
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1962).  A football coach cannot be expected “to extract from 
the game the body clashes that cause bruises, jolts and hard 
falls.”  Id.  Instead, a coach should ensure that players are 
able to “withstand the shocks, blows and other rough treatment 
with which they would meet in actual play” by making certain 
that players are in “sound physical condition,” are issued 
proper protective equipment, and are “taught and shown how to 
handle [themselves] while in play.”  Id.  The instruction on 
how to handle themselves during a game should include 
demonstrations of proper tackling techniques.  Id.  By 
voluntarily participating in football, Andy and his parents 
necessarily consented to instruction by the coach on such 
techniques.  The alleged battery occurred during that 
instruction. 
 
The plaintiffs alleged that they were not aware that 
Andy’s coach would use physical force to instruct on the rules 
and techniques of football since neither he nor the other 
coaches had done so in the past.  Surely, the plaintiffs are 
not claiming that the scope of their consent changed from day 
to day depending on the coaches’ instruction methods during 
prior practices.  Moreover, they did not allege that they were 
told that the coaches would not use physical demonstrations to 
instruct the players. 
 
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Additionally, the plaintiffs did not allege that the 
tackle itself violated any rule or usage of the sport of 
football.  Nor did they plead that Andy could not have been 
tackled by a larger, physically stronger, and more experienced 
player either during a game or practice.  Tackling and 
instruction on proper tackling techniques are aspects of the 
sport of football to which a player consents when making a 
decision to participate in the sport. 
 
In sum, I conclude that the plaintiffs did not 
sufficiently plead a claim for battery.  We must remember that 
acts that might give rise to a battery on a city street will 
not do so in the context of the sport of football.  See 
Thompson, 559 N.E.2d at 707.  We must also not blur the lines 
between gross negligence and battery because the latter is an 
intentional tort.  I agree fully that the plaintiffs alleged 
sufficient facts to proceed with their claim for gross 
negligence. 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully concur, in part, and 
dissent, in part, and would affirm the judgment of the circuit 
court sustaining the demurrer with regard to the claim for 
battery. 
 
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