Case Title: Emanuel v. State

Citation: 412 So. 2d 1187

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1982-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
412 So. 2d 1187 (1982) Charles Edward EMANUEL v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 53175. Supreme Court of Mississippi. April 21, 1982. *1188 Louis Fondren, Pascagoula, for appellant. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Frankie Walton White, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. En Banc. WALKER, Justice, for the Court: Charles Edward Emanuel was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Michelle Pino in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. Feeling aggrieved, he appeals. We affirm. The first question which we address is whether the court erred in refusing to grant a jury hearing to the defendant on the question of his mental competency to stand trial. The trial of a defendant, when his mind is so clouded that he cannot remember and intelligently relate what occurred at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, is a denial of due process and contrary to public policy, and when it appears to the trial court that there is a probability that defendant is incapable of making a rational defense, the trial should not proceed until the defendant's mental condition has been investigated and it appears that he is sufficiently rational to make a defense. Barr v. State, 359 So. 2d 334 (Miss. 1978); Pace v. State, 218 Miss. 614, 67 So. 2d 521 (1953); Shipp v. State, 215 Miss. 541, 61 So. 2d 329 (1952); Williams v. State, 205 Miss. 515, 39 So. 2d 3 (1949); Carter v. State, 198 Miss. 523, 21 So. 2d 404 (1945); Hawie v. State, 121 Miss. 197, 83 So. 158, 10 A.L.R. 205 (1919). In Williamson v. State, 330 So. 2d 272 (Miss. 1976), we commented: When the competency of a defendant to stand trial is raised, the trial court should preliminarily, prior to trial, conduct a hearing to determine whether there is a probability that defendant is incapable of making a rational defense. It naturally devolves upon the defendant to go forward with the evidence to show his probable incapacity to make a rational defense. After hearing all the evidence, the trial judge should weigh the evidence and make a finding as to whether there is a probability that defendant is incapable of making a rational defense. If the evidence shows such a probability, then the trial court should impanel a jury to decide that issue prior to trial on the merits. If the trial court is of the opinion, after weighing the evidence both for the state and the defendant, that there is not sufficient proof to show a probability that defendant *1189 is incapable of conducting a rational defense, he should make such finding a matter of record. The case may then proceed to trial on the merits. When the trial court has made a finding that the evidence does not show a probability that the defendant is incapable of making a rational defense, we will not overturn that finding unless we can say, from the evidence, that the finding was manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The evidence must show more than a possibility that defendant is incompetent to stand trial the evidence must go further until it appears to the trial court that there is a probability that defendant is incapable of making a rational defense. In this initial inquiry, the trial judge must weigh the evidence and be the trier of the facts. In the case sub judice, the defendant filed his motion containing a suggestion of insanity and requested a mental examination. That motion was sustained, and an examination was conducted. Later, the defendant was sent to Whitfield for further mental examination. Thereafter, the trial judge conducted a preliminary hearing on the question of whether there was a probability that the defendant was incapable of aiding and assisting his attorney in conducting a rational defense. At the hearing, he heard the testimony of Dr. Kent Walter Andrews, PhD, a psychologist, also Dr. Malcolm Latour, a psychiatrist, and Dr. William D. Bridges, a psychiatrist. Additionally, the court heard the testimony of the defendant's mother, Mrs. Barbara Emanuel. After hearing extensive testimony from these witnesses, which included a probing, lengthy cross-examination as well as a series of questions propounded by the court, observing the witnesses, and weighing the evidence before it, the court found that there was no probability that the defendant, Emanuel, was insane or incompetent to aid and assist his attorneys in presenting a rational defense. The court summed up its findings as follows: We have carefully reviewed this record, including the testimony of the above named witnesses, much of which was conflicting, and are unable to say that the findings of the trial judge with reference to whether there appeared to him a probability that Emanuel was insane or incompetent to aid and assist his attorneys in presenting a rational defense were manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Emanuel a preliminary jury trial on that question. The appellant, Emanuel, next assigns as error that the court denied him an instruction which informed the jury that if Emanuel was found not guilty by reason of insanity and that he was dangerous to the community, that he would be confined in a mental institution. The appellant cites Pouncy v. State, 353 So. 2d 640 (Fla.App. 1977), which approves this type instruction. However, it is well settled in this State that, in cases of this nature, the jury's role is to find the defendant guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity stating whether the accused has since been restored to his reason and whether he be dangerous to the community. The possible consequences of either of such verdicts are not a matter upon which the jury should be informed. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-13-7 (1972); Hill v. State, 339 So. 2d 1382 (Miss. 1976); Gambrell v. State, 238 Miss. 892, 120 So. 2d 758 (1960). *1191 The jury's verdict of guilty and judgment of the court were amply supported by the evidence and law. Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court of Jackson County is affirmed. AFFIRMED. SMITH, P.J., and BROOM, ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING and DAN M. LEE, JJ., concur. HAWKINS, J., PATTERSON, C.J., and SMITH and SUGG, P. JJ., specially concur. HAWKINS, Justice, specially concurring: I concur in the result reached in this case, but I would clear the air of solemn pronouncements which have proved meaningless and are never applied. Is an accused entitled to a jury trial on the sole issue of his present mental competency to stand trial? In my view this is a question addressed solely to the discretion of the circuit judge, and it is unnecessary and inappropriate to empanel a jury to try this one issue. This question has nothing to do with his guilt or innocence, only with his present ability to go to trial. Beginning with Shipp v. State, 215 Miss. 541, 550, 61 So. 2d 329, 331 (1952), this Court stated: The right to trial by jury on the sole issue of present mental competency to stand trial was set out again in Robinson v. State, 223 Miss. 70, 77 So. 2d 265 (Miss. 1955); Olsen v. State, 224 Miss. 226, 79 So. 2d 841 (Miss. 1955); and Pace v. State, 218 Miss. 614, 67 So. 2d 521 (1953). In 1960, however, the Legislature enacted 1960 Miss. Laws, ch. 262, codified at Miss. Code Ann. § 99-13-11 (1972), which set forth the procedure for determining whether an accused is mentally able to stand trial: Nothing is said in this section about the right to a jury determination. In McGinnis v. State, 241 Miss. 883, 893, 133 So. 2d 399, 402 (1961), this Court construed the statute, stating: Departure from this rule of requiring a jury to try the present competency of a person to stand trial was further evidenced in Brown v. Jaquith, 318 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1975). Finally, Rule 4.08 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice specifically and in detail sets forth the procedure to be followed by the circuit judge when present mental incompetency is brought to the attention of the court. There is no requirement whatsoever for a jury in this Rule. I would, therefore, expressly overrule all previous holdings by this Court that a defendant is entitled to a jury, under any circumstances, to try the sole issue of his present mental competency to stand trial. The matter should not be left to future argument, conjecture and confusion. The instant case affords an excellent example wherein this issue, because of the conflicting evidence before the trial judge, should have gone to the jury. The accused, though not mentally retarded, was classified as a slow learner suffering with a progressive schizoid personality. *1192 The trial judge was not manifestly wrong in his finding that the defendant was competent to stand trial. Conflicting evidence warranting a jury determination was before him, however. For example, Dr. Kent W. Andrews, a psychologist, testified that the defendant: Dr. Malcolm Latour, a psychiatrist, testified: As to his ability to assist his counsel, Dr. Latour stated: This testimony relates evidence showing his inability to stand trial. There was other testimony to the effect he was capable to stand trial. If the matter had been left solely to the discretion of the trial judge, as it should in these cases, I do not think the trial judge abused his discretion. On the other hand, if this Court is going to adhere to the rule that an accused is entitled to a jury trial to determine his present mental competency to stand trial, sufficient evidence was adduced, in my view, to make a jury issue on this point. By approving the trial judge's finding, this Court has de facto overruled precedent requiring a jury determination of mental competency to stand trial, where conflicting testimony has been presented to the trial judge. I think we should so state. PATTERSON, C.J., and SMITH and SUGG, P. JJ., join in this specially concurring opinion.