Case Title: Redick v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 487, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RANDREW R. REDICK, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 487, 2003 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Cr.A. No. IN02-10-0099 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§      and IN02-10-0100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  July 21, 2004 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:  August 20, 2004 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED in part, 
VACATED in part and REMANDED. 
 
 
Joseph A. Hurley, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.  
 
 
Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
2
 
The defendant-appellant, Randrew R. Redick, was indicted by a grand 
jury on charges of the use, possession with intent to distribute, or sale, of 
fifty or more unlawful telecommunication and access devices.1  Redick 
entered a guilty plea to Count I of the indictment and admitted to a violation 
of his existing probation.2  Redick was sentenced to two years in jail for the 
unlawful telecommunications access device offense.  That period of 
incarceration was suspended, however, for decreasing levels of probation.  
Redick was also fined $300 and ordered to pay restitution as subsequently 
determined by the Investigative Services Office.   
Comcast submitted a victim loss and impact statement to the 
Investigative Services Office requesting $85,425.  Redick filed a motion for 
a hearing to determine the amount of restitution.  Following a restitution 
hearing, the Superior Court ordered Redick to pay a total of $48,475.  The 
Superior Court ordered restitution to the Delaware Department of Justice in 
the amount of $2,800, loss of services to Comcast in the amount of $18,350, 
investigation costs to Comcast in the amount of $5,625 and payment to the 
Wilmington Public Library “as recipient for other service providers and 
public” in the amount of $21,700. 
                                          
 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 850(a)(2), (b)(3) (2001).   
2 Redick’s probation was revoked and he was sentenced to be incarcerated for 18 months 
at Level V, suspended after six months for supervision at Level III.   
 
3
 
Redick has raised three issues on appeal.  First, he contends the 
methodology used by the Superior Court in calculating the amount of 
restitution due to Comcast was speculative and also challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence presented by Comcast to support its request to be 
reimbursed for investigative costs.  Second, Redick alleges that the Superior 
Court erred, as a matter of law, in awarding any restitution to the 
Wilmington Public Library or the Department of Justice.  Third, Redick 
asserts that the Superior Court did not properly consider his ability to pay the 
total amount of restitution that was ordered. 
 
With regard to the first issue presented by Redick, we have concluded 
that the restitution awarded to Comcast is both supported by the record 
evidence and the product of a logical deductive process.  Redick’s second 
claim of error is meritorious.  In its Answering Brief, “the State concedes 
that awarding restitution to the Wilmington Public Library and the 
Department of Justice is not statutorily authorized.”  We agree and those 
awards of restitution to “non-victims” must be vacated.  Redick’s final 
“ability to pay” argument is without merit, in view of the substantial 
reduction in the total amount of restitution, after the awards to the 
Wilmington Public Library and the Department of Justice are vacated.    
 
4
Facts 
The record reflects that Redick, trading as Custom Cable Pros, 
advertised for sale on the internet digital high pass filters designed to bypass 
the billing cycle for digital cable box usage.  The advertisement came to the 
attention of Comcast security personnel.  Comcast began an investigation 
into the sale of the devices and contacted the New Castle County Police to 
assist in that investigation.  As part of their investigation, Comcast security 
personnel purchased at least one device from Redick.  Redick was identified 
as the seller by the internet company through which he was selling the 
devices.   
The police secured search warrants for two addresses where Redick 
was alleged to have been operating his business.  Two of the unlawful 
devices were discovered at a Wilmington address.  More than 800 devices 
were located at Redick’s mother’s home in Newark, Delaware.  The police 
also found packaging and documents including a mailing list of customers.  
A search of Redick’s computer revealed a spreadsheet detailing the sales of 
267 cable devices.   
 
Redick pled guilty to one count of use, possession with intent to 
distribute, or sale, of fifty or more unlawful telecommunication and access 
devices.  As part of his plea agreement with the State, Redick agreed to pay 
 
5
restitution.  Comcast submitted a victim loss and impact statement 
requesting restitution in the amount of $85,425.3  Along with that request, 
Comcast 
submitted 
a 
statement 
from 
the 
National 
Cable 
& 
Telecommunications Association explaining potential revenue loss from the 
installation of a digital cable filter.  Pictures of the seized devices and the 
advertisement Redick published in EBay were also included.   
Redick challenged the $85,425 amount of restitution submitted by 
Comcast.  At Redick’s request, the Superior Court held an evidentiary 
hearing to determine the amount of restitution.  Additional evidence was 
presented.   
Comcast Restitution Award 
At the restitution hearing, the State introduced evidence of Redick’s 
sales records showing that Redick had sold 267 unlawful devices (400 sales 
less 133 returned devices).  The records included the names and addresses of 
Redick’s purchasers, as well as the date and quantity of sale and any returns.  
A Comcast system security specialist, John O’Connor, testified that only 
thirty-seven of Redick’s purchasers could positively be identified as 
Comcast subscribers.  One of the 267 customers was determined to 
definitely not have been a Comcast subscriber.  O’Connor could not say who 
                                          
 
3 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4106(a) (2001). 
 
6
the cable provider was for the remaining listed purchasers, but noted that 
Comcast was not the sole digital cable provider in approximately 20% of the 
locations.   
Comcast presented evidence that it had the telecommunication devices 
tested and confirmed that the items sold by Redick blocked the billing 
signal.  Because the unlawful devices interfere with the transmission of 
billing information to the cable provider, there was no way for Comcast to 
determine how often the devices were actually used.  Comcast provided a 
letter from the National Cable & Telecommunications Association, however, 
explaining that the loss to cable companies for each device could be 
estimated at $275 for a thirty-day period.   
The Superior Court reduced that $275 per thirty-day period for each 
device that Comcast submitted to a total of $250 per device regardless of the 
length of time that the user may have had illegal access to services.  The 
Superior Court further reduced that $250 amount to sixty percent of the 
starting point, i.e., $150 ($250 x 60% = $150).  Based on the testimony that 
Comcast was not the exclusive cable provider in approximately 20% of the 
markets, the Superior Court awarded Comcast only 20% ($50 = 20% of 
$250) of the potential loss for devices in non-exclusive areas.  The Superior 
Court then calculated Comcast’s total loss of services at $18,350, based on 
 
7
fifty devices (some of the thirty-seven Comcast purchasers purchased more 
than one device) at $150 and added 217 devices at $50 each to reflect that 
Comcast was not the exclusive provider for those purchasers. 
O’Connor testified that 75 hours was a reasonable estimate of the total 
time he and his partner spent on the Redick matter during the three-month 
investigation by Comcast.  Comcast sought restitution from Redick in the 
amount of  $75 an hour for each investigator.  O’Connor testified that 
although he had not recorded his or his partner’s time during the 
investigation, he had reasonably estimated their time commitment to this 
investigation.  O’Connor testified that the Comcast investigators:  had made 
several attempts to contact Redick; attempted to purchase devices on more 
than one occasion; contacted EBay for information; discussed the case with 
employees in another state; contacted police and prosecutors; had the 
purchased devices tested at a lab; and prepared loss statements for the 
Superior Court.  The Superior Court accepted O’Connor’s testimony 
regarding the investigative costs and awarded $5,625 for the cost of its 
investigation (75 hours x $75 = $5,625).  Therefore, Comcast was awarded 
restitution in the total amount of $23,975.    
 
8
Restitution Standards 
 
Redick pled guilty to one count of use, possession with intent to 
distribute, or sale, of fifty or more unlawful access devices.4  The Superior 
Court is required by statute to include restitution as part of the sentence for 
anyone convicted of this offense.5  That restitution is to be made “in the 
manner provided in § 4106 of this title.”6   
Section 4106 provides that a “convicted offender shall … be liable for 
direct out-of-pocket losses, loss of earnings and other expenses and 
inconveniences incurred by victim as a direct result of the crime” in addition 
to “the value of the property or property rights lost to the victim.”7  A victim 
is one who suffers injury or loss as a result of the voluntary act or 
undertaking of another.8  Redick does not dispute that Comcast was a victim 
of his crime.   
Section 4106 further directs the court to determine the nature and 
amount of restitution to be made to each victim “[i]n accordance with the 
evidence presented.”9  “[R]estitution may be based on those factors which 
                                          
 
4 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 850(a), (b)(3)b, (b)(6) (2001). 
5 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 850(b)(8).  
6 Id. 
7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4106(a) (2001); see also Benton v. State, 711 A.2d 792, 796 
(Del. 1998). 
8 See Pratt v. State, 486 A.2d 1154, 1160 (Del. 1983). 
9 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4106(b). 
 
9
are established by a preponderance of the evidence.”10  Evidence is sufficient 
if it affords a reasonable basis for estimating loss.11  Accordingly, a 
restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion.12  To the extent that a 
challenge to a restitution order depends upon a legal question, however, that 
issue is reviewed de novo.13 
Comcast Restitution Valid 
 
Redick alleges that there was insufficient evidence of Comcast’s loss 
to justify the restitution amount ordered by the Superior Court.  According to 
Redick, Comcast should have provided more information concerning the 
purchasers of devices in areas not exclusively serviced by Comcast.  Redick 
also alleges that there is no rational basis for the calculations made by the 
Superior Court in determining its restitution award to Comcast.   
The evidence presented at the hearing established that no “actual” loss 
could be determined for this type of crime because the unlawful devices sold 
by Redick had accomplished their intended purpose of successfully blocking 
the billing signal.  Consequently, by its very nature, the amount of restitution 
had to be quantified by the Superior Court according to some other 
                                          
 
10 Benton v. State, 711 A.2d at 797.  
11 Moody v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 549 A.2d 291, 293 (Del. 1988). 
12 See Pratt v. State, 486 A.2d 1154, 1161 (Del. 1983). 
13 See, e.g., Benton v. State, 711 A.2d 792 (Del. 1998). 
 
10
reasonable analysis.14  The record reflects that Redick presented no method 
of calculating the loss at the restitution hearing.  
The State submits that the Superior Court could have reasonably used 
the $275 per device per thirty-day period based on the uncontroverted 
evidence presented by Comcast at the hearing.  Nevertheless, the Superior 
Court used $250 per device for any length of time as a basis for calculating 
the cable providers’ loss.  The rationale for the Superior Court’s use of the 
$250 figure was apparently derived by analogy from the civil damages 
section of the relevant statute.  Pursuant to that section, a court may award 
between $250 and $10,000 for each access device in lieu of actual 
damages.15  Thus, the State submits, there was a reasonable basis for the 
Superior Court’s starting point of $250 in determining the restitution 
amounts and, thereafter, exercising its discretion to reduce that amount by 
60% in those areas where Comcast was the exclusive cable provider and to 
20% in those non-exclusive areas.16  We agree.17   
                                          
 
14 See United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
restitution could be based on a reasonable estimate of losses when it would be impossible 
to determine the precise amount). 
15 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 850(d)(3)(b). 
16 See, e.g., Benton v. State, 711 A.2d 792, 797 n.10 (Del. 1998)(Superior Court 
concluded that it was authorized by Section 4106(a) to award all of the association's 
accounting fees, but exercised its discretion to allow only half of the amount paid in 
connection with the accountant's preparation of the case for trial. The sentencing court 
further reduced the restitution amount by 10% because “some accounting fees may have 
been incurred independently of [defendant’s] theft”). 
 
11
 
Section 4106(a) provides that a restitution award shall include 
compensation to the victim for expenses directly relating from the 
defendants criminal acts.18  The award to Comcast for the costs of its 
investigation was based on the sworn testimony of O’Connor and the 
documentary evidence presented by Comcast at the hearing.  O’Connor 
testified that at least 75 hours (37.5 hours each for two investigators) were 
devoted to the investigation in this case.  O’Connor also testified that the 
$75 per hour rate was standard.  Accordingly, the record does not support 
Redick’s assertion that the estimated costs of investigation were “mere 
speculation.”19  Moreover, Redick did not provide any evidence to 
demonstrate that the $75 per hour was not the standard rate in the industry or 
that time estimate by O’Connor was unreasonable. 
 
Comcast was an undisputed victim of Redick’s crime.  Therefore, 
Comcast was entitled to an award of restitution based on its loss.  When, 
given the type of crime, there is no method for calculating a precise amount 
of loss, a reasonable estimate of the victim’s loss can be awarded by the 
Superior Court.  There was sufficient credible evidence presented at the 
restitution hearing for the Superior Court to find by a preponderance of the 
                                                                                                                             
 
17 Id. (noting Section 4106(a) authorizes the Superior Court to use discretion in awarding 
restitution). 
18 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4106(a); Benton v. State, 711 A.2d at 797. 
19  Benton v. State, 711 A.2d at 797. 
 
12
evidence that Comcast was entitled to restitution both for the costs of 
investigation in the amount of $5,625 and for loss of revenue associated with 
the unlawful devices sold by Redick in the amount of $18,350.20  
Accordingly, we hold that the Superior Court’s restitution award to Comcast 
in the aggregate amount of $23,975 is supported by the evidence presented 
at the hearing and is the product of a logical deductive process.   
 
We note that the $23,975 awarded to Comcast in restitution is 
significantly less than the $85,425 it requested.  The restitution award is not 
necessarily Comcast’s exclusive remedy for recovering the damages it 
sustained as a result of Redick’s criminal conduct.  An award of restitution, 
based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, does not preclude a victim 
(like Comcast) from pursuing an action for civil damages.21   
 
In fact, the criminal statute that Redick violated provides specific 
guidelines for such a civil damage action.22  The amount of any civil award 
will depend upon the evidence presented at that separate proceeding.  Any 
                                          
 
20 Accord Id. (each component of restitution order established by a preponderance of the 
evidence). 
21 Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 4106(e) (restitution does not preclude an award of damages). 
22 Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 850(d) (“Any person aggrieved by a violation of this section 
may bring a civil action ….”). 
 
13
payments of restitution, however, must be credited against a separate civil 
damage award.23 
Non-victim Restitution Invalid  
 
Section 4106 of Title 11 authorizes payment of restitution to “the 
victim.”  A victim is one who suffers loss or injury as the result of another’s 
acts.24  The Superior Court has no statutory authority to order restitution to 
anyone other than a victim.   
The Superior Court determined that the total amount of restitution to 
be paid by Redick was $48,475.  $23,975 was awarded to Comcast, the only 
victim identified at the restitution hearing.  The remaining amount was 
allocated as follows:  $2,800 to the Delaware Department of Justice for costs 
of prosecution; and $21,700 to the Wilmington Public Library as recipient 
for the other service providers and the public.   Neither the Wilmington 
Public Library nor the Delaware Department of Justice is a victim in this 
case.    
 
The State concedes that awarding restitution to the Wilmington Public 
Library and the Delaware Department of Justice is not authorized by statute.  
Because an order to pay restitution to a non-victim is a sentence that cannot 
                                          
 
23 Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 4106(e) (“A civil verdict shall be reduced by the amount of 
restitution paid under the criminal restitution order.”). 
24 See Pratt v. State, 486 A.2d 1154, 1160 (Del. 1983). 
 
14
be predicated on the judgment of conviction it is an illegal portion of 
Redick’s sentence.25  A sentence which includes unauthorized illegal terms 
may be corrected by the Superior Court at any time pursuant to Criminal 
Rule 35(a).   
Because the restitution statute does not authorize the Superior Court to 
award funds to non-victims,26 this case must be remanded for correction of 
sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a).  Although 
conceding that the illegal awards of restitution to the Department of Justice 
and the Wilmington Public Library must be vacated, the State argues that 
upon remand the Superior Court should be permitted to impose fines up to 
the amount of the “mischaracterized restitution.”  According to the State, 
this would effectuate the original intent of the sentencing judge.  The record 
does not support that characterization of the sentencing judge’s original 
intent.   
 
The record reflects that the original sentence imposed by the Superior 
Court judge included a fine of $300 and restitution as determined by a 
subsequent investigation.  Thus, the original sentence reflects an intention 
that the amount of restitution to be paid by Redick was separate and distinct 
                                          
 
25 See United States v. Wolf, 90 F.3d 191, 194 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. 
Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506 (1954)). 
26 Cf. United States v. Mendoza-Benitez, 119 F.Supp.2d 48, 51 (D. Puerto Rico 2000) 
(federal restitution statute does not apply to unidentified victims). 
 
15
from the $300 that Redick was fined.  Accordingly, there is no record 
support for the proposition that the Superior Court originally intended to 
have Redick pay a total fixed amount of money in a combination of fines 
and restitution.   
Defendants’ Payment Ability 
 
In his final argument, Redick alleges that the Superior Court failed to 
consider his ability to pay as a factor in determining the amount of 
restitution.  Redick argues that he is destitute and, therefore, the restitution 
amount is overly burdensome.  Redick had the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence both his financial obligations and the lack of 
resources that he contended were relevant to his inability to make 
resitution.27   
The Superior Court heard testimony at the restitution hearing 
concerning Redick’s financial situation, his educational background and his 
ability to work.  Redick testified that he was twenty-six years old and a 
college graduate.  He is employed at his father’s wholesale flower and plant 
company as a delivery person.  Because of a prior felony conviction, Redick 
testified that he could not find a better job.  Redick also testified that he 
owes his father $3,000 for legal bills, and that his father withholds Redick’s 
                                          
 
27 Benton v. State, 711 A.2d 792, 800 (Del. 1998). 
 
16
paycheck to satisfy the debt.  Conversely, Redick lives rent-free; he does not 
pay for his food; his father provides spending money for him; and he has 
access to a company cell phone.  Redick also testified that he has between 
$600 and $1,000 currently in the bank. 
 
In Pratt v. State,28 this Court noted that there is no statutory 
requirement that a defendant’s ability to pay be considered in determining 
the nature and amount of restitution.29  Nevertheless, in Pratt this Court 
provided guidelines to assist the trial courts in implementing the restitution 
statute.30  Included as part of the guidelines is the following language:  “The 
defendant’s ability to pay is an element to be considered in determining the 
amount of restitution and the schedule of payments.”31   
The defendants in Pratt were transient servicemen stationed in 
Delaware.  They had no marketable skills and would be serving five years in 
prison.  Under those circumstances, this Court held there was no abuse of 
discretion in the trial court’s order requiring each defendant to pay almost 
$23,000 in restitution.32   
                                          
 
28 Pratt v. State, 486 A.2d 1154, 1160 (Del. 1983). 
29 Id. at 1160 (citation omitted). 
30 Id. at 1161. 
31 Id. 
32 See id. 
 
17
A fortiori, there was no abuse of discretion in the Superior Court’s 
determination that Redick pay restitution to Comcast in the amount of 
$23,975.  Redick is a college graduate.  He is not incarcerated and his 
current expenses are minimal. Additionally, Redick testified that he hopes to 
obtain a better job.   
Conclusion 
 
The improper restitution awards to non-victims, the Wilmington 
Public Library and the Department of Justice, must be vacated.  In all other 
respects, the sentencing judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.  This 
matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
 
18
No. 487, 2003 
Joseph A. Hurely, Esquire 
1215 King Street 
Wilmington, DE   19801 
 
Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire 
Department of Justice 
820 N. French Street 
Wilmington, DE   19801 
 
Honorable Richard S. Gebelein 
Superior Court of Delaware 
500 N. King Street, Suite 10400 
Wilmington, DE   19801