Case Title: Democratic Party of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Department of Justice

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP002536-FT

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2016-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
2016 WI 100 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP002536-FT 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Democratic Party of Wisconsin and Cory Liebmann, 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Justice and Kevin 
Potter, 
          Respondents-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 28, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 6, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard G. Niess 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
Abrahamson, J., joined by A.W. Bradley, J. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondents-appellants-petitioners the cause was 
argued by Misha Tseytlin, solicitor general with whom on the 
briefs was Luke N. Berg, deputy solicitor general, and Brad D. 
Schimel, Attorney General. 
 
For the petitioners-respondents, there was a brief by 
Michael R. Bauer and Bauer Law LLC., Madison, and oral argument 
by Michael R. Bauer.
 
 
2016 WI 100
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP2536-FT 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV2937) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Democratic Party of Wisconsin and Cory 
Liebmann, 
 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Justice and Kevin 
Potter, 
 
          Respondents-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 28, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   This is a review of an  
unpublished court of appeals' opinion and order,1 which affirmed 
the circuit court's order2 granting a writ of mandamus compelling 
the Wisconsin Department of Justice to disclose two video 
recordings requested by the Democratic Party of Wisconsin under 
Wisconsin's Public Records Law, Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31-.39 (2013-
                                                 
1 Democratic Party of Wis. v. DOJ, No. 2014AP2536-FT, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2015). 
2 The Honorable Richard G. Niess of Dane County presided. 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
2 
 
14).3  We are asked to decide whether the justification for 
nondisclosure outweighs Wisconsin's commitment to public access 
to government records.  We conclude that the reasons given by 
the record custodian for nondisclosure sufficiently demonstrate 
that the legislative presumption in favor of disclosure has been 
outweighed by the public harm that would result from disclosure.  
We reverse the decision of the court of appeals and deny the 
writ of mandamus. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
In September 2014, Cory Liebmann, Research Director 
for the Democratic Party of Wisconsin, submitted a public 
records request to the Wisconsin Department of Justice.  The 
request asked for the release of 
[a]ny and all photographs, films, and tape recordings 
including but not limited to computer tapes and 
printouts, CDs, DVDs, videotapes and optical discs of 
any presentation made at any training program by Brad 
Schimel on the following dates:  May 14, 2013; June 8, 
2012; November 8, 2012, May 20, 2010; June 17, 2009. 
¶3 
Kevin Potter, the Department of Justice's Record 
Custodian, responded to the request by letter in October 2014.  
Potter explained the DOJ had "identified two records responsive 
to [Liebmann's] request:  one video recording of a presentation 
made by Mr. Schimel on May 14, 2013 on the topic of victim 
confidentiality and one video recording of a presentation on 
June 17, 2009 concerning the prosecution of, and common defenses 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
3 
 
in 
online 
child 
exploitation 
cases." 
 
Both 
videos 
were 
recordings of presentations Attorney Schimel4 gave at Wisconsin 
State Prosecutors Education and Training conferences.  The 
subject matter of the 2013 conference was "Protecting Victims of 
Crime" 
and 
Attorney 
Schimel's 
segment 
addressed 
"Victim 
Confidentiality."  Attorney Schimel's presentation at the 2009 
conference addressed "Prosecution [and] Common Defenses in 
Online Child Exploitation Cases."  These conferences were 
training sessions for prosecutors and victims' rights advocates, 
with some law enforcement representatives present.  Attendance 
was limited to those groups and not open to the public or the 
media.  The videos were not publicly available but were recorded 
and stored so that prosecutors who were not able to attend could 
view the educational training at a later date.5 
¶4 
Potter explained that neither recording would be 
released because, after applying the public records balancing 
test, 
he 
concluded 
the 
public 
interest 
in 
nondisclosure 
outweighed the general presumption favoring release.  Potter 
                                                 
4 During the pendency of this case, Attorney Schimel served 
as the Waukesha County District Attorney and later as Wisconsin 
Attorney General.  To avoid confusion, we refer to him 
throughout as "Attorney Schimel."  At the time of both 
presentations at issue, Attorney Schimel served as the Waukesha 
District Attorney.  At the time of the 2013 presentation, he was 
also the Republican candidate for Wisconsin Attorney General in 
a contested election, which he won in November 2014. 
5 The presentations are not professionally recorded and the 
videos are of low quality.  As we understand it, a video camera 
was set up and an attendee was asked to push "record" when the 
presentation started and to push "stop" when it ended. 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
4 
 
gave specific reasons for his conclusion particular to each 
recording, with some overlap.  The 2009 recording would not be 
released 
because 
(1) 
the 
presentation 
contained 
specific 
litigation strategies for online child exploitation cases, 
disclosure of which would impede effective investigation and 
prosecution of sexual predators; (2) the prosecutor training 
programs are similar to the contents of a prosecutor's case 
files, which are exempt from disclosure under State ex rel. 
Richards v. Foust, 165 Wis. 2d 429, 477 N.W.2d 608 (1991); (3) 
the 
material 
presented 
may 
be 
privileged 
attorney-client 
communication, 
work 
product 
material, 
or 
both; 
and 
(4) 
disclosure would adversely impact victims' rights.  The reasons 
for not disclosing the 2013 recording included:  (1) the 
presentation, which was part of a joint training program for 
prosecutors and crime victim staff, discussed prosecution 
strategies in a high-profile sexual extortion case involving 
high school students; and (2) the presentation contained a 
substantial amount of detail, which, if disclosed, would violate 
the Wisconsin Constitution's Article I, § 9m provision requiring 
that crime victims be treated with "fairness, dignity and 
respect for their privacy."  The recording also contained 
"sufficient details" that "could lead to identification and 
invasion of privacy for young victims of a very sensitive series 
of crimes."  In addressing release of a redacted version, Potter 
explained that doing so would render an "end result meaningless 
to the viewer." 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
5 
 
¶5 
Liebmann and the Democratic Party petitioned the 
circuit court for a writ of mandamus seeking release of the 
records, punitive damages, and costs and attorney's fees.  The 
petition asserted the withheld recordings may contain evidence 
of misconduct by Attorney Schimel:  "Upon information and 
belief, several or all of these tapes may include offensive 
racial remarks and ethnic slurs, including but not limited to 
stereotyped accents, as well as sexist remarks, made by Mr. 
Schimel." 
¶6 
After viewing both recordings in camera, the circuit 
court concluded neither video showed misconduct by Attorney 
Schimel, but ordered both recordings disclosed.  The circuit 
court felt the 2009 video presented a close question because it 
contained strategies and techniques used in investigating and 
prosecuting sexual predators.  Nevertheless, the circuit court 
reasoned this video should be disclosed because the techniques 
discussed were "widely known" via "books, magazine articles, 
[and] TV shows."  It did not think the video contained "any real 
secrets" and compared prosecuting sexual predators to playing 
hopscotch:  when the predators find ways to get around the 
State's techniques, the State has to catch up and find another 
way.  The circuit court was "certain" the strategies discussed 
"are 
taught 
in 
law 
enforcement 
academies, 
FBI 
training 
academies, et cetera."  The circuit court decided that parents 
needed to see the 2009 video so they could better protect their 
children from sexual predators.  The circuit court specifically 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
6 
 
acknowledged that the 2009 video did not involve "misconduct on 
the part of any of the presenters." 
¶7 
With respect to the 2013 video, the circuit court 
reasoned disclosure was required because (1) the video did not 
contain specifically identifiable names of victims; (2) the 
victims' responses to the sex extortion, described by Attorney 
Schimel in the video, were "perfectly natural responses to the 
horrific crimes that these children were subject to," and no one 
should be surprised by the "traumatic effects" these children 
suffered; (3) this information is important for members of the 
public to know so they can protect their children; and (4) many 
of the details discussed in the video were in the original case 
file and had previously been "splattered all over the Internet."  
The 
circuit 
court 
did 
recognize 
that 
re-disclosing 
this 
information now may "distress" and re-traumatize the victims, 
but the court did not believe such factors outweighed the 
public's right to "know the contents of these tapes." 
¶8 
In a summary disposition opinion and order, the court 
of appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision.  Release of 
the two recordings at issue has been stayed during the appeal 
process.  In addition, the DOJ allowed the attorney representing 
the Democratic Party to view both the 2009 and 2013 videos, 
subject to a protective order.  After viewing the videos twice, 
counsel abandoned any claim that the videos contain any 
misconduct by Attorney Schimel.  We accepted the DOJ's petition 
for review in January 2016. 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
7 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶9 
Our review here is de novo.  See Woznicki v. Erickson, 
202 Wis. 2d 178, 192, 549 N.W.2d 699 (1996).  "Whether harm to 
the public interest from [disclosure] outweighs the public 
interest in [disclosure] is a question of law."  See Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 427, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979).  The 
legislature has created a presumption of accessibility to public 
records.  See Nichols v. Bennett, 199 Wis. 2d 268, 273, 544 
N.W.2d 428 (1996).  If a custodian denies a public records 
request, he or she must give specific reasons for denying 
access, and it is the role of the court to determine whether the 
reasons are sufficient.  See Breier, 89 Wis. 2d at 427.  
Although we may benefit from the circuit court's and court of 
appeals' analyses, our determination is made independently.  See 
Hempel v. City of Baraboo, 2005 WI 120, ¶21, 284 Wis. 2d 162, 
699 N.W.2d 551.  The party seeking nondisclosure has the burden 
to "show that 'public interests favoring secrecy outweigh those 
favoring disclosure.'"  John K. MacIver Inst. for Pub. Policy, 
Inc. v. Erpenbach, 2014 WI App 49, ¶14, 354 Wis. 2d 61, 848 
N.W.2d 862 (quoted source omitted). 
B.  Applicable Law 
¶10 Wisconsin is firmly committed to open and transparent 
government, as evidenced by the policy expressed by the 
legislature in our Public Records Law: 
[I]t is declared to be the public policy of this state 
that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
8 
 
information regarding the affairs of government and 
the official acts of those officers and employees who 
represent them . . . .  To that end, ss. 19.32 to 
19.37 shall be construed in every instance with a 
presumption of complete public access, consistent with 
the conduct of governmental business.  The denial of 
public access generally is contrary to the public 
interest, and only in an exceptional case may access 
be denied. 
Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  Wisconsin law does recognize three types of 
exceptions to this general policy of open access:  (1) statutory 
exceptions; (2) common law exceptions; and (3) public policy 
exceptions.  See Hempel, 284 Wis. 2d 162, ¶28.  When a public 
records request is made, the record custodian must determine 
whether the Public Records Law applies.  If the law applies, the 
presumption favors disclosure of the record.  Id.  The next step 
is to determine whether any exceptions operate to overcome the 
general presumption of openness.  Id.  "[T]he legislature 
entrusted the records custodian with substantial discretion" in 
making this determination.  Id., ¶62. 
¶11 Exceptions 
to 
the 
public 
records 
law's 
general 
presumption of disclosure exist because some requests conflict 
with other important policy considerations.  Id., ¶28.  The 
custodian must conduct "the open records disclosure analysis on 
a case-by-case basis."  Id., ¶62.  If a statutory or common law 
exception applies, the analysis ends and the records will not be 
disclosed.  Id.  If neither applies, the custodian proceeds to 
the public policy balancing test, which requires a consideration 
of all relevant factors to determine whether the public interest 
in nondisclosure outweighs the public interest in favor of 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
9 
 
disclosure.  Id., ¶63.  The test considers whether disclosure 
would cause public harm to the degree that the presumption of 
openness is overcome. 
¶12 This case does not involve any of the statutory 
exceptions set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31-.39.  The DOJ 
asserts one common law exception:  prosecutorial files are 
exempt as recognized in Foust.  This court in Foust held that 
"prosecutorial files are exempt from public access" as a common 
law exception even after the case is closed.  Id. at 430, 433-
34.  In doing so, we explained that investigations and data 
collected are not open for public viewing because disclosure of 
this information would be "harmful to the orderly administration 
of justice."  Id. at 435-36.  We listed multiple reasons for our 
conclusion, including the discretion afforded to prosecutors and 
the fact that their files "may contain historical data leading 
up to the prosecution which may be in the form of anonymous 
statements, 
informants' 
statements, 
or 
neighborhood 
investigations at the scene of the crime."  Id. at 434-35.  We 
noted that this material needs to be protected in order to 
ensure that the public will continue to cooperate in criminal 
investigations.  Id. at 435. 
¶13 Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 646 
N.W.2d 811, is another pertinent public records case.  In 
Linzmeyer, we held that a police report requested by a newspaper 
and the alleged victims could be disclosed over the objection of 
the teacher who was the subject of the police investigation.  
Id., 
¶¶2-3. 
 
Emphasizing 
the 
strong 
public 
interest 
in 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
10 
 
investigating and prosecuting criminal activity, we recognized 
that nondisclosure is appropriate when necessary to protect the 
public interest in "the reputation and privacy of citizens."  
Id., ¶31.  Our concern was not for the individual teacher's 
embarrassment but for "the public effects of the failure to 
honor the individual's privacy interests."  Id.  We also quoted 
the exemptions set forth in the Freedom of Information Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2000), and said that "when coupled with our 
prior caselaw," FOIA "factors provide a framework that records 
custodians can use to determine whether the presumption of 
openness in law enforcement records is overcome by another 
public policy."  Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶33.  As pertinent 
here, the Freedom of Information Act exempts records that "would 
disclose 
techniques 
and 
procedures 
for 
law 
enforcement 
investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for 
law 
enforcement 
investigations 
or 
prosecutions 
if 
such 
disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of 
the law."  Id., ¶32 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E)).6  The 
threat that releasing a record would reveal techniques and 
procedures used in "a sting or undercover operation that would 
                                                 
6 The Freedom of Information Act applies to federal records 
and therefore is not controlling in Wisconsin Public Records 
cases, 
but 
as 
Linzmeyer 
and 
other 
Wisconsin 
cases 
have 
recognized, FOIA and the cases interpreting it can be used as 
persuasive authority in deciding Wisconsin Public Records cases.  
See Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, ¶33, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 646 
N.W.2d 811; State ex rel. Hill v. Zimmerman, 196 Wis. 2d 419, 
428 n.6, 538 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1995). 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
11 
 
require secrecy" weighs against disclosure in the balancing 
test.  Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶41. 
¶14 This case also involves a very important public policy 
consideration——of constitutional dimension——with respect to the 
treatment of crime victims in Wisconsin.  The Wisconsin 
Constitution specifically provides:  "This state shall treat 
crime victims, as defined by law, with fairness, dignity and 
respect for their privacy."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m.  This 
policy is further embodied in Wis. Stat. § 950.04(1v)(ag)7 
governing rights of crime victims and Wis. Stat. § 950.055(1)8 
governing rights of juvenile crime victims.  This court 
recognizes "that justice requires that all who are engaged in 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 950.04(1v) provides, in part: 
RIGHTS OF VICTIMS.  Victims of crimes have the 
following rights: 
(ag)  To be treated with fairness, dignity, and 
respect for his or her privacy by public officials, 
employees, or agencies.  This paragraph does not 
impair the right or duty of a public official or 
employee to conduct his or her official duties 
reasonably and in good faith. 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 950.055(1) provides: 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT.  The legislature finds that it is 
necessary to provide child victims and witnesses with 
additional consideration and different treatment than 
that usually afforded to adults.  The legislature 
intends, in this section, to provide these children 
with additional rights and protections during their 
involvement with the criminal justice or juvenile 
justice system.  The legislature urges the news media 
to use restraint in revealing the identity of child 
victims or witnesses, especially in sensitive cases. 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
12 
 
the prosecution of crimes make every effort to minimize further 
suffering by crime victims."  Schilling v. Crime Victims Rights 
Bd., 2005 WI 17, ¶26, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623.  The 
public policy interest in protecting the privacy of victims of 
crime——especially children affected by very sensitive crimes——
weighs heavily in favor of nondisclosure. 
¶15 Having set forth the relevant framework, we now turn 
to an analysis of the 2009 and 2013 recordings. 
C.  Analysis 
1.  2009 Recording 
¶16 At the 2009 training, Attorney Schimel discussed:  
what undercover officers can and cannot say when attempting to 
catch sexual predators, specific strategies to ensure adequate 
evidence exists for trial, how to extract evidence from 
computers, and how to overcome common defenses in sexual 
exploitation cases.  Attorney Schimel shared the specific 
strategies and techniques he used, and he provided numerous 
case-specific examples, even on occasion referring to the cases 
by name.  There is no doubt that this recording contains 
specific 
techniques 
and 
procedures 
for 
law 
enforcement 
investigations and prosecutions in Wisconsin.  The question is 
whether, because of this, application of the balancing test 
makes 
the 
2009 
video 
an 
exceptional 
case 
justifying 
nondisclosure.  Stated otherwise, would releasing this video be 
harmful to the public interest so as to overcome the general 
presumption in favor of disclosure? 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
13 
 
¶17 The law does not provide an exhaustive list of 
specific factors used when applying the balancing test.  An 
exhaustive list would be difficult if not impossible to create 
given the factually specific nature of public records cases.  We 
review whether the custodian considered "all the relevant 
factors."  Hempel, 284 Wis. 2d 162, ¶63. 
¶18 Attorney Schimel is an elected official, and this 
factor weighs in favor of disclosure.  See Linzmeyer, 254 
Wis. 2d 306, ¶29.  The content of the 2009 video, however, and 
its potentially harmful impact on the public interest weighs 
strongly in favor of nondisclosure.  In the video, Attorney 
Schimel discusses tactics and strategies used by law enforcement 
and prosecutors to catch and convict criminals who prey on 
minors.  The techniques discussed involve undercover and sting 
operations to catch criminals who use computers to victimize 
children.  The presentation occurred at a confidential training 
session for prosecutors and victims' right advocates, with some 
police representatives present.9  Public records containing 
prosecution strategies and police tactics are not specifically 
excepted from disclosure by Wisconsin statutes, but record 
                                                 
9 The Democratic Party argues the training seminars were 
open to the defense bar, pointing to two names of attorneys on 
the attendee list currently doing criminal defense work.  This 
argument fails to recognize the reality of the underlying facts.  
At the time of the presentations, those attorneys attended the 
seminar in their capacity as prosecutors.  The fact that they 
left their jobs as prosecutors and now represent criminal 
defendants does not change the nature of the training seminars. 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
14 
 
custodians can properly consider such content when determining 
"whether the 
presumption of openness . . . is overcome by 
another public policy," see Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶¶32-33, 
and as noted, the federal Freedom of Information Act lists this 
type of record as exempt "if such disclosure could reasonably be 
expected to risk circumvention of the law" and protects it 
statutorily from disclosure, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). 
¶19 The reason for protecting prosecutorial techniques and 
local police strategies is obvious:  if local criminals learn 
the specific techniques and procedures used by police and 
prosecutors, 
the 
disclosed 
information 
could 
be 
used 
to 
circumvent the law.  The content of the 2009 video falls 
squarely into this category.  Releasing this video would create 
a significant risk that specific techniques and strategies being 
used in Wisconsin could instantly be disseminated over the 
internet and exploited by sexual predators.  This information 
would in essence serve as a textbook enlightening Wisconsin 
criminals on how to avoid detection, elude capture, and escape 
conviction.  The harm arising from release would substantially 
impair the ongoing battle police and prosecutors face in 
protecting children and would impede efforts made to catch and 
prosecute sexual predators who lurk in the shadows and anonymity 
of internet websites.  Although disclosing this information 
directly to the Democratic Party alone would not necessarily be 
harmful, releasing the 2009 video to one effectively renders it 
public to all, including anyone plotting to use it to circumvent 
the law.  See Foust, 165 Wis. 2d at 435 (declining to release a 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
15 
 
prosecutor's file to a defendant wanting to see his own file 
because doing so would open the file to anyone who requested the 
file).  Releasing the 2009 video would frustrate the public 
policy of investigating and prosecuting criminal activity that 
in this instance would cause considerable public harm, which 
overwhelmingly outweighs any public interest in viewing it.  See 
Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶39. 
¶20 Drawing on reasons the circuit court used in ordering 
disclosure, the Democratic Party asserts:  (1) the video would 
be helpful to parents trying to protect their children from 
predators, and (2) the techniques discussed on the video are not 
novel, do not contain any secrets, and are widely known, often 
seen on television shows.  The Democratic Party's arguments, 
like the circuit court's reasons, are flawed and erroneous.  
This video is replete with police and prosecutor tactics, 
specific instances of cases with descriptive details, and 
practical strategies to gather evidence.  This content would not 
assist the average parent. 
¶21 The Democratic Party's assertion that the techniques 
and strategies are so widely known that disclosure would not be 
harmful is equally questionable.  There is no rule of law 
protecting only brand new or novel prosecution techniques and 
police strategies, and there is no evidence that releasing local 
strategies will not lead to circumvention of the law simply 
because they are also seen on television crime shows.  The 
Democratic Party does not cite any authority to support its 
"novel" argument, and when directly asked for authority for this 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
16 
 
proposition 
during 
oral 
argument, 
the 
Democratic 
Party's 
attorney was unable to provide any.  Although child predators 
may know in general terms various techniques taught to and 
employed by police departments across the country, the specific 
techniques used by police officers in a particular jurisdiction 
or geographic area are not necessarily a matter of common public 
knowledge.  A criminal who knows the specific techniques being 
used locally is much more likely to evade capture than a 
criminal who, after viewing a crime show, guesses at what 
techniques local police and prosecutors are using. 
¶22 Another factor to balance in these cases is the 
presence of "official cover-up" by public officials.  Hempel, 
284 Wis. 2d 162, ¶68.  "The public has a very strong interest in 
being informed about public officials who have been derelict in 
their duty."  Id.  Everyone in this case, including the 
Democratic Party, agrees that the video does not contain any 
evidence of misconduct.  Because the video reveals no misconduct 
or dereliction of duty, this factor does not counter the strong 
public policies supporting nondisclosure. 
¶23 Additionally, the context of the records' request, 
although not always relevant, should be considered here.  See 
id., ¶66 ("When performing a balancing test, however, a records 
custodian almost inevitably must evaluate context to some 
degree.").  The Public Records Law does not require a requestor 
to disclose his or her identity or to state a purpose for the 
request.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(i).  But by asserting that, 
"[u]pon information and belief, several or all of these tapes 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
17 
 
may include offensive racial remarks and ethnic slurs, including 
but not limited to stereotyped accents, as well as sexist 
remarks, made by Mr. Schimel," the language of the Democratic 
Party's petition for a writ of mandamus suggests a partisan 
purpose underlying the request.  During a contested election, 
the request sought records containing allegedly offensive 
comments made by the candidate from the opposing political 
party.  And the Democratic Party persists in its pursuit of the 
records, despite the fact that its attorney has now viewed the 
recordings and the parties agree the recordings contain no such 
offensive content.  When weighed against the likely harm to law 
enforcement's efforts to capture and convict sexual predators 
who target children, the counterfactual justification offered 
for the request clearly does not tip the balance towards 
overturning the record custodian's decision. 
¶24 In applying the balancing test to the 2009 video, we 
conclude that the public interest in preventing release of 
specific police and prosecution strategies and techniques being 
taught and used in Wisconsin outweighs the general legislative 
presumption that public records should be disclosed.  We are a 
State committed to open and transparent government, but if 
disclosure results in greater public harm than nondisclosure, 
the scale must tip in favor of nondisclosure, especially when 
sexual exploitation of vulnerable children is at risk.  Because 
the 2009 video consists almost entirely of police tactics and 
specific prosecution strategies in cases involving sexual 
exploitation of children, disclosure would result in public 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
18 
 
harm.  The public policy factors favoring nondisclosure thus 
overcome the presumption in favor of disclosure.  The record 
custodian gave specific reasons for the decision not to disclose 
the 2009 recording, and we conclude the reasons given were 
legally sufficient and sound.10 
                                                 
10 While excerpts of the recording may fall beyond the 
public 
policy 
considerations 
favoring 
nondisclosure, 
which 
ordinarily results in the release of a redacted version under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6), our viewing of the recording validates 
the custodian's assessment that a redacted version would be 
meaningless to the viewer.  See John C. v. Martha A., 592 
N.Y.S.2d 229, 235-36 (Civ. Ct. 1992) (where "entire court file 
is permeated with confidential" information, no part can be 
opened for viewing); cf. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of 
Defense, 543 F.3d 59, 84 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming district 
court order releasing certain redacted photographs depicting 
abuse of detainees at military prison, but mentioning without 
objection that "[w]here 'individual recognition could not be 
prevented without redaction so extensive as to render the images 
meaningless,' 
the 
court 
ordered 
those 
photographs 
to 
be 
withheld"), vacated on other grounds 558 U.S. 1042 (noting 
intervening change in federal law); Harwood v. McDonough, 799 
N.E.2d 859, 866-70 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (affirming withholding 
of report under Illinois open records law where trial court 
"concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to a redacted 
report . . . if the result of the redaction was a document 
consisting of blank pages, along with meaningless pronouns and 
articles 
such 
as 
the 
words 
'and,' 
'or,' 
'but,' 
etc."); 
Kestenbaum v. Mich. State Univ., 327 N.W.2d 783, 788 n.10 (Mich. 
1982) (observing that "redaction of the exempt information——
names 
and 
addresses 
of 
students——[under 
personal 
privacy 
exemption in Michigan open records law] would render the 
computer tape useless to plaintiff Kestenbaum," who sought to 
use source for university directory to create political mailing 
list).  But cf. State ex rel. Pietrangelo v. Avon Lake, 2016- 
Ohio-2974, ¶35, 55 N.E.3d 1091 ("As we noted in . . . rejecting 
the . . . argument that the remainder of a redacted document 
would be 'meaningless,' there is no 'exception to the explicit 
duty in [the Ohio public records law] for public offices to make 
available all information that is not exempt after redacting the 
information that is exempt.'" (quoting State ex rel. Anderson v. 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
19 
 
2.  2013 Recording 
¶25 In the 2013 recording, Attorney Schimel discussed a 
high-profile sex extortion case where a high school student 
victimized dozens of minors before a single victim reported the 
abuse. 
 
Attorney 
Schimel 
recounted 
the 
background, 
the 
investigation, the charging decisions, the attempt to keep the 
victims' identities confidential, the impact on the case when a 
breach of that confidentiality revealed the identity of all of 
the victims, the negative effects the disclosure of the 
identities 
caused, 
and 
his 
thoughts 
and 
strategies 
for 
prosecution. 
¶26 Before we apply the balancing test, we analyze whether 
the common law exception to disclosure for a prosecutor's case 
files, discussed in Foust, applies to these facts.  See Foust, 
165 Wis. 2d at 433-35.  Foust held that a district attorney's 
closed files were not subject to the Public Records Law based on 
the broad discretion a district attorney has in charging, the 
confidential nature of the contents of a file, and the threat 
disclosure poses to the orderly administration of justice.  Id. 
¶27 The 2013 video, of course, is not a prosecutor's 
typical paper case file.  Rather, the record is an oral, in-
depth presentation by Attorney Schimel, who was the prosecutor 
in charge of the sex extortion case discussed.  Attorney Schimel 
                                                                                                                                                             
Vermilion, 2012-Ohio-5320, ¶19, 980 N.E.2d 975)).  Meaningless 
redaction is particularly applicable here where the records 
consist of video recordings.  The nondisclosable content on the 
videos permeates the recordings, making redaction futile. 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
20 
 
shared his thought processes for charging and walked through the 
case from the beginning to the end.  The presentation is in 
great respect the oral equivalent of a prosecutor's closed case 
file.  The same rationale asserted in Foust to protect closed 
prosecutorial case files from disclosure under public records 
requests applies to the video here.  Attorney Schimel's oral 
presentation included his analysis and impressions regarding 
charging and how to charge, a concept Foust labeled as 
confidential.  Foust, 165 Wis. 2d at 433-35.  The presentation 
also addressed issues relating to confidentiality of victims' 
identities and statements, which parallels Foust's concerns 
about anonymous statements and informants' statements.  See id. 
at 435.  Attorney Schimel discussed what would equate to 
"historical data leading up to the prosecution," which Foust 
expressed should be protected from public disclosure.  Id.  
Based on these similarities, it would be illogical to conclude 
that a paper accounting of a district attorney's discretionary 
processes must be kept confidential but an oral accounting of 
the same, given in a confidential setting, need not.  It is the 
nature of the record, rather than its form or location that 
matters.  See Nichols, 199 Wis. 2d at 270, 274-75.  ("To 
conclude otherwise would elevate form over substance."); see 
also Portage Daily Register v. Columbia Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 
2008 WI App 30, ¶¶18-19, 21-22, 308 Wis. 2d 357, 746 N.W.2d 525 
(declining to allow sheriff's department to rely on Foust 
exception as basis for withholding report merely because it was 
forwarded to district attorney's office); Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
21 
 
Council of S. Cent. Wis. v. Waunakee Cmty. School Dist., 221 
Wis. 2d 575, 
587 
n.3, 
585 
N.W.2d 726 
(Ct. 
App. 
1998) 
(distinguishing private records from public records).  The 
substance of this 2013 video contains the same discretionary 
content found in a prosecutor's file; therefore, the Foust 
common law exception renders the 2013 video exempt from 
disclosure under Wisconsin's Public Records Law. 
¶28 Our analysis could end here because the common law 
exception applies.  This case, however, involves a public policy 
consideration of constitutional significance, and we therefore 
choose to proceed to an application of the public policy 
balancing test.  First, again, Attorney Schimel is a public 
official, a factor weighing in favor of disclosure.  Second, the 
content of the video, like the 2009 video, contains prosecution 
strategies and law enforcement tactics, which, as Linzmeyer 
explains, weighs in favor of nondisclosure.  See Linzmeyer, 
¶¶32-33.  Third, the 2013 video discusses the victims of the sex 
extortion case and the devastating impact of these crimes, 
especially after the victims' identities were discovered.  
Wisconsin's constitutional commitment to the fair treatment of 
victims and their privacy rights, together with this court's 
commitment to minimizing victims' suffering, weigh in favor of 
nondisclosure.  Although we cannot always protect victims from 
re-traumatization or additional suffering, the circumstances 
here clearly allow us to do so. 
¶29 Although we review the record custodian's decision, we 
briefly explain why the four reasons the circuit court gave for 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
22 
 
overturning 
the 
custodian's 
decision 
are 
inadequate 
and 
erroneous.  We do so because the Democratic Party relies on the 
circuit court's reasoning to advance its position that the 2013 
video should be disclosed.  First, the fact that no specific 
names are used on the video does not render the victims 
unidentifiable. 
 
Disclosing 
the 
recording 
would 
reignite 
interest in the case and allow identification in the same way it 
occurred the first time around.  There is sufficient factual 
detail in the recording to easily connect the dots to identify 
the dozens of victims, who would be re-traumatized should this 
case result in a repeat exposure of their identities almost a 
decade after these events occurred.  Disclosure leading to re-
victimization would run afoul of Wisconsin's constitutional 
commitment to treating victims with "fairness, dignity and 
respect for their privacy."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m.  Further, 
the victims involved here were all child victims who deserve 
special treatment and protection with an emphasis on keeping 
their identities confidential, "especially in sensitive cases." 
See Wis. Stat. § 950.055(1).  This court will "make every effort 
to minimize further suffering by crime victims."  Schilling, 278 
Wis. 2d 216, ¶26. 
¶30 Second, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
reasoning 
that 
the 
victims' reactions to the crimes were "perfectly natural" and 
would not be surprising to anyone is not a relevant factor in 
weighing disclosure over nondisclosure.  Whether a victim's 
reaction is natural or excessive should not be a justification 
for re-traumatizing child victims of sensitive crimes.  What 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
23 
 
must be considered is whether the victims will be re-traumatized 
by renewed suffering as a result of an additional violation of 
their privacy. 
¶31 Third, the rationale that disclosure would help 
parents 
protect 
their 
children 
from 
sexual 
predators 
is 
unconvincing.  Although this video may contain limited helpful 
information on this topic, many other useful resources exist for 
parents but do not present the same threat of harm to victims.  
The DOJ makes available online materials helpful to concerned 
parents.11  Local schools, communities, and police departments 
also offer a variety of helpful resources and seminars.12 
¶32 Fourth, the fact that a significant amount of the 
information discussed in the recording had been previously 
disseminated seven or eight years ago, although "germane to the 
balancing test" see Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶37, does not 
require disclosure.  This information was disclosed almost a 
decade ago.  As presented in the affidavit submitted by Jill J. 
Karofsky, Executive Director of the Office of Crime Victim 
Services, re-disclosing the details of a case typically re-
traumatizes victims.  Karofsky asserts that bringing new public 
attention to a case can be "crushing" for victims who have 
                                                 
11 See Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force, Protect 
Kids Online Podcast (2016), https://www.doj.state.wi.us/dci/icac
/protect-kids-online-pko-podcast. 
12 See, e.g., Internet Crimes Against Children, Milwaukee 
Cty., 
http://county.milwaukee.gov/InternetCrimesAgains9120.htm 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
24 
 
otherwise moved on from a case.  It is not unreasonable——indeed, 
it comports with common sense——to expect additional harm will be 
inflicted on the victims every time a case such as this is 
publicized, especially if done in a high-profile way such as a 
lawsuit that is pursued through all three levels of Wisconsin's 
court system with much media attention.  Moreover, releasing the 
2013 video creates a real risk that future victims will not 
report 
crimes 
and 
will 
not 
cooperate 
with 
prosecutors.  
Effective prosecution depends upon victims reporting in the 
first instance and cooperating until the end of the case.13 
¶33 In balancing the equally important public policies of 
openness 
of 
public 
records 
against 
the 
constitutional 
declaration demanding protection and fair treatment of victims, 
coupled with the need for victim reporting and cooperation in 
order to identify lawbreakers, we conclude that the Public 
Records Law did not require the record custodian to release the 
2013 video.  The video contains no misconduct or evidence 
                                                 
13 This case is not about protecting an individual's privacy 
interest like in Linzmeyer, where the teacher objected to the 
release of a police report generated during an investigation of 
possible inappropriate actions between the teacher and some 
students.  See Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶31 (observing that 
the public interest in protecting the reputation and privacy of 
citizens is "not equivalent to an individual's personal interest 
in protecting his or her own character and reputation").  
Rather, the case before this court is about the public interest 
in protecting the reputation and privacy of crime victims and 
the 
concomitant 
public 
policy 
that 
such 
protection 
will 
encourage victims to report crimes and cooperate in prosecution 
of criminals. 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
25 
 
showing dereliction of duty.  Rather, it contains an oral 
account of the prosecution of a high school student who sexually 
extorted dozens of his fellow students.  The account was 
presented at a confidential prosecutor training seminar, and 
aside from the general presumption favoring disclosure, it has 
little public value.  Disclosure would provide the public with 
Attorney Schimel's mental processes and thoughts with respect to 
a sex extortion case he prosecuted many years ago.  Contrary to 
Foust, releasing the video would give the public insight into 
Attorney Schimel's discretionary charging decisions, and it 
would likely reignite the public and media outrage associated 
with the crimes at issue here.  It would undoubtedly re-
traumatize and harm the  victims who were minors at the time of 
these crimes, and its disclosure would send a strong message to 
crime victims that the continued pain that sometimes accompanies 
the pursuit of justice does not end——even when a prosecution is 
complete and the case is closed.  The balancing test clearly 
weighs in favor of nondisclosure and strongly overcomes the 
presumption favoring disclosure. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶34 Wisconsin and this court are firmly committed to open 
and transparent government.  The denial of public access occurs 
only in exceptional cases.  This case presents one of those 
exceptional situations.  The two videos requested here do not 
contain any evidence of official misconduct.  The circuit court, 
the court of appeals, this court, and the Democratic Party all 
agree on this point.  Both the 2009 and 2013 videos arise from 
No. 
2014AP2536-FT 
 
26 
 
confidential prosecutors' training sessions, and both videos 
contain 
instruction 
on 
prosecutorial 
strategies 
and 
law 
enforcement tactics.  The 2013 recording is an accounting of a 
single case and the functional equivalent of a prosecutor's case 
file, which is exempt from disclosure under Foust.  Further, it 
contains information, which, if released, would harm the public 
interest by re-traumatizing the victims and violating their  
privacy rights, contrary to the policies enshrined in our state 
constitution, statutes, and case law.  In applying the balancing 
test required by Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a), the DOJ record 
custodian gave specific reasons for nondisclosure, and our 
review independently demonstrates that the reasons proffered are 
sufficient and supported by the facts in this case.  We reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals and deny the writ of 
mandamus.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶35 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
Our 
"Sunshine Law," Wisconsin's public records law, is a core 
principle of democracy: "[T]he people must be informed about the 
inner 
workings 
of 
their 
government 
and . . . openness 
in 
government is essential to maintain the strength of our 
democratic society."1  
¶36 The majority opinion eclipses the "Sunshine Law." It 
dims the lights on persons seeking information about Wisconsin 
government operations and——in the instant case——shuts the lights 
off on two records that show how district attorneys, charged 
with prosecuting all criminal actions within their prosecutorial 
units,2 fulfill their duties. 
¶37 The majority opinion completely bars release of then-
Waukesha 
County 
District 
Attorney 
Brad 
Schimel's 
video 
presentations at two different educational conferences.3   
                                                 
1 Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, ¶15, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 646 
N.W.2d 811.  See also Wis. Stat. § 19.31 ("[A]ll persons are 
entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the 
affairs of government and the official acts of those officers 
and employees who represent them.").      
2 Wis. Stat. § 978.05. 
3 Then-District Attorney Schimel's video presentations about 
former cases in his office raise an issue not discussed by the 
parties.   
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.9(c), as it stands now, imposes on 
lawyers a duty of confidentiality to former clients.  It is 
arguable that lawyers can publicly discuss former cases only 
with the informed consent of the client.   
(continued) 
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶38 The Department of Justice performs more than one task 
regarding the public records law.  The legislature imposes 
duties on the Department of Justice regarding the public records 
law.  The legislature established that "[a]ny person may request 
advice from the attorney general as to the applicability of [the 
public records law] under any circumstances," and the "attorney 
general may respond to" the request.  Wis. Stat. § 19.39.4  In 
                                                                                                                                                             
On July 21, 2016, this court denied Rule Petition 15-04, In 
the matter of the Petition to Modify SCR 20:1.9(c), which 
addressed a lawyer's duties to former clients. The petition 
proposed an amendment enabling an attorney to discuss a closed 
case at an educational seminar.  For a discussion of the rule 
and the proposed amendment by the amendment's author, see 
Michael D. Cicchini, On the Absurdity of Model Rule 1.9, 40 Vt. 
L. Rev. 69 (2015).   
The question whether a prosecutor may discuss a closed 
criminal case at an educational conference arose at the hearing 
on the rule petition.  The discussants were not certain about 
who is the prosecutor's client.  And, whoever the client may be, 
it is unclear whether a prosecutor must obtain informed consent 
before discussing the details of the criminal case.   
The court denied the petition.  The discussants at the 
hearing intimated that they may be providing further guidance on 
this issue.    
4 "The opinions and writings of the Attorney General have 
special significance in interpreting the Public Records Law, 
inasmuch as the legislature has specifically authorized the 
Attorney General to advise any person about the applicability of 
the Law." Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 
WI 65, ¶41, 341 Wis. 2d 607, 815 N.W.2d 367 (2012); see also 
Schill v. Wis. Rapids. School Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶106, 327 
Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177 (2010); State v. Beaver Dam Area 
Dev. Corp., 2008 WI 90, ¶37, 312 Wis. 2d 84, 752 N.W.2d 295. 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
3 
 
the instant case, an employee of the Department of Justice is 
the custodian of the records requested and has refused to grant 
the request for release of the two videos at issue.  The 
Department of Justice is also a defendant in the instant case.  
When the original request was made, Brad Schimel was the 
Waukesha County District Attorney, and was represented by the 
Department of Justice.  Now, Brad Schimel is the Attorney 
General, head of the Department of Justice, and is represented 
by the Department of Justice.   
¶39 I too wear more than one hat.  I view the public 
records law from three vantage points.  I have participated in 
numerous cases as a member of this court ruling on the 
interpretation and application of the public records law.  These 
cases are precedent that binds us all.  In my capacity as an 
elected official and custodian of records, I have been the 
recipient of numerous open records requests, to which I have 
responded by complying with the public records law (although the 
court has never ruled on whether the public records law is 
applicable to it).  I am also a requester.  I have made numerous 
                                                                                                                                                             
The attorney general also plays an enforcement role under 
the public records law when authorities deny open records 
requests.  Wisconsin Stat. § 19.37(b) provides that after an 
authority denies access to a record, "[t]he requester may, in 
writing, request . . . the attorney general[] to bring an action 
for mandamus asking a court to order release of the record to 
the requester" and that the "attorney general may bring such an 
action."  See also § 19.37(4) (attorney general may enforce 
forfeitures against a records custodian that "arbitrarily and 
capriciously denies or delays response to a request or charges 
excessive fees").   
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
4 
 
requests for court records (that is, records under the public 
law, especially those relating to the court system's fiscal 
status), to the Interim Director of State Courts, an employee of 
the supreme court, to which he has refused to respond.  I have 
not sought a writ of mandamus.  I have not requested the 
Attorney General or the Dane County District Attorney to bring 
an action for a writ of mandamus pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.37(1).    
¶40 I write this dissent guided by these three viewing 
platforms——justice, records custodian, and requester.  
¶41 The majority opinion follows the approach that the 
Department of Justice has been taking:  Prevent release of the 
videos in their entirety.  Do not adopt a redact and release 
approach.5     
¶42 In this court, the Department of Justice again seeks 
to bar release of the two videos in their entirety.  I agree 
with the circuit court and court of appeals that the Department 
of 
Justice 
has 
not 
provided 
evidence 
to 
support 
the 
nondisclosure of the videos.  Instead, the Department of Justice 
relies on speculation, conjecture, and fear.   
¶43 The Department of Justice has presented no evidence 
that the two videos reveal any investigation and prosecution 
practices not already known or knowable in the public sphere.  
The Department of Justice has presented no evidence that 
                                                 
5 At the circuit court, the Department of Justice rejected 
the Democratic Party's suggestion that the circuit court 
consider redaction of certain parts of the videos.   
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
5 
 
information in the videos would hinder the state's ability to 
prosecute sex offenders.  The Department of Justice has 
presented no evidence that the videos disclose personally 
identifiable information about the crime victims.     
¶44 As an alternative to releasing the videos in their 
entirety, for the first time the Department of Justice asks a 
court to view the videos for redaction.  
¶45 I would remand the cause to the circuit court to 
conduct proceedings to determine whether any part of the two 
videos should be redacted and the remainder released in 
compliance with the public records law.     
¶46 I dissent because the majority opinion casts a long 
shadow on several principles of Wisconsin's public records law.   
¶47 I state the principles that the majority opinion 
either ignores or jeopardizes, and then I discuss several of 
these principles more fully in addressing whether each video in 
the instant case should be released in whole or in part.  
¶48 Principle:  A "presumption of public access" governs 
every open records request.  Wis. Stat. § 19.31.   
¶49 Principle:  The Wisconsin Legislature has provided few 
exceptions to disclosing records.  Wis. Stat. §§ 19.35-.36.  A 
court is to "narrowly construe any exceptions to the general 
rule of disclosure."6   
                                                 
6 Nichols 
v. 
Bennett, 
199 
Wis. 2d 268, 
273-74, 
544 
N.W.2d 428 (1996).   
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶50 Principle:  A court should not consider the identity 
of the requester or the requester's motive.7  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(i) provides in relevant part:  
Except as authorized under this paragraph, no request 
under pars. (a) and (b) to (f) may be refused because 
the person making the request is unwilling to be 
identified or to state the purpose of the request.8   
¶51 The majority opinion speculates that there is a 
"partisan purpose" to these requests.  Majority op., ¶23.  This 
court should not superimpose its own theories of the requester's 
motives onto the requester.  This court should be a force for 
lawfulness.  This court should separate and distance itself from 
partisan politics. 
¶52 A corollary of the majority opinion's view of the 
requester's motive is that the opinion rests on the idea that 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Juneau County Star-Times v. Juneau County, 2013 
WI 4, ¶62, n.33, 345 Wis. 2d 122, 824 N.W.2d 457; Schill v. Wis. 
Rapids School Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶10 n.10, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 
N.W.2d 177. 
8 Nothing in the public records law or case law authorizes 
refusal in the instant case based on the identity of the 
requester or the purpose of the request. 
The majority opinion (¶23) nonetheless relies on a single 
sentence in Hempel v. City of Baraboo, 2005 WI 120, 284 
Wis. 2d 162, 
544 
N.W.2d 428, 
to 
justify 
scrutinizing 
the 
Democratic Party's request.  Justice Prosser's opinion in 
Hempel, 
284 
Wis. 2d 162, 
¶66, 
stated 
only 
that 
"[w]hen 
performing a balancing test, however, a records custodian almost 
inevitably must evaluate context to some degree." 
To jump from considering "context" to concluding that the 
identity and reasons for the request in the instant case weigh 
in favor of nondisclosure contravenes the public records law and 
our precedent. 
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
7 
 
the requester agrees that the videos do not show any misconduct 
on the part of then District Attorney Schimel.  Majority op., 
¶22.  The majority opinion further asserts that the requester 
agrees that the recordings do not contain any offensive 
comments.  Majority op., ¶23.  No such agreement about offensive 
comments appears in the record.  Offensive comments, if any, are 
not an issue before this court.  
¶53 Without any citation to Wisconsin's (or another 
jurisdiction's) statutes or case law, the majority opinion 
essentially states that because the videos show no misconduct or 
offensive comments, the public is not harmed by the non-
disclosure.  This proposition is not in keeping with Wisconsin's 
commitment to open government to enable the public to monitor 
and 
evaluate 
how 
government 
officials 
discharge 
their 
responsibilities.      
¶54 Principle:  Wisconsin Stat. § 19.36(6) requires a 
records custodian to disclose that part of a record that is 
subject to disclosure and redact (delete) information that is 
not 
subject 
to 
disclosure.9 
 
If 
the 
record 
is 
in 
an 
incomprehensible form or in a form that cannot be redacted 
without revealing nondisclosable information, a transcript of 
                                                 
9 "[T]o the extent that [] privacy interests are implicated, 
they could be protected by a redaction of the Report in 
accordance 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.36(6)." 
 
Linzmeyer, 
254 
Wis. 2d 306, ¶40.  Cf. Wis. Stat. § 801.21(4) (2015) (discussing 
motions to seal) ("In restricting access, the court will use the 
least restrictive means that will achieve the purposes of this 
rule and the needs of the requester.").     
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
8 
 
the record may be made and information redacted from the 
transcript.  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(e), (em). 
¶55 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.36(6) provides for redaction as 
follows:  
(6) SEPARATION OF INFORMATION. If a record contains 
information that is subject to disclosure under s. 
19.35(1)(a) or (am) and information that is not 
subject to such disclosure, the authority having 
custody of the record shall provide the information 
that 
is 
subject 
to 
disclosure 
and 
delete 
the 
information that is not subject to disclosure from the 
record before release.10 
¶56 The majority opinion refers to this provision, the 
text of which governs the instant case.  Majority op., ¶24 n.10.  
Rather than addressing this statutory provision directly, the 
majority opinion relegates the issue of redaction to a footnote 
and refers to cases from other jurisdictions that are inapposite 
and unpersuasive.  Majority op., ¶24 n.10. 
¶57 The majority opinion's refusal to adhere to Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.36(6) contravenes the basic policy of the public records 
law:  Disclosure is presumed and exceptions are narrowly 
construed.  I shall discuss the issue of redaction further.  See 
¶¶80-96, infra.     
¶58 Principle:  The records custodian is obliged to state 
specific and sufficient reasons for refusing to release the 
                                                 
10 See also Wis. Stat. § 19.36(1) ("Any record which is 
specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal law or 
authorized to be exempted from disclosure by state law is exempt 
from disclosure under s. 19.35(1), except that any portion of 
that record which contains public information is open to public 
inspection as provided in sub. (6).").   
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
9 
 
record at issue.11  If the custodian gives no reason or an 
insufficient 
reason, 
a 
writ 
of 
mandamus 
compelling 
the 
production of records may issue.  In the instant case, I examine 
both the custodian's response and the Department of Justice's 
briefs filed in this court for specific and sufficient reasons 
for refusing to release the videos in their entirety.     
¶59 Principle:  "The process of police investigation is 
one where public oversight is important . . . and [is] generally 
[a] matter[] of public interest . . . ."12   
¶60 Principle:  "The United States Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, does not apply to states."13  The 
Department of Justice's 2015 Wisconsin Public Records Law 
Compliance Guide states that this court has declared that 
although "the public policies expressed in FOIA may be relevant 
to 
application 
of 
the 
common 
law 
balancing 
test . . . [g]enerally, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Public 
Records 
Law 
                                                 
11 See Hempel v. City of Baraboo, 2005 WI 120, ¶¶25-26, 284 
Wis. 2d 162, 699 N.W.2d 240; Portage Daily Register v. Columbia 
Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 2008 WI App 30, ¶¶12-14, 308 Wis. 2d 357, 
746 N.W.2d 525 (the specificity requirement is designed to 
provide the requester with sufficient notice of the grounds for 
denial to enable the requester to prepare a challenge); ECO, 
Inc. v. City of Elkhorn, 2002 WI App 302, ¶24, 259 Wis. 2d 276, 
655 N.W.2d 510; Wisconsin Dep't of Justice, Wisconsin Public 
Records Law Compliance Guide 15-18 (Nov. 2015) , available at 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/dls/2015-PRL-
Guide.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2016).. 
12 Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶27.  
13 Wisconsin Dep't of Justice, Wisconsin Public Records Law 
Compliance Guide 2 (Nov. 2015). 
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
10 
 
provides for greater access to state governmental records than 
FOIA does to federal records."14 
¶61 The majority opinion does not sufficiently caution 
that FOIA does not govern Wisconsin's public records law. 
¶62 These principles inform my dissent.   
¶63 Today, the majority opinion significantly dims the 
lights on transparency in government and shuts off some lights 
by concluding that the Department of Justice may withhold both 
of the videos in their entirety.   
¶64 Because each video presents some different issues, I 
first address whether the 2009 video of then District Attorney 
Schimel's educational presentation should be released in whole 
or in part.  I then examine whether the 2013 video of then-
District Attorney Schimel's educational presentation should be 
released in whole or in part. 
I.  The 2009 Video 
¶65 The majority opinion rests on three grounds: 
(A) It applies the common-law balancing test to determine 
whether the public interest in nondisclosure of the 
2009 
video 
outweighs 
the 
public 
interest 
in 
disclosure.  Majority op., ¶16.   
(B) It relies on the federal Freedom of Information Act  
(FOIA).  Majority op., ¶13. 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Dep't of Justice, Wisconsin Public Records Law 
Compliance Guide 2 (Nov. 2015).  
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
11 
 
(C) It bars release of the 2009 video in its entirety, and 
refuses to consider redaction of any part of the 
video. Majority op., ¶24 n.10. 
A 
¶66 In barring release of the entire 2009 video, the 
majority opinion balances the presumption of and public interest 
in openness against the public interest in nondisclosure.  
¶67 The public interest in the government's investigating 
and prosecuting criminal activity is "strong."  Majority op., 
¶13.  The majority opinion considers the strong public interest 
in disclosing information about government operations to catch 
sexual predators who prey on children and to educate parents 
about sexual predators of children and their use of the 
internet.   
¶68 In the instant case, the alleged countervailing public 
interest is that a record should not be disclosed when the 
record gives criminals information regarding law enforcement 
techniques and procedures in Waukesha County and Wisconsin that 
they could use to circumvent the law.  Majority op., ¶¶16, 18.   
¶69 The Department of Justice has the burden to show that 
the presumption of openness and the public interests favoring 
disclosure are outweighed by the public interests favoring 
secrecy.  Majority op., ¶9.  
¶70 The majority opinion supports its conclusion that the 
Department of Justice has met its burden with several arguments.   
¶71 Several times it notes that the presentation on the 
video 
was 
given 
at 
a 
confidential 
training 
session 
for 
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
12 
 
prosecutors and victims' right advocates, with some police 
representatives present.15  Majority op., ¶18. Despite the 
Department of Justice's assertion that these seminars are 
confidential 
and 
closed 
to 
persons 
not 
associated 
with 
prosecution and law enforcement, attendees at the presentation 
were not informed in the video or distributed materials that 
they were bound to secrecy.16   
                                                 
15 An affidavit of Ray Korte, the Director for the Wisconsin 
Department of Justice's Criminal Litigation Unit, is attached to 
the Department of Justice's Motion to Dismiss the Petition and 
Quash the Proposed Writ in the instant case.  The affidavit 
states:  "The attendees are almost exclusively prosecutors and 
DOJ staff.  Former DAs and ADAs who continue to make themselves 
available as special prosecutors may also attend, but only if 
that person does not also provide defense attorney services."  
The 
affidavit 
further 
states: 
 
"The 
expectation 
of 
the 
presenters is that the audience is limited . . . and that the 
information shared is for use only by prosecutors and those 
assisting with prosecutions and investigations and, at times, by 
employees who aid crime victims."  
16 The circuit court impliedly found that, despite the 
Department of Justice's asserting that these seminars are closed 
to the public, attendees at the presentation were not bound to 
secrecy: 
THE COURT:. . . What happens to the people like Mr. 
Verhoff and Mr. Kiefer who have flipped over to the 
defense side, are they under any obligation not to use 
any of this information in their pursuit of their 
client's causes? 
[ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL]:  Well, I guess I'll 
split that up.  I don't know that there's any kind of 
agreement from these conferences.  The understanding 
is these are for people who are in [sic] the 
prosecutorial side.  But I guess it's always a risk 
whenever anyone knows something they'll flip and then 
for the other side at some point. . . .  
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶72 As Judge Niess colorfully and correctly stated:  The 
video really is "Investigating Child Predators 101."17  The 
circuit 
court 
explicitly 
found 
that 
the 
videos 
repeat 
information that has been made public in several venues.  
                                                 
17 The judge was apparently referring to "To Catch a 
Predator," a TV program that ran from 2004-2007. It was a 
reality 
television 
series 
that 
featured 
hidden 
camera 
investigations by the television program Dateline NBC.  People 
were lured to meet with a decoy under the pretense of sexual 
contact with a minor and then were confronted on TV.  In some 
episodes law enforcement officials were involved, leading to 
arrests. 
 
Wikipedia, 
To 
Catch 
a 
Predator, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/To_Catch_a_Predator (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2016).    
A spin-off book, To Catch a Predator: Protecting Your 
Children from Online Enemies Already in Your Home, was published 
in 2007.  See Publishers Weekly, Feb. 12, 2007.       
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
14 
 
Indeed, 
the 
internet 
is 
replete 
with 
readily 
available 
information substantially similar to that in the videos.18   
¶73 That information in the 2009 videos at issue is 
publicly known or publicly available weighs in favor of release. 
Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, ¶37, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 330, 646 
N.W.2d 811, 821.  The majority opinion pays lip service to this 
principle but does not apply it to the instant case.  See 
majority op., ¶21.  
¶74 After looking at the video and examining public 
sources of information about law enforcement techniques in 
capturing sexual predators of children using the internet, I 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Louise Tickle, How Police Investigators Are 
Catching Paedophiles Online, The Guardian (Aug. 22, 2012, 4:00 
AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/social-care-
network/2012/aug/22/police-investigators-catching-paedophiles-
online ("When caught . . . they say things like 'it was just a 
fantasy' but you find them with lubricants and toys . . . ."); 
Walter Glenn, How to Hide Your Porn, Lifehacker (Feb. 20, 2014, 
4:30 
PM), 
http://lifehacker.com/how-to-hide-your-porn-
1525454917; Paula McMahon, Feds: Broward Child Porn Suspect Used 
Encryption To Hide Files, SunSentinel (Sep. 23, 2015, 12:52 AM), 
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/fl-child-porn-
encryption-20150922-story.html; 
Susan 
Saulny, 
Sex 
Predator 
Accusations Shake a Wisconsin Town, N.Y. Times (Feb. 10, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/11/us/11wisconsin.html?_r=0 
(describing a high-profile Wisconsin case that is the subject of 
the 2013 video and how the perpetrator organized files on his 
computer); Ty E. Howard, Don't Cache Out Your Case: Prosecuting 
Child Pornography Possession Laws Based on Images Located in 
Temporary Internet Files, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1227 (2004) 
(discussing how forensic investigators examine caches containing 
internet files and the legal factors and defenses in possession 
cases); Jason B. Sheffield & Douglas N. Peters, From Chat Room 
to Courtroom: The Internet, Experts, and Entrapment, Champion, 
Aug. 2015, at 34 (discussing how to use evidence to mount an 
entrapment defense and how to distinguish between fantasy 
roleplay and predatory behavior).  
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
15 
 
conclude, as did the circuit court and court of appeals, that 
the Department of Justice has not demonstrated that the contents 
of the 2009 video are not publicly known or that the contents of 
the 2009 video reveal any information that is peculiar to 
Waukesha County or Wisconsin prosecutions.   
¶75 Neither the Department of Justice nor the majority 
opinion offers an illustration (even a guarded one) of any local 
law enforcement technique that is distinctively used in Waukesha 
County or the state or explains how the release of the 2009 
video would enable a criminal to circumvent Wisconsin law.  The 
whole discussion that releasing the 2009 video would create a 
significant risk is ipse dixit; that is, there is a significant 
public risk to effective law enforcement only because the 
Department of Justice and the majority opinion say so.  Majority 
op., ¶¶19, 20. 
¶76 The law enforcement interest that the Department of 
Justice 
and 
the 
majority 
opinion 
identify 
(but 
do 
not 
demonstrate) does not overcome the statutory presumption of 
openness in the instant case.  In any event, the majority 
opinion should not be read as adopting a per se rule that any 
time a requested record implicates any law enforcement technique 
or prosecutorial strategy, the record will be withheld from 
public view.  Indeed, the Department of Justice's brief explains 
that it is not asking for any sort of blanket exception.  
Rather, the Department of Justice's position is that law 
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
16 
 
enforcement training records must be analyzed on a case-by-case 
basis.19   
B 
¶77 I turn now to the Department of Justice and majority 
opinion's reliance on the federal Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) and the Linzmeyer decision to support their conclusion.  
Majority op., ¶¶13, 18.  This reliance is misplaced. 
¶78 Wisconsin's public records law provides for greater 
access to records than FOIA provides.  "Wisconsin courts have 
more effectively enforced the public records statute . . . than 
federal courts have enforced the federal Freedom of Information 
Act."  Wis. Family Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 95 
Wis. 2d 670, 672-73, 291 N.W.2d 631 (Wis. App. 1980) (also 
noting that the language in Wisconsin's public records law 
provides for greater access than FOIA, citing Constance Y. 
Singleton & Howard O. Hunter, Statutory and Judicial Responses 
to the Problem of Access to Government Information, 1979 Det. 
Coll. L. Rev. 51, 70-71).  
¶79 FOIA is not binding on Wisconsin records custodians or 
courts, and it does not lower the bar on when law enforcement 
records may be withheld in Wisconsin.  Although FOIA may assist 
in determining "whether the presumption of openness in law 
enforcement records is overcome by another public policy,"20 its 
use is limited.       
                                                 
19 Reply Brief of the Wis. Dep't of Justice & Kevin Potter 
at 5. 
20 Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶33. 
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
17 
 
C 
¶80 Without reference to any Wisconsin case law directing 
a records custodian to redact any information that should not be 
disclosed, the majority opinion declares that the entire video 
is barred from public view.  The majority opinion relegates the 
subject of redaction to a footnote.   
¶81 The majority opinion baldly asserts that redaction is 
not an option because the records at issue are videos, rather 
than text documents, and cannot be redacted.  Majority op., ¶24 
n.10.  Nothing in the record reveals whether this assertion is 
true.  If it is true, a transcript can be prepared and 
redactions shown.  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(em).  It appears, 
however, that videos can be redacted.21 
¶82 The majority opinion also states, without any support, 
that releasing the 2009 video with redactions would present a 
video that would be "meaningless." 
¶83 The majority opinion does not attempt to clarify what 
it means by "meaningless."  It does, however, cite to an 
Illinois appellate court decision.  Majority op., ¶24 n.10.  The 
Illinois court concluded that a redacted document would be 
meaningless when "the result of the redaction was a document 
consisting of blank pages, along with meaningless pronouns and 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Schwartz v. United States Drug Enf't Admin., 
No. 13CV5004CBARML, 2016 WL 154089, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 
2016) ("[T]he DEA has not overcome FOIA's presumption of 
disclosure and must disclose the requested portion of the Video, 
subject only to the redaction discussed above."). 
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
18 
 
articles [sic] such as the words 'and,' 'or,' 'but,' etc."  
Harwood v. McDonough, 799 N.E.2d 859, 866 (Ill. App. 2003).   
¶84 In the instant case, redactions would not result in a 
meaningless document as defined by the Illinois court.  We know 
because the Department of Justice tells us so.  A records 
custodian seeking to withhold a record may satisfy its burden by 
searching 
the 
record 
and 
giving 
a 
reasonably 
detailed 
explanation for refusing to release all or part of the record.  
"If a custodian denies a public records request, he or she must 
give specific reasons for denying access, and it is the role of 
the court to determine whether the reasons are sufficient."  
Majority op., ¶9.    
¶85 In fulfilling its obligation to give specific and 
sufficient reasons for refusing to turn over the 2009 video in 
its entirety, the Department of Justice cites in its opening and 
reply briefs portions of the 2009 video that the Department of 
Justice contends should not be disclosed.  It cites to comments 
in the 2009 video about undercover strategies, helpful types of 
evidence, Department of Justice litigation defenses, technology 
and creation of files, and examples from sensitive cases.22   
¶86 These specific portions of the 2009 video cited by the 
Department of Justice, should I even agree that they should be 
redacted (and I do not), run about 30 minutes.  The entire 2009 
                                                 
22 See Corrected Opening Brief of the Wis. Dep't of Justice 
& Kevin Potter at 3-4, 17; Reply Brief of the Wis. Dep't of 
Justice & Kevin Potter at 5-6. 
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
19 
 
video runs about 74 minutes.23  Thus, over half of the video 
presentation apparently would be available for the public.   
¶87 Simple arithmetic undercuts the majority opinion's 
assertion that the videos would be meaningless if redacted.  
Furthermore, my in camera view of the video contravenes the 
majority opinion's unsupported assertion, majority op., ¶24 
n.10, that "the nondisclosable content on the videos permeates 
the recordings, making redaction futile."    
¶88 The Department of Justice has not demonstrated that 
the 2009 video is permeated with information that must be 
redacted under its view of the public records law and that 
redaction would render the video meaningless. 
¶89 Addressing redaction, the majority opinion does not 
rely on the Wisconsin redaction statute, Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6), 
or Wisconsin precedent.  Indeed, the majority opinion relies 
only on distinguishable out-of-state cases.  See majority op., 
¶24 n.10.  
¶90 The majority opinion's reliance, for example, on John 
C. v. Martha A., 592 N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1992), is 
misplaced.  John C. involved a New York City Municipal Court 
landlord-tenant dispute and was not an open records case.  The 
landlord's counsel provided the court information about the 
medical condition of the tenant's husband; the confidential 
medical information was obtained illegally and permeated the 
whole court file.  John C., 592 N.Y.S.2d at 235. 
                                                 
23 The Department of Justice takes a similar approach to 
withholding the 2013 video, as well.     
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
20 
 
¶91 In Kestenbaum v. Michigan State University, 327 
N.W.2d 783, 788 n.10 (Mich. 1982), without discussion or 
explanation, the Michigan court stated that a computer tape 
should not be released because redaction would render the tape 
"useless" to the requester.  The majority opinion in the instant 
case extracts this language from the Michigan case that appears 
to support the majority opinion's view without comparing the 
Michigan and Wisconsin public records laws and without analyzing 
the meaning of "useless" and whether redaction makes the 2009 
video "useless" in the instant case.     
¶92 In contrast, in State ex rel. Pietrangelo v. City of 
Avon Lake, 55 N.E.3d 1091, ¶35 (Ohio 2016), the Ohio supreme 
court noted that a redacted document must be released even if 
"meaningless":  Ohio (like Wisconsin) has no law allowing a 
public official to refuse to release a redacted document even if 
it is "meaningless" or "useless." 
¶93 The majority opinion also relies on a federal Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals case, American Civil Liberties Union v. 
Department of Defense, 543 F.3d 59 (2nd Cir. 2008), for the 
proposition that a redacted record need not be released if the 
redactions render it meaningless.  This case provides little, if 
any, support for the majority opinion.  
¶94 Using 
FOIA, 
the 
American 
Civil 
Liberties 
Union 
attempted to obtain photographs of detainees held by government 
forces abroad depicting prisoner abuse by these forces. The 
defendant government entities justified nondisclosure under 5 
U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) and (7)(C).    
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
21 
 
¶95 FOIA provides for redaction.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) 
("Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be 
provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of 
the portions which are exempt under this subsection.").   
¶96 Both the federal district court and federal court of 
appeals ordered redacted photographs released in American Civil 
Liberties Union.24  The courts discussed redaction, but most 
photographs were released without redaction.  The Second Circuit 
court noted that "[w]here individual recognition could not be 
prevented without redaction so extensive as to render the images 
meaningless" the district court properly withheld those photos, 
but the Second Circuit court agreed with the district court's 
dismissal of "speculative [] risk[s] that persons depicted in 
the photographs might recognize themselves or be recognized by 
members of the public in spite of the redactions." Am. Civil 
Liberties Union, 543 F.3d at 84.  No further discussion of 
redaction ensued.25  Unlike the Second Circuit court's opinion in 
the American Civil Liberties Union case, our court's majority 
                                                 
24 For a supplemental order by Judge Hellerstein in the 
Southern District of New York releasing photographs, see 
American Civil Liberties Union v. Department of Defense, No. 
04Civ.415(AKH), 2006 WL 1722574 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
25 On petition for a writ of certiorari, the United States 
Supreme Court "vacated" the judgment and remanded the case to 
the federal circuit court of appeals.  The United State Supreme 
Court did not remand the case under FOIA.  Rather, the remand 
was "for further consideration in light of Section 565 of the 
Department 
of 
Homeland 
Security 
Appropriations 
Act, 
2010 . . . ."  Dep't of Defense v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 
558 U.S. 1042 (2009). 
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
22 
 
opinion refusing to redact and barring disclosure is based on 
speculative risks.   
¶97 In sum, in applying its amalgamation of public records 
law to prohibit release of the 2009 video in its entirety, the 
majority opinion (like the Department of Justice) dismisses  
valid public policy concerns while embracing hollow talk lauding 
the secrecy of publicly known prosecutorial strategy and police 
techniques.       
II.  The 2013 Video 
¶98 The 2013 video is a recording of a presentation that  
then Waukesha County District Attorney Schimel gave to share the 
knowledge he gleaned during the prosecution of Anthony Stancl, a 
high-profile 
sex 
extortion 
case. 
 
The 
presentation 
is 
essentially a "war story" depicting how the District Attorney 
handled the case, including the background of the case, the 
investigation, the charging decisions, the impact on victims, 
and more.  Majority op., ¶25.  This story has already been 
publicly divulged by then-District Attorney Schimel and was 
reported widely in Wisconsin and across the country.26     
¶99 The majority opinion focuses its discussion justifying 
withholding the 2013 video in its entirety on two grounds:   
                                                 
26 The circuit court reported that it "did a Google search 
of the perpetrator here and in a half a second came up with 
15,300 entries about this case."  Counsel for the Department of 
Justice agreed with the circuit court that coverage of the 
Stancl case was widespread.  My search located many articles, as 
well, including the following:  Susan Saulny, Sex Predator 
Accusations Shake a Wisconsin Town, N.Y. Times (Feb. 10, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/11/us/11wisconsin.html?_r=0l.  
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
23 
 
(A) A common-law exception for prosecutors' case files, as 
described in State ex rel. Richards v. Foust, 165 
Wis. 2d 429, 477 N.W.2d 608 (1991).  Majority op., 
¶27.  
(B) Victims' rights, as set forth in Article I, Section 9m 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 950.04(1v)(ag),27 .055.28  Majority op., ¶14.   
A 
¶100 The majority opinion characterizes the 2013 video as 
an "oral equivalent" of the district attorney's prosecutorial 
files and reads the Foust case as not subjecting the district 
attorney's closed files to the public records law "based on the 
broad discretion a district attorney has in charging, the 
confidential nature of the contents of a file, and the threat 
disclosure poses to the orderly administration of justice."  
Majority op., ¶26 (citing Foust, 165 Wis. 2d at 433-35).       
¶101 This extension of Foust's common-law exception to the 
public records law to the instant case overlooks the factors 
                                                 
27 Section 950.04(1v)(ag) provides:  
Victims of crimes . . . [are] [t]o be treated with 
fairness, dignity, and respect for . . . privacy by 
public officials, employees, or agencies.  This 
paragraph does not impair the right or duty of a 
public official or employee to conduct his or her 
official duties reasonably and in good faith. 
28 In 
addition 
to 
factoring 
in 
victims' 
rights, 
the 
majority's application of the balancing test to the 2013 video 
raises the same issues that I discuss above.  As an alternative 
to relying on Foust, the majority opinion also applies the 
balancing test.   
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
24 
 
that 
drove 
the 
Foust 
decision: 
protecting 
confidential 
informants' identities and protecting prosecutors' discretion. 
Foust, 165 Wis. 2d 429, 435-37.  The Department of Justice has 
not demonstrated that either of these factors is present in the 
instant case. 
¶102 Foust did not enshrine the entire prosecutorial file 
beyond the public's view.  This court has recognized that not 
all documents in a prosecutor's file are subject to the common-
law exception to disclosure.  See Nichols v. Bennett, 199 
Wis. 2d 268, 544 N.W.2d 428 (1996) (the document's nature and 
not its location determines its status under the public records 
law).  "[D]ocuments integral to the criminal investigation and 
prosecution process are protected 'from being open to public 
inspection.'"  Nichols, 199 Wis. 2d at 275 n.4 (quoting Foust, 
165 Wis. 2d at 434).   
¶103 The Department of Justice has not shown that the 
content of the 2013 video is integral to the closed case or to 
future open criminal investigations, especially in light of the 
publicity surrounding Stancl's case. 
¶104 The Department of Justice's brief, citing Linzmeyer, 
254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶26, acknowledges that balancing the public 
policies for and against release requires "special care."29  Yet 
the Department of Justice does not take and has not taken 
"special care."  The Department of Justice acknowledges that the 
records custodian must demonstrate how the release of the 
                                                 
29 Corrected Opening Brief of the Wis. Dep't of Justice & 
Kevin Potter at 8. 
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
25 
 
requested information will create a risk of "circumvention" of 
the law.30  The Department of Justice does not do so, and neither 
does the majority opinion. 
¶105 My objection to extending Foust to the instant case 
does not elevate form (files vs. oral presentation) over 
substance (content of the video).  Rather, the majority 
opinion's extension of Foust violates the essence of the Foust 
decision and contravenes the express legislative mandate that 
exceptions to open records be construed narrowly.  See Nichols, 
199 Wis. 2d at 273; Fox v. Bock, 149 Wis. 2d 403, 411, 438 
N.W.2d 589 (1989). 
B 
¶106 Protection 
of 
crime 
victims 
is 
an 
important 
consideration 
in 
the 
instant 
case 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
constitution, statutes, and case law.  There is no disagreement 
on this point.  
¶107 In 
performing 
the 
balancing 
test 
to 
justify 
nondisclosure of the 2013 video on grounds of protecting crime 
victims, the majority opinion (like the Department of Justice) 
views the protection of crime victims as outweighing the 
presumption of openness of public records in the instant case. 
¶108 As he was trying this case, the then-District Attorney 
wanted to get the information he learned in prosecuting the 
                                                 
30 Corrected Opening Brief of the Wis. Dep't of Justice & 
Kevin Potter at 13-14. 
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
26 
 
Stancl case to kids and parents.31  The circuit court agreed that 
the information could be useful for parents.  The majority 
opinion, in contrast, justifies not releasing the videos by 
stating that many other useful resources exist for parents.  See 
majority op., ¶31.   
¶109 The 
majority 
opinion 
accepts 
the 
Department 
of 
Justice's view of the balancing. 
But the Department of Justice 
and the majority opinion ignore the comments of the Attorney 
General, a key figure in the administration of the public 
records law, with regard to the relationship of the public 
records law and the laws on protecting crime victims.  
¶110 The then-Attorney General explained in 2012 that 
neither the constitutional provisions nor the Wisconsin statutes 
relating to crime victims factor into the open records balancing 
test any more than other factors.32  
                                                 
31 Michael Joseph Gross, Sextortion at Eisenhower High, GQ 
(June 30, 2009), available at http://www.gq.com/story/wisconsin-
high-school-sex-scandal-online-facebook ("Brad Schimel, Waukesha 
County D.A., says he hopes the Stancl case will be 'a two-by-
four upside the head to parents,' encouraging them to get 
involved in their children's lives online."); Laurel Walker, 
Stancl gets 15 years in prison in Facebook coercion case, 
Milwaukee 
Journal 
Sentinel 
(Feb 
24, 
2010), 
available 
at 
http://archive.jsonline.com/news/waukesha/85252392.html 
("After 
the sentence was imposed, with Stancl taken immediately to 
prison, [then-District Attorney] Schimel said outside the 
courtroom that he wasn't sure this case, with all its publicity, 
was getting through to kids, because new cases of sexting have 
continued to occur.  'I'm just not sure they're hearing this 
message,' he said.  'I hope their parents are.'").   
32 This memorandum dated April 27, 2012, is available at 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/dls/act-283-
advisory.pdf.    
(continued) 
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
27 
 
¶111 In April 2012, then-Attorney General J.B. Van Hollen 
advised interested parties about the relation of the public 
records law and the victim rights legislation as follows:  
The new statutory provisions created by Act 283 
[relating to victim rights] do not prohibit law 
enforcement agencies or other public entities from 
disclosing personal identifiers of crime victims and 
witnesses 
in 
response 
to 
public 
records 
requests. . . .   
Privacy, confidentiality, and safety concerns related 
to victims and witnesses have been and should continue 
to be carefully considered by records custodians when 
making public records release decisions, however.  
These important concerns generally are addressed in 
case-by-case 
application 
of 
the 
public 
records 
balancing test which, under appropriate circumstances, 
allows 
sensitive 
information 
to 
be 
redacted 
or 
withheld.     
The 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Justice, 
echoing 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 950.04(1v)(ag), (see ¶99 n.27, supra), quoted and reaffirmed 
Attorney General Van Hollen's view in Wisconsin Public Records 
Compliance Guide at 39 (Nov. 2015).33 
                                                                                                                                                             
See ¶38 n.4, supra, explaining that the court gives special 
weight to the Attorney General's opinions and writings on the 
public records law.   
33 The Compliance Guide states at 39:   
2011 
Wisconsin 
Act 
283 
created 
three 
statutory 
provisions, Wis. Stat. §§ 950.04(1v)(ag), (1v)(dr), 
and (2w)(dm), related to disclosure of personally 
identifying information of victims and witnesses by 
public officials, employees or agencies, which were 
intended 
to 
protect 
victims 
and 
witnesses 
from 
inappropriate and unauthorized use of their personal 
information.  These statutes are not intended to and 
do not prohibit law enforcement agencies or other 
public 
entities 
from 
disclosing 
the 
personal 
identities of crime victims and witnesses in response 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
28 
 
¶112 Regarding crime victims, the majority opinion does not 
hold the Department of Justice to the principle that the records 
custodian must state specific and sufficient reasons for 
nondisclosure and that a court must determine whether the 
reasons given are sufficient.  Majority op., ¶¶28-33.  The 
majority opinion departs from this precedential requirement 
without reason. 
¶113 No victims are identified in the video.  Both the 
circuit court and the Assistant Attorney General representing 
the Department of Justice agreed that nothing in the video 
suggests who the victims were.  To support its conclusion that 
release of the 2013 video has the potential for re-victimizing 
crime victims and imposes too high a cost on crime victims in 
the instant case, the Department of Justice and the majority 
opinion rely on Jill J. Karofsky's affidavit.  Jill Karofsky is 
Executive Director of the Office of Crime Victim Services in the 
Department of Justice. 
¶114 Director Karofsky is very knowledgeable about victims.  
Her affidavit, however, makes generalized statements about crime 
victims without addressing the 2013 video and without taking a 
position on whether the video at issue should be disclosed.  
¶115 For example, Director Karofsky's affidavit fails to 
consider the number of victims in the Stancl case, the extensive 
                                                                                                                                                             
to public records requests, although those public 
records duties should continue to be performed with 
due regard for the privacy, confidentiality, and 
safety of crime victims and witnesses. 
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
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publicity that the case received, the years that have elapsed 
since the incident, whether any of the 39 victims could be 
identified in the video, and the difficulty or ease of 
identifying the victims by examining past publicity of the 
case.34   
¶116 The Department of Justice's reply brief states:  "It 
is the Department as a whole——not Karofsky——that concluded that 
these 
generally 
applicable 
considerations 
militate 
against 
disclosure of these particular videos."35  Instead of complying 
with the requirement of specificity, the Department of Justice's 
brief asks this court to give deference to the Department when 
it is protecting crime victims.  
¶117 The Department of Justice has not fulfilled its burden 
to show that the public interests favoring disclosure are 
outweighed by the public interests favoring secrecy in the 
instant case justifying barring release of the 2013 video in its 
entirety.  See majority op., ¶9. 
¶118 The entire 2013 video runs a little over 70 minutes.  
The 2013 video, like the 2009 video, should be reviewed on 
                                                 
34 As the majority opinion acknowledges, the victims' 
identities were already disclosed publicly years ago. This 
consideration weighs in favor of disclosure of the 2013 video, 
or at least parts thereof.  Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶37. 
35 Reply Brief of the Wis. Dep't of Justice & Kevin Potter 
at 6 n.3. 
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remand by the circuit court to determine which parts of the 2013 
video, if any, should be redacted.36 
¶119 By concluding that the protection of crime victims in 
the instant case overcomes the legislatively created presumption 
of openness, the majority opinion offers no workable limits on 
when protection of crime victims will or will not outweigh the 
presumption of openness.  When a victim of a crime is not 
identified but is implicated in the record, what is the weight 
of the thumb on the scale for nondisclosure?  Does the majority 
opinion intend to promulgate a per se rule that protection of 
crime victims who are not identified but may be implicated 
always defeats the presumption of openness of records?  I think 
not.   
¶120 I would remand the cause to the circuit court to 
conduct proceedings to determine whether any part of the 2013 
video should be redacted, and what part of the video should be 
released in compliance with the public records law. 
* * * * 
¶121 I write separately because the majority opinion fails 
to follow principles and procedures the legislature and courts 
have set forth and because it reaches the wrong result.  Along 
the way to reach its result, the majority opinion extends 
exceptions to the public records law and, in effect, renders 
meaningless the statutory direction to redact.   
                                                 
36 The 2013 video describes an undisclosed and traumatic 
fact about one of the unidentified victims.  This reference 
might be redacted.   
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
31 
 
¶122 Because the majority opinion cannot point to a basis 
for prohibiting redaction in the instant case, I would remand 
the cause to the circuit court to redact any information 
justified under the public records law and release the rest of 
the videos. 
¶123 The question for me is:  What has the majority 
achieved with its opinion grounded in speculative, abstract, and 
unsubstantiated fears?  The answer for me is:  A dimming of the 
light on public oversight of government, especially in matters 
pertaining to criminal justice.  
¶124 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶125 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
No.  2014AP2536-FT.ssa 
 
 
 
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