Case Title: State v. Davison

Citation: 

Docket Number: 77228-2

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 20–0950 
 
Submitted October 21, 2021—Filed April 15, 2022 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
CAESAR CHARLES DAVISON, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, John M. 
Wright, Judge. 
 
 
A defendant convicted of assault causing serious injury and conspiracy to 
commit a forcible felony (murder) appeals the award of $150,000 restitution and 
the sentence. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 
 
 
Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Appel, 
McDonald, and Oxley, JJ., joined, and in which McDermott, J., joined, except as 
to the discussion of legislative history in part III.A. McDonald, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which Oxley, J., joined. McDermott, J., filed a special 
concurrence. Waterman, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, in which Christensen, C.J., joined. 
 
2 
 
 
Martha Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Maria Ruhtenberg, Assistant 
Appellate Defender, and Lucee Laursen (argued), law student, for appellant. 
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout (argued), 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
 
 
 
3 
 
MANSFIELD, Justice. 
A jury found the defendant guilty of assault causing serious injury and 
conspiracy to commit murder in connection with a shooting death. The district 
court later awarded restitution against the defendant under Iowa Code section 
910.3B (2017). That law mandates an award of at least $150,000 restitution 
when “the offender is convicted of a felony in which the act or acts committed by 
the offender caused the death of another person.” Id. § 910.3B(1). The defendant 
now argues that the restitution was statutorily and constitutionally 
impermissible because the offenses of which he was convicted did not include, 
as an element, causing the death of another person.  
We conclude that Iowa Code section 910.3B does not require a jury finding 
that the defendant caused the death of another person. But the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution is a different matter. The United 
States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Sixth Amendment requires 
facts that increase the defendant’s minimum or maximum punishment to be 
determined by a jury. Because the $150,000 restitution is punitive in part, 
awards of such restitution must be based on jury findings. No jury found that 
the defendant caused the death of the victim of the shooting. Therefore, we 
reverse the award of restitution in this case and remand for further proceedings. 
I. Facts and Procedural History. 
 
Early in the morning of September 10, 2017, Demarcus Chew rode back 
with a group of friends from a club in Gulfport, Illinois to his home in Burlington, 
Iowa. Another group had been at the same club. Members of that other group, 
 
4 
 
which included the defendant Caesar Davison, Emmanuel Spann, Antoine 
Spann, Andre Harris, and Derrick Parker, also left at the same time. The second 
group was aware that an individual named A.J. Smith had a conflict with the 
Chew family and had put a bounty on Demarcus Chew’s head. 
When the car carrying Chew home neared Chew’s apartment, a vehicle 
carrying most of the members of the second group also stopped. Davison and 
Emmanuel Spann got out of that vehicle, leaving Antoine Spann and Harris 
behind.1 
Davison and Emmanuel Spann were out of the vehicle for only seconds or, 
at most, a couple of minutes. During that time, multiple gunshots were fired. 
Chew was struck seven times by bullets, once in the head, three times in the 
chest or abdomen, once in the pelvis, once in the left arm, and once in the left 
leg. Chew’s head wound was “rapidly fatal,” according to the medical examiner, 
but the wounds to Chew’s lungs and liver would also have resulted in Chew’s 
death by themselves. 
Davison and Emmanuel Spann returned quickly to their vehicle. Antoine 
Spann was told “to go.” When Davison and Emmanuel Spann were asked if they 
got Chew, Davison responded, “Yeah, it was up close.” Davison was also heard 
saying, “He gone.” As Antoine Spann drove away, Emmanuel Spann was seated 
in the vehicle holding the murder weapon wrapped in a T-shirt. The vehicle made 
another brief stop so Emmanuel could get out and hide the gun in some bushes.  
                                      
 
1Both Antoine Spann and Harris made plea agreements that avoided murder charges but 
required them to testify for the State. 
 
5 
 
On April 2, 2019, the State filed a trial information in the Iowa District 
Court for Des Moines County charging Davison with first-degree murder, in 
violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1 and 707.2(1), and conspiracy to commit a 
forcible felony, murder, in violation of Iowa Code sections 706.1 and 706.3.  
The case was heard by a jury beginning on February 11, 2020. On 
February 20, the jury returned verdicts finding Davison guilty of the lesser 
included offense of assault causing serious injury, a class “D” felony, in violation 
of Iowa Code section 708.2(4), and guilty as charged of conspiracy to commit a 
forcible felony, murder, a class “C” felony.  
The jury instruction for assault causing serious injury read as follows: 
The State must prove all of the following elements of the 
lesser-included offense of Assault Causing a Serious Injury: 
1. On or about September 10, 2017, the defendant committed 
an assault upon Demarcus Chew. 
2. The defendant had the apparent ability to do the act. 
3. The defendant’s act caused a serious injury to Demarcus 
Chew. 
The instruction for conspiracy to commit a forcible felony read: 
As to Count II of the Trial Information, the State must prove 
all of the following elements of Conspiracy to Commit a Forcible 
Felony: 
1. On or about the 10th day of September, 2017, Caesar 
Davison agreed with Antoine Spann, Andre Harris, Emmanuel 
Spann, and Derrick Parker that one or more of them would commit 
the crime of Murder, a forcible felony, or solicit another to commit 
the crime of Murder; or attempt to commit the crime of Murder. 
2. Caesar Davison entered into the agreement with the intent 
to promote or facilitate the crime of Murder. 
 
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3. Caesar Davison, or Antoine Spann, Andre Harris, 
Emmanuel Spann, or Derrick Parker committed an overt act in 
furtherance of the agreement. 
Significantly, neither of those crimes—unlike the murder and lesser-included 
manslaughter offenses of which Davison was acquitted—required the jury to find 
that Davison had caused Chew’s death. 
On March 12, the State filed a statement of pecuniary damages requesting 
an award of $150,000 restitution for the benefit of the Chew’s estate because 
Davison had “caused the death of another person.” Iowa Code § 910.3B(1). The 
next day, Davison lodged an objection based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000), and Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343 (2012). 
On July 13, the district court imposed consecutive prison sentences on Davison 
totaling fifteen years and ordered him to pay $150,000 in restitution to Chew’s 
family under Iowa Code section 910.3B(1). 
 
Davison appeals his restitution award and sentence. He argues that 
section 910.3B does not authorize a restitution award unless causing the death 
of another is an element of an offense for which the defendant was convicted. 
Alternatively, Davison argues that the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution require a jury 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he caused the death of another. Finally, 
Davison claims the district court abused its discretion at sentencing because it 
was not aware it could sentence him to probation. 
 
We retained Davison’s appeal. 
 
7 
 
II. Standard of Review. 
This court reviews restitution orders for correction of errors at law. State 
v. Waigand, 953 N.W.2d 689, 694 (Iowa 2021). However, our review is de novo 
when a constitutional claim is at issue. State v. Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d 541, 545 
(Iowa 2000) (en banc). We review the district court’s sentence for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Iowa 2018). 
III. Legal Analysis. 
A. Does Iowa Code Section 910.3B(1) Apply Only to Defendants 
Convicted of a Crime in Which an Element Was Causing the Death of 
Another? Iowa Code section 910.3B(1) states: 
In all criminal cases in which the offender is convicted of a felony in 
which the act or acts committed by the offender caused the death of 
another person, in addition to the amount determined to be payable 
and ordered to be paid to a victim for pecuniary damages, as defined 
under section 910.1, and determined under section 910.3, the court 
shall also order the offender to pay at least one hundred fifty 
thousand dollars in restitution to the victim’s estate if the victim 
died testate. 
The first issue Davison raises is one of statutory interpretation—does the 
phrase “a felony in which the act or acts . . . caused the death of another person” 
mean that the death-causing acts have to be part of the definition of the felony 
itself or is it sufficient if the defendant is convicted of a felony and the acts that 
constituted the felony also caused a death? Id. The defendant argues that the 
correct interpretation requires causing a death to be an element of the felony.2 
                                      
 
2The State does not dispute that causing a death is not a required element of either 
offense of which Davison was convicted. See Iowa Code §§ 706.1, .3 (listing the elements of 
conspiracy to commit a forcible felony); id. §§ 708.1(2), .2(4) (listing the elements of assault 
causing serious injury). 
 
8 
 
Our first step in a case of statutory interpretation “is to determine whether 
the language is ambiguous.” State v. Richardson, 890 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Iowa 
2017). To determine if a statute is ambiguous, we consider its language in 
context and consider whether “reasonable minds differ or are uncertain as to the 
meaning of the statute.” Id. (quoting Rhoades v. State, 880 N.W.2d 431, 446 
(Iowa 2016)). In our view, the plain text of section 910.3B leaves room for 
reasonable minds to differ, providing two explicit requirements but limited 
guidance as to how closely they must connect. It is clear that the statute is 
intended to apply to defendants convicted of a felony where a felonious act 
resulted in the death of another, but less clear whether an act causing death 
must be part of the felony. 
The legislature could have avoided this issue with clearer language. For 
example, the general rule for restitution is that the victim is entitled to pecuniary 
damages they “could recover against the offender in a civil action arising out of 
the same facts or event.” Iowa Code § 910.1(6). Iowa Code section 910.3B(1) does 
not track that broad causation standard. On the other hand, the legislature 
didn’t choose to say, “In all criminal cases in which the offender is convicted of 
a felony an element of which is causing the death of another person . . . .” That 
word choice would have mandated that we follow the narrower of the two 
interpretations at issue here. 
While the text leaves room for reasonable debate, we think it tends to favor 
the broader interpretation. The statute uses the past tense, “caused,” rather than 
the present tense, “cause.” The present tense would have conveyed that the 
 
9 
 
attributes of the felony are determinative. In other words, does this felony involve 
causing the death of another person? The past tense suggests that the acts in 
the specific case matter—i.e., did this defendant’s felonious acts cause the death 
of another person? 
We note that the rule of lenity can come into play when interpreting 
criminal statutes. Recently, though, in State v. Shears, we seemed to question 
whether the rule of lenity applied to victim restitution: 
We have stated that because criminal restitution is penal in 
nature, the provisions of Iowa Code chapter 910 should be 
interpreted strictly. See [State v. Bonstetter, 637 N.W.2d 161, 166 
(Iowa 2001)]. We have also stated in passing that the rule of lenity 
is applicable to criminal restitution. See State v. Hagen, 840 N.W.2d 
140, 146 (Iowa 2013). Yet, we have suggested that it is appropriate 
to consider a broader interpretation of restitution provisions 
because the purpose of the statute is to protect the public. See [State 
v. Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d 370, 372–73 (Iowa 1986)]. We have thus 
held, for example, that the amount of restitution ordered is not 
limited by the parameters of the offense for which the defendant 
enters a guilty plea. See [State v. Watts, 587 N.W.2d 750, 751 (Iowa 
1998)]. 
920 N.W.2d 527, 533 (Iowa 2018). We need not resolve today whether the rule of 
lenity applies to awards of restitution to crime victims. We have said that the 
rule of lenity is a “last resort.” In re Prop. Seized from Bo Li, 911 N.W.2d 423, 429 
n.4 (Iowa 2018). It “applies only when a reasonable doubt persists after the 
traditional canons of interpretation have been considered.” Antonin Scalia & 
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 197 (2012). For 
the reasons we discuss herein, we believe Iowa Code section 910.3B can be 
interpreted without touching upon the question of whether the rule of lenity 
applies to criminal victim restitution. 
 
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Iowa Code section 910.3B became law in 1997. 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 125, 
§ 11. In 2000, we decided several cases involving that section. State v. Rohm, 
609 N.W.2d 504 (Iowa 2000) (en banc); State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 
2000) (en banc); State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526 (Iowa 2000) (en banc); Izzolena, 
609 N.W.2d 541. None of the four cases directly presented the question of 
interpretation we must answer today. Yet some language in State v. Izzolena 
supports the broader interpretation that the State urges here. In Izzolena, this 
court considered section 910.3B as it applied to a defendant convicted of 
unintentionally causing the death of another by operating a motor vehicle in a 
reckless manner. 609 N.W.2d at 545. The district court imposed victim 
restitution under section 910.3B of $150,000. Id. On appeal, the defendant 
argued that the restitution award was unconstitutional because it was an 
excessive fine, a violation of due process, and a violation of double jeopardy. Id. 
at 546–47.  
In rejecting these claims, we observed in Izzolena that the statute “only 
applies to offenders who committed a crime which caused the death of another 
human.” Id. at 550. We also remarked that “[the defendant’s] actions resulted in 
the death of [the victim].” Id. at 552. Additionally, we noted that “the commission 
of the offense must have been the proximate cause of the victim’s death.” Id. at 
553. Our choice of words in Izzolena indicates that Iowa Code section 910.3B 
would be triggered by the defendant’s felonious acts, not necessarily by the 
elements of the crime. The defendant’s actions, i.e., his or her commission of the 
 
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offense, must cause the death of another, but causing the death of another 
doesn’t have to be part of the crime itself. 
Also, the legislative history of Iowa Code section 910.3B seemingly 
supports the broader interpretation. See Iowa Code § 4.6(3) (providing that the 
court may consider legislative history in interpreting an ambiguous statute). The 
preamble characterizes the section as “providing restitution for death of a victim 
of a crime.” 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 125. The official bill explanation states that “[t]he 
bill also provides for payment of $150,000 by an offender, . . . to the estates of 
persons whose deaths are caused by the offender’s felonious criminal acts.” S.F. 
503, 77th G.A., 1st Sess., explanation (Iowa 1997). Thus, in the legislature’s 
view, the key point appears to be whether the victim died as a result of the 
defendant’s felonious acts, not whether the elements of the crime included 
causing the victim’s death.  
For these reasons, we are not persuaded by Davison’s argument that Iowa 
Code section 910.3B requires causing the death of another to be an element of 
a felony for which the defendant is convicted. 
B. Is Section 910.3B Restitution an Increase in Penalty Requiring a 
Jury Finding under Apprendi v. New Jersey and its Progeny? Davison also 
argues that awarding restitution against him under section 910.3B was 
unconstitutional absent a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he had 
caused the death of another. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.3  
                                      
 
3Davison does not dispute that the district court found he had caused the death of Chew. 
 
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1. The Apprendi Line of Cases. In Apprendi, the United States Supreme 
Court held that a New Jersey statute violated the Fourteenth and Sixth 
Amendments because it authorized the sentencing court to enhance the 
defendant’s prison term as a “hate crime” without a jury determination that the 
defendant acted with a purpose to intimidate based on the victims’ race. Id. at 
468–69, 497. The Court held that because the fact of racial animus increased 
the defendant’s maximum penalty, it was subject to the Sixth Amendment 
requirement of a jury finding like any other element of a crime. Id. at 476–77. 
Under this standard, the relevant inquiry is “one not of form, but of effect—does 
the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that 
authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?” Id. at 494.  
 
Over a decade later, in Southern Union, the Court considered whether a 
statutory fine was subject to the rule in Apprendi. 567 U.S. at 346. A jury 
returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of one count of unlawfully storing 
liquid mercury. Id. at 346–47. The criminal statute under which the defendant 
was convicted authorized “a fine of not more than $50,000 for each day of 
violation.” Id. at 347 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)). The district court imposed a 
fine of $6 million after determining there had been a 762-day violation. Id. The 
defendant argued that because it had only been convicted of a single count, the 
district court could only levy the maximum fine for one day; Apprendi, in other 
words, limited fines to the maximum authorized by the jury verdict alone. Id. The 
Court agreed with the defendant’s argument, expressly holding that the Apprendi 
rule applied to criminal fines. Id. at 360. As the Court put it, “In stating 
 
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Apprendi’s rule, we have never distinguished one form of punishment from 
another. Instead, our decisions broadly prohibit judicial factfinding that 
increases maximum criminal ‘sentence[s],’ ‘penalties,’ or ‘punishment[s]’—terms 
that each undeniably embrace fines.” Id. at 350 (alterations in original).  
 
Southern Union was followed by Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 
(2013). There, the defendant had been convicted of robbery and using a firearm 
in relation to a crime of violence, which carried a mandatory minimum of five 
years in prison. Id. at 103–04. Yet the defendant received a seven-year 
mandatory minimum sentence based on a district court finding that he had 
“brandished” a firearm. Id. at 104. The Supreme Court rejected such district 
court fact-finding. Id. at 108. It held that “[f]acts that increase the mandatory 
minimum sentence are . . . elements and must be submitted to the jury and 
found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 
This sets the stage for Davison’s argument here. We will parse Davison’s 
argument into its components. First, the Apprendi rule embraces all forms of 
penalty or punishment including monetary fines. See S. Union, 567 U.S. at 360. 
Second, that rule requires the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact 
that increases the minimum or maximum penalty or punishment. See Alleyne, 
570 U.S. at 108; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Third, the $150,000 restitution 
award is an additional penalty or punishment for committing a felony that 
caused the death of another. See Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d at 548–49. And fourth, 
no jury found that Davison caused Chew’s death. 
 
14 
 
2. Courts have generally declined to apply Apprendi to restitution because 
restitution is usually compensatory and indeterminate. At first glance, Davison’s 
argument faces a steep climb. Courts considering the matter have ruled 
overwhelmingly that Apprendi and Southern Union do not apply to criminal 
restitution. See, e.g., State v. Leon, 381 P.3d 286, 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (“Leon 
acknowledges that no court has applied Apprendi to restitution awards.”); State 
v. Arnett, 496 P.3d 928, 933 (Kan. 2021) (“[A]t least 11 of 13 federal United States 
Circuit Courts of Appeal have refused to extend Apprendi and its progeny to 
orders of restitution, not to mention the many state courts which have followed 
suit.”); State v. Deslaurier, 371 P.3d 505, 509 n.2 (Or. Ct. App. 2016) (“Our 
conclusion here is consistent with other jurisdictions that have considered 
whether Southern Union has expanded the rule of Apprendi to restitution.”); see 
also State v. Jenkins, 788 N.W.2d 640, 643 (Iowa 2010) (“Most federal authorities 
reject the requirement of a jury trial for criminal restitution.”). 
Although the rationales behind these decisions have varied, courts have 
typically emphasized that restitution is both (1) compensatory and (2) an 
indeterminate scheme arising from the conviction itself, with no statutory 
maximum or minimum. See Arnett, 496 P.3d at 933. The decision in United 
States v. Green is illustrative. 722 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2013). There, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the constitutionality of 
a federal restitution award under Apprendi and Southern Union. Id. at 1150. The 
defendants argued that the crimes for which they had been convicted had no 
express element of a victim or a loss, and therefore these elements had to be 
 
15 
 
independently found by a jury. Id. The defendants equated restitution to a 
criminal fine that would be subject to Apprendi in the wake of Southern Union. 
Id. at 1149–50. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, noting the differences between a 
criminal fine and restitution. Id. at 1150–51. First, restitution has compensatory 
purposes. Id. at 1150. Second, the federal restitution scheme at issue was “an 
indeterminate scheme” that had no statutory maximum. Id. at 1151. 
One problem with relying on federal precedent here is that it primarily 
involves restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MRVA) and the 
Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), which differ from Iowa Code section 
910.3B in key respects. See VWPA, 18 U.S.C. § 3663; MRVA, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. 
In both acts, the restitution obligation flows from the conviction itself. See id. 
§§ 3663(a), 3663A(a). Neither act sets any mandatory maximum or minimum 
amount of restitution to be awarded; they merely identify types of actual 
damages that may be recovered. Id. §§ 3663(b), 3663A(b). The specific amount 
of restitution is dependent on the court’s factual findings of the victim’s loss. Id. 
§§ 3663(b), 3663A(b). This includes offenses resulting in bodily injury that 
results in death. Id. §§ 3663(b)(3), 3663A(b)(3). 
3. Restitution under Iowa Code section 910.3B is punitive and determinate. 
By contrast, Iowa Code section 910.3B establishes a mandatory minimum of 
$150,000 awardable only if the defendant’s felonious acts caused the death of 
another person. It may be a low number for the nonmonetary loss attributable 
to a death of a human being, but it is a floor—and it is awarded only if certain 
facts are found to exist. Under normal circumstances, a victim of crime in Iowa 
 
16 
 
is limited to recovery of “pecuniary damages,” which exclude “damages for pain, 
suffering, mental anguish, and loss of consortium.” Iowa Code §§ 910.1(6), 
.2(1)(a). Only when the defendant is convicted of a felony in which their acts 
caused the death of another person may the minimum amount of $150,000 be 
recovered in addition. See id. § 910.3B(1). 
Like other forms of restitution, the restitution authorized by Iowa Code 
section 910.3B provides compensation. “It serves a remedial purpose in 
compensating the victim’s estate.” Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d at 520.  
But section 910.3B restitution is also punitive. In our 2000 decision, 
Izzolena, we detected “several punitive elements” in the statute. 609 N.W.2d at 
548. Restitution under section 910.3B “is awarded in addition to separate 
restitution for pecuniary damages.” Id. Also, the statute “establishes a minimum 
threshold amount of $150,000 for all cases, with no required proof of evidence 
to support damages excluded from the definition of pecuniary damages.” Id. at 
548–49. For this reason, we found that the $150,000 restitution was subject to 
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 549. 
We amplified on the punitive character of section 910.3B restitution in 
State v. Corwin, decided later the same year. 616 N.W.2d 600, 601–02 (Iowa 
2000) (en banc). There we held that the Ex Post Facto Clause barred an award 
of the $150,000 minimum restitution for conduct that predated the 1997 
enactment of the statute. Id. at 602. We remarked that “our analysis in Izzolena 
rested on the premise that the legislative aim of section 910.3B was to enhance 
 
17 
 
the punishment for crimes resulting in death, thereby deterring such conduct in 
others.” Id. We concluded that “[b]ecause section 910.3B makes more 
burdensome the penalty suffered by Corwin for crimes he committed before the 
statute was enacted, it cannot be applied to him without violating constitutional 
norms.” Id. 
 
Our court most recently examined the punitive role of section 910.3B 
restitution in State v. Richardson, 890 N.W.2d 609. Richardson had pleaded 
guilty to aiding and abetting second-degree murder as a juvenile and was ordered 
to pay $150,000 in restitution under section 910.3B. Id. at 612–13. She appealed 
the order of restitution, arguing that the court should have considered her age 
and related circumstances before ordering the full mandatory restitution. Id. at 
613–14. Her statutory argument was based on what is now Iowa Code section 
901.5(13), which gives the court authority to “suspend the sentence in whole or 
in part, including any mandatory minimum sentence” for juvenile offenders. The 
defendant maintained that “mandatory minimum sentence” includes restitution 
under section 910.3B, and therefore the sentencing court had the discretion to 
suspend the $150,000 restitution. Richardson, 890 N.W.2d at 615. The 
defendant also maintained that assessment of the $150,000 restitution on a 
juvenile offender violated the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 620. 
We reiterated in Richardson that “a restitution award under section 910.3B 
is partly punitive. Therefore, depending on the context, restitution could be 
considered part of the ‘sentence.’ ” Id. at 617. Yet we concluded it was not part 
 
18 
 
of the “mandatory minimum sentence” as that term was used by the legislature. 
Id. at 619.  
We also rejected Richardson’s argument that the $150,000 restitution was 
an unconstitutional excessive fine when assessed on a juvenile homicide 
offender. Id. at 624. Among other things, we noted that “payments on wrongful-
death judgments and settlements are credited against section 910.3B 
restitution.” Id. at 623. We also pointed out that “[i]n a sense, Iowa Code section 
910.3B functions as an alternative to a wrongful-death action.” Id. And we noted 
that “$150,000 is not extraordinary or even generous compensation for the death 
of a person,” despite the fact that pecuniary damages can be recovered 
separately. Id. at 623 & n.10. Still, we reiterated that section 910.3B is subject 
to an excessive fines analysis because of its “punitive characteristics.” Id. at 622. 
Notably, in this case, the district court made clear that the $150,000 
restitution award was a single award to be assessed jointly and severally against 
all the defendants who had been convicted in connection with Chew’s death. In 
that respect, it resembled a civil rather than a criminal sanction. 
Yet at the end of the day, restitution under Iowa Code section 910.3B is a 
form of punishment, as we explained in Izzolena and continued to acknowledge 
in Corwin and Richardson. The $150,000 minimum assessment occurs only 
upon conviction of a felony where the felonious act results in the death of the 
victim, and the assessment is mandatory. See Iowa Code § 910.3B. 
As we have already noted, every criminal conviction in Iowa can result in 
an award of restitution. See id. § 910.2(1)(a) (“In all criminal cases in which there 
 
19 
 
is a plea of guilty, verdict of guilty, or special verdict upon which a judgment of 
conviction is rendered, the sentencing court shall order that pecuniary damages 
be paid by each offender to the victims of the offender’s criminal activities . . . .”). 
But this standard restitution is limited to damages the victim could recover in a 
civil action, exclusive of punitive damages, pain and suffering, mental anguish, 
and loss of consortium. Id. § 910.1(6). And with this regular type of restitution, 
there is no predetermined minimum or maximum. The defendant is on notice 
that their criminal conduct, if proved in a jury trial, could lead to an 
indeterminate award of restitution as needed to compensate the victim for 
pecuniary losses.  
Section 910.3B restitution is different. A criminal defendant is required to 
pay at least $150,000 to the decedent’s estate for having “caused the death of 
another person.” Id. § 910.3B(1). This additional assessment for criminally 
causing the death of another is not triggered by the mere fact of conviction and 
must be paid regardless of the attendant circumstances. For example, it must 
be paid even if, hypothetically, the decedent had already been dying of a painful 
terminal illness; the decedent had asked the defendant to assist him in taking 
his own life; and the decedent’s spouse (and sole beneficiary of his estate) had 
been present and backed the wishes of the decedent. In sum, section 910.3B 
restitution is both determinate and a form of punishment. 
4. Applying Apprendi to Iowa Code Section 910.3B. We conclude that the 
punitive and determinate characteristics of the $150,000 restitution bring it 
within the rule of Apprendi and its offspring. The $150,000 assessment is, at 
 
20 
 
least in constitutional terms, a fine, and “juries must determine facts that set a 
fine’s maximum amount.” S. Union, 567 U.S. at 356.  
Some other states have restitution statutes that impose mandatory 
amounts of restitution for specific crimes. Under Minnesota law, those convicted 
of identity theft must pay each direct victim “not less than $1,000” in restitution. 
Minn. Stat. § 609.527(4)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2022 Reg. Sess.). The 
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that given the purpose to “compensate crime 
victims for their losses” and “the modest amount of mandatory restitution,” such 
awards do not constitute “fines.” State v. Rey, 905 N.W.2d 490, 496–97 (Minn. 
2018). Hence, the court declined to consider Apprendi-type arguments as to 
identity theft restitution. Id. at 497.  
Under California law, defendants convicted of a felony pay a “restitution 
fine” of no less than $300 and no more than $10,000. Cal. Penal Code 
§ 1202.4(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2022 Reg. Sess.). Defendants convicted of 
a misdemeanor pay restitution fines of no less than $150 and not more than 
$1,000. Id. California courts have found that Apprendi and Southern Union do 
not impact the restitution fines imposed under this section. As the California 
Supreme Court has explained, 
[T]his mandatory restitution fine “is properly understood as part of 
the maximum penalty statutorily authorized by a jury’s finding that 
the defendant is guilty of a felony.” In imposing the fine, a court does 
not make any factual finding that increases the range of penalties to 
which the defendant is exposed. It simply sets a fine within the 
prescribed statutory range. “Its ruling therefore raises no concerns 
under Apprendi.” 
 
21 
 
People v. Chhoun, 480 P.3d 550, 590 (Cal. 2021) (citations omitted) (first quoting 
People v. Wall, 404 P.3d 1209, 1228 (Cal. 2017); then quoting People v. 
Henriquez, 406 P.3d 748, 781 (Cal. 2017)). 
Iowa Code section 910.3B differs from these laws. Unlike the $1,000 
minimum authorized in Minnesota, $150,000 is not a modest amount. In fact, 
we have previously treated section 910.3B restitution as a form of punishment 
for Eighth Amendment and Ex Post Facto purposes. See Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d at 
549; Corwin, 616 N.W.2d at 602. Nor is the restitution under section 910.3B 
simply a range of sentencing discretion that attaches to every criminal 
conviction, like the restitution fines available in California or the standard victim 
restitution available under section 910.2(1)(a). 
One could well argue that even if Iowa Code section 910.3B did not contain 
a $150,000 mandatory minimum, it would still be subject to the rule in Apprendi 
because the statute imposes an otherwise unavailable type of restitution—
namely, nonpecuniary damages—only on defendants whose felonious acts 
caused the death of another. That seemingly necessitates a jury finding that the 
defendant’s acts caused the death of another. “When a judge inflicts punishment 
that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts 
‘which the law makes essential to the punishment,’ and the judge exceeds his 
proper authority.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004) (citation 
omitted) (quoting 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure § 87, at 55 (2d ed. 1872)). In 
any event, the existence of “a minimum threshold amount of $150,000 for all 
cases” helped us conclude in Izzolena that the award is partly punitive. 609 
 
22 
 
N.W.2d at 548–49. And, here, it clearly distinguishes this case from other cases 
where Apprendi has not been applied because the award of restitution was 
considered simply a form of compensation. 
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court’s award of $150,000 
restitution in this case violated the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.4 We therefore vacate this award and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Since the parties have not briefed or 
argued the issue, we do not address today whether the Double Jeopardy Clause 
or any other source of law would prohibit the State from pleading and proving in 
a jury trial that the defendant caused Chew’s death and therefore should pay 
$150,000 in restitution. 
5. Responding to the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. The 
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part veers off the mark in two 
respects. First, the opinion suggests that the jury did find Davison responsible 
for Chew’s death. This suggestion is built on a mix-and-match of aiding-and-
abetting law, outdated criminal law that predates the current Iowa Criminal 
Code, and civil tort law. The suggestion is incorrect. The State doesn’t even make 
this suggestion, only members of this court do. 
We can guess today that the verdicts may have been the product of a jury-
room compromise. Still, the jury could have rationally found that Davison 
                                      
 
4In light of this conclusion, we need not reach Davison’s alternative argument that the 
$150,000 restitution award violated the jury trial guarantee in article I, section 9 of the Iowa 
Constitution. We point out that article I, section 10—not article I, section 9—is Iowa’s counterpart 
to the Sixth Amendment. However, article I, section 9 does contain a separate jury trial 
guarantee, stating, “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate . . . .” Iowa Const. art. I, § 9. 
 
23 
 
entered into an agreement to murder Chew which included the overt act of 
following Chew by car to Burlington. The jury could also have found that Davison 
only fired nonfatal shots at Chew after both he and Emmanuel Spann got out of 
the car, thus supporting the assault verdict. The jury did not receive an aiding-
and-abetting instruction. 
The second error committed by the opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part is its admonition to “follow the wisdom of the crowd” without 
recognizing that we are interpreting a statute with unique characteristics. In a 
typical restitutionary scheme, committing any crime automatically triggers an 
indeterminate amount of purely compensatory restitution. So, courts have held 
that Apprendi only requires that a jury have found a crime was committed. Here, 
by contrast, having “caused the death of another person” (and no other 
circumstance) triggers a punitive award of $150,000. We hold, therefore, that 
Apprendi requires the jury to find that the defendant caused the death of another 
person. 
We also note that the practical effects of today’s decision should be 
relatively narrow. In each of the previous cases where we were asked to review 
an award of section 910.3B restitution following a jury trial, the defendant had 
been convicted of a homicide felony—that is, a felony where the jury had to find 
the defendant caused the death of another person.5 We believe cases where the 
                                      
 
5See State v. Kolbet, 638 N.W.2d 653, 655 (Iowa 2001) (homicide by vehicle); Corwin, 616 
N.W.2d at 601 (homicide by vehicle); Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d at 544 (involuntary manslaughter); 
Rohm, 609 N.W.2d at 507 (involuntary manslaughter); Artzer, 609 N.W.2d at 528–29 (second-
degree murder); Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d at 517 (involuntary manslaughter). 
 
24 
 
$150,000 restitution would be assessed on a defendant who was not convicted 
of a homicide felony are, and likely will remain, relatively rare.  
Further, to assure a jury finding of causation in such cases, the State 
would have the option of submitting a special interrogatory to the jury. This 
could be analogous to the special interrogatory used today to ascertain whether 
an offense was sexually motivated, thus requiring the defendant to register as a 
sex offender. See Iowa Code § 692A.126(1). 
C. Did the Trial Court Abuse its Discretion by Not Considering the 
Possibility of Probation? Although the briefing and oral argument in this 
appeal have largely focused on the question of restitution, there is one other 
issue we must address. Davison argues that the district court abused its 
sentencing discretion by not considering him for probation based on a mistaken 
belief that he was not eligible for probation after having been convicted of a 
forcible felony.  
The record raises some concerns about a misunderstanding. As Davison 
points out, his defense counsel said near the beginning of the sentencing 
proceeding that “Count I [assault causing serious injury under Iowa Code section 
708.2(4)] is a forcible felony, so that probation would not be an option.” That 
statement by Davison’s counsel was not correct. Assault causing serious injury 
is not a forcible felony. See Iowa Code § 702.11(2)(f) (excluding assault causing 
serious injury from the category of forcible felony). 
 
25 
 
Later, the district court may have considered the possibility of probation. 
During pronouncement of sentence, the court said to Davison, “You have no 
family in the area who can assist you if you were on probation.”  
 
Yet, still later, the district court expressed the view that Davison was not 
eligible for bond on appeal because he had been convicted of a forcible felony. 
Both the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed with that view, mistakenly. The 
prosecutor said that “Count I would be a forcible felony,” and defense counsel 
concurred, “That’s my understanding, Judge.” Again, that was incorrect. 
 
“A sentencing court’s decision to impose a specific sentence that falls 
within the statutory limits ‘is cloaked with a strong presumption in its 
favor. . . .’ ” State v. Boldon, 954 N.W.2d 62, 73 (Iowa 2021) (quoting State v. 
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002)). But when the sentencing court fails 
to exercise discretion because it “was unaware that it had discretion,” we 
typically vacate and remand for resentencing. State v. Moore, 936 N.W.2d 436, 
440 (Iowa 2019). Here the State tries to thread a needle. It acknowledges that 
the district court may have misunderstood whether the assault conviction was a 
forcible felony when bond on appeal was discussed, yet claims that the district 
court didn’t misunderstand the situation several minutes earlier when it 
sentenced Davison to prison.  
 
Although any fault lies primarily with the parties and not with the district 
court, prudence dictates that we should vacate Davison’s prison sentence and 
remand for resentencing. 
 
26 
 
IV. Conclusion. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Davison’s conviction. We vacate his 
sentence and the award of $150,000 restitution and remand for resentencing. 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 
Appel, McDonald, and Oxley, JJ., join this opinion, and McDermott, J., 
joins this opinion except as to the discussion of legislative history in part III.A. 
McDonald, J., files a concurring opinion, in which Oxley, J., joins. McDermott, 
J., files an opinion concurring specially. Waterman, J., files an opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Christensen, C.J., joins. 
 
 
 
27 
 
#20–0950, State v. Davison 
McDONALD, Justice (concurring). 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury.” In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury required the 
jury—and not the sentencing judge—to find “any fact,” except the fact of a prior 
conviction, “that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum.” 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). In Blakely v. Washington, the 
Court clarified that the “statutory maximum” within the meaning of Apprendi is 
the “maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts 
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” 542 U.S. 296, 303 
(2004). “Thus, while judges may exercise discretion in sentencing, they may not 
‘inflic[t] punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow.’ ” S. Union Co. 
v. United States, 567 U.S. 343, 348 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304). In Southern Union Co. v. United States, the Court 
extended Apprendi and held “that the rule of Apprendi applies to the imposition 
of criminal fines.” Id. at 360. 
The threshold question in this case is whether Iowa Code section 910.3B 
(2017) is a penalty for a crime within the meaning of the Supreme Court’s 
Apprendi jurisprudence. See United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1054 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (stating that in determining whether Apprendi applies “the first 
question is whether restitution is a ‘penalty for a crime’ ”). Our precedents dictate 
 
28 
 
the answer to that question. In State v. Izzolena, we stated the financial penalty 
imposed pursuant to “section 910.3B . . . serves other purposes normally 
associated with punishment such as retribution and deterrence” and is a “fine” 
subject to “the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 17 of the Iowa Constitution.” 609 N.W.2d 541, 549 (Iowa 2000) (en banc). 
In State v. Corwin, we stated “the legislative aim of section 910.3B was to 
enhance the punishment for crimes resulting in death” and held the Ex Post 
Facto Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions prohibited the retroactive 
imposition of the statutory punishment. 616 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Iowa 2000) (en 
banc). In State v. Richardson, we reiterated that section 901.3B has several 
punitive elements and is subject to the excessive fines clause of the Iowa 
Constitution. 890 N.W.2d 609, 621–22 (Iowa 2017). This court’s repeated 
conclusion that section 910.3B imposes a criminal punishment or fine subject 
to the Excessive Fines and Ex Post Facto Clauses is controlling here, and I see 
no reason why section 910.3B should be deemed a criminal punishment for 
those purposes and not for the purposes of the right to trial by jury. See Oregon v. 
Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 173 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating Apprendi and 
related cases reject “artificial limitations upon the facts subject to the jury-trial 
guarantee” and “the guarantee turns upon the penal consequences attached to 
the fact”). 
The opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part argues that Apprendi 
should not be extended to restitution awards, but this merely begs the question. 
It is not disputed that courts almost uniformly have held that Apprendi does not 
 
29 
 
apply to restitution awards. See, e.g., United States v. Flynn, 969 F.3d 873, 881–
82 (8th Cir. 2020); United States v. Green, 722 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Milkiewicz, 470 F.3d 390, 404 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Carruth, 418 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2005); but see Hester v. United States, 139 
S. Ct. 509, 509–11 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) 
(“[J]ust as a jury must find any facts necessary to authorize a steeper prison 
sentence or fine, it would seem to follow that a jury must find any facts necessary 
to support a (nonzero) restitution order.”); Green, 722 F.3d at 1151 (“Our 
precedents are clear that Apprendi doesn’t apply to restitution, but that doesn’t 
mean our caselaw’s well-harmonized with Southern Union. Had Southern Union 
come down before our cases, those cases might have come out differently.”). And 
the court’s opinion in this case says nothing different. The question in this case 
is not, as the dissenting opinion frames it, whether Apprendi should be extended 
to restitution awards. Instead, the question is whether section 910.3B is merely 
a restitution award or whether it also amounts to criminal punishment. The 
dissent assumes the former, but our precedents dictate the latter. 
The dissenting opinion also concludes Apprendi is not applicable here 
because section 910.3B prescribes a specific fine and thus does not “increase” 
the defendant’s “ ‘statutory maximum’ (or minimum) sentence.” (Quoting 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.) In my view, this argument misapprehends the 
Court’s Apprendi jurisprudence. Crime and punishment is wholly a creature of 
statute. See State v. Crawford, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2022 WL 815299, at *5 (Iowa 
Mar. 18, 2022). Crimes are defined by statute, and the district court can impose 
 
30 
 
a sentence only when authorized by statute. See State v. Manser, 626 N.W.2d 
872, 874 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001) (noting the court’s power to punish a defendant 
only extends as far as the Iowa Code authorizes). Apprendi requires that the facts 
authorizing the imposition of a statutory sentence be found by a jury and 
reflected in the jury’s verdict. 530 U.S. at 490. It is immaterial whether the 
punishment is a maximum, a minimum, range-bound, or wholly discretionary. 
“When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, 
the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the 
punishment,’ and the judge exceeds his proper authority.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 
304 (citation omitted) (quoting 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure § 87, at 55 (2d 
ed. 1872)).  
Apprendi ensures “that the judge’s authority to sentence derives wholly 
from the jury’s verdict. Without that restriction, the jury would not exercise the 
control that the Framers intended.” Id. at 306. Justice Scalia, writing for the 
Court, provided an example of how Apprendi applies and the type of absurd 
result Apprendi prohibits:  
Those who would reject Apprendi are resigned to one of two 
alternatives. The first is that the jury need only find whatever facts 
the legislature chooses to label elements of the crime, and that those 
it labels sentencing factors—no matter how much they may increase 
the punishment—may be found by the judge. This would mean, for 
example, that a judge could sentence a man for committing murder 
even if the jury convicted him only of illegally possessing the firearm 
used to commit it—or of making an illegal lane change while fleeing 
the death scene. Not even Apprendi’s critics would advocate this 
absurd result. The jury could not function as circuitbreaker in the 
State’s machinery of justice if it were relegated to making a 
determination that the defendant at some point did something 
 
31 
 
wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts of 
the crime the State actually seeks to punish. 
Id. at 307–08 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
This case is Justice Scalia’s absurd result that Apprendi prohibits. Davison 
was charged with murder in the first degree. With respect to this charge, the jury 
was instructed that the State had to prove, among other things, Davison caused 
the death of Demarcus Chew. The jury was also instructed on the lesser included 
offenses of murder in the second degree, voluntary manslaughter, and 
involuntary manslaughter. With respect to each of these lesser included offenses, 
the jury was instructed the State had to prove, among other things, Davison 
caused the death of Demarcus Chew. The jury did not find Davison guilty of 
these charges and instead found Davison guilty of assault causing serious injury 
and conspiracy to commit a forcible felony. Neither of these offenses required the 
jury to find Davison caused the death of another, nor is any such finding 
reflected in the jury’s verdict. Even though the jury acquitted Davison of murder 
and three lesser included offenses requiring the State to prove Davison caused 
the death of another, the district court nonetheless found Davison caused the 
death of another and imposed a $150,000 punishment on the defendant 
pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.3B. As in Justice Scalia’s absurd and 
prohibited result, here the district court imposed a financial penalty on Davison 
for a homicide offense even though the jury found him guilty only of an assault. 
This is precisely the kind of jury circumvention Apprendi was intended to avoid. 
See S. Union Co., 567 U.S. at 350 (stating Apprendi applies broadly to “prohibit 
judicial factfinding that increases maximum criminal ‘sentence[s],’ ‘penalties,’ or 
 
32 
 
‘punishment[s]’ ” (alterations in original)); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482–83 (noting 
the “historic link between verdict and judgment” and denouncing “a legislative 
scheme that removes the jury from the determination of a fact that, if found, 
exposes the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would 
receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone” 
(emphasis omitted)).  
With this understanding, I join the court’s opinion. 
Oxley, J., joins this concurring opinion. 
 
 
 
33 
 
#20–0950, State v. Davison 
McDERMOTT, Justice (concurring specially). 
 
I join today’s opinion except for the part relying on legislative history. The 
majority analyzes whether the statute’s phrase “a felony in which the act or acts 
committed by the offender caused the death of another person” requires that the 
death-causing acts be part of the elements of the felony itself. Iowa Code 
§ 910.3B (2017). The majority correctly construes the statute’s use of past tense 
language (caused vs. cause) as requiring that the death of another person need 
not be one of the elements of the felony. But instead of ending the inquiry there, 
the majority goes on to evaluate the legislative history of the statute, citing to the 
bill “explanation” that initially accompanied the legislation when it was 
introduced as indicative of “the legislature’s view.” I believe that this detour into 
the legislative history is unnecessary and, in fact, undermines the majority’s 
otherwise sound textual analysis.  
“The law is what the law says.” Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Tr. 
Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). That statement might seem so obvious that it borders on banal. 
But to explain the grounds for why we must reject legislative history as an 
interpretive tool, it’s important to consider what the law is—and is not. 
The law is not the statements or beliefs of particular legislators or 
legislative staff. State v. Macke, 933 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Iowa 2019) (“[W]e must 
apply the new enactment as written, not by what the legislature might have said 
or intended.”). A statute’s meaning “is to be found not in the subjective, multiple 
 
34 
 
mind of Congress but in the understanding of the objectively reasonable person.” 
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 59, 65 (1988). Legislators of varying viewpoints—aware 
that courts might cite to legislative history in potential future cases involving the 
interpretation of the legislation—may seek to stack the deck with suitable 
“legislative history” for just such a purpose. Justice Scalia, perhaps the foremost 
critic of using legislative history in construing statutes, deemed it “less that the 
courts refer to legislative history because it exists than that legislative history 
exists because the courts refer to it.” Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: 
Federal Courts and the Law 34 (1997) [hereinafter Scalia]. 
The practice of mining legislative history for statements that support a 
favored viewpoint (while almost always disregarding statements that support 
disfavored ones) diverts us from our judicial charge: giving effect to the text that 
lawmakers have adopted and that the people are entitled to rely on. With most 
important legislation, “the legislative history is extensive, and there is something 
for everybody.” Scalia at 36. Judges, who should be constrained by the statutory 
text, thus open a path to “manipulate the meaning of a law by choosing which 
snippets to emphasize.” In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(Easterbrook, J.). 
Reliance on legislative history is built on the flawed premise that when 
construing statutes we are looking for the intent of the legislature rather than 
the meaning of a statute’s text. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: 
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 375 (2012) [hereinafter Scalia & Garner]. But 
 
35 
 
legislative bodies do not possess some freestanding “intent” or “views” that courts 
can divine. See State v. Mathias, 936 N.W.2d 222, 239 (Iowa 2019) (Mansfield, 
J., dissenting) (“Statutory interpretation is not a quest for legislative intent.”). 
For this reason, “[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only 
what the statute means.” Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 
384, 396–97 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
The Theory of Legal Interpretation, in Collected Legal Papers 203, 207 (1920)). 
A broad body of legal canons have formed around how courts should 
construe statutes. See generally Scalia & Garner. But no similar canons exist for 
all the disparate legislative histories one might find. “Since there are no rules as 
to how much weight an element of legislative history is entitled to, it can usually 
be either relied upon or dismissed with equal plausibility.” Scalia at 35–36. 
Proper constraints on judicial decision-making that derive from the text—
constraints consistent with, if not critical to, the nature of our democratic 
system—come undone when we resort to legislative history as an interpretive 
tool. 
In Iowa, a bill must pass both the senate and house of representatives and 
be signed by the Governor to become law. Iowa Const. art. III, §§ 15–16. The 
preamble and bill explanation are attached at the beginning and end of a bill 
when introduced, but neither part is voted on, and neither becomes part of our 
codified law. See, e.g., Star Equip., Ltd. v. State, 843 N.W.2d 446, 454 n.3 (Iowa 
2014) (“The legislature enacts the bill—not the accompanying explanation.”). 
Ours is a system of written laws, and people can readily understand that they 
 
36 
 
will be bound by a law’s actual text. But people have no way of knowing that 
they might also be bound by explanatory passages that a sponsoring legislator 
includes when the bill is introduced in the legislature, or bound by some 
individual legislator’s statements uttered in the course of debate on a bill. And, 
with any particular piece of legislative history, people “would not know any way 
of anticipating what would impress enough members of the Court to be 
controlling” in any event. Schwegmann Bros., 341 U.S. at 396 (Jackson, J., 
concurring). Our interpretation should be based on what the text says and fairly 
implies without resort to extraneous “history,” which neither controls nor 
clarifies the law’s meaning. 
I otherwise fully join the court’s opinion on all the issues presented. 
 
 
 
37 
 
#20–0950, State v. Davison 
WATERMAN, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I join the court’s opinion except for part III.B. I respectfully dissent from 
the court’s holding extending Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and 
its progeny to victim restitution awards. Our court is the first appellate court in 
the nation to do so. Only two justices of the United States Supreme Court have 
concluded that Apprendi should be applied to require a jury to find all the facts 
needed to justify a restitution order. Hester v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 509, 509–
11 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., joined by Sotomayor, J., dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari). Seven justices declined to take the bait. See id. at 509 (mem.). Every 
federal circuit court of appeals to reach the issue has refused to extend Apprendi 
to victim restitution awards. So too has every state appellate court to reach the 
issue. I would follow the wisdom of that crowd. 
The court correctly construes Iowa Code section 910.3B (2017) to allow 
the award of $150,000 in victim restitution for Chew’s death even though the 
crimes of conviction did not include causing his death as an element. In my view, 
the legal effect of the jury’s conspiracy verdict also satisfies Apprendi. See, e.g., 
United States v. Garcia-Castillo, 127 F. App’x 385, 388–90 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(rejecting Apprendi challenge to restitution award because the defendant, as a 
“conspiracy participant is legally liable for all reasonably foreseeable acts of his 
or her coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy” (quoting United States v. 
Brewer, 983 F.2d 181, 185 (10th Cir. 1993))).  
 
38 
 
The jury convicted Caesar Davison of felony assault causing serious injury 
and conspiracy to commit murder. Davison joined a death squad to hunt down 
Demarcus Chew, who literally had a bounty on his head. It is undisputed that 
Chew was shot to death. Mission accomplished. The conspiracy was a success. 
It doesn’t matter whether Davison fired a fatal shot, a mere flesh wound, or 
missed, because the conspiracy conviction makes him liable for the acts of his 
coconspirators as a matter of law. See Iowa Code §§ 703.1 (“All persons 
concerned in the commission of a public offense, whether they directly commit 
the act constituting the offense or aid and abet its commission, shall be charged, 
tried and punished as principals.”), .2 (“When two or more persons, acting in 
concert, knowingly participate in a public offense, each is responsible for the 
acts of the other done in furtherance of the commission of the offense . . . .”).  
Iowa has long recognized criminal liability for the acts of coconspirators. 
State v. Kneedy, 3 N.W.2d 611, 616 (Iowa 1942) (“Where two or more persons 
combine to accomplish an unlawful purpose, each is responsible for the act of 
another which is a probable consequence of carrying out the unlawful design, 
even though the particular crime committed was not a part of that design.” (citing 
State v. McCahill, 33 N.W. 599, 601–02 (Iowa 1887))).  
United States v. Garcia-Castillo is illustrative. There, the defendant was 
convicted of conspiracy to rob a train, and the district court ordered him to pay 
restitution for personal injuries inflicted by his coconspirators. Garcia-Castillo, 
127 F. App’x at 386, 388. He objected under Apprendi and its progeny, arguing 
the absence of a jury finding that he caused those injuries. Id. at 388. The United 
 
39 
 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the restitution order, 
holding that he was legally liable for the acts of his coconspirators, without the 
need for a jury verdict on the restitution award. Id. at 388–89; see also United 
States v. Sawyer, 825 F.3d 287, 294–97 (6th Cir. 2016) (affirming entire 
$10,688,576 restitution award and rejecting the defendant’s Apprendi challenge 
and argument “that the district court erred in assessing the total losses 
attributed to the conspiracy jointly and severally against him and his 
co-defendants rather than assessing an amount keyed to his specific role in the 
conspiracy”); United States v. Bengis, 783 F.3d 407, 413–14 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(conditionally affirming restitution award based on acts of coconspirators); 
United States v. Castillo, 186 F. App’x 25, 27 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A] restitution order 
may hold a defendant liable for ‘the reasonably foreseeable acts of all 
co-conspirators’, even though the jury acquitted the defendant as to some 
aspects of the conspiracy.” (quoting United States v. Boyd, 222 F.3d 47, 51 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (per curiam))); State v. Arnett, 496 P.3d 928, 931–33 (Kan. 2021) 
(rejecting Sixth Amendment Apprendi challenge to restitution award of $33,248 
jointly and severally with co-defendants based on conviction for conspiracy to 
commit burglary, even though Arnett only obtained $200 for her part in the 
burglaries). The court and the concurrences cite no case to the contrary 
addressing Apprendi and the law of conspiracy. 
Iowa’s criminal restitution statute is linked to civil tort law. State v. 
Roache, 920 N.W.2d 93, 100 (Iowa 2018); see also Iowa Code §§ 910.1(6) 
(allowing restitution in the amount that “a victim could recover against the 
 
40 
 
offender in a civil action arising out of the same facts or event”), .8 (providing 
that restitution payments are set off against a civil judgment); State v. 
Richardson, 890 N.W.2d 609, 623 (Iowa 2017) (payments on civil wrongful death 
judgments credited against criminal restitution ordered under section 910.3B). 
Under black letter law, Davison is culpable for the acts of his coconspirators in 
furtherance of the goal of the conspiracy. See Anderson v. Anderson Tooling, Inc., 
928 N.W.2d 821, 828 (Iowa 2019) (holding the district court “correctly applie[d] 
our rule of law, holding coconspirators jointly and severally liable for damages 
resulting from the conspiracy”); see also Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Apportionment of Liab. § 15 (Am. L. Inst. 2000) (“When persons are liable 
because they acted in concert, all persons are jointly and severally liable for the 
share of comparative responsibility assigned to each person engaged in 
concerted activity.”). Davison’s crime of conviction, conspiracy to commit 
murder, legally and factually caused Chew’s death. Based on that jury verdict, 
the district court correctly ruled that Davison is jointly and severally liable for 
Chew’s death and for restitution to the victim’s estate or heirs. No separate jury 
finding that he personally caused the death is required to order restitution under 
section 910.3B. 
Davison and the court rely in part on Southern Union Co. v. United States, 
which extended Apprendi to criminal fines. 567 U.S. 343, 346–48, 360 (2012). 
But that case did not address victim restitution. Unlike a criminal fine paid to 
the government, the restitution award is compensation payable to the deceased 
victim’s estate or heirs. See Richardson, 890 N.W.2d at 623. The $150,000 
 
41 
 
restitution award under Iowa Code section 910.3B does not move up or down 
based on any factual finding by the judge or jury as to the value of the victim’s 
life. Rather, that amount is fixed by the legislature and therefore, by definition, 
is within the statutory range. And as the court reiterates today, “$150,000 is 
[neither] extraordinary, [n]or even generous compensation for the death of a 
person.” 
The theory of Apprendi is that the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution requires a jury to find any fact that triggers an increase in a criminal 
defendant’s “statutory maximum” (or minimum) sentence. 530 U.S. at 490. That 
theory is inapplicable here because the jury verdict on the crime of conviction in 
this felony death case triggers the automatic $150,000 victim restitution award. 
Because the award is set at the legislatively prescribed statutory amount, there 
is no “increase” based on a factual finding by the court that should have been 
made by a jury. The California Supreme Court for that very reason declined to 
extend Apprendi to victim restitution awarded by the court within ranges set by 
the legislature. People v. Chhoun, 480 P.3d 550, 590 (Cal. 2021) (holding that no 
Apprendi concerns are raised when restitution is set “within the prescribed 
statutory range”). I see no purpose for requiring an additional jury finding to 
support this restitution award under section 910.3B. 
Today’s unprecedented extension of Apprendi to victim restitution is not 
justified by characterizing such awards as partly punitive. The court, as it must, 
acknowledges that this victim restitution award is compensatory, and is 
effectively a substitute for a civil wrongful death award. See Richardson, 890 
 
42 
 
N.W.2d at 623; State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515, 520 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) 
(“[Restitution] serves a remedial purpose in compensating the victim’s estate.”).6 
“Restitution both ‘serves to protect the public by compensating victims for 
criminal activities, [and] also serves to rehabilitate the defendant.’ ” State v. 
Waigand, 953 N.W.2d 689, 694 (Iowa 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting State 
v. Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d 541, 548 (Iowa 2000) (en banc)). “[Restitution] forces the 
offender to answer directly for the consequences of his or her actions.” Id. 
(quoting State v. Bonstetter, 637 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Iowa 2001)). Thus, the 
overriding purpose of restitution is victim compensation with a secondary goal 
of offender rehabilitation to instill responsibility. 
True, we have described the victim restitution award as having “punitive 
characteristics.” Richardson, 890 N.W.2d at 622. But we said so in the context 
of applying precedent under the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause, 
which can be violated by an award in a criminal case that is “grossly 
disproportional to the gravity of the defendant’s offense.” Id. (quoting Izzolena, 
609 N.W.2d at 549). We have repeatedly rejected Eighth Amendment challenges 
to the $150,000 restitution award in felonious death cases. Id. at 624–25; 
Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d at 551. Neither Davison nor the court rely on the Eighth 
Amendment. Yet our court today photoshops words from Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence to this Sixth Amendment setting. What’s missing here is any 
                                      
 
6Neither the court nor Davison rely on the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil 
cases.  
 
43 
 
precedent or sound basis for doing so. Perhaps that’s why our court stands alone 
on this issue. 
Our court of appeals correctly rejected an Apprendi challenge in State v. 
Turner, No. 15–2191, 2016 WL 7393894, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016). 
Turner fatally stabbed his brother and entered an Alford plea to attempted 
murder. Id. at *1. The sentencing court ordered restitution of $150,000 under 
Iowa Code section 910.3B(1). Id. Turner appealed, relying on Apprendi to argue 
“the assessment violates the [Sixth Amendment] because he neither admitted he 
caused [his brother’s] death nor was there a jury finding that he caused his 
death.” Id. at *1–2. In upholding the restitution award, the court of appeals 
followed federal precedent: 
Even if Apprendi covers all forms of punishment, restitution’s 
not “clearly” punishment . . . . 
. . . Restitution carries with it no statutory maximum; it’s 
pegged to the amount of the victim’s loss. A judge can’t exceed the 
non-existent statutory maximum for restitution no matter what 
facts he finds, so Apprendi’s not implicated. 
Id. at *3 (omissions in original) (quoting United States v. Green, 722 F.3d 1146, 
1150 (9th Cir. 2013)).  
The Ninth Circuit, joining other circuit courts, unequivocally held 
“Apprendi doesn’t apply to restitution.” Green, 722 F.3d at 1151; see also United 
States v. Garza, 429 F.3d 165, 170 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“We agree with 
our sister Circuits, who have uniformly held that judicial fact-finding supporting 
restitution orders does not violate the Sixth Amendment.”); United States v. 
Carruth, 418 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Restitution is designed to make 
 
44 
 
victims whole, not to punish perpetrators; it is essentially a civil remedy created 
by Congress and incorporated into criminal proceedings for reasons of economy 
and practicality.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 
1054 (7th Cir. 2000) (“A civil remedy included with a criminal judgment does not 
make it a ‘penalty for a crime’ that must be established beyond a reasonable 
doubt; otherwise it would not be possible to apply the law of preclusion (or grant 
summary judgment) in an ordinary civil suit seeking restitution. It follows that 
Apprendi does not affect the calculation of restitution.”). In United States v. 
Wooten, the Tenth Circuit stated, “Even if the court were to conclude that [the 
restitution order] is a criminal penalty, Mr. Wooten does not contend that the 
restitution order exceeds the value of the damaged property, and it is for that 
reason that Apprendi does not apply here.” 377 F.3d 1134, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004). 
Similarly, Davison does not contend that $150,000 exceeds the value of the 
victim’s life. 
Courts offer varying rationales applicable here when holding Apprendi 
doesn’t apply to restitution. The restitution award under 910.3B(1) is primarily 
compensatory rather than “clearly punitive.” The $150,000 restitution award 
doesn’t exceed the value of the loss and is within the legislatively prescribed 
statutory range for the conviction based on the jury verdict. No additional jury 
finding is necessary.  
[In Apprendi and its progeny] all the facts found by trial judges that 
rendered 
the 
sentences 
unconstitutional 
[under 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment] were facts that made the defendant’s offense more 
serious or culpable and hence exposed the defendant to a greater 
sentencing range. 
 
45 
 
In contrast, a court’s factfinding regarding restitution is 
limited to determining the victim’s actual damages and the 
defendant’s ability to pay. When a sentencing court concludes the 
punishment warrants restitution, it does so based only on the fact 
of conviction. As federal courts have noted, it is the conviction that 
authorizes restitution. 
State v. Clapper, 732 N.W.2d 657, 663 (Neb. 2007) (per curiam). 
Davison argues the $150,000 restitution can’t be awarded without a jury 
finding that he personally killed the victim. The United States v. Green court 
specifically rejected this “trigger” argument: that Apprendi requires a jury 
determination “of whether restitution is triggered at all” even if the court can 
then determine the amount. 722 F.3d at 1149. In affirming a $250,000 
restitution order, the court in Green adhered to its categorical precedent holding 
that “restitution is ‘unaffected’ by Apprendi.” Id. at 1148–49. The Green court 
added, “We further hesitate to adopt the trigger argument because the Greens 
can’t cite any case—state or federal—that has accepted it, and because the two 
circuits that considered it, rejected it.” Id. at 1149. Davison suffers the same 
shortcoming. The majority confronts Green, but errs by not following its Sixth 
Amendment analysis. 
Over eleven years ago in State v. Jenkins, we observed that “[m]ost federal 
authorities reject the requirement of a jury trial for criminal restitution.” 788 
N.W.2d 640, 643 (Iowa 2010). That hasn’t changed. See, e.g., United States v. 
Vega-Martínez, 949 F.3d 43, 54–55 (1st Cir. 2020); Sawyer, 825 F.3d at 297; 
United States v. Thunderhawk, 799 F.3d 1203, 1209 (8th Cir. 2015); Bengis, 783 
F.3d at 411–13; United States v. Rosbottom, 763 F.3d 408, 419–420 (5th Cir. 
2014); Green, 722 F.3d at 1148–1151; United States v. Wolfe, 701 F.3d 1206, 
 
46 
 
1215–1217 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 732 (4th Cir. 
2012); see also United States v. Geovanni, No. 19–11044, 2022 WL 291761, at 
*11 (11th Cir. Feb. 1, 2022) (“Geovanni argues that the imposition of restitution 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because there was no jury 
finding on the facts needed to support the restitution order. But, as Geovanni 
acknowledges, this argument is foreclosed by our decision in Dohrmann v. United 
States.” (citation omitted)); Dohrmann v. United States, 442 F.3d 1279, 1281 
(11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 335–39 (3d Cir. 2006) (en 
banc); Wooten, 377 F.3d at 1143–45; United States v. Bauer, No. 3:19 CR 490, 
2022 WL 822089, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 2022) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit has 
‘already squarely held that restitution orders are not affected by the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey because the restitution statutes do not 
specify a statutory maximum.’ ” (quoting United States v. Churn, 800 F.3d 768, 
782 (6th Cir. 2015))). 
Yet our court today strains to evade federal constitutional precedent such 
as Green based on perceived differences between the federal restitution statutes 
in which the district court determines the amount of restitution, and Iowa’s fixed 
$150,000 award for the victim’s death. But the common denominator in both the 
federal and Iowa statutes is that the restitution award does not increase the 
criminal penalties beyond what the legislature already prescribed. It makes no 
constitutional difference under the Sixth Amendment whether the legislature 
fixes the amount of restitution for a victim’s death or the court, so long as the 
 
47 
 
award falls within the maximum amount the legislature permits for the crime of 
conviction.  
I would follow the federal and state caselaw uniformly holding the Sixth 
Amendment requires no jury finding on causation or the amount awarded for 
victim restitution when, as here, the legislature required victim restitution for 
the crime of conviction. In State v. Arnett, the Kansas Supreme Court recently 
reached that conclusion, noting “at least 11 of 13 federal United States Circuit 
Courts of Appeal have refused to extend Apprendi and its progeny to orders of 
restitution, not to mention the many state courts which have followed suit.” 496 
P.3d at 933.  
Our court attempts to distinguish several contrary cases from sister state 
courts while obscuring the reality that state courts overwhelmingly hold 
Apprendi is inapplicable to restitution. See, e.g., State v. Leon, 381 P.3d 286, 
289–90 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (noting the absence of authority supporting the 
defendant’s argument that Southern Union extends Apprendi to restitution); 
Chhoun, 480 P.3d at 590 (“[T]his mandatory restitution fine ‘is properly 
understood as part of the maximum penalty statutorily authorized by a jury’s 
finding that the defendant is guilty of a felony.’ ” (quoting People v. Wall, 404 
P.3d 1209, 1228 (Cal. 2017))); People v. Wasbotten, 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878, 879 
(Ct. App. 2014) (“[D]irect victim restitution is a substitute for a civil remedy so 
that victims of crime do not need to file separate civil suits. It is not increased 
‘punishment.’ ”); People v. Smith, 181 P.3d 324, 327 (Colo. App. 2007) (“A 
number of state courts have similarly concluded that Apprendi does not apply to 
 
48 
 
restitution orders because the states’ restitution statutes do not set a maximum 
restitution amount that can be ordered.”); Smith v. State, 990 N.E.2d 517, 520–
22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding Apprendi is not violated when “the trial court 
based its restitution order wholly on the acts underlying Smith’s conviction”); 
State v. Brown, 498 P.3d 167, 178 (Kan. 2021) (“Kansas’ criminal restitution 
statutes do not trigger the Sixth Amendment protections identified in Apprendi 
and its progeny.”); Commonwealth v. Denehy, 2 N.E.3d 161, 174 (Mass. 2014) 
(“Because we treat restitution as an entirely judicially determined penalty, 
lacking any legislative parameters, the mandate of Apprendi does not apply.”); 
State v. Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (“Based on the 
unmistakable consensus of the persuasive authority, we conclude that . . . 
Apprendi [is] inapplicable to restitution orders.”); Clapper, 732 N.W.2d at 663 
(“But the critical distinction is that for restitution, the sentencing court is not 
required to make any additional finding of fact regarding the defendant’s conduct 
or offense.”); State v. Martinez, 920 A.2d 715, 721–22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2007) (relying on federal precedent to hold Apprendi does not apply to 
restitution); People v. Horne, 767 N.E.2d 132, 139 (N.Y. 2002) (holding Apprendi 
does not apply to restitution because “a sentencing court is not increasing the 
maximum sentence available when it makes factual determinations affecting 
restitution but is merely issuing a sentence within the authorized statutory 
range”); State v. Deslaurier, 371 P.3d 505, 509 (Or. Ct. App. 2016) (“Restitution 
in the full amount of the victim’s economic damages does not exceed the 
‘prescribed statutory maximum’ because restitution for the full amount of the 
 
49 
 
victim’s economic damages is the only ‘restitution outcome that is consistent 
with a jury’s verdict.’ ” (quoting State v. Ramos, 340 P.3d 703, 706–07 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2014))). Our court today declines to follow that body of precedent, without 
citing a single decision to the contrary applying Apprendi to a victim restitution 
award. 
For these reasons, I am unable to join part III.B of the court’s opinion. 
Christensen, C.J., joins this concurrence in part and dissent in part.