Case Title: In re J.J.

Citation: 2006-Ohio-5484

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205, 2006-Ohio-5484.] 
 
 
 
IN RE J.J. 
[Cite as In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205, 2006-Ohio-5484.] 
Jurisdiction — Magistrates — Improper assignment of case by magistrate to 
judge not affecting subject-matter jurisdiction. 
(No. 2006-0064 — Submitted May 24, 2006 — Decided November 8, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 86276, 2005-Ohio-6096. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
 
1. 
In a court that possesses subject-matter jurisdiction, procedural 
irregularities in the transfer of a case to a visiting judge affect the court’s 
jurisdiction over the particular case and render the judgment voidable, not void. 
 
2. 
Appellate courts are duty-bound to resolve conflicts within their 
respective appellate districts through en banc proceedings. 
 
3. 
The procedure for certified conflicts does not apply to conflicts 
existing within an appellate district.  Section 3(B)(4), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family 
Services appeals from a decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals that held 
that a magistrate’s assignment of this permanent-custody case to a visiting judge 
rendered the subsequent proceedings void. 
{¶ 2} The record before us reveals that on August 31, 2000, Shannon 
Jeffi gave birth to J.J., the minor child who is the subject of this permanent-
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custody dispute.  Upon his release from the hospital five weeks later, the 
Department of Children and Family Services placed J.J. with his foster mother, 
Sharon Snyder.  In August 2002, the court awarded custody of J.J. to Donald 
Murphy, his biological father, after he completed parenting seminars and a drug 
rehabilitation program. 
{¶ 3} On October 24, 2003, as Murphy drove to pick up J.J. from a day-
care program, a Cleveland police officer stopped him and arrested him for driving 
with a suspended license and for possession of cocaine. 
{¶ 4} Consequently, the department filed a complaint for neglect in the 
juvenile court, seeking temporary and permanent custody of J.J. and requesting 
that the court immediately remove J.J. from Murphy’s custody.  The juvenile 
court magistrate held a hearing and granted the department’s motion for 
predispositional temporary custody.  Pursuant to that order, Snyder assumed 
foster care of J.J., pending the resolution of the department’s complaint for 
permanent custody. 
{¶ 5} The magistrate then transferred the matter to a visiting judge for 
further proceedings.  Following that transfer, several visiting judges presided over 
different hearings in the case.  Judge John T. Patton entered an arraignment order 
on December 9, 2003, and Judge Joseph J. Nahra presided over a hearing on 
January 23, 2004, in which the department amended its original complaint to 
include additional allegations regarding Murphy’s prior drug use.  Murphy 
objected neither to the magistrate’s transfer order nor to the jurisdiction of a 
visiting judge at any subsequent hearing. 
{¶ 6} The case then proceeded to trial before another visiting judge, 
Judge Judith A. Cross, who, following trial, awarded permanent custody of J.J. to 
the Department of Children and Family Services.  Although he never objected to 
Judge Cross’s jurisdiction or assignment at trial, on appeal, Murphy argued for the 
first time that the magistrate lacked authority to transfer cases to visiting judges, 
January Term, 2006 
3 
that the judges lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and that all subsequent 
proceedings and the court’s judgment became void ab initio.  The Eighth District 
agreed and held the juvenile court’s judgment void for lack of jurisdiction.  We 
granted discretionary review.  Based on the following, we reverse the judgment of 
the court of appeals. 
{¶ 7} The issue presented in this case concerns whether the magistrate’s 
transfer of the case to a visiting judge divested the juvenile court of subject-matter 
jurisdiction and rendered the subsequent proceedings void or whether that order 
constituted a procedural irregularity rendering the final judgment voidable. 
{¶ 8} The department contends that the magistrate’s order is a procedural 
irregularity that does not affect the subject-matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court 
and does not alter the authority of a visiting judge to decide cases absent a timely 
objection. 
{¶ 9} Murphy argues that Sup.R. 4(B) provides that only the 
administrative judge may assign cases to a visiting judge, and, therefore, the 
visiting judges lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to render judgment. 
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Compared with 
Jurisdiction over the Particular Case 
{¶ 10} In Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 
N.E.2d 992, we analyzed two distinct forms of jurisdiction: subject-matter 
jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the particular case.  Id. at ¶ 12.  Distinguishing 
between these concepts is important because “ ‘ “[i]t is only when the trial court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction that its judgment is void; lack of jurisdiction over 
the particular case merely renders the judgment voidable.” ’ ”  Id., quoting State v. 
Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002-Ohio-2833, 769 N.E.2d 846, ¶ 22 (Cook, J., 
dissenting), quoting State v. Swiger (1998), 125 Ohio App.3d 456, 462, 708 
N.E.2d 1033.  We begin by analyzing these two forms of jurisdiction. 
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{¶ 11} Subject-matter jurisdiction “connotes the power to hear and decide 
a case upon its merits.”  Morrison v. Steiner (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87, 61 
O.O.2d 335, 290 N.E.2d 841.  The General Assembly established the jurisdiction 
of juvenile courts and, in R.C. 2151.23(A)(1), granted them exclusive, original 
jurisdiction concerning matters involving a neglected or dependent child.  This 
action, therefore, involving the permanent custody of J.J. following a complaint 
alleging neglect, is within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court as 
specified in R.C. 2151.23(A)(1). 
{¶ 12} “Jurisdiction over the particular case,” as the term implies, 
involves “ ‘ “the trial court’s authority to determine a specific case within that 
class of cases that is within its subject matter jurisdiction.” ’ ”  Pratts, 102 Ohio 
St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, at ¶ 12, quoting Swiger, 125 Ohio 
App.3d at 462, 708 N.E.2d 1033.  In that case, Pratts pleaded guilty to aggravated 
murder with death-penalty and firearm specifications.  Id. at ¶ 2.  At the 
sentencing hearing, he waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to submit his 
plea to a single judge, despite the requirement of R.C. 2945.06 that capital 
offenses “be tried by a court to be composed of three judges.”  Id.  Pratts failed to 
appeal the single judge’s findings, but sought relief through an action in habeas 
corpus, contending that the trial court’s failure to comply with R.C. 2945.06 
divested it of subject-matter jurisdiction and rendered its judgment void.  Id. at ¶ 
3-4.  We rejected that argument, holding that “[t]he failure of the court to convene 
a three-judge panel, as required by R.C. 2945.06, does not constitute a lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction that renders the trial court’s judgment void ab initio * * 
* .”  Id. at ¶ 36.  The trial court’s error, however, did make the judgment voidable 
and permitted Pratts to challenge the decision on direct appeal.  Id. at ¶ 35.  
Having failed to preserve the error and argue the issue on appeal, Pratts waived 
that irregularity.  Id. 
January Term, 2006 
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{¶ 13} Similarly, in State v. Thomas, 97 Ohio St.3d 309, 2002-Ohio-6624, 
779 N.E.2d 1017, where Thomas elected to have a three-judge panel decide his 
sentence pursuant to R.C. 2945.06, the panel assigned an evidentiary issue to a 
visiting judge, reasoning that the victim-impact statements “would taint any 
members of the Panel or the entire Panel.”  Id. at ¶ 53.  In our analysis, we first 
noted that R.C. 2945.06 does not authorize a panel to request a visiting judge to 
rule on the admissibility of victim-impact statements, id. at ¶ 56, but we 
nonetheless held that “the improper referral of an evidentiary matter to another 
judge did not go to the jurisdiction of the court or render the judgment void,” id. 
at ¶ 58.  As in Pratts, Thomas had failed to preserve the error at the trial level and 
had therefore waived all but plain error.  Id. 
{¶ 14} Also, in Ex Parte Strang (1871), 21 Ohio St. 610, Strang 
challenged, by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the validity of a judgment 
rendered by a judge whom the mayor of Cincinnati had appointed because of an 
elected judge’s illness.  We affirmed the denial of an order for Strang’s discharge, 
noting that “the question raised is not an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court, 
but an inquiry into the right of the judge to hold the office, which is a question 
entirely distinct from that of the jurisdiction of the court over the offense.”  Id. at 
616.  There, we held the appointed attorney to be a de facto judicial officer and 
stated, “To constitute an officer de facto of a legally existing office it is not 
necessary that he should derive his appointment from one competent to invest him 
with a good title to the office.  It is sufficient if he derives his appointment from 
one having colorable authority to appoint * * * .”  Id., paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  Moreover, “[t]he acts of an officer de facto, when questioned 
collaterally, are as binding as those of an officer de jure.”  Id., paragraph one of 
the syllabus. 
{¶ 15} These cases establish the duty of a complaining party seeking 
review to object in the trial court and timely preserve the error for appeal and the 
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distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the particular 
case.  In a court that possesses subject-matter jurisdiction, procedural 
irregularities in the transfer of a case to a visiting judge affect the court’s 
jurisdiction over the particular case and render the judgment voidable, not void. 
The Transfer Order 
{¶ 16} Sup.R. 4(B) authorizes the administrative judge to “assign cases to 
individual judges of the court or division [and to] * * * * [r]equest, as necessary, 
the assignment of judges to the court or division.”  Juv.R. 40 does not extend this 
power of assignment to magistrates, and even the department concedes that the 
magistrate erred by signing the transfer order.  This error, however, does not 
affect the subject-matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court over neglect and 
custody hearings.  This case, like Pratts and Strang, is “not an inquiry into the 
jurisdiction of the court, but an inquiry into the right of the judge to hold the 
office.”   Strang, 21 Ohio St. at 616.  Therefore, the magistrate’s order, although 
erroneous, did not divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction; further, because 
Murphy failed to object at any time during any of the proceedings, he has not 
properly preserved the error and has waived it for purposes of appellate review. 
En Banc Procedures within Appellate Districts 
{¶ 17} Further confusing the issue presented in this case is the fact that the 
Eighth District Court of Appeals issued two separate opinions in two different 
cases on this issue on the same day, with separate panels of the Eighth District 
Court of Appeals each reaching a different result.  See In re J.L., Cuyahoga App. 
Nos. 85668-85670, 2005-Ohio-6125.  In re J.L. held that J.L.’s father waived the 
procedural irregularity by not objecting to the transfer order during the 
proceedings in the trial court.  The court in J.L. reasoned that though the 
magistrate did not have authority to transfer the case to the visiting judge docket, 
“ ‘[a] delegation of judicial authority under color of right may allow the person to 
whom the judicial authority is transferred to act as a de facto judge, even if the 
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delegation of authority is defective.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 43, quoting Cangemi v. Cangemi, 
Cuyahoga App. No. 84678, 2005-Ohio-772, at ¶ 25.  That holding, unlike the one 
in the instant case, comports with our precedent because it recognizes that the 
magistrate’s order, though improper, granted the visiting judge authority as a de 
facto officer to preside over the case.  A party may timely object to the authority 
of a visiting judge on the basis of an improper case transfer or assignment, but 
failure to timely enter such an objection waives the procedural error. 
{¶ 18} The procedure for certified conflicts does not apply to conflicts 
within an appellate district, Section 3(B)(4), Article IV, Ohio Constitution, and 
such conflicts should be resolved through en banc proceedings.  See, e.g., 
Whitelock v. Gilbane Bldg. Co. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 594, 613 N.E.2d 1032 
(dismissing an appeal pursuant to an Eighth District order certifying a conflict for 
review and noting that “[f]or certification to be proper, there must be conflicting 
decisions between districts on a rule of law” [emphasis sic]).  The Eighth 
District’s conflicting rulings on the same legal issue create confusion for lawyers 
and litigants and do not promote public confidence in the judiciary.  Appellate 
courts are duty-bound to resolve conflicts within the district through en banc 
proceedings. 
{¶ 19} In Eisenberg v. Peyton (1978), 56 Ohio App.2d 144,10 O.O.3d 
158, 381 N.E.2d 1136, the Eighth District Court of Appeals used en banc 
proceedings in a case involving an improper procedure regarding a referee.  
There, the court stated: “Although the trial court may commit error by not fully 
complying with the procedural requirements of Civil Rule 53, that failure does not 
affect the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear and determine the action.”  Id. at 
148, 10 O.O.3d 158, 381 N.E.2d 1136.  Thus, as in this case, the procedural error 
did not affect the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. 
{¶ 20} The en banc proceedings in Eisenberg permitted the court “to state 
clearly [its] position on the applicability of Civil Rule 53, * * * to indicate the 
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lack of any effect on previous judgments which have not been appealed for a 
failure to fully comply with Civil Rule 53,” and “to review its pronouncements on 
the subject and reach a common policy conclusion.”  Id. at 145, 10 O.O.3d 158, 
381 N.E.2d 1136.  This reasoning comports with Article 8(b)(ii) of the Eighth 
District’s Standing Resolution of the Rules for the Conducting of Court Work and 
supports our directive that appellate courts should resolve conflicts within their 
respective appellate districts. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 21} Based on the foregoing, the judgment is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of assignments of error that it 
originally declared moot. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’CONNOR, 
JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
William D. Mason and Joseph C. Young, for appellant Cuyahoga County 
Department of Children and Family Services. 
 
John H. Lawson, for appellee Don Murphy. 
______________________