Case Title: Plaintiff v. Defendant

Citation: 

Docket Number: S51937

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2005-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  December 15, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
CONRAD BRISCOE MUNRO,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 02-0243; CA A120381; SC S51937)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 6, 2005.
Douglas F. Zier, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on
review.  With him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
Andy Simrin, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent.
DE MUNIZ, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed.
*Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Patrick D. Gilroy, Judge. 194 Or App 538, 96 P3d 348 (2004).
DE MUNIZ, J.  
In accordance with a lawful warrant authorizing the search for and seizure of
drug-related evidence, the police seized a Beta videotape from defendant's apartment.  When the
police initially played the videotape, it appeared to be blank.  A year later, the police received
information that the videotape contained evidence of child pornography.  The police examined
the tape again, this time looking for images of children engaged in unlawful sexual activity. 
Again the tape appeared to be blank.  Eventually, using a different tape player, the police were
able to view pornographic images of children on the videotape and charged defendant with
encouraging child sexual abuse in the second degree. (1)  Before trial, defendant moved to
suppress the videotape and its contents.  The trial court denied defendant's motion, and a jury
found defendant guilty of encouraging child sexual abuse in the second degree.  
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in
failing to suppress the contents of the videotape. (2)  The Court of Appeals agreed with
defendant, holding that the warrant did not authorize the state's subsequent
examination of the videotape.  State v. Munro, 194 Or App 538, 96
P3d 348 (2004).  We allowed the state's petition for review and
now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.  
The facts are undisputed.  In June 2000, the unit
supervisor for the Clackamas County Sheriff's Child Abuse Team
prepared an affidavit for a search warrant. (3)  Based on the
affidavit, a judge issued a search warrant authorizing a search
of defendant's home for drug-related evidence, including
marijuana, drug paraphernalia, business records and various media
including photographs and videotapes, and proceeds from drug
trafficking. (4)  In the search of defendant's home that
followed, police officers seized various VHS videotapes and one
Beta videotape along with marijuana and drug-related items.  When
the officers initially viewed the Beta videotape, it appeared to
be blank.  Nevertheless, the officers retained the tape.  In May
2001, the state charged defendant with possession of a controlled
substance. (5) 
In June 2001, while defendant's trial on the drug
charges was pending, police officers received information
indicating that the Beta videotape contained images of child
pornography that was not readily viewable on every Beta player. 
Police officers again attempted to view the tape on their own
Beta player and then at the facilities of a Portland television
station.  When both of those attempts proved unsuccessful, the
officers contacted a video service company.  That video company
was successful in accessing the pornographic contents of the
videotape. (6)  Thereafter, the state charged defendant with
encouraging child sexual abuse.  Subsequently, a jury found
defendant guilty of encouraging child sexual abuse in the second
degree.  Defendant appealed that conviction to the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction
and remanded the case for a new trial.  The Court of Appeals held
that the trial court should have suppressed the contents of the
videotape because the police officers' subsequent viewing of the
videotape constituted a separate, warrantless search that
violated Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. 
Munro, 194 Or App 538.  As noted, we allowed the state's petition
for review. 
On review, the state concedes that the "videotape did
not announce its contents" and that the second examination of the
videotape was a "search."  We accept the state's concessions. 
Nevertheless, the state argues that the search of the videotape
was reasonable under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution "[b]ecause the police continued to act pursuant to
the warrant's authority and did not exceed its scope when they
looked only in a place identified by the warrant."  In other
words, the state does not seek to justify the second examination
of the videotape on any basis independent of the authority of the
warrant.  
In response to the state's argument, defendant contends
that the subsequent examination of the videotape for evidence of
child pornography was not authorized under the drug-related-evidence scope of the warrant and, therefore, amounted to a
separate warrantless search that violated his privacy rights
under various statutory provisions, Article I, section 9, of the
Oregon Constitution, (7) and the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. (8)  In our view, the question before this
court is whether defendant retained a privacy interest in the
contents of the videotape after its seizure and initial
examination that lawfully could not be invaded under the
authority of the warrant.
Ordinarily, this court analyzes statutory issues
applicable to a case before reaching constitutional ones.  State
v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 240, 666 P2d 802 (1983).  However, in this
case, defendant's various statutory arguments center on the
warrant requirements set out in ORS 133.565(2). (9)  In State
v. Ingram, 313 Or 139, 143, 831 P2d 674 (1992), this court
observed that the ORS 133.565(2) requirements are intended to
address the extent of discretion that the face of a warrant
permits an executing officer to exercise and to implement the
constitutional prohibition against general warrants, and are as
restrictive as the constitutional prohibitions against general
warrants.  Given those observations regarding the statutory
requirements and the legislature's subsequent enactment of ORS
136.432, (10) we necessarily analyze defendant's arguments
under Article I, section 9.
Article I, section 9, protects both possessory and
privacy interests in effects.  State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 206,
729 P2d 524 (1986).  In State v. Campbell, 306 Or 157, 170, 759
P2d 1040 (1988), this court stated that "[a] privacy interest * *
* is an interest in freedom from particular forms of scrutiny." 
Privacy interests that are protected by Article I, section 9,
commonly are circumscribed by the space in which they exist and,
more particularly, by the barriers to public entry (physical and
sensory) that define that private space.  State v. Smith, 327 Or
366, 373, 963 P2d 642 (1998).  We agree with defendant that an
unlabeled videotape is not a transparent container that announces
its content to anyone looking at the container.  As the owner of
the videotape, defendant had a possessory and a privacy interest
in the contents of the videotape protected by Article I, section
9.
The warrant, however, authorized the seizure of the
videotape, thereby lawfully depriving defendant of his possessory
interest in the videotape.  Similarly, the warrant authorized the
police to invade the privacy of the videotape by examining and
exhibiting its contents. 
It is true that, in this case, the police initially did
not see anything on the videotape when they examined it. 
Defendant argues from that fact that, because nothing had been
revealed by that initial examination, defendant's privacy
interest in the contents of the videotape was never destroyed. 
That is, as we understand defendant's argument, so long as there
remained the possibility that defendant could reclaim the
videotape, defendant's privacy interest in the content of the
videotape remained until that privacy interest was lawfully
invaded under the authority of a warrant.  According to
defendant, because the warrant authorized the seizure and search
of the videotape only for evidence of illegal drug activity, the
subsequent examination for evidence of child pornography was not
within the authority of the warrant and therefore amounted to an
unwarranted and unreasonable search in violation of Article I,
section 9.  As we explain below, we disagree with defendant's
premise that defendant retained any privacy interest in the
content of the videotape that was not destroyed by its warranted
seizure and initial examination.
Here, the warrant lawfully authorized the seizure of
the videotape and the invasion of defendant's privacy interest in
its contents.  Once the police seized the videotape under the
authority of the warrant, any privacy interest that defendant had
in the content of the videotape was destroyed by the authority of
the warrant permitting the examination and exhibition of the
contents of the videotape.  Until such time as defendant regained
lawful possession of the videotape, he had no remaining privacy
interest in its contents that he could assert.  
The fact that the police did not initially observe any
images on the videotape when they initially examined it is of no
legal significance.  Once they lawfully had seized the videotape,
nothing prevented the police from examining the contents of the
videotape as often as they deemed necessary.  Furthermore, once
the videotape was lawfully seized under the authority of the
warrant, any images stored on the videotape, no matter how
hidden, private, or secret, were no longer protected by Article
I, section 9.  See Campbell, 306 Or at 166 ("The constitutional
provisions against unreasonable searches and seizures do not
protect a right to keep any information, no matter how hidden or
'private,' secret from the government.").
When the police subsequently accessed the pornographic
images stored on the videotape, they were searching in a location
authorized by the warrant.  As long as the police were searching
in a location authorized by the warrant -- a location in which
defendant had no remaining privacy interest -- their subjective
intent or their purpose for the search is of no constitutional
significance.  
We hold that, in this case, the subsequent examination
of the videotape for evidence of child pornography was reasonable
under Article I, section 9, because the police were lawfully in
possession of the videotape under the authority of the warrant,
they searched in a location authorized by the warrant, and
defendant had no remaining privacy interest in the videotape's
contents at the time of the search. (11)
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
1. ORS 163.686 provides, in part:
"(1) A person commits the crime of encouraging child sexual abuse in the
second degree if the person:
"(a)(A)(i) Knowingly possesses or controls any photograph, motion
picture, videotape or other visual recording of sexually explicit conduct involving
a child for the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual desires of the person or
another person; * * *
"* * * * *
"(2) Encouraging child sexual abuse in the second degree is a Class C
felony."
2. In the Court of Appeals, defendant raised other challenges to his conviction.  The Court
of Appeals rejected those challenges, and we do not address them here.
3. The affidavit described videotapes related to drug possession and sales in two places:
"D) Persons who possess and distribute marijuana and other controlled
substances often keep records pertaining to their illegal narcotic activities.  These
include records of marijuana values they have packaged and sold, lists of
customers and associates, and records of drug payments and debts. Such records
are commonly kept at the premises where the controlled substances are processed
and sold, are secured in safes, lockboxes, computers, or other secure or concealed
locations secreted at the location.  This facilitates easy access by the seller while
affording protection from unwanted discovery.
"These records include written and electronically stored business
documents, ledgers, address books, computer files and software, telephone toll
records, notes, messages, photographs and video films, and encrypted memoranda
indicating drug debts/sales.
"* * * * *
"Based on the above information, I have probable cause to believe that
located on or in the premises, property, buildings, and curtlage located at #2
Jefferson Parkway Apartment H6, Lake Oswego, Clackamas County, Oregon and
in a black 1999 Ford Mustang Coup, Oregon License JEFRSN is evidence of the
crimes of Possession of a Schedule 1 Controlled Substance and Delivery of a
Schedule 1 Controlled Substance to wit: marijuana, including but not limited to
other controlled substances; drug paraphernalia including a custom marijuana
smoking pipe about 7 inches long with the date and signature of the artist on the
mouthpiece; items of identification such as utility bills, mail addressed to the
occupants, rent receipts and property ownership papers, financial and personal
paper, business records such as ledgers, address books, bank records, travel
records, computers and their files and related software, telephone toll records;
phone recorders, cellular telephones, electronic pagers, caller identification
devices, notes, messages, encrypted memoranda, records of drug sales and debts,
photographs and videotapes; business equipment such as weigh scales, packaging
materials, any equipment, supplies and instruction guides used to traffic marijuana
and any other controlled substances; cash and other negotiable securities and
commodities including checks, money orders precious metals and any other
proceeds from the trafficking of controlled substances; and weapons."
(Emphasis added.)
4. The warrant provided, in pertinent part:
"You are hereby commanded to search:
"* * * * *
"For the following described property:
"[M]arijuana, including but not limited to other controlled substances;
drug paraphernalia including a custom marijuana smoking pipe about 7 inches
long with the date and signature of the artist on the mouthpiece; items of
identification such as utility bills, mail addressed to the occupants, rent receipts
and property ownership papers, financial and personal paper; business records
such as ledgers, address books, bank records, travel records, computers and their
files and related software, telephone toll records; phone recorders, cellular
telephones, electronic pagers, caller identification devices, notes, messages,
encrypted memoranda, records of drug sales and debts, photographs and
videotapes; business equipment such as weigh scales, packaging materials, any
equipment, supplies and instructions guides used to traffic marijuana and any
other controlled substances; cash and other negotiable securities and commodities
including checks, money orders, precious metals and any other proceeds from the
trafficking of controlled substances; and weapons."
(Emphasis added.)
5. In August 2001, a jury convicted defendant of possession of
a controlled substance. 
6. In its opinion below, the Court of Appeals wrote that the video service company had
"succeeded in copying the content of the Beta videotape into VHS format. [The police officer]
then viewed the videotape and saw 'what appeared to be young boys involved in sexual activity.'" 
State v. Munro, 194 Or App 538, 541, 96 P3d 348 (2004).  The state contends, and the evidence
appears to establish, that a police officer was able to view the contents of the videotape prior to
those contents being transferred onto a VHS videotape.  
7. Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution provides:
"No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized."
8. The Fourth Amendment provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
9. ORS 133.565(2) provides:
"The warrant shall state, or describe with particularity:
"(a) The identity of the judge issuing the warrant and the date the warrant
was issued;
"(b) The name of the person to be searched, or the location and designation
of the premises or places to be searched;
"(c) The things constituting the object of the search and authorized to be
seized; and
"(d) The period of time, not to exceed five days, after execution of the
warrant except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, within which the
warrant is to be returned to the issuing authority."
10. ORS 136.432 provides:
"A court may not exclude relevant and otherwise admissible evidence in a
criminal action on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of any statutory
provision unless exclusion of the evidence is required by:
"(1) The United States Constitution or the Oregon Constitution;
"(2) The rules of evidence governing privileges and the admission of
hearsay; or
"(3) The rights of the press." 
11. Defendant's similarly phrased arguments under the Fourth Amendment are rejected for
the same reasons expressed in our analysis under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.