Case Title: Cobb v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 495, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ROGER N. COBB,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 495, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID No. 89K02081DI 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: October 20, 2010 
Decided: December 17, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 17th day of December 2010, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Roger N. Cobb, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s July 14, 2010 order denying his motion to correct an 
illegal sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a).  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
 
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Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in January 1990, a Superior Court jury 
found Cobb guilty of Trafficking in Cocaine, Maintaining a Vehicle for 
Keeping Controlled Substances, Possession With Intent to Deliver Cocaine, 
Conspiracy in the Second Degree, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia and 
Possession of Marijuana.  On April 6, 1990, Cobb was declared a habitual 
offender under Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4214(b) and was sentenced to life in 
prison without benefit of probation or parole.  In 1991, this Court dismissed 
Cobb’s appeal of his convictions.2  In 1994 and 1996, this Court affirmed the 
Superior Court’s denials of Cobb’s first and second motions for 
postconviction relief.3  Cobb did not appeal the Superior Court’s denial of 
his third motion for postconviction relief.   
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for 
correction of an illegal sentence, Cobb claims that the Superior Court abused 
its discretion when it denied his motion as untimely under Rule 35(b).  
According to Cobb, his untimely motion should be excused because a) his 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Cobb v. State, Del. Supr., No. 251, 1990, Christie, C.J. (Oct. 15, 1991).  Cobb’s motion 
to discharge his attorney was granted and, thereafter, he failed to submit his opening brief 
and appendix.  
3 Cobb v. State, Del. Supr., No. 425, 1993, Hartnett, J. (July 11, 1994); Cobb v. State, 
Del. Supr., No. 362, 1995, Walsh, J. (Jan. 10, 1996). 
 
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trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, resulting in the untimely filing; 
and b) his sentencing as a habitual offender violated the Ex Post Facto 
Clause of the United States Constitution because a 1984 conviction was used 
to enhance his 1990 sentence after §4214(b) was amended in 1985.   
 
(4) 
A defendant may seek to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 
35(a) only under a limited set of circumstances: a) if the sentence exceeds 
the statutorily-authorized limits; b) if the sentence violates double jeopardy; 
c) if the sentence is internally contradictory or ambiguous with respect to a 
material provision; or d) if the sentence omits a statutorily-required term.4  
The purpose of a motion under Rule 35(a) is not to attack the legality of a 
defendant’s convictions or to raise allegations of error in the proceedings 
leading to the judgment of conviction.5 
 
(5) 
Cobb fails to state a claim under the limited parameters of Rule 
35(a).  To the extent that Cobb claims that his sentence was imposed in an 
illegal manner, any such claim is untimely since, under Rule 35(b), it had to 
be filed within 90 days of his April 6, 1990 sentence.  Moreover, Cobb has 
failed to demonstrate any “extraordinary circumstances” that would permit 
his untimely motion to be considered.  To the extent Cobb attempts to rely 
upon his ex post facto argument to demonstrate “extraordinary 
                                                 
4 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
5 Id. 
 
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circumstances,” any such attempt must fail, since the punishment for Cobb’s 
1984 conviction was not enhanced and his punishment as a habitual offender 
in 1990 is neither a new jeopardy nor additional punishment for his earlier 
crimes, but, rather, is an enhanced penalty for his latest crime.6  As such, 
there is no ex post facto violation.7 
 
(6) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
 
                                                 
6 Felix v. State, Del. Supr., No. 150, 2007, Berger, J. (Mar. 5, 2008) (citing Roberts v. 
State, 494 A.2d 156, 159 (Del. 1985). 
7 Id.