Case Title: Laramie Rivers Co. v. Wheatland Irr. Dist.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Laramie Rivers Co. v. Wheatland Irr. Dist.1985 WY 161708 P.2d 20Case Number: 84-52Decided: 10/10/1985LARAMIE RIVERS COMPANY, APPELLANT (RESPONDENT), 

v. 

WHEATLAND IRRIGATION DISTRICT, APPELLEE (PETITIONER).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
LARAMIE RIVERS COMPANY, 
APPELLANT (RESPONDENT), 

v. 

WHEATLAND IRRIGATION 
DISTRICT, APPELLEE (PETITIONER).

 
 

Appeal from the State 
Board of Control.

 
 

Horace M. 
MacMillan, II and George J. Millett of Pence & MacMillan, Laramie, for appellant.

William R. Jones 
of Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, for appellee.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., John D. Erdmann, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for State Bd. of 
Control.

Before THOMAS,* C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral arguments.

ROSE, Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal brings 
these parties before the court for the second time. See Wheatland Irrigation District v. Laramie 
Rivers Company, Wyo., 659 P.2d 561 (1983).

Background

[¶2.]     In the first appeal, we 
held that the abandonment petition of contestant Wheatland Irrigation District 
(sometimes referred to as Wheatland) had been timely filed - undertaking of dam 
repairs does not prevent forfeiture - and we remanded to the district court for 
resolution of the question which asks whether contestee Laramie Rivers Company 
(sometimes referred to as Laramie or Laramie Rivers) had failed to utilize its 
reservoir storage rights to the contested 41,100 acre-feet in Lake Hattie 
Reservoir according to statutory directive, and, if not, whether Laramie had a 
lawful excuse for such nonuse.

[¶3.]     In reliance upon 
Wyoming's nonuse water-abandonment statute, § 41-3-401(a), W.S. 1977,1 Wheatland originated the action by 
filing a petition with the State Board of Control, seeking to abandon 41,100 of 
the 68,500 acre-feet of water which had been appropriated to the Laramie Rivers 
Company from the Laramie and Little Laramie rivers under two reservoir permits 
for the Lake Hattie Reservoir. The reservoir permits for the storage of 90,872 
acre-feet for the appellee's Wheatland No. 3 Reservoir are junior to and 
downstream from LakeHattie. It is Wheatland's contention that 
the statutory five successive years having passed since Laramie applied the 
contested water to beneficial use, the appropriation was, under § 41-3-401(a), 
abandoned and therefore subject to declaration of abandonment under § 
41-3-401(b), W.S. 1977.2

Remand 
Proceedings

[¶4.]     The State Board of 
Control, upon remand from this court, reconsidered the evidence received in the 
original hearing and, on August 18, 1983, ordered all storage rights in Lake 
Hattie Reservoir abandoned above an elevation of 7,263 feet above mean sea 
level. Further, the State Board of Control ordered that the Laramie Rivers 
Company or its successors cause a survey to be made to determine the actual 
capacity of Lake Hattie Reservoir below 7,263 feet and to prepare a capacity map 
to the satisfaction of the State Board of Control prior to May 1, 
1986.

Issues for 
Decision

[¶5.]     Laramie appealed to the 
district court and the case was certified directly to this court, with the 
following issues assigned for our review:

"1. Does Wheatland 
Irrigation District lack standing to file a petition for partial abandonment of 
the storage rights held by Laramie Rivers Company in Lake Hattie 
Reservoir?

"2. Did the Board of 
Control properly comply with Wyoming law by arbitrarily disregarding the 
facts as to the actual amount of water available for diversion during the years 
in question?

"3. Did the Board of 
Control comply with Wyoming law in concluding that a partial 
abandonment of storage rights in Lake Hattie Reservoir could be based upon 
elevation, rather than the actual quantity of water put to beneficial 
use?

"4. Was the order of the 
Board of Control directing that all storage rights in Lake Hattie Reservoir 
shall be abandoned if Laramie Rivers Company fails to provide a map certifying 
the capacity of Lake Hattie Reservoir by May 1, 1986, and until such time that 
an acceptable map is provided in compliance with Wyoming law?"

 Issue No. 1 - Standing

[¶6.]     We will find that the 
threat of resuscitating Laramie River's abandoned water rights constitutes such 
abridgment of Wheatland's water rights as will provide standing to petitioner in 
abandonment, because, after the triggering of the injury which flows from 
resuscitation (i.e., reapplication to beneficial use), it is then too late for 
Wheatland to protect its right to the use of the contested water under our 
holding in Wheatland Irrigation District 
v. Pioneer Canal Co., Wyo., 464 P.2d 533 (1970); Sturgeon v. Brooks, 73 Wyo. 436, 281 P.2d 675 (1955).

Wheatland's 
Position

[¶7.]     In the appeal at bar, 
it is the appellee Wheatland's position that the threat of the reapplication of 
Laramie River's abandoned storage rights to beneficial use would adversely 
affect Wheatland's water right which - for purposes of the case at bar - it 
identifies as being the uninterrupted flow of the contested water past the Lake 
Hattie diversion into Wheatland's No. 3 Reservoir subject only to the rights of 
such intermediate users as may be in priority.

[¶8.]     In the words of its 
brief, Wheatland urges that it has standing

"* * * in order to 
protect its right to use its previously appropriated water in Wheatland 
Reservoir No. 3 from the injury which it would suffer were the 
Contestee/Appellant allowed to resuscitate the water rights which it abandoned 
from non-use."

Wheatland's Resuscitation 
Theory

[¶9.]     Concerning its standing 
to petition for abandonment under § 41-3-401(b), where the "water user" must be 
found to have been "affected," Wheatland argues that it is a junior downstream 
appropriator which is possessed of an unsatisfied water right that is being 
supplemented through the nonuse of Laramie River's upstream, partially 
abandoned, senior appropriation, and, therefore, the threat of the reassignment 
of the contested water to beneficial use causes Wheatland to become such an 
"affected" water user as is contemplated by § 41-3-401(b).

[¶10.]  Essential to the understanding of 
contestant's theory is a continuing awareness of the provisions of § 41-3-401(a) 
and (b). Particularly is it important to remember that § 41-3-401(a) provides 
that contestee's nonuse for the statutory period creates a condition which the 
legislature has described as "having 
abandoned the water right" (emphasis added). Section 41-3-401(b) then 
explains who it is that will be permitted to take advantage of the "abandoned * 
* * water right" - namely, "any water 
user who might be affected" (emphasis added).

[¶11.]  Where standing is in issue and non-use is 
alleged, Wheatland interprets these statutory provisions to say that, even 
though - through nonuse - Laramie has factually abandoned the water right in 
question, prior to a declaration of abandonment it nevertheless retains 
"resuscitation"3 privileges which contemplate that 
the abandoned water right may be retrieved and revitalized through reapplication 
to such beneficial use as is contemplated by the contestee's original 
appropriation authority. In support of this automatic abandonment theory, with 
its attendant "resuscitation" properties, Wheatland remembers Sturgeon v. Brooks, supra, and Wheatland Irrigation District v. Pioneer 
Canal Co., supra. The lesson of these opinions is that nonuse for the 
statutory period renders a right forfeited, but, if the petition for abandonment 
is not filed until after beneficial use is resumed, forfeiture of the water 
right will not be declared.

[¶12.]  We discussed Sturgeon and Wheatland Irrigation District in our 
first opinion and, in light of the importance of these cases to an understanding 
of the appellee's theory of standing in this appeal, what we said there bears 
repeating. In Wheatland Irrigation 
District v. Laramie Rivers Company, 659 P.2d  at 566-567, we 
said:

"In Sturgeon v. Brooks, 281 P.2d  at 683-684, 
this court said:

"`* * * We might say at 
this point, plaintiff Sturgeon testified that he acquired the land on which the 
reservoir in question is located in 1936 or 1937. The reservoir rights in 
question here had not been put in use for five years previously and were not put 
to use until 1951 or 1952. Yet he waited sixteen or seventeen years before 
bringing an action of forfeiture, and that after the defendant Brooks had twice 
repaired the reservoir and had 
recommenced to use the water. The testimony does not disclose the outlay, 
but judging from the fact that plaintiff Sturgeon had offered to contribute $500 
to the repair of the dam of the reservoir, the expenditure by Brooks must have 
been at least substantial. Waiting sixteen or seventeen years to bring an action 
for forfeiture would, on its face, seem to be an unreasonable time, especially 
in view of the facts just stated.' (Emphasis added.)

"The court then went on 
to explain that had the reservoir water not been put to use, the result might 
not have been the same when we said:

"`* * * It may be 
conceded herein for the purpose of this case, that if the action for forfeiture had been 
brought before Brooks put the reservoir again into use, the court would have 
been justified, if not constrained, to declare a forfeiture.' (Emphasis 
added.)

"In Wheatland Irrigation District v. Pioneer 
Canal Co., Wyo., 464 P.2d 533 (1970), we were later 
confronted with a fact situation (like the case before the court here) where a 
forfeiture petition was filed before 
the water had been applied to its beneficial use. There, both the Board of 
Control and the district court found that the Pioneer Canal Company should have 
a reasonable period of time to enlarge their reservoir to its appropriated size 
rather than abandoning the right as to any excess over its present capacity. 
This court reversed the district court's affirmance of the Board of Control's 
order and declared the excess of the right to be abandoned. Commenting on Sturgeon v. Brooks, we said:

"`* * * One of the 
questions dealt with in the case was whether or not the owner had abandoned his 
storage right because of the prolonged disuse of the reservoir. We held he had 
not for the reason no formal declaration of abandonment had theretofore been 
obtained from the board or the district court. It was said, however, "that if 
the action for forfeiture had been brought before Brooks [defendant] put the 
reservoir again into use, the court would have been justified, if not 
constrained, to declare a forfeiture," 281 P.2d  at 684. Inasmuch as there has 
been no change in the statute relating to the matter since that time, see § 
41-47, W.S. 1957, the rationale of the case is particularly persuasive here, and 
as indicated above we hold the board and the district court erred in granting 
Pioneer additional time within which to enlarge its reservoir.' (Emphasis 
added.) 464 P.2d  at 540-541."

Accord Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln 
Land Co., 54 Wyo. 320, 92 P.2d 572 (1939).

[¶13.]  In the case at bar, the injury to the 
contestant's water rights - i.e., the right to have the abandoned water flow by 
the Lake Hattie diversion, to aid in the satisfaction of Wheatland's 
long-standing but unfulfilled reservoir rights - could not occur until the 
abandoned water rights were resuscitated (when it would then be too late for the 
contestant to petition in abandonment under Wheatland Irrigation District v. Pioneer 
Canal Co., supra) unless we are prepared to say that the threat of 
resuscitation constitutes an effective abridgement of Wheatland's existing 
reservoir right. Wheatland puts the thought this way: 

"If the Contestant was to 
be required to actually suffer that injury [the reapplication of water to 
beneficial use] prior to obtaining standing to institute this proceeding, they 
would have to give up their cause of action before they could assert 
it."

[¶14.]  The contestant's rationale for this 
proposition is expressed in its brief as follows:

"If the junior water 
right holder waits until after the senior right is resuscitated by being once 
again put to use, he may no longer claim the benefit of the earlier period of 
non-use, no matter how extensive it was, because the subsequent reuse of the 
earlier right reestablishes it with all the validity it would have had, had it 
been continually used since its inception."

Laramie 
River's Position

[¶15.]  In response, Laramie Rivers says to 
Wheatland:

You have not identified a 
water right that is being abridged through refusal to abandon - you only point 
to a benefit from abandonment, and benefit without associated injury is 
insufficient to structure standing under Platte County Grazing Association v. State 
Board of Control, Wyo., 675 P.2d 1279 (1984).

[¶16.]  More specifically, Laramie Rivers 
describes its position this way in its brief:

"The injury factor, 
stressed the Court [in Platte County Grazing Association], is the 
jurisdictional, statutory requirement which must be present before one 
appropriator can bring a petition for abandonment against the water rights of 
another. * * * The majority opinion of Justice Rose further explained, `the 
complainant must, in order to vest the appropriate boards and courts with 
jurisdiction to hear his petition, be 
able to allege and prove that his water right has been injured, i.e., abridged by the 
use or misuse that the contestee makes of the water in which the contestant has 
a protective interest.' Platte County 
Grazing Association, supra at 1283-1284 (emphasis added).

"Several other recent 
Wyoming cases 
reiterate the requirement that an appropriator be able to allege and prove 
injury to his water right in order to be vested with standing to bring an 
abandonment action. See, Cremer vs. State 
Board of Control, 675 P.2d 250 (Wyo. 1984); 
Budd vs. Bishop, [Wyo., 543 P.2d 368 
(1975)]. In Cremer, the Court 
discussed the general body of law regarding standing, and concluded that 
requiring proof of injury as a prerequisite to a complaint in abandonment was 
simply an application of the historic rule, 675 P.2d  at 256."

[¶17.]  Laramie Rivers, thus, relies mainly upon 
our decisions in Platte County Grazing 
Association v. State Board of Control, supra, and Cremer v. State Board of Control, Wyo., 
675 P.2d 250 (1984), to defeat the petition on the grounds that Wheatland, the 
junior appropriator, is unable to identify a water right that will be 
"affected"4 - i.e., abridged - "injured"5 by reason of the ever-present 
threat of reapplication to beneficial use. Laramie goes on to argue that the only result 
of abandonment will be to "benefit" the Wheatland No. 3 Reservoir absent the 
required jurisdictional proof of injury to an existing water right. For these 
reasons, says the appellant, Wheatland is not possessed of standing to petition 
for the partial abandonment of the LakeHattie storage rights.

[¶18.]  In Platte County Grazing Association, we 
held that the junior appropriator downstream contestants lacked standing to 
petition under § 41-3-401(b) because the facts in that case reveal that, even 
though the contestee was not using the water for "the beneficial purposes for 
which it was appropriated" as contemplated by § 41-3-401(a) in that the senior 
was applying all of its appropriated water to only one-half of the land 
authorized by its appropriation (thereby making the contestee's water right 
eligible for a declaration of abandonment), the contestant's water rights were, 
nevertheless, not abridged and therefore were not "affected" for standing 
purposes. The Platte County Grazing Association opinion was fact-oriented in the 
sense that the record in that case revealed that the same amount of water would 
return to the stream through misapplication as would have returned were the 
water to have been applied as contemplated by the contestee's appropriation 
authorization; hence - no injury to the contestant's water rights. It is, of 
course, conceded that the water rights of the contestant in Platte County 
Grazing Association would have benefited 
from a declaration of abandonment, but the contestants found it impossible 
to demonstrate that the use to which the contestee was putting its water was in 
any way abridging the water rights of the contestants. The sense of the Platte 
County Grazing Association holding is that standing to complain contemplates an 
ability to plead and prove injury to the contestant's water right. Accord Cremer v. State Board of Control, 
supra.

Decision Concerning 
Wheatland's Standing

[¶19.]  In International Association of Fire Fighters 
v. Civil Service Commission of the Fire Department of the City of Cheyenne, 
Wyo., 702 P.2d 1294, 1297-1298 (1985), Chief Justice Thomas, in his specially concurring 
opinion, summarized the law of standing when he said:

"A fundamental aspect of 
the doctrine of standing is that those who press an issue must allege `a 
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S. Ct. 691, 703, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252, 97 S. Ct. 555, 561, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1977). It is the personal stake in the result which guarantees a full and 
complete adversary presentation of the case. Spratt v. Security Bank of Buffalo, 
Wyoming, Wyo., 654 P.2d 130, 134 (1982); In the Matter of Various Water Rights in 
Lake DeSmet Reservoir, Wyo., 623 P.2d 764, 767 (1981); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 
731-732, 92 S. Ct. 1361, 1364, 31 L. Ed. 2d 636, 641 (1972). In Wyoming this personal 
stake has been described as a `tangible interest at stake.' Cremer v. State Board of Control, Wyo., 
675 P.2d 250, 254 (1984); Washakie County 
School District Number One v. Herschler, Wyo., 606 P.2d 310, 316 (1980), 
cert. denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980). It has been our 
requirement that one asserting an issue be `sufficiently affected to insure that 
a justiciable controversy is presented to the court.' Cremer v. State Board of Control, supra, 
675 P.2d  at 254; Washakie County School 
District Number One v. Herschler, supra, 606 P.2d  at 317."

[¶20.]  The record shows in the case at bar that, 
for the five years in question here, an unidentified amount of the water in 
contest, which might otherwise have been lawfully diverted to LakeHattie, ran downstream where it was 
utilized by various appropriators, including Wheatland Irrigation District's No. 
3 Reservoir.6 That reservoir, with its 90,872 
acre-feet of storage authority, has never been filled to capacity, including 
those years when at least a part of the contested LakeHattie water was not being diverted for 
that reservoir's purposes. Therefore, whatever right Wheatland has to assert 
standing here comes out of Laramie's nonuse of its water rather than 
misuse or misapplication as was the case in Platte County Grazing Association. 
It is also conceded that Laramie Rivers' alleged nonuse resulted in a benefit to 
Wheatland's unsatisfied appropriation. Granting the benefit that would flow to 
Wheatland from a declaration of abandonment, whether the State Board of 
Control's refusal to declare a forfeiture would have resulted in such abridgment 
to its appropriation as would furnish standing to petition for abandonment is 
the question which must be decided in this opinion.

[¶21.]  This turns the standing issue for this 
appeal into this inquiry:

Does a contestant junior 
downstream reservoir appropriator possess standing to bring partial abandonment 
under § 41-3-401(b) against a senior appropriator where the junior undertakes to 
establish that his appropriation is "affected" (as contemplated by § 
41-3-401(b)) by the senior's failure to apply water to beneficial use for the 
statutory period of time under facts which show

(a) that the junior's 
existing water right has historically been unfulfilled by the stream flow 
whether the senior diverts the contested water or not, but

(b) the undiverted flow 
of contested water will serve to more nearly approximate the fulfillment of the 
reservoir authority of the junior downstream appropriator?

[¶22.]  We will hold that Wheatland is possessed 
of standing to petition in abandonment.

The Standing Decision's 
Rationale

To Be Affected Under § 
41-3-401(b), The Abridgment Must Be To the Water Right

[¶23.]  The standing requirements of § 
41-3-401(b) mandate that the petitioner must be possessed of a water right that is being abridged 
either by misuse (misapplication), as 
was the case in Platte County Grazing Association,7 or nonuse as the junior 
appropriator contends here. In pursuit of the answer to the question which wants 
to know whether or not Wheatland was possessed of an abridged water right, we 
pause to reiterate that it is a sound principle of water law in this state which 
holds that "affected" under a statutory provision containing § 41-3-401(b) 
language can only pertain to an abridgment of the contestant's water 
right.

[¶24.]  We are aware of the school of thought 
which holds that a water user need only show that his right will be "benefited" 
in order to establish standing under § 41-3-401(b). We are also aware that the 
legislature has amended the statutes so that any user on the system may now 
bring abandonment. However, this appeal is decided upon § 41-3-401(a) and (b) before amendment, and under these 
statutes and their predecessors, as well as the relevant decisions of this 
court, benefit from abandonment, 
without attendant injury from nonuse or misuse, is factually insufficient to 
establish standing to bring abandonment. Cremer v. State Board of Control, 
supra; Platte County Grazing Association v. State Board of Control, 
supra.

[¶25.]  In denying standing in Mitchell Irr. Dist. v. Whiting, 59 Wyo. 
52, 136 P.2d 502 (1943), where a senior downstream appropriator sought to 
abandon the water right of the junior upstream water user and the senior was 
shown to be receiving all the water to which he was entitled, we quoted from 2 
Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, 2d ed., 1377, § 789:

"* * * `So long as the 
prior appropriator obtains all the water of satisfactory quality to the full extent of his appropriation, 
he has no right to interfere with or complain of the enjoyment of the rights of 
subsequent appropriators on the stream.' * * * See, also, Clough v. Wing, 2 Ariz. 371, 17 P. 453; 
Albion-Idaho Land Company v. Naf 
Irrigation Company et al., 10 Cir., 97 F.2d 439, 444." (Emphasis added.) 136 P.2d  at 508.

[¶26.]  In Campbell v. Wyoming Development Co., 55 
Wyo. 347, 100 P.2d 124, 140, reh. denied 55 Wyo. 347, 102 P.2d 745 (1940), we 
said:

"Before a party may 
attack the right of another, either on constitutional or other grounds, he must first show that he himself has a 
right which has been invaded thereby. He must have an interest which is 
affected." (Emphasis added.)

[¶27.]  In Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln 
Land Co., 92 P.2d  at 580, where the facts disclosed that the junior 
downstream contestant would not have received the water in issue because of the 
distance between the properties of the nonuser and those of the contestant, we 
said:

"Finally, returning again 
to the opening words in the sentence last above quoted from the procedural 
statute, Section 122-422, supra, `when, pursuant to the provisions of § 122-421, 
any water user who might be affected by a declaration of abandonment,' etc., it 
is manifest that the italicized word, `affected,' is both significant and 
controlling. It indicates to our mind that it was not the legislative purpose to 
open the door to any person whomsoever to undertake proceedings to procure a 
declaration of abandonment. Those who are authorized to use the procedure set 
forth in Sections 122-422 to 122-427, W.R.S. 1931, inclusive, are only those 
whose rights would be `affected.'

"* * * Our statute 
evidently means, therefore, that if a party's water rights would be abridged in 
some way, i.e., changed to his disadvantage, he may invoke the statutory 
procedure." (Emphasis added.) 92 P.2d  at 580.

[¶28.]  In Hagie v. Lincoln Land Co., 18 F. Supp. 637, 639 (D.C.Wyo. 1937), where Wyoming's abandonment statute was under 
consideration and the facts revealed that the junior contestant's rights were 
ten miles downstream from those of contestee - there being no proof that any 
such abandoned water would enlarge the rights or even reach the lands of the 
contestant - the federal district court said:

"* * * It is claimed by 
the defendant that the plaintiff is not legally qualified to challenge the water 
rights of the defendant because of the fact that he does not come within the 
provisions of the statute as one eligible to present a contest. Section 122-422, 
W.R.S. 1931, provides in part: `When, pursuant to the provisions of § 122-421, 
any water user who might be affected by a declaration of abandonment of existing 
water rights, desires to bring about a legal declaration of such abandonment, he 
shall present his case in writing to the board of control.'

"In respect of this 
statute it is urged that the plaintiff is in no wise affected through the use of 
water by the defendant in the manner which has been above outlined. If it be 
held that the plaintiff is affected through the use of water by defendant on Fox 
creek, ten miles below plaintiff's land under the facts in this case, it would 
mean that pure theory must place plaintiff in a position to become a contestant 
of defendant's rights. The evidence in this case from the practical standpoint 
shows rather conclusively that the 
plaintiff's rights could in no way be affected injuriously or otherwise by 
the exercise of the defendant in its claimed right of appropriation."8 (Emphasis added.) 18 F. Supp.  at 
639.

[¶29.]  In Cremer v. State Board of Control, 675 P.2d  at 256, we concluded with these thoughts: 

"We therefore reiterate 
the historic rule (which is nothing more than the law of standing applied to 
water users in an abandonment proceeding) that an appropriator's rights are not `affected' 
for the purpose of bringing abandonment unless those rights are changed to his 
disadvantage. [Emphasis added.] In other words, he has to be able to show injury. [Emphasis in original.] A water 
user may not bootstrap standing for the purpose of bringing abandonment of his 
neighbor's water rights when the only effect of the abandonment would be to 
enlarge the contestant's appropriation as distinguished from protecting his 
right to use his previously appropriated water."

[¶30.]  In Platte County Grazing Association v. State 
Board of Control, 675 P.2d  at 1283, we reaffirmed these historic 
water-rights concepts when we said:

"When contemplating the 
meaning of § 41-3-401(b), supra, we held in the Cremer case that `affected' means 
adversely affected - injured - it connotes a use which results in an abridgment 
of the contestant's water rights as compared to an enhancement of those rights. 
We said that in order that a user be 
`affected' so as to have standing to bring abandonment, the complaining user must be able to show 
that the contestee is utilizing his water to the disadvantage of the water 
rights of the contestant.

"In reaching these 
conclusions we were merely summarizing and reiterating old and familiar rules of 
this court as well as rules of other courts which have been considered with 
approval. See Hagie v. Lincoln Land 
Co., [supra]; Mitchell v. 
Whiting, supra; Campbell v. Wyoming 
Development Co., [supra]; Horse Creek 
Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co., [supra]." (Emphasis added; emphasis 
in original omitted.)

[¶31.]  Therefore, when § 41-3-401(b) speaks 
about a "water user" who might be "affected" by the nonuse contemplated by § 
41-3-401(a), it has reference to the abridgment of the water rights of a "water 
user." Transposed to the case at hand, this means that when a junior downstream 
appropriator such as Wheatland charges an upstream senior appropriator with 
nonuse, in order to satisfy standing requirements, the contestant must be able 
to show that its water right is "abridged."

Wheatland's Water Right 
(For Standing Purposes)

[¶32.]  What does Wheatland's water right consist 
of? The facts reveal that Wheatland's is a reservoir right authorizing certain 
storage capacity which is downstream from the Laramie Rivers reservoir right and 
junior thereto. As long as senior users on the stream, including Laramie Rivers, 
are applying their available entitlements to the beneficial use called for by 
their appropriation, this describes the totality of that right - even if it 
means, in Wheatland's case, that its reservoir's storage appropriations remain 
unfulfilled. Clearly, however, the statutes envision other options which are 
available to an unfulfilled junior water-rights appropriator where the upstream 
user fails to divert its authorized water according to appropriation authority. 
Particularly are these options available where a contestee's failure to divert 
results in the downstream contestant's fuller utilization of its water rights, 
and the threat of resuscitation by reapplication to beneficial use serves to 
jeopardize contestant's right to utilize such abandoned water for purposes of 
fulfilling its appropriation. Indeed, in order to establish standing, the 
contestant need not have suffered the ultimate abridgment which would flow from 
his doing nothing until the contestee reapplies abandoned water to beneficial 
use. Where the threat of inevitable and irretrievable injury to his water right 
exists, and his awaiting the falling of the axe would itself serve as the engine 
for foreclosing any effective effort to protect his appropriation, a junior 
appropriator need not await the fatal blow. He may act upon the threat of injury which is fashioned 
by the probability that the contestee will return the water to beneficial use. 
See Kearney Lake Land & Reservoir 
Company v. Lake De Smet Reservoir Company, Wyo., 475 P.2d 548 (1970).

[¶33.]  As we have noted, the relevant statutes 
provide that where the appropriator fails to use the water "for the beneficial 
purposes for which it was appropriated" (for five years), "he is considered as 
having abandoned the water right" (§ 41-3-401(a)) and anyone who would be 
"affected" by a declaration of abandonment, may, under § 41-3-401(b), present 
his case to the State Board of Control in pursuit of the declaration. Therefore, 
once senior water rights fall into the status of statutory abandonment for 
nonuse under § 41-3-401(a), but prior to a declaration of abandonment by the State 
Board of Control, the "injury" to a downstream junior appropriator with which § 
41-3-401(b) is concerned when it provides that only "affected" water users may 
"present [the] case in writing," is the injury to the junior appropriator's 
water right that results from the ever-present possibility that the contestee 
may, at any time, resuscitate its abandoned water right through reapplication to 
beneficial use.

[¶34.]  In the case at bar, Laramie Rivers' 
reservoir right is eligible for declaration of abandonment by contestant 
Wheatland because the threat of injury to Wheatland's reservoir right is 
everpresent in view of the fact that the reapplication of the abandoned water to 
beneficial use by Laramie Rivers would have the effect of final and ultimate 
deprivation of appellee's right to the contested Laramie Rivers water. This is 
to say that if injury for standing purposes does not ripen until the day when 
the necessary proof of injury may be made (which would occur at the moment when 
Laramie 
reapplied the contested water to beneficial use), it is clear that the 
contestant must therefore rely upon an undeclared water-right abandonment to 
support his standing contention. In this context, we again refer to the rules of 
Wheatland Irrigation District v. Pioneer 
Canal Co., supra, and Sturgeon v. 
Brooks, supra, where we held that, even though a water right may be 
qualified for abandonment before beneficial use is resumed, abandonment will not 
be declared where beneficial use has been reinitiated prior to the filing of the 
petition.

[¶35.]  With the rules of Wheatland Irrigation District v. Pioneer 
Canal Co. and Sturgeon v. Brooks 
in mind, it can be seen that the reapplication of Laramie Rivers' water to 
beneficial use would have the effect of depriving Wheatland of the contested 
reservoir storage water. However, in order to establish the abridgment which is 
contemplated by § 41-3-401(b), the contestant need not wait until he can no 
longer assert his rights.

[¶36.]  This is the conclusion which must be 
reached upon any careful consideration of the nonuse standing provisions of § 
41-3-401(a) and (b). It would indeed be illogical for this court to refuse to 
recognize a junior appropriator "injury" under facts which show the senior 
appropriator's five-year failure to beneficially apply water to its designated 
use in circumstances which reveal that the junior possessed a water right that 
was being satisfied, or more nearly satisfied, through the senior's failure to 
divert. The consequence of such a holding would be to say that the only users 
who have standing to assert rights under the five-year nonuse statutes are those 
junior downstream appropriators who are receiving less water than that to which 
they are entitled by reason of excessive and invasive use on the part of 
upstream appropriators. This would deny standing to junior downstream 
appropriators whose water rights are jeopardized by an ever-existing threat to 
return the contested water to beneficial use. Not only would this constitute an 
illogical conclusion concerning the nonuse statutes, § 41-3-401(a) and (b), but 
it would have the effect of refusing to interpret these statutes in accord with 
their plain language and public-policy purpose. We identified the public-water 
use policy of the state when, in Wyoming 
Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., 33 Wyo. 14, 236 P. 764, 766 (1925), 
we said:

"A fundamental principle 
underlying the irrigation laws is that all the available water supply should be 
used as far as that is possible. Kinney on Irrigation (2d Ed.) § 
1118."

[¶37.]  The legislature has also identified the 
public-water policy of the state when it spoke of the "Nature of water rights 
and beneficial use" in § 41-3-101, W.S. 1977, where it is said in relevant 
part:

"A water right is a right 
to use the water of the state, when such use has been acquired by the beneficial 
application of water under the laws of the state relating thereto, and in 
conformity with the rules and regulations dependent thereon. Beneficial use 
shall be the basis, the measure and limit of the right to use water at all times 
* * *."

Conclusion

[¶38.]  Where nonuse of a senior upstream 
appropriator's water rights is urged as grounds for abandonment under § 
41-3-401(b) - the situation with which we are concerned in the case at bar - a 
prerequisite to standing contemplates that the contestee's undiverted water is 
serving contestant's unsatisfied water right. Given these circumstances, injury 
to contestant's water rights results from the ever-present danger and 
probability that the contestee will one day exercise its prerogative of 
resuscitating the abandoned water right by reapplication to beneficial use, 
thereby depriving the contestant's lawful utilization of the abandoned water. 
See Wheatland Irrigation District v. 
Pioneer Canal Co., supra, and Sturgeon v. Brooks, supra (discussed 
infra). It may be parenthetically observed that, in these circumstances, 
"benefit" and "injury" become different sides of the same coin.

[¶39.]  We hold that the threat of resuscitation 
of appellant's reservoir rights, under the facts of this case, constitutes such 
injury to the reservoir rights of the Wheatland Irrigation District as to 
furnish it with standing to petition in abandonment under and by authority of 
the provisions of § 41-3-401(a) and (b), W.S. 1977.

Issues 2, 3 and 
4

Actions Taken by the 
Board of Control on Remand

[¶40.]  At the conclusion of our prior opinion, 
Wheatland Irrigation District v. Laramie 
Rivers Co., 659 P.2d  at 568, we said:

"We hold that the 
Wheatland Irrigation District's petition was timely filed, and the Board of 
Control may not, as was done in this case, circumvent the clear language of § 
41-3-401(a), which provides that a forfeiture may only be avoided by application 
of water to beneficial use. Therefore there is left for resolution the question 
which asks whether the contestee has failed to use its water rights to the 
contested 41,100 acre feet in the way directed by the laws of this state 
applicable to such matters and, if such use has not been affected, whether there 
is a defense to such nonuse as is contemplated by law.

"Reversed and remanded 
with directions to the district court that it remand to the Board of Control, 
directing that the Board make findings of fact on the basis of the evidence it 
had before it, and to take further evidence if necessary for purposes of 
determining if there had been an abandonment under the provisions of the first 
sentence of § 41-3-401(a), W.S. 1977 and the last sentence of § 41-3-401(b), 
W.S. 1977."

The first 
sentence of § 41-3-401(a) provides that the nonuse of appropriated water for 
five successive years results in the abandonment of such 
appropriation:

"Where the holder of an 
appropriation of water from a surface, underground or reservoir water source 
fails, either intentionally or unintentionally, to use the water therefrom for 
the beneficial purposes for which it was appropriated, whether under an 
adjudicated or unadjudicated right, during any five (5) successive years, he is 
considered as having abandoned the water right and shall forfeit all water 
rights and privileges appurtenant thereto."

 

The last 
sentence of § 41-3-401(b) sets out a defense to an action for a declaration of 
abandonment:

"The total absence of 
water to divert during an irrigation season precludes the inclusion of any such 
period of nonuse resulting therefrom in the computation of the successive five 
(5) year period."

[¶41.]  The State Board of Control, on remand, 
reconsidered the evidence which it had received during the original hearing in 
this case. Based on this review of the evidence, the State Board of Control 
issued its final order containing the following findings of fact:

"4. THAT the adjudicated 
storage capacity of Lake Hattie Reservoir is 68,500 acre-feet (60,000 acre-feet 
under Permit No. 1372 Res. plus 8,500 acre-feet under Permit No. 1373 
Res.).

"5. On April 5, 1972, 
then Wyoming State Engineer, Floyd A. Bishop, imposed a storage limitation on 
Lake Hattie Reservoir because of concerns over the safety of the dam * * *. The 
amount of storage was limited to the amount of water which could be stored up to 
Elevation 7,263 feet above mean sea level, and was stated to be approximately 
27,400 acre-feet of active storage.

"6. THAT the petition in 
this case seeks a declaration of abandonment as against the difference between 
the full storage capacity of Lake Hattie Reservoir and the storage capacity as 
limited by the State Engineer on April 5, 1972, (Elevation 7263 feet) which was 
stated to be 41,100 acre-feet (68,500 - 27,400 = 41,100).

* * * * * *

"9. THAT the years placed 
in contest at the hearing were 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1979. The parties 
stipulated that water was unavailable for storage during 1976, 1977 and 
1978.

* * * * * *

"11. THAT the evidence 
shows that during the years in contest (1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1979), no 
water was stored in Lake Hattie Reservoir in excess of the State Engineer's 
limitation, i.e., the water level in the reservoir never came up to or rose 
above Elevation 7,263 feet.

"12. THAT the evidence 
shows that during each of the years in contest (1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 and 
1979), water was available in priority for diversion into the Lake Hattie Supply 
Canal from the Laramie River and into the Lake Hattie Supply Canal No. 2 from 
the Little Laramie River over and above the amounts actually diverted by the 
Laramie Rivers Company.

"13. THAT had the Laramie 
Rivers Company diverted the full amount of water available to it each year 
during the times the Lake Hattie Reservoir storage rights were in priority 
during 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1979, the reservoir storage capacity would 
have been more fully utilized and water would have been stored at an elevation 
greater than Elevation 7,263 feet.

"14. THAT a close 
examination of the record in this case, the permit documents for Permit Nos. 
1372 Res. and 1373 Res., and the filing maps and proofs of appropriation filed 
with these permits, indicates that an accurate total storage capacity for Lake 
Hattie Reservoir or the storage capacity at Elevation 7,263 feet cannot be 
determined. It appears from this examination that active storage capacity at 
this elevation may be considerably more than the 27,400 acre-feet referenced in 
the State Engineer's safety limitation order of April 5, 1972. This is also the 
amount referenced by the Wheatland Irrigation District in its petition for 
declaration of partial abandonment. * * *"

[¶42.]  Based on these factual findings, the 
State Board of Control reached and entered the following conclusions of 
law:

"4. THAT the fact of 
non-use of Lake Hattie Reservoir above Elevation 7,263 feet for five successive 
years when water was available for diversion and storage compels the State Board 
of Control to declare an abandonment of all storage rights above that level, but 
to leave unaffected the right to storage below said elevation.

"5. THAT the Board of 
Control is unable to determine the specific amount of storage capacity abandoned 
or remaining unabandoned in Lake Hattie Reservoir, or what portion is abandoned 
or retained under either Permit No. 1372 Res. or 1373 Res."

The order issued 
by the State Board of Control reads:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
THAT all right to store water in Lake Hattie Reservoir above the Elevation 7,263 
feet above mean sea level is hereby DECLARED ABANDONED * * *.

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
THAT the Laramie Rivers Company or its successors shall have a survey made to 
determine the actual capacity of Lake Hattie Reservoir below Elevation 7263 
feet. A map shall then be prepared to the satisfaction of the State Board of 
Control. * * This map shall be prepared and submitted to the Board prior to May 
1, 1986. Receipt of the map will enable the Board to amend the Lake Hattie 
permit or permits and to issue a supplemental order fixing the quantity of water 
abandoned and the quantity remaining, in acre-feet. If the map is not submitted 
by May 1, 1986, no further storage of water will be allowed under the 
appropriation until an acceptable map is submitted."

[¶43.]  Laramie Rivers contends on appeal that 
the State Board of Control has not complied with this court's mandate issued in 
Wheatland Irrigation District v. Laramie 
Rivers Co., supra. Specifically, Laramie Rivers asserts that the State Board 
of Control acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it failed to determine the 
actual amount of water available for diversion into Lake Hattie during the 
fiveyear period in question; that it violated state law when it ordered 
abandonment based upon elevation rather than the actual quantity of water put to 
beneficial use; and that it acted in excess of its authority when it ordered 
that all storage rights in Lake Hattie would be abandoned if the 
appellant-contestee failed to provide a map certifying the capacity of the 
reservoir by May 1, 1986 and until such time as an acceptable map is 
provided.

Availability of Water for 
Storage

[¶44.]  Appellant Laramie Rivers Company contends 
that the state engineer's limitation order of April 5, 1972, rendered the full 
use of its storage appropriation an impossibility, just as if no water had been 
available in the stream. According to appellant, its failure to store water 
above 7,263 feet in elevation was neither intentional nor unintentional as 
required by § 41-3-401(a), but was mandated by the state engineer. Therefore, 
appellant concludes, the limitation order was equivalent to the total absence of 
water for storage above 7,263 feet and afforded appellant a defense under § 
41-3-401(b) to the action for a declaration of abandonment.

[¶45.]  We cannot agree with the premise 
underlying appellant's position. The limitation order itself did not prevent 
appellant from making full use of its water storage rights; rather, the 
deteriorated condition of the dam prevented the storage of water. The letter 
from the state engineer directing appellant to limit its use of water provides 
in part:

"As you know, we have 
been observing the condition of the dam at Lake Hattie rather closely during the 
past season. Erosion of the dam and deterioration of the concrete facing on the 
dam indicate the need for some limitations in method of operation of the 
reservoir during the forthcoming season. In the interests of public safety, I 
feel it is necessary to impose a limitation that storage of water in the 
reservoir shall be limited to the present elevation of approximately 7263 feet. 
This represents approximately 27,400 acre feet of live storage.

"This limitation is to 
take effect immediately and will remain in effect until such time as a 
rehabilitation program has repaired the dam and outlet works to a safe and 
completely useable condition."

This order 
simply recognizes the fact that the condition of the dam precludes the safe 
storage of appellant's full appropriation for Lake Hattie.

[¶46.]  When an appropriator fails to use 
available water because its storage or diversion facilities have not been 
properly maintained, it risks losing its water rights in an action for a 
declaration of abandonment. In Wyoming 
Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., supra, we affirmed a decree of 
abandonment where the contestee had failed to use available water for the 
statutory period and

"* * * had permitted its 
ditches to become filled and grown up with grass and brush until they had become 
useless and almost obliterated." 236 P.  at 766.

An appropriator 
has a duty to maintain its reservoir or diversion facilities in a condition 
which allows it to use the water available under its appropriation. Failure to 
do so constitutes a failure to use water for the beneficial purposes for which 
it was appropriated and can result in the forfeiture of the water right under § 
41-3-401(a).

[¶47.]  The fact that the state engineer in the 
instant case issued an order recognizing the inadequacy of appellant's storage 
facilities cannot shift the responsibility for appellant's nonuse of the water 
to the state engineer. We hold, therefore, that the limitation order did not 
excuse appellant's failure to fully use the water available under its 
appropriation and did not constitute a defense under § 41-3-401(b) to the action 
for a declaration of abandonment.

[¶48.]  Appellant makes an additional argument 
concerning the availability of water for storage. According to appellant, the 
State Board of Control had an obligation to determine the exact volume of water 
available, but not used, for storage during the years in contest and to declare 
appellant's water rights abandoned only to that extent.

[¶49.]  Our statutes, however, do not envision a 
piecemeal abandonment of water rights based on the quantity of water actually 
available for diversion. Under § 41-3-401(a), the failure to use water when 
available can result in the forfeiture of "all water rights and privileges 
appurtenant" (emphasis added) to an appropriation. The only defense to such 
forfeiture proceedings, where nonuse of water is established for five successive 
years, is proof by the contestee of "[t]he total absence of water to divert during 
an irrigation season." (Emphasis added.) Section 41-3-401(b); Matter of North Laramie Land Company, 
Wyo., 605 P.2d 367 (1980); Yentzer v. 
Hemenway, Wyo., 440 P.2d 7 (1968). Thus, a proper decree of abandonment is 
not limited by the actual quantity of water available for diversion, as 
appellant suggests, but may dispose of an entire appropriation where the 
contestee made no use of the water and failed to show that no water was 
available.

[¶50.]  In the case at bar, appellee Wheatland 
Irrigation District sought a declaration of abandonment as to appellant's rights 
to store water in Lake Hattie above an elevation of 7,263 feet. Appellee stated 
the storage capacity above 7,263 feet to be 41,100 acre-feet. Appellant 
presented no evidence of the total absence of water for storage above that 
elevation during the five years in contest. In fact, appellant's engineer 
established that in each year water was available for storage above 7,263 feet, 
but that such water was allowed to pass by the diversion structures. 
Accordingly, Laramie Rivers' storage rights to that volume of appropriated water 
in excess of the reservoir capacity at 7,263 feet in elevation, but not more 
than the 41,100 acre-feet indicated in the petition, were subject to a 
declaration of abandonment.

Volume of Water 
Stored

[¶51.]  We agree with appellant that the 
appellee-contestant, Wheatland Irrigation District, bore the burden of 
establishing the actual volume of water in Lake Hattie represented by an 
elevation of 7,263 feet. Proof of such storage volume determines the extent to 
which appellant failed to use its appropriated water, which figure, in turn, 
identifies the portion of appellant's storage rights which are subject to a 
declaration of abandonment. Appellee, however, did not establish whether or to 
what extent Laramie Rivers failed to use the 41,100 acre-feet of water in 
contest, and the State Board of Control tied its abandonment order to 
elevation:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
THAT all right to store water in Lake Hattie Reservoir above the Elevation 7,263 
feet above mean sea level is hereby DECLARED ABANDONED * * *."

Because this 
order purports to abandon appellant's water rights to an undertermined extent, 
the State Board of Control had no authority to issue it.

[¶52.]  Appellant has a vested property interest 
in its adjudicated rights to store 68,500 acre-feet of water in Lake Hattie 
Reservoir each irrigation season. See Quinn v. John Whitaker Ranch Co., 54 
Wyo. 367, 92 P.2d 568 (1939); Enterprise 
Irr. Dist. v. Willis, 135 Neb. 827, 284 N.W. 326 (1939). As long as 
appellant used this water for the beneficial purposes for which it was 
appropriated, the underlying storage rights were not subject to abandonment. 
Section 41-3-401(a). Therefore, to declare a partial abandonment of these 
rights, the State Board of Control first had to determine the actual volume of 
water which appellant had properly used. Appellant stood to lose in these 
proceedings only its rights to that volume of appropriated water in excess of 
the amount used.

[¶53.]  The State Board of Control admitted its 
inability to determine the specific volume of water actually and properly used 
by appellant during the years in contest. However, the State Board of Control 
attempted to resolve this problem by declaring abandoned all right to store 
water above 7,263 feet in elevation and by ordering appellant to prepare a 
contour map from which a more definite order might issue.

[¶54.]  The abandonment order, as it now stands, 
is meaningless. It does not, and cannot, reveal how much of the water right 
appellant lost and how much it retained. To know these figures, the State Board 
of Control needed a contour map of the floor of the reservoir which would have 
permitted the calculation of the volume of water stored by appellant during the 
years in contention. The difference between the volume actually stored in the 
reservoir at 7,263 feet and the amount of appellant's total appropriation 
constituted the portion of appellant's storage rights which were subject to 
abandonment. Instead of making these precise determinations necessary to a valid 
abandonment order, the State Board of Control issued an order which leaves 
Laramie Rivers with unknown water rights, with rights subject to change as the 
reservoir floor changes, and with a consequent impairment of its ability to 
engage in its business of apportioning water among its members. Such order 
abridges appellant's vested water rights without a proper factual basis and will 
not be allowed to stand.

[¶55.]  Furthermore, the State Board of Control 
cannot compensate for these deficiencies in proof by ordering the contestee 
Laramie Rivers to furnish the needed data. The burden of proving nonuse of 
appropriated water in abandonment proceedings rests on the contestant. Ramsay v. Gottsche, 51 Wyo. 516, 69 P.2d 535 (1937). The State Board of Control acted impermissibly when it shifted this 
duty to Laramie Rivers by ordering the preparation of the contour map needed to 
establish the capacity of the reservoir below 7,263 feet.

[¶56.]  In its brief, the State Board of Control 
contends that it needs a contour map of the floor of Lake Hattie Reservoir for 
administrative purposes, and that appellant should be required to furnish such 
map regardless of whether the abandonment portion of the order is upheld. We can 
understand the State Board of Control's need for the information a contour map 
of the reservoir would afford. However, we find that the sanction of complete 
withdrawal of appellant's water rights for failure to prepare the map 
constitutes an abuse of the State Board of Control's discretion, where appellant 
holds adjudicated rights obtained in apparent compliance with requirements 
existing at the time. 

[¶57.]  We reverse the State Board of Control's 
order of abandonment, and remand this case for purposes of furnishing appellee 
with an opportunity to establish the elements necessary for a meaningful order 
of partial abandonment.

1 In relevant part, § 
41-3-401(a), W.S. 1977, provides:

"Where the holder of an 
appropriation of water from a surface, underground or reservoir water source 
fails, either intentionally or unintentionally, to use the water therefrom for 
the beneficial purposes for which it was appropriated, whether under an 
adjudicated or unadjudicated right, during any five (5) successive years, he is 
considered as having abandoned the water right and shall forfeit all water 
rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. * * *"

2 Section 41-3-401(b), 
W.S. 1977, provided:

"When any water user who 
might be affected by a declaration of 
abandonment of existing water rights desires to bring about a legal declaration 
of abandonment, he shall present his case in writing to the state board of 
control. The board has exclusive original jurisdiction in water right 
abandonment proceedings. The board shall, if the facts so justify, refer the 
matter to the superintendent of the water division where the abandonment is 
claimed to have occurred. The total absence of water to divert during an 
irrigation season precludes the inclusion of any such period of nonuse resulting 
therefrom in the computation of the successive five (5) year period." (Emphasis 
added.)

3 A word which is 
frequently relied upon by the appellee in describing the remaining right or 
privilege of a contestee following such five-year nonuse abandonment as is 
contemplated by § 41-3-401(a). Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
gives as one of its definitions of "resuscitate": "to revive from apparent death 
or unconsciousness."

4 As the word "affected" 
is contemplated by § 41-3-401(b).

5 As "injured" is utilized 
in the Platte County Grazing Association opinion.

6 One of the appellee's 
witnesses testified as follows:

"A. We have used this 
water a number of years in the past, since '73, including '73, and it has been 
used on the Wheatland Irrigation Project in those years. It has, in a number of 
cases, sure added to the supply of water that we had to benefit the crops that 
we raised there. And probably if we lost that water, it would be a detriment to 
the crops we raise, we would have less supply.

* * * * * *

"Q. * * * Mr. Weber, what 
prompted you to initiate the abandonment proceeding against the Laramie Rivers 
Company? Was there any one thing in particular that prompted it? 

"A. One thing in 
particular that prompted it? The fact that it was a threat to our No. 3 
reservoir is what prompted it."

7 Under § 41-3-401(a), the 
holder of an appropriation "is considered as having abandoned the water right" 
if he fails to use the water "for the 
beneficial purposes for which it was appropriated" (emphasis added) for the 
five successive years contemplated by the statute. Therefore, under an 
appropriate fact situation, abandonment can come from misuse as well as 
nonuse.

8 It is to be noted in 
this quote from Hagie v. Lincoln Land 
Co. that the writer of the opinion refers to plaintiff being affected (by 
abandonment) and "the plaintiff's rights" being affected by the abandonment. We 
understand that all references, in this context, are to the water rights of the 
plaintiff.

ROONEY, Justice, specially 
concurring, with whom CARDINE, 
Justice, joins.

[¶58.]  Although I believe appellee has the 
standing required to institute abandonment proceedings, I do not agree with the 
reasoning by which the majority opinion finds such standing. The majority 
opinion does so because there is a "threat of resuscitation," thus causing 
injury to appellee's

"water rights - i.e., the 
right to have the abandoned water flow by the Lake Hattie diversion, to aid in 
the satisfaction of Wheatland's long-standing but unfulfilled reservoir rights - 
* * *."

[¶59.]  My disagreement with this reasoning is 
twofold:

[¶60.]  1. Appellee's water rights do not 
encompass appellee's right to use appellant's abandoned water until the 
abandonment is adjudicated. Section 41-3-401, W.S. 1977,1 states that, when conditions for an 
abandonment occur, the water right is "considered" to be abandoned, but it then 
speaks of the procedure for "legal declaration of abandonment" and of notice to 
holders of water rights "sought to be abandoned," and a hearing to determine the 
fact of abandonment. The very fact that abandonment proceedings can be 
forestalled after the five-year interval by reactivating (resuscitating) its use 
evidences the continued existence of the right until adjudication of 
abandonment. Wheatland Irrigation 
District v. Laramie Rivers Company, Wyo., 659 P.2d 561 (1983); Wheatland Irrigation District v. Pioneer 
Canal Co., Wyo., 464 P.2d 533 (1970); Sturgeon v. Brooks, 73 Wyo. 436, 281 P.2d 675 (1955); Horse Creek Conservation 
Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co., 54 Wyo. 320, 92 P.2d 572 (1939).

[¶61.]  2. The "threat" of reactivation 
(resuscitation) is present on the day after the five successive years of nonuse. 
To say that it triggers standing is redundant. The standing occurs without any 
"threat" as soon as the five years elapse if the other requirements for standing 
are present.

[¶62.]  I find standing on the part of appellee 
from the facts that (1) the five successive years of nonuse had elapsed when the 
abandonment proceedings were instituted, (2) appellee presented the matter to 
the Board of Control in a timely fashion, and (3) appellee was a water user who 
"might be affected" by a declaration of abandonment of appellant's water rights. 
Appellee is a junior appropriator to appellant, and appellee's rights have 
regularly not been fulfilled.

[¶63.]  The parties and the majority seem to have 
trouble with the existence of the requirement that appellee water user "might be 
affected" in view of some of our holdings. I do not. I do not believe that we 
have changed the historic position on this point. Before explaining my 
understanding of the law as set forth in previous holdings of this court, some 
concerns should be noted which form a background for our efforts to reach a just 
and fair conclusion in such cases.

[¶64.]  The decision in State of Nebraska v. State of Wyoming, 
325 U.S. 589, 65 S. Ct. 1332, 89 L. Ed. 1815 (1945), as it pertains to abandonment 
actions, must be kept in mind. The water involved in an abandonment must be 
shown to be useable under another adjudication. A new lawsuit with another state 
as a result of changes since 1945 may not be to the benefit of this 
state.

[¶65.]  The Board of Control has the duty to 
regulate and administer the use of the state's water. It can bring an 
abandonment action in its own right. Substantive rights of citizens should not 
be lost because of failure to properly administer to the several water rights. 
The courts cannot make legal the "stealing" of water beyond one's water rights 
or the misapplication of a water right.

[¶66.]  Finally, a specific concern with standing 
in abandonment proceedings can be illustrated: A's water right is prior to B's 
water right; B's is prior to C's; C's is prior to D's; and D's is prior to E's. 
Each has a right to ten cubic feet per second from the stream. There is normally 
only thirty-five cubic feet per second (including return flow, etc.) for supply 
in the stream. B does not use five cubic feet per second for five consecutive 
years. Our holdings have refused to find A sufficiently "affected" to bring 
abandonment against B. He gets his water first. Whether or not B takes his full 
allotment does not "affect" A's water right. Although C's water right is junior 
to B's, his appropriation is not normally affected since he has a call on ten 
cubic feet per second of water in a thirty-five cubic feet per second stream 
with only a twenty cubic feet per second call ahead of him. Our holdings would 
have him carry the burden of showing an effect on him of the abandonment. The 
burden would be much easier for D, and since E can definitely show an unfulfilled appropriation, his standing 
would be apparent.

[¶67.]  The parties and the majority concern 
themselves with the use of the words "injury" and "benefit" as they pertain to 
the word "affected" in § 41-3-401, W.S. 1977 (see fn. 1). Although "injury" and 
"benefit" are not synonymous, they mean the same thing as far as result is 
concerned in the context of their use and of the use of the word "affected" in 
the statute. When one would be benefited by the abandonment of a water right 
under the statute, he would be injured if the right is reactivated and not 
abandoned. Conversely, if one would be injured by failure to abandon a water 
right, whereby it is reactivated, he would be benefited by the abandonment. It 
makes no difference whether the result is described as "might be affected" or as 
"might be benefited" or as "might be injured."2

[¶68.]  The facts of recent cases have caused 
language therein to emphasize the injury aspect of the abandonment on the 
contestor, but the thrust of the holding in such cases has been directed more at 
the word "might" in the phrase "might be affected," and such holdings simply 
require that the injury or benefit be 
direct and not speculative or probable. Almost anyone making any use of 
water in the state of Wyoming "might" be "affected," "injured" or "benefited" in 
some way by an abandonment of a water right. Our holdings limit the availability 
of the abandonment procedure to those to be directly affected by the 
result.

[¶69.]  In Platte County Grazing Association v. State 
Board of Control, Wyo., 675 P.2d 1279 (1984), the petitioners in abandonment 
proceedings were junior in appropriation to the respondents. The petitioners 
failed to show a direct injury to their water rights if the petition was not 
granted, i.e., they failed to show a direct benefit if the petition was granted. 
The failure to make a similar showing by the junior appropriator existed in Budd v. Bishop, Wyo., 543 P.2d 368 
(1975), although the primary concern was the constitutionality of the surplus 
water legislation. Cremer v. State Board 
of Control, Wyo., 675 P.2d 250 (1984) also concerned the surplus water 
legislation and the effect it had on the appropriation date of the water right 
to which the surplus water right was appurtenant. We held that A, with an 
appropriation senior to B, could not use his statutory surplus water right of 
March 1, 1945, to establish a junior position as to B for the purpose of an 
abandonment proceeding. Again, we found any injury or benefit to the senior 
appropriator to be other than direct. And we recognized the surplus water 
legislation to concern surplus water3, and its relationship to the result 
of the holding in State of Nebraska v. 
State of Wyoming, supra. We concluded at pages 257-258 of Cremer v. State Board of Control, 
supra:

"We hold, then, that the 
surplus water law does not authorize its utilization for the purpose of 
bestowing junior appropriator standing upon a base right senior appropriator 
such as Schmid, Inc. in order that such senior appropriator may establish that 
he is `affected' within the purview of the abandonment statute. This holding 
contemplates these propositions: First, the base and surplus water rights of 
Schmid, Inc. are not being abridged by the appellants' utilization of the water 
contemplated by their corresponding appropriations. Secondly, it would be 
necessary to abandon the appellants' base rights in order to effect abandonment 
of their surplus water rights, and the surplus water law (§ 41-4-324, supra) 
prohibits its utilization for the purpose of taking or diverting other than 
surplus water."

[¶70.]  In short, I find nothing in our previous 
opinions inconsistent with the basis set forth above and upon which I concur 
with the result reached by the majority opinion. Appellee was a junior 
appropriator to the water user against which the abandonment proceedings were 
instituted. Appellee's appropriation has not been fulfilled. Thus, he can show a 
direct injury should his abandonment petition be denied, or, said another way, 
he can show a direct benefit if the petition is granted.

1 Section 41-3-401, W.S. 
1977, read in pertinent part, as of the time controlling this case, as 
follows:

"(a) Where the holder of 
an appropriation of water from a surface, underground or reservoir water source 
fails, either intentionally or unintentionally, to use the water therefrom for 
the beneficial purposes for which it was appropriated, whether under an 
adjudicated or unadjudicated right, during any five (5) successive years, he is 
considered as having abandoned the water right and shall forfeit all water 
rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. * * *

"(b) When any water user 
who might be affected by a declaration of abandonment of existing water rights, 
desires to bring about a legal declaration of abandonment, he shall present his 
case in writing to the state board of control. The board has exclusive original 
jurisdiction in water right abandonment proceedings. The board shall, if the 
facts so justify, refer the matter to the superintendent of the water division 
where the abandonment is claimed to have occurred. The total absence of water to 
divert during an irrigation season precludes the inclusion of any such period of 
nonuse resulting therefrom in the computation of the successive five (5) year 
period."

2 Section 41-3-401(b), 
W.S. 1977 (fn. 1) was amended, effective May 23, 1985, to change (among other 
things) the language from "when any water user who might be affected by a 
declaration of abandonment" to "when any water user who might be benefitted by a 
declaration of abandonment * * * or who might be injured by the reactivation of 
the water right," and the amendment also added the following to the 
subsection:

"(b) * * * The following 
persons have standing to petition the state board of control to declare the 
abandonment of existing water rights under this section:

"(i) Any person who has a 
valid adjudicated water right or is the holder of a valid permit from the same 
source of supply which is equal to or junior in date of priority to the right 
for which abandonment is sought; or

"(ii) The holder of a 
valid water right entitled to surplus water under W.S. 41-4-318 through 
41-4-324, petitioning to abandon a water right from the same source of supply if 
the right sought to be abandoned has a priority date of March 1, 1945, or 
earlier."

That said in 
this dissent is not advisory with reference to the consistency and 
constitutionality of § 41-3-401(b)(i) and (ii), W.S. 1977 (Cum. Supp. 
1985).

3 The establishment of a 
surplus water right by the legislature in 1945 concerned water in a drainage 
system which is

"* * * at any time in 
excess of the total amount required to furnish to all existing appropriations 
from said stream system the maximum amount of water for which all said 
appropriations have been granted, whether by permit or by adjudicated decree as 
of March 1, 1945." § 41-4-318, W.S. 1977.

It granted a 
surplus water right to the extent of one cubic foot per second for each seventy 
acres to lands having pre-March 1, 1945 water rights.