Case Title: Moore v. Moore

Citation: 

Docket Number: 619, 2009

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WILLIAM MOORE,1   
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
EMMA MOORE,  
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 619, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  File No. CN08-01523 
§  Petition No. 09-21759 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 11, 2010 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: August 3, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This third day of August 2010, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The petitioner-appellant, William Moore (“Father”), filed an 
appeal from the Family Court’s September 24, 2009 order denying his 
request for review of the August 5, 2009 order of the Family Court 
commissioner,2 which lifted the suspended enforcement of a support order 
that was issued by the State of New York and that was registered and 
                                                 
1 The Court sua sponte assigned pseudonyms to the parties by Order dated October 27, 
2009.  Supr. Ct. R. 7(d). 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §915(d)(1). 
 
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confirmed for enforcement and modification in Delaware on March 3, 2008.  
We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm.    
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects the following.  Father and 
respondent-appellee, Emma Moore (“Mother”), have one daughter, Sara, 
born August 26, 1989.  The support order at issue in this case originally was 
issued in the State of New York.  After Father moved to Louisiana, the 
support order was registered in that State and later modified to provide for a 
different level of support.  After Father moved to Delaware, Mother filed an 
action in the Family Court to register and confirm the Louisiana support 
order for enforcement and modification in Delaware under the Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”).3   
 
(3) 
On March 3, 2008, a Family Court commissioner registered and 
confirmed the Louisiana order for $551 per month current support and $55 
per month in arrears, which at that time totaled $2,795.40.4  Upon 
determining that Father had filed a timely motion to reopen, however, the 
matter was reopened by the Family Court commissioner and the arrears 
portion of the order was vacated, on Father’s representation that the arrears 
had been satisfied.  Father did not raise any objection to the amount of 
                                                 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, Subchapter VI. 
4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §513(b)(2)b. 
 
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current support and that portion of the order addressing current support 
remained in place.   
 
(4) 
On July 8, 2008, the Family Court temporarily suspended 
Father’s current support obligation pending a hearing before a Family Court 
master on whether Sara was emancipated under New York law.  The hearing 
took place on July 23, 2008.  Father argued, unsuccessfully, that his support 
obligation was terminated because Louisiana had determined that Sara 
became emancipated on August 26, 2007, at age 18, and had closed its case.  
The Family Court advised Father that the case was still active in Delaware 
and that the sole remaining legal issue was whether Sara was emancipated 
under New York law.  In addition, while Father claimed to have made direct 
support payments to Mother since July 31, 2007, he provided no proof of 
any such payments.  A second hearing was scheduled before the Family 
Court master so that Father could provide that proof and so that the parties 
could present legal argument on the emancipation issue.   
 
(5) 
The second hearing before the Family Court master took place 
on August 12, 2008.   On August 15, 2008, after considering the testimony 
and submissions of the parties, the Family Court master issued an order 
ruling that Sara was a full-time college student under the age of 21, the age 
of emancipation under New York law, and, therefore, was not financially 
 
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independent.  Moreover, after giving Father credit for some support 
payments made directly to Mother, the master set the total amount of arrears 
at $2,287.00 as of August 31, 2008.  Under the support order, Father 
remained obligated to pay a total of $660 per month in support, representing 
$551 in current support and $55 in arrears.   
 
(6) 
Mother subsequently filed an arrears contempt petition and a 
hearing before a Family Court commissioner was scheduled.  At the 
December 1, 2008 contempt hearing, Father produced an order of the State 
of Louisiana that raised a question in the mind of the commissioner as to 
whether Father’s support obligation had been terminated.  As a result, the 
commissioner, by order dated December 16, 2008, temporarily suspended 
enforcement of Father’s support obligation.  In addition, a motion filed by 
Father to vacate the master’s August 15, 2008 order was dismissed by a 
Family Court commissioner as moot, in light of the commissioner’s 
December 16, 2008 order.   
 
(7) 
On June 30, 2009, Mother again sought to register the 
Louisiana support order.  Father objected.  However, as noted by the Family 
Court commissioner in his August 5, 2009 decision, the Louisiana order 
already had been registered and confirmed in Delaware on March 3, 2008.  
As a result, by order dated August 5, 2009, the commissioner dismissed as 
 
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moot Mother’s June 30, 2009 registration of the Louisiana support order as 
well as Father’s objection.  The commissioner further determined that his 
previous suspension of enforcement of Father’s support obligation was in 
error because the law of the State of New York, and not the law of the State 
of Louisiana, governed the issue of the age of emancipation.   
 
(8) 
Father requested a review of the commissioner’s August 5, 
2009 order.  He once again argued that the State of Delaware lacked 
jurisdiction over the matter of child support because Louisiana previously 
had ruled that Sara had reached the age of emancipation and had closed its 
case.  In its September 24, 2009 order following a de novo review of the 
commissioner’s order, the Family Court denied Father’s request for review. 
 
(9) 
In this appeal, Father claims that the Family Court’s September 
24, 2009 order should be reversed because the commissioner’s order a) was 
obtained by fraud perpetrated by Mother; b) was invalid because Mother 
never appealed the commissioner’s December 16, 2008 order; c) constituted 
an abuse of discretion because the commissioner’s December 17, 2008 order 
directed him to raise the emancipation issue with the State of Louisiana; d) 
erroneously failed to acknowledge the closed Louisiana case; and e) violated 
the United States Constitution by failing to give full faith and credit to the 
Louisiana order.   
 
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(10) The standard and scope of review applicable to an appeal from 
a decision of the Family Court extends to a review of the facts and the law as 
well as to a review of the inferences and deductions made by the trial judge.5  
Where the Family Court’s decision involves a ruling of law, this Court’s 
standard of review is de novo.6  If the Family Court has correctly applied the 
law, the standard of review is abuse of discretion.7  This Court will not 
disturb the Family Court’s factual findings if they are supported by the 
record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process.8   
 
(11) The UIFSA permits the registration, enforcement and 
modification in Delaware of a support order issued by a sister state.9  Unless 
the party objecting to the registration and confirmation of such an order 
proves one of the limited defenses against registration provided under the 
statute,10 Delaware must recognize and enforce the order as a valid order of 
the issuing state,11 in accordance with the full faith and credit requirement of 
the federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act 
                                                 
5 Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 186 (Del. 1991) (citing Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 
(Del. 1983)). 
6 Waters v. Division of Family Services, 903 A.2d 720, 724 (Del. 2006). 
7 Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d at 186. 
8 Id. at 187 (citing Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d at 1279). 
9 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §§6-601-608; §§6-609-615. 
10 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §6-607. 
11 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §6-603. 
 
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(“FFCCSOA”).12  Confirmation of such an order precludes further contest of 
the order with respect to any challenge that could have been raised at the 
time of registration.13   
 
(12) The issue of the age of emancipation with respect to registration 
of a foreign child support order is governed by both the UIFSA and the 
FFCCSOA.  In accordance with both, the duration of current child support 
payments is controlled by the law of the issuing state.14  In this case, the law 
of the State of New York, the issuing state, determines the applicable age of 
emancipation.  The Family Court determined, and the parties have never 
disputed, that the age of emancipation is 21 years of age under New York 
law.15        
 
(13) Father’s first claim is that the registration of the Louisiana 
support order in Delaware was obtained by fraud.  Because the defense of 
fraud was not raised below, this Court will not consider it in this appeal.16  
Father’s second claim is that the commissioner’s order was invalid because 
his December 16, 2008 order was never appealed by Mother.  However, the 
commissioner’s December 16, 2008 order did not vacate his prior order, as 
                                                 
12 28 U.S.C.A., §1738B. 
13 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §6-608. 
14 28 U.S.C.A. §1738B(h)(2); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §6-604(a)(1) and §6-611(c). 
15 McKinney’s Family Court Act, §413. 
16 Supr. Ct. R. 8.  Moreover, Father’s fraud claim appears to relate only to Mother’s 
second registration, which was dismissed as moot. 
 
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argued by Father, but merely suspended it, which the commissioner had the 
inherent authority to do.17  As such, there was no final order from which 
Mother could have taken an appeal.  Father’s third claim is that the Family 
Court’s order constitutes an abuse of discretion because the commissioner’s 
December 17, 2008 order directed him to raise the emancipation issue with 
the State of Louisiana.  The record reflects that the commissioner’s 
December 17, 2008 order ruled that Father’s motion to vacate the master’s 
August 15, 2008 support order was moot.  Any mention of the emancipation 
issue was advisory in nature and was rendered irrelevant by subsequent 
rulings of the court.  Father’s fourth claim is that the Family Court’s refusal 
to acknowledge Louisiana’s closure of the case violates Section 6-607 of the 
UIFSA.  Since Father never timely raised any of the defenses listed in that 
section of the statute, he is foreclosed from doing so now.  Finally, Father’s 
fifth claim is that the Family Court’s failure to acknowledge Louisiana’s 
closure of the case violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United 
States Constitution.  Father’s argument misapprehends both the nature of the 
Louisiana support order and the statutory requirements for registration of 
that order in Delaware under the UIFSA.  As such, the argument has no 
                                                 
17 Dept. of Nat. Resources v. Front Street Properties, Del. Supr., No. 398, 2001, Steele, J. 
(Oct. 29, 2002).  
 
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merit.  Having thoroughly considered all of Father’s arguments, we conclude 
that they are entirely without merit.18    
 
(14) Having reviewed de novo the legal analysis of the Family Court 
and having determined that the Family Court properly interpreted and 
applied the applicable law and, moreover, having reviewed the factual 
findings of the Family Court and having determined that those findings are 
fully supported by the record and that there was no abuse of discretion, we 
conclude that the decision of the Family Court must be affirmed. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Family Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
  
                                                 
18 To the extent Father claims that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to register the 
foreign support order because it did not have “continuing exclusive jurisdiction” over the 
matter, that claim also is without merit.  The Family Court had subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction over Father and, therefore, had jurisdiction to register the order.  
Linn v. DCSE, 736 A.2d 954, 959 (Del. 1999).