Case Title: JOHN RUSSELL REYNOLDS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0263

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-09-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOHN RUSSELL REYNOLDS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 120284 P.3d 823Case Number: S-11-0263Decided: 09/11/2012
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2012 

 
JOHN 
RUSSELL REYNOLDS,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal from the 
District Court of Campbell County
The Honorable Dan R. 
Price II, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate 
Counsel.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
KITE, Chief 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      
John Russell Reynolds was convicted of felony driving while under the 
influence.  He asserts he is entitled to a new trial because a 
computer malfunction resulted in part of the transcript of his jury trial being 
unavailable for appeal.  We conclude that the record was 
properly settled pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03 and 3.04, and Mr. 
Reynolds has failed to demonstrate the settled record is insufficient or the 
settlement process could not have been used to collect the information he claims 
is still missing.
 
[¶2]      
We affirm.  
 
ISSUE
 
[¶3]      
Mr. Reynolds presents the following issue on appeal:
 
            
Is the record too incomplete to provide appellant a meaningful 
appeal?
 
The State provides a 
more detailed statement of the issue:
 
After Reynolds filed 
his notice of appeal, the court reporter discovered that a computer malfunction 
had destroyed her electronic notes covering jury selection, opening statements, 
and the first trial witness.  The court and parties settled 
the record by reconstructing the missing portions as prescribed by Wyo. R. App. 
P. 3.03 and 3.04.  In his brief, Reynolds identifies four 
substantive issues that he contends are outside the purview of meaningful 
appellate review because of the state of the record.  Would 
the settled record allow a meaningful review of Reynolds’ conviction on each of 
these issues if he had chosen to present their merits to this Court with cogent 
argument and supporting authority?
 
FACTS
 
[¶4]      
At 4:24 p.m. on October 24, 2010, the Campbell County Sheriff’s 
Department received a REDDI (Report Every Drunk Driver Immediately) 
report from Arrow Langston.  She reported a green Ford Ranger 
pickup was traveling at varying speeds and weaving across the road on Highway 59 
near Wright, Wyoming.  Ms. Langston did not feel comfortable 
getting close enough to the vehicle to read the license plate, but she continued 
to follow it and reported to the 911 operator that the vehicle had parked at 
Hank’s Bar and Lounge.  
 
[¶5]      
Deputy Mark Raymond was dispatched to Hank’s Bar and Lounge but could not 
locate the vehicle.  A few minutes later an anonymous caller 
made a second REDDI report.  Responding to that 
call, the deputy located a green Ford Ranger pickup parked off the road at 
milepost 79 on Highway 59 and Mr. Reynolds sitting in the driver’s seat 
 talking on his cell phone.  The truck was 
running, but when the deputy approached, Mr. Reynolds turned it off, removed the 
key and threw it onto the passenger side floor board. 
 
[¶6]      
The deputy smelled alcohol on Mr. Reynolds’ breath and there was a twelve 
pack container of beer on the passenger seat and a spilled beer on the 
floor.  Mr. Reynolds told the deputy that he had consumed only 
one beer, but he refused to perform field sobriety maneuvers or take a portable 
breath test.  Deputy Raymond arrested him for driving while 
under the influence of alcohol.  
 
[¶7]      
At the jail, Mr. Reynolds refused to take a breath test in accordance 
with the Wyoming implied consent law1 but later he requested and was 
given a portable breath test, which showed the presence of alcohol in his 
system.  Mr. Reynolds was charged with driving while under the 
influence and, because it was his fourth offense in ten years, the charge was a 
felony under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b)(iii)(A) and (e) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 He pleaded not guilty and the matter was tried to a 
jury.  The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the district 
court sentenced Mr. Reynolds to twenty to twenty-four months 
incarceration.    
 
[¶8]      
Mr. Reynolds filed a notice of appeal and requested the trial transcript 
be prepared for appeal.  The court reporter stated that she 
had experienced computer problems and the record of the morning session of the 
trial was lost and could not be transcribed.  The missing 
session included voir dire, opening statements and the testimony of 
the first witness, Ms. Langston.    
 
[¶9]      
Mr. Reynolds’ trial counsel filed a “Supplemental to Transcript,” in 
which he stated that he could not reconstruct the voir dire and 
asked that the following information about Ms. Langston’s testimony be used to 
“complete” the transcript:
 
The First witness was 
Arrow Langston who observed a green pickup truck being [driven] erratically on 
Highway 59 until it pulled off and parked at Hanks Bar.  She 
did not get close enough to see the license plate and could not identify the 
driver.  She did call in a Reddi report. 

 
The State responded 
with objections and proposed amendments pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03 
and 3.04.  The State’s response was compiled from notes taken 
by the State’s paralegal during the trial, the recollection of the district 
judge’s law clerk who attended the entire trial and the prosecutor’s 
recollection and notes.  It included summaries of the parties’ 
opening statements and a detailed rendition of Ms. Langston’s direct, cross 
examination and redirect testimony.     

 
[¶10]   
Mr. Reynolds’ appellate counsel filed a motion to correct or modify the 
record on appeal pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.04 asking that the record be 
supplemented with the parties’ earlier submissions and an additional proposed 
supplement.  The motion stated that appellate counsel had 
attempted to “obtain recollection of the trial from State’s counsel, defense 
counsel, and Mr. Reynolds.”  The filings did not include any 
new substantive information regarding the trial proceedings or any objections to 
the State’s earlier submission, although the proposed supplement did 
state:  “Consultation with Mr. Reynolds reveals that Mr. 
Reynolds, after this lapse of time, cannot reconstruct the cross-examination of 
the first witness, but Mr. Reynolds recalls the cross-examination as being 
extremely important to his defense.”    
 
[¶11]   
After considering the various filings, the district court entered an 
Order Settling and Approving Statement of Evidence.  It 
confirmed the accuracy of the defense trial counsel’s submission and the State’s 
response and provided its own detailed recollection of the voir 
dire.  
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶12]   
Because the issue in this case requires our independent determination of 
the sufficiency of the record on appeal, our standard of review is de 
novo.  See generally, Eaton v. State, 2008 
WY 97, ¶¶ 101-102, 192 P.3d 36, 78 (Wyo. 
2008); Bearpaw v. State, 803 P.2d 70, 
78-79 (Wyo. 1990).  
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶13]   
The court reporter is charged with producing the official transcript of 
criminal proceedings, including the trial, and filing the transcript as part of 
the official court record.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
5-3-403 through 5-3-406 (LexisNexis 2011); Bromley v. State, 2009 WY 133, ¶ 17, 
219 P.3d 110, 115 (Wyo. 2009).  A criminal 
defendant is entitled to have his entire trial recorded and available for 
appeal.  In Bearpaw, 803 P.2d  
at 78-79, we examined an early Wyoming decision which discussed a criminal 
defendant’s right to a complete record for appeal, Richardson v. State, 
15 Wyo. 465, 484, 89 P. 1027, 1034-35 (1907):
 
In its 
early years, this court determined “[t]here is no more reason for permitting a 
party to be deprived of his legal rights through a failure or a refusal of the 
official stenographer to perform his duties than through the failure or refusal 
of the judge or any other officer of the court to perform a duty imposed by 
law.” [Richardson, 89 
P.] at 
1030. The 
court recognized an absolute right of appeal in a criminal case and the 
corollary right to be provided a complete record. Otherwise, the court noted, 
the defendant is effectively deprived of the right of appeal. Richardson 
held that a new trial is required when a necessary record is absent. 
 
We also 
discussed several cases from other jurisdictions with favor:
 
[T]he 
rule that a mandatory requirement for the court reporter to record all 
proceedings in a criminal case establishes a principle which cannot be 
overridden by any local practice, United States v. 
Brumley, 
560 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir.1977). That 
court, in quoting United States v. 
Selva, 
559 F.2d 1303, 1306 (5th Cir.1977), 
emphasized that “'[w]hen . . . a criminal defendant is represented on appeal by 
counsel other than the attorney at trial, the absence of a substantial and 
significant portion . . . of the record’ will result in a presumption of 
prejudice sufficient to mandate reversal * * *.” Brumley, 560 F.2d  at 
1281.
 
Bearpaw, 
803 P.2d  
at 79.  
 
[¶14]   
Wyoming court rules, however, provide an alternative means of producing a 
record on appeal when a transcript is not available.  See 
generally Barela v. State, 936 P.2d 66, 69 (Wyo. 1997).  Under W.R.A.P. 3.03 and 3.04, 
the district court may settle the record when a transcript is unavailable or 
does not accurately reflect the court 
proceedings.  W.R.A.P. 
3.03 states:
 
            
If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was 
made, or if a transcript is unavailable, appellant may prepare a statement of 
the evidence or proceedings from the best available means including appellant’s 
recollection. The statement shall be filed and served on appellee 
within 35 days of the filing of the notice of 
appeal.  Appellee may file and serve objections or 
propose amendments within 15 days after service. The trial court shall, within 
10 days, enter its order settling and approving the statement of evidence, which 
shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on 
appeal.
 
W.R.A.P. 3.04 
states:
 
 
            
If any difference arises as to whether the record discloses what occurred 
in the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by that 
court and the record made to conform to the truth. If anything material to 
either party is omitted from the record by error or accident or is misstated, 
the parties by stipulation, or the trial court either before or after the record 
is transmitted to the appellate court, or the appellate court on motion or its 
own initiative, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected, and 
if necessary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. All other 
questions as to the form and content of the record shall be presented to the 
appellate court by motion.
 
[¶15]   
Unlike in Bearpaw, the parties in the case at bar 
used the procedures available under Rules 3.03 and 3.04, and the district court 
settled the record.  Mr. Reynolds did not object to the 
settlement of the record or provide any additional information.  
The importance of the Rule 3.03 and 3.04 process is shown in other cases 
where we have rejected criminal defendants’ claims that the record was 
inadequate when no effort was made to settle it.  See, 
e.g., Eaton, ¶¶ 101-02, 192 P.3d  at 78; Petersen v. 
State, 594 P.2d 978, 979-80 (Wyo. 1979) (applying former 
rule).  
 
[¶16]   
Because Fed. R. App. P. 10(c)2 
is very similar to our Rule 3.03, we look to federal precedent for 
guidance as to the adequacy of the record on appeal.  See, 
e.g., DeLoge v. State, 2010 WY 60, ¶ 17, 
231 P.3d 862, 865 (Wyo. 2010); Bromley, ¶ 18, 
219 P.3d  at 115.  Federal decisions 
emphasize the importance of the record settlement process and have noted the 
difficulty of challenging a district court’s reconstruction of missing portions 
of transcripts.  16A Fed. Prac. & Proc. 
Juris. § 3956.3 (4th ed. 2012).  “In rare 
cases, however, a party may persuade the court of appeals that the effort to 
reconstruct the record does not afford a sufficient foundation for effective 
review and that the case must be retried.” 
 Id.  The Ninth Circuit conducted a 
comprehensive review of criminal and civil cases addressing the sufficiency of a 
reconstructed record and adopted the following analysis:
 
[A]n 
appellant seeking a new trial because of a missing or incomplete transcript must 
1) make a specific allegation of error; 2) show that the defect in the record 
materially affects the ability of the appeals court to review the alleged error; 
and 3) show that a Rule 10(c) [here, Rule 3.03] proceeding has failed or would 
fail to produce an adequate substitute for the evidence.
 
Bergerco, 
U.S.A. v. Shipping Corp. of India, Ltd., 896 F.2d 1210, 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).   
 
[¶17]   
The Bergerco test fulfills a number of 
purposes.  It helps us identify when a substantial and 
significant portion of the record is absent, thereby adversely impacting the 
appellant’s right of appeal.  Bearpaw, 
803 P.2d  at 79.  It also recognizes that a 
defect in the record will not result in reversal if the existing record is 
sufficient to review an alleged error.  See Lucero 
v. State, 14 P.3d 920, 922 (Wyo. 2000) (refusing to grant the 
appellant a new trial even though the record did not include a transcript of the 
jury instruction conference because we were able to review the allegation of 
error from the existing record).  Additionally, the test 
recognizes an appellant’s responsibility to attempt to reconstruct the record 
using the rules of appellate procedure.  See United 
States v. Williams, 2009 WL 4506411, p. 3-4 (D.Colo. 2009); United 
States v. Locust, 95 Fed. Appx. 507, 51213 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(recognizing appellants may not be entitled to a new trial if they do not 
attempt to reconstruct the record through the Fed. R. App. P. 10(c) 
process).  In sum, the Bergerco test 
properly balances a criminal defendant’s right to a record of his criminal 
proceedings with his obligation to participate in the process of creating an 
alternative record when the transcript is not available.
 
[¶18]   
Mr. Reynolds identifies a number of issues which he asserts the settled 
record is insufficient to resolve.  His first argument 
pertains to the district court’s ruling that the recording of Ms. 
Langston’s REDDI report could be played for the jury.  
The recording was played during the testimony of the 911 dispatcher who 
took Ms. Langston’s REDDI call.  Defense counsel 
objected to the recording because it was improper “vouching,” was not relevant 
and Ms. Langston had already testified.  The district court 
overruled the objection, stating that “it’s either [a] prior consistent 
statement or prior inconsistent statement depending upon how it compares with 
the testimony.”      
 
[¶19]   
On appeal, Mr. Reynolds does not identify the legal basis for his claim 
that the district court erroneously allowed the recording into evidence or 
provide any legal analysis to support his claim.  As such, he 
has failed to make a specific allegation of error as required by the first 
factor of the Bergerco test.  The 
second and third factors require Mr. Reynolds to demonstrate that the defect in 
the record materially affects our ability to review his claim and that the Rule 
3.03 process failed to produce an adequate substitute for the 
transcript.  Mr. Reynolds argues the statement of the evidence 
is insufficient to allow proper review of this issue because it does not 
describe Ms. Langston’s testimony in sufficient detail to determine whether the 
trial court’s ruling was correct.  
 
[¶20]   
As we described earlier, the defense provided a general statement 
of Ms. Langston’s testimony and the State supplemented it with a more detailed 
statement.  The State’s submission included nearly two full 
pages describing Ms. Langston’s direct, cross examination and redirect 
testimony.  The district court confirmed the parties’ 
submissions as accurate recollections of Ms. Langston’s testimony, and Mr. 
Reynolds did not object to the statement as being incomplete or submit 
additional information relating to the supposedly missing parts of Ms. 
Langston’s testimony.  He also does not specify on appeal what 
specific information would be necessary for him to properly present the 
issue.  Under these circumstances, Mr. Reynolds cannot be 
heard to complain that the record is incomplete, if, indeed, it could be 
considered so.  
 
[¶21]   
In his second issue, Mr. Reynolds claims the record is insufficient to 
evaluate the effectiveness of his trial counsel.  He provides 
two “examples” of possible ineffectiveness.  First, he asserts 
his trial counsel may have improperly opened the door to admission of the 
second REDDI report when he mentioned it in his opening statement 
and he needs the transcript of the opening statement in order to effectively 
evaluate whether his counsel was effective.  He also claims 
that his counsel may have been ineffective by stipulating that he was driving 
the vehicle when Deputy Raymond encountered him.  
 
[¶22]   
Both of Mr. Reynolds’ claims fail to satisfy the 
third Bergerco element because he does not establish 
that the Rule 3.03 proceeding, had it been properly used, would have failed to 
produce an adequate substitute for the transcript.  He made no 
effort to reconstruct the portions of the transcript which would have shown 
these alleged errors, i.e., the opening statement and the part of the record 
where the stipulation was presented to the jury, and he does not explain why 
such an effort would have been unsuccessful.    

 
[¶23]   
In addition, with regard to his first claim of ineffectiveness, Mr. 
Reynolds fails to fulfill the other Bergerco elements 
because the available transcript clearly shows that defense counsel objected to 
the admission of the contents of the second REDDI report and the 
district court partially upheld his objection.  The district 
court ruled that the State could present evidence of the 
second REDDI report to establish the reason the dispatcher sent the 
deputy to the location where he encountered Mr. Reynolds, but the report itself 
could not be played for the jury.  On appeal, Mr. Reynolds 
does not provide any legal analysis showing that the limited admission of the 
evidence of the second REDDI report was erroneous.  
He has not demonstrated that, even if his attorney referred to the report 
in his opening statement, he somehow opened the door to improper 
evidence.  Mr. Reynolds has, therefore, failed to make a 
specific allegation of error or show that the missing parts of the transcript 
materially affect our ability to review this issue.  

 
[¶24]   
Mr. Reynolds’ second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel suffers 
from similar problems.  He questions his trial counsel’s 
decision to stipulate that he was “driving” the vehicle when, in fact, he was 
parked when Deputy Raymond contacted him.  He claims the lack 
of a record of whether the stipulation was presented to the jury, and if so how 
it was done, hampers his ability to prove his attorney was ineffective for 
entering into the stipulation.  
 
[¶25]   
The extant parts of the record demonstrate that Mr. Reynolds stipulated 
that he would not “raise a defense to the element that he was driving a motor 
vehicle at the time of the stop by Deputy Mark Raymond on October 24, 
2010.”  Defense counsel entered into the stipulation to avoid 
the State’s introduction of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence that Mr. Reynolds 
had already been convicted in circuit court of two other crimes resulting from 
the same incident—driving while under suspension and driving with an open 
container.  By entering into the stipulation, the defense was 
able to keep evidence of the other convictions from the jury.  

 
[¶26]   
The available record clearly shows what was stipulated and 
why.  Mr. Reynolds has not demonstrated that the 
unavailability of the portion of the trial transcript where the stipulation was 
read to the jury (if it was) would materially impact our ability to review his 
claim that his counsel was ineffective for entering into the 
stipulation.  Despite having the information from the record, 
Mr. Reynolds does not provide any legal analysis of his ineffectiveness claim; 
consequently, we decline to address it.  See Fix v. 
South Wilderness Ranch Homeowners Ass’n, 2012 WY 96, ¶ 15, 
280 P.3d 527, 531-32 (Wyo. 2012) (stating we do not consider issues 
not supported by citation to pertinent authority or cogent argument). 

 
[¶27]   
Mr. Reynolds’ next allegation of error relates to questions posed by the 
jury and the district court’s response to them.  The jury 
asked the following questions during deliberation:
 
# 5 
While under the influence of alcohol à what 
indicates this?  Blood level # or any alcohol?
 
 Who 
was the second call from? Was it reporting erratic driving[?]
 
What 
about priors DUI???
 
The 
district court, with the consent of the attorneys, provided the following 
response:  “The court cannot answer these 
questions.  You must decide based upon the evidence presented 
in court.”  Mr. Reynolds suggests he needs the testimony of 
Ms. Langston and/or the opening statements to analyze whether the district 
court’s answer was appropriate.  
 
[¶28]   
Mr. Reynolds falls short on the first factor of 
the Bergerco analysis because he does not identify a 
specific error or provide any analysis of how the judge’s response was 
improper.  Mr. Reynolds also fails to explain how the missing 
parts of the transcript, specifically opening statements and Ms. Langston’s 
testimony, could possibly relate to the jury questions and, thus, does not 
establish that our review would be materially affected by the missing 
information.  Finally, as we mentioned before, the 
reconstruction of Ms. Langston’s testimony was quite detailed and Mr. Reynolds 
has failed to show that it was insufficient or that further efforts under Rules 
3.03 or 3.04 would not have resulted in the information he says is 
missing.
 
[¶29]   
Mr. Reynolds’ next claim relates to the jury question about his prior DUI 
convictions.  He maintains the jury’s question suggests the 
district court may have read the criminal information (with the reference to his 
prior DUI convictions) to the jury.  According to Mr. 
Reynolds, the possibility that the information was read to the jury raises two 
issues—whether the district court erred by doing so and whether defense counsel 
was ineffective for failing to object to any such reading.  
This issue could have been simply resolved by using Rules 3.03 or 3.04 to 
determine whether the information was read to the jury or not.  
The details provided by the district court regarding voir 
dire and by the State concerning other aspects of the missing record indicate 
there is a good possibility that someone would have recalled whether the 
information was read to the jury or not.  By failing to 
address this issue through the reconstruction process in the appellate rules, 
Mr. Reynolds failed the third element of the Bergerco 
test.  
 
[¶30]   
In his final substantive issue, Mr. Reynolds claims the prosecutor may 
have committed misconduct during her final argument by stating that Ms. 
Langston’s REDDI report related directly to “this defendant,” when 
Ms. Langston did not identify Mr. Reynolds.  He claims that, 
without more detail about Ms. Langston’s testimony, it is impossible to know 
whether it was a reasonable inference for the prosecutor to link Ms. Langston’s 
call to him.  We conclude that the settled part of the record 
very clearly demonstrates the inference was appropriate and any “missing” part 
of her testimony does not materially affect our review of this 
issue.  See Bergerco, 
896 F.2d  at 1217; Lucero, 14 P.3d  at 922 
(“This case is distinguishable from Bearpaw because 
the lack of the missing transcript does not frustrate our review of Lucero’s 
claim of error . . . .”).   
 
[¶31]   
The statement of the evidence included the following relevant information 
about Ms. Langston’s testimony: 
 
Ms. 
Langston testified that she was familiar with a REDDI 
report.  Ms. Langston stated she called in a REDDI 
report to the Campbell County Sheriff’s 911 Dispatch on October 24, 
2010.  Ms. Langston stated that she remembered the call very 
well.  Ms. Langston testified that the subject of 
the REDDI report was a single cab vehicle which she identified as a 
green Ford Ranger.  . . . Ms. Langston testified that she 
traveled east from her residence to Hwy 59.  When she reached 
Hwy 59, she was unable to pull onto the highway because there was an on-coming 
vehicle traveling north that she had to wait to pass.  Once 
the vehicle passed, Ms. Langston was able to safely pull her vehicle onto Hwy 59 
and travel [n]orth to Wright, Wyoming.  Ms. Langston 
stated that she quickly caught up to the vehicle that she had just had to wait 
for prior to pulling onto the highway.  Ms. Langston testified 
the vehicle, which she identified as a green single cab Ford Ranger, was 
traveling at varying speeds and was having great difficulty maintaining its lane 
of travel.  When asked, Ms. Langston stated the green Ford 
Ranger was drifting all the way into the southbound lane, bumping the fog line 
on the southbound lane of travel, then drifting back into the northbound lane 
and bumping the fog line. . . . Ms. Langston stated she had her daughter and her 
daughter’s friend with her in her vehicle and was afraid so decided to call 911 
to report the green Ford Ranger as a REDDI report.  
Ms. Langston stated she followed the green Ford Ranger the rest of the 
way to Wright, Wyoming where she observed it pull off into the parking lot of 
Hank’s Bar and Lounge.  Ms. Langston testified she remained on 
the phone with the 911 dispatcher while she was following the green Ford 
Ranger.  Ms. Langston stated since she had two children with 
her in her vehicle she was afraid to follow the green Ford Ranger into the 
parking lot, so she pulled into the gas station across the street and continued 
to watch the green Ford Ranger and updated the 911 dispatcher.  
Ms. Langston testified that there was only one occupant in the green Ford 
Ranger while she was following behind it on Hwy 59.  

 
            
At approximately 1152 hours on February 28, 2011, the Defendant’s 
attorney began his cross examination of Ms. Langston.  During 
cross, Ms. Langston testified she could see the cab of the green Ford Ranger 
when it was parked at Hank’s Bar and Lounge.  Ms. Langston 
stated she watched the green Ford Ranger the entire time she was on the phone 
with 911 until she was informed a Deputy was on his way.  Ms. 
Langston stated she was afraid to get too close to the green Ford Ranger to get 
a license plate number when it was driving on Hwy 59 due to the erratic 
driving.  Ms. Langston was questioned if she was sure the 
vehicle was a Ford Ranger.  She stated she was sure as she 
used to drive an identical Ford Ranger as the one she was following and 
observing.
 
            
At approximately 1154 hours on February 28, 2011, the State conducted 
re-direct of Ms. Langston.  Ms. Langston stated that while she 
was watching the green Ford pickup, nobody got in or out of the pickup and that 
the driver remained in the same position. 
 
[¶32]   
Deputy Raymond testified that he responded to Ms. 
Langston’s REDDI report by going to Hank’s Bar, but could not locate 
the vehicle.  In response to a second REDDI 
report, he went to milepost 79; it took him approximately three minutes to get 
there.  Deputy Raymond found “the little green Ford Ranger 
pickup” off the side of the road.  He called in the license 
plate number and learned the vehicle belonged to Mr. Reynolds.  
When he approached the vehicle, it was running and there was one person 
inside.  The driver was talking on his cell phone and, when he 
realized the deputy was standing by the vehicle, he ended his call, turned off 
the vehicle, removed the key from the ignition, and threw it on the passenger 
side floorboard.  The driver identified himself as John 
Reynolds.   
 
[¶33]   
A prosecutor’s closing argument must be based upon the evidence produced 
at trial.  However, the prosecutor is entitled to draw 
reasonable inferences from the trial evidence.  Adams v. 
State, 2005 WY 94, ¶ 18, 
117 P.3d 1210, 1217 (Wyo. 2005); Condra v. 
State, 2004 WY 131, ¶¶ 
21-22, 100 P.3d 386, 392 (Wyo. 2004).  Ms. 
Langston’s testimony, as reflected in the statement of the evidence approved by 
the district court, together with Deputy Raymond’s testimony, clearly establish 
the prosecutor’s statement that Ms. Langston’s REDDI report referred 
to “this defendant” was a reasonable inference from the evidence produced at 
trial.  The record was sufficient, and Mr. Reynolds has failed 
to demonstrate that a deficiency in the record materially affects our ability to 
address the issue.  Under these circumstances, Mr. Reynolds is 
not entitled to a new trial.
 
[¶34]   
Affirmed.  
 
 
FOOTNOTES
1Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 31-6-101, et. seq.
2Rule 10(c) states:
(c) 
Statement of the Evidence When the Proceedings Were Not Recorded or When a 
Transcript Is Unavailable. If the 
transcript of a hearing or trial is unavailable, the appellant may prepare a 
statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, 
including the appellant's recollection. The statement must be served on the 
appellee, who may serve objections or proposed amendments within 14 days 
after being served. The statement and any objections or proposed amendments must 
then be submitted to the district court for settlement and approval. As settled 
and approved, the statement must be included by the district clerk in the record 
on appeal.