Case Title: SUBLETTE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER NINE, STATE OF WYOMING and SUBLETTE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, STATE OF WYOMING and CAMPBELL COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, STATE OF WYOMING; FREMONT COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 24, STATE OF WYOMING; and LINCOLN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, STATE OF WYOMING V. JIM McBRIDE, STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, in his official capacity

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0073

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUBLETTE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER NINE, STATE OF WYOMING and SUBLETTE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, STATE OF WYOMING and CAMPBELL COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, STATE OF WYOMING; FREMONT COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 24, STATE OF WYOMING; and LINCOLN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, STATE OF WYOMING V. JIM McBRIDE, STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, in his official capacity2008 WY 152198 P.3d 1079Case Number: S-08-0073Decided: 12/19/2008Modified: 12/19/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
SUBLETTE 
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER NINE, STATE OF WYOMING and SUBLETTE COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 
 
andCAMPBELLCOUNTYSCHOOL 
DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, STATE OF WYOMING; FREMONT COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 24, STATE OF 
WYOMING; and LINCOLN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellants(Intervening Plaintiffs),v.JIM 
McBRIDE, STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, in his official 
capacity,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
W.R.A.P. 
11 Certified Question

from 
the DistrictCourtofSubletteCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Mark 
W. Gifford and Kelley A. Anderson of Law Offices of Gifford & Brinkerhoff, 
Casper, Wyoming, for Appellant Sublette 
County 
School District Number One; Tracy J. Copenhaver of Copenhaver, Kath, 
Kitchen & Kolpitcke, LLC, Powell, Wyoming, for Appellant 
Sublette County School District Number Nine and Lincoln County School District 
Number One; Ford T. Bussart of Bussart, West & Tyler, P.C., Rock 
Springs, Wyoming, for Appellant Campbell County 
School District Number One; Joel M. Vincent of Vincent & Vincent, 
Riverton, Wyoming, for Appellant 
Fremont County School District No. 24.  
Argument by Messrs Bussart, Copenhaver and 
Gifford.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Michael R. O'Donnell, State's School 
Finance Counsel, Special Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
O'Donnell.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and BURKE JJ; DONNELL, 
D.J.

 
 
DONNELL, 
DISTRICT JUDGE.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellants, 
five Wyoming 
school districts, filed a declaratory judgment action questioning the continued 
constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006), 
following an amendment to Wyoming Constitution, Article 15, Section 17 (the 2006 
Amendment), passed during the 2006 General Election.  More specifically, those districts seek 
a ruling that the 2006 Amendment authorized, but did not mandate, the Wyoming 
Legislature to repeal or amend § 21-13-102(c) (2006).  The statute was not amended for a period 
of sixteen (16) months after the Amendment's effective date, and the districts 
argue that § 21-13-102(c) (2006) remained in effect during that 
time.

 
 
[¶2]      Depending upon 
the conclusion as to the constitutionality of § 21-13-102(c) (2006), the school 
districts also ask for a declaration that any change in the law caused by the 
implied repeal of § 21-13-102(c) (2006) cannot be applied retroactively.  They assert this retroactive application 
would be an unconstitutional ex post 
facto application of the law.

 
 

CERTIFIED 
QUESTIONS

 
 
[¶3]      At the request of 
the parties, the district court presented the following certified questions to 
this Court for consideration: 

 
 
1.      Is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c) [(2006)] 
[constitutional] in light of the amendment to Article 15, Section 17 of the 
Wyoming Constitution?

 
 
2.      Do ex post facto 
principles impact the Wyoming Department of Education's (Department) calculation 
of rebated revenue if the districts have encumbered, obligated, or spent any of 
the funds sought by the Department?

 
 
RELEVANT 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 
 
[¶4]      In Washakie County School District Number One 
v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), 
this Court declared Wyoming's local wealth-based scheme of 
educational financing unconstitutional.  
We determined that the financing system then in place failed to provide 
equal educational funding statewide in violation of the Wyoming Constitution, 
Article 1, Section 34, and Article 7, Section 1, requiring a "uniform system of 
public instruction."  Id. at 
340.

 
 
[¶5]      In response, the 
electors of the State of Wyoming, at the General Election of 1982, then 
amended Wyoming Constitution, Article 15, Section 17 to 
provide:

 
 
There 
shall be levied each year in each county of the state a tax of not to exceed six 
mills on the dollar of the assessed valuation of the property in each county for 
the support and maintenance of the public schools.  This tax shall be collected by the 
county treasurer and disbursed among the school districts within the county as 
the legislature shall provide.  The 
legislature may authorize boards of trustees of school districts to levy a 
special tax on the property of the district.  The legislature may also provide for the 
distribution among one or more school districts of not more than three-fourths of any 
revenue from the special school district property tax in excess of a state 
average yield, which shall be calculated each year, per average daily 
membership.

 
 

Wyo. 
Const. art. 15, § 17 (Michie Cumm. Supp. 1983) (the 1982 Amendment) (emphasis 
added).

 
 
[¶6]      Thereafter, in 
1983, the Legislature enacted enabling legislation as 
follows:

 
 
The 
revenue to be rebated under subsection (b) of this section shall not exceed seventy-five percent (75%) 
of the difference between the revenue received by a school district from the 
mandatory levies per average daily membership provided by subsection (a) of this 
section and the statewide revenue per average daily membership from twenty-five 
(25) mills, multiplied by the average daily membership of the school 
district.  Annually, on or before 
July 15, the department using average daily memberships and assessed valuations 
from the preceding fiscal year, shall compute maximum recapture under this 
subsection for each district and the final amount of recapture computed under 
subsection (b) of this section for the preceding fiscal year.  If any district rebated more revenue to 
the state during the preceding fiscal year than the maximum computed, or than 
the amount to be rebated under subsection (b) of this section as computed using 
actual data from the preceding fiscal year, the department shall rebate the 
excess to the district.  If any 
district rebated less revenue to the state during the preceding fiscal year than 
the amount to be rebated under subsection (b) of this section, as computed using 
actual date from the preceding fiscal year, the district shall rebate the 
difference to the state.

 
 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c) (Michie Cumm. Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).  The purpose of this statute was to give 
effect to the 1982 Amendment.  It is 
this statute that is at issue today.

 
 
[¶7]      Essentially, the 
1982 Amendment and § 21-13-102 (1983), as they existed in 1983, reduced the 
inequalities created by wide disparities in local property tax revenues.  Instead, locally generated revenues were 
"rebated" to the State of Wyoming and deposited into the Wyoming Public School 
Foundation Program Account (foundation account), a state account, to be 
redistributed to all Wyoming school districts for the education of all of 
Wyoming's school children.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(b).  The 
Department then determined the amount of funding to which each school district 
was entitled.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
21-13-102(e).  If the local revenue 
generated in the district was insufficient (e.g., less than the district's 
entitlement), then the Department would remit the difference between the local 
funding and the entitlement to the district from the foundation 
account.

 
 
[¶8]      The unique aspect 
of the 1982 Amendment and the 1983 enabling legislation was that it limited the 
rebate amount to seventy-five percent of the difference between the designated 
local revenue sources and the statewide average of those same sources.  This allowed some school districts to 
retain a portion of their locally generated revenues (the portion in excess of 
their entitlement that exceeded seventy-five percent of the statewide average of 
those revenues) and not remit them to the foundation account for redistribution 
to all school districts, a concept that came to be known as "recaptured 
rebate."

 
 
[¶9]      Since 1982, in a 
series of opinions, this Court continued to hold that educational funding for 
Wyoming 
schoolchildren must be a function of state, not local, wealth.  Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 
2008 WY 2, 181 P.3d 43 (Wyo. 2008) (Campbell IV); State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 
2001 WY 90, 32 P.3d 325 (Wyo. 2001) (Campbell III); State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 
2001 WY 19, 19 P.3d 518 (Wyo. 2001) (Campbell II); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995) (Campbell 
I).

 
 
[¶10]   In a continued effort to address 
this Court's concerns about the ongoing unconstitutional nature of the 
then-existing school finance scheme, the Wyoming State Legislature passed 
Original Senate Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 2006 Budget Session.  
http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2006/Enroll/SJ0001.pdf (last visited December 
17, 2008).  This Joint Resolution 
proposed that an amendment to Wyoming Constitution, Article 15, Section 17 be 
placed before Wyoming voters in the 2006 General 
Election.  The proposal passed the 
Legislature and, in 2006, the voters of Wyoming amended the Wyoming Constitution by 
eliminating the "not more than three-fourths" language from Article 15, Section 
17.  The 2006 Amendment resulted in 
the following constitutional provision:

 
 
There 
shall be levied each year in each county of the state a tax of not to exceed six 
mills on the dollar of the assessed valuation of the property in each county for 
the support and maintenance of the public schools.  This tax shall be collected by the 
county treasurer and disbursed among the school districts within the county as 
the legislature shall provide.  The 
legislature may authorize boards of trustees of school districts to levy a 
special tax on the property of the district.  The legislature may also provide for the 
distribution among one (1) or more school districts of any revenue from the special school 
district property tax in excess of a state average yield, which shall be 
calculated each year, per average daily membership.

 
 

Wyo. 
Const. art. 15, § 17 (2007) (emphasis added).  This 2006 Amendment was effective 
November 15, 2006.  Id. at annot. 
"2006 amendment."

 
 
[¶11]   Despite some anticipation that the 
2006 Amendment would generate new enabling legislation or, at the very least, a 
change in the existing enabling legislation, as codified in § 21-13-102(c) 
(2006), the Fifty-Ninth Wyoming Legislature neither repealed nor amended § 
21-13-102(c) (2006) during the 2007 Legislative Session.  While the Legislature considered new 
enabling legislation, proposed as Senate File 0046,1 that would have repealed § 
21-13-102(c) (2006), the Legislature ultimately took no action on the matter.2

 
 
[¶12]   In March 2007, the districts were 
notified by the Department of Education that it was demanding payment of a one 
hundred percent rebate after November 15, 2006.  In essence, the Department interpreted 
the 2006 Amendment as necessarily repealing § 21-13-102(c) (2006) and its 
seventy-five percent cap on the rebated amount.  Accordingly, the Department directed the 
districts to pay the previous twenty-five percent "recaptured" difference for 
the 2006-2007 fiscal year into the foundation account.  The districts objected, arguing, in some 
cases, that they already had expended those funds and were obligated to perform 
under preexisting contracts.

 
 
[¶13]   The impasse between the five 
Appellant school districts and the Department led to the filing of the present 
declaratory judgment action and, ultimately, to the certification of the 
questions now presented to this Court.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶14]   Certified questions are reviewed 
pursuant to W.R.A.P. 11.  Pinnacle Bank v. Villa, 2004 WY 150, 100 P.3d 1287, 1289 (Wyo. 2004).  While 
traditional standards of review are only "tangentially" of service in cases 
involving certified questions, where a case seeks a determination on the 
constitutionality of a statute, it is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.  Muller v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort, 
2006 WY 100, ¶ 9, 139 P.3d 1162, 1165 (Wyo. 2006); Reiter v. State, 2001 WY 116, ¶ 7, 36 P.3d 586, 589 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
ANALYSIS

 
 
I.       
POST-AMENDMENT STATUS OF WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-13-102(c) 
(2006)

 
 
[¶15]   Although the parties phrase their 
certified question in terms of "constitutionality," the issue that first must be 
determined is whether the 2006 Amendment impliedly repealed Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
21-13-102(c) (2006).   If § 
21-13-102(c) was impliedly repealed by the adoption of the Amendment, then the 
districts may well be required to rebate to the Department one hundred percent 
of the difference between their local funding revenues and the statewide average 
revenue for the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 fiscal years,3 as opposed to the historical amount 
of seventy-five percent.  If § 
21-13-102(c) (2006) was not impliedly repealed, then the five school districts 
are obligated only to rebate the traditional seventy-five percent rebate for 
those two years and may retain the remaining twenty-five percent, which roughly 
translates into a collective dispute over $97,550,113.36.

 
 
[¶16]   As a general rule, a statute in 
effect at the time of a constitutional amendment is not affected unless the 
amendment expressly abrogates the pre-existing rights contained in the statute 
or unless the amendment is clearly and irreconcilably in conflict with the 
statute.  See 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 48 (1998).  Here, the parties agree that there is no 
express abrogation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c) (2006).  This Court, then, must decide if there 
is an obvious, clear, and strong conflict between the 2006 Amendment and § 
21-13-102(c) in effect at that time.  
See 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 49 (1998).  If the provisions of § 21-13-102(c) 
(2006) are inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the provision of Wyoming 
Constitution Article 15, Section 17 (2006) such that the statutory provisions 
are rendered obnoxious or ineffective, then the statute must be deemed impliedly 
repealed.  Id.; Mathewson v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 
WY 10, ¶ 11, 61 P.3d 1229, 1233 (Wyo. 2003); Shumway v. Worthey, 2001 WY 130, ¶ 15, 
37 P.3d 361, 367 (Wyo. 2001); Parker v. 
Energy Dev. Co., 691 P.2d 981, 986 (Wyo. 1984); Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 908, 912 (Wyo. 1977).

 
 
[¶17]   As in any case addressing statutory 
interpretation, this Court follows the well-established principles of statutory 
construction:

 
 
Our 
rules of statutory construction are well known and we will not repeat them at 
length.  See Pagel v. 
Franscell, 2002 WY 169, ¶ 9, 57 P.3d 1226, 1230 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting 
Wyoming Community College Com'n v. Casper Community College Dist., 2001 WY 
86, ¶¶ 16-18, 31 P.3d 1242, 1249 (Wyo. 2001)).  We will, however, note a few 
particularly pertinent rules of construction.  Our primary concern is legislative intent, 
which intent must be ascertained from the words of the statute.  Id.  Construction is unnecessary where statutory 
language is unambiguous.  
Id.  The intent of an unambiguous statute is 
determined from the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words used.  In re Wilson, 2003 WY 105, ¶ 6, 
75 P.3d 669, 672 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Wyoming Dept. of Transp. v. Haglund, 982 P.2d 699, 701 
(Wyo. 1999)). 
 "When the words are clear and 
unambiguous, a court risks an impermissible substitution of its own views, or 
those of others, for the intent of the legislature if any effort is made to 
interpret or construe statutes on any basis other than the language invoked by 
the legislature.'"  Pagel, 
2002 WY 169, ¶ 9, 57 P.3d  at 1230 (quoting Wyoming Community College 
Com'n, 2001 WY 86, ¶ 16, 31 P.3d at 1249)).  "A statute is clear and unambiguous if 
its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning 
with consistency and predictability.'"  Pagel, 2002 WY 169, ¶ 9, 57 P.3d  
at 1230 (quoting Wyoming Community College Com'n, 2001 WY 86, ¶ 17, 31 
P.3d at 1249)).

 
 

In 
re Walsh, 
2004 WY 96, ¶ 3, 96 P.3d 1, 2 (Wyo. 2004) (emphasis added).  See also Mgmt. Council of the Wyo. 
Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo. 1998).

 
 
[¶18]   The 2006 Amendment provides, in 
pertinent part:  "The legislature may also provide for the distribution among one (1) or more school districts 
of any revenue from the special 
school district property tax in excess of a state average yield[.]"  Wyo. Const., art. 15, § 17 (2007) (emphasis 
added).  Despite the way the 
proposed 2006 Amendment may have been postured to the Wyoming voters in 2006,4 this plain and unambiguous language 
permits the Wyoming Legislature to retain discretion in determining the 
distribution and amount of excess revenue to be rebated from the school 
districts to the State.  Further, as 
the Department concedes, the rebate portion of the Amendment is not 
self-executing; it requires enabling legislation to be given effect in that the 
Amendment authorizes, but does not mandate, that the Legislature 
act.

 
 
[¶19]   Reading the language of the 
Amendment that permits the Wyoming Legislature to redistribute any special school district property tax 
funds among one or more school 
districts, this Court is at a loss to find an inherent or irreconcilable 
conflict between the 2006 Amendment and § 21-13-102(c) (2006) as it existed at 
the time in which the Legislature chose to redistribute seventy-five percent of 
those tax funds.  That legislative 
determination falls squarely within the parameters of the 2006 Amendment; Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c) (2006) is consistent with the language found in 
Wyoming Constitution Article 15, Section 17 (2006).

 
 
[¶20]   In advocating this conclusion, 
Appellants point to the fact that the Wyoming Legislature, in its 2007 
Legislative Session, debated Senate File 0046, but failed to pass, proposed 
changes to § 21-13-102(c) (2006).  
On the other hand, in disputing this conclusion, the Department relies 
upon Wyoming Constitution Article 7, Sections 1 and 9, and Article 1, Section 
34, which, when read together, establish education as a fundamental interest in 
Wyoming.  When these constitutional 
provisions are interpreted in light of this Court's previous school finance 
decisions that mandate that the Wyoming Legislature provide an "equal 
opportunity for a quality education" for all Wyoming school children, see Campbell I, 907 P.2d  at 1263, and 
the ballot language presented to Wyoming voters at the time of the 2006 General 
Election, a fair argument may be made that the 2006 Amendment must be construed 
so as to prohibit the Wyoming Legislature from distributing funds for education 
in a wealth-based manner (e.g. with a rebate amount of anything less than one 
hundred percent).  

 
 
[¶21]   While this Court is cognizant of 
the Department's policy concerns, the fact remains that we cannot stray beyond 
the "four corners" of the plain and unambiguous language contained in the 2006 
Amendment.  In re Walsh, ¶ 3, 96 P.3d  at 2; Geringer, 953 P.2d  at 843.  Where, as here, the provisions of the 
pre-existing statute are not inconsistent with the subsequent constitutional 
amendment, there is simply no basis by which to declare the statute impliedly 
repealed.5

 
 
[¶22]   While the Department argues that 
this Court must give effect to the premise that "an amendment means change was 
intended," Cantrell v. Sweetwater County 
School District No. 2, 2006 WY 57, ¶ 11, 133 P.3d 983, 987 (Wyo. 2006) 
(citation omitted), this Court's conclusions do just that:  The Court presumes that the 2006 
Amendment intended to remove the seventy-five percent cap on rebates paid by the 
school districts to the foundation account; what it did not do, without further 
legislation, was require that the amount be changed to one hundred percent.  Quite simply, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
21-13-102(c) (2006) remained effective and in effect after the 2006 Amendment 
until the Legislature expressly repealed the statute in 
2008.

 
 
[¶23]   Having argued that § 21-13-102(c) 
(2006) was not impliedly repealed by the 2006 Amendment, and perhaps with an eye 
toward the flexible nature of the current Wyoming Constitution, Article 15, 
Section 17, the five Appellant school districts also would have this Court go 
one step further in declaring that § 21-13-102(c) (2006) did not create 
unconstitutional, wealth-based disparities in the amount of education funding 
distributed by the State, even with the seventy-five percent cap.  The districts argue that 
unconstitutional inequality is related solely to funding levels that primarily 
or predominantly depend upon local wealth, as opposed to funding levels that 
simply permit educational enhancements based on local wealth.  For this proposition, see Campbell II, 2001 WY 19, ¶ 120, 19 P.3d  at 
557.  They hint that this Court 
historically approved of the seventy-five percent limit on the rebate, thereby 
equally approving of the potential twenty-five percent rebate recapture.  

 
 
[¶24]   In previous decisions, this Court 
commented on the nature of the seventy-five percent rebate limit in the context 
of the educational funding system as a whole, specifically noting the ability of 
certain districts to make use of some local funds to provide for improvements 
and enhancements.  See, e.g., Campbell IV, 2008 WY 2, ¶ 
128, 181 P.3d  at 82 (upholding a school district's right to provide local 
enhancements with money raised locally or through property taxes not subject to 
recapture); Campbell III, 2001 WY 90, 
¶ 27, 32 P.3d  at 331 (acknowledging a school district's right to rely upon some 
local funding); Campbell II, 2001 WY 
19, ¶ 126, 19 P.3d  at 560 (referring to the ability of districts to build 
world-class facilities funded by property taxes not subject to recapture under 
the constitutional provision).  
However, in making these comments, largely dicta, this Court never directly 
considered the constitutionality of the seventy-five percent rebate limit.  The remarks were, at most, a neutral 
observation of the fact that, under the previous legislation, excess rebate 
funds could be recaptured by the school districts as a possible source of 
funding for local enhancements.  
Appellants should not read these previous comments as holdings that the 
seventy-five percent rebate limit, in and of itself, was constitutional; that 
determination has not yet been made.  
Indeed, that question has never been squarely presented to 
us.

 
 
[¶25]   Insofar as any current request that 
this Court make a finding that the previous version of Wyoming Constitution, 
Article 15, Section 17 and its implementing statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
21-13-102(c) (2006), were constitutional or that they did not create 
unconstitutional disparities in the amount of education funding distributed by 
the State to

the 
various school districts, this Court has not, at this time, been presented with 
sufficient evidence to make any determination of the sort.  We decline the districts' invitation to 
do so now.

 
 
II.         
EX POST FACTO 
PRINCIPLES

 
 
[¶26]   In light of this Court's conclusion 
that the 2006 Amendment to Wyoming Constitution, Article 15, Section 17 did not 
impliedly repeal Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c) (2006), the five Appellant 
school districts are not required to rebate the additional twenty-five percent 
of their excess local funds for 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 fiscal years.  That result necessarily disposes of the 
second certified question regarding whether ex post facto principles impact the 
Department's efforts to collect additional rebated funds from the school 
districts for these two years.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶27]   The Court concludes that the 2006 
Amendment to Wyoming Constitution, Article 15, Section 17 did not impliedly 
repeal Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c) (2006).  That statute remained in effect until 
its express repeal in 2008, and the seventy-five percent limit on the special 
school district property tax rebate imposed by § 21-13-102(c) (2006) remained in 
place for the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 fiscal years for all Wyoming school 
districts.  Accordingly, the five 
Appellant school districts were entitled to recapture any rebate amounts in 
excess of the seventy-five percent cap and are not now obligated to pay those 
sums over to the Department.  Having 
so concluded, the Court declines to make any determination on the 
constitutionality of the now-repealed seventy-five percent cap.  Finally, the determination that 
Appellants are entitled to retain their excess local funds for 2006-2007 and 
2007-2008 moots the second certified question.

 
 
[¶28]   The answer to the District Court's 
first Certified Question is "yes" in the sense that § 21-13-102(c) (2006) was 
not impliedly repealed by the 2006 Amendment.  This matter is remanded to the District 
Court for further action as may be appropriate and consistent 
herewith.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Senate File 0046, Section 2 reads: "W.S. 
21-13-102(c) and 2006 Wyoming Session Laws, Chapter 37, Section 6(b) are 
repealed."  
http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2007/Engross/SF0046.pdf (visited December 17, 
2008).  The legislature also 
proposed enabling legislation to allow school districts to retain their 
recaptured rebate funds if payment of those funds would interfere with any 
contractual obligations entered into by the district as of January 1, 2007.  For whatever reason, Senate File 0046 
was not passed by the Legislature.

 
 

2In 2008, the Wyoming Legislature 
repealed that part of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102 (2006) that described the 
application of the earlier version of Wyoming Constitution, Article 15, Section 
17 and its seventy-five percent limitation.  See 2008 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 94, § 2.  The result is that the issues presented 
to this Court affect only the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 fiscal years for the 
school districts and the rebated funds at issue during those 
years.

 
 

3More specifically, the one hundred 
percent rebate amount would apply only to that portion of the 2006-2007 fiscal 
year from November 15, 2006, the effective date of the Amendment, until June 20, 
2007.  Thereafter, for the 2007-2008 
fiscal year, the Department seeks a one hundred percent rebate for the entire 
year.  Because the Wyoming 
Legislature repealed Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c) (2006) in 2008, the issue is 
resolved for the 2008-2009 fiscal year and every year thereafter.  See 2008 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 94, § 
2.

 
 

4The ballot language for the 2006 
Amendment read:

 
 
The Wyoming Supreme Court has held that 
school funding must be equalized among all school districts in the 
state.

 
 
The adoption of this amendment would 
repeal the current limitation on the amount of property tax revenues that may be 
redistributed by the state through the School Foundation Program Account from 
school districts with greater property tax revenues to other school districts in 
the state.

 
 
The ballot language can be found at the 
Elections tab of the Wyoming Secretary of State's home page http://soswy.state.wy.us (visited December 17, 
2008).  The clear implication of 
this language is that the Amendment served to eliminate the seventy-five percent 
ceiling on the rebate amount so as to "equalize" school funding, which then 
would require wealthier school districts to rebate one hundred percent of their 
excesses into the foundation account.

 
 

5It is worth noting that the Department 
relies upon Senate File 54, enacted during the 2008 Legislative Session as 
support for its position.  That 
legislation, which repealed Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c) (2006), also provided 
the following commentary:

 
 
(a)  By adopting this act, the legislature 
clarifies application of the 2006 amendment to Article 15, Section 17 of the 
Wyoming Constitution, as adopted by the Wyoming electorate, certified by the 
state canvassing board and proclaimed adopted by the governor in accordance with 
W.S. 22-20-108.  It is the understanding and intent of the 
legislature that at the time the 2006 amendment to Wyoming Constitution, Article 
15, Section 17 was certified and proclaimed adopted, W.S. 21-13-102(c), 2006 
Wyoming Session Laws, Chapter 37, Section 6(b) and the provision within W.S. 
21-13-313(g) repealed by section 1 of this act were all superseded and 
effectively repealed by such adoption.

 
 
(b)  By adopting this act, the legislature 
further intends to clarify that sections 1 and 2 of this act apply to school 
district revenues for school year 2006-2007 and each school year thereafter. 
 Revenues which would have been 
subject to W.S. 21-13-102(c) but for adoption of the amendment to Article 15, 
Section 17 of the Wyoming Constitution as specified under subsection (a) of this 
section are not and were not available for school district budgeting and were 
not subject to provisions under W.S. 16-4-101 through 16-4-124 and 
21-3-110(a)(vi) pertaining to school district budgeting procedures. . . 
.

 
 
2008 Wyo. Sess. L. Ch. 94 §§2-3 (emphasis 
added).

 
 
However, statutory interpretation is 
a matter for the judiciary, not the legislature.  "A subsequent Legislature has no 
authority to place a legislative construction upon an existing legislative 
act:  If it was intended solely as a 
legislative construction of a previously existing statute, then it is of no 
effect whatever."  See Protest of the 1990-1991 Budget of 
Vo-Tech #22 v. Metro Area Voc.-Tech. Sch. Dist. No. 22, 848 P.2d 30, 33 
(Okla. Civ. App. 1992).  That being 
said, the 2008 Wyoming Legislature had no ability to make after-the-fact 
statements of legislative intent that run contrary to the clear and unambiguous 
language of the 2006 Amendment.