Case Title: GARNETT v. HETTGAR

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-19

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
GARNETT v. HETTGAR2000 WY 922 P.3d 558Case Number: 97-19Decided: 04/14/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
KERRY GARNETT, Appellant 
(Plaintiff), v.JIM BROCK and WILLIAM HETTGAR, Appellees (Defendants).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Carbon County: The Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, 
Judge.

Representing 
Appellant: Kerry Garnett, Pro 
Se.Representing Appellees: William U. Hill, Attorney General; John W. 
Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Jennifer A. Cudworth, Assistant Attorney 
General.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
expedited conference; retired November 2, 1998.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] The only 
novel question in this case is the primary issue of whether a prisoner has a 
property right in a particular work assignment and rate of pay. Collateral 
issues are presented concerning whether a claim under state law was stated in 
the absence of an appropriate allegation that a claim was filed as required by 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act,1 and whether the district court's 
ruling with respect to jurisdiction stands as the law of the case in the absence 
of an attack on the ruling in this appeal. Kerry Garnett's (Garnett) Complaint, 
alleging that he was unlawfully removed from his prison work assignment as a 
janitor and reassigned to work in the prison laundry at a lower pay scale, and 
naming as defendants two employees of the State of Wyoming, was dismissed by the 
district court for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
We agree with the district court that the Complaint failed to state a claim 
under state law in the absence of any allegation that a timely claim was filed 
as required by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. We afford Garnett the 
benefit of any doubt as to whether he perfected his appeal from an adverse 
jurisdictional ruling. The district court correctly ruled that Garnett, as a 
state prisoner, had no legally cognizable property right in any particular work 
assignment. The Order Dismissing Complaint is affirmed.

[¶2] In the 
Brief of Appellant, Garnett defines the issues as follows:

ARGUMENT I: The court 
below erred in dismissing the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted[.]

ARGUMENT II: The 
defendants are not entitled to immunity under the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act[.]

[¶3] The State, 
in the Brief of Appellees, states the issues this way:

I. Whether the district 
court's jurisdictional determination is the law of the case and not considered 
by this Court when appellant failed to appeal this particular ruling. 
Alternatively, was the district court without jurisdiction to hear appellant's 
state law claims due to appellant's failure to comply with the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-101, et. seq.?

II. Does an inmate at the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary have a protected property interest in maintaining a 
specific wage level for his prison job?

[¶4] Garnett is 
serving a life sentence at the Wyoming State Penitentiary for a vicious murder. 
He also is subject to a consecutive sentence of 20-25 years for burglary. 
Garnett v. State, 769 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1989). The facts upon which Garnett's civil 
action is premised are taken from his Complaint. He was assigned a prison job as 
a janitor, and received a prisoner's salary for that position. On June 10, 1996, 
officers at the penitentiary advised Garnett that he was being terminated from 
his job as a janitor and that he was to report to the laundry the next morning, 
where he would be starting at the bottom of the pay scale. Garnett objected to 
this job reassignment, and he requested a due process hearing, claiming that the 
State lacked authority to assign him to a new job at lower pay. Garnett then 
filed an informal grievance with the shift commander at the penitentiary. 
Garnett alleges that during the course of the grievance process, he was informed 
that the actions of the prison authority violated the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary's own "Policy and Procedure" because the deprivation of pay had to 
be preceded by a formal due process hearing in the form of a "Job 
Classification." Garnett alleges that the result of the grievance process was 
that he was not entitled to and did not receive a due process 
hearing.

[¶5] 
Representing himself, Garnett filed his Complaint in the district court of the 
Second Judicial District on September 18, 1996. He claimed that he had been 
denied his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States when he was deprived of "property," his state pay, without 
a hearing. In his Complaint, Garnett demanded a Temporary Restraining Order 
against the State, as well as compensatory relief, punitive damages, court 
costs, attorney's fees, and such other relief as the district court deemed just 
and proper.

[¶6] On October 
9, 1996, the State filed a Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In its motion, the 
State contended that Garnett's Complaint failed to state any claim for which 
immunity was waived under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act; Garnett failed to 
comply with the procedural requirements of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act; 
and he failed to plead a violation of any constitutional right. Garnett opposed 
the State's motion, arguing that the State was not entitled to immunity and that 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act was unconstitutional. In a decision letter 
filed November 14, 1996, the district court ruled that the State's Motion to 
Dismiss should be granted. The district court concluded that Garnett had not 
complied with the requirements of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, 
foreclosing the court from jurisdiction to hear his state law claims. The 
district court also concluded that Garnett had no constitutionally protected 
property interest in maintaining a specific wage level as an inmate laborer at 
the penitentiary, and for that reason, the Complaint failed to state a claim 
under federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Order Granting Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss was entered on November 25, 1996, and Garnett has appealed from that 
order. 

[¶7] 
Jurisdiction consists of the power to hear and determine a matter in 
controversy. In Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140, 1146 (Wyo. 1993). On appeal, 
jurisdictional questions are subject to plenary review under the inherent power 
and duty of the Supreme Court to address jurisdictional defects. Pawlowski v. 
Pawlowski, 925 P.2d 240, 242 (Wyo. 1996). The technical ramification of the 
plenary review is that the opinion of the district court is afforded no 
deference, but in this instance, the district court's opinion is well reasoned 
and helpful to us in the review of this case. See Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. 
Public Service Com'n of Wyoming, 662 P.2d 878, 882 (Wyo. 1983); Wyoming Public 
Service Com'n v. Hopkins, 602 P.2d 374 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶8] The 
district court decided that it was without jurisdiction over the state law claim 
because Garnett failed to comply with the claims procedures found in the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-101 through 1-39-120 (Michie 
1988 & Cum.Supp. 1996). We are satisfied that the prison officers named as 
defendants indeed are "public employees" of the Wyoming State Penitentiary, 
acting within the scope of their duties, and the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act 
applies. One seeking relief pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is 
required to submit a claim to the governmental entity within two years of the 
date of the alleged act upon which the asserted liability is premised. Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113. The submission of a claim is a prerequisite to an action 
against the state or its public employees. Allen v. Lucero, 925 P.2d 228, 230 
(Wyo. 1996); Board of Trustees of University of Wyoming v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 
413 (Wyo. 1983). We have held:

[I]n order to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the district court, such an allegation must encompass a 
statement of the date the claim was filed to demonstrate the filing of the claim 
within two years of the date of the "alleged act, error or omission: or, 
alternatively, the statutory ground for the late discovery of the "alleged act, 
error or omission."

Amrein v. 
Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 771 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶9] There is no 
allegation in Garnett's Complaint that he filed a claim with the State, pursuant 
to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, at any time. Our cases require 
compliance with the claims filing provisions of the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act in order to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. The ruling of 
the district court that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to proceed 
to adjudicate Garnett's state law claims clearly is correct. In the absence of 
any jurisdiction to hear Garnett's claims asserted under state law, the question 
of whether the State was entitled to immunity is not before this Court, and will 
not be further addressed in this opinion.

[¶10] We turn 
then to Garnett's claim that he was deprived of a constitutional property right 
without due process, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The decision letter 
filed by the district court on November 14, 1996 thoroughly addressed Garnett's 
claim in a commendable manner:

In determining whether an 
employee has a state law property interest in employment courts "generally 
resolve[] the matter by providing a simple yes or no answer based on whether the 
employment contract is at-will or for cause." Gardetto [v. Mason], 854 F. Supp. 
[1520] at 1534 [(D.Wyo. 1994)]. Absent an express employment contract, the 
general rule in Wyoming is that employment is at will, although an implied 
contract may arise. See, e.g. Sanchez v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 855 P.2d 1256 (Wyo. 1993). In addition to general employment law in Wyoming, the 
court must examine the specific statutes relating to prison labor as found in 
Wyo Stat. §§ 7-16-201 through 7-16-205.

[¶11] Plaintiff 
cites to Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1989) for the 
proposition that the Wyoming prison labor statutes confer a property interest in 
his employment. Plaintiff's reliance on Gillihan, however, is misplaced. The 
inmate in Gillihan brought an action alleging he was deprived of a property 
right when prison officials froze his prison account demanding that he pay 
$174.53 that was incurred in transporting him from a prison in Arizona to the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary. The court looked specifically at Wyo Stat. §§ 
7-16-204, 7-16-205, and 7-16-205(a)(v) and concluded that they "create a 
legitimate expectation that money not used for specified reasons will be 
returned to the inmate at the end of his incarceration and, therefore, create a 
protected property interest in the funds." Id. at 939. The property in Gillihan 
was money that had already been earned by the plaintiff. By statute, the inmate 
had a right to those funds. In the present case, Plaintiff is claiming a 
protected property interest in a certain wage level. The issue, therefore, is 
whether he had a legitimate entitlement to keep the same 
salary.

[¶12] In Hrbek 
v. Farrier, 787 F.2d 414 (8th Cr. 1994), the issue was whether an inmate had a 
protected property interest in pay under Iowa law. The court concluded that 
there was no property interest in the inmate's wages because, among other things 
"the payment of prison wages is a matter subject to the discretion of the 
director of the institution . . ." Id. at 416. The Eighth Circuit addressed the 
question under Missouri law in Robinson v. Cavanaugh, 20 F.3d 892 (8th cir. 
1994) The Missouri inmate claimed a protected property interest in his former 
wage rate was deprived when the prison instituted a new wage scale. The court 
concluded that "[t]here is no constitutional right to prison wages and any such 
compensation is by the grace of the state." Id. at 894, citing Hrbek, 787 F.2d  
at 416. Similar conclusions have been reached in Flittie v. Solem, 827 F.2d 276 
(8th Cir. [1987]) (concluding that under South Dakota law, inmates have no 
constitutional right to be assigned to a particular job); Lyon v. Farrier, 727 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1984) (concluding inmates have no constitutional entitlement 
to tenure in prison jobs); See, also Wallace v. Robinson, 940 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 
1991); Jackson v. O'Leary, 689 F. Supp. 846 (N.D.Ill. 
1988).

[¶13] Plaintiff 
has pointed to no Wyoming law that grants him a property interest in maintaining 
his previous rate of pay. To the contrary, Wyoming law indicates that plaintiff 
has no protected interest in maintaining his previous rate of pay. Under Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-16-202, an inmate "in a state penal institution may be employed within 
the institution or in any work for the benefit of and use by the state or any of 
its agencies or political subdivisions." (emphasis added) Under Wyo. Stat. § 
7-16-203 an inmate "may receive compensation for services performed as specified 
by the department of corrections." (emphasis added). The statutes indicate broad 
discretion over whether an inmate may even work and if so, whether he or she 
will receive any compensation. Given the broad discretion over inmates work and 
compensation and the general rule of at-will employment, it cannot be said that 
Plaintiff had a legitimate expectation of maintaining a specific salary level. 
In Wyoming there is no right to prison wages and any such compensation is by the 
grace of the state.

[¶14] Plaintiff 
has failed to allege the deprivation of a protected property interest. 
Accordingly, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted.

[¶15] In 
Listenbee v. City of Milwaukee, 976 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 1992), the court 
summarizes the rule in Wisconsin with respect to the state law property interest 
in substantially the same language used in Gardetto.

[¶16] The 
district court granted the State's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6). In pursuing review of an order dismissing a complaint, we accept all 
facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff. Gillis v. F & A Enterprises, 934 P.2d 1253, 1254-55 (Wyo. 
1997). In Gillis, we reiterated that dismissal is a drastic remedy which should 
be granted sparingly. We sustain a dismissal pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) only 
when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot 
allege any facts that would entitled him to relief. Rissler & McMurry Co. v. 
State, 917 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Wyo. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1091 (1997); 
Herrig v. Herrig, 844 P.2d 487, 490 (Wyo. 1992). 

[¶17] Garnett 
contends that his due process rights were violated under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In order to sustain his 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff [Garnett] must allege that he was 
subjected to the deprivation of a federally protected right by the defendant, 
and that the defendant's actions were taken "under color of state law." See, 
e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2254, 101 L. Ed. 2d 40 
(1988); Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155, 98 S. Ct. 1729, 1732, 56 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1978). Gardetto v. Mason, 854 F. Supp. 1520, 1527 (D.Wyo. 1994). 
The Fourteenth Amendment insures that a state may not "deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law * * *." We accept the two 
part analysis for determining whether a violation of the due process clause has 
occurred articulated by the United States District Court for the District of 
Wyoming in Gardetto:

The analysis for 
determining whether there has been a violation of due process involves two 
distinct inquires. First, the court must determine whether the individual has a 
protected interest, which usually takes the form of a liberty or property 
interest. "[Liberty and property] interests attain . . . constitutional status 
by virtue of the fact that they have been initially recognized and protected by 
state law[.]" Paul [v. Davis], 424 U.S. [693] at 710, 96 S.Ct. [1155] at 1165, 
[47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976)]. "[If] it is determined that the due process clause 
applies, `the question remains what process is due.'" Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985) 
(citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972)). This second prong of the analysis depends on the three-party 
balancing test adopted in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), which focuses on the private and public interests at stake as 
well as the degree of accuracy-enhancement that additional process would provide 
under the circumstances.

Id. at 335, 96 S. Ct.  at 903.

[¶18] Gardetto, 
854 F. Supp.  at 1533-34. We have invoked the three-part balancing test, found in 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 7893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), in both 
employment and non-employment cases. Mondt v. Cheyenne Police Dept., 924 P.2d 70, 81 (Wyo. 1996); Walker v. Karpan, 726 P.2d 82, 87 (Wyo. 
1986)

[¶19] In order 
to be afforded constitutional status, property rights must have been initially 
recognized and protected by state law. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1165, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976); see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430, 102 S. Ct. 1148, 71 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1982); Board of Regents of State 
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). 
Whether a property right to wages exists must be examined in the light of 
Wyoming law. We are in complete accord with the district court's determination 
that Garnett had no property right to a particular wage scale attaching to his 
employment at the prison. Consequently, he fails in his effort to establish a 
property right to wages. Garnett contends that this right is established by 
Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1989). The district court's 
explanation of how Gillihan is distinguishable is indeed apposite. We agree that 
Garnett's reliance upon Gillihan is misplaced.

[¶20] While we 
do afford Garnett the benefit of the doubt as to whether he appropriately 
appealed from the decision of the district court with respect to jurisdiction 
over the state law claims, we are satisfied that his failure to follow the 
claims procedure in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act indeed did deprive the 
district court of jurisdiction over those claims. The law does not support his 
contention that he had a constitutional property right to maintain his prison 
wage at any particular rate, and consequently he failed to allege a claim under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.

[¶21] We affirm 
the Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

Footnotes

1 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 1-39-101 through 1-39-120 (Michie 1988 & Cum.Supp. 1996).