Case Title: Guillermo Arbelaez v. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC02-2284

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2005-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC02-2284 
____________ 
 
GUILLERMO OCTAVIO ARBELAEZ, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-1718 
____________ 
 
 
GUILLERMO OCTAVIO ARBELAEZ, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., ETC., 
Respondent. 
 
[January 27, 2005] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Guillermo Octavio Arbelaez, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals an 
order of the circuit court denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida 
 
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Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 after an evidentiary hearing.  Arbelaez also 
petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, 
§§ 3(b)(1), 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of 
Arbelaez’s postconviction motion and deny his petition for habeas corpus. 
I.  PROCEEDINGS TO DATE 
Arbelaez was convicted in 1991 of first-degree murder and kidnapping in the 
death of Julio Rivas, the five-year-old son of his former girlfriend, Graciela Alfara.  
The child died on February 14, 1988, after being strangled and thrown off Key 
Biscayne’s Powell Bridge into the water seventy feet below.  The cause of death 
was asphyxia resulting from both strangulation and drowning.  After committing 
the crime, Arbelaez fled to his family’s home in Medellin, Colombia.  He later 
returned to Florida, however, and gave full confessions on audiotape and 
videotape.  Arbelaez admitted that, on the night before the murder, he saw his 
former girlfriend kissing another man.  Deciding that “the best way to get to a 
woman is through her children,” he murdered her son. 
The jury at Arbelaez’s trial recommended a death sentence by a vote of 
eleven to one.  The trial court found three aggravating factors: the murder was 
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner (CCP) without any 
pretense of moral or legal justification; the murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and the murder was committed during a kidnapping.  
 
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The court also found one statutory mitigating factor (Arbelaez did not have a 
significant prior criminal history) and one nonstatutory mitigating factor (Arbelaez 
exhibited remorse).  Agreeing with the jury’s recommendation, the trial court 
sentenced Arbelaez to death. 
 
On direct appeal, we affirmed both the convictions and the sentence.  
Arbelaez v. State, 626 So. 2d 169, 178 (Fla. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1115 
(1994).  After the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of 
certiorari, Arbelaez filed a motion for postconviction relief that, as amended, raised 
twenty-three claims.  The trial court summarily denied all relief requested.  On 
appeal, we affirmed the summary denial of all but one.  Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 
2d 909, 920 (Fla. 2000).  We concluded that “the trial court erred by failing to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing as to Arbelaez’s claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial for failing to present expert 
testimony as to his epilepsy and other mental health mitigation and for failing to 
introduce evidence of his family history of abuse.”  Id. at 912.  The factual 
allegations that formed the basis of Arbelaez’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim were summarized as follows: 
Arbelaez contends that testimony was available to show that his life 
was marked by abuse and deprivation, that he suffered from a lifetime 
of drug abuse, and that he suffered from mental illness and epilepsy 
and tried repeatedly to commit suicide; yet no witnesses were called 
by trial counsel to present this testimony.  Arbelaez further contends 
that trial counsel never had him examined by a competent mental 
 
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health expert for purposes of presenting mitigation.  He asserts that he 
has now been examined by mental health experts who have found that 
he suffers from organic brain damage and epilepsy; is mentally 
retarded; and has an IQ of 67.    
Id. at 913.  We concluded that, under Ragsdale v. State, 720 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 
1998), Arbelaez had “stated sufficient allegations of mitigation to warrant an 
evidentiary hearing.”  Arbelaez, 775 So. 2d at 913.  We therefore reversed in part 
and remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the one claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. 
 
On remand, Arbelaez filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge, which she 
denied as legally insufficient.  The court then held the evidentiary hearing for 
which we had remanded the case.  After considering post-hearing memoranda, the 
trial court denied relief.  Just before the court entered its order, Arbelaez filed a 
supplemental motion under rule 3.850 arguing the applicability of the then-recent 
United States Supreme Court decisions in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), 
and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  The trial court denied the 
supplemental claims as untimely and procedurally barred. 
 
Arbelaez now appeals the trial court’s order denying postconviction relief, as 
well as the denial of his supplemental Ring and Atkins claims and the denial of his 
motion to disqualify.  He also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, 
raising five separate claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  We 
examine each of Arbelaez’s claims in turn.   
 
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II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
AT THE PENALTY PHASE 
 
We remanded this case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether 
Arbelaez’s trial counsel, Reemberto Diaz, was ineffective during the penalty phase 
of trial in his investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence concerning 
three issues: (A) Arbelaez’s epilepsy, (B) his “other mental health mitigation,” 
including possible mental retardation, and (C) his “family history of abuse” in 
Colombia.  Arbelaez, 775 So. 2d at 912.  The trial court denied relief on all three 
issues. 
 
We have repeatedly held that to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel, a defendant must prove two elements: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 
deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This 
requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.  Unless a 
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction 
or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process 
that renders the result unreliable. 
Valle v. State, 778 So. 2d 960, 965 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  In Valle, we further explained: 
In evaluating whether an attorney’s conduct is deficient, “there 
is ‘a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance,’” and the defendant 
“bears the burden of proving that counsel’s representation was 
 
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unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the 
challenged action was not sound strategy.”  This Court has held that 
defense counsel’s strategic choices do not constitute deficient conduct 
if alternative courses of action have been considered and rejected.  
Moreover, “[t]o establish prejudice [a defendant] ‘must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.’” 
Id. at 965-66 (citations omitted) (quoting Brown v. State, 775 So. 2d 616, 628 (Fla. 
2000), and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000)).   
After an evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
we review the deficiency and prejudice prongs as “mixed questions of law and fact 
subject to a de novo review standard but … the trial court’s factual findings are to 
be given deference.  So long as the [trial court’s] decisions are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the trial court on questions of fact and, likewise, on the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence.”  Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 
766, 781 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 923 (Fla. 2001)) 
(emphasis omitted).  Applying this standard of review, we affirm the trial court’s 
decision to deny relief to Arbelaez as to all three issues.  We discuss each in turn. 
A.  Epilepsy 
Arbelaez argues that his counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase in 
presenting evidence of his epilepsy.  During the penalty phase, counsel presented 
 
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three witnesses to testify about Arbelaez’s problems with epilepsy.  Two lay 
witnesses testified that they had observed Arbelaez taking epileptic medication.  
One of them, Adelfa Salazar, described a few “very strong” epileptic seizures he 
had suffered in her presence.  Dr. Raul Lopez, a neurologist, testified that he 
treated Arbelaez for an epileptic seizure in 1984, four years before the murder.  He 
deemed it “very likely” that Arbelaez had suffered from epilepsy since birth.  He 
testified that, as a youth, Arbelaez had been treated in Colombia with Mysoline, an 
“anticonvulsion medication” used to prevent epileptic episodes.  He testified that 
two other epilepsy medications, Dilantin and Depakote, were prescribed for 
Arbelaez after the 1984 incident, but that at times Arbelaez “was not taking his 
medications as instructed.”  Dr. Lopez testified that he received three phone calls 
from emergency room physicians—one in 1986 and two in 1987––about Arbelaez, 
who “on those three occasions … had not been taking the medication as 
instructed.”  Dr. Lopez admitted, however, that he had “no idea” how much 
medication Arbelaez was taking at the time of the murder. 
 
Arbelaez argues that counsel should have presented more evidence detailing 
the state of his epilepsy around the time of the murder in 1988.  At the evidentiary 
hearing, counsel testified that he had pursued the epilepsy issue by consulting with 
Dr. Lopez.  Dr. Lopez informed him that, following an epileptic seizure, an 
epileptic will not remember the events immediately before the seizure.  Because 
 
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Arbelaez could recall the events surrounding the murder––as illustrated by his 
videotaped confession, admitted into evidence at trial––counsel concluded that 
epilepsy had not “played a role” in the crime.  He testified that he adjusted his 
penalty phase strategy accordingly. 
The trial court found that counsel had adequately investigated Arbelaez’s 
history of epilepsy and presented it to the jury in the penalty phase.  Calling the 
entire issue a “red herring,” the court concluded that Arbelaez “failed to offer . . . 
any evidence relating to [his] epileptic disorder which could have been presented 
and was not.”  
 
Arbelaez has not met his burden of showing that counsel’s investigation and 
presentation of evidence about his epilepsy was “unreasonable under prevailing 
professional norms and that the challenged action was not sound strategy.”  Valle, 
778 So. 2d at 965.  The record reveals that counsel did present substantial evidence 
of epilepsy from three witnesses.  The jury heard enough evidence to conclude that 
Arbelaez had engaged in a lifelong battle with epilepsy and had repeatedly failed, 
throughout the four years leading up to the murder, to keep the condition under 
control with medication.  Counsel was not deficient in presenting this evidence.  
Moreover, counsel gave a reasonable strategic explanation for why he did not 
argue at the penalty phase that Arbelaez committed the crime under the direct 
influence of his epileptic condition.  He explained that Arbelaez’s detailed 
 
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confession did not mesh with Dr. Lopez’s assertion that epileptics typically cannot 
remember the events immediately preceding a seizure.  Because of this 
inconsistency, counsel chose to limit the testimony at the penalty phase to general 
statements about Arbelaez’s epileptic condition.  This strategic choice was not 
deficient. 
 
Arbelaez also fails to establish prejudice.  Almost all of the epilepsy 
evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing was cumulative to the evidence 
presented at trial.  The only significant new evidence was that Arbelaez’s epileptic 
disorder had apparently worsened while he was on death row, most likely due to 
stress.  This post-trial evidence is irrelevant to what counsel could have presented 
at trial.  Arbelaez has not presented any then-available evidence whose exclusion 
undermines our confidence in the outcome of his trial.  See Valle, 778 So. 2d at 
965; see also Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So. 2d 541, 546 (Fla. 1990) (holding that 
defendant failed to establish prejudice where the additional evidence was largely 
cumulative).  The trial court properly denied his claim. 
B.  Other Mental Health Mitigation 
Arbelaez also argues that counsel was ineffective in his investigation and 
presentation of “other mental health mitigation evidence” during the penalty phase.  
Aside from the epilepsy evidence, counsel did not present any evidence about 
Arbelaez’s mental health problems, such as his low intelligence and his history of 
 
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depression.  Instead, counsel portrayed Arbelaez as a reliable, hard-working man 
who was trusted by others and who, before the murder, was a positive contributor 
to society.  Four lay witnesses testified that Arbelaez was a hard worker.  The only 
reference to Arbelaez’s intellectual limitations came in the closing argument, 
where counsel told the jury:  
[Arbelaez] was 30 years old when he committed the crime, but ask 
yourself also what was his emotional or mental age. … You were able 
to listen and observe the man describing what he said he did. … You 
can decide how well he understood the ramifications and the severity, 
the moral and legal implications of what he did on that day. 
Arbelaez contends that, under prevailing professional norms, counsel should have 
pursued and presented evidence to bolster this undeveloped argument.  The trial 
court disagreed, finding that Arbelaez had demonstrated neither deficient 
performance nor prejudice.  The court concluded that counsel “conducted a 
reasonable investigation as to the Defendant’s mental status” in preparation for the 
penalty phase and that Arbelaez had presented “no competent evidence . . . that the 
Defendant suffered from any major mental illness . . . other than his epilepsy . . . or 
that the Defendant is mentally retarded.” 
1. Deficient Performance 
 
We conclude that counsel did not conduct a reasonable investigation of 
Arbelaez’s mental health status.  To the contrary, counsel ignored various red flags 
indicating that Arbelaez could have significant mental health problems.  For 
 
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instance, counsel clearly knew from the competency and sanity evaluation that 
Arbelaez had low intelligence and a history of depression.  The report of Dr. A. M. 
Castiello, the psychiatrist who conducted the competency and sanity evaluation in 
1990, states that “[c]linically, the defendant is functioning at a low average 
intellectual capacity.”  The report recounts Arbelaez’s hospitalization at a 
Colombian mental hospital and his attempted suicides in Colombia.  Counsel 
received confirmation of these facts from family members.  For example, in a letter 
to counsel shortly before the penalty phase, Arbelaez’s mother wrote that he “is not 
normal” and described how, as a youth, Arbelaez “wanted to die,” once ingested 
rat poison, and was repeatedly treated at mental hospitals.  Although counsel 
denied receiving any indication from Dr. Castiello, Arbelaez, or his family 
members that his client was mentally retarded, he admitted at the evidentiary 
hearing that “I would not say … that [Arbelaez] is an intelligent man” and that it 
was “entirely possible … that someone could have something wrong with them 
and I would not see it.”    
Despite the overt indications of Arbelaez’s low intelligence and his history 
of depression, counsel did not arrange a mental health evaluation of Arbelaez for 
purposes of mitigation.  Nor did counsel recall asking Arbelaez’s initial defense 
attorney if any mental health work had been done before his involvement.  Had he 
asked, counsel would have learned that Dr. Merry Haber evaluated Arbelaez 
 
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briefly in 1988 and 1989 at the request of prior counsel.  Dr. Haber concluded that 
Arbelaez suffered from depression and had “very limited intelligence.”  While 
admitting that she “did not find anything that [she] felt at that time required further 
evaluation” and that she “would not have thought about an IQ test,” Dr. Haber 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that “because [Arbelaez] had a seizure disorder, 
[she] probably would have recommended a neuro-psychological evaluation” if 
contacted by counsel before trial.  Such a recommendation would have pushed 
counsel in the same direction as the information from Dr. Castiello and Arbelaez’s 
family members––that is, toward a mental health evaluation for purposes of 
mitigation.  
The lack of a serious and sustained effort by counsel to pursue mental health 
mitigation, despite various red flags indicating Arbelaez’s low intelligence and his 
history of depression, amounted to deficient performance.  Although we have not 
required a mental health evaluation for mitigation purposes in every capital case, 
see Sweet v. State, 810 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 2002); Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216 
(Fla. 1998), when available information indicates that the defendant could have 
significant mental health problems, such an evaluation is “fundamental in 
defending against the death penalty.”  Bruno v. State, 807 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2001) 
(Anstead, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  This remains true even 
when the mental health problems do not appear to rise quite to the level of mental 
 
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retardation.  See, e.g., Crook v. State, 813 So. 2d 68, 76 (Fla. 2002) (“We have . . . 
elected to . . . treat low intelligence as a significant mitigating factor with the lower 
scores indicating the greater mitigating influence.”).  A competency and sanity 
evaluation as superficial as the one Dr. Castiello performed for Arbelaez obviously 
cannot serve as a reliable substitute for a thorough mitigation evaluation.  See 
Rutherford, 727 So. 2d at 222 n.3 (“We of course recognize that competency 
evaluations are different from mitigation evaluations, and in no way mean to imply 
here that one can necessarily take the place of the other.”).  To conform to the 
prevailing norms of the legal profession, counsel should have arranged a mental 
health evaluation for mitigation purposes.  See Pietri v. State, 885 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 
2004) (“Counsel contacted at least five experts, and ultimately produced [two] at 
trial. . . .  This is not a situation in which defense counsel did nothing to secure a 
mental health expert to evaluate his client.  Here defense counsel made a 
reasonable effort.”).  Arbelaez has therefore satisfied his burden of showing that 
counsel’s performance in investigating and presenting Arbelaez’s mental health 
problems was “unreasonable under prevailing professional norms.”  Valle, 778 So. 
2d at 965. 
2. Prejudice 
Although we conclude that counsel’s performance was deficient, Arbelaez 
nevertheless failed to prove prejudice.  Arbelaez confessed to, and was convicted 
 
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of, killing a five-year-old boy to exact revenge on his former girlfriend.  The trial 
court found that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated, as well as 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  The jury recommended a death sentence by 
a vote of eleven to one.  To undermine confidence in the outcome of his penalty 
phase, Arbelaez would have to present fairly strong evidence of mental health 
mitigation.  For instance, “[w]e have held that a new sentencing hearing is 
warranted ‘in cases which entail psychiatric examinations so grossly insufficient 
that they ignore clear indications of either mental retardation or organic brain 
damage.’”  Rose v. State, 617 So. 2d 291, 295 (Fla. 1993) (quoting State v. Sireci, 
502 So. 2d 1221, 1224 (Fla. 1987)).  Arbelaez did not demonstrate at the 
evidentiary hearing that he suffers from mental retardation, organic brain damage, 
or any other major mental illness aside from epilepsy. 
Arbelaez’s strongest evidence of mental health mitigation is that he is of low 
intelligence (but has a high level of adaptive functioning) and that he was 
hospitalized with severe depression before moving to the United States (but was 
never treated or hospitalized for depression during the decade before the murder).  
This evidence is not strong enough to shake our confidence in the outcome.  
Arbelaez has not shown “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  
Valle, 778 So. 2d at 966. 
 
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At the evidentiary hearing, Arbelaez presented evidence that he is mentally 
retarded.  Dr. Ruth Latterner, a neuropsychologist who evaluated him after his 
direct appeal, testified that he suffers not only from epilepsy, but also from mental 
retardation and organic brain damage.  She testified that Arbelaez has a full-scale 
IQ score of 67, placing him in the range of “educable mentally retarded,” and that 
his language skills place him between a first- and a third-grade level.  These 
conditions, she testified, “pre-existed” her evaluation.  Dr. Latterner was the only 
expert witness who testified unambiguously that Arbelaez has mental retardation 
or organic brain damage. 
The trial court rejected Dr. Latterner’s testimony as having “little if any 
evidentiary value as it is refuted by other mental health professionals and other 
evidence, and is otherwise wholly unbelievable.”  The court emphasized that Dr. 
Latterner admitted on cross-examination that, in reaching her finding of mental 
retardation, she looked only at testing results and “refuse[d] to consider” 
Arbelaez’s ability to adapt to his surroundings, even though section 916.106(12), 
Florida Statutes (2003), defines mental retardation as necessarily including 
“deficits in adaptive behavior.”  The court also emphasized that Dr. Latterner 
refused to consider the possibility that Arbelaez’s difficult experiences on death 
row might have negatively impacted his intellectual functioning and thus his 
testing results.  If they had, the court implied, then Dr. Latterner’s findings from 
 
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1995 would not accurately reflect Arbelaez’s mental condition at the time of the 
penalty phase in 1991. 
The trial court found that the testimony of two other mental health 
professionals, Dr. Sonia Ruiz and Dr. Haber, “conclusively refute[d]” that of Dr. 
Latterner.  Dr. Ruiz, a clinical psychologist who evaluated Arbelaez at the State’s 
request in 2001, testified that Arbelaez has no mental retardation or “any major 
thought disturbance [or] psychosis whatsoever.”  She acknowledged that 
Arbelaez’s testing performances, if analyzed independently, revealed a “borderline 
level of mental retardation.”  However, unlike Dr. Latterner, Dr. Ruiz also 
considered Arbelaez’s ability to adapt to his surroundings.  She testified that 
Arbelaez’s “adaptive level of functioning was quite high [so] that you cannot label 
him as mentally retarded.”  This assessment was echoed, to some extent, by Dr. 
Haber, who testified for the defense that Arbelaez has “very limited intelligence” 
and is at least “close” to being “mildly mentally retarded,” but also acknowledged 
that Arbelaez had adapted to his environment and “appeared to be functioning 
behaviorally within an adequate range.”  In fact, Dr. Haber admitted that she 
“would not have thought about an IQ test” based on her brief pretrial evaluations in 
1988 and 1989. 
The trial court’s decision to assign greater weight to the comparatively 
modest assessments of Dr. Ruiz and Dr. Haber than it assigned to the 
 
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uncorroborated findings of Dr. Latterner was based on competent, substantial 
evidence and thus warrants deference on appeal.  Sochor, 883 So. 2d at 781.  This 
Court “will not substitute its judgment for that of the circuit court on questions of 
fact and, likewise, on the credibility of the witnesses and weight to be given to the 
evidence.”  Id. 
Because Arbelaez failed to present competent, substantial evidence that he 
suffers from mental retardation or major mental illness, his claim now rests upon 
the uncontested evidence of his low intelligence and his struggles with depression 
in Colombia, including his suicide attempts.  Arbelaez contends that this evidence 
might have altered the outcome of his penalty phase.  We disagree.  The jury heard 
plenty of evidence from which to arrive at a rough estimate of Arbelaez’s low 
intelligence level.  Arbelaez testified during the guilt phase of the trial and claimed 
that the boy’s death was an accidental drowning, despite the strong physical 
evidence of strangulation.  The State discredited Arbelaez’s testimony by 
introducing a videotaped confession in which Arbelaez recounted the facts of the 
crime in detail, making it clear that the crime was both premeditated and 
deliberate.  The jury therefore knew that Arbelaez had enough intelligence to plan 
and remember the details of the murder, as well as enough intelligence to concoct a 
patently false story to explain the boy’s death.  In fact, counsel appealed to the jury 
during the penalty phase’s closing argument to reflect on what Arbelaez’s 
 
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testimony revealed about his intellectual limitations: “[A]sk yourself … what was 
[Arbelaez’s] emotional or mental age. … You were able to listen and observe the 
man describing what he said he did.” 
This case is comparable to White v. State, 664 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1995), where 
we stated: 
[T]rial counsel’s performance was not rendered deficient by his 
failure to present to the jury data concerning White’s low IQ as 
evidenced in the PSI report.  The trial record contains extensive 
evidence documenting the deliberate nature of White’s actions before, 
during, and after the crime.  White himself took the stand and gave a 
detailed account of the crime and his actions.   
Id. at 244-45.   
Although we believe that expert testimony relating to Arbelaez’s low 
intelligence would have been vastly preferable and that counsel was deficient in 
failing to arrange for such testimony, we are confident that the presentation of such 
testimony would not have changed the outcome.  Given that the jury listened to 
Arbelaez’s testimony and also heard him explain on videotape how he executed a 
premeditated murder of a five-year-old boy to exact revenge on his former 
girlfriend, we do not believe that expert testimony about Arbelaez’s intellectual 
limitations, short of mental retardation or major mental illness, would have altered 
the jury’s perceptions to such an extent that it would have been swayed from its 
nearly unanimous recommendation of death.  See Damren v. State, 838 So. 2d 512, 
517 (Fla. 2003) (concluding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to present 
 
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evidence of minimal brain damage, “in light of the strong [CCP, HAC, and 
contemporaneous violent felony] aggravating factors which were present”); Sweet, 
810 So. 2d at 866 (concluding that mitigation evidence of the defendant’s “low-
average” IQ and his “personality disorder” would not “have led to the imposition 
of a sentence other than death, given the four strong aggravators” in the case); 
Brown v. State, 755 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2000) (concluding that mitigation evidence of 
the defendant’s low intelligence would not have altered the outcome of the trial, 
given the presence of strong aggravating factors); Haliburton v. Singletary, 691 So. 
2d 466, 471 (Fla. 1997) (holding that “[i]n light of the substantial, compelling 
aggravation found by the trial court, there is no reasonable probability that had the 
mental health expert testified [to his finding of a “strong indication of brain 
damage”], the outcome would have been different”).  
 
Evidence of Arbelaez’s struggles in Colombia with depression would have 
been equally unlikely to sway the jury.  Counsel for Arbelaez admitted at oral 
argument that Arbelaez’s suicide attempts and his hospitalization for severe 
depression all occurred before he moved to Florida as a young man.  During the 
more than ten years that Arbelaez spent outside of Colombia before committing 
murder at age 31, Arbelaez “just had everyday problems.”  He was neither 
hospitalized nor treated for depression.  He held numerous jobs and, by all 
accounts, learned to live independently despite his intellectual limitations.  This 
 
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case is therefore not one in which the defendant could have shown that he was 
struggling with severe depression and was contemplating suicide around the time 
of the crime.  Rather, Arbelaez struggled with these problems during his youth, 
more than a decade before the crime, and apparently found a way to control them 
as an adult.   
Again, this potential mitigation evidence is not strong enough to shake our 
confidence in the outcome of Arbelaez’s penalty phase.  Arbelaez was found to 
have committed a revenge murder of a young boy in a manner that was cold, 
calculated, and premeditated, as well as especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  
The jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of eleven to one.  Evidence 
that Arbelaez was hospitalized for severe depression as a youth but then did not 
require treatment or hospitalization for depression at any point during the decade 
leading up to the murder would not have been nearly enough to counterbalance the 
powerful aggravating factors in this case.  See Breedlove v. State, 692 So. 2d 874, 
878 (Fla. 1997) (finding no prejudice because the case’s strong aggravating factors 
would have “overwhelm[ed]” mitigation evidence of the defendant’s history of 
drug addiction and his troubled childhood); Tompkins v. Dugger, 549 So. 2d 1370, 
1373 (Fla. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990) (same); Buenoano v. Dugger, 
559 So. 2d 1116, 1119 (Fla. 1990) (“In our opinion the mitigation evidence . . . in 
no way would be sufficient to overcome the overwhelming evidence presented 
 
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against [the defendant] at trial. . . .  We do not believe the unfortunate 
circumstances of Buenoano’s childhood are so grave nor her emotional problems 
so extreme as to outweigh, under any view, the four applicable aggravating 
circumstances.”). 
C.  Family History of Abuse 
Most of Arbelaez’s immediate family lives in Medellin, Colombia.  
Arbelaez argues that counsel was ineffective in failing to call Arbelaez’s family 
members as witnesses during the penalty phase and also in his investigation of 
Arbelaez’s troubled background in Colombia.  Aside from Dr. Lopez’s general 
references to Arbelaez’s lifelong struggles with epilepsy, counsel did not present 
any evidence of Arbelaez’s background in Colombia.  Nevertheless, the trial court 
concluded that counsel “conducted a reasonable investigation” into Arbelaez’s 
history of abuse in Colombia.  The court also concluded that, having “discussed 
[with Arbelaez] the pros and cons of having his family members testify,” counsel 
had a “reasonable basis” for not calling the family members as penalty phase 
witnesses.  
Two of Arbelaez’s family members from Colombia testified at the 
evidentiary hearing.  One of his sisters, Amparo Arbelaez Alvarez, described his 
childhood in Colombia.  She testified to the troubled relationship between their 
mother and father and to her father’s abuse of the children.  She testified that her 
 
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brother was beaten on a daily basis “because he was stupid … [and] was doing 
really badly in studies.”  She testified that Arbelaez “wanted to kill himself” and 
drank poison on several occasions.  After one of his attempted suicides, she said, 
Arbelaez was sent to a mental hospital “far away.”  Amparo recalled speaking with 
counsel after trial about obtaining some of her brother’s medical records, but she 
testified that they never spoke about the possibility of her testifying at trial.  She 
claimed that she would have testified if asked.  Another one of Arbelaez’s sisters, 
Luz Marina Arbelaez Alvarez, testified to generally the same facts.  She, too, 
recalled that her brother attempted to poison himself and was sent to a mental 
hospital.  She recalled their father beating Arbelaez, and Arbelaez at times 
“trembl[ing] from hunger.”  She did not recall speaking with counsel at any point 
before the trial, but testified that she would have helped with the mitigation effort 
if asked. 
Counsel gave three reasonable strategic rationales for deciding not to call 
any of Arbelaez’s family members to testify at the penalty phase.  First, counsel 
testified that Arbelaez “did not want the family members here.”  He and Arbelaez 
agreed, after discussing the issue “at length,” that it would be too suspicious and 
therefore too dangerous for his family members to leave Colombia during a 
politically turbulent period.  When a defendant informs his attorney that he does 
not want his family members to testify on his behalf, the attorney is generally not 
 
- 23 -
found to be ineffective in failing to call the family members as witnesses.  See 
Rutherford, 727 So. 2d at 350; State v. Riechman, 777 So. 2d 342, 350 (Fla. 2000). 
Second, counsel feared that Arbelaez’s family members would either 
contradict Arbelaez’s guilt phase testimony or commit perjury, thereby creating a 
credibility problem.  Arbelaez testified at the guilt phase—against counsel’s 
wishes—that the boy’s death was an accident, which directly contradicted the story 
that Arbelaez had told his family.  Counsel concluded that, no matter how the 
family members testified, their testimony likely would weaken the defense.  We 
generally have found that strategic decisions of this sort “do not constitute 
deficient conduct if alternative courses of action have been considered and 
rejected.”  Valle, 778 So. 2d at 965. 
Third, counsel testified that he feared, based on his personal experience with 
“several of these cases where children are the victims,” that testimony about 
Arbelaez’s “rough childhood” in Colombia would be “very tricky” and might be 
counterproductive because the murder victim in this case was a five-year-old child.  
Counsel concluded that it would “do a disservice” to Arbelaez to present such 
evidence at the penalty phase.  Instead, counsel presented testimony that Arbelaez 
was a hard worker and a good roommate.  Counsel was not oblivious to Arbelaez’s 
background in Colombia.  He testified that he knew from his correspondence with 
the family that Arbelaez was poor, lacked an adequate education, struggled with 
 
- 24 -
acne problems, attempted to kill himself, and was sent to a Colombian mental 
hospital.  Dr. Castiello’s competency and sanity evaluation also recounted some of 
these facts.  Counsel’s decision not to present this testimony was a strategic one in 
which “alternative courses [were] considered and rejected.”  Gamble v. State, 877 
So. 2d 706, 714 (2004).  Counsel testified that he “thought [his] way through and 
had planned the best approach to the jury,” after receiving “input from [his] client.”  
We have generally denied relief where the attorney’s chosen strategy was to 
“humanize” the defendant rather than to portray him as psychologically troubled.  
See, e.g., Henry v. State, 862 So. 2d 679, 685-86 (Fla. 2003); Rutherford, 727 So. 
2d at 223; Haliburton, 691 So. 2d at 471; Bryan v. Dugger, 641 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 
1994). 
The combination of these three strategies, if not each alone, provides 
competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s ruling that counsel did 
not perform deficiently in declining to call Arbelaez’s family members during the 
penalty phase.  See Hamilton v. State, 875 So. 2d 586, 592 (Fla. 2004) (“Trial 
counsel was well prepared and well informed with respect to Hamilton’s family, 
and simply made a reasonable, tactical decision not to present certain family 
members during the penalty phase . . .”). 
There is also competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s 
ruling that counsel reasonably investigated Arbelaez’s background in Colombia.  
 
- 25 -
Counsel communicated multiple times with Arbelaez’s family members about 
Arbelaez’s background, searching for what he said “you could consider . . . 
potential mitigation.”  Counsel asked the family members to attempt to obtain 
documentation of Arbelaez’s mental health problems.  A message that Arbelaez’s 
family members left with counsel’s assistant shortly before the trial confirmed that 
the family was attempting to locate hospital records.  However, in a letter sent to 
counsel shortly before the penalty phase, Arbelaez’s mother wrote that she “tried to 
get [Arbelaez’s] medical records from the hospital [but] was not able to obtain 
them.”  Counsel also obtained a letter from the Colombian government, dated 
April 1988, stating that none of Arbelaez’s medical records could be found in the 
historical archives but that the social services department would continue its 
search. 
Counsel reasonably relied on these representations from the people and 
institutions best positioned to obtain mitigation evidence in Colombia.  In 
hindsight, perhaps counsel could have been more aggressive in his investigation.  
But “[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 984 
(Fla. 2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).  As this Court stated in Marshall 
v. State, 854 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 2003), “A fair assessment of attorney performance 
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, 
 
- 26 -
. . . and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Id. at 
1247 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 
Arbelaez suggests that counsel should have hired an investigator to travel to 
Colombia or should have gone to Colombia himself to obtain mitigation evidence.  
At the evidentiary hearing, Arbelaez introduced three documents from Colombia 
that his postconviction counsel obtained through investigators: an affidavit from 
Arbelaez’s sixth-grade teacher, who described Arbelaez as a “poor student” with 
“mental problems”; a letter from Dr. Luis Alfonso Arango Tobon, an emergency 
doctor with Colombian social services, who had “treated [Arbelaez] for a suicidal 
attempt and depression” in 1976; and a letter from Dr. Ernesto Botero Ramirez, a 
psychiatrist who had treated Arbelaez in Colombia with electroshock while 
Arbelaez was hospitalized for a suicide attempt.  Even if Arbelaez had managed to 
prove deficient performance, these three documents would not suffice to show 
prejudice.  Although the documents do contain some new information––most 
notably, that Arbelaez was treated with electroshock after one of his suicide 
attempts––they largely confirm facts counsel already knew from Arbelaez or his 
family.  In particular, counsel knew at the time of the penalty phase that Arbelaez 
had been poor, had struggled with depression, had attempted suicide, had spent 
time in a Colombian mental hospital, and had received an inadequate education.  
Counsel considered asking Arbelaez’s family members to testify to these facts.  
 
- 27 -
Ultimately, however, he decided not to present testimony about Arbelaez’s 
childhood because he feared it would be counterproductive given that Arbelaez 
himself had cut short the childhood of his five-year-old murder victim.  Arbelaez 
has essentially presented cumulative evidence to argue against counsel’s 
reasonable strategic choice. 
A comparison with the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), confirms that counsel’s investigation of Arbelaez’s 
background satisfied the constitutional requirements.  In Wiggins, “counsel 
abandoned their investigation of [the defendant’s] background after having 
acquired only a rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow set of 
sources.”  Id. at 524.  In contrast, counsel in this case acquired more than a 
rudimentary knowledge of his client’s background.  He testified that, in preparation 
for trial, he knew most of the major facts about Arbelaez’s troubled background.  
Whereas counsel in Wiggins “abandon[ed] their investigation at an unreasonable 
juncture,” id. at 527, counsel here never truly abandoned his investigation.  Rather, 
he waited for either Arbelaez’s family members or the Colombian government to 
send him any available documentation of Arbelaez’s mental health history as they 
assured him they would.  Counsel’s performance was not “unreasonable under 
prevailing professional norms.”  Valle, 778 So. 2d at 965.  The trial court was 
 
- 28 -
justified in concluding that counsel did not perform at a constitutionally deficient 
level in investigating Arbelaez’s background in Colombia. 
III. OTHER CLAIMS ON APPEAL 
 
We briefly discuss Arbelaez’s other claims.  These are (A) denial of his 
motion to disqualify the trial judge; (B) denial of his motion to exclude the 
testimony of a death row mental health counselor; and (C) denial of his 
supplemental claims based on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
A.  Motion for Disqualification 
After we remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing, Arbelaez 
moved to disqualify the trial judge, Leslie B. Rothenberg.  He alleged that the 
judge’s comments in a separate capital case, that of Gerardo Manso, Manso v. 
State, 704 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1997), raised a reasonable fear that Arbelaez would not 
receive a fair and impartial hearing.  Manso had alleged in his own disqualification 
motion that “Judge Rothenberg stated that if found competent to proceed, the 
Defendant would be getting a jolt of electricity which the undersigned takes to 
mean a sentence of death.”  Judge Rothenberg granted Manso’s disqualification 
motion, but later denied Arbelaez’s motion as legally insufficient.  Arbelaez 
appeals that denial. 
 
- 29 -
Whether a motion to disqualify the judge is legally sufficient is a question of 
law we review de novo.  See, e.g., Chamberlain v. State, 881 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 
2004); Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 842 (Fla. 2002).  Such a motion will be 
deemed legally insufficient if it fails to establish a “well-grounded fear on the part 
of the movant that he will not receive a fair hearing.”  Arbelaez, 775 So. 2d at 916 
(citing Correll v. State, 698 So. 2d 522, 524 (Fla. 1997)).  A mere “subjective 
fear[]” of bias will not be legally sufficient; rather, the fear must be objectively 
reasonable.  Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240, 242 (Fla. 1986).  The primary 
consideration is whether the facts alleged, if true, would place a reasonably prudent 
person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.  Id. 
 
Arbelaez failed to allege facts sufficient to establish a “well-grounded fear” 
that he would not receive a fair and impartial hearing before Judge Rothenberg.  
Nothing in Arbelaez’s motion directly linked the judge’s alleged comment in the 
Manso case to Arbelaez.  Although the comment certainly evinced a predisposition 
regarding the outcome of Manso’s case––namely, that Judge Rothenberg intended 
to impose a sentence of death––the comment did not, on its face, evince a 
predisposition about all capital cases or show a personal bias or prejudice against 
Arbelaez simply because he was a capital defendant.  Arbelaez, 775 So. 2d at 916 
(citing Tafero v. State, 403 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1981)).  Arbelaez essentially argues 
that Judge Rothenberg was biased toward all capital defendants.  As we stated in 
 
- 30 -
Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 2000), however, such serious allegations of 
judicial bias “cannot be left to surmise from differing interpretations.”  Id. at 952. 
Arbelaez also asks us to revisit the denial of his previous, unsuccessful 
motion to disqualify Judge Rothenberg.  See Arbelaez, 775 So. 2d at 916.  He 
argues that, in light of the recent allegations in the Manso case, Judge 
Rothenberg’s “tough-on-crime” judicial campaign and her prosecutorial 
background have taken on new meaning.  We decline Arbelaez’s request.  Nothing 
about Judge Rothenberg’s judicial campaign or prosecutorial background has 
changed over the past four years.  The trial court’s denial of Arbelaez’s recent 
disqualification motion, like its denial of his initial disqualification motion, was 
proper. 
B.  Testimony by State-Employed Mental Health Expert 
 
Before the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Arbelaez sought to exclude 
the testimony of Lisa Wiley, an employee of the Florida Department of Corrections 
who provided mental health services to Arbelaez while he was on death row.  
Arbelaez argued that Wiley’s testimony would violate his Fifth Amendment rights 
because Wiley interrogated Arbelaez in prison without administering Miranda1 
warnings or obtaining his consent to her testimony.  The trial court denied the 
motion, concluding that Miranda requirements did not apply and that Arbelaez had 
                                          
 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
- 31 -
waived any relevant privilege.  Wiley testified at the evidentiary hearing.  Arbelaez 
now appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion, arguing that Wiley’s testimony 
violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Because Arbelaez 
failed to raise his Fourteenth Amendment claim before the trial court, it is 
procedurally barred.  See, e.g., Duest v. Dugger, 555 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1990).   
We reject Arbelaez’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims on the merits.  The 
United States Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment does not apply 
once the defendant’s “sentence has been fixed and the judgment of conviction has 
become final,” which describes the circumstances under which Arbelaez met with 
Wiley on death row.  Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 326 (1999) (citing 
Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 513 (1960)) (“[W]here there can be no 
further incrimination, there is no basis for the assertion of the privilege.”).  
Similarly, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to critical stages “of the 
prosecution,” United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967), not to 
postconviction meetings after the defendant has been fully prosecuted. 
Even if Wiley’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing had violated Arbelaez’s 
Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights, we would conclude that those violations were 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The circuit court did not rely upon Wiley’s 
testimony in reaching its decision to deny postconviction relief. 
 
- 32 -
C.  The Supplemental Ring and Atkins Claims 
We remanded this case to the trial court solely for an evidentiary hearing on 
the issue of whether Arbelaez’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue 
penalty phase mitigation evidence.  After the hearing but before a ruling, Arbelaez 
attempted to supplement his rule 3.850 motion with arguments based on two recent 
Supreme Court decisions, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  The trial court rejected the supplemental motion as 
beyond the scope of our remand.  We review such decisions under an “abuse of 
discretion” standard.  See Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 916 (Fla. 2000).  Although 
we recognize that it might have been more efficient for the trial court to hear 
Arbelaez’s Ring and Atkins claims during the remand, we cannot say that the trial 
court abused its discretion in declining to hear them.  The trial court was justified 
in adhering strictly to our instructions on remand and dismissing the supplemental 
motion. 
For purposes of efficiency, however, we note that Arbelaez’s Ring and 
Atkins claims would certainly fail on the merits.  Contemporaneously with the 
conviction for first-degree murder, the jury also convicted Arbelaez of kidnapping.  
Id. at 911.  That conviction became the basis for one of the aggravating factors the 
trial court found.  See Arbelaez, 775 So. 2d at 912.  This Court has repeatedly 
dismissed arguments under Ring where one of the aggravating factors is a previous 
 
- 33 -
or contemporaneous conviction.  See, e.g., Kimbrough v. State, 29 Fla. L. Weekly 
S323 (Fla. June 24, 2004); Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2004); Doorbal 
v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 963 (Fla.), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 962 (2003). 
Arbelaez cannot feed Atkins through Ring.  He contends that, after Atkins, 
the absence of mental retardation is now an element of capital murder that, under 
Ring, the jury must consider and find beyond a reasonable doubt.  We have 
rejected such arguments.  See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002) 
(rejecting the defendant’s Atkins claim on the ground that the trial judge had found 
the defendant not to be mentally retarded).  Other state supreme courts have 
reached the same conclusion.  See, e.g., Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 619-21 (Ga. 
2003); Russell v. State, 849 So. 2d 95, 148 (Miss. 2003); State v. Williams, 831 
So. 2d 835, 860 n.35 (La. 2002).  Arbelaez has no right under Ring and Atkins to a 
jury determination of whether he is mentally retarded.2 
IV. HABEAS CORPUS 
 
Arbelaez also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, contending 
that his appellate counsel, the same attorney who served as his trial counsel, was 
                                          
 
2 Arbelaez also asserts that he is preserving his right to request a determination of 
whether he is mentally retarded for purposes of Atkins.  The procedure for 
requesting such a determination is provided in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.203, which became effective on October 1, 2004.  See Amendments to Fla. R. 
Crim. P. and Fla. R. App. P., 875 So. 2d 563, 565 (Fla. 2004).  Rule 3.203(d)(4)(E) 
governs Arbelaez’s circumstances.  Arbelaez must pursue his mental retardation 
claim in accordance with the new rule.  We express no opinion on the merits of 
such a claim. 
 
- 34 -
ineffective in failing to raise five separate issues on direct appeal.  The standard of 
review for Arbelaez’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel “mirrors 
the Strickland v. Washington standard for claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness.”  
Valle v. Moore, 837 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. 2002).  The unique attributes of 
appellate counsel claims were explained in Valle: 
[A]ppellate counsel cannot be considered ineffective … for failing to 
raise issues that were not properly raised during the trial court 
proceedings and do not present a question of fundamental error.  The 
same is true for claims without merit because appellate counsel cannot 
be deemed ineffective for failing to raise nonmeritorious claims on 
appeal.  In fact, appellate counsel is not necessarily ineffective for 
failing to raise a claim that might have had some possibility of 
success; effective appellate counsel need not raise every conceivable 
nonfrivolous issue. 
Valle, 837 So. 2d at 907-08 (citations omitted).  We now apply this standard to 
each of Arbelaez’s habeas claims.  
A. Admission of Photographs of the Victim’s Body 
 
At trial, counsel objected to the admission of every photograph depicting the 
victim’s body.  Arbelaez, 775 So. 2d at 920.  Arbelaez argued in his 3.850 motion 
that the photographs were prejudicial and cumulative, but we held that his claim 
was procedurally barred because the issue had not been raised on direct appeal.  Id. 
at 919-20.  Arbelaez now argues that his appellate counsel’s failure to challenge 
the admissibility of the photographs amounted to ineffective assistance.  We 
disagree.  The admission of photographic evidence is “within the trial judge’s 
 
- 35 -
discretion and a trial judge’s ruling on this issue will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless there is a clear showing of abuse.”  Davis v. State, 875 So. 2d 359, 373 (Fla. 
2003) (quoting Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 646 (Fla. 2000)).  Appellate 
counsel would not have been able to show an abuse of discretion. 
At trial, counsel objected to ten photographs of the victim’s body, all of 
which the court admitted.  Four depicted the victim lying on the dock, where he 
was placed when he was pulled from the water.  Six depicted the victim’s autopsy.  
The trial court said of the dock photographs: “I don’t find [them] to be excessively 
gruesome, and they are relevant to show where the child was found . . . by the 
people who brought his body onto the dock.”  The court initially questioned 
whether one of the photographs was cumulative, but concluded that it “seems to 
depict something other than what [the similar] picture depicts . . . they are both 
relevant and they are not excessively gruesome.”  As for the autopsy photographs, 
the trial court admitted them after the medical examiner testified they would assist 
him in explaining to the jury the autopsy and his findings.  The autopsy 
photographs showed injuries to the victim’s thigh and torso, as well as various 
different angles of the injuries to the victim’s face and head. 
“We have consistently upheld the admission of allegedly gruesome 
photographs where they were independently relevant or corroborative of other 
evidence.”  Czubak v. State, 570 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990).  As we stated in 
 
- 36 -
Henderson v. State, 463 So. 2d 196 (1985), “Those whose work products are 
murdered human beings should expect to be confronted by photographs of their 
accomplishments.”  Id. at 200.  All ten photographs were deemed relevant either to 
the crime scene technician’s explanation of the location of the victim’s body, to the 
medical examiner’s explanation of the findings of the autopsy, or as proof that the 
victim was strangled and did not die by accidental drowning as Arbelaez claimed.  
Each of these is clearly a legitimate basis for admitting photographs of a murder 
victim.  See Hertz v. State, 803 So. 2d 629, 641-43 (Fla. 2001) (finding no abuse of 
discretion where the photos were “relevant to show the position and location of the 
bodies when they were found” and to “assist[] the crime scene technician in 
describing the crime scene” and were “probative of the medical examiner’s 
determination as to the manner of the victims’ deaths”). 
The fact that the victim here was a young child does not alter the analysis.  
See, e.g., Chavez v. State, 832 So. 2d 730, 763 (Fla. 2002) (affirming the 
admission into evidence of allegedly “cumulative gruesome photographs” 
depicting the body a murdered “little boy”).  Nor does the sheer number of non-
cumulative photographs.  See Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336, 1342-43 (Fla. 1990) 
(rejecting the notion that seven non-cumulative photographs of a charred murder 
victim “constituted an unnecessarily large number of inflammatory photographs,” 
even though they were “extremely gruesome”).  The photographs were not 
 
- 37 -
cumulative and were relevant to disputed issues.  The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting the photographs.  Arbelaez has therefore failed to show that 
his appellate counsel was ineffective, because any challenge to the photographs 
would have lacked merit.  See Valle, 837 So. 2d at 908 (“[A]ppellate counsel 
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise nonmeritorious claims on 
appeal.”). 
B.  Restriction on Defense Cross-Examination as to Bias 
Arbelaez also argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to 
challenge the trial court’s decision to cut off a line of questioning relating to the 
bias of prosecution witness Pedro Salazar.  During the cross-examination of 
Salazar by counsel, the following exchange took place:  
DEFENSE: Where is your father? 
SALAZAR: In Colombia. 
DEFENSE: Why is he in Colombia? 
STATE:  
Objection.  There is no relevance. 
COURT:  
Sustained. … Next question? 
DEFENSE: Sir, when was the last time you answer [sic] your father? 
STATE:  
Objection to the question. 
DEFENSE:  May we approach? 
COURT:   Yes. 
STATE:   
Go ahead. 
DEFENSE: His father is a fugitive from a federal charge.  My 
understanding is that this man is on probation for a money 
laundering charge.  My understanding is that – 
STATE:   
Which man? 
DEFENSE: This man over here.  There is only one man on the stand here.  
That is it. 
 
- 38 -
STATE:  
I’m asking him to ask proper impeachment questions.  Counsel 
knows what the question is.  Let him ask it in the appropriate 
way. 
COURT:   Please.  Why is this relevant, first? 
DEFENSE: Judge, this man has been led by the State to answer specific 
questions in a specific manner, almost like a puppet.  When 
they pull him he say [sic] the right words.  He is a fugitive from 
justice, and that is his father. 
STATE:   
The jury can hear him better than I can right now. 
COURT:   The objection is sustained. 
 
Although Arbelaez claims that the trial court prevented him from eliciting 
the fact that the witness, Salazar, was on probation for a money laundering charge, 
the transcript reveals that the State objected to a line of questioning about the 
witness’s father being a fugitive.  Counsel did allude, at sidebar, to the witness 
being on probation for a money laundering charge, but the questions to which the 
State objected were not probative of that fact.   
Because counsel never asked the witness about his being on probation for a 
money laundering charge, and because the State never objected to such a line of 
questioning, no factual basis existed to argue that it was reversible error to restrict 
questioning about the witness’s probationary status.  Nor could appellate counsel 
have argued that it was reversible error for the trial court to restrict questioning 
related to the witness’s father’s fugitive status.  See Smith v. State, 194 So. 2d 310, 
312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966) (“There is no precedent for this novel approach that 
counsel may attempt to impeach a witness by showing that close relatives of the 
 
- 39 -
witness have a criminal record.”).  Arbelaez’s appellate counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective for failing to raise an issue that was wholly lacking in factual support. 
C.  Jury Instructions for the HAC and CCP Aggravators 
 
Arbelaez argued in his 3.850 motion that his trial counsel was ineffective in 
failing to object to the jury instructions for the “heinous, atrocious or cruel” (HAC) 
and “cold, calculated and premeditated” (CCP) aggravating factors as being 
unconstitutionally vague.  Arbelaez, 775 So. 2d at 919 n.8.  We rejected this claim 
as procedurally barred because “[o]n direct appeal, Arbelaez did not challenge the 
vagueness of the HAC and CCP instructions, but only the applicability of these 
factors to his case.”  Id. (citing Arbelaez, 626 So. 2d at 176-77).  Arbelaez now 
reformulates his argument as a claim for ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.   
There is no question that the standard HAC jury instructions in effect at the 
time of Arbelaez’s trial were unconstitutionally vague under the holding of 
Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992), and the standard CCP instructions were 
unconstitutionally vague under the holding of Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 
1994).  Both Espinosa and Jackson, however, were decided after the trial in 
Arbelaez’s case.  Arbelaez did not object to the content of the HAC or CCP 
instructions at trial.  Arbelaez, 775 So. 2d at 919 n.8.  For this reason alone, the 
vagueness of those instructions could not have been raised by Arbelaez’s counsel 
 
- 40 -
on appeal.  This Court has repeatedly held that “[t]he contemporaneous objection 
rule applies to Espinosa error, i.e., a specific objection on the form of the 
instruction must be made to the trial court to preserve the issue for appeal.”  
Hodges v. State, 619 So. 2d 272, 273 (Fla.), cert. denied 510 U.S. 996 (1993); see 
also Nelson v. State, 850 So. 2d 514, 525 (Fla.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 961 
(2003); Melendez v. State, 612 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 1992).  Similarly, we have 
required a contemporaneous objection in order to preserve a challenge to vague 
CCP instructions.  See, e.g., Jackson, 648 So. 2d at 90 (“Claims that the instruction 
on the [CCP] aggravator is unconstitutionally vague are procedurally barred unless 
a specific objection is made at trial and pursued on appeal.”) (citing James v. State, 
615 So. 2d 668, 669 & n.3 (Fla. 1993)).  Because Arbelaez’s Espinosa and Jackson 
claims would have been procedurally barred, his appellate counsel was not 
ineffective in failing to raise them on appeal. 
D. Jury Instructions for the Murder In the Course of a Felony Aggravator 
At the penalty phase of Arbelaez’s trial, the jury was instructed that it could 
consider as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the murder was committed 
during the course of a kidnapping.  The State told the jury during its closing 
argument that this murder in the course of a felony aggravator had already been 
established by virtue of Arbelaez’s contemporaneous kidnapping conviction:  “You 
found that the defendant was guilty of kidnapping, so clearly the murder of [the 
 
- 41 -
child] occurred while the defendant was kidnapping this child.  There is no 
question about that.”  Arbelaez argued in his 3.850 motion that his trial counsel 
was ineffective in failing to object to the jury instructions for the murder in the 
course of a felony aggravator, which in his view established an impermissible 
automatic aggravating factor.  Arbelaez, 775 So. 2d at 919 n.8.  We rejected his 
claim as procedurally barred, because it was not raised on direct appeal.  Id.  
Arbelaez now argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to 
challenge both the jury instructions and the State’s comments during closing 
argument. 
We find no merit to Arbelaez’s argument.  We have repeatedly rejected 
defendants’ claims that “the aggravating circumstance that the murder was 
committed in the course of committing a specified felony is unconstitutional 
because it constitutes an automatic aggravator and does not narrow the class of 
persons eligible for the death penalty.”  Ault v. State, 866 So. 2d 674, 686 (Fla. 
2003); see also Hitchcock v. State, 755 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 2000); Blanco v. 
State, 706 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997); Banks v. State, 700 So. 2d 363, 367 (Fla. 
1997); Clark v. State, 443 So. 2d 973, 978 (Fla. 1983).  Because Arbelaez’s 
challenge to the jury instructions clearly would have failed on appeal, his appellate 
counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise the issue. 
 
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As to the State’s allegedly improper comments during closing argument, 
Arbelaez would have been procedurally barred from challenging those comments 
on appeal.  This Court has stated that, “[a]s a general rule, the failure to raise a 
contemporaneous objection when improper closing arguments are made waives 
any claim concerning such comments for appellate review.”  Card v. State, 803 So. 
2d 613, 622 (Fla. 2001) (citing Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 898 (Fla. 2000)).  
Arbelaez did not object to the allegedly improper comments in the State’s closing 
argument, nor did those comments constitute fundamental error for which no 
objection would be required.  See, e.g., Cherry v. Moore, 829 So. 2d 873, 882 (Fla. 
2002) (explaining that improper comments in closing argument must be relatively 
“egregious” to constitute fundamental error).  Thus, Arbelaez waived his right to 
challenge the State’s comments on appeal.  Arbelaez’s appellate counsel was not 
deficient in failing to raise a procedurally barred claim. 
E. The Vienna Convention 
Finally, Arbelaez argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing 
to challenge the State’s alleged violation of the Vienna Convention in its dealings 
with Arbelaez, who is a Colombian citizen.  See Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, April 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77, 101, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (requiring 
United States authorities to “inform the [defendant] without delay of his rights” to 
communicate with consular officers from his country of citizenship).  Because 
 
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Arbelaez failed to raise or preserve the issue of the alleged Vienna Convention 
violation, his appellate counsel would have been procedurally barred from raising 
the issue on appeal.  See, e.g., Riechmann, 777 So. 2d at 365 (stating that 
“appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise this [Vienna 
Convention] issue because it was not raised or preserved at trial”).  Again, 
Arbelaez’s appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a 
procedurally barred claim. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Arbelaez’s 
motion for postconviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, and we deny 
Arbelaez’s petition for habeas corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County,  
Leslie Rothenberg, Judge - Case No. 88-5546 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
 
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Todd G. Scher, Special Assistant, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Miami, 
Florida and Marian Garcia Perez, Assistant CCRC-South, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Leslie T. Campbell 
and Debra Rescigno, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent