Case Title: State v. Henley

Citation: 141 Ariz. 465, 687 P.2d 1220

Docket Number: 6128-PR

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1984-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
141 Ariz. 465 (1984) 687 P.2d 1220 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jack Glenn HENLEY, Appellant. No. 6128-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. May 1, 1984. Reconsideration Denied June 5, 1984. *466 Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer III and Jack Roberts, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Diana G. Montgomery, Globe, for appellant. CAMERON, Justice. Defendant, Jack Glenn Henley, was convicted and adjudged guilty of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class 3 felony, and sentenced to a mitigated prison term of six years on each count under A.R.S. §§ 13-1203, 13-1204(A)(1) & (2), 13-604(G), and 13-701, to be served concurrently. The defendant appealed and the Court of Appeals, Division Two, issued a memorandum decision reversing the defendant's conviction. We granted the State's petition for review. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. Art. 6, § 5(3), Rule 31.19, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., and A.R.S. § 12-120.24. The issues we must decide on appeal are: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter are as follow. On 5 November 1981 an altercation occurred at the Drift Inn Bar in Globe, Arizona. Initially, Gary Beagle and William Waldie engaged in a fist-fight outside the bar. Janice Beagle, Gary Beagle's wife, tried to pull William Waldie away from Mr. Beagle. Mrs. Beagle was in turn pulled away from Mr. Waldie by defendant, who allegedly threw her on the ground and began hitting her. Mrs. Beagle screamed for her husband, who broke away from Mr. Waldie and chased defendant back inside the bar. Defendant then allegedly obtained a gun and aimed and fired a shot at Mr. Beagle. This bullet hit Mr. Beagle, traveled through his body, and entered and lodged in the body of Mr. Waldie, who was standing behind Mr. Beagle. Mr. Beagle and Mr. Waldie were both hospitalized. A colostomy was performed upon Mr. Beagle. An exploratory laparotomy was performed upon Mr. Waldie and a bullet was removed from the wall of his stomach. The defendant was charged with, convicted, and adjudged *467 guilty of two counts of aggravated assault. He appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the case should have been tried to a twelve-person jury rather than an eight-person jury. We granted the State's petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING The trial judge in this case apparently thought that he was precluded from imposing consecutive sentences: We do not agree. A person is guilty of assault if he A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(1). The accused is guilty of aggravated assault if when committing assault he "causes serious physical injury to another" or "uses a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument." A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(1) & (2). Because defendant's objective was to shoot Gary Beagle, his conduct toward Mr. Beagle was intentional. A.R.S. § 13-105(5)(a). Defendant's conduct toward Mr. Waldie could fit under the "reckless" prong of A.R.S. § 13-105(5)(c) because Bill Waldie was standing behind Gary Beagle when the shot was fired. The defendant may also be found guilty of "double aggravated assault" under another statute: A.R.S. § 13-203. This statute essentially codifies the common law concept of transferred intent. As our Court of Appeals has stated: State v. Gunter, 132 Ariz. 64, 69, 643 P.2d 1034, 1039 (App. 1982). Although the court in Gunter, supra, was specifically addressing the word "offense" under the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution, this same reasoning applies when determining culpability for multiple aggravated assaults under our criminal code. When the act of firing one bullet results in two persons being injured, the person firing the bullet is responsible for two separate and distinct injuries and therefore has committed two assaults. This is so even though he has only committed one act and may only have had one "original" intent. Because both counts are punishable under the same sections of the law, consecutive sentences would not have constituted double punishment in violation of our double punishment statute, A.R.S. § 13-116. Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 20, 357 P.2d 839, 844, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 612 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 823, 81 S. Ct. 708, 5 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1961), quoted in Gunter, supra, 132 Ariz. at 70, 643 P.2d at 1040. Accord, State v. Warren, 124 Ariz. 396, 404, 604 P.2d 660, 668 (App. 1979). There is neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to receive concurrent sentences for two separate offenses, see A.R.S. § 13-708; State v. Wesley, 131 Ariz. 246, 248, 640 P.2d 177, 179 (1982). Defendant Henley could have received consecutive sentences of fifteen years each for a maximum prison term of thirty years. RIGHT TO A TWELVE-PERSON JURY Defendant asserts that his conviction should be reversed on appeal because he had a right to a twelve-person jury. We agree. Admittedly, the United States Supreme Court has held that a twelve-person jury "is not a necessary ingredient of `trial by jury'," Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 1898, 26 L. Ed. 2d 446, 453 (1970). Our state constitution, however, states: Ariz. Const. Art. 2, § 23. One of our relevant statutes reads: A.R.S. § 21-102(A). Also, we look to the possible cumulative sentences in each case and not just the possible sentence for each count or charge. See, e.g., State v. Buffum, 125 Ariz. 488, 489, 610 P.2d 1049, 1050 (1980); State v. Madison, 114 Ariz. 221, 224, 560 P.2d 405, 408 (1977); State v. Parker, 22 Ariz. App. 111, 115, 524 P.2d 506, 510 (1974). Because defendant in the present case could have received two consecutive sentences of fifteen years, regardless of the sentence he actually did receive, he had a right to a twelve-person jury. FUNDAMENTAL ERROR AND HARMLESS ERROR In the instant case, the defendant did not timely object to the eight-man jury. We have stated that: State v. Sorrell, 132 Ariz. 328, 329, 330, 645 P.2d 1242, 1243, 1244 (1982). Accord, State v. Deschamps, 105 Ariz. 530, 532, 468 P.2d 383, 385 (1970); State v. Sanchez, 130 Ariz. 295, 298, 635 P.2d 1217, 1220 (App. 1981). *469 In the present case the error is fundamental because it violates a state constitutional provision. See Sorrell, supra, 132 Ariz. at 330, 645 P.2d at 1244; Thomas, supra, 130 Ariz. at 436, 636 P.2d at 1218. Because we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not significantly contribute to the defendant's conviction, the error is also harmful. We cannot predict, for example, whether four additional jurors would have found defendant Henley guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's conviction must be reversed. We believe it important to note the holdings of two recent decisions by our Court of Appeals. In the first case the defendant was faced with a possible sentence of at least thirty years and was tried by an eight-person jury. After the jury deliberated and returned a verdict the trial judge allowed the state to withdraw certain allegations of prior felonies, thus reducing defendant's possible sentence to less than thirty years. The defendant was then sentenced by the court. In reversing the defendant's conviction, Division One of the Court of Appeals stated that State v. Fancy, 139 Ariz. 76, 79, 676 P.2d 1134, 1137 (App. 1983). In the second case, the trial judge realized during trial that defendant's possible sentence totaled at least thirty years due to the type of crime charged, the defendant's admission of two prior felony convictions, and the state's allegation of two prior convictions. Over the defendant's objection, the trial judge reduced the charge from theft to attempted theft thereby decreasing defendant's possible sentence to less than thirty years, and the trial continued. Division Two of the Court of Appeals upheld the guilty verdict handed down by an eight-person jury. State v. Thompson, 139 Ariz. 133, 134, 677 P.2d 296, 297 (App. 1983). The Thompson court reasoned that the conviction did not require reversal because "the theft charge was amended prior to the submission to the jury." The difference between Thompson and Fancy is that in Fancy the jury was able to find the defendant guilty of offenses that could result in sentences of thirty or more years, while in Thompson the jury did not have this ability. Id. Accord, State v. Cook, 122 Ariz. 539, 541, 596 P.2d 374, 376 (1979) (court held it was proper to allow the state to withdraw allegation of a prior conviction at the close of defendant's case, thereby reducing defendant's possible sentence to less than thirty years). Believing that both Fancy, supra, and Thompson, supra, were properly decided, we denied review in both cases on 22 February 1984. We find no conflict between the holding in this case and the holdings of the two cases of Fancy, supra, and Thompson, supra. Defendant's conviction is reversed and his case remanded for a new trial with a twelve-person jury. HOLOHAN, C.J., GORDON, V.C.J., and HAYS and FELDMAN, JJ., concur.