Case Title: Kenneth Allen Stewart v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC01-1998

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2003-09-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC01-1998
____________
KENNETH ALLEN STEWART,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[September 11, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Kenneth Allen Stewart, appeals his sentence of death after his
resentencing.  We have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The underlying facts are detailed in our decision on Stewart's direct appeal. 
See Stewart v. State, 558 So. 2d 416, 418 (Fla. 1990).  The essential facts,
however, are as follows.  Stewart walked into a bar and convinced one Ruben Diaz
to give him a ride in his car.  Once in the car, Stewart pulled a gun and ordered Diaz
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1993) (requiring trial court to
conduct separate evidentiary hearing after jury's recommendation to (a) give the
defendant, his counsel, and the State an opportunity to be heard; (b) afford, if
appropriate, both the State and the defendant an opportunity to present additional
evidence; and (c) allow both sides to comment on or rebut information in any
presentence or medical report).
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to drive to a wooded area.  He then ordered Diaz out of the car and made him lie
on the ground with his hands on his head.  After removing the cash from Diaz's
wallet, Stewart shot Diaz twice in the head, killing him.  He then set Diaz's car on
fire to destroy the fingerprints.
Stewart was initially sentenced to death.  We reversed that sentence because
the trial court failed to give a requested instruction on the statutory mitigating
circumstance of impaired capacity even though the defense presented evidence on
that defense.  See Stewart, 558 So. 2d at 416.  On remand, Stewart was
resentenced to death and we affirmed that sentence.  See Stewart v. State, 620 So.
2d 177 (Fla. 1993).  During postconviction proceedings, Stewart and the State
agreed that Stewart would waive any potential guilt-phase claims and the State
would agree to a new sentencing.  By a seven-to-five vote, the jury again
recommended a sentence of death.  After conducting a Spencer1 hearing, the trial
judge sentenced Stewart to death.  The court found three aggravating
circumstances: (1) Stewart previously had been convicted of violent felonies (one
2.  Stewart first argues that he was entitled to a special jury instruction on the
nonstatutory mitigation presented.  We have repeatedly rejected this argument.  See,
e.g., San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1349 (Fla. 1997).  Second, Stewart
argues that death-qualifying aggravators must be alleged in the indictment and
individually found by a jury.  We have repeatedly rejected this argument as well. 
See, e.g., Kormondy v. State, 845 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 2003).  Finally, Stewart argues
that Florida's death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it permits a jury
recommendation of death by a bare majority vote.  When the defendant has been
convicted of a prior violent felony, as Stewart has, we have rejected the argument
that a jury's recommendation of death must be unanimous.  See, e.g., Doorbal v.
State, 837 So. 2d 940, 963 (Fla.) cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2647 (2003).
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first-degree murder, two attempted murders, an aggravated assault, and two
robbery convictions); (2) he was under a sentence of imprisonment at the time of
the murder; and (3) he committed the murder for pecuniary gain.  The court found
the two statutory mitigating factors – his extreme mental disturbance at the time of
the shooting and his inability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. 
The judge gave “some” weight to both factors even though she concluded that
Stewart's mental disturbance was not extreme and his impairment was not
substantial.  The court also found and weighed nonstatutory mitigation.
II.  ISSUES ON APPEAL
Stewart raises five issues on appeal.  We summarily reject the first three
because we have repeatedly addressed the same issues.2  Therefore, we address
only claims 4 and 5, asserting that the trial court failed to properly weigh the
3.  In a footnote, Stewart argues that the State's expert had a conflict of
interest because he was a witness for the defense in the original penalty phase. 
Stewart admitted that this issue was not preserved for review.  Accordingly, this
subissue is procedurally barred.  See Lugo v. State, 845 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2003)
(nonfundamental errors are procedurally barred unless they have been preserved for
review).  
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mitigation and that Stewart's death sentence is disproportionate.
A. The Trial Court's Weighing of Mitigation
Appellant argues that the trial court failed to give enough weight to the two
statutory mental mitigators it found.  We review this claim under an abuse of
discretion standard.  Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. 1997).  The mental
health experts presented conflicting testimony about the existence and extent of the
two statutory mental mitigators.  The defense's experts testified that Stewart's
mental condition was "extreme" and "substantial," while the State's expert testified
it was not.3  The trial court found the two statutory mental mitigators, but gave them
only "some" weight.  
Stewart essentially wants us to reevaluate the evidence and assign different
weight to the mitigating factors.  As we have said before, however:
[E]xpert testimony alone does not require a finding of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance.  Even uncontroverted opinion testimony can
be rejected, especially when it is hard to reconcile with the other
evidence presented in the case.  As long as the court considered all of
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the evidence, the trial judge's determination of lack of mitigation will
stand absent a palpable abuse of discretion.
Foster v. State, 679 So. 2d 747, 755 (Fla. 1996) (citations omitted).
The sentencing order shows that the trial court considered, but ultimately
rejected, the defense expert’s testimony about the severity of Stewart's mental
condition.  Under Foster, the trial court could have totally rejected the statutory
mitigators.  Instead, however, it found that the two statutory mental mitigators
existed but reduced the weight given to them based on its findings about the
severity of Stewart's mental condition.  As this Court stated in Quince v. State, 414
So. 2d 185, 187 (Fla. 1982), "[t]he trial judge was not unreasonable in failing to give
great weight to this mitigating factor, which he nevertheless did find to exist, in the
light of contradictory evidence."  Likewise, in light of the contradictory evidence
presented to the trial court below, it did not abuse its discretion by reducing the
weight given to the two statutory mental mitigators from "full weight" to "some
weight." 
B.  Proportionality
Stewart finally argues that the death penalty is disproportional in this case
compared with other capital cases because of the substantial mitigation he
4.  These were: Stewart’s physical abuse as a child (some weight); his
witnessing of repeated physical brutality against family members and others; the
normality of violence in his life (some weight); gross emotional stress between the
ages of three and twelve (some weight); Stewart’s inability to adapt to his
surroundings (some weight); the absence of an acceptable role model in his life
(modest weight); his abandonment by his mother at age three (little additional
weight); abuse by his aunt while in her care (some weight); the absence of his
mother during his tender years (little additional weight); the absence of a father
during his tender years (modest weight); inculcation with alcohol abuse as a child
(modest weight); intoxication at the time of the Diaz murder and the other murder
(modest weight); his learning at age twelve that the man he believed to be his father
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presented.  The trial court found three aggravating factors and 25 mitigating factors,
including two statutory mitigators. 
We find that Stewart's sentence of death is proportional.  The aggravating
factors were: that Stewart had been convicted of a prior violent felony (great
weight); that he was under a sentence of imprisonment when the crime was
committed (modest weight); and that the capital felony was committed for
pecuniary gain (great weight).  The previous violent felony aggravator comprised
several crimes, including another murder, two attempted murders, armed robbery,
attempted armed robbery, and aggravated assault.  The mitigating factors consisted
of the two statutory mental mitigators, i.e., extreme mental disturbance at the time
of the murder and inability of Stewart to conform his conduct to the requirements
of the law at the time of the murder.  The trial court also found 23 nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances.4  However, as we have repeatedly held, proportionality
was actually his stepfather (modest weight); low-normal intelligence (little weight);
eighth-grade education (little weight); homelessness at age 20 (little weight); long-
term alcohol abuse (modest weight); Stewart’s crippling, lifelong obsession with
the mother who abandoned him (little additional weight); mental illness for two
preceding generations in his family and his own mental illness in his early twenties
evidenced by suicide attempts, inability to function normally, homelessness, and
criminal behavior (no additional weight); his remorse for the killing of Diaz (modest
weight); his compassion for others while incarcerated (modest weight); an interest
in spirituality developed during incarceration (modest weight); his sentencing on
unrelated charges to 130 years in prison with an additional 30 years to be served
concurrently (modest weight); and his good prison record (little weight).    
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“is not a comparison between the number of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances."  Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990); see also Ocha
v. State, 826 So. 2d 956, 965 (Fla. 2002); Philmore v. State, 820 So. 2d 919, 939-
40 (Fla. 2002); Morris v. State, 811 So. 2d 661, 668 (Fla. 2002).  Rather, it is a
qualitative review of each aggravating and mitigating circumstance.  Ocha, 826 So.
2d at 965.  This qualitative analysis is then compared with other capital cases to
ensure that the death penalty is being applied uniformly across the State.  Bradley v.
State, 787 So. 2d 732, 745 (Fla. 2001).  
Here, appellant's sentence of death is proportional to other cases where the
death sentence has been applied.  See Pope v. State, 679 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1996)
(affirming death sentence with aggravators of previous violent felony conviction
and pecuniary gain, both statutory mental mitigators, and nonstatutory mitigators). 
Moreover, on Stewart's direct appeal to this Court following his last resentencing
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for this same murder, we found Stewart's death sentence to be proportional. 
Stewart, 620 So. 2d at 180 n. 2.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm Stewart's sentence of death.  
It is so ordered.
WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
QUINCE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring.
I concur fully in the majority opinion in this case, and write separately only to
address Stewart's claim that the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury on
each of his thirteen proposed nonstatutory mitigators.  I reiterate that 
in a proper case, in which the evidence is insufficient to warrant an
instruction on the statutory mitigating circumstances contained in
section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (2002), an instruction that the jury
may consider a specific circumstance in mitigation may nonetheless be
warranted.  Whereas each of the "statutory" aggravators is specifically
enumerated for the jury, the standard catch-all instruction on mitigation
provides no guidance on how to determine what factors are mitigating. 
In particular, facts indicating emotional disturbance, extreme duress,
or impaired capacity which fall short of the threshold for statutory
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mitigation remain potentially significant considerations in a jury's
advisory sentencing decision. 
Belcher v. State, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S575, S578 (Fla. July 10, 2003) (Pariente, J.,
specially concurring).  In this case, the trial court gave the standard instruction on
the statutory mitigators of extreme emotional disturbance and impaired capacity as
well as the catchall instruction.  Under these circumstances, I conclude that, as in
Belcher, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct on the "virtual laundry list
of proposed nonstatutory mitigation," which "would not have provided greater
assistance to the jury than the catch-all instruction alone."  Id.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion except for the summary rejection of the
defendant's first three claims on appeal.  For the reasons I expressed in my opinion
in Downs v. Moore, 801 So. 2d 906, 918-922 (Fla. 2001), I disagree with the
majority's summary rejection of the defendant's claim that the brief instruction on
nonstatutory mitigation provided adequate guidance to the jury as to what it might
properly consider during its deliberations.  Further, for the reasons explained in my
opinion in Duest v. State, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S501, S507-10 (Fla. June 26, 2003), I
also cannot agree with the majority's decision to summarily reject the defendant's
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claims based on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County, 
Barbara Fleischer, Judge - Case No. 85-5667
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and A. Anne Owens, Assistant Public
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
for Appellant
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Carol M. Dittmar, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee