Case Title: STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. McLAIN

Citation: 

Docket Number: SCBD-4583

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2003-02-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. McLAIN  STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. McLAIN 2003 OK 15 65 P.3d 281 Case Number: SCBD-4583 Decided: 02/18/2003 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA [65 P.3d 281] STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION, Complainant, v. DONNA DEE McLAIN, Respondent. BAR DISCIPLINE PROCEEDING ¶0 The complainant, Oklahoma Bar Association (Bar Association), charged the respondent, Donna Dee McLain, with one count of professional misconduct associated with the preparation and execution of a codicil leaving property to the respondent's family members. The respondent stipulated to a violation of Rule 1.8(c), Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 3-A. A divided panel found clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and recommended a one year suspension and the payment of costs. Unconvinced that the evidence was sufficient to show dishonest or fraudulent conduct, the presiding master recommended a six month suspension and the imposition of costs. The Bar Association seeks a suspension of two years and one day plus recompense for costs of the investigation. We hold that: 1) there is clear and convincing evidence to support the finding of a technical violation of Rule 1.8 (c), Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 3-A; 2) insufficient evidence exists to support charges of conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; and 3) the respondent's misconduct and her lack of a prior disciplinary history warrants a six-month suspension and the payment of $3,456.33 in costs. RESPONDENT SUSPENDED; COSTS IMPOSED. Mike Speegle, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Bar Association, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Complainant. Charles F. Alden, III, Ronald R. Hudson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Respondent. KAUGER, J.: ¶1 The complainant, Oklahoma Bar Association (Bar Association), charged the respondent, Donna Dee McLain, with one count of professional misconduct arising from [65 P.3d 282]the drafting and execution of a codicil for the decedent, Corrine Childs Dennis (Childs/decedent), which left property to the respondent's relatives. The Bar Association alleged that the respondent's actions involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. ¶2 Upon a de novo review, FACTS ¶3 The disciplinary proceeding arises out of a friendship between the respondent and Childs. The two were not related by blood. Nevertheless, Childs had been like a relative to the respondent and her family and, as a long-time Tulsa attorney, served as the respondent's role model and mentor. Childs' followed the respondent's legal career, often giving her advise and counsel. Leona McLain (McLain), the respondent's mother, worked for Childs for nearly forty years having held a power of attorney over the decedent's property since 1989. ¶4 Sometime in 1998, Childs mentioned to the respondent that she was considering replacing her will drawn and executed in 1986. Initially, Childs did not ask the respondent to draft a new will. However, during the fall or winter of the same year, Childs requested that the respondent prepare a codicil to the 1986 writing. Under the original will, McLain was to receive $10,000.00. Pursuant to the codicil, McLain was given additional property. Further, three bronzes, originally bequeathed to Gilcrease Museum, were left to the respondent's sister, Linda McLain. The gifts to the respondent's family members under the codicil totaled approximately $350,000.00. The codicil contained other gifts to three of Childs' employees, none of which were related to the respondent: $10,000.00 to Madelon P. Hollie; $10,000.00 to Betty J. Reynolds; and $1,000.00 to Mercedes Simmons. ¶5 Early in 1999, Childs became extremely ill with colon cancer. Initially, she was hospitalized. Later, she asked to go home to spend her last few days. The respondent did not draft the requested codicil until after Childs was at home and under the care of a hospice nurse who was administering several drugs, one of which was morphine, to the [65 P.3d 283] decedent to keep her comfortable. Childs signed the codicil the day before her death on February 12, 1999. At the time, the decedent was bedridden, extremely weak, had to be aroused into wakefulness and required assistance to place an "X" on the codicil. ¶6 Childs' two sisters traveled from Texas to attend the decedent's funeral. Although they questioned the respondent's mother about the terms and conditions of their sister's will, McLain told them the will had not been located. The respondent testified that she did not tell the sisters about the codicil because of their attitude towards the decedent, essentially that their primary concern was how much they were going to get from the estate. ¶7 McLain, as executor under the codicil, filed probate proceedings. In March of 1999, Childs' sisters and other beneficiaries under the 1986 will contested the codicil's terms. By an agreement signed on April 6, 1999, McLain's petition to enter the codicil to probate was dismissed and proceedings were instituted to disburse the estate under the terms of the 1986 will. ¶8 On January 7, 2000, the Bar Association received a complaint against the respondent dealing with the circumstances surrounding the drafting and execution of Childs' codicil. The complaint was not filed by Childs' beneficiaries. Rather, it was forwarded by the attorney handling the will contest on a contingency fee basis. The Bar Association filed this cause as a Rule 68 proceeding on December 5, 2000. A hearing was conducted before the trial panel on March 20-21, 2002. A divided panel filed its report on June 4, 2002, finding clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and recommended a one year suspension and the payment of costs. Unconvinced that the evidence was sufficient to show dishonest or fraudulent conduct, the presiding master recommended a six month suspension and the imposition of costs. The Bar Association seeks a suspension of two years and one day plus recompense for costs of the investigation. The Court ordered briefing cycle was completed on August 12, 2002. Although the respondent has asked that only a private reprimand be imposed, she has not opposed the Bar Association's application to assess costs filed on August 29, 2002. I. ¶9 CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF A TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF RULE 1.8(c), RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 3-A. ¶10 Rule 1.8 (c), Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 3-A, provides in clear and mandatory language9 that: "A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee." ¶11 It is clear from the record, and the respondent concedes, that she violated Rule 1.8 (c) when she prepared Childs' codicil which benefitted both her mother and her sister. It is also apparent that the respondent felt as though Childs was a member of her family. Childs had long shown an interest in the respondent and fully supported her decision to become a lawyer, she followed her education and career, shared holidays with her and her family, and had an employer-employee relationship so close with the respondent's mother that McLain had held Childs' power of attorney since 1989. Although all these considerations make it un-[65 P.3d 284]derstandable that the respondent would want to follow Childs' request and draft the codicil pursuant to the decedent's instructions, we determine that clear and convincing evidence10 supports the finding of a technical violation of Rule 1.8 (c), Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 3-A.11 II. ¶12 THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CHARGES OF CONDUCT INVOLVING DISHONESTY, FRAUD, DECEIT OR MISREPRESENTATION. ¶13 The Bar Association contends12 that the respondent engaged in a dishonest act in drafting the Childs' codicil and then misrepresented or fraudulently induced the decedent to execute the document in violation of Rule 8.4 (c), Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 3-A.13 The respondent argues that the record does not support these contentions. We agree. ¶14 Several facts clearly presented by the record foreclose a finding that the respondent acted dishonestly or deceptively in drafting Childs' codicil and presenting it for her signature. First, the complaint was not filed by the beneficiaries of the decedent's original will -- Childs' sisters -- perhaps because they had no prior expectation of recovering anything from the estate. Billie Childs Gilson testified that she had never discussed with Childs how her estate would be divided.14 Lucille Childs Roush stated that she wasn't surprised that her sister would make substantial bequests to non-family members.15 ¶15 The complaint was filed by the attorney involved in the will contest -- who recovered fees of $113,092.90 plus interest and $342.36 in costs pursuant to a one-third contingent fee contract in a proceeding filed on [65 P.3d 285] March 5, 1999, and resolved by agreement on April 6, 1999. The complaining attorney participated only in the contest. He did not complete the probate of Childs' estate.16 ¶16 Second, the notary present at the execution signed and sealed the codicil as though it had been property executed. ¶17 Third, the respondent was not a beneficiary under the codicil. The codicil was withdrawn by agreement of the respondent's mother and sister -- the two parties standing to inherit. Although the respondent's mother was certainly someone in whom Childs had complete confidence -- having given her a general power of attorney to conduct her [65 P.3d 286] business and to dispose of her property in 1989, she voluntarily stepped aside as administrator of Childs' estate and forfeited any inheritance. ¶18 However, these actions were not taken at the recommendation of counsel. David Phillips (Phillips) was hired to represent the respondent's mother and sister in the will contest. Phillips testified that, had it been his decision, he would have neither withdrawn from the contest nor dropped the case for the purpose of protecting the respondent's reputation. However, he followed his client's wishes which were based -- not on the hope of protecting the respondent -- but to keep Child's reputation intact. ¶19 The Bar Association failed to establish either that the codicil was not drafted pursuant to the decedent's instructions or that the respondent falsely induced Childs to execute the document. Therefore, we determine that insufficient evidence exists to support charges of conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. III. ¶20 THE MISCONDUCT WARRANTS A SIX-MONTH SUSPENSION AND THE IMPOSITION OF COSTS. ¶21 A divided panel found clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and recommended a one year suspension and the payment of costs. Unconvinced that the evidence was sufficient to show dishonest or fraudulent conduct, the presiding master recommended a six month suspension and the imposition of costs. The Bar Association seeks a suspension of two years and one day plus recompense for costs of the investigation. Although the respondent agrees that she should be disciplined for the technical violation of Rule 1.8 (c), Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 3-A, she asserts that a suspension is unwarranted. We disagree. ¶22 Discipline is administered to preserve public confidence in the bar. Our responsibility is not to punish but to inquire into and gauge a lawyer's continued fitness to practice law, with a view to safeguarding the interest of the public, of the courts and of the legal profession. Discipline is imposed to maintain these goals rather than as punish-[65 P.3d 287]-ment for the lawyer's misconduct. ¶23 This Court has not had previous occasion to discipline an attorney under facts similar to those presented here. Nevertheless, discipline should be sufficient to persuade the attorney that such conduct will not be tolerated. ¶24 In mitigation, we may consider that: no grave economic harm occurred to any complaining party -- the beneficiaries under the 1986 will did not file the complaint; the respondent has not been previously disciplined; and the respondent admits that she committed a professional transgression in drafting the codicil resulting in gifts to her family members. On the other hand, however the cause is viewed, an injustice has been done. The injustice may be that Childs' wishes were not honored. Because of the respondent's negligence in not timely drafting and having executed the codicil to her mentor's estate, the intended beneficiaries withdrew the codicil and forfeited their rights in an attempt to protect the decedent's reputation. On the other hand, it may be that Childs' sisters -- who prevailed in the contest -- should have inherited all of the estate valued in excess of $300,000.00. Instead, they forfeited almost a third of the recovered inheritance as attorneys' fees in an agreed withdrawal of the codicil. In any case, the respondent should have recognized the need to bring in independent counsel to draft a codicil which would result in a gift from a non-family member client to her relatives. ¶25 Under any scenario, discipline is appropriate because of the respondent's admitted violation of Rule 1.8 (c), Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 3-A. CONCLUSION ¶26 The nondelegable, constitutional responsibility to regulate both the practice and the ethics, licensure, and discipline of the practitioners of the law is solely vested in this Court. RESPONDENT SUSPENDED; COSTS IMPOSED. HODGES, LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, KAUGER, SUMMERS, concur. WATT, C.J., with whom Boudreau and Winchester, JJ., join concurring in part and dissenting in part: I would suspend the respondent from the practice of law for one year. OPALA, V.C.J., dissents from that part of the opinion which exonerates respondent of constructive fraud and imposes much more lenient professional discipline than that recommended by the Bar. [ 65 P.3d 289 ] FOOT