Case Title: In re Williams

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1989-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
                                No. 87-362
 
 
In re Douglas R. Williams                    Supreme Court
 
                                             On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 1, Rutland Circuit
 
                                             May Term, 1989
 
 
George F. Ellison, J.
 
Henry C. Brislin, City Attorney, Rutland, for plaintiff-appellant
 
Cortland Corsones of Corsones and Corsones, Rutland, for defendant-
  appellee
 
 
PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.
 
 
     DOOLEY, J.   This proceeding involves district court review of the
grounds and procedure for dismissing a police officer.  We hold that the
statute that authorizes this proceeding violates the separation of powers
provision of the Vermont Constitution Chapter II, { 5, and dismiss the
proceeding.
     In October of 1986, the Rutland City Police Chief gave Douglas
Williams, an officer in the Rutland Police Department, a notice of dismissal
without pay effective seven days later.  The notice also served as a request
to the Rutland Board of Civil Authority to convene a hearing on the Chief's
action.  On November 3, 1986, defendant Williams exercised his option
pursuant to 24 V.S.A. { 1932(c) to file with the district court a notice of
election to have the case heard before that court.  The district court held
a hearing and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law on April 27,
1987.  The court concluded that the dismissal of defendant was constitu-
tionally defective since the procedure used did not strictly comply with
the city charter and ordinances, and the applicable Vermont statutes.  The
court also concluded that defendant could not receive a fair hearing because
the dismissal was based on incidents that occurred eight years earlier.
Finally, the court concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to find
defendant guilty of misconduct.
     The City of Rutland has appealed here alleging that the district court
did not have jurisdiction, and, in any event, that it made a number of
errors fatal to its conclusions.  Defendant moved to dismiss the appeal
arguing that no appellate jurisdiction lies as held in City of Winooski v.
Vincent, 137 Vt. 252, 252, 402 A.2d 1192, 1192 (1979), and otherwise argues
that the lower court decision should be affirmed.  Following argument, we
requested supplemental briefing on whether the statutory scheme imposes non-
judicial responsibilities on the judiciary in violation of the separation of
powers section of the Vermont Constitution.  Vt. Const. ch. II, { 5 (the
departments "shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the
powers properly belonging to the others"). (FN1)
     24 V.S.A. { 1932(a) provides that when "it appears to the appointing
authority" of a municipal police officer that the officer has become negli-
gent or derelict in official duty, or is guilty of conduct unbecoming an
officer, the appointing authority must set a hearing before the legislative
body of the municipality on the charge.  The officer can go to hearing
before the legislative body or, at least twenty-four hours before the hear-
ing time, file with the district court a notice of election to have the
hearing before the district court.  24 V.S.A. { 1932(c).  If the officer
elects to go to the district court, the court must set the matter for
hearing within ten days from the filing of the notice.  In such a case, the
court must determine "the facts and certify its findings, which shall be
final, to the legislative body."  Id.
     If the legislative body or the court finds that the officer is guilty
of the alleged charges, "the legislative body shall have the power by
majority vote to remove said officer or to suspend him without pay for a
period of time not to exceed sixty days."  24 V.S.A. { 1932(d).  The statute
does not require that the legislative body take any action on its findings
or those of the district court.  If the officer is found not guilty,
however, the statute appears to prohibit the legislative body from taking
any action.  24 V.S.A. { 1932(e).  All of this procedure is superseded if
the municipality "has charter provisions providing for tenure of police
officers during good behavior with removal only after hearing and for
cause."  24 V.S.A. { 1934.
     The statute makes our district courts hearing officers for munici-
palities.  As agents of the municipality, the court "certifies" its action
to the legislative body of the municipality.  The court's determination that
an officer is guilty of the charges has no effect unless a majority of the
governing body of the municipality votes to give it a particular effect.
Ironically, the court is involved because the municipality has no standards
it must follow in deciding whether to remove or discipline an officer.  If
the municipality adopts a charter provision that allows for removal of an
officer "only after hearing and for cause" the court is not involved in the
hearing.  24 V.S.A. { 1934.
     By letter to the Governor, this Court advised the Governor and Legis-
lature that a statute that attempted to require this Court to answer ques-
tions about the constitutionality of pending legislation was unconstitu-
tional.  In re Constitutionality of House Bill 88, 115 Vt. 524, 64 A.2d 169
(1949).  The Court reasoned that in the absence of constitutional authoriza-
tion for such a procedure, the giving of advisory opinions would be "extra-
judicial" and violate the separation of powers between the judicial and
legislative branches.  Id. at 527-28, 64 A.2d  at 171.  The power of courts
is "'to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants,
duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.'"  Id. at 529, 64 A.2d  at
172 (quoting Muskrat v. United States,