Case Title: Willmschen v. Meeker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87-83

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-02-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Willmschen v. Meeker1988 WY 16750 P.2d 669Case Number: 87-83, 87-84Decided: 02/18/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

STANLEY WILLMSCHEN AND LETISHA 
WILLMSCHEN, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

WES MEEKER, DOING 
BUSINESS AS MEEKER AGENCY, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

WES MEEKER, DOING 
BUSINESS AS MEEKER AGENCY, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

STANLEY WILLMSCHEN AND LETISHA 
WILLMSCHEN, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Big HornCounty, John T. Dixon, 
J.

Don W. Riske, 
Cheyenne, for     
Stanley Willmschen and LeTisha 
Willmschen.

Kenneth M. 
Koski, Powell, for Wes 
Meeker.

Before THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., 
and HANSCUM, District Judge.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Cross appeals are 
presented, derived from consecutive installment-contract land sales, with buyer 
suing the real estate broker for land title and encumbrance misrepresentation as 
a fraud action, and the broker counterclaiming for a resale commission on a part 
of the purchased property. Both litigants were unsuccessful in trial court, and 
we affirm, to their equal sufferance in denial.

[¶2.]     We address the 
Willmschens' appeal by affirming the trial court on disposition under stated 
Issue IV of their brief:

"WHETHER THE APPELLANTS 
WERE DAMAGED AS A RESULT OF THE FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS OF THE 
APPELLEE,"

and as restated 
by appellee broker Meeker in his brief as Issue I:

"WHETHER PLAINTIFFS 
FAILED TO PROVE A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF AN ALLEGED 
FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION? (i.e. Whether the Appellants were damaged as a 
result of an `alleged' fraudulent misrepresentation of the Appellee - ISSUE IV 
of Appellants' brief)."1

FACTS

[¶3.]     This case involves 
consecutive sales of portions of a 320-acre parcel of land in Big Horn 
County, Wyoming. The first transaction occurred on May 
1, 1981, when Larry W. Ellis and Janis M. Ellis sold the entire tract to Darrel 
R. Wagner and Teresa P. Wagner by a contract for deed. This contract required 
the escrow of a warranty deed from sellers to buyers; the escrow of a quitclaim 
deed from the buyers to the sellers; retention of the deeds by the escrow agent; 
and the sellers to consent to any whole or partial sale of the property by the 
buyers. A notice document of the existence of the sale was filed with the county 
clerk as the real estate transaction office of record. On October 7, 1981, the 
Wagners assigned their acquisition interest (equitable estate) in the property 
to the Wyoming Production Credit Association of Casper (PCA), as a separate 
transaction loan security, by execution of an escrowed security transaction 
quitclaim deed and a recorded (April 9, 1982) Notice of Assignment of 
Agreement.

[¶4.]     On January 11, 1983, 
the Wagners listed the property for sale with Wes Meeker, d/b/a Meeker Agency. 
The listing agreement drafted by the agency real estate agent, Mr. Gifford, 
listed the only encumbrance as a "Mortgage to Larry Ellis." A Meeker Agency 
representative subsequently went to the PCA office and was advised that the PCA 
would be willing to do anything it could to help accomplish resale of the 
property as would include security assignment release upon proportional payments 
to PCA for application on its loan to Wagners.

[¶5.]     At this point in the 
title, the appellants, LeTisha and Stanley Willmschen, enter the picture by 
contacting the Meeker Agency about a land purchase, and were directed to an 
80-acre parcel to be divided from the original 320 acres, and for which a 
purchase agreement was struck. An attorney was asked by Meeker to prepare a 
contract for deed, deeds, and escrow instructions for the transaction suitable 
for sale closing. A title insurance commitment was ordered for this transaction, 
and appellants, in mid-March of 1983, took possession of the 80 acres, 
subsequently closing on April 4, 1983 and thus ending the first chapter of this 
saga when, by installment contract underlying the original sales installment 
contract, they had purchased 80 of the total 320 acres originally sold to 
Wagners. In essence, Wagners had undersold their purchase equity subject to 
agreed right of partial release of assignment debt 
encumbrance.

[¶6.]     The following spring, 
appellants decided to resell the property, again splitting to create a 60-acre 
parcel and a 20-acre parcel. The 60-acre parcel was purchased by Dennis and Val 
Jean Beech through Meeker, who arranged for the sale documents to be prepared. 
This was done by the same attorney, who, aware of the PCA assignment, 
protectively provided not only that the contract for deed contain specific 
references to the prior agreements for deed, but also that a deed from Ellises 
to Wagners, and deed from Wagners to the appellants, as well as deed from 
appellants to Beeches should be placed in escrow.

[¶7.]     Having completed the 
60-acre sale to Beeches, the Willmschens, on May 16, 1984, entered into a 
Deposit, Receipt, Offer and Acceptance typed agreement to sell the remaining 
20-acre tract to Robert E. Claar, Carol A. Claar, and Robert E. Claar, Jr. 
Closing of the Claar sale for the 20 acres was to take place at a local bank. 
For reasons undisclosed in the record, the bank requested that the Willmschens 
leave the premises before the transaction could be closed, although the Claars 
as well as the Willmschens were present for that purpose. Nothing further was 
ever attempted or done thereafter to complete the transaction. Before the end of 
the month, the Willmschens vacated the 20-acre parcel, left the area, and 
discontinued payments to Wagners on the purchase 
obligation.

[¶8.]     On December 16, 1985, 
the Willmschens filed suit against Wes Meeker, alleging three causes of action: 
(1) intentional misrepresentation (fraud); (2) punitive damages as a result of 
willful misrepresentation (fraud); and (3) violation of § 33-28-111(a)(i), W.S. 
1977.2 Appellee Wes Meeker filed a 
counterclaim for a $1,800 commission still due and owing on the Beech sale. The 
case was tried to the court starting October 15, 1986, and at the close of the 
case Meeker moved for a directed verdict3 which was favored by dismissal of 
the complaint from which this appeal arrived. The trial was adjourned without 
defendant presenting his case on the counterclaim. That adverse court decision 
was followed by Willmschens' motion for reconsideration, and objections to the 
defendant's proposed order of dismissal. The saga ended January 27, 1987 when 
the trial court signed the Meeker order dismissing the Willmschens' complaint 
but also dismissed the counterclaim to conclude the case by denied recovery to 
both parties.

PROOF OF 
DAMAGES

[¶9.]     Although the facts in 
this case are complex, the law is not. Neither the Willmschens nor Meeker4 proved their damages regardless of 
any fraud involved.5 Generally, fraud without damage 
cannot serve as a foundation for an action of deceit. Gulke v. Brock, 222 Cal. App. 2d 459, 35 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1963); 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 40 at 288. To hold a 
broker liable for fraud one must prove: (1) falsity of the representation; (2) 
guilty knowledge or scienter; (3) intent to deceive or cause someone to believe 
the falsehood; (4) reliance on the misrepresentation which induced the purchaser 
to act; (5) actual deception; and (6) injury or damage to the person dealing 
with the broker. Sanders v. Stevens, 23 Ariz. 370, 203 P. 1083 (1922); 12 C.J.S. 
Brokers § 107 at 308-309. The burden of proving the damages, beyond nominal 
ones, is upon the party seeking the recovery. Adel v. Parkhurst, Wyo., 681 P.2d 886, 892 (1984); State ex rel. Scholl v. Anselmi, Wyo., 640 P.2d 746, cert. 
denied 459 U.S. 805, 103 S. Ct. 28, 74 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1982); Downing v. Stiles, 
Wyo., 635 P.2d 808, 817 (1981); Western National Bank of Lovell v. Moncur, Wyo., 
624 P.2d 765, 773 (1981); Quinlan v. Jones, 27 Wyo. 410, 198 P. 352 (1921). 
Damages cannot be presumed. State ex rel. Scholl v. Anselmi, supra, 640 P.2d  at 
750. See United 
States v. Winters, 224 F. Supp. 8 (D.Wyo. 
1963), for a case where adequate proof of damages of alleged governmental fraud 
was not shown.

[¶10.]  In Parkhurst, this court was faced with a 
situation similar to the case at bar where punitive damages were sought on 
several claims, one of which was misrepresentation. This court there identified 
factors justifying an award of punitive damages, and concluded that no evidence 
was presented on the financial condition or the wealth of the defendant so the 
award of punitive damages was inappropriate.

[¶11.]  In this case, this court need not even go 
that far because there simply is no proof in the record of any damages sustained 
by the Willmschens. Willmschens argue the Claars would not close because of the 
PCA security encumbrance. However, the record is devoid of any evidence why the 
deal between the Willmschens and the Claars did not close, and certainly there 
is no evidence that Claars were unwilling to close the transaction negotiated by 
Willmschens. There is no question but that the PCA would release the assignment 
upon pro-rata payment so that proper title was available upon proper payment. 
The record only reflects that the closing was scheduled and that it did not 
occur because the Willmschens were asked to leave the bank where the closing was 
to take place.6 

Without more in 
the record, this court cannot find trial-court error to determine that the 
reason the closing did not occur arose from any title flaws or occasioned 
damage. It is a fundamental principle that underlies the damage assessment that 
a person injured shall only receive compensation commensurate with his loss, and 
no more. Rocky Mountain Packing Co. v. Branney, 
Wyo., 393 P.2d 131, 135 (1964); Hunt v. 
Thompson, 19 Wyo. 523, 120 P. 181, 184 (1912). Although 
dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, in effect, occurred pursuant to Rule 41(b), 
W.R.C.P., which does require consideration of the evidence in the light most 
favorable to them including all reasonable inferences which may be deduced 
therefrom, this record fails to provide a factual basis as proof of damages 
which will justify reversal. Osborn v. Manning, Wyo., 685 P.2d 1121 (1984); Amfac Mechanical Supply Co. v. 
Federer, Wyo., 
645 P.2d 73 (1982); Fuller v. Fuller, Wyo., 606 P.2d 306 (1980); Angus Hunt Ranch, Inc. v. REB, Inc., Wyo., 577 P.2d 645 
(1978).

SALES COMMISSION 
COUNTERCLAIM

[¶12.]  In cross appeal, Meeker claims 
trial-court error in denial of an opportunity to present his case in chief on 
the counterclaim for the commission. The record reflects no court denial of the 
Meeker case on the counterclaim, but rather that Meeker failed to do anything, 
evidenced by the following dialogue after the trial court granted the Meeker 
motion for a directed verdict (motion to dismiss) on plaintiff's 
claims:

"MR. RISKE: If that's 
what the Court wants to put on the record, that's fine.

"THE COURT: It's more 
persuasive that way to me.

"MR. RISKE: Okay. I guess 
we go home.

"THE COURT: 
Okay.

"MR. KOSKI: I will draft 
the Order and send it to you for approval as to form.

"THE COURT: 
Pardon?

"MR. KOSKI: I will draft 
an appropriate Order and send it to Don for his approval as to form. 
Okay?

"THE COURT: All 
right.

"MR. KOSKI: Thank you, 
Judge.

"THE COURT: All 
right.

"(At 10:08 A.M., the 
matter was completed.)"

 

Apparently 
everyone "went home," the order of dismissal was prepared and approved as to 
form by Meeker's attorney but not Willmschens, and the court executed and filed 
the order. As this dialogue shows, Meeker's attorney drafted the order of 
dismissal which included his client's counterclaim dismissal. This record cannot 
sustain Meeker's appeal involving an issue now first presented on appeal. Matter 
of Estate of Obra, Wyo., 749 P.2d 272 (1988); Davenport v. Epperly, Wyo., 
744 P.2d 1110 (1987); Ricci v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., Wyo., 721 P.2d 1081 (1986); ABC Builders, Inc. v. 
Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925 (1981). Even if we were to 
go further than this sound appellate principle, we would have to hold that this 
was invited error which may not now be asserted as a ground for reversal since 
the error was induced or invited by the losing party. Appeal of Williams, Wyo., 
626 P.2d 564, 571, cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. Public Service Commission 
of Wyoming, 454 U.S. 896, 102 S. Ct. 394, 70 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1981); Weber v. 
Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., Wyo., 519 P.2d 972, 978 (1974). A litigant cannot 
walk out of the courthouse, prepare and submit the judgment, and then on appeal 
complain about trial-court error in denial of his counterclaim for which no 
evidence was introduced or trial-court objection taken. This is a "went home and 
case concluded" result. Denial of a litigant's day in court is not presented on 
this record where the litigant failed to object to trial conclusion or 
seasonably request an opportunity to present his counterclaimant 
evidence.

[¶13.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 By virtue of this 
disposition of the case, we decline to address the complex of broadly stated 
arguments defined by the parties as follows:

Willmschens, the 
buyers, urge the issues as:

"ISSUE 
I

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS' [Real Estate Broker Meeker] MOTION FOR A 
DIRECTED VERDICT (MOTION TO DISMISS).

"A. WHETHER THE TRIAL 
COURT APPLIED THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW IN GRANTING THE APPELLEE'S MOTION 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT (MOTION TO DISMISS) AT THE CLOSE OF THE APPELLANTS' 
CASE.

"B. WHETHER THE TRIAL 
COURT APPLIED THE PROPER RULES OF BURDEN OF PROOF IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS.

"ISSUE 
II

WHETHER THE APPELLANTS 
HAD ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION BY THE 
APPELLEE.

"ISSUE 
III

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED 
IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANTS WERE CONTRIBUTORILY 
NEGLIGENT.

* * * * * 
*

"ISSUE 
V

WHETHER THE APPELLANTS 
WOULD HAVE RECEIVED MARKETABLE TITLE TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IF THEY HAD 
COMPLETELY PERFORMED THEIR PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE WAGNER TO WILLMSCHEN 
CONTRACT."

Meeker, the 
broker, advances these issues:

"2. ISSUE NO. 2: WHETHER 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERR [sic] IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS?

"A. WHETHER THE TRIAL 
COURT APPLIED THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS AT THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFFS' CASE? (ISSUE NO. I.A. of Appellants' 
Brief).

"B. WHETHER THE TRIAL 
COURT APPLIED THE PROPER RULES OF BURDEN OF PROOF IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS? (ISSUE NO. I.B. of Appellants' Brief).

"3. ISSUE NO. 3: WHETHER 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF FRAUDULENT 
MISREPRESENTATION BY THE DEFENDANT? (ISSUE NO. II of Appellants' 
Brief).

"4. ISSUE NO. 4: WHETHER 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND PLAINTIFFS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT? (ISSUE NO. III of 
Appellants' Brief).

"5. ISSUE NO. 5: AT WHAT 
POINT IN TIME IS MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE UNDER A CONTRACT FOR DEED (INSTALLMENT 
LAND CONTRACT) REQUIRED? (i.e. Appellants would have received marketable record 
title to the subject property if they had completely performed their payment 
obligations under the Wagner-Willmschen contract) (ISSUE NO. V of Appellants' 
Brief).

"6. ISSUE NO. 6: WHETHER 
PLAINTIFFS WAIVED THEIR CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION BY THEIR 
SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS IN SELLING PART OF FARM UNIT `D' TO DENNIS AND VAL JEAN 
BEECH; IN ENTERING INTO A STANDARD PURCHASE, OFFER AND RECEIPT WITH ROBERT E. 
AND CAROL A. CLAAR; AND IN SUBSEQUENTLY DEFAULTING UNDER THEIR CONTRACT FOR DEED 
WITH THE WAGNERS?"

2 Section 33-28-111(a)(i), 
W.S. 1977 pertains to the Wyoming Real Estate Commission's authority to censure 
a real estate licensee, or to suspend or revoke such 
license:

"(a) The commission shall 
upon a written sworn complaint or may upon its own motion investigate the 
actions of any broker, associate broker or salesman and may censure the 
licensee, suspend or revoke any license issued under this act [§§ 33-28-101 
through 33-28-206] for any of the following:

"(i) Making any 
substantial misrepresentation, false promises or false or fraudulent 
representation; * * *."

3 More properly, this 
should have been a motion to dismiss, since without a jury there would be no 
verdict.

4 Where damages are sought 
by the defendant by counterclaim, the burden rests with him to prove his 
damages. 25A C.J.S. Damages § 144 at 15. Even if the plaintiff may have mostly 
proved defendant Meeker's counterclaim case, trial process `presentation' did 
not demonstrate attribution for that purpose.

5 The Willmschens had 
notice by the title binder at the time they originally purchased the property, 
and they even stipulated during trial that there was no misrepresentation of the 
property conditions. The more complex issue of underselling from an installment 
contract simply does not merit our attention on this record where damage 
remained unproven in the very curious factual context of why the second resale 
did not close.

6 That bank had no 
apparent connection with the financing of this transaction except as escrow 
agent for installment-contract documents. Apparently it was just a convenient 
place for the parties to meet to conduct their business. Less than the full 
story is proved. All we discern from the record is:

"Q. Was Mr. Copenhaver 
[your closing attorney] at the bank [First National Bank of Lovell] when you 
were doing the closing?

"A. 
No.

"Q. Why was 
that?

"A. That I don't know. He 
called up -

"Q. Excuse me. Who had 
possession of the documents at the time of the closing?

"A. He gave me a copy of 
some documents to take down there to the bank. He was supposed to come down, 
seems like I did have - I don't know if I had his copy. I did have a copy of the 
contracts for deed. I don't know if it was or not - I know he didn't show 
up.

"Q. The attorney handling 
the closing didn't show up?

"A. That's 
correct.

"Q. Did you have legal 
documents?

"A. That I can't answer. 
I don't think so though.

"Q. How were you going to 
close if you didn't have the documents that you had to 
sign?

"A. Because the attorney 
was going to be there with the documents. I presume the attorney told me to be 
at the bank. I was at the bank.

"Q. The reason for not 
closing was because the attorney was not there?

"A. I believe I called 
the attorney and told him. We were asked to leave before he got 
there.

"Q. The reason for not 
closing was because the bank asked you to leave?

"A. I think basically we 
could say that, yes.

"Q. It wasn't because the 
P.C.A. would not agree to this transaction; isn't that correct? Isn't it a fact 
the P.C.A. agreed to this transaction?

"A. I believe they did, 
yes.

"Q. They consented to you 
selling the property to the Claars?

"A. Yes. I believe they 
did.

"Q. Do you recall, Mr. 
Willmschen, what time the closing was to take place?

"A. I think I told you 
before it was 2:30, I believe, in the afternoon.

"Q. What time did the 
bank ask you to leave?

"A. It was shortly after 
I got there, probably within ten minutes of me arriving at the 
bank.

"Q. Do you recall - so 
it's your statement to the Court that the problem on closing was because the 
attorney did not show up?

"MR. RISKE: Objection, 
Your Honor. That wasn't his statement at all.

"THE COURT: 
Sustained.

"A. I didn't say 
that."