Case Title: Suliber v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92-248

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Suliber v. State1993 WY 165866 P.2d 85Case Number: 92-248Decided: 12/30/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Alan 
James SULIBER, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Leonard 
D. Munker, State Public Defender, and Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel 
(argued), for appellant.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mary Beth Wolff, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), for 
appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Alan James 
Suliber appeals from his conviction for the murder of his stepson, seven 
year-old Adam Franklin. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by 
admitting prior bad acts testimony and by admitting appellant's statements to 
the police which were given after he made an equivocal request for counsel. 
Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the second 
degree murder conviction.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellant raises 
the following issues:

ISSUE 
I

Did 
the trial court err in allowing the introduction of evidence concerning the 
character and prior bad acts of the appellant?

ISSUE 
II

Did 
the admission of appellant's statements to the police after an equivocal request 
for counsel violate appellant's rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article One, Section 11 of the Wyoming 
Constitution?

ISSUE 
III

Was 
there sufficient evidence to support the conviction of second degree 
murder?

FACTS

[¶4]      This tragic tale 
begins in March of 1991 when Katie Franklin (Franklin) and her then six year-old 
son, Adam Franklin (Adam), moved to Rock Springs, Wyoming. Franklin went to work 
for the Rock Springs post office, where she met a customer, Alan Suliber 
(appellant). They began dating shortly thereafter, and a serious relationship 
quickly developed between the two. They were married in October of 
1991.

[¶5]      Throughout the 
time they were married, Franklin noticed various injuries to Adam. These 
included scratches, bruises and blisters. There was also an incident in July of 
1991, which occurred prior to the marriage, where appellant slapped Adam so hard 
that he left a bruise on Adam's face in the shape of a hand. These injuries were 
also noticed by several other persons at various times.

[¶6]      On February 13, 
1992, Franklin drove her son and appellant to a boy scout meeting. She then went 
to her job at the post office, where she worked from 5:00 pm to 3:30 am. 
Meanwhile, appellant and Adam attended the scout meeting; and after it was over, 
they walked to a friend's house to get a ride home. The friend, however, was not 
home, so appellant and Adam began to walk home. After they had walked awhile, a 
passerby stopped and gave them a ride. They arrived home around 6:30 p.m. that 
night.

[¶7]      Adam went to bed 
that night around 8:00 p.m., and appellant testified that he went to bed around 
10:00 p.m. Franklin arrived home from work around 4:00 a.m. the morning of 
February 14. She turned on the television and read the mail for about ten 
minutes. She noticed that appellant was not sleeping on the couch or in his art 
room. She thought it was unusual because he usually did that when she worked 
late. After Franklin went to bed, she remembered that she had not kissed Adam 
goodnight, which was her habit. Appellant awoke, held her tight, and told her 
not to worry about it; it was not important.

[¶8]      The next morning, 
Franklin was awakened by appellant who said that something was wrong with Adam. 
She ran down to Adam's room where she found him lying on his back on the floor 
next to his bunk bed. Adam was not breathing, and his skin felt cool. Franklin 
immediately attempted to resuscitate Adam by performing 
CPR.

[¶9]      Appellant called 
911, and an ambulance was sent to the scene. The EMTs attempted to revive the 
boy, but they were unsuccessful; and Adam was declared dead by a doctor at the 
hospital emergency room. Both the EMTs and the doctor noticed bruising on Adam 
that was inconsistent with any type of accidental death. They also noticed other 
bruises on his body, including on his buttocks. An autopsy subsequently 
confirmed that Adam died from injuries that were the result of a beating with a 
blunt object.

[¶10]   Appellant was charged with second 
degree murder in the beating death of Adam Franklin. A jury convicted appellant, 
and he was sentenced to life in prison. He now appeals that 
conviction.

DISCUSSION

A.W.R.E. 
404(b)

[¶11]   Appellant challenges the 
admissibility of prior bad acts testimony by the State's witnesses. These 
witnesses testified about the relationship between appellant and Adam. Several 
of those witnesses testified about the July 1991 slapping incident and the 
resulting bruise on Adam's face. Three of the witnesses testified about 
instances of emotional abuse, such as when appellant bathed Adam and soap was in 
Adam's hair, and appellant told Adam not to open his eyes or they would burn, 
then watched Adam walk around the house for several hours and eat a meal with 
his eyes closed.

[¶12]   Appellant claims that this 
testimony was irrelevant and constituted an improper attack on his character. He 
points out that the testimony was elicited during the prosecutor's 
case-in-chief; and he argues, as a consequence, it was used to show he had the 
propensity to commit the crime charged. Appellant further asserts that the 
testimony was not admissible to show identity under W.R.E. 404(b) because the 
acts testified to were not peculiar or unique enough to show a personal 
"signature." Finally, appellant complains that the admission of this testimony 
violated W.R.E. 403 because it put him on trial for who he was, not for the 
crime charged.

W.R.E. 
404(b) provides:

(b) 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. - Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that 
he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

In 
reviewing Rule 404(b) evidence, we give great deference to the trial court's 
determination of admissibility. Longfellow v. State, 803 P.2d 848, 851 (Wyo. 
1990). We will not find abuse of discretion as long as there is a legitimate 
basis for the court's decision. Pino v. State, 849 P.2d 716, 719 (Wyo. 1993); 
Pena v. State, 780 P.2d 316, 318 (Wyo. 1989). The trial court's discretion does 
have some limits, and to that end we have established a five-part test to 
determine the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b). The five factors to 
be considered are:

1. 
The extent to which the prosecution plainly, clearly, and convincingly can prove 
the other similar crimes.

2. 
The remoteness in time of those crimes from the charged 
offense.

3. 
The extent to which the evidence of other crimes is introduced for a purpose 
sanctioned by W.R.E. 404(b). 

4. 
The extent to which the element of the charged offense, that the evidence is 
introduced to prove, is actually at issue.

5. 
The extent to which the prosecution has a substantial need for the probative 
value of the evidence of the other crimes.

Longfellow, 
at 851; Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 246 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985). Not all five of these factors need 
to be satisfied for 404(b) evidence to be admissible. Longfellow, at 851; Pena, 
at 318. Usually, however, when 404(b) evidence has been properly admitted, all 
five factors will be found. Longfellow, at 851. Finally, the probative value of 
the evidence must outweigh any unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues as a 
result of its admission. W.R.E. 403; Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104, 109 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶13]   The determination of whether prior 
bad acts testimony is admissible under W.R.E. 404(b) necessarily includes the 
determination of relevancy. Coleman v. State, 741 P.2d 99, 103 (Wyo. 1987). Thus 
the question of relevancy is considered at the same time the admissibility of 
the evidence under Rule 404(b) is determined. Longfellow, at 850 n. 
2.

[¶14]   The State offered the evidence as 
probative of intent, identity and malice. At trial there was no dispute that 
Adam was beaten to death; according to the defense's opening statement to the 
jury, the only question was who did it. The night of Adam's death only two 
people had been with him - Franklin and appellant. The defense theory was that 
Franklin had beaten her son to death as stated in his closing argument. 
Therefore, the identity of Adam's killer was a critical issue in dispute at 
trial.

[¶15]   This case is very similar to what 
occurred in Longfellow. There the question was whether the mother or her 
boyfriend beat a baby to death. We held that prior bad acts evidence which 
showed the mother had abused her other child was admissible to prove intent and 
identity. Longfellow, at 853-54. The evidence in this case, as in Longfellow, 
was needed by the prosecution to establish whether appellant or Franklin beat 
Adam to death. Id. The testimony of the prior bad acts was circumstantial 
evidence from which the identity of Adam's killer could be inferred. Barnes v. 
State, 858 P.2d 522, 532 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶16]   Also, the evidence was relevant as 
proof of intent. As we pointed out in Longfellow, even though second degree 
murder is a general intent crime, the prosecution must still prove that the 
defendant undertook the prohibited conduct voluntarily. Longfellow, at 853; see 
also Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 52 (Wyo. 1986). Appellant denied committing 
the act at all, thus intent was at issue at trial.

[¶17]   Finally, the evidence was 
admissible to establish malice. Appellant was charged with second degree murder. 
In order to establish that charge, the prosecution must 
prove:

1) 
appellant

2) 
purposely and maliciously

3) 
without premeditation

4) 
killed Adam Franklin

W.S. 
6-2-104. The jury was also instructed on manslaughter as a lesser included 
offense. Malice is not an element of manslaughter. W.S. 6-2-105. Whether a 
person acted maliciously (second degree murder) or in the "sudden heat of 
passion" (voluntary manslaughter) is a question for the jury. Smith v. State, 
564 P.2d 1194, 1197-98 (Wyo. 1977). Thus the question of malice was in dispute 
at the trial. The prior bad acts evidence was admissible as evidence from which 
malice could be inferred.

[¶18]   Having found the third and fourth 
factors of the Bishop test present, we conclude that the first, second and fifth 
factors are present also. The prosecution "plainly, clearly, and convincingly" 
proved the acts through witnesses who saw the acts or observed their effects. 
All of the acts testified to occurred within a year of appellant being charged 
with murdering Adam, which is sufficiently close in time. See Pena, at 319 (acts 
seven years before charged offense not too remote). The circumstantial nature of 
the prosecution's case and the existence of two suspects gave the prosecution a 
substantial need for the evidence. See Longfellow, at 854. Thus all five of the 
factors have been met in this case. 

[¶19]   The decision under Rule 403 of 
whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by unfair prejudice or 
confusion is within the trial court's discretion. Wehr, at 109. The evidence was 
substantially probative of identity and malice. The trial court did not abuse 
its discretion.

B. 
REQUEST FOR COUNSEL

[¶20]   Appellant was interviewed four 
times by the police. The first two were at the hospital immediately following 
the victim's death. The third was at the police station on the same day. The 
fourth was also at the station, but it took place on the following day, February 
15.

[¶21]   Appellant does not challenge the 
propriety of the first three interviews, only the fourth one. At the start of 
the fourth interview, the police showed appellant a rights-waiver form and asked 
him to sign it. A police officer testified that the following then 
occurred:

[defense 
attorney] No. Right after you asked him about it [the waiver form], did he not 
say, "Do I need a lawyer"?

[officer] 
Yes, sir.

[defense 
attorney] And then he's told he's not under arrest. It's a continuation of 
questioning, and then he goes ahead and signs off, but he asked if he needed a 
lawyer?

[officer] 
Yes, sir.

Appellant 
argues that his statements from the fourth interview should have been suppressed 
because they were given after he had made an equivocal request for counsel. 
Appellant made statements about Adam's bruises which were conflicting with prior 
accounts he had given, and he admitted to spanking the child two days before his 
death. Appellant claims that the admission of these statements violated his 
rights against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution.

[¶22]   The Fifth Amendment 
provides:

     No person shall be 
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.

[¶23]   Article 1, § 11 of the Wyoming 
Constitution provides:

     No person shall be 
compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If a jury disagree, or if the 
judgment be arrested after a verdict, or if the judgment be reversed for error 
in law, the accused shall not be deemed to have been in 
jeopardy.

[¶24]   At the trial court, appellant 
challenged the interviews in the context of Black v. State, 820 P.2d 969 (Wyo. 
1991) (continued interrogation by police was coercive where pregnant suspect was 
emotionally distraught and police already had a case against her). Appellant has 
raised the question of an equivocal request for counsel for the first time on 
appeal. Therefore, we examine his claim for plain error. Ramos v. State, 806 P.2d 822, 827 (Wyo. 1991). In order for plain error to be found, appellant must 
show that:

(1) 
the record clearly shows what occurred at trial, (2) transgression of a clear 
and unequivocal ule of law, and (3) which adversely affected one of 
[appellant's] substantial rights. Failure to establish each element of this 
three-part test precludes a finding of plain error.

Geiger 
v. State, 859 P.2d 665, 668 (Wyo. 1993) (citations omitted); Ramos, at 
827.

[¶25]   Once a person makes a request for 
counsel, no further interrogation is allowed unless counsel has been made 
available or the person voluntarily chooses to communicate. Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739, 742 (Wyo. 1987) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 reh'g denied 452 U.S. 973, 101 S. Ct. 3128, 69 L. Ed. 2d 984 
(1981)). If the request for counsel is equivocal, however, the police can 
continue to talk with the person in order to "resolve the question of the 
suspect's desire for counsel." Best, at 743; see also Cheatham v. State, 719 P.2d 612, 619 (Wyo. 1986). The police may not question the suspect on the 
offense until they determine whether he desires counsel or not. Id. If he does 
not, the police must obtain a voluntary written waiver for interrogation to 
continue. Best, at 743-44.

[¶26]   The purpose behind this rule is to 
protect a person's constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination. 
U.S. Const.Amend. V; Wyo. Const. Art. I, § 11; Best, at 742; see also Edwards, 
451 U.S.  at 482, 101 S. Ct.  at 1883; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, reh'g denied 385 U.S. 890, 87 S. Ct. 11, 17 L. Ed. 2d 121 
(1966).

[¶27]   Throughout the fourth interview, 
appellant repeatedly denied killing Adam. Even if we assumed that appellant was 
improperly questioned after requesting counsel, we fail to see how those 
statements rise to the level of plain error. Appellant did make inconsistent 
statements during the interview about how Adam received his injuries, however, 
the statements do not incriminate appellant in the sense that he admitted to the 
crime. To the contrary, he emphatically denied killing Adam throughout the 
interview.

[¶28]   In his brief, appellant provides no 
argument as to what effect, if any, the suppression of his statements would have 
had on the trial. There is abundant evidence in the record that appellant did in 
fact kill Adam. Thus even if we suppressed his statements, the outcome of 
appellant's trial would likely be the same. Consequently, no substantial right 
of appellant was adversely affected by the admission of the statements and there 
was no plain error.

C. 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

[¶29]   Appellant, in his final issue, 
questions the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his second degree murder 
conviction. In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims we examine the 
evidence to determine

whether 
all of the evidence presented is "adequate to support a reasonable inference of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the finder of fact, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the state." * * * We do not substitute 
our judgment for that of the jury in applying this rule, and our only duty is to 
determine if a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even 
could, have come to the same result the jury actually did.

Taul 
v. State, 862 P.2d 649, 657 (Wyo. 1993) (citations omitted) (quoting Saldana v. 
State, 846 P.2d 604, 619 (Wyo. 1993)). In order to sustain appellant's 
conviction for second degree murder, the evidence must be sufficient to show 
that he killed Adam purposely and maliciously without premeditation. W.S. 
6-2-104.

[¶30]   It is undisputed that Adam was 
beaten to death. There is evidence from eyewitnesses and from the autopsy of the 
extensive injuries that Adam suffered. There was evidence of the physical and 
emotional abuse that permeated appellant's relationship with Adam. The appellant 
had ample time and access to Adam on the night of his death. While this evidence 
is circumstantial, it was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that 
appellant was guilty of second degree murder in the beating death of Adam 
Franklin.

CONCLUSION

[¶31]   The prior bad acts evidence, which 
related to appellant's relationship with the victim, was admissible under W.R.E. 
404(b) as tending to prove intent, identity and malice. The admission of 
appellant's statements from his fourth interview with the police did not rise to 
the level of plain error. Finally, there was sufficient evidence to sustain 
appellant's second degree murder conviction. Therefore, appellant's conviction 
and sentence are affirmed.