Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V DESHOWN R PASHA

Citation: 

Docket Number: 220092

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 18, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 119049  
DESHOWN R. PASHA,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
After a bench trial, defendant was convicted of  
possession of less than twenty-five grams of heroin1 and  
carrying a concealed weapon.2  On appeal, defendant argued  
that the concealed weapon conviction was not supported by the  
evidence.  The Court of Appeals affirmed on authority of  
People v Marrow, 210 Mich App 455; 534 NW2d 153 (1995), aff’d  
453 Mich 903 (1996).  We reverse the CCW conviction and  
overrule the Court of Appeals holding in Marrow to the extent  
1 MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v).  
2 MCL 750.227(2).  
 
that it requires lawful ownership of a pistol as a  
prerequisite to a valid claim to an exception contained in the  
concealed weapons statute, MCL 750.227(2).  In light of the  
effect of our decision on the administration of justice, we  
limit the retroactive effect of our holding to certain  
categories of cases currently pending on appeal, as discussed  
below.  
I  
In 
December 
1998, police raided the house where defendant  
was living. 
The police officers testified they found  
defendant standing over a toilet, attempting to flush away  
some heroin. 
In the process of securing defendant, the  
officers found a pistol in the waistband of his pants.  
Defendant testified that he was in boxer shorts when he opened  
the door to the house for police and that the pistol that was  
seized was actually found by police under a couch.  
Defendant was charged with possession of less than  
twenty-five grams of heroin, possession of a firearm during  
the commission of a felony,3 and with being an habitual  
offender, third offense.4  The trial court found defendant  
guilty of the possession offense, acquitted him of the felony­
firearm charge, and then indicated it was convicting him of  
3 MCL 750.227b.  
4 MCL 769.11  
2  
 
carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227(2).5  Defendant was  
sentenced to one to four years for the possession conviction  
and one to five years for the CCW conviction.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed.6  Defendant has applied  
for leave to appeal.  
II  
With regard to the possession and carrying of firearms  
and having them within a dwelling house, the following  
statutes are germane.  MCL 28.422 forbids a person from  
purchasing, carrying, or transporting a pistol without first  
obtaining a license.  MCL 750.224f forbids certain felons,  
such as defendant, from possessing a firearm. Further, MCL  
750.227(2), 
our 
CCW 
statute, provides that, absent a concealed  
weapons permit, a person may not carry a pistol in a concealed  
manner except in a dwelling house, place of business, or other  
land possessed by the person.  In this case, we deal with the  
exception known as the dwelling house exception.  
5  
A person shall not carry a pistol concealed on 
or about his or her person, or, whether concealed 
or otherwise, in a vehicle operated or occupied by 
the person, except in his or her dwelling house, 
place of business, or on other land possessed by 
the person, without a license to carry the pistol 
as provided by law and if licensed, shall not carry 
the pistol in a place or manner inconsistent with 
any restrictions upon such license.  
6 
 Unpublished memorandum opinion, issued February 23, 
2001 (Docket No. 220092).  
3  
 
In Marrow, the Court of Appeals read MCL 28.422 together  
with MCL 750.227(2) to conclude that, while the Legislature  
intended the CCW statute to allow a person to conceal an  
otherwise lawful firearm to defend his property, the dwelling  
house exception to the CCW statute did not sweep so broadly as  
to extend to one who was precluded from even possessing or  
carrying a weapon such as a felon under MCL 750.224f. Thus,  
the defendant, a felon, who was standing with a gun in front  
of his house shortly before being apprehended by a police  
officer, could not avail himself of the dwelling house  
exception, and his CCW conviction was upheld.7  
III  
Pursuant to the rule outlined in Marrow, the Court of  
Appeals in this case held that the dwelling house exception to  
the CCW statute does not apply to persons who are not lawful  
possessors of weapons and that defendant was appropriately  
convicted of CCW.  
In reviewing whether the CCW statute can sustain such an  
interpretation as offered by the Marrow Court, and now the  
7 It is important to note that buttressing the Court’s 
peremptory order, and indeed relied upon by this Court in our 
affirmance of the judgment, was the fact the defendant did not 
have a sufficient possessory interest in the property to come 
within the dwelling house exception. This Court said:  
[W]e affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals on the ground that the defendant did not 
have a possessory interest in the area between the 
sidewalk and roadway sufficient to come within the 
exception stated in the statute.  MCL 750.227. [453  
Mich 903 (1996).]  
4  
  
 
 
current Court of Appeals panel, it is well to begin by  
recalling the bedrock rule that the goal of judicial  
interpretation of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to  
the intent of the Legislature.  McJunkin v Cellasto Plastic  
Corp, 461 Mich 590, 598; 608 NW2d 57 (2000).  “The first step  
in that determination is to review the language of the statute  
itself.” 
In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich  
396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).  Thus, if the language is  
clear, no further construction is necessary or allowed to  
expand what the Legislature clearly intended to cover. People  
v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 284; 597 NW2d 1 (1999). The  
application of this rule is dispositive of this matter.  
MCL 750.227(2) provides:  
A person shall not carry a pistol concealed on 
or about his or her person, or, whether concealed 
or otherwise, in a vehicle operated or occupied by 
the person, except in his or her dwelling house, 
place of business, or on other land possessed by 
the person, without a license to carry the pistol 
as provided by law and if licensed, shall not carry 
the pistol in a place or manner inconsistent with 
any restrictions upon such license.  
In order to qualify for the dwelling house exception, the  
defendant must present evidence that the location where the  
concealed pistol was carried was defendant’s dwelling house.  
No other condition, such as lawful ownership of the pistol, is  
statutorily required.  To state this proposition is to expose  
the problem with Marrow in that Marrow effectively read a  
requirement of lawful ownership of the weapon into the  
5  
 
dwelling house exception to the CCW statute.  Such an addition  
of a requirement simply cannot be done by a court.  If such a  
condition is to be added, it must be added by the Legislature.  
As that has not happened, this defendant has been convicted of  
a crime that does not apply to him, and his conviction is  
invalid. We therefore overrule the Court of Appeals holding  
in Marrow that requires lawful ownership of the pistol as a  
prerequisite to a valid claim to an exception contained in MCL  
750.227(2).8  
Moreover, we express our disapproval of the practice  
employed by the trial court in this case.  The prosecutor  
charged defendant with felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b.  The  
trial court did not explain why defendant was not guilty of  
that offense.  Instead, it convicted defendant of CCW, an  
offense that the prosecutor did not charge. It is doubtful  
that CCW was truly a “cognate” offense of felony-firearm, so  
the trial court probably lacked authority to convict the  
defendant of that offense even under this Court’s pre-People  
v Cornell, 466 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2002),9 jurisprudence.  
8 
 We emphasize that our holding is confined to an 
interpretation of the dwelling house exception to the CCW 
statute.  
Convicted 
felons who possess firearms remain subject 
to prosecution under other weapon laws, including 18 USC 
922(g)(1) and MCL 750.224f.  See generally Old Chief v United  
States, 519 US 172; 117 S Ct 644; 136 L Ed 2d 574 (1997); 
United States v Gordon, 744 F Supp 149 (ED Mich, 1990); People  
v Swint, 225 Mich App 353; 572 NW2d 666 (1997).  
9 
 Following our decision in Cornell, the trier of fact 
may no longer convict a defendant of a cognate lesser offense.  
6  
 
 
IV  
This Court will reverse a conviction on the basis of an  
unpreserved 
nonconstitutional error if the error was plain and  
affected substantial rights and if the defendant is actually  
innocent or the error seriously affected the fairness,  
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.  
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). We  
conclude that defendant has met the Carines standard. 
The  
error is plain and defendant’s substantial rights have been  
affected.  Since it is clear defendant possessed the gun in  
his residence, he has demonstrated, with regard to the CCW  
conviction, that he is actually innocent.10  Defendant’s CCW  
conviction is reversed, and we enter a directed verdict of  
acquittal. MCR 7.316(A)(7).  
Finally, we consider the effect of our decision to  
overrule Marrow’s interpretation of the statutory dwelling  
house exception.  Prosecutors and courts have relied on Marrow  
in deciding whether to charge or convict a defendant of CCW.  
Full retroactive application of our holding would undermine  
the interest in finality of convictions and disrupt the  
effective administration of justice.  
Accordingly, the retroactive effect of our decision is  
limited to certain cases currently pending on appeal.  To seek  
10 While it appears defendant could have been prosecuted 
for being a felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, he 
was not so charged.  There also was no apparent obstacle to a 
felony-firearm conviction.  
7  
 
 
 
 
retroactive application of our holding in a case currently  
pending on appeal, a defendant must demonstrate that 1) the  
dwelling house exception issue has been raised on appeal, and  
2) the defendant either preserved the issue in the trial court  
or is entitled to relief under Carines. 
See, generally,  
Cornell, supra; Lowe v Estate Motors Ltd, 428 Mich 439, 475;  
410 NW2d 706 (1987); Murray v Beyer Mem Hosp, 409 Mich 217,  
221-223; 293 NW2d 341 (1980).  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
8  
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 119049  
DESHOWN R. PASHA,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
I would not resolve this case by a per curiam opinion.  
This case raises a jurisprudentially significant issue of  
statutory interpretation: whether a felon in possession of a  
concealed weapon convicted of CCW may avail himself of the  
dwelling house exemption in the CCW statute, MCL 750.227(2).  
In answering this issue, the per curiam opinion overrules the  
Court of Appeals holding in, People v Marrow, 210 Mich App  
455; 534 NW2d 153 (1995), aff’d, 453 Mich 903; 554 NW2d 901  
(1996), which previously interpreted MCL 750.227(2) for the  
same reason.  I would rather grant leave so we may receive the  
benefit of full briefing and argument by the parties before  
taking such action.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.