Case Title: State ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. v. Sidney

Citation: 2001-Ohio-79

Docket Number: 20001899

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. v. 
Sidney, 91 Ohio St.3d 399, 2001-Ohio-79.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, OHIO LABOR COUNCIL, 
INC. ET AL. v. CITY OF SIDNEY. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. v. 
Sidney (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 399.] 
Mandamus sought to compel city of Sidney to comply with R.C. 5923.05 by 
paying relator his regular pay as a police lieutenant in addition to his 
military pay while performing military service without being required to 
schedule vacation leave during those absences — Cause dismissed, 
when. 
(No. 00-1899 — Submitted March 27, 2001 — Decided May 16, 2001.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Relator John Frilling is a permanent public employee as 
defined in R.C. 5903.01(A) who is employed as a police lieutenant by respondent, 
the city of Sidney, Ohio, a chartered municipality.  Frilling is a member of relator 
Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. (“FOP”), which is the 
exclusive representative of employees in the classifications of Communications 
Technicians, Patrol Officers, Sergeants, and Lieutenants for the Sidney Police 
Department.  Frilling has also been a member of the United States Air Force 
Reserve and the Ohio Air National Guard. 
 
Between December 23, 1996 and December 13, 1999, Sidney Ordinance 
No. 131.18 provided: 
 
“MILITARY LEAVE. 
 
“Any employee who is a member of the National Guard or militia or of the 
military or naval forces of the United States, and is required to undergo field 
training therein or is called for active duty, shall be granted a leave of absence 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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with pay for the period.  Vacation and sick leave shall only be accrued at the 
employee’s regular rate during this paid leave.  This paid leave of absence shall 
be in addition to his vacation leave, but shall not exceed fifteen days in any fiscal 
year.  In the case of military leave, paid leave shall mean the difference between 
the employee’s regular salary and all government money received for such 
military leave, excluding any transportation reimbursement received.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
In December 1999, this ordinance was amended to provide for twenty-two 
days military leave in any calendar year. 
 
In addition, the collective bargaining agreement between the FOP and 
Sidney contained a comparable military leave provision that provided that this 
leave shall not exceed fifteen days in any fiscal year and that paid military leave is 
“the difference between the employee’s regular salary and all governmental 
money received for such military leave, excluding any transportation 
reimbursement received.” 
 
These provisions confer lesser benefits than R.C. 5923.05, which provides 
for military leave “without loss of pay” for permanent public employees.  R.C. 
5923.05(A).  Effective September 18, 1997, R.C. 5923.05(F) was amended to 
provide that “[a]ny permanent public employee of a political subdivision whose 
employment is governed by a collective bargaining agreement with provision for 
the performance of service in the uniformed services shall abide by the terms of 
that collective bargaining agreement with respect to the performance of such 
service, except that no collective bargaining agreement may afford fewer rights 
and benefits than are conferred under this section.”  (Emphasis added.)  147 Ohio 
Laws, Part IV, 7806, 7875. 
 
Since September 18, 1997, Frilling has been on requested leaves of 
absence from his job with Sidney while serving in the United States Air Force 
Reserve and the Ohio Air National Guard.  According to Frilling, during these 
January Term, 2001 
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absences, Sidney did not grant him a leave of absence without loss of pay, and the 
city required him either to use his days off or use his accrued vacation or personal 
leave to cover his military absences.  Frilling never provided evidence to the city 
that he had been called to military duty when he requested and received military 
leave. 
 
In January 2000, Frilling attempted to schedule two days of military leave 
in addition to his eight unpaid, authorized days off.  Sidney treated Frilling’s 
military leave as paid personal days off, and Frilling filed a grievance under the 
grievance and arbitration procedure of the collective bargaining agreement.  
Neither the FOP nor Frilling pursued the grievance through the final step in the 
agreement, i.e., arbitration. 
 
In October 2000, the FOP and Frilling filed this action for a writ of 
mandamus to compel the city of Sidney to comply with R.C. 5923.05 by paying 
Frilling “his regular pay plus interest, irrespective of any pay he receives from the 
military, during his leaves of absence since September 18, 1997 while performing 
services in the uniformed services without requiring him to schedule his off days 
or benefit leave during these absences.”  After Sidney filed an answer in 
December 2000, the case was referred to mediation.  In February 2001, the cause 
was returned to the regular docket. 
 
This cause is now before the court for its S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) determination. 
 
We must now determine whether dismissal, an alternative writ, or a 
peremptory writ is appropriate.  S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5); State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. 
Illum. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 447, 
449, 727 N.E.2d 900, 902.  Dismissal is appropriate if it appears beyond doubt, 
after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations and making all 
reasonable inferences in favor of relators, that they are not entitled to the 
requested extraordinary relief.  State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson (1999), 86 Ohio 
St.3d 629, 632, 716 N.E.2d 704, 708. 
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Relying solely upon R.C. 5923.05, relators claim that Frilling must be paid 
his regular salary from Sidney in addition to his military pay while performing 
military service without being required to schedule vacation leave during these 
absences.  For the following reasons, relators’ claim is meritless. 
 
First, R.C. 5923.05 is inapplicable to Frilling’s military leave because of 
the plain language of R.C. 4117.10.  R.C. 4117.10(A) expressly states that absent 
an election by the city to provide the military leave specified in R.C. 5923.05, the 
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement prevail: 
 
“The law pertaining to the leave of absence and compensation provided 
under section 5923.05 of the Revised Code prevails over any conflicting 
provisions of [collective bargaining] agreements if the terms of the agreement 
contain benefits which are less than those contained in that section or the 
agreement contains no such terms and * * * the public authority is another entity 
listed in division (B) of section 4117.01 of the Revised Code that elects to provide 
leave of absence and compensation as provided in section 5923.05 of the Revised 
Code.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Here, R.C. 5923.05 does not prevail over either the collective bargaining 
agreement or the Sidney ordinance.  The city has not elected to provide the 
military leave and compensation specified in R.C. 5923.05.  In fact, through its 
collective bargaining agreement and ordinance, Sidney has elected otherwise. 
 
Second, R.C. 5923.05 is inapplicable because it conflicts with Sidney 
Ordinance No. 131.18.  An ordinance adopted by a municipality pursuant to its 
constitutional home-rule authority regarding military leave of its employees 
prevails over conflicting state law.  See N. Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. 
Parma (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 375, 378, 15 O.O.3d 450, 452, 402 N.E.2d 519, 
521-522 (“It is axiomatic that an ordinance, similar to the one at bar [regarding 
military pay], if enacted by a chartered municipality, would prevail over the state 
law  [R.C. 5923.05] irrespective of any conflict”); Mullen v. Akron (1962), 116 
January Term, 2001 
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Ohio App. 417, 22 O.O.2d 251, 188 N.E.2d 607; see, also, 2000 Ohio 
Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 2000-007, fn. 4. 
 
Third, even assuming that R.C. 5923.05 conferred a legal right on Frilling 
to the requested military leave and compensation, relators failed to specifically 
allege that Frilling satisfied the statutory prerequisite for these benefits.  R.C. 
5923.05(E) mandates that each permanent employee entitled to this leave “shall 
submit to the permanent public employee’s appointing authority the published 
order authorizing the call or order to the uniformed services or a written 
statement from the appropriate military commander authorizing that service, 
prior to being credited with such leave.”  (Emphasis added.)  S.Ct.Prac.R. 
X(4)(B) requires the pleading of specific facts in mandamus actions in this court 
rather than unsupported conclusions.  State ex rel. Taxpayers Coalition v. 
Lakewood (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 385, 390, 715 N.E.2d 179, 184.  Relators’ 
complaint does not contain even conclusory allegations regarding compliance 
with the R.C. 5923.05(E) statutory requirement. 
 
Finally, to the extent that relators might claim that they are entitled to 
relief under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, they have or had an 
adequate legal remedy through the agreement’s grievance and arbitration 
procedure.  State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 447, 449, 
663 N.E.2d 639, 641. 
 
Based on the foregoing, it appears beyond doubt that relators’ action lacks 
merit and is dismissed. 
Cause dismissed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would grant an alternative writ. 
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Paul L. Cox and Kay E. Cremeans, for relators. 
 
Denlinger, Rosenthal & Greenberg Co., L.P.A., Robert M. Lamb and 
Daniel G. Rosenthal, for respondent. 
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