Case Title: Matter of Taylor

Citation: 

Docket Number: 488, 2015

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2016-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
PETITION OF MILTON E. TAYLOR 
FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
 
§ 
§  No. 488, 2015 
§ 
 
Submitted: June 15, 2016 
   
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
June 22, 2016             
 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND, VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and 
SEITZ, Justices, constituting the Court en banc. 
 
 
Upon the Petition for a Writ of Mandamus.  GRANTED. 
 
 
Herbert W. Mondros, Esquire, Margolis Edelstein, Wilmington, Delaware, for 
Petitioner Milton E. Taylor. 
 
 
Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for 
Respondent State of Delaware. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SEITZ, Justice: 
2 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Milton Taylor was sentenced to death in 2001.  His pending petition requests 
this Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Superior Court to docket his 
second motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  
The State concedes that the writ should be issued.  After careful consideration, we 
hold that the Superior Court erroneously concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to act 
in Taylor’s case because of a stay of execution order entered by the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware (“the District Court”).  Under the 
circumstances, we shall issue the writ directing the Superior Court to vacate its 
November 2014 order, refusing to docket Taylor’s second postconviction motion.  
Taylor should be allowed to file his Rule 61 motion without any preconditions 
related to the federal court proceedings.   
II.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A Superior Court jury found Taylor guilty in March 2001 of Murder in the 
First Degree.  By a vote of 10-2, the jury recommended that Taylor be sentenced to 
death.  On July 5, 2001, the Superior Court accepted the jury’s recommendation 
and imposed a death sentence.  This Court affirmed Taylor’s conviction and 
sentence on direct appeal.1  In March 2006, Taylor filed his first motion for 
                                                             
1 Taylor v. State, 822 A.2d 1052 (Del. 2003).  
3 
 
postconviction relief under Rule 61.  The Superior Court denied that motion,2 and 
we affirmed.3  After the Superior Court set a new execution date, Taylor filed a 
motion in the District Court requesting to stay his execution so he could pursue 
federal habeas corpus relief.  The District Court granted Taylor’s motion for a stay 
of execution on February 10, 2012.4  After he filed an amended petition for habeas 
corpus in the District Court, Taylor requested to stay the federal habeas 
proceedings and to return to state court to exhaust his claims.  The District Court 
granted that motion to stay the federal proceedings on April 14, 2014.5 
 
In November 2014, Taylor attempted to file his second motion for 
postconviction relief in the Superior Court.  The brief in support of his motion was 
182 pages long.  The Superior Court rejected the filing, noting that “[a]s far as the 
court knows, this case is pending in the federal district court and this court does not 
have authority to consider it further.”6  The Superior Court informed the parties 
that it would not undertake further review of Taylor’s case “until the State submits 
an order lifting the stay[,]”7 and that upon the lifting of the stay, the Superior Court 
would impose a new sentencing order.  Only then would Taylor be permitted to file 
                                                             
2 State v. Taylor, 2010 WL 3511272 (Del. Super. Aug. 6, 2010). 
3 Taylor v. State, 32 A.3d 374 (Del. 2011). 
4 Taylor v. Danberg, C.A. No. 11-1251 (D. Del. Feb. 10, 2012). 
5 The State appealed the District Court’s 2014 stay order to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit.  That appeal, along with Taylor’s motion to dismiss the appeal, remains 
pending before the Third Circuit in Taylor v. Comm’r Dep’t of Corr., No. 14-9000 (3d Cir.). 
6 State v. Taylor, Cr. ID 0003016874 (Del. Super. Nov. 26, 2014). 
7 Id. 
4 
 
his motion for postconviction relief, limited to 50 pages.  The Superior Court 
ordered the Prothonotary to reject any filing that was in derogation of the court’s 
order. 
 
Taylor appealed that order to this Court.  We issued a notice to Taylor to 
show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed based on the Court’s lack of 
jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal in a criminal matter.  Both parties 
responded and filed supplemental memoranda as directed by the Court.  
Ultimately, we concluded that the Superior Court’s order rejecting Taylor’s second 
Rule 61 petition for filing was neither final nor interlocutory because no 
proceeding had ever begun in the Superior Court.8  We concluded that the proper 
course of action to challenge the Superior Court’s refusal to docket the motion was 
through the extraordinary writ process.   
 
Taylor filed the current petition for an extraordinary writ on September 9, 
2015.  He argues that a writ of mandamus must be issued because, by refusing to 
docket his motion, the Superior Court arbitrarily failed to perform a duty that it 
owed to him, and Taylor has no other adequate legal remedy.  The State agrees that 
the Superior Court erred by placing conditions precedent, which were unrelated to 
form, upon the docketing of Taylor’s Rule 61 motion.  The State asserts that a writ 
of mandamus should be issued directing the Superior Court to vacate its November 
                                                             
8 Taylor v. State, 2015 WL 5076795, at *1 (Del. Aug. 26, 2015). 
5 
 
2014 order and to allow Taylor to file a new, conforming Rule 61 motion without 
any conditions related to the District Court’s consideration of Taylor’s federal 
habeas petition. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The Delaware Constitution confers original jurisdiction upon this Court to 
issue extraordinary writs.9  A writ of mandamus is a command to compel a trial 
court to perform an official, legal duty.10  As a condition precedent to the issuance 
of a writ of mandamus, the petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) he has a clear 
right to the performance of a duty; (2) no other adequate legal remedy is available; 
and (3) the trial court has arbitrarily failed or refused to perform its duty.11  Absent 
a clear showing of an arbitrary refusal to act, this Court will not issue a writ of 
mandamus to compel the trial court to perform a discretionary act or to decide a 
matter in a particular way.12 
In this case, the parties both assert that the Superior Court erred when it 
concluded that the District Court’s 2012 stay of execution order divested the state 
court of jurisdiction in Taylor’s case.  We agree with that assertion.  The District 
Court’s February 10, 2012 order stayed Taylor’s execution date and did nothing 
more than that.  The Superior Court thus had jurisdiction to accept Taylor’s second 
                                                             
9 Del. Const. art. IV, § 11(5). 
10 In re Brookins, 736 A.2d 204, 206 (Del. 1999). 
11 Id. 
12 In re Bordley, 545 A.2d 619, 620 (Del. 1988). 
6 
 
Rule 61 motion.  The Superior Court also had no discretion, under the 
circumstances of this case, to direct the Prothonotary to refuse to docket Taylor’s 
Rule 61 motion until the State “submit[ted] an order lifting the stay”13 or for any 
reasons that were unrelated to the procedural requirements of Rule 61(b).14  
 Rule 61 sets forth the exclusive remedy for an inmate seeking to overturn a 
conviction or death sentence after the judgment has become final.15  Although Rule 
61 authorizes the Prothonotary to refuse to docket a motion that fails to conform to 
the procedural requirements of Rule 61(b),16 a defendant has the right to have a 
conforming motion docketed, reviewed, and decided by the Superior Court in a 
timely manner.17 
We thus conclude that Taylor has established a clear right to file a Rule 61 
motion in this case, and that the Superior Court arbitrarily refused to perform its 
duty when it failed to docket Taylor’s motion.  Accordingly, a writ of mandamus 
directing the Superior Court to vacate its November 2014 order is appropriate 
under these unique circumstances.  We note, however, that our issuance of the writ 
                                                             
13 State v. Taylor, Cr. ID 0003016874, ¶ 3 (Del. Super. Nov. 26, 2014). 
14 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(b).  Rule 61(b) sets forth certain requirements regarding the format, 
timing, and location for filing a Rule 61 motion.  Rule 61(c)(1) provides that the Prothonotary 
shall return a motion that does not comply with Rule 61(b), if a judge so directs, with the reasons 
for the return.  Rule 61(c)(2) states, in part, “Upon receipt of a motion that appears on its face to 
comply with subdivision (b) of this rule, the prothonotary shall accept the motion and enter it on 
the docket in the proceeding in which the judgment under attack was entered.”  Id. R. 61(c)(2) 
(emphasis added). 
15 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(2). 
16 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(c)(1). 
17 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(c)(2); Brookins v. State, 736 A.2d at 207. 
7 
 
does not mean that Taylor has an unqualified right to file the 182-page brief that he 
attempted to file in support of his motion.  The Superior Court has discretion to set 
reasonable page limits and deadlines for briefing Rule 61 motions.18  The parties 
may seek the Superior Court’s leave to extend those limitations as the 
circumstances warrant. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The writ of mandamus is GRANTED.  The Superior Court is directed to 
vacate its order dated November 26, 2014. 
                                                             
18 Gattis v. State, 955 A.2d 1276, 1286 (Del. 2008).