Case Title: State v. Driskill

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC93882

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent,              
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v.    
            
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC93882 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
JESSE DRISKILL,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT OF LACLEDE COUNTY 
Honorable Kenneth M. Hayden, Judge 
 
Opinion issued March 31, 2015 
 
Jesse Driskill (hereinafter, “Driskill”) was found guilty of two counts of first-
degree murder, section 565.020, RSMo 2000,1 one count of forcible rape, section 
566.030, one count of forcible sodomy, section 566.060, and five counts of armed 
criminal action, section 571.015.  Consistent with the jury’s recommendations, Driskill 
received two death sentences, a consecutive fifteen-year term of imprisonment on the 
burglary count, and seven consecutive life sentences on the remaining counts.  This Court 
has exclusive jurisdiction.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.  The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
                                              
1 All further statutory references herein are to RSMo 2000. 
Factual Background 
On July 25, 2010, Driskill and Jessica Wallace (hereinafter, “Wallace”) were at 
the Prosperine River Access on the Niangua River.  Together, they did drugs and later 
“ended up having sex.”  Driskill and Wallace were interrupted by a police officer.  
Driskill ran off into the woods with his clothes and a gun.  Wallace spoke to the police 
officer and returned home. 
Contemporaneously, J.W. and C.W. (collectively, hereinafter, “the victims”) were 
at their home, located approximately one and one-half miles from the Prosperine River 
Access.  J.W. was 82 years old; C.W. was 76.  The victims were celebrating their fifty-
ninth wedding anniversary.  They were due to return to Highlandville, Missouri,2 the next 
day. 
 
When the victims never returned to Highlandville, family members became 
worried.  Multiple attempts were made to reach the victims by telephone, but without 
success.  Concerned family members also contacted hospitals to inquire about the 
victims, pondering whether they could have had an accident. 
 
On the evening of July 26, the following day, family members arrived at the 
country house.  When they arrived at the house, the doors were locked and the victims’ 
vehicle was not present.  One relative entered the residence through a window.  The 
interior was “smoky and smelly.”  In the dining room, the relative saw C.W.’s feet 
sticking out from under a big pile of smoldering blankets. 
                                              
2 The victims’ permanent residence was in Highlandville with family members.  
3 
 
 
The relative opened the front door and told the victims’ son to come inside.  
Together, they found J.W. underneath another pile of blankets with chairs piled on top of 
him.  There were pools of blood near the victims’ heads.  They called the police. 
 
When the police officers arrived, they found no signs of forced entry.  There was 
an odor of accelerant near the victims.  C.W. had burn marks around the top part of her 
body.  Paper towels had been wadded up and burned in her groin area.  There was a clear 
fluid and blood draining from her vaginal and anal areas.  C.W. had a blackened area 
beneath both eyes and a wound above her right eyebrow.  J.W. was naked, except for his 
shoes, and there was a plastic bag over his head.  A large amount of blood had drained 
out of the bag and soaked the carpet beneath his head.  There was a wound on his face.  
C.W.’s purse was emptied on the floor.  There was a can of gasoline in the hallway.  
While police officers were conducting their investigation in the victims’ home, they 
received reports of a burning vehicle near Conway, Missouri. 
 
Meanwhile, Driskill called Wallace, telling her that he needed a ride.  Driskill 
called her again, asking to be picked up on Highway N in Conway.  Wallace drove to 
meet Driskill but had difficulty locating him.  She drove up and down the highway a 
couple of times and stopped at a gas station.  She saw smoke in the distance and first 
responders heading toward the smoke.  She eventually went home without locating 
Driskill. 
 
At approximately 10:45 p.m., Driskill went to Hannah’s General Store in Conway 
to charge his cell phone, but there was no charger.  Driskill then went to a nearby Budget 
Inn, asking to use its telephone.  Driskill reached Jessica Cummins (hereinafter, 
4 
 
“Cummins”), and he asked her to come get him.  Cummins agreed and met Driskill at the 
Budget Inn.   
During the drive, Driskill kept mumbling to Cummins.  He said he had “shot 
someone” and that he “messed up really bad.”  Cummins also thought he said he had 
“shot up” some drugs.   
 
About 11:33 p.m., a highway patrol sergeant went to the scene of the burned 
vehicle, located near the county line of Laclede and Dallas counties.  The sergeant 
recovered the license plate from the vehicle and discovered the vehicle belonged to the 
victims. 
 
Cummins dropped Driskill off a little after midnight at Codi Vause’s (hereinafter, 
“Vause”) house in Lebanon, Missouri.  Driskill appeared anxious and exhausted, saying 
he “needed some help,” indicating the authorities were after him.  Driskill stated he 
needed new clothes and that he had killed a couple of people.   
 
At some point, Driskill called Wallace and told her he committed a home invasion, 
robbery, and a double homicide.  Wallace drove to Vause’s house.  Driskill explained to 
the group that an elderly couple caught him going through their shed or garage and that 
he murdered them.  Driskill further stated that he ordered them into their house while 
holding up his gun.  Inside the victims gave Driskill money, but Driskill said it was not 
enough.  Driskill then shot J.W., told C.W. to bend over, and raped her.  He shot C.W. in 
5 
 
the face, but she tried to get away, so Driskill shot her two more times and “put a plastic 
bag down her throat and a pillow over her head.” 3     
 
Driskill detailed how he attempted to clean up the evidence.  Driskill said he 
shaved C.W.’s “pussy” and “poured bleach inside of her.”  Driskill put newspaper in her 
vaginal area, poured gasoline on her, and lit it.  Driskill then used five gallons of gasoline 
to burn the house.  He took the victims’ vehicle, which he later burned.  Driskill said his 
shoes were filled with blood.   
 
After listening to Driskill, Wallace left and went to a store where a friend worked.  
Wallace was upset and crying.  A police officer at the store asked her what was wrong.  
Wallace recounted Driskill’s story to the police officer. 
 
Cummins then returned to Vause’s home.  Driskill was washing out his shoes in 
the kitchen sink.  Driskill changed his clothes and directed Vause to get rid of the clothes 
he had been wearing.  Vause put the clothes into a trash bag.  Driskill fell asleep on the 
couch.  The others told Cummins what Driskill told them; they decided to call the police, 
and they each provided a statement. 
 
On July 27, at approximately 1:45 a.m., law enforcement officers arrested Driskill 
while he was sleeping on the couch at Vause’s home.  Driskill awoke and resisted his 
arrest.  During the arrest, Driskill’s head hit a coffee table, resulting in a laceration.  
Driskill continued to resist and was tasered.  The officers finally handcuffed Driskill and 
                                              
3 The timing of whether Driskill raped C.W. prior to killing her or whether he killed her 
prior to raping her is unclear from the record.   
6 
 
took him to the hospital for treatment.  The officers also seized the trash bag containing 
Driskill’s clothes.   
 
Several hours later, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant to collect 
“DNA, hair samples, anything that would have been involved with [] Driskill or the 
homicide.”  They conducted a gunshot residue test.  They collected blood stains from 
Driskill’s hands.  They seized an unlabeled pill bottle and found a pack of cigarettes in 
his clothes that had the same “run number” as ones at the victims’ home.  They also 
conducted a sexual assault kit on Driskill.   
 
Both of the victims’ bodies were autopsied.  C.W. had extensive burns on her face, 
head, back, and legs.  The burns were direct thermal injuries, indicating the fire was in 
constant contact with her skin.  There were burnt paper towels and calendar pages 
between her legs.  There was a gunshot wound that traveled along her jawline, exited her 
neck, and reentered her shoulder.  C.W. also was shot above the left eye.  This shot was 
instantly incapacitating and fatal; it was fired from “near contact” or less than an inch 
away.  C.W. had a laceration along her right eyebrow from blunt trauma, and her skull 
was fractured beneath that laceration.  Additionally, C.W. had injuries consistent with 
sexual assault.  There were bruises and tears at the entrance to C.W.’s vagina from 
penetrating injuries.  There were also two small tears at the entrance to C.W.’s rectum.   
 
During the autopsy of J.W., a wadded-up plastic bag was found in his throat.  J.W. 
had a gunshot wound that indicated a bullet entered his right cheek, went through his 
tongue and throat, exited his neck, and lodged in his shoulder.  While this gunshot wound 
7 
 
was potentially fatal, J.W.’s cause of death was determined to be asphyxiation due to the 
plastic bag. 
 
The vaginal swabs from C.W. were subjected to DNA analysis.  The first swab 
produced a mixture from two individuals, C.W. and Driskill.  J.W. was eliminated as a 
contributor to the DNA mixture.  Additional testing revealed that it was 94.97 billion 
times more likely that the mixture was produced by C.W. and Driskill than by C.W. and 
some other unknown person.   
Procedural Background 
 
On July 27, 2010, the state filed a complaint and subsequently charged Driskill by 
amended information with two counts of first-degree murder, one count of first-degree 
burglary, one count of forcible rape, one count of forcible sodomy, and five counts of 
armed criminal action.  On November 1, 2010, the state gave notice it intended to seek 
the death penalty.   
Pre-trial Proceedings 
 
In July 2013, Driskill’s counsel advised the trial court that Driskill suffered from 
“anxiety disorder” and “intermittent explosive disorder.”  Defense counsel then 
requested, should Driskill believe he would have a panic attack, that he be permitted to 
leave the courtroom and participate in part of proceedings via a closed-circuit television.  
The trial court questioned Driskill regarding his counsel’s request.  Driskill confirmed 
that he wanted to be able to leave the courtroom, if he felt he would have a panic attack.   
 
On August 14, 2013, Driskill’s counsel again requested the trial court 
accommodate Driskill by allowing him to remove himself from the courtroom and 
8 
 
observe the proceedings by closed-circuit television if he felt he was about to have a 
panic attack.  At that time, Driskill’s counsel advised the trial court that it retained an 
expert (hereinafter, “Dr. Gruenberg”) who determined in May 2013, that Driskill was 
incompetent to stand trial without being medicated.  Driskill’s counsel then disclosed 
Driskill was evaluated by another expert (hereinafter, “Dr. Fucetola”) in July 2013, who 
determined that Driskill was competent to stand trial without being medicated.  Driskill’s 
counsel stated that “we may have to ask for a competency evaluation in the middle of 
trial.”   
Voir dire 
 
During voir dire on August 14, 2013, Driskill’s counsel informed the trial court 
that Driskill needed to leave the courtroom.  Accordingly, the trial court called a recess 
and allowed Driskill to leave.  Driskill’s counsel notified the trial court that Driskill had 
suffered a panic attack outside the courtroom and did not “think that he [could] 
participate in the trial right now at this moment meaningfully.”   
 
Driskill was escorted to a cell.  When he entered the cell, a deputy observed him 
punch the wall, appear to be red in the face, crying, rubbing his head, and kneeling over 
as if his stomach were hurting.  A second deputy reported Driskill had been sick. 
Driskill’s counsel requested a competency examination.  The trial court inquired 
as to the results of Driskill’s two previous examinations.  Driskill’s counsel informed the 
trial court that, while Dr. Fucetola’s examination was more proximate in time, Dr. 
Fucetola could not give an opinion as to whether during the middle of trial Driskill would 
be competent if he suffered a panic attack.  The trial court noted that if Driskill were 
9 
 
evaluated again in jail, the examination would be no different in that he would not be 
evaluated at the time of trial, and it denied the request for another competency evaluation.   
 
After Driskill calmed down, defense counsel spoke briefly with him.  Defense 
counsel reported to the trial court that she did not have “a really good conversation with 
him.”  Defense counsel believed Driskill was not able to participate actively in trial.  
Further, defense counsel requested a recess for the day with the accommodation of 
allowing Driskill to participate by closed-circuit television on the following day.  The 
trial court agreed, recessing for the day and allowing Driskill to participate via closed-
circuit television the following day.  Driskill’s counsel clarified that the request for 
participation via closed-circuit television was in lieu of the motion for a competency 
evaluation because the trial court had overruled the motion for a competency evaluation.   
 
On August 15, 2013, at the trial court’s request, Driskill admitted the evaluations 
of Drs. Gruenberg and Fucetola into the record.  Dr. Gruenberg’s report dated May 13, 
2013, concluded that Driskill was “incompetent for trial without being placed on 
Neurontin.”  Dr. Fucetola’s examination conducted on July 13, 2013, concluded that 
Driskill “does have the adequate capacity to appreciate his own legal situation, he has a 
rational understanding of the legal situation, he has an adequate factual understanding of 
the legal system and process of adjudication and the capacity to assist his own counsel in 
his defense.”     
The trial court questioned Driskill, who was participating in the proceedings via 
closed-circuit television.  The trial court inquired as to whether Driskill was able to hear 
the proceedings and how he was feeling.  Driskill confirmed that he was able to hear the 
10 
 
proceedings and that he was calmer; there was nothing prohibiting him from 
understanding the proceedings.  Driskill asked to be excused from the courtroom for the 
day, and he understood he had a right to be present.  Further, Driskill stated he had no 
questions and did not need additional time to speak with his counsel.  Driskill 
corroborated the fact that he wanted to participate via closed-circuit television for the 
day’s proceedings and he had not been threatened or promised anything to induce him to 
participate by the closed-circuit television system.  The trial court found that Driskill was 
calm, and there was no evidence before the court that he was suffering from any duress.  
Driskill stated that he hoped to return to the courtroom on the following day. 
Defense counsel reiterated the belief that Driskill was not competent to proceed 
without medication.  The trial court directly questioned Driskill, who stated he was 
thinking clearly and nothing was preventing him from communicating with his counsel or 
assisting in his defense.  Driskill confirmed he had a telephone so he could communicate 
with his counsel, either by calling or texting.  The trial court observed, and Driskill 
confirmed, that he was calmer than the previous day.   
On August 16, 2013, Driskill was present in the courtroom.  There were no issues. 
Guilt phase 
On the fourth day of trial, August 19, 2013, Driskill was present in the courtroom 
when the guilt phase of his trial began.  Driskill’s counsel requested a competency 
evaluation and presented an e-mail from Dr. Fucetola, which was received over the 
weekend.  Dr. Fucetola’s statement indicated that based on his understanding of the 
11 
 
events during voir dire, in the moments before, during, and after a panic attack, Driskill 
may not be able to assist his counsel adequately.    
There were no issues on the fourth day of trial.  At the end of the day, defense 
counsel reported Driskill was able to converse with her, answer questions, and assist in 
his defense.  Driskill’s counsel had no reason to believe he was “under any type of duress 
or mental disability” during the day.     
On the fifth day of trial, August 20, 2013, Driskill was present in the courtroom.  
The state concluded presenting its case.  There was no indication Driskill was not 
competent to stand trial.   
Driskill decided he would not take the stand to testify.  Driskill communicated his 
decision with counsel and gave rational answers when the trial court questioned him.  
The trial court inquired as to whether Driskill understood his right to testify and whether 
anyone threatened or coerced him to waive his right.  Driskill provided coherent and 
rational responses to this inquiry.  Driskill confirmed the decision not to testify was his 
alone.  Driskill stated, “I want to testify, but I just know I can’t.  I mean I’m not good 
with people.”   
On August 21, 2013, the sixth day of trial, the trial court again questioned Driskill 
regarding whether he wanted to testify.  Driskill’s counsel presented an argument, 
believing Driskill refused to testify for fear that he would have a panic attack while 
testifying.  There were no issues with Driskill’s anxiety level during his counsel’s 
presentation of evidence or during closing arguments.  Driskill’s counsel confirmed this, 
stating that Driskill was able to assist in his defense during this portion of the trial.   
12 
 
During the trial court’s reading of the verdict, Driskill asked to be escorted from 
the courtroom.  Driskill requested to be excused after the trial court read the first seven 
guilty verdicts.  The trial court granted a recess and requested his counsel speak with 
Driskill to determine whether he wanted to be present for the reading of the remaining 
verdicts.  During this recess, there was no evidence presented that Driskill was suffering 
from another panic attack.  Driskill decided that he did not wish to be present for the 
reading of the remaining verdicts.  The jury found Driskill guilty on all counts.   
Penalty phase 
The penalty phase of Driskill’s trial began on August 22, 2013, the seventh day of 
trial.  Driskill’s counsel stated that he was able to assist the defense, but he was in a 
“somewhat of a heightened state of anxiety.”   
During the state’s opening argument, Driskill asked to be excused from the 
courtroom.  The trial court granted his request, holding the court in recess.  When the 
court reconvened, and out of the presence of the jury, the trial court spoke with Driskill.  
The trial court inquired as to whether Driskill believed that he would have an “episode” 
during the presentation of the state’s evidence.  Driskill stated, “I know I’ll snap out.” 
Focusing only on the time period for the state’s presentation of evidence, the trial 
court questioned Driskill as to whether he wished to remain in the courtroom.  Driskill 
indicated he did not want to remain physically in the courtroom because he felt uneasy.  
The trial court offered Driskill the opportunity to participate via closed-circuit television 
as he did on the first day of voir dire.  Driskill declined, stating that he did not like it.  
Further, he did not want to watch the proceedings remotely.  Driskill requested to be 
13 
 
excused.  The trial court inquired as to whether anyone had threatened him and he 
understood he had the right to be present.  The trial court excused Driskill for the 
presentation of the state’s evidence and indicated that the issue would be revisited later 
that day. 
Driskill’s counsel requested a competency evaluation, a mistrial, or a recess for an 
undetermined amount of time until Driskill believed he could be in the courtroom without 
feeling anxious.  The state opposed Driskill’s requests as he appeared calm during the 
trial court’s questioning and was able to answer all questions coherently.  Driskill’s 
counsel disagreed, stating that Driskill’s legs were shaking, he was wringing his hands, 
and he was perspiring a little bit.  The trial court asked whether there was any new 
evidence it should consider it support of the claim for a competency evaluation.  Driskill 
had no additional evidence to support his claims of a diminished mental capacity.  
Driskill asked to be excused from the courtroom before the jury returned.   
After the state finished presenting its penalty phase witnesses, Driskill returned to 
the courtroom outside the presence of the jury.  Driskill reaffirmed his desire to not be 
present for the presentation of the evidence on his behalf, and he asked to be excused 
again.  The trial court inquired again as to whether anyone had threatened him and 
whether he understood he had the right to be present.  Driskill reaffirmed that he did not 
wish to participate via closed-circuit television or watch the proceedings remotely.  The 
trial court explained that, as it planned to take a mid-afternoon break, his counsel would 
have the opportunity to visit with him then, and he would have the opportunity to return 
14 
 
to the courtroom if he desired.  The trial court also noted that Driskill did not appear to be 
under duress but noticed his leg bouncing a bit.   
After Driskill’s counsel finished presenting evidence on his behalf, the trial court 
took another recess so it could discuss with Driskill whether he wanted to testify in the 
penalty phase.  Driskill indicated that he did not want to testify, he understood he had the 
right to remain silent, he had ample time to discuss the issue with counsel, and no one 
had threatened him regarding his decision.  Driskill chose to remain in the courtroom 
during the instruction conference and penalty phase closing arguments.  Following the 
closing arguments, Driskill asked to be excused.   
Driskill returned to the courtroom while the trial court excused the alternate jurors.  
Driskill was also present when the trial court read the jury’s final verdicts and during the 
polling of the jurors.   
The jury recommended death sentences for each count of first-degree murder.  In 
regard to C.W.’s murder, the jury found nine statutory aggravating circumstances.  In 
regard to J.W.’s murder, the jury found eight statutory aggravating factors.  On 
November 5, 2013, the trial court sentenced Driskill to death for each count of first-
degree murder.  Further, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of fifteen years’ 
imprisonment for burglary and life imprisonment for each of the other offenses.  Driskill 
appeals. 
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews a sentence of death on direct appeal for prejudice, not just 
mere error.  State v. Anderson, 306 S.W.3d 529, 534 (Mo. banc 2010).  This Court will 
15 
 
reverse a trial court’s decision only when an alleged error is so prejudicial that the 
defendant was deprived of a fair trial.  State v. Johnson, 284 S.W.3d 561, 568 (Mo. banc 
2009); State v. McFadden, 391 S.W.3d 408, 417 (Mo. banc 2013).  Prejudice exists when 
there is a reasonable probability that the trial court’s error affected the outcome at trial.  
McFadden, 391 S.W.3d at 417.  Evidence admitted at trial is reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Anderson, 306 
S.W.3d at 534. 
 
Driskill raises six points on appeal.  They are all denied. 
Point I:  Mental Competency 
 
Driskill alleges the trial court erred in accepting the guilty verdicts and sentencing 
him because he was not mentally competent to stand trial.  Driskill claims he suffered 
from anxiety and panic attacks, which rendered him unable to consult with his counsel 
and assist in his own defense.  Driskill asserts that, given the evidence presented to the 
trial court, he was not competent to stand trial.  Accordingly, Driskill believes the trial 
court had a duty to stop the trial and order a competency evaluation. 
 
“It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he [or 
she] lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him 
[or her], to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his [or her] defense may not be 
subjected to a trial.”  Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 903, 43 L.Ed2d 
103 (1975).  “[T]he failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right 
not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him [or her] of his 
[or her] due process right to a fair trial.”  Id. at 172. 
16 
 
A trial court “is required to initiate proceedings to investigate the competency of a 
defendant ‘whenever a reasonable judge in the same situation as the trial judge would 
experience doubt about the defendant’s competency to stand trial.’”  State v. Anderson, 
79 S.W.3d 420, 432 (Mo. banc 2002) (quoting State v. Johns, 34 S.W.3d 93, 104 (Mo. 
banc 2000)); see also section 552.020.2.  A trial court’s determination regarding a 
defendant’s competency is a factual determination that will be upheld unless there is no 
substantial evidence to support it.  Anderson, 79 S.W.3d at 433; State v. Whitt, 330 
S.W.3d 487, 493 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010); State v. Elam, 89 S.W.3d 517, 521 (Mo. App. 
W.D. 2002).  “The standard for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant has 
‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding’ and has ‘a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him [or her].’”  Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 183 (Mo. banc 2009) (quoting 
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)). 
When reviewing the trial court’s determination, this Court does not weigh the 
evidence, but accepts as true all evidence and reasonable inferences that tend to support 
the trial court’s findings.  Id.  A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and bears 
the burden of showing that he or she is incompetent.  Section 552.020.8; Anderson, 79 
S.W.3d at 432-33.  “The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a 
psychological exam, and is not a mere ‘automaton’ that must grant these motions merely 
because they are filed.”  State v. Bracken, 382 S.W.3d 206, 212 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) 
(citing United States v. McEachern, 465 F.2d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 1972)). 
17 
 
 
Here, the trial court determined that there was no need for a competency 
evaluation during either the guilt or penalty phase of Driskill’s trial.  However, Driskill 
argues that there were multiple factors presented to the trial court that should have 
triggered the trial court’s duty to order a competency hearing.  Driskill asserts the factors 
presented to the trial court were the findings of the two doctors, Driskill’s panic attack 
during voir dire, and his mental health history.  Driskill paints a portrait of a mentally 
incompetent defendant who is unable to participate in his criminal defense, but this 
picture is refuted by the record. 
The first request for a competency hearing was made after Driskill had a panic 
attack during voir dire.  When Driskill knew the panic attack was beginning, he informed 
his counsel, who informed the trial court.  Immediately, the trial court excused Driskill 
from the courtroom.  The trial court recessed the proceedings for the rest of the day, and 
prior to resuming, the trial court made its own independent inquiry into Driskill’s state of 
mind.   
At the trial court’s request, Driskill presented the results of two mental 
competency evaluations prepared prior to trial by Drs. Gruenberg and Fucetola.  Dr. 
Gruenberg believed that in May 2013, Driskill was incompetent to stand trial without 
being medicated.  Dr. Gruenberg’s report concluded that Driskill “understands the 
components of the court and the roles of most individuals in the court room as well as the 
basic court room proceedings, however he is likely unable to appropriately assist in his 
defense during trial, in addition to possibly becoming explosive and disruptive during the 
trial proceedings.”  Dr. Fucetola’s examination in July 2013, determined that based on his 
18 
 
clinical interview of Driskill, review of his records, and the standardized testing he 
performed, Driskill “has an adequate factual understanding of the legal system and 
process of adjudication and the capacity to assist his own counsel in his defense.”   
 
The trial court observed Driskill in the courtroom and questioned him as to his 
state of mind, seeking to determine whether he was able to assist in his defense.  
Additionally, the trial court questioned defense counsel as to whether Driskill was able to 
assist in his defense.  The fact that the trial court chose to believe one expert’s evaluation 
does not diminish this determination.  The trial court had a rational basis to believe a 
competency examination that was closer in time to the trial and contained a series of 
standardized tests, which were not included in the previous report.  A “mere 
disagreement among experts does not necessarily indicate error on the part of the trial 
court.  On the contrary, it is the duty of the trial court to determine which evidence is 
more credible and persuasive.”  State v. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600, 609 (Mo. banc 2009) 
(quoting Anderson, 79 S.W.3d at 433); see also Helton v. Director of Revenue, State of 
Mo., 944 S.W.2d 306, 310 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997) (stating that when there is a conflict in 
the evidence the fact finder “is entitled to believe all, none, or any part of the testimony, 
including testimonial records.”).   
After receiving all of this information, the trial court determined that an additional 
competency evaluation was not necessary.  Driskill had a factual understanding of the 
proceedings.  Driskill and his counsel confirmed Driskill had the present ability to consult 
with his counsel and assist in his own defense.  See Zink, 278 S.W.3d at 183. 
19 
 
 
Any time that Driskill felt he was unable to remain in the courtroom, he was 
accommodated.  The trial court continually asked Driskill how he felt and whether he 
was able to assist his counsel.  There was no indication that Driskill was unable to 
understand the proceedings against him or assist in his own defense.   
 
During the penalty phase of trial, Driskill stated that he was “uneasy” at times and 
that he did not want to remain in the courtroom.  It is axiomatic that a person facing a 
sentence of death may become uneasy; it would be illogical to not be uneasy at such a 
time.   
 
While Driskill points to various occurrences at trial, which he believes should 
have called into question his competency, none are persuasive.  The trial court relied 
upon a report from one of Driskill’s experts, and it extensively questioned both Driskill 
and his counsel regarding his state of mind.  Throughout the guilt and penalty phases of 
trial, the trial court took adequate precautions to ensure that when Driskill believed he 
would suffer a panic attack, he was able to leave the courtroom.  When Driskill actually 
suffered one panic attack, the trial court recessed until it ensured Driskill had calmed 
down and was able to resume assisting in his defense.   
Driskill presented no additional evidence that he was unable to understand the 
proceedings against him or was unable to participate in his own defense at any point 
during the guilt or penalty phases of his trial.  There was substantial evidence supporting 
the trial court’s finding that Driskill was competent to stand trial based upon Driskill’s 
own expert reports and the trial court’s continual questioning of Driskill and his counsel.  
20 
 
Driskill failed to meet his burden to demonstrate he was not competent to stand trial; 
there was no error.   
Point II:  Right to be Present 
Driskill claims the trial court erred in allowing phases of his trial to proceed 
without his physical presence in the courtroom.  Driskill states that he could not waive his 
right to be present at his trial, and even if he could, any waiver was not voluntary because 
he could not remain in the courtroom without suffering panic attacks in the presence of 
the jury. 
Underlying the entirety of Driskill’s argument is the premise that he was 
incompetent throughout the entirety of his trial and he should not have been tried.  This 
proposition has been rejected.  This Court has affirmed herein that Driskill was able to 
understand the proceedings against him and assist in his own defense.     
Driskill asserts that he objected repeatedly to appearing by closed-circuit 
television because the trial court denied his motion for a competency hearing.  However, 
the record demonstrates that Driskill never presented an objection to the trial court that he 
was denied his right to be present.   
“To properly preserve an issue for an appeal, a timely objection must be made 
during trial.”  State v. McFadden, 369 S.W.3d 727, 740 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting State v. 
Cooper, 336 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011)).  The objection at trial must be 
specific and made contemporaneously with the purported error.  State v. Shockley, 410 
S.W.3d 179, 204 n.4 (Mo. banc 2013).  To preserve a constitutional claim of error, the 
claim must be raised at the first opportunity with citation to specific constitutional 
21 
 
sections.  State v. Tisius, 362 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Mo. banc 2012).  On appeal, the 
objection presented to the trial court may not be broadened.  Id. 
 
Accordingly, Driskill’s challenge to his right to remain present in the courtroom 
on the grounds that it violated his constitutional rights can be reviewed only for plain 
error.  Rule 30.20.  “Plain error is found when the alleged error ‘facially establish[es] 
substantial grounds for believing a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice occurred.’” 
State v. Dorsey, 318 S.W.3d 648, 652 (Mo. banc 2010) (quoting State v. Salter, 250 
S.W.3d 705, 713 (Mo. banc 2008)). 
 
Driskill ponders whether he could waive the right to be present at trial.  “The right 
to be present at critical stages of trial is guaranteed by the United States Constitution, the 
Missouri Constitution, and Missouri statutory law.”  Johns, 34 S.W.3d at 116.  The 
“broad dicta … that a trial can never continue in the defendant’s absence [has] been 
expressly rejected.”  Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1060, 25 L.Ed.2d 
353 (1970) (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Drope, 462 S.W.2d 677, 682 
(Mo. 1971); Johns, 34 S.W.3d at 116.  Driskill could waive his right to be present. 
“A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right or privilege.”  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L. Ed. 
1461 (1938).  When a defendant choses to waive a constitutional right, the waiver must 
be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.  Bracken, 382 S.W.3d at 211.  “[T]he 
law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the 
defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in 
general in the circumstances—even though the defendant may not know the specific 
22 
 
detailed consequences of invoking it.” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628, 122 S.Ct. 
2450, 2455, 153 L.Ed.2d 586 (2002) (emphasis in original) (determining whether a guilty 
plea was made voluntarily).   
This Court has found that waivers pursuant to Rule 27.01(b) require the record to 
be unmistakably clear.  State v. Baxter, 204 S.W.3d 650, 654-55 (Mo. banc 2006).  
Accordingly, the “best practice for a trial court is to question the defendant personally, on 
the record, to ensure that the defendant understands the right, understands what is lost in 
the waiver, has discussed the issue with defense counsel, and voluntarily intends to waive 
the right.”  Id. at 655.  Following this procedure, a defendant later has no argument to 
later declare the waiver was ineffective.  Id.  Similarly, in the context of a defendant 
providing a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, this Court stated that 
the trial court must “engage in a colloquy with the defendant to make certain the 
defendant understands ‘exactly what rights and privileges he [or she] is waiving, as well 
as the dangers associated with waiving constitutional rights.’”  State v. Davis, 318 
S.W.3d 618, 630-31 (Mo. banc 2010).   
Missouri courts have found that a defendant may purposefully absent him or 
herself from the courtroom and thereby, waive the right to be present, even without a 
statement on the record.  See State v. Bowens, 964 S.W.2d 232, 239 (Mo. App. E.D. 
1998); Bracken, 382 S.W.3d at 211-12; Drope, 462 S.W.2d at 681.  Further, this Court 
has recognized that a defendant may not be inclined to remain in the courtroom during 
certain penalty phase testimony given the fact that it would concern topics that the 
23 
 
defendant may find sensitive, including childhood abuse, educational levels, and mental 
abilities.  Johns, 34 S.W.3d at 106. 
 
In this case, the trial court repeatedly questioned Driskill on the record regarding 
whether he wished to remain present in the courtroom.  Driskill requested leave to not be 
present, and the trial court, after confirming this was Driskill’s voluntary choice, allowed 
him to remove himself from the courtroom proceedings.  Any time Driskill decided that 
he did not want to remain in the courtroom, he executed a valid waiver on the record of 
his right to be present.   
Driskill claims that, because he was not present in the courtroom, the jury was left 
to speculate.  He states the jury could have not fully appreciated the gravity of its role in 
sentencing a person to death and could morally disengage from its decision.  Driskill also 
asserts that the jury could come to nefarious conclusions in reasoning why he was not in 
the courtroom.  Any unintended consequences that may have resulted from Driskill’s 
request to remove himself from the courtroom does not affect the validity of his waiver.  
See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 628, 122 S.Ct. at 2455. 
Driskill fails to present any argument or reason why he was prevented from 
appearing or that his absence was anything other than intentional.   Prior to every instance 
when he did not appear in the courtroom, Driskill made a clear waiver on the record as to 
his absence.  The trial court did not plainly err in granting Driskill’s requests to not 
remain in the courtroom.   
 
 
24 
 
Point III:  Right to Testify 
 
Driskill avers the trial court erred in finding he voluntarily waived his right to 
testify during both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial.  Driskill claims that any 
waiver was involuntary because Driskill told the trial court he wanted to testify but he felt 
he could not due to his untreated mental illness.   
 
“A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his own behalf at 
trial.”  Davis, 318 S.W.3d at 637; Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 
L.Ed.2d 37 (1987).  “The decision to testify solely rests with the defendant ….”  State v. 
Edwards, 173 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005) (quoting Rousan v. State, 48 
S.W.3d 576, 585 (Mo. banc 2001)).  However, the defendant may knowingly and 
voluntarily waive the right to testify.  Davis, 318 S.W.3d at 637. 
Driskill’s contention again is predicated upon the erroneous underlying premise 
that he is incompetent to stand trial.  Driskill argues that he was coerced into waiving his 
right to testify because he was denied the benefit of being medicated.  Hence, Driskill 
claims it was impossible for him to testify without having a panic attack. 
Driskill asserts on appeal that he wanted to testify, but that he was compelled to 
waive this right.  Driskill claims the trial court was informed of this coercion when he 
informed the trial court, “I want to testify, but I just know I can’t.  I mean I’m not good 
with people.”  Driskill understood he had the right to remain silent, and there would be no 
inference drawn from his silence.  The trial court questioned Driskill multiple times, 
seeking to verify that no one had threatened or coerced him into choosing to waive his 
25 
 
right to testify.  Driskill never altered his decision not to testify or his response that he 
was not being threatened or coerced into not testifying. 
Driskill analogizes his case to Flemming v. State, 949 S.W.2d 876, 879 (Tex. App. 
1997), to support his argument that “physical or mental compulsion may remove the 
element of voluntariness from a defendant’s decision to incriminate himself.”  In 
Flemming, the defendant was arrested after his DNA matched samples recovered from a 
rape victim.  Id. at 878.  After being given his Miranda4 warnings twice, the defendant 
waived his rights and provided a bifurcated statement to a detective.  Id.  The first portion 
of the defendant’s statement was recorded by a tape recorder sitting on the table in plain 
view.  Id.  The detective turned off the recorder, and the defendant continued speaking, 
ultimately admitting he had sex with the victim after entering her home.  Id.  The 
detective stepped out of the room, activated a hidden recording device, and returned to 
take the second portion of defendant’s statement.  Id.  The defendant acknowledged he 
was aware of his rights, and he did not want his statement to be recorded.  Id.  The 
detective continued the interview, wherein the defendant admitted to consensual 
intercourse with the victim.  Id. 
 
On appeal, the defendant claimed the trial court failed to suppress the second 
portion of his statement because it was involuntary.  Id.  The Texas court noted that 
“[c]riminal defendants … are constitutionally protected only from compulsory self-
incrimination.”  Id. at 879.  Further, it noted that while a defendant may waive a 
                                              
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 
 
 
26 
 
constitutional right, physical or mental compulsion may remove the component of 
voluntariness.  Id.  “The waiver, therefore, must be voluntary in the sense that it is the 
product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception.”  
Id. 
 
The Texas court provided examples of impermissible conduct designed to 
overcome a suspect’s free will.  See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534, 83 S.Ct. 917, 
920, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963) (finding police officer informing a suspect she would lose 
welfare benefits and custody of her children if she did not confess was a form of mental 
compulsion), and Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 1207, 3 L.Ed.2d 
1265 (1959) (finding it impermissible for a police officer to suggest to a suspect, who is 
also a close friend, that the officer’s future in the police department might be in jeopardy 
if the suspect did not confess).  The Texas court also provided examples of conduct that 
did not overcome a suspect’s free will.  See Rodriquez v. State, 934 S.W.2d 881, 890 
(Tex. App. 1996) (finding it not improper for interrogating officer to tell the suspect that 
the victim, on his deathbed, identified the suspect when that event did not occur), and 
Fraizer v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737-38, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1423-24, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) 
(finding it permissible for officers to inform a suspect his accomplice provided a 
complete confession when there was none).  The Texas court concluded that the 
defendant’s ignorance of the hidden recording device could not have compelled him to 
confess.  Flemming, 949 S.W.2d at 879.  Accordingly, the detective’s deception was not 
coercive and could not have overborn the defendant’s will.  Id. 
27 
 
 
Here, Driskill asserts that because he was incompetent to stand trial, the 
voluntariness of his waiver was invalid.  Driskill’s argument relies on the incorrect 
assumption that he was incompetent to stand trial.   
The record is devoid of any mental anguish that could lead one to believe Driskill 
did not voluntarily relinquish his right to testify or that he was being coerced.  Driskill’s 
responses to the trial court’s examination were unequivocal, clear, and straightforward.  
Driskill even stated that, “I’m not good with people.”  There is no indication there was 
any coercion on the trial court’s part to force Driskill to waive his right to testify.  The 
record demonstrates the trial court questioned Driskill on multiple occasions about his 
decision not to testify to ensure that Driskill understood his constitutional right. 
There is no evidence, and Driskill makes no argument, that there was any coercion 
in forcing him to waive his right to testify.  Driskill had full knowledge of all of the facts 
and circumstances surrounding his right to testify; there was no additional fact or 
scenario that would occur should he choose to waive his right to testify.  C.f. Lynumn, 
372 U.S. at 534 (finding the suspect must confess or lose additional rights) and Spano, 
360 U.S. at 323 (finding the suspect must confess or a close friend could lose his 
employment).    
Finally, while admittedly not preserved in the record, Driskill now argues the trial 
court should have made accommodations for him to testify since he suffered from what 
he claims was, at the least, a physical disability.  Driskill asserts that the trial court was 
required to ensure equal access to disabled individuals pursuant to the Americans with 
Disabilities Act. 
28 
 
Yet, Driskill fails to present any evidence that he was disabled pursuant to any 
statutory provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act or that he was denied equal 
access to the witness stand.  Further, Driskill’s alleged disability of having panic attacks 
was known by the trial court and accommodated so that Driskill did not appear in the 
courtroom when he suffered from the one panic attack during voir dire.  This argument is 
specious.   
While Driskill expressed some interest in testifying, he consulted with counsel and 
voluntarily chose to waive his right to testify.  There was no error. 
Point IV:  Denial of Continuance to be Medicated 
 
Driskill asserts the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a continuance, 
failing to order him to be medicated, and proceeding through trial when he was in need of 
psychiatric treatment and medication.  Driskill claims the denial of medication caused 
him to experience such extreme anxiety at trial that he was physically and mentally ill 
and he was prevented from participating and assisting his counsel. 
The trial court is vested with sound discretion to grant a continuance.  State v. 
Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 535 (Mo. banc 2003); State v. Christeson, 50 S.W.3d 251, 
261-62 (Mo. banc 2001).  “Reversal is warranted only upon a very strong showing that 
the court abused its discretion and prejudice resulted.”  Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 535.   
 
Again, Driskill’s argument in this point proceeds from the belief that he was 
incompetent to stand trial.  Driskill asserts the trial court should have ensured he was 
medicated so he could participate fully in his trial.  Without the medication, Driskill 
29 
 
claims he was not able to assist in his defense.  This Court has addressed this argument 
and found Driskill to be competent to stand trial.   
Driskill has failed to make a showing that the trial court abused its discretion in 
failing to grant a continuance.  When Driskill suffered from his panic attack, the trial 
court recessed for the day, thereby allowing Driskill the time he needed to recover.  
Further, whenever Driskill felt he needed to leave the courtroom, he was allowed to do 
so, and the trial court granted a recess.  The trial court made multiple inquiries of Driskill 
and his counsel as to whether Driskill was able to proceed with trial and assist in his 
defense throughout the entire trial.  There is no showing that Driskill was incompetent to 
stand trial without being medicated; there was no error. 
Point V:  Request to View Exhibits 
Driskill claims the trial court erred in denying the jury’s request to view all of the 
exhibits admitted into evidence during the penalty phase.  Driskill asserts the trial court 
erred in barring the jury from viewing defense exhibits because they were crucial in 
supporting his case for a sentence of life without parole and to rebut the state’s inferences 
and arguments.  Driskill argues that the failure to send the exhibits to the jury resulted in 
a violation of his right to present evidence in mitigation. 
During its penalty phase deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial court stating, 
“We would like to see all evidence/submissions during the penalty phase.”  The trial 
court previously informed the state and Driskill that if exhibits were requested by the jury 
either all or none of the exhibits would be provided.   
30 
 
Driskill wanted to provide the jury all of the records supporting the testimony of 
Drs. Robert Hanlon and William Bernet, two of the witnesses he presented in support of 
mitigation.  These supporting records were voluminous and contained more than 1,100 
pages.  However, Driskill objected to providing the jury with the state’s prior conviction 
exhibits.  Driskill objected to redacting copies of the state’s prior conviction exhibits, 
believing it would suggest to the jury that Driskill was guilty of other criminal acts.  
Driskill suggested that rather than sending the state’s redacted exhibits, the jury receive a 
list of the convictions and accompanying information the state read to the jury.  Driskill’s 
suggestion, however, was not accepted.  Ultimately, the state and Driskill were unable to 
arrive at an agreement regarding the exhibits, and, accordingly, the trial court responded 
to the jury that “You must be guided by the instructions given and the evidence as you 
remember it.”  No exhibits were sent to the jury. 
“Even where an exhibit is properly admitted into evidence, the decision whether 
the exhibit should be sent back to the jury during deliberations remains a matter within 
the sound discretion of the trial court.”  State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, 596 (Mo. banc 
1997); see also State v. Barnett, 980 S.W.2d 297, 308 (Mo. banc 1998).  An abuse of 
discretion occurs only when the trial court’s decision to exclude an exhibit from the 
jury’s deliberation was clearly against reason and resulted in an injustice to the defendant.  
State v. Wolfe, 13 S.W.3d 248, 257 (Mo. banc 2000), abrogated by Mitchell v. Kardesch, 
313 S.W.3d 667 (Mo. banc 2010).  
Driskill asserts that his case is analogous to Taylor v. State, 262 S.W.3d 231 (Mo. 
banc 2008), and Hutchison v. State, 150 S.W.3d 292 (Mo. banc 2004), abrogated by 
31 
 
Mallow v. State, 439 S.W.3d 764 (Mo. banc 2014).  However, both Taylor and Hutchison 
were cases wherein this Court found trial counsel to be ineffective for failing to present 
mitigation evidence available to counsel or information that counsel should have 
investigated and introduced.  See Taylor, 262 S.W.3d at 249-53; Hutchison, 150 S.W.3d 
at 307-08.  Taylor and Hutchison are dissimilar to the facts and circumstances 
surrounding Driskill’s argument because Driskill’s counsel investigated and introduced 
substantial evidence in mitigation. 
Here, Driskill claims the trial court abused its discretion in failing to provide only 
the documents supporting the testimony of Drs. Hanlon and Bernet, which exceeded 
1,100 pages.  The trial court committed no error in not providing the jury with a 
voluminous, one-sided record. 
Point VI:  Victim Impact Evidence 
Driskill alleges the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his objections and 
in admitting excessive victim impact testimony and evidence.  Driskill made a continuing 
objection as to the testimony of the three relatives and the admission of the photographs 
of the victims, seeking “[t]o exclude victim impact evidence.”  Driskill claims the state’s 
excessive victim impact evidence and testimony overwhelmed the jury with emotion and 
encouraged it to weigh the value of his life against the victims’ lives. 
Victim impact evidence is admissible under the United States and Missouri 
Constitutions.  State v. McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d 257, 273 (Mo. banc 2008).  The trial 
court has broad discretion to admit whatever evidence it determines may be helpful to the 
jury in assessing punishment.   State v. Bowman, 337 S.W.3d 679, 691 (Mo. banc 2011).  
32 
 
The state is permitted to show the victims are individuals whose deaths represent a 
unique loss to society and to their family and that the victims are not simply faceless 
strangers.  State v. Gill, 167 S.W.3d 184, 195 (Mo. banc 2005); see also McFadden, 391 
S.W.3d at 423 (“Victim impact evidence, and related argument about the impact of the 
crime upon the victim and victim’s family, is admissible in the penalty phase.”).  Victim 
impact evidence violates the constitution if it is “so unduly prejudicial that it renders the 
trial fundamentally unfair.”  State v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 225 (Mo. banc 2006). 
Three of the victims’ relatives provided victim impact testimony in this case:  their 
son, their granddaughter, and their granddaughter’s husband.  Each provided a picture of 
C.W. and J.W.’s long-lasting, loving relationship and a glimpse into their lives since the 
time of the victims’ murders.  The victims’ granddaughter laid the foundation for 
multiple photographs depicting C.W. and J.W. at various times in their lives.    
Clearly, victim impact statements are admissible to illustrate the loss to the family.  
Gill, 167 S.W.3d at 195.  Further, admission of photographs is not per se prejudicial to a 
defendant.  In comparison, this Court has not found an abuse of discretion in allowing a 
jury to view twenty-seven photographs of the victim and his family as part of the victim 
impact evidence.  Id. 
 
Driskill presents no argument as to how the family’s relatively brief statements of 
loss5 were so excessive and emotionally-charged that his sentencing was rendered unfair.  
There was no error. 
                                              
5 The testimony of the three family members was contained on approximately eighteen 
pages of the 1,775 page transcript.   
33 
 
Proportionality Review 
This Court is obliged to conduct an independent review of all death penalty cases 
for proportionality, even when not requested by a defendant.  Section 565.035.  Section 
565.035.3 requires this Court to determine: 
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of 
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and 
 
(2) Whether the evidence supports the jury’s or judge’s finding of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in subsection 2 of section 
565.032 and any other circumstance found; 
 
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the 
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime, the strength 
of the evidence and the defendant. 
 
(1)  Passion and prejudice 
After an independent review of the record, this Court does not find that the 
sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other 
factor.  Driskill has not identified any such factor to this Court, and his allegations of trial 
court error are without merit. 
(2)  Aggravating circumstances 
 
Driskill does not claim that the evidence does not support the jury’s findings 
beyond a reasonable doubt as to at least one statutory aggravating circumstance.  Section 
565.035.3(2).  The jury made findings of multiple aggravating circumstances surrounding 
both the victims’ murders. 
As to C.W’s murder, the jury found multiple statutory aggravating circumstances: 
34 
 
1. Driskill had two separate serious assaultive convictions in two different 
counties.6 
 
2. C.W.’s murder was committed while engaged in the commission of 
another unlawful homicide of J.W.. 
 
3. Driskill murdered C.W. for the purpose of receiving money or another 
thing of monetary value from her or another. 
 
4. C.W.’s murder involved depravity of mind and was outrageously and 
wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman. 
 
5. C.W.’s murder was committed while Driskill was engaged in the 
perpetration of a burglary. 
 
6. C.W.’s murder was committed while Driskill was engaged in the 
perpetration of a robbery. 
 
7. C.W.’s murder was committed while Driskill was engaged in the 
perpetration of forcible rape. 
 
8. C.W.’s murder was committed while Driskill was engaged in the 
perpetration of forcible sodomy. 
 
As to J.W.’s murder, the jury found multiple statutory aggravating circumstances: 
 
1. Driskill had two separate serious assaultive convictions in two different 
counties.7 
 
2. J.W.’s murder was committed while engaged in the commission of 
another unlawful homicide of C.W.. 
 
3. Driskill murdered J.W. for the purpose of receiving money or another 
thing of monetary value from him or another. 
 
4. J.W.’s murder was committed while Driskill was engaged in the 
perpetration of a burglary. 
                                              
6 The jury found this to be two separate serious assaultive convictions, one for each 
county. 
7 The jury found this to be two separate serious assaultive convictions, one for each 
county. 
 
35 
 
 
5. J.W.’s murder was committed while Driskill was engaged in the 
perpetration of a robbery. 
 
6. J.W.’s murder was committed while Driskill was engaged in the 
perpetration of a forcible rape. 
 
7. J.W.’s murder was committed while Driskill was engage in the 
perpetration of a forcible sodomy. 
 
“The jury need find only one statutory aggravating circumstance in order to 
recommend imposition of the death penalty.”  State v. Clay, 975 S.W.2d 121, 145 (Mo. 
banc 1998); see also Shockley, 410 S.W.3d at 202.  After this Court’s independent 
review, there was sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s findings of at least one 
statutory aggravating circumstance for each of the victims beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Further, Driskill fails to assert any error in submission of these statutory aggravators. 
 (3)  Similar cases 
This Court’s independent review reveals that imposition of the sentence of death 
was not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering 
both the crime and the defendant.  This Court has affirmed sentences of death in cases 
when the defendant has murdered a victim in the course of, or just after, raping that 
victim.  Davis, 318 S.W.3d 618; Dorsey, 318 S.W.3d 648; McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d 257; 
State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. banc 1996).  The death penalty has been imposed 
when the jury finds the defendant acted with a depraved mind in strangling or smothering 
the victim to death after raping or sodomizing or attempting to rape or sodomize the 
victim.  State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. banc 1995); State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1 
(Mo. banc 1981).  The death penalty has been upheld in cases when the defendant 
36 
 
murdered more than one victim.  Anderson, 306 S.W.3d 529; Christeson, 50 S.W.3d 251; 
State v. Smith, 32 S.W.3d 532 (Mo. banc 2000); State v. Ringo, 30 S.W.3d 811 (Mo. banc 
2000).  Finally, this Court has upheld the death sentence when the defendant murdered at 
least one victim and perpetrated a robbery or a burglary.  State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527 
(Mo. banc 2010); State v. Gilbert, 103 S.W.3d 743 (Mo. banc 2003); State v. Williams, 
97 S.W.3d 462 (Mo. banc 2003). 
This Court independently researched both death and life cases and has not 
identified any similar case involving two brutal murders, burglary, robbery, sodomy, rape 
and an attempt to conceal the crimes committed that would support a finding that 
Driskill’s sentence is disproportionate.  The evidence of Driskill’s guilt is overwhelming.  
The imposition of the death penalty meets the statutory requirements.  There was no 
error. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
George W. Draper III, Judge 
 
 
Russell, C.J., Fischer, Wilson and Teitelman, JJ., concur; 
Breckenridge, J., dissents in separate opinion filed; 
Stith, J., concurs in opinion of Breckenridge, J. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
    ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ) 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
    ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
    ) 
No.  SC93882 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ) 
JESSE DRISKILL,  
 
 
    ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
    ) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION  
 
I write separately because I do not agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that 
the record, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s rulings, supports a finding that   
Mr. Driskill was competent to stand trial because the information in the record should have 
compelled the trial court to order a psychiatric examination to determine Mr. Driskill’s 
competency.  Section 552.020.21 provides that “[w]henever any judge has reasonable cause 
to believe that the accused lacks mental fitness to proceed,” the trial court shall, either on the 
court’s own motion or upon a motion of the state or defense counsel, order an examination 
of an accused by a physician, psychiatrist, or psychologist to determine the accused’s fitness 
to proceed.  Rather than focus on the standard applicable to whether the statute compelled 
an examination to provide both the trial court and a reviewing court with the information 
necessary to evaluate Mr. Driskill’s competency, the majority opinion examines whether the 
                                              
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2013. 
2 
 
record supports the trial court’s finding that Mr. Driskill, in fact, was competent to proceed 
with trial because he had an adequate factual understanding of the legal system and process 
of adjudication.  This misframing of the issue creates an insurmountable burden for          
Mr. Driskill on appeal. 
The majority opinion discusses at length that the trial court chose to believe that    
Mr. Driskill was competent to stand trial based on the trial court’s observation and 
questioning of Mr. Driskill in the courtroom and on an opinion of one of the two mental 
health experts who evaluated Mr. Driskill’s competency prior to trial.  It is undisputed from 
the record, and not challenged by Mr. Driskill, that he was competent to stand trial in that he 
did not have a mental condition that precluded him from understanding the legal system and 
the nature of the charges against him.  That never was Mr. Driskill’s claim of incompetency.  
Rather, in his requests for a competency examination during trial, he asserted that he had a 
mental condition that precluded him from being present in the courtroom so that he could 
consult with his counsel and assist with his defense.  
On that issue, the majority opinion simply finds that the trial court took adequate 
precautions to ensure that, whenever Mr. Driskill believed he would suffer a panic attack, he 
was able to leave the courtroom.  The opinion further holds that Mr. Driskill’s absence from 
the courtroom during the penalty phase of trial can be explained because “a person facing a 
sentence of death may become uneasy; it would be illogical to not be uneasy at such a time.”   
The record before the trial court shows that Mr. Driskill was not suffering from the 
anxiety experienced by any person facing a sentence of death.  The mental health history of 
Mr. Driskill was contained in the reports of Dr. Linda Gruenberg, a board-certified 
3 
 
psychiatrist, and Dr. Robert Fucetola, a board-certified clinical neuropsychologist, both of 
whom evaluated Mr. Driskill.  Dr. Gruenberg’s report states that Mr. Driskill had been 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and generalized anxiety disorder and demonstrated 
symptoms of intermittent explosive disorder during his adolescence and possibly earlier.2  
The report, prepared three months before trial, also noted that Mr. Driskill had difficulty 
with mood and behavior – evidenced by the fact that he had experienced explosive episodes 
while incarcerated and in the courtroom during pretrial proceedings.   
Similarly, Dr. Fucetola’s report noted that Mr. Driskill’s medical records include 
diagnoses of anxiety disorder, behavior problems, bipolar disease, chronic severe headaches, 
and intermittent explosive disorder.  The report also contained references to Mr. Driskill’s 
prior suicide attempt.  While Dr. Fucetola opined prior to trial that Mr. Driskill was 
competent to stand trial, defense counsel filed an email written by Dr. Fucetola during trial 
to supplement his earlier opinion.  Dr. Fucetola had read testimony of the deputy present at 
Mr. Driskill’s trial and discussed with defense counsel Mr. Driskill’s behavior during voir 
dire when Mr. Driskill asked to be removed immediately from the courtroom and, upon 
placement back in a jail cell, punched the wall, appeared red in the face, was crying, was 
rubbing his head, and then vomited.  In the email, Dr. Fucetola described the “episode” as a 
panic attack.  Dr. Fucetola called into question his prior determination of competency, 
stating, “During the panic attacks, and in the moments before and after attacks, I am 
                                              
2 Mr. Driskill has also been diagnosed with polysubstance dependence in remission while in 
a controlled environment and a cognitive disorder demonstrated by mild neurocognitive 
deficits due to multiple head traumas, chronic polysubstance abuse, and chronic migraine 
headaches.  
4 
 
concerned that Mr. Driskill does not have the capacity to assist you in his own defense due 
to his transient state of mind.”    
“It is well established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits the prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial.”  State v. 
Anderson, 79 S.W.3d 420, 432 (Mo. banc 2002).  The failure to inquire into a defendant’s 
mental competence when there is sufficient evidence of incompetence deprives a defendant 
of his or her right to a fair trial.  Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966).  As the 
majority opinion states, a trial court “is required to initiate proceedings to investigate the 
competency of a defendant whenever a reasonable judge in the same situation as the trial 
judge would experience doubt about the defendant’s competency to stand trial.”  Anderson, 
79 S.W.3d at 432 (internal quotations omitted).  Here, the record shows that the trial court 
experienced doubts about the defendant’s competency to stand trial.  The trial court chose 
the wrong path in responding to those doubts.  Rather than initiate the proceedings required 
by section 552.020.2 and order an examination of Mr. Driskill to determine his competency, 
the trial court attempted to address the obvious issues raised by Mr. Driskill’s behavior 
during trial by repeatedly questioning Mr. Driskill and his counsel and recessing the trial to 
give Mr. Driskill time to recover from his anxiety or panic attacks.  A defendant’s demeanor 
at trial is relevant to the ultimate determination of competence, but it cannot replace the 
required proceedings to fully determine competency.  See Robinson, 383 U.S. at 386.   
 While the trial court’s extensive accommodations may have been sufficient for     
Mr. Driskill to meaningfully participate in trial during the guilt phase, his condition had 
deteriorated significantly by the penalty phase of trial – the phase of trial that ultimately 
5 
 
resulted in Mr. Driskill being sentenced to death.  The record shows that, during the penalty 
phase of his trial, Mr. Driskill had to interrupt the trial multiple times to leave the 
courtroom.3  The first time this occurred, the trial court questioned Mr. Driskill at a recess in 
the midst of the state’s opening statement.  When addressing the issue, the trial court noted     
Mr. Driskill’s statement to his counsel that he believed he might have “one of those 
episodes” like he had previously.  Mr. Driskill told the trial court that he knew he would 
have such an episode – that he would “snap out.”  When given an offer to view the trial by 
closed-circuit television, Mr. Driskill declined because doing so made him feel worse.  In 
fact, during the penalty phase of his capital trial, Mr. Driskill was absent during half of the 
state’s opening statement, defense counsel’s opening statement, the presentation of all the 
state’s evidence, and the presentation of four out of seven of his own witnesses.  At this 
point,    Mr. Driskill no longer was able to be present in the courtroom or participate in the 
proceeding by closed-circuit television and communicate and advise counsel by telephone.   
This record makes clear that the trial court’s accommodations were no longer 
sufficient during the penalty phase to protect Mr. Driskill’s rights.  Even if Mr. Driskill was 
competent at the commencement of his trial, the trial court was obligated to consider 
subsequent “circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to 
meet the standard of competence to stand trial.”  Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 
(1975).  
                                              
3 Mr. Driskill asked to be excused from the courtroom four times in the jury’s presence.  
Each time, without any explanation, the jury either heard defense counsel ask if Mr. Driskill 
could be excused or saw Mr. Driskill leave.  In particular, the jury would have observed his 
absence during most of the penalty phase of his trial.  These events undoubtedly would have 
made a negative impression on the jury.   
6 
 
On this record, there was reasonable cause for the trial court to experience doubts 
regarding Mr. Driskill’s mental fitness to proceed.  Under section 552.020.2, the trial court 
should have, either on the motions made by defense counsel or on the court’s own motion, 
ordered an examination of Mr. Driskill by a mental health professional who met the 
statutory criteria to evaluate Mr. Driskill’s competency to proceed with trial.  Under section 
552.020, the trial court was authorized to order that the examination be made at such time 
and under such conditions as the court deemed proper.  While it is a drastic remedy to grant 
a mistrial, it is unknown whether the required examination could have been accomplished 
without a mistrial.  If a mistrial was necessary to determine Mr. Driskill’s competency to 
proceed with the guilt phase of his trial, the trial court was required to grant one.   
 
The record in Mr. Driskill’s case shows that the trial court had reasonable cause to 
believe Mr. Driskill was not competent to stand trial, triggering the mandatory provisions of 
section 552.020.2 requiring the court to order an independent competency examination.  I 
would find that its failure to do so is reversible error and remand the case to the trial court 
for a new penalty phase trial.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE