Case Title: V-1 Oil Co. v. People

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-205

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-10-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
V-1 Oil Co. v. People1990 WY 117799 P.2d 1199Case Number: 89-205Decided: 10/24/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
V-1 OIL COMPANY, A 
WYOMING CORPORATION, 

APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, 

APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

F.M. Andrews, 
Jr. and Robert O. Anderson of Andrews and Anderson, P.C., Riverton, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Mary B. Guthrie, and Steve Jones, Sr. Asst. Attys. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J.,* and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      By appeal, this 
case invokes consideration of the effect of a statutory provision, penal or 
punitive in nature, which was expressly repealed before appeal decision, but 
following entry of a district court monetary judgment. Appellant V-1 Oil Company 
(V-1 Oil), based on the enacted statute, moved to vacate the judgment and 
release a posted supersedeas bond of $50,000. We grant V-1 Oil's motion, reverse 
and remand for entry of dismissal of the environmental agency judgment obtained 
against V-1 Oil, the operator of a self-service gasoline station.

I.

PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY

[¶2]      V-1 Oil, for an 
extended time, had operated a retail station in Lander, Wyoming. Question arose 
whether underground tanks or pipe connection leakage had occurred, polluting the 
subsurface and invading underground aquifers. An extended, active and hostile 
course of administrative agency proceedings ensued.1

[¶3]      This proceeding, 
as a district court damage action, was separately and consecutively initiated in 
the First Judicial District under the penal provision of the Wyoming 
Environmental Quality Act, W.S. 35-11-301(a)(i) and (ii) and 35-11-901(a) and 
(q).2 As a result of this district court 
proceeding, which in effect superceded the pending administrative proceeding, a 
judgment was entered June 29, 1989 against V-1 Oil providing in 
part:

     1. Defendant, V-1 Oil 
Company, shall pay a penalty in this matter of fifty thousand dollars 
($50,000.00) for violations of the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act, 
specifically W.S. 35-11-301(a)(i) and (ii). Such violations include but are not 
limited to V-1 Oil ignoring the presence of contamination in the groundwater. 
The penalty must be paid by the Defendant to the State of Wyoming within ninety 
(90) days of the date of this Final Order.

* * * * * *

18. A suspended penalty 
against the Defendant, V-1 Oil Company, in the amount of one million 
($1,000,000.00) dollars, is hereby imposed upon the Defendant. Should the 
Defendant fail to cleanup the plume, as required by the terms of this Final 
Order the suspension of this penalty shall be removed, and the Defendant shall 
be required to pay to the State of Wyoming, within one hundred twenty (120) 
days, the amount of one million ($1,000,000.00) dollars.

[¶4]      Responding to 
entry of the judgment, V-1 Oil posted a $50,000 cash supersedeas bond and 
appealed to this court citing issues including:

     I. The district court 
was without subject matter jurisdiction over this action, exclusive jurisdiction 
to find a violation, impose a penalty and issue a mandatory injunction and 
cleanup order being reserved to the administrative body.

     II. There was an 
insufficiency of evidence upon which to find, as a matter of law, that V-1 Oil 
Company caused, threatened or allowed pollution to enter groundwaters of the 
state.

     III. The statute was 
applied retroactively, contrary to law.

     IV. The court erred in 
not granting a new trial or in the alternative hearing newly discovered 
evidence.

      V. The court 
abused its discretion in imposing a $50,000.00 penalty and a $1,000,000.00 
conditional penalty.

[¶5]      Underground 
storage tank problems in Wyoming initiated extensive legislative attention in 
numerous meetings. After an interim session study, Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 98 
(1990), effective March 21, 1990, was enacted to comprehensively address the 
problems in an act entitled "Water Pollution from Underground Storage Tanks 
Corrective Action Act of 1990," W.S.35-11-1414(a).3

II.

FACTS AND CURRENT 
LEGISLATION

[¶6]      Passage of the 
Water Pollution from Underground Storage Tanks Corrective Action Act of 1990 
presented a new issue for this appeal resulting from W.S. 35-11-1418(a), (b) and 
(c) of that comprehensive enactment which provides:

     (a) The state attorney 
general shall move to dismiss any pending or ongoing suits or administrative 
actions which are based on the requirement the owner and operator take 
corrective action or which are for cost recovery of state corrective actions. 
The defendants in cases which are dismissed may become eligible for use of 
corrective action account monies in the same manner as any other owner or 
operator. Failure to take the necessary actions to become eligible shall result 
in the owner or operator who was a defendant in a dismissed case being 
considered ineligible for use of the corrective action account monies in the 
same manner as any other owner or operator.

     (b) Any obligations 
owed the state under court orders or negotiated settlements resulting from suits 
requiring corrective action shall be released by the state if the owner or 
operator of the site takes action necessary to become eligible for use of 
corrective action account monies.

     (c) The state shall 
not reimburse any person for payments made prior to the effective date of this 
article to the state or any other person pursuant to a court order or negotiated 
settlement arising from a release from an underground storage tank.

[¶7]      Despite the 
passage of the statute, the State declined to dismiss this case or release the 
judgment and V-1 Oil moved this court for an "Order of Dismissal of the Judgment 
and Order before the Court on appeal, or in the alternative, for an Order 
remanding this matter to the District Court, First Judicial District, with 
directions to vacate the judgment and order entered herein and to dismiss 
plaintiff's complaint with prejudice and to release defendant/appellant's bond 
of $50,000.00." Briefs on the motion were filed by both litigants and this court 
deferred consideration until after scheduled oral argument. The two new issues 
developed by the motion by passage of the 1990 legislation were whether (1) 
posting a supersedeas bond constituted a "payment made prior to the effective 
date of the [statute]" and (2) institution of appeal continues a "pending or 
ongoing suit or administrative action."

[¶8]      In assessment of 
the legislative intent, we determine both issues in favor of V-1 Oil.4

III.

SUPERSEDEAS 
BOND

[¶9]      The argument of 
the State that posting a supersedeas bond constituted a payment made to trigger 
W.S. 35-11-1418(c) lacks logical or precedential support.5 The essence of posting a 
supersedeas bond by an appellant following judgment entry is to avoid a mootness 
challenge that might otherwise arise if the judgment is paid before appeal is 
taken, Greenough v. Prairie Dog Ranch, Inc., 531 P.2d 499, 502 (Wyo. 1975); see 
also Yellowstone Sheep Co. v. Ellis, 55 Wyo. 63, 96 P.2d 895 (1939), or 
alternatively that the judgment creditor in absence of security would proceed to 
execution, Farmers' State Bank of Riverton v. Haun, 29 Wyo. 322, 213 P. 361 
(1923). The supersedeas bond constitutes security provided by the judgment 
debtor to avoid execution on the judgment and does not constitute accomplished 
payment until an unqualified right to the proceeds accrues after the judgment is 
affirmed on appeal. Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 563 P.2d 1382, reh'g 
denied 566 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1977).

IV.

PENDING OR ONGOING SUIT 
OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

[¶10]   Definition of a pending or ongoing 
suit reaches into a broad array of case law considering retroactivity questions. 
We follow the general and well-enunciated determination that pending or ongoing 
status for litigation defines the time through determined appeal. MacKenzie v. a 
Engelhard & Sons Co., 266 U.S. 131, 142, 45 S. Ct. 68, 68, 69 L. Ed. 205 
(1924); Pieper v. City of Scottsbluff, 176 Neb. 561, 126 N.W.2d 865 (1964); 
Haynes v. City of Seattle, 87 Wn. 375, 151 P. 789 (1915); State v. Tugwell, 19 
Wn. 238, 257, 52 P. 1056 (1898).6

[¶11]   The issue presented is the pending 
status of the litigation and not the final order for appealability. See W.R.A.P. 
1.05. Consequently, we do not find that the case cited by the State, P B Realty 
Co. v. Wallace, 93 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio App. 1950), is authoritative or dispositive. 
The peculiar nature of P B Realty Co., as an intermediate appellate decision 
involving rental contract with forceful eviction and detainer, does not detract 
from the predominant rule well stated by MacKenzie, 266 U.S. 131, 45 S. Ct. 68. 
"An appeal is a proceeding in the original cause and the suit is pending until 
the appeal is disposed of." Id. at 142-43, 45 S. Ct.  at 68-69. See also Hamling 
v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S. Ct. 2887, 41 L. Ed. 2d 590, reh'g denied 419 U.S. 885, 95 S. Ct. 157, 42 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1974); Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15, 71 S. Ct. 93, 95 L. Ed. 15 (1950); Hardy v. Western Landscape Const., 141 Cal. App. 3d 1015, 190 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1983); Wilson v. Clark, 414 So. 2d 526 (Fla.App. 1982); 
Pieper, 126 N.W.2d 865; and Reickhoff v. Consolidated Gas Co., 123 Mont. 555, 
217 P.2d 1076, 1080 (1950).7 There is no finality to the 
proceeding until the appeal is concluded. People ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Bros' 
Santa Ana Theater, 101 Cal. App. 3d 296, 161 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1980); Golden Rule 
Ins. Co. v. Robeza, 194 Ill. App.3d 468, 141 Ill.Dec. 506, 551 N.E.2d 693 
(1990).

[¶12]   The intent of the legislature was 
both clear and explicit when W.S. 35-11-1418(a) and (b) was enacted. The 
establishment and removal of penal and punitive constraints for societal 
misconduct are vested in that branch of government. Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877 
(Wyo. 1987); Wyo. Const. art. 2, Distribution of Powers.

V.

DISPOSITION

[¶13]   We reverse and remand to the 
district court for entry of an order releasing the judgment in compliance with 
W.S. 35-11-1418(a) and (b).

FOOTNOTES

1 See V-1 Oil Co. v. Dept. 
of Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality Council, No. 90-12 (Dismissed 
3/2/90), which was recently dismissed in this court, and Matter of Contempt 
Order Issued Against Anderson, 765 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 1988). See also V-1 Oil Co. v. 
State of Wyo., Dept. of Environmental Quality, 902 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 
1990).

2 W.S. 35-11-901 
provides:

(a) Any person who 
violates, or any director, officer or agent of a corporate permittee who 
willfully and knowingly authorizes, orders or carries out the violation of any 
provision of this act, or any rule, regulation, standard or permit adopted 
hereunder or who violates any determination or order of the council pursuant to 
this act or any rule, regulation, standard, permit, license or variance is 
liable to either a penalty of not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) 
for each day during which violation continues, or, for multiple violations by 
surface coal mining operations, a penalty of not to exceed five thousand dollars 
($5,000.00) for each violation for each day during which the violation 
continues, which may be recovered in a civil action, and the person may be 
enjoined from continuing the violation as hereinafter provided.

(b) Except for surface 
coal mining operations, damages are to be assessed by the court. For surface 
coal mining operations, all notices for abatement and cessation orders shall be 
reported to the director. The director shall:

(i) Issue a notice of 
assessment, if a cessation order was issued;

(ii) Make a determination 
on whether a notice of assessment will be issued, if a notice for abatement was 
issued.

(c) Upon issuance of a 
notice of abatement or cessation order, the director shall inform the operator 
of the proposed amount of the penalty within thirty (30) days. The amount shall 
be determined in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the 
council. The person charged with the penalty shall have fifteen (15) days to 
request a conference with the director for informal disposition of any dispute 
over either the amount of the penalty or the occurrence of the 
violation.

(d) If a conference is 
held and after the director has determined that a violation did occur and the 
amount of the penalty which is warranted, the person charged with the penalty 
shall, within fifteen (15) days, either:

(i) Pay the proposed 
penalty in full; or

(ii) Petition the council 
for review of either the amount of the penalty or the fact of the violation, 
submitting a bond equal to the proposed amount of the penalty at the time of 
filing the petition. The bond shall be conditioned for the satisfaction of the 
penalty in full, or as modified by the council, if the director's determination 
as to the occurrence of the violation and the assessment of a penalty are 
affirmed. The petition is effective when the bond is approved by the council. If 
the bond is not approved, the person charged with the penalty has ten (10) days 
to forward the proposed amount to the council for placement in an escrow account 
in order to make the petition effective.

(e) If a conference is 
not requested, the person charged with the penalty has thirty (30) days to take 
the action described in sub-section (c) of this section.

(f) After a petition is 
effective, the council shall hold a hearing, which shall be conducted as a 
contested case proceeding, as required by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act [§§ 16-3-101 through 16-3-115]. The council shall either:

(i) Determine the 
occurrence of the violation and the amount of penalty which is warranted for the 
purpose of ordering that the penalty be paid; or

(ii) Determine that no 
violation occurred, or that the amount of penalty should be reduced. If such a 
determination is made either through administrative or judicial review, the 
director shall within thirty (30) days remit the appropriate amount to the 
person, if any deposit has been made, with interest at the rate of six percent 
(6%), or at the prevailing department of the treasury rate, whichever is 
greater. Failure to file an effective petition shall result in a waiver of all 
legal rights to contest the violation or the amount of the penalty.

(g) Any person aggrieved 
or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of the council pursuant to 
this section is entitled to judicial review in accordance with the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act.

(h) Any person who 
violates this act, or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, and thereby 
causes the death of fish, aquatic life or game or bird life is, in addition to 
other penalties provided by this act, liable to pay to the state, an additional 
sum for the reasonable value of the fish, aquatic life, game or bird life 
destroyed. Any monies so recovered shall be placed in the general fund of 
Wyoming, state treasurer's office.

(j) Any person who 
willfully and knowingly violates, or any director, officer or agent of a 
corporate permittee who willfully and knowingly authorizes, orders or carries 
out the violation of any provision of this act or any rule, regulation, 
standard, permit, license, or variance or limitations adopted hereunder or who 
willfully violates any determination or order of the council or court issued 
pursuant to this act or any rule, regulation, standard, permit or limitation 
issued under this act shall be fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars 
($25,000.00) per day of violation, or imprisoned for not more than one (1) year, 
or both. If the conviction is for a violation committed after a first conviction 
of such person under this act, punishment shall be by a fine of not more than 
fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) per day of violation or by imprisonment of 
not more than two (2) years, or both.

* * * * * *

(q) All actions pursuant 
to this article shall be brought in the county in which the violation occurred 
or in Laramie county by the attorney general in the name of the people of 
Wyoming.

W.S. 35-11-301(a)(i) and 
(ii) states:

(a) No person, except 
when authorized by a permit issued, pursuant to the provisions of this act, 
shall:

(i) Cause, threaten or 
allow the discharge of any pollution or wastes into the waters of the 
state;

(ii) Alter the physical, 
chemical, radiological, biological or bacteriological properties of any waters 
of the state[.]

3 The Water Pollution from 
Underground Storage Tanks Corrective Action Act provides in part:

(b) The legislature 
recognizes the threat to the public health, safety, welfare and the environment 
caused by pollution to water from underground storage tanks. The purpose of this 
article is to take primacy of the underground storage tank program and to 
provide funding to take corrective actions at sites contaminated by underground 
storage tanks.

(c) The legislature also 
recognizes that owners and operators cannot take corrective action without 
placing their businesses' existence in financial jeopardy. The legislature finds 
that, because Wyoming is a large rural state, it is in the public interest to 
take corrective action at contaminated sites so that fuel will continue to be 
readily available throughout Wyoming.

W.S. 
35-11-1414.

4 We judicially notice 
that Representative Dennis W. Tippets chaired the legislative interim committee 
public meetings and bill preparation as a legislator elected from Fremont 
County, Wyoming. We were advised during oral argument by the attorney for the 
State that there apparently was only one other "pending" proceeding in the state 
at bill enactment date. Constitutionality questions about special legislation 
were neither raised nor considered in this court. See Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 27. 
Cf. American Nat. Can Corp. v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 114 Wn.2d 236, 787 P.2d 545 (1990).

5 W.R.A.P. 2.07, captioned 
Supersedeas Bonds, provides in relevant part:

Whenever an appellant 
entitled thereto desires a stay on appeal, he may present to the court at or 
before the time of filing his notice of appeal, a supersedeas bond in such 
amount as shall be fixed by the district court and with surety or sureties to be 
approved by the court or by the clerk thereof. The bond shall be conditioned for 
the satisfaction of the judgment in full together with costs, interest, and 
damages for delay, if for any reason the appeal is not perfected or is 
dismissed, or if the judgment is affirmed, and to satisfy in full such 
modification of the judgment and such costs, interest, and damages as the 
Supreme Court may adjudge and award. * * * A separate supersedeas bond need not 
be given, unless otherwise ordered, when the appellant has already filed in the 
district court security including the event of appeal, except for the difference 
in amount, if any.

A supersedeas is a stay 
of proceedings and the supersedeas bond frequently filed upon appeal is 
"required of one who petitions to set aside a judgment or execution and from 
which the other party may be made whole if the action is unsuccessful." Blacks 
Law Dictionary 1289 (5th ed. 1979). See Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 563 P.2d 1382, 1392, reh'g denied 566 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1977).

6 The parenthetical 
requirement addressed in Matter of Boyd's Estate, 606 P.2d 1243, 1245 (Wyo. 
1980) for retroactivity statutes is met by this statutory text when explicitly 
applied to "any pending or ongoing suits or administrative actions."

7 Pending status for 
ongoing litigation was exhaustively researched and detailed by citation in 
Schuler v. State, 771 P.2d 1217, 1237 n. 12 (Wyo. 1989) (Urbigkit, J., 
dissenting).