Case Title: JOLLEY v. STATE LOAN AND INVESTMENT BOARD

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOLLEY v. STATE LOAN AND INVESTMENT BOARD2002 WY 738 P.3d 1073Case Number: 00-330Decided: 01/25/2002

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                
   

JOHN R. 
JOLLEY, 

Appellant(Plaintiff/Petitioner),

v.

STATE 
LOAN AND INVESTMENT BOARD,

BOARD OF 
LAND COMMISSIONERS,

GOVERNOR 
JIM GERINGER, JOSEPH B. MEYER

MAX 
MAXFIELD, CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, and

JUDY 
CATCHPOLE, 

Appellees(Respondents/Defendants).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Timothy 
C. Kingston of Graves, Miller & Kingston, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. Kingston.

 Representing 
Appellees:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and 
Nancy E. Vehr, Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Vehr.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

  

            
HILL, Justice. 

[¶1]      John R. Jolley 
(Appellant) appeals a district court decision dismissing, for lack of standing, 
his action against the State Loan and Investment Board (the Loan Board), the 
Board of Land Commissioners (BLC), and the respective members of each Board 
(collectively the Boards) for allegedly altering their schedule of public 
meetings from a monthly to a bimonthly basis without complying with the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act.  We 
affirm.

[¶2]      Appellant 
succinctly summarizes the issue on appeal:

Did the 
Appellant have standing to sue the Appellees?

The 
Boards answer with a slightly longer statement of the 
issue:

Whether 
the district court was correct in its determination that Appellant lacked 
standing to seek judicial review of the State Loan and Investment Board and 
Board of Land Commissioners' administrative action setting meeting dates for the 
year 2000.

[¶3]      Appellant is the 
editor and publisher of the Grass Roots Advocate, a bimonthly newspaper 
focusing on issues of land use, access, and development in Wyoming.  Appellant regularly covers and 
participates in public meetings of the Boards in his capacity with his newspaper 
and as a citizen of the state.

[¶4]      The Boards are 
comprised of the same members:  the 
Governor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, State Auditor, and Superintendent 
of Public Instruction.  Wyoming 
Constitution Art. 18, § 3; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-34-102(b) (LexisNexis 
2001).  The BLC is statutorily 
directed to hold such regular public meetings as it may prescribe or consider 
necessary.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
36-2-104 (LexisNexis 2001).  In 
1999, the BLC had a rule which, in effect, established a schedule of public 
meetings:

The Board shall meet regularly on 
the first Thursday of each month.  A 
regular meeting may be postponed or cancelled by the President of the 
Board.

Board 
of Land Commissioners Rules and Regulations, Chapter 1, § 3(a).  The Governor is the President of the 
BLC.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 36-2-103 
(LexisNexis 2001).  There is no 
equivalent statutory directive relating to public meetings for the Loan 
Board.  However, like the BLC, the 
legislature has granted the Land Board the authority to promulgate rules and 
regulations proper and necessary for the conduct of its business.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-34-103(a) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  In 1999, the 
Land Board had a rule in place which established a public meeting schedule 
substantially similar to that of the BLC:

The 
Board shall meet regularly on the first Thursday of each month and at the call 
of the President, to consider all matters under its jurisdiction. A regular 
meeting may be postponed or cancelled by the President of the 
Board.

State 
Loan and Investment Board Rules and Regulations, Chapter 1, § 3(a).  Also, like the BLC, the Governor is the 
President of the Loan Board, and the President is given apparent discretionary 
power to cancel or postpone meetings.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-34-102(b).

[¶5]      On December 21, 
1999, the schedule for the Boards was set by the Governor and faxed to the press 
and interested parties:

                        
January 20 (Semi-annual Mineral Royalty Grant 
Meeting)

                        
February 3

                        
April 6

                        
June 1

                        
July 20 (Semi-annual Mineral Royalty Grant Meeting)

                        
August 3

                        
October 5

 November 
(Annual meeting to consider Transportation  Enterprise Funds Grants and Loans  
no specific date set at this time)

December 
7

Appellant 
filed a Petition for Review pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114 (LexisNexis 
2001) and Wyo.R.App.P. 12 on February 11, 2000 challenging the decision to 
schedule bimonthly public meetings for 2000 in light of the rules and 
regulations calling for monthly meetings.  
The Boards responded with a motion to dismiss the petition for a lack of 
standing.  The Boards contended that 
Appellant was not "aggrieved or adversely affected in fact" under § 
16-3-114(a)1 by the reduction in public 
meetings.  Appellant countered he 
was "aggrieved or adversely affected in fact" because of the negative impact the 
reduction in public meetings would have on the financial status of his newspaper 
and on his interests as an active participant in the Boards' meetings and as a 
potential buyer of state lands.  On 
October 23, 2000, the district court dismissed Appellant's petition for lack of 
standing.  The court concluded that 
Appellant had failed to "provide any supporting facts for his interests as a 
taxpayer, buyer and potential buyer of state lands" sufficient to confer 
standing.  In addition, the court 
noted that the schedule of public meetings should not have any appreciable 
effect on Appellant's press coverage of the Boards.  This appeal 
followed.

[¶6]      Standing is a 
legal concept designed to determine whether a party is sufficiently affected to 
insure that the court is presented with a justiciable controversy.  Roe v. Board of County Commissioners, 
Campbell County, 997 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Memorial 
Hospital of Laramie County v. Department of Revenue and Taxation of State of 
Wyoming, 770 P.2d 223, 226 (Wyo. 1989) and Washakie County School 
District Number One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 316 (Wyo. 
1980)).

"The doctrine of standing is a 
jurisprudential rule of jurisdictional magnitude.  At its most elementary level, the 
standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should refrain from 
considering issues in which the litigants have little or no interest in 
vigorously advocating.  Accordingly, 
the doctrine of standing focuses upon whether a litigant is properly situated to 
assert an issue for judicial or quasi-judicial determination.  A litigant is said to have standing when 
he has a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy." This personal stake 
requirement has been described in Wyoming as a "tangible interest" at 
stake.  The tangible interest 
requirement guarantees that a litigant is sufficiently interested in a case to 
present a justiciable controversy."

State ex 
rel. Bayou Liquors, Inc. v. City of Casper, 906 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Schulthess v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 
556-57 (Wyo. 1992) (citations omitted)).

Roe, 997 P.2d  at 1022-23.

[¶7]      Judicial review 
of an agency action is authorized by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(a) only for 
those persons "aggrieved or adversely affected in fact" by the challenged 
action.

An 
aggrieved or adversely affected person is one who has a legally recognizable 
interest in that which will be affected by the action. Hoke v. Moyer, 865 P.2d 624, 628 (Wyo. 1993).  A 
potential litigant must show injury or potential injury by "alleg[ing] a 
perceptible, rather than a speculative, harm resulting from the agency action." 
Foster's, Inc. v. City of Laramie, 718 P.2d 868, 872 (Wyo. 1986).  " The interest which will sustain a 
right to appeal must generally be substantial, immediate, and pecuniary. A 
future, contingent, or merely speculative interest is ordinarily not 
sufficient.' " L Slash X Cattle Company, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 623 P.2d 764, 769 (Wyo. 1981) (quoting 4 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 
180).

Roe, 997 P.2d  at 1023.

[¶8]      On appeal, 
Appellant reiterates his contention that he is a person "aggrieved or adversely 
affected in fact" under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(a) by the Boards' alteration 
of their public meeting schedule in 2000 from a monthly to a bimonthly 
basis.  The grounds cited by 
Appellant in support of his argument in favor of standing  the negative impact 
on his newspaper's subscriber base and finances, his attendance and 
participation in the public meetings, and his status as a citizen of Wyoming, 
and as past and potential purchaser of state land  are not specific factual 
allegations of harm sufficient to demonstrate an injury related to the Boards' 
action.  Appellant has only raised 
the specter of speculative harm based upon future or contingent interests 
indistinguishable from that which could be raised by any citizen of 
Wyoming.  In other words, Appellant 
has not shown a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" nor any 
"injury" derived from the Boards' decision to alter their schedule of public 
meetings.  He only cites potential 
or possible harms that may affect his newspaper business or his status as a 
citizen or as a potential buyer of state land.  Claims of injury of a broad and general 
nature are not sufficient to demonstrate that Appellant was "aggrieved or 
adversely affected in fact" by the Boards' actions.  What we said in Roe is equally 
applicable in this case:

Given the Roes' failure to present 
specific, articulable facts to demonstrate how they were harmed by the Board's 
decision, we hold that the district court was without jurisdiction to decide 
their case.

997 P.2d  at 
1023.

[¶9]      Perhaps 
recognizing the weakness of his position under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(a), 
Appellant also suggests that he should be granted standing based upon his status 
as a citizen or taxpayer of Wyoming.  
We have recognized a more expansive or relaxed definition of standing 
when a matter of great public interest or importance is at stake.  Washakie County School District 
Number One, 606 P.2d 310, 317; Management Council of the Wyoming 
Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 841-42 (Wyo. 1998).  This exception to the general standing 
requirements evolved out of a determination of the existence of a justiciable 
controversy in the context of a declaratory judgment action.  In Management Council, we 
reviewed the evolution of the exception in our precedent:

As a threshold question, we turn to 
the certified question relating to standing. We accept the standing of the 
Management Council to pursue the relief sought by way of a declaratory judgment 
under the doctrine of great public interest or importance.  We first acknowledged the doctrine of 
great public interest or importance in connection with the existence of a 
justiciable controversy to support the invocation of the authority of the court 
to make a declaratory judgment.  We 
said that the requirement of a justiciable controversy is relaxed or not 
followed in such instances.  
Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574 (Wyo. 1974). We invoked 
Brimmer in our first school finance case. Washakie County School Dist. 
No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980). In Memorial Hosp. of 
Laramie County v. Department of Revenue and Taxation of State of Wyo., 770 P.2d 223, 226 (Wyo. 1989), we began to extend the doctrine of great public 
interest or importance from a relaxation of the requirement for justiciable 
controversy to a justification for standing when we said:

  
Declaratory relief should be 
liberally administered if the elements of a justiciable controversy exist to 
give the trial court jurisdiction. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 577 
(Wyo. 1974).  For that controversy 
to exist, a genuine right or interest must be at issue between adversarial 
parties, and the trial court must be able to make an effective judgment which 
will finally determine the rights of the parties. Id. at 578.  Even these prerequisites, however, may 
properly be avoided or relaxed when matters of great public interest or 
importance are presented to the trial court.  Id.; Kurpjuweit v. Northwestern 
Development Company, Inc., 708 P.2d 39, 44 (Wyo. 1985). If the hospital 
could establish the existence of an actual controversy with the department, 
there is no doubt the trial court could effectively and finally determine that 
dispute.  Thus, the only question 
remaining is whether the department has so affected an interest of the hospital 
so as to create an actual controversy. "Standing is a concept utilized to 
determine if a party is sufficiently affected to insure that a justiciable 
controversy is presented to the court." Washakie County School Dist. No. 1 v. 
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 316 (Wyo. 1980).

                        
The transition became complete when we said:

We have recognized an exception to 
the standing requirement when we are faced with a matter of great public 
interest or importance. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574 (Wyo. 
1974).  Without deciding whether 
Petitioners have standing to seek the issuance of a writ of mandamus which 
requires Governor Sullivan to implement the Wyoming Professional Review Panel 
Act, we hold that the issue of whether the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act 
is constitutional is of great public importance and, therefore, merits a 
decision from this Court.

State ex rel. Wyoming Ass'n of 
Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors v. Sullivan, 798 P.2d 826, 828-29 (Wyo. 1990) 
(footnotes omitted).  We hold that 
the issue presented in the second certified question is of great public 
importance that merits a decision from this Court, and we, therefore, recognize 
the standing of the Management Council to seek a declaratory judgment on that 
question.

953 P.2d  at 841-42.  Historically, we have applied the great 
public interest and importance doctrine to find standing where we ordinarily 
would not in the following instances:  
Washakie County School District Number One, 606 P.2d 310 
(constitutionality of school financing); Memorial Hospital of Laramie 
County, 770 P.2d 223 (tax exempt status of hospital); State ex rel. 
Wyoming Association of Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors v. Sullivan, 
798 P.2d 826 (Wyo. 1990) (constitutionality of the Wyoming Professional Review 
Panel Act); Board of County Commissioners of the County of Laramie v. Laramie 
County School District Number One, 884 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1994) (entitlement of 
school district to interest on school district funds held by county treasurer); 
and Management Council of the Wyoming Legislature, 953 P.2d 839 
(constitutional scope of governor's veto power).

[¶10]   The question before us now is 
whether or not the change of the Boards' public meetings schedule, arguably in 
violation of their rules and regulations, is of such great public interest and 
importance to justify relaxing the standing requirements to permit Appellant to 
bring this action based on his status as a citizen and taxpayer of Wyoming.  In light of our precedent and the 
rationale behind the great public interest or importance doctrine, we conclude 
that it is not of such a nature.  As 
noted above, we have historically applied the doctrine when a constitutional 
question is presented  as in Washakie School District Number One; 
Wyoming Association of Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors; and 
Management Council  or where the issue concerns the apportionment of 
state revenues among governmental entities  as in Memorial Hospital and 
Board of County Commissioners of the County of Laramie.  This case raises neither a 
constitutional claim nor an issue related to the apportionment of state 
revenue.  The doctrine of great 
public interest or importance should be applied 
cautiously:

The question of great public 
importance rests with this court, Kellner v. District Court In and For City 
and County of Denver, 127 Colo. 320, 256 P.2d 887, 888. This exception must 
be applied with caution and its exercise must be a matter where strict standards 
are applied to avoid the temptation to apply the judge's own beliefs and 
philosophies to a determination of what questions are of great public 
importance.

Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo. 
1974).  We decline to expand the 
doctrine to encompass alleged violations of an agency's rules and regulations 
that do not directly implicate the constitutionality of legislation or an 
agency's actions or inactions.  
Therefore, Appellant does not have standing to contest the Boards' 
scheduling of their public meetings under the doctrine of great public interest 
or importance.

[¶11]   The district court's decision 
dismissing Appellant's complaint for lack of standing is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

  1Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-3-114(a) (LexisNexis 2001) provides:

Subject to the requirement that 
administrative remedies be exhausted and in the absence of any statutory or 
common-law provision precluding or limiting judicial review, any person 
aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an agency in a 
contested case, or by other agency action or inaction, or any person affected in 
fact by a rule adopted by an agency, is entitled to judicial review in the 
district court for county in which the administrative action or inaction was 
taken, or in which any real property affected by the administrative action or 
inaction is located, or if no real property is involved, in the district court 
for the county in which the party aggrieved or adversely affected by the 
administrative action or inaction resides or has its principal place of 
business.  The procedure to be 
followed in the proceeding before the district court shall be in accordance with 
rules heretofore or hereinafter adopted by the Wyoming Supreme 
Court.