Case Title: In Interest of Sweeney

Citation: 393 Pa. Super. 437, 574 A.2d 690

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1990-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
393 Pa. Superior Ct. 437 (1990) 574 A.2d 690 In the Interest of Laura SWEENEY. Appeal of Verna THOMPSON. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued March 8, 1990. Filed May 9, 1990. *438 Barbara J. Entwistle, Gettysburg, for appellant. David K. James, Gettysburg, for appellee. Chester G. Schultz, Gettysburg, for Adams County Children and Youth Services, participating party. *439 Before WIEAND, TAMILIA and POPOVICH, JJ. TAMILIA, Judge: This is an appeal from an Order entered July 6, 1989 which continued placement of appellant Verna Thompson's daughter, Laura L. Sweeney, in foster care and which adopted a long-range goal of adoption for the child, rather than reunification with appellant. Laura Sweeney was born on May 31, 1983 and except for a three-month period in 1985-86, has been in foster care continuously since October 5, 1984, when appellant voluntarily relinquished custody to Adams County Children and Youth Services.[1] During the time Laura has been in foster care, the court conducted periodic review hearings, as required by the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301 et seq., and each time the court concluded the conditions necessitating placement had not been alleviated. It is from the last of these hearings, July 5, 1989, and the subsequent Order, that the instant appeal stems. Appellant first argues the trial court erred in applying the "best interests of the child" standard instead of the "clear and convincing evidence" standard in determining whether the placement goal should be changed. We disagree. The standard for adjudicating a child dependent is "clear and convincing evidence", as well as a showing of clear necessity. Helsel v. Blair County Children and Youth Serv., 359 Pa.Super. 487, 519 A.2d 456 (1986); 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c). Once a child is adjudicated dependent, however, the issues of custody and continuation of foster care are determined according to a child's best interests. In Re Miller, 380 Pa.Super. 423, 552 A.2d 261 (1988). In the instant case, appellant has not contested the dependency finding, and as Laura had been adjudged dependent prior *440 to, and at the time of, the July 5, 1989 judicial review hearing, the trial court applied the proper standard in continuing Laura in foster care and modifying the long-range goal. We also do not find the clear and convincing standard applicable to appellant's allegations the change in the long-term goal means appellant's "minimal visitation schedule" with Laura may be reduced. The trial court allayed these concerns at the last judicial review hearing. N.T., 7/5/89, p. 21. At such time as appellant's parental rights are subject to termination, the applicable evidentiary standard will be clear and convincing evidence. However, the situation is not presented instantly, and this claim is without merit. Appellant next argues the facts and equities of the case do not support the conclusion reached by the trial court that the condition necessitating placement had not been alleviated, and that it would be contrary to the child's welfare to reunify her with her mother. Specifically, appellant argues the lack of housing which necessitated placement of Laura in foster care in 1984 is no longer a problem. Review by the court is not limited to the original conditions or circumstances which necessitated placement. Sections 6351(f) and (g) of the Juvenile Act enumerate the determinations to be made by the court. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6351(f), (g). The trial court, within the exercise of its discretion, found, based on the record and the testimony presented on behalf of both Children and Youth Services and appellant, appellant had not cooperated with the family service plan and circumstances warranted the child's continued placement in foster care. The court stated: N.T., 7/5/89, pp. 76-78. Therefore, after a careful, independent review of the record in this case, this Court finds no basis for interfering with the Order entered by the trial court, nor can we say the court abused its discretion in modifying the long-range goal. Moreover, we reject appellant's assertion that the trial court's reference to In Re Quick 384 Pa.Super. 412, 559 A.2d 42 (1989), with its notion of Permanency Planning, is inappropriate to the case sub judice. Id., 384 Pa. Superior Ct. at 422, 559 A.2d at 47, footnote 2. While not the sole consideration for the Juvenile Court Judge in determining the best interests of the child, we consider the concept of Permanency Planning an invaluable aid to those considerations, as evidenced by the able trial court herein. Order affirmed. [1] At the end of the three-month period, appellant, who was then residing in York County, relinquished custody to York County Children and Youth Services, whereupon the case was returned to the jurisdiction of Adams County.