Case Title: State v. Clayborn L. Walker

Citation: 2008 WI 34

Docket Number: 2006AP000562-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2008-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
2008 WI 34 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP562-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Clayborn L. Walker, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 142 
Reported at: 302 Wis. 2d 735, 735 N.W.2d 582 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 1, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 16, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
John Franke   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Stephen W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Amelia L. 
Bizzaro and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, oral argument by 
Amelia L. Bizzaro. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Randall Paulson, 
assistant state public defender, with whom on the brief was 
Nicholas Chiarkas, state public defender. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 34
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP562-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2002CF6153) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Clayborn L. Walker, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 1, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published court of appeals' decision,1 which reversed Walker's 
two year reconfinement order imposed by the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court, John A. Franke, Judge.  The court of appeals 
determined that the reconfinement hearing was defective because 
nothing in the record indicates that Judge Franke, who did not 
originally sentence Walker, reviewed the original sentencing 
transcript in full.   
                                                 
1 State v. Walker, 2007 WI App 142, 302 Wis. 2d 735, 735 
N.W.2d 582. 
No. 
2006AP562-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
This appeal presents the following question: Did this 
court create a per se rule in State v. Brown2 that a circuit 
court judge must review the original sentencing transcript 
before reconfining a defendant?  Walker argues that the court of 
appeals properly interpreted Brown and pre-Brown decisions to 
conclude that when the sentencing judge and reconfinement judge 
are different, the original sentencing transcript must be read 
prior to the reconfinement hearing.  The State, on the other 
hand, argues that Brown did not establish a per se requirement.   
¶3 
We agree with the State and conclude that State v. Gee3 
misinterpreted our decision in Brown.  We conclude that a 
circuit court is not required to read the original sentencing 
transcript in every reconfinement hearing.  Rather, the circuit 
court should be familiar with the particulars of the case at 
issue.  That can be accomplished in any number of ways, and we 
acknowledge that this may differ from case to case.  As 
articulated in Brown, the circuit court must decide which 
factors are relevant for consideration in any given case, and 
the circuit court must use its discretion as to how it 
ascertains the information needed to consider the relevant 
factors.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' decision 
in this case and overrule Gee. 
                                                 
2 State v. Brown, 2006 WI 131, 298 Wis. 2d 37, 725 
N.W.2d 262. 
3 State v. Gee, 2007 WI App 32, 299 Wis. 2d 518, 729 N.W.2d 
424. 
No. 
2006AP562-CR   
 
3 
 
 
I 
¶4 
The underlying facts are neither relevant to this 
decision nor are they in dispute.  In short, however, Walker and 
another person confronted a man at gun point in an effort to 
take the man's car.  Their attempt to take the car was 
unsuccessful, but they did flee the scene with the victim's car 
keys.  Walker was subsequently apprehended and charged with 
armed robbery.  Walker pled guilty to armed robbery with use of 
force as a party to a crime contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 943.32(2), 
939.05 (2001-02)4 before the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Jean 
W. DiMotto, Judge.  Judge DiMotto sentenced Walker to six years 
imprisonment——two years of initial confinement and four years of 
extended supervision.  Just weeks after his release to extended 
supervision, Walker committed a number of violations that 
prompted the Department of Corrections (DOC) to revoke his 
extended supervision. 
¶5 
Walker then appeared before Judge Franke for a 
reconfinement hearing pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 302.113(9)(am).  
At the outset of the hearing, the circuit court indicated that 
it had reviewed the "Court Memo" prepared by a "Probation/Parole 
Agent" from the Department of Corrections.  The court memo 
contained information pertinent to reconfinement such as: the 
relevant dates including the date of the offense, conviction, 
                                                 
4 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2006AP562-CR   
 
4 
 
and release to extended supervision; Walker's violations of 
extended supervision; a Plotkin5 analysis; justifications for 
reincarceration; and a discussion of the underlying crime, 
institutional conduct record, and conduct while on extended 
supervision.  The department's memo recommended two years of 
reincarceration. 
¶6 
At the reconfinement hearing, the prosecutor informed 
the circuit court of Walker's prior juvenile record, past 
history regarding Walker's childhood, and that the State was in 
agreement with the agent's recommendation of two years of 
reconfinement.  Walker's counsel agreed that a message needed to 
be sent to Walker, but he argued for eight to twelve months of 
reincarceration.  He informed the circuit court of Walker's poor 
relationship with his agent and described the struggles Walker 
faced when being released from prison, such as no job, no money, 
and no phone service for electronic monitoring.  Walker then 
spoke on his own behalf.   
¶7 
In 
concluding 
that 
two 
years 
reconfinement 
was 
warranted, the circuit court discussed the following points in 
making the record at the reconfinement hearing: 
• Walker's conflict with his agent: "When your agent 
says you have to do something, you have to do it. 
Whether you like your agent, whether your agent is 
polite about it, whether your agent even handles it 
well or not, you have to put up with it." 
                                                 
5 See State ex rel. Plotkin v. DHSS, 63 Wis. 2d 535, 544-45, 
217 N.W.2d 641 (1974) (adopting ABA guidelines that established 
the duties of an administrative body and factors to be 
considered when exercising discretion to revoke probation). 
No. 
2006AP562-CR   
 
5 
 
• Walker's underlying crime was "serious." 
• The 
neglect 
Walker 
suffered 
throughout 
his 
childhood, which, the circuit court surmised, "ha[d] 
something to do with the juvenile difficulties you had 
and now the adult difficulties you're having." 
• Absconding 
was 
not 
a 
solution 
to 
whatever 
difficulties Walker was having with his agent. "You 
served two years.  You got out and you blew it 
immediately and you blew it in a big way.  You didn't 
commit a new offense, at least no major offense, and 
there is no case pending.  But short of committing a 
new crime, you blew it about as much as a person can." 
State v. Walker, 2007 WI App 142, ¶24, 302 Wis. 2d 735, 735 
N.W.2d 582. 
¶8 
The circuit court concluded that a "message has to be 
sent and anything less than half of the reconfinement time would 
be insufficient."  Id. 
¶9 
Walker moved the court for post-conviction relief.  He 
asserted a number of theories for relief: the circuit court's 
consideration of inaccurate information, the court's sentence 
was unduly harsh, his counsel was ineffective, the circuit court 
failed to review the initial sentencing transcript, and Walker 
set forth a "new factor" which warranted a modification of 
reconfinement.  In a written decision, the circuit court denied 
Walker's post-conviction motion.  The circuit court wrote:   
The defendant is correct that the record does not 
reflect whether I had reviewed the initial sentencing 
transcript or was specifically aware of his mental 
health history.  It was my general reconfinement 
practice to review at least the judges' sentencing 
comments.  I would sometimes review more of the 
transcript depending on the particular circumstances 
of the case and the arguments advanced by counsel.  I 
do not recall whether I reviewed this particular 
transcript and note that Judge DiMotto's sentencing 
No. 
2006AP562-CR   
 
6 
 
remarks 
did 
not 
reference 
the 
mental 
health 
background. 
Id., ¶25. 
¶10 The circuit court, citing to State v. Jones,6 reasoned 
that it was not required to review the original sentencing 
transcript prior to the reconfinement hearing.  Additionally, 
the circuit court stated that it had now reviewed the sentencing 
transcript and concluded that modification was not warranted. 
¶11 The court of appeals consolidated two appeals brought 
by Walker.  The first appeal was in regard to a denial of 
Walker's petition for writ of habeas corpus.  We, however, are 
not reviewing that decision.  In the second appeal, Walker 
asserted that the circuit court erred by failing to consider or 
read the original sentencing hearing transcript.  The court of 
appeals reversed the circuit court's decision and stated: 
Although we conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion, this court has 
held in a decision ordered published on February 28, 
2007, [Gee], that Brown did create a per se rule, even 
though Brown itself did not so treat its suggestion 
that 
reconfinement 
courts 
'should 
consider' 
the 
original sentencing transcript.  We are bound by Gee.  
We respectfully seek clarification from the supreme 
court as to whether it intended to create a per se 
rule, as Gee held, or whether, as we now conclude, it 
did not. 
Id., ¶30 (citations omitted). 
¶12 Judge Kessler concurred and wrote that Brown did 
create a per se rule that required circuit courts to review the 
                                                 
6 State v. Jones, 2005 WI App 259, 288 Wis. 2d 475, 707 
N.W.2d 876. 
No. 
2006AP562-CR   
 
7 
 
original 
sentencing 
transcripts 
at 
reconfinement 
hearings.  
Judge Kessler remarked: 
As we observed in Gee, '[i]n Brown, the court 
. . . imposed on trial courts the requirement that 
they 
'provid[e] 
reasoned 
explanations 
for 
reconfinement decisions.''  To provide those reasoned 
explanations, the court in Brown discusses a number of 
factors that may be relevant, and explains '[t]hese 
factors are not a mandatory checklist, and we do not 
hold that a circuit court must examine each factor on 
the record in every case.'  The Brown court then 
explains what is important to review in order to 
examine the relevant factors: 
The 
original 
sentencing 
transcript 
is 
an 
important source of information on the defendant that 
discusses many of the factors that circuit courts 
should consider when making a reconfinement decision.  
The 
original 
sentencing 
transcript 
is 
readily 
available for a circuit court to examine, and those 
portions that are considered by the court to be 
relevant should be mentioned. 
One can only wonder how a reconfinement judge who 
did not impose the original sentence could comply with 
the supreme court's clear instruction to examine the 
relevant factors the court described in Brown, much 
less 
mention 
those 
portions 
of 
the 
sentencing 
transcript which are relevant to those factors, unless 
the sentencing transcript has been reviewed. 
Walker, 302 Wis. 2d 735, ¶34 (Kessler, J., concurring) (internal 
citations and emphasis omitted). 
II 
¶13 Interpretation of our own case law presents a question 
of law that we review de novo.  State v. Krawczyk, 2003 WI App 
6, ¶10, 259 Wis. 2d 843, 657 N.W.2d 77.  "The standards 
governing appellate review of an imposed sentence are well 
settled. 
 
A 
circuit 
court 
exercises 
its 
discretion 
at 
No. 
2006AP562-CR   
 
8 
 
sentencing, and appellate review is limited to determining if 
the court's discretion was erroneously exercised."  State v. 
Brown, 2006 WI 131, ¶19, 298 Wis. 2d 37, 725 N.W.2d 262 (citing 
State v. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, ¶17, 289 Wis. 2d 34, 710 N.W.2d 466 
and State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 
N.W.2d 197).  "A reconfinement hearing is certainly akin to a 
sentencing hearing and, therefore, both are reviewed on appeal 
to determine if there has been an erroneous exercise of 
discretion."  Brown, 298 Wis. 2d 37, ¶20. 
III 
¶14 As a preliminary matter, while the issue before the 
court is moot because Walker has completed his reconfinement 
term and thus our decision will not affect the underlying 
controversy, we may at times consider a moot issue if it is of 
"great public importance or arises frequently enough to warrant 
a definitive decision to guide the circuit courts."  State ex 
rel. Riesch v. Schwarz, 2005 WI 11, ¶12, 278 Wis. 2d 24, 692 
N.W.2d 219.  Because circuit courts regularly preside over 
reconfinement hearings, we review the issue at hand even though 
it is moot.   
¶15 In short, we conclude that Gee misinterprets our 
decision in Brown.  Gee places additional requirements on a 
circuit court judge.  A circuit court is not required to read 
the original sentencing transcript in every case.7  Rather, the 
                                                 
7 We recognize that often circuit court judges do conduct 
such a review and such a review is often warranted. 
No. 
2006AP562-CR   
 
9 
 
circuit court should be familiar with the case.  It, however, 
can accomplish the requisite familiarity in a number of ways, 
and we acknowledge that this may differ from case to case.  As 
articulated in Brown, the circuit court must decide which 
factors are relevant for consideration in any given case, and 
the circuit court must use its discretion as to how it 
ascertains the information needed to consider the relevant 
factors. 
A 
¶16 Our decision in Brown was the first time we set forth 
any guidelines regarding what factors a circuit court should 
consider at a reconfinement hearing.  Brown, 298 Wis. 2d 37, ¶5.  
Our decision today should in no way be construed to alter the 
guidance set out in Brown.  As stated in Brown, circuit court 
judges 
must 
give 
reasoned 
explanations 
for 
reconfinement 
decisions.  Id., ¶29.  However, we do not "set forth a required 
checklist that must be followed in every instance."  Id., ¶45.   
¶17 In making a reconfinement decision, "we expect that 
circuit courts will usually consider [the recommendation from 
DOC,] the nature and severity of the original offense, the 
client's institutional conduct record, as well as the amount of 
incarceration necessary to protect the public from the risk of 
further criminal activity, taking into account the defendant's 
conduct and the nature of the violation of terms and conditions 
during 
extended 
supervision." 
 
Id., 
¶¶34, 45. 
 
"The 
reconfinement period imposed should be the minimum amount that 
is necessary to protect the public, to prevent depreciation of 
No. 
2006AP562-CR   
 
10 
 
the seriousness of the offense, and to meet the defendant's 
rehabilitative needs."  Id.  Circuit courts may also consider 
"'what balance of time between renewed incarceration and further 
[] [extended] supervision is most likely to protect society and 
at the same time to facilitate the violator's transition between 
prison 
and 
unconditional 
freedom.'" 
 
Id., 
¶35 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
Other 
factors 
that 
may 
be 
relevant 
include 
"consideration of the defendant's record, attitude, and capacity 
for 
rehabilitation, 
and 
the 
rehabilitative 
goals 
to 
be 
accomplished by imprisonment for the time period in question in 
relation to the time left on the violator's original sentence."  
Id., ¶36. 
¶18 We recognize that not all factors will apply in every 
case.  Id., ¶39.  Accordingly, it is appropriate for the circuit 
court 
to 
"identify 
the 
general 
objectives 
of 
greatest 
importance, and describe the factors and circumstances relevant 
to those objectives."  Id.  "[I]t is within the circuit court's 
discretion to decide what weight should be given to a particular 
factor in a particular case," and the amount of requisite 
explanation will vary from case to case.  Id. (citation 
omitted). 
¶19 As stated in Brown, the original sentencing transcript 
can be an important source of information regarding these 
factors 
and 
is 
generally 
readily 
available. 
 
Id., 
¶38.  
Information pertaining to the relevant factors may also be found 
No. 
2006AP562-CR   
 
11 
 
in the court memo8 or other documents in the circuit court's 
file.  Additionally, the prosecutor and defense counsel will 
often review the file, which includes the sentencing transcript, 
to prepare for the hearing.  Both defense counsel and the 
prosecutor are certainly able to provide the circuit court with 
information pertaining to reconfinement and even direct the 
court to matters in the file relevant for review.  In fact, in 
Brown, we urged "the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the 
defendant to bring to the court's attention any factors and 
circumstances, which may be particularly relevant to the 
guidelines discussed [in Brown]."  Id., ¶40.  The parties are, 
therefore, encouraged to identify relevant information from the 
sentencing transcript or any other document and bring it to the 
circuit court's attention, so the judge may then specifically 
review that information.    
¶20 While 
the 
circuit 
court 
may 
ascertain 
relevant 
information from a number of sources, we do not require that any 
one source or list of sources be utilized in every case.  
Rather, we merely require that the circuit court be familiar 
with the case before it.  Ultimately, it is for the circuit 
                                                 
8 The 
"Court 
Memo" 
is 
a 
document 
prepared 
by 
a 
"Probation/Parole Agent" from the Department of Corrections.  It 
contains information pertinent to reconfinement such as: the 
relevant dates including the date of the offense, conviction, 
and release to extended supervision; violations of extended 
supervision; 
a 
Plotkin 
analysis; 
justifications 
for 
reincarceration; and a discussion of the underlying crime, 
institutional conduct record, and conduct while on extended 
supervision. 
No. 
2006AP562-CR   
 
12 
 
court to determine the appropriate manner in which to accomplish 
this, and it may vary based upon the particular case.   
¶21 In the case at hand, the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion.  While the judge could not 
recall whether he read the original sentencing transcript prior 
to the reconfinement hearing, the record reflects that the judge 
was familiar with the file, and he did give a reasoned 
explanation for his reconfinement decision.  Moreover, the 
circuit court judge stated that it was his usual practice to 
review the sentencing court's comments and that he would review 
more of the hearing transcript if appropriate, but he could not 
recall whether he had done so in Walker's case. 
B 
¶22 In Gee, the court of appeals relied on Brown, 298 
Wis. 2d 37, ¶38, to conclude that the circuit court must review 
the original sentencing transcript every time it presides over a 
reconfinement hearing.  State v. Gee, 2007 WI App 32, ¶15, 299 
Wis. 2d 518, 729 N.W.2d 424.  The court of appeals, in Gee, 
concluded that given the statement in Brown regarding the 
importance of sentencing transcripts, it was puzzled that the 
State, in Gee, would argue that the trial court need not review 
the original transcript.  Id. 
¶23 While we did emphasize the likely usefulness of the 
sentencing transcript in our Brown decision, we did not intend 
for that to be construed as a per se rule that circuit courts 
must read the original sentencing transcript before every 
reconfinement hearing.  Rather, we leave it to the circuit 
No. 
2006AP562-CR   
 
13 
 
court's discretion to determine which factors articulated in 
Brown are relevant, and we leave it to the circuit court to 
determine how best to ascertain information pertaining to the 
relevant factors.  While it certainly may be good practice for 
the circuit court to review the sentencing transcript, it may 
not always be necessary, and therefore, we do not create a 
per se rule, but instead leave it to the trial court's 
discretion. 
¶24 Accordingly, we overrule Gee to the extent that it 
creates a requirement that circuit court judges must read the 
original sentencing transcript prior to every reconfinement 
hearing.  Additionally, to the extent other cases call for such 
a requirement, we reject their directives. 
¶25 Walker 
argues 
that 
regardless 
of 
whether 
Gee 
misinterpreted Brown, the rule established in Gee is reasonable.  
Walker asserts, "[t]he obligation that the new reconfinement 
judge review the relevant record, including the transcript of 
any prior hearings, is sound public policy and good common 
sense."  We, however, reject a rigid approach that requires 
judges to read specific documents in every case, and instead, we 
leave it to the circuit court's discretion as to how it 
familiarizes itself with the file.        
¶26 Walker, relying primarily on State v. Reynolds, argues 
that even pre-Brown court of appeals' decisions established that 
a circuit court must review the original sentencing transcript 
prior to a reconfinement hearing.  We reject this argument.  
Reynolds was a sentencing after revocation of probation case and 
No. 
2006AP562-CR   
 
14 
 
not a reconfinement hearing case.  State v. Reynolds, 2002 WI 
App 15, 249 Wis. 2d 798, 643 N.W.2d 165.  Moreover, Reynolds did 
not establish such a bright-line rule.  Id., ¶¶9-11, 13-15.  
Rather, Reynolds supports the conclusion that reviewing the 
original sentencing transcript may be necessary in some cases.  
Id.  For example, in Reynolds, a review of the original 
sentencing transcript, in order to ascertain the severity of the 
original offense, was "essential to a fair sentencing after 
revocation."  Id., ¶11.  To the extent that Reynolds even 
supports Walker's argument, the court of appeals seemingly had 
conflicting published decisions prior to Brown and Gee.  Compare 
Reynolds with State v. Jones, 2005 WI App 259, ¶13, 288 
Wis. 2d 475, 707 N.W.2d 876 (rejecting the defendant's argument 
that under Reynolds, a judge must review the original sentencing 
transcript prior to a reconfinement hearing).  Our decision 
today resolves any potential conflicts that existed at the court 
of appeals——no per se rule exists. 
¶27 Because we did not create a per se, rigid rule in 
Brown that the original sentencing transcript must be read every 
time, arguments about whether that "rule" applies retroactively 
are irrelevant and need not be addressed.     
IV 
¶28 We conclude that Gee misinterpreted our decision in 
Brown.  A circuit court is not required to read the original 
sentencing transcript in every reconfinement hearing.  Rather, 
the circuit court should be familiar with the particulars of the 
case at issue.  That can be accomplished in any number of ways, 
No. 
2006AP562-CR   
 
15 
 
and we acknowledge that this may differ from case to case.  As 
articulated in Brown, the circuit court must decide which 
factors are relevant for consideration in any given case, and 
the circuit court must use its discretion as to how it 
ascertains the information needed to consider the relevant 
factors.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' decision 
in this case and overrule Gee. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No. 
2006AP562-CR   
 
 
 
1