Case Title: P. v. John Z.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S103427

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2003-01-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
 
Filed 1/6/03 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re JOHN Z., a Person Coming Under the ) 
Juvenile Court Law. 
) 
____________________________________) 
 
) 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S103427 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C036210 
JOHN Z., 
) 
 
) 
El Dorado County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. PJ1281B 
___________________________________ ) 
 
We granted this case to settle a conflict in Court of Appeal decisions as to 
whether the crime of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)) is committed if 
the female victim consents to an initial penetration by her male companion, and 
then withdraws her consent during an act of intercourse, but the male continues 
against her will.  (Compare People v. Vela (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 237 (Vela) [no 
rape committed] with People v. Roundtree (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 846 (Roundtree) 
[rape committed].)  We agree with Roundtree and the Court of Appeal in the 
present case that a withdrawal of consent effectively nullifies any earlier consent 
and subjects the male to forcible rape charges if he persists in what has become 
nonconsensual intercourse.   
The juvenile court, after holding a contested jurisdictional hearing on a 
unitary petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 602, 777, subd. (a)) filed on behalf of 
 2
 
John Z. (defendant), found that he committed forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, 
subd. (a)(2)) and that his previous juvenile court disposition had been ineffective.  
(Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.)  He was 
committed to Crystal Creek Boys Ranch.  On appeal, defendant contends the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain the finding that he committed forcible rape.  We 
disagree.   
FACTS 
The following facts are largely taken from the Court of Appeal opinion in 
this case.  During the afternoon of March 23, 2000, 17-year-old Laura T. was 
working at Safeway when she received a call from Juan G., whom she had met 
about two weeks earlier.  Juan wanted Laura to take him to a party at defendant’s 
home and then return about 8:30 p.m. to pick him up.  Laura agreed to take Juan to 
the party, but since she planned to attend a church group meeting that evening she 
told him she would be unable to pick him up.   
Sometime after 6:00 p.m., Laura drove Juan to defendant’s residence.  
Defendant and Justin L. were present.  After arranging to have Justin L.’s 
stepbrother, P. W., buy them alcohol, Laura picked up P. W. and drove him to the 
store where he bought beer.  Laura told Juan she would stay until 8:00 or 8:30 
p.m.  Although defendant and Juan drank the beer, Laura did not.   
During the evening, Laura and Juan went into defendant’s parents’ 
bedroom.  Juan indicated he wanted to have sex but Laura told him she was not 
ready for that kind of activity.  Juan became upset and went into the bathroom. 
Laura left the bedroom and both defendant and Justin asked her why she 
“wouldn’t do stuff.”  Laura told them that she was not ready.   
About 8:10 p.m., Laura was ready to leave when defendant asked her to 
come into his bedroom to talk.  She complied.  Defendant told her that Juan had 
 3
 
said he (Juan) did not care for her; defendant then suggested that Laura become his 
girlfriend.  Juan entered the bedroom and defendant left to take a phone call. 
When defendant returned to the bedroom, he and Juan asked Laura if it was 
her fantasy to have two guys, and Laura said it was not.  Juan and defendant began 
kissing Laura and removing her clothes, although she kept telling them not to.  At 
some point, the boys removed Laura’s pants and underwear and began “fingering” 
her, “playing with [her] boobs” and continued to kiss her.  Laura enjoyed this 
activity in the beginning, but objected when Juan removed his pants and told 
defendant to keep fingering her while he put on a condom.  Once the condom was 
in place, defendant left the room and Juan got on top of Laura.  She tried to resist 
and told him she did not want to have intercourse, but he was too strong and 
forced his penis into her vagina.  The rape terminated when, due to Laura’s 
struggling, the condom fell off.  Laura told Juan that “maybe it’s a sign we 
shouldn’t be doing this,” and he said “fine” and left the room.  (Although Juan G. 
was originally a codefendant, at the close of the victim’s testimony he admitted 
amended charges of sexual battery (§ 243.4) and unlawful sexual intercourse (§ 
261.5, subd. (b)), a misdemeanor.) 
Laura rolled over on the bed and began trying to find her clothes; however, 
because the room was dark she was unable to do so.  Defendant, who had removed 
his clothing, then entered the bedroom and walked to where Laura was sitting on 
the bed and “he like rolled over [her] so [she] was pushed back down to the bed.”  
Laura did not say anything and defendant began kissing her and telling her that she 
had “a really beautiful body.”  Defendant got on top of Laura, put his penis into 
her vagina “and rolled [her] over so [she] was sitting on top of him.”  Laura 
testified she “kept . . . pulling up, trying to sit up to get it out . . . [a]nd he grabbed 
my hips and pushed me back down and then he rolled me back over so I was on 
my back . . . and . . . kept saying, will you be my girlfriend.”  Laura “kept like 
 4
 
trying to pull away” and told him that “if he really did care about me, he wouldn’t 
be doing this to me and if he did want a relationship, he should wait and respect 
that I don’t want to do this.”  After about 10 minutes, defendant got off Laura, and 
helped her dress and find her keys.  She then drove home. 
On cross-examination, Laura testified that when defendant entered the 
room unclothed, he lay down on the bed behind her and touched her shoulder with 
just enough pressure to make her move, a nudge.  He asked her to lie down and 
she did.  He began kissing her and she kissed him back.  He rolled on top of her, 
inserted his penis in her and, although she resisted, he rolled her back over, pulling 
her on top of him.  She was on top of him for four or five minutes, during which 
time she tried to get off, but he grabbed her waist and pulled her back down.  He 
rolled her over and continued the sexual intercourse.  Laura told him that she 
needed to go home, but he would not stop.  He said, “just give me a minute,” and 
she said, “no, I need to get home.” He replied, “give me some time” and she 
repeated, “no, I have to go home.” Defendant did not stop, “[h]e just stayed inside 
of me and kept like basically forcing it on me.” After about a “minute, minute and 
[a] half,” defendant got off Laura. 
Defendant testified, admitting that he and Juan were kissing and fondling 
Laura in the bedroom, but claimed it was with her consent.  He also admitted 
having sexual intercourse with Laura, again claiming it was consensual.  He 
claimed he discontinued the act as soon as Laura told him that she had to go home. 
DISCUSSION 
Although the evidence of Laura’s initial consent to intercourse with John Z. 
was hardly conclusive, we will assume for purposes of argument that Laura 
impliedly consented to the act, or at least tacitly refrained from objecting to it, 
until defendant had achieved penetration.  (But see § 261.6 [defining the type of 
consent at issue under section 261 as “positive cooperation in act or attitude 
 5
 
pursuant to an exercise of free will”].)  As will appear, we conclude that the 
offense of forcible rape occurs when, during apparently consensual intercourse, 
the victim expresses an objection and attempts to stop the act and the defendant 
forcibly continues despite the objection.   
Vela, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d 237, held that where the victim consents to 
intercourse at the time of penetration but thereafter withdraws her consent, any use 
of force by her assailant past that point is not rape.  (Id. at pp. 242-243.)  The court 
in Vela found “scant authority” on point (id. at p. 241), relying on two out-of-state 
cases which had held that if consent is given prior to penetration, no rape occurs 
despite the withdrawal of consent during intercourse itself.  (See Battle v. State 
(Md. 1980) 414 A.2d 1266, 1268-1270; State v. Way (N.C. 1979) 254 S.E.2d 760, 
762.)  According to Vela, these cases held that “the presence or absence of consent 
at the moment of initial penetration appears to be the crucial point in the crime of 
rape.”  (Vela, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 242.) 
Vela agreed with these cases, reasoning that “the essence of the crime of 
rape is the outrage to the person and feelings of the female resulting from the 
nonconsensual violation of her womanhood.  When a female willingly consents to 
an act of sexual intercourse, the penetration by the male cannot constitute a 
violation of her womanhood nor cause outrage to her person and feelings.  If she 
withdraws consent during the act of sexual intercourse and the male forcibly 
continues the act without interruption, the female may certainly feel outrage 
because of the force applied or because the male ignores her wishes, but the sense 
of outrage to her person and feelings could hardly be of the same magnitude as 
that resulting from an initial nonconsensual violation of her womanhood.  It would 
seem, therefore, that the essential guilt of rape as stated in . . . section 263 is 
lacking in the withdrawn consent scenario.”  (Vela, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 
243.) 
 6
 
With due respect to Vela and the two sister state cases on which it relied, 
we find their reasoning unsound.  First, contrary to Vela’s assumption, we have no 
way of accurately measuring the level of outrage the victim suffers from being 
subjected to continued forcible intercourse following withdrawal of her consent.  
We must assume the sense of outrage is substantial.  More importantly, section 
261, subdivision (a)(2), defines rape as “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished 
with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator . . . . [¶] . . . [w]here it is 
accomplished against a person’s will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, 
or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.”  
Nothing in section 261 conditions the act of rape on the degree of outrage of the 
victim.  Section 263 states that “[t]he essential guilt of rape consists in the outrage 
to the person and feelings of the victim of the rape.  Any sexual penetration, 
however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime.”  But no California case has 
held that the victim’s outrage is an element of the crime of rape.   
In Roundtree, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d 846, the court recognized that, by 
reason of sections 261 and 263, “[t]he crime of rape therefore is necessarily 
committed when a victim withdraws her consent during an act of sexual 
intercourse but is forced to complete the act.  The statutory requirements of the 
offense are met as the act of sexual intercourse is forcibly accomplished against 
the victim’s will.  The outrage to the victim is complete.”  (Roundtree, supra, 77 
Cal.App.3d at p. 851.)  Roundtree cited several cases from other states either 
criticizing Vela or reaching a contrary conclusion.  (See State v. Crims 
(Minn.Ct.App. 1995) 540 N.W.2d 860, 865; State v. Jones (S.D. 1994) 521 
N.W.2d 662, 672; State v. Siering (Conn.Ct.App. 1994) 644 A.2d 958, 963; State 
v. Robinson (Me. 1985) 496 A.2d 1067, 1071; see also McGill v. State (Alaska 
Ct.App. 2001) 18 P.3d 77, 84 [Vela’s view that sexual assault statute is based on 
considerations of “ ‘outrage’ ” to victim’s “ ‘womanhood’ ” represents “archaic 
 7
 
and outmoded social conventions”]; Note, Post-Penetration Rape—Increasing the 
Penalty (1991) 31 Santa Clara L.Rev. 779, 804-808 [criticizing Vela and 
advocating legislation to punish forcible and nonconsensual postpenetration 
intercourse as second degree rape].) 
As the Court of Appeal in this case stated, “while outrage of the victim may 
be the cause for criminalizing and severely punishing forcible rape, outrage by the 
victim is not an element of forcible rape.  Pursuant to section 261, subdivision 
(a)(2) forcible rape occurs when the act of sexual intercourse is accomplished 
against the will of the victim by force or threat of bodily injury and it is immaterial 
at what point the victim withdraws her consent, so long as that withdrawal is 
communicated to the male and he thereafter ignores it.”   
In the present case, assuming arguendo that Laura initially consented to, or 
appeared to consent to, intercourse with defendant, substantial evidence shows that 
she withdrew her consent and, through her actions and words, communicated that 
fact to defendant.  Despite the dissent’s doubt in the matter (dis. opn., post, at pp. 
1-2, 5-6), no reasonable person in defendant’s position would have believed that 
Laura continued to consent to the act.  (See People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 
354, 360-361 [requiring “reasonable and good faith belief,” supported by 
substantial evidence, that the victim voluntarily consented to intercourse]; cf. 
CALJIC No. 10.65 [same].)  As the Court of Appeal below observed, “Given 
[Laura’s testimony], credited by the court, there was nothing equivocal about her 
withdrawal of any initially assumed consent.”   
Vela appears to assume that, to constitute rape, the victim’s objections must 
be raised, or a defendant’s use of force must be applied, before intercourse 
commences, but that argument is clearly flawed.  One can readily imagine 
situations in which the defendant is able to obtain penetration before the victim 
can express an objection or attempt to resist.  Surely, if the defendant thereafter 
 8
 
ignores the victim’s objections and forcibly continues the act, he has committed 
“an act of sexual intercourse accomplished . . . . [¶] . . . against a person’s will by 
means of force . . . .”  (§ 261, subd. (a)(2).)   
Defendant, candidly acknowledging Vela’s flawed reasoning, contends that, 
in cases involving an initial consent to intercourse, the male should be permitted a 
“reasonable amount of time” in which to withdraw, once the female raises an 
objection to further intercourse.  As defendant argues, “By essence of the act of 
sexual intercourse, a male’s primal urge to reproduce is aroused.  It is therefore 
unreasonable for a female and the law to expect a male to cease having sexual 
intercourse immediately upon her withdrawal of consent.  It is only natural, fair 
and just that a male be given a reasonable amount of time in which to quell his 
primal urge . . . .”  
We disagree with defendant’s argument.  Aside from the apparent lack of 
supporting authority for defendant’s “primal urge” theory, the principal problem 
with his argument is that it is contrary to the language of section 261, subdivision 
(a)(2):  Nothing in the language of section 261 or the case law suggests that the 
defendant is entitled to persist in intercourse once his victim withdraws her 
consent.   
In any event, even were we to accept defendant’s “reasonable time” 
argument, in the present case he clearly was given ample time to withdraw but 
refused to do so despite Laura’s resistance and objections.  Although defendant 
testified he withdrew as soon as Laura objected, for purposes of appeal we need 
not accept this testimony as true in light of Laura’s contrary testimony.  (E.g., 
People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)  As noted above, Laura testified 
that she struggled to get away when she was on top of defendant, but that he 
grabbed her waist and pushed her down onto him.  At this point, Laura told 
defendant that if he really cared about her, he would respect her wishes and stop.  
 9
 
Thereafter, she told defendant three times that she needed to go home and that she 
did not accept his protestations he just needed a “minute.”  Defendant continued 
the sex act for at least four or five minutes after Laura first told him she had to go 
home.  According to Laura, after the third time she asked to leave, defendant 
continued to insist that he needed more time and “just stayed inside of me and kept 
like basically forcing it on me,” for about a “minute, minute and [a] half.”  
Contrary to the dissent’s concerns (dis. opn., post, at pp. 6-7), the force defendant 
exerted in resisting Laura’s attempts to stop the act was clearly ample to satisfy 
section 261, subdivision (a)(2).  (See People v. Mom (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1217, 
1224, and cases cited [force “substantially different from or substantially greater 
than that necessary to accomplish the rape itself”].) 
Although the dissent herein would prefer more guidance for future cases, 
this is an appeal from a juvenile court adjudication rather than a jury trial, and the 
briefing does not address what pinpoint instructions, if any, might be appropriate 
in these withdrawn consent cases.  Accordingly, we do not explore or recommend 
instructional language governing such matters as the defendant’s knowledge of the 
victim’s withdrawal of consent, the possibly equivocal nature of that withdrawal, 
or the point in time at which defendant must cease intercourse once consent is 
withdrawn.   
 10
 
We disapprove Vela, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d 237, to the extent that decision 
is inconsistent with our opinion.  The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY BROWN, J. 
 
 
A woman has an absolute right to say “no” to an act of sexual intercourse.  
After intercourse has commenced, she has the absolute right to call a halt and say 
“no more,” and if she is compelled to continue, a forcible rape is committed.  
Although California’s rape statutes are gender neutral, the criminalization of more 
subtle forms of sexual violence reflects a new view of women as “responsible, 
autonomous beings who possess the right to personal, sexual, and bodily  
self-determination.”  (Berger et al., The Dimensions of Rape Reform Legislation, 
22 L. & Soc’y Rev. (1988) 329, 330.)  Thus, both courts and legislatures have 
expanded the concept of rape to include spousal rape, lesser degrees of rape, and 
what has been characterized as postpenetration rape.  (See, e.g., McGill v. State 
(Alaska Ct.App. 2001) 18 P.3d 77, 84; State v. Siering (Conn.App.Ct. 1994) 644 
A.2d 958, 962-963; State v. Robinson (Me. 1985) 496 A.2d 1067, 1070-1071; 
State v. Crims (Minn.Ct.App. 1995) 540 N.W.2d 860, 865.) 
 
To the extent the majority holds the clear withdrawal of consent nullifies 
any earlier consent and forcible persistence in what then becomes nonconsensual 
intercourse is rape, not assault and battery as the Court of Appeal held in People v. 
Vela (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 237, 243 (Vela), I concur in that portion of its 
reasoning.  However, because the majority ignores critical questions about the 
nature and sufficiency of proof in a postpenetration rape case, I cannot concur in 
the rest of the majority opinion.  The majority opinion is deficient in several 
respects.  First, the opinion fails to consider whether the victim’s statements in this 
 2
 
case clearly communicated her withdrawal of consent.  Second, there is no attempt 
to define what constitutes force in this context.  Finally, questions about wrongful 
intent are given short shrift. 
 
The People must prove the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt 
(Pen. Code, § 1096; U. S. Const., 14th Amend.).  As relevant to this case, “Rape is 
an act of sexual intercourse . . . with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator” 
“accomplished against a person’s will by means of force, violence, duress, 
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or 
another.”  (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2).)  Presumably, in a postpenetration rape 
case, the prosecution still has the burden of showing, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the victim clearly communicated withdrawal of consent and the defendant 
exercised some degree of force to continue.1  Moreover, a defendant’s reasonable 
and good faith mistake of fact regarding a person’s consent to sexual intercourse is 
a defense to rape.  (People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 360; People v. 
Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 154-155.)  To be acquitted, a defendant need only 
raise a reasonable doubt as to his reasonable and honest belief in consent.  Thus, to 
convict in such a case, the People must prove the absence of such a belief beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
 
Ordinarily, these cases involve a credibility contest in which the victim tells 
one story, the defendant another.  The trial judge in this juvenile matter relied 
primarily on Laura’s testimony and rejected John Z.’s testimony in its entirety.  
Even so, “assuming arguendo that Laura initially consented to, or appeared to 
consent to, intercourse with defendant” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 7), the facts in this 
                                             
 
1  
The People did not use the term “postpenetration rape” during the juvenile 
adjudication.  The theory is first articulated by the Court of Appeal. 
 3
 
case, as described solely by the prosecution witness, create doubt both about the 
withdrawal of consent and the use of force. 
 
This is a sordid, distressing, sad little case.  From any perspective, its facts 
are appalling.  Laura T., a 17-year-old girl, finds herself alone in a house with four 
young men, ranging in age from 16 to 21.  One of them, Juan, is “sort of” her 
boyfriend.  Laura and Juan met at a bus stop near her workplace and had known 
each other for about two weeks when they arrived at the “party” at John Z.’s house 
on March 23, 2000.  Laura drove to the party in her own vehicle.  She planned to 
drop Juan off and leave.  The other partygoers were unknown to Laura.  John Z. 
was introduced to her after they arrived.  Instead of leaving, Laura remained at 
John Z.’s house for several hours.  During the evening she was openly affectionate 
with Juan, and sporadically engaged in some mutual kissing with John Z.—in the 
kitchen and later in the master bedroom when Juan was sulking in the bathroom. 
 
This is how she described subsequent events: 
 
Around 8:00 p.m., Laura decided she was ready to leave.  Before she 
walked out the door, John asked if he could talk to her.  She walked back into the 
house and went into his bedroom, which was completely dark.  She did not ask to 
turn on the light.  She entered the room willingly and was not restrained from 
leaving.  They sat in the dark, talking.  John told her Juan never cared about her, 
was only “using [her] and anyone else could use [her] too.”  John said he really 
liked her; she should dump Juan and become John’s girlfriend.  When Juan came 
into the bedroom, Laura confronted him with what John had said.  He denied it.  
The boys asked if she had ever fantasized about having “two guys.”  Laura said 
she had not, but she continued to sit on the bed in John’s darkened bedroom with 
both Juan and John while one or both of them removed various items of her 
clothing.  At first, she tried to replace her clothing, but after pulling her bra back 
into place a couple of times, she made no further efforts to retrieve her clothes.  
 4
 
Asked why she did not leave, she responded:  “There is no reason.  I just didn’t.  I 
didn’t think about it.  I had already tried to leave once, and they asked me to go in 
the bedroom and talk.” 
 
Feeling there was “no point in fighting” because there was nothing she 
could do about it anyway, she laid back on the bed, with Juan on one side of her 
and John on the other.  She did not say anything and she was not fighting or 
resisting while the rest of her clothing was removed.  The boys were “fingering” 
her and playing with her “boobs” and kissing her and “like just trying to like keep 
me satisfied type of thing.”  She acknowledged that she enjoyed these activities, 
enjoyed it “because it was like a threesome”; she was laughing and liked being the 
center of attention. 
 
After that prelude and after she had intercourse with Juan, which ended 
when the condom kept falling off and she told him perhaps that was a sign they 
“shouldn’t be doing this,” we come to the facts which form the basis of John Z.’s 
adjudication.  According to Laura, she was sitting on the bed naked when John Z. 
came into the room, naked or partially unclothed.  She had been unable to find her 
clothes in the dark.  John sat on the bed behind her and touched her with one hand 
on her shoulder.  He did not pull or push her backward.  He nudged her with one 
hand.  His left hand was in a cast.  She laid back down on the bed.  John began 
kissing her.  She kissed him back.  He climbed on top of her and achieved 
penetration.  She did not say anything.  She did not push him away, slap him or 
strike him.  He made no threats and he did not hurt her.  John asked her repeatedly 
“will you be my girlfriend?” 
 
He rolled over so she was on top.  She remained in that position for four to 
five minutes.  Although he held her only with one hand on her waist—not hard 
enough for her to feel the pressure or to create a bruise—she was unable to 
extricate herself or break the connection.  There was no conversation when 
 5
 
intercourse began and she said nothing while she was on top of him.  When she 
found herself on the bottom again, she said:  “If he really did care about me, he 
wouldn’t be doing this to me and if he really did want a relationship, he should 
wait and respect that I don’t want to do this.”  John responded:  “I really do care 
about you.”  She never “officially” told him she did not want to have sexual 
intercourse. 
 
Sometime later she said:  “I should be going now.”  “I need to go home.”  
John said:  “Just give me a minute.”  Several minutes later, she said again:  “I need 
to get home.”  He said:  “[G]ive me some time.”  She said:  “No.  I have to go 
home.”  The third time she told him she had to go home she was a little more 
urgent.  She never “officially” cried, but she was starting to.  When asked if at 
anytime while having intercourse with John Z., she had told him “no,” Laura 
answers:  “No,” and repeats her contingent statement.  Calling a halt, her answers 
suggest, was entirely John Z.’s responsibility.  He said he cared about her, “but he 
still just let it happen.” 
 
The majority finds Laura’s “actions and words” clearly communicated 
withdrawal of consent in a fashion “no reasonable person in defendant’s position” 
could have mistaken.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.)  But, Laura’s silent and ineffectual 
movements could easily be misinterpreted.  And, none of her statements are 
unequivocal.  While Laura may have felt these words clearly conveyed her 
unwillingness, they could reasonably be understood as requests for reassurance or 
demands for speed.  And, Laura’s own testimony demonstrates that is precisely 
how John Z. interpreted what she said.  Indeed, Laura demonstrates a similar 
ambivalence.  When asked if she had made it clear to John that she didn’t want to 
have sex, Laura says “I thought I had,” but she acknowledges she “never officially 
told him” she did not want to have sexual intercourse.  When asked by the 
 6
 
prosecutor on redirect why she told John “I got to go home,” Laura answers:  
“Because I had to get home so my mom wouldn’t suspect anything.” 
 
Furthermore, even if we assume that Laura’s statements evidenced a clear 
intent to withdraw consent, sexual intercourse is not transformed into rape merely 
because a woman changes her mind.  (State v. Robinson, supra, 496 A.2d at p. 
1070; People v. Roundtree (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 846, 851).  As the majority 
acknowledges, by reason of Penal Code sections 261 and 263, “ ‘[t]he crime of 
rape therefore is necessarily committed when a victim withdraws her consent 
during an act of sexual intercourse but is forced to complete the act.  The statutory 
requirements of the offense are met as the act of sexual intercourse is forcibly 
accomplished against the victim’s will.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6, quoting 
Roundtree, at p. 851, italics added.)  In other words, an act of sexual intercourse 
becomes rape under these circumstances if all the elements of rape are present.  
Under the facts of this case, however, it is not clear that Laura was forcibly 
compelled to continue.  All we know is that John Z. did not instantly respond to 
her statement that she needed to go home.  He requested additional time.  He did 
not demand it.  Nor did he threaten any consequences if Laura did not comply. 
 
The majority relies heavily on John Z.’s failure to desist immediately.  But, 
it does not tell us how soon would have been soon enough.  Ten seconds?  Thirty?  
A minute?  Is persistence the same thing as force?  (See People v. Mom (2000) 80 
Cal.App.4th 1217, 1224 [suggesting force must be “substantially different from or 
substantially greater” than that necessary to accomplish the act itself].)  And even 
if we conclude persistence should be criminalized in this situation, should the 
penalty be the same as for forcible rape?  Such questions seem inextricably tied to 
the question of whether a reasonable person would know that the statement “I 
need to go home” should be interpreted as a demand to stop.  Under these 
 7
 
circumstances, can the withdrawal of consent serve as a proxy for both 
compulsion and wrongful intent? 
 
The majority finds these deficiencies insignificant because this is a juvenile 
adjudication.  But, if John Z. is convicted of a felony as an adult, the same juvenile 
adjudication will qualify as a strike.  Thus, the absence of a jury or jury 
instructions cannot justify a lesser standard of proof.   
 
In reviewing a criminal conviction challenged as lacking evidentiary 
support we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to 
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence such that a reasonable trier of 
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. 
Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496.)  Presumably, in determining guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the juvenile court would have to consider and resolve the same 
questions the majority declines to address.  Because the record contains no 
indication the juvenile court did so, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
 
 
 1
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re John Z. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 94 Cal.App.4th 33 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S103427 
Date Filed: January 6, 2003 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: El Dorado 
Judge: Thomas A. Smith 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Carol L. Foster, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Michael J. Weinberg, Stan Cross and John G. McLean, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Wendy J. Murphy, Barbara F. Berenson; Gina S. McClard, Douglas E. Beloof; Bingham McCutchen, 
Leslie G. Landau and Alison Beck for the Victim Advocacy and Research Group, the National Crime 
Victim Law Institute, the California Coalition Against Sexual Assault and the National Sexual Violence 
Resource Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 2
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Carol L. Foster 
372 Florin Road, Suite 311 
Sacramento, CA  95831 
(916) 393-5206 
 
John G. McLean 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5184 
 
Doulgas E. Beloof 
National Crime Victim Law Institute 
10015 SW Terwilliger Boulevard 
Portland, OR  97219 
(503) 768-6855