Case Title: Commonwealth v. Gosselin

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11598

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11598 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RENE GOSSELIN. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     April 10, 2020. - November 19, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Cellular Telephone.  Constitutional Law, Assistance 
of counsel, Subpoena, Grand jury, Privacy.  Grand Jury.  
Subpoena.  Privacy.  Search and Seizure, Expectation of 
privacy, Warrant.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, 
Assistance of counsel, Motion to suppress, Grand jury 
proceedings, Subpoena. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 25, 2008. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Robert 
C. Cosgrove, J.; the case was tried before Thomas F. McGuire, 
Jr., J., and a motion for a new trial, filed on September 27, 
2016, was heard by him. 
 
 
Theodore F. Riordan for the defendant. 
Mary E. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
                     
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In 2012, a jury convicted the defendant, Rene 
Gosselin, of murder in the first degree in connection with the 
death of Frederick Thompkins.  In this direct appeal from the 
conviction, with which we have consolidated his appeal from the 
2019 denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant claims 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to 
suppress (1) the defendant's optical records, which he alleges 
the police obtained unconstitutionally after the prosecutor 
misused the grand jury subpoena power; and (2) the defendant's 
cell site location information (CSLI), which the police included 
in its warrant application to search the defendant's home, where 
they located evidence critical to the jury's verdict.  The 
defendant finally asks us to vacate his conviction or to order a 
new trial pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We affirm the trial 
judge's denial of the motion for a new trial and decline to 
exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  On February 15, 2008, the 
police found the victim's decomposing body on the floor of his 
apartment, surrounded by a pool of blood.  Experts estimated 
that the victim had been dead for about a week.  At the crime 
scene, the police found a pair of eyeglasses with the right lens 
popped out and with the victim's bloody fingerprint on the left 
lens.  The police also found a bloody footprint with the word 
"Vans" clearly visible; the footprint matched a size thirteen 
3 
 
Vans MacGyver shoe.  The police never recovered the victim's 
primary cell phone. 
 
The victim sold cocaine and marijuana discerningly by 
limiting his customer base and by only admitting into his 
apartment customers whom he knew.  The defendant was a customer 
and someone who visited with the victim at his apartment from 
time to time.  The defendant was also the only person who wore 
size thirteen shoes out of the approximately twenty people whom 
the police interviewed shortly after discovering the victim's 
body.  According to the victim's cell phone records, the 
defendant and the victim called each other repeatedly in the 
week leading up to the victim's death, and the defendant was the 
last person the victim called on February 8, 2008, before he 
died. 
 
The victim's cell phone records indicated that following 
the victim's final outbound call at 4:56 P.M. on February 8 to 
the defendant, the victim received four subsequent calls, some 
of which came from the defendant, and all of which went to 
voicemail.  The records further indicated that the victim's cell 
phone connected to only one tower near the victim's apartment 
for all 210 calls made between February 1, 2008, and 5:46 P.M. 
on February 8, 2008.  Starting with a 5:46 P.M. call, which came 
from the defendant, the victim's cell phone pinged off different 
towers from the 210 earlier calls.  In fact, during the 5:46 
4 
 
P.M. call, the victim's cell phone pinged off two different 
towers, which indicated that the cell phone was moving. 
 
Given that the defendant was the only person the police 
interviewed who wore size thirteen shoes, and considering the 
pattern of the victim's final calls, the defendant became a 
suspect following his first interview with the police.  In 
furtherance of their investigation into the defendant, the 
Commonwealth submitted a motion to obtain the defendant's CSLI 
pursuant to the Federal Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(d), which a Superior Court judge granted on March 3, 
2008.  The CSLI indicated that the defendant's cell phone 
connected to a tower located just blocks away from the victim's 
apartment during the 4:56 P.M. call, and that the defendant's 
cell phone connected to the same towers as the victim's cell 
phone during the 5:46 P.M. call. 
 
Using the CSLI to bolster other evidence that the police 
had already gathered, the Commonwealth obtained a warrant to 
search the defendant's apartment for evidence, specifically 
including the victim's primary cell phone and anything related 
to size thirteen Vans MacGyver shoes.  On March 5, 2008, while 
officers were interrogating the defendant for a second time at 
the police station, other officers executed the search warrant 
at his apartment.  Inside the apartment, the police found a 
shoebox for size thirteen Vans MacGyver shoes filled with the 
5 
 
defendant's paperwork and an empty eyeglasses case from Walmart 
Vision Center.2  They did not recover any Vans MacGyver sneakers 
or the victim's cell phone.3 
 
Near the beginning of the March 5 interrogation, the 
defendant admitted that he repeatedly called the victim in the 
days before February 8 because he owned a pair of eyeglasses 
with a lens that always popped out and had left them at the 
victim's apartment.  Immediately thereafter, an assistant 
district attorney issued a grand jury subpoena to the 
defendant's optometrist at the Walmart Vision Center in North 
Dartmouth (Walmart), requesting call records4 and any other 
information related to the defendant's eyeglasses, even though a 
grand jury had not yet convened to consider the defendant's 
case.  That afternoon, State police troopers consulted an 
                     
 
2 Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress 
the shoebox, contending that the apartment building's shared 
basement, where the police found the shoebox, was outside the 
scope of the warrant.  The motion judge denied the motion to 
suppress, and we see no reason to differ based on our review 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
3 The officers interviewing the defendant confronted him 
with the empty shoe box, asking him if he knew what the box was.  
The defendant responded, "Obviously it was Vans, right?  You got 
Vans footprints somewhere?"  He further exclaimed, "You're 
bringing my shoes in here," and admitted that he at one point 
owned size thirteen Vans MacGyvers even if he did not know when 
he purchased them or where the actual shoes were. 
 
 
4 The defendant had called Walmart on February 8 at 5:37 
P.M. 
6 
 
optician, who confirmed that the eyeglasses recovered from the 
crime scene matched the defendant's prescription and frame style 
received from Walmart pursuant to the grand jury subpoena. 
 
The grand jury indicted the defendant on June 25, 2008, and 
the jury convicted the defendant on May 4, 2012. 
 
b.  Procedural history.  More than two years before trial, 
defense counsel filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the 
search warrant affidavit did not provide enough information for 
the issuing magistrate to find probable cause that the defendant 
was responsible for the victim's murder or that evidence of the 
crime would be found in the defendant's apartment.  The motion 
judge denied this motion on March 17, 2010.5  More than four 
years after his conviction, the defendant filed a motion for a 
new trial, arguing that he had received ineffective assistance 
of counsel because his trial attorney had not additionally 
sought to suppress the optical records or the defendant's CSLI.  
The trial judge denied the new trial motion on January 9, 2019, 
because he concluded that any motions to suppress the optical 
records or the CSLI would have failed, such that any error was 
nonprejudicial and trial counsel was therefore not ineffective.  
                     
 
5 Although defense counsel did not move to suppress the 
CSLI, at trial he successfully moved to limit how the 
Commonwealth could use the CSLI.  The trial judge prohibited the 
Commonwealth from introducing evidence that would have estimated 
the locations of the defendant's and the victim's respective 
cell phones relative to the cell towers. 
7 
 
The judge nonetheless agreed with the defendant's argument that 
the Commonwealth had issued the grand jury subpoena for the 
improper purpose of furthering a police investigation and that 
the Commonwealth had followed an improper procedure by allowing 
Walmart to produce the records to the State police troopers who 
presented the subpoena, rather than to a court. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  When we analyze 
an appeal from the denial of a motion for a new trial 
consolidated with a direct appeal from a conviction of murder in 
the first degree pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we do not ask 
whether counsel's behavior fell below that of an "ordinary, 
fallible lawyer," because that standard is less favorable to the 
defendant than the review we deploy pursuant to § 33E.  
Commonwealth v. Morales, 453 Mass. 40, 43-44 (2009), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 109, 115 n.10 (1977).  
Rather, we assess whether any error occurred, based on the 
defendant's substantive claims, and if so, whether that error 
likely influenced the jury's conclusion so as to create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Morales, supra at 44, citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 
678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).  One such error 
would be if defense counsel failed "to litigate a viable claim 
of an illegal search and seizure."  Commonwealth v. Comita, 441 
Mass. 86, 90 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Pena, 31 Mass. App. 
8 
 
Ct. 201, 204 (1991).  Whether trial counsel so failed depends on 
whether the defendant can "demonstrate a likelihood that the 
motion to suppress would have been successful" when filed.  
Comita, supra at 91.  We analyze that likelihood objectively, 
"given what [the attorney] knew or should have known at each 
relevant moment in time," Commonwealth v. Hardy, 464 Mass. 660, 
665 (2013), quoting Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 27-28 (1st 
Cir. 2002), and without "the advantage of hindsight," 
Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 729 (1978).  There was no 
error. 
 
b.  Propriety of the grand jury subpoena.  The defendant 
contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 
because he did not move to suppress the optical records that the 
Commonwealth received from Walmart in compliance with the grand 
jury subpoena for two reasons:  (1) the Commonwealth issued the 
subpoena following improper procedure and for an improper 
purpose; and (2) the defendant had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his optical records, such that the subpoena violated 
his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.6 
                     
 
6 Even if the defendant's allegations concerning the 
propriety of the grand jury subpoena had merit, suppression 
would be an improper remedy because the errors did not prejudice 
his defense, given that he had sufficient notice of the contents 
of the optical records prior to trial.  See Commonwealth v. 
9 
 
 
i.  Proper procedure for and purpose of a grand jury 
subpoena.  The defendant argues that the Commonwealth followed 
improper procedure and issued a subpoena for an improper 
purpose, because the subpoena sought third-party records without 
judicial authorization, because the subpoena authorized the 
third party to produce the records to the issuing officer in 
lieu of bringing the records to the court, because the 
Commonwealth issued the subpoena the day before the grand jury 
first heard evidence on the defendant's case and weeks prior to 
the Commonwealth introducing the evidence to the grand jury, and 
because the prosecutor intended the subpoena to further a police 
investigation.  No contention has merit. 
 
In the context of a grand jury investigation, the 
Commonwealth may subpoena certain documents in the possession of 
third parties pursuant to G. L. c. 277, § 68, for the purpose of 
presenting evidence to the grand jury prior to the defendant's 
indictment without prior judicial approval and without producing 
them directly to the court.  See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 444 
Mass. 786, 798 n.17 (2005); Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 
265, 270-271 (2004) ("a subpoena for documents in the possession 
of a nonparty may be issued by a prosecutor over his or her own 
signature" pursuant to G. L. c. 277, § 68).  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
                     
Burgos, 470 Mass. 133, 148 (2014); Commonwealth v. Smallwood, 
379 Mass. 878, 888 (1980). 
10 
 
Odgren, 455 Mass. 171, 178-179 (2009) (discussing historical 
development of G. L. c. 277, § 68).7  The procedure was proper. 
 
The Commonwealth must issue the subpoena under G. L. 
c. 277, § 68, for a proper purpose, namely, "to present a 
witness or evidence to a court or grand jury," Mitchell, 444 
Mass. at 798 n.17, so as to further the grand jury's function, 
which is to determine whether there was sufficient probable 
cause to issue an indictment, Commonwealth v. Cote, 407 Mass. 
827, 832 (1990).  See Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 427 
                     
 
7 The defendant mistakenly contends that the Commonwealth 
must comply with the requirements of Mass. R. Crim. P. 17 (a), 
378 Mass. 885 (1979), which requires seeking prior judicial 
approval and producing the records to the court, when 
subpoenaing third-party records for a grand jury.  The 
Commonwealth only must do so postindictment, even though a 
defendant must comply with the rule when subpoenaing third-party 
records prior to trial at all stages of the criminal case.  See 
Commonwealth v. Odgren, 455 Mass. 171, 179, 187 n.28 (2009) 
("The result we reach in this case -- that, apart from grand 
jury proceedings, the Commonwealth must obtain judicial approval 
before seeking the production of records from a third party in 
advance of an evidentiary hearing or trial -- is compelled by 
the authorities . . . , including Mass. R. Crim. P. 17 [a].  
Under our current law, the only way for a prosecutor, 
postindictment, or a defendant to subpoena third-party records 
without first obtaining judicial approval is to subpoena the 
records for production on the first day of trial, on the theory 
that the party subpoenaing the records wishes to use them at 
trial").  See also Preventive Med. Assocs., Inc. v. 
Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 810, 820 (2013) ("a party to a pending 
criminal case seeking pretrial production of third-party records 
under rule 17 [a] [2] -- whether the party be the Commonwealth 
or the defendant -- must file a motion seeking prior judicial 
approval").  A prosecutor may also issue a grand jury subpoena 
postindictment if the grand jury investigation is continuing and 
if the purpose of that subpoena is to aid that investigation in 
determining whether to indict the defendant further. 
11 
 
Mass. 221, 226 (1998).  Prosecutors abuse their subpoena 
authority when they seek third-party records under G. L. c. 277, 
§ 68, for matters that are not or will not come before a grand 
jury by "us[ing] an evidentiary hearing intended for one purpose 
to subpoena records for another, unrelated purpose" or to obtain 
evidence from third parties in preparation for trial.  Odgren, 
455 Mass. at 184.  See Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 86 Mass. 
App. Ct. 705, 709 (2014) (ethical or statutory violation when 
"the records could not have been intended to be produced at a 
grand jury, as none had been convened at the time"). 
 
The prosecutor issued the grand jury subpoena for the 
defendant's optical records on a day the grand jury were sitting 
and one day before the grand jury convened to consider the 
defendant's case.  To the extent that the prosecutor also hoped 
to obtain evidence tying the defendant to the crime scene while 
the police interrogated the defendant, that does not mean that 
the Commonwealth issued the subpoena for an improper purpose, if 
it, in good faith, intended to present evidence to a sitting 
grand jury.  Even though the subpoenaed documents were not 
immediately presented to the grand jury, the Commonwealth soon 
thereafter informed the grand jury about the evidence and 
formally introduced the documents to the grand jury thereafter.  
Prosecutors collect and analyze evidence in advance of 
presenting it to the grand jury, and there is nothing improper 
12 
 
about presenting that evidence in context.  See Supreme Judicial 
Court Committee on Grand Jury Proceedings:  Final Report to the 
Justices, at 29 (June 2018) (prosecutors may review grand jury 
materials prior to presentation, to prevent nonresponsive or 
inappropriate information from reaching grand jury). 
 
ii.  Suppression.  Whether the Commonwealth issued the 
subpoena with improper procedure or for an improper purpose is a 
"statutory or ethical violation, not a constitutional one," 
Chamberlain, 86 Mass. App. Ct. at 709, for which suppression is 
not ordinarily the proper remedy, see Commonwealth v. Smallwood, 
379 Mass. 878, 888 (1980).  See also Odgren, 455 Mass. at 188.  
Moreover, the optical records are not privileged. 
 
Nonetheless, the defendant contends that the subpoena, 
which neither is a search warrant nor demonstrates probable 
cause, violated his constitutional rights because it constituted 
a search of his optical records for which he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  See Commonwealth v. Doe, 408 Mass. 764, 
768 (1990) ("Although grand juries have broad authority to 
conduct inquiries, they may not override constitutional rights 
. . ." [citations omitted]).  See also Odgren, 455 Mass. at 188 
(for subpoena that violated defendant's constitutional right, 
"evidentiary exclusion . . . might be appropriate").  Medical 
records and hospital records are summonsed into court by 
statute, without application of the protocol for privileged 
13 
 
records.  See Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 136 (2006); 
G. L. c. 233, §§ 79, 79G.  Pursuant to the third-party doctrine, 
the Commonwealth did not search, in the constitutional sense, 
the defendant's ophthalmological records when subpoenaing them 
from Walmart because he has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his optical prescription retained by Walmart in order to 
complete his purchase of eyewear.  See Carpenter v. United 
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (discussing third-party 
doctrine); Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 244 (2014), 
S.C., 472 Mass. 448 (2015) (same). 
 
The defendant nevertheless compares his ophthalmological 
records to CSLI, for which we have determined that people have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy under art. 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, see Augustine, 467 Mass. at 
232, and for which the United States Supreme Court found the 
same under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, see Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220-2221.  Neither 
Augustine nor Carpenter formally abrogated the third-party 
doctrine; they merely declined to extend it to CSLI because its 
"unique nature" creates "an all-encompassing record of the 
holder's whereabouts."  Carpenter, supra at 2217.  See 
Augustine, supra at 251 ("we do not reject categorically the 
third-party doctrine and its principle that disclosure to a 
third party defeats an expectation of privacy").  Unlike CSLI 
14 
 
and other modern technological information, the government 
cannot use optical records to go "rummaging through the complex 
digital trails and location records created merely by 
participating in modern society."  Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 484 
Mass. 493, 499 (2020), citing Commonwealth v. Almonor, 482 Mass. 
35, 46 (2019) (police using cell phone to reveal real-time 
location violates art. 14).  Because the government can 
aggregate long periods of CSLI to create a "complete mosaic" of 
a person's life, people must have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in that mosaic even if they do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in each individual movement collected by 
the CSLI.  McCarthy, supra at 503-504.  Optical records, on the 
other hand, cannot provide a similar mosaic.  We decline to 
abrogate the third-party doctrine for optical records, and 
therefore, the grand jury subpoena did not violate the 
defendant's constitutional rights and suppression is not 
warranted.8 
 
For the reasons stated supra, trial counsel accordingly did 
not provide ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion 
                     
 
8 The defendant also attempts to analogize to a situation in 
which a defendant unwillingly provided information to a medical 
provider, who then, without the defendant's knowledge or 
consent, turned the records over to the police for a criminal 
investigation.  See Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70-71, 
78 (2001) (joint program created by police and hospital for 
purpose of collecting information from expectant mothers for law 
enforcement investigation).  The analogy is inapposite. 
15 
 
to suppress the optical records based on the grand jury subpoena 
because such a motion would have been futile at the time of 
trial.  See Comita, 441 Mass. at 90. 
 
c.  Suppression of the CSLI.  The defendant asserts that 
his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did 
not move to suppress the CSLI evidence, an error that caused a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice because the 
search warrant for the defendant's home, which produced critical 
inculpatory evidence, would have lacked probable cause absent 
the CSLI.  We disagree, because the search warrant affidavit 
demonstrated probable cause even with the CSLI evidence excised, 
and therefore the failure of trial counsel to file a motion to 
suppress did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
We assess whether the search warrant affidavit would have 
satisfied probable cause absent the unconstitutionally obtained 
CSLI.9  See Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852, 865 (2015).  
We must therefore determine "whether there are enough facts in 
the affidavit traceable to sources independent of the illegally 
                     
 
9 While the issue is a close one, we need not resolve 
whether there was probable cause within the four corners of the 
§ 2703 warrant, because probable cause was satisfied in the 
search warrant with the CSLI excised from the affidavit in 
support of the search warrant.  For the same reason, we need not 
reach whether Augustine applies retroactively to the defendant's 
case. 
16 
 
obtained CSLI to establish probable cause for the search 
warrant."  Id. at 866.10  "An affidavit in support of a search 
warrant . . . must demonstrate 'probable cause to believe 
[1] "that a particularly described offense has been, is being, 
or is about to be committed, and [2] that [search] will produce 
evidence of such offense or will aid in the apprehension of a 
person who the applicant has probable cause to believe has 
committed, is committing, or is about to commit such offense."'"  
Id. at 870, quoting Augustine, 467 Mass. at 256.  We review the 
affidavit de novo, evaluating its four corners "in a commonsense 
and realistic fashion," making reasonable inferences where 
                     
 
10 A case currently pending before this court on further 
appellate review raises the issue whether, in cases such as 
Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852, 865-870 (2015), we 
have inappropriately omitted an additional, subjective prong of 
the independent source analysis discussed in Murray v. United 
States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988), namely, whether the officers 
would have sought the warrant absent information obtained in the 
initial illegal search.  See Commonwealth vs. Pearson, No. SJC-
12930.  The defendant has not raised such an argument here.  
Nonetheless, having considered the issue as part of our plenary 
review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we conclude that this case 
does not require us to resolve the open questions regarding the 
applicability and contours of such a subjective prong.  Even 
examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
defendant, the officers would have sought the warrant for the 
defendant's apartment in the absence of the CSLI data.  The 
defendant was the only suspect investigated with size thirteen 
shoes, the police knew from the victim's cell phone records that 
the last outbound call made by the victim was to the defendant, 
and, among other evidence, the defendant admitted that he had 
left a pair of eyeglasses at the victim's apartment, which the 
police found with a bloody fingerprint on the lens.  There was 
no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
17 
 
appropriate to ensure that there is a sufficient nexus between 
the items sought and the criminal activity, and to ensure that 
the items would reasonably be expected to be in the place to be 
searched (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 482 Mass. 
538, 544 (2019). 
 
The search warrant affidavit met these requirements without 
the CSLI.  In ruling on the defendant's pretrial motion to 
suppress, the motion judge found sufficient evidence to 
establish probable cause and noted that any inference about the 
defendant's location drawn from the CSLI was "not essential to 
the magistrate's finding probable cause."  The warrant affidavit 
recounted evidence that the victim limited whom he admitted into 
his apartment and how he did so, that there was no sign of 
forced entry, and that the defendant had no apparent defensive 
wounds, which constituted reasonable grounds to infer that the 
victim knew his assailant.  The affidavit also described the 
distinctive Vans shoe sole impression, which the police believed 
with a reasonable degree of certainty came from a size thirteen 
Vans MacGyver shoe.  The police had interviewed at least twenty 
people in connection with the murder, and the defendant was the 
only person known to them who had size thirteen shoes, and he 
was a customer and at least an acquaintance of the victim.  
Given that the victim maintained a tight circle of clientele and 
friends whom he allowed into his apartment, and that size 
18 
 
thirteen shoes are relatively uncommon, it was reasonable for 
the issuing magistrate to infer that the defendant may have made 
the footprint, indicating that he stepped through the crime 
scene at or about the time of the murder.  The affidavit also 
included information that the defendant and the victim had 
recently argued about a drug sale, that the victim had likely 
died sometime around February 8, 2008, and that the last 
outgoing call from the victim's cell phone was made to the 
defendant at 4:56 P.M.  Moreover, the warrant affidavit 
indicated that the defendant may have lied when he told the 
police that he called the victim numerous times around the time 
of the murder to plan a snowmobiling trip, a plan that the 
victim's best friend disputed. 
 
The warrant affidavit sought authority to search the 
defendant's apartment for, among other things, (1) the victim's 
cell phone, which was missing and could have critical evidence 
about who saw the victim near the time of his death; and 
(2) evidence related to the size thirteen Vans MacGyver 
shoeprint.  Taken together, the information in the warrant 
affidavit, after excising the CSLI, demonstrated probable cause 
to believe that the defendant might have committed the crime and 
that a search of his apartment would produce evidence related to 
the crime.  See Estabrook, 472 Mass. at 870.  Moreover, the 
affidavit alleged a sufficient nexus between the items sought, 
19 
 
such as the Vans MacGyver shoes and the victim's cell phone, and 
the victim's murder.  See Hobbs, 482 Mass. at 544.  Finally, the 
affidavit provided sufficient information for a magistrate to 
have reasonably inferred that the evidence sought would be at 
the defendant's apartment, because the victim's CSLI indicated 
that his cell phone moved following the murder and because 
people ordinarily keep shoes at their apartment.  See id. 
 
Because the search warrant affidavit satisfied probable 
cause when excising the unconstitutionally obtained CSLI, the 
defendant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice.11  See 
Estabrook, 472 Mass. at 865.  The defendant's trial counsel was 
thus not ineffective for failing to move to suppress the CSLI 
because the court would have denied that motion, such that any 
error did not result in prejudice to the defendant, let alone 
cause a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Morales, 453 Mass. at 44; Comita, 441 Mass. at 90. 
 
d.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
reviewed the entire record comprehensively and find no basis to 
set aside the verdict of murder in the first degree or to order 
a new trial. 
                     
 
11 For the same reason, the search did not violate the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.  See Murray, 487 U.S. at 
537 (explaining independent source doctrine). 
20 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons stated supra, the 
defendant has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel was 
ineffective.  We affirm his conviction and the order denying his 
motion for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered