Case Title: Martini v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 643, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
DALE A. MARTINI, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 643, 2006 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
 
)  Cr. No. VN0302062005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  December 5, 2007 
Decided:  December 21, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 21st day of December 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
 
 
(1) 
Dale Martini, defendant-appellant, appeals a Superior Court judge’s 
order finding him in violation of probation, revoking his Level III probation 
sentence, and sentencing him to six years at Level V supervision.  Martini argues 
that the judge improperly ordered Martini removed from his violation of probation 
hearing and limited his right to be heard, to present evidence, and to question 
witnesses at his the hearing.  Martini also contends that the judge’s sentence of six 
years at Level V supervision deviated from the sentencing guidelines without 
articulating with particularity the reasons for deviating from the guidelines.  
Because the judge failed to warn Martini adequately before removing him from the 
 
2
VOP hearing and because the judge deviated from the sentencing guidelines 
without any explanation, we REVERSE and REMAND. 
 
(2) 
In November 2006, the State charged Martini with violating three of 
the terms of his Level III probation imposed after a fourth degree rape conviction.  
At his December 2006 VOP hearing, the probation officer explained that Martini 
had been arrested on new charges, failed to attend three scheduled office visits 
with his probation officer and three sex offender group meetings, and was not 
home for one telephone curfew check.  The new charges against Martini, i.e. 
criminal impersonation and second-degree forgery, rested on the fact that Martini 
used the name Kedar Anshari Ptah-El on a defendant history form and identified 
himself by that name to a police officer. 
 
(3) 
At the VOP hearing, a public defender came to represent Martini, but 
he refused representation.  Martini asked to address the judge himself and said “I 
do not accept any representation from the Public Defender’s Office and no one 
claims power of attorney over the living soul.”  The judge attempted to determine 
Martini’s position on the VOP charges.  Rather than stating his position, a stirred 
Martini objected to being identified as Dale A. Martini and to his name being 
spelled in all capital letters.  When the judge asked Martini to clarify his position, 
Martini declared that he was “not the person you’re referring to.”  The judge 
informed Martini that his identity had already been established and that the 
 
3
purpose of the hearing was to “sentence [Martini] on violating [his] probation.”  
Martini then began arguing with the judge and proclaimed that his name was 
“Kedar Anshari Ptah-El” and “I can’t answer anything under Mr. Martini.  I need 
from you a delegation of authority order, your license to practice law, and I need 
you to establish status in this case before you.”  The judge informed Martini if he 
did not stop arguing “right now” that she would find him in contempt.  Martini 
continued arguing and responded that, among other things, “[f]or the record, I’m 
not Mr. Martini.”  The judge ordered Martini removed from the courtroom, found 
him in contempt, and stated that: 
I think I can go forward with the sentencing because I’m going to find 
him in violation irrespective [sic] because I can’t expect him to act or 
behave any differently next time.  
 
The probation officer told the judge that Martini had not submitted any documents 
indicating that he legally changed his name.  The judge concluded: 
As far as this Court is concerned, he is Dale Martini, Jr.  That’s the 
way he was named at birth . . . we can put [Kedar Anshari Ptah-El] as 
an a/k/a, but he still gets sentenced as the person that was standing 
before me.  So I’m just going to revoke his probation . . . . 
 
The probation officer recommended that, if the judge found Martini in violation of 
his Level III probation, Martini should be sentenced to six years at Level V 
supervision, suspended after three years of imprisonment, followed by decreasing 
levels of supervision.  The judge ultimately sentenced Martini to six years Level V 
incarceration. This appeal followed. 
 
4
 
(4) 
Martini argues that the judge violated his due process rights by 
denying his opportunity to be heard, to present evidence, and to question witnesses 
after the judge excluded him from the VOP hearing.  We review an alleged 
violation of constitutional rights de novo.1   
 
(5) 
Revocation of probation results in a loss of liberty and entitles the 
probationer to a hearing and certain “minimum requirements of due process.”2  
Superior Court Criminal Rule 32.1(a) provides: 
Revocation of partial confinement or probation.  Whenever a person is 
taken into or held in custody on grounds that the person has violated a 
condition of partial confinement or probation, the person . . . shall be 
afforded a prompt hearing before a judge of Superior Court on the 
charge of violation.  The person shall be given: 
 
(A) Written notice of the alleged violation; 
(B) Disclosure of the evidence against the person; 
(C) An opportunity to appear and present evidence in the 
person’s own behalf 
(D) The opportunity to question adverse witnesses; and 
(E) Notice of the person’s right to retain counsel and, in 
cases in which fundamental fairness requires, to the 
assignment of counsel if the person is unable to obtain 
counsel. 
 
 
(6) 
The record indicates that the judge held no hearing on the question of 
whether Martini violated his probation.  The probation officer appeared on behalf 
of the State and set forth the allegations giving rise to the VOP.  Martini never 
                                                 
1  
See Bentley v. State, 930 A.2d 866, 871 (Del. 2007). 
 
2  
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). 
 
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admitted violating probation.  And the judge heard no testimony about Martini’s 
alleged VOP.  Instead, the judge summarily found that Martini violated probation.  
The judge stated that the reason for Martini’s appearance was to sentence him for a 
violation of probation and not to conduct a hearing on the issue of whether Martini 
violated his probation and, if so, whether any mitigating circumstances existed.   
 
(7) 
A defendant’s due process rights at a VOP hearing are not unlimited.  
In Illinois v. Allen, the United States Supreme Court held that: 
[T]rial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly 
defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the 
circumstances of each case.  No one formula for maintaining the 
appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations.  We 
think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a 
trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant . . . (1) bind and gag 
him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take 
him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself 
properly.3 
 
Here, the judge employed cumulatively two of the three remedies listed by the 
Allen court.  The judge found Martini in contempt and ordered him removed from 
the courtroom.  We conclude that these sanctions were not a reasonable response to 
Martini’s conduct. 
 
(8) 
First, the record shows that the judge found Martini in contempt.  
Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 42(a) and 11 Del. C. §§ 1271 and 1272, direct 
criminal contempt, i.e. when the “judge saw or heard the conduct constituting the 
                                                 
3  
397 U.S. 337, 337 (1970). 
 
 
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contempt [which] was committed in the actual presences of the court,” may be 
punished summarily.  The judge sanctioned Martini for contempt by removing him 
from the courtroom without the opportunity to return.  Although “Delaware courts 
have the inherent power to impose criminal sanctions for contempt” (independent 
of contempt as a statutory crime),4 these circumstances did not warrant that 
sanction.  In analyzing the methods judges can use to maintain an appropriate 
courtroom atmosphere, the United States Supreme Court noted that the remedy of 
contempt, as opposed to removal, is appropriate where it would result in the 
defendant remaining in the courtroom but behaving in a civilized manner.5  In 
Martini’s case, the remedy of contempt resulted in his removal from the courtroom 
without warning that contempt might result in his permanent removal from the 
proceedings.  The judge apparently found Martini in contempt because of Martini’s 
insistence to be addressed as Kedar Anshari Ptah-El.  However, this conduct may 
have been intimately related to Martini’s new criminal charge of criminal 
impersonation and forgery.  To admit that his name was not Kedar Anshari Ptah-El 
exposed Martini to potential criminal liability on the pending charges.6 
                                                 
4  
DiSabatino v. Salicete, 671 A.2d 1344, 1348 (Del. 1996). 
 
5  
See Allen, 397 U.S. at 345 (noting that citing or threatening to cite might be sufficient to 
punish the contumacious defendant and allow the defendant to remain in the courtroom). 
 
6  
Martini was later found not guilty of these offenses. 
 
 
7
 
(9) 
Second, the judge removed Martini from the courtroom.  Superior 
Court Criminal Rule 43(b)(2) provides that “[t]he further progress of the trial . . . 
shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be considered to have waived the 
right to be present whenever [the] defendant . . . [a]fter being warned by the court 
that disruptive conduct will cause removal . . . persists in conduct as to justify 
exclusion from the courtroom.”  In Allen, the United States Supreme Court upheld 
removal of a defendant and emphasized that that Allen had been “repeatedly 
warned by the trial judge that he would be removed from the courtroom if he 
persisted in his unruly conduct” and “constantly informed that he could return to 
the trial when he would agree to conduct himself in an orderly manner.”7  
However, the judge employed none of these safeguards.  The judge never warned 
Martini nor gave him an opportunity to return if he promised to conduct himself in 
an orderly manner.  The judge prematurely determined that “I can’t expect him to 
act or behave any differently the next.”  Because Martini did not receive 
“minimum requirements of due process” at his VOP hearing and because Martini 
did not waive those rights by his conduct, the judge violated Martini’s right to due 
process. 
                                                 
7  
397 U.S. at 346 (emphasis added). 
 
 
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(10) Martini also argues that the judge improperly sentenced him.  We 
review sentencing of a criminal defendant for abuse of discretion.8  In general, our 
review ends once we determine that the sentence is within the statutory limits 
prescribed by the legislature.  Here, Martini’s December 5, 2006 VOP sentence fell 
within the statutory limits.9  Even in these circumstances, we have appellate 
jurisdiction to review criminal sentences where the defendant alleges 
“unconstitutionality; factual predicates which are either false, impermissible, or 
lack minimum indicia of reliability; judicial vindictiveness, bias, or sentencing 
with a ‘closed mind;’ and any other illegality.”10  In this case, the last two 
categories—sentencing with a closed mind and illegality—are at issue. 
(11) Martini claims that his sentence was “illegal” because the December 
2006 VOP order fails to give Martini credit towards his Level V incarceration for 
time previously served at Level IV VOP Center.11  The record is unclear about how 
much time, if any, Martini served at Level IV VOP Center but the State concedes 
                                                 
8  
See Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 704 (Del. 2006). 
 
9  
The December 5, 2006 VOP sentence (six years at Level V supervision) is not greater 
than the previous VOP sentence (six years at Level V supervision, suspended after six years at 
Level IV VOP Center supervision, suspended after six months served at Level IV VOP Center 
supervision, followed by 2 years at Level III supervision).    See Pavulak v. State, 880 A.2d 1044 
(Del. 2005) (holding that trial court is precluded from imposing a VOP sentence exceeding the 
total sentence originally imposed in prior VOP proceedings). 
 
10  
Siple v. State, 701 A.2d 79, 83 (Del. 1997). 
 
11  
See Anderson v. State, 2006 WL 3931460 (Del. 2006) (holding that defendant should be 
given Level V credit for time spent at Level IV VOP Center). 
 
 
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on appeal that “to the extent Martini was not given credit for time previously 
served in the VOP Center, he should be afforded credit.”  Because the presiding 
judge failed to account for time previously served by Martini at the VOP Center, a 
judge must consider Martini’s time served should a judge find at a new VOP 
hearing that Martini, in fact, violated probation. 
(12) Martini also contends that the judge sentenced him with a “closed 
mind” because the judge deviated from both the probation officer’s 
recommendation and from SENTAC sentencing guidelines.12  The judge departed 
from the guidelines, without stating with particularity her reasons for the departure:  
(1) the court raised the supervision level from Level III to Level V; and (2) the 
court imposed a Level V supervision period of incarceration significantly higher 
than that recommended by the SENTAC guidelines. 
(13) Under the SENTAC sentencing guidelines, where a judge determines 
“that the offender is guilty of the violation and probation is to be revoked, it is 
presumed that the offender may move up only one SENTAC level from his/her 
current level” and “may have [the] level of supervision raised more than one level 
if ... aggravating circumstances exist.”13  Here, Martini was serving Level III 
probation at the time of his VOP hearing.  After the judge found that Martini 
                                                 
12  
See Delaware SENTAC Handbook, at 104 (2006), Violation of Probation Sentencing 
Policy. 
 
13  
Id. at 104. 
 
 
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violated his probation, the sentencing guidelines recommend Level IV probation.  
Yet, the judge gave Martini Level V incarceration without identifying any 
aggravating factors justifying that two level jump. 
(14) Second, under the SENTAC sentencing guidelines, whenever a judge 
imposes Level V incarceration, the incarceration period should be “in accordance 
with the current SENTAC standard presumptive sentence for the original crime for 
which the probation is being served.”14  Here, Martini’s probation related to a 
fourth-degree rape conviction with a “standard presumptive sentence” of 30 
months at Level V supervision.  The judge, however, sentenced Martini to 6 years 
(72 months) at Level V supervision. 
(15) Although the SENTAC sentencing guidelines are “voluntary” and 
“non binding,”15 this Court’s Administrative Directive No. 76 requires that judges 
“set forth with particularity the reasons for the deviation” from the guidelines, in 
order to allow appellate review by this Court.16  Here, the judge clearly departed 
from the guidelines but failed to state any reasons for her departure.  Moreover, the 
judge exceeded the sentence recommended by the probation officer and failed to 
account for any time already served.  Finally, the judge sentenced Martini 
                                                 
14  
Id. at 104. 
 
15  
See Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 846 (Del. 1992). 
 
16  
Supreme Court Administrative Directive No. 76, dated September 15, 1987. 
 
 
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moments after she found him in contempt.  Because the judge ordered Martini 
removed from the courtroom, Martini had no opportunity to argue that he did not 
violate his probation, present evidence regarding his character, or present any other 
mitigation evidence.  We have previously held that a judge “must have an open 
mind for receiving all information related to the question of mitigation,” and that a 
judge exhibits a “closed mind when the sentence is based on a preconceived bias 
without consideration of the nature of the offense or the character of the 
defendant.”17   If, a judge determines at a new hearing that Martini did violate his 
probation, the judge must sentence Martini in accordance with this order. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is REVERSED and REMANDED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
                                                 
17  
Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del.2003).