Case Title: Carter v. Reese

Citation: 2016-Ohio-5569

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-08-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Carter v. Reese, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5569.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-5569 
CARTER ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. REESE ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Carter v. Reese, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5569.] 
Tort law―Limitation on liability―”Good Samaritan” statute―R.C. 2305.23 
applies to any person who administers emergency care at scene of 
emergency, not just health care professionals―“Administering emergency 
care” means giving medical and nonmedical care. 
(No. 2015-0108—Submitted January 5, 2016—Decided August 30, 2016.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Butler County, 
No. CA2014-04-095, 2014-Ohio-5395. 
_______________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.   
Ohio’s Good Samaritan statute applies to any person who administers 
emergency care or treatment at the scene of an emergency including but not 
limited to health care professionals. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
2.   
The phrase “administering emergency care” as used in Ohio’s Good 
Samaritan statute includes rendering medical and any other form of 
assistance to the safety and well-being of another when the result of an 
unforeseen combination of circumstances calls for immediate action. 
_______________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} Dennis Carter and his wife, Mary, appeal from a judgment of the 
Twelfth District Court of Appeals that affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Larry Reese Jr. in connection with an action they filed for 
injuries Carter sustained when Reese attempted to move a tractor-trailer that had 
pinned Carter’s leg between the trailer and a loading dock. 
{¶ 2} Ohio’s Good Samaritan statute states: 
 
No person shall be liable in civil damages for administering 
emergency care or treatment at the scene of an emergency * * *, for 
acts performed at the scene of such emergency, unless such acts 
constitute willful or wanton misconduct. 
 
R.C. 2305.23. 
{¶ 3} In this case, Carter told Reese to pull the tractor-trailer forward in 
order to free his leg, but when Reese attempted to do so, the truck rolled backward, 
resulting in serious injury to Carter. 
{¶ 4} “Administering emergency care” is a broad phrase that includes 
rendering medical and any other form of assistance to the safety and well-being of 
another when the result of an unforeseen combination of circumstances calls for 
immediate action.  Therefore, because Reese administered emergency care at the 
scene of the emergency and because the statute expressly states that no person shall 
be liable in civil damages for acts performed at the scene of such emergency, and 
January Term, 2016 
 
 
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because no allegation of willful or wanton misconduct has been asserted against 
him, pursuant to Ohio’s Good Samaritan statute, Reese is not liable in civil 
damages, and we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 5} On April 24, 2012, Carter, a truck driver for S&S Transport, Inc., 
pulled a tractor-trailer into the loading dock at AIC Contracting, Inc., in Fairfield, 
Ohio, to deliver an empty trailer and to pick up another.  After attaching the second 
trailer, he pulled his truck about four to six inches away from the loading dock, 
unlocked the trailer brake, and locked the tractor brake so that the tractor wheels 
could not move.  As he pulled himself onto the loading dock to close the trailer 
door, he slipped, and his leg became wedged between the loading dock and the 
trailer.  Although he felt no physical pain at that time, he could not free himself and 
began to yell for help and bang on a loading dock door in an effort to get someone 
to help him. 
{¶ 6} About ten minutes later, Reese heard Carter and drove to the AIC 
Contracting lot.  Carter told him to “get in my truck, move it forward about a foot, 
* * * but whatever you do, don’t put it in reverse.”  Reese responded, “[N]o 
problem.” 
{¶ 7} Reese climbed into the cab of the truck and put it in neutral before 
realizing that he did not know how to operate it.  Carter recalled that Reese “revved 
up” the truck three times before he heard the air brake release, and within five 
seconds of that happening, the trailer rolled backwards and broke his leg. 
{¶ 8} Paramedics arrived four minutes later, and someone moved the truck 
and freed Carter’s leg.  Due to the severity of the injuries, however, his right leg 
had to be amputated above the knee. 
{¶ 9} Carter and his wife sued Reese but did not allege that he had engaged 
in willful or wanton misconduct.  Reese asserted Ohio’s Good Samaritan statute as 
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a defense and moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted it pursuant 
to the statute. 
{¶ 10} The court of appeals affirmed and held that R.C. 2305.23 
 
applies to any person, health care professional or otherwise, who 
administers “emergency care,” medical or otherwise, at the scene of 
an emergency and who meets the remaining requirements of the 
statute, e.g., their acts do not constitute willful or wanton 
misconduct. 
  
(Emphasis sic.)  2014-Ohio-5395, ¶ 15.  The court explained that an emergency 
situation exists when a man’s leg is pinned between a truck and a loading dock, that 
Reese’s actions in attempting to move the truck constituted emergency care because 
he was trying to resolve the emergency created by Carter, and further, that Reese 
did not commit willful or wanton misconduct. 
{¶ 11} The Carters appealed and we accepted the following proposition of 
law for review: 
  
The trial court committed reversible error in granting 
Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals 
committed error in affirming the judgment, because the protection 
afforded under the Ohio Good Samaritan statute, R.C. 2305.23, is 
limited in scope and application to health care responders providing 
emergency medical care or treatment to another individual at the 
scene of an emergency and who otherwise satisfy the statute. 
 
 
 
January Term, 2016 
 
 
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The Parties to the Appeal 
{¶ 12} On appeal to this court, the Carters urge that R.C. 2305.23 provides 
immunity from civil liability only for health care professionals and trained first 
responders who voluntarily administer emergency medical care and treatment to 
injured persons at the scene of an emergency and that it is for the General Assembly 
to amend R.C. 2305.23 if it intends for the statute to immunize any person who 
voluntarily administers emergency nonmedical care or treatment.  In support of 
their position, they point to language in the statute excluding coverage for 
emergency care or treatment that is administered in a hospital, doctor’s office, or 
other place having proper medical equipment or for care rendered with the 
expectation of remuneration and language regarding law enforcement officers and 
fire fighters acting as part of their duties.  The Carters also note that this court stated 
in footnote five in Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St.2d 195, 205, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975), 
that R.C. 2305.23 applies to those who render medical treatment, and that appellate 
courts have followed Primes, and they assert that the General Assembly is 
presumed to know the decisions of this court, but it has not amended the Good 
Samaritan statute.  They also assert that the lower courts’ interpretation of R.C. 
2305.23 emasculates the common law rule that Good Samaritans have a duty to 
exercise reasonable care.  They finally contend that Reese did not administer any 
emergency care or treatment when he attempted to move the truck. 
{¶ 13} Reese argues that R.C. 2305.23 applies to any person, regardless of 
profession, and that the legislature could have used the phrase “health care 
professionals” if it had intended the statute to protect only those individuals.  Reese 
contends that limiting R.C. 2305.23 to those rendering emergency medical care or 
treatment would require this court to add the word “medical” to the statute and 
asserts the appellate court correctly determined he provided emergency care in 
attempting to free Carter’s leg and therefore he is protected by R.C. 2305.23.  
Notably, Reese does not claim that he provided emergency treatment. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Issues on Appeal 
{¶ 14} This case presents our court with two separate questions involving 
the legislative intent behind Ohio’s Good Samaritan statute. 
{¶ 15} First, what did the General Assembly intend by using the phrase “no 
person shall be liable in civil damages”—did it intend to include only health care 
professionals who administer emergency care or treatment at the scene of an 
emergency, or, more broadly, to include any person who administers emergency 
care or treatment at the scene of an emergency?   
{¶ 16} Second, what did the General Assembly intend by using the phrase 
“administering emergency care”—did it intend to limit emergency care to only the 
administration of medical care, or, did it intend to include all forms of care 
administered at the scene of an emergency? 
{¶ 17} Our interpretation of Ohio’s Good Samaritan statute and resolution 
of these questions present matters of first impression in our court.  Other 
jurisdictions, however, have considered similar questions in connection with their 
respective Good Samaritan statutes, and their decisions are instructive in resolving 
these questions. 
Historical Perspective 
Common Law 
{¶ 18} The common law in Ohio is that a bystander has no affirmative duty 
to aid or protect another absent a special relationship justifying the imposition of a 
duty.  Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 77 Ohio St.3d 284, 
293, 673 N.E.2d 1311 (1997), citing 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Sections 
314-319, at 116-130 (1965); see also Gelbman v. Second Natl. Bank of Warren, 9 
Ohio St.3d 77, 79, 458 N.E.2d 1262 (1984).  However, one who voluntarily and 
gratuitously renders services to another for the protection of the other person is 
liable at common law for injuries resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable 
care under the circumstances.  See 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 323 
January Term, 2016 
 
 
7
(1965); Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton & Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Law of Torts, 
Section 56, 378 (5th Ed.1984). 
Good Samaritan Statutes 
{¶ 19} In 1959, California enacted the nation’s first Good Samaritan statute, 
which provided that no physician or podiatrist, “who in good faith renders 
emergency care at the scene of the emergency, shall be liable for any civil damages 
as a result of any acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency 
care.”  Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code 2144, enacted 1959, now codified as Cal.Bus. & 
Prof.Code 2395.  See generally Brandt, Good Samaritan Laws – The Legal 
Placebo: A Current Analysis, 17 Akron L.Rev. 303, 305 (1983), fn. 23.  
Commentators have explained that California’s legislature sought to encourage 
physicians to provide emergency treatment to injured persons in emergency 
situations without fear of liability for malpractice. See 17 Akron L.Rev. at 306, 332; 
see also Waisman, Negligence, Responsibility, and the Clumsy Samaritan: Is there 
a Fairness Rationale for the Good Samaritan Immunity?, 29 Ga.St.U.L.Rev. 609, 
628-630 (2013). 
{¶ 20} Since that time, every state has enacted some version of Good 
Samaritan legislation. Id. at 631; see also Annotation, Construction and 
Application of “Good Samaritan” Statutes, 68 A.L.R. 4th 294, 300 (1989).  These 
statutes generally fall into three categories—those that specifically include by 
reference only medically trained persons; those that apply to the rendition of 
medical aid by any person; and those that more broadly apply to any person 
rendering emergency care, treatment, or other kinds of assistance without expressly 
requiring that such actions be medical in nature. 
I.  Only Medically Trained Persons 
{¶ 21} Five states have Good Samaritan statutes that, with certain 
exceptions, expressly exclude only medically trained persons from liability for civil 
damages.  See Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. 52-557b(a) (“A person licensed to practice 
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8
medicine and surgery * * * or dentistry * * *, a person licensed as a registered 
nurse * * * or certified as a licensed practical nurse * * *, a medical technician or 
any person operating a cardiopulmonary resuscitator or a person trained in 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation * * * or a person operating an automatic external 
defibrillator, who * * * renders emergency medical or professional assistance to a 
person in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages 
* * *”); Ill.Comp.Stat.Ann. Chapter 745, 49/25 (“Any person licensed under the 
Medical Practice Act of 1987 or any person licensed to practice the treatment of 
human ailments in any other state * * * who, in good faith, provides emergency 
care * * * shall not * * * be liable for civil damages * * *”); Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. 
411.148(1) (“No physician * * *, registered or practical nurse * * *, person 
certified as an emergency medical technician * * *, person certified * * * to perform 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, or employee of any board of education * * * who 
has completed a course in first aid and who maintains current certification * * * 
shall be liable in civil damages for administering emergency care or treatment at 
the scene of an emergency * * *”); Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. 691.1501(1) (“A 
physician, physician’s assistant, registered professional nurse, licensed practical 
nurse, or licensed EMS provider who in good faith renders emergency care * * * is 
not liable for civil damages * * *”); Mo.Stat.Ann. 537.037.1(1) (“Any physician or 
surgeon, registered professional nurse or licensed practical nurse * * * and any 
person licensed as a mobile emergency medical technician * * * may * * * render 
emergency care or assistance * * * at the scene of an emergency * * *, and shall 
not be liable for any civil damages * * *”).  (Emphases added.) 
II.  Any Person Rendering Medical Assistance 
{¶ 22} Four states have Good Samaritan statutes that apply to any person 
but expressly limit protection from liability to the rendering of medical aid through 
use of terms such as “first aid,” “medical attention,” and “health care treatment.”  
See Idaho Code Ann. 5-330 (“That no action shall lie or be maintained for civil 
January Term, 2016 
 
 
9
damages * * * against any person * * * who * * *, being at, or stopping at the scene 
of an accident, offers and administers first aid or medical attention * * *); 
N.C.Gen.Stat.Ann. 90-21.14(a) (“Any person * * * who * * * renders first aid or 
emergency health care treatment to a person who is unconscious, ill or injured  
* * * shall not be liable for damages * * *”); Okla.Stat.Ann., Title 76, 5(a)(2) (“any 
person who * * * renders or attempts to render emergency care consisting of 
artificial respiration, restoration of breathing, or preventing or retarding the loss 
of blood, or aiding or restoring heart action or circulation of blood to the victim 
or victims of an accident or emergency * * * shall not be liable for any civil 
damages”); Or.Rev.Stat.Ann. 30.800(2) (“No person may maintain an action for 
damages for injury, death or loss that results from acts or omissions of a person 
while rendering emergency medical assistance * * *”).  (Emphases added.) 
III.  Anyone Rendering Emergency Care, Treatment, or Other Assistance 
{¶ 23} The remaining states have Good Samaritan statutes that broadly 
apply to any person who renders emergency care, treatment, or other kinds of 
assistance without an express requirement that those acts be medical in nature.  See 
Ala.Code 6-5-332(g) (“Any person, who * * * renders emergency care at the scene 
of an accident or emergency * * * shall not be liable for any civil damages * * *”); 
Alaska Stat.Ann. 09.65.090(a) (“A person * * * who renders emergency care or 
emergency counseling * * * is not liable for civil damages * * *”); 
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. 32-1471 (“Any health care provider * * * or any other person 
who renders emergency care at a public gathering or at the scene of an emergency 
occurrence * * * shall not be liable for any civil or other damages * * *”); Ark.Code 
Ann. 17-95-101(b) (“Any person who is not a health care professional who is 
present at an emergency or accident scene and who * * * [p]roceeds to lend 
emergency assistance or service * * * shall not be held liable in civil damages  
* * *”) (subdivision (a) of the statute covers health care professionals); Cal.Health 
& Safety Code 1799.102(b)(2) (“no person who * * * renders emergency medical 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
or nonmedical care or assistance at the scene of an emergency shall be liable for 
civil damages * * *”); Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann. 13-21-108(1) (“Any person licensed as 
a physician and surgeon * * * or any other person, who * * * renders emergency 
care or emergency assistance * * * at the place of an emergency or accident * * * 
shall not be liable for any civil damages * * *”); Del.Code Ann., Title 16, 6801(a) 
(“any person who * * * renders first aid, emergency treatment or rescue assistance 
* * * shall not be liable for damages * * *”); Fla.Stat.Ann. 768.13(2)(a) (“Any 
person * * * who * * * renders emergency care or treatment * * * in direct response 
to emergency situations * * * shall not be held liable for any civil damages * * *”); 
Ga.Code Ann. 51-1-29(a) (“Any person * * * who * * * renders emergency care at 
the scene of an accident or emergency * * * shall not be liable for any civil damages 
* * *”); Haw.Rev.Stat.Ann. 663-1.5(a) (“Any person who * * * renders emergency 
care * * * at the scene of an accident or emergency * * * shall not be liable for any 
civil damages * * *”); Ind.Ann.Code 34-30-12-1(b) (“a person who * * * renders 
emergency care at the scene of the emergency or accident is immune from civil 
liability * * *”); Iowa Code Ann. 613.17(1) (“A person, who * * * renders 
emergency care or assistance * * * shall not be liable for any civil damages  
* * *”); Kan.Stat.Ann. 65-2891b (“Any person who is not a health care provider  
* * * who * * * renders emergency care or assistance * * * at the scene of an 
emergency or accident shall not be liable for any civil damages * * *”) 
(Kan.Stat.Ann. 65-2891 contains a similar provision for health care providers); 
La.Stat.Ann., Title 9, 2793(A) (“No person who * * * renders emergency care, first 
aid or rescue at the scene of an emergency * * * shall be liable for any civil damages 
* * *”); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., Title 14, 164 (“any person who * * * renders first aid, 
emergency treatment or rescue assistance * * * shall not be liable for damages  
* * *”); Md.Code Ann., Courts & Judicial Proceedings, 5-603(c) (“An individual  
* * * is not civilly liable for any act or omission in providing assistance or medical 
aid * * *”); Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., Chapter 112, 12V (“Any person who * * * 
January Term, 2016 
 
 
11 
attempts to render emergency care * * * shall not be liable * * *”); Minn.Stat.Ann. 
604A.01(2)(a) (“A person who * * * renders emergency care, advice, or assistance 
at the scene of an emergency * * * is not liable for any civil damages * * *”); 
Miss.Code Ann. 73-25-37(1) (“No duly licensed, practicing physician, physician 
assistant, dentist, * * * or any other person who * * * renders emergency care to 
any injured person at the scene of an emergency * * * shall be liable for any civil 
damages * * *”); Mont.Code Ann. 27-1-714(1) (“Any person licensed as a 
physician and surgeon * * * or any other person who * * * renders emergency care 
or assistance * * * at the scene of an emergency or accident is not liable for any 
civil damages * * *”); Neb.Rev.Stat.Ann. 25-21,186 (“No person who renders 
emergency care at the scene of an accident or other emergency * * * shall be held 
liable for any civil damages * * *”); Nev.Rev.Stat.Ann. 41.500(1) (“any person  
* * * who renders emergency care or assistance in an emergency * * * is not liable 
for any civil damages * * *”); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. 508:12(1) (“If any person * * * 
renders emergency care at the place of the happening of an emergency * * * the 
person who renders the care is not liable in civil damages * * *”); N.J.Stat.Ann. 
2A:62A-1 (“Any individual * * * who * * * renders emergency care at the scene of 
an accident or emergency * * * shall not be liable for any civil damages * * *”); 
N.M.Stat.Ann. 24-10-3 (“No person who comes to the aid or rescue of another 
person by providing care or assistance * * * at or near the scene of an emergency 
* * * shall be held liable for any civil damages * * *”); N.Y.Public Health Law 
3000-a(1) (“any person who * * * renders first aid or emergency treatment at the 
scene of an accident * * * shall not be liable for damages * * *”); N.D.Code Ann. 
32-03.1-02 (“No person * * * who renders aid or assistance necessary or helpful 
in the circumstances * * * may be named as a defendant or held liable in any 
personal injury civil action * * *”); 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. 8332(a) (“Any person * * * 
who * * * renders emergency care, treatment, first aid, or rescue at the scene of an 
emergency * * * shall not be liable for any civil damages * * *”); R.I.Gen.Laws 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
Ann. 9-1-27.1 (“No person who * * * renders emergency assistance * * * shall be 
liable for civil damages * * *”); S.C.Code Ann. 15-1-310 (“Any person, who * * * 
renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or emergency * * * shall not be 
liable for any civil damages * * *”); S.D.Codified Laws 20-9-4.1 (“No peace 
officer, conservation officer, member of any fire department, police department and 
their first aid, rescue or emergency squad, or any citizen acting as such as a 
volunteer, or any other person is liable * * * in the course of their rendering in good 
faith, any emergency care and services during an emergency * * *”); Tenn.Code 
Ann. 63-6-218(b) (“Any person * * * shall not be liable to victims or persons 
receiving emergency care for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission 
by such person in rendering the emergency care * * *”); Tex.Civ.Practice & 
Remedies Code Ann. 74.151(a) (“A person who * * * administers emergency care 
is not liable in civil damages for an act performed during the emergency * * *”); 
Utah Code Ann. 78B-4-501(1) (“A person who renders emergency care at or near 
the scene of, or during an emergency * * * is not liable for any civil damages  
* * *”); Vt.Stat.Ann., Title 12, 519(b) (“A person who provides reasonable 
assistance [to a person “exposed to grave physical harm”] shall not be liable in civil 
damages * * *”); Va.Code Ann. 8.01-225(A)(1) (“Any person who * * * renders 
emergency care or assistance * * * at the scene of an accident, fire, or any life-
threatening emergency * * * shall not be liable for any civil damages * * *”); 
Wash.Rev.Code Ann. 4.24.300(1) (“Any person, * * * who * * * renders emergency 
care at the scene of an emergency or who participates in transporting * * * 
therefrom an injured person * * * for emergency medical treatment shall not be 
liable for civil damages * * *”); W.Va.Code Ann. 55-7-15 (“No person * * * who 
* * * renders emergency care at the scene of an accident * * * shall be liable for 
any civil damages * * *”); Wisc.Stat.Ann. 895.48(1) (“any person who renders 
emergency care at the scene of an emergency or accident * * * shall be immune 
from civil liability”); Wyo.Stat.Ann. 1-1-120(a) (“Any person licensed as a 
January Term, 2016 
 
 
13 
physician and surgeon * * * or any other person, who * * * renders emergency 
care or assistance * * * at the place of an emergency or accident, is not liable for 
any civil damages * * *”).  (Emphases added.) 
Law and Analysis 
Ohio’s Good Samaritan Statute 
{¶ 24} R.C. 2305.23 provides:  
 
No person shall be liable in civil damages for administering 
emergency care or treatment at the scene of an emergency outside 
of a hospital, doctor’s office, or other place having proper medical 
equipment, for acts performed at the scene of such emergency, 
unless such acts constitute willful or wanton misconduct. 
Nothing in this section applies to the administering of such 
care or treatment where the same is rendered for remuneration, or 
with the expectation of remuneration, from the recipient of such care 
or treatment or someone on his behalf.  The administering of such 
care or treatment by one as a part of his duties as a paid member of 
any organization of law enforcement officers or fire fighters does 
not cause such to be a rendering for remuneration or expectation of 
remuneration. 
 
{¶ 25} Regarding the first question—whether R.C. 2305.23 applies only to 
health care professionals—the statute expressly states, “No person shall be liable 
in civil damages * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  If the legislature had intended that this 
statute apply only to health care professionals, it could have expressed its intent by 
using a more limiting phrase such as “no health care professional shall be liable in 
civil damages” or by naming the categories of individuals it intended to exclude 
from liability, e.g., physicians or nurses.  And Ohio’s General Assembly knows 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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how to express its intent in this regard because in R.C. 2305.231, the statute 
immediately following R.C. 2305.23, it stated: 
 
(B) No physician who volunteers the physician’s services as 
a team physician or team podiatrist to a school’s athletics program, 
no dentist who volunteers the dentist’s services as a team dentist to 
a school’s athletics program, and no registered nurse who 
volunteers the registered nurse’s services as a team nurse to a 
school’s athletics program is liable in damages in a civil action for 
administering emergency medical care, emergency dental care, 
other emergency professional care, or first aid treatment to a 
participant in an athletic event involving the school, at the scene of 
the event * * * , or for acts performed in administering the care or 
treatment, unless the acts of the physician, dentist, or registered 
nurse constitute willful or wanton misconduct. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  
{¶ 26} Obviously, the General Assembly did not similarly limit the scope 
of Ohio’s Good Samaritan statute; rather, by stating that no person shall be liable 
in civil damages, it expressed its intent that the statute apply to anyone who 
otherwise meets the statutory requirements.  Compare Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 
Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, ¶ 25 (by using the phrase “[n]o 
person shall operate a motor vehicle” in R.C. 4511.21(A), the General Assembly 
“extends [the statute’s] application to the citizens of the state generally and does 
not single out any group or class for different treatment”).  Thus, Ohio joins the 
majority of states that extend application of their Good Samaritan legislation to all 
persons and not only to those in the health care profession. 
January Term, 2016 
 
 
15 
{¶ 27} We recognize that the title of the act containing the original version 
of Ohio’s Good Samaritan statute states its purpose:  “To enact section 2305.23 of 
the Revised Code, relative to the liability of physicians and nurses for emergency 
treatment.”  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 14, 130 Ohio Laws, 1424.  However, while the title 
of an act is sometimes helpful in arriving at legislative intent, it is not dispositive.  
Columbus Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Moyer, 163 Ohio St. 189, 200, 126 
N.E.2d 429 (1955).  “The title of an act is never employed to defeat the clear intent 
of the Legislature.”  Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231, 243, 78 N.E.2d 370 
(1948). 
{¶ 28} Ohio’s Good Samaritan statute applies to any person who 
administers emergency care or treatment at the scene of an emergency including 
but not limited to health care professionals. 
{¶ 29} Regarding the second question—whether the phrase “administering 
emergency care” is limited to medical attention or more broadly includes other 
forms of assistance—because the legislature did not define any of these terms in 
R.C. 2305.23, we “look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words.”  Hewitt v. 
L.E. Myers Co., 134 Ohio St.3d 199, 2012-Ohio-5317, 981 N.E.2d 795, ¶ 17. 
{¶ 30} The term “administer” means, inter alia, “[f]urnish, supply, give.”  1 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 28 (5th Ed.2002).  See also Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary 27 (1986) (definition of “administer” includes “to 
mete out”). 
{¶ 31} An “emergency” is “an unforeseen combination of circumstances or 
the resulting state that calls for immediate action.”  Id. at 741.  See also 1 Shorter 
Oxford at 814 (an emergency is “[a] situation, esp. of danger or conflict, that arises 
unexpectedly and requires urgent action”); Utah Code Ann. 78B-4-501(1) (for 
purposes of Utah’s Good Samaritan statute, emergency “means an unexpected 
occurrence involving injury, threat of injury, or illness to a person or the public, 
including motor vehicle accidents, disasters, actual or threatened discharges, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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removal, or disposal of hazardous materials, and other accidents or events of a 
similar nature”). 
{¶ 32} The separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part objects 
to the definition of an “emergency” including the phrase “an unforeseen 
combination of circumstances.”  The concurring and dissenting opinion notes that 
some injuries are “wholly foreseeable, but nonetheless, they require immediate, 
urgent care,” concurring and dissenting opinion at ¶ 51, and “would not limit an 
‘emergency’ for purposes of R.C. 2305.23 to those that are unforeseeable,” id. at  
¶ 61.  It uses the terms “unforeseen” and “unforeseeable” as if they are 
interchangeable.  They are not. 
{¶ 33} “Unforeseen” means unexpected—a term used in several definitions 
of an “emergency” relied upon by the concurring and dissenting opinion.  Webster’s 
at 2496.  In contrast, “unforeseeable” means “incapable of being foreseen, foretold, 
or anticipated.”  Id.  A combination of circumstances may be unforeseen or 
unexpected by the individuals experiencing them even though those circumstances 
were capable of being foreseen. 
{¶ 34} “Care” includes “responsibility for or attention to safety and well-
being.”  Webster’s at 338.  See also 1 Shorter Oxford at 345 (“care” includes 
“[s]erious attention”); Willingham v. Hudson, 274 Ga.App. 200, 204, 617 S.E.2d 
192 (2005), quoting Anderson v. Little & Davenport Funeral Home, 242 Ga. 751, 
753, 251 S.E.2d 250 (1978) (applying definition of “emergency care” used by the 
Georgia Supreme Court in a “similar statutory context,” i.e., “ ‘the performance of 
necessary personal services during an unforeseen circumstance that calls for 
immediate action’ ”); Utah Code Ann. 78B-4-501(1) (stating that for purposes of 
Utah’s Good Samaritan statute, emergency care “includes actual assistance or 
advice offered to avoid, mitigate, or attempt to mitigate the effects of an 
emergency”). 
January Term, 2016 
 
 
17 
{¶ 35} To construe the phrase “administering emergency care” to mean 
only emergency medical care would require this court to add a descriptive adjective 
to the statute.  Notably, in Van Horn v. Watson, 45 Cal.4th 322, 325-326, 331, 86 
Cal.Rptr.3d 350, 197 P.3d 164 (2008), that is what the Supreme Court of California 
did when it determined that the phrase “emergency care” in that state’s Good 
Samaritan statute meant emergency medical care at the scene of a medical 
emergency, despite the fact that the legislature had not used that limiting adjective.  
The California legislature amended the statute the following year to clarify that 
emergency care meant “emergency medical or nonmedical care.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Cal. Health and Safety Code 1799.102(b)(2). 
{¶ 36} Similarly, the Ohio General Assembly used the phrase “emergency 
care,” not “emergency medical care,” and therefore, its intent is more expansive 
and includes both medical and nonmedical emergency care. 
{¶ 37} We recognize that footnote five in Primes, 43 Ohio St.2d at 201, 331 
N.E.2d 723, states that R.C. 2305.23 “singles out a group of benevolently-disposed 
individuals for immunity from negligent injury to persons while rendering medical 
treatment during the exigencies of an emergency.”  (Emphasis added.)  In that case, 
however, we determined only that R.C. 4515.02, Ohio’s guest statute, was 
unconstitutional and did not address the scope or application of the Good Samaritan 
statute. 
{¶ 38} Thus, the phrase “administering emergency care” as used in Ohio’s 
Good Samaritan statute includes rendering medical and any other form of assistance 
to the safety and well-being of another when the result of an unforeseen 
combination of circumstances calls for immediate action.  Compare Wallace v. 
Hall, 145 Ga.App. 610, 610-611, 244 S.E.2d 129 (1978) (holding that a former 
version of Georgia’s Good Samaritan statute, which is similar to the current version 
and protected “[a]ny person” who “in good faith renders emergency care at the 
scene of an accident or emergency,” applied to a homeowner who, when a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
repairman was injured in a fall at her house, aggravated his injuries by transporting 
him home); Held v. Rocky River, 34 Ohio App.3d 35, 38-39, 516 N.E.2d 1272 (8th 
Dist.1986) (holding that an off duty firefighter rendered emergency care for 
purposes of R.C. 2305.23 in moving another firefighter who was lying unconscious 
under a stream of rushing water). 
{¶ 39} A careful reading of R.C. 2305.23 reveals that the statute contains 
two significant prepositional phrases:  “No person shall be liable in civil damages 
[1] for administering emergency care or treatment at the scene of an emergency  
* * * [2] for acts performed at the scene of such emergency * * *.”  When a court 
interprets the meaning of a statute, it “must give effect to all of the statute’s words.”  
Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., 146 Ohio St.3d 281, 2016-Ohio-1567, — N.E.3d 
—, ¶ 9.  The latter prepositional phrase in R.C. 2305.23 precludes liability for any 
acts performed at the scene of an emergency and further supports the conclusion 
that the General Assembly intended for the phrase “administering emergency care” 
to broadly include nonmedical care.  In this regard, Ohio’s statute is similar to 
statutes of other states that broadly apply to any type of assistance given at the scene 
of an emergency.  Compare Ark.Code Ann. 17-95-101(b) (protecting anyone who 
lends “emergency assistance or service”); Iowa Code Ann. 613.17(1) (protecting 
anyone who renders “emergency care or assistance”). 
{¶ 40} The uncontested facts in this case show that Reese performed acts at 
the scene of an emergency that constituted administering “emergency care” to 
Carter.  Carter slipped, his leg became wedged between a loading dock and a trailer, 
and he could not free himself from a situation that resulted from an unforeseen 
combination of circumstances, called for immediate action, and thus constituted an 
“emergency” for purposes of R.C. 2305.23.  In responding, Reese administered care 
and performed an act at the scene of the emergency by attempting to move the truck 
in an effort to free Carter’s leg, and there is no allegation that his conduct was 
January Term, 2016 
 
 
19 
willful or wanton.  Accordingly, R.C. 2305.23 applies to Reese, and he is not liable 
in civil damages to the Carters. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 41} Ohio’s Good Samaritan statute applies to any person who 
administers emergency care or treatment at the scene of an emergency including 
but not limited to health care professionals.  Moreover, the phrase “administering 
emergency care” in the statute is not limited to medical acts and includes rendering 
medical and any other form of assistance to the safety and well-being of another 
when the result of an unforeseen combination of circumstances calls for immediate 
action.  Because Reese performed acts at the scene of an emergency in 
administering emergency care to Reese and there is no allegation of willful or 
wanton misconduct, pursuant to R.C. 2305.23, he is not liable in civil damages.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissents, with an opinion joined by LANZINGER, J. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 42} I agree with the majority’s holding that R.C. 2305.23 applies to any 
person who administers emergency care or treatment.  But I dissent from the 
remainder of the opinion and syllabus, including the majority’s holding that an 
“emergency” for purposes of R.C. 2305.23 requires “an unforeseen combination of 
circumstances,” and its affirmation of the use of summary judgment to determine 
the applicability of the statute to the facts of this case. 
{¶ 43} I would hold that the definition of an “emergency” includes sudden 
events or circumstances that require urgent or immediate attention or action, 
regardless of whether the events were foreseeable.  And I would hold that questions 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
about the application of R.C. 2305.23 to the facts presented in a given case are 
typically a question of fact for the jury or other fact-finder. 
ANALYSIS 
Emergencies are not limited to unforeseeable circumstances and 
foreseeability is irrelevant for purposes of R.C. 2305.23 
 
{¶ 44} The portion of Ohio’s Good Samaritan statute that is relevant to this 
appeal states: “No person shall be liable in civil damages for administering 
emergency care or treatment at the scene of an emergency * * *, for acts performed 
at the scene of such emergency, unless such acts constitute willful or wanton 
misconduct.”  R.C. 2305.23. 
{¶ 45} “There is no definition of ‘emergency medical care or treatment’ in 
the Revised Code.”  Campbell v. Colley, 113 Ohio App.3d 14, 19, 680 N.E.2d 201 
(4th Dist.1996).  When a statute does not define a term, courts are to give the term 
its usual, normal, or customary meaning.  Colbert v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 215, 
2003-Ohio-3319, 790 N.E.2d 781, ¶ 12; R.C. 1.42.  “The process of judicial 
interpretation of a statute involves, ‘reading undefined words and phrases in context 
and construing them in accordance with the rules of grammar and common usage.’ 
” Wolf v. E. Liverpool School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 03 CO 
5, 2004-Ohio-2479, ¶ 40, quoting State ex rel. Portage Lakes Edn. Assn., OEA/NEA 
v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 95 Ohio St.3d 533, 2002-Ohio-2839, 769 N.E.2d 853, 
¶ 36. 
{¶ 46} Here, the majority defines “administering emergency care” 
according to the definitions of “emergency” found in some dictionaries.  See, e.g., 
Majority opinion at ¶ 31.  The majority adopts those definitions, which include the 
legal concept of foreseeability, and then sets forth a definition of “administering 
emergency care” as “rendering medical and any other form of assistance to the 
safety and well-being of another when the result of an unforeseen combination of 
circumstances calls for immediate action.”  (Emphasis added.)  Majority opinion, 
January Term, 2016 
 
 
21 
at paragraph two of the syllabus.  But the majority is not mindful that while 
determining legislative intent primarily involves an analysis of the statutory 
language, it is also necessary to consider the legislature’s purpose in enacting the 
law.  Fisher v. Hasenjager, 116 Ohio St.3d 53, 2007-Ohio-5589, 876 N.E.2d 546, 
¶ 20, quoting State ex rel. Watkins v. Eighth Dist. Court of Appeals, 82 Ohio St.3d 
532, 535, 696 N.E.2d 1079 (1998). 
{¶ 47} With that purpose in mind, I would not limit the statutory term 
“emergency care” to an unforeseen combination of circumstances.  Several reasons 
support a definition of “emergency” that does not incorporate the concept of 
foreseeability. 
The urgency of a situation, not its foreseeability, is critical to defining an 
emergency in a manner consistent with purpose of the statute 
 
{¶ 48} First, we must be cognizant that the purpose of the statute is to 
promote the public policy of encouraging the rendering of aid to those in dire 
circumstances.  See Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St.2d 195, 201, 331 N.E.2d 723 
(1975), fn. 5 (describing R.C. 2305.23’s immunity as an effort “to further a 
legitimate legislative objective of providing emergency medical assistance to 
injured persons where delay might result in death or great bodily injury”).  The 
majority correctly holds that the statute is intended to shield all those who give aid 
or assistance, and not to limit the protections of the statute to people with medical 
education, training, and experience.  See majority opinion, at paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 49} But given the broad scope of the statute and its intent to shield well-
intended individuals from liability for rendering aid, it is unlikely that the General 
Assembly intended to incorporate a legal concept (foreseeability) into the definition 
of emergency because the average person is unlikely to have a sufficient 
understanding of the legal aspects of foreseeability.  Rather, it is more likely that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
the legislative intent was to rely on commonly used and understood words, like 
“sudden,” “unexpected,” “urgent,” and “immediate,” to define an emergency. 
{¶ 50} Requiring that the circumstances giving rise to the “emergency” be 
unforeseeable is not reflective of the legislative intent.  And the incorporation of 
foreseeability into the understanding of an “emergency” could lead to both 
confusion in Ohio’s bench and bar as well as its ball parks. 
{¶ 51} Consider a high school’s varsity football team playing on a Friday 
night in autumn.  As those who attend games often see, high schools across Ohio 
retain ambulances for football games because players and spectators can sustain 
serious injuries during the game.  Indeed, it is now widely understood that players 
can suffer concussions during games.  Lueke, High School Athletes and 
Concussions, 32 J.Leg.Med. 483, 485, 501 (2011) (noting that “[c]oncussions are 
inevitable in high school sports” and that there are 300,000 sports-related 
concussions each year in the United States, that concussions are twice as likely to 
occur during games than in practice, and that the majority of concussions in high 
school athletics occur while students play football, soccer, and basketball).  Those 
injuries are thus wholly foreseeable, but nonetheless, they require immediate, 
urgent care.  Id. at 489-490 (allowing a player with a concussion to return to the 
field can lead to long-term neuropsychological dysfunction, severe disability, and 
death).  Under the majority’s definition, a concussion at a football game might not 
qualify as an “emergency.” 
{¶ 52} Similarly, we expect that there will be lifeguards on duty at public 
swimming pools.  And the presence of lifeguards signifies the presence of potential 
emergencies, including drowning and injuries sustained from diving.  In other 
words, injuries and life-threatening conditions are foreseeable at water parks and 
pools, and those injuries and conditions require immediate action. 
{¶ 53} In construing Ohio’s Good Samaritan statute, we must be mindful 
that the salient inquiry in cases involving R.C. 2305.23 and other “emergencies” is 
January Term, 2016 
 
 
23 
the urgency of the situation, not the foreseeability of it.  When “[l]ife or wholeness 
of body may be in the balance,” we should not radically narrow the definition of 
emergency.  Mary Day Nursery, Children’s Hosp. v. Akron, 90 Ohio Law Abs. 457, 
189 N.E.2d 745, 750 (C.P.1961). 
{¶ 54} “Within the [Good Samaritan] Act’s intended meaning an 
emergency occurs whenever a stranger appears (or may be perceived) to be ill or in 
need of succor.”  (Emphasis deleted.)  Jackson v. Mercy Health Ctr., Inc., 1993 OK 
155, 864 P.2d 839, 845.  “[L]imited and technical definitions given to the concepts 
of ‘emergency’ and ‘emergency care’ frustrate the purpose of Good Samaritan 
legislation,” McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, 626 N.W.2d 666, ¶ 18, and should 
be avoided.  This is particularly true given the intent of Good Samaritan laws, which 
is to abrogate the common-law rescue doctrine and to encourage people to risk 
helping strangers in need of emergency assistance without fear of liability, even 
when they have no duty to render aid.  “Generally, a bystander has no duty to 
provide affirmative aid to an injured person, even if the bystander has the ability to 
help.” Lundy v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 34 F.3d 1173, 1178 (3d Cir.1994), 
citing Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton & Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 
Section 56, at 375 (5th Ed.1984); McDowell at ¶ 6 (“In an attempt to eliminate the 
perceived inadequacies of the common law rules, all states have enacted some form 
of Good Samaritan legislation to protect individuals from civil liability for any 
negligent acts or omissions committed while voluntarily providing emergency aid 
or assistance”). 
{¶ 55} But under the majority’s definition of an emergency, the foreseeable 
nature of injuries, including those at football games and swimming pools, renders 
them outside the scope of R.C. 2305.23’s protections.  It is inconceivable that the 
General Assembly intended such a result.  And if such a limitation was desired, the 
legislature could have incorporated it into the statute.  It is the legislature’s province 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
to do so; I would not limit the term “emergency” in R.C. 2305.23 by judicial fiat.1   
Colbert, 99 Ohio St.3d 215, 2003-Ohio-3319, 790 N.E.2d 781. 
To the extent that dictionaries have utility in defining “emergency,” we should 
look to those definitions that existed when the General Assembly enacted R.C. 
2305.23 
 
{¶ 56} Second, to the extent that dictionary definitions of “emergency” are 
illustrative of the legislative intent, we must be mindful that a judge or justice often 
has several versions of a definition from which to choose.  While the majority 
correctly cites certain definitions of which it approves, other dictionaries define the 
term “emergency” differently.2   Thus, we should rely on dictionary definitions that 
were contemporaneous with the passage of R.C. 2305.23 in 1977 and that a 
legislator could have consulted. 
                                                          
 
1 The preferred practice is for a legislature to define the terms in its statutes, including Good 
Samaritan acts.   But given that the word “emergency” is well known in common parlance, it seems 
likely that the General Assembly intended it to carry the same broad meaning in R.C. 2305.23.   And 
if it so chooses, the General Assembly can respond to the court’s interpretation of “emergency” in 
this case by amendment that makes clear its intent.   Indeed, after the California Supreme Court 
interpreted California’s Good Samaritan law to grant immunity only to persons who render 
emergency medical care and not to persons who render emergency nonmedical care, Van Horn v. 
Watson, 45 Cal.4th 322, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 350, 197 P.3d 164 (2008), the California Legislature 
amended the statute (Cal.Health & Safety Code, Section 1799.102(a), to state explicitly that “[n]o 
person who in good faith, and not for compensation, renders emergency medical or nonmedical care 
at the scene of an emergency shall be liable for any civil damages resulting from any act or 
omission.”  (Emphasis added.)  See Verdugo v. Target Corp., 59 Cal.4th 312, 327, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 
662, 327 P.3d 774 (2014). 
2 Notably, medical dictionaries, which have relevance to the statute given its intent and scope, do 
not inject notions of foreseeability into the definition of emergency: 
 
The Attorney’s Dictionary of Medicine defines “emergency” as “[a]n 
urgent demand for medical or surgical action; a medical or surgical condition 
demanding immediate action.” 2 J.E. Schmidt, Attorney’s Dictionary of Medicine 
E 71 (1999).  Stedman’s Medical Dictionary defines “emergency” as “[a]n 
unlooked for contingency or happening; a sudden demand for action.” Stedman’s 
Medical Dictionary 456 (24th ed.1982). 
 
Rivera v. Arana, 322 Ill.App.3d 641, 650-651, 749 N.E.2d 434 (2001), abrogated on other grounds 
by Home Star Bank & Fin. Servs. v. Emergency Care & Health Org., Ltd., 2014 IL 115526, 379 
Ill.Dec. 51, 6 N.E.3d 128. 
January Term, 2016 
 
 
25 
{¶ 57} The Sixth District’s definition of “emergency” in Goebel’s, based on 
the definition of “emergency” as it appeared in a 1983 dictionary, is more consistent 
with the common meaning of the word at the time of the statute’s enactment.  And 
that definition―“a sudden or unexpected occurrence * * * demanding prompt 
action; urgent necessity”―omits the notion of foreseeability.  See Goebel’s, 58 
Ohio App.3d at 26, 567 N.E.2d 1330, quoting Webster’s New Universal 
Unabridged Dictionary 593 (2d Ed.1983). 
Ohio courts interpret “emergency” without reference to foreseeability in other 
statutory schemes 
 
{¶ 58} Third, when the term “emergency” is undefined in a statute, Ohio’s 
courts often have interpreted the word without reference to foreseeability. 
{¶ 59} In the context of a statute requiring “emergency medical or hospital 
care” for the indigent, this court has recognized that “commonly understood, an 
emergency is a sudden or unexpected occurrence which demands immediate 
action.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Mansfield Gen. Hosp. v. Richland Cty. Bd. of Cty. 
Commrs., 170 Ohio St. 486, 166 N.E.2d 224 (1960), paragraph 3 of the syllabus.  
And as the Tenth District succinctly explained in another context,  
 
[B]ecause the term “emergency” in R.C. 2917.13(A)(1) is undefined 
by statute, the term is given its common, everyday meaning. The 
common dictionary definition of “emergency” is “ ‘ “an unexpected 
situation or sudden occurrence of a serious and urgent nature that 
demands immediate attention.” ’ ”  
 
State v. Zaleski, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-101, 2010-Ohio-5557, ¶ 12, quoting 
State v. Blocker, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-313, 2007-Ohio-144, at ¶ 51, quoting Wolf, 
2004-Ohio-2479, ¶ 40, quoting American Heritage Dictionary (2d College 
Ed.1922). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
{¶ 60} When defining the term “emergency call” for purposes of political-
subdivision liability under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1), our appellate courts recognized that 
the definition is a broad one and one that they are “reluctant to abridge.”  Carter v. 
Columbus, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 96APE01-103, 1996 WL 465252, *3 (Aug. 15, 
1996).  See also Bates v. Cincinnati, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-960659 and A-
9306972, 1997 WL 684840, *2 (Oct. 31, 1997) (describing the “open-ended 
definition of ‘emergency call’ as provided by the legislature” in R.C. 2744.01(A)).  
Similarly, Ohio courts broadly define “emergency” when characterizing situations 
to which emergency personnel respond. See, e.g., Campbell, 113 Ohio App.3d at 
20, 680 N.E.2d 201, citing Moore v. Columbus, 98 Ohio App.3d 701, 706, 649 
N.E.2d 850 (1994) (definition of “emergency” is open-ended and not limited to 
inherently dangerous situations or situations in which human life is in danger); 
Goebel’s, 58 Ohio App.3d at 26, 567 N.E.2d 1330 (term “emergency patient” does 
not require that the patient’s condition be life-threatening).  See also Radecki v. 
Lammers, 15 Ohio St.2d 101, 103, 238 N.E.2d 545 (1968) (in wrongful-death case 
in which the “sudden emergency” doctrine was implicated, finding no error in jury 
instruction stating that “[a]n emergency arises when there is a sudden or unexpected 
occurrence, or combination of occurrences which demand prompt action” when the 
facts supported the instruction); Miller v. McAllister, 169 Ohio St. 487, 160 N.E.2d 
231 (1959), paragraph six of the syllabus (“In a negligence action, the so-called 
‘emergency doctrine’ applies only where there was a sudden and unexpected 
occurrence of a transitory nature which demanded immediate action without time 
for reflection or deliberation and does not comprehend a static condition which 
lasted over a period of time”). 
{¶ 61} Consistent with the broad judicial definitions of “emergency” in 
other Ohio statutory schemes, I would not limit an “emergency” for purposes of 
R.C. 2305.23 to those that are unforeseeable. 
January Term, 2016 
 
 
27 
Other state courts interpret “emergency” in their Good Samaritan statutes 
without reference to foreseeability 
 
{¶ 62} Notably, other states have not limited the term “emergency” in their 
Good Samaritan laws to emergencies that are unforeseeable.  Instead, they focus 
both on the nature of an emergency and the purpose of Good Samaritan laws.  As a 
California appellate court explained,  
 
An emergency within the meaning of the Good Samaritan 
statutes exists when there is an urgent medical circumstance of so 
pressing a character that some kind of action must be taken.  It would 
seem obvious that in determining whether a patient’s condition 
constitutes such an emergency the trier of fact must consider the 
gravity, the certainty, and the immediacy of the consequences to be 
expected if no action is taken.  However, beyond observing that 
these are the relevant considerations, the variety of situations that 
would qualify as emergencies under any reasonable set of criteria is 
too great to admit of anything approaching a bright line rule as to 
just how grave, how certain, and how immediate such consequences 
have to be. 
 
(Citations omitted.) Breazeal v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem. Hosp., 234 Cal.App.3d 
1329, 1338, 286 Cal.Rptr. 207 (1991).  See also Newhouse v. Osteopathic 
Examiners Bd., 159 Cal.App.2d 728, 735, 324 P.2d 687 (1958) (an emergency 
exists “where the exigency is of so pressing a character that some kind of action 
must be taken”). 
{¶ 63} In formulating definitions of “emergency,” other courts have 
effectuated the public policies that drove the enactment of Good Samaritan laws 
but recognized the limitations of torts, from which the Good Samaritan doctrine 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
devolves.  For example, in Texas law, “An ‘emergency’ is a condition arising 
suddenly and unexpectedly and not proximately caused by any negligent act or 
omission of the person in question and which calls for immediate action on his part 
and without time for deliberation.”  Eoff v. Hal & Charlie Peterson Found., 811 
S.W.2d 187, 191 (Tex.App.1991), citing Goolsbee v. Texas & New Orleans RR. 
Co., 243 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex.1951).  Thus, it is not necessary to use the legal 
concept of foreseeability to limit the scope of an “emergency” for purposes of R.C. 
2305.23. 
Summary Judgment was Entered Improperly by the Trial Court and 
Affirmed by the Appellate Court; the Determination of Emergency is a 
Question of Fact for a Jury 
 
{¶ 64} As the opinion of my fellow dissenter illustrates, reasonable minds 
may differ as to whether an emergency was extant in the cause before us.  That 
dissenting opinion illustrates why the determination of whether an emergency 
exists for purposes of R.C. 2305.23 is a question of fact for the jury rather than a 
question of law for the judge. 
{¶ 65} Although this court has never directly addressed this issue, our trial 
courts correctly recognize that, at least in some cases, whether the statutory 
elements of R.C. 2305.23 have been proven are questions for the jury. See, e.g., 
Dayton v. Brennan, 64 Ohio Law Abs. 525, 112 N.E.2d 837 (M.C.1952) (whether 
an emergency existed that would exempt an officer from speeding laws is a question 
of fact for the jury).  Accord Butler v. Rejon, 9th Dist. Summit No. 19699, 2000 
WL 141009 (Feb. 2, 2000) (trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the Good 
Samaritan statute was proper because there was no evidence to support the defense, 
indicating that had there been sufficient evidence, the question would have gone to 
the jury). 
{¶ 66} Our sister courts have directly addressed the propriety of summary 
judgment in the context of Good Samaritan laws.  “[T]here is ample authority that 
January Term, 2016 
 
 
29 
[the] applicability [of the Good Samaritan statute] as to whether an emergency 
existed or not may be a question of fact for the jury.” Jackson v. Mercy Health Ctr., 
1993 OK 155, 864 P.2d at 846 (Summers, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 67} As the Supreme Court of North Dakota has explained, a Good 
Samaritan act is essentially a defense that requires the proponent to establish that 
he or she reasonably believed that an emergency was occurring, that immediate 
action was required to prevent death or serious injury, and that he or she could 
successfully assist the party in peril.  McDowell, 2001 ND 91, 626 N.W.2d 666,  
¶ 21.  Accord Willingham v. Hudson, 274 Ga.App. 200, 202-203, 617 S.E.2d 192 
(2005) (noting that the burden of proof rested upon the proponent of the state’s 
Good Samaritan immunity defense, that he discharged his burden by citing 
affidavits, deposition testimony, and medical records and invoices, and that the 
burden then shifted to the person who had been in peril to point to specific 
documentary evidence of record, beyond mere accusations, that gave rise to a 
triable issue refuting the applicability of Good Samaritan immunity). 
{¶ 68} Evaluating the putative Good Samaritan requires looking at the 
“overall perception of the nature and severity of the injury or illness and the total 
emergency situation.”  McDowell at ¶ 21.  “Thus, the statute combines elements of 
the reasonable person standard as well as the aider’s subjective state of mind. 
Generally, issues involving the reasonable person standard and a person’s 
subjective state of mind are inappropriate for disposition by summary judgment.”  
Id.  And the question whether there is an emergency that warrants application of a 
Good Samaritan statute is “an issue of fact not amenable to summary judgment 
disposition.”  Id., citing Travers v. Vaz, 714 A.2d 603, 604 (R.I.1998).  See also 
Charleston Station, L.L.C. v. Stephens, Nev.Sup.Ct. No. 63943, 2015 WL 9480322, 
*3 (Dec. 23, 2015) (in appeal arising in part from the application of Nevada’s Good 
Samaritan act, reiterating rule that “[e]xcept in rare cases where the reasonableness 
of the defendant’s actions is clear, determining whether a defendant acted 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
reasonably is a question of fact for the jury to decide”); Travers at 604 (“whether 
there existed an emergency situation that warranted the application of the Good 
Samaritan statute is also an issue of fact”); Jefferson Cty. School Dist. R-1 v. Justus, 
725 P.2d 767, 771 (Colo.1986) (holding that the application of  the “assumed duty” 
or Good Samaritan doctrine  is “obviously not a purely legal question,” but rather, 
a mixed question of law and fact). 
{¶ 69} I would hold, consistent with other states’ high and appellate courts, 
that whether a party has properly invoked the application of a Good Samaritan 
statute is a mixed question of law and fact for the jury, at least in some cases.  This 
is such a case. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 70} I dissent as to the definition of “emergency” provided by the 
majority that limits emergencies to “unforeseeable” situations, and I dissent from 
its judgment, which affirms the grant of summary judgment on an issue that should 
be decided by the jury. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 71} I agree with both paragraphs of the syllabus; they are good law, and 
just, too.  But the majority opinion applies the law a bit too loosely for one simple 
reason: the situation that confronted Larry Reese Jr. was not an emergency; 
therefore, he ought not to be protected by the Good Samaritan statute. 
{¶ 72} The Good Samaritan statute does not apply to this case because, 
although Reese provided care, he did so when urgent or immediate action was not 
necessary.  Dennis Carter was trapped, to be sure.  But he was not in pain, and he 
was not in danger.  He was inconvenienced and he wanted to get out, but the 
situation did not demand urgent action.  It demanded rational action, reasoned to fit 
January Term, 2016 
 
 
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the situation.  Hesitation or delay was not dangerous to Carter, because he was not 
in pain and no detrimental change in his situation was imminent. 
{¶ 73} The majority opinion defines an emergency as “ ‘an unforeseen 
combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action,’ 
” quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 741 (1986).  Majority 
opinion at ¶ 31.  “Immediate action” was not needed to help Carter, as it would 
have been if, for example, he were about to fall off a building or if the truck had 
been rolling toward him.  What Carter needed was a person competent to move a 
tractor-trailer forward without allowing any movement backward.  That did not 
have to be done immediately or urgently―it needed to be done well.  
Unfortunately, it was not done well, because Reese didn’t know how to drive a 
tractor-trailer.  Reese should have sought assistance from a competent driver.  
Instead, he inserted himself into a situation that did not demand immediate action 
and made the situation much worse.  Because the situation did not demand 
immediate or urgent action, Reese should not be shielded by the Good Samaritan 
statute, which only protects those who render care when there is an emergency. 
{¶ 74} Although I agree with the syllabus, I disagree with today’s judgment.  
I would reverse the court of appeals’ judgment on the merits.  Accordingly, I 
dissent. 
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Robert A. Winter Jr. and Stephanie Collins, for appellants. 
Markesbery & Richardson Co., L.P.A., Katherine A. Clemons, and Glenn 
A. Markesbery, for appellee Larry Reese Jr. 
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