Case Title: State v. Agustin Velez

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP002430-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2430-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Agustin Velez,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  214 Wis. 2d 589, 571 N.W.2d 923 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-Unpublished) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 12, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 12, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
David Hansher 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bradley, J., concurs (Opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J., joins 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Scott B. Taylor and Lucas, Wilkoski & Taylor, West 
Allis and oral argument by Scott B. Taylor. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Agustin Velez,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
FILED 
 
FEB 12, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.   The issue in this case is 
whether the circuit court erred when it did not conduct a due 
process evidentiary hearing following the defendant's allegation 
that the State deliberately delayed charging him with the crime 
of first degree murder to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction.  We 
hold that the circuit court did not err. 
¶2 
The defendant-appellant-petitioner appeals a decision 
of the court of appeals upholding the decision of the circuit 
court for Milwaukee County, the Honorable David A. Hansher, that 
an evidentiary hearing was unwarranted under the facts of this 
case. 
¶3 
Of the several issues the defendant raised in the 
court of appeals, only his claim that the circuit court erred in 
failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing is renewed here. 
I 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
2 
¶4 
The relevant facts are as follows.  On August 23, 
1994, the defendant, Agustin Velez, was charged as an adult with 
first-degree intentional homicide for a crime committed on June 
14, 1994, a date on which the defendant was a juvenile. 
¶5 
Early in their investigation, police identified the 
juvenile Velez as a suspect in the murder of James Lovett. The 
record reveals that shortly after the murder was committed, the 
police spoke with eye witnesses who placed Velez at the crime 
scene on the night of the murder and also identified Velez as 
the murderer. 
¶6 
On June 22, 1994, with the support of an affidavit 
describing the circumstances surrounding the June 14, 1994 
murder, 
the 
Milwaukee 
County 
Assistant 
District 
Attorney 
requested of the Judicial Court Commissioner of the Children's 
Division of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court a warrant for the 
arrest of the juvenile Velez.  The affiant, a law enforcement 
officer employed by the City and County of Milwaukee, State of 
Wisconsin Police Department,1 and liaison between the department 
and the children's court, attested to familiarity with police 
reports stemming from the June 14 murder, which placed Velez at 
the murder scene the night of the crime and identified Velez as 
a suspect.  The affiant further attested that those same police 
reports described the unsuccessful attempts made by the City of 
Milwaukee police officers to locate Velez at his mother's home 
                     
1 The affiant himself stated in his affidavit that he was so 
employed.  
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
3 
and the homes of his acquaintances.  Finding probable cause, the 
Judicial Court Commissioner issued the requested warrant for the 
arrest of the juvenile Velez on June 22, 1994. 
¶7 
The police did not locate the defendant while he was a 
juvenile.  When the defendant became an adult on August 2, 1994, 
the juvenile court warrant was withdrawn, and a criminal warrant 
was issued in its place.  Then, following an anonymous tip on an 
unrelated matter, the defendant was apprehended on August 19, 
1994.  The criminal complaint issued August 23, 1994, not quite 
three weeks after the defendant became an adult under the law in 
effect at the time.2 
¶8 
On September 2, 1994, the defendant moved to dismiss 
the complaint against him for lack of jurisdiction.  He renewed 
the motion on October 19, 1994, supporting it with a memorandum 
and affidavit.  He requested the court hold an evidentiary 
hearing on whether the State intentionally "manipulated the 
system" in order to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction when it 
did not file a criminal complaint against Velez until more than 
two months after he had been identified as a suspect, and nearly 
three weeks after he became an adult. 
                     
2 The age at which a court of criminal jurisdiction has 
original jurisdiction of a defendant accused of committing a 
crime has since been lowered from 18 to 17.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 
938.02(1) and (10m), and 938.12 (1995-96).  The age at which a 
court of criminal jurisdiction has original jurisdiction of a 
defendant accused of committing an intentional homicide has 
since been lowered to ten.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(am) and 
(2)(a) (1995-96).  
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
4 
¶9 
With his memorandum, the defendant identified two 
areas of inquiry for an evidentiary hearing:  first, he 
contended that the State should have filed a delinquency 
petition in Children's Court, not, as it did, a request for a 
warrant for the arrest of a juvenile.  Second, the defendant 
believed that the arrest warrant, obtained on June 22, 1994, was 
"apparently" not entered into the Crime Information Bureau (CIB) 
and/or the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) computer 
systems, which, he further alleged, would have alerted law 
enforcement agencies nationwide that the defendant was being 
sought by the Milwaukee Police Department. 
¶10 Without holding the requested evidentiary hearing, the 
circuit court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. At a 
nonevidentiary hearing on the motion, held October 31, 1994, the 
circuit court determined that before a defendant was entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing on the question, the defendant needed to 
make some threshold showing of manipulative intent.  The court 
found that the defendant had failed to make that sufficient 
initial showing following its examination of the defendant's 
motion, the defendant's counsel's affidavit and memorandum of 
law, as well as the prosecutor's offer of proof on the issue. 
¶11 In reaching its decision, the circuit court placed a 
fair degree of significance upon the prosecutor's offer of 
proof, which included the following: first, after identifying 
Velez as a suspect, the police were initially unable to locate 
him; second, because the defendant could not be located, the 
prosecutor requested of the Children's Court a warrant for his 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
5 
arrestunder circumstances where a suspect cannot be located, a 
warrant as issued here, not a delinquency petition, is the 
appropriate course of action; third, following the issuance of 
the warrant,  police continued to search for the defendant but 
were unsuccessful; finally, police in other cities did make 
attempts to locate Velezfor instance, following anonymous tips 
that Velez was located outside Milwaukee, the police contacted 
the Gang Crimes Units in at least two other cities, which in 
turn made their own attempts to find him. 
¶12 After accepting the prosecutor's offer of proof, the 
circuit court asked the defendant to make his own offer of 
proof.  The defendant's counsel repeated the allegations 
contained in the motion but was not prepared to offer additional 
facts in support of his position, nor any evidence tending to 
contradict the State's offer.  The circuit court stated that 
without more, the allegations offered by the defense were 
insufficient to support the holding of an evidentiary hearing.  
The court twice offered the defendant an opportunity for his 
requested evidentiary hearing at a later date if he could "come 
up any time prior to trial and submit affidavits showing 
manipulative intent by the District Attorney's Office or police 
department."  The court entered an order denying the defendant's 
motion to dismiss on November 4, 1994. 
¶13 Following the hearing and prior to the defendant's 
trial, the circuit court issued an order to the Milwaukee Police 
Department 
to 
provide 
the 
defendant's 
counsel 
with 
any 
documentation that would verify the entering of the warrant 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
6 
issued by the Children's Court into the CIB or NCIC systems.  On 
December 12, 1994, the Milwaukee Police Department responded to 
the court order with a departmental memorandum and attachments 
from the NCIC and the CIB verifying that the warrant was entered 
into both computer systems on June 22, 1994, the same date the 
warrant issued. 
¶14 Despite the circuit court's invitation, the defendant 
did not bring forward any additional evidence that the State or 
the police department intentionally manipulated the system in 
order to charge him as an adult.  An evidentiary hearing was 
never held. 
¶15 At his subsequent jury trial in January 1995, the 
defendant was convicted of one count of First Degree Intentional 
Homicide, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1).  He was sentenced 
to a term of life imprisonment in the Wisconsin prison system. 
¶16 The defendant appealed.  With respect to the circuit 
court's denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing, the 
court of appeals, in an unpublished opinion, concluded that 
because the State had refuted the defendant's claim of a 
manipulative 
intent 
at 
the 
nonevidentiary 
hearing, 
an 
evidentiary hearing was not required. 
II 
¶17 "[W]hen the charging 
authorities 
have 
reason to 
believe that a child has committed an offense which, if 
committed by an adult, constitutes a crime, jurisdiction in a 
criminal court cannot be maintained on a charge brought after 
the child becomes eighteen, unless it is affirmatively shown 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
7 
that the delay was not for the purpose of manipulating the 
system to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction."  State v. Becker, 
74 Wis. 2d 675, 678, 247 N.W.2d 495 (1976); see also State v. 
Avery, 80 Wis. 2d 305, 310, 259 N.W.2d 63 (1977), overruled in 
part on other grounds by State v. Montgomery, 148 Wis. 2d 593, 
436 N.W.2d 303 (1989); Montgomery, 148 Wis. 2d 593.  The State 
bears the burden of proving that it did not intentionally delay 
charging the defendant in order to avoid juvenile jurisdiction. 
 Montgomery, 148 Wis. 2d at 604; see also Becker, 74 Wis. 2d at 
678. 
¶18 The issue presented for our review requires us to 
determine whether a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing as a matter of right whenever he or she makes the mere 
allegation that the State intentionally "manipulated the system" 
to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction. 
¶19 The defendant's argument is essentially two-fold.  
First, relying upon our decisions in Becker, Avery, and 
Montgomery, the defendant argues that a motion to dismiss that 
no more than alleges that the State intentionally manipulated 
the system in order to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction 
automatically triggers his right to an evidentiary hearing on 
the issue.  Therefore, because he did make that allegation in 
his motion, he was entitled to his hearing.  Second, if, in 
addition to the allegation, he is required to allege facts 
which, if true, would entitle him to the relief he sought, he 
argues that he did allege such facts.  In either event, he 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
8 
argues that he should have received the requested evidentiary 
hearing. 
¶20 The State finds less significance in the holdings of 
Becker, Avery, and Montgomery than does the defendant.  For its 
part, the State believes that these cases set forth the 
procedure by which a defendant may request reliefthrough a 
motion to dismiss as the defendant made herenot that the cases 
require an evidentiary hearing as a matter of right.  In the 
State's view, a motion devoid of the factual basis upon which 
relief could be granted should not entitle the defendant to an 
evidentiary hearing.  It argues that at a minimum, the defendant 
must be required to present some factual basis for holding the 
evidentiary hearing. 
¶21 The State proposes that a defendant should be required 
to move to dismiss the criminal charges and that the motion to 
dismiss itself be subject to established procedure required of 
motion practice generally.  That procedure would first require 
that the defendant's motion state with particularity the grounds 
upon which the motion is based. See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 
597, 
606, 
563 
N.W.2d 
501 
(1997); 
see 
also 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.30(2)(c) (1995-96).  Second, the procedure would require 
that the motion to dismiss raise a question of fact sufficient 
to warrant an evidentiary hearing.  See State v. Garner, 207 
Wis. 2d 520, 531-32, 558 N.W.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing 
Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 497-98, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972)). 
 To adequately meet the second step, the defendant would need to 
meet the standards adopted by this court in Nelson for 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
9 
postconviction motions to vacate pleas of guilty, which the 
State proposes should be applied here as the standard for 
pretrial motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
¶22 We agree with the State that an evidentiary hearing on 
the issue presented is not a right as a matter of course, and 
that 
the 
Nelson 
standards, 
with 
additional 
due 
process 
safeguards, may be appropriately adopted for use in the instant 
case. 
¶23 In Nelson, we held that before a defendant was 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction motion 
to withdraw a plea of guilty, he first needed to make a showing 
that the relief sought was warranted.  Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 
497.  We further set forth the standard by which a circuit court 
would determine the necessity of that hearing: 
 
if a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after judgment 
and sentence alleges facts which, if true, would 
entitle the defendant to relief, the trial court must 
hold 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing. 
 
However, 
if 
the 
defendant fails to allege sufficient facts in his 
motion to raise a question of fact, or presents only 
conclusionary 
allegations, 
or 
if 
the 
record 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not 
entitled to relief, the trial court may in the 
exercise of its legal discretion deny the motion 
without a hearing. 
Id. at 497-98. 
¶24 The defendant distinguishes the facts of Nelson from 
those here on the basis that Nelson concerned a defendant's 
postconviction motion, not a pretrial motion.  However, the 
defendant points to no significance in the distinction he draws. 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
10
¶25 Some of the very reasons we require that the defendant 
make a prima facie showing for an evidentiary hearing following 
a postconviction motion are relevant with respect to a pretrial 
motion.  First, by showing that the relief sought may be 
warranted, we conserve scarce judicial resources by eliminating 
unnecessary evidentiary hearings when there may be no disputed 
facts requiring resolution, or when the facts would not warrant 
the relief sought even if proved.  See Garner, 207 Wis. 2d at 
527-528.  Second, where an evidentiary hearing is necessary, a 
full statement of the facts in dispute allows both parties to 
prepare and to litigate the real issues more efficiently and the 
evidentiary hearing will serve as more than a discovery device. 
 See id. at 528. 
¶26 To be sure, we noted in Nelson that the standard 
therein adopted was an exception to the traditional rule that 
hearings are to be liberally granted if a motion is made prior 
to judgment or sentence.  Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 496 (citation 
omitted).  However, despite the traditional rule, an evidentiary 
hearing need not be granted as a matter of course when requested 
prior to trial.  We agree with the Seventh Circuit that a "court 
does not have to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion just 
because a party asks for one.  An evidentiary hearing is 
necessary only if the party requesting the hearing raises a 
significant, disputed factual issue."  United States v. Sophie, 
900 F.2d 1064, 1070 (7th Cir. 1990). 
¶27 On at least one occasion in Wisconsin, the Nelson 
standards have been applied to a defendant's pretrial motion.  
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
11
In Garner, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals considered a pretrial 
motion challenging the admissibility of identification evidence 
and found that the application of the Nelson standards provided 
a "solid foundation on which to build the analysis [of whether 
an evidentiary hearing was warranted]"  Garner, 207 Wis. 2d at 
532.  
¶28 We find that the Nelson standards may also be applied 
in the context of a pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction based upon "manipulative intent" to avoid juvenile 
court jurisdiction.  However, the Nelson standards are not, by 
themselves, sufficient to protect a defendant's due process 
rights when he is bringing a motion prior to trial.  We must be 
mindful of the inherent difficulties a defendant may have in 
developing the facts necessary to support a pretrial motion, a 
situation to which the court of appeals in Garner was sensitive: 
unlike the plentiful record often available to a defendant 
making a postconviction motion, at a pretrial motion, a 
defendant is often not in a position to have the necessary and 
proper facts before him on the ultimate question.  Garner, 207 
Wis. 2d at 532-33.  With an eye to this problem, the Garner 
court found that application of only the Nelson standards to a 
pretrial 
motion 
to 
suppress 
identification 
would 
be 
insufficient.  Id. at 533.  As remedy, the Garner court 
described the addition of a safeguard: 
 
[A]lthough a defendant may be unable to allege 
sufficient specific facts to warrant relief, a trial 
court must provide the defendant the opportunity to 
develop the factual record where the motion, alleged 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
12
facts, inferences fairly drawn from the alleged facts, 
offers of proof, and defense counsel's legal theory 
satisfy the court of a reasonable possibility that an 
evidentiary hearing will establish the factual basis 
on which the defendant's motion may prevail.  
 
Id. at 533. 
¶29 We hold that the Nelson standards for granting an 
evidentiary hearing, coupled with the safeguards provided by 
Garner, are applicable to a circuit court's consideration of a 
pretrial motion to dismiss where the defendant alleges the 
State's 
manipulative 
intent 
to 
avoid 
juvenile 
court 
jurisdiction.  A circuit court's consideration of both standards 
will sufficiently protect a defendant's right to due process. 
¶30 These 
due 
process 
rights 
in 
issue 
are 
not 
insignificant.  The deliberate delay in instituting proceedings 
until 
a 
juvenile 
offender 
becomes 
an 
adult 
within 
the 
jurisdiction of the criminal court unfairly deprives a juvenile 
offender of the opportunity he or she otherwise would have had 
to a waiver hearing on whether the criminal court should 
exercise its jurisdiction.  See Avery, 80 Wis. 2d at 310-11.  
The significance of the due process right in issue was first 
identified in Miller v. Quatsoe, 348 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Wis. 
1972).  In Miller, the defendant, while in custody in the county 
jail and within three weeks of his eighteenth birthday, stabbed 
a guard with a ballpoint pen.  The authorities deferred the 
prosecution until he turned 18, and then charged him in circuit 
court, thereby avoiding the juvenile waiver proceeding. 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
13
¶31 The court in Miller noted that when "a state operates 
a dual criminal justice system with one set of procedures and 
penalties for juveniles and another for adults" constitutional 
safeguards attach to a determination that a juvenile offender 
should be treated as an adult.  Id. at 765.  Therefore, when the 
filing of a criminal complaint determines juvenile court 
jurisdiction, the filing could not be delayed in order to avoid 
juvenile court jurisdiction unless "the juvenile is granted a 
hearing with the necessary constitutional safeguards."  Id. at 
766. 
¶32 We adopted the reasoning of Miller in Becker, where we 
wrote that "where the filing [of a criminal complaint] is 
'delayed in order to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction,' the 
circuit court can maintain jurisdiction only after a due-process 
hearing."  Becker, 74 Wis. 2d at 677 (emphasis in the original). 
 The hearing is conducted to determine "whether the delay in 
charging was in fact occasioned by a deliberate effort to avoid 
juvenile court jurisdiction."  Id.  We then suggested that "when 
criminal courts face this problem in the future and are 
confronted with the question of whether the prosecution delayed 
charging to avoid juvenile-court jurisdiction, the adult court, 
upon motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, proceed to 
resolve the Miller issues."  Id. at 680. 
¶33 Here, the circuit court did hold a hearing on the 
defendant's motion to dismiss.  And although not an evidentiary 
hearing, the hearing was sufficient to protect the defendant's 
right to due process as required by Becker.  The circuit court 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
14
properly considered whether the defendant placed into issue any 
question of fact that could have led to relief, and found that 
he had not.  We acknowledge that Montgomery clearly stated that 
the State has the burden of showing that any delay was not 
intentional.  Montgomery, 148 Wis. 2d at 604.  However, we find 
that requiring the defendant to bring forward some facts which, 
if true, would entitle the defendant to relief is not in 
conflict with the State's burden to prove that it did not have a 
manipulative intent.   
¶34 The general notion of "burden of proof" has two 
aspects:  the burden of producing some probative evidence on a 
particular issue, and the burden of persuading the fact finder 
with respect to that issue.  Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 
695 n.20 (1975); Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., 
Criminal Law 44-45 (1972).  The principles of due process are 
not violated if the burden of production, as opposed to the 
burden of persuasion, is placed upon a defendant.  For instance, 
a defendant is required to produce some evidence in support of 
his or her affirmative defenses even though the State bears the 
ultimate burden of proof on that issue.  State v. Schulz, 102 
Wis. 2d 423, 430, 307 N.W.2d 151 (1981); see also State v. 
Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 640, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) ("a 
defendant's due process rights are not violated when a burden of 
production, as opposed to a burden of persuasion, is placed upon 
a defendant to start matters off by putting in some evidence of 
the negative defense." (citations omitted)(emphasis in the 
original)).  In a matter more analogous to that here, where a 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
15
defendant claims governmental misconduct, he or she may first be 
required to meet a burden of production.  See United States v. 
Carter, 966 F. Supp. 336, 343 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
¶35 Finally, we do not agree with the defendant's view 
that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing because his motion 
properly identified the basis upon which relief could be 
granted.  To accept his view would be to create a rebuttable 
presumption of the State's manipulative intent whenever an adult 
is arrested for a crime committed when the adult was still a 
juvenile.  Our prior cases do not go so far as to create this 
presumption.  We deem it appropriate to require that the 
defendant make a prima facie showing of manipulative intent 
before gaining as a matter of right his or her request for an 
evidentiary hearing.  We recognize that the State bears the 
ultimate burden of proof on the issue. 
¶36 We hold that a nonevidentiary hearing on a defendant's 
motion to dismiss used to determine whether an evidentiary 
hearing is required satisfies the due process hearing required 
of Becker.  At the nonevidentiary hearing on the motion, the 
circuit court must determine whether an evidentiary hearing is 
required under the Nelson standards.  Nelson demands the 
application of a two-part test.  State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 
303, 310, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).  "If the [defendant's] motion on 
its face alleges facts which would entitle the defendant to 
relief, the circuit court has no discretion and must hold an 
evidentiary hearing."  Id. (citing Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 497).  
However, if the motion does not allege sufficient facts, the 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
16
circuit court has the discretion to deny the motion without 
holding an evidentiary hearing if it finds one of the following 
circumstances: 1) the defendant failed to allege sufficient 
facts in his or her motion to raise a question of fact; 2) the 
defendant presented only conclusory allegations; or 3) the 
record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not 
entitled to relief.  Id. at 310, 311. 
¶37 Further, because we consider here a pretrial motion, 
we modify the second part of the Nelson test to accommodate the 
inherent difficulties presented a defendant when making a 
pretrial motion as the defendant does here.  Where the circuit 
court must use its discretion in determining whether to grant an 
evidentiary hearing, it must: 
 
carefully consider the record, the motion, counsels' 
arguments and/or offers of proof, and the law.  Where 
the record establishes no factual scenario or legal 
theory on which the defendant may prevail, and/or 
where the defendant holds only hope but articulates no 
factually-based good faith belief that any impropriety 
will be exposed through an evidentiary hearing, the 
evidentiary hearing is not required. 
Garner, 207 Wis. 2d at 534-35.  Where there is a reasonable 
possibility that the defendant will establish the factual basis 
at an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court must "provide the 
defendant the opportunity to develop the factual record."  Id. 
at 533. 
III 
¶38 Applying Nelson, we must first determine whether the 
defendant's motion alleged sufficient facts which would entitle 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
17
him to the dismissal of the charges against him due to the 
State's manipulative intent.  See Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311.  
 Such an allegation is required in order for a defendant to meet 
his or her initial burden of production on the issue.  If a 
defendant's motion does allege sufficient facts, an evidentiary 
hearing is required.  Id.  Whether a defendant alleged facts 
sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing is a question of 
law which we review de novo.  Id.   However, if a defendant's 
motion does not allege sufficient facts, the circuit court has 
the discretion to deny the motion without an evidentiary hearing 
for any of the three reasons enumerated in Nelson.  Id. at 310-
11.  Further, because a pretrial motion is in issue, in 
exercising its discretion under the second part of the Nelson 
test, the circuit court must take into consideration the record, 
motion, counsel's arguments and offers of proof, and the law.  
Garner, 207 Wis. 2d at 534-35.  We use the deferential erroneous 
exercise of discretion standard in reviewing a circuit court's 
discretionary decision.  Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311. 
¶39 Velez's allegation was two-fold.  First, he alleged 
that a juvenile delinquency petition, not a warrant for the 
arrest of a juvenile, should have been issued from the 
Children's Court.  His second allegation was that the warrant 
for his arrest, once issued, might not have been entered into 
the NCIC or CIB computer systems.  We find that with these two 
allegations, the defendant failed to meet his burden of 
production in alleging sufficient facts entitling him to an 
evidentiary hearing under the first prong of the Nelson test. 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
18
¶40 The defendant's allegation that the State could not 
request a warrant for an arrest in place of a juvenile 
delinquency petition is unsupported by facts.  The defendant 
noted in his memorandum on the motion that the State did not 
pursue him with a capias issued by a judge as authorized by Wis. 
Stat. § 48.19(1)(b).  The defendant questioned the State's 
request for a warrant, but did not bring forward any evidence 
that such a request was improperhe further suggested that the 
practice here was unusual, but provided no facts that this was 
true.  At most, the defendant's memorandum maintains that had 
the State requested a delinquency petition instead of a warrant 
for arrest, the State would have provided notice to the 
defendant or the defendant's parent that could have, in turn, 
provided the defendant an opportunity to have a chance of 
remaining in the juvenile system.  At best, the allegation 
points to the State's negligence, which would still not entitle 
the defendant to the relief sought since the State's negligent 
delay in bringing criminal charges does not constitute a due 
process violation.  Montgomery, 148 Wis. 2d at 602-03. 
¶41 We also find the defendant's second allegation to be 
speculation, insufficient to entitle him to an evidentiary 
hearing.  The defendant alleged that the warrant may not have 
been entered into either of the two nationwide computer systems. 
 This allegation is not a fact upon which relief could be 
granted.  The defendant's counsel's affidavit details a number 
of requests made for conclusive evidence of when, if ever, the 
warrant was entered into the computer systems.  Counsel received 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
19
little satisfaction and nothing that would constitute proof of 
its entry.  However, an evidentiary hearing is not a discovery 
device and the questions that defendant's counsel had regarding 
the entry of the warrant into the computer system does not 
present a fact sufficient to entitle the defendant to the relief 
sought. 
¶42 We find that the defendant alleged no facts which 
would have entitled him to an evidentiary hearing.  Because we 
find that no facts alleged would have been sufficient for the 
relief sought, we find that the circuit court committed no error 
of law.  The first of the two-part Nelson test was not satisfied 
by the defendant, and therefore no evidentiary hearing was 
required. 
¶43 Where the first of the two-part Nelson test is not 
satisfied, the circuit court is to use its discretion in 
determining whether to grant the evidentiary hearing even though 
sufficient facts are not alleged.  Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311. 
 Because this motion was brought prior to trial, the circuit 
court's discretion must be made with consideration of the 
guidelines articulated in Garner. 
¶44 The circuit court properly exercised its discretion 
under the facts and did so considering the information required 
of Garner.  In concluding that the defendant was not entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court considered the 
defendant's motion, memorandum of law and affidavit, and both 
parties' offers of proof.  Included in the assistant district 
attorney's offer of proof was the statement that the police were 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
20
continuing to look for Velez following the murder but were 
unable to find him, and that the issuance of a warrant, as 
opposed to a delinquency petition, was the appropriate method of 
apprehending a suspect who could not be found.  The defendant 
was unable to contribute any additional facts in support of his 
allegation. 
¶45 The defendant did not dispute the State's offer to 
prove that the police made a good faith effort to find the 
defendant before his birthday; he questioned whether the 
juvenile warrant had been entered into the computerized crime 
information system.  His counsel's own affidavit, in addition to 
his statements that he was unable to find conclusive evidence 
that the warrant was or was not entered, established that a 
Milwaukee police officer, working the warrant desk, "believed"  
that the warrant had been entered.  The defendant simply had 
difficulty confirming or denying this belief.  This evidence 
does not support an allegation of intentional manipulation of 
the system by the police. 
¶46 We find of particular import the invitation the 
circuit court made to the defendant to come before the court at 
any time prior to trial with additional facts if he coulda 
safety measure that adequately protected this defendant who 
faced pretrial motion evidentiary hurdles.  The defendant was 
allowed time to develop a factual record prior to trial and make 
a request for an evidentiary hearing when he had some facts to 
support his allegations.  Notably, the circuit court took the 
additional step of ordering discovery on the defendant's 
No. 96-2430-CR 
 
21
allegation that the arrest warrant may not have been entered 
into the computer system.  The police department responded to 
that order and conclusively demonstrated that the warrant was 
indeed entered.  Under these circumstances, we find that the 
defendant was not denied due process in the proceedings.  The 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
determining that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. 
¶47 The 
defendant's 
evidence 
does 
not 
support 
his 
allegation of the State's intentional manipulation of the 
criminal justice system.  We conclude that the circuit court 
properly exercised discretion in denying Velez's motion without 
an evidentiary hearing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
No.  96-2430-CR.ab  
¶48 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Concurring).   I agree with the 
majority that the decision of the court of appeals should be 
affirmed.  I also agree with the test adopted by the majority.  
I write separately, however, because I disagree with the 
application of the test to the facts of this case. 
¶49 Under Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 496-98, 195 
N.W.2d 629 (1972), a defendant must "allege[] facts which, if 
true, would entitle the defendant to relief" in order to receive 
an evidentiary hearing.  If the defendant makes only conclusory 
allegations or does not allege sufficient facts to raise a 
question of fact, the defendant is not entitled to such a 
hearing.  This post-conviction test places a considerable burden 
on a defendant.  Thus the majority correctly tempers the post-
conviction Nelson test by adopting the rationale of State v. 
Garner, 207 Wis. 2d 520, 558 N.W.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1996): 
 
[A]lthough a defendant may be unable to allege 
sufficient specific facts to warrant relief, a trial 
court must provide the defendant the opportunity to 
develop the factual record where the motion, alleged 
facts, inferences fairly drawn from the alleged facts, 
offers of proof, and defense counsel's legal theory 
satisfy the court of a reasonable possibility that an 
evidentiary hearing will establish the factual basis 
on which the defendant's motion may prevail. . . . 
[H]owever, 
a 
defendant 
is 
not 
entitled 
to 
an 
evidentiary hearing simply to search for something 
based on nothing but hope or pure speculation. 
 
Thus, 
in 
determining 
whether 
to 
grant 
an 
evidentiary hearing, trial courts must, on a case-by-
case basis, carefully consider the record, the motion, 
counsels' arguments and/or offers of proof, and the 
law.  Where the record establishes no factual scenario 
or legal theory on which the defendant may prevail, 
and/or where the defendant holds only hope but 
No.  96-2430-CR.ab 
 
2 
articulates no factually-based good faith belief that 
any impropriety will be exposed through an evidentiary 
hearing, the evidentiary hearing is not required.  Id. 
at 533-35 (emphasis in original). 
¶50 Velez alleged that the police department violated his 
due process rights by intentionally waiting until he had reached 
his eighteenth birthday before seriously attempting to arrest 
and charge him.  To support his allegation, Velez included an 
affidavit detailing his trial counsel's attempts to obtain  
information about the efforts of the police department to 
apprehend him. 
¶51 The affidavit described how Velez's attorney obtained 
information from a detective in the Milwaukee County Sheriff's 
Department and an officer in the Milwaukee Police Department.  
Based on those discussions, the attorney learned that the police 
had possibly failed to enter the warrant for Velez's arrest into 
various databases to aide in his apprehension.  Additionally, 
the affidavit described how the police department either 
rebuffed or ignored his attorney's subsequent attempts for 
clarification on this matter.  Finally, the affidavit described 
how his attorney's perusal of his juvenile records discovered 
documents implying that a juvenile warrant had never been issued 
or entered into the computer system. 
¶52 Standing 
alone, 
these assertions 
would 
not 
have 
definitively 
demonstrated 
that 
the 
police 
department 
deliberately delayed its efforts to apprehend Velez until he 
became an adult.  That is to say, the Nelson test would not be 
satisfied by this affidavit.  However, Velez did more than 
No.  96-2430-CR.ab 
 
3 
assert conclusory allegations.  Rather, he articulated a 
specific factual basis that supported his legal theory. 
¶53 Velez's affidavit documented both suspicious police 
activity prior to his arrest and an apparent attempt by the 
police department to frustrate his attempts at uncovering that 
suspicious activity.  In light of this "factually-based good 
faith belief" that something improper had occurred, I cannot 
conclude that Velez sought a hearing "based on nothing but hope 
or pure speculation."  Garner, 207 Wis. 2d at 534-35.  The 
circuit court erred in not granting Velez an evidentiary 
hearing. 
¶54 If my disagreement with the majority opinion was 
merely a difference of whether the affidavit in this case was 
sufficient, I would not write separately.  But the opinion of 
the majority sets the contours for future cases and defines how 
the test that it adopts is to be applied.  In concluding that 
the 
factual 
allegations 
are 
insufficient 
to 
warrant 
an 
evidentiary hearing the majority places an almost insurmountable 
burden on the defendant in this pretrial motion.   
¶55 The majority acknowledges the "inherent difficulties a 
defendant may have in developing the facts necessary to support 
a pretrial motion" (majority op. at 11), yet affords little 
recourse.  This is especially troublesome where, as here, the 
evidence necessary to demonstrate manipulation of the system in 
order to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction will most likely be 
exclusively in the control of the State.  There will be few 
"smoking guns" alleged as a factual basis for an evidentiary 
No.  96-2430-CR.ab 
 
4 
hearing.  Instead, the defendant will usually be left with 
alleging specific facts which constitute circumstantial evidence 
and arguing the reasonable inferences from that evidence. 
¶56 Nevertheless, any error on the part of the circuit 
court does not warrant a new trial in this case.  At the time 
Velez sought the evidentiary hearing, the actions of the police 
department reasonably permitted the inference that it had 
deliberately attempted to delay Velez's arrest until his 
eighteenth birthday.  However, documents produced by the police 
department a month after the court erroneously denied Velez's 
motion for an evidentiary hearing make clear that the police did 
not engage in any misconduct.  Specifically, the police 
department produced a report, complete with copies of the actual 
documents in question, that detailed the thorough and proper 
procedures it followed in attempting to apprehend Velez while 
still a juvenile.  These documents resolved the very issue that 
Velez argues needed to be resolved by an evidentiary hearing.   
¶57 While I am concerned with the police department's 
delay in offering an adequate explanation, the fact remains that 
this issue is now conclusively answered.  Accordingly, I concur 
in the mandate of the court affirming the court of appeals. 
 
¶58 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson joins this concurring opinion.   
 
No.  96-2430-CR.ab 
 
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