Case Title: Mann v. Levin

Citation: 177 Vt. 261, 2004 VT 100, 861 A.2d 1138

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2004-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mann v. Levin (2003-394); 177 Vt. 261; 861 A.2d 1138

2004 VT 100

[Filed 01-Oct-2004]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2004 VT 100

                                No. 2003-394

  Bette Mann and Kelley Mann	                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Lamoille Superior Court

  Diane Levin	                                 June Term, 2004

  Edward J. Cashman, J.

  Heather Rider Hammond and Robert F. O'Neill of Gravel and Shea, Burlington,
    for  Plaintiffs-Appellees.

  Christopher D. Roy of Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, Burlington, for
    Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., (FN1) Dooley, (FN2) Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ.

        
       ¶  1.  REIBER, J.  In this appeal, we consider whether the trial
  court erred in interpreting  the terms of a restrictive covenant that
  limited the "height" of any building on defendant Diane Levin's property to
  that of a neighboring farmhouse.  The trial court found that the covenant
  was intended as a scenic easement, and thus, it restricted buildings from
  exceeding the absolute elevation, or "ridge line," of the farmhouse. 
  Because Levin's building exceeded the ridge line by approximately seven
  feet, the court granted permanent injunctive relief to plaintiffs Bette and
  Kelly Mann, and ordered Levin to reduce the height of her building.  Levin
  appealed, arguing that the court erred in interpreting the covenant.  We
  affirm.

       ¶  2.  Levin and the Manns own real property in Jeffersonville,
  Vermont.  The property is located along Route 108, and it is surrounded by
  the mountain range that includes the Smuggler's Notch ski area and Mt.
  Mansfield.  Levin acquired title to her property as follows.  In 1994,
  Thomas Kontos subdivided property that he owned in Jeffersonville into
  three parcels, Parcel 1A, 1B, and 1C.  In December 1994, he sold Parcel 1A,
  and a right of first refusal in Parcel 1B, to Levin and her then-husband,
  Doug Walker.  The deed contained numerous restrictions, including the
  following covenant at issue in this appeal: 

    The 7.8 acre parcel [(Parcel 1A)] and the 3.2 acre parcel [(Parcel
    1B)] retained by the Grantors herein shall both be restricted for
    commercial or residential or light farming.  Any building must be
    limited to height no greater than the adjoining farmhouse (2 ½
    stories).  Specifically, steel-sided warehouse-type facilities are
    excluded, along with mobile homes. 

  It is undisputed that the "adjoining farmhouse" referred to in the deed is
  the Mannsview Inn, a bed and breakfast owned and operated by the Manns. 
   
       ¶  3.  In March 1999, Levin and Walker divorced, and they divided
  Parcel 1A into two lots.  Walker retained approximately 3.05 acres, and
  quit-claimed the remaining 4.89 acres to Levin.  Levin's quit-claim deed
  contained the building height restriction.  In September 1999, Levin and
  Walker exercised their option to purchase Parcel 1B.  Within "ten minutes"
  after purchasing the lot, Levin and Walker sold it to Demars Properties. 
  In December 2001, after a failed development attempt, Demars Properties
  sold Parcel 1B to the Manns.  Parcel 1B adjoins Walker's portion of Parcel
  1A, which in turn adjoins Levin's property.  The grade of Levin's property
  is at a higher elevation than that of the Inn.
        
       ¶  4.  In the summer of 2001, Levin excavated her lot.  She stripped
  the top soil and brought in numerous loads of fill.  In August 2002, she
  began construction of a building.  During the construction process, she
  showed the Manns several drawings of her proposed building, and assured
  them that her building would comply with the height restriction in the
  deed.  However, while Levin's building was being framed, and particularly
  after the roof trusses were added, Walker and the Manns became increasingly
  concerned that Levin's building would violate the height restriction.  In
  October 2002, Mrs. Mann wrote Levin a letter expressing her concerns, as
  did Walker.  Levin responded to Mrs. Mann by letter, asserting that her
  home complied with the restrictive covenant. 

       ¶  5.  In December 2002, the Manns filed suit against Levin, alleging
  that she had violated the terms of the restrictive covenant, and seeking
  permanent injunctive relief.  Levin filed a counterclaim, alleging that she
  had not violated the covenant, and that the Manns' claims were made solely
  to interfere with the construction on her lot.  On December 11, 2002, the
  court held a hearing on the Manns' motion for a temporary restraining order
  and preliminary injunction.  The court concluded that the covenant appeared
  to be ambiguous, and it ordered Levin not to increase the present height of
  her building pending a trial on the merits.  
   
       ¶  6.  In February 2003, the court held a trial, and made findings
  on the record.  The court found that the covenant was a scenic easement,
  and the uncontradicted evidence established that "height" referred to the
  ridge line of the Inn.  The court explained that the parenthetical
  reference to "2 ½ stories" was intended to identify the particular
  farmhouse to which the deed referred.  Although the court found that Levin
  had attempted to frustrate the covenant, it could not establish the extent
  to which her building exceeded the Inn's ridge line because the parties'
  experts, apparently using the same mathematical formula, had reached
  different results.  To prevent future disputes, the court ordered the
  evidence to remain open so that the ridge line height could be conclusively
  established.  The parties later submitted a joint expert report in which
  the experts agreed that Levin's building exceeded the Inn's ridge line by
  6.7 feet.
        
       ¶  7.  On April 30, 2003, the court held an additional factual
  hearing, and closed the evidence.  At the hearing, the court rejected
  Levin's argument that her violation of the covenant was de minimis, or that
  a balancing of the relative hardships weighed in her favor.  In response to
  the Manns' request, the court indicated that it would be agreeable to an
  order requiring Levin to present it with a compliance plan within thirty
  days, and to comply with the height restriction within sixty days after the
  plan was filed.  The court stated that it was prepared to order Levin to
  vacate the building until she complied with the restriction, and it would
  impose a fine of $500 per day for noncompliance. 
   
       ¶  8.  In July 2003, the court issued a written order granting the
  Manns' request for a permanent injunction.  The court reiterated its
  earlier finding that the height restriction in the deed referred to the
  ridge line of the Inn.  Because the evidence showed that Levin's building
  exceeded the ridge line by 6.7 feet, the court found that she had violated
  the restrictive covenant.  The court noted that Levin had not contested the
  existence of the deed restriction or its applicability to her property in
  any of the underlying hearings.  It thus rejected her assertion, raised for
  the first time in her proposed findings, that the Manns lacked standing to
  enforce the covenant under the doctrine of merger.  The court also rejected
  Levin's argument that the Manns were barred from enforcing the covenant
  under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.  The court explained that Levin
  had received repeated advice that her home, then under construction, would
  exceed the height restriction.

       ¶  9.  The court ordered Levin to present it with a plan for reducing
  the ridge line elevation of her home no later than August 1, 2003, and to
  comply with the height restriction by September 1, 2003.  The court stated
  that if Levin failed to comply with any of these deadlines, she would have
  to immediately vacate the premises and pay $500 per day until compliance
  was reached.  The court granted Levin's request for a temporary stay of its
  order, and this appeal followed. 

       ¶  10.  On appeal, Levin argues that the court erred in finding that
  her building violated the terms of the restrictive covenant.  Specifically,
  she argues that: (1) the Manns lacked standing to enforce the covenant
  under the doctrine of merger; (2) the court erred in concluding that the
  covenant was ambiguous; (3) alternatively, even if the covenant is
  ambiguous, the court erred in finding that the parties intended to limit
  the height of any building to the ridge line of the Inn; (4) the doctrines
  of equitable estoppel and laches prevent the Manns from enforcing the
  restriction; (5) the court failed to balance the hardships before granting
  injunctive relief; and (6) the court improperly imposed onerous prospective
  fines.  
   
       ¶  11.  We first address Levin's assertion that the Manns lack
  standing to enforce the terms of the covenant under the doctrine of merger. 
  Levin maintains that as of September 1999, she and her ex-husband held
  title to both Parcel 1A and 1B, which benefitted from and were burdened by
  the height restriction.  According to Levin, because there is no evidence
  that the height restriction was intended to continue in force beyond this
  merger of title, the height restriction was extinguished and it therefore
  cannot be enforced by the Manns.  See Albright v. Fish, 136 Vt. 387, 395,