Case Title: ANN T. DWAN V. INDIAN SPRINGS RANCH HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a Wyoming nonprofit corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0064

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
ANN T. DWAN V. INDIAN SPRINGS RANCH HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a Wyoming nonprofit corporation2010 WY 72232 P.3d 1183Case Number: S-09-0064Decided: 06/03/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
ANN 
T. DWAN,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
INDIAN 
SPRINGS RANCH HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a Wyoming nonprofit 
corporation,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

David 
G. Lewis, Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Edward 
F. Hess, Hess, Carlman & D'Amours, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming; Heather Noble, 
Jackson, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Hess.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Ann 
Dwan contends that our previous decision in this same case, Dwan 
v. Indian Springs Ranch Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 
2008 WY 74, ¶ 16, 186 P.3d 1199, 1203 (Wyo. 2008) ("Dwan I") entitles her to summary 
judgment on her claims for damages and attorney's fees.  The Indian Springs Ranch Homeowners 
Association disagrees.  The district 
court ruled against Ms. Dwan, and granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Association.  We will affirm the 
district court's decision.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      
Ms. 
Dwan presents two issues:

 
 

1.    
Whether 
the Supreme Court's earlier decision in this case entitles Ms. Dwan to summary 
judgment on her claims for breach of the Indian Springs Ranch Covenants, 
Conditions, and Restrictions (CCRs), and the opportunity to prove her 
damages.

 
 

2.    
Whether 
Ms. Dwan is entitled under the CCRs to attorney's fees and costs she has 
incurred in the enforcement of her contract rights in this litigation. 

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
The 
facts underlying this case were set forth in Dwan I, and will be summarized briefly 
here.  In 1998, the Association 
approved the plans for Ms. Dwan's residence, even though the roof had a steeper 
pitch than allowed by the CCRs.  In 
2003, the Association approved Ms. Dwan's plans for a combination garage and 
guesthouse with the same roof pitch as the house.  In 2006, Ms. Dwan sought approval for an 
addition to her home, proposing a roof with the same steep pitch.  The Association denied that application 
on the basis that the roof pitch did not comply with the 
CCRs.

 
 

[¶4]        
Ms. 
Dwan sued the Indian Springs Ranch Homeowners Association, claiming that it had 
unreasonably denied her application to build the addition.  Her complaint included claims both for 
equitable relief and for damages based on a breach of the CCRs.  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Association on all claims, and Ms. Dwan appealed.  We reversed the district court's 
ruling.  Dwan, ¶ 16, 186 P.3d  at 
1203.

 
 

[¶5]        
On 
remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. Dwan on her 
claim for equitable relief.  
However, Ms. Dwan contended that she was also entitled to recover damages 
against the Association because it had breached the CCRs.  She moved for summary judgment on the 
Association's liability for damages, and asked for an opportunity to prove her 
damages.  She also sought to recover 
attorney's fees under the provisions of the CCRs.  The district court denied Ms. Dwan's 
request for attorney's fees.  It 
denied her motion for summary judgment on her breach of contract claim, and 
granted the Association's cross motion for summary judgment on that issue.  Ms. Dwan appealed, bringing this 
case before us a second time. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶6]        
We 
apply this standard when reviewing a district court's decision to grant summary 
judgment:

 
 
Summary 
judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c); Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 2002).  "A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish or refute an essential 
element of a cause of action or a defense that the parties have asserted."  Id.  Because summary judgment involves a 
purely legal determination, we undertake de novo review of a trial court's 
summary judgment decision.  Glenn v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2008 WY 
16, ¶ 6, 176 P.3d 640, 642 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 

Jacobs 
Ranch Coal Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 
LLC, 2008 WY 101, ¶ 8, 191 P.3d 125, 128-29 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Claim 
for damages for breach of contract

 
 

[¶7]        
As 
noted above, the district court denied Ms. Dwan's motion for summary judgment on 
her claim for damages for breach of contract, and granted the Association's 
cross-motion for summary judgment on that claim.  The district court's order contains this 
explanation for the decision:

 
 

7.            
This 
Court interprets the Opinion of the Wyoming Supreme Court in granting summary 
judgment to Plaintiff as the complete adjudication of the legal issues under 
appeal.  The Wyoming Supreme Court 
enforced the restrictive covenants as equitable servitudes and provided a remedy 
in equity, that is, the court required specific performance of the 
covenants.  The court simply stated, 
"Her [Plaintiff's] application should be approved."  In resolving the claim in equity, the 
court did not address either the legal claim, for which monetary damages could 
be awarded, or the plea for a declaratory judgment on the waiver issue.  In Streets v. J M Land & Developing 
Co., the Wyoming Supreme Court noted that the general view is that "[s]uch 
agreements [restrictive covenants] are enforceable in equity against all those 
who take the estate with notice of them."  
898 P.2d 377, 379 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting 20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions 
§ 304, 868 (1965)).  Further 
the court said, "The availability of a doctrine of equitable enforcement of 
restrictive covenants is perhaps more clearly approved in Bowers Welding and Hotshot, Inc. v. 
Bromley, 699 P.2d 299, 303 (Wyo. 1985) [where the court enjoined the use of 
appellant's property for commercial purposes]."  Id. at 380.

 
 

8.            
Plaintiff 
interprets the Wyoming Supreme Court's statements about the unreasonableness of 
the Defendant's decision to disallow Plaintiff's application as an adjudication 
of the breach of contract issue.  
Regarding the reasonableness issue, the supreme court notes that the CCRs 
require that approval of applications by the homeowners board "shall not be 
unreasonably withheld."  The court 
then notes that "[w]e think it quite unreasonable to require Dwan to alter her 
roof pitch in order to add an otherwise acceptable addition onto her residence," 
and it later declares that "[i]t defies reason to require a homeowner to build 
an addition onto her residence with a shallower roof pitch than the rest of the 
residence."  The court, however, 
makes no finding that Defendant is in breach of contract.  The court does not address the contract 
issue at all.

 
 

9.            
The 
Wyoming Supreme Court has adopted the requirement of reasonableness in 
consent-to-build covenants, even if the covenants do not specifically impose 
such a requirement.  Hammons v. Table Mountain Ranches Owners 
Association, Inc., 2003 WY 85, ¶ 23, 72 P.3d 1153, 1157 (Wyo. 
2003).  However, the court has also 
held that a finding of reasonableness is a finding of fact.  Id. at ¶ 24.  Because the Wyoming Supreme Court in its 
appellate capacity is not a finder of fact, this Court does not interpret the 
court's remarks regarding unreasonableness as a finding of fact with respect to 
a breach of contract claim.  Rather, 
this Court interprets the supreme court's determination of unreasonableness as a 
conclusion of law with respect to the equitable claim for specific 
performance.  Again, this Court 
concludes that the Wyoming Supreme Court adjudicated this case on the basis of 
equity to the exclusion of the declaratory judgment and breach of contract 
claims.

 
 
(Footnote 
omitted.)

 
 

[¶8]        
The 
district court correctly interpreted our previous decision in this case.  Our opinion stated that Ms. Dwan's 
"application should be approved," and we remanded the case "for the entry of 
summary judgment to [Ms.] Dwan on the issue of approval of her 
application."  Dwan I, ¶¶ 15-16, 186 P.3d  at 
1203.  In effect, we ordered that 
her application should be approved.  
That remedy is consistent with Ms. Dwan's equitable claim for 
specific performance.  

 
 

[¶9]        
Our 
cases involving restrictive covenants almost invariably include claims for 
equitable relief, and often claims for declaratory judgment.  See, e.g., Fayard v. Design Comm. of the Homestead 
Subdivision, 2010 WY 51, ___ P.3d ___ (Wyo. 2010).  While we have often explained that 
restrictive covenants are contractual in nature, see, e.g., Dwan I, ¶ 9, 186 P.3d 1202, that 
does not necessarily mean that a homeowner is entitled to recover contract 
damages against a homeowners association.  
Ms. Dwan has not identified any provision of her CCRs that would 
allow her to claim damages against the Association.  She has not provided any legal 
authority, from Wyoming or any other jurisdiction, supporting her claim for 
damages.  As stated by the 
Association, Ms. Dwan "did not support her claim for monetary relief with 
any cogent argument or citation to legal authority."  Because Ms. Dwan failed to 
establish that her claim for damages against the homeowners association stated a 
viable cause of action, the district court did not err in granting the 
Association's motion for summary judgment on this issue.

 
 
Claim 
for attorney's fees

 
 

[¶10]     
In 
Wyoming, "[w]e follow the American rule that each party in a lawsuit bears its 
own attorney's fees in the absence of an expressed contractual or statutory 
provision for attorney's fees."  McLain v. Anderson, 933 P.2d 468, 472 
(Wyo. 1997).  We have also 
recognized that restrictive covenants may provide contractual authority for the 
recovery of attorney's fees.  Id. at 473.  Ms. Dwan contends that she is entitled 
to recover attorney's fees under the terms of paragraph 8(c) of her CCRs.  The pertinent provisions of that 
paragraph read as follows:

 
 
Any 
Owner who uses or allows his or her Site to be used or developed in violation of 
these Covenants further agrees to pay all costs incurred by the party enforcing 
these Covenants, including reasonable attorney's 
fees.  In addition, the 
Association shall have the right to enforce the restoration of the portions of 
the Property affected by activities in violation of the terms and conditions of 
these Covenants to the condition which existed prior to the undertaking of such 
unauthorized activity.  In all such 
cases, the cost of enforcement and/or restoration of the Property, including reasonable attorney's 
fees, whether or not judicial proceedings are initiated, shall be borne 
by the violating party.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  "Because they are 
contractual in nature, restrictive covenants are to be interpreted in accordance 
with the principles of contract law.  
We construe plain terms of a covenant, if they are sufficiently clear, 
without reference to any attendant facts and circumstances or extrinsic 
evidence."  McLain, 933 P.2d  at 474 (internal 
citation omitted).

 
 

[¶11]     
Interpreting 
the clear language of the CCRs quoted above, we agree with the district court 
that Ms. Dwan is not entitled to recover attorney's fees from the 
Association.  The first sentence 
allows for the recovery of attorney's fees against an Owner who violated the 
CCRs.  Ms. Dwan is not seeking to 
recover attorney's fees from another Owner, but from the Association.  The first sentence does not apply to 
Ms. Dwan's situation.  The 
second sentence recognizes the Association's right to enforce the CCRs, and the 
third sentence allows for the recovery of attorney's fees "[i]n all such 
cases."  Together, these sentences 
allow the Association to recover attorney's fees when it enforces the CCRs.  They do not allow a homeowner like Ms. 
Dwan to recover attorney's fees against the Association.  We find no error in the district court's 
denial of Ms. Dwan's request to recover attorney's fees against the 
Association.

 
 

[¶12]     
Affirmed.