Case Title: Hill v. Zimmerer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92-50

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-10-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hill v. Zimmerer1992 WY 139839 P.2d 977Case Number: 92-50Decided: 10/28/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Ron HILL, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

Bob 
ZIMMERER, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District Court, GoshenCounty, John T. Langdon, 
J.

 James A. 
Eddington of Jones, Eddington & Weaver, Torrington, for appellant.

Michael 
E. Warren of Sawyer, Warren & Kautz, Torrington, for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

 [¶1.]     Ron Hill appeals from a 
district court judgment which adjudged him to be an apparent joint adventurer 
with his cousin, Johnny Hill, in a hay hauling operation. As a result of this 
determination, the district court ordered that judgment be entered against Ron 
Hill for a debt incurred via a hay purchase agreement with appellee Bob 
Zimmerer. We will affirm.

ISSUES

 [¶2.]     The primary issues 
are:

     1. Whether the 
district court abused its discretion by allowing evidence to be presented at 
trial concerning the apparent business relationship of Ron Hill and Johnny Hill 
as partners or joint adventurers.

     2. Whether the 
district court erred by failing to grant Ron Hill's Wyo.R.Civ.P. 41(b)(1) motion 
to dismiss after Bob Zimmerer had presented his 
case-in-chief.

     3. Whether the 
district court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment were 
supported by sufficient evidence.

FACTS

 [¶3.]     Very few facts of this 
case are not in dispute. Of those that are not, however, some foundation can be 
given to the present controversy. In March of 1988, Ron Hill contacted Bob 
Zimmerer to see if he had any hay to sell. Bob Zimmerer informed Ron Hill that 
he did. A short time thereafter, Ron Hill, Johnny Hill, Bobby Hill and Bobby 
Hill, Jr. showed up at Bob Zimmerer's place to load hay. The hay was first 
ground by Bobby Hill and Bobby Hill, Jr. for a price of $10 per ton. It was then 
loaded into Johnny Hill's trailer which was pulled by Ron Hill's over-the-road 
tractor. Once loaded, the hay was delivered to various feedlots to satisfy 
supply contracts held by Johnny Hill. Ron and Johnny Hill agreed to split 
profits on a 60/40 ratio.

 [¶4.]     By mid-April, the Hills 
had hauled eleven loads of hay from Bob Zimmerer's place without paying for 
them. Bob Zimmerer put a halt to the operation at this point and demanded 
payment. Payment in full was made by late May with checks which were drafted on 
Johnny Hill's account. Thereafter, the hay hauling operation resumed. Ron Hill 
did not actively participate from this point forward, as he left for Texas to do custom 
harvesting. He did, however, leave his tractor behind for continued use. The 
Hills hauled another twenty-three and one-half loads of hay from Bob Zimmerer's 
farm by early-July. Once again, they had fallen substantially behind with their 
payments. Bob Zimmerer told them not to take any more hay and demanded payment. 
The Hills subsequently left and never returned.

 [¶5.]     Bob Zimmerer filed a 
complaint against Johnny Hill and Ron Hill October 13, 1988, which stated in 
pertinent part:

2. That 
during the months of March, April, May, June and July, 1988, Plaintiff sold to 
Defendants $19,375.00 worth of alfalfa hay which Defendants have removed from 
Plaintiff's property and have failed to pay for.

3. That 
during the same period of time Defendants purchased an additional $6,250.00 
worth of alfalfa hay which they have failed to pick up and which has 
deteriorated in value because of weather damage. That during the same period of 
time Plaintiff ground hay for the Defendants and his labor for said work was 
$1,000.00.

4. The 
Defendants owe to Plaintiff the total sum of $26,625.00 which sum they have 
refused to pay.

5. That 
all of the transactions between the Plaintiff and the Defendants were conducted 
in Goshen County, Wyoming, and all contacts between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendants were in Goshen 
County, Wyoming.

WHEREFORE, 
Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendants in the amount of $26,625.00, 
plus the costs of this action, attorney's fees and all other relief to which the 
Plaintiff is entitled.

 [¶6.]     Neither Johnny Hill nor 
Ron Hill timely responded to the complaint, and default judgments were entered 
against them. The default judgment against Johnny Hill was subsequently 
discharged in bankruptcy and that against Ron Hill was vacated so that the case 
could proceed on its merits.

 [¶7.]     After numerous 
procedural delays not relevant to this appeal, a one-day, nonjury trial was held 
on December 11, 1991. Bob Zimmerer's theory of the case was that Ron Hill and 
Johnny Hill's business relationship constituted an ostensible partnership. Ron 
Hill had two primary lines of defense. First, he asserted that he was neither a 
partner nor a joint adventurer with Johnny Hill in the hay hauling operation. 
Ron Hill explained that he merely accommodated Johnny Hill by contacting Bob 
Zimmerer on his behalf and by "leasing" his tractor to him for a share of the 
profits. Second, Ron Hill asserted that, if he did have a contract with Bob 
Zimmerer, it was only for the first eleven loads of hay (250 tons) which had 
been paid for in full.

 [¶8.]     After the trial, the 
district court filed its judgment which contained findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. The district court concluded that Ron Hill and Johnny Hill 
were apparent joint adventurers in the hay hauling operation and ordered that 
judgment be entered against Ron Hill in the amount of $17,507.50 plus costs of 
$111.34 at seven percent interest. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

 [¶9.]     Ron Hill argues 
initially that the district court abused it discretion by permitting partnership 
and joint adventure evidence to be admitted over his objection at trial and 
without amendment of the pleadings. He contends that such evidence went beyond 
the scope of the pleadings, depriving him of adequate notice and opportunity to 
defend. While it is true that Bob Zimmerer's complaint does not specifically 
contain the words "partnership" or "joint adventure," Ron Hill's assertion that 
he was prejudicially surprised by Bob Zimmerer's theory of the case is wholly 
without merit. The record clearly reflects, through affidavits, discovery 
documents and the trial transcript, that Ron Hill had notice of and prepared a 
defense for a partnership or joint adventure theory of liability - the two 
theories being virtually indistinguishable substantively. Consequently, we hold 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting evidence to 
be introduced concerning Bob Zimmerer's theory of the 
case.

 [¶10.]  Ron Hill contends secondly that the 
district court erred by failing to grant his Wyo.R.Civ.P. 41(b)(1)1 motion to dismiss at the close of 
Bob Zimmerer's case-in-chief. Ron Hill's argument before the district court, and 
now on appeal, was essentially that Bob Zimmerer had failed to present facts 
which would entitle him to relief under the law. The district court denied this 
motion on the basis that the facts presented looked to him very much like Bob 
Zimmerer had made out a claim of joint adventure. Following the denial, Ron Hill 
proceeded to present his defense.

 [¶11.]  We find no Wyoming case which has 
dealt specifically with the issue of whether a district court's denial of a Rule 
41(b)(1) motion to dismiss is reviewable when a defendant has proceeded to 
present evidence following the ruling.2 The matter has, however, been 
considered in the federal courts. The general rule in the federal courts was 
that a defendant, by presenting evidence, waived his right to appeal from a 
denial of a Rule 41(b)(1) motion to dismiss.3 E.g., Bituminous Const., Inc. v. 
Rucker Enter., Inc., 816 F.2d 965, 967 (4th Cir. 1987); 5 James Wm. Moore et 
al., Moore's 
Federal Practice ¶ 41.13[1] (2d ed. 1991). The significance of this rule was 
that, when a defendant appealed an adverse final judgment, a review was made by 
considering all of the evidence relied upon by the district court, not just that 
presented in plaintiff's case-in-chief. 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. 
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2371 (1971 and Supp. 
1992).

 [¶12.]  We believe that the federal rule promotes 
the policy of deciding cases on their merits and that it is consonant with the 
provision in Rule 41(b)(1) which allows courts to defer ruling on a motion to 
dismiss until all evidence has been presented. Consequently, we apply the 
federal rule in this case and hold that Ron Hill has waived his right to appeal 
the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. We proceed then, in accord 
with the federal rule, to consider the entire record to determine if sufficient 
evidence exists to support the district court's judgment.

 [¶13.]  As indicated above, our analysis of Ron 
Hill's second issue leads us directly to his third area of concern - sufficiency 
of the evidence. Ron Hill argues primarily that the evidence in the record is 
insufficient to support the district court's finding that he was an apparent 
joint adventurer with his cousin, Johnny Hill, in the hay hauling operation. He 
does not challenge the amount of the judgment except to the extent that $662.50 
was awarded for damaged hay. After setting forth the applicable standard of 
review, we will address these contentions in order.

 [¶14.]  Our standard of review when faced with a 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is well known. We presume that the 
findings of the district court are correct and will not disturb them unless they 
are clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the evidence. E.g., 
Ferguson v. Reed, 822 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Wyo. 1991). When 
reviewing the evidence, we accept the evidence of the prevailing party as true, 
giving it all favorable inferences and leaving out all evidence in conflict 
therewith. E.g., Town of Wheatland v. Bellis 
Farms, Inc., 806 P.2d 281, 284 (Wyo. 1991).

 [¶15.]  The evidence that we look for initially 
is that of a joint adventure. A joint adventure is defined generically as an 
"association of persons to carry out a single business enterprise for profit, 
for which purpose they combine their property, money, effects, skill, and 
knowledge." Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). As between the parties, a 
joint adventurer relationship may be formed only by contract. 46 Am.Jur.2d Joint 
Ventures § 8 (1969). Consequently, such a relationship will be found when there 
exists (1) an agreement, express or implied, (2) to carry out a common business 
purpose, (3) for pecuniary gain, (4) in which each party has an equal voice in 
control and direction of the undertaking. Popejoy v. Steinle, 820 P.2d 545, 549 
(Wyo. 1991). 
As to third persons, however, the law will impose joint adventurer status upon 
individuals or entities conducting their affairs as though they are joint 
adventurers, regardless of their actual intent. 46 Am.Jur.2d Joint Ventures § 9 
(1969). Whether or not a joint adventurer relationship exists may be inferred 
from the circumstances, True v. Hi-Plains Elevator, 577 P.2d 991, 997 (Wyo. 
1978), and is preeminently a question for the finder of fact, Robinson Trans. 
Co. v. Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co., 385 P.2d 203, 205 (Wyo. 
1963).

 [¶16.]  The district court as finder of fact 
determined that Ron Hill was an apparent joint adventurer with his cousin, 
Johnny Hill, and that Ron Hill should be held jointly and severally liable for 
the hay purchase debt incurred with Bob Zimmerer. Applying our standard of 
review to the evidence, we are satisfied that the district court's 
determinations are amply supported. The record reflects that both Ron Hill and 
Johnny Hill negotiated with Bob Zimmerer to purchase hay; that the purpose of 
the negotiations was to satisfy supply contracts which Johnny Hill held with 
various feed lots; that Ron Hill and Johnny Hill both contributed their time, 
talents and property to the undertaking; that they agreed to share the profits 
and losses on a 60/40 ratio; and that Bob Zimmerer thought that Johnny Hill and 
Ron Hill were jointly involved in the hay hauling operation. While Johnny Hill 
explained that he was merely leasing Ron Hill's tractor, the most favorable 
inference that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence is that Johnny Hill and 
Ron Hill were engaged in a joint adventure. The district court, after hearing 
the testimony, determining credibility and weighing the evidence, so determined. 
We find no reason to disturb its findings in this regard.

 [¶17.]  Ron Hill's other 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge concerns $662.50 that was awarded to Bob 
Zimmerer as compensation for damaged hay. The district court made this award in 
relation to Bob Zimmerer's testimony that the Hills left 106 tons of hay at his 
place which they never picked up. Bob Zimmerer testified that he was able to 
sell fifty-three tons and that he fed the other fifty-three tons, which became 
badly damaged by the weather, to his cows. He estimated that the value of the 
hay, as damaged, would be $37.50 per ton. Accordingly, the district court 
awarded compensation of $662.50 (53 X [$50.00 - $37.50]). Ron Hill, however, 
argues that no compensation should be awarded as Bob Zimmerer got full use of 
the hay by feeding it to his cows. We are not impressed with this argument. 
Common sense dictates that damaged hay is less valuable than good hay, 
regardless of whether it is used for one's own purposes or sold to others. The 
district court's award of $662.50 is supported by substantial 
evidence.

 [¶18.]  In sum, after reviewing all the evidence 
in this case, we are persuaded that the judgment of the district court serves 
the ends of justice, and that it is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to 
the great weight of the evidence.

 [¶19.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 1 Wyo.R.Civ.P. 41(b)(1) 
provides in relevant part:

After the 
plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the 
presentation of evidence, the defendant, without waiving the right to offer 
evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the 
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to 
relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render 
judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the 
close of all the evidence.

2 The court has, on several 
occasions, addressed the standard of review applicable when a Rule 41(b)(1) 
motion to dismiss has been granted by a district court. See, e.g., True Oil Co. 
v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 771 P.2d 781 (Wyo. 
1989); Kure v. Chevrolet Motor Div., 581 P.2d 603 
(Wyo. 1978); Arbenz v. Bebout, 444 P.2d 317 
(Wyo. 
1968).

3 The language in Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b), 
which authorized the use of the rule to terminate a nonjury action on the merits 
when a plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof, was deleted in 1991 and 
was replaced by subsection (c) of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52. As Wyoming has not similarly 
amended its rule, we find the preamendment cases and commentary regarding 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) to be persuasive.