Case Title: STATE v LaFLAMME

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13234 I N TWE SUPREME C O U R T OF T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1976 STATE O F M O N T A N A , p l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - MILTARD WADE LaFTAME , Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Sixteenth J u d i c i a l District, Honorable A . B. Martin, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana John North argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Robert J. Brooks argued, County Attorney, Broadus, Montana For Respondent: John R. Carr argued, Miles City, Montana Filed: F J u r - - Submitted: May 27, 1976 Decided : J U L - 8 1976 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. The s t a t e of Montana brings t h i s appeal from an order of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Powder River County, suppressing evidence as i l l e g a l l y seized. The defendant, Millard Wade LaFlamrne, w a s charged with criminal mischief, i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 94-6-102(1)(a), R.C.M. 1947, causing damages of more than $150, a felony. O n January 24, 1975, a . 4 4 magnum p i s t o l w a s used t o damage a weigh s t a t i o n near Broadus. It was known t h a t t h e de- fendant owned a .44 magnum and on January 27, 1975, t h e Powder River County s h e r i f f , accompanied by t h e Custer County s h e r i f f approached t h e defendant on t h e grounds of M i l e s Community College and asked i f a b a l l i s t i c s examination could be made of defendant's weapon. Defendant agreed and went t o t h e room where he stayed, followed by t h e two peace o f f i c e r s who waited i n t h e room while defendant looked f o r t h e weapon. Defendant was unable t o f i n d t h e weapon t h e r e . A t t h i s p o i n t , t h e Powder River County s h e r i f f suggested t h a t before defendant r e p o r t t h e weapon missing, de- fendant should examine t h e l i g h t u t i l i t y pickup truck t h a t he owned t o s e e i f t h e p i s t o l was t h e r e . Defendant s t a t e d i n re- sponse t o t h i s suggestion: " I * * * I d o n ' t know i f it w a s o u t t h e r e o r n o t ' , and I s a i d , ' I ' d go t a k e a look' " After a b r i e f examination of t h e small pickup t r u c k , t h e de- fendant made a comment t o t h e e f f e c t : " * * * ' W e l l , I guess i t ' s not h e r e ' * * *." The Powder River County s h e r i f f r e c a l l e d what happened next: " * * * when he q u i t looking, I s a i d , 'How about behind t h e s e a t ' and -- ' W e l l , I d o n ' t t h i n k s o ' , he s a i d , and I j u s t tipped t h e s e a t ahead while I was standing t h e r e , and t h e r e it l a i d . " The s h e r i f f confiscated t h e .44 magnum t h a t he found on t h e f l o o r of t h e pickup truck. The defendant contends t h a t t h e search made by t h e Powder River County s h e r i f f of h i s pickup t r u c k v i o l a t e s t h e Fourth Amendment's guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and t h e s i m i l a r guarantee i n t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n i n A r t i c l e 11, Section 11. He f u r t h e r a l l e g e s t h a t it v i o l a t e d t h e s e c t i o n of t h e Code of Criminal Procedure which c o d i f i e s these guarantees, s e c t i o n 95-701, R.C.M. 1947. This s e c t i o n a u t h o r i z e s searches t o be made: " ( a ) A s an i n c i d e n t t o a lawful arrest. " (b) With t h e consent of t h e accused * * * " ( c ) By t h e a u t h o r i t y of a v a l i d search warrant. " ( d ) Under a u t h o r i t y and within t h e scope of a r i g h t of lawful inspection granted by law." A t t h e t i m e of t h e search t h e r e w a s no lawful a r r e s t and no search warrant, so subsections ( a ) and (c) a r e not a p p l i c a b l e . The search was not a r o u t i n e inspection type search contemplated by subsection ( d ) . Therefore t h e only b a s i s remaining and t h e only one claimed a s t h e b a s i s f o r t h e search is t h a t of subsec- t i o n ( b ) , t h a t t h e search w a s one conducted with t h e consent of t h e accused. The question before t h i s Court is whether defendant gave h i s consent t o have h i s pickup truck searched. There i s a heavy burden of proof required t o show t h a t t h e r e w a s a consent. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 20 L ed 2d 797, 802, 88 S.Ct. 1788, set f o r t h t h e b a s i c requirement: "When a prosecutor seeks t o r e l y upon consent t o j u s t i f y t h e lawfulness of a search, he has t h e burden of proving t h a t t h e consent was, i n f a c t , f r e e l y and v o l u n t a r i l y given. * * *" The Ninth C i r c u i t Court of Appeals gave a more e l a b o r a t e state- ment of t h i s requirement i n Channel1 v. United S t a t e s , 285 F.2d 217, 219 (1960), saying: "A search and s e i z u r e may be made without a search warrant i f t h e i n d i v i d u a l f r e e l y and i n t e l l i g e n t l y g i v e s h i s unequivocal and s p e c i f i c consent t o search, uncontaminated by any d u r e s s o r coercion, a c t u a l o r implied. The Government has t h e burden of proving by c l e a r p o s i t i v e evidence t h a t such consent w a s given." This Court has expressed a similar view i n S t a t e v. P e t e r s , 146 Mont. 188, 205, 405 P.2d 642, when it s a i d t h a t a p p e l l a n t through h i s " * * * verbal consent and a c t i v e cooperation ' r e f l e c t e d an understanding, uncoerced, and unequivocal e l e c t i o n t o g r a n t [ t h e a u t h o r i t i e s ] a l i c e n s e which he knew could be f r e e l y and e f f e c t i v e - l y withheld.'" The question t o be answered i n t h i s c a s e is whether t h e words and a c t i o n s of t h e defendant w e r e such t h a t a f r e e l y given, unequivocal, and s p e c i f i c consent is shown by clear p o s i t i v e evidence. The f i r s t evidence is t h i s : A t t h e suppression hearing t h e Powder River County s h e r i f f upon questioning by t h e c o u r t admitted t h a t he had never asked t h e defendant i f he could search t h e defendant's room o r truck. The c r u c i a l question "Can I search your pickup truck?" w a s never asked, Nearly a l l t h e c a s e s t h a t d e a l with t h e problem of whether t h e r e was a clear and unequivocal consent follow a s i m i l a r f a c t u a l p a t t e r n . In those c a s e s , t h e defendant g i v e s a clear v e r b a l con- s e n t but does something which i n d i c a t e s a c o n t r a r y i n t e n t . For 97 , example i n Cipres v. United S t a t e s , 343 F.2d 95,/(1965), t h e de- fendant, when asked i f t h e a u t h o r i t i e s could search her bags s a i d , "Yes, I have nothing t o hide." but went on t o say t h a t she d i d not have t h e keys t o t h e bags, t h a t t h e keys w e r e i n N e w York. The bags w e r e n o t locked and t h e a u t h o r i t i e s searched them. I n t h e S t a t e of Montana v . Tomich, 332 F.2d 987 989 (1964), t h e deputy asked t h e defendant i f he could search t h e trunk of t h e defend- a n t ' s c a r and t h e defendant s a i d , "Yes, you can." b u t a l s o s a i d t h a t he d i d not have t h e key s o it could n o t be opened. De- fendant had t h e key i n h i s shoe. Thc deputy had a locksmith open t h e trunk and it was searched. I n both of t h e s e cases t h e Ninth C i r c u i t found t h a t t h e search was n o t a v a l i d un- equivocal consent t o a search. While t h i s Court is n o t i n f u l l agreement with t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n it is c l e a r t h a t i n t h e absence of a p o s i t i v e v e r b a l a s s e n t t o t h e search, equivocal conduct alone is i n s u f f i c i e n t as a b a s i s f o r a n inference of consent t o search, which is a waiver of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t asked t h e Powder River County s h e r i f f t h i s question: "Q. You j u s t took it from t h e circumstances, t h a t he was giving h i s consent? A . W e l l , he unlocked t h e door and went i n and looked i n and s a i d t h a t it wasn't here, and I t o l d him t h a t he should look everywhere t h a t it might be before he reported it missing." This statement is n o t t h e s o r t of c l e a r evidence required t o show t h e v a l i d unequivocal consent t h a t is required f o r t h e waiver of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t . A comparison of t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e and P e t e r s shows t h e s u b s t a n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e between t h e two c a s e s . I n P e t e r s defendant gave h i s verbal a s s e n t t o t h e search and a c t i v e l y a s s i s t e d t h e a u t h o r i t i e s i n t h e search. Here, defendant never gave h i s v e r b a l a s s e n t t o t h e search and d i d a l l t h e searching himself. I f P e t e r s had t o l d t h e a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t he would look f o r t h e c a l v e s himself and then reported t h a t he had found noth- ing unusual, t h e a u t h o r i t i e s would not have been j u s t i f i e d i n e n t e r i n g t h e premises themselves and making t h e i r own search. For t h e same reasons t h e s h e r i f f here could n o t search t h e t r u c k a f t e r defendant had looked f o r t h e weapon and reported t h a t it was n o t i n t h e truck. For a c a s e where no search w a s made by o f f i c e r s b u t a r i f l e w a s v o l u n t a r i l y turned over t o t h e s h e r i f f who v o l u n t a r i l y received it, see S t a t e v. W i l l i a m s , 153 Mont. 2 6 2 , 455 P.2d 634. For t h e s e reasons t h e order of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t is a £ f irmed . W e concur: I judge, s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of M r . Chief J u s t i c e J a m e s T. Harrison.