Case Title: Hovagimian v. Concert Blue Hill, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13039

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13039 
 
KHRIS HOVAGIMIAN & another1  vs.  CONCERT BLUE HILL, LLC,2 
& others.3 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     March 1, 2021. - August 23, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Tips.  Labor, Wages.  Statute, Construction.  Practice, Civil, 
Judgment on the pleadings.  Words, "Service charge." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
May 7, 2018. 
 
 
The case was heard by Elaine M. Buckley, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Paul Holtzman for the plaintiffs. 
 
Paul G. King for the defendants. 
 
1 Dilma Silva.  Both plaintiffs bring the action 
individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly 
situated. 
 
 
2 Doing business as Blue Hill Country Club. 
 
3 Peter Nanula, Gregg Deger, Bryan Elliott, Francisco 
Ventura, and Tom Gibson. 
2 
 
 
Shannon Liss-Riordan & Tara Boghosian, for Massachusetts 
Employment Lawyers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  Under G. L. c. 149, § 152A, commonly known as 
the Tips Act (act), an employer or other person who collects a 
service charge or tip, as defined by the act, is required to 
remit the total proceeds of that charge to wait staff and 
service employees in proportion to the services provided.  The 
plaintiffs, Khris Hovagimian, Dilma Silva, and other individuals 
(collectively, plaintiffs), worked as service employees for 
Concert Blue Hill, LLC, doing business as Blue Hill Country 
Club, and its managerial staff (collectively, Blue Hill or the 
club).4  The plaintiffs allege that Blue Hill violated the act by 
failing to remit to them charges identified as a "service" 
charge on invoices sent to patrons, but previously described as 
an "administrative" or "overhead" charge in initial documents.  
Blue Hill maintains that the term used on the invoices was 
simply poor drafting and that, pursuant to the "safe harbor" 
provision of the act, G. L. c. 149, § 152A (d), second par., the 
club is permitted to retain the disputed charges.   
 
4 Defendants Peter Nanula, Gregg Deger, Bryan Elliott, 
Francisco Ventura, and Tom Gibson acted as managerial staff for 
Blue Hill Country Club at various times during the period at 
issue in the complaint.  
3 
 
 
We conclude that the plaintiffs' interpretation is correct 
and consistent with our rules of statutory interpretation.  The 
term "service charge" is a defined term in the act.  See G. L. 
c. 149, § 152A (a).  Pursuant to that clear definition, we hold 
that the disputed charge is properly characterized as a "service 
charge" and, further, that the safe harbor provision does not 
apply in these circumstances.  Accordingly, the order allowing 
Blue Hill's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denying the 
plaintiffs' cross motion must be reversed. 
 
Background.  1.  Factual history.  Blue Hill owns and 
operates an establishment that hosts banquets and other events 
requiring food and beverage services.  When a patron hosts an 
event using Blue Hill's facilities, the transaction is processed 
through three steps.  At the initial step, patrons are required 
to execute an "Event Contract" with the club.  This threshold 
contract details, among other things, deposit and payment 
schedules, event hours, menu selections, and pricing.  The 
contract contains a provision stating that the patron will be 
charged a ten percent gratuity that is remitted to wait staff 
employees, as well as an additional ten percent "administrative" 
or "overhead" charge that is retained by the club, on all food 
and beverage purchases.5   
 
5 Under a section entitled "Menu Selections & Pricing," the 
contract provides:   
4 
 
Once the contract has been signed, and prior to the event 
itself, the second step is that the patron executes a "Banquet 
Event Order Invoice."  The order invoice details, among other 
things, the number of anticipated guests, the patron's specific 
food and beverage choices, and instructions for the management 
of the event.  The monetary charges on the order invoice are 
organized into three categories:  "charges," "taxes," and 
"service charges and gratuities."  The ten percent 
administrative charge described in the contract is not 
 
 
"All food and beverage is subject to ten percent (10%) 
gratuity which is distributed one hundred percent (100%) to 
the wait staff employees, service employees and service 
bartenders working on the function and an overhead charge 
of an additional ten percent (10%) administrative charge is 
also added on all food and beverage purchases which is held 
by the [defendant] to be used for administration and other 
overhead costs and does not represent or constitute any 
form of gratuity to the wait staff, service employees and 
service bartenders working on the function."   
 
 
Additionally, under a section entitled "Schedule of Charges 
and Fees –- Event," the contract enumerates the following 
categories of charges the patron can expect to incur:   
 
"A 10% gratuity and a 10% overhead charge are applied to 
all food and beverage charges together with the 7% 
Massachusetts Meals and Sales Tax.  The 10% gratuity is 
distributed 100% to the wait staff employees, service 
employees and service bartenders serving the function.  The 
overhead charge is retained by [the defendant] for 
administrative and overhead costs only.  The 10% overhead 
charge does not represent a gratuity or tip to wait and 
service staff" (emphasis in original).   
5 
 
specifically labeled or identified in the order invoice but is 
equal to the ten percent "service" charge in the final bill.   
After the event has been held, the third and final 
transactional step takes place; the patron receives a second 
invoice from Blue Hill that operates as the final bill and 
describes the charges the patron incurred.  In this invoice, 
under a heading labeled "Service & Tax Charges," three separate 
categories of charges are listed:  "tax," "gratuity," and 
"service."  The ten percent administrative charge described in 
the contract again is not specifically labeled or identified in 
the final invoice.  The charge described as an "administrative" 
or "overhead" charge in the contract, but labeled as a "service" 
charge in the final bill, is the disputed fee at issue here.   
 
2.  Prior proceedings.  In May of 2018, the plaintiffs 
commenced an action in the Superior Court against Blue Hill, 
seeking to recover under the act the full proceeds of the 
"service" charges listed in the order invoices and final 
invoices that the club collected from its patrons and retained 
for itself rather than remitting to wait staff employees.  The 
plaintiffs also sought damages for the club's violation of 
minimum wage laws, as well as class certification, treble 
damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees.  Blue Hill 
moved for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), as to all of the plaintiffs' 
6 
 
claims, arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim for 
violation of the act and requesting judgment in the club's 
favor.  The plaintiffs filed a cross motion seeking judgment in 
their favor as to their claim under the act.6  In March 2019, a 
Superior Court judge granted Blue Hill's motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, denied the plaintiffs' cross motion, and entered 
a judgment of dismissal.   
 
The plaintiffs appealed, and a majority of the Appeals 
Court affirmed the judge's order, on the ground that the safe 
harbor provision of the act, G. L. c. 149, § 152A (d), second 
par., allowed Blue Hill to retain the proceeds from the disputed 
"service" charge.  See Hovagimian v. Concert Blue Hill, LLC, 98 
Mass. App. Ct. 69, 73-74 (2020).  We allowed the plaintiffs' 
application for further appellate review and now conclude that 
the plain meaning of the act requires the club to remit the 
disputed charge to the plaintiffs.   
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  We review a decision 
affirming or denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), as well as questions of 
 
6 The parties argued, and the motion judge agreed, that the 
dispositive issue raised in the cross motions was whether the 
disputed charge is a "service charge," which the act requires 
that the club remit to the plaintiffs, or is a "house or 
administrative fee," which the act permits Blue Hill to retain.  
The motion judge did not address the plaintiffs' other claims.  
 
7 
 
statutory interpretation, de novo.  See Kraft Power Corp. v. 
Merrill, 464 Mass. 145, 147 (2013); Wheatley v. Massachusetts 
Insurers Insolvency Fund, 456 Mass. 594, 600-601 (2010).  We 
base our review on the allegations contained within the 
complaint.7  Kraft Power Corp., supra.   
"A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that 
statutory language should be given effect consistent with its 
plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless 
to do so would achieve an illogical result."  Sullivan v. 
Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001).  "Where possible, we 
construe the various provisions of a statute in harmony with one 
another, recognizing that the Legislature did not intend 
internal contradiction."  DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 
454 Mass. 486, 491 (2009).  "[O]ur respect for the Legislature's 
considered judgment dictates that we interpret the statute to be 
sensible, rejecting unreasonable interpretations unless the 
 
7 As discussed infra, the parties disagree on whether we 
should consider the contract in determining whether the disputed 
charge constitutes a "service charge" within the meaning of the 
act.  In reviewing an affirmance or denial of a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, we review the same pleadings 
presented to the motion judge, which here included both the 
contract and the invoices included with Blue Hill's answer to 
the plaintiffs' complaint.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 10 (c), as 
amended, 456 Mass. 1401 (2010) ("A copy of any written 
instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof 
for all purposes").  See also Pilch v. Ware, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 
779, 780 (1979) ("Everything which was presented to the . . . 
judge [below] is in the record before us . . .").   
8 
 
clear meaning of the language requires such an interpretation."  
Meshna v. Scrivanos, 471 Mass. 169, 173 (2015), quoting Bednark 
v. Catania Hospitality Group, Inc., 78 Mass. App. Ct. 806, 811 
(2011).   
 
2.  Classification of disputed charges.  The act "applies 
to tips, gratuities, and fees that are called 'service charges' 
in aid of a clear purpose:  letting employees keep these 
payments."  Cooney v. Compass Group Foodservice, 69 Mass. App. 
Ct. 632, 638 (2007).  Specifically, if an employer "submits a 
bill, invoice or charge to a patron or other person that imposes 
a service charge or tip," the service charge or tip must be 
remitted to the employee for the services he or she rendered.  
G. L. c. 149, § 152A (d).  The act, as amended in 2004, St. 
2004, c. 125, § 13, defines the term "service charge" as   
"a fee charged by an employer to a patron in lieu of a tip 
to any [protected employee], including any fee designated 
as a service charge, tip, gratuity, or a fee that a patron 
or other consumer would reasonably expect to be given to a 
[protected employee] in lieu of, or in addition to, a tip."   
 
G. L. c. 149, § 152A (a).  This statutory definition of "service 
charge" controls, "unless a different meaning is required by the 
context" to effectuate the legislative intent of securing for 
employees these types of payments.  G. L. c. 149, § 152A (a).  
See DiFiore, 454 Mass. at 497 (invoking "context" provision to 
thwart employer's "attempt to avoid compliance with the [a]ct").  
If a fee is determined to be a "service charge" under the act, 
9 
 
then, as the statutory language further specifies, the "total 
proceeds of that service charge . . . shall be remitted only to 
the [protected employees] in proportion to the service provided 
by those employees."  G. L. c. 149, § 152A (d).   
 
This case centers on contractual documents that are 
inconsistent with one another.  The record indicates that all 
three of these documents –- the original contract and the two 
invoices –- were drafted by Blue Hill.  Under a long-established 
principle contract law, ambiguities in a contract are construed 
against the drafter.  Costa v. Brait Bldrs. Corp., 463 Mass. 65, 
76 (2012).  See 2 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206, at 
105 (1981).  Although the plaintiffs are not parties to the 
agreements between Blue Hill and its patrons, the rationale of 
this rule nonetheless is applicable here.  In light of the clear 
protective purpose of the act, Blue Hill appropriately should 
bear the responsibility of its choice of labels in its 
contracts.  Indeed, the record suggests that Blue Hill clearly 
is aware of these label distinctions given its multiple sets of 
contracts, some of which use the correct language that would 
permit the club to retain the fee.  All Blue Hill (or any 
employer) must do to avoid liability to its wait staff employees 
for an amount labeled as a "service" charge that the employer 
intends to retain is to be conscientious and consistent in its 
drafting.   
10 
 
Here, the Blue Hill contract describes the disputed fee as 
an "administrative" or "overhead" charge, which is to be 
retained by the club, and lists a separate fee as a "gratuity" 
that is to be distributed entirely to wait staff.  Were this the 
only language to consider, we comfortably could conclude that 
the disputed charge does not fall within the definition of a 
"service charge" under G. L. c. 149, § 152A (a).  In both 
subsequent invoices that Blue Hill sent to its patrons, however, 
it clearly listed the disputed fees as a "service" charge.  
Contrast Norrell v. Spring Valley Country Club, Inc., 98 Mass. 
App. Ct. 57, 67-68 (2020) (disputed fees were not "service 
charge[s]" under act where invoices to patrons labeled fees as 
"house charge[s]").  Blue Hill's invoices informed patrons that 
they were being billed for "service charge[s]," a term 
specifically defined in the act as proceeds payable to the 
protected service employees.   
The phrase "service charge" is also a term that a person 
reasonably would assume refers to proceeds that would be paid to 
an employee for "services" rendered.  See Black's Law Dictionary 
1644 (11th ed. 2019) (defining "service charge" as "[a] charge 
assessed for performing a service, such as the charge assessed 
by a restaurant for waiters").  Cf. United States Jaycees v. 
Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 391 Mass. 594, 601 
(1984), quoting G. L. c. 4, § 6, Third ("words and phrases shall 
11 
 
be construed according to the[ir] common and approved usage").  
Accordingly, the disputed fee is characterized most 
appropriately within the meaning of G. L. c. 149, § 152A (a), as 
a "service charge" that must be paid to the plaintiffs.  See 
DiFiore, 454 Mass. at 491 (act's terms evince Legislature's 
intent that "service employees receive the tips, gratuities, and 
service charges that customers intend them to receive").  The 
use of "service charge" in this limited context, which would 
render the employer liable to pay service employees the 
designated amount, also conforms with ordinary experience. 
In our prior jurisprudence construing the act, we 
consistently have held that its unambiguous terms impose 
liability on employers who fail to remit employer-designated 
"service" charges to their employees.  See, e.g., Meshna, 471 
Mass. at 175 ("if payment of a tip or service charge is made to 
an employer, the statute requires that the proceeds be remitted 
to the [covered] employees" [quotation and citation omitted]); 
Cooney, 69 Mass. App. Ct. at 637 ("the statutory language 
reflects legislative intent to regard any fee that the invoicing 
entity chooses to call a 'service charge' on an invoice for food 
or beverage service as being the functional equivalent of a tip 
or gratuity, thereby subjecting the fee to the statute").  As we 
have previously noted, "[t]he Legislature intended to ensure 
that service employees receive all the proceeds from service 
12 
 
charges, and any interpretation of the definition of 'service 
charge' must reflect that intent."  DiFiore, 454 Mass. at 493.  
A plain reading of the language of the final invoice, labeling 
the disputed fee as a "service" charge, accomplishes this 
purpose.   
Against this ordinary meaning and prior case law, Blue Hill 
maintains that the statutory definition of "service charge" does 
not encompass the disputed fee on the patrons' invoices, because 
G. L. c. 149, § 152A (a), also provides that the term "service 
charge" may be defined by "a different meaning [if that] is 
required by the context or is specifically prescribed."  In 
essence, Blue Hill argues that because it "specifically 
prescribed" in its contracts that the disputed fee is an 
"administrative" or "overhead" charge, we may disregard the 
designation of the fee as a "service" charge on the subsequent 
invoices tendered to patrons.  We are unpersuaded.   
We previously have explained that "[t]he Legislature . . . 
made clear . . . that it wished the definitions it enacted to 
serve [the act's] legislative purpose, not thwart it, and 
invited courts to revise the definitions if they interfered with 
that legislative purpose."  DiFiore, 454 Mass. at 493-494.  We 
further noted that G. L. c. 149, § 152A (a), "instructs those 
interpreting the definitions in the [a]ct to give a different 
meaning to a defined term if necessary to prevent such 
13 
 
disharmony among the provisions of the statute."  Id. at 494-
495.  Thus, in considering the "context" as contemplated by 
§ 152A (a), the Legislature intended reviewing courts to look to 
the context of the statutory scheme, and not individual 
transactions between parties.   
Blue Hill's interpretation of the act transforms a law that 
clearly is meant to help employees secure their tips into one 
that would aid employers in frustrating this purpose.  This 
interpretation is contrary to our settled canons of construction 
because it requires us to disregard the unambiguous language 
employed in the invoices, and instead substitute those words for 
the parties' intent.  This we cannot do.  See A.L. Prime Energy 
Consultant, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 479 Mass. 
419, 431 (2018) ("we analyze the contract according to the 
principle that '[w]hen contract language is unambiguous, it must 
be construed according to its plain meaning'" [citation 
omitted]).   
Consistent with well-established principles of statutory 
construction, the act requires employers to proceed with due 
care in drafting bills, invoices, and charges to patrons.  Even 
if an employer's carelessness in drafting were to result in its 
employees unintendedly acquiring proceeds that the employer 
planned to retain, that result is mandated by a plain reading of 
the statute, consistent with the Legislature's intent.  Cooney, 
14 
 
69 Mass. App. Ct. at 639 ("To be sure, from time to time service 
employees may reap seemingly unfair benefits from an invoicing 
entity's honest misstep, but such situations do not require that 
the statute be differently construed").  The employer has every 
opportunity, and every incentive, to designate the categories of 
charges on its bills and invoices accurately in the first 
instance and should expect the terms it uses to be understood by 
its customers in their usual, ordinary meaning.  Indeed, "[t]his 
is not a case where following the statute's literal meaning 
would lead to a result contrary to legislative intent."  Id. at 
638, quoting Shamban v. Masidlover, 429 Mass. 50, 54 (1999).  
See DiFiore, 454 Mass. at 494 ("Because a customer reasonably 
would expect a fee 'designated as a service charge' to be given 
to service employees, all, or nearly all, fees designated as 
service charges would also be fees that customers would 
reasonably expect to be given to service employees").   
Had the Legislature wished to place the burden elsewhere, 
it could have done so.8  See Cooney, 69 Mass. App. Ct. at 638 
 
8 In 2020, the Legislature amended the act, but declined to 
alter the definition of "service charge," notwithstanding 
precedent from this court and the Appeals Court interpreting the 
act to reflect strict liability on the part of the invoicing 
entity when a fee is designated as a "service" charge, tip, or 
gratuity.  See St. 2020, c. 358, § 77 (amending G. L. c. 149, 
§ 152A, to expand definition of "wait staff employee").  See 
also Commonwealth v. Montarvo, 486 Mass. 535, 541 (2020), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Vega, 449 Mass. 227, 231 (2007) ("The 
15 
 
("The Legislature no doubt could have . . . put[] the burden on 
service employees to prove in each instance that a particular 
'service charge' was in fact intended by the 'employer or other 
person' as a tip or gratuity.  Doing so would surely have 
accorded greater protection to the innocent 'employer or other 
person' and would have made recovery under the statute more 
onerous a task.  But the Legislature did not strike the balance 
that way . . ." [footnote omitted]).  Ascribing its plain 
meaning to the term "service charge" settles expectations.9  
Patrons know when they receive a bill whether any portion of the 
amount billed will be going to the employees, or whether they 
must be tipped separately.10  Likewise, if "service charge" 
 
Legislature is presumed to be aware of the prior state of the 
law as explicated by the decisions of this court").   
 
9 As amicus Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association 
aptly points out, "[i]nconsistent representations to customers 
increase the likelihood that waitstaff will lose out on earnings 
they would otherwise receive."  This is so because "[w]hile 
customers tend to rely on pre-event contracts to budget for how 
much an event will cost, customers tend to rely on the final 
invoice to determine whether to add an extra tip for waitstaff."  
See Robinson, If a Restaurant Adds a Surcharge, Do I Still Have 
to Tip?, LAist (Aug. 26, 2019), https://laist.com/2019/08/26 
/restaurant_surcharge_tip_los_angeles [https://perma.cc/59D2-
A2EZ] (answering that no tip is required where restaurant 
includes surcharge). 
 
10 We note that the redacted sample event contract appended 
to Blue Hill's answer to the plaintiffs' complaint -- the only 
document that purported to inform the patron of the ten percent 
house fee -- was executed two months prior to the date of the 
scheduled event.  We note further that the redacted sample final 
invoice is dated on the day of the event itself.  The length of 
16 
 
appears on an invoice, then employees know whether they are 
entitled to any portion of the paid bill. 
 
3.  Safe harbor provision.  Blue Hill argues -- and the 
Appeals Court agreed -– that despite Blue Hill's use of the term 
"service charge" on both invoices, the clear language of the 
contract brings into play the safe harbor provision of the act, 
which entitles Blue Hill to retain the disputed fee.11  The safe 
harbor provision of the act, G. L. c. 149, § 152A (d), second 
par., provides:   
 
time between the signing of the event contract and the event 
further supports our holding, as a patron cannot reasonably be 
expected to base his or her tipping decision on a contract 
signed months earlier, rather than on the final invoice tendered 
on the heels of the event's completion.   
 
11 Blue Hill argues that G. L. c. 149, § 152A (d), which 
requires it to remit disputed charges to wait staff employees if 
it "submit[ted] a bill, invoice or charge to a patron . . . that 
impose[d] a service charge," should alter our analysis.  Blue 
Hill apparently is suggesting that the inclusion of the word 
"charge" in the statutory language means the safe harbor 
provision should not be limited to those documents that have 
been identified as a "bill, invoice or charge," but, rather, 
also should be applied to the entirety of the documents that 
make up the transaction between the employer and the patron.  In 
essence, Blue Hill attempts to circumvent the plain meaning of 
the statute by contorting the statutory language.  This claim is 
unavailing.  We do not look beyond the language of the statute 
when the plain meaning of the statutory language does not lead 
to absurd results.  See Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 
360 (2001).  We must look to the "charge . . . impose[d]" on the 
patron, here the final invoice, as it designated a final and 
identifiable monetary amount the patron was required to pay.  
That invoice identified the disputed charge as a service charge, 
not a "house or administrative fee," as set forth in the safe 
harbor provision, rendering the safe harbor provision 
inapplicable.   
17 
 
"Nothing in this section shall prohibit an employer from 
imposing on a patron any house or administrative fee in 
addition to or instead of a service charge or tip, if the 
employer provides a designation or written description of 
that house or administrative fee, which informs the patron 
that the fee does not represent a tip or service charge for 
wait staff employees, service employees, or service 
bartenders."   
 
 
Thus, by its own terms, the safe harbor provision permits 
an employer to "impos[e] on a patron any house or administrative 
fee in addition to or instead of a service charge or tip," but 
only so long as the employer give patrons a sufficient 
"designation or written description" of the fee.  G. L. c. 149, 
§ 152A (d), second par.  By using different terms to denote the 
different fees at issue -- "house or administrative fee" as 
compared to "service charge or tip" -- the Legislature made 
clear that these terms are independent of each other and refer 
to different fees.  We thus must read "service charge" in light 
of the plain and ordinary meaning of the words the Legislature 
chose to use in defining the term.  See Beeler v. Downey, 387 
Mass. 609, 617 (1982) ("we choose to follow the canon of 
statutory construction that where words are used in one part of 
a statute in a definite sense, they should be given the same 
meaning in another part of the statute").  Accordingly, because 
Blue Hill denoted the disputed fee in the final invoice as a 
"service" charge, the safe harbor provision is inapplicable.   
18 
 
 
Conclusion.  The order granting Blue Hill's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings and denying the plaintiffs' cross 
motion is vacated and set aside.  The matter is remanded to the 
Superior Court for entry of an order denying Blue Hill's motion 
for judgment on the pleadings and granting the plaintiffs' cross 
motion consistent with this opinion and for further proceedings.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.   
 
KAFKER, J. (dissenting).  I respectfully dissent.  I would 
hold that the Tips Act, G. L. c. 149, § 152A, was not violated 
for the reasons articulated in the Appeals Court majority 
opinion, Hovagimian v. Concert Blue Hill, LLC, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 
69 (2020).