Case Title: Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86-43

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1987-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc.1987 WY 48735 P.2d 722Case Number: 86-43Decided: 04/17/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
Rick 
Carl BETTENCOURT and Kelly Bettencourt, husband and wife, Appellants 
(Plaintiffs)

 
 
v.

 
 
PRIDE 
WELL SERVICE, INC., a Texas corporation; Larry Welch, supervisor for Pride Well 
Services, Inc., Thatcher & Sons, Inc., a Wyoming corporation; Phillips 
Petroleum Company, a Delaware corporation; John Doe Corporations I through XX; 
and John Does I through XXX, Appellees (Defendants)

 
 
Kenneth 
R. Marken and James T. Anest of Marken & Anest, Casper, and Gordon W. 
Jenkins of Ririe, Lee & Jenkins, for Appellants.

 
 
Cameron 
S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, for Appellee 
Welch.

 
 
Jeffrey 
C. Brinkerhoff and Tim I. Munson of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Massey & 
Sullivan, for Appellee Thatcher.

 
 
Richard 
L. Williams, Frank D. Neville, and Richard E. Day of Williams, Porter, Day & 
Neville, P.C., for Appellee Phillips. 

 
 
Brown, 
C.J., Thomas, Urbigkit and Macy, JJ., and Guthrie, J., Retired. 

 
 
THOMAS, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The 
question which we must address in this case is whether a summary judgment 
appropriately may be entered against an injured person who is afflicted with 
traumatic amnesia and for that reason is unable to specify what act or omission 
caused his injury. The district court held that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact in this case and that the several defendants were entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law because proximate cause, one of the elements 
of a cause of action for negligence, could not be established through the 
testimony of the injured person or others. The district court concluded that in 
the absence of such evidence causation became a matter of speculation or 
conjecture. We conclude that there is present a genuine issue of material fact 
relating to causation which arises out of permissible inferences to be drawn by 
the finder of fact. The summary judgment for defendants is 
reversed.

 
 
[¶2.]     Rick Bettencourt was 
injured when he fell while attempting to descend a ladder on an oil storage tank 
located in Converse County, 
Wyoming. He brought this action to 
recover damages for his injuries, and his wife, Kelly, joined in the action to 
recover damages for loss of consortium. The named defendants were Bettencourt's 
employer, Pride Well Service, Inc., his immediate supervisor, Larry Welch, the 
manufacturer of the oil storage tank, Thatcher & Sons, Inc. (Thatcher), and 
the lessee of the oil storage tank, Phillips Petroleum Company (Phillips). Pride 
Well Service, Inc., was dismissed from the action, and following discovery, 
which included the depositions of Bettencourt and his fellow worker, Steve 
McGowen, the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court 
granted summary judgment to the several defendants, and after their motion to 
reconsider the grant of the summary judgment was denied, the Bettencourts 
appealed.

 
 
[¶3.]     In their brief, the 
Bettencourts set forth the issues as:

 
 
"A. Did 
the appellees sustain their burden of showing the absence of genuine issues of 
material fact concerning the causation of appellants' 
injuries?

"1. What 
were the appellees' duties to exclude the controverted allegations of 
appellants' pleadings?

"2. What 
were the appellants' duties to contravene appellees' motions for summary 
judgment?

"B. In 
the absence of direct, eye-witness testimony concerning causation, are the 
appellants precluded from proving causation via circumstantial evidence on the 
grounds that such evidence would require speculation by the 
jury?

"C. Did 
the lower court err in denying appellants' 'Motion to Reconsider Defendants' 
Motions for Summary Judgment?'"

 
 
[¶4.]     The several appellees 
submitted different expressions of the issues in their briefs. Welch stated the 
following:

 
 
"A. Did 
the District Court err in granting Larry Welch's motion for summary 
judgment?

"B. Did 
the District Court err in denying plaintiff Bettencourt's motion under Rule 59 
of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure?"

 
 
Phillips 
adopted Welch's first issue, but stated the second issue to 
be:

 
 
"B. Did 
Plaintiff Bettencourt fail to meet his burden of proving the existence of a 
genuine issue of material fact with respect to the proximate cause of his 
injury?"

 
 
Thatcher 
submitted the following statement of the issues:

 
 
"A. Did 
the trial court correctly find that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
and that Thatcher & Sons, Inc. was entitled to summary judgment as a matter 
of law?

"B. Is 
the trial court's denial of appellants' Rule 59 'Motion to Open, Alter or Amend 
the Order Granting Summary Judgment, and to Reconsider Defendants' Motions for 
Summary Judgment' a final appealable order?"

 
 
[¶5.]     There appears to be no 
dispute as to the operative facts preceding and surrounding Bettencourt's fall 
so far as they are known. On November 16, 1983, Bettencourt was celebrating his 
birthday. He was contacted by Welch and told to come to work that evening. 
Bettencourt was reluctant to go in to work because he had been drinking, but he 
agreed to after Welch informed him that he would only be required to write down 
flow measurements taken from an oil tank which would be relayed to him by 
another employee. Welch told him that he would not need his work clothes or 
boots because of the limited nature of his assignment. Bettencourt went to the 
work office where he was introduced to Steve McGowen, the fellow employee who 
was to take the measurements from the oil tank. Bettencourt and McGowen were 
told the location of the tank from which they were to be taking the measurements 
that night and that other workers on the scene would demonstrate for them the 
proper procedure to be followed in gauging the flow of the tank. The record 
indicates that neither of them were familiar with that 
procedure.

 
 
[¶6.]     Bettencourt and McGowen 
proceeded to the work site, and by the time they arrived, it was dark, cold and 
windy. The workers from the preceding shift instructed McGowen with respect to 
the proper procedure in gauging the flow from the oil tank which included a 
requirement of an hourly reading throughout the 12-hour shift. In order to 
accomplish the gauging, one was required to climb a large 400-barrel oil storage 
tank, walk across the top of that tank to a second tank where the measurement of 
the flow of oil in the second tank was to be taken, and then return by the same 
path. One person could perform this gauging operation, but Bettencourt decided 
to accompany McGowen in order to learn the procedure. They completed the gauging 
measurement process in the first hour without incident. After they had taken the 
reading in the second hour and were returning to the ground, Bettencourt 
apparently fell from the ladder used in climbing to the top of the tanks and 
suffered serious injuries.

 
 
[¶7.]     One aftereffect of 
Bettencourt's injuries is amnesia which prevents him from recalling any of the 
events of that night from the time he left the work office until he woke up in 
the hospital. Consequently, when his deposition was taken, Bettencourt could not 
state what had happened at the scene. The information concerning the events at 
the time of his injury comes from McGowen's deposition. McGowen testified that 
Bettencourt had gone with him to the top of the first oil tank, crossed over to 
the second oil tank where the required measurements were taken, and they then 
were returning to the ground at the time of the accident. There was no lighting 
at the tank site, and the only light available to make the journey up the ladder 
and across the tanks was flashlights. Because only one flashlight was carried to 
the top of the tanks, it was necessary for McGowen to light Bettencourt's path 
from the second tank across the first tank back to the ladder. McGowen was able 
to see Bettencourt reach the ladder on the first tank and begin his descent. 
McGowen then shifted the light beam to illuminate the path for his own walk 
across the second tank to the ladder. When McGowen reached the ladder on the 
first tank, he shined the beam from the flashlight on the ground below the 
ladder where he saw Bettencourt lying on the ground 
bleeding.

 
 
[¶8.]     The surface of these 
oil tanks was smeared with oil and was slippery, and dirt had been spread across 
the first tank to the second to alleviate that condition. The ladder for 
ascending and descending the first tank had only one handhold at the top on the 
left side which consisted of a four-inch pipe which was difficult to grasp. 
McGowen testified that previously he had slipped on the same ladder himself and 
that, before descending, he wrapped his arm around the pipe because it was 
difficult to hold onto with his hand.

 
 
[¶9.]     The theories of 
recovery alleged in the complaint were that Welch was culpably negligent in 
failing to adequately instruct and supervise Bettencourt with respect to the 
assigned task. Thatcher, it was alleged, had negligently designed and 
constructed the oil storage tank, including the ladder. The complaint charged 
Phillips with negligence in failing to provide a safe place to work alluding not 
only to the unsafe features of the constructed oil storage tank but also to the 
slippery surface and the failure to provide artificial lighting. Additionally, 
the complaint alleged that Phillips and Thatcher both were strictly liable as 
the providers of a defective product. After the issues were joined, depositions 
were obtained from Welch, McGowen and both of the 
Bettencourts.

 
 
[¶10.]  Welch, Phillips and Thatcher moved for 
summary judgment arguing that there existed no issue of material fact and that 
each of them was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In granting the 
several motions for summary judgment, the trial court decided that the 
Bettencourts had failed to meet their burden of proof as to causation. The 
district court concluded that, since it demonstrably was impossible for the 
Bettencourts to offer evidence which would specify the causative factor or 
factors, the several defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In 
presenting this appeal, the parties agree that if the allegations of the 
complaint are controverted, by affidavits, depositions or testimony at the 
hearing, a plaintiff may not rely on his pleadings but must set forth 
information supported by competent evidence which demonstrates the existence of 
a genuine issue of material fact. Board of County 
Commissioners of Fremont County, Wyoming v. Memorial Hospital of Natrona 
County, Wyo., 682 P.2d 334 (1984). 
The Bettencourts insist, however, that the first step, i.e., that the 
allegations of the complaint are controverted, was not accomplished in this 
instance.

 
 
[¶11.]  The entry of a summary judgment is 
authorized by Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P., "* * * * if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
According to Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P. "* * * * when a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported as provided in this rule an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits 
or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him." The requirements of 
Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P., recently have been applied in Samuel Mares Post No. 8, 
American Legion, Department of Wyoming v. Board of 
County Commissioners of Converse County, 
Wyo., 697 P.2d 1040 (1985); O'Donnell v. 
City of Casper, Wyo., 696 P.2d 1278 
(1985); and Larsen v. 
Roberts, Wyo., 676 P.2d 1046 
(1984).

 
 
[¶12.]  In forming a decision with respect to the 
propriety of a summary judgment, the facts must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment, and that party must be 
given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn. 
England v. Simmons, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1137 
(1986); O'Donnell v. City of 
Casper, supra; Garner v. Hickman, Wyo., 
709 P.2d 407 (1985). The two words "if appropriate" in Rule 
56(e) are not without significance. "'Where the evidentiary matter in support of 
the motion does not establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary 
judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented.'" 
Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1075 (7th Cir. 1982), quoting the 
Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. 
P. (1963 amendments). In concluding that summary judgment was appropriate 
in this case, the district court said that it was:

 
 
"* * * * 
Based upon the failure of the Plaintiffs to meet their burden of proof as to 
causation. Liability cannot be established by conjecture. The affidavits, 
depositions, and other material in the file do not produce a clue as to why the 
plaintiff fell, there is no evidence as to causation."

 
 
[¶13.]  We perceive the debate in this case to 
isolate the question of whether, given evidence which would establish the duty 
of care owed by a reasonable person under the circumstances and a breach of that 
duty, a plaintiff in a personal injury case is entitled to rely upon inferences 
to avoid the entry of a summary judgment even in light of a discovery record 
which demonstrates that the plaintiff can produce no evidence that a particular 
breach was the cause of his injuries. We note again that the Bettencourts are 
entitled to the benefit of all inferences to be drawn from the affidavits, 
depositions and other material appearing in the record. Reno Livestock Corporation v. Sun Oil Company (Delaware), 
Wyo., 638 P.2d 147 (1981). Clearly, circumstantial evidence may be invoked to establish 
proximate cause in conjunction with or in the absence of direct evidence. 
Colorado Serum Company v. Arp, Wyo., 504 P.2d 801 (1972); Miller v. Hedderman, 
Wyo., 464 P.2d 544 (1970); O'Malley v. 
Eagan, 43 Wyo. 233, 2 P.2d 1063 
(1931); W. Prosser and W. Keeton on The Law of Torts, § 39 at 242 (5th 
ed. 1984); 4 F. Harper, F. James and O. Gray, The Law of Torts, § 19.3 at 6-8 
(2d ed. 1986); 58 Am. Jur.2d Negligence § 
478 at 53 (1971). Furthermore, in negligence cases "'even where the facts 
bearing upon the issue of negligence are undisputed, * * * *, if reasonable 
minds could reach different conclusions and inferences from such facts, the 
issue must be submitted to the trier of fact.'" Fegler v. Brodie, Wyo., 
574 P.2d 751, 754 (1978), quoting Marsden v. Patane, 
380 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1967).

 
 
[¶14.]  This court has developed only very 
limited exceptions to the foregoing propositions. In Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, Wyo., 671 P.2d 334 (1983), we held, after examining 
the record from the perspective most favorable to the plaintiffs, that a bare 
inference contrary to direct testimony was insufficient to support a conclusion 
that a genuine issue of material fact existed. In that case, the plaintiffs' 
claim was a contractual theory founded upon the alleged use by the defendant of 
a prospectus supplied to it by the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest. In 
supporting its motion for a summary judgment, the defendant filed affidavits 
which stated unequivocally that it had not used the prospectus. The summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant was affirmed. On several occasions, we also 
have sustained summary judgments in medical malpractice cases in favor of 
defendants and said that there is no inference of a causal connection premised 
upon a bad result following treatment. E.g., Harris v. Grizzle, 
Wyo., 625 P.2d 747 (1981); Keller v. Anderson, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1253 (1976); Stundon v. Stadnik, Wyo., 
469 P.2d 16 (1970).

 
 
[¶15.]  The situation which led to the decision 
in Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, supra, is far 
different from this case. The record here encompasses no affidavits or other 
evidence demonstrating that the acts or omissions of the several defendants did 
not cause Bettencourt's injuries. It does not appear that the defendants could 
have made such a showing any more than Bettencourt was able to demonstrate the 
converse. Under these circumstances, the rule developed in Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, supra, has no 
application, and instead, we should invoke the rule that the Bettencourts are 
entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences which could be drawn in 
establishing the element of causation. This would lead to a conclusion that the 
defendants have not established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
[¶16.]  The concept of proximate cause and how it 
is to be established in a judicial forum is the crux of this case. In McClellan v. Tottenhoff, Wyo., 
666 P.2d 408, 414 (1983), we said, "proximate cause means that 
the accident or injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the act 
of negligence." That case involved the sale of intoxicating liquor to a minor, 
and we went on to hold that whether the vendor could foresee an injury to a 
third person would be the ultimate test. More recently, in Buckley v. Bell, Wyo., 
703 P.2d 1089, 1091-1092 (1985), the following definition of 
proximate or legal causation was espoused:

 
 
"* * * * 
That conduct which is a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries 
identified in the complaint. * * * * If the conduct is 'that cause which in 
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by a sufficient intervening cause 
produces the injury, without which the result would not have occurred,' it must 
be identified as a substantial factor in bringing about the harm." (Citations 
omitted.)

 
 
[¶17.]  Our usual disposition is to treat 
proximate causation as a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact 
unless, on the evidence demonstrated in the file reasonable persons could not 
disagree. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, supra. In O'Malley v. 
Eagan, supra, this court held that 
the question of proximate cause is one to be decided by the trier of fact when 
different inferences might be drawn even though the evidence might be 
undisputed. In O'Donnell v. City of 
Casper, supra, we applied the 
general concept that whether an act is deemed a substantial factor is a question 
for the trier of fact which may be decided as a matter of law only if reasonable 
minds could not disagree. See the cases cited in Buckley v. Bell, 
supra.

 
 
[¶18.]  The Kansas Supreme Court has aptly 
expressed the effect of circumstantial evidence upon the question of causation 
utilizing the following illustration:

 
 
"The 
fact that soon after the passing of an engine a fire starts near a railway track 
in an enclosed field, covered at the time with a growth of highly inflammable 
vegetation, and travels before a high wind in a direction away from the track, 
is sufficient to warrant a jury in finding that the fire was caused by the 
operation of the railroad, without its appearing that the engine emitted sparks 
or live cinders or was put to special exertion, and without further proof 
excluding other possible origins." (Syl. P1 .) Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. 
Perry, 65 Kan. 792, 70 P. 876 
(1902).

 
 
That 
court also has noted in citing the earlier case that circumstantial evidence 
need not rise to that degree of certainty which will exclude any and every other 
reasonable conclusion in order to sustain a finding in a civil case. American 
Family Mutual Insurance Company v. 
Grim, 201 Kan. 340, 440 P.2d 621 
(1968).

 
 
[¶19.]  Cases relied upon by the appellees are 
distinguishable. In Bluejacket v. 
Carney, Wyo., 550 P.2d 494 (1976); and LeGrande v. Misner, Wyo., 
490 P.2d 1252 (1971), we sustained the granting of summary 
judgments because the undisputed facts demonstrated the absence of any duty owed 
by the defendant to the plaintiff. The existence of a duty is a question of law 
to be determined by the court. Caterpillar Tractor 
Company v. Donahue, Wyo., 674 P.2d 1276 
(1983); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 
supra; Beard v. Brown, Wyo., 616 P.2d 726 (1980). Similarly, 
we must distinguish Apperson v. 
Kay, Wyo., 546 P.2d 995 (1976), 
because the plaintiff there admitted that there was no evidence of a defect in 
the accused appliance, and the only suggestion of a possible defect came from 
hearsay which would not be admissible at trial.

 
 
[¶20.]  In this case, appellee Thatcher, as the 
designer and manufacturer of the oil tank, owed a duty to Bettencourt and others 
to refrain from selling products that were negligently designed or manufactured. 
The testimony of McGowen made it clear that the only means of access to the top 
of the tank was a ladder welded to the side of the tank and that the ladder at 
the top had only one handhold on the left side. McGowen testified that the 
handhold was four-inch pipe which was so difficult to grasp that he wrapped his 
arm around the pipe before descending the ladder to prevent him from slipping 
off. No safety cage, safety belt or any other means was provided in connection 
with that ladder to prevent a fall in the event of a slip.

 
 
[¶21.]  Defendant Phillips owed a duty to provide 
Bettencourt and others a reasonably safe place to work. It is clear that there 
was no artificial lighting provided at the site of these tanks, and the only 
lighting available was the flashlight which McGowen carried, despite the 
necessity for working in the area at night. The presence of oil on the top of 
the tanks with a dirt path covering it also was undisputed. Furthermore, in 
using the tank with the type of handrail described, Phillips may well be charged 
with the same duty and breach as Thatcher.

 
 
[¶22.]  These factors make this case analogous to 
Zinnel v. United States Shipping Board Emergency 
Fleet Corporation, 10 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 
1925), in which the court held that the failure of the ship owner to 
provide a guard rope which might have been grabbed by a sailor who was swept 
overboard and drowned presented a question of fact for the jury which made 
dismissal of the complaint improper. Judge Learned Hand authored the opinion of 
the court which held:

 
 
"There 
of course remains a question whether they [the jury] might have also said that 
the fault caused the loss. About that we agree no certain conclusion was 
possible. Nobody could, in the nature of things, be sure that the intestate 
would have seized the rope, or, if he had not, that it would have stopped his 
body. But we are not dealing with a criminal case, nor are we justified, where 
certainty is impossible, in insisting upon it. We cannot say that there was no 
likelihood that a rope three feet above the deck made by the timber would not 
have saved the seaman. * * * * We think it is a question about which reasonable 
men might at least differ whether the intestate would not have been saved, had 
it been there." Zinnel v. United States Shipping 
Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, supra, 
at 49.

 
 
See also 
Kirincich v. Standard Dredging 
Company, 112 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 
1940), (whether or not intestate could have been saved from drowning had 
something more buoyant been available than a one-inch heaving line presented a 
question of fact for the jury as to proximate cause); Tesmer v. Rich Ladder Company, Minn., 380 N.W.2d 203 (1986), (whether or not 
defective design in ladder and inadequate warnings and instructions for safe use 
were the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries was a question of fact for the 
jury); cases cited in 4 F. Harper, F. James and O. Gray, The Law of Torts, 
supra, § 20.2 at 98 n.18.

 
 
[¶23.]  The absence of lighting is a significant 
factor also. In Coleman v. Shaw, 281 S.C. 107, 314 S.E.2d 154 (1984), the defendant 
violated an ordinance by failing to have a lifeguard at the swimming pool in 
which the plaintiff's husband drowned. The defendant urged that, in the absence 
of any eye witness, only by speculation could the trier of fact conclude that 
the violation of the ordinance was a proximate cause of the drowning. A summary 
judgment entered in the trial court was vacated by the appellate court which 
held that a defendant should not benefit from its failure to provide a 
lifeguard. Certainly, in this instance Phillips should not benefit by virtue of 
the fact that the absence of adequate lighting well may have prevented McGowen 
from witnessing Bettencourt's fall.

 
 
[¶24.]  In Vitanza 
v. Growth Realties, Inc., 91 A.D.2d 917, 
457 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1983), the court rejected an argument by defendant that 
as a matter of law the evidence was insufficient to establish causation in an 
instance in which the plaintiff could show that she fell down steps which had 
loose edges and protruding nails, but she could not establish how her fall 
began. The court there approved the following statement from W. Prosser and W. 
Keeton on the Law of Torts, supra, § 41 at 269-270:

 
 
"The 
fact of causation is incapable of mathematical proof * * * *. If as a matter of 
ordinary experience a particular act or omission might be expected, under the 
circumstances, to produce a particular result, and that result in fact has 
followed, the conclusion might be permissible that the causal relation 
exists."

 
 
This 
statement does reflect an accurate rule of law. In the same work, the following 
comment also appears:

 
 
"Circumstantial 
evidence, expert testimony, or common knowledge may provide a basis from which 
the causal sequence may be inferred. Thus it is every day experience that 
unlighted stairs create a danger that someone will fall. Such a condition 
'greatly multiplies the chances of accident, and is of a character naturally 
leading to its occurrence.' When a fat person tumbles down the steps, it is a 
reasonable conclusion that it is more likely than not that the fall would not 
have occurred but for the bad lighting. When a child is drowned in a swimming 
pool, no one can say with certainty that a lifeguard would have saved the child; 
but the experience of the community permits the conclusion that the absence of 
the guard played a significant part in the drowning. Such questions are 
peculiarly for the jury; and whether proper construction of a building would 
have withstood an earthquake, or whether reasonable police precautions would 
have prevented a boy from shooting the plaintiff in the eye with an air gun, are 
questions on which a court can seldom rule as a matter of law." W. Prosser and 
W. Keeton on The Law of Torts, supra, § 41 at 270.

 
 
[¶25.]  The counterproposition is set forth in F. 
Harper, F. James and O. Gray, The Law of Torts, supra, § 19.4 at 9, in which the 
authors, quoting Eitel v. Times, 
Inc., 221 Or. 585, 352 P.2d 485, 488 
(1960), state:

 
 
"* * * * 
Wherefrom the facts most favorable to the plaintiff the nonexistence of the fact 
to be inferred is just as probable as its existence (or more probable than its 
existence), the conclusion that it exists is a matter of speculation, surmise, 
and conjecture, and a jury will not be permitted to draw it. 'Where the 
probabilities are at best evenly balanced between negligence and its absence, it 
becomes the duty of the court to direct the jury that there is no sufficient 
proof.'" (Footnotes omitted.)

 
 
[¶26.]  An analysis of our prior cases discloses 
that, in ruling on summary judgments in negligence cases when the issue was the 
absence of the element of causation, we have upheld summary judgments for 
defendants only in limited circumstances. If causation were clearly refuted by 
positive evidence contained in discovery materials, the summary judgment would 
be sustained. Cf., Blackmore v. Davis Oil 
Company, supra. In cases such as 
medical malpractice cases in which a presumption of no breach of duty causing 
injury is present, in the absence of evidence establishing causation, the 
summary judgment will be sustained. Harris v. 
Grizzle, supra; Stundon v. Stadnik, 
supra. In any other situation in which the discovery materials or 
unrefuted allegations disclose a duty and a breach of that duty, we treat the 
existence of the element of causation as more probable than its nonexistence; 
and we require the issue to be submitted to the finder of 
fact.

 
 
[¶27.]  We hold that in this instance the 
circumstantial evidence presents a question for the jury and extends beyond 
conjecture, speculation or surmise. The circumstantial evidence here present and 
common knowledge provide a basis from which the causal sequence may be inferred. 
Reasonable minds could differ on the question, but they also could find that the 
design of the oil tank and the attached ladder; the absence of artificial 
lighting; the oil on top of the tanks; and the continued use of the tank with 
the ladder in the condition described by McGowen or any or all of these did 
constitute a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries to Bettencourt. 
Under the circumstances, the summary judgment in favor of Thatcher and Phillips 
must be reversed.

 
 
[¶28.]  We affirm the summary judgment in favor 
of Welch. He was a fellow employee of Bettencourt and owed only a duty to 
refrain from culpable negligence. § 27-12-103(a), W.S. 1977. In Bryant v. Hornbuckle, 
Wyo., 728 P.2d 1132, 1136 (1986), 
quoting Hamilton v. Swigart Coal 
Mine, 59 Wyo. 485, 143 P.2d 203, 206, 149 A.L.R. 998 
(1943), we said:

 
 
"In 
order to recover against a coemployee under this section of the Worker's 
Compensation Act, a plaintiff must establish more than simple negligence; the 
coemployee's conduct must constitute 'culpable' negligence. In Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 
622 P.2d 1349, 1362 (1981), we defined the term 'culpable 
negligence' as 'willful and serious misconduct.' We defined the term 'willful' 
in this context as '"such as is done purposely, with knowledge -- or misconduct 
of such a character as to evince a reckless disregard of 
consequences."'

 
 
"The 
aggravating factor which distinguishes willful misconduct from ordinary 
negligence is the actor's state of mind. See Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 34 
(5th ed. 1984). In order to prove that an actor has engaged in willful 
misconduct, one must demonstrate that he acted with a state of mind that 
approaches intent to do harm. Id.State of mind, of course, may be difficult 
to prove. Accordingly, courts allow a party to establish that willful misconduct 
has occurred by demonstrating that an actor has intentionally committed an act 
of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so 
great as to make it highly probable that harm will 
follow."

 
 
[¶29.]  The undisputed evidence demonstrating 
that Welch advised Bettencourt to report for work without his work coveralls and 
boots even though he would be working on a cold and windy night; his knowledge 
that Bettencourt had been celebrating his birthday by drinking intoxicating 
beverages; and the limitation on Bettencourt's function to record the gauging 
readings all fall short of demonstrating culpable negligence, i.e., an intent by 
Welch to harm Bettencourt or actions by him that had a high probability of 
causing harm to Bettencourt. The summary judgment in favor of Welch is 
affirmed.

 
 
[¶30.]  Affirmed in part and reversed in part for 
proceedings consistent with the opinion of the court.