Case Title: State v. Sloan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80173-8

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 2008-02-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
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Filing Date:   June 23, 2016
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STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 
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Plaintiff-Appellee,
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v.
NO. S-1-SC-34858
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MATTHEW SLOAN,
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Defendant-Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF EDDY COUNTY
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Lisa B. Riley, District Judge
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Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
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Tania Shahani, Assistant Appellate Defender
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Santa Fe, NM
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for Appellant
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Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
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Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General
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Santa Fe, NM
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for Appellee
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DISPOSITIONAL ORDER OF REVERSAL
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VIGIL, Justice.
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{1}
This direct appeal having come before the full Court, the Justices having read
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the briefs of the parties and otherwise having fully informed themselves on the issues
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and applicable law as raised by the parties; and
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{2}
All of the Justices having concurred that there is no reasonable likelihood that
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a written decision or opinion would affect the disposition of this appeal or advance the
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law of the state;
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ADJUDGED THAT:
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{3}
Defendant appeals from his convictions for felony murder, burglary, and
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tampering with evidence. Defendant raises three issues on appeal. Defendant’s first
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issue raises a number of challenges to the jury instructions as a matter of fundamental
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error. Defendant’s second issue raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
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arising from the erroneous jury instructions given in this case. And Defendant’s third
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issue challenges the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence
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based on Defendant’s claims of a faulty search warrant process. For the reasons that
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follow, we reverse Defendant’s convictions for felony murder and burglary, affirm his
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conviction for tampering with evidence, and remand for a new trial.
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Defendant’s Convictions for Felony Murder and Burglary Must Be Reversed and
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Remanded for a New Trial Because of Errors in the Instructions Given to the
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Jury
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{4}
Defendant argues that the jury was erroneously instructed because (1) the
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essential elements instruction for the felony murder charge did not include the
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essential elements of the predicate offense of attempted armed robbery; (2) the
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intoxication instruction given with the felony murder charge also refers to attempted
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armed robbery but fails to accurately set forth the intent element for that crime; (3) the
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duress instruction given to the jury refers to both attempted robbery and armed
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robbery but does not define either crime; (4) the aggravated burglary instruction uses
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armed robbery as the predicate offense but does not set forth the elements of the
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crime; (5) the intoxication instruction given with the aggravated burglary charge refers
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to an unparticularized felony and refers to “theft” even though theft was not included
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as a basis for aggravated burglary; and (6) the lesser-included offense of burglary uses
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robbery as the predicate felony even though the court did not provide the jury with the
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essential elements for that crime.
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Felony Murder and Related Instructions Fail to Provide the Essential Elements
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for the Predicate Offense of Attempted Armed Robbery
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{5}
The State concedes error in the felony murder instruction because the essential
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elements of the predicate offense, attempted armed robbery, were not given. And
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although the intoxication and duress instructions that were given with the felony
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murder instruction reference the predicate felony of attempted armed robbery, neither
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of those instructions sets forth the essential elements for attempted armed robbery.
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{6}
We agree that the felony murder instruction was erroneous. As Use Note 3 to
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UJI 14-202 NMRA provides, the jury must be instructed on the essential elements of
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the predicate offense for felony murder. There is no dispute that attempted armed
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robbery was the predicate offense at issue in this case and that the jury was not
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instructed on the essential elements for that offense. As such, notwithstanding any
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failure to object to the adequacy of the instructions that were given, we agree with
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Defendant’s contention—and the State’s concession—that the failure to instruct the
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jury on the essential elements of the predicate felony of attempted armed robbery
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amounts to fundamental error requiring the reversal of Defendant’s felony murder
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conviction and remand for a new trial on that charge. See State v. Contreras, 1995-
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NMSC-056, ¶ 17, 120 N.M. 486, 903 P.2d 228 (recognizing that, when armed robbery
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is the predicate felony for felony murder, proof of armed robbery is a necessary
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element of felony murder); State v. Barber, 2004 NMSC-019, ¶ 20, 135 N.M. 621, 92
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P.3d 633 (recognizing that the failure to instruct the jury on an essential element is
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ordinarily fundamental error even when the defendant fails to object); see also UJI 14-
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1621 NMRA (providing the essential elements for armed robbery); UJI 14-2801
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NMRA (providing the essential elements for attempt to commit a felony). Because we
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reverse Defendant’s felony murder conviction on this basis, we need not address
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Defendant’s claims that the felony murder instruction also failed to include an element
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related to his defenses of intoxication and duress.
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Defendant’s Claim of Error By the Aggravated Burglary Instruction Is Moot
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{7}
Defendant also argues that the aggravated burglary instruction given to the jury
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was erroneous because it too used attempted armed robbery as the predicate felony but
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failed to set forth the essential elements of that crime. But as the State points out,
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Defendant was implicitly acquitted of aggravated burglary when the jury convicted
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Defendant of the lesser-included offense of burglary. We therefore agree that any
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claimed error on this point is moot and need not be addressed further. See State v.
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Melton, 1984-NMCA-115, ¶ 14, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (noting that claims of
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instructional error need not be addressed when related to a charge upon which the jury
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acquitted).
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The Instructional Errors Related to Defendant’s Burglary Conviction Require
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Reversal
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{8}
As the parties note, “[b]urglary is a specific intent crime.” See State v. Jennings,
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1984-NMCA-051, ¶ 14, 102 N.M. 89, 691 P.2d 882. Although the intoxication
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instruction given to the jury for aggravated burglary provided the jury should acquit
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Defendant if it found that he was too intoxicated to form the specific intent, the jury
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was not similarly instructed with regard to the non-aggravated burglary charge. But
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as the State concedes, the failure to instruct the jury in this regard was error because
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burglary is also a specific intent crime for which the defense of intoxication also
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applies. See UJI 14-5111 NMRA Use Note 1. We therefore agree that Defendant’s
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burglary conviction must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. See State v. Leyba,
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2012-NMSC-037, ¶ 44, 289 P.3d 1215 (recognizing that UJI 14-5111 must be given
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as an element of the offense for which intent can be negated rather than as a separate
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instruction). Because his burglary conviction is reversed on this basis, we need not
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address Defendant’s other claimed errors with regard to the burglary charge itself.
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Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Need Not Be Addressed
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{9}
Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel relate to trial counsel’s
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failures to properly object to the instructional defects discussed above. But because
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we have already concluded that Defendant’s convictions for felony murder and
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burglary must be reversed because of instructional error, Defendant’s claims of
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ineffective assistance of counsel will not provide him with any greater relief. We
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therefore do not address his ineffective assistance of counsel issues any further. See
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generally State v. Almanza, 2007-NMCA-073, ¶ 5, 141 N.M. 751, 160 P.3d 932
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(recognizing that an appellate court will not address other issues that will not result
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in greater relief than that afforded by issues upon which relief is already granted).
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The District Court Did Not Err in Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
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Evidence Based on Technical Defects in the Search Warrant Process
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{10}
Although the reversal of Defendant’s convictions for felony murder and
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burglary makes it unnecessary to address his suppression issue to the extent it
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implicates those convictions, Defendant’s claims of erroneous jury instructions and
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ineffective assistance of counsel do not relate to his tampering with evidence
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conviction. We will therefore proceed to address whether the district court’s denial of
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Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence was error that would require the reversal of
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his conviction for tampering with evidence.
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{11}
During the second day of trial, defense counsel first challenged the validity of
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the search warrant on the basis that (1) the search warrant was dated December 31,
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2011, even though the victim was not killed until January 2, 2012, and (2) the
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detective did not sign the statement of probable cause prior to the issuance of the
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search warrant and only did so after the warrant was issued upon direction by the
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judge who issued the warrant to do so. With regard to the matter of the date on the
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warrant, Detective Naylor testified that the incorrect date was a typographical error.
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The detective testified that he took the warrant application to the warrant judge at her
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house early on the morning of January 4, 2012. At that time, the detective testified that
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the judge placed him under oath and he swore that the contents of the search warrant
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affidavit were true. Later that day, the detective testified that another officer told him
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he had forgotten to sign the search warrant application, at which time he contacted the
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issuing judge to ask her what to do about it. The detective testified that the judge
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noted that he had been sworn in by her and advised him to sign it and submit it to the
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clerk’s office, which he immediately did.
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{12}
 We agree with the State that the constitutional requirements for a search
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warrant, namely an oath or affirmation and written statement of probable cause, were
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met in this case. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.M. Const. art. II, § 10. Suppression for
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technical violations in securing and executing a search warrant is only required when
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“the defendant can show prejudice or if there was a deliberate disregard of the rule.”
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See State v. Malloy, 2001-NMCA-067, ¶ 11, 131 N.M. 222, 34 P.3d 611. We agree
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with the State that no such showing has been made in this case. We therefore hold that
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the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. Id. at ¶ 23
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(concluding that there is no reason to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search
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warrant notwithstanding technical violations without a showing of prejudice to the
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defendant or a deliberate violation of the rule).
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CONCLUSION
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{13}
Because the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress
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and Defendant has not raised any other claims of error with regard to his tampering
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with evidence conviction, that conviction is affirmed. For the reasons set forth above,
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however, Defendant’s felony murder and burglary convictions must be reversed
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because of errors in the jury instructions that amounted to fundamental error. And
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because Defendant has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
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convictions for felony murder and burglary, this case is remanded to the district court
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for a new trial on those charges.
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{14}
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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__________________________________
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BARBARA J. Vigil, Justice
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____________________________________
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CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice
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___________________________________
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PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
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___________________________________
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EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
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___________________________________
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JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice
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