Case Title: Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey

Citation: 317 P.2d 1094, 83 Ariz. 163

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1957-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
83 Ariz. 163 (1957) 317 P.2d 1094 CRYSTAL COCA-COLA BOTTLING CO., a corporation, Appellant, v. Friou CATHEY, Appellee. No. 6367. Supreme Court of Arizona. November 19, 1957. *165 Conner & Jones, and A.O. Johnson, Tucson, for appellant. Martin S. Rogers, Tucson, for appellee. PHELPS, Justice. This appeal involves the liability of a beverage bottler to an ultimate consumer for personal injury damages sustained as a result of drinking a beverage containing a dead fly. The complaint alleges: The plaintiff, Friou Cathey, introduced evidence to show that he purchased a bottle of coca-cola from a drugstore. The salesclerk took the bottle from a cooler, opened the bottle at the cooler, and placed it on the counter about two or three feet away in front of Cathey. The bottle remained on the counter for about a minute before Cathey began to drink from it. After he had consumed about a third of the bottle something caught in his throat which caused him to spit the contents of his mouth back into the bottle. Examination revealed a dead fly in the bottle. Cathey became ill and vomited three times that evening according to his testimony and that of his wife, and he experienced spells of nausea for a week or more afterward. Evidence established that the drugstore had purchased the bottle of coca-cola from the defendant, Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. The defendant introduced evidence to show that its bottling plant was operated under sanitary conditions common to similar bottling plants with the usual inspection after washing and before filling the bottles. Defendant also presented testimony to the effect that coca-cola bottles can be opened and the cap replaced without any obvious indication of tampering. At the close of plaintiff's case and again at the close of all the evidence, the court denied the defendant's motions for a directed verdict. The court instructed the jury on the elements of liability under implied warranty as well as in negligence. He also gave instructions on the inference which arises under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and when it applies and left to the jury's determination whether the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of this doctrine. The jury returned a verdict of $1,000 for the plaintiff and judgment was entered accordingly. The court denied defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and also denied defendant's motion for a new trial on condition that plaintiff remit $400 of *167 the $1,000 judgment within ten days. The plaintiff made a highly conditional offer of remittal which did not amount to an acceptance of the remittitur. The defendant appeals from the judgment and the order denying these motions. Defendant-appellant sets forth thirteen assignments of error in his brief. Because each proposition of law asserted by defendant is used to support a group of these assignments, for the sake of simplicity, we shall discuss the correctness of each proposition of law in order to determine the propriety of the judgment entered. Defendant's Proposition of Law A reads: This precise proposition has never before been presented to this court for decision. Defendant admits that there is a split of authority on this proposition. He cites the New York case of Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576, 27 A.L.R. 1533, in support of his position. A number of other jurisdictions hold that there can be no implied warranty in the absence of privity of contract and admit of no exception in the case of foodstuffs and beverages. Birmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64, 17 A.L.R. 667; Drury v. Armour & Co., 140 Ark. 371, 216 S.W. 40; Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A.2d 224; Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 A. 186, 39 A.L.R. 972; Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A.2d 316; Carlson v. Turner Centre System, 263 Mass. 339, 161 N.E. 245; Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125; Enloe v. Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305, 180 S.E. 582; Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Co., R.I., 112 A.2d 701; Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 158 S.W.2d 721, 171 A.L.R. 1200. However, an imposing group of jurisdictions hold that there is an exception to the general rule in the case of manufacturers of foodstuffs such that an implied warranty of fitness inures to the benefit of the ultimate consumer though there be no strict privity of contract running between the manufacturer and consumer. Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 163 P.2d 470; Heimsoth v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 1 Ill. App.2d 28, 116 N.E.2d 193; Anderson v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N.W. 48; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Savage, Miss., 89 So. 2d 634; Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Mo. App., 285 S.W.2d 53; Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557; Sweeney v. Cain, Tex.Civ.App., 243 S.W.2d 874. We believe that the decisions in the latter group of jurisdictions represent the more recent trend and provide the better reasoned authority. Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 42 Ariz. 262, 25 P.2d 162. Most particularly we quote with approval from Jacob E. *168 Decker & Sons, Inc., v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828, 829, 142 A.L.R. 1479, as follows: We hold that in the case of food, beverages, and drugs an implied warranty by the manufacturer that the goods are pure and free from deleterious foreign substances inures to the benefit of the ultimate consumer of those goods by operation of law even in the absence of privity of contract. Defendant's Proposition of Law A is rejected. Defendant's Proposition of Law B reads: Though this may correctly state the law in the standard classic case to which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, the requisite of exclusive control receives a special interpretation when applied to cases involving injury from food and beverages containing deleterious foreign substances. In his brief defendant directed our attention to the case of Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 158 S.W.2d 721, 725, which classifies cases of this sort in order to define the proper application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to them. We adopt that classification as set forth in the following quote from that case: In adopting this classification we expand it in one respect. We hold that in this fourth class of case in order to satisfy the exclusive control requisite of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the plaintiff must either prove "that there has been no reasonable opportunity for tampering" or that there was no tampering "with the bottle, or its contents, in the interim between the physical control of the bottler or manufacturer, and that of the consumer." This is a question of fact which the plaintiff may prove by circumstantial evidence for submission to the jury under proper instructions. In the instant case the court instructed the *171 jury that in order for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, they must determine that the fly did not get into the bottle as a result of the intervening act of a third party and that the condition of the bottle was the same when it left the defendant bottling company's control as when it was received by the plaintiff. We believe the jury might reasonably have decided that under the circumstances there was no tampering with the bottle after it left the bottler's control. To decide that there was a tampering would require the jury to believe in this case that a person would go unobserved to the cooler behind the counter in a drugstore or the druggist or one of his employees would go to the cooler and place therein a bottle of coca-cola in which he had put a fly by removing and replacing the cap and this without being able to foretell who might be served that bottle or when it might be served. This, we submit, is too far-fetched for reasonable men to consider seriously. Defendant's Proposition of Law B does not correctly state the law applicable to this case. The trial judge placed the question of whether res ipsa loquitur doctrine applied properly before the jury on circumstantial evidence which might well justify a finding by the jury that it did apply. Defendant's Proposition of Law C reads: In our consideration of Proposition of Law B we make it clear that in such a case as this the plaintiff satisfies the above proposition by showing to the satisfaction of the jury that third parties did not tamper with the bottle after it left the control of the bottler. In the instant case the very question of whether the fly was in the bottle when it left the bottler's control was presented to the jury as a basis for liability on both the theory of implied warranty and under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Thus Proposition of Law C was followed and therefore affords no support for any assignments of error. Defendant's Proposition of Law D reads: This proposition does not adequately state the law applicable to a case in which the res ipsa loquitur doctrine properly applied has raised an inference of negligence. We believe that defendant's evidence in this case did not "destroy any reasonable inference of negligence" hence the question was properly submitted to the jury for determination. Thus, defendant's Proposition of Law D affords no support for his assignments of error. Defendant's Proposition of Law E reads: We accept this as a correct statement of the law; however, the plaintiff may prove this fact by circumstantial evidence and is entitled to have it presented to the jury when, as in the instant case, the circumstances admit of such a determination by reasonable men. The trial judge submitted this question to the jury when he instructed them that the plaintiff had sustained the burden of proof on breach of the implied warranty only if they found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant bottling company prepared a sealed bottle of coca-cola containing a dead fly which was purchased and consumed in part by the plaintiff. Since this proposition of law was followed, it affords no support for any assignments of error. Defendant's Proposition of Law F reads: The soundness of this proposition depends upon the nature of the illness with which *173 the jury is concerned. Ordinarily a jury would require expert medical evidence to help it to determine whether an illness resulted from particular acts. However, we conclude, that a reasonable person does not require the aid of expert medical evidence in order to determine that the discovery of a fly in a mouthful of coca-cola caused the vomiting which immediately followed the discovery. Proposition of Law F does not support the assignments of error. Defendant's Proposition of law G reads: In order to set aside a verdict and order a new trial because of bias and prejudice of the jury the damages "must be so excessive as to strike mankind, at first blush, as being beyond all measure, unreasonable, and outrageous, as such as manifestly show the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice, or corruption. In short, the damages must be flagrantly outrageous and extravagant * * *." Stallcup v. Rathbun, 76 Ariz. 63, 258 P.2d 821, 824. We do not consider the $1,000 award of damages by the jury to be of this character. We find that the propositions of law which defendant offers in support of his thirteen assignments of error are either incorrect, inapplicable to this case, or were followed and that the proper rules of law were followed by the trial court. Hence the assignments of error must fail. We believe the trial court exercised sound discretion by attempting to reduce the amount of the award to $600 by remittitur. The parties apparently did not agree to the remittitur. When the plaintiff failed to unconditionally accept the court's grant of the $400 remittitur, the defendant had the right to demand a new trial as to damages only under the provisions of the court's order. Instead of exercising this right the defendant appealed from the $1,000 judgment of June 8, 1956. In view of the expense plaintiff has necessarily incurred in defending this appeal we are not disposed to order a remittitur under A.R.S. § 12-2104, and the $1,000 judgment stands affirmed. Judgment affirmed. UDALL, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, and JOHNSON, JJ., concurring. WINDES, J., concurs in the result.