Case Title: Brune v. Administrative Director of the Courts. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 05/01/2006 [pdf].

Citation: 110 Haw. 172

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
‘+#*POR PUBLICATION**#

i
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

---000:
ee
ALBINE J. BRUNE, IIT, Petitioner-Appellant

ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS, uf
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent-Appellee

 

wo, 27108

 

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. JR 04-0033; ORIGINAL CASE NO. 04-03830)

MARCH 16, 2006
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

oe oF THE ACO!
We hold that the completion of certain Administrative
Driver's License Revocation Office (ADLRO) forms by Petitioner-
Appellant U.S. Navy Lieutenant Albin J. Brune, III (Appellant)
and subsequent transmittal of the forms by a civilian police
officer for the Department of the U.S. Navy (the Navy) to the

ADLRO do not violate the Posse Comitatus Act (the PCA)’ inasmuch

 

sed at 16 .U.5.C. § 1385. Tt

  

+ the Posse Conitatus Act (FCI
provides that!

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly
iehoriked by the Constitution of Act of Congress, willfully

Sino any part of the Amy or the Air Force as posse
{cont inged.-.)

 

 

aaqs
‘+#*P0R PUBLICATION***

 

as (1) the enforcement of Hawai'i state law against military
personnel on a military base does not infringe on civil
authority, and (2) a primary military purpose for the completion
and transmittal was established. In light of the foregoing, the
January 10, 2005 “Decision and Order Affirming Administrative
Revocation” of the district court of the first circuit? (the
court), which upheld the suspension of Appellant's driver's
license, is affirmed.

Appellant was arrested on October 3, 2004, near the
intersection of Center Drive and Kamehameha Highway, on the Pearl
Harbor Naval reservation, by Navy Civilian Police Officer Jose
Valentin-Santana (Officer Santana) of Navy Regional Security
Hawai'i, Pearl Harbor, for operating a vehicle under the
influence of an intoxicant, Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)

§ 2918-61(a) (Supp. 2004).

After stopping the vehicle, Officer Santana read to
Appellant the Special Assistant United States Attorney (SAUSA)
form entitled “Implied Consent warning/Waiver Certificate and
Hawaii Administrative Driver's License Revocation Office” form
(the Implied Consent form). The Implied Consent form refers to
(2) “Prescribing Directive(s)," (2) “Authority,” (3) “Principle

Purpose,” (4) “Routine Use [for the form],” and (5) “mandatory or

(ss seontinued)
Comitatus or otherwise to execute the lave shall be fined
Under thie title or imprisoned not more then two years, oF
both:

 

* the Honorable William Cardwell presided

2
‘+**P0R PUBLICATION®**

 

voluntary disclosure and effect on individual not providing
information." According to the Implied Consent form, this “data”
is provided under the mandate of the Privacy Act of 1974.?
Officer Santana completed the Inplied Consent form, and the Navy
forwarded it to the ADLRO with 2 Navy police report and a SAUSA
form entitled "Administrative Driver's License Revocation
Document Checklist" (the ADLRD Checklist). The ADLRD Checklist
enumerates the forms that must be included in the packet
submitted to the ADLRO and the forms that must be provided to the
ariver.

» thts aspect of the Inplied Consent form has not

ionersAppeliant hibine J” Srune, Ui!" (Appel

‘Rdsinistrative Director of the Courts, Si
Director). The Inpliea Consent form states in rele

 
     

iE (the

 

Title of Form: Inpliea Consent #arning/Waiver Certificate
Prescribing Dizective: (Ary Regulation] 190°5; (Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV)] 11200.5¢; [Air Force
Regulation) 125-14; (Marine Corps Order) 5210.1¢) 18 U.8.6.
Section 3118; and Administrative Revocation Law, Hawaii
Revised stacut
Authority: Title 10, United States Code, Section 3012
‘fo prepare s record which accurately
Toentifses person suspected of driving under the influence
of aicenel or other drag(s) who has been advises of the
Sanctions for fatlure to submit to an evidentiary test (2)
fer determining the presence of alcohol or other drags.
Houtine Use" The completed form becomes part of the police
Fecord concerning the incident. The inferration provided on
the form is to facilitate filing and retrieval of the form
for use by law enforcenent officials and military commanders
ip disciplinary, acninistrative and Judicial actions, and

Revocation Section officials.

(Some emphases in original and emphasis added.) The Implied Consent form alse
inforns the driver that he or she nae Been arvested for operating # vehicle
Under the influence of an intoxicant. It detalis the circumstances under
Which 2 driver's licence will be adninistestively revoted. Upon revocation,
the Inplies Consent form lists the applicable tine periods for which the
acinistrative revocation will be imposed. Further, definitions of related
terms, such as “alechol enforcement contact,” are provided. The consequences
of an’ administrative revocation are detailed. ‘Finsily, the Implied consent
form indicates whether alcchol or drug teste were submitted to or refused and
provides fer the signatures of the driver and arresting officer

 

 

 

 

 

 

     

3
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Appellant was also issued a Notice of Administrative
Revocation on October 3, 2004, informing him of the
“administrative revocation of [his] License and privileges” for
one year. On October 8, 2004, Appellant's one-year driver's
License revocation was sustained by an ADLRO review officer.
Appellant requested an administrative hearing, which took place
on Noverber 10, 2004.

The hearing began with the hearing officer relating the
procedure to be followed. Subsequently, the hearing officer
received most of the ADLRO file into evidence, as well as
subpoenas Appellant had requested for the arresting officer and
the Intoxilyzer operator. Also admitted was a subpoena request
for the ADLRO “Chief Adjudicator”; this subpoena was denied.

Counsel for Appellant notified the hearing officer that
before the hearing, a woman asked to attend the hearing and
offered to be searched. This woman was not willing to present
identification and sign in, declaring it a violation of her
privacy. Appellant’s counsel stated for the record that the
hearing officer denied her access to the hearing, unless the
identification and sign-in procedure was followed.

counsel for Appellant also requested a particular
procedure be followed, and a copy of the procedure was made part
of the record, Appellant objected to the hearing officer’ s

procedure but was ultimately overruled.

+ Hearing Officer Leonor Tanorie presided.

4
+#*POR PUBLICATION®**

 

Lt. David Thomas (Lt. Thomas), an Intoxilyzer operator,
was then called to testify. He related that he is @ lieutenant
with the Pearl Harbor police and is a “civilian, government
service, general schedule employee.”* He further reported that
the police force is under direct military command.

Lt. Thomas was shown the ADLRD Checklist. Lt. Thomas
confirmed that he was familiar with the form and that the purpose
of the ADLRD Checklist was to ensure that the documents required
to be sent to the ADLRO were transmitted. Lt. Thomas then
identified the Implied Consent form, with which he vas also
acquainted. He affirmed that the Implied Consent form is to be
forwarded to the ADLRO for compliance with Hawaii’s implied
consent law.

Officer Santana testified that he is a civilian police
officer for the Navy. According to the officer he stopped
Appellant in the Hale Moke housing area, which is a part of the
Pearl Harbor Naval reservation. After being shown the Implied
Consent form, he, like Lt. Thomas, testified that it is forwarded
to the ADLRO in compliance with the implied consent law.

on November 15, 2004, the hearing officer, on behalf of
Respondent-Appellee Administrative Director of the Courts, State

of Hawai'i (the Director), issued her “Findings of Fact,

 

+ in describing the police force at Fear] Harbor, Lt. David Thomas
testified chat “Ie is a mixed contingent, civilian, ["GS"] employees ang
active duty militery personnel."

«  awai't Revised statutes (HRS) § 2918-1 (Supp. 2005) states that
ssptuector’ means the administrative director of the courts oF any other
(Continued,

 
‘+#*P0R PUBLICATION***

Conclusions of Law, and Decision” (the Decision). In the
Decision, the hearing officer stated that she is authorized by
HRS § 291E-38 (Supp. 2005) only to conduct an adninistrative
hearing concerning the revocation of Appellant's driver’s license
and that constitutional claims concerning the ADLRO security
measures are outside the scope of that provision. Appellant
argued that the PCA was violated because there was not 2 separate
military purpose for the completion and subsequent transmittal of
‘the Implied Consent form and the ADLAD Checklist and that the
military has its own administrative revocation proceedings. The
hearing officer concluded that Appellant's arguments regarding
the PCA were unpersuasive, declaring that the State has
concurrent jurisdiction of violations of HRS § 2918-61 (Supp.
2005)" which occur on a military installation and “there is
nothing that specifically prohibits military personnel from
carrying out their duties with respect to on-base/nilitary
reservation violations for operating a vehicle while under the
influence of an intoxicant.” She further stated that the
arresting officer is not required to explain every consequence or

aspect related to a refusal or taking of a blood alcohol

+1. continued)

person within the judiciary appointed by the director to conduct
Scministrative reviews or Hearings oF carry out other functions relating to
Sdministrative revoestion under part 111 [entitled ‘Adrinistrative Revocation
Process']." See Soderlund vAdnin, Dip. of the Courts, "96 Hawaii 114, 11
hil, 26 Pl3d i2i4, 1215 n-1 (2001) (eeferving to the statutory definition of
Saibestor* as including a hearing officer).

 

> No authority was cited for the reference to “concurrent

jurisdiction.”
‘+**FOR PUBLICATION®**

concentration (BAC) test and failing it. The hearing office!

 

made the following findings of fact:

1. On October 3, 2004, st 2:50 a.m., in the County of
Honolula, Arresting Officer’ Jose Valentin-Santana observed 3
a 1991 Volvo wagon with Hawaii License nunber ED2~638)
vehicle driven by the [Appellant]. The officer observed the
Veniele travelling north-east on Center Drive near the
Intersection with Hanchanena Highway. The officer saw the
venicle travelling ata high rate of speed and observed the
Veniele executed (sic) a left turn at the intersection
agsinet a red light without stopping.

2. officer Santana pulled the vehicle over, approached
the driver's side of the vehicle, and spoke with
appellant). officer Santana identified (Appellant) with
MiS"geives's alcense and informed him of the reason for the
traffic: stop.

3. Ofticer santana, as he spoke with (xppellant]
detected 2 strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on
Tnppeliant’s] breath, eyes that were red and bloodshot, and
slurred speech,

%, The result of (Appelient’s) field sobriety tests
were not considered by this Hearing Officer besed upon the
foundational testimony of the Arresting Officer. However,
Officer Valentin’ s personal observations thst. [appellant]
Woe unstesdy on his feet, difficulty with balance, swaying,
land inability to fellow [sic] as instructed were considere!
by this Hearing Offices

3. appelient] was arrested for operating a vehicle
under the influence of an intonicene.

E. appellant] wae read the sanctions of (HRS chapter)
2018, Part Ill. [appellant] did not refuse to take an
alcohol concentration test by & breath test.

5. Tappeilant’ 8) pricr driving record in the state of
Hawaii hows no prior alcohol enforcement contact, as
Gefined by (HRS) § 2918-1, from the State of Hawai'l traffic
Violator database (TRAVIS").

&. (appellant’s] driver's License was revoked by the
honinistrative Review Officer for the period November 3,
2004, through to and including Novenber 2, 2005. However,
this’ nearing Officer anended the adsinistrative revocation
toa three month period, from Novenber 3, 2004 to February
2, 2005.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

‘The hearing officer rendered the following conclusions
of law:

2. The Director concludes there existed reascnable
suspicion, the traffic violation(s), te stop the motor
Vehicle driven by (Appellant)

2. The Director concludes there existed probable cause
thet [Appellant] drove, operated, or was in actual physical
Control of the vehicle, while under the influence of an

‘Sr [appellant) did not refuse to take an slcohol
concentration test.

i The Director separately and independently
concludes, By 2 preponderance of the evidence, without

 

7
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consideration of the alcohol concentration test result that
[appellant] Grove, operated, or was in actual physical
control, ‘of the vehlele while under the influence of an
Sntoxicant

Appellant's driver's license thus was revoked for three months.
The hearing officer made no findings or conclusions regarding the
Pca.

on Novenber 17, 2004, Appellant filed a Petition for
Judicial Review. On January 10, 2005, the court affirmed the
hearing officer via a decision and a separate judgment. The
court concluded that the PCA does not prohibit a military police
officer from acting upon an on-base violation of HRS § 2915-61 by
an active-duty Navy officer. The court further ruled that the
hearing was conducted in accordance with HRS § 291-38. It was
noted that the issue as to whether the ADLRO sign-in procedure
violated Appellant’s right to an open hearing was then pending
before this court, but that the ADLRO had already determined that

Appellant's right was not violated. ‘The court rejected

 

Appellant's arguments that the hearing officer erred in relying
on a field sobriety test and in citing to unpublished decisions
because the hearing officer noted that either she was not relying
on such matters or, according to the court, there was no error.
1.
on appeal Appellant argues that the court erred in

(1) “failing to set aside [Appellant’s) license revocation
because the ADLRO paperwork, at the time of [Appellant's] arrest,

was completed and transmitted to the ADLRO by Department of
‘+**POR PUBLICATION***

 

Defense police officers in violation of the [FCA]; (2) “holding
that [Appellant] was neither denied [(a)] his right to 2 hearing
on the ADLRO restrictions on public access nor [(b)] public
access to his ADLRO hearings - - all in violation of his state
and federal constitutional rights to a public hearing”;

(3) “failing to uphold [Appellant's] federal and state
constitutional rights to due process of law and the clear mandate
of (HRS) Chapter 2918, Part III”; (4) “holding that the
requirement of [HRS] § 2918-34(a) (2) was not violated in this

ring officer for citing

 

case"; and (5) “failing to reverse the hi
to unpublished district court ADLRO decisions to justify her
decision.” In conjunction with his arguments, Appellant asserts
that (1) the Implied Consent form does not have a military
purpose; (2) there is a contradiction in HRS § 2926-38(a) which
declares the revocation hearing will “review the (administrative
review) decision,” yet allows motorists to call witnesses and
offer evidence, suggesting that the hearing is de nova; (3) the
hearing officer improperly adhered to Desmond v. Admin. Dir. of
the Courts, $1 Hawai'i 212, 219, 962 2.2 346, 353 (App. 1998)
(hereinafter “Desmond 1”) (advising hearing officers to inform
the parties at the beginning of the hearing of the procedure to

be followed but not requiring hearing officers to follow the

procedure set forth by Appellant), rev'd on other grounds, 90
Hewai"i 301, 978 P.2d 739 (1999) [hereinafter “Desmond II");

(4) the procedure set forth in HRS chapter 291£, Part III, which
‘**+FOR PUBLICATION*#*

requires that there be a valid chemical test result or refusal
for the ADLRO to have jurisdiction, was disregarded; and (5) the
ADLRO Notice of Administrative Revocation lacks any “explanation
of distinction” between the administrative revocation and the
criminal suspension “in clear language,” in violation of HRS
§ 2916-34 (a) (2) (Supp. 2005).

In response, the Director contends that
(2) “[Appeliant’s} arrest and processing were proper and the
[Pca] does not affect this case"; (2) “the Hawaii Supreme Court's
ruling in Freitas Iv, Admin, Dir, of the Courts, 104 Hawai'i 483,
92 P.3d 993 (2004),] does not require reversal or remand”;
(3) *[Appellant’s) due process attack on the procedures used at
his administrative hearing has already been rejected by the
Intermediate Court of Appeals and the Hawaii Supreme Court, and
is without merit”; (4) “neither a valid BAC result or a valid
refusal is required for the ADLRO to have jurisdiction; the
hearing officer may properly uphold a revocation even if she
strikes a chemical BAC test, by basing her finding that
[Appellant} operated under the influence on OTHER evidence”
(capitalization in original); (5) “the explanation provided in
the notice of administrative revocation more than adequately
explained the distinction between the administrative revocation
and the criminal license suspension”; and (6) “the hearing
officer did not reversibly err in citing to unpublished district

court decisions.”

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In reply, Appellant again maintains that the court

erred in (1) “failing to set aside [Appellant's] license
revocation because the ADLRO paperwork, at the time of
appellant's] arrest, was completed and transmitted to the ADLRO
by Department of Defense police officers in violation of the
[Pca], and (2) “holding that (Appellant) was neither denied
[(a)] his right to a hearing on the ADLAO restrictions on public
access nor [(b)] public access to his ADLRO hearings - - all in
violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to a
public hearing.” Appellant requests that this court reverse the
court's decision upholding his driver's license revocation and

order that Appellant's driver's license be returned to him.

 

It has been established that

[jludicial review of a decision of the Director regarding
the Tevocation of s driver's
§ 286-260, and i

Teense ie governed by HRS
Tunites to the

ring. and thi

iS constitutional or statutory authority,
erroneously interpreted the lav, acted in on arbitrary or
capricious manner, committed an abuse of discretion, or made
S determination that was unsupported by the evidence in the
fecord. Review of 8 decision made by (a) court upon its
feriew of an [administrative] decision is a secondary
appeal. The standard of review 1# one in which this court
most detersine whetner the court (under review) was right or
rong in ies decieion(-]

Famer v. Adnin. Dir, of the Court, State of Hawai'i, 94 Hawai'i

232, 236, 11 P.3d 457, 461 (2000) (internal quotation marks and

 

    
 

Saainistrativ
Director exces:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

citations omitted) .
nt
Arguments (2), (3), and (5) and points in conjunction
(2), (3), and (4) raised therewith by Appellant have been

n
‘+*+F0R PUBLICATION***

 

resolved previously. See Custer v. Admin, Dir. of the Courts,
108 Hawai'i 350, 120 P.3d 249 (2005); Dunaway v. Admin, Dir. of
Courts, 108 Hawai'i 78, 117 P.34 109 (2005); Freitas v. Admin,

Dir. of Courts, 108 Hawaii 31, 116 P.34 673 (2005) [hereinafter
Exeitas II]. Accordingly, we do not address these argunents.
wv.

Argument (4) and point (5) in conjunction with this
argument are the same arguments made in Dunaway, in which we held
that the notice adequately explained the difference between the
administrative proceeding and the criminal proceeding. The
instant form is materially the same as the form in Dunaway."
Therefore, as we concluded in Dunaway, the form satisfies HRS
§ 291E-34(a) (2), which mandates, in relevant part, that “(t]he
notice of administrative revocation shall provide, at a minimum
and in clear language, . . . (Jn explanation of the distinction
between administrative revocation and a suspension or revocation
imposed under section 2918-61 or 291E-61.5."

ve

In the remaining argument (1) and point in conjunction,

* phe form ie the sane ae the form in Dunaway v. Admin, Dir of

Gourts, 108 Hawal't 76, 117 P.3d 109 (2005), except the words "or  29TE-61.5"
Te the clause quoted below weve not in the Dunaway form:

he _aduinistrative revocation srocess is a civ

Adpinistiative oroceeding that is separate and distinct trom
Erininal prosecution. Criminal charges. filed pursuant to
HRs § 2s1e-el or § 2518-61.5 may be prosecuted concurrently
with the saniniatrative proceeding.

(Emphasis added.) HRS § 2926-61.5 (Supp. 2005) de entitled *Habitvslly.
operating a venicie under the influence of an intexicant”, whereas SRS § 2516-
61 (Supp. 2005) is entitled “Operating a vehicle under the influence of an
Antoxieant™

 

 

2
‘**+FOR PUBLICATION*+*

 

Appellant contends that the ADLRO “paperwork,” at the time of his
arrest, was completed and transmitted to the ADLRO by military
police officers in violation of the PCA because (1) there is no
independent and primary military purpose in the completion of the
Implied Consent form and the ADLRO checklist by the arresting
officer or in the transmittal of them by the Navy to the ADLRO
and (2) the ADLRD Checklist has no military purpose because on
its face the purpose of the form is to enforce Hawaii's
administrative driver’s license revocation law. Appellant admits
that the military may enforce federal “driving under the
influence” laws on military bases. He points out that the Navy
has adopted an Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV)
Instruction, namely 1120.5C, which provides for @ federal
administrative driver’s license revocation scheme. Appellant
maintains, therefore, that the sole function of the actions by
the arresting officer and the subsequent procedure is to enforce
the State’s administrative driver's license revocation law.

‘The Director in essence relies on the “military
purpose” doctrine, which this court recognized in State v
Battioay, 78 Hawai'i 455, 460, 896 P.2d 911, 916 (1995). That
doctrine holds that if the military officers are pursuing a
legitimate military purpose independent of the involvement with
civilian law enforcement in question, the PCA is not violated.
Id, In Pattioay, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Department

undercover agents were working with the Honolulu Police

13
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i

 

Department to “target” suspected civilian drug dealers. Id. at
456-57, 896 P.2d at 912-13. However, as Pattioay indicated, “the

‘primary military purpose’ exception ‘must be used with caution,
and does not include actions taken for the primary purpose of
aiding civilian law enforcement officials or otherwise serving as
a subterfuge to avoid the restrictions of the (PCA)."" Id. at
460-61, 896 P.2d at 916-17 (quoting 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(a) (2) (4).
See United States v. Chon, 210 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2000)
(£inding a PCA exception where there is an “independent military
purpose” for military actions). The Director argues that all
military actions in response to on-base violations of any nature
are not prohibited by the PCA. Specifically, the Director
asserts that a PCA violation does not occur because “it is
essentially a given that enforcement of civil laws against
military personnel on a military base are undertaken primarily
for a military purpose.” (Bnphasis in original.)

ve

a

‘The purpose of the PCA is to restrict military

intrusion into civilian matters, except where Congress has

recognized @ special need for military assistance in law

 

enforcement ted st nson, 410 F.3d 137 (4th Cir.

2008). See alse Sean J. O'Hara, The Posse Conitatue Act Applied

 

+ For example, pursuant to the Civil Disturbance Statutes, a state

nay request military aetistance in enforcing civilian laws if the state is
Gnperiencing civil unrest, gig. riots. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335 (2000)

 

 

4
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to the Prosecution of Civilians, 53 U. Kan. L. Rev. 767 (2005);
Clarence I. Meeks, Illeqal Lat : vi
Authorities in Violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, 69 Mil. L.

Rev. 83 (1975); Brian L. Porto, Construction and Application of

e Comitatus Act 1385), and Similar Prede:
revisions, Re: f United States Arm
to Execute laws, 141 A.L.R. Fed. 271 (1997). While the FCA

explicitly applies to only the “Army or the Air Force,” the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the Act also extends to

the Navy and the Marine Corps.”

The Ninth Circuit hes helé that:

Although the FCA does not directly reference the Navy oF
Marine Corps, we do not construe this omission 35
Congressional approval for Navy Anvelvenent in enforcing
eivilien lus. congress nas, in fact, requires the
Secretary of Defence to "prescribe such regulations as may
becnecessery" to pechibit “direct participation by @ menber
Gt the Army, ty; Air force, or Marine Corps” in law
Separtnent of Defense. (Dob) thereafter, By directive, made
tthe PCA applicable to the avy and Marine Corps as a “natter
fof Dob policy,” Deo Directive $525.5(C) {(Jan. 15, 1986));
the Secretary of the Navy, using nearly identical language,
hes adopted this policy, seg (Secretary of the Navy
Instruction} 562075.

 

 

 

 

 

=. Chon, 210 F.34 990, 993 (Sth Cir. 2000) (emphases added)
[footnote and citation omitted). Se alas Sean J. O'Mara,
Het Apel Sed" to the Prosecution of Civilians, 5: U: xan. L. Rev. 767, 767
(2005); Matthew cariton Hanmond, The Posse comitatus Act: A Principle in Need
gi Rengual, 75 Wash. U. L-Q. 983 (1997). But seg United States v vunis, sz
F.Z4 1086, 1093 (0.c. Cir. 1981) (stating that “nothing In this history

ts that we should defy the express Language cf the Poste Comitatus Act
fending it to the Navy"); Schowenserdt v, Gen, Dynamics Corp, 823 F.2d
126, 1340" (9th Cir. 1987) (concluging that the PCA “by ite express terns is
inapplicable to Navy involvement in law enforcenent™).” 10.U.S.c. § 375,
referred to in chon and referenced by both Appellant and the Director,
provices that}

 

   

 

 

 

‘The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as

may be necessary to ensure that any activity (ineluaing the

Provieson of any equipment or faciitey of the sssiganent oF

Setail of any personnel) under this chapter does net inclue

Of permit direct participation by a menber of the Army,
(eontinved...)

1s
‘*s9FOR PUBLICATION***

5.
The court's decision as to Appellant’s PCA argument
states as follows:

(appellant's) reliance on the [FCA] is misplaced. In
, 539 F.2d 14 (Sth Cir. 1976), the
fourt, by the eoteened Judge choy, held that the (PCA) does
hot prohibit militsry personnel from acting upon on-base
Wolations comiteed by civilians. Given thin, it ie.
delonstic chat the [peh) “aose not prohibit military police

‘fiouacting yron combase viclatichs committed by an_active-
‘Suty Navy officer As to the "prisary military purpose,”
Suage Choy stated in Banks: “The power to maintain order,
Security and discipline on a allitary reservation ts
necessary to militery operations.” Id. To suggest. tht
Sonething more need be shown cther than that this violation
took place on Pearl Harbor Naval reservation and was
Committed by 2 Navy officer is to ignore the obvious
military interest in securing compliance with state law by
its personnel on ite property. Indeed, the only reason the
Court founda violation of the (Pca) in (fatticay) was
because there wat no evidence that the illegal activity
Snvolved military personnel or took place one milivary
reservation. Paitioay, gpa at #70. Both were shown and
Senitted in thie cass

 

(Emphasis added.) We believe that the court was correct. In
attioay, it was stated that “[wJhere the target of a military
investigation is a civilian and there is no verified connection
tomilitary personnel, the PCA prohibits military participation
in activities designed to execute civilian laws.” 78 Hawai'i at

464, 896 P.2d at 920 (emphasis added). In that case, the

 

Prosecution argued that State v, Haves, 404 $.£.2d 12 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1991), should control. Pattioay, 78 Hawai'i at 463-64, 696
P.2d at 919-20. In Haves, the North Carolina Court of Appeals

held that the PCA was not violated when military investigators

(scent tinued)
Navy, Air Force, ox Marine Corps in a search, seizure,
arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in
Such activity by tuch member is Otherwise authorized by law.

 

(Emphases added.)

16
+*+POR PUBLICATION*#*

assisted local law enforcement officers in arresting an absent-
without-cfficial-leave soldier. 404 8.£.2d at 14-15. This
court, in Pattioay, found Haves to be clearly distinguishable
because the defendant was a member of the military. Pattioay, 78
Hawai'i at 464, 696 P.2d at 911.

‘Thus the restrictions of the PCA do not appear to apply
in the instant case as Appellant is a member of the military and
was arrested on the Pearl Harbor Naval reservation. See United
States v. Thompson, 33 M.J. 218, 220-21 (C.M.A. 1991) (concluding
that the PCA was not violated when military agents accompanied
local law enforcement agents to the off-base home of a senior
airman with the U.S. Air Force to search the apartment and seize
stolen property); cf. United States v, Grilev, 814 F.2d 967, 976
(4th Cir. 1987) (stating that “[i]t is well settled that militery
investigators may look into violations of civil law that occur on
military bases, or within military operations” and holding that
the PCA vas not violated when a civilian defendant’s home located
on a military base was searched by a Federal Bureau of
Investigation special agent and a military investigator for
stolen property when it was not known whether the thief was a
military employee or a civilian (internal citations omitted)).

We thus agree with the reasoning of the North Carolina Court of
Appeals in this respect.
viz.

Moreover, @ military purpose supporting enforcement of

uv
***FOR PUBLICATION*#*

the ADLRO lew on a military reservation has been established. As
advanced by the Director, many courts have concluded that the PCR
is not violated if there is an independent, legitimate, and
primary military purpose that justifies the involvement of

military personnel in a law enforcement activity. See, ea,

Chon, 210 F.3d at 9947 Eooleston v. Dep't of Revenue, Motor
veh: vez State o} , 895 P.2d 1169, 1170 (Colo. Ct. App.

1995) (concluding that @ primary military purpose of “the
protection of military personnel, equipment, and guests at the
Air Force Acadeny from a notor vehicle driver suspected of
Griving under the influence” existed and the PCA was not violated
when an Air Force security officer stopped @ civilian motorist on
Air Force Acadeny grounds for suspicion of driving under the
influence of alcohol and forwarded the results of a sobriety and
breath test to a sheriff’s deputy because “the power to maintain
order, security, and discipline on @ military facility is

essary for military operations”); Battioay at 460, 896 P.2d at

   

956.
In the instant case, Appellant only challenges the

completion and transmittal of the ADLRO forms. Therefore, he

implicitly concedes that Officer Santana could stop him for

suspicion of DUI. Under the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA),"

 

% Appellant cites to OPNAY directive 11200.5C, which he asserts
contains the military's “own administrative procedure for revoking driving
privileges on nilitary bases.” Appellant states that Department of Defense
Eieective (000) $525.4 (Nov. 2, 1961] is contained in the appendix to his
opening brief. DOD $825.4 Crimes Act (ACA) as @
reference, Do0 $525.4 lists fablishnent of policies te
(Gone insed. =.)

 

 

 

  
‘**FOR PUBLICATION*#*

Hiowas's traffic laws may apply to the instant naval base.
Therefore, enforcenent of state traffic laws on base, including
investigation of DUI cases, may be dened to be in “the normal
course of military . . . operations.” 10 U.S.C. § 371." see

also Departnent of Defense Directive 5525.5 (Jan. 15, 1986)."

 

8, -scontinued)

enforce state sraffic laws on Departnent of Defense installations. The ACA
provides, in pertinent part, as follow

 

 

i ig auilty of
nL Set + + uiieh, although not made punishable by any
Gnactnent of Congress, would be ounishable if committed
sitnin the iuriediction of the State, |. in which
Suit’ place ie situated, by the laws thereo! in force at the
tine 8f such act.

2 like a
Titi > + flor purposes of subsection (a)... that
hich nay of hall be imposed through Judicial or
Dosinisttative action under the law of a State, . fore
Conviction fer operating a motor vehicle under the influence
ofa drug of alcehol, shell be considered to be @ punishment
provided by that law

 

 

 

16 U.S.C. § 13 (emphases added).

® 19 u,8.¢, $ 372, entit
military operation

 

\j “Use of information collected during
Stated in relevant parts

 

a) The Secretary of Defense mai
applicable lew, provids te Fede:

An accordance with other
state. or loca) civilian

 

she nomal course of military training oF

‘Seexabions thet
farbe relevant tos violation of anv Federal ox state law
Mithin the jurisdiction of such officials,

(Emphases added.)
» Appellant cites to Department of Defense Directive $525.5 in his
opening Briefs Enclosure 2 of DOD s525.5 states:

Military Departnents and Defense Agencies are encouraaed te
Ersviae eo Feseral. Steve, of iece, civilise Tew enforcement
militar z Bay be rele wiolarion
‘any Federal of State law within the iuradiction of such
Eiicisls. the Secretaries of the Milicary Departnents and
Directors of the defense Agencies shall prescrite procedures
fer eleasing information upon reasonable Belief that there

has been such @ violation

 

(emphasis added.) In the instant case, the “informaticn [was] collected
Goring the noraal course of military operations” end the instant forms are
(continued...)

19
‘+**POR PUBLICATION***

on the face of 10 U.S.C, § 371, information gathered in this way
may be provided to state or local civilian law enforcement
officials.

As stated supra, Appellant cites OPNAV Instruction
11200.5C (one of the “prescribing directives” in the “data”
section), as support for his argument that “the military has its
own administrative procedure for revoking driving privileges on
military bases” because it provides for a federal administrative
Griver's license revocation schene. However, we are not
persuaded that such a scheme precludes enforcement of HRS chapter
2918 by military personnel on a military base. Such enforcement
does not infringe on the PCA. Hence, the fact that there may be
a federal counterpart for a driving under the influence violation
does not prevent resort to local law, and there is no impingement
of civilian authority when state law is enforced on a military
base. The Summary of Change sheet™* for this OPNAV Instruction
explicitly applies the ACA. The OPNAV Instruction states that it
“[mJandates the assimilation of host State traffic codes for
Dfepartment) off] D[efense] installations.”

In addition, Paragraph 4-20(a) of the same OPNAY
Instruction, entitled “State-Armed Forces Traffic Workshop

Program,” indicates that “(t]his program is an organized effort

continued)

procedures for releasing informetion upen reasonable belief that
mn such @ violation”. DDD 825.5

  

 

the Suamary of Change sheet describes the purpo
to OpNAY 11200 5C-

of the revision

 

20
***FOR PUBLICATION*#*
to coordinate military and civil traffic safety activities

throughout @ State or area. Installation commanders will
cooperate with State and local officials in this program and
provide proper support and participation.” Also, listed as
“prescribing directives” on the Implied Consent form are 16
U.S.C. § 3118 and the Administrative Revocation Law, Hawai'i
Revised Statutes.

As stated previously and as indicated on the Implied
Consent form, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 3013," the purpose of the
Implied Consent form is “[t]o prepare a record which accurately
identifies a person suspected of driving under the influence of
alcohol or other drug(s) who has been advised of the sanctions
for failure to submit to an evidentiary test(s) for determining
the presence of alcohol or other drug(s)." Furthermore, as

related before, drivers are informed via the Implied Consent form

 

% 48 u.8.c. $ 3128, entitled “Implied consent for certain tests,”
provides in relevant part

(a) Consent. Whoever operates 2 meter vehicle in the
Special maritine and territorial Jurisdiction of the United
States consents thereby to # chemical test or tests of such
person's blocd, breath, or urine, if arrested for any
Cffense ericing from such person's driving while under the
Gnfluence of a drug or alcohol in such Jurisdiction. The
test oF tests shall be aduinistered upon the request of &
police officer having ressonable grounds to believe the
Person arrested te have been driving a scter vehicle upon
Ehe special maritine and territoria: Jurisdiction of the
United States while under the influence of drugs oF alcohol
in Wloiation cf the laws of 2 State, territory, possession,
Gr district

 

 

 

   

 

 

M The Speckal Assistant United States Attorney form refers to 10
v.8.c. § 2012." Section 3012 became Section 3013 in 1966, and Section 3013
appears to be the statute that grants the authority necessary for transmittal
of the Implied Consent form to the ADLAG pursuant to the mandates of the
Privacy Ret of 1576

 

2
‘+##FOR PUBLICATION***

 

that the “routine use” of the form includes use by the ADLRO.

‘The completed form becones part of the police record
concerning the incident. the information provided on the
form is to facilitate filing and retrieval of the form for
use by Law enforcement officials and military commanders in
Sisciplinary, adninistrative and judicial actions, and nay,
slo be used’ by Howali Driver's License Aduinisteative
evocation Section officials.

(Enphasis added.) ‘Therefore, we conclude that there was a

 

 

sufficient independent military purpose demonstrated on the
record for completion and transmittal of the subject forme.
virr.
For the foregoing reasons, the court's January 10, 2005
“decision and Order Affirming Administrative Revocation” is

aftizmed,

on the briefs:
Earle A. Partington for Ch
petitioner-appellant. Lica Co mae

Girerd D. Lau, Deputy
Attorney General, State Rite Coney

of Hawai'i, for

respondent appellee. aa

22