Case Title: Venus Feagins, individually and as next friend of Tamesha Feagins, a minor v. Curtis Waddy and George Moore

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1051349

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel 08/03/07
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 SPECIAL TERM, 2007
_________________________
1051349
_________________________
Venus Feagins, individually and as next friend of Tamesha
Feagins, a minor
v.
Curtis Waddy and George Moore
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-05-1946)
COBB, Chief Justice.
Venus Feagins, individually and as next friend of her
daughter Tamesha Feagins, a minor, appeals from a summary
judgment in favor of defendants Curtis Waddy and George Moore.
We affirm.
1051349
Waddy disputes Feagins's allegations.  According to
1
Waddy, he asked Tamesha to perform the high jump because he
was shorthanded in that event and she had previously
successfully competed in the long jump.  Waddy also contends
that he instructed Tamesha individually on the proper
2
I.  Background
During the 2002-2003 academic year, Tamesha Feagins was
an eighth-grade student at Center Street Middle School in
Birmingham, where she participated in track and field.  On
April 12, 2003, the Center Street Middle School track team
participated in a city-wide track meet for middle schools held
at Parker High School.  Tamesha was late for the track meet,
and she missed her first event.  According to Tamesha, when
she arrived at the track meet, Waddy, the coach of the Center
Street track team, told her that she had to perform in the
high-jump event, an event Tamesha had never done.  Tamesha
told Waddy that she did not know how to perform a high jump,
to which Waddy responded that she was one of his best runners
and that he knew she could perform the high jump.  When
Tamesha reiterated that she did not know how to perform a high
jump, Waddy responded that he was the coach and that she could
do it.  Tamesha contends that Waddy did not instruct her in
the proper form and technique in performing the high jump.1
1051349
technique associated with the high jump before she attempted
it and that he had instructed the track team earlier in the
season regarding the proper technique for performing the high
jump.  Waddy also disputes that he forced Tamesha to perform
in the high-jump competition.  
3
However, Tamesha acknowledges that she had previously watched
the high-jump competition.
As Tamesha attempted a practice jump, she felt pain in
her left knee.  An athletic trainer at the track meet examined
Tamesha's knee and wrapped it in ice; she was unable to
compete in the high-jump event.  It was later determined that
Tamesha had torn her anterior cruciate ligament ("ACL"); the
tear required surgery to repair. 
On April 1, 2005, Feagins, individually and as Tamesha's
next friend, sued Waddy and George Moore, the athletic
director for Birmingham City Schools, the school system for
the City of Birmingham, in the Jefferson Circuit Court.  She
alleged that Waddy negligently, willfully, wantonly, and in
bad faith failed to adequately train and supervise Tamesha in
the high jump, resulting in her injury.  She also alleged that
Waddy and Moore had negligently, willfully, wantonly, and in
bad faith failed to notify her of insurance the Birmingham
Board of Education had in place that would have been available
1051349
4
to pay Tamesha's medical expenses and to notify the insurer of
Tamesha's injury.  She further sought compensation for the
loss of Tamesha's services.  Waddy and Moore moved for a
summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to State-
agent immunity and that they had no duty to notify the insurer
of Tamesha's injury; the trial court entered a summary
judgment in their favor on May 9, 2006.  Feagins appealed.
II.  Standard of Review
"This Court's review of a summary judgment is de
novo.  Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
886 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003).  We apply the same
standard of review as the trial court applied.
Specifically, we must determine whether the movant
has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that the movant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Rule
56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.
2004).  In making such a determination, we must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant.  Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758
(Ala. 1986).  Once the movant makes a prima facie
showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
produce 'substantial evidence' as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact.  Bass v.
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12."
Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39
(Ala. 2004).
1051349
5
III.  Analysis
Feagins argues that the trial court erred in entering a
summary judgment for Waddy because a question of material fact
exists as to whether Waddy trained Tamesha in the proper
technique for performing the high jump.  She argues that Waddy
had no discretion in training Tamesha and thus that he was
performing a ministerial function instead of a discretionary
function and is not protected by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.  We disagree.
"Since [Ex parte] Cranman[, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000)],
we analyze immunity issues in terms of 'State-agent' immunity
rather than 'under the dichotomy of ministerial versus
discretionary functions.'"  Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So.
2d 201, 203 (Ala. 2003)(quoting Ex parte Hudson, 866 So. 2d
1115, 1117 (Ala. 2003)).  In Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392
(Ala. 2000), a plurality of this Court restated the rule
governing State-agent immunity:  
"A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent's
"(1) 
formulating 
plans, 
policies, 
or 
designs; 
or
1051349
6
"(2) exercising his or her judgment in the
administration of a department or agency of
government, including, but not limited to, examples
such as:
"(a) 
making 
administrative
adjudications;
"(b) allocating resources;
"(c) negotiating contracts;
"(d) hiring, firing, transferring,
assigning, or supervising personnel; or
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department
or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar
as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the
manner for performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
"(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of
the criminal laws of the State, including, but not
limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons; or
"(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in
releasing prisoners, 
counseling or releasing 
persons
of unsound mind, or educating students.
"Notwithstanding 
anything 
to 
the 
contrary 
in 
the
foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall
not be immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
"(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws,
rules, or regulations of this State enacted or
promulgated for the purpose of regulating the
activities 
of 
a 
governmental 
agency 
require
otherwise; or
1051349
7
"(2) when the State agent acts willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his
or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation
of the law."
792 So. 2d at 405 (some emphasis added).  In Ex parte Butts,
775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000), a majority of this Court adopted
the Cranman restatement of the rule governing State-agent
immunity.
"We 
have 
established 
a 
'burden-shifting' 
process
when a party raises the defense of State-agent
immunity.  Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705 (Ala.
2002).  In order to claim State-agent immunity, the
[defendants] bear the burden of demonstrating that
[the plaintiff's] claims arise from a function that
would entitle them to immunity.  Wood, 852 So. 2d at
709; Ryan v. Hayes, 831 So. 2d 21 (Ala. 2002).  If
the [defendants] make such a showing, the burden
then shifts to [the plaintiff], who, in order to
deny the [defendants] immunity from suit, must
establish that the [defendants] acted willfully,
maliciously,  fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond
their authority.  Wood, 852 So. 2d at 709; Ex parte
Davis, 721 So. 2d 685, 689 (Ala. 1998).  A State
agent acts beyond authority and is therefore not
immune when he or she 'fail[s] to discharge duties
pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as
those stated on a checklist.' Ex parte Butts, 775
So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000)."
Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003).
This Court addressed a similar issue in Ex parte Nall,
879 So. 2d 541 (Ala. 2003).  In Nall, a baseball hit by a high
school baseball coach during a practice drill struck a player
1051349
8
in the head.  The player's parents sued the baseball coach,
alleging that the coach was acting "tortiously" when he hit
the baseball and that he therefore was not protected by State-
agent immunity.  Specifically, they argued that the coach was
hitting the ball too hard because some players had been
teasing him for not hitting the ball very hard.  The Nall
Court noted:
"There is no exception under Cranman for
'tortious' conduct unless the State agent 'acts
willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith,
beyond his ... authority, or under a mistaken
interpretation of the law.'  Cranman, 792 So. 2d at
405.  Once a State agent demonstrates that a
plaintiff's claims are based on conduct that
occurred while the State agent was exercising his
judgment, '"the burden then shifts to the plaintiff
to establish that the [State agent] acted in bad
faith or with malice or willfulness in order to deny
the [State agent] immunity from suit."' [Ex parte]
Spivey, [846 So. 2d 322, 333 (Ala. 2002)] (quoting
Ex parte Davis, 721 So. 2d 685, 689 (Ala. 1998))."
879 So. 2d at 546.  The Court concluded that although the
coach may have been hitting the ball hard, there was no
evidence indicating that doing so was outside the intended
scope or nature of the practice drill the coach was
conducting.  Therefore, the coach's actions did not fall under
one of the Cranman exceptions to State-agent immunity.   
1051349
9
In limited circumstances this Court has held that State-
agent immunity does not apply to the actions of a coach.  In
Giambrone, supra, Douglas, a 29-year-old, 200-pound wrestling
coach, wrestled Giambrone, a 15-year-old, 150-pound student,
in a challenge wrestling match during practice.  While Douglas
was performing a wrestling maneuver called a "cement job" on
Giambrone, Giambrone suffered a severe spinal-cord injury,
which 
rendered 
him a 
quadriplegic.  
Giambrone's 
mother, acting
individually and on behalf of Giambrone, sued Douglas.
Douglas claimed 
that 
his actions 
were protected 
by 
State-agent
immunity.  This Court noted: "A State agent acts beyond his
authority and is therefore not immune when he or she 'fail[s]
to 
discharge 
duties 
pursuant 
to 
detailed 
rules 
or 
regulations,
such as those stated on a checklist.'  Ex parte Butts, 775 So.
2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000)."  874 So. 2d at 1052.  Although the
local board of education had not adopted any rules,
regulations, 
policies, 
or 
procedures 
establishing 
how
wrestling practice was to be conducted, the high school
athletic director had furnished Douglas with the guidelines
and rules of the Alabama High School Athletic Association
("AHSAA") 
and 
the 
National 
Federation 
of 
Wrestling 
("NFW"), 
as
1051349
10
well as the Alabama High School Athletic Directors and Coaches
Association Directories ("the Athletic Directories").  Both
the AHSAA and NFW rules addressed potentially dangerous
wrestling holds and illegal headlocks. 
 
Likewise, 
the Athletic
Directories contained a code of conduct that prohibited
"inequitable competition."  This Court concluded that the
athletic director exercised judgment the local board allowed
him to exercise in giving Douglas the rules and guidelines of
the AHSAA and NFW, as well as the Athletic Directories.  "We
cannot agree that such guidelines and rules must be adopted by
the Board before they can create a duty on Douglas's part."
874 So. 2d at 1055.  Thus, this Court concluded that the
summary 
judgment 
based 
on 
State-agent 
immunity 
was
inappropriate as to the coach in that situation.
In this case, no evidence refuting Waddy and Moore's
summary-judgment motion was properly before the trial court.
The record indicates that the trial court instructed Feagins
to file a response to the summary-judgment motion on or before
May 5, 2006, and that a hearing on the motion was to be held
on May 8, 2006.  The trial court entered the summary judgment
on May 9, 2006, and Feagins did not file her response to the
1051349
11
summary-judgment motion until May 10, 2006, a day after the
summary judgment was entered.  Any response to Waddy and
Moore's summary-judgment motion had to be served on the court
at least two days before the scheduled hearing.  Rule
56(c)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Because May 6, 2006, was a Saturday
and the hearing was on Monday, the trial court ordered a
response by Friday, May 5.  The trial court was certainly
entitled to disregard Feagins's submission as untimely under
Rule 56(c)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., and nothing in the record
indicates that the trial court considered her tardy response.
Even assuming that the trial court chose to consider it,
however, Feagins's submission fails to create a question of
fact that would defeat Waddy and Moore's motion for a summary
judgment.  Specifically, Feagins failed to properly present
the trial court with evidence of the kind that existed in
Giambrone, i.e., rules or regulations providing guidance for
Waddy.  The record does indicate that Feagins attached to her
response to the summary-judgment motion what appear to be
excerpted pages from the AHSAA rules and regulations.  These
pages, however, are not authenticated in any manner.
"Documents submitted in support of or in opposition to a
1051349
12
summary-judgment 
motion 
are 
generally 
required 
to 
be 
certified
or otherwise authenticated; if they are not, they constitute
inadmissible hearsay and are not considered on summary
judgment."  Tanksley v. ProSoft Automation, Inc., [Ms.
1050099, June 1, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2007).  Thus,
we will not consider those documents in our analysis.  
As was the case in Nall, it is undisputed that Waddy was
discharging his duties in educating students by coaching the
track 
team. 
 
By selecting 
which 
participants 
would 
participate
in which event, Waddy was exercising his judgment in
discharging his duties in educating students, and "we may not
second-guess his decision."  Ex parte Spivey, 846 So. 2d 322,
332 (Ala. 2002). 
The notice of appeal and docketing statement to this
Court 
indicate 
that Feagins 
also 
appealed 
the summary 
judgment
entered in favor of Moore.  However, Feagins fails to address
the summary judgment entered in favor of Moore in her brief to
this Court.  Feagins does not pursue on appeal her allegation
that Waddy and Moore breached a duty to inform the Board of
Education's insurer of Tamesha's injury and to notify Tamesha
of the availability of insurance to cover her injury.  "Issues
1051349
13
not argued in a party's brief are waived."  Waddell & Reed,
Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins. Co., 875 So. 2d 1143, 1167
(Ala. 2003).  We therefore do not disturb the summary judgment
in favor of Moore and Waddy on this issue.
IV. Conclusion
Because the trial court correctly determined that Waddy
is entitled to State-agent immunity relating to the decisions
he made as a track-and-field coach at a public school, we
affirm the summary judgment in his favor.  Because Feagins
makes no argument on appeal as to Moore, we affirm the summary
judgment in his favor.
AFFIRMED.
See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and Parker,
JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.