Case Title: Owens v. State

Citation: 399 Md. 388

Docket Number: 103/06

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Marcus Dannon Owens v. State of Maryland, No. 103, Sept. Term 2006.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - THE COMMON LAW RIGHT TO A JURY COMPOSED
ENTIRELY OF U.S. CITIZENS IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL HAS BEEN ABROGATED BY
LEGISLATIVE ACTION COVERING THE ENTIRE SUBJECT MATTER OF JURY
SELECTION - STATUTORY RIGHT TO A JURY OF U.S. CITIZENS IS WAIVED IF
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ASK FOR VOIR DIRE QUESTION TO DISCOVER ANY NON
CITIZENS - BOYD V. STATE, 341 MD. 431 (1996) PARTIALLY OVERRULED.
Circuit Court for How ard Cou nty
Case # 13-K-03-04298 5 IN
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 103
September Term, 2006
MARCUS DANNON OWENS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, specially
assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Bell, C.J., and Cathell, J., Dissent.
Filed:   June 5, 2007
1THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 519 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Gideon ed., 1818).
24 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *344 (1769) (referring to England, whose
common law was applicable to the American colonies at the time of Blackstone’s writing).
3Daniel D. Blinka, Jefferson and Juries: The Problem of Law, Reason, and Politics
in the New Republic, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 35, 79 (2005).
4THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776) (“For depriving us in
many cases, of the benefit of Trial by Jury.”).  By operation of the Sugar Act of 1764 and the
Stamp Act of 1765, offenses under those statutes were to be tried by the vice-admiralty court
located in Halifax, Nova Scotia, regardless of where the offense was committed, even if it
had no maritime implications.  Blinka, supra note 3, at 79; see also Thomas C. Grey, Origins
of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30
STAN. L. REV. 843, 870 (1978).  This compounded the abridgment of the right to a jury trial
by removing the power to render judgment from the vicinage of where the offense was
committed.  Sam Sparks & George Butts, Disappearing Juries and Jury Verdicts, 39 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 289, 290-91 (2007); see also infra note 24 for more on the concept of vicinage.
Further, the “Coercive” or “Intolerable” Acts of 1774 provided that some violations of its
provisions had to be tried in England.  LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
226 (1999).
5In addition to its mention as a grievance against the Crown in the Declaration of
Independence, the preservation of the jury trial was discussed in several other foundational
documents.  The “Stamp Act Congress,” so-called because its tenure coincided with the
(continued...)
Trial by jury is lauded as “the very palladium of free government,” 1 and a “sacred
bulwark of the nation.” 2  Thomas Jefferson lauded “trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet
imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”
3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (Washington ed., 1861).  Encroachment on this
institution by the expanding jurisdiction of the English vice-admiralty courts, the trials of
which were conducted without juries,3 was chief among the complaints registered by
American colonists in the Declaration of Independence.4  There can be no question that the
jury trial is a vital and cherished institution of United States5 and Maryland law.6
5(...continued)
passage of the Act, declared in a petition to the King the colonies’ “full power of legislation
and trial by jury.”  John Dickinson, A Petition to the King from the Stamp Act Congress, in
1 THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON 1764-1774, at 193-96 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., 1970) (1895)).  The First Continental Congress expressed in the fifth resolution of The
Declaration of Rights of 1774 that “the respective colonies are entitled to the common law
of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their
peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law.”  1 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS: 1774-1789, at 69 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1904).  The right to
jury trial was also secured in The Northwest Ordinance of 1787.  Northwest Ordinance of
1787, art. II, reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS,
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 960-61 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909).  Further, every state
constitution composed prior to 1787 guaranteed the right to a jury trial in criminal cases.
LEONARD LEVY, Bill of Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 258, 269
(Leonard Levy ed., 1987).
Since our nation’s founding, the right to trial by jury has been defended vigorously.
American jurisprudence on the right to jury trials is epic, beginning with the landmark case
of Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303, 309, 25 L. Ed. 664 (1880), enforcing
a black defendant’s right to a jury not selected by discriminatory means intended to eliminate
black jurors.  The seminal decisions in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S. Ct. 1712,
1719, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146, 114 S.
Ct. 1419, 1430, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1994), restricting discriminatory abuses of peremptory
challenges to remove blacks and women from criminal juries, respectively, represent the
latest struggles to preserve this fundamental institution.  In view of this history, the Supreme
Court has opined that “the inestimable privilege of trial by jury . . . is a vital principle,
underlying the whole administration of criminal justice.”  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
309, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1776, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1987) (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 123, 18 L. Ed. 281 (1866)).
6The first Constitutional Convention of Maryland referred to the same grievance of
the abridgment of the right to a jury trial as articulated in the Declaration of Independence.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND, 1774-1776, at 202
(James Lucas & E. K. Deaver eds., 1836).  Accordingly, the delegates enshrined the right in
multiple places in the first Declaration of Rights.  Id. at 311, 313 (Articles 3, 19, and 21).
Recently we affirmed the fundamental character of the right to a jury trial in criminal cases.
Powell v. State, 394 Md. 632, 646, 907 A.2d 242, 250 (2006).
2
With that historical perspective firmly in mind, we confront the issues concerning this
right debated by the parties in the present case.  The primary controversy touches on the
7 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
3
question of whether the empanelling of a non-citizen on a jury in a criminal case abridged
Marcus Dannon Owens’s right to a jury trial under either the U.S. or Maryland Constitutions.
Alternatively, we consider whether empaneling a non-citizen juror violates “merely”
Maryland statutory law.  In either case, we decide whether Owens waived his opportunity to
object to service by the non-citizen on his jury.
The second issue we review is whether Owens was “in custody,” as that term is
understood in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, at the time he was questioned, without
Miranda7 warnings, by the police at the hospital where his stepson was taken following a
medical emergency.
I. FACTS
Marcus Dannon Owens was tried in the Circuit Court for Howard County before a
presiding judge and a jury of twelve individuals, on charges of murder and child abuse
resulting in death.  The jury convicted Owens of second degree murder and child abuse
resulting in death.  The victim of both crimes was Owens’s stepson, Kevonte Davis.  The trial
judge sentenced Owens to two consecutively-running 30 year terms in prison.  The facts
giving rise to these convictions are not in dispute.
Owens married Kenesha Davis in late July 2003, and lived with her in their Columbia,
Maryland, townhouse.  Also living with the couple were Davis’s two children from a prior
relationship: Dacquan Davis, age four; and Kevonte Davis, age 2; as well as the couple’s
8Dr. Zabiullah Ali, an Assistant Medical Examiner, performed an autopsy on Kevonte
and concluded that “the cause of death was multiple blunt force trauma” inflicted less than
four to six hours before death.
4
seven month-old infant, Kemari Owens.  In July 2003, Owens was unemployed, but Davis
worked at a warehouse for the distributing firm, Genco, in Columbia where she typically
worked from 7:00 a.m. until 5:30 p.m.  The couple shared a single car so, each morning,
Owens would drive the children to daycare, drop his wife off at Genco, and then return home.
At the end of the work day, Owens would pick up the children and his wife and return home.
Owens deviated from that routine on the morning of 30 July 2003 when he took Davis
to work directly, without dropping the children at daycare.  Davis testified that Kevonte
appeared normal when she exited the car.  Kevonte, however, did not appear so when Owens
picked Davis up from work approximately 10 hours later.  Davis noticed that Kevonte had
his eyes closed, was foaming at the mouth, had cold hands, and was “moaning like he was
in pain.”  She and Owens took Kevonte to Howard County General Hospital (“the Hospital”),
where the child died after approximately thirty minutes of failed attempts to revive him.
A number of witnesses from the Hospital medical staff testified at Owens’s trial to the
extent and possible causes of the injuries leading to Kevonte’s death.  The consensus of the
testimony was that Kevonte sustained severe trauma on the level of a serious car accident or
a fall off a building of several stories.8  Several of the staff members also noted that Owens’s
explanation of Kevonte’s activities during the critical 10 hours on July 23 was not consistent
with the extent of his injuries.  At about 6:30 p.m., Howard County Police Detectives Eric
9Detective Kruhm testified that “[a]t one point, [Owens banged] his head against the
wall and muttered, ‘Fucking up.’  And then at another point in the conversation, between
questions he said to himself, just audibly, ‘How does this shit happen?’”
5
Kruhm and Vicki Shaffer encountered and interviewed Owens for 10 to 15 minutes in the
playroom of the Hospital’s pediatric ward, where he was tending Dacquan.  That
conversation, to which Owens was apparently a free participant, yielded some additional
background on the day’s events.  Owens indicated that the two older boys had spent the day
playing and watching TV together and seemed relatively normal at lunch time.  Around the
time the children and Owens picked up Davis, however, Kevonte was “fussy” and difficult
to keep awake.  When asked how Kevonte received such heavy bruising, Owens attributed
it to fighting with his four year-old brother, Dacquan.  The detectives noted that Owens
seemed nervous during their conversation.9  The interview ended when Owens left the room.
At that point, the detectives considered Owens a suspect in Kevonte’s death.
Several hours later, around 9:48 p.m., the detectives conducted a second interview.
The detectives approached Owens, who was in the Hospital parking lot, and asked him to
come back inside for another interview.  Owens complied with the request and also did not
object to the audiotaping of the interview.  The two plain-clothes detectives and their suspect,
Owens, convened in an empty room in the pediatric ward, several doors down from the
playroom where the first interview took place.  The detectives took possession of Owens’s
car keys, but the record is not clear as to whether this occurred before or after the second
10Despite some uncertainty, cross-examination of Detective Kruhm and the direct
testimony of Owens seem to indicate that the keys were obtained prior to the second
interview.
6
interview.10  During the interview, the detectives asked pointed questions about the
circumstances surrounding the death of Kevonte.  The interview lasted somewhere between
20 and 30 minutes and was terminated at Owens’s initiative.  The following exchange took
place at the end of the interview:
[Owens]:
Is there anything else before I go?
[Detective Kruhm]: You can leave at any time; we’re not
holding you in here anymore.
[Owens]:
All right.  See you tomorrow.
The police arrested Owens two days later on 1 August 2003.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Non-Citizen Juror Issue
The jury in Owens’s trial returned its verdict against him on 10 June 2004.  Later that
same evening, Steven Merson, the Howard County Jury Commissioner, received a voicemail
message from Juror No. 10, Adeyemi Alade.  Alade indicated that he was concerned about
the propriety of his jury service because he was not a U.S. citizen.  On 18 June 2004, the
Circuit Court held a hearing regarding this revelation.  At the hearing, Merson explained that
Alade expressed concern for the status of the case because he had just learned that jury
service was restricted to U.S. citizens.  Merson testified that Alade indicated that he was
7
qualified to serve as a juror on his pre-trial juror questionnaire.  According to Merson, his
office does not review for accuracy the responses provided by juror candidates unless some
information is missing.  Merson also confirmed that the videotape shown to potential jurors
upon their arrival for service does not include information relating to qualification for
service.
Alade testified that his “country of origin” was Nigeria and that he was not a U.S.
citizen.  Rather, he stated that he had been in the U.S. for two years as a “permanent
resident,” was attending university, and had obtained a valid Maryland driver’s license,
listing his Howard County residence address.  Alade acknowledged that he checked the box
on the juror questionnaire indicating that he was qualified to serve as a juror as an oversight
and did not do so deliberately.  Apparently, no one inquired into his citizenship status when
he reported for possible jury duty and he was never asked about the subject at any point in
the trial.  For Alade’s part, the court found no intent to misrepresent his status to the court.
Owens filed a Motion for a New Trial on the same day as the hearing.  The rationale
for the motion was that Owens was deprived of a lawful jury because Alade, as a non-U.S.
citizen, was not qualified to serve as a juror.  The State argued that the citizenship
requirement for jurors is confined to the realm of statutory rights, a right which Owens
waived by not challenging Alade’s service in a timely fashion.  The Circuit Court, on 21 July
2004, denied Owens’s motion.  The court reasoned that neither the U.S. nor Maryland
Constitutions mandate a jury composed of U.S. citizens only.  As to Owens’s contention that
8
Alade’s non-citizenship status could not reasonably have been discovered because voir dire
questions relating to statutory disqualifications are not mandatory, the court pointed out that
neither party sought a voir dire question on the subject of citizenship.  Had it been proposed,
the court ventured that the citizenship question would have been propounded to the jurors
and Alade would have been disqualified as a juror.
B. Suppression Issue
Prior to trial, Owens sought to suppress any statements he made to Detectives Kruhm
and Shaffer during their two interviews.  Owens argued that the conversations between him
and the detectives occurred while he was in custody and must be suppressed because the
detectives never advised him of his Miranda rights.  The Circuit Court denied the motion to
suppress the statements made during the interviews based on a totality of the circumstances
analysis.  The court examined numerous factors in concluding that the interrogation of
Owens was not custodial, including: the neutral locations and short length of the interviews,
the small number of officers present and their relaxed posture, whether Owens was a suspect
and treated as such, Owens’s willingness to commence the interviews, the lack of use of
physical restraint, the absence of force or coercion, and that Owens was not placed under
arrest.
C. Review by the Court of Special Appeals
Owens noted timely an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  The intermediate
appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court.  As to both issues discussed
11Owens also raised a “sufficiency of the evidence” argument.  He does not pursue that
in this Court.
9
previously, it relied on much the same grounds as expressed by the trial court.11  The
intermediate appellate court concluded that Owens’s right to a citizen jury was purely
statutory, not constitutional, in nature.  Owens v. State, 170 Md. App. 35, 71, 906 A.2d 989,
1009 (2006).  Because the voir dire process is the means by which defendants are accorded
the opportunity to identify and challenge unqualified jurors, a failure to pose proper questions
and object during that time is equated to a waiver of that opportunity.  Owens, 170 Md. App.
at 71-73, 906 A.2d at 1009-10.  The Court of Special Appeals reinforced its conclusion by
examining Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293, 16 S. Ct. 304, 40 L. Ed. 432 (1895), a case
where, in spite of a due process argument, the Supreme Court refused to grant a post-
conviction objection to a non-citizen juror.  Owens, 170 Md. App. at 73, 906 A.2d at 1010.
The appellate panel analogized Kohl to several Maryland cases involving jurors whose
statutory disqualifications were discovered only after a verdict was rendered and motions for
new trials were denied because it was held that the right to object to unqualified jurors had
been waived.  Owens, 170 Md. App. at 73-77, 906 A.2d at 1010-12.  As for the custodial
interrogation issue, the Court of Special Appeals reasoned that the encounters between the
detectives and Owens were not very long and that a reasonable person in Owens’s position
would have felt free to leave the situations.  Owens, 170 Md. App. at 99, 906 A.2d at 1025.
We granted Owens’s petition for a writ of certiorari.  396 Md. 12, 912 A.2d 648 (2006).
10
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Non-Citizen Juror Issue
In another case concerning the right to a jury trial, albeit in the realm of civil law, we
said that “[b]ecause our interpretation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and
Constitution, provisions of the Maryland Code, and the Maryland Rules are appropriately
classified as questions of law, we review the issues de novo to determine if the trial court was
legally correct in its rulings on these matters.”  Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604, 861 A.2d
78, 80-81 (2004); see also Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535, 907 A.2d 175, 184 (2006)
(“where an order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional,
statutory or case law, our Court must determine whether the trial court’s conclusions are
‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review”).  Thus, because we are presented with
legal questions on the constitutional and statutory soundness of a jury containing a non-
citizen, we consider them de novo.
B. Suppression Issue
In State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207, 821 A.2d 439, 443-44 (2003) (citations
omitted), we stated the applicable standard of review regarding motions to suppress and
determinations of custody for purposes of evaluating arguments asserting Miranda right
violations:
Our review . . . is ordinarily “limited to the evidence presented
at the suppression hearing.”  In conducting our analysis, we
view the evidence and inferences that may be reasonably drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the prevailing party on the
12The phrase “judgment of [one’s] peers” means “trial by jury.”  Tichnell v. State, 287
Md. 695, 714, 415 A.2d 830, 840 (1980) (citing Wright v. Wright’s Lessee, 2 Md. 429, 452
(1852)).
13This Latin phrase is translated to “of half-tongue,” which is a reference to the fact
that half of the jury speaks the same language as the defendant, and the other does not.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 463 (8th ed. 1999).
11
motion . . . . We pay deference to the trial court's factual
findings, upholding them unless “they are clearly erroneous.”
“[We] must make an independent constitutional evaluation,”
however, “by reviewing the relevant law and applying it to the
unique facts and circumstances of the case.”
In determining whether there was custody for purposes of
Miranda, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless
clearly erroneous.  “We must, however, make an independent
constitutional appraisal of the record to determine the
correctness of the trial judge’s decision concerning custody.”
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Non-Citizen Juror Issue
Owens advances two interrelated arguments in support of his position that the
Maryland Constitution recognizes a right to a trial by a jury composed only of United States
citizens.  He argues that the substantive due process component of Article 24 of the
Declaration of Rights, guaranteeing that no person is to be “deprived of his life, liberty, or
property, but by the judgment of his peers,”12 when informed by English common law made
applicable through Article 5, means a “jury of citizens.”  Assertedly, English common law
at the time of the Revolution required jurors to be citizens.  This general rule, Owens
contends, is proven by its exception: jury de medietate linguae,13 the mechanism by which
14In the event that the requisite number of aliens could not be summoned, the common
law permitted the trial to continue with a jury composed of as many aliens as possible, if any.
RICHARD CLARKE SEWELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SHERIFF 357 (1845); 3 W. F.
FINLASON, REEVES’ HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 195 (1880); MAXIMUS A. LESSER, THE
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM 219, n.59 (1894); LLOYD E. MOORE, THE
JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 58 (2d 3d. 1988).  The purpose of this
procedure was to ensure an impartial jury, which was more likely to occur if some of the
defendant’s own countrymen were empanelled to dilute possible xenophobia on the part of
the English jurors.  3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *360 (1768); 2 FREDERICK
POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 623-24 n.3
(1898) (hereinafter POLLOCK & MAITLAND).
15304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938); see infra note 41 and
accompanying text.
12
non-English citizens were tried, which permitted the jury to be composed of one-half citizens
and one-half non-citizens.14  3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *362 (1768).  Thus,
by the complimentary operation of Articles 5 and 24, Owens posits that the Declaration of
Rights in the Maryland Constitution secures for defendants like himself the right to a trial by
a jury of U.S. citizens.  As a right of constitutional pedigree, it may be waived only upon a
knowing and voluntary Johnson v. Zerbst15-type waiver by the defendant himself, a much
harder waiver for the State to prove than must be shown for waiver of a statutory right.  Even
if the right to a citizen jury is of a statutory, rather than constitutional dimension, Owens
maintains that he did not waive that right because our decision in Boyd v. State, 341 Md. 431,
439-40, 671 A.2d 33, 37 (1996), would have made his request for a voir dire question
regarding citizenship potentially a futile effort.
The State responds by directing us to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Kohl and
Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320, 90 S. Ct. 518, 24 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1970), implying
16The Sixth Amendment reads, in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”
17“That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to a speedy trial by an
impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty.”
18Article 23 provides, in relevant part: “In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall
be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency
of the evidence to sustain a conviction.”
13
that the U.S. Constitution does not mandate citizen juries.  Additionally, the State argues that
the Maryland Constitution is amenable to a similar interpretation, despite the common law
practice of trials by jury de medietate linguae.  Instead, Owens’s right to a jury composed of
U.S. citizens exists solely as a matter of statutory law, which right he waived by failing to
request a voir dire question inquiring into the citizenship status of the venire.
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right to a trial by an
impartial jury in criminal matters.16  This right has been incorporated into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and is thereby applicable to
Maryland and the several states.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L.
Ed. 2d 491 (1968); accord Miller v. Warden, 16 Md. App. 614, 623-24, 299 A.2d 862, 868
(1973).  The Maryland Constitution also provides for the right to a jury trial in several
articles of its Declaration of Rights.  Two of the provisions deal specifically with the right
to a jury trial in criminal cases: Articles 2117 and 23,18 but they are not especially applicable
19Article 21, beyond its assurance of a jury trial generally, is not otherwise implicated
in this case in its guarantee of a speedy trial by an impartial jury (as Owens has raised no
issue of delay or a partial jury).  Also not implicated in Owens’s arguments is Article 23's
direction that juries shall be the “judges of law,”a somewhat antiquated provision since
refurbished with judicial gloss concerning the true role of jurors as judges of “the law of the
crime.”  In this role, jurors are empowered to interpret a statute in light of disputed facts to
determine whether a crime has been committed.  Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 176-80,
423 A.2d 558, 563-65 (1980).  Owens has not alleged that this right has been curtailed.
20MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RTS, art. 17 (1776);  MD. CONST. of 1851, DECL. OF
RTS, art. 3 (1851); MD. CONST. of 1864, D ECL. OF RTS, art. 4 (1864); M D. CONST. of 1867,
DECL. OF RTS, art. 5 (1867).
14
in the present case.19  Thus, we look to the provisions of Articles 5(a)(1) and 24, on which
Owens bases his arguments, for guidance on the question of the right to a jury trial in
Maryland.
Article 5(a)(1) of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides as follows:
That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the
Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the
course of that Law, and to the benefit of such of the English
statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred
and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found
applicable to their local and other circumstances, and have been
introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity;
and also of all Acts of Assembly in force on the first day of
June, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven; except such as may
have since expired, or may be inconsistent with the provisions
of this Constitution; subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and
amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State . . . .
This provision has deep roots.  Some iteration of its provisions has been an organ of the
fundamental law of Maryland since 1776,20 when the State declared its independence and
formed its Constitution.  The origin of Article 5(a)(1) harkens to the popular sentiment
15
among colonists that they should restore and guarantee the common law privileges, their
birthright as Englishmen, of which England had wrongfully deprived them, including the
right to trial by jury.  See supra notes 4 and 5 and accompanying text; see also CHARTER OF
MARYLAND art. X (1634) (guaranteeing the colonists of Maryland “all Privileges, Franchises
and Liberties of this our Kingdom of England, freely, quietly, and peaceably to have and
possess, and the same may use and enjoy in the same manner as our Liege-Men born, or to
be born within our said Kingdom of England . . . .”).  We turn now to the task of identifying
the common law principles of English criminal jury trials in 1776.
1. The English Common Law of Jury Trials
To better understand the status of criminal jury trials at the time of the Revolution, we
examine briefly the evolution of that institution in common law England.  The earliest record
of a primordial form of the criminal jury trial in English common law history may be
attributed to the Saxon king, Ethelred the Unready (978-1013, 1014-16).  Under Ethelred’s
law, 12 elders of a local community would be accompanied by a sheriff to swear on a
religious relic and swear not to accuse an innocent man of a crime.  MAXIMUS A. LESSER,
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM 134 (1894); WILLIAM FORSYTH,
HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 57 (2d ed. 1875).  This form of accusation and conviction was
replaced by the “frank-pledge” system, instituted by the Normans following their Conquest
in 1066, which held every member of a community responsible for the conduct of his
neighbors.  LESSER, supra at 135-36 (citing FORSYTH, supra at 161).  This system compelled
21The taking of oaths, also known as a “wager of law,” later led to the practice of
assembling witnesses, also known as compurgators or oath-helpers, to vouch for the veracity
of the defendant’s oath, FRANCIS STOUGHTON SULLIVAN, AN HISTORICAL TREATISE ON THE
FEUDAL LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF ENGLAND 273 (1772);  2 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 14, at 600-01. 
22Blackstone identifies various iterations of the fire and water ordeals in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *336-37
(1769).  Apparently, a different kind of ordeal was reserved generally for accused clergy,
which required them to attempt to swallow a large piece of bread without choking.  LESSER,
supra note 14, at 82.
23Trial by battle, or “wager of battle,” was usually conducted by “witnesses,” or
champions as they were better known, who swore to the truth of their litigant’s claims.
FRANCIS STOUGHTON SULLIVAN, AN HISTORICAL TREATISE ON THE FEUDAL LAW, AND THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF ENGLAND 273 (1772).  More is the pity, trial by battle was
outlawed shortly after Pope Innocent III, by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, prohibited
clergy from participating therein.  2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 14, at 599; LESSER,
supra note 14, at 142.
16
neighbors to bring to justice the criminal element in their communities.  Id.  This led to
another mode of trial by accusers making oaths, called voraths, against a defendant.21  JOHN
PROFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY 25-26 (1877).  A defendant would typically
undergo an ordeal22 or, under Norman rule, trial by combat.23    LESSER, supra at 136 (citing
FORSYTH, supra at 194).  Dissatisfaction with this rumor-driven, perilous process lead to
reforms in the following centuries.
The criminal jury trial began to assume a form more recognizable to us under the reign
of King Henry II.  Among Henry II’s innovations was his Assize of Clarendon, decreed in
1166, which brought under the jurisdiction of the royal courts serious crimes and felonies
24The term “vicinage” is descriptive of the fact that jurors all lived and held property
in the immediate vicinity of the area where the disputed facts arose.  GILES DUNCOMBE,
TRIALS PER PAIS, OR THE LAW OF ENGLAND CONCERNING JURIES BY NISI PRIUS, &C. 90 (6th
ed. 1718); 3 J.H. THOMAS, A SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF LORD COKE’S FIRST INSTITUTE
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 365 (1836); JOHN PROFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY 37,
39-40, 52 (1877).  At this point in the evolution of jury trials, it was crucial that jurors have
personal knowledge of the facts of the case because that was typically the only evidence
available to aid them in reaching a verdict.  LESSER, supra note 14 at 139; PROFFATT, supra
note 24, at 35; JOHN HAWLES, THE ENGLISH-MANS RIGHT, reprinted in JUSTICES AND JURIES
IN COLONIAL AMERICA 7 (1972) (1680).  Around 1751, however, King George II abolished
the vicinage requirement for criminal trials by statute.  PROFFATT, supra note 24, at 117
(citing 24 Geo II., ch. 18). 
This practice was imported to Virginia and other colonies. Harold M. Hyman &
Catherine M. Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial Jury History, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN
AMERICA 26 (Rita James Simon ed., 1975).  Maryland attempted to have the Bill of Rights
require federal courts to observe the vicinage standards of the state in which the court sat.
EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 18 (1957).  The
U.S. Constitution is now said to have a “Vicinage Clause” or “Venue Clause” requiring trials
to be held in the state where the offense is committed.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The
Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the
said Crimes shall have been committed . . . .”); see also U.S. CONST. amend VI (“In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law . . . .”); see generally Steven A. Engel,
The Public’s Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658 (2000);
Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 803 (1976).  This is very different than the
common law notion that the jury would be composed of the local inhabitants of where the
crime occurred, which evoked controversy among some colonists.  Hyman & Tarrant, supra
note 24, at 33-34.  But see William Wirt Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases:
Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 MICH. L. REV. 59, 65-66 (1944) (arguing that the
colonists’ complaints were directed more to the idea of having to defend against actions
being tried in other colonies, Nova Scotia, or England).
17
identified by an inquest, or a type of grand jury, of 16 men gathered from the vicinage.24
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE PALLADIUM OF JUSTICE: ORIGINS OF TRIAL BY JURY 11 (1999).
These jurors were charged with the responsibility of speaking for the neighborhood as to
18
their suspicions and accusations of criminal activity.  Id.  Once identified by this sworn jury,
the defendant was faced with one of several possible ordeals.  Id.  This method of reaching
a verdict was beginning to replace the older Saxon and Norman procedures of taking oaths
of innocence and trial by battle.  2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 598-603 (1898).
Steadily, advancements in the realm of civil trials under Henry II lead to the petit jury
verdict’s replacement of the ordeal as the final arbiter of criminal guilt or innocence.
Contemporaneous with the Assize of Clarendon was the establishment of the assizes of novel
disseisin (recent dispossession), mort d’ancestor (death of an ancestor), and darrein
presentment (last presentment), which provided for final jury verdicts bearing on various
issues of land possession.  LEVY, supra at 13-14.  The jurors in these cases were drawn from
the vicinity and resolved the disputes before them based upon their knowledge of the facts
at issue.  Id.  In 1179, Henry II promulgated the Grand Assize, a form of appeal from civil
jury verdicts as to rightful possession of land, which called for yet another jury.  Id. at 14.
This jury was selected by the sheriff, who nominated 4 knights to complete the jury with 12
other knights hailing from the same neighborhood as situs of the land in question.  Id.  Again,
these jurors relied on their knowledge of the facts to reach a decision.  Id. at 14-15.
With the advent of the Magna Carta in 1215, the nobles of England secured for
25Several scholars have noted that this right was available to “freeman,” that is, the
land-owning nobles only, and not the general non-landed populace, known as villeins.
SAMUEL W. MCCART, TRIAL BY JURY 5 (1964); W ILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA
CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 287 (2d ed. 1914).  The
nobles compelled King John to assent to this provision of the Magna Carta to prevent the
kind of arbitrary justice doled out by the Crown’s own judges and place the nobles’ fates in
the hands of their equals, or peers: other nobles.  MCCART, supra note 25, at 5; DUNCOMBE,
supra note 24, at 132-33.
It was not until 1275, when King Edward I signed the First Statute of Westminster,
3 Edw. 1, ch. 39, that jury trials were made available to non-landed defendants.  1 EDWARD
COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *169-70 (1797);
MCCART, supra note 25, at 5-6.  The principle of a jury of one’s peers did not exist in
precisely the same way for the villeins.  Because the property qualification still existed for
jury service, villeins were still not permitted to serve as jurors.   DUNCOMBE, supra note 24,
at 7; 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *362.  Thus, villeins were judged by their hierarchal
superiors.
26“No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in
any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful (judgment) of his
peers or by the law of the land.”  MAGNA CARTA, art. 39.
27The Magna Carta purported to make this right to a trial by jury available without
charge.  “To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.”  MAGNA
CARTA, art. 40.
28Interestingly, some defendants, particularly those who felt that the evidence against
them would invariably condemn them before a jury (who were liable to be punished for
(continued...)
19
themselves,25 in Article 39 of the Great Charter,26 the right to a jury verdict in lieu of the
more perilous methods of determining guilt or innocence.  LESSER, supra at 142-43.  Until
that time, a petit jury verdict was only available for a price as a dispensation from the
Crown.27  Id.  Two legal authorities of good repute from the period, Henry de Bracton and
the Fleta, indicated that criminal jury trials had become typical by the end of the 13th
century.28  Id. at 143; see supra note 25.  This may have been attributable in large measure
28(...continued)
unwarranted acquittals), objected to the jury trial because they felt more confident in
subjecting themselves to trial by combat or compurgation.  LESSER, supra note 14, at 145-46.
29As early as 1218, process was served for witnesses separate from the jury to convene
with the jurors and there is a record of a trial being conducted based on the opinion of jurors
and document witnesses.  LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF
JUSTICE 56-57 (2d ed. 1988); see also LEONARD W. LEVY, THE PALLADIUM OF JUSTICE:
ORIGINS OF TRIAL BY JURY 22-23 (1999).
30It is by virtue of the land-owning requirement that citizenship became an indirect
qualification for jury service.  Because only citizens could own land or hold an estate or
sufficient value, non-citizens were disqualified necessarily.  3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14,
at *362.  Relatedly, slaves and villeins could not be jurors because they, too, lacked the
ability to own land for themselves.  Id.; 1 W. F. FINLASON, REEVES’ HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH LAW 353-54 n.b (1880).  The property qualification for non-citizens was waived
in the instances of which required a jury de medietate linguae.  3 BLACKSTONE, supra note
(continued...)
20
to the abolition of the trial by ordeal around 1215, see supra note 22, which left judges with
few desirable alternatives for trying the guilt of defendants.  LESSER, supra at 145.
Beginning in the 1300s, the petit and grand juries finally emerged as bodies of distinct jurors.
In 1352, King Edward III agreed to a statute empowering defendants to challenge petit jurors
because of their service on the grand jury that indicted the defendant.  LEVY, supra at 22.
Another development in the ancient jury trial, making it resemble closer our modern
institution, was the move away during the reign of King Henry III from the jurors as
witnesses, which became normal practice by the mid-15th century.29
The qualifications for jury service remained principally unchanged over the many
centuries of the common law’s development.  A juror was required to be a land-owning
(freeholder, or freeman)30 male31 possessing land and chattel of a specified value who
30(...continued)
14, at *362-63; see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
313 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *362; DUNCOMBE, supra note 24, at 85.  Women
were only permitted on juries (in fact the entire jury had to be composed of women) to decide
the factual question of whether a woman was pregnant.  This was achieved by the writ de
ventre inspiciendo.  3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *362.
32It is said that a jury should be “of the country” of the defendant.  Contrary to
Owens’s assertions, this was not meant to be taken to imply citizenship.  Rather, the phrase
was a reference to the “country-side,” or the general vicinity of the where the crime occurred.
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *359-60; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 14, at 624
n.1; PROFFATT, supra note 24, at 117.
21
dwelled in the general area from which the disputed question arose.32  3 BLACKSTONE, supra
at *362; GILES DUNCOMBE, TRIALS PER PAIS, OR THE LAW OF ENGLAND CONCERNING JURIES
BY NISI PRIUS, &C. 7, 85-88, 103, 123 (6th ed. 1718).  Jurors also had to be lawful, that is,
not outlawed for some illegal act previously done.  D UNCOMBE, supra at 85; 3 BLACKSTONE,
supra at *363-64.  Jurors could also be challenged for possible partiality, insufficient age,
and occupation as a clergymen or member of Parliament.  3 BLACKSTONE, supra at *361,
363, 364.  
In summary, the practice of the criminal jury trial in English common law at the time
of the Revolution stood as follows.  A grand jury was assembled to indict a defendant based
upon eye-witness testimony and other evidence.  Then, a petit jury of 12 free, land-holding,
lawful men worth a certain amount of money from the general area of the situs of the crime
determined the correctness of the indictment based on testimony from witnesses and
instructions of law from judge.
33Maryland is the only state of the thirteen colonial states that retains an express
constitutional guarantee of English common law from the time independence was declared.
At least two of these states formerly had such constitutional provisions.  DEL. CONST. of
1776, art. 25 (1776); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, § 35 (1777).  Several of the colonial states have
current statutes to the same effect.  G A. CODE ANN., § 1-1-10(c)(1) (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 4-1 (2006); 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1503(a) (2006).
22
As its language indicates, Article 5(a)(1) of the Declaration of Rights avails
Marylanders of the common law of England as it existed at the time Maryland declared its
independence.33  Id., State v. Canova, 278 Md. 483, 486, 365 A.2d 988, 990 (1976).  We,
however, have made clear in our cases, as does Article 5(a)(1) itself, that this imported
common law is subject to change and repeal by appellate courts and the Legislature.
Stearman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 381 Md. 436, 454, 849 A.2d 539, 550 (2004);
Spitzinger v. State, 340 Md. 114, 129, 665 A.2d 685, 692 (1995); Miles Laboratories, Inc.
Cutter Laboratories Div. v. Doe, 315 Md. 704, 724, 556 A.2d 1107 1117 (1989); Jones v.
State, 303 Md. 323 n.10, 337 493 A.2d 1062, 1069 n.10 (1985) (“The common law rule may,
within constitutional constraints, be changed or modified by legislative enactment or judicial
decision where it is found to be a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to the circumstances
of our people.”); Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934); Gladden v. State, 273
Md. 383, 389, 330 A.2d 176, 180 (1974); Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361, 378 (1872);
Coomes v. Clements, 4 H. & J. 480, 481 (1819).  It is the province of this and other courts
to adjudge whether the common law of England at the time of the Revolution remains a valid
portion of the law of Maryland.  Ireland v. State, 310 Md. 328, 331, 529 A.2d 365, 366
34There may be occasions where the General Assembly has dealt piecemeal with a
particular subject-matter, which only repeals the common law to that limited extent.  See
Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 693, 728 A.2d 698, 702 (1999) (citing Lutz v. State, 167 Md.
12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934)); N ORMAN J. SINGER, 2B SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 50:5 (6th ed. 2000).
23
(1987) (“The determination of the nature of the common law as it existed in England in 1776,
and as it then prevailed in Maryland either practically or potentially, and the determination
of what part of that common law is consistent with the spirit of Maryland’s Constitution and
her political institutions, are to be made by this Court.”); Gilbert v. Findlay College, 195 Md.
508, 513, 74 A.2d 36, 38 (1950).
The common law also may be abrogated by a statute or statutory scheme when the
Legislature’s act addresses the whole subject matter34 on which the common law spoke or
the common law and the legislative enactments may not co-exist independently.  Stearman,
381 Md. at 454, 849 A.2d at 550 (quoting State ex rel. Sonner v. Shearin, 272 Md. 502, 510,
325 A.2d 573, 578 (1974)) (“When the common law and a statute collide, the statute, if
constitutional, controls.”); Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 693, 728 A.2d 698, 702-03
(1999) (citing Lutz v. State, 167 Md. at 15, 172 A. at 356) (“Where a statute and the common
law are in conflict, or where a statute deals with an entire subject-matter, the rule is
otherwise, and the statute is generally construed as abrogating the common law as to that
subject.”); Hitchcock v. State, 213 Md. 273, 279, 131 A.2d 714, 716 (1957) (“Where the
Legislature undertakes to deal with the whole subject matter, there is an exception to the
general rule that repeal by implication is not favored . . . .”); Watkins v. State, 42 Md. App.
35All references to the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article are to the 2002
Replacement Volume in effect at the time of Owens’s arrest.  Since then, the General
Assembly revised the Article, which changed the substance and organization of applicable
provisions.
24
349, 353-54, 400 A.2d 464, 467 (1979).  Thus, notwithstanding whatever merit may inhere
in Owens’s English common law argument, if the Maryland statutory scheme prescribing the
qualifications for jury service overbears completely the common law as it existed at the time
of the Revolution, Article 5(a)(1) of the Maryland Declaration of Rights offers no support
for Owens’s argument for a constitutional right to a jury composed of U.S. citizens.  We
examine that statutory scheme.
2. Maryland’s Statutory Juror Qualification Scheme
The Maryland Rules reiterate that the right to a jury trial is preserved in the Circuit
Courts as it is guaranteed by the Maryland Constitution and Declaration of Rights.  Maryland
Rule 4-311(a).  Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 8-102(a) states
that when a criminal defendant is entitled to a petit jury, “the jury shall be selected at random
from a fair cross section of the citizens of the State who reside in the county where the court
convenes.”  Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Cts. & Jud. Proc., § 8-102(a) (hereinafter
“Cts. & Jud. Proc.”).35  The Article also specifies that either a jury commissioner or the clerk
of the court should manage the jury selection process with the end goal of establishing
procedures that “assure the random selection of a fair cross section of the citizens of the State
who reside in the county where the court convenes.”  Cts. & Jud. Proc., § 8-202(2).  Among
36The form also addresses other points of possible disqualification, including: prior
jury service, physical or mental infirmities, ability to communicate in the English language,
and any pending felony crime charges or unpardoned felony convictions.  Cts. & Jud. Proc.,
§ 8-202(5)(i).
37The statute also disqualifies those who are: unable to communicate in the English
language, incapable of rendering satisfactory jury service by reason of mental or physical
infirmity, charged or convicted (without pardon) of a felony, charged or convicted of
misrepresenting a material fact on a juror qualification form for the purpose of avoiding or
securing service as a juror, party to a civil suit where a jury trial is permitted in the court
where the juror is called to serve, under 18 years of age, or unable to pass any other objective
test prescribed by the Court of Appeals.  Cts. & Jud. Proc., § 8-207(b)(2)-(9).
25
those procedures is the provision of a “juror qualification form” to be mailed to potential
jurors asking them, among other things:36 their race and national origin, length of residence
within the county, and any other questions within the purview of the statutes concerning jury
selection.  Id. § 8-202(5)(i).  The Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article further provides
that “[a] person may not be disqualified or excused from jury service except on the basis of
information provided by the juror qualification form” and leaves the determination of
qualifications to the jury judge, on his or her initiative, or by recommendation of the jury
commissioner or clerk of the court, as the case may be.  Cts. & Jud. Proc., § 8-207(a).
Under the Article, “[a] person is qualified to serve as a juror unless he [or she]: (1) Is
not constitutionally qualified to vote in the county where the court convenes . . . .”37  Cts. &
Jud. Proc., § 8-207(b)(1).  The Maryland Constitution, in turn, states that “no person shall
vote . . . unless his [or her] name appears in the list of registered voters . . . .”  MD. CONST.
art. I, § 2.  In order to be registered to vote, an individual must be “a citizen of the United
States . . . .”  Md. Code (2002), Election Law Article, § 3-102(a)(1).  Thus, the Courts and
38We also note that other, now objectionable, criteria for juror disqualification, such
as inadequate property or monetary holdings and being of the female sex, were explicitly
abrogated in the statutory scheme.  Cts. & Jud. Proc., § 8-103 (“A citizen may not be
excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the courts of the State on account of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.”).
39Chapter 138, § 15 of the Acts of 1809.
26
Judicial Proceedings Article requires indirectly, among other qualifications, that jurors be
citizens of the United States.
We believe that this broad and detailed statutory scheme for selecting qualified jurors
encompasses the same, if not greater, body of law addressed in the English common law
extant in 1776.  Importantly, the statute discusses clearly the same citizenship requirement
that existed implicitly at common law, thus abrogating the older common law rule.38  This
renders inconsequential Owens’s “de medietate linguae argument.”
Properly understood, Owens’s argument contends that because the de medietate
linguae exception was not formally abolished by the Maryland General Assembly until
180939 proves that the common law embraced that concept in 1776.  Therefore, if the
exception were still in place at common law, its existence demonstrates that citizenship was
a qualification for jury service in 1776.  This is irrelevant because, as Owens points out, the
Legislature created an express statutory citizenship qualification for jury service as early as
1973.  Md. Code (1957, 1972 Repl. Vol.), Article 51, § 1.  We have noted previously that a
statutory enactment may abrogate completely a common law principle, rendering it of no
effect.  The 1973 statute creating the citizenship qualification did just that.
40Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896) (upholding
the principle of “separate, but equal” in the segregation of the black and white races).
27
3. Due Process Does Not Mandate a Citizen Jury
Turning to Owens’s second constitutional argument for the right to a citizen jury, we
consider whether the substantive due process components of either the U.S. or Maryland
Constitutions acknowledges such a right.  Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court make clear
that the federal Constitution does not require that jurors be U.S. citizens.  Carter, 396 U.S.
at 332, 90 S. Ct. at 525, 24 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1970); Kohl, 160 U.S. at 300, 16 S. Ct. at 306, 40
L. Ed. 432 (1895); Jugiro v. Brush, 140 U.S. 291, 297-98, 11 S. Ct. 770, 772, 35 L. Ed. 510
(1891); Hollingsworth v. Duane, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 353, 1 L.Ed. 864 (1801).  Owens’s
protestations that the Supreme Court precedent is stale, and possibly tainted by some vague
prejudice because it emerged from the same era as the infamous Plessy v. Ferguson40 case,
are unavailing.  First, the Supreme Court reaffirmed, in its 1970 Carter decision, the essence
of its dicta in Kohl.  Carter, 396 U.S. at 332, 90 S. Ct. at 525, 24 L. Ed. 2d 549.  Second,
courts since Kohl concurred routinely in this analysis.  See, e.g., United States v. Gordon-
Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 976-77 (5th Cir. 1975). United States v. Armsbury, 408 F. Supp. 1130,
1135 (D. Or. 1976). Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 138 (D. Md. 1974), aff’d, 426 U.S.
913, 96 S. Ct. 2616, 49 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1976); State v. Mendoza, 596 N.W.2d 736, 742 n.5
(Wis. 1999); Commonwealth v. Acen, 396 N.E.2d 189, 195 (Mass. 1986).
Maryland law does not provide any firmer footing for Owens’s argument.  The
28
Maryland Constitution makes no express guarantee of a trial by a citizen jury and no opinion
of this Court construes it as such.  The only support Owens can marshal in favor of his
Maryland due process claim is a few sentences of dicta from a 1983 Court of Special Appeals
opinion linking the phrases “jury of peers” to “jury of citizens.”  Lawrence v. State, 51 Md.
App. 575, 581, 444 A.2d 478, 482 (1982).  In Lawrence, the intermediate appellate court
correctly parsed the words “judgment of his peers” from Article 24 of the Declaration of
Rights as signifying a jury trial.  51 Md. App. at 581, 444 A.2d at 482 (citing Wright, 2 Md.
at 452); see supra note 11.  The court then referred inexplicably to Black’s Law Dictionary
to further illuminate the constitutional significance of the term “peer.”  51 Md. App. at 581,
444 A.2d at 482.  The dictionary indicated that peers are equals, a definition from which the
Court of Special Appeals derived the contextually unwarranted and facile conclusion that
“‘trial by a jury of his peers’ means ‘trial by a jury of citizens.’” Id.  The general utility of
Black’s Law Dictionary notwithstanding, such a reference is not a controlling or persuasive
authority in construing the Maryland Constitution and Declaration of Rights.  The
intermediate appellate court would have been better advised to halt its inquiry into the phrase
“judgment of his peers” at this Court’s precedent in Wright interpreting it as simply a trial
by jury.  This is the latter-day construction of the peerage principle discussed previously,
which limited the privilege of jury trials to the landed gentry of 13th century England.  See
supra note 25.
4. Waiver of the Statutory Right to a Citizen Jury
41“A waiver [of the fundamental right to a jury trial] is valid and effective only if made
on the record in open court and if the trial judge determines, after an examination of the
defendant on the record and in open court, that it was made ‘knowingly and voluntarily.’”
Powell v. State, 394 Md. 632, 646, 907 A.2d 242, 250 (2006) (interpreting Maryland Rule
4-246(b)).  In order for the waiver to be both “knowing” and “voluntary,” the “‘trial judge
must be satisfied that there has been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege.’”  Powell, 394 Md. at 639, 907 A.2d at 246 (quoting Smith v. State,
375 Md. 365, 379, 825 A.2d 1055, 1064 (2003)); accord Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938).  Further, only a defendant, and not his
attorney, may waive this right.  Powell, 394 Md. at 646, 907 A.2d at 250 (citing Smith, 375
Md. at 379-81, 825 A.2d at 1064); State v. Collins, 265 Md. 70, 80, 288 A.2d 163, 168-69
(1972).
29
Because we hold that the right to a jury composed of U.S. citizens is of a statutory,
rather than constitutional, dimension, we consider whether Owens waived this right under
applicable standards.  Cubbage v. State, 304 Md. 237, 241, 498 A.2d 632, 634-35 (1985)
(“Just as constitutional rights may be waived, so may nonconstitutional rights be waived.”).
As opposed to waiver of a constitutional right, which ordinarily must meet more stringent
standards,41 a statutory right may be deemed waived by a lesser showing.  Generally, “most
rights, whether constitutional, statutory or common-law, may be waived by inaction or failure
to adhere to legitimate procedural requirements.”  State v. Rose, 345 Md. 238, 248, 691 A.2d
1314, 1319 (1997).  In the case of the statutory right to a citizen jury, there exist three levels
of screening to preserve that right.  Boyd, 341 Md. at 441, 671 A.2d at 38 (“Maryland courts
screen juror qualifications on at least three levels: a statutorily-required qualification form,
appearance before the jury judge or commissioner at the courthouse, and the trial judge’s
observance of each juror during the voir dire.”).  In the event that the court’s internally-
42As the Court of Special Appeals noted below, “[w]hile [Owens] may have assumed
that the venire panel had been pre-screened based on the jury questionnaire, it is easy to
anticipate that mistakes do occur, which is why a questionnaire alone is not the sole tool used
to select a jury.”  Owens v. State, 170 Md. App. 35, 73, 906 A.2d 989, 1010 (2006).  Over
120 years ago, we noted the same possibility of error on the part of those administering the
jury selection process on behalf of the court as reason for voir dire challenges in the first
instance.  Johns v. Hodges, 60 Md. 215, 221-22 (1883) (“The right of challenge itself is a
safeguard provided by law in contemplation of the contingency that the officers whose duty
it is to select only qualified persons have failed in the performance of that duty.  It is a means
specially provided by which a party to a suit may readily and effectually protect himself
against any oversight or neglect committed in the original selection.”).  In the present case,
the jury commissioner for Howard County readily acknowledged that his staff did not
confirm the veracity of the information contained on juror questionnaires and the orientation
session also failed to address citizenship as a qualification.  Under those circumstances, it is
not difficult to imagine how non-citizens such as Alade sometimes end up on venire panels.
30
administered means of automatically disqualifying prospective jurors has failed to eliminate
a disqualified juror,42 we have recognized the voir dire process as a proper procedural
occasion to verify juror qualifications.  Williams v. State, 394 Md. 98, 112, 904 A.2d 534,
542 (2006) (“[V]oir dire is the mechanism by which we give substance to the constitutional
guarantee to criminal defendants of a fair and impartial jury trial.”); see Jenkins v. State, 375
Md. 284, 331, 825 A.2d 1008, 1035 (2003); Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 9, 759 A.2d 819, 823
(2000) (citing Boyd, 341 Md. at 435, 671 A.2d at 35, Grogg v. State, 231 Md. 530, 532, 191
A.2d 435, 436 (1963), Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 280, 661 A.2d 1164, 1166 (1995), and
Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 670, 566 A.2d 111, 116 (1989)).   Thus, a defendant’s failure
to pursue the opportunity to question prospective jurors as to citizenship during voir dire
constitutes a waiver of the statutory means of protecting the right to a citizen jury.  See Hunt
v. State, 345 Md. 122, 144, 691 A.2d 1255, 1265-66 (1997) (construing Cts. & Jud. Proc. §
31
8-211) (holding that if a party fails to pose a challenge to a potential juror after voir dire, that
party “has lost the statutory remedy and must labor under constitutional or common law
principles.”).
The record in this case reveals that Owens did not propose any questions for the judge
to ask of the venire regarding the citizenship status of the potential jurors, including the non-
citizen, Alade.  Owens argues, however, that his request for such a voir dire question would
have been futile because our precedent in Boyd leaves it to the discretion of the trial court
whether actually to put the question to the venire.  In Boyd, the Court reviewed two
consolidated appeals raising the issue of whether it was an abuse of discretion for a trial
judge to refuse to ask the venire a voir dire question seeking to discover any potential jurors
with physical infirmities that may compromise their ability to serve.  341 Md. at 433, 671
A.2d at 34.  The defendants argued that under Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 633 A.2d 867
(1993), and Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627 (1958), it was
mandatory for the court to pose the question.  The Boyd Court distinguished Casey, which
concerned a voir dire question seeking to uncover bias, from the Boyd cases, which
concerned voir dire questions directed to the minimum statutory qualifications for jury
service.  In neither of the consolidated cases in Boyd was the physical impairment question
attributable to any specific bias linked to the armed robbery and second-degree murder
charges faced by the defendants.  341 Md. at 438, 671 A.2d at 36-37.  Further, the question
would not have uncovered an automatic cause for disqualification.  Boyd, 341 Md. at 438,
32
671 A.2d at 37.  Our predecessors in Boyd also distinguished Davis on the ground that it
concerned voir dire questions seeking to expose bias on the part of potential jurors rather
than their ability to meet minimum statutory qualifications.  Id.  Also, the bias question in
Davis would not have exposed grounds for immediate disqualification.  Boyd, 341 Md. at
439, 671 A.2d at 37.  Although Davis indicated that questions bearing on the satisfaction of
the minimum statutory qualifications fell generally into the category of mandatory questions,
the key inquiry was whether the given inquiry would be “reasonably likely to reveal cause
for disqualification.”  333 Md. at 35-36, 633 A.2d at 871.
Based on these distinctions, the Boyd Court opined that the defendants’ requested
question regarding physical infirmities was not mandatory because it “would not be
reasonably likely to lead to [discovery of] cause for disqualification of a juror.”  341 Md. at
440, 671 A.2d at 37.  First, as in Casey and Davis, a physical disability would not have
served as an automatic cause for disqualification.  Id.  Even if a disability were discovered,
accommodations are more likely to precede dismissal.  Id.  Second, Boyd stated that posing
questions already covered by the processes preceding voir dire would be “redundant and
unnecessary.”  341 Md. at 441, 671 A.2d at 38.  Thus, Boyd ostensibly stands for the
proposition that voir dire questions concerning the minimum statutory qualifications of a
potential juror are only mandatory should they reflect a reasonable likelihood of bias or
prejudice against the defendant.  It is this rationale that Owens invokes in his argument that
he did not waive his right to challenge a non-citizen juror.  Essentially, he complains that
43In fact, it is conceivable that, on the whole, more time is saved and the interests of
judicial economy advanced by spending a relatively few minutes asking rote questions rather
than risking the possibility of requiring a new trial by sparing those few minutes of additional
voir dire questions.
33
because Boyd leaves it entirely to the trial judge’s discretion whether to pose a citizenship
question in a case where citizenship is not a likely source of bias, his request of such a
question would have been futile.  We cannot agree entirely with this complaint.
The rule in Boyd that voir dire questions concerning minimum statutory qualifications
are not mandatory when sought was animated, in part, by a belief that such questions
duplicate needlessly the efforts of the pre-voir dire screening methods which focus on
statutory disqualifications.  That cases such as the present one occur demonstrate a
correctable weakness in this reasoning.  Because the pre-voir dire screening methods failed
to identify and excuse Alade, a non-citizen, it is evident that voir dire questions regarding
minimum statutory qualifications are not always “redundant and unnecessary.”43  In fact, our
cases ruminate that the pre-voir dire processes of screening out disqualified jurors are not
fail-safe.  See supra note 42.  We are persuaded, and so hold, that it is in the better interests
of justice to require trial judges to pose voir dire questions directed at exposing constitutional
and statutory disqualifications when requested by a party.  Accordingly, we overrule Boyd
to the extent that it conflicts with this holding.
Notwithstanding our limited overruling of Boyd, the result in this case is not affected.
Simply because it is not mandatory for a judge to pose a particular question does not make
34
it a prohibited question.  Had Owens sought, and the trial judge refused, a citizenship
question in the present case, the propriety of the denial would have been preserved for
appellate review as an abuse of discretion.  But because Owens did not suggest the question,
he may not complain reasonably that a non-citizen was empanelled on his jury.  Indeed, the
Circuit Court noted in its opinion denying Owens’s motion for a new trial that “[h]ad such
a question been requested, the court would in all likelihood have made the inquiry (as it did
sua sponte regarding the issue of pending jury trials) and Mr. Alade would have been
excused as a disqualified juror.”  Owens, 170 Md. App. at 59, 906 A.2d at 1002.  We agree
with the intermediate appellate court that there is no reason not to credit the Circuit Court on
this point.  Owens, 170 Md. App. at 77, 906 A.2d at 1012.
There exist several persuasive authorities supplying examples of waived objections
to potential jurors who otherwise would have been disqualified had a defendant proposed and
a judge asked a pertinent voir dire question.  In Kohl, the Supreme Court held that a
defendant’s failure to object to the non-citizen status of a juror as a disqualification, whether
done voluntarily, negligently, or unknowingly, was not grounds to upset the murder
conviction against the defendant.  160 U.S. at 302, 16 S. Ct. at 307.  In Hansel v. Collins, this
Court held that a defendant waived his objection to a West Virginia resident serving on the
jury that found him liable for trespass when he waited four months after the verdict to raise
his objection and could not show that the presence of the out-of-state resident prejudiced
him.  180 Md. 100, 103, 23 A.2d 1, 2-3 (1941).  The Court stated that the defendant’s
35
ignorance of the juror’s non-resident status was immaterial because he just as easily could
have inquired into the matter.  180 Md. at 104, 23 A.2d at 3.  In Johns v. Hodges, our
predecessors concluded that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a
new trial to a defendant who, after the case was decided against him, discovered that two
jurors empanelled to hear the matter were below the minimum statutory age for jury service.
60 Md. 215, 220 (1883).  The Johns Court reasoned that the defendant should not have
assumed that the statutory screening devices produced an entire jury of qualified persons, but
rather, he should have undertaken to protect his interests through his own inquiry.  60 Md.
at 222-23.
Maryland appellate cases also demonstrate that even when a voir dire question is
posed to the venire, false or withheld responses do not necessarily entitle the defendant to a
new trial.  See, e.g., Hunt, 345 Md. at 144-46, 691 A.2d at 1265-66 (citing United States v.
Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1992)); Leach v. State, 47 Md. App. 611, 618-19, 425
A.2d 234, 238-39 (1981) (refusing to strike a juror, who upon cross-examination at trial, was
discovered to be an old neighbor and acquaintance of a State’s witness when the trial judge
was satisfied that the juror had no bias); Burkett v. State, 21 Md. App. 438, 445, 319 A.2d
845, 849 (1974) (refusing to grant new trial on the ground that an unbiased juror
inadvertently failed to reveal that he was the father of a secretary in the State’s Attorney’s
Office, despite voir dire question asking jurors to reveal their relation to any prosecutor’s
office personnel).
44The Court emphasized that although the statutory challenge is no longer available
at this stage, a constitutionally-based challenge remains an option.  Hunt v. State, 345 Md.
(continued...)
36
Most instructive is Hunt v. State, where a prospective juror, Diana Void, was arrested
on a misdemeanor theft charge several days after returning her juror qualification form, on
which she stated (then-truthfully) that she had not been charged or convicted of a serious
crime.  345 Md. at 140-41, 691 A.2d at 1263-64.  When summonsed for jury service, Void
failed to respond affirmatively to questions regarding pending criminal charges during her
orientation and, again, during voir dire.  Hunt, 345 Md. at 141, 691 A.2d at 1264.
Subsequent to his conviction, during a second petition for post-conviction relief, the
defendant, Hunt, challenged Void’s presence on the jury that convicted him on the ground
that she was disqualified statutorily.  The Court disagreed with Hunt’s argument, concluding
that because Void had been empanelled, Hunt lost the opportunity to exercise the statutory
remedy of challenging jurors.  Hunt, 345 Md. at 145-46, 691 A.2d at 1266.
Owens argues that his situation is different than the scenario presented in Hunt
because his objection to an unqualified juror came much closer in time after the verdict.
Hunt and our other appellate decisions belie any validity in this point of distinction.
Although the objection raised in Hunt came during the defendant’s second petition for post-
conviction relief, the Court did not rely on length of delay in denying the objection.  Rather,
the Court specifically noted that the statutory right to challenge a juror expires at least as
early as when a juror is empanelled.44  Hunt, 345 Md. at 145-46, 691 A.2d at 1266.  This
44(...continued)
122, 145-46, 691 A.2d 1255, 1266 (1997).  
45In the end calculus, the primary concern in guaranteeing a defendant a jury trial is
that the trial be heard by a fair and impartial jury, untainted by bias or prejudice.  MD. CONST.
of 1867, D ECL. OF RTS, art. 21 (1867); Williams v. State, 394 Md. 98, 112, 904 A.2d 534, 542
(2006).  Should an unqualified juror be empanelled, courts are satisfied generally with the
verdict when the record establishes that the juror did not evade intentionally disqualification
and that his or her service was performed without bias.  See, e.g., Williams, 394 Md. at 112;
904 A.2d at 542; Leach v. State, 47 Md. App. 611, 618-19, 425 A.2d 234, 238-39 (1981);
Burkett v. State, 21 Md. App. 438, 445, 319 A.2d 845, 849 (1974).
37
principle also is illustrated in Leach, where the Court of Special Appeals upheld a trial
court’s decision not to strike a juror who was discovered during cross-examination at trial
to have been an acquaintance of a State’s witness.  47 Md. App. at 618-19, 425 A.2d at 238-
39.  Even in 19th century practice, the Court of Appeals noted that “[t]he usual method is by
challenge before the juror is sworn or the trial begins.”  Johns, 60 Md. at 221.
Hunt indicates that the reason for this narrow allowance of time for statutory
challenges to juror qualifications advances the “goal of finality in judicial decision-making.”
345 Md. at 144, 691 A.2d at 1266.  Owens mistakenly argues that because he raised his
objection to the non-citizen juror within the ten-day post-trial motion period, the concerns
of finality and judicial economy are not impacted.  A verdict was reached by, what appeared
to the trial judge to be, impartial jurors.45  After Alade’s non-citizen status was revealed, the
trial judge held a hearing on the matter and satisfied himself that there was “no showing that
Mr. Alade’s non-citizen status in any way or manner prejudiced the Defendant’s case, his
46The burden to demonstrate partiality rests with the challenging party, which, in this
case, is Owens.  Hunt, 345 Md. at 146, 691 A.2d at 1267 (citing Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27,
38, 633 A.2d 867, 873 (1993)).
47In fact, even if Owens possessed a constitutional or common law right to a jury
composed entirely of U.S. citizens, those same common law principles indicate that waiting
until this stage in the proceedings constitutes a waiver of his right to challenge a non-citizen
juror.  Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293, 300, 16 S. Ct. 304, 306, 40 L. Ed. 432 (1895);
DUNCOMBE, supra note 24, at 150; see also Moton v. State, 569 S.E.2d 264, 266-67 (Ga.
(continued...)
38
consideration of the evidence, or the jury’s deliberations.” 46
Related to the goal of judicial economy is the object of integrity of the process.  Our
cases highlight the necessity for foreclosing statutory challenges to jurors after voir dire in
the interests of preventing an abuse of those challenges.  In Hansel, our predecessors noted
the wisdom of the earlier Johns decision, admonishing courts not to allow new trials based
on challenges to juror qualifications after a verdict has been rendered, lest parties be allowed
a second bite at the apple whenever the litigation does not end in their favor.  180 Md. at 104,
23 A.2d at 3 (citing Johns, 60 Md. at 220); see also Johns, 60 Md. at 223.  This Court also
noted the potential for collusion between defendants and venal jurors to invalidate guilty
verdicts by subsequently revealing or conjuring some disqualifying trait in order to obtain a
new trial.  Young v. Lynch, 194 Md. 68, 73-74, 69 A.2d 787, 789 (1949) (citing Hollars v.
State, 125 Md. 367, 376-77, 93 A.2d 970, 974 (1915)).
Because Owens waited until after voir dire (indeed, after a verdict was reached) to
challenge Alade’s presence on the jury, he waived his statutory right to challenge an
unqualified juror.47  Simply because Boyd did not require the citizenship question to be a
47(...continued)
App. 2002).
48Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1493-94, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964).
39
mandatory one for the trial judge to pose to the venire does not excuse Owens of exercising
due diligence in requesting the question.  Had he done so, Owens’s request most likely would
have been granted and Alade would have been excused.  Even if the trial judge had refused
to pose the question, the issue would have been preserved for appellate review.  In either
instance, the result is far better than the waiver we find due to Owens’s lack of foresight in
at least proposing the question.  Accordingly, we find no abridgement of Owens’s right to
a trial by jury.
B. Suppression Challenge
Owens invokes the self-incrimination provision of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, as applicable to the states by incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment48
and construed by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602,
16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), for the proposition that his questioning by the Howard County
police detectives at the Hospital was illegal because it was custodial in nature and not
preceded by the proper warnings prescribed by Miranda.  Perhaps nothing is more
recognized in the realm of constitutional criminal procedure than the notion that once a
suspect is in “custody,” agents of law enforcement must advise the suspect of his Miranda
rights before engaging in “interrogation,” should the state wish to admit the resulting
statements against the suspect at trial.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612; accord
40
Fenner v. State, 381 Md. 1, 9, 846 A.2d 1020, 1024-25.  It is clear that the strictures of
Miranda apply only in a custodial setting.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441, 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1610-
11, 1612; Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1528, 128 L. Ed. 2d
293 (1994) (per curiam); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1293, 84 L.
Ed. 2d 222 (1985); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct. 711, 714, 50 L. Ed.
2d 714 (1977); accord Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 333, 893 A.2d 1018, 1043 (2006);
Fenner, 381 Md. at 9, 846 A.2d at 1025 (2004).  Thus, if Owens was not “in custody” at the
time he was questioned by the detectives, the absence of Miranda warnings is immaterial and
the Fifth Amendment presents no impediment to the admission of his inculpatory statements.
A significant body of law has developed around the questions of what constitutes
“custody” and “interrogation” for Fifth Amendment purposes.  The Miranda Court defined
“custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.”  384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612.  “Custody,” though typically associated with
formal arrest or incarceration, Allen v. State, 158 Md. App. 194, 229, 857 A.2d 101, 122
(2004), aff’d, 387 Md. 389, 875 A.2d 724 (2005), is not always so clearly delineated a
concept.  The Supreme Court declared in California v. Beheler that “the ultimate inquiry is
simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.”  463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L. Ed. 2d
1275 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S. Ct. at 714) (emphasis
41
added).  In fact, a person is considered “in custody” when “a reasonable person [would] have
felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.”  Thompson v.
Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S. Ct. 457, 465, 133 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1995); see also
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938
(2004); accord Rucker, 374 Md. at 209, 821 A.2d at 445; Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124,
141, 411 A.2d 415, 425 (1980).  “Interrogation” is no longer considered solely as direct
questioning by the police, a concept that prevailed when Miranda was newly-minted.  That
concept now “refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the
part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1690, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980)
(footnotes omitted); accord Drury v. State, 368 Md. 331, 335-36, 793 A.2d 567, 570 (2002).
The question of whether a suspect is “in custody” is determined objectively, to the
exclusion of the subjective intent of law enforcement, in light of the totality of circumstances
of the situation.  Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 667, 124 S. Ct. at 2151; Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323,
322, 114 S. Ct. at 1529; accord Whitfield, 287 Md. at 140, 411 A.2d at 425.  Among the
circumstances which should be considered in determining whether a “custodial interrogation”
took place are:
when and where it occurred, how long it lasted, how many
police were present, what the officers and the defendant said and
did, the presence of actual physical restraint on the defendant or
things equivalent to actual restraint such as drawn weapons or
42
a guard stationed at the door, and whether the defendant was
being questioned as a suspect or as a witness. Facts pertaining
to events before the interrogation are also relevant, especially
how the defendant got to the place of questioning whether he
came completely on his own, in response to a police request or
escorted by police officers. Finally, what happened after the
interrogation whether the defendant left freely, was detained or
arrested may assist the court in determining whether the
defendant, as a reasonable person, would have felt free to break
off the questioning.
Whitfield, 287 Md. at 141, 411 A.2d at 425 (quoting Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895
(Alaska 1979)).
The record here establishes that the first interrogation of Owens by the detectives took
place in the pediatric ward’s playroom where Detectives Kruhm and Shaffer encountered
Owens.  The playroom was a public space, apparently enclosed mostly in glass, and Owens
was not detained in the room in any way.  The two non-uniformed detectives were wearing
side-arms, but did not draw or display threateningly their weapons.  The questioning was
brief, lasting only 10 to 15 minutes, and involved subjects relating to their investigation, but
did not tend to imply that Owens was responsible for Kevonte’s death.  The encounter ended
when Owens left the room.  Under these circumstances, it is beyond cavil that the first
interrogation was not custodial in nature.  No force or compulsion kept Owens in the
playroom: there were only two officers; and, there is no evidence that either of them advised
Owens not to leave or positioned themselves to prevent or discourage such an attempt.  In
fact, the interview was terminated after less than a quarter of an hour because Owens left.
Clearly, Owens was not placed under formal arrest, restrained in his freedom of movement,
49We note that just because the hospital may not have been a familiar place for Owens,
it remains a public place akin to a sidewalk or park for purposes of Fifth Amendment
analysis.  In fact, “[t]he consensus of American case law is that the questioning of a suspect
who is confined in a hospital but who is not under arrest is not a custodial interrogation with
the contemplation of Miranda.”  Cummings v. State, 27 Md. App. 361, 369-70, 341 A.2d
294, 301 (1975).  A fortiori, Owens, who was not confined to the Hospital (evidenced by the
fact that he was found outside in the parking lot for the second interview), could not have
been in custody solely because of the place of his interrogation.
43
or made to feel that he was not at liberty to leave.
Though the second interrogation bears more characteristics of a custodial
interrogation, those qualities are sufficiently outweighed by those indicative of a non-
custodial encounter.  The detectives initiated the second contact by seeking out Owens, who
was now a suspect, in the Hospital parking lot and requested his car keys (whether to effect
a search or restrain his movement was likely not clear to Owens).  This request to talk was,
however, from all indications, not a compulsory order and Owens agreed to accompany the
detectives back inside.  Owens also agreed to the audiotaping of the interview.  Owens
argues that the unoccupied patient room, with the door closed, was so unfamiliar and the
questioning so accusatory that he must have been “in custody.”  This argument is
significantly compromised by the fact that the hospital room was still a public place49 from
which he was more than capable of extricating himself in the face of hard questioning, a feat
he accomplished after approximately 30 minutes when he evidently felt that the detectives
were being too confrontational.  Owens was not arrested that night.
Owens’s reliance on Bond v. State, 142 Md. App. 219, 788 A.2d 705 (2002), is
44
inapposite.  Bond involved a situation where three police officers confronted a half-undressed
suspect in his bedroom around midnight and, while blocking the only exit, accused him of
being involved in a hit-and-run accident.  142 Md. App. at 223-24, 788 A.2d at 707-08.  The
Court of Special Appeals held that the unexpected nature of the sudden bedroom
confrontation at such a late hour would have curtailed a reasonable person’s ability to ask the
officers to leave.  Bond, 142 Md. App. at 233-34, 788 A.2d at 713.  There was no unexpected
late-night home invasion in the present case.  Rather, the two detectives approached Owens
in the Hospital parking lot and acquired his consent for more questioning.  We are persuaded
that Owens must not have felt unable to end the encounter because, unlike in Bond, he did
just that.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID
BY APPELLEE.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 103
September Term, 2006
MARCUS DANNON OWENS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M . 
(Retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J., which
Cathell, J., joins.
Filed:   June 5, 2007
1On this point, I am not persuaded by the majority’s analysis.  I incline to the view
advanced by and forcefully advocated by the petitioner.  I do not address this issue
specifically, however, believing that the petitioner is entitled to reversal even if the right is
only statutory.   I note, however, that it is well settled that a jury consists of one’s peers and
that, as the Constitution required, see Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the
General Assembly, by prescribing the qualifications for jury service, made clear that, for that
purpose, a defendant’s peers are his or her fellow citizens.   Thus, while it may be true that
neither Constitution explicitly states that only citizens may serve on juries, the implementing
legislation, which necessarily is complementary and explanatory, does.   Bear in mind that
the legislature may not legislate in derogation of the Constitution.   See Lamone v. Capozzi,
396 Md. 53, 73, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006), citing Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 546,
873 A.2d 1122, 1140; Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037
(1979). 
Although it was dismissed summarily as having no application to this case, ___ Md.
___, ___, ___ A. 2d ___, ___ (2007) [slip op. at 14], I believe Article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights to be quite relevant and, indeed, that its application is dispositive with
respect to the composition of an “impartial jury,” as consisting only of citizens.   In this view,
I am persuaded by Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974).   In that case, a non-
citizen challenged [his/her] exclusion from jury service.  In rejecting that challenge, the court
enunciated principles that are just as, if not particularly, applicable to this case.   The Perkins
Court stated:
“This Court considers that grand and petit jurors in both state and federal
courts are ‘persons holding ... important nonelective ... judicial positions’, that
they participate directly in the execution of the laws and ‘perform functions
that go to the heart of representative government.’ Blackstone [3 Blackstone
The majority holds that the empaneling, in a criminal case, of a jury, which includes
a non-citizen, does not compromise the criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial under either
the United States or the Maryland Constitution, and, in any event, because the right is only
statutory, not constitutional, by failing to inquire as to the citizenship status of the venire, the
defendant waived the right to complain about the service of a non-citizen on the jury.  I do
not agree with either premise.  On the contrary, I believe that Marcus Dannon Owens
(“Owens”), the petitioner, did, and does now, have the constitutional right, federal and State,
to a trial by jury composed only of citizens of the United States.1   I am also of the
Commentaries, Sec. 380] considered juries as ‘the best investigators of truth,
and the surest guardians of public justice.’ The institution of jury trial, he said,
‘preserves in the hands of the people that share which they ought to have in the
administration of public justice, and prevents the encroachments of the more
powerful and wealthy citizens.’ In No. 83 of The Federalist [at 562 (J. Cooke
Ed. 1961) (Hamilton)], Alexander Hamilton, after referring to the ‘high
estimation’ in which he held the institution of jury trial, concluded that ‘it
would be altogether superfluous to examine to what extent it deserves to be
esteemed useful or essential in a representative republic, or how much more
merit it may be entitled to as a defense against the oppressions of an hereditary
monarch, than as a barrier to the tyranny of popular magistrates in a popular
government. Discussions of this kind would be more curious than beneficial,
as all are satisfied of the utility of the institution, and of its friendly aspect to
liberty.’
370 F. Supp. at 137. The Court went on to state:
“In maintaining the jury system as ‘the very palladium of free government’ the
states logically can anticipate that native-born citizens would be conversant
with the social and political institutions of our society, the customs of the
locality, the nuances of local tradition and language.  Likewise naturalized
citizens, who have passed through the citizenship classes sponsored by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, have demonstrated a basic
understanding of our form of government, history and traditions. There is no
corresponding basis for assuming that resident aliens, who owe allegiance not
to any state or to the federal government, but are subjects of a foreign power,
have so assimilated our societal and political mores that an equal reliance
could be placed on their performing as well as citizens the duties of jurors in
our judicial system.
“The nature or the operation of juries makes it apparent that persons
unfit for jury service can work a great deal of harm, through inability or
malice, to efficiency and fairness.  Jury deliberations are perhaps the most
secret form of decision-making in the nation; the means of persuasion used by
jurors on each other are never revealed. A single juror who failed to
understand the import of the evidence being presented or who lacked any
concern for the fairness of the outcome could severely obstruct or distort the
course of justice.  A single persuasive and unprincipled juror could even direct
the course of justice into channels deliberately chosen for their deleterious
effect on this country.  We conclude, therefore, that the state has a compelling
interest in the restriction of jury service to those who will be loyal to,
2
interested in, and familiar with, the customs of this country.”
Id. at 138.  The court recognized, quite correctly, that “service on juries is the prime example
of an instance ‘where citizenship bears some rational relationship to the special demands of
the particular position.’”  Id., quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 339 F. Supp. 906, 911 (D.C.N.Y.
1971) (Lumbard, J. concurring); see Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320, 90 S. Ct. 518,
24 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1970); Jugiro v. Brush, 140 U.S. 291, 11 S. Ct. 770, 35 L. Ed. 510 (1891);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664 (1879) (recognizing the special
relationship between citizenship and jury service).
Because I believe the right to an impartial jury requires the jury to consist of citizens
and that right is constitutionally given, the standard for waiver is significantly different, it
must be done “knowingly and voluntarily,” a proposition with which the majority does not
disagree.   ___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 12, 29 n.41].   In this case, the record
is clear, Owens was not aware that Mr. Alade was not a citizen until after his trial and, thus,
he could not have waived his right to an impartial jury trial knowingly and voluntarily.
3
view that,  even if the right to an all citizen jury is only statutory, Owens did not waive the
right.   To save this conviction, the majority holding, in that regard, imposes on criminal
defendants a burden that is both unnecessary and unreasonable and, for good measure,
misapplies our precedents.   Therefore, I dissent.
I.
Whatever may be the case with respect to the constitutional right to jury trial, it is
quite clear that Mr. Alade, a non-citizen, did not meet Maryland’s statutory requirements for
juror qualification. Maryland Code (1973, Repl. Vol. 2002) § 8-207 (b) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJP") provides that, in order to serve on a jury, one must be,
inter alia, an adult citizen of this State.  As pertinent, it provides:
“(b) Grounds for disqualifications. - A person is qualified to serve as a juror
unless he: 
“(1) Is not constitutionally qualified to vote in the county where
2It is perfectly clear that former Maryland Code (1973, Repl. Vol. 2002) § 8-207 (b)
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article required a prospective juror to be a citizen of
the United States, for in order to vote in any county of this State, one must be, pursuant to
Maryland Code (2003) § 3-102 (a) (l) of the Election Law Article, a United States citizen.
The current iteration of § 8-207 (b), codified at Maryland Code (1973, Repl. Vol. 2006) §
8-103 (a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, is even clearer, using express
language to that effect:
“(a) Requirements. – Notwithstanding § 8-102 of this subtitle, an individual
qualifies for jury service for a county only if the individual:
“(1) Is an adult as of the day selected as a prospective juror;
“(2) Is a citizen of the United States; and
“(3) Resides in the county as of the day sworn as a juror.”
(Emphasis added).
3See CJP § 8-207 (b), which provided:
“(b) Grounds for disqualification. – A person is qualified to serve as a juror
unless he:
“(1) Is not constitutionally qualified to vote in the county where
the court convenes;
“(2) Is unable to read, write, or understand the English language
with a degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily
the juror qualification form;
“(3) Is unable to speak the English language or comprehend
spoken English;
“(4) Is incapable, by reason of physical or mental infirmity, of
rendering satisfactory jury service; any person claiming such a
disqualification may be required to submit a doctor’s certificate
as to the nature of the infirmity;
“(5) Has a charge pending against him for a crime punishable by a fine of more
than $500, or by imprisonment for more than six months, or both, or has been
convicted of such a crime and has received a sentence of a fine of more than
$500, or of imprisonment for more than six months, or both, and has not been
pardoned;
“(6) Has a charge pending against him for, or has been
4
the court convenes;
*     *     *     *
“(8) Is under 18 years of age[.]2 
Section 8-207 also provides for limited instances of disqualification,3 specifically, where
convicted of, an offense punishable under the provision of §
8-401 (c) of this title.”
“(7) Is a party in a civil suit, except for those civil actions in which a party is
not entitled to a jury trial, pending in the court in which he is called to serve;
“(8) Is under the age of 18 years of age;
“(9) Fails to meet any other objective test prescribed by the Court of Appeals.
This section now is codified at CPJ § 8-103 (b), see Acts of 2006, ch. 372, and provides:
“Disqualifying factors
“(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section and subject to the federal
Americans with Disabilities Act, an individual is not qualified for jury service
if the individual:
“(1) Cannot comprehend spoken English or speak English;
“(2) Cannot comprehend written English, read English, or write
English proficiently enough to complete a juror qualification
form satisfactorily;
“(3) Has a disability that, as documented by a health care
provider's certification, prevents the individual from providing
satisfactory jury service;
“(4) Has been convicted, in a federal or State court of record, of
a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding 6 months and
received a sentence of imprisonment for more than 6 months; or
“(5) Has a charge pending, in a federal or State court of record,
for a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding 6 months.”
4Perhaps it is because Mr. Alade, on his own, advised the jury commissioner of his
alien status that Mr. Alade’s assertion that he did not intentionally misrepresent his status is
not being challenged.   What is troubling, of course, is the lack of verification or follow-up
5
there is a language problem, an inability to speak, understand and/or write the English
language, a documented disability which prevents satisfactory jury service and there is a
disqualifying or pending disqualifying conviction.
Owens did not learn that one of the jurors who sat on his case, Mr. Alade, was a non-
citizen until after he had been convicted.  Indeed, if Mr. Alade had not informed the jury
commissioner to the contrary, 4 his citizenship status never would have become an issue; it
by the jury commissioner’s office.
5Maryland Code (2001) § 6-105 of the Criminal Procedure Article provides, as
relevant:
“(a) Timing of hearing on motion. – Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, a court in which a motion for new trial in a criminal case is pending shall hear
the motion:
“(1)within 10 days after the motion is filed; or
“(2) if an agreed statement of the evidence or a statement of the evidence
certified by the trial judge is filed, within 10 days after the statement is filed.”
6
undoubtedly would have remained undiscovered and, thus, unknown.  That is not at all
surprising, or should be: the majority points out that “[the jury commissioner’s office] does
not review for accuracy the responses provided by juror candidates unless some information
is missing,” ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A. 2d ___, ___ (2007) [slip op. at 7], and, presumably
because he had filled out the juror qualification form adequately, that office clearly did not
verify Mr. Alade’s citizenship in this case.   As it was required to do, pursuant to Maryland
Code (2001) § 6-105 of the Criminal Procedure Article,5 the Circuit Court held a hearing to
determine whether the non-disclosure, and/or the juror’s status, influenced the outcome of
the trial, thus, entitling Owens to a new trial.  The court found that neither denied Owens a
fair trial.  It, therefore, rejected Owens’ constitutional and statutory arguments.  The court
viewed Mr. Alade’s non-disclosure and consequent service on the jury to be purely a
statutory matter, cognizable on voir dire.  Because Owens did not pose a question, during
voir dire, inquiring into the citizenship status of the venire, to include Mr. Alade, the court
concluded that he had waived his objection to Mr. Alade’s service on the jury,
6The first level occurs when the juror qualification form is executed and returned and
it is under the supervision of the jury commissioner’s office, overseen by the jury judge.   The
second level occurs when the potential juror comes to court; he or she then is seen by, and
may be interviewed by, the jury commissioner or the jury judge.  At this stage, “upon the
juror’s appearance at the court,” as Boyd v. State, 341 Md. 431, 444, 671 A.2d 33, 39 (1996),
makes clear, “the jury judge or commissioner [is authorized] to question the potential juror
further on the information contained in the questionnaire.”  The third level occurs in the
courtroom during jury selection, when, in the superintendence of the process, the trial judge
has the opportunity to observe the venire.  The main purpose of the juror qualification
questionnaire is the formation of a jury pool.  Necessarily, therefore, the object of the inquiry
largely relates to whether, at the threshold, the potential juror meets the minimum
7
notwithstanding his non-citizenship and the fact that, had that fact been known, he would
have been required to have been struck for cause.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed.
 Like the trial court, it believed that voir dire, rather than post-judgment, was the proper time
for Owens to have challenged unqualified jurors, and that his failure to inquire of the panel
as to the citizenship of its members at that time is equivalent to a waiver of the challenge. 
Owens v. State, 170 Md. App. 35, 71-73, 906 A. 2d 989, 1009-10 (2006).  The majority
concurs in that rationale.   ___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 30].
II.
How the majority reaches the result it does is quite interesting and also most
instructive.   It acknowledges the three levels of screening that this Court has recognized
potential jurors are subjected to ensure that they are minimally qualified to serve and, further,
that each level of screening is performed by a different actor. ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at
___ [slip op. at 29-30], citing and quoting Boyd v. State, 341 Md. 431, 441, 671 A.2d 33, 38
(1996).6  Viewing those efforts as not much more than preliminary, certainly not conclusive,
qualifications of a juror.  It is still at issue, although, perhaps not so much as at the
questionnaire stage, at the second screening, where deferrals or excuses from service take on
a greater importance.  As we shall see, infra, the jury pool having been set and two
screenings having already occurred, the focus at the third screening is on empaneling a fair
and impartial jury, not determining whether the venire is properly constituted.   At that stage,
it is assumed to be, and reasonably so. 
 
8
with respect to juror qualifications, the majority perceives the voir dire procedure, which it
characterizes as “a proper procedural screening occasion to verify juror qualifications,” as
the fall back position, “[i]n the event that the court’s internally-administered means of
automatically disqualifying prospective jurors has failed to eliminate a disqualified juror.”
 Id. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 30].   For that proposition, it relies on Williams v.
State, 394 Md. 98, 112, 904 A.2d 534, 542 (2006); Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 331, 825
A.2d 1008, 1035 (2003) and Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 9, 759 A.2d 819, 823 (2000), in turn
citing Boyd, 341 Md. at 435, 671 A.2d at 35, Grogg v. State, 231 Md. 530, 532, 191 A.2d
435, 436 (1963), Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 280, 661 A.2d 1164, 1166 (1995), and Bedford
v. State, 317 Md. 659, 670, 566 A.2d 111, 116 (1989).  It is from this premise that the
majority asserts “a defendant’s failure to pursue the opportunity to question prospective
jurors as to citizenship during voir dire constitutes a waiver of the statutory means of
protecting the right to a citizen jury.”   Id. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 30].
The implications of the pre-screening process - that it is monitored by the jury
commissioner’s office, an arm of the court, that a question on the juror qualification
7 In Johns v. Hodges, 60 Md. 215, 221-22 (1883), our predecessors reasoned:
“The right of challenge itself is a safeguard provided by law in contemplation
of the contingency that the officers whose duty it is to select only qualified
persons have failed in the performance of that duty.  It is a means specially
provided by which a party to a suit may readily and effectually protect himself
against any oversight or neglect committed in the original selection.”
That reasoning is the exact opposite of that employed by this Court in Boyd.  Rather than
applaud an inquiry aimed at checking the adequacy with which the jury commissioner or
comparable official performed, we decried and discouraged the “redundancy.” 341 Md. at
438, 671 A.2d at 37 (indicating that the inquiry in that case, involving physical infirmity, one
of the enumerated minimum qualifications, was “to be conducted at several earlier points in
the juror selection process, rendering the requested questions unnecessary on voir dire.”).
 
9
questionnaire specifically asked the citizenship question and that it was in this case answered
albeit, and perhaps inadvertently, incorrectly - and the fact that voir dire inquiries into juror
qualifications are not mandatory questions, see Boyd, 341 Md. at 446-47, 671 A. 2d at 40-41,
are not lost on the majority.   Its response to the former is facile and predictable: “‘[w]hile
[Owens] may have assumed that the venire panel had been pre-screened based on the jury
questionnaire, it is easy to anticipate that mistakes do occur, which is why a questionnaire
alone is not the sole tool used to select a jury.”’ Id. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 30
n. 42], quoting  Owens v. State, 170 Md. App. at 73, 906 A.2d at 1010.  It buttresses its logic
by citing a case, decided 113 years before Boyd and whose rationale is inconsistent with
Boyd’s holding and rationale.  Johns v. Hodges, 60 Md. 215, 221-22 (1883)7 
As to the latter, the majority confesses partial error, and, thus, overrules that portion
of Boyd that made voir dire questions concerning minimum statutory qualifications for jurors
discretionary, rather than mandatory.   It pronounces itself satisfied “that it is in the better
10
interests of justice to require trial judges to pose voir dire questions directed at exposing
constitutional and statutory disqualifications when requested by a party.” ___ Md. at ___, ___
A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 33].  Its explanation for why that is necessary is classic
bootstrapping:
“The rule in Boyd that voir dire questions concerning minimum statutory
qualifications are not mandatory when sought was animated, in part, by a
belief that such questions duplicate needlessly the efforts of the pre-voir dire
screening methods which focus on statutory disqualifications.  That cases such
as the present one occur demonstrate a correctable weakness in this reasoning.
Because the pre-voir dire screening methods failed to identify and excuse
Alade, a non-citizen, it is evident that voir dire questions regarding minimum
statutory qualifications are not always ‘redundant and unnecessary.’  In fact,
our cases ruminate that the pre-voir dire processes of screening out
disqualified jurors are not fail-safe. . . .”
Id. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 33] (footnote and citation omitted).   In support of the
latter proposition, the majority again turns to Johns v. Hodge.   And it directs our attention
to the concession by the jury commissioner for Howard County, “that his staff did not
confirm the veracity of the information contained on juror questionnaires and the orientation
session also failed to address citizenship as a qualification.”  Id. at ___ n. 42, ___ A. 2d at
___ n. 42 [slip op. at 30 n. 42].
 The partial overruling of Boyd is prospective, of course, and does not, therefore,
serve to make the question in this case mandatory.  Nevertheless, presumably because, in the
majority’s view, the defendant could, and probably should, have anticipated that there could
be a failure of the screening process, thus allowing a non-citizen to slip through the cracks,
the majority faults Owens for relying on the screening procedures and not asking the court
8Self-servingly, the trial court indicated that, had Owens proposed a “citizenship”
question, the court would in all likelihood have asked it, and Mr. Alade would have been
excused.  The majority accepts that speculation.  That is all that is, speculation.  And
speculation is much too tenuous support for the denial of so important a right.  There is,
moreover, not even a guarantee that Mr. Alade would have responded to the question.  After
all, he had once, already, inadvertently failed to respond correctly to a rather straight-forward
and unambiguous question. 
It is curious that the majority believes that the respondent would have been helped by
proposing the citizenship question to be put to the venire.   That presupposes that the
information now known either should have been known then or would become known during
the voir dire process.  Otherwise, because the exercise of discretion is judged on the basis of
information known, and the facts and circumstances existing, when the discretion is
exercised, the later discovery of the lack of citizenship on the part of Mr. Alade would not
inform the decision on review.  As the majority has correctly pointed out, that a juror
provides false information does not guarantee relief.  See ___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___
[slip op. at 35], citing Hunt v. State, 345 Md. 122, 144-46, 691 A.2d 1255, 1265-66 (1997);
Leach v. State, 47 Md. App. 611, 618-19, 425 A.2d 234, 238-39 (1981) (affirming the refusal
to strike a juror, who upon cross-examination at trial, was discovered to be an old neighbor
and acquaintance of a State’s witness when the trial judge was satisfied that the juror had no
bias and Burkett v. State, 21 Md. App. 438, 445, 319 A.2d 845, 849 (1974) (failure to reveal
relationship to prosecutor).  The interest of justice could and probably would suffice as a
basis for relief, I would have thought, but it is an avenue available in this case already.
11
to again ask the venire a question to which everyone of them already had responded, and
consistently so with service on the jury.  To it, because the trial court’s refusal to ask the
question could have been reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Owens may only benefit from
the jury deficiency if he asked the trial court to inquire of the venire concerning an issue as
to which he had no basis  for inquiring.8    
At the outset, the voir dire process is not a back-up to the juror qualification process;
its office is not to “verify juror qualifications.”  None of the cases cited for this proposition
support it.   To be sure, in Williams, 394 Md. at 112, 904 A.2d at 542, we said that “[V]oir
12
dire is the mechanism by which we give substance to the constitutional guarantee to criminal
defendants of a fair and impartial jury trial,” which, we made clear, was accomplished by
“exclud[ing] from the venire potential jurors for whom there exists cause for disqualification,
so the jury that remains is capable of deciding the matter before it based solely on the facts
presented, and uninfluenced by extraneous considerations.”  Id. at 107, 904 A. 2d at 539,
citing Hill, 339 Md. at 279, 661 A.2d at 1166, in which we stated that the voir dire procedure
is undergirded by the “single, primary, and overriding principle or purpose:  ‘to ascertain “the
existence of cause for disqualification.”’” Quoting McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 58, 146 A.2d
194, 196 (1959), in turn quoting Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 140, 88 A.2d 556, 559 (1952).
See Jenkins, 375 Md. at 331, 825 A.2d at 1035-36 (“[O]ne of the ways to protect a
defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury is to expose the existence of factors which
could cause a juror to be biased or prejudiced through the process of voir dire examination”);
 Dingle, 361 Md. at 9, 759 A.2d at 823 (stating that voir dire is the process by which
prospective jurors are examined to determine whether cause for disqualification exists);
Boyd, 341 Md. at 435, 671 A.2d at 35 (same).   
In Boyd, we explained the nature of the disqualification to which we had reference:
“In virtually all our previous cases . . ., the proposed questions concerning
specific cause for disqualification were related to the biases, such as racial or
religious interests or prejudices, of the prospective jurors.   As a result, in
discussing what type of questions must be asked on voir dire, we have defined
the proper focus of the voir dire examination to be only “the venireperson's
state of mind and the existence of bias, prejudice, or preconception, i.e., ‘a
mental state that gives rise to cause for disqualification. . . .’ ”  Hill, 339 Md.
at 280, 661 A.2d at 1167, citing Davis, 333 Md. [27,] 37, 633 A.2d [867,] 872
13
[(1993)].  Although we did make a general statement in Davis that the
minimum statutory qualifications for jurors would be included in the
mandatory scope of voir dire, that case pertained solely to possible biases the
venirepersons might have had in favor of law enforcement personnel, and our
analysis and application of the rules of voir dire involved primarily the search
for bias.”
341 Md. at 436-37, 671 A.2d at 36.  Thus, Boyd and all of the cases the majority cites, with
the exception of the over-broad statement in Davis v. State, addressed a process  developed
to ensure juror impartiality, not to verify juror qualification.
This is consistent with the elaborate system for vetting potential jurors that the Court
identified and described in Part IV of the Boyd decision.  341 Md. at 441-45, 671 A.2d at 38-
40. That system, whose origin is a statutory scheme of some sophistication, is implemented
by Rules of this Court in which this Court plays a significant role.  The Rule requires each
circuit court to develop a jury plan, which must be approved by the Court of Appeals.  The
plan prescribes the procedures for compiling a list of potential jurors meeting the minimum
statutory qualifications and for  processing them.  It assigns responsibility for the
superintendence of the process to court personnel, including the bench or jury judge, and it
contemplates that such personnel will gather the necessary information and do what is
required to amass a venire, to develop a pool from which impartial juries may be selected.
That system, I submit, contemplates that the litigants will rely on the results of the process.
It simply is inconceivable that the majority’s view of the jury plans and the very important
tasks assigned to court personnel in order to develop a venire is correct.  That certainly is not
how this Court viewed such systems in Boyd.   
9That the jury commission office did not verify Mr. Alade’s citizenship or challenge
his assertion that he was a citizen is not a basis for suggesting that Owens should have known
14
There, we construed the jury selection subtitle as being “concerned with the removal
of unnecessary screening barriers,” so that mandatory voir dire of prospective jurors about
matters (in that case, their physical limitations) already thoroughly covered earlier in the
selection process “imposes an unnecessary screening barrier.  Indeed, further questioning
may embarrass or intrude upon the privacy of a prospective juror.”  Boyd, 341 Md. at 446,
671 A.2d at 40 (emphasis in original).  That is especially the case, we added, “when an
affirmative answer does not by any means denote likely disqualification[.]” Id.  We also said:
“The petitioners cannot specify a single reason why further questioning
specifically on physical limitations is necessary.  We acknowledge that a
question on voir dire about physical limitations of jurors and addressed to all
venirepersons might occasionally result in disqualification of a juror;  but so
might literally any other line of questioning.  Defendants have not documented
instances where the juror selection process failed completely to screen out
physically incapable jurors, who would have been identified and excused had
the question been asked on voir dire.  In short, unless the judge has made some
observations regarding possible physical problems, such questioning can
become merely a general attempt to ‘fish’ about for more information than is
necessary about prospective jurors.  Certainly it is not reasonably likely to lead
to cause for disqualification.”
Id., 671 A.2d at 40-41.   These observations apply with at least equal force to the case sub
judice, with the exception of the likelihood of disqualification.  Owens had no reason to
suspect that Mr. Alade was not a citizen and neither did anyone else.  The trial judge, so far
as the record reflects, had not made any observations concerning possible citizenship
problems and certainly the pre-screening process had revealed none.9  Under these
to inquire.  Just the opposite, the responsibility for developing the jury pool, which
necessarily requires the screening of the potential jurors for eligibility, is placed on the jury
commission office, not the defendant.  This opinion shifts that responsibility and it does so
unreasonably and unnecessarily.
15
circumstances, there was no basis to ask the question, the screening already having been
done, and there simply is no basis for believing that had it been proposed, it would have been
met with anything but a refusal, in the absence of the proffer of some basis for doing so. 
There is also in this case no showing of “documented instances” where the juror
selection process has failed completely to screen out non-citizens, just this case.  That is not
enough, I submit, not by a long shot.  Nothing is perfect.  There simply is no completely fail-
safe system, no matter what it is intended to accomplish.  Because this is so, one always can
anticipate and expect mistakes.  But this fact does not mean that the system is broken.  It is
not a reason to deny to a party the right to rely on the results of the process or to change the
responsibility for inquiring, in hopes of discovering the pertinent information.  It is not a
basis for holding a party to a different standard or changing the jurisprudence.
 Maryland is, and has prided itself on being, a limited voir dire State. See Curtin v.
State, 393 Md. 593, 602, 903 A.2d 922, 928 (2006); Landon v. Zorn, 389 Md. 206, 216, 884
A.2d 142, 147 (2005);  State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202, 216-17, 798 A.2d 566, 574-75 (2002);
Davis, 333 Md. at 34, 40-43, 633 A.2d at 870, 873-75.  There are, at present, only a few
mandatory inquiries.  Dingle, 361 Md. at 11 n. 8, 759 A.2d at 824 n. 8, listed those this Court
has identified:  “racial, ethnic and cultural bias,” Hernandez v. State, 357 Md. 204, 232, 742
16
A.2d 952, 967 (1999); Hill, 339 Md. at 285, 661 A.2d at 1169; Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1,
15, 595 A.2d 448, 455 (1991), religious bias, Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 217 Md.
595, 606-07, 143 A.2d 627, 632 (1958), predisposition as to the use of circumstantial
evidence in capital cases, Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 564, 45 A.2d 340, 343-44 (1946),
and placement of undue weight on police officer credibility, see Langley v. State, 281 Md.
337, 349, 378 A.2d 1338, 1344 (1977).  To these, we may add the inquiries approved in
Thomas, 369 Md. at 214, 798 A.2d at 573 (bias due to the nature of the narcotics crime with
which the defendant is charged) and Sweet v. State, 371 Md. 1, 9-10, 806 A.2d 265, 271
(2002) (applying Thomas to sexual abuse related crimes).   All of these categories involve
“potential biases or predispositions that prospective jurors may hold which, if present, would
hinder their ability to objectively resolve the matter before them.”  Davis, 333 Md. at 36, 633
A.2d at 872.  Ironically, this case expands those categories to each and every qualification
category there is.  Questions proposed as to any of them, whether there is basis for them or
not, will have to be asked; there simply is no basis for doing otherwise.  The jury
commissioner is just as likely to make mistakes as to any one of them as he or she has done
with regard to citizenship.  Moreover, an attorney representing a defendant will be
constrained to ask each of the questions for fear of later post-conviction - the failure to ask
and there subsequently turns up information showing a juror was disqualified for failing to
meet one of them would be incompetency of counsel, as the defendant’s right to appeal
would have been lost.  This hardly seems to be productive of judicial economy.  Just the
17
opposite.
Judge Cathell joins in the views herein expressed.