Case Title: Neff v. Poboisk

Citation: 161 N.W.2d 823

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1968-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
161 N.W.2d 823 (1968) Mollie NEFF, Respondent, v. Harry POBOISK, individually, and as executor, and as special administrator of the Estate of Ben Poboisk, Appellant. No. 40935. Supreme Court of Minnesota. October 4, 1968. *824 Stacker, Silverstein, Burke & Radsom, St. Paul, for appellant. Ruttenberg, Orren, Griswold & Cohen, St. Paul, for respondent. Heard before KNUTSON, C. J., and NELSON, MURPHY, OTIS, and ROGOSHESKE, JJ. OTIS, Justice. This is an action by a sister against a brother seeking to enforce the terms of mutual wills executed by their parents. The matter was tried without a jury. The court found that the wills constituted an irrevocable contract enforcible in equity. This appeal is from the judgment. The only issue is whether there was clear, positive, and convincing evidence to support the court's findings. We hold that there was not. On August 24, 1961, Ben and Pauline Poboisk executed identical wills drafted in their presence by the same attorney. Each left the other all of his or her property with the provision that the estate of the survivor would be distributed as follows: To their son, Harry Poboisk, Lots 5, 6, and 7, Block 4, Van Doren's Addition to St. Paul; and to their daughter, Mollie Neff, Lots 6, 7, and 8, Block 1, Milton's Addition to St. Paul. Pauline Poboisk died on January 16, 1965, and on April 27, 1965, Ben Poboisk executed a new will, leaving his son, Harry, the three lots in the Milton Addition as well as the three lots in the Van Doren Addition. To his daughter, Mollie Neff, he left his homestead. Ben Poboisk died on November 25, 1965. Mrs. Neff has brought these proceedings to recover title to Lots 6, 7, and 8, Block 1, Milton's Addition. Various relatives testified concerning the intention which the parents expressed to them in numerous family discussions. It is clear that both parents repeatedly stated their purpose to divide their estate equally between their children. They wanted peace in the family. Plaintiff argues that the court's finding that the elder Poboisks intended to enter a binding contract in executing mutual wills is supported by the fact the wills themselves were identical and reciprocal, were executed at the same time before the same witnesses, and were prepared by the same *825 attorney. Nevertheless, the attorney who prepared the wills and supervised their execution did not insert in the wills a recitation that they would have the effect of a binding agreement. He testified as follows: In holding that the mutual wills of the elder Poboisks constituted a binding contract between them, the trial court relied on Mosloski v. Gamble, 191 Minn. 170, 253 N.W. 378,[1] where we approved the following definition of a mutual will (191 Minn. 171, 253 N.W. 379): We went on to say that the fact two wills are made concurrently does not necessarily establish them as mutual wills, but their mutuality may be shown by surrounding circumstances and parol evidence. We concluded (191 Minn. 175, 253 N.W. 381): Mosloski is distinguishable on two grounds. First, and decisively, the attorney who drafted the wills in that case told the testator and testatrix that the wills would "stand like a contract." Equally significant was the fact that the son who claimed to be a beneficiary of the mutual wills was promised by his father that he would have the property in question by will or descent, and the son farmed and developed the land in reliance on that promise. Mosloski was a case where, during the lifetime of the parents, each son was allocated a tract of 160 acres which each occupied and treated as his own. As we view the case before us, the testimony falls far short of proving by evidence which is clear, positive, and convincing a contract between the elder Poboisks. Jannetta v. Jannetta, 205 Minn. 266, 269, 285 N.W. 619, 621. At most, we find two elderly parents preoccupied with preserving peace in the family by treating their children equally. The fact that the parents executed identical wills has little significance. Indeed, it is the usual manner in which parents plan the disposition of their estates. Diez v. Rosicky, 145 Neb. 242, 245, 16 N.W.2d 155, 157. We subscribe to the view that execution of identical wills gives rise to no presumption that a binding contract was intended. Ridders v. Ridders, 156 Or. 165, 65 P.2d 1424; Frese v. Meyer, 392 Ill. 59, 63 N.E.2d 768.[3] A leading case cited by plaintiff is Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 198 N.W. 763, 33 A.L.R. 733. The Wisconsin court *826 there held (183 Wis. 608, 198 N.W. 766, 33 A.L.R. 738): The Doyle case subsequently lost much of its vitality by a holding of the Wisconsin court in Re Estate of Hoeppner, 32 Wis.2d 339, 145 N.W.2d 754. There the court recognized that the Doyle decision represented a minority position but stated (32 Wis.2d 344, 145 N.W.2d 757): Our reluctance to find mutually binding wills in the absence of unequivocal evidence of intention is well articulated by Mr. Justice Gordon in his concurring opinion (32 Wis.2d 349, 145 N.W.2d 760): We share the misgivings thus expressed where compelling proof of intention is absent. A wiser rule is to presume that a husband and wife intend flexibility in the disposition of the survivor's estate. It is human experience that the "dead hand" of a long-departed testator often creates more mischief than it prevents. Since, as Judge Gordon suggests, the circumstances of children and grandchildren may fluctuate greatly in the course of time, the law should be slow to embalm a disposition which proves to be unrelated to the realities which exist at the time of the surviving spouse's death. We find the proof of mutually binding wills inadequate and the judgment is therefore reversed. Reversed. [1] Sparks, Enforcement of Contracts to Devise or Bequeath after the Death of the Promisor, 39 Minn.L.Rev. 1, 23; Note, 19 Minn.L.Rev. 95, 112; 32 Minn.L.Rev. 630, 631. [2] See, Annotation, 169 A.L.R. 9, 69. [3] The testimony in the Frese case was strikingly similar to that in the instant case, viz., the testator was quoted as saying (392 Ill. 64, 63 N.E.2d 770): "I made ma happy today. We made our wills together. * * * Everything goes to ma, and then to the children;" to which the testatrix added, "That's right, and if I should go first, it goes to pa and then to the children." [4] Schwartz v. Schwartz, 273 Wis. 404, 78 N.W.2d 912.