Case Title: Dedeaux v. State

Citation: 630 So. 2d 30

Docket Number: 91-KA-0164

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1993-11-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
630 So. 2d 30 (1993) Willie Lee DEDEAUX v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 91-KA-0164. Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 24, 1993. *31 James L. Davis, III, Gulfport, for appellant. Michael C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Deirdre McCrory, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. En Banc. SMITH, Justice, for the Court: Willie Lee Dedeaux appeals his conviction of murder and sentence of life imprisonment from the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Harrison County. While the evidence presented does not support a conviction of murder, the Court finds that it does support the lesser charge of manslaughter. Because the evidence in this case clearly indicates that Willie Lee Dedeaux killed Luke Turner without malice or premeditation and without justification, this case will be reversed and remanded for resentencing for manslaughter. The case at bar is representative of the typical "juke joint" confrontation: a marriage gone sour, too much booze consumed, an angry husband and a wife's new found live-in boy friend. Luke and Kim Turner were husband and wife, separated, but not divorced. Kim was living with Willie Lee Dedeaux. Turner arrived at Isabell's Lounge at approximately 10:30 p.m. accompanied by Ricardo Lizana. The testimony revealed that Luke and Ricardo had been doing some powerful drinking since 4:00 p.m. Their six and one half hour consumption spree, which staggers the imagination, consisted of the following: To say Luke Turner was drunk upon arrival at Isabell's would be putting it mildly. His first act inside the premises was to drink from a pitcher of beer, which belonged to someone else. When Turner saw his estranged wife Kim, he asked her to accompany him outside so that they could discuss their children. While Turner was talking to Kim, Dedeaux "came up and grabbed Kim" and told her to come inside. When Kim asked Dedeaux to let her talk to Luke a few more minutes, Dedeaux told Luke that "he would whip his mother-fucking ass." The confrontation between Dedeaux and Luke was arguably initiated by Dedeaux. Although there is testimony that Luke was an aggressor in this case, Dedeaux clearly started this incident. However, this does not excuse or justify the killing of Luke. While Luke may be characterized as the aggressor in the events leading up to his death, what is even more clear is that Dedeaux used more force than was necessary under the circumstances. Luke's sister, Toni Brown, testified that if the two men had fought, there would have been just one bloody nose and she doubted that it would have been Luke's. "But one thing that I wouldn't do that Dedeaux did was tell no man twice my size that I was going to beat him ..." Also typical of juke joint shootings is the inconsistent testimony given by various witnesses. Dedeaux's mother, Carolyn Dedeaux Lee, a waitress at Isabell's, gave very conflicting testimony at trial which conflicted with her original statement given to the police. Her statement was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 3. She testified at trial, "I didn't tell them that ... it is in disagreement." Immediately the State produced a tape recording of her statement, and the jury was allowed to hear exactly what she originally told the police, and compare the tape with the written statement. Carolyn's statement given to the police on the night of the incident contained the following: Carolyn's testimony at trial totally contradicts this statement given to the police the night of the incident. The jury obviously did not ignore her prior statement. Willie Lee Dedeaux claimed Luke had something in his hand that "he reached back" for and threatened him stating: "I've been promising you this and I am going to give it to you." Dedeaux claimed that while Luke was chasing him around the cars, his mother got her gun out of the trunk of her car and fired one shot into the ground. Dedeaux stated, "I ran up to her from behind her snatched the gun ... and then just shot." Other witnesses testified that Carolyn shot up into the air and that they saw her give the gun to Dedeaux, rather than his grabbing the gun from her. Carolyn ended up with the gun in her purse. She also failed to tell police initially of the gun's whereabouts. Additionally, she told Dedeaux to leave the premises, after the killing. A review of Carolyn's statements to police, her testimony at trial and Dedeaux's testimony indicate why the jury convicted Dedeaux of murder. Dedeaux knew the gun was in the trunk of his mother's car and he intended to use it on Luke. He actually had the gun in his hands prior to his mother's ever touching it. Sgt. Bill Collins, Harrison County Sheriff's Office, searched the scene and did not find any weapon on Luke's body. Collins was unable to obtain any information concerning any prior threats by Luke against Dedeaux. Kim Luke admitted that when Dedeaux fired the first shot at Luke, Luke was walking towards Dedeaux. Luke fell when the second bullet hit him. The next obvious question is: where was Luke's body when the third bullet was fired? Even more puzzling is the question of why Dedeaux fired a third bullet after Luke had fallen? A case could be made for the jury's murder verdict; however, this case is weak. The trial judge thought the case lacking in proof of murder also. Even the assistant district attorney had second thoughts. An alleged discovery violation had been committed by the defense for failure to disclose their witnesses to the State until the day of trial. The trial judge allowed the State an interview to question the defense witnesses before continuing with the trial. The assistant district attorney told the court that, had he known about these witnesses, he would have proceeded under a theory of manslaughter. Indeed, the record confirms that the State insisted that the trial judge grant a manslaughter instruction. The defense objected at trial to such an instruction being granted, but now raises this issue for consideration on appeal. Dedeaux appeals to this Court and presents six issues all of which are without merit except issue III which warrants discussion. Issue III is as follows: "Our law is well settled that jury instructions are not given unless there is an evidentiary basis in the record for such." Davis v. Davis, 530 So. 2d 694, 701 (Miss. 1988). Dedeaux's case hinged upon the element of self-defense. Dedeaux now asserts it was error to deny the manslaughter instruction. Dedeaux is now represented by different counsel. One might normally view the decision of the trial defense counsel to refuse the manslaughter instruction as trial strategy, and viewed as such the issue would be clearly barred on appeal. Moawad v. State, 531 So. 2d 632, 635 (Miss. 1988); Cummins v. State, 515 So. 2d 869, 872 (Miss. 1987). However, where it appears from the record in its entirety that there has been a miscarriage of justice, this Court applies Mississippi Supreme Court Rule 28(a)(3) to prevent manifest injustice. Cummins v. State, 515 So. 2d at 876, 877 also addressed whether the trial court was in error for refusing to instruct the jury: In light of the evidence reflected in the record, the murder conviction in the case sub judice appears to rise to the level of manifest injustice. The jury heard all the testimony and obviously rejected Dedeaux's self-defense argument. Although strategically the manslaughter instruction was rejected by Dedeaux, this decision does not detract from the jury's finding and from the testimony at trial that Dedeaux unlawfully took the life of Luke. To discharge the defendant cannot be justified. In Wells v. State, 305 So. 2d 333, 339-340 (Miss. 1974), the Court held: In Clemons v. State, 473 So. 2d 943 (Miss. 1985), this Court held that the facts would not support a conviction of murder but the evidence did establish guilt of manslaughter. The case was remanded for resentencing for the crime of manslaughter. Accord Bradley v. State, 413 So. 2d 725 (Miss. 1982). Applying the law set forth in Wells and Clemons to the facts in the case sub judice, the same result should be reached. The facts herein clearly support manslaughter. According to all witnesses at trial, Luke was unarmed. According to the police investigators, both Luke's body and the area around it did not reveal any weapon. Dedeaux unlocked the trunk to his mother's car according to her statement. Dedeaux knew the gun was in the trunk. He intended to get the gun and use it against Luke. According to Carolyn's statement, Dedeaux actually had his hands on the gun prior to her getting it away from him and firing the first shot. Dedeaux used a greater amount of force than necessary under the circumstances. This clearly was a killing in the heat of passion. This Court will follow its holdings in Wells and Clemons, and reverse and remand for resentencing for the crime of manslaughter. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING. PRATHER, P.J., and PITTMAN, McRAE and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur. HAWKINS, C.J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J. *34 BANKS, J., concurs in part, dissents in part with a separate written opinion. HAWKINS, Chief Justice, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The dispositive issue on this appeal is whether or not the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Dedeaux was not acting in reasonable necessary self-defense when he shot Luke Turner. That was the State's burden; it failed. When I say "proved," I do not mean conjecture or surmise, but competent testimony. Why is it that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this slaying was not in necessary self-defense? Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-15 makes the killing of a human being justifiable in various factual situations. One of these is "when committed in the lawful defense of one's own person ... where there shall be reasonable ground to apprehend... a design to ... do some great personal injury, and there shall be imminent danger of such design being accomplished." Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-15(f). The uncontradicted testimony in this case is that when Dedeaux shot Turner, he had every reason to believe and did believe he was in great personal danger at the hands of Turner. I have great difficulty envisioning any reasonable person situated that night as Dedeaux would have acted much differently. Kimberly Ambrose (Kim) Turner and Luke Turner, who had three children, separated, following which she filed for a divorce. Some five months following the separation, she met Dedeaux and moved into Dedeaux's residence in Pass Christian. Turner upon one or two occasions visited his sons in Dedeaux's and Kim's Pass Christian residence without incident. Dedeaux testified he would either leave or go into his own room when Turner visited. Following this Dedeaux and Kim moved to Delisle. Thereafter Turner's behavior changed. About a month prior to the slaying, Turner met Dedeaux at a store, put a gun to his throat and told him "to stay away from his kids." At some subsequent time Turner came by their trailer with his girl friend to visit the children. Dedeaux left the room, but upon overhearing Turner threaten to beat Kim up, asked him to leave. Turner returned shortly thereafter armed with a pistol, and asked Dedeaux to come outside, which invitation was declined. Following this Dedeaux heard reports that Turner "wanted to kill me." On the night of December 2, 1988, Dedeaux and Kim went to "Isabell's" Lounge where Carolyn D. Lee, Dedeaux's mother, was a waitress. They were having a peaceful, uneventful evening until Turner arrived on the scene, intoxicated. The uncontradicted testimony is that Turner chased Dedeaux from outside into the lounge, following him and chasing him around tables and chairs. Mrs. Lee, in an effort to get her son out and safely home, got Dedeaux and Kim in tow and was accompanying them outside to the car. Turner also came back outside and Mrs. Lee got a pistol out of the trunk of her car. Turner kept following, threatening, and she shot either into the ground or the air to get him to stop. When he did not stop, but kept coming, Dedeaux took the pistol from his mother and shot Turner three times in quick succession. He testified he thought Turner was armed and was afraid he was going to kill him. All of the above is uncontradicted. Dedeaux had never been convicted of any offense, and never been in any kind of trouble with the law prior to this. Here are the "facts," in detail, which while fairly stated, are presumably related favorably to support its case, verbatim from the State's brief: Appellee's Brief, pp. 4-9 (brackets original; parentheses original; emphasis added). *37 Richard Lizano testified that he had been with Turner from 4:00 p.m. on December 2, and the two of them had consumed an enormous amount of alcohol. Although disputed by every other witness, Turner's sister, Toni Brown, testified Dedeaux made the first threat. The record also shows that a search of Turner following the shooting revealed no weapons. At trial some of the witnesses testified that following the shot made by Carolyn D. Lee, they heard three shots in quick succession (bang, bang, bang). Dedeaux could not recall how many times he fired the pistol. He testified that he shot Turner because he was afraid he was going to kill him. While the trial testimony of Dedeaux's mother, Carolyn Dedeaux Lee, supported his claim of self-defense, her statement to the police on the night of the shooting said that Dedeaux had asked her for the keys to her car trunk, and when she asked him why he wanted them, he told her he was tired of Turner picking on him. Dedeaux was indicted August 30, 1989, and tried July 18-19, 1990. At the conclusion of his trial, the State sought a manslaughter instruction on the ground that under the proof in this case such an instruction was authorized, but following a strenuous and protracted objection by the defense counsel the instruction was refused. Except for the statement Toni Brown testified she heard Dedeaux make at the very beginning of the trouble that evening that he (Dedeaux) was going to whip him (Turner), the uncontradicted evidence shows that Turner was the aggressor, and continued the aggressor throughout the difficulty until he was shot.[1] The record is also uncontradicted that Turner while armed with a pistol had made previous threats against the life of Dedeaux. Because Dedeaux was authorized under the law to act upon reasonable appearances as well as actual danger, the fact that Turner was unarmed does not deprive him of his claim of necessary self-defense. Bond v. State, 249 Miss. 352, 162 So. 2d 510, 512 (1964); Lee v. State, 232 Miss. 717, 723, 100 So. 2d 358, 361 (1958). Did Dedeaux have good reason to be afraid for his life that night? Unless we ignore uncontradicted testimony, he certainly did. The majority ignores the rule of law that it is not incumbent upon an accused to prove that he acted in necessary self-defense, but to the contrary the burden is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time of the slaying he did not act in necessary self-defense, and if there is a reasonable doubt thereasto, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. In Scott v. State, 203 Miss. 349, 34 So. 2d 718, 719 (1948), we held: In Sloan v. State, 368 So. 2d 228, 229 (Miss. 1979), we held: Accord Heidel v. State, 587 So. 2d 835, 843 (Miss. 1991). The dubious testimony of Brown that Dedeaux made the initial threat does not deprive Dedeaux of a claim of self-defense, because the undisputed testimony of all witnesses is that following this initial statement, Dedeaux was in continuous retreat from Turner. Nor, as above stated, does the fact that *38 Turner was in fact unarmed deprive Dedeaux of such claim. Carolyn D. Lee's statement to the police on the night of the slaying, offered into evidence on cross-examination, suggests that Dedeaux was fed up with Turner. According to this statement, during the affray, Dedeaux asked her for the keys to her trunk, and when she asked why, he said, "I'm tired of this guy picking on me, way he picks at me so." Unfortunately for the State, Lee's unsworn pretrial statement cannot be considered as substantive evidence. This was the law prior to our adoption of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Hall v. State, 250 Miss. 253, 264, 165 So. 2d 345, 350 (1964): "[E]vidence of extra judicial statements made by a witness who is not a party ... is admissible only to impeach of discredit the witness and is not competent as substantive evidence of the facts to which such statements relate... ." Wilkins v. State, 603 So. 2d 309, 317 (Miss. 1992); Moffett v. State, 456 So. 2d 714, 719 (Miss. 1984). The Mississippi Rules of Evidence make no change in this evidentiary rule as to out of court unsworn statements. Miss.R.Evid. 613; Jordan v. State, 513 So. 2d 574, 581 (Miss. 1987). See also, U.S. v. Martin, 694 F.2d 885 (1st Cir.1982); Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834 (5th Cir.1979); U.S. v. Palacios, 556 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir.1977).[2] If you gave Mrs. Lee's testimony at trial no weight whatever, tore it out of this record, the uncontradicted evidence of lawful self-defense remains. Mrs. Lee as a witness testified that her son had not asked for her keys, and when confronted with the pretrial statement, said she was nervous and upset on the night of the shooting and did not recall what she had told the police. The pretrial statement, while at the most bearing upon the credibility of Mrs. Lee's trial testimony, cannot be considered as substantive evidence in opposition to the testimony of other witnesses. Dedeaux positively denied asking his mother for the car keys, or that he unlocked Mrs. Lee's car trunk. The majority seizes upon discrepancies understandable under the circumstances between Mrs. Lee's testimony at trial and the detailed statement she related to the police the night of the slaying. These discrepancies in no way negate a claim of self-defense: neither the pretrial statement nor the trial testimony suggest anything other than a valid claim of self-defense. But, as above stated, even if her pretrial statement diminished in some way Dedeaux's claim of self-defense, it cannot under our rules of evidence constitute substantive evidence of guilt. It can only go to Mrs. Lee's credibility as a witness. The majority tells us, "The jury obviously did ignore her prior statement." Majority Opinion, p. 31. The majority is quite correct. The jury obviously did consider this statement, but under the law this Court cannot consider it as substantive evidence of guilt, which is precisely what the majority does to reach its conclusion. The majority sprinkles "facts" from the unsworn pretrial statement as substantive, positive evidence of Dedeaux's guilt; e.g. "Dedeaux unlocked the trunk to his mother's car according to her statement," and "[A]ccording to Carolyn's statement, Dedeaux actually had his hands on the gun prior to her getting it away from him and firing the first shot." Majority Opinion, p. 33.[3] *39 All the substantive evidence in this record reveals the following: As already noted, the threat Brown alleged Dedeaux initially made which dissipated instantly, and the fact that Turner was in fact unarmed does not deprive Dedeaux of his claim of self-defense. Nor does Lee's pretrial statement to the police constitute substantive evidence, for the reasons stated. I have at considerable pain set forth the facts from this record. I have not only set forth the facts precisely as related in the State's brief, which presumably would be as favorable to the State as possible, but have set forth every factual basis upon which a homicide could be predicated. There is nothing in this record to show that Dedeaux did not believe, and did not have reasonable ground to apprehend Turner was about to put his threats against his life into effect, as he testified. Any other hypothesis is conjecture. The majority's dissertation on the State's being entitled to a manslaughter instruction is irrelevant.[4] The majority cites Wells v. State, 305 So. 2d 333, 339-40 (Miss. 1974) and Clemons v. State, 473 So. 2d 943 (Miss. 1985), in support of its "conviction" of Dedeaux on this appeal of manslaughter. My view is that the holding in these cases should be carefully re-examined, if these cases were properly before us. The dissent in Wells (Rodgers, J., dissenting, 305 So.2d at 340-43), makes more sense to me. Wells and Clemons, however, in which there was abundant testimony to support a conviction of manslaughter, are a far cry from the facts here. Before we place the final seal on a man's fate to wear stripes and lace a convict's shoes at Parchman, this Court is entrusted to adhere to settled principles of law. I would reverse and discharge, and therefore respectfully dissent. DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J., join this opinion. BANKS, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part: We all agree that the charge of murder is not sustainable. In my view, the charge of manslaughter is sustainable but the evidence is such that a new trial is warranted, as opposed to remand with directions to enter a judgment for manslaughter. I agree with Justice Hawkins that Carolyn Dedeaux Lee's prior statement cannot be considered as substantive evidence as the majority opinion seems to do. I do not agree that we can reject testimony favorable to the state, out-of-hand, based on our view that it lacks credibility as Justice Hawkins seems to do. When the substantive evidence is viewed, I believe that we can say with confidence that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict of murder warranting a judgment not withstanding the verdict as to that charge and that the jury verdict was so *40 contrary to the weight of the evidence as to evince bias and passion warranting a new trial as to manslaughter in the interest of justice. See Rule 5.16(1) and (2), Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice; Jesco v. Whitehead, 451 So. 2d 706, 714 (Miss. 1984) (Robertson, J. Concurring). Like the majority in Kirkland v. State, 573 So. 2d 681 (Miss. 1990), I am "not willing to say that no reasonable juror could have convicted the defendant of manslaughter under these facts, [but] the evidence is, in [my] opinion, exceedingly unconvincing that the shooting was not justified. * * * Under these facts, [I] feel compelled to reverse and remand for a new trial before another jury." 573 So. 2d at 683. [1] Brown's testimony as to Dedeaux's threat to her brother stretches credulity when the record shows every other witness denied any such statement, and that Turner was a half-foot taller and outweighed Dedeaux fifty pounds. Both were young men. The record also shows that even if made, it was not much of a threat, because Brown herself testified that after he said it, Dedeaux took off running from Turner. [2] Both Miss.R.Evid. 801 and Fed.R.Evid. 801, from which our M.R.E. 801 comes, do make significant changes in the evidentiary effect of an inconsistent pretrial statement "given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial." Such inconsistent statement by definition under this rule is not hearsay and is admissible as substantive evidence. See Miss.R.Evid. 801(d)(1) and comment thereunder. U.S. v. Stockton, 788 F.2d 210 (4th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 840, 107 S. Ct. 147, 93 L. Ed. 2d 89; U.S. v. Plum, 558 F.2d 568 (10th Cir.1977). [3] The majority's bias is evident in other ways. It tells us Dedeaux "claimed" Turner had something in his hand when he threatened him. Majority Opinion, p. 32. It tells us Collins, the police officer, "was unable to obtain any information concerning any prior threats by Turner against Dedeaux." So what? Is the majority telling us they were not made, that it can disregard Dedeaux's uncontradicted testimony? It takes umbrage at Mrs. Lee telling her son after the slaying to leave and go home. Majority Opinion, p. 32. What on earth was wrong with that? She remained, freely told the officers what had happened and where her son was. [4] Defense counsel at trial prudently objected to a manslaughter instruction offered by the State, no doubt reasoning that the chances of the jury convicting his client of murder under the facts of this case were quite remote, but a conviction of manslaughter was less improbable. That, however, is neither here nor there, because this was not a case of manslaughter, either.