Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V CLINTON WAYNE REESE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 117891

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 9, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee—Cross-Appellant,  
v  
No. 117891  
CLINTON WAYNE REESE,  
Defendant-Appellant—Cross-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
WEAVER, J.  
Defendant was convicted by a jury in the Kent Circuit  
Court of armed robbery.  MCL 750.529. He was sentenced as an  
habitual offender to life imprisonment.  MCL 769.12. 
The  
issue presented is whether the trial court erred in refusing  
to give a requested instruction on unarmed robbery.  Applying  
the analysis of People v Cornell, 466 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___  
(2002) to the facts of this case, we conclude that the trial  
court did not err in refusing to give the requested  
instruction because the element differentiating armed robbery  
from unarmed robbery—namely, whether the perpetrator was  
armed—was not disputed.  Therefore, we affirm defendant’s  
conviction.  
Defendant’s conviction stems from an incident occurring  
September 27, 1997, at a Wesco gas station in Kent County.  
Michelle Livernois, an employee who was working at the gas  
station at the time of the robbery, testified that at  
approximately 3:45 p.m., a bald, stocky man entered the gas  
station wearing a nylon over his face and a green and white  
sweatshirt turned inside out.  He was holding a knife.  Ms.  
Livernois was standing behind the counter and had just  
finished dropping some money in the safe.  She testified that  
she recognized the man immediately as a previous customer.  
Although she did not know his name, she recalled that on  
previous occasions he had purchased beer and Pall Mall  
cigarettes.  
She 
later identified defendant as the perpetrator  
after he was taken into police custody.  
Ms. Livernois testified that after defendant entered the  
store, he pushed her against the wall and began taking money  
from the register.  After about ten seconds, Ms. Livernois was  
able to escape and run out of the gas station, across the  
street to the Hot ‘N Now. She returned to the station after  
she observed defendant run across Daniel Street into a yard.  
She and her co-worker, Chris McCune, then reentered the store  
2  
  
and waited for the police to arrive.  Ms. Livernois stated  
that approximately $1,095 was taken from the register.  
Mr. McCune testified that when defendant entered the  
store carrying a knife, he was on the “customer side” of the  
counter fixing a cigarette display rack.1  He ran out of the  
store to a pay phone to call 911.  He then got into a truck  
with one of the customers who was present at the gas station.2  
They followed the defendant for a few minutes before Mr.  
McCune returned to the gas station.  
Michael 
Noren 
and 
his 
girlfriend, 
Sabina 
Borowka, 
stopped  
at the Wesco gas station to buy a pair of sunglasses. As he  
was driving into the station, he observed defendant crouching  
near a wall.  After making their purchases and returning to  
their car, an employee ran out of the gas station, screaming  
that he had been robbed.  Mr. Noren observed defendant run out  
of the store and over to Daniel Street.  He testified that  
defendant’s hands were full, and he was trying to shove things  
into his pocket as he ran.  A few things dropped to the ground  
as he ran.  Mr. Noren and Ms. Borowka went around to the south  
side of the station, where they observed money on the ground  
1 Mr. McCune also identified defendant after he was taken  
into custody.  
2 Mr. McCune got into the truck before he completed the 
call to 911.  Another customer picked up the phone and 
finished the call.  
3  
 
and a knife sitting in the dirt.  He and Ms. Borowka stayed  
near the knife until the police arrived.  
Vivian 
Shepard, 
the manager of the gas station, explained  
that the gas station had eight cameras that recorded twenty­
four hour surveillance of the gas station.  The jury was shown  
the video tape of the robbery while Ms. Shepard explained what  
was happening on the tape.  Ms. Shepard testified that the  
tape showed Ms. Borowka looking at sunglasses and paying for  
her purchase. 
Ms. Livernois was behind the register  
completing a safe drop and Mr. McCune was near a display of  
cigarettes. The perpetrator entered the gas station wearing  
a blue hat with a red button on the top.3
 Ms. Shepard  
testified that as the perpetrator entered the store, one could  
observe a stick-like object—the knife—in his hand.  
Paulette VanKirk testified that as she drove into the gas  
station to get gas, she observed defendant run out of the  
station shoving money into his pocket.  The money was falling  
to the ground, but defendant did not stop to pick it up.  She  
and Mr. McCune followed defendant for a few minutes in her  
3 Laura Clark, a fifth grader who lived in the area where 
defendant was apprehended, testified that at about 4:00 or 
4:30 p.m., she observed a black man kneel by the raspberry 
bushes in their yard and throw his gloves there.  A short time  
later, Laura informed her mother, who went outside to check 
the area near the raspberry bushes.  She discovered a blue  
hat, some nylons, and a pair of gloves. The next day, after 
learning about the robbery of the Wesco gas station, Mrs. 
Clark called the police, who came and retrieved the items.  
4  
 
truck down a dead-end street.  After she turned around, she  
let Mr. McCune out at the station and continued to follow  
defendant.  She observed defendant enter the parking lot of  
Diemer’s Motors, a car dealership.  She then flagged down two  
police officers who were approaching the area and told them  
that the Wesco gas station had been robbed and that she had  
observed the suspect in the parking lot.  
Defendant was eventually discovered in a home near the  
car dealership.  Robert Neuman, who resided in the home,  
testified that he heard defendant trying to get into his home.  
Defendant was perspiring. Neuman let defendant come inside.  
Defendant told him that he had been robbed at knife-point by  
two white men.  Defendant used the bathroom and telephone  
while in Neuman’s home.  Defendant was wearing a green and  
white sweatshirt when he entered the home, but changed into  
one of Neuman’s Express Autowash shirts that were drying in  
the bathroom.4  About ten to fifteen minutes after defendant  
entered his home, police officers arrived and asked Neuman to  
come.  After Neuman came out of the house, the officers asked  
defendant to come out.  He eventually came out and was  
apprehended.  
At 
trial, 
defense counsel requested the court to instruct  
4 The green and white sweatshirt was found in Mr. 
Neuman’s bathroom.  
5  
 
the jury on unarmed robbery.  The trial court denied the  
request, stating:  
You 
did 
[request 
an 
unarmed 
robbery 
instruction], and I concluded not to. 
The  
prosecutor 
objected, 
and 
I 
agreed 
with 
his  
objection that on these facts that was not a 
reasonable assessment of the evidence, but would 
merely have opened the door to compromise somewhere 
between guilty and not guilty.  And while juries 
have the right to exercise leniency and to find 
someone guilty of less than they are in fact guilty 
of, if that’s the situation, we’re not to invite 
it, which I think would have been done in this  
case. But your objection is duly noted.  
Defendant 
appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in  
refusing the instruction on unarmed robbery. In a two-to-one  
decision,5 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
affirmed 
defendant’s  
conviction.6  Questioning whether an instruction on a  
necessarily included lesser offense should be required where  
a rational view of the evidence would not support a conviction  
under the instruction, the Court of Appeals agreed that  
existing precedent required it to hold that the trial court  
had erred in refusing the instruction on the necessarily  
lesser included offense of unarmed robbery.  The Court of  
Appeals urged this Court to adopt the federal model and apply  
a “rational view of the evidence standard” to all requests for  
lesser included instructions. Id. at 633.  
5 One judge concurred in the result only.  
6 242 Mich App 626; 619 NW2d 708 (2000).  
6 
 
  
Despite the error, the Court of Appeals determined that  
reversal was not required because the error was harmless.  The  
Court of Appeals explained that there was no dispute  
concerning the existence of the knife. 
Uncontroverted  
eyewitness testimony demonstrated that the perpetrator of the  
robbery used a knife, that a knife was found in an area where  
the perpetrator had dropped some items, and that a stick-like  
or knife-like object was observable on the tape from the  
video-surveillance camera.  
This Court granted leave “on the issue of the standard to  
be used by the trial court in determining whether necessarily  
lesser included offense instructions must be given when  
requested.” The order instructed the parties to  
specifically address whether MCL 768.32 prevents
the Supreme Court from adopting the federal model
for 
necessarily 
lesser 
included 
offense 
instructions 
and, 
if 
it 
does, 
whether 
such 
prohibition violates Const 1963, art 6, § 5.[7] 
Resolution of this case is controlled by our recent  
opinion in People v Cornell, supra.  In Cornell, we concluded  
that MCL 768.32(1) only permits instructions on necessarily  
included lesser offenses, not cognate lesser offenses.  
Moreover, such an instruction is proper if the charged greater  
offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element  
7 465 Mich 851 (2001).  
7 
 
   
 
 
    
 
that is not part of the lesser included offense and it is  
supported by a rational view of the evidence. 
Id. at __.  
(Slip op, p 25).8  Unarmed robbery is clearly a necessarily  
included lesser offense of armed robbery.  Thus, the issue in  
this case is whether the evidence supported such an  
instruction.  We conclude that it did not and therefore affirm  
defendant’s conviction.9  
The element distinguishing unarmed robbery from the  
offense of armed robbery is the use of a weapon or an article  
used as weapon.10  In the present case, there is no real  
8 We note that the Court of Appeals decision in this case 
urged this Court to consider adopting the “federal model” 
regarding included offense instructions.  However, as our  
decision in Cornell makes clear, it unnecessary to do so 
because resolution of this matter is governed by MCL 768.32, 
which, when given its intended meaning, happens to be similar 
to the federal model.  
9 
The concurrence/dissent criticizes our majority 
decision in Cornell as one disregarding precedent from this 
Court and straying “far beyond the issue presented.”  Slip op 
at 2.  However, as we explained in Cornell, the cases that we  
overruled in that matter (and which the concurrence/dissent 
relies on in this matter) were cases that blatantly 
disregarded 
MCL 
768.32(1)–a statute that had been in existence 
since 1846–as well the prior case law interpreting that 
statute.  “The interests in the “evenhanded, predictable, 
consistent 
development 
of 
legal 
principles” 
and 
the 
“integrity 
of the judicial process” require[d] that we rectify the 
conflict that our case law ha[d] created.”  Cornell at ___, n 
14. (Slip op, p 27, n 14).  
10 The armed robbery statute reads in pertinent part:  
Any person who shall assault another, and 
shall feloniously rob, steal and take from his  
person, or in his presence, any money or other  
8 
 
dispute concerning whether defendant was armed. Rather, the  
evidence that he was armed is overwhelming.  Both employees of  
the gas station testified that defendant was armed with a  
knife when he entered the store, a knife-like or stick-like  
object can be observed in defendant’s hand in the surveillance  
video tape, and a knife was found outside the gas station in  
the same area where defendant had dropped money.  Indeed,  
defense counsel did not explicitly argue that defendant was  
not armed.  Rather, he questioned the lack of fingerprints on  
the knife,  argued that defendant was mistakenly identified as  
the perpetrator, and suggested that the prosecution failed to  
prove that the “perpetrator” used or threatened to use  
violence because no testimony established that the employees  
felt threatened by the knife.  The closest counsel came to  
challenging the existence of a knife was to suggest that  
property, which may be the subject of larceny, such 
robber being armed with a dangerous weapon, or any 
article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the  
person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be 
a dangerous weapon, shall be guilty of a felony 
. . . . [MCL 750.529.]  
The unarmed robbery statute reads:  
Any person who shall, by force and violence, 
or by assault or putting in fear, feloniously rob, 
steal and take from the person of another, or in 
his presence, any money or other property which may 
be the subject of larceny, such robber not being 
armed with a dangerous weapon shall be guilty of a 
felony . . . . [MCL 750.530.]  
9 
 
 
eyewitness 
testimony 
was 
unreliable 
because 
the 
witnesses 
were  
excited. A rational view of the undisputed evidence in this  
case requires us to conclude that the trial court did not err  
in refusing to give an instruction on unarmed robbery.  
Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.11  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred with WEAVER, J.  
11 While the trial court’s decision was correct under the  
law existing at the time it refused to give the instruction, 
as we explained in Cornell, this case law improperly ignored 
MCL 768.32. Under a proper application of this statute, the 
instruction was not required.  
10  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee 
Cross-Appellant,  
No. 117891  
CLINTON WAYNE REESE,  
Defendant-Appellant 
Cross-Appellee.  
KELLY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
The majority applies the framework for lesser included  
offense instructions that it recently adopted in People v  
Cornell 466 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2002).  There, a majority  
of 
this 
Court 
overruled longstanding precedent to require that  
the lesser offense for which a jury instruction is given be  
supported by substantial evidence.  Id. at ___.  The issue in  
Cornell was whether the trial court erred in refusing to give  
a requested lesser included misdemeanor offense instruction.  
The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred  
in refusing to give a requested necessarily lesser included  
felony offense instruction.  In the past, this Court has  
distinguished between necessarily lesser included felony  
 
 
 
 
offenses and necessarily lesser included misdemeanor offenses  
and treated them differently.  See People v Stephens, 416 Mich  
252; 330 NW2d 675 (1982).  Cornell rejected the distinction  
and addressed itself to both types of offenses.  In so doing,  
it strayed far beyond the issue presented.  Properly applied,  
Cornell should not control the outcome of this case.  
This case represents a new and more broad application of  
the rule in Cornell. Therefore, I again write separately to  
dissent.  However, because I believe that any error in this  
case was harmless, I concur in the result reached in the  
majority opinion.  
In People v Kamin,1 this Court recognized that our  
previous decisions required a judge to automatically instruct  
the jury on necessarily lesser included offenses. Refusal to  
give the requested instruction was error.  This Court  
reiterated the automatic instruction rule more recently in  
People v Mosko, 441 Mich 496; 495 NW2d 534 (1992):  
"Pursuant to People v Ora Jones, 395 Mich 379;  
236 NW2d 461 (1975), and People v Chamblis, 395 
Mich 408; 236 NW2d 473 (1975), it is clear that a 
defendant has a right upon request to have the jury 
instructed 
on 
necessarily 
included 
offenses.  
Further, a defendant has a right upon request to 
jury instructions on those cognate lesser included 
offenses which are supported by record evidence.  
"The 
automatic 
instruction 
rule 
for  
necessarily lesser included offenses removed the 
need for the trial judges to review the record in 
order to determine whether or not there is evidence  
1405 Mich 482, 493; 275 NW2d 777 (1979).  
2  
 
  
 
  
to support a verdict on the lesser offenses. 
Review of the record for evidentiary support is now 
in order only when the defense requests that the 
jury be instructed on a cognate lesser included 
offense." [Mosko at 501, quoting Kamin at 493.]  
At the time Ora Jones, Chamblis, and Kamin were decided,  
the automatic instruction rule applied to all necessarily  
included offenses.  The Stephens Court altered that when it  
adopted 
the 
rational 
basis test for lesser misdemeanor offense  
instructions, derived from the federal rule established in  
United States v Whitaker, 144 US App DC 344; 447 F2d 314  
(1971). 
Stephens expressly refused to extend the rational  
basis test to lesser included felony offense instructions,  
noting that People v Ora Jones still controlled. Stephens at  
264.  
The Mosko Court stated, just ten years ago, that “[t]hese  
principles remain sound.” Id. at 501. The majority has not  
persuaded me that something has occurred in the interim to  
render them illogical.  
The trial judge in this case denied defendant’s request  
to instruct the jury on unarmed robbery, stating that it  
"would merely have opened the door to compromise somewhere  
between guilty and not guilty." However, the Chamblis Court  
addressed this very concern, thereby precluding a trial judge  
from refusing a lesser included offense instruction for fear  
of a compromise verdict.  Chamblis acknowledged that the  
possibility of compromise exists, but quoted Justice Holmes  
3  
 
  
"[t]hat the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or  
of a mistake on the part of the jury is possible.  But  
verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such  
matters." Chamblis at 426, quoting Dunn v United States, 284  
US 390, 394; 52 S Ct 189; 76 L Ed 356 (1932).  
As I stated in Cornell, I disagree with the majority's  
disregard for the well reasoned and supported precedent of  
this Court.  It expressly adopted the automatic instruction  
rule for necessarily lesser included felony offenses and  
articulated sound reasoning for doing so.  I also disagree  
with the application of Cornell to this case because,  
traditionally, we treated necessarily lesser included felony  
offenses and necessarily lesser included misdemeanor offenses  
differently, as stated in Stephens.  Moreover, I would adhere  
to the longstanding rule for necessarily lesser included  
felony offense instructions and find error in the trial  
court's refusal to deliver instructions on unarmed robbery.  
Nevertheless, I agree with the Court of Appeals that it  
was harmless error for the trial judge to refuse to give the  
unarmed robbery instructions.2  The only disputed fact was  
2The Mosko Court applied the harmless error rule to 
errors involving a failure to provide a requested instruction 
on a necessarily lesser included felony offense.  Id. at 503.  
As I stated in Cornell, I disagree with the majority's 
new harmless error test, which increases the burden on a 
defendant by requiring that the instructions be supported by 
substantial evidence.  Id. at ___. The new rule increases the  
(continued...)  
4  
 
whether the robber was defendant.  There was no question that  
the robber was armed. 
That fact is the element that  
distinguishes the greater and lesser offenses. Because it was  
not disputed, the judge's failure to deliver the instructions  
on the lesser offense, although erroneous, was harmless.  See  
Mosko, supra at 502-506.  
This is the rare case where the facts comprising the  
element distinguishing the charged offense and the lesser  
included offense are undisputed. Therefore, under the facts  
of this case, the majority's change in the law appear  
innocuous. More often, however, the issue is not so clear.  
Today, in this case and in Cornell, the majority erodes  
the fact-finding powers of the jury, allowing judges to weigh  
the evidence in place of the jury.  In so doing, it rewards  
overcharging by the prosecution. Once again it departs from  
the precedent of this Court and makes a wrong turn.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.  
2(...continued) 
likelihood that juries will convict defendants of greater 
offenses than they believe them guilty of as an alternative to 
acquitting them altogether.  
5