Case Title: FORD v RUPPLE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1972-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12186 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1972 J. L. FORD, Guardian A d Litem of JAY FORD, a Minor, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, HENRY RUPPELL, WILLIAM FIREBAUGH and G E N E R A L M O T O R S , INC., J o i n t l y and Severally, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable John B. McClernan, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Edward D, Yelsa argued, Anaconda, Montana. For Respondent: Poore, McKenzie and Roth, Butte, Montana. Robert A, Poore argued, Butte, Montana. James P. Melican, Jr. argued, Detroit, Michigan. Submitted: May 17, 1972 Decided: -- DEO 1 :! 1q-i; M r . Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal i s from a summary judgment i n favor of the defendant General Motors, Inc. entered i n the d i s t r i c t court o f the second j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Silver Bow, Hon. John B. McClernan, presiding. O n October 25, 1969, p l a i n t i f f Ford, 19 years of age, was a sleeping passenger i n a 1968 Corvette automobile, the subject of t h i s l i t i g a t i o n . The Corvette was being driven by defendant William Firebaugh. It was manufactured by defendant General Plotors, Inc. The Corvette had j u s t l e f t Butte and was proceeding south on Highway 91, approaching Melrose, along a narrow winding roadway when i t became involved i n a sideswipe collision, with a vehicle driven by defendant Henry Rupple. The Corvette went out of control and collided head-on with an oncoming vehicle, which resulted i n personal i n j u r i e s and extensive damage t o the Corvette. Following the accident, a personal injury action was f i l e d on January 8 , 1971 by p l a i n t i f f Ford against a l l defendants, Firebaugh, Rupple, and General Motors,based on the f a c t t h a t Ford was unaware of the events before or during the accident which caused h i s i n j u r i e s . Defendant Firebaugh was never served. General Motors was served through i t s designated agent on January 18, 1971. Defendant Rupple was served on March 31, 1971. Prior t o service on Rupple, General Motors had moved the cause t o the federal d i s t r i c t court, Butte, on February 8 , 1971, on the basis of d i v e r s i t y of citizenship. After Rupple, a s a Montana resident, appeared i n the federal d i s t r i c t court on April 22, 1971, t h e d i v e r s i t y of citizenship was defeated pursuant t o the r u l e of Jensen v. Safeway Stores, 24 F.Supp. 585. O n June 15, 1971, the p a r t i e s stipulated t h a t t h e action be remanded t o Department I of the second j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Silver Bow, where the action had originated. O n March 8 , 1971, General Motors submitted i t s interroga- t o r i e s t o p l a i n t i f f , t o which p l a i n t i f f responded on March 29, 1971. Following remand by the federal d i s t r i c t court t o the second j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , on July 27, 1971 defendant Rupple submitted a lengthy s e t of interrogatories t o p l a i n t i f f , which were never answered by p l a i n t i f f . On July 12, 1971, p l a i n t i f f noticed the deposition of defendant Rupple f o r August 6, 1971. A t the appointed time General ~ o t o r s ' counsel attended, but neither p l a i n t i f f , h i s counsel, nor the witnesses appeared. Subsequently, General ~ o t o r s ' counsel was advised by p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel t o b e i n Anaconda f o r the taking of ~ u p p l e ' s deposition on October 6 , 1971, but on t h a t appointed date Rupple did not appear and no deposition was taken. I n separate l e g a l proceedings defendant Kupple, the motorist involved i n the i n i t i a l sideswipe with the Corvette, obtained a summary judgment against p l a i n t i f f Ford. I n September 1971, the d i s t r i c t court s e t the i n s t a n t case f o r t r i a l on October 18, 1971. On September 13, 1971, General Motors f i l e d i t s motion f o r surrunary judgment with notice of hearing of i t s motion s e t f o r September 24, 1971. General lo tors ' motion f o r summary judgment was based upon the theory t h a t a c a r manufacturer has no duty t o manufacture a car which i s safe from c o l l i s i o n s such a s the dne involved here, and defendant General Motors was e n t i t l e d t o judgment a s a matter of law. O n September 16, 1971, p l a i n t i f f submitted interrogatories and requests f o r admissions of f a c t t o General Motors which were directed t o determining the design, manufacturing processes, and specifications of the fiberglass body of the Corvette. p l a i n t i f f ' s interrogatories and admissions were predicated on the theory of p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint against General Motors, t h a t General Motors I I so negligently and carelessly constructed, manufactured, assembled, and inspected said automobile (Corvette) a s t o endanger the occu- pants therein i n the event of c o l l i s i o n . 11 General Motors f i l e d objections t o p l a i n t i f e s interrogatories and requests f o r admissions contending t h a t the request f o r ad- missions and interrogatories pertained t o the same basic issue t o which General Motors directed i t s motion f o r summary judgment and t h a t i f defendant's motion f o r summary judgment was meritorious then the request f o r admissions and interrogatories was irrelevant. Hearing on General Motors objections was s e t t o be heard on the same day a s i t s motion f o r summary judgment, September 24, 1971. After hearing o r a l arguments and receiving b r i e f s , the d i s t r i c t court held t h a t there was no duty of General Motors owed t o p l a i n t i f f and entered judgment dismissing p l a i n t i f f ' s com- p l a i n t against General Motors. From t h a t judgment, p l a i n t i f f appeals. P l a i n t i f f contends the primary issue on appeal i s the question of whether o r not an absence of a genuine i s s u e of negligence was presented t o a s u f f i c i e n t degree t o j u s t i f y t h e granting of summary judgment t o General Motors. Essentially, the issue i s whether the d i s t r i c t court was correct i n granting defendant General Motors summary judgment. The i s s u e of substantive law i n t h i s determination is---did the defendant, General Motors, breach any duty owed the plain- t i f f , proximately causing p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r i e s ? The authority f o r granting summary judgment i s Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., which provides i n pertinent p a r t : 1 1-1- 9 : 9~ The judgment sought s h a l l be rendered forthwith i f the pleadings, depositions, answers t o interrogatories, and admissions on f i l e show t h a t there i s no genuine i s s u e a s t o any material f a c t and t h a t the moving p a r t i s e n t i t l e d t o a judgment a s a matter of law.9~ 9 : 2 ' ~ Y; In determining the burden of proof, t h i s Court i n Kober & Kyriss v. Billings Deac.Hosp., 148 Mont. 117, 121, 417 P.2d 476, quoted with approval 6 ~ o o r e ' s Federal Practice, 5 56.15[3], r r I f c * * the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue a s t o a l l the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, e n t i t l e him t o judgment as a matter of law. I I 1 See also: Byrne v. Plante, 154 Mont. 6, 459 P. 2d 266. Plaintiff argues that since general negligence was pleaded against a l l defendants, further discovery, such as defendant ~ u p p l e ' s deposition, must be taken t o dispose of a l l material facts concerning the affect of the i n i t i a l sideswipe on the maneuverability of the Corvette, prior t o the head-on impact. This contention i s not correct for two reasons, (I) defendant General Motors can only be held i n the lawsuit i f there i s a duty t o the plaintiff which has been breached, and (2) the discovery, including p l a i n t i f f ' s deposition, has effectively confined the issue t o the singular legal determination of whether or nct defendant General Motors owed p l a i n t i f f a duty of reason- able care i n design of the Corvette, so a s not to subject plain- t i f f t o unreasonable r i s k of injury or an enhancement of injury i n the event of a head-on collision with another vehicle, There i s no disagreement that t h i s i s an issue of law for court de- termination. In more simple and concise terms, t h i s lawsuit involves the "second collision" theory of negligence, i.e. the collision of the passenger with the interior part of the automobile which follows the automobile collision. Impact and causation of the i n i t i a l collision i s not part of the consideration of fault or duty i n the "second collision"; and damages are generally enchance- ment of injury due t o alleged faulty design or construction. The legal community i n recent years has signaled the r i s e I t of the theory of negligence encompassing the second collision". Two cases are standard-bearers for divergent legal attitudes regarding the duty of automobile manufacturers: (1) Evans v. General Motors Corporation, (1966 C.A,7th), 359 F.2d 822,824,825, c e r t , den. 385 U.S. 836, 87 S.Ct. 83, 17 L ed 2d 70, for the r e s t r i c t i v e view, and (2) Larsen v, General Motors Corporation, (1968 C.k.8th), 391 F.2d 495, 502,503, f o r the expansive view. See a l s o annotation 42 ALR3d 560. In Evans, the p l a i n t i f f alleged t h a t General Motors was negligent i n designing the frame of i t s 1961 Chevrolet s t a t i o n wagon. The car was manufactured without perimeter frame r a i l s which were being used i n many other cars. The complaint alleged 11 11 t h a t because the X type frame would not adequately protect occupants during a side impact c o l l i s i o n , defendant had created an unreasonable r i s k of serious injury. The court stated: "A manufacturer i s not under a duty t o make h i s automobile accident-proof or fool-proof f: it *I1. The court held a s a matter of law on the duty aspect, t h a t the manufacturer's duty did not extend t o the p a r t i c u l a r design pre- caution which p l a i n t i f f deemed t o be unreasonable. It further held t h a t the danger t o be avoided was obvious t o a l l , since the intended purpose of an automobile did not include i t s participa- t i o n i n c o l l i s i o n s with other objects, despite the manufacturer's a b i l i t y t o foresee the possiblity t h a t such c o l l i s i o n s may occur. In Larsen, the steering column of p l a i n t i f f ' s Corvair pro- truded beyond the forward surface of the f r o n t t i r e s . P l a i n t i f f complained t h a t the rearward displacement of the steering s h a f t i n a head-on c o l l i s i o n was much greater on the Cowair than on cars designed t o protect against such displacement. Defendant, General Motors, r e l i e d on the Evans "crashproof" argument t o rebut the contention. Although the court i n Larsen agreed t h a t it was beyond the s t a t e of the a r t t o produce a crashworthy c a r , i t s t a t e d t h a t such an argument was irrelevant. The court i n Larsen con- cerned i t s e l f with the manufacturer's a b i l i t y t o foresee t h a t many of the c a r s which i t produced would be involved i n accidents and whether i t was possible t o design vehicles which would not increase the r i s k of serious i n j u r i e s resulting from these accidents, and held: I I W e perceive of no sound reason, e i t h e r i n logic or experience, nor any command i n precedent, why the manufacturer should not be held t o a reasonable duty of care i n the design of i t s vehicle con- sonant with the s t a t e of the a r t t o minimize the e f f e c t of accidents. g : * "This duty of reasonable care i n design r e s t s on common law negligence t h a t a manufacturer of an a r t i c l e should use reasonable care i n the design and manufacture of h i s product t o eliminate any unreasonable r i s k of foreseeable injury. The duty of reasonable care i n design should be viewed i n l i g h t of the rislc. While a l l r i s k s cannot be eliminated nor can a crash-proof vehicle be designed under the present s t a t e of the a r t , there a r e many commonsense factors i n design, which a r e or should be well known t o the manufacturer t h a t w i l l minimize or lessen t h e injurious e f f e c t s of a c o l l i s i o n . The standard of reasonable care i s applied i n many other negligence s i t u a t i o n s and should be applied here. I1 k second argument advanced by General Motors i n both Evans and Larsen and again i n the i n s t a n t case, i s the u t i l i z a t i o n of the doctrine of abnormal use. This argument r e l i e s on the well- established principle t h a t a manufacturer's l i a b i l i t y f o r negligence i s r e s t r i c t e d t o s i t u a t i o n s where the product i s used I I f o r a purpose f o r which the manufacturer should expect i t t o be used". 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, 5 395. I n Evans the court held: "The intended purpose of an automobile does not include i t s participation i n c o l l i s i o n s with other objects, despite the manufacturer's a b i l i t y t o foresee the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t such c o l l i s i o n s may occur. I I I n Larsen the court held: "While automobiles a r e not made f o r the purpose of colliding with each other, a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use w i l l r e s u l t i n c o l l i s i o n s and injury-producing impacts. f: fc Where the i n j u r i e s or enhanced i n j u r i e s a r e due t o the manu- f a c t u r e r ' s f a i l u r e t o use reasonable care t o avoid subjecting the user of i t s products t o an unreasonable r i s k of injury general negligence principles should be applicable. ? I I n conjunction with the two above c i t e d federal c i r c u i t cases, we have examined the limited number of cases available on the subject of defect enhanced i n j u r i e s and find t h a t some courts have held under the Larsen r a t i o n a l e t h a t s p e c i f i c defects were actionable such a s cases involving shatter-proof g l a s s , gearshift levers, and ash t r a y defects. Most jurisdictions avoid the s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y concept and breach of warranty and apply general negligence principles. However, steering assembly, seat defects, heater location, front end design, door latch and others were denied under the Evans rationale. 4 2 ALR3d 567,568. Generally the particular defects involved i n these cases do not seem to bear on the results reached by the courts, nor do the courts that have taken the Larsen view develop the problem beyond the fact that the i n i t i a l accident i s reasonably foreseeable t o the manufacturer, who should exercise due care or reasonable care i n design or manufacture t o eliminate unreasonable r i s k of foreseeable injury. While the courts denying recovery generally hold that the duty being obvious t o a l l and collision not within the intended purpose, foreseeability created no duty when claimed defects did not contribute t o the i n i t i a l accident. It has been further suggested that the best or proper or most effective solution t o t h i s recognizable problem i s by legislation, not necessarily a sure or quick solution, as there i s none, but possibly the most reliable and uniform method t o accommodate the f i f t y s t a t e s with standardization of design improvements t o be placed on the manufacturers. Some cases c i t e the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, (19661, 15 U.S.C. $ 5 1381-1426, which appears t o be an effective beginning i n the area of estab- lishing design standards, This approach has been criticized as inadequate, industry controlled, and an escape hatch for courts not wanting t o deal directly with the problem. With a f u l l appreciation of the principle that manufacturers should be held t o as safe a design and construction as i s reasonably possible t o protect the public, we also recognize the d i f f i c u l t i e s that attend the proposed application of the principle on the facts of t h i s case under Montana law. The cases applying t h i s principle under common law negligence standards r e c i t e that collisions with or without f a u l t of the user are clearly forseeable i n normal use and w i l l result i n injury producing impact and the "second collision" of the passenger with the i n t e r i o r part of the automobile i s also foreseeable, Hence, duty and l i a b i l i t y on the manufacturers i n the event of f a u l t y design. However, a f t e r having established the principle they immediately r e t r e a t i n t o undefined sanctuaries of q u a l i f i c a t i o n which d i l u t e the principle and add no help t o i t s application. For example, it excludes the c o l l i s i o n with water, which i s a s foreseeable as any and occurs more frequently than some and could enhance danger o r injury by defective design. These cases further qualify t h a t the manufacturer i s not an insurer and not required t o design accident-proof machines, j u s t avoid unreasonable r i s k of injury. This a l l seems t o i n f e r t h a t t h e duty imposed i s qualified by circumstances of some kind and n o t based e n t i r e l y on reasonable foreseeability. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 3rd ed. 1965, 140, has t h i s t o say: " 9 : ft * i f foresight of r i s k i s a necessary condition, it i s by no means a l s o a s u f f i c i e n t condition of l i a b i l i t y * $ : *. Admittedly some occasional j u d i c i a l d i c t a seem t o insinuate t h a t foresight offered a t e s t by which the existence of a duty of care can be logic- a l l y inferred. Yet nothing could be further from the t r u t h . " (Emphasis added). D. 326 Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th Ed. ,)contains an extensive discus- sion on a l l aspects of duty but observes the formula of duty t o be: 11 You must take reasonable care t o avoid a c t s o r ommissions which you can reasonably foresee would be l i k e l y t o in- j u r e your neighbor[s] $ < * * persons who a r e so closely and d i r e c t l y affected by m y a c t t h a t I ought reasonably t o have them i n contemplation a s being so affected when I am directing m y mind t o the a c t s o r omissions which a r e c a l l e d i n question, "As a formula t h i s i s so vague a s t o have l i t t l e meaning, and a s a guide t o decision it has no value a t a l l . " (Emphasis added.) Prosser further s t a t e s our problem i n the application of foreseeability and duty a t p. 254: "1n 1928 someth.ing of a bombshell b u r s t upon t h i s f i e l d , when t h e New York Court of Appeals, forsaking 1 1 roximate cause, s t a t e d the i s s u e of foreseeability i : terms of dut .I1 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.Co., 248 N.Y. 3 3 9 3 2 N.E. 99. (Emphasis added). Prosser does not r e j e c t t h i s principle, but recognizes the prob- lems attendant t o it. In Mang v, Eliasson, 153 Mont. 431, 458 P.2d 777, t h i s Court rejected any doctrine of abstract foreseeability and affirmed the doctrine of reasonable foreseeability, but i n t h a t case found no necessity t o reach the law of "causation" absent a finding of duty. However, causation was most recently discussed i n terms of proximate cause and the "but for" r u l e affirmed i n DeVerniero v. E ~ Y , M o n t . , 496 P.2d 290,293, 29 St.Rep. 273, 278, i n t h i s language: I I Proximate cause is a twofold l e g a l concept which may l i m i t l i a b i l i t y depending upon the existence of (1) an intervening a c t and (2) the unforeseeability of t h a t intervening a c t . This Court s t a t e d i n Sztaba v. Great Northern Ry., 147 Mont. 185, 195, 411 P.2d 379, 385: I1 1 Causation i s a fact. It i s important t o de- termine causation f i r s t t o avoid i t s confusion with the issues t o follow. This i s not a relationship be- tween negligence and injury, but r a t h e r a causal re- l a t i o n between conduct and h u r t , both of which a r e factual concepts. It i s only a f t e r the causal relation- ship, duty, and i t s scope a r e found t h a t the negligence issue i s reached. 61 Co1.L.R. 1401. he t e s t most generally employed i n determining causation i s the "but for" t e s t . Montana has adopted t h i s t e s t i n numerous cases. I1 I 1 I Proximate cause i s one which i n a n a t u r a l and con~inuoussequence, unbroken by any new, independent cause, produces the injury, and without which the in- 11 jury would not have occurred. Stroud v. Chicago, M. [&] St.P. & P.Ry. Co., 75 Mont. 384, 393, 243 P. 1089, 1092.'" (Emphasis added:) - The principle urged by p l a i n t i f f under the f a c t s of t h i s case f a l l s i n t o the area of "abstract foreseeability" condemned i n man^ and f a i l s t o meet the law i n r e l a t i o n t o causation a s it e x i s t s i n )lantana. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s affirmed. --- ............................ dAssociate Justices.