Case Title: MICHAEL S. WILKINS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
MICHAEL S. WILKINS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 2104 P.3d 85Case Number: 03-127Decided: 01/11/2005
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                
   

 
 
MICHAEL 
S. WILKINS,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant) 
,

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff) 
.

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ, and YOUNG, 
DJ.

 
 
            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      On December 4, 
2002, appellant, Michael S. Wilkins (Wilkins), entered a conditional plea of 
nolo contendere1 to the crime of third degree sexual 
assault.2  In addition to the complaint from the 
victim of the crime, a very important piece of evidence against Wilkins was a 
confession he made after taking a polygraph test that indicated he was being 
untruthful in his answers.  The 
"condition" of his nolo contendere plea was that he reserved the right to appeal 
the district court's conclusion that his confession was voluntary and, 
therefore, admissible in evidence at his trial.  Wilkins asserted that he agreed to talk 
with the police, and to take the polygraph exam, only because he was assured 
that he would receive probation as his punishment.  He also contended that when the police 
asked him to take the polygraph, they told him that if he were deceptive in 
answering the questions, he would have to talk to them and tell them what really 
happened.  After failing the 
polygraph exam, Wilkins told police officers that he did have sexual intercourse 
with the victim.3  Wilkins reasserted his innocence after 
the confession, and said he made it only to "get it over with" and spare his 
family any more anguish.  The only 
issue posed by Wilkins before the district court was whether his confession was 
involuntary because it was induced by the promise of probation.4  In its decision letter, the district 
court addressed all of the concerns raised by the evidence presented at the 
suppression hearing, thus going beyond just the asserted promise of probation, 
and considering also the totality of the circumstances.  In his brief, Wilkins also makes a 
broader argument than just the promise of probation.  Because the district court considered 
all of the facts and circumstances developed at the suppression hearing, we too 
will address all of the arguments raised by Wilkins in this appeal.  We will affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Wilkins and the 
State agree that the sole issue is whether the trial court erred in denying 
Wilkins' motion to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement 
officers.

 
 

 
[¶3]      The facts 
pertinent to this appeal were developed at a hearing on Wilkins' motion to 
suppress his confession.  At the 
outset of the hearing, Wilkins asserted that the sole basis for the motion to 
suppress was a promise of probation made to him by police officers.  Detective John Haukap of the Laramie 
County Sheriff's Office testified that on March 29, 2002, at Haukap's request, 
Wilkins voluntarily came to the Sheriff's office along with his parents and his 
fiancé.  At that point, no charges 
had as yet been filed against him.  
Haukap reviewed with Wilkins the complaints that had been made against 
him.  Wilkins denied having 
committed any crimes.  Haukap 
indicated that the complaints made against him were credible, and asked Wilkins 
to take a polygraph test.  He also 
explained to Wilkins the range of punishments applicable to the alleged crimes 
"from prison time to probation."  
Haukap testified that he made no promises.  The upshot of this initial meeting 
between Wilkins and Detective Haukap was that Wilkins eventually agreed to take 
a polygraph test that was administered on April 23, 2002.   Haukap also related that after the 
polygraph test was over, Wilkins admitted to having sexual intercourse with the 
victim.

 
[¶4]      Deputy Steve 
Reese of the Laramie County Sheriff's Office administered the polygraph 
exam.  Prior to the test, Wilkins 
signed a waiver to this effect:

 
 
I have 
been cautioned by John Haukap who has identified himself as a Police Officer who 
has warned me as follows:

 
 
"I 
caution you that you have an absolute right to remain 
silent[;]

 
            
That anything you do say can and will be used in a court of law against 
you;

 
 
That you 
have the right to the advice of a lawyer before and the presence of a lawyer 
here with you during questioning; and

 
 
That if 
you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be furnished to you for free before any 
questioning, if you desire."

 
 
I hereby 
state that the above rights have been explained to me; that I fully understand 
such rights and further, that I knowingly waive such 
rights.

  
 
In view 
of the above, I do hereby consent, voluntarily, without duress, coercion, 
threats, promises of reward or immunity to be examined on a polygraph instrument 
(lie detector), a detection of deception technique.  I understand that operation of this 
instrument involves the use of electronic apparatus for the recording of 
physiological and psychological responses.  
I have had the nature of this examination explained to me and do hereby 
consent both to the placing of the necessary apparatus upon my person and to the 
use of any electronic hearing or recording devices operated contemporaneously 
with this examination.  I do hereby 
release and forever hold harmless the County of Laramie, its agents and employees from any 
liability flowing either from the operation of the devices or use of the results 
obtained therefrom.  I further agree 
that the results of this examination may be made available to the proper 
authorities.

 
[¶5]      Prior to the 
test, Deputy Reese informed Wilkins of all the questions he was to be asked, so 
as to ensure that he was able to understand all of them.  The questions asked were all "Yes" or 
"No" questions.  The same set of 
nine questions was asked in two sessions (called charts).  The two sessions were separated with a 
brief rest interval.  The questions 
were asked in a different order during the second session.  Deputy Reese pointed out that it takes 
longer to explain the procedure and ensure the test subject understands the 
procedure, than it does to ask the two series of nine questions.  Wilkins indicated that he understood the 
process and the questions he was to be asked.  The test indicated that Wilkins had 
answered some of the questions deceptively.  Deputy Reese 
continued:

 
            
I advised him that he didn't do very well on the polygraph.  It was my opinion he wasn't being 
truthful about, in this case, having sex with [the 
victim].

            
At that point, I explained to him I wanted to know from him if he made a 
habit of having sex with juveniles, and at that point, he stated no, he was not, 
and then we got into it, "Well, tell me the truth." And he told me exactly what 
happened.

 
 
Deputy 
Reese testified that he made no promises of "favor, benefit, leniency, no 
charges, probation, any of that stuff."

 
 
[¶6]      Wilkins testified 
that Detective Haukap told him, as well as his parents and fiancé, that the most 
he could get for his crimes was "3015 or probation," and that he would 
not have agreed to the polygraph or made any statements had that promise not 
been made.  He claimed to have been 
confused by the testing process.  
Wilkins also related he was told before he took the polygraph that, "if I 
passed it, that he'd excuse the charges against me, and if I failed it, I had to 
tell him what happened."  Wilkins 
claimed that when this circumstance came to pass, he again asked what would 
happen to him if he confessed and that he was told he would get "probation or 
301."  He claimed he admitted to the 
crime, even though he hadn't done it, because he "was scared and I wanted it all 
to be over with because I thought all I was going to get was probation."  The gist of Wilkins' argument is that 
the police officers mentioned probation to him on several occasions, leaving him 
with the impression that such would be his punishment, although Wilkins also 
conceded that the police officers did not promise him 
probation.

 
 
[¶7]      Wilkins' mother 
testified that Detective Haukap promised her son probation if he 
cooperated.  She also testified that 
Wilkins had a learning disability and that he froze up when taking tests.  Defense counsel then informed the 
district court that she had two other witnesses, Wilkins' father and fiancé, who 
would testify pretty much as his mother had, though it would be cumulative.  The district court appeared to agree 
that it would take note of the other two witnesses' testimony as well, although 
they did not testify.

 
 
[¶8]      Wilkins met with 
police officers on two occasions.  
Portions of both of those sessions were tape-recorded.  The tape recordings were not 
transcribed, but the district court listened to the tape recordings, noting that 
they were difficult to understand because of the poor quality of the 
recording.  The cassette tapes are a 
part of the record on appeal and we too have considered them in our resolution 
of this appeal.

 
 

 
[¶9]      A trial court's 
ruling on a defendant's motion to suppress a statement on the grounds that it 
was made involuntarily is reviewed de novo.   In conducting such a review, we 
defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly 
erroneous.  This Court considers all 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination 
because the trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence and to assess 
the credibility of witnesses.  The 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Wyoming 
Constitution article 1, §§ 6 and 11, require that confessions be voluntary.  A statement that is obtained by coercion 
is not trustworthy and may not be used at trial against the person who made 
it.  A defendant is deprived of the 
right to due process of law if an involuntary statement is admitted at his 
trial.  A statement is considered to 
be voluntary if the defendant of his own free and deliberate choice, and not 
because of intimidation, coercion, or deception, makes it.  The prosecution has the burden to prove, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant's statement is 
voluntary.  We must examine the 
totality of the circumstances that existed when the statements were procured in 
order to determine the voluntary nature of those statements.  Lara v. State, 2001 WY 53, 
¶¶9-10, 25 P.3d 507, 510, ¶¶9-10 (citing Edwards v. State, 973 P.2d 41, 
48 (Wyo.1999)); also see Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶¶50-59, 84 P.3d 320, ¶¶50-59, and Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1194-95 (Wyo. 
1997).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   The district court issued a 
decision letter announcing its conclusion that it would not suppress Wilkins' 
confession:

 
 
Given that there is no dispute about 
the fact that the officers did discuss the possible consequences of a conviction 
for the offense, the difference between an informational statement of the 
possibilities and on the other hand an improper promise of probation could 
depend upon one's subjective interpretation of what was said, influenced no 
doubt, by what one wanted to hear.  
Recall may be influenced in the same way.  The differences, though critical, may be 
quite subtle.

 
 
Having heard the testimony of the 
police officers, the defendant and his mother, the tape-recorded portions of the 
interviews, it is the finding of the Court that the alleged promises were not 
made.  The conclusion that the 
confession was voluntary almost necessarily follows, though the circumstances 
must be viewed in their entirety.  
The finding requires some explanation because it implies the rejection of 
the testimony of the defendant and his mother.

 
 
Wilkins was interviewed by Haukap on 
March 29, 2001, and by Reese and Haukap on April 23, 2001.  There is no record of the entirety of 
the conversations among the various participants on those dates, but there are 
tape recordings of portions of those conversations, more particularly the 
interviews of Wilkins.  The March 
29th interview of Wilkins by Haukap begins 
with Haukap's statement to Wilkins that he is not in custody and need make no 
statement.  Wilkins acknowledged 
this information.  Haukap described 
the charges made by the girls and Wilkins denied them.  The recordings are of very poor quality 
and difficult to understand, but with effort one can make out their 

  
content.  The March 29th interview of 
Wilkins by Haukap, toward the end, includes the following:

 
 
[215]  DETECTIVE 
HAUKAP:  Are you worried about what's gonna 
happen?

 
 
            
MICHAEL:  
Kinda.

 
 
            
HAUKAP:  You have any questions about what could 
happen?

 
 
            
MICHAEL:  Well, I just wanna know what would happen if you went 
to the full extent of the law on me.

 
 
            
HAUKAP:  Well, at this point Dave and they have no say in it 
since it got reported to us.  We 
will do our report and send it to [the] DA and they are the ones who are gonna 
file the charges and decide what's appropriate and what's 
not.

 
 
I mean, I can state from information 
right now that you'll probably get charged with 3rd degree sexual assault; once through [M] and a 
couple of counts or a couple of times through [L].  So, like I said, could be nothing ever 
happened. That's why I want you to take the polygraph 
test.

 
 
The interview ended with Wilkins 
denying having sexual intercourse with [L] or fondling [M].  This interview, so as far as the tape 
reveals, did not include any promise express or implied by Haukap to 
Wilkins.  But that is not conclusive 
because Wilkins alleges that Haukap's representation was made after the 
interview when the two of them returned to the room in which Wilkins' family 
[was] waiting.

 
 
The other tape is a recording of the 
interview of Wilkins after the polygraph result was given to him and after his 
confession, which included his detailed statement describing his commission of 
the offense charged.  The tape 
reveals that he is quite cooperative.  
Wilkins is told toward the end of this interview that the detectives 
could not see the DA putting him in jail for this offense.  Haukap:  "And I don'tI will doubt the DAyou 
know I don'tI don't see them putting you in jail for this."  It must be emphasized, though, that this 
was after Wilkins made his confession.

 
 
The conversation on the tape 
indicates the detectives are speaking on the assumption that since Wilkins has 
confessed he intended to admit guilt in the legal proceedings.  They do inform him that there could be 
charges arising out of the occurrence alleged by [M] concerning which Wilkins 
made no admissions.  In view of the 
above, it must be said that the tapes give no conclusive evidence.  If the alleged assurance was given 
Wilkins it is not included on these tapes.  
However, as previously stated, there were portions of the conversation 
not recorded.  This leaves one to 
rely on the other available evidence, including the testimony at the hearing on 
the motion.

 
 
Wilkins' own testimony at the 
hearing is that on three occasions he was assured by the police officers that 
probation would be the worst that could befall him.  That his testimony is self-serving is 
obvious, but it does not necessarily mean that it should be rejected.  Rather, it should be weighed with the 
other evidence.  What damages 
Wilkins' credibility is that one way or the other he was untruthful.  That is, he first vehemently denied any 
sexual contact with [L], then admitted it, then did another about-face and now 
denies it.  He testified that he 
falsely told the officers that he did it only because his family was very upset 
about it and he thought that since he would get only probation anyway he may as 
well admit it and get it all over with.  
Wilkins thus testified under oath that if it suited his purpose at the 
moment he would be untruthful.  In 
view of the several changes in Wilkins's position, it is difficult to ascribe 
much credibility to his testimony.  
That testimony was, however, corroborated by that of Mr. Wilkins' 
mother.

 
 
            
Taken all together, Mrs. Wilkins' testimony simply is not 
convincing.  It is clear that she, 
as most mothers one supposes naturally would, finds it hard to believe that her 
son would commit such an offense.  
That it occurred within the family probably makes it even harder to 
accept.  But Mrs. Wilkins' testimony 
reveals her mindset that there is no way she would believe that her son 
committed the offense and is convinced that if he confessed to it he was 
duped.  She equates what she refers 
to as Wilkins' "anxiety" about taking tests with his not doing well in the 
polygraph examination.  Drawing 
such

  
a parallel between testing in the 
academic sense and a "lie detector test" is a stretch.  Wilkins is 22 years old, at the time of 
the hearing he was married and living apart from his own family, although with 
his wife's parents.  He received a 
high school diploma.  His own 
testimony indicates more a capacity to manipulate that susceptibility to 
manipulation.

 
 
Just as the testimony of the accused 
may not be rejected on the basis alone that it is his testimony, so the 
testimony of police officers may not [be] accepted solely because it is the 
testimony of police officers.  
However, the two officers who testified, Haukap and Reese, are police 
officers of substantial experience.  
Had they made the statements attributed to them by Wilkins it would have 
been wrong in several respects other than the improper inducement of the 
confession.  First, of course, it 
would have been an untrue statement.  
These officers know full well that there can be no guarantee of probation 
on any felony offense.  There are 
simply far too many variables.  In 
addition, they are without authority to make any such representation.  To have made the representations 
attributed to them the officers would have had to ignore their ethical 
obligations.  Nothing in their 
testimony indicated that they were not being truthful.

 
 
Also of significance is that 
Wilkins' denial persisted through the alleged assurances.  It was only after he was given the 
results of the polygraph that he confessed.  If the inducement for his statement were 
the promise, one would expect it at that time, rather than considerably 
later.

 
 
All of the above must be seen in the 
light of the factor mentioned early on.  
That is, there would need be only a slight difference in phraseology 
between an assurance of probation and information that probation was a 
possibility along with others.  It 
would not be at all surprising for Mr. Wilkins, his parents and fiancé to have 
heard or interpreted what was said to mean what they would prefer was said.  The hearing was several months after the 
incidents described in the testimony.

  
 
 
Other aspects of the voluntariness 
issue are not seriously in dispute.  
It is plain in the record that Wilkins was not undergoing custodial 
interrogation when he made statements to either Haukap or Reese.  In addition, he was fully advised prior 
to the polygraph examination and his subsequent confession of his "Miranda" 
rights.  The totality of the 
circumstances leads to a conclusion that the statement was voluntary.  In view of the above, the motion to 
suppress the confession and statements is denied.

 
 
[¶11]   We begin our analysis with an 
iteration of the standard of review that requires us to embrace the factual 
findings of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous.  A confession is not voluntary if it is 
extracted by threats, coercion, or improper influences or promises.  Burk v. State, 848 P.2d 225, 230 
(Wyo. 1993); Garcia v. State, 777 P.2d 603, 606-7 (Wyo. 1989); also 
see Gunn v. State, 2003 WY 24, ¶25, 64 P.3d 716, ¶25 (Wyo. 2003).  A confession obtained by use of false 
promises in exchange for a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege may require 
suppression of any statement made in reliance upon that promise.  State v. Petitjean, 140 
Ohio App.3d 
517, 748 N.E.2d 133, 144-46 (Ohio App. 2 Dist. 2000)(defendant informed that if 
he confessed to murder he would "probably get two years probation," whereas if 
the police proved he did it "you go bye bye for life, or lose your life.").  However, while a confession resulting 
from a direct or indirect promise of leniency is inadmissible, a police 
officer's statement to a suspect that cooperating is in his or her best 
interests is not improperly coercive and does not, as a matter of law, render a 
confession involuntary.  State v. 
Sutherland, 11 S.W.2d 628, 632-33 (Mo.App. E.D. 1999) (statement to the 
effect that if defendant cooperated he may be a good candidate for probation not 
coercive); also see A.A. v. State, 706 N.E.2d 259, 263-64 (Ind.App. 1999) 
(suggesting possibility of minimal punishment in exchange for confession, 
standing alone, did not render confession inadmissible); Knight v. State, 
971 SW.2d 272, 274-77 (Ark.App. 1998) (closely divided appellate court upheld 
trial court's decision not to suppress confession in case where probation was 
known to police officer not to be a possibility for that crime); and see 
generally Holmes v. State, 598 So. 2d 24, 26-28 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992) 
(promises of leniency and probation, coupled with threat with respect to 
habitual offender status, rendered confession 
involuntary).

 
 
[¶12]   Wilkins conceded that he was not 
"promised" probation.  His argument 
rests on his contentions that, by repetition of the prospect of probation, a 
"promise" arose and, based on that promise, he told the police officers what 
they wanted to hear even though the statement he made was not the truth.  When coupled with his inability to 
comprehend instructions, slow learning, test anxiety, and stress avoidance, he 
further contends that the suggestion of a promise of probation rendered his 
confession involuntary.  Wilkins 
also suggests that the polygraph test was explained to him in a "coercive" 
manner, i.e., if he did not pass it, he would be required to tell the police 
officers what happened.6  If that did occur, then it is not to be 
found in the tape-recorded statement.  
Indeed, our perception of the tape recording is that the questioning was 
very brief, non-coercive, and in general a cordial conversation between Wilkins 
and the police officers.

 
 
[¶13]   Wilkins parses the findings of the 
district court and takes aim at its conclusion that Wilkins' mother was not a 
credible witness, when both Wilkins' father and fiancé corroborated the mother's 
testimony, as well as that of Wilkins himself.  The district court does take into 
account that Wilkins and his three witnesses all agreed that probation was the 
centerpiece of the discussion they had with the police on March 29, 2002, and 
his decision letter classifies all of their statements as a legitimate, albeit 
self-serving, view of what they thought they heard.  Because that portion of the discussion 
on that day was not recorded, the district court had to rely on what all the 
witnesses said.  The police said 
they made no promise of probation.  
Wilkins concedes that there was no "promise" of probation, and his three 
witnesses claim such a promise was made, or that such a promise was at least 
implied by the circumstances.  We 
conclude that the district court's finding that no such promise was made is not 
clearly erroneous under these circumstances.  We also conclude that the district 
court's finding that Wilkins' learning disability and tendency toward "test 
anxiety" was not relevant to these circumstances is also not clearly 
erroneous.  The questions asked of 
Wilkins were very simple "Yes" or "No" questions, and the process was explained 
to him thoroughly.  The only 
evidence before the district court on that point was that the polygraph test 
assumes most persons are "anxious," and the test differentiates from on-going 
anxiety and the body's physiological response to answering pointed questions 
untruthfully (an example of such a pointed question is, "Did you have sexual 
intercourse with [the victim] on December 16, 2000?").

 
 
[¶14]   Wilkins also refers us to an 
exhaustive list of the factors that are to be taken into account when evaluating 
the voluntariness of a statement or confession.  However, most of those factors were not 
issues below and, furthermore, the record bears out that they are not relevant 
in the instant analysis.  For 
instance, it is clear that Wilkins was not in custody, he provided a written 
waiver of his Miranda rights that is rock solid, the questioning after 
the polygraph test was quite brief and, thus, his will was not overborne by 
exhaustive questioning.  The only 
factors of merit are Wilkins' contention that he was promised probation and that 
he had trouble taking tests.  We 
agree with the district court that Wilkins was not promised probation and his 
asserted "test anxiety" is not a factor rendering his confession 
involuntary.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   The district court did not err in 
determining that Wilkins' confession was voluntary and, therefore, admissible at 
his trial.  The judgment and 
sentence of the district court are affirmed in all 
respects.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

  
1The judgment and 
sentence, the amended judgment and sentence, the second amended judgment and 
sentence, and the nunc pro tunc judgment and sentence, all recite that Wilkins 
entered a plea of guilty.  The 
arraignment proceedings at which Wilkins entered his change of plea (he 
initially pled not guilty) demonstrate that Wilkins entered a nolo contendere 
plea.  See W.R.Cr.P. 
11(a)(1)(A).  At the change of plea 
proceeding, the district court equated a plea of nolo contendere with a plea of 
guilty and asked that a factual basis be established for the plea.  It was decided that the district court 
would rely on the affidavit of probable cause and Wilkins's attorney agreed with 
that procedure, but also stated that her client "maintains his innocence."  In Peitsmeyer v. State, 2001 WY 
38, ¶¶2-7, 21 P.3d 733 ¶¶2-7 (Wyo. 2001), we held that a factual basis is not 
required for a nolo contendere plea, indeed, such a requirement tends to 
obliterate the distinction between a plea of guilty and a plea of nolo 
contendere.  Moreover, in some 
circumstances a guilty plea may not properly be accepted by a trial court in the 
face of a protestation of innocence by the defendant, coupled with an inadequate 
factual basis.  See Sanchez v. 
State, 592 P.2d 1130, 1135-36 (Wyo. 1979).

 
 
   2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304 
(LexisNexis 2003) provides:

 
 
§ 6-2-304. Sexual assault in the 
third degree.

            
(a)  An actor commits sexual assault in the third degree if, 
under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first or second 
degree:

(i)  The actor is at least 
four (4) years older than the victim and inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim 
under the age of sixteen (16) years; 
or

(ii)  The actor is an adult 
and subjects a victim under the age of fourteen (14) years to sexual contact 
without inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim and without causing serious 
bodily injury to the victim;

(iii)  The actor subjects a 
victim to sexual contact under any of the circumstances of W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i) 
through (iv) or 6-2-303(a)(i) through (vi) without inflicting sexual intrusion 
on the victim and without causing serious bodily injury to the victim.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 

  3Wilkins was 
charged with two counts of third degree sexual assault involving two different 
victims (L and M).  The crimes were 
not reported to the police until several months after they occurred.  As a part of the plea bargain leading to 
his nolo contendere plea, the second count (involving M) was 
dismissed. 

 
  4The sentence 
imposed on Wilkins was a term of seven to ten years in a state penal 
institution.  From the outset, the 
sentence contemplated that if Wilkins successfully completed the boot camp 
program, then the remainder of his prison sentence would be suspended and he 
would be placed on probation.  On 
September 22, 2003, Wilkins filed a motion for sentence reduction.  In recognition of his successful 
completion of boot camp, an order reducing Wilkins' sentence was entered on 
October 6, 2003.  That order 
suspended the remainder of his prison sentence and placed him on four years of 
probation. 

  
5This refers to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301 (LexisNexis 2003) (placing person found guilty, but 
not convicted, on probation).

   6Because this 
argument is not supported by any evidence of record, and because Wilkins has not 
supported it with cogent argument or pertinent authority, we need not address it 
further.  However, we take note that 
there is an annotation that is of tangential interest to the issues at 
hand.  See Joel E. Smith, 
Annotation, Admissibility in Evidence of Confession Made by Accused in 
Anticipation of, During, or Following Polygraph Examination, 89 A.L.R.3d 
230, 235 (1979 and Supp. 2004) ("[I]t may be stated that the accused will in 
general be unsuccessful in challenging the admissibility of an alleged 
polygraph-induced confession unless specific coercive conduct or a denial of 
constitutional rights is shown, as opposed to merely alleging that, in general, 
the polygraph examination improperly influenced the accused in confessing to the 
crime involved.).