Case Title: Brown v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 40, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ALBERT BROWN, 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 40, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0703022100 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 11, 2010 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: August 16, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 16th day of August 2010, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and 
the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Albert Brown, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s summary dismissal of his first motion for postconviction relief.  After 
careful consideration of the parties’ contentions on appeal, we find no error in the 
Superior Court’s judgment.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
(2) 
The record at trial established that, on the afternoon of March 20, 
2007, Wilmington police officer Todd Riley was conducting surveillance using 
binoculars from an elevated position on Jefferson Street.  In a half-hour period, 
Riley twice observed Brown, who carried a cane, cross the street, retrieve a small 
 
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package from a plastic bag lying on the ground and return to other side of the 
street, where he handed the small package to an unknown individual in exchange 
for another object.  A short while later, Riley saw Brown cross the street a third 
time, remove an object from the plastic bag and continue walking down the block.  
Riley called for other officers to apprehend Brown.  Riley retrieved the larger 
plastic bag that Brown had left on the street.  Inside were smaller zip lock bags, 
which were described in the police report (written by a different officer) as “pink-
tinted” bags.  The contents of the bags field tested positive for crack cocaine.  The 
responding officers arrested Brown and found $159 in his pockets.  
(3) 
The Superior Court jury convicted Brown in November 2007 of 
possession with intent to deliver cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia.  
This Court affirmed Brown’s convictions on direct appeal.1  In February 2009, 
Brown filed his first motion for postconviction relief, as well as several 
amendments to the motion.  After considering Brown’s motion and amendments, 
as well as trial counsel’s affidavit, and the State’s response, the Superior Court 
denied relief.  This appeal followed.  
(4) 
Brown raises four issues in his opening brief on appeal.  First, he 
contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in several respects.  Second, he 
contends that his arrest violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an 
illegal search and seizure.  Third, he argues that a proper chain of custody was not 
                                                 
1 Brown v. State, 2008 WL 5308097 (Del. Dec. 22, 2008). 
 
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established for the drug evidence admitted at trial.  Finally, he contends that the 
police report and medical examiner’s report were both falsified.2 
(5) 
Before we can address the substantive merits of Brown’s claims on 
appeal, this Court must first consider the procedural requirements of Superior 
Court Criminal Rule 61.3  Rule 61(i)(3) provides that any ground for relief that was 
not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction is thereafter 
barred unless the movant can establish cause for the procedural default and 
prejudice.  Brown did not assert his Fourth Amendment, chain of custody, or 
falsified documents arguments at trial.  Moreover, on appeal, Brown’s trial counsel 
filed a brief pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  Brown filed a response to 
counsel’s brief raising forty-one pro se claims.  Brown, however, did not raise any 
of these three issues in his direct appeal.  Accordingly, we find no error in the 
Superior Court’s conclusion that these claims were procedurally barred by 
Brown’s failure to raise them on direct appeal and that Brown had failed to 
overcome this procedural hurdle.   
(6) 
Brown’s remaining claim on appeal is that his trial counsel was 
ineffective in several respects.  Specifically, Brown argues that his trial counsel 
                                                 
2 To the extent that Brown raised additional issues in the motion and amendments he filed in the 
Superior Court, those additional issues are deemed waived for his failure to brief them on appeal.  
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997).  The Court will only address the issues raised 
in Brown’s opening brief. 
3Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
 
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was ineffective because he: (i) stipulated to the admission of the medical 
examiner’s report; (ii) failed to subpoena for trial all of the police officers involved 
in the surveillance of Brown and his arrest; and (iii) failed to file a suppression 
motion.  The real gist of Brown’s claims is that there were “major” inconsistencies 
between the facts set out in the police report, the testimony of the police officer at 
Brown’s preliminary hearing, and Riley’s testimony at trial.  Brown also contends 
that the description of the drugs in the medical examiner’s report, which described 
the drugs as being in “red” baggies, was not the same as the police report, which 
described the baggies as “pink-tinted.”  Brown concludes that all of these 
inconsistencies are proof that the evidence against him was falsified, testimony 
was perjured, and his counsel was ineffective for failing to expose this fraud. 
(7) 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 
is required to establish that: (i) trial counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different.4  A defendant must set forth and substantiate concrete allegations of 
actual prejudice5 in order to overcome the “strong presumption” that counsel’s 
representation was professionally reasonable.6 
                                                 
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). 
5 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556. 
6 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 
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(8) 
Having reviewed the parties’ contentions and the record on appeal 
very carefully, we find it manifest that the judgment below should be affirmed on 
the basis of, and for the reasons set forth in, the Superior Court’s well-reasoned 
decision dated January 13, 2010.  There was neither attorney error nor prejudice to 
Brown from counsel’s failure to call the medical examiner or other officers besides 
Riley to testify at trial.  As the Superior Court found, whatever discrepancies may 
have existed between the police report and the preliminary hearing testimony and 
between the police report and the medical examiner’s report were “insignificant 
and [of] no consequence.”7  Calling these additional witnesses would not have 
changed the outcome of Brown’s trial.  Moreover, there was no error in counsel’s 
failure to file a suppression motion because the record clearly established that the 
officers had probable cause to arrest Brown and search him incident to arrest. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
7 State v. Brown, Del. Super., Cr. ID 0703022100, Herlihy, J. (Jan. 13, 2010).