Case Title: F. D. Scott et al. v. Kenneth Coachman, as Mayor of the City of Fairfield

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1081570

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2011-05-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
This case was originally assigned to another Justice on
1
this Court; it was reassigned to Justice Main on January 19,
2011.
REL: 05/27/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
_________________________
1081570
_________________________
F.D. Scott et al.
v.
Kenneth Coachman, as Mayor of the City of Fairfield
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court,  Bessemer Division
(CV-09-660)
MAIN, Justice.1
F.D. Scott, Vincent Smith, William Murray, Ronald
Strothers, and Ves Marable, the five members of the City
1081570
The record indicates that the circuit court scheduled a
2
hearing on the motion to alter, amend, or vacate and then
rescheduled that hearing.  However, the record does not
indicate whether a hearing was ever held, nor does the record
contain any ruling on the motion.
2
Council of the City of Fairfield (hereinafter referred to
collectively as "the city council"), appeal from the order of
the Jefferson Circuit Court granting the declaratory and
injunctive relief requested by Kenneth Coachman, as mayor of
the City of Fairfield, on his challenge to the city council's
enactment of Ordinance No. 1022.  Mayor Coachman asserted in
his motion that Ordinance No. 1022 impermissibly usurped the
appointment powers granted the mayor by § 11-43-81, Ala. Code
1975.  On June 9-10, 2009, the circuit court conducted a bench
trial at which it heard testimony from Mayor Coachman and
argument from counsel for both sides.  On June 30, 2009, the
circuit court issued a written order granting Mayor Coachman
the declaratory and injunctive relief he sought.  The city
council filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the ruling;2
this appeal followed.  We affirm.
Factual Background
Defendant's exhibit 1, a copy of Chapter 2 of the
Fairfield City Code, is included in the record.  Section 2-2
1081570
3
of the code provides: "The appointing authority for the city
shall be the city council.  (Code 1957, § 2-1; Ord. No. 356,
§ 1, 10-21-57; Ord. No. 516, 8-4-69; Ord. No. 545, 10-16-72;
Ord. No. 578, 5-6-74; Ord. No. 607, 11-16-76; Ord. No. 661, 6-
12-79)."  Ordinance No. 874, enacted on November 2, 1992,
provided that the mayor was the appointing authority and that
the mayor's appointing authority was to be exercised "'with
the advice and consent of the Fairfield City Council as
provided in Section 1l-43-81, Code of Alabama.'"
On or about May 18, 2009, the city council adopted
Ordinance No. 1022, which repealed Ordinance No. 874 and
returned the appointing authority to the city council where it
had originally reposed under § 2-2 of the Fairfield City Code.
Mayor Coachman vetoed Ordinance No. 1022.  On June 1, 2009,
the city council overruled Mayor Coachman's veto and enacted
Ordinance No. 1022.  Mayor Coachman then sought declaratory
and injunctive relief in the circuit court.  
Mayor Coachman testified at trial that he had served on
the Fairfield City Council from 1980 to 1984 and that he was
elected mayor of Fairfield in November 2008.  He stated that
he believed that Ordinance No. 1022 would adversely impact his
1081570
4
ability to supervise and discipline employees of the City of
Fairfield.  Mayor Coachman also testified that Ordinance No.
1022 would undermine his authority over city employees and
that employees would be confused as to whom they ultimately
answered to in terms of things such as being assigned tasks
and being disciplined.  He further stated that the city
council was not equipped to oversee the day-to-day operations
or supervision of city employees.
Mayor 
Coachman 
conceded 
on 
cross-examination 
that
Ordinance No. 1022 had been enacted and vetoed and his veto
overridden all in accordance with applicable rules and
procedures, i.e.,  Ordinance No. 1022 had been lawfully
enacted.  Mayor Coachman further conceded on cross-examination
that he did not recall any instances during his tenure on the
city council or as mayor of any member of the council
interfering with the day-to-day activities of city employees
or attempting to countermand his instructions to the heads of
the various city departments.
Standard of Review
Although there were some disputed facts as to whether any
irreparable harm was caused by the enactment of Ordinance No.
1081570
We note that Mayor Coachman did not file a brief with
3
this Court.
5
1022, the ultimate question in this case is whether, in light
of § 11-43-81, Ala. Code 1975, the city council could lawfully
enact an ordinance naming the city council, rather than the
mayor, the appointing authority for the City of Fairfield.
That question presents a pure question of law; as to it, the
facts are undisputed.   Thus, we review de novo the
3
application of the law to the undisputed facts.  See Barnett
v. Estate of Anderson, 966 So. 2d 915 (Ala. 2007).
Analysis
The Alabama Legislature has provided that, in a mayor-
council form of government, the council is the legislative
authority.  See § 11-43-43, Ala. Code 1975.  The general law
providing for the adoption and enforcement of ordinances by
municipalities is as follows:
"Municipal corporations may from time to time
adopt ordinances and resolutions not inconsistent
with the laws of the state to carry into effect or
discharge the powers and duties conferred by the
applicable provisions of this title and any other
applicable provisions of law and to provide for the
safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity,
and 
improve 
the 
morals, 
order, 
comfort, 
and
convenience of the inhabitants of the municipality,
and may enforce obedience to such ordinances."
1081570
6
§ 11-45-1, Ala. Code 1975.  Thus, the city council is
authorized to adopt ordinances, but only to the extent that
those ordinances are not inconsistent with existing state law.
One of the duties assigned by the Alabama Legislature to the
mayor in the mayor-council form of government is as follows:
"The mayor shall be the chief executive officer,
and shall have general supervision and control of
all other officers and the affairs of the city or
town, except as otherwise provided in this title.
He shall have the power to appoint all officers
whose appointment is not otherwise provided for by
law.  He may remove any officer for good cause,
except those elected by the people, and fill the
vacancy 
caused 
thereby, 
permanently, 
if 
the
appointment of such officer is made by the mayor,
and temporarily, if such officer was elected by the
council or appointed with its consent, in either of
which last two cases he must report such removal and
his reasons therefor to the council at its next
regular meeting, when, if the council shall sustain
the act of removal by the mayor by a majority vote
of those elected to the council, the vacancy shall
be filled as provided in this title."
§ 11-43-81, Ala. Code 1975.
The appointing authority of the mayor, although broad, is
not absolute and all encompassing.  Indeed, the very language
in § 11-43-81 extends the mayor's power only as far as not
otherwise provided by law and contemplates situations where
the council, rather than the mayor, is the appointing
authority.  The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals seemingly
1081570
7
recognized this possibility in City of Brighton v. Gibson, 501
So. 2d 1239, 1241 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987), stating:
"In our opinion § 11-43-81, in the absence of
any contrary statute or other contrary appropriate
authority, gave the mayor the authority to hire the
employee as her personal secretary without obtaining
the consent of the City Council. Such authority is
implicit in and merely part of the broad power
granted to the mayor by § 11-43-81 to supervise and
control the affairs of the City." 
(Emphasis added.) Further, although not binding on this Court,
the Alabama Attorney General has issued a number of attorney
general opinions concluding that, based on the authority
delegated to municipalities and in light of the language in
§ 11-43-81, a municipality is permitted to enact ordinances
naming the city council of the municipality as the appointing
authority.  See Ala. Op. Att'y Gen. 2009-103 (Sept. 8, 2009);
Ala. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2009-054 (March 13, 2009); Ala. Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 2004-163 (June 22, 2004).
Additionally, this Court has acknowledged that municipal
ordinances are "law," stating: "[W]e find further, that
Alabama case law, consistent with this statutory mandate
[§ 11-45-1, Ala. Code 1975], permits the enactment of laws by
ordinance or resolution in the absence of a statutory
requirement for a specific mode of enactment."  Tutwiler Drug
1081570
8
Co. v. City of Birmingham, 418 So. 2d 102, 106 (Ala. 1982).
The Alabama Attorney General has relied on this Court's
language in Tutwiler to conclude that a city council has the
authority to reserve for itself the appointing authority for
a municipality.  See Ala. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 1997-166 (April
21, 1997).
However, despite the Court of Civil Appeals' conclusion
in Brighton and the aforementioned attorney general opinions
to the effect that a city council can enact an ordinance
reserving 
for 
itself 
the 
appointing 
authority 
for 
a
municipality, we hold that the phrase "not otherwise provided
for 
by 
law" 
in 
§ 
11-43-81 
does 
not 
allow 
such 
an
interpretation in this case.  The source of a city council's
authority is not found in the ordinances enacted by the city
council.  Rather, the source of a city council's authority is
the authority that the Alabama Legislature granted it by
statute.  The legislature has granted city councils appointing
authority with regard to certain officers of a town.  See,
e.g., § 11-43-3, Ala. Code 1975 (city council appoints city
treasurer and city clerk in towns having more than 6,000
inhabitants); § 11-43-4 (city council appoints city clerk in
1081570
9
cities having less than 6,000 inhabitants and in towns); and
§ 11-43-5, Ala. Code 1975 ("The council may provide for a tax
assessor, tax collector, chief of police, and chief of the
fire department and shall specifically prescribe their
duties.").  The legislature has also granted the mayor general
appointing authority, subject only to those positions as to
which 
the 
legislature 
designated 
appointing 
authority
elsewhere.  Conversely, the city council's authority to adopt
ordinances and resolutions in a legislative fashion is limited
to ordinances and resolutions that are not inconsistent with
existing state law.  See  § 11-45-1, Ala. Code 1975.  Thus,
the council did not have the authority to override state law
to take the general appointing authority from the mayor and
assign that power to itself.
Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that Ordinance
No. 1022 is inconsistent with § 11-43-81, Ala. Code 1975.
Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's judgment. 
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Stuart, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Bolin, Murdock, and Shaw, JJ., concur in the result.  
1081570
Also, the authority to enact an ordinance is not without
4
limitations in addition to the statutory requirement that the
ordinance not be inconsistent with existing state law.   See,
e.g., § 11-45-1, Ala. Code 1975.
10
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
By statute, the legislature has chosen mayors, and not
city councils, to be the repositories of the general power to
hire and fire municipal employees. The statute by which the
legislature has made this choice, § 11-43-81, Ala. Code 1975,
by merely accommodating those situations "otherwise provided
by law," is reasonably understood simply to mean "law" that is
equal to or superior to that statute.  I cannot conclude that
the legislature intended to say:  "We choose by statute to
give this power to mayors as a general rule, but only to the
extent that a local city council does not override our choice
and elect to assign this power to itself."  I am not more
inclined to accept this notion merely because the legislature
has given the city council the general legislative authority
to enact ordinances.    Nor am I persuaded by the opinion of
4
the Court of Civil Appeals in City of Brighton v.  Gibson, 501
So. 2d 1239 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987), which actually is a ruling
in favor of the mayor in that case and which contains only an
1081570
11
unexplained 
reference 
to 
other 
contrary 
"appropriate
authority," or by applicable attorney general opinions, which
also suffer from a lack of analysis and for the most part
merely rely upon City of Brighton. 
In pertinent part, § 11-43-81 provides that the mayor
"shall have the power to appoint all officers whose
appointment is not otherwise provided for by law."  In City of
Brighton, the Court of Civil Appeals interpreted this
statement to mean that 
"§ 11-43-81, in the absence of any contrary statute
or other contrary appropriate authority, gave the
mayor the authority to hire the employee as her
personal secretary without obtaining the consent of
the City Council.  Such authority is implicit in and
merely part of the broad power granted to the mayor
by § 11-43-81 to supervise and control the affairs
of the City."
501 So. 2d at 1241 (emphasis added).  The Court of Civil
Appeals did not provide any authority for its assertion that
the phrase "otherwise provided for by law" includes "other
contrary appropriate authority" (although I would consider
this a correct statement insofar as it would include
constitutional provisions, assuming any were applicable, or
perhaps some contrary, but more specific, statutory delegation
of authority).  More specifically, the Court of Civil Appeals
1081570
12
did not explain, and provided no authority as to, what it
meant by the phrase "other contrary appropriate authority." 
The Court of Civil Appeals in City of Brighton did,
however, go on to explain that the power to hire and fire
resided with the mayor in that case because there was no
contrary statutory authority: 
"The City's reliance upon Ala. Code (1975), §§
11-43-4 and 11-43-7, is misplaced.  Section 11-43-4
gives the City Council the power to determine the
City's officers, their salary, the manner of their
election, and their terms of office.  That statute
has nothing to do with the hiring of administrative
personnel by the mayor to carry on the functions of
her office.  Section 11-43-7 gives the City Council
the authority to prescribe by ordinance the salaries
of City employees whose compensation is not fixed by
law.  That statute does not address the question
presented on appeal of who is authorized to hire
City employees."
Id. (emphasis omitted; some emphasis added).  Thus, aside from
its unexplained and unsupported statement concerning "other
contrary appropriate authority," the opinion in City of
Brighton actually supports the conclusion that it is the mayor
in this case who has the authority to hire and fire municipal
employees. 
Several attorney general opinions state that city
councils have the authority to withdraw the power to appoint
1081570
13
city officers from the mayor and give that authority to
themselves.  See, e.g., Ala. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2009-051
(March 10, 2009) (stating that "section 11-43-81 has been
interpreted as authorizing the adoption of personnel rules,
which then have the force and effect of law and take the
hiring authority out of the hands of the mayor"); Ala. Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 2009-054 (March 13, 2009) (same); Ala. Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 2009-103 (Sept.  8, 2009) (same); Ala. Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 99-072 (Jan.  5, 1999) (stating that "section
11-43-81 allows for other appropriate authority, such as
personnel rules, to govern the appointment of municipal
employees").  As  Ala. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-163 (June 22,
2004) makes clear, however, these attorney general opinions
rely upon the reference in City of Brighton to "other contrary
appropriate authority" to reach this conclusion:
"Section 11-43-81 of the Code of Alabama
provides, in pertinent part, that the mayor 'shall
have the power to appoint all officers whose
appointment is not otherwise provided for by law.'
Ala. Code § 11-43-81 (1989) ....  The Alabama Court
of Civil Appeals has held that, under the statute,
absent contrary authority, a mayor has the sole
power to hire a secretary.  City of Brighton v.
Gibson, 501 So. 2d 1239, 1240 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987).
In reliance on Brighton, this Office has interpreted
the statute to hold that a city personnel rule
governed the appointment of officers and employees
1081570
The 2009 
attorney 
general 
opinions 
cite 
previous 
attorney
5
general opinions that directly rely upon City of Brighton.  
14
[Opinion to Honorable Jerry W. Jackson, Attorney,
Haleyville City Council, dated January 5, 1999, A.G.
No. 99-00072] and that a city council can make
itself, by ordinance, the appointment authority for
all officers and employees [Opinion to the Honorable
Jay M. Ross, Attorney, City of Bayou La Batre dated
April 21, 1997, A.G. No. 97-00166]."
Ala. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-163 (emphasis omitted; emphasis
added).5
The sole exception to this reliance upon City of Brighton
is Ala. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 1997-166 (April 21, 1997), which
provides, in pertinent part:
"The issue of whether an ordinance is a law is
well-settled in the case law of Alabama.  The
Supreme Court, in Tutwiler Drug Company v. City of
Birmingham, [418 So. 2d 102, 106 (Ala. 1982),] when
interpreting Code of Alabama 1975, § 11-45-1, which
provides for the adoption of ordinances by a
municipality, held:
"'We find further, that Alabama case
law, 
consistent 
with 
this 
statutory
mandate, "permits the enactment of laws by
ordinance or resolution in the absence of
a statutory requirement for 
a specific mode
of 
enactment." 
 
Tucker 
v. 
City 
of
Robertsdale, 406  So. 2d  886 (Ala. 1981).
See, 
also, 
McQuillen, 
Municipal
Corporations, Vol. 5 (3rd ed., 1981)
15.06.'
"(Emphasis added.)
1081570
15
"Clearly, 
if 
the 
council, 
by 
ordinance, 
reserves
for itself the authority to appoint all officers and
employees, it has provided otherwise by law as
mandated in Section 11-43-81."
The conclusory assertion in the last sentence quoted
above is just that -- a conclusory assertion unaccompanied by
any authority or reasoning.  The quotation from Tutwiler Drug
Co.  v.  City of Birmingham, 418 So. 2d 102 (Ala.  1982), that
precedes it merely states that, if a local law is to be
enacted, an ordinance or resolution may be the appropriate
form for that enactment.  Further, although it is true that a
municipal ordinance is binding as "law" in respect to matters
that have not been decided otherwise by the constitution or by
statute and that the municipality has the  authority to
address by ordinance, this merely begs the questions whether
the matter at hand has in fact been decided otherwise by
statute and whether the municipality has the authority to
address this matter by way of an ordinance enacted by its city
council.   In light of the general statutory delegation of
authority to mayors in § 11-43-81, the question becomes
whether this Court can conclude that the legislature intended
that city councils have the authority to create exceptions to
this general rule by enacting ordinances to such effect.  If
1081570
16
not, then any such ordinance would have to yield to the
contrary statutory delegation of authority.
It is axiomatic that State statutory law is superior to
ordinances enacted by municipal corporations.  Section 11-45-
1, 
Ala. 
Code 
1975, 
provides 
that "[m]unicipal 
corporations may
from time to time adopt ordinances and resolutions not
inconsistent with the laws of the state to carry into effect
or discharge the powers and duties conferred by the applicable
provisions of this title and any other applicable provisions
of law ...."  See also Reed v. City of Montgomery, 341 So. 2d
926, 933 (Ala. 1976) (discussing a Montgomery ordinance and
stating that "[a] basic principle of our system of government
is the superiority of state law"); Hall v. City of Tuscaloosa,
421 So. 2d 1244, 1249 (Ala. 1982) (holding that "a municipal
ordinance that contravenes state law, as here, is invalid for
that reason alone").  Did the legislature intend to make a
general policy choice -- giving mayors the general power to
hire and fire -- only to follow that choice with a caveat that
local city councils are free to override the legislature's
choice and make some different "law" for themselves?  Had the
legislature intended this, it certainly could have chosen a
1081570
17
less obsfucated manner of expressing it, e.g., by simply
saying, "Except as a city council may by ordinance assign this
power to itself ...."
Furthermore, the term "law" in the phrase "provided by
law" when used in statutes is generally understood to mean
statutory law.  For example, the sixth edition of Black's Law
Dictionary states:  "Provided by law.  This phrase when used
in a constitution or statute generally means prescribed or
provided by some statute."  Black's Law Dictionary 1224
(6th ed. 1990).  State courts have interpreted the phrase in
the same manner.  See, e.g., Brooks v. Northglen Ass'n, 76
S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. App. 2002) (stating that "[t]he phrase
'unless otherwise provided' or similar language, when used in
a statute, usually refers to other statutes pertaining to the
same subject matter" (reversed in part on other grounds, 141
S.W.3d 158 (Tex. 2004))); Cook v. Turner, 219 Conn. 641, 644,
593 A.2d 504, 505 (1991) (concluding that the word "law" in
the phrase "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law" is "limited
to state and federal statutes"); Oregon County R-IV Sch. Dist.
v. LeMon, 739 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (stating
that "'"except as otherwise provided by law," means except as
1081570
18
otherwise 
provided 
by 
statute'" (quoting 
Yates 
v. 
Casteel, 
329
Mo. 1101, 1104, 49 S.W.2d 68, 69 (1932))); Manchin v.
Browning, 170 W. Va. 779, 785, 296 S.E.2d 909, 915 (1982)
(holding that the phrase "provided by law" means prescribed or
provided by statute); Trujillo v. Tanuz, 85 N.M. 35, 40, 508
P.2d 1332, 1337 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) (noting that "'[p]rovided
by law' means 'provided by statute law'" (quoting Fountain v.
State, 149 Ga. 519, 101 S.E. 294, 295 (1919))); and Pace v.
Pace Bros. Co., 91 Utah 132, 59 P.2d 1, 8 (1936) (concluding
that the phrase "except as provided by law" did not refer to
the "general law"; rather the phrase seems to "smack of the
flavor of something done by the legislature").  
This general understanding of the phrase "provided by
law" supports the conclusion in this particular case that the
legislature did not expressly choose mayors rather than city
councils to be the repositories of the power to appoint, only
to then add a clause in the same statute intended to empower
city councils to contravene that choice by way of local
ordinances.  It seems clear that the phrase "otherwise
provided for by law" in § 11-43-81 was intended by the
legislature to accommodate any applicable constitutional
1081570
See, e.g., §§  11-43-3 and -4, Ala.  Code 1975 (described
6
in the main opinion).  Unlike the main opinion, I am not
persuaded that the language in § 11-43-5, Ala.  Code 1975,
lends that statute for use as a further example of this point.
19
provisions and any existing or future statutes providing for
the appointment by city councils of specific city officials;6
it is not intended to grant to city councils the authority to
assign the power of appointment to themselves through local
ordinances.