Case Title: MICHAEL ANGELO SENA, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0192

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
MICHAEL ANGELO SENA, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 93Case Number: S-09-0192Decided: 06/30/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
MICHAEL 
ANGELO SENA, JR.,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Michael H. 
Reese, Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant 
Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Michael 
Angelo Sena, Jr., claims the district court did not follow the required 
procedures when it accepted his plea of no contest to a charge of battery.  We conclude that the procedural 
requirements were met, and affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]      
The 
issue stated by Mr. Sena is "Whether the trial court failed to comply with the 
procedural requirements of Rule 11 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure."

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
On 
August 15, 2008, an information was filed against Mr. Sena, charging him with 
"Battery  Third Offense Domestic," in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007).1  According to the affidavit of probable 
cause filed in support of the information, Mr. Sena's girlfriend was giving 
him a ride in her car.  He was 
extremely intoxicated.  While they 
were stopped at an intersection, Mr. Sena started punching her and pulling her 
hair.  She opened the driver's door, 
and fell from the car.  
Mr. Sena fell on top of her, hitting and biting.  She escaped, ran to a hiding place, and 
called the police.

 
 

[¶4]        
The 
responding officer found her still in hiding.  He observed that she was extremely 
upset, and had "numerous abrasions, cuts, and bite marks over her body."  He found Mr. Sena passed out in the car, 
with scratches on his face and blood on his hands.  The officer placed him under 
arrest.  He and his girlfriend were 
taken to the hospital for medical attention.  Mr. Sena was then taken to 
jail.

 
 

[¶5]        
On 
September 18, 2008, Mr. Sena entered a plea of not guilty, and was released on 
bond pending trial.  On February 18, 
2009, Mr. Sena appeared before the court on a motion to modify his 
bond.  At the start of this hearing, 
defense counsel told the court that Mr. Sena was prepared to change his 
plea to no contest.  As defense 
counsel explained, "the reason for the no contest plea," as opposed to a guilty 
plea, "is that he was highly intoxicated on the night and day that this occurred 
and has a very limited memory of what occurred."  Defense counsel informed the court that 
there was a "limited" plea agreement:  
there was no agreement as to sentencing, but the prosecution agreed not 
to object to Mr. Sena's request to be released on bond until sentencing, 
allowing him to participate in a residential treatment 
program.

 
 

[¶6]        
The 
court advised Mr. Sena of his rights, and engaged him in a colloquy to determine 
whether the requirements for accepting the no contest plea were met.  This colloquy is at the heart of Mr. 
Sena's appeal, and additional details will be considered in the discussion 
below.  The court found that there 
was a sufficient factual basis for accepting the no contest plea, and that the 
plea was made voluntarily and knowingly.  
It then accepted Mr. Sena's no contest plea.  It ordered a Presentence Investigation 
Report, and told Mr. Sena that after the report was filed, he would be sentenced 
at the court's discretion.  In 
accordance with Mr. Sena's request, and without objection from the prosecution, 
the court released Mr. Sena on bond.  
Conditions of his bond included no contact with his girlfriend and 
successful completion of the residential treatment 
program.

 
 

[¶7]        
Mr. 
Sena enrolled in the treatment program, but was soon terminated from it because 
he had contacted his girlfriend.  
His bond was revoked, and he was sent to jail pending sentencing.  At the sentencing hearing on July 2, 
2009, Mr. Sena's defense counsel noted that Mr. Sena had already spent 
approximately ten months in jail on this charge, and urged the court to sentence 
him to time served, followed by enrollment in a residential treatment program, 
then intensive supervised probation.  
The prosecution emphasized Mr. Sena's lengthy criminal record, which 
included several prior convictions for batteries against girlfriends, and 
advocated a sentence of three to five years imprisonment.  The court stated that it had reviewed 
all of the sentencing alternatives, but found that other options "are not 
appropriate and that it is necessary to impose a sentence of 
incarceration."  Mr. Sena received a 
sentence of thirty to sixty months imprisonment, with credit for time already 
served.  Mr. Sena 
appealed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶8]        
Mr. 
Sena's broad contention that the court did not comply with W.R.Cr.P. 11 is 
divided into three specific issues.  
First, he claims that the court did not properly advise him of the 
elements of the crime charged.  
Second, he maintains that the court did not tell him whether he could or 
could not withdraw the plea.  Third, 
he asserts that the court did not advise him that his sentence could be affected 
by the Addicted Offender Accountability Act.  The State counters that the district 
court met all of the requirements of Rule 11, with "every i' dotted and every 
t' crossed."  

 
 

[¶9]        
Rule 
11 sets forth procedures "for courts to use in determining that a defendant's 
plea is intelligent, knowing and voluntary and entered with an understanding of 
the consequences."  Thomas v. State, 2007 WY 186, ¶ 9, 170 P.3d 1254, 1257 (Wyo. 
2007).  The general purpose of the 
rule is "to 
assist the district judge in making the constitutionally required determination 
that a defendant's guilty plea is truly voluntary."  Britain v. State, 497 P.2d 543, 545 (Wyo. 1972) 
(interpreting former W.R.Cr.P. 15, now W.R.Cr.P. 11, and quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 
465, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 1170, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969)). 

 
 
Claims 
regarding the voluntariness of a guilty plea are reviewed de novo.  Maes v. State, 2005 WY 70, ¶ 9, 114 P.3d 708, 
710 (Wyo. 2005); Van Haele v. State, 
2004 WY 59, ¶ 12, 90 P.3d 708, 711 (Wyo. 2004).  We examine the procedure utilized to 
accept a guilty plea as a whole to determine if the trial court "sufficiently 
described the nature of the charges, including the possible penalties; informed 
the defendant of the right to representation; informed the defendant of the 
rights waived by a guilty plea; and obtained a factual basis for the plea."  Id.[, ¶ 11, 90 P.3d  at 711 (emphasis 
omitted).]  These procedural 
requirements are intended to assure that the defendant is not misled into an 
unintentional waiver of substantial rights.  Reyna v. State, 2001 WY 105, ¶ 9, 33 P.3d 1129, 1132 (Wyo. 2001); McCarty v. State, 883 P.2d 367, 372 (Wyo. 1994).  A guilty plea will stand where the 
totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the defendant made a voluntary 
and intelligent choice to plead guilty from alternative courses of action 
available to him and understood the consequences of his plea.  Maes, ¶ 9, 114 P.3d  at 
710.

 
 

Craig 
v. State, 
2007 WY 122, ¶ 8, 163 P.3d 828, 830-31 (Wyo. 
2007).  Mr. Sena did not enter 
a guilty plea, but rather a 
no contest or "nolo contendere" plea.  
However, "[f]or purposes of appellate review, a nolo contendere plea is 
functionally equivalent to a guilty plea."  
Major v. State, 2004 WY 4, ¶ 11, 83 P.3d 468, 472 (Wyo. 2004).  We therefore apply the same de novo standard of 
review.

 
 

[¶10]     
Rule 
11 has been described as "lengthy and complex."  Reyna, ¶ 7, 33 P.3d  at 1131.  Because Mr. Sena has raised three 
separate and discrete issues, it is unnecessary to quote or analyze the rule in 
its entirety.  Instead, we will 
focus on those portions of the rule relevant to the issues raised by Mr. 
Sena.

 
 
Did 
the court err by failing to advise Mr. Sena of the nature of the crime 
charged?

 
 

[¶11]     
Rule 
11(b)(1) requires a court, when accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, 
to "address the defendant personally in open court and . . . determine that the 
defendant understands . . . [t]he nature of the charge to which the plea is 
offered."  We have explained that, 
"To 
be informed of the nature of the charge' means that the defendant must be aware 
of what acts were necessary to establish guilt.'"  Duke v. State, 2009 WY 74, ¶ 23, 209 P.3d 563, 571 (Wyo. 2009) 
(quoting Sanchez v. State, 592 P.2d 1130, 1135 (Wyo. 
1979)).

 
 

[¶12]     
After 
defense counsel indicated that Mr. Sena was prepared to enter a plea of no 
contest, the court began its colloquy with Mr. Sena, which included the 
following:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  The charge in this case is 
third offense domestic battery.  The 
Information alleges that on August 13 of 2008 that you committed a third offense 
domestic battery on [your girlfriend].  
The maximum penalty for that offense is five years confinement and a 
$2,000 fine.  Do you understand the 
charge against you and the maximum penalty?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, Your 
Honor.

 
 
Mr. 
Sena claims that this did not adequately inform him of the nature of the charge 
against him because the "district court did not read aloud the full text of the 
statute charging Mr. Sena with third domestic offense triggering a sentence of 
up to five years."   

 
 

[¶13]     
Mr. 
Sena offers no authority for the proposition that the court must read the full 
text of the statute to a defendant.  
Our precedent suggests otherwise.  
In Reyna, we deemed it 
sufficient for the court to inform a defendant that he was charged with 
"conspiracy to commit forgery," without reading the statute or listing the 
elements of either conspiracy or forgery.  
In doing so, we noted that the "change of plea hearing did not take place 
in a vacuum," Id., ¶ 12, 33 P.3d  
at 1133, and therefore, we review "the totality of the circumstances" to 
evaluate whether a plea was properly accepted.  Id., ¶ 9, 33 P.3d  at 1132.  Among the circumstances we considered 
were that Mr. Reyna was "an experienced criminal, with three previous 
penitentiary sentences for felony convictions," and that he was "represented by 
an experienced public defender who reviewed the evidence and plea options with 
him."  Id., ¶ 12, 33 P.3d  at 1133.  Given those circumstances, we were 
satisfied that the court had adequately advised Mr. Reyna of the nature of 
the charge against him.

 
 

[¶14]     
Similarly, 
Mr. Sena has a lengthy criminal history, including several previous convictions 
on charges of battery against household members.  He was also represented by an 
experienced defense attorney, who informed the court that he had "gone over the 
affidavit of probable cause with Mr. Sena.  
And he does not contest it.  
He advises me that he does not contest those allegations, he just doesn't 
have any memory as a result of his excessive drinking that night."  Mr. Sena was adequately informed of 
the nature of the charge against him, and the court was not required to read to 
him the text of the statute.

 
 

[¶15]     
Mr. 
Sena also points out that the court did not ask him if he had been convicted of 
two previous instances of battery against household members, and further, did 
not inform Mr. Sena "that such prior offenses must be against a household 
member" in order to trigger the charge of "Battery  Third Offense 
Domestic."  On this basis, 
Mr. Sena claims that the court did not adequately inform him of the nature 
of the charge against him.  The 
record does not support this claim.

 
 

[¶16]     
Three 
times during the colloquy, the court informed Mr. Sena that the charge 
against him was "third offense domestic battery."  Because his criminal history includes 
several previous convictions for domestic battery, we have no doubt that Mr. 
Sena understood the terms "third offense," "domestic," and "battery."  Indeed, he explicitly confirmed that he 
understood the charge.  Furthermore, 
Mr. Sena did not contest the allegations set forth in the affidavit of probable 
cause.  Those uncontested 
allegations included the fact that Mr. Sena "has two previous convictions 
for domestic violence; one out of Colorado on 10-21-2004 and another on 
10-05-2007 out of Laramie County."  
In light of all of the circumstances, we conclude that the court met the 
Rule 11 requirement of ensuring that Mr. Sena understood the charge of a third 
offense of battery against a household member.

 
 
Did 
the court err in not informing Mr. Sena whether he could or could not withdraw 
his no contest plea?  

 
 

[¶17]     
The 
provisions of Rule 11 pertinent to this issue read as 
follows:

 
 
(e)       Plea agreement procedure.    

 
 

(1)          
In 
General.  The attorney for the state and the attorney for the defendant or the 
defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussions with a view toward 
reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser related offense, the attorney for 
the state will do any of the following:

 
 
(A)       Agree not 
to prosecute other crimes or move for dismissal of other 
charges;

 
 
(B)       Make a 
recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request, for a particular 
sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or request shall not 
be binding upon the court; or

 
 
(C)       Agree that 
a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of this case. . . 
.

 
 
(2)       Disclosure of 
Agreement; Decision of Court.  If a plea agreement has been reached by the 
parties, the court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement 
in open court. . . .  If the 
agreement is of the type specified in subdivision (e)(1)(A) or (e)(1)(C), the 
court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the 
acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the 
presentence report.  If the 
agreement is of the type specified in subdivision (e)(1)(B), the court shall 
advise the defendant that if the court does not accept the recommendation or 
request, the defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw the plea. 

 
 
Mr. 
Sena maintains that these provisions of Rule 11 require the court to tell him 
whether he could or could not withdraw his plea if the court did not accept the 
recommendation or request.  

 
 

[¶18]     
Mr. 
Sena does not indicate whether his plea agreement was of the type specified in 
Rule 11's subdivision (e)(1)(A), subdivision (e)(1)(B), or subdivision 
(e)(1)(C).  His position therefore 
appears to be that, no matter what kind of agreement was reached, the court was 
required to advise him whether or not he would be able to withdraw the 
plea.  This position is contrary to 
the language of Rule 11.

 
 

[¶19]     
Pursuant 
to subdivision (e)(2) of Rule 11, the court is required to advise the defendant 
that he has no right to withdraw his plea only if the plea agreement is "of the 
type specified in subdivision (e)(1)(B)."  
This advisement is therefore required only if the attorney for the State 
agrees to "[m]ake a recommendation, or . . . not to oppose the defendant's 
request, for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such 
recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the court."  In Mr. Sena's case, defense counsel made 
it clear that the agreement was not of the type specified in subdivision 
(e)(1)(B).  The agreement was a 
"limited one" because the attorney for the State had made  

 
 
no 
agreement as i[t] relates to sentencing; however, there is an agreement to 
release Mr. Sena on all the  on his own recognizance on all of the bond 
conditions that were previously set . . . but with the additional requirement 
that he participate and successfully complete the Transitions Residential 
Treatment Program here in Cheyenne. . . .  
So there is no agreement on sentencing, but there is an agreement to 
release him to the treatment program today.

 
 
Responding 
to questions from the court, the prosecutor agreed that this was an accurate 
description of the agreement, and Mr. Sena confirmed that it was consistent 
with his understanding of the agreement.

 
 

[¶20]     
Because 
Mr. Sena's plea agreement was not "of the type specified in 
subdivision (e)(1)(B)," the court was not required by Rule 11 to advise 
Mr. Sena whether or not his plea could be withdrawn.  The court could have given such advice 
and, under other circumstances, it may be prudent to do so.  In Mr. Sena's case, however, everyone 
knew that there was no agreement as to sentencing, and the court made it clear 
to Mr. Sena that he would be sentenced at the court's discretion.  The district court did not err by 
failing to tell Mr. Sena whether his plea could be 
withdrawn.

 
 
Did 
the court err by failing to advise Mr. Sena about the potential impact of the 
Addicted Offender Accountability Act on his 
sentence?

 
 

[¶21]     
The 
portion of Rule 11 relevant to this issue requires the Court to determine that 
the defendant understands "the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if 
any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law and other sanctions which 
could attend a conviction."  
W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(1).  To 
reiterate a point noted above, the broad purpose of Rule 11 is "to allow the 
judge to determine whether the defendant entered the plea voluntarily," and to 
be truly voluntary, a plea must be made "with an understanding of the 
consequences of the plea."  Major, ¶ 11, 83 P.3d  at 
472.

 
 

[¶22]     
Mr. 
Sena asserts that he was not adequately advised of the maximum possible penalty 
because he was not informed of the potential impact on his sentence of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1303, part of Wyoming's Addicted Offender Accountability 
Act.  Pursuant to this statute, a 
"qualified offender" (defined as "a person convicted of a felony whom the court 
finds has a need for alcohol or other drug treatment," Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 7-13-1301(a)(iv)) may be placed on probation to allow him to participate 
in a treatment program.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-13-1303(a).  
We 
have observed that "the unambiguous purpose of the Act, as set forth in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1304, is to determine whether an offender could participate 
in a treatment program without posing an unreasonable risk to the safety of the 
public.'"  Janpol v. State, 2008 WY 21, ¶ 20, 178 P.3d 396, 403 (Wyo. 2008) 
(emphasis omitted).  

 
 

[¶23]     
Mr. 
Sena points out that the court found him to be a qualified offender, and 
therefore, he was eligible for probation rather than incarceration.  "Because probation is a possible 
sentence," he asserts, "the trial court must so advise Mr. Sena."  This assertion is unsupported by the 
language of Rule 11, and contrary to our precedent.

 
 

[¶24]     
Mr. 
Sena was charged with a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) and 
(f)(ii).  The statute does not 
mandate a minimum penalty for this crime, so the court was not required to 
inform Mr. Sena of any mandatory minimum penalty.  The statute provides for a maximum 
penalty of "not more than five (5) years, a fine of not more than two thousand 
dollars ($2,000.00), or both."  
During the colloquy, the court informed Mr. Sena that the "maximum 
penalty for that offense is five years confinement and a $2,000 fine."  The court then asked Mr. Sena, "Do you 
understand the charge against you and the maximum penalty?"  Mr. Sena responded, "Yes, Your 
Honor."

 
 

[¶25]     
Under 
Wyoming law, "the restraints of probation cannot exceed a period in excess of 
the maximum term of imprisonment authorized by the statute violated."  Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743, 753 (Wyo. 1975); see also Lanier v. State, 900 P.2d 1161, 1163 (Wyo. 
1995).  Accordingly, Mr. Sena could 
not have been sentenced to a term of probation longer than five years.  We have recognized that probation "is 
an authorized mode of mild and ambulatory punishment,'" 
and that a "person on probation is not serving a sentence but is in a status something less than 
imprisonment."  Hicklin, 535 P.2d  at 753 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Korematsu v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 432, 435, 63 S. Ct. 1124, 1126, 87 L. Ed. 1497, 1499 
(1943)).  Based on this precedent, 
it is apparent that five years of probation is a less severe penalty than five 
years of imprisonment.  
Mr. Sena was informed, and understood, that the maximum possible 
penalty for the crime charged against him was five years imprisonment.  Because probation was not the "maximum 
possible penalty provided by law," the court was not required by Rule 11 to 
inform Mr. Sena of the possibility of probation.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶26]     
Having 
considered each of Mr. Sena's claims, we conclude that the court 
complied with the procedural requirements of Rule 11 of the Wyoming Rules 
of Criminal Procedure.  We affirm 
Mr. Sena's conviction and sentence.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
pertinent portions of this statute read as follows:

 
 
(b)        A 
person is guilty of battery if he unlawfully touches another in a rude, insolent 
or angry manner or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury 
to another . . . .

 
 
(f)         
A household member as defined by W.S. 35-21-102 who commits a second or 
subsequent battery against any other household member shall be punished as 
follows: . . .

 
 

(ii)            
 A person convicted upon a plea of guilty 
or no contest or found guilty of a third or subsequent offense under this 
subsection against any other household member, after having been convicted upon 
a plea of guilty or no contest or found guilty of a violation of W.S. 
6-2-501(a), (b), (e) or (f), 6-2-502, 6-2-503, 6-2-504 or other substantially 
similar law of this or any other state, tribe or territory against any other 
household member within the previous ten (10) years is guilty of a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, a fine of not more 
than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), or both.

 
 
The Wyoming 
legislature amended this statute in 2009, but in ways that do not affect this 
appeal.  See 2009 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
124.