Case Title: John Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee

Citation: 2007 WI 95

Docket Number: 2005AP001945

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 95 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1945 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
John Doe 1, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Alias Insurance Company #1, 
          Defendant. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
John Doe 2 and John Doe 3, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
Charles Linneman, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Franklyn Becker, 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  ___ Wis. 2d ___, 722 N.W.2d 400 
(Ct. App. 2006-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 24, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael D. Guolee   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs in part and dissents 
in part (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
 
2 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Jeffrey R. Anderson, St. Paul, MN, Marci A. Hamilton, 
Washington, PA, and James S. Smith, Brookfield, and oral 
argument by Marci A. Hamilton. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by John A. 
Rothstein, David P. Muth, and Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by John A. Rothstein. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Richard Jasperson and 
Richard Jasperson P.A., St. Paul, MN, and Matthew A. Biegert and 
Doar Drill, S.C., New Richmond, on behalf of the Leadership 
Council on Child Abuse & Interpersonal Violence. 
 
 
2007 WI 95
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP1945  
(L.C. No. 
2005CV1351, 2005CV1977, 2005CV4902) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John Doe 1, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Alias Insurance Company #1, 
 
          Defendant. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
John Doe 2 and John Doe 3, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
Charles Linneman, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
2 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Franklyn Becker, 
 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part; reversed in part and remanded to the circuit court.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals that affirmed the 
circuit court's order dismissing the complaints of John Doe 1, 
John Doe 2, John Doe 3, and Charles Linneman against the 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee (the Archdiocese).1  The court of 
appeals agreed with the circuit court that the claims against 
the Archdiocese for negligent supervision and fraud relating to 
the Roman Catholic priests' sexual molestation of children were 
barred by the statute of limitations.  John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese 
of Milwaukee, No. 2005AP1945, unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Aug. 29, 2006) (John Doe 1).  
¶2 
We conclude that the claims asserted against the 
Archdiocese for negligent supervision are barred by the statute 
of limitations because according to controlling precedent such 
claims are derivative and accrued as a matter of law by the time 
of the last incident of sexual assault.  However, we also 
                                                 
1 Judge Michael D. Guolee, Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 
presided. 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
3 
 
conclude 
that 
the 
claims 
of 
fraud 
for 
intentional 
misrepresentation 
are 
independent 
claims 
based 
on 
the 
Archdiocese's alleged knowledge of the priests' prior sexual 
molestation of children and the Archdiocese's intent to deceive 
children and their families.  We further conclude that the date 
of the accrual of the fraud claims is "when the plaintiffs 
discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should 
have discovered" that the Archdiocese's alleged fraud was a 
cause of their injuries.  John BBB Doe v. Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 312, 340, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997) (BBB Doe).  
This determination cannot be resolved by a motion to dismiss the 
complaints.  Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of the negligent 
supervision claims; we reverse the dismissal of the fraud 
claims; and we remand for further proceedings.   
I.  BACKGROUND2 
¶3 
This review arises from the consolidation of three 
lawsuits filed against the Archdiocese that was dismissed for 
failure to state a claim.  In 2005, John Doe 1 and John Does 2 
and 3 (the Doe plaintiffs), filed complaints that were nearly 
identical.3  The Doe plaintiffs, who are adults, allege that from 
                                                 
2 The facts set forth in the complaints and all reasonable 
inferences therefrom are taken as true for purposes of our 
review of the motion to dismiss.  John BBB Doe v. Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 312, 320, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997) (citing 
Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 512, 405 N.W.2d 305 (1987)) 
(BBB Doe).    
3 John Doe 2 and John Doe 3 jointly filed one complaint 
against the Archdiocese. 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
4 
 
1973 to 1976, when they were children, a now-deceased Roman 
Catholic priest, Siegfried Widera, abused them sexually after he 
had been criminally convicted of sexually molesting another 
child and the Archdiocese knew of his conviction.  It was after 
Widera's criminal conviction that the Archdiocese moved Widera 
from a parish in Port Washington, Wisconsin, to St. Andrew's 
Parish in Delavan, Wisconsin, where Widera molested the Doe 
plaintiffs.   
¶4 
The Archdiocese also was informed that Widera sexually 
molested an altar boy at St. Andrew's Parish and confronted 
Widera, who admitted he had made "a slip."  The Archdiocese's 
notes made contemporaneously with this assault are attached to 
the complaint.  They reveal that it would "try to keep the lid 
on the thing, so no police record would be made" and also that 
it knew the mother of the boy "feared reprisals from Church if 
she would go to police."  Subsequently, in 1976, the Archdiocese 
transferred Widera to California.  The Archdiocese told Widera 
to tell people in Delavan that he was going on vacation rather 
than telling the truth.  Widera molested numerous boys after his 
transfer to California. 
¶5 
The Doe plaintiffs claim negligent supervision because 
the "Defendant Archdiocese knew or should reasonabl[y] have 
known of Widera's dangerous and exploitative propensities as a 
child sexual exploiter and/or as an unfit agent and despite such 
knowledge, Defendant Archdiocese negligently retained and failed 
to 
provide 
reasonable 
supervision 
of 
Widera." 
 
The 
Doe 
plaintiffs also claim fraud because the Archdiocese "knew that 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
5 
 
Siegfried Widera had a history of sexually molesting children 
and that he was a danger to children," but notwithstanding that 
knowledge, the Archdiocese:  (1) affirmatively represented that 
it "did not know that Siegfried Widera had a history of 
molesting children" and "did not know that Siegfried Widera was 
a danger to children"; and (2) failed to disclose its knowledge 
of Widera's history of sexually molesting children.   
¶6 
The Doe plaintiffs contend they did not discover, nor 
in the exercise of reasonable diligence should they have 
discovered, that the Archdiocese negligently supervised Widera 
or that the Archdiocese knew of Widera's history of sexually 
abusing children until 2004.  It was in 2004 that the Doe 
plaintiffs allege they discovered that Widera had been convicted 
of sexually molesting a minor boy prior to Widera's abuse of 
them.  The Doe plaintiffs also contend that they did not 
discover, nor in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
they have discovered, that the Archdiocese's fraud was a cause 
of their injuries until they learned of Widera's conviction.   
¶7 
In addition, in 2005, Charles Linneman, an adult, 
filed a complaint alleging that in approximately 1982 another 
Roman Catholic priest, Franklyn W. Becker, abused him sexually 
while he was a child.4  Becker and Linneman became acquainted 
while Linneman was an altar boy at St. Joseph Church in Lyons, 
Wisconsin.  Becker was subsequently moved to a parish in 
                                                 
4 The 
complaint 
states 
that 
Charles 
Linneman 
was 
approximately 12 years old at the time of the abuse. 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
6 
 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, but continued to maintain contact with 
Linneman.  Linneman was sexually abused in the priest's living 
quarters when he stayed overnight at one of the Archdiocese's 
churches in Milwaukee in order to serve as an altar boy the next 
day.   
¶8 
Similar to the Doe plaintiffs' complaints, Linneman 
claims that the "Archdiocese knew that Franklyn Becker had a 
history of sexually molesting children and that he was a danger 
to children" before he molested Linneman in 1982.  Linneman sued 
the Archdiocese for negligent supervision and fraud.5  Linneman 
also claims he did not know the Archdiocese defrauded him until 
recently and did not discover, nor in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should he have discovered, that the Archdiocese was a 
cause of his injuries until recently. 
¶9 
The Archdiocese moved to dismiss the Doe plaintiffs' 
complaints asserting, among other things, that the claims were 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations.  The circuit 
court agreed that the statute of limitations barred the Doe 
plaintiffs' claims because the last sexual assault occurred 29 
years 
before 
they 
brought 
suit. 
 
Linneman 
subsequently 
stipulated 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
that 
his 
claims 
were 
"substantially identical" to the Doe plaintiffs' claims and had 
similar statute of limitations problems because his last sexual 
contact with Becker occurred 23 years before his lawsuit was 
                                                 
5 Charles 
Linneman also sued Franklyn W. Becker for 
"fiduciary fraud"; however, the appellants do not assert this 
claim on appeal. 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
7 
 
filed.  He agreed to the consolidation and dismissal of his 
claims, but he preserved his right to appeal. 
¶10 All the plaintiffs appealed and the court of appeals 
affirmed 
the 
dismissal 
of 
the 
complaints 
against 
the 
Archdiocese, concluding that the claims were barred by the 
statute of limitations.  John Doe 1, No. 2005AP1945, unpublished 
slip op., ¶1.  The court of appeals concluded that the negligent 
supervision claims were controlled by BBB Doe, which concluded 
that victims of non-incestuous sexual assault knew or should 
have known they were injured when they were assaulted, and 
therefore, the victims had "a duty to inquire into the injury 
that result[ed] from [the] tortious activity."  John Doe 1, No. 
2005AP1945, unpublished slip op., ¶¶10-11 (quoting BBB Doe, 211 
Wis. 2d at 340).  As such, "the discovery rule did not save the 
victims' claims against the priests because the statute of 
limitations began to run no later than the date of the last 
sexual assault."  Id., ¶11 (citing BBB Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 344-
45; Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 316-
17, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995)).   
¶11 The court of appeals also concluded that the fraud 
claims were barred by Wis. Stat. § 893.93(1)(b) (2005-06)6 
because the statute of limitations began to run when the facts 
constituting fraud could have been discovered upon diligent 
inquiry and under BBB Doe, "the appellants are deemed, as a 
                                                 
6 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
8 
 
matter of law, to have discovered their injuries no later than 
the last sexual assault.  . . .  Accordingly, they had a duty to 
seek out the cause of their injuries . . . at that time."  John 
Doe 1, No. 2005AP1945, unpublished slip op., ¶¶13-15.  All the 
plaintiffs petitioned for supreme court review, which we 
granted.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶12 We independently review a dismissal for failure to 
state a claim as a question of law.  Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. 
Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶10, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 
205; John Doe 67C v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 123, ¶19, 
284 Wis. 2d 307, 700 N.W.2d 180 (John Doe 67C).  "A motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency 
of the complaint."  BBB Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 331.  The reviewing 
court liberally construes the pleadings and accepts the facts as 
set forth in the complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences 
from those facts.  Kaloti, 283 Wis. 2d 555, ¶11; Pritzlaff, 194 
Wis. 2d at 311.  However, the court is "not required to assume 
as true legal conclusions pled by the plaintiffs."  BBB Doe, 211 
Wis. 2d at 331.  "Dismissal of a claim is improper if there are 
any conditions under which the plaintiffs could recover."  Id.   
¶13 In order to decide whether we should grant the 
Archdiocese's motion to dismiss, we must determine whether the 
plaintiffs' claims for negligent supervision and fraud are 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations.  As such, we 
must determine "when the plaintiffs discovered or, in the 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
9 
 
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered that 
they were injured, and the cause of their injury."  Id. at 340.  
Reasonable diligence is ordinarily a question of fact for the 
fact-finder.  Id. at 341.  "However, when the facts and 
reasonable 
inferences 
that 
can 
be 
drawn 
from 
them 
are 
undisputed, 
whether 
a 
plaintiff 
has 
exercised 
reasonable 
diligence in discovering his or her cause of action is a 
question of law.  In addition, whether an inference is 
reasonable is a question of law."  Id. (citations omitted).7 
¶14 In our analysis of this case, we may consider whether 
the complaints state claims for fraud due to the failure to 
disclose, which turns on whether the Archdiocese had a duty to 
disclose the history of the priests' sexual abuse.  "Whether a 
duty exists is also a question of law that we review 
independently . . . ."  Kaloti, 283 Wis. 2d 555, ¶10.   
B. 
Motion to Dismiss 
¶15 "A threshold question when reviewing a complaint is 
whether the complaint has been timely filed, because an 
otherwise sufficient claim will be dismissed if that claim is 
time barred."  Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 312.  In general, the 
controlling statutory limitation period is the one in effect 
when the claim for relief accrued.  Betthauser v. Med. 
Protective 
Co., 
172 
Wis. 2d 
141, 
493 
N.W.2d 
40 
(1992).  
                                                 
7 Therefore, whether a reasonable person knew or should have 
known of the Archdiocese's alleged fraud more than six years 
before the complaints were filed may be a question of law 
depending on the reasonable inferences from undisputed facts.  
See BBB Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 341.   
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
10 
 
Substantive "legislation is presumptively prospective unless the 
statutory language clearly [indicates] an intent that the 
statute applies retroactively."  Id. at 147 (quoting United 
States Fire Ins. Co. v. E.D. Wesley Co., 105 Wis. 2d 305, 319, 
313 N.W.2d 833 (1982)).  However, if "a statute is procedural or 
remedial, rather than substantive, the statute is generally 
given retroactive application."  Id.  Statutes of limitations 
are generally viewed as substantive because they can extinguish 
otherwise 
valid 
claims, 
and 
therefore, 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations that applies is the one in effect when the claim for 
relief accrued.8  Id. at 149.  
1. 
Negligent supervision 
¶16 A claim for negligent supervision of an employee 
requires a plaintiff to plead and prove all of the following:  
(1) the employer had a duty of care owed to the plaintiff; (2) 
the employer breached its duty; (3) a wrongful act or omission 
of an employee was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury; 
and (4) an act or omission of the employer was a cause-in-fact 
of the wrongful act of the employee.  John Doe 67C, 284 Wis. 2d 
307, ¶43 (citations omitted).   
                                                 
8 Black's Law Dictionary defines "accrue" as follows:  "To 
come into existence as an enforceable claim or right."  Black's 
Law Dictionary 22 (8th ed. 2004).  We have explained that before 
a claim for relief can accrue, there must exist "a claim capable 
of present enforcement, a suable party against whom it may be 
enforced, and a party who has a present right to enforce it."  
Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y of Wis., 149 Wis. 2d 19, 26, 
437 N.W.2d 532 (1989) (quoting Barry v. Minahan, 127 Wis. 570, 
573, 107 N.W. 488 (1906)). 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
11 
 
¶17 In the case before us, the last sexual assault of the 
Doe plaintiffs occurred no later than 1976.  Therefore, if their 
claim for negligent supervision accrued then, the statute of 
limitations would be three years from that date in 1976.  Wis. 
Stat. § 893.205(1) (1975-76).  However, because all of the Doe 
plaintiffs were less than 18 years of age at the time their 
claims for relief accrued, the statute of limitations would have 
been tolled for one year after each Doe claimant reached the age 
of 18.  Wis. Stat. § 893.33(1) (1975-76).   
¶18 In 1979, ch. 893 was repealed and recreated in its 
entirety and Wis. Stat. § 893.33 was revamped and renumbered as 
Wis. Stat. § 893.16.  § 28, ch. 323, Laws of 1979.  Therefore, 
if the claim for negligent supervision accrued in 1982, when 
Linneman alleges he was last assaulted by Becker, the statute of 
limitations would still be three years, Wis. Stat. § 893.54(1) 
(1981-82), but it would be tolled for two years after Linneman 
reached the age of 18.  Wis. Stat. § 893.16.9  The current 
statute of limitations for negligence is still three years from 
the date when the claim accrued.  § 893.54(1).  Therefore, 
unless the claims for negligent supervision accrued within three 
years of when the complaints were filed in 2005, they are 
barred.  Accordingly, we must determine when the claims accrued. 
¶19 Similar to this case, in BBB Doe, all the plaintiffs' 
claims against the Archdiocese included a claim for negligence 
                                                 
9 The current Wis. Stat. § 893.16 applies to claims for 
relief that accrued after July 1, 1980.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.16(5)(c).   
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
12 
 
in the training, placement and supervision of priests who 
allegedly sexually assaulted them while they were minors.  BBB 
Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 324.  In determining when the claims 
accrued, we first reviewed the policy considerations underlying 
the statute of limitations and noted:   
On the one hand, we are concerned with allowing tort 
victims a fair opportunity to enforce legitimate 
claims against wrongdoers.  On the other hand, we are 
concerned with protecting defendants from having to 
defend against stale claims, where so much time has 
passed between the allegedly tortious act and the 
filing of the claim that witnesses and relevant 
evidence may be unavailable.   
Id. at 334.   
¶20 With these policy considerations in mind, we reviewed 
the development of the discovery rule in Wisconsin.  Id. at 334-
38.  We noted that the discovery rule was first adopted in 
Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 560, 335 N.W.2d 578 
(1983).  There we held that "all tort actions other than those 
already governed by a legislatively created discovery rule . . . 
accrue on the date the injury is discovered or with reasonable 
diligence 
should [have been] discovered, whichever occurs 
first."  Id.  After Hansen, we decided that the discovery rule 
also applied to discovery of the cause of the injury.  BBB Doe, 
211 Wis. 2d at 335 (citing Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 
397, 411, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986)). 
¶21 In BBB Doe, we reviewed opinions in which the 
discovery rule was applied to negligence allegations arising 
from sexual assault.  Id. at 335-38 (citing Hammer v. Hammer, 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
13 
 
142 Wis. 2d 257, 267, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Ct. App. 1987);10 Pritzlaff, 
194 Wis. 2d at 319).  In Pritzlaff, the plaintiff alleged that 
she was coerced into sexual relations with a priest and filed 
claims against the priest and also against the Archdiocese for 
negligent 
hiring, 
retaining, 
training 
and 
supervision.  
Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 306-07.  Twenty-seven years had passed 
since the end of the alleged relationship between the plaintiff 
and the priest, and therefore, one of the issues was whether the 
statute of limitations had been tolled during that time.  Id. at 
312.  We explained that the discovery rule "tolls the statute of 
limitations until the plaintiff discovers or with reasonable 
diligence should have discovered that he or she has suffered 
actual 
damage 
due 
to 
wrongs 
committed 
by 
a 
particular, 
identified person."  Id. at 315-16 (citations omitted).  Since 
Pritzlaff knew both the identity of the tortfeasor and the 
injurious conduct, we determined that she could have alleged her 
complete cause of action by the time the relationship ended, and 
therefore, the claims were time barred.  Id. at 316-17. 
¶22 In BBB Doe, one or more of the plaintiffs alleged 
claims 
against 
the 
Archdiocese 
"for 
negligent 
training, 
placement, and supervision of the priest, liability under the 
doctrine of apparent authority, and for breach of duty under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.981 [(1995-96)] to report abuse and mitigate 
harm."  BBB Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 322.  During our review, we 
                                                 
10 In Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257, 267, 418 N.W.2d 23 
(Ct. App. 1987), the court of appeals applied the discovery rule 
to claims of incest. 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
14 
 
explained a plaintiff's duty to conduct due diligence under the 
discovery rule: 
Plaintiffs have a duty to inquire into the injury that 
results from tortious activity.  The measure of 
diligence required of a plaintiff to discover the 
elements of his or her cause of action is such 
diligence as the great majority of persons would use 
in the same or similar circumstances.  Plaintiffs may 
not ignore means of information reasonably available 
to them, but must in good faith apply their attention 
to those particulars which may be inferred to be 
within their reach. . . .  If the plaintiff has 
information providing the basis for an objective 
belief as to his or her injury and its cause, he or 
she has discovered the injury and its cause.   
Id. at 340-41 (citations omitted).  Applying the discovery rule 
in that case, we concluded as a matter of law that each of the 
five "plaintiffs discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, should have discovered" their injury and the cause 
thereof at least by the time of the last incident of assault.  
Id. at 342.  We noted that "[a]s we recognized in Pritzlaff, 
actionable 
injury 
flows immediately from a nonconsensual, 
intentional sexual touching.  While the plaintiffs may not have 
known the extent of their injuries at the time of the sexual 
assaults, in Wisconsin accrual of an action is not dependent 
upon knowing the full extent of one's injuries."  Id. at 343-44 
(citing Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 317).  Accordingly, we decided 
"as a matter of law that the claims of these plaintiffs accrued 
by the time of the last incident of sexual assault."  Id. at 
346. 
¶23 We concluded that the plaintiffs' claims "accrued by 
the time of the last incident of sexual assault," id., even 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
15 
 
though the plaintiffs claimed that they repressed their memories 
of the sexual abuse.  Because their recollections were delayed, 
they were unable to discover the identity of the abuser and the 
fact of the abuse until their memory had returned.  Id. at 357.  
We reasoned that: 
[I]t would be contrary to public policy, and would 
defeat the purposes of limitations statutes, to allow 
claims of repressed memory to invoke the discovery 
rule 
and 
to 
indefinitely 
toll 
the 
statutory 
limitations for these plaintiffs.  We hold that a 
claim of repressed memory of past sexual abuse does 
not delay the accrual of a cause of action for non-
incestuous sexual assault, regardless of the victim's 
minority and the position of trust occupied by the 
alleged perpetrator. 
Id. at 364. 
¶24 While our discussion in BBB Doe focused on the direct 
claims against the priests, we extended our analysis to the 
claims of negligent supervision against the Archdiocese, which 
we held were derivative claims.11  We explained that we were not 
                                                 
11 A derivative claim is one "that derives from, grows out 
of, or results from an earlier or fundamental state or 
condition."  
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
Unabridged 608 (1961 ed.).  For example, a derivative action is 
a suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action 
based on a right of the corporation.  Wis. Stat. § 180.0740(2).  
Accordingly, 
a 
claim 
against 
an 
employer 
for 
negligent 
supervision of an employee is derivative of an employee's 
wrongful act that causes injury to another, which wrongful act 
is alleged to have been caused by the employer's negligence.  
Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 267-68, 580 
N.W.2d 233 (1998).  A claim for negligent supervision by an 
employer contrasts with a claim of fraud by an employer, which 
is not a derivative claim.  The contrast is demonstrated by the 
elements of the fraud claim.  For example, proof of a claim 
based on fraud does not require proof of a wrong by an employee 
that causes injury to another.  Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg 
Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶12, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205.   
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
16 
 
addressing 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations 
relative 
to 
the 
plaintiffs' claims 
based on negligent employment theories 
because "[p]laintiffs' derivative causes of action against the 
Archdiocese and the churches accrued at the same time that the 
underlying intentional tort claims accrued, and similarly would 
be barred by the statute of limitations."  Id. at 366 (citing 
Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 312).   
¶25 We note that in Pritzlaff we decided that the 
discovery rule did not save the plaintiff's claims against the 
priest and that the claim for negligent supervision accrued 
against the Archdiocese on the same date as those against the 
priest.  Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 312.  At the time of our 
decision in Pritzlaff, we assumed, without deciding, that a 
claim for negligent hiring, training and supervision existed in 
Wisconsin.  Id. at 325-26.  We looked to opinions from other 
jurisdictions for the elements of such a claim.  Id. at 326.  We 
reasoned that if such a claim existed in Wisconsin, Pritzlaff 
would have to prove that the Archdiocese was negligent in hiring 
or retaining the priest because he was unfit for the role of a 
priest.  Id.  We explained that the First Amendment of the 
United States 
Constitution prevents Wisconsin courts from 
determining what makes a person competent to serve as a Catholic 
priest.  Id.  Therefore, we concluded that even if the 
plaintiff's negligent supervision claims were not time-barred, 
the claims were prohibited by the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  Id.   
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
17 
 
¶26 In BBB Doe, we relied on Pritzlaff for its discussion 
of the discovery rule as applied to claims of sexual assault.  
BBB Doe, 211 Wis. 3d at 336-38.  We then concluded that because 
the negligent supervision claims were derivative of the claims 
against the priests for sexual assault, they were also barred by 
the statute of limitations.  Id. at 366.     
¶27 In L.L.N. v. Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d 674, 563 N.W.3d 434 
(1997), we also addressed a claim for negligent supervision of a 
priest that was brought against the Diocese of Madison.  We 
assumed that a claim for negligent supervision existed in 
Wisconsin, as we did in Pritzlaff.  Id. at 685.  However, we 
refused to reach that claim because we concluded that the case 
involved sexual contact between two consenting adults, and 
therefore, a priest's vow of celibacy could be involved.  Id. at 
695-96.  We reasoned that a civil court "has no authority to 
determine or enforce standards of religious conduct and duty" 
and held that the First Amendment precluded L.L.N.'s claim for 
negligent supervision.  Id. at 696. 
¶28 In the case before us, we do not address whether the 
First Amendment prohibits the negligent supervision or fraud 
claims because the issue was not brought to us.  The Archdiocese 
explicitly stated in its brief that "there are no First 
Amendment grounds or issues presented on this record or appeal."  
The Archdiocese maintained the same position when questioned 
about 
First 
Amendment 
defenses 
during 
oral 
argument.  
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the conclusions we reached 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
18 
 
in BBB Doe, Clauder and Pritzlaff relative to claims of 
negligent supervision.   
¶29 The plaintiffs herein contend that BBB Doe, Clauder 
and Pritzlaff are not controlling because the law regarding 
negligent employment and supervision has evolved since those 
decisions.  The plaintiffs also argue that an employer's torts 
are not derivative, but independent of a plaintiff's underlying 
claim against an employee who caused the injury.  They rely on 
Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 267-68, 580 
N.W.2d 233 (1998). 
¶30 In Miller, we recognized that in Wisconsin a claim for 
negligent supervision is a "valid claim."  Id.  However, a 
review of our jurisprudence prior to and subsequent to Miller 
demonstrates that Miller in no way undermines or overrules our 
holdings in BBB Doe, Clauder or Pritzlaff.   
¶31 Prior to Miller, we had not decided whether a common 
law claim against an employer for negligent hiring, training or 
supervision of an employee could be maintained in Wisconsin 
courts.  Id. at 259.  Our decision in Miller does not mention 
BBB Doe, nor does it opine whether the tort of negligent hiring, 
training or supervision of an employee is, or is not, a 
derivative claim of the underlying wrongful conduct of the 
employee.  However, we did say in Miller that in order for a 
claim of negligent hiring, training or supervision to arise 
against an employer, there must be wrongful conduct by an 
employee.  Id. at 263.  And finally, since the employee in 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
19 
 
Miller was not a priest employed by an archdiocese, the First 
Amendment was not mentioned.  
¶32 We also recognize that there are cases describing the 
claim of negligent supervision as a claim that focuses on 
conduct that is separate from the underlying wrongful act of the 
employer.  See, e.g., Doyle v. Engelke, 219 Wis. 2d 277, 291 
n.6, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998) ("While negligent supervision does 
require an underlying wrong to be committed by [an] employee as 
an element, the tort actually focuses on the tortious, i.e., 
negligent, conduct of the employer."); Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d at 
698-99 n.21 (reasoning that "liability does not result solely 
because of the relationship of the employer and employee, but 
instead because of the independent negligence of the employer").  
However, 
Doyle 
and 
Clauder 
were 
not 
determining 
whether 
negligent supervision was or was not a derivative claim for 
purposes of determining whether the statute of limitations bars 
the action.   
¶33 For example, in Doyle, we were deciding whether an 
insurer had a duty to defend its insured against claims of 
negligent supervision.  Doyle, 219 Wis. 2d at 291 n.6.  We were 
explaining that the insurer's argument that it did not have to 
defend the claim on vicarious liability grounds was not 
persuasive because the claim for negligent supervision was not a 
claim based on vicarious liability.  Id. at 291-92.  We also 
said that while the intentional acts exclusion in the policy may 
exempt the insurer from defending the individual employees for 
what was characterized as intentional conduct, the tort of 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
20 
 
negligent supervision focused on the negligence of the employer.  
Id. at 291.  As with Miller, in Doyle, we did not mention BBB 
Doe, and we did not discuss whether a claim of negligent 
supervision was or was not derivative of the underlying wrong of 
the employee. 
¶34 In Clauder, the language to which the plaintiffs refer 
arose when we were explaining that a tort claim for negligent 
supervision was distinct from a tort claim for vicarious 
liability because vicarious liability is based on principles of 
agency 
that 
are 
not 
implicated 
in 
claims 
of 
negligent 
supervision.  Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d at 698-99 n.21.   
¶35 Clauder was released on May 23, 1997 and BBB Doe was 
released one month later on June 27, 1997.  Therefore, any 
argument 
that 
Clauder 
is 
persuasive 
authority 
for 
the 
proposition that a claim of negligent supervision is not a 
derivative claim as we said it was in BBB Doe is unavailing.   
¶36 Accordingly, we conclude that BBB Doe and Pritzlaff 
control the outcome of the claims for negligent supervision that 
are before us.  They are controlling precedent that have decided 
that 
the 
claims 
of 
negligent 
supervision 
made 
here 
are 
derivative of the underlying sexual molestations by the priests.  
As such, those claims accrued, as a matter of law, by the time 
of the last incident of sexual assault.  For the Does, this 
would be no later than 1976 and for Linneman, it would be no 
later than 1982.  As all claims for negligent supervision 
accrued at least 23 years before the complaints were filed, the 
tolling periods due to the plaintiffs' minorities are of 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
21 
 
insufficient length to save them.  Furthermore, even though the 
plaintiffs contend that their injuries and the cause thereof 
were not discovered until recently due to psychological coping 
mechanisms, the statute of limitations is not tolled based on 
claims of repressed memories.  BBB Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 357.  
Therefore, the claims for negligent supervision are barred by 
the statute of limitations for negligence, as applied in prior 
controlling precedent. 
2. 
Fraud 
¶37 The statute of limitations for an action based on 
fraud is six years, regardless of whether the claim accrued in 
the 
mid-1970s 
or 
any 
time 
thereafter. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.93(1)(b); see, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 893.19(1) (1973-74).  As 
with the statute of limitations for negligent supervision, this 
statute would be tolled for one or two years after the person 
who brings the claim reaches the age of 18, if the injury 
occurred during the minority of the claimant.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.33 (1975-76); Wis. Stat. § 893.16.  Based on this statute 
of limitations, unless the claims for fraud accrued within six 
years of when the complaints were filed in 2005, the claims are 
barred.  Accordingly, we must examine when the claims for fraud 
accrued.  However, before we analyze claim accrual for fraud, we 
decide whether the plaintiffs sufficiently allege all of the 
elements of a claim based on fraud. 
a. 
Fraud allegations 
¶38 A claim for intentional misrepresentation requires 
proof that: 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
22 
 
(1) the defendant made a factual representation; (2) 
which was untrue; (3) the defendant either made the 
representation knowing it was untrue or made it 
recklessly without caring whether it was true or 
false; (4) the defendant made the representation with 
intent to defraud and to induce another to act upon 
it; and (5) the plaintiff believed the statement to be 
true and relied on it to his/her detriment.   
Kaloti, 293 Wis. 2d 555, ¶12.12  The allegations of fraud in the 
complaints that are before us are of two types:  (1) alleged 
affirmative representations that the priests did not have a 
history of molesting children and that they were not a danger to 
children; and (2) alleged failures to disclose the material fact 
that each priest had a history of sexual molestation of 
children.  Either an affirmative representation or a failure to 
disclose, when there is a duty to disclose, can support a claim 
of intentional misrepresentation.  Id., ¶13.  
¶39 We note that Wis. Stat. §§ 802.02 and 802.03 set forth 
the requirements of pleadings generally and pleadings for claims 
of fraud.  Section 802.02(1)(a) requires "[a] short and plain 
statement of the claim."  However, § 802.03(2), pertaining to 
                                                 
12 We have concluded that a party to a business transaction 
has a duty to disclose a fact when: 
(1) the fact is material to the transaction; (2) the 
party with knowledge of that fact knows that the other 
party is about to enter into the transaction under a 
mistake as to the fact; (3) the fact is peculiarly and 
exclusively within the knowledge of one party, and the 
mistaken party could not reasonably be expected to 
discover it; and (4) on account of the objective 
circumstances, the mistaken party would reasonably 
expect disclosure of the fact. 
Kaloti, 283 Wis. 2d 555, ¶20.   
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
23 
 
pleadings for fraud, states "the circumstances constituting 
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."  We have 
interpreted this statute to require that "allegations of fraud 
must specify the particular individuals involved, where and when 
misrepresentations occurred, and to whom misrepresentations were 
made."  Id., ¶21. 
i. 
Affirmative representations 
¶40 As 
affirmative 
factual 
representations, 
the 
Doe 
plaintiffs allege that the Archdiocese represented that it did 
not know that Widera had a history of molesting children and it 
did not know he was a danger to children.  The Doe plaintiffs 
allege the Archdiocese did so by its responses to parishioners' 
letters wherein it affirmed the parishioners' positive comments 
about Widera's frequent interactions with children.  For 
example, on February 12, 1974, the Vice President of the St. 
Andrew School Board wrote: 
The children in our school literally follow him 
(Widera) around, he is so kind and shows so much 
interest in them.   
On February 19, 1974, the Reverend John J. Theisen, Executive 
Secretary for the Archdiocese, responded: 
We are most happy to hear that you are so pleased 
with Father Sig Widera.  We are happy to hear that he 
is doing well in the school and shows so much interest 
in the children.   
The Doe plaintiffs' complaints attach and incorporate these 
letters and other documents showing that Widera was convicted of 
a violation of Wis. Stat. § 944.17 (1973-74) (sexual perversion) 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
24 
 
on August 13, 1973.  It is alleged that the Archdiocese knew of 
this conviction when it responded in a reaffirming manner to the 
parishioners' letters. 
¶41 The Doe and Linneman complaints also allege that the 
Archdiocese's act of placing the priests in parishes with 
unsupervised 
access 
to 
children 
constituted 
affirmative 
representations that the Archdiocese did not know that the 
priests had a history of sexually molesting children and that 
the Archdiocese did not know the priests were a danger to 
children.  For example, the Doe plaintiffs' complaints allege:  
34.  By placing Siegfried Widera at St. Andrews 
in Delavan, the Archdiocese affirmatively represented 
to minor children and their families at the parish, 
including [the] Plaintiffs [] and their families, that 
Siegfried Widera did not have a history of molesting 
children, that Defendant Archdiocese did not know that 
Siegfried Widera had a history of molesting children 
and that Defendant Archdiocese did not know that 
Siegfried Widera was a danger to children. 
. . . .   
36.  Particularly, Defendant Archdiocese knew 
that Siegfried Widera had sexually molested numerous 
children and that Siegfried Widera was a danger to 
children before Widera molested [] Plaintiff[s].  
. . . .   
50.  Defendant Archdiocese knew that Siegfried 
Widera had a history of sexually molesting children 
before Plaintiff[s]. 
(See John Doe 1 Compl.)  Similar allegations are made in 
Linneman's 
complaint 
relative 
to 
the 
Archdiocese's 
representations about Becker.   
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
25 
 
¶42 We have held that acts can be the equivalent of a 
representation.  Scandrett v. Greenhouse, 244 Wis. 108, 113, 11 
N.W.2d 510 (1943).  In Scandrett, the attorney who had 
represented Greenhouse in a prior suit received an offer to 
settle the entire suit, including a subrogated claim, for $250.  
Id. at 110.  He responded to the offer by saying he would have 
to check with the insurance carrier in regard to its position on 
settling the subrogated claim.  Id.  The attorney later accepted 
the check without further comment.  Id.  However, when he 
accepted the check, he had not contacted the insurance carrier, 
and he did not pay its claim.  Id. at 110-11.  Later, when the 
insurance carrier sued to collect its $41.20 subrogated claim, 
there was a question about whether the attorney's act of 
accepting the check could be construed as an affirmative 
representation sufficient to support a claim for fraud.  Id. at 
111.  We concluded that it did and explained: 
It is not necessary for a person to make oral 
misrepresentation of fact in order to be guilty of 
fraudulent conduct,——such representations may be made 
by the acts or conduct of the party.  The rule is 
stated in 1 Bigelow, Fraud, p. 467:   
"Any conduct capable of being turned into a 
statement of fact is a representation.  There is no 
distinction between misrepresentations effected by 
words and misrepresentations effected by other acts." 
Id. at 113 (citations omitted).   
¶43 Courts of other jurisdictions also have recognized 
that 
affirmative 
representations 
may, 
under 
certain 
circumstances, be made by non-verbal conduct.  See, e.g., 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
26 
 
Haberstick v. Gordon A. Gundaker Real Estate Co., 921 S.W.2d 
104, 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that conduct undertaken 
to mislead may satisfy an affirmative representation); Bedell v. 
Daugherty, 242 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Mo. 1951) (concluding "[a] 
misrepresentation may be made by conduct calculated to mislead 
and to fraudulently obtain an undue advantage"); Guaranty Bond 
State Bank of Mt. Pleasant v. Kelley, 13 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex. 
Comm'n 
App. 
1929) 
(concluding 
that 
even 
if 
the 
husband 
consummated the deal with the bank, the wife's conduct "amounted 
to an affirmative representation that she and her husband had, 
in good faith, conveyed the homestead and reserved the lien thus 
assigned to the bank").   
¶44 Here, all the plaintiffs allege that the Archdiocese's 
act 
of placing the priests in parishes where they had 
unsupervised access to children affirmatively represented to the 
minor children and their families that the Archdiocese did not 
know the priests had a history of molesting children and that 
the Archdiocese did not know the priests were a danger to 
children.  Because acts can constitute representations of fact, 
based solely on the allegations in the complaints before us, we 
cannot conclude that such acts as are described in the 
complaints are not sufficient to constitute an affirmative 
representation.   
¶45 The 
other 
four 
elements 
of 
intentional 
misrepresentation were also pled by the plaintiffs.  First, the 
plaintiffs allege that the affirmative representations that the 
Archdiocese did not know of the priests' history of molestation 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
27 
 
and that the Archdiocese did not know the priests were a danger 
to children were untrue.  Second, the plaintiffs allege that the 
Archdiocese knew the representations were untrue when made.13   
¶46 Third, the complaints allege the Archdiocese intended 
to deceive the plaintiffs and induce them to act on the 
representations by not telling the parishioners of Widera's 
criminal conviction of sexually molesting a minor boy and of 
Becker's history of sexually molesting children.   
                                                 
13 The Doe plaintiffs' complaints state that Widera had been 
criminally convicted of child molestation and the Archdiocese 
knew of the conviction.  The complaints also state that the 
Archdiocese received a letter detailing comments of a priest 
that worked at the parish Widera worked at when criminally 
convicted.  The letter stated that a male grade school teacher 
who saw Widera "fooling around with the boys of another teacher" 
told the priest that if Widera "fooled around in the same way 
with his students, he would punch Father in the face"; that 
parishioners had come forward after the criminal conviction and 
reported incidents they had noticed and warnings they gave to 
their own children; and that Widera would shower all in the nude 
with boys and then "[w]hen an adult male entered the shower, Fr. 
Siegfried covered himself with a towel." 
Linneman alleged that the Archdiocese knew Becker had 
sexually molested numerous children and that he was a danger to 
children.  Linneman's complaint states that Becker fondled the 
genitals and attempted to sodomize a minor boy on approximately 
ten 
separate 
occasions 
from 
1971 
to 
1972 
in 
Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, and in approximately 1978, fondled another boy 
numerous times in California.  The pastor at the church in 
California asked that Becker be transferred back to Milwaukee.  
Linneman's complaint also states that the Archdiocese received a 
report from two parishioners in 1980 that Becker had "an 
unfortunate 
incident" 
with 
a 
teenage 
boy, 
whereupon 
the 
Archdiocese sent Becker to therapy and transferred him to 
another 
parish. 
 
Linneman's 
complaint 
also 
states 
the 
Archdiocese received other complaints from concerned parents 
regarding Becker's inappropriate behavior with children. 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
28 
 
¶47 Fourth, the plaintiffs allege that they relied on such 
representations because the defendants were in positions of 
superiority and influence, which caused them to be sexually 
molested and suffer damages.  Therefore, we conclude that the 
plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to state claims for 
fraud. 
ii. Failure to disclose 
¶48 The 
complaints 
also 
alleged 
fraud 
through 
the 
Archdiocese's failure to disclose the fact that the priests had 
histories of sexual abuse of children.  In general, silence or a 
failure 
to 
disclose 
a 
fact 
is 
not 
an 
intentional 
misrepresentation unless the person has a duty to disclose.  
Kaloti, 283 Wis. 2d 555, ¶13; Doe 676C, 284 Wis. 2d 307, ¶49; 
Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 26, 288 N.W.2d 95 
(1980).  "If there is a duty to disclose a fact, failure to 
disclose that fact is treated in the law as equivalent to a 
representation of the nonexistence of the fact."  Ollerman, 94 
Wis. 2d at 26.  Therefore, whether non-disclosure can satisfy an 
element of fraud turns on whether the Archdiocese had a duty to 
disclose to the plaintiffs the fact that the priests had 
histories of sexual molestation of children.   
¶49 Although the question of whether a legal duty exists 
is a question of law, id. at 27, it is an extremely complex 
question 
that 
may 
have 
factual 
components 
that 
make 
it 
unsuitable to address on a motion to dismiss.  When we review a 
motion to dismiss, we may, but we are not compelled to, address 
whether the complaint states more than one claim for relief.  
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
29 
 
Attoe v. Madison Prof'l Policemen's Ass'n, 79 Wis. 2d 199, 205, 
255 N.W.2d 489 (1977).  Because we have concluded that the 
plaintiffs' 
allegations 
of 
affirmative 
fraudulent 
misrepresentations are sufficient, we do not address the 
sufficiency of the plaintiffs' fraudulent misrepresentation 
claims based on failures to disclose Widera's and Becker's 
histories of sexually molesting children that were known to the 
Archdiocese prior to the sexual abuse of the plaintiffs.     
iii. Accrual of fraud claims14 
¶50 Since we conclude that claims for fraud against the 
Archdiocese 
based 
on 
intentional 
misrepresentations 
are 
sufficiently pled, we now determine whether such claims are 
barred by the statute of limitations.  The claims for fraud 
based on intentional misrepresentations are distinguishable from 
negligent supervision claims.  As we explained above, fraud 
claims are not derivative claims, but rather, intentional torts 
where 
the 
wrongful 
act 
is 
the 
Archdiocese's 
fraudulent 
representation that it did not know of the priests' histories of 
sexually molesting children and that it did not know the priests 
                                                 
14 Our opinion in BBB Doe did not address intentional 
misrepresentation.   BBB Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 319 (explaining 
that the plaintiffs alleged claims against the Archdiocese for 
"negligent employment, training and supervision of the defendant 
priests, and for failure to report the abuse").  Our opinion in 
BBB 
Doe 
also 
contains no discussion of the statute of 
limitations for fraud, as it would have if the viability of a 
fraud claim had been analyzed.  We point this out because there 
has been some confusion about whether BBB Doe addressed claims 
of fraud (intentional misrepresentation) by the Archdiocese.  It 
did not.  
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
30 
 
were dangerous to children. Fraud claims, if proven, provide a 
separate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.15   
¶51 The statute of limitations for fraud codifies the 
discovery rule and states:  "The cause of action in such case is 
not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved 
party, of the facts constituting the fraud."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.93(1)(b).  We explained the discovery rule as it pertains 
to fraud as follows: 
Actual and complete knowledge of the fraud on the 
part of the plaintiff is not necessary in order to set 
the limitation period running. 
When 
the 
information 
brought 
home 
to 
the 
aggrieved party is such as to indicate where the facts 
constituting the fraud can be effectually discovered 
upon diligent inquiry, it is the duty of such party to 
make the inquiry, and if he fails to do so within a 
reasonable time he is, nevertheless, chargeable with 
notice of all facts to which such inquiry might have 
led. 
. . . 
Under the rule quoted above, it is not necessary 
that a defrauded party have knowledge of the ultimate 
fact of fraud.  What is required is that it be in 
possession of such essential facts as will, if 
diligently investigated, disclose the fraud.  The 
burden of diligent inquiry is upon the defrauded party 
as soon as he has such information as indicates where 
the facts constituting the fraud can be discovered. 
                                                 
15 As 
we 
explained 
above, 
the 
reason 
the 
negligent 
supervision claims accrue at the same time as the underlying 
sexual assault claims is because when sexual assault by a priest 
is alleged, the negligent supervision claims are derivative 
causes of action to the underlying intentional tort claims.  BBB 
Doe, 
211 
Wis. 2d 
at 
366. 
 
No 
claim 
for 
intentional 
misrepresentation was made in BBB Doe.   
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
31 
 
Koehler v. Haechler, 27 Wis. 2d 275, 278, 133 N.W.2d 730 (1965) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted).  
¶52 In Koehler, we concluded that a stock purchaser was 
not barred by the statute of limitations from claiming fraud in 
the sale of corporate stock allegedly in excess of the number of 
shares authorized because no fact was presented that should have 
alerted the purchaser to look to the probate proceeding for 
information regarding ownership of shares prior to when he did 
so.  Id. at 278-79.  Here, the complaints set out no fact that 
should have alerted the plaintiffs to attempt to discover 
whether the Archdiocese knew that the priests had prior 
histories of sexual abuse of children.16   
¶53 The court of appeals applied the discovery rule to a 
fraud claim in Stroh Die Casting Co. v. Monsanto Co., 177 
Wis. 2d 91, 502 N.W.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1993).  The plaintiff in 
Stroh was a hydraulic fluid user that brought a products 
liability action against the manufacturer, Monsanto, alleging 
the fluid was defective due to high polychlorinated biphenyl 
compounds (PCBs).17  Id. at 98.  Monsanto moved for summary 
                                                 
16 Although voluminous submissions were made after we 
accepted review of this case, they may not be used in the motion 
to dismiss the complaints for failing to state a claim because 
that motion tests only the legal sufficiency of the complaint.  
BBB Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 331. 
17 PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls) "are toxic [compounds 
that] persist in the environment, and tend to accumulate in the 
food chains of both human beings and animals."  Stroh Die 
Casting Co. v. Monsanto Co., 177 Wis. 2d 91, 97, 502 N.W.2d 132 
(Ct. App. 1993).  
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
32 
 
judgment, claiming that the cause of action was time barred.  
Id. at 99.  The court of appeals noted that the "date of 
discovery" is generally a question of fact for the jury and is a 
question of law only where the facts are undisputed.  Id. at 
104.  The parties in Stroh agreed that for purposes of claim 
accrual, "it is not necessary that a defrauded party have 
knowledge of the ultimate fact of fraud.  What is required is 
that it be in possession of such essential facts as will, if 
diligently investigated, disclose the fraud."  Id. at 117-18 
(quoting Milwaukee W. Bank v. A.A. Lienemann, 15 Wis. 2d 61, 65, 
112 N.W.2d 190 (1961)).   
¶54 The court of appeals in Stroh concluded that the 
action was time barred under Wis. Stat. § 893.93(1)(b).  With 
the enactment of Chapter NR 157 of the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code in September 1977, entitled "Management of PCBs and 
Products Containing PCBs," Stroh had to incur substantial 
expenses for PCB testing and incineration due to its continued 
use of PCBs in its hydraulic fluids.  Id. at 118-19.  The 
regulation also alerted the user "to the pervasiveness and 
persistence of PCB-containing products in the environment."  Id.  
Furthermore, the user noted that the problems associated with 
PCB-containing 
products 
created 
"tremendous 
public 
outcry 
throughout the mid-1970s."  Id.  Therefore, the court of appeals 
concluded 
that 
"[a]s 
of 
September 
1977, 
a 
conscientious 
enterprise 
in 
the 
position 
of 
Stroh 
should 
have 
become 
suspicious of Monsanto's [representation] that its Pydraul 
fluids could continue to be used in Stroh's die casting 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
33 
 
operation."  Id. at 119.  Since the court of appeals concluded 
that had Stroh "diligently investigated the facts known to it 
[in] September 1977, the alleged fraud on the part of Monsanto 
would have been discovered."  Id.  Accordingly, Stroh's 
intentional misrepresentation claim was time barred.  Id. 
¶55 Stroh does not provide sufficient support to cause us 
to dismiss the fraud claims for at least three reasons.  First, 
Stroh was decided after motions for summary judgment and a full 
trial for factual development.  Id. at 99.  In contrast, the 
case now before us presents as a motion to dismiss where the 
only facts developed are those stated in the complaints or the 
reasonable inferences that flow from facts pled.  BBB Doe, 211 
Wis. 2d at 331.  Second, Stroh's failure to comply with federal 
regulations in regard to PCB disposal was a cause of its 
injuries.  Stroh, 177 Wis. 2d at 112.  By contrast, none of the 
children who was assaulted by Widera and Becker did anything to 
cause 
their 
own 
injuries. 
 
Third, 
reasoning 
about 
the 
investigation that reasonably may be required in a business 
context is not directly transferable to a relationship that is 
based on trust, particularly when the trust relationship arises 
in a religious context such as that of priest and parishioner.  
Therefore, it does not follow from the fact of being sexually 
molested that any plaintiff would suspect that the Archdiocese 
knew that the priests had prior histories of sexual molestation 
of children and yet placed them in the position where they would 
molest more children. 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
34 
 
¶56 It also has been argued that we should follow the 
reasoning of the Utah Court of Appeals in Colosimo v. Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 104 P.3d 646 (2004) and 
dismiss the fraud claims because the plaintiffs should have 
discovered the Archdiocese's fraud long before the statute of 
limitations on fraud had run.  We decline the invitation to do 
so.   
¶57 In Colosimo, the plaintiffs brought suit against the 
Bishop of Salt Lake City, d/b/a the Catholic Diocese of Salt 
Lake City, and other archdioceses (the Bishop) grounded in their 
sexual assaults by a parish priest.  Id. at 649.  Fraud was one 
of the claims alleged against the Bishop.  Id.  The trial court 
dismissed all claims on summary judgment.  Id. at 650.  The 
court of appeals affirmed the dismissal based on its conclusion 
that the trial court had correctly interpreted the Utah statute 
of limitations as barring all claims.  Id. at 652.  It concluded 
that because the plaintiffs knew at the time of the sexual 
assault that they were injured by the priest and because they 
knew of the priest's relationship to the other defendants, they 
were required after turning 18 years of age to "exercise 
reasonable diligence" in discovering whether they had claims 
against the Bishop.  Id. at 653.   
¶58 Colosimo is not persuasive.  Initially, we note that 
Colosimo is a summary judgment decision where facts outside of 
the pleadings were considered by the court in coming to its 
conclusions.  Id. at 650.  We have not considered facts outside 
of the pleadings and the reasonable inferences therefrom, when 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
35 
 
deciding the case now before us.  BBB Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 331.  
Furthermore, 
Colosimo 
does 
not 
give 
any 
reason 
for 
its 
conclusion that the assaulted children on reaching majority 
should have investigated whether the Bishop knew of the priest's 
history of sexually assaulting children before the Bishop placed 
the priest in the parishes where he assaulted Colosimo.  
Accordingly, as we review the complaints before us, we conclude 
they do not provide a basis from which we can conclude, as a 
matter of law, that a reasonable person in the position of the 
plaintiffs should have investigated whether the Archdiocese knew 
of Widera's and Becker's prior sexual molestations of children 
and yet placed them in positions where they could sexually 
molest more children. 
¶59 The Archdiocese also contends that the statute of 
limitations for sexual abuse of a child, Wis. Stat. § 893.587, 
demonstrates that the legislature's public policy is to toll the 
statute of limitations for the plaintiffs' claims no later than 
their 35th birthday.18  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.587 states:  
An action to recover damages for injury caused by an 
act that would constitute a violation of s. 948.02, 
948.025, 948.06, 948.085, or 948.095 or would create a 
cause of action under s. 895.442 shall be commenced 
before the injured party reaches the age of 35 years 
or be barred.  
                                                 
18 We did not address this contention under the claim for 
negligent supervision because we concluded those claims accrued 
at the time of abuse in the mid-1970s or 1982 and were barred by 
the statute of limitations then in effect.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 893.587 was not created until 2003 and did not take effect 
until May 2004.  2003 Wis. Act 279, § 6. 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
36 
 
¶60 The statutes listed in Wis. Stat. § 893.587 refer to 
acts of sexual assault, incest, or sexual exploitation.19  The 
act 
that 
the 
complaints 
allege 
caused 
injury 
is 
the 
Archdiocese's 
fraudulent 
misrepresentation, 
i.e., 
the 
representation that the Archdiocese did not know the priests had 
histories of sexually abusing children and did not know the 
priests were dangerous to children.  None of the statutes listed 
in 
§ 893.587 
refers 
to 
fraudulent 
misrepresentations.  
Therefore, the statute does not apply to these claims of fraud.   
¶61 We do recognize the important policy consideration of 
protecting 
defendants 
from 
defending 
stale 
claims, 
when 
witnesses and relevant evidence may be unavailable.  BBB Doe, 
211 Wis. 2d at 334.  However, we also recognize that tort 
victims should be given a fair opportunity to enforce legitimate 
claims against wrongdoers.  Id.   
¶62 Keeping these policy considerations in mind, we deny 
the motion to dismiss the fraud claims because we conclude that, 
based solely on the complaints, we cannot determine when the 
plaintiffs knew or should have known of the Archdiocese's 
alleged knowledge of the priests' past histories of sexual 
                                                 
19 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02 refers to "[s]exual assault of a 
child"; Wis. Stat. § 948.025 refers to "[e]ngaging in repeated 
acts of sexual assault of the same child"; Wis. Stat. § 948.06 
refers to "[i]ncest with a child"; Wis. Stat. § 948.085 refers 
to "[s]exual assault of a child placed in substitute care"; Wis. 
Stat. § 948.095 refers to "[s]exual assault of a child by a 
school staff person or a person who works or volunteers with 
children"; 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.442 
refers 
to 
"[s]exual 
exploitation by a member of the clergy." 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
37 
 
molestation of children.  Therefore, their claims may or may not 
be time-barred by Wis. Stat. § 893.93(1)(b), depending on when 
the claims for fraud accrued.  The date of discovery is usually 
a question of fact.  See Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 404.  However, 
if the facts are not in dispute or if there is only one 
reasonable inference to be drawn from them, determination of the 
date of discovery is a question of law that we will review 
independently.  See Vocational, Technical & Adult Educ., Dist. 
13 v. DILHR, 76 Wis. 2d 230, 240, 251 N.W.2d 41 (1977). 
¶63 Since a motion to dismiss does not present the 
opportunity 
to 
fully 
develop 
the 
facts 
surrounding 
the 
Archdiocese's argument that plaintiffs' fraud claims accrued 
more than six years before the date on which they were filed, we 
conclude that the claims for fraud survive the motion to 
dismiss.  However, we want to clarify that we are not precluding 
summary judgment if undisputed facts demonstrate that the claims 
for fraud accrued more than six years prior to the dates on 
which the claims were filed.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶64 We conclude that the claims asserted against the 
Archdiocese for negligent supervision are barred by the statute 
of limitations because according to controlling precedent such 
claims are derivative and accrued as a matter of law by the time 
of the last incident of sexual assault.  However, we also 
conclude 
that 
the 
claims 
of 
fraud 
for 
intentional 
misrepresentation 
are 
independent 
claims 
based 
on 
the 
Archdiocese's alleged knowledge of the priests' prior sexual 
No. 
2005AP1945   
 
38 
 
molestation of children and the Archdiocese's intent to deceive 
children and their families.  We further conclude that the date 
of the accrual of the fraud claims is "when the plaintiffs 
discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should 
have discovered" that the Archdiocese's alleged fraud was a 
cause of their injuries.  BBB Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 340.  This 
determination cannot be resolved by a motion to dismiss the 
complaints.  Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of the negligent 
supervision claims; we reverse the dismissal of the fraud 
claims; and we remand for further proceedings.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded to the circuit 
court. 
 
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶65 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  This case involves two types of claims 
against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee:  negligent supervision and 
fraud.  The plaintiffs, now adults, allege that as children they 
were sexually abused by Roman Catholic priests and that the 
defendant, the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, negligently supervised 
the priests and committed fraud by not disclosing information 
about, and by actively covering up, previous incidents of sexual 
abuse by the priests.  The Archdiocese asserts that these claims 
are barred by the statute of limitations because the last sexual 
assault occurred 29 years prior to the commencement of the 
lawsuit. 
¶66 I agree with the majority opinion that "the claims of 
fraud for intentional misrepresentation are independent claims 
based on the Archdiocese's alleged knowledge of the priests' 
prior sexual molestation of children and the Archdiocese's 
intent to deceive children and their families."  Majority op., 
¶2.  I further agree that "the date of the accrual of the fraud 
claims is 'when the plaintiffs discovered or, in the exercise of 
reasonable 
diligence, 
should 
have 
discovered' 
that 
the 
Archdiocese's alleged fraud was a cause of their injuries."  
Majority op., ¶2 (quoted source omitted).  I join that part of 
the majority opinion that remands the cause to the circuit court 
for further proceedings on the plaintiffs' fraud claims. 
¶67 I cannot, however, join that part of the opinion that 
affirms the dismissal of the plaintiffs' negligent supervision 
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
2 
 
claims.  I do not agree that the "claims asserted against the 
Archdiocese for negligent supervision are barred by the statute 
of limitations because according to controlling precedent such 
claims are derivative and accrued as a matter of law by the time 
of the last incident of sexual assault."  Majority op., ¶2.  I 
think the majority opinion turns the case law on its head. 
¶68 I reason as follows: (I) the majority opinion's 
classification 
of 
the 
tort 
of 
negligent 
supervision 
as 
"derivative" does not comport with traditional understandings of 
"derivative claims"; (II) the controlling precedent, the Miller1 
and Doyle2 cases, is clear that claims brought against an 
employer for negligent supervision are independent claims; and 
(III) the BBB Doe3 and Pritzlaff4 cases (and similar cases) do 
not control.   
I 
¶69 The majority opinion holds that negligent supervision 
claims are "derivative claims" that accrue at the time of the 
wrongful act of the employee, not at the time of the wrongful 
act of the employer.   
                                                 
1 Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 267-68, 
580 N.W.2d 233 (1998).   
2 Doyle v. Engelke, 219 Wis. 2d 277, 291 n.6, 580 N.W.2d 245 
(1998). 
3 John BBB Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 312, 
565 N.W.2d 94 (1997). 
4 Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 
533 N.W.2d 780 (1995) 
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶70 The 
majority 
opinion 
has 
no 
trouble 
with 
the 
classification "derivative."  I do.   
¶71 The distinction drawn by this court between derivative 
and independent causes of action has not been clear or 
consistent.  In fact, "this court has concluded that these 
labels 
[of 
"separate" 
and 
"derivative" 
claims] 
are 
not 
particularly useful . . . ."5  The distinction often depends on 
the purpose for which the distinction is being made.6  Moreover, 
our cases have reached divergent conclusions about whether a 
claim is derivative or not.  "The concept of what is a 'separate 
claim' and what is a 'derivative claim' has caused this court 
great difficulty, and 'the cases are confusing.'"7   
¶72 Even more troubling is that the majority opinion, by 
classifying this claim as "derivative," distorts the traditional 
and 
accepted 
understanding 
of 
"derivative 
claims." 
 
The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts instructs that "derivative claims" 
occur "where a plaintiff claims injury due to the defendant's 
                                                 
5 Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 527, 344 
N.W.2d 513 (1984). 
6 See Finnegan ex rel. Skoglind v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 
2003 
WI 
98, 
¶44 
n.9, 
263 
Wis. 2d 574, 
666 
N.W.2d 797 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring) 
(discussing 
how 
the 
characterization depends on whether the court is addressing 
contributory negligence, limits on amount of recovery, or 
statutes of limitations).   
7 Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 316, 294 
N.W.2d 437 (1980) (quoted source omitted).  In White v. Lunder, 
66 Wis. 2d 563, 574, 225 N.W.2d 442 (1975), the court confessed 
that "[t]o declare both of these causes of action [medical 
expenses for his wife and loss of consortium] derivative might 
not be entirely logical" but did so anyway.  
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
4 
 
tortiously injuring a third person."8  The Restatement also 
explains that "[c]laims in which the plaintiff's recovery 
depends on the defendant's committing a tort against a third 
person are often called 'derivative claims,'" and include 
wrongful death claims.9   
¶73 Traditionally, claims are "derivative" when one person 
asserts that he or she experienced damage as a result of a tort 
committed by a tortfeasor against another person.10  The claim 
                                                 
8 Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Apportionment of Liability, 
§ 6 cmt. b (reporter's note) (1999). 
9 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, 
§ 6 cmt. a (1999). 
10 See also Wis. Stat. § 655.007 (2005-06) which provides 
that "On and after July 24, 1975, any patient  or the patient's 
representative having a claim or any spouse, parent, minor 
sibling or child of the patient having a derivative claim for 
injury or death on account of malpractice is subject to this 
chapter."  In Pierce v. Physicians Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, 
Inc., 2005 WI 14, ¶12, 278 Wis. 2d 82, 692 N.W.2d 558, the court 
explained the obvious application of § 655.007: "[t]here is no 
dispute that Pierce [the mother] has the derivative claim of a 
parent for the wrongful death of Brianna [her daughter] under 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007."  In Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, ¶29, 274 
Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866, the court also explained that "[a] 
parent's claim for the loss of society and companionship with a 
minor child is a derivative claim." 
See also State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Langridge, 2004 WI 113, ¶33, 275 Wis. 2d 35, 683 N.W.2d 75, 
discussing and agreeing with Gocha v. Shimon, 215 Wis. 2d 586, 
573 N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1997), and Richie v. American Family 
Mutual Insurance Co., 140 Wis. 2d 51, 409 N.W.2d 146 (Ct. App. 
1987), two cases that "distinguish between independent claims 
and derivative claims.  Both conclude that when an insured seeks 
payment arising out of the bodily injury of another, the 
insured's claims are 'derivative' of the claim of the person 
suffering the bodily injury . . . ."   
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
5 
 
derives 
from 
the 
injury 
another 
suffers. 
 
In 
negligent 
supervision claims, however, a plaintiff asserts that he or she 
was directly injured by two separate persons.  In a negligent 
supervision claim, there are two wrongs: one wrong by the 
employee and a separate wrong by the employer.   A negligent 
supervision claim does not fit the traditional concept of 
"derivative claim." 
¶74 The majority opinion tries to find support for its 
characterization 
of 
the 
negligent 
supervision 
claim 
as 
"derivative" by resort to corporate law, namely shareholder 
suits.11  In a shareholder suit, the shareholder sues on behalf 
of the company for wrongs done to the company.  Put another way, 
the shareholder is asserting the company's claim, not his or her 
own personal claim.12  The analogy to shareholder suits thus does 
not support the treatment of a claim for negligent supervision 
as a derivative claim.  The plaintiff with a negligent 
                                                                                                                                                             
In Finnegan, 263 Wis. 2d 574, ¶26, a plurality of the court 
explained that "[o]ur jurisprudence outlines the types of claims 
that are considered derivative.  Claims for the loss of society, 
companionship, and consortium are derivative even though they 
technically 'belong' to the close relative making the claim."   
11 The majority opinion states that "a derivative action is 
a suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action 
based on a right of the corporation."  Majority op., ¶24 n.11. 
12 Justice Roggensack explained in a concurring opinion that 
"[i]n the context of corporate law, a derivative claim for 
relief permits an individual shareholder to enforce a claim for 
relief that belongs to the corporation by claiming the action of 
another injured the corporation.  See Einhorn v. Culea, 2000 WI 
65, ¶16, 235 Wis. 2d 646, 612 N.W.2d 78."  Gottsaker v. Monnier, 
2005 
WI 
69, 
¶47 
n.4, 
281 
Wis. 2d 361, 
697 
N.W.2d 436 
(Roggensack, J., concurring). 
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
6 
 
supervision claim is asserting a personal claim for a personal 
injury that was caused by the employer.   
¶75 Of course, the conduct leading to the negligent 
supervision claim is related to the underlying wrong by the 
employee.  But as a plurality of the court explained in Finnegan 
ex rel. Skoglind v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2003 
WI 98, ¶27, 263 Wis. 2d 574, 666 N.W.2d 797, a claim can be 
nonderivative "although [the claim] arises from a shared set of 
underlying facts" as another claim.  Despite the shared set of 
underlying facts, a plaintiff who sues for negligent supervision 
is asserting that he or she has been the victim of an 
independent tort, not that he or she has a separate but 
dependent damages claim deriving from a tort injury to another 
(as in a derivative claim such as loss of consortium or society) 
or from a tort injury by the employee.   
¶76 A derivative claim does not have its own elements 
distinct from the negligence claim to which it attaches.  For 
instance, juries are instructed that loss of consortium and loss 
of society and companionship are categories of damages, not 
separate 
negligence 
inquiries.13 
 
A 
claim 
for 
negligent 
                                                 
13 See Wis JI——Civil 1815 (loss of consortium); 1837 
(parent's loss of society and companionship); 1838 (minor 
child's loss of society and companionship) (all appearing in the 
jury instruction manual under the subheading "Damages").  Jury 
instructions 
for 
"Employer 
Negligence: 
Negligent 
Hiring, 
Training, or Supervision" are located in the jury instruction 
manual under the subheading "Other Negligence."  Wis JI——Civil 
1383.    
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
7 
 
supervision, on the other hand, has its own elements distinct 
from the tort claim against the employee.14 
¶77 Applying the traditional statement of the difference 
between derivative and independent claims, I conclude that the 
claim for negligent supervision is an independent claim.   
II 
¶78 Contrary to the majority opinion, well-established 
precedent does not support the conclusion that the negligent 
supervision claims in the instant case are derivative actions 
that accrue at the time of the injury.  A review of the case law 
makes this conclusion abundantly clear. 
¶79 The claim of negligent supervision was not recognized 
by this court as a valid cause of action until 1998 in Miller v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 267-68, 580 N.W.2d 233 
(1998).15  
¶80 The Miller court, 219 Wis. 2d at 262, makes clear that 
"there must be a nexus between the negligent hiring, training, 
                                                 
14 "A claim for negligent supervision of an employee 
requires the plaintiff to plead and prove all of the following: 
(1) the employer had a duty of care owed to the plaintiff; (2) 
the employer breached its duty; (3) a wrongful act or omission 
of an employee was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury; 
and (4) an act or omission of the employer was a cause-in-fact 
of the wrongful act of the employee."  Majority op., ¶17.  See 
also Wis JI——Civil 1383 ("Employer Negligence: Negligent Hiring, 
Training, or Supervision").  The elements of the tort claim 
against the employee are different.  For instance, a battery 
claim would require the fact-finder to determine whether the 
employee intentionally caused bodily harm to the plaintiffs and 
that the plaintiff did not consent to the harm.  Wis JI——Civil 
2005 (battery). 
15 John Doe 67C v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 123, 
284 Wis. 2d 307, ¶21 n.3, 700 N.W.2d 180. 
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
8 
 
or supervision and the act of the employee."  As the court in 
Miller explained, "[w]ith respect to a cause of action for 
negligent hiring, training or supervision, we determine that the 
causal question is whether the failure of the employer to 
exercise due care was a cause-in-fact of the wrongful act of the 
employee that in turn caused the plaintiff's injury."  219 
Wis. 2d at 262. 
¶81 The employee's wrongful act, however, did not have to 
be actionable itself.  The Miller court, 219 Wis. 2d at 263, 
explained that "we stop short of requiring an underlying tort."  
The court clearly set forth the elements required for a claim of 
negligent supervision in Miller:  "[w]e do conclude that there 
must be an underlying wrongful act committed by the employee as 
an element of the tort of negligent hiring, training or 
supervision.  A wrongful act may well be a tort, but not 
necessarily."  The Miller court, 219 Wis. 2d at 263-64, went on 
to emphasize the point:  The employer "should not escape 
liability for its negligent act or omission simply because the 
employee's underlying wrongful act is not an actionable tort."     
¶82 Justice Steinmetz dissented in Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 
275, on the ground that he "would hold that the tort of 
negligent hiring, training, or supervision should include, as a 
necessary 
element, 
an 
underlying 
tort 
committed 
by 
the 
employee."  Justice Steinmetz explained his position as follows: 
"Since the employee did not commit an underlying tort, the court 
should have simply reversed the judgment of the circuit court.  
The court, however, has taken it upon itself to craft a new, 
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
9 
 
untested theory of law to allow this particular plaintiff to 
recover damages from the exonerated employee's employer."  
Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 276 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting). 
¶83 If there is no need for an underlying tort, how can 
the negligent supervision claim be derivative?  What exactly is 
it derivative of?  The majority opinion does not answer these 
questions, and as a result, rewrites Miller. 
¶84 In Doyle v. Engelke, 219 Wis. 2d 277, 291 n.6, 580 
N.W.2d 245 (1998), the court further discussed the nature of 
negligent 
supervision claims, making clear that negligent 
supervision claims are independent causes of action. 
¶85 In Doyle, an employee had allegedly committed an 
intentional tort against the plaintiff, and the plaintiff sued 
the employer, claiming negligent supervision.  At issue was 
whether the insurer had a duty to defend its insured (the 
employer) against claims of negligent supervision when the 
insurance policy exempted intentional torts from the duty to 
defend.16  The circuit court and the court of appeals had 
concluded that the intentional acts exclusion clause of the 
insurance policy released the insurance company from any duty to 
defend for negligent supervision stemming from the intentional 
torts of the employee.  This court reached a different 
conclusion. 
                                                 
16 Specifically, the intentional act exclusion indicates 
that 
the 
insurance 
company 
"'won't 
cover 
bodily 
injury . . . that's . . . intended by the protected person.'" 
219 Wis. 2d at 291 (quoting insurance policy).  The "protected 
person" was the employer. 
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶86 This court in Doyle recognized that although the 
negligent supervision claim was related to the employee's 
intentional misconduct, the claim of negligent supervision was 
nonetheless 
independent 
and 
distinct 
from 
the 
employee's 
intentional tort.  The Doyle court explained that "[w]hile 
negligent supervision does require an underlying wrong to be 
committed by the employee as an element, the tort actually 
focuses on the tortious, i.e. negligent, conduct of the 
employer."  219 Wis. 2d at 291 n.6.  According to the Doyle 
court, the claim of negligent supervision "focuses on [the 
employer's] negligence in supervising its employees——whether or 
not the employees committed the underlying wrong intentionally."  
219 Wis. 2d at 291. 
¶87 The Doyle court further explained that the claim for 
negligent supervision was not a claim based on vicarious 
liability.  219 Wis. 2d at 291-92.   
¶88 As in Miller, the decision in Doyle is abundantly 
clear that there need be no underlying tort for a claim of 
negligent supervision to arise.  Without an underlying tort, 
what is a claim of negligent supervision derivative of? 
¶89 Although the Miller and Doyle cases do not use the 
word "independent" or "derivative," the cases make clear that 
negligent supervision of an employee is an independent claim. 
¶90 The majority opinion's attempt to distinguish the 
instant case from Miller and Doyle is weak and unpersuasive.  
The majority points out several times that the court in Miller 
and Doyle did not refer to BBB Doe.  Majority op., ¶¶31, 33.  It 
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
11 
 
does not matter in the slightest that Miller and Doyle did not 
refer to BBB Doe.  BBB Doe did not conclusively decide anything 
about negligent supervision claims.  The court in BBB Doe 
avoided answering even whether negligent supervision claims 
existed.  Why would a later case cite to BBB Doe in regard to 
negligent supervision?17 
¶91 The majority opinion gives short shrift to the Miller 
and Doyle cases, apparently on the ground that they do not 
involve the Archdiocese, priests, or any religious order 
employers or employees of a religious order.   
¶92 The majority opinion's reliance on Pritzlaff and BBB 
Doe simply because they share a factual context——supervision (or 
lack thereof) by the Archdiocese——is misplaced.  These cases did 
not recognize that the claim of negligent supervision existed in 
Wisconsin law, let alone definitively determine whether such a 
claim was derivative or independent or shared the same statute 
of limitations as a cause of action against a priest. 
¶93 I turn to the cases involving priests and dioceses. 
III 
¶94 The majority opinion asserts that "BBB Doe and 
Pritzlaff control the outcome of the claims for negligent 
supervision that are before us."  Majority op., ¶36.  The 
majority opinion states that "[t]hey are controlling precedent 
                                                 
17 The comments to the relevant jury instruction, Wis JI——
Civil 1383 ("employer negligence: negligent hiring, training, or 
supervision"), do not refer to BBB Doe or Pritzlaff. The 
comments instead rely heavily on Miller for guidance on the 
elements of and nature of the tort claim. 
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
12 
 
that have decided that the claims of negligent supervision made 
here are derivative of the underlying sexual molestations by the 
priests."  Id.  Not true! 
¶95 BBB Doe and Pritzlaff do not control the outcome in 
the instant case.  These cases did not decide whether a claim of 
negligent supervision was a derivative or independent cause of 
action.  In fact, when these cases were decided, the court had 
not even recognized that a claim of negligent supervision, 
training, or hiring could be brought against an employer under 
Wisconsin law.   
¶96 In 1995, this court decided Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese 
of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995).  The 
plaintiff, an adult woman, brought suit against a priest whom 
she claimed had coerced her into having sexual relations.  The 
plaintiff also sued the Archdiocese, claiming it was negligent 
in hiring, retaining, training, and supervising the priest.   
¶97 The Pritzlaff court focused much of its attention and 
discussion on the plaintiff's direct claim against the priest.  
In fact, over 20 pages of the court's 35-page decision 
exclusively analyzed this claim.   
¶98 When the Pritzlaff court finally got around to 
discussing the plaintiff's claim against the Archdiocese, the 
Pritzlaff court "assumed, without deciding, that a claim for 
negligent 
hiring, 
training 
and 
supervision 
existed 
in 
Wisconsin."  Majority op., ¶25 (citing Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 
325-26).  The assumption that the negligent supervision claim 
existed in Wisconsin was not the only assumption employed by the 
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
13 
 
Pritzlaff court.  The Pritzlaff court also "assume[d], without 
deciding, that the discovery rule applies to the Archdiocese." 
¶99 The Pritzlaff court did not have occasion to decide 
whether the claim actually existed, and if so, whether it was 
independent or derivative of any tort committed by the priest, 
because of First Amendment issues.  Majority op., ¶25 (citing 
Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 326).  The Pritzlaff court concluded 
that "the claims of negligent hiring, retaining, training and 
supervision are barred by the First Amendment in this case."  
194 Wis. 2d at 307.  See also 194 Wis. 2d at 326. 
¶100 The Pritzlaff court never decided whether a claim of 
negligent supervision was viable in Wisconsin and whether the 
discovery rule would apply to it.  The Pritzlaff court did not 
engage in any analysis of the nature of the plaintiff's claim 
against 
the 
Archdiocese. 
 
Pritzlaff, 
a 
case 
that 
made 
assumptions but did not decide the issue, is neither controlling 
nor helpful. 
¶101 In 
1997, 
the 
court 
again 
addressed 
negligent 
supervision claims brought against the Archdiocese in  John BBB 
Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 312, 565 N.W.2d 94 
(1997).  The plaintiffs in BBB Doe were adults who alleged that 
they were sexually molested by priests when they were children 
but had repressed their memories of these traumatic events.  The 
plaintiffs brought direct claims against the priests who 
allegedly sexually abused them.  The plaintiffs also brought 
claims against the churches and the Archdiocese for negligent 
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
14 
 
employment, training and supervision of the priests, and for 
failure to report the abuse.  
¶102 As in Pritzlaff, the court in BBB Doe focused almost 
exclusively on the claims brought directly against the priests.  
The opinion devotes over 50 pages (from 211 Wis. 2d at 312 to 
211 Wis. 2d at 366) of analysis to discussing the claims against 
the priests. 
¶103 Only in the "Conclusion" section of the opinion, that 
is, only at the very end of the majority opinion, does the court 
discuss the claims against the Archdiocese.  The BBB Doe court 
states: 
In light of our conclusion that all seven plaintiffs' 
claims based on intentional sexual assault are barred 
by the applicable statute of limitations, we need not 
address their claims based on respondeat superior and 
negligent employment theories.  Plaintiffs' derivative 
causes of action against the Archdiocese and the 
churches accrued at the same time that the underling 
intentional tort claims accrued, and similarly would 
be barred by the statute of limitations.  See 
Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 312, 533 N.W.2d 780 (statute 
of 
limitations 
period 
for 
actions 
against 
the 
Archdiocese begins on same date the cause of action 
accrued against the individual priest defendant). 
BBB Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 366.  This paragraph constitutes the 
court's 
entire 
discussion 
on 
the 
subject 
of 
negligent 
supervision.  Two sentences later is the mandate line.     
¶104 The BBB Doe decision barely paid any attention to the 
claim against the Archdiocese.  These claims were a mere 
afterthought in the decision, and the only support for the 
conclusion that the claims were "derivative" and barred by the 
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
15 
 
statute of limitations was the Pritzlaff decision, which, as 
discussed above, did not decide the issue.   
¶105 Even more telling is that the BBB Doe court, 211 
Wis. 2d at 366, characterized the claims against the Archdiocese 
as "based on respondeat superior and negligent employment 
theories" which suggests that the court viewed these claims as 
grounded in vicarious liability.  The court later clarified in 
Miller and Doyle that this view of negligent supervision claims 
was wrong.  These later cases——which actually recognized that a 
claim of negligent supervision existed in Wisconsin law——
explained that a claim of negligent supervision was based on the 
independent wrongful act of the employer. 
¶106 If 
Pritzlaff 
and 
BBB 
Doe 
were 
based 
only 
on 
assumptions and speculation, how can they be controlling 
precedent?  Pritzlaff and BBB Doe cannot and do not hold the 
answer to the instant case. 
¶107 Another case, decided after BBB Doe and Pritzlaff, 
supports the conclusion that BBB Doe and Pritzlaff did not 
resolve the questions surrounding negligent supervision claims.  
John Doe 67C v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 123, 284 
Wis. 2d 307, 700 N.W.2d 180, like BBB Doe, involved claims 
brought against priests and the Archdiocese by adults who 
alleged they were sexually abused as children by priests.  
Specifically, 
the 
plaintiffs alleged that the Archdiocese 
negligently supervised the priests. 
¶108 The majority opinion in John Doe 67C, however, did not 
answer whether a claim of negligent supervision was a derivative 
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
16 
 
claim 
and 
did not answer whether a claim of negligent 
supervision could be saved by the discovery rule.  The majority 
opinion in John Doe 67C upholds dismissal of the plaintiffs' 
negligent supervision claims on very limited grounds: the 
complaint insufficiently alleged facts to support the claim of 
negligent supervision.  The John Doe 67C court makes clear that 
it was leaving resolution of the questions regarding negligent 
supervision for another day.18 
¶109 If there were any doubt about the majority's position 
in John Doe 67C, Justice Bradley's concurring opinion in John 
Doe 
67C 
emphasized 
that 
"[i]nstead 
of 
answering 
the 
questions . . . the majority dodges them.  It decides this case 
in an error correcting fashion based on the sufficiency of 
particular allegations in an individual complaint."  John Doe 
67C, 284 Wis. 2d 307, ¶62 (Bradley, J., concurring).  Justice 
Bradley announced that "the questions in this context remain 
open."  Id., ¶63 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
                                                 
18 The John Doe 67C court explained that "[i]n essence, Doe 
alleges that the Archdiocese committed the tort of negligent 
supervision because it 'knew or should have known' that its 
employee, Nuedling, was in fact a notorious pedophile."  284 
Wis. 2d 307, ¶21.  Footnote three in this paragraph explains: 
This court did not recognize the tort of 'negligent 
supervision' until 1998.  Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 267-68, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998).  
Doe argues that because he did not discover his claims 
until 2002, four years after our decision in Miller, 
he can benefit from that holding despite the fact that 
the Archdiocese's allegedly wrongful conduct occurred 
in 1960-62.  Given our holding in this case, we need 
not address this argument.   
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶110 If compelled to find support in a case involving 
similar parties, the majority opinion should more closely 
examine L.L.N. v. Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d 674, 563 N.W.2d 434 
(1997).  In Clauder, the court was faced with a situation 
similar to Pritzlaff.  The plaintiff, an adult woman, alleged 
that the diocese was negligent in supervising the priest who 
served as a hospital chaplain and who used his position as a 
pastoral counselor to coerce the woman to have sexual relations. 
¶111 The Clauder court, like the Pritzlaff and BBB Doe 
courts, refused to recognize whether the claim of negligent 
supervision existed in Wisconsin law.  Nonetheless, the Clauder 
court elaborated on what it thought this claim might look like, 
reaching conclusions similar to those in the Miller and Doyle 
cases, which recognized the claim.   
¶112 The 
Clauder 
court 
stated 
that 
in 
negligent 
supervision, "liability does not result solely because of the 
relationship of the employer and employee, but instead because 
of the independent negligence of the employer."  209 Wis. 2d at 
699 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 cmt. d).  
According to the Clauder court,  
a claim for negligent supervision is distinct from a 
claim for vicarious liability, in that the former is 
based on tort principles and the latter is based on 
agency 
principles. 
 
More 
specifically, 
with 
a 
vicarious liability claim, an employer is alleged to 
be vicariously liable for a negligent act or omission 
committed by its employee in the scope of employment.  
Thus, vicarious liability is based solely on the 
agency relationship of a master and servant.  In 
contrast, with a negligent supervision claim, an 
employer is alleged to be liable for a negligent act 
or omission it has committed in supervising its 
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
18 
 
employee.  Therefore, liability does not result solely 
because of the relationship of the employer and 
employee, but instead because of the independent 
negligence of the employer. 
209 Wis. 2d at 699 n.21. 
¶113 The Clauder court elaborated further:  "Liability 
results under 
the 
rule stated in this Section [of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency] not because of the relation of 
the parties, but because the employer antecedently had reason to 
believe that an undue risk of harm would exist because of the 
employment.  The employer is subject to liability only for such 
harm as is within the risk."  Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d at 699. 
¶114  Clauder, too, is not controlling precedent.  Like BBB 
Doe and Pritzlaff, it does not recognize the claim of negligent 
supervision and only ruminates about what it might look like.  
Nonetheless, Clauder engages in a richer discussion beyond the 
few sentences located in Pritzlaff and BBB Doe.     
¶115 Justice Bradley's concurring opinion in John Doe 67C 
explained the direct claims against the Archdiocese and the 
application of the statute of limitations and the discovery 
rule: "Because Doe's independent, direct claims against the 
Archdiocese involve different elements from any potential cause 
of action against [the priest], the discovery rule may still 
benefit Doe's claims even when the underlying claim against the 
perpetrator has already been time barred.  As counsel for Doe 
explained at oral argument, the allegations in this case 'do not 
arise out of the moment of the sexual attack.  They arise out of 
the secrecy of the Archdiocese, which we could only learn about 
as of 2002.'"  284 Wis. 2d 307, ¶83 (Bradley, J., concurring).   
No.  2005AP1945.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶116 Justice Bradley's reasoning in John Doe 67C applies in 
the instant case.  
* * * * 
 
¶117 Decades have elapsed since the alleged wrongful 
conduct of the Archdiocese occurred.  But that should not 
prevent the plaintiffs from having their day in court.  The 
plaintiffs shoulder the burden of proving their case against the 
Archdiocese, including demonstrating that the discovery rule 
applies to their independent causes of action against the 
Archdiocese.  I would give them that opportunity rather than 
dismissing their complaint and terminating their cause. 
¶118 For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the parts of 
the majority opinion that reverse the decision regarding the 
plaintiffs' causes of action grounded in fraud and I dissent 
from the parts of the majority opinion that affirm the decision 
dismissing the negligent supervision claims.  I would remand the 
cause to the circuit court for further proceedings on all of the 
plaintiffs' claims. 
¶119 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
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