Case Title: Estate of Stevic v. Bio-Medical Application of Ohio, Inc.

Citation: 2009-Ohio-1525

Docket Number: 20080392

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Estate of Stevic v. Bio-Medical Application of Ohio, Inc., 121 Ohio St.3d 488, 2009-
Ohio-1525.] 
 
 
ESTATE OF STEVIC ET AL., APPELLEES, v. BIO-MEDICAL APPLICATION OF 
OHIO, INC., D.B.A. FMC DIALYSIS SERVICES OF RICHLAND COUNTY, 
APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Cite as Estate of Stevic v. Bio-Medical Application of Ohio, Inc., 
 121 Ohio St.3d 488, 2009-Ohio-1525.] 
Limitation of actions — R.C. 2305.113(A) — Definition of “medical claim.” 
(No. 2008-0392 — Submitted December 17, 2008 — Decided April 8, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Richland County,  
No. 2006 CA 0095, 2008-Ohio-33. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
For the purposes of the R.C. 2305.113(A) one-year statute of limitations, a 
“medical claim” under R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) is a claim that both arises out 
of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person and is asserted 
against one or more of the statutorily enumerated medical providers. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, appellant-defendant contends that it may claim the 
benefit of the one-year “medical claim” statute of limitations contained in R.C. 
2305.113(A) against a claim arising out of the medical diagnosis, care, or 
treatment of a person even though the claim is not asserted against one of the 
medical professionals or facilities (“providers”) specifically listed in R.C. 
2305.113(E)(3). 
{¶ 2} Because R.C. 2305.113(E) defines a “medical claim” for purposes 
of R.C. 2305.113(A) not only as a claim that arises out of the medical diagnosis, 
care, or treatment of a person but also as one that is asserted against one of the 
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enumerated providers, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand 
the case to the trial court. 
I 
{¶ 3} In October 2003, Donald Stevic went to the Richland County 
Kidney Dialysis Center for dialysis treatment.  Appellant, Bio-Medical 
Application of Ohio, Inc., d.b.a. FMC Dialysis Services of Richland County 
(“Bio-Medical”), owns and operates the Richland County Kidney Dialysis Center.  
According to the complaint, employees of the center either physically dropped 
Stevic or allowed him to fall from a mechanical lift device that was used to move 
him from a wheelchair and into position for dialysis.  As a result of the fall, Stevic 
suffered a fractured hip, abrasions, and other injuries.  In February 2004, Stevic 
died. 
{¶ 4} Almost two years later, in October 2005, appellee Betty Stevic, as 
widow and executor of appellee the estate of Donald Stevic, filed a complaint for 
personal injuries and other tort damages against appellant, Bio-Medical. 
{¶ 5} Bio-Medical filed an answer and a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.  Bio-Medical asserted that notwithstanding Stevic’s styling of the 
claims as claims for personal injury, the claims nevertheless arose in the course of 
medical treatment, were essentially medical claims falling within the R.C. 
2305.113(E)(3) definition of “medical claims,” and were subject to the R.C. 
2305.113(A) one-year statute of limitations.  Further, Bio-Medical contended that 
the claims were time-barred because Stevic’s complaint was filed more than one 
year after the date of the injury.  In a one-sentence entry without any supporting 
rationale, the trial court granted Bio-Medical’s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings and dismissed Stevic’s suit. 
{¶ 6} Upon review, a divided appellate court concluded that it was not 
clear from the face of Stevic’s complaint whether or not claims based on Mr. 
Stevic’s injuries constituted R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) medical claims, which are 
January Term, 2009 
3 
subject to the one-year statute of limitations.  Specifically, the court stated that it 
could not unambiguously determine whether the complained-of injuries occurred 
while Stevic was under the care and direction of a medical provider or in a facility 
specified in the R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) definition of “medical claim.”  Estate of 
Stevic v. Bio-Medical Application of Ohio, Inc., Richland App. No. 2006 CA 
0095, 2008-Ohio-33, ¶ 20.  Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial 
court and remanded the case for a determination of whether Stevic’s complaint 
alleged an R.C.2305.113(E)(3) medical claim.  Id., ¶ 20, 23. 
{¶ 7} Thereafter, Bio-Medical appealed to this court, and we accepted 
review under our discretionary jurisdiction.  Estate of Stevic v. Bio-Medical 
Application of Ohio, Inc., 118 Ohio St.3d 1432, 2008-Ohio-2595, 887 N.E.2d 
1202. 
II 
{¶ 8} Although an action for bodily injury must generally be brought 
within two years after the cause of action accrues, R.C. 2305.10(A), certain 
medical claims are subject to the shorter one-year statute of limitations set forth at 
R.C. 2305.113.1  This one-year limitation statute specifically lists and defines the 
types of claims included within its ambit. 
{¶ 9} As pertinent to this appeal, “medical claim” has the following 
specific, defined statutory meaning: 
{¶ 10} “(3) ‘Medical claim’ means any claim that is asserted in any civil 
action against a physician, podiatrist, hospital, home, or residential facility, 
against any employee or agent of a physician, podiatrist, hospital, home, or 
residential facility, or against a licensed practical nurse, registered nurse, 
advanced practice nurse, physical therapist, physician assistant, emergency 
                                                 
1.  Although not pertinent to this appeal, the R.C. 2305.113(A) one-year statute of limitations also 
applies to dental, optometric, and chiropractic claims. 
 
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medical technician-basic, emergency medical technician-intermediate, or 
emergency medical technician-paramedic, and that arises out of the medical 
diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person.  ‘Medical claim’ includes the 
following: 
{¶ 11} “(a) Derivative claims for relief that arise from the medical 
diagnosis, care, or treatment of a person;   
{¶ 12}  “(b) Claims that arise out of the medical diagnosis, care, or 
treatment of any person and to which either of the following applies: 
{¶ 13}  “(i) The claim results from acts or omissions in providing medical 
care. 
{¶ 14} “(ii) The claim results from the hiring, training, supervision, 
retention, or termination of caregivers providing medical diagnosis, care, or 
treatment.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2305.113(E)(3). 
{¶ 15} Further, the statute also lists and defines the medical providers 
included within the R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) definition of “medical claim.”2   
{¶ 16} Both parties in this appeal assert that the definition of “medical 
claim” set forth in R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) is plain and unambiguous.  We agree.  
Therefore, our analysis is limited to applying the legislature’s enactment and 
giving it effect according to its plain meaning.  Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 66 
Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. 
III 
{¶ 17} Bio-Medical argues that the R.C. 2305.113(A) limitations period 
applies even if only one portion of the R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) definition is satisfied.  
Specifically, Bio-Medical asserts that Stevic’s claim meets the definition of 
                                                 
2.  For instance, the following terms are also defined: physician, podiatrist, hospital, home, 
residential facility, licensed practical nurse, registered nurse, advanced practice nurse, physical 
therapist, physician assistant, emergency medical technician-basic, emergency medical technician-
intermediate, and emergency medical technician-paramedic.  R.C. 2305.113(E)(1), (2), (4), (8), 
(13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19). 
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“medical claim” through the sole application of this clause: “ ‘Medical claim’ 
includes * * * [c]laims that arise out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment 
of any person [when the] claim results from acts or omissions in providing 
medical care.”  R.C. 2305.113(E)(3)(b).  According to Bio-Medical, because Mr. 
Stevic’s injury resulted from the acts or omissions of the dialysis center’s staff in 
connection with his dialysis treatment, Stevic presented a medical claim within 
the purview of R.C. 2305.113(E)(3). 
{¶ 18} Bio-Medical may be correct that Stevic’s claim arises out of the 
diagnosis, care, or treatment of a person.  However, Bio-Medical ignores the 
portion of the statute that also requires that the claim be asserted against one or 
more of the specific medical professionals or facilities listed in R.C. 
2305.113(E)(3).  The term “medical claim” as defined in R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) has 
two components that the statute states in the conjunctive: (1) the claim is asserted 
against one or more of the specifically enumerated medical providers and (2) the 
claim arises out of medical diagnosis, care, or treatment.  We must give full 
meaning to all of the express statutory language.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Roberts 
(2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 311, 314, 762 N.E.2d 1001; Wachendorf v. Shaver (1948), 
149 Ohio St. 231, 237, 36 O.O. 554, 78 N.E.2d 370. 
{¶ 19} Therefore, based on the plain meaning of the legislature’s 
enactment, we hold that for the purposes of the R.C. 2305.113(A) one-year statute 
of limitations, a medical claim under R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) is a claim that both (1) 
arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person and (2) is 
asserted against one or more of the statutorily enumerated medical providers. 
{¶ 20} Moreover, as the appellate court correctly concluded, because 
Stevic’s complaint did not clearly indicate whether any of her claims were 
asserted against medical providers enumerated in R.C. 2305.113(E), the trial 
court’s judgment on the pleadings in favor of Bio-Medical was premature.  
Remand is appropriate because further proceedings in the trial court are required 
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to determine whether Stevic’s complaint alleges a medical claim within the 
purview of R.C. 2305.113. 
IV 
{¶ 21} For the reasons stated, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment affirmed  
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Benham & Ream Co., L.P.A., Jeffery S. Ream, and Frank L. Benham, for 
appellees. 
 
Tucker, Ellis & West, L.L.P., Jane F. Warner, and Susan M. Audey, for 
appellant. 
______________________