Case Title: Ohio State Bar Association v. Mason

Citation: 2017-Ohio-9215

Docket Number: 2017-0794

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2017-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Ohio 
State Bar Assn. v. Mason, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-9215.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-9215 
OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION v. MASON. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Mason, Slip Opinion No.  
2017-Ohio-9215.] 
Judges—Misconduct—Attempted 
felonious 
assault 
and 
domestic 
violence―Indefinite suspension with no credit for time served on interim 
felony suspension and with added conditions for reinstatement. 
(No. 2017-0794—Submitted October 18, 2017—Decided December 28, 2017.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2016-037. 
_______________________ 
KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Lance Timothy Mason, of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0067346, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio on 
November 19, 1996.  From 2008 to 2015, Mason served as a judge on the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas. 
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{¶ 2} In a complaint filed on August 24, 2016, relator, Ohio State Bar 
Association, alleged that Mason pled guilty to one count of attempted felonious 
assault, a third-degree felony, and one count of domestic violence, a first-degree 
misdemeanor.  A hearing was held on March 1, 2017, before a panel of the Board 
of Professional Conduct.  Based on the parties’ stipulations and evidence presented 
at the hearing, the panel found by clear and convincing evidence that Mason 
committed the charged violations.  After weighing the applicable aggravating and 
mitigating factors, the panel recommended that Mason be disbarred for his 
misconduct.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and recommended sanction. 
{¶ 3} We agree with the board that Mason committed the violations alleged 
in the complaint.  However, we disagree with the board that disbarment is the 
appropriate sanction for Mason.  Instead, we impose an indefinite suspension with 
no credit for time served on the interim felony suspension and with added 
conditions for reinstatement. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} When the misconduct in this case occurred, Mason was a sitting judge 
on the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, General Division. During all 
relevant times, he was subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct as well as the Rules 
of Professional Conduct. 
{¶ 5} In March 2014, Mason and his wife, Aisha Fraser Mason (“Fraser”), 
separated, with Mason continuing to live in what was the marital home and Fraser 
residing in an apartment.  During their separation, Mason and Fraser shared equally 
in the custody and parenting of their two minor children. 
{¶ 6} On August 2, 2014, Mason, Fraser, and the children attended a funeral 
service for Mason’s aunt.  Mason and Fraser agreed that after the service, Mason 
would drop Fraser off at her apartment and Mason would spend the afternoon with 
the children. 
January Term, 2017 
 
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{¶ 7} During the ride to Fraser’s apartment, the couple engaged in a 
conversation about their relationship.  As the discussion progressed, Mason became 
upset and began assaulting Fraser, all the while continuing to drive.  Mason struck 
Fraser repeatedly in the head, hit Fraser’s head against the armrest, the dashboard, 
and the window of the passenger door, and bit Fraser on her face.  Fraser attempted 
to escape the moving car, but Mason grabbed her hair.  When the car stopped at a 
red light, Fraser was able to open the door, but fell to the ground as she tried to flee.  
With the two children still in the car, Mason placed the vehicle in park, got out, and 
began to strike Fraser as she lay on the ground. 
{¶ 8} Mason then returned to his vehicle and drove away, leaving Fraser 
behind.  Mason and Fraser’s two children (ages six and four at the time) were seated 
in the back seat and witnessed the events.  The older child, who has special needs 
and possesses limited verbal abilities, was quiet while the attack was occurring, but 
the younger child was screaming. 
{¶ 9} Upon arriving at the house, Mason called his sister, Dr. Lynn Mason, 
and asked her to come and pick up the two children because he intended to shoot 
himself.  He was arrested by police later that day. 
{¶ 10} As a result of the attack, Fraser sustained severe physical harm to 
her head, face, and neck, including an orbital blowout fracture under her left eye.  
She was hospitalized overnight from August 2-3, 2014, following the attack, and 
again from August 8-9, 2014, for surgery.  Fraser subsequently arranged for her 
two children to begin counseling.  As of February 2017, they continued to receive 
counseling as a result of what they witnessed on August 2, 2014. 
{¶ 11} On August 26, 2014, Mason was charged in an eight-count 
indictment stemming from this incident.  On the same date, this court ordered that 
Mason be disqualified from acting as a judge pursuant to Gov.Jud.R. III(6)(A).  In 
re Disqualification of Mason, 140 Ohio St.3d 1405, 2014-Ohio-3703, 14 N.E.3d 
1051.  On August 19, 2015, Mason pled guilty to attempted felonious assault and 
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domestic violence, and on September 16, 2015, he was sentenced to 24 months in 
prison at the Lorain Correctional Institution and six months in county jail, with the 
sentences to run concurrently and with additional conditions. 
{¶ 12} The board found that Mason’s conduct violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 (a 
judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(a) (a lawyer 
shall not violate or attempt to violate the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct), 
8.4(b) (a lawyer shall not commit an illegal act that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness), and 8.4(h) (a lawyer shall not engage in 
conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). 
Sanction 
{¶ 13} When imposing sanctions for judicial and professional misconduct, 
we consider several relevant factors, including the ethical duties violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), any other relevant 
factors, and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Jacob, 
150 Ohio St.3d 162, 2017-Ohio-2733, 80 N.E.3d 440, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 14} Here, the board unanimously found the following aggravating 
factors:  Mason’s victims were vulnerable and suffered harm as a result of Mason’s 
acts; he failed to adequately explain the conduct that is the basis for the violation; 
he failed to provide assurances that the conduct will not happen again; and he did 
not fully engage in the redemptive process. 
{¶ 15} In mitigation, the board found that Mason did not have a prior 
disciplinary record, demonstrated a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary 
process, and presented evidence of his good character and reputation.  See Gov.Bar 
R. V(13)(C)(1), (4), and (5).  The board also found that other penalties and 
sanctions had been imposed for Mason’s misconduct.  In addition to the criminal 
sanctions for his offenses, the board noted that Mason was removed from his 
January Term, 2017 
 
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position as a judge, was incarcerated for his conduct, and was in debt to his former 
wife for $150,000 from the settlement of a civil case she filed against him.  See 
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(6).  Mason also apologized in open court to his wife at the 
conclusion of the civil case. 
{¶ 16} We agree with these findings.  We find as an additional mitigating 
factor the fact that Mason was under stress at the time of the assault.  His house had 
flooded twice in the months leading up to the assault. In addition, he was separated 
from his wife, and he had gone to the ER complaining of chest pains. Finally, the 
assault occurred on the way home from his aunt’s funeral. 
{¶ 17} In reaching its recommendation of disbarment as the appropriate 
sanction, the board relied on five cases involving judges who committed grave 
misconduct, including four who were convicted of felonies: Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Terry, 147 Ohio St.3d 169, 2016-Ohio-563, 63 N.E.3d 88; Disciplinary Counsel 
v. McAuliffe, 121 Ohio St.3d 315, 2009-Ohio-1151, 903 N.E.2d 1209; Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Hoskins, 119 Ohio St.3d 17, 2008-Ohio-3194, 891 N.E.2d 324; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallagher, 82 Ohio St.3d 51, 693 N.E.2d 1078 (1998); and 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Mosely, 69 Ohio St.3d 401, 632 N.E.2d 1287 (1994). The 
aggravating circumstances justifying disbarment in these cases were fraud, 
dishonesty, protracted or premeditated acts, or the abuse of judicial office. 
{¶ 18} In Terry, a judge was convicted of multiple federal felonies in 
connection with his judicial duties.  The conduct underlying these convictions 
consisted of providing judicial favors in exchange for contributions to his 2008 
election campaign.  This conduct violated five canons of the former Code of 
Judicial Conduct and two Rules of Professional Conduct.  We held that Terry’s 
misconduct “occurred in the performance of his core judicial duties,” and as a 
result, we adopted the board’s recommendation of disbarment.  Terry at ¶ 17. 
{¶ 19} In McAuliffe, a judge violated the former Code of Professional 
Responsibility and the former Code of Judicial Conduct by burning down his house 
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in order to defraud an insurance company, committing several federal felonies in 
the process.  The board recommended the judge’s disbarment.  This court agreed, 
concluding that a judge who engages in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude  
“ ‘deserves the full measure of our disciplinary authority.’ ” Id. at ¶ 29, quoting 
Gallagher at 53. 
{¶ 20} In Hoskins, 119 Ohio St.3d 17, 2008-Ohio-3194, 891 N.E.2d 324, a 
sitting common-pleas judge leased part of a building he owned to the Adult Parole 
Authority.  When he became concerned about leasing to an agency whose 
representatives regularly appeared before him as witnesses, Hoskins first attempted 
to conceal his interest in the building, then sought to sell the building to a felon who 
he knew would be paying him with proceeds from a criminal enterprise.  Hoskins 
also illegally released an inmate from custody on the suggestion of a personal 
friend, failed to recuse himself from a criminal case in which the defendant was his 
assistant’s son, and made misleading public statements about a pending case.  This 
court was persuaded that the ultimate sanction of permanent disbarment was 
warranted because Hoskins’s misconduct spanned a ten-year period and included 
deceit and abuse of his office. 
{¶ 21} In Gallagher, 82 Ohio St.3d 51, 693 N.E.2d 1078, a sitting common-
pleas judge was arrested and charged with attempting to distribute cocaine.  He pled 
guilty to distributing cocaine and was sentenced to 12 months in prison. Id.  We 
permanently disbarred Gallagher, characterizing the offense of distributing cocaine 
as a crime “involving moral turpitude.”  Id. at 53.  This court approved the board’s 
recommendation for disbarment because this court believed that the judge’s 
felonious conduct “brings disrepute to the judicial system, [by which] the institution 
is irreparably harmed.”  Id. 
{¶ 22} In Mosely, 69 Ohio St.3d 401, 632 N.E.2d 1287, a judge was 
convicted of six federal felonies stemming from a conspiracy to use his position as 
judge to unlawfully obtain property not due him.  He received in excess of $230,000 
January Term, 2017 
 
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in illegal payments or kickbacks from certain persons, including court-appointed 
contractors.  This court concurred with the findings and recommendations of the 
board to disbar the judge for this misconduct. 
{¶ 23} In Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Katalinas, 90 Ohio St.3d 140, 735 N.E.2d 
432 (2000), which was not considered by the board but which demonstrates the 
same philosophy in assessing sanctions as the cases above, a sitting municipal-court 
judge agreed to manage the financial affairs of a childhood friend.  He took control 
of the friend’s funds for his own personal use and ignored demands for their return.  
He also agreed to represent clients while a judge and then neglected their cases, and 
in one case, he refused to return his clients’ file unless the clients paid him $5,000.  
This court adopted the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the board and 
disbarred the judge. 
{¶ 24} In this case, Mason was convicted of a felony based on a single 
violent assault.  Brutal it surely was.  But it was not shown to be premeditated or 
part of a pattern of behavior.  In this regard, we consider this case to be 
distinguishable from those cited by the board.  Instead, we look to Ohio State Bar 
Assn. v. McCafferty, 140 Ohio St.3d 229, 2014-Ohio-3075, 17 N.E.3d 521.  In that 
case, a sitting judge was convicted of lying to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  
This court imposed an indefinite suspension with no credit for time served.  We 
distinguished previous cases, including those cited by the board in this case: “[T]he 
circumstances in this case can be distinguished from Gallagher, McAuliffe, and 
Hoskins, in which judges were permanently disbarred.  In those cases, the judges 
had engaged in criminal conduct over a period of time, from a few days to months, 
and the misconduct was preplanned.”  Id. at ¶ 23.  We emphasized that 
McCafferty’s violations were unplanned and occurred on a single impromptu 
occasion, rather than as a pattern of premeditated criminal conduct.  Id. at ¶ 24.  
Therefore, we concluded, “imposition of the system’s most severe sanction [was] 
not warranted * * *.”  Id. 
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{¶ 25} We do not demean the gravity and severity of Mason’s misconduct, 
but we do believe that there is a distinction to be made between the misconduct in 
this case and the cases relied on by the board to justify disbarment as the 
recommended sanction. 
{¶ 26} In our research, we have not found any cases in which a judge was 
disciplined after a felony conviction for assault.  However, for purposes of 
comparison, we look to similar cases involving lawyers who were convicted of 
felony level assaults.  In those cases, this court approved a term of suspension with 
credit for time served on an interim felony suspension. 
{¶ 27} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Whitfield, 132 Ohio St.3d 284, 2012-
Ohio-2708, 971 N.E.2d 915, a lawyer pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault, 
a fourth-degree felony, for hitting another man at a bar with a glass bottle, causing 
two facial lacerations and imbedding a piece of glass in the man’s eye.  After 
finding violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, this court suspended the 
lawyer for two years with credit for time served under the interim felony suspension 
conditioned upon a two-year extension of his OLAP contract and his continued 
compliance with the treatment recommendations of his mental-health 
professionals.  Id. at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 28} Similarly, in Disciplinary Counsel v. Goodall, 103 Ohio St.3d 501, 
2004-Ohio-5583, 817 N.E.2d 23, a lawyer was convicted of aggravated assault, a 
felony of the fourth degree, for injuring her husband’s arm during a domestic 
dispute. This court imposed a six-month suspension with credit for time served on 
the interim felony suspension. 
{¶ 29} We also found that a one-year suspension was warranted when an 
attorney was convicted of aggravated assault, a felony of the fourth degree, for 
breaking into a house and getting into an altercation with a male friend of his ex-
wife.  Columbus Bar Assn. v. Harris, 1 Ohio St.3d 33, 437 N.E.2d 596 (1982).  The 
January Term, 2017 
 
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victim in this case suffered “various serious injuries” after the attorney involved in 
the altercation struck him with a bat. Id. at 34. 
{¶ 30} We recognize that there are other cases involving attorneys 
convicted of felonious assault or aggravated assault in which the attorney received 
an indefinite suspension, but we consider these cases distinguishable from the 
assault in this case because a deadly weapon was used in the assaults.  See, e.g., 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Cushion, 92 Ohio St.3d 144, 749 N.E.2d 224 (2001) 
(felonious assault: shot female companion/indefinite suspension); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Lucey, 63 Ohio St.3d 143, 586 N.E.2d 78 (1992) (aggravated assault: 
stabbed wife with a knife/indefinite suspension); Disciplinary Counsel v. Colburn, 
42 Ohio St.3d 173, 538 N.E.2d 110 (1989) (felonious assault: shot wife’s ex-
husband/indefinite suspension). 
{¶ 31} Of course, these cases represent discipline of lawyers convicted of 
felony-level assaults.  We hold judges to “the highest possible standard of ethical 
conduct.”  Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 23, 151 N.E.2d 17 
(1958); In re Complaint Against Harper, 77 Ohio St.3d 211, 220, 673 N.E.2d 1253 
(1996).  Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states, “A judge shall uphold and 
promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary * * *.”  
Jud.Cond.R. 1.1 states, “A judge shall comply with the law.” 
{¶ 32} As set forth above, the consistent aggravating circumstances in all of 
the cases the board relied on is that the judicial misconduct involved either fraud, 
dishonesty, protracted or premeditated acts, or the abuse of judicial office.  The 
board recommended disbarment, which would mean that Mason “shall not be 
readmitted to the practice of law in Ohio.”  Gov.Bar R. V(12)(B).  We agree with 
the board that Mason’s misconduct was “egregious.”  In fact, his misconduct was 
reprehensible and abhorrent. However, we do not believe that his misconduct fits 
in the same category as the cases in which disbarment was the sanction imposed. 
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{¶ 33} The primary purpose of judicial discipline is “to protect the public, 
guarantee the evenhanded administration of justice, and maintain and enhance 
public confidence in the integrity of [the] institution.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 33.  Because of 
the distinction between the misconduct in this case and the premeditated or 
protracted misconduct in the cases relied on by the board, and because Mason’s 
misconduct did not involve dishonesty or abuse of his judicial office, we conclude 
that the appropriate sanction for Mason is something less than the ultimate penalty 
of disbarment.  But his position as a judge and the gravity of his offense demand 
something more than a term suspension with credit for time served and the usual 
conditions for reinstatement.  See Gov.Bar R. V(24)(A). 
{¶ 34} The imposition of an indefinite suspension with no credit for time 
served on the interim felony suspension with conditions is appropriate here because 
it protects the public by ensuring Mason cannot return to the practice of law without 
petitioning for reinstatement pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(25)(A). Before he can be 
reinstated, he must demonstrate that he has met the conditions set forth in this 
opinion. Gov.Bar R. V(25)(D)(1).  In addition, Mason must establish by “clear and 
convincing evidence” that he is “now a proper person to be readmitted to the 
practice of law in Ohio,” Gov.Bar R. V(25)(D)(1)(f). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 35} Accordingly, Lance Timothy Mason is hereby indefinitely 
suspended from the practice of law with no credit for time served under his interim 
felony suspension.  Furthermore, in addition to the requirements set forth in 
Gov.Bar R. V(25)(D)(1), the following conditions for reinstatement shall apply: 
Mason shall (1) submit to a mental-health evaluation conducted by the Ohio 
Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) and obtain a report that he is able to return 
to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law, (2) enter into an OLAP 
contract, the duration and terms of which shall be determined by OLAP, and (3) 
January Term, 2017 
 
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comply with all recommendations of OLAP and his treating professionals.  Costs 
are taxed to Mason. 
Judgment 
accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, FRENCH, O’NEILL, FISCHER, and 
DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
 
J. Desiree Blankenship and Eugene P. Whetzel; and Kelly E. Heile, Butler 
County Prosecuting Attorney; and Scanlon Group Co., L.P.A., and Maura S. 
Scanlon, for relator. 
Alkire & Nieding, L.L.C., Richard C. Alkire and Dean Nieding, for 
respondent. 
_________________