Case Title: RICHARD D. KNORI, personal representative of the estate of Pansy Knori, V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
RICHARD D. KNORI,  personal representative of the estate of Pansy Knori, V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,2005 WY 48109 P.3d 905Case Number: 04-189Decided: 04/14/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
                                                                                                            

 
 
RICHARD 
D. KNORI, Personal

Representative 
of the Estate of

PANSY 
KNORI, deceased,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant) 
,

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex 
rel.,

DEPARTMENT 
OF HEALTH,

OFFICE 
OF MEDICAID,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff) 
.

 
 
 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Lawrence B. Hartnett, Law Offices of 
Lawrence B. Hartnett, Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; 
Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; and James P. Espy, Special 
Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Espy.

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and BURKE, JJ., and DONNELL, 
DJ.

 
 
 
 
            
DONNELL, District Judge.

 
 
[¶1]      This case 
concerns the availability of the defense of equitable estoppel against a 
governmental agency seeking to collect a judgment on a creditor's claim. The 
District Court granted the agency's motion for summary judgment.  For the reasons stated herein, we 
affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Appellant states 
the issue as follows:

 
 
[I]s 
equitable estoppel against a governmental agency allowed and an appropriate 
remedy under Wyoming law when an employee of the Wyoming Department of Family 
Services, employed as a Medicaid Eligibility Technician, negligently informs and 
advises an applicant for Medicaid assistance for nursing home care that her 
family home is permanently exempt from estate recovery under the provisions of 
W.S. §42-4-206, and the applicant acts on that advice to her substantial 
prejudice. 

 
 
The 
State addresses the issue somewhat differently:

 
 
Whether 
the District Court correctly ruled that, under the Doctrine of Equitable 
Estoppel, a governmental employee did not bind the State of Wyoming by making an 
erroneous, unauthorized oral statement, which was contrary to both federal and 
state law.

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      In late January 
or early February of 1995, Richard D. Knori (Knori), in his capacity as guardian 
and conservator of his grandmother, Pansy B. Knori (Pansy), sought advice from 
Hazel Staley (Staley), a "Medicaid Eligibility Technician," employed by the 
Wyoming Department of Family Services (the Department).  Specifically, Knori inquired as to 
Pansy's eligibility for Medicaid assistance for nursing home care and as to the 
long-term liability, if any, of Pansy's estate for reimbursement for the costs 
of the Medicaid assistance.

 
 
[¶4]      Staley advised 
Knori that, if Pansy wished to preserve her family home, she need only apply for 
Medicaid assistance for the nursing home care with the "intent to return 
home."  Staley informed Knori that, 
once Pansy exhausted her cash assets to the limits for eligibility, Medicaid 
would pay the costs of the nursing home care.  Further, Staley advised that Pansy's 
real property would be exempt from Medicaid reimbursement recovery, both before 
and after her death.

 
 
[¶5]      In fact, Staley 
was incorrect.  In 1993, Congress 
passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA), effective July 1, 
1993.  This Act mandated recovery of 
Medicaid costs from the estate of a deceased recipient by those states 
participating in the Medicaid program, of which Wyoming was one.  Under OBRA, Wyoming was given one 
year to bring its laws into compliance with the mandatory estate recovery.  Effective July 1, 1994, Wyoming passed Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 42-4-206 (LexisNexis 2003) to conform to OBRA requirements.  The intent of the statute 
was:

 
 
[To] 
implement changes to the Wyoming Medical Assistance and Services Act required by 
the Federal Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.  This act is intended to authorize 
changes to the state plan for medical assistance and services under chapter 4 of 
title 42, which are required or authorized by the provisions of the Federal 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, and which are in accordance with the 
provisions of this act.  It is the 
intent of the legislature that the provisions of this act be interpreted in 
accordance with construction of that federal act and rules promulgated pursuant 
to that act.

 
 
1994 
Wyo. Sess. 
Laws, ch. 73, § 4.  Further, under 
the provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 42-2-103(b)(xiii), the state administering 
department was required to adopt rules necessary to carry out the provisions of 
§ 42-4-206 for "Medicaid Benefit Recovery."  Such rules were adopted, effective June 
30, 1995.  At the time Staley 
advised Knori, she advised him under the "old" Medicaid rules but not the rules 
mandating estate recovery that went into effect on June 30, 
1995.

 
 
[¶6]      Knori, relying on 
Staley's representations, assisted Pansy with her Medicaid application.  Pansy was approved for Medicaid 
eligibility beginning April 1, 1995.  
She received Medicaid benefits, totaling $259,446.38, for medical and 
nursing home care from 1995 until her death in 2001.  After her death, the Department of 
Health, Office of Medicaid (the Office) filed a claim against Pansy's estate 
seeking reimbursement for these Medicaid benefits.

 
 
[¶7]      Knori rejected 
the claim, and the Office filed an action to obtain a judgment on the 
claim.  Although Knori conceded that 
§ 42-4-206 allowed the Office to recover its claim, he argued that the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel should be applied to prevent any 
recovery.

 
 

 
 
[¶8]      The standard for 
summary judgment under W.R.C.P. 56 is well established in Wyoming:

 
 
Summary 
judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and 
the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law.  Eklund v. PRI Environmental, 
Inc., 2001 WY 55 ¶10, 25 P.3d 511, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001).  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of establishing 
or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense that has been 
asserted by the parties.  
Williams Gas Processing-Wamsutter Co. v. Union Pacific Resources 
Co., 2001 WY 57, ¶11, 25 P.3d 1064, ¶11 (Wyo. 2001).  We examine the record from the vantage 
point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party 
the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  Id.

 
 

NuHome 
Investments, LLC v. Weller, 2003 
WY 171 ¶7, 81 P.3d 940, ¶7 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Trabing v. Kinko's, Inc., 
2002 WY 171, ¶8, 57 P.3d 1248, ¶8 (Wyo. 2002)).  See Davis v. State, 910 P.2d 555, 558 (Wyo. 1996); and Smith v. Throckmartin, 893 P.2d 712, 714 (Wyo. 
1995).

 
 
[¶9]      Where summary 
judgment has been granted, this Court will review a grant of summary judgment 
deciding a question of law de novo 
and uphold the trial court's decision "on the basis of any proper legal theory 
appearing in the record."  Bitker v. First National Bank in 
Evanston, 2004 WY 114, ¶8, 98 P.3d 853, ¶8 (Wyo. 2004) (citations 
omitted).

 
 

 
 
[¶10]   The parties agree there are no 
genuine issues of material fact:  
Staley incorrectly advised Knori as to the Office's ability to seek 
reimbursement by making a claim against Pansy's estate after her death.  That said, Knori urges the application 
of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which has the effect of precluding an 
individual from asserting his rights against another person who relied, to his 
detriment, on the voluntary conduct of the former.  See Dewitt v. Balben, 718 P.2d 854, 
861-62 (Wyo. 
1986).  As traditionally viewed, 
equitable estoppel is embodied by the following concept:

 
 
[O]ne 
who by his acts or representations intentionally or through culpable negligence 
induces another to believe certain facts to exist, and the latter, not knowing 
the facts, acts on such belief to his substantial prejudice, the former is, in 
equity, estopped to deny the existence of such fact.

 
 

Department 
of Family Services v. Peterson, 957 P.2d 1307, 1311 (quoting Seaman v. Big Horn Canal Association, 29 
Wyo. 391, 398, 
218 P. 938 (1923)).  In its current 
form, equitable estoppel requires "some misrepresentation and is generally 
applied to prevent fraud, either constructive or actual."  Id. 
at 1311-12 (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶11]   With respect to governmental 
agencies functioning in their governmental capacities, the standard for 
equitable estoppel is higher, requiring "even more egregious conduct."  Peterson, 957 P.2d  at 1312.1  Namely, for equitable estoppel to 
operate against the government, the movant must demonstrate that the inducement 
was made by "authorized affirmative misconduct."  In addition to the "authorized 
affirmative misconduct" requirement, equitable estoppel is applied against the 
government only in rare and unusual circumstances, where its application would 
not serve to defeat public policy.  
See Big Piney Oil & Gas 
Company v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission, 715 P.2d 557, 560 (Wyo. 1986).  Accordingly, for Knori to succeed under 
his claim of equitable estoppel against the Office, he must demonstrate: (1) 
authorized affirmative misconduct; (2) reliance; (3) substantial prejudice; (4) 
rare and unusual circumstances; and (5) a situation that will not defeat public 
policy.  We find it necessary to 
address only two: "authorized affirmative misconduct" and "rare and unusual 
circumstances."

 
 

 
 
[¶12]   As to the first requirement of 
invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel against a governmental agency acting 
in its governmental capacity, we have previously stated:

 
 
In order 
to invoke the doctrine against a government or public agency functioning in its 
official capacity, there must be a showing of affirmative misconduct.  [Citation omitted.]  Affirmative misconduct exists where a 
person, by his acts, representations, or admissions, intentionally or through 
culpable negligence induces another to believe that certain facts exist and the 
other person rightfully relies and acts on such belief and will be prejudiced if 
the former is permitted to deny the existence of such 
facts.

 
 

Thompson 
v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Sublette, 2001 
WY 108, ¶11, 34 P.3d 278, ¶11 (Wyo. 2001).  
See In re General Adjudication of 
All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, 90 (Wyo. 
1988), cert. granted, 488 U.S. 1040, 
judgment aff'd, 492 U.S. 406 (1989); 
Greub v. Frith, 717 P.2d 323, 326 
(Wyo. 1986); and Big Piney Oil and Gas 
Company, 715 P.2d 557.  See also United States v. California, 
332 U.S. 19, 39-40, 67 S. Ct. 1658, 91 L. Ed. 1889 (1947); and Utah Power and 
Light Company v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405-409, 37 S. Ct. 387, 61 L. Ed. 791 (1917).  With more recent 
decisions, we have made it increasingly clear that "equitable estoppel rarely is 
applied against a governmental entity and certainly will not lie in the absence 
of any showing of affirmative misconduct or misrepresentation."  Bell v. Schell, 2004 WY 153, ¶38, 101 P.3d 465, ¶38 (Wyo. 2004) (and cases cited therein).  The reason for the higher standard for 
equitable estoppel as to the government is premised on the notion 
that:

 
 
When the 
Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has 
given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience 
to the rule of law is undermined.  
It is for this reason that it is well settled that the Government may not 
be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant.

 
 

Heckler 
v. Community Health Services, 467 U.S. 51, 60, 104 S. Ct. 2218, 81 L. Ed. 42 (1984).  The context and scope of 
"affirmative misconduct," was thoroughly addressed by an Arizona appellate court, 
from which we quote at length:

 
 
The 
party attempting to estop the government must first show that the government 
engaged in wrongful conduct.  See [Freightways, Inc. v. Arizona Corporation 
Commission, 129 Ariz. 245, at 248, 630 P.2d 541 at 544, 
(1981)].  In cases where the state's actions involved 
mere negligence or oversight, the courts have refused to apply equitable 
estoppel.  See Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. Arizona Dept. 
of Transp., 171 Ariz. 263, 830 P.2d 475 (App. 1992) (finding that the state 
agency's inadvertent issuance of three nonconforming sign permits and failure to 
notice the error for two years did not amount to wrongful conduct which would 
give rise to equitable estoppel); Mohave 
County v. Mohave-Kingman Estates, Inc., 120 Ariz. 417, 586 P.2d 978 (1978) 
(county's failure to immediately enforce the terms of a land sale contract upon 
the purchaser's breach did not equitably estop it from later suing the 
purchaser); Graham v. Asbury, 112 
Ariz. 184, 540 P.2d 656 (1975) (state was not estopped from seeking overpayment 
of salary to an employee because more than one year delay in suing was not 
intentional and did not constitute culpable negligence).

 
 

Where 
equitable estoppel has been applied against the state, the state's action has 
been more egregious than it was in the instant case.  See [Tucson Electric Power Company v. Arizona 
Department of Revenue, 174 Ariz. 
507, 851 P.2d 132 (Ariz.App.Div 1 1992)] (referring generally to agency's 
"wrongful" obstructive conduct in arbitrarily refusing to perform obligations 
imposed upon it by statute); Freightways, 129 Ariz. at 245, 630 P.2d  
at 541 (equitably estopping the agency from denying the validity of a "motor 
vehicle certificate" where the agency knew of the defect in the filing of the 
application, approved numerous transfers of the invalid certificate, and waited 
over fifty years before challenging the certificate's 
validity).

 
 

This 
prerequisite of "wrongful conduct" when a government is to be estopped is more 
clearly enunciated as "affirmative misconduct" in federal cases.  Since the Department is complying with a 
federal regulation in seeking reimbursement, it is appropriate to look to how 
the federal courts apply the doctrine of estoppel against the federal government 
in similar situations.  Federal 
courts have adopted requirements for the application of estoppel that are 
similar to those established under Arizona decisional law. They 
are:

 
 
(1)  The 
party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct 
shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a 
right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of the true 
facts; and (4) he must rely on the former's conduct to his 
injury.

 
 

Hampton 
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 364 U.S. 882, 81 S. Ct. 170, 5 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1960).  Compare Freightways, supra.  To apply estoppel against the 
United 
States government, two additional factors must 
be present. First, the government must 
have engaged in some form of "affirmative misconduct."  See, e.g., Oki v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Serv., 598 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1979).  Second, the "injustice caused by the 
[g]overnment's misconduct [must be] sufficiently severe to outweigh the 
countervailing interest of the public not to be unduly damaged by the imposition 
of estoppel."  Beacom v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Comm'n, 500 F. Supp. 428, 435-36 (D. Ariz. 1980).

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 

In cases 
in which equitable estoppel has been applied against the federal government, the 
conduct was egregious.  For example, in United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406 
(9th Cir. 1975), the government was estopped from refusing to issue a deed when 
government officers knew that the long-time occupant of the land was within the 
time limit for  asserting a claim 
and advised him to the contrary.  In 
Sun Il Yoo v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Serv., 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976), the government's 
one-year delay of an investigation to correct a mistake in an alien's 
immigration status estopped the government from deporting the alien when the 
government had been advised of its mistake and offered no excuse for the 
delay.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 

Carlson 
v. Arizona Department of Economic Security, 906 P.2d 61, 63-65 (Ariz.App.Div. 1 1995).  Clearly the concept of "affirmative 
misconduct" as enunciated in Carlson 
is analogous to the standard adopted and applied in Wyoming precedent.  See Thompson, 34 P.3d 278.  Therefore, we must consider whether 
Staley's act of providing misinformation to Knori rose to the level of 
"affirmative misconduct" sufficiently egregious to estop the Office from 
recovering the Medicaid benefits it provided to Pansy.

 
 
[¶13]   The parties agree that Staley, in 
fact, erroneously and unintentionally miscommunicated facts concerning the 
Office's ability to seek reimbursement of the Medicaid benefits that Pansy 
received.  However, Knori also 
concedes:

 
 
It is 
completely understandable why Hazel Staley was misguided in January of 1995 when 
she gave incorrect information to Richard Knori.  For years Hazel Staley had been advising 
citizens regarding Medicaid eligibility.  
Prior to the early 1995 meeting with Richard Knori[,] Hazel had never 
experienced or heard about post-death estate recovery against the family 
home.  Hazel understood that the 
finding of "intent to return home" meant the family home was "exempt" from sale 
in determining eligibility, and since to her knowledge there had been no homes 
sold to pay back Medicaid after death, it meant exempt 
forever.

 
 
Additionally, 
Knori recognizes that even the updated version of Chapter 6000 of the Wyoming 
Public Assistance Manual, a copy of which Staley had at the time of advising 
Knori, failed to inform Staley or Department field offices of the mandatory 
estate recovery program contained in § 42-4-206.  In fact, Staley's interpretation of 
Medicaid rules and procedures had been correct until the then-recent adoption of 
Wyoming's 
rules necessary to carry out the provisions of OBRA, which were not effective 
until June 30, 1995.  Still, Knori 
asserts that Staley's conduct rose to the level of affirmative misconduct 
because she had a "duty . . . to give accurate advice to Medicaid Applicants 
about their eligibility for Medicaid and how it affected their assets, including 
their family home[s]."  To hold 
government agencies to such a standard would be akin to stating that any innocent mistake equates to 
"culpable negligence" and that employees of such agencies are under a duty never 
to make mistakes.  We cannot agree 
that the requirement is so broad.

 
 
[¶14]   This conclusion is bolstered by the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of equitable estoppel as against 
the government in a situation where a non-profit corporation received double 
reimbursement for certain Medicare expenses, although the non-profit acted in 
good faith in seeking such reimbursement upon mistaken advice that it had 
received from a government agent.  
The court said:

 
 
There is 
no doubt that respondent will be adversely affected by the Government's 
recoupment of the funds that it has already spent.  It will surely have to curtail its 
operations and may even be forced to seek relief from its debts through 
bankruptcy. . . .   Respondent 
may need an extended period of repayment or other modifications in the 
recoupment process if it is to continue to operate, but questions concerning the 
Government's method of enforcing collection are not before us.  The question is whether the Government 
has entirely forfeited its right to the money.

 
 
A 
for-profit corporation could hardly base an estoppel on the fact that the 
Government wrongfully allowed it the interest-free use of taxpayers' money for a 
period of two or three years, enabling it to expand its operation.  No more can respondent claim any right 
to expand its services to levels greater than those it would have provided had 
the error never occurred.  
Curtailment of operation does not justify an estoppel when -- by 
respondent's own account -- the expansion of its operation was achieved through 
unlawful access to governmental funds.  
And even if there will be a reduction below the service provided by 
respondent prior to its receipt of CETA funds, the record does not foreclose the 
possibility that the aggregate advantages to the community stemming from 
respondent's use of the money have more than offset the actual hardship 
associated with now being required to restore these funds.  Respondent cannot raise an estoppel without 
proving that it will be significantly worse off than if it had never obtained 
the CETA funds in question.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
As a 
participant in the Medicare program, respondent had a duty to familiarize itself 
with the legal requirements for cost reimbursement.  Since it also had elected to receive 
reimbursement through Travelers, it also was acquainted with the nature of and 
limitations on the role of a fiscal intermediary.  When the question arose concerning 
respondent's CETA funds, respondent's own action in consulting Travelers 
demonstrates the necessity for it to have obtained an interpretation of the 
applicable regulations; respondent indisputably knew that this was a doubtful 
question not clearly covered by existing policy statements.  The fact that Travelers' advice was 
erroneous is, in itself, insufficient to raise an estoppel, as is the fact that 
petitioner had not anticipated this problem and made a clear resolution 
available to respondent.  There is simply no requirement that the 
Government anticipate every problem that may arise in the administration of a 
complex program such as Medicare; neither can it be expected to ensure that 
every bit of informal advice given by its agents in the course of such a program 
will be sufficiently reliable to justify expenditure of sums of money as 
substantial as those spent by respondent.  Nor was the advice given under 
circumstances that should have induced respondent's reliance.  As a recipient of public funds well 
acquainted with the role of a fiscal intermediary, respondent knew Travelers 
only acted as a conduit; it could not resolve policy questions.  The relevant statute, regulations, and 
Reimbursement Manual, with which respondent should have been and was acquainted, 
made that perfectly clear.  Yet 
respondent made no attempt to have the question resolved by the Secretary; it 
was satisfied with the policy judgment of a mere conduit.  [Emphasis added; footnotes 
omitted.]

 
 

Heckler, 467 U.S.  at 62-65.

 
 
[¶15]   Knori will, no doubt, suffer 
adverse consequences from reimbursing the Office for the $259,446.38 of benefits 
Pansy received.  There also is no 
doubt that Pansy received  
substantial benefits from the receipt of such Medicaid funds.  Knori has not demonstrated that Pansy 
was any "worse off" from Staley's mistaken advice than she otherwise would have 
been due to the expenditure of personal funds for medical and nursing 
care.

 
 
[¶16]   Additionally, Staley's 
misinformation does not rise to the level of affirmative misconduct:  She did not "know the facts," and her 
well-intentioned but incorrect information simply did not rise to the 
"egregious" level required to estop the government.  Staley's error was neither intentional 
nor intended to deceive Knori.  
Instead, her advice was based upon outdated information, given the recent 
changes to Medicaid reimbursement rules in Wyoming.2

 
 
[¶17]   Furthermore, as stated in Heckler, Knori was expected to know the 
law and could not act blindly on Staley's advice contrary to the law.  On a final note, we agree with the 
United States Supreme Court in holding that the government cannot guarantee the 
reliability every bit of "informal advice" given by its agents.  467 U.S.  at 
64-65.  For these reasons, Knori has 
not demonstrated that Staley's advice was sufficient to estop the Office from 
seeking Medicaid reimbursement.

 
 

 
 
[¶18]   Second, despite the dispositive 
nature of our earlier discussion, we feel inclined to address the requirement 
that equitable estoppel be applied against a government agency only in rare and 
unusual circumstances.

 
 
[¶19]   Knori argues that the situation he 
presents must be "rare and unusual" given the lack of Wyoming precedent on this 
issue.  He further argues that this 
case is unique given that Staley's advice to Knori was "simply wrong" and that 
there could be only a few still-surviving Medicaid recipients who received this 
incorrect information.  Accordingly, 
Knori argues that any other outstanding claims of equitable estoppel against the 
Office are unlikely, and we should seize this opportunity to apply the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel.  We 
disagree.  There is nothing in the 
record that would indicate that the circumstances presented by Knori are "rare 
and unusual" as required for the application of equitable estoppel against the 
government acting in its governmental capacity.  See Appleby v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2002 WY 84, ¶28, 47 P.3d 613, ¶28 
(Wyo. 2002); and Bauer v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 695 P.2d 1048 (Wyo. 
1985).

 
 
[¶20]   The Office seeks reimbursement from 
numerous individuals and estates every year and, most likely, will continue to 
do so.  And, while not limited to 
Medicaid benefits, government employees do, on occasion, make mistakes.  See generally Jean F. Rydstrom, LL.B., 
Annotation, Modern Status of 
Applicability of Doctrine of Estoppel Against Federal Government and Its 
Agencies, 27 A.L.R. Fed. 702 § 14 (1976 and 2004 Supp.) (discussing cases in 
which courts have held that the government was not estopped by misleading or 
erroneous advice furnished by government agents to claimants for Social 
Security, retirement pay for federal officers and employees, and similar 
government benefits).  We are 
presented no reason to conclude here that the mistake in this case was either 
rare or unusual.

 
 
[¶21]   Because Staley's mistake did not 
rise to the level of "affirmative misconduct" and because Knori failed to 
demonstrate that this case presented those "rare and unusual" circumstances 
justifying an application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, we conclude 
that the District Court did not err in granting summary 
judgment.

 
 
[¶22]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1This 
standard for the application of equitable estoppel must be distinguished from 
those situations where the government is acting "as an employer or in a 
proprietary capacity."  See Wells v. Board of Trustees of Laramie 
County School District No. 1, 3 P.3d 861, 867 (Wyo. 2000) (recognizing the 
application of equitable estoppel for "unintentional, misleading statement[s]" 
when the government is functioning in a proprietary 
capacity).

2Given 
our conclusion that Staley's error was not "affirmative misconduct," we need not 
address, as the Office urges us to, whether Staley's acts were 
authorized.