Case Title: IN THE INTEREST OF CT, MINOR: CT V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-05-14

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE INTEREST OF CT, MINOR: CT V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 101140 P.3d 643Case Number: C-05-14, C-05-15Decided: 08/14/2006
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
IN THE 
INTEREST OF CT, MINOR:

 
 
CT,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Koski.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. Pojman, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This appeal 
challenges certain procedures and orders in a juvenile court matter.  We reverse because the juvenile court 
did not follow statutory mandates.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.  Did the juvenile court violate the 
appellant's right to the due process of law by failing to advise him of the 
terms and conditions of probation?

 
 
            
2.  Did the juvenile court 
err by failing to consider a predispositional report prior to 
disposition?

 
 
            
3.  Did the juvenile court 
err by failing to select a statutory sanction level and by failing to impose the 
appropriate terms of probation for that sanction level?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The appellant, 
then fourteen years old, was charged in juvenile court on March 24, 2005, with 
having committed an act of juvenile delinquencyfelony property 
destruction.  After the juvenile 
petition was served upon him, a public defender was appointed as his attorney 
and guardian ad litem, and the court 
ordered the Department of Family Services (DFS) to prepare a predispositional 
report.1  The appellant was briefly confined in a 
juvenile detention facility, but was released to his mother's custody.  In the detention hearing order, the court 
ordered the appellant to obtain a psychological evaluation prior to disposition, 
and ordered that a multi-disciplinary team (MDT) convene as soon as possible in 
the appellant's interest.2

 
 
[¶4]      At arraignment 
the day after the petition was served, the appellant admitted the allegations of 
the petition.  The juvenile court 
then entered an "Order of Arraignment and Final Disposition" with the following 
pertinent provisions:

 
 
            
1.  The appellant was 
adjudicated to be a delinquent child "as defined by W.S. 14-6-203."3

 
 
            
2.  The appellant was placed 
in the legal and physical custody of the State of Wyoming, for placement in the 90-day Youth on Track 
Program at the JeffreyC.WardleYouthAcademy, through Frontier Correctional 
Systems, Inc.

 
 
            
3.  While in placement, the 
appellant was to undergo psychological, psychiatric, and medication 
evaluations.

 
 
            
4.  The MDT was to convene at 
the earliest available date.

 
 
[¶5]      The MDT met on 
April 5, 2005, and filed its report a week later.  The MDT recommended in that report that 
the appellant remain in the 90-Day Youth on Track Program.  After a second meeting on June 21, 2005, 
the MDT filed a report recommending that upon discharge from Youth on Track, the 
appellant should (1) be placed on standard probation; (2) participate in a day 
treatment program during the summer; (3) receive individual and family therapy; 
and (4) return to school in the fall.

 
 
[¶6]      A second 
dispositional hearing was held on June 27, 2005, which was followed by an 
additional hearing occasioned by a dispute over the language of the proposed 
hearing order.  At the second 
hearing, on July 7, 2005, appellant's counsel presented two objections to the 
order:  (1) that it allowed Frontier 
Correctional Systems' staff to authorize immediate detention of the appellant 
upon any program violation; and (2) that it contained probationary conditions 
that had not been announced from the bench.  As a result of the hearing, the juvenile 
court modified the order to require a hearing before detention in the event of a 
program infraction, but declined to adopt the appellant's position that all 
probationary conditions must be detailed in open court by the judge.  The resultant Order of Further 
Disposition, filed on July 25, 2005, contained the following pertinent 
provisions:

 
 
1.   Legal and physical custody of the 
appellant were returned to his mother.

 
 
2.   The appellant was placed on 
probation for an indeterminate period of time, to be supervised by 
DFS.

 
 
3.   The appellant was to "conform to 
the rules, regulations and conditions imposed by law, by the Court, and by the 
Probation Officer and shall sign a Probation Agreement, and abide by the terms 
of that agreement."

 
 
4.   The appellant also was to "abide by 
all rules and regulations of his current placement, to include those rules set 
forth in the document attached to this Court Order."4

 
 
In 
addition, the order contained several specific conditions, such as not violating 
the law, not consuming alcohol or controlled substances, participating in the 
day treatment program, abiding by a curfew, and attending therapy 
sessions.

 
 
[¶7]      On August 23, 
2005, the appellant appealed the July 25, 2005 Order of Further 
Disposition.  Shortly thereafter, 
because the appellant had completed the day treatment program, the juvenile 
court held a status/further disposition hearing.  The Order of Status Hearing/Further 
Disposition resulting from that hearing was filed on October 14, 2005.  It contained the following pertinent 
provisions, whereby the appellant:

 
 
1.   Was left in the legal and physical 
custody of his mother.

 
 
2.   Was released from further 
participation in the day treatment program.

 
 
3.   Was to attend public school, was 
not to be a disciplinary problem, was not to be truant, and was to apply himself 
to attain better than passing grades.

 
 
4.   Was to remain on probation for an 
indefinite period of time, supervised by DFS.

 
 
5.   Was to "conform to the rules, 
regulations and conditions imposed by law, by the Court, and by the Probation 
Officer and shall sign a Probation Agreement, and abide by the terms of the 
agreement."

 
 
This 
order also contained the specific conditions included in the earlier order, plus 
the additional conditions that the appellant (1) not own, purchase, possess, or 
transport weapons or explosives; (2) allow his probation officer to visit him at 
his home, his employment site, or elsewhere; (3) comply with all instructions in 
matters affecting his supervision and cooperate by promptly and truthfully 
answering questions posed by his probation officer; (4) not leave the State of 
Wyoming without his probation officer's prior permission; (5) keep his probation 
officer informed of his whereabouts and all activities; and (6) submit such 
reports as may be required.  Five 
days after the order from the October 14, 2005 hearing was filed, the appellant 
appealed therefrom.   That 
appeal has been combined with his appeal from the order filed on July 25, 
2005.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      The appellant's 
claim that his constitutional due process rights have been violated is reviewed 
de novo by this Court.  Meyers v. State, 2005 WY 163, ¶ 8, 124 P.3d 710, 714 (Wyo. 2005).  The 
party claiming an infringement on his right to due process has the burden of 
demonstrating both that he has a protected interest and that such interest has 
been affected in an impermissible way.  
DH v.     
    Wyo.  Dep't of Family 
Servs. (In re "H" Children), 2003 WY 155, ¶ 38, 79 P.3d 997, 1008 (Wyo. 
2003), reh'g denied (January 13, 
2004).  Generally, sentencing 
decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Bitz v. State, 2003 WY 140, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 257, 259 (Wyo. 2003).  Such 
discretion is limited, however, inasmuch as a court may not enter an illegal 
sentence.  White v. State, 934 P.2d 745, 746 
(Wyo. 
1997).  A sentence is illegal if it 
violates the constitution or other law.  
Martinez v. State, 2002 WY 10, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 394, 
396 (Wyo. 2002).    An "error of law committed by the 
court under the circumstances" is an abuse of discretion.  White, 934 P.2d  at 746 (quoting Garcia v. State, 777 P.2d 603, 607 
(Wyo. 
1989)).  If there was no objection 
below, alleged errors are reviewed under our plain error standard, where the 
appellant must show (1) a clear record of the alleged error; (2) the violation 
of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; (3) denial of a substantial right; and 
(4) material prejudice.  Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶¶ 29, 
33, 123 P.3d 543, 552, 553 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did the 
juvenile court violate the appellant's right to the due process of law 
by failing to advise him of the terms and conditions of 
probation?

 
 
[¶9]      Both the United 
States Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution provide that no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
6.  Although the United States 
Supreme Court and this Court have held that due process applies in juvenile 
proceedings and in probation revocation proceedings, neither court has 
specifically delineated the extent to which such protections are applicable 
during the dispositional stage of juvenile proceedings.  In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 
562, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 1057, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966), the United States Supreme Court 
reached the limited conclusion that a hearing to determine whether juvenile 
court jurisdiction should be waived "must measure up to the essentials of due 
process and fair treatment."  
Similarly, in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-57, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1445-1459, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), the Court held 
that the juvenile court proceedings that lead up to an adjudication of 
delinquency must provide due process of law, including sufficient notice of the 
charges, advisement of the right to counsel, and the right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses.  TLL v. State (In the Interest of TLL), 
899 P.2d 44, 45-46 (Wyo. 1995), holds similarly.  Notably, for our present purposes, the 
Court in In re Gault declared, 
however, that "we [do not] here rule upon the question whether ordinary due 
process requirements must be observed with respect to hearings to determine the 
disposition of the delinquent child."  
In re Gault, 387 U.S.  at 27, 87 S. Ct.  at 1443.  In a case finding that the Due Process 
Clause applies to, but does not necessarily prohibit, pretrial detention of 
juveniles, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that its goal in these cases is to 
strike a balance in juvenile court between the formalistic procedures of adult 
criminal court and the informal flexibility often sought in juvenile court.  Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2409, 
81 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1984).

 
 
[¶10]   Because both adult and juvenile 
probationers face a loss of liberty if they violate probation, they are entitled 
to notice of the terms and conditions of probation.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-232 (LexisNexis 2005); 
16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1669 
(2005); Neil P. Cohen, The Law of 
Probation and Parole §§ 7.7, 7.16, 7.22 (2d ed. 1999 & Cumm. Supp. 
2005); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1556 
(1989 & Supp. 2005).  Like the 
United States Supreme Court, however, this Court has recognized the uniqueness 
of the dispositional phase of juvenile proceedings and the resultant need for 
broad judicial discretion:

 
 
However, 
the Fourth Amendment protections which apply to adult probationers do not necessarily apply to 
juvenile probationers.  The dispositional phase of juvenile 
proceedings requires broad judicial discretion to accommodate the unique 
rehabilitative needs of juveniles.  
We hold that it is within the court's discretion to allow a probation 
officer to search a juvenile without reasonably suspecting that a probation 
violation exists.

 
 
            
Other courts have recognized that minors' constitutional rights available 
in the adjudicatory stage are not necessarily applicable in the dispositional 
stage.  The Supreme Court has found 
that in adjudicatory hearings minors are entitled to those rights which comport 
with due process and fair treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967); 
Kent v. United States , 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966).  However, the Supreme 
Court in In re Gault, recognizing the 
uniqueness of the disposition stage, specifically limited its finding to the 
adjudicatory stage.  387 U.S.  at 13, n. 48, 87 S. Ct.  at 1436, 
1445 n. 31.

 
 
            
This difference between the adjudicative and dispositional phases 
reflects the broad discretion judges need for making an appropriate 
disposition.  Wyoming requires that, 
when entering an order of disposition, the court must do what is best suited for 
the public safety, the preservation of families, and the physical, mental, and 
moral welfare of the child.  See Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-229(a) (Supp. 1991).  To fulfill this mandate and to address 
the rehabilitative needs of juveniles, the court must have flexibility when it 
is formulating the probation conditions.

 
 

In re 
Interests of ALJ, 836 P.2d 307, 311 (Wyo. 
1992) (emphasis in original).

 
 
[¶11]   As a general rule of criminal law, probationary 
conditions must be specific, but general conditions are acceptable if specific 
guidelines will follow:

 
 
            
Generally, the probationer should be apprised of the conditions with 
which he must comply, and the court should state in its order the terms and 
conditions on which it grants the suspension or probation.  To be enforceable a condition of 
probation must not be vague, indefinite, or uncertain, and a general condition 
of probation is permissible only so long as it is contemplated that the court or 
its designee will provide the probationer with reasonable, specific direction 
within the ambit of the initially expressed general condition, and such guidance 
is in fact given.

 
 
24 
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1556 (1989 
& Supp. 2005) (internal footnotes omitted).  But juvenile court dispositions are 
different.  Given that difference, 
these strict criminal court guidelines do not necessarily apply to the 
latter.  See WJH v. State (In re Interest of WJH), 
2001 WY 54, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 1147, 1151 (Wyo. 2001).  We conclude that the juvenile court in 
the instant case did not violate the appellant's right to the due process of law 
in fashioning the probation conditions as it did.  As the record reflects, the 
recommendations of the MDT and the preliminary findings of the juvenile 
probation officer were included in the court's order, which meets the statutory 
purpose of designing individualized dispositions.5  Beyond that, the appellant "signed off" 
on the probation conditions imposed by DFS, so he had actual knowledge of 
them.

 
 

Did the 
juvenile court err by failing to consider a predispositional report prior to 
disposition and by failing to select a statutory sanction 
level?

 
 
[¶12]   We are combining these issues for 
discussion because the similar reasoning applied to both issues leads to the 
same resolutionreversal.  
Wyoming's Juvenile Justice Act contains clear 
mandates as to both predisposition reports and sanction levels.  In particular, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-6-227(a) (LexisNexis 2005) requires that DFS conduct a thorough 
predisposition study in all delinquency cases, and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-229(a) 
(LexisNexis 2005) requires the court to review the predisposition report before 
entering a disposition.  As to 
sanction levels, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-6-245 through 14-6-252 (LexisNexis 2005), 
establish particular sanction levels for particular levels of misbehavior, with 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-246(d) requiring the court to state in writing its 
reasons for any deviation from the appropriate sanction level and to enter that 
statement into the record.

 
 
[¶13]   A predisposition study was ordered 
in the instant case, but there is no indication in the record that such was ever 
accomplished or that the court reviewed a predisposition report prior to 
disposition.  Furthermore, the 
statutory sanction level for felony property destruction is sanction level 
three, which provides for a maximum probationary term of twelve months.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-6-246(a)(iii) and 
14-6-250(a)(ii).  In the instant 
case, the court twice entered dispositional orders placing the appellant on 
probation for an indefinite period, a sanction not available to the court unless 
expressly justified in writing on the record.

 
 
[¶14]   While we previously have held that 
the Juvenile Justice Act does not require absolutely strict compliance, we have 
also said that it cannot be "ignored with impunity."  KP v. State, 2004 WY 165, ¶ 30, 102 P.3d 217, 226 (Wyo. 2004) (MDT report does not equal predisposition report, and the 
court must review both and follow recommendations thereof unless supporting on 
the record its decision to deviate therefrom); and WJH, ¶ 24, 24 P.3d  at 1155 (sanction 
level must be assigned and any deviation therefrom must be explained on the 
record).

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   The probationary disposition in 
this case did not violate the juvenile appellant's right to the due process of 
law.  The district court did, 
however, err in failing to consider a predisposition report and in failing to 
assign a sanction level and to justify deviation from the appropriate statutory 
sanction level.

 
 
[¶16]   Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent herewith.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-6-216 (LexisNexis 2005) requires appointment of a guardian ad litem in certain circumstances.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 14-6-222 (LexisNexis 
2005) similarly requires appointment of counsel in certain circumstances.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-227 (LexisNexis 
2005) requires the court to order a predisposition study and report by DFS after 
the filing of any petition alleging that a child is 
delinquent.

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-6-219 (LexisNexis 2005) allows the court to order any child charged 
via juvenile petition to undergo a psychological or psychiatric evaluation.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-227 (LexisNexis 
2005) requires the court to appoint an MDT whenever a petition is filed alleging 
that a child is delinquent.

 
 

3Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-6-203 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2006) defines the juvenile court's 
jurisdiction.  The term "delinquent 
child" is defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-201(a)(x) (LexisNexis 2005) as "a 
child who has committed a delinquent act."  
"Delinquent act" is defined in subsection (a)(ix) of the same statute as 
"an act punishable as a criminal offense by the laws of this state or any 
political subdivision thereof, or contempt of court under W.S. 14-6-242, or an 
act violating the terms and conditions of any court order which resulted from 
the criminal conviction of any child but does not include a status 
offense."

 
 

4The order 
found in the record has no attachments.

 
 

5Indeed, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-304 (LexisNexis 2005) directly contemplates that the 
individualized probation conditions be prepared and explained to the juvenile by 
his or her probation officer:

 
 
(a)  Under direction and supervision of the 
director of the department or division administrators, the designated department 
probation officers shall:  . . 
.

(ii)  Furnish to each person released on 
probation or home leave under his supervision a written statement of the 
conditions of the probation or home leave and instruct the youth regarding the 
conditions; . . .