Case Title: LAW v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW v. STATE2004 WY 11198 P.3d 181Case Number: 03-4Decided: 09/24/2004
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

WILLIAM 
J. LAW,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, 
and Brandon N. Delozier, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance 
Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Delozier.

 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

GOLDEN, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; KITE, J., files a specially 
concurring opinion, in which HILL, C.J., joins.

 

  

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
After 
a jury trial, William J. Law was convicted of stalking in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(e)(iii) (LexisNexis 2004).1  On appeal, Law challenges the admission 
of a knife into evidence and claims that certain remarks made by the prosecutor 
in voir dire and closing constituted prosecutorial misconduct requiring 
reversal.  Finding no reversible 
error, we affirm.

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
Law 
presents two issues2 for review by this 
Court:

1.  Whether the trial court committed 
reversible error when it admitted evidence which was irrelevant and highly 
prejudicial.

 

2.  Whether prosecutorial misconduct 
occurred when the state argued for the jury to convict Mr. Law for reasons other 
than the evidence and when the state preconditioned the jury during voir 
dire.

 

The 
State essentially agrees with the phrasing of the issues.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
In 
1994, Law married AC, and the couple had a son.  The marriage was rocky, and the couple 
divorced in 1998.  The couple 
attempted a reconciliation, and Law moved back in with AC in 1999.  AC accepted a job offer in Cheyenne as a 
civilian employee at Warren Air Force Base.  The couple moved to Cheyenne in 2000, 
continuing to live together in a house owned solely by AC.  

 

[¶4]           
In 
May 2001, Law pled guilty to child endangerment for striking his son.  Law was placed on probation for one 
year.  The relationship continued to 
deteriorate and in September 2001, AC wrote a letter to Law essentially telling 
Law to move out of her house by the end of the year.  Law did not move out of the house by the 
end of December.  In early January 
2002, AC found an envelope on the window of her car when she was leaving her 
workplace on the base.  In the 
envelope were a couple of newspaper articles: one on children generally and the 
other a horoscope to the effect that AC needed to pay attention to someone she 
was neglecting.  AC assumed Law 
placed the envelope on her window because Law, as a veteran, had full access to 
the base. AC contacted an attorney who sent Law a Notice to Quit, essentially 
evicting Law from AC's house.  Law 
finally moved out of the house on January 11, 2002.

 

[¶5]           
A 
few days after Law moved out, AC began receiving hang up phone calls from pay 
phones around town.  AC and her 
neighbors saw Law drive by her house frequently, usually in the mornings.  AC set up a camera in her front window 
to record passing cars, but the camera could only record the general make, 
model, and color of the cars.  It 
could not capture the license plate number or the identity of the driver.  On January 25, 2002, a message was left 
on AC's voice mail that was too garbled to understand.  On February 14, 2002, Law went to a 
neighbor's house and left flowers for the neighbor to give to AC.  In March, Law gave flowers to their son 
to give to AC.  AC saw Law driving 
through her neighborhood a few days later.  
AC spoke to Law that evening and told him to leave her alone.  She did not want him to contact her 
either directly or through their son.  
Law wanted to continue the conversation and left repeated messages on 
AC's home phone and work phone.  AC 
contacted the safe house for information on how to obtain a stalking protection 
order.  On March 22, 2002, AC filed 
for a stalking protection order in circuit court.  On March 29, the proceeding resulted in 
a mutually agreed upon no-contact order, restricting Law from contacting AC or 
driving on certain streets in her neighborhood. 

 

[¶6]           
On 
March 30, AC drove her son down to Denver where he boarded a flight to San 
Antonio to spend time with his maternal grandmother.  Later that same evening, after AC 
returned to Cheyenne, AC went out to a local club.  Law walked in, saw her and walked 
out.  On April 1, AC awoke to find 
her phones did not work.  She went 
outside and discovered that the box containing the telephone lines had been 
opened and her phone lines disconnected.  
On April 2, AC attempted to fill up the gas tank on her car and 
discovered a foreign substance, presumably ceiling tile material, jammed into 
the gas tank.  On April 3, AC went 
out to the Outlaw Saloon.  Upon her 
return home she discovered a garbled message on her voice mail.  She was able to make out the 
message.  It essentially suggested 
that she should not be hanging out in bars and such activity would be used 
against her in a custody dispute over their son.  Despite being garbled, AC testified that 
she was one hundred percent certain the message was from Law.  After discovering the message, AC went 
out to her car to see if the gas tank had been tampered with and discovered the 
remains of a package of sugar and a package of Sweet N Low in the tank.  

 

[¶7]           
After 
each of the incidents described in the prior paragraph, AC contacted law 
enforcement.  Initially, law 
enforcement found no proof that Law was involved.  AC declined an offer by law enforcement 
that they speak to Law, fearing that an approach by law enforcement would only 
escalate Law's alleged stalking behavior.  
Because law enforcement could not offer much help under the 
circumstances, AC decided to hire private security.  She contacted David Lopez, a private 
investigator, and Mark Thayer, the owner of Century Security Services.  As it happened, AC had meetings with 
both men scheduled at her house for the early evening of April 4, 2002.  Lopez arrived first, and then Thayer 
arrived around 6:00 in the evening.  
Lopez had finished his meeting with AC and was just leaving.  Within a few minutes of Lopez having 
left the house, Lopez called and told AC that he thought he saw Law's car parked 
a few blocks from her house.  AC 
confirmed the license plate number to Law's car.  Thayer left AC's house to drive around 
and look for Law in the neighborhood.  
AC then received information from her next-door neighbor that the 
neighbor had seen Law running down an alley in the 
neighborhood.

 

[¶8]           
Thayer 
spotted Law walking down a sidewalk a few blocks from AC's house.  When Law spotted Thayer, he crouched 
down behind a pickup truck and stayed there until Thayer passed.  Thayer left the area because he knew he 
had been spotted by Law and did not believe Law would do anything while he knew 
Thayer was still around.  Lopez, 
meanwhile, was still watching Law's car.  
A few minutes after Thayer left the area, Lopez reported that Law got 
into his vehicle and left the area.  
Thayer attempted to follow Law but Law was speeding away from the area 
and Thayer did not want to pursue him.

 

[¶9]           
Thayer 
and Lopez both returned to AC's house.  
Law enforcement was contacted, and Officer Robert Bower responded.  Officer Bower took statements from AC, 
Lopez, Thayer, and the neighbor.  
Officer Bower then went to interview Law.  Law was not home so Officer Bower waited 
until Law returned.  Officer Bower 
observed Law drive up and park in the driveway in the vehicle whose description 
he had been given.  Officer Bower 
approached Law while Law was still in his car, identified himself, and asked if 
he could speak to him about a report from AC implicating him in violating the 
no-contact order and stalking.  Law 
voluntarily agreed to speak to Officer Bower, turned off his car and exited the 
car so they could speak.

 

[¶10]      Officer 
Bower asked Law why he had been in the neighborhood where AC lived.  Law denied being in that 
neighborhood.  Officer Bower 
indicated to Mr. Law that he did not believe Law.  Law then said that he had visited a 
store in the area but had not stopped anywhere near AC's neighborhood.  Because Law continued to lie to Officer 
Bower, Officer Bower placed Law under arrest for stalking.  Law gave Officer Bower permission to 
search his vehicle.  As a result of 
this consensual search, Officer Bower found a large knife in the passenger 
compartment of Law's vehicle.  The 
knife was on the backseat floorboard accessible to Law from the driver's 
seat.  When asked about the knife, 
Law replied that it was his grandfather's from World War II and he always 
carried it with him in his vehicle for protection.  The knife found in Law's car was 
introduced into evidence in Law's trial.  
AC testified that she had never seen the knife and had never known Law to 
carry a knife in his car when they were together.

 

[¶11]      Officer 
Bower informed Law of his Miranda rights and Law agreed to continue to talk to 
the officer.  Initially Law 
continued to deny that he had stopped anywhere near AC's neighborhood.  When Officer Bower informed Law that he 
had three independent witnesses who saw him in the neighborhood, Law changed his 
story.  Law stated that he had 
received a call on his cell-phone from his son and pulled over to talk to his 
son.  He just happened to be in AC's 
neighborhood when he pulled over.  
Law stated he did not get out of the car at any time.  Officer Bower told him the witnesses saw 
him outside his vehicle and Law changed his story again, stating that he got out 
of the vehicle for better reception on his cell-phone, but never left the side 
of the car.  Officer Bower told Law 
the witnesses placed him away from his car.  Law then suggested he may have walked a 
little distance from the car toward an alley but he never entered the 
alley.  Officer Bower informed Law 
that he had been seen in the alley.  
Law stated he did walk down the alley but had no idea he was headed 
towards AC's house.  He was paying 
attention to the phone conversation.  
Officer Bower asked Law why he hid behind a pickup truck.  Law stated that he was not hiding but 
only inspecting the truck because it was for sale.  Although Officer Bower told Law he was 
being arrested for stalking, Law repeatedly told Officer Bower that he had not 
violated the no-contact order because he was not driving on any of the 
restricted streets.  When asked at 
trial why he lied to Officer Bower about his being in AC's neighborhood, Law 
testified that he did not want AC to know he had been in her 
neighborhood.

 

[¶12]      In 
an attempt to verify that Law received a phone call from his son around 6:00 
p.m., Officer Bower, with Law's assistance, scrolled through the received calls 
section of Law's cell phone.  No 
in-coming call was registered around 6:00 p.m.  A call that Law stated was from his son 
registered at 6:50 p.m. and Law then stated his son must have called twice.  Law stated he must have erased the 
earlier call, although the received calls section reflected numerous other 
calls.

 

[¶13]      AC 
received the last hang-up phone call from a pay phone on April 5, 2002.  The pay phone was traced to the Laramie 
County Jail where Law was being detained.  
Law was tried and convicted by a jury of stalking AC by his actions on 
April 4, 2002.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Introduction 
Of Evidence

 
1. 
Standard of Review

 

[¶14]      Decisions 
regarding the introduction of evidence are committed to the sound discretion of 
the trial court.  A trial court's 
ruling regarding the admission of evidence will not be disturbed absent a 
finding of a clear abuse of discretion.  

 

Rulings 
on the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of 
discretion.  English v. 
State, 982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo.1999) (citing Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1197 (Wyo. 1997)).  We 
will not overturn a trial court's discretionary decision unless the court acted 
in a manner exceeding the bounds of reason and could not rationally conclude as 
it did.  Id.; Simmers, 
943 P.2d  at 1197.   Decisions 
of the trial court with respect to the admissibility of evidence are entitled to 
considerable deference and, as long as there exists a legitimate basis for the 
trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be reversed on appeal.  English, at 143; Simmers, 
at 1197.   It is also well 
settled that a district court judgment may be affirmed on any proper legal 
grounds supported by the record.  
English, at 143; Bird v. Rozier, 948 P.2d 888, 892 (Wyo. 
1997).

 

Billingsley 
v. State, 
2003 WY 61, ¶9, 69 P.3d 390, ¶9 (Wyo. 2003).

 

[¶15]      More 
specifically, considerable deference is given a trial court's decision regarding 
the admissibility of evidence pursuant to W.R.E. 401 and 402.3  Oukrop v. Wasserburger, 755 P.2d 233, 238 (Wyo. 1988) (in reviewing a trial court's determination of 
admissibility of evidence pursuant to W.R.E. 401 and 402, "we must recognize 
that rulings with respect to the admission of evidence are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and those rulings are entitled to considerable 
deference.")  This Court will not 
overturn a trial court's determination regarding the admissibility of evidence 
pursuant to W.R.E. 4034 as long as a legitimate basis 
exists supporting the determination.  
Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶20, 57 P.3d 332, ¶20 (Wyo. 2002). 
"When appellant claims the testimony was unduly prejudicial under Rule 403, 
W.R.E., he must demonstrate that the evidence had little or no probative value 
and that it was extremely inflammatory or introduced for the purpose of 
inflaming the jury."  Apodaca v. 
State, 627 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo. 1981) (footnote 
omitted).

 

 

2.  Introduction of the knife into 
evidence

 

[¶16]      The 
trial court allowed the knife found in the passenger compartment of Law's car to 
be introduced into evidence by the State.  
The State introduced the knife at trial in its case-in-chief through 
Officer Bower.  AC testified that 
she had never seen that particular knife before, and that Law never carried a 
knife with him for protection while they were together.  Law argues that the trial court abused 
its discretion when it allowed the introduction of this knife into evidence 
because his possession of the knife in his car is irrelevant to any material 
fact at issue in this trial.  Law 
argues his possession of the knife is irrelevant because he did not use the 
knife against AC, and in fact AC did not even know he possessed the knife.  Additionally, Law argues that, even if 
this Court were to find that his possession of the knife was somehow relevant, 
the prejudice of its introduction far outweighs any relevancy, requiring its 
exclusion under W.R.E. 403.  

 

[¶17]      We 
first must determine if Law's possession of the knife in his car at the time of 
his arrest is relevant.  Evidence is 
always relevant if it tends to prove or disprove one of the elements of the 
crime charged.  W.R.E. 401.  The elements of stalking as defined by § 
6-2-506(b), are that Law, with the intent to harass AC, engaged in a course of 
conduct reasonably likely to harass AC.  
Section 6-2-506(a)(i) defines "course of conduct" as "a pattern of 
conduct composed of a series of acts over any period of time evidencing a 
continuity of purpose."  The same 
statute defines "harass" as "to engage in a course of conduct, including but not 
limited to verbal threats, written threats, vandalism or nonconsensual physical 
contact, directed at a specific person or the family of a specific person, which 
the defendant knew or should have known would cause a reasonable person to 
suffer substantial emotional distress, and which does in fact seriously alarm 
the person toward whom it is directed."  
§ 6-2-506(a)(ii).

 

[¶18]      The 
State argues that the knife was relevant to show that Law intended to harass AC 
and to show Law engaged in a course of conduct intended to harass AC.  The State directs the attention of this 
Court to Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953 (Wyo. 1996), to support its 
contentions.  In Vit, 
statements made by Vit to friends and a mental health therapist to the effect 
that he was considering physically harming his stalking victim were introduced 
into evidence.  On appeal, Vit 
attacked the introduction of the statements on the grounds that they were not 
relevant because his victim was not aware of the statements.  The Vit Court affirmed the 
admission of the statements, stating in part that the statements were probative 
of Vit's criminal intent.  
Id. at 957-58.  

 

[¶19]      We 
fail to discern any similarity between the facts in this case and the facts in 
Vit.  Vit's statements 
claiming he was contemplating physically harming his stalking victim were 
directly probative of Vit's criminal intent.  In the case sub judice, all we have is 
possession of a knife in a car.  
There simply is no evidence linking Law's possession of the knife in his 
car to any act relating to AC.  Law 
did not use the knife or the fact of his possession thereof to directly threaten 
AC.  Law did not tell anybody that 
he intended to physically harm AC.  
There is no evidence even that Law ever carried the knife on his 
person.  

 

[¶20]      Law's 
possession of a knife in his vehicle does not indicate anything regarding his 
intended use of the knife.  It 
certainly does not reasonably lead to the inference that Law intended to use the 
knife against AC in any manner.  
Further, harassment under the statute does not require physical threats 
and the State did not affirmatively allege that Law physically threatened 
AC.  In the final analysis, Law's 
possession of the knife in his vehicle when he was arrested, in and of itself, 
has no relevance to any fact material to the charge of stalking as presented in 
this case.  Specifically, the fact 
that Law possessed a knife in his car at the time of his arrest cannot 
reasonably be used to infer anything concerning Law's intent or course of 
conduct in relation to AC.

 

[¶21]      The 
State also argues that Law's credibility was called into question because he 
told Officer Bower that he always carried it with him in his car for protection, 
while AC testified that she previously had never seen that particular knife, and 
that Law never carried a knife in his car when they were together.  Since we have already ruled that Law's 
possession of the knife is irrelevant to the charges against him, however, 
questioning AC regarding the knife as a means of impeachment through 
contradicting Law's statements to the police officer constitutes improper 
impeachment because it involves a collateral matter.

 

[¶22]      The 
rule against impeachment on collateral matters often arises in connection with a 
criminal defendant attempting to impeach a witness, but the rule applies to any 
attempt to impeach credibility.  
This Court previously has explained the rule:

 

Both 
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 1, § 10 
of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming preserve the right to confront 
witnesses testifying against a defendant.  
The right is not without its limitations, however, and "[c]ourts 
recognize what might be called a hard-edged limit on impeachment by 
contradiction, drawn from common-law tradition and captured in the notion that 
contradiction on collateral matters' is improper."  3 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 320 (2d ed. 1994).  Contradicting a witness, as Daniel 
attempted here, is a recognized method of impeachment by showing something the 
witness said is erroneous.  The New 
York court defined the rule regarding impeachment on cross-examination of a 
witness, using collateral matters through extrinsic evidence, and had this to 
say:

The 
general rule is that a cross-examiner cannot contradict a witness' 
answers concerning collateral matters by producing extrinsic evidence for the 
sole purpose of impeaching credibility.  However, an exception to this rule 
exists where the evidence sought to be introduced is relevant to some issue in 
the case other than credibility or if independently admissible to impeach 
the witness.  The reason for this 
exception to the collateral evidence rule is evident from the policy 
considerations underlying the general rule. The collateral evidence rule is said 
to rest upon auxiliary policy considerations of preventing undue confusion of 
issues and unfair surprise by extrinsic testimony.  Also, testimonial errors concerning 
distant and unconnected points are of inferior probative value.  

People 
v. Schwartzman, 
24 N.Y.2d 241, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, 821, 247 N.E.2d 642, 644-45 (1969), cert. 
denied, 396 U.S. 846, 90 S. Ct. 103, 24 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1969) (emphasis in 
original, citations omitted).

            

Daniel 
v. State, 
923 P.2d 728, 738-39 (Wyo. 1996).  
Under the facts in Daniel, this Court concluded the general rule 
had been violated:

 

Daniel's 
effort to impeach the doctor was contrary to the general rule because his 
cross-examination endeavored to contradict her answers relating to collateral 
matters by inquiring into extrinsic evidence for the sole purpose of impeaching 
credibility.  This effort does not 
fit the exception to the rule because the evidence sought to be introduced was 
not relevant to some issue in the case other than credibility nor was it 
independently admissible to impeach the witness.  There would have been the danger of 
causing undue confusion of issues, unfair surprise by extrinsic testimony, and 
little, if any, probative value.

 

Id. 
at 
739.  The rule extends to attempts 
to introduce evidence by other methods than simply 
cross-examination:

 

The 
latitude allowed counsel on cross-examination and rebuttal is a matter within 
the sound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court should not 
interfere unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion resulting in 
manifest prejudice to the defendant. (People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 269, 87 Ill.Dec. 910, 924, 478 N.E.2d 267, 281.)  Generally speaking, any permissible kind 
of impeaching matter may be developed on cross-examination, since one of the 
purposes of cross-examination is to test the credibility of the witness. (106 Ill. 2d  at 269, 87 Ill.Dec. at 924, 478 N.E.2d  at 281.)  However, the cross-examiner may not 
impeach a witness on a collateral matter.  
(106 Ill. 2d  at 269, 87 Ill.Dec. at 924, 478 N.E.2d  at 281.) Collateral 
matters are generally considered to include facts irrelevant to the substantive 
issues in the case and facts which are not independently provable by extrinsic 
evidence, apart from impeachment purposes.  
(People v. McGhee (1974), 20 Ill.App.3d 915, 922, 314 N.E.2d 313, 
319; McCormick, Evidence § 47, at 101-02 (1954).) The test which 
determines if a matter is collateral is whether the matter could be introduced 
for any purpose other than to contradict. (Collins, 106 Ill. 2d  at 269, 87 
Ill.Dec. at 924, 478 N.E.2d  at 281.) We reiterate that defendant does not 
contend that the trial court erred in limiting the cross-examination of Teri H. 
Instead, defendant argues that the trial court erred by not allowing three 
witnesses to contradict her testimony elicited under cross-examination. Whether 
Teri H. neglected her child was not the issue in this case, and such evidence 
could not be introduced for any purpose other than to contradict. Therefore, 
evidence that Teri H. left her child alone or tried to give her child away on 
prior occasions is collateral to this case, and extrinsic evidence was properly 
barred by the trial court. We find no abuse of the trial court's 
discretion.

 

People v. Hutson, 584 N.E.2d 975, 978 (Ill. App. 1991).

 

[¶23]      In the case sub judice, the State in its case-in-chief 
asked AC about a knife she had never seen.  AC then testified that she had never known 
Law to carry a knife in his car for protection.  The State then introduced the knife (the 
knife AC had never seen) through Officer Bower for the simple reason that it had 
been found on the floorboard of the back seat of Law's car.  The State then 
elicited testimony from Officer Bower that Law claimed he always carried the 
knife in his car for protection.  This is the sum total of evidence surrounding 
Law's possession of the knife in his vehicle at the time of his arrest.  

 

[¶24]      While drawing reasonable inferences from evidence is 
allowed, it is no more reasonable to infer that the mere presence of a knife in 
a car supports stalking conduct than to infer the mere presence of a knife 
infers intent to commit murder.  The evidence regarding Law's possession of 
the knife in his car simply has no relevance to Law's state of mind regarding 
the charge of stalking AC, it is not probative of his intent towards AC and it 
is not probative of any course of conduct by Law in relation to the stalking 
charge.  Since 
Law's possession of the knife in his car has no relevance to the case, it is a 
completely collateral matter and as such cannot be introduced solely to impeach 
Law's credibility.  
Under the facts of this case, especially where no threat of physical harm 
was ever alleged by the State, this Court is compelled to conclude that the 
trial court abused its discretion in allowing evidence of Law's possession of a 
knife in his car at the time of his arrest to be admitted.

 

[¶25]      It remains to be determined, however, whether the error in 
allowing the introduction of this evidence affected Law's substantial 
rights.  
W.R.A.P. 9.04 (on appeal, this Court disregards harmless errors).  An error is harmful 
if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more 
favorable to the defendant had the error never occurred.  To demonstrate 
harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under "circumstances which 
manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public 
sense of fair play."  
Seward v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶13, 76 P.3d 805, ¶13 (Wyo. 
2003); Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶21, 49 P.3d 975, ¶21 (Wyo. 
2002); Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo. 
1990).  

 

[¶26]      In his brief, Law presents this Court with no specific 
argument on how, in view of the entire record, Law suffered prejudice to a 
substantial right by the erroneous introduction of the knife.  Law's argument is 
essentially limited to a single sentence: "Confidence in the verdict is 
undermined when highly prejudicial, irrelevant evidence is admitted at a trial 
with so little direct evidence of a course of conduct."  Law points out that 
it was never proven that he had any role in any of the alleged problems AC was 
having prior to April 4, 2002.  Therefore, the verdict may possibly have been 
more favorable to Law had the knife not been admitted into evidence.

 

[¶27]      This Court is reluctant to do Law's work for him and search 
the record for prejudice.  Suffice it to say that, reviewing the record 
as a whole, the evidence regarding the knife was minimal.  The State mentions 
the knife three times: twice in its case-in chief and once in closing.  The State offered 
the knife into evidence through Officer Bower, who only identified it as a knife 
Law stated he always kept in the car for protection.  AC testified she 
had never seen the knife before and never knew Law to keep a knife in his car 
for protection.  
These references are minimal.  Of slightly more concern was the State's 
reference to the knife in closing.  In its closing argument, upon showing the 
jury the knife, the State argued: 

 

She said he never carried this in his car the whole time 
that she knew him.  
The whole time they were married and dated, never saw this in his car 
before.  You 
figure it out.  
You will get to look at that.  Oh, nobody saw him carrying this.  Nobody saw him 
carry it that day.  
He had a waist length coat on, folks.  Draw your own conclusion, that's what you're 
here for.

 

[¶28]      The defense referred to the knife twice.  On 
cross-examination, the defense elicited from the neighbor that he had not 
noticed anything in Law's hands when he saw him running in the alley on April 
4.  Then, upon 
cross-examination of Officer Bower, the defense posed several questions, the 
answers to which strongly emphasized that no witness interviewed by Officer 
Bower mentioned a knife, and Officer Bower was in no way suggesting that Law 
ever possessed the knife on his person.  The defense was thus able to effectively 
underscore that AC was not aware of the knife, had never seen the knife, Law was 
never seen carrying the knife, and Law never threatened AC with the knife.  

 

[¶29]      The defense did not request any limiting instruction 
regarding the evidentiary purpose of the knife.  The State took advantage of this free reign 
to argue in closing that the jury was free to infer that Law was carrying the 
knife with him when he was in AC's neighborhood on April 4.  While prejudicial 
in the sense that the presence of the knife suggested Law might have been 
willing to resort to physical violence against AC, we do not think the 
introduction of the knife into evidence substantially impacted the jury's 
verdict.  The 
State never alleged that Law threatened AC with physical violence, while the 
defense clearly showed that there was no evidence that Law ever carried the 
knife on his person.  
Harassment in the form of physical violence was not an element of the 
crime of stalking as presented by the State.  The State produced considerable evidence of 
harassment by means of surveillance and unwanted communication.  The jury was 
presented with ample evidence from which it could convict Law of stalking as 
charged.  Under 
the facts of this case, we do not think the introduction of the knife had a 
substantial impact on the verdict of the jury, nor can we say that the defendant 
has shown prejudice under "circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and 
injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play."  Johnson, 790 P.2d  at 232.

 

 

Prosecutorial Misconduct

 

1.         
Standard of Review

 

[¶30]      At trial, Law did not object to any of the issues of 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct he brings before this Court on appeal.  Although not raised 
before the trial court, this Court may review Law's allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct for plain error.

 

Under our cases, in order to invoke the plain error 
doctrine, the following elements must be present:  (1) the record must demonstrate clearly what 
occurred at trial without resort to speculation;  (2) a clear and unequivocal rule of law must 
have been violated in an obvious way; and (3) this violation must have adversely 
affected some substantial right of the accused.  

 

Williams v. State, 2002 WY 
136, ¶12, 54 P.3d 248, ¶12 (Wyo. 
2002).  With 
regard to prosecutorial misconduct generally, this Court has stated:

 

Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are settled by reference 
to the entire record and 
hinge on whether a defendant's case has been so prejudiced as to constitute 
denial of a fair trial.  King v. State, 780 P.2d 943, 951 (Wyo. 
1989).  
Similarly, the propriety of any comment within a closing argument is 
measured in the context of the entire argument.  Virgilio v. 
State, 834 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Wyo. 
1992).  A trial 
court's rulings as to the scope of permissible argument will not be disturbed 
absent a "clear or patent" abuse of discretion.  Mayer v. State, 618 P.2d 127, 132 (Wyo. 
1980).  Even 
then, reversal is not warranted unless a reasonable probability exists, absent 
the error, that the appellant may have enjoyed a more favorable verdict.  Trujillo v. State, 750 P.2d 1334, 1337 (Wyo. 
1988) (quoting Jones v. State, 735 P.2d 699, 703 (Wyo. 
1987)).  
Failing to timely object to an improper closing argument, the appellate 
threshold for reversal is "a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice."  Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 384 (Wyo. 
1992).

 

Arevalo v. State, 939 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 1997).  The defendant has the burden of proving there 
was a reasonable probability of a more favorable verdict absent the alleged 
error.  Simmons v. State, 2003 WY 84, ¶27, 72 P.3d 803, ¶27 (Wyo. 
2003); Moore v. State, 2003 WY 153, ¶29, 80 P.3d 191, ¶29 (Wyo. 2003).  
Further, "[p]lain error is difficult to find in closing argument, lest 
the trial court becomes required to control argument because opposing counsel 
does not object."  
Taul v. State, 862 P.2d 649, 659 (Wyo. 
1993).

 

 

2.  Voir Dire 

 

[¶31]      Rule 24, W.R.Cr.P., governs the selection of trial 
jurors.  Law 
alleges that the State violated several restrictions imposed by Rule 24(c) 
during the course of its voir dire.  Rule 24(c) states:

 

(c) Examination of jurors. -- 
After the jury panel is qualified the attorneys or a pro 
se defendant shall be entitled to conduct the examination of prospective 
jurors, but such examination shall be under the supervision and control of the 
judge, and the judge may conduct such further examination as the judge deems 
proper.  The 
judge may assume the examination if counsel or a pro 
se defendant fail to follow this rule.  If the judge assumes the examination, the 
judge may permit counsel or a pro se defendant to 
submit questions in writing.  The examination shall be on the record.

(1) The only purpose of the examination is to select a 
panel of jurors who will fairly and impartially hear the evidence and render a 
just verdict.

(2) The court shall not permit counsel or a pro se defendant to attempt to precondition prospective 
jurors to a particular result, comment on the personal lives and families of the 
parties or their attorneys, nor question jurors concerning the pleadings, the 
law, the meaning of words, or the comfort of jurors.

(3) In voir dire examination counsel or a pro se defendant shall not:

(A) Ask questions of an individual juror that can be asked 
of the panel or a group of jurors collectively;

(B) Ask questions answered in a juror questionnaire except 
to explain an answer;

                                                
(C) Repeat a question asked and answered;

(D) Instruct the jury on the law or argue the case; or

(E) Ask a juror what the juror's verdict might be under any 
hypothetical circumstance.

Notwithstanding the restrictions set forth in subsections 
24(c)(3)(A)-(E), counsel or a pro se party shall be 
permitted during voir dire examination to preview portions of the evidence from 
the case in a non-argumentative manner when a preview of the evidence would help 
prospective jurors better understand the context and reasons for certain lines 
of voir dire questioning.

 

[¶32]      Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 24(c)(1), the purpose of voir dire is 
to choose jurors who will be fair and impartial:

 

In Wyoming, the purpose of voir dire is to seek to 
establish grounds for challenge for cause; assess any individual bias as to each 
member of the panel; and to arrive at a determination of the potential jurors' 
ability to decide a case fairly.  Herdt [v. State, 891 P.2d 793 (Wyo. 1995)]; Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033 (Wyo. 1986), 
confirmed on reh'g, 731 P.2d 558 (1987); Gresham v. State, 708 P.2d 49 (Wyo.1985); Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo.1984); 
Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981), 
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982); Lopez v. 
State, 544 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1976). 
 It is clear 
from our cases that the process is one of jury selection, not jury 
indoctrination.

In accordance with the rule, voir dire is subject to the 
supervision and control of the trial judge.  The rulings of the trial judge are given 
deference within the permissible bounds.  The authority of the trial court is 
discretionary and "[t]he only inhibition regarding the discretion of the trial 
court is that it must be exercised subject to the essential demands of 
fairness."  Jahnke, 682 P.2d  at 999.   

Vit, 909 P.2d  at 960.

 

[¶33]      One area of alleged error occurs when the State asked 
individual jurors what their definition of stalking would be, how they would 
feel if they were being stalked, and what they would do, specifically, if they 
were a single mother being stalked:

 

State:  Anyone ever hear of stalking before 
today?  Ever 
hear of that word used?  Come on, don't be shy.  Someone has heard 
of it.  I had 
to get a feel.  
Ms. Murdoch, what do you think stalking is?

 

Juror Murdoch:  Watching somebody.

 

State:  Okay.  Watching somebody.  Ms. Schmidt, what 
do you think?  
Could it be more than watching somebody, something different?

 

Juror Schmidt:  Sure.  Um, invading their privacy.  

 

State:  Invading their privacy.  That's a good 
word.  I like 
that.  Ms. 
Schmidt, how would you feel if someone kept calling your house repeatedly and 
hanging up on you?  
How would you feel?

 

Juror Schmidt:  It would be irritating.

 

State:  It would be irritating.  And, Mr. Horen, how 
would you feel if someone was doing that [sic] you?

 

Juror Horen:  I wouldn't like it.

 

State:  You wouldn't like it.  How about, -- let's 
see, who do we get to pick on now.  I'm trying to figure who I haven't picked 
on.

            
Ms. Schmidt, how would you feel if that person were driving by your house 
all the time?

 

Juror Schmidt:  I wouldn't like it.

 

State:  How would you feel?

            

Juror Schmidt:  I might be scared of what they would do to 
me.

State:  Scared.  That's a good word.  Now, let's say that 
is happening to someone you know that's a single woman.  How do you think 
she would feel, folks?  Do you think scared would apply?  Irritated?  Annoyed?

 

(Nodded head.)

 

State:  Now, is there anyone here that thinks you 
have to be scared?  
Could it be stalking and you're just irritated or annoyed.  Does anyone think 
that, like Mr. Horen said, he would be annoyed on those calls?  Maybe he wouldn't 
be scared.  
He's a big guy.  Maybe he's not scared about it, maybe it's 
some tiny person doing this.  Do you think you can still stalk somebody 
even though you didn't scare them?

 

(Nodded head.)

 

State:  So that would still be wrong?

 

(Nodded head.)

 

State:  Okay.  If someone were doing those kinds of things 
to you, what should you do?  Ms. Doering, what should you do if somebody 
was doing this to you?

 

Juror Doering:  I would report it to somebody?

 

State:  Report it to somebody.  Mr. Jeffres?

 

Juror Jeffres:  Yes sir.

 

State:  Excuse my point  I'm sorry.  What would you 
do?

 

Juror Jeffres:  I would probably confront the person.

 

State:  Okay.  And what if you were that single woman that I 
was talking about and then the person doing this was a man.  Would you think she 
should do the same thing?  Would that be a good idea?

 

Juror Jeffres:  Probably not.

 

State:  And he gave me a honest and a fair answer, to 
confront them.  
That would be my inclination.  Maybe I'm a little old school.  I know what the law 
says, but I would probably say, hey, what are you doing?

But it kind of changes when you change the circumstances a 
little.  It's 
not Mr. Jeffres.  
It's not a male.  It's a single mother.

            
All right.  
You say call the police or report it to some one.  Are the police good 
people to call?

 

Juror Jeffres:  Yes.

 

The Court:  How about, has anyone heard of the procedure 
in issue here of a stalking order or a no contact order?

 

(Nodded head.)

 

State:  You all have heard of that?

 

(Nodded head.)

 

State:  Might that be a good idea to try to get one 
of those?

 

(Nodded head.)

 

State:  Mr. Watt.

 

Mr. Watt:  Yes, sir.  It will take some time.  You have to go to 
court to acquire that.  And that would be appropriate.

 

State:  Did you hear his answers, folks?  That would be a 
good idea, but it takes time, you've got to go to court.  Now, what if you 
did all those things and that person didn't stop?  They kept calling and driving by?  What do you 
do?  That's 
kind of a rhetorical question.  I don't know that I want to hear your answers 
to that, but it's something that I wanted you to think about  be sure you are 
thinking about it.

 

 

[¶34]      We accept that this line of questioning during voir dire 
violated clear and unequivocal rules of law in an obvious way.  The State was 
blatantly preconditioning the jury by arguing its case to the jury.  With the aid of the 
jury, the State set out its definition of harassment and invited the members of 
the jury to rely upon their own feelings and emotions to conclude that a single 
mother would be seriously alarmed by such harassment.  Essentially, the 
State made a serious attempt to prove elements of stalking  that AC was 
seriously alarmed by Law's harassing actions  through voir dire.  The State also used 
voir dire to impermissibly inject issues broader than the guilt or innocence of 
the accused by inviting the jury to emotionally sympathize with AC.  See Hart v. State, 2003 WY 12, ¶14, 62 P.3d 566, ¶14 (Wyo. 
2003).  

 

[¶35]      It remains to be determined, however, if, within the 
context of the entire record, such error resulted in a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  As blatant as the error was, this Court does 
not believe the error denied Law a fundamentally fair trial.  The evidence against 
Law was strong.  
He was seen by three independent witnesses in AC's neighborhood after she 
had filed for a stalking protection order and been issued a no contact order 
against Law.  
The State presented ample circumstantial evidence from which the jury 
could reasonably have inferred that Law engaged in a course of conduct intended 
to harass AC.  
Law knew AC did not want him in her neighborhood.  When Law testified 
at trial he testified that he lied to Officer Bower because he didn't want AC to 
know he was in her neighborhood.  Yet direct evidence placed Law in AC's 
neighborhood anyway.  

 

[¶36]      The jury was instructed that the "statements, questions, 
and arguments of counsel are not evidence."  The jury was also instructed on the legal 
definition of "harass" as contained in the statute.  The jury also heard 
uncontradicted evidence from AC that she was scared. Officer Bower corroborated 
that evidence by testifying that AC was concerned for her safety and that AC was 
"visibly scared" when he interviewed her on April 4.  Given the evidence 
properly presented to the jury during trial, we cannot say that there was a 
reasonable probability of a more favorable verdict for Law absent the error in 
voir dire.  

 

[¶37]      Other issues Law complains of in voir dire include the fact 
that the State went into considerable detail and gave numerous examples of 
circumstantial evidence and the inferences that can be drawn therefrom, leading 
to the inappropriate use of a hypothetical, and arguing the meaning of words and 
the law.  After 
a thorough review, this Court does not find plain error in any of the other 
complained of actions.

 

 

3.  Closing

 

[¶38]      Law argues one specific passage from the State's rebuttal 
closing constitutes plain error.  The language at issue is:

 

State:  Folks, [AC] was annoyed.  She was 
frustrated.  
She was scared.  She was stalked.  She was the 
victim.  She 
did not deserve any of that.  What she deserves is a protection of the 
law.  What she 
deserves is justice.  
You are the ones that can give that to her.  She's tried 
everything else.  
This is where we are at.  Find him guilty. 

 

Law argues that this language asks the jury to convict Law 
for reasons other than the evidence produced at trial.  Law cites to Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, 49 P.3d 975 (Wyo. 2002), 
as authority that the State crossed a line with this argument.  The following are 
the pertinent facts from Wilks:

 

Mr. Wilks asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct when 
he said to the jury, "Do your duty, please, and find the Defendant guilty of 
First Degree Murder."   We are required to look at this 
statement in the context it was made.  The full context of the prosecutor's 
statement is as follows:

Read the law.  Please follow the law.  It's all there for 
you.  I don't 
want you to twist it, I don't want you to turn it.  Just read it as it 
is and apply the facts to the law.

There is no triumph greater that the ascertainment of the 
truth.  That's 
your job.  Do 
your duty, please, and find the Defendant guilty of First Degree Murder.

"Generally, an exhortation to the jury to do the right 
thing,' to do your job,' or to do your duty' is error if it impl[ies] that, 
in order to do so, it can only reach a certain verdict, regardless of its duty 
to weigh the evidence and follow the court's instructions on the law.'"  Jackson v. State, 791 So. 2d 979, 1029 
(Ala.Crim.App.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 934, 121 S. Ct. 1387, 149 L. Ed. 2d 311 (2001) (quoting Arthur v. State, 575 So. 2d 1165, 1185 
(Ala.Crim.App.1990)).  
Such a statement may also run afoul of the admonition against injecting 
issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused.  See Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(d), supra.  When this statement is read in context, it is 
clear the prosecutor was not telling the jury that fulfillment of its duty could 
be achieved only through a first-degree murder conviction.  Rather, the 
prosecutor explicitly encouraged the jury to do its duty and ascertain the truth 
and to apply the evidence to the given law.  When the statement is reviewed in context, it 
is apparent there was not a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law.

 

Wilks, ¶28.  Law contends that, by arguing what AC 
"deserves," the State injected an issue broader than the facts of the case.

 

[¶39]      "In analyzing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we 
consider the prosecutor's argument in the context in which it was made and with 
regard to the evidence produced at trial."  Trujillo v. 
State, 2002 Wy 51, ¶5, 44 P.3d 22, ¶5 (Wyo. 
2002).  Law's 
defense was that AC was making everything up because she was afraid he would be 
granted sole custody of their son, and that AC wanted to get Law out of the way, 
so she concocted this entire story about being stalked.  The State's above 
quoted comments were in response to the closing argument of Law painting himself 
as the victim of AC's machinations.  While coming close to the line, we do not 
believe these remarks constituted plain error.  The State did not argue that the only way for 
the jury to do its job would be to convict Law.  The State did not argue that the only way AC 
could be protected would be if Law were convicted.

 

[¶40]      Finally, reviewing the entirety of the State's closing 
argument and its rebuttal closing, it is clear the State argued that the jury 
must consider the facts introduced at trial.  The State argued each element of stalking and 
discussed the evidence produced on each element.  The State discussed Law's observed movements 
on April 4, 2002, and the fact that Law continuously lied about his whereabouts 
and movements that evening.  In short, the State argued the facts.  The State argued 
that the jury should look at the facts.  The State argued that the facts prove that AC 
was the victim of stalking by Law and, based on the facts of the case, Law 
should be found guilty.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶41]      This was not a perfect trial, but then very few are.  In fact a perfect 
trial is not required.  "[T]he Constitution guarantees only a fair 
trial, not a perfect one."  King v. State, 780 P.2d 943, 952 (Wyo. 
1989).  When 
viewed in its entirety, we cannot say that any of the identified errors deprived 
Law of a fundamentally fair trial.  Affirmed.

  
KITE, Justice, specially concurring, with whom HILL, Chief 
Justice, joins.

 

[¶42]   While I concur with the result reached 
by the majority opinion, and with most of the reasoning in support of that 
result, I must part company with the conclusion that Mr. Law's possession of a 
knife was irrelevant to the elements of stalking, and therefore, improperly 
admitted into evidence.  A person is guilty of the crime of stalking 
if he or she (1) engages in a course of conduct, (2) which means a pattern of 
conduct composed of a series of acts over any period of time evidencing a 
continuity of purpose, (3) directed at a specific person, (4) which the 
defendant knew or should have known would cause a reasonable person to suffer 
substantial emotional distress, and (5) which does seriously harm the person 
toward whom it is directed.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506 (LexisNexis 2004). 

 

[¶43]   The State presented voluminous evidence 
concerning Mr. Law's course of conduct which demonstrated a continuity of 
purpose, e.g. to harass his estranged ex-wife.  The majority concludes the evidence that Mr. 
Law had a weapon in the car at the time he was in her neighborhood on the night 
of his arrest was irrelevant because she was unaware of that fact and there was 
no direct evidence he intended to threaten her with the weapon.  However, relevant 
evidence is any evidence that has "any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence."  W.R.E. 401. 

 

[¶44]   The State had to prove Mr. Law's 
actions constituted a course of conduct demonstrating a continuity of 
purpose.  
Evidence of all of Mr. Law's actions that night were relevant to proving 
he was engaged in a course of conduct as defined by the statute.  At the time he was 
prowling through his estranged wife's neighborhood, down her alley, and hiding 
behind vehicles to avoid detection, she was unaware of his presence.  Yet, no one argued 
the evidence of those actions was irrelevant because she was unaware of 
them.  I 
perceive no difference between evidence of his actions that night and evidence 
of items he possessed at the time.  A direct threat to use the knife was not 
needed to make evidence of it relevant.

 

[¶45]   I also find Vit 
v. State, 909 P.2d 953 (Wyo. 1996) 
supports my conclusion.  Everything Mr. Law did that evening was 
relevant to his criminal intent even if it did not directly threaten his 
estranged ex-wife.  
The jury could draw whatever inference it deemed appropriate from Mr. 
Law's possession of the knife.  I would have held the district court properly 
exercised its discretion in admitting the knife into evidence.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1§ 6-2-506. Stalking; 
penalty.

(a) As used in this 
section:

(i) "Course of conduct" 
means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over any period of time 
evidencing a continuity of purpose;

(ii) "Harass" means to 
engage in a course of conduct, including but not limited to verbal threats, 
written threats, vandalism or nonconsensual physical contact, directed at a 
specific person or the family of a specific person, which the defendant knew or 
should have known would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial 
emotional distress, and which does in fact seriously alarm the person toward 
whom it is directed.

(b) Unless otherwise 
provided by law, a person commits the crime of stalking if, with intent to 
harass another person, the person engages in a course of conduct reasonably 
likely to harass that person, including but not limited to any combination of 
the following:

            
(i) Communicating, anonymously or otherwise, or causing a communication 
with another person by verbal, electronic, mechanical, telegraphic, telephonic 
or written means in a manner that harasses;

            
(ii) Following a person, other than within the residence of the 
defendant;

            
(iii) Placing a person under surveillance by remaining present outside 
his or her school, place of employment, vehicle, other place occupied by the 
person, or residence other than the residence of the defendant; or

            
(iv) Otherwise engaging in a course of conduct that harasses another 
person.

(c) This section does not 
apply to an otherwise lawful demonstration, assembly or picketing.

(d) Except as provided 
under subsection (e) of this section, stalking is a misdemeanor punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven 
hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both.

(e) A person convicted of 
stalking under subsection (b) of this section is guilty of felony stalking 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, if:

            
(i) The act or acts leading to the conviction occurred within five (5) 
years of a prior conviction under this subsection, or under subsection (b) of 
this section, or under a substantially similar law of another jurisdiction;

            
(ii) The defendant caused serious bodily harm to the victim or another 
person in conjunction with committing the offense of stalking;

            
(iii) The defendant committed the offense of stalking in violation of any 
condition of probation, parole or bail; or

            
(iv) The defendant committed the offense of stalking in violation of a 
temporary or permanent order of protection issued pursuant to W.S. 7-3-508 or 
7-3-509, or pursuant to a substantially similar law of another jurisdiction. 

 

2Law originally included a 
third issue.  
The trial transcript reflected that the alternate juror was present 
during jury deliberations and voted on the ultimate issue of guilt.  After Law submitted 
his appellate brief, the court reporter submitted an affidavit stating the 
record was in error and the alternate juror was released prior to jury 
deliberations.  
At oral argument Law conceded the issue.

 

3Rule 401. Definition of 
"relevant evidence".

            
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

 

Rule 402. Relevant 
evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.

            
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by 
statute, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.  Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible.

 

4Rule 403. Exclusion of 
relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.

            
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.