Case Title: DUSTIN LEE NELSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0299

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
DUSTIN LEE NELSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 37202 P.3d 1072Case Number: No. S-07-0299Decided: 03/11/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
DUSTIN 
LEE NELSON,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk 
A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Morgan.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 
GOLDEN, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, C.J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Dustin 
Lee Nelson was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and battery.  Nelson seeks reversal of that conviction 
based on asserted errors in the district court's discovery and evidentiary 
rulings.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Nelson presents 
these issues:

 
 
I.          
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Nelson's motion to compel 
discovery, requesting the State to turn over internal investigation and other 
material contained in the personnel file of the witnessing police officer, 
without conducting an in camera 
review of the material?

 
 
II.         
Did the district court err when it prevented the defense from being able 
to recall the police officer during the defense's case to question him 
concerning past experiences where he had been assaulted in a manner similar to 
the method used in the present case?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On May 9, 2006, 
Sergeant Andy Boisvert of the Gillette Police Department1 attempted to execute a traffic stop 
of a gray Ford pickup truck driven by Nelson.  Instead of stopping, Nelson accelerated 
in an effort to elude the officer.  
During the pursuit, Nelson lost control of the truck and it ended up in a 
parking lot near a six-foot chain link fence.  Sergeant Boisvert pulled his patrol car 
behind the truck at an angle to block Nelson from escaping.  

 
 
[¶4]      Sergeant Boisvert 
exited his vehicle and approached the truck in an attempt to contact 
Nelson.  He noticed that Nelson was 
frantically looking around and attempting to get the truck into gear.   Sergeant Boisvert drew his service 
weapon and ordered Nelson to shut off the truck and show his hands.  Instead of obeying Sergeant Boisvert's 
commands, Nelson kept trying to get the truck into gear and continued to glance 
back at the officer who, at that juncture, was standing between the two 
vehicles.  After several attempts, 
Nelson finally got his truck in reverse and popped the clutch, causing the truck 
to go "screaming back" towards Sergeant Boisvert.  Fortunately, Sergeant Boisvert was able 
to jump out of the way before the truck smashed into his patrol car.  The force of the impact pushed the 
patrol car several feet backwards and into the street.  

 
 
[¶5]      While Nelson was 
shifting the truck back into a forward gear, Sergeant Boisvert holstered his 
weapon and grabbed his pepper spray.  
When Nelson drove the truck forward, Sergeant Boisvert sprayed him with 
the pepper spray in an attempt to subdue him.  Nelson, however, managed to evade the 
officer.  After striking a fence and 
some camper trailers parked nearby, Nelson made his way back onto the street and 
sped away.  A short distance later, 
Nelson crashed the truck into another fence, abandoned the vehicle, and fled on 
foot.  Police pursued Nelson into a 
trailer not far from the abandoned truck and placed him under arrest.  

 
 
[¶6]      The State charged 
Nelson with one count of felony property destruction based on the damage caused 
to Sergeant Boisvert's patrol car and the camper trailers and one count of 
aggravated assault and battery for attempting to cause bodily injury to Sergeant 
Boisvert with his pickup truck.  
Nelson subsequently pled "no contest" to the property destruction 
charge.  Prior to his trial on the 
aggravated assault and battery charge, Nelson filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 
16 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, to compel the State to disclose, 
among other things, any "information concerning disciplinary actions taken 
against any law enforcement officers who may testify in this matter," claiming 
that such "actions relate to conduct concerning his or her integrity, 
responsibilities or competency." The State opposed Nelson's discovery request, 
contending the requested information was outside the scope of Rule 16 and not 
subject to disclosure.  

 
 
[¶7]        The district court held a hearing on 
Nelson's motion.  During that 
hearing, Nelson limited his discovery request to information contained in 
Sergeant Boisvert's personnel file, including reports, internal investigations 
and psychological assessments, pertaining to any incidents in which Sergeant 
Boisvert was the alleged victim of a vehicular assault.  Nelson generally identified two such 
incidents, one involving Mike Owens and the other involving Christopher 
Carey.  In each instance, Sergeant 
Boisvert pulled his weapon and shot the suspects.  He killed Owens and injured Carey.  No further factual details of these 
events were provided.  Nelson suggested the records might 
reveal impeachment evidence indicating Sergeant Boisvert was more prone to 
overreact to a driver's actions as an attempt to harm him.  

 

[¶8]      After considering 
the parties' arguments, the district court denied Nelson's motion.  Among other things, the district court 
expressed concerns about the propriety and scope of Nelson's discovery request, 
the prosecutor's ability to obtain the requested information, and the relevancy 
and exculpatory value of the records to the particular facts of this case.  The district court ultimately concluded 
that the personnel records Nelson sought were outside the ambit of Rule 16.  

 
 
[¶9]      Nelson's jury 
trial commenced on July 23, 2007.  
Near the end of the first day of testimony, Nelson notified the district 
court that he wished to recall Sergeant Boisvert as a defense witness in order 
to question him about the two previously identified incidents in which Sergeant 
Boisvert had been the alleged victim of an aggravated assault with a 
vehicle.  In his offer of proof, 
Nelson contended the evidence would show that Sergeant Boisvert's opinion as to 
Nelson's intent  that he intended to strike Sergeant Boisvert with the truck  
was clouded by his earlier experiences.  
Nelson offered no testimony or other evidence in support of his 
contention and, instead, simply asked the district court to take judicial notice 
of the existence of a transcript of Sergeant Boisvert's testimony in the 
criminal trial of Christopher Carey.2  

 
 
[¶10]   The district court denied Nelson's 
request to question Sergeant Boisvert concerning the prior incidents, concluding 
the information was not relevant and that it would tend to confuse the 
jury.  Specifically, the district 
court stated:

 
 
The 
task before the jury in this case is to ascertain whether under the facts of 
this case as presented and will be presented in the evidence, the defendant 
attempted to inflict bodily injury on Officer Boisvert, using the car as a 
deadly weapon.  And in that case, 
those allegations are going to stand and fall on their own.  The State has certain elements they need 
to prove.  The incident itself 
offers some proof, and Officer Boisvert's opinion is just one part of the proof 
that is in the State's basket of proof with respect to the elements of whether 
or not there was an intent.  There 
was an attempt, I should say, to inflict bodily injury on Officer 
Boisvert.

 
 
He 
testified in his opinion, that is the way at least I received the testimony, is 
that the defendant was trying to run him or hit him with the vehicle.  That is his opinion.  That is not the only evidence in the 
State's basket of evidence, and in my view[] [c]areening off into the side 
cases, direct[s] the jury away from the facts of this case, and would tend to 
confuse them, confuse the jury.  And 
therefore, the Court is going to decline to permit the defendant to inquire of 
Officer Boisvert with respect to the facts involved in the Chris Carey case that 
ha[s] been referenced, and the Mike Owens case, that has been referenced.  

 
 
[¶11]   In the end, the jury found Nelson 
guilty of aggravated assault and battery.  
The district court sentenced Nelson on both counts to concurrent prison 
terms of three to seven years.3  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶12]   This Court reviews a trial court's 
discovery and evidentiary rulings under the abuse of discretion standard.  Person v. State, 2004 WY 149, ¶ 11, 100 P.3d 1270, 1275 (Wyo. 2004); Trusky v. 
State, 7 P.3d 5, 11 (Wyo. 2000); Dodge v. State, 562 P.2d 303, 307 (Wyo. 
1977).  On review, our primary 
consideration is the reasonableness of the trial court's decision.  Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 103, ¶ 12, 191 P.3d 974, 977 (Wyo. 2008).  The 
burden of establishing an abuse of discretion rests with the party challenging 
the trial court's determination.  Id.  

 
 

Issue 
I  Discovery

 
 
[¶13]   W.R.Cr.P. 16(a)(1)(C) generally 
requires production by the State of certain identified evidence, in the 
possession of the State, material to the preparation of the defense.4  On the issue of materiality, we have 
said

 
 
evidence 
sought in discovery is material only if there is a reasonable probability that 
the outcome of the case would have been different.  The requirement of materiality is tested 
by the court's inquiry as to whether the evidence which is sought is likely to 
affect the outcome of the trial.

 
 

Vena 
v. State, 
941 P.2d 33, 39 (Wyo. 1997), abrogated on 
other grounds by Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1998).

 
 
[¶14]   Nelson complains his entire defense 
rested on the "assertion that [Sergeant] Boisvert was biased and jaded, because 
he had experienced similar past events."  
Nelson also asserts that "[t]estimony concerning other, similar 
occurrences, which [Sergeant] Boisvert was involved in, was the only way to test 
his credibility."  He contends that 
production of his requested documents was therefore not only material but 
essential to his defense.  The 
district court denied Nelson's motion primarily because it determined the 
information sought would not be material to his defense.5  

 
 
[¶15]   We agree with the district court 
that the requested documents were not material in light of the facts of this 
case.  We fail to see how any 
information relative to Sergeant Boisvert's past work-related affairs could have 
adversely affected his credibility concerning the isolated events in 
question.  Simply being involved in 
similar circumstances does not give rise to any presumption of a negative 
predisposition to such events.  
Given the record before us, we cannot conclude that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying Nelson's discovery 
motion.

 
 

Issue 
II  Recall of Sergeant Boisvert

 
 
[¶16]   Nelson complains that the district 
court erred in not allowing him to call Sergeant Boisvert during his 
case-in-chief.  This complaint is 
easily disposed of.  The reason 
given for calling Sergeant Boisvert was to question him about specific past 
experiences.  The district court 
denied the request on the grounds that the proposed testimony was not relevant 
and would likely confuse the jury.  
Again we agree with the district court.  As stated above, any involvement by 
Sergeant Boisvert in prior, similar events was irrelevant to the credibility of 
his testimony in the instant case.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   We find no abuse of discretion by 
the district court in the contested discovery and evidentiary rulings.  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1At the time of the incident, Sergeant Boisvert was a patrol corporal with 
the police department.  

 
 

2Nelson opted not to provide a copy of the transcript to the district 
court. 

 
 

3The district court delayed sentencing Nelson on the property destruction 
conviction pending the outcome of the jury trial on the aggravated assault and 
battery charge.  

 
 

4Rule 16(a)(1)(C) states:

 
 
Upon written demand of the defendant, the state shall permit the 
defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, 
photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions 
thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of the state, and 
which are material to the preparation of the defendant's defense or are intended 
for use by the state as evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or 
belong to the defendant.

 
 

5The parties disputed whether police personnel files would be considered 
in "possession, custody or control" of the State.  W.R.Cr.P. 16(a)(1)(C).  Because of our disposition of this case, 
we need not conduct a foray into this issue.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice, dissenting.

 
 
[¶18]   I respectfully dissent.  I would find an abuse of discretion in 
the district court's refusal to allow the appellant to call Sergeant Boisvert as 
a witness in his case-in-chief.  
Every criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present a 
defense.  Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 5, 63 P.3d 875, 879 (Wyo. 2003).  The 
question for the jury in regard to the aggravated assault and battery charge was 
whether the appellant attempted to inflict bodily injury upon Sergeant 
Boisvert.  The State proved this 
element of the crime through the opinion testimony of Sergeant Boisvert.  The appellant should have been allowed 
to question Sergeant Boisvert about the prior similar incidents, to test whether 
his perception of the appellant's intent may have been colored by those 
incidents.  The evidence was 
relevant and admissible.  W.R.E. 
401, 402.  The district court's 
conclusion that the testimony would "direct the jury away from the facts of this 
case, and would tend to confuse them, confuse the jury" simply is not 
reasonable.  Surely this jury could 
be trusted to handle this small slice of the truth.