Case Title: Cotton v. Terry

Citation: 495 So. 2d 1077

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1986-09-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
495 So. 2d 1077 (1986)
John COTTON, Jr.
v.
Nora Jane TERRY.
84-824.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 26, 1986.
*1078 Ronald L. Spratt, Birmingham, for appellant.
John Oliver Cameron, Montgomery, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
The question in this appeal is whether Code of 1975, § 43-8-48(2)b., allows paternity to be proved by an illegitimate child after the death of an intestate father. We hold that the statute does allow paternity to be proven after the father's death.
The appellant, John Cotton, Jr., is the legitimate son of John Cotton, Sr. Cotton, Jr., brought this suit to quiet title to 160 acres of land located in Montgomery County and owned by Cotton, Sr., at the time of his death. Cotton, Sr., died intestate in 1973 and his estate was never probated.
Cotton, Jr., filed this suit in November 1984. His first complaint prayed for a sale of the land for division of the proceeds, alleging that he owned a one-half interest in it and that the defendant, Nora Jane Terry, owned a one-half interest. In December 1984, however, Cotton, Jr., amended his complaint, deleting the request for a sale for division, and, instead, he sought to quiet title, claiming the land as sole owner.
In due course, an ore tenus hearing was held by the trial court without a jury. By agreement of the parties, the court proceeded to determine whether the defendant, Nora Jane Terry, might inherit under the estate of Cotton, Sr., as his illegitimate child. Following the hearing, the trial court held that under § 43-8-48(2)b. the defendant had established paternity by clear and convincing evidence and decreed her ownership of a one-half interest in the Cotton, Sr., land.
The appellant, Cotton, Jr., contends that the trial court erred, in light of Murphy v. Murphy, 421 So. 2d 1285 (Ala.Civ.App. 1982). He also maintains that the trial court had no "jurisdiction" to decide the defendant's interest. We find both arguments untenable.
Prior to the adoption of § 43-8-48(2)b., the law of legitimation was as stated in Everage v. Gibson, 372 So. 2d 829, 833 (Ala. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 1322, 63 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1980):
However, in 1982, the legislature adopted the Alabama version of the Uniform *1079 Probate Code, which became effective on January 1, 1983. Ala.Acts 1982, Act 82-399, pp. 578-603. Part of that uniform code, now codified at § 43-8-48, Code of 1975, in its pertinent part, states:
Thus, it may be seen from the plain language of the statute that paternity of an illegitimate child may be established after the death of the father through an adjudication supported by clear and convincing evidence. When so established, such a child may inherit from the father through intestate succession.
The commentary following § 43-8-48 explains:
(See State v. Martin, 437 So. 2d 1311 (Ala. Civ.App.1983), and Abrams v. Wheeler, 468 So. 2d 126 (Ala.1985), holding the two-year limitations period in Code of 1975, § 26-12-7, violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.)
Contrary to the interpretation given to (2)b. above by the authors of the commentary, however, the literal language of the section ultimately enacted by the legislature is as the trial court applied it and needs no interpretation.
The record supports the trial court's finding of clear and convincing evidence that Cotton, Sr., was the father of Nora Jane Terry. Cotton, Jr., himself testified so on direct examination:
And, Cotton, Jr., testified on cross-examination:
Also, a newspaper obituary concerning Cotton, Sr., was introduced into evidence identifying Nora Jane Terry as a surviving daughter. Cotton, Jr., testified:
Cotton, Jr., acknowledged that Nora went by the name "Cotton" before she married:
Walter Bivens, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that his neighbor, Cotton, Sr., had an "outside" daughter:
The defendant, Nora Jane Terry, testified that she was the child of Cotton, Sr., and of Hattie Love (Mays) Smith. In fact, the undisputed evidence of all the witnesses, including that of the plaintiff, established that Cotton, Sr., recognized the defendant as his child and held himself out as her father. That undisputed evidence proves that Cotton, Sr., was the father of Nora Jane Terry.
Concerning the plaintiff's argument pertaining to the trial court's jurisdiction, there is nothing in the record to impeach the trial court's express finding that the parties agreed to an adjudication of Nora Jane Terry's right to inherit under the estate of Cotton, Sr. Parties may agree to try their case upon a theory of their choosing and their agreements will be binding. Reese Funeral Home v. Kennedy Electric Co., 370 So. 2d 1030 (Ala.Civ.App. 1979); Rule 47, A.R.A.P. Plaintiff has not *1081 presented any evidence which would negate the trial court's finding that the parties expressly agreed to try defendant's right to inherit in these proceedings. That being the case, we find no deficiency in the trial court's proceedings.
Following the filing of this appeal and the briefs in regard to it, the defendant, Nora Jane Terry, filed in this Court a "Suggestion of Death and Motion for Relief by Dismissal." This motion alleged that Cotton, Jr., had died, that no evidence of a will had been found, and that Nora Jane Terry was, as his half-sister, his only relative and therefore was entitled to his entire estate. Shortly thereafter, the attorney for Cotton, Jr., filed a response to that motion acknowledging the death of Cotton, Jr., but alleging that a last will of Cotton, Jr., naming James Mapson as his beneficiary, had been filed for probate.
The decision of this Court reaches only Nora Jane Terry's interest in the estate of Cotton, Sr. We have nothing before us on the matter of the estate of Cotton, Jr., since we have reviewed only the matter considered by the trial court below. Thus, we cannot presume, based upon any alleged probate proceedings pertaining to the estate of Cotton, Jr., to determine at this point the parties who would be interested in the estate of Cotton, Jr. The effect of our holding in the case before us must be applied in any such probate proceeding.
The defendant's motion to dismiss is overruled.
Let the judgment be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
All the Justices concur.