Case Title: Smith v. Kount Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 48228

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2021-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 48228 
 
NATHAN SMITH, an individual, 
 
     Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
KOUNT, INC., a Delaware corporation 
authorized to do business in the State of 
Idaho, 
 
     Defendant-Respondent. 
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Boise, August 2021 Term 
 
Opinion Filed:  October 20, 2021 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of  
Idaho, Ada County. Steven Hippler, District Judge.   
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed.  
  
Rossman Law Group, PLLC, Boise, for Appellant. Matthew Gunn argued. 
 
Holland & Hart, LLP, Boise, for Respondent. Dean A. Bennett argued. 
 
_________________________ 
ZAHN, Justice. 
This case arises from an employee’s claim, filed pursuant to the Idaho Wage Claim Act, 
seeking to recover bonus compensation that his employer refused to pay following the 
employee’s resignation. Nathan Smith (“Smith”) appeals from a district court order granting 
summary judgment in favor of his former employer, Kount, Inc. (“Kount”), and denying his 
cross motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the compensation agreement 
unambiguously required Smith to remain employed until a specified date to earn the bonus 
compensation and Smith resigned before that date. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm 
the district court’s decision. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Kount is a fraud prevention firm with headquarters in Boise, Idaho. In the spring of 2018, 
Smith began working at Kount as a business development representative. As part of his 
employment agreement, Smith entered into a written agreement with Kount governing the terms 
 
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of his compensation—the Incentive Compensation Plan (“ICP”). Under the ICP, Smith could 
earn two separate forms of compensation: a set annual base salary paid monthly, and additional 
“variable compensation” that was paid quarterly for meeting certain enumerated metrics. The 
ICP refers to “Variable Compensation,” “Target Incentive,” and “Commissions.” For ease of 
reference, we will refer to the additional metric-based compensation as “variable 
compensation.”1 
 Kount updated the ICP at the beginning of each calendar year. On January 2, 2019, 
Smith signed an updated ICP effective through December 31, 2019. Section 3 of the ICP, entitled 
“Compensation Components,” provided a participant’s compensation may include base salary, 
commission-based incentive pay, bonus-based incentive pay, other bonuses, and potentially other 
non-cash compensation. Exhibit A to the ICP is a “Plan Acknowledgement Form” (“PAF”), 
which set forth Smith’s name, assignment, annual base salary, and variable compensation. The 
2019 PAF set Smith’s annual base salary at $35,500. The PAF also identified four metrics for 
determining the amount of variable compensation payable to Smith under the ICP: (1) call 
volume; (2) conversations; (3) overviews/demos; and (4) closed/won deals, and specified bonus 
amounts based on the number of completed events in each metrics category.2   
With respect to variable compensation, Section 2 of the ICP provided that “[i]ncentives 
are earned based upon the attainment of performance measure quotas and goals as described 
herein below.” Section 3 of the ICP provided, in relevant part:  
Each Participant’s PAF specifies the base salary, annual Target Incentive (TI) 
opportunity, goals, and other related individual information for each participant. 
No amounts will be earned under the [ICP] until an applicable event or activity is 
complete, including all applicable forms as designated by Kount.  
Section 6 of the ICP, entitled “General Payment Conditions,” provided, in relevant part: 
In order to receive Commissions payments, you must complete all required 
documentation and reports, and be an employee in good standing at the time of 
payment. No incentives will be earned or paid for a contract signed after the 
Participant’s termination of employment, for any reason. Unpaid Variable 
Compensation will be forfeited in the event a Participant separates from Kount 
before payment is made . . . Commissions will be paid forty-five (45) days after 
the end of each quarter. 
                                                 
1 The parties do not contend that a meaningful difference exists between the terms “Variable Compensation,” 
“Target Incentive,” and “Commissions” as used in the ICP.  
2 For example, the PAF identified three tiers for the call volume metric. Each tier identified a specific bonus to be 
paid for a specified number of “outbound dials.” The more “outbound dials” completed, the greater the bonus. 
 
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In 2019, the end of the third quarter (“Q3”) fell on September 30, 2019. Pursuant to the 
ICP, Q3 variable compensation was scheduled to be paid on November 15, 2019. Before the end 
of Q3, on September 17, Smith submitted a two-week notice of his resignation from employment 
with Kount; his last day coinciding with the end of the quarter. At the time Smith submitted his 
two-week notice, he claims he would have been eligible for $6,600 in variable compensation for 
Q3 based upon the PAF’s metrics.  
On September 17, Smith met with his supervisor, Scott Przybyla, to discuss his 
resignation. Smith disclosed he was leaving for another job. Przybyla explained that Smith 
would not receive his Q3 variable compensation unless he remained employed with Kount on the 
scheduled payment date—November 15, 2019. Smith asked Przybyla to make an exception. On 
September 23, 2019, Przybyla denied the request. Smith’s last day at Kount was September 23, 
2019. Kount paid Smith his base salary through his last day of employment but did not pay 
Smith any variable compensation for Q3.  
On December 16, 2019, Smith filed a complaint against Kount alleging a violation of the 
Idaho Wage Claim Act based on Kount’s failure to pay Smith the $6,600 in variable 
compensation.3 Shortly thereafter, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Following a 
hearing, the district court issued a memorandum decision and order granting Kount’s motion for 
summary judgment and denying Smith’s cross-motion for summary judgment because the ICP 
unambiguously required Smith’s continued employment as a condition precedent to earning the 
Q3 variable compensation, Smith failed to satisfy that condition, and as a result was not entitled 
to the compensation. The district court subsequently entered a judgment dismissing Smith’s 
claim. Smith timely appealed.  
II. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the district court err in concluding that Kount was not required to pay Smith any 
variable compensation because he failed to remain an employee in good standing on the 
designated payment date? 
                                                 
3 We note that paragraphs 3(b), 4, 5, and 7(b) of the ICP described commissions-based compensation based on the 
revenue that Kount recognized from client contracts. The PAF, however, does not indicate Smith was entitled to this 
revenue-based commission compensation. It is unclear why these apparently inapplicable provisions are in Smith’s 
ICP. At any rate, Smith did not raise any claim to this revenue-based compensation in his complaint. Instead, 
Smith’s complaint and his arguments on appeal concern only the variable compensation based on the metrics set 
forth in the PAF. 
 
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III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court 
applies the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Turner v. City of 
Lapwai, 157 Idaho 659, 661, 339 P.3d 544, 546 (2014). That is, summary judgment is 
appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(a). Furthermore, all disputed 
facts are “construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.” Bedke v. 
Ellsworth, 168 Idaho 83, __, 480 P.3d 121, 129 (2021) (quoting Venable v. Internet Auto Rent & 
Sales, Inc., 156 Idaho 574, 578, 329 P.3d 356, 360 (2014)). 
“The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not 
change the applicable standard of review, and this Court must evaluate each party’s motion on its 
own merits.” Id. at ___, 480 P.3d at 128 (quoting Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 
285, 148 Idaho 630, 633, 226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010)). 
Where the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment relying on the 
same facts, issues and theories, the parties effectively stipulate that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the district court from entering 
summary judgment. However, the mere fact that both parties move for summary 
judgment does not in and of itself establish that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact. 
Id. (quoting Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. La. Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 235, 31 P.3d 
921, 923 (2001)) (internal citations omitted). Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of 
law which are reviewed by this Court de novo. Hayes v. City of Plummer, 159 Idaho 168, 170, 
357 P.3d 1276, 1278 (2015) (citing State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 865, 264 P.3d 970, 972 
(2011)). 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
Idaho’s Wage Claim Act governs an employee’s claim to wages against a former 
employer. Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 189, 108 P.3d 332, 336 
(2005) (citing I.C. § 45-601 et seq.)). The parties do not dispute that the variable compensation in 
question constituted “wages” for purposes of the Wage Claim Act. With respect to the payment 
of wages for currently employed individuals, the Wage Claim Act requires only that employers 
pay their employees the minimum wage for all hours worked and pay employees on a scheduled 
payday at least once a month. Savage v. Scandit, Inc., 163 Idaho 637, 641, 417 P.3d 234, 238 
 
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(2018) (citations omitted); see also I.C. § 45-608(1). Beyond that, the parties to an employment 
contract are free to negotiate the terms of an employee’s compensation. See Bakker, 141 Idaho at 
190, 108 P.3d at 337 (“As long as the employer is meeting the minimum wage requirements of 
state law, further compensation is subject to negotiations between the employer and employee.”); 
Savage, 163 Idaho at 640–41, 417 P.3d at 238–39 (citing Bakker, 141 Idaho at 190, 108 P.3d at 
337) (“While employers are required to pay wages [at least] monthly, the employer and 
employee have a great deal of freedom to determine how that compensation will be paid.”).  
When an employee separates from his employer, the Wage Claim Act requires the 
employer to pay “all wages then due the employee” on the next scheduled payday or within ten 
days, whichever is sooner. I.C. § 45-606(1). In determining whether wages are “due” to an 
employee and thus required to be paid under Idaho Code section 45-606(1), “this Court often 
looks to whether the employee is entitled to the wages for services rendered or whether there is 
more they must do in order to be entitled to the wages.” Savage, 163 Idaho at 641, 417 P.3d at 
238 (citations omitted). “If the employee was entitled to the commission at the time he brought 
the suit it would fall under the IWCA [Idaho Wage Claim Act], if there was more that he was 
required to do then it would not.” Id. 
Smith concedes that Kount paid him at least the minimum wage required on at least a 
monthly basis, and that within 10 days of his separation Kount paid him at least the minimum 
wage for all hours worked. Smith’s claim in this case solely concerns the unpaid Q3 variable 
compensation. As such, the question is whether the variable compensation was “due” to Smith at 
the time he separated from employment. See I.C. § 45-606(1). Because employees and 
employers are free to contract as to the terms of an employee’s compensation beyond the 
minimum wage requirement, whether any variable compensation was due to Smith at the time of 
his separation depends upon the terms of his contract with Kount. See Bakker, 141 Idaho at 190, 
108 P.3d at 337. 
The primary objective in interpreting a contract “is to discover the mutual intent of the 
parties at the time the contract is made.” Credit Suisse AG v. Teufel Nursery, Inc., 156 Idaho 189, 
196, 321 P.3d 739, 746 (2014) (quoting Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 69, 175 P.3d 754, 758 
(2007)). The best indication of the parties’ intent is derived from the language of their 
agreement. Id. This Court views the contract as a whole in determining the parties’ intent. 
Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 185, 75 P.3d 743, 746 (2003) (citing Daugharty v. 
 
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Post Falls Highway Dist., 134 Idaho 731, 735, 9 P.3d 534, 538 (2000)). Where its language is 
unambiguous, a contract will be given its plain meaning. Credit Suisse AG, 156 Idaho at 196, 
321 P.3d at 746 (citing Bakker, 141 Idaho at 190, 108 P.3d at 337). However, where a contract is 
ambiguous, its interpretation becomes a question of fact. Lamprecht, 139 Idaho at 185, 75 P.3d at 
746 (citing Daugharty, 134 Idaho at 735, 9 P.3d at 538). A contract is ambiguous where its 
language is “reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations.” Id. at 185–86, 75 P.3d at 746–47 
(citing Lewis v. CEDU Educ. Serv., Inc., 135 Idaho 139, 144, 15 P.3d 1147, 1152 (2000)). 
Smith argues that the most significant issue in this case is the distinction between when 
wages are “earned,” when they are “due,” and when they are “paid.” Smith contends that the 
district court correctly recognized that an earned, but unpaid, commission is due to an employee 
upon separation of employment, citing Goff v. H.J.H. Co., 95 Idaho 837, 840, 521 P.2d 661, 664 
(1974). The distinction between when wages are “earned,” “due,” and “paid” is critical to 
Smith’s interpretation of the ICP because Sections 2 and 3 use the term “earned,” whereas 
Section 6 uses the terms “general payment conditions,” “receive,” and “forfeit.” Smith argues 
this difference in language demonstrates that the intent of Sections 2 and 3 was to govern the 
way Smith could earn variable compensation, whereas the intent of Section 6 was simply to 
identify the date that compensation would be “paid.” Smith claims that, under Goff, the variable 
compensation was “due” to him the moment he “earned” it by completing the activities identified 
in Sections 2 and 3.    
Under this interpretation, Smith argues that he earned $6,600 in variable compensation 
when, pursuant to Section 2 of the ICP, he attained the goals identified in the PAF and when, 
pursuant to Section 3, he completed each applicable activity and completed all applicable forms 
designated by Kount. Because those sections have no requirement that Smith remain an 
employee in good standing until a specified date, he contends that his continued employment 
was not a condition precedent to “earning” the variable compensation. Smith asserts that, 
pursuant to Goff, because he had already earned the variable compensation when he separated 
from employment, Idaho Code section 45-606 simply accelerated the payment date identified in 
Section 6 of the ICP. Smith argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor 
of Kount because Section 6 only identified the timing of the payment, not the conditions for 
“earning” it.   
 
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Kount argues that the district court did not err when it interpreted the ICP as 
unambiguously requiring Smith to remain an employee in good standing as a condition precedent 
to earning variable compensation under the plan. Specifically, Kount contends that the district 
court correctly read Sections 2, 3, and 6 of the ICP in determining whether Q3 variable 
compensation was due to Smith, and that Smith’s interpretation ignores this Court’s precedent on 
contract interpretation by reviewing Sections 2 and 3 in isolation, while ignoring the plain 
language of Section 6.  
When reviewing the district court’s decision here we decline to depart from the plain 
language of the Wage Claim Act and our prior precedent. While Smith and Kount focus their 
arguments on whether Smith had “earned” the variable compensation under the ICP, the term 
“earned” does not appear within the governing provision of the Wage Claim Act. See I.C. § 45-
606(1). Rather, the Wage Claim Act requires that upon termination of employment, “the 
employer shall pay or make available at the usual place of payment all wages then due the 
employee by the earlier of the next regularly scheduled payday or within ten (10) days[.]” 
(emphasis added). Thus, the proper focus under the Wage Claim Act is whether wages were 
“due,” not whether they were earned. See id.  
This Court’s decision in Goff does not hold otherwise. The issue confronted in Goff was 
whether the Wage Claim Act required treble damages be awarded to any successful plaintiff in a 
suit for wages wrongfully withheld, even if the person who withheld the wages did not act with 
malice, wantonness, fraud, or oppression. Goff, 95 Idaho at 838, 521 P.2d at 662. The employee 
in Goff, a salesman at a farm implement dealership, was paid a monthly salary and a year-end 
bonus based on his sales. Id. The employer paid the employee a bonus of $2,400 for 1969 and a 
bonus of $2,000 for 1970. Id. The employee claimed the employer improperly calculated the 
bonus and he should have received more money for both years. Id. A jury returned a verdict for 
the employee for $965. Id. This Court determined that the Wage Claim Act mandated the 
trebling of the damage award. Id. at 840, 521 P.2d at 664.   
Contrary to Smith’s contentions, nothing in this Court’s decision in Goff suggests that 
once a commission is “earned” it becomes “due” for purposes of the Wage Claim Act. In fact, 
there was no dispute in Goff that a commission was due to the employee. The only questions 
were whether the employee’s bonus was correctly calculated and whether the employee was 
entitled to treble damages after the jury awarded him additional wages. As this Court later 
 
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recognized, “[n]othing in Goff is easily read as dictating public policy regarding how employers 
and employees may negotiate the terms of compensation for employment.” Bakker, 141 Idaho at 
190, 108 P.3d at 337. 
In this case, when determining whether wages were “due” Smith for purposes of the 
Wage Claim Act, the proper inquiry is whether there was more that Smith needed to do to be 
entitled to wages under the contract. Savage, 163 Idaho at 641, 417 P.3d at 238. Turning to the 
plain language of the ICP, the plan unambiguously required Smith to remain an employee in 
good standing until forty-five days after the end of the quarter to qualify for payment of variable 
compensation. When Sections 2, 3, and 6 are read together, three conditions emerge that must be 
satisfied before variable compensation is due to an employee under the ICP. First, Section 2 
requires that the employee qualify for variable compensation by meeting specific, individualized 
metrics identified in the PAF. Second, Section 3 clarifies that the events or activities upon which 
the metrics are based must be completed along with any applicable forms. Finally, Section 6 of 
the ICP expressly states that to receive payment of variable compensation, an individual must 
“be an employee in good standing at the time of payment.” (Emphasis added). In other words, 
Section 6 of the ICP adds a third condition that an employee remain employed in good standing 
until forty-five days after the end of the quarter to be paid for having met the applicable metrics. 
When read as a whole, the ICP indicates that all three conditions must be met before the variable 
compensation is due to Smith.  
Although Smith argues at length that he had “fully earned” the variable compensation by 
satisfying only the conditions laid out in Sections 2 and 3, the line drawn by Smith between 
conditions for earning variable compensation and conditions for receiving payment of variable 
compensation is an overly technical distinction. It fails to give effect to Sections 2, 3, and 6, as a 
whole. Regardless of the precise phrasing used to set the conditions for payment, Smith needed 
to satisfy another condition before the variable compensation was due to him; namely, he needed 
to remain an employee in good standing on the date payment was to be made.   
 
This Court addressed a similar contract provision under the Wage Claim Act in Bakker v. 
Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 108 P.3d 332 (2005). In that case, a real estate 
agent filed a wage claim against her former employer for commissions she alleged were due for 
the sale of a living unit in a Sun Valley development. Id. at 188, 108 P.3d at 335. The agent had 
procured a buyer who entered into a purchase and sale agreement for the unit but separated from 
 
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her employment with Thunder Spring before the transaction closed. Id. The employment contract 
term at issue in that case provided: 
Your compensation will be $3500 per month paid semi-monthly at $1750 per 
period. You will also be paid .25% of 1% override on all successful closings of 
escrow on units at Thunder Spring. This begins as of your first day of 
employment estimated to be on or about December 30, 2001. This includes all 
transactions written inside or outside the sales venue, and will be in effect until all 
units at Thunder Spring close escrow. This will not be applicable for units 
previously disclosed by the developer or those in a holdover period with McCann 
Daech Fenton. Further, this is in affect [sic] only during your term of 
employment with . . . Thunder Spring. 
Id. (emphasis in original). Thunder Spring refused to pay any commission for the unit because 
the contract made the agent’s continued employment through closing a condition precedent to 
receiving her commission. Id. In upholding the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Thunder Spring, this Court reasoned that the provision, though “certainly not a model of 
good drafting,” unambiguously required the real estate agent to be employed at the time of 
closing to receive a commission for the sale. Id. at 189–91, 108 P.3d at 336–38. In doing so, this 
Court determined that so long as minimum wage requirements are being met and employees are 
paid at least monthly, a contract provision requiring continued employment as a condition 
precedent to receiving commissions was not against public policy in Idaho. Id. at 189–90, 108 
P.3d at 336–37. 
Smith’s case is similar to Bakker. As in Bakker, the parties contracted for Smith’s 
compensation beyond minimum wage. In such a case, Bakker instructs that the terms of the 
contract govern. Also as in Bakker, Section 6 of the ICP required continued employment as a 
condition precedent to the receipt of variable compensation. Stated differently, there was more 
Smith needed to do before he would be entitled to the variable compensation—he needed to be 
an employee in good standing with Kount on the payment date. See Savage, 163 Idaho at 641, 
417 P.3d at 238. When Smith resigned before the payment date, he failed to satisfy all the 
required conditions for payment. As a result, the variable compensation was not “due” Smith at 
the time of his resignation. 
At oral argument and in his briefing, Smith referenced a hypothetical to illustrate what he 
alleges would be an unfair result if we construe the ICP as requiring continued employment. 
Smith’s hypothetical concerns a laborer employed by a landscaping company at the hourly rate 
of $20 per hour, who is paid on the last day of each month. According to Smith, if the laborer 
 
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resigns on the 15th of the month his wages do not evaporate, but rather Idaho Code section 45-
606(1) accelerates the payment date. Smith contends the same result should apply here. Smith’s 
hypothetical, however, is inapplicable to the facts of this case because it concerns the base wage 
paid to the laborer for hours worked prior to his separation, not compensation paid in addition to 
the base wage. Smith concedes that Kount paid him the base salary due to him at the date of his 
separation. Since Smith’s claim concerns compensation over and above his base salary, whether 
any variable compensation was due to Smith depends upon the terms of his contract with Kount. 
See Bakker, 141 Idaho at 190, 108 P.3d at 337. Our decision today simply enforces the terms of 
the parties’ contract. 
In sum, the plain language of the Wage Claim Act dictates that the proper inquiry for 
purposes of Idaho Code section 45-606(1) is whether wages were “due” to Smith at the time of 
his separation, not whether Smith had “earned” the wages prior to his separation. Because Kount 
paid Smith at least minimum wage and paid him at least monthly, the Wage Claim Act did not 
limit Kount’s and Smith’s ability to contract for additional compensation and the terms of its 
payment. The terms of the parties’ contract unambiguously required that Smith, to receive the 
variable compensation, remain a Kount employee in good standing on the payment date for the 
variable compensation. When Smith resigned before the payment date, he failed to satisfy this 
condition and therefore the variable compensation was not due to Smith at the time of his 
separation from employment. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s decision granting summary 
judgment in favor of Kount and denying Smith’s cross motion for summary judgment. 
Chief Justice BEVAN and Justices BRODY, STEGNER, and MOELLER CONCUR.