Case Title: Phyllis June Brown v. Billy Earl Brown

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Phyllis June BROWN v. Billy Earl BROWN

97-646                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered March 12, 1998


1.   Divorce -- interpretation of decree -- decree not contract but
     order of court. -- Appellant's contention that the divorce
     decree was subject to two interpretations and should be
     construed against the party under whose auspices the decree
     was drafted was without merit; divorce decrees are not
     contracts but are orders of the chancery court; moreover, the
     decree did not specify the method to be used in calculating
     the appropriate shares of appellant's pension; hence, it was
     left to the chancellor to make that determination by
     subsequent order. 

2.   Divorce -- pensions -- distributed as marital property. --  
     Pensions are marital property and subject to distribution as
     such.

3.   Divorce -- pensions -- spouse entitled to postmarital
     enhancement of benefits. -- Divorced spouses are entitled to
     postmarital enhancement in benefits because enhancements to a
     retirement plan are often most dramatic in the later years,
     and it might be inequitable to allow a person who had
     supported his or her spouse through the lean years to be
     deprived of those later rewards; the chancellor has
     considerable discretion to divide marital property other than
     one-half to each party when it is equitable to do so.

4.   Divorce -- pensions and postmarital enhancement of benefits --
     chancellor's determination affirmed. -- The chancellor's
     decision granting the appellee a one half interest in
     appellant's pension and profit sharing, and his determination
     that appellee was entitled to benefit from any postmarital
     salary raises, even though appellee did not begin receiving
     his pension share until the appellant actually retired some
     seven years after their divorce, was affirmed. 

5.   Divorce -- postmarital enhancement of benefits -- increases in
     appellant's salary following separation and divorce
     constituted legitimate adjustments for retirement benefits in
     which appellee could participate. -- Appellant's contention
     that merit increases should not be included to increase
     appellee's share was without merit; the increases in
     appellant's salary following the separation and divorce
     constituted legitimate adjustments for retirement benefits in
     which appellee could participate; this was the chancellor's
     call under Ark. Code Ann.  9-12-315 (a)(1)(A), as is the case
     with all divisions of marital property.


     Appeal from Crawford Chancery Court; Harry A. Foltz,
Chancellor; affirmed.
     J. Patrick McCarty, for appellant.
     Rex W. Chronister, for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     This appeal involves the distribution of a pension between
divorced spouses.  Appellant, Billy Brown, and appellee, Phyllis
Brown, were married in 1951.  In April 1981, Phyllis Brown began
working at Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., in Fort Smith, and the
following year, she began to participate in the business's
retirement plan.  On March 17, 1988, the couple separated, and they
were eventually divorced on June 20, 1989.  The divorce decree
contained the following provision:
     The Defendant (Phyllis Brown) has currently obtained an
     interest in a pension and savings plan through her
     employment at Hiram Walker.  That the Defendant has been
     employed with this employer since April 20, 1981.  The
     court finds that the Plaintiff (Billy Brown) shall have
     a one half interest in those pension and profit sharing
     benefits up to March 17, 1988.
     There were, in fact, two pensions involved in the Browns'
divorce decree.  Billy Brown's military pension was also divided,
with Phyllis Brown being awarded a one-half marital interest in
ninety percent of his pension.  The Arkansas Court of Appeals later
held that her marital share included any postdecretal cost-of-
living increases which enhanced the amount of Billy Brown's
pension.  Brown v. Brown 38 Ark. App. 99, 828 S.W.2d 601 (1992).
     Phyllis Brown continued to work at Hiram Walker until she
retired in January 1996 at age 63.  At that time, she began to draw
retirement benefits in the amount of $978.72.  That same year, her
former husband filed this action in chancery court, seeking an
accounting and a contempt order against her for failing to pay him
the correct share of her pension benefits and refusing to provide
him with information of what his share should be.
     Phyllis Brown answered, and after receiving briefs and
supporting documents, the chancellor ultimately made several
findings in a modified order:
         that at the time of the divorce Phyllis Brown had accrued
          benefits in her retirement account in an amount which
          would allow her to receive approximately $414.00 per
          month if she continued to work at her current rate of pay
          until she retired on the normal retirement date of
          December 1, 1997;
         that between March 17, 1988, and the date she retired on
          January 1, 1996, Phyllis Brown received periodic merit
          increases in her monthly salary totaling $775.00;
         that these salary increases had the effect of raising her
          retirement benefits from $414.00 to $978.72 per month;
         that Phyllis Brown retired from Hiram Walker on January
          1, 1996, and began drawing retirement benefits in the
          amount of $978.72 per month.  
     The chancellor initially concluded that even though the 1989
divorce decree was drafted by Billy Brown's attorney, there was no
merit to Phyllis Brown's argument that the decree should be
interpreted strictly against her former spouse.  He next considered
Phyllis Brown's postmarital enhancement argument that Billy Brown
should not benefit from any increases in her salary following their
separation.  On this point, he concluded that Askins v. Askins, 288
Ark. 333,