Case Title: In the matter of the Estate of Bell-Levine

Citation: 

Docket Number: 106821

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF BELL-LEVINE2012 OK 112Case Number: 106821Decided: 12/18/2012THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA BELL-LEVINE, 
Deceased,
THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA BELL-LEVINE, Appellee,v.STATE OF 
OKLAHOMA, ex rel., OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION, Appellant.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION II,ON 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF GRADY COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA, HONORABLE 
TIMOTHY A. BRAUER
¶0 The Oklahoma Tax Commission appealed a ruling by the District Court of 
Grady County, Honorable Timothy A. Brauer, which found Decedent's outstanding 
1978-1985 income tax liability was barred from collection through Decedent's 
probate case. The trial court's ruling was based on the ten-year limitation 
imposed by 68 O.S. 2001 § 
223(A). The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, concluding 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A) operated as a statute 
of limitations and did not violate the Oklahoma Constitution; however, COCA also 
found that the Oklahoma probate code required satisfaction of the tax debt 
before distribution of the estate assets. We find COCA correctly held that 
68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A) is a statute of 
limitations and does not extinguish an underlying debt to the state in violation 
Article 5, § 53 of the Oklahoma Constitution. However, we conclude that neither 
58 O.S. 2001 § 591 nor 58 O.S. 2001 § 635 of the probate code 
require payment of a debt otherwise barred by the statute of limitations.
THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; DISTRICTCOURT'S 
FEBRUARY 3, 2009 ORDER REINSTATED; MATTER REMANDED FOR FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS
Charles N. Woodward, Lisle & Woodward, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 
AppelleeRobert J. Hays, Hayes & Gordon, PLLC, Chickasha, 
Oklahoma, for AppelleeMarjorie L. Welch, Julie M. Ezell, 
Geoffrey D. Long, Oklahoma Tax Commission, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 
Appellant.
GURICH, J.
Facts and Procedural History
¶1 Patricia Bell-Levine died testate on April 9, 2006. Decedent's son, 
Michael Allen Bell filed a probate proceeding in Grady County on May 18, 2006. 
Bell was appointed personal representative of the estate without objection. On 
September 12, 2008, Bell filed a Petition for Release of Estate Tax Liability, 
which sought a determination from the trial judge that no estate tax was due. 
Following the procedure outlined in 58 O.S. 2001 § 282.1, Bell set the matter for 
hearing and served notice on the Tax Commission.1 The Tax Commission filed 
an objection to the petition based solely on Decedent's unpaid income tax 
liabilities. The Tax Commission also presented a Notice of Outstanding Tax 
Liability in the probate case, which reflected an income tax debt of $11,133.00 
for the years 1978-1985, and $603.00 for years 1992, 1997, and 1998.2 Together with penalties 
and interest, the Tax Commission alleged Decedent had accumulated an income tax 
obligation of $57,182.58 and urged the trial court to require payment of all 
unpaid income taxes prior to allowing any distribution of estate assets.
¶2 Bell responded to the Tax Commission's pleadings, filing an Objection to 
Notice of Outstanding Tax Liability. Bell argued that the ten-year limitation 
period in 68 O.S. 2001 § 
223(A) barred the Tax Commission's efforts to collect the 1978-1985 tax debt 
by pursuing the claim in Decedent's probate proceeding. Nevertheless, Bell 
voluntarily paid the tax bill for the years 1992, 1997, and 1998, utilizing a 
payment option specified in the Clean Slate '08 Voluntary Compliance 
Initiative.3 Bell's objection did not challenge the Tax Commission's 
assessment of the 1978-1985 income tax liability; rather his protest relied 
solely on the ten-year limitation period in 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A).
¶ 3 Despite the Tax Commission's objection, the trial judge sustained Bell's 
petition, finding no estate tax liability. An Order Releasing Estate Tax 
Liability was filed on November 10, 2008, but it did not determine the validity 
of the alleged income tax debt. After a subsequent hearing, the trial judge 
entered an order on January 8, 2009, concluding the tax assessments for 1978 
through 1985 could not be collected in the probate proceeding because of the 
limitations period in 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A).
¶4 The Tax Commission appealed the January 8, 2009 order.4 
COCA reversed, holding (1) Article 5, § 53 of the Oklahoma Constitution 
forbids the Legislature from enacting any law which releases or extinguishes a 
debt owed to the State of Oklahoma; (2) 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A) must be interpreted as 
a statute of limitations, which extinguishes only the remedy, not the underlying 
tax obligation; and (3) the existing tax debt could be collected in the probate 
proceeding according to the terms of decedent's will and the statutory 
requirements imposed by 58 O.S. 2001 § 591 and 58 O.S. 2001 § 635 of the probate code. Bell 
petitioned this Court for review, and we granted certiorari on May 3, 2010, to 
address this first-impression controversy.
Standard of Review
¶5 Whether the time limit of 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A) prohibits collection 
of outstanding income tax liability through a probate proceeding after passage 
of the ten-year limitations period presents a question of law which we review de 
novo. Duncan v. Okla. Dept. of Corrections, 2004 OK 58, ¶ 3, 95 P.3d 1076, 1078. Likewise, whether the terms of 
68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A) violate Article 5, § 
53 of the Oklahoma Constitution by extinguishing a debt owed to the state, also 
presents a question of law, reviewable under the de novo standard. EOG Res. 
Mktg., Inc. v. Okla. State Bd. of Equalization, 2008 OK 95, ¶ 13, 196 P.3d 511, 518-19. The de novo standard necessitates 
a plenary, independent, and non-deferential examination of the trial court's 
legal rulings. White v. Heng Ly Lim, 2009 OK 79, ¶ 2, n.5, 224 P.3d 679, 681.
Analysis
¶6 This case requires us to interpret and balance three statutory provisions: 
68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A), 58 O.S. 2001 § 635, and 58 O.S. 2001 § 591. It also mandates 
consideration of these sections in light of Article 5, § 53 of the Oklahoma 
Constitution.
¶7 Bell maintains that the plain language of 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A)--which authorizes 
taxes to be collected through a court proceeding only if commenced within ten 
(10) years after an assessment of tax has become final--applies to all court 
proceedings, regardless of who initiates the action. According to Bell, because 
a probate matter is a court proceeding, the plain terms of 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A) prohibit any efforts 
to collect the Decedent's tax liability through the probate case. Further, Bell 
asserts the delinquent taxes are not an enforceable debt of the estate. Because 
both 58 O.S. 2001 § 
591 and 58 O.S. 2001 § 
635 apply to income and estate taxes due the state, Bell claims the 
probate code does not mandate payment of a debt otherwise barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations.
¶8 The Tax Commission argues that 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A) places a ten-year 
limitation solely upon the issuance of a tax warrant or a court proceeding which 
the agency initiates against a taxpayer. Further, the Tax Commission 
contends that the limitation period does not preclude collection by other 
methods, including through submission of a claim in a probate proceeding.5 Finally, the Tax 
Commission contends the application of 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A) extinguishes 
Decedent's tax debt in violation of Article 5, § 53 of the Oklahoma 
Constitution.
68 O.S. 2001 § 
223(A) Does Not Extinguish a Debt to the State in Violation of Article 
5, § 53
¶9 Article 5, § 53 provides:
Except as to tax and assessment charges against real property remaining 
delinquent and unpaid for a period of time as long or longer than that provided 
by law to authorize the taking title to real property by prescription, the 
Legislature shall have no power to release or extinguish, or to authorize the 
releasing or extinguishing, in whole or in part, the indebtedness, liabilities, 
or obligations of any corporation or individual, to this State, or any county or 
other municipal corporation thereof.
The relevant portion of 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A) reads as follows:
No assessment of any tax levied under the provisions of any state tax law 
except as provided in this section, shall be made after the expiration of three 
(3) years from the date the return was required to be filed or the date the 
return was filed, whichever period expires the later, and no proceedings by tax 
warrant or in court without the previous assessment for the collection of such 
tax shall be begun after the expiration of such period. . . . If the 
assessment has been made within the limitation period set forth in this 
subsection, the tax may be collected by tax warrant or court proceeding, but 
only if the tax warrant is issued or the proceeding begun within ten (10) years 
after the assessment of the tax has become final. (emphasis 
added).
A legislative enactment that neither extinguishes nor releases an obligation 
owed to the state does not conflict with the terms of Article 5, § 53 of the 
Oklahoma Constitution. See, e.g., Charles Banfield Co. v. State 
of Okla. ex rel. Fallis, 1974 OK 92, ¶ 21, 525 P.2d 638, 640 (holding a dormancy statute 
extinguishing a lien terminated the remedy not the underlying obligation, and 
did not violate Article 5, § 53). Legislative enactments are presumed 
constitutional. Jacobs Ranch, L.L.C. v. Smith, 2006 OK 34, ¶ 18, 148 P.3d 842, 848. When feasible, this Court construes 
statutes in a manner "so as to uphold their constitutionality." Rural Water 
Sewer and Solid Waste Mgmt., Dist. No. 1, Logan Cnty., Okla. v. City of 
Guthrie, 2010 OK 
51, ¶ 15, 253 P.3d 38, 45 (internal citation omitted).
¶ 10 We have previously applied statutory limitation periods to preclude 
claims raised by the State of Oklahoma. For example, in State of Oklahoma ex 
rel. Central State Griffin Memorial Hospital v. Reed, 1972 OK 14, 493 P.2d 815, we determined a state claim for medical 
expenses incurred by a decedent's wife was barred from collection under the 
probate code. In that case, a state medical provider presented a claim for 
outstanding bills more than three years after the administrator published notice 
to creditors. Id. ¶ 12, 493 P.2d  at 817. In defense of its claim for 
repayment, the state alleged it was immune from application of the time limits 
imposed by 58 O.S. 1961 § 
333.6 Id. ¶ 13, 493 P.2d  at 817. Rejecting this 
argument, we concluded the legislative body intended for the procedures and time 
limits for creditor's claims to apply equally to the State of Oklahoma. 
Id. ¶ 19, 493 P.2d  at 818-819.
¶11 In City of Claremore v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, we held a statutory time 
limit for assessing sales taxes was binding on the State and did not offend the 
Oklahoma Constitution.7 City of Claremore v. Okla. Tax Comm'n 
1946 OK 122, ¶¶ 26-33, 
169 P.2d 299, 304-05; see 
also In re Income Tax Protest of F & M Bancorporation and 
Subsidiaries, 2005 OK CIV APP 6, ¶ 8, 105 P.3d 837, 839 (applying the 68 O.S. 2001 § 223 time limit to prohibit 
the Tax Commission from attempting to assess tax liability more than three years 
from the date of filing the relevant tax returns).8 
¶12 The purpose behind Article 5, § 53 was to eliminate the passage of 
special laws designed to exonerate political constituents from public debt. 
see State ex rel. Schones v. Town of Canute, 1993 OK 90, 858 P.2d 436, 442-443 (Opala, J., dissenting ¶ 5) 
(decision abrogated by statute); see also 20 C.J.S. § 319, n.16 
(2012). Title 68 O.S. 2001 § 
223(A) is clearly not such an enactment. The provision is a statute of 
limitations, which merely withholds a party's remedy; it does not destroy the 
underlying claim or debt.9 Because 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A) does not extinguish 
Decedent's tax obligation, its terms do not transgress Oklahoma's constitutional 
restrictions. 
58 O.S. 2001 § 
591 and 58 O.S. 2001 § 635 Do Not Require 
Payment of a Debt OtherwiseBarred by the Statute of Limitations 
¶13 We next address the interplay among 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A), 58 O.S. 2001 § 635, and 58 O.S. 2001 § 591. When interpreting an 
apparent conflict or inconsistency among multiple statutory enactments dealing 
with the same subject matter, we are required to view them "together as a 
harmonious whole so as to give effect to each provision." McNeill v. City of 
Tulsa, 1998 OK 
2, 
¶ 9, 953 P.2d 329, 332 (citing Abbott v. Board of Trustees of Oscar Rose Junior 
College, 1978 OK 
129, ¶ 7, 586 P.2d 1098, 1101).
¶14 Although at first blush there appears to be a conflict among these 
provisions, no conflict exists when the statues are viewed as a whole. The 
period of limitation in 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A) specifically operates 
to bar the collection of assessed taxes through a court proceeding if the 
proceeding is not commenced within ten years of the assessment. The Tax 
Commission did not perfect a tax warrant or attempt to collect the 1978-1985 
liability in a court proceeding within ten years of the assessment. Although 
barred from filing its own court proceeding, the Tax Commission suggests its 
right to litigate the claim was somehow revived by Bell's subsequent filing of 
Decedent's probate proceeding in 2006.
¶15 While the probate of an individual's estate is a court proceeding, the 
Bell probate proceeding was not filed within the ten-year statute of 
limitations. To hold that the probate code requires payment of a decedent's tax 
liability, regardless of the time limit imposed by the Legislature in 
68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A), would render the 
terms of that statute meaningless. We decline to adopt such an interpretation. 

¶16 This Court's decision in Brogden v. Baugh, 1936 OK 244, ¶ 23, 55 P.2d 994, 997, further supports our reading of 
these statutes. In Brogden we said the purpose of 58 O.S. 2001 § 591 "is to establish 
priority of legal and enforceable debts against the estate of a deceased 
person, and [it] does not create liability." Id. ¶ 22, 
55 P.2d  at 997 (emphasis added). A claim against a decedent's estate cannot properly be 
allowed unless the debt originally created remains enforceable. Id. ¶ 23, 
55 P.2d  at 997. A debt barred by the statute of limitations cannot form the basis of a 
claim presented in a probate estate. Id. As in Brogden, the Tax 
Commission cannot circumvent the time constraints of 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A), by attempting to 
assert a claim in Decedent's probate case; such a demand is not permissible 
unless the debt originally created remains enforceable. 
Conclusion
¶17 We conclude that 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A) is a statute of 
limitations and does not extinguish the underlying debt to the state, and that 
neither 58 O.S. 2001 § 
591 nor 58 O.S. 2001 § 
635 of the probate code require payment of a debt otherwise barred by the 
statute of limitations. The trial judge correctly determined 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A) precludes collection 
of Decedent's outstanding income tax liability through the Grady County probate 
proceeding.
THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; DISTRICTCOURT'S 
FEBRUARY 3, 2009 ORDER REINSTATED; MATTERREMANDED FOR FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS
¶18 WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, REIF, COMBS, GURICH, JJ. - CONCUR
¶19 KAUGER, J. - CONCURS IN RESULT
¶20 TAYLOR, C.J., COLBERT, V.C.J, WATT, J. - DISSENT
FOOTNOTES
1 Title 58 O.S. 2001 § 282.1 reads:
If it appears there is no possibility that estate tax is due under the 
provisions of Sections 801 et seq. of Title 68, the executor or administrator of 
an estate or a surviving joint tenant or remainderman may request the district 
court to enter an order releasing estate tax liability. Such request may be 
included in a petition for distribution, in a petition to judicially determine 
the death of a joint tenant or life tenant or may be made by separate petition. 
Such request shall be set for hearing and notice thereof shall be given by 
certified mail to the Tax Commission at least thirty (30) days before the 
hearing. The notice shall have attached thereto a statement, verified by the 
requesting party, containing the description of the property claimed not to be 
subject to taxation, the recipient thereof, their relationship to the deceased, 
and an estimate of the value of the property. The Tax Commission may appear at 
such hearing to object to the issuance of such order, or may file a written 
objection with the court. If the court finds that no possibility of tax 
liability exists under the provisions of Sections 801 et seq. of Title 68, it 
shall issue an order releasing estate tax liability as to the property described 
in the notice. Such order shall have the same legal effect as a release or 
waiver from the Tax Commission, and shall be a final order on the issue of 
estate tax liability of such estate as to the property described in the notice 
and order. If the court finds there is a possibility that tax liability exists, 
it shall refer such matter to the Tax Commission and the determination of tax 
liability or absence thereof shall proceed as in other cases. For deaths 
occurring on or after January 1, 2010, no release of estate tax liability is 
necessary pursuant to Section 5 of this act.
2 The briefs filed on behalf of the estate and the trial 
judge's order only reference unpaid taxes for the years 1978 through 1984. 
Because the Tax Commission records reveal 1985 taxes are included in the 
delinquent taxes, we will reference taxes due as those from 1978 through 1985. 

3 The Clean Slate '08 program, codified at 
68 O.S.Supp. 2008 § 
216.3, was an effort to encourage voluntary payment of taxes owed to the 
state. It provided a limited period of time for those with outstanding tax 
liabilities to pay those amounts or file past due tax returns free of penalty, 
interest, and collection fees. Interestingly, the Clean Slate notice for 
Patricia A. Bell referenced only the taxes due for the years 1992, 1997, and 
1998. This appears to be a tacit admission that the earlier liabilities were 
barred by the applicable limitation period. As further evidence the Tax 
Commission recognized 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A)'s application to 
Decedent's tax debt, a warrant filed on January 16, 2008, included only the 
assessed amounts for 1996 and 1997.
4 COCA correctly held the January 8, 2009 order, 
qualified as an appealable interlocutory order under 58 O.S. 2001 § 721(7) and (10).
5 The Tax Commission urges 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A) does not limit its (1) 
ability to intercept an individual's tax refund to satisfy outstanding income 
tax liability, 68 O.S. Supp. 2006 § 
205.2, OKLA. ADMIN. CODE §710:50-11-5, et seq.; (2) statutory authority to 
demand tax compliance as a condition of employment with the state, 
68 O.S. Supp. 2005 § 
238.2, OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 710:95-11-1, et seq.; (3) right and requirement to 
demand tax compliance as a condition of obtaining or renewing a professional 
license, 68 O.S. 2001 § 
238.1, OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 710:95-9-1, et seq.; (4) right to accept payment of 
tax liability in a foreclosure, quiet title, or bankruptcy proceeding; or (5) 
right to enjoin business operations for failure to file or remit sales and 
withholding taxes pursuant to 68 O.S. 2001 § 232. 
6 The Tax Commission has not alleged that it is immune 
from application of 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A). Prior 
decisions of this Court have declined to impose a time limit on claims of "a 
government entity seeking in its sovereign capacity to vindicate public rights." 
see Oklahoma City Mun. Imp. Authority v. HTB, Inc., 
1988 OK 149, ¶ 5, 769 P.2d 131, 133. However, where the Legislature has 
expressly indicated its intention to impose a time limit against the state, 
application of this principle is unwarranted. see Reed, 
1972 OK 14, ¶¶ 16-18, 
493 P.2d 815, 818.
7 The Tax Commission's own regulations recognize the time 
limits for assessing tax liability under 68 O.S. 2001 § 223(A). OAC § 
710:50-5-12.
8 This Court denied certiorari on January 10, 2005.
9 see Cole v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 
2003 OK 81, ¶ 10, n.23, 
78 P.3d 542, 
547.