Case Title: Alabama v. Greenetrack, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1101313, 1101384, 1110310, 1110158, 1130598

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2014-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 04/01/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1101313
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: State of Alabama
v.
Greenetrack, Inc.)
____________________
1101384
____________________
State of Alabama
v.
Greenetrack, Inc.
____________________
1110158
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: State of Alabama
v.
Frontier Bingo, Inc., and Nova Gaming, LLC)
____________________
1110310
____________________
State of Alabama
v.
Frontier Bingo, Inc., and Nova Gaming, LLC
(Proceedings from Greene Circuit Court)
________________
1130598
_______________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(Proceeding from Greene District Court;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-13-0530)
PER CURIAM.
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
Before us are two appeals (case no. 1101384 and case no.
1110310) and two petitions for writs of mandamus (case no.
1101313 and case no. 1110158) filed by the State of Alabama,
all challenging orders entered by a circuit judge in Greene
County purporting to require State officials to return to
private parties property seized by the State as contraband
pursuant to search warrants previously issued by the Greene
Circuit Court.  Also before us is a petition for a writ of
mandamus (case no. 1130598) filed by the State seeking relief
from the refusal of a district judge in Greene County to issue
warrants similar to the warrants involved in the first four
cases  based on evidentiary submissions similar to those
provided by the State in those same four cases.  The latter
case appears to involve the same potential defendants and
gaming establishments as the first four cases, as well as
similar gambling devices alleged by the State to be illegal. 
Moreover, the district judge in case no. 1130598 relied upon
the judgment of the trial judge in the former cases in
refusing to issue the warrants in that case.  Accordingly, we
find it helpful to our discussion of the factual and
procedural histories and the legal issues presented to
3
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
consolidate our discussion of all of these cases in this
opinion.
The first four cases referenced above (hereinafter
sometimes referred to as "the Rule 3.13 cases") are cases in
which a specially appointed circuit judge for Greene County,
Judge Houston L. Brown, initially issued warrants to the State
for search and seizure operations at certain gaming
establishments in Greene County, including, but not limited
to, establishments owned or operated by Greenetrack, Inc.
("Greenetrack"), and Frontier Bingo, Inc. ("Frontier").
Several weeks later, however, in response to motions filed
pursuant to Rule 3.13, Ala. R. Crim. P., Judge Brown decided
that the warrants had been issued based on an incorrect
understanding of applicable criminal law, specifically what
was and was not prohibited under certain statutory and
constitutional provisions pertaining to "gambling devices,"
"slot machines," and "bingo."  Largely on the basis of his
reconsideration of this legal question, Judge Brown ordered
the State to return to the gaming establishments all the
gaming machines, currency, and other property it had seized
pursuant to the warrants.  
4
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
In case no. 1130598, Greene County District Judge Lillian
Jones-Osborne 
was 
presented 
by 
State 
officials 
with
applications for search warrants relating to gambling devices
similar to those at issue in the Rule 3.13 cases and alleged
by the State to be located at facilities owned or operated by
Greenetrack and Frontier, and two additional facilities known
as River's Edge Casino and Green Charity Casino.  Judge Jones-
Osborne refused to grant the State's applications for these
warrants. Specifically, she referred to the order of Judge
Brown in the Rule 3.13 cases and adopted Judge Brown's
reasoning as the basis for her decision to deny the State's
applications.   
I.  Facts and Procedural History
A.  The Rule 3.13 Cases
Amendment 
No. 
743, 
Ala. 
Const. 
1901 
(now 
Local
Amendments, Greene County, § 1, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off.
Recomp.)), provides in part that "[b]ingo games for prizes or
money may be operated by a nonprofit organization in Greene
County."  It defines "bingo" as "[t]hat specific kind of game
commonly known as bingo in which prizes are awarded on the
basis of designated numbers or symbols on a card or electronic
5
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
marking machine conforming to numbers or symbols selected at
random."  Charity "bingo," as permitted by Amendment No. 743,
stands as an exception to the general prohibition of gambling
in the Alabama Constitution and specific statutes.  See Ala.
Const. 1901, Art. IV, § 65, and Ala. Code 1975, §§ 13A-12-20
and -27,  making it a criminal offense to possess "gambling
devices," including but not limited to "slot machines."  See
generally Barber v. Jefferson Cnty. Racing Ass'n, Inc., 960
So. 2d 599, 603 (Ala. 2006).
In April 2011, a team of undercover officers supervised
by Lt. Mike Reese of the Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control
Board 
investigated 
operations 
at 
Greenetrack's 
gaming 
facility
in Greene County.  Specifically, the officers examined the
gaming machines at the facility to determine whether they were
authorized under the charity-bingo exception of Amendment
No. 743.  The investigation included making a video disc of
officers playing the machines that was entered as evidence in
the hearing below pertaining to Greenetrack's property.  The
officers concluded that the machines did not qualify as
"bingo" under the definition provided in Amendment No. 743.  
6
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
In May 2011, a team of undercover officers supervised by
Lt. William Carson of the Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control
Board investigated operations at the Frontier gaming facility
in Greene County.  As with the Greenetrack investigation, the
officers examined gaming machines at the facility, at least
some of which were owned by Nova Gaming, LLC ("Nova"), to
determine 
whether 
they 
were 
authorized 
under 
the 
charity-bingo
exception of Amendment No. 743.  This investigation also
included making a video disc of officers playing the machines
that was entered as evidence in the hearing below pertaining
to Frontier and Nova's property.  As in the Greenetrack
investigation, the officers 
concluded that the games played on
the machines did not qualify as "bingo" under the definition
provided in Amendment No. 743. 
Prior to the foregoing events, on July 1, 2010, then
Chief Justice Sue Bell Cobb entered an order appointing
Jefferson Circuit Judge Houston L. Brown "to preside as
circuit judge in all matters concerning" a case styled as
State of Alabama v. 825 Electronic Gambling Devices, case no.
CV-2010.20, in the circuit court of Greene County.  Chief
Deputy Attorney General Richard Allen 
testified in the hearing
7
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
below pertaining to Greenetrack's property that because 
of 
the
July 1, 2010, order he was not sure what judge had authority
to rule on a search warrant pertaining to gaming devices in
Greene County.  Allen telephoned the Administrative Office of
Courts to inquire about Judge Brown's authority in Greene
County.  On May 17, 2011, then Chief Justice Cobb entered an
order appointing Judge Brown as a "special circuit judge" for
the 17th Judicial Circuit "until further orders of this
Court." 
On May 31, 2011, Lt. Reese and Lt. Carson applied to
Judge Brown for warrants to search the Greenetrack and
Frontier facilities and to seize gaming machines, records, 
and
proceeds.  The affidavits Lt. Reese and Lt. Carson filed in
support of their applications for search warrants contained
almost identical language and in general concluded that the
machines at each facility were 
"illegal slot machines under Alabama law, in that
they operate by the insertion of a PIN number which
activates cash value credits purchased at a cashiers
window, and operate with the aid of some physical
act by the player, in such a manner that, depending
upon elements of chance, they may eject something of
value."
8
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
More specifically, the affidavits contrasted what undercover
officers observed at the facilities with regard to the
machines with the six characteristics of "the game commonly or
traditionally known as bingo" provided in Barber v.
Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc., 42 So. 3d 65, 86 (Ala.
2009).  In this regard, Lt. Reese's affidavit repeated each of
those six characteristics and then commented on whether the
machines in question satisfied that characteristic:
"(1) 'Each player uses one or more cards with
spaces arranged in five columns and five rows, with
an alphanumeric or similar designation assigned to
each space.'
"The undercover operations revealed that the
predominant display on these machines is a slot
machine 
type 
display 
involving 
a 
video
representation of slot-style spinning reels. There
is also a much smaller video depiction of a bingo
card on each machine.  There is no paper or printed
card associated with play of any of the machines.
The player is not required to use or interact with
a video depiction of a card in any way in the play
of the game, and physically cannot personally
interact with any video representation of a bingo
card once play is initiated.  In fact, once cash
value credits are inserted using a PIN number, the
game can be played blindfolded or with the eyes
closed by simply pressing the play button, and can
be played without ever looking at or paying any
attention to any electronic representation of a
bingo card.  I observed that players in the facility
regularly and typically played the game without
looking at any video representation of a bingo card
at all.
9
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
"(2) 'Alphanumeric or similar designations are
randomly drawn and announced one by one.'
"The undercover operations revealed that in
terms of what the human eye can see, the numbers are
neither drawn one by one nor are they announced one
by one, as required by the Cornerstone opinion.
Instead, on one touch machines the first press of
the play button on these machines typically caused
a video depiction of a large number (approximately
thirty) balls to drop simultaneously.  An entire
game can be played in about three (3) to five (5)
seconds on most machines, in one second on others.
The three touch machines also [displayed] video
depictions of the dropping of a large number of
balls at a time. There was no announcer involved in
the play of any of the machines.
"(3) 'In order to play, each player must pay
attention to the values announced; if one of the
values matches a value on one or more of the
player's cards, the player must physically act by
marking his or her card accordingly.'
"The undercover investigation revealed that
these machines do not play a game in which 'a player
must pay attention to the values announced.'  In
fact, it is not necessary for a player to pay any
attention whatsoever to the values announced in
order to play the game.  Again, once cash credits
are inserted by way of a PIN, the game can be played
blindfolded or with the eyes closed by simply
pressing the play button and can be played without
any paper or printed bingo card and without ever
looking at any video representation of a bingo card.
"In fact, because the game is played so quickly,
it is impossible for the human player to personally
match 
numbers 
drawn 
to 
his 
or 
her 
video
representation of a bingo card.  In addition, the
machines simply require the player to press the play
button, after which the machine automatically
10
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
determines what numbers match at computer speed,
which is faster than the human eye can match and
daub.  The player is not required to recognize any
matching numbers or daub them one by one, and in
fact cannot daub the numbers one by one.
"(4) 'A player can fail to pay proper attention
or to properly mark his or her card, and thereby
miss an opportunity to be declared a winner.'
"The undercover operation revealed that on one
touch machines at least, the game once started could
not be slept and ended automatically without any
player interaction.  Furthermore, as to all of the
machines, a player is neither required to nor able
to recognize and daub matching numbers one by one,
and therefore there is no opportunity to improperly
mark (i.e., fail to 'properly mark') his or her
video representation of a bingo card.
"(5) 'A player must recognize that his or her
card has a "bingo," i.e., a predetermined pattern of
matching values, and in turn announce to the other
players and the announcer that this is the case
before any other player does so.'
"The undercover operation revealed that the
player is not required to recognize any numbers
drawn on any of the machines, much less any bingo
pattern on any physical card (or electronic
representation of a card) in order to win.  There is
no announce, and the players are not required to
announce bingo to other players to claim their
prizes.  Instead, the machine displays to the player
whether or not the player has won anything.  There
is no way for a losing player to identify the player
who won, or where that player is located, much less
verify that player's 'bingo.'
"(6) 'The game of bingo contemplates a group
activity in which multiple players compete against
each other to be the first to properly mark a card
11
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
with the predetermined winning pattern and announce
that fact.'
"The 
undercover 
operation 
revealed 
that 
there 
is
no meaningful interaction between players on any of
the machines.  The machines appear to require that
at least two machines be activated, but there does
not appear to be any requirements that players press
buttons simultaneously or complete their games at
the same time.  Players do not have the opportunity
to improperly mark a card.  Players are not required
to personally identify, recognize, announce, or even
know any winning patterns in order to play the game.
"Finally, 
the 
machines 
located 
at 
Greenetrack 
do
not simply enable a player to mark his or her card
electronically.  Instead, the machines totally
eliminate the requirements that a player personally
recognize and identify matching numbers and take
action to mark each matching number on his or her
card accordingly as numbers are drawn and announced
one by one, and in fact eliminate all elements of
human skill and recognition featured in the
traditional game of bingo.  And rather than
electronically marking a card, they eliminate the
traditional paper or printed bingo card altogether,
and only allow the player who chooses to ignore the
larger slot machine display to see a small
electronic simulation of a bingo card with which the
player cannot interact at all during the computer
simulated number draw, and a draw which is simulated
at computer speed as described above. Once the
player presses the play button on a one touch
machine the player can do nothing to influence which
individual numbers are or are not marked on any
electronic simulation of a bingo card.  On a three
touch machine, the player can only fail to press the
button the second and third time, but cannot
influence which specific numbers the machine will
automatically daub if the button is pressed the
second and third time.  Moreover, the machines
accept cash value credits and dispense cash value
12
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
credits by means of a PIN, which has nothing to do
with card marking, but which makes the machines slot
machines and illegal gambling devices in violation
of Ala. Code § 13A-12-20, et seq."
(Emphasis in original.)  After considering the State's
submissions, Judge Brown issued the search warrants.  
On June 1, 2011, the State executed the warrants at the
Greenetrack and Frontier gaming facilities.  The State seized
approximately 376 gaming devices at the Greenetrack facility,
business records, and $93,917.50 in proceeds.  The State
seized approximately 267 gaming devices at the Frontier
facility, business records, 
and 
an unknown amount of proceeds.
The property seized at the Frontier facility included gaming
machines owned by Nova.  
On June 7, 2011, Greenetrack, Frontier, and other
entities who are not parties to the cases before us filed a
joint "Motion for Return of Seized Property" under Rule 3.13,
Ala. R. Crim. P..   The motion was referred to Judge Brown.  
1
Rule 3.13 provides:
1
"A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure may move the court for the return of the
property seized on the ground that he or she is
entitled to lawful possession of the property which
was illegally seized.  The judge shall receive
evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the
13
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
On June 22, 2011, the State filed in the Greene Circuit
Court two civil forfeiture actions as to the gaming machines,
records, and proceeds seized through the warrants executed at
the Greenetrack and Frontier facilities.  The State filed
amended complaints on June 24, 2011, and second amended
complaints on July 6, 2011.  The forfeiture actions were
assigned to Judge Eddie Hardaway.  
On June 27, 2011, Nova filed a motion for return of
property pursuant to Rule 3.13 on the basis of its claimed
interest in the property seized under the warrant executed at
the Frontier facility.  On June 29, 2011, Frontier withdrew
its motion for return of property based on the State's filing
its forfeiture action.  Nova likewise subsequently withdrew
its motion for return of property as a result of the State's
filing of a forfeiture complaint.   Greenetrack did not
2
withdraw its motion for return of property.  
decision of the motion. If the motion is granted,
the property shall be restored. If a motion of
return of property is made or comes on for hearing
after an indictment or information is filed, it
shall be treated also as a motion to suppress
evidence."
The other entities who are not parties to the cases
2
before us also withdrew their motions for return of property.
14
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
On July 6-7, 2011, Judge Brown held an evidentiary
hearing on Greenetrack's motion for return of property.  Judge
Brown heard testimony from Richard Allen and Judge Hardaway
pertaining to the process that led to Judge Brown's
appointment.  He also heard from Lt. Reese and Desmond Ladner,
a gambling expert presented by the State, regarding their
observations of the gaming machines at the Greenetrack
facility.  
On August 3, 2011, Judge Brown entered an order requiring
the State to "RETURN all of the property seized during the
execution of the subject search warrant to GREENETRACK, Inc.
Before the passage of Ten (10) days from the date of this
Order."  (Capitalization in original.)  Among other things,
Judge Brown reconsidered the meaning of the term "bingo" and
reached the conclusion that there was not probable cause to
believe that the machines at issue were not "bingo games" and
therefore illegal gambling devices.  In this regard, Judge
Brown reasoned (a) that Lt. Reese has "misled the Court" as to
the meaning of the term "bingo," and (b) that the term
"bingo," as used in this Court's opinion in Cornerstone and in
15
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
Amendment No. 743 should be understood as 
allowing 
"electronic
bingo games" of the type described in the State's evidence:
"[Lt.] 
Reese 
is 
operating 
under 
a 
mistaken
interpretation of the law.  At the outset,
[Lt.] Reese misled the Court to believe that the
games did not comply with the elements of a bingo
game identified in Cornerstone. [Lt.] Reese further
testified that bingo could only be played using
paper cards and that no electronic bingo game could
ever be anything other than a slot machine. This is
clearly not the case under Amendment 743 or
Cornerstone."
Elsewhere, 
however, 
Judge 
Brown 
rejected 
the
applicability of the Cornerstone criteria to the cases before
him based on the "unique" wording of Amendment No. 743, a
local amendment applicable to Greene County.  He stated:
"The only pertinent definition of 'bingo' in this
matter is the definition found in Amendment 743.
Amendment 743 defines 'bingo' and 'bingo equipment.'
It is obvious from a plain reading of both
definitions that bingo games may be played in an
electronic format in Greene County, Alabama.  Any
other reading would be violative of the Amendment.
Furthermore, 
... 
Cornerstone 
is 
not 
binding
precedent with regard to Amendment 743 ...."
On August 5, 2011, Nova filed a renewed motion for return
of property based on Judge Brown's order in the Greenetrack
proceeding described above; Frontier likewise renewed its
motion on August 30, 2011.  The State filed motions to dismiss
the motions of Nova and Frontier on the ground that the court
16
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
in the civil forfeiture proceeding had jurisdiction over the
subject property.  Judge Brown denied the State's motions to
dismiss.
On September 13, 2011, Judge Brown held an evidentiary
hearing on Frontier's and Nova's motions for return of
property in which he heard testimony from an attorney for the
State, the Greene County Sheriff, and Lt. Carson.  
On October 31, 2011, Judge Brown entered an order that
relied upon the findings -- and except for changing dates and
names tracked the language -- of his order in the Greenetrack
action.  The order required the State to return "all of the
property seized during the execution of the subject Search
Warrant to Frontier Bingo before the passage of ten (10) days
from the date of this Order." 
The State appealed Judge Brown's order in the Greenetrack
action on August 4, 2011 (case no. 1101384).  The State also
moved in the trial court for a motion to stay the order
pending appeal, but the trial court denied the motion.  The
State then sought from this Court an emergency motion to stay
the order. This Court granted a stay of the trial court's
order.  It ordered that the State's emergency motion would be
17
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
treated as a petition for a writ of mandamus (case no.
1101313), and it consolidated the petition with the State's
appeal of Judge Brown's order in the Greenetrack action.
The State appealed the trial court's order in the
Frontier and Nova action on November 7, 2011 (case no.
1110310).  As in the Greenetrack case, the State moved in the
trial court for a stay of its order in the Frontier and Nova
action, but the trial court denied the motion.  The State
sought from this Court an emergency motion to stay the order. 
This Court granted the stay on November 10, 2011.  It ordered
that the State's emergency motion would be treated as a
petition for a writ of mandamus (case no. 1110158), and it
consolidated the petition with the State's appeal of the trial
court's order in the Frontier and Nova action. 
B.  The Denial-of-Warrant Case
In its petition in case no. 1130598, the State takes note
of our holding in Cornerstone and our reliance upon
Cornerstone last year in Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d 337, 359
(Ala. 2013).  The State also notes that, consistent with these
holdings, judges  have in recent months issued warrants to the
State to seize so-called "electronic bingo machines" in
18
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
Greene, 
Houston, Jefferson, and Lowndes Counties and judges 
in
Jefferson and Houston Counties have issued various final
rulings finding this sort of gambling illegal.  Citing the
sworn affidavits of two of its agents, the State posits that,
"despite these ... elements, casinos are still openly
operating in Greene County" and that, "indeed, gambling
appears to be proliferating in Greene County" and that "the
casinos' devices do not even attempt to satisfy the
Cornerstone test."  Against this asserted background, the
State recounts the following procedural history and facts
relating to this case:
"A team of undercover officers conducted
operations at four casinos in Greene County over
December 2013 and January 2014:  Greenetrack Casino
(Exh. A), River's Edge Casino (Exh. B), Greene
Charity Casino (Exh. C), and Frontier Bingo (Exh.
D). See Exh. E (Aff. of Sisson); Exh. F (Aff. of
Butler).  They made videos of themselves playing the
gambling devices at each casino and assembled
detailed affidavits establishing probable cause ·to
seize the machines at each casino and search for
related contraband and evidence of illegal gambling.
See Exhs. A, B, C, D .... 
"According to the facts recounted in the
affidavits and portrayed on the video, the machines
at these Greene County casinos are just as illegal
as the machines at issue in Cornerstone.  At the
very least, the officers have established the same
level of probable cause that compelled the Supreme
Court to grant the writ in Ex parte State. 
19
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
"Although 
there 
are 
some 
differences 
between 
the
four casinos, their gambling devices are the same in
every way that matters. To begin play, the gambler
establishes an account with the casino, funds it,
and obtains a 'player's card' and/or personal
identification number ('PIN') that allows him to
access the account on the casino's machines.  See
Exh. A at 3 (PIN & card); Exh. B at 3 (PIN & card):
Exh. C at 3 (PIN & card); Exh. D at 3 (PIN).  The
gambler then swipes his card and/or enters his PIN
into a machine, wagers an amount of money, and
begins to play.  See id. 
"There are three basic kinds of machines being
used at these facilities.  The display on most of
the machines is the kind 'typically associated with
common slot machines' -- reels, lines and bars. 
Exh. D. at 3. See also Exh. A at 3 ('either three or
five slot machine-type, vertically spinning reels');
Exh. B at 3 ('machines in the casino looked and
operated like electronic slot machines'); Exh. C at
8 ('With the exception of the Keno game, every
machine they played or observed involved the
presence of three to five digitally spinning reels
with three lines each').  At River's Edge casino,
certain machines also purport to play video poker.
Exh. B at 4-5. And, at River's Edge, Frontier, and
Greene Charity casinos, certain machines purported
to play keno, which is a lottery-style game.  Exh.
B at 5-6 (describing keno); Exh. C at 8; Exh. D at
7. Although most of these machines contain a small
grid that fills with numbers like a bingo card, the
experience of playing these machines is functionally
indistinguishable from playing acknowledged slot
machines, video poker machines, or keno machines and
nothing like the 'bingo' game contemplated in
Cornerstone.  See Exhs. A, B, C, D. The gambler does
not 
pay 
attention, 
listen 
to 
alphanumeric
designations drawn one-by-one, and manually match
them up to a bingo card.  See Exhs. A, B, C, D.
Instead, the gambler presses a button, watches
20
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
slot-machine reels spin, sees various lines appear
on the screen, and is told whether he or she has won
-- all in a matter of a few seconds.  Exh. A at 10
('in every case, less than 3 seconds'); Exh. B at 4
('2.5 seconds,' '2 seconds'); Exh. C at 4 ('less
than two seconds'); Exh. D at 5 ('4 seconds').  On
other machines, the gambler plays a simulated
version of poker or keno.  Exh. B at 4-6; Exh. C at
8; Exh. D at 7.
"The officers visited each of the four casinos
on either January 14 or January 15.  Exh. A at 7;
Exh. B at 7; Exh. C at 9; Exh. D at 8. 
The only circuit judge in Greene County, Judge
Eddie Hardaway, has been removed from or has recused
himself from cases having to do with gambling.  See
Exh. E [at] 12. 
"On January 16, 2014, state officers approached
the district judge for Greene County, Judge Lillie
Jones-Osborne, and presented her with applications
for warrants to search the casinos and seize the
illegal machines, computer servers, and other
contraband there.  See Exh. E ¶2-3.  The officers
presented the judge with four affidavits, one for
each casino, each to be sworn before her under the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, setting forth the facts
described above, and proposed warrants describing
the places to be searched and the items to be seized
in detail.  See Exh. E ¶3-17.  The officers also
presented the judge with the videos.  See Exh. E
¶10.
"Judge Jones-Osborne respectfully declined to
issue the requested warrants.  See Exh. E ¶12. The
judge reviewed the affidavits but declined to view
the videos.  Exh. E ¶10.  The judge did not assert
that the State's evidence was insufficient.  See id.
at ¶12.  Judge Jones-Osborne explained instead that
she was declining to issue the warrants because of
another judge's decision in 2011 to quash search
21
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
warrants that he had issued to search and seize
gambling devices in Greene County.  See Exh. E ¶12. 
The officers had provided those orders to Judge
Jones-Osborne for the purposes of full disclosure,
and they are attached as attachments 4 and 6 to
Exhibit A to this petition."
According to an affidavit supplied by one of the State's
agents, Judge Jones-Osborne declined to grant the State's
request for the search warrants in this case because she
"concluded that she had to rely on what Judge Brown ruled." 
In her "answer" to the petition for a writ of mandamus pending
before this Court, Judge Jones-Osborne confirms that "she
denied the State's search warrant based on a 17th Judicial
Circuit order issued by Judge Houston Brown," referring to the
order of Judge Brown discussed above.  
On January 21, 2014, the State filed its petition for a
writ of mandamus with the Court of Criminal Appeals seeking an
order requiring Judge Jones-Osborne to issue the warrants
requested.  Judge Jones-Osborne filed her answer to the
petition on February 5, 2014.  Pursuant to § 12-3-14, Ala.
Code 1975, the case was transferred to this Court on March 7,
2014.
22
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
II.  Analysis
A.  The Rule 3.13 Cases
As a preliminary matter, we are confronted with two
related, threshold questions of appellate jurisdiction in
relation to the Rule 3.13 cases: (1) whether the proper
vehicles for appellate review are the two pending petitions
for a writ of mandamus or the two pending appeals, and
(2) whether these proceedings are civil or criminal in nature
and, in turn, whether they fall within the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court or of the Court of Criminal
Appeals.  At least under the circumstances presented in these
cases, we conclude that appellate review is by way of appeal
and that these appeals are within the  appellate jurisdiction
of this Court. 
Rule 3.13, Ala. R. Crim. P., was patterned after then
Rule 41(e), now Rule 41(g), Fed. R. Crim. P.  See Committee
Comment to Rule 3.13, Ala. R. Crim. P.   At the time the
3
Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
3
which is virtually identical to our Rule 3.13, reads as
follows:
"(g) Motion to Return Property. A person
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of
property or by the deprivation of property may move
23
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
Rule 3.13 motions were filed, no criminal cases were pending. 
The United States Supreme Court explained in Di Bella v.
United States, 369 U.S. 121, 132 (1962), that, where a motion
filed under then Rule 41(e) (now Rule 41(g)) is not intended
as a motion in limine in a criminal proceeding but, instead,
addresses solely the return of the property in question "and
is in no way tied to a criminal prosecution in esse[ ] against
4
the movant," the proceeding "can be regarded as independent." 
See also, e.g., Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv., Inc. v. United
States, 587 F.2d 15, 16 (7th Cir. 1978) (quoting Di Bella for
the proposition that the denial of a motion for return of
for the property's return. The motion must be filed
in the district where the property was seized. The
court must receive evidence on any factual issue
necessary to decide the motion. If it grants the
motion, the court must return the property to the
movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to
protect access to the property and its use in later
proceedings."
The provision in Rule 41(g) for the return of property
was part of Rule 41(e).  "In 2002, the motion-to-return
provision was re-designated Rule 41(g).  
Courts 
recognize that
case law interpreting former Rule 41(e) generally applies to
current Rule 41(g)."  3A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim § 690, Motion
to Return Property (4th ed. 2013).
"In esse" is defined as "in being."  Black's Law
4
Dictionary 840 (9th ed. 2009).
24
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
property is a final appealable order "'if the motion is solely
for return of property and is in no way tied to a criminal
prosecution in Esse against the movant'"); Caracas Int'l
Banking Corp. v. United States, 670 F. Supp. 2d 142, 146 (D.
P.R. 2009) (explaining that "it is possible to pursue relief
under Rule 41(g) through an independent action").  Compare
Smith v. United States, 377 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1967) (holding
that, for purposes of appealability, an order denying a
petition tied to a prosecution against petitioners that was
"in esse" was not "final," where petition sought return of
property allegedly obtained in violation of petitioners'
constitutional rights and sought to suppress its use in a
criminal prosecution).
Judge Brown entered orders requiring the State to return
the subject property in both the Greenetrack matter and the
Frontier/Nova 
matter; 
of 
necessity, 
therefore, 
he 
purported 
to
adjudicate 
all 
issues in those matters to final 
determination. 
Judge Brown's orders thus amount to final judgments subject to
appeal, not interlocutory orders subject to review by a
petition for a writ of mandamus.  
25
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
Furthermore, at least where, as here, there is no
criminal case pending, it is clear that the action generated
by the filing of a motion under Rule 3.13 and the trial
court's 
order 
adjudicating 
that 
motion 
are 
properly 
considered
civil in nature and, accordingly, that jurisdiction over the
appeal of the trial court's order would lie in this Court
rather than in the Court of Criminal Appeals.  In this regard,
we note the case of State v. Cobb, 660 So. 2d 1014 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1995), in which the plaintiff filed a Rule 3.13 motion
when "[t]here was no pending criminal action, and the motion
was docketed in the trial court as a civil action."  660 So.
2d at 1014.  The Court of Civil Appeals did not question its
jurisdiction over the appeal.  More recently, in Jones v.
State, 937 So. 2d 59 (Ala. 2006), this Court held that a
"motion" seeking an order to require the State to return
currency and firearms following both a successful forfeiture
action against those items and a conviction on related
criminal charges gave rise to a civil action from which an
appeal would lie to the Court of Civil Appeals. See generally
§ 12-3-10, Ala. Code 1975 (assigning to the Court of Civil
26
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
Appeals appellate jurisdiction over civil matters where the
amount in controversy does not exceed $50,000).   
Federal authorities on this issue are, if anything, even
more clear that a motion for return of property filed under
the parallel federal Rule 41(g), at least when no criminal
action is pending, gives rise to an independent action that is
civil in nature.  See United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
("[W]hen the motion [to return property] is made by a party
against whom no criminal charges have been brought, such a
motion is in fact a petition that the district court invoke
its civil equitable jurisdiction."); United States v. Howell,
425 F.3d 971, 974 (11th Cir. 2005) ("A motion to return seized
property under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g), is a motion in equity,
in 
which 
courts 
will 
determine 
all 
the 
equitable
considerations in order to make a fair and just decision.");
United States v. Search of Music City Mktg., Inc., 212 F.3d
920, 923 (6th Cir. 2000) ("There is no criminal indictment or
proceeding pending against Music City.  Thus, Music City's
Rule 41[(g)] motion for the return of its property was really
in the nature of a civil proceeding invoking the court's
27
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
equitable powers, rather than a criminal proceeding."); Pena
v. 
United 
States, 
122 
F.3d 
3, 
5 
(5th 
Cir. 
1997)
("[R]ule 41[(g)] proceedings ... have always been considered
to be civil actions."); Mora v. United States, 955 F.2d 156,
158 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[W]here no criminal proceedings against
the movant are pending or have transpired, a motion for the
return of property is 'treated as [a] civil equitable
proceeding[] even if styled as being pursuant to Fed. R. Crim.
P. 41[(g)].'" (quoting United States v. Martinson, 809 F.2d
1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1987))); United States v. Martinson, 809
F.2d at 1366-67  ("A district court has jurisdiction to
entertain motions to return property seized by the government
when there are no criminal proceedings pending against the
movant. ... Such motions are treated as civil equitable
proceedings even if styled as being pursuant to Fed. R. Crim.
P. 41[(g)]."); and Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv., Inc., 587 F.2d
at 16 ("The motion for return of property is not one tied to
a criminal prosecution in esse against the movant until the
criminal process shifts from the investigatory phase to the
accusatory."). 
28
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
In addition, it should be kept in mind that the Rule 3.13
cases concern property seized as contraband that is the
subject of pending forfeiture actions.  The Rule 3.13 court,
in an adversarial proceeding between the "defendants" and the 
State, effectively has decided the very legal and factual
issues that are 
presented for adjudication in those forfeiture
actions.  Specifically, the Rule 3.13 judge necessarily has
decided the purely legal question of what standard must be met
in order for the property at issue to considered illegal and,
in turn, necessarily has measured the evidence and facts of
the case against that standard to determine that the property
may be "lawfully possessed" (as it must be in order to qualify
for relief under Rule 3.13).  Such determinations have 
effectively 
adjudicated 
the 
civil 
forfeiture 
actions. 
 
Further
still, the execution of Judge Brown's orders for the return of
the property to those from whom it was seized would implicate
the jurisdiction of the trial court in the in rem, civil
forfeiture action.
Based on all the foregoing, we are clear to the
conclusion that the actions before us are civil in nature. 
Because, unlike the controversy in Jones v. State, supra, they
29
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
each involve an amount in controversy in excess of $50,000,
these appeals fall within the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court.  Compare § 12-2-7, Ala. Code 1975 (providing that the
Supreme Court is "[t]o exercise appellate jurisdiction
coextensive with the state, under such restrictions and
regulations as are prescribed by law") with § 12-3-10
(providing that the Court of Civil Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction over "all civil cases where the amount involved,
exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed $50,000").  
Having determined that the appeals filed by the State are
the appropriate mechanism for appellate review and that those
appeals are within the appellate jurisdiction of this Court,
we now turn our attention to the merit of those appeals.  For
the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the trial court
lacked 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction 
to 
enter 
the 
judgments 
from
which the appeals are taken.    
As noted, Rule 3.13 begins as follows:
"A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure may move the court for the return of the
property seized on the ground that he or she is
entitled to lawful possession of the property which
was illegally seized."  
30
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
(Emphasis added.)  As the federal courts have explained in
applying the analogous federal rule, to succeed in obtaining
a return of property under the rule, the movant must prove not
only that the seizure of the property was illegal but also
that the movant is entitled to "lawful possession" of the
property.  See, e.g., Shea v. Gabriel, 520 F.2d 879, 882 (1st
Cir. 1975) ("[A]ppellant made no effort to show that he is
entitled to lawful possession of the seized items.  Rule
41[(g)] 'provides for a return of the property if (1) the
person is entitled to lawful possession and (2) the seizure
was illegal.' Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 143, 170 (1972).
No showing was made or offered that the things seized were
appellant's lawful property rather than components of an
illegal gambling business." (emphasis added)); Matter of
Ninety-One Thousand Dollars in United States Currency, 715 F.
Supp. 423, 427 (D.R.I. 1989) ("The gravaman of the motion,
however, is petitioner's dual assertion that the search and
seizure procedures employed by law enforcement officials in a
particular 
situation 
violated 
petitioner's 
Fourth 
and
Fourteenth Amendment rights and deprived the complainant of
property to which she was lawfully entitled." (emphasis
31
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
added)).  Thus, if property is held only for its evidentiary
value and is not, itself, seized as an illegal thing,
Rule 41(g) provides for its return in the event of a
determination that its method of seizure was illegal and that
ownership of the property is in the claimant rather than some
other party.  See United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d 1100,
1103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Palmer, 565 F.2d
1063, 1064 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 
On the other hand, contraband "is illegal to possess and
therefore not susceptible of ownership."  Farmer v. Florence
Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 401 S.C. 606, 613, 738 S.E.2d 473, 477
(2013) (citing Mims Amusement Co. v. SLED, 366 S.C. 141, 621
S.E.2d 344 (2005)).  "[A]lthough [Rule 41(g)] is ostensibly
broad enough to reach any unlawful seizure, a movant has no
right to the return of property that is contraband."  Matter
of Ninety-One Thousand Dollars in United States Currency, 715
F. Supp at 427.  Indeed, as the Comment to Rule 41(g) itself
notes, that rule is of no moment "in cases involving
contraband which, even if seized illegally, is not to be
returned."  Comments to 1972 Amendments, Rule 41, Fed. R.
32
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
Crim. P.  The Committee Comments to Alabama's Rule 3.13
similarly explain:
"Of course, if the property seized is contraband, it
can be lawfully held even if the property is subject
to the exclusionary rules and does not have to be
returned."
In 
light 
of 
the 
foregoing, 
federal 
courts 
have
consistently held that, where a forfeiture action has been
commenced, it is inappropriate for the trial court to take up
the Rule 41(g) motion.  The issues raised by such a motion --
the legality of the search and, in particular, the legality of
the seized items -- must be examined and decided in the
forfeiture proceeding, and the Rule 41(g) proceeding was
intended to yield to it. "When property is retained pursuant
to civil forfeiture, instead of for use as evidence, a Rule
41[(g)] motion is not available." United States v. Watkins,
120 F.3d 254, 255 (11th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).  See also
United States v. Castro, 883 F.2d 1018, 1020 (11th Cir. 1989)
(holding that federal Rule 41(g) could not be invoked because
"Defendant's cars and boat are not being retained to be used
as evidence against him"; rather, "these vehicles are being
detained strictly pursuant to civil forfeiture provisions").
33
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
"Although it is possible to pursue relief under Rule
41(g) through an independent action, such an action
is generally precluded by the existence of parallel
civil forfeiture proceedings. See, e.g., Rosevita
Charter Constr. Corp. v. United States, 787 F. Supp.
39, 43-44 (D. P.R. 1992). Several courts have held
that a pending civil forfeiture action, rather than
an independent Rule 41(g) motion, is the proper
forum to address issues related to government
seizure of property. See Rosevita Charter Constr.
Corp., 787 F. Supp. at 43; De Almeida v. United
States, 459 F.3d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 2006); [United
States v.] Hernandez, 911 F.2d [981] at 983 [(5th
Cir. 1990)]; United States v. Price, 914 F.2d 1507,
1511 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Shaw v. United States, 891
F.2d 602, 603 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Castro, 883 F.2d 1018, 1019 (11th Cir. 1989); United
States v. U.S. Currency $83,310.78, 851 F.2d 1231,
1235 (9th Cir.1988)."
Caracas Int'l Banking Corp. v. United States, 670 F. Supp. 2d
142, 146 (D.P.R. 2009) (emphasis added). 
"We have not previously reviewed the dismissal
of a Rule 41(g) motion in favor of a pending
criminal forfeiture proceeding; but we have upheld
dismissal where the government had commenced a civil
forfeiture proceeding.  In In Re One 1987 Jeep
Wrangler Automobile, we observed that where 'the
claimant is afforded the opportunity to test the
legality 
of 
the 
seizure 
in 
the 
forfeiture
proceeding,' 
relegating 
the 
claimant 
to 
that
proceeding would avoid problems inherent in parallel
proceedings.  972 F.2d 472, 479 (2d. Cir. 1992).
Other Circuits have similarly held that a pending
administrative 
or 
civil 
forfeiture 
proceeding
affords an adequate remedy at law and thereby
justifies dismissal of the Rule 41(g) motion.  See
United States v. Price, 914 F.2d 1507, 1511 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (per curiam ) ('Accordingly, we now hold
that once the Government initiates an administrative
34
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
forfeiture proceeding and the property is not the
subject of an ongoing criminal proceeding, the
District Court has no jurisdiction to resolve the
issue of return of property.'); Shaw v. United
States, 891 F.2d 602, 603-04 (6th Cir. 1989)
(explaining that Rule 41[(g)] is an equitable
remedy, and '[u]nder standard equity doctrine, where
there is an adequate remedy at law it must be
pursued'); United States v. Castro, 883 F.2d 1018,
1019 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) ('It is
well-settled that the proper method for recovery of
property which has been subject to civil forfeiture
is not the filing of a Rule 41[(g)] Motion, but
filing a claim in the civil forfeiture action.');
United States v. United States Currency $83,310.78,
851 F.2d 1231, 1233-35 (9th Cir. 1988); In re
Harper, 835 F.2d 1273, 1274-75 (8th Cir. 1988)
(district court did not abuse discretion in not
exercising equitable jurisdiction under Rule 41[(g)]
after 
government 
instituted 
forfeiture 
proceeding)."
De Almeida v. United States, 459 F.3d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 2006)
(emphasis added).  See also, e.g., United States v. Real Prop.
Commonly Known as 16899 S.W. Greenbrier, Lake Oswego,
Clackamas Cnty., 774 F. Supp. 1267, 1274-75 (D. Or. 1991) (to
like effect).
As indicated, some federal decisions suggest that an
order granting relief under Rule 41(g) must yield to a
separate forfeiture action because, in relation to the
forfeiture action, the Rule 41(g) action lacks equity based on
the adequacy of other relief made available by the pendency of
the forfeiture action; others indicate that the obstacle to
35
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
consideration of a separate Rule 41(g) motion when a
forfeiture action is pending is jurisdictional in nature.  As
to the latter, see also United States (DEA) v. One 1987 Jeep
Wrangler Auto. VIN No. 2BCCL8132HBS12835, 972 F.2d 472, 479
(2d Cir. 1992), commenting on an administrative forfeiture
process through which a claimant can trigger a judicial
forfeiture proceeding and stating:
"Under all of the above scenarios, the claimant
is afforded the opportunity to test the legality of
the seizure in the forfeiture proceeding. See In re
Harper, 835 F.2d 1273, 1274 (8th Cir. 1988).
Consequently, once the administrative process has
begun, the district court loses subject matter
jurisdiction 
to 
adjudicate 
the 
matter 
in 
a
peripheral setting such as a Rule 41[(g)] motion.
United States v. Price, 914 F.2d 1507 (D.C. Cir.
1990). ... To hold otherwise would be to ignore the
jurisprudential particularities of actions in rem
(as discussed above) and to thwart the DEA's grant
of limited administrative autonomy. See 21 C.F.R. §§
1316.77, 1316.78. Here, the administrative forum
afforded the claimant the opportunity to raise all
objections to the seizure and the lack of a judicial
remedy deprived him of nothing. Thus, we find that
the district court properly dismissed the action
before it for lack of jurisdiction and therefore we
affirm its holding."
(Emphasis added.)  See also, e.g., Application of Mayo, 810 F.
Supp. 121, 122 (D. Vt. 1992) (noting that, "[u]nder Second
Circuit 
precedent, 
upon 
proper 
commencement 
of 
the
administrative 
process, 
a 
district 
court 
'loses 
subject 
matter
36
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter in a peripheral setting
such as a Rule 41[(g)] motion'").
The foregoing cases aid in framing the issue presented
here. The case before us is not one in which a movant seeks
the return of mere "evidence" retained by the State for use in
support of the State's case.  Instead, the subject property is
held by the State on the ground that it is contraband and is
subject to forfeiture as such.  On this basis alone, we would
be sympathetic to the view expressed in those federal cases
discussed above that consider the issue in jurisdictional
terms, especially when one considers that an adverse result
for the State in a Rule 3.13 proceeding would deprive a
forfeiture court of possession of the alleged contraband
necessary for its jurisdiction.  
Although the discussion of the foregoing federal cases is
therefore instructive, our holding today ultimately is
grounded in our precedents.  More specifically, our holding is
informed by the principle that an "accused" may not employ
independent judicial proceedings to preempt or thwart the
executive branch's exercise of the discretion afforded it to
37
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
pursue criminal prosecutions or forfeiture actions for the
purpose of enforcing our criminal laws.
We explained in Tyson v. Macon County Greyhound Park,
Inc., 43 So. 3d 587, 589-90 (Ala. 2010), that the collateral
civil action attempted in that case was not permissible
because it would "interfere with the orderly functioning of
the executive branch within its zone of discretion in
violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine set forth at
§ 43 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901."  See also
Citizenship Trust v. Keddie-Hill 68 So. 3d 99, 106 (Ala. 2011)
(to like effect and discussing Macon County Greyhound Park). 
Similarly, in Ex parte Rich, 80 So. 3d 219, 225 (Ala. 2011),
we held that the Montgomery Circuit Court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction over a collateral proceeding that would
interfere with "law enforcement's effort to enforce the
criminal laws of the State of Alabama" through the filing of
a forfeiture action pursuant to § 13A-12-30, Ala. Code 1975).  
5
Like a criminal prosecution, a civil forfeiture action
5
is a mechanism available to the executive branch for the
enforcement of criminal laws making the possession of certain
property illegal.  See, e.g., Macon County Greyhound Park, 43
So. 3d at 591  (noting that a forfeiture statute applicable to
gambling devices, § 13A–12–30, Ala. Code 1975, is "a provision
found in the Criminal Code," and disallowing an independent
38
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
See also Redtop Mkt., Inc. v. State ex rel. Green, 66 So. 3d
204, 205-06 (Ala. 2010).  
Like the above-cited cases, these are not cases in which
the property seized was seized merely as evidence of a crime
(i.e., that otherwise is subject to being lawfully owned) and
in which the gravamen of the motion is merely some faulty
procedure followed by the State in seizing it.  We may presume
for present purposes that Rule 3.13 would have ample field for
operation in such circumstances.  
6
Instead, these are cases in which the State takes the
position that the property seized is itself the illegal thing. 
In response, the accused has initiated an independent
proceeding that, if allowed to proceed, would require the
State, in advance of any criminal prosecution or civil
forfeiture proceeding, to prove the same "case" it would prove
in such proceedings.  In this key respect, these cases are
proceeding initiated by the defendant that would have
preempted a potential forfeiture action by the State). 
In such a case, if the court were to agree as to the
6
deficiency in the procedures by which the property was seized,
the property could be returned to its owner with presumably
little or no prejudice to the State's prosecution of its case,
given the fact that such property would, in that event, be
subject to the exclusionary rule anyway. 
39
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
like the 
aforementioned seminal case of Macon County Greyhound
Park, in which  "[t]he gravamen of [VictoryLand's separate]
complaint [was] VictoryLand's assertion that its activities
are lawful and that it will suffer irreparable injury if the
machines are seized."  43 So. 3d at 589.  It is on this same
gravamen -- the assertion that the property seized or to be
seized is legal -- that the movants seek relief in these
present cases. 
Indeed, the Rule 3.13 movants seek to rest upon the
gravamen of the alleged lawfulness of the seized property as
the basis for not just one, but both, of the elements
necessary for relief under Rule 3.13.  First, because of their
interpretation of Amendment No. 743, the movants take the
position that the machines at issue are games of "bingo" and
that the property seized therefore meets the lawfully-
possessed element of Rule 3.13.  Moreover, it is on the basis
of this same assertion as to the meaning of the term "bingo"
that the movants contend that the search warrants were issued
without probable cause that the targeted property was illegal
and that, therefore, the unlawful-seizure element of 
Rule 3.13
also was  satisfied.  To decide these motions on their merits
40
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
as postured, therefore, would require the trial court to put
the State to trial on the very issues the State seeks to
prosecute by its seizure of the property and an ensuing
criminal prosecution or civil forfeiture action.  The trial
court no more has the subject-matter jurisdiction to do this
in the present cases than did the trial court in Macon County
Greyhound Park.
Macon County Greyhound Park and its progeny are grounded
in the separation-of-powers doctrine found in § 43 of the
Alabama 
Constitution 
of 
1901 
and, 
specifically, 
the
restriction this doctrine places on the ability of the
judicial branch to invade the  discretion and power vested in
our executive branch with respect to the enforcement of
Alabama's criminal laws.  See Piggly Wiggly No. 208, Inc. v.
Dutton, 601 So. 2d 907, 910–11 (Ala. 1992); Fitts v. McGhee,
172 U.S. 516, 531–32 (1899).   Macon County Greyhound Park and
7
If, in the end, the executive branch is proven wrong in
7
its interpretation of the constitution or a statutory
provision, then so be it.  The role of making arrests and
initiating 
prosecutions 
nonetheless 
lies 
in 
the 
first 
instance
with the executive branch, and the mere fact that it might
make an error of judgment as to such a matter is not a
sufficient ground for concluding that it has acted beyond the
power delegated to it.
41
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
its progeny stand for the proposition that a party may not
litigate in advance or by separate proceeding the question of
the lawfulness of an activity or property subject to
prosecution by law-enforcement authorities.  "[I]nstead," as
we said in Macon County Greyhound Park, "the party aggrieved
by such enforcement shall make his case in the prosecution of
the criminal action."  43 So. 3d at 589.  Of course, the same
is true if and when law-enforcement officials choose the
alternative enforcement mechanism of a forfeiture action, as 
in Ex parte Rich, supra.  In either case, the gravamen of the
enforcement mechanism pursued by the executive branch is the
illegality of the activity or item itself, and the accused is
not free to preempt or to thwart that prosecution by asking
the judicial branch to decide the same question in some
separate proceeding.  As we explained in Macon County
Greyhound Park, such actions will not be entertained where
their "'only effect would be to decide matters which properly
should be decided in a criminal action.'  43 So. 3d at 589
(quoting 22A Am.Jur.2d Declaratory Judgments § 57 (2003)).
We further made clear in Macon County Greyhound Park that
the principle recognized in that case "'applies ... to
42
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
prosecutions which are merely threatened or anticipated as
well as to those which have already been commenced.  The rule
extends to ... searches and seizures in the course of
investigation of crime....'"  43 So. 3d at 589 (quoting 43A
C.J.S. Injunctions § 280 (2004)).  Of particular relevance for
both that case and the present case, Macon County Greyhound
Park also stands for the proposition that it is not a ground
for relief in a separate proceeding
"'that the prosecuting officer has erroneously
construed the statute on which the prosecution is
based so as to include the act or acts which it is
the purpose of the prosecution to punish....
"'... [T]he fact that the enforcement thereof
would materially injure the complainant's business
or property constitutes no ground for equitable
interference, and is not sufficient reason for
asking a court of equity to ascertain in advance
whether the business as conducted is in violation of
a penal statute....'"
43 So. 3d at 589 (quoting 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 280
(footnote omitted)).
In Tyson v. Jones, 60 So. 3d 831 (Ala. 2010), this Court
distinguished the circumstances presented there from those
presented in Macon County Greyhound Park and its progeny by
noting that "[n]o attempt is made ..., as it was in Macon
43
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
County Greyhound Park, to determine the legality of certain
conduct or devices by means of some action other than a
criminal prosecution or a forfeiture under Ala. Code 1975,
§ 13A–12–30."  60 So. 3d at 842 n.5.  The same cannot be said
here. 
The judgments entered by Judge Brown in the Rule 3.13
proceedings, if allowed to stand, will foreclose the ability
of the State to prosecute either a criminal action or a civil
forfeiture action.  They will effectively adjudicate the very
legal issue that would be the gravaman of such actions. 
Further, they will deprive the State of the very property it
seeks to condemn in an in rem forfeiture action, returning to
private hands property the State contends constitutes illegal
gambling 
devices 
while 
simultaneously 
thwarting 
the 
efforts 
of
executive-branch officials to adjudicate the question of that
illegality in a civil forfeiture proceeding.  Judge Brown was
without jurisdiction to enter such judgments in response to
the Rule 3.13 motions.
B.  The Denial-of-Warrant Case
Before turning to the merits of Judge Jones-Osborne's
refusal to issue a search warrant in case no. 1130598 and her
44
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
adoption of Judge Brown's legal rationale in the Rule 3.13
proceedings as the basis for this refusal, we find it
instructive 
to compare other aspects of the procedural 
posture
of and issues raised in the State's request for that warrant
with the procedural posture of and issues raised in the Rule
3.13 proceedings.  Such a comparison is helpful because it is
corroborative of the foregoing discussion of the lack of
jurisdiction of our courts to adjudicate in the Rule 3.13
proceedings 
the 
issues 
raised 
there 
while 
simultaneously 
being
explanatory of why we do have jurisdiction to assess, and
possibly deny, the State's request for a search warrant.
As in the case of a Rule 3.13 motion, in considering an
application for a search warrant, the trial judge must decide
the proper legal standard against which to measure the
evidence presented.  Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d 337, 355 (Ala.
2013).  It does so, however, only for the purpose of deciding
whether to issue the requested search warrant.  Id.  Likewise,
it must evaluate the evidence, but, again, it does so only for
the purpose of deciding whether it is "probable" that the
facts will eventually be proven to meet that legal standard. 
Id.  In other words, decisions as to the issuance of a warrant
45
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
are not made in a context like independent Rule 3.13
adjudications where a judgment by the trial court that
property is lawful and must be returned by the State to the
opposing party gives rise to a final judgment that is binding
on both parties.  Moreover, search-warrant determinations are
as a rule made in circumstances where they are mandated by
competing constitutional concerns, see U.S. Const. Amend. 4,
that constitute a circumscription of the powers otherwise
vested in the executive branch to fulfill its law-enforcement
function.
  
That said, a decision to deny an application for a
warrant cannot properly be made based on an incorrect legal
standard.  Id.  That is what happened in this case.
As noted, in the Rule 3.13 proceedings, Judge Brown was
critical of the State agent who supplied the affidavit
supporting the application for the search warrant for
"misleading" him as to the proper legal standard to be
applied.  In regard to a request for a search warrant,
however, the role of a witness is to give evidence regarding
the facts; the role of the judge is to decide the law against
which that evidence will be measured.  If a mistaken
46
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
understanding of law is used as a framework to assess the
facts presented by a witness, the mistake is the court's, not
the witness's.  To the degree Judge Brown -- and by extension
Judge Jones-Osborne -- ruled against the State based on a
witness's understanding of what our law does and does not
prohibit, 
such 
a 
ruling 
was 
based 
on 
an 
erroneous
understanding of the judge's role in the warrant process.  See
id.
Despite his criticism of a State agent for allegedly
misleading him as to what the law was, it appears that Judge
Brown ultimately did in fact make his own determination of
that law, a determination upon which Judge Jones-Osborne in
turn relied.  She then concluded that the facts did not rise
to the level necessary to meet that legal standard (or, more
precisely, that the evidence did not establish a probability
that the facts eventually to be proven would meet that
standard).  It is in the first of these two determinations
that there was an error of law that must be corrected in case
no. 1130598.  
Amendment No. 743, just like the amendment at issue in
Cornerstone 
and 
bingo 
amendments 
applicable 
to 
other 
counties,
47
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
speaks of and permits the playing of "bingo games" (provided
that a number of other restrictions, including charitable
purposes, are met).  We identified in Cornerstone and we
reaffirm today that the game of "bingo" as that term is used
in local constitutional amendments throughout the State is
that game "commonly or traditionally known as bingo," 42
So. 3d at 86, and that this game is characterized by at least
the six elements we identified in Cornerstone.  Id. 
There is, however, at least one notable difference
between Amendment No. 743 and the comparable amendments in
most other counties –- namely the fact that the "card"
required for the playing of bingo may be "an electronic
marking machine."  It is on this difference that Judge Brown
and Judge Jones-Osborne based their decisions as to the proper
legal standard by which to measure the evidence presented by
the State.  We therefore must further examine this difference.
In Cornerstone, we explained that, among other things,
the game commonly or traditionally known as bingo involved
"each player"  utilizing a "card" with a certain pattern and
8
The 
game 
we 
described 
in 
Cornerstone 
contemplates 
a 
group
8
activity involving multiple players competing against each
other.  42 So. 3d at 86.
48
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
universe of alphanumeric or other designations and that each
player must respond to the random drawings of these
designations by an "announcer" by manually marking this card. 
42 So. 3d at 86.  Clearly, the "bingo" at issue in this case
does not employ a "card" in the sense of a flat rectangular or
square object made of paper, cardboard, or some similar
material on which the required designations are printed. 
Obviously aware that no such "card" was used in the games in
the present case, Judge Brown considered the provisions for
"electronic marking machines" in Amendment No. 743 to allow
bingo to be played in Greene County without the necessity of
such a card.  In this he was correct.  
The question, however, is whether the ability to employ
an "electronic marking machine" obviates all the other
criteria of bingo this Court has recognized.  Clearly, it does
not.  By way of explanation, we reiterate and affirm our
discussion of Amendment No. 743 in Cornerstone itself:
"In contrast to the use of merely the term
'bingo games,' ... Amendment No. 743 ... legalizes
in Greene County a form of bingo that would include
an 'electronic marking machine' in lieu of a paper
card.  Even [Amendment No. 743], which is the only
amendment in Alabama we have located that makes any
reference to the use of electronic equipment of any
form, contemplates a game in all material respects
49
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
similar 
to 
the 
game 
of 
bingo 
described 
in
§ 45–8–150(1), [Ala. Code 1975,] and something that
is materially different from the types of electronic
gaming machines at issue here.  Amendment No. 743
begins by saying that 'bingo' is '[t]hat specific
kind of game commonly known as bingo.'  The
definition then explains that bingo is a game 'in
which prizes are awarded on the basis of designated
numbers or symbols on a card or electronic marking
machine conforming to numbers or symbols selected at
random.'  Moreover, the equipment contemplated by
Amendment No. 743 for use in a bingo game is
entirely different than the equipment at issue here.
Specifically, Amendment No. 743 defines 'equipment'
for the game of bingo as follows:
"'The 
receptacle 
and 
numbered 
objects 
drawn
from it, the master board upon which such
objects are placed as drawn, the cards or
sheets 
bearing 
numbers 
or 
other
designations to be covered and the objects
used to cover them or electronic card
marking machines, and the board or signs,
however operated, used to announce or
display the numbers or designations as they
are drawn.'"
Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 79-80.  Clearly, the fact that an
"electronic marking machine" can be substituted for a paper
card under the terms of Amendment No. 743 does not eliminate
the requirement that, in all other respects, the game of bingo
permitted by that amendment be the game traditionally known as
"bingo."  Judge Jones-Osborne therefore erred in rejecting
50
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
this traditional definition and in refusing to issue the
requested search warrants as a result.   
9
As we explained in Ex parte State: 
"Cases both within and without Alabama make
clear that a court considering the issuance of a
warrant acts outside its discretion when it denies
the warrant based on an improper or erroneous legal
ground.  This Court long ago held that a writ of
mandamus may be used to require the issuance of a
warrant under such circumstances.
"In Benners v. State ex rel. Heflin, 124 Ala.
97, 26 So. 942 (1899), this Court held that mandamus
will lie to compel the issuance of an arrest warrant
where the magistrate refused to issue the warrant
based only upon the supposed invalidity of a
statute.  Benners is thus similar to the present
case in that both involve a legal question as to
Most of, if not all, the "bingo" amendments throughout
9
the State also contain specific restrictions on who may
operate bingo games and the use and distribution of proceeds
from those operations.  Questions regarding compliance with
such requirements are not before us in the present case.
Nor does the fact that the machines at issue in both
Judge Brown's 
order 
and Judge Jones-Osborne's action use "PIN"
numbers change anything.  The characteristics of inserting a
PIN number and ejecting a ticket are similar to the
characteristics of the machines described in Barber v.
Jefferson County Racing Ass'n, 960 So. 2d 599 (Ala. 2006),
which the Court concluded were characteristics indicative of
slot machines. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated
that it looks at "the substance and not the semblance of
things, so as to prevent evasions of the law."  960 So. 2d at
611.  Judge Brown stated in his orders that he was "aware" of
this Court's decision in Barber; it appears that he and Judge
Jones-Osborne too readily discounted its significance. 
51
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
what conduct is prohibited under extant law.  The
Court in Benners explained the availability of
mandamus as follows:
"'Mandamus as a remedy is available in
criminal as well as in civil cases.  While
it will not ordinarily in either case be
used to direct a judicial officer how to
act in the performance of discretionary
judicial functions, it will lie to set in
motion the performance of official duties,
whether they be judicial or ministerial. 
So it lies to compel an inferior court to
proceed with a criminal trial or proceeding
of which the court has wrongfully declined
jurisdiction and to compel an officer
charged with the duty to take cognizance of
a criminal charge preferred by affidavit,
and thereon to issue his warrant of arrest
.... The affidavit is regular in form, and
full in substance.  When made, it became
the duty of the justice to issue his
warrant of arrest, returnable as provided
by the act of February 9, 1895 (Acts
1894–95, p. 498).
"'There was no error in the judgment
awarding the writ of mandamus, and it will
be affirmed.'
"124 Ala. at 101–02, 26 So. at 943–44 ....
"....
"In Marshall v. Herndon, 161 Ky. 232, 170 S.W.
623 (1914), the Kentucky Supreme Court likewise
considered a trial court's refusal to issue a
warrant based on an improper legal ground.  Similar
to the error in Benners, the error in Marshall
concerned 
whether 
the 
challenged 
conduct 
was
prohibited by a viable criminal statute.  As in the
present case, there was no dispute as to the facts;
52
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
the only question was the purely legal one –-
whether there was in place a statute that made the
suspect's conduct a crime.  The Kentucky Supreme
Court's analysis, which begins by noting a Kentucky
statute similar to Rule 3.8 and Rule 3.9, Ala.
R.Crim. P., is helpful:
"'Section 31, Criminal Code, is as follows:
"'"A magistrate shall issue a
warrant for the arrest of a
person 
charged 
with 
the
commission of a public offense,
when, 
from 
his 
personal
knowledge, or from information
given to him on oath, he shall be
satisfied 
that 
there 
are
reasonable grounds for believing
the charge."
"'This section makes it the imperative
duty of the magistrate to issue a warrant
whenever he shall be satisfied, from the
information given him on oath, that there
are reasonable grounds for believing the
charge.  The question before the magistrate
at this time is not whether accused is
guilty or should be convicted.  Such
matters as guilt and conviction are
presented 
to 
him 
for 
judicial
determination, 
when 
the 
accused 
is 
arrested
and brought before him for trial. ...
"'....
"'Since the pleadings show that there
was a valid city ordinance on the subject,
and it is admitted that the affidavit was
sufficient, we think it was the duty of the
magistrate to issue the warrant, and, upon
refusal to act, he can be compelled to do
so by mandamus, and on this state of facts
53
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
the lower court erred in dismissing the
petition.'
"161 Ky. at 234, 170 S.W. at 624 ....
"Likewise, in State v. Viatical Services, Inc.,
741 So. 2d 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), there was
no dispute as to the applicable facts.  The Florida
District Court of Appeal held that the trial court
had committed legal error in declining to issue the
search 
warrant 
by 
improperly 
allowing 
other
considerations to override the existence of probable
cause.  Treating a petition for a writ of mandamus
as a petition for the writ of certiorari, the
Florida appellate court ordered a trial court to
issue a search warrant that had been denied:
"'... [I]f the state shows a departure
from the essential requirements of law, a
writ should issue. What the trial court has
done in effect is to suppress evidence
prior to its seizure by a pre-seizure
hearing. We frequently review suppression
orders where the court has suppressed
evidence in a post-seizure hearing. Review
of such pretrial order is appealable. See
Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(B).  Because
the state has no similar remedy from this
pre-seizure hearing, we review it by
certiorari.'
"741 So. 2d at 562 ....
"Finally, 
we 
find 
noteworthy 
the 
observations 
by
one commentator based on his review of the cases:
"'... [R]eviewing courts have ordered
warrants to issue when a magistrate refused
to do so on a ground that was extrinsic to
probable cause, such as his belief that his
term of office had expired, or that the
54
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
statute 
allegedly 
violated 
was
unconstitutional.'
"Abraham S. Goldstein, The Search Warrant, the
Magistrate, and Judicial Review, 62 N.Y.U.L.Rev.
1173, 1196 (1987) (emphasis added). Cf. State ex
rel. Umbreit v. Helms, 136 Wis. 432, 118 N.W. 158
(1908) (under its general supervisory powers, state
supreme court had the power to compel a trial court
to proceed with the trial in a criminal case after
the lower court quashed a good complaint upon the
purely legal ground that the acts complained of did
not constitute an offense)."
Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d at 352-55 (some original emphasis
omitted; some emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
We have reviewed the affidavits and the video evidence
submitted by the State, and the circumstances presented allow
for no reasonable conclusion other than that probable cause
exists for the issuance of the search warrants requested.  As
we stated in Ex parte State: 
"The games depicted in the surveillance video
and described in the affidavit ... in support of the
application for the warrant do not reasonably
resemble a game of 'bingo.'  Without turning a blind
eye to that which is depicted in the video and
described in the affidavit, a 'man of reasonable
caution' could reach no conclusion other than that
there is a 'fair probability' that the machines in
question are not the game of bingo and, instead, are
slot machines or other gambling devices that are
illegal under Alabama law.
"....
55
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
"The Alabama Constitution and the Alabama
Legislature decide the criminal law applicable in
each of the 67 counties in this State.  A circuit
judge is not free to frustrate the enforcement of
the criminal law by refusing to issue warrants
necessary or appropriate to its enforcement in his
or her circuit.  To allow a judge to do so without
the exercise and fulfillment by this Court of its
supervisory 
jurisdiction 
and 
responsibility 
relative
to lower courts (see Ala. Const. 1901, § 140;
§ 12–2–7, Ala. Code 1975) would be to allow that
judge essentially to rewrite the law in the county
he or she serves.  This we cannot do."
121 So. 3d at 358-59 (emphasis added). 
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the State that
Judge Jones-Osborne exceeded her discretion in denying the
requested search warrants.  The State was entitled to an order
directing the judge to grant the warrant application and to
issue the requested warrant, and this Court issued such an
order on March 25, 2014.
III.  Conclusion
In 
effect, 
Judge 
Brown 
was 
asked 
to 
adjudicate
preemptively, within the confines of a motion filed under Rule
3.13, Ala. R. Crim. P., the lawfulness of property seized as
contraband.  He had no jurisdiction to do so.   We therefore
vacate the orders of the trial court in both the Greenetrack
appeal (case no. 1101384) and the Frontier/Nova appeal (case
56
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
no. 1110310) and dismiss those actions.  We dismiss the
appeals in those cases, and we dismiss the related petitions
for writ of mandamus pending before us in case no. 1101313 and
case no. 1110158.
As to case no. 1130598, we have by separate order granted
the State's petition for a writ of mandamus and have remanded
this case to Judge Jones-Osborne for the immediate issuance of
the warrants for which the State applied. 
1101313 –- PETITION DISMISSED.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Shaw,
Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
1101384 –- JUDGMENT VACATED; CASE DISMISSED; APPEAL
DISMISSED.
Stuart, Parker, Murdock, Shaw, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Bolin, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur in the rationale in
part and concur in the result.
Moore, C.J., concurs in the result.
1110158 –- PETITION DISMISSED.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Shaw,
Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
57
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
1110310 –- JUDGMENT VACATED; CASE DISMISSED; APPEAL
DISMISSED.
Stuart, Parker, Murdock, Shaw, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Bolin, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur in the rationale in
part and concur in the result.
Moore, C.J., concurs in the result.
1130598 –- PETITION GRANTED AND WRIT ISSUED BY ORDER
DATED MARCH 25, 2014.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Shaw,
Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
58
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
MAIN, Justice (concurring in case no. 1101313, case no.
1110158, and case no. 1130598 and concurring in the rationale
in part and concurring in the result in case no. 1101384 and
case no. 1110310).
I concur fully in the main opinion with the exception of
the discussion concerning this Court's appellate jurisdiction
over the two Rule 3.13 cases filed as appeals (case no.
1101384 and case no. 1110310).  To determine whether this
Court has appellate jurisdiction over the Rule 3.13 appeals,
we must look to the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions.  The Alabama Constitution provides 
that this Court
"shall have such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by
law."  Art. VI, § 140(c).  Section 12-2-7, Ala. Code 1975,
provides that this Court has authority to "exercise appellate
jurisdiction 
coextensive 
with 
the 
state, 
under 
such
restrictions and regulations as are prescribed by law."  § 12-
2-7(1).  The Alabama Constitution further provides that the
Court of Criminal Appeals and the Court of Civil Appeals
"shall exercise appellate jurisdiction under such terms and
conditions as shall be provided by law and by rules of the
supreme court."  Art. VI, § 141(a) and (b).  With regard to
the Court of Criminal 
Appeals' 
appellate jurisdiction, § 12-3-
9, Ala. Code 1975, provides that the "Court of Criminal
59
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all
misdemeanors, including the violation of town and city
ordinances, habeas corpus and all 
felonies, including all post
conviction writs in criminal cases."
The matters underlying the Rule 3.13 appeals are not
matters that can be considered "misdemeanors, ... habeas
corpus [or] ... felonies."  Accordingly, the Court of Criminal
Appeals does not have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
the Rule 3.13 appeals, and this Court may properly exercise
original appellate jurisdiction over them.
Bolin, J., concurs.
60
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
BRYAN, Justice (concurring in case no. 1101313, case no.
1110158, and case no. 1130598 and concurring in the rationale
in part and concurring in the result in case no. 1101384 and
case no. 1110310).
I concur in all aspects of the main opinion, except the
discussion of this Court's appellate jurisdiction over cases
arising under Rule 3.13, Ala. R. Crim. P.  As to that
discussion, I agree with the ultimate holding –- that this
Court has appellate jurisdiction.
61
1101313, 1101384, 1110158, 1110310, and 1130598
MOORE, Chief Justice (concurring in case no. 1101313, case no.
1110158, and case no. 1130598 and concurring in the result in
case no. 1101384 and case no. 1110310).
In my view the property at issue in this case was
lawfully seized under the authority of a valid warrant.
Because relief under Rule 3.13, Ala. R. Crim. P. ("Unlawfully
Seized Property"), is not available to seek return of lawfully
seized property, I concur in the result in case no. 1101384
and case no. 1110310.  
10
I concur fully that probable cause exists to issue the
search warrant in case no. 1130598, and I concur to dismiss
the petitions for the writ of mandamus in case no. 1101313 and
case no. 1110158.
I find the separation-of-powers discussion relating to
10
Tyson v. Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., 43 So. 3d 587
(Ala. 2010), not germane. Because the Rule 3.13 proceedings
and the separate forfeiture actions are both judicial
proceedings, no issue of interference with executive-branch
prerogatives is present in the Rule 3.13 cases.  
62