Case Title: State v. Hurley

Citation: 2015 WI 35

Docket Number: 2013AP000558-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 WI 35 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP558-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
     v. 
Joel M. Hurley, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 354 Wis. 2d 622, 848 N.W.2d 903 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 31, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 8, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Marinette 
 
JUDGE: 
David G. Miron 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: Shirley S. Abrahamson, C.J. and Ann Walsh 
Bradley, J. dissent. (Opinion Filed.)   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent-petitioner, 
the cause was argued by Jacob J. Wittwer, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney 
general.  
 
For the defendant-respondent-cross-appellant, the cause was 
argued by Craig S. Powell and Kohler & Hart, S.C., Milwaukee. 
The briefs were filed by Craig S. Powell. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 35
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP558-CR 
(L.C. 
No. 
2011CF90) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Joel M. Hurley, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 31, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded to the circuit court with the instruction to 
reinstate the judgment of conviction.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   We review an unpublished per 
curiam decision of the court of appeals1 reversing in part two 
decisions of the Marinette County circuit court.2  In an amended 
                                                 
1 State v. Hurley, No. 2013AP558-CR, unpublished slip op., 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2014) OPINION WITHDRAWN AND REISSUED 
(May 6, 2014). 
2 The Honorable David G. Miron, presiding. 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
2 
 
criminal complaint ("amended complaint") filed on July 29, 2011, 
the Marinette County District Attorney's Office charged Joel M. 
Hurley ("Hurley") with one count of engaging in repeated acts of 
sexual assault of the same child under Wis. Stat § 948.025(1).3  
The amended complaint detailed how Hurley sexually assaulted his 
stepdaughter, M.C.N., 26 times between 2000 and 2005.  M.C.N. 
was between 6 and 11 years old when the assaults occurred. 
¶2 
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to admit 
other-acts evidence under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a) (2011-12).  
The State sought to admit evidence that Hurley repeatedly 
sexually assaulted his younger sister, J.G., 25 years prior to 
trial.  J.G. stated that the assaults occurred when Hurley was 
between the ages of 12 and 14 years old, and J.G. was between 
the ages of 8 and 10 years old.  The circuit court granted the 
State's motion and admitted the other-acts evidence for the 
                                                 
3  The amended complaint alleged that Hurley assaulted 
M.C.N. between 2000 and 2005.  While the applicable statutes, 
Wis. Stat. §§  948.02 and 948.025, were amended during this 
period, the underlying crime with which Hurley was charged 
remained materially the same.  Under each version of § 948.025, 
any person who committed three of more acts of first degree 
sexual assault of a child, against the same child, was guilty of 
a class B felony.  First degree sexual assault of a child was 
defined as sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person 
who has not attained the age of 13 years that did not result in 
great bodily harm to the child.  M.C.N. was under the age of 13 
years during the charging period.  Although it is unclear under 
which version the Marinette County District Attorney's Office 
charged Hurley, the facts alleged in the complaint satisfy each 
version.  All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes 
are to the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
3 
 
purpose of establishing Hurley's modus operandi (method of 
operation) and opportunity. 
¶3 
At trial, Hurley testified in his own defense and his 
attorney asked him twice whether he recalled the assaults 
alleged by J.G.  Hurley answered that he did not recall the 
assaults.  During closing argument, the prosecutor stated, "when 
the defendant testified, he was asked by his [] attorney 
regarding [J.G.] he said well, do you recall any of these 
incidents with [J.G.] ever happening?  And his answer was no.  
The question wasn't did you do this or not, it was do you 
recall?  That's different than it didn't happen."  The jury 
found Hurley guilty of one count of engaging in repeated acts of 
sexual assault of the same child and the circuit court sentenced 
him to 25 years imprisonment consisting of 18 years of initial 
confinement and 7 years of extended supervision.   
¶4 
Subsequently, Hurley filed a post-conviction motion 
arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
move to dismiss the amended complaint on due process grounds. 
Alternatively, Hurley argued that the amended complaint was 
deficient and constituted plain error4 requiring reversal.  
Hurley also argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the remarks made by the prosecutor during closing 
argument.  Finally, Hurley argued that the prosecutor's remarks 
                                                 
4 Plain error is "'error so fundamental that a new trial or 
other relief must be granted even though the action was not 
objected to at the time.'"  State v. Jorgensen, 2008 WI 60, ¶21, 
310 Wis. 2d 138, 754 N.W.2d 77 (citation omitted). 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
4 
 
during closing argument required a new trial in the interest of 
justice. 
¶5 
The 
circuit 
court 
agreed 
with 
Hurley 
that 
the 
prosecutor's statement was improper and ordered a new trial in 
the interest of justice.  The circuit court denied Hurley's 
other grounds for relief.  
¶6 
The State and Hurley filed cross-appeals with the 
court of appeals.  The State argued the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion by granting a new trial in 
the interest of justice.  Hurley argued that his trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the amended 
complaint on due process grounds.  Alternatively, Hurley argued 
that the amended complaint was deficient and constituted plain 
error requiring reversal.  Hurley also argued that the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting the 
other-acts evidence. 
¶7 
The court of appeals agreed with Hurley and concluded 
that the amended complaint failed to provide adequate notice, 
and thus violated Hurley's due process rights, and that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting 
the other-acts evidence.  Hurley, No. 2013AP558-CR, ¶¶38, 54.  
The court of appeals did not address the remarks made by the 
prosecutor during his closing argument.   
¶8 
Three issues are presented for our consideration: 1) 
whether the amended complaint and information charging Hurley 
with one count of engaging in repeated acts of sexual assault of 
the same child provided adequate notice to satisfy Hurley's due 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
5 
 
process right to plead and prepare a defense; 2) whether the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting 
other-acts 
evidence 
that 
Hurley 
had 
repeatedly 
sexually 
assaulted his sister, J.G., when she was between the ages of 8 
and 10 years old and he was between the ages of 12 and 14 years 
old; and 3) whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion in ordering a new trial in the interest of justice 
because of the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument. 
¶9 
First, 
we 
hold 
that 
the 
amended 
complaint 
and 
information5 provided adequate notice and thus did not violate 
Hurley's due process right to plead and prepare a defense.  
Second, we hold that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in admitting the other-acts evidence.  
Finally, we hold that the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion in granting a new trial in the interest of 
justice.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals and remand 
to the circuit court with the instruction that the judgment of 
conviction be reinstated.  
                                                 
5 "The information is the [charging document] . . .  to 
which [a] defendant must enter a plea."  Pillsbury v. State, 31 
Wis. 2d 87, 93, 142 N.W.2d 187, 191 (1966).  "A defendant has 
the benefit of both the factual allegations required in the 
complaint and the final statutory charges alleged in the 
information."  State v. Copening, 103 Wis. 2d 564, 576, 309 
N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1981).  However, "[t]he factual allegations 
relied on by the state which satisfy the elements of the crime 
are more likely found in the complaint.  The facts recited in 
the complaint need not be repeated in the information."  Id. at 
577.  Thus, when discussing the sufficiency of the factual 
allegations against Hurley, we refer to the amended complaint. 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
6 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶10 On July 29, 2011, the Marinette County District 
Attorney's Office filed an amended complaint charging Hurley 
with one count of engaging in repeated acts of sexual assault of 
the same child, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.025(1),6 for 
assaulting his stepdaughter, M.C.N. on three or more occasions 
"on and between" 2000 and 2005.   
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.025 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) Whoever commits 3 or more violations under s. 
948.02 (1) or (2) within a specified period of time 
involving the same child is guilty of: 
 . . .  
(ar) A Class B felony if fewer than 3 of the 
violations were violations of s. 948.02 (1) (a) but at 
least 3 of the violations were violations of s. 948.02 
(1) (a) or (b). 
 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.025 does not require proof of an 
exact offense date and was  
enacted to address the problem that often arises in 
cases where a child is the victim of a pattern of 
sexual abuse and assault but is unable to provide the 
specifics of an individual event of sexual assault.  
The purpose of the legislation was to facilitate 
prosecution of offenders under such conditions.   
State v. Nommensen, 2007 WI App 224, ¶15, 305 Wis. 2d 695, 741 
N.W.2d 481.  A jury is required to agree unanimously only to the 
fact that three separate assaults occurred, not to which three 
assaults occurred.  State v. Johnson, 2001 WI 52, ¶¶14-15, 243 
Wis. 2d 365, 627 N.W.2d 455.  "In other words, it is the course 
of sexually assaultive conduct that constitutes the primary 
element of this offense, about which the jury must be unanimous 
(the second and third elements are the age of the victim and the 
timing of the acts). . . . Unanimity is explicitly not required 
regarding the individual acts of sexual assault."  Id., ¶16. 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
7 
 
¶11 According 
to 
the 
amended 
complaint, 
Hurley 
and 
M.C.N.'s mother were married sometime in 2000 and divorced in 
November 2006.  The family lived together at a residence in 
Peshtigo, Wisconsin.  According to M.C.N. the assaults began 
shortly after the marriage in 2000, when she was 6 years old, 
and lasted until 2005, when she was 11 years old.  All the 
sexual assaults occurred at the family residence.   
¶12 According to the amended complaint, M.C.N. explained 
that the assaults began "as the defendant played a type of game 
with her."  When M.C.N.'s mother was away from the residence, 
Hurley chased M.C.N. around the house and removed her clothing 
when he caught her.  According to the amended complaint, the 
chasing game happened one time. 
¶13  Hurley then started coming into M.C.N.'s bedroom at 
night and would get into bed with her.  Hurley then placed his 
hand into M.C.N.'s pajama bottoms and inserted his fingers 
inside her vagina.  The amended complaint relates that M.C.N. 
said Hurley did this "approximately five times during the time 
she lived with him."  The amended complaint also stated that 
during these incidents Hurley tried "to get her to touch him, 
which M.C.N. stated she did during one of these encounters."  
M.C.N. was unsure whether her mother was home during these 
assaults. 
¶14 Around the same time that the nighttime assaults 
began, Hurley began weighing M.C.N. while she was naked when she 
got home from school.  During this game Hurley "would have her 
take her clothing off and would put her on his shoulders to take 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
8 
 
her into the bathroom" where he would weigh her on a scale.  
M.C.N. said that Hurley did this frequently, in excess of 20 
times, when she was between the ages of 6 and 11 years old.  
M.C.N. stated that during these incidents Hurley "would not go 
any further than have her naked on his shoulders and weigh her." 
¶15 During one of the "last occasions" Hurley got into the 
shower with M.C.N. after school.  M.C.N. stated she was naked 
but Hurley had on his underwear.  Hurley asked her "you're not 
going to tell your mother are you?"  M.C.N. replied "yes," which 
caused Hurley to leave the shower.   
¶16 M.C.N. stated these incidents occurred until 2005, one 
year prior to the 2006 divorce.  M.C.N. estimated Hurley weighed 
her naked in excess of 20 times, placed his fingers inside of 
her vagina approximately five times, and forced her to touch his 
genitals one time while he was touching her genitals. 
¶17 M.C.N. stated that she disclosed the assaults to a few 
friends in 2010 and decided to disclose the assaults to her 
mother in September 2010 when she was 15 years old after Hurley 
moved to Indiana. 
¶18 Before trial, the State filed a motion to introduce 
other-acts 
evidence 
that 
Hurley 
had 
repeatedly 
sexually 
assaulted his younger sister, J.G., over the course of two 
years, from 1984 to 1986, when she was between the ages of 8 and 
10 years old, and he was between the ages of 12 and 14 years 
old.  At the motion hearing J.G. testified that Hurley 
repeatedly sexually assaulted her.  J.G. testified that, while 
their parents were away, Hurley asked her to remove her clothes, 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
9 
 
put on a fur coat, and meet him in their parents' bedroom.  When 
J.G. entered, Hurley was naked under the covers and asked J.G. 
to slowly perform a strip tease.  J.G. stated that Hurley 
fondled himself while watching her, that they performed oral sex 
on each other, and that Hurley made J.G. fondle him.  J.G. 
further testified that Hurley often penetrated her vagina with 
his fingers, and there was a lot of "humping," but she could not 
recall whether Hurley penetrated her vagina with his penis.   
¶19 The circuit court granted the other-acts motion, 
concluding that the evidence was admissible to show opportunity 
and method of operation.  The circuit court also concluded that 
the evidence was relevant and that it bolstered M.C.N.'s 
credibility.  The circuit court explained that there was great 
similarity between the assaults because 1) the victims were 
similar in age, 2) Hurley played a game with each victim before 
the assaults, and 3) each victim was digitally penetrated by 
Hurley, a trusted family member, in a private bedroom.  Finally, 
the circuit court concluded the testimony would not be unfairly 
prejudicial if the court gave two limiting instructions. 
¶20 At trial, Hurley testified in his own defense.  Hurley 
denied assaulting M.C.N. and testified that his job required 
some travel causing his absence from one day to one week at a 
time.  Hurley did not present an alibi defense.  On direct 
examination Hurley was asked by his attorney: "Now, [J.G.] 
testified that she was assaulted when she believed she was 
around eight years old.  Do you recall having an encounter with 
[J.G.] when she was around eight?"  Hurley answered: "No."  He 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
10 
 
was then asked by his attorney: "Do you recall any of the 
allegations [J.G.] brought up here today?"  Hurley answered: 
"No, I do not."  During closing arguments the assistant district 
attorney stated: "when the defendant testified, he was asked by 
his—by the attorney regarding [J.G.] he said well, do you recall 
any of these incidents with [J.G.] ever happening?  And his 
answer was no.  The question wasn't did you do this or not, it 
was do you recall?  That's different than it didn't happen."  
Hurley's trial counsel did not object.  The assistant district 
attorney had in his possession a police report which explained 
that on September 26, 2010, J.G. confronted Hurley over the 
phone about the assaults he committed against her.  During this 
conversation Hurley denied assaulting J.G. 
¶21 The jury found Hurley guilty and the circuit court 
sentenced Hurley to 25 years imprisonment consisting of 18 years 
of initial confinement and 7 years of extended supervision.   
¶22 Hurley subsequently filed a post-conviction motion, 
arguing the amended complaint violated his right to due process 
by failing to provide adequate notice to plead and prepare a 
defense, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to move to dismiss the amended complaint.  Alternatively, Hurley 
argued that the amended complaint was deficient and constituted 
plain error requiring reversal.  Hurley also argued that his 
counsel 
was 
ineffective 
for 
failing 
to 
object 
to 
the 
prosecutor's remarks during closing arguments.  Hurley also 
requested a new trial in the interest of justice because of the 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
11 
 
prosecutor's 
purportedly 
improper 
remarks 
during 
closing 
argument.   
¶23 At a Machner7 hearing, Hurley's trial counsel testified 
that he decided not to file a motion to dismiss after 
researching the issue of constitutionally deficient charging 
documents and discussing the matter with Hurley.  Counsel said 
that he concluded a motion to dismiss would likely fail based on 
his reading of the case law, and that, even if it had succeeded, 
the State would likely re-file with additional details.  With 
regard 
to 
the 
allegedly 
improper 
remarks, 
trial 
counsel 
testified that he made a strategic decision not to object, 
explaining an objection would have drawn "more attention from 
the jury" to a statement that the prosecutor "said very quickly 
and didn't harp on."     
¶24 The circuit court rejected Hurley's notice claim.  
However, the court ordered a new trial in the interest of 
justice based on the prosecutor's remarks that Hurley did not 
recall assaulting J.G.  Both parties filed cross-appeals.  In an 
unpublished per curium decision, the court of appeals reversed 
in part concluding that 1) the amended complaint violated 
Hurley's right to due process, and 2) the circuit court erred in 
admitting J.G.'s other-acts evidence.  Hurley, No. 2013AP558-CR, 
¶¶38, 54.  The court of appeals did not address whether the 
closing argument remarks were improper. 
                                                 
7 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
12 
 
¶25 The State petitioned for review, which this court 
granted on September 18, 2014. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶26 Whether a complaint and information are sufficient to 
provide notice to the defendant is a question of constitutional 
fact that we review de novo.  State v. Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244, 
249, 426 N.W.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1988).  "The criminal complaint is 
a self-contained charge which must set forth facts that are 
sufficient, in themselves or together with reasonable inferences 
to which they give rise, to allow a reasonable person to 
conclude that a crime was probably committed and that the 
defendant is probably culpable."  Id. at 250 (citing State v. 
Hoffman, 106 Wis. 2d 185, 197, 316 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1982)).  
The sufficiency of a pleading is a question of law reviewed 
independently.  Id.  In reviewing a complaint, our analysis is 
restricted to the charging document and we do not consider 
extrinsic evidence.   
¶27 In order to satisfy the requirements of the United 
States and Wisconsin Constitutions, the charges in the complaint 
and information "must be sufficiently stated to allow the 
defendant to plead and prepare a defense."  Id.  When reviewing 
the sufficiency of the complaint and information, we consider 
two factors: "whether the accusation is such that the defendant 
[can] determine whether it states an offense to which he [can] 
plead and prepare a defense and whether conviction or acquittal 
is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense."  Holesome 
v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 95, 102, 161 N.W.2d 283 (1968).   
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
13 
 
¶28 The admission of other-acts evidence is within the 
trial court's discretion.  State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶38, 
236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606.  "We review a circuit court's 
admission of other-acts evidence for an erroneous exercise of 
discretion."  State v. Marinez, 2011 WI 12, ¶17, 331 Wis. 2d 
568, 797 N.W.2d 399 (citing State v. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, ¶34, 263 
Wis. 2d 1, 666 N.W.2d 771).  A reviewing court will uphold a 
circuit court's evidentiary ruling if it "'examined the relevant 
facts, applied a proper standard of law, used a demonstrated 
rational process and reached a conclusion that a reasonable 
judge could reach.'"  Id. (quoting Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶34).   
¶29 "When reviewing a circuit court's determination for 
erroneous exercise of discretion an appellate court may consider 
acceptable purposes for the admission of evidence other than 
those contemplated by the circuit court, and may affirm the 
circuit court's decision for reasons not stated by the circuit 
court."  Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶52.  "'Regardless of the extent 
of the trial court's reasoning, [a reviewing court] will uphold 
a discretionary decision if there are facts in the record which 
would support the trial court's decision had it fully exercised 
its 
discretion." 
 
Id. 
(citing 
State 
v. 
Shillcutt, 
116 
Wis. 2d 227, 238, 341 N.W.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1983), aff'd on other 
grounds, 119 Wis. 2d 788, 350 N.W.2d 686 (1984)). 
¶30 "A trial court's ruling on a postconviction motion for 
a new trial in the interest of justice is within its 
discretion."  State v. Williams, 2006 WI App 212, ¶13, 296 
Wis. 2d 834, 723 N.W.2d 719 (citing State v. Randall, 197 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
14 
 
Wis. 2d 29, 36, 539 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1995)).  Thus, we 
review the circuit court's decision granting of Hurley's motion 
for an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Id.  "A trial court 
properly exercises its discretion if it applies accepted legal 
standards to the facts in the record."  Id.  (citation omitted). 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶31 We first consider whether the amended complaint and 
information provided adequate notice to satisfy Hurley's due 
process right to plead and prepare a defense, and conclude that 
it did.  We then address whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in admitting other-acts evidence that 
Hurley had sexually assaulted his sister, J.G., when they were 
children, and conclude that it did not.  Finally, we consider 
whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
in granting a new trial in the interest of justice, and conclude 
that it did.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court with the instruction to reinstate 
the judgment of conviction. 
A. Under the Totality of the Circumstances, the Amended 
Complaint and Information Provided Hurley with Adequate Notice 
to Plead and Prepare a Defense. 
¶32 When reviewing the sufficiency of a criminal complaint 
and information, a court considers "whether, under the totality 
of the circumstances, the complaint and information allege facts 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
15 
 
such that the defendant can plead and prepare a defense."8  State 
v. Kempainen, 2015 WI 32, ¶36,    Wis. 2d   ,    N.W.2d   .   
¶33 Child sexual assaults are difficult crimes to detect 
and to prosecute, as typically there are no witnesses except the 
victim and the perpetrator.  Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 249.  Often 
the child is assaulted by a trusted relative and does not know 
whom to turn to for protection.  Id.  The child may have been 
threatened, or, as is often the case, may harbor a natural 
reluctance to come forward.  Id.  "These circumstances many 
times serve to deter a child from coming forth immediately.  As 
a result, exactness as to the events fades in memory."  Id.  
Thus, "[y]oung children cannot be held to an adult's ability to 
comprehend and recall dates and other specifics."  Id.  See also 
Gail S. Goodman & Vicki S. Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault: 
Children's Memory and the Law, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 181, 185-86 
(1985) (explaining that "children often retain and report less 
than adults do").  "A person should not be able to escape 
punishment for such a . . . crime because he has chosen to take 
carnal knowledge of an infant too young to testify clearly as to 
the time and details of such . . . activity."  State v. Sirisun, 
90 Wis. 2d 58, 65-66 n.4, 279 N.W.2d 484 (Ct. App. 1979).  
"However, no matter how abhorrent the conduct may be, a 
                                                 
8 Neither Hurley nor the State raise the double jeopardy 
factor, 
whether 
conviction 
would 
be 
a 
bar 
to 
another 
prosecution.  Therefore, we do not address it. 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
16 
 
defendant's due process [rights] . . . may not be ignored or 
trivialized."  Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 250.   
¶34 Because "[t]ime is not of the essence in [child] 
sexual assault cases" when the date of the commission of the 
crime is not a material element of the offense, it need not be 
precisely alleged.  Id. at 250; see also Hoffman, 106 Wis. 2d at 
198-99 ("'[W]here time of commission of a crime is not a 
material element of the offense charged, it need not be 
precisely alleged.'").  A "more flexible application of notice 
requirements is required and permitted [in child sexual assault 
cases].  The vagaries of a child's memory more properly go to 
the credibility of the witness and the weight of the testimony, 
rather than to the legality of the prosecution in the first 
instance."  Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 254.  
¶35 With these considerations in mind, the Fawcett court 
adopted a seven factor test to apply when determining whether a 
charge of sexual abuse of a child provides adequate notice.  
These factors include: 
(1) the age and intelligence of the victim and other 
witnesses; (2) the surrounding circumstances; (3) the 
nature of the offense, including whether it is likely 
to occur at a specific time or is likely to have been 
discovered immediately; (4) the length of the alleged 
period of time in relation to the number of individual 
criminal acts alleged; (5) the passage of time between 
the alleged period for the crime and the defendant's 
arrest; (6) the duration between the date of the 
indictment and the alleged offense; and (7) the 
ability of the victim or complaining witness to 
particularize the date and time of the alleged 
transaction or offense. 
Id. at 253.   
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
17 
 
¶36 As we explain in Kempainen,    Wis. 2d   , ¶4, a 
reviewing court may apply the seven Fawcett factors, and may 
consider any other relevant factors necessary to determine 
whether a criminal complaint and information provide adequate 
notice.  No single factor is dispositive, and not every Fawcett 
factor will necessarily be present.   
¶37 Before turning to the Fawcett factors, we must address 
the parties' dispute over how many individual assaults are 
alleged in the amended complaint because the criminal complaint 
places a defendant on notice as to what he may have to defend 
against.  The State contends that the amended complaint alleged 
26 assaults while Hurley claims the amended complaint alleged 
five assaults.  "A criminal complaint is a self-contained charge 
which must set forth facts that are sufficient, in themselves or 
together with reasonable inferences to which they give rise, to 
allow a reasonable person to conclude that a crime was probably 
committed and that the defendant is probably culpable."  
Hoffman, 106 Wis. 2d at 197; State ex rel. Evanow v. Seraphim, 
40 Wis. 2d 223, 226, 161 N.W.2d 369 (1968).  A complaint must 
put forth "enough that a fair-minded magistrate could conclude 
that the facts and circumstances alleged justify further 
criminal proceedings and that the charges are not merely 
capricious."  Hoffman, 106 Wis. 2d at 200 (citation and 
quotation omitted).  We have previously explained that a 
criminal complaint must answer five questions when stating 
probable cause: "1) Who is charged?; 2) What is the person 
charged with?; 3) When and where did the alleged offense take 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
18 
 
place?; 4) Why is this particular person being charged; and 5) 
Who says so? or How reliable is the informant?"  State v. White, 
97 Wis. 2d 193, 203, 295 N.W.2d 346, 350 (1980).  In reviewing a 
complaint, our analysis is restricted to the charging document 
and we do not consider extrinsic evidence.    
¶38 The amended complaint alleges six acts that occurred 
in M.C.N.'s bed: five acts of digital penetration of the vagina 
and one act of forced touching of Hurley's genitals, all 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(b).9  The amended complaint 
reads:  
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(1)(b) states: "Whoever has sexual 
contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained 
the age of 13 years is guilty of one of the following: If the 
sexual contact or sexual intercourse did not result in great 
bodily harm to the person, a Class B felony."   
The definition of sexual intercourse, which was constant 
throughout the charging period, was  
vulvar penetration as well as cunnilingus, fellatio or 
anal 
intercourse 
between 
persons 
or 
any 
other 
intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's 
body or of any object into the genital or anal opening 
either by the defendant or upon the defendant's 
instruction.  The emission of semen is not required.   
Wis. Stat. § 948.01(6). 
Sexual contact, as applicable here, remained constant 
throughout the charging period, and was defined as: 
(a) 
Any 
of 
the 
following 
types 
of 
intentional 
touching, whether direct or through clothing, if that 
intentional touching is either for the purpose of 
sexually 
degrading 
or 
sexually 
humiliating 
the 
complainant or sexually arousing or gratifying the 
defendant: 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
19 
 
[Hurley] would get into bed with [M.C.N.] and place 
his hand into her pajama bottoms and put his fingers 
inside her vagina.  M.C.N. said she thought this 
occurred approximately five times during the time she 
lived with him.  On these occasions, the defendant 
would also try to get her to touch him, which M.C.N. 
stated she did during one of these encounters.  
We agree with the State that the incident of forced touching of 
Hurley's genitals is sufficiently alleged because the context——
where M.C.N. had just alleged Hurley committed acts of digital 
penetration——indicates that Hurley forced M.C.N. to touch his 
genitals while he touched her genitals.   
¶39 Additionally, at least twenty acts of sexual contact 
with a child under the age of thirteen, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1)(b)10 are alleged that relate to the after-school 
weighing incidents.  The amended complaint alleges:  
[M.C.N.] stated that after getting home from school, 
the defendant would have her take her clothing off and 
would put her on his shoulders to take her into the 
                                                                                                                                                             
1. Intentional touching by the defendant or, upon the 
defendant's instruction, by another person, by the use 
of any body part or object, of the complainant's 
intimate parts. 
2. Intentional touching by the complainant, by the use 
of any body part or object, of the defendant's 
intimate parts or, if done upon the defendant's 
instructions, the intimate parts of another person. 
Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5). 
Intimate parts was also consistent throughout the charging 
period and was defined as "the breast, buttock, anus, groin, 
scrotum, penis, vagina or pubic mound of a human being."  Wis. 
Stat. § 939.22(19). 
10 See supra, note 9. 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
20 
 
bathroom.  He would then put her on the scale.  These 
incidents occurred on a very frequent basis, M.C.N. 
thought 
a 
couple 
of 
times 
per 
week. . . . [The 
defendant] weighed her naked in excess of 20 times.   
When Hurley had M.C.N. take off her clothes so that he could 
carry her naked on his shoulders, her intimate parts (buttocks, 
groin, vagina, or pubic mound) would necessarily have been in 
contact with Hurley's neck and shoulders.  "Intent can [] be 
inferred from the circumstances and from one's acts."  Hoffman, 
106 Wis. 2d at 200.  The circumstances here (frequent nude 
weighing, nude "rides" on Hurley's shoulders, and the five acts 
of digital penetration and one act of forced touching) are 
sufficient to draw a reasonable inference that Hurley acted with 
sexual intent during these incidents.   
¶40 These 
26 
acts 
in 
the 
amended 
complaint 
were 
sufficiently alleged to put Hurley on notice that he might have 
to defend against these allegations as incidents of sexual 
intercourse and sexual contact.11  Therefore, our application of 
the Fawcett factors will be grounded in the conclusion that the 
amended complaint alleges 26 separate and distinct sexual 
assaults.    
¶41 Further, before applying the Fawcett factors, it is 
important to reiterate our conclusion in Kempainen that State v. 
R.A.R., 148 Wis. 2d 408, 408, 435 N.W.2d 315 (Ct. App. 1988), 
                                                 
11 Because we are bound by the four corners of the amended 
complaint and do not examine extrinsic evidence, we do not 
examine any facts adduced at trial, what the prosecution focused 
on, or the court's jury instructions.     
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
21 
 
incorrectly limited a court's consideration of factors one 
through three to situations where a defendant alleges that 
prosecutors could have obtained a more narrow offense period 
through diligent efforts.  As we explain in Kempainen, Fawcett 
made no such limitation.  Kempainen,    Wis. 2d   , ¶28 
("'courts may consider these factors and any other relevant 
factors helpful.  . . . To the extent that R.A.R. conflicts with 
the holding in Fawcett, and thus limits the factors a court may 
consider 
when 
applying 
the 
Holesome 
test 
[(whether 
the 
accusation is such that the defendant can determine whether it 
states an offense to which he can plead and prepare a defense 
and whether conviction or acquittal is a bar to another 
prosecution for the same offense)] it is overruled.").  Fawcett 
concluded that all seven factors can "assist us in determining 
whether the Holesome test is satisfied" and proceeded to apply 
all seven factors.  Id. at 253-54.  See also State v. Miller, 
2002 WI App 197, 257 Wis. 2d 124, 650 N.W.2d 850 (applying all 
seven Fawcett factors despite the absence of any claim of a lack 
of 
prosecutorial 
diligence). 
 
When 
evaluating 
whether 
a 
complaint and information give a defendant sufficient notice a 
court may examine all the Fawcett factors, and any other factors 
it deems relevant.   
¶42 Turning to the Fawcett factors, factor one, the age 
and intelligence of the victim, weighs in favor of our 
conclusion that the amended complaint and information provided 
notice.  In a prosecution under Wis. Stat. § 948.025, due weight 
must be given to the impact of the repeated nature of the sexual 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
22 
 
assaults on a child's ability to provide details.  Contrary to 
the court of appeals' conclusion that the assaults may not have 
begun until M.C.N. was 11 years old, the amended complaint 
plainly states that the assaults began "shortly after the 
marriage at the residence" when M.C.N. was six years old.  At 
age six, M.C.N. was still a young child.  At this young age it 
is highly unlikely that she could particularize the dates or the 
sequences in which the assaults occurred.  Even at the age of 
ten years old, given her young age and intelligence, M.C.N. was 
likely 
rendered 
incapable 
of 
reporting 
the 
incidents 
or 
recalling back to the exact date or time period when the 
assaults began.   
¶43 Further, as described below, assaults committed by a 
stepfather against a young girl constitute a compelling reason 
for the delay in reporting.  See generally Miller, 257 Wis. 2d 
124, ¶31 (describing that where the sexual assault of a child 
occurred in a doctor-patient relationship, the trust that a 
child would place in a doctor would explain a delay in reporting 
and thus such delay would not create a due process issue); 
Goodman & Helgeson, supra, Child Sexual Assault, 185-86.  
Additionally, the repeated and similar nature of the crimes 
could reasonably have led to M.C.N.'s failure to recall the 
exact dates and times of the assaults.  Goodman & Helgeson, 
supra, Child Sexual Assault, 190-91.  A child repeatedly 
assaulted at such a young age is likely extremely confused and 
upset, and it is not surprising that she would not take note of 
the specific date on which the assaults occurred. 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
23 
 
¶44 Factors two and three, the surrounding circumstances 
and the nature of the offense, including whether it is likely to 
occur at a specific time or is likely to have been discovered 
immediately, also weigh in favor of our conclusion that the 
amended complaint and information provided notice.  Hurley was 
M.C.N.'s stepfather and they lived together in the same home.  
Hurley allegedly committed the assaults when they were alone, 
and the assaults were frequent and similar in nature.  "Child 
molestation often encompasses a period of time and a pattern of 
conduct.  As a result, a singular event or date is not likely to 
stand out in [a] child's mind."  Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 254.  
Goodman & Helgeson, supra, Child Sexual Assault, 190 ("Children 
can 
order 
simple, 
familiar 
events 
quite 
well, 
but 
have 
difficulty ordering more complex, less familiar events.").   
¶45 The acts occurred in the family home when Hurley may 
have been alone with M.C.N., either at night or after school.  
The assaults were not likely to happen on any particular day, 
and M.C.N. was as specific as could reasonably be expected about 
the times at which they took place.  Given that M.C.N. was the 
only 
witness, 
was 
assaulted 
in 
the 
home 
during 
regular 
activities, and was dissuaded from reporting by Hurley during 
the shower incident, it is unlikely that the crimes would have 
been discovered immediately or would have occurred at a specific 
time or at a unique location that would have stuck out in a 
child's mind.  Further, during the shower incident, Hurley 
specifically asked if M.C.N. was going to tell her mother, as if 
to ward off potential accusations and to dissuade M.C.N. from 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
24 
 
coming forward to tell her mother, the most likely person that 
could have helped.  Finally, as Hurley's stepdaughter, M.C.N. 
would undoubtedly feel vulnerable as Hurley held a position of 
authority over M.C.N. as her stepfather and the sexual acts he 
performed on her highlighted his position of dominance.   
¶46 The assaults themselves, the statement made by Hurley 
to M.C.N., and Hurley's paternal relationship indisputably would 
have had a significant impact on M.C.N, and thus it is 
reasonable that no single incident stood out in M.C.N.'s memory.  
When a parent abuses a child's trust and takes advantage of the 
child's vulnerability, it is also understandable that a child 
may not immediately come forward.  M.C.N.'s age at the time of 
the assaults and the circumstances surrounding the assaults 
"represent 
the 
most 
compelling 
factor[s] 
in 
explaining 
[M.C.N.'s] delay in reporting."  Miller, 257 Wis. 2d 124, ¶¶30-
31.  
¶47 Factor four, the length of the alleged period of time 
in relation to the number of individual criminal acts alleged 
further belies Hurley's claim.  The amended complaint alleged 26 
separate criminal acts spanning six years.  The court of appeals 
was incorrect in determining that "[a]ll of the acts could have 
occurred within a single month in 2000, or within a single month 
in 2005."  Hurley, No. 2013AP558-CR, ¶29.  The amended complaint 
was clear that M.C.N. stated that the offenses occurred over 
several years and began shortly after the marriage in 2000.  
Though M.C.N. could not state the order of the assaults or what 
month each assault occurred in, given that the assaults were 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
25 
 
committed by her stepfather as well as their cumulative nature, 
"the vagaries of [M.C.N's] memory more properly go to the 
credibility of the witness and the weight of the testimony, 
rather than to the legality of the prosecution."  Fawcett, 145 
Wis. 2d at 254.   
¶48 At the time of the assaults Hurley was M.C.N.'s 
stepfather, and they lived together in the same house.  As a 
result, the defenses available to Hurley were limited.  Hurley 
contends 
that, 
with 
a 
narrower 
charging 
period, 
it 
is 
conceivable that he could have raised an alibi defense.  
However, as the court of appeals explained in Fawcett: 
an alibi defense does not change the nature of the 
charges against the defendant or suddenly incorporate 
time as a necessary element of the offense.  . . . If 
we required that a complaint be dismissed for lack of 
specificity when a defendant indicated a desire to 
assert an alibi defense, such a holding would create 
potential for an untenable tactic: a defendant would 
simply have to interpose an alibi defense in order to 
escape prosecution once it became apparent that a 
child victim/witness was confused with respect to the 
date or other specifics of the alleged criminal 
event.  . . . We decline to adopt such a rule.   
Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 254 n.3.  See also People v. Jones, 792 
P.2d 643 (Cal. 1990) (concluding that where a defendant has 
lived with a victim for an extensive period of time and has thus 
had continuous access to the victim, neither alibi nor mistaken 
identity are likely defenses).  We too decline to adopt such a 
rule.  Thus, factor four weighs against Hurley's argument 
because no indication exists that a narrower charging period 
would have changed or aided his defense under the circumstances. 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
26 
 
¶49 Factors five and six, the passage of time between the 
alleged period of the crime and the defendant's arrest, and the 
duration between the date of the complaint and the alleged 
offense, while at first blush may support Hurley's claim, a 
close examination proves they do not.   
¶50 These factors address the "problem of dimmed memories 
and the possibility that the defendant may not be able to 
sufficiently recall or reconstruct the history regarding the 
allegations."  Miller, 257 Wis. 2d 124, ¶35.  The offense period 
here ended in 2005, the investigation did not begin until 2010, 
and the District Attorney did not charge Hurley until 2011.  
Hurley advances a strictly mechanical and mathematical approach 
to these factors.  Hurley simply points out that the charging 
period was from 2000 to 2005, and the District Attorney's Office 
did not charge him until June 2011, 5 to 10 years after the 
assaults.12  In essence, what Hurley is arguing is that too much 
time has passed to allow for a prosecution.  However, the 
District Attorney's Office filed the amended complaint within 
the period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations.13  
                                                 
12 The court of appeals' discussion of these factors was 
just as mechanical, in that it merely examined the length of 
time and compared it to the length of time that was rejected in 
R.A.R.  Hurley, No. 2013AP558-CR, ¶31.  
13 The amended complaint alleged a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.025(1).  A prosecution under Wis. Stat. § 948.025(1) (a), 
(b), (c), or (d) "may be commenced at any time."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.74(2)(a)(1) (2011-12).  A prosecution under Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.025(1)(e) "shall be commenced before the victim reaches 
the age of 45 years or be barred."  Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) 
(2011-12). 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
27 
 
"'The statute of limitations is the principal device . . . to 
protect against prejudice arising from a lapse of time between 
the date of an alleged offense and an arrest.'"  State v. 
McGuire, 2010 WI 91, ¶45, 328 Wis. 2d 289, 786 N.W.2d 227 
(quoting State v. Wilson, 149 Wis.2d 878, 903, 440 N.W.2d 534 
(1989)).  If we were to accept Hurley's argument we would 
invalidate the statute of limitations because the amended 
complaint was filed within the statute of limitations. 
¶51 Thus, a purely mathematical approach is impracticable 
when determining the overall reasonableness of the charging 
period.  The long delay may have hampered Hurley's ability to 
provide a defense; however, Hurley has not explained how this 
delay actually impacted his ability to plead and prepare a 
defense.  Nor has Hurley alleged, much less demonstrated, any 
improper purpose for the delay.  See Kempainen,    Wis. 2d   , 
¶39.  Simply stating that he has been impacted is insufficient.  
A defendant arguing that factors five and six weigh in his favor 
must articulate how his ability to present a defense has been 
impaired.  Further, as the State suggests, good reason exists 
for the delay; namely, the fact that M.C.N. waited to report the 
incidents until 2010 when Hurley moved away to Indiana.  
Therefore, factors five and six weigh in favor of our conclusion 
that the amended complaint and information provided notice. 
¶52 Factor seven, the ability of the victim or complaining 
witness to particularize the date and time of the alleged 
offense, weighs against Hurley's argument.  As we explained when 
describing the first three factors, at age six, when the first 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
28 
 
offense occurred, M.C.N.'s ability to recall details was very 
limited and thus she did not have the capacity to particularize 
the date of each offense.  Despite not being able to 
particularize the date of each offense, she was able to 
particularize the time of each offense.  M.C.N. stated that the 
acts of digital penetration and forced touching occurred when 
she went to bed at night, and the "weighing" incidents occurred 
after school.  Also, M.C.N.'s ability to recall the particular 
dates on which each assault occurred was hampered by their 
repeated and similar nature.  We thus disagree with the court of 
appeals' conclusion that M.C.N.'s "complete inability" to narrow 
down the charging period was not understandable.  Hurley, No. 
2013AP558-CR, ¶34.  Given the repeated and similar nature of the 
assaults at the hands of a trusted stepparent in the family 
home, it is reasonable and understandable that M.C.N. would be 
unable to narrow down the charging period.   
¶53 Based on our application of the Fawcett factors, the 
amended complaint and information provided sufficient notice to 
satisfy Hurley's due process right to plead and prepare a 
defense.  Hurley alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object to the amended complaint and that the 
alleged error in the amended complaint affected a substantial 
right, such that the plain error rule mandated dismissal.  
However, because the amended complaint did not violate Hurley's 
due process rights, counsel's recommendation not to file a 
motion to dismiss was reasonable professional advice and was not 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
29 
 
prejudicial.  Put simply, the plain error rule does not apply 
here because no error occurred. 
B. The Circuit Court Did Not Erroneously Exercise Its Discretion 
in Admitting Other-Acts Evidence. 
¶54 Next, 
we 
consider 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting other-acts 
evidence that Hurley had repeatedly sexually assaulted his 
sister, J.G., when she was between the ages of 8 and 10 years 
old and he was between the ages of 12 and 14 years old.  We 
conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in admitting the other-acts evidence, as "[t]he 
circuit court's decision was not a decision that no reasonable 
judge could make."  State v. Payano, 2009 WI 86, ¶52, 320 
Wis. 2d 348, 768 N.W.2d 832. 
i. General Principles Regarding the Admissibility of Other-Acts 
Evidence 
¶55 Under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a) (2011-12): 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.  
This subsection does not exclude the evidence when 
offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
30 
 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.14   
¶56 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 
904.04(2)(a) 
(2011-12) 
thus 
"prohibits the admission of evidence of a defendant's other bad 
acts to show that the defendant has a propensity to commit 
crimes."15  Marinez, 331 Wis. 2d 568, ¶18.  "However, other-acts 
evidence that is offered for a purpose other than the prohibited 
propensity purpose is admissible if it is relevant to a 
permissible purpose and is not unfairly prejudicial."  Id.   
¶57 In Sullivan, we developed a three-prong test to guide 
courts in determining whether other-acts evidence is admissible 
under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a) (2011-12).  Other-acts evidence 
is admissible (1) if it is offered for a permissible purpose 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a) (2011-12), (2) if it is 
relevant under the two relevancy requirements of Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.01(2)(a) (2011-12) "contains an 
illustrative, 
and 
not 
exhaustive, 
list 
of 
some 
of 
the 
permissible 
purposes 
for 
which 
other-acts 
evidence 
is 
admissible." 
 
State 
v. 
Marinez, 
2011 
WI 
12, 
¶18, 
331 
Wis. 2d 568, 797 N.W.2d 399.  "The rule does not require that 
courts pigeonhole . . . the other act evidence into one of these 
[enumerated] categories.  As long as the evidence is relevant 
and otherwise admissible apart from the propensity inference 
(act/character/conduct), Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) does not bar its 
use."  7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series: Wisconsin 
Evidence § 404.6, at 173 (3d ed. 2008). 
15 In other words, other-acts evidence cannot be used to 
prove a person's character through circumstantial evidence of 
conduct, but instead must be used for a permissible purpose. 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
31 
 
§ 904.01 (2011-12),16 and (3) if its probative value is not 
substantially outweighed by the risk or danger of unfair 
prejudice under Wis. Stat. § 904.03 (2011-12).  Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d at 772-73; State v. Jackson, 2014 WI 4, ¶55, 352 
Wis. 2d 249, 841 N.W.2d 791. 
¶58 "The party seeking to admit the other-acts evidence 
bears the burden of establishing that the first two prongs are 
met by a preponderance of the evidence."  Marinez, 331 
Wis. 2d 568, ¶19 (citations omitted).  "Once the proponent of 
the other-acts evidence establishes the first two prongs of the 
test, the burden shifts to the party opposing the admission of 
the other-acts evidence to show that the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk or danger of 
unfair prejudice."  Id. (citations omitted). 
¶59 "Because this is a child sexual assault case with a 
young victim, the greater latitude rule permit[s] a more liberal 
admission of other crimes evidence."17  Id., ¶20 (citing 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 904.01 
(2011-12) defines relevant 
evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence."  Evidence is relevant if it (1) "relates to a 
fact or proposition that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action" and (2) "has a tendency to make a consequential 
fact more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence."  State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 785-86, 576 
N.W.2d 30 (1998). 
17 Despite the greater latitude rule, courts still have the 
duty to ensure that other-acts evidence is offered for a proper 
purpose.  State v. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, ¶87, 263 Wis. 2d 1, 666 
N.W.2d 771. 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
32 
 
Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶44; State v. Hammer, 2000 WI 92, 
¶23, 236 Wis. 2d 686, 613 N.W.2d 629) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The greater latitude rule applies to each Sullivan 
prong.  Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶51.  Other-acts evidence is 
particularly relevant in child sexual assault cases because an 
average juror likely presumes that a defendant is incapable of 
such an act.18  Id., ¶42.  An additional rationale for the 
greater latitude rule "is the need to corroborate the victim's 
testimony against credibility challenges."19  Id., ¶40.   
ii. The Sullivan Analysis 
                                                 
18 We have explained that the other-acts evidence was 
relevant under the greater latitude rule because: 
[t]o a person of normal, social and moral sensibility, 
the idea of the sexual exploitation of the young is so 
repulsive that it's almost impossible to believe that 
none but the most depraved and degenerate would commit 
such an act.  The average juror could well find it 
incomprehensible that one who stands before the court 
on trial could commit such an act.  Juries must have 
all the relevant facts before them.  A past history of 
such a defendant's plans, schemes and motives is 
relevant. 
State v. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 27-28, 398 N.W.2d 763 (1987). 
19 Because of "the difficulty sexually abused children 
experience in testifying, and the difficulty prosecutors have in 
obtaining admissible evidence in such cases" a more liberal 
admissibility standard in child sexual assault cases applies.  
State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶42, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 
606.  "The dangers presented by the propensity inference are 
thus evenly balanced by the need to corroborate young victims 
whose horrific allegations might otherwise be doubted."  Blinka, 
supra, § 404.7, at 218-19. 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
33 
 
¶60 With these principles in mind, we turn now to whether 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in 
admitting testimony from J.G. that Hurley sexually assaulted her 
when she was between the ages of 8 and 10 years old and he was 
between the ages of 12 and 14 years old. 
1. Was the Evidence Offered for a Permissible Purpose? 
¶61 The circuit court admitted the other-acts evidence for 
two purposes: method of operation and opportunity.20  After 
describing J.G.'s testimony, the circuit court, in explaining 
why the evidence was admissible to show method of operation, 
stated, "there is a great similarity [in the] descriptions of 
what 
the 
two 
alleged 
victims 
are 
claiming 
occurred 
here.  There's quite a similarity in this.  And again, I think 
that go[es] towards the alleged method of operation of Mr. 
Hurley and how he goes about this."  The circuit court explained 
                                                 
20 Similar to its position at the court of appeals, the 
State does not argue that opportunity was a permissible purpose 
for the other-acts evidence.  Therefore, the argument is 
conceded.  Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd. v. FPC Secs. Corp., 
90 Wis. 2d 97, 108-09, 279 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1979).  While it 
is axiomatic that we are not bound by a party's concession, we 
agree with the court of appeals on this point.  Hurley's 
assaults against J.G. do not inform whether or not he had the 
opportunity to assault M.C.N years later, without overlapping 
with the impermissible propensity inference.  Therefore, our 
analysis will center on the permissible purposes, method of 
operation and motive.  See Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶52 (explaining 
that "[w]hen reviewing a circuit court's determination for 
erroneous exercise of discretion an appellate court may consider 
acceptable purposes for the admission of evidence other than 
those contemplated by the circuit court, and may affirm the 
circuit court's decision for reasons not stated by the circuit 
court.").  
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
34 
 
that Hurley had a distinct method of operation because he 
repeatedly 
digitally 
penetrated 
each 
victim, 
incorporated 
"games" into each assault, and targeted a specific type of girl: 
an elementary school-aged girl, to whom he is related, and over 
whom he had a great degree of control.  The circuit court noted 
that J.G. was Hurley's younger sister and was assaulted between 
the ages of 8 and 10 years old, and M.C.N. was Hurley's 
stepdaughter and was assaulted between the ages of 6 and 11 
years old.  The circuit court also noted that Hurley assaulted 
each victim when no one else was around.  The circuit court 
concluded that these similarities bolstered M.C.N.'s credibility 
given Hurley's distinct method of operation.  The circuit court 
also admitted the other-acts evidence for the purpose of 
establishing Hurley's 
opportunity stating it answered the 
question: "Did Mr. Hurley have the opportunity to commit these 
crimes?"   
¶62 Identifying a proper purpose for other-acts evidence 
is not difficult and is largely meant to develop the framework 
for the relevancy examination.  Payano, 320 Wis. 2d 348, ¶63; 
see also Marinez, 331 Wis. 2d 568, ¶25 ("The purposes for which 
other-acts evidence may be admitted are 'almost infinite' with 
the prohibition against drawing the propensity inference being 
the main limiting factor.").  "The proponent need only identify 
a relevant proposition that does not depend upon the forbidden 
inference of character as circumstantial evidence of conduct."  
7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series: Wisconsin 
Evidence § 404.6, at 180 (3d ed. 2008).  As long as one 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
35 
 
permissible purpose for the other-acts evidence exists, the 
first prong of the Sullivan analysis is met.  See Hammer, 236 
Wis. 2d 686, ¶29 n. 4. 
¶63 Applying these principles to our review of the circuit 
court's decision, we conclude that, given the greater latitude 
rule, the circuit court reasonably concluded that the other-acts 
evidence was admissible for the purposes of establishing 
Hurley's method of operation.  Further, we agree with the State 
that the other-acts evidence was admissible to show Hurley's 
motive.   
¶64 First, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise 
its discretion in concluding that the other-acts evidence was 
admissible to establish method of operation through which 
Hurley's plan may be proved because of the similarity between 
the two acts.  Id., ¶24; see also Blinka, supra, § 404.7, at 211 
("Proof of a distinctive 'modus operandi' does not, however, 
lead to automatic admissibility.  Rather, the method of 
operation must be probative of issues such as intent, plan, or 
identity.").  As we explained in State v. Fishnick, 127 
Wis. 2d 247, 263, 378 N.W.2d 272 (1985): 
Where 
other-acts 
evidence 
is 
used 
for 
identity 
purposes, similarities must exist between the 'other 
act' and the offense for which the defendant is being 
tried.  Similarities which tend to identify the 
defendant as the proponent of an act also tend to 
ensure a high level of probativeness in the other-acts 
evidence.  These similarities may be established, for 
example, where there is a discernable method of 
operation from one act to the next, [citation omitted] 
or where the other act and the crime charged and their 
surrounding circumstances are so similar that the 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
36 
 
incidents and circumstances bear the imprint of the 
defendant.     
(citations omitted).  "The threshold measure for similarity with 
regard to identity is nearness of time, place, and circumstance 
of the other act to the crime alleged.  Whether there is a 
concurrence of common features is generally left to the sound 
discretion of the trial courts."  State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 
722, 746-47, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991).    
¶65 The circuit court acted within its discretion in 
admitting J.G.'s testimony for the purpose of proving method of 
operation to prove the plan of Hurley.  A great similarity 
exists between the two sets of assaults as 1) J.G.'s and 
M.C.N.'s allegations were very similar, 2) J.G. and M.C.N. were 
similar in age, 3) both sets of assaults involved digital 
penetration that were repeated over a number of years, and 4) 
Hurley preceded the assaults with games.   
¶66 First, the allegations were similar.  J.G.'s and 
M.C.N.'s testimony showed that Hurley's preferred sexual target 
was an elementary-school-aged girl who lived in his home and was 
a member of his immediate family.  The testimony showed that 
Hurley also preferred a young girl over whom he had a great deal 
of control and with whom there was a relationship of implied 
trust: in J.G.'s case an older brother whom J.G. "always leaned 
towards" growing up, and in M.C.N.'s case her stepfather to whom 
she was close.  In each instance Hurley used this trust to his 
advantage by continually assaulting each girl and by attempting 
to dissuade them from coming forward.  Hurley asked J.G. during 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
37 
 
one assault "you're not going to tell mom and dad, are you?" and 
asked M.C.N. during the shower incident "you're not going to 
tell your mother, are you?," language that was virtually 
identical.   
¶67 Second, the victims were similar in age.  J.G. was 
assaulted between the ages of 8 and 10 years old, and M.C.N. was 
assaulted between the ages of 6 and 11 years old.  Third, each 
assault involved repeated acts of digital penetration in a 
private bedroom.  J.G.'s testimony also indicated that, while 
Hurley's conduct with her involved a wider variety of sexual 
acts, digital penetration was among his preferred acts, and he 
engaged in these acts regularly over a period of years.  Hurley 
also repeatedly digitally penetrated M.C.N. over a number of 
years, even though he also committed other sexual acts with 
M.C.N.     
¶68 Finally, Hurley preceded each set of assaults with a 
"game" that involved stripping the victim of her clothes.  With 
regard to J.G., Hurley had her wear a fur coat and perform a 
striptease before the assaults.  With regard to M.C.N., Hurley 
chased M.C.N. around the house and stripped her naked before the 
first assault.  Hurley also had M.C.N. remove all her clothes, 
placed her on his shoulders, and took her to the bathroom where 
he would weigh her.   
¶69 Though Hurley was younger when he assaulted J.G., and 
he was much closer to J.G. in age, the striking similarities 
outweigh these differences.  Given both the similarities between 
the assaults and greater latitude rule, the circuit court did 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
38 
 
not erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting the other-
acts evidence to show method of operation through Hurley's plan.  
¶70 The 
State 
also 
suggests 
that 
the 
evidence 
is 
admissible to prove motive.  As we explained above, a reviewing 
court may consider acceptable purposes for the admission of 
other-acts evidence other than that contemplated by the circuit 
court.  Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶52 (citations omitted).   
¶71 "'Motive' is defined as the cause or reason that moves 
the will and induces action."  Blinka, supra, § 404.07, at 202; 
State v. Balistreri, 106 Wis. 2d 741, 756, 317 N.W.2d 493 (1982) 
("Motive explains the reasons for a person's actions.").  The 
admissibility of other-acts to prove motive "is purely a 
function of relevance: How does the other act help the trier of 
fact to understand why the person acted as he did?"  Blinka, 
supra, § 404.7, at 204.  
¶72 "When a defendant's motive for an alleged sexual 
assault is an element of the charged crime, we have held that 
other crimes evidence may be offered for the purpose of 
establishing . . . motive."  Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶60 (emphasis 
added); see also Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶57 ("Our cases 
establish that when the defendant's motive for an alleged sexual 
assault is an element of the charged crime, other crimes 
evidence may be offered for the purpose of establishing 
motive.") (emphasis added).   
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
39 
 
¶73 Here, the District Attorney's Office charged Hurley 
with repeated sexual assault of a child under Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.025.21  "There is no doubt that sexual assault, involving 
either sexual contact or sexual intercourse, requires an 
intentional or volitional act by the perpetrator."  Hunt, 263 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶60.  Here, "[t]he other-acts evidence was properly 
admitted to prove motive because purpose is an element of sexual 
assault, and motive [is] relevant to purpose."  Hunt, 263 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶60 (citing State v. Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d 583, 593–
96, 493 N.W.2d 367 (1992)); Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶57.   
¶74 The motive to which the other-acts evidence relates is 
Hurley's desire to achieve sexual arousal or gratification.  As 
the State correctly notes: "within its discretion, a circuit 
court could conclude that Hurley's repeated acts of incest with 
a younger female family member in his formative years was 
relevant to show Hurley's desire as an adult to target another 
girl of the same age within his immediate family for sexual 
gratification." 
 
"Thus 
[Hurley's] 
purpose 
or 
motive 
for 
allegedly touching [M.C.N.] was one element of the charged 
crime, 
and 
evidence 
relevant 
to 
motive 
was 
therefore 
admissible."  Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶59.  Hurley's 
                                                 
21 For the relevant statutory definitions see supra notes 3, 
6, & 9.  Though the circuit court did not instruct the jury on 
"sexual contact," as we explained above a reviewing court "may 
consider acceptable purposes for the admission of evidence other 
than those contemplated by the circuit court."  Hunt, 263 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶52. 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
40 
 
"motive . . . for allegedly touching or having intercourse with 
[M.C.N.] was part of the corpus of the crimes charged, and 
evidence relevant to the motive . . . was therefore admissible."  
Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶60.  The court of appeals thus was 
incorrect in rejecting motive as a permissible purpose.  Hurley, 
No. 2013AP558-CR, ¶47.  Given the greater latitude rule, we 
conclude that the other-acts evidence was admissible to show 
Hurley's motive. 
2. Were the Assaults Committed by Hurley against J.G. Relevant 
to the Admissible Purposes? 
¶75 In 
describing 
the 
relevance 
of 
the 
other-acts 
evidence, the circuit court explained: 
I think that this evidence is relevant and it – 
certainly it bolsters the credibility of [M.C.N.].  It 
clearly relates to a fact of proposition of whether it 
occurred or not.  . . . The Hammer case talks about 
the measure of probative value in assessing relevance 
is a similarity between the charged offense and the 
other act.  . . . Now I understand that the nearness 
of time, we don't have that here.  We're talking 
perhaps 15 to 20 years prior, but there is case law in 
this State and even in this same paragraph here, 
paragraph 32 of Hammer it talks about incidences that 
occurred years before.  They talked also about 
evidence being admissible even though the victims were 
of different ages.  I'm finding here the victims were 
very similar in age and that the alleged conduct is 
 . . . very similar when you talk about digital 
penetration, you talk about the games that the 
defendant allegedly had each of the victims partake 
in.  So I do find it to be probative as well.  . . . 
Also the allegation, of course, is that [they] share 
some common characteristics, occurring when there is 
nobody else around and it's just the defendant and the 
alleged victim.  That goes towards his opportunistic 
nature of doing this. 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
41 
 
¶76 "Because other acts evidence is inherently relevant to 
prove 
character 
and 
therefore 
a 
propensity 
to 
behave 
accordingly, 'the real issue is whether the other act is 
relevant to anything else.'"  Payano, 320 Wis. 2d 348, ¶67 
(citing Blinka, supra, § 404.6, at 181) (emphasis removed).  
"This second prong is significantly more demanding than the 
first prong but still does not present a high hurdle for the 
proponent 
of 
the 
other-acts 
evidence." 
 
Marinez, 
331 
Wis. 2d 568, ¶33.   
¶77 Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 904.01 (2011-
12).  There are two parts to a relevancy analysis: first, 
"whether the evidence relates to a fact or proposition that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action," and second, 
"whether the evidence has a tendency to make a consequential 
fact more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence."  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 785–86.  "The key is 
relevance: What is it being offered to prove, and does it have 
any tendency to make that proposition more or less likely?" 
Blinka, supra, § 404.6, at 174-75.   
¶78 In answering the first question——whether the evidence 
is offered in relation to any fact or proposition that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action——"the court must 
focus its attention on the pleadings and contested issues in the 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
42 
 
case."  Payano, 320 Wis. 2d 348, ¶69 (citing Blinka supra, 
§ 404.6, at 181.)   
¶79 "The second part of the relevancy analysis illustrates 
the evidence's probative value, which is also part of the third 
prong of the Sullivan test."  Marinez, 331 Wis. 2d 568, ¶33.  
"The measure of probative value in assessing relevance is the 
similarity between the charged offense and the other act."  
Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶64 (citation omitted).  Similarity is 
demonstrated by showing the "nearness of time, place, and 
circumstance" between the other-act and the charged crime.  
State v. Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 305, 595 N.W.2d 661 (1999).  
"The greater the similarity, complexity and distinctiveness of 
the events, the stronger is the case for admission of the other 
acts evidence."  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 787.  It is within a 
circuit court's discretion to determine whether other-acts 
evidence is too remote.  Hough v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 807, 814, 
235 N.W.2d 534 (1975).   
¶80 However, events that are dissimilar or that do not 
occur near in time may still be relevant to one another.  
Payano, 320 Wis. 2d 348, ¶70.  "There is no precise point at 
which a prior act is considered too remote, and remoteness must 
be considered on a case-by-case basis."  Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶64 (citation omitted).  "Even when evidence may be considered 
too remote, the evidence is not necessarily rendered irrelevant 
if the remoteness is balanced by the similarity of the two 
incidents."  Id. (citing State v. Mink, 146 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 429 
N.W.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1988)).  
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
43 
 
¶81 Turning to the first prong of relevance, each of the 
purposes for which the circuit court admitted the other-acts 
evidence relates to a proposition that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action, namely, whether the jury believed 
M.C.N.'s account of sexual abuse by Hurley.  Indeed, the central 
issue in dispute at trial was credibility.  "'A witness's 
credibility is always 'consequential' within the meaning of Wis. 
Stat. § 904.01.'"  Marinez, 331 Wis. 2d 568, ¶34 (quoting 
Blinka, supra, § 401.101, at 98).  Like many child sexual 
assault 
cases, 
this 
case 
boiled 
down 
to 
a 
credibility 
determination.  See Blinka, supra, § 404.7, at 217–18 ("Child 
sexual abuse prosecutions often proceed under three major 
disabilities: they rely on a single witness who is very young 
and whose allegations are frequently unsupported by physical 
evidence.").   
¶82 These proof issues provide the rationale for the 
greater latitude rule.  Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶40; State v. 
Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 25, 398 N.W.2d 763 (1987).  "Thus, it 
follows that the greater latitude rule allows for the more 
liberal admission of other-acts evidence that has a tendency to 
assist the jury in assessing a child's allegations of sexual 
assault."  Marinez, 331 Wis. 2d 568, ¶34.  The circuit court 
correctly concluded that the assaults committed against J.G. 
"clearly relate[d] to a fact of proposition of whether it 
occurred or not" and it was reasonable for the circuit court to 
conclude that the assaults against J.G. were admissible to allow 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
44 
 
the jury to better assess M.C.N.'s credibility, which was the 
central determination.   
¶83 Further, the other-acts evidence was relevant to 
establish Hurley's method of operation and motive to assault 
M.C.N.  See Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 28-29 ("Juries must have 
all the relevant facts before them.  A past history of such a 
defendant's plans, schemes and motives is relevant. . . . It is 
this 
scheme 
or 
plan 
to 
achieve 
sexual 
stimulation 
or 
gratification from the young, the most sexually vulnerable in 
our society, that allows trial courts in the exercise of 
discretion to admit evidence of past similar acts to show scheme 
or plan to exploit children.") (emphasis added).  As already 
discussed, Hurley's motive for assaulting M.C.N. was directly 
related to an element of the charged crime (for the purpose of 
sexual arousal or gratification), and the J.G. assaults related 
to that consequential fact.  See Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶65 
(explaining that the defendant's motive for touching the victim 
was an element of the crime, and the sexual assault on the prior 
victim related to that fact of consequence to the determination 
of the action).  Plan, and thus method of operation, is a fact 
of consequence, and thus is relevant because Hurley denied 
assaulting M.C.N.  The same can certainly be said for motive.  
Whether or not Hurley had the plan or motive to carry out the 
assaults against M.C.N. was certainly informed by his assaults 
against J.G. 
¶84 Turning 
to 
the 
second 
prong 
of 
the 
relevance 
determination, the circuit court correctly stated that the 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
45 
 
evidence was probative because of its similarity.  "The measure 
of probative value in assessing relevance is the similarity 
between the charged offense and the other act."  Id., ¶67 
(citation and quotations omitted).  The assaults committed 
against J.G. and M.C.N. were very similar and it was reasonable 
for the circuit court to conclude that the similarity provided 
context to Hurley's method of operation.  It would have also 
been reasonable for the circuit court to conclude that the 
similarity provided context for Hurley's motive.  Both victims 
1) were similar in age; 2) were members of Hurley's immediate 
family; 3) lived in the same household as Hurley; 4) were 
female; 5) were younger than Hurley; 6) were controlled by 
Hurley and trusting of him; 7) were assaulted via digital 
penetration; 8) were assaulted in the home and bedroom; 9) were 
assaulted repeatedly over a period of years; 10) before being 
assaulted, participated in a stripping "game" initiated by 
Hurley; and 11) Hurley attempted to dissuade each victim by 
saying "you're not going to tell mom, are you?".   
¶85 Though Hurley was 25 years younger when he assaulted 
J.G., we do not conclude this is a significant distinction given 
the many similarities discussed above.  Further, even though the 
other-acts evidence was removed in time, as the circuit court 
noted, courts have upheld the admission of other-acts evidence 
that was removed in time due to the similarity between the 
incidents.  See Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d 583 (upholding the 
admissibility of 13 year old evidence); Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722 
(upholding the admissibility of 16 year old evidence).  Given 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
46 
 
the multitude of similarities outlined above, we conclude that 
the J.G. assaults were relevant evidence, because they related 
to a fact of consequence in the case and had strong probative 
value. 
3. Was the Probative Value of the Other-Acts Evidence 
Substantially Outweighed by the Risk of Unfair Prejudice? 
¶86 After discussing the relevance of the other-acts 
evidence, the circuit court explained: 
[a]nd then with respect to the danger of unfair 
prejudice, clearly this is prejudicial information.  
If it wasn’t, the State wouldn’t seek to use it.  And 
I agree that a limiting instruction should be given 
both before the testimony and again at the close of 
the case.  And I think that [] will be a sound way to 
make sure that the jury does not conclude that Mr. 
Hurley is a bad person simply because of that.  And 
the purpose of using this is to establish method of 
operation and opportunity for doing this. 
¶87 Evidence that is relevant "may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice."  Wis. Stat. § 904.03 (2011-12).  The 
probative value of evidence "is a function of its relevance 
under Wis. Stat. § 904.01."  Blinka, supra, § 403.1, at 135.  
The circuit court is to consider the proponent's need to present 
this evidence given the context of the entire trial.  Id. at 
136.  "Essentially, probative value reflects the evidence's 
degree of relevance.  Evidence that is highly relevant has great 
probative value, whereas evidence that is only slightly relevant 
has low probative value."  Payano, 320 Wis. 2d 348, ¶81.  If the 
probative value is close to or equal to its unfair prejudicial 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
47 
 
effect, the evidence must be admitted.  State v. Speer, 176 
Wis. 2d 1101, 1115, 501 N.W.2d 429.  Prejudice is not based on 
simple harm to the opposing party's case, but rather "whether 
the evidence tends to influence the outcome of the case by 
improper means."  Payano, 320 Wis. 2d 348, ¶87 (quotation 
omitted).   
¶88 "Unfair prejudice [also] results when the proffered 
evidence . . . appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its 
sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise 
causes a jury to base its decision on something other than the 
established propositions in the case."  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 
789-90.  "The circuit court's job is to ensure that the jury 
will not 'prejudge a defendant's guilt or innocence in an action 
because of his prior bad act.'"  Payano, 320 Wis. 2d 348, ¶89 
(quoting Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 262).   
¶89 To limit the possibility that the jury will convict 
based on "improper means" circuit courts may provide limiting 
instructions, give cautionary instructions, edit the evidence, 
or restrict a party's arguments.  Id., ¶99; Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶¶72–73 (explaining that cautionary instructions help to limit 
any unfair prejudice that may result from other-acts evidence); 
Sullivan, 
216 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
791. 
 
Limiting 
instructions 
substantially mitigate any unfair prejudicial effect.  Hunt, 263 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶73-75 (concluding limiting instructions in child 
sexual assault cases were proper, limited any prejudicial 
effect, and had been approved of in the past).  In some cases, 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
48 
 
limiting 
instructions 
eliminate 
the 
potential 
for 
unfair 
prejudice.  Hammer, 236 Wis. 2d 686, ¶36. 
¶90 A reviewing court "presume[s] that juries comply with 
properly given limiting and cautionary instructions, and thus 
consider this an effective means to reduce the risk of unfair 
prejudice to the party opposing admission of other acts 
evidence."  Marinez, 331 Wis. 2d 568, ¶41; see also Hunt, 263 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶72.  "Because [§ 904.04] provides for exclusion only 
if the evidence's probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, '[t]he bias, then, is squarely 
on the side of admissibility.  Close cases should be resolved in 
favor of admission.'"  Marinez, 331 Wis. 2d 568, ¶41 (quoting 
Blinka, supra, § 403.1, at 139). 
¶91 For the reasons discussed above in the relevancy 
analysis, the assaults against J.G. were highly probative.  
While the evidence was certainly prejudicial, the limiting 
instructions given before J.G.'s testimony and again at the 
close of the case were a sound way to make sure that the jury 
did not use the evidence for an improper purpose.  See Marinez, 
331 Wis. 2d 568, ¶41.  Here, the circuit court gave two limiting 
instructions, the first before J.G. testified and the second 
after closing arguments. 
Evidence will now be presented regarding other conduct 
of the defendant for which the defendant is not on 
trial, specifically evidence will be presented that 
the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with 
[J.G.].  Sexual intercourse means any intrusion 
however slight by any part of a person's body or of 
any object into the genital or anal opening of 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
49 
 
another.  Emission of semen is not required.  If you 
find this conduct did occur, you should consider it 
only on the issues of opportunity and method of 
operation.  You may not consider this evidence to 
conclude that the defendant has a certain character or 
a certain character trait and that the defendant acted 
in conformity with that trait or character with 
respect to the offense charged in this case.  The 
evidence 
is 
received 
on 
the 
issues 
of, 
first, 
opportunity, that is whether the defendant had the 
opportunity to commit the offense charged; and second, 
method of operation.  You may consider this evidence 
only for the purposes I have described giving it the 
weight you determine it deserves.  It is not to be 
used to conclude that the defendant is a bad person 
and for that reason is guilty of the offense charged.22   
¶92 Because we presume that juries comply with properly 
given limiting and cautionary instructions and because there was 
no unfair prejudice, the circuit court could reasonably conclude 
that Hurley did not meet his burden23 of establishing that the 
probative value of the other-acts evidence was substantially 
                                                 
22 During opening and closing arguments, the prosecutor was 
careful to explain that J.G.'s testimony was being admitted only 
to show Hurley's opportunity and method of operation. 
23 See Marinez, 331 Wis. 2d 568, ¶19 ("Once the proponent of 
the other-acts evidence establishes the first two prongs of the 
test, the burden shifts to the party opposing the admission of 
the other-acts evidence to show that the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk or danger of 
unfair prejudice."). 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
50 
 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.24  Simply put, the 
circuit court's decision regarding the prejudicial effect was 
not a decision that no reasonable judge could make.   
¶93 Given that the evidence was admissible for a proper 
purpose, 
was 
relevant, 
and 
its 
probative 
value 
was 
not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
admitting the other-acts evidence.  
C. The Circuit Court Erroneously Exercised its Discretion in 
Granting a New Trial in the Interest of Justice. 
¶94 Finally, 
we 
consider 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in granting a new trial in 
                                                 
24 State v. McGowan, 2006 WI App 80, 291 Wis. 2d 212, 715 
N.W.2d 631, which the court of appeals used to reach the 
opposite conclusion, is distinguishable.  In McGowan, the court 
of appeals concluded that McGowan's assault of a 5 year old 
female cousin when he was 10 years old did not provide evidence 
of McGowan's motive to assault a 10 year old cousin when McGowan 
was 18.  We agree with the State in distinguishing McGowan as 
McGowan was only 10 years old when he committed the other-act, 
while Hurley was between the ages of 12 and 14 when he assaulted 
J.G.  Further, the result in McGowan was driven by the 
difference in the nature of the two sets of acts, and the horrid 
nature of urinating in a child's mouth.  Id., ¶¶20, 23.  In 
contrast, Hurley was 14 years old when he stopped assaulting 
J.G., much older than McGowan who was 10 years old at the time 
of the other-act.  Further, both sets of assaults committed by 
Hurley were repeated in nature, contrasted with the single 
other-act in McGowan.  As the circuit court explained: "what 
distinguishes McGowan from this case, quite frankly, is they 
were talking about a single incident that had occurred some time 
previously, which is completely different from what we have in 
this case where [J.G.] is alleging that these acts occurred for 
quite a long time, perhaps a number of years."   
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
51 
 
the interest of justice and conclude that it did.  The circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion because it did not 
apply accepted legal principles to the facts in the record in 
explaining how the comments "'so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process.'"  State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶43, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 
N.W.2d 115 (quoting Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶88).   
¶95 A "prosecutor may comment on the evidence, detail the 
evidence, argue from it to a conclusion and state that the 
evidence convinces him and should convince the jurors."  State 
v. Draize, 88 Wis. 2d 445, 454, 276 N.W.2d 784 (1979).  The 
prosecutor should aim to "analyze the evidence and present facts 
with a reasonable interpretation to aid the jury in calmly and 
reasonably drawing just inferences and arriving at a just 
conclusion upon the main or controlling questions."  Id.  
However, "[c]ounsel is allowed considerable latitude in closing 
arguments," and is permitted to draw any reasonable inference 
from the evidence.  State v. Burns, 2011 WI 22, ¶48, 332 
Wis. 2d 730, 798 N.W.2d 166 (citing Draize, 88 Wis. 2d at 454); 
State v. Nemoir, 62 Wis. 2d 206, 213 n.9, 214 N.W.2d 297 (1974).   
¶96 "When 
a 
defendant 
alleges 
that 
a 
prosecutor's 
statements constituted misconduct, the test we apply is whether 
the statements so infected the trial with unfairness as to make 
the resulting conviction a denial of due process."  Davidson, 
236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶88.  "Even if there are improper statements by 
a prosecutor, the statements alone will not be cause to overturn 
a conviction.  Rather, the statements must be looked at in 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
52 
 
context of the entire trial."  Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, ¶43; see 
also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) ("[A] 
criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis 
of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or 
conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be 
determined 
whether 
the 
prosecutor's 
conduct 
affected 
the 
fairness of the trial."). 
¶97 The circuit court in the instant case erroneously 
exercised its discretion as it misapplied the holding of State 
v. Weiss, 2008 WI App 72, 312 Wis. 2d 382, 752 N.W.2d 372.  In 
Weiss, the defendant was charged with two counts of sexual 
assault of a child under the age of 16.  Id., ¶2.  Weiss 
testified that he verbally told the police that he did not 
commit the assaults, but did not include that denial in his 
written statements.  Id., ¶4.  Two police reports stated that 
Weiss had verbally denied the accusations.  Id., ¶1.  During 
closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the first and only 
time the defendant had denied committing the assaults was during 
his oral testimony.  Id., ¶5.  On ten occasions during closing 
and rebuttal the prosecutor remarked that Weiss did not deny 
assaulting the victim until trial.  Id., ¶¶5-7. 
¶98 In granting a new trial in the interest of justice, 
the Weiss court explained that the prosecutor "was asking the 
jury to disbelieve Weiss's statement that he had verbally denied 
the crime to the police."  Id., ¶15.  The Weiss court explained: 
[The prosecutor] knew better.  She had the two police 
reports saying otherwise.  . . . We point out once 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
53 
 
more, because this is important: the State concedes 
that the prosecutor's argument, asserting that Weiss 
never denied the crime, implicitly including verbal 
denials, was incorrect.  The importance of what we are 
about 
to 
say 
cannot 
be 
underscored 
enough.  
Prosecutors may not ask jurors to draw inferences that 
they know or should know are not true.  That is what 
occurred here and it is improper.  
Id. 
¶99 At trial, Hurley testified in his own defense.  On 
direct examination his attorney asked: "Now, [J.G.] testified 
that she was assaulted when she believed she was around eight 
years old.  Do you recall having an encounter with [J.G.] when 
she was around eight?"  Hurley answered: "No."  His attorney 
then asked: "Do you recall any of the allegations [J.G.] brought 
up here today?"  Hurley answered: "No, I do not."   
¶100 During his closing argument the assistant district 
attorney stated "[w]hen the defendant testified, he was asked by 
his—by the attorney regarding [J.G.] he said well, do you recall 
any of these incidents with [J.G.] ever happening?  And his 
answer was no.  The question wasn't did you do this or not, it 
was do you recall?  That's different than 'it didn't happen.'"  
The assistant district attorney and the defense attorney had in 
their possession a police report which stated that on September 
26, 2010, J.G. called Hurley and discussed the assaults he 
committed against her, which Hurley denied.   
¶101 The circuit court concluded that the application of 
Weiss required a new trial.  The circuit court found the 
prosecutor's comments were designed to have the jury draw the 
inference that Hurley had not previously denied that the sexual 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
54 
 
assaults described by J.G. occurred, and that Hurley could only 
not recall whether he engaged in the sexual contact with his 
sister.  The circuit court further found that this inference was 
inaccurate and that the prosecutor knew that Hurley had 
previously denied J.G.'s allegations when confronted by her.  
The circuit court explained that the case largely boiled down to 
a credibility determination and that the prosecutor's remarks 
were intended to undermine the credibility of the defendant.     
¶102 However, the circuit court did not apply accepted 
legal principles in that it misapplied Weiss.  In Weiss there 
were at least ten separate comments by the prosecutor relating 
to the denial during closing and rebuttal.  Id., ¶¶5, 7.  Here 
the prosecutor made two very brief remarks and did not dwell on 
the defendant's testimony.  Further, the inference that the 
circuit court thought the prosecutor was asking the jury to draw 
is unfounded.  The circuit court thought the prosecutor was 
asking the jury to draw the inference that Hurley had never 
denied assaulting J.G., and that he only could not recall 
whether 
it 
had 
happened. 
 
The 
reasonable 
inference 
the 
prosecutor was arguing was that Hurley had not been asked by his 
trial counsel whether he assaulted J.G. (and Hurley did not 
volunteer a denial of J.G.'s allegations) because Hurley 
believed it was possible he had assaulted her, but could not 
recall having done so.  The prosecutor did not say "he has never 
denied the assault before today" as the prosecutor did in Weiss, 
but instead stated that Hurley could not recall the assault 
which is different from "it didn't happen."  The prosecutor did 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
55 
 
not ask the jury to draw an inference that he knew or should 
have known was untrue.  The prosecutor merely commented on 
Hurley's testimony at trial, appropriately held him to that 
testimony, and confined his remark to the reasonable inference 
discussed above.   
¶103 Finally, in Weiss the defendant denied assaulting the 
victim, but here Hurley denied assaulting J.G., the other-acts 
victim.  Because Hurley's denial did not go to the heart of the 
case, whether or not he assaulted the victim for which he was on 
trial, even if the prosecutor's remarks were improper, which we 
do not conclude, they did not so infect the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process.  "Even if there are improper statements by a 
prosecutor, the statements alone will not be cause to overturn a 
conviction.  Rather, the statements must be looked at in context 
of the entire trial."  Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, ¶43.  Noting that 
Hurley could not recall whether the assaults occurred is in fact 
different than the assaults did not occur.  Had the prosecutor 
argued that Hurley had never denied the assaults, then, given 
the credibility contest, those remarks may have infected the 
trial with unfairness.  But that was not the case.   
¶104 The prosecutor's comments were brief, fair, and did 
not ask the jury to draw an inference that the prosecutor knew 
or should have known was false.  Therefore, the circuit court 
misapplied Weiss in reaching its conclusion and thus the court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in granting a new trial.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
No. 
2013AP558-CR   
 
56 
 
¶105 First, 
we 
hold 
that 
the 
amended 
complaint 
and 
information provided adequate notice and thus did not violate 
Hurley's due process right to plead and prepare a defense.  
Second, we hold that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in admitting the other-acts evidence.  
Finally, we hold that the circuit court did erroneously exercise 
its discretion in granting a new trial in the interest of 
justice.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals and remand 
to the circuit court with the instruction that the judgment of 
conviction be reinstated. 
 
By the Court.—Reversed and cause remanded to the circuit 
court with the instruction to reinstate the judgment of 
conviction.   
 
 
 
No.  2013AP558-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶106 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with the decision of the court of appeals on the issue of the 
other-acts evidence.1  I, like the court of appeals, conclude 
that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in 
admitting the State's other-acts evidence. 
¶107 The admissibility of other-acts evidence is governed 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2). 
 
Other-acts 
evidence 
is 
not 
admissible "to prove the character of a person in order to show 
that the person acted in conformity therewith" or to show that 
the defendant has a propensity to commit crimes.2  Other-acts 
evidence introduced for a different purpose is admissible so 
long as the evidence is relevant to a permissible purpose and 
its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice.3 
¶108 I agree with the court of appeals that the other-acts 
evidence introduced by the State fails each prong of the three-
prong analysis set forth in State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 
772, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998).4  The State offered other-acts 
evidence in order to show that the defendant is a bad person 
                                                 
1 State v. Hurley, No. 2013AP558-CR, unpublished slip op., 
at 23-24 (Wis. Ct. App. May 6, 2014). 
2 State v. Marinez, 2011 WI 12, ¶18, 331 Wis. 2d 568, 797 
N.W.2d 399. 
3 Id. 
4 The three-prong test set forth in State v. Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d 768, 772, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998), is discussed in ¶57 of 
the majority opinion. 
No.  2013AP558-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
with a propensity to sexually assault children.  The State 
sought to persuade the jury, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(a), that the assaults alleged in the State's 
complaint were committed by the defendant in conformity with his 
criminal character and propensity to sexually assault children. 
¶109 If the State's other-acts evidence is relevant to show 
more than the defendant's criminal character or propensity to 
sexually assault children (and it is not), its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.5  
Evidence that the defendant "committed repeated acts of incest 
against his sister was likely to arouse the jury's sense of 
horror and provoke its instinct to punish."6  The limiting 
instructions provided by the circuit court did not, in my view, 
cure 
the 
unfair 
prejudice 
and 
thus 
"do 
not 
sway 
this 
balance . . . ."7 
¶110 An erroneous exercise of discretion in admitting the 
State's other-acts evidence does not necessarily lead to a new 
trial.8  Rather, this court must determine whether the error was 
harmless.9   
                                                 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 904.03. 
6 Hurley, No. 2013AP558-CR, unpublished slip op., at 23. 
7 Marinez, 331 Wis. 2d 568, ¶77. 
8 Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶30, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 
N.W.2d 698. 
9 Id. 
No.  2013AP558-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶111 In the instant case, the State properly conceded at 
the court of appeals that if its other-acts evidence was 
erroneously admitted, the error was not harmless.10  The State 
does not assert harmless error in its brief before this court.11 
¶112 I agree with the court of appeals that the error was 
not harmless and would therefore grant the defendant a new 
trial. 
¶113 By denying the defendant relief in the instant case, 
the majority opinion adds to the growing body of case law 
whittling away at the protections afforded to defendants by Wis. 
Stat. § 904.04(2).  As Justice Bradley wrote over a decade ago: 
Rather than endeavoring to stretch beyond repair the 
definitions of the acceptable purposes [for other-acts 
evidence 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2)(a)], 
the 
majority should simply lay all its cards on the table 
and acknowledge that it is sanctioning the blanket use 
of propensity evidence in child sexual assault cases. 
[Instead], the majority maintains its refuge under the 
cloak 
of 
the 
very 
statute 
it 
simultaneously 
erodes. . . .12 
¶114 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶115 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
                                                 
10 Brief (in Court of Appeals) of the State as Appellant and 
Cross-Respondent at 34. 
11 Brief (in Supreme Court) of the State as Plaintiff-
Appellant-Cross-Respondent-Petitioner at 44 n.8. 
12 State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶109, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 
N.W.2d 606 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
No.  2013AP558-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1