Case Title: Yarbrough v. Warden

Citation: 

Docket Number: 021660

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
ROBERT STACY YARBROUGH 
 
v.  Record No. 021660   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  March 3, 2005 
WARDEN OF THE SUSSEX I STATE PRISON 
 
 
UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
 
This petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed under 
our original jurisdiction.  We consider whether the petitioner 
was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance 
of counsel in a second penalty phase proceeding conducted after 
we remanded his capital murder case. 
I. PROCEEDINGS 
 
The petitioner, Robert Stacy Yarbrough, was convicted in a 
jury trial in the Circuit Court of Mecklenburg County (the 
circuit court) of the capital murder of Cyril Hugh Hamby during 
the commission of robbery, in violation of Code § 18.2-31(4), 
and of the robbery of Hamby, in violation of Code § 18.2-58.  
The jury found Yarbrough guilty of both crimes, and fixed his 
punishment at death for the capital murder and at life 
imprisonment for the robbery.  The circuit court sentenced 
Yarbrough in accordance with the jury verdict. 
We affirmed Yarbrough’s robbery conviction and sentence, 
and his conviction of capital murder, but vacated the death 
sentence and remanded the case for a new penalty phase 
proceeding because the circuit court had refused Yarbrough’s 
request to instruct the jury that he would be ineligible for 
parole if he received a sentence of life imprisonment.  
Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 347, 374-75, 519 S.E.2d 602, 
616-17 (1999)(Yarbrough I).  On remand, a jury again fixed 
Yarbrough’s punishment for capital murder at death, and the 
circuit court sentenced Yarbrough in accordance with the jury 
verdict.  We affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.  Yarbrough 
v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 388, 551 S.E.2d 306 (2001)(Yarbrough 
II), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1060 (2002). 
Yarbrough filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
under Code § 8.01-654 against the warden of the Sussex I State 
Prison (the warden).  Based on the death sentence he received on 
remand, Yarbrough alleged that (1) the jury was selected in a 
racially discriminatory manner; (2) the jury was misled about 
the appropriate burden of proof; (3) his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance; and (4) Virginia’s capital murder 
statute is unconstitutional.  We refused Yarbrough’s petition. 
Yarbrough filed a petition for rehearing pursuant to Rule 
5:39, which we granted limited to consideration of the claim 
that Yarbrough was denied the effective assistance of counsel at 
his second penalty phase proceeding.  We entered an order 
directing the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing 
pursuant to Code § 8.01-654(C) to consider the merits of 
 
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Yarbrough’s allegation that he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel at his penalty phase proceeding on remand 
because counsel unreasonably failed to investigate and present 
relevant mitigating evidence as required by the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 
(2003).  The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing (the 
habeas hearing) and submitted a written report that contained 
findings of fact and conclusions of law as directed by Code 
§ 8.01-654(C)(3).1
II. FACTS 
 
In Yarbrough I, we provided a complete statement of facts 
concerning the crimes for which Yarbrough was convicted and 
sentenced.  258 Va. at 353-55, 519 S.E.2d at 603-05.  In 
Yarbrough II, we described the evidence presented at the second 
penalty phase proceeding, which is relevant to the present 
habeas corpus proceeding.  262 Va. at 391-92, 551 S.E.2d at 307-
08.  We will recite the facts from that opinion: 
 
During the second penalty phase proceeding, the 
Commonwealth presented essentially the same evidence 
it had presented during the first penalty phase 
proceeding, including evidence that the defendant 
killed Hamby by stabbing him multiple times in the 
neck.  The Commonwealth’s evidence also included 
testimony from Hamby’s family and friends concerning 
                     
1 The Honorable Charles L. McCormick, III (retired) 
conducted the evidentiary hearing and submitted the required 
report to this Court.  Judge McCormick also presided over 
Yarbrough’s original guilt and penalty phase proceedings, as 
well as the second penalty phase proceeding on remand. 
 
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the impact of Hamby’s murder on them.  Hamby’s two 
daughters, his daughter-in-law, and one of his 
granddaughters testified that their relationships with 
Hamby were close and were nurtured by his kindness and 
thoughtfulness, and that Hamby’s death has devastated 
their family.  Two former neighbors and long-time 
customers of Hamby testified that Hamby had developed 
close friendships with them that demonstrated his 
warmth and generosity. 
 
 
The Commonwealth also presented testimony from 
Dr. Marcella F. Fierro, the Chief Medical Examiner for 
the Commonwealth.  Dr. Fierro testified that Hamby 
bled to death as a result of at least ten separate 
knife wounds to his neck.  She testified that the 
wounds penetrated to the junction between the neck and 
skull at several locations on the rear of Hamby’s 
neck, and that such wounds “are usually associated 
with trying to take the head off.”  In addition, Dr. 
Fierro identified injuries from at least five separate 
blows to Hamby’s head that were consistent with 
beating and kicking.  She testified that Hamby was 
alive when all these wounds were inflicted, and that 
it took as long as 15 minutes for him to bleed to 
death.  The Commonwealth presented additional 
testimony from Dominic Rainey, a witness to the 
killing, who testified that Hamby was begging the 
defendant to stop attacking him while the defendant 
was cutting the front and rear of Hamby’s neck in a 
“sawing motion.” 
 
 
Yarbrough presented testimony from his mother who 
stated that Yarbrough had lived with her his entire 
life except for two years as a teenager during which 
he lived with his grandmother.  Yarbrough also 
presented testimony from his former prison counselor 
who testified that Yarbrough had not received any 
adverse disciplinary reports during his time in 
prison. 
 
Id.
 
At the habeas hearing, Yarbrough’s trial counsel, Buddy 
Ward, testified that he and his investigator, William Smith, 
conducted a “deep background check” that began with Yarbrough’s 
 
4
birth.  They collected Yarbrough’s school records and 
investigated a medical incident from Yarbrough’s childhood. 
Ward and Smith interviewed Yarbrough at length, and 
contacted Yarbrough’s family members and other potential 
character witnesses.  According to Ward, Yarbrough did not say 
anything negative about his mother, and did not indicate that he 
had been neglected during his childhood years. 
The only two family members with whom Ward spoke were 
Yarbrough’s mother and grandmother.  Yarbrough’s mother stated 
that at one point, she sent her son to live with his grandmother 
in order to “work through” her own problems with drugs.  
Yarbrough’s grandmother, however, did not offer any information 
suggesting that Yarbrough had experienced a troubled childhood.  
Ward did not interview Yarbrough’s father or sister because 
Yarbrough stated that he had not had contact with them in many 
years. 
 
Ward also stated that he discussed Yarbrough's case with 
Dr. Evan Nelson, a psychologist appointed by the circuit court 
who interviewed Yarbrough and his family members.  Dr. Nelson 
informed Ward that Yarbrough’s mother had a drug problem when 
Yarbrough was a child and once placed Yarbrough in the care of 
his grandmother for this reason. 
After receiving Dr. Nelson’s evaluation, Ward attempted to 
“follow up” with Yarbrough’s mother and grandmother, but 
 
5
received no new information and did not “push” for more 
information about Yarbrough’s childhood or about his mother’s 
drug use.  Ward also stated that he did not use Dr. Nelson as a 
witness at the second penalty phase proceeding because Dr. 
Nelson had concluded that his testimony could prove harmful to 
Yarbrough’s case. 
 
Yarbrough’s mother, Lorraine R. Mitchell, testified 
extensively about Yarbrough’s childhood years and about her  
struggle with drug abuse.  She stated that Yarbrough spent his 
early childhood years with her in a low-income housing project 
in Camden, New Jersey.  Her boyfriend, Willis Jenkins, and their 
daughter, Dorian, also lived there for a number of years. 
Mitchell stated that when Jenkins brought crack cocaine 
into the home, she started using the drug and became addicted to 
it.  Jenkins eventually moved out of the home because of her 
addiction.  After Jenkins left, Mitchell did not pay her bills 
regularly, and her utility services often were disconnected.  
She eventually lost her home after failing to make the mortgage 
payments. 
 
Mitchell testified that the rest of Yarbrough’s childhood 
was spent in several different locations.  She and the two 
children lived for a period of time at her mother’s house and, 
when Yarbrough was 11 years old, he spent a year in Illinois 
 
6
with his half brother.  While Yarbrough was in Illinois, Jenkins 
removed Dorian permanently from Mitchell’s care. 
Mitchell stated that after Yarbrough returned from 
Illinois, they lived in a shelter and in an apartment she 
described as a “slum.”  She and Yarbrough later moved to 
Virginia’s Eastern Shore.  They eventually began living with a 
man named Willie Jiggets, who sold crack cocaine and whose home 
was a place where neighbors would “hang out,” play cards, and 
drink liquor. 
 
Mitchell testified that despite her drug use and living 
conditions, she tried not to use illegal drugs in front of her 
children, and that Yarbrough was never physically or sexually 
abused.  Mitchell also testified that her children always had 
food, clothing, and a place to live.  Mitchell stated that she 
answered all the questions Ward and Smith asked, and that she 
thought she had discussed her drug use with Ward. 
Yarbrough’s grandmother, Annie Mae Riley, testified that 
neither Ward nor Smith requested details about Yarbrough’s 
personal history.  However, Riley stated that she was present 
when Smith asked Mitchell some questions about her use of crack 
cocaine. 
Riley also testified that Yarbrough lived with her while he 
was attending kindergarten and first grade.  When Yarbrough and 
 
7
Mitchell moved to their own house in Camden, Riley visited them 
regularly. 
During this time, Riley observed a change in Mitchell’s 
behavior and a deterioration of conditions in the home.  
However, Riley stated that the children always had food to eat.  
Riley also testified that Yarbrough often cared for Dorian when 
Mitchell failed to do so. 
When Mitchell confessed her drug addiction to Riley, Riley 
helped Mitchell obtain assistance to deal with the problem and 
later helped her move to Virginia.  Riley further stated that 
Yarbrough was not abused or neglected as a child. 
 
Yarbrough also presented the testimony of Willis Jenkins, 
who confirmed many of the details of Mitchell’s testimony and 
testified that neither Ward nor Smith contacted him about 
Yarbrough.  Jenkins also stated that he introduced Mitchell to 
the use of crack cocaine, and that she began using it on a daily 
basis.  He testified that even after he stopped using the drug, 
Mitchell continued taking it and frequently had a “house full of 
people getting high” in the basement while the children were 
upstairs.  Jenkins also stated that during this period Mitchell 
took money from his bank account to buy drugs and often did not 
pay their utility bills, which resulted in disruptions in 
service. 
 
8
Jenkins testified that he never witnessed any abuse of the 
children, and that he and Mitchell tried to shield the children 
from their drug use.  He eventually moved out of the house and 
removed Dorian from Mitchell’s care one or two years later. 
 
Jenkins also stated that during the period when Mitchell 
was addicted to drugs, the children were able to walk to their 
grandmother’s house, about 10 minutes away, where she would 
provide them with food.  He also noted that Yarbrough often took 
care of Dorian’s needs when Mitchell failed to do so. 
Yarbrough’s father likewise confirmed aspects of his son’s 
early childhood years.  He testified that although he remained 
in frequent contact with his son over the years, no lawyer or 
investigator ever contacted him on his son’s behalf. 
Yarbrough’s father also testified that after Mitchell and 
his son moved out of his house and began living with Jenkins, he 
eventually learned of Mitchell’s drug addiction and took his son 
to live with a half brother in Illinois.  Yarbrough’s father 
testified that when his son returned one year later and resumed 
living with Mitchell, she appeared to have overcome her 
addiction. 
 
Finally, Yarbrough presented the testimony of his sister, 
Dorian Jenkins, and his cousin, Anthony Riley.  Both testified 
that Yarbrough’s trial counsel did not contact them.  Riley 
stated that although he was very young at the time, he 
 
9
remembered “rampant” drug activity in Yarbrough’s childhood 
home, as well as very poor living conditions.  Dorian Jenkins, 
who lived with Yarbrough and Mitchell until she was five years 
old, described very dirty living conditions, with the frequent 
absence of electricity and water.  She also stated that 
Yarbrough often helped feed her and did “anything [else] I 
needed for him to do.” 
 
The warden presented testimony from the investigator, 
William Smith, who testified that Yarbrough did not provide any 
information about his childhood living conditions.  Smith stated 
that Yarbrough did not indicate that there were problems in his 
home life during his childhood, nor did he suggest any 
circumstances that would have required additional investigation.  
Smith also testified that Mitchell never mentioned her drug 
addiction, nor did she indicate any unusual problems that 
occurred during Yarbrough’s childhood years.  Smith acknowledged 
that he did not request any records from social service 
agencies, explaining that he did not think that he could obtain 
access to them. 
 
The warden also presented testimony from Ward, who stated 
that Mitchell portrayed herself to him as a “good mother with a 
problem that she was working her way through.”  According to 
Ward, Mitchell did not discuss any details of her drug use or 
 
10
provide information about any other difficulties Yarbrough 
encountered during his childhood years. 
Ward testified that he would have liked to have had Dorian 
Jenkins’ testimony at the penalty phase proceeding of the trial.  
He did not consider contacting her, however, because Yarbrough 
had not seen her in many years. 
Ward further testified that while it would have been 
possible to present a mitigation case based solely on 
Yarbrough’s difficult childhood, he would have preferred to 
include the testimony of an expert regarding the impact of such 
a childhood on Yarbrough.  Ward conceded, however, that he did 
not ask the circuit court to appoint a new expert to replace Dr. 
Nelson. 
 
In its report, the circuit court found that Ward was unable 
to obtain substantial information from the witnesses he 
interviewed, and that he did not attempt to obtain any 
additional information from other witnesses.  The court 
concluded that Ward received little assistance from Yarbrough, 
his mother, and his grandmother. 
The court found that Mitchell and Jenkins both used alcohol 
and drugs during Yarbrough’s childhood, but that they attempted 
to conceal their drug use from their children.  The court also 
found that although there was neglect and privation in 
Yarbrough’s childhood history, these circumstances did not 
 
11
result from the mother’s willful misconduct toward her children 
but from her inability to care for them during the unspecified 
period that she was addicted to crack cocaine. 
The court noted that on Yarbrough’s return from his one-
year stay in Illinois, Mitchell’s condition had improved.  The 
court also found that although Mitchell occasionally “slipped 
and slid,” she “managed to straighten out her life and avoid her 
prior difficulties with crack cocaine use.”  The court further 
concluded that there was no credible evidence that Yarbrough had 
been the victim of physical or sexual abuse. 
 
In addition, the circuit court found that the testimony of 
both Anthony Riley and Dorian Jenkins was incredible.  The court 
concluded that because Dorian’s testimony described living 
conditions when she was at most five years old and these events 
occurred about 15 years before she testified, her testimony was 
“questionable as it was likely influenced by what others had 
told her rather than her personal recollection.”  The court 
further found that Anthony Riley’s testimony “came across as 
overreaching and exaggerated – almost rehearsed.” 
In its proposed conclusions of law, the circuit court 
recommended that Yarbrough’s habeas corpus petition be dismissed 
because Yarbrough failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced 
by his counsel’s performance.  The court first concluded that 
Yarbrough’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he 
 
12
failed to investigate aggressively Yarbrough’s personal history 
and, thus, could not make a reasonable strategic decision 
regarding whether to present mitigation evidence based on a 
claim that Yarbrough suffered neglect as a child.  The court 
further concluded, however, that the mitigation evidence 
received at the habeas hearing was insufficient to demonstrate a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the second penalty 
phase proceeding would have been different had that evidence 
been considered by the jury. 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Yarbrough argues that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance at the second penalty phase proceeding.  
He asserts that Ward should have conducted a more thorough 
background investigation in order to obtain and present 
mitigation evidence during the penalty phase.  Yarbrough 
contends that Ward failed to contact witnesses who would have 
been able to provide information that Yarbrough was severely 
neglected as a child, and also failed to pose detailed questions 
about his upbringing to those witnesses who were interviewed. 
 
Yarbrough also asserts that the circuit court applied the 
wrong standard of proof at the habeas hearing in reaching its 
conclusion that Yarbrough did not suffer prejudice as a result 
of his counsel’s performance.  He maintains that the court 
erroneously indicated that he was required to prove that the 
 
13
available mitigation evidence outweighed the evidence in 
aggravation of the offense.  In the alternative, Yarbrough 
contends that he met his actual burden of proof, namely, that 
there was a reasonable probability that if the available 
mitigation evidence had been presented to the jury during the 
second penalty phase proceeding, the jury would have reached a 
different result. 
 
In response, the warden argues that Ward provided effective 
assistance of counsel during the second penalty phase 
proceeding.  The warden notes that Ward investigated Yarbrough’s 
personal history and reasonably determined that he would not 
benefit from further investigation.  The warden also contends 
that it was reasonable for Ward to have relied on Yarbrough’s 
indication that he experienced no particular problems during his 
childhood, and that there would be no benefit to be derived from 
contacting his extended family. 
 
The warden also argues that the circuit court correctly 
held that Yarbrough was not prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged 
failure to investigate and present evidence of Yarbrough’s 
personal history.  The warden observes that at the habeas 
hearing, Yarbrough did not present evidence of sexual or 
physical abuse, extreme neglect, or other substantial mitigating 
evidence.  Thus, the warden contends that Yarbrough failed to 
meet his burden of proving that but for his counsel’s alleged 
 
14
ineffective assistance, the jury would have fixed his punishment 
at life imprisonment. 
 
In reviewing the circuit court’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law submitted pursuant to Code § 8.01-654(C), we 
defer to the court’s factual findings and are bound by them 
unless they are plainly wrong or without evidentiary support.  
Lovitt v. Warden, 266 Va. 216, 229, 585 S.E.2d 801, 808 (2003), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2018 (2004); Hedrick v. 
Warden, 264 Va. 486, 496, 570 S.E.2d 840, 847 (2002).  However, 
we review de novo the circuit court’s recommended conclusions of 
law, because they involve mixed questions of law and fact.  
Lovitt, 266 Va. at 229, 585 S.E.2d at 808; Hedrick, 264 Va. at 
496, 570 S.E.2d at 847; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 698 (1984). 
 
We consider the circuit court’s submissions in the context 
of Yarbrough’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which includes 
the right to the effective assistance of counsel.  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 685-86; see Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476 
(2000); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984); 
Lovitt, 266 Va. at 248, 585 S.E.2d at 820; Sheikh v. Buckingham 
Corr. Ctr., 264 Va. 558, 564, 570 S.E.2d 785, 788 (2002).  This 
guarantee entitles a criminal defendant to counsel who is 
reasonably competent and who provides advice that is within the 
range of competence required of attorneys in criminal cases.  
 
15
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 
521 (2003); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986); 
Lovitt, 266 Va. at 249, 585 S.E.2d at 820; Green v. Young, 264 
Va. 604, 609, 571 S.E.2d 135, 138 (2002). 
 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
a petitioner must ordinarily satisfy both parts of the two-part 
test established in Strickland.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; 
Lovitt, 266 Va. at 249, 585 S.E.2d at 820; see Wiggins, 539 U.S. 
at 521; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000).  The 
petitioner must first show that “counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687-88; see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521; Bell v. Cone, 
535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002); Williams, 529 U.S. at 390-91; Lovitt, 
266 Va. at 249, 585 S.E.2d at 820.  In deciding this question, 
the court considering the habeas corpus petition “must indulge a 
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689; see also Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 381; Lovitt, 266 
Va. at 249, 585 S.E.2d at 820. 
To prove that counsel’s conduct fell outside the range of 
reasonable professional assistance, a petitioner must overcome 
the presumption that under the particular circumstances of the 
case, the challenged actions may be considered sound trial 
strategy.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Lovitt, 266 Va. at 249, 
 
16
585 S.E.2d at 820; see Bell, 535 U.S. at 698; Darden v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186 (1986).  However, “strategic 
choices made after less than complete investigation are 
reasonable” only “to the extent that reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitations on investigation.”  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 
521; Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987); Lovitt, 266 Va. 
at 249, 585 S.E.2d at 821.  
 
Addressing the investigation and presentation of mitigation 
evidence, the Supreme Court observed in Wiggins that “Strickland 
does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line 
of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would 
be to assist the defendant at sentencing.  Nor does Strickland 
require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence at 
sentencing in every case.”  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533. 
Instead, in determining whether trial counsel exercised 
reasonable professional judgment regarding the investigation and 
presentation of mitigation evidence, a reviewing court must 
focus on whether the investigation resulting in counsel’s 
decision not to introduce certain mitigation evidence was itself 
reasonable.  Id. at 523; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; Lovitt, 
266 Va. at 250, 585 S.E.2d at 821.  In making this 
determination, “a court must consider not only the quantum of 
evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known 
 
17
evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate 
further.”  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527; see also Lovitt, 266 Va. 
250, 585 S.E.2d at 821. 
If the reviewing court concludes that counsel’s performance 
was deficient under the first part of the Strickland test, a 
petitioner seeking relief must also establish that “there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694; see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534; Williams, 529 U.S. at 
391; Lovitt, 266 Va. at 250, 585 S.E.2d at 821; Hedrick, 264 Va. 
at 496-97, 570 S.E.2d at 847. 
A reviewing court, however, is not required to decide 
whether “counsel’s performance was deficient before examining 
the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the 
alleged deficiencies.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.  As the 
Supreme Court has stated, “If it is easier to dispose of an 
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 
prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should 
be followed.”  Id.; see also Lovitt, 266 Va. at 250, 585 S.E.2d 
at 821; Strickler v. Murray, 249 Va. 120, 128, 452 S.E.2d 648, 
652, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 850 (1995). 
 
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When a prejudice determination involves the failure to 
pursue the presentation of mitigation evidence, the reviewing 
court is required to evaluate the totality of the available 
mitigation evidence, both that adduced at trial and that 
presented at the habeas hearing, along with the evidence in 
aggravation of the offense received at trial.  Wiggins, 539 U.S. 
at 536; Williams, 529 U.S. at 397-98; Lovitt, 266 Va. 250, 585 
S.E.2d at 821. 
 
In the present case, Yarbrough’s contentions address trial 
counsel’s alleged failure to investigate his family background, 
which he asserts contained evidence of neglect and drug abuse by 
his mother, impoverished living conditions, and general abuse 
resulting from his mother’s drug-related activities.  As 
recommended by the Supreme Court in Strickland, we move directly 
to consider the second prong of the two-part test, namely, the 
issue whether Yarbrough suffered prejudice sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome of the second penalty phase 
proceeding as a result of his counsel’s failure to investigate 
and present available mitigation evidence.2  See Strickland, 466 
                     
2 Because we address the issue of prejudice directly, we 
need not consider and we express no opinion on the circuit 
court's finding that Yarbrough received ineffective assistance 
of counsel in the second penalty phase proceeding.  Such 
finding, having not been adopted by this Court, has no effect in 
these proceedings. 
 
19
U.S. at 694; see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391; Lovitt, 266 Va. 
at 252, 585 S.E.2d at 822. 
Initially, we find no merit in Yarbrough’s argument that 
the circuit court applied the wrong standard of proof in making 
its prejudice determination by requiring Yarbrough to show that 
the mitigating evidence outweighed the evidence in aggravation 
of the offense.  Contrary to Yarbrough’s contention, the circuit 
court based its prejudice determination on the Strickland 
standard whether there was a reasonable probability of a 
different result at the second penalty phase proceeding if the 
totality of the available mitigation evidence had been presented 
to the jury. 
In reaching its conclusion that Yarbrough had not satisfied 
the Strickland standard, the circuit court observed that the 
evidence in aggravation “more than outweighs” the available 
mitigating evidence.  This statement did not impose a separate 
evidentiary standard in violation of Strickland but merely 
served to explain the court’s view that the evidence in 
mitigation did not even closely approach the evidence in 
aggravation presented at Yarbrough’s trial. 
Moreover, as we have already observed, we are required to 
make our own prejudice determination without any deference to 
the circuit court’s recommended conclusion of law, because this 
issue is subject to our de novo review.  Lovitt, 266 Va. at 229, 
 
20
585 S.E.2d at 808; Hedrick, 264 Va. at 496, 570 S.E.2d at 847; 
see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698.  Thus, we proceed to consider 
this mixed question of law and fact under the established 
principles stated above. 
In making our prejudice determination, we rely on the 
Wiggins decision in which the Supreme Court, applying 
Strickland, invalidated a habeas petitioner’s death sentence 
based on the prejudicial effect of trial counsel’s failure to 
investigate and present certain mitigation evidence to the jury 
at the petitioner’s sentencing proceeding.  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 
537-38.  There, the petitioner was convicted of capital murder 
in a bifurcated trial.  Id. at 515-16.  Trial counsel decided 
not to present any mitigation evidence during the penalty phase, 
and instead sought to prove that the evidence was insufficient 
to prove that the defendant was the actual perpetrator of the 
murder rather than a lesser participant in the crime.  Id.  
Under Maryland law, this determination is made at the penalty 
phase of a capital murder trial, and a jury may sentence a 
defendant to death only if it determines that the defendant was 
the actual perpetrator of the crime.  See Md. Code Ann., Crim. 
Law § 2-202 (2002). 
 
Before adopting this approach, trial counsel had the 
defendant evaluated by a psychologist, who concluded that the 
defendant “had an IQ of 79, had difficulty coping with demanding 
 
21
situations, and exhibited features of a personality disorder.” 
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523.  However, the psychologist’s report 
did not discuss the defendant’s extensive personal history.  Id.  
Trial counsel also reviewed court and social services records, 
which referred to the defendant’s “misery as a youth” and to the 
fact that he had spent most of his childhood years in foster 
care.  Id.
 
At the habeas hearing in Wiggins, the petitioner presented 
a report from a psychologist, who stated that the petitioner had 
“experienced severe privation and abuse in the first six years 
of his life while in the custody of his alcoholic, absentee 
mother.”  Id. at 534-35.  The psychologist also stated that the 
petitioner “suffered physical torment, sexual molestation, and 
repeated rape during his subsequent years in foster care.”  Id. 
at 535.  Additionally, the evidence showed that the petitioner 
was homeless for a period of time and had “diminished mental 
capacities.”  Id.
 
The Supreme Court held that trial counsel’s decision to 
limit their investigation of mitigation evidence was 
unreasonable, because the information counsel had seen in the 
social services records would have led a reasonably competent 
attorney to conduct a further investigation.  Id. at 534.  The 
Court determined that the petitioner suffered prejudice as a 
result of counsel’s unprofessional errors of judgment because 
 
22
the mitigating evidence that counsel failed to discover and 
present was “powerful.”  Id.
 
Mindful of this analysis, we consider the evidence 
presented at Yarbrough’s habeas hearing and the circuit court’s 
recommended findings of fact.  The evidence of Yarbrough’s 
personal history consisted of testimony from family members and 
friends.  As stated above, the circuit court found the testimony 
of both Dorian Jenkins and Anthony Riley incredible.  Having 
rejected the testimony of these two witnesses, the circuit court 
made its findings of fact based on the remaining evidence 
received at the habeas hearing. 
We conclude that the testimony of Yarbrough’s mother and 
grandmother supports the circuit court’s finding that although 
Yarbrough faced periods of privation and neglect during his 
childhood due to his mother’s drug addiction, at other times she 
provided adequately for him under difficult circumstances.  
Their testimony also supports the court’s finding that 
Yarbrough’s mother did not regularly use drugs after she 
admitted her problem to her mother and took action to correct 
it. 
We also conclude that in addition to the testimony of 
Yarbrough’s mother and grandmother, evidence from Willis Jenkins 
and Yarbrough’s father supports the circuit court’s conclusion 
that Yarbrough was not physically or sexually abused as a child.  
 
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Further, the testimony of Willis Jenkins and Yarbrough’s 
grandmother supports the court’s finding that Yarbrough often 
cared for himself and his sister as a result of his mother’s 
drug addiction.  Thus, we conclude that there is evidence in the 
record to support these recommended findings of fact, and we 
apply them in undertaking our prejudice analysis.  See Lovitt, 
266 Va. at 229, 585 S.E.2d at 808; Hedrick, 264 Va. at 496, 570 
S.E.2d at 847. 
 
In determining prejudice, we “reweigh the evidence in 
aggravation against the totality of available mitigating 
evidence.”  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534; see also Williams, 529 
U.S. at 397-98; Lovitt, 266 Va. at 256, 585 S.E.2d at 824-25.  
The evidence in aggravation at Yarbrough’s second penalty phase 
proceeding included the brutal nature of the attack on Hamby, a 
77-year old man, which appeared to be an attempted decapitation.  
Also in aggravation was the fact that Hamby was alive when all 
ten of the knife wounds were inflicted on him, and that he may 
have lived for 15 minutes as he bled to death.  The evidence 
also showed that Yarbrough continued to cut Hamby’s neck in a 
sawing motion even after Hamby pleaded with Yarbrough to stop 
cutting him. 
 
The mitigation evidence concerning Yarbrough’s childhood 
home life showed that his mother was addicted to crack cocaine 
for an unspecified period of time, and that the family lost its 
 
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home and later faced substandard living conditions at different 
locations.  During the time of her drug addiction, Yarbrough’s 
mother sometimes neglected her children.  Yarbrough frequently 
helped to take care of his sister to compensate for his mother’s 
failure to do so. 
Because of his mother’s drug addiction, Yarbrough was 
required to live with relatives on two occasions, and his  
sister was removed permanently from the mother’s home.  The 
mitigation evidence also showed that Yarbrough had no prior 
record. 
In contrast to the penalty phase evidence in Wiggins, the 
record from Yarbrough’s second penalty phase proceeding shows 
that counsel presented some recent personal background 
information for the jury’s consideration.  That testimony, 
provided by Yarbrough’s former prison counselor, showed that 
Yarbrough had adjusted to prison life in that he had not 
received any adverse disciplinary reports during the time he had 
been incarcerated. 
 
We further observe that there was no mitigation evidence 
presented at the habeas hearing showing that Yarbrough has a 
diminished mental capacity.  This aspect of his case constitutes 
a major distinction from the evidence presented in Wiggins, 
which showed that the petitioner exhibited “borderline 
retardation.”  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 518.  Also missing from the 
 
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present case is the evidence of extreme physical abuse that 
permeated the record in Wiggins. 
These critical differences likewise distinguish Yarbrough’s 
case from Williams.  There, the Supreme Court concluded that a 
defendant had suffered prejudice resulting from his counsel’s 
failure to present substantial mitigation evidence at the 
penalty phase of his capital murder trial.  Williams, 529 U.S. 
at 396-98.  The evidence presented at the habeas hearing in that 
case showed that the petitioner was “borderline mentally 
retarded” and had suffered extreme abuse and neglect as a child.  
Id. at 370.  That evidence included documents that “dramatically 
described mistreatment, abuse, and neglect during his early 
childhood, as well as testimony that he . . . had suffered 
repeated head injuries, and might have mental impairments 
organic in origin.”  Id.
 
With these distinctions in mind, and reviewing the evidence 
in mitigation and aggravation of the offense in accordance with 
the holding of Wiggins, we conclude that Yarbrough has failed to 
demonstrate that his defense was prejudiced by trial counsel’s 
failure to investigate and present the available mitigation 
evidence introduced at the habeas hearing.  We hold that the 
record does not demonstrate that, but for his trial counsel’s 
alleged failures, there is a reasonable probability that the 
result of the second penalty phase proceeding would have been 
 
26
different.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Wiggins, 
539 U.S. at 534; Williams, 529 U.S. at 391; Lovitt, 266 Va. at 
257, 585 S.E.2d at 825.  In short, the record before us does not 
undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceedings.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534; 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 391; Lovitt, 266 Va. at 257, 585 S.E.2d at 
825. 
 
For these reasons, we will dismiss the petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus. 
Petition dismissed. 
 
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