Case Title: State v. Gleason

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87-384

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1989-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
   as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
   Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
   Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
   that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
                                   No. 87-384
 
 
   State of Vermont                             Supreme Court
 
                                                On Appeal from
        v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                                Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit
 
   Myron Gleason                                June Term, 1989
 
 
 
   Dean Pineles, J.
 
   Robert M. Butterfield, Caledonia County Deputy State's Attorney,
     St. Johnsbury, for plaintiff-appellee
 
   Walter M. Morris, Jr., Defender General, and Henry Hinton, Appellate
     Defender, Montpelier, and Robert Appel, Public Defender, St. Johnsbury,
     for defendant-appellant
 
 
   PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Dooley and Morse, JJ., and Keyser, J. (Ret.),
             Specially Assigned
 
 
        ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant appeals from the order of the district court
   revoking his probation and imposing an underlying sentence following his
   conviction for the misdemeanor offense of lewdness.  13 V.S.A. { 2632(a)(8).
   We affirm.
        The trial court accepted defendant's plea of nolo contendere, issued a
   suspended sentence of one to three months, and placed defendant on pro-
   bation.  In addition to the standard conditions, the court imposed the
   special condition, No. 21, that defendant "continue with family counseling
   at Northeast Kingdom Mental Health."  Approximately seven months after the
   imposition of conditions, defendant's probation officer filed a complaint
   alleging that defendant had violated two of the standard conditions (FN1)
   and the special condition of his probation.  At the probation violation
   hearing, the probation officer testified that, due in part to defendant's 
   1973 felony sexual offense conviction, she referred defendant to a sexual 
   offender's treatment program.  The probation officer stated that defendant 
   had refused to discuss any sex-related issues or the sexual offense
   convictions that had brought him before the court.
        Roger Putnam, a licensed psychologist with Northeast Kingdom Mental
   Health (NEKMH), had been counseling defendant for over two years.  Mr.
   Putnam testified that defendant declined to discuss his sexuality or the
   history of that sexuality.  The psychologist stated that defendant had "not
   addressed the issue in any way with me in a meaningful way and this pattern
   of massive denial concerns me for his safe[ty] and for the community."  In
   conclusion, Mr. Putnam opined that defendant presented a high risk of re-
   peating some kind of sexually deviant behavior if he did not receive treat-
   ment for his "sexual confusion."
        The court found that defendant had violated conditions 8 and 21.  To
   allow defendant to continue probation, the court modified condition 21
   (21(a)) to require defendant to "discuss issues surrounding sexual behavior
   and sexual offenses with Roger Putnam at NEKMH twice per month."  The modi-
   fication of condition 21 followed defendant's expression that he wished to
   continue counseling with Mr. Putnam and was willing to discuss all the
   issues surrounding the offenses for which he had been convicted.  Defendant
   then signed the modified probation order indicating that he understood it
   and would abide by the modified conditions.
        Approximately five months later, defendant's probation officer filed a
   second probation violation complaint alleging that defendant had violated
   conditions 8 and 21(a).  At the violation hearing on this complaint, the
   psychologist testified once again.  Mr. Putnam explained that defendant
   faithfully met his appointments and was pleasant.  However, "when the agenda
   focused on any sexual matters or issues, there was a definite change in
   attitude and cooperation in terms of discussing that particular issue."
   While defendant elaborated to some extent on his childhood history, his
   sexual knowledge, and his adolescent sexual experiences, he adamantly
   refused to engage in any meaningful dialogue regarding his sexual offense
   convictions.  Defendant also "readily dismissed" Mr. Putnam's suggestion
   that he engage in group therapy or group therapeutic work.  Mr. Putnam
   concluded that because of this "wall of denial," defendant had failed to
   achieve any insight or self-understanding regarding his sexual behavior and
   the two offenses in particular.  The psychologist testified that, as a
   result, he discontinued defendant's therapy sessions in the belief that
   additional counseling would not prove helpful.  Defendant's probation
   officer also testified that defendant declined to discuss his sexual conduct
   or treatment issues.
        The court concluded that defendant had steadfastly refused to discuss
   the issues surrounding his two sexual offense convictions and had therefore
   violated 21(a), the modified condition of probation.  The court revoked
   defendant's probation and this appeal followed.
                                       I.
        Defendant argues that special condition 21(a) is invalid on its face
   and therefore could not serve as a basis for the trial court's revocation of
   defendant's probation.  Specifically, defendant contends that the modified
   condition violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination be-
   cause it compelled him to discuss issues surrounding the two sexual offenses
   or face probation revocation and, consequently, incarceration.  Any admis-
   sions to the therapist could subsequently be revealed to the probation
   officer.  Therefore, defendant maintains that statements of the kind
   required could only be ordered with a grant of immunity because:  (1) any
   information disclosed would be available to the State for use against him in
   any future revocation proceeding; and (2) the modified condition required
   him to confess to the instant offense, to which he never admitted by virtue
   of his nolo contendere plea, and to any unknown and uncharged acts of sexual
   deviancy.
         At the outset we note that defendant raised none of these objections
   before the trial court.  The policy that requires parties to bring to the
   attention of the trial court errors capable of correction applies in the
   context of probation hearings. (FN2) See State v. Cooper, 304 N.C. 180, 183,