Case Title: State v. Friedlander

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017AP001337-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2019-03-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2019 WI 22 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1337-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Zachary S. Friedlander, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 382 Wis. 2d 271,915 N.W.2d 730 
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 12, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 11, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson 
 
JUDGE: 
David Wambach 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissents (opinion filed).  
A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:     
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Jacob J. Wittwer, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief is Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Jacob J. Wittwer. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Mark R. Thompson, assistant state public defender, with whom on 
the brief is Jeremy A. Newman, assistant state public defender. 
There was an oral argument by Mark R. Thompson.  
 
 
 
2019 WI 22
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP1337-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF326) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Zachary S. Friedlander, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 12, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished, per curiam decision of the court of appeals, State 
v. Zachary S. Friedlander, No. 2017AP1337-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2018) (per curiam), reversing the 
Jefferson County circuit court's order.  The circuit court order 
denied Zachary S. Friedlander ("Friedlander") sentence credit 
for time that he spent at liberty after being mistakenly 
released from prison without being transferred, pursuant to a 
detainer, to serve remaining conditional jail time.1  The court 
                                                 
1 The Honorable David J. Wambach presided. 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
2 
 
of appeals remanded this case to the circuit court with 
directions to amend Friedlander's judgment of conviction to 
reflect the sentence credit that Friedlander requested.  We 
reverse the court of appeals. 
¶2 
This court is presented with two issues.  First, we 
must determine the meaning of "in custody" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155 (2015–16).2  In doing so, we consider whether the court 
of appeals' decisions in State v. Riske, 152 Wis. 2d 260, 448 
N.W.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1989), and State v. Dentici, 2002 WI App 
77, 251 Wis. 2d 436, 643 N.W.2d 180, are in harmony with this 
court's decision in State v. Magnuson, 2000 WI 19, 233 
Wis. 2d 40, 606 N.W.2d 536.  We conclude that for the purpose of 
receiving sentence credit under § 973.155, a defendant is "in 
custody" whenever the defendant is subject to an escape charge 
under Wis. Stat. § 946.42, or another statute which expressly 
provides for an escape charge, as this court held in Magnuson.  
In doing so, we overrule the court of appeals' decisions in 
Riske and Dentici. 
¶3 
Second, we must determine whether Friedlander is 
entitled to sentence credit for time he spent at liberty after 
being mistakenly released from prison without being transferred 
to serve his remaining conditional jail time.  We conclude that 
Friedlander 
is 
not 
entitled 
to 
sentence 
credit 
because 
Friedlander, who was at liberty, could not have been subject to 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015–16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
3 
 
conviction for escape under Wis. Stat. § 946.42.  Thus, we 
reverse the court of appeals. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
On April 15, 2016, Friedlander pled no contest to one 
count of felony bail jumping according to the terms of a plea 
agreement.  According to the plea agreement, the parties jointly 
recommended 
a 
withheld 
sentence, 
instead 
placing 
him 
on 
probation for three years, with Friedlander serving eight 
months' jail time as a condition of his probation, to run 
concurrent with Friedlander's then-existing prison sentence.3  
Consequently, most of the eight months of conditional time would 
be served while he was in prison.  However, at the time of 
sentencing, a detainer4 was placed on Friedlander so that if 
released from prison, he would be transferred to jail to serve 
the remainder of his conditional time.  
¶5 
The same day that Friedlander pled no contest, the 
circuit court adopted the parties' joint recommendation and 
ordered that the conditional jail time would start immediately 
                                                 
3 At the time, Friedlander was already serving a prison 
sentence at the Oshkosh Correctional Institution for a prior 
conviction for possession with intent to manufacture or deliver 
heroin——a class F felony under Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(d)1.  See 
State v. Friedlander, Jefferson County case number 2014CF212. 
4 "Detainer" is not defined by statute, but this court has 
defined 
"detainer" 
as 
"a 
'notification 
filed 
with 
the 
institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising 
that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another 
jurisdiction.'"  State v. Eesley, 225 Wis. 2d 248, 257–58, 591 
N.W.2d 846 (1999) (citing United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 
359 (1978)). 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
4 
 
and run concurrently with the prison sentence Friedlander was 
already serving for the unrelated offense.  The circuit court 
specified on the record that once Friedlander's prison sentence 
had been completed, he would still be required to serve the 
remainder of his conditional jail time.  Additionally, the 
circuit court noted that because the jail time was a condition 
of probation, it was not a sentence.  As a result, the circuit 
court stated that there was a question as to where the 
Department of Corrections ("DOC") would have Friedlander serve 
the remainder of his conditional jail time. 
¶6 
On September 27, 2016, Friedlander finished serving 
his prison sentence on the unrelated drug offense but still had 
75 days of his conditional time to serve on the offense now 
before this court.  However, instead of being transported 
according to the detainer to serve his remaining conditional 
time in jail, he was mistakenly released by the authorities from 
the Oshkosh Correctional Institution.  Officials at the Oshkosh 
Correctional Institution failed to notify the Jefferson County 
jail of Friedlander's release and did not arrange to transfer 
Friedlander to the Jefferson County jail.   
¶7 
Friedlander met with his probation agent immediately 
after being released.  The probation agent did not tell 
Friedlander that he needed to report to jail.  Friedlander met 
with his probation agent again and was not told anything about 
reporting to jail.  Friedlander's probation agent did not 
contact the circuit court to request clarification regarding his 
conditional jail time. 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
5 
 
¶8 
On November 11, 2016, the Jefferson County sheriff's 
office learned from the county's child support agency that 
Friedlander had been released from prison.  That same day the 
sheriff's 
office 
contacted 
Friedlander's 
probation 
agent.  
Friedlander's probation agent then spoke with Friedlander, 
telling him to contact Captain Duane Scott ("Captain Scott") in 
the sheriff's office.  Friedlander did so and reported to 
Captain Scott that a social worker at the Oshkosh Correctional 
Institution had told him his conditional jail time was completed 
prior to his release from prison.  Captain Scott then contacted 
a DOC staff member who said that Friedlander's probation agent 
should have taken him to the Jefferson County jail on 
September 27, 2016.  On November 23, 2016, Captain Scott wrote 
the circuit court summarizing these recent events and asking the 
circuit court whether Friedlander should report to serve his 
conditional time and, if so, what should be done regarding the 
days he was not in jail. 
¶9 
On December 1, 2016, the circuit court held a hearing 
to determine how to proceed regarding Friedlander's unserved 
portion of his conditional jail time.  The circuit court found 
that Friedlander had served 165 days of the eight months, or 240 
days, of conditional jail time.  The circuit court determined 
that Friedlander had 75 days of conditional jail time remaining 
that he needed to serve.  The circuit court then considered 
whether Friedlander was entitled to sentence credit for the 65 
days that elapsed between Friedlander's release on September 27, 
2016, and the date of the hearing.  If granted sentence credit 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
6 
 
for all 65 days between September 27, 2016, and December 1, 
2016, Friedlander would have only 10 days of conditional jail 
time remaining under the terms of his probation. 
¶10 Friedlander argued that he should be entitled to 
sentence credit for the 65 days he was not in jail following his 
release from the Oshkosh Correctional Institution.  Citing Riske 
and Dentici, Friedlander claimed that he should receive a 65-day 
sentence credit because he was at liberty through no fault of 
his own, leaving 10 days remaining on Friedlander's conditional 
jail term.  The State made no argument regarding Friedlander's 
claim for a 65-day sentence credit. 
¶11 After hearing testimony from a deputy at the Jefferson 
County jail and Friedlander, the circuit court concluded that 
Friedlander was not entitled to a 65-day sentence credit for the 
time he was not in jail following his release from prison on 
September 27, 2016.  The circuit court distinguished Riske and 
Dentici, stating that in those cases the defendants reported to 
jail and were turned away due to overcrowding.  The circuit 
court concluded that Friedlander should have reported to jail 
like the defendants in Riske and Dentici, or at least sought 
clarification from the circuit court.  Since Friedlander did 
neither the circuit court concluded that under Riske and Dentici 
Friedlander was not entitled to sentence credit for any of the 
time he was not in jail following his release from prison.  The 
circuit court did not reference Magnuson in its decision. 
¶12 As a result, the circuit court ordered Friedlander to 
begin serving the remainder of his conditional jail time.  On 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
7 
 
December 9, 2016, Friedlander filed a motion for stay of his 
confinement pending appellate review of the circuit court's 
sentence credit determination.  On December 12, 2016, the 
circuit court denied Friedlander's motion to stay.  Friedlander 
then filed a petition for leave to appeal, which the court of 
appeals denied on January 10, 2017. 
¶13 On July 6, 2017, Friedlander filed a notice of appeal.  
Though he conceded that defendants normally must be "in custody" 
to receive sentence credit under Wis. Stat. § 973.155, he argued 
that under Riske and Dentici, time spent at liberty satisfies 
the "in custody" requirement because Friedlander was released 
from custody due to an administrative error and thus through no 
fault of his own.  The State argued that Friedlander was not "in 
custody" under § 973.155 and pursuant to this court's decision 
in Magnuson.  The State further asserted that Riske and Dentici 
did not apply.  Alternatively, the State argued that Friedlander 
was not, in fact, at liberty through no fault of his own, as 
Friedlander knew he had time to serve but did not report to jail 
nor seek clarification regarding his conditional jail time. 
¶14 On April 12, 2018, the court of appeals issued an 
unpublished, per curiam opinion.  Friedlander, No. 2017AP1337-
CR.  The court of appeals agreed with Friedlander and reversed 
the circuit court, remanding the matter with directions to amend 
Friedlander's judgment of conviction to reflect an additional 65 
days of sentence credit in the event Friedlander's probation was 
revoked and his sentence was imposed.  Id., ¶1.  The court of 
appeals relied on Riske and Dentici, not Magnuson, and reasoned 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
8 
 
that "Friedlander was at liberty between the date that he was 
released from prison and the date he was remanded to jail, not 
through any fault of his own but through the fault of government 
officials."  Id., ¶19.  Therefore, the court of appeals 
concluded that Friedlander was entitled to 65 days of sentence 
credit.  Id. 
¶15 Addressing the State's arguments, the court of appeals 
first rejected the State's attempts to distinguish Riske and 
Dentici, holding that it would be unfair to Friedlander to 
require him to serve the 65 days since he was at liberty due to 
the government's mistake.  Id., ¶¶21–24.  Second, the court of 
appeals asserted that the State selectively quoted Magnuson to 
suggest that the escape statute, Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a), is 
the exclusive means to determine whether a defendant is in 
custody.  Id., ¶¶25–26.  The court of appeals also distinguished 
Magnuson because there was no fault-related issue raised in 
Magnuson.  Id., ¶27.  Thus, the court of appeals relied on its 
decisions in Riske and Dentici, resolving that they existed in 
harmony with Magnuson, to conclude that Friedlander was entitled 
to 65 days of sentence credit.  See id., ¶¶26–28. 
¶16 On May 14, 2018, the State filed a petition for review 
in this court.  On July 10, 2018, we granted the petition. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 This case requires the interpretation of the sentence 
credit statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.155, to determine the meaning 
of 
"in 
custody" 
for 
sentence 
credit 
purposes. 
 
"The 
interpretation and application of a statute presents questions 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
9 
 
of law that this court reviews de novo while benefitting from 
the analyses of the court of appeals and circuit court."  State 
v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶21, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346 
(citing State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶37, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 
N.W.2d 238).  Therefore, because there are no disputed facts in 
this case, we review de novo when a defendant is "in custody" 
within the context of a sentence credit determination. 
¶18 "[S]tare decisis concerns are paramount where a court 
has 
authoritatively 
interpreted 
a 
statute 
because 
the 
legislature 
remains 
free 
to 
alter 
its 
construction."  
Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶45, 281 
Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417 (citing Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. 
Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991)).  "When a party asks this 
court to overturn a prior interpretation of a statute, it is his 
'burden . . . to show not only that [the decision] was mistaken 
but also that it was objectively wrong, so that the court has a 
compelling reason to overrule it.'"  Id. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Statutory Interpretation 
¶19 Wisconsin's statutes reflect the legislature's policy 
determination with respect to sentence credit determinations.  
As a result, we begin our analysis with the language of the 
relevant statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  See State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "[T]he purpose of statutory 
interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it 
may be given its full, proper, and intended effect."  Id., ¶44.  
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
10 
 
If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
inquiry and give the language its "common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  Id., ¶45.  
¶20 Context and structure of a statute are important to 
the meaning of the statute.  Id., ¶46.  "Therefore, statutory 
language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not 
in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language 
of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id.  Moreover, the 
"[s]tatutory language is read where possible to give reasonable 
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Id.  "A 
statute's purpose or scope may be readily apparent from its 
plain language or its relationship to surrounding or closely-
related statutes——that is, from its context or the structure of 
the statute as a coherent whole."  Id., ¶49. 
¶21 "If this process of analysis yields a plain, clear 
statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the statute 
is applied according to this ascertainment of its meaning."  
Id., ¶46.  If statutory language is unambiguous, we do not need 
to consult extrinsic sources of interpretation.  Id.  "Statutory 
interpretation involves the ascertainment of meaning, not a 
search for ambiguity."  Id., ¶47.   
¶22 As this court discussed in Magnuson, Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155 governs when a defendant is entitled to receive 
sentence credit.  Magnuson, 233 Wis. 2d 40, ¶12.  Under Wis. 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
11 
 
Stat. § 973.155, "[a] convicted offender shall be given credit 
toward the service of his or her sentence for all days spent in 
custody in connection with the course of conduct for which 
sentence was imposed."  § 973.155(1)(a).  The statute defines 
"days spent in custody" as "confinement related to an offense 
for which the offender is ultimately sentenced, or for any other 
sentence arising out of the same course of conduct."  Id.  
Additionally, under § 973.155(1)(a), confinement occurs:  (1) 
"[w]hile the offender is awaiting trial"; (2) "[w]hile the 
offender is being tried"; and (3) "[w]hile the offender is 
awaiting 
imposition 
of 
sentence 
after 
trial."  
§ 973.155(1)(a)1.-3.  Under § 973.155(1)(b),  
[t]he categories in par. (a) . . . include custody of 
the convicted offender which is in whole or in part 
the result of a probation, extended supervision or 
parole . . . placed upon the person for the same 
course of conduct as that resulting in the new 
conviction. 
¶23 Thus the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 973.155 
reflects the legislative determination that for sentence credit 
to be awarded:  (1) the defendant must show that the defendant 
was "in custody"; and (2) the defendant must show that "the 
custody 'was in connection with the course of conduct for which 
the sentence was imposed.'"  Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a); see 
also State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 107, ¶31, 304 Wis. 2d 318, 735 
N.W.2d 505 (quoting State v. Gavigan, 122 Wis. 2d 389, 391, 362 
N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1984)).  Notably, the term "in custody" is 
not defined anywhere in the statutes.  The parties dispute only 
whether Friedlander was actually "in custody" for the purposes 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
12 
 
of 
the 
sentence 
credit 
between 
September 
27, 
2016, 
and 
December 1, 2016.  They do not debate whether, if Friedlander 
was "in custody," it was in connection with the course of 
conduct for which any sentence was imposed.  We therefore turn 
to our prior case law to determine the meaning of "in custody" 
for sentence credit purposes.  If Friedlander was not "in 
custody" he is not statutorily due sentence credit. 
B.  Riske, Magnuson, and Dentici 
¶24 While the parties agree that Wis. Stat. § 973.155 
controls, they disagree as to when a defendant is "in custody" 
such that the defendant should receive sentence credit.  The 
State argues that this court's holding in Magnuson should 
control, meaning that a defendant is "in custody" for sentence 
credit purposes whenever the defendant would be subject to an 
escape charge.  The State thus urges this court to overrule the 
court of appeals' decisions in Riske and Dentici.  Friedlander 
claims 
that 
Riske, 
Dentici, 
and 
Magnuson 
all 
coexist 
harmoniously 
such 
that 
Riske 
and 
Dentici 
should 
not 
be 
overruled.  Accordingly, Friedlander claims that a defendant is 
entitled to sentence credit because the defendant "could have 
been charged with escape had they intentionally escaped from 
their time spent at liberty from a court's confinement order 
through no fault of their own."  We agree with the State, and in 
the interest of providing clarity, overrule Riske, decided 
before, and Dentici, decided after, Magnuson. 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
13 
 
1.  Riske 
¶25 In Riske, the court of appeals concluded that the 
defendant 
was 
entitled 
to 
sentence 
credit 
without 
even 
considering the sentence credit statute.  There, the defendant 
was sentenced on April 6, 1987, to one year in jail after 
pleading no contest to sexual intercourse with a minor.  Riske, 
152 Wis. 2d at 262.  The defendant surrendered to the county 
jail the same day he was sentenced, but the jailer told the 
defendant that the jail was full.  Id.  Therefore, the jailer 
told the defendant to return on May 1, 1987.  Id.  The defendant 
failed to report back to the county jail on May 1, 1987, and 
remained at large until April 14, 1988, when the circuit court 
issued an execution for the defendant's arrest.  Id.  While the 
defendant remained at large, he lived and worked in the 
community, and made no attempt to hide.  Id. 
¶26 Following his arrest in 1988, the circuit court 
concluded that the defendant would have begun serving his 
sentence on May 1, 1987, but that the defendant did not begin 
serving his sentence on that date of his own doing.  Id.  
Therefore, the circuit court held that the defendant was not 
entitled to sentence credit for the time he was not in jail on 
and after May 1, 1987.  See id. 
¶27 The defendant appealed, claiming that his one-year 
sentence had completely run at the time of his 1988 arrest and 
that he should therefore be entitled to sentence credit.  Id. at 
263.  The State conceded that the defendant should be given 
sentence credit for the time he was out of jail between April 6 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
14 
 
and May 1, 1987, as the defendant reported to the jail and was 
turned away because the jail was full.5  Id.  However, the State 
argued that the defendant "escaped" by failing to return to the 
county jail on May 1, 1987.  Id. at 265.  Citing Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.15(7) (1987-88), the State asserted that the defendant was 
not entitled to sentence credit for any time the defendant was 
at large on or after May 1, 1987.6  Id. 
¶28 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court in 
part and remanded with directions to give the defendant sentence 
credit for the time he was at large between April 6 and May 1, 
1987.  Id.  Relying on a decision issued by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit nearly 60 years prior, 
the court of appeals reasoned that "[s]entences are continuous" 
in nature, unless they are "interrupted by escape, violation of 
parole, or some fault of the prisoner."  Id. at 264.  The court 
of appeals then stated, "'[W]here a prisoner is discharged from 
a penal institution, without any contributing fault on his part, 
and 
without 
violation 
of 
conditions 
of 
parole, . . . his 
sentence continues to run while he is at liberty.'"  Id. 
(quoting White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930)).  
                                                 
5 The State now asserts that its concession in State v. 
Riske, 152 Wis. 2d 260, 448 N.W.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1989), was made 
in error. 
6 The 2015–16 version of Wis. Stat. § 973.15(7), which is 
identical to the 1987–88 version the court of appeals cited in 
Riske, states, "If a convicted offender escapes, the time during 
which he or she is unlawfully at large after escape shall not be 
computed as service of the sentence." 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
15 
 
As additional support, the court of appeals noted a decision 
issued by this court in 1884, along with an Attorney General 
Opinion issued in 1925.  Id. at 264–65 (citing In re Crow: 
Habeas Corpus, 60 Wis. 349, 370, 19 N.W. 713 (1884); 14 Op. 
Att'y Gen. 512 (1925)).  The court of appeals then refused to 
determine whether the defendant "escaped," instead relying on 
what it described as the "broader principle" codified by Wis. 
Stat. § 973.15(7):  "that a person's sentence for a crime will 
be credited for the time he was at liberty through no fault of 
the person."  Riske, 152 Wis. 2d at 265.  At no point did the 
court of appeals reference or discuss Wis. Stat. § 973.155. 
2.  Magnuson 
¶29 This court was thereafter faced with a sentence credit 
issue in Magnuson.  There, the defendant was charged with eight 
counts of securities fraud.  Magnuson, 233 Wis. 2d 40, ¶2.  The 
circuit court set bail at $12,000 per count for a total of 
$96,000.  Id.  The defendant was unable to post bail and 
remained in jail.  Id.  As trial preparation ensued, the 
defendant moved for bail modification and reduction.  Id., ¶3.  
The circuit court granted the motion and modified bail to a 
$10,000 signature bond, requiring that others co-sign the bond.  
Id., ¶4.  As part of the bond, the circuit court required the 
defendant to reside with one of the co-signers of the bond.  Id.  
Additionally, the circuit court imposed a nightly curfew on the 
defendant, confining the defendant to his chosen co-signer's 
residence between 7:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.  Id., ¶5.  The circuit 
court subsequently modified the bond to slightly reduce the 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
16 
 
daily 
period 
of 
confinement 
to 
allow 
the 
defendant 
to 
participate in substance abuse counseling and attend church 
activities.  Id.  The defendant was formally supervised by a 
bail monitoring program and was forced to wear an electronic 
monitoring bracelet.  Id., ¶6.  Further, the defendant had to 
contact bail monitoring authorities each morning, submit to 
urine testing, and have weekly face-to-face contact with 
authorities.  Id., ¶7. 
¶30 The defendant was released on bond on June 12, 1996, 
and later pled no contest to three counts of securities fraud.  
Id., ¶8.  The defendant remained under his chosen co-signer's 
care until December 11, 1996, when his co-signer reported to 
authorities that he disapproved of the defendant's conduct.  Id.  
The defendant was returned to jail the following day.  Id. 
¶31 The circuit court sentenced the defendant to eight 
years of imprisonment followed by seven years of probation and 
granted 229 days of sentence credit for time the defendant spent 
in jail.  Id., ¶9.  The defendant then filed a postconviction 
motion seeking sentence credit for the 183 days he stayed with 
his bond co-signer as a condition of his bond.  Id.  The circuit 
court denied the defendant's motion, concluding that his 
detention at his co-signer's home with electronic monitoring as 
a condition of bond was not "custody" for sentence credit 
purposes.  Id. 
¶32 The defendant appealed the denial of sentence credit.  
Id., ¶10.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit court, 
holding that the defendant was entitled to sentence credit for 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
17 
 
the time he was under home detention with electronic monitoring.  
Id., ¶10.  In reaching its holding, the court of appeals applied 
a test set forth in State v. Collett, 207 Wis. 2d 319, 558 
N.W.2d 642 (Ct. App. 1996), where the court of appeals adopted a 
case-by-case analysis for determining whether a defendant was in 
custody for sentence credit purposes.  Magnuson, 233 Wis. 2d 40, 
¶10.  Under the Collett test, the court of appeals concluded 
that the bond conditions were restrictive enough such that they 
were 
the 
"functional 
equivalent 
of 
confinement." 
 
Id.  
Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that the defendant was 
entitled to sentence credit for the time he was required to stay 
at his co-signer's residence.  See id. 
¶33 Citing the need for judicial economy and consistency, 
this court reversed the court of appeals, establishing a 
"bright-line" rule and abandoning the Collett test.  See id., 
¶¶10, 22.  Unlike the court of appeals in Riske, this court 
began with Wis. Stat. § 973.155, noting that the plain language 
of the statute did not expressly define custody.  Magnuson, 233 
Wis. 2d 40, ¶13.  However, we noted that "numerous cases have 
interpreted the sentence credit statute and concluded that the 
plain meaning of custody under the statute corresponds to the 
definition of custody contained in the escape statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 946.42."  Id.  Therefore, we held "that for sentence 
credit 
purposes 
an 
offender's 
status 
constitutes 
custody 
whenever the offender is subject to an escape charge for leaving 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
18 
 
that 
status," 
referencing 
§ 946.42(1)(a).7 
 
Id., 
¶¶25–26.  
However, this court did not restrict the inquiry to the 
                                                 
7 The 2015–16 version of Wis. Stat. § 946.42, which is 
substantially similar to the version this court considered in 
State v. Magnuson, 2000 WI 19, 233 Wis. 2d 40, 606 N.W.2d 536, 
states that "custody" includes without limitation all of the 
following: 
a.  Actual custody of an institution, including a 
juvenile 
correctional 
facility, 
as 
defined 
in 
s. 938.02(10p), a secured residential care center for 
children and youth, as defined in s. 938.02(15g), a 
juvenile 
detention 
facility, 
as 
defined 
in 
s. 938.02(10r), a Type 2 residential care center for 
children and youth, as defined in s. 938.02(19r), a 
facility used for the detention of persons detained 
under 
s. 980.04(1), 
a 
facility 
specified 
in 
s. 980.065, or a juvenile portion of a county jail. 
b.  Actual 
custody 
of 
a 
peace 
officer 
or 
institution guard. 
bm.  Actual 
custody 
or 
authorized 
physical 
control of a correctional officer. 
c.  Actual custody or authorized physical control 
of a probationer, parolee, or person on extended 
supervision by the department of corrections. 
e.  Constructive custody of persons placed on 
supervised release under ch. 980. 
f.  Constructive 
custody 
of 
prisoners 
and 
juveniles subject to an order under s. 938.183, 
938.34(4d), (4h), or (4m), or 938.357(4) or (5)(e) 
temporarily outside the institution whether for the 
purpose of work, school, medical care, a leave granted 
under s. 303.068, a temporary leave or furlough 
granted to a juvenile, or otherwise. 
g.  Custody of the sheriff of the county to which 
the prisoner was transferred after conviction. 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
19 
 
definition of "custody" contained in § 946.42(1)(a), emphasizing 
the need to read statutes in pari materia and referring to three 
statutes in which the legislature "classified certain situations 
as restrictive and custodial by attaching escape charges for an 
unauthorized departure from those situations."8  Id. 
¶34 Applying its new bright-line rule in Magnuson, this 
court held that the defendant was not entitled to sentence 
credit for the time he was on electronically-monitored home 
detention as a condition of his bond release.  Id., ¶32.  
Specifically, we concluded that the release conditions of the 
defendant's bond did not subject the defendant to an escape 
charge under any pertinent statute.  Id.  This court further 
concluded that the defendant was not part of a program that 
included 
statutorily-proscribed 
escape 
charges 
for 
certain 
violations.  Id., ¶¶33–36.  Additionally, this court stated that 
simply having bond conditions similar to requirements under a 
confinement or treatment program did not render the defendant a 
participant 
within 
any 
such 
program 
for 
sentence 
credit 
                                                                                                                                                             
h.  Custody of a person subject to a confinement 
order under s. 973.09(4). 
§ 946.42(1)(a)1. 
8 Specifically, this court referenced Wis. Stat. §§ 301.046 
("Community 
residential 
confinement."), 
301.048 
("Intensive 
sanctions program."), and 302.425 ("Home detention programs.").  
Magnuson, 233 Wis. 2d 40, ¶¶28–30.  All three statutes expressly 
provide that unauthorized flight from or failure to comply with 
the programs constitutes an escape.  See id. 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
20 
 
purposes, expressing its aversion for "a rule for determining 
custody as amorphous as the Collett test."  Id., ¶35. 
¶35 This court then considered whether the defendant was 
"in custody" under the escape statute, Wis. Stat. § 946.42.  
Magnuson, 233 Wis. 2d 40, ¶¶39–46.  In analyzing § 946.42(1)(a), 
this court first concluded that the defendant was not in actual 
custody under § 946.42(1)(a), as he was not in the custody of an 
institution, secured correctional facility, secure detention 
facility, a peace officer, or an institutional guard.  Id., ¶40.  
Next, this court concluded that the defendant was not under 
constructive custody within the meaning of § 946.42(1)(a).  Id., 
¶41.  This court noted that constructive custody included 
"temporary leave for the purpose of work, school, medical care, 
or 
otherwise," 
and 
concluded 
that 
the 
defendant's 
bond 
conditions did not equate to "a temporary release for any of the 
specified purposes."  Id. 
¶36 Therefore, since the defendant would have been subject 
to a bail-jumping charge only for violating the conditions of 
his bond, this court concluded that he was not in danger of 
being charged with escape and thus was not eligible to receive 
sentence credit for the time he spent under home detention.  
Id., ¶46.  Notably, this court did not address Riske nor did it 
espouse any lack-of-fault requirement like the court of appeals 
in Riske.  This court, however, did not specifically overrule 
Riske. 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
21 
 
3.  Dentici 
¶37 Two years after this court's decision in Magnuson, the 
court of appeals was again faced with a sentence credit issue in 
Dentici.  There, on February 3, 1997, the defendant pled guilty 
to operating a vehicle without the owner's consent and was 
placed on probation.  Dentici, 251 Wis. 2d 436, ¶2.  As a 
condition of probation, the circuit court ordered the defendant 
to serve 60 days in jail.  Id.  When the defendant reported to 
the jail the same day he was sentenced, he was informed that the 
jail was overcrowded and that he should return on February 28, 
1997.  Id.  The defendant returned on February 28, 1997, and was 
released on May 13, 1997.  Id.  On February 5, 1998, the 
defendant's probation was revoked, and the defendant was 
sentenced to two years of imprisonment.  Id., ¶3.  The defendant 
filed a series of motions with the circuit court in part seeking 
sentence credit for the 25 days he was not in jail between 
February 3 and February 28, 1997, because of overcrowding.  Id.  
The circuit court denied the defendant's motion for the 25 days 
of sentence credit, and the defendant appealed.  Id. 
¶38 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court, 
concluding that the defendant was entitled to sentence credit 
for the 25 days elapsing between February 3 and February 28, 
1997.  Id., ¶13.  Specifically, the court of appeals concluded 
that:  (1) the definition of "custody" is not limited to the 
definition provided in Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a) (1999-2000); 
(2) under Riske and Wis. Stat. § 973.15(7), a defendant is in 
custody while at liberty through no fault of his or her own due 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
22 
 
to overcrowding; and (3) the defendant would have been subject 
to an escape charge for violating any of the conditions of his 
constructive custody.  Dentici, 251 Wis. 2d 436, ¶13.  In 
reaching its holding, the court of appeals compared the 
defendant's situation to that of the defendant in State v. 
Sevelin, 204 Wis. 2d 127, 554 N.W.2d 521 (Ct. App. 1996).9  
Dentici, 251 Wis. 2d 436, ¶11.  The court of appeals concluded 
that like Sevelin, the Dentici "was granted leave for a 
temporary period of time, [25] days, and was required to return 
on a specified date."  Id.  Additionally, the court of appeals 
considered the defendant's "leave" from jail to be similar to 
leave granted under Wis. Stat. § 303.068 (1999-2000), concluding 
that the defendant was in constructive custody, as he was 
temporarily outside of jail for a purpose that would be covered 
by the "or otherwise" language of § 946.42(1)(a)1.f.  Dentici, 
251 Wis. 2d 436, ¶12.  Therefore, the court of appeals reasoned 
that the defendant would have been subject to an escape charge 
for not returning to the jail on February 28, 1997.  Id. 
                                                 
9 In Sevelin, which was decided before Magnuson, the circuit 
court granted the defendant a "furlough" to attend an inpatient 
treatment facility.  State v. Sevelin, 204 Wis. 2d 127, 130, 554 
N.W.2d 521 (Ct. App. 1996).  Sevelin signed "an authorization so 
that the [circuit] court could obtain information from the 
facility about his progress and whether he had left the 
[treatment facility].  The [circuit] court warned Sevelin that 
if he left the [treatment facility] for any reason, he would 
have to return to jail immediately."  Id.  Unlike Freidlander, 
Sevelin sought credit for this time in treatment.  Id. at 133. 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
23 
 
¶39 Apparently recognizing a need to square its holding 
with Magnuson, the court of appeals in Dentici attempted to 
harmonize 
Riske 
and 
Magnuson, 
claiming 
that 
"the 
Riske 
definition of custody coexists with the Magnuson definition."  
Id., ¶13.  In the ensuing discussion, the court of appeals cited 
Magnuson for only this court's statement that Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.42(1)(a) is not the exclusive definition of "in custody" 
for sentence credit purposes, and that the statutes should be 
read in pari materia.  Dentici, 251 Wis. 2d 436, ¶13.  The court 
of appeals then relied on Riske, stating that under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.15(7), "custody" included the time that defendants are at 
liberty through no fault of their own.  Id.  The court of 
appeals thus concluded that the defendant would have been 
subject to an escape charge for violating any of the conditions 
of his constructive custody.  Id.  
¶40 Judge Ralph Adam Fine authored a persuasive dissent to 
the majority's opinion in Dentici.  He emphasized that "Magnuson 
established a bright-line rule to determine when a person is in 
'custody' for sentence-credit purposes:  a person is in 
'custody' if he or she is 'subject to an escape charge for 
leaving that status.'"  Id., ¶15 (Fine, J. dissenting) (citing 
Magnuson, 233 Wis. 2d 40, ¶31).  Judge Fine further stated, "The 
Majority does not tell us under what provision of law, or under 
what circumstances, Dentici could have been guilty of "escape" 
before the date he had to report to the [jail], and I am aware 
of none . . . ."  Id. (Fine, J. dissenting).  As Judge Fine 
aptly concluded, the defendant in Dentici "was free——'escape 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
24 
 
from freedom' is not yet a crime."  Id. (Fine, J. dissenting).  
Additionally, Judge Fine noted that the defendant was not 
"sentenced" to incarceration as he was ordered to serve jail 
time as a condition of probation, not as a sentence.  Id., ¶16 
(Fine, J. dissenting) (citing Prue v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 109, 
114, 216 N.W.2d 43 (1974) (stating that "probation is not a 
sentence")).  Judge Fine concluded that the court of appeals was 
"bound by Magnuson," not Riske.  Id. (Fine, J. dissenting). 
¶41 As Judge Fine correctly discussed in his dissent, the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
holding 
in 
Dentici 
is 
fundamentally 
problematic.  The court of appeals modified the bright-line rule 
established in Magnuson, effectively bootstrapping the Riske 
standard to the rule we set forth in Magnuson.  This court did 
not state in Magnuson that a defendant who is at liberty through 
no fault of his or her own is "in custody" and thus entitled to 
sentence credit.  Indeed, that was not part of the analysis.  
Rather, we held that a defendant who is subject to an escape 
charge for leaving his or her status is "in custody" for 
sentence credit purposes.  Certainly, our rule in Magnuson would 
not be as "bright-line" as we indicated if we silently 
incorporated the court of appeals' test in Riske as a latent 
part of the analysis, leaving courts to engage in a guessing 
game regarding the proper standard. 
¶42  Therefore, today we clarify and overrule Riske and 
Dentici in favor of our bright-line rule set forth in Magnuson.  
We disavow the Riske and Dentici adoption of a common-law rule 
to award sentence credit especially given the legislature's 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
25 
 
enactment of a comprehensive statutory method to address 
sentence credit.  When determining whether a defendant is "in 
custody" for the purposes of sentence credit under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155, we look to whether the defendant is subject to an 
escape 
charge 
for 
leaving 
the 
defendant's 
status. 
 
In 
determining whether an escape charge could lie, we generally 
turn to the escape statute, Wis. Stat. § 946.42.  However, 
whether a defendant is subject to an escape charge for leaving 
his status may also be informed by other statutes which 
expressly provide for escape charges for violation of the 
statute, such as Wis. Stat. §§ 301.046 ("Community residential 
confinement."), 301.048 ("Intensive sanctions program."), and 
302.425 ("Home detention programs.").  However, such statutes 
are relevant only for consideration for sentence credit purposes 
where a defendant is actually a participant in the programs 
governed by those statutes.10  Whether a defendant is at liberty 
                                                 
10 For example, Wis. Stat. § 301.046 creates a "[c]ommunity 
residential confinement" program, which provides that under the 
program, the DOC "shall confine prisoners in their places of 
residence or other places designated by the department."  
§ 301.046(1).  Subsection (6), which is titled "Escape," states, 
"Any intentional failure of a prisoner to remain within the 
extended limits of his or her confinement or to return within 
the time prescribed by the superintendent is considered an 
escape under s. 946.42(3)(a)."  § 301.046(6).  As Friedlander 
was not under any such statutorily-created program, much less 
one that provides for an escape charge if the terms of the 
program are violated, we need not consider any statute outside 
of Wis. Stat. § 946.42 in determining whether Friedlander would 
be subject to an escape charge during his time at liberty. 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
26 
 
through no fault of that defendant is irrelevant to a sentence 
credit determination. 
 
C.  Under Magnuson, Friedlander Is Not Entitled  
To Sentence Credit. 
¶43 Having determined the proper standard for evaluating 
whether a defendant is entitled to sentence credit under Wis. 
Stat. § 973.155, we now turn to whether Friedlander is entitled 
to sentence credit for the time he spent at liberty from 
September 27, 2016, through December 1, 2016.  The State argues 
that under Magnuson and Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a)2., Friedlander 
is not entitled to sentence credit for his time spent at liberty 
because he was merely on probation and could not have been 
charged with escape for leaving that status.11  Friedlander 
claims that even upon an overruling of Riske and Dentici, he is 
entitled to sentence credit on equitable principles since he was 
at liberty through no fault of his own.  We disagree.  
¶44 Friedlander argues that despite the statute, we should 
award sentence credit for equitable reasons.  Courts, however, 
should be most hesitant to adopt judicially created remedies 
when the legislature, the primary policymaker, has statutorily 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.42(1)(a)2. states as follows: 
 
"Custody" 
does 
not 
include 
the 
constructive 
custody of a probationer, parolee, or person on 
extended supervision by the department of corrections 
or a probation, extended supervision, or parole agent 
or, subject to s. 938.533(3)(a), the constructive 
custody of a person who has been released to community 
supervision or aftercare supervision under ch. 938 
(emphasis added). 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
27 
 
addressed the topic.  Here, we defer to those policy choices.  
Cf. Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, ¶30, 369 
Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333.  Moreover, Friedlander offers 
little to explain how the sentence credit he seeks is anything 
but a windfall.  He seeks credit for time he spent at liberty 
even though the circuit court here found that he knew he was 
sentenced to serve additional time.  
¶45 Under the rule we established in Magnuson and reaffirm 
today, Friedlander was not in custody between September 27, 
2016, and December 1, 2016, and is not entitled to sentence 
credit.  Our analysis is straightforward and consistent with 
Magnuson.  In order to receive sentence credit under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155, Friedlander must have been "in custody."  Under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.42(1)(a), 
custody 
can 
either 
be 
actual 
or 
constructive.  Crucially however, the escape statute is clear 
that "custody" does not include constructive custody of a 
defendant 
on 
probation 
or 
extended 
supervision. 
 
See 
§ 946.42(1)(a)2. 
¶46 Here, Friedlander does not contend that he was in 
actual custody between September 27 and December 1, 2016.  
Therefore, Friedlander could be entitled to sentence credit for 
the 65 days at issue only if he was under constructive custody 
within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a).  He was not.  
Unlike the defendant in Magnuson, who was under a bail 
monitoring program and awaiting sentencing, Friedlander was on 
probation between September 27 and December 1, 2016.  Since 
Friedlander was merely on probation during those 65 days, under 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
28 
 
§ 946.42(1)(a)2., Friedlander could not have been in "custody."  
As a result, like the defendant in Magnuson, Friedlander is not 
entitled to 65 days sentence credit. 
¶47 Friedlander's reliance on equitable principles is 
unpersuasive.12  In arguing equitable principles, Friedlander in 
large part simply restates the rationale the court of appeals 
                                                 
12 Unfortunately, mistaken early release is somewhat common.  
See e.g., Monique Garcia, Gov. Pat Quinn admits mistake on 
early-release of prisoners, blames corrections chief, Chicago 
Tribune, Dec. 31, 2009, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-
xpm-2009-12-31-chi-quinn-parole-program-31dec31-story.html; 
Kevin Johnson, Federal prison errors cause mistaken releases, 
USA 
Today, 
May 
24, 
2016, 
https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation/2016/05/24/federal-prison-errors-mistaken-
releases/84851378/; 
Kendra 
Alleyne, 
Computer 
Glitch 
Causes 
Mistaken Early Release of More Than 3,000 Inmates, Campbell Law 
Observer, 
Jan. 
11, 
2016, 
http://campbelllawobserver.com/ 
computer-glitch-causes-mistaken-early-release-of-more-than-3000-
inmates/; John Guidry II, Florida Prison's Mistaken/Accidental 
Early Release Programs, Orlando Criminal Defense Blog, Jan. 1, 
2011, 
https://www.orlandocriminaldefenseattorneyblog.com/ 
florida-prisons-mistakenaccide/; Associated Press, Jail inmate 
mistakenly released instead of shipped to prison, The Post and 
Courier, Jun. 5, 2017, https://www.postandcourier.com/news/a-
south-carolina-jail-inmate-was-mistakenly-released-instead-
of/article_1ab5db32-494f-11e7-b226-b3c803f08d6e.html.   
We recognize that after being mistakenly released, some 
federal and state courts have granted defendants sentence 
credit, but other federal and state courts have not.  Some 
courts have awarded sentence credit based upon considerations of 
equity, substantive due process, estoppel, common law, or other 
policy.  While it might be tempting to pick and choose a case 
from another jurisdiction to lend support for granting or not 
granting sentence credit, that exercise is of little value 
without also considering the facts and law underlying that 
decision.  Instead of turning to other jurisdictions for 
guidance, we rely upon Wisconsin's comprehensive sentence credit 
statutes, Magnuson, and our escape statute, Wis. Stat. § 946.42. 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
29 
 
relied upon in Riske, which we overrule.  As Friedlander 
correctly notes, the sentence credit statute is "designed to 
prevent a defendant from serving more time than his sentence or 
his sentences call for."  State v. Johnson, 2009 WI 57, ¶31, 318 
Wis. 2d 21, 
767 
N.W.2d 207 
(citing 
State 
v. 
Beets, 
124 
Wis. 2d 372, 379, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985)).  Here, however, 
Friedlander does not argue that disallowing sentence credit for 
the 65 days he was at liberty would somehow require him to serve 
more time than given by the circuit court.  Indeed, Friedlander 
at this point has served the entirety of the eight months of 
conditional jail time called for as part of his probation, which 
was notably the result of a joint recommendation to the circuit 
court by both the State and Friedlander's counsel.  Friedlander 
thus seeks a sentence credit presumably that would apply to a 
sentence if probation were revoked and result in frustrating the 
circuit court's sentence because he would then be subject to 
less than the prescribed amount of time.13  Our holding today 
                                                 
13 As discussed previously, Friedlander's eight months of 
conditional jail time was a condition of probation.  We 
acknowledge that individuals who are deemed to be in custody 
would nonetheless receive credit for the time in custody even if 
that time is served as a condition of probation.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.42.  We also acknowledge that probation is not a sentence.  
See Prue v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 109, 114, 216 N.W.2d 43 (1974) 
(stating that "probation is not a sentence").  Even considering 
the language Friedlander quotes from State v. Johnson, 2009 WI 
57, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207, his situation is inapposite, 
as Friedlander was on probation between September 27 and 
December 1, 2016, but he was released to freedom instead of 
serving his court-ordered time in custody. 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
30 
 
does not require Friedlander to serve more time in confinement 
than he was ordered and thus does not violate any sort of 
equitable 
principle 
associated 
with 
the 
sentence 
credit 
statute.14  We cannot condone such a subversion of a judicial 
officer's determination. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶48 This court is presented with two issues.  First, we 
must determine the meaning of "in custody" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155.  In doing so, we consider whether the court of 
appeals' decisions in Riske, 152 Wis. 2d 260, and Dentici, 251 
Wis. 2d 436, are in harmony with this court's decision in 
Magnuson, 233 Wis. 2d 40.  We conclude that for the purpose of 
receiving sentence credit under § 973.155, a defendant is "in 
custody" whenever the defendant is subject to an escape charge 
under Wis. Stat. § 946.42, or another statute which expressly 
provides for an escape charge, as this court held in Magnuson.  
In doing so, we overrule the court of appeals' decisions in 
Riske and Dentici. 
¶49 Second, we must determine whether Friedlander is 
entitled to sentence credit for time he spent at liberty after 
being mistakenly released from prison without being transferred 
to serve his remaining conditional jail time.  We conclude that 
Friedlander 
is 
not 
entitled 
to 
sentence 
credit 
because 
                                                 
14 Friedlander did not raise any arguments regarding his 
constitutional right to due process.  Therefore, we need not 
consider whether Friedlander's due process rights were violated, 
and decline to do so. 
No. 
2017AP1337-CR   
 
31 
 
Friedlander, who was at liberty, could not have been subject to 
conviction for escape under Wis. Stat. § 946.42.  Thus, we 
reverse the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.
No.  2017AP1337-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶50 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with Justice Ann Walsh Bradley that fundamental principles of 
fairness support the equitable doctrine of credit for time 
erroneously spent at liberty. 
¶51 I do not join Justice Bradley's dissent because, in my 
view, the defendant is entitled to sentence credit under the 
rule announced in State v. Magnuson, 2000 WI 19, 233 Wis. 2d 40, 
606 N.W.2d 536. 
¶52 In Magnuson, this court held that "an offender's 
status constitutes custody for sentence credit purposes when the 
offender is subject to an escape charge for leaving that 
status."1  The Magnuson court looked to Wisconsin's escape 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a)1., to determine whether the 
defendant was in "custody" as defined therein. 
¶53 The escape statute provides that "'[c]ustody' includes 
without limitation all of the following: . . . h.  Custody of a 
person subject to a confinement order under s. 973.09(4)."2 
                                                 
1 State v. Magnuson, 2000 WI 19, ¶1, 233 Wis. 2d 40, 606 
N.W.2d 536. 
2 Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a)1.h. 
The 
majority 
appears 
to 
conflate 
the 
definition 
of 
"custody" as provided in subsection h. (i.e., subject to a 
confinement order under Wis. Stat. § 973.09(4)) with the 
definition of "custody" in subsection a. (i.e., actual custody 
in an institution).   See majority op., ¶46 n.12. 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP1337-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶54 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.09(4) allows a court to require 
as a condition of probation that the probationer be confined for 
a period not to exceed one year. 
¶55 In the instant case, the defendant was incarcerated in 
the Oshkosh Correctional Institution as a result of a conviction 
that is not relevant to resolving the sentence credit issue 
presented here.  In a separate criminal case, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to bail jumping, and the circuit court ordered 
that the defendant be confined in the Jefferson County jail for 
eight months as a condition of his probation.  This order 
constitutes a confinement order under Wis. Stat. § 973.09(4). 
¶56 After completing his prison sentence in Oshkosh, the 
defendant was supposed to be transferred to the county jail to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Individuals serving jail time as a condition of their 
probation per Wis. Stat. § 973.09(4) would be entitled to 
sentence credit for that time even if subsection h. did not 
exist because that time would qualify as "custody" under 
subsection a.  That is, the jail time would constitute time 
spent in the "[a]ctual custody of an institution."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.42(1)(a)1.a.  The majority's contrary reasoning renders 
subsection h. superfluous. 
To 
the 
extent 
the 
majority 
relies 
on 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.42(1)(a)2., 
that 
reliance 
is 
misplaced. 
 
Section 
946.42(1)(a)2. specifies that "'[c]ustody' does not include the 
constructive custody of a probationer . . ." (emphasis added).  
Probationers serving jail time as a condition of their probation 
are not in constructive custody.  They are in the "[a]ctual 
custody of an institution" per § 946.42(1)(a)1.a. while serving 
that conditional jail time.  See State v. Zimmerman, 2001 WI App 
238, ¶¶13-14, 248 Wis. 2d 370, 635 N.W.2d 864 (providing helpful 
statutory and legislative history regarding the escape statute's 
application to probationers).     
No.  2017AP1337-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
serve his confinement as a condition of his probation, but 
instead, he was mistakenly released through no fault of his own. 
¶57 In my view, the defendant was still "subject to a 
confinement order under s. 973.09(4)" upon his mistaken release.3 
¶58 In the instant case, the defendant was not aware that 
he was mistakenly released.  While mistakenly released, the 
defendant met with his probation agent as he was required to do.  
The probation agent did not tell the defendant that he needed to 
report to jail.  However, approximately six weeks after the 
defendant's mistaken release, the Jefferson County Sheriff's 
Office discovered that the defendant was mistakenly released 
from prison.  A sergeant from the sheriff's office contacted the 
defendant's probation agent.  The probation agent contacted the 
defendant, and the defendant promptly cooperated with law 
enforcement officials in sorting out how to proceed. 
¶59 The defendant posits that if he had "left the state or 
failed to respond to inquiries from his probation agent or law 
enforcement concerning his court-ordered confinement, he [] 
could have been charged with escape."  
                                                 
3 See State v. Edwards, 2003 WI App 221, ¶¶20-21, 267 
Wis. 2d 491, 671 N.W.2d 371 (explaining that a probationer 
serving jail time as a condition of his probation who was 
periodically transferred to a hospital for a medical condition 
was still in "custody" while at the hospital because he "was 
subject 
to 
a 
confinement 
order 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.09(4)," but when the circuit court stayed its order for 
conditional jail time, the probationer was no longer in 
"custody" because "he was no longer subject to the confinement 
order during the periods of his hospitalizations"). 
No.  2017AP1337-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶60 I agree.  Under the defendant's hypothetical scenario, 
fleeing the state or failing to respond to inquiries from law 
enforcement concerning his Wis. Stat. § 973.09(4) confinement 
order would be persuasive evidence that the defendant intended 
to avoid complying with the confinement order, and he could be 
charged with escape. 
¶61 Because I conclude that the defendant's status during 
the time period at issue constituted "custody" for sentence 
credit purposes, I further conclude that the defendant is 
entitled to sentence credit under the Magnuson rule.   
¶62 Accordingly, I dissent. 
 
No.  2017AP1337-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶63 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
bucks an apparent trend in the law of our sister states and 
federal circuits that have adopted the equitable doctrine of 
credit for time erroneously spent at liberty.  Paying little 
mind to the plethora of courts that have adopted the doctrine, 
it summarily dispatches with Friedlander's invocation of equity. 
¶64 In 
my 
view, 
persuasive 
authority 
from 
other 
jurisdictions 
and 
fundamental 
fairness 
require 
a 
deeper 
examination of this topic. 
¶65 When Friedlander was released from prison, he was told 
by words and actions that he was free to go.  Relying on the 
information he received from Oshkosh Correctional Institution, 
where 
he 
had 
been 
previously 
incarcerated, 
he 
took 
the 
Department of Corrections at its word. 
¶66 By rejecting the equitable doctrine of credit for time 
erroneously spent at liberty, the majority inequitably holds 
Friedlander's reliance on the State against him and allows 
several state players to escape accountability for their 
mistakes.  Yet, fundamental fairness appears to rest squarely 
with Friedlander. 
¶67 Adopting the doctrine ensures a fair and equitable way 
to 
resolve 
an 
uncommon 
factual 
scenario. 
 
Additionally, 
consistent with case law, it holds the State to its obligation 
to provide a certain end date for incarceration and prevents the 
service of a sentence in installments. 
¶68 I conclude that Friedlander should receive the benefit 
of the equitable doctrine of credit for time erroneously spent 
No.  2017AP1337-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
at liberty.  This conclusion is consistent with the sense of 
fairness and equity embraced by a majority of the federal 
circuits and an abundance of state courts that have adopted the 
doctrine and at odds with the sense of fairness and equity 
tersely espoused by the majority here. 
¶69 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶70 The record throughout this case reflects mistakes by 
the State and some uncertainty on the part of the court.  At the 
outset, the circuit court was unsure as to where the Department 
of Corrections would have Friedlander serve the conditional jail 
sentence that remained after his prison sentence was complete.  
Majority op., ¶5.  At sentencing, the circuit court indicated: 
Clearly you'll be serving your sentence when you have 
a prison sentence and conditional jail in the prison, 
and that's the Court's expectation, and I doubt that 
the 
Department 
of 
Corrections 
will 
in 
any 
way 
interpret that portion any differently, but it's just 
a question of once your underlying case is done and if 
there's still some of this conditional jail time, 
where they'll have you serve it (emphasis added). 
Thus, the circuit court left it to the Department of Corrections 
to resolve the unanswered question of where it would have 
Friedlander serve the extra conditional time. 
¶71 The uncertainty was resolved when, according to 
Friedlander, a social worker at Oshkosh Correctional Institution 
informed him that his conditional jail sentence was satisfied 
prior to his release.  Majority op., ¶8. 
¶72 This resolution by the Department of Corrections was 
underscored 
when, 
after 
completing 
his 
prison 
sentence, 
No.  2017AP1337-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
Friedlander was released from Oshkosh Correctional Institution 
instead of being transported to the Jefferson County jail to 
finish any conditional jail sentence.  Id., ¶6.  It was further 
underscored by Oshkosh officials never bothering to notify 
Jefferson County of Friedlander's release.  Id. 
¶73 But why would they? 
¶74 The sentencing court apparently left to the Department 
of Corrections the decision as to where the conditional time 
would be served and they apparently determined it would be 
served prior to his release from Oshkosh.  We now learn, 
however, 
that 
Oshkosh's 
apparent 
determination 
of 
where 
Friedlander would serve the extra conditional jail time and 
their actions supporting that determination were all mistakes. 
¶75 To compound the apparently mistaken determination and 
actions, once Friedlander was released, more mistakes and 
uncertainty appear. 
¶76 Upon his release, Friedlander immediately met with his 
probation agent.  Id., ¶7.  At the initial meeting, the agent 
either did not know or knew but failed to tell him that he 
needed to report to jail to serve additional time.  Id.  
Friedlander met with his probation agent a second time.  Id.  
Again, the agent failed to tell him to report to jail or in any 
way indicate that he had additional time to serve.  Id.  Neither 
the probation agent nor Friedlander apparently saw a need to 
contact the circuit court to clarify whether Friedlander had to 
serve additional time.  Id. 
No.  2017AP1337-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
¶77 The Jefferson County Sheriff's Office eventually was 
concerned about Friedlander's status and contacted his probation 
agent, 
who 
in 
turn 
spoke 
with 
Friedlander. 
 
Id., 
¶8.  
Friedlander immediately contacted the Jefferson County Sheriff's 
Office after his probation agent informed him of the issue.  Id. 
¶78 Friedlander relayed to the sheriff's office what his 
social worker had told him about his conditional jail sentence 
being satisfied prior to his release.  Id.  Unsure how to 
proceed, the sheriff's office wrote a letter to the circuit 
court asking how to resolve the situation.  Id. 
¶79 Similarly unsure how to proceed, the circuit court 
held a hearing.  Id., ¶9.  After hearing testimony and argument, 
it ultimately concluded that under existing law Friedlander is 
not entitled to sentence credit for his time erroneously spent 
at liberty.  Id., ¶11. 
II 
¶80 Although I agree with the majority's reliance on State 
v. Magnuson, 2000 WI 19, ¶47, 233 Wis. 2d 40, 606 N.W.2d 536, I 
part ways with the majority when it brushes off Friedlander's 
argument that he should be granted sentence credit pursuant to 
equitable principles.  It spurns the litany of our sister states 
and federal circuits that have adopted the equitable doctrine of 
credit for time erroneously spent at liberty.  See majority op., 
¶47 n.12.  In summary fashion, the majority dispenses with 
Friedlander's invocation of the doctrine.  See majority op., 
¶¶44, 47.  In my view, the majority is incorrect in its summary 
dismissal of Friedlander's legitimate equitable concerns. 
No.  2017AP1337-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
¶81 This court has stated that "confinement credit is 
designed to afford fairness——that a person not serve more time 
than that for which he is sentenced."  State v. Beets, 124 
Wis. 2d 372, 379, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985).  Putting this principle 
into practice, the Tenth Circuit has determined that "[a] 
prisoner has some rights.  A sentence of five years means a 
continuous sentence, unless interrupted by escape, violation of 
parole, or some fault of the prisoner, and he cannot be required 
to serve it in installments."  White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 
789 (10th Cir. 1930) (emphasis added).1 
                                                 
1 The Ninth Circuit has further explained: 
The least to which a prisoner is entitled is the 
execution of the sentence of the court to whose 
judgment he is duly subject.  If a ministerial 
officer, such as a marshal, charged with the duty to 
execute the court's orders, fails to carry out such 
orders, that failure cannot be charged up against the 
prisoner.  The prisoner is entitled to serve his time 
promptly if such is the judgment imposed, and he must 
be deemed to be serving it from the date he is ordered 
to serve it and is in the custody of the marshal under 
the commitment, if, without his fault, the marshal 
neglects to place him in the proper custody.  Any 
other holding would give the marshal, a ministerial 
officer, power more arbitrary and capricious than any 
known in the law.  A prisoner sentenced for one year 
might thus be required to wait forty under the shadow 
of his unserved sentence before it pleases the marshal 
to incarcerate him.  Such authority is not even 
granted 
to 
courts 
of 
justice, 
let 
alone 
their 
ministerial officers.  Citation of authority is hardly 
needed to establish so elementary a proposition. 
Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir. 1937) (citations 
omitted). 
No.  2017AP1337-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
¶82 In the federal courts, this principle has manifested 
as "a common law rule, which has been held applicable to federal 
sentencing, that unless interrupted by fault of the prisoner (an 
escape, for example) a prison sentence runs continuously from 
the date on which the defendant surrenders to begin serving it."  
Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 1994).  In 
practice, this means that "[t]he government is not permitted to 
delay the expiration of the sentence either by postponing the 
commencement of the sentence or by releasing the prisoner for a 
time and then reimprisoning him."  Id. 
¶83 Such a proposition is embodied by the "doctrine of 
credit for time erroneously spent at liberty."  Pursuant to this 
doctrine, a convicted person is granted "credit against his 
sentence for time spent at liberty due to 'simple or mere 
negligence on behalf of the government' and 'provided the delay 
in execution of sentence was through no fault [of the convicted 
person].'"  In re Roach, 74 P.3d 134, 137 (Wash. 2003) (citing 
United States v. Martinez, 837 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
No.  2017AP1337-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
¶84 The vitality of this doctrine has been recognized by a 
majority of federal circuit courts and an abundance of state 
courts.2  Wisconsin should do the same. 
¶85 Adopting the equitable doctrine would be consistent 
with the trend in federal and state courts throughout the 
country that implicitly reject an assertion that it necessarily 
results in a windfall for defendants.  Indeed, many federal and 
state courts have "moved away from a strict application of the 
traditional rule requiring a released prisoner to serve his full 
sentence no matter the circumstances of his release, and have 
granted an erroneously released prisoner relief based on 
                                                 
2 See Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 90 (1st Cir. 2009); 
Kiendra v. Hadden, 763 F.2d 69, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1985); Vega v. 
United States, 493 F.3d 310, 318 (3d Cir. 2007); Free v. Miles, 
333 F.3d 550, 554 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Croft, 450 
F.2d 1094, 1097 (6th Cir. 1971); Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335, 
336-37 (7th Cir. 1994); Green v. Christiansen, 732 F.2d 1397, 
1400 (9th Cir. 1984); White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th 
Cir. 1930); McCall v. State, 594 So.2d 733, 734 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1992); McKellar v. Arizona State Dep't of Corr., 566 P.2d 1337, 
1339-40 (Ariz. 1977); People v. Stark, 902 P.2d 928, 930 (Colo. 
App. 1995); Drumwright v. State, 572 So.2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Derrer v. Anthony, 463 S.E.2d 690, 693 
(Ga. 1995); State v. Kline, 475 So.2d 1093, 1093 (La. 1985) (per 
curiam); State v. Williams, 410 A.2d 251, 252 (N.J. 1980); 
People ex rel. Bilotti v. Warden, New York City Corr. Inst. For 
Men, 345 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (per curiam); 
Jacobs v. Robinson, 410 A.2d 959, 960 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 1980); 
Curry v. State, 720 S.W.2d 261, 263-64 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); In 
re Roach, 74 P.3d 134, 137 (Wash. 2003); see also Gabriel J. 
Chin, Getting Out of Jail Free:  Sentence Credit for Periods of 
Mistaken Liberty, 45 Cath. U. L. Rev. 403, 406-10 (1996); Andrew 
T. Winkler, Implicit in the Concept of Erroneous Liberty:  The 
Need to Ensure Proper Sentence Credit in the Fourth Circuit, 35 
N.C. Cent. L. Rev. 1, 11-20 (2012). 
No.  2017AP1337-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
principles of equity and fairness."  Roach, 74 P.3d at 136 
(internal citations omitted). 
¶86 The doctrine of credit for time erroneously spent at 
liberty is a fair and equitable way to resolve an infrequent 
factual situation.  It holds the State to its obligation to 
provide a certain end date for incarceration and prevents the 
service of a sentence in installments.  "The government is not 
permitted to play cat and mouse with the prisoner, delaying 
indefinitely the expiation of his debt to society and his 
reintegration into the free community."  Dunne, 14 F.3d at 336.  
Yet 
the 
majority 
is 
unbothered 
by 
the 
possibility 
that 
Friedlander and others similarly situated may face just the type 
of piecemeal sentence that federal case law instructs us to 
avoid. 
¶87 This case presents the very "cat and mouse" scenario 
the equitable doctrine is designed to prevent.  Mistakes and 
uncertainty on the part of multiple state actors——the Oshkosh 
social worker who told Friedlander his sentence was satisfied, 
the Oshkosh staff who failed to notify Jefferson County of his 
release, the probation agent who neglected to tell Friedlander 
to report to jail, the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office that 
was unsure how to handle the situation, and the circuit court 
that was similarly unsure how to address the scenario——resulted 
in the possibility of Friedlander serving a non-continuous 
sentence. 
¶88 Such a sentence served in installments is, as the 
Seventh 
Circuit 
observed 
in 
Dunne, 
detrimental 
to 
the 
No.  2017AP1337-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
reintegration of prisoners back into society.  See id.  "When 
courts fail to recognize the doctrine [of credit for time 
erroneously spent at liberty], erroneously released prisoners 
who have successfully rehabilitated themselves into society must 
continually suffer under the auspice that the government may one 
day require re-incarceration for the service of an unfulfilled 
sentence."  Andrew T. Winkler, Implicit in the Concept of 
Erroneous Liberty:  The Need to Ensure Proper Sentence Credit in 
the Fourth Circuit, 35 N.C. Cent. L. Rev. 1, 30 (2012). 
¶89 Additionally, despite the Department of Corrections, 
law enforcement, and the circuit court being either mistaken or 
unsure how to proceed, the majority opines that it is the 
defendant's responsibility to track his release date.  In the 
majority's view, it is up to Friedlander to tell the State that 
he may have more time to serve if he is released early through 
no fault of his own. 
¶90 That's easier said than done.  Some defendants may 
have very complex sentences, with overlapping consecutive and 
concurrent periods of confinement.  To expect a defendant to 
monitor and repeatedly correct the State's math places an 
untenable and unreasonable responsibility on a defendant——
especially when the State indicates by words and actions that he 
is free. 
¶91 In sum, the government, by its words and actions, told 
Friedlander 
that 
he 
was 
free 
and 
then 
took 
it 
back.  
Friedlander's rehabilitation and reintegration into society 
should not be delayed because of the government's errors.  He 
No.  2017AP1337-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
should receive the sentence credit he seeks pursuant to 
equitable doctrine of credit for time erroneously spent at 
liberty. 
¶92 For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  2017AP1337-CR.awb 
 
1