Case Title: Myers v. Philip Morris, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S095213

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 8/5/02  (Publishers:  This opinion should precede the companion case, Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco.) 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
BETTY JEAN MYERS, 
   ) 
 
 
   ) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
   ) 
 
 
   ) 
S095213 
 
v. 
   ) 
 
 
   ) On certification from the United 
PHILIP MORRIS COMPANIES, INC., et al.,    ) 
  States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
 
   ) 
 
 
   ) 
No. 99-17383 
 
Defendants and Respondents. 
   ) 
_______________________________________) 
 
In 1995, the California Legislature found that “[t]obacco related disease 
places a tremendous financial burden upon the persons with the disease, their 
families, the health care delivery system, and society as a whole,” and that 
“California spends five billion six hundred million dollars ($5,600,000,000) a year 
in direct and indirect costs on smoking-related illnesses.”  (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 104350, subd. (a)(7).)  To obtain compensation for the physical and mental 
suffering and staggering expenses inflicted by tobacco-related illness, users of 
tobacco products and their families have sought relief in our courts through 
product liability lawsuits against manufacturers and sellers of tobacco products.  In 
dealing with those lawsuits, courts have not been free to apply ordinary principles 
of tort law because, as we shall explain, the Legislature has enacted statutes that 
directly control the extent to which our courts may award damages against tobacco 
companies in product liability actions.   
 
2 
The statutes at issue are two successive versions of section 1714.45 of 
California’s Civil Code.1  The first version, which we here sometimes refer to as 
the Immunity Statute, granted tobacco companies complete immunity in certain 
product liability lawsuits as of January 1, 1988.2  (Added by Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, 
§ 3, p. 5778.)  The second version, which we here sometimes refer to as the Repeal 
Statute, rescinded that immunity 10 years later on January 1, 1998.  (Stats. 1997, 
ch. 570, § 1.)  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
certified to us a question asking whether the Repeal Statute governs “a claim that 
accrued after January 1, 1998, but which is based on conduct that occurred prior to 
January 1, 1998.”  (Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (9th Cir. 2001) 239 
F.3d 1029, 1030 (Myers).) 
Our answer is this:  The Immunity Statute applies to certain statutorily 
described conduct of tobacco companies that occurred during the 10-year 
immunity period, which began on January 1, 1988 and ended on December 31, 
1997.  With respect to such conduct, therefore, the statutory immunity applies, and 
no product liability cause of action may be based on that conduct, regardless of 
when the users of the tobacco products may have sustained or discovered injuries 
as a result of that conduct.  That statutory immunity was rescinded, however, when 
the California Legislature enacted the Repeal Statute, which as of January 1, 1998, 
restored the general principles of tort law that had, until the 1988 enactment of the 
Immunity Statute, governed tort liability against tobacco companies.  Therefore, 
                                                 
1  
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code. 
2  
As this court has done in prior cases discussing this legislation, we use the 
term “immunity” rather loosely, without restricting it to its narrowest technical 
meaning, that is, “a complete defense . . . [that] does not negate the tort.”  (Black’s 
Law Dict. (1996 pocket ed.) p. 298; see also Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 
Cal.3d 785, 797, fn. 6 [discussing the “immunity-privilege distinction”].) 
3 
with respect to conduct falling outside the 10-year immunity period, the tobacco 
companies are not shielded from product liability lawsuits.  
I.  FACTS 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit described the background of this 
case as follows:  “Betty Jean Myers began smoking cigarettes in 1956 and 
continued to smoke heavily until 1997.  Throughout this period, and until August 
of 1998, she also worked and lived in environments in which those around her 
smoked cigarettes.  On April 8, 1998, Myers was diagnosed with lung cancer 
allegedly caused by her exposure to tobacco.  On March 4, 1999, Myers filed a 
complaint in Tulare County Superior Court against Philip Morris and other 
defendant tobacco manufacturers (collectively, the ‘Tobacco Manufacturers’) 
alleging several claims, including strict liability, negligence, breach of implied 
warranties, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation.”  (Myers, supra, 239 F.3d at 
p. 1030.) 
The Ninth Circuit’s description continues:  “After removi ng this case to the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, the Tobacco 
Manufacturers moved, on April 13, 1999, to dismiss Myers’s complaint for failure 
to state a claim.  On May 25, 1999, the district court granted the motion to dismiss, 
with leave to amend, on the ground that Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.45 barred Myers’s 
actions for any injuries incurred prior to January 1998.  On June 30, 1999, Myers 
amended her complaint to allege that she was exposed to secondhand cigarette 
smoke between January 1, 1998 and April 8, 1998.  On July 19, 1999, the Tobacco 
Manufacturers again moved to dismiss Myers’s complaint for failure to state a 
claim.  On October 6, 1999, the district court again dismissed Myers’s complaint 
for failure to state [a] claim, this time without leave to amend, on the grounds that 
she had conceded that her lung cancer was not caused by her exposure to 
secondhand smoke after January 1, 1998, and, again, that pre-1998 exposures were 
4 
not actionable.  Myers filed a timely notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit.”  
(Myers, supra, 239 F.3d at p. 1031.) 
II.  BACKGROUND 
We start with a review of the Immunity Statute and two California cases 
that have construed that statute, American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 
208 Cal.App.3d 480, a decision of the state Court of Appeal, and Richards v. 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 985, a decision of this court.   
A.  The Immunity Statute 
Enacted as part of the Willie L. Brown, Jr.--Bill Lockyer Civil Liability 
Reform Act of 1987, former section 1714.45 (the Immunity Statute) provided in 
full: 
“(a) In a product liability action, a manufacturer or seller shall not be liable 
if: 
“(1) The product is inherently unsafe and the product is known to be unsafe 
by the ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge 
common to the community; and 
“(2) The product is a common consumer product intended for personal 
consumption, such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, tobacco, and butter, as identified 
in comment i to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
“(b) For purposes of this section, the term ‘product liability action’ means 
any action for injury or death caused by a product, except that the term does not 
include an action based on a manufacturing defect or breach of an express 
warranty. 
“(c) This section is intended to be declarative of and does not alter or 
amend existing California law, including Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., (1972) 8 
Cal. 3d 121, and shall apply to all product liability actions pending on, or 
5 
commenced after, January 1, 1988.”  (Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, § 3, pp. 5778-5779, 
italics added.) 
We now discuss the two California decisions that have interpreted the 
Immunity Statute. 
1.  American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court 
The state Court of Appeal’s 1989 decision in American Tobacco Co. v. 
Superior Court, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d 480 (American Tobacco), which was 
authored by Presiding Justice J. Anthony Kline, was the first to construe the 
Immunity Statute.  In that case, the court described the Immunity Statute as the 
result of a “ ‘peace pact’ ” or “compromise between parties seeking and opposing 
comprehensive changes in California tort law who had been locked in a long 
political struggle that had reached a stalemate.”  (American Tobacco, supra, at 
pp. 486-487.)  Those involved included major special interest groups such as 
insurers, physicians, manufacturers, and plaintiff’s lawyers.  (Id. at p. 486.)3  The 
Court of Appeal in American Tobacco characterized the Immunity Statute as so 
“poorly drafted” that “on its face[, it was] amenable to two diametrically opposed 
interpretations, each of which conflict[ed] in some way with the words” used by 
the Legislature.  (American Tobacco, supra, at p. 485.)  But legislative history, the 
court noted, indicated that the Immunity Statute’s intent was to ensure that “ ‘high-
cholesterol foods, alcohol, and cigarettes that are inherently unsafe and known to 
be unsafe by ordinary consumers, [were] not to be subject to product liability 
lawsuits.’ ”  (American Tobacco, supra, at p. 487, italics added.)  In light of that 
                                                 
3   
The compromise agreement reportedly is known as “the ‘napkin deal’ since 
it was hammered out by political adversaries” -- (one side “wanting 
comprehensive changes in California tort law, the other wanting to maintain the 
status quo”) -- on a white cloth napkin in a Sacramento restaurant.  (Moy, Tobacco 
Companies, Immune No More—California’s Removal of the Legal Barriers 
Preventing Plaintiffs From Recovering for Tobacco-Related Illness (1998) 29 
McGeorge L.Rev. 761, 770.)      
6 
legislative intent, the Court of Appeal in American Tobacco concluded that the 
statutory immunity was very broad, providing “nearly complete” immunity for 
manufacturers and sellers of tobacco and the other enumerated products.  (Ibid.)   
2.  Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.  
In 1997, some eight years after the Court of Appeal’s decision in American 
Tobacco, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d 480, we construed the Immunity Statute in 
Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.4th 985 (Richards).  Because 
Richards is central to answering the question the Ninth Circuit has certified to us, 
we discuss it in some detail.   
The plaintiff in Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th 985, was a former shipyard 
worker who sued several asbestos manufacturers, claiming that his exposure to 
asbestos fibers at various shipyard jobs had caused him to develop asbestosis, a 
severe respiratory injury.  At trial, one asbestos manufacturer, defendant Owens-
Illinois, Inc., presented evidence that the plaintiff had contributed to the 
development of his respiratory injury by smoking for more than 40 years.  (Id. at 
p. 990.)  The issue before this court was whether the trial court should have 
allowed Owens-Illinois to present its so-called tobacco company defense, which 
would have required the jury, in determining fault with respect to noneconomic 
damages (to compensate the plaintiff for pain and suffering), to apportion to 
tobacco companies some percentage of fault, thereby reducing the percentage of 
the noneconomic damages award attributable to Owens-Illinois.  (Id. at p. 991.) 
To decide this question, we considered the interplay between the Immunity 
Statute and section 1431 et seq., enacted by the California electorate in an 
initiative known as Proposition 51.  Proposition 51 provided in part that “in a tort 
action governed by principles of comparative fault, a defendant shall not be jointly 
liable for the plaintiff’s ‘non-economic damages,’ but shall only be severally liable 
for such damages ‘in direct proportion to that defendant’s percentage of fault.’ ”  
7 
(Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 988, quoting § 1431.2, subd. (a).)  The specific 
question we addressed in Richards was this:  “To the extent [the Immunity 
Statute] protects tobacco companies from direct ‘liab[ility]’ for harm caused by 
smoking, does it also preclude the allocation of proportionate ‘fault’ to absent 
tobacco companies in a smoker’s suit for asbestos-related lung injury, in order to 
reduce the ‘non-economic’ damages payable by the asbestos defendant under 
Proposition 51?”  (Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 988.)   
We explained:  “Though the [Immunity Statute] states only an exemption 
from direct ‘liab[ility]’ where specified conditions are met, the express premise 
which justifies this immunity is of a broader nature.  This premise is that suppliers 
of certain products which are ‘inherently unsafe,’ but which the public wishes to 
have available despite awareness of their dangers, should not be responsible in tort 
for resulting harm to those who voluntarily consumed the products despite such 
knowledge.  With respect to injuries meeting the statute’s requirements, that 
principle precludes the assignment of legal ‘fault’ to such suppliers in all contexts, 
including suits from which they are absent by law.”  (Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th 
at p. 1002, italics added, original italics omitted.)   
We pointed out that the Immunity Statute drew “its express inspiration 
from product liability principles” set forth in comment i to section 402A of the 
Restatement Second of Torts (Restatement), and these principles provided the 
premise for the statute.  (Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 999.) 
We observed:  “Section 402A of the Restatement proposes generally that 
when a manufacturer or distributor sells a product ‘in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer’ ([Rest.] p. 347, italics added), 
and the product reaches that person, as expected and intended, without substantial 
change in its condition, the seller is ‘subject to liability’ for physical harm ‘thereby 
caused to the ultimate user or consumer.’  [¶]  However, comment i asserts an 
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important qualification of the general rule . . . . [It] makes clear that ‘[t]he rule [of 
liability] applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.’  (Restatement, p. 352, italics 
added.)  As comment i then explains, ‘[m]any products cannot possibly be made 
entirely safe for all consumption,’ but if a product is pure and unadulterated, its 
inherent or unavoidable danger, commonly known to the community which 
consumes it anyway, does not expose the seller to liability for resulting harm to a 
voluntary user.”  (Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 999.)   
Richards added:  “The clear premise of comment i is that no ‘liability’ 
arises [for the manufacture or distribution of a product that in its pure and 
unadulterated form poses for its voluntary users an inherent and unavoidable 
danger] because there is no sound basis for liability.  In other words, comment i 
posits, a manufacturer or seller breaches no legal duty to voluntary consumers by 
merely supplying, in unadulterated form, a common commodity which cannot be 
made safer, but which the public desires to buy and ingest despite general 
understanding of its inherent dangers.”  (Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1000.) 
Because it would have been “anomalous” for a supplier of tobacco 
products, “though immunized . . . from direct liability for providing an ‘inherently 
unsafe’ product to a knowing and voluntary consumer . . . [to] nonetheless be 
assigned ‘fault’ for doing so in an action between that same consumer and a third 
party defendant,” we held in Richards “that to the extent [the Immunity Statute] 
afford[ed] tobacco suppliers immunity from ‘liab[ility]’ in direct actions against 
them, on grounds that the immunized conduct breache[d] no duty and constitute[d] 
no tort, the statute also preclude[d] indirect assignment of comparative ‘fault’ . . . 
to such entities for purposes of Proposition 51.”  (Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1000-1001, italics added.) 
9 
In short, our unanimous decision in Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th 985, made 
clear that between January 1, 1988, and December 31, 1997, when the Immunity 
Statute was in effect, supplying pure and unadulterated tobacco products to 
knowing and voluntary consumers of those products was not subject to tort 
liability because it breached no legal duty and thus constituted no tort.   
B.  The Repeal Statute 
Ten years after enactment of the Immunity Statute and some eight months 
after our decision in Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th 985, the California Legislature 
enacted the Repeal Statute, which amended former section 1714.45 to rescind the 
statutory immunity for tobacco companies as of January 1, 1998.4  When enacted, 
the Repeal Statute provided, and with one minor change still provides: 
“(a) In a product liability action, a manufacturer or seller shall not be liable 
if both of the following apply: 
“(1) The product is inherently unsafe and the product is known to be unsafe 
by the ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge 
common to the community. 
“(2) The product is a common consumer product intended for personal 
consumption, such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, and butter, as identified in  
comment i to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
                                                 
4  
Earlier in the same legislative session, the California Legislature passed, as 
urgency legislation effective June 12, 1997, Assembly Bill No. 1603 (1997-1998 
Reg. Sess.) (hereafter the Public Entity Amendment).  That bill amended the 
Immunity Statute to allow for “an action brought by a public entity to recover the 
value of benefits provided to individuals injured by a tobacco-related illness 
caused by the tortious conduct of a tobacco company.”  (Former § 1714.45, subd. 
(d), as amended by Stats. 1997, ch. 25, § 2.)  A third bill, regarding secondhand 
smoke (Sen. Bill No. 340 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.)), was passed by the Legislature 
but vetoed by the Governor.   
10 
“(b) This section does not exempt the manufacture or sale of tobacco 
products by tobacco manufacturers and their successors in interest from product 
liability actions, but does exempt the sale or distribution of tobacco products by 
any other person, including, but not limited to, retailers or distributors. 
“(c) For purposes of this section, the term ‘product liability action’ means 
any action for injury or death caused by a product, except that the term does not 
include an action based on a manufacturing defect or breach of an express 
warranty. 
“(d) This section is intended to be declarative of and does not alter or 
amend existing California law, including Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., (1972), 8 
Cal. 3d 121, and shall apply to all product liability actions pending on, or 
commenced after, January 1, 1988. 
“(e) This section does not apply to, and never applied to, an action brought 
by a public entity to recover the value of benefits provided to individuals injured 
by a tobacco-related illness caused by the tortious conduct of a tobacco company 
or its successor in interest, including, but not limited to, an action brought pursuant 
to Section 14124.71 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.  In such an action 
brought by a public entity, the fact that the injured individual’s claim against the 
defendant may be barred by a prior version of this section shall not be a defense.  
This subdivision does not constitute a change in, but is declaratory of, existing law 
relating to tobacco products. 
“(f) It is the intention of the Legislature in enacting the amendments to 
subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section adopted at the 1997-98 Regular Session to 
declare that there exists no statutory bar to tobacco-related personal injury, 
wrongful death, or other tort claims against tobacco manufacturers and their 
successors in interest by California smokers or others who have suffered or 
incurred injuries, damages, or costs arising from the promotion, marketing, sale, 
11 
or consumption of tobacco products.  It is also the intention of the Legislature to 
clarify that such claims which were or are brought shall be determined on their 
merits, without the imposition of any claim of statutory bar or categorical defense. 
“(g) This section shall not be construed to grant immunity to a tobacco 
industry research organization.”  (§ 1714.45, as amended by Stats. 1997, ch. 570, 
§ 1, italics added.) 5  
Through subdivisions (b) and (f), the Repeal Statute expressly rescinded the 
statutory immunity from product liability lawsuits for tobacco companies that the 
Legislature had allowed 10 years earlier.  Although the Repeal Statute retained the 
Immunity Statute’s reference to comment i to Section 402A of the Restatement 
Second of Torts, negating liability to voluntary users of certain common but 
inherently unsafe consumer products, the Repeal Statute in subdivision (a) omitted 
tobacco products from specified “inherently unsafe” products. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
We now turn to the question that the Ninth Circuit has asked us to decide:  
“Do the amendments to Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.45 that became effective on January 
1, 1998, apply to a claim that accrued after January 1, 1998, but which is based on 
conduct that occurred prior to January 1, 1998?”  To answer this question we must 
determine how the Repeal Statute affects product liability suits against tobacco 
companies based on their activities as manufacturers and sellers of tobacco products 
before, during, and after the statutory immunity period. 
                                                 
5   
In 1998, the Legislature made nonsubstantive changes to the final sentence 
in subdivision (f) of the Repeal Statute.  It now reads:  “It is also the intention of 
the Legislature to clarify that those claims that were or are brought shall be 
determined on their merits, without the imposition of any claim of statutory bar or 
categorical defense.”  (§ 1714.45, subd. (f), as amended by Stats. 1998, ch. 485, 
§ 38, underlining indicates changes.) 
12 
In certifying the question, the Ninth Circuit noted plaintiff’s contention that 
applying the Repeal Statute in her case would be a prospective rather than a 
retroactive application of that law because she was diagnosed with cancer on April 
8, 1998, three months after January 1, 1998, the date on which the Repeal Statute 
took effect.  We address that issue below. 
A. Whether Applying the Repeal Statute to Defendant Tobacco 
Companies’ Conduct During the Immunity Period Would be a 
Prospective or a Retroactive Application of that Statute 
As we said more than 50 years ago, a retroactive or retrospective law “ ‘is 
one which affects rights, obligations, acts, transactions and conditions which are 
performed or exist prior to the adoption of the statute.’ ”  (Aetna Cas. & Surety 
Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 388, 391; accord, Evangelatos v. Superior 
Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1206 (Evangelatos).)  Similarly, the United States 
Supreme Court has stated:  “ ‘[E]very statute, which takes away or impairs vested 
rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new 
duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations 
already past, must be deemed retrospective.’ ”  (Landgraf v. USI Film Products 
(1994) 511 U.S. 244, 269.)  Phrased another way, a statute that operates to 
“increase a party’s liability for past conduct” is retroactive.  (Id. at p. 280; 
Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1206.) 
As we explained earlier, while the Immunity Statute was in effect—from 
January 1, 1988, through December 31, 1997—no tortious liability attached to a 
tobacco company’s production and distribution of pure and unadulterated tobacco 
products to smokers.  (Former § 1714.45, as amended by Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, 
§ 3, p. 5778; Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1001.)  But on January 1, 1998, the 
California Legislature, through its enactment of the Repeal Statute, terminated that 
statutory immunity.  (§ 1714.45.)  Here, plaintiff started smoking in 1956 and, 
13 
some 41 years later, quit smoking in 1997.  But during 10 of those 41 years, from 
January 1, 1988, to December 31, 1997, because of the Immunity Statute, the 
manufacture and sale of covered products was not tortious.  Accordingly, to have 
the Repeal Statute govern product liability suits against tobacco companies for 
supplying tobacco products to smokers during the immunity period would indeed 
be a retroactive application of that statute because it could subject those companies 
to “liability for past conduct” (Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, 511 U.S. at 
p. 280; see also Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1206) that was lawful during 
the immunity period (Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1001).  Such retroactive 
application is impermissible unless there is an express intent of the Legislature to 
do so.  We explore that issue below. 
B. Whether the California Legislature Expressed an Intent that the 
Repeal Statute Govern Tobacco Companies’ Liability During the 
Immunity Period 
Generally, statutes operate prospectively only.  In the words of section 3 of 
California’s Civil Code:  “No part of [this Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared.”  (Italics added.)  The Ninth Circuit, in certifying the question to us, 
cited our decision in Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at page 1208, when noting 
defendant tobacco companies’ contention that “a retroactive application [of a 
statute] requires either ‘express language or clear and unavoidable implication’ 
from the California Legislature.”  (Myers, supra, 239 F.3d at p. 1032.)  On that 
point, defendants are right.  We explained in Evangelatos:  “ ‘ “[T]he first rule of 
[statutory] construction is that legislation must be considered as addressed to the 
future, not to the past. . . .  The rule has been expressed in varying degrees of 
strength but always of one import, that a retrospective operation will not be given 
to a statute which interferes with antecedent rights . . . unless such be ‘the 
unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the manifest intention of the 
14 
legislature.’ ” ’ ”  (Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1207, quoting United States 
v. Security Industrial Bank (1982) 459 U.S. 70, 78-79, italics omitted.)  In the 
words of the United States Supreme Court, “The ‘principle that the legal effect of 
conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct 
took place has timeless and universal appeal.’ ”  (Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 
supra, 511 U.S. at p. 265; accord, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer 
(1997) 520 U.S. 939, 946.)   
As the United States Supreme Court has consistently stressed, the 
presumption that legislation operates prospectively rather than retroactively is 
rooted in constitutional principles:  “In a free, dynamic society, creativity in both 
commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives people 
confidence about the legal consequences of their actions.  [¶]  It is therefore not 
surprising that the antiretroactivity principle finds expression in several provisions 
of our Constitution.  The Ex Post Facto clause flatly prohibits retroactive 
application of penal legislation. . . .  The Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause[, and] [t]he Due Process Clause also protect[] the interests in fair notice 
and repose that may be compromised by retroactive legislation; a justification 
sufficient to validate a statute’s prospective application under the [Due Process] 
Clause ‘may not suffice’ to warrant its retroactive application.”  (Landgraf v. USI 
Film Products, supra, 511 U.S. at pp. 265-266, italics added; accord, I.N.S. v. St. 
Cyr (2001) 533 U.S. 289, 316.)   
Just as federal courts apply the time-honored legal presumption that statutes 
operate prospectively “unless Congress has clearly manifested its intent to the 
contrary” (Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 946), 
so too California courts comply with the legal principle that unless there is an 
“express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it 
is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature . . . must have intended a 
15 
retroactive application” (Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1209, italics added).  
California courts apply the same “general prospectivity principle” as the United 
States Supreme Court.  (Id. at p. 1208.)  Under this formulation, a statute’s 
retroactivity is, in the first instance, a policy determination for the Legislature and 
one to which courts defer absent “some constitutional objection” to retroactivity.  
(Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 244.)  But “a 
statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed . . . to 
be unambiguously prospective.”  (I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, supra, 533 U.S. at p. 320, fn. 
45; Lindh v. Murphy (1997) 521 U.S. 320, 328, fn. 4 [“ ‘retroactive’ effect 
adequately authorized by a statute” only when statutory language was “so clear 
that it could sustain only one interpretation”].) 
1. Repeal Statute has no express retroactivity language 
In contending that the Repeal Statute is not retroactive, defendant tobacco 
companies contrast it with other California statutes that our Legislature has 
expressly made retroactive.  (See § 1646.5 [“This section applies to contracts . . . 
entered into before, on, or after its effective date; it shall be fully retroactive . . . .” 
(italics added)]; Gov. Code, § 9355.8 [“This section shall have retroactive 
application . . . .” (italics added)].)   
In addition, defendants point to language in the Repeal Statute’s 
subdivision (e) as a clear indication that the Legislature did not intend the Repeal 
Statute to be retroactive.  (§ 1714.45, subd. (e).)  That provision incorporates the 
substance of an earlier amendment to the Immunity Statute, the Public Entity 
Amendment (see fn. 4, ante), which was intended to allow public entities to sue 
tobacco companies notwithstanding the statutory immunity.  When first enacted, 
the Public Entity Amendment added to the Immunity Statute a provision, 
subdivision (d), which stated that in an “action brought by a public entity, the fact 
that the injured individual’s claim against the defendant may be barred by this 
16 
section shall not be a defense.”  (Former § 1714.45, subd. (d), as added by Stats. 
1997, ch. 25, § 2, italics added.)  But when that provision became subdivision (e) 
of the Repeal Statute, the Legislature rephrased it to state that a public entity’s suit 
against a tobacco company would not be precluded by “the fact that the injured 
individual’s claim against the defendant may be barred by a prior version of this 
section.”  (§ 1714.45, subd. (e), as added by Stats. 1997, ch. 570, § 1, italics 
added.)  The italicized language suggests that even after the January 1, 1998, 
effective date of the Repeal Statute, “a prior version” of that statute, namely the 
Immunity Statute, may continue to bar claims against tobacco companies brought 
by individual smokers.   
Plaintiff insists that certain phrases in the Repeal Statute are express 
legislative declarations of retroactivity notwithstanding the absence of the term 
“retroactive” in that provision.  When enacted, subdivision (f) of the Repeal 
Statute provided:  “It is the intention of the Legislature in enacting the 
amendments to subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section adopted at the 1997-98 
Regular Session to declare that there exists no statutory bar to tobacco-related 
personal injury, wrongful death, or other tort claims against tobacco manufacturers 
and their successors in interest by California smokers or others who have suffered 
or incurred injuries, damages, or costs arising from the promotion, marketing, 
sale, or consumption of tobacco products.  It is also the intention of the Legislature 
to clarify that such claims which were or are brought shall be determined on their 
merits, without the imposition of any claim of statutory bar or categorical 
defense.”  (§ 1714.45, subd. (f), as added by Stats. 1997, ch. 570, § 1, italics 
added.)  
Focusing on the italicized phrases in isolation, plaintiff asserts, as does the 
dissent, that they are express declarations of the California Legislature’s intent to 
retroactively apply the statute repealing the tobacco companies’ immunity from 
17 
products liability lawsuits brought by smokers.  We are not persuaded.  Neither the 
italicized phrases nor section 1714.45, subdivision (f) as a whole states anything 
more than that the Repeal Statute rescinded any former statutory immunity for 
tobacco companies.  But even were we to accept that proposed reading of 
subdivision (f), the Repeal Statute is, at best, ambiguous on the question of 
retroactivity because of the Legislature’s reference in subdivision (e) (allowing 
public entities to sue tobacco companies) to “a prior version” of the statute as 
possibly precluding suits against tobacco companies by individual smokers.  This 
ambiguity requires us to construe the Repeal Statute as “unambiguously 
prospective.”  (I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, supra, 533 U.S. at p. 320, fn. 45.)   
Furthermore, the time-honored presumption against retroactive application 
of a statute, as reflected in section 3 of the California Civil Code as well as in 
decisions by this court and the United States Supreme Court, would be 
meaningless if the vague phrases relied on by plaintiff and the dissent were 
considered sufficient to satisfy the test of a “clear[] manifest[ation]” (Hughes 
Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 946) or an 
“ ‘ “ ‘unequivocal and inflexible’ ” ’ ” assertion (Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at 
p. 1207, italics omitted) of the Repeal Statute’s retroactivity.  After a painstaking 
review of the entire Repeal Statute, we find it to be devoid of any express 
legislative intent of retroactivity.  Although we agree with the dissent that “no 
talismanic word or phrase is required to establish retroactivity” (dis. opn. of 
Moreno, J., post, at p. 1), we do not agree there is language in the Repeal Statute 
of the unequivocal and inflexible statement of retroactivity that Evangelatos 
requires.   
Interestingly, the Attorney General, in his role as amicus curiae for plaintiff, 
does not join plaintiff in urging this court to construe the Repeal Statute as 
retroactive.  Instead, in an effort to avoid “the constitutional concerns inherent in 
18 
retroactive laws,” the Attorney General argues that the Immunity Statute did nothing 
more than codify the common law defense of assumption of risk, a statutory defense 
that the Legislature, by its enactment of the Repeal Statute effective January 1, 
1998, eliminated for all trials after that date. 
The Attorney General’s argument disregards the logical basis of this court’s 
1997 decision in Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th 985, 1001, which construed the 
Immunity Statute not as codifying an existing affirmative defense for trial but as 
declaring legally permissible and not wrongful certain conduct of tobacco 
companies.  Applying Richards here, we reject the Attorney General’s 
interpretation of the Immunity Statute. 
2. Extrinsic sources provide no clear indication of legislative intent to 
apply the Repeal Statute retroactively 
In contending that the Repeal Statute’s legislative history is a “very clear” 
indicator that the California Legislature intended the statute to apply retroactively, 
plaintiff points to a brief comment in a report of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
prepared for the April 8, 1997, hearing on the bill to enact the Repeal Statute.  The 
comment appears under the heading “Prospective repeal only” and states:  “Some 
concern has been expressed that Senate Bill No. 67 would apply only to causes of 
action arising on or after January 1, 1998, assuming it is enacted this year.  In the 
absence of specific language in the legislation specifying retroactive application, a 
measure will operate prospectively only. . . .”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. 
Bill No. 67 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 8, 1997, p. 3.)  Plaintiff observes that just 
eight days later, an amendment added to the bill language stating that “there exists no 
statutory bar to . . . tobacco-related personal injury, wrongful death, or other tort 
claims by California smokers or others who have suffered or incurred injuries,” and 
indicating “that such claims which were or are brought” should be determined on 
their merits.  (Sen. Bill No. 67 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 16, 1997, 
19 
italics added; now § 1714.45, subd. (f).)  Plaintiff characterizes this amendment as the 
Legislature’s “direct response” to the expressed “concern” about retroactivity, and 
thus as comprising a “very clear” indication that the Repeal Statute was to apply 
retroactively.  We are not persuaded. 
As we observed earlier, a statute may be applied retroactively only if it 
contains express language of retroactivity or if other sources provide a clear and 
unavoidable implication that the Legislature intended retroactive application.  
(Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1208.)  Addressing in this section the latter 
ground, we conclude that plaintiff has not shown a clear and unavoidable 
implication of legislative intent to apply the Repeal Statute retroactively.  The 
committee report that plaintiff cites merely states the general rule that legislation 
operates prospectively unless there is clear language of retroactivity; nothing in 
that report indicates that the Legislature desired retroactive application of the 
Repeal Statute.  The April 16, 1997, bill amendment adding language to 
subdivision (f) of the Repeal Statute does not cure this omission, because the 
added language does not itself supply an unavoidable implication that the 
Legislature intended to subject tobacco companies to potential tort liability for 
conduct occurring during the 10-year period when the Immunity Statute declared 
that very conduct to be lawful.  Its addition to the Repeal Statute eight days after 
some unspecified person voiced concern about retroactivity suggests that 
subdivision (f) may have been “the product of a legislative compromise” (Fremont 
Compensation Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 867, 874), a way 
for legislators with differing views on retroactivity to vote for the Repeal Statute.  
“Avoiding resolution of disputed points is one of the classic means by which 
legislators are able to achieve agreement on legislative text.”  (Id. at pp. 873-874; 
accord, J.A. Jones Construction Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 
1568, 1577.) 
20 
Plaintiff also points to comments by the Repeal Statute’s author that 
“tobacco companies may have deliberately manipulated the level of nicotine” in 
tobacco products and “waged an aggressive campaign of disinformation about the 
health consequences of tobacco use.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill 
No. 67 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 8, 1997, p. 2.)  According to plaintiff, these 
comments reflect the Legislature’s intent to remedy “past fraud” by tobacco 
companies by making the Repeal Statute retroactive.  Not so.   
Those comments were simply reasons given “in support of repeal” of the 
statutory immunity for tobacco companies (Sen. Com. on Judiciary Rep. on Sen. 
Bill No. 67 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 8, 1997, p. 2); they did not at all address 
retroactivity of the Repeal Statute.  Moreover, we have repeatedly declined to 
discern legislative intent from comments by a bill’s author because they reflect 
only the views of a single legislator instead of those of the Legislature as a whole.  
(Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1062; Grupe 
Development Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 4 Cal.4th 911, 922.)6   
3. Constitutional considerations reinforce our reading of the Repeal 
Statute as not having retroactive application 
 
Earlier we discussed the constitutional underpinnings of the presumption 
against a statute’s retroactive application.  That presumption has particular force in 
this case, in which retroactive application of the California Legislature’s repeal of 
tobacco companies’ statutory immunity from product liability lawsuits could 
                                                 
6   
The dissent broadly asserts that these comments by the bill’s author and 
similar remarks in a letter supporting passage of the Repeal Statute “suggest” that 
the 1987 enactment of the statutory immunity was “secured in part by deceptive 
representations by the tobacco companies about the lethal nature of their product.”  
(Dis. opn. of Moreno, J., post, at p. 7, fn. 2.)  Neither these comments nor anything 
else in the record before us show that the 1987 legislation was indeed a product of 
deception by tobacco companies.  As an appellate court, we may not consider 
assertions of fact that are not supported by the record.  (See People v. Szeto (1981) 
29 Cal.3d 20, 35.)   
21 
expose them to huge monetary damages for conduct that occurred during the 
statutory immunity period when that conduct carried no tort liability.   
Instructive on this point is the United States Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel (1998) 524 U.S. 498 (Apfel), in which the 
high court invalidated a federal law that retroactively imposed on coal mining 
companies substantial financial obligations for the health care of their retired 
workers.  In a plurality opinion, four of the nine justices concluded the law was an 
unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution.  
(Apfel, supra, at p. 538 (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.).)  In his concurring opinion, 
Justice Kennedy concluded that the act violated the Fifth Amendment’s due 
process clause by retroactively creating liability for past conduct.  (Apfel, supra, at 
p. 549 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).)  He observed:  “If retroactive laws change the 
legal consequences of transactions long closed, the change can destroy the 
reasonable certainty and security which are the very objects of property 
ownership.  As a consequence, due process protection for property must be 
understood to incorporate our settled tradition against retroactive laws of great 
severity.  Groups targeted by retroactive laws, were they to be denied all 
protection, would have a justified fear that a government once formed to protect 
expectations now can destroy them.  Both stability of investment and confidence 
in the constitutional system, then, are secured by due process restrictions against 
severe retroactive legislation.”  (Id. at pp. 548-549 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) 
In an earlier decision, Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, 511 U.S. 244, 
the high court questioned the constitutionality of legislation that retroactively 
would result in the imposition of punitive damages for particularly egregious 
conduct, suggesting it might violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post 
facto laws.  (U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 3 [restricting federal government]; see also 
id., art. I, § 10, cl. 1 [restricting state governments]; Cal. Const., art. I, § 9.)  In the 
22 
words of the high court:  “The very labels given ‘punitive’ or ‘exemplary’ 
damages, as well as the rationales that support them, demonstrate that they share 
key characteristics of criminal sanctions.  Retroactive imposition of punitive 
damages would raise a serious constitutional question.”  (Landgraf v. USI Film 
Products, supra, at p. 281.)   
An established rule of statutory construction requires us to construe statutes 
to avoid “constitutional infirmit[ies].”  (United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co. 
(1909) 213 U.S. 366, 407-408; United States v. Security Industrial Bank, supra, 
459 U.S. 70, 78; see also Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 670, 727-728 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  That rule reinforces 
our construction of the Repeal Statute as prospective only.   
C.  Whether the Immunity Statute Precludes Recovery for Defendants’ 
Conduct Before the Immunity Period 
Plaintiff began smoking cigarettes in 1956 and continued to do so until 
1997, a period of 41 years.  For 10 years of this period—from January 1, 1988, 
through December 31, 1997—the Immunity Statute was in effect to shield tobacco 
companies from liability for personal injuries that their tobacco products caused to 
voluntary consumers.  Because, as explained above, the Repeal Statute is not 
retroactive, plaintiff has no product liability claim against defendant tobacco 
companies for their conduct in manufacturing and distributing cigarettes during 
the statutory immunity period. 
Regarding the portion of plaintiff’s claim attributable to her use of cigarettes 
that defendant tobacco companies manufactured or distributed before the period of 
statutory immunity afforded those companies, defendants contend that the Immunity 
Statute shields them from liability.  In support, they point out that the statute was 
expressly retroactive, covering during its effective period “all product liability 
actions pending on, or commenced after, January 1, 1988” (former § 1714.45, subd. 
23 
(c), as added by Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, § 3, p. 5779), whereas (as we hold here) the 
Repeal Statute was not retroactive and thus could not remove any of the protection 
conferred by the Immunity Statute.  We reject defendants’ contention. 
Although the Repeal Statute has no retroactive effect, it nonetheless 
removed the protection that the Immunity Statute gave to tobacco companies for 
their conduct occurring before the Immunity Statute’s effective date.  This is so 
because a retroactive effect is one that “impair[s] rights a party possessed when he 
acted.”  (Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 280, italics added.)  
The Repeal Statute did not impair any rights that tobacco companies possessed 
before the immunity period.  On the contrary, by abrogating the Immunity Statute, 
the Repeal Statute restored the law governing product liability for the manufacture 
or sale of tobacco products to what it had been before the January 1, 1988, 
effective date of the Immunity Statute. 
Before January 1, 1988, general tort principles defined the extent of any tort 
liability that tobacco companies might have for manufacturing or distributing their 
tobacco products for sale to voluntary consumers.  When, 10 years later, the 
California Legislature repealed the statutory immunity for tobacco manufacturers in 
product liability actions, it reinstated those general tort rules.  This repeal did not 
“change the legal consequences” (Apfel, supra, 524 U.S. at p. 548) of defendants’ 
conduct in manufacturing or distributing tobacco products before the effective date of 
the immunity.  Nor could defendants reasonably have relied upon the Immunity 
Statute before its enactment.  (See In re Marriage of Buol (1985) 39 Cal.3d 751, 761.)  
Accordingly, repeal of the Immunity Statute eliminated any retroactive effect it may 
have had, so that the tort liability, if any, that defendants could incur for their conduct 
before the effective date of the Immunity Statute is determined by applying general 
tort principles. 
24 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Repeal Statute rescinding the tobacco companies’ statutory immunity in 
certain product liability lawsuits contains no express retroactivity provision.  Nor has 
the Legislature given any clear indication that it wanted the Repeal Statute to apply 
retroactively.  Thus, the Immunity Statute continues to shield defendant tobacco 
companies in product liability actions but only for conduct they engaged in during the 
10-year period when the Immunity Statute was in effect.  The liability of tobacco 
companies based on their conduct outside the 10-year period of immunity is governed 
by general tort principles.  We stress, however, that we are not here asked to decide, 
and do not decide, what liability, if any, defendants may have under those general tort 
principles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J.  
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
I agree with the majority that “to have the Repeal Statute govern product 
liability suits against tobacco companies . . . would indeed be retroactive 
application of that statute . . . .”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.)  Unlike the majority, 
however, I believe both the statutory language and the legislative history of Civil 
Code section 1714.51 evince a clear legislative intent to apply the statute 
retroactively.  I further conclude that such retroactive application would not raise 
serious questions of constitutionality.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.) 
 
Statutes are presumed to operate prospectively.  (Evangelatos v. Superior 
Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1208 (Evangelatos); Civ. Code, § 3.)  “Of course, 
when the Legislature clearly intends a statute to operate retrospectively, we are 
obliged to carry out that intent unless due process considerations prevent us.  
[Citation.]”  (Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 
243.)  Whether the Legislature intended retroactive application of a statute 
requires an exercise in statutory interpretation to ascertain if, by “ ‘express 
language or clear and unavoidable implication,’ ” the presumption of prospective 
application has been overcome.  (Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1208.)  As 
this formulation in Evangelatos suggests, no talismanic word or phrase is required 
to establish retroactivity.  Rather, the question is whether, from the language 
employed in the statute, there plainly emerges a legislative intent for the statute to 
operate retrospectively.  Moreover, even in the absence of an express retroactivity 
                                                 
1  
All statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated. 
 
2
provision, a statute may still be applied retroactively if the Legislature’s intention 
is sufficiently clear from such extrinsic sources as legislative history.  (Id. at pp. 
1208-1209.) 
 
Contrary to the majority, I conclude that subdivision (f) of section 1714.45 
(added by Stats. 1997, ch. 570, § 1; all references to the Repeal Statute are to the 
1997 enactment) is a sufficiently unambiguous statement of the Legislature’s 
intent that the Repeal Statute be given retrospective effect.  In reaching this 
conclusion, I rely on the familiar principle of statutory construction that requires, 
in the first instance, consulting the word of the statute itself to ascertain legislative 
intent.  (Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg (1985) 38 Cal.3d 46, 51.)  “The 
court is required to give effect to statutes ‘ “ ‘according to the usual, ordinary 
import of the language employed in framing them.’  [Citations.]  ‘If possible, 
significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in 
pursuance of the legislative purpose [ ]’ [citation]; ‘a construction making some 
words surplusage is to be avoided.’  [Citation.]” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 52.) 
 
Subdivision (f) of section 1714.45 states:  “It is the intention of the 
Legislature in enacting the amendments to subdivision (a) and (b) of this section 
adopted at the 1997-98 Regular Session to declare that there exists no statutory 
bar to tobacco-related personal injury, wrongful death, or other tort claims against 
tobacco manufacturers and their successors in interest by California smokers or 
others who have suffered or incurred injuries, damages, or costs arising from the 
promotion, marketing, sale, or consumption of tobacco products.  It is also the 
intention of the Legislature to clarify that those claims that were or are brought 
shall be determined on their merits, without the imposition of any claim of 
statutory bar or categorical defense.”  (Italics added.) 
 
A statute speaks from the day it takes effect.  (Hersh v. State Bar (1972) 7 
Cal.3d 241, 245.)  The inclusion of persons who “have suffered or incurred 
injuries” as among those to whom the abolition of the statutory immunity applies 
cannot be understood to mean anything other than that the Legislature, speaking as 
 
3
of January 1, 1998, intended to eliminate immunity for past injury-producing 
conduct by the tobacco industry.  This construction of section 1714.45, 
subdivision (f) is further supported by the next sentence which declares an intent 
that “those claims that were or are brought shall be determined, without the 
imposition of any statutory bar or categorical defense.”  The ordinary meaning of 
this language plainly precludes assertion by the tobacco companies of a statutory 
bar or other categorical defense not only to claims which may be brought in the 
future (“are brought”) but those based on past conduct (“were . . . brought”) as to 
which the original enactment (Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, § 3, p. 5778; hereafter the 
Immunity Statute) might otherwise have applied. 
 
The majority is “not persuaded” that these “phrases in isolation” express 
the Legislature’s intent that the Repeal Statute should retroactively applied.  (Maj. 
opn. at pp. 16-17.)  The majority asserts:  “Neither the italicized phrases nor 
section 1714.45, subdivision (f) as a whole states anything more than that Repeal 
Statute rescinded any former statutory immunity for tobacco companies.”  (Maj. 
opn. at p. 17.)  This conclusory statement, however, fails to suggest an alternative 
interpretation of the statute.  In this respect, the majority’s approach does not 
comport with the principle of statutory construction that requires a reviewing court 
to give significance, if possible, to every word and phrase of a statute and avoid a 
construction that renders some words surplusage.  (Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & 
Rothberg, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 52.)  The majority then goes on to state that, even 
“were we to accept this reading of subdivision (f), the Repeal Statute is, at best, 
ambiguous on the question of retroactivity because of the Legislature’s reference 
in subdivision (e) (allowing public entities to sue tobacco companies) to a ‘a prior 
version’ of the statute as possibly precluding suits against tobacco companies by 
individual smokers.”  Having thus discerned this ambiguity, the majority would 
apply the rule that a statute ambiguous as to retroactive application is to be applied 
prospectively.  (Maj. opn. at p. 17.)  As I point out elsewhere, however, 
subdivision (e) does not conflict with the legislative mandate in subdivision (f) 
 
4
that the Repeal Statute be applied retroactively but, rather, addresses another 
legislative concern entirely; the possibility that the courts might determine that 
constitutional considerations preclude retroactivity, in which event, the Legislature 
carved out in subdivision (e) an exemption for public entities.  In my view, 
therefore, subdivision (e) does not create an ambiguity.  I would also observe that, 
by construing these two subdivisions so as to create a apparent conflict between 
them, the majority’s interpretation is contrary to the fundamental principle of 
statutory construction that requires us, in construing legislation, “to harmonize its 
various elements without doing violence to its language or spirit.”  (Wells v. 
Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781, 788.) 
 
I find further support for my conclusion that the Legislature intended 
retroactive application of the Repeal Statute in the legislative history surrounding 
the addition of subdivision (f) to section 1714.45.  This history strongly suggests 
that subdivision (f) was added in response to a concern that the statute might only 
apply prospectively. 
 
Senate Bill No. 67, as originally proposed, did not contain what eventually 
became subdivision (f), nor any other declaration of legislative intent.  (Sen. Bill 
No. 67 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) § 1, as introduced Dec. 11, 1996.)  In anticipation 
of an April 1997 hearing on the bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted that 
“[s]ome concern has been expressed that [Senate Bill No.] 67 would apply only to 
causes of action arising on or after January 1, 1998, assuming it is enacted this 
year.  In the absence of specific language in the legislature specifying retroactive 
application, a measure will operate prospectively only upon its enactment.”  (Sen. 
Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 67 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
Feb. 14, 1997, italics added.)  One week after this acknowledgement of concern 
about a prospective-only application of amendments as then drawn, the bill was 
amended further by the insertion of what would become subdivision (f).  (Sen. Bill 
No. 67 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) § 1, subd. (d), as amended Apr. 16, 1997.) 
 
5
 
The proximity of these events suggests that subdivision (f) was added to 
section 1714.45 in response to the concern expressed in the committee report.  At 
minimum, that “the retroactivity question was actually consciously considered 
during the enactment process” (Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1211) supports 
a conclusion that retroactivity was intended. 
 
The majority, examining this legislative history, simply concludes that the 
addition of subdivision (f) “may have been” the product of legislative compromise 
that allowed legislators with “differing views on retroactivity to vote for the 
Repeal Statute.”  (Maj. opn. at p. 19.)  But no “differing views” are expressed in 
the committee report regarding retroactivity and I cannot agree with the majority’s 
explanation of the report.  The plain meaning of the language used in subdivision 
(f) and the legislative history seem to me to unmistakably document such intent. 
 
To buttress the assertion that subdivision (f) does not mean what it says, the 
majority, like defendants, cites subdivision (e) of section 1714.45.  Subdivision (e) 
essentially reiterates an amendment to the Immunity Statute that exempted public 
entities from the statute.  The original provision in the Immunity Statute stated that 
in an “action brought by a public entity, the fact that the injured individual’s claim 
against the defendant may be barred by this section shall not be a defense.”  
(§ 1714.45, former subd. (d), as amended by Stats. 1997, ch. 25, § 2, eff. June 12, 
1997.)  The current version in the Repeal Statute provides “[i]n the action brought 
by a public entity, the fact that the individual’s claim against the defendant may be 
barred by a prior version of this statute shall not be a defense.”  (§ 1714.45, subd. 
(e), italics added.) 
 
The majority finds that the phrase “a prior version of this section” suggests 
that “even after the January 1, 1998, the effective date of the Repeal Statute, ‘a 
prior version’ of that statute, namely the Immunity Statute may continue to bar 
claims against tobacco companies brought by individual smokers.”  (Maj. opn. at 
p. 16.)  In my view, subdivision (e) of section 1714.45 simply reflects the 
Legislature’s concern that, notwithstanding its intent that the Repeal Statute apply 
 
6
retroactively, the courts might decline to give retroactive effect to the statute based 
on due process or other constitutional concerns raised by retroactivity.  (Western 
Security Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 243 [“Of course, when the 
Legislature clearly intends a statute to operate retrospectively, we are obliged to 
carry out that intent unless due process considerations prevent us” (italics 
added)].)  Indeed, the majority touches upon these constitutional issues and while, 
in my view, they provide no basis to deny retroactive application of the Repeal 
Statute, the Legislature could not have forecast with absolute certainty whether its 
intent to apply the statute retroactively would survive a court challenge.  This 
uncertainty by the Legislature is demonstrated by its use of the word “may.”  
Therefore, the Legislature chose to make it clear that, at minimum, suits by public 
entities would not be precluded by judicial fiat.  This interpretation harmonizes 
subdivisions (e) and (f), which, notably, the majority’s approach does not.  (Wells 
v. Marina City Properties, Inc , supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 788 [“It is fundamental that 
legislation should be construed so as to harmonize its various elements without 
doing violence to its language or spirit.”].) 
 
Finally, the majority suggests that constitutional considerations reinforce its 
interpretation of the Repeal Statute as not having retroactive application.  (Maj. 
opn. at p. 20.)  Specifically, the majority alludes to potential due process and ex 
post facto issues.  The retroactive application of any statute must be vetted for 
constitutionality, but I do not agree that constitutional considerations support a 
conclusion of non-retroactivity.  Nor are the cases cited by the majority persuasive 
in this respect.  The concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy in Eastern Enterprises 
v. Apfel (1998) 524 U.S. 498, 548-549, states little more than the truism that 
retroactive laws must meet the test of due process.  The majority’s citation to 
dictum in Landgraf v. USI Film Products (1994) 511 U.S. 244, on the ex post 
facto issue is equally general. 
 
Retroactive application of a statute may be unconstitutional if, inter alia, it 
deprives a person of a vested right without due process of law.  (In re Marriage of 
 
7
Buol (1985) 39 Cal.3d 751, 756.)  I am not convinced that the immunity conferred 
in this case, however, is a vested right.  First, the immunity involved here was 
wholly a creation of statute, and its abolition does not affect the tobacco 
companies’ right to assert common law defenses in product liability actions.  (Cf. 
Callet v. Alioto (1930) 210 Cal. 65, 68 [statutory rights, unlike common law rights, 
not vested for purposes of retroactive application of a statute because “all statutory 
remedies are pursued with full realization that the legislature may abolish the right 
to recover at any time”].)  Second, I question whether a statutory immunity 
secured in part by deceptive representations by the tobacco companies about the 
lethal nature of their product should be deemed a vested right under any 
circumstance.2 
 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Immunity Statute created a vested right, 
it is settled that “[v]ested rights are not immutable; the state, exercising its police 
power, may impair such rights when considered reasonably necessary to protect 
the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the people.”  (In re Marriage of 
                                                 
2  The majority asserts that there is no proof in the record that the 1987 legislation 
was the product of deception by tobacco companies.  (Maj. opn. at p. 20, fn. 6.)  
At the time the Repeal Statute was proposed its author explained the need for the 
legislation was due in part to evidence that “the tobacco companies may have 
deliberately manipulated the level of nicotine” and also that “evidence shows the 
tobacco companies have systematically suppressed and concealed material 
information and waged an aggressive campaign of disinformation about the health 
consequences of tobacco use.”  (Sen. Com. On Judiciary Rep. On Sen. Bill 67 
(199701998 Reg. Sess.) p. 2.)  In the same report, the California Medical 
Association, identified as “one of the main participants” in the 1987 legislation 
stated in support of the bill that “‘[o]ver the last decade we have learned much 
regarding the addictive nature of tobacco and the industry’s intentional efforts to 
mislead the public on the health effects of tobacco.  This, coupled with the courts’ 
broad interpretation of the California statute, has precipitated the need to change 
that statute and remove tobacco’s liability protections.’”  (Ibid.)  I submit that 
these remarks, particularly the comments of the California Medical Association  
which was a participant in the 1987 legislation, suggest that the tobacco 
companies did deceive the other parties to the legislative effort that resulted in the 
Immunity Statute. 
 
8
Buol, supra, 39 Cal.3d  at pp. 760-761.)  “In determining whether a retroactive law 
contravenes the due process clause, we consider such factors as the significance of 
the state interest served by the law, the importance of the retroactive application of 
the law to the effectuation of that interest, the extent of reliance upon the former 
law, the legitimacy of that reliance, the extent of actions taken on the basis of that 
reliance, and the extent to which the retroactive application of the new law would 
disrupt those actions.”  (In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 592.)  
 
I submit that, if the due process issue actually arose, all these factors would 
weigh heavily in favor of finding that retroactive application of the Repeal Statute 
does not contravene the due process clause.  The state has a substantial interest in 
seeing that victims of dangerous products are compensated for their injuries by the 
manufacturers of dangerous or defective products that are in the best position to 
provide such compensation.  (Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart (1978) 21 Cal.3d 
322, 330 [“one of the principal social policies served by product liability doctrine 
is to assign liability to a party who possesses the ability to distribute losses over an 
appropriate segment of society . . . .”].)  The state has an equally substantial 
interest in protecting and promoting the health of Californians.  These interests 
would be significantly advanced by retroactive application of the Repeal Statute.  
 
The Repeal Statute restores the right of Californians suffering from 
smoking-related illnesses to pursue product liability actions against the tobacco 
companies.  Such meritorious actions would properly compensate the victims and 
would also shift the costs for their care from the public health system, to the extent 
the victims rely on public health care, to the tobacco companies.  Furthermore, 
such actions expose the life-threatening consequences of tobacco use, as well as 
the tobacco companies’ deceptive practices in promoting the use of their products.  
In the past, such suits have helped create a popular repugnance toward the tobacco 
companies and their products that has, in turn, contributed to a decline in the 
amount of consumption of tobacco products, thus promoting the health of the 
populace and reducing health costs associated with tobacco use.  Retroactive 
 
9
application of the Repeal Statute would serve both goals of victim compensation 
and reduction of the use of tobacco products.  By contrast, the tobacco companies 
can claim little reliance on the decade-old Immunity Statute, since the claims 
ordinarily advanced in these kinds of suits involve conduct stretching back 
decades.  Furthermore, as I observed, retroactive application of the Repeal Statute 
does not strip the tobacco companies of their common law defenses. 
 
Briefly, the majority also suggests that retroactive application of the Repeal 
Statute could implicate the prohibition against ex post facto laws because of the 
potential availability of punitive damages.  Again, however, the majority does not 
engage in an in-depth analysis that demonstrates retroactive application of the 
Repeal Statute would in fact violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.  
Furthermore, the brief discussion of this point in the case cited by the majority, 
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, 511 U.S. 244, is dictum.  (Id. at p. 281.)  
Assuming a punitive damages award might be deemed penal for purposes of the 
ex post facto clause, the clause applies only if the challenged law makes criminal 
conduct that was not criminal at the time the action was performed.  (Ibid.  
[“Before we entertain [the ex post facto] question, we would have to be confronted 
with a statute that explicitly authorized punitive damages for preenactment 
conduct”]; Collins v. Youngblood (1989) 497 U.S. 37, 42.) 
 
The conduct engaged in by the tobacco companies that might support an 
award of punitive damages in the instant case stretches back far beyond the 10-
year period during which the Immunity Statute was in effect.  As the majority 
concludes elsewhere in the opinion, neither due process concerns nor the ex post 
facto clause shield the tobacco companies from liability, presumably including 
punitive damages, for conduct they engaged in prior to the enactment of the 
Immunity Statute in 1988.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 22-23.)  The effect of the 
Repeal Statute in that case is simply to restore the status quo ante that existed 
before January 1, 1988.  Since the tobacco companies’ conduct that is the basis of 
the instant suit is a continuous course of action that encompasses several decades, 
 
10
I question whether a plausible ex post facto claim could be made.  To do so the 
tobacco companies would be required to isolate specific acts that occurred during 
the immunity period and identify the percentage of a punitive damages award 
attributable to such conduct.  This is not their position.  Rather, they have argued 
that the Immunity Statute insulates them from any liability, including their pre-
1988 conduct.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 22.)  Therefore, the ex post facto concern 
raised by the majority seems both theoretical and dubious and does not present a 
substantive reason for declining to carry out the Legislature’s will by retroactively 
applying the Repeal Statute.  
 
For all these reasons, therefore, I dissent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J.  
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Myers v. Phillip Morris Co., Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX (on certification pursuant to rule 29.5, Cal. Rules of Court) 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S095213 
Date Filed: August 5, 2002 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Bourdette & Partners, Philip C. Bourdette and André P. Gaston for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Wartnick, Chaber, Harowitz & Tigerman, Harry F. Wartnick, Madelyn J. Chaber; Law Offices of Daniel U. 
Smith, Daniel U. Smith and Ted W. Pelletier for Patricia Henley, Leslie Whiteley and Leonard Whiteley as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Dennis Eckhart, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Peter M. Williams, Deputy Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for  Respondent: 
 
Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk & Rabkin and H. Joseph Escher III for Defendant and 
Respondent R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. 
 
Munger, Tolles & Olson, Michael R. Doyen, Fred A. Rowley, Jr., Daniel P. Collins and Ronald L. Olsen 
for Defendant and Respondent Philip Morris Incorporated. 
 
Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold and Frederick D. Baker for Defendant and Respondent Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corporation. 
 
William L. Gausewitz for The Alliance of American Insurers, The American Insurance Association, The 
National Association of Independent Insurers, The National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies 
and The Reinsurance Association of America as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Fred Main for California Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Philip C. Bourdette 
Bourdette & Partners 
2924 W. Main street 
Visalia, CA  93291 
(559) 625-8425 
 
Daniel U. Smith 
Law Offices of Daniel U. Smith 
Post Office Box 278 
Kentfield, CA  94914 
(415) 461-5630 
 
Ronald L. Olson 
Munger, Tolles & Olson 
355 South Grand Avenue 
Los Angeles, CA  90071-1560 
(213) 683-9100