Case Title: Lussier v. MD Racing Commission

Citation: 343 Md. 681

Docket Number: 96/94

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 96, September Term, 1994
Frank P. Lussier v. Maryland Racing Commission
[Concerns The Validity, As Applied To A Racehorse Owner, Of A
Maryland Racing 
Commission 
Regulation 
Which 
Authorizes 
The
Commission To Impose A Monetary Penalty Not Exceeding $5,000 Upon A
Person Subject To Its Jurisdiction Who, inter alia, Violates The
Commission's Regulations]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 96 
September Term, 1994
________________________________________
FRANK P. LUSSIER
v.
MARYLAND RACING COMMISSION
_______________________________________
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
    McAuliffe, John F.
 (Retired, specially
          assigned), 
    
            JJ.
________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
 Bell, J., dissents.
________________________________________
        Filed:  November 8, 1996
       COMAR 09.10.04.03D provides as follows:
1
"D. Denials of Licenses and Sanctions.
(1) The Commission may refuse to issue
or renew a license, or may suspend or revoke a
license issued by it, if it finds that the
applicant or licensee:
    (a) Has engaged in unethical or
criminal conduct;
    (b) Is associating or consorting
with an individual who has been convicted of a
crime in any jurisdiction;
    (c) Is consorting or associating
with, or has consorted with, a bookmaker,
tout, or individual of similar pursuits;
    (d) Is, or has been, operating as a
bookmaker, tout, or a similar pursuit;
    (e) Is not financially responsible;
    (f) Has been engaged in, or at-
tempted to engage in, any fraud or misrepre-
sentation in connection with the racing or
breeding of a horse;
    (g) Assaults, or threatens to do
bodily injury to, a member of the Commission
or any of its employees or representatives or
(continued...)
The single issue before us in this case concerns the
validity, as applied to a racehorse owner, of a Maryland Racing
Commission regulation which authorizes the Commission to impose a
monetary penalty not exceeding $5,000 upon a person subject to its
jurisdiction who, inter alia, violates the Commission's regula-
tions.1
- 2 -
     (...continued)
1
a member or employee of an association;
    (h) Has engaged in conduct detri-
mental to racing; or
    (i) Has violated, or attempted to
violate:
        (i) A law or regulation in any
jurisdiction, including this State, or 
        (ii) A condition imposed by the
Commission.
(2) Instead of, or in addition to,
suspending a license, the Commission may
impose a fine not exceeding $5,000.
(3) In determining the penalty to be
imposed, the Commission shall consider the:
    (a) Seriousness of the violation;
    (b) Harm caused by the violation;
    (c) Good faith or lack of good
faith of the licensee; and
    (d) Licensing history of the
licensee."
Other regulations authorize fines or monetary penalties in various
amounts, but not exceeding $5,000, for certain specific types of
misconduct.  See, e.g., COMAR 09.10.03.02.
Although there has been no substantial change in the regulations
pertinent to this case since 1992, the numbering of the regulations
has changed.  Except for quotations, we shall in this opinion use
the current numbering of the regulations.
I.
The petitioner, Frank P. Lussier, is a Vermont resident who
purchased three thoroughbred racehorses in the spring of 1991.
Later in 1991, the three horses were shipped to Maryland where they
raced at the Laurel Race Course in three races on November 26,
1991, December 29, 1991, and December 31, 1991. Lussier was
licensed by the Maryland Racing Commission as an owner of race-
horses, and his license expired at the end of 1991. Lussier did not
- 3 -
       Under COMAR 09.10.01.25 and 09.10.01.28, an owner of a
2
racehorse is not allowed to start the horse in a race subject to
the Maryland Racing Commission's jurisdiction unless that owner is
licensed by the Commission.  The license is issued on an annual
basis, and expires on December 31st of each year.
      In light of the limited issue before this Court, we have no
3
occasion to set forth the evidence presented at the administrative
hearing regarding Lussier's misconduct.  A detailed review of the
evidence is contained in the comprehensive opinion of the Court of
Special Appeals. See Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 100 Md.
(continued...)
renew his Maryland license for 1992 or thereafter.2
In February 1992, the Maryland Racing Commission and the
Thoroughbred Racing Protective Bureau commenced an investigation
with regard to the races on November 26, December 29, and Decem-
ber 31, to determine whether the true owner or trainer of the three
horses had been concealed and whether falsified workout reports for
the three horses had been published. Upon the completion of the
investigation, and after a hearing before the Commission on July 1,
1992, the Commission found that Lussier had participated in
"improper acts in relation to racing in violation of COMAR
09.10.01.11(A)(3);" that Lussier transferred two of his horses
"from himself to the name of another person for a purpose other
than the legitimate sale of the horses in violation of COMAR
09.10.01.11(A)(14);" and that Lussier perpetrated "dishonest acts
in connection with his activities, responsibilities and duties on
the race track, and has engaged in conduct detrimental to racing in
violation of COMAR 09.10.01.25(B)(8)." In an order issued on
July 24, 1992, the Commission imposed a $5,000 fine upon Lussier.3
- 4 -
     (...continued)
3
App. 190, 640 A.2d 259 (1994).
Lussier filed an action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County for judicial review of the Commission's decision, chal-
lenging the administrative decision on several grounds.  After a
hearing, the circuit court upheld the Commission's order imposing
a $5,000 fine upon Lussier.  Lussier appealed to the Court of
Special Appeals, again raising numerous issues.  The intermediate
appellate court rejected each of Lussier's contentions and
affirmed.  Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 100 Md. App. 190, 640
A.2d 259 (1994).  Lussier then filed in this Court a petition for
a writ of certiorari, presenting all of the issues which he had
raised in both courts below.  This Court granted the petition
limited to a single question, namely whether the Commission could,
in accordance with its regulation, impose a fine as a sanction for
misconduct absent a statutory provision expressly authorizing the
imposition of a fine.
II.
Lussier argues that it is an "elementary" principle of
Maryland law that administrative agencies lack the authority to fix
"penalties in the absence of specific statutory authorization from
the Legislature," and that "it has always been the Legislature's
exclusive province to fix penalties . . . for transgressions of the
law, either directly or via specific delegation."  (Petitioner's
- 5 -
brief at 10, 17).  Lussier cites three cases which he claims
support this alleged principle of Maryland administrative law.
They are Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Services, 283 Md. 677, 393 A.2d
181 (1978); Gutwein v. Easton Publishing Co., 272 Md. 563, 325 A.2d
740 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991, 95 S.Ct. 1427, 43 L.Ed.2d
673 (1975); and County Council v. Investors Funding, 270 Md. 403,
312 A.2d 225 (1973).  According to Lussier, since the General
Assembly did not explicitly authorize the Commission to impose a
fine upon a racehorse owner, the Commission's order in this case
"is a nullity" (Petitioner's brief at 10).  Lussier asserts that
the Commission's regulation authorizing the imposition of a fine,
COMAR 09.10.04.03D, is invalid except as applied to those licensed
racetrack operators who have been awarded racing dates.  (Petition-
er's brief at 16-18).  See Maryland Code (1992, 1995 Supp.), § 11-
308(d) of the Business Regulation Article (expressly authorizing
the Commission to impose a monetary penalty not exceeding $5,000
upon racetrack operators who, inter alia, violate the statute or
the Commission's regulations).
As pointed out by the Court of Special Appeals, Lussier v.
Maryland Racing Comm'n, supra, 100 Md. App. at 203-204, 640 A.2d at
266, this Court's prior cases relied upon by Lussier neither
recognize nor support the assertion that, under Maryland law, an
administrative agency lacks authority to impose a particular
penalty unless it has explicit authorization from the Legislature
- 6 -
to do so.  Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Services, supra, was not
concerned with the imposition of penalties; instead, the question
in that case was whether, as a matter of statutory construction, an
administrative agency's statutory authority to regulate hospital
rates extended to fees charged by physicians to hospital patients.
In Gutwein v. Easton Publishing Co., supra, 272 Md. at 576, 325
A.2d at 747, the issue was whether, under the pertinent statutory
provisions and "[i]n view of the [Human Relations] Commission's
legislative background," the Human Relations Commission was
authorized to make an award of compensatory damages to a victim of
employment discrimination.  Neither a penalty nor a regulation
adopted by the agency was involved in the Gutwein case.  The
portion of County Council v. Investors Funding, supra, 270 Md. at
441-443, 312 A.2d at 246-247, relating to monetary penalties, had
nothing to do with an administrative agency's imposition of a
particular type of penalty without express statutory authorization.
In fact, in Investors Funding there was express statutory authori-
zation for the agency to impose monetary penalties.  The issue in
that case concerned the validity of the statute in light of
constitutional delegation of powers and due process principles.
Neither the Maryland cases relied on by Lussier, nor any
other decisions of this Court which have been called to our
attention, set forth or support a general principle that a state
administrative agency lacks authority, by regulation, to fix a
- 7 -
civil penalty for misconduct subject to its jurisdiction unless the
General Assembly has expressly authorized the agency to fix that
type of penalty.
Instead, the cases invoked by Lussier, as well as numerous
other decisions by this Court, indicate that, in determining
whether a state administrative agency is authorized to act in a
particular manner, the statutes, legislative background and
policies pertinent to that agency are controlling.  See, e.g.,
Comptroller v. Washington Restaurant, 339 Md. 667, 670-673, 664
A.2d 899, 900-902 (1995); Luskin's v. Consumer Protection, 338 Md.
188, 196-198, 657 A.2d 788, 792-793 (1995); Fogle v. H & G
Restaurant, 337 Md. 441, 654 A.2d 449 (1995); Christ v. Department,
335 Md. 427, 437, 440, 644 A.2d 34, 38, 40 (1994); McCullough v.
Wittner, 314 Md. 602, 610-612, 552 A.2d 881, 885-886 (1989);
Consumer Protection v. Consumer Pub., 304 Md. 731, 756-759, 501
A.2d 48, 61-63 (1985); Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Services, supra,
283 Md. at 683-689, 393 A.2d at 184-187; Gutwein v. Easton
Publishing Co., supra, 272 Md. at 575-576, 325 A.2d at 746-747.
Moreover, with regard to the validity of a regulation promulgated
by an administrative agency, the governing standard is whether the
regulation is "`consistent with the letter and spirit of the law
under which the agency acts.'"  Christ v. Department, supra, 335
Md. at 437, 644 A.2d at 38, quoting Department of Transportation v.
Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 74, 532 A.2d 1056, 1061 (1987).  See also
- 8 -
Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, supra, 337 Md. at 453, 654 A.2d at 455,
and cases there cited.
III.
Turning to the statutes applicable to the Maryland Racing
Commission, title 11, subtitle 2, of the Business Regulation
Article of the Maryland Code establishes the Commission, provides
for its membership and staff, and sets forth generally the
authority of the Commission.  Instead of particularizing various
powers of the Commission with regard to racehorse owners, trainers,
jockeys, and others involved in Maryland racing, the statutory
provisions, in § 11-210, broadly authorize the Commission to "adopt
regulations . . . to govern racing and betting on racing in the
State," and then specify four types of regulations which the
Commission may not adopt.  Thus, § 11-210 of the Business Regula-
tion Article states in relevant part as follows:
"§ 11-210. Regulatory power of Commission.
(a) In general. - Except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section, the Commission
may:
(1) adopt regulations and conditions to
govern racing and betting on racing in the
State . . . 
    (b) Prohibited regulations. - The Commis-
sion may not adopt regulations that allow:
(1) racing a breed of horse not now
authorized by law; or
(2) holding currently unauthorized:
    (i) intertrack betting;
    (ii) off-track betting; or
    (iii) telephone betting other than
telephone account betting."
- 9 -
This Court has consistently held that, where the Legislature
has delegated such broad authority to a state administrative agency
to promulgate regulations in an area, the agency's regulations are
valid under the statute if they do not contradict the statutory
language or purpose.  We have repeatedly rejected the argument,
similar to that made by Lussier here, that the Legislature was
required expressly or explicitly to authorize the particular
regulatory action.  Recently in Christ v. Department, supra, 335
Md. at 437-439, 644 A.2d at 38-39, in upholding a Department of
Natural Resources regulation prohibiting persons under the age of
14 from operating certain types of watercraft, we explained (335
Md. at 437-438, 644 A.2d at 39):
"In the State Boat Act, . . . the General
Assembly broadly granted to the Department the
authority to adopt regulations governing the
`operations of any vessels' which are subject
to the Act.  In numerous situations where the
General Assembly has delegated similar broad
power to an administrative agency to adopt
legislative rules or regulations in a particu-
lar area, this Court has upheld the agency's
rules or regulations as long as they did not
contradict the language or purpose of the
statute.
"For example, in Jacobson v. Md. Racing
Comm'n, 261 Md. 180, 186, 274 A.2d 102, 104-
105 (1971), where the pertinent statute gave
the Racing Commission the `full power to
prescribe rules, regulations and conditions
under which all horse races shall be con-
ducted,' the contention that the legislative
delegation of power did not reach a rule
regulating the transfer of race horses was
characterized by this Court as an argument
- 10 -
which `approaches the frivolous.'"  
After reviewing numerous other cases in this Court upholding
various types of regulations under broad delegations of authority
to administrative agencies, we went on in Christ to reject an
argument like that advanced by Lussier in the present case (335 Md.
at 439, 644 A.2d at 39):
"The crux of the plaintiff's argument con-
cerning absence of statutory authority is that
`there is no specific delegation of authority
by the General Assembly to the Department
permitting the Department to promulgate regu-
lations which prohibit the use of vessels by
an entire class of citizens of the State.'
(Plaintiff's brief at 10).  As the above-cited
cases demonstrate, however, such specificity
is not required.  The broad authority to
promulgate `regulations governing the . . .
operations of any vessels' plainly encompasses
a regulation prohibiting the operation of
certain motor vessels by persons under 14."
See Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, supra, 337 Md. at 455, 654 A.2d at
456 (in upholding an administrative regulation prohibiting smoking
in most workplaces, even though the statute did not expressly
address the matter, this Court pointed out "that courts should
generally defer to agencies' decisions in promulgating new
regulations because they presumably make rules based upon their
expertise in a particular field").
Similarly, the broad authority granted by the Legislature to
the Maryland Racing Commission to promulgate regulations "to govern
- 11 -
racing and betting on racing" plainly encompasses a regulation
authorizing the imposition of a monetary penalty, not exceeding
$5,000, upon a racehorse owner who engaged in Lussier's deceptive
misconduct in connection with three races at the Laurel Race
Course.  The regulation in no manner contradicts the language of
the statutes relating to the Commission.
Moreover, the regulation authorizing the imposition of a
fine is entirely in accord with the statutory purpose.  We have
often stated that "[t]he Legislature's purpose in granting to the
Racing Commission the authority to promulgate rules was to assure
that horse races in Maryland are `conducted fairly, decently and
clean[ly],'" Heft v. Md. Racing Comm'n, 323 Md. 257, 263-264, 592
A.2d 1110, 1113 (1991), quoting Mahoney v. Byers, 187 Md. 81, 84,
48 A.2d 600, 602 (1946).  The "Commission performs an active role
of policy formation in order to ensure the integrity of horse
racing in this State."  Maryland Racing Com'n v. Castrenze, 335 Md.
284, 294, 643 A.2d 412, 416-417 (1994). See Greenfeld v. Maryland
Jockey Club, 190 Md. 96, 105, 57 A.2d 335, 338 (1948) (one of
purposes of the statute and regulations was to insure that "[t]he
law protects bettors against fraud").
If we were to accept Lussier's argument that the Maryland
Racing Commission is powerless to impose any penalty or sanction
without express statutory authority relating to that type of
penalty, then racehorse owners, trainers, jockeys and others could
- 12 -
commit numerous deceptions and frauds upon bettors and the public,
and the Commission could do little about it.  The statutory purpose
requires that the Commission be able to sanction misconduct in
connection with racing.  The challenged regulation is, therefore,
clearly consistent with the statutory purpose of insuring the
integrity of racing and protecting the public from fraud. 
As the General Assembly has delegated broad power to the
Maryland Racing Commission to adopt regulations "to govern racing
and betting on racing in the State," and as the regulation
providing for the imposition of a monetary penalty does not
contradict the statutory language or purpose, the regulation is
statutorily authorized under a consistent line of this Court's
decisions dealing with the regulatory authority of state adminis-
trative agencies.
IV.
Furthermore, the history, nature and rationale of the
regulatory scheme governing horse racing in this State, as well as
actions by the General Assembly and opinions by this Court, confirm
the validity of the regulation authorizing the imposition of a fine
upon racehorse owners, trainers, jockeys, etc., engaging in
misconduct.
Prior to 1920, the licensing and regulation of horse racing
and betting on horse races in Maryland was accomplished on a
county-by-county basis.  In a few jurisdictions, local racing
commissions were created to license and regulate horse racing.  In
- 13 -
most counties, the circuit courts issued licenses.  Much of the
regulation was accomplished by statutes with criminal sanctions
enforced by the state's attorney for each county.  For a review of
the pre-1920 licensing and regulation of horse racing, see, e.g.,
Nolan v. State, 157 Md. 332, 146 A. 268 (1929); Close v. Southern
Md. Agr. Asso., 134 Md. 629, 108 A. 209 (1919); Agri. Soc.
Montgomery Co. v. State, 130 Md. 474, 101 A. 139 (1917); Clark v.
Harford Agri. & Breed. Asso., 118 Md. 608, 85 A. 503 (1912),
overruled on other grounds, Howard County Comm. v. Westphal, 232
Md. 334, 342, 193 A.2d 56, 611 (1963); State v. Dycer, 85 Md. 246,
36 A. 763 (1897).
In 1919, this Court held that the statutes providing for the
licensing of horse racing by the circuit courts were unconstitu-
tional because they imposed nonjudicial functions and duties upon
the circuit courts in violation of the separation of powers
requirement in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Close v. Southern Md. Agr. Asso., supra, 134 Md. 629, 108 A. 209.
In response to the Close case, the General Assembly in 1920
adopted an entirely new statewide scheme of licensing and regu-
lating horse racing which has continued, largely intact, until the
present time.  By Ch. 273 of the Acts of 1920, the Legislature
created the Maryland Racing Commission as a state agency, whose
members were appointed by the Governor, and whose jurisdiction
encompassed "any meeting within the State of Maryland whereat horse
- 14 -
racing shall be permitted for any stake, purse or reward."  Ch. 273
of the Acts of 1920, § 1, subsection 1.  The 1920 statute contained
somewhat detailed provisions with regard to the licensing and
regulation of "[a]ny person or persons, association or corporation
desiring to conduct racing within the State of Maryland," id.,
subsection 7.  Apart from the provisions concerning racetrack
owners or operators who conducted racing, however, the 1920 statute
broadly stated that the "Racing Commission shall have full power to
prescribe rules, regulations and conditions under which all horse-
races shall be conducted within the State of Maryland.  Said
Commission may make rules governing, restricting or regulating
betting on such races," id., subsection 11.
As the 1920 statute did not expressly authorize the Maryland
Racing Commission to license and regulate racehorse owners,
trainers, jockeys, etc., in 1921 the Attorney General was specifi-
cally asked whether the Commission was authorized to license
trainers and jockeys.  Judge Motz for the Court of Special Appeals
in the present case summarized the Attorney General's response as
follows (Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, supra, 100 Md. App. at
205-206, 640 A.2d at 267):
"In 1921, the Attorney General was asked
whether the above quoted general powers per-
mitted the Commission to require that jockeys
and trainers be licensed.  6 Opp. Att'y Gen.
at 480.  In concluding that licensing of
jockeys and trainers was within the scope of
authority granted the Commission, the Attorney
- 15 -
General specifically recognized that `no
control over them [was] given the Commission
by any express provision in the [Act],' id. at
481, and that very few of the Commission's
express statutory powers dealt with `the
regulation of racing itself.'  Id. at 480.
The Attorney General noted that the reason for
this was that the legislature `realized that
the formulation of adequate, practical and
satisfactory 
regulations 
[governing 
those
involved in racing itself] involved a knowl-
edge of racing conditions which the General
Assembly did not possess, and which could only
be acquired by a careful study of racing, and
of the many problems connected therewith.'
Id."
The Court of Special Appeals went on to point out that the 1921
Attorney General's opinion
"concluded that even though the Commission was
given no express statutory control over, let
alone power to license, jockeys and trainers,
the General Assembly intended that it have
this power.  He reasoned:
`There can be no full and complete con-
trol of racing on the part of the Com-
mission, unless it controls those upon
whose skill and honesty the outcome of
the race so largely depends.  All other
regulations, rules and conditions pre-
scribed by the Commission for the pur-
pose of securing clean racing and ele-
vating the standards by which racing is
to be conducted in Maryland could be
nullified by dishonest and purchasable
jockeys and trainers. . . .  I do not
believe, . . . that the Legislature
intended that jockeys and trainers,
whose probity is so essential a feature
of clean racing, should be entirely
beyond the control of the Commis-
sion. . . .  [The Act was] clearly de-
signed to give the Commission broad and
- 16 -
sweeping powers of control and regula-
tion of racing, and I am of the opinion
that, in spite of the [limited] authori-
zation expressly conferred therein, the
Commission possess practically unlimited
power to pass, promulgate and enforce
such rules and regulations actually
dealing with the control of racing as in
the judgment of the Commission appear to
be desirable and necessary.
Id. at 481-82 (emphasis added).  Thus, since
the General Assembly had given the Commission
`full power' to regulate horseracing, the
Attorney General found that the Commission
could not do so without the ability to
`full[y] and complete[ly]' control `those upon
whose honesty and skill the outcome of races
depended.'  Id. 480-81."
With regard to the 1921 opinion of the Attorney General
taking the position that the Racing Commission's authority extended
to racehorse owners, trainers, jockeys, and others not expressly
covered by the statutory language, this Court in Mahoney v. Byers,
supra, 187 Md. at 84-85, 48 A.2d at 602, stated:
"At the outset it may be stated that under
the Act of 1920, Chapter 273, Article 78B,
Code 1939, which created the Maryland Racing
Commission, it has power and authority to
promulgate reasonable rules to govern the
racing of horses.  It may make such rules
regulating the conduct of trainers, jockeys,
owners, and generally regulate all matters
pertaining to horse racing, in order that they
may 
be 
conducted 
fairly, 
decently 
and
clean[ly] but may not revoke a license except
for cause.  6 Opinions of Attorney General
480; 11, 273; 24, 662.
"These decisions of the Attorneys General
have governed the Commission for a long time,
- 17 -
       Section 11-308 of the Business Regulation Article states as
4
follows:
"11-308. Denials, reprimands, suspensions, and
revocations - Grounds; penalty.
(a) In general. - Subject to the hearing
provisions of §§ 11-309 and 11-310 of this
(continued...)
and Attorney General Armstrong's decision was
rendered shortly after the passage of the Act.
We see no reason to alter or disturb these
decisions, long applied.  Popham v. Conserva-
tion Commission, 186 Md. 62, 46 A.2d 184;
Baltimore City v. Machen, 132 Md. 618, 104 A.
175."
As previously mentioned, the basic scheme of the 1920
statute has continued until the present time.  Under Maryland Code
(1992, 1995 Supp.), title 11 of the Business Regulation Article,
the General Assembly has legislated in detail with respect to those
licensees who hold race meetings in Maryland, i.e., the owners or
operators of race courses.  See, e.g., §§ 11-301 through 11-320,
11-501 through 11-526, 11-601 through 11-620, 11-701 through 11-
704, 11-801 through 11-812, and 11-1001 of the Business Regulation
Article.  Thus, the Maryland Racing Commission is expressly
authorized by statute to grant or deny licenses to those desiring
to hold race meetings, to "suspend or revoke a license" to hold a
race meeting, or to "impose a penalty not exceeding $5,000 for each
racing day" that the licensee holding a race meeting is in
violation of the statute or a Commission regulation or a condition
set by the Commission.4
- 18 -
     (...continued)
4
subtitle, the Commission may deny a license to
an applicant or discipline a licensee in
accordance with this section.
(b) Denials. - The Commission may deny a
license to any applicant for any reason that
the Commission considers sufficient.
(c) Reprimands, suspensions, and revoca-
tions. - (1) The Commission may reprimand any
licensee or suspend or revoke a license if the
licensee violates:
    (i) this title;
    (ii) a regulation adopted under
this title; or
    (iii) a condition set by the Com-
mission.
(2) The Commission shall suspend or
revoke a license if the applicant or licensee
fails to:
    (i) keep records and make reports
of ownership of stock that are required under
§ 11-314 of this subtitle; or
    (ii) make a reasonable effort to
get affidavits required under § 11-314(b) and
(c) of this subtitle.
(d) Penalty. - (1) The Commission may
impose a penalty not exceeding $5,000 for each
racing day that the licensee is in violation
of subsection (c) of this section:
    (i) instead of suspending or re-
voking a license under subsection (c)(1) of
this section; and
    (ii) in addition to suspending or
revoking a license under subsection (c)(2) of
this section.
(2) To determine the amount of the
penalty imposed under paragraph (1) of this
subsection, the Commission shall consider:
    (i) the seriousness of the viola-
tion;
    (ii) the harm caused by the viola-
tion; and
    (iii) the good faith or lack of
good faith of the licensee.
(3) A penalty imposed on a licensee
(continued...)
- 19 -
     (...continued)
4
shall be paid from the licensee's share of the
takeout."
For purposes of § 11-308, a "`[l]icensee' means a person who has
been awarded racing days for the current calendar year."  § 11-
101(h) of the Business Regulation Article.  See also § 11-302 of
the same Article (indicating that a licensee is a "person [who]
holds a race meeting in the State. . .").  
Nevertheless, with regard to other persons involved in
Maryland racing and subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, such
as racehorse owners, trainers, jockeys, grooms, etc., the statutory
provisions largely remain silent.  There are no statutory sections,
comparable to those cited above, relating to racehorse owners,
trainers or jockeys.  Instead, the General Assembly has simply
granted to the Commission the broad authority to regulate racing in
Maryland, and has specified a few areas which are beyond the
Commission's authority to adopt regulations.   
In accordance with this statutory scheme, and the 1921
Attorney General's opinion, the Maryland Racing Commission since
1921 has adopted regulations governing racehorse owners, trainers,
jockeys, and others which, to the extent that is relevant, parallel
the statutory provisions concerning racetrack operators.  Thus, the
regulation at issue in the present case, COMAR 09.10.04.03D,
providing for the suspension or revocation of licenses, or the
imposition of a fine not exceeding $5,000, with respect to those
engaging in specified types of misconduct, parallels § 11-308 of
the Business Regulation Article which provides for suspensions or
- 20 -
       The General Assembly has clearly been aware of the Maryland
5
Racing Commission's regulation authorizing the imposition of fines
upon racehorse owners, jockeys, trainers, and others, and has
legislated with respect to those fines.  See, e.g., Ch 786 of the
Acts of 1947, authorizing the Commission to establish "the Relief
Fund of the Maryland Racing Commission," referring in both the
title and the preamble to the "fines and [monetary] penalties . . .
collected from jockeys, trainers, owners and others," and providing
that such fines should continue to be paid into the Relief Fund.
See also the Department of Fiscal Service's Sunset Review of the
Maryland Racing Commission for 1989, at 37-38, referring to the
(continued...)
revocations of licenses, or monetary penalties up to $5,000, of
racetrack operators who engage in specified types of misconduct. 
Moreover, the authority to impose a fine upon racehorse
owners, trainers, jockeys, etc., has been set forth in the
Commission's regulations consistently since the first regulations
in 1921.  Thus, the 1921 regulations permitted stewards to suspend
the licenses of or impose a fine not exceeding $200 upon "[o]wners,
trainers, jockeys, grooms, and other persons attendant on
horses. . . ."  1921 Rules of Racing, Rules 24 and 27.  Further-
more, if the maximum of $200 was deemed insufficient, the stewards
could so advise the Commission which could impose a higher penalty.
Id., Rule 27.  Consequently, the Commission's authority under the
statute, to impose a monetary penalty upon racehorse owners and
others guilty of misconduct, is supported by the long and consis-
tent administrative construction of the statute.  The General
Assembly has not, over the past 75 years, changed that administra-
tive construction of the statute.   See, e.g., Md. Classified
5
- 21 -
     (...continued)
5
Commission's authority to impose fines upon "general" licensees
such as racehorse owners, trainers and jockeys, and commending the
effectiveness of these monetary penalties. 
Employees v. Governor, 325 Md. 19, 33, 599 A.2d 91, 98 (1991)
("legislative acquiescence in a long-standing administrative
construction `"gives rise to a strong presumption that the
interpretation is correct"'"); Morris v. Prince George's County,
319 Md. 597, 613, 573 A.2d 1346, 1354 (1990) ("long-standing
administrative construction of [the statute] and its predecessor
statutes by an agency charged with administering them . . . is
entitled to deference"); Board v. Harker, 316 Md. 683, 699, 561
A.2d 219, 227 (1989) ("the agency rule is entitled to considerable
weight in determining the meaning of [the statute's] provisions");
McCullough v. Wittner, supra, 314 Md. at 612, 552 A.2d at 886 ("The
interpretation of a statute by those officials charged with
administering the statute is, of course, entitled to weight");
Sinai Hosp. v. Dep't of Employment, 309 Md. 28, 46, 522 A.2d 382,
391 (1987) ("the long-standing legislative acquiescence [in the
administrative interpretation of the statute] gives rise to a
strong presumption that the interpretation is correct"); Balto. Gas
& Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 305 Md. 145, 161, 501 A.2d 1307,
1315 (1986) ("the contemporaneous interpretation of a statute by
the agency charged with its administration is entitled to great
deference, especially when the interpretation has been applied
- 22 -
consistently and for a long period of time"); Consumer Protection
v. Consumer Pub., supra, 304 Md. at 759, 501 A.2d at 63 ("The
consistent construction of a statute by the agency responsible for
administering it is entitled to considerable weight").
This Court has often pointed to the Commission's broad
regulatory authority, and we have regularly upheld the application
of the Commission's regulations, including the penalty provisions,
to racehorse owners, trainers, jockeys and others.  In Jacobson v.
Md. Racing Commission, supra, 261 Md. 180, 274 A.2d 102, Jacobson
was both a racehorse owner and trainer who violated a Commission
regulation which prohibited an owner or trainer who had claimed a
horse in a Maryland claiming race from selling it within 60 days of
the claim.  The Commission fined Jacobson $2,500 for claiming a
horse in a Maryland race and selling the horse in New York before
the expiration of the 60-day period.  Jacobson principally
contended that the Commission's regulation prohibiting the sale of
the claimed horse for 60 days was invalid; he argued, inter alia,
that the Legislature had not delegated to the Commission the
authority to apply its regulations to events occurring outside of
Maryland.  In response, Chief Judge Hammond for the Court explained
the necessity for conferring broad regulatory authority upon the
Commission (261 Md. at 183, 274 A.2d at 103):
"Horse racing is an endeavor and undertaking
that necessarily must be the subject of inten-
sive, extensive and minute regulation.  Green-
- 23 -
feld v. Md. Jockey Club, 190 Md. 96, 104-105,
57 A.2d 335.  It exists only because it is
financed by the receipts from controlled
legalized gambling which must be kept as far
above suspicion as possible, not only to
sustain and profit the racing fraternity but
to feed substantial . . . millions to the
State's revenues.  Not surprisingly the legis-
lature has given the Commission full power to
control racing."
Addressing the argument that the Commission's regulation pro-
hibiting the sale of the horse within 60 days was not authorized by
the language of the statute, Chief Judge Hammond succinctly stated
(261 Md. at 186, 274 A.2d at 105):
"Jacobson's argument that the legislature's
delegations to the Commission of the power to
regulate racing does not extend to the regula-
tion imposed by Rule 80 approaches the frivo-
lous, and we turn to his constitutional argu-
ments."
Although Jacobson had not specifically challenged the
Commission's authority to impose a $2,500 fine if the regulation
concerning the sale of claimed horses was valid, nevertheless this
Court concluded its opinion as follows (261 Md. at 190, 274 A.2d at
107, emphasis supplied):
"We think that Jacobson had become a racing
citizen of Maryland as far as the purposes and
effects of the Rules are concerned and that
this State acquired sufficient personal juris-
diction over him in matters of licensed racing
to permit it to enjoin him by Rule 80 from
selling a horse claimed in a licensed Maryland
race for sixty days, and to punish him if he
- 24 -
disobeyed that rule."
For other cases recognizing the broad authority of the
Maryland Racing Commission to promulgate and enforce regulations
appropriate to insure the integrity of Maryland racing, see, e.g.,
Maryland Racing Com'n v. Castrenze, supra, 335 Md. at 294-295, 643
A.2d at 417 (in affirming the Commission's application of a
regulation providing for reciprocal suspensions, we commented that
"[t]he Racing Commission is given broad statutory authority to
adopt regulations governing horse racing and betting on racing in
Maryland"); Heft v. Md. Racing Comm'n, 323 Md. 257, 264, 592 A.2d
1110, 1113 (1991) (applying numerous Commission regulations, and
pointing out that "[t]he statute and `the Commission's rules and
regulations provide a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of
horse racing in Maryland,'" quoting Silbert v. Ramsey, 301 Md. 96,
105, 482 A.2d 147, 152 (1984)); So. Md. Agri. Ass'n v. Magruder,
198 Md. 274, 280, 81 A.2d 592, 594 (1951) ("The Maryland Racing
Commission is given exceedingly wide and comprehensive regulatory
powers.  * * *  It is apparent that the Legislature deliberately
imposed grave responsibility upon the Racing Commission in order
that this [betting on horse races] exception to the anti-gambling
laws of the State be kept within proper limits"); Brann v. Mahoney,
187 Md. 89, 103, 48 A.2d 605, 611 (1946) (the Racing Commission
"may make rules regulating the conduct of trainers, jockeys, and
owners in order that horse racing may be conducted fairly").
- 25 -
       We hasten to add that no such basis in the statutory
6
provisions has been suggested to us.
As discussed earlier, acceptance of Lussier's argument, that
a Maryland Racing Commission regulation authorizing the Commission
to impose a particular type of penalty must be expressly authorized
by the statutory language, would leave the Commission in a position
whereby it could promulgate regulations governing the conduct of
racehorse owners, trainers, jockeys and others, but could not
enforce those regulations.  The statutory provisions do not
expressly authorize the imposition of any particular type of
sanction upon racehorse owners, trainers, jockeys, etc.  The
Commission's authority to suspend or revoke the licenses of
racehorse owners, trainers, jockeys and others, like the authority
to impose monetary penalties upon them, is based entirely upon the
Commission's regulations.  It is inconceivable that the General
Assembly intended to grant broad authority to the Commission to
regulate the conduct of these individuals, but did not intend that
the Commission be able to enforce its regulations by sanctions.
Finally, even if there were some statutory basis to
distinguish between the revocation or suspension of a license on
the one hand, and the imposition of a monetary penalty on the
other,  the inability to impose a fine would still leave the Racing
6
Commission powerless to enforce its regulations under circumstances
like those in the instant case.  After the race on December 31,
1991, which was the last day before expiration of Lussier's
- 26 -
       Lussier collected more than $30,000 winnings on the three
7
races in question.
license, Lussier left Maryland and did not thereafter seek to renew
his license as a racehorse owner.  When his misconduct was
discovered, Lussier neither possessed nor desired a Maryland
license.  There was nothing to revoke or suspend.  Under the
circumstances, the imposition of a monetary penalty was the only
sanction that could be imposed upon Lussier to enforce the
regulations of the Commission.  We very much doubt that the
Legislature intended that a racehorse owner could come into
Maryland, enter his horses in Maryland races with the true names of
the owner and trainer disguised, publish false workout reports,
make a large sum of money by betting on his horses at the track,7
and then escape any sanction for his misconduct because he did not
desire to renew his Maryland license.  
We conclude, in agreement with both courts below, that the
Maryland Racing Commission's regulation authorizing the imposition
of a reasonable fine is valid.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  PETITIONER TO
PAY COSTS.