Case Title: In Interest of Tina K.

Citation: 390 Pa. Super. 94, 568 A.2d 210

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1989-12-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
390 Pa. Superior Ct. 94 (1989) 568 A.2d 210 In the Interest of TINA K., a Minor. Appeal of MONTGOMERY COUNTY OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued April 6, 1989. Filed December 27, 1989. Stephen P. Imms, Jr., Ambler, for appellant. Wendy G. Rothstein, Lansdale, for participating party. *95 Before BROSKY, McEWEN and HOFFMAN, JJ. McEWEN, Judge: This is an appeal by the Montgomery County Office of Children and Youth Services (hereinafter "CYS"), from an order, which classified as dependent Tina K., a ten year old minor. Tina had been in the legal and physical custody of CYS as a result of voluntary placement with CYS by her parents in 1985. CYS asserts that the trial court erred (1) when it reversed its prior order of November 24, 1986, which classified the child as abused, and (2) reinstated her classification as dependent. We affirm. The trial judge has aptly summarized the underlying factual history: The court determined at the conclusion of the hearing of November 24, 1986, that the child "is a dependent abused child". The record reflects the following chronology of events subsequent to this ruling that the child was dependent/abused: The trial court recounted in its order of June 18, 1987, the basis for its decision to classify the child as dependent/ungovernable, and not as abused: The issue presented by this appeal arises from the child victim exception to the hearsay rule created by the Act of 1986, February 21, P.L. 41, No. 14, Section 1: 42 Pa.C.S. § 5986. Appellant asserts that the court erred when it imposed upon CYS the further condition precedent of demonstrating *99 the "unavailability" of the assertedly abused child since the statute prescribes but one prerequisite to the admissibility of such testimony, namely, "sufficient indicia of reliability". Since, appellant argues, the trial court declared that "sufficient indicia of reliability" attended the hearsay testimony of the social workers presented by CYS, the trial court erred when it refused to classify the child as dependent/abused, and instead persisted in the classification of dependent/ungovernable. Our study of the challenge presented by appellant proceeds from this factual posture: The issue is, therefore, clear and narrow: Must, under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5986, the presentation into evidence of the out-of-court statements of a child be preceded by evidence and a finding that the child is "unavailable" because the appearance of the child as a witness would adversely traumatize the child? We agree with the decision of the distinguished Judge Paul W. Tressler (1) that if a child is "unable to testify because of trauma", she is "unavailable", (2) that such "unavailability" is to be the subject of judicial determination, and (3) that, absent a demonstration by CYS of that unavailability, the statements of the child were inadmissible. The trial court viewed the question we consider as: and decided: The care and protection of the children of our Commonwealth is, of course, a sacred trust. A similar hallowed duty is to preserve the protections of the Bill of Rights. We are here called upon to weigh the precious balance between these commandments.[2] *101 The legislature, at the outset of the Act which afforded to children the protection we here study, proclaimed: 42 Pa.C.S. § 5981. The legislators of Pennsylvania, our ever esteemed partners in government, have always been most sensitive when *102 weighing human laws and constitutional protections. Surely then, the legislature intended that the protection of the human rights of children should require only such sacrifice of the constitutional right of confrontation as is necessary. The tension between the rights of two individuals in an adversarial status need effect an intrusion of one right upon the other only in that extraordinary situation when every means of easing the tension by adjustment of those competing rights has been employed but is unsuccessful. Here the adjustment of the competing rights to ease the tension between them as well as the goal of the legislature to intrude upon the constitutional right of confrontation for only so much as is necessary to protect the child can be achieved if we were to impose a restrictive interpretation of the statutory exceptions upon the hearsay rule enacted by Section 5986. Therefore, we hold: Order affirmed.[3] [1] The exact provisions of the order from which this appeal has been taken state, inter alia: ". . . the decision of the Court entered the [24th] day of November, 1986 finding Tina K. to be dependent/abused is hereby reversed. Tina K. shall remain classified as a dependent/ungovernable child." A careful scrutiny of the actual record does not reveal an order which earlier classified the child "dependent/ungovernable". Moreover, the initial order of classification, namely, the order of adjudication of January 9, 1986, is a printed form which expresses an adjudication of the child as "dependent/abused". Nonetheless, the trial court makes clear, and appellant does not dispute, that the order of January 9, 1986, served merely to adopt the report of the Master of January 3, 1986, and that the report of the Master did not recommend that the juvenile be adjudicated "dependent/abused" but instead specifically recommended "to the court that the said juvenile be adjudicated a dependent child". Thus we accept as a fact that the adjudication of January 9, 1986, classified the child as "dependent" by reason of being ungovernable and not as "dependent/abused". [2] The Bill of Rights in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . . The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania proclaims in Article 1, Section IX: In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face. . . . There is no more scarlet "A" than that branded upon the abuser. An accusation of incest, or other sexual abuse upon a child, hurls the accused into the deepest, darkest abyss where the lash of shame and scorn is matched only by the cries of the furies for vengeance. It is, therefore, of no consequence that the accused confronts these charges in the family forum and not the criminal court. Thus, the constitutional right of appellant to confrontation is firm and certain. Every bit as firm and certain, on the other hand, is the human right of the child to be free of the trauma of appearance in court and exposure to the torment of savage cross-examination. Human rights are inherent elements of the moral order, and while philosophers may differ as to a precise definition of human rights, and legal scholars do not always agree as to what may be designated a human right, they are of one mind that the advent of mankind and of the moral order were simultaneous. That moral order is manifested in and by the laws of humanity. Those laws of humanity confer human rights upon each individual simply because he or she is a human, and not by reason of any legislative enactment, executive decision, or court decree nor even by constitutional mandate or decision of the majority. Constitutions are to be revered, and enacted laws deserve respect, provided, of course, that their provisions do not clash with human rights. The founders of our nation considered such human rights so critical that they proclaimed at the outset of the Declaration of Independence: When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people . . . to assume . . . the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, . . . they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights. . . . (emphasis supplied). The Bill of Rights extended explicit guarantee of certain human rights, and declared in the Ninth Amendment that the Constitution was not to be considered a delineation of all human rights, because certain rights of "the people" are inherent and, while worthy of constitutional protection, require not expression there. Surely the human right of a child to be free of the trauma of the circumstances attendant a court appearance is such a human right and is as firm and certain as any of the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. [3] The record does not reflect the basis for reference during the presentation of oral argument that a finding of dependent/abused will effect a higher rate of reimbursement to the county for the care of the child than would a finding of dependent/ungovernable. Nor does the record disclose the varying consequences to the child of a finding of dependent/abused and dependent/ungovernable since the child was, in any event, to remain in the custody of CYS. It is repugnant, of course, to contemplate that such enhanced reimbursement would motivate CYS to pursue a finding of abuse, and, therefore, we assume that the hint of such a motivation is spurious.