Case Title: State of New Jersey v. W.K.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-10-98

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Per Curiam The question in this appeal concerns the maximum term for which a person found not guilty by reason of insanity may remain confined under Krol status. (State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236 (1975), established that a person acquitted by reason of insanity may be held in continued confinement if he or she is a danger to self or others and is in need of medical treatment.) W.K. is confined at Greystone Psychiatric Hospital. He has been institutionalized since his arrest in December 1983. On 12/4/83, he armed himself with a butcher knife, approached a police officer, and demanded the officer's pistol. A struggle ensued, and W.K. obtained the gun and attempted to shoot the officer in the stomach. W.K. was charged with armed robbery, attempted murder, and aggravated assault on an officer. In 1988, the trial court determined W.K. was suffering from chronic-paranoid schizophrenia, and found him not guilty by reason of insanity. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8b(3), he was committed to a State psychiatric hospital. At a periodic review hearing in 1997, an examining physician found that W.K. continued to suffer from paranoid schizophrenia and that he remained a potential danger to himself and the community. The trial court ordered W.K. to remain confined, holding that the attempted murder charge was a first-degree offense with a maximum sentence of twenty years. W.K. appealed, arguing that in 1983 attempted murder carried a maximum term of only ten years, and that he therefore had been confined well beyond the maximum period of imprisonment authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8b(3). In an unreported opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed. It concluded that the maximum period of confinement under Krol status should be calculated consecutively for each of the offenses, unreduced by merger considerations. Because of the multiple counts of the indictment, the outer limit of W.K.'s aggregate sentence, calculated consecutively, was sixty-nine years. The Supreme Court granted W.K.'s petition for certification. HELD: A defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity may remain under Krol commitment for the maximum ordinary aggregate term that the person would have received if convicted of the offenses charged, taking into account the usual principles of sentencing. 1. The applicable statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8b(3), provides that a defendant may be committed "during the maximum period of imprisonment that could have been imposed, as an ordinary term of imprisonment, for any charge on which defendant has been acquitted by reason of insanity." The Appellate Division concluded that the maximum period of commitment was calculated by aggregating the maximum possible sentence for each of the crimes charged. W.K. cites to the Legislature's reference to "any charge, " and argues that the period is limited by the maximum sentence possible for only the most severe charge. Directive #9-96 of the Administrative Office of the Courts supports W.K.'s position, referring to "any" charge and requiring consideration of merger or other possible sentencing dispositions. (pp. 4-6) 2. The Hudson County prosecutor acknowledged that the Appellate Division opinion gives the State more than it had sought, and that the answer to the problem lies somewhere in between the perimeter positions. The Court agrees that the most reasonable understanding of the statute is that in cases involving multiple offenses, the usual sentencing principles of merger and consecutive versus concurrent terms should be applied. (pp. 6-8) 3. Following an acquittal by reason of insanity, a trial court should determine the probable maximum ordinary aggregate term a defendant would have received if convicted as charged, taking into account usual principles of sentencing. In earlier cases where this was not done, the Krol court usually will be able to determine what the appropriate sentence is. In some cases, it may be necessary to remand to the sentencing court. In W.K.'s case, because the trial record is sketchy, the matter is remanded to the Krol court for the sentencing analysis. The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED as MODIFIED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN join in this opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 10 September Term 1998 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. W.K., Defendant-Appellant. Argued February 17, 1999 -- Decided April 28, 1999 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Bernadette N. DeCastro, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). Susan B. Gyss, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Fred J. Theemling, Jr., Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney). PER CURIAM When a person accused of a crime is acquitted by reason of insanity, the accused may be held in continued confinement if the person is a danger to self or others and is in need of medical treatment. We describe such a person as being on Krol status, a reference to State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236 (1975), which established the standard for such commitments. The question in this appeal concerns the maximum term for which a person found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) may remain confined under Krol status. NO. A-10 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. W.K., Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED