Case Title: In re Shantee Point, Inc.

Citation: 174 Vt. 248, 811 A.2d 1243

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Shantee Point, Inc. (2000-474); 174 Vt. 248; 811 A.2d 1243

[Filed 04-OCT-2002]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                No. 2000-474


  In re Appeals of Shantee Point, Inc.	         Supreme Court
       
                                                 On Appeal from
                                                 Environmental Court
                                                 and Franklin Superior Court 

                                                 September Term, 2001


  Merideth Wright, J.
      
  Lisa B. Shelkrot and Liam L. Murphy of Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP,
    Burlington, for Appellant.

  Brian P. Hehir, Burlington, for Cross-Appellant.
      
  David A. Barra of Hill, Unsworth & Barra, PLC, Essex Junction, for
    Appellee.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.
   
        
       DOOLEY, J.   This case centers on a road, known as Shantee Point Road,
  located on a peninsula on Lake Champlain in the Town of St. Albans.  The
  road was relocated in part by appellant, Shantee Point Estates, Inc. (SPE). 
  The Town Zoning Board, affirmed by the environmental court, ruled that the
  relocation required a subdivision permit.  SPE appeals that decision,
  arguing that it was based on an invalid subdivision ordinance, was
  erroneous even if the ordinance were valid, and resulted from an improper
  intervention by appellee, Stephen Dana (Dana).  Dana also sued in superior
  court, and that court, with the environmental judge sitting by designation,
  ruled that SPE had the power to relocate the road.  Dana appeals from that
  decision, arguing that SPE 

 

  could not relocate the road without his consent and that the relocated road
  was not of the same width and quality as the prior one.  SPE responds that
  Dana failed to properly and timely appeal the superior court decision.  We
  conclude that we have jurisdiction over the superior court appeal and
  affirm it and the decision of the environmental court.

       The Shantee Point peninsula juts out into Lake Champlain in a
  southerly direction.  Access has been provided by a dirt road along the
  west edge of the peninsula between the Lake and a series of summer camps
  and permanent homes.  Up until 1965, the developed land was owned by one
  person who rented lots, some forty-three in all, upon which the camps and
  homes were constructed.  In that year, the owner's daughters inherited the
  property as tenants in common.  Each sold her interest so that ownership of
  the land ended up with the litigants in this case as tenants in common.

       Dana brought an action to partition the property in 1989, and the
  superior court did so in 1990 pursuant to a commissioner's report.  Each
  party received some of the land containing camp and house lots, but to
  equalize value the lots were not entirely contiguous.  Thus, proceeding
  from the north down the peninsula, Dana received the land containing the
  first ten lots, but the next group went to SPE, and the lots to the south
  of these were again awarded to Dana.  The distribution of the land meant
  that both parties, and their tenants, would regularly use the length of the
  access road.

       Litigation between the parties developed when SPE decided to relocate
  the road section serving its contiguous lots away from the Lake and behind
  the camps and homes.  Dana chose not to do a similar relocation of the road
  serving his ten contiguous lots to the North.  Thus, after SPE's road
  relocation, a vehicle coming onto the peninsula from the North would first
  proceed along the Lake on the old road in front of Dana's ten lots, then
  proceed to the East on the "connector" portion and then proceed South on
  the new road behind SPE's lots, until joining the old road again South of
  these lots.

 
   
       SPE built the road relying on opinions of the zoning administrator
  that no site plan or subdivision permit was necessary for the construction,
  and the following language in the partition order:

    Nothing herein shall be interpreted to construed to [sic] prohibit
    the above identified access roadway as it crosses the [a]bove
    parcels partitioned to [SPE] from being relocated by [SPE]
    (subject to applicable laws and regulations, if any) as long as
    its width and quality is at least maintained.

       Dana was unhappy with the road relocation and commenced an action in
  superior court to require relocation of the road to its former location. 
  Various proceedings started in the town planning commission and zoning
  board of adjustment (ZBA) and continued on appeal in the environmental
  court.  The environmental judge was assigned to preside over the related
  superior court case and she heard it in conjunction with the environmental
  court cases, but did not consolidate them.  The court issued a final
  decision and order on September 21, 2000.  We have consolidated all of the
  matters on appeal.

       In the superior court case,  Dana claimed that Shantee Point Road was
  a public road and that SPE unlawfully interfered with his easement over the
  road by relocating part of it without his consent.  He also claimed that
  SPE unlawfully built the connector portion of the road on his property. 
  SPE filed a third-party complaint against the Town to resolve whether the
  road was public or private.
   
       While the trial in superior court was going on, and a year after
  construction of the new road section, the zoning administrator informed SPE
  on June 15, 1998 that a site plan permit was  required for the road.  On
  July 8, the administrator issued a notice of violation to SPE for
  constructing the road without site plan approval.  The ZBA upheld the
  administrator's decision, and SPE appealed that decision to the
  environmental court.  On June 1, 1999, the environmental court 

 

  affirmed with respect to the connector section, but deferred decision on
  the rest of the new road until the superior court determined whether the
  old road was private or public.

       On May 27, 1999, the administrator issued SPE a notice of violation
  for constructing the new road without subdivision approval.  He relied upon
  § 200(b) of the Town of Saint Albans Subdivision Regulations, which
  provides that land development for residential or recreational purposes is
  subject to the subdivision regulations if it involves "[c]onstruction or
  extension of a road or driveway to serve more than two lots."  The ZBA
  upheld this decision, and SPE appealed to the environmental court, arguing
  that (1) all the land it owned was one "lot" despite the home and camp
  leases and (2) § 200(b) was invalid because it created a permit requirement
  without an actual subdivision.  On cross motions for summary judgment, the
  environmental court agreed with the Town and held that the road required
  subdivision approval under § 200(b).  It did not, however, address SPE's
  argument that § 200(b) is invalid.  This decision is one of the two on
  appeal before us.

       Thereafter, the parties continued to skirmish over the connector
  section.  The superior court ruled that it had been constructed on Dana's
  property and required that it be moved.  On appeal from the planning
  commission, the environmental court granted site plan approval to the
  connector section once it was moved.  Because the superior court ruled that
  Shantee Point Road was not a public road, this ended the site plan permit
  litigation, and the site plan permit has not been appealed. 

       As noted above, the superior court first ruled that the connector
  section had to be moved and that Shantee Point Road was a private road.  On
  September 21, 2000, the court ruled that pursuant to the partition order,
  SPE had the right unilaterally to relocate the road section without Dana's
  consent.  The court also found that the new road section surpassed the old
  road section in width and quality, as required by the partition order. 
  This is the second decision on appeal before us.

 
   
       SPE has filed appeals in the environmental court and the superior
  court cases.  SPE also claims that, on the same day, Dana filed an appeal
  of the environmental court cases, but failed to file an appeal of the
  superior court case.  We are treating these appeals under one docket
  because these cases are obviously interrelated. 

       We begin with SPE's claim that the trial court erred by allowing Dana
  to intervene in the environmental court matters.  The environmental court
  allowed intervention under V.R.C.P. 24(a)(2), made applicable to the
  environmental court by V.R.C.P. 76(a)(2), (FN1) which allows for
  intervention of a party in certain circumstances when the intervener claims
  an interest in property which is the subject of the action and the
  intervener's interests are not adequately represented by other parties. 
  SPE's position is that the Town of Saint Albans adequately represented
  Dana's interests so it was error to allow Dana to intervene.

       We do not reach SPE's argument because we find that Dana was entitled
  to intervention under V.R.C.P. 24(a)(1), which allows intervention "when a
  statute confers an unconditional right to intervene."  24 V.S.A. § 4471(a)
  provides a right to intervene "to every interested person appearing and
  having been heard at the hearing before the planning commission, board of
  adjustment, or the development review board."  The term "interested person"
  is defined in 24 V.S.A. § 4464(b), including:

    (3) A person owning or occupying property in the immediate
    neighborhood of a property which is the subject of any decision or
    act taken under this chapter, who alleges that the decision or
    act, if confirmed, will not be in accord with the policies,
    purposes or terms of the plan or bylaw of that municipality.

  24 V.S.A. § 4464(b)(3).

 
   
       It is undisputed that Dana appeared and was heard before the ZBA. 
  Nevertheless, the environmental court ruled that Dana could not intervene
  as of right under § 4471 because he was not an interested person. 
  Apparently, the court ruled that Dana would be an interested person under §
  4464(b)(3) only if he were contesting an adverse decision of the ZBA, and
  not when he is supporting the ZBA decision.  SPE argues that this
  represents a policy judgment of the Legislature that a landowner should not
  have to litigate against both the municipality and the adjoining landowner
  at the same time. 

       Although we recognize that the plain meaning of the statute appears to
  support the environmental court's decision, we also recognize that we held
  in Mohr v. Village of Manchester, 161 Vt. 562, 562,