Case Title: DAVID E. FOLLETT V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
DAVID E. FOLLETT V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 47132 P.3d 1155Case Number: 04-133, 05-63Decided: 04/19/2006Modified: 05/02/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
DAVID E. 
FOLLETT,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSweeetwaterCounty

The 
Honorable Nena James, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Mike Cornia, Evanston, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy 
Attorney General.                      

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After undergoing 
a mental evaluation which indicated he was competent to stand trial, David 
Follett pled guilty to one count of third degree sexual assault in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-304(a)(i) and 6-2-306(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2005).  The district court sentenced him to a 
term of ten to twelve years in the state penitentiary, and Mr. Follett 
appealed.  Mr. Follett also filed a 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming the district court should have 
ordered a second mental evaluation before accepting the plea.  The district court denied Mr. Follett's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and he appealed that determination, as 
well.  Mr. Follett's two appeals 
were consolidated for decision.  We 
affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Follett 
presents the following issues on appeal:

 
 
I.          
Was the appellant's right to due process violated when the court accepted 
his guilty plea?

 
 
II.          
Whether the denial of the motion to withdraw guilty plea was an abuse of 
discretion?

 
 
The 
State presents a single appellate issue:

 
 
Whether 
the court properly accepted appellant's guilty plea and whether it abused its 
discretion in denying appellant's subsequent motion to withdraw the plea after 
sentencing?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Follett lived 
next door to the thirteen-year-old female victim and her family.   He and his wife were 
well-acquainted with the victim's family, and the victim and her younger sister 
often visited the Follett home.  
Approximately two years before the charged offense, Mr. Follett told the 
victim's father angels had directed him to teach the victim about sex.  He claimed he would have to answer to 
Gideon's sword if he did not obey the angel.  The men agreed Mr. Follett should not be 
alone with the victim.  
Nevertheless, in July of 2003, Mr. Follett, who was sixty-five years old, 
had sexual intercourse with the young girl in his motor home which was parked 
outside his residence.  Shortly 
thereafter, Mr. Follett confessed to the victim's father that he had "broken his 
trust."    

 
 
[¶4]      The State charged 
Mr. Follett with one count of third degree sexual assault in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-304(a)(i) and 6-2-306(a)(iii).  Through his attorney, Mr. Follett filed 
a motion for a mental evaluation and stay of the proceedings pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 7-11-301(a) and 7-11-304(d) (LexisNexis 2005).  The circuit court entered an order 
granting the defense motion, and a mental health professional evaluated Mr. 
Follett on September 25, 2003.  The 
evaluator filed a report on October 13, 2003, indicating she had no concerns 
about Mr. Follett's competence to stand trial.  The report also concluded Mr. Follett 
did not meet the threshold criteria for a defense of not guilty on the basis of 
mental defect because he admitted he knew what he was doing was wrong when he 
committed the offense.  

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Follett 
waived his preliminary hearing and the case was bound over to the district court 
on October 24, 2003.  The district 
court arraigned him on November 13, 2003, at which time Mr. Follett pleaded not 
guilty, not guilty by reason of mental illness and not triable because of mental 
defect.  Trial was set for February 
17, 2004.  An order setting a change 
of plea hearing was subsequently entered, and the hearing was held on February 
6, 2004.  Mr. Follett pled guilty to 
the charge without the benefit of a plea agreement.  He provided a factual basis for the 
guilty plea, and the district court accepted his plea.  The district court subsequently 
sentenced Mr. Follett to serve not less than ten nor more than twelve years in 
the Wyoming State Penitentiary.  He 
filed a notice of appeal of the judgment and sentence on April 26, 2004.    

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Follett 
retained new defense counsel who filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  The defense argued, since Mr. 
Follett entered pleas of not guilty and not triable because of mental illness or 
defect after the competency evaluation was completed, the district court should 
have sua sponte ordered a second 
evaluation before it accepted his guilty plea.1  The district court denied Mr. Follett's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and he appealed to this Court.  Mr. Follett's two cases were 
consolidated for decision on appeal.

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
Competency 
Procedures

 
 
[¶7]      Mr. Follett 
argues his right to due process was violated because the district court did not 
follow the statutorily mandated procedures for determining whether he was 
competent to proceed with the trial court proceedings.  In particular, he claims the district 
court should not have accepted his guilty plea without ordering a competency 
hearing. 

 
 
[¶8]      "A criminal 
defendant may not be tried unless he is competent, and he may not waive his 
right to counsel or plead guilty unless he does so "competently and 
intelligently."  Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938).  The same standard of competency applies 
whether a defendant goes to trial or pleads guilty.  Godinez, 509 U.S.  at 
398.  The United States Supreme 
Court has ruled that a defendant is competent, under the standards of due 
process, if he has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with 
a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and has a rational as well as 
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'"  Godinez, 509 U.S.  at 396, quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960) (per curiam).  The determination of whether a defendant 
is mentally fit to proceed must be made by the trial court.  Hayes v. State, 599 P.2d 558, 563 
(Wyo. 
1979).  "It is not in the nature of 
a defense to the charge.  It is a 
threshold issue, necessary to be resolved to prevent a violation of due process 
through conviction of a person incompetent to stand trial."  Id.  
Moreover, the competency requirement continues from the time of 
arraignment through sentencing.  See Godinez, 509 U.S.  at 
403 (Kennedy, J., concurring); deShazer 
v. State, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 20, 74 P.3d 1240, 1248 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 
[¶9]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-301 et. seq. sets forth the 
requirements for determining whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand 
trial.  The statutes are designed to 
protect criminal defendants' due process rights.  deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 26, 74 P.3d  at 
1251.  Under the principles 
articulated in Godinez and the clear 
language of the statutes, the statutory requirements pertain to all trial court 
proceedings, including change of plea proceedings.   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303 
(LexisNexis 2005) provides, in pertinent part:

 
 
(a) If 
it appears at any stage of a criminal proceeding, by motion or upon the court's 
own motion, that there is reasonable cause to believe that the accused has a 
mental illness or deficiency making him unfit to proceed, all further 
proceedings shall be suspended.

 
 
            
(b) The court shall order an examination of the accused by a designated 
examiner.  The order may include, 
but is not limited to, an examination of the accused at the Wyoming state hospital on 
an inpatient or outpatient basis, at a local mental health center on an 
inpatient or outpatient basis, or at his place of detention.   

 
 
* * * 

 
 
            
(d) The clerk of court shall deliver copies of the report to the district 
attorney and to the accused or his counsel.  The report is not a public record or 
open to the public.  After receiving 
a copy of the report, both the accused and the state may, upon written request 
and for good cause shown, obtain an order granting them an examination of the 
accused by a designated examiner of their own choosing. 

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304 (LexisNexis 2005) provides specific protections when a 
defendant pleads not guilty or not triable on the basis of mental illness or 
defect.  That statute provides, in 
relevant part:

 
 
                        
* * * 

 
 
(d) 
In all cases where a plea of "not guilty by reason of mental illness or 
deficiency" is made, the judge shall order the defendant examined as provided in 
W.S. 7-11-303(b).  If an examination 
provided in W.S. 7-11-303(b) was made, the report may be received in evidence 
and no new examination shall be required unless, in the discretion of the court, 
another examination is necessary.  
Within five (5) days after receiving a copy of the report, both the 
accused and the state, upon written request, may obtain an order granting them 
an examination of the accused by a designated examiner of their own 
choosing.  The clerk of court shall 
deliver copies of the report or reports to the district attorney and to the 
accused or his counsel.  All reports 
required by this subsection shall conform to the requirements of W.S. 
7-11-303(c).  These reports are not 
public records or open to the public.

            
  

[¶10]   In deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 12, 74 P.3d  at 
1244-45, we adopted the standards articulated by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to review competency issues.  

 
 
Although 
competence is a factual issue, that term . . . is not self-defining.  Because competency to stand trial is an 
aspect of substantive due process, . . . the legal standard by which competency 
is to be evaluated is constitutionally mandated.  Accordingly, the components of that 
standard, required as they are by the Constitution, do not vary according to the 
views of a particular court.  The 
Constitution can require but one gauge against which to determine whether, 
because of his mental condition, a defendant's due process rights are violated 
by requiring him to stand trial.  
The content of the standard of competency is therefore a question of law 
which we review de novo.

 
 

Id. 
(citations 
omitted).  We look to the following 
standard in evaluating the sufficiency of the processes used by the trial court 
in determining whether a defendant is competent to continue with legal 
proceedings:

 
 
Once 
the trial court has "evaluated a defendant's competency by the correct standard, 
the second inquiry on review is whether the trial court's determination of a 
defendant's competency is fairly supported by the record of the proceeding at 
which the determination [is] made. . . .  
In other words, the substantial evidence standard of review governs the 
second inquiry."   [State v.] Soares, 916 P.2d [1233], 1251 [(Haw. Ct. 
App. 1996)].  

 
 

deShazer, 
2003 
WY 98, ¶ 13, 74 P.3d  at 1244-45.  

 
 
[¶11]   Prior to being bound over to the 
district court for a trial, Mr. Follett filed a motion to suspend the 
proceedings and for a mental evaluation.  
The circuit court granted the defense motion, and the resulting 
evaluation concluded:  

 
 
It can 
be stated with a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that Mr. Follett 
has the basic capacity to comprehend his position, understand the nature and 
object of the proceedings against him, conduct his defense in a rational manner, 
and the ability to cooperate with his counsel to the end that a defense may be 
interposed on his behalf.

 
 
Neither 
Mr. Follett nor the State objected to the report or requested a second 
evaluation in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(d) or § 
7-11-304(d).  Mr. Follett 
subsequently waived his preliminary hearing and the circuit court bound him over 
to the district court for trial.  
The district court arraigned Mr. Follett on November 13, 2003, and he 
entered pleas of not guilty, not guilty by reason of mental illness and not 
triable by reason of mental deficiency.  

 
 
[¶12]   On appeal, Mr. Follett argues the 
district court should have sua sponte 
ordered a second evaluation after he pleaded not guilty by reason of mental 
illness.  He claims a second 
evaluation following his plea was mandated by the language in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-304(d) which states:  "[i]n all 
cases where a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency is 
made, the judge shall order the defendant examined as provided in W.S. 
7-11-303(b)."  He also complains the 
district court violated the statutory requirements by failing to make an express 
finding on the record that he was competent.    

 
 
[¶13]   Mr. Follett did not object to the 
results of the first evaluation or request another evaluation as he was entitled 
to by the statutes.  Thus, the 
results of the first evaluation did not trigger additional obligations.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304(d) sets out 
the requirement for an examination when a defendant enters a mental illness 
plea; however, it also specifically states that if an evaluation has already 
been performed, then "the report may be received in evidence and no new 
examination shall be required unless, in the discretion of the court, another 
examination is necessary."  The 
clear language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304(d) allowed the court to rely on the 
initial examination, so long as it did not deem another examination was 
necessary.  Moreover, although it is 
good practice for the district court to make an express finding of competency 
after a mental health evaluation, the district court's failure to do so in this 
case was not erroneous.  In Hayes, we held the district court did 
not err by failing to enter a specific order regarding the defendant's 
competency to stand trial.  Hayes, 599 P.2d  at 568.  As in this case, there was no 
conflicting evidence about the defendant's competency resulting from the mental 
health evaluation and there was but one ruling which the record would 
support.  Id.   
 

 
 
[¶14]   Other cases have followed 
procedural paths similar to Mr. Follett's case.  In Smith v. State, 871 P.2d 186 (Wyo. 1994), Mr. Smith was 
charged with two counts of first degree murder.  Prior to his arraignment, the trial 
court ordered the procedures suspended for an evaluation of Mr. Smith's 
competency to stand trial.  
Id. at 187.  After the trial court determined he was 
fit to proceed, Mr. Smith was arraigned and pled not guilty and not guilty by 
reason of mental illness or deficiency.  
Id.  
Mr. Smith subsequently 
changed his plea to guilty.  
Id.  
On appeal, this Court concluded his guilty plea was unconditional 
and, consequently, he waived all non-jurisdictional defenses.  Id. 
at 190.  There was no contention 
that the trial court was required to order Mr. Smith to undergo another 
competency evaluation simply because he pled not guilty by reason of mental 
illness after the competency evaluation was completed.  Id.

 
 
[¶15]   Mr. Follett maintains the 
competency requirement is continuing and the evaluation in circuit court was 
insufficient to comply with the statutory requirements.  We agree the district court has a 
continuing duty to monitor whether a defendant's competency should be 
evaluated.  This continuing duty is 
recognized by both our statutes and our case law.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-11-303 and 
7-11-304; deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 26, 
74 P.3d  at 1251.  However, unless the parties avail 
themselves of the procedures for contesting an evaluation pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-11-303(d), there must be some basis for the district court to conclude 
additional evaluations are warranted.  
In other words, there must be "reasonable cause to believe the accused 
has a mental illness or deficiency making him unfit to proceed" before other 
evaluations are mandated.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(a).  

 
 
[¶16]   Mr. Follett points to statements 
made in association with his sentencing as evidence his competence was 
questionable.  His wife and son both 
testified he had not been the same since he suffered a heart attack and 
underwent heart bypass surgery several years before, and they testified Mr. 
Follett needed mental help.  This 
evidence did not, however, trigger the need for a second evaluation because 
those same circumstances existed when the initial evaluation was conducted.  Furthermore, the district court 
acknowledged it was cognizant of Mr. Follett's potential mental health issues 
and paid particular attention to those matters during all court 
proceedings.  Mr. Follett points to 
nothing in the record to indicate his mental health situation changed between 
the time of the evaluation and the change of plea hearing. 

 
 
[¶17]   Because Mr. Follett did undergo a 
mental evaluation and there was no indication his mental health changed after 
the evaluation, this case is substantively different from deShazer.  "The status of deShazer's mental 
health was in question from the very outset of this case," and, yet, no 
evaluation was ordered prior to his trial.  
deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 14, 74 P.3d  at 1245.  The evidence of his 
diminished capacity included "tape-recorded rantings' and typewritten and 
handwritten letters and notes, most of which might have raised the specter of 
mental illness or incompetency even in the mind of a lay observer."  deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 15, 74 P.3d  at 
1245.  In addition, the prosecution 
called the district court's attention to the fact "deShazer's father had 
attempted to have his son involuntarily committed to a mental hospital shortly 
before the crimes were committed because he believed his son to be obsessed with 
the victim, severely depressed, and suicidal."  deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 16, 74 P.3d  at 
1249.  Similarly, defense counsel 
indicated, on several occasions, he was concerned about deShazer's state of 
mind.  deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶¶ 16-18, 74 P.3d  
at 1249.  The district court did 
not, however, order deShazer to undergo a mental evaluation.  On appeal, we concluded the district 
court erred by failing to sua sponte 
order the proceedings suspended and a mental health evaluation to determine 
whether deShazer was competent to proceed.  
deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 28, 74 P.3d  at 1252.  "We [held] that the 
circumstances presented at trial were sufficient to trigger the requirement that 
the district court conduct a competency hearing in order to determine if 
deShazer was fit to proceed."  
Id.  
 

 
 
[¶18]   In contrast, Mr. Follett's rights 
were protected in this case.  He 
underwent a mental evaluation which concluded he was competent, and he did not 
contest the results of the evaluation or request an additional evaluation.  After the evaluation was completed, there 
was no new evidence suggesting Mr. Follett's capacity had diminished.  We conclude the district court complied 
with the mental examination requirements set out in the statutes and Mr. 
Follett's due process rights were not violated.  

 
 

Motion 
to Withdraw Guilty Plea  

 
 
[¶19]   Mr. Follett maintains the district 
court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) sets out the standards for 
withdrawal of a guilty plea.  

 
 
If 
a motion for withdrawal of a plea of guilty is made before sentence is imposed, 
the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of 
any fair and just reason.  The 
standard for withdrawing a plea of guilty after sentencing requires the 
defendant to show "manifest injustice."   

 
 

Ingersoll 
v. State, 2004 
WY 102, ¶ 12, 96 P.3d 1046, 1051 (Wyo. 2004).  See also,  Major  
v. State, 2004 WY 4, ¶ 12, 83 P.3d 468, 473 (Wyo. 2004).   

 
 
"Manifest 
injustice" contemplates a "situation that is unmistakable or indisputable, was 
not foreseeable, and affects the substantial rights of a party."  It is, in part, intended to address "a 
fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice 
or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair 
procedure."  The party seeking to 
withdraw his plea bears the burden of demonstrating manifest injustice.  Justification for this heightened 
standard for withdrawal of a plea after sentencing is based in the 

 
 
       "practical 
considerations important to the proper administration of justice. Before 
sentencing, the inconvenience to court and prosecution resulting from a change 
of plea is ordinarily slight as compared with the public interest in protecting 
the right of the accused to trial by jury.  
But if a plea of guilty could be retracted with ease after sentence, the 
accused might be encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential 
punishment, and withdraw the plea if the sentence were unexpectedly severe.  The result would be to undermine respect 
for the courts and fritter away the time and painstaking effort devoted to the 
sentencing process."

 
 
A 
district court has discretion in determining whether a party has proved manifest 
injustice.  Absent an abuse of that 
discretion, we will not disturb the district court's determination.  A district court's decision to deny a 
motion to withdraw a plea "will not be reversed for an abuse of discretion so 
long as the district court reasonably could conclude as it 
did."

 
 

Ingersoll, 
2004 
WY 102, ¶ 19, 96 P.3d  at 1051-52 (citations omitted).

 
 

[¶20]   Mr. Follett 
claims he showed "manifest injustice," entitling him to withdraw his guilty plea 
because his plea was not knowing and voluntary.  As the United States Supreme Court 
acknowledged in Godinez, the knowing 
and voluntary requirement for a guilty plea is distinct from a finding the 
defendant is competent.  Godinez, 509 U.S.  at 
400-01.  

 
 
The 
focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant's mental capacity; the question 
is whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings. See Drope 
v. Missouri, [420 U.S. 162, 171, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 95 S. Ct. 896 (1975)] (defendant is 
incompetent if he "lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object 
of the proceedings against him") (emphasis added). The purpose of the "knowing 
and voluntary" inquiry, by contrast, is to determine whether the defendant 
actually does understand the significance and consequences of a 
particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced. See Faretta v. 
California, [422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1974)] (defendant waiving counsel must be 
"made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the 
record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made 
with eyes open'") (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel.  McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 87 L. Ed. 268, 63 S. Ct. 236 
(1942)); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.  at 244 (defendant 
pleading guilty must have "a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of 
its consequence").

 
 

Id.  at 401, n. 12.  

 
 
[¶21]   W.R.Cr.P. 11 sets forth the 
requirements which must be met to ensure a defendant's guilty plea is voluntary 
and knowing.  Major, 2004 WY 4, ¶ 11, 83 P.3d  at 472.  When accepting a guilty plea, the 
district court must carefully follow the dictates of Rule 11.  See, Ingalls v. State, 2002 WY 75, ¶ 10, 46 P.3d 856, 859 (Wyo. 2002).  
W.R.Cr.P. 11 states, in relevant part:

 
 
                        
* * * 

 
 
   (b) Advice to Defendant.Except for 
forfeitures on citations (Rule 3.1) and pleas entered under Rule 43(c)(2), 
before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony or to a 
misdemeanor when the defendant is not represented by counsel, the court must 
address the defendant personally in open court and, unless the defendant has 
been previously advised by the court on the record and in the presence of 
counsel, inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, 
the following:

 
 
(1)  The nature of the charge to which the 
plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the 
maximum possible penalty provided by law and other sanctions which could attend 
a conviction . . . . 

 
 
* * * 

 
 
            
(2) The defendant has the right to be represented by an attorney at every 
stage of the proceeding and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent 
the defendant;

 
 
            
(3) The defendant has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that 
plea if it has already been made, the right to be tried by a jury and at that 
trial the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses, the right to court process to obtain the 
testimony of other witnesses, and the right against compelled 
self-incrimination;

 
 
            
(4) If a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted by the court there 
will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo 
contendere the defendant waives the right to a trial;  and

 
 
            
(5) If the court intends to question the defendant under oath, on the 
record, and in the presence of counsel, about the offense to which the defendant 
has pleaded guilty, that the defendant's answers may later be used against the 
defendant in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.

 
 
[¶22]   Mr. Follett claims the district 
court did not ensure his guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily.  In particular, he challenges the 
district court's failure to advise him at his change of plea hearing about:  the maximum penalty associated with the 
charge, his right to counsel at the plea hearing, the elements of the crime, his 
right to plead not guilty and his right to persist with that plea to trial.   

 
 
[¶23]   Rule 11 requires that the defendant 
be informed of his rights at the time he enters a plea of guilty, unless he has already been so advised on 
the record.  W.R.Cr.P. 11(b) 
(emphasis added).  As we recognized 
in McCarty v. State, 883 P.2d 367, 
373 (Wyo. 1994), "[t]he language of W.R.Cr.P. 11(b) no longer requires the 
district court to perfunctorily repeat information on rights and consequences 
which has previously been conveyed during arraignment or during other on the 
record proceedings in the presence of counsel."  The following colloquy occurred at the 
change of plea hearing:  

 
 
            
THE COURT:  I note the 
presence of the Defendant in the courtroom today.  Mr. LaBuda is here representing 
him.  

 
 
And 
you're privately retained, as I recall, in this case.  

 
 
            
MR. LABUDA:  
Yes.

 
 
            
* * * 

 
 
            
THE COURT:  You appeared in 
this court on the 13th day of November of 
2003.  On that date I informed you 
that you faced a felony charge of Sexual Assault in the Third Degree, and that 
for that charge if you either entered a plea of guilty or were convicted of it 
after a trial, you were facing maximum possible penalties of 15 years in the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary, a $10,000 fine or both the imprisonment and the fine 
combined.  

 
 
            
Did you understand me then and do you understand me now regarding the 
nature of the charge you face and the maximum possible 
penalties?

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
ma'am.  

 
 
            
* * * 

 
 
            
THE COURT:  When you were 
here in court in November, I advised you of your constitutional rights.  Do you have any questions about them 
today?

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT:  No, 
ma'am.  

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Before I ask 
whether you're ready to plea, I have to warn you that if you plead guilty, you 
would be admitting all of the essential facts of the 
charge.

  

            
In that event, you would be giving up the right to the presumption of 
innocence, the right to remain silent, the right to a trial, the right to be 
confronted by witnesses and to cross-examine those witnesses, and the State 
wouldn't have to prove any charge against you.  The only issue that would remain would 
be the sentence to be imposed. 

 
 
            
Also, if you plead guilty to a felony you lose certain civil rights.   If you are on probation or parole 
for any other crime, that could [be] revoked and you could be compelled to serve 
any sentence imposed for that crime, in addition to any sentence that might be 
imposed on this charge. 

 
 
            
If you plead guilty you also give up the right to object to evidence 
allegedly obtained in violation of your constitutional 
rights.

 
 
            
Do you understand the consequences of a guilty 
plea?

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
ma'am.  

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Are you ready to 
plead today?

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
ma'am.

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Will your plea be 
entered voluntarily?

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Yes.

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Has anyone 
forced, threatened, or promised you anything outside of a plea 
agreement?

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT:  No, 
ma'am.

 
 
            
* * * 

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Have you talked 
with Mr. LaBuda about the plea that you intend to enter?

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
ma'am.

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Are you satisfied 
with his representation of you so far?

            

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
ma'am.

 
 
            
THE COURT:  If you plead 
guilty, Mr. Follett, you need to understand that the Court would ask you 
questions about the crime, which you would have to answer under oath, on the 
record and in the presence of your attorney, and that those answers could be 
used against you in this case or in any prosecution for perjury or false 
statement.  Do you understand 
that?

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
ma'am.

 
 
            
* * * 

 
 
            
THE COURT:  All right.  Mr. Follett, you face one charge of 
Sexual Assault, Third Degree, a felony.  
You've entered a plea of not guilty to that on a prior date.  How do you plead to it 
today?

 
 
            
THE DEFENDANT:  
Guilty.

 
 
[¶24]   The district court then asked Mr. 
Follett to provide a factual basis for his guilty plea.  

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Before accepting your plea 
of guilty, I have to find out if you're pleading knowingly and intelligently, 
and I have to establish a factual basis for your plea.  The only way that I can do that is for 
you to tell me about this matter under oath.  [oath 
administered].

 
 
* * * 

 
 
Mr. 
Follett, you need to tell me in your own words, what you did on or about mid to 
late July of 2003 that constitutes the felony crime of Sexual Assault, Third 
Degree.

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  In July of 2003, I did 
have sex with [the victim].  Oh, and 
she's under 16 years of age and I'm 65.  

 
 
THE 
COURT:  I see.  And when you say you had sex with her, 
do you mean that you had sexual intercourse with her?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
ma'am.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  And you knew how old she was 
at the time?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes. 

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Did that happen here in 
Sweetwater County, 
Wyoming?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
ma'am.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  The State has filed an 
Affidavit in support of the Information in this case.  You've told me on a prior date in 
November that you had read that Affidavit.  
Would you say that the allegations in that Affidavit are substantially 
correct?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, ma'am.  

 
 
* * * 

 
 
THE 
COURT:  The Court finds that the 
Defendant is mentally alert, capable of understanding these proceedings and 
competent to enter his plea of guilty to the charge.

 
 
His plea 
has been knowingly and voluntarily made, and not the result of force or threats 
or promises . . . .  

 
 
The plea 
was made after consultation with competent counsel, with whom the Defendant has 
indicated he is satisfied, without any improper inducement or conditions, and 
with an understanding of the charge and the direct 
consequences.

 
 
The 
Defendant was advised as required by Rule 11 and understood those 
advisements.

 
 
There is 
a factual basis for the plea of guilty, which the Court 
accepts.

 
 
[¶25]   As referenced by the district 
court, Mr. Follett was advised of his constitutional rights at his arraignment 
in November 2003.  At the 
arraignment hearing, Mr. Follett waived a complete reading of the charge; 
however, the district judge recited a comprehensive summary of the charge and 
explained the penalties associated with the charge.  She specifically noted he had the right 
to be represented by an attorney at every stage in the proceedings and, even 
though Mr. Follett was represented by private counsel at that time, she informed 
him he could request court appointed counsel in the future if he satisfied the 
indigency requirements.  Mr. Follett 
was told he would be presumed innocent throughout the proceedings and the State 
had the burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  The district judge informed him he had 
the right to:  plead not guilty; be 
tried by a jury; assistance of counsel; confront and cross-examine witnesses; 
use court processes to obtain the testimony of witnesses; a speedy trial; and 
appeal all errors.  The judge 
explained in detail his right against self-incrimination.  Following her recitation of his 
constitutional rights, the judge specifically asked Mr. Follett if understood 
his rights and he responded affirmatively.  
The judge then carefully informed him of the consequences of a guilty 
plea, and Mr. Follett again expressed his understanding.   

 
 
[¶26]   Contrary to Mr. Follett's 
assertion, the district court clearly complied with the requirements of Rule 11 
by providing the appropriate advisements, both at his arraignment and his change 
of plea hearing.  Mr. Follett's contention that he 
should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not voluntary and 
knowing is, therefore, unfounded.  
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea.

 

[¶27]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1There was some confusion in the record because the mental evaluation 
report was not initially included as part of the official district court record 
and the other circuit court documents pertaining to the evaluation proceedings 
were not delivered to the district court when Mr. Follett was bound over for 
trial.  The record was supplemented 
on appeal pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.04.  
Mr. Follett contested the supplementation of the record in his reply 
brief; however, it is clear from the record the district court relied upon the 
mental evaluation and found the documents pertaining to it should be included in 
the record to make it "conform to the truth."  We conclude, therefore, the district 
court properly supplemented the record in accordance with W.R.A.P. 3.04.  See, Harlow v. State, 2003 WY 47, ¶ 87, 70 P.3d 179, 206 (Wyo. 
2003).