Case Title: Bon Aventure, L.L.C., and William Staggers v. Craig Dyas L.L.C. and Olympia Corte Dyas

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1051679

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-08-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
The notice of appeal describes this appellant as
1
"Bon Adventure and/or Bon Adventure, L.L.C."  It appears,
however, that the real party in interest is Bon Aventure,
L.L.C.
REL: 08/29/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2008
____________________
1051679
____________________
Bon Aventure, L.L.C., and William Staggers
v.
Craig Dyas L.L.C. and Olympia Corte Dyas
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court 
(CV-04-1279)
MURDOCK, Justice.
William Staggers and Bon Aventure, L.L.C.,  appeal from
1
1051679
2
a judgment in favor of Craig Dyas L.L.C. and Olympia Corte
Dyas, Craig Dyas's mother.  We reverse and remand.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
Mrs. Dyas and her husband owned a tract of land on
Highway 98 in Baldwin County.  In 1979, they named the
property "Bayou Volanta Commercial Park" and subdivided it
into three "units."  The northern portion of the property was
divided into Units 1 and 2.  The southern portion of the
property, measuring 6.8 acres in area, was designated as Unit
3.
In 1986, Mrs. Dyas and her husband recorded restrictive
covenants on Units 1 and 2 ("the restrictive covenants"),
which, among other things, prohibited construction of more
than "one permanent building for housing professional offices"
on any of the various lots or parcels within those two units.
The restrictive covenants were recorded at Miscellaneous Book
58, page 1022, in the Baldwin County Probate Court.  The
restrictive covenants contained a paragraph indicating that
they did not apply "to any portion of Bayou Volanta Commercial
Park, Unit 3 ...."
1051679
We assume for purposes of this opinion that Staggers
2
holds an ownership interest in Bon Aventure, although the
nature and extent of his affiliation with Bon Aventure is not
apparent from the record.
3
As of March 2001, Mrs. Dyas apparently had become the
sole owner of Unit 3.  In that month, she entered into an
agreement to sell a portion of Unit 3 to Staggers.  Among
other 
things, 
the 
agreement 
included 
the 
following
contingency: "Buyer intends to develop this property into a
medical office park and possibly other health related
operations. 
 
The 
purchase 
is 
subject 
to 
the 
proper
subdivision, 
zoning 
verification 
and 
approval 
by 
the
jurisdictional governing body in order to accomplish this type
of project."  As called for in the purchase agreement, Mrs.
Dyas resubdivided Unit 3 into two lots.  Apparently at
Staggers's request, Mrs. Dyas thereafter conveyed Lot 1 of
Unit 3 to Bon Aventure, L.L.C., in June 2001.   The deed to
2
Bon Aventure provided that the conveyance of the property was
"made subject to ... [r]estrictive covenants as contained in
Miscellaneous Book 58, Page 1022 ...."
On November 5, 2004, Staggers and Bon Aventure sued Mrs.
Dyas and Craig Dyas L.L.C., which, according to Staggers and
Bon Aventure, had acted as Mrs. Dyas's agent for the sale of
1051679
4
Lot 1.  Staggers and Bon Aventure alleged that the defendants,
as part of the agreement by which Bon Aventure purchased
Lot 1, agreed that the purchaser could erect a sign on certain
property owned by Mrs. Dyas that fronted on Highway 98.  They
alleged that the defendants breached this agreement by
subsequently refusing to allow Staggers to erect a sign, and
that their previous agreement to allow him to do so
constituted a misrepresentation.  Mrs. Dyas and Craig Dyas
L.L.C. 
answered 
the 
complaint, 
denying 
the 
material
allegations thereof.  Mrs. Dyas also filed a counterclaim in
which she asserted that Lot 1 was subject to the restrictive
covenants and that, among other things, Bon Aventure had
violated the restrictive covenants by erecting two buildings
on Lot 1.
A bench trial was held on March 1, 2006.  On April 25,
2006, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Mrs. Dyas
and Craig Dyas L.L.C. on the complaint and in favor of
Mrs. Dyas on her counterclaim.  With regard to the
counterclaim, the trial court stated:
"[T]he Court does hereby determine and declare that
those certain Restrictive Covenants dated September
23, 1986 and recorded in Miscellaneous Book 58, page
1022 in the Office of the Judge of Probate of
1051679
They do not appeal from the portion of the judgment
3
ruling against them on their claim against Mrs. Dyas and Craig
Dyas L.L.C.
5
Baldwin County, Alabama are properly incorporated by
reference in that certain Warranty Deed from Olympia
Corte Dyas to Bon Aventure, L.L.C., dated June 20,
2001, which is recorded as Instrument No. 603226 in
the Office of the Judge of Probate, Baldwin County,
Alabama, 
and 
that those restrictive covenants
constitute a burden on the title to the real
property conveyed by that deed, and that the said
covenants are valid and fully enforceable as to said
real property according to their terms ...."
Staggers and Bon Aventure appeal from the trial court's
judgment related to Mrs. Dyas's counterclaim.3
II.  Standard of Review
As noted, this case was tried without a jury.  "Where
evidence is presented to the trial court ore tenus, a
presumption of correctness exists as to the court's
conclusions on issues of fact ...."  American Petroleum Equip.
& Constr., Inc. v. Fancher, 708 So. 2d 129, 132 (Ala. 1997).
The presumption of correctness accorded a trial court's
judgment following a bench trial where evidence is presented
ore tenus does not extend to its decisions on questions of
law.  Instead, this Court reviews de novo the trial court's
1051679
Staggers and Bon Aventure's argument as quoted is
4
somewhat confusing.  Although Bayou Volanta Commercial Park
includes all three units, they apparently intend their
references to Bayou Volanta Commercial Park in the first two
sentences of the quoted paragraph to refer to only Units 1 and
2.
6
rulings on questions of law.  Ex parte Graham, 702 So. 2d
1215, 1221 (Ala. 1997).
III.  Analysis
Staggers and Bon Aventure initially contend that the
trial court should have dismissed Mrs. Dyas's counterclaim
because, they argue, Mrs. Dyas was without standing to enforce
the restrictive covenants.  Although they did not raise this
issue in the trial court, "'[s]tanding represents a
jurisdictional 
requirement 
which 
remains 
open 
to 
review 
at 
all
stages of the litigation.'"  Ex parte Fort James Operating
Co., 871 So. 2d 51, 54 (Ala. 2003) (quoting National Org. for
Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 (1994)).  Thus, we
will address the issue of Mrs. Dyas's standing to assert her
counterclaim.
According to Staggers and Bon Aventure, the restrictive
covenants
"constitute a common development scheme for the
Bayou Volanta Commercial Park.
  Those who are
[4]
1051679
7
owners of lots in Bayou Volanta are required to
comply with all of the restrictions in the general
scheme, and only those owners have the right to
enforce those restrictions.  Paragraph 15 of the
restrictions provides:  [']The covenants contained
herein may be enforced by the owner of any lot in
the subject property or by any member of the
Covenant 
Review 
Committee.' 
... 
The 
'subject
property' is defined in the legal descriptions of
Units One and Two in the first two paragraphs of the
restrictions.  As there is no evidence that the Dyas
defendants owned property in Units One or Two, the
Dyas defendants lack standing to enforce the
[restrictive covenants]."
We disagree. 
Mrs. Dyas executed and filed the restrictive covenants.
The restrictive covenants contained the following clause:
"WHEREAS, [Mrs. Dyas] is interested in restricting
the use, occupancy and improvement of all lots in
said subdivision and on said parcel, so as to keep
the 
use, 
occupancy 
and 
improvement 
of 
said
subdivision and parcel at a high level for the
benefit and pleasure of the owners of the lots in
said subdivision and for the owners of neighboring
property, which is owned by [Mrs. Dyas] and also to
promote the appearance and protect the value of lots
in the subdivision and adjoining property ...."
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, the record reflects that the
restrictive covenants were put in place for the express
benefit of property owned by Mrs. Dyas that is adjacent to the
property to which the restrictive covenants apply (Units 1 and
2).  Because Mrs. Dyas owns property that is expressly
1051679
See also Nature Conservancy v. Congel, 253 A.D.2d 248,
5
251, 689 N.Y.S.2d 317, 319 (1999) ("Subsequently, New York
courts adopted the view that an owner of neighboring land, for
whose benefit a restrictive covenant is imposed by a grantor,
may enforce the covenant as a third-party beneficiary despite
the absence of any privity of estate between the grantor and
the neighbor ...."); Amir v. D'Agostino, 328 N.J. Super. 141,
152, 744 A.2d 1233, 1239 (1998) ("Amir contends that he has
standing even without the purported assignment. It is his
position that he is the intended beneficiary of the
restrictive covenants in the Fernicola/D'Agostino deed. It is
true that persons not a party to a transaction may
nevertheless be the intended beneficiary of a covenant and
thereby gain standing to enforce it."); Southeast Toyota
Distribs., Inc. v. Fellton, 212 Ga. App. 23, 25, 440 S.E.2d
708, 711 (1994) ("If a grantor sells his property with
restrictions which he intends are for the benefit of his
neighbors, the neighbors, as beneficiaries, may enforce the
benefiting restrictions."); and Muldawer v. Stribling, 243 Ga.
673, 675, 256 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1979) ("Where a grantor sells
his property with a restriction benefiting his neighbors, the
neighbor, as the beneficiary, may enforce it.").
8
benefited by the restrictive covenants, she is entitled to
enforce those restrictive covenants.  See 20 Am. Jur. 2d
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 247 (2005) ("[A]
breach of ... a [restrictive] covenant may be restrained at
the suit of one who owns property or for whose benefit the
restriction has been established ...."); 2 Restatement (Third)
of Property:  Servitudes § 8.1 (2000) ("A person who holds the
benefit of a servitude ... has a legal right to enforce the
servitude.").5
1051679
9
Furthermore, it is undisputed that Bon Aventure purchased
Lot 1 of Unit 3 directly from Mrs. Dyas, who owns the
remaining portion of Unit 3.  The deed by which Mrs. Dyas
conveyed Lot 1 to Bon Aventure references, on its face, the
restrictive covenants.  Assuming solely for purposes of this
discussion of the standing issue that this reference to the
restrictive covenants resulted in the incorporation of those
covenants into the deed (an issue we address below), Bon
Aventure, by its acceptance of the deed, would have agreed
that its ownership of Lot 1 was encumbered by the covenants
contained in the deed.  See McKee v. Club-View Heights, Inc.,
230 Ala. 652, 654, 162 So. 671, 673 (1935) ("The grantee in
accepting the deed containing such conditions or covenants
accepts the title encumbered thereby, and is bound as though
he had signed the conveyance ....").  As the covenantee to the
restrictive covenants allegedly incorporated in the deed
conveying the property to Bon Aventure, Mrs. Dyas would have
standing to seek enforcement of the restrictive covenants.
See 20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions
§ 242 (2005) ("The parties to a restrictive covenant may
enforce it among themselves, at least so long as the
1051679
The record does not reflect whether Mrs. Dyas is a member
6
of the "Covenant Review Committee."
10
covenantee continues to own any part of the tract for the
benefit of which the restrictions have been created."
(footnotes omitted)).
The foregoing analysis is not altered by the language in
paragraph 15 of the restrictive covenants, which states that
"[t]he covenants contained herein may be enforced by the owner
of any lot in the subject property or by any member of the
Covenant Review Committee."   We do not read this clause as
6
being restrictive, but rather as permissive.  That is, we do
not read this clause as limiting the scope of individuals and
entities with the authority to enforce the restrictive
covenants.  Instead, we read this clause as expressly
affirming that certain individuals who might or might not
otherwise have a right to do so "may" enforce the covenants.
Specifically, this provision makes it clear that, in addition
to the owners of lots in Units 1 and 2, any member of the
Covenant 
Review 
Committee 
"may" 
sue 
to 
enforce 
the 
restrictive
covenants.  Under the circumstances of this case, and without
more upon which to base such a reading, we decline to read the
1051679
11
affirmative grant of authority in this clause as negatively
implying an abrogation of Mrs. Dyas's right to seek
enforcement of the restrictive covenants under the common-law
principles discussed above.
Having determined that Mrs. Dyas has standing to enforce
the restrictive covenants, we turn now to the issue whether
the restrictive covenants are enforceable against Lot 1,
Bon 
Aventure's 
property. 
 
Regarding 
the 
restrictive 
covenants,
the deed for Lot 1 provides:
"This conveyance is made subject to the
following:
"....
"Restrictive 
covenants 
as 
contained 
in
Miscellaneous Book 58, Page 1022, but deleting any
covenant, condition, or restriction indicating a
preference, limitation or discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin to the extent such
covenants, conditions or restrictions violate 42
U.S.C. 3604(c)."
Staggers and Bon Aventure contend that this language is
ambiguous and, as a result, that it did not effectively
incorporate the restrictive covenants into the deed.  We
agree.
1051679
12
Recently, we stated:  "Regarding the construction of
deeds, it is well settled that a deed is construed most
strongly against the grantor."  Barnett v. Estate of Anderson,
966 So. 2d 915, 918 (Ala. 2007).  See also Earle v.
International Paper Co., 429 So. 2d 989, 994 (Ala. 1983)
("[D]eeds of bargain and sale for valuable consideration are
to be construed against the grantor and in favor of the
grantee, when ambiguous.").  See generally 23 Am. Jur. 2d
Deeds § 200 (2002) ("Most courts agree that if there is any
ambiguity 
 
rendering 
a 
deed 
subject 
to 
alternative
constructions, 
that construction 
will 
be 
adopted which is more
favorable to the grantee than to the grantor, all doubts being
resolved against the grantor." (footnotes omitted)).
Furthermore, "[i]t is also well settled that restrictions
on the use of land are not favored in the law, and such
restrictions are strictly construed in favor of the free use
of such property."  Hill v. Rice, 505 So. 2d 382, 384 (Ala.
1987).  Indeed, the construction this Court gives a
restrictive covenant "will not be extended by implication or
include anything not plainly prohibited and all doubts and
ambiguities must be resolved against the party seeking
1051679
13
enforcement."  Bear v. Bernstein, 251 Ala. 230, 231, 36 So. 2d
483, 484 (1948).
The portion of the deed indicating that the conveyance of
Lot 1 to Bon Aventure was "subject to" the "[r]estrictive
covenants as contained in Miscellaneous Book 58, Page 1022,"
is ambiguous in two ways.  First, the language employed does
not specifically state that the deed incorporates the
restrictive covenants, but only that the act of conveying the
property is "subject to" the restrictive covenants.  The deed
is simply not clear with regard to whether the restrictive
covenants, which by their terms are not applicable to the
property conveyed to Bon Aventure, were to become a new
encumbrance on the property by operation of the deed.
Moreover, the document entitled "Restrictive Covenants"
appearing at "Miscellaneous Book 58, Page 1022," states
explicitly and in no uncertain language that it has no
application to Unit 3, a portion of which was eventually
conveyed to Bon Aventure.  Specifically, it provides that "the
Restrictive Covenants contained herein are not intended to
apply to any portion of Bayou Volanta Commercial Park, Unit
Three ...."  Thus, even if the "subject to" language employed
1051679
14
in the deed unambiguously incorporated the restrictive
covenants into the deed, those covenants, by their own terms,
do not apply to Bon Aventure's property, and, as a result, the
incorporation, even if effective, would create a further
ambiguity between the terms of the deed and the terms of the
restrictive covenants that would be incorporated therein.
Applying the rules of construction set forth above and
construing the deed most strongly in favor of both the grantee
(Bon Aventure) and the free use of the property conveyed, we
determine that the "subject to" clause in the deed listing the
book and page of the restrictive covenants did not effectively
encumber the property with the restrictive covenants that
apply to Units 1 and 2 of Bayou Volanta Commercial Park.  The
trial court erred when it held otherwise.
IV.  Conclusion
For the foregoing reason, we reverse the judgment of the
trial 
court 
finding 
that 
the 
restrictive 
covenants 
applying 
to
Units 1 and 2 of Bayou Volanta Commercial Park also encumber
Bon Aventure's property, and we remand the case for the entry
of an order consistent with this opinion.
1051679
15
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and Parker,
JJ., concur.
Lyons, J., concurs in the result.
Woodall, J., dissents.
1051679
16
LYONS, Justice (concurring in the result).
The trial court awarded Mrs. Dyas relief on her
counterclaim in which she asserted that the property
Bon Aventure purchased, which was part of Unit 3,  was subject
to the restrictive covenants applicable to Units 1 and 2.  The
main opinion concludes that Mrs. Dyas had standing to enforce
the restrictive covenants but then reverses the judgment of
the trial court in favor of Mrs. Dyas on her counterclaim
based upon a finding that the restrictive covenants do not
apply to the subject property. 
Mrs. Dyas and her husband are the source of the
restrictive covenants because they initially placed the
restrictive covenants of record.  Paragraph 15 of the
restrictive 
covenants 
states: 
 
"The 
covenants 
contained 
herein
may be enforced by the owner of any lot in the subject
property or by any member of the Covenant Review Committee."
Mrs. Dyas is not within the category of entities described in
paragraph 15 that may enforce the restrictive covenants.  
The main opinion "decline[s] to read the affirmative
grant of authority in [paragraph 15] as negatively implying an
abrogation of Mrs. Dyas's right to seek enforcement of the
1051679
17
restrictive 
covenants 
under 
the 
common-law 
principles
discussed above."  ___ So. 2d at ___.  In so doing, the main
opinion disregards the plain language of paragraph 15 of the
restrictive covenants.  Moreover, even if we were to deem the
reference in paragraph 15 to who may enforce the restrictive
covenants as ambiguous, we cannot construe it in favor of
Mrs. Dyas, the source of the covenants, because the relevant
rule 
of 
construction, 
"expressio 
unius 
est 
exclusio 
alterius,"
operates to prevent her from being a member of the group
entitled to standing to enforce the covenants.  In Ex parte
Haponski, 395 So. 2d 971, 972 (Ala. 1981), this Court stated:
"Similarly the meaning of 'curbs, gutters, and
pavement' should not be extended to include
underground storm drainage systems. The agreement
contained in respondent's letter specifically named
the items for which the petitioner was to pay fifty
percent of the costs.  A familiar [maxim] of
statutory construction, 
expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, is equally applicable in contract to
construction of contract language so that specific
mention of one of a class of things implies the
exclusion of those items not mentioned.  Black's Law
Dictionary, p. 521 (5th Ed. 1979).  It is axiomatic
that if a contract is ambiguous the court will
construe the contract most strongly against the
party who drew it; in this case, Todd Farms. Jewell
v. Jackson & Whitsitt Cotton Co., 294 Ala. 112, 313
So. 2d 157 (1975).
"Where, as here, the language of the contract is
unambiguous and plain in its expression, the court
1051679
18
cannot alter the agreement by construction but
rather must expound it as it is made by the parties.
Flowers v. Flowers, Ala., 334 So. 2d 856 (1976);
Springdale Gayfer's Store Co. v. D.H. Holmes Co.,
281 Ala. 267, 201 So. 2d 855 (1967).  The terms of
this contract are clear as to what items of cost are
to be shared, but even if they were considered to be
ambiguous, the relevant rules of construction
mandate reversal of the decision of the Court of
Civil Appeals."
I therefore respectfully concur in the result.
1051679
19
WOODALL, Justice (dissenting).
I agree with the majority that Mrs. Dyas has standing to
enforce 
the 
restrictive 
covenants. 
However, 
I 
must
respectfully dissent, because, in my opinion, the restrictive
covenants 
are 
enforceable 
against 
the 
property 
conveyed 
to 
Bon
Aventure by Mrs. Dyas.
"A contractual provision is ambiguous if it is reasonably
susceptible of more than one meaning."  FabArc Steel Supply,
Inc. v. Composite Constr. Sys., Inc., 914 So. 2d 344, 357
(Ala. 2005).  In my opinion, the language of the conveyance
from Mrs. Dyas to Bon Aventure is reasonably susceptible of
only one meaning, namely, that it imposed upon that portion of
Unit 3 conveyed to Bon Aventure the same restrictive covenants
that had been imposed on Units 1 and 2 by the referenced
recorded instrument.  I agree with Mrs. Dyas that any other
construction "would mean that there is no significance to the
'subject 
to' 
provision 
of 
the 
deed 
referencing 
the 
restrictive
covenants, contrary to the general rules of construction."
Mrs. Dyas's brief, at 19-20.  See Wittmeir v. Leonard, 219
Ala. 314, 317, 122 So. 330, 333 (1929)("In construing
1051679
20
conveyances, 'each word is presumed to have been used for some
purpose, and deemed to have some force and effect.'").