Case Title: MERRILL v. JANSMA

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
MERRILL v. JANSMA2004 WY 2686 P.3d 270Case Number: 02-205Decided: 03/18/2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

SUE 
A. MERRILL,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

ALVINA 
JANSMA,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable Hunter Patrick, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Colin M. Simpson of Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, LLC, Cody, Wyoming 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Jeffrey J. Gonda and Michael C. Steel of Lonabaugh & Riggs, Sheridan, 
Wyoming

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

 

KITE, 
Justice.

 [¶1]     Sue A. Merrill appeals 
from a summary judgment dismissing her claims for personal injury resulting from 
a fall on rental property belonging to Alvina Jansma.  She claims the district court erred in 
ruling that, as a matter of law, Ms. Jansma owed no duty to Ms. Merrill under 
the Residential Rental Property Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-1202 (LexisNexis 
2001) and no genuine issue of material fact existed under the common law as set 
forth in Restatement (Second) of  
Torts § 326 (1965).  We 
reverse and hold the Residential Rental Property Act imposes a duty on landlords 
to maintain leased premises in a fit and habitable condition.  We further hold that this duty 
establishes the standard of care applicable generally to personal injuries 
occurring on leased premises - a standard of reasonable care under the 
circumstances.  Finally, we hold 
that the statutory duty and the standard arising from it replace the common law 
rule of landlord immunity and its exceptions.  

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Ms. Merrill 
states the issues as follows:

 

I.  The 
District Court erred when it held, as a matter of law, that the Residential 
Rental Property Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-1201 (LexisNexis 2001), et 
seq., imposed no duty on Appellee in favor of Appellant under the facts of 
this case.

 

            
II.  Material questions of fact existed as to whether § 362, 
Restatement 2d Torts (1965) applied and imposed a duty on Appellee in 
favor of Appellant.

 

[¶3]      Ms. Jansma 
restates the issues as follows:

 

I.  Does 
the Residential Rental Property Act, W.S. § 1-21-1201, et seq., reverse 
the Wyoming common law doctrine of landlord immunity by imposing a legal duty 
upon a landlord that subjects her to negligence liability in the event that her 
tenant's invitee suffers injury on the leased premises?

 

            
II.  Did the district court correctly determine that there is 
no material fact in dispute that, if proven by Appellant, would bring this case 
under one of the recognized exceptions to the general rule of landlord 
immunity?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      The facts, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion, 
are that on February 19, 2000, Ms. Merrill injured her right shoulder when she 
fell as she was ascending the front steps leading to the porch and front door of 
the mobile home her daughter, Sherri Pritchard, rented from Ms. Jansma.  The step became loose during the time 
Ms. Pritchard rented the home.  
Prior to the fall, Ms. Pritchard attempted to repair the step by securing 
it with nails.  When that failed, 
she informed the manager of the property that the step was loose.  The manager suggested Ms. Pritchard try 
using screws to secure the step.  
Ms. Pritchard told the manager she did not have a screw gun.  The manager had one and said she would 
screw the step into place.  
Subsequently, and without Ms. Pritchard's knowledge, the manager 
attempted to repair the step.  
Apparently, that effort was unsuccessful and Ms. Merrill fell when the 
step separated from the porch as she stepped on it.   

 

[¶5]      Ms. Merrill filed 
a negligence claim against Ms. Jansma as the owner of the property alleging she 
knew or reasonably should have known the step was dangerous and failed to 
exercise reasonable care to alleviate the danger.  She further alleged Ms. Jansma owed a 
duty of care to her as a visitor to the rental property.  She sought damages for the injuries she 
sustained in the fall from the step, including medical expenses, lost earnings 
and damages for emotional distress and pain and suffering.  Ms. Jansma answered the complaint and 
then filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming she owed no legal duty to Ms. 
Merrill.  The district court granted 
Ms. Jansma's motion for summary judgment, holding that, as a matter of law, she 
had no legal duty to Ms. Merrill under either the Residential Rental Property 
Act or the common law as set forth in § 362 of the Restatement.         

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶6]      In reviewing 
summary judgment orders, we have the same duty, review the same materials, and 
follow the same standards as the district court.  Hoblyn v. Johnson, 2002 WY 
152, ¶ 11, 55 P.3d 1219, ¶ 11 (Wyo. 2002).  
The propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the 
correctness of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.  Id.       A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if proven, would have the effect of establishing or 
refuting an essential element of an asserted cause of action or defense.  Board of County Commissioners of 
Teton County v. Crow, 2003 WY 40, ¶ 17, 65 P.3d 720, ¶ 17 (Wyo. 
2003).  

 

[¶7]      We view the 
record from the standpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, 
giving to that party all favorable inferences that fairly may be drawn from the 
record.  Id.  We will uphold summary judgment on the 
basis of any proper legal theory appearing in the record.  Id.  We review a grant of summary judgment 
deciding a question of law de novo and afford no deference to the district 
court's ruling.  Goglio v. Star 
Valley Ranch Association, 2002 WY 94, ¶ 12, 48 P.3d 1072, ¶ 12 (Wyo. 
2002).  Summary judgment is not 
favored in negligence cases.  
Roitz v. Kidman, 913 P.2d 431, 432 (Wyo. 1996).  We, therefore, scrutinize orders 
granting summary judgment more carefully in such cases.  Id. 

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

1.         
Residential Rental Property Act

 

[¶8]      In its summary 
judgment order, the district court held Ms. Jansma owed no duty to Ms. Merrill 
under the Residential Rental Property Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-1201, et seq. 
(LexisNexis 2001) because Ms. Merrill failed to give Ms. Jansma written notice 
of the loose step as required by the act.  
Ms. Merrill contends this holding is incorrect in two respects.  First, she cites § 1-21-1202(a) of the 
act, which states:  "[e]ach owner 
and his agent renting or leasing a residential rental unit shall maintain that 
unit in a safe and sanitary condition fit for human habitation."  Ms. Merrill asserts that, by the 
enactment of this provision, the legislature abrogated the common law rule of 
landlord immunity and imposed a broad affirmative duty upon landlords and their 
agents to maintain rental properties in a reasonably safe condition.  She claims Ms. Jansma breached this duty 
by failing to maintain, or have her manager maintain, the steps leading up to 
Ms. Pritchard's home.  Ms. Merrill 
also contends the district court erred in holding that her failure to give 
written notice under § 1-21-1206 precludes her claim.  She asserts the notice provision applies 
only when a landlord disputes a tenant's request for repair, which did not occur 
here.

 

[¶9]      Citing the rule 
that legislative abrogation or modification of the common law will not be 
presumed absent explicit, unambiguous language demonstrating that intent, Ms. 
Jansma argues the Residential Rental Property Act does not abrogate the common 
law rule of landlord immunity.  Ms. 
Jansma asserts the act does not explicitly repeal the common law and, when read 
as a whole, does not support the conclusion that the legislature intended to 
impose a general duty requiring a landlord to maintain rental premises, 
including steps, on a single-dwelling unit.  Rather, she contends, it is clear the 
legislature intended only to set out minimum health and safety requirements - 
operational electricity, heating, plumbing and hot and cold water - and 
procedural mechanisms for enforcing them.  
In the event we find the legislature intended to abrogate the common law 
rule of immunity, Ms. Jansma argues alternatively that Ms. Pritchard did not 
comply with the notice requirements of the Residential Rental Property Act and 
Ms. Merrill's claim is precluded for that reason.  We consider first the question of 
whether the act imposes a duty on landlords supplanting the common law rule of 
immunity.  In addressing that issue, 
we find it helpful to review the development of landlord-tenant law from a 
historical perspective.   

 

a.         
Historical development  

 

[¶10]   For centuries, landlord immunity 
was the rule in landlord-tenant law.

 

Since 
16th century feudal England a lease has 
been considered a conveyance of an interest in land, carrying with it the 
doctrine of caveat emptor.  

 

The 
lessor impliedly covenanted that he had the legal right to transfer possession 
and that he would leave the tenant in "quiet enjoyment of the leasehold," but he 
did not impliedly warrant as to the habitability or fitness of the 
premises for any particular use.  

 

As 
a lessee of real property a 16th century 
tenant in England was expected to inspect the premises prior to the "sale," and 
in the absence of express covenants to the contrary, he took possession with 
whatever defects existed at the time of the lease.  Nor did the landlord have an implied 
responsibility to maintain the leasehold in a reasonable state of repair during 
the term of the lease. . . . 

 

It 
was in this setting that the principle of tort immunity for the landlord 
developed . . . as part and parcel of the concept that a lease is primarily a 
conveyance of real estate.  The 
landlord was not liable to the tenant or third persons for personal injury or 
personal property damage caused by a defect present at the transfer of 
possession or by defects arising during the term of the 
leasehold.

Old 
Town Development Company v. Langford, 
349 N.E.2d 744, 753-54 (Ind. App. 1976) (footnotes 
omitted).

 

[¶11]   With the transition from a mostly 
rural to a more urban society, however, the rule of landlord immunity gave way 
slightly to some judicially recognized exceptions.

 

During 
and following the Industrial Revolution, the population migration from rural to 
urban areas accentuated the importance of the structural improvements on the 
premises, and a corresponding decrease in the significance of the land 
itself.  Leases often developed into 
complex transactions.  The typical 
lease began to look more like a contract than a conveyance of real estate, often 
containing numerous express covenants alien to common law transfers of 
nonfreehold estates.  

 

Accompanying 
this migration was an ever-increasing distaste for the continued application of 
caveat emptor, or caveat lessee, to urban leases of both 
commercial and residential property.  
Modern and more complex buildings brought added maintenance costs.  At the same time tenants were less able 
to cope with the machinery and sophisticated systems in dwellings and commercial 
structures, which they had neither the expertise nor the funds to repair.  But caveat lessee did not change, 
and remained firmly entrenched in both English and American common law 
protecting the lessor from liability for personal injury or personal property 
damage arising out of defective conditions on the leased premises.  

 

While 
the cloak of immunity remained draped over the landlord as social and economic 
conditions changed, certain judicial exceptions were gradually, and grudgingly, 
carved-out "when such action could be harmonized with the rules governing the 
liability of a vendor of real property, or when the characterization of a lease 
as a conveyance was so contrary to social and economic realities that justice 
required the creation of an exception to the general rule."  Love, Landlord's Liability for 
Defective Premises:  Caveat Lessee, 
Negligence or Strict Liability?, 1975 Wis.L.Rev. 19, 50 (1975). 

 

Id. 
at 754-55.  Five exceptions to the 
rule of landlord immunity emerged.

 

A 
landlord could be held liable in tort for (1) defects in premises leased for 
admission of the public; (2) a breach of a covenant to repair; (3) negligent 
repairs; (4) defects in "common areas" under the landlord's control; and more 
recently (5) defects constituting a violation of a provision of the applicable 
building or housing code.

 

Id.1  

 

[¶12]   Despite, or perhaps in part because 
of the exceptions, there was by the 1960s increasing "discontent with the 
appearance of unfairness in the landlord's general immunity from tort liability, 
and with the artificiality and increasing complexity of the various exceptions 
to this seemingly archaic rule of nonliability."  W.L. Prosser & W.P. Keeton, Prosser 
& Keeton on Torts, 446 (5th ed. 1984).  As a result, some courts began to 
re-examine landlord tenant law.2  One of the first of these was the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, which in Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1961), adopted a rule that residential leases between landlord and 
tenant carried with them an implied warranty of habitability and fitness  that 
is, a promise that the premises would be fit for human habitation.  In reaching this result, the court 
said:  

 

[T]he 
frame of reference in which the old common-law rule operated has changed.  

 

Legislation 
and administrative rules, such as the safeplace statute, building codes, and 
health regulations, all impose certain duties on a property owner with respect 
to the condition of his premises.  
Thus, the legislature has made a policy judgment  that it is socially 
(and politically) desirable to impose these duties on a property owner  which 
has rendered the old common-law rule obsolete.

 

Id. 
at 595.  Pines was followed 
by Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Haw. 1969) and Javins v. First 
National Realty Corporation, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C.Cir. 1970).  The latter decision is frequently cited 
as the first all-out assault on traditional concepts of landlord-tenant 
law.  Old Town, 349 N.E.2d  at 
756; Olin L. Browder, The Taming of a Duty  The Tort Liability 
of Landlords, 81 Michigan Law Review 99, 109 (1982).  Like the court in Old Town, the 
courts in Lemle and Javins recognized that an implied warranty of 
habitability applied to rental property.  
Since then a number of other courts have followed the lead of 
Pines and its progeny.3 

 

[¶13]   In addition to the courts that 
rejected the common law in favor of recognition of an implied warranty of 
habitability, other courts cast aside landlord immunity on the basis of general 
negligence principles.  In 
Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 530 (N.H. 1973), the court 
said:

 

General 
principles of tort law ordinarily impose liability upon persons for injuries 
caused by their failure to exercise reasonable care under all the 
circumstances.  A person is 
generally negligent for exposing another to an unreasonable risk of harm which 
foreseeably results in an injury.  
But, except in certain instances, landlords are immune from these simple 
rules of reasonable conduct which govern other persons in their daily 
activities.  This "quasisovereignty 
of the landowner" (2 F. Harper and F. James, Law of Torts 1495 (1956)) finds its 
source in agrarian England of the dark ages.  Due to the untoward favoritism of the 
law for landlords, it has been justly stated that "the law in this area is a 
scandal."  Quinn and Phillips, 
The Law of Landlord-Tenant:  A 
Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 Ford L. 
Rev. 225 (1969).  "For decades the 
courts persistently refused to pierce the hardened wall that preserved the 
landlord-tenant relationship in its agrarian state."  Note, 59 Geo. L.J. 1153, 1163 
(1971).  But courts and legislatures 
alike are beginning to reevaluate the rigid rules of landlord-tenant law in 
light of current needs and principles of law from related areas.  "Justifiable dissatisfaction with the 
rule" of landlord tort immunity (2 F. Harper and F. James, supra at 1510) 
compels its reevaluation. . . .

 

On 
this basis, the court discarded the common law rule and held: 

 

[h]enceforth, 
landlords as other persons must exercise reasonable care not to subject others 
to an unreasonable risk of harm.  A 
landlord must act as a reasonable person under all of the circumstances 
including the likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such 
injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk.  We think this basic principle of 
responsibility for landlords as for others "best expresses the principles of 
justice and reasonableness upon which our law of torts is founded."  The questions of control, hidden defects 
and common or public use, which formerly had to be established as a prerequisite 
to even considering the negligence of a landlord, will now be relevant only 
inasmuch as they bear on the basic tort issues such as the foreseeability and 
unreasonableness of the particular risk of harm.  

 

Id. 
at 534 (some citations omitted).   
Citing the New Hampshire court's decision in Sargent, the Nevada 
Supreme Court likewise removed the landlord's cloak of immunity in Turpel v. 
Sayles, 692 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Nev. 1985), holding:

 

In 
accord with those courts which have discerned no sound policy reason in the 
modern social context for retaining the ancient exception for landlords or 
property owners from the general application of the basic principles of tort 
law, we find no basis for excusing the landlord in this case from the 
requirement that she defend the allegation that she has, through her negligence, 
been the cause of foreseeable injuries to the plaintiff for which she should 
assume liability. 

 

[¶14]   As mentioned in Sargent, the 
re-evaluation of landlord-tenant law has not been confined to the 
judiciary.  In the past thirty 
years, legislatures in nearly every state have enacted statutes imposing new 
duties on landlords.  The Uniform 
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA) likely played a role in this 
development and served as a model for similar legislation, with varying degrees 
of amendment, in many states.  7B 
Uniform Laws Annotated (West Group 2000), Uniform Residential Landlord and 
Tenant Act, 527 (1972); Browder, 
supra, at 113.  Although the URLTA differs in many 
respects from Wyoming's Residential Rental Property Act, both acts contain 
provisions requiring landlords to maintain the premises in a fit, safe and 
habitable condition.  Both acts are 
also illustrative of the overwhelming movement nationwide away from landlord 
immunity and toward landlord responsibility for known dangers and those which 
ought to be known with the exercise of reasonable care.  For that reason, we briefly discuss the 
URLTA.      

 

[¶15]   The purposes of the URLTA as stated 
in § 1.102 are generally to modernize the law and the rights and obligations of 
landlords and tenants, encourage both lessor and lessee to maintain rental 
premises, and make uniform the laws among those states that adopt it.  Uniform Laws Annotated, supra, at 
534.  Among other things, the URLTA 
provides: 

 

§ 
2.104.  [Landlord to Maintain 
Premises].

(a)    A 
landlord shall

 

* 
* *

 

(2)   make 
all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit 
and habitable condition;

 

                                        
* * *

 

(4)   maintain 
in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, 
heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances . . 
. supplied or required to be supplied by him[.] 

 

* 
* *

 

Id. 
at 566.  Section 4.101(a) of the 
URLTA authorizes the tenant to provide written notice to a landlord who is not 
in noncompliance with the preceding section that the lease will terminate if the 
condition is not corrected.  
Id. at 609.  Section 
4.101(b) allows the tenant to recover actual damages for the landlord's 
noncompliance in addition to the remedies available under § 4.101(a).  Section 1.105 also provides for the 
recovery of appropriate damages by the aggrieved party and the right to bring an 
action to enforce the rights and obligations declared by the act.  Id. at 537.  As of 2001, fifteen states had adopted 
the URLTA in whole or in part.4      

 

[¶16]   Altogether, over forty states have 
discarded the common law rule of landlord immunity and recognize a duty in some 
form, either through legislation, judicial declaration, or both.5  Among the states with legislation 
addressing the landlord-tenant relationship, the statutory language varies 
considerably, with some following the example of the URLTA quite closely and 
others adopting their own version of landlord tenant statutory law.  Just as the statutory language varies, 
the approaches taken by the courts differ in deciding whether the statute 
creates a duty and, if so, what the legal basis for the duty is and what 
remedies are available for breach of the duty.  As noted, although there is considerable 
variation from state to state in the statutory language employed and judicial 
interpretation of that language, nearly every court is in agreement that 
landlords in the modern era have duties they did not have at common law.  

 

[¶17]   In Thompson v. Crownover, 
381 S.E.2d 283, 284-85 (Ga. 1989), for example, after noting the Georgia 
legislature's early rejection of the common law in favor of a duty of reasonable 
care, the court said:    

 

The 
public policy of this state supports the position advanced by The Restatement of 
Law 2d, Property, § 17.6:

 

A 
landlord should be subject to liability for physical harm caused to the tenant 
and others upon the leased property with the consent of the tenant or his 
subtenants by a dangerous condition existing before or arising after the tenant 
has taken possession, if he has failed to exercise reasonable care to repair the 
condition and the existence of the condition is in violation 
of:

 

(1) 
an implied warranty of habitability; or

(2) 
a duty created by statute or administrative 

regulation.

 

 

In 
Young v. Garwacki, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (Mass. 1980), the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court likewise was persuaded the common law rule had outlived 
its usefulness:

 

Today, 
we do away with the ancient law that bars a tenant's guest from recovering 
compensation from a landlord for injuries caused by negligent maintenance of 
areas rented to the tenant.  Like 
the other rules based on status, this rule has prevented a whole class of people 
from raising the overriding issue:  
whether the landlord acted reasonably under the circumstances.  The practical result of this archaic 
rule has been to discourage repairs of rented premises.  In cases like the one before us, a 
landlord with knowledge of a defect has less incentive to repair it.  And the tenant, who often has a 
short-term lease, limited funds, and limited experience dealing with such 
defects, will not be inclined to pay for expensive work on a place he will soon 
be leaving.  Thus, the defect may go 
unrepaired until an unsuspecting plaintiff finds herself with a lawsuit that 
care could have prevented.

 

The 
Massachusetts court held a landlord is required to exercise reasonable care to 
correct unsafe conditions of which he has notice and if he fails to make the 
repairs, the tenant or any person rightfully on the premises may bring a tort 
action against him for any injuries sustained.  The court found this result to be 
consistent with the state statute governing landlord-tenant relations.6   

 

 [¶18]  Similarly, in Newton v. Magill, 
872 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1994), the Alaska Supreme Court held a landlord has a duty 
of reasonable care in light of all the circumstances.  The court stated:  

 

We 
now further expand the landlord's duty of care in aligning Alaska with the 
jurisdictions following Sargent, and thus reject the traditional rule of 
landlord immunity. . . .  We do this 
because it would be inconsistent with a landlord's continuing duty to repair 
premises imposed under the URLTA to exempt from tort liability a landlord who 
fails in this duty.  The legislature 
by adopting the URLTA has accepted the policy reasons on which the warranty of 
habitability is based.  These are 
the need for safe and adequate housing, recognition of the inability of many 
tenants to make repairs, and of their financial disincentives for doing so, 
since the value of permanent repairs will not by fully realized by a short-term 
occupant.  The traditional rule of 
landlord tort immunity cannot be squared with these policies.  

 

Id. 
at 1217.   The court further 
stated:

 

Our 
rejection of the general rule of landlord immunity does not make landlords 
liable as insurers.  Their duty is 
to use reasonable care to discover and remedy conditions which present an 
unreasonable risk of harm under the circumstances.  Nor does our ruling mean that questions 
as to whether a dangerous condition existed in an area occupied solely by the 
tenant or in a common area, or whether the condition was apparent or hidden, are 
irrelevant.  These are circumstances 
which must be accounted for in customary negligence analysis.  They may pertain to the reasonableness 
of the landlord's or the tenant's conduct and to the foreseeability and 
magnitude of the risk.  In 
particular, a landlord ordinarily gives up the right to enter premises under the 
exclusive control of the tenant without the tenant's permission.  The landlord's ability to inspect or 
repair tenant areas is therefore limited.  
In such cases, "a landlord should not be liable in negligence unless he 
knew or reasonably should have know of the defect and had a reasonable 
opportunity to repair it."  
[Garwacki, supra.]

 

Id. 
at 1218.    

 

[¶19]   In accord with these cases, the 
court in New Haverford Partnership v. Stroot, 772 A.2d 792 (Del. 
2001) held:

 

[T]he 
Landlord Tenant Code imposes a duty on landlords to maintain the leased premises 
in a safe, sanitary condition and that an injured tenant may recover for 
personal injuries sustained as a result of landlord's negligent failure to do 
so.

 

In 
reaching this result, the court said:

 

[T]here 
is nothing to suggest that, in undertaking to regulate landlord/tenant 
relations, the General Assembly also intended to eliminate a tenant's ability to 
bring tort claims against a landlord.  
Our courts have long recognized that such claims remain unaffected by the 
Landlord Tenant Code.

 

Id. 
at 798. Like the courts in Georgia, Massachusetts, Alaska and Delaware, courts 
in the following states have applied negligence principles to landlord tenant 
relations on the basis of either legislative or judicial pronouncement:  Cummings v. Prater, 386 P.2d 27, 
31 (Ariz. 1963); Stephens v. Stearns, 678 P.2d 41 (Idaho 1984); 
Brichacek v. Hiskey, 401 N.W.2d 44, 47 (Iowa 1987); Jackson v. 
Wood, 726 P.2d 796 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986); Lenz v. Ridgewood 
Associates, 284 S.E.2d 702 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981); Shump v. First 
Continental-Robinwood Associates, 644 N.E.2d 291 (Ohio 1994); Errico v. 
LaMountain, 713 A.2d 791 (R.I. 1998); Pryor v. Northwest Apartments, 
469 S.E.2d 630 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996); Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 
1981); Favreau v. Miller, 591 A.2d 68 (Vt. 1991); Marple v. 
Papermill Park Corp., 30 Va. Cir. 154 (1993); Antwaun v. Heritage Mutual 
Insurance Co., 596 N.W.2d 456 (Wis. 1999).  

 

[¶20]   Even in states sometimes cited as 
having neither a statute nor court decision imposing liability on landlords,7 the law has evolved away from 
landlord immunity.  In Colorado, for 
example, where there is no legislation similar to the URLTA or Wyoming's 
Residential Rental Property Act, the courts have allowed recovery by injured 
persons for a landlord's failure to use reasonable care on the basis of the 
landowner liability statutes.  
C.R.S. § 13-21-115 (1993 Cum. Supp.); Maes v. Lakeview 
Associates, 892 P.2d 375 (Colo. App. 1994).  

 

[¶21]   In contrast to the forty-plus 
states that have done away with landlord immunity, a few states have retained 
the common law except as explicitly provided in their particular landlord-tenant 
act.  Nebraska, for example, enacted 
the URLTA but has since substantially modified it, including adding a provision 
that states:  "The obligations 
imposed by this section are not intended to change existing tort law in the 
state."  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-1419 
(1974).  The Nebraska Supreme Court 
has interpreted this provision to mean that the act does not change the common 
law, thus a landlord owes no duty to a tenant to repair leased premises absent a 
contractual provision to that effect or retention of control of the area where 
an injury occurs.  Tighe v. Cedar 
Lawn, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 520 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002).  It bears repeating, however, that 
Nebraska is one of only a very few states that adheres strictly to the common 
law "no duty" rule.  

 

[¶22]   Unlike Nebraska, other states that 
continue to apply the common law allow personal injury claims against a landlord 
on the basis of various legal theories.  
In Ohio, for example, despite the courts' continued adherence to the 
common-law rule, a landlord may be liable in tort for failing to maintain leased 
premises in a fit and habitable condition as required under Ohio's Landlords and 
Tenants Act.  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
5321.04 (1974); Shump, 644 N.E.2d  at 296.  The Ohio statute is viewed as an 
exception to a landlord's common-law immunity and as expanding the duties a 
landlord owes to those using rental property.  Id.  

 

[¶23]   Along similar lines, the Oregon 
Supreme Court has held that the common law exists alongside the Oregon 
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act  
(ORLTA).  Davis v. 
Campbell, 965 P.2d 1017,1021 (Ore. 1998).  Thus, a tenant may bring a statutory 
claim under the ORLTA, a common-law negligence claim, or both.  Id.  With respect to the statutory claim, the 
court held the fact that the legislature did not incorporate elements of 
common-law negligence into the statute indicated its intent that a tenants' 
remedies under the act not be conditioned upon proof of such elements (thus, the 
court would not read into the act a requirement that the landlord have actual or 
constructive knowledge of an unsafe condition).  Id. at 1019.  Of further interest in terms of the 
issue before us, the Oregon Supreme Court has broadened the standard applicable 
to common-law negligence claims by rejecting previously adopted principles of 
obvious danger and actual or constructive knowledge in favor of more general 
comparative negligence principles.  
Coulter Property Management, Inc. v. James, 970 P.2d 209 (Ore. 
1998).  Citing the rule that the 
court would "reconsider a court-created rule or doctrine if surrounding 
statutory law or regulations have altered some essential legal element assumed 
in the earlier case,'" the court held that with the adoption of comparative 
negligence the previously applied principles of obvious danger and actual or 
constructive knowledge contained in Restatement, supra, no longer 
accurately stated the common law of Oregon, thus altering an essential legal 
element assumed at the time the Restatement was adopted and warranting 
reconsideration of the common law rule. 

 

[¶24]   The Washington courts also continue 
to recognize common law principles governing personal injury claims arising out 
of the landlord-tenant relationship while simultaneously allowing claims for 
personal injuries by tenants based upon the Washington Residential 
Landlord-Tenant Act.  Tucker v. 
Hayford, 75 P.3d 980 (Wash. App. 2003).  In reaching this result, the court has 
emphasized the provision of the Washington act taken from the URLTA authorizing 
the tenant to bring an action in an appropriate court for any remedy provided 
under the act or otherwise provided by law.  Id. at 985.  

 

[¶25]   As this discussion illustrates, 
landlord-tenant law has evolved considerably from the days when the common law 
rule was established.  Today, the 
vast majority of states recognize that a landlord has a duty to maintain rental 
property in a safe, habitable condition.  
With this overview in mind, we turn to a discussion of the law in 
Wyoming.

 

  

[¶26]   Despite the overwhelming movement 
in other states to replace the rule of landlord immunity, Wyoming up to now has 
continued to apply the common law rule - absent a contractual provision to 
repair, a landlord generally owes no duty to a tenant or a tenant's guests for 
dangerous or defective conditions of the premises.  Hefferin v. Scott Realty Co., 254 P.2d 194, 197 (Wyo. 1953).  The only 
exceptions we have recognized to this general rule are where: 

 

1.      
Hidden 
or latently dangerous conditions known to the landlord and unknown to the tenant 
cause an injury.

 

2.      
The 
premises are leased for public use and a member of the public is 
injured.

 

3.      
An 
injury occurs on a part of the premises retained under the control of the 
landlord but open to the tenant's use.

 

4.  The landlord contracts to repair the 
premises.

 

5.  The landlord negligently makes 
repairs.

 

Ortega 
v. Flaim, 
902 P.2d 199, 202 (Wyo. 1995).  In 
all but the five limited circumstances listed above, we have held to the common 
law rule that a landlord owes no duty to a tenant and have declined on several 
occasions to join the majority of states by judicially adopting landlord 
liability.  Id., Pavuk v. 
Rogers, 2001 WY 75, 30 P.3d 19 (Wyo. 2001).  Such a change in the common law, we have 
said, is best left to the legislature.  
Id.  Most notably, in 
Ortega, we said:

 

In 
order for social guest Ortega to succeed in imposing landlord liability in this 
case, Wyoming's adherence to the common law rule must be abandoned. . . .  

 

Other 
states have construed statutes, contracts, or an implied warranty of 
habitability as imposing tort liability upon landlords.  Since the 1970s, this legal trend has 
resulted in the majority of states abrogating the common law rule of landlord 
nonliability under various legal theories.

  

Presently, 
Wyoming has no legal basis for landlord tort liability as it has not enacted 
legislation on this issue, has not judicially recognized an implied warranty of 
habitability for rental premises and has not judicially altered the common law 
rule. . . .

  

This 
court has modified or abandoned the common law on the issues of interspousal 
tort immunity, parental tort immunity, recovery for loss of spousal and parental 
consortium, negligent infliction of emotional distress, off-premises liability 
of a lessee, and classifications of tort plaintiffs in landowner liability 
cases.

 

Where 
this court has considered whether a duty should be imposed based on a particular 
relationship, numerous factors have been balanced to aid in determining whether 
a duty should be imposed.  Social 
guest Ortega does not analyze these factors or provide a record for our 
analysis, but offers only the decision of Sargent [v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 
308 A.2d 528 (1973)] as argument that modern trends demand abrogation of the 
common law in this instance.  We 
believe such a change  cannot 
be  based solely  upon a trend, but rather 

must 
be based upon relevant data and analysis which supports the legal, social and/or 
economic theories behind abrogating the common law.

 

Although 
most states have judicially recognized some type of landlord liability without 
relevant data, this recognition appears to have been driven by a desire to 
further the social policy of improving living conditions.  In our opinion this is a matter for the 
legislature, and we decline to abrogate the common law in this instance without 
a proper record and insightful analysis of whether conditions in Wyoming warrant 
a change regarding residential leases.

 

Ortega, 
902 P.2d  at 202-04 (some citations omitted).    

 

[¶27]   Presumably with Ortega in 
mind, the legislature in short order took up the matter of landlord-tenant 
law.  Just over a year after the 
decision, during the 1997 legislative session, a bill addressing landlord-tenant 
relations was introduced and assigned to committee where it was defeated without 
reaching the floor of either chamber.  
Two years later, during the 1999 legislative session, it was modified, 
reintroduced, amended, and passed into law as the Wyoming Residential Rental 
Property Act, § 1-21-1201, et seq.  
The provisions of the act pertinent to this appeal are quoted below.  Those set out in bold and italicized are 
central to the issues before us. 

 

§ 
1-21-1202.  Duties of owners 
and renters; generally   (a) Each owner and 
his agent renting or leasing a residential rental unit shall maintain that unit 
in a safe and sanitary condition fit for human habitation. Each residential 
rental unit shall have operational electrical, heating and plumbing, with hot 
and cold running water unless otherwise agreed upon in writing by both 
parties. Provided, however, this section shall not prevent the rental of 
seasonal rental units such as summer cabins which are not intended to have such 
amenities.

  (b) Each renter shall cooperate in 
maintaining his residential rental unit in accordance with this 
article.

  (c) This article does not 
apply to breakage, malfunctions or other conditions which do not materially 
affect the physical health or safety of the ordinary 
renter.

  (d) Any duty or obligation in this 
article may be assigned to a different party or modified by explicit written 
agreement signed by the parties.

§ 
1-21-1203.  Owner's duties; notice by renter of noncompliance; 
duty to correct; exceptions; termination of rental agreement; liability 
limited

   (a) To 
protect the physical health and safety of the renter, each owner 
shall:

   (i)  
Not rent the residential rental unit unless it is reasonably safe, sanitary and 
fit for human occupancy;

   (ii)  Maintain common 
areas of the residential rental unit in a sanitary and reasonably safe 
condition;

   (iii) 
 Maintain electrical systems, plumbing, heating and hot and cold water; 
and

   (iv)  
Maintain other appliances and facilities as specifically contracted in the 
rental agreement.

   (b) If the renter is 
current on all payments required by the rental agreement and has reasonable 
cause supported by evidence to believe the residential rental unit does not 
comply with the standards for health and safety required under this article, the 
renter shall advise the owner in writing of the condition and specify the 
remedial action the renter requests be taken by the owner. 
Within a reasonable time after receipt of this notice, the owner shall 
either commence action to correct the condition of the residential rental unit 
or notify the renter in writing that the owner disputes the renter's 
claim. The notices required by this subsection shall be served by 
certified mail or in the manner specified by W.S. 
1-21-1003.

  (c) The owner shall not be required 
to correct or remedy any condition caused by the renter, the renter's family or 
the renter's guests or invitees by inappropriate use or misuse of the property 
during the rental term or any extension of it.

  (d) The owner may refuse to 
correct the condition of the residential rental unit and terminate the rental 
agreement if the costs of repairs exceeds an amount which would be reasonable in 
light of the rent charged, the nature of the rental property or rental 
agreement. If the owner refuses to correct the condition and intends to 
terminate the rental agreement, he shall notify the renter in writing 
within a reasonable time after receipt of the notice of noncompliance and shall 
provide the renter with sufficient time to find substitute  housing,  which  shall be  no less  than ten (10) days 

nor 
more than twenty (20) days from the date of the notice. If the rental agreement 
is terminated, the rent paid shall be prorated to the date the renter vacates 
the unit and any balance shall be refunded to the renter along with any deposit 
due in accordance with W.S. 1-21-1208.

  (e) The 
owner is not liable under this article for claims for mental suffering or 
anguish.

 §1-21-1204.  Renter's duties.

 

(a)   Each 
renter shall:

(i) 
Maintain the residential rental unit occupied in a clean and safe condition and 
not unreasonably burden any common area;

(ii) 
Dispose of all garbage and other waste in a clean and safe 
manner;

(iii) 
Maintain all plumbing fixtures in a condition as sanitary as the fixtures 
permit;

(iv) 
Use all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating and other facilities and 
appliances in a reasonable manner;

(v) 
Occupy the residential rental unit in the manner for which it was designed and 
shall not increase the number of occupants above that specified in the rental 
agreement without written permission of the owner;

(vi) 
Be current on all payments required by the rental 
agreement;

(vii) 
Comply with all lawful requirement of the rental agreement between the owner and 
the renter; and

(viii) 
Remove all property and garbage either owned or placed within the residential 
rental unit by the renter or his guests prior to termination of the rental 
agreement and clean the rental unit to the condition at the beginning of the 
rental agreement.

 

§ 
1-21-1205.  Prohibited acts by 
renter.

 

(a)    No 
renter shall:

(i)     Intentionally 
or negligently destroy, deface, damage, impair or remove any part of the 
residential rental unit or knowingly permit any person to do 
so;

(ii)   Interfere 
with another person's peaceful enjoyment of the residential property; 
or

(iii) 
Unreasonably deny access to, refuse entry to or withhold consent to enter the 
residential rental unit to the owner, agent or manager for the purpose of making 
repairs to or inspecting the unit, and showing the unit for rent or 
sale.

 

§ 
1-21-1206.  Renter's remedies; notice to owner or agent; 
judicial remedy; rights under termination of rental 
agreement

 

  (a) The remedies set forth in this 
section are available to a renter in compliance with all provisions of W.S. 
1-21-1204 and 1-21-1205 when the rental agreement has not been lawfully 
terminated pursuant to W.S. 1-21-1203(d).  (b) If a reasonable time has 
elapsed after the renter has served written notice on the owner under W.S. 
1-21-1203 and the owner has failed to respond or to correct the condition 
described in the notice, the renter may cause a "notice to repair or correct 
condition" to be prepared and served on the owner 
by certified mail or in the manner specified by W.S. 1-21-1003. This notice 
shall:

     (i) Recite the previous notice 
served under W.S. 1-21-1203(b);     (ii) State the number of days 
that have elapsed since the notice was served and that under the circumstances 
the period of time constitutes the reasonable time allowed under W.S. 
1-21-1203(b);

     (iii) State the conditions 
included in the previous notice which have not been 
corrected;

     (iv) Demand that the uncorrected 
conditions be corrected; and

     (v) State that if the owner fails 
to commence reasonable corrective action within three (3) days he will seek 
redress in the courts.

  (c) If the owner has not 
corrected or used due diligence to correct the conditions following notice under 
this section, or if the owner has notified the renter that the claim is 
disputed, the renter may commence a civil action in county or justice of the 
peace court. The court shall endorse on the summons the number of days 
within which the owner is required to appear and defend the action, which shall 
not be less than three (3) nor more than twenty (20) days from the date of 
service. Upon a showing of an unreasonable refusal to correct or the 
failure to use due  diligence 
to  correct a  condition  described in this 

article, 
the renter may be awarded costs, damages and affirmative relief as determined by 
the court. Damages awarded to the renter may include rent improperly retained or 
collected. Affirmative relief may include a declaration terminating the rental 
agreement, or an order directing the owner to make reasonable 
repairs.

  (d) If the court terminates the 
rental agreement pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the renter is 
entitled to receive a refund of the balance of the rent and the deposit on the 
rental unit within thirty (30) days of the date the agreement is ordered 
terminated. The renter shall be required to vacate the rental unit no sooner 
than ten (10) days nor later than twenty (20) days after termination of the 
rental agreement by a court.

Sections 
1-21-1207 through 1211 of the act address matters arising after termination of a 
rental agreement, such as the disposition of any deposit, prepaid rent, or 
personal property left behind by the renter, damage to the premises, refusal to 
vacate and owner's remedies, and are not relevant to the issues presented for 
our review.  Having considered the 
language of our statute, as well as the law in other states, we turn to the 
question before us  the effect, if any, of Wyoming's landlord-tenant statute on 
the common law rule of landlord immunity.

 

c.         
The effect of §§ 1-21-1201 through 1-21-1211 on the common law 

 

[¶28]   In considering the pertinent 
provisions, we are bound by well-established rules for interpreting and 
construing statutes.  

 

"In 
interpreting statutes, we primarily determine the legislature's intent.  If the language is sufficiently clear, 
we do not resort to rules of construction.  
We apply our general rule that we look to the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of a statute when the language is unambiguous."  We construe together all parts of the 
statutes in pari materia, and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, we 
consider and construe in harmony all statutes relating to the same subject or 
having the same general purpose.  

 

When 
the language is not clear or is ambiguous, the court must look to the mischief 
the statute was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its 
enactment, the public policy of the state, the conclusions of law, and other 
prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances, making use of the accepted 
rules of construction to ascertain a legislative intent that is reasonable and 
consistent.  

 

Albertson's, 
Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 
2001 WY 98, ¶ 7, 33 P.3d 161, ¶ 7 (Wyo. 2001) (citations omitted).  When the legislature has spoken in 
unambiguous terms, however, "we are bound to the results so expressed."  Id.  A statute is unambiguous if its wording 
is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with 
consistency and predictability.  Rawlinson v. Greer, 2003 WY 28, ¶ 14, 
64 P.3d 120, ¶ 14 (Wyo. 2003).  A 
statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to 
varying interpretations.  
Id.

            

[D]ivergent 
opinions among parties as to the meaning of a statute may be evidence of 
ambiguity.  However, the fact that 
opinions may differ as to a statute's meaning is not conclusive of 
ambiguity.  Ultimately, whether a 
statute is ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court.  

 

McClean 
v. State, 
2003 WY 17, ¶ 6, 62 P.3d 595, ¶ 6 (Wyo. 2003) (citations 
omitted).

 

[¶29]   We will not insert language into 
the statutes that the legislature omitted.  
Mathewson v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 10, ¶ 9, 61 P.3d 1229, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 2003).  A basic 
tenet of statutory construction is that omission of words from a statute is 
considered to be an intentional act by the legislature, and this court will not 
read words into a statute when the legislature has chosen not to include 
them.  Id.    

 

[¶30]   Applying these rules of statutory 
interpretation to the provisions quoted above, we note first the absence of 
explicit language stating that the act is intended to abrogate, preserve, or 
modify the general common-law rule of landlord immunity.  The act does not contain a statement of 
purpose nor does it reference in any manner the common law rule of landlord 
immunity.  It likewise makes no 
reference to personal injury claims arising from unsafe conditions on rental 
premises.

 

[¶31]   The act does, however, clearly and 
expressly impose a duty on landlords not previously recognized in Wyoming 
law.  Section 1-21-1202(a) requires 
landlords to maintain rental units in a safe, sanitary and habitable 
condition.  Section 1-21-1203(a)(i) 
prohibits landlords from renting premises that are not reasonably safe, sanitary 
and fit for human occupancy.  Ms. 
Merrill asserts the imposition of the duty is itself sufficient evidence of 
legislative intent and that an express statement of intent to abrogate the 
common law is unnecessary - no duty existed before, a duty clearly exists now, 
therefore, the act abrogated, or at least modified, the common-law rule of 
landlord immunity.

 

[¶32]   In contrast, Ms. Jansma contends 
the language is insufficient to change the common law of immunity.  She argues the act must contain explicit 
language stating that the common law is abrogated, repealed or modified in order 
for this court to conclude the legislature intended to change the common 
law.  As examples of statutory 
enactments containing such express language, Ms. Jansma cites Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-102(b) of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (abolishing judicially 
created categories for determining governmental immunity or liability), Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-1-102 of the Wyoming Criminal Code (abolishing common law 
crimes), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-101(b) of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act 
(providing the common law rule of liberal construction does not apply) and Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 34-20-104(c) of the Condominium Ownership Act (providing common law 
rules do not apply). 

 

[¶33]   It is well-established that 
legislative intent to repeal the common law will not be inferred absent clear 
language evidencing that intent. However, effectuation of such repeal does not 
require the use of some particular word or words.  It requires instead plain, unambiguous 
language making it clear that is what was intended.  This Court recognized long ago that 
"when a common-law procedure or a precedence in the court of common law has 
prevailed for centuries the statute which abrogates it should be so plainly 
expressed that nothing is left to disputable inference."  McBride v. Union Pacific 
Railway Co., 21 P. 687, 690 (Wyo. 1889).  More recently we 
said:

 

"It 
is not to be presumed that the legislature intended to abrogate or modify a rule 
of the common law by the enactment of a statute upon the same subject; it is 
rather to be presumed that no change in the common law was intended unless the 
language employed clearly indicates such [intent]. . . .  The rules of common law are not to be 
changed by doubtful implication, nor overturned except by clear and unambiguous 
language."

 

Kaycee 
Land and Livestock v. Flahive, 
2002 WY 73, ¶ 9, 46 P.3d 323, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 2002) (citation omitted).  

 

[¶34]   Absent a manifestation of 
legislative intent to repeal a common-law rule, statutes should be construed as 
consistent with the common law.  
Andersen v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 105, ¶ 13, 49 P.3d 1011, 
¶ 13 (Wyo. 2002).  Statutes are not 
to be understood as effecting any change in the common law beyond that which is 
clearly indicated either by express terms or by necessary implication from 
the language used. Urbach v. Urbach, 73 P.2d 953, 961 (Wyo. 1937) 
(emphasis added).   

 

[¶35]   On the basis of these standards, we 
have held that legislative intent to abrogate, change or retain common law rules 
was clear even in the absence of particular words to the effect that the common 
law was abrogated.  The right to sue 
for wrongful death, for example, did not exist at common law but was purely a 
creature of statute.  Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 
1139 (Wyo. 2000).  The right was 
recognized as abrogating the common law even though the act did not contain 
words to that effect.  In O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1282 (Wyo.1985), we held the common law rule that a known and obvious 
danger barred recovery was not compatible with the comparative negligence 
statute.  Although we concluded the 
common law rule was not completely abrogated by statutory comparative 
negligence, we indicated the statute modified the known and obvious danger rule 
- even though the statute did not expressly say it was intended to have that 
effect.  Likewise, the Wyoming 
legislature has enacted several statutes impacting the common law rules 
governing livestock running at large, which we have applied in derogation of the 
common law even though the statutes did not expressly state they repealed the 
common law.  Andersen, 49 P.3d  at 1020.     

 

[¶36]   The need for change in the common 
law pertaining to landlord-tenant relations has been recognized in most other 
states.  This Court likewise 
acknowledged that change was warranted but declined to act judicially, believing 
it was a matter for the legislature.  
Our legislature subsequently acted with the adoption of the Residential 
Rental Property Act.  It acted with 
plain language that leaves no room for disputable inference.  The language of the act does not require 
us to presume the legislature intended to modify the common law.  Nor does it suggest a change in the 
common law by doubtful implication or by unclear, ambiguous language.  Rather, the language of the act clearly 
states that landlords have a duty not previously recognized in Wyoming.  

 

[¶37]   Section 1-21-1202 is entitled 
"Duties of owners and renters; generally."  
It requires owners to "maintain [rental property] in a safe and sanitary 
condition fit for human habitation" and, unless otherwise agreed in writing, to 
provide "operational electrical, heating and plumbing, with hot and cold running 
water."  Section 1-21-1203 is also 
entitled "Owner's duties" and subsection (a) delineates the components of the 
duty described in § 1-21-1202 more specifically - to protect the health and 
safety of the renter, the owner shall:  
not rent premises unless they are safe, sanitary and fit for human 
occupancy; maintain common areas in a sanitary and reasonably safe condition; 
maintain electrical, plumbing, heating and hot and cold water systems; 
and maintain other aspects of the premises as agreed in the 
lease.

 

[¶38]   These provisions are directly 
contrary to the common law rule that a landlord owed no duty to a tenant for 
dangerous or defective conditions of the premises.  Hefferin, 254 P.2d 194. 
 The act clearly and 
unequivocally changed the common law by requiring landlords to provide rental 
premises that are reasonably safe, sanitary and fit for human habitation.  Electricity, heating, plumbing and hot 
and cold running water are certainly among the items the landlord must 
provide.  Contrary to Ms. Jansma's 
argument, however, the act when considered as a whole cannot be reasonably read 
to say that a landlord who provides electricity, heating, plumbing and hot and 
cold water has fulfilled his duty.  
The initial statement of the general duty imposed by § 1-21-1202(a) is 
broader, contains no limiting language supporting Ms. Jansma's narrow 
interpretation and is clarified in § 1-21-1203(a) where the duty owed by 
landlords is more specifically defined to include four separate components, 
including, not renting premises unless they are safe, sanitary and fit for human 
occupancy and maintaining electrical, plumbing and heating 
systems.  Given the legislature's 
use of the conjunction "and" in § 1-21-1203(a) and its delineation of the four 
specific duties constituting the owner's general duty to provide safe, sanitary 
and fit premises, we are not persuaded that the duty imposed by the act is 
limited to providing electrical, heating and plumbing systems, and hot and cold 
water.  We hold that the Residential 
Rental Property Act imposed a duty on landlords to provide and maintain premises 
in a safe and sanitary condition fit for human habitation. 

 

[¶39]   We further hold that this 
legislatively created duty establishes a new standard of conduct for purposes of 
personal injuries occurring on rental property.  As we said in McClellan v. 
Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 413 (Wyo. 1983), the duty of exercising care to 
protect another person may exist either at common law or be imposed 
by statute, and where legislation is silent as to whether it establishes a 
new standard of conduct for purposes of a tort action, it is up to the judiciary 
to decide whether it has that effect.  
Here, the statute imposed the duty, and we conclude that it likewise 
establishes a new standard of conduct in cases involving personal injuries 
occurring on rental property  a standard of reasonable care under all of the 
circumstances.  In reaching this 
conclusion, we act to further the legislature's intent.  Our holding is also influenced by the 
following comment:

 

If 
one can extricate himself from all the prevailing preconceptions concerning the 
nature of this problem, the most simple and obvious avenue to defining a 
landlord's tort liability respecting the condition of leased premises is to 
brush aside contracts, warranty, or statutory violations, and declare a rule of 
reasonable care, which includes the duty to respond reasonably to the need for 
action and to act reasonably in doing so. . . .  In most states having new statutes that 
impose a similar general obligation on landlords, courts by construction could . 
. . treat the statutes as enlarging a landlord's duty. . . 
.

 

Browder, 
supra, 
at 124.

 

[¶40]   In concluding that the act does 
away with the common law rule and its exceptions and imposes a duty of 
reasonable care under the circumstances, we also point to the rule that we are 
to presume the legislature enacts statutes with full knowledge of existing 
law.  Parker, 845 P.2d  at 
1044.  We do not review statutes in 
isolation but rather construe them in relation to and in harmony with existing 
law and as part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence.  Id.  Our legislature enacted the Residential 
Rental Property Act at a time when landlord-tenant law was undergoing massive 
changes nationwide.  Numerous states 
had already enacted the URLTA.  The 
vast majority of other states, either by legislation or by judicial decision, 
had adopted similar rules of law imposing a duty on landlords.  We had expressly deferred similar action 
to our state legislature.  
Accordingly, we presume the legislature enacted the Residential Rental 
Property Act with full knowledge of the law in Wyoming that, with only limited 
exceptions, a landlord historically had no duty to maintain rental 
premises.  We also presume the 
legislature enacted the provision with full knowledge that the trend nationwide 
has been to replace the no-duty rule and impose a duty on landlords to keep 
rental property safe.  We further 
presume the legislature promulgated the act with full knowledge that this Court 
declined to judicially change the common law rule on several occasions because 
in our view it was a matter for the legislature. Making these presumptions, and 
looking at the plain language used by the legislature, we do not find the act to 
be vague or uncertain or subject to varying interpretations.  In providing that the owner of rental 
property and his agent have a duty to "maintain that unit in a safe and sanitary 
condition fit for human habitation," the legislature has spoken in unambiguous 
terms and we are bound to the results so expressed. Albertson's, ¶ 
7.  We turn to the question whether 
Ms. Pritchard's claim is precluded because she failed to give written notice of 
the broken step as required in the act.

 

 

[¶41] 
As set forth above, § 1-21-1203(b) requires a tenant who has a reasonable belief 
supported by evidence that the premises are not safe, sanitary and fit for 
habitation to advise the landlord in writing of the defective condition and the 
corrective action he wants the landlord to take.  Section 1-21-1206(b) further provides 
that if the landlord does not respond to the first notice, the tenant may serve 
a second notice.  If the landlord 
again fails to respond or disputes the claim, the tenant then may file a civil 
action in county or justice of the peace court under § 1-21-1206(c).  Upon showing the landlord unreasonably 
refused or failed to use diligence to correct an unsafe condition, the tenant 
may recover costs, damages, including rental payments, and affirmative relief 
which may include termination of the lease or an order directing the landlord to 
make reasonable repairs. 

 

[¶42]   Pursuant to the clear language of 
the act, there is no question the tenant is required to provide written notice 
to the landlord before he is entitled to the relief available under 
§1-21-1206.  The act uses the word 
"shall" in describing the renter's obligation to provide written, certified 
notice to the landlord, a word usually accepted by this Court as a mandatory 
term.  Stewart Title Guaranty Co. 
v. Tilden, 2003 WY 31, ¶ 7, 64 P.3d 739, ¶ 7 (Wyo. 2003).  Where a statute uses the mandatory 
language "shall," a court must obey the statute and has no right to make the law 
contrary to what the legislature prescribed.  In re: DCP, 2001 WY 77, ¶ 16, 30 P.3d 29, ¶ 16 (Wyo. 2001).  
Therefore, for purposes of the remedies available under the Residential 
Rental Property Act, Ms. Pritchard was required to advise Ms. Jansma in writing 
of the condition of the step.  Her 
failure to provide the notice required precludes any claim Ms. Merrill may have 
had to the relief available under the act. 

 

[¶43]   Ms. Merrill, however, did not seek 
the relief available under the act.  
She did not seek to recover damages for rent improperly retained nor did 
she seek termination of the rental agreement or an order directing Ms. Jansma to 
make reasonable repairs.  She also 
did not seek damages available in county or justice of the peace court, courts 
of limited jurisdiction that are not statutorily authorized to hear cases 
involving claims in excess of $7000 and $3000 respectively.8  Instead, Ms. Merrill sought personal 
injury damages, including medical expenses exceeding $25,000, pain and 
suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and lost earnings - damages clearly not 
contemplated by the Residential Rental Property Act and, in the case of her 
claims for emotional damages, expressly precluded by § 1-21-1203(e) of the 
act.

 

[¶44]   We have said, "[r]emedial statutes 
are presumed to provide remedies in addition to those which existed at common 
law and equity, unless a clear intent is expressed to make the statutory remedy 
exclusive."  Urbach, 73 P.2d  
at 961.  The language used in the 
Residential Rental Property Act suggests the legislature intended the remedies 
available under the act to be aimed at corrective action  either getting the 
landlord to fix the problem or reimbursing the tenant for back rent or letting 
him out of the lease.  There is 
nothing to suggest the legislature intended the remedies to be the exclusive 
remedy in all actions arising out of the landlord-tenant relationship.  There likewise is nothing to suggest the 
legislature intended the remedies to preclude the usual remedies for personal 
injury.  This conclusion is 
supported by the decisions of other courts that have addressed the issue.    

 

[¶45]   In Shroades v. Rental Homes, 
Inc., 427 N.E.2d 774 (Ohio 1981), the court addressed the remedies available 
under the Ohio Landlords and Tenants Act by stating:

  

[T]he 
remedies provided in [the Act] are cumulative. . . . For example, the remedy of 
depositing rental payments with the clerk of court is grossly inadequate to 
compensate tenants for the types of [personal] injuries sustained in the present 
case . . .  An alternative remedy of 
termination of the lease is also not an adequate or viable option for many 
tenants when there is a lack of availability of other apartments and considering 
the costs involved in relocating.  
Thus, the new remedies given tenants in [the Act] are intended to be 
preventive and supplemental to other remedial measures.

 

 

Id. 
at 777 (citations omitted).  
Similarly, in Jones v. Bierek, 743 P.2d 1153 (Ore. Ct. App. 1987), 
the landlord argued Oregon's Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (ORLTA) 
replaced all common law actions between landlord and tenants and, therefore, a 
one year statute of limitations applied rather than the two year limitation 
period for negligence claims.  The 
court rejected the argument, concluding the statutory provisions and legislative 
history did not clearly evince an intention to replace negligence claims between 
landlord and tenant.  The court 
said, "it is highly unlikely the legislature would eliminate a large segment of 
the state's tort law . . . without explicitly spelling out its intention to do 
so.  We treat plaintiff's pleadings 
as stating cognizable claims for negligence."  Id. at 
1154.

 

[¶46]   Paraphrasing what the court said in 
Newton, 872 P.2d  at 1217, it would be inconsistent with the duty to 
maintain imposed by the act to exempt from tort liability a landlord who fails 
in this duty.  Our legislature by 
adopting the act has manifested acceptance of the policy reasons behind the 
URLTA and other statutes and judicial decisions imposing a duty on 
landlords.  Maintaining the common 
law rule and its exceptions in personal injury cases, while imposing a new duty 
only in cases seeking repair, return of rent or termination of the lease, cannot 
be squared with that policy.  It 
simply makes no sense to permit a tenant to withhold rent or terminate a lease 
because of a broken step while denying him a remedy for personal injuries 
sustained as a result of it.  See 
also Browder, supra, at 125.  We hold that the remedies provision of 
the act is exclusive to cases in which corrective action is sought and does not 
apply in personal injury actions.  
Therefore, Ms. Pritchard's failure to provide written notice of the 
broken step as required under § 1-21-1203(b) does not preclude Ms. Merrill's 
claim.  

 

2.         
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 326.

            

[¶47]   In her complaint, besides claiming 
Ms. Jansma breached the duty imposed by the Residential Rental Property Act, Ms. 
Merrill also claimed she breached the duty imposed by § 326 of the 
Restatement  (Second) of Torts.9  Our resolution of the first issue makes 
discussion of the second issue unnecessary - the common law and its exceptions, 
including Restatements (Second) of Torts § 326, no longer apply.           
      

 

 

[¶48]   With the enactment of the 
Residential Rental Property Act, Wyoming joined the majority of other states by 
modifying the rule of landlord immunity and imposing a duty on owners of rental 
property to maintain them in a safe, sanitary and habitable condition.  The imposition of that legislatively 
created duty gives rise to a new standard of care applicable in cases involving 
personal injuries occurring on rental property, i.e. reasonable care under the 
circumstances.   Upon 
establishing that a breach of this standard proximately caused injury, the 
injured party is entitled to prove any damages recoverable in a personal injury 
claim.  The remedies provided for in 
the act are limited to cases where corrective action is sought by a tenant in 
the form of an order requiring the landlord to make repairs, refund or excuse 
rental payments or allow the tenant to be excused from the lease. 

 

[¶49]   Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings.

 

 

 

 

 

FOOTNOTES

1In 
Wyoming, we have not addressed the fifth exception referenced in Old 
Town.  As discussed later in 
this opinion, we have recognized the other four exceptions plus an exception for 
hidden or latently dangerous conditions known to the landlord and unknown to the 
tenant.  Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 202 
(1995).

 

2Actually, 
at least one state rejected the common law rule much earlier.  In 1895, the Georgia legislature enacted 
a statute imposing a duty of reasonable care on landlords and providing a remedy 
in the form of damages for injuries resulting from a landlord's failure to keep 
the premises in repair.  O.C.G.A. § 
44-7-14.   

 

3Other courts 
which have recognized an implied warranty of habitability in the context of 
rental property include:  Marini 
v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526 (N.J. 1970); Kline v. Burns 276 A.2d 248 
(N.H. 1971); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 280 N.E.2d 208 (Ill 1972); 
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 
293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); Green 
v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 
517 P.2d 1168 (Cal. 1974); Steele v. 
Latimer, 
521 P.2d 304 (Kan. 1974); Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. 
1984).

 

4Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee and 
Virginia.  Uniform Laws Annotated, 
2003 Supp., at 78.  

 

5The 
following states have recognized a duty in some form by legislation, judicial 
declaration, or both: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin. 

6Massachusetts 
General Law Chapter 186 § 19 provides:  

A 
landlord or lessor of any real estate except an owner-occupied two- or 
three-family dwelling shall, within a reasonable time following receipt of a 
written notice from a tenant forwarded by registered or certified mail of an 
unsafe condition, not caused by the tenant, his invitee, or any one occupying 
through or under the tenant, exercise reasonable care to correct the unsafe 
condition described in said notice except that such notice need not be given for 
unsafe conditions in that portion of the premises not under control of the 
tenant. The tenant or any person rightfully on said premises injured as a result 
of the failure to correct said unsafe condition within a reasonable time shall 
have a right of action in tort against the landlord or lessor for damages. Any 
waiver of this provision in any lease or other rental agreement shall be void 
and unenforceable. The notice requirement of this section shall be satisfied by 
a notice from a board of health or other code enforcement agency to a landlord 
or lessor of residential premises not exempted by the provisions of this section 
of a violation of the state sanitary code or other applicable by-laws, 
ordinances, rules or regulations.

 

7Browder, supra, cites the following states:  Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, 
Mississippi, South Carolina and Utah.  
Our research reveals that of these states, at least four allow recovery 
either by statute or judicial decision by individuals injured as a result of a 
landlord's failure to maintain rental premises  Colorado, Indiana, South 
Carolina and Utah.      

 

8Under the statutes in effect at the time of Ms. Merrill's injury, county 
court jurisdiction was limited to claims not exceeding $7,000.00 (Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 5-9-128, (LexisNexis 2001)) and justice of the peace courts were limited 
to claims not exceeding $3,000.00 (Wyo. Stat. § 5-4-106 (LexisNexis 2001)).  

 

9§ 
362.  Negligent Repairs by 
Lessor.  A lessor of land who, by 
purporting to make repairs on the land while it is in the possession of his 
lessee, or by the negligent manner in which he makes such repairs has, as the 
lessee neither knows nor should know, made the land more dangerous for use or 
given it a deceptive appearance of safety, is subject to liability for physical 
harm caused by the condition to the lessee or to others upon the land with the 
consent of the lessee or sublessee.