Case Title: Gallegos v. Schooley

Citation: 393 P.2d 573

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1964-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
393 P.2d 573 (1964) Petition of Robert Elmer GALLEGOS for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Plaintiff in Error, v. John M. SCHOOLEY, as Manager of Safety and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the City and County of Denver, Colorado, Defendant in Error. No. 20542. Supreme Court of Colorado. En Banc. June 29, 1964. Rehearing Denied July 20, 1964. *574 Charles S. Vigil, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error. MOORE, Justice. July 3, 1962, Robert Elmer Gallegos filed his "Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus" in the district court of the City and County of Denver. The writ issued directing Schooley, the Manager of Safety of the City and County of Denver, to produce the body of petitioner before the court, and to make return to said writ. Gallegos was brought before the court September 19, 1962, and on August 3, 1962, a hearing was had on the matters alleged in the petition, the pertinent allegations of which were denied in an instrument captioned "Return to the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus." This document reads as follows: Once more we must direct attention to the procedural impropriety involved in the filing of the above so-called "Return to the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus." In Stilley v. Tinsley, 153 Colo. ___, 385 P.2d 677, we said: Neither of the persons to whom the writ was directed in the instant action made any return to the writ. The "return" filed by the district attorney was not presented by him as counsel for those to whom the writ was directed. The instrument filed by him indicates a misapprehension concerning his duty. The document itself appears under a misnomer. The "return" which can only be filed by the individuals to whom the writ is directed is a return to the writ and not a return to the petition. Notwithstanding the foregoing improprieties the trial court conducted a hearing. Evidence was taken and the undisputed facts are that in the district court of the City and County of Denver Gallegos was tried for and convicted of the crime of murder. On writ of error directed to that judgment this court affirmed the conviction. Gallegos v. People, 145 Colo. 53, 358 P.2d 1028. Thereafter the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment, holding in effect that the written confession *575 of Gallegos, to which reference is made in the above cited case, should not have been admitted because in obtaining same he had been denied due process of law. The case was remanded to the Supreme Court of Colorado which in turn remanded it to the district court for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of the U. S. Supreme Court in Gallegos v. State of Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S. Ct. 1209, 8 L. Ed. 2d 325, 87 A.L.R.2d 614. The argument of counsel for Gallegos is grounded upon the following assertions made by him to the trial court at the hearing in this action: The trial court did not agree with the above quoted argument of counsel and dismissed the habeas corpus proceedings. Gallegos was admitted to bail pending review on writ of error to this court. In vacating the writ and dismissing the action the trial court was correct. There is nothing in the opinion of the U. S. Supreme Court which prevents a new trial of Gallegos on the murder charge involved in Gallegos v. People, supra. We think it sufficient to direct attention to Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S. Ct. 921, 88 L. Ed. 1192, and a second case under the same title reported in 327 U.S. 274, 66 S. Ct. 544, 90 L. Ed. 667, in which the Supreme Court of the United States under facts similar to those in the instant case, said, with reference to the same argument made herein, "We do not think our mandate lends itself to such an interpretation." The judgment is affirmed. SUTTON, J., not participating.