Case Title: Kane v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 248, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2013-10-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BRENT KANE, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 248, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID 1201007706 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: September 18, 2013 
  Decided: October 2, 2013 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 2nd day of October 2013, upon consideration of the appellant's Supreme 
Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the State's response 
thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Following a three-day jury trial and a one-day bifurcated bench trial in 
February 2013, the defendant-appellant, Brent Kane, was convicted of three counts 
of Sex Offender Unlawful Sexual Conduct Against a Child.1  The Superior Court 
sentenced Kane to a total period of seventy years at Level V incarceration, with 
credit for time served, to be suspended after serving fifty years in prison for 
decreasing levels of supervision.  This is Kane’s direct appeal. 
                                                 
1 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 777A(a) (Supp. 2012). 
 
2
(2) 
Kane's counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Kane's counsel asserts that, based upon a complete and 
careful examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By 
letter, Kane's attorney informed him of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided 
Kane with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Kane 
also was informed of his right to supplement his attorney's presentation.  Kane has 
raised several issues for this Court's consideration.  The State has responded to 
Kane’s points, as well as to the position taken by Kane's counsel, and has moved to 
affirm the Superior Court's judgment. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of a 
motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) 
this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious 
examination of the record and the law for arguable claims; and (b) this Court must 
conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an 
adversary presentation.2 
(4) 
The testimony at trial fairly established that the two victims, Mary and 
Jane,3 were half-sisters.  Between 2006 and 2009, they lived with their mother, 
                                                 
2 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 
429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
3 The Court has assigned pseudonyms to the minor victims for purposes of this order. 
 
3
step-father, and several siblings in Seaford, Delaware.  Kane was a friend of the 
family.  Jane, who was thirteen at the time of trial, testified that Kane molested her 
while she was in asleep in her bed one night by touching her breasts and vagina.  
She never told anyone about the incident until several years later when she was 
visiting her father in Georgia over Christmas break in 2011.  Her father then 
contacted the Delaware State Police.  Jane was approximately eight years old at the 
time of the incident. 
(5) 
Mary, who was fifteen years old at the time of trial, testified that Kane 
molested her one evening after she had fallen asleep on the sofa in the family’s 
living room.  She testified that Kane carried her to her bedroom and then pulled off 
her pajama bottoms and attempted to put his penis in her vagina.  He also fondled 
her breasts and buttocks.  Mary resisted, and Kane stopped.  She ran to her 
mother’s room to tell her what happened but her mother was only half-awake and 
did not understand what Mary was trying to tell her.  Mary was approximately ten 
years old at the time of the incident. 
(6) 
The arresting officer testified that Kane would have been 19 or 20 
years old at the time of the reported incidents.  Kane was arrested on January 12, 
2012.  At the time, Kane gave a recorded statement saying that he did not 
remember the alleged incidents but that he may have rubbed one of the children.  
This recorded statement was played for the jury.  Kane did not testify in his own 
 
4
defense.  After the jury found Kane guilty of the three charged offenses, the 
Superior Court judge held a bench trial to determine Kane’s status as a prior sex 
offender and ultimately imposed an enhanced sentence based on Kane’s status as a 
prior sex offender.  This appeal followed. 
(7) 
In response to his counsel’s Rule 26(c) brief, Kane presented four 
handwritten pages of unnumbered paragraphs, which generally challenge alleged 
inconsistencies in the testimony at trial and also challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support his convictions.  Kane also asserts that the arresting officer 
lacked “any probable cause for questioning.”  
(8) 
In reviewing Kane’s challenge to the credibility of the witnesses and 
the overall sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must determine whether, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could 
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.4  A victim’s testimony 
alone is sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict concerning a sexual assault 
so long as the testimony establishes every element of the offense charged.5  The 
victims’ testimony regarding Kane’s actions in this case was sufficient to establish 
the elements of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.  To the extent 
                                                 
4 Word v. State, 801 A.2d 927, 929 (Del. 2002) 
5 Farmer v. State, 844 A.2d 297, 300 (Del. 2004). 
 
5
Kane challenges the credibility of the witnesses’ testimony, it was for the jury to 
determine the weight of the evidence and to resolve any conflicts in the testimony.6 
(9) 
Kane’s only other cognizable claim appears to be that the arrest 
warrant was defective and thus the police lacked “probable cause for questioning” 
him.  To the extent Kane is arguing that the warrant issued in 2012 was invalid 
because it alleged conduct that occurred in 2008, there is no merit to this argument 
because there is no statute of limitations on the sexual offenses for which Kane 
was arrested.7  Any delay in the reporting of the incidents was an issue to be raised 
at trial as part of Kane’s defense.8  In this case the initial report to police was made 
on December 31, 2011 by Jane’s father, who was living in Georgia.  On January 
10, 2012, an interview was conducted with Mary who described Kane’s assault.  
Hours after that interview, police swore out an affidavit of probable cause based on 
Mary’s interview and obtained a warrant for Kane’s arrest.  Under the 
circumstances, there was sufficient probable cause for issuance of the arrest 
warrant based on Mary’s allegations concerning Kane’s conduct.  Moreover, the 
grand jury’s subsequent indictment of Kane for his assault on both victims was an 
independent determination of probable cause in this case.9 
                                                 
6 Tyre v. State, 412 A.2d 326, 330 (Del. 1980). 
7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 205(e) (2007). 
8 See generally Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 274-75 (Del. 1987). 
9 Joy v. Superior Court, 298 A.2d 315, 316 (Del. 1972). 
 
6
(10) The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
Kane’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 
issue.  We also are satisfied that Kane's counsel has made a conscientious effort to 
examine the record and the law and has properly determined that Kane could not 
raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to 
withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice