Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Paul M. Kasprowicz

Citation: 2004 WI 151

Docket Number: 2003AP002844-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 151 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-2844-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Paul M. Kasprowicz, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Paul M. Kasprowicz,  
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST KASPROWICZ 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 21, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
2004 WI 151 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-2844-D  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Paul M. Kasprowicz, Attorney at  
Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Paul M. Kasprowicz,  
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 21, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the referee's report and 
recommendation that Attorney Paul M. Kasprowicz be publicly 
reprimanded for having committed 16 counts of professional 
misconduct involving six separate client matters as alleged in 
the complaint filed by the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) in 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
2 
 
this court on October 23, 2003.1  Noting that Kasprowicz had 
admitted to most of the misconduct counts in his answer or at the 
public hearing, the referee concluded that his misconduct had 
been proven by clear and convincing evidence.  The primary 
dispute before the referee concerned the appropriate sanction to 
be recommended for Kasprowicz' multiple counts of misconduct: The 
OLR sought a 60-day suspension of Kasprowicz' license to practice 
law, while Kasprowicz urged the referee to recommend a public 
reprimand.  The referee appointed in this matter, Attorney Kim M. 
Peterson, agreed with Kasprowicz and has recommended to this 
court that Kasprowicz receive a public reprimand for his 
professional misconduct.  
¶2 
Neither the OLR nor Kasprowicz have appealed from the 
referee's report and recommendation; thus, this court's review 
proceeds pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).2  We conclude the referee's 
findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing evidence 
in the record and accordingly, we adopt those findings as well as 
                                                 
1 The OLR complaint alleged 16 separate counts of misconduct 
pertaining to six separate matters but one of the client matters 
did not allege any misconduct related to that client; rather, 
the charge focused on Kasprowicz' failure to provide a timely 
response to OLR's request for information. 
2 SCR 22.17(2) provides: 
(2) If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme 
court shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject 
or modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline. The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
3 
 
the referee's conclusions of law that Kasprowicz committed all 16 
counts of misconduct as alleged in the OLR complaint.  We also 
accept the referee's recommendation and publicly reprimand 
Attorney Kasprowicz for his misconduct.   
¶3 
We also direct that Attorney Kasprowicz pay the OLR the 
costs accrued in this disciplinary proceeding, now totaling 
$5760.16. 
¶4 
Respondent, Attorney Paul Kasprowicz, was admitted to 
practice law in this state in 1986 and has practiced as a sole 
practitioner in Waukesha county.  He has never before been the 
subject of a disciplinary proceeding.  Because there has been no 
appeal and there is no dispute over the facts, the allegations of 
the OLR complaint and the referee's findings will be only briefly 
discussed.  
COUNTS 1 THROUGH 6——CLIENT K.M. 
¶5 
K.M. retained Kasprowicz on December 14, 1998, to help 
in the probate of her mother's estate.  Kasprowicz and K.M. 
agreed that his fee would be based on a percentage of the estate.   
¶6 
On January 8, 1999, Kasprowicz filed an application for 
informal probate and K.M. was appointed personal representative.  
Subsequently, on July 13, 1999, the register in probate filed a 
"Notice of Overdue Inventory" because the inventory of the estate 
had not been filed within six months of the appointment of the 
personal representative as required by Wis. Stat. § 858.01.3   
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
4 
 
¶7 
On August 4, 1999, Kasprowicz filed the inventory 
listing 
property 
valued 
at 
$417,835.22 
as 
subject 
to 
administration.  The inventory, however, improperly included an 
IRA and life insurance policy that were held by the decedent's 
living trust, a document Kasprowicz had drafted for the decedent 
in 1992.  The beneficiary form on the decedent's IRA designated 
her trust, not her estate, as beneficiary.   
¶8 
The inventory also incorrectly listed the decedent as 
having a one-half ownership in real estate in Monroe county, when 
in fact, she had only a one-quarter ownership in that property.   
¶9 
The value of the property Kasprowicz had erroneously 
included in the decedent's estate exceeded $275,000.   
¶10 After the inventory, Kasprowicz filed no additional 
documents in the estate and failed to close the estate within 18 
months.  When orders to show cause were subsequently issued in 
October 2000 regarding his failure to close the estate, 
Kasprowicz appeared and asked that the file be transferred to 
another attorney, Attorney George Love.  Kasprowicz stated at the 
order to show cause hearing that he would pay all of Attorney 
Love's fees incurred in closing the estate.  
¶11 That order to show cause hearing had been requested by 
K.M. because Kasprowicz had been unresponsive to her questions 
about settling the estate.  Kasprowicz had moved his office 
without informing K.M. of the new location and her numerous 
attempts to discuss the status of her mother's estate with 
Kasprowicz had been unsuccessful.  Ultimately, Kasprowicz left a 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
5 
 
voicemail message for K.M. stating that he was taking a leave of 
absence from his law practice.   
¶12 After taking over the estate as successor counsel, 
Attorney Love asked Kasprowicz several times to turn over his 
file on the estate; Kasprowicz finally did so over four months 
later.   
¶13 During the time he handled the estate, Kasprowicz 
failed to file a fiduciary income tax return for the estate and 
the trust.  That failure resulted in the assessment of $4100 in 
interest and penalties.   
¶14 After K.M. filed a grievance with the OLR about 
Kasprowicz' conduct, the OLR began its investigation; Kasprowicz, 
however, failed to timely respond to the OLR's investigative 
efforts.   
¶15 Ultimately, however, Kasprowicz paid over $11,000 which 
included all of Attorney Love's fees, a return to the client of 
one-half of Kasprowicz' fees, and all of the penalties and 
interest imposed by the IRS as the result of the late filing of 
the estate's tax returns. 
¶16 This course of conduct, as alleged in the OLR complaint 
and which the referee found had been proven by clear and 
convincing evidence, led to the following six counts of 
misconduct against Kasprowicz: 
• Count 1.  By improperly including an IRA and life 
insurance policy in the estate's inventory, Kasprowicz 
failed to represent a client with the legal knowledge, 
skills, 
thoroughness, 
and 
preparation 
reasonably 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
6 
 
necessary for the representation, in violation of SCR 
20:1.1.4 
• Count 2.  By failing to file the estate's inventory 
within six months as required by Wis. Stat. § 858.01, 
by failing to close the estate within 18 months, as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 863.35, without filing a 
request for an extension of time to close the estate, 
and by failing to file fiduciary income tax returns 
for 
the 
estate 
and 
trust, 
which 
resulted 
in 
approximately 
$4100 
in 
interest 
and 
penalties, 
Kasprowicz failed to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.3.5 
• Count 3.  By failing to respond to K.M.'s attempts to 
contact him regarding the status of the estate, 
Kasprowicz failed to promptly comply with a client's 
numerous requests for information, in violation of SCR 
20:1.4(a).6  
                                                 
4 SCR 20:1.1 provides: "Competence. A lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client. Competent representation 
requires 
the 
legal 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness 
and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." 
5 SCR 20:1.3 provides: "Diligence. A lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
6 SCR 20:1.4(a) provides: "(a) A lawyer shall keep a client 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly 
comply with reasonable requests for information." 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
7 
 
• Count 4.  By failing to turn K.M.'s file over to her 
new counsel for approximately four and one-half months 
after a request was made for the file, Kasprowicz 
failed 
to 
take 
steps 
to 
the 
extent 
reasonably 
practicable 
to 
protect 
a 
client's 
interest, 
in 
violation of SCR 20:1.16(d).7 
• Count 5.  By charging K.M. a percentage of the 
estate's value for his representation in the matter, 
Kasprowicz 
violated 
a 
statute 
[Wis.  
Stat. § 851.40(2)(e)] and supreme court decision [In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Sylvan, 
202 
Wis. 2d 123, 549 N.W.2d 249 (1996)] regulating the 
conduct of lawyers, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(f).8  
• Count 6.  By failing to timely respond to OLR staff's 
investigative letters 
and 
by failing 
to provide 
relevant 
information 
during 
the 
course 
of 
an 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides: 
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. 
The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to 
the extent permitted by other law. 
8 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides: "It is professional misconduct for 
a lawyer to: (f) violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
8 
 
investigation, Kasprowicz failed to timely disclose 
all 
facts 
and 
circumstances 
pertaining 
to 
the 
grievance and failed to timely answer questions or 
furnish documents, in violation of SCR 22.03(2),9 
constituting misconduct, pursuant to SCR 20:8.4(f). 
COUNT SEVEN——CLIENT R.K. 
¶17 In October 1999 R.K. retained Kasprowicz to handle the 
probate of R.K.'s mother's estate.  In October 2001 R.K. filed a 
grievance with the OLR asserting that despite multiple orders to 
show cause issued by the probate court, the estate had not been 
closed.   
¶18 The OLR staff mailed a copy of that grievance to 
Kasprowicz and informed him that pursuant to SCR 22.03(2), he 
was required to provide a written response disclosing all facts 
and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct on or 
                                                 
9 SCR 22.03(2) provides: 
(2) Upon 
commencing 
an 
investigation, 
the 
director shall notify the respondent of the matter 
being investigated unless in the opinion of the 
director the investigation of the matter requires 
otherwise. The respondent shall fully and fairly 
disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served 
by ordinary mail a request for a written response. The 
director 
may 
allow 
additional 
time 
to 
respond. 
Following receipt of the response, the director may 
conduct further investigation and may compel the 
respondent to answer questions, furnish documents, and 
present 
any 
information 
deemed 
relevant 
to 
the 
investigation. 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
9 
 
before November 15, 2001.  Kasprowicz failed to respond to that 
letter.  
¶19 Kasprowicz 
also 
failed 
to 
respond 
to 
a 
second 
investigative letter sent by the OLR staff by certified mail on 
November 28, 2001.  Likewise, although Kasprowicz had signed a 
return receipt for a third letter from the OLR on December 14, 
2001, he did not respond to that letter either.  
¶20 Subsequently, on January 28, 2002, the OLR filed a 
motion in this court pursuant to SCR 22.03(4)10 requesting that 
Kasprowicz be ordered to show cause why his license should not 
be suspended for his willful failure to cooperate with the OLR 
                                                 
10 SCR 22.03(4) provides: 
(4) If the respondent fails to respond to the 
request for written response to an allegation of 
misconduct or fails to cooperate in other respects in 
an 
investigation, 
the 
director, 
or 
a 
special 
investigator acting under SCR 22.25, may file a motion 
with the supreme court requesting that the court order 
the respondent to show cause why his or her license to 
practice law should not be suspended for willful 
failure 
to 
respond 
or 
cooperate 
with 
the 
investigation. 
All 
papers, 
files, 
transcripts, 
communications, and proceedings on the motion shall be 
confidential and shall remain confidential until the 
supreme court has issued an order to show cause. The 
license of an attorney suspended for willful failure 
to respond or cooperate with an investigation may be 
reinstated by the supreme court upon a showing of 
cooperation with the investigation and compliance with 
the terms of suspension. The director or the special 
investigator shall file a response in support of or in 
opposition to the reinstatement within 20 days after 
the filing of an attorney's request for reinstatement. 
Upon a showing of good cause, the supreme court may 
extend the time for filing a response. 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
10 
 
in its investigation of this grievance.  After Kasprowicz had 
been served with a copy of that motion, he finally on January 
30, 2002, submitted an initial response to the R.K. grievance; 
as a result, the OLR withdrew its request for a suspension of 
Kasprowicz' license for his failure to cooperate.  
¶21 On June 18, 2002, OLR staff sent a letter to 
Kasprowicz requesting a supplemental response to some additional 
investigative questions.  He was asked to submit his response by 
July 1, 2002.  Again, Kasprowicz failed to respond, and he 
likewise failed to respond to a second letter sent to him by OLR 
staff by certified mail.  On July 15, 2002, a third OLR 
investigative letter, which requested a response by July 23, 
2002, was personally served on Kasprowicz.  On that date, 
Kasprowicz finally hand-delivered a response to the OLR and met 
with OLR staff.  At that meeting, OLR staff requested additional 
information by August 19, 2002, and Kasprowicz was sent a letter 
from the OLR on July 24, 2002, confirming that request.  
Kasprowicz, however, again failed to respond and supply the 
additional information by the specified date.   
¶22 Another letter from the OLR personally served on 
Kasprowicz on August 21, 2002, requested a response from him by 
August 30, 2002; Kasprowicz faxed his response to OLR staff on 
August 31, 2002.   
¶23 On September 5, 2002, OLR staff sent Kasprowicz 
another letter requesting additional information by October 4, 
2002; again, Kasprowicz did not respond or supply the requested 
information. 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
11 
 
¶24 This course of conduct, as alleged in the OLR 
complaint and which the referee found had been proven by clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence, 
led 
to 
the 
following 
count 
of 
misconduct against Kasprowicz: 
• Count 7.  By failing to respond to OLR staff's letters 
of October 23, 2001, November 28, 2001, and December 
14, 2001, until after the OLR filed an order to show 
cause on January 28, 2002, requesting the temporary 
suspension of Kasprowicz' license to practice law, and 
by failing to respond staff's letters of June 18, 
2002, and July 2, 2002, until after being personally 
served with a third request, and by failing to respond 
to staff's letters of July 24, 2002, until after being 
personally served with a second request, Kasprowicz 
failed to timely provide relevant information during 
the course of the investigation, in violation of SCR 
22.03(2) and SCR 22.03(6),11 constituting misconduct, 
pursuant to SCR 20:8.4(f). 
COUNTS 8 THROUGH 10——CLIENT S.M. 
¶25 Kasprowicz prepared tax returns for S.M. for the years 
1994 through 1997, and again for the year 1999.  In February 
2001 the Wisconsin Department of Revenue (DOR) placed a lien on 
                                                 
11 SCR 
22.03(6) 
provides: "(6) In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, 
the 
respondent's wilful 
failure 
to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance." 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
12 
 
S.M.'s personal residence for back taxes.  S.M. contacted 
Kasprowicz regarding the tax lien and signed a power of attorney 
allowing Kasprowicz to deal directly with the DOR regarding 
S.M.'s taxes. 
¶26 During the next eight months, S.M. tried to contact 
Kasprowicz several times to discuss the status of the matter. 
Kasprowicz failed to respond except to send S.M. a copy of the 
letter Kasprowicz had mailed to the DOR on June 20, 2001.  
During the eight months that Kasprowicz represented S.M. 
regarding the DOR tax lien, Kasprowicz was unable to resolve the 
matter.   
¶27 S.M. subsequently filed a grievance with the OLR on 
October 18, 2001, noting that the tax lien was still attached to 
his home and Kasprowicz had not responded to his attempts to 
contact him.  Also, in October 2001, S.M. hired an accountant to 
deal with the tax lien.  The accountant cleared up that matter 
within a month; the accountant later stated that " . . . it was 
no problem to make a few calls and sort out the matter with the 
DOR auditor." 
¶28 On December 14, 2001, OLR staff wrote to Kasprowicz 
requesting a response to S.M.'s grievance by January 8, 2002; 
Kasprowicz failed to respond.  
¶29 On January 11, 2002, OLR staff sent additional 
correspondence to Kasprowicz requesting a response to S.M.'s 
grievance by January 22, 2002.  By letter dated January 23, 
2002, Kasprowicz requested an extension of time to respond to 
S.M.'s grievance and informed the OLR that he had retained an 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
13 
 
attorney to represent him in the OLR investigation.  The request 
for an extension was granted.   
¶30 On March 29, April 8, and April 30, 2002, the OLR 
received copies of letters the attorney sent to Kasprowicz 
stating that the attorney needed to talk with Kasprowicz as soon 
as possible regarding S.M.'s grievance and telling Kasprowicz to 
contact the attorney to schedule a conference to discuss the 
matter.  The final letter from the attorney informed Kasprowicz 
that he was withdrawing from representing Kasprowicz in the 
grievance matter.  
¶31 By letter dated May 7, 2002, OLR staff requested 
Kasprowicz to respond to S.M.'s grievance no later than May 15, 
2002. 
 
After 
being 
personally 
served 
with 
that 
letter, 
Kasprowicz contacted OLR staff and promised to provide a 
response; again he failed to do so.  
¶32 On July 23, 2002, Kasprowicz appeared at the OLR 
office in Milwaukee and stated that he would respond to S.M.'s 
grievance by August 2, 2002, a date OLR staff later confirmed by 
letter.  Kasprowicz, however, failed to respond as promised.  He 
finally responded on August 30, 2002, after he had been 
personally served with another follow up letter from OLR staff.  
¶33 This course of conduct, as asserted in the OLR 
complaint and which the referee found had been proven by clear 
and convincing evidence, led to the following three counts of 
misconduct against Kasprowicz: 
• Count 8.  By failing to diligently and promptly pursue 
removal of the tax lien on his client's home, and by 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
14 
 
sending only one letter to the Wisconsin Department of 
Revenue in the matter during an eight-month time span, 
Kasprowicz failed to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.3. 
• Count 9.  By failing to return telephone calls and 
respond to other attempts of his client to contact him 
about the matter, Kasprowicz failed to keep a client 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and 
promptly 
comply 
with 
reasonable 
requests 
for 
information, in violation of SCR 20:1.4.12 
• Count 10. By failing to respond to multiple OLR staff 
investigative letters relating to the S.M. grievance, 
Kasprowicz failed to timely fully and fairly disclose 
all facts and circumstances pertaining to alleged 
misconduct, in violation of SCR 22.03(2), constituting 
misconduct, pursuant to SCR 20:8.4(f). 
                                                 
12 SCR 20:1.4 provides: "Communication. (a) A lawyer shall 
keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter 
and 
promptly 
comply 
with 
reasonable 
requests 
for 
information. (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation." 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
15 
 
COUNTS 11 AND 12——CLIENT N.G. 
¶34 Kasprowicz represented N.G. in her divorce action and 
obtained a judgment of divorce on her behalf on February 20, 
2002.  As the attorney for the moving party, Kasprowicz was to 
draft and submit proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and the judgment within 30 days of the final divorce hearing 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 767.37(1). 
¶35 Because this proposed draft had not been filed by 
Kasprowicz, an order to show cause hearing was held on May 24, 
2002.  Kasprowicz informed the court that he had drafted the 
paperwork and forwarded it to opposing counsel; opposing counsel 
finally received the proposed drafts on May 28, 2002.  On that 
same day, the court approved the drafts as to form and returned 
them to Kasprowicz; Kasprowicz, however, did not file the 
documents with the court until July 2002.   
¶36 On June 26, 2002, N.G. filed a grievance about 
Kasprowicz' conduct with the OLR.  The OLR sent Kasprowicz a 
letter on August 22, 2002, requesting a response to N.G.'s 
allegations.  Kasprowicz submitted a two-paragraph response and 
a copy of his final bill to N.G.  
¶37 On September 19, 2002, the OLR requested additional 
specific 
information 
from 
Kasprowicz 
relating 
to 
N.G.'s 
grievance, but Kasprowicz failed to respond.   
¶38 On October 11, 2002, the OLR sent another request to 
Kasprowicz by certified mail which Kasprowicz signed for; 
however, he again did not respond.  
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
16 
 
¶39 On December 9, 2002, Kasprowicz was personally served 
with a request for information regarding the N.G. grievance and 
finally submitted his written response to the OLR on December 
16, 2002.   
¶40 This course of conduct, as alleged in the OLR 
complaint and which the referee found to have been proven by 
clear and convincing evidence, led to the following counts of 
misconduct against Kasprowicz: 
• Count 11.  By failing to provide opposing counsel 
with proposed final paperwork until three months 
after the final divorce hearing, and by failing to 
file the paperwork until five months after the final 
divorce 
hearing, 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 767.37(1), Kasprowicz failed to act 
with 
reasonable 
diligence 
and 
promptness 
in 
representing a client, in violation of SCR 20:1.3. 
• Count 12.  By failing to timely respond to OLR 
staff's 
investigative 
letters 
regarding 
N.G.'s 
grievance, Kasprowicz failed to provide relevant 
information during the course of an investigation, 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 
22.03(6), 
constituting 
misconduct, pursuant to SCR 20:8.4(f). 
COUNTS 13 AND 14——CLIENT R.S. 
¶41 In early 1999 R.S. retained Kasprowicz to represent 
her in a divorce action.  R.S. was granted a divorce on February 
15, 2000, but a Qualified Domestic Relation Order (QDRO) was 
necessary to divide R.S.'s ex-husband's retirement account.  
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
17 
 
After the final hearing, Kasprowicz told R.S. that it would be 
necessary to hire a third party to prepare the QDRO.  R.S. 
thought Kasprowicz would hire someone to prepare it, but 
Kasprowicz did nothing and failed to advise R.S. that he was not 
arranging for someone to prepare the QDRO.   
¶42 Subsequently, 
when 
R.S. 
attempted 
to 
contact 
Kasprowicz about the QDRO, Kasprowicz failed to respond to her 
calls.  Later, R.S. hired other counsel to prepare the QDRO 
which was then submitted to the trial court and signed by the 
court in March of 2003.   
¶43 After R.S. filed a grievance against Kasprowicz, the 
OLR sent Kasprowicz a request on October 2, 2002, that he submit 
a full and complete response to the grievance; Kasprowicz did 
not reply. 
¶44 On October 30, 2002, the OLR sent another request to 
Kasprowicz, this one by certified mail. Although Kasprowicz 
signed for that letter, he did not respond.   
¶45 Then, on December 9, 2002, Kasprowicz was personally 
served with the OLR's request that he respond to the grievance; 
he finally did so submitting a written response to the OLR on 
December 23, 2002.  
¶46 This course of conduct, as alleged in the OLR's 
complaint and which the referee found to have been proven by 
clear and convincing evidence, led to the following two counts 
of misconduct against Kasprowicz:  
• Count 13. By failing to follow up on the status of 
the QDRO, and by failing to ensure the completion of 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
18 
 
the division of the marital estate, Kasprowicz 
failed 
to 
act 
with 
reasonable 
diligence 
and 
promptness in representing a client, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.3.  
• Count 14. By failing to timely fully and fairly 
disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to 
the alleged misconduct, Kasprowicz failed to timely 
fully 
and 
fairly 
disclose 
all 
facts 
and 
circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct, 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 
20:03(2), 
constituting 
misconduct, pursuant to SCR 20:8.4(f). 
COUNTS 15 AND 16——CLIENT D.H-V 
¶47 In May 2001 D.H-V. retained Kasprowicz to represent 
her in a child support matter.  After Kasprowicz filed a post-
divorce petition on her behalf, the circuit court issued an 
order to show cause and scheduled a hearing for July 13, 2001.  
That hearing, however, had to be postponed to November 27, 2001, 
because of a failure to obtain an affidavit of service with 
respect to D.H-V.'s ex-husband.   
¶48 At that rescheduled November 27, 2001, hearing, D.H-V. 
appeared with Kasprowicz; D.H-V.'s husband, however, did not 
appear.  The circuit court entered a default judgment in favor 
of D.H-V. ordering an increase in the amount of child support 
D.H-V. would receive; those increased payments were to be 
retroactive to July 13, 2001.  Kasprowicz was directed to 
determine the arrearages owed by D.H-V.'s former husband and to 
incorporate that amount into the court order Kasprowicz was to 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
19 
 
draft.  Kasprowicz did not speak with D.H-V. after the November 
27, 2001, hearing.   
¶49 Sometime 
after 
that 
hearing, 
however, 
Kasprowicz 
received a proposed stipulation from the attorney representing 
D.H-V.'s former husband.  The terms of that stipulation differed 
from 
the 
circuit 
court's 
November 
27, 
2001, 
order 
that 
Kasprowicz was to draft.  The proposed stipulation provided for 
an increase in child support but made it effective November 29, 
2001, instead of retroactively to July 13, 2001.   
¶50 In addition, a wage assignment for the monthly child 
support had become effective on January 31, 2002, but the 
stipulation proposed by D.H-V.'s former husband calculating the 
arrearages for December 2001 and January 2002 provided that "all 
other arrearages, and interest accruing therefrom, are hereby 
waived . . . ."   
¶51 The proposed stipulation also provided that her former 
husband, rather than D.H-V., would be entitled to claim their 
son as an exemption on tax returns for 2002 and all successive 
years.  
¶52 Kasprowicz did not send a copy of the proposed 
stipulation to D.H-V.; instead, he called her and left a 
voicemail describing the terms of the stipulation and stating 
that if she did not respond, he would sign it.  Kasprowicz never 
received a response from D.H-V.  D.H-V. claimed she never 
received the voicemail.  In any event, Kasprowicz signed the 
stipulation on behalf of D.H-V.  D.H-V. first learned of the 
stipulation and the subsequent order signed by the court in 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
20 
 
January 2003 when her former husband called and told her that 
he, not she, was entitled to claim their son as a tax exemption 
pursuant to the stipulation.  
¶53 After D.H-V. filed a grievance with the OLR, OLR staff 
sent Kasprowicz letters on June 6, June 26, and July 18, 2003, 
requesting information and copies  of  all correspondence in 
D.H-V.'s files; Kasprowicz did not provide the requested 
information.  On August 6, 2003, in a telephone conference with 
OLR staff, Kasprowicz explained he had not submitted the copies 
of the correspondence in D.H-V.'s file because there were none.  
Kasprowicz informed the OLR of this lack of documentation more 
than two months after the OLR had requested the information. 
¶54 This course of conduct, as alleged in the OLR 
complaint and which the referee found to have had been proven by 
clear and convincing evidence, led to the following two counts 
of misconduct against Kasprowicz: 
• Count 15. By signing a stipulation without consulting 
with D.H-V. about its terms and explaining to her how 
it was different from the previous court order, 
Kasprowicz failed to abide by a client's decision 
concerning the objectives of representation and failed 
to consult with the client as to the means by which 
they 
are 
to 
be 
pursued, 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 
20:1.2(a).13 
                                                 
13 SCR 20:1.2(a) provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation, subject 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
21 
 
• Count 
16. By 
failing 
to 
notify 
D.H-V. 
of 
the 
stipulation and resultant court order, and by failing 
to send her copies of those documents, Kasprowicz 
failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the 
status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable 
requests 
for 
information, 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 
20:1.4(a). 
¶55 After listing her findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, Referee Peterson discussed the sanction she would recommend 
for Kasprowicz' misconduct.  Balancing the mitigating and 
aggravating factors, the referee concluded that a public 
reprimand was the appropriate sanction in this situation.  She 
explained that in the first place, the misconduct, while 
serious, was not malicious or intentionally deceptive; moreover, 
at least two of the counts were based on Kasprowicz' apparent 
misunderstanding of the law.  Although the misconduct, occurring 
over approximately a two-year period, involved at least five 
clients (and 
one 
count 
of 
failing 
to cooperate in the 
investigation of a grievance filed by a sixth client), the 
referee concluded that Kasprowicz' primary problem was in 
                                                                                                                                                             
to paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), and shall consult with 
the client as to the means by which they are to be 
pursued. A lawyer shall inform a client of all offers 
of settlement and abide by a client's decision whether 
to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a 
criminal case or any proceeding that could result in 
deprivation of liberty, the lawyer shall abide by the 
client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, 
as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury 
trial and whether the client will testify. 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
22 
 
failing to act and then avoiding his clients when questioned 
about that failure.    
¶56 Disclaiming 
any 
attempt 
to 
minimize 
Kasprowicz' 
failures, the referee additionally pointed out that his conduct 
was not intended to——and did not——provide him with any monetary 
gain or benefit.  According to the referee, Kasprowicz' 
avoidance behavior was not the result of any attempt on his part 
to harm his clients; rather, his behavior was a result of the 
medical and emotional problems he was experiencing during the 
two-year period.   
¶57 Moreover, the referee noted that the harm caused by 
Kasprowicz' misconduct was generally minor in nature; the only 
monetary damage suffered involved K.M. when interest and 
penalties were imposed due to Kasprowicz' failure to file the 
fiduciary income tax return for the estate and the trust 
involved in that matter.  In any event, the referee further 
observed that all monetary damages resulting from Kasprowicz' 
conduct had been voluntarily repaid by him, including his 
payment of successor counsel fees in the K.M. matter.  
¶58 Because 
the 
referee 
found 
that 
Kasprowicz 
was 
sincerely 
remorseful 
and 
obviously 
embarrassed 
about 
the 
situation, the referee determined that a public reprimand would 
be 
an 
appropriate 
sanction 
to 
remind 
Kasprowicz 
of 
the 
seriousness of his conduct.  
¶59 Although 
the 
OLR 
had 
argued 
that 
Kasprowicz' 
misconduct was intentional, the referee pointed to the analysis 
of the psychologist who had been hired to evaluate Kasprowicz' 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
23 
 
ability to practice law and based on that analysis, the referee 
determined that Kasprowicz had not acted intentionally in a way 
that was meant to harm his clients; he had not deceived or lied 
to them, nor had he taken money that was not his.  The referee 
characterized Kasprowicz' conduct as a "failure to act."  She 
said that while that failure to act was frustrating, it did not 
result in significant harm to his clients.   
¶60 Furthermore, the referee concluded that there were 
significant mitigating factors, specifically Kasprowicz' medical 
condition during the time period in question.  The referee 
wrote: 
 . . . the testimony indicates that around 
the year 2000, respondent's health began 
deteriorating.  He gained weight, became 
lethargic, 
tired, 
and 
was 
unable 
to 
concentrate or focus on work.  Respondent 
himself 
testified 
that 
he 
had 
trouble 
sleeping 
and 
concentrating. 
 
When 
he 
realized that he was having difficulties 
with the OLR, and several clients, rather 
than address the situation, [he] avoided the 
problems, failing to respond to either his 
clients or the OLR until the last possible 
moment. 
 
Respondent 
indicated 
he 
felt 
somewhat hopeless, and due to his illness, 
felt unable to address the problems.  
After 
seeing 
several 
doctors 
and 
undergoing numerous tests, respondent was 
finally diagnosed with hyperinsulinism, with 
a degree of depression as well.  As both 
respondent and his wife testified, as part 
of his treatment, respondent started a new 
eating 
regimen 
designed 
to 
improve 
his 
condition.  After a few months, respondent's 
health improved. His energy returned, he 
became more focused, lost his weight, and, 
as friends and family indicated, was back to 
his "old self."  He has not had any problems 
with clients, the OLR or family since his 
diagnosis and treatment.  Respondent appears 
to have cooperated in these proceedings; he 
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
24 
 
presented himself well throughout the course 
of this proceeding.   
I 
find 
the 
unanimous 
testimony 
of 
respondent, his wife, and close friend, 
demonstrates that respondent's conduct in 
avoiding his clients, avoiding the inquiries 
of the office of lawyer regulation and 
failing to act in various respects, are a 
direct result of his illness.  In other 
words, had respondent been healthy, I do not 
believe he would have acted the way he did 
in 
these 
matters, 
and 
this 
belief 
is 
bolstered by the fact that he has not had 
problems since his treatment began. 
¶61 After review, we conclude, consistent with prior 
similar cases such as In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Theobald, 2004 WI 59, 271 Wis. 2d 690, 679 N.W.2d 804, that a 
public reprimand is an appropriate sanction for Kasprowicz' 
misconduct as established in this disciplinary proceeding.  We 
agree with the referee's analysis and observations.  We find 
that the seriousness of Attorney Kasprowicz' misconduct warrants 
this public reprimand and we direct that Attorney Kasprowicz pay 
the costs of this disciplinary proceeding now totaling $5760.16.  
¶62 IT IS ORDERED that Paul M. Kasprowicz is publicly 
reprimanded for professional misconduct.  
¶63 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Paul M. Kasprowicz pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation all the costs of this proceeding provided that if 
such costs are not paid within the time specified, and absent a 
showing to this court of his inability to pay the costs within 
that time, the license of Attorney Paul M. Kasprowicz to 
practice law in Wisconsin shall be suspended until further order 
of this court.  
No. 
03-2844-D   
 
 
 
1