Case Title: SL v. CAD

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0268

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF SDL, AJL, and GASL, Minor Children: SL, v. CAD2012 WY 78Case Number: S-11-0268Decided: 06/04/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ADOPTION OF
SDL, AJL and GASL, 
Minor Children:
 
SL,
 
Appellant 
(Respondent),
 
v.
 
CAD,
 
Appellee 
(Petitioner).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County
The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Pro 
se.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Farrah L. Spencer, 
Long, Reimer, Winegar, Beppler, LLP, Park City, Utah.
 
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Father, SL, resisted 
the petition by Stepfather, CAD, to adopt SL’s three youngest children.  The district court approved the adoption 
over SL’s objections, and SL appeals.  
We will affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]        
Father, who appears 
pro se in this appeal as he did in 
the district court, lists several issues.  
We summarize and reorganize them as follows:
 
1.    
Did the district 
court err in calculating the arrearages in Father’s child support 
payments?
 
2.    
Did the district 
court misapply Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-304(e) (LexisNexis 2011) by failing 
to give Father credit for social security payments made directly to Mother as 
child support?
 
3.    
Did the district 
court err in finding Stepfather “fit and competent” to adopt the 
children?
 
4.    
Did the district 
court err in failing to consider information contained in Father’s answer to the 
petition for adoption, in Father’s proposed findings of fact following the 
hearing in this matter, and in a letter sent to the court by Stepfather’s 
attorney after the hearing?
 
5.    
Did the district 
court err in denying Father’s motions for visitation with the 
children?
 
Stepfather presents 
this statement of the issue:  Did 
the district court abuse its discretion when it granted the petition for 
adoption?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
Father and Mother 
were divorced in Colorado in 2008.  
Six children had been born of the marriage.  Mother was granted custody of the 
children, and Father was ordered to pay $686.00 per month for child 
support.  Mother married Stepfather 
in 2009, and the couple moved to Wyoming with the three youngest children.  By that time, the oldest child had 
joined the military.  The second 
child remained in Colorado, living with the family of a friend.  The third child moved into Father’s 
home.  
 
[¶4]        
In 2011, Stepfather 
filed a petition with the district court to adopt the three youngest 
children.  Mother consented to the 
adoption.  The petition alleged that 
Father’s consent was not required because he had willfully failed to satisfy his 
child support obligations.  Father 
responded to the petition for adoption, disputing that he was in arrears with 
his child support payments, and raising several other issues.  
 
[¶5]        
The district court 
held a hearing on the matter on September 22, 2011.  It heard testimony from Stepfather, 
Mother, Father, Father’s brother, and the third child.  The district court later issued an order 
granting Stepfather’s petition for adoption.  Father has appealed from that order. 

 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶6]        
We have consistently 
said that, if all statutory elements are met, the power to grant or deny a 
petition for adoption is within the sound discretion of the district court.  In re Adoption of RMS, 2011 WY 78, 
¶ 7, 253 P.3d 149, 151 (Wyo. 2011).  We will not disturb a district court’s 
decision absent a clear abuse of discretion.  In re Adoption of KJD, 2002 WY 26, 
¶ 21, 41 P.3d 522, 527 (Wyo. 2002).  
In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the 
ultimate question is whether the court could reasonably have concluded as it 
did.  Id.  
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶7]        
Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-22-110(a), in pertinent part, allows the adoption of a child without 
the written consent of the parent:
 
if the court finds 
that the putative father or the nonconsenting parent or parents have: . . 
.
 
(ix)  Willfully failed to pay a total dollar 
amount of at least seventy percent (70%) of the court ordered support for a 
period of two (2) years or more and has failed to bring the support obligation 
one hundred percent (100%) current within sixty (60) days after service of the 
petition to adopt.
 
It is undisputed 
that, upon his divorce from Mother, Father was ordered to pay $686.00 per month 
in child support.  The district 
court, in its order, included these findings of fact:
 
16.       [Father] 
stipulated to not having personally paid child support to Mother for the support 
of the minor children.  [Father’s] 
argument at the hearing was that the social security payments received by Mother 
on behalf of the minor children should be considered child support payments and 
therefore he has not willfully [failed to pay] child 
support.
 
17.       [Father] is 
67 years old and began receiving social security payments two (2) years 
ago.  Because [Father] was divorced 
from Mother and Mother had custody of their children, a portion of the social 
security payments were paid to Mother.  
Mother receives $94.00 per month for each child under the age of majority 
for a total monthly sum of $376.00.1 . . .
 
34.       The Court 
finds that pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-304(e), [Father] should receive a 
credit for the social security benefit sent directly to the custodial parent, 
[Mother].
 
35.       [Father] 
should receive a credit of $376.00 per month towards his child support 
obligation of $686.00 per month.
 
36.       The Court 
finds that at the time of the hearing, [Father] was in arrears in his child 
support obligation in the amount of $10,540.00 ($310 x 34 
months).
 
37.       The Court 
finds that 70% of the court ordered child support amount is $480.00 per 
month.
 
38.       The Court 
finds that [Father] has willfully failed to pay a total dollar amount of at 
least seventy percent (70%) of the court ordered support for a period of two 
years or more and has failed to bring the support obligation one hundred percent 
(100%) current within sixty days after being served with the Petition for 
Adoption.
 
39.       The Court 
finds that [Father’s] consent to the adoption is not 
required.
 
[¶8]        
On appeal, Father 
contends that these findings are in error.  
His position is that he was ordered to pay child support of $686.00 per 
month for the six children, or $114.33 per month per child.  He argues that his child support 
obligation was reduced by $114.33 when his oldest child became emancipated upon 
joining the military, by another $114.33 when his second child reached the age 
of majority or stopped living with Mother, and by another $114.33 when his third 
child stopped living with Mother and started living with him.  On that basis, Father insists that his 
child support obligation had been reduced to $114.33 per month for each of the 
three youngest children living with Mother, for a total of $343.00 per 
month.  Because Mother received 
social security payments of $376.00 per month, Father asserts that his child 
support payments exceeded his obligation, and that Mother actually owed him 
money.
 
[¶9]        
Our consideration of 
Father’s argument is severely hampered by the fact that the hearing on this 
matter was not transcribed or reported.  
The question before us is whether the district court abused its 
discretion because it could not reasonably have ruled as it did.  “Absent a transcript or a statement of 
the evidence, we must presume the district court had a reasonable evidentiary 
basis for its decision.”  Montoya v. Montoya, 2005 WY 161, 
¶ 8, 125 P.3d 265, 269 (Wyo. 2005), citing 
Burt v. Burt, 2002 WY 127, ¶ 7, 
53 P.3d 101, 103 (Wyo. 2002).  “In 
the absence of anything to refute them, we will sustain the trial court’s 
findings, and we assume that the evidence presented was sufficient to support 
those findings.”  Willowbrook 
Ranch, Inc. v. Nugget Exploration, Inc., 896 P.2d 769, 771-72 (Wyo. 
1995).  On this basis alone, we 
could decline to consider Father’s argument, or summarily affirm the district 
court’s decision.  See BB v. 
RSR, 
2007 WY 4, ¶ 7, 149 P.3d 727, 731 (Wyo. 2007).
 
[¶10]     
We are reluctant to 
do that, however, because of the significant interests at stake.  The “determination by the district court 
that [Father’s] consent to adopt was not required effectively terminated his 
parental rights.”  In re Adoption of RHA, 702 P.2d 1259, 
1264 (Wyo. 1985).  We 
“strictly scrutinize petitions to terminate parental rights” because 
“the 
right to 
associate with one’s family is fundamental.”  JLW v. CAB, 2010 WY 9, ¶ 17, 224 P.3d 14, 19 (Wyo. 2010).  Because 
Father’s parental rights are involved here, we will exercise our discretion to 
consider his argument to the extent possible in the absence of a record.  Compare BB, ¶ 9, 149 P.3d  at 732 
(“In light of the important interests at stake,” we reviewed the matter “in the 
exercise of our discretion” despite the lack of an official transcript of the 
hearing.).
 
[¶11]     
Initially, 
we must consider whether the district court correctly calculated Father’s child 
support obligations and arrearages.  
Father and Mother were divorced in Colorado, and his obligation to pay 
child support was imposed by a Colorado court.  We therefore determine the child support 
arrearages by applying Colorado law.  
See Witowski v. Roosevelt, 2009 WY 5, 
¶ 19, 199 P.3d 1072, 1077 (Wyo. 2009).  The Colorado court ordered Father to pay 
a lump sum of $686.00 per month in child support, not $114.33 per month per 
child.  Under established Colorado 
law, 
 
When a divorce decree 
directs the father to pay a specified amount periodically for the joint benefit 
of more than one minor child, the emancipation of one of such children does not 
automatically affect the liability of the father for the full sum prescribed by 
the order.  Rather it becomes the burden of the father, if he so desires, 
to make such showing as would entitle him to be relieved of all or a part of 
such obligation.
 
Taylor v. 
Taylor, 147 Colo. 140, 145, 
362 P.2d 1027, 1029 (1961).  See also Ferguson v. Ferguson, 32 Colo. 
App. 145, 148-49, 507 P.2d 1110, 1111-12 (1973); In re Marriage of 
Schmedeman, 190 P.3d 788, 792-93 (Colo. App. 2008).
 
[¶12]     
It is undisputed that 
Father was ordered to pay “a specified amount periodically for the joint benefit 
of more than one minor child.”  
Under the Colorado precedent cited above, he is therefore incorrect in 
asserting that the emancipation of his oldest child automatically reduced his 
child support obligation.  See also Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 14-10-115(13)(a) (“[U]nless a court finds that a child is otherwise 
emancipated, emancipation occurs and child support terminates without either 
party filing a motion when the last or only child attains 
nineteen years of age.”  (emphasis 
added)).  Similarly, Father’s child 
support obligation was not automatically reduced when his second child stopped 
living with Mother, or when his third child started living with him instead of 
Mother.  Under Colorado law, “a 
mutually agreed change of physical care” may provide grounds for a court to 
modify child support obligations, but the modification does not occur 
automatically without a court order.  
In re Marriage of White, 240 P.3d 534, 538 (Colo. App. 2010).  It 
is undisputed that Father’s child support obligation had not been modified at 
the time the adoption decree was entered.2
 
[¶13]     
We therefore reject 
Father’s argument that his child support obligations were automatically reduced 
by the emancipation or change of custody of the three oldest children.  It is undisputed that Father was 
obligated to pay $686.00 per month in child support.  Even though Father may be credited with 
the $376.00 per month social security payments, $376.00 is only approximately 
fifty-five percent of the $686.00 child support obligation.  The district court did not err, 
therefore, in ruling that Father was more than seventy percent in arrears on his 
child support payments, and that he had not brought the support current within 
sixty days of being served with the petition to adopt.  Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-22-110(a)(ix), Father’s consent to the adoption was not 
required.
 
[¶14]     
This discussion also 
effectively resolves Father’s second issue.  It is apparent from the order quoted 
above that the district court did apply the statutory provisions of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-304(e), and did give Father credit for the social security 
payments.  Father’s assertions to 
the contrary are simply incorrect.
 
[¶15]     
Father also 
challenges the fitness and competency of Stepfather to adopt the children.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-103 provides 
that only a person “who is determined by the court to be fit and competent to be 
a parent may adopt in accordance with this act.”  Father alleges, on several different 
grounds, that Stepfather is unfit and incompetent to be a parent.  Again, our review is hampered by the 
lack of a record on appeal, but we are told in Father’s brief that the district 
court “was informed of all this information, and, in spite of this knowledge 
deemed [Stepfather] 'fit and competent.’”  
Father’s argument implicitly concedes that the district court weighed the 
evidence and considered the arguments, but was unconvinced by Father’s 
allegations.  Because there is no 
transcript or statement of the evidence for us to review, we must defer to the 
district court and presume it “had a reasonable evidentiary basis for its 
decision.”  Montoya, ¶ 8, 125 P.3d  at 
269.  We cannot conclude that the district 
court abused its discretion.
 
[¶16]     
As a related matter, 
Father complains that the district court failed to order an investigation of the 
background of Stepfather pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-22-111(a)(ii).  That 
statute provides as follows:
 
(a)          
After the petition to 
adopt has been filed and a hearing held the court acting in the best interest 
and welfare of the child may make any of the following 
orders:
 
(i)         
Enter an interlocutory decree of adoption giving the care and custody of 
the child to the petitioners pending further order of the 
court;
 
(ii)          
Defer entry of an 
interlocutory decree of adoption and order the department of family services or 
a private licensed agency to investigate and report to the court the background 
of the child and of the petitioners, and the medical, social and psychological 
background and status of the consenting parent and putative father.  After a written report of the 
investigation is filed, the court shall determine if the adoption by petitioners 
is in the best interest and welfare of the child and thereupon enter the 
appropriate order or decree;
 
(iii)         
Enter a final decree 
of adoption if the child has resided in the home of the petitioner for six (6) 
months; or
 
(iv)         
Deny the adoption if 
the court finds that the best interests and welfare of the child will be served 
by such denial.
 
Applying the plain 
language of this statute, it is apparent that ordering an investigation of the 
petitioner is only one of the options the district court may choose.  It is undisputed in this case that the 
three youngest children had resided with Stepfather and Mother for more than six 
months.  The district court chose to 
enter the adoption decree rather than order an investigation, and that decision 
was not an abuse of discretion.
 
[¶17]     
Father further 
contends that the district court failed to consider information contained in 
Father’s answer to the petition for adoption and in Father’s proposed findings 
of fact following the hearing in this matter.  Father does not designate any specific 
information to which this argument applies.  As to the general information in these 
documents, the order in this case makes it plain that the district court duly 
considered Father’s pleadings and arguments but, based on the evidence, found 
Stepfather’s arguments more compelling.  

 
[¶18]     
Moreover, with regard 
to Father’s proposed findings of fact, we have previously observed that a 
district court may require both parties to submit proposed findings, 
conclusions, and orders so that the court will be “reminded or made aware of the 
positions, arguments, and objections of both parties.”  Zaloudek v. Zaloudek, 2009 WY 140, 
¶ 22, 220 P.3d 498, 504 
(Wyo. 2009).  Upon receiving the proposed orders, 
however, the court may reject one party’s order in its entirety and adopt the 
other party’s “nearly verbatim.”  Id., ¶ 7, 220 P.3d  at 501.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it declined to accept Father’s proposed 
findings.
 
[¶19]     
Father also argues 
that the district court erred by failing to consider information contained in a 
letter written to the court by Stepfather’s attorney after the hearing.  Although that letter has not been 
designated as part of the record, Father indicates that the main point of the 
letter was that Father “was correct in his assertion that he should be given 
credit for the social security benefits being received by his ex-wife.”  As previously discussed, the district 
court’s final order in this case demonstrates that Father was given credit for 
these social security payments.
 
[¶20]     
Finally, Father 
requests that custody of the three minor children be given to him, but if not, 
he “prays” that we grant “reasonable visitation to the natural father and 
sibling brother [the third child].”  
As stated earlier, the “determination by the district court that 
[Father’s] consent to adopt was not required effectively terminated his parental 
rights.”  RHA, 702 P.2d  at 1264.  Father suggests no legal basis for 
granting visitation to a biological father whose parental rights have been 
terminated.  The question of the 
brother’s right to visitation with his siblings is simply not before us in this 
case, and we decline to consider it.
 
[¶21]     
The district court’s 
decision is affirmed.
 
FOOTNOTES
1Although there are 
six children, Mother did not receive social security payments for the two oldest 
children after they reached the age of majority.  Mother received social security payments 
for the four youngest children, even though one of them was living with 
Father.  4 x $94.00 = 
$376.00.
2Attached to Father’s 
brief is an order from a Colorado court modifying his child support 
obligations.  Although it is not 
technically a part of the record on appeal, we note that it was dated 
December 27, 2011, more than two months after the Wyoming district court 
entered the adoption decree.  Of 
particular significance to the case before us now, the order also confirmed that 
Father was more than $10,000.00 in arrears in his child support 
payments.