Case Title: The Florida Bar V. John A. Barley

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC95-168

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2000-08-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
1    Case numbers SC95168, SC95921, SC96029, and SC96539 were all consolidated by
order of this Court dated October 15, 1999.  In addition to these four cases, we hereby sua sponte
consolidate case number SC96097, bringing to five the total number of consolidated cases addressed in
this opinion involving respondent Barley.  
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
Nos. SC95168, SC95921, SC96029, SC96097, & SC96539
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
JOHN A. BARLEY,
Respondent.
[August 24, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
These five consolidated Florida Bar cases all involve attorney John A.
Barley.1  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  For ease of
discussion, we first address the main case at issue here (case number SC95168), 
followed by a discussion of the four remaining ancillary cases (case numbers
SC95921, SC96029, SC96097, and SC96539).
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I. THE MAIN CASE
The question in the main case (case number SC95168) is whether the mere
filing of a motion for dissolution of an emergency suspension stays the emergency
suspension itself under Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.2(e)(1).  We hold that it
does not.    
FACTS
This Court placed Barley on emergency suspension on April 9, 1999, based
on the Bar’s allegations of trust fund violations.  See Florida Bar v. Barley, 731 So.
2d 650 (Fla. 1999) (table).  According to Barley, at a meeting on April 13, 1999,
Bar counsel initially advised him and his counsel that this Court’s emergency
suspension would be stayed by operation of law if he filed a motion for dissolution
of the emergency suspension under rule 3-5.2(e)(1).  Rule 3-5.2(e)(1) provides:
The attorney may move at any time for dissolution
or amendment of an emergency order [of probation or
suspension] by motion filed with the Supreme Court of
Florida, a copy of which will be served on bar counsel. 
Such motion shall operate as a stay of any other
proceedings and applicable time limitations in the case
and, unless the motion fails to state good cause or is
procedurally barred as an invalid successive motion, shall
immediately be assigned to a referee designated by the
chief justice.
Barley filed such a dissolution motion with this Court on April 19, 1999, and the
2    Bar counsel disputes Barley’s assertion that he initially advised Barley and his counsel that
this Court’s emergency suspension would be stayed by operation of law if he filed a motion for
dissolution of the emergency suspension under rule 3-5.2(e)(1).  Specifically, in the Bar’s response to
Barley’s emergency motion for stay of suspension and clarification, Bar counsel explained:
While it is true that Bar counsel pointed [Barley’s] counsel to the stay provision of the
rule, Bar counsel was extremely careful to caution [Barley’s] counsel that [Barley’s]
counsel was every bit as capable and qualified to interpret that provision as was Bar
counsel, who had never encountered that provision of the rule in his relatively short
tenure with The Bar up to that point. . . .  Thus, contrary to [Barley’s assertion], no
opinion was expressed by Bar counsel upon which [Barley’s] counsel could have or
should have relied. . . .  Bar counsel repeatedly cautioned [Barley’s] counsel not to rely
upon what ultimately was determined to be an erroneous interpretation.
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motion was, pursuant to the rule and the practice of this Court, immediately
assigned to a referee.  However, at about that same time, in a letter to Barley’s
counsel dated May 13, 1999, Bar counsel made clear that Barley’s filing of a
dissolution motion “[did] not abate the operation of the [emergency] suspension
order” and that Barley was therefore required to comply with the emergency
suspension order within thirty days.2  
On May 28, 1999, Barley filed in this Court an emergency motion for stay of
suspension and clarification, outlining the above facts and requesting relief.  This
Court ordered the Bar to file a response.  Prior to receipt of the Bar’s response, the
referee issued his report on June 15, 1999, recommending that this Court grant
Barley’s April 19 motion to dissolve the emergency suspension.  On review of that
report, we rejected the referee’s recommendation in an order dated January 26,
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2000, which provided as follows:
Upon consideration, this Court disapproves the
report of the referee filed June 15, 1999[, recommending
that this Court dissolve its April 9 emergency suspension
order].  This Court’s April 9, 1999, order suspending
Respondent on an emergency basis accordingly remains
in full force and effect.  Respondent’s emergency motion
for stay of suspension/clarification, filed May 28, 1999,
remains under consideration, and will be addressed
separately by subsequent action of this Court.
The present opinion is the “subsequent action of this Court” contemplated in the
above-quoted order.
ANALYSIS
In his emergency motion for stay of suspension and clarification, Barley asks
this Court to stay his emergency suspension until this Court’s final disposition on
his motion to dissolve the emergency suspension.  Significantly, there has been a
final disposition on the motion to dissolve the emergency suspension.  As indicated
above, this Court’s January 26, 2000, order disapproved the referee’s report
recommending that this Court grant Barley’s motion to dissolve the emergency
suspension and stressed that the emergency suspension remains in full force and
effect.  To clarify any ambiguity in this regard, by subsequent order dated March 3,
2000, we granted the Bar’s “Motion for Clarification of [This Court’s] Order Dated
January 26, 2000" to make clear that our January 26 order was a final disposition
3    Thus, we further specified in our March 3, 2000, order that the Bar had sixty days from
January 26, 2000, to file a formal complaint against Barley.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.2(e)(4). 
The Bar in turn filed a formal complaint against Barley on March 17, 2000, in case number SC00-579.  
      
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denying Barley’s dissolution motion and continuing his emergency suspension
uninterrupted since its commencement on April 9, 1999.3  Therefore, we dismiss as
moot the portion of Barley’s present motion requesting a stay of his suspension.
As to the clarification portion of Barley’s present emergency motion for stay
of suspension and clarification, Barley urges that the confusion in his case
regarding whether the filing of  a motion to dissolve an emergency suspension
under rule 3-5.2(e) operates to stay the emergency suspension itself “is capable of
being repeated, has statewide significance, and merits a published opinion by the
Court.”  We agree and grant clarification to the extent set forth in this opinion.      
Rule 3-5.2(e)(1) provides in pertinent part that the filing of a motion for
dissolution of an emergency order of probation or suspension “shall operate as a
stay of any other proceedings and applicable time limitations in the case.” 
(Emphasis added.)  Barley urges that this language applies to the emergency
suspension itself, but a plain reading of the language dictates otherwise.  An
emergency suspension order is neither a “proceeding” nor an “applicable time
limitation” as those terms are commonly understood and therefore plainly falls
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outside the scope of the rule.  This straightforward interpretation is buttressed by
this Court’s opinion adopting the language at issue:
[T]he . . . rule specifies that The Bar must file a formal
complaint within sixty days of the emergency order and
proceed to trial, whether or not it appears that a motion
for dissolution later may be filed in some stage of the
proceedings.  However, this time limitation is suspended
if, prior to the filing of the formal complaint, the attorney
in question exercises the right to move for dissolution of
the order.  If a complaint already has been filed, the
motion operates as a stay of any further proceedings and
suspends the time limitations imposed on The Bar.
Successive motions for dissolution will summarily
be dismissed by the Court without being referred to a
referee to the extent that they raise issues that were or
with due diligence could have been raised in a prior
motion.  In such instances, the motion operates as a stay
only until dismissed, thus extending any applicable time
limitations for an amount of time equal to the duration of
the stay.
Once a valid motion for dissolution is filed that
states good cause, the chief justice will appoint a referee
to hear the motion, and the hearing must occur within the
time limits specified.  The Court then will review the
referee's findings and recommendation.
Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 593 So. 2d 1035,
1037 (Fla. 1991).  In short, the opinion is silent as to staying the emergency
suspension itself; rather all references in the opinion to stays and suspensions of
time relate to the filing of the Bar’s complaint and proceedings thereunder.     
Furthermore, the opinion’s directive that “the hearing [on a dissolution
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motion] must occur within the time limits specified” refers to Rule Regulating The
Florida Bar 3-5.2(e)(2), which provides in pertinent part that “[t]he referee shall hear
such motion within 7 days of assignment, or a shorter time if practicable, and
submit a report and recommendation to the Supreme Court of Florida within 7 days
of the date of the hearing, or a shorter time if practicable.”  This expedited handling
of dissolution motions is clearly intended to benefit the attorney under emergency
suspension (i.e., if the emergency suspension is to be dissolved, then it should be
dissolved as quickly as possible in order to minimize interference with the lawyer’s
practice).  Rhetorically speaking, what would be the rush if the filing of the
dissolution motion itself served to stay the emergency suspension? 
Finally, for purposes of the requested clarification, we stress that it has never
been this Court’s policy to automatically stay an emergency suspension simply
because the respondent filed a motion to dissolve the emergency suspension. 
Rather, the emergency suspension remains in full force and effect unless and until
this Court dissolves it upon review of the expedited referee’s report.  Thus, when
this Court in its January 26, 2000, order disapproved the referee’s report
recommending that Barley’s emergency suspension be dissolved, we specified that
“[t]his Court’s April 9, 1999, order suspending Respondent on an emergency basis
accordingly remains in full force and effect.”  In other words, the emergency
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suspension order had never not been in full force and effect; Barley’s filing of a
dissolution motion did not stay the emergency suspension under rule 3-5.2(e)(1).
 
II. THE FOUR ANCILLARY CASES
In addition to the main case discussed above (case number SC95168), there
are four related ancillary cases involving Barley that we discuss below in sets of
two under the subheadings “Orders to Show Cause” and “Subpoena.”  
ORDERS TO SHOW CAUSE   
While the referee’s report and Barley’s motion for stay were pending in this
Court in the main case discussed above, the Bar in two ancillary cases (case
numbers SC95921 and SC96539) filed petitions for orders to show cause why
Barley should not be held in contempt or disbarred for violating or failing to
comply with this Court’s April 9, 1999, emergency suspension order.  These two
petitions alleged that, in contravention of the emergency suspension order, Barley
continued to represent clients, failed to advise clients of his suspension, and failed
to provide Bar counsel with copies of notifications to financial institutions or advise
Bar counsel of the receipt and location of all sums received from the practice of
law.  
In his responses, Barley not only denied many of the allegations but also
suggested that any failure to comply with the emergency suspension order was
4    Even assuming that, as urged by Barley, Bar counsel at an April 13, 1999, meeting initially
advised Barley and his counsel that this Court’s emergency suspension would be stayed by operation of
law if he filed a dissolution motion under rule 3-5.2(e)(1), it is undisputed that in a letter to Barley’s
counsel dated May 13, 1999, Bar counsel made it clear that a dissolution motion “does not abate the
operation of the [emergency] suspension order” and that Barley was therefore required to comply with
the emergency suspension order within thirty days.  The Bar has not wavered from that position.   
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unintentional and excusable under the unique facts of his case which, according to
Barley, included the ambiguity of rule 3-5.2(e) and the Bar’s vacillating
interpretation of same.  We disagree. 
Barley’s reading of rule 3-5.2(e) and his claims that any noncompliance with
the suspension order was unintentional and excusable are strained given the plain
language of the rule, this Court’s opinion adopting the rule, and the implications
inherent in having an expedited handling of dissolution motions (all discussed at
length above), as well as the Bar’s almost immediate insistence that Barley’s filing
of his dissolution motion did not stay his emergency suspension under the rule.4 
We therefore reject Barley’s suggestion that we excuse him for failing to comply
with the emergency suspension order. 
However, insofar as Barley has denied many of Bar’s allegations underlying
its petitions for orders to show cause, factual findings are required.  As such, and
by operation of this opinion and a corresponding unpublished order, we hereby
assign these two cases to a referee for resolution.  Should the appointed referee
ultimately find that Barley failed to comply with the emergency suspension order,
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we direct that the referee may consider in possible mitigation any perceived
ambiguity surrounding rule 3-5.2(e) and Barley’s asserted reliance thereon.   
SUBPOENA
In both ancillary cases discussed above, the Bar referenced Barley’s alleged
misconduct in his handling of an estate in which he was acting as both attorney and
personal representative (one of the heirs had filed a complaint with the Bar).  In a
third ancillary case (case number SC96029), the Bar subpoenaed Barley’s file and
accounting records pertaining to the estate; however, Barley did not comply with
the subpoena, and the Bar filed a petition for order to show cause why Barley
should not be held in contempt and sanctioned for failing to do so.  
In response, Barley in the fourth and final ancillary case at issue here (case
number SC96097) filed a “motion to quash subpoena, for protective order, and for
sanctions,” arguing that the subpoena lacked proper notice and particularity, was
excessive in scope, was prematurely issued, and subjected him to undue burden
and hardship.  Barley adopted this motion into his response to the Bar’s show
cause petition, adding that the underlying complaint involved his performance as a
personal representative, not as an attorney, and was therefore more appropriate for
a probate court, not a disciplinary proceeding.
The Bar countered in its reply that Barley’s dual capacity did not shield him
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from Bar discipline and again urged that Barley be held in contempt for not
complying with the subpoena.  In response to Barley’s motion to quash the
subpoena, the Bar countered that the subpoena was properly issued and limited in
scope and purpose and again urged this Court to find Barley in contempt.  We
decline to hold Barley in contempt but otherwise agree with the Bar’s arguments.  
The subpoena at issue is grounded on a complaint filed by one of the heirs
to the estate in question, and contrary to Barley’s contentions, we find that the
subpoena is not lacking in particularity, excessive in scope, or unduly burdensome. 
Rather, in essentially standard language, the subpoena simply commands Barley to
produce his “original file or files pertaining to the administration of the Estate . . .
together with all original records [comprehensively lists all such possible records] .
. . of the Estate . . . for the period of time beginning with the inception of said
matter and continuing up to and including the date of service of the subpoena.” 
See generally R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.11(d) (authorizing the issuance of
subpoenas for, among other things, “the production of documentary evidence” in
disciplinary investigations and proceedings).   We likewise reject Barley’s
arguments that the subpoena was prematurely issued and lacked proper notice.  
Barley’s suggestion that his acts as a personal representative did not involve
the practice of law and are therefore not subject to Bar discipline is plainly wrong. 
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This Court has rejected similar arguments as “simply untenable,” holding that 
[c]onduct while not acting as an attorney can subject one
to disciplinary proceedings.  The Florida Bar v. Hefty,
213 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1968).  As this Court has stated
before, "'an attorney is an attorney is an attorney.'"The
Florida Bar v. Bennett, 276 So. 2d 481, 482 (Fla. 1973).  
Even in personal transactions and when not acting as an
attorney, attorneys must "avoid tarnishing the
professional image or damaging the public."  Id.; The
Florida Bar v. Hooper, 507 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 1987);
State ex rel. The Florida Bar v. Clements, 131 So. 2d 198
(Fla. 1961). . . . The practice of law is a privilege which
carries with it responsibilities as well as rights.   That an
attorney might, as it were, wear different hats at different
times does not mean that professional ethics can be
"checked at the door" or that unethical or unprofessional
conduct by a member of the legal profession can be
tolerated.
Florida Bar v. Della-Donna, 583 So. 2d 307, 310 (Fla. 1989); see also R. Regulating
Fla. Bar 3-4.3 (“The commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary
to honesty and justice, whether the act is committed in the course of the attorney’s
relations as an attorney or otherwise, . . . may constitute a cause for discipline.”)
(emphasis added).  Clearly, Barley may be disciplined as an attorney if he is found
to have engaged in misconduct as a personal representative.  See, e.g., Florida Bar
v. Fine, 607 So. 2d 416, 417 (Fla. 1992) (disciplining attorney for his misconduct
as a personal representative “despite the fact that he was acting as a personal
representative and not attorney for the estate”).
5    We direct the Bar to propose an amendment to incorporate this holding into the language of
rule 3-5.2(e)(1) in order to avoid any misinterpretation or confusion whatsoever on this issue in the
future.   
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Accordingly, we deny all relief requested in Barley’s motion to quash the
subpoena in case number SC96097 and command Barley to immediately comply
with the subpoena.  Affording Barley a generous benefit of the doubt, we decline at
the present time to hold him in contempt under the Bar’s petition for order to show
cause in case number SC96029.  However, in both of these cases and all others
discussed in this opinion, we find Barley’s conduct to border on defiance,
recalcitrance, and obstructionism.  
III. CONCLUSION
In main case number SC95168, we dismiss as moot the stay portion of
Barley’s emergency motion for stay and clarification, but grant the clarification
portion of that motion as set forth above.  We hold that the mere filing of a motion
for dissolution of an emergency suspension does not stay the emergency
suspension itself under rule 3-5.2(e)(1).5  Thus, Barley’s emergency suspension has
been continuously in effect since it was ordered by this Court on April 9, 1999, and
has at no time been stayed, delayed, interrupted, suspended, or otherwise abated or
lifted.  To the extent that Barley has not already fully complied with the emergency
suspension order, we command that he immediately do so or face  sanctions from
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this Court.              
In ancillary case numbers SC95921 and SC96539 (the related order to show
cause cases), we reject Barley’s contention that, due to the asserted confusion
surrounding rule 3-5.2(e), he should be excused for any noncompliance with the
emergency suspension order.  Instead, because findings of fact are required on the
Bar’s underlying allegations, we hereby assign these two cases to a referee for
resolution.  If the referee ultimately finds that Barley failed to comply with the
emergency suspension order, the referee may consider in possible mitigation any
perceived ambiguity surrounding the rule and Barley’s asserted reliance thereon.
Finally, in ancillary case numbers SC96029 and SC96097 (the related
subpoena cases), we deny all relief requested in Barley’s motion to quash the
subpoena and command him to immediately comply with same or face sanctions
by this Court.  We decline to hold Barley in contempt at this time but will not
hesitate to impose such a sanction should he fail to comply with other orders of
this Court.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
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Five Consolidated Original Proceedings - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, John Anthony Boggs, Staff Counsel,
and Donald M. Spangler, Bar Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Complianant
John A. Barley, pro se, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent