Case Title: Milladge v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Milladge v. State1995 WY 129900 P.2d 1156Case Number: 94-164Decided: 08/14/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
David 
A. MILLADGE, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming,

 Appellee (Plaintiff).

David 
A. Milladge, pro se.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen.; Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen.; D. Michael Pauling, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen.; Mark T. Moran, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR, and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The only issue in 
this case is whether David Milladge (Milladge) is entitled to credit on his 
sentence for time served in presentence confinement, which he sought by a Motion 
to Vacate or Correct Sentence under WYO.R.CRIM.P. 35(a). In addressing that 
question, we must apply WYO.R.CRIM.P. 32(c), which formalizes our decision in 
Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491, 498 (Wyo. 1990). After pleading guilty to felony 
check fraud in Cheyenne and then in Laramie, Milladge first was sentenced to a 
term of not less than three and one-half, nor more than four and one-half, years 
on the Cheyenne charge. In that sentence, he was granted credit for ninety-eight 
days of presentence confinement. His subsequent sentence for the Laramie charge 
was for a term of not less than two years nor more than five years to run 
consecutively to the Cheyenne sentence. No credit was given for presentence 
confinement on the Laramie sentence. In both instances, the execution of the 
sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation. When his probations were 
revoked, the sentences imposed upon Milladge were modified by the district court 
for the Second Judicial District so that the Cheyenne sentence was to be served 
concurrently with the Laramie sentence. In modifying the Cheyenne sentence and 
imposing it to run concurrently with the Laramie sentence, the district court 
specified it had taken Milladge's presentence confinement into account. It did 
not follow WYO. R.CRIM.P. 32(c), however, and we are unable to fashion a correct 
award for time spent in presentence confinement in Laramie from the record. We 
remand the case for the limited purpose of written findings to comply with the 
provisions of WYO.R.CRIM.P. 32(c).

[¶2]      In his Brief of 
Appellant, Milladge offers this statement of the issue:

Whether 
appellant should be credited with 198 days of time served to be credited against 
the minimum and maximum term of all phases of appellant's sentence for time 
served in the county jail while waiting disposition of his case; whether the 
officials of the Wyoming State Penitentiary should be ordered to comply with the 
original judgment and sentence in appellant's case wherein the court ordered 
that appellant be credited with all time served in presentence confinement 
consisting of 98 days.

In 
its Brief of Appellee, the State parses the matter into two issues as 
follows:

I. 
Whether the district court abused its sentencing discretion by failing to 
specifically grant credit for presentence confinement where the appropriate 
amount of credit was considered and awarded in its modification of the 
sentences.

II. 
Whether the modified sentence of the district court which incorporated 
presentence confinement credit was within the maximum and minimum statutory 
sentencing limits of WS § 6-3-702(a)(b)(iii).

[¶3]      Milladge first 
was charged in Cheyenne with felony check fraud in violation of WYO. STAT. § 
6-3-702(a)(b)(iii) (1988).1 When he was sentenced on that 
charge, after pleading guilty, it was to a term of not less than three and 
one-half, and not more than four and one-half years to be served in the Wyoming 
penitentiary. He specifically was given credit for ninety-eight days spent in 
presentence confinement. The judgment and sentence of the court in the Cheyenne 
case provided the sentence should be served "concurrently with any other 
jurisdiction." Later, Milladge entered a plea of guilty to another felony check 
charge in Laramie. In that case, he was sentenced to a term of not less than two 
years nor more than five years, but that sentence was imposed to run 
consecutively to the Cheyenne sentence. In both cases, the execution of the 
sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation.

[¶4]      Approximately a 
year later, in Laramie, the district court for the Second Judicial District 
revoked Milladge's probation on the Laramie charge and reimposed the previously 
suspended sentence. About one month later, the district court for the First 
Judicial District in Cheyenne, with Milladge's consent, transferred his 
probation revocation on that charge to Laramie, pursuant to WYO. R.CRIM.P. 21.2 Within a week, the district court 
in Laramie was convened to revoke probation on the Cheyenne charge and to modify 
the Laramie sentence and the Cheyenne sentence. At the hearing, Milladge's 
probation on the Cheyenne charge was revoked.

[¶5]      At that time, the 
court made these comments with respect to sentence:

THE 
COURT: All right. If you would stand with your attorney, I'll try to clarify 
this conflict between the Cheyenne sentence and the - and the Albany County 
sentence so that you - your time will be clear, because there are a number of 
variables here that I need to address.

First 
of all, the Cheyenne sentence was not less than three-and-a-half nor more than 
four-and-a-half years, but it gave you credit for 98 days, so I don't - I don't 
know if, that's about a little over three months, so you would also start off 
with three-and-a-quarter years to four-and-a-half years.

This 
court, on the Albany County probation violation gave you not less than two nor 
more than five years, but it was consecutive to the time in Cheyenne. You've 
also spent some time in the Albany County Jail, and I don't know if you're 
entitled to credit for that on a probation revocation. I don't think 
so.

So 
I just want to make it clear that I'm going to clear out all the Judgment and 
Sentences and modify them as follows, so that you will be doing the following 
time, and I'm going to modify the Cheyenne sentence, now that I have 
jurisdiction over that, and it is going to be run concurrent with the Albany 
County sentence, so that there is no consecutive time, and the time you serve 
will be the time that I now will announce, and I have taken into consideration 
all the credits for time served off the Cheyenne sentence in modifying the 
Cheyenne sentence, so that this time is the time.

It 
is the Judgment and Sentence of this court that you serve a term in the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary of not less than two nor more than five years, concurrent 
time Albany County, Cheyenne * * *.

The 
Order Upon Probation Revocation Hearing provided:

WHEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's probation is revoked and the Court 
reimposes the underlying sentence that the Defendant be incarcerated in the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary for a term of not less than two years and not more 
than five years, with no credit being given for time served.

IT 
IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant's sentence in the First Judicial District, 
under Docket Number 21295, shall run concurrent with the sentence under this 
docket, and the sentence is modified to a sentence of not less than two years to 
not more than five years with no credit being given for time served.

[¶6]      Following the 
imposition of the sentences, as modified, Milladge filed a Motion to Vacate or 
Correct Sentence in the district court in Laramie. He appeals the denial of that 
motion, stating the court abused its discretion by denying the time he served in 
the county jail awaiting disposition of his case. Milladge's concern revolves 
around his belief that the records show he never has been credited with the 
ninety-eight days from the original judgment, fifty-eight days awaiting the 
original Laramie sentencing, and 140 days after the revocation of his 
probation.

[¶7]      Wyoming has no 
statutory provision relating to presentence confinement credit, but we have 
codified certain requirements in WYO.R.CRIM.P. 32(c), which provides in 
pertinent part: 

(c) 
Sentence.

* 
* * * * *

(2) 
Contents. - A written sentence shall be signed by the judge and entered by the 
clerk of court without delay. The sentence may be included in the judgment or 
separately entered. As a minimum it shall:

(A) 
State each offense for which sentence is imposed, including the statute number 
and whether the offense is a felony or a misdemeanor;

(B) 
State the sentence imposed for each convicted offense including for felonies the 
minimum and maximum term and state whether multiple sentences are to run 
concurrently or consecutively;

(C) 
State whether the sentence is to run concurrently with or consecutive to any 
other sentence being served or to be served by the defendant;

(D) 
If probation is not granted, state whether probation was considered by the 
court;

(E) 
Include a finding of all time served by the defendant in presentence 
confinement for any sentenced offense;

(F) 
State the extent to which credit for presentence confinement is to be given 
for each sentenced offense; * * *. (Emphasis added.)

Neither 
Milladge nor the State alludes to this rule in the briefs filed in this 
case.

[¶8]      The Order Upon 
Probation Revocation Hearing does not comply with the provisions of 
WYO.R.CRIM.P. 32(c)(2)(E) since it does not "include a finding of all time 
served by the defendant in presentence confinement for any sentenced offense." 
The record is clear that, when Milladge was sentenced in Cheyenne, the court 
found he had served a total of ninety-eight days in presentence confinement, and 
he was given credit against both the minimum and maximum terms for that number 
of days. The record is silent as to any days served in presentence confinement 
in the county jail in Laramie before sentencing occurred on the Laramie charge. 
It appears, however, that the warrant on the charge in Laramie was executed on 
January 27, 1993, and Milladge was not sentenced until February 23 or 24, 1993. 
Apparently, the State concedes he was confined for twenty-eight days awaiting 
sentencing on the Laramie charge. What is not accounted for is the period 
between the sentencing on the Cheyenne charge on January 20, 1993, and the 
execution of the warrant on the Laramie charge on January 27, 1993.

[¶9]      The district 
court apparently complied with WYO.R.CRIM.P. 32(c)(2)(F) when it stated "with no 
credit being given for time served." However, the Order Upon Probation 
Revocation Hearing runs afoul of our decision in Renfro. We said in that 
case:

The 
prospective rule for sentences entered following the publication date of this 
opinion is:

Credit 
will be automatically granted for presentence incarceration time on all 
sentences. We will presume that in imposing the stated sentence, the trial 
court, in its exercise of discretion, considered presentence confinement. 
Consequently, without regard for what is or is not stated in the sentence, 
credit for presentence confinement will be applied to reduce the length of 
remaining incarceration under the sentence. As long as the maximum and 
minimum terms remain within statutory limits, discretion of the trial court 
continues to establish the periods which obviously include recognition of 
presentence confinement.

Renfro, 
785 P.2d  at 498 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).

This 
judicial rule was adopted in response to ambiguities in sentencing when the 
trial court in that case did not state, and the sentence did not reflect, any 
decision about credit regarding 138 days spent by the defendant in presentence 
confinement. We went on to say, "[t]his resolution provides certainty of result, 
clarity of rules, and preservation of equal protection of constitutional 
interests." Renfro, 785 P.2d  at 498 (citations omitted).

[¶10]   The court's Order Upon Probation 
Revocation Hearing obviously cannot be relied upon by the State to avoid credit 
on Milladge's sentence for time spent in presentence confinement on the charge 
in Laramie. Renfro was premised upon the requirement that credit for presentence 
incarceration be afforded when the defendant is incarcerated because of his 
inability to post a bond. A defendant who has been confined prior to being 
sentenced because of inability to post bail is entitled to receive a credit 
against the sentence for the time spent in presentence confinement. Renfro, 785 P.2d  at 498. When a sentencing court erroneously fails to award a presentence 
confinement credit, a later denial of a motion to correct the illegal sentence 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. Ramirez v. State, 800 P.2d 503, 504 (Wyo. 
1990).

[¶11]   When we returned to a similar 
problem in Eustice v. State, 871 P.2d 682, 685 (Wyo. 1994), we said:

Under 
our current rules of criminal procedure, a sentence must contain both a finding 
of the amount of the presentence confinement and either an express award or an 
express denial of a credit for that presentence confinement. W.R.Cr.P. 
32(c)(2)(E) & (F); accord W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C) (similar requirement for 
contested information contained in the presentence investigation report). 
Despite our rules, these issues continue to plague our docket; therefore, we 
deem it appropriate to refine our standard procedure for awarding a presentence 
confinement credit. See Renfro, 785 P.2d  at 497 n. 7.

If 
a sentence fails to comply with W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(E) or (F), the accused would 
be entitled to have a limited remand for a new award of a credit unless we have 
been able to fashion a correct award from the record. Compare Mehring v. State, 
860 P.2d 1101 (Wyo. 1993) (limited remand for written findings to correct 
violations of W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C)(ii)); and Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933 
(Wyo. 1992) (remand not necessary when the Supreme Court can accomplish 
amendment to judgment and sentence). On remand and resentencing, "we assume 
appellants will not be punished for exercising their constitutional right to 
appeal." Griebel v. State, 763 P.2d 475, 478 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶12]   Since no credit was afforded for 
any presentence confinement on the charge in Laramie, we remand this case for 
the limited purpose of determining that time, if any, and awarding a credit 
against the Laramie sentence. WYO.R.CRIM.P. 32(c)(2)(E) establishes how the 
credit will be determined.

[¶13]   As the sentences now stand, the 
Laramie sentence will be served with the Cheyenne sentence being served 
concurrently. The question not raised by the parties is the manner in which the 
time spent in presentence incarceration is to be credited in an instance in 
which sentences imposed in two different courts are made to run concurrently. 
Milladge asserts this case is controlled by Weedman v. State, 792 P.2d 1388 
(Wyo. 1990), but that case is distinguishable.

[¶14]   In Weedman, where disparate 
sentences were imposed in the same court for separate crimes, the court ruled 
credit should be given against the minimum and maximum terms for both crimes, 
even though they were to be served concurrently. The presentence confinement was 
the same for both offenses. Here, while the record is less than precise, it 
appears Milladge first was incarcerated in Cheyenne while awaiting sentence. He 
then was incarcerated in Laramie for some period of time while awaiting sentence 
on that charge. The Cheyenne sentence ultimately was made to run concurrently 
with the Laramie sentence. Whether or not ninety-eight days are credited to the 
Cheyenne sentence, it is impossible for Milladge to complete the Cheyenne 
sentence before finishing the Laramie sentence.

[¶15]   Milladge wants the ninety-eight 
days of incarceration in Cheyenne to be credited on the Laramie sentence. This 
contention is contrary to what we said in Van Duser v. State, 796 P.2d 1322, 
1325 (Wyo. 1990) (emphasis added):

For 
the purposes of granting credit against a prison sentence, presentence 
confinement is

"incarceration 
for inability and failure to post bond on the offense for which the sentence is 
entered and does not include revoked probation or other confinement that 
would continue to exist without regard for bond posting capabilities in [the] 
particular proceeding. 785 P.2d  at 498 n. 8." Prejean v. State, 794 P.2d 877 
(Wyo. 1990).

Van 
Duser is reaffirmed in Wilson v. State, 896 P.2d 1327 (Wyo. 1995). Milladge's 
contention also conflicts with the spirit of our decision in Duffy v. State, 730 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶16]   We are satisfied credit must be 
afforded by the State for any time Milladge was incarcerated in Laramie prior to 
sentencing, if he was unable to post bond due to his indigency. That credit 
should be awarded against the minimum and maximum term of two years and five 
years. If for some reason Milladge should succeed in having the Laramie 
conviction vacated so that only the Cheyenne sentence would be served, he would 
be entitled to credit against the minimum and maximum terms of the Cheyenne 
sentence for ninety-eight days spent in presentence confinement in Cheyenne.3 He is not entitled to credit 
against either sentence for time spent in custody while awaiting revocation 
proceedings because that is not attributable to his inability to post bond due 
to indigence.

[¶17]   We hold the Order Denying Motion to 
Vacate or Correct Sentence must be reversed and the case remanded for the 
limited purpose of determining and awarding credit against the Laramie sentence 
for any time spent in presentence confinement on the Laramie 
charge.

Footnotes

1 
WYO. STAT. § 6-3-702(a)(b)(iii) (1988) provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows:

(a) 
Any person who knowingly issues a check which is not paid because the drawer has 
insufficient funds or credit with the drawee has issued a fraudulent check and 
commits fraud by check.

(b) 
Fraud by check is:

* 
* * * * *

(iii) 
A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the fraudulent 
check was for the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more, or if the 
offender is convicted of fraud by check involving two (2) or more checks issued 
within any sixty (60) day period in the state of Wyoming totaling five hundred 
dollars ($500.00) or more in the aggregate.

2 
WYO.R.CRIM.P. 21 provides in pertinent part:

* 
* * * * *

(b) 
Other cases. - For the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the interest 
of justice, the court upon consent of the parties may transfer the proceeding as 
to that defendant or any one or more of the counts thereof to another 
county.

(c) 
Proceedings on transfer. - When a transfer is ordered the clerk shall transmit 
to the clerk of the court to which the proceeding is transferred the court file 
in the proceeding or duplicates thereof and any bail taken, and the prosecution 
shall continue in that county.

3 
We have no issue before us with respect to the propriety of the district court 
increasing Milladge's maximum term on the Cheyenne sentence when it was modified 
to run concurrently with the Laramie sentence.