Case Title: People v. Moore

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87958

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 87958-Agenda 3-September 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								COREY MOORE, Appellant.
Opinion filed May 22, 2003.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County,
defendant, Corey Moore, was convicted of the first degree murder
and the aggravated unlawful restraint of Kimberly Fort. See 720
ILCS 5/9-1(a), 10-3.1 (West 1996). At a separate sentencing
hearing, the court found defendant eligible for the death penalty
and further determined that there were no mitigating
circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of that sentence.
Accordingly, the trial court sentenced defendant to death.
	Defendant prepared a pro se motion for the appointment of
counsel other than the public defender. The motion contained a
number of allegations of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. At the
posttrial hearing, the trial court refused to consider defendant's pro
se motion.
	Defendant's death sentence has been stayed pending direct
review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs.
603, 609(a). Subsequent to the filing of defendant's appeal,  then-governor George Ryan commuted defendant's death sentence to
natural life without possibility of parole or mandatory supervised
release.
	An appellate issue is moot when it is abstract or presents no
controversy. People v. Blaylock, 202 Ill. 2d 319, 325 (2002). An
issue can become moot if circumstances change during the
pendency of an appeal that prevent the reviewing court from being
able to render effectual relief. People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286,
294 (2002). Commutation removes a judicially imposed sentence
and replaces it with a lesser, executively imposed sentence. People
ex rel. Johnson v. Murphy, 257 Ill. 564, 566 (1913); Black's Law
Dictionary 274 (7th ed. 1999).
	Therefore, the commutation rendered defendant's sentencing
issues moot. See, e.g., Lewis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 31, 38,
235 S.E.2d 320, 325 (1977); State v. Mitchell, 239 Or. 87, 88, 396 P.2d 572, 573 (1964).(1) We exercise our discretion to address the
nonsentencing issues in this case. See, e.g., McGill v. Illinois
Power Co., 18 Ill. 2d 242, 244 (1959). Addressing only one
nonsentencing issue, we now remand the cause to the trial court
with instruction to conduct an appropriate inquiry into defendant's
pro se post-trial motion.

BACKGROUND

	The record contains the following pertinent and uncontested
facts. Defendant was indicted in Cook County in two separate
cases. In case No. 97-CR-1779, the charges arose from the
September 3, 1996, fatal shooting and armed robbery of Lonnie
Williams and the attempted shooting of Melanie Williams. In the
case before us, No. 97-CR-1780, the charges arose from the
November 21, 1996, shooting of Kimberly Fort.
	Defendant waived a jury for both the guilt phase and the death
sentencing hearing in each case. The court conducted separate
bench trials to determine defendant's guilt.
	The State's case in No. 97-CR-1779 included the following
evidence. Melanie Williams and Lonnie Williams were business
partners in an ice cream store in Chicago. On September 3, 1996,
Lonnie and Melanie closed the store; Lonnie took with him a bag
containing money from the store's sales for the week. They lived
in the second-floor apartment of a two-flat building in Chicago.
They arrived home at approximately 10:25 p.m. Melanie followed
Lonnie toward the front porch. Defendant, a former employee,
grabbed Melanie and put a handgun to her head. Defendant told
her to be quiet.
	Near the top of an inner stairway, Lonnie became aware of
defendant's presence and turned to face him. Lonnie pulled
Melanie behind him. Defendant demanded money. Lonnie handed
defendant the money from the store. Defendant then said, "You all
shouldn't have done me like you did." Melanie then heard the gun
discharge. Melanie ran inside her apartment, with defendant in
close pursuit. Facing defendant, who was aiming the gun at her,
Melanie backed up to a couch and fell on it. Defendant pulled the
trigger three times, but the gun failed to discharge. Defendant
turned and ran out of the apartment. Lonnie died from a gunshot
wound to the face.
	In the case before us, No. 97-CR-1780, the State's evidence
against defendant, which included his statement to police, was as
follows. Fort was defendant's girlfriend and they lived together.
Beginning on the night of the Lonnie Williams shooting, law
enforcement officials spoke with Fort regarding defendant's
whereabouts. She cooperated with police and gave them another
possible address for defendant and a photograph of him.
	On November 21, 1996, at approximately 9 a.m., defendant
returned to the house he shared with Fort. He was armed with a
12-gauge, double-barreled, sawed-off shotgun concealed under his
coat. Defendant was armed that day because he had killed Lonnie
Williams and people were trying to kill defendant in retaliation.
He tried to open the door with his key, but Fort had changed the
locks.
	While defendant was breaking into the house, Fort escaped
and ran down the street. Defendant chased and eventually caught
Fort. He pulled her down the street toward the house. Defendant
reasoned that Fort was afraid of him because she had told police
about Lonnie Williams' murder. When they were near, defendant
ordered her to walk down a side gangway and enter the house.
While Fort was about 10 feet in front of defendant, he shot her in
the back, firing both barrels. Fort died from the shotgun blast.
	At the close of the bench trial in this case, the court convicted
defendant of the first degree murder and the aggravated unlawful
restraint of Fort. Regarding the Williams shooting, the court
convicted defendant of the first degree murder and armed robbery
of Lonnie Williams and the attempted murder of Melanie
Williams.
	The trial court then held a joint death sentencing hearing. In
this case, the court concluded that defendant was eligible for the
death penalty, finding the presence of two statutory aggravating
factors: defendant was convicted of murdering two or more
individuals; and defendant murdered Fort with the intent to
prevent her from testifying in a criminal prosecution or giving
material assistance to the State. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3), (b)(8)
(West 1996). We note that the trial court also found defendant
eligible for the death penalty for the Williams murder.
	At the second stage of the joint death sentencing hearing, the
court considered evidence in aggravation and mitigation. In this
case, the court found: "[T]he aggravating factors presented are
not-are not overcome by the mitigating factors," i.e., that there
were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition
of the death penalty. The trial court accordingly sentenced
defendant to death on the Fort murder conviction. Regarding the
Lonnie Williams murder conviction, we note that the court found
that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors.
Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to a prison term of
natural life.
	At the hearing on posttrial motions in the two cases, defense
counsel informed the trial court that defendant had prepared a pro
se motion for the appointment of counsel other than the public
defender. The court directed counsel to proceed with his motions
for new trials and, afterwards, the court would consider
defendant's pro se motion for the appointment of other counsel.
The trial court then considered, and denied, defense counsel's
motions for new trials in this case and in case No. 97-CR-1779.
	Defendant's trial counsel then reminded the court that
defendant's pro se motion for other counsel was yet pending. In
response, the court stated:
			"As to the pro se motion, I am assuming that I would
allow the-I would be upon notice of appeal by-I assume
is going to be filed in this case, I would appoint the
state-appointment of state appellate defender, so there
would be an appointment of different counsel which is
which [sic] Mr. Moore is requesting."
The trial court next denied defense counsel's motion to reconsider
the death sentence imposed on the Fort murder conviction. The
following colloquy next occurred:
			"[Defense counsel]: Judge, Mr. Moore has asked
whether [sic] for a little clarification on the pro se motion.
That is granted as to-
			THE COURT: As to the Appellate-State Appellate
Defender. I'd ask that the public defender do file the
notice of appeal. At least as to the 1779, that is a life
sentence. So I believe that would go to the Appellate
Court as opposed to the Illinois Supreme Court. You can
file that.
			But upon filing that, the Appellate Defender would be
appointed as counsel. As to both cases.
			[Defense counsel]: Thank you, judge."
No further discussion was had, nor was any further action taken,
on defendant's pro se motion.
	The trial court then sentenced defendant on his nonmurder
convictions. In this case, for the aggravated unlawful restraint of
Fort, the trial court imposed a five-year prison term. Regarding
case No. 97-CR-1779, we note that the trial court sentenced
defendant to 30-year prison terms on the convictions for the armed
robbery of Lonnie Williams and the attempted murder of Melanie
Williams.
	Defendant appeals. Additional pertinent facts will be
discussed in the context of the issues presented.

ANALYSIS
	Defendant raises several issues for review. His first claim is
that the trial court erred in failing to consider his pro se posttrial
motion for appointment of counsel other than the public defender.
He asks us to remand the cause to the trial court for an appropriate
inquiry into his pro se posttrial motion. We address only this issue,
which is meritorious and dispositive.
	We note at the outset our standard of review. The State
contends that "the trial court properly exercised its discretion in
denying defendant's motion to substitute counsel in view of the
meritless nature of defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel." However, as we will explain, the trial court neither
"denied" defendant's pro se posttrial motion nor found the
allegations therein to be "meritless." Rather, the trial court
operated under the legal misapprehension that defendant's claim
could be resolved by appointment of different counsel on appeal.
A trial court must exercise its discretion within the bounds of the
law. A reviewing court determines a legal question independently
of the trial court's judgment. People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365,
369 (1999), quoting In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523, 526
(1996).
	During pretrial discovery, defendant repeatedly informed the
trial court that he did not want his appointed trial counsel, an
assistant public defender, to defend him. During an appearance on
April 21, 1997, the following colloquy occurred:
			"THE DEFENDANT: I don't want him defending me.
May I speak to the judge?
			THE COURT: You may if it doesn't concern the facts
of the case.
			THE DEFENDANT: I don't feel that he can defend me
in this case. He's not-he doesn't come to see me and he
don't talk to me like he trying to help me. He act like he
against me, and I don't feel that he can defend me in this
case. My case is too serious.
			THE COURT: I have had [the assistant public
defender] on several cases in this courtroom. He is a very
good attorney, from the top unit in the Public Defender's
Office, the Murder Task Force. I can only appoint the
Public Defender's Office, and that's where it's going to
stay. I'm sure he will speak to you."
Nine months later, defendant's concerns had not been allayed.
	On January 30, 1998, approximately one year prior to trial,
defendant informed the trial court that he wanted to file a written
motion for appointment of counsel other than the public defender.
The following colloquy ensued:
			"THE COURT: Well, I have appointed the public
defender and have Murder Task Force and they are
excellent attorneys. And I have had-I think [the assistant
public defender] is an excellent attorney. You have a right
to represent yourself but the only attorney I am appointing
on this case is the public defender, so if you do not wish-I
would speak with [the assistant public defender] but I'm
not going to appoint outside counsel.
			THE DEFENDANT: So I wouldn't need to file this
paper?
			THE COURT: You can file it so it's on the record, but
if it gets to that point it is needed for appeal."
In his written pro se motion, defendant alleged that his appointed
trial counsel: visited defendant in jail only a few times; failed to
file various pretrial motions or investigate the facts; and advised
defendant that his "first order of business was to effect the least
possible sentence through plea bargaining." The record does not
disclose any action taken by the trial court on defendant's pro se
motion.
	As earlier stated, defendant prepared a pro se posttrial motion
for appointment of counsel other than the public defender. As with
his first motion, defendant's posttrial motion claimed that "no line
of meaningful communication was established" between defendant
and trial counsel, whose "entire attitude" showed that counsel was
unconcerned with the defense of the case. Defendant repeated his
allegations contained in his first pro se motion. He also alleged
that trial counsel: wrongly advised defendant to waive a jury for
trial and for sentencing and not to testify on his own behalf at trial;
and failed to adequately cross-examine the State's witnesses where
their testimony conflicted with police reports. Defendant also
complained that the trial court denied his first motion for
appointment of counsel other than the public defender "without a
hearing or giving any reason."
	We earlier quoted the entire discussion of record concerning
defendant's pro se posttrial motion. The trial court's sole response
to the motion was to appoint the State Appellate Defender as
defendant's counsel on appeal.
	In People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), the defendant's
trial counsel failed to contact an alibi witness or to present an alibi
defense at trial. The defendant raised a pro se posttrial challenge
to his attorney's competence at trial. The parties agreed that the
trial court should have appointed counsel, other than his originally
appointed counsel, to represent defendant at the posttrial hearing
regarding his claim of ineffective assistance. This court remanded
the matter for a new hearing on the defendant's motion with newly
appointed counsel. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d  at 187-89.
	In interpreting Krankel, the following rule developed. New
counsel is not automatically required in every case in which a
defendant presents a pro se posttrial motion alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel. Rather, when a defendant presents a pro se
posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court
should first examine the factual basis of the defendant's claim. If
the trial court determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains
only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint
new counsel and may deny the pro se motion. However, if the
allegations show possible neglect of the case, new counsel should
be appointed. People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 230 (2000);
People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 210 (1998); People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 199-200 (1996); People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82, 134
(1991) (and cases cited therein). The new counsel would then
represent the defendant at the hearing on the defendant's pro se
claim of ineffective assistance. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 200; Nitz,
143 Ill. 2d  at 134-35. The appointed counsel can independently
evaluate the defendant's claim and would avoid the conflict of
interest that trial counsel would experience if trial counsel had to
justify his or her actions contrary to defendant's position.
Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d  at 230; see generally 14B Ill. L. & Prac.
Criminal Law §578 (1999).
	The operative concern for the reviewing court is whether the
trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the defendant's pro
se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v.
Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97, 125 (1994). During this evaluation, some
interchange between the trial court and trial counsel regarding the
facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective
representation is permissible and usually necessary in assessing
what further action, if any, is warranted on a defendant's claim.
Trial counsel may simply answer questions and explain the facts
and circumstances surrounding the defendant's allegations. See
People v. Parsons, 222 Ill. App. 3d 823, 829 (1991); People v.
Jackson, 131 Ill. App. 3d 128, 139 (1985); see, e.g., Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 211. A brief discussion between the trial court and the
defendant may be sufficient. See, e.g., Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at
228-29; Munson, 171 Ill. 2d at 200-01; People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 252 (1991). Also, the trial court can base its evaluation of
the defendant's pro se allegations of ineffective assistance on its
knowledge of defense counsel's performance at trial and the
insufficiency of the defendant's allegations on their face. People
v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453, 466 (1996); Williams, 147 Ill. 2d  at 252-53.
	In this case, it is quite clear from the record that the trial court
was unaware of this rule. The trial court conducted no inquiry of
any sort into defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Indeed, the record does not show whether the trial court
ever read defendant's pro se posttrial motion. Rather, the court
apparently concluded that defendant's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel could be resolved by the appointment of
different counsel on appeal.
	The law requires the trial court to conduct some type of
inquiry into the underlying factual basis, if any, of a defendant's
pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. No such
investigation occurred in this case. Accordingly, we must remand
the cause to the trial court for that limited purpose.
	The State contends that defendant waived this issue when he
and his trial counsel "stood mutely and did nothing to request
further inquiry." This contention lacks merit. It would be
inappropriate for trial counsel to argue a motion that is predicated
on allegations of counsel's own incompetence. See Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d  at 135; see also People v. Pope, 284 Ill. App. 3d 330, 333
(1996); People v. Jameson, 155 Ill. App. 3d 650, 662-63 (1987).
Further, a pro se defendant is not required to do any more than
bring his or her claim to the trial court's attention, which the
defendant did in this case. See, e.g., People v. Giles, 261 Ill. App.
3d 833, 846-47 (1994); People v. Finley, 222 Ill. App. 3d 571,
576, 583-85 (1991). In any event, we note that trial counsel asked
the trial court to clarify its disposition of defendant's pro se
posttrial motion.
	The State continues: "Even, assuming, arguendo, that the trial
court should have considered defendant's motion more fully, the
meritless nature of defendant's claims would still remain." The
State reasons that "[t]he insubstantial nature of defendant's claims
would not have changed despite any procedural steps taken by the
trial court, therefore, any error was harmless."
	The State's contention misses the mark. Again, this is not a
question of whether the trial court should have considered
defendant's motion "more fully." Rather, the trial court did not
consider defendant's motion at all. "While defendant's claims may
be without merit, the trial court should have afforded the
defendant the opportunity to specify and support his complaints.
In short, the defendant's motion was precipitously and prematurely
denied." People v. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68, 86 (1993).
	A trial court's failure to appoint new counsel to argue a
defendant's pro se posttrial motion claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel can be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d  at 135. However, in Nitz, the trial court produced a record
that demonstrated the meritless nature of defendant's claims. Nitz,
143 Ill. 2d  at 135; see, e.g., Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d  at 230 ("The
record reveals that the trial court made a significant effort to
explore the matters that defendant raised in the motion"); Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 210-11 (noting that the trial court found defendant's
allegations to be spurious only after hearing from defendant and
his trial counsel); Towns, 174 Ill. 2d  at 465-66 (noting that trial
court not only considered and denied defendant's pro se posttrial
motion, but further allowed defendant to file amended motion,
which court considered and denied); Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 201
("The [trial] court made every effort to ascertain the nature and
substance of defendant's ineffectiveness claim"); People v. Byron,
164 Ill. 2d 279, 304-05 (1995) (noting that trial court heard
defendant describe in detail the factual basis of claim, and that the
court then concluded that defendant's claim was without merit);
Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d  at 125 ("the trial court made a significant
effort to explore the matters raised in defendant's motion");
Williams, 147 Ill. 2d  at 252-53 ("the trial court conducted a proper
examination of the factual bases for defendant's claims" and found
them to be meritless).
	In contrast, in the present case, no record at all was made on
defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore,
unlike the above-cited cases, it is simply not possible to conclude
that the trial court's failure to conduct an inquiry into those
allegations was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g.,
People v. Jackson, 243 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1036-37 (1993). "In the
absence of a ruling by the trial court on the defendant's pro se
post-trial motion, we decline to consider its merits ***." People
v. Jackson, 158 Ill. App. 3d 394, 401 (1987).
	Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing
to conduct the necessary preliminary examination as to the factual
basis of defendant's allegations against his appointed trial counsel.
"[W]e emphasize that we are not remanding for a full evidentiary
hearing and appointment of counsel on the issue of trial counsel's
incompetence." Parsons, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 831. Rather, we
remand the cause for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court
to conduct the required preliminary investigation. If the court
determines that the claim of ineffectiveness is spurious or pertains
only to trial strategy, the court may then deny the motion and leave
standing defendant's convictions and sentences. If the trial court
denies the motion, defendant may still appeal his assertion of
ineffective assistance of counsel along with his other assignments
of error. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d  at 189; see, e.g., People v. Bell, 197
Ill. App. 3d 613, 618-19 (1990); Jackson, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 401-02; Jameson, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 663.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we remand the cause to the circuit
court of Cook County for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Remanded with directions.
 
 
1.      1We took with the case defendant's motion to withdraw certain
sentencing issues. We now deny that motion as moot.