Case Title: Belding v. Demoulin

Citation: 2014 WI 8

Docket Number: 2012AP000829

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 8 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP829   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Ronald E. Belding, Jr. and Antoinette Belding, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Deeanna L. Demoulin, 
          Defendant, 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 346 Wis. 2d 160, 828 N.W.2d 890 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No: 2013 WI App 26  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 7, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 23, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
Rebecca Matoska-Mentink 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Claude J. Covelli and Boardman & Clark LLP, Madison, and oral 
argument by Claude J. Covelli. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellants, there was a brief by Gregory 
A. Pitts and Schoone, Leuck, Kelley, Pitts & Knurr, S.C., 
Racine, and oral argument by Gregory A. Pitts.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jesse B. Blocher, and 
Habush, Habush & Rottier S.C., Waukesha, and Kevin Lonergan and 
 
 
2 
Herrling Clark Law Firm, Ltd., Appleton, on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association for Justice, with oral argument by Kevin Lonergan.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Friedman, 
Katherine Stadler, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, on behalf 
of Wisconsin Insurance Alliance and the Property Casualty 
Insurers Association of America. 
 
 
 
2014 WI 8
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2012AP829 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV311) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Ronald E. Belding, Jr. and Antoinette Belding, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
 
 
v. 
 
Deeanna L. Demoulin,   
 
 
Defendant, 
 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner 
FILED 
 
FEB 7 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Petitioner, State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), seeks review of a 
published court of appeals decision that reversed a summary 
judgment that had been granted in State Farm's favor.1  Although 
the circuit court agreed with State Farm that the drive-other-
car 
exclusion 
precluded 
coverage, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
                                                 
 
1 Belding v. Demoulin, 2013 WI App 26, 346 Wis. 2d 160, 828 
N.W.2d 890 (reversing judgment of the circuit court for Kenosha 
County, S. Michael Wilk, J. presiding). 
No.  2012AP829    
 
2 
 
determined that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(d) (2009-10),2 which 
prohibited anti-stacking3 clauses, barred the drive-other-car 
exclusion State Farm sought to apply. 
¶2 
State Farm argues that the drive-other-car exclusion 
is enforceable because it is specifically authorized by Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(5)(j).  Contending that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) 
is clear on its face, State Farm asserts that the court of 
appeals erroneously interpreted the statute. 
¶3 
The error in State Farm's argument is that it focuses 
on subsection (5)(j) in isolation, ignoring the rest of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32. 
 
Instead, 
we 
review 
the 
drive-other-car 
exclusion permitted by Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) in context. We 
apply the test set forth in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(e) that 
harmonizes the exclusion with the prohibition on anti-stacking 
clauses in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(d).  This legislative test 
allows policies to contain coverage exclusions if they are not 
prohibited by Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6) or other law.   
                                                 
2   All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated.  We note that 
the current version of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(d) differs from the 
version at issue in this case.  After being in effect for two 
years, subsection (d) of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6) was repealed in 
2011.  Accordingly, the interpretation of that subsection in 
this opinion is of limited application.   
 
3 Stacking refers to a policyholder's ability to recover 
under multiple policies for the same loss when coverage under a 
single policy would be inadequate. Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. 
Segalla, 12 Couch on Insurance § 169:4 (3d ed. 1998); see also 
Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶117, 293 
Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216. 
No.  2012AP829    
 
3 
 
¶4 
Applying this legislative test, we conclude that 
pursuant to the prohibition on anti-stacking clauses in Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(6)(d), State Farm cannot use the drive-other-car 
exclusion in the Beldings' policy to prevent them from stacking 
the uninsured motorist coverage of up to three vehicles owned 
and insured by them.  This conclusion is supported by both our 
precedent and legislative history.  Additionally, we are guided 
by well-established canons of statutory construction. 
¶5 
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶6 
The relevant facts of this case are not in dispute.  
On January 13, 2010, Deeanna Demoulin (Demoulin) disobeyed a red 
traffic light and crashed into the Ford Ranger pickup truck that 
Ronald Belding, Jr., (Belding) was driving.  Belding sustained 
multiple injuries in the accident.  He alleged he incurred 
medical expenses, lost wages, and lost earning capacity due to 
his injuries.  His wife alleged that she suffered a loss of 
society and companionship, and shared in the pecuniary losses 
caused by Belding's injuries.   
¶7 
The Beldings had two separate policies with State Farm 
for which they paid separate premiums and had separate uninsured 
and underinsured motorist coverage.  Because Demoulin was 
uninsured, the Beldings sought to collect their damages from 
State Farm, which provided uninsured motorist coverage for their 
No.  2012AP829    
 
4 
 
Ford Ranger and their other vehicle, a Mercury Villager.4  After 
State Farm paid the Beldings $100,000, which was the maximum 
permitted under the Ford Ranger policy, the Beldings sought to 
collect their excess damages through the uninsured motorist 
coverage in their Mercury Villager policy.   
¶8 
The Mercury Villager policy contains a clause referred 
to as the "drive-other-car" exclusion.  Intended to address the 
problem of free riders, drive-other-car exclusions keep an 
insured from using insurance coverage of one car to provide 
coverage on another vehicle the insured owns but has not 
insured.  See Arnold P. Anderson, 1 Wisconsin Insurance Law, 
§ 3.72 (6th ed. 2010); Agnew v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
150 Wis. 2d 341, 350, 441 N.W.2d 222 (1989).   
¶9 
The drive-other-car provision in the Mercury Villager 
policy provides that: 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE: 
2. FOR AN INSURED WHO SUSTAINS BODILY INJURY RESULTING 
FROM THE USE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU OR ANY 
RESIDENT RELATIVE IF IT IS NOT YOUR CAR, A NEWLY 
ACQUIRED CAR, OR A TEMPORARY SUBSTITUTE CAR. . . .   
(Emphasis in original).  The policy defines "your car" as "the 
vehicle shown under 'YOUR CAR' on the Declarations Page."   The 
Declarations Page for the Mercury Villager policy lists only the 
Mercury Villager.  Because Mr. Belding was not driving the 
Mercury 
Villager 
when 
the 
accident 
occurred, 
State 
Farm 
                                                 
4 The Beldings also had a third policy covering their Toyota 
Corolla.  It is undisputed that the Corolla policy is 
inapplicable to the damages sought in this case.  
No.  2012AP829    
 
5 
 
determined that the drive-other-car exclusion in the Mercury 
Villager policy applied to bar his claim and precluded coverage.  
 
¶10 Thereafter, the Beldings filed suit in the circuit 
court against Demoulin and State Farm.  They sought to collect 
from State Farm compensatory damages in excess of the amounts 
previously paid under the Ford Ranger policy.  State Farm filed 
a motion for summary judgment.  It argued that the drive-other-
car exclusion, which was permitted by Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j), 
operated to exclude coverage under the Mercury Villager policy.  
In response, the Beldings asserted that the drive-other-car 
exclusion was not applicable because Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(d) 
prohibited anti-stacking clauses from applying to uninsured 
motorist coverage.  The circuit court determined that the drive-
other-car exclusion permitted by Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) was 
controlling and granted State Farm's motion.  
¶11 The court of appeals reversed.  Belding v. Demoulin, 
2013 WI App 26, 346 Wis. 2d 160, 828 N.W.2d 890.  Central to its 
analysis was an examination of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(e),5 which 
harmonizes the drive-other-car exclusion with the prohibition of 
anti-stacking clauses.  Accordingly, it applied that statute's 
two-step test to determine the applicability of the drive-other-
car exclusion in the Mercury Villager policy.  Id., ¶¶15, 16.   
¶12 The first step looks at whether the exclusion is 
prohibited by subsection (6), and the second step looks at 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(5)(e) provides: "A policy may 
provide for exclusions not prohibited by sub. (6) or other 
applicable law." 
No.  2012AP829    
 
6 
 
whether the exclusion is prohibited by any other law.  Id., ¶15.  
The court determined that the drive-other-car exclusion failed 
this test because it ran afoul of the anti-stacking prohibition 
in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(d).  Accordingly, it reversed the 
circuit court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case. 
II 
¶13 In this case we are asked to review the circuit 
court's grant of summary judgment.  We review grants of summary 
judgment independently, applying the same methodology employed 
by the circuit court.  Park Bank v. Westburg, 2013 WI 57, ¶36, 
348 Wis. 2d 409, 832 N.W.2d 539.  Summary judgment is 
appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and [] the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law."  Wis.  Stat. § 802.08(2). 
¶14 Here, there are no disputed facts.  The dispute is 
over whether an automobile insurance policy could prohibit 
stacking the coverage limits for uninsured motorist coverage 
during the time period when both Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) 
(permitting 
drive-other-car 
exclusions) 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(6)(d) 
(prohibiting 
anti-stacking 
clauses) 
were 
in 
effect.  To answer this question we must interpret those 
statutes as they apply to the insurance policy at issue.  
Statutory interpretation and the interpretation of an insurance 
policy present questions of law that this court reviews 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. 
Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶9, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258.  
No.  2012AP829    
 
7 
 
¶15 Statutory interpretation always begins with examining 
the statutory language at issue.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  We interpret statutory language "in the context in 
which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes."  Id., ¶46.   
 ¶16  When we are unable to discern the answer to our 
inquiry by an examination of the statutory language and its 
context, we can look to our prior case law.  It may illumine how 
we 
have 
previously 
interpreted 
or 
applied 
the 
statutory 
language.  See, e.g., State v. Robert K., 2005 WI 152, ¶30, 286 
Wis. 2d 143, 706 N.W.2d 257.  We also may turn to legislative 
history to ascertain the meaning of the statute.  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶51. 
¶17 Our consideration of a statute's language and context 
is guided by well-established canons of statutory construction. 
Statutory provisions dealing with the same matter should be read 
in harmony such that each has force and effect. Statutory 
interpretations that render provisions meaningless should be 
avoided.  See Madison Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Circuit Court, 2011 
WI 72, ¶101, 336 Wis. 2d 95, 800 N.W.2d 442; see also State v. 
Kruse, 101 Wis. 2d 387, 395, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981).  In the event 
of "a conflict between a general and a specific statute, the 
latter controls."  Emjay Inv. Co. v. Village of Germantown, 2011 
WI 31, ¶38, 333 Wis. 2d 252, 797 N.W.2d 844 (quoting Bornemann 
No.  2012AP829    
 
8 
 
v. City of New Berlin, 27 Wis. 2d 102, 111, 133 N.W.2d 328 
(1965). 
III 
¶18 
To provide context for our discussion, we begin with a 
brief history of the legislation governing stacking provisions 
in insurance policies.  Prior to 1995, Wisconsin courts 
disfavored limitations on stacking, including drive-other-car 
exclusions, and routinely struck them down.  As summed up by 
Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, 2000 WI 41, ¶19, 234 Wis. 2d 
587, 610 N.W.2d 467: 
[A] long line of cases held invalid uninsured motorist 
exclusions that served to prohibit the stacking of 
claims. 
Courts 
also 
invalidated 
exclusions 
that 
generally sought to limit uninsured motorist coverage. 
Cases invalidating the various "drive other car" 
exclusions relied on the broad purpose underlying 
uninsured motorist coverage and reasoned that such 
coverage 
is 
personal 
and 
portable 
"under 
all 
circumstances."  
(Citations omitted). 
¶19 The Legislature responded in 1995, by amending Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32 to include subsections (5)(f)-(5)(j),6 which 
                                                 
 
6 Those provisions provided: 
 
(f) A policy may provide that regardless of the number 
of 
policies 
involved, 
vehicles 
involved, 
persons 
covered, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown on the 
policy or premiums paid the limits for any coverage 
under the policy may not be added to the limits for 
similar coverage applying to other motor vehicles to 
determine the limit of insurance coverage available for 
bodily injury or death suffered by a person in any one 
accident. 
 
No.  2012AP829    
 
9 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(g) A policy may provide that the maximum amount of 
uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage available 
for bodily injury or death suffered by a person who was 
not using a motor vehicle at the time of an accident is 
the highest single limit of uninsured or underinsured 
motorist coverage, whichever is applicable, for any 
motor vehicle with respect to which the person is 
insured. 
 
(h) A policy may provide that the maximum amount of 
medical payments coverage available for bodily injury 
or death suffered by a person who was not using a motor 
vehicle at the time of an accident is the highest 
single limit of medical payments coverage for any motor 
vehicle with respect to which the person is insured. 
 
(i) A policy may provide that the limits under the 
policy for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage 
for bodily injury or death resulting from any one 
accident shall be reduced by any of the following that 
apply: 
 
1.  
Amounts paid by or on behalf of any person or 
organization that may be legally responsible for 
the bodily injury or death for which the payment 
is made. 
 
2.  
Amounts paid or payable under any worker's 
compensation law. 
 
3.  
Amounts paid or payable under any disability 
benefits laws. 
 
(j) A policy may provide that any coverage under the 
policy does not apply to a loss resulting from the use 
of a motor vehicle that meets all of the following 
conditions: 
 
1.  
Is owned by the named insured, or is owned by 
the named insured's spouse or a relative of the 
named insured if the spouse or relative resides 
in the same household as the named insured. 
 
2.  
Is not described in the policy under which 
the claim is made. 
 
No.  2012AP829    
 
10 
 
relate to the stacking of motor vehicle coverage and drive-
other-car exclusions.  Relevant here are subsection (5)(f), 
which specifically permitted insurers to include anti-stacking 
clauses, and subsection (5)(j) which allowed drive-other-car 
exclusions.  1995 Wis. Act 21, §4.   
¶20 The Legislature made additional amendments to Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32 in 2009.  2009 Wis. Act 28, §§ 3148-72.  It 
renumbered (5)(f) as (6)(d) and changed its language from a 
grant of permission for anti-stacking clauses to a prohibition 
on such clauses.  Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(d).   
¶21 The Legislature also sought to repeal subsection 
(5)(j) in the 2009 bill, however, that portion of the bill was 
vetoed by Governor Doyle.  He explained "I am vetoing this 
provision . . . because it may increase the costs of premiums, 
but I am retaining separate provisions . . . that allow the 
stacking of coverage limits for up to three vehicles owned by 
the insured."  Governor's Veto Message to 2009 Wis. Act 28, July 
6, 2009, at 39 (available at Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, WI). 
¶22 In 2011, the Legislature further amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32.  This time it repealed Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(d) and 
reinserted subsection (5)(f), restoring insurers' ability to 
include anti-stacking clauses.  2011 Wis. Act 14, § 23.   
                                                                                                                                                             
3.  
Is not covered under the terms of the policy 
as a newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5) (1995-96). 
No.  2012AP829    
 
11 
 
¶23 This case arose during the time period when both Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) (permitting drive-other-car exclusions) and 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(d) (prohibiting anti-stacking clauses) 
were in place.   
¶24 Our analysis begins with an examination of Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32, which governs motor vehicle insurance.  The statutory 
scheme provides for insurance clauses that are mandatory, 
prohibited, and permissive.  At issue here is the interplay 
between a prohibited insurance clause and a permissive insurance 
clause and how we are to resolve the conflict between the two. 
¶25 On one hand we have subsection (6)(d) that prohibits 
anti-stacking clauses and on the other hand we have subsection 
(5)(j) that permits drive-other-car exclusions.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 632.32(6)(d)(2009-10) sets forth the prohibition as follows: 
No policy may provide that, regardless of the number 
of 
policies 
involved, 
vehicles 
involved, 
persons 
covered, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown on 
the policy, or premiums paid, the limits for any  
uninsured motorist coverage or underinsured motorist 
coverage under the policy may not be added to the 
limits for similar coverage applying to other motor 
vehicles to determine the limit of insurance coverage 
available for bodily injury or death suffered by a 
person in any one accident except that a policy may 
limit the number of motor vehicles for which the 
limits for coverage may be added to 3 vehicles.  
(Emphasis supplied). 
In contrast, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j)7 provides a permissive 
exclusion: 
                                                 
7 Subsection (5)(j) has remained the same since the 1995 
amendments. 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) (2011-12). 
 
No.  2012AP829    
 
12 
 
A policy may provide that any coverage under the 
policy does not apply to a loss resulting from the use 
of a motor vehicle that meets all of the following 
conditions:  
1. Is owned by the named insured, or is owned by the 
named insured's spouse or a relative of the named 
insured if the spouse or relative resides in the same 
household as the named insured.  
2. Is not described in the policy under which the 
claim is made.  
3. Is not covered under the terms of the policy as a 
newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle. 
¶26 The language in subsection (6)(d) expressly prohibits 
insurers from using policy exclusions that would limit an 
insured's ability to add the uninsured or underinsured motorist 
coverage of up to three vehicles.  On its face, this conflicts 
with the language in subsection (5)(j) which permits an insurer 
to use a policy exclusion that would limit an insured's ability 
to combine that coverage with another policy.  See Welch v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 172, 176, 361 
N.W.2d 680 (1985) (concluding that a "'drive other car' 
exclusion serves to prohibit stacking of uninsured motorist 
benefits against the same insurer"). 
¶27 State Farm asserts that we need focus only on 
subsection (5)(j) that permits the drive-other-car exclusions 
and that such a focus should begin and end our inquiry.  It 
maintains that there is no conflict because the drive-other-car 
exclusion is a specifically permitted insurance clause and that 
the application of such a permitted clause results in the 
exclusion of coverage here.  
No.  2012AP829    
 
13 
 
¶28 Yet, subsection (5)(j) does not exist in isolation 
from the wider embraces of the statutory scheme.  It must be 
examined in context.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  As noted 
above, this case involves a conflict between prohibited and 
permissible clauses. 
 Our 
resolution 
of 
this 
conflict 
requires us to examine yet another subsection in the statutory 
scheme, (5)(e).   
¶29 In 1979 the Legislature enacted subsection (5)(e), 
which sets forth a two-part test that governs how we are to 
resolve conflicts between prohibited and permissive insurance 
clauses.  Our subsequent precedent has applied this two-part 
methodology.  Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(5)(e) states: "[a] policy 
may provide for exclusions not prohibited by sub. (6) or other 
applicable law."  We have previously determined that this 
language lays out a test for interpreting exclusions from 
coverage, requiring us to: 1) consider whether the disputed 
exclusion is prohibited by subsection (6), and if not, 2) 
consider if it is prohibited by any other applicable law.  
Blazekovic, 234 Wis. 2d 587, ¶¶12-13; Clark v. American Family 
Mut. Ins. Co., 218 Wis. 2d 169, 174, 577 N.W.2d 790 (1998).   
¶30 Application of this test is illustrated in Blazekovic, 
234 Wis. 2d 587, ¶19.  Similar to the situation here, that case 
involved a dispute over whether a drive-other-car exclusion was 
permissible.  Citing the test in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(e), we 
looked first to Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6) to see if the disputed 
exclusion 
fit 
the 
description 
of 
any 
of 
the 
enumerated 
provisions.  Id., ¶¶12-13.  Notably, at that time the anti-
No.  2012AP829    
 
14 
 
stacking prohibition in subsection (6)(d) did not exist.  
Because the exclusion did not fall within any of the enumerated 
prohibitions in subsection (6), we then turned our focus to 
whether the exclusion was prohibited by any other applicable 
law.  Id., ¶14.  We determined that the insurance policy 
exclusion at issue conflicted with the statutory requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j), and thus concluded that it was 
invalid.  Id., ¶42. 
¶31 State Farm asserts that the test in Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(e) is inapplicable to the exclusion at issue here.  
It argues that Blazekovic does not support the use of the test 
because the issue in that case was whether a drive-other-car 
exclusion met the requirements for drive-other-car exclusions in 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j).  It contends that the only reason 
that the Blazekovic court applied the test in subsection (5)(e) 
was because the exclusion at issue did not comply with Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(5)(j).   
¶32 This argument is unavailing.  In Blazekovic we looked 
first at whether the exclusion was prohibited under Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(6) before considering whether the requirements for 
drive-other-car exclusions in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) applied.  
234 Wis. 2d 587, ¶13.  The methodology employed by the 
Blazekovic court undercuts State Farm's argument that the test 
in subsection (5)(e) applied only because the exclusion at issue 
was inconsistent with the requirements in subsection (5)(j). 
¶33  State Farm additionally contends that because the 
drive-other-car exclusion here is expressly permitted by Wis. 
No.  2012AP829    
 
15 
 
Stat. § 632.32(5)(j), the exclusion does not need to be further 
authorized by Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(e).  This argument ignores 
well established canons of statutory construction.  Where 
possible, statutory provisions dealing with the same subject 
matter should be interpreted "in a manner that harmonizes them 
in order to give each full force and effect."  Madison Metro. 
Sch. Dist., 336 Wis. 2d 95, ¶101 (quoting McDonough v. Dep't of 
Workforce Dev., 227 Wis. 2d 271, 279-80, 595 N.W.2d 686 (1999)).  
Further, "[a] construction of a statute rendering a portion of 
it meaningless must be avoided."  Kruse, 101 Wis. 2d at 395.   
¶34  Here, applying the drive-other-car exclusion as 
suggested 
by 
State 
Farm 
would 
render 
meaningless 
both 
subsections (6)(d) and (5)(e).  In contrast, construing the 
prohibition 
on 
anti-stacking 
clauses 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(6)(d) 
as 
trumping 
the 
drive-other-car 
exclusion 
permitted by subsection (5)(j), gives meaning to all three 
subsections. 
¶35  Such a construction would not render subsection (5)(j) 
meaningless 
because 
the 
drive-other-car 
exclusion 
that 
subsection permits would still function in other circumstances.  
Subsection (6)(d) is of limited application.  It provides that 
no policy may prohibit stacking the uninsured or underinsured 
motorist coverage of up to three vehicles.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(6)(d).  The exclusion permitted by subsection (5)(j) 
still has force in that it would continue to apply to prevent 
the 
stacking 
of 
coverage 
on 
more 
than 
three 
vehicles.  
Additionally, 
because 
the 
limitations 
on 
anti-stacking 
No.  2012AP829    
 
16 
 
provisions in subsection (6)(d) apply only to uninsured and 
underinsured motorist coverage, the drive-other-car exclusion 
permitted by subsection (5)(j) continues to apply to other types 
of coverage. 
¶36  Importantly, construing the prohibition on anti-
stacking clauses in subsection (6)(d) as trumping the drive-
other-car exclusions permitted by subsection (5)(j), still 
allows subsection (5)(j) to function as it was intended.  The 
drive-other-car exclusion was meant to address what has been 
referred to as the "free rider" problem.   
Wisconsin courts have long recognized that the purpose 
of the drive other cars exclusion is to provide 
coverage to the insured when he or she has infrequent 
or casual use of a vehicle other than the one 
described in the policy, but to exclude coverage of a 
vehicle that the insured owns or frequently uses for   
which no premium has been paid.    
Westphal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 WI App 170, ¶11, 266 
Wis. 2d 569, 669 N.W.2d 166 (citations omitted); see also Agnew 
v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Wis. 2d 341, 350, 441 
N.W.2d 222 (1989) ("the purpose of the drive-other-car provision 
is to prevent a policyholder from insuring all the cars in one 
household by taking out just one policy and paying only one 
premium"). 
¶37  Subsection (5)(j) can still operate to allow an 
exclusion that would prevent policyholders from using their 
uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage on one vehicle to 
provide coverage for another vehicle that the policyholders own 
but have not paid to insure.  Accordingly, applying the 
No.  2012AP829    
 
17 
 
prohibition on anti-stacking clauses in subsection (6)(d) does 
not render subsection (5)(j) meaningless and still gives effect 
to the primary purpose of subsection (5)(j).   
¶38 Further support for our interpretation can be found in 
the 
legislative 
history. 
 
As 
discussed 
above, 
when 
the 
Legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 632.32 in 2009, it did not 
merely remove the permission for anti-stacking clauses in 
subsection (5)(f).  It also added anti-stacking clauses to the 
list of prohibited provisions under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6), and 
the Governor retained this portion of the bill.  The Legislature 
is presumed to have acted with the knowledge of this court's 
prior construction of (5)(e), prioritizing prohibitions over 
permissible clauses.  See Lang v. Lang, 161 Wis. 2d 210, 227, 
467 N.W.2d 772 (1991).  It is appropriate to presume the 
Governor is also fully informed when making amendments to 
legislation.  Accordingly, it appears that both the Legislature 
and Governor were aware of the conflict and intended for the 
prohibition on stacking clauses in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(d) to 
supersede any conflicting, permissible clause in Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(5). 
¶39  Our interpretation is also consistent with another 
canon of statutory construction: "One of the well-recognized 
canons of statutory construction is that, in event of a conflict 
between a general and a specific statute, the latter controls."  
Emjay Inv. Co., 333 Wis. 2d 252, ¶387 (quoting Bornemann, 27 
Wis. 2d at 111). 
No.  2012AP829    
 
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¶40  A comparison of the applications of subsections 
(6)(d) and (5)(j) reveals that subsection (6)(d) is more 
specific.  The drive-other-car exclusion permitted by Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(j) applies to "any coverage."  In contrast, the 
prohibition 
on 
anti-stacking 
provisions 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(6)(d) applies only to the uninsured and underinsured 
motorist coverage on up to three vehicles.  Thus, subsection 
(6)(d) controls because it is the more specific provision. 
IV 
¶41 Having set forth the test for determining the validity 
of insurance policy exclusions, we turn to the facts of this 
case.  Here, the Beldings had separate insurance policies for 
two vehicles, their Ford Ranger pickup truck and their Mercury 
Villager, and they paid two separate premiums.  After an 
accident with an uninsured motorist, State Farm paid the maximum 
amount under the Ford Ranger's uninsured motorist coverage.  The 
Beldings seek to apply the uninsured motorist coverage in their 
Mercury Villager policy to obtain compensation from State Farm 
for their damages in excess of the Ford Ranger policy's limit.  
They rely on the fact that anti-stacking clauses are prohibited 
by Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(d).  State Farm wants to use the 
drive-other-car exclusion in the Mercury Villager policy to deny 
coverage.  It relies on the fact that drive-other-car exclusions 
are permitted by Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j). 
¶42 To resolve the conflict between statutory language 
regarding permissible and prohibited exclusions, we turn to the 
test laid out in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(e).  First, we look to 
No.  2012AP829    
 
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see if the exclusion is prohibited under subsection (6).  If a 
prohibition applies, the exclusion is barred.  Second, if no 
prohibition in subsection (6) applies, then we look to see if 
any other law bars the exclusion.  If neither prevents the 
exclusion, it is permissible.  
¶43 Here, the inquiry stops after the first step of the 
test.  Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(6)(d) provides that no policy 
may prohibit the stacking of the uninsured or underinsured 
motorist coverage on up to three vehicles.  It states: 
No policy may provide that, regardless of the number 
of 
policies 
involved, 
vehicles 
involved, 
persons 
covered, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown on 
the policy, or premiums paid, the limits for any  
uninsured motorist coverage or underinsured motorist 
coverage under the policy may not be added to the 
limits for similar coverage applying to other motor 
vehicles to determine the limit of insurance coverage 
available for bodily injury or death suffered by a 
person in any one accident except that a policy may 
limit the number of motor vehicles for which the 
limits for coverage may be added to 3 vehicles. 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(d).  Thus, pursuant to the prohibition on 
anti-stacking clauses in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(d), State Farm 
could not use the drive-other-car exclusion to prevent the 
Beldings from stacking the uninsured motorist coverage in their 
Mercury Villager policy onto the uninsured motorist coverage in 
their Ford Ranger policy. 
V 
¶44 In sum, we review the drive-other-car exclusion 
permitted by Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) in context.  We apply the 
test set forth in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(e) that harmonizes the 
No.  2012AP829    
 
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exclusion with the prohibition on anti-stacking clauses in Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(6)(d).  This legislative test allows policies to 
contain coverage exclusions if they are not prohibited by Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(6) or other law.   
¶45 Applying this legislative test, we conclude that 
pursuant to the prohibition on anti-stacking clauses in Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(6)(d), State Farm cannot use the drive-other-car 
exclusion in the Mercury Villager policy to prevent the Beldings 
from stacking the uninsured motorist coverage of up to three 
vehicles owned and insured by them.  This conclusion is 
supported by both our precedent and by legislative history.  
Additionally, we are guided by well-established canons of 
statutory construction.   
¶46 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
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