Case Title: Oregon v. Delaney

Citation: 

Docket Number: S068908

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2022-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
554	
December 22, 2022	
No. 54
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
ANTHONY RANDALL DELANEY,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 17CR15134) (CA A165686) (SC S068908)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 5, 2022.
Andrew D. Robinson, Deputy Public Defender, Office of 
Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed 
the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs was 
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender.
Jonathan N. Schildt, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on 
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Walters, Chief Justice, and Balmer, Flynn, Duncan, 
Nelson, Garrett, Justices, and Linder, Senior Judge, Justice 
pro tempore.**
FLYNN, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of 
the circuit court are affirmed.
______________
	
*  On appeal from the Clackamas County Circuit Court, Michael C. Wetzel, 
Judge. 314 Or App 561, 498 P3d 315 (2021).
	
**  DeHoog, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Cite as 370 Or 554 (2022)	
555
556	
State v. Delaney
	
FLYNN, J.
	
Defendant appeals his convictions on multiple sex 
offenses arising from two separate incidents, each involving 
a different victim. He challenges the trial court’s refusal to 
sever the counts involving the first incident from the counts 
involving the second incident. At issue is the proper applica­
tion of ORS 132.560(3), which describes actions that a trial 
court “may order” when “it appears, upon motion, that the 
state or defendant is substantially prejudiced by a joinder of 
offenses” that otherwise satisfy the requirements for join­
ing multiple offenses. Defendant contends that the state’s 
pretrial description of the evidence that it expected to offer 
demonstrated that defendant would be substantially prej­
udiced by a joint trial, and he contends that the prejudice 
that he identified required the court to sever the counts. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, and we allowed 
review to address the type of showing that the legislature 
intended to require when it adopted the “substantially prej­
udiced” standard.
	
As we will explain, a defendant seeking severance 
under ORS 132.560(3) must identify a case-specific theory 
of substantial prejudice that is more than the prejudice 
that is inherent whenever joined charges allow the jury 
to hear that the defendant may have committed other bad 
acts. And whether a defendant has identified a case-specific 
theory that meets the “substantially prejudiced” standard 
is a question of law that the appellate court reviews with­
out deference to the trial court. Applying those standards, 
we conclude that defendant has failed to demonstrate that 
the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to sever. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
I.  FACTS
	
The state charged defendant with six sex offenses 
in a single indictment. The first three counts—first-degree 
rape (ORS 163.375), first-degree sexual abuse (ORS 163.427), 
and second-degree sexual abuse (ORS 163.425)—related to 
a 2014 incident involving M. The second three counts—first-
degree sodomy (ORS 163.405), first-degree sexual abuse, 
and second-degree sexual abuse—related to a 2016 incident 
Cite as 370 Or 554 (2022)	
557
involving L. Before trial, defendant moved to sever the 
charges related to each incident and corresponding victim, 
arguing under ORS 132.560(3) that joinder of the charges 
would cause substantial prejudice because the evidence of 
each incident would improperly influence the jury regarding 
the other.
	
The trial court held a hearing and asked the state 
to describe the facts of both incidents in the light most favor­
able to the state.1 The state first summarized the evidence 
that it expected to offer with respect to the 2014 incident 
involving M. The state explained that M met defendant 
through mutual friends and later contacted defendant 
so that defendant could help M sell her car. According to 
the state, M would testify that she went to a property in 
Estacada, where defendant kept a small trailer and a boat. 
M later accepted defendant’s suggestion that she take a nap 
in his boat and continued sleeping on the boat when defen­
dant told her that he was taking it out onto the river.
	
When M later woke up, her pants were down, and 
defendant was raping her. M did not react because she was 
afraid of defendant, and they were alone on the river. M pre­
tended to sleep until after defendant finished, and then M 
pretended to wake up. Defendant and M later returned to 
shore, and M did not have any other significant contact with 
defendant. M delayed reporting the incident for over two 
years. According to the state, M’s explanation for why she 
ultimately came forward was that she had “heard allegedly 
that he’s done similar things to other women.”
	
The state then summarized the evidence relating 
to L, including L’s expected testimony about defendant sex­
ually assaulting her in 2016. The state explained that L was 
acquainted with defendant and was walking alone when 
defendant pulled over and offered her a ride to her destina­
tion. When L accepted the ride, defendant instead drove L 
	
1  ORS 132.560 does not prescribe a procedure for trial courts to follow when 
considering a motion to sever joined charges. But the court’s instruction that the 
prosecutor describe the evidence that the state expected to present at trial in the 
light most favorable to the state was an effective way for the court in this case to 
assess defendant’s argument that he would be prejudiced by the joinder of multi­
ple charges. 
558	
State v. Delaney
to the property in Estacada after telling L that he needed 
to “go up there” and “do a few things.” Although L initially 
refused to go into the trailer, defendant told her that he 
would be at least an hour, and L agreed to wait inside defen­
dant’s trailer.
	
Later, defendant told L that he wanted her to per­
form oral sex. Defendant pointed a firearm at L and hit 
her in the head, and she acquiesced to performing oral sex. 
Afterward, defendant would not let L leave his trailer to go 
to the bathroom, which was outside, without supervising 
her. When defendant later fell asleep, L fled from the trailer, 
leaving behind her purse. She ran toward town until she 
encountered an older man and told him that she had just 
been sexually assaulted and needed to make a phone call. 
Either L or the man contacted the police that day, and L 
later provided a statement describing the assault. As part of 
L’s report, law enforcement took photographs of L’s injuries, 
which included a head injury and bruising on her arms.
	
Based on the state’s description of the evidence, 
defendant argued that he would be substantially prejudiced 
by the joinder of charges arising from the two incidents and 
that the court should exercise its discretion to sever the 
charges. Specifically, defendant argued that he would be 
prejudiced by “cross-pollination of prior bad acts, as motiva­
tion,” if each witness were to testify that she “came forward 
because [she] heard about all these prior bad acts that he 
did on these other women.” And he argued that the prejudice 
could not be adequately addressed by a jury instruction.
	
After defendant’s argument, the prosecutor con­
sulted police reports that described the previous statements 
made by M and L and offered more background “to clar­
ify just a couple things with regard to the facts.” The state 
then explained that the victims reported defendant’s con­
duct because they were concerned that defendant would 
harm other women in the future: “I mean, [M and L] do talk 
about the concerns that the defendant, you know, may do 
this again in the future. And so that is part of the reason 
that they came forward.” The prosecutor further explained 
that M had told law enforcement that she wanted to report 
defendant’s assault because she had heard that defendant 
Cite as 370 Or 554 (2022)	
559
was dating her friend and M was concerned that defendant 
might harm that friend.2
	
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to sever, 
and the case proceeded to trial. The trial testimony from M 
and L described the alleged attacks much as the prosecu­
tor’s summary had predicted, but neither witness testified 
that she had heard about defendant committing bad acts 
against other women.3 Ultimately, the jury found defendant 
guilty of all the charged offenses.
	
Defendant appealed, challenging the trial court’s 
denial of his motion to sever, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed in a written decision. State v. Delaney, 314 Or App 
561, 498 P3d 315 (2021). The court concluded that defendant 
was not substantially prejudiced, because the evidence of 
defendant’s conduct towards M and L “was sufficiently sim­
ple and distinct to mitigate the dangers created by a joint 
trial.” Id. at 571. In other words, the court concluded that, 
because the charges “arose from different incidents that 
occurred at different times and places and involved differ­
ent victims, the availability of proper jury instructions and 
limiting the state’s cross-examination would have cured any 
prejudice resulting from joinder.” Id. at 572 (internal quota­
tion marks omitted).
	
In his briefing to this court, defendant criticizes 
the Court of Appeals’ reliance on a “simple and distinct” 
evidence inquiry for denying severance, and he again 
argues that the predicted testimony about defendant’s 
	
2  As described below, the parties disagree on the significance of the state’s 
“clarification.” The state argues that the prosecutor was correcting a previous 
misstatement and clarifying that M came forward because of a prospective con­
cern that defendant would harm other women in the future. Defendant disagrees 
and argues that the state was providing additional information rather than cor­
recting a prior misstatement. 
	
3  The Court of Appeals observed, and we agree, that the state’s description 
of the evidence referred only to M having come forward because she “heard” that 
defendant had harmed other women. State v. Delaney, 314 Or App 561, 571, 498 
P3d 315 (2021). We also note that the state’s description of both victims’ testi­
mony included a reference to being afraid of defendant because they had heard 
that defendant was “scary” or “dangerous,” that he was involved in a gang, and 
that he always carried weapons with him. In this court, defendant argues only 
that he could have been prejudiced from M testifying that she was motivated by 
an awareness of prior bad acts against other women, and we limit our analysis to 
that theory. 
560	
State v. Delaney
reputation for sexual violence was so prejudicial that the 
trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to 

sever.
II.  ANALYSIS
	
The rules for joinder in Oregon are governed by 
statute. ORS 132.560 describes both the standard for join­
ing multiple charges in the same charging instrument and 
the requirement for granting relief despite proper joinder. In 
relevant part, ORS 132.560(1) provides:
	
“A charging instrument must charge but one offense, 
and in one form only, except that:
	
“* 
* 
* 
* 
*
	
“(b)  Two or more offenses may be charged in the same 
charging instrument in a separate count for each offense if 
the offenses charged are alleged to have been committed by 
the same person or persons and are:
	
“(A)  Of the same or similar character;
	
“(B)  Based on the same act or transaction; or
	
“(C)  Based on two or more acts or transactions con­
nected together or constituting parts of a common scheme 
or plan.”
And ORS 132.560(3) sets out severance or other relief from 
joinder:
	
“(3)  If it appears, upon motion, that the state or defen­
dant is substantially prejudiced by a joinder of offenses 
under subsection (1) or (2) of this section, the court may 
order an election or separate trials of counts or provide 
whatever other relief justice requires.”
	
Because there is no dispute that the charges against 
defendant were properly joined in the same indictment, our 
focus is on the severance provision set out in subsection (3), 
and ultimately on whether the trial court was required to 
grant defendant’s motion to sever the charges related to 
M from the charges related to L. That ultimate question, 
however, encompasses several component questions that we 
Cite as 370 Or 554 (2022)	
561
also must resolve. Most significantly, the parties disagree 
about the meaning of “substantial prejudice” and the cir­
cumstances under which a trial court is required to sever 
joined charges. Our resolution of that dispute, however, 
turns on additional questions about how a reviewing court 
determines whether that standard was met.
	
All of those disputes present questions of statu­
tory construction that we resolve by employing our well-
established analytical framework, as set out in PGE v. 
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 
(1993), and modified in State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 206 P3d 
1042 (2009). Under that framework, we examine the text and 
context of ORS 132.560, including our prior cases interpret­
ing that statute, and we consider legislative history to the 
extent that it aids the analysis—all with the goal of deter­
mining the intent of the legislature. See Gaines, 346 Or at 
171-72; State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 100, 261 P3d 1234 (2011) 
(“Our analysis of [the statute] is also informed by this court’s 
prior construction of that statute or its predecessors.”).
	
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that 
whether the joinder of multiple charges substantially preju­
dices a party is a question of law and, thus, that an appellate 
court reviews the question without deference to the determi­
nation of the trial court. We emphasize, however, that that 
legal question is a circumstance-dependent inquiry; that 
relevant circumstances can include whether joinder would 
permit a jury to hear otherwise-inadmissible evidence; and 
that case-specific circumstances may require severance 
even if the evidence of the joined charges is simple and 

distinct.
	
We also conclude that, in this case, the trial court 
did not err in rejecting defendant’s theory of substantial 
prejudice because the record permitted the court to infer 
that the state would not in fact offer the identified preju­
dicial evidence. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction 
is affirmed. The decision of the Court of Appeals is also 
affirmed, although we take this opportunity to clarify the 
role of a “simple and distinct” inquiry when an Oregon court 
considers a party’s claim of substantial prejudice caused by 
joinder of unrelated offenses.
562	
State v. Delaney
A.  Brief Overview of Oregon Joinder Law
	
Oregon law has permitted the joinder of certain 
offenses for indictment and trial since 1933.4 See State v. 
Warren, 364 Or 105, 117, 430 P3d 1036 (2018) (describing 
Or Laws 1933, ch 40, § 1; OCLA § 26-711 (1940), recodified 
at ORS 132.560 (1953), amended by Or Laws 1989, ch 842, 
§ 1, amended by Or Laws 1993, ch 278, § 1). But the modern 
joinder provisions at issue here are primarily the product of 
a 1989 amendment through House Bill (HB) 2251. Or Laws 
1989, ch 842, § 1. That amendment expanded the bases for 
joinder but also created a process for courts to address cases 
in which the joining of multiple charges caused prejudice to 
either party. Or Laws 1989, ch 842, § 1; see also Warren, 364 
Or at 125 (explaining that the “purpose of the 1989 amend­
ment was to expand the bases for joinder”). The legislature 
borrowed wording for the new provisions from the federal 
rules that govern the joinder of criminal offenses and relief 
from prejudicial joinder, FRCrP 8(a)5 and FRCrP 14.6 See 
Exhibit R, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 2251, Jan 14, 
1989 (a staff measure summary indicating that “HB 2251 
would bring Oregon law into conformance with Rule 8 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which allows joinder of 
	
4  Until then, Oregon law included a complete prohibition on the joinder of 
charges and allowed the state to charge the defendant with only one crime in 
the indictment, “except that where the crime may be committed by the use of 
different means, the indictment may allege the means in the alternative.” See 
General Laws of Oregon, Crim Code, ch VIII, title I, § 72, p 350 (Deady & Lane 
1843-1872); The Codes and General Laws of Oregon, ch VIII, title I, § 1273 (Hill 
1887); The Codes and Statutes of Oregon, title XVIII, ch VIII, § 1308 (Bellinger 
& Cotton 1901); Lord’s Oregon Laws, title XVIII, ch VII, § 1442 (1910); Oregon 
Laws, title XVIII, ch VII, § 1442 (1920); Oregon Code, title XIII, ch 7, § 13-708 
(1930).
	
5  FRCrP 8(a) (1989) provided:
“Joinder of Offenses. Two or more offenses may be charged in the same 
indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses 
charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or sim­
ilar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more 
acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common 
scheme or plan.” 
	
6  FRCrP 14 (1989) provided: 
“Relief from Prejudicial Joinder. If it appears that a defendant or the govern­
ment is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment 
or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an 
election or separate trials or counts, grant a severance of defendants or pro­
vide whatever other relief justice requires.” 
Cite as 370 Or 554 (2022)	
563
offenses”); Exhibit LL, Senate Committee on Judiciary, HB 
2251, June 7, 1989 (same).
	
Ten years later, the legislature amended ORS 
132.560 again, changing “prejudiced” to “substantially prej­
udiced.” Or Laws 1999, ch 1040, § 17. That amendment fol­
lowed this court’s decision in State v. Miller, 327 Or 622, 
969 P2d 1006 (1998), which the Oregon District Attorneys 
Association (ODAA) argued was confusing some trial courts 
about the threshold for what constituted “prejudice” that jus­
tified severance of joined charges. Tape Recording, Senate 
Committee on Judiciary, HB 3374, June 30, 1999, Tape 261, 
Side A (testimony of Marion County District Attorney Dale 
Penn, urging an amendment to “bring[ 
] in the term that 
the federal courts and the Court of Appeals have always 
interpreted this to say, and that is ‘substantial prejudice’ 
” 
because trial judges “in some counties” have read Miller and 
are “trying to sever in more cases”). And the 1999 legislative 
history again highlights an intent that Oregon joinder deci­
sions align with the federal decisions interpreting FRCrP 8 
and FRCrP 14. Id.
B.  Whether a party is “substantially prejudiced” by joinder 
is a legal determination.
	
Although the state contends that we should review 
the denial of a motion to sever for abuse of discretion, we have 
previously held otherwise. In Miller, this court explained 
that evaluating a motion to sever under ORS 132.560(3) 
involves two distinct inquiries: (1) “whether the facts stated 
in the motion show the existence of prejudice”; and (2) if so, 
“the appropriate form of relief.” 327 Or at 629. We concluded 
that the first inquiry “is a legal determination that is sub­
ject to appellate review for errors of law,” while the second 
“is a choice that the statute commits to the trial court’s dis­
cretion.” Id.
	
The state acknowledges that holding in Miller but 
invites us to reconsider whether the determination of sub­
stantial prejudice under ORS 132.560(3) should be a legal 
determination, in light of the amendments to that provision 
by the 1999 legislature. The state points to indications that 
the 1999 legislature intended to adopt the federal approach 
to review of motions to sever, which—according to the 
564	
State v. Delaney
state—involved reviewing determinations of prejudice for 
an abuse of discretion. For present purposes, we assume, 
without necessarily agreeing, that is a correct understand­
ing of the federal case law. Even so, we decline to disavow 
our conclusion in Miller for two reasons.
	
First, the text of the statute itself continues to sug­
gest that the legislature contemplated a two-step analyti­
cal process: The statute specifies that, “[i]f it appears” that 
a party “is substantially prejudiced,” then “the court may 
order” relief. ORS 132.560(3) (emphasis added). And because 
the legislature did not amend that wording when it changed 
“prejudiced” to “substantially prejudiced,” nothing in the 
1999 amendments alters our conclusion in Miller that the 
first inquiry is a legal determination. See Miller, 327 Or at 
628 (explaining that “[t]he statute does not indicate that the 
trial court’s determination about whether joinder of offenses 
causes prejudice is a discretionary choice”). Although the 
1999 legislature amended ORS 132.560 in response to this 
court’s decision in Miller, as described above, the legisla­
ture’s concern was with confusion in the trial courts about 
the “prejudice” threshold for severing joined charges. 370 
Or at 563 (quoting testimony of Dale Penn). Indeed, there 
was no testimony suggesting concern with Miller’s conclu­
sion that the prejudice inquiry is a legal determination; pro­
ponents of the measure expressly endorsed the holding of 
Miller as correct. See Tape Recording, Senate Committee on 
Judiciary, HB 3374, June 30, 1999, Tape 261, Side A (testi­
mony of Dale Penn, agreeing with this court’s holding “that 
severance was not appropriate; joinder was the right thing 
to do”).
	
Second, in multiple decisions since Miller, this court 
has continued to review the question of prejudice under 
ORS 132.560(3) as a question of law—including as recently 
as 2019. See State v. Taylor, 364 Or 364, 378, 434 P3d 331, 
cert den, ___ US ___, 140 S Ct 505 (2019) (explaining that 
“[w]e review for errors of law the trial court’s determination 
that the joinder will not result in substantial prejudice”); 
see also State v. Barone, 329 Or 210, 217, 986 P2d 5 (1999), 
cert den, 528 US 1086 (2000) (same); State v. Thompson, 
328 Or 248, 257, 971 P2d 879, cert den, 527 US 1042 (1999) 
(same). For those reasons, we decline to reconsider the 
Cite as 370 Or 554 (2022)	
565
standard by which we review substantial prejudice under 
ORS 132.560(3). See Farmers Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 350 Or 686, 
697-98, 261 P3d 1 (2011) (explaining that this court follows 
its prior constructions of a statute as a matter of stare deci­
sis and assumes that issues considered in those cases were 
correctly decided).
	
Thus, we adhere to our conclusion in Miller that 
we review as a matter of law the question of whether the 
harm that a party has identified from the joinder of multiple 
charges rises to the level of substantial prejudice. With that 
question resolved, we turn to the more complicated dispute 
regarding the kind of harm that will rise to the level of sub­
stantial prejudice.
C.  “Substantial Prejudice” Under ORS 132.560
	
Under ORS 132.560(3), severance of joined charges 
is permitted when it appears that a party is “substantially 
prejudiced” by joinder. Defendant argues that the defendant 
is “substantially prejudiced” by joinder when evidence of one 
unrelated charge may improperly influence the jury regard­
ing another charge, even when the evidence of each charge 
is so “simple and distinct” that the jury will not be confused. 
Defendant references Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines 
“prejudice” as “[d]amage or detriment to one’s legal rights or 
claims.” Black’s 1428 (11th ed 2019). Defendant then notes 
that the text of ORS 132.560(3) does not limit or qualify the 
kinds of “prejudice” that can justify severance. Accordingly, 
defendant argues, the legislature intended to permit sever­
ance when it appears that joinder would cause a defendant 
to suffer any kind of detriment to their defense at trial, if 
that detriment is substantial.
	
The state responds that the legislature intended to 
adopt the federal standards for joinder and severance, and it 
urges us to conclude that the legislature understood the fed­
eral standard to equate “prejudice” that requires the sever­
ance of joined charges with prejudice that impairs the defen­
dant’s right to a fair trial. The state emphasizes this court’s 
statement in Miller that “[t]he ‘prejudice’ standard in ORS 
132.560(3) demonstrates that the legislature intended to 
authorize the court to safeguard the parties from potential 
566	
State v. Delaney
injury or harm to their interests in a fair trial,” 327 Or at 
627 (emphasis omitted), which the state views as consistent 
with federal joinder law. The state adds that, under this 
court’s decisions, the defendant must identify case-specific 
prejudice that will result from joinder when moving to sever 
charges that were joined under ORS 132.560(1). And the 
state argues that, when evidence of multiple charges is suf­
ficiently “simple and distinct” to “allow the jury to compart­
mentalize the evidence of each offense,” the trial court does 
not err by denying the defendant’s motion to sever.
	
Both parties are correct in part. Our prior deci­
sions about ORS 132.560(3) and the extensive legislative 
history identify three key principles for evaluating whether 
the defendant was substantially prejudiced by the joinder of 
unrelated charges. First, claims of prejudice arising from 
joinder are evaluated on a “case-by-case” basis to determine 
whether the defendant has identified the kind of potential 
injury or harm that threatens the defendant’s interest in a 
fair trial. Miller, 327 Or at 627, 629. Second, to establish that 
the defendant was prejudiced by joinder, the defendant must 
articulate a case-specific theory of prejudice. Thompson, 328 
Or at 257. And third, the defendant’s theory must demon­
strate a degree of prejudice beyond the prejudice that is 
inherent to the joinder of unrelated charges. Miller, 327 Or 
at 634.
	
This court first considered a claim that the defen­
dant was prejudiced by joinder of charges in Miller, in which 
the defendant claimed that he was prejudiced by the joinder 
of multiple sex offenses involving two separate victims. 327 
Or at 625. In Miller, we explained that the statutory “prej­
udice” standard is intended to “safeguard the parties from 
potential injury or harm to their interests in a fair trial.” 
Id. at 627 (emphasis in original). Those interests include 
“the interest in a trial conducted efficiently, and in accor­
dance with all applicable laws,” and the interest “in a deci­
sion based on a dispassionate consideration of the evidence 
rather than bias, emotion, or other improper criteria.” Id. at 
627-28. But we rejected the state’s argument that we should 
construe the “prejudice” standard of former ORS 132.560(3) 
as a “substantial prejudice” standard. Id. at 628.
Cite as 370 Or 554 (2022)	
567
	
Applying those general standards, we concluded 
that the defendant had not established prejudice under 
the statute, and we rejected a definition of prejudice that 
is very similar to the standard that defendant urges us to 
apply in this case. The defendant in Miller argued that prej­
udice is inherent when unrelated violent crimes are joined 
if the evidence of the unrelated charges would not be cross-
admissible in separate trials. Id. at 625. The defendant also 
argued that he was prejudiced because he would testify 
in his own defense regarding some charges but might not 
testify regarding the other counts. Id. He further argued 
that this court “should conclude categorically that prejudice 
exists” under those circumstances. Id. at 629.
	
We rejected those arguments. Id. at 635. First, we 
rejected the defendant’s “categorical approach” to claims of 
prejudice resulting from the joinder of unrelated crimes and 
instead explained that the prejudice analysis “must flow 
from a case-by-case assessment” rather than a “one size fits 
all” approach. Id. at 629. In other words, and as pertinent 
to our inquiry here, we concluded that defendants cannot 
demonstrate, as a matter of law, that they are “prejudiced” 
solely on the basis that the joined charges are unrelated vio­
lent offenses or solely on the basis that evidence will be intro­
duced that would not be cross-admissible in separate trials.7 
We recognized that joinder of unrelated claims presents an 
inherent risk of prejudice. See id. at 634 (explaining that 
“there was at least some degree of danger that admitting 
evidence of [the] defendant’s multiple offenses in a joint trial 
	
7  Defendant understands Miller to stand for the proposition there is no “cog­
nizable prejudice” when the identified harm from joinder is “the admission of evi­
dence to prove one charge that would be inadmissible other-acts evidence under 
OEC 404(3) in a separate trial on another charge.” He understands the Court 
of Appeals also to have read Miller for the proposition stated above, citing six 
decisions including State v. Murphy, 307 Or App 844, 845, 478 P3d 1018 (2020), 
rev den, 368 Or 168 (2021), and State v. Dewhitt, 276 Or App 373, 386-87, 368 
P3d 373, rev den, 359 Or 667 (2016). We decline the invitation to disavow Miller 
because the proposition that is of concern to defendant is not found in Miller. 
Rather, we explained that “the trial court [had] correctly considered whether evi­
dence of defendant’s multiple criminal acts would be admissible in separate trials 
on the charged offenses,” because that “inquiry is probative, at least to some 
degree, of whether joinder causes prejudice to [the] defendant.” 327 Or at 631. 
To the extent that Court of Appeals’ decisions could be understood as suggesting 
that cross-admissibility is never cognizable prejudice, that suggestion is contrary 
to Miller. 
568	
State v. Delaney
would tempt the jury to decide the case on the basis of the 
defendant’s perceived propensity to commit crimes”). But we 
also noted that categorically allowing severance when the 
evidence of unrelated charges would not be cross-admissible 
in separate trials “would undermine the legislature’s policy 
choice to authorize joinder of unrelated charges for trial.” 

Id. at 632.
	
In Thompson and Barone, we reiterated that a suc­
cessful claim of prejudice under ORS 132.560(3) must iden­
tify prejudice based on the defendant’s case. In Thompson, 
we noted that the defendant “essentially argue[d] that the 
jury’s decision was not based on dispassionate consideration 
of the evidence.” 328 Or at 257. But because the defendant 
“[did] not support his claim of error with arguments based 
on the facts of his case,” we concluded that the “defendant 
ha[d] failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced, within the 
meaning of ORS 132.560(3).” Id.
	
We again rejected the defendant’s claim of preju­
dice in Barone because the defendant’s theory of prejudice 
was not case-specific. 329 Or at 217. Instead, the defendant 
argued that it was “obvious” that joinder of charges for sep­
arate murders was “highly inflammatory” and allowed the 
state to make the defendant look guilty because of other 
murders, rather than being “required to prove each case on 
its merits.” Id. In rejecting the defendant’s claim, we empha­
sized that such general arguments “could be made in any 
case in which charges are joined.” Id. Accordingly, we con­
cluded that “[a]bsent an argument of prejudice related to the 
specific facts of [the] case * 
* 
* [the] defendant [had] failed to 
demonstrate that he was prejudiced within the meaning of 
ORS 132.560(3).” Id.
	
Although Miller, Thompson, and Barone were all 
decided under the 1989 version of ORS 132.560(3), Taylor 
was not. In that more recent case, we again emphasized 
the requirement of a case-specific theory of prejudice. We 
explained that the defendant’s argument that “the jurors 
will convict a defendant based, not upon the evidence, but 
upon their perception of the defendant’s bad character,” was 
a general concern of prejudice and not specific to the defen­
dant’s case. 364 Or at 379. And because the defendant had 
Cite as 370 Or 554 (2022)	
569
not offered a case-specific theory of prejudice, we concluded 
that the defendant had failed to demonstrate that he was 
“substantially prejudiced” by joinder. Id.
	
The legislative history of ORS 132.560(3) further 
illuminates what kind of joinder-related detriment the leg­
islature intended would rise to the level of substantial prej­
udice and trigger a right to relief. As noted above, the legis­
lature amended ORS 132.560 through HB 2251 by adding 
language borrowed from FRCrP 8(a) and FRCrP 14. And it 
is undisputed that the purpose of the amendment was to 
adopt the federal approach to joinder. The legislative history 
of HB 2251 is replete with references to the intent to bring 
Oregon joinder law into conformance with federal law. See, 
e.g., Exhibit R, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 2251, 

Jan 14, 1989 (Staff Measure Summary); see also Warren, 
364 Or at 126 (agreeing with the state’s argument that “the 
legislature intended to adopt the substantive portion of the 
federal rules insofar as federal law had expanded the scope 
of what offenses may [be] joined in a single indictment” 
(brackets in original)).
	
The legislative history also includes a request from 
ODAA for the legislature to adopt, as legislative history, 
federal decisions interpreting the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to guide Oregon courts in interpreting ORS 
132.560.8 Exhibits H & I, House Committee on Judiciary, 
Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections, HB 2251, Jan 13, 

1989 (ODAA letter and memo); Tape Recording, House 
Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and 
Corrections, HB 2251, Jan 13, 1989, Tape 1, Side B (tes­
timony of Dale Penn). ODAA specifically referenced the 
	
8  The federal decisions referenced by ODAA in the legislative history are: 
United States v. Disla, 805 F2d 1340 (9th Cir 1986); United States v. Evans, 796 
F2d 264 (9th Cir 1986); United States v. Lewis, 787 F2d 1318, opinion amended 
on denial of reh’g, 798 F2d 1250 (9th Cir 1986); United States v. Roberts, 783 F2d 
767 (9th Cir 1985); United States v. Irvine, 756 F2d 708 (9th Cir 1985); United 
States v. Nolan, 700 F2d 479 (9th Cir), cert den, 462 US 1123 (1983); United States 
v. Anderson, 642 F2d 281 (9th Cir 1981); United States v. Armstrong, 621 F2d 
951 (9th Cir 1980); United States v. Reed, 620 F2d 709 (9th Cir), cert den, 449 US 
880 (1980); United States v. Bronco, 597 F2d 1300 (9th Cir 1979); United States v. 
Foutz, 540 F2d 733 (4th Cir 1976); United States v. Ragghianti, 527 F2d 586 (9th 
Cir 1975); United States v. Olson, 504 F2d 1222 (9th Cir 1974); Baker v. United 
States, 401 F2d 958 (DC Cir 1968); and Drew v. United States, 331 F2d 85 (DC Cir 
1964). 
570	
State v. Delaney
Ninth Circuit’s analysis of joinder law as a model for Oregon 
courts. Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, 
HB 2251, June 7, 1989, Tape 228, Side A (testimony of Dale 
Penn). And Chair Tom Mason explained that HB 2251 would 
adopt the federal interpretation of FRCrP 8 and FrCrP 14 
and referenced three decisions that had interpreted join­
der rules as examples of that approach.9 Tape Recording, 
House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime 
and Corrections, HB 2251, Jan 13, 1989, Tape 2, Side A.
	
The 1999 legislature reiterated that intent. As 
explained above, the 1999 legislature approved HB 3374, 
which, among other things, amended ORS 132.560(3) by 
changing “prejudiced” to “substantially prejudiced.” Or Laws 
1999, ch 1040, § 17. That change was requested by ODAA 
because our decision in Miller had contradicted prior Court 
of Appeals decisions that had relied on federal decisions and 
reviewed motions to sever pursuant to ORS 132.560(3) for 
“substantial prejudice.”10 Tape Recording, Senate Committee 
on Judiciary, HB 3374, June 29, 1999, Tape 261, Side A 
(testimony of Dale Penn). ODAA argued that by adopting 
the “substantial prejudice” standard, Oregon courts would 
interpret ORS 132.560 in conformity with federal decisions, 
as the Court of Appeals had. See id. (testimony of Dale 
Penn, explaining that “everything was going fine until the 
Miller case” because “the Court of Appeals reviewed cases 
and adopted [the] federal standards” as the legislature had 
intended and urging an amendment adopting “substantial 
prejudice” to “bring[ 
] in the term that the federal courts and 
the Court of Appeals” had used).11
	
9  Those cases are United States v. Weber, 437 F2d 327 (3rd Cir 1970), cert 
den, 402 US 392 (1971), Drew, 331 F2d 85, and Commonwealth v. Lasch, 464 Pa 
573, 347 A2d 690 (1975). 
	
10  See, e.g., State v. Meyer, 109 Or App 598, 604, 820 P2d 861 (1991), rev den, 
312 Or 677 (1992) (“Under [FRCrP] 14, a denial of severance is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion and, in order to prevail, a defendant must show substantial preju­
dice.” (Citing United States v. Werner, 620 F2d 922, 928 (2nd Cir 1980) (emphasis 
in original)). 
	
11  We note that the decisions cited by ODAA in the legislative history of 1989 
HB 2251 did not reference “substantial prejudice.” Of the 15 cases that ODAA 
requested that the legislature include in the legislative history, one case had 
referenced “untoward prejudice.” Foutz, 540 F2d at 737. Two cases had referred 
to “undue prejudice.” Lewis, 787 F2d at 1322; Olson, 504 F2d at 1224. Another 
two cases had asked whether joinder “sufficiently prejudiced” the defendant or 
Cite as 370 Or 554 (2022)	
571
	
By adopting the federal framework for analyzing 
claims of “prejudice” under FRCrP 14, the legislature would 
have understood that it had adopted certain key principles 
to assist Oregon courts. Those principles include the recog­
nition that joinder of charges presents an inherent risk of 
prejudice to the defendant, United States v. Reed, 620 F2d 
709, 712 (9th Cir), cert den, 449 US 880 (1980), but that the 
decision to permit joinder accepted that risk to some extent, 
because “joinder is the rule rather than the exception,” 
United States v. Armstrong, 621 F2d 951, 954 (9th Cir 1980).
	
In addition, as in Oregon, the federal courts had 
rejected categorical approaches to prejudice and instead 
evaluated claims of prejudice on a case-by-case basis. See 
United States v. Lewis, 787 F2d 1318, 1322, opinion amended 
on denial of reh’g, 798 F2d 1250 (9th Cir 1986) (rejecting 
per se rule of prejudice based on the cross-admissibility of 
evidence and instead embracing case-by-case approach). 
But, when the legislature adopted wording from the federal 
rules, federal courts had described at least three theories 
of prejudice that can justify severing charges. Exhibit I,
House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime 
and Corrections, HB 2251, Jan 13, 1989 (statement of Dale 
Penn). First, “the jury may confuse and cumulate the evi­
dence, and convict the defendant of one or both crimes when 
it would not convict [them] of either if it could keep the evi­
dence properly segregated”; second, “the defendant may be 
confounded in presenting defenses, as where [they] desire[ 
] 
to assert [their] privilege against self-incrimination with 
respect to one crime but not the other”; and third, “the jury 
may conclude that the defendant is guilty of one crime and 
then find [them] guilty of the other because of [their] crim­
inal disposition.”12 United States v. Foutz, 540 F2d 733, 736 
was “sufficiently prejudicial” to require severance. Anderson, 642 F2d at 285; 
Foutz, 540 F2d at 738. Three cases had considered whether joinder of charges 
was “manifestly prejudicial.” Lewis, 787 F2d at 1321; Irvine, 756 F2d at 712; 
Armstrong, 621 F2d at 954. It appears that the first reference to “substantial 
prejudice” in Oregon case law interpreting ORS 132.560(3) was in Meyer, 109 Or 
App at 604, where the Court of Appeals quoted Werner, 620 F2d at 928. 
	
12  Under the second theory of prejudice, the federal courts had concluded that 
the defendant must make “a convincing showing that he has both important tes­
timony to give concerning one count and [a] strong need to refrain from testifying 
on the other.” Armstrong, 621 F2d at 954. 
572	
State v. Delaney
(4th Cir 1976); see also United States v. Ragghianti, 527 F2d 
586, 587 (9th Cir 1975) (describing “three possible kinds of 
prejudice” that result from joinder of unrelated offenses as 
“(1) the jury may consider that the defendant must be bad 
to have been charged with so many things; (2) inadmissi­
ble proof of one offense may be admissible through a joined 
offense; and (3) the defendant may wish to testify on one 
count but not another” (citing Charles A. Wright, 1 Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 222, 437 (1969)).
	
The federal cases also identified circumstances 
under which joinder of multiple charges was so prejudicial 
that the trial court was required to sever. See, e.g., Armstrong, 
621 F2d at 954 (explaining that the moving party needed “to 
show that joinder was so manifestly prejudicial that it out­
weighed the dominant concern with judicial economy and 
compelled exercise of the court’s discretion to sever”); Lewis, 
787 F2d at 1321 (explaining that the court will reverse the 
denial of a motion to sever charges only when the prejudice 
was “of such magnitude that the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial was abridged”).
	
For example, multiple federal courts had held that 
severance was required because the evidence of some joined 
charges was much stronger than the evidence of other 
unrelated charges. See Ragghianti, 527 F2d at 587-88 (con­
cluding that severance was required where the evidence 
for one charge was insufficient to support a conviction and 
the trial court granted a post-verdict motion for acquittal 
on that charge); Lewis, 787 F2d at 1322-23 (concluding that 
severance was required where evidence of prior crimes was 
admissible for some but not all charges and the evidence 
of one joined charge was “sparse”); Foutz, 540 F2d at 739 
(explaining that, because the evidence of one charge was 
weaker than the other, there was a “strong likelihood that 
the jury found [the defendant] guilty of the second rob­
bery, and then concluded that since he had once robbed the 
bank, it was plausible that he had done so before”). From 
those federal decisions, the legislature would have under­
stood that the harm from introducing evidence of multiple 
bad acts could—under certain circumstances—contribute 
to prejudice so substantial that it required severance, even 
Cite as 370 Or 554 (2022)	
573
if the decision to allow joinder accepted that risk to some 

extent.
	
The federal decisions also provide guidance as to 
a key issue in this case—the relevance of a determination 
that the evidence regarding the joined charges is “simple 
and distinct.” As explained above, the Court of Appeals 
highlighted that consideration in concluding that defendant 
was not substantially prejudiced by the joining of charges 
here because the evidence of defendant’s conduct towards 
M and L “was sufficiently simple and distinct to mitigate 
the dangers created by a joint trial.” Delaney, 314 Or App 
at 571. In reaching that conclusion, it relied on earlier cases 
in which it had also highlighted the “simple and distinct” 
inquiry. See, e.g., State v. Cox, 272 Or App 390, 396-97, 359 
P3d 257 (2015) (describing the Court of Appeals’ “simple 
and distinct” inquiry). According to defendant, the Court of 
Appeals decisions have erroneously treated that consider­
ation as dispositive of whether a defendant is substantially 
prejudiced by the joinder of charges. Although the state con­
tends that defendant overstates the weight that the Court of 
Appeals has attributed to the “simple and distinct” inquiry, 
we share defendant’s concern that there is at least a risk of 
confusion.
	
We take this opportunity to clarify that a party 
may be substantially prejudiced by the joinder of charges 
even where evidence of the joined charges is “simple and dis­
tinct.” For one thing, there are categories of prejudice, which 
we understand the legislature to have recognized under 
ORS 132.560(3), where the prejudicial effect of the evidence 
will have little to do with whether it is “simple and distinct.” 
Although federal courts applying FRCrP 14 sometimes con­
sidered whether evidence was “simple and distinct,” they did 
so when considering harm based on the admission of evi­
dence that might not have been admissible in separate tri­
als, or in assessing whether such harm could be adequately 
addressed with a cautionary instruction. See Drew v. United 
States, 331 F2d 85, 91 (DC Cir 1964) (explaining that there 
was “no prejudicial effect from joinder when the evidence 
of each crime is simple and distinct, even though such evi­
dence might not have been admissible in separate trials”); 
574	
State v. Delaney
Reed, 620 F2d at 712 (concluding that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant’s motion 
to sever where the evidence was “separate and distinct” and 
the “court carefully instructed the jury that it should con­
sider each count separately and that it should segregate evi­
dence” and “provided the jury with separate forms of verdict 
for each count”).
	
As described above, however, when the legislature 
adopted federal joinder law, federal decisions had identi­
fied at least three theories of prejudice arising from joinder: 

(1) that the jury will confuse or cumulate the evidence; 

(2) that the defendant may be confounded in presenting con­
flicting defenses; and (3) that the jury will conclude that the 
defendant is guilty of one crime and therefore guilty of oth­
ers. Foutz, 540 F2d at 736. Although “simple and distinct” 
evidence may mitigate prejudice under the first theory, it 
often will have no bearing on the second and does little to 
address the third.
	
As the court in Foutz emphasized, even though the 
“simple and distinct” inquiry may mitigate concerns about 
confusing and cumulative evidence, it “does not address 
itself, however, to the graver mischief possible where the jury, 
while limiting its consideration of the evidence to the crime 
to which it relates, properly finds the defendant guilty of 
one crime but considers that finding probative of [the defen­
dant’s] guilt of another.” Foutz, 540 F2d at 738 n 5. In Foutz, 
the federal court concluded that the “simple and distinct” 
inquiry was inapplicable to the defendant’s case because the 
defendant’s theory of prejudice—that “the jury may conclude 
that the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find him 
guilty of the other because of his criminal disposition”—
could not be mitigated by “simple and distinct” evidence. 

Id. at 736, 738. In rejecting the government’s argument to 
the contrary, the court concluded that “[t]he reasons for the 
rule which the government invokes are largely inapplicable 
and the prejudice to the defendant, arising from the weak­
ness of the government’s one case and strength of the other, 
so marked that we cannot presume that the jury adhered to 
limiting instructions.” Id. at 738. We agree with the court 
in Foutz that there are circumstances in which case-specific 
Cite as 370 Or 554 (2022)	
575
prejudice caused by the admission of otherwise inadmissi­
ble propensity evidence is “substantially prejudicial” even if 
the evidence is simple and distinct.13 See State v. Skillicorn, 
367 Or 464, 478, 479 P3d 254 (2021) (explaining that char­
acter evidence can “(1) impair the opposing party’s ability 
to present its case; (2) distract and confuse the factfinder; 

(3) prejudice the factfinder against a person; and (4) result in 
verdicts based on erroneous assumptions”).
	
In sum, when the defendant moves to sever charges, 
the trial court must consider “whether the facts stated in 
the motion show the existence of prejudice” and, if so, “the 
appropriate form of relief.” Miller, 327 Or at 629. At a mini­
mum, that means that the theory of prejudice must describe 
more than the prejudice that is an inherent risk of joining 
charges. Id. at 634; see also Reed, 620 F2d at 712 (explaining 
that the “risks” of prejudice that the defendant identified 
“are present in any case in which there is joinder of even 
remotely similar offenses”). And that theory must describe 
prejudice related to the specific circumstances of the case. 
Taylor, 364 Or at 379; Barone, 329 Or at 217. Recognized 
theories of substantial prejudice include but are not limited 
to: (1) that the jury will confuse or cumulate the evidence; 
(2) that the defendant may be confounded in presenting con­
flicting defenses; and (3) that the jury will conclude that the 
defendant is guilty of one crime and therefore guilty of oth­
ers. Foutz, 540 F2d at 736.
	
On review of the denial of a motion to sever, the 
reviewing court must determine, as a matter of law, whether 
the defendant suffered substantial prejudice because of join­
der. Taylor, 364 Or at 378; Barone, 329 Or at 217. And we 
must review for an abuse of discretion any relief that the 
trial court provided or declined to provide to address the 
substantial prejudice. Miller, 327 Or at 629.
	
13  Although we find Foutz’s discussion of the “simple and distinct” inquiry 
persuasive, to the extent that Foutz could be understood as concluding that the 
defendant demonstrated prejudice solely on the basis that joint trials would 
result in the admission of evidence that would not be cross-admissible in separate 
trials, we emphasize that, in Oregon, categorically allowing severance when the 
evidence of unrelated charges would not be cross-admissible in separate trials 
“would undermine the legislature’s policy choice to authorize joinder of unrelated 
charges for trial.” Miller, 327 Or at 632. 
576	
State v. Delaney
D.  Defendant was not substantially prejudiced by joinder of 
the charges.
	
Having described the appropriate framework in 
reviewing a claim of substantial prejudice under ORS 
132.560(3), we now apply that framework. As explained 
above, defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
failing to recognize that the evidence the prosecutor ini­
tially described—predicted testimony that M came forward 
because she had “heard” that defendant had “done similar 
things to other women”—was “substantially prejudicial.” 
Defendant’s argument, however, relies on a view of the 
record that is in dispute. The state contends that the trial 
court could have understood that the state was not planning 
to offer the concerning testimony and further notes that, in 
fact, neither victim testified at trial that she had heard of 
defendant committing bad acts against other women.14 As 
explained below, we agree with the state that the trial court 
could have understood that the predicted evidence would 
not include the testimony that defendant had identified as 
substantially prejudicial.
	
As described above, after defendant argued that he 
would be substantially prejudiced by testimony about simi­
lar uncharged bad acts, the prosecutor told the court that he 
“want[ed] to clarify just a couple of things with regard to the 
facts.” He then consulted police reports and described the 
victim’s reported explanations for coming forward as more 
generalized “concerns that the defendant, you know, may do 
this again in the future.” He described M as explaining that, 
“if [she] can stop another woman” from being harmed by 
defendant, “then [she] wanted to do it.” He also explained 
that M had told law enforcement that she wanted to report 
defendant’s assault because she had heard that defendant 
was dating her friend and was concerned that defendant 
	
14  The Court of Appeals reasoned that its review was limited “to the state 
of the record at the time of the court’s ruling on the motion to sever.” Delaney, 
314 Or App at 562 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have never expressly 
addressed whether review of a motion to sever is limited to the record created 
at the time of the motion, but neither party challenges that standard applied by 
the Court of Appeals. And we decline to unilaterally take up the question in this 
case, in part because the answer would not impact our conclusion that defendant 
was not substantially prejudiced by joinder—the trial record as a whole confirms 
that the state did not introduce the concerning testimony. 
Cite as 370 Or 554 (2022)	
577
might harm that friend. But the prosecutor also described 
both victims as explaining that “[o]ne of the main reasons 
[for coming forward] is because of what he did to them.” 
Defendant did not respond to the “clarification” or offer an 
alternative theory of substantial prejudice.
	
Defendant now insists, however, that the prosecutor 
never expressly disavowed his earlier representation of M’s 
predicted testimony. In defendant’s view, the record of antic­
ipated prejudice from a joint trial must be understood as 
including testimony that M came forward because she had 
“heard” that defendant had “done similar things to other 
women.” And defendant’s argument that he demonstrated 
substantial prejudice depends on that view of the record.
	
But the prosecutor’s representations about the 
expected evidence can be understood in multiple ways. The 
question of whether the prosecutor was clarifying that he did 
not expect M to offer the concerning testimony was a prelim­
inary question that the trial court needed to answer before 
determining whether defendant would be substantially 
prejudiced by the expected testimony. In other contexts, 
we assume that the trial court resolved preliminary ques­
tions in the light most favorable to its legal ruling, and we 
accept the trial court’s resolution of a preliminary question 
if there is evidence to support it. See, e.g., State v. Turnidge 
(S059155), 359 Or 364, 404, 374 P3d 853 (2016), cert den, 137 
S Ct 665 (2017) (explaining that, in the motion to suppress 
context, this court is “bound” to view the record “in the light 
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling” with respect to 
preliminary questions about the historical circumstances); 
State v. Cunningham, 337 Or 528, 539-40, 99 P3d 271 (2004) 
(explaining that this court accepts “reasonable inferences 
and reasonable credibility choices that the trial court could 
have made” when reviewing the trial court’s resolution of 
preliminary factual questions in the admissible-evidence 
context). We are unwilling to apply a different standard of 
review to the dispositive preliminary question here.
	
In sum, the trial court did not err in rejecting defen­
dant’s theory of substantial prejudice because the record 
permitted the court to infer that the state would not in fact 
offer the identified prejudicial evidence. Because defendant 
578	
State v. Delaney
was not substantially prejudiced by joinder, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s 
motion to sever. Accordingly, we affirm.15
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judg­
ment of the circuit court are affirmed.
	
15  Defendant asks this court to adopt factors to guide the trial court in exer­
cising its discretion under ORS 132.560(3). Because we conclude that defendant 
was not substantially prejudiced by joinder of the charges, we decline to do so.