Case Title: In Interest of EWR

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-95-1

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-09-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
In Interest of EWR1995 WY 148902 P.2d 696Case Number: C-95-1Decided: 09/08/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Interest of EWR, a Minor:

 ELR, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming,

 Appellee (Plaintiff). 

Robert 
J. O'Neil of THE LEGAL CLINIC OF ROBERT J. O'NEIL, Gillette, for 
appellant.

William 
U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; and Barbara 
L. Boyer, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for 
appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The appellant 
appeals from his conviction for criminal contempt of court which resulted from 
his willful failure to attend and successfully complete parenting 
classes.

[¶2]  We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      The appellant 
presents these issues for our review:

I.

Did 
the trial Court have subject matter jurisdiction to order the defendant 
(appellant) to attend and successfully complete the parenting classes in 
question?

II.

In 
the context of a criminal contempt proceeding, is it the burden of the State of 
Wyoming to prove "willfulness" as an essential element of criminal contempt or 
is [it] the burden of the defendant (appellant) to prove a lack of 
willfulness?

III.

Did 
the State of Wyoming prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
(appellant) willfully failed to attend parenting classes?

FACTS

[¶4]      In September 
1993, a minor was adjudged as being guilty of committing a delinquent act. A 
dispositional hearing was held on September 30, 1993, to determine his fate. At 
that hearing, the district judge ordered the father, the appellant in this case, 
to "attend and successfully complete parenting classes as arranged by the 
Campbell County Juvenile Probation Office." The mother and her husband were also 
required to complete the parenting classes.

[¶5]      Even though a 
probation officer recommended specific parenting classes to the appellant, he 
did not attend any classes. On April 21, 1994, the probation officer sent a 
letter to the appellant in which she reminded him that he had not yet complied 
with the district court's order and that he had an obligation to attend the 
parenting classes. The appellant still did not attend the classes. On July 15, 
1994, an information was filed which charged the appellant with criminal 
contempt of court on the grounds that he had not complied with the district 
court's order. After holding a hearing on the charge, the district court found 
that the appellant was in criminal contempt of court. The district court 
sentenced the appellant to serve a term of thirty days in the county jail but 
suspended the jail sentence on the condition that the appellant would 
"immediately begin to and faithfully attend" the parenting classes. This appeal 
followed.

DISCUSSION

[¶6]      The criminal 
contempt action was initiated against the appellant under Wyoming's juvenile 
court statutes. On July 15, 1994, when the information was filed, WYO. STAT. § 
14-6-242 (1978) (amended 1995) provided: 

Any 
person who willfully violates, neglects or refuses to obey or perform any order 
or provision of this act is liable for contempt of court and may be fined not 
more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) or imprisoned in the county jail not 
more than ninety (90) days, or both.

The 
action was prosecuted as an indirect (constructive) criminal contempt of court 
action governed by W.R.Cr.P. 42(a)(2). A person commits indirect criminal 
contempt of court under W.R.Cr.P. 42(a)(2)(C) when, outside of the court's 
presence and personal knowledge, the person disobeys any lawful order of the 
court.

[¶7]      The appellant 
contends that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over 
this case because the order which required the appellant to attend parenting 
classes was not a lawful order. He argues that the order was not entered in 
compliance with WYO. STAT. § 14-6-229(f)(vii) (1993) (amended 1995), which 
provided:

(f) 
As a part of any order of disposition and the terms and conditions thereof, the 
court may:

. 
. . . .

(vii) 
Order the child, or his parent, or both, to undergo evaluation and indicated 
treatment or another program designed to rectify problems which contributed to 
the adjudication.

The 
appellant insists that the order did not comply with the statute since the 
district court had not ordered him to be evaluated before it required him to 
attend the parenting classes and since the district court did not specifically 
find that the parenting classes constituted a "program designed to rectify 
problems which contributed to the adjudication."

[¶8]      The appellant is 
mistaken when he argues that the district court did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over this case. In GN v. State (In re C.N.), 816 P.2d 1282 (Wyo. 
1991), we stated that, even though the district court did not, under the 
then-existing juvenile court statutes, have the statutory authority to require 
the parents to attend a counseling program without them giving their consent, it 
did have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the 
proceedings. 816 P.2d  at 1284. See also WYO. STAT. § 14-6-203(a)(iii) (1994). 
The same reasoning applies here. The district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over this case.

[¶9]      The real issue is 
whether the district court had the statutory authority to order the appellant to 
attend parenting classes and, more specifically, whether the district court 
followed the proper procedures in entering its order. We must interpret the 
language of § 14-6-229(f)(vii) as it appeared on July 15, 1994, in order to 
answer this question.

[¶10]   Determining the lawmakers' intent 
is our primary focus when we are interpreting statutes. Christensen v. 
Oedekoven, 888 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 1995). Initially, we make "`an inquiry 
respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to 
their arrangement and connection.'" Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming 
Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. 
Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819 (1897)). We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to each word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all 
parts of the statute in pari materia. Id.

[¶11]   The appellant contends that the 
language of § 14-6-229(f)(vii) as it existed on July 15, 1994, should have been 
read as requiring that an evaluation be made in every case before a child or a 
parent may be ordered to undergo treatment or a program which is designed to 
rectify problems. We do not concur in the appellant's interpretation of the 
statutory language. The plain language of the statute reveals that the 
Legislature gave the district courts authority to require that a parent or a 
child undergo an evaluation and indicated treatment or undergo another program 
which was designed to rectify the problems which contributed to the 
adjudication. The phrase "evaluation and indicated treatment" denotes a single 
course of action. While an evaluation may be imperative in some cases, in other 
instances an evaluation may not be necessary in order for the district court to 
determine that a certain program may be beneficial in solving the problems which 
resulted in the minor's delinquent behavior. In this case, the district court 
was aware that problems existed between the minor and his parents. The minor had 
a history of running away from his parents' homes when disputes occurred. 
Additionally, the appellant admitted that he was at a loss as to what to do when 
the minor refused to follow the household rules. The district court acted within 
its statutory authority in ordering the appellant to attend parenting classes 
without first directing that he be evaluated.

[¶12]   The appellant also contends that 
the district court's order was unlawful because the district court failed to 
specifically find that the parenting classes constituted a "program designed to 
rectify problems which contributed to the adjudication." Initially, we note that 
the statute does not require the district court to make that specific finding. 
Evidence was presented to the district court which established that the parents 
had problems with discipline and rule enforcement within their households and 
that these problems contributed to the commission of the delinquent act. Since 
the parenting classes addressed discipline and communication issues, the classes 
constituted a program which was designed to rectify the problems that 
contributed to the adjudication. The district court properly ordered the 
appellant to attend the classes.

[¶13]   Even if the district court's order 
had been unlawful, the appellant could not simply choose to ignore its 
provisions. Failure to comply with a court order, notwithstanding the fact that 
it may be erroneous, may be considered to be a contempt of court. See GN, 816 P.2d  at 1285; see also Leyba v. State, 882 P.2d 863, 865 (Wyo. 1994). The remedy 
which was available to the appellant was to appeal the order, not to make 
himself the judge of the validity of the order by his inactivity. GN, 816 P.2d  
at 1285.

[¶14]   In his second issue, the appellant 
questions whether the State had the burden of proving that he willfully violated 
the district court's order or whether the appellant had the burden of proving 
that his violation was not willful. This issue was precipitated by the district 
court's finding that, "when the State of Wyoming has shown the other necessary 
elements of criminal contempt of court in the above juvenile proceeding, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to show a lack of willfulness." We do not approve 
of the district court's decision to assign the burden of proof to the defendant 
for the "willfulness" element of the crime of criminal contempt under § 
14-6-242.

[¶15]   This Court has recognized that 
criminal contempt "is a crime in every fundamental respect." Skinner v. State, 
838 P.2d 715, 722 n. 5 (Wyo. 1992). The State carries the burden of proving that 
the accused is guilty by establishing every essential element of the crime. See 
Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 143 (Wyo. 1995). We indicated that the State must 
prove the requisite mental state in a criminal contempt case when we stated: 
"[C]riminal contempt necessarily implies an element of intent that must be 
proved before a contempt citation can be upheld." Horn v. District Court, Ninth 
Judicial District, 647 P.2d 1368, 1375 (Wyo. 1982). The State had the burden of 
proving that the appellant willfully disobeyed the district court's order which 
required him to attend parenting classes. Of course, the appellant had the right 
to present evidence to rebut the State's willfulness evidence. See Marquiss v. 
Marquiss, 837 P.2d 25 (Wyo. 1992). We conclude, however, that sufficient 
evidence supported the appellant's conviction.

[¶16]   This Court assesses whether all the 
evidence which was presented is adequate enough to form the basis for a 
reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder 
of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. 
Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 761 (Wyo. 1995). We will not substitute our 
judgment for that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our only duty is 
to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or 
even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually did. 
Id.

[¶17]   The district judge discussed the 
parenting classes with the appellant during the dispositional hearing. They 
discussed why the judge believed that parenting classes were warranted and how 
the times for the classes could be arranged so that the classes would fit into 
the appellant's work schedule.

[¶18]   The probation officer testified at 
the contempt hearing that she had recommended a particular series of parenting 
classes to the appellant. The probation officer stated, however, that she did 
not want the appellant to attend the classes during the same time when the 
mother and her husband were attending them. After the probation officer had 
determined that the mother and her husband were no longer attending the classes 
and that the appellant had not yet begun to attend the classes, she sent the 
April 21, 1994, letter to the appellant to remind him of his obligation to 
attend the classes.

[¶19]   The appellant contends that the 
State did not prove that he had received the letter or that it had been mailed 
to the correct address. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
State, we conclude that the district court could have reasonably inferred that 
the appellant received the letter and willfully failed to comply with the 
district court's order.

[¶20]   The appellant further contends that 
the State's evidence failed because the State did not show that sufficient 
classes were available to allow the appellant to complete the parenting classes 
between the date on which the letter was sent (April 21, 1994) and the date on 
which the information was filed against him (July 15, 1994). The evidence 
established that the parenting classes were taught in eight-week lesson plans 
and that a class met every Tuesday night, with a few exceptions. The parenting 
class teacher testified that the eight-week lesson plan was designed to be 
flexible so that people could "work it around their work schedules and family 
commitments." The appellant's claim would have more credibility if he had begun 
attending the classes before the State charged him with failing to successfully 
complete the classes. The evidence established that the appellant had not 
attended any classes and, consequently, proved that the appellant had failed to 
"attend and successfully complete" the parenting classes.

CONCLUSION

[¶21]   We hold that the district court had 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case and that sufficient evidence 
supported the appellant's conviction for criminal contempt of 
court.

[¶22]  Affirmed.