Case Title: Commonwealth v. Sallop

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11753

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-09-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11753 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  GEORGE SALLOP. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     March 5, 2015. - September 3, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Community Parole Supervision for Life.  
Constitutional Law, Sentence, Sex offender, Double 
jeopardy.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Double jeopardy. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 9, 2000. 
 
 
A motion to vacate a condition of probation, filed on April 
9, 2013, was considered by Diane M. Kottmyer, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Iris Alkalay for the defendant. 
 
Melissa Weisgold Johnsen, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In this appeal, we consider whether a newly 
restructured sentence imposed on a defendant after he has 
successfully moved to vacate community parole supervision for 
2 
 
life (CPSL) violates our double jeopardy doctrine.  We conclude 
that, where a defendant sentenced to committed time on a 
conviction is resentenced to a term of probation, the new 
sentence violates double jeopardy where the defendant already 
has completed the original sentence on that conviction before 
the resentencing.  But where the defendant has yet to complete 
the original sentence on a conviction, resentencing to a term of 
probation does not violate double jeopardy, provided that the 
total length of incarceration imposed on the defendant for that 
conviction is not increased.  Consequently, if the defendant's 
probation were to be revoked, the defendant may not be sentenced 
to a term of incarceration longer than the time remaining on his 
original uncompleted sentence. 
 
Background.  In 2002, the defendant, George Sallop, pleaded 
guilty to two indictments charging rape of a child with force 
(counts 1 and 2), one indictment charging assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon (count 3), one indictment charging 
open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior (count 4), and 
two indictments charging assault and battery (counts 5 and 6).  
He was sentenced to concurrent committed terms as follows: on 
counts 1 and 2, from ten to fifteen years in the State prison; 
on count 3, from nine to ten years in the State prison; on count 
4, from two to three years in the State prison; and on counts 5 
and 6, two and one-half years in the house of correction.  In 
3 
 
addition, on count 1, the defendant was sentenced to CPSL to be 
served from and after his release. 
 
After we held that the CPSL statute was unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to first-time sex offenders, Commonwealth v. 
Pagan, 445 Mass. 161, 162 (2005),1 the defendant moved to correct 
his sentences.  In 2009, after the defendant had served 
approximately eight years in prison,2 a different judge3 vacated 
the sentence of CPSL on count 1.  The judge also restructured 
the sentence by vacating the sentences of committed time on 
counts 3 and 4 and replacing those sentences with two concurrent 
terms of ten years of probation to run from and after the 
completion of his sentences on counts 1 and 2, with global 
positioning system (GPS) monitoring a condition of probation.  
At the time of his resentencing, the defendant had fully served 
his original sentence as to count 4 and had approximately two 
years remaining to the end date of his original sentence as to 
count 3. 
                     
 
1 We have since struck the community parole supervision for 
life (CPSL) statute in its entirety because it "violates our 
separation of powers doctrine, articulated in art. 30 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, by improperly delegating to 
the parole board, an entity of the executive branch, the 
exercise of the judicial power to impose sentences."  
Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 295 (2014). 
 
 
2 At the time of the original sentencing, Sallop received 
313 days of jail credit. 
 
 
3 The original sentencing judge had retired. 
 
4 
 
 
The defendant moved to vacate and correct the revised 
sentence, arguing that the GPS condition was improper.  That 
motion was denied.  The defendant again challenged the GPS 
condition, this time in a motion to vacate conditions of 
probation.  That motion was likewise denied.  A panel of the 
Appeals Court affirmed the denial in a decision pursuant to its 
rule 1:28.  See Commonwealth v. Sallop, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1123 
(2014). 
 
We granted the defendant's application for further 
appellate review, limited to an issue briefly addressed by the 
Appeals Court panel:  the "propriety of resentencing the 
defendant by imposing a term of probation to run from and after 
committed sentences that either had been fully served at the 
time of the resentencing or will have been fully served before 
the probationary term is due to begin."  Commonwealth v. Sallop, 
469 Mass. 1110 (2014).4  Although this was not an issue addressed 
in the order appealed from, we address it out of concern that an 
injustice might otherwise arise in these circumstances from a 
violation of double jeopardy. 
                     
 
4 As our limitation of the scope of further appellate review 
suggests, we are not reexamining the imposition of the probation 
condition of global positioning system (GPS) monitoring.  The 
order denying Sallop's motion to vacate that condition stands as 
affirmed by the Appeals Court. 
 
5 
 
 
Discussion.  The resentencing judge was not obligated 
merely to vacate the CPSL portion of the defendant's sentence, 
but was permitted to restructure the over-all sentence to 
provide a lengthy period of probation supervision in place of 
the parole supervision that would have been provided with CPSL, 
provided the sentence did not violate double jeopardy.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 310 (2014) ("The vacating 
of CPSL sentences permits the possibility of resentencing, 
except where barred by double jeopardy").  Under double jeopardy 
principles, the new sentence on a conviction must not "increase 
the 'aggregate punishment' imposed under the original sentence."  
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Cumming, 466 Mass. 467, 468 (2013).  
In particular, double jeopardy principles bar resentencing on 
any conviction for which the defendant has already fully served 
his sentence.  See Commonwealth v. Parrillo, 468 Mass. 318, 321-
322 (2014), citing Cumming, supra at 473-474 (remanding with 
instructions not to resentence defendant on convictions as to 
which sentence had been fully served); Cole, supra at 311 (where 
defendant already served original sentence, "any resentencing . 
. . necessarily would violate principles of double jeopardy").5  
                     
 
5 The Commonwealth, relying on Commonwealth v. Leggett, 82 
Mass. App. Ct. 730, 734-738 (2012), disputes this proposition, 
arguing that so long as the aggregate sentence arising from the 
sentencing scheme is not increased, a defendant has suffered no 
violation of double jeopardy even if he is resentenced on a 
conviction for which he has completed the original sentence.  
6 
 
The defendant, as noted, had fully served his original sentence 
as to count 4 when the resentencing judge vacated that sentence 
and replaced it with a ten-year term of probation.  This 
necessarily increased his sentence on that count, violating 
double jeopardy principles. 
 
As to count 3, the defendant had not fully served his 
original sentence at the time of resentencing; he had served 
approximately eight years on a sentence of from nine to ten 
years in prison.  Resentencing therefore did not necessarily 
increase the defendant's punishment on this count.  The 
resentencing judge, in her sound discretion, was permitted to 
impose a new sentence for count 3, so long as this did not 
otherwise violate double jeopardy principles.  See Parrillo, 468 
Mass. at 321; Cumming, 466 Mass. at 470-474 (upholding, with 
modification, imposition of ten years of probation in place of 
committed terms where original sentences were not completed at 
time of resentencing).  The practical effect of the resentencing 
judge's decision as to count 3 was to replace the unserved 
portion of the defendant's sentence -- approximately one to two 
years in the State prison -- with ten years of probation.  The 
                                                                  
However, as the Appeals Court more recently has recognized, "the 
breadth of [Leggett's] holding" is no longer governing law after 
Commonwealth v. Parrillo, 468 Mass. 318 (2014), Commonwealth v. 
Cole, 468 Mass. 294 (2014), and Commonwealth v. Cumming, 466 
Mass. 467 (2013), all issued after Leggett.  Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 814-815 (2015). 
 
7 
 
resentencing judge was within her discretion to determine that 
this was consistent with the original sentencing scheme and that 
it did not increase the defendant's punishment as to count 3. 
 
However, in Cumming, we recognized that the replacement of 
a CPSL sentence with a term of probation has the potential to 
increase the aggregate punishment imposed on a defendant if the 
defendant's probation were later revoked and the defendant were 
sentenced to a period of incarceration on that conviction that 
exceeds the time remaining on his original uncompleted sentence.6  
See Cumming, 466 Mass. at 473-474.  We noted that, whereas the 
statute prescribed certain limited periods of confinement for 
violating a condition of CPSL, see G. L. c. 127, §§ 133D (c), 
149, "a violation of the conditions of his probation might 
subject the defendant to incarceration for the maximum . . . 
sentence attributable to each of the underlying . . . offenses."  
Cumming, supra at 473.  To avoid increasing the defendant's 
punishment "in the peculiar circumstances of" Cumming, we ruled 
that "the maximum period of incarceration to which the defendant 
may be subject for violating a condition of his probation is the 
period of time between the defendant's resentencing . . . and 
the ten-year maximum period of confinement remaining under the 
six- to ten-year sentences originally imposed on the indictments 
                     
 
6 In its brief, the Commonwealth invites us to revisit this 
aspect of Cumming.  We decline to do so. 
 
8 
 
on which he was resentenced."  Id. at 474.  The same "peculiar 
circumstances" are present in this case.  Accordingly, the 
maximum period of incarceration to which the defendant may be 
subject for violating a condition of his probation on count 3 is 
the period of time between his resentencing on April 16, 2009, 
and the ten-year maximum period remaining under the nine- to 
ten-year sentence originally imposed on count 3. 
 
Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion to 
vacate the GPS condition of probation is affirmed for the 
reasons stated by the Appeals Court in its decision.  The case 
is remanded to the Superior Court for resentencing consistent 
with this opinion.  The original sentence on count 4, which the 
defendant has already fully served, shall be reinstated, and the 
probationary sentence on count 3 shall be amended to make clear 
that, if at any time during the probationary term the defendant 
violates his probation and his probation is revoked, he may not 
be sentenced to a term longer than the time remaining as of his 
resentencing on April 16, 2009, until the end date of his nine- 
to ten-year sentence originally imposed on count 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.