Case Title: Cavalier Manufacturing, Inc. v. Gant

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1080284

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2013-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 12/20/2013
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1080284
____________________
Cavalier Manufacturing, Inc.
v.
Janie Gant
Appeal from Wilcox Circuit Court
(CV-07-11)
STUART, Justice.1
This case was mistakenly placed on this Court's
1
administrative docket in September 2011 and was not assigned
to Justice Stuart until October 22, 2013.  We regret the delay
in the issuance of a decision in this appeal.
1080284
Cavalier Manufacturing, Inc. ("Cavalier"), appeals the
order of the Wilcox Circuit Court denying Cavalier's motion to
alter, amend, or vacate an arbitration award entered in favor
of Janie Gant.  We affirm.
I.
On March 25, 2003, Gant purchased a mobile home
manufactured by Cavalier ("the mobile home") from Demopolis
Home Center, L.L.C. ("DHC"), for $47,379.  At the time of
purchase, Gant and representatives of Cavalier and DHC
executed an alternative-dispute-resolution agreement in which
they agreed to arbitrate any disputes that might arise among
them stemming from Gant's purchase of the mobile home.  The
mobile home was also covered by a manufacturer's warranty
issued by Cavalier that likewise contained a provision
requiring Gant to submit to arbitration any disputes that
might arise between her and Cavalier relating to the mobile
home.  That warranty also generally provided, subject to
certain exclusions, that Cavalier would repair or replace any
defect in material or workmanship that became evident within
a 1-year period after purchase, so long as Cavalier was
2
1080284
provided with written notice of the defect within 15 days of
the expiration of the warranty period.
Gant was not satisfied with the manner in which DHC
delivered and installed the mobile home on her property. 
After she moved into the mobile home, she began noticing
various problems with it.  It is undisputed that Gant notified
DHC of those problems and that DHC made multiple efforts to
satisfy Gant; it is disputed whether Gant ever notified
Cavalier of her problems with the mobile home.  It appears
that contractors hired by DHC were able to remedy to Gant's
satisfaction some of the problems; however, on January 26,
2007, Gant sued Cavalier and DHC, asserting various fraud and
breach-of-warranty claims stemming from her purchase of the
allegedly defective mobile home.
On March 2, 2007, Cavalier moved the trial court to
dismiss Gant's complaint or, in the alternative, to compel
arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("the
FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., based on the alternative-dispute-
resolution agreement Gant had executed with Cavalier and DHC. 
On April 25, 2007, the trial court granted Cavalier's motion,
stayed the case, and ordered "the parties" to submit their
3
1080284
dispute to arbitration.  Gant thereafter initiated an
arbitration claim with the American Arbitration Association,
and the parties prepared their cases for arbitration.  On July
17 and 18, 2008, an arbitration hearing was held in Camden;
part of the proceedings included a tour of the mobile home,
which, for all that appears, Gant continued to live in.  On
October 17, 2008, the arbitrator issued an interim award in
favor of Gant, awarding her $45,550 on her breach-of-express-
warranty claim, plus an additional sum to be determined for
attorney fees based on Cavalier's and DHC's violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. ("the Magnuson-Moss Act").  See
Forest River, Inc. v. Posten, 847 So. 2d 957, 961 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2002) ("[Section] 2310(d)(2) of the Magnuson-Moss Act
authorizes the award of an attorney fee to prevailing
plaintiffs in warranty actions at the discretion of the trial
judge.").  In the award, the arbitrator made the following
findings of fact:
"The evidence, specifically including but not
limited to the arbitrator's view of [Gant's] home,
makes very clear that the mobile home was not set up
and/or finished properly.  For example, there are
substantial gaps between a number of the doors and
the home itself.  In addition, more than a
4
1080284
preponderance of the evidence shows that substantial
amounts of water came into the home via the ridge
cap.
"The evidence is overwhelming that the home has
sustained substantial damage caused by the presence
of water and/or water vapor inside the exterior
walls of the home.  The arbitrator's view of damage,
specifically including but not limited to seeing
rotted wood adjacent to the rear doors of the home,
was consistent with the testimony and report of
Michael Gurtler, one of [Gant's] experts.  Indeed,
at one point at the right side of the left rear door
(viewed from the inside) the arbitrator was
convinced that if he pushed harder with his finger,
he would put a hole through the floor.  The
arbitrator decided not to test his suspicion in the
interest of not making a bad situation worse.
"The suggestion offered that the water damage
near the rear doors was caused by water getting
beneath the exterior roofing near the ridge cap and
moving down between the interior and exterior roofs
is inconsistent with the evidence.  Although there
is some staining above the outside of the left rear
door (viewed now from the outside) consistent with
water having flowed from the space between the
roofs, there is no such staining above the other
rear door noted above, where the rotting appears to
be significantly greater.
"The ridge cap is curled and deformed along much
if not all of its length.  The suggestion offered by
one or another of the witnesses that the deformation
was caused by violent storms that passed through the
area is not persuasive.  If that were the cause, one
would expect other areas of the roof to have been
affected as well as the ridge cap, but the roof
other than the ridge cap appears largely undamaged. 
In 
short, 
physical 
facts 
support 
Gurtler's
determination that the attic is not sufficiently
5
1080284
well ventilated and that situation contributed to
the presence of water vapor in the home."
The arbitrator also explained the award in favor of Gant on
her breach-of-express-warranty claim as follows:
"[Gant's] claims include breach of express
warranty against Cavalier and [DHC].  It is
undisputed that Cavalier issues a warranty covering
every home it sells. ...  Cavalier contends that it
is entitled to judgment on [Gant's] claims under the
express warranty because she did not provide
Cavalier with the notice required under the warranty
and/or Alabama law prior to filing her complaint and
did not provide it with an opportunity to cure the
alleged defects prior to suit being filed.  With the
exception of a letter dated May 15, 2003, and an
inspection list with comments dated May 17, 2003,
both of which [Gant] signed, it is undisputed that
[Gant] did not communicate with any representative
of Cavalier. ...
"The evidence, specifically including the
testimonies of [Cavalier's service manager Jerry]
Dudley and Shawn Wilson, former manager of [DHC],
persuades the arbitrator that there existed a course
of dealing whereby [DHC] received complaints of
problems from customers to whom it had sold homes
built by Cavalier and that when those problems
related to warranty issues passed them on to
Cavalier who then took action.  The evidence
persuades the arbitrator that Cavalier took action
on warranty items related to [Gant's] home based on
that course of dealing without seeking written or
oral confirmation from her.  The arbitrator finds
that Cavalier waived the requirement for written
notice set out in its manufacturer's limited
warranty.  Because Cavalier waived its right to
notice 
of 
warranty 
claims 
from 
[Gant], 
the
arbitrator must deny Cavalier's opportunity to cure
argument.  The evidence is clear that [Gant]
6
1080284
complained to [DHC] of items covered by the
manufacturer's limited warranty and that several of
those items were not corrected.
"Cavalier's 
argument 
that 
[Gant] 
did 
not 
provide
notice of alleged defects identified by her experts
prior to filing this action is not persuasive.
[Gant] provided those reports shortly after the
investigations.  Moreover, many of the defects noted
were not knowable until completion of those
inspections."
(Footnotes omitted.)  Following the entry of the arbitrator's
interim award, Gant submitted evidence to the arbitrator
supporting her claim for attorney fees and Cavalier filed its
objections to that claim.
On December 1, 2008, DHC, out of an abundance of caution,
filed a premature notice of appeal to this Court seeking
review of the arbitrator's award; that appeal 
was 
subsequently
dismissed by this Court on DHC's motion after DHC indicated
that it had reached a settlement with Gant (case no.
1080283).   On December 30, 2008, Cavalier moved the trial
2
At that time, Rule 71B, Ala. R. Civ. P., which now
2
governs the time limits and procedure for appealing an
arbitration award, had not yet been adopted, and there was
some confusion regarding the procedure for seeking judicial
review of an arbitration award.  See, e.g., Horton Homes, Inc.
v. Shaner, 999 So. 2d 462, 464 (Ala. 2008), in which this
Court 
recognized 
that 
"'the 
procedure 
for 
obtaining
jurisdiction to review an arbitration award under § 6-6-15,
Ala. Code 1975, is far from clear.'" (Quoting Jenks v. Harris,
990 So. 2d 878, 882 (Ala. 2008).)
7
1080284
court to alter, amend, or vacate the arbitration award.  Gant
opposed the motion, and, on March 6, 2009, the trial court
denied Cavalier's motion.  
On March 17, 2009, the arbitrator entered his final
award, confirming the $45,550 award previously made to Gant
and also awarding an additional $72,732 in attorney fees and
expenses.  On April 16, 2009, Cavalier filed the arbitrator's
final award with the trial court and filed a new notice of
appeal.  On May 14, 2009, Cavalier moved the trial court to
alter, amend, or vacate the arbitrator's final award; Gant
thereafter filed a brief opposing Cavalier's motion.  On
August 4, 2009, the trial court denied Cavalier's motion, and
the case then proceeded on appeal in accordance with
Cavalier's April 16, 2009, notice of appeal.  See New Addition
Club, Inc. v. Vaughn, 903 So. 2d 68, 71 (Ala. 2004) ("Rule
4(a)(5), Ala. R. App. P., provides that a notice of appeal
filed before the disposition of all postjudgment 
motions 
shall
be held in abeyance until any remaining postjudgment motions
are disposed of.").3
DHC went out of business in October 2003 but remained
3
active in the litigation until it reached a settlement with
Gant after the arbitrator's award was entered.  It is not a
party to this appeal.
8
1080284
II.
Cavalier argues that the trial court erred by confirming
the arbitration award in favor of Gant and that, pursuant to
the FAA, the trial court's judgment confirming the award
should be reversed.
"In R.P. Industries, Inc. v. S & M Equipment
Co., 896 So. 2d 460 (2004), this Court reviewed the
trial court's order granting a motion to confirm an
arbitration award and denying the opposing party's
motion to vacate that award.  We stated:
"'"Where parties, as in this case,
have agreed that disputes should go to
arbitration, the role of the courts in
reviewing 
the 
arbitration 
award 
is 
limited. 
Transit 
Casualty 
Co. 
v. 
Trenwick
Reinsurance 
Co., 
659 
F. 
Supp. 
1346
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), affirmed, 841 F.2d 1117
(2d Cir. 1988); Saxis Steamship Co. v.
Multifacs International Traders, Inc., 375
F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1967).  On motions to
confirm or to vacate an award, it is not
the function of courts to agree or disagree
with the reasoning of the arbitrators. 
Application of States Marine Corp. of
Delaware, 127 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). 
Courts are only to ascertain whether there
exists one of the specific grounds for
vacation of an award.  Saxis Steamship Co. 
A court cannot set aside the arbitration
award just because it disagrees with it; a
policy allowing it to do so would undermine
the federal policy of encouraging the
settlement of disputes by arbitration. 
United 
Steelworkers 
of 
America 
v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960);
9
1080284
Virgin 
Islands 
Nursing 
Association's
Bargaining Unit v. Schneider, 668 F.2d 221
(3d Cir. 1981).  An award should be vacated
only where the party attacking the award
clearly establishes one of the grounds
specified [in 9 U.S.C. § 10].  Catz
American 
Co. 
v. 
Pearl 
Grange 
Fruit
Exchange, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 549 (S.D.N.Y.
1968)."'
"896 So. 2d at 464 (quoting Maxus, Inc. v. Sciacca,
598 So. 2d 1376, 1380-81 (Ala. 1992)).  The standard
by which an appellate court reviews a trial court's
order confirming an arbitration award under the
Federal Arbitration Act is that questions of law are
reviewed de novo and findings of fact are reviewed
only for clear error.  See Riccard v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2002)."
Hereford v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 13 So. 3d 375, 378 (Ala. 2009).
III.
Cavalier summarizes its argument to this Court as follows
in its brief:
"In summary, the arbitrator exceeded his
authority and/or was guilty of misconduct and/or
misbehavior under 9 U.S.C. § 10, and/or acted in
manifest disregard of the law for each of the
following reasons.  Each ground supplies an
independent basis to vacate the award of the
arbitrator.
"A.  The arbitrator imposed liability upon
Cavalier in the absence of the proper
notice required under the warranty, under
Alabama law, and under federal law.  The
arbitrator acknowledged that he was not
even suggesting Cavalier received proper
notice of Ms. Gant's warranty claims.
10
1080284
"B.  The arbitrator held Cavalier liable
for defects not reported to Cavalier within
the one-year warranty term.
"C.  The arbitrator imposed liability when
Cavalier had not been provided a reasonable
opportunity to cure.
"D.  The arbitrator ignored Alabama law in
finding that a 'course of dealing' existed
between Ms. Gant and Cavalier that excused
Ms. Gant from the requirements of notice
and an opportunity to cure within the
warranty term.
"E.  The arbitrator ignored Alabama law in
finding that there was a 'course of
performance' that altered the terms of the
warranty.
"F.  The arbitrator ignored Alabama law in
finding that Cavalier had waived the
requirements in the warranty when there was
no 
evidence 
that 
Cavalier 
ever
intentionally relinquished its right to
written notice from Ms. Gant.
"G.  The arbitrator ignored Alabama law and
held a savings clause, which was not
applicable to the case, was required to be
signed by Ms. Gant for Cavalier to enforce
the warranty.
"H. 
 
The 
arbitrator 
ignored 
well-
established federal preemption law and
imposed 
liability 
upon 
Cavalier 
for 
conduct
that was expressly permitted under federal
law.
"I.  The arbitrator entered an award of
damages when there was a complete lack of
any evidence of the alleged cost to repair
11
1080284
or replace the alleged defective attic and
plumbing ventilation.
"J.  The arbitrator ignored Alabama law and
entered an award of attorneys' fees and
costs to [Gant]."
Cavalier's brief, pp. 32-33 (emphasis in original; citations
to record omitted).
As an initial matter, we note that when Cavalier
discusses each of these individual grounds in further detail
in its brief, it frames each argument in terms of whether the
award returned by the arbitrator demonstrates a manifest
disregard of the law.  That is, with regard to each of the 10
grounds Cavalier has identified, Cavalier seeks to establish
that the relevant legal principles were well defined and were
called to the arbitrator's attention; yet, Cavalier argues,
the arbitrator nevertheless chose to ignore those identified
principles.  This  approach is essentially consistent with
those cases in which this Court has discussed manifest
disregard of the law as a basis for vacating an arbitration
award.  See, e.g., Jenks v. Harris, 990 So. 2d 878, 885 (Ala.
2008) ("Furthermore, 'a 
party 
seeking to vacate an arbitration
award on the basis of manifest disregard of the law must
establish that "(1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal
12
1080284
principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether,
and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined,
explicit, and clearly applicable to the case."'" (quoting
Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So. 2d 27, 50 (Ala. 2004),
quoting in turn Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197,
202 (2d Cir. 1998) (footnote omitted))).
Of course, in Hereford, this Court held that manifest
disregard of the law was no longer a valid basis for vacating
an arbitration award under the FAA, stating:
"Under the Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street
Associates[, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576
(2008)], ... manifest disregard of the law is no
longer an independent and proper basis under the
Federal Arbitration Act for vacating, modifying, or
correcting an arbitrator's award.  In light of the
fact that the Federal Arbitration Act is federal
law, and in light of the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution of the United States, Art. VI, we
hereby overrule our earlier statement in Birmingham
News that manifest disregard of the law is a ground
for 
vacating, 
modifying, 
or 
correcting 
an
arbitrator's award under the Federal Arbitration
Act, and we also overrule any such language in our
other cases construing federal arbitration law."
13 So. 3d at 380-81.  However, in a footnote we recognized
that the Supreme Court in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v.
Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), had not fully excised the
13
1080284
concept of manifest disregard of the law from the body of
arbitration law:
"The Supreme Court noted that the [first] use of
the phrase 'manifest disregard' in Wilko [v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953),] was particularly vague
and that it could have had several possible
meanings.  The Court surmised that the use of the
phrase 'manifest disregard,' instead of intending to
create 'a new ground for review,' may merely have
'referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather
than adding to them....  Or, as some courts have
thought, 
"manifest 
disregard" 
may 
have 
been
shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4), authorizing
vacatur when the arbitrators were "guilty of
misconduct" or "exceeded their powers."'  Hall
Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 585, 128 S.Ct. at
1404.  Relying on these latter two possible
meanings, some courts have held that 'manifest
disregard' survives as a judicial gloss on the
specific grounds for vacatur listed in § 10 of the
Federal Arbitration Act.  See Stolt-Nielsen SA v.
AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir.
2008) (citing with approval decisions of other
courts that have held that 'manifest disregard'
survives as a gloss on the § 10(a) grounds of the
Federal Arbitration Act).  We do not address whether
manifest disregard of the law remains as a judicial
gloss on the grounds specified in § 10(a) of the
Federal Arbitration Act or is merely 'shorthand for
§ 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4).'  We simply note that by
the express language of the Supreme Court of the
United States the text of the Federal Arbitration
Act 'compels a reading of the § 10 and § 11
categories [of relief] as exclusive.'  552 U.S. at
586, 128 S.Ct. at 1404."
13 So. 3d at 380 n. 1.  
14
1080284
Post-Hereford, this Court 
has 
consistently 
indicated that
courts must enforce awards entered in arbitration proceedings
conducted pursuant to the FAA unless the challenging party
establishes that vacatur is appropriate based on one of the
following grounds enumerated in § 10(a) of the FAA:
"1) where the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or undue means;
"2) where there was evident partiality or corruption
in the arbitrators, or either of them;
"3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct
in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced; or
"4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or
so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final,
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made."
See, e.g., Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Honea, 55 So. 3d
1161, 1166 (Ala. 2010), and Smallwood v. Holiday Dev., LLC, 38
So. 3d 718, 720 (Ala. 2009).  Cavalier now asks this Court to
adopt the viewpoint of courts such as the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in  Stolt-Nielsen SA v.
AnimalFeeds International Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir.
2008), cited in Hereford, and to use the two-part manifest-
15
1080284
disregard-of-the-law test used in cases such as Jenks and
Birmingham News as a mechanism to determine whether vacatur is
appropriate based on a § 10(a) ground.  Thus, Cavalier argues,
if there is evidence indicating that the arbitrator exhibited
a manifest disregard of the law, the resulting award is
necessarily the product of corruption, fraud, undue means,
partiality, misconduct, misbehavior, and/or the arbitrator's
exceeding his or her powers, and the award must accordingly be
vacated.
We decline Cavalier's invitation to give further life to
the concept of manifest disregard of the law.  The Supreme
Court of the United States has made it clear, and this Court
has recognized, that under the FAA the § 10 grounds are the
exclusive avenue for seeking vacatur of an arbitration award. 
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
stated in Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d
349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009), the effect of Hall Street Associates
is essentially that the phrase "manifest disregard of the
law," "as a term of legal art, is no longer useful in actions
to vacate arbitration awards."   We agree; the § 10 grounds
4
In an Alabama case, the United States Court of Appeals
4
for the Eleventh Circuit aligned itself with the Fifth
16
1080284
are sufficiently clear that it is unnecessary to view them
through a "manifest disregard" lens.  Thus, a party arguing to
this Court that a trial court erred in denying a motion to
vacate or modify an arbitration award must frame its arguments
by specific reference to the § 10 grounds.   See also Horton
5
Homes, Inc. v. Shaner, 999 So. 2d 462, 467 n. 2 (Ala. 2008)
("[A] party desiring judicial review of an arbitration award
Circuit's decision in Citigroup Global Markets.  See Frazier
v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir.
2010) ("We hold that our judicially-created bases for vacatur
are no longer valid in light of Hall Street.  In so holding,
we agree with the Fifth Circuit that the categorical language
of Hall Street compels such a conclusion.").  However, we
recognize that some other federal circuit courts have
continued to employ a manifest-disregard-of-the-law analysis,
considering it to be a shorthand way of encompassing some of
or all the § 10 grounds.  See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen (second
circuit), Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 Fed. Appx.
415 (6th Cir. 2008) (not selected for publication in the
Federal Reporter), and Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West
Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009).
Cavalier has also argued that the arbitration award
5
returned in favor of Gant should be vacated because, Cavalier
argues, the award is irrational, is contrary to public policy,
is arbitrary and capricious, and lacks any factual support. 
These arguments clearly have no relation to § 10, and we
accordingly grant them no consideration.  See Frazier, 604
F.3d at 1322-24 (holding that appellant's "additional
arguments that the [arbitration] award was arbitrary and
capricious [and] in violation of public policy" are no longer
valid in light of Hall Street Associates).
17
1080284
in a proceeding subject to the [FAA] is limited to arguments
based on those grounds enumerated in 9 U.S.C. § 10.").
In this case, Cavalier failed to make such specific
reference or argument, citing no caselaw in which this Court
has discussed arbitrator misconduct, misbehavior, or what it
means for an arbitrator to exceed his or her powers.  Rather,
Cavalier has essentially done exactly what the appellant in
Hereford did –– made solely a manifest-disregard-of-the-law
argument –– the one difference being that Cavalier prefaced
the substance of its argument by arguing that "'manifest
disregard of the law' is simply a shorthand expression for
'misconduct,' 'misbehavior,' and/or 'exceeded their powers.'" 
Cavalier's brief, p. 19.  The appellant in Hereford was
unsuccessful.  See Hereford, 13 So. 3d at 381 ("Hereford has
raised manifest disregard of the law as the only ground on
which she seeks to have the arbitrator's award vacated. 
Because manifest disregard of the law, by itself, is not a
valid ground for relief from the arbitrator's award and
because Hereford has not argued that this Court should vacate
the decision of the arbitrator on any of the grounds specified
in § 10(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act, she has not
18
1080284
demonstrated that she is entitled to relief from the trial
court's decision confirming the arbitrator's decision."). 
Cavalier is likewise unsuccessful because its general
assertion that the arbitrator exceeded his authority or was
guilty of misconduct or misbehavior is not supported by
citations to authority; rather, all of Cavalier's 
citations to
authority are dedicated to demonstrating that the arbitrator
failed to correctly apply the law and, in fact, exhibited a
manifest disregard of the law.  "'Where an appellant fails to
cite any authority for an argument, this Court may affirm the
judgment on those issues, for it is neither the Court's duty
nor its function to perform all the legal research for an
appellant.'"  Welch v. Hill, 608 So. 2d 727, 728 (Ala. 1992)
(quoting Sea Calm Shipping Co., S.A. v. Cooks, 565 So. 2d 212,
216 (Ala. 1990) (citations omitted)).  
We further note, however, that there is no misconduct,
misbehavior, or exceeding of powers by the arbitrator simply
because 
an 
arbitrator 
might 
have 
decided 
an 
issue
incorrectly.   With regard to misconduct and misbehavior, §
6
It is ultimately unnecessary for us to consider whether
6
the legal conclusions made by the arbitrator in this case were
correct, and we express no opinion on that point.
19
1080284
10(a)(3) of the FAA provides for vacatur of an arbitration
award  
"where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced ...." 
This context indicates that the misconduct and misbehavior
that merits a vacatur must relate to whether a party was
afforded a fundamentally fair hearing.  See, e.g., Robbins v.
Day, 954 F.2d 679, 685 (11th Cir. 1992) ("A federal court may
vacate an arbitrator's award under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) only if
the arbitrator's refusal to hear pertinent and material
evidence prejudices the rights of the parties and denies them
a fair hearing.").  There is no evidence indicating or even an
allegation in the instant case that Cavalier was not afforded
a full and fair arbitration hearing at which to present its
evidence and make its argument; § 10(a)(3) accordingly
provides no basis for vacating the arbitrator's award in favor
of Gant.
Moreover, in Birmingham News, this Court explained §
10(a)(4) and the exceeded-powers ground for vacatur of an
arbitration award, stating:
20
1080284
"In 
general, 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
'exceeded powers'
ground is described as follows:
"'We 
have 
consistently 
accorded 
the
narrowest 
reading 
to 
section 
10(d)
[currently section 10(a)(4)], especially
when it has been invoked in the context of
the 
arbitrators' 
alleged 
failure 
to
correctly decide a question which all
concede to have been properly submitted in
the first instance.  Our inquiry under §
10(a)(4) thus focuses on whether the
arbitrators had the power, based on the
parties' submissions or the arbitration
agreement, to reach a certain issue, not
whether the arbitrators correctly decided
that issue.'
"DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818,
824 (2nd Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)."
901 So. 2d at 47 (emphasis added).  The arbitration agreements
in this case were broadly written and, without dispute,
encompass the issues presented in this case.  We will not
conclude that an arbitrator exceeded his or her authority
simply because he or she may have decided an issue
incorrectly; accordingly, § 10(a)(4) provides no relief to
Cavalier in this case.
IV.
When Gant purchased the Cavalier mobile home from DHC,
the parties –– Gant, Cavalier, and DHC –– executed an
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agreement agreeing to arbitrate any disputes that arose
related to the transaction.  A dispute did arise and, pursuant
to that agreement, the dispute was submitted to arbitration,
at the conclusion of which an award was entered in favor of
Gant.  Cavalier subsequently sought judicial review of that
award, the gravamen of its argument being that the
arbitrator's conclusions were contrary to the applicable law. 
However, on motions to vacate an arbitration award, it is not
the function of courts to agree or disagree with the legal
reasoning of the arbitrator –– courts are to determine only
whether the party challenging the award has clearly
established that vacatur is justified by one of the grounds
specified in § 10 of the FAA.  Hereford, 13 So. 3d at 378. 
Cavalier has not done so.  Accordingly, the judgment of the
trial court is hereby affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.
Moore, C.J., concurs in the result.
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