Case Title: Scott v. Hall

Citation: 203 Kan. 331, 454 P.2d 449

Docket Number: 45,315

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1969-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
203 Kan. 331 (1969)
454 P.2d 449
WM. E. SCOTT, Appellee,
v.
CHARLES WILLIAM HALL, Appellant.
No. 45,315

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 17, 1969.
Frederick K. Cross, of Kansas City, argued the cause, and Felix G. Kancel, of Kansas City, was with him on the brief for appellant.
Donald W. Vasos, of Kansas City, argued the cause, and Wm. E. Scott and LaVone A. Daily, of Kansas City, were with him on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FATZER, J.:
The plaintiff, Wm. E. Scott, commenced this action against Charles William Hall, to recover a money judgment for legal services rendered in a Kansas divorce proceeding. The action is based upon the property settlement and divorce decree entered in the case entitled Charles William Hall, plaintiff, versus Betty Arlene Hall, defendant, Wyandotte district court, which settlement and decree were before this court in Woodring v. Hall, 200 Kan. *332 597, 438 P.2d 135. The plaintiff Scott was awarded judgment and the defendant Hall has appealed, and they are hereafter referred to as the plaintiff and defendant.
On December 1, 1966, the plaintiff, a member of the Bar of this state, filed his petition in the district court of Wyandotte County, which was in two counts. The first alleged the defendant's indebtedness based upon the plaintiff's representation of Mrs. Hall in the divorce action and of his negotiating a property settlement, contractual in nature, which provided that on April 17, 1962, the plaintiff was to receive as reasonable compensation for his professional services, the sum of $2,500. The second count alleged that on February 25, 1966, judgment was duly entered in the divorce action on matters concerning child custody and child support of the minor children of the Halls, wherein the defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of $500 as an additional attorney's fee for professional services rendered Mrs. Hall. The prayer was to recover the sum of $3,000 plus interest and costs.
The plaintiff's praecipe directed the clerk of the district court to issue summons returnable according to law to the sheriff of Harris County, Texas, for services upon the defendant at his residence at 4846 Creek Bend, Houston, Texas.
Summons for personal service outside the state of Kansas as authorized by K.S.A. 60-308, was issued by the clerk on December 8, 1966, and personal service thereof, together with a copy of the plaintiff's petition, was duly made upon the defendant by the sheriff of Harris County, Texas, at 1:00 p.m. on January 30, 1967, at the Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, and the sheriff's verified return of the service of summons was duly filed in the office of the clerk of the Wyandotte district court.
On March 2, 1967, the defendant entered his special appearance challenging the jurisdiction of the district court, and moved the court to quash and dismiss all writs and processes issued against him upon the ground that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and the person of the defendant, and that the summons was neither issued, served, nor returned in the manner provided by law.
On June 1, 1967, the district court, after hearing statements of counsel and examining the pleadings and documents in the court's file and briefs submitted, overruled the defendant's motion to dismiss the action for the reasons alleged.
Following the filing of the defendant's answer on June 27, 1967, which admitted all the allegations of the plaintiff's petition, except *333 the amounts alleged to be due, the plaintiff filed his motion for summary judgment on the ground there existed no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action.
On October 31, 1967, the district court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and those pertinent to this appeal are quoted in toto:
"FINDINGS OF FACT
"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The defendant principally contends the provisions of K.S.A. 60-308 may not be applied retroactively to a cause of action arising prior to its effective date of January 1, 1964, and that the district court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and person of the defendant to render a valid in personam judgment against him.
K.S.A. 60-308 (a) provides in effect that personal service of summons may be made upon any party outside the state, and if made upon a person domiciled in this state or upon a person who has submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, it shall have the force and effect of personal service of summons within this state. Subsection (b) relates to the process of submitting to jurisdiction, and the part here pertinent reads:
*336 As indicated, the property settlement and divorce decree which form the basis of this action, were before this court in the Woodring case, wherein Charles William Hall acknowledged in writing his indebtedness to Flora M. Woodring, the mother of Betty Arlene Hall, in the amount of $3,766.40 for money lent by Mrs. Woodring from December 1, 1952, through April 3, 1962, for living expenses for Hall's family while he was a student at Kansas University and the Medical Center in Wyandotte County, and the reader is referred to that opinion.
The property settlement and divorce decree awarded the plaintiff a judgment on April 17, 1962, for attorney's fee in the amount of $2,500, which specifically provided for its enforcement either as a judgment or as a contract. (Petty v. Petty, 147 Kan. 342, 353, 76 P.2d 850; French v. French, 171 Kan. 76, 81, 229 P.2d 1014.) The plaintiff elected to enforce the judgment as a contract and filed the present action against the defendant. That contract was an enforceable cause of action on January 1, 1964, when 60-308 became effective and the district court, in approving service of summons upon the defendant in the state of Texas, did not give the statute retroactive application. In the Woodring case it was held:
The problem of obtaining in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants was effectively remedied in Kansas by the enactment of 60-308. The entire concept of jurisdiction, and the antiquated rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565, were changed by Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, *337 90 L. Ed. 95, 66 S. Ct. 154, 161 A.L.R. 1057, from which 60-308 had its antecedent source. The matter was fully considered by this court in Tilley v. Keller Truck & Implement Corp., 200 Kan. 641, 438 P.2d 128, where it was held that the courts of Kansas may constitutionally render an in personam judgment against a nonresident defendant provided the defendant had the "minimum contacts" within the forum state. The point was also considered in the Woodring case, where it was held:
The facts involved in this action are not in dispute. The defendant and his former wife lived in marital relationship in Kansas until April 17, 1962. While a resident of Kansas and a student at the Kansas University Medical Center, he caused the divorce action to be filed in the district court of Wyandotte County. Just prior to the conclusion of the proceedings in that case, he entered into a contractual property settlement wherein he agreed to pay the plaintiff part of the attorney's fee in question. Shortly thereafter the defendant departed from the state of Kansas and acquired a Texas domicile where he has resided since 1962. However, his former wife and the children born to that marriage have continuously resided in the state of Kansas since that time. As indicated, living in marital relationship in Kansas forms an additional basis for in personam judgment against the leaving spouse as to all obligations arising for child support or property settlement as provided in Article 16, both of which are here involved. (60-308 [b] [6].)
Subsection (6) of 60-308 (b) is unique to Kansas procedural law and is not found in the procedural provisions of other states which have adopted the long-arm statutes. (Hopson, Divorce and Alimony *338 Under the New Code, 12 Kan. L. Rev., 27-37.) The subsection appears to be based upon wrongs committed in the marital relationship while the defendant was domiciled in Kansas, and personal service outside the state is sufficient to support a personal judgment with respect to all obligations mentioned therein, even though the defendant has acquired a domicile in another state. The subsection requires that the party to the marital relationship other than the leaving spouse, continue to reside in Kansas. (4 Vernon's, Kansas Statutes Annotated [Fowks, Harvey, Thomas], § 60-308, pp. 96, 97.) Hence, the plaintiff may enforce the contractual property settlement made in his favor since Mrs. Hall continues to reside in Kansas, and may likewise enforce the $500.00 additional attorney's fee ordered paid by the defendant on February 25, 1966, since its allowance arose out of proceedings with respect to child support, which is specifically enumerated in the subsection.
We have considered, not overlooked, the case of Mroczynski v. McGrath, 34 Ill. 2d 451, 216 N.E.2d 137, relied upon by the defendant. It is not in point. Illinois does not have a subsection similar to 60-308 (b) (6). (Smith-Hurd, Ill. Annot. Statutes, Ch. 110, § 17.) The case merely holds that the establishment of a marital domicile and the birth of a child in Illinois does not constitute the transaction of business within the meaning of the statute, and in an action brought by the incompetent son's conservator against a foreign executor of his father's estate to declare his will invalid, where the father had permanently left Illinois upon abandonment of his family over 25 years before his death, the trial court did not err in dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction. (Woodring v. Hall, supra, p. 608.)
The foregoing conclusion makes it unnecessary to discuss the plaintiff's contention that the defendant's activities constituted the "transaction of any business" as provided in 60-308 (b) (1).
The defendant makes no objection to the adequacy of notice of the pendency of the instant action. He was properly served with summons in Houston, Harris County, Texas, and his contention that his activities and conduct were not sufficient "minimum contacts" to give the court jurisdiction over his person under 60-308 (b) (6) cannot be sustained. Considering the matrimonial domicile of the Halls and the quality and nature of the defendant's activities, it may be said he invoked the benefits and protection of the laws of *339 this state, and we have no hesitancy in concluding the district court did not err in rendering the in personam judgment against him (60-308 [b] [6]), and that judgment is affirmed.