Case Title: True Christianity Evangelism v. Zaino

Citation: 2001-Ohio-295

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-03-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as True Christianity Evangelism v. Zaino, 91 Ohio St.3d 117, 2001-Ohio-
295.] 
 
 
 
TRUE CHRISTIANITY EVANGELISM, APPELLANT, v. ZAINO, TAX COMMR., 
APPELLEE. 
[Cite as True Christianity Evangelism v. Zaino (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 117.] 
Taxation — Real property — Exemptions — Relevant factor for determining 
exemption under R.C. 5709.12 of two-story house owned by an Ohio 
nonprofit corporation is whether the institution is using the property 
exclusively for charitable purposes — Decision of Board of Tax Appeals 
denying exemption reversed. 
(No. 00-292 — Submitted January 10, 2001 — Decided March 7, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 96-K-904. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellant seeks exemption for a two-story house in Akron.  
Over a year ago in True Christianity Evangelism v. Tracy (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 
48, 716 N.E.2d 1154, we remanded this matter to the Board of Tax Appeals 
(“BTA”) to determine whether appellant used the property exclusively for 
charitable purposes. 
 
The BTA found that the property is neither open to the public nor used in 
public worship.  No one resides in the house.  Jeffrey A. Botzko, appellant’s 
president, is the only person using the property.  After remand, the BTA denied 
the exemption because the property was not being used exclusively for charitable 
purposes.  This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
Appellant seeks exemption under R.C. 5709.12, which states that “[r]eal * 
* * property belonging to institutions that is used exclusively for charitable 
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.” 
 
We are to strictly construe statutes granting exemption, and the burden 
rests on the one claiming an exemption to demonstrate that the property qualifies.  
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OCLC Online Computer Library Ctr., Inc. v. Kinney (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 198, 
11 OBR 509, 464 N.E.2d 572. 
 
To be exempted from taxation under R.C. 5709.12, the property must (1) 
belong to an institution and (2) be used exclusively for charitable purposes.  
Highland Park Owners, Inc. v. Tracy (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 405, 406, 644 N.E.2d 
284, 286.  The BTA found that appellant was an institution, and that finding has 
not been challenged; thus, the property belonged to an institution. 
 
The BTA next found that the primary use of the property was “an 
evangelistic one.”  On the basis of this finding, the BTA stated that “a distinction 
may be drawn between charitable and religious institutions and the activities in 
which they engage.”  The BTA cited for support Summit United Methodist 
Church v. Kinney (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 72, 2 OBR 628, 442 N.E.2d 1298; Summit 
United Methodist Church v. Kinney (1983), 7 Ohio St.3d 13, 7 OBR 406, 455 
N.E.2d 669; and Operation Evangelize-Youth Mission, Inc. v. Kinney (1982), 69 
Ohio St.2d 346, 23 O.O.3d 315, 432 N.E.2d 200.  We decline to follow these 
cases because they limited the application of R.C. 5709.12 to the entities 
described in R.C. 5709.121.  The application of R.C. 5709.121 is limited by its 
terms to “[r]eal property and tangible personal property belonging to a charitable 
or educational institution or to the state or a political subdivision.”  R.C. 5709.121 
does not limit the application of R.C. 5709.12 to other entities.  This case applies 
only R.C. 5709.12. 
 
In Episcopal Parish v. Kinney (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 199, 201, 12 O.O.3d 
197, 198, 389 N.E.2d 847, 848, we adopted Justice Stern’s concurring opinion in 
White Cross Hosp. Assn. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 199, 203, 67 
O.O.2d 224, 226, 311 N.E.2d 862, 864, wherein he stated that as regards R.C. 
5709.12, “any institution, irrespective of its charitable or noncharitable character, 
may take advantage of a tax exemption if it is making exclusive charitable use of 
its property.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Thus, R.C. 5790.12 is applicable to “any 
January Term, 2001 
3 
institution”; religious institutions are not excluded from the application of R.C. 
5709.12. Conversely, the application of R.C. 5709.121 is limited to charitable or 
educational institutions or to the state or a political subdivision. 
 
Thus, for purposes of exemption under R.C. 5709.12 whether the 
institution is religious or charitable is not a relevant factor.  The relevant factor for 
determining exemption under R.C. 5709.12 is whether the institution is using the 
property exclusively for charitable purposes.  In Am. Commt. of Rabbinical 
College of Telshe, Inc. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1951), 156 Ohio St. 376, 46 O.O. 
217, 102 N.E.2d 589, paragraph one of the syllabus, we held, “If operated without 
any view to profit, an institution used exclusively for the lawful advancement of 
education and of religion is an institution used exclusively for charitable purposes, 
within the meaning of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution and of Section 
5353, General Code [now R.C. 5709.12].”  See, also, opinion of Justice Taft 
concurring in judgment in Cleveland Bible College v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1949), 
151 Ohio St. 258, 261, 39 O.O. 70, 71, 85 N.E.2d 284, 285. 
 
The BTA found that the primary use of the property was (1) “an 
evangelistic one” and (2) for “the preparation and dissemination of a religious 
message.”  At another point the BTA stated that the property was “used by 
Botzko in the preparation and deliverance of his evangelic message.” 
 
The term “evangelistic” is defined in Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary (1986) 786 as “1: of or relating to evangelism.”  “Evangelism” is 
defined as “1: the proclamation of the gospel; * * * the presentation of the gospel 
to individuals and groups by such methods as preaching, teaching, and personal or 
family visitation programs 2: missionary, militant, or crusading zeal for or earnest 
advocacy of any cause.”  Id.  In describing his activities, Botzko stated: 
 
“My goal is to inspire, enthuse, or to badger people into actually reading 
the Bible and finding out what it says and living up to its standards.  Or even apart 
from that, just encourage them to seek the highest moral standards they can from 
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whatever source they will accept.  Like I tried to encourage people who believe in 
the Koran to find the best moral standards in it and see if there is higher things in 
the Bible that you can go above what the Koran says. 
 
“I try to promote true Christianity, but if I can’t do that, I still try to 
promote the best moral standards part.” 
 
In another part of his testimony, Botzko described his activities as 
“distribution of the literature, influencing everyone I can, in any way, to live up to 
the better moral standards of the Bible, you know, thus not be a burden on society 
instead of acting contrary to the good moral standards which puts a burden on 
society; supporting them in prison, assuming their children, you know, and 
everything that goes into all the police work and social services that result from 
the fact that people are not living up to the best moral standards they could.”  In 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943), 319 U.S. 105, 108, 63 S.Ct. 870, 872, 87 L.Ed. 
1292, 1296, the court stated that “[t]he hand distribution of religious tracts is an 
age-old form of missionary evangelism—as old as the history of printing presses.” 
 
The question for consideration thus becomes whether the evangelistic 
activities of appellant constitute charitable purposes.  The General Assembly has 
not defined what activities of an institution subject to R.C. 5709.12 and not R.C. 
5709.121 constitute charitable purposes.  However, in past cases we have held 
that “[i]n the absence of a legislative definition, ‘charity,’ in the legal sense, is the 
attempt in good faith, spiritually, physically, intellectually, socially and 
economically to advance and benefit mankind in general, or those in need of 
advancement and benefit in particular, without regard to their ability to supply 
that need from other sources, and without hope or expectation, if not with positive 
abnegation, of gain or profit by the donor or by the instrumentality of the charity.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Planned Parenthood Assn. of Columbus, Inc. v. Tax Commr. 
(1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 117, 34 O.O.2d 251, 214 N.E.2d 222, paragraph one of the 
January Term, 2001 
5 
syllabus.  It is against this definition that appellant’s activities must be measured 
to determine if they constitute a charitable purpose. 
 
In Herb Soc. of Am., Inc. v. Tracy (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 643 
N.E.2d 1132, 1134, we stated, “The dissemination of useful information to benefit 
mankind is, traditionally, charity.”  In Battelle Mem. Inst. v. Dunn (1947), 148 
Ohio St. 53, 60, 35 O.O. 9, 12, 73 N.E.2d 88, 92, we stated that “[g]enerally, the 
dissemination of knowledge for the edification and improvement of mankind is 
regarded as a charitable object.”  Likewise, in Am. Issue Publishing Co. v. Evatt 
(1940), 137 Ohio St. 264, 266, 18 O.O. 27, 28, 28 N.E.2d 613, 614, we held, “ 
‘Charity’ has been broadly defined as that which benefits mankind and betters its 
condition.  Hence it has often been held by the courts that organizations engaged 
in discouraging the consumption of intoxicants are promoting individual and 
social welfare and come within the definition of a charity.”  In Am. Humanist 
Assn., Inc. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1963), 174 Ohio St. 545, 23 O.O.2d 210, 190 
N.E.2d 685, we reversed a decision of the BTA that had denied exemption under 
R.C. 5709.12 to a not-for-profit corporation whose purposes were “to study and 
extend educational principles and ideals concerning human progress, values and 
welfare, and, in connection therewith, to publish magazines, books, pamphlets 
and other forms of literature, and to engage lecturers in order that the purposes of 
the association may be accomplished.”  The association’s properties were used for 
offices, conference and storage rooms, and an area where multilithing, addressing, 
and mailing were done. 
 
The information disseminated by appellant attempts to encourage people 
to read the Bible and to live up to its moral standards.  These efforts are a good-
faith attempt to disseminate information to spiritually advance and benefit 
mankind in general.  Under the definition of charity followed by this court, 
appellant’s activities constitute charitable purposes. 
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The General Assembly has used the phrase “used exclusively” as a 
limitation in both R.C. 5709.07 (houses used exclusively for public worship) and 
R.C. 5709.12 (property used exclusively for charitable purposes).  In Moraine 
Hts. Baptist Church v. Kinney (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 134, 135, 12 OBR 174, 175, 
465 N.E.2d 1281, 1282, this court held that for purposes of R.C. 5709.07, the 
phrase “used exclusively for public worship” was equivalent to “primary use.”  
There is no indication that the phrase “used exclusively” as used in R.C. 5709.12 
is to be interpreted differently than it is in R.C. 5709.07.  Thus, when the BTA 
found that the primary use of the appellant’s property was for an evangelic 
purpose it was equivalent to the “exclusive use” being for evangelic purposes, 
which we have found to be charitable purposes. 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above we find the decision of the BTA 
to be unreasonable and unlawful, and therefore we reverse it. 
Decision reversed. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  Because I conclude that the Tax Commissioner and 
Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) correctly denied the charitable use exemption 
sought here by True Christianity Evangelism, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
 
The BTA is vested “with wide discretion in determining the weight to be 
given to evidence and the credibility of witnesses which come before it.  It is not 
the function of this court to substitute its judgment for that of the board on factual 
issues, but only to determine from the record whether the decision rendered by 
[the] board is unreasonable or unlawful.  Thus, the proper scope of this court’s 
review of the board’s decision * * * is solely to determine from the record if the 
board’s decision is supported by any probative evidence.”  (Citations omitted.)  
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7 
Monsanto Co. v. Lindley (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 59, 63, 10 O.O.3d 113, 115, 381 
N.E.2d 939, 942.  The majority reverses the BTA’s decision here without 
mentioning this deferential standard of review, but the record contains ample 
probative evidentiary support for the board’s conclusions. 
 
The majority assigns great weight to one particular finding in the record—
the BTA’s statement that “the primary use to which the property is devoted is an 
evangelistic one.”  Because this court has previously determined that “exclusive 
use” under another tax exemption statute can (sometimes) really mean “primary 
use,” and because evangelistic uses can (sometimes) be characterized as 
charitable uses, the majority supports its decision granting the exemption with that 
phrase.  A close reading of the BTA’s decision, however, suggests that the 
majority has read this language out of context and overlooked other key evidence 
in the record. 
 
When the BTA wrote that “the primary use to which the property is 
devoted is an evangelistic one,” it did so in an attempt to analytically distinguish 
between a broad category of charitable uses and a narrower category of 
evangelistic uses.  The BTA reasoned: 
 
“While aspects of Botzko’s activities, and those of the institutions with 
which he is associated, may arguably be considered charitable in nature, the 
primary use to which the property is devoted is an evangelistic one.  As tribunals 
have acknowledged in the past, a distinction may be drawn between charitable 
and religious institutions and the activities in which they engage.” 
 
To support this distinction, the BTA relied on several cases from this 
court.  See, e.g., Summit United Methodist Church v. Kinney (1983), 7 Ohio St.3d 
13, 7 OBR 406, 455 N.E.2d 669; Summit United Methodist Church v. Kinney 
(1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 72, 2 OBR 628, 442 N.E.2d 1298; and Operation 
Evangelize-Youth Mission, Inc. v. Kinney (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 346, 23 O.O.3d 
315, 432 N.E.2d 200.  The majority declines to follow these cases, deciding that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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they incorrectly limited the application of R.C. 5709.12 to the specific entities 
described in R.C. 5709.121. 
 
Assuming, arguendo, that the majority correctly declines to follow the 
cases upon which the BTA relied, the BTA knew that the distinction it was 
attempting to draw between charitable and evangelistic uses was a narrow one—if 
such a distinction existed at all.  Like today’s majority, the board referred to the 
very broad definition of “charity” that appeared in this court’s Planned 
Parenthood syllabus over three decades ago.  Planned Parenthood Assn. of 
Columbus, Inc. v. Tax Commr. (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 117, 34 O.O.2d 251, 214 
N.E.2d 222, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Due to the breadth of that definition, 
the BTA anticipated that at least some of Botzko’s evangelical uses might also be 
deemed charitable ones.  Accordingly, the board provided an alternative theory in 
support of its decision to deny the exemption.  The board expressly noted that, 
“[t]o the extent an argument may continue to exist that evangelic and charitable 
are synonymous, we acknowledge the other uses of the property which are clearly 
not ‘exclusively charitable.’ * * * [W]hile a portion of Botzko’s use of the subject 
property may be charitable in nature, we are unable to conclude that the use of the 
subject property is exclusively for charitable purposes.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  The 
“other uses” that the board expressly referred to here included (1) Botzko’s 
storage of clothing and other personal items at the property, (2) Botzko’s use of 
exercise equipment at the property to improve his own physical condition, and (3) 
Botzko’s use of the property to prepare “personal ads in newspapers with the 
apparent purpose of soliciting women interested in leading a similar lifestyle such 
as his own.” 
 
In addition to these findings, which the majority does not discuss, the 
record contains Botzko’s own testimony that he had not “really kept track of what 
was done” at the property.  Because it was True Christianity Evangelism’s burden 
to demonstrate entitlement to the charitable use exemption, Episcopal Parish of 
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Christ Church, Glendale v. Kinney (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 199, 12 O.O.3d 197, 
389 N.E.2d 847, the BTA’s decision to uphold the Tax Commissioner’s denial of 
the exemption is supported by probative evidence of record—the sworn testimony 
of True Christianity Evangelism’s president, Botzko. 
II 
 
I also question the majority’s reliance on Moraine Hts. Baptist Church v. 
Kinney (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 134, 12 OBR 174, 465 N.E.2d 1281.  Instead of 
undercutting the BTA’s analysis, Moraine Hts. actually supports it. 
 
In Moraine Hts., this court was asked to determine whether a forty-nine-
acre church camp containing various separate buildings and facilities qualified for 
the R.C. 5709.07 exemption.  To do so, this court reviewed three prior cases 
concerning this exemption, which requires the taxpayer to show that the property 
is “used exclusively for public worship.”  Id. at 135, 12 OBR at 175, 465 N.E.2d 
at 1282, citing In re Bond Hill-Roselawn Hebrew School (1949), 151 Ohio St. 70, 
38 O.O. 527, 84 N.E.2d 270; Bishop v. Kinney (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 52, 2 OBR 
594, 442 N.E.2d 764; and Summit United Methodist Church v. Kinney (1983), 7 
Ohio St.3d 13, 7 OBR 406, 455 N.E.2d 669.  Like Moraine Hts. itself, each of 
these three cases addressed properties of a character far different from the two-
story house at issue here. 
 
In Bond Hill-Roselawn, for example, this court held that a Hebrew school 
building qualified for the public worship exemption even though the entire 
building was not used exclusively for public worship—a caretaker and his family 
lived in three rooms above the first floor. 151 Ohio St. at 71-73, 38 O.O. at 528, 
84 N.E.2d at 272.  The Bond Hill-Roselawn court reasoned that church buildings 
often contain certain rooms that are not exclusively used for public worship—
such as rooms used for cooking or for Boy Scout meetings—and that the 
existence of such rooms within a church building should not foreclose exemption 
of the building itself.  Id.  “Certainly it was not the intention of the people that 
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their words ‘used exclusively for public worship,’ should be so literally construed 
that any such uses would prevent tax exemption of a church building.”  Id. at 73, 
38 O.O. at 528, 84 N.E.2d at 272. 
 
After Bond Hill-Roselawn, in Bishop v. Kinney, this court also granted the 
R.C. 5709.07 exemption to a parish hall that was used primarily for religious 
purposes but was also used occasionally for social gatherings and bingo games.  2 
Ohio St.3d at 52-53, 2 OBR at 594-595, 442 N.E.2d at 765-766.  In Summit 
United Methodist Church, on the other hand, this court upheld the BTA’s denial 
of the exemption for the educational wing of a parish center that was used for 
Sunday school but leased to the Ohio State University as a daycare center on 
weekdays.  7 Ohio St.3d at 15, 7 OBR at 407-408, 455 N.E.2d at 670-671. 
 
The taxpayer in Moraine Hts. claimed that “although recreational 
activities are conducted to entertain the youth attending the camp, the primary use 
of the camp and its facilities is to create an atmosphere conducive to the worship 
of God. * * * [T]he camp-like environment promotes a better atmosphere to instill 
Christian principles.”  Moraine Hts., 12 Ohio St.3d at 136, 12 OBR at 176, 465 
N.E.2d at 1283.  Applying Bond Hill-Roselawn, Bishop, and Summit United 
Methodist, this court disagreed and affirmed the board’s denial of the R.C. 
5709.07 exemption.  Id. at 136, 12 OBR at 176-177, 465 N.E.2d at 1282-1283.  
The Moraine Hts. court conceded that the phrase “used exclusively for public 
worship” should not be so literally construed as to defeat exemption for 
multipurpose church buildings that may contain some rooms where nonreligious 
activities occur.  Id. at 136, 12 OBR at 176, 465 N.E.2d at 1282.  Even so, the 
Moraine Hts. court reasoned: 
 
“The record demonstrates that of the forty-nine acres sought to be 
exempted, only the chapel is used primarily for public worship, and it has been 
exempted from taxation.  The balance of the land, including the lodging facilities, 
swimming pool, cafeteria, as well as the recreational and nature areas, are, at best, 
January Term, 2001 
11 
merely supportive of appellant’s goal to promote worship.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Id. at 136, 12 OBR at 177, 465 N.E.2d at 1283. 
 
Accordingly, though Moraine Hts. does indeed stand for the proposition 
that the statutory qualifier “used exclusively” in the tax code should not be 
construed so strictly as to deny an exemption for every multipurpose church 
facility, the case still requires the taxpayer to meet a substantial burden in order to 
qualify for exemption.  The Moraine Hts. taxpayer’s asserted uses of the facilities 
located on the property—to instill Christian values and create an atmosphere 
conducive to worship—though laudable, did not suffice to meet this burden.  The 
BTA drew a similar conclusion about True Christianity Evangelism’s asserted 
uses of the property involved here, and for the foregoing reasons, it is a 
conclusion that I would uphold. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing 
dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Thompson Hine & Flory, L.L.P., and Karen Kelly Grasso, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Phyllis J. Shambaugh, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
__________________