Case Title: Pollard v. State

Citation: 250 N.E.2d 748, 252 Ind. 513

Docket Number: 868S134

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1969-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
252 Ind. 513 (1969)
250 N.E.2d 748
POLLARD
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 868S134.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed September 24, 1969.
Rehearing denied October 20, 1969.
*514 William C. Erbecker, James Manahan, Erbecker & Manahan, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Richard V. Bennett, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
*515 HUNTER, J.
Appellant was charged with conspiracy to commit second degree burglary to which he entered a plea of not guilty. The cause was tried before the court over the objection of appellant and he was found guilty as charged.
On appeal appellant assigns as error the trial court's overruling of his motion for new trial. In such motion for new trial appellant alleges error on the part of the trial court in pertinent part as follows:
The first error alleged by appellant in his motion for new trial is the sole point argued in this appeal and resulted from the court's refusal to grant appellant's verified motion for change of venue from judge. Appellant attacks the propriety of the court's refusal to grant a change of venue as well as its jurisdiction once such a motion has been filed.
Appellant fails to argue points two and three raised in his motion for new trial and they are therefore deemed waived. Supreme Court Rule 2-17. Brown v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 161, 247 N.E.2d 76; Short v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 459, 237 N.E.2d 258; Waggoner v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 269, 85 N.E.2d 642.
*516 A brief review of the proceedings in this case follows: On September 5, 1966, appellant and one Joseph Smith were arrested on the roof of a drug store where a hole had been cut through the roof and ceiling to the store below. An indictment, filed December 29, 1966, charged appellant with conspiracy to commit a felony, to-wit: second degree burglary. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the charge and on January 12, 1967, he filed a petition for a change of judge which was granted. The parties were given five (5) days to agree on a special judge, but failing to do so the court then presented a panel of three from which the Honorable Jacob S. Miller was selected by striking. Judge Miller qualified as special judge on February 3, 1967.
On April 5, 1967, the day set for trial, appellant filed for a continuance on the grounds that appellant's defense attorney, William Erbecker, due to a heavy work schedule was unable to make the necessary defense preparations. The continuance was granted and the cause set for May 25, 1967. On May 19, 1967, appellant moved for trial by jury which motion was granted. The court, on August 29, 1967, by its own motion continued the cause to September 20, 1967.
Appellant filed another motion for continuance on September 19, 1967, which motion was based on defense attorney William Erbecker's statement that he had been unable to completely and effectively consult with the appellant and his co-defendant to ascertain their complete defense and that the trial date of September 20, conflicted with a scheduled appearance in the United States District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis, Indiana. The continuance was granted and the cause set for trial on November 13, 1967. Also on September 20, 1967, appellant again moved for trial by jury, which motion was granted.
On November 10, 1967, appellant filed for another continuance, the reason for such motion being that appellant's attorney, Erbecker, could not appear because of pending litigation *517 in the Henry Circuit Court. Appellant's move for continuance was granted on November 13, 1967. It was also on this date that the court found appellant's bond insufficient and raised it in the sum of Five Thousand ($5,000) Dollars.
A verified motion for change of venue from judge was filed on January 17, 1968, by the appellant. The substance of the motion was that the appellant believed he could not have a fair and impartial trial because of the bias, prejudice and hostility of the special judge, Judge Miller, toward appellant's attorney, William Erbecker. The motion further alleged that such bias, prejudice and hostility resulted from appellant's motion for continuance of November 10, 1967. The motion proceeds to read as follows:
The court on January 19, 1968, overruled defendant's motion for change of venue. Subsequently, appellant filed a motion to reconsider. In support of the motion to reconsider was an affidavit which reads as follows:
The motion to reconsider was overruled on January 29, 1968, the date set for trial and on the same day appellant moved for another continuance, appellant's counsel being engaged in other litigation. Such motion was granted and trial was set for March 30, 1968. On March 19, 1968, appellant *519 filed an objection to trial. Appellant was subsequently tried and convicted as charged.
In determining the propriety of the special judge's refusal to grant a second change of venue, we turn first to the applicable statute, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-1305 (1956 Repl.) which reads in pertinent part as follows:
The same language is incorporated in Supreme Court Rule 1-12C.
As has been noted, appellant had already been granted one change of venue from the judge, and in this appeal is challenging the trial court's denial of a second request.
This court early upheld the policy of allowing one change of venue for the same cause. In Line v. State (1875), 51 Ind. 172, 173, it was said:
Duggins v. State (1879), 66 Ind. 350. Woodsmall v. State (1914), 181 Ind. 613, 105 N.E. 155.
A thorough discussion of this proposition appears in State ex rel. Fox, etc. v. LaPorte Cir. Ct. et al. (1956), 236 Ind. 69, 138 N.E.2d 875, where the court was concerned with *520 a second change of venue from the county. After establishing that the right to a change of venue is statutory and consequently must be governed by the provisions and prohibitions of the statute, the court asserts the proposition that where the statute limits the number of changes of venue which a defendant may have in a criminal case, it is mandatory and must be followed. The court concludes, after a discussion of the constitutional aspects of the question, that neither the trial court nor this court has any right to ignore the plain mandate of a constitutional statute.
In a concurring opinion in the Fox case, Chief Justice Achor further analyzed the question by reasoning that the Constitution of Indiana clearly, fully and finally declared the law on the subject of venue as it existed on that date in Article 1, § 13, which provides as follows:
Such a constitutional mandate completely covered the field as to the venue of criminal actions. Judge Achor further reasoned that the present right to a change of venue (from the county) exists solely by virtue of statutes subsequently enacted, unless such right exists by reason of provisions found in the constitutions of the State of Indiana or the United States. Since the right to a second change of venue does not exist by virtue of the statute, it must arise, if at all, from a provision in our state constitution or that of the United States made applicable by the 14th Amendment due process clause. In view of the constitutional declaration that the defendant shall have the right to a public trial by an impartial jury, Judge Achor indicates a possible exception to the statute which decrees only one change of venue, such exception being grounded on the constitution.
*521 This line of reasoning was adopted by the court in State ex rel. Gannon, etc. v. Porter Cir. Ct. et. al. (1959), 239 Ind. 637, 159 N.E.2d 713, where the affidavit for change of venue asserted that "it would be impossible for the defendant to have this case heard by a jury ... and have the case decided solely upon the evidence presented in court." This court held that such a statement was tantamount to an allegation that it would be impossible to obtain an impartial jury and that since the state agreed that such was the case, his constitutional right should contravene the statute:
Gannon involved a second change of venue from the county, as opposed to a second change of venue from the judge. However, it would seem to this court that such a line of reasoning is just as applicable to a second change of venue from the judge where the judge is to act as the trier of the facts, thus supplanting the jury, and where the requested change is grounded on the assertion that a failure to grant a change of venue will result in an unfair trial to the accused. Certainly this is the essence of a guarantee that the defendant be tried by an impartial jury i.e. a fair trial devoid of bias or prejudice on the part of those whose responsibility it is to try the facts. It would *522 seem that trial by an impartial judge, where he is the trier of the facts, is just as much a constitutional right as the right to an impartial jury.
In the case of State ex rel. Thrapp, etc. v. Noble Cir. Ct. et al. (1963), 243 Ind. 567, 188 N.E.2d 913, which involved an original action for writ of prohibition and mandate to compel the respondent judge to deny a second application for a change of judge, this court relied on State ex rel. Fox, etc. v. Laporte Cir. Ct. et al., supra, in making the writ permanent. However, the court failed to preclude itself from following the reasoning in Gannon at a future date, as evidenced by the statement:
In light of the court's reference to the Gannon case, we can only conclude that one such compelling reason would be an undisputed allegation of bias or prejudice on the part of the trier of the facts.
The most recent case to shed any light on the present state of the law, which case is principally relied on by appellant in this appeal is that of State ex rel Neal et al v. Hamilton Cir. Ct. et al. (1967), 248 Ind. 130, 230 N.E.2d 775. This case involved contempt proceedings under Ind. Ann. Stat. § 3-911 (1968 Repl.) which statute provides for the appointment of a special judge and then states: "The court shall thereupon appoint such person who shall remain unchallenged to preside in said cause as special judge." (our emphasis). Supporting the view that a change of venue in such an instance would not be proper is the case of Allison v. State, ex. rel. Allison (1963), 243 Ind. 489, 187 N.E.2d 565, which held that the wording of the statute was plain and indeed a change of venue should not be allowed. However, when faced with the application of the same statute in Neal, this court per Judge Arterburn held that where an *523 undisputed case of prejudice was alleged a change of venue would be proper notwithstanding the statute:
It would appear that the situation presented by Neal and a case involving a second change of venue from judge are analagous in that a statute, in both instances, clearly dictates that a change of venue shall not be granted. However, in Neal as in Gannon, the court found an overriding policy upon which to base an exception to the statute to-wit: an undisputed allegation that the accused will not have a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by the constitution unless such change of venue be allowed.
Turning to the case at bar, we note that the special judge selected to preside over appellant's trial had expressed some displeasure over appellant's counsel's apparent lack of consideration in informing the judge of a requested continuance. On the same day the judge raised appellant's bail.
Appellant alleges in his affidavit for change of venue that such words and act evidence bias, prejudice and hostility and that appellant will be unable to have a fair trial. The state failed to dispute this allegation.
In applying the law as we have heretofore analyzed it, having recognized those instances where a second change of *524 venue would be proper, it would appear to this court that the special judge properly denied appellant's second motion for change from judge. As we have noted, we are dealing with an exception to a statutory mandate and such exception, although well grounded on the constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial, should be narrowly applied. Looking back to Neal, we note that the court there stipulated, as quoted above, that the right to a change of judge is predicated on that judge having expressed an opinion regarding the merits of the controversy before him. In Neal, the judge was quoted as saying: "that Jim Neal had been asking for it and he got what he deserved by being held in contempt".
Certainly this is a far cry from what was said and done in the case at bar. We are not inclined to hold that where a judge makes a statement evidencing a justifiable annoyance at counsel's lack of consideration, he should be disqualified for bias or prejudice. Nor would we hold that the raising of appellant's bail, by itself, evidences bias. We take judicial notice of the fact that this cause had been pending for some eleven months, due primarily to the continuances requested by appellant's counsel. Also Smith, the person arrested with appellant at the scene of the crime, had already since failed to appear and had forfeited his bond. It seems reasonable for the trial judge to find under the circumstances that appellant's bail was insufficient and to raise it accordingly.
Appellant does not attack the trial court's discretion in this regard but argues only that such increase violated this state's constitutional prohibition of excessive bail. The object of bail prior to a trial is to insure the presence of the accused. Hobbs v. Lindsey (1959), 240 Ind. 74, 162 N.E.2d 85. Green v. Petit (1944), 222 Ind. 467, 54 N.E.2d 281. Factors to be considered in setting bail are the nature of the offense and the penalty attaching, likelihood *525 of the accused appearing at trial, and the accused's financial position. Hobbs v. Lindsey, supra. Appellant fails to relate these considerations to his allegation that the bail was excessive and without such a showing, there is no basis upon which we can disturb the trial court's determination.
Having found no basis to appellant's charge of bias and prejudice on the part of the special judge appointed to hear this case, we hold that the trial court did not err in overruling appellant's second motion for change of venue or the subsequent motions relating thereto. Therefore judgment should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
DeBruler, C.J., Arterburn and Givan, JJ., concur; Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 250 N.E.2d 748.