Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V JERRY CLAY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 183102

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 30, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 120024  
JERRY CLAY,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
AFTER REMAND  
YOUNG, J.  
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of  
defendant’s motion for relief from judgment on the ground that  
defendant 
was 
not 
“lawfully imprisoned” as contemplated by MCL  
750.197c. We reverse.  
I. Background  
Defendant was stopped by the police for allegedly  
trespassing, failing to obey a police officer, and assisting  
in a traffic violation.  After the stop, the police discovered  
that defendant was carrying a concealed weapon without a  
permit in violation of MCL 750.227.  As a result, defendant  
was placed under arrest and taken to the county jail.  
While at the county jail, defendant assaulted a law  
enforcement 
officer. 
 
Consequently, 
defendant 
was 
charged 
with  
assaulting a corrections officer, MCL 750.197c, and being an  
habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12.  Defendant was  
convicted of these offenses at trial and his convictions were  
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.1  Defendant’s application  
for leave to appeal was denied by this Court.2  
In separate proceedings, defendant was convicted of  
unlawfully 
carrying 
a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, and being  
an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, for the  
events that had led to his arrest and imprisonment in the  
first place.  However, these convictions were reversed by the  
Court of Appeals3 because there was insufficient probable  
cause to initially stop defendant for trespassing, failing to  
obey a police officer, or assisting in a traffic violation.  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that evidence of the  
concealed weapon subsequently discovered should have been  
1Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 21, 1997 
(Docket No. 183102).  
2456 Mich 888 (1997)(Docket No. 108578).  
3Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 11, 1997 
(Docket No. 183101).  
2  
 
suppressed 
under 
the 
exclusionary 
rule. 
Plaintiff’s  
application for leave to appeal was denied by this Court.4  
Armed 
with 
the 
reversal 
of 
his 
concealed-weapon  
conviction, defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment  
for his conviction of assaulting a corrections officer under  
MCL 750.197c.  Defendant argued that § 197c requires one to be  
“lawfully imprisoned” and that the reversal of the concealed­
weapon 
conviction 
because 
of 
the 
unconstitutional 
initial 
stop  
and subsequent search meant that defendant had not been  
“lawfully imprisoned” at the time he struck the officer in the  
county jail. The trial court denied the motion on alternate  
bases.  First, the trial court held that the arrest was valid  
for purposes of § 197c because an outstanding bench warrant  
for defendant’s arrest existed at the time of his detention.5  
Second, the trial court reasoned that a subsequent finding  
that there was insufficient probable cause to arrest does not  
render an arrest unlawful for purposes of § 197c.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on different grounds  
from the trial court.6  The Court of Appeals majority held  
that the text of § 197c does not necessarily require a  
4456 Mich 876 (1997) (Docket No. 109947).  
5Given our disposition of this case, we need not address 
the prosecution’s appellate argument regarding the propriety 
of the trial court’s bench warrant rationale.  
6239 Mich App 365, 369; 608 NW2d 76 (2000).  
3  
 
defendant to be “lawfully imprisoned.”  The dissenting judge,  
on the other hand, read the statute such that the phrases  
“lawfully imprisoned” in the statute collectively applied to  
all the subclassifications listed in the statute.  
After this Court granted defendant leave to appeal in  
order to consider whether the Court of Appeals majority  
properly interpreted the requirements of § 197c,7 the  
prosecution conceded that the Court of Appeals dissent  
correctly construed the statute.  That is, § 197c requires  
under all circumstances that the defendant be “lawfully  
imprisoned” in order to be convicted of violating the statute.  
We concurred with the prosecution’s concession that the Court  
of Appeals dissent correctly stated the requirements of § 197c  
and, in a summary disposition order, reversed the judgment of  
the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that Court to  
decide whether the defendant’s imprisonment was, in fact,  
lawful.8  
On remand, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial  
court’s 
denial 
of 
defendant’s motion for relief from judgment,  
adopting 
the 
reasoning of the previous dissenting opinion that  
defendant was not lawfully imprisoned.9  The Court wrote:  
7463 Mich 906 (2000).  
8463 Mich 970 (2001).  
9247 Mich App 322, 323-324; 636 NW2d 303 (2001).  
4  
The 
prosecution 
argues 
that 
defendant’s  
incarceration was lawful because he had committed  
the crime of carrying a concealed weapon and there 
was an outstanding bench warrant for defendant’s 
arrest when he was stopped.  However, there is no 
evidence that police were aware of either fact at 
the time of the stop. The fact that the search of  
defendant’s person led to evidence is irrelevant. 
A search, in law, is good or bad at the time of 
commencement, and its character does not change on 
the basis of its success.  People v LoCicero (After  
Remand), 453 Mich 496, 501; 556 NW2d 498 (1996). 
[247 Mich App 322, 324; 636 NW2d 303 (2001).]  
We granted the prosecution leave to appeal.10  
II. Standard of Review  
At issue is the proper interpretation of MCL 750.197c.  
We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation.  
People v Thousand, 465 Mich 149, 156; 631 NW2d 694 (2001).  
III. Analysis  
At the time of the alleged offense,11 MCL 750.197c  
provided:  
A person lawfully imprisoned in a jail, other 
place of confinement established by law for any 
term, or lawfully imprisoned for any purpose at any 
other place, including but not limited to hospitals 
and other health care facilities or awaiting 
examination, trial, arraignment, sentence, or after 
sentence awaiting or during transfer to or from a 
prison, for a crime or offense, or charged with a 
crime or offense who, without being discharged from  
10466 Mich 860 (2002).  
111998 PA 510 inserted a subsection 2 to include public 
and 
private 
youth 
correctional facilities in the definition of 
“place of confinement” and independent contractors in the 
definition of “employee.”  These later amendments do not  
appear to alter our analysis of the legal issue before us.  
5  
the 
place 
of 
confinement, 
or 
other 
lawful  
imprisonment by due process of law, through the use 
of violence, threats of violence or dangerous 
weapons, assaults an employee of the place of 
confinement or other custodian knowing the person 
to be an employee or custodian or breaks the place 
of confinement and escapes, or breaks the place of 
confinement although an escape is not actually 
made, is guilty of a felony. [Emphasis added.]  
The issue presented is whether the reversal of  
defendant’s conviction of the concealed-weapon offense,  
effectuated by an application of the exclusionary rule, means  
that defendant was not “lawfully imprisoned” as contemplated  
by MCL 750.197c.  
To say that an action is “lawful” is to say that it is  
authorized by law.  Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 885.  
In this case, defendant committed, in an officer’s presence,  
the felony of carrying a concealed weapon without a permit.  
Consequently, 
defendant 
was 
detained 
pursuant 
to 
MCL  
764.15(1), which provides:  
A peace officer, without a warrant, may arrest 
a person in any of the following situations:  
(a) A felony, misdemeanor, or ordinance  
violation is committed in the peace officer’s 
presence.  
As a result, by the authority granted to him by MCL  
764.15(1)(a), the police officer was authorized to imprison  
defendant.  
Accordingly, 
defendant’s 
imprisonment 
was 
“lawful”  
as contemplated by MCL 750.197c.  
Defendant advances, nevertheless, that the subsequent  
6  
 
suppression of the evidence of the concealed weapon because of  
the application of the exclusionary rule causes the police  
officer’s conduct to be retroactively considered “unlawful.”  
We disagree.  Simply put, for purposes of MCL 750.197c, a  
subsequent determination concerning a defendant’s prosecution  
cannot and does not serve to retroactively render “unlawful”  
the actions of a law enforcement officer where those actions  
are authorized by law.  
Rather, 
for 
the 
purposes of MCL 750.197c, an imprisonment  
cannot be unlawful where a law enforcement officer has been  
given the authority under law to imprison the individual.  
Because 
defendant 
was detained pursuant to the officer’s legal  
authority 
under 
MCL 
764.15(1)(a), 
he 
was 
“lawfully 
imprisoned”  
under MCL 750.197c.12  
12To be certain, we note that in concluding in this case 
(Docket No. 120024) that defendant was lawfully imprisoned as 
contemplated by MCL 750.197c because of the authority vested 
in the law enforcement officer by MCL 764.15(1), we are not 
reconsidering whether in defendant’s other case (Docket No. 
109947), concerning the underlying charge of unlawfully 
carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, the law enforcement 
officer had probable cause to stop or search defendant or 
whether the seized evidence should have been suppressed. We  
already denied leave to appeal in that case, 456 Mich 876 
(1997), 
and 
regardless, as our analysis above indicates, those 
issues are not relevant to the issue before us.  Accordingly, 
to the extent that the dissent suggests that an exclusionary 
rule analysis is relevant to the issue presented, we disagree.  
In addition, we find curious the dissent’s conclusion 
that under MCL 764.15(1) and MCL 750.197c an arrest is lawful 
but an imprisonment following such a lawful arrest is not. 
Such an interpretation would lead to a mandatory “catch and  
7  
  
 
Conclusion  
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court  
of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s denial of  
defendant’s motion for relief from judgment.  
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Stephen J. Markman  
CAVANAGH, J.  
I concur in the result only.  
Michael F. Cavanagh  
release” system of law enforcement, whereby criminals may be 
lawfully “arrested,” but not lawfully “imprisoned” until a 
defendant has the opportunity to have any suppression motions 
adjudicated.  The statutes at issue simply do not permit such 
an interpretation.  
Further, we fail to find any logic in the dissent’s 
position 
that 
statutorily 
permitting 
police 
officers 
to 
arrest 
and hold an individual seen committing a crime under MCL 
764.15(1), before a determination of the constitutionality of 
such an arrest through subsequent judicial process, somehow 
“sanctions, even encourages, illegal conduct by police  
officers.” 
Post at 1.  Under this “encouraged behavior 
theory,” one must accept that police officers will seek to 
arrest individuals with the hope that these arrested  
individuals later assault a police officer while being held, 
causing significant injury to the police officer, so that the 
defendant will then be subjected to greater punishment for the 
assault.  
8  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 120024  
JERRY CLAY,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion.  
I believe that a defendant who has been illegally stopped  
cannot be "lawfully imprisoned" within the meaning of MCL  
750.197c.  The majority's conclusion to the contrary has no  
basis in the law.  Moreover, it circumvents constitutional  
protections 
and 
sanctions, 
even 
encourages, 
illegal 
conduct 
by  
police officers.  
The majority's reasoning is that police officers may  
arrest a suspect if they observe him committing a felony,  
although their observation was possible only because of their  
own illegal activity. 
Thus, applied to this case, the  
majority holds that a later determination that the officers'  
initial stop of defendant's vehicle was illegal will not  
render unlawful the imprisonment that followed the stop.  
I think the decision is ill-advised.  First, this case  
implicates the exclusionary rule that the United States  
Supreme Court fashioned to deter illegal police conduct.  Mapp  
v Ohio, 367 US 643; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961); Terry  
v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).  The  
protection of the rule is vitiated by a holding that the  
imprisonment of a suspect can be "lawful," even if the initial  
stop were constitutionally impermissible.  
Under the majority's decision, the police could seize a  
suspect with neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion,  
literally for no legally sanctioned reason, hoping to find  
evidence of a felony.  If they found such evidence and  
imprisoned the suspect, the imprisonment would be "lawful."  
Surely the same rationale that renders the fruit of the  
poisonous tree inadmissible renders the imprisonment arising  
from an unconstitutional seizure unlawful.  
This is a case where defendant's stop was illegal,  
lacking probable cause.  As a result, the search that revealed  
the concealed weapon was also illegal. However, the majority  
finds that the imprisonment that was based on the search was  
legal. It makes this finding because MCL 764.15(1) gives an  
2  
officer the right to arrest a person who commits a felony in  
the officer's presence. In so ruling, the majority not only  
discards from consideration the fact that the officer's  
presence in this case was illegal, it equates lawful arrest  
with lawful imprisonment.  
MCL  764.15(1) makes the arrest lawful.  However, MCL  
750.197c, the statute in question, refers not to "lawful  
arrest," but to "lawful imprisonment."  The police have the  
legal right to arrest an illegally stopped suspect, for  
example, to prevent the furtherance of a felony.  But there is  
no legal basis for a finding that either the evidence seized  
or the imprisonment of that suspect is "lawful."  The  
rationale underlying the exclusionary rule would dictate the  
opposite result.  
If the imprisonment were lawful, then could not the  
police (1) illegally break into someone's home and search it,  
(2) without a warrant or permission, (3) allege that the owner  
possessed some kind of contraband, (4) imprison him, and (5)  
if 
the 
owner, 
feeling wronged, escaped confinement, charge and  
convict him of prison escape under MCL 750.197c because he was  
"lawfully imprisoned" when he escaped?  
The Legislature has used no language in MCL 750.197c from  
which one can conclude that it intended such an outrageous  
result.
 Rather, it took pains to specify that, for the  
3  
statute to apply, the imprisonment must be lawful.  The  
majority's only authority shows that it was lawful to arrest,  
not that it was lawful to imprison.  
The case before us on appeal is not one in which a  
straightforward application of criminal law as written allows  
defendant 
to 
escape 
the consequences of his criminal behavior.  
The prosecutor could have charged defendant with, and  
presumably seen him convicted of and sentenced for, assault  
and battery, MCL 750.81, and resisting or obstructing an  
officer, MCL 750.479.  These offenses constitute a ninety-day  
misdemeanor and a two-year felony, respectively.  It is  
apparent that, here, the prosecutor seeks an extension of the  
law for the purpose of charging defendant with a more serious  
crime, a four-year felony under MCL 750.197c.  
I believe that a holding that one may be "lawfully"  
imprisoned under MCL 750.197c after an illegal stop lacks  
legal 
authority. 
 
Morever, it constitutes a flagrant disregard  
for the protections of our constitution. If a constitutional  
violation can be so easily sanitized after the fact, there  
will be less incentive for police to observe constitutional  
protections. For those reasons, I would affirm the decision  
of the Court of Appeals.  
Marilyn Kelly  
4