Case Title: STATE v LANCE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1982-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 82-206 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs . JOHN FESLER LANCE, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Ravalli Honorable Gordon Bennett, Judge presidinq. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Koch & McKenna, Hamilton, Montana Thomas P. Koch, Hamilton, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Robert B. Brown, County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana ------ Submitted on briefs: Seotember 10, 1982 Filed: ocl' 6 - 1982 Decided:. October 4, 1982 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . D e f e n d a n t - a p p e l l a n t was charged w i t h t h e crime of c u s t o d i a l i n t e r f e r e n c e a r i s i n g o u t of a n i n c i d e n t which took p l a c e on August 1 3 , 1979. On December 18, 1979, t h e d a t e set f o r t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t e n t e r e d a p l e a of g u i l t y to t h e charge w h i l e a t a con- f e r e n c e i n t h e judges chambers. On February 1 8 , 1982, d e f e n d a n t moved t o withdraw h i s p l e a of g u i l t y . The District Court denied d e f e n d a n t ' s motion and d e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s . P u r s u a n t to a d e c r e e of d i v o r c e e n t e r e d i n t h e District Court o f t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l District of t h e S t a t e of Montana, s i x - y e a r o l d , Brad Lance, w a s placed i n t h e l e g a l c u s t o d y of Dale Lance, d e f e n d a n t ' s ex-wife. P r i o r to August 1 3 , 1979, t h e ~ i s t r i c t C o u r t had i s s u e d a r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r e n j o i n i n g d e f e n d a n t from i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h Dale L a n c e ' s c u s t o d y of t h e minor c h i l d r e n and from d i s t u r b i n g t h e peace of Dale Lance and t h e minor c h i l d r e n . On August 1 3 , 1979, d e f e n d a n t removed Brad Lance who w a s s l e e p i n g i n a t e n t i n t h e yard of Dale Lance. Defendant removed Brad Lance w i t h p r o t e s t from Dale Lance. L a t e r i n t h e day of August 1 3 , 1979, d e f e n d a n t was l o c a t e d and a r r e s t e d i n t h e p a r k i n g l o t of Tremper I s Shopping C e n t e r i n Missoula , Montana. Brad Lance was r e t u r n e d to Dale Lance by Missoula p o l i c e . Defendant was a r r a i g n e d and pled "not g u i l t y " t o t h e charge of c u s t o d i a l i n t e r f e r e n c e on September 21, 1979. T r i a l was sche- d u l e d f o r December 1 8 , 1979. Thomas P . Koch was appointed by Judge Gordon R. B e n n e t t to r e p r e s e n t d e f e n d a n t , b u t s i n c e defen- d a n t r e f u s e d M r . Kochls s e r v i c e s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t asked him to a p p e a r as " s t a n d b y c o u n s e l . " On December 1 3 , 1979, t h e county a t t o r n e y , Douglas H a r k i n , Judge B e n n e t t , t h e d e f e n d a n t and M r . Koch m e t i n chambers t o con- s i d e r p r e l i m i n a r y motions. The county a t t o r n e y made a motion i n l i m i n e to e x c l u d e a l e t t e r w r i t t e n by d e f e n d a n t a d d r e s s e d to Judge B e n n e t t dated December 1 4 , 1979. Defendant s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e a d i n g of t h e letter would c o n s t i t u t e h i s d e f e n s e t o t h e charge of c u s t o d i a l i n t e r f e r e n c e . The t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s motion to exclude t h e l e t t e r , holding t h a t a m a j o r i t y o f its c o n t e n t s were i r r e l e v a n t to t h e case b e f o r e t h e c o u r t . A f t e r conversing w i t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t , d e f e n d a n t s t a t e d to avoid f o r c i n g h i s son to t e s t i f y and t o save t i m e he would plead g u i l t y t o t h e charge a s t h e letter was t h e o n l y d e f e n s e he was going to p r e s e n t . Whereupon, t h e proceeding was moved from t h e chambers to t h e courtroom where t h e judge opened t h e m a t t e r f o r t r i a l , read d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a i n t o t h e record and dismissed t h e jury. On J u n e 27, 1980, d e f e n d a n t was sentenced to t e n y e a r s i n p r i s o n , w i t h a l l t i m e suspended e x c e p t t h a t a l r e a d y served. On February 1 8 , 1982, d e f e n d a n t , appearing p r o se, f i l e d a motion to withdraw h i s p l e a of g u i l t y . On February 23, 1982, Judge B e n n e t t denied t h e motion and e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law i n s u p p o r t of h i s o r d e r on March 8 , 1982. Defendant a p p e a l s t h e o r d e r denying h i s motion to withdraw t h e p l e a of g u i l t y . Defendant r a i s e s t h r e e i s s u e s f o r review: 1. Whether t h e District Court e r r e d by a c c e p t i n g t h e g u i l t y p l e a w i t h o u t informing d e f e n d a n t of a p o s s i b l e d e f e n s e to t h e c h a r g e v i a s e c t i o n 45-5-304 ( 3 ) , MCA. 2. Whether t h e g u i l t y p l e a was accepted i n open c o u r t as r e q u i r e d under s e c t i o n 46-16-105 (1) ( a ) , MCA. 3 . Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n determining t h a t undue d e l a y j u s t i f i e d t h e d e n i a l . S e c t i o n 45-5-304, MCA, s t a t e s : " C u s t o d i a l i n t e r f e r e n c e . (1) A person com- m i t s t h e o f f e n s e of c u s t o d i a l i n t e r f e r e n c e i f , knowing t h a t he h a s no l e g a l r i g h t t o do so, h e t a k e s , e n t i c e s , or w i t h h o l d s from l a w f u l c u s t o d y any c h i l d , incompetent p e r s o n , or o t h e r person e n t r u s t e d by a u t h o r i t y of law to t h e custody of a n o t h e r person o r i n s t i t u t i o n " ( 3 ) A person who has not l e f t t h e s t a t e does n o t c o m m i t an o f f e n s e under t h i s s e c t i o n i f he v o l u n t a r i l y r e t u r n s such p e r s o n to law£ u l c u s t o d y p r i o r to arraignment ." Here, d e f e n d a n t was a r r e s t e d a t t h e shopping c e n t e r and h i s - 3 - son was r e t u r n e d to d e f e n d a n t ' s ex-wife by t h e Missoula p o l i c e . I t does n o t a p p e a r d e f e n d a n t w a s g i v e n an o p p o r t u n i t y to volun- t a r i l y r e t u r n t h e c h i l d t o t h e mother. The Commission's comments t o s e c t i o n 45-5-304, MCA, state: " [ o l n e should be e s p e c i a l l y c a u t i o u s i n pro- v i d i n g p e n a l s a n c t i o n s a p p l i c a b l e t o e s t r a n g e d p a r e n t s s t r u g g l i n g o v e r t h e c u s t o d y of t h e i r c h i l d r e n , s i n c e such s i t u a t i o n s are b e t t e r r e g u l a t e d by c u s t o d y o r d e r s en£ o r c e d through con tempt p r o c e e d i n g s . " W e a g r e e w i t h t h e Commission's comments. Here, d e f e n d a n t ' s t a k i n g o f t h e c h i l d i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e c u s t o d y o r d e r could p o s s i b l y have been grounds f o r a contempt c h a r g e . However, t h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t condone c h a r g i n g an e s t r a n g e d husband or wife w i t h c u s t o d i a l i n t e r f e r e n c e j u s t because t h e y want to spend t i m e w i t h t h e i r n a t u r a l c h i l d , when t h e y do n o t a t t e m p t to h i d e or secret s u c h c h i l d from t h e o t h e r p a r e n t . The r e c o r d shows d e f e n d a n t was a r r e s t e d e x a c t l y where he t o l d t h e mother he would be. W e are aware t h a t d e f e n d a n t would have been better r e p r e s e n t e d had he chosen to a v a i l h i m s e l f of t h e a d v i c e of l e g a l c o u n s e l . The r e c o r d is void of any i n d i c a t i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t was aware of t h e a v a i l a b l e d e f e n s e as c o n t a i n e d i n sect i o n 45-5-304, MCA. S e c t i o n 46-16-105, MCA, states when a p l e a of g u i l t y may be a c c e p t e d : " ( 1 ) Before o r d u r i n g t r i a l , a p l e a of g u i l t y may be accepted when: " ( a ) t h e d e f e n d a n t e n t e r s a p l e a of g u i l t y i n open c o u r t ; and " ( b ) t h e c o u r t h a s informed t h e d e f e n d a n t of t h e consequences of h i s p l e a and of t h e maxi- mum p e n a l t y provided by l a w which may be imposed upon a c c e p t a n c e of such a p l e a . " ( 2 ) A t any t i m e b e f o r e or af ter judgment t h e c o u r t may, f o r good cause shown, p e r m i t t h e p l e a of g u i l t y to he withdrawn and a p l e a of n o t g u i l t y s u b s t i t u t e d . " The s t a n d a r d by which t h e v a l i d i t y of a g u i l t y p l e a is judged is whether t h e p l e a r e p r e s e n t s a v o l u n t a r y and i n t e l l i g e n t c h o i c e among t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s of a c t i o n open t o t h e d e f e n d a n t a s a f f i r m a t i v e l y d i s c l o s e d by t h e r e c o r d . S c h a n t l e v. C r i s t ( 1980 ), Mont . , 612 P.2d 673, 37 St.Rep. 1053; Yother v. S t a t e (1979 1 I Mont . -- - -- - - , 597 P.2d 79, 36 St.Rep. 1192. While it is clear t h a t c o u r t s a r e n o t r e q u i r e d t o a r t i c u l a t e s p e c i f i c r i g h t s when a c c e p t i n g a g u i l t y p l e a , an i n d e p t h examination by t h e c o u r t is d e s i r a b l e and mandatory i n cases where t h e record r e q u i r e s it. Yother , s u p r a . Here, t h e d i s c u s s i o n i n chambers between t h e c o u r t , s t a n d b y c o u n s e l and d e f e n d a n t was as f o l l o w s : "THE COURT: NOW, even though you h a v e n ' t a s k e d , consented f o r him to be your a t t o r n e y , I would l i k e t o a s k M r . Koch i f you b e l i e v e t h i s p l e a is now being e n t e r e d v o l u n t a r i l y w i t h f u l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of w h a t ' s involved? "MR. KOCH: I b e l i e v e t h a t he h a s your honor. "THE COURT: And you can s a y t h a t -- "MR. KOCH: I ' m n o t s u r e t h a t I b e l i e v e t h a t it is wise, b u t I b e l i e v e he knows what he is d o i n g . "THE COURT: Very w e l l . Can you s a y t h a t y o u ' r e e n t e r i n g t h i s p l e a v o l u n t a r i l y ? "MR. LANCE: Y e s , Your Honor. "THE COURT: With f u l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of w h a t ' s involved? A l l r i g h t . I ' l l a c c e p t your p l e a o f g u i l t y , and t h a t concludes t h e f u n c t i o n of t h e j u r y . " Here, it was n o t an i n t e l l i g e n t c h o i c e f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t to e n t e r a p l e a of g u i l t y when t h e r e was an a v a i l a b l e d e f e n s e i n t h e sta- t u t e . The meaning and consequences of s e c t i o n 45-5-304(3), MCA, s h o u l d have been e x p l a i n e d to t h e d e f e n d a n t and t h e r e c o r d is s i m p l y empty as t o any d i s c u s s i o n i n t h a t r e g a r d . W e t h e r e f o r e h o l d t h e District Court e r r e d i n a c c e p t i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a w i t h o u t f u l l y informing him of t h e a v a i l a b l e d e f e n s e to t h e c h a r g e . Although d e f e n d a n t waited o v e r t h r e e y e a r s t o move to withdraw h i s p l e a , c o n s i d e r i n g t h e f a c t s of t h i s case, undue d e l a y d i d n o t j u s t i f y t h e d e n i a l . A s we have a l r e a d y found r e v e r s i b l e error as t o t h e a c c e p t a n c e of t h e g u i l t y p l e a , w e w i l l n o t comment upon whether t h e p l e a w a s accepted i n open c o u r t as r e q u i r e d under s e c t i o n 46-16-105 (1) ( a ) , MCA. Judgment is r e v e r s e d , and t h i s cause is remanded to t h e District Court f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s w i t h d i r e c t i o n s to allow the appellant to withdraw h i s plea. We concur: Chief, Justice F = "