Case Title: In re Bruce S.

Citation: 2012-Ohio-5696

Docket Number: 2012-0059

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
Re Bruce S., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5696.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5696 
IN RE BRUCE S. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In Re Bruce S., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5696.] 
(No. 2012-0059—Submitted September 12, 2012—Decided December 6, 2012.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County,  
No. C-110042, 2011-Ohio-6634. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we answer a question certified, sua sponte, by the 
First District Court of Appeals:  “May Senate Bill 10’s classification, registration, 
and community-notification provisions be constitutionally applied to a sex 
offender who had committed his sex offense between the July 1, 2007, repeal of 
Megan’s Law and the January 1, 2008, effective date of Senate Bill 10’s 
classification, registration, and community-notification provisions?”  For the 
reasons that follow, we answer the question in the negative, as did the First 
District. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Bruce S., committed an act on September 1, 2007 that, if 
committed by an adult, would constitute rape.  On November 25, 2008, he was 
adjudicated delinquent, and the juvenile court, applying Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 
(“S.B. 10”), classified him as a Tier III (the most serious) sex offender, subject to 
community-notification requirements. 
{¶ 3} He appealed his classification, and the First District Court of 
Appeals reversed.  In re Bruce S., 1st Dist. No. C-081300 (Dec. 16, 2009).  It held 
that the juvenile court committed reversible error by failing to use its discretion to 
classify Bruce S. as a Tier I, Tier II, or Tier III sex offender.  Id.  Accordingly, it 
vacated the classification and remanded the case to the juvenile court to conduct a 
new classification hearing.  Id. 
{¶ 4} On remand, the juvenile court magistrate held a classification 
hearing on May 19, 2010.  The magistrate again classified Bruce S. as a Tier III 
sex offender.  The juvenile court judge overruled Bruce’s objections on December 
20, 2010. 
{¶ 5} Bruce S. appealed his classification, asserting that he should not be 
classified a Tier III sex offender under S.B. 10 because he committed his offense 
before the effective date of the applicable part of that statute.  The First District 
Court of Appeals agreed that the juvenile court had erred in applying S.B. 10 to 
him and reversed.  In re Bruce S., Hamilton App. No. C-110042, 2011-Ohio-
6634, ¶ 6.  But noting that its analysis was in conflict with the analysis of the 
Eighth District Court of Appeals, the First District certified the question to us.  Id. 
at ¶ 8.  Upon review, we agreed that the question was properly before us and 
ordered briefing.  In re Bruce S., 131 Ohio St.3d 1482, 2012-Ohio-1143, 963 
N.Ed.2d 823.  We now resolve the conflict. 
 
 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 6} In State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 
N.E.2d 1108, this court held, at syllabus:  “2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, as applied 
to defendants who committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, violates Section 
28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly 
from passing retroactive laws.”  Williams noted, in passing, that S.B. 10 “was 
enacted in 2007, and is based on the federal Adam Walsh Act, Section 16901 et 
seq., Title 42, U.S. Code.”  Id. at 7.  But it never addressed the discrete issue 
presented here, i.e., whether an individual who committed a sex offense after S.B. 
10’s “enactment” date1 (June 27, 2007) but before the date S.B. 10’s registration, 
classification and community-notification provisions became effective (January 1, 
2008) is subject to the S.B. 10’s provisions, or whether he is subject to the 
provisions of the predecessor statute, Megan’s Law, under which sex-offender 
registration requirements were less severe.  Id. at ¶ 16-20. 
{¶ 7} In considering that question, we are presented with two reasonable 
answers.  The First District in this case held that the critical date was January 1, 
2008.  In re Bruce S., 2011-Ohio-6634, ¶ 5.  But the Eighth District, in State v. 
Scott, Cuyahoga App. No. 91890, 2011-Ohio-6255, ¶ 5, summarily held that S.B. 
10’s enactment date of June 27, 2007, controls.  We adopt the reasoning of the 
First District, which applied Cox v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 67 Ohio St.2d 501, 
508, 424 N.E.2d 597 (1981). 
{¶ 8} In Cox, this court adopted a “well-stated” rule proffered by the 
Legislative Service Commission and held: 
 
                                                          
 
1 In this appeal, the state asserts that the enactment date is June 30, 2007, i.e., the date that the 
governor signed the bill.   In the conflict case, State v. Scott, Cuyahoga App. No. 91890, 2011-
Ohio-6255, the court treated June 27, 2007, the date the bill was passed, as its enactment date.  For 
purposes of this appeal, it is not necessary to resolve if the enactment date is June 27 or June 30, 
2007.  We shall use the state’s date, June 27, 2007, which is consistent with our prior opinion in 
Williams. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
“Where an act of the General Assembly amends an existing 
section of the Revised Code * * *, postpones the effective date of 
the amended section for one year after the effective date of the act, 
and repeals the ‘existing’ section in a standard form of repealing 
clause used for many years by the General Assembly for the 
purpose of complying with Section 15(D) of Article II of the 
Constitution of Ohio, the constitutionally mandated repealing 
clause must be construed to take effect upon the effective date of 
the amended section in order to prevent a hiatus in the statutory 
law, during which neither the repealed section nor the amended 
section is in effect.” 
 
(Footnote omitted.)  Cox at 508, quoting the Legislative Service Commission. 
{¶ 9} Cox reflects prudential principles that should be applied in all cases 
in which the General Assembly amends a statute and then repeals the pre-
amendment version of the statute.  In its arguments here, the state ignores Cox.  
The state asserts that S.B. 10 was an “emergency” law that necessarily became 
effective immediately.  But while the state argues that S.B. 10 became effectively 
immediately upon the governor’s signature, it also concedes “the enormity of this 
legislation required a period of transition to the new statutory scheme.”  We think 
S.B. 10 presents exactly the situation that Cox was designed to control:  to prevent 
a hiatus during the period in which the legislature amends a statute but directs the 
amendments take place in the future, and orders the repeal of the pre-amendment 
version of the statute after amendment. 
{¶ 10} Cox remains an accurate statement of Ohio law and controls here.  
The rule in Cox was suggested by the Legislative Service Commission, see Cox at 
508, which we recognize plays a vital role in assisting the General Assembly in 
drafting legislation.  See http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/about/default.htm 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
{¶ 11} Moreover, we presume that if the General Assembly disagreed with 
the rule set forth in Cox, it would have responded to it at some point in the past 
thirty years.  See State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 
N.E.2d 110, ¶ 22, citing Clark v. Scarpelli, 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 278, 744 N.E.2d 
719 (2001), citing State ex rel. Huron Cty. Bd. of Edn. v. Howard, 167 Ohio St. 
93, 96, 146 N.E.2d 604 (1957) (“It is presumed that the General Assembly is fully 
aware of any prior judicial interpretation of an existing statute when enacting an 
amendment”).  After all, “the General Assembly has shown no hesitation in acting 
promptly when it disagrees with appellate rulings involving statutory construction 
and interpretation.”  Id. at ¶ 23, citing Shay v. Shay, 113 Ohio St.3d 172, 2007-
Ohio-1384, 863 N.E.2d 591, ¶ 25.  It has not done so. 
{¶ 12} We thus adopt the First District’s analysis and judgment and hold 
that Senate Bill 10’s classification, registration, and community-notification 
provisions cannot be constitutionally applied to a sex offender who committed his 
sex offense between July 1, 2007, and December 31, 2007, the last day before 
January 1, 2008, the effective date of S.B 10’s classification, registration, and 
community-notification provisions. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. 
Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant, the state of Ohio. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Amanda S. Powell, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellee, Bruce S. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 
Taylor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal on behalf of amicus 
curiae, Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association.