Case Title: LESLIE WAKNIN V RICHARD CHAMBERLAIN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 120299

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chie f Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2002  
LESLIE WAKNIN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 120299  
RICHARD CHAMBERLAIN,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
PER CURIAM  
Defendant 
was 
convicted 
of 
assault 
and 
battery.  
Plaintiff, the victim, then brought this civil suit against  
defendant for assault and battery, in part on the basis of the  
same act that resulted in defendant’s conviction. The trial  
court, relying on Wheelock v Eyl, 393 Mich 74, 79; 223 NW2d  
276 
(1974), held that evidence of 
defendant’s 
conviction 
could  
not be introduced in this civil case.  The jury thereafter  
returned a verdict of no cause of action.  The trial court,  
relying on its earlier decision and MRE 403, denied  
plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.  The Court of Appeals,  
 
 
relying on MRE 403, affirmed.  Unpublished opinion per curiam,  
issued October 12, 2001 (Docket No. 224042).  Because we  
conclude that evidence of defendant’s conviction should not  
have been excluded in this subsequent civil case on the basis  
of either Wheelock or MRE 403, we reverse the judgment of the  
Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for a  
new trial.  
I  
Defendant was convicted of assault and battery for an  
incident that occurred on May 6, 1996. 
Subsequently,  
plaintiff, the victim of the incident that gave rise to  
defendant’s conviction, brought this civil suit against  
defendant, seeking damages for a series of assaults that  
allegedly occurred in July of 1995, as well as the alleged  
assault and battery of May 6, 1996, that resulted in  
defendant’s conviction. Defendant moved to exclude evidence  
of his prior conviction, and the trial court granted this  
motion, concluding that Wheelock bars the admission of a  
defendant’s conviction for purposes of establishing civil  
liability.1  Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict of  
1 Defendant also moved to preclude plaintiff from 
presenting any witnesses because plaintiff had been directed 
in a pretrial order to file with the court a list of 
witnesses, but he failed to do so.  As a result, the trial 
court only allowed plaintiff to present the witnesses that 
plaintiff had listed in his answer to an interrogatory asking 
plaintiff who he was going to call as witnesses.  Because  
plaintiff failed to list, as a potential witness, the police  
2  
  
no cause of action. Plaintiff then filed a motion for a new  
trial, arguing that the trial court had erred in excluding  
evidence of defendant’s conviction.  The trial court denied  
plaintiff’s motion, concluding that not only was evidence of  
the conviction inadmissible under Wheelock, but it was also  
inadmissible under MRE 403 because it would have been more  
prejudicial than probative.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the trial  
court.  The Court did not address the merits of the rule  
announced in Wheelock, but instead based its decision on MRE  
403. 
It concluded that the trial court had not abused its  
discretion in holding that the probative value of evidence of  
defendant’s conviction was outweighed by its prejudicial  
effect.2  
II  
officer who apparently was involved in the criminal assault 
and battery charge against defendant, the officer was not 
allowed to testify. We agree with the Court of Appeals that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it precluded 
this officer’s testimony.  The trial court may, pursuant to 
MCR 2.401(I)(2), preclude any witnesses not named in a witness 
list from testifying. In this case, plaintiff concedes that 
he did not file a witness list and offers no reason for  
failing to do so.  
2   The Court of Appeals also concluded that the trial  
court did not err in holding that defendant’s criminal 
conviction was not admissible for the purpose of impeachment 
because, pursuant to MRE 609(a), only crimes containing an 
element of dishonesty, false statement, or theft are  
admissible to impeach a witness, and an assault and battery 
conviction does not involve any of these elements.  
3  
 
 
 
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s  
decision whether to admit evidence.  People v Lukity, 460 Mich  
484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).  To the extent that this  
inquiry requires examination of the meaning of the Michigan  
Rules of Evidence, we address such a question in the same  
manner as the examination of the meaning of a court rule or a  
statute, which are questions of law that we review de novo.  
Id.; Cam Constr v Lake Edgewood Condominium Ass’n, 465 Mich  
549, 553; 640 NW2d 256 (2002).  
III  
This Court in Wheelock, supra at 79, stated that “a  
criminal conviction after trial, or plea, or payment of a fine  
is not admissible as substantive evidence of conduct at issue  
in a civil case arising out of the same occurrence.”  After  
Wheelock was decided, the Michigan Rules of Evidence were  
adopted.
 An analysis of these rules, as discussed below,  
leads us to conclude that the rule announced in Wheelock, at  
least as it pertains to the use of a conviction in a  
subsequent civil case, did not survive their adoption. This  
Court has previously determined that a rule announced in an  
opinion by this Court did not survive the adoption of the  
Michigan Rules of Evidence.  See People v Kreiner, 415 Mich  
372, 377; 329 NW2d 716 (1982)(holding that the “tender years”  
exception did not survive the adoption of the Michigan Rules  
4  
of Evidence). “In Kreiner, this Court essentially held that  
the Michigan Rules of Evidence constituted a codification of  
the rules of evidence that superseded the common-law rules.”  
People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 502, n 12; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).  
MRE 101 provides that “[t]hese rules govern proceedings  
in the courts of this state to the extent and with the  
exceptions stated in Rule 1101.” None of the exceptions set  
forth in rule 1101 are applicable here.  One of the rules that  
govern court proceedings in this state is MRE 402.  MRE 402  
provides that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except  
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United  
States, the Constitution of the State of Michigan, these  
rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court.”  MRE 401  
defines relevant evidence as that “having any tendency to make  
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the  
determination of the action more probable or less probable  
than it would be without the evidence.”  
In this case, the fact that defendant had been convicted  
of assault and battery for the same conduct that plaintiff is  
now seeking civil damages for certainly “would have a tendency  
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence . .  
. more probable or less probable than it would be without the  
evidence.”  Accordingly, defendant’s conviction is relevant  
evidence, and thus admissible, unless otherwise precluded by  
5  
 
 
 
the Michigan or federal constitution, the rules of evidence,  
or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court.  
In our judgment, the trial court abused its discretion in  
finding that defendant’s conviction was more prejudicial than  
probative. 
 
MRE 
403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence 
may  
be 
excluded 
if 
its probative value is substantially 
outweighed  
by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”  (Emphasis added.)  
Evidence is 
not 
inadmissible 
simply 
because it is prejudicial.  
Clearly, in every case, each party attempts to introduce  
evidence that causes prejudice to the other party.  In People  
v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75-76; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), we stated:  
All evidence offered by the parties is  
"prejudicial" to some extent, but the fear of 
prejudice does not generally render the evidence 
inadmissible. It is only when the probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice that evidence is excluded.  
“Relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial; 
but it is only unfair prejudice, substantially 
outweighing 
probative 
value, 
which 
permits 
exclusion of relevant matter under Rule 403. . . .  
Its major function is limited to excluding matter 
of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in 
by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial 
effect. . . .  It is not designed to permit the 
court to ‘even out’ the weight of the evidence, to 
mitigate a crime, or to make a contest where there 
is little or none.”  [United States v McRae, 593 
F2d 700, 707 (CA 5, 1979).][3]  
3 Similarly, in People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 398; 582 
NW2d 785 (1998), we stated: “Rule 403 does not prohibit 
prejudicial evidence; only evidence that is unfairly so. 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger 
that marginally probative evidence will be given undue or 
preemptive weight by the jury.”  
6  
 
 
In this case, the trial court concluded that “the  
prejudicial effect would clearly outweigh any probative  
value.”
 The Court of Appeals agreed with this conclusion  
without conducting its own analysis.  The lower courts here  
appear to have focused exclusively on the word “prejudice” and  
overlooked the word “unfair.” As we have repeatedly stated,  
only 
evidence 
whose 
probative 
value 
is 
substantially  
outweighed by its unfair prejudice is inadmissible. The trial  
court here stated:  
[C]learly 
the 
prejudicial 
effect 
[of 
defendant’s 
conviction] 
would 
be 
tremendous.  
Essentially, school would be out. Plaintiff wants  
to just prove his civil case by introducing the 
conviction that was secured in district court, and 
obviously that would be a bombshell against a 
defendant in a civil case who had the jury find out  
And, in People v Vasher, 449 Mich 494, 501; 537 NW2d 168 
(1995), we stated:  
In this context, prejudice means more than 
simply damage to the opponent's cause.  A party's 
case is always damaged by evidence that the facts 
are contrary to his contentions, but that cannot be 
grounds for exclusion.  What is meant here is an  
undue tendency to move the tribunal to decide on an 
improper basis, commonly, though not always, an 
emotional one.  
Evidence 
presents 
the 
danger 
of 
unfair  
prejudice when it threatens the fundamental goals 
of MRE 403: accuracy and fairness.  Gold, Federal  
Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the nature of  
unfairly prejudicial evidence, 58 Wash L R 497 
(1983).  The perceived danger here is that the jury 
would decide that this evidence is more probative 
of a fact than it actually is.  
7  
that a different jury in a criminal case had 
convicted him of an assault.  
Although we agree with the lower courts that the admission of  
defendant’s conviction would be prejudicial, we do not agree  
that this prejudicial effect would be unfair.  
Defendant’s 
conviction 
is 
not 
merely 
marginally 
probative  
evidence, and thus there is no danger that marginally  
probative evidence will be given undue weight by the jury.  
Rather, that defendant was found guilty beyond a reasonable  
doubt—a standard 
of 
proof 
granting 
him protection greater than  
the preponderance of the evidence standard in the civil  
case—is highly probative evidence.  Where a civil case arises  
from the same incident that resulted in a criminal conviction,  
the admission of evidence of the criminal conviction during  
the civil case is prejudicial for precisely the same reason it  
is probative.  That fact does not, without more, render  
admission of evidence of a criminal conviction unfair, i.e.,  
substantially more prejudicial than probative.  Defendant had  
an opportunity and an incentive to defend himself in the  
criminal proceeding.  For these reasons, we conclude that the  
trial court abused its discretion in precluding evidence of  
defendant’s conviction on the basis that its probative value  
was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair  
prejudice.  
We express no opinion regarding whether pleas of nolo  
8  
 
contendere 
are 
admissible 
as 
substantive 
evidence in  
subsequent civil proceedings.  
IV  
The trial court abused its discretion in barring the  
admission of evidence of defendant’s conviction by a jury on  
the basis that the introduction of this evidence would violate  
MRE 403.  To the extent that Wheelock is inconsistent with the  
subsequently enacted Rules of Evidence, it did not survive  
their adoption. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the  
Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for a  
new trial.  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
CAVANAGH, J.  
I would not dispose of this case by opinion per curiam,  
but would grant leave to appeal.  
Michael F. Cavanagh  
9