Case Title: Little America Refining Co. v. Witt

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Little America Refining Co. v. Witt1993 WY 76854 P.2d 51Case Number: 92-245Decided: 06/04/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of the 
Workers' Compendation Claim of LITTLE AMERICA REFINING CO., 

Appellant 
(Petitioner/Employer),

v.

David 
WITT,

 Appellee 
(Respondent/Claimant).

 

Stephenson D. 
Emery of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, for 
appellant.

Eric A. Easton, 
Casper, for appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      An employer 
challenges a worker's compensation award to its employee on three 
grounds:

First, the employer 
questions whether the independent hearing examiner had jurisdiction to issue an 
order scheduling a contested case hearing before the worker's compensation 
division had taken its final action on the worker's claim. We hold that the 
hearing examiner had jurisdiction to issue the scheduling order.

Second, the employer 
asserts that the award decision must be reversed because the employee failed 
timely to report the occurrence and general nature of the accident to the 
employer within seventy-two hours "after the general nature of the injury became 
apparent" to the worker, as required by WYO. STAT. § 27-14-502(a) (1991). We 
hold that the employee timely reported the occurrence and general nature of the 
accident within the requisite time period "after the general nature of the 
injury became apparent" to him.

Finally, the employer 
contends the hearing examiner's decision that the employee's injury arose out of 
his employment is not supported by substantial evidence, is arbitrary and 
capricious, and is characterized by an abuse of discretion. We hold that the 
hearing examiner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious, and is not the product of an abuse of 
discretion.

[¶2]      We affirm the 
hearing examiner's decision.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant Little 
America Refining Company presents its three principal contentions through these 
issues:

1. Did the Office of 
Administrative Hearings (hereinafter referred to as "Office") issue its "Order 
Setting Hearing," dated December 31, 1991, in excess of its statutory 
jurisdiction, authority or limitations?

2. Was the Office's 
finding that "[i]t therefore seems most likely that the injury occured [sic] on 
October 7 or 9, and not over a substantial period of time," supported by 
substantial evidence?

3. Was the Office's 
conclusion that "[o]n or about October 7 or 8, 1991, Claimant sustained a 
work-related injury . . .," arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law?

4. Was the Office's 
finding and conclusion that "[c]laimant timely notified his employer and timely 
filed a Report of Injury," supported by substantial evidence or arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law?

5. Was the Office's 
finding that claimant rebutted, by clear and convincing evidence, the 
presumptive denial of benefits pursuant to W.S. 27-14-502(c), supported by 
substantial evidence?

6. Was the Office's 
finding and conclusion that "[t]he injury does not come from a hazard to which 
Claimant would have been equally exposed outside of his employment," supported 
by substantial evidence or arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law?

[¶4]      Appellee David 
Witt counters with this statement of the issues:

1. Was the decision of 
the Administrative Hearing Officer dated April 20, 1992 awarding benefits to 
Petitioner supported by substantial evidence?

2. Was the finding of the 
Administrative Hearing Officer that the Employee-Claimant timely notified his 
employer and timely filed a report of injury, supported by substantial 
evidence?

3. Did the Administrative 
Hearing Officer have authority to hear this matter?

FACTS

[¶5]      David Witt 
(employee) was employed as a maintenance mechanic and heavy equipment operator 
by Little America Refining Co. (employer) for seventeen years. Following a 
nine-day elk hunting vacation during which he walked more than eight miles a day 
in mountainous terrain, the employee returned to work on October 7, 1991. During 
his hunting vacation he had no accidents, received no injuries, was pain free, 
and he remained so upon his return to work. On October 7, the employee put a 
seal and a power steering pump on a backhoe. Between October 8 and October 21, 
he worked on a pipe cutting and moving job. The pipe on which he worked was in 
random lengths, one being seventy-two feet long. The size of the pipe ranged 
from two-inch to six-inch; the weight was about three pounds per foot. On 
occasion, the employee, along with a co-worker, had to lift the pipe and move it 
a distance of about ten feet.

[¶6]      On October 17, 
1991, the employee told his supervisor, Joe Koenig, that he had been feeling 
some pain in his back for some time, it was affecting his leg, it was not 
getting better, and he needed a doctor to look at it. He told Koenig that he was 
not sure what had caused the pain, that it could be from a 1986 work-related 
back injury. According to Koenig, the employee told him he was feeling "kind of 
a tingling sense * * * going down his arm and leg * * * and he thought that he 
might have reinjured his back * * *." Under cross-examination at the hearing, 
the employee did not identify any particular incident during the period of 
October 8 to 17 when he was working with the pipe in which he felt a pop and 
then immediate pain; rather, during that time period his back became 
progressively worse. The employee's co-worker on October 8, was Larry Smith, an 
employee of Halston Services and on temporary assignment to the employer. Smith 
testified that on October 8, when he and the employee were picking up a heavy 
strand of pipe, the employee "started talking about his back was stinging." He 
further testified that the employee "really didn't complain about saying he just 
hurt his back. He said his back was hurting." Smith told him to sit down for 
awhile, which he did.

[¶7]      Although the 
employee informed his supervisor of his sore back and tingling leg and the need 
to see a doctor, he did not receive permission from his supervisor to see the 
doctor until October 22. On that day, the employee called to arrange a doctor's 
appointment. The doctor, a neurosurgeon who had attended and operated on the 
employee for the previous back injury, could not see the employee until November 
6. From October 22 to November 6, the employee remained at work performing 
routine maintenance tasks.

[¶8]      Following his 
doctor's appointment on November 6, the employee had a magnetic resonance 
imaging test (MRI). On November 11, his doctor told him he had a herniated disk 
at the L4-5 level in his lower back and that this injury was new and unrelated 
to the previous one. After receiving his doctor's diagnosis and suggested course 
of treatment which was surgery, the employee returned to work that day and told 
his supervisor of the diagnosis and surgery. On November 13, pursuant to 
Koenig's instruction, the employee told Bob MacNamara, the employer's accounting 
and office manager, of the diagnosis and need for surgery. The employee filed a 
written report of injury and a claim that same day. The worker's compensation 
division, the clerk of the district court, and the employer all received copies 
of that filing.

[¶9]      On November 15, 
1991, the employer filed its report of injury disputing the validity of the 
claimed injury:

At issue is whether the 
back problem is a result of workplace or off duty injury. [The employee] stated 
that he had told his supervisor that he had a sore back in mid-October, but that 
he could not remember when he hurt it. Joe Koenig, his supervisor, remembered 
[the employee] mentioning a sore back, but since [he] was not able to explain a 
specific incident, Joe did not feel that the complaint warranted an injury 
report.

On November 18, 
1991, the clerk of court informed the employee of the employer's objection to 
his claim and advised him to contact the clerk's office for an explanation of 
the procedure for protesting the employer's denial of the claim.

[¶10]   On December 2, 1991, the employee 
filed an amended report of injury. On December 6, 1991, the clerk of court 
received and filed the division's "Initial Review-Employer Dispute" document 
dated December 4. The document requested that the employee provide a written 
response to the employer's objection and informed the parties that unless the 
division received an objection to the division's conclusion by December 23, 
1991, the division's conclusion would become the final determination. By letter 
dated December 10, the employee responded to the division's request. He noted 
his objection to the employer's objection, asserted the injury occurred at work, 
and stated he had informed his supervisor on October 17. On December 16, 1991, 
the clerk of court filed the employee's written explanation for claiming 
benefits. In this narrative, the employee explained in pertinent 
part:

I feel this was a work 
related injury because of the job I was assigned prior to the time I began to 
feel the pain. Approximately seven to ten days prior to the pain, I was lifting 
1" to 3" pipe from a pipe rack on the ground and moving it by hand in order to 
pick [it] up with the winch truck. I have done nothing outside of work that 
could cause this type of injury.

[¶11]   On December 26, 1991, the clerk of 
court transmitted the claim file to the Office of Administrative Hearings. The 
hearing examiner issued an order on January 2, 1992, setting the contested case 
hearing for January 28, 1992. By letter dated January 3, 1992, the division sent 
the employee a document entitled "Initial Review Concerning Claim For Benefits" 
in which it stated the conclusion that the employee was ineligible for the 
benefits claimed. This document was filed January 13, 1992. The division advised 
the employee that he "may" submit a written objection to the conclusion by 
January 22, but if he did not then the conclusion "will become the division's 
final determination."

[¶12]   The contested case hearing was held 
on January 28, 1992, before the independent hearing examiner. Neither the 
employer nor the division questioned the hearing examiner's jurisdiction to 
conduct the hearing. Witnesses testifying at the hearing included the employee, 
his supervisor, the office manager and a co-worker. The hearing officer recessed 
the hearing to permit taking the deposition of the employee's neurosurgeon. The 
deposition was taken February 24, 1992, and incorporated into the hearing 
record. On April 16, 1992, the hearing examiner heard final argument from the 
parties. He filed the order awarding benefits to the employee on April 20, 
1992.

[¶13]   The employer filed a petition for 
review with the district court; that court upheld the hearing examiner's 
decision. The employer timely filed this appeal.

DISCUSSION

1. 
Jurisdiction.

[¶14]   In its first contention challenging 
the hearing examiner's decision, the employer asserts that the hearing examiner 
lacked jurisdiction to issue the December 31, 1991 order setting the contested 
case hearing for January 28, 1992, because the division had not yet made a final 
determination about the employee's claim. In the employer's view, the hearing 
examiner did not have a "ripe" contested case on December 31, 1991. In support 
of this position, the employer points to the provisions of WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-601(e) (1991) and the division's rules promulgated thereunder for 
authority that the division must reach a final decision before the clerk of the 
district court may refer the case for review by the hearing examiner. The 
referenced statutory provision provides that settlement of the compensability of 
an injury through interviews with employees, the employer and health care 
personnel or through review of written reports "shall not exceed ninety (90) 
days from the date the accident report or claim is filed." WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-601(e). The division's rule provides that the clerk of the district court 
shall refer the matter to a hearing examiner if the division has not made a 
decision within ninety days. State of Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division 
Rules, Regulations and Fee Schedules, ch. VI, § 2(c). Thus, the employer 
reasons, even if the division does nothing with respect to a disputed claim, the 
parties must wait ninety days before a contested case hearing can be 
requested.

[¶15]   The division issued on January 3, 
1992, its document entitled "Initial Review Concerning Claim For Benefits" in 
which it notified the employee of the division's conclusion that he was 
ineligible for the benefits claimed. Neither the division nor the employer 
raised any objection about jurisdiction before the hearing examiner at any time 
from the date of the order setting a hearing through the date of the hearing 
examiner's final decision in April, 1992. Despite the division's initial review 
and the failure to object to jurisdiction, the employer maintains that we should 
remand this matter to the division with instructions to render a final decision 
on the claim.

[¶16]   Countering the employer's 
contention, the employee points out the following statutory 
provision:

(b) If the employer 
objects to the compensability of the injury or death resulting from injury, to 
the right of the employee to receive compensation, to the amount of compensation 
or to amounts or procedures claimed for medical or hospital care, or if a health 
care provider objects to the amount paid under this act, or at the request of 
the employee, the clerk of court shall upon receipt of notice of objection, 
refer the case to a hearing examiner who shall set the case for hearing at the 
earliest opportunity. The case shall be determined by a hearing examiner in 
accordance with the law in effect at the time of the injury following the 
contested case procedures of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act and the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure as applicable under rules of the office of 
administrative hearings. Appeals may be taken from the decision by any party to 
the contested case to the district court as provided by the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act. Hearings may be held in any area of Wyoming giving 
consideration to the convenience of the employee, employer and 
division.

WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-602(b) (1991). Given this straight-forward language, the employee 
maintains that from the time of the employer's filing of its first objection to 
the claim, it was evident the objection could not be resolved; thus, under the 
plain language of the statute, it was proper for the clerk of the district court 
to refer the case to the hearing examiner for hearing at the earliest 
opportunity. The employee asserts that any construction of the statute other 
than this would lead to unnecessary delays.

[¶17]   Reflecting upon the manner in which 
the parties have presented this issue of statutory interpretation to us, we find 
that we are in that facet of appellate review involving the choice, 
interpretation and application of the controlling legal precepts. In that facet 
the scope of our review is plenary. Ruggero J. Aldisert, OPINION WRITING, § 5.4, 
at 53, 66-67 (1990); see also Ruggero J. Aldisert, THE APPELLATE BAR: 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE - A VIEW FROM THE 
JAUNDICED EYE OF ONE APPELLATE JUDGE, 11 Cap.U.L.Rev. 445, 467, 471-72 
(1982).

[¶18]   From our consideration of the 
following factors, we find that the employee presents the better argument. We 
comprehensively reviewed our method of statutory construction in Parker Land 
& Cattle v. Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040 (Wyo. 1993). To 
determine the lawgiver's intent, we construe the statute as a whole and all 
components of the statute in pari materia. Parker at 1042. If the language is 
unambiguous, we do not usually resort to application of rules of construction. 
Parker at 1043, 1045. "If the language of a statute communicates a plain meaning 
to this court, that meaning will be applied." Parker at 1043 (quoting Zmijewski 
v. Wright, 809 P.2d 280, 282 (Wyo. 1991)). The worker's compensation statutory 
scheme must be construed as a whole, its component parts in pari materia. In a 
worker's compensation case, the case pleadings include the employee's report of 
injury, the employer's report of injury, the employee's claim, and other 
documents filed with the clerk of the district court and the division. WYO. 
STAT. § 27-214-602(c) (1991). The case file maintained by the clerk of the 
district court is the official case file for purposes of any contested case 
proceeding under the act. WYO. STAT. § 27-14-601(n) (1991). The division 
receives and reviews the initial reports from the employee and the employer to 
determine compensability of the injury and jurisdiction. WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-601(a) (1991). If either the division determines noncompensability or the 
employer objects to compensability, no subsequent claim for compensation shall 
be approved until the hearing examiner renders a decision after a contested case 
hearing. See, §§ 27-14-601(a); 27-14-602. If the employer objects to 
compensability of the injury and the employee's right to receive compensation, 
upon receipt of that objection the clerk of the district court shall refer the 
case to a hearing examiner who shall set the case for hearing at the earliest 
opportunity. WYO. STAT. § 27-14-602(b). "The hearing examiner has exclusive 
jurisdiction to make the final administrative determination of the validity and 
amount of compensation payable under [the] act." WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-602(c).

[¶19]   The statute states the employee 
may file written objection to the division's determination of 
noncompensability of an injury within ten days of notice of that determination. 
WYO. STAT. § 27-14-601(a). Subsection (e) states the division has a time limit 
of fifteen days for its initial review and ninety days to settle the 
compensability of an injury and disability claims. WYO. STAT. § 27-14-601(e). We 
find nothing in the overall statutory scheme that prohibits what was done in 
this instance. When the clerk of the district court transmitted the case to the 
hearing examiner on December 26, 1991, that court official was simply following 
the plain command of the statute. Upon receipt of the employer's objection, the 
clerk shall refer the case to the hearing examiner who shall set 
the case for hearing at the earliest opportunity. WYO. STAT. § 27-14-602(b). We 
find a legislative intent to expedite the disposition of the worker's 
claim.

[¶20]   We consider the following: 1) both 
the division and the hearing examiner engage in administrative 
determinations, with the latter enjoying the exclusive jurisdiction to make 
the final determination of the validity and amount of compensation; 2) 
legislative intent is for an expeditious disposition of a claim; and 3) we 
liberally construe the statutory provisions "to accomplish the benevolent 
purpose for which they were promulgated."1 We hold, therefore, that the 
hearing examiner acquired jurisdiction for purposes of initiating the contested 
case proceedings under his exclusive jurisdiction when the clerk of the district 
court transmitted the official case file to him on December 26, 1991. WYO. STAT. 
§ 27-14-602(b). On December 31, 1992, when the hearing examiner issued the order 
setting the case for hearing, he was acting within his jurisdiction.

2. Employee's 
timely report.

[¶21]   In its second contention 
challenging the hearing examiner's decision, the employer maintains that the 
employee's claim is barred because he failed timely to "report the occurrence 
and general nature of the accident" to his employer within seventy-two hours 
"after the general nature of the injury became apparent," as required by WYO. 
STAT. § 27-14-502(a) (1991). Pointing to § 27-14-502(c), the employer correctly 
notes that the employee's failure to report the accident within the requisite 
time period prescribed by subsection (a), gives rise to a presumption that the 
claim shall be denied. The employer's contention is premised on the assumption 
that the date of the employee's injury was either October 7 or 8, 1991. As 
viewed by the employer, the employee had to report the accident to his employer 
by either October 10 or 11 under the seventy-two hour rule. Since it is 
undisputed that the employee did not report his back pain to his supervisor 
until October 17, the employer concludes that the presumption arose that the 
claim should be denied.

[¶22]   The employer asserts that the 
hearing examiner made no specific finding as to when "the general nature of the 
[employee's] injury became apparent" to him. Furthermore, the employer contends 
that the hearing examiner apparently determined, albeit incorrectly, that the 
employee did not become aware of the general nature of his injury until the date 
of diagnosis, which was November 13, 1991. Because the employee believed that 
his back pain was related to his prior work-related injury, the employer reasons 
that the employee knew his back was injured on October 7 or 8 and had to report 
it within three days to his employer or face claim denial.

[¶23]   Disagreeing with the employer's 
analysis, the employee maintains that Big Horn Coal Co. v. Wartensleben, 502 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1972) is dispositive. There, on July 20, 1971, the employee, with 
no history of previous back injury or back pain, began to suffer muscle spasms 
in his lower back area while operating a scraper, a rough-riding piece of 
equipment. Having no awareness of the cause of the spasms, he saw a doctor who 
told him it was probably just nerves. He returned to work but was laid off in 
September, 1971. Apparently in late November, 1971, he entered the hospital 
where x-rays and a myelogram revealed a back injury. Upon learning that 
diagnosis, he immediately filed a report of the occurrence and compensation 
claim. The surgeon who operated to correct the back injury opined that the 
injury occurred July 20, 1971, and was work-related. The statute then in effect 
required the employee to report the occurrence of an accident causing injury 
within twenty-four hours after the injury.2 The trial court found from the 
evidence that the employee did not know he had suffered a compensable injury 
until the x-rays were taken and the myelogram performed and that he timely filed 
his report and claim immediately after acquiring that knowledge.

[¶24]   In affirming the trial court's 
decision in Big Horn, this court observed that the "question of the time when 
the employee first knows that he has suffered an injury which results in, or is 
likely to cause, compensable disability is of course one for the trial judge," 
which "turns on findings of fact from the evidence." Big Horn, 502 P.2d  at 187, 
189. In Big Horn, we reaffirmed the long-standing principle that, in the context 
of the statutory requirement that an employee must timely report the occurrence 
causing an injury, "the term `injury' as used in the compensation statutes means 
compensable injury." Big Horn, 502 P.2d  at 188. When Big Horn was decided, the 
standard of review of findings of fact was that the reviewing court accepted as 
true the evidence favorable to the winning party in the trial court. Today, with 
the hearing examiner's decision being administrative in nature, our standard of 
review of his factual findings is whether they are supported by substantial 
evidence in light of the whole record.

[¶25]   The above principle concerning a 
compensable injury was operative in Baldwin, 50 Wyo. at 535, 62 P.2d  at 538-39. 
There, on July 15, 1934, while he and co-workers were unloading heavy steel pipe 
from a truck, the employee was struck a glancing blow over the right hip with 
the end of a pipe. Continuing to work, the employee experienced some pain, which 
at first was minimal and then progressively worse. In August, 1934, in order to 
determine the cause of his pain, the employee sought medical advice. From late 
August, 1934, to mid-January, 1935, the doctors he consulted treated him for 
arthritic rheumatism. Finally, in mid-January, 1935, one of his doctors 
determined from x-rays that the employee's condition was due to a fracture in 
the upper edge of the posterior rim of the acetabulum attributable to the July 
accident. The statute then in effect required the employee to file his claim 
within five months after the day on which the injury occurred.3 Against the employer's contention 
that the employee's filing in April, 1935, was untimely given the date of injury 
of July 15, 1934, the trial court found that the employee's compensable injury 
and disability dated from mid-January, 1935, when his condition was first 
correctly diagnosed.

[¶26]   In affirming the trial court's 
award, this court observed:

Medical science and 
diagnosis have advanced with well-nigh miraculous strides in the last decade or 
two, yet they cannot at this time, and probably never will be able to foretell 
accurately the reaction of every particular human body to every particular hurt 
it may sustain in industrial employment. Under these circumstances it seems to 
us palpably unjust to the employee to deny him compensation because he has tried 
to keep his place on the employer's payroll by doing his regular work and then 
has found that conditions produced at the time of the accident, and which 
medical science could not recognize or whose final consequences it could not 
forecast, have gradually and ultimately produced a compensable injury. We do not 
think the language employed in the law by our state legislature was reasonably 
intended to produce any such result.

Baldwin, 50 Wyo. 
at 530-31, 62 P.2d  at 539. This court has consistently upheld the Baldwin 
principle. See, e.g., Matter of Injury to Klevgard, 747 P.2d 509 (Wyo. 1987); 
Matter of Meredith, 743 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 1987); Pacific Power & Light Co. v. 
Rupe, 741 P.2d 609 (Wyo. 1987); In the Matter of Barnes, 587 P.2d 214 (Wyo. 
1978).

[¶27]   Klevgard is helpful to our 
resolution of the instant case. There, a registered nurse employed by a hospital 
hurt her back while lifting a patient from a wheelchair to a bed. Sometime 
between July 1 and July 11, 1986, she filled out an undated incident report 
which indicated she experienced lower back pain and pain in her right buttock 
area. The employer's director of nursing discussed the incident report with the 
employee on July 12, 1986. At the employee's routine physical examination on 
July 30, 1986, she reported no back problems other than congenital scoliosis. In 
mid-September, 1986, the employee spent four days on a wood-gathering vacation 
with her husband, at the end of which she was limping and complaining of back 
pain. A few days later, in late September, an examining doctor diagnosed her 
condition as a herniated disk. In October, 1986, the doctor and the employee 
discussed surgery. In late October, 1986, the employee filed her claim; the 
employer objected in early November. The employee had an early December 
myelogram followed within a few days by surgery.

[¶28]   In Klevgard, one of the employer's 
objections was that the employee failed to report to her employer "the 
occurrence and general nature of the injury * * * within twenty-four (24) hours 
after the injury became apparent," as required by the statute then in effect.4 The trial court found that the 
employee had complied with the rule. After noting that the question of when an 
employee first realized that she suffered a compensable injury is one for the 
trier of fact, we held substantial evidence existed "to warrant the trial 
court's finding that [the employee] first realized she had a compensable injury 
when the final diagnosis, rendered on December 1, 1986, revealed the herniated 
disk." Klevgard, 747 P.2d  at 510. We choose to follow this line of decisions 
again today.

[¶29]   Although the hearing examiner did 
not make an express finding that the general nature of the employee's injury 
became apparent to him on November 11, 1991, when his doctor gave him the 
diagnosis of the herniated disk, that factual finding is so implicit in the 
hearing examiner's stated findings as to be tantamount to an express finding. 
Applying our standard of review, we find substantial evidence from the whole 
record to support those findings. Since we find that the Baldwin line of cases, 
including Big Horn, is controlling, we hold that no error exists on this second 
contention.

3. 
Work-related injury.

[¶30]   The employer's final contention is 
that the hearing examiner's decision that the employee's herniated disk injury 
arose out of his employment is not supported by substantial evidence, is 
arbitrary and capricious, or is the product of an abuse of discretion. Our 
standard of review for this contention is well known:

We examine the entire 
record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support an agency's 
findings. If the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we 
cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the agency, and must uphold 
the findings on appeal. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a 
reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusion of the agency. It is 
more than a scintilla of evidence.

Worker's Comp. 
Div. v. Hollister, 794 P.2d 886, 891 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting Trout v. Wyoming Oil 
& Gas Conservation Comm'n, 721 P.2d 1047, 1050 (1986)) (citation 
omitted).

[¶31]   The employee testified that he was 
pain free while on his elk hunting vacation and on October 7, 1991, his first 
day of employment upon return from that trip and that during the period from 
October 8 to October 17 his back became progressively worse. The employee's 
co-worker, Larry Smith, testified that on October 8, while lifting heavy pipe 
the employee complained about his lower back, and the employee's neurosurgeon 
testified that the employee's herniated disk more likely than not was caused by 
his work activities during the October 8 to October 17 time period. Despite all 
this testimony, the employer asserts that other, conflicting evidence exists 
which the hearing examiner ignored. In particular, the employer points to 
conflicting evidence given by the employee, i.e., in his November 6 office visit 
he told his doctor that he had been experiencing pain for six weeks or longer 
which would place the onset of the pain earlier than October 7 or 8.

[¶32]   The hearing examiner heard all the 
testimony elicited by direct and cross-examination and observed the witnesses' 
demeanor. The resolution of conflicts in that testimony was for the hearing 
examiner to make. We cannot substitute our judgment for his as long as the 
record reveals substantial evidence to support his resolution of the conflict in 
the evidence. We hold that substantial evidence exists to support his decision 
that the employee's herniated disk was work-related.

[¶33]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 
Wyo. 508, 529-30, 62 P.2d 531, 538, 108 A.L.R. 304 (1936).

2 WYO. STAT. § 27-104 
(1957).

3 WYO. STAT. § 124-112 
(1931).

4 WYO. STAT. § 
27-12-502(a) (1977).