Case Title: In re Adoption of SMR

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-98-7

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Adoption of SMR1999 WY 89982 P.2d 1246Case Number: C-98-7Decided: 06/25/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

 

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF 
SMR, a minor child

 

MVC and SC, Appellants 
(Petitioners),

 

v.

 

MB, Appellee 
(Respondent).

 

                       
        

Appeal from the District Court 
of Sheridan County Honorable John

C. Brackley, Judge.

 

   Michael K. Shoumaker, Sheridan, 
WY. Representing Appellants:

  Jan Flaharty, 
Family Law Office, Sheridan, WY. Representing 
Appellee.

 

   
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, 
JJ.

 

   
HILL, Justice.

   
[¶1]    At the 
request of the natural parents, appellants MVC and SC (the Guardians) became the 
legal guardians for SR, a minor child, and served in this crucial capacity for 
approximately three and one-half years. The Guardians then petitioned to adopt 
SR with the consent of SR's natural father. However, SR's natural mother 
objected. After a hearing, the district court denied the Guardians' petition, 
finding that SR's natural mother had not willfully abandoned SR. The Guardians 
claim the evidence is insufficient to support the district court's decision, and 
that the district court erred in failing to consider Mother's lack of 
contribution to the financial support of the child as a separate basis on which 
to grant their petition. Finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's 
determination, we affirm.

 

                              
ISSUES

 

  [¶2]    Appellants present a single 
issue for review:

 

Did the District Court Err By Failing to Terminate 
the Parental Rights of [MB][?]

 

 Appellee MB (Mother) responds with the 
following issues:

 

A. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in 
finding that there was not clear and convincing evidence to justify terminating 
Appellee's parental rights on the grounds of willful abandonment, pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. § 1-22-110(a)(iii)?

 

B. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by 
failing to consider whether Appellee's parental rights should be terminated 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 1-22-110(a)(iv) for willful failure to contribute to 
the support of the child?

 

                               
FACTS

 

 [¶3]       SR was born in November of 1991. MB 
(Mother) was 18 years old, unmarried, and living with Father. The three lived in 
the same household until February of 1993, when Father joined the military. In 
April of 1993, Mother accepted a job which required her to travel out of the 
state. Due to Father's assignment overseas and the travel requirements of 
Mother's job, Mother and Father determined that SR should live with the 
Guardians, Father's aunt and uncle. To facilitate the arrangement, the parents 
stipulated to the transfer of SR's legal guardianship, which was so ordered in 
July of 1993. When Mother returned to Sheridan to sign the guardianship 
documents, she was terminated from her job. Although Mother remained in Sheridan 
as a consequence, she did not attempt to alter the guardianship 
arrangement.

 

 [¶4]       According to Mother, the parties agreed 
that she would forward any of the courtordered child support payments made by 
Father to the Guardians. Mother received three child support payments from 
Father in 1993 but retained the funds for her personal use.  Mother also testified that the Guardians 
agreed to call her if the child needed anything.

 

 [¶5]       In January of 1994, Mother filed a 
petition to terminate the guardianship, but the proceeding was stayed because 
Father had not been notified. Frustrated with the delay, Mother withdrew her 
petition and subsequently moved to North Carolina in July of 1994. She returned 
to Sheridan in February of 1995 and later contacted an attorney to seek advice on 
reestablishing custody of the child. However, no action was taken as a result of 
this consultation.

 

 [¶6]       In February of 1997, Mother relocated to 
Nevada, where she now lives with her current husband and their child. Since 
stipulating to the guardianship in 1993, Mother has had intermittent personal 
and telephone contact with the child, primarily during SR's visits with her 
parents. She has not contributed to SR's financial support, and the Guardians 
have made no request that she do so.

 

 [¶7]       In June of 1997, the Guardians filed a 
petition for adoption. Father provided written consent, but Mother refused and 
filed an answer in opposition to the adoption. One month later, Mother countered 
with a petition to revoke the guardianship. On June 12, 1998, the district court 
held a bifurcated hearing which separated the evidence relating to the petition 
for adoption and the evidence regarding Mother's petition to terminate the 
guardianship. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court denied both 
petitions. The district court concluded that the Guardians had failed to present 
clear and convincing evidence that Mother willfully abandoned SR, but determined 
that the guardianship should remain in place while providing for an increase in 
Mother's visitation with SR. The Guardians timely appealed the district court's 
denial of their petition for adoption.

 

                        
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

 [¶8]       The power to grant or deny a petition 
for adoption is within the discretion of the trial court. Matter of Adoption of 
BGH, 930 P.2d 371, 377 (Wyo. 1996); Matter of Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 988 
(Wyo. 1986). "Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria." Mintle v. Mintle, 764 P.2d 255, 257 (Wyo. 
1988) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)). "In determining 
whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the 
court could reasonably have concluded as it did."  Matter of Adoption of BGH, 930 P.2d  at 
377-78 (quoting Matter of Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73, 76 (Wyo. 1982)). In the 
context of alleged abuse of discretion, the assessment of the circumstances in 
the case

 

is tantamount to an evaluation of whether the 
evidence is sufficient to support the decision of the district court. In review 
of the evidence, we accept the successful party's submissions, granting them 
every favorable inference fairly to be drawn and leaving out of consideration 
conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party.

 

 Basolo 
v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 353 (Wyo. 1995).

 

                            
DISCUSSION

 

 [¶9]       The issue on appeal is whether the 
district court abused its discretion in applying the provisions of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-22-110 (a) (iii) and (iv). These sections provide in relevant 
part:

 

(a) [T]he adoption of a child may be ordered without 
the written consent of a parent or putative        father . . 
. if the court finds that the putative father or the nonconsenting parent or 
parents have: . . . .

 

                        
(iii) Willfully abandoned or deserted the child; or

 

(iv) Willfully failed to contribute to the support of 
the child for a period of one (1) year immediately prior to the filing of the 
petition to adopt and has failed to bring the support obligation current within 
sixty (60) days after service of the petition to adopt[.]

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-22-110(a)(iii) and (iv) (Michie 1997).  
When an adoption proceeding is contested by a nonconsenting parent, the 
statute must be strictly construed. "Every reasonable intendment is made in 
favor of the nonconsenting parent's claims."  Matter of Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 
988 (quoting Matter of Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73, 74-75 (Wyo. 1982) and 
Matter of Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976)). Strict construction 
is necessary because an adoption will result in the termination of the 
fundamental parental rights of a nonconsenting parent. Matter of Adoption of 
BGH, 930 P.2d  at 375, 377.1 

 

[¶10]   As used in the context of the 
statute, the term "willfully" means "intentionally, knowingly, purposely, 
voluntarily, consciously, deliberately, and without justifiable excuse, as 
distinguished from carelessly, inadvertently, accidentally, negligently, 
heedlessly or thoughtlessly." Matter of Adoption of CJH, 778 P.2d 124 (Wyo. 
1989); ALT v. DWD, 640 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 1982). In order for a willful abandonment 
of a child to occur, there must be clear and convincing evidence of "an actual 
intent to terminate the parental ties and a purpose to relinquish parental 
ties." In re Adoption of Female Child X, 537 P.2d 719, 721-22 (Wyo. 
1975).

 

 [¶11]    
Here, Mother remained in infrequent, but continuing, contact with the 
child throughout the time of the guardianship. Furthermore, Mother had initiated 
proceedings to terminate the guardianship on one occasion prior to the filing of 
the petition for adoption and later sought advice regarding the restoration of 
her custody of the child. Based on this evidence, the trial court 
concluded:

 

I'm not condoning the way she acted, the things that 
she did or the things that she did not do. I'm just merely making a finding that 
there's not clear and convincing evidence of abandonment; therefore, the 
petition for adoption is denied at this time.

 

We must agree. Given the 
record before the district court, there is no abuse of discretion in finding 
that the Guardians failed to clearly and convincingly show an actual intent to 
terminate parental ties.

 

 [¶12]    
In the alternative, the Guardians contend that their petition must be 
granted on the basis that Mother willfully failed to financially contribute to 
the support of the child pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110 (a) (iv). They 
argue that, despite the pleadings and the evidence presented at the hearing, the 
trial court "ignored the issue" and denied the petition solely on the issue of 
abandonment. A willful failure to contribute to a child's support can constitute 
a termination of rights under this statute. Matter of Adoption of G. A. R., 810 P.2d 113 at 118 (Wyo. 1991). However, when a petitioner invokes this basis for 
adoption without consent, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110 (b) (Michie 1997) requires 
the pleadings to contain "a clear and concise  statement of the consequences of the 
respondent's failure to bring the support obligation current[.]" This 
requirement is a logical precedent for the second consideration found in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(a)(iv), which requires the nonconsenting parent to bring 
her support obligation current within 60 days after service of the 
petition.

 

 [¶13]    
In this case, the Guardians' petition alleged: "Petitioners have been the 
sole means of support for said minor since the guardianship was created and that 
neither the natural mother or father have contributed to the support of said 
minor." There is no indication of the amount Mother must submit in order to 
bring her obligation current, nor is there a clear statement of the consequences 
of failing to do so. In addition, Guardians' counsel made the following opening 
statement:

 

Your honor, . . . Pursuant to Wyoming Statute 
1-22-110 . . . we are claiming in this case there has been an abandonment, 
willful abandonment and some neglect in the past and that the child was 
deserted and left. And it has been 
almost five years now with minimal contacts.

 

According to what I've been able to delineate from 
the case law, there is a clear and convincing standard. And as the Court is, I'm 
sure, aware, we are willing to proceed at this time.

 

Given the Guardians' failure 
to conform their pleadings with the statutory requirements, and the affirmative 
statements to the district court that they were proceeding on the basis of 
abandonment, the trial court did not err in failing to directly address Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110 (a)(iv) in its decision.

 

 [¶14]    
Moreover, we do not agree that the district court failed to consider the 
Mother's willful failure to contribute financially.  The nonconsenting parent must not only 
fail to contribute to the child's support, but that failure must be willful. 
Matter of Adoption of G. A. R., 810 P.2d  at 116. The district court noted that 
it considered the things that Mother "did not do," which implicitly includes the 
failure to contribute to SR's support.  
There is no question that Mother did not contribute to SR's support. 
However, the Guardians and Mother had an agreement relating to her financial 
contribution. The first part of the agreement was for Mother to forward the 
child support payments made by Father. There is no evidence that Father sent 
child support payments to Mother in the year immediately preceding the filing of 
the adoption petition. The second part of the agreement anticipated that the 
Guardians would inform Mother if the child was in need of anything, which was 
not done.

 

 [¶15]    
This situation may be distinguished from prior cases where we held that a 
willful failure to support existed. For example, in G. A. R, the Mother 
specifically asked the nonconsenting putative father for assistance, which the 
father denied. Matter of Adoption of G. A. R., 810 P.2d  at 118-119. In Matter of 
Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73, 74, the 
father was under a court order to provide support. In this case, there was no 
request for assistance, nor was there a court order identifying Mother's 
contribution. We do not, by this decision, abandon the principle that every 
parent has a duty to contribute to the support of his or her child, whether 
ordered by a court or not. Matter of Adoption of G. A. R., 810 P.2d  at 115. In 
fact, we reaffirm it.  However, we 
do not find clear and convincing evidence that Mother willfully failed to 
financially contribute to the support of the child in this case, and, therefore, 
we will not disturb the ruling of the district court.

 

                            
CONCLUSION

 

 [¶16]      The district court did not 
abuse its discretion in determining that the Guardians failed to present clear 
and convincing evidence that Mother's actions or inaction fell within the 
provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110 (a) (Michie 1997).  The Order denying the Guardians' 
Petition for Adoption is affirmed.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

1 In 
Matter of Adoption of BGH, 930 P.2d 371, 375 (Wyo. 1996), Justice Thomas noted 
on behalf of the Court, "In addition to providing for the termination of 
parental rights for the reasons articulated in Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-309, the 
legislature has provided for the termination of parental rights through the 
adoption procedure."  Prior to this 
decision, Justice Brown authored Matter of Adoption of SLS and CRS, 808 P.2d 207, 209 (Wyo. 1991), wherein the Court commented, "W.S. 1-22-110 does not 
provide for termination of parental rights[.]"

 To 
clarify any perceived conflict between these cases, we point out that these 
statements are dicta. In SLS, Justice Brown was simply being technically 
precise; while in BGH, Justice Thomas was simply stating the practical reality 
of what occurs through the adoption procedure in the case of a non-consenting 
parent or putative father who has failed to provide support for a year's period 
before the adoption petition was filed. However, the holdings in both cases are 
compatible and provide sound precedent for our holding in this 
case.