Case Title: Estate of Miller v. Storey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP002420

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 99 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2420 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Estate of Stanley G. Miller c/o Genevieve 
Miller, Personal Representative, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Diane Storey, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 371 Wis. 2d 669, 885 N.W.2d 787 
PDC No:  2016 WI App 68 – Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 30, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 12, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon 
 
JUDGE: 
Jill N. Falstad 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: 
      
KELLY, J. concurs and dissents, joined by R. 
G. BRADLEY, J. (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissents (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Scott A. Swid, Benjamin J. Krautkramer, and Swid Law 
Offices, LLC, Mosinee.  There was an oral argument by Scott A. 
Swid. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Jennifer A. Slater-Carlson and Legal Advantage, LLC, Cedarburg.  
There was an oral argument by Jennifer A. Slater-Carlson.
 
 
2017 WI 99
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2014AP2420 
(L.C. No. 
2013SC669) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Estate of Stanley G. Miller c/o Genevieve 
Miller, Personal Representative, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Diane Storey, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 30, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, Estate of Miller v. 
Storey, 2016 WI App 68, 371 Wis. 2d 669, 885 N.W.2d 787, which 
reversed the Marathon County circuit court's1 small claims money 
judgment for the Estate of Miller ("Estate") against Diane 
Storey ("Storey"). 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Jill N. Falstad presided. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
2 
 
¶2 
In a small claims action by the Estate, a jury found 
Storey liable under Wis. Stat. § 895.446 (2013-14)2 for theft of 
money from her elderly uncle when she cared for him in the last 
year of his life.  After the verdict, the circuit court awarded 
the 
Estate 
actual 
damages 
of 
$10,000 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 799.01(1)(d),3 
exemplary 
damages 
of 
$20,000 
under 
§ 895.446(3)(c), attorney fees of $20,000 under § 895.446(3)(b),4 
and double taxable costs under Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3).  Storey 
appealed. 
¶3 
On appeal, Storey argued that the actual damages 
should be reduced to $5,000 because Wis. Stat. § 895.446 is a 
"tort action" under Wis. Stat. § 799.01(1)(cr), not an "other 
civil action" under § 799.01(1)(d), which also meant that double 
costs were not authorized under Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3).  Storey 
further 
argued 
that 
attorney 
fees 
were 
not 
"costs 
of 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 While the evidence presented at trial would support a 
claim for over $10,000, at the time, small claims actions were 
limited to $5,000 for an "action based in tort" and to $10,000 
for an "other civil action."  See Wis. Stat. § 799.01(1)(cr), 
(d).  Thus, the jury verdict reflects a finding for actual 
damages in the amount of $10,000.   
4 We note that the reasonableness of this amount was not an 
issue before this court.  Storey did argue in her briefing that 
any award of attorney fees must be limited to the amount to be 
recovered under the Estate's contingency fee agreement.  See 
Stathus v. Horst, 2003 WI App 28, ¶¶19-24, 260 Wis. 2d 166, 659 
N.W.2d 165.  This issue, however, was not raised below and we 
decline to address it so as to afford the circuit court the 
opportunity to consider it in the first instance on remand. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
3 
 
investigation and litigation" under § 895.446(3)(b) and that 
exemplary damages under § 895.446(3)(c) could not be awarded by 
the judge where the jury had been the trier of fact.  The court 
of appeals agreed and reversed the judgment of the circuit 
court.  The Estate filed a motion for reconsideration, which the 
court of appeals denied.  The Estate then petitioned this court 
for review. 
¶4 
There are four issues on this appeal.  First, we 
consider whether Wis. Stat. § 895.446 is an "action based in 
tort" under Wis. Stat. § 799.01(1)(cr) or an "other civil 
action" under § 799.01(1)(d).  Our conclusion on this issue will 
resolve the consequent issues of which damages cap under 
§ 799.01 applies and whether double costs are authorized under 
Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3).  Second, we consider whether attorney 
fees are included within the meaning of "costs of investigation 
and litigation" under § 895.446(3)(b).  Third, we consider 
whether 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion in considering whether the circuit court erred when 
it awarded exemplary damages on the Estate's post-verdict 
motion.  Fourth, we consider whether the court of appeals 
properly denied the Estate's motion for reconsideration.  
¶5 
As to the first issue, we conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.446 
is 
an 
"other 
civil 
action" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 799.01(1)(d) based on fundamental principles of statutory 
interpretation 
and 
the 
established 
distinctions 
between 
statutory civil claims and common law tort claims.  Because we 
conclude 
that 
§ 895.446 
is 
an 
"other 
civil 
action," 
we 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
4 
 
consequently conclude that the damages cap is $10,000 under 
§ 799.01(1)(d) and that double costs are authorized under Wis. 
Stat. § 807.01(3).   
¶6 
As to the second issue, we conclude that attorney fees 
are included within the meaning of "costs of investigation and 
litigation" under Wis. Stat. § 895.446(3)(b) because Stathus v. 
Horst, 2003 WI App 28, 260 Wis. 2d 166, 659 N.W.2d 165, a 
judicial interpretation by the court of appeals, has long stood 
for that proposition, and the legislature, despite taking other, 
subsequent action in that very statute, has not legislated so as 
to alter that interpretation.   
¶7 
As to the third issue, we conclude that the court of 
appeals did not err when it considered the issue of exemplary 
damages, in part because the issue raised was a legal question, 
the parties thoroughly briefed the issue, and there were no 
disputed issues of fact.  We also conclude that the court of 
appeals' reversal of the circuit court was proper because the 
circuit court's ruling was contrary to the clear legal standard 
set forth in Kimble v. Land Concepts, Inc., 2014 WI 21, 353 
Wis. 2d 377, 845 N.W.2d 395.   
¶8 
As to the fourth issue, we conclude that our analysis 
as to the first issue renders analysis of the fourth issue 
unnecessary because our reversal of the court of appeals' 
holdings on actual damages and double costs obviates the 
substance of the Estate's remaining arguments.   
¶9 
Thus, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
as to the first and second issues and affirm the decision of the 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
5 
 
court of appeals as to the third issue.  Because we reverse on 
the first issue, we need not decide the fourth issue.  We remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶10 On February 28, 2013, the Estate filed a small claims 
action against Storey in the Marathon County circuit court 
seeking damages of $10,000 for misappropriation of funds from 
the Estate of Stanley Miller.  For the purposes of this appeal, 
the facts underlying the claim are not pertinent.   
¶11 On June 7, 2013, the Estate filed a notice of its 
offer of settlement pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3), which 
authorizes the award of double costs where the plaintiff's 
recovery is more favorable than the settlement offer.  The 
Estate offered to settle the matter for $7,500.5  Storey 
declined, and, after an unsuccessful mediation, the case 
proceeded to a jury trial.   
                                                 
5 While typically an offer to settle is inadmissible, the 
offer is not used here "to prove liability for or invalidity of 
the claim or its amount."  See Wis. Stat. § 904.08.  Rather, the 
settlement offer is relevant in this case to determine whether 
double costs are authorized under Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3), which 
states in part as follows: 
After issue is joined but at least 20 days before 
trial, the plaintiff may serve upon the defendant a 
written offer of settlement for the sum, or property, 
or the effect therein specified, with costs. . . . If 
the offer of settlement is not accepted and the 
plaintiff recovers a more favorable judgment, the 
plaintiff shall recover double the amount of the 
taxable costs. 
 
§ 807.01(3). 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
6 
 
¶12 On October 30, 2013, prior to trial, the Estate 
submitted its requested jury instructions, which included the 
following request for a specialized jury instruction for 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 895.4466 based on conduct prohibited by 
Wis. Stat. § 943.20:7   
To 
recover 
for 
theft 
by 
misappropriation, 
Plaintiff must prove by evidence that satisfies you to 
a reasonable certainty by the greater weight of the 
credible evidence that the following four elements 
were present: 
First, 
that 
Defendant 
intentionally 
used, 
transferred, 
or 
retained 
possession 
of 
movable 
property of another.  The term "intentionally" means 
that the Defendant must have had the mental purpose to 
take and carry away property.  The term "movable 
property" means property whose physical location can 
be changed; "movable property" includes money. 
Second, that the owner of the property did not 
consent to taking and carrying away the property. 
Third, that Defendant knew the owner did not 
consent. 
Fourth, that Defendant intended to deprive the 
owner permanently of the possession of the property. 
Storey made no objection to this specialized jury instruction.   
¶13 On January 9, 2014, the trial began.  The trial lasted 
two days, and, at the close of the case, the circuit court 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.446 is a civil statute that provides 
a cause of action for "Property damage or loss caused by crime" 
by reference to enumerated criminal statutes. 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.20 is a criminal statute that 
prohibits "Theft." 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
7 
 
instructed the jury as requested by the Estate.  The jury found 
Storey liable under Wis. Stat. § 895.446. 
¶14 On July 8, 2014, the circuit court held a hearing on 
the Estate's post-verdict motions.  The Estate argued that the 
court should award (1) $10,000 for actual damages under Wis. 
Stat. § 895.446(3)(a); (2) $30,000 for exemplary damages under 
§ 895.446(3)(c); (3) $814.95 for taxable costs under Wis. Stat. 
§ 799.25; (4) $814.95 for double costs under Wis. Stat. 
§ 807.01(3); 
and 
(5) 
$20,000 
for 
attorney 
fees 
under 
§ 895.446(3)(b).  Storey argued that the actual damages should 
be limited to the $5,000 cap for an "action based in tort"; that 
the exemplary damages were inappropriate because they were not 
requested in the initial complaint; that the taxable costs 
should not be doubled because, if the actual damages were 
limited to $5,000, then § 807.01(3) did not apply; and that the 
attorney fees exceeded the maximum award allowed under Wis. 
Stat. § 814.04(1).  The circuit court ruled in favor of the 
Estate and entered a judgment for $52,629.90.8   
¶15 On October 15, 2014, Storey appealed.   
¶16 On July 6, 2016, the court of appeals reversed the 
judgment of the circuit court.   
                                                 
8 The circuit court awarded only $20,000 in exemplary 
damages, and, as noted by the court of appeals, the record 
appears to support an award of $51,629.90, which is one thousand 
dollars less than the amount of the judgment entered by the 
circuit court.  See Estate of Miller v. Storey, 2016 WI App 68, 
¶10 n.3, 371 Wis. 2d 669, 885 N.W.2d 787. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
8 
 
¶17 On the issue of actual damages, the court of appeals 
held that civil theft claims under Wis. Stat. § 895.446(1)9 are 
"tort claims."  Consequently, it held that the actual damages 
award was limited to $5,000 under Wis. Stat. § 799.01(1)(cr) and 
reversed the award of double costs under Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3).  
¶18 On the issue of attorney fees, the court of appeals 
held that the phrase "costs of . . . litigation" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.446(3)(b) did not include attorney fees because, if the 
legislature had intended that attorney fees be collectible, it 
would have so specified, as it did in making specific provision 
for "reasonable attorney fees" in § 895.446(3m)(b).   
¶19 On the issue of exemplary damages, the court of 
appeals held that whether to award exemplary damages in a jury 
trial must be decided by the jury.  Here, the Estate not only 
challenges the court of appeals' holding but also argues that it 
was an erroneous exercise of discretion for the court of appeals 
                                                 
9 The court of appeals' July 6th opinion cites to Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.446(3)(c), which is the exemplary damages subsection.  We 
read this as a typo and interpret their holding to apply to 
subsection (1). 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
9 
 
to decide the issue at all, as it was not preserved by objection 
in the circuit court below.10   
¶20 On July 11, 2016, the Estate filed a motion for 
reconsideration.  As pertains to the issue here, the Estate 
argued that the court of appeals' holding as to actual damages 
was not supported by the case law cited in the opinion and that 
the holding as to double costs did not address existing 
precedent interpreting the application of Wis. Stat. § 807.01.  
¶21 On July 14, 2016, the court of appeals withdrew and 
vacated its July 6th opinion. 
¶22 On July 28, 2016, the court of appeals denied the 
Estate's motion for reconsideration.   
¶23 On August 16, 2016, the court of appeals issued a 
revised opinion.  As pertains to the issue here, the revised 
opinion reflects changes to the analysis of actual damages and 
double costs.  See Estate of Miller, 371 Wis. 2d 669, ¶¶21, 31.  
With regard to actual damages, the court of appeals removed 
                                                 
10 Storey did object to the award of exemplary damages in 
her responses to the Estate's post-verdict motion in the circuit 
court and at the July 8, 2014 hearing on the motion, but her 
objection was based on a different ground than she raised on 
appeal.  See supra ¶14; State v. Nelis, 2007 WI 58, ¶31, 300 
Wis. 2d 415, 733 N.W.2d 619 ("An objection is sufficient to 
preserve an issue for appeal, if it apprises the court of the 
specific grounds upon which it is based.").  In the circuit 
court she argued that exemplary damages were barred because the 
Estate had not requested them in the complaint; in the court of 
appeals, and in this court, she argued that exemplary damages 
were barred because the judge cannot award them where the jury 
is the finder of fact.   
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
10 
 
citations to legal authority and added language that the Estate 
had conceded the issue.  Id., ¶21.  With regard to double costs, 
the court of appeals added language that the Estate had conceded 
the issue.  Id., ¶31.  Here, the Estate argues that the court of 
appeals erroneously exercised its discretion in denying the 
Estate's motion for reconsideration because the court of appeals 
withdrew and revised its opinion contemporaneously with its 
review of the motion, and two of the revisions made were 
responsive to two of the motion's arguments.  In essence, the 
Estate argues that the court of appeals cannot both revise its 
decision and deny the Estate's motion for reconsideration, 
especially because the revisions appear to be based on the 
merits of the motion's arguments. 
¶24 On September 12, 2016, the Estate filed a petition for 
review in this court.  On January 9, 2017, we granted the 
petition. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶25 Interpretation of a statute is a question of law that 
we review de novo, although we benefit from the analyses of the 
circuit court and the court of appeals.  See State v. Harrison, 
2015 WI 5, ¶37, 360 Wis. 2d 246, 858 N.W.2d 372.  Thus, we 
review de novo whether Wis. Stat. § 895.446 is an "action based 
in tort" or an "other civil action" and whether attorney fees 
are included within the meaning of "costs of . . . litigation" 
under 
§ 895.446(3)(b). 
 
The 
proper 
allocation 
of 
responsibilities between the judge and the jury with regard to 
exemplary damages is also a question of law that we review de 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
11 
 
novo.  See Kimble, 353 Wis. 2d 377, ¶38.  Thus, we also review 
de novo the merits of the court of appeals' decision to reverse 
the circuit court's award of exemplary damages. 
¶26 We review the court of appeals' exercise of discretion 
under the deferential erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  
See State v. Lemberger, 2017 WI 39, ¶13, 374 Wis. 2d 617, 893 
N.W.2d 232.  Whether to consider an issue not preserved below is 
an exercise of discretion.  See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 
609, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997).  Whether to grant or deny a motion 
for reconsideration under Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.24 is an 
exercise of discretion.  See State v. Thiel, 171 Wis. 2d 157, 
159-60, 491 N.W.2d 94 (Ct. App. 1992).  Thus, we review the 
court of appeals' decisions to consider the issue of exemplary 
damages and to deny the Estate's motion for reconsideration for 
erroneous exercise of discretion.11 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶27 The following analysis will address four issues: (A) 
Whether Wis. Stat. § 895.446 is an "action based in tort" under 
Wis. Stat. § 799.01(1)(cr) or an "other civil action" under 
§ 799.01(1)(d); (B) Whether attorney fees are included within 
                                                 
11 To the extent that the Estate's fourth issue may be read 
as raising an issue of the court of appeals' authority under 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.24, this would require interpretation of 
the statute, which is a question of law that we would review de 
novo.  See State v. Harrison, 2015 WI 5, ¶37, 360 Wis. 2d 246, 
858 N.W.2d 372.  However, because we conclude that our analysis 
of the first issue renders analysis of the fourth issue 
unnecessary, we need not address this question of law. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
12 
 
the meaning of "costs of investigation and litigation" under 
§ 895.446(3)(b); (C) Whether the court of appeals erroneously 
exercised its discretion in considering whether the circuit 
court erred when it awarded exemplary damages on the Estate's 
post-verdict motion; and (D) Whether the court of appeals 
properly denied the Estate's motion for reconsideration. 
¶28 As to the first issue, we conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.446 
is 
an 
"other 
civil 
action" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 799.01(1)(d) based on fundamental principles of statutory 
interpretation 
and 
the 
established 
distinctions 
between 
statutory civil claims and common law tort claims.  Because we 
conclude 
that 
§ 895.446 
is 
an 
"other 
civil 
action," 
we 
consequently conclude that the damages cap is $10,000 under 
§ 799.01(1)(d) and that double costs are authorized under Wis. 
Stat. § 807.01(3).   
¶29 As to the second issue, we conclude that attorney fees 
are included within the meaning of "costs of investigation and 
litigation" under Wis. Stat. § 895.446(3)(b) because Stathus, 
260 Wis. 2d 166, a judicial interpretation by the court of 
appeals, 
has 
long 
stood 
for 
that 
proposition, 
and 
the 
legislature, despite taking other, subsequent action in that 
very statute, has not legislated to alter that interpretation.   
¶30 As to the third issue, we conclude that the court of 
appeals did not err when it considered the issue of exemplary 
damages, in part because the issue raised was a legal question, 
the parties thoroughly briefed the issue, and there were no 
disputed issues of fact.  We also conclude that the court of 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
13 
 
appeals' reversal of the circuit court was proper because the 
circuit court's ruling was contrary to the clear legal standard 
set forth in Kimble, 353 Wis. 2d 377.   
¶31 As to the fourth issue, we conclude that our analysis 
as to the first issue renders analysis of the fourth issue 
unnecessary because our reversal of the court of appeals' 
holdings on actual damages and double costs obviates the 
substance of the Estate's remaining arguments. 
 
A.  Whether Wis. Stat. § 895.446 Is An  
"Action Based In Tort" Under Wis. Stat. § 799.01(1)(cr)  
Or An "Other Civil Action" Under § 799.01(1)(d). 
 
¶32 The first issue we consider is whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.446 is an "action based in tort" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 799.01(1)(cr), and thus subject to the $5,000 small claims 
limit, or an "other civil action" under § 799.01(1)(d), and thus 
subject to the $10,000 small claims limit.  The applicable 
statutory limit also impacts the award of costs.  The Estate 
argues that § 895.446 is an "other civil action," and thus 
subject to the $10,000 limit, because its civil theft claim 
arises from a statutorily created right to enforce criminal law.  
The Estate distinguishes this statutory civil theft claim from 
the civil action for conversion, which arises from the common 
law of tort.  Storey, to the contrary, argues that § 895.446 is 
an "action based in tort," and thus subject to the $5,000 limit, 
because the elements required to prove the Estate's statutory 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
14 
 
civil theft claim are similar to the elements of the common law 
tort of conversion.   
¶33 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 895.446 is an "other 
civil 
action" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 799.01(1)(d) 
based 
on 
fundamental principles of statutory interpretation and the 
established distinctions between statutory civil claims and 
common law tort claims.  Because we conclude that § 895.446 is 
an "other civil action," we consequently conclude that the 
damages cap is $10,000 under § 799.01(1)(d) and that double 
costs are authorized under Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3).   
 
1.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.446 is an "other civil action"  
under Wis. Stat. § 799.01(1)(d). 
¶34 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.446 is an "other civil action" 
under Wis. Stat. § 799.01(1)(d) for four reasons: first, the 
statute itself refers to its cause as a "civil action"; second, 
our case law distinguishes the statutory civil theft claim under 
§ 895.446 from similar common law tort claims; third, our case 
law distinguishes between other statutorily created civil claims 
and common law tort claims; and fourth, there is a long-standing 
distinction in the common law between crimes and torts, even 
though both may be based on the same conduct, which suggests 
that a plaintiff acting under a civil statute that enables 
enforcement of criminal law is not bringing an action based in 
tort. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
15 
 
¶35 "[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language 
of the statute."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110; Antonin Scalia 
& Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts 56-58 (2012) (Supremacy-of-Text Principle).12  Here, the 
statute provides for a civil cause of action against a person 
who has caused damage or loss to property by conduct that is 
proscribed by the enumerated criminal statutes.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.446(1).  Subsections (2) and (3) both refer to this cause 
as a "civil action": 
(2) The burden of proof in a civil action under 
sub. (1) . . . .  
(3) If the plaintiff prevails in a civil action 
under sub. (1) . . . . 
§ 895.446(2), (3).  Words are to be understood in their ordinary 
everyday meaning.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45; Scalia & 
Garner, supra, at 69-77 (Ordinary-Meaning Canon).13  Thus, when a 
statute characterizes its cause as a "civil action" it is within 
the bounds of ordinary understanding to interpret it as a "civil 
action."  Furthermore, a word or phrase is presumed to bear the 
same meaning throughout a text.  See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 
                                                 
12 The Supremacy-of-Text Principle dictates that "[t]he 
words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what 
they convey, in their context, is what the text means."  Antonin 
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts 56 (2012). 
13 The Ordinary Meaning Canon dictates that "[w]ords are to 
be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings——unless the 
context indicates that they bear a technical sense."  Id. at 69. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
16 
 
170-73 (Presumption of Consistent Usage).14  Thus, the use of the 
term "civil action" in § 895.446 to describe the cause therein 
provided 
indicates 
that 
the 
cause 
may 
also 
be 
properly 
characterized as a "civil action" under Wis. Stat. § 799.01.  
See § 799.01(1)(d) ("Other civil actions where the amount 
claimed is $10,000 or less . . . ."). 
¶36 Additionally, Wisconsin cases analyzing a civil theft 
claim under the statute have referred to the cause as a civil 
action.  See Tri-Tech Corp. of Am. v. Americomp Servs., Inc., 
2002 WI 88, ¶1, 254 Wis. 2d 418, 646 N.W.2d 822 ("civil theft").  
This statutory civil theft claim has also been specifically 
distinguished from similar claims of conversion, which sound in 
tort.  In other words, a civil claim for theft under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.446 is separate and distinct from a claim for conversion.  
For example, in H.A. Friend & Co. v. Professional Stationery, 
Inc., the plaintiff brought a civil theft claim under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.80(1) (2003-04)15 and a common law tort claim for 
conversion where the defendant had written checks and withdrawn 
and transferred funds without authorization.  2006 WI App 141, 
¶¶2, 5-6, 294 Wis. 2d 754, 720 N.W.2d 96.  The court of appeals 
treated these as separate and distinct claims in its analysis.  
                                                 
14 The Presumption of Consistent Usage dictates that "[a] 
word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a 
text; a material variation in terms suggests a variation in 
meaning."  Id. at 170. 
15 Wis. Stat. § 895.80 (2003-04) was renumbered as Wis. 
Stat. § 895.446 in 2006.  See 2005 Wis. Act 155, § 70. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
17 
 
Compare id., ¶9, with id., ¶11.  See also Cook v. Public 
Storage, Inc., 2008 WI App 155, ¶49, 314 Wis. 2d 426, 761 
N.W.2d 645 (distinguishing the plaintiff's common law claim of 
conversion from its statutory theft claim under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.446 (2005-06) via Wis. Stat. § 943.20 (2005-06)); Phillips 
v. Parmelee, 2013 WI 105, ¶9, 351 Wis. 2d 758, 840 N.W.2d 713 
(where the plaintiff brought a statutory civil theft claim under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.446 (2009-10) via Wis. Stat. § 943.20 (2009-10) 
and a common law tort claim for negligence because defendant-
sellers had failed to disclose asbestos-related defects). 
¶37 Moreover, there is an established distinction between 
statutory claims and common law claims generally.  See Kailin v. 
Armstrong, 2002 WI App 70, 252 Wis. 2d 676, 643 N.W.2d 132; 
Chomicki v. Wittekind, 128 Wis. 2d 188, 381 N.W.2d 561 (Ct. App. 
1985).  In Chomicki the plaintiff brought a statutory civil 
claim under Wis. Stat. § 101.22(7) (1985-86) where her landlord 
had sexually harassed and threatened her.  See Chomicki, 128 
Wis. 2d at 192.  In rejecting the landlord's challenge to the 
jury's award of compensatory damages, the court of appeals held 
that Chomicki's recovery was not controlled by the rules 
regarding the common law tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress because "Chomicki . . . did not bring a 
common law tort claim, but a private civil action specifically 
authorized by statute."  Id. at 199. 
¶38 Similarly, 
in 
Kailin, 
the 
plaintiff 
brought 
a 
statutory civil claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 (1999-2000) and 
a common law tort claim for misrepresentation where defendant-
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
18 
 
sellers had failed to disclose a tenant with a history of 
delinquent rent payments.  252 Wis. 2d 676, ¶¶1-2.  The court of 
appeals treated these claims as separate and distinct in its 
analysis, compare id., ¶¶26-36, with id., ¶¶37-45, and held that 
"[t]he fact that two different claims may be proved with the 
same evidence in a particular case does not mean they are the 
same claim."  Id., ¶41.  This is particularly true where the 
elements of the statutory cause of action "differ from those of 
the common law claim[]."  Id., ¶40; see also Below v. Norton, 
2008 WI 77, ¶42, 310 Wis. 2d 713, 751 N.W.2d 351 (noting that 
the plaintiff was not without a remedy where the economic loss 
doctrine barred common law claims of misrepresentation because 
the statutory civil claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18 (2003-04) 
was still available). 
¶39 Here, the Estate brought a statutory civil theft claim 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.446 via Wis. Stat. § 943.20.  Statutory 
claims are distinct from common law claims, and in fact, often 
both can be pursued.  See Kailin, 252 Wis. 2d 676, ¶41; 
Chomicki, 128 Wis. 2d at 199.  Additionally, the precise 
statutory civil theft claim being pursued by the Estate here has 
been held to be distinct from the similar common law tort of 
conversion.  See H.A. Friend & Co., 294 Wis. 2d 754, ¶¶9, 11.  
Moreover, this distinction is supported by the fact that the 
elements of the statutory cause of action "differ from those of 
the common law claim[]."  Kailin, 252 Wis. 2d 676, ¶40.   
¶40 The elements of the Estate's statutory civil theft 
claim are as follows: 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
19 
 
 
1. 
Defendant intentionally used, transferred, or 
retained 
possession 
of 
movable 
property 
of 
another; 
2. 
The owner of the property did not consent to 
taking and carrying away the property; 
3. 
Defendant knew the owner did not consent; and 
4. 
Defendant 
intended 
to 
deprive 
the 
owner 
permanently of the possession of the property.16 
See supra ¶12.  Conversely, the elements of the common law tort 
claim of conversion are as follows: 
 
1. 
That 
(defendant) 
intentionally 
(controlled) 
(took) property belonging to (owner); 
2. 
That defendant (controlled) (took) the property 
without the consent of (owner) or without lawful 
authority; and 
3. 
That defendant's act with respect to the property 
seriously interfered with the right of (owner) to 
possess the property. 
                                                 
16 The elements of criminal theft under Wis. Stat. § 943.20 
are exactly the same as the elements of the civil theft claim 
brought by the Estate: 
1. 
The defendant intentionally took and carried away 
movable property of another. . . . 
2. 
The owner of the property did not consent to 
taking and carrying away the property. 
3. 
The defendant knew that the owner did not 
consent. 
4. 
The defendant intended to deprive the owner 
permanently of the possession of the property. 
Wis JI——Criminal 1441 (2009) (footnotes omitted).  The cause of 
action under Wis. Stat. § 895.446 does not have a set of 
elements unique from criminal causes because the statutory civil 
claim is tied to whichever enumerated criminal statute listed in 
subsection (1) applies.  See also supra note 7.  Of course, the 
burden of proof and the consequences are different, as is the 
enforcement mechanism: a criminal charge is brought by the 
government taking formal action, and a civil action is brought 
by a citizen seeking monetary damages. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
20 
 
Wis JI——Civil 2200 (2014).  Although similar, the Estate's 
statutory civil theft claim significantly differs from the 
common law tort claim of conversion in two respects: first, the 
statutory civil theft claim additionally requires that the 
"defendant knew that the owner did not consent"; second, the 
statutory civil theft claim differs in that it requires that the 
"defendant 
intended 
to 
deprive 
the 
owner 
permanently 
of . . . possession," not simply that the defendant acted to 
"seriously interfere with the right of the owner to possess the 
property."  Compare supra ¶12, with Wis JI——Civil 2200 (2014).  
Thus, the Estate's statutory civil theft claim under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.446 is, in fact, separate and distinct from a common law 
tort claim for conversion, even if the same facts might support 
both causes of action.  
¶41 Furthermore, the Estate's claim is essentially a 
criminal charge being brought civilly by a plaintiff (for money 
damages) instead of by the State (for conviction), as authorized 
by statute.  These criminal roots are important because there 
has long been a distinction in the common law between a tort 
claim and a criminal charge.  See David J. Seipp, The 
Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
21 
 
B.U. L. Rev. 59 (1996).17  Thus, the long-standing distinction 
between causes of action brought as crimes and causes of action 
brought as torts suggests that statutory claims which enable 
civil enforcement of criminal law, such as the claim brought 
here,18 need not necessarily be treated as "actions based in 
tort" because they are actually "actions based in criminal law." 
¶42 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.446 
is 
an 
"other 
civil 
action" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 799.01(1)(d), 
not 
an 
"action 
based 
in 
tort" 
under 
§ 799.01(1)(cr).  It is true that any cause that is not criminal 
is civil; thus, tort claims are civil actions.  But the 
distinction between an "action based in tort" and an "other 
civil action" is one that the legislature has made, and is one 
that is important to claimants because there is a significant 
difference in the amounts that may be recovered.  Compare 
§ 799.01(1)(cr), with § 799.01(1)(d).  Thus, it is the task of 
this court to give effect and meaning to that distinction.  See 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("Statutory language is read where 
possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in order to 
                                                 
17 The earliest distinction at common law was between the 
"appeal of felony" (crimes) and the "writ of trespass" (torts).  
See David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in 
the Early Common Law, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 59, 60 (1996).  Although 
both were considered "breaches of the king's peace," conviction 
of a felony carried much harsher penalties and had different 
procedural requirements.  Id. at 59, 61-63.   
18 The Estate specifically brought an action under Wis. 
Stat. § 895.446 for conduct prohibited by Wis. Stat. § 943.20——a 
criminal statute prohibiting "Theft."   
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
22 
 
avoid surplusage."); Scalia & Garner, supra ¶35, at 174-79 
(Surplusage Canon).19  In doing so, we hold that § 895.446 is an 
"other civil action" under § 799.01(1)(d) because the statute 
itself refers to its cause as a "civil action," our case law 
distinguishes the statutory civil theft claim under § 895.446 
from similar common law tort claims, our case law distinguishes 
between other statutory civil claims and common law tort claims 
generally, and there is a long-standing distinction in the 
common law between crimes and torts that suggests that a 
plaintiff acting under a civil statute that enables enforcement 
of criminal law is not bringing an "action based in tort," but 
rather is bringing an "action based in criminal law," even 
though both claims may be based on the same conduct.  
¶43 In sum, to conclude that Wis. Stat. § 895.446——the 
civil theft statute——is an "action based in tort" rather than an 
"other civil action" would require us to, at a minimum, ignore 
fundamental principles of statutory construction, disregard the 
legislature's choice to provide a statutory civil theft claim, 
and discount the established distinctions between statutory 
civil claims and common law tort claims.  
 
 
                                                 
19 The Surplusage Canon dictates that "[i]f possible, every 
word and every provision is to be given effect . . . .  None 
should be ignored.  None should needlessly be given an 
interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or 
to have no consequence."  Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 
174. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
23 
 
2.  Because Wis. Stat. § 895.446 is an "other civil  
action" under Wis. Stat. § 799.01(1)(d),  
the damages cap is $10,000 and double costs  
are authorized under Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3). 
¶44 Because we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 895.446 is an 
"other civil action" under Wis. Stat. § 799.01(1)(d), the 
damages cap is $10,000 and double costs are authorized under 
Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3).   
¶45 With regard to the damages cap, Wis. Stat. § 799.01(1) 
states in relevant part as follows: 
EXCLUSIVE USE OF SMALL CLAIMS PROCEDURE.  Except 
as provided in ss. 799.02(1) and 799.21(4) and except 
as provided under sub. (2), the procedure in this 
chapter is the exclusive procedure to be used in 
circuit court in the following actions: . . .  
(d) Other civil actions.  Other civil actions 
where the amount claimed is $10,000 or less, if the 
actions or proceedings are: 
1.  For money judgments . . . . 
§ 799.01(1)(d)1. 
¶46 The jury found Storey liable for a violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 895.446 and awarded $10,000 in actual damages.  As 
established above, § 895.446 is an "other civil action."  Thus, 
the $10,000 in damages claimed and subsequently awarded is 
appropriate under Wis. Stat. § 799.01(1)(d)'s damages cap.  We 
therefore remand the cause to the circuit court with direction 
to reinstate the circuit court judgment as to actual damages in 
the amount of $10,000. 
¶47 With 
regard 
to 
the 
double 
costs, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 807.01(3) states in relevant part as follows: 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
24 
 
After issue is joined but at least 20 days before 
trial, the plaintiff may serve upon the defendant a 
written offer of settlement for the sum, or property, 
or 
to 
the 
effect 
therein 
specified, 
with 
costs. . . . If 
the 
offer 
of 
settlement 
is 
not 
accepted and the plaintiff recovers a more favorable 
judgment, the plaintiff shall recover double the 
amount of the taxable costs. 
§ 807.01(3).  The Estate (the plaintiffs below) filed a notice 
of its offer of settlement on June 7, 2013 (approximately seven 
months before trial).  The Estate offered to settle with Storey 
for a sum of $7,500.  Storey declined to settle.  After trial 
and appeal, the Estate will recover $10,000 in actual damages, 
which is a higher and more favorable judgment.  Thus, the Estate 
"shall recover double the amount of the taxable costs."  
§ 807.01(3).  The Estate's taxable costs amount to $814.95, 
which doubled amount to $1,629.90.  We therefore remand the 
cause to the circuit court with direction to reinstate the 
circuit court's judgment as to taxable costs in the amount of 
$1,629.90. 
 
B.  Whether Attorney Fees Are Included Within The  
Meaning Of "Costs Of Investigation And Litigation"  
Under Wis. Stat. § 895.446(3)(b). 
¶48 The second issue we consider is whether attorney fees 
are included within the meaning of "costs of investigation and 
litigation" under Wis. Stat. § 895.446(3)(b).  The Estate argues 
that attorney fees are included as "costs of . . . litigation" 
because the court of appeals has already interpreted this phrase 
as including attorney fees.  See Stathus, 260 Wis. 2d 166, ¶¶12-
24.  Storey argues that Stathus is not good law because it 
considered a version of the statute that did not include 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
25 
 
subsection (3m); subsection (3m) specifically provides for 
"reasonable attorney fees" and interpreting subsection (3)(b) to 
include attorney fees in light of this amendment would render 
the specific provision in (3m) superfluous.   
¶49 We conclude that attorney fees are included within the 
meaning of "costs of investigation and litigation" under Wis. 
Stat. § 895.446(3)(b) because 
Stathus, 260 Wis. 2d 166, a 
judicial interpretation by the court of appeals, has long stood 
for that proposition and the legislature, despite taking other, 
subsequent action in that very statute, has not legislated so as 
to alter that interpretation. 
¶50 We begin with the language of the statute.  See Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  Section 895.446(3)(b) states in relevant 
part as follows:  
If the plaintiff prevails in a civil action under sub. 
(1), he or she may recover all of the following:  
. . .  
(b)  All costs of investigation and litigation 
that were reasonably incurred, including the value of 
the time spent by any employee or agent of the victim. 
Wis. Stat. § 895.446(3)(b).   
¶51 "If a statute uses words or phrases that have already 
received authoritative construction by the jurisdiction's court 
of last resort, or even uniform construction by inferior 
courts . . . they are to be understood according to that 
construction."  Scalia & Garner, supra ¶35, at 322-26 (Prior-
Construction Canon).  "A statute will be construed to alter the 
common law only when that disposition is clear," and "[r]epeals 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
26 
 
by implication are . . . 'very much disfavored.'" Id. at 318-19 
(Presumption Against Change in Common Law); id. at 327-33 
(Presumption 
Against 
Implied 
Repeal). 
 
In 
other 
words, 
legislative inaction in the wake of judicial construction of a 
statute indicates legislative acquiescence.20  See Progressive N. 
Ins. Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶52, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 
N.W.2d 417.  This doctrine of legislative acquiescence applies 
with equal, if not greater, force where the legislature has 
acted on the statute, but declines to revise the interpreted 
language.  See Tucker v. Marcus, 142 Wis. 2d 425, 434, 418 
N.W.2d 818 (1988) (citing Munninghoff v. Wis. Conservation 
Comm'n, 255 Wis. 252, 258, 38 N.W.2d 712 (1949) ("The re-
enactment of the statute on which there existed a judicial 
determination 
indicates 
an 
intent 
to 
adopt 
the 
judicial 
determination as a part of the statute.")); see also United 
States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 483 (2012) 
(declining to give the same language in a reenacted statute a 
different construction where the operative language in a 
                                                 
20 We note that Justice Kelly's concurrence/dissent takes 
issue with this canon of construction, see Justice Kelly's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶¶94-104, but does not argue that Wisconsin 
law does not support application of the canon or that we have 
incorrectly applied the canon here.  Thus, its scrutiny of the 
assumptions that underlie the canon do not bear directly on the 
integrity of our analysis.  In other words, the dissent has 
presented a problem without suggesting a solution, and we 
decline to digress from the established canons of construction 
because to do so would leave us with "no intelligible, generally 
accepted 
and 
consistently 
applied 
theory 
of 
statutory 
interpretation."  Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 8. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
27 
 
reenacted provision was identical because stare decisis counsels 
against such interpretive variation). 
¶52 The 
phrase 
"[a]ll 
costs 
of 
investigation 
and 
litigation" has previously been interpreted to include attorney 
fees.  See Stathus, 260 Wis. 2d 166, ¶¶12-24.21  In Wisconsin, 
                                                 
21 We acknowledge that the Stathus court did not directly 
consider the issue of whether attorney fees were awardable; 
rather, in promulgating the standards by which a circuit court 
should determine whether an award of attorney fees under the 
statute is reasonable, the Stathus court assumed that attorney 
fees were awardable.  This assumption, however, is a prior 
construction 
under 
the 
Predicate-Act 
Canon 
and 
the 
Interpretation 
Principle 
of 
statutory 
construction. 
 
The 
Interpretation Principle holds that "[e]very application of a 
text to particular circumstances entails interpretation"; the 
Predicate-Act Canon holds that "[a]uthorization of an act also 
authorizes a necessary predicate act."  See Scalia & Garner, 
supra note 12, at 53-55, 192-94.  Thus, when the Stathus court 
remanded to the circuit court with instructions to "apply the 
appropriate 
standards 
for 
determining 
'reasonableness'" 
of 
attorney fees under the statute, it necessarily construed the 
statute as authorizing the award of attorney fees.  Stathus, 260 
Wis. 2d 166, ¶25. 
Additionally, 
lower 
courts 
have 
consistently 
awarded 
attorney fees under the statute.  See Revolution Processing 
Sol., Inc. v. Collins Fin., LLC, No. 13CV657, 2015 WL 13540579, 
at *4 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dec. 9, 2015); Gribble v. Gribble, No. 
11CV017625, 2015 WL 5192481, at *2 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 
2015); Coyle v. Coyle, No. 11CV0510, 2013 WL 6211087, at *1 
(Wis. Cir. Ct. Oct. 2, 2013); Offerman v. Pettijohn, No. 
09CV04775, 2011 WL 2260387 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Apr. 8, 2011); Carter 
v. Cuttingedge of Elkhart Lake, Inc., No 06CV414, 2007 WL 
5308643 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2007); Lautenslager v. Wallace 
Enters., Inc., No. 03CV1860, 2004 WL 5162818 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Nov. 
5, 2004); see also BJK of Manitowoc Cty., Inc. v. Barkwell, No. 
09CV738, 2012 WL 13001081, at *17 (Wis. Cir. Ct. June 25, 2012); 
cf. KBS Constr., Inc. v. McCullough Plumbing, Inc., No. 
2008AP1867, unpublished slip op., ¶¶31-32 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec 23, 
2009); IW Enter. V. Kopas, No. 03-2036, unpublished slip op., 
¶¶11, 32-33 (Wis. Ct. App. July 27, 2004); Lorge v. Rabl, No. 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
28 
 
this is an authoritative interpretation.  See Wenke v. Gehl Co., 
2004 WI 103, ¶21, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405 ("The 
principle of stare decisis applies to the published decisions of 
the court of appeals.").  After Stathus, the legislature made 
six revisions to the statute.22  Thus, the legislature had ample 
opportunity to act on or repeal the judicial interpretation of 
"costs of . . . litigation" in Stathus, particularly when it 
amended subsection (3)(b).  See 2003 Wis. Act 138, § 22.  But 
the legislature did not act on or repeal the interpreted 
language.  Therefore, the Stathus court's interpretation that 
attorney fees are included as "costs of . . . litigation" stands 
as good law.23   
¶53 Additionally, the language of Wis. Stat. § 799.25——
governing costs recoverable in small claims actions——supports 
                                                                                                                                                             
03CV1629, 2006 WL 6623605 (Wis. Cir. Ct. May 2, 2006).  
On this, the legislature has stood silent. 
22 See 2003 Wis. Act 36, § 11; 2003 Wis. Act 138, §§ 19-25; 
2005 Wis. Act 155, § 70 (renumbering as Wis. Stat. § 895.446); 
2005 Wis. Act 447, § 1; 2007 Wis. Act 96, § 161; 2011 Wis. Act 
186, § 2. 
23 We note also that this interpretation is consonant with 
the instructions given in the legislative drafting file for the 
act creating the statute, which describes the purpose as 
allowing "a person who wins a civil action to receive treble 
damages and costs for certain property crimes.  This includes 
all reasonable attorney fees and other costs of investigation 
and litigation. . . ."  Drafting File, 1995 Wis. Act 27, 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
29 
 
the conclusion that attorney fees are included as costs of 
litigation.  Section 799.25 states in relevant part as follows: 
Costs.  The clerk shall without notice to the 
parties tax and insert in the judgment as costs in 
favor 
of 
the 
party 
recovering 
judgment 
the 
following: . . .  
(10)  Attorney 
Fees. 
 
(a)  Attorney 
fees 
as 
provided in s. 814.04(1) and (6), except if the amount 
of attorney fees is otherwise specified by statute.24 
§ 799.25(10)(a).  Thus, the Stathus interpretation of "costs 
of . . . litigation" 
as 
inclusive 
of 
attorney 
fees 
seems 
particularly appropriate in small claims actions, given the 
language in the statute directing that "attorney fees" are 
"costs." See also Scalia & Garner, supra ¶35, at 170-73 
(Presumption of Consistent Usage). 
¶54 Moreover, 
the 
private 
attorney 
general 
doctrine 
supports the conclusion that attorney fees are included as costs 
of litigation.  The term "private attorney general" first 
appeared in the law in 1943, when Judge Jerome Frank used the 
phrase to describe attorneys empowered by Congress to "institute 
a proceeding . . . to vindicate the public interest."  Assoc. 
Indus. of New York v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943).  
It was soon after analogized to "a sort of King's proctor," but 
did not take root in widespread practice until the 1970s.  
                                                 
24 As 
established 
here, 
the 
amount 
of 
attorney 
fees 
recoverable in this action is "otherwise specified" by Wis. 
Stat. § 895.446(3)(b).  Thus, the $300 limit provided in Wis. 
Stat. § 814.04(1)(a) does not apply to the Estate's recovery in 
this case. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
30 
 
F.C.C. v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 239, 265 n.1 (1943) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting); see William B. Rubenstein, On What a 
"Private Attorney General" Is——And Why it Matters, 57 Vand. L. 
Rev. 2129, 2130 (2004). 
¶55 The expansive popularity of the doctrine in the 1970s 
has been attributed to its status as an equitable exception to 
the American rule that each party in a lawsuit bears its own 
costs.  See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Private Attorney General 
Doctrine—State 
Cases 
106 
A.L.R. 
5th 
523, 
§ 2(a) 
(2003); 
Rubenstein, supra ¶54, at 2136 ("Once loosed as a matter of 
money, the private attorney general concept's diffusion was 
limited only by the imagination of lawyers seeking attorneys' 
fees.").  This rapid expansion, however, prompted courts to 
craft legal standards to define its limits.   
¶56 Under federal law, attorney fees are recoverable under 
the private attorney general doctrine only where there is 
statutory authority or a contract justifying the award.  See 
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 
263 (1975); cf. id. ("[U]nder some, if not most, of the statutes 
providing for the allowance of reasonable fees, Congress has 
opted to rely heavily on private enforcement to implement public 
policy and to allow counsel fees so as to encourage private 
litigation.").   
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
31 
 
¶57 This 
holding 
did 
not 
control 
the 
doctrine's 
development at the state level,25 but Wisconsin has adopted a 
similar limitation.  See Marquardt v. Milwaukee Cty., 2002 WI 
App 12, ¶23, 249 Wis. 2d 780, 639 N.W.2d 762.  In Marquardt, the 
court held that, "[i]n order for Marquardt to prevail on his 
theory that he was acting as a private attorney general, he was 
required to show that some statutory basis existed for his 
request for attorney's fees."  Id.  The statutory basis for the 
request, however, need not be express statutory language 
authorizing 
attorney 
fees. 
 
See 
Watkins 
v. 
LIRC, 
117 
Wis. 2d 753, 755, 345 N.W.2d 482 (1984) (holding "that DILHR has 
the 
authority 
to 
award 
reasonable 
attorney's 
fees 
to 
a 
prevailing complainant" "even though [the] Act contains no 
express statutory language authorizing such an award").  Where 
there is no express authorization for attorney fees, the court 
must determine "whether the authority to award attorney's fees 
may be fairly implied from [the statute]"; this is a question of 
statutory interpretation.  Id. at 761.   
¶58 "A cardinal rule in interpreting statutes is to favor 
a construction that will fulfill the purpose of the statute over 
a construction that defeats the manifest object of the act."  
Id. at 761; see also Scalia & Garner, supra ¶35, at 63-65 
                                                 
25 In some states the legal standard is promulgated by 
statute, see, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5, but in most 
states, as in Wisconsin, the legal standard has developed in the 
common law. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
32 
 
(Presumption Against Ineffectiveness).26  An award of reasonable 
attorney fees effectuates the purpose of a public rights statute 
if, without the award, victims would not be in an economic 
position to advance the private and public interest at stake.  
See Watkins, 117 Wis. 2d at 764; Shands v. Castrovinci, 115 
Wis. 2d 352, 358, 340 N.W.2d 506 (1983) ("Often the amount of 
pecuniary 
loss 
is 
small 
compared 
with 
the 
cost 
of 
litigation. . . . The 
award 
of 
attorney 
fees 
encourages 
attorneys to pursue [] claims where the anticipated monetary 
recovery would not justify the expense of legal action.").  This 
is grounded in the maxim that, if rights are to be meaningful, 
they must be enforceable.  See also Hartman v. Winnebago Cty., 
216 Wis. 2d 419, 433 n.8, 574 N.W.2d 222 (1998) (noting that, 
where a party is acting as a private attorney general, the costs 
incurred in retaining counsel are "necessary" costs because, to 
fully enforce the public's rights, "assistance of counsel is 
fundamental"). 
¶59 Given this analysis, Wis. Stat. § 895.446 could well 
fall under the private attorney general doctrine.27  On the facts 
of the cause before us, the Estate brought a private suit based 
                                                 
26 The Presumption Against Ineffectiveness dictates that 
"[a] textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather 
than obstructs the document's purpose should be favored."  
Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 63. 
27 We note also that other states provide for similar civil 
actions based on criminalized conduct.  See, e.g., In. Stat. 
35-43-4-2 
(Theft; 
receiving 
stolen 
property); 
In. 
Stat. 
34-24-3-1 (Pecuniary loss as result of property offenses). 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
33 
 
on a criminal statute that deters theft.  Criminal prosecution 
is the exclusive province of the government in the United States 
today.  Rubenstein, supra ¶54, at 2141.  Thus, in bringing a 
private suit that enforces criminal proscriptions, the Estate's 
cause vindicates the public right to be free from crime.  See 
also Watkins, 117 Wis. 2d at 764 ("[A]n individual who brings an 
action to enforce a statutory right may be acting as a 'private 
attorney general' to enforce the public's rights under the 
statute.").  Additionally, the Estate's claim was for $10,000 
and the circuit court found that the hourly legal fees amounted 
to $24,708.50.  As a practical matter then, without attorney 
fees, the Estate may not have been in an economic position to 
advance the private and public interest at stake.28 
¶60 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that attorney fees 
are recoverable as "costs of . . . litigation" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.446(3)(b) because the court of appeals' authoritative 
interpretation in Stathus stands where the legislature failed to 
act 
to 
repeal 
that 
interpretation. 
 
Additionally, 
the 
itemization of "attorney fees" as "costs" in Wis. Stat. § 799.25 
(applicable to small claims) and the private attorney general 
doctrine 
support 
the 
conclusion 
that 
attorney 
fees 
are 
recoverable here.   
                                                 
28 We note that the circuit court awarded attorney fees 
based on an hourly rate, although the record reflects that the 
Estate had a contingency fee agreement, and confine our analysis 
to the facts underlying the circuit court award.  See supra note 
4. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
34 
 
¶61 Furthermore, other language in the statute supports 
our conclusion that attorney fees are recoverable.  It is well 
established that attorneys are agents of their clients.  See, 
e.g., Marten Transp., Ltd v. Hartford Specialty Co., 194 
Wis. 2d 1, 13, 533 N.W.2d 452 (1995) ("The relationship of 
attorney and client is one of agency.").  Section 895.446(3)(b) 
allows the plaintiffs in a civil theft action to recover the 
"value of the time spent by any employee or agent of the 
victim."  Thus, the language of this provision further supports 
that the Estate, as the plaintiff in this civil theft action, 
may recover attorney fees as the value of the time spent by the 
Estate's attorneys, who are its agents.29 
¶62 In sum, to conclude that Wis. Stat. § 895.446(3)(b) 
does not include attorney fees would require us to, at a 
minimum, overturn precedent, disregard fundamental principles of 
statutory interpretation, and ignore the legislature's inaction 
with respect to this subsection, especially when the legislature 
modified this very statute six times post-Stathus.  We therefore 
remand the cause to the circuit court with direction to award 
reasonable attorney fees consistent with this opinion.  See 
supra ¶2 note 4.  
 
                                                 
29 Again, the reasonableness of the amount awarded was not 
an issue before this court and we decline to address it so as to 
afford the circuit court the opportunity to consider it in the 
first instance on remand.  See supra note 4. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
35 
 
C.  Whether The Court Of Appeals Erroneously Exercised  
Its Discretion In Considering Whether The Circuit Court  
Erred When It Awarded Exemplary Damages On  
The Estate's Post-Verdict Motion. 
¶63 The third issue we consider is whether the court of 
appeals erred in considering an argument regarding exemplary 
damages that was not raised in the circuit court.  This issue is 
two-fold: first we determine whether considering the argument 
was an erroneous exercise of discretion; second, we determine 
whether the court of appeals' decision to reverse the circuit 
court's award of exemplary damages was an error of law.     
¶64 As 
to 
whether 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
erred 
in 
considering the issue of the circuit court's award of exemplary 
damages, the Estate argues that the court of appeals erroneously 
exercised its discretion because considering an argument not 
preserved below creates a double standard for parties who 
decline to address arguments not fully briefed by an opposing 
party.30 Storey argues that the court of appeals did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion because the circuit court 
was wrong to award exemplary damages to the Estate on the 
Estate's post-verdict motion where there is clear law that 
                                                 
30 The essence of this double standard is as follows: on the 
one hand, responding to an issue that the opposing party did not 
fully brief or raise below "open[s] the door for the Court of 
Appeals to consider the issue 'thoroughly' briefed"; on the 
other hand, "a failure to take on the merits of that [issue] can 
be used against the respondent if the Court of Appeals" decides 
to consider the issue and determines it has been forfeited by 
the party that declined to respond on the basis that the issue 
had not been fully briefed.   
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
36 
 
requires an award of exemplary damages be made by the trier of 
fact, which in this case was the jury.   
¶65 As to whether the court of appeals erred in reversing 
the circuit court's award of exemplary damages, the Estate 
argues that the court of appeals erred because the law does not 
clearly require a jury to determine the amount of exemplary 
damages.  Storey argues that the court of appeals did not err 
because the law clearly requires that the trier of fact 
determine the amount of exemplary damages, which in this case 
was the jury; thus, the judge's award of exemplary damages on a 
post-verdict motion was improper.   
¶66 Regarding discretion, we conclude that the court of 
appeals did not err when it considered the issue of exemplary 
damages, in part because the issue raised was a legal question, 
the parties thoroughly briefed the issue, and there were no 
disputed issues of fact.  Regarding the legal merit of reversal, 
we conclude that the court of appeals' reversal of the circuit 
court was proper because the circuit court's ruling was contrary 
to 
the 
clear 
legal 
standard 
set 
forth 
in 
Kimble, 
353 
Wis. 2d 377. 
¶67 First, we determine whether considering the argument 
was an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Typically, on appeal, 
a court will not consider an issue not preserved below.  See 
State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶10, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 
N.W.2d 727.  Although this has commonly been known as the 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
37 
 
"waiver rule," we reiterate here that it is more properly 
referred to as "forfeiture."31  See id., ¶11 n.2; Brunton v. 
Nuvell Credit Corp., 2010 WI 50, ¶35, 325 Wis. 2d 135, 785 
N.W.2d 302.  At the circuit court, issues are preserved by 
timely objection.  Huebner, 235 Wis. 2d 486, ¶10.  An appellate 
court may, however, exercise its discretion to hear an issue not 
preserved below.  See Caban, 210 Wis. 2d at 609.  Such an 
exercise of discretion is proper where the issue raised is a 
legal question, the parties have thoroughly briefed the issue, 
and there are no disputed issues of fact.  See Wirth v. Ehly, 93 
Wis. 2d 433, 444, 287 N.W.2d 140 (1980), superseded by statute 
on other grounds; see also State v. Bodoh, 226 Wis. 2d 718, 737, 
595 N.W.2d 330 (1999). 
¶68 Here, the court of appeals did not err when it 
considered the issue of exemplary damages.  First, the proper 
allocation of responsibilities between the judge and the jury 
with regard to exemplary damages is a question of law.  See 
Kimble, 353 Wis. 2d 377, ¶38.  Second, Storey raised the issue 
of the proper allocation of responsibilities between judge and 
jury with regard to exemplary damages in her briefing in the 
court of appeals, and the Estate's court of appeals brief 
responds to her argument on that issue.  Third, the parties do 
not dispute that it was the judge, not the jury——the trier of 
                                                 
31 "[F]orfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion 
of a right[;] waiver is the intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right."  Brunton v. Nuvell Credit Corp., 
2010 WI 50, ¶35, 325 Wis. 2d 135, 785 N.W.2d 302. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
38 
 
fact below——who determined both the appropriateness and the 
amount of the award of exemplary damages.  Thus, the court of 
appeals did not err when it considered whether the circuit court 
had improperly awarded exemplary damages.  
¶69 Second, we determine whether the court of appeals 
decision to reverse the circuit court's award of exemplary 
damages was an error of law.  The accepted legal standard for 
awarding exemplary damages is clear.  In Kimble, this court 
stated: 
The judge has the duty to act as the "gatekeeper" when 
determining whether the issue of punitive damages32 is 
properly before the jury.  Once the judge has 
determined that the issue of punitive damages is 
properly before the jury, whether to actually award 
punitive damages in a particular case is entirely 
within the discretion of the jury.  
353 Wis. 2d 377, ¶44 (citation omitted) (footnote added).  This 
establishes that, although the judge initially determines 
whether exemplary damages are an appropriate issue to be 
presented to the trier of fact, it is within the discretion of 
the trier of fact to determine whether to actually award 
exemplary damages and, if so, in what amount.  See also 
Topolewski v. Plankinton Packing Co., 143 Wis. 52, 53, 126 
N.W. 554 (1910); Shopko Stores, Inc. v. Kujak, 147 Wis. 2d 589, 
601, 433 N.W.2d 618 (Ct. App. 1988).  Of course, that 
                                                 
32 "Exemplary 
damages" 
are 
synonymous 
with 
"punitive 
damages."  Exemplary Damages, Black's Law Dictionary 692 (10th 
ed. 2014). 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
39 
 
determination is subject to post-verdict review, for example, on 
proper motion and/or on appeal. 
¶70 Here, the trier of fact in the circuit court was the 
jury.33  Thus, the circuit court's decision to first award 
exemplary damages on the Estate's post-verdict motion was 
contrary to clear law because the issue was not first presented 
to the jury, and the court of appeals decision to reverse was 
proper.   
¶71 In sum, we affirm the court of appeals' exercise of 
discretion to consider the issue of the circuit court's post-
verdict award of exemplary damages.  After consideration of the 
issue, the court of appeals held that, in a jury trial, the 
award of exemplary damages must be decided by the jury.  See 
Estate of Miller, 371 Wis. 2d 669, ¶16.  Because this is a 
proper application of the legal standard, we also affirm the 
court of appeals' holding on the merits.  
 
D.  Whether The Court Of Appeals Properly Denied  
The Estate's Motion For Reconsideration. 
¶72 The fourth and final issue we consider is whether the 
court of appeals properly denied the Estate's motion for 
reconsideration. 
 
The 
Estate 
filed 
its 
motion 
for 
reconsideration on July 11, 2016.  In its motion, the Estate 
argued that the court of appeals' holding as to actual damages 
                                                 
33 We note that in some instances, the judge is also the 
trier of fact and it would be appropriate in that instance for 
the judge to determine whether to award exemplary damages and 
the amount of the award. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
40 
 
was not supported by the case law cited in the opinion and that 
the holding as to double costs did not address existing 
precedent interpreting the application of Wis. Stat. § 807.01.  
The court of appeals withdrew its opinion on July 14, 2016.   
¶73 On July 28, 2016, the court of appeals denied the 
Estate's motion, and, on August 16, 2016, the court of appeals 
issued a revised opinion.  With regard to actual damages, the 
court of appeals removed citations to legal authority and added 
language that the Estate had conceded the issue.  Estate of 
Miller, 371 Wis. 2d 669, ¶21.  With regard to double costs, the 
court of appeals added language that the Estate had conceded the 
issue.  Id., ¶31.   
¶74 The 
Estate 
argues 
that 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
erroneously exercised its discretion because the court of 
appeals withdrew and revised its opinion contemporaneously with 
its consideration of the Estate's motion for reconsideration and 
two of the revisions made were responsive to two of the motion's 
arguments.  In essence, the Estate argues that the court of 
appeals cannot both revise its decision and deny the Estate's 
motion for reconsideration, especially because the revisions 
appear to be based on the merits of the motion's arguments.  
Storey argues that the court of appeals properly exercised its 
discretion because its withdrawal of its decision and its denial 
of the Estate's motion for reconsideration were "completely 
within its statutory authority."   
¶75 We conclude that our analysis as to the first issue 
renders analysis of this issue unnecessary because our reversal 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
41 
 
of the court of appeals' holdings on actual damages and double 
costs 
obviates 
the 
substance 
of 
the 
Estate's 
remaining 
arguments.34, 35  
¶76 Above, we concluded that the Estate's claim is an 
"other civil action" for which the $10,000 damages cap applies 
and that double costs are authorized by law.  See supra ¶¶32-47.  
This obviates the need for us to further analyze the court of 
appeals' holding on this issue,36 and we decline to do so. 
                                                 
34 As a general matter, we note that, under Wis. Stat. 
(Rule) § 809.24(3), the court of appeals may reconsider a 
decision on its own motion.  Section 809.24(3) does not dictate 
the grounds on which the court of appeals may withdraw and 
revise a previously issued opinion.  Thus, the court of appeals 
is afforded discretion in withdrawing and revising previously 
issued opinions.  Additionally, under § 809.24(2), the court of 
appeals may deny a motion for reconsideration.  Section 
809.24(2) does not dictate what action the court of appeals must 
take on a motion, just that it must take action.  Thus, the 
court of appeals is afforded discretion to deny motions for 
reconsideration. 
35 Again, to the extent that the Estate's arguments may be 
read to raise a question of law regarding the court of appeals' 
statutory authority under Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.24, analysis 
of that issue is also rendered unnecessary by our analysis of 
the first issue and we need not comment further on whether the 
court of appeals' revision actually reflects a grant of the 
motion for reconsideration.  See also supra note 11. 
36 The court of appeals held that the Estate conceded that 
it should have filed in large claims.  See Estate of Miller, 371 
Wis. 2d 669, ¶21.  Although we do not analyze that holding, we 
note that it appears from the record that the Estate did not 
concede this issue: first, it is not clear that Storey's brief 
in the court of appeals fully developed this as an argument; 
second, there was no reference anywhere in the record to the 
requirements for filing a large claim, not the least of which is 
the filing fee, see Wis. Stat. ch. 814. 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
42 
 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶77 There are four issues on this appeal.  First, we 
consider whether Wis. Stat. § 895.446 is an "action based in 
tort" under Wis. Stat. § 799.01(1)(cr) or an "other civil 
action" under § 799.01(1)(d).  Our conclusion on this issue 
resolves the consequent issues of which damages cap under 
§ 799.01 applies and whether double costs are authorized under 
Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3).  Second, we consider whether attorney 
fees are included within the meaning of "costs of investigation 
and litigation" under § 895.446(3)(b).  Third, we consider 
whether 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion in considering whether the circuit court erred when 
it awarded exemplary damages on the Estate's post-verdict 
motion.  Fourth, we consider whether the court of appeals 
properly denied the Estate's motion for reconsideration.  
¶78 As to the first issue, we conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.446 
is 
an 
"other 
civil 
action" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 799.01(1)(d) based on fundamental principles of statutory 
interpretation 
and 
the 
established 
distinctions 
between 
statutory civil claims and common law tort claims.  Because we 
conclude 
that 
§ 895.446 
is 
an 
"other 
civil 
action," 
we 
consequently conclude that the damages cap is $10,000 under 
§ 799.01(1)(d) and that double costs are authorized under Wis. 
Stat. § 807.01(3).   
¶79 As to the second issue, we conclude that attorney fees 
are included within the meaning of "costs of investigation and 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
43 
 
litigation" under Wis. Stat. § 895.446(3)(b) because Stathus, 
260 Wis. 2d 166, a judicial interpretation by the court of 
appeals, 
has 
long 
stood 
for 
that 
proposition, 
and 
the 
legislature, despite taking other, subsequent action in that 
very 
statute, 
has 
not 
legislated 
so 
as 
to 
alter 
that 
interpretation.   
¶80 As to the third issue, we conclude that the court of 
appeals did not err when it considered the issue of exemplary 
damages, in part because the issue raised was a legal question, 
the parties thoroughly briefed the issue, and there were no 
disputed issues of fact.  We also conclude that the court of 
appeals' reversal of the circuit court was proper because the 
circuit court's ruling was contrary to the clear legal standard 
set forth in Kimble, 353 Wis. 2d 377.   
¶81 As to the fourth issue, we conclude that our analysis 
as to the first issue renders analysis of the fourth issue 
unnecessary because our reversal of the court of appeals' 
holdings on actual damages and double costs obviates the 
substance of the Estate's remaining arguments.   
¶82 Thus, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
as to the first and second issues and affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals as to the third issue.  Because we reverse on 
the first issue, we need not decide the fourth issue.  We remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to 
No. 
2014AP2420   
 
44 
 
the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
1 
 
¶83 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting in 
part).  I join the court's opinion except insofar as it 
concludes that Wis. Stat. § 895.446(3)(b) awards attorney's fees 
to prevailing plaintiffs.  Stathus v. Horst,1 our opinion's sole 
source of authority supporting that conclusion, is actually 
silent on the issue.  And the legislature has been silent with 
respect to Stathus's silence.  But in that doubly-quiet void we 
purport to hear not only an authoritative interpretation of a 
statute, but also the legislature's commendation of that 
unspoken interpretation.  Because I hear no such thing, I must 
respectfully dissent from that part of our opinion. 
¶84 The availability of attorney's fees depends entirely 
on what Wis. Stat. § 895.466(3) means when it says a prevailing 
plaintiff "may recover all of the following: . . . All costs of 
investigation and litigation that were reasonably incurred, 
including the value of the time spent by any employee or agent 
of the victim."  Our methodology for discerning that meaning 
focuses on the statute's text, context, and structure.  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶45-46, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins 
with the language of the statute.' . . . Context is important to 
meaning. So, too, is the structure of the statute in which the 
operative language appears. Therefore, statutory language is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
                                                 
1 2003 WI App 28, 260 Wis. 2d 166, 659 N.W.2d 165. 
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
2 
 
surrounding 
or 
closely-related 
statutes . . . ." 
(internal 
citation omitted)).  In performing this analysis, we carefully 
avoid ascribing an unreasonable or absurd meaning to the text.  
Id., ¶46 ("[S]tatutory language is interpreted . . . reasonably, 
to avoid absurd or unreasonable results." (citations omitted)).  
If we find the statute's plain meaning through this methodology, 
we go no further.  Id., ¶45 ("If the meaning of the statute is 
plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.'" (quoting Seider v. 
O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659)); 
see generally Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 
100 Marq. L. Rev. 969 (2017). 
¶85 Our opinion does not conform to this methodology.  
Instead of "begin[ning] with the language of the statute," we 
began with a court opinion that did not address itself to the 
question sub judice.  Instead of considering the statute's 
context and structure, we turned to a canard about the 
significance of legislative inaction.  And we argued that it 
would be wise policy to award attorney's fees in situations like 
this——an argument on which I offer no comment except to say that 
the wisdom of a given policy makes the asserted meaning of a 
statute neither more nor less likely to be true.  And then, at 
the end, we finally arrived at the statute's language, but only 
in search of justification for the conclusion we had already 
reached.  This is a method of statutory interpretation so far 
removed from the practice we endorsed in Kalal that it is 
unrecognizable. 
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
3 
 
I. WHAT STATHUS V. HORST CANNOT TELL US 
 
¶86 Citing Kalal, our opinion says "[w]e begin with the 
language of the statute."  Majority op., ¶50.  And we did, 
inasmuch as we quoted Wis. Stat. § 895.446(3) near the beginning 
of the attorney's fees section of our opinion.  But Kalal is not 
telling us where we should place the quote——it is telling us 
that the language should be the first thing to capture our 
analytical attention.  However, after quoting the statute, we 
promptly ignored it until giving it a paragraph's worth of 
attention at the end of our analysis, and then only after we had 
already concluded the language we did not construe awards 
attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs.  Our analysis actually 
started with the invocation of a canon of construction to make 
it appear that Stathus said something it did not. 
¶87 We said that the "Prior Construction Canon" requires 
us to read Wis. Stat. § 895.446(3) as awarding attorney's fees 
to prevailing plaintiffs.  This interpretive aid counsels that 
"[i]f a statute uses words or phrases that have already received 
authoritative construction by the jurisdiction's court of last 
resort, 
or 
even 
uniform 
construction 
by 
inferior 
courts . . . , they are to be understood according to that 
construction."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 322 (2012).  We have never 
construed the language of § 895.446(3)(b), so the canon directs 
our attention to our court of appeals. 
¶88 We offered Stathus as the only candidate in which we 
may 
find 
an 
authoritative 
construction 
of 
the 
statute's 
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
4 
 
language.  But before we hunt through the Stathus opinion for 
such a thing, it's worth a short digression to describe the 
subject of our search.  The term "construction" refers to the 
process by which we discover the meaning of the written law.  It 
is "[t]he act or process of interpreting or explaining the sense 
or intention of a writing (usu. a statute, opinion, or 
instrument)."  Black's Law Dictionary 308 (7th ed. 1999). 
Construction, as applied to written law, is the art or 
process of discovering and expounding the meaning and 
intention of the authors of the law with respect to 
its application to a given case, where that intention 
is rendered doubtful either by reason of apparently 
conflicting provisions or directions, or by reason of 
the fact that the given case is not explicitly 
provided for in the law. 
Id. (quoting Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction 
and Interpretation of the Laws 1 (1896)). 
¶89 So if Stathus is to bear the weight we assign it, we 
should find in that opinion an effort to discover and expound on 
the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 895.446(3)(b) as it relates to 
liability for the plaintiff's attorney's fees.  Stathus, of 
course, contains no such thing.  Surprisingly, this is not even 
a point of contention——our opinion frankly admits the court of 
appeals did not construe the language in which we are 
interested:  "We acknowledge that the Stathus court did not 
directly consider the issue of whether attorney fees were 
awardable; rather, in promulgating the standards by which a 
circuit court should determine whether an award of attorney fees 
under the statute is reasonable, the Stathus court assumed that 
attorney fees were awardable."  Majority op., ¶52 n.21.  Because 
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
5 
 
the 
"Prior 
Construction 
Canon" 
performs 
its 
work 
on 
"constructions," our concession that Stathus contains only an 
assumption 
necessarily 
disqualifies 
it 
from 
the 
canon's 
operation. 
¶90 But with a liberal application of a few more canons, 
we claim to have coaxed something authoritative out of Stathus:  
"This assumption, however, is a prior construction under the 
Predicate-Act Canon[2] and the Interpretation Principle[3] of 
statutory 
construction. . . . Thus, 
when 
the 
Stathus 
court 
remanded to the circuit court with instructions to 'apply the 
appropriate 
standards 
for 
determining 
"reasonableness"' 
of 
attorney fees under the statute, it necessarily construed the 
statute as authorizing the award of attorney fees."  Majority 
op., 
¶52 
n.21. 
 
No 
sentence 
that 
begins 
"[t]his 
assumption . . . is a prior construction" can advance 
any 
logically 
defensible 
proposition. 
 
A 
"construction," 
as 
described above, is the discovery and exposition of meaning.  An 
                                                 
2 "Authorization of an act also authorizes a necessary 
predicate act."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 192 (2012) (defining the 
"Predicate-Act Canon"). 
3 "Every application of a text to particular circumstances 
entails 
interpretation." 
 
Id. 
at 
53 
(defining 
the 
"Interpretation Principle"). 
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
6 
 
assumption is the absence of that.  The laws of a rational 
universe forbid these being the same thing.4 
¶91 Even without this error, the "Predicate-Act Canon" can 
provide no useful instruction here.  It is certainly true that 
the Stathus court, in remanding the case to determine the 
reasonableness of the claimed attorney's fees, also authorized 
the circuit court to award those fees.  But what of it?  Our 
project here is discerning the meaning of a statute, not a 
matter's undisputed procedural history.  But perhaps we mean to 
say the Stathus court's assumption was an "act" within the 
meaning of this canon.  If that is what we meant, then this is a 
good object lesson in why the canon applies to "acts" (as its 
name suggests), not reasoning.  If the canon allows us to 
conclude that Stathus authoritatively answered the question 
before us because its assumptions were necessary for its 
conclusion, then the canon does nothing but create logical 
fallacies.  Positing an argument's premise in the conclusion as 
a means of proving the premise's truth is known as the petitio 
principii (or "begging the question") error.  Bootstrapping does 
not make a premise more likely to be true. 
                                                 
4 The law of non-contradiction holds that a proposition 
cannot be simultaneously true and not true.  Aristotle, 
Metaphysics bk. IV, ch. VI, at 1011b (W.D. Ross, trans., Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 1908) (c. 350 B.C.E.) (stating that "the most 
indisputable of all beliefs is that contradictory statements are 
not at the same time true").  Thus, the Stathus court cannot 
have both (1) assumed this statute awards attorney's fees, and 
also (2) engaged in a process of discovery and exposition on 
that subject. 
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
7 
 
¶92 The "Interpretation Principle" is similarly unhelpful.  
Yes, "[e]very application of a text to particular circumstances 
entails interpretation."  Scalia & Garner, supra ¶5, at 53.  But 
that truism requires an application of the text.  As our opinion 
admits, however, the Stathus court didn't apply the text to the 
question in which we are interested.  Thus, there is no 
interpretation for this canon to validate.  So, even if we had 
the power to suspend the iron-clad law of non-contradiction, 
this brace of canons is no more helpful than the first. 
¶93 As 
our 
opinion 
reveals, 
we 
don't 
have 
enough 
interpretive canons to make Stathus say something authoritative 
about the availability of attorney's fees under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.446(3)(b).  We should be grateful this is so.  For if our 
opinion is correct, and this cocktail of canons has the power to 
create 
ex 
nihilo, 
then 
we 
have 
called 
forth 
from 
our 
interstitial silences a host of undefined (and undefinable) 
authorities.  Who knows what manner of inchoate precedent will 
answer that summons?  Our responsibility (and authority) lies 
only in saying what the law is——that is, saying what it already 
is; it is not for us to use interpretive canons to speak the law 
into existence.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
II. LEGISLATIVE INACTION 
¶94 To affirm the continuing validity of Stathus's non-
holding, our opinion observes that the legislature has done 
nothing to counter the court of appeals' assumption that Wis. 
Stat. § 895.446(3)(b) awards attorney's fees to prevailing 
plaintiffs:  "[T]he legislature had ample opportunity to act on 
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
8 
 
or 
repeal 
the 
judicial 
interpretation 
of 
'costs 
of . . . litigation' in Stathus, particularly when it amended 
subsection (3)(b). . . . [b]ut the legislature did not act on or 
repeal the interpreted language."  Majority op., ¶52.  Accepting 
for 
the 
sake 
of 
argument 
that 
there 
was 
a 
"judicial 
interpretation" to which the legislature could respond, there is 
nothing to suggest the legislature's non-response could have 
anything to say about the statute. 
¶95 As mentioned above, we look for a statute's meaning in 
its text, context, and structure.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶45-
46.  These are things that exist and have definable content, the 
meaning of which we may contest.  Some would also include 
legislative history as a source of a statute's meaning——e.g., 
instructions delivered to the bill's drafter, iterations of a 
bill presented in committee or to the full legislative body, 
statements delivered by the members in a legislative chamber, et 
cetera.  Regardless of the propriety of consulting such 
material, it at least shares with the statute's text the benefit 
of being something that exists; it has definable content to 
which construing minds might have recourse. 
¶96 Legislative 
inaction, 
on 
the 
other 
hand, 
is 
a 
negation.  There is no definable content in a void, and there 
can be no meaning drawn from it.  There are several reasons this 
is true. 
¶97 First, 
attributing 
significance 
to 
legislative 
inaction depends on an overweening, court-centric view of our 
relationship to the other branches of government.  If this 
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
9 
 
interpretive device is to function, it requires a belief that 
the 
legislature 
carefully 
attends 
to 
everything 
we 
say, 
rigorously compares our pronouncements to its own understanding 
of the statutory corpus,5 compiles a list of disagreements, and 
privileges corrective measures over everything else on its 
crowded legislative calendar. 
¶98 This, of course, hasn't the slightest correlation to 
reality.  The legislature is a coordinate branch of government 
with its own unique responsibilities, functions, and priorities.  
It does not pay court to us, nor does it have the least 
obligation to do so.  That it does, from time to time, adopt 
legislation specifically designed and intended to respond to one 
of our holdings gives us no license to pretend it will always do 
so when it disagrees with us. 
¶99 Second, drawing an inference from legislative inaction 
involves an unwarranted temporal elision.  The meaning of a 
statute is fixed at the point it is adopted.  To the extent we 
are looking past the text to the legislature to determine what 
its membership thought the statute meant, we should at least 
look to the body that adopted it.  The legislature does not have 
stagnant membership——it is, in fact, reconstituted every other 
year.  Many legislators return, but the change of even one 
member makes it a new body.  If we look for meaning in the 
                                                 
5 The legislature does not actually have a collective 
understanding of a statute's meaning.  A legislature is not a 
monolith; ours is a body that comprises 132 members, all of whom 
exercise their mental faculties independently of the others.  So 
to speak of a collective understanding is to speak of a fiction. 
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
10 
 
inactivity of successive legislatures, then we are asking after 
the wrong body. 
This assumption [about the significance of legislative 
inactivity], which frequently haunts our opinions, 
should be put to rest.  It is based, to begin with, on 
the patently false premise that the correctness of 
statutory construction is to be measured by what the 
current Congress desires, rather than by what the law 
as enacted meant. 
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cty. Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 
671 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
¶100 Third, whether a court's interpretation of a statute 
should be rejected is a substantively different question from 
whether the statute should be adopted in the first instance:  
"To make matters worse, it [the legislative inaction principle] 
assays the current Congress' desires with respect to the 
particular provision in isolation, rather than (the way the 
provision was originally enacted) as part of a total legislative 
package containing many quids pro quo."  Id. (emphasis omitted).  
There is no telling what might incentivize legislators to reject 
our statutory interpretations, or dissuade them from doing so.  
Nor do we have the means by which to compare those dynamics to 
the supporting rationale for the statute's provisions when 
adopted. 
¶101 Finally, 
there 
are 
a 
variety 
of 
reasons 
the 
legislature may take no action on any given question.  Because 
most of those reasons have nothing to do with the accuracy of 
our work, there simply isn't any way to espy meaning in the 
legislature's silence: 
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
11 
 
But even accepting the flawed premise that the intent 
of the current Congress, with respect to the provision 
in isolation, is determinative, one must ignore 
rudimentary principles of political science to draw 
any conclusions regarding that intent from the failure 
to enact legislation.  The 'complicated check on 
legislation,'  The Federalist No. 62, p. 378 (C. 
Rossiter ed. 1961), erected by our Constitution 
creates an inertia that makes it impossible to assert 
with any degree of assurance that congressional 
failure to act represents (1) approval of the status 
quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to 
alter the status quo, (3) unawareness of the status 
quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or even (5) 
political cowardice. 
Id. at 671-72.  Even if a majority of one of the succeeding 
legislature's members wished to rebuke our interpretation, that 
desire still might not result in a new law:  "[I]ntuiting those 
desires from congressional failure to act is an uncertain 
enterprise which takes as its starting point disregard of the 
checks and balances in the constitutional scheme of legislation 
designed to assure that not all desires of a majority of the 
Legislature find their way into law."  United States v. Johnson, 
481 U.S. 681, 703 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
¶102 This "legislative inaction" device has no explanatory 
power whatsoever, and we should not pretend it does.  As Justice 
Scalia said, "I think we should admit that vindication by 
congressional inaction is a canard."  Johnson, 480 U.S. at 672 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  I do, too. 
¶103 Our opinion relies on it anyway because, well, that's 
what we do:  "[The] concurrence/dissent takes issue with this 
canon of construction . . . but does not argue that Wisconsin 
law does not support application of the canon or that we have 
incorrectly applied the canon here."  Majority op., ¶51 n.20.  
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
12 
 
Alas for the day in which exposing one of our analytical 
constructs as just make-believe doesn't diminish its authority.  
Notwithstanding the emptiness of this judicial fabrication, we 
are so humbled by it that we cannot even imagine challenging its 
place in our jurisprudence.  Yes, our prior opinions support the 
use of this fiction.  But reason doesn't.  Between the two, we 
should choose the latter.  We have both the authority and the 
responsibility to do so. 
¶104 Perhaps even more unsettling is our revelation that, 
without this fiction and a clutch of inapposite canons, we would 
be unable to interpret our statutes:  "In other words, the 
dissent has presented a problem without suggesting a solution, 
and we decline to digress from the established canons of 
construction 
because 
to 
do 
so 
would 
leave 
us 
with 
no 
intelligible, generally accepted and consistently applied theory 
of statutory interpretation."  Majority op., ¶51 n.20 (internal 
quotations and citation omitted).  We could always consult the 
statute's text, as Kalal teaches——a solution with which I 
introduced this opinion, and which I address below. 
III. THE STATUTE'S TEXT 
¶105 After having already concluded that the statute shifts 
responsibility for attorney's fees to the defendant, our opinion 
finally turns to the statute's text to see what it might have to 
say for itself:  "Furthermore, other language in the statute 
supports our conclusion that attorney fees are recoverable."6  
                                                 
6 We reached our conclusion as early as ¶49; our treatment 
of the statute's language did not start until ¶61. 
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
13 
 
Majority op., ¶61.  "Other" language supports our conclusion?  
This suggests we had already construed some of the statute's 
language.  We hadn't.  Until this paragraph all we had done with 
the language was quote it.  In any event, our analysis of the 
statute's language spanned a single paragraph.  See id.  And in 
that paragraph we simply recognized that (1) attorneys act in an 
agency capacity with respect to their clients, and (2) the 
statute awards "the value of the time spent by any employee or 
agent of the victim" as a cost to the prevailing plaintiff. 
¶106 While it is true that attorneys act in an agency 
capacity for their clients, it does not inexorably follow from 
this that the legislature means the term "agent" to encompass 
"attorney."  And there is substantial evidence that it does not 
mean this.  When the legislature wants a provision to apply to 
both attorneys and agents, it makes its intention known by 
actually saying it applies to both attorneys and agents.  It has 
done this so consistently, and so broadly across the statutory 
corpus, that it has created a quite distinct pattern, a pattern 
our opinion does not acknowledge.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§§ 19.05 ("the plaintiff's agent or the plaintiff's attorney"), 
42.01 ("an authorized attorney or agent"), 59.40 ("the party's 
agent or the party's attorney"), 59.694 ("agent or attorney"), 
60.06 ("agents, attorneys and representatives"), 60.351 ("agent 
or attorney"), 62.23 ("by agent or by attorney"), 66.0111 
("attorney or agent"), 66.0703 ("agents or attorneys"), 71.78 
("agent or attorney"), 73.01 ("petitioner's attorney or agent"), 
76.30 
("person's 
authorized 
agent 
or 
attorney"), 
77.61 
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
14 
 
("person's authorized agent or attorney"), 87.12 ("engineers, 
attorneys, agents, assistants, clerks, employees and laborers"), 
93.18 ("agent or attorney"), 100.23 ("his or her agent or 
attorney"), 102.123 ("employee's attorney or other authorized 
agent"; "employee, attorney, or agent"), 102.30 ("agent or 
attorney"), 102.33 (stating phrase "attorney or authorized 
agent" five times), 103.275 ("attorney or agent"; "person's 
attorney or agent"), 103.58 ("agents, servants, employees and 
attorneys"), 133.08 ("applicant's agent or attorney"), 115.997 
("officers, attorneys, employees, agents, or consultants"), 
134.19 ("principal, agent or attorney"), 145.10 ("attorney or 
agent"; "person's attorney or agent"), 171.04 ("person's agent 
or attorney"), 171.05 ("person's agent or attorney"), 171.06 
("person's agent or attorney"), 181.1603 ("member's agent or 
attorney"; "agent or attorney"), 180.0720 (stating "shareholder 
or his or her agent or attorney" three times), 180.1602 ("agent 
or attorney"), 180.1603 ("shareholder's agent or attorney"), 
185.47 ("any member or stockholder, or his or her agent or 
attorney"), 186.70 ("agent or attorney"), 193.501 ("member's 
agent or attorney"), 214.525 ("person, agent, or attorney"), 
217.19 ("agent or attorney"), 221.0518 (stating "shareholder or 
his or her agent or attorney" three times), 279.07 ("interested 
persons or their agents or attorneys"), 280.13 ("attorney or 
agent"; "licensee's attorney or agent"), 304.16 ("officers, 
attorneys, employees, agents, or consultants"), 321.61 (stating 
"person's agent or attorney" three times; "person or agent or 
attorney"), 610.50 ("insurer or an employee, agent or attorney 
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
15 
 
of an insurer"), 611.51 ("policyholder's agent or attorney"), 
701.0802 ("agent or attorney of the trustee"), 757.30 ("person 
who appears as agent, representative or attorney"), 779.98 
("person's agent or attorney"), 799.45 ("plaintiff's attorney or 
agent"; "plaintiff or his or her attorney or agent"), 804.01 
("attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent"), 
814.245 ("attorneys or agents"), 815.53 ("creditor or his or her 
attorney, 
or 
agent"), 
881.016 
("attorneys, 
accountants, 
investment advisers, agents or other persons"), 893.80 ("party, 
agent or attorney"), 893.82 ("his or her agent, attorney or 
personal representative"), 895.14 ("the party injured, agent or 
attorney"), 898.02 ("plaintiff's agent or attorney"), 898.03 
("plaintiff's 
agent 
or 
attorney"), 
938.999 
("officers, 
attorneys, 
employees, 
agents, 
or 
consultants"), 
946.13 
("director, officer, employee, agent or attorney"), 946.17 
("agent or attorney of any person"; "agent or attorney").7 
¶107 If the term "agent" subsumes "attorney," there would 
have been no need to mention the latter on these 60 occasions.  
We should not shoehorn the term "attorney" into "agent" when the 
legislature so clearly does not.  The statute, by its own terms, 
makes a defendant liable for the time value of the prevailing 
plaintiff's agents.  But, for whatever reason, the legislature 
                                                 
7 Two of these statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 60.06 and 814.245, 
are fee-shifting provisions, demonstrating that even in this 
context the legislature makes a distinction between "attorneys" 
and "agents."  All of these statutes refer to the current 2015-
16 version. 
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
16 
 
chose not to extend the statute's mandate to attorney's fees.  
Whether it should have done so is none of our business. 
¶108 Even if this were an insufficient reason to reject our 
reading of the statute, the text provides an even more explicit 
reason to do so.  One of the most respected principles of 
statutory construction is that we should not interpret text in a 
manner 
that 
reduces 
any 
of 
its 
language 
to 
ignominious 
surplusage.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("Statutory language is 
read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in 
order to avoid surplusage.").  We cannot understand "agent" as 
inclusive of "attorney" without violating that principle for the 
following reasons. 
¶109 The statute under consideration actually contains two 
cost-shifting provisions.  The first is general and applies to 
all causes of action authorized by Wis. Stat. § 895.446(1):  "If 
the plaintiff prevails in a civil action under sub. (1), he or 
she may recover all of the following:  . . . ."  § 895.446(3).  
The second is specific, and applies only to a subset of claims 
authorized by the statute.  This specific provision explicitly 
makes the defendant liable for the prevailing plaintiff's 
attorney's fees:  "If the violation of s. 943.01(1) involves the 
circumstances under s. 943.01(2d), the court may award a 
prevailing plaintiff the reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
litigating the action . . . ."  § 895.446(3m)(b).8 
                                                 
8 The type of property damage to which this provision refers 
is not at issue in this case. 
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
17 
 
¶110 Our conclusion does irremediable damage to the text of 
the specific cost-shifting provision.  If the general provision 
already includes attorney's fees, there is no reason for the 
specific provision to authorize a court to make such an award.  
That is to say, our understanding of the general provision makes 
the specific provision's award of attorney's fees entirely 
meaningless.  But there is nothing about the statute or this 
case that requires us to cause that damage.  If we don't stuff 
"attorney" into "agent" (which would be felicitously consistent 
with the legislature's choices), then the specific provision's 
award of attorney's fees will have good work to do.  And we will 
have given "reasonable effect to every word," and left no 
surplusage.  We did not explain why we should ignore this 
internally-consistent reading of the statute. 
¶111 Our opinion demonstrates an understandable fondness 
for canons of statutory construction.  When carefully applied in 
applicable circumstances, they can powerfully illuminate a 
statute's meaning.  Out of the many cited canons, however, 
perhaps the only applicable one is the presumption against 
legislative changes to the common law:  "A statute will be 
construed to alter the common law only when that disposition is 
clear."  Scalia & Garner, supra ¶5, at 318 (defining the 
"Presumption Against Change in Common Law"); see majority op., 
¶51.  In Wisconsin, we follow the "American Rule" with respect 
to attorney's fees: 
The general rule, known as the American rule, is that 
attorney's fees are not ordinarily recoverable in the 
absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing 
therefor.  Each party to a lawsuit, under this theory, 
No.  2014AP2420.dk 
 
18 
 
should bear its own costs of litigation. The American 
rule has been recognized and followed in Wisconsin. 
Kremers-Urban Co. v. Am. Emp'rs Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 744-
45, 351 N.W.2d 156 (1984) (internal citations omitted).  That's 
our common law.  So if Wis. Stat. § 895.446(3)(b) is to alter 
that rule, it must do so clearly.  We, however, derived our 
attorney's fees holding wholly from what we think we squeezed 
out of silence.  That should make it self-evident that this 
statute did not "clearly" alter the common law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶112 We found the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 895.446(3)(b) in 
a court of appeals opinion that did not address the question we 
answered, a collection of inapposite interpretive canons, some 
policy arguments, and a canard.  This is not how we are supposed 
to interpret statutes.  And the methodology we employed led us 
to the wrong conclusion.  Consequently, I respectfully dissent 
from that portion of our opinion. 
¶113 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
No.  2014AP2420.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶114 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  Unlike the 
majority, I conclude that civil theft is an "action based in 
tort" 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 799.01(1)(cr).  
Therefore, the Estate's compensatory damages should be capped at 
$5,000, and the Estate is not entitled to double costs.1   
¶115 In reaching an opposite conclusion, the majority 
relies entirely on unremarkable truisms and simply ignores the 
wealth of prior cases in which Wisconsin courts have either 
explicitly or implicitly characterized certain statutory causes 
of action as "torts" or as "sounding in tort."   
¶116 The majority repeatedly draws distinctions between 
statutory claims and "common law" tort claims in order to 
conclude that the statutory claim for civil theft under Wis. 
Stat. § 895.446 cannot be a common law tort claim.  In so doing, 
the majority pulls a bait-and-switch in order to answer a 
question that was never asked. 
¶117 The question presented in the instant case is not 
whether a civil theft claim pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.446 is 
a "common law" tort claim.  It obviously is not.  Rather, the 
actual question presented is whether a civil theft claim 
pursuant to § 895.446 is an "action based in tort" under Wis. 
Stat. § 799.01(1)(cr).  Reader beware!  The majority's choice of 
language is calculated to erect a strawman that it can then 
                                                 
1 I agree with the majority that whether to award exemplary 
damages, and if so, in what amount, is a question to be decided 
by the finder of fact. 
No.  2014AP2420.ssa 
 
2 
 
easily set ablaze in the guise of reasoned and principled 
analysis. 
¶118 I also write to make clear that I do not agree with 
the majority's conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 895.446(3)(b) awards 
attorney fees in the present case.  On this issue, I largely 
agree with the analysis of Justice Kelly's dissent.   
¶119 Lastly, I conclude that the majority fails to fully 
delineate the elements of the private attorney general doctrine, 
leading to a flawed result. 
¶120 Because a civil theft claim pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.446 is an "action based in tort" and attorney fees are not 
awardable 
to 
prevailing 
plaintiffs 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.446(3)(b), I dissent. 
I 
¶121 The majority states four equally unpersuasive reasons 
for its conclusion that a civil theft claim pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 895.446 is not an "action based in tort," but instead, 
qualifies 
as 
an 
"other 
civil 
action" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 799.01(1)(d).  The majority reasons as follows:  first, 
§ 895.446, the civil theft statute, states that it is creating a 
"civil action"; second, Wisconsin case law distinguishes the 
statutory civil theft claim under § 895.446 from similar common-
law tort claims; third, Wisconsin case law distinguishes between 
other statutorily created civil claims and common-law tort 
claims; and fourth, there is a long-standing distinction in the 
common law between crimes and torts, even though both may be 
based on the same conduct, which suggests that a plaintiff 
No.  2014AP2420.ssa 
 
3 
 
acting under a civil statute that enables enforcement of 
criminal law is not bringing an action based in tort.  Majority 
op., ¶34. 
¶122 The majority's latter three reasons together suffer 
from the same infirmity:  these three reasons answer a question 
that was never asked.  These three reasons answer the question 
"Is a civil theft claim pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.446 a 
common law tort claim?"  This is not the question presented by 
the case.  The question presented is as follows: "Is a civil 
theft claim pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.446 an 'action based in 
tort' under Wis. Stat. § 799.01(1)(cr)?"2 
¶123 The majority spends several paragraphs explaining the 
unremarkable proposition that specific statutory causes of 
action are separate and distinct from their similar common law 
counterparts, see, e.g., majority op., ¶¶36-40, and pointing out 
that "there has long been a distinction in the common law 
between a tort claim and a criminal charge[,]" majority op., 
¶41. 
                                                 
2 The majority opinion explains that causes of action 
created by Wis. Stat. § 895.446(1), including a civil theft 
claim, are referred to as "civil actions."  Majority op., ¶35; 
Wis. Stat. § 895.446(2), (3).  It then concludes that "the use 
of the term 'civil action' in Wis. Stat. § 895.446 to describe 
the cause therein provided indicates that the cause may also be 
properly characterized as a 'civil action' under Wis. Stat. 
§ 799.01."  Majority op., ¶35.  This conclusion leads nowhere.  
It is a dead end.  Every action listed in § 799.01 is a "civil 
action," including all tort actions.  Being a "civil action" is 
not 
a 
distinguishing 
characteristic 
that 
is 
helpful 
in 
determining the specific subsection of § 799.01 into which the 
claim of civil theft falls. 
No.  2014AP2420.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶124 The 
majority's 
analytical 
errors 
are 
threefold.  
First, the majority answers a question that is not asked.  It 
repeatedly draws distinctions between statutory claims and 
common law tort claims without ever acknowledging that the 
question presented asks whether a statutory civil theft claim is 
"an action based in tort" as opposed to asking whether a 
statutory civil theft claim is a "common-law tort."   
¶125 Second, the majority fails to explain why a statutory 
claim and a very similar, though distinct, common-law tort claim 
cannot both be considered actions based in tort.  The great 
weight of Wisconsin authority confirms that statutory claims and 
very similar, though distinct, common-law tort claims may both 
be considered actions based in tort.3 
¶126 Third, the relevance of the majority's pointing out 
that a civil tort claim, whether created by statute or common 
law, is separate and distinct from a criminal prosecution for 
the same conduct is not apparent.  There are countless crimes 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Fandrey ex rel. Connell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 2004 WI 62, ¶¶9, 19, 272 Wis. 2d 46, 680 N.W.2d 345 
(recognizing "that § 174.02 [strict liability dog-bite statute] 
is a codified tort action" and further explaining that "the fact 
that liability in this case is predicated upon a statute rather 
than a common-law cause of action is not dispositive, as 
§ 174.02 still sounds in tort; it is a codified cause of action 
for a civil wrong"); Hanlon v. Town of Milton, 2000 WI 61, ¶16, 
235 Wis. 2d 597, 612 N.W.2d 44 (describing claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 as a tort); Johnson v. ABC Ins. Co., 193 Wis. 2d 35, 45-
46, 532 N.W.2d 130 (1995) (describing the "purely [] statutory 
remedy" of wrongful death action as "an action in tort"); Shopko 
Stores, Inc. v. Kujak, 147 Wis. 2d 589, 433 N.W.2d 618 (Ct. App. 
1988) (referring to an "underlying tort" when examining a civil 
action under § 943.51 for retail theft). 
No.  2014AP2420.ssa 
 
5 
 
the commission of which will likely constitute a tort against 
the victim, including, for example, battery and theft.  Conduct 
that amounts to a crime is very likely to be considered "conduct 
that amounts to a legal wrong and that causes harm for which 
courts will impose civil liability."  1 Dan Dobbs et al., The 
Law of Torts § 1 (2d ed. 2011). 
¶127 In sum, the majority opinion answers a question that 
was never asked in order to reach a conclusion that contradicts 
almost 30 years of case law.  As a result, the majority is 
unpersuasive. 
II 
¶128 In addition to asking this court to determine whether 
a statutory civil theft claim is an "action based in tort" 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 799.01(1)(cr), the instant case also 
asks us to determine whether Wis. Stat. § 895.446(3)(b), 
specifically, the language "[a]ll costs of investigation and 
litigation that were reasonably incurred, including the value of 
the time spent by any employee or agent of the victim," includes 
an award for actual reasonable attorney fees to prevailing 
plaintiffs.   
¶129 I agree to a large extent with Justice Kelly's dissent 
concluding that Wis. Stat. § 895.446(3)(b) does not provide for 
an award of actual reasonable attorney fees.     
¶130 In invoking the private attorney general doctrine to 
support its conclusion that a plaintiff successful in proving a 
statutory civil theft claim is entitled to an award of attorney 
No.  2014AP2420.ssa 
 
6 
 
fees, the majority writes too broadly and misstates the private 
attorney general doctrine.4 
¶131 In Wisconsin, a party will be awarded attorney fees, 
even in the absence of contractual or statutory authorization, 
if that party vindicates a right that: (1) benefits a large 
number of people; (2) requires private enforcement; and (3) is 
of societal importance.  See Shands v. Castrovinci, 115 
Wis. 2d 352, 340 N.W.2d 506 (1983); State ex rel. Hodge v. Town 
of Turtle Lake, 180 Wis. 2d 62, 508 N.W.2d 603 (1993); Watkins 
v. LIRC, 117 Wis. 2d 753, 345 N.W.2d 482 (1984); Richland Sch. 
Dist. v. DILHR, 166 Wis. 2d 262, 479 N.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1991); 
accord Maness v. Daily, 307 P.3d 894, 906 (Alaska 2013); Cave 
Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey, 308 P.3d 1152, 1159 (Ariz. 
2013); In re Conservatorship of Whitley, 241 P.3d 840, 846 (Cal. 
2010); Honolulu Const. & Draying Co., Ltd. v. State, Dep't of 
Land & Natural Res., 310 P.3d 301, 303 (Haw. 2013); Bitterroot 
River Protective Ass'n v. Bitterroot Conservation Dist., 251 
P.3d 131, ¶20 (Mont. 2011); Highlands at Jordanelle LLC v. 
Wasatch Cnty., 355 P.3d 1047, ¶35 (Utah 2015); Ann K. Wooster, 
Annotation, Private Attorney General Doctrine——State Cases, 106 
A.L.R. 5th 523 (2003); Carl Cheng, Comment, Important Rights and 
                                                 
4 For further background on the doctrine, see William B. 
Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney General" Is——and Why It 
Matters, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2129, 2129-36, 2139-48 (2004); Carl 
Cheng, Comment, Important Rights and the Private Attorney 
General Doctrine, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1929, 1929-41 (1985); The 
Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 47, 170-82 (1975). 
No.  2014AP2420.ssa 
 
7 
 
the Private Attorney General Doctrine, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1929, 
1929 (1985). 
¶132 The seminal Wisconsin case regarding the private 
attorney 
general 
doctrine 
is 
Shands 
v. 
Castrovinci, 
115 
Wis. 2d 352, 340 N.W.2d 506 (1983).  In Shands, the plaintiff, a 
residential tenant, commenced a small claims action against her 
former landlord to recover her security deposit of $145.  
Shands, 115 Wis. 2d at 354.  The statute under which Shands sued 
allowed for the recovery of twice the amount of the actual 
pecuniary loss, together with costs, including a reasonable 
attorney fee.  Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) (1983-84).  The circuit 
court found that the landlord improperly withheld her security 
deposit and awarded Shands $290 as damages.  Shands, 115 Wis. 2d 
at 355.  After an evidentiary hearing, the court awarded an 
additional $287.50 for attorney fees.  Shands, 115 Wis. 2d at 
355.  Castrovinci appealed but was unsuccessful.  Shands, 115 
Wis. 2d at 356.  The issue on appeal was whether Shands was 
entitled to an award of attorney fees incurred as a result of 
the appeal.  Shands, 115 Wis. 2d at 357-58.  The supreme court 
held that she was. 
¶133 The Shands court held that Shands was entitled to 
attorney fees incurred as a result of Castrovinci's unsuccessful 
appeal, explaining that its decision was in accord with the 
purpose of the statute and public policy in general as follows: 
First, the recovery of double damages and attorney 
fees encourages injured tenants to bring legal actions 
to enforce their rights under the administrative 
regulations.  Often the amount of pecuniary loss is 
small compared with the cost of litigation.  Thus, it 
No.  2014AP2420.ssa 
 
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was necessary to make the recovery large enough to 
give tenants an incentive to bring suit.  The award of 
attorney fees encourages attorneys to pursue tenants' 
claims where the anticipated monetary recovery would 
not justify the expense of legal action.  While 
attorneys generally are willing to perform pro bono 
legal services in appropriate cases, we recognize that 
practical considerations limit the number of such 
suits. 
Second, the tenant who sues under the statute acts as 
a "private attorney general" to enforce the tenants' 
rights set forth in the administrative regulations.  
Thus, the individual tenant not only enforces his or 
her individual rights, but the aggregate effect of 
individual suits enforces the public's rights. 
Third, tenant suits have the effect of deterring 
impermissible conduct by landlords because, if they 
violate the administrative regulations, they will be 
subject to double damages and will be responsible for 
costs, including attorney fees.  The deterrent effect 
of the statute strengthens the bargaining power of 
tenants in dealing with landlords. 
Finally, in an amicus brief the Wisconsin Department 
of Justice noted that private tenant actions provide a 
necessary backup to the state's enforcement powers 
under sec. 100.20, Stats.  The department pointed out 
that the sheer number of violations prevent it from 
proceeding against all violators.  Private tenant 
actions 
thus 
constitute 
an 
enforcement 
mechanism 
reinforcing that of the justice department. 
Shands, 115 Wis. 2d at 358-59.   
¶134 Wisconsin has also applied the private attorney 
general doctrine in cases involving the enforcement of rights 
under the Wisconsin Open Meetings Law, State ex rel. Hodge v. 
Town of Turtle Lake, 180 Wis. 2d 62, 508 N.W.2d 603 (1993), the 
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, Watkins v. LIRC, 117 Wis. 2d 753, 
345 N.W.2d 482 (1984), and the Wisconsin Family and Medical 
Leave Act, Richland Sch. Dist. v. DILHR, 166 Wis. 2d 262, 479 
N.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1991).   
No.  2014AP2420.ssa 
 
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¶135 The instant case does not meet the elements of the 
private attorney general doctrine, and bears no resemblance to 
other Wisconsin cases in which the private attorney general 
doctrine has been applied.   
¶136 First, the lawsuit does not benefit the general public 
or a large class of persons.  Though the instant case involved 
theft from an elderly individual, the theft statute and Wis. 
Stat. § 895.446 apply broadly to all individuals.  The benefit 
conferred to the public in the lawsuit is that the law is 
enforced.5  To the extent one could fairly identify a benefit 
conferred upon the elderly as a class, the motivation for the 
lawsuit in the instant case was personal monetary recovery, not 
the advancement of the public's interest in protecting the 
elderly as such. 
¶137 Second, it does not appear that private enforcement is 
necessary to enforce the public's right to be free from theft.  
There is no evidence that prosecutors' offices across the state 
are overwhelmed such that private actions are needed to 
constitute an enforcement mechanism reinforcing the State 
criminal law punishing theft.  See Shands, 115 Wis. 2d at 359. 
¶138 Relatedly, and contrary to the majority's conclusion,6 
the Estate had a sufficient financial incentive to pursue 
                                                 
5 The public always has a significant interest in seeing 
that the laws are enforced——it always derives some benefit when 
illegal private or public conduct is rectified.  Something more 
than this general benefit must be shown to make sure that the 
private attorney general doctrine does not become the default 
rule.    
6 Majority op., ¶59. 
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litigation in the instant case.  It sought $10,000 in actual 
damages and could have received an additional $30,000 in 
exemplary damages under the statute in addition to costs.  
Compare this potential $40,000 recovery with the $290 recovery 
in Shands and the lack of any monetary recovery at all to the 
successful plaintiff in Watkins.   
III 
¶139 By relying entirely on unremarkable truisms and red 
herrings in the guise of reasoned analysis, the majority 
concludes that a civil theft claim under Wis. Stat. § 895.446 is 
not an "action based in tort" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 799.01(1)(cr).  Thus, the majority contravenes almost 30 years 
of case law compelling a contrary conclusion.   
¶140 Additionally, the majority erroneously concludes that 
Wis. Stat. § 895.446(3)(b) affords successful plaintiffs an 
award for attorney fees when the statute's text, context, and 
structure all lead to a contrary conclusion.  Compounding its 
errors, the majority purports to rely in part on the private 
attorney general doctrine for its conclusion that the Estate is 
entitled to attorney fees.  In doing so, the majority fails to 
fully and correctly explain the doctrine's elements, leading to 
its misapplication of the doctrine.  Consequently, I dissent. 
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