Case Title: DAVID R. COLYER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0183

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
DAVID R. COLYER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION2009 WY 43203 P.3d 1104Case Number: No. S-08-0183Decided: 03/25/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
DAVID 
R. COLYER,Appellant(Petitioner),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County

The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Vance 
Countryman of Vance T. Countryman, P.C., Lander, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; 
Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Michael T. Kahler, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant's 
driver's license was suspended because he refused to submit to a chemical test 
of his blood alcohol content after a traffic stop.  That suspension was affirmed after a 
contested case hearing and again after a petition for review was filed in the 
district court.  The focal issue is 
whether the arrest was unlawful, which, if so, would negate the appellant's 
statutorily implied consent to chemical testing, and would require reversal of 
the driver's license suspension.  We 
affirm, although not precisely on the basis upon which the hearing examiner and 
district court determinations rested.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The appellant 
presents the following issue in this appeal:

 
 
            
Whether Wyoming Statutes Section 7-2-106 [(LexisNexis 2007)] authorizes a 
Bureau of Indian Affairs officer to detain and/or arrest a non-Indian person on 
the Wind River Indian Reservation.

 
 
[¶3]      The State phrases 
the issue somewhat differently:

 
 
            
[Whether] the district court correctly affirm[ed] the hearing officer's 
finding that [the] Bureau of Indian Affairs officer [] had authority to detain 
appellant on the Wind River Indian Reservation once he determined that appellant 
was not Native American, until Fremont County Sheriff's deputies arrived to take 
control of the scene?

 
 
[¶4]      We will state 
what we consider to be the dispositive issue as follows:  Whether the appellant's detention by a 
Bureau of Indian Affairs officer on the Wind River Indian Reservation rendered 
unlawful the otherwise lawful arrest of the appellant by a Fremont County deputy 
sheriff?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶5]      The facts in this 
case are not contested.  We will set 
forth those facts of which the deputy sheriff was aware at the time he arrested 
the appellant for drunk driving:

 
 
           
1.   Law enforcement 
officers in Fremont County received a REDDI (Report Every Drunk Driver 
Immediately) report at approximately 1:08 a.m., on March 2, 2006.  The initial report and pre-arrest 
follow-up investigation indicated that a 1992 white Cadillac coupe bearing 
license plate number 10-34CC had driven into a pole and trash can at a 
convenience store in Riverton.  
Because the vehicle was registered to a person who resided in nearby 
Lander, a Fremont County deputy sheriff drove southward out of Riverton toward 
Lander on U.S. 789 in an attempt to intercept the vehicle.

 
 
           
2.   A Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (B.I.A.) officer radioed that he had located the vehicle headed westward 
on 17 Mile Road, in an area that is within the Wind River Indian 
Reservation.  The B.I.A officer 
advised that "the vehicle was all over the road and had left the road way on the 
shoulder and then drove back onto the roadway."

 
 
           
3.   As the deputy 
sheriff drove toward the location described by the B.I.A. officer, he heard 
another B.I.A. officer radio that he had just seen the vehicle and was turning 
around to catch up with it.  The 
second B.I.A. officer stated that the vehicle had accelerated to about 75 miles 
per hour in a 55 miles per hour zone, and was driving "all over the road."  He also, before the arrest, told the 
deputy sheriff that the driver of the vehicle had not dimmed his headlights as 
he approached, and that he had seen the vehicle drift across the fog line on the 
highway.

 
 
           
4.   The second B.I.A. 
officer stopped the vehicle and detained its driver, the appellant, until the 
deputy sheriff arrived.  The 
appellant admitted to the B.I.A. officer that he "had been 
drinking."

 
 
           
5.   The deputy sheriff 
arrived and approached the appellant, who was standing outside his vehicle.  The appellant again admitted that he had 
been drinking, and the deputy sheriff noted a "distinct odor of alcoholic 
beverage" coming from the appellant, noted that the appellant's speech was very 
slurred, and noted that the appellant was very unsteady on his 
feet.

 
 
           
6.   At the deputy 
sheriff's request, the appellant attempted to perform various field sobriety 
maneuvers, with minimal success.  A 
portable alco-sensor test revealed the appellant's blood alcohol level to be 
.080%.  In response to the deputy's 
direct question, the appellant answered that he "had drunk way too much to be 
driving."  He was then arrested for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol.

 
 
[¶6]      In addition to 
these pre-arrest facts, it is important to note that, after he was arrested, the 
appellant refused to submit to a chemical test to determine his blood alcohol 
content.  There is also an 
unverified presumption throughout this record and in the briefs that, had the 
appellant been a tribal member, he would have been arrested by the B.I.A. 
officers, rather than being detained for formal arrest by the deputy 
sheriff.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      The question 
before uswhether the appellant's detention by the B.I.A. officers rendered the 
subsequent arrest unlawfulis purely a question of law that we review de novo.  Worcester v. State, 2001 WY 82, ¶ 13, 30 P.3d 47, 52 (Wyo. 2001); Marshall v. 
State ex rel. DOT, 941 P.2d 42, 44 (Wyo. 1997).  That review takes place within the 
context of the statutorily based standards for the review of administrative 
agency action.  Batten v. Wyo. DOT Drivers' License Div., 
2007 WY 173, ¶ 6, 170 P.3d 1236, 1240 (Wyo. 2007).  We may sustain the decision of the lower 
tribunal on any basis found in the record.  
Van Order v. State, 600 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Wyo. 1979).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶8]      
This 
discussion logically must begin with an analysis of the statutory significance 
of an arrest in the context of driving while under the influence and implied 
consent to chemical testing for blood alcohol content.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b) 
(LexisNexis 2007) prohibits "driving while under the influence" (DWUI).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(a) 
(LexisNexis 2007) provides that a person lawfully arrested for DWUI is "deemed 
to have given consent" to a chemical test to determine his or her blood alcohol 
content.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
31-6-102(d) and (f), and 31-6-107(a) (LexisNexis 2007) require the Wyoming 
Department of Transportation to suspend the driver's license or driving 
privileges of anyone who, having been lawfully arrested for DWUI, refuses to 
consent to a chemical test to determine his or her blood alcohol 
content.

 
 
[¶9]      A person who has 
been arrested for DWUI and who has refused to consent to a chemical test to 
determine his or her blood alcohol content may request a hearing to determine 
the following issues:  (1) whether 
the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the person was driving under 
the influence; (2) whether the person was placed under arrest; (3) whether the 
person refused to submit to a chemical test upon request of "the peace officer"; 
(4) whether, if the person did submit to a chemical test, the result was a blood 
alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more; and (5) whether the person was advised 
that his driver's license would be suspended upon refusal to submit to chemical 
testing.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-6-103(a), (b) (LexisNexis 2007).  
The hearing is civil, rather than criminal in nature, and the State's 
burden of proof is the standard civil burden of producing a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Bradshaw v. Wyo. DOT Drivers' License Div., 
2006 WY 70, ¶ 18, 135 P.3d 612, 618 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶10]   The above-described process is 
exactly what happened to the appellant.  
He drove a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, he was 
arrested, he refused to submit to a chemical test to determine his blood alcohol 
content, and his driver's license was thereafter suspended.1  He contended in his administrative 
hearing and in his petition to the district court, and he now contends on 
appeal, that B.I.A. officers are not "peace officers" as defined by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-2-101(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2007), and that, therefore, the two B.I.A. 
officers had no authority to detain him while waiting for the deputy sheriff to 
arrive.  His conclusion is that his 
arrest was, therefore, unlawful.2

 
 
[¶11]   It is this contention that became 
the focus of the agency hearing and of the district court proceedings.  Our review, however, guides us to look 
at two of the precepts within this statutory scheme.  First, the scope of the hearing 
officer's review, as provided by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-103(b), and as it 
relates to this case, is whether the arresting peace officer had probable cause 
to make the arrest, and second, the request to submit to a chemical test must be 
made by a peace officer.  The point 
we wish to make is that neither of these precepts is at issue; the arrest was 
made by a deputy sheriff, who is a peace officer under the statute, and the 
request for a chemical test was similarly made by a deputy sheriff.  What has happened in this case is that 
the parties have skipped over the actual question presented by the facts:  does the detention of the appellant by 
the B.I.A. officers prior to his arrest make the arrest unlawful as a matter of 
law?

 
 
[¶12]   The appellant relies almost solely 
upon two cases in arguing that his arrest was unlawful.  First, he cites Marshall v. State ex rel. DOT, 941 P.2d 42, 46 (Wyo. 1997), wherein we concluded that college campus police officers "do 
not have authority to make arrests outside their territorial boundaries absent 
fresh pursuit."  While this is a 
correct recitation of the holding of the case, it is inapplicable to the issue 
at hand, because the facts of Marshall do not resemble the facts of 
this case.  In Marshall, a campus police officer 
observed what he believed to be a stolen car drive past the campus.  The officer left the campus and 
effectuated a traffic stop that eventually led to an arrest of the car's driver 
for DWUI.  Nothing similar to that 
happened in the instant case, where neither the B.I.A. officer nor the deputy 
sheriff left his territorial jurisdiction.

 
 
[¶13]   The second case relied upon by the 
appellant is United States v. Atwell, 
470 F. Supp. 2d 554, 560-70 (D. Md. 2007), where the court concluded that neither 
federal nor Maryland state law authorized a military police officer to pursue a 
traffic law violator from the military base and arrest him off the military 
base, and further concluded that Maryland's "citizen's arrest" statute did not 
justify the arrest.  Like Marshall, Atwell is not applicable to our case, 
which involved neither fresh pursuit out of an officer's territorial 
jurisdiction, nor a citizen's arrest.

 
 
[¶14]   Like the appellant, the State 
relies primarily upon two cases to support its thesis that the B.I.A. officer 
was a "peace officer" within the meaning of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-2-101(a)(iv), 
and was, therefore, qualified to detain the appellant under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 31-6-101(a)(iv) and 31-6-102(a)(i)(A).  In Pogue v. Allison, 851 F. Supp. 1536 
(D. Wyo. 1994), Pogue was arrested by a B.I.A. officer on the Wind River 
Indian Reservation and charged under tribal law with DWUI.  As part of the arrest, the B.I.A. 
officer seized Pogue's Wyoming driver's license.  Id. at 1537.  The relevant issue in Pogue was whether the B.I.A. officer had 
the authority to seize the driver's license.  In answering that question in the 
affirmative, the federal district court went through the following exercise in 
statutory construction:

 
 
           
1.   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-7-116 (LexisNexis 2007) requires every driver to display his or her driver's 
license upon demand to "any police officer as defined in W.S. 
31-5-102(a)(xxxiii) [(LexisNexis 2007)]."

 
 
           
2.   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-102(a)(xxxiii) defines "police officer" to mean "every officer authorized 
to direct or regulate traffic or to make arrests for violations of traffic 
regulations."

 
 
           
3.   B.I.A. officers are 
authorized to make arrests for violation of traffic regulations under tribal 
law, and are, therefore, "police officers" under the 
statute.

 
 
           
4.   A person arrested 
for DWUI under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233 (LexisNexis 2007), or similar law 
including tribal law, must surrender his or her driver's license to the 
arresting officer, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-1205(k) (LexisNexis 
2007).

 
 

Id. 
at 1539-40.

 
 
[¶15]   These statutes led the federal 
district court to conclude that, inasmuch as B.I.A. agents are authorized to 
enforce Wyoming's license suspension scheme, "it would be disingenuous to 
suggest" that they could not "act to effectuate license suspensions."  Id. at 1540.  The limited legal conclusion of Pogue is that B.I.A. officers may seize 
a Wyoming driver's license when enforcing a tribal code DWUI law.  Id.  Unfortunately, Pogue does not address either the 
question of whether a B.I.A. officer is a peace officer under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-2-101(a)(iv), or whether a B.I.A. officer may detain a non-tribal member on 
the reservation pending arrival of state officers.

 
 
[¶16]   The second case relied upon by the 
State comes closer, perhaps, to answering the questions pertinent to our 
inquiry.  In United States v. Santiago, 846 F. Supp. 1486 (D. Wyo. 1994), an airman was arrested for DWUI on Warren Air Force Base 
near Cheyenne.  Wyoming's DWUI laws 
had been adopted as federal law on the base pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 13 
(1988).  See Santiago, 846 F. Supp.  at 1488 
n.1.  After his arrest, Santiago 
submitted to a breathalyzer test, but later moved to suppress it as evidence on 
the ground that, inter alia, the 
entry gate guard who arrested him and administered the test was not a "peace 
officer" as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(a)(i)(C), and as defined by 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-2-101(a)(iv).  
Id. at 
1495.

 
 
[¶17]   Upon first reading, it appears that 
Santiago stands simply for the 
proposition that the military guard must be considered a "peace officer" under 
the statutes for no other reason than to avoid an "odd result."  Id.  In other words, if the military guard 
could not test Santiago's blood alcohol content, nobody could, and that would be 
absurd.  Id. at 1496.  A more careful reading, however, reveals 
that the ratio decidendi of the 
decision is that Wyoming's DWUI law "lacks any authority of its own force" on the air base, and 
must, as a result be interpreted within the context of a law adopted as federal 
law for use on the base.  Id. at 1495.  In other words, the federal law 
enforcement officer is a "peace officer" under the statute, not for purposes of 
Wyoming's own use of the law, but for purposes of federal use of the law.  Id. 

 
 
[¶18]   It makes sense at this juncture to 
recite the precise points of law upon which the hearing examiner concluded that 
the B.I.A. officer's detention of the appellant was not 
unlawful:

 
 
            
51.   This Office finds 
that [the] BIA Officer [] had jurisdiction to stop the vehicle and once he 
determined that the Licensee was not Native American had the authority to detain 
him until the Fremont County Sheriff's Deputy arrived to take custody.  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-2-106(a)(i) and (ii) 
(LEXIS 2006) provides that an officer can act outside of his jurisdiction upon a 
request for assistance by an officer within or having jurisdiction or when the 
peace officer possesses reasonable cause to believe that a crime is occurring 
involving an immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death to any 
person.

 
 
            
52.   [The] BIA Officer 
[] did not have jurisdiction over the Licensee because he was not an enrolled 
member of on [sic] the Indian tribes but, jurisdiction for the detention of 
Licensee was conferred on him by [the deputy sheriffs] while in route [sic] to 
the scene and by the fact that [the] BIA Officer [] had ample reasonable cause 
to believe that a crime (DWUI) was occurring and such crimes most certainly 
involved an immediate threat of serious bodily injury or 
death.

 
 
[¶19]   We are not comfortable with this 
legal analysis, for several reasons.  
First, the "peace officer" to which reference is made in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 7-2-106 is the "peace officer" defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-2-101, which 
definition does not, on its face, include B.I.A. officers or tribal police 
officers.  Second, this incident 
does not involve extraterritorial authority, because neither the B.I.A. officer 
nor the deputy sheriff left his respective territorial jurisdiction.  Third, the reasoning of Santiago does not apply because the 
facts are so dissimilar.  In Santiago, Wyoming's DWUI statute had 
been incorporated into federal law for use on the military base, but only 
federal law enforcement officers had jurisdiction to enforce it thereon, 
including application of the chemical testing requirements.  Here, the deputy sheriff had the 
authority to enforce, and did enforce, the DWUI and implied consent statutes 
because the appellant was not a tribal member.  This was not a case where a B.I.A. 
officer or a tribal police officer was the only officer authorized to enforce 
the statute.  Fourth, there is 
nothing in the record, or cited law, to suggest that the deputy sheriff somehow 
conferred upon the B.I.A. officer "jurisdiction for the detention of" the 
appellant.

 
 
[¶20]   This is not a new or unique 
question.  For years, courts across 
the country have been faced with jurisdictional issues on Indian reservations 
and federal enclaves.  We will 
review some of that precedent to demonstrate how similar matters have been 
resolved.  For instance, Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975) held that tribal authorities, as part of their 
inherent sovereignty, may deliver non-Indian state or federal law violators to 
the appropriate authorities.  Three 
years later, in Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208, 98 S. Ct. 1011, 1020, 55 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1978), 
the United States Supreme Court detailed the history of the congressional 
presumption that Indian tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians on reservations, and then stated that the tribes "are to promptly 
deliver up any non-Indian offender, rather than try and punish him 
themselves."

 
 
[¶21]   In 1990, the United States Supreme 
Court relied upon Oliphant and a 
later case, United States v. Wheeler, 
435 U.S. 313, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 55 L. Ed. 2d 303 (1978), to make more clear the rule 
stated in Oliphant.  The correct rule is "that Indian tribes 
lack jurisdiction over persons who are not tribal members," which includes 
members of other tribes and not just non-Indians.  Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2059, 109 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1990).3  The particular relevance of Duro to the instant inquiry is its 
reiteration of the following rule:

 
 
Tribal 
law enforcement authorities have the power to restrain those who disturb public 
order on the reservation, and if necessary, to eject them.  Where jurisdiction to try and punish an 
offender rests outside the tribe, tribal officers may exercise their power to 
detain the offender and transport him to the proper 
authorities.

 
 

Id., 
495 U.S.  at 697, 110 S. Ct.  at 2065.

 
 
[¶22]   We will mention two additional, 
more recent, federal cases.  In United States v. Terry, 400 F.3d 575, 
579 (8th Cir. 2005), the court relied upon Duro, Oliphant, and Ortiz-Barraza in holding that tribal 
police officers on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota had the 
authority to detain a non-Indian "whose conduct disturbs the public order on 
their reservation."  Mr. Terry, 
whose crime was unlawful possession of a firearm, was held in the tribal jail 
overnight because the county sheriff was 80 miles away, on a rainy night, and 
there was no deputy sheriff available.  
Id. at 580.  A few months after it was published, a 
federal district court relied upon Terry and the cases cited therein to 
find lawful the detention of a non-Indian on the Turtle Mountain Indian 
Reservation in North Dakota during the initial stages of an investigation by 
B.I.A. officers into possible drug offenses.  United States v. Keys, 390 F. Supp. 2d 875, 884 (D. N.D. 2005).4

 
 
[¶23]   Several state courts have also 
addressed these issues.  In State v. Assman, 386 N.W.2d 492, 494 
(S.D. 1986), the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed Assman's DWUI conviction 
because Assman, a non-Indian, had been arrested and subjected to the implied 
consent statute procedures by a B.I.A. officer on the Rosebud Reservation.  The reversal was based upon the court's 
conclusion that the B.I.A. officer was not a "law enforcement officer" under 
applicable South Dakota law.  Id.  This fact situation is not similar to 
ours, where the arrest was made by, and the implied consent advisements were 
given by, the deputy sheriff.

 
 
[¶24]   To the contrary, the facts in State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332 (Wash. 
1993), are quite similar to ours.  
Schmuck, a non-Indian, was stopped for speeding by a tribal police 
officer on the Port Madison Reservation.  
Id. at 1333-34.  Circumstances indicated that Schmuck was 
intoxicated, so he was detained pending the arrival of a Washington state 
patrolman.  Id. at 1334.  The patrolman arrested Schmuck and 
transported him to a county jail, where he submitted to a chemical test to 
determine his blood alcohol content.  
Id.  Schmuck appealed his conviction on the 
ground that the Suquamish Tribe had no authority to stop and detain a non-Indian 
on the reservation.  Id. at 1335.  Relying upon Oliphant, Wheeler, Duro, Ortiz-Barraza, and other cases with 
similar holdings, the Supreme Court of Washington rejected Schmuck's contentions 
and concluded that the tribe retained the right to stop non-Indian violators and 
to detain them for delivery to state authorities for prosecution.  Id. at 1342.  See also State v. Pamperien, 967 P.2d 503, 504-06 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); and State v. Haskins, 887 P.2d 1189, 1195 
(Mont. 1994).

 
 
[¶25]   Viewing the facts of the instant 
case in the context of the law just recited, we must conclude that nothing 
occurred in the detention of the appellant to render his arrest unlawful.  The appellant could not have been 
arrested and prosecuted within the tribal court system because he was not a 
tribal member.  He could not have 
been arrested by the B.I.A. officer and prosecuted within the federal system 
because the DWUI offense was a State offense, making him subject to arrest and 
prosecution by the State.  Despite 
the jurisdictional olio on the reservation, the law is clear that the 
appropriate action to be taken in circumstances such as those presented in this 
case is for the reservation officer to detain the appellant for formal arrest by 
a state officer.5  That is what 
happened.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶26]   The appellant was lawfully detained 
by the B.I.A. officer pending his lawful arrest by the deputy sheriff.  The State proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence the statutory elements required for the suspension of the 
appellant's driver's license due to his refusal to submit to a chemical test of 
his blood alcohol content.  The 
Order Upholding Implied Consent Suspension is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1A 
preliminary breath test such as the "alco-sensor" test given the appellant at 
the scene, is not considered to be the chemical test contemplated under the 
implied consent statute.  Nellis v. Wyo. DOT, 932 P.2d 741, 745 
(Wyo. 1997).

 
 

2In 
addition to the factors that the State must prove under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-6-103 set forth above (see supra ¶ 
9), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(a)(i)(A) (LexisNexis 2007) specifies that the 
implied consent law applies only in the event of a "lawful arrest."  Marshall, 941 P.2d  at 44; State v. Chastain, 594 P.2d 458, 462 
(Wyo. 1979), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 1985).

 
 

3A 
footnote in Duro describing 
jurisdiction on Indian reservations is helpful as general background information 
in this discussion:

 
 
            
Jurisdiction in "Indian country," which is defined in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1151, see United States v. 
John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-649, 98 S. Ct. 2541, 2548-2549, 57 L. Ed. 2d 489 
(1978), is governed by a complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal 
law.  For enumerated major felonies, 
such as murder, rape, assault, and robbery, federal jurisdiction over crimes 
committed by an Indian is provided by 18 U.S.C. § 1153, commonly known as the 
Indian Major Crimes Act . . . .

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
It 
remains an open question whether jurisdiction under § 1153 over crimes committed 
by Indian tribe members is exclusive of tribal jurisdiction.  See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 
325, n.22, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 1087, n.22, 55 L. Ed. 2d 303 
(1978).

 
 
            
Another federal statute, the Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152, 
applies the general laws of the United States to crimes committed in Indian 
country:

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
The 
general law of the United States may assimilate state law in the absence of an 
applicable federal statute.  18 
U.S.C. § 13. . . .

 
 
            
For Indian country crimes involving only non-Indians, longstanding 
precedents of this Court hold that state courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
despite the terms of § 1152. . . .

 
 
            
The final source of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is the 
retained sovereignty of the tribes themselves.  It is undisputed that the tribes retain 
jurisdiction over their members, subject to the question of exclusive 
jurisdiction under § 1153 mentioned above. . . .

 
 

Id., 
495 U.S.  at 680 n.1, 110 S. Ct.  at 2057 n.1.

 
 

4Keys 
filed several motions to suppress evidence, one of which was granted because the 
court found that Keys' detention for several days eventually became 
unreasonable.  Keys, 390 F. Supp. 2d  at 
884.

 
 

5If 
there is a distinction to be made between a tribal police officer and a B.I.A. 
officer in these cases, such has not been raised by the parties, and no argument 
has been presented that it is a distinction with a difference.  There may be room to argue that the 
inherent authority of an Indian tribe on a reservation cannot be exercised 
through B.I.A. agents.  We are not 
inclined to explore that issue on our own, where it has not been raised by the 
parties, and where the underlying policy of maintaining law and order on the 
reservation is satisfied by the action of either 
officer.