Case Title: Delhall v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC09-87

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2012-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-87 
____________ 
 
WADADA DELHALL,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[July 12, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Wadada Delhall appeals from a judgment of conviction of first-degree 
murder and a sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. 
Const.  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Delhall‟s conviction for first-
degree murder, but we vacate Delhall‟s death sentence and remand for a new 
penalty phase proceeding.  
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Overview 
Wadada Delhall, age twenty-four at the time of the murder, was indicted on 
January 8, 2002, for the November 29, 2001, first-degree premeditated murder of 
 
 
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Hubert McCrae in his auto repair shop in Opa-locka, Florida.  He was also charged 
with unlawful use of a firearm in violation of section 782.04, Florida Statutes 
(2001), unlawful discharge of the firearm resulting in death or serious bodily harm 
upon McCrae in violation of section 790.07(2), Florida Statutes (2001), and 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.1  At the jury trial held in June 2008, 
the State presented evidence that Delhall murdered McCrae because he was, at that 
time, the only known eyewitness to the murder of another individual named Gilbert 
Bennett with which Delhall‟s brother Negus Delhall was charged.  The jury found 
Wadada Delhall guilty of all the charges and the case proceeded to the penalty 
phase trial.   
At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury recommended a death 
sentence by a vote of eight to four, and the trial court ultimately entered an order 
sentencing Delhall to death.  This appeal ensued.  Delhall raises ten issues on 
appeal concerning admission of evidence in the guilt phase and improper 
prosecutorial argument in the penalty phase, as well as a claim of error in a jury 
instruction in the penalty phase.2  We turn first to the facts of the case based on the 
evidence presented in the guilt phase of the trial. 
                                          
 
 
1.  It was stipulated during trial that Delhall is a convicted felon.   
 
2.  The issues raised by Delhall are: (1) error in denial of Delhall‟s motion 
for mistrial based on the prosecutor‟s cross-examination of Delhall implicating him 
in the Gilbert Bennett murder; (2) error in overruling objections to evidence of the 
 
 
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The Guilt Phase  
Fred Williams was working at the J&B Body Shop in the warehouse area of 
Opa-locka Boulevard in Opa-locka on November 29, 2001.  Around 6:50 p.m., he 
heard a series of gunshots coming from the direction of Ray‟s Auto Service shop 
(sometimes called Ray‟s Auto Shop or Ray‟s Auto Body Shop) located at 2143 
Opa-locka Boulevard.  Williams looked in that direction and saw a slim, brown-
skinned man, about 5‟11” tall, coming out of Ray‟s Auto Service with his hand 
held down by his side.  Williams could not make out the man‟s face.  The man 
came out to a car, reached for the door handle, then turned around and shot one 
more time toward the shop.  The man then got into the passenger side of the car 
and, as it drove away, shot one more time out the window.  Williams said the car 
was a small, light-colored car with tinted windows.  Rolando Rodriguez was also at 
work at the J&B Body Shop on November 29, 2001, and heard a series of shots.  
He did not see who was shooting, but he did see a person at the passenger side 
                                                                                                                                        
Bennett murder; (3) error in overruling objection to McCrae‟s affidavit concerning 
the Bennett murder; (4) error in excluding the Broward County Jail booking report; 
(5) error in overruling objection to McCrae‟s statements to Officer Hufnagel; (6) 
error in denying motion to suppress Delhall‟s statements obtained after search of 
his bedroom; (7) error in admitting evidence of an unspent 9mm cartridge found in 
Maria Berry‟s Mazda automobile; (8) error in penalty phase jury instruction on 
burglary; (9) error in overruling objections to prosecutor‟s comments concerning 
Delhall‟s mitigation as “excuses”; and (10) error in numerous improper 
prosecutorial comments in the penalty phase.   
 
 
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door of the car just before it left.  As the car turned left to leave, Rodriguez heard 
another shot.     
 
Miami-Dade Police Officer Michael Hufnagel arrived at the scene of the 
shooting and found Hubert McCrae lying on the ground in front of a car repair bay.  
McCrae was still alive but in obvious pain from gunshot wounds, including an 
apparent stomach wound.  McCrae told Officer Hufnagel that he was having 
difficulty breathing.  Hufnagel rolled McCrae onto his side to ease his breathing.  
Officer Hufnagel asked McCrae if he had any idea who shot him and, over defense 
objection to hearsay, Officer Hufnagel testified that McCrae said “it was the 
brother of the guy who shot the man who owned the business before.”  Officer 
Hufnagel said McCrae gave him a description of the shooter‟s car as “a small gray 
Mazda, possibly a 323” with tinted windows, and Hufnagel relayed this 
information to the detectives when they arrived.  During the time he was talking, 
McCrae continued to have labored breathing and a look of pain on his face.  Fire 
rescue then arrived and began working on McCrae, during which time he died.   
The Gilbert Bennett Murder 
Over Delhall‟s objection, the State presented a substantial amount of 
testimony and evidence concerning the earlier murder of Gilbert Bennett at that 
same repair shop in 1998, which was referred to by McCrae.  The evidence 
included testimony of four witnesses, a detailed description of the Bennett murder 
 
 
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crime scene and investigation, as well as photos showing Bennett‟s lifeless body 
lying in a pool of blood.  The asserted purpose for presentation of the evidence 
concerning the Bennett murder was to prove Wadada Delhall‟s motive for 
murdering McCrae, who was at the time the sole known witness to the Bennett 
murder.  A fingerprint lifted from the outside of the office door at the scene of 
Bennett‟s murder was attributed to Negus Delhall, Wadada Delhall‟s younger 
brother.  An arrest warrant was subsequently issued for Negus Delhall in the 
murder of Bennett, but it was not until 2001 that Negus was finally arrested out of 
state and transported back to Miami from Virginia Beach, Virginia. 
Hubert McCrae had provided police with a description of Bennett‟s shooter 
and had given a sworn statement about what he witnessed.  After Negus‟s arrest, 
an Arthur hearing to determine if bond would be set for Negus was held on 
September 6, 2001.3  McCrae did not testify at the bond hearing, but his sworn 
affidavit describing how he witnessed the Bennett murder and identified a 
photograph of the shooter was introduced at that hearing.4  No other eyewitness 
had been located as of that date.  The evidence also established that Wadada 
                                          
 
 
3.  State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1980) (entitling a capital or life 
felony defendant to a bail hearing where the State must show that guilt is evident 
or the presumption great in order to deny bail, and holding that it is in the 
discretion of the judge whether to grant bail). 
 
4.  McCrae‟s September 5, 2001, affidavit was also read into evidence in the 
trial of the instant case over defense objection of hearsay. 
 
 
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Delhall had visited Negus in jail and was very disturbed by the fact that he was 
charged with Bennett‟s murder and might be facing the death penalty.  
 
After Hubert McCrae was killed, the police located another eyewitness to 
the Bennett murder—Clarence Gooden.  Gooden used to operate a food truck in 
the warehouse area and testified at Wadada‟s trial that he actually witnessed the 
murder of Gilbert Bennett at that auto repair shop in 1998, but did not come 
forward as a witness.  Gooden described how he was parked near the shop in 1998 
when he heard shots from inside the office area of the shop and then observed a 
man leaving the shop carrying a gun.  Gooden described how he entered the shop 
and found Bennett lying on the floor in a pool of blood.  Gooden testified that it 
was Negus Delhall who shot Bennett, although he did not know Negus‟s name at 
the time, and that McCrae was also present.  Gooden said he left because he did 
not want to get involved.  After Negus‟s arrest, Gooden said Wadada Delhall and a 
man named Erwin Bruce came to Gooden‟s food truck to talk to him about 
Bennett‟s murder, and Gooden assured them he was not going to tell the police 
anything about the murder.  It was some days later that Gooden learned McCrae 
had been killed at the same auto shop.  Gooden subsequently became a witness at 
Negus‟s trial. 
 
 
 
 
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Investigation of McCrae’s Murder 
The State‟s theory of the case was that Wadada Delhall learned that Hubert 
McCrae was the sole witness against Negus after the Arthur hearing and began 
searching for him.  The State contended that after Delhall learned that Gooden was 
not the eyewitness who was prepared to testify against Negus, Delhall concluded 
that the man who worked at Ray‟s Auto Service must be the sole eyewitness 
identified as Hubert McCrae.  After learning that McCrae had identified his 
assailant as the brother of the shooter in the Bennett murder, Miami-Dade Police 
Detective John Butchko began searching for Negus‟s brothers, Wadada and Atiba, 
to question them.  Butchko and his team, Sergeant Yolanda Rayborn and 
Detectives Julio Estopinan and Gus Bayas, finally located an apartment connected 
to Wadada Delhall in Pembroke Pines.   
On December 5, 2001, Butchko and his team went to the apartment where 
they observed a car matching the description of the car seen leaving the McCrae 
shooting.  The apartment door was answered by Delhall‟s cousin, Tiese Caldwell, 
who explained that Wadada Delhall lived there but was not home.  Caldwell told 
the officers that aside from the several small children playing in the living room, 
no one else was home.  When asked if they could search, she refused but did allow 
them in to talk with her.  At one point Detective Bayas became alarmed and asked 
her again if anyone else was there.  She said there was not, but Bayas insisted that 
 
 
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he “just heard a noise behind me.”  When he heard the sound again, Bayas 
immediately drew his gun and went to the adjacent bedroom, and within seconds 
was yelling at someone to get down on the floor.  Bayas said he found a man 
hiding in a closet.  When the man emerged from the closet, he told Bayas he was 
hiding because he was on probation and did not want to get into trouble.  After 
being checked for weapons—he had none—the man was taken downstairs in 
handcuffs.  Once the officers learned that the man was Wadada Delhall, the 
handcuffs were removed and Delhall was not placed under arrest.     
Delhall agreed to go to the police station to answer some questions and was 
not handcuffed on the ride to the station or when he arrived there.  Once at the 
station, a Miranda5 rights form was read to him, after which he initialed each right 
and signed the form.  When asked about his activities on November 29, 2001, 
Delhall initially reported that he was with his girlfriend, Marcia Berry, after 
picking her up from work at 6:30 p.m.  Delhall told Butchko that after going to a 
shopping mall and then to Berry‟s father‟s house, he and Berry took her father‟s 
car, a black Chevrolet, back to their apartment at 10640 Washington Street, 
Pembroke Pines, where they stayed through the night.  Delhall also told Butchko 
that his girlfriend, Marcia Berry, who worked at American Express in Broward 
County, drove the Mazda that was parked at the apartment.   
                                          
 
 
5.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
 
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When questioned further about the murder of McCrae, Delhall denied any 
involvement or knowledge of the facts.  Delhall had agreed to go to the station 
around noon and, once there, Butchko‟s questioning lasted until about 3:30 p.m., at 
which time they took a break.  After Butchko returned to the interview room at 
4:30 p.m., and Delhall continued to deny involvement in McCrae‟s murder, 
Butchko asked for assistance from William Clifford, who was described as a 
civilian employee who sometimes assists in interrogations.6  Delhall signed a 
consent form to allow questioning by Clifford, and Butchko left to contact 
Detective Bayas, who was in Broward County to meet with Marcia Berry.      
William Clifford testified that he asked Delhall about November 29, 2001, 
and Delhall again denied knowing McCrae or anything about his murder.  When 
Clifford told him they could find out if he had had any dealings with McCrae, 
Delhall then admitted he had not been entirely truthful and that he did know who 
McCrae was, having gotten the name from Negus‟s first lawyer, Paul Gerson.  
Delhall told Clifford that he learned from Gerson that McCrae was the only 
witness against Negus in the Bennett murder.  Delhall continued to insist that he 
was with Marcia Berry at the time of the McCrae murder.  Pursuant to department 
policy at the time, no audio or video of this interview was recorded.   
                                          
 
 
6.  Clifford is actually a polygraph examiner.  Pursuant to a motion in 
limine, the State was not allowed to disclose the fact that Clifford was a polygraph 
examiner to the jury.    
 
 
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Marcia Berry did not confirm Delhall‟s alibi and, when confronted with this 
fact, Delhall confessed to Clifford that he killed McCrae to keep him from 
testifying against Negus.  When he visited Negus in jail a few days before the 
McCrae shooting, Negus told Delhall that the State wanted the death penalty, and 
when Negus broke down and cried, Delhall was “shaken up about that.”  The 
handwritten confession was admitted over Delhall‟s pretrial and trial objections, 
and stated as follows: 
 
I‟m sorry, for being in this prodickument (sic).  But, I was left 
without solution when I heard that my brother was facing the death 
penalty. I try to get a lawyer w/ friends of mine, but the money was 
not even, so I even got church members to raise charity from church, 
but by this time, I was already out of time.  So the love of my brother 
was vanishing away forever, so in my heart I feel like I wouldn‟t have 
a brother because of a lie, so in desperation I went by my self to the 
shop and shot him.  I‟m sorry.  But I got [to] take responsibility. 
 
 
 
After Clifford obtained the written confession, Butchko returned and questioned 
Delhall further about the details of the murder.  According to Butchko, at that point 
Delhall was not free to leave the interview, but he agreed to continue speaking with 
Butchko.   
Delhall later refused to go through the details again with a court reporter 
present, but in the oral interview with Butchko, Delhall described further details of 
the murder and, in this version of events, claimed to have acted alone.  Delhall told 
Butchko that he was driving Berry‟s older model Mazda with tinted windows, and 
had with him a 9mm semiautomatic handgun and a .38 caliber silver-colored 
 
 
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revolver.  Delhall also reported dropping Berry off at home shortly after 6 p.m. and 
driving to Opa-locka in the Mazda.  According to Butchko, Delhall said that he 
first planned to scare McCrae by showing him the gun, but that when he drove by 
McCrae‟s shop he “thought he would leave it in God‟s hands. . . .  If God didn‟t 
want me to shoot the victim, then don‟t let the victim be there.”  Delhall saw 
McCrae working on a sport utility vehicle but kept driving.  He then came back 
into the warehouse area and drove past the victim again.  Butchko said Delhall 
reported that the passenger side of the car was toward the shop.   
This description of the side of the car facing McCrae did not comport with 
other witnesses‟ testimony that there were two people in the car and that the 
shooter got into the passenger side of the car.  Instead, Delhall told Butchko he was 
alone, got out of the car with the semiautomatic in one hand and the revolver in the 
other, and that when he was about ten feet from McCrae, he started shooting with 
both guns.  Butchko did not formally learn that two guns were used in the shooting 
until speaking with the firearms examiner on January 16, 2002.  Delhall also told 
Butchko that just before he got back into the car, he fired another shot to scare any 
possible witnesses.  After leaving the scene, Delhall said he drove to Hialeah 
where he sold both guns to someone on the street.   
At 11:15 p.m. on December 5, 2001, detectives Butchko and Estopinan left 
the interview room after telling Delhall they thought he was not giving the whole 
 
 
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story and that someone else was involved.  About a half hour later, the detectives 
returned and Delhall told them that his brother, Atiba, was with him in the car 
earlier on November 29, but that he had dropped him off before the shooting.  
Delhall continued to maintain that he did the shooting alone, although the police 
knew from the witness statements that there was a second person in the car.  At 
about 1:30 a.m. on December 6, 2001, Delhall said he would tell the officers the 
whole truth.  He then admitted that Atiba was with him and was the one driving 
Marcia Berry‟s car.  Delhall said Atiba did not fire any shots at McCrae, which 
was in accord with witness testimony that Delhall was the passenger of the car and 
was the one who fired the shots.  Around 2 a.m., Butchko told Delhall they wanted 
him to provide a formal statement, after going through the unrecorded interview 
orally, but there was no stenographer present.  The stenographer did not arrive until 
about 3:30 a.m., and by then, Delhall‟s mood had changed.  He refused to give a 
recorded statement, saying: 
All those things I told you.  The whole thing is a lie.  My 
brother wasn‟t with me.  I can‟t do that to my mother. . . .  I can‟t face 
my mother by saying my brother is involved in this.  I‟m not giving a 
statement. 
 
Butchko agreed there was no eyewitness identification of the person who did the 
shooting and that no firearms were ever recovered.   
 
Delhall‟s girlfriend in 2001, Marcia Berry, testified that she left work around 
3 p.m. on November 29, 2001, and that when Delhall picked her up, Atiba was 
 
 
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with him.  Around 5:15 p.m., Wadada and Atiba drove her home to Pembroke 
Pines and then left.  She testified that she next saw Wadada later that evening when 
he came back around 10 p.m., or a little later, and they went to Checkers 
restaurant.  With Berry‟s consent, a search was done of her 1992 Mazda Protege 
automobile.  Retired Miami-Dade Police Detective Tommy Charles testified that 
on December 6, 2001, he searched the Mazda and found, among other things, a 
probation payment receipt issued to Wadada Delhall, a job application by Delhall, 
a book bag with papers bearing Delhall‟s name, Marcia Berry‟s passport, and a live 
round of 9mm ammunition manufactured by Winchester found in one of the book 
bags in the car.  Marcia Berry testified that in 2001, she did not keep any 
ammunition in her car and did not know why a 9mm live round of ammunition was 
found in her car.  Detective Charles also processed the vehicle for fingerprints, and 
found a latent print identified as belonging to Wadada Delhall.     
George Hertel, a criminalist supervisor at the Miami-Dade Police 
Department crime laboratory, testified concerning a report prepared by a former 
crime laboratory criminalist, Jess Galan, on the firearms used in McCrae‟s murder.  
Hertel testified that two different firearms were used in the McCrae murder.  In 
Hertel‟s opinion, the first group of projectiles, comprising ammunition produced 
by various manufacturers, was fired from a 9mm weapon, probably a Smith and 
 
 
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Wesson semiautomatic.  The second group was, in his opinion, fired from a 
revolver, possibly a “.38 Special or .350 manufactured by Luger.”   
Finally, Dr. Emma Lew, Chief Medical Examiner for Miami-Dade County, 
testified about the autopsy report on Hubert McCrae.  Dr. Lew testified that after 
reviewing the report and autopsy files, it was her opinion that Hubert McCrae died 
of multiple gunshot wounds and that the manner of death was homicide.  Dr. Lew 
reported that McCrae suffered fifteen gunshot wounds to various parts of his body, 
mostly to his left side.  She testified that the fatal gunshot wound was likely the 
one to the right side of McCrae‟s abdomen, which resulted in a projectile traveling 
through the mesentery of the small bowel and upward through his liver and into his 
diaphragm.  There was a quart of blood in the abdominal cavity, which would have 
taken minutes to occur.   
After the State rested, Wadada Delhall testified in his own defense, 
explaining how, after his mother was arrested and deported back to Jamaica several 
years earlier, he began caring for his brothers, the youngest of whom was an infant.  
His father was absent and, at age eighteen, Delhall was the oldest son and became 
responsible for brothers Negus, Bobo, Atiba, Jamal, and Dwight.  He explained 
that when his brother Negus was arrested for Bennett‟s murder, Delhall hired Paul 
Gerson to represent Negus at the Arthur hearing.  Delhall said he did not attend the 
hearing, and he denied murdering McCrae.   
 
 
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Delhall testified that on November 29, 2001, he picked up Berry from work, 
but denied that Atiba was with him.  He testified that after he left Marcia at her 
house, he dropped off another brother, Jamal, at home and then went to a music 
studio.  He said he never left the studio until he picked up Berry and took her to a 
fast food restaurant in Pembroke Pines late that evening.  He added that he gave a 
statement confessing to murdering McCrae because Clifford told him the officers 
were considering arresting his fourteen-year-old brother, Jamal.  He said he 
confessed because he also feared being beaten up by the police, and related an 
incident in Broward County in which he said officers beat him after he was 
arrested for fleeing officers in a car chase.  Delhall testified that Clifford told him 
he would try to get a deal for three to five years to add to his probation, and that if 
he wanted to help himself he should write up a statement and “just tell them you 
are sorry for being in this predicament and tell them stuff that you will do to help 
your brother, your brother that‟s locked up.”  When shown a copy of the statement 
he wrote, Delhall said it was “[t]he statement Mr. Clifford coerced me to write.”  
Delhall said when he first gave the statement to Clifford, it did not include 
confessing to the murder, and that when Clifford read the statement, he said, “Man, 
look here.  You are not putting yourself involved in any crime. . . .  I came out here 
to help you.  If you don‟t put yourself involved with the crime, I‟m going to leave 
you with these guys and they can do what they want with you.”  Delhall said 
 
 
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Clifford told him to write that he shot McCrae.  Delhall denied ever giving any 
details of the crime to Butchko after speaking with Clifford, and that all the things 
Butchko said about Delhall selling the guns on the street and putting the decision 
to shoot McCrae in God‟s hands were made up.  He also denied telling Butchko he 
was with Atiba.   
In rebuttal, the State presented testimony from Broward County Sheriff‟s 
Deputy Christopher Schaub, who testified about Wadada‟s 1999 arrest for fleeing 
and eluding and the subsequent altercation with officers, which Delhall referred to 
in his testimony.  Schaub testified that when Delhall was on the way to be 
fingerprinted, Delhall began throwing punches and ripped his shirt.  They were 
struggling on the floor when, Deputy Schaub testified, “I felt him grab a hold of 
my gun.  He was tugging on my gun.”  After closing argument in the guilt phase, 
the jury returned a verdict finding Wadada Delhall guilty as charged on all counts.  
The case proceeded to an August 13, 2008, penalty phase proceeding. 
Penalty Phase and Sentencing Order 
 
The State presented evidence of Delhall‟s prior violent felony conviction 
arising from the December 1999 incident involving Deputy Schaub in the Broward 
County Sheriff‟s substation after Delhall was arrested for fleeing police in a car 
chase.  The State presented the judgment and sentence for aggravated fleeing and 
eluding, resisting with violence, driving while license suspended, leaving the scene 
 
 
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of an accident, and several misdemeanors.  This prior violent felony conviction 
was relied on as an aggravating factor in the sentencing order.  The State also 
presented victim impact evidence by Irma McCrae, Hubert McCrae‟s widow; 
Roslyn McCrae, his daughter; and Andrew Benjamin, a cousin.   
The defense presented the testimony of ten family members and one family 
friend in mitigation.  These witnesses testified about how, after his mother was 
deported and with his father absent, Delhall took over caring for his younger 
brothers, including an infant.  Delhall was described as a loving son, brother, and 
cousin, who cared deeply for his family and felt responsible for taking care of his 
younger siblings.  He was like a brother and a father to them, and urged them to 
stay in school.  The jury, by a vote of eight to four, returned an advisory verdict 
recommending that Delhall be sentenced to death.  As discussed in detail below, 
during closing argument, defense counsel lodged numerous objections to 
comments of the prosecutor.  These comments, along with several other errors 
discussed below, are the basis for this Court‟s reversal of the penalty phase.   
 
Prior to sentencing Delhall, the trial court held a Spencer7 hearing at which 
the defense presented mitigation testimony of Dr. Brad Fisher, a clinical 
psychologist.  Dr. Fisher testified that Delhall would likely adjust properly to the 
                                          
 
 
7.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993) (reiterating that before 
pronouncing sentence in a death case, the trial judge shall hold a hearing at which 
the defendant, his attorney, and the State may present additional evidence and 
argument concerning the sentence). 
 
 
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rules of prison if incarcerated for life without parole.  As to mitigating 
circumstances, the court found Delhall‟s family background and positive family 
relationships to be factors in mitigation, but gave them little weight.  The trial court 
also found that friends and family testified of the devastating impact the 
defendant‟s execution would have on them, but gave this mitigation little weight.  
Little weight was also given to the testimony of Dr. Fisher that Delhall would 
adjust well to life in prison.  The trial court subsequently issued an order 
sentencing Delhall to death based on four aggravating circumstances: (1) the 
murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) (great weight); (2) Delhall 
had a prior violent felony conviction for resisting arrest with violence in Broward 
County (great weight); (3) the murder was committed while Delhall was on 
probation (great weight); and (4) the murder was committed to hinder or disrupt 
government function or enforcement of law (great weight).   
 
We turn first to a discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence presented in 
the guilt phase.  
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
  
Delhall does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
conviction for first-degree murder.  However, this Court has a mandatory 
obligation to review the sufficiency of the evidence of first-degree murder in every 
case in which a death sentence has been imposed, even where the issue is not 
 
 
- 19 - 
raised on appeal.  See Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5); see also Miller v. State, 42 So. 
3d 204, 227 (Fla. 2010) (“[T]his Court has a mandatory obligation to 
independently review the sufficiency of the evidence in every case in which a 
sentence of death has been imposed.”).   
 
“In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is whether, 
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of 
fact could have found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Simmons v. State, 934 So. 2d 1100, 1111 (Fla. 2006) (quoting 
Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001)).  That test is met in the evidence 
presented in this case.  The State presented evidence that on November 29, 2001, 
Hubert McCrae was found still alive but with multiple gunshot wounds, lying on 
the ground in his auto repair shop in Opa-locka.  The parties stipulated that the 
victim was Hubert McCrae.  McCrae had previously given police a statement about 
witnessing the murder of a man named Gilbert Bennett at the same auto shop in 
1998.  The evidence showed that Delhall‟s brother Negus was subsequently 
identified as Bennett‟s murderer and had been arrested and charged.  As McCrae 
lay injured, he told a responding officer that the person who shot him was “the 
brother of the guy that shot the man that owned the business before.”  The State 
presented the written, signed confession of Wadada Delhall admitting to the 
murder of McCrae, in which Delhall said he shot McCrae to protect his brother 
 
 
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Negus in the prosecution of the Bennett murder case.  The State also presented the 
waiver of Miranda rights signed by Delhall before he confessed.  Descriptions of 
the car in which the murderer left the scene matched the car owned by Delhall‟s 
girlfriend and in which Delhall rode with his brother Atiba on the day of the 
murder.  Some of Delhall‟s personal possessions were found in the car, along with 
an unfired round of ammunition of the same caliber that was used in shooting 
McCrae.  Viewing the competent, substantial evidence submitted at trial in the 
light most favorable to the State, we find that the evidence was sufficient to prove 
Delhall guilty of first-degree murder.  We turn next to Delhall‟s claim that his 
confession should have been suppressed. 
Delhall’s Confession 
Prior to trial, Delhall filed a motion to suppress his statements to police on 
the grounds that they were obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights 
subsequent to a warrantless search of his apartment and what he contends was an 
illegal arrest without probable cause during that search.  A suppression hearing was 
held at which Detectives Ray Hoadley, Butchko, and Bayas, Sergeant Rayborn, 
and William Clifford testified.  The trial court denied the motion.   
“A trial court‟s ruling on a motion to suppress comes to us clothed with a 
presumption of correctness and, as the reviewing court, we must interpret the 
evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner 
 
 
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most favorable to sustaining the trial court‟s ruling.”  Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 
598, 605 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Murray v. State, 692 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. 1997)). 
As we explained in Connor, a trial court‟s ruling on a motion to suppress is a 
mixed question of law and fact that ultimately determines constitutional rights and 
should be reviewed using a two-step approach—deferring to the trial court‟s 
findings of fact as long as they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, 
but reviewing de novo a trial court‟s application of law to the historical facts.  
Connor, 803 So. 2d at 605; see, e.g., Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).  
We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Delhall‟s motion to suppress 
because the search conducted in his apartment was not an unreasonable search.  
Moreover, Delhall went with the police to the police station and spoke with them 
voluntarily, and was not arrested until after he confessed.  Delhall was advised of 
his right to remain silent and to have an attorney present, and waived those rights 
in a written waiver form prior to giving his statements.  We first examine the 
warrantless search of his bedroom in which he was discovered hiding in a closet.   
Delhall first contends that his confession should have been suppressed 
because it was the result of a warrantless search of his bedroom.  The State 
counters that the officers were present in the home with consent, and officer safety 
required the search that disclosed Delhall hiding in a closet.  We agree.  There is 
no dispute that the police were inside Delhall‟s apartment with the consent of one 
 
 
- 22 - 
of the occupants, Tiese Caldwell.  There is also no dispute that she told the officers 
several times that only she and her several young children who were with her in the 
living room were the only ones home.  Further, the facts are not in dispute that the 
police were at the apartment because they had information that one of Negus‟s 
brothers killed McCrae.  When the police arrived, they noted the presence of a 
Mazda automobile, which they knew matched the description of the car driven by 
the shooter.  Delhall further contends that because Caldwell denied permission to 
search the apartment, the warrantless search that disclosed Delhall hiding in the 
closet violated the Fourth Amendment and was not an authorized protective sweep 
incident to a lawful arrest in the apartment.  However, exceptions exist which 
justify a warrantless search within a home that is not required to accompany a 
lawful in-home arrest.   
 “It is well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a 
search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is „per se 
unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.‟ ”  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (quoting 
Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); see also Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177, 
192 (Fla. 2010) (noting that although a warrantless search of a home is per se 
unreasonable, “several exceptions to this rule have developed”) (citing Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978)).  We have recognized “[t]he right of police to 
 
 
- 23 - 
enter and investigate an emergency, without an accompanying intent either to seize 
or arrest . . . [is] inherent in the very nature of their duties as peace officers and 
derives from the common law.”  Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. 1981).  
“[P]olice may enter a residence without a warrant if an objectively reasonable basis 
exists for the officer to believe that there is an immediate need for police assistance 
for the protection of life or substantial property interests.”  Twilegar, 42 So. 3d at 
192 (quoting Seibert v. State, 923 So. 2d 460, 468 (Fla. 2006) (emphasis 
removed)).  Such a search must be “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which 
justify its initiation.”  Siebert, 923 So. 2d at 468 (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 
393).  The search must cease once the officer determines that the emergency does 
not exist or has been met.  Id. (citing Rolling, 695 So. 2d at 293).  “It is immaterial 
whether an actual emergency existed in the residence; only the reasonableness of 
the officer‟s belief at the time of entry is considered on review.”  Seibert, 923 So. 
2d at 468.  “There is no catalog of all the exigencies that may allow a warrantless 
search of a residence because „[t]he reasonableness of an entry by the police upon 
private property is measured primarily by the totality of existing circumstances.‟ ”  
Davis v. State, 834 So. 2d 322, 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (quoting Zeigler, 402 So. 
2d at 371).  These same principles apply when police are in the home lawfully, 
such as in this case with consent of one of the occupants, and circumstances arise 
 
 
- 24 - 
that provide an objectively reasonable basis for officers to believe that there is an 
immediate need for protection of themselves or other occupants. 
In the instant case, the officers were in Delhall‟s apartment lawfully with the 
consent of an occupant, Tiese Caldwell.  Even though she explicitly assured 
officers more than once that no one else was in the apartment, Detective Bayas 
heard unidentifiable sounds coming from the bedroom, which was adjacent to the 
living room.  The officers had reason to believe that one of Negus‟s brothers shot 
McCrae and, based on the leasing agent‟s information, had reason to believe that 
Delhall and possibly another male lived in the apartment.  They knew that a car 
matching the shooter‟s car was parked outside the apartment.  Under these 
circumstances, when Detective Bayas heard the noise, he had a well-founded, 
objectively reasonable, articulable fear that a person carrying a gun might be in the 
other room, thus posing an immediate risk to officers and occupants of the 
apartment.  These circumstances meet the exigent circumstances requirement for 
warrantless entry into the bedroom and the protective search of the closet.  
Moreover, the search did not extend beyond what was necessary to locate the 
source of the noise heard by Bayas and to determine there was no immediate threat 
of danger.  
Under the totality of the circumstances present in this case, the warrantless 
search of the bedroom closet was not an unreasonable search in violation of the 
 
 
- 25 - 
Fourth Amendment.  Because the search produced no tangible evidence but 
produced only the person of Wadada Delhall, we turn next to Delhall‟s argument 
that once he was found in the apartment, he was unlawfully placed under arrest by 
the actions of the officers, without a warrant or probable cause, thereby tainting his 
later confession at the police station.   
The officers testified at the suppression hearing and at trial that they did not 
arrest Delhall at the apartment, and they told him several times, both in the 
apartment and at the police station, that he was not under arrest.  The evidence 
established that Delhall went with the officers willingly, without handcuffs or other 
restraints.  Delhall now contends his belief about whether he would have been free 
to leave was dictated by the fact that he was taken from his bedroom by the police, 
at gunpoint, in handcuffs, in the presence of police officers scattered about his 
apartment and parking lot.  He cites the fact that police told him that they wanted 
to question him about a murder and that, once at the police station, he was not told 
he was free to leave and was given Miranda warnings.  However, Detective 
Butchko testified that he told Delhall at least three times that he was not under 
arrest.  Butchko also testified that if Delhall had demanded to leave, they would 
have stopped questioning him and let him go, but that Delhall never said he wanted 
to leave or that he did not want to be questioned further.     
 
 
- 26 - 
The officers were in Delhall‟s apartment with the consent of Tiese Caldwell, 
an occupant.  Due to exigent circumstances, the police discovered him hiding in a 
closet in the bedroom.  Because evidence established that the police did not know 
who he was and did not know if he was armed, a temporary investigatory detention 
was reasonable under all the circumstances present.  We reiterated in Taylor v. 
State, 855 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2003), the three levels of encounter that a person may 
have with law enforcement.  The first level is a consensual encounter that involves 
only minimal contact.  Id. at 14.  The second level, an investigatory stop as 
enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), allows the police to temporarily 
detain a person if the officer has a reasonable, well-founded, and articulable 
suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime.  See Taylor, 
855 So. 2d at 15.  The third level is an arrest, which must be supported by probable 
cause.  Id.  
When Delhall was discovered in the closet, officers reasonably concluded 
that he may have been one of Negus‟s brothers and thus may have been armed.  
The officers had reasonable concern and articulable well-founded suspicion that 
the individual may have committed or been present at the McCrae murder.  At a 
minimum, the police had reasonable grounds to believe that the individual hiding 
in the closet might take violent action based on the fact that he was hiding from 
police in the first instance.  As the officers testified, when they learned that he was 
 
 
- 27 - 
Wadada Delhall and that he was unarmed, his handcuffs were removed.  
Competent, substantial evidence established that he voluntarily accompanied the 
detectives to the police station.  Evidence further established that he was 
transported in an unmarked car without handcuffs and was not handcuffed at the 
station until after he confessed.  Further, officers testified that Delhall was told 
several times that he was not under arrest.  Based on the totality of the 
circumstances in this case, we find that Delhall was not unlawfully arrested at his 
apartment or when he was taken to the police station.   
Even if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it can be said that the 
interview at the police station was actually a custodial interrogation after a seizure 
or detention, the question is not a Fifth Amendment issue concerning whether 
Delhall was questioned without being advised of Miranda—Delhall actually 
complains that he was advised of his Miranda rights too many times.  The question 
raises a Fourth Amendment issue concerning whether Delhall was essentially 
under arrest at the police station, without probable cause, before he confessed.  
“[R]ights under the two Amendments may appear to coalesce since „the 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” condemned in the Fourth Amendment are 
almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against 
himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment.‟ ”  Brown 
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601 (1975) (quoting Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 633 
 
 
- 28 - 
(1886)).  The Supreme Court has made clear that Miranda warnings do not remedy 
a Fourth Amendment violation.  Brown, 422 U.S. at 601.  Where an illegal arrest 
precedes the confession, the pertinent inquiry is not whether Miranda warnings 
were given, but whether the statement is truly voluntary.  Brown, 422 U.S. at 601-
02.  The Supreme Court explained: 
In order for the causal chain, between the illegal arrest and the 
statements made subsequent thereto, to be broken, Wong Sun [v. U.S., 
371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963)] requires not merely that the statement meet 
the Fifth Amendment standard of voluntariness but that it be 
“sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.” 
 
Id. at 602 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486).  “No single fact is dispositive.”  
Brown, 422 U.S. at 603.  Miranda warnings are a pertinent factor, as are the 
temporal proximity of the arrest and confession, the presence of intervening 
circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct, but “the 
voluntariness of the statement is the threshold requirement.”  Id. at 603-04.  The 
Supreme Court noted in Brown that the illegal arrest in that case was separated 
from the confession by only two hours, with no significant intervening event.  Id. 
at 604.  Additionally, the impropriety of the arrest was noted and the actions of the 
police were “calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion.”  Id.  
In the instant case, Delhall went voluntarily to the police station without 
handcuffs and spoke to several officers at length.  No threat or force was used.  He 
was not handcuffed during the interview.  The intervening event which could 
 
 
- 29 - 
reasonably have precipitated his confession was learning that Marcia Berry, his 
alibi witness, did not support his claim that he was with her when McCrae was 
killed.  Thus, under Brown, the totality of the circumstances tends to show that 
even if at some point in the consensual interview Delhall was “arrested,” his 
confession was still voluntary and sufficiently an act of free will to purge any taint 
of an illegal arrest.   
Finally, competent substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the 
police did have probable cause to arrest Delhall, give him Miranda warnings, and 
proceed to obtain a confession.  We recently explained: 
The Supreme Court has further explained that probable cause is a 
“fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in 
particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a 
neat set of legal rules.”  Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71, 
(2003) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).   
 
State v. Hankerson, 65 So. 3d 502, 506 (Fla. 2011).  The evidence in this case 
established that the police knew one of Negus‟s brothers shot McCrae and that two 
individuals drove to the crime scene in a car matching Marcia Berry‟s car.  Delhall 
physically matched the description of the shooter given by witnesses.  The police 
knew brother Bobo was in jail at the time and brother Jamal was a young teen.  
Thus, Atiba was the only likely other brother who could have been a viable suspect 
along with Wadada.  Even if police were not sure which brother did the shooting, 
they had reasonable grounds to believe Wadada was either the shooter or the 
 
 
- 30 - 
driver.  “Probable cause to arrest exists when facts and circumstances within an 
officer‟s knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information are 
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has 
[been] or is being committed.”  Caraballo v. State, 39 So. 3d 1234, 1246 (Fla. 
2010) (quoting Chavez v. State, 832 So. 2d 730, 747-48 (Fla. 2002) (quoting 
McCarter v. State, 463 So. 2d 546, 548-49 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985))).  The facts and 
circumstances known to the officers were sufficient to warrant a person of 
reasonable caution to believe that Delhall was involved in the McCrae shooting.   
We also conclude that the statements were given after Delhall waived his 
right to remain silent.  There is no dispute that Delhall was given his Miranda 
warnings, both by Detective Butchko and by William Clifford.  There is no 
evidence to indicate that Delhall‟s statements to police were anything but 
voluntarily and freely given.  For all of the above reasons, relief is denied on this 
claim.   
The 9mm Cartridge Found in the Mazda 
Delhall next contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the 
9mm cartridge found in a backpack in Marcia Berry‟s Mazda less than a week after 
the McCrae shooting.  He contends that the cartridge was irrelevant because it was 
not shown to be related to crimes charged and was unduly prejudicial.  “In Florida, 
all relevant evidence is admissible, unless its probative value is substantially 
 
 
- 31 - 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the 
jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”  Miller, 42 So. 3d at 224; 
see also § 90.402-.403, Fla. Stat. (2008).  “An appellate court will not disturb a 
trial court‟s determination that evidence is relevant and admissible absent an abuse 
of discretion.”  McGirth v. State, 48 So. 3d 777, 786 (Fla. 2010).  A trial court‟s 
discretion is limited by the rules of evidence and the principles of stare decisis.  
Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 949 (Fla. 2007).    
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
evidence.  The 9mm cartridge was found in the Mazda driven by Delhall, and was 
located in a backpack containing other items related to Delhall.  In his oral 
confession, Delhall told Butchko that he carried two firearms in that car—a .38 
revolver and a 9mm semiautomatic—both of which he used to shoot McCrae.  
Evidence showed that Delhall had possession of the car at the time of the shooting.  
McCrae was shot with 9mm ammunition made by various manufacturers, although 
not the manufacturer of the 9mm ammunition in the backpack.  Finally, Delhall 
was charged with both murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.  
Evidence that the round of ammunition, which matched the caliber of ammunition 
fired at McCrae, was found in the Mazda—and evidence that Delhall admitted 
transporting the 9mm murder weapon in the Mazda—provides the necessary nexus 
 
 
- 32 - 
to both the charge of murder and the charge of possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon.   
 
Even if the unfired 9mm cartridge was irrelevant and should not have been 
admitted, any error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The evidence 
established that Delhall fired more than a dozen rounds of ammunition during the 
murder, and he confessed to the murder.  There is no reasonable possibility that the 
admission of one unfired cartridge found in the Mazda affected the verdict.  See 
State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986). 
McCrae’s Statement to Officer Hufnagel 
Delhall contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence Hubert 
McCrae‟s statements to police at the scene of the shooting.  A trial judge‟s ruling 
on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of 
discretion.  See Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 546 (Fla. 2011).  The trial judge‟s 
discretion is limited, however, by the rules of evidence and by the principles of 
stare decisis.  McDuffie v. State, 970 So. 2d 312, 326 (Fla. 2007) (citing Johnston 
v. State, 863 So. 2d 271, 278 (Fla. 2003)).  The court‟s discretion is also abused if 
“its ruling is based on an „erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous 
assessment of the evidence.‟ ”  McDuffie, 970 So. 2d at 326 (quoting Cooter & 
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)).  Thus, our first inquiry is 
whether the statements were inadmissible hearsay or whether they met some 
 
 
- 33 - 
exception to the rule excluding hearsay under Florida law.  The trial court 
concluded that the statements met the excited utterance exception to hearsay under 
section 90.803(2), Florida Statutes (2008).  In Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 
2008), we explained that: 
[T]o qualify as an excited utterance, the statement must be made: (1) 
“regarding an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement”; 
(2) “before there was time to contrive or misrepresent”; and (3) “while 
the person was under the stress or excitement caused by the event.” 
 
Id. at 107 (quoting Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 251 (Fla. 1996)).  In this 
case, McCrae had been shot shortly before police arrived, his statements related to 
the event, the event was sufficiently startling, and there is no evidence of time for 
reflection.  Thus, the trial court was correct in determining the statements to be 
admissible excited utterances.  Even so, the inquiry now turns to whether the 
statements were testimonial and thus inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004), and its progeny.  As explained below, McCrae‟s statements 
were not testimonial under recent Supreme Court precedent, and thus did not 
violate the Confrontation Clause contained in the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  
 
Testimonial Out-of-Court Statements under Crawford 
The United States Supreme Court held in Crawford that testimonial hearsay 
that is introduced against a defendant violates the Confrontation Clause unless the 
declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior meaningful opportunity to 
 
 
- 34 - 
cross-examine that witness.  541 U.S. at 68.  The Court left “for another day any 
effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of „testimonial.‟ ”  Id.  The Supreme 
Court subsequently explained in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006): 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution. 
 
Id. at 822 (emphasis added).  The ongoing emergency in Davis was the fact that 
when the domestic violence victim made the statements to police via a 911 call, her 
assailant was still in the home threatening her.  The Supreme Court in Davis held 
the 911 statements to be nontestimonial and thus admissible.  The Court 
distinguished the circumstances in Davis from those in Crawford, where the 
statements were made in a formal interrogation hours after the events.  See Davis, 
at 827.  In the instant case, McCrae‟s statements were neither made while McCrae 
was still being threatened by the assailant, nor were they made in a formal 
interview given hours after the crime like Crawford.  However, because the 
statements were made at the scene shortly after the shooting, before emergency 
personnel arrived and while McCrae was injured, and because the perpetrator had 
just left the scene while still shooting from the window of the car—circumstances 
 
 
- 35 - 
indicating a possible ongoing emergency—McCrae‟s statements are more akin to 
those in Davis than in Crawford.   
 
This assessment is borne out by the recent decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).  In Bryant, the 
Supreme Court held that statements made in response to police questioning by a 
gunshot victim found by police were not testimonial and therefore were not barred 
by the Confrontation Clause.  Id. at 1150.  The shooting in Bryant had occurred 
about twenty minutes earlier at another location, and the victim had driven himself 
to a gas station where he was found.  Id.  When the officer asked the victim “what 
had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had occurred,” the victim 
told police “Rick” had shot him, indicating the appellant, Richard Bryant.  Id.  
Emergency services then arrived and the victim was transported to the hospital 
where he died.  Id.  The police left the scene and traveled to Bryant‟s house where 
they found blood, a bullet hole in the door, and the victim‟s wallet inside the 
house.  Id.   
 
The United States Supreme Court held in Bryant, as it did in Crawford and 
Davis, that the reach of the Confrontation Clause is limited to testimonial 
statements.  Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1153.  The Court recognized that it had not 
comprehensively defined testimonial statements in Crawford and that in Davis it 
“took a further step to „determine more precisely which police interrogations 
 
 
- 36 - 
produce testimony.‟ ”  Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1153 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).  
Even so, the Court in Bryant commented that Davis did not set forth an exhaustive 
classification of all conceivable statements as either testimonial or nontestimonial.  
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155.  The Supreme Court explained:  “When, as in Davis, 
the primary purpose of an interrogation is to respond to an „ongoing emergency,‟ 
its purpose is not to create a record for trial and thus is not within the scope of the 
Clause.”  Id.  The Court then expanded this concept, stating:   
But there may be other circumstances, aside from ongoing 
emergencies, when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose 
of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.  In making 
the primary purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, 
designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.  
Where no such primary purpose [of creating an out-of-court substitute 
for testimony] exists, the admissibility of a statement is the concern of 
state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause. 
 
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 (bracketed material added).   
 
Thus, Bryant focuses to a large degree on whether the statement was elicited 
primarily to create an out-of-court substitute for testimony.  The Court in Bryant 
also recognized that the circumstances of Davis, where the domestic violence 
assailant was still threatening the victim, happened to be the factual situation at 
hand in that case, but may not be the only context in which statements will be 
found to be nontestimonial.  The Court explained, “We now face a new context: a 
non-domestic dispute, involving a victim found in a public location, suffering from 
a fatal gunshot wound, and a perpetrator whose location was unknown at the time 
 
 
- 37 - 
the police located the victim.”  Id. at 1156.  The Court stated that this “new context 
requires us to provide additional clarification with regard to what Davis meant by 
„the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency.‟ ”  Id. at 1156 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).   
The Court in Bryant also explained that Davis was not intended to define the 
outer bounds of an ongoing emergency.  See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158.  The Court 
then expanded the inquiry for an ongoing emergency, which it held was a context-
specific inquiry, and stated:  “An assessment of whether an emergency that 
threatens the police and public is ongoing cannot narrowly focus on whether the 
threat solely to the first victim has been neutralized because the threat to the first 
responders and public may continue.”  Id. at 1158.  Thus, Bryant supports the 
conclusion that an ongoing emergency existed when Delhall left the scene firing a 
shot out of the window of the car.    
The Supreme Court held in Bryant that “[as] Davis made clear, whether an 
ongoing emergency exists is simply one factor—albeit an important factor—that 
informs the ultimate inquiry regarding the „primary purpose‟ of an interrogation.”  
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160.  The formality or informality of the police inquiry of 
the victim is another factor.  The questioning in Bryant, which occurred in a 
disorganized fashion outdoors prior to the arrival of medical services, was an 
important factor in distinguishing that interrogation from formal in-house 
 
 
- 38 - 
interrogation and in determining the primary purpose of police questioning.  See 
id.  The Supreme Court also distinguished Bryant from Davis and Crawford by 
noting that Byrant was the first post-Crawford Confrontation Clause case to 
involve a gun.  See Bryant, 132 S. Ct. at 1164.  Where a gun is concerned, the fact 
that the shooter is not present does not necessarily signify an end to a possible 
threat: “An emergency does not last only for the time between when the assailant 
pulls the trigger and the bullet hits the victim.”  Id.    
 
The Supreme Court applied the above principles to the facts in Bryant to 
determine if the primary purpose of the police questioning and victim statements 
was “to enable police assistance to meet [the] ongoing emergency.”  Id. at 1165 
(quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).  That inquiry in Bryant resulted in the conclusion 
that the victim‟s statements to police in response to the question of “what had 
happened” served the primary purpose of assisting police to respond to an ongoing 
emergency and were not testimonial.  Noting that the victim was obviously in 
considerable pain and having difficulty breathing and talking, the Supreme Court 
could not say that a person in the victim‟s situation “would have had a „primary 
purpose‟ „to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.‟ ”  422 U.S. at 1165 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).  The Court 
pointed out that the question to the victim in Bryant asking “what had happened” 
was precisely the type of question that would allow police to assess the situation, 
 
 
- 39 - 
including the threat to their own safety and possible danger to the victim and to the 
public.  Id. at 1166.  Thus, the statements in Bryant were held to be “the type of 
nontestimonial statements we contemplated in Davis” and were not barred by the 
Confrontation Clause.  Id. at 1166.   
In light of the holding in Bryant, and its similarity to the instant case, this 
Court finds that McCrae‟s statements to Officer Hufnagel, admissible under 
Florida law as excited utterances, were not testimonial and thus not barred by the 
Confrontation Clause.  Thus, relief is denied on this claim. 
Admission of McCrae’s Affidavit Concerning the Bennett Murder 
 
Delhall also contends that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence the 
affidavit that Hubert McCrae made in the Bennett murder case.  That affidavit was 
originally admitted into evidence at Negus Delhall‟s Arthur hearing and was read 
into evidence in this case.  It stated: 
1.  I operate an auto repair business located at 2143 Opa Locka 
Boulevard, Miami Dade County. 
2.  I was a witness to the shooting of Gilbert Bennett on April 
24th, 1998. 
3.  I gave a sworn statement to Detective Ray Hoadley in the 
evening of April 24th, 1998, and answered all of the detective's 
questions. 
4.  I viewed a photo line-up on April 29th, 1998, and identified 
a photograph of the man I saw enter my business and shoot Gilbert 
Bennett on April 24th, 1998.  I indicated my choice by, among other 
things circling the photograph of the shooter on the line-up and 
signing my name below it, noting the date and the time. 
           
 
Hubert McCrae, Affiant. 
 
 
- 40 - 
 
Delhall argues that this affidavit was inadmissible testimonial hearsay in violation 
of the Confrontation Clause, contrary to the holding of Crawford.  The Court in 
Crawford did not define “testimonial statements,” but noted that statements such as 
prior testimony at a hearing, trial, or before a grand jury, and statements given in 
police interrogations, would violate the Confrontation Clause unless certain 
conditions for admission were met.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.  The affidavit in 
this case was without doubt testimonial.   
 
However, in the instant case, Delhall has not identified any pretrial motion 
or contemporaneous objection in which he raised an express Confrontation Clause 
objection to admission of the McCrae affidavit.  The main ground argued at trial 
was that the out-of-court statements were unreliable hearsay.  In order to preserve a 
Crawford objection to hearsay as violative of the Confrontation Clause, “a specific 
objection is necessary.”  Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735, 747 n.11 (Fla. 2007) 
(citing Schoenwetter v. State, 931 So. 2d 857, 871 (Fla. 2006)).  The defendant 
must object on the grounds that admission of the out-of-court statement will violate 
the defendant‟s right to confront witnesses; it is not sufficient to object to the 
statements as inadmissible hearsay.  Id.  Thus, an express Crawford objection was 
not preserved by Delhall‟s hearsay objection made during trial.  Even assuming the 
objection was sufficiently preserved by counsel‟s passing reference to “Crawford” 
 
 
- 41 - 
at the pretrial hearing, we conclude that a Crawford violation did not occur in this 
case.  
The Supreme Court in Crawford stated that the Confrontation Clause “does 
not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the 
truth of the matter asserted.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n.9 (citing Tennessee v. 
Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)).  When analyzed solely under Florida “hearsay” 
law, i.e., whether it is an out-of-court statement offered in court for the truth of the 
matter asserted, it can be seen that McCrae‟s affidavit was not inadmissible 
hearsay and thus is not barred by the Confrontation Clause.  The McCrae affidavit 
was offered in Wadada‟s trial not to prove that McCrae actually did see Negus 
Delhall kill Bennett or that McCrae actually picked a photograph of Bennett‟s 
killer out of a photo array, as the affidavit indicates.  The affidavit was not offered 
to prove the truth of the allegations against Negus but to prove that Delhall had a 
reason to believe McCrae would be a witness against Negus, regardless of the 
veracity of the allegations in the affidavit.  This provided evidence of Delhall‟s 
motive for murdering McCrae.   
We reached a similar conclusion in Smith v. State, 7 So. 3d 473, 497 (Fla. 
2009).  In Smith, the defendant was tried for killing Cynthia Brown, who was to be 
the sole witness against Smith in a separate murder case.  Id. at 485.  Smith 
involved admissibility of a report found in Smith‟s possession which contained 
 
 
- 42 - 
Brown‟s out-of-court statements to police in which she said she witnessed the 
earlier murder by Smith.  We held the report was not inadmissible hearsay because 
it was not offered to prove the truth of Brown‟s statement about witnessing the 
murder, but to prove that Smith had a motive to kill Brown to keep her from 
testifying.  See Smith, 7 So. 3d at 497-98.  Similarly, in the instant case, McCrae‟s 
affidavit was not admitted to prove Negus killed Bennett.  It was admitted to prove 
Wadada Delhall‟s knowledge of McCrae as a possible witness against Negus, thus 
proving a motive for killing McCrae.  Delhall admitted that he learned about 
McCrae from Negus‟s first lawyer, who had attended the Arthur hearing where the 
affidavit was presented.  Because the McCrae affidavit was not offered to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted—that McCrae actually identified Negus as 
Bennett‟s murderer—but was only offered to show that Delhall had reason to 
believe McCrae was an eyewitness who would testify against his brother, 
admission of the McCrae affidavit did not violate the Confrontation Clause or the 
principles of Crawford.  Thus, relief is denied on this claim. 
Delhall’s Booking Sheet 
Delhall next contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of a 
Broward County Jail booking sheet that showed he was in jail at the time of 
Negus‟s Arthur hearing.  The defense raised a factual issue as to when Delhall 
learned that McCrae was the only eyewitness to the Gilbert Bennett murder, for 
 
 
- 43 - 
which Negus Delhall was arrested.  The Arthur bond hearing for Negus Delhall 
was held on September 6, 2001.  The McCrae affidavit was presented at the bond 
hearing where Negus was present with his attorney Paul Gerson, and Hubert 
McCrae‟s name was mentioned as the only eyewitness.   
In an apparent attempt to dispel the idea that he learned about McCrae from 
attending the Arthur hearing, Delhall, who appeared in his own defense during the 
guilt phase, testified that he did not attend the hearing and, further, that he was in 
jail on the date of the hearing and did not get out until September 7, 2001.  On 
cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Delhall if he had proof with him that day 
that he was incarcerated on September 6, 2001, and Delhall replied that he did.  On 
redirect examination, defense counsel sought to admit, for identification, a booking 
sheet from the Broward County Sheriff‟s Office showing Delhall was in custody 
for a minor offense from August 27 to September 7, 2001, when he was released at 
7:38 pm.  When the prosecutor objected, the trial court asked her if there was any 
real dispute over the date.  In response, the prosecutor simply objected on the 
grounds that it was never disclosed in discovery and was a Richardson violation.  
The prosecutor also contended that she had no way to investigate its authenticity.  
Defense counsel responded that there was no real prejudice to the State because a 
brief computer check on the prosecutor‟s own computer would verify the accuracy 
 
 
- 44 - 
of the document, and further asked for a short continuance to obtain documentation 
of the authenticity of the booking sheet.    
 
Where a discovery violation occurs, we held in Richardson v. State, 246 So. 
2d 771 (Fla. 1971), that the trial court must conduct an inquiry as to whether the 
violation: (1) was willful or inadvertent; (2) was substantial or trivial; and (3) had a 
prejudicial effect on the aggrieved party‟s trial preparation.  Id. at 774-75.  This 
Court will review the record to determine if the inquiry was properly made and if 
the trial court‟s actions pursuant to the inquiry were proper.  See McDuffie, 970 
So. 2d at 321.  “A trial court‟s decision on a Richardson hearing is subject to 
reversal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion.”  Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 
930, 958 (Fla. 2003).  However, if the trial court abused its discretion in excluding 
the evidence as a sanction, thus erring, this Court will conduct a harmless error 
analysis.8  McDuffie, 970 So. 2d at 322.  Often, a Richardson violation involves a 
discovery violation by the State.  The same rules apply, however, regardless of 
which party is at fault.  The following questions will be examined in turn:  
Whether the trial court conducted an adequate Richardson inquiry; whether the 
                                          
 
 
8.  The Court reiterated in McDuffie that “a harmless error analysis is 
proper,” although error in conducting a Richardson inquiry, even if harmless 
standing alone, may be reviewed cumulatively with other errors that are found to 
have occurred.  McDuffie, 970 So. 2d at 322. 
 
 
- 45 - 
trial court erred in excluding the booking sheet; and whether any error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In response to the trial court‟s ruling that a discovery violation had occurred, 
defense counsel argued first that there was no way he could have anticipated that 
the State would ask the question and then demand proof.  He stated, “They said 
what proof.  Now I am being put in a position that this jury doubts my client 
because of [the] question posed by the prosecutor on a death penalty case.”  The 
trial court also noted that there was no custodian of records listed to testify about 
the booking sheet, although defense counsel‟s motion for a short continuance to 
call a custodian witness was denied.   
As to possible prejudice to the State in preparation of its case, the prosecutor 
argued only that she would not have challenged Wadada to produce proof if she 
had been given the booking sheet.  The trial court did not make any express finding 
that the violation was willful or that the State was substantially prejudiced, but 
stated: 
THE COURT:  Listen, this is a Richardson violation.  There is 
absolutely no reason why this should not have been given to the 
prosecutor, if you had it at some point, other than right at this 
moment.  Certainly before the case.  Not the case necessarily, 
certainly before the defendant began his testimony I‟m having to 
assume you had it in your hands before that.  It just didn‟t come in 
over the banister after she asked that question. 
 
 
 
- 46 - 
The court finally ruled that this is “a Richardson violation so it‟s inadmissible at 
this time.”  The court refused to admit the Broward booking sheet, but Delhall was 
allowed to testify again that he was in jail in Broward County on September 6, 
2001, and did not get out until September 7, 2001.  Delhall also testified that 
counsel had refreshed his recollection of the date he was released by showing him 
some documents from the Broward County Sheriff‟s office.  The State did not 
attempt to put on any evidence or testimony to dispute that fact.  
Richardson Inquiry 
The trial court did not announce that it was engaging in a Richardson 
inquiry, but the discussion between the court and counsel qualified as a limited 
Richardson inquiry.  Even so, the court did not make specific findings concerning 
the willfulness of the violation or the substantial prejudice to the State.  As 
explained next, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the booking sheet 
as a sanction for a Richardson violation.  The question of whether the error was 
harmless is discussed later in this issue. 
First, defense counsel‟s explanation for not providing the booking sheet in 
discovery was essentially that he could not have anticipated that the State would 
demand evidentiary proof of the jail stay when Wadada was on the witness stand.  
Thus, it appears that even though defense counsel could have provided the booking 
sheet prior to Delhall‟s testimony, counsel‟s failure to do so was not clearly shown 
 
 
- 47 - 
to be willful nondisclosure.  Second, in light of the nature of the document sought 
to be introduced—a simple booking sheet that the prosecutor could easily verify—
the violation was not shown to be substantial.  Moreover, the State presented 
nothing to compel a conclusion that failure of the defense to provide the booking 
sheet substantially prejudiced the State in the preparation of its case, as Richardson 
requires.  The most that the prosecutor argued at trial and in this Court is that she 
would not have asked the question about the existence of proof if she had been 
given the booking sheet.   
 
“[T]he failure of either the State or a defendant to comply with a discovery 
deadline, standing alone, is not dispositive for purposes of determining whether the 
sanction of exclusion of a witness or other evidence is appropriate” and the inquiry 
must involve a determination of whether the violation resulted in substantial 
prejudice to the opposing party.  State v. Randol, 947 So. 2d 609, 613 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2007).  Here, the defense committed the discovery violation, but it was 
incumbent upon the State, as the aggrieved party, to show substantial and material 
prejudice to its trial preparation if the evidence is admitted.  The trial court 
incorrectly accepted “surprise” as sufficient prejudice.  The State contends that its 
case did not hinge on proof that Delhall attended the bond hearing to learn about 
the McCrae affidavit.  Thus, if there was no legitimate issue concerning whether 
Delhall attended the bond hearing, it is difficult to see how the State was 
 
 
- 48 - 
substantially prejudiced by proof that he could not have done so.  Whether Delhall 
was unfairly prejudiced by the exclusion of the booking sheet is discussed 
separately below.  We turn next to whether exclusion of the booking sheet was an 
abuse of discretion.  
Error in Exclusion of the Booking Sheet 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(n)(1) allows a trial court to 
exclude evidence for a violation of discovery rules, but exclusion “should only be 
imposed when there is no other adequate remedy.”  McDuffie, 970 So. 2d at 321; 
see also Rimmer v. State, 59 So. 3d 763, 787 (Fla. 2010).  In McDuffie, which also 
involved a Richardson violation by the defense, we explained:  
Where the issue involves possible exclusion of defense 
evidence, the “extreme sanction of excluding [defense] evidence . . . 
should be used only as a last resort” and “it is incumbent upon the trial 
court . . . to determine whether any other reasonable alternatives can 
be employed to overcome . . . possible prejudice,” including 
declaration of a mistrial. . . .  
. . . . 
When, as in this case, the discovery violation is committed by 
the defense, special importance attaches to the trial court‟s inquiry 
into alternative sanctions because exclusion of exculpatory evidence 
implicates the defendant's constitutional right to defend himself or 
herself. 
   
McDuffie, 970 So. 2d at 322 (citations omitted).   
It is well-settled that when a discovery violation is committed by the State, 
exclusion of the evidence is viewed as an extreme sanction to be employed only as 
a last resort and only after the court determines no other reasonable alternative 
 
 
- 49 - 
exists to overcome the prejudice and allow the witness to testify.  See, e.g., Cooper 
v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133, 1138 (Fla. 1976).  As expressed in McDuffie, this rule 
applies with equal or greater force when a defense witness or evidence is sought to 
be excluded for a defense discovery violation, because there are few rights more 
fundamental than the right of an accused to present evidence or witnesses in his 
own defense.  970 So. 2d at 321.  The “extreme sanction of excluding [defense] 
evidence” should be used only as a last resort and it is incumbent upon the trial 
court to determine whether any other reasonable alternatives can be employed to 
overcome possible prejudice.  McDuffie, 970 So. 2d at 322 (quoting Casseus v. 
State, 902 So. 2d 294, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)).9  Here, exclusion of the evidence 
was actually the first resort, not the last.  Defense counsel asked for but was denied 
a brief continuance to authenticate the document to the satisfaction of the State.  
Counsel also suggested the State could perform a computer check to verify the 
accuracy of the evidence sought to be introduced.  These options were rejected. 
Even though the prosecutor was surprised at the submission of the booking 
sheet at that point in the proceedings, she did initially challenge Delhall on the 
witness stand to produce hard proof at that time—proof that defense counsel was 
willing and anxious to provide.  The trial court did not make an adequate inquiry 
                                          
 
9.  See also Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1271 (Fla. 2005) (noting 
that exclusion of a defense witness is a severe sanction that should be a last resort 
for extreme circumstances) (citing Tomengo v. State, 864 So. 2d 525, 529 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2004)).  
 
 
- 50 - 
into any possible alternatives to the drastic sanction of exclusion.  Thus, the trial 
court abused its discretion in excluding the defense evidence as a sanction for a 
Richardson violation.  
Harmless Error Analysis 
 
Even though the trial court erred in excluding the booking sheet as a 
sanction, we must determine if the error was harmless.  “This Court has defined the 
harmless error test as placing „the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the 
error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.‟ ”  Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 
451, 466 (Fla. 2006) (quoting DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1135).     
The State correctly argues that although it contended throughout trial that 
Delhall‟s motive for killing Hubert McCrae was to eliminate the only eyewitness 
to Negus‟s murder of Gilbert Bennett, the State did not contend that Wadada 
learned of the witness by attending Negus‟s bond hearing.  In the State‟s opening 
statement, the prosecutor argued that after the bond hearing at which McCrae‟s 
affidavit was presented, “it was at this point that the defendant decided to take 
matters into his own hands.  He met with the lawyer and he found out why his 
brother had been denied bond. . . .  Hubert McCrae‟s affidavit was now public 
record.”  Although Paul Gerson, the lawyer hired for Negus by Delhall, later 
 
 
- 51 - 
testified that he could not recall Wadada coming to him after the bond hearing to 
ask what happened, Delhall told William Clifford that he learned about McCrae 
from Gerson.    
In the closing arguments, the State again noted, “So this defendant had to 
find out who this witness was because the lawyer wasn‟t helping.  The lawyer 
didn‟t do well.  So he fired the lawyer, got the information that he could, Hubert 
McCrae.  Did he read the affidavit?  Did he see the affidavit?  Doesn‟t matter 
because he started looking for Hubert McCrae and you know that from Clarence 
Gooden because he is looking for whoever is Hubert McCrae. . . .  That‟s what this 
defendant knew.”   
The State‟s case did not hinge on proving that Delhall attended the bond 
hearing.  In any event, Delhall testified several times that he did not attend the 
bond hearing and was in jail on that date.  That evidence, in the form of his 
testimony, was presented to the jury.  The State introduced Delhall‟s confession 
and other evidence proving Delhall guilty of murdering McCrae.  Therefore, there 
is no reasonable possibility that the error in excluding the paper documentation that 
Delhall was in jail on the date of the Arthur hearing contributed to his conviction.  
Because the error in excluding the booking sheet was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, relief is denied on this claim.  
 
 
 
- 52 - 
Evidence Concerning the Bennett Murder 
Delhall next contends that the trial court erred in allowing admission of a 
substantial amount of evidence through a number of different witnesses concerning 
the Gilbert Bennett murder, including a photograph of Bennett‟s dead body lying 
in a pool of blood.  Delhall also contends that the trial court erred in failing to 
recognize the validity of his objection during his cross-examination when the 
prosecutor stated, as a preamble to a question, that Delhall participated in the 
Bennett murder.  We agree that admission of the extensive evidence of the Bennett 
murder, along with the prosecutor‟s improper remark during cross-examination, 
were error.  As explained more fully below, even though we conclude these errors 
were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt phase, when considered 
cumulatively with error that occurred in the penalty phase, these errors 
cumulatively require that a new penalty phase be held.  We first examine the errors 
in the guilt phase concerning the Bennett murder.   
During cross-examination of Delhall in the guilt phase, the prosecutor asked 
if he, along with his brother Atiba and three other individuals, dealt drugs out of a 
place in the warehouse district where the Bennett and McCrae murders occurred.  
The prosecutor also asked Delhall to confirm that an individual named Conroy 
Turner “ripped you guys off for drugs” and asked Delhall to confirm that his 
brother, Negus, took a contract to kill Conroy Turner.  The prosecutor then asked: 
 
 
- 53 - 
Q.  You couldn‟t find Conroy Turner so you killed Richie B 
[Bennett] his best friend unless Richie told you where Conroy was to 
be found? 
MR. LENAMON [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection, sidebar. 
A.  No, sir.  Who Richie B? 
Q.  Richie B‟s best friend was Conroy Turner.  Conroy Turner 
ripped you guys off for some dope and your brother agreed to kill 
Richie B because Richie B wouldn‟t say where Conroy Turner could 
be found so that Conroy Turner could pay you back for the dope that 
he ripped off. 
A.  I don‟t know who that was Conroy Turner. 
Q.  You know who Richie B was? 
A.  After they start showing me pictures of the dude. 
Q.  After your brother took the contract to kill him and after 
your brother killed him? 
A.  No. 
Q.  Your brother killed him right in that auto shop right there 
that day with his shirt off showing his tattoos, something you don‟t 
have, right. 
That‟s why they knew it was your brother and not you? 
A. Wrong. 
Q.  You don‟t have those kind of tattoos that your brother has? 
A.  No. 
Q.  He has tattoos all over his back, doesn‟t he? 
A.  No. 
Q.  Across his back? 
A.  He has one tattoo from what I remember. 
Q.  An[d] once, once you found out and your brother found out 
that he was wanted by the police in Miami Dade County and there 
was a warrant for his arrest for the murder of Richie B, someone 
actually cared that Richie B was killed, you didn‟t figure on that did 
you, Mr. Delhall? 
A.  I don‟t know nothing about what you talking about. 
MR. LENAMON [defense counsel]:  Objection, I have a 
motion to make. 
THE COURT:  Do you.  Come sidebar. 
[Thereupon, counsel for the respective parties approached the 
Bench and conferred with the Court outside the hearing of the jury 
and the following proceeding was held:] 
THE COURT:  What‟s the motion? 
 
 
- 54 - 
MR. LENAMON:  Judge I‟m moving for a mistrial.  Miss 
Levine is indicating my client was involved in another homicide. 
THE COURT:  She never said that. 
MR. LENAMON:  I think she did. 
THE COURT:  She did not. 
MR. LENAMON:  I believe she did. 
THE COURT:  I believe she didn‟t.  Is that the motion?   
MR. LENAMON:  That‟s the motion.  I‟m going to have a 
continuing objection to anything about my client having any 
involvement in any other homicide. 
THE COURT:  Okay motion is denied. 
 
(emphasis added).  After failing to recognize that the prosecutor had, in fact, stated 
that Delhall was involved in the Bennett murder, the trial court denied the motion 
for mistrial.  Where, as here, counsel simultaneously objects to an improper 
comment and moves for mistrial without obtaining a ruling on the objection, the 
standard of review of denial of the mistrial is abuse of discretion.  Poole v. State, 
997 So. 2d 382, 391 n.3 (Fla. 2008) (citing Dessaure v. State, 891 So. 2d 455, 464-
65 n.5 (Fla. 2004)).  “A motion for mistrial should be granted only when the error 
is deemed so prejudicial that it vitiates the entire trial, depriving the defendant of a 
fair proceeding.”  Wade v. State, 41 So. 3d 857, 872 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Floyd v. 
State, 913 So. 2d 564, 576 (Fla. 2005)).   
The strong implication during cross-examination that Delhall was involved 
in Bennett‟s murder was improper.  This Court has long held that it is improper “to 
inject into the cross-examination of the defendant appearing as a witness in his 
 
 
- 55 - 
own behalf veiled innuendoes and suggestions of general criminality.”  Messer v. 
State, 162 So. 146, 147 (Fla. 1935).  Further, we have stated: 
It is well settled that the prosecution in a criminal case cannot 
call witnesses to impeach the character of the defendant, unless the 
defendant puts it in issue.  Nor can the prosecution accomplish the 
same forbidden end by indirection through pursuing a method of 
questioning defendant and his witness on cross-examination that is 
principally designed, by means of innuendo and suggestions of 
general criminality on accused‟s part, to lead the jury to believe that 
the accused should be found guilty of the particular crime charged, 
because of his being suspected or accused of other offenses, or 
because of his connections or associations with other accused persons 
under indictment for different crimes not constituting a part of the 
charge on trial. 
 
Foy v. State, 155 So. 657, 658 (Fla. 1934) (citation omitted).  In the present case, 
the prosecutor‟s question violated the rule laid down in Messer and Foy in that it 
suggests criminality on Delhall‟s part, and specifically accuses him of the murder 
of Gilbert Bennett, a murder for which he was not on trial.  While the State‟s case 
did involve the necessary presentation of some information about the Gilbert 
Bennett murder in order to show Delhall‟s motive for killing the eyewitness to that 
murder to protect Negus, such proof did not require either allegations or proof that 
Delhall killed Bennett, or innuendo that he was involved in its planning or was 
present when it occurred.  
As to the guilt phase, we conclude that although the comments suggesting 
that Wadada Delhall was involved in the murder of Bennett were highly improper, 
they were not repeated in the prosecutor‟s subsequent cross-examination of 
 
 
- 56 - 
Delhall.  These comments, standing alone, did not vitiate the entire guilt phase or 
deprive Delhall of a fair guilt-phase proceeding when considered in light of all the 
other evidence.  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion for mistrial.  However, this error may be viewed cumulatively with other 
error that occurred in admission of evidence highlighting the Bennett murder.  
“Where multiple errors are discovered in the jury trial, a review of the cumulative 
effect of those errors is appropriate because „even though there was competent 
substantial evidence to support a verdict . . . and even though each of the alleged 
errors, standing alone, could be considered harmless, the cumulative effect of such 
errors [may be] such as to deny to defendant the fair and impartial trial that is the 
inalienable right of all litigants in this state and this nation.‟ ”  McDuffie, 970 So. 
2d at 328 (alterations in original) (quoting Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 202 
(Fla. 2005)).  
Delhall also objected to the extent of the evidence submitted to prove 
circumstances surrounding the Bennett murder.  This evidence was not submitted 
as similar fact evidence pursuant to Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).  
Rather, it can be characterized as dissimilar fact evidence pertinent to an issue in 
the case—Delhall‟s motive for killing Hubert McCrae.  In discussing the 
admission of dissimilar fact evidence, we stated in McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d 848 
(Fla. 2011): 
 
 
- 57 - 
This Court has explained that “relevant evidence of collateral crimes 
impermissibly becomes a feature of the trial when the evidence 
„transcend[s] the bounds of relevancy to the charge being tried‟ and 
the prosecution „devolves from development of facts pertinent to the 
main issue of guilt or innocence into an assault on the character of the 
defendant.‟ ”  Peterson v. State, 2 So. 3d 146, 155 (Fla. 2009) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 945 
(Fla. 2003)).  Where evidence does, in fact, become a feature of the 
capital trial, reversible error will result.  See, e.g., Steverson v. State, 
695 So. 2d 687, 687 (Fla. 1997) (reversing Steverson‟s conviction and 
death sentence because State‟s presentation of excessive collateral 
crime evidence was unfairly prejudicial and became a feature of 
Steverson‟s capital murder trial). 
 
Id. at 877.  “Regardless of relevancy of collateral crime evidence . . . admissibility 
is improper where the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed 
by undue prejudice.”  Id. (quoting Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 358 (Fla. 
2004)).   
The evidence concerning the Bennett murder was offered to prove Wadada 
Delhall‟s motive to kill the witness, Hubert McCrae.  We have approved admission 
of dissimilar fact evidence of other crimes to prove motive in other cases.  In 
Victorino v. State, 23 So. 3d 87 (Fla. 2009), we found relevant and admissible 
dissimilar fact evidence showing a continuing chain of violent events leading up to 
the murders.  The evidence showed that Victorino and his codefendants acted as a 
group in avenging wrongs suffered by the group‟s members by attacking a rival 
group on several occasions.  Id. at 99.  In Jackson v. State, 25 So. 3d 518 (Fla. 
2009), we approved admission of evidence that the defendant had a history of drug 
 
 
- 58 - 
dealing, where the theory of the State‟s case was that Jackson killed the victim 
because the victim stole Jackson‟s drugs and money.  Id. at 529.  In Jorgenson v. 
State, 714 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1998), we approved admission of dissimilar fact 
evidence that the defendant was a drug dealer because a material issue was 
Jorgenson‟s motive for the murder.  The victim had threatened to turn Jorgenson in 
if he were to cut off her drug supply.  Id. at 428.    
In the present case, evidence of the facts and circumstances of the Bennett 
murder investigation were admitted to prove that Wadada had a motive to kill 
McCrae to protect Negus in that prosecution.  However, the State presented a 
substantial body of evidence concerning the Bennett murder that exceeded the 
scope of evidence necessary to simply prove that Negus Delhall was charged with 
the Bennett murder; that Hubert McCrae was the sole eyewitness to the Bennett 
murder at that time; and that Wadada Delhall thus had a motive to kill Hubert 
McCrae to protect his own brother.  Certainly, the photograph of Bennett‟s dead 
body lying in a pool of blood was not necessary to prove motive on Delhall‟s part.  
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in admission of the photograph of 
Bennett‟s body.  However, reversal is not mandated if the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1138.  The harmless error 
test “is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct result, a not clearly wrong, a 
substantial evidence, a more probable than not, a clear and convincing, or even an 
 
 
- 59 - 
overwhelming evidence test” but the “focus is on the effect of the error on the trier-
of-fact.”  Id. at 1139.  Applying this test, and considering how both the permissible 
and impermissible evidence could have affected the trier-of-fact, we conclude the 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to Delhall‟s guilt.      
 
Although we find that the errors in the State‟s cross-examination question, 
which suggested at a minimum that Delhall was involved in the murder of Bennett, 
and the admission of unnecessarily prejudicial evidence of the Bennett murder 
were harmless in the guilt phase, we turn next to a discussion of the effect of these 
guilt phase errors when considered cumulatively with error committed in the 
penalty phase of the trial.   
Improper Prosecutorial Comment in the Penalty Phase 
The next claim raised by Delhall concerns improper prosecutorial comment 
during penalty phase closing arguments that Delhall contends denied him a fair 
penalty phase proceeding.  We agree.  First, the prosecutor argued that Delhall‟s 
mitigation evidence was “excuses.”  Delhall‟s objection was sustained, but shortly 
thereafter the prosecutor again argued that “every single thing that was presented 
to you in mitigation, which I really think was one thing, stretched it out [to] make 
it more, but it‟s one, it‟s an excuse.”  Objection to this comment was overruled.  
“This Court has long recognized that a prosecutor cannot improperly denigrate 
mitigation during a closing argument.”  Williamson v. State, 994 So. 2d 1000, 
 
 
- 60 - 
1014 (Fla. 2008).  In Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 2000), we specifically 
addressed denigration of mitigation as “excuses” and held: 
[T]he prosecutor‟s characterization of the mitigating circumstances as 
“flimsy,” “phantom,” and repeatedly characterizing such 
circumstances as “excuses,” was clearly an improper denigration of 
the case offered by Brooks and Brown in mitigation. 
 
Id. at 904; see also Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d 82, 98 (Fla. 2011) (holding that 
denigrating mitigation as “make believe” is improper); cf. Cox v. State, 819 So. 2d 
705, 718 (Fla. 2002) (holding that comments “designed to convey the concept that 
while the mitigator may be valid, perhaps its weight should be somewhat 
discounted because of the passage of time and the lack of an evidentiary nexus to 
the defendant” were proper).  In the instant case, calling the mitigation “excuses” 
was not a comment designed to recognize the validity of the mitigation and simply 
urge less weight.  The comment appears designed to invalidate the mitigation 
entirely by dismissing it as an excuse.  While this Court has recognized that 
comments that are “a fair statement of the evidence produced during the trial and 
fair rebuttal of the defense closing argument” are proper, see Pagan v. State, 830 
So. 2d 792, 809 (Fla. 2002), the prosecutor‟s denigration in this case does not fall 
in that category of proper comment.  As recognized in Brooks, the prosecutor 
improperly called Delhall‟s mitigation “excuses.”  762 So. 2d at 904.  A similar 
argument—characterizing the defendant‟s mitigation as excuses—was also held to 
 
 
- 61 - 
be error in Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 422 n.14 (Fla. 1998).  Thus, the trial 
court erred in overruling the objection.  
Second, the prosecutor argued numerous times, sometimes over objection 
and sometimes without objection, that Delhall is “violent,” “dangerous,” that he 
“can‟t be fixed,” that “he acts with violence,” and “[f]rom a school child he was 
violent.”  At one point, when the prosecutor argued that Delhall is dangerous, the 
trial court sustained the objection but the prosecutor simply continued to argue 
dangerousness.  The trial judge then chastised the prosecutor: “You keep saying 
that word.  Don‟t do that, okay.  Please.”  Despite defense counsel‟s further 
objection and request to make a motion, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to 
proceed.  The prosecutor‟s next comment was, “His violence speaks for itself.  
You know what? Sometimes it‟s really sad a person can‟t be fixed.”  She further 
argued that Delhall deserves the “ultimate punishment” because it‟s for the “worst 
of the worst.”  When the court called a recess, defense counsel was allowed to 
make a motion for mistrial and argued that the prosecutor violated the court‟s 
pretrial ruling that prohibited argument about future dangerousness.  Delhall‟s 
motion was denied.   
This Court has held that arguments of future dangerousness as a basis to 
impose a death sentence are improper and “prosecutorial overkill.”  Teffeteller v. 
State, 439 So. 2d 840, 845 (Fla. 1983).  The State contends that the prosecutor 
 
 
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never argued future dangerousness but only commented on the dangerousness of 
the crime committed and the dangerousness of the prior violent felonies.  This is 
not correct.  The above transcript excerpts show arguments that Delhall is a 
dangerous adult, who was dangerous from the time he was a child, and that he 
cannot be fixed—all of which suggest a pattern of dangerousness extending into 
the future.  This argument of dangerousness was improper.  See, e.g., Brooks, 762 
So. 2d at 905 (reversing for a new penalty phase for cumulative error where 
prosecutor made repeated comments about the violent and vicious nature of the 
defendant as well as other improper comments). 
“A motion for mistrial should be granted only when the error is deemed so 
prejudicial that it vitiates the entire trial, depriving the defendant of a fair 
proceeding.”  Wade, 41 So. 3d at 872 (quoting Floyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 564, 576 
(Fla. 2005)).  For a new trial to be warranted, the comments “must either deprive 
the defendant of a fair and impartial trial, materially contribute to the conviction, 
be so harmful or fundamentally tainted as to require a new trial, or be so 
inflammatory that they might have influenced the jury to reach a more severe 
verdict than that it would have otherwise.”  Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 207 
(Fla. 2005) (quoting Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 383 (Fla. 1994)).   
We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion 
for mistrial based on the prosecutor‟s repeated improper comments on Delhall‟s 
 
 
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dangerousness.  Our conclusion that a new penalty phase is required is buttressed 
by the fact that during the guilt phase, the State presented an excess of evidence—
some of which was unnecessarily gruesome—concerning the Bennett murder.  
More importantly, the prosecutor strongly implied during cross-examination of 
Delhall in the guilt phase first that he actually committed the Bennett murder, and 
subsequently that he was involved in the planning of the Bennett murder with his 
brother, Negus.  The error in the guilt phase cross-examination, although harmless 
as to Delhall‟s guilt, may be viewed cumulatively with the error in the penalty 
phase committed by the overzealous prosecutorial argument that Delhall has 
always been violent and cannot be fixed, and that his mitigation is nothing but 
excuses.  When reviewing error in prosecutorial argument, it is appropriate to 
consider the cumulative effect of numerous instances of both objected-to and 
unobjected-to improper comment.  See Brooks, 762 So. 2d at 899.  This principle 
is not limited to improper comment.  The Court has held that “[w]here multiple 
errors are found, even if deemed harmless individually, „the cumulative effect of 
such errors‟ may „deny to defendant the fair and impartial trial that is the 
inalienable right of all litigants.‟ ”  Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 1015 (Fla. 2009) 
(quoting Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 202 (Fla. 2005)); see also McDuffie, 970 
So. 2d at 328.   
 
 
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We have cautioned in the past that a prosecutor shall not exceed the bounds 
of proper conduct and professionalism by overzealous advocacy, which is 
especially egregious in a death case “where both the prosecutors and courts are 
charged with an extra obligation to ensure that the trial is fundamentally fair in all 
respects.”  Brooks, 762 So. 2d at 905 (quoting Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197, 
1202 (Fla. 1998)).  “While prosecutors should be encouraged to prosecute cases 
with earnestness and vigor, they should not be at liberty to strike „foul blows.‟ ”  
Gore, 719 So. 2d at 1202 (quoting Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).  “When 
comments in closing argument are intended to and do inject elements of emotion 
and fear into the jury‟s deliberations, a prosecutor has ventured far outside the 
scope of proper argument. . . .  In his [or her] determination to assure that appellant 
was sentenced to death, this prosecutor acted in such a way as to render the whole 
proceeding meaningless.”  Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 359 (Fla. 1988).  
We are compelled once again to emphasize that the prosecutor has a “duty to 
seek justice, not merely „win‟ a death recommendation.”  Merck v. State, 975 So. 
2d 1054, 1068 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 422 (Fla. 
1998)); see also Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1985) (“We are 
deeply disturbed as a Court by the continuing violations of prosecutorial duty, 
propriety and restraint”).  The prosecutor in this case, by her overzealous and 
unfair advocacy, appeared to be committed to winning a death recommendation 
 
 
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rather than simply seeking justice.  On numerous occasions, as discussed earlier, 
her improper advocacy continued even after an objection was sustained.  In one 
instance, the judge was forced to step in and specifically admonish her to stop it.  
Yet, she continued in spite of this admonition. 
We find that these cumulative errors so fundamentally tainted the guilt phase 
that we cannot conclude they did not influence the jury to reach a more severe 
penalty recommendation than it would have otherwise.  This is especially 
significant in view of the fact that the jury recommended death by a vote of eight 
to four—a recommendation that was far from unanimous.  Because we now vacate 
Delhall‟s death sentence and remand for a new penalty phase proceeding, we do 
not reach other penalty phase claims raised by Delhall, nor do we reach the issue of 
proportionality of the death sentence.  
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Delhall‟s judgment and conviction for 
first-degree murder.  We vacate the sentence of death and remand for a new 
penalty phase proceeding.  
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
 
POLSTON, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the majority‟s decision to affirm Wadada Delhall‟s conviction 
for the first-degree murder of Hubert McCrae.  However, I disagree with the 
decision to remand for a new penalty phase.  Any errors when considered alone or 
cumulatively were harmless.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
 
First, the record demonstrates that any error during Delhall‟s cross-
examination was harmless, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the motion for a mistrial.  A complete review of the cross-examination 
shows that the prosecutor was accusing Delhall‟s brother, not Delhall, of 
murdering Gilbert Bennett.  The improper reference to Delhall was fleeting, and it 
was clarified by the prosecutor‟s remaining questions and comments regarding 
Delhall‟s brother as the person involved in the murder of Bennett.  The prosecutor 
never again implied that Delhall murdered Bennett.  And the other evidence 
presented in Delhall‟s trial about the Bennett murder clearly indicated that 
Delhall‟s brother was the individual arrested, charged, and later convicted of 
murdering Bennett.  Therefore, any error was harmless, and the questioning cannot 
be deemed “so prejudicial that it vitiates the entire trial, depriving the defendant of 
a fair proceeding.”  Floyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 564, 576 (Fla. 2005). 
 
 
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Second, the extent of the evidence that was presented about the Bennett 
murder does not provide any basis to remand for a new penalty phase.  This Court 
has upheld the admission of dissimilar fact evidence of other crimes in order to 
establish motive.  See, e.g., Victorino v. State, 23 So. 3d 87 (Fla. 2009); Foster v. 
State, 679 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1996).  And the relevance of the evidence of Bennett‟s 
murder as presented was not substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial 
impact.  Importantly, the evidence did not involve crimes or bad acts committed by 
Delhall, but instead concerned the Bennett murder and the subsequent arrest of 
Delhall‟s brother for that murder.  Cf. Sexton v. State, 697 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1997) 
(reversing defendant‟s murder conviction where the State presented the testimony 
of five of the defendant‟s children about the defendant‟s bizarre sexual abuse of 
those children to show how the defendant could have influenced his son to kill his 
son-in-law).  Furthermore, the evidence of the Bennett murder was not 
disproportionate in relation to the evidence that was presented regarding Delhall‟s 
murder of McCrae.  Therefore, even if the State presented more evidence than 
absolutely necessary to prove motive, Delhall cannot demonstrate that the evidence 
unfairly prejudiced him or misled or confused the jury.     
 
Finally, the prosecutor‟s improper comments during the closing argument of 
the penalty phase were harmless, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying a mistrial.  The jury considered all of Delhall‟s mitigation evidence as 
 
 
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well as all of the evidence supporting the aggravators, including the aggravators 
that the murder was committed to eliminate a witness and that the murder was 
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner.  It cannot be reasonably 
said that the improper comments contributed to the recommendation of death in 
this case.  See Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 207 (Fla. 2005).  Moreover, the 
comments were not so prejudicial that they vitiated the entire penalty phase or 
deprived Delhall of a fair proceeding.  See id. 
 
Accordingly, I would affirm Delhall‟s death sentence and his conviction. 
CANADY, J., concurs. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Dade County,  
Antonio E. Marin, Judge - Case No. F01-037081 
 
Melodee Smith of the Law Offices of Melodee A. Smith, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Sandra S. Jaggard, 
Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee