Case Title: McCARD v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-255

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
McCARD v. STATE2003 WY 14278 P.3d 1040Case Number: 02-255Decided: 11/06/2003
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                

 

JOSHUA 
L. McCARD,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. 
Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, Joshua 
L. McCard (McCard), appeals from the district court's order denying his motion 
to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere prior to the imposition of 
sentence.  We will affirm, 
concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying that 
motion.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      McCard 
articulates this issue:

 

Did 
the district court abuse its discretion when it refused to grant [McCard's] 
motion to [withdraw] his nolo contendere plea before 
sentencing?

 

The 
State reformulates the issue only slightly:

 

Whether 
the district court properly denied [McCard's] pre-sentencing motion to withdraw 
his pleas.

 

FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 

[¶3]      In an information 
filed in the district court on June 28, 2001, McCard was charged with two counts 
of sexual assault in the second degree.1  McCard, then age 21 years, was alleged 
to have twice inflicted sexual intrusion on the victim, who was then nine years 
old.  These events occurred on the 
night of June 18, 2001.  The victim 
reported the incidents to her mother the morning after they occurred.  McCard was a live-in boyfriend to the 
victim's mother.  McCard waived his 
right to a preliminary hearing.  He 
was represented by the public defender throughout the 
proceedings.

 

[¶4]      On July 13, 2001, 
McCard was arraigned.  He pleaded 
not guilty, and trial was set for September 17, 2001.  McCard's trial was continued on several 
occasions.  On April 25, 2002, he 
appeared in the district court for rearraignment, but that too was 
continued.  McCard appeared again 
for rearraignment (in essence a change of plea hearing) on May 3, 2002.  At those proceedings the district court 
complied with W.R.Cr.P. 11.  In 
accordance with a plea agreement, McCard entered pleas of nolo contendere (no 
contest) to two counts of sexual assault in the third degree.2  W.R.Cr.P. 11(1)(A).  An updated presentence report was 
ordered by the district court, and McCard appeared for sentencing on August 9, 
2002.  At those proceedings he was 
represented by a new public defender, and a continuance was requested and 
granted.

 

[¶5]      McCard appeared 
for a second sentencing hearing on August 23, 2002, and again a continuance was 
requested and granted.  On September 
6, 2002, McCard again appeared before the district court for sentencing.  Prior to that proceeding, McCard had 
filed a motion to withdraw his nolo contendere plea under W.R.Cr.P. 32(d).  The asserted bases for the motion to 
withdraw were that McCard contended he was innocent of at least one of the 
crimes and that the pleas were not voluntary because of heavy-handed threats 
made by the prosecutor.  McCard 
testified, describing those threats as coercive.  He contended that the prosecutor 
intimidated him with the possibility that many more charges would be filed 
against him if he did not enter the plea.  
He also challenged the process because he was given only a few days to 
make a decision about the plea.  
Cross-examination of McCard seriously undermined the bases for withdrawal 
of his plea.  Ultimately, the 
district court denied the motion for withdrawal and imposed the sentences agreed 
upon in the plea bargain.

 

 

[¶6]      A district 
court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or a plea of nolo 
contendere is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court.

 

            
A defendant does not enjoy an absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty 
prior to the imposition of sentence.  
Osborn v. State, 672 P.2d 777, 788 (Wyo.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S. Ct. 1331, 79 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1984); Ecker v. State, 545 P.2d 641, 642 (Wyo.1976).  The trial 
court is vested with discretion to determine whether to grant a motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty made prior to sentencing, and it does not abuse that 
discretion by denying the withdrawal of the plea so long as the requirements of 
W.R.Cr.P. 11 were complied with at the time the plea was accepted.  Kaldwell v. State,  908 P.2d 987, 990 (Wyo. 1995).   Even when the defendant  provides  a  
plausible  or  just  and  fair  reason  for 

withdrawal 
of the plea of guilty, the denial of the defendant's motion does not amount to 
an abuse of discretion if the trial court conducted a careful hearing pursuant 
to W.R.Cr.P. 11 at which the defendant entered a plea or pleas of guilty that 
was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  
Osborn, 672 P.2d  at 778-79.

 

Stout 
v. State, 
2001 WY 114, ¶8, 35 P.3d 1198, ¶8 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Nixon v. State, 4 P.3d 864, 868-69 (Wyo.2000)); and see Becker v. State, 2002 WY 126, ¶11, 
53 P.3d 94, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002) (for purposes of a review such as this, a plea of 
nolo contendere is functionally equivalent to a guilty 
plea).

 

[¶7]      This standard of 
review has been further refined as follows:

 

A 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea, such as that filed here, is governed by 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) which provides that if a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea 
is made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit withdrawal upon a 
showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason.  A defendant has no absolute right to 
withdraw a plea of guilty before sentence is imposed, and where the strictures 
of W.R.Cr.P. 11 have been met, and the defendant intelligently, knowingly, and 
voluntarily entered into his plea of guilty, the district court's decision to 
deny such a motion is within its sound discretion.  Burdine v. State, 974 P.2d 927, 
929-30 (Wyo.1999); 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure:  Criminal 2d § 538 (1982 and 
Supp.2001).  Seven factors have been 
suggested as pertinent to the exercise of the court's discretion:  (1) Whether the defendant has asserted 
his innocence;  (2) whether the 
government would suffer prejudice;  
(3) whether the defendant has delayed in filing his motion;  (4) whether withdrawal would 
substantially inconvenience the court;  
(5) whether close assistance of counsel was present;  (6) whether the original plea was 
knowing and voluntary; and (7) whether the withdrawal would waste judicial 
resources.  3 Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure:  Criminal 2d 
§ 538 (Supp.2001); United States v. Black, 201 F.3d 1296, 1299-1300 (10th 
Cir.2000).

 

Frame 
v. State, 
2001 WY 72, ¶7, 29 P.3d 86, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶8]      Furthermore, 
"[t]he findings of fact that led to denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review, while the decision to 
deny the motion is reversed only if it constituted an abuse of discretion."  3 Charles Alan Wright, Nancy J. King and 
Susan R. Klein, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 538 (Supp. 
2003).

 

 

[¶9]      We agree with 
McCard that it was his burden to show "any fair and just reason" before the 
district court was required to permit the withdrawal of his guilty plea.  As the embarkation point for this 
analysis, we are compelled to conclude, from the record extant which we have 
carefully scrutinized, that McCard entered his plea freely and voluntarily, and 
without the presence of coercion, threat or other undermining factor.  If McCard had been able to demonstrate 
"any fair and just reason" for withdrawal of the plea, then the burden would 
shift to the State to demonstrate prejudice to its case.  3 Federal Practice and Procedure, 
supra, at 198-204 (1982).

 

[¶10]   McCard intimates that the district 
court was not fully prepared to address the motion to withdraw, and that is 
suggestive of an abuse of discretion in and of itself.  However, an examination of the record 
does not reveal any such failing on the part of the district court.  The district court noted that it did not 
"realize" that the motion was to be considered at the sentencing hearing, but 
there is no suggestion in the record that the district court was other than 
fully prepared to address the issue.

 

[¶11]   McCard next discusses the 
seven-part test set out above.  
First, McCard contends that he asserted his innocence.  The record does not support that 
contention.  McCard did not assert 
his innocence.  Rather, he asserted 
that a videotaped statement taken from the victim did not prove the second of 
the two counts.  In response to that 
assertion, the State countered that there was other evidence, independent of the 
videotape, which did go to prove the second count.  There is a difference between an 
assertion of innocence and an assertion that the State lacks the requisite 
evidence to prove the charged crime.  
With respect to the second prong, McCard made no credible argument that 
the State would not be prejudiced by grant of the withdrawal.  As noted above, it is his initial burden 
to demonstrate "any fair and just reason" for withdrawal, and only then is the 
State required to demonstrate the prejudice it may suffer.  Third, McCard entered his nolo 
contendere plea on May 3, 2002.  His 
sentencing was originally scheduled for July 12, 2002, but was continued several 
times.  It was not until August 5, 
2002, just three days before the twice continued sentencing hearing was to be 
conducted, that McCard filed the motion to withdraw his plea.  Given these circumstances, we conclude 
that McCard's motion was not promptly filed.  In addition, McCard's crime was 
committed in June of 2001, and he had acquiesced, or himself sought, the many 
continuances of the expeditious resolution of his case.

 

[¶12]   As to the fourth prong, 
inconvenience to the court, the record is virtually silent.  However, the lengthy history of these 
proceedings counsels that the district court might, indeed, have been 
inconvenienced by withdrawal of the plea at such a late date.  Fifth, while McCard posits self-serving 
claims that he did not have close assistance of counsel, the record supports a 
conclusion that McCard was represented by a series of very competent public 
defenders.  Sixth, as noted more 
fully above, the record unquestionably supports that the plea was knowing and 
voluntary.  Seventh, and finally, 
the record suggests that the withdrawal of the plea would waste judicial 
resources.

 

[¶13]   We conclude that McCard did not 
posit before the district court "any fair and just reason" or a "plausible" 
reason why he should have been permitted to withdraw his nolo contendere 
plea.  Having failed in that regard, 
we need not further address the matter of prejudice to the 
State.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶14]   The district court's conclusion 
that McCard did not come forward with "any fair and just reason" for the 
withdrawal of his plea is not clearly erroneous, nor did the district court 
abuse its discretion in the processes at issue here.  The judgment and sentence of the 
district court are affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

   1Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-303(a) (LexisNexis 2003) (emphasis added) 
provides:

 

§ 6-2-303. 
Sexual assault in the second degree.

            
(a) Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual 
assault in the second degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual 
assault in the first degree:

(i) 
The actor causes submission of the victim by threatening to retaliate in the 
future against the victim or the victim's spouse, parents, brothers, sisters or 
children, and the victim reasonably believes the actor will execute this 
threat.  "To retaliate" includes 
threats of kidnapping, death, serious bodily injury or extreme physical 
pain;

(ii) The actor causes submission of the victim by any means that would 
prevent resistance by a victim of ordinary 
resolution;

(iii) The actor administers, or knows that someone else administered to 
the victim, without the prior knowledge or consent of the victim, any substance 
which substantially impairs the victim's power to appraise or control his 
conduct;

(iv) The actor knows or should reasonably know that the victim submits 
erroneously believing the actor to be the victim's 
spouse;

(v) 
At the time of the commission of the act the victim is less than twelve (12) 
years of age and the actor is at least four (4) years older than the 
victim;

(vi) The actor is in a position of authority over the victim and uses 
this position of authority to cause the victim to submit; 
or

(vii) The actor inflicts sexual intrusion in treatment or examination of 
a victim for purposes or in a manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable 
medical practices.

 

   2Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-304 (LexisNexis 2003) (emphasis added) 
provides:

 

§ 6-2-304.  Sexual assault in the third 
degree.

            
(a) An actor commits sexual assault in the third degree if, under 
circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first or second 
degree:

(i) 
The actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim and inflicts 
sexual intrusion on a victim under the age of sixteen (16) years; 
or

(ii) The actor is an adult and subjects a victim under the age of 
fourteen (14) years to sexual contact without inflicting sexual intrusion on the 
victim and without causing serious bodily injury to the 
victim;

(iii) The actor subjects a victim to sexual contact under any of the 
circumstances of W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i) through (iv) or 6-2-303(a)(i) through (vi) 
without inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim and without causing serious 
bodily injury to the victim.