Case Title: Spurlock v. Ely

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-260

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Spurlock v. Ely1985 WY 167707 P.2d 188Case Number: 83-260Decided: 10/17/1985W. NYLES SPURLOCK, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

JEAN ELY, FRAN EVERSON, MARY FLEMING, CONNIE FOSTER, DARYL GARVIN, FREDERICK J. HARRISON, BRUCE HARVEY, KATHY McCRACKEN, MARY MOREHOUSE, JUANA MORSE, DOE I, AND DOE II, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS), 

ANNA MAE ADAMS AND LOIS WREN, (DEFENDANTS).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
W. NYLES SPURLOCK, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

JEAN ELY, FRAN EVERSON, 
MARY FLEMING, CONNIE FOSTER, DARYL GARVIN, FREDERICK J. HARRISON, BRUCE HARVEY, 
KATHY McCRACKEN, MARY MOREHOUSE, JUANA MORSE, DOE I, AND DOE II, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS), 

ANNA MAE ADAMS AND LOIS 
WREN, (DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CarbonCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

 
 
C.M. Aron and 
Sid L. Moller, Aron & Hennig, Laramie, for appellant.

Bernard Q. 
Phelan, William M. McKellar, Lathrop & Uchner, and William Walton, Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before THOMAS,* C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

* Became Chief Justice on 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

ROONEY, Justice.1

1 This opinion was 
originally assigned to Chief Justice Thomas on May 29, 1984 for the rendering of 
a proffered majority opinion. No such opinion being forthcoming, it was 
reassigned to Justice Rooney on July 30, 1985. Justice Rooney distributed a 
proffered opinion to the court on August 5, 1985. Justice Rose distributed his 
dissenting opinion to the court on October 8, 1985.

[¶1.]     W. Nyles Spurlock, a 
former school principal, brought an action against appellees for intentional 
interference with contractual relations and for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
appellees, former employees and parents of former students, holding that as a 
matter of law the information furnished to the school board by those persons did 
not cause the school board to discharge the principal and holding that the claim 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, being dependent upon recovery 
on the claim for malicious interference with the principal's contract, must 
fail. Spurlock challenges both rulings. We affirm.

[¶2.]     Appellant is the former 
principal of MorrowSchool, the high school in Baggs, Wyoming, and was employed by Carbon County 
School District No. 1. All the appellees save Harrison are individual parents, students and teachers who 
addressed complaints against appellant to the board of trustees of that 
district. Harrison is the attorney who 
represented the rest of the appellees in bringing their complaints to the 
attention of the board.

[¶3.]     Acting as the group's 
attorney, Harrison wrote to the school board on September 2, 1981, concerning 
the allegations against appellant. On December 11, 1981, the board notified the 
appellees that a hearing concerning appellant's fitness to function as a 
principal would be held. That hearing began on March 29, 1982, before hearing 
officer Ford T. Bussart and continued for five days. Based upon his findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, Bussart recommended to the board that they 
terminate appellant. Inter alia, Bussart found many of the allegations against 
appellant harmless or insubstantial; others, unfounded. However, he found two 
allegations serious enough to justify termination. The board, however, rejected 
Bussart's recommendation and did not discharge appellant.

[¶4.]     Meanwhile appellant was 
involved in an altercation with two teachers on May 5, 1982. The details of this 
incident are fully set forth in Spurlock 
v. Board of Trustees, CarbonCountySchool 
District No. 1, Wyo., 699 P.2d 270 (1985). A separate 
proceeding before the board based on this incident was initiated on May 27, 
1982. A hearing in that matter was held June 23 and 24, 1982. On August 12, 
1982, the board issued findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its 
determination to discharge appellant based on the May 5 
incident.

INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE 
WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

[¶5.]     A summary 
judgment

"* * * shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. * * *" Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P.

[¶6.]     Appellant argues the 
determination of the cause of his discharge from employment is an issue of fact 
which precludes summary judgment. Causation is a material element in a claim for 
intentional interference with contractual relations. If the cause is disputed, 
it is an issue of fact. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 766, comment o. But of 
course if there is no genuine issue as to causation, a summary judgment is not 
thereby precluded.

[¶7.]     This court has 
recognized an action for intentional interference with contractual relations is 
allowable. Wartensleben v. Willey, Wyo., 
415 P.2d 613, 614 (1966), citing 4 Restatement, Torts, § 766, p. 49 (1939). Also 
see Kvenild v. Taylor, Wyo., 594 P.2d 972 (1979); Board of Trustees of Weston County School 
District No. 1 v. Holso, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1009, reh. denied 587 P.2d 203 
(1978). The defendant can be held liable, however, only if he causes the loss. 
Prosser & Keeton, Torts, § 129, p. 989 (5th ed. 1984); Ethyl Corporation v. Balter, Fla.App., 
386 So. 2d 1220, cert. denied 452 U.S. 955, 101 S. Ct. 3099, 69 L. Ed. 2d 965 
(1981); Seaway Yacht Sales, Inc. v. 
Brunswick Corporation, Fla.App., 242 So. 2d 192 (1970); See also Lingard v. Kiraly, Fla.App., 110 So. 2d 715, 717 (1959) (plaintiff must establish by evidence that the employment was 
terminated because of the defendant's acts). We agree with the Pennsylvania 
Court's analogy:

"* * * An action for 
interference with another's contract is, in a way, analogous to the old action 
for alienation of affections, in which, of course, there was no liability if the 
affections, though lost, were not alienated by the alleged tortfeasor." Wahl v. Strous, 344 Pa. 402, 25 A.2d 820, 822 
(1942).

[¶8.]     In support of their 
motion for summary judgment, appellees presented a memorandum and a number of 
affidavits and depositions which bore upon the causation issue. The affidavits 
of Frederick J. Harrison, Jean Ely, a parent, and Ford T. Bussart, the hearing 
officer, indicated that the board had refused to accept Bussart's recommendation 
of dismissal. The affidavits of T. Michael Golden, the attorney for the school 
district, and William E. Scoggin, a member of the board of trustees, indicated 
that the board had ruled in favor of appellant on the Bussart hearing but had 
terminated him for a separate May 5 incident. The appellees also presented 
excerpts from depositions taken in another suit involving some of the same 
parties. The partial deposition of Clark Hull, a board member, stated that 
appellant was not terminated for the Bussart hearing allegations but rather 
because of the May 5 incident. The depositions of Sue Williams and Katherine 
Morehead, board members, indicated that the two incidents were kept separate. 
The deposition of Bruce Harvey, describing the May 5 incident, was included in 
the record. The appellees also presented as exhibits the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law of hearing officer Ford T. Bussart, as well as the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law of the board of trustees dated August 12, wherein 
appellant was terminated for the May 5 incident.

[¶9.]     In opposition to all of 
this appellant filed a memorandum of points and authorities, but he filed no 
counter-affidavits, nor excerpts from the depositions of board members, which 
might have supported his belief that they did in fact rely in part on the 
charges appellees had levied against him. The only potential for creating an 
issue of fact with reference to the cause of discharge is appellant's 
deposition, and it is unclear from the record whether that was even before the 
trial judge.2 Nonetheless a careful perusal 
of the deposition reveals only the following of possible pertinence: "I was 
dismissed for this whole thing leading up to it." He bases this conclusion on 
"human nature" and the fact that the "Board is human." He claims he was fired on 
a "technicality." He makes the bald assertion that the defendants succeeded in 
getting him fired. He did not believe that the May 5 incident was enough to be 
fired for; therefore, he concluded that the board must have been influenced in 
their decision by the other allegations.

[¶10.]  Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P., provides in 
pertinent part:

"* * * When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule [depositions], must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶11.]  Even if the deposition was properly 
before the trial judge when he considered the motion for summary judgment, the 
conclusory nature of the deposition testimony falls short of the specific facts 
necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Appellant would have this 
court decide that inferences contrary to the affidavits and depositions of the 
defendants are sufficient to raise an issue of fact. We recognized in Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, Wyo., 
671 P.2d 334 (1983), that even though we must consider the record in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and give 
him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the facts, any inferences drawn 
must be based on facts in the record. "[A]n inference which is contrary to 
direct testimony is insufficient to support a finding that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists," 671 P.2d  at 337, citing Forbes Company v. MacNeel, Wyo., 
382 P.2d 56 (1963). Therefore, because appellant failed to show any specific 
facts raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the cause of his 
termination, summary judgment on the claim, intentional interference with 
contractual relations, was proper.

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

[¶12.]  The parties and the court treated the 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in this case as parasitic 
to the claim for intentional interference with contractual relations, and thus, 
when the host action failed, the claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress also failed. In connection with an argument on motions, the following 
was said (Mr. Aron is appellant's attorney):

"THE COURT: * * * My 
concern is the factual material. I don't have a feeling for this, whether or not 
there are still factual issues to be resolved. And I'm not willing to say there 
aren't.

"So, I'm saying if I 
decide its a factual matter, that there are factual issues to be resolved, and 
we're talking about this issue where it's conceded if the statement - Well, if 
the ruling by the board is conclusive, in other words, if you can't look behind 
that ruling, then I think it becomes a matter of law, if the Court holds in that 
direction. And we're not even concerned with the fact issue, and all the 
evidence in the world isn't going to make much difference.

"MR. ARON: I think that's 
correct, Your Honor. In fact, that would 
dispose of the entire case. So it's a very significant issue because clearly 
there could not have been anything other than - Well, I guess conceivably there 
could be intentional infliction of emotional distress, but we did want to at 
least re-evaluate the case if that were the Court's holding." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶13.]  Even if the trial court was not misled by 
appellant into understanding that the theory of appellant's claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress was a parasite to the claim of 
intentional interference with contractual relations, the nature and facts of 
this case would make it one in which it is unnecessary and impractical to 
address the factors and ramifications of the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress as an independent action.

[¶14.]  We have not yet recognized and set the 
perimeters for an independent action of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress or for an independent action of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress.3 The pleadings, affidavits and 
depositions before the court fortify appellant's representation that the claim 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress is but an adjunct to the claim 
for intentional interference with contractual relations. The material before the 
court reflects that appellees' efforts to obtain a termination of appellant's 
position with the school district were premised upon alleged incidents in which 
appellant made uninvited sexual advances to a female school librarian and to a 
teacher; in which he questioned two female students about their personal life 
and sexual activities; in which he administered excessive physical punishment to 
students on four separate occasions; in which he administered improper medical 
treatment to students on seven separate occasions (ranging from extracting a 
piece of pencil lead from an arm with a pocket knife to manipulating an arm and 
wrist subsequently found to have been broken); in which he allowed and offered 
to allow fist fights between students to settle differences; in which he refused 
to accept a report from a physician's assistant that a student was over chicken 
pox and could return to school; and in which he refused to allow a certain 
commencement speaker because he was black.

[¶15.]  When allegations such as these are 
presented to the school board, the trial court could properly find that the 
presentation was not "outrageous," especially since § 21-3-110(a), W.S. 1977, 
provides in pertinent part:

"(a) The board of 
trustees in each school district shall:

* * * * * 
*

"(xiii) Consider every 
petition presented to the board and subscribed by at least five (5) citizens of 
the school district and take some action on such petition within thirty (30) 
days after it is received * * *."

[¶16.]  The nature of the acts alleged to be 
"outrageous" were before the court. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, reads 
in pertinent part:

"(1) One who by extreme 
and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly[4] causes severe emotional distress to another is 
subject to liability for such emotional distress * * *."

The Comment to § 
46 contains the following:

"d. Extreme and outrageous conduct. The 
cases thus far decided have found liability only where the defendant's conduct 
has been extreme and outrageous. It has not been enough that the defendant has 
acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended 
to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized 
by `malice,' or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to 
punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the 
conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go 
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and 
utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in 
which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would 
arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 
`Outrageous!'

* * * * * * 

"g. The conduct, although 
it would otherwise be extreme and outrageous, may be privileged under the 
circumstances. The actor is never liable, for example, where he has done no more 
than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even though he is 
well aware that such insistence is certain to cause emotional distress. * * 
*

"h. Court and jury. It is for the court to 
determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably 
be regarded as to extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is 
necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to 
the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the 
conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in 
liability."

[¶17.]  The matter here before the court for 
consideration of a summary judgment was such that it could decide in the first 
instance that the essential element of "outrage" could not reasonably be 
established, that appellees' actions were privileged, and that the claim was 
parasitic in nature. The summary judgment is proper.

[¶18.]  Our holding in this case must not be 
taken to say that the independent claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress does not exist in Wyoming or that it can exist only when there 
is no host claim for relief. Such decisions will wait a case in which these 
issues are not encumbered by facts and circumstances such as are in this 
case.

[¶19.]  Affirmed.

2 At the hearing on the 
summary judgment motion plaintiff's attorney indicated that the deposition was 
not yet filed because it had not been signed. In fact it is not yet signed 
before this court. The district court docket shows no entry for the Spurlock 
deposition prior to the order granting summary judgment, and the deposition did 
not reach this court until some three months after the main record on appeal was 
filed.

3 We have recognized 
mental injury under certain circumstances is compensable under the statutory 
provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act. Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, 
Wyo., 678 P.2d 874 (1984); Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 
Wyo., 687 P.2d 885 (1984).

4 The Restatement 
addresses negligent infliction of emotional distress in §§ 312, 313, 436 and 436 
A.

ROSE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶20.]  I cannot agree with the majority that 
appellant failed to structure a triable question of fact with respect to his 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

[¶21.]  Appellant complains that he suffered 
severe emotional distress as a result of the false and insubstantial allegations 
presented by appellees to his employer, the school district, for the purpose of 
humiliating him and interfering with his ability to perform his duties as high 
school principal. Appellant seeks to recover damages for such conduct pursuant 
to § 46(1) of the Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d (1965). That section 
provides:

"(1) One who by extreme 
and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional 
distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if 
bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily 
harm."

The majority, in 
affirming the summary judgment entered against appellant, hold that no jury of 
reasonable persons could conclude that appellees' actions were extreme and 
outrageous.

[¶22.]  The evidence before the court in the form 
of affidavits, depositions, exhibits, and pleadings establishes that appellees 
made numerous charges to the school board concerning appellant's interactions 
with teachers, staff and students. Many of these allegations are summarized in 
the majority opinion. Other charges brought by appellees against appellant 
include his making sexual overtures to a student; examining the back of a female 
student while she was unclad above the waist; ordering teachers to strip-search 
students; committing assault and battery on a spectator at a basketball game; 
violating hunting regulations; and harassing and embarrassing students. These 
alleged incidents span a period of ten years.

[¶23.]  Appellant, in his deposition and 
complaint, contends that the charges against him were distorted or false and 
were presented to the school board in an effort to embarrass him and interfere 
with his work. He says that appellees repeatedly raised accusations which the 
school board had previously considered and found to be trivial or without merit. 
He complains that appellees publicized numerous trivial accusations against him 
in order to create a false impression of improper conduct. Appellant asserts 
that these actions by appellees caused him to suffer severe emotional distress. 

[¶24.]  Courts in other jurisdictions have 
recognized claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the 
defendants' improper comments and allegations in the context of employment 
relationships. In Contreras v. Crown 
Zellerbach Corporation, 88 Wn.2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977), the plaintiff 
alleged that during his employment he was continuously humiliated and 
embarrassed by the racial jokes and slurs made in his presence by his employer's 
agents and employees. He further alleged that these individuals had wrongfully 
accused him of stealing corporate property, thereby subjecting him to public 
scorn and a denial of employment. The trial court dismissed the claim for 
failure to state grounds for relief. The Supreme Court of Washington reversed, 
saying:

"* * * It is for the 
trier of fact to determine, taking into account changing social conditions and 
plaintiff's own susceptibility, whether the particular conduct was sufficient to 
constitute extreme outrage." 565 P.2d  at 1177.

Analyzing 
similar facts, the California Supreme Court in Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 603 P.2d 58 (1979), upheld a jury's finding of outrageous 
conduct. There the defendants had recommended the plaintiff's dismissal for 
erroneous reasons and had attempted to humiliate him through the use of racial 
epithets and the assignment of demeaning tasks. See also Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football 
Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3rd Cir. 1979).

[¶25.]  In view of the foregoing authorities, I 
am unable to understand how the majority can conclude, as a matter of law, that 
the conduct of which appellant complains is not "outrageous." This question is 
for the finder of fact after full development of the evidence - not for this 
court upon review of summary judgment. Furthermore, I cannot agree that such 
conduct, if established as appellant contends, is privileged. To assert a 
privilege, a party must have acted "in a permissible way." Restatement of the 
Law, Torts 2d, § 46, comment g. I would have remanded for a trial on the issue 
of whether appellees' presentations to the school board constituted extreme and 
outrageous behavior.