Case Title: Mendenhall v. Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0189

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
DENISE MENDENHALL v. MOUNTAIN WEST FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a WYOMING INSURANCE COMPANY2012 WY 46Case Number: S-11-0189Decided: 03/27/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
DENISE 
MENDENHALL,Appellant (Defendant),v.MOUNTAIN WEST FARM 
BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a Wyoming insurance company,Appellee 
(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County
The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Jeffrey 
J. Gonda and Amanda K. Roberts of Lonabaugh and Riggs, LLP, Sheridan, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. Roberts 
and Mr. Gonda.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
George 
E. Powers, Jr. and J. Zachary Courson of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin LLC, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Powers.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      The appellant, 
Denise Mendenhall (Mendenhall), was injured when she was involved in a motor 
vehicle accident.  The other vehicle 
involved in the accident, a 1997 Ford truck, was listed on two different 
insurance policies:  an Allstate 
Insurance Company (Allstate) policy issued to Jeremy Lucas (Lucas) and a 
Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Mountain West) policy issued 
to Wyoming Electric Company, Inc. (Wyoming Electric).  The Appellee, Mountain West, filed a 
complaint for declaratory judgment, requesting that the district court find that 
Mountain West did not have to cover the truck under the policy because the 
person driving the truck at the time could not be considered an “insured.”  Mendenhall and Mountain West filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment.  
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mountain West, 
finding that the owner of Wyoming Electric had given the truck to Lucas and, 
therefore, the truck was no longer covered under the company’s insurance 
policy.  Mendenhall appeals the 
district court’s decision, arguing that Mountain West should be required to pay 
under the policy because the truck was titled and registered in the name of 
Wyoming Electric, and was still listed as a specific vehicle on the Mountain 
West policy.  We affirm the district 
court’s order. 
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      Whether the 
district court erred when it determined that ownership of the 1997 Ford truck 
passed by an inter vivos gift from 
Wyoming Electric to Lucas before the date of the accident.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      In January 
2008, Lucas told David Nelson (Nelson), the owner of Wyoming Electric, that he 
was looking to acquire a pickup truck.  
Nelson decided to give Lucas one of the old company trucks.  Lucas took the keys to the 1997 Ford 
truck from the Wyoming Electric office, took possession of the truck, and 
retained possession of the truck.  
Lucas was responsible for all the expenses associated with the truck, and 
on January 29, 2008, he added the truck to his Allstate automobile insurance 
policy.  Nelson and Wyoming Electric 
did not exercise any control over the truck after Lucas drove it off the company 
lot.  However, Nelson and Lucas did 
not apply for a new certificate of title reflecting Lucas as the owner of the 
truck until April 16, 2008.  Additionally, the truck’s registration 
and plates remained in Wyoming Electric’s name and the truck was not removed 
from Wyoming Electric’s Mountain West insurance policy.
 
[¶4]      On March 3, 2008, 
while using the truck with Lucas’ permission, Alicia Rocovits was involved in a 
motor vehicle accident, causing injuries to Mendenhall.  After the accident, Mendenhall submitted 
claims to Allstate and Mountain West.  
Mountain West denied coverage and filed a petition for declaratory 
judgment, seeking an order that it did not have to provide coverage under 
Wyoming Electric’s policy.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶5]      When reviewing a 
district court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment, this Court 
uses the following standard of review:
 
Summary 
judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c);  Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 2002).  “A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a dispute of fact, if it were proven, would establish or refute an 
essential element of a cause of action or a defense that the parties have 
asserted.”  Id.  Because summary judgment involves a 
purely legal determination, we undertake de novo review of a trial court’s 
summary judgment decision.  Glenn v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2008 WY 
16, ¶ 6, 176 P.3d 640, 642 (Wyo. 2008).
 
Hageman 
v. Goshen Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
2011 WY 91, ¶ 5, 256 P.3d 487, 491 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting Jacobs Ranch Coal Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal 
Co., LLC, 2008 WY 101, ¶ 8, 191 P.3d 125, 128-29 (Wyo. 
2008)).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶6]      Mendenhall claims 
that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of 
Mountain West, finding that Wyoming Electric no longer owned the 1997 Ford truck 
and, therefore, Mountain West did not have to provide coverage for the 
truck.  Specifically, Mendenhall 
argues that the district court should have determined that, because Wyoming 
Electric was still listed as the vehicle owner on the certificate of title and 
registration, Wyoming Electric was still the legal owner of the truck at the 
time of the accident.  While the 
parties’ briefings in this case are extensive, the question can be narrowed down 
rather succinctly:  As a matter of 
law, can an inter vivos gift overcome 
the presumption of ownership in a certificate of title?  We find that it can, and specifically 
does so here.
 
[¶7]      It appears that 
both parties agree that we must look to Wyoming law to find the definition of 
“owner” as used in the insurance policy, as there is not a definition of owner 
contained in the policy.  Mendenhall 
focuses on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-1-101(a)(xiv) (LexisNexis 2011) of the motor 
vehicle statutes, which states:  
“'Legal owner’ means all persons in whose name a valid certificate of 
title has been issued[.]”  Further, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-1-101(a)(xviii) (LexisNexis 2011) defines “owner” 
as:
 
(A)    The legal owner as defined by 
W.S. 31-1-101(a)(xiv); or
 
(B)    A person, other than a 
lienholder, who leases a vehicle and is entitled to lawful use and possession of 
a vehicle subject to a security interest in another person but excluding a 
lessee under a lease not intended as security.
 
[¶8]      While, on its 
face, the definition of “legal owner” appears fairly straightforward, the other 
motor vehicle statutes demonstrate that the legislature did not intend for the 
name on the certificate of title to be the decisive factor in determining 
ownership of a motor vehicle in all cases.  
In fact, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-103(d) (LexisNexis 2011) specifically 
states that, “[c]ertificates of title are valid for the vehicle so long as the 
vehicle is owned or held by the person in whose name the title was issued.  A certificate of title is prima facie 
proof of ownership of the vehicle for which the certificate was issued.”1  This statute makes clear that the 
legislature anticipated that a certificate of title may reflect the name of an 
individual who is no longer the “owner” of the vehicle, rendering the 
certificate invalid.  While a 
certificate of title may reflect the presumed owner of a vehicle, that 
presumption may be overcome by other evidence. 
 
[¶9]      “It is well 
established that '[a]ll kinds of personal property which are capable of manual 
delivery and of which the title either legal or equitable can be transferred by 
delivery may be the subject-matter of a valid gift.’”  McKinney v. Timber Equip., Inc., 288 S.E.2d 610, 611 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Underwood v. Underwood, 159 S.E. 725, 
726 (Ga. Ct. App. 1931)); see also Poirot 
v. Gundlach, 1 N.E.2d 801, 803 (Ill. App. Ct. 1936) (“Every species of 
property, real and personal, legal or equitable, in possession, reversion or 
remainder, vested or contingent, incorporeal as well as corporeal, and including 
choses in action, may be the subject of a gift inter vivos.”).  In Wyoming, three elements must be 
present before personal property can be transferred through a valid inter vivos gift: “(1) a present 
intention to make an immediate gift; (2) actual or constructive delivery of the 
gift that divests the donor of dominion and control; and (3) acceptance of the 
gift by the donee.”  Kenyon v. Abel, 2001 WY 135, ¶ 10, 36 P.3d 1161, 1165 (Wyo. 2001).
 
[¶10]   The parties agree that Nelson gave 
Lucas the truck; that Lucas removed the keys from the Wyoming Electric office 
and took possession of the truck; that Lucas was responsible for all expenses 
associated with the truck and purchased insurance; and that Nelson and Wyoming 
Electric did not exercise any further control over the truck.  The fact that Nelson gave Lucas the 
truck, and allowed him to leave with possession of the truck, demonstrates that 
Nelson had the present intention to make an immediate gift.  Additionally, the stipulated facts show 
that Nelson actually delivered the truck to Lucas, divesting himself of dominion 
and control.  Finally, the facts 
show that Lucas accepted the truck when he drove it off Wyoming Electric’s 
property and took responsibility for all expenses related to the truck.  The undisputed facts, as applied to the 
elements of a gift, clearly demonstrate that Nelson transferred ownership of the 
truck to Lucas through an inter vivos 
gift.
 
[¶11]   Mendenhall argues that Nelson could 
not complete the inter vivos gift to 
Lucas without transferring the title into Lucas’ name.  We disagree.  The elements of an inter vivos gift do not contain a 
special element requiring the transfer of title if an automobile is at 
issue.  Our focus, again, is on Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-2-103(d), which states that a certificate of title simply is prima facie proof of ownership, and 
that a certificate of title is valid only so long as the vehicle is owned by the 
person whose name is on the title.  
Further, there is nothing in the statutes that states that a transfer of 
ownership is void if the buyer or seller fails to comply with the motor vehicle 
statutes.
 
[¶12]     Instead, we agree with 
the Restatement of Property with respect to how a certificate of title plays 
into the transfer of property via an inter vivos gift:
 
i.    Tangible personal property 
subject to registered title.  
Controlling 
federal or state law requires registration of the title to certain items of 
personal property, such as automobiles, boats, or airplanes.  The delivery of that type of personal 
property to an intended donee, or to a third person for the intended donee, with 
donative intent is effective as between the donor and the donee to place the 
ownership of the personal property in the donee.  The adverse consequences of the failure 
to register the personal property in the name of the donee depend on the terms 
of the registration law.  The 
donor’s failure to follow the specified procedure for making the transfer casts 
doubt on the claim of donative intent.  
Consequently, the donee must establish donative intent by clear and 
convincing evidence.  If the donee 
carries that burden of proof, the donee may require the donor or the donor’s 
successors to do whatever is necessary to have the title properly registered in 
the donee’s name.
 
Restatement 
(Third) of Prop.: Wills & Donative Transfers § 6.2(i) (2003).  Since the motor vehicle statutes do not 
render a transfer void if the parties fail to comply with the statutes, and 
there is no dispute that Nelson’s intent was to give Lucas the truck, the fact 
that the title was not immediately transferred has no bearing on Lucas’ 
ownership interest in the truck.
 
[¶13]   We also are persuaded that this is 
the proper conclusion after a review of case law from jurisdictions with motor 
vehicle statutes similar to Wyoming’s.  
In Brackin v. Brackin, 894 N.E.2d 206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), the Indiana Court of Appeals had to determine 
whether the husband had given an automobile to his wife through an inter vivos gift, although husband and 
wife were both named on the certificate of title.  Id. at 208, 210.  The court recognized that Indiana law 
parallels the Restatement, and that a certificate of title is “indicia of 
ownership and control” but “is not itself proof of ownership or legal title to 
the vehicle.”  Id. at 212 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  Thus, while 
there is a presumption that the person named on the certificate of title is the 
owner, that presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence of the 
donor’s intent to gift the vehicle.  
Id.  The court did not create a bright line 
rule that any evidence of a gift, standing alone, may overcome the presumption 
of ownership when a name is on a certificate of title, but did hold 
that:
 
. 
. . this court must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
gift in question to determine the existence of donative intent.  However, we hold, as a matter of law, 
that where, as here, there is uncontroverted evidence of clear and decisive 
words of gift and an absence of any evidence to negate donative intent, such 
evidence clearly and convincingly establishes donative intent despite the 
presumption to the contrary created by the donor retaining his name on the 
certificate of title.
 
Id.; 
see also Johnson v. Tomlinson (In re 
Tomlinson), 347 B.R. 639, 642 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006) (it is the intent of 
the parties and not the certificate of title that determines ownership of an 
automobile); O’Fallon v. O’Fallon, 14 S.W.3d 506, 508 (Ark. 2000) (the intent of the donor can negate the fact that 
the certificate of title was not transferred); In re Estate of Curry, 143 Misc. 2d 252, 
254, 255 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1989) (The certificate of title is only prima facie evidence of the facts 
appearing on it.  Further, the 
question of whether the automobile was gifted was a proper question under the 
common law of gifts and not under the vehicle and traffic law.); Thompson v. Thompson, 16 Pa. D. & 
C.3d 778, 781-82 (Pa. C. P. 1981) (“although a certificate of title to an 
automobile is evidence of ownership, it is not conclusive evidence of the 
ownership of that motor vehicle”).
 
[¶14]   We find that, although the 
certificate of title was still in Wyoming Electric’s name, there is 
uncontroverted clear and convincing evidence that Nelson intended to give the 
truck to Lucas and, therefore, at the time Lucas accepted the truck, the inter vivos gift was complete.  We decline to find that, as a matter of 
law, the person or entity named on the certificate of title is the owner, and we 
note that to do otherwise would render the “prima facie” language in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-2-103(d) meaningless.  See Crain v. State, 2009 WY 128, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 934, 939 (Wyo. 2009) (“we will not construe statutes in such a manner as to 
render any portion of the statute meaningless”).  The district court did not err when it 
determined that, based upon the stipulated facts presented by the parties, 
Wyoming Electric no longer owned the 1997 Ford truck and Mountain West was not 
obligated to pay for Mendenhall’s damages under Wyoming Electric’s 
policy.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶15]   Ownership of the 1997 Ford truck 
passed from Nelson to Lucas via an inter 
vivos gift in January 2008, and before Mendenhall was injured.  Therefore, on the date of the accident, 
Wyoming Electric no longer owned the truck and it was no longer covered under 
the Mountain West insurance policy.  
The district court did not err when it determined that Mountain West did 
not have to cover Mendenhall’s injuries.
 
[¶16]   We affirm.
FOOTNOTES
1We 
have previously defined prima facie 
evidence as “'evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted is sufficient to 
sustain a judgment in favor of the issue which it supports, but which may be 
contradicted by other evidence.’”  
Evans v. State, 655 P.2d 1214, 
1221 (Wyo. 1982) (quoting State v. 
Haremza, 515 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Kan. 1973)).