Case Title: State Ex Rel. Young v. Madison Circuit Court

Citation: 312 N.E.2d 74

Docket Number: 474S79

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1974-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
312 N.E.2d 74 (1974)
STATE of Indiana On the Relation of Mack Arthur Young, Relator,
v.
The MADISON CIRCUIT COURT, Alva Cox, Special Judge of the Madison Circuit Court, Respondents.
No. 474S79.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
June 12, 1974.
*75 John E. Eisele, Robbins, Dietzen & Eisele, Anderson, for relator.
William F. Lawler, Jr., Pros. Atty., Anderson, for respondents.
HUNTER, Justice.
This is an original action arising out of the arrest, charging and incarceration of the relator-defendant, Mack Arthur Young. Relator has petitioned this Court to mandate the Special Judge of the Madison Circuit Court, Alva Cox, to release relator on his own recognizance pursuant to CR. 4(A) (as amended, February 1, 1974).
Relator's incarceration commenced on May 3, 1973  a full nine months prior to the amending of CR. 4(A). Relator takes the position that CR. 4(A) (as amended, February 1, 1974) has retroactive application to his pretrial detention. Relator's contention is wholly without merit. CR. 4(A), as amended on February 1, 1974, operates only prospectively as of that date. The amended rule has absolutely no retroactive application to incarcerations beginning prior to February 1, 1974.
The criminal rule which should be applied to these facts is CR. 4(A), prior to the February, 1974 amendment. That rule read as follows:
Relator's verified petition for writ of mandate recites the following uncontroverted chronology of events:
The record indicates a series of continuances and motions chargeable to the relator. This Court has held that delays caused by the acts of a defendant cause the six-month period to run anew. Summerlin v. State (1971), Ind., 271 N.E.2d 411; State v. Grow (1970), 255 Ind. 183, 263 N.E.2d 277. We recognize that since the adoption of CR. 4(F), as part of the amendment of February 1, 1974, defendant initiated delay no longer triggers the commencement of an entire new period; however, CR. 4(F), for the reasons stated above, likewise has no application to this case.
Therefore, the six-month period began to run anew on August 15, 1973. Between that date and February 27, 1974, there are no continuances or other delaying motions chargeable to relator. If the above stated chronology were the only facts before us, the relator would be eligible for discharge. But that simply is not the case.
Respondent, Alva Cox, in his Verified Return, states that counsel for relator informed the court prior to January 2, 1974, "that in no event could he be prepared for trial on January 2, 1974." William F. *77 Lawler, Jr., the prosecutor of this cause, in a sworn affidavit entitled "Respondent's Exhibit A," reaffirms the respondent's allegation. That affidavit reads in pertinent part as follows:
We hold that the above statements made by defense counsel, albeit informal, constituted the kind of delaying acts contemplated by CR. 4(A) (prior to amendment). Therefore, we hereby deny relator's petition for writ of mandate.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.