Case Title: IN THE INTEREST OF FM: BA V. LARAMIE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-06-14

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE INTEREST OF FM: BA V. LARAMIE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2007 WY 128163 P.3d 844Case Number: C-06-14Decided: 08/08/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
IN 
THE INTEREST OF 
FM:BA,Appellant(Defendant),v.LARAMIE COUNTY 
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY 
SERVICES,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal from theDistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Karen 
Ashcraft Byrne, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Dan S. Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Sue Chatfield, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Chatfield.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, JJ., and JAMES, 
D.J.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      BA (Mother) 
appeals the termination of her parental rights to FM, her biological son.  Mother objects to the lack of an 
appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) for FM in the termination 
proceeding.  She also generally 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination.  We reverse the order of the district 
court and remand this case with directions for the district court to dismiss the 
petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to FM.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mother presents 
the following issues for this Court's review:

 
 
I.  Did the lower court use an incorrect 
legal standard in making the decision to terminate BA's parental rights and base 
its decision on a misunderstanding of the consequences of its 
decision?

 
 
II.  Was it error not to consider appointing 
a guardian ad litem and compounding that error for Mr. Frentheway (whom the 
court thought had been appointed) to testify?

 
 
III.  Was insufficient evidence produced to 
legally support a termination of parental rights?  

 
 
FACTS1

 
 
[¶3]      Mother has three 
children  two girls and a son, FM.  
FM is the youngest and has a different father than the girls.  FM's father is deceased.  On the afternoon of September 1, 2002, a 
sheriff's deputy conducted a welfare check at Mother's home.  He found the two girls, then ages 
thirteen and eleven, home alone in the house.  FM, who was nine at the time, was at his 
grandmother's house.  According to 
the deputy, Mother's house was "dirty," "there were a lot of dishes in the 
sink," and there "wasn't much food in the home."  The deputy also found a glass pipe in 
the master bathroom, which he testified was consistent with methamphetamine 
use.  The deputy determined that the 
children should be taken into protective custody and contacted a case worker 
with the Department of Family Services (DFS), who took physical custody of the 
children.  Despite the fact that FM 
was not at the home but rather with his grandmother, he was also taken into 
protective custody.  A child 
protection proceeding was commenced with the filing of a neglect petition in 
juvenile court and physical custody of the children was placed judicially with 
the DFS.  In June 2003 FM was placed 
with his paternal aunt and her family, where he has remained.  By all accounts, FM's placement with his 
paternal aunt has been beneficial for him.

 
 
[¶4]      A case plan, 
dated December 2002, was developed by the DFS listing family reunification as 
the goal and establishing certain tasks for Mother to complete before Mother 
could be reunified with her children.  
The case plan did not contain any concurrent permanency goal.  Specifically, the case plan did not 
inform Mother that her parental rights to her children might be terminated if 
she did not complete the tasks contained in the case plan. 

 
 
[¶5]      Mother's 
compliance with the 2002 case plan was sketchy.  Most critically, in February 2003, 
Mother was arrested for, and eventually convicted of, delivery and conspiracy to 
deliver methamphetamine. She was placed on probation and ordered to complete the 
Transitions Residential Program (TRP) as one of the conditions of her probation. 
Mother enrolled in the TRP program, but, in approximately November 2003, left 
the program because of a perceived lack of sincerity in her work. Mother 
immediately left the jurisdiction and was absent for approximately five 
months.  During her absence, Mother 
sent cards and clothing to her children and called the DFS periodically.  In May 2004 Mother returned and turned 
herself in to authorities.  Mother's 
probation was revoked and a three to six year prison sentence was imposed.  At the time of the termination trial, 
Mother was still incarcerated.

 
 
[¶6]      In the meantime, 
the child protection proceedings continued in juvenile court.  The DFS case worker testified she first 
recommended terminating Mother's parental rights to FM to the juvenile court in 
October 2003.  An order from a 
twelve month review dated October 2004 recites that the DFS recommended 
termination of Mother's parental rights to FM.  In February 2005 Mother admitted the 
allegations set forth in the child protection neglect petition.  The DFS did not develop a second case 
plan until June 2005.  The second 
case plan states the permanency plan for FM was adoption and set Mother's task 
as voluntarily relinquishing her parental rights to FM.  An order from a twelve month review 
dated January 2006 again recites that the DFS recommended termination of 
Mother's parental rights to FM.2  This action for termination of Mother's 
parental rights to FM was finally filed on February 17, 2006, and the trial was 
held June 21, 2006.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶7]      Although this 
Court strictly scrutinizes any proceeding terminating parental rights, we still 
apply our traditional principles of evidentiary review to Mother's challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination of her parental 
rights.  CDB v. DJE, 2005 WY 102, ¶ 4, 118 P.3d 439, 440 (Wyo. 2005); In re CC, 2004 
WY 167, ¶ 11, 102 P.3d 890, 894 (Wyo. 2004); Matter of SYM, 924 P.2d 985, 987 
(Wyo. 
1996).  We examine the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, assuming all favorable 
evidence to be true while discounting conflicting evidence presented by the 
unsuccessful party.  In re MN, 2003 WY 135, ¶ 5, 78 P.3d 232, 
234 (Wyo. 2003).  This Court then 
reviews the supporting evidence to ascertain if it clearly and convincingly 
establishes the statutory elements required to support termination.  In re IH, 2001 WY 100, ¶ 14, 33 P.3d 172, 178 (Wyo. 2001).  Evidence is 
clear and convincing if it would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the 
contention is highly probable.  Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 982 
(Wyo. 
1984).  

 
 
Statutory 
Construction

 
 
[¶8]      Mother's 
contention that the district court should have considered appointing a guardian 
ad litem for FM presents an issue of statutory construction.  As always, this Court reviews issues of 
statutory construction de novo.  
Layton v. State, 2007 WY 1, ¶ 10, 150 P.3d 173, 176 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶9]      Mother's Issues I 
and III both ultimately question the sufficiency of the evidence against her 
within the context of the appropriate standard of proof.  The grounds for terminating parental 
rights must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 
768-70, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1402-03, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982); In re A.D., 2007 WY 23, ¶ 
9, 151 P.3d 1102, 1105 (Wyo. 2007); In re 
CS, 2006 WY 130, ¶ 7, 143 P.3d 918, 921 (Wyo. 2006).  This is required because a parent's 
right to raise his or her children is an essential and basic civil right. 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212-13, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972). Parents 
have a "fundamental liberty interest" in the care, custody, and management of 
the child. Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 753, 102 S. Ct.  at 1394.  It is 
"cardinal" that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside, first, in the 
parents. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410, 101 S. Ct. 1164, 1172, 67 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1981).  A termination of parental rights is both 
total and irrevocable.  Unlike other 
custody proceedings, it leaves the parent with no right to visit or communicate 
with the child.  See Santosky.  Few forms of state action are so severe 
and so irreversible.  

 
 
[¶10]   In this case, the State sought 
termination of Mother's parental rights under the provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (v) (LexisNexis 2007):

 
 
(a) The 
parent-child legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the 
following facts is established by clear and convincing 
evidence:

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
(iii) 
The child has been abused or neglected by the parent and reasonable efforts by 
an authorized agency or mental health professional have been unsuccessful in 
rehabilitating the family or the family has refused rehabilitative treatment, 
and it is shown that the child's health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the parent;

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
(v) The 
child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the state of 
Wyoming for 
fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, and a showing that the 
parent is unfit to have custody and control of the 
child[.]

 
 
Evidence 
supporting termination under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(iii)

 
 
[¶11]   In this case, termination of 
Mother's parental rights pursuant to § 14-2-309(a)(iii) requires clear and 
convincing proof of three elements: (1) abusive treatment or neglect by the 
parent; (2) reasonable efforts by the DFS have been unsuccessful to rehabilitate 
the family; and (3) the child's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized 
by remaining with or returning to the parent.  In re A.D., ¶ 11, 151 P.3d  at 1105; RS v. Dep't of Family Servs., 2004 WY 
87, ¶ 12, 94 P.3d 1025, 1028 (Wyo. 2004).    It is the second element 
where the case for termination falls.  

 
 
[¶12]   There are only two case plans in 
the record.  The first case plan, 
dated December 2002, lists reunification as the goal, with no mention of the 
possibility of termination of parental rights.  The case plan not only contains tasks 
for Mother, but also tasks for the DFS to assist in the reunification 
process.  No evidence was introduced 
as to any services provided by the DFS to Mother with regards to finding 
housing, employment, or completing other tasks set out in the case plan.  By October 2003, however, the DFS was 
recommending to the juvenile court that Mother's parental rights to FM be 
terminated.  

 
 
[¶13]   Since no new case plan was 
developed, however, family reunification remained the permanency goal.  Certainly Mother's fleeing the state in 
November 2003 and ultimate incarceration made reunification efforts difficult, 
but not impossible.  Mother was out 
of the state for approximately five months but continued to maintain contact 
with the children.  She also 
attempted to maintain contact with FM after her incarceration.   For the DFS's part, no evidence was 
presented as to what efforts, if any, the DFS took to facilitate communication 
between Mother and FM after she returned and was incarcerated.  

 
 
[¶14]   Family reunification clearly was a 
difficult objective to achieve without contact between Mother and FM.  As stated, there is no indication the 
DFS assisted with such communication.  
FM's aunt testified that FM had very little contact with Mother.  His last visitation with Mother was 
sometime before February 2005.  
Mother sent letters to FM almost monthly but it was FM's aunt, not the 
DFS, who decided the fate of the letters.  
FM's aunt allowed FM himself to determine whether he wanted to read the 
letters.  According to her, FM did 
not read the letters, nor did he write back.  Finally, as of the second case plan 
dated June 2005, the DFS officially set the permanency goal for FM as adoption 
and the only task for Mother was to voluntarily relinquish her parental 
rights.  Under the circumstances, 
even given Mother's incarceration, the State did not present clear and 
convincing evidence that the DFS provided reasonable efforts to reunify Mother 
with FM which were ultimately unsuccessful.3

 
 
Evidence 
supporting termination under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(v)

 
 
[¶15]   There is no question that FM was in 
foster care for fifteen of the twenty-two months preceding the filing of the 
termination petition.  The question 
is whether the State presented clear and convincing evidence that Mother was 
unfit to have custody and control of FM as of the time of the trial.4  

 
 
[¶16]   First, the district court found 
"the simple status of incarceration proves the absence of fitness as a 
parent."  This finding is in 
error.  The fact of incarceration, 
by itself, is not per se evidence of unfitness.  CDB, ¶ 6, 118 P.3d  at 441; Matter of Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d 624, 
630 (Wyo. 
1989) ("incarceration alone is insufficient to establish unfitness").  The district court also erroneously 
relied on evidence relating to Mother's interaction with her daughters.  It is Mother's relationship with FM that 
is at issue.  It is not unusual for 
a parent to have different relationships with their individual children.  FM has a different father, is the only 
boy, and is Mother's youngest child.  
Any of these factors, as well as individual personalities and 
characteristics, may cause Mother to interact with FM differently than she does 
her girls.  We think it imprudent to 
rely on evidence of Mother's interaction with her girls as clear and convincing 
evidence of unfitness as a parent with regard to FM.

 
 
[¶17]   In her favor, Mother did attempt to 
maintain contact with her children from the time they were removed from her 
home.  While incarcerated, and prior 
to the termination trial, Mother completed a variety of courses including 
substance abuse education and treatment courses, parenting courses, employment 
courses, a keyboard course, and a critical thinking course.  Mother participated in a 12-step 
program, narcotics anonymous and alcoholics anonymous.  Although it is for the district court to 
evaluate Mother's credibility, we think it worth noting that Mother testified 
that she is not the same person she was three years ago.  The classes she has taken in prison have 
given her better coping skills and parenting skills.  She testified she has become more 
religious and upon her release she intends to

 
 
get my 
stuff together.  I want to move into 
a house.  I want a relationship with 
my kids.  I want to work.  I want to go to church.  I want to keep the friends I have now 
and work with them to make myself better for myself and my 
children.

 
 
Mother 
specifically mentioned her hope is to pursue a career as a medical 
transcriptionist.

 
 
[¶18]   In terminating Mother's parental 
rights to FM the district court relied on all the evidence regarding Mother's 
history.  It reasoned that Mother 
communicated to her children that they were not important to her by committing a 
crime and then running away upon her leaving the TRP program.  The district court discounted Mother's 
personal work in prison because the certificates of completion provided to the 
court evidenced that Mother completed the courses after the petition to 
terminate her parental rights was filed.  

 
 
[¶19]   It is certainly appropriate for the 
district court to rely on the details of Mother's life as demonstrating a 
pattern.  A.D., ¶ 26, 151 P.3d  at 1108 ("courts 
often consider the family's history over a long period of time in determining 
whether parental rights should be terminated").  Focus, however, should be maintained on 
Mother's current status.

 
 
[¶20]   The only evidence of Mother's then 
current fitness was that she was in prison living a drug free life and trying to 
better herself as a person and as a parent.  While we understand the district court's 
skepticism, even if Mother's testimony is not believed we find the State did not 
meet its burden of introducing clear and convincing evidence that Mother was 
currently unfit to have custody and control of FM.  

 
 
[¶21]   One of the primary problems in this 
case was that the State, instead of focusing on Mother, focused on the best 
interest of FM.  Most witnesses 
called by the State only testified to how positive FM's placement with his aunt 
was and that his continued placement there was in FM's best interest.  The most egregious example was John 
Frentheway who testified "this isn't about [Mother].  This isn't about how well she's 
developed."  Mr. Frentheway opined 
that Mother's parental rights should be terminated even "[i]f she was the most 
perfect individual at this point."5   

 
 

[¶22]   Unfortunately, the determination of 
the child's best interests comes into play only after statutory grounds for 
termination of parental rights have been established by clear and convincing 
evidence.  See Santosky.  The United States Supreme Court has 
said: "[w]e have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended "if 
a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the 
objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness 
and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best 
interest."  Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 
98 S. Ct. 549, 555, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1978) 
(quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster 
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-863, 97 S. Ct. 2094, 
2119, 53 L. Ed. 2d 14 
(1977) 
(Stewart, J., concurring in judgment)).  

 
 
[¶23]   We wish to make clear that, by this 
opinion, we are only deciding that clear and convincing evidence was not 
produced by the State to support the termination of Mother's parental rights to 
FM.  FM will not be precipitously 
removed from his aunt's house as a result of this decision.  FM's custody will be determined within 
the confines of the juvenile court action, as always.  

 
 
[¶24]   Even though FM does not now have 
the permanency that others wished for him, his future seems stable.  Even Mother testified that she knew FM's 
placement with his aunt was in his best interest and she would not attempt to 
regain physical custody of him.  
Indeed, Mother was willing to sign any guardianship papers necessary to 
ensure FM remained with his aunt.  
Mother simply does not want her parental rights terminated.  Mother is not completely in the clear, 
however.  There is always the 
possibility of another petition for the termination of Mother's parental rights 
to FM should Mother's future behavior fall within the statutory grounds for 
termination.

 
 
Issue II 
 Appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem

 
 
[¶25]   While our reversal of the district 
court moots the need to discuss Mother's second issue regarding the lack of 
appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) for FM in this case, it raises a 
fundamental concern that is likely to arise again.  The statute governing the appointment of 
a GAL for children in termination of parental rights actions is Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-2-312 (LexisNexis 2007), which in pertinent part 
reads:

 
 
            
After the petition has been filed, the court shall appoint a guardian ad 
litem to represent the child unless the court finds the interests of the child 
will be represented adequately by the petitioner or another party to the action 
and are not adverse to that party.   

 
 
In this 
case no GAL was appointed to represent FM.  
The district court did not know of this until the trial.  

 
 
[¶26]   We believe the statute 
unambiguously calls for a very specific procedure.  With an unambiguous statute, this Court 
ascertains legislative intent by giving effect to the plain and ordinary meaning 
of the words used.  Jenkins v. State, ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Comp. Div., 2007 WY 39, ¶ 6, 153 P.3d 271, 273 (Wyo. 2007).  The statute begins by stating that "the 
court shall appoint a guardian ad 
litem" (emphasis added).  This 
mandates the court to appoint a GAL when a petition is filed.  The only exception to this requirement 
is if "the court finds the interests of the child will be represented adequately 
by the petitioner or another party to the action and are not adverse to that 
party."  Therefore, in every 
termination case there must be an order either appointing a GAL or setting forth 
findings in accord with the statutory exception.  We trust in the future district courts 
will be more attentive to following the mandates of this 
statute.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶27]   We understand that termination of 
parental rights is a sensitive and emotion-laden subject.  We strongly believe that parents should 
not be given numerous chances after failing to adequately care for their 
children.  The children are the 
victims in these situations and are being forced to suffer needlessly.  Having children is not just a right, but 
a right with attendant responsibilities. 

 
 
[¶28]   However, parents facing the 
termination of their parental rights - fundamental constitutional rights - must 
be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law allows. See In re CC, 2004 WY 167, ¶ 16, 102 P.3d 890, 895 (Wyo. 2004).  The district 
court was wrong to suggest that Mother should not be concerned that termination 
of her parental rights will "kill" her relationship with FM because all it was 
doing was "terminating the legal, technical relationship; the familial 
relationship, the mother/son relationship, will always be there."  Termination of parental rights is the 
family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.  As the evidence stands in this case, it 
is not clear that Mother's parental rights should be absolutely, permanently, 
terminated.  The order of the 
district court terminating Mother's parental rights is reversed and this case is 
remanded with directions for the district court to dismiss the 
petition.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In accord 
with our standard of review, our factual review is based upon evidence adduced 
at trial most favorable to the State.

  

2There is no 
evidence in the record that a multidisciplinary team was appointed in the 
juvenile court action.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-427(b) (LexisNexis 
2007).

 
 

3Compare the 
lack of evidence of reasonable efforts in this case with the evidence supporting 
reasonable efforts in In re HP, 2004 
WY 82, ¶ 26, 93 P.3d 982, 990 (Wyo. 2004):

 
 
            
The juvenile court's first finding is that there had been reasonable 
efforts to reunify the family.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-431(c)(iv).  We conclude that there was sufficient 
evidence for the juvenile court to make this determination.  Six MDT meetings were held to assess the 
case.  At each of these meetings the 
MDT encouraged Mother to complete her case plan and offered assistance.  The MDT wrote four case plans for Mother 
that outlined the steps she would have to take to achieve reunification.  While Mother was incarcerated, the MDT 
tailored case plans to her situation.  
DFS arranged overnight-unsupervised visits between the children's 
maternal grandmother and the children while Mother was incarcerated.  This allowed Mother visitation with her 
children because her mother took the children to the Women's Center twice a 
month.  Additionally, the MDT 
requested and the court appointed a CASA worker to facilitate providing services 
to Mother and the children.  
Immediately upon her release from the Women's Center, Mother was allowed 
visitation with the children, and the children were allowed to live with Mother 
within two weeks of her release.  
DFS offered Mother transportation to visitation, recommended Mother for 
counseling services, and assisted Mother in procuring suitable housing.  It is true that the rehabilitative 
efforts after Mother was released from the Women's Center were short lived.  However, over the course of the plan the 
above-noted facts show that reasonable efforts were made to reunify the 
family.

 
 

4There seems 
to be some confusion as to the time frame when a parent must be deemed unfit 
under the statute.  The language of 
the statute, however, is very clear.  
It states there must be a finding "that the parent is unfit" (emphasis 
added).  The statute unambiguously 
requires a finding of present unfitness.

 
 

5Mother generally objects 
to the testimony of Mr. Frentheway on various grounds.  In light of our reversal, we need not 
address Mother's objections.