Case Title: Branch v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13304

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13304 
 
ANTHONY MICHAEL BRANCH  vs.  FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE 
ASSOCIATION & another.1 
 
 
December 29, 2022. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Summary Process, Appeal.  Practice, Civil, Summary process. 
 
 
The petitioner, Anthony Michael Branch, filed a petition in 
the county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking relief 
from monthly use and occupancy payments that a judge of the 
Housing Court ordered him to pay pending his appeal in a summary 
process action.  The petitioner also requested, in the 
alternative, that this court issue an order requiring the 
Appeals Court to docket a purported appeal from the order of an 
Appeals Court single justice affirming the Housing Court's use 
and occupancy order.  The petition was denied by a single 
justice of this court.  We affirm. 
Background.  After the foreclosure of Branch's residence, 
the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) initiated 
a summary process action against Branch.  Judgment entered in 
favor of Fannie Mae as to possession, and Branch appealed.  A 
judge in the Housing Court waived the appeal bond, but ordered 
Branch to pay monthly use and occupancy payments of $1,800.  
Branch sought interlocutory review of the use and occupancy 
order before a single justice of the Appeals Court, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 239, § 5 (f).  The single justice reduced the monthly 
payment amount to $500 on the basis of financial hardship. 
 
 
1 Roberto Pina Cardoso. 
 
2 
 
 
 
While Branch's appeal from the judgment in the summary 
process action (substantive appeal) remained pending, Fannie Mae 
transferred title of the property to Roberto Pina Cardoso.  As a 
result, the existing use and occupancy order was vacated at 
Fannie Mae's request.  Cardoso was subsequently permitted to 
intervene in the summary process action, and he moved for use 
and occupancy payments from Branch, who continued to reside on 
the property.  After a hearing before a judge in the Housing 
Court, Branch was ordered to pay monthly use and occupancy 
payments of $1,000.  Branch again sought review before a single 
justice of the Appeals Court.  A different single justice 
affirmed the second use and occupancy order of the lower court. 
Branch filed a notice of appeal from the order of the 
second single justice.  A third single justice of the Appeals 
Court struck the notice of appeal, indicating that Branch had no 
right to additional appellate review of the use and occupancy 
order.  Branch filed another notice of appeal and, later, a 
motion to vacate the order striking his notice of appeal.  That 
motion was denied, and Branch filed yet another notice of 
appeal.   
The last of Branch's notices of appeal resulted in an 
appeal being docketed in the Appeals Court.  Nonetheless, Branch 
filed this petition in the county court, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, requesting that this court vacate the use and 
occupancy order, reduce it to $500 per month, or order the 
Appeals Court to docket his appeal from the second single 
justice's ruling affirming the use and occupancy order.  A 
single justice of this court denied the petition, and Branch 
appealed.  
While this appeal was pending, Branch sought to stay 
proceedings in both of his appeals before the Appeals Court.  
The Appeals Court denied that request, and because Branch's 
existing substantive appeal in the summary process action 
"relate[d] to the collateral issue of use and occupancy," the 
court ordered that both of his appeals there be "paired for 
consideration by the same panel" of that court.  Branch made the 
apparent choice to file a brief in only the substantive summary 
process appeal, and his other appeal before the Appeals Court 
was subsequently dismissed pursuant to rule 19.0 of the Rules of 
the Appeals Court.   
Discussion.  A single justice properly denies relief under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, "where the petitioning party has or had 
adequate and effective avenues other than G. L. c. 211, § 3, by 
which to seek and obtain the requested relief" (citation 
3 
 
 
 
omitted).   Marnerakis v. Phillips, Silver, Talman, Aframe & 
Sinrich, P.C., 445 Mass. 1027, 1027 (2006).  "Decisions of a 
single justice will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear 
error of law or abuse of discretion."  Adjartey v. Central Div. 
of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 Mass. 830, 833 (2019), quoting 
Fogarty v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 103, 106 (1989). 
Where, as here, a judge in the Housing Court has ordered an 
occupant in a summary process action to make use and occupancy 
payments pending appeal, the occupant is entitled to seek review 
from a single justice of the Appeals Court.  See G. L. c. 239, 
§ 5 (f).  The petitioner did so here when he was initially 
ordered to make use and occupancy payments to Fannie Mae, and 
again later when he was ordered to make use and occupancy 
payments to Cardoso.   
Indeed, the petitioner not only received review from a 
single justice of the Appeals Court, but also received the 
opportunity to raise the issue before a full panel of the 
Appeals Court.  As noted, Branch's existing substantive appeal 
in the summary process action had already been docketed.  See 
Perry v. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., 484 Mass. 1054, 1054 (2020) 
(petitioner was "free to raise his claims concerning . . . the 
use and occupancy payments" in his direct appeal from summary 
process judgment).  Yet, despite this, Branch sought to stay his 
substantive appeal while he continued to pursue relief from this 
court.   
 
It is well established that "this court's general 
superintendence power is truly extraordinary, reserved for 
exceptional circumstances where a litigant demonstrates a 
substantial claim of violation of his or her substantive rights 
that cannot be remedied by any other available means."  
McMenimen v. Passatempo, 452 Mass. 178, 184 (2008).  This was no 
such instance, and Branch was "not entitled as of right to an 
additional layer of review of the . . . use and occupancy orders 
in this court."  Bigelow v. Massachusetts Courts Promulgator of 
Official Forms, 484 Mass. 1056, 1057 (2020). 
The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in 
denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Anthony Michael Branch, pro se. 
 
Karl F. Stammen, Jr., for Roberto Pina Cardoso.