Case Title: People v. Jimenez

Citation: 

Docket Number: S249397

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2020-03-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
MIGUEL ANGEL JIMENEZ, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
S249397 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Six 
B283858 
 
Ventura County Superior Court 
2016041618 
 
 
 
March 2, 2020 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
 
 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
S249397 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
Consumers today entrust businesses with more personal 
data than ever before.  Residing on remote servers and secured 
by protocols of varying strength, that trove of data is 
increasingly susceptible to breach and misuse.  (See generally 
Douglas, 2020 Identity Theft Statistics (January 2020) 
Consumer 
Affairs 
 [as of Mar. 2, 2020].)1  
Like many states, California criminalizes not only the nefarious 
ends enabled by information misuse — credit card fraud, for 
instance, and tax fraud — but also the act of using personal 
identifying information without authorization.  (Pen. Code, § 
530.5, subd. (a).)2  That distinction matters in this case. 
What we must decide here is whether a felony conviction 
for misuse of personal identifying information under section 
530.5, subdivision (a) can be reduced to misdemeanor 
shoplifting under Proposition 47, which was approved by voters 
in the November 4, 2014 General Election. We hold that it 
cannot.  Proposition 47 added section 459.5 to the Penal Code, 
which dictates that an “act of shoplifting . . . shall be charged as 
shoplifting,” and that “[n]o person who is charged with 
                                        
1 All Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, 
docket 
number 
and 
case 
name 
at 
. 
2 All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal 
Code. 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
2 
shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the 
same property.”  (§ 459.5, subd. (b).)  Its prohibition applies only 
to “burglary or theft” offenses.  (Ibid.)  Although misuse of 
identifying information is sometimes colloquially described as 
“identity theft,” the language, context, and history of section 
530.5, subdivision (a) tells us no “burglary or theft” offense is 
committed by virtue of a defendant violating that statute.   
Reaching the opposite conclusion, the Court of Appeal 
below in People v. Jimenez (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1282 (Jimenez) 
relied on the similarity between defendant’s conduct here — 
cashing a false check — and the conduct of the defendant in 
People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858 (Gonzales).  What we 
held in Gonzales is that a burglary conviction based on conduct 
meeting the requirements for shoplifting under section 459.5 
could be reduced to shoplifting under Proposition 47.  (Gonzales, 
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 862.)  Our holding gave effect to section 
459.5, subdivision (b), which provides that a person who 
commits “[a]ny act of shoplifting” cannot “be charged with 
burglary or theft of the same property.”  (Italics added.)  But 
Jimenez was not charged with burglary, and in any event, our 
inquiry here is not whether Jimenez’s conduct could conceivably 
be called “shoplifting.”  We must address instead whether the 
public offense defined in section 530.5, subdivision (a), of which 
he was convicted, qualifies as a “theft” offense under section 
459.5, subdivision (b).   
It does not.  Section 530.5 criminalizes the willful use of 
someone’s personal identifying information for an unlawful 
purpose, not an unlawful taking.  It is not a theft offense because 
criminal liability pivots on how the information was used rather 
than how it was acquired.  The offense therefore evinces a 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
3 
concern with the panoply of harms occurring when personal 
information is no longer personal. 
A conviction for misuse of identifying information is not 
subject to reclassification as misdemeanor shoplifting.  Because 
the Court of Appeal held otherwise, we reverse its judgment and 
remand.   
I. 
 
In June 2016, defendant Miguel Angel Jimenez twice 
entered Loans Plus, a commercial check-cashing store in 
Oxnard, to cash a check from OuterWall, Inc., made payable to 
himself.  The first check sought $632.47, and the second, 
$596.60.  Each contained OuterWall’s personal identifying 
information in the form of an account number.  On both 
occasions, Loans Plus was open for business.  And on both 
occasions, OuterWall had not issued the checks in Jimenez’s 
name, nor did Jimenez have permission to possess, issue, or use 
the checks.   
 
The People charged Jimenez with two felony counts of 
misusing personal identifying information in violation of section 
530.5, subdivision (a) –– an offense the prosecution informally 
calls “misuse of identity” and the defendant colloquially terms 
“identity theft.” That section prohibits “willfully obtain[ing] 
personal identifying information” of another person “and us[ing] 
that information for any unlawful purpose, including to obtain, 
or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, real property, or 
medical information without the consent of that person.” 
(§ 530.5, subd. (a).)  The jury instructions provided the unlawful 
purpose 
for which Jimenez 
used 
OuterWall’s 
account 
information:  “unlawfully obtaining or attempting to obtain 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
4 
money in the form of cash in exchange for a presented check 
without the consent of the other person.”  The jury convicted 
Jimenez of both counts.  
 
In May 2017, Jimenez moved to reclassify his felony 
convictions to misdemeanors under Proposition 47:  The Safe 
Neighborhoods and Schools Act.  To decrease the number of 
people in prison for nonviolent crimes, Proposition 47 
reclassified certain drug- and theft-related offenses from 
felonies or “wobblers” to misdemeanors.  It did this by amending 
the statutes that defined those crimes and redefining the way 
terms are understood throughout the Penal Code.  (See Voter 
Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, 
§ 8, p. 72 (Voter Information Guide) [adding, for instance, 
§ 490.2 to lower the punishment for certain categories of grand 
theft “[n]otwithstanding . . . any other provision of law defining 
grand theft”].)  
 
One such amendment enshrined in California law a new 
misdemeanor shoplifting offense. (§ 459.5.)  Distinct from felony 
burglary based on the value of the goods, the structure entered, 
and the time of entry, the new shoplifting offense prohibits 
entering a commercial establishment “with intent to commit 
larceny” while the establishment is open during business hours, 
and where the value of the property taken or intended to be 
taken is $950 or less.  (§ 459.5, subd. (a).)  Also affecting the 
scope of this new offense is the following limitation:  Any act of 
shoplifting “shall be charged as shoplifting,” and, “[n]o person 
who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with 
burglary or theft of the same property.”  (Id., subd. (b).)  
 
Jimenez made the case for relief relying on our recent 
opinion in Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at page 862, in which we 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
5 
held that the shoplifting statute applied to an entry with intent 
to commit nonlarcenous theft.  Like Jimenez, the defendant in 
Gonzales had entered a commercial establishment and cashed 
two checks containing another person’s bank account 
information.  (Ibid.)  Because Jimenez committed essentially the 
same conduct as Gonzales, Jimenez argued his conduct, too, 
constituted misdemeanor shoplifting under section 459.5, 
subdivision (a).  The trial court granted Jimenez’s motion.  It 
concluded that between Gonzales and our earlier opinion in 
People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski), its 
“ ‘hands ha[d] been somewhat tied.’ ”  (Jimenez, supra, 22 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1286.)  What we held in Romanowski is that 
theft of access card information could be reduced to a 
misdemeanor under another provision of Proposition 47, 
codified at Penal Code section 490.2.  (Romanowski, supra, 2 
Cal.5th at pp. 905–906.)  Romanowski and Gonzales, the court 
said, mandated reduction of “ ‘conduct that has been described 
in Proposition 47 as a shoplifting type of offense.’ ”  (Jimenez, at 
p. 1286.)  “ ‘And even though [this case] involves a different 
charge,’ it observed, ‘it appears to be somewhat of a theft charge 
which was the focus of Gonzale[s] and Romanowski.’ ” (Ibid.)  
 
The People appealed the trial court’s decision to reduce 
Jimenez’s conviction, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, 
reasoning that Jimenez’s criminal conduct is “identical to 
Gonzales’s conduct.”  (Jimenez, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1289.)  It observed that “both entered a commercial 
establishment during business hours for the purpose of cashing 
stolen checks valued at less than $950 each.  Both defendants 
[entered with intent to commit] ‘theft by false pretenses,’ which 
‘now constitutes shoplifting under [section 459.5, subdivision 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
6 
(a)].’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 862.)  And, 
the court explained, where a defendant’s “underlying conduct 
constituted shoplifting,” the preclusive effect of section 459.5, 
subdivision (b) — which provides that “[a]ny act of shoplifting 
as defined in subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting” 
(§ 459.5, subd. (b)) — barred a charge of identity theft.  (Jimenez, 
supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1291.)  In sum, the court said, “[t]hat 
Jimenez committed identity theft in the course of the shoplifting 
does not alter the fact that he committed shoplifting.”  (Id. at p. 
1290.)  
 
The District Attorney filed a petition for review.  We 
granted review to determine whether a felony conviction for 
misuse of personal identifying information can be reduced to 
misdemeanor shoplifting under Proposition 47. 
II. 
 
As with most cases arising from Proposition 47, this one 
requires that we understand the interaction between a statutory 
scheme enacted by the Legislature and one enacted by the 
public.  Because the scope of these statutory schemes is a 
question of law, we review de novo the Court of Appeal’s 
interpretation of both the shoplifting statute enacted through 
Proposition 47 and the preexisting section 530.5, subdivision (a), 
of which Jimenez was convicted.  (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court 
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.)  We look first to “ ‘the language of 
the statute, affording the words their ordinary and usual 
meaning and viewing them in their statutory context.’ ”  (People 
v. Gonzales (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44, 49–50.)  We must construe 
statutory language in context, bearing in mind the statutory 
purpose, and giving effect to the intended purpose of an 
initiative’s provisions.  (Id. at p. 50; see California Cannabis 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
7 
Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 933 [explaining 
that our “primary concern is giving effect to the intended 
purpose of the provisions at issue”].)  We may also consider 
extrinsic sources, “such as an initiative’s election materials, to 
glean the electorate’s intended purpose.”  (People v. Gonzales, 
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 50; Larkin v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. 
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 152, 158 [“[W]e may look to various extrinsic 
sources . . . to assist us in gleaning the [voters’] intended 
purpose”].) 
 
Applying these principles, we conclude that section 459.5 
does not encompass misuse of identifying information.  The 
preclusive language of section 459.5, subdivision (b) — that 
“[a]ny act of shoplifting as defined in subdivision (a) shall be 
charged as shoplifting,” and “[n]o person who is charged with 
shoplifting may also be charged with theft or burglary of the 
same property” — applies only as to theft or burglary offenses.  
Section 530.5, subdivision (a) does not define such an offense. 
A. 
 
We first consider the statutory scheme approved by voters 
five years ago.  The misdemeanor shoplifting statute under 
which Jimenez seeks a reduction is section 459.5.  It is one of 
two new theft crimes reflecting the electorate’s decision to 
downgrade certain felonies; the other is section 490.2, which 
defines petty theft.  (Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 907.)  
Section 459.5, subdivision (a), provides:  “Notwithstanding 
Section 459, shoplifting is defined as entering a commercial 
establishment with intent to commit larceny while that 
establishment is open during regular business hours, where the 
value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does 
not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950).”  Subdivision (b) 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
8 
next provides the preclusive language on which Jimenez 
primarily relies:  “Any act of shoplifting as defined in 
subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting.  No person who 
is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary 
or theft of the same property.”  (Id., subd. (b).) 
 
We granted review to determine whether Jimenez can 
secure relief under section 1170.18, subdivision (a), which 
allows defendants “serving a sentence for a conviction . . . of a 
felony or felonies” on Proposition 47’s effective date of 
November 5, 2014, to petition to reclassify their eligible felony 
offenses to misdemeanor shoplifting. (§ 1170.18, subd. (a), added 
by Prop. 47, § 14; People v. Martinez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 647, 654 
(Martinez).)  But Jimenez was not a person “serving a sentence” 
for his conviction on November 5, 2014.  Indeed, he did not even 
commit the relevant crime until 2016.  He is ineligible for relief 
under section 1170.18.  Jimenez, however, is not out of luck.  We 
have previously held that “[d]efendants who had not yet been 
sentenced as of Proposition 47’s effective date are entitled to 
initial sentencing under Proposition 47’s amended penalty 
provisions.”  (People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1131.)  This 
seems the more appropriate framework for Jimenez, who was 
neither sentenced nor convicted as of Proposition 47’s effective 
date.  Under either section 1170.18 or the standard in People v. 
Lara, Jimenez’s entitlement to relief turns on whether the new 
shoplifting statute at section 459.5 altered or redefined the 
offense set forth in section 530.5, subdivision (a) — in other 
words, whether section 459.5 permitted the prosecutor to charge 
Jimenez with misuse of personal identifying information, or only 
with shoplifting. 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
9 
 
The People charged a violation of, and Jimenez was 
convicted of violating, section 530.5, subdivision (a).  Entitled 
“Unauthorized use of personal identifying information of 
another person,” it provides:  “Every person who willfully 
obtains personal identifying information . . . of another person, 
and uses that information for any unlawful purpose, including 
to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, real 
property, or medical information without the consent of that 
person, is guilty of a public offense . . . .”  (§ 530.5, subd. (a).)  
Personal identifying information is elsewhere defined to include 
“any name, address, [or] telephone number,” as well as any 
“checking account number” and a host of other personal 
identifying information — from medical information and social 
security numbers to telecommunications data and mothers’ 
maiden names.  (§ 530.55, subd. (b).)  In short, a conviction 
under section 530.5, subdivision (a) requires proof “(1) that the 
person willfully obtain[ed] personal identifying information 
belonging to someone else; (2) that the person use[d] that 
information for any unlawful purpose; and (3) that the person 
who use[d] the personal identifying information d[id] so without 
the consent of the person whose personal identifying 
information [was] being used.”  (People v. Bollaert (2016) 248 
Cal.App.4th 699, 708–709, quoting People v. Barba (2012) 211 
Cal.App.4th 214, 223 (Barba).)   
 
Although lawmakers and the public sometimes refer to 
section 530.5, subdivision (a)’s prohibition on the misuse of 
personally identifying information as “identity theft,” section 
530.5, subdivision (a) makes no mention of theft.  It makes no 
reference to the consolidated theft offenses in section 484.  (See 
Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 865.)  It contains no 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
10 
requirement, “central to the crime of theft[,] that the 
information be stolen at all” (People v. Truong (2017) 10 
Cal.App.5th 551, 562 (Truong)), or that the victim’s information 
was taken with “the intent to permanently deprive the owner of 
its possession” (People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175, 1182 
(Page)).  Indeed, by its very terms, the offense of misuse of 
personal identifying information can be accomplished by 
acquiring the information with valid consent, using it for an 
unlawful purpose, and returning it.   
 
The structure and history of section 530.5 reinforce our 
understanding that “[t]he gravamen of the . . . offense is the 
unlawful use of a victim’s identity.”  (People v. Sanders (2018) 
22 Cal.App.5th 397, 400 (Sanders).)  The Legislature enacted 
section 530.5 in 1997 as part of a slate of changes to California’s 
Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act.  (Stats. 1997, ch. 768, 
§ 6, p. 5205.)  Until section 530.5 took effect, “law enforcement 
agencies generally considered the defrauded business entity . . . 
to be the victim of identity theft, not the person whose identity 
was stolen so that the fraud could be committed.”  (Sen. Com. on 
Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 245 (2001–2002 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended May 1, 2000.)  As a result, victims found it 
difficult to report the crime, seek damages, and clear their 
names.  (Ibid.)   
 
This vexing problem ballooned as the expansion of the 
Internet made it easier than ever before to access and misuse 
personal information.  As part of a comprehensive attack on this 
growing problem, the bill’s sponsor lobbied to create section 
530.5.  In contrast, “existing law [did] not provide any remedy 
for the real victim:  the person whose credit has been damaged 
or ruined.”  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
11 
No. 156 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 3, 1997, p. 8.)  
Instead, the sponsor said, “all existing related crimes, such as 
grand theft (§ 484), fraudulent use of access cards (§§ 484d–484i) 
and using another person’s identification in a financial 
statement (§ 532) are crimes against parties other than the 
person whose identity has been used.”  (Sen. Com. on Public 
Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 156 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) 
as amended July 3, 1997,  pp. 7–8.)  Thus was born the offense 
we now call “identity theft.”  It accompanied a set of reporting 
and verification requirements for consumer credit agencies, a 
series of police investigation protocols for identity theft reports, 
and new procedures by which victims could clear their names 
and block inaccurate information from their credit files.  (Id. at 
pp. 2–3.)  
 
Perhaps reflecting legislative concern to right-size the 
offense relative to the perceived societal harms at issue, the 
Legislature has amended section 530.5 nearly a dozen times 
since its enactment.  That section currently provides that court 
records “shall reflect that [a] person whose identity was falsely 
used to commit [a] crime did not commit the crime” (§ 530.5, 
subd. (b)); creates separate offenses for acquisition or retention 
(id., subd. (c)), and sale or transfer of personal identifying 
information “with intent to defraud” (id., subd. (d)); prohibits 
mail theft as defined in the United States Code (id., subd. (e)); 
and immunizes Internet service providers from liability for the 
defined offenses (id., subd. (f)).  
 
What this history reflects is a concern for the “ripples of 
harm” that “flow from the initial misappropriation” of 
identifying information — harm that often goes “well beyond the 
actual property obtained.”  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
12 
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2886 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended May 26, 2006.)  Legislators recognized that “[v]ictims 
cannot easily change their name, birth date, social security 
number or address, and they should not have to do so.”  (Sen. 
Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1254 (2001–
2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 11, 2002, p. 8.)  And the 
Legislature’s continued revision of the statute — generally by 
broadening its scope — “shows that the felony hinged on the 
seriousness of the crime and of its consequences, rather than on 
the type or value of property involved” as in section 459.5.  
(People v. Weir (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 868, 875 (Weir).)  
Appropriately, then, section 530.5 — unlike the theft offense at 
issue in Romanowski — resides in the chapter of the Penal Code 
titled “False Personation and Cheats,” rather than the chapter 
titled “Larceny.”  (Cf. Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 908; 
see Truong, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 561 [“Although 
commonly referred to as ‘identity theft’ [citation], the 
Legislature did not categorize the crime as a theft offense”].)  
 
That distinction is no accident. The new shoplifting 
offenses are ill-suited to punish misuse of identifying 
information.  (See, e.g., Weir, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th 868; 
Sanders, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th 397; Truong, supra, 10 
Cal.App.5th 551.)  The offenses are fundamentally different, and 
they 
reflect 
different 
legislative 
rationales. 
 
Consider 
shoplifting, whose rationale we recently discussed in People v. 
Colbert (2019) 6 Cal.5th 596.  We explained that unauthorized 
entries — of the sort still chargeable as burglary — present an 
increased danger of violence because the entry is unwelcome, 
unexpected, and results in panic and risk to personal safety.  (Id. 
at p. 607.)  In enacting the shoplifting statute, “the electorate 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
13 
signaled that these interests do not apply in the same way” 
during the day, when a person is stealing property worth $950 
or less “in a place where he or she has been invited to peruse the 
goods and services that are on offer.”  (Ibid.)  The physical 
intrusion element is missing, and with it the danger that makes 
burglary more culpable than shoplifting.   
 
Section 530.5, subdivision (a), meanwhile, evinces a lack 
of concern with the time of day, the method of acquiring the 
information, its value, or even what –– precisely –– is done with 
it.  The statute prohibits a person from “acquiring, retaining, or 
using information, rather than taking it,” — itself a fair 
indicator that the Legislature was concerned with use, not theft.  
(Weir, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 874.)  And on its face, it 
addresses harms reaching well beyond theft, implicating issues 
of privacy and control of personal data.  (See Barba, supra, 211 
Cal.App.4th at p. 226 [explaining that the statute aims to 
“address[] disruptions caused in victims’ lives when their 
personal identifying information is used”].)  
 
From the language, structure, and history of section 530.5, 
we glean that its purpose reaches far beyond what Proposition 
47 pulled into its orbit.  It is not a theft offense, but “an 
essentially unique crime.”  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis 
of Assem. Bill No. 2886, supra, as amended May 26, 2006.)   
B. 
 
Perhaps recognizing the mismatch between section 530.5 
and Proposition 47, Jimenez focuses his argument on the 
similarity between his conduct and that of the defendant in 
Gonzales.   The argument is intuitively appealing:  Jimenez did, 
after all, enter a commercial establishment (Loans Plus) with 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
14 
intent to commit theft by false pretenses — a course of conduct 
analogous to what we decided was enough to constitute 
shoplifting in Gonzales.  (See Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 
862 [holding that because cashing a stolen check is a form of 
larceny under § 490, subd. (a), a defendant’s conviction for 
burglary for “entering a bank to cash a stolen check for less than 
$950 . . . constitutes shoplifting under the statute”].) Jimenez 
thus contends he also committed shoplifting, and, under section 
459.5, subdivision (b), an act of shoplifting “shall” be charged as 
shoplifting.  To Jimenez, this means any conduct that a 
prosecutor could reasonably treat as fulfilling the elements of 
shoplifting must be charged as shoplifting, and cannot be 
charged as anything else, including misuse of identifying 
information.   
 
Jimenez builds scaffolding on a tenuous foundation.  His 
argument presumes a defendant’s conduct, not his crime of 
conviction, is what Proposition 47 sought to reclassify.  The 
Court of Appeal seems to have shared this view when it affirmed 
the reduction to shoplifting.  It explained:  “Jimenez’s conduct is 
identical to Gonzales’s conduct.  They both entered a commercial 
establishment during business hours for the purpose of cashing 
stolen checks valued at less than $950 each.”  (Jimenez, supra, 
22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1289, italics added.)  Yet Jimenez’s conduct, 
though unquestionably relevant, bears on only one aspect of our 
analysis.  What triggers section 459.5, subdivision (b)’s bar is 
not only whether a defendant’s course of conduct includes an act 
of shoplifting, but also whether the charged crime is burglary or 
theft of the same property.  Conduct indeed bears on whether a 
defendant “may . . . be charged with burglary or theft of the 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
15 
same property,” but not on whether section 530.5 creates a 
“theft” offense.  (§ 459.5, subd. (b).) 
 
As we conveyed in Martinez, similarity of conduct is not 
pivotal.  The critical question for reclassification is whether the 
felony offense “ ‘would have been . . . a misdemeanor under 
[Proposition 47] had [it] been in effect at the time of the 
offense.’ ”  (Martinez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 652, quoting § 
1170.18, subd. (a).)  Under People v. Lara, the question varies 
only in verb tense:  Is the felony offense now a misdemeanor 
under Proposition 47? In Martinez, although the defendant 
committed conduct that, under another statute, may well have 
been reduced to a misdemeanor, we found him ineligible for 
resentencing because “none of the statutes amended or enacted 
by Proposition 47 altered the offense [of which he was 
convicted].”  (Martinez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 653.)  Conversely, 
though the defendant in Gonzales committed conduct that could 
have been charged as misuse of identifying information — and, 
in Jimenez’s case, was — we found him eligible for a reduction 
because he was charged and convicted of burglary, which 
Proposition 47 did alter.  (Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 872, 
876.)  Only if the offense is eligible for reclassification must a 
court consider whether a defendant’s conduct fulfills the 
elements of shoplifting, bringing it within Proposition 47’s 
scope.  
 
We can confirm this categorical understanding of 
Proposition 47’s scope through the initiative’s express “purpose 
and intent” to “[r]equire misdemeanors instead of felonies for 
nonserious, nonviolent crimes like petty theft and drug 
possession” absent a disqualifying prior.  (Prop. 47, § 3(3).)  In 
the same terms, the Legislative Analyst explained that the 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
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16 
initiative applied only to certain kinds of offenses, noting that it 
“[r]equires misdemeanor sentenc[ing] instead of felony for 
[specified crimes] when  [the] amount involved is $950 or less” 
and “[r]equires resentencing for persons serving felony 
sentences for [specified] offenses unless [a] court finds [an] 
unreasonable public safety risk.”  (Voter Information Guide, 
supra, analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, at p. 34.)  While 
we must be guided by Proposition 47’s intended purpose to 
reduce punishment for certain nonserious, nonviolent offenses, 
we are not free to read into it any offense we might deem 
nonserious and nonviolent.   
 
 “Identity theft” is explicitly mentioned only once in 
Proposition 47:  to create an exception to the Proposition’s new 
rule allowing certain convictions for forgery to be reduced to 
misdemeanors.  (Prop. 47, § 6.)  The Legislative Analyst 
explained:  “Under current law, it is a wobbler crime to forge a 
check of any amount.  Under this measure, forging a check 
worth $950 or less would always be a misdemeanor, except that 
it would remain a wobbler crime if the offender commits identity 
theft in connection with forging a check.”  (Voter Information 
Guide, supra, analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, at p. 35, 
italics added.)  The voters thus considered misuse of personal 
identifying information solely in the context of maintaining 
felony treatment for offenses that otherwise would be reducible 
to misdemeanors.  This strongly suggests voters did not intend 
for “identity theft” convictions to be reduced to misdemeanors 
under Proposition 47.   
 
The cases on which Jimenez relies underscore the 
centrality of the offense charged by the prosecution in the 
Proposition 47 analysis.  In Romanowski, for instance, we 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
17 
considered whether section 484e, subdivision (d) — prohibiting 
theft of access card information — qualifies for resentencing as 
petty theft under section 490.2.  (Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th 
at p. 908.)  It was no small part of our analysis that section 484e 
explicitly defined theft of access card information as grand theft, 
which pulled it within the ambit of the new petty theft statute.  
(Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 908.)  But we confirmed 
that the offense also sounded in theft and sat comfortably in the 
“Larceny” chapter of the Penal Code.  (Id. at pp. 908–909.)   
 
 We did much the same in Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at page 
1180.  What we decided is that one version of Vehicle Code 
section 10851 — “taking or driving a vehicle without the owner’s 
consent” — established an offense qualifying as petty theft 
under the new Penal Code section 490.2.  As a carve-out for 
offenses otherwise deemed grand theft, that section mandates 
misdemeanor punishment for a defendant who “obtain[ed] any 
property by theft” where the value of the property was $950 or 
less.  (Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 1180, 1183.)  Although 
Vehicle Code section 10851 did not “expressly designate the 
offense as ‘grand theft’ ” and its prohibitions swept more broadly 
than “theft,” we had previously identified a theft and non-theft 
way to commit the offense.  (Id. at p. 1182.)  The theft version of 
the vehicular offense fully mapped on to the new petty theft 
statute, and we thus concluded that version, alone, was eligible 
for reduction:  “ ‘[A] defendant convicted under section 10851(a) 
of unlawfully taking a vehicle with the intent to permanently 
deprive the owner of possession’ has been convicted of stealing 
the vehicle.”  (Id. at p. 1184.)   
 
The same doesn’t hold for Jimenez’s offense.  Where 
Vehicle Code section 10851 contemplates two permutations — 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
18 
one fully satisfying the elements of petty theft after Proposition 
47 — Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (a) contains no 
separate provision that, when violated, exclusively constitutes 
shoplifting or even theft.  Instead the offense defined in section 
530.5, subdivision (a) always requires more than “entering a 
commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny” 
during business hours — so proving shoplifting is not sufficient 
to prove misuse of identifying information under section 530.5, 
subdivision (a).  (See § 459.5, subd. (a); People v. Soto (2018) 23 
Cal.App.5th 813, 822 [distinguishing Page and Romanowski 
from offenses that are “not identified as grand theft and 
require[] additional necessary elements beyond . . . theft”].)  
Section 530.5, subdivision (a) also requires much less than the 
elements specified in section 459.5; indeed, misuse of personal 
identifying information contains none of the elements of section 
459.5, subdivision (a).  (Compare § 530.5, subd. (a) [“Every 
person 
who 
willfully 
obtains 
personal 
identifying 
information . . . of another person, and uses that information for 
any unlawful purpose . . . is guilty of a public offense”] with 
§ 459.5, subd. (a) [“shoplifting is defined as entering a 
commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while 
that establishment is open during regular business hours, 
where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be 
taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950)”].) 
 
Jimenez nonetheless maintains that we used unequivocal 
language in Gonzales to hold that the only permissible charge in 
a case with facts analogous to those in this case is shoplifting. 
“A defendant must be charged only with shoplifting when the 
statute applies,” we wrote, because “[i]t expressly prohibits 
alternate charging and ensures only misdemeanor treatment for 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
19 
the underlying described conduct.”  (Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th 
at p. 876.)  Jimenez further argues that Gonzales stands for the 
proposition that whenever a defendant’s conduct constitutes 
shoplifting, it can only be charged as shoplifting.   
 
This argument misses the mark.  Gonzales resolved a 
different question:  whether a defendant was eligible for 
misdemeanor shoplifting resentencing under Proposition 47 
when his conviction was for burglary based on a course of 
conduct involving entering a store to cash a fraudulent check.  
Our decision in Gonzales explained that the defendant was 
eligible for resentencing on those facts because of what was 
essentially a perfect overlap between the charged burglary and 
the facts that would have supported the shoplifting charge:  The 
course of conduct rested on precisely the same entry, with the 
same intent, to take the same property, as would have supported 
a shoplifting charge.  So Proposition 47’s mandate that “[a]ny 
act of shoplifting . . . be charged as shoplifting” and “[n]o person 
who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with 
burglary or theft of the same property” applied with full force.  
When we explained that a “defendant must be charged only with 
shoplifting when the statute applies” (Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th 
at p. 876), what we meant is simply that a person whose conduct 
constitutes shoplifting could not be charged with burglary or a 
theft crime for that same conduct instead of shoplifting, as 
occurred in Gonzales.  It does not follow that similar conduct, 
including conduct that fulfills the elements of the misuse of 
personal 
identifying 
information 
under 
section 
530.5, 
subdivision (a), must always be charged only as shoplifting, even 
if no conviction for burglary or theft — the only crimes barred 
under section 459.5, subdivision (b) —  is at issue.  In fact, no 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
20 
conviction for personal identifying information misuse even 
occurred in Gonzales. 
 
The Attorney General also made another relevant 
argument in Gonzales:  that Gonzales’s burglary conviction was 
ineligible for resentencing because of the possibility that 
Gonzales might have entered with intent to violate section 
530.5.  In addressing this contention, we explained that a 
burglary charge might be permitted for entry with intent to 
commit acts other than theft of an amount equal to or less than 
$950.  But section 459.5, subdivision (b)’s bar against burglary 
charges applied with full force to Gonzales because the only 
proof was of entry with the intent to steal property in an amount 
below the shoplifting threshold.  (See Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th 
at pp. 876–877.)  No similar bar applies here.  Jimenez was 
charged with a violation of section 530.5 –– neither a burglary 
nor theft offense. 
  
To therefore read the language of Gonzales as forcing the 
prosecution to charge only misdemeanor shoplifting for any 
misuse of personal identifying information involving $950 or 
less would lead to odd results –– ones that make for an awkward 
fit with the statutes at issue.  Consider a person who enters a 
commercial establishment during the day with the intent to 
steal a particular video game from the shelf.  If a child were 
holding the video game and the person simply took the child 
along with the game, the course of conduct would likely be 
chargeable as kidnapping.  (See § 207.)  It defies logic to argue 
that Proposition 47 mandates only a misdemeanor shoplifting 
charge on those facts.  We have no reason to believe Proposition 
47 “extends to any course of conduct that happens to include” 
entry into a commercial establishment with intent to commit 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
21 
larceny.  At oral argument, Jimenez attempted to address this 
concern by contending that additional offenses could be charged 
with shoplifting, but only if the other offenses involved force or 
violence.  To adopt such a test would be to write into the statute 
a limitation which is simply not there.   Voters made clear that 
section 459.5’s prohibition extends only to “burglary or theft” 
offenses.  Because misuse of personal identifying information is 
neither, this proscription simply does not apply.   
 
True:  People who violate section 530.5, subdivision (a) will 
often use the information to commit some manner of theft, 
making the theft an important element of that second crime.  
This is what Gonzales was charged with doing when he stole his 
grandmother’s checkbook and cashed two checks without her 
consent (Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 862), and it bears some 
resemblance to the facts at issue here.  No doubt it was this 
realization that prompted the Court of Appeal to conclude:  
“That Jimenez committed identity theft in the course of the 
shoplifting does not alter the fact that he committed 
shoplifting.”  (Jimenez, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1290.)  What 
would be more accurate, however, is to put it this way:  That 
Jimenez committed shoplifting in the course of identity theft 
does not alter the fact that he committed identity theft.  
C. 
 
Jimenez also posits that his conviction can be reduced to 
misdemeanor petty theft, the other new misdemeanor theft 
offense created by Proposition 47.  (See § 490.2, subd. (a).)  
Section 490.2 provides:  “Notwithstanding Section 487 or any 
other provision of law defining grand theft, obtaining any 
property by theft where the value of the money, labor, real or 
personal property taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
22 
dollars ($950) shall be considered petty theft and shall be 
punished as a misdemeanor . . . .”   
 
This argument fails, too.  It falters for the same reason his 
conviction cannot be reclassified as shoplifting:  Misuse of 
personal identifying information is not a theft offense.  The 
offense described by section 530.5 criminalizes the improper use, 
not the illegal taking, of information.  Like shoplifting, misuse 
of personal identifying information shares no common elements 
with petty theft.  (Compare § 530.5, subd. (a) [“Every person who 
willfully obtains personal identifying information . . . of another 
person, 
and 
uses 
that 
information 
for 
any 
unlawful 
purpose . . . is guilty of a public offense”] with § 490.2 
[“[O]btaining any property by theft where the value of the 
money, labor, real or personal property taken does not exceed 
nine hundred fifty dollars ($950) shall be considered petty 
theft”].)   
 
Endeavoring to support his expansive interpretation of 
section 490.2, Jimenez relies on two of our earlier cases, 
Romanowski and Page.  As we have already explained, however, 
both of those cases involved crimes that could readily be 
classified as theft offenses.  In Romanowski we noted that 
section 484, subdivision (a), theft of access card information, is 
explicitly defined as grand theft (Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th 
at p. 908), clearly moving it into the scope of section 490.2 (see 
§ 490.2, subd. (a) [“Notwithstanding Section 487 or any other 
provision of law defining grand theft, obtaining any property by 
theft where the value . . . does not exceed nine hundred fifty 
dollars ($950) shall be considered petty theft”]).  In Page we 
relied on our previous identification of a “theft” and “nontheft” 
way to commit the offense.  (Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 1182–
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
23 
1183.)  There is no similar reason to conclude that misuse of 
personal identifying information is a theft offense.     
III. 
 
The prohibitions on shoplifting and misuse of personal 
identifying information protect potential victims from different 
harms.  The shoplifting offense is like forgery and other 
nonviolent theft crimes:  It protects the entity with which the 
shoplifter is (in a manner of speaking) engaging — here, Loans 
Plus.  Section 530.5, subdivision (a) is different.  It protects 
primarily the person or entity whose information was 
unlawfully used without consent — here, OuterWall, who may 
have suffered repercussions from the misuse of its financial 
account information.  (See Sanders, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 
403 [noting the “basic problem is that appellant’s acts of stealing 
from merchants do not amount to a theft from the cardholder” 
because the “cardholder was harmed by the unlawful use of her 
card and thefts from the merchants do not make the cardholder 
a victim of those thefts”].)  
 
Ultimately, use of the shorthand “identity theft” to 
describe the offense in section 530.5 doesn’t somehow make the 
misuse of personal identifying information swallow up elements 
of the theft offense, nor does it otherwise “provide a reason to 
read into the statute an additional element that cannot be found 
by referring to the language of the statute.”  (Barba, supra, 211 
Cal.App.4th at p. 227.)  Section 459.5 proscribes charging 
“burglary or theft of the same property” for shoplifting conduct  
(§ 459.5, subd. (b).)  But misuse of personal identifying 
information is not a “theft” offense, so it remains a perfectly 
valid charge where a defendant engages in actions including 
conduct overlapping with misdemeanor shoplifting but where 
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
24 
the course of conduct also fulfills elements — such as the misuse 
of personal identifying information that is all too common in the 
digital economy —  wholly distinct from what a shoplifting 
conviction would require.  
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and this 
case is remanded to the Court of Appeal with instructions to 
send the case back to the trial court for sentencing not 
inconsistent with this opinion.  To the extent it conflicts with 
this holding, People v. Brayton (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 734 
(review granted Oct. 10, 2018, S251122) is disapproved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Jimenez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XXX 22 Cal.App.5th 1282 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S249397 
Date Filed:  March 2, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Ventura 
Judge:  Manuel J. Covarrubias 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Gregory D. Totten, District Attorney, Lisa O. Lyytikainen and Michelle J. Contois, Deputy District 
Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Todd W. Howeth, Public Defender, and William M. Quest, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Michelle J. Contois 
Deputy District Attorney 
800 South Victoria Avenue 
Ventura, CA 93009 
(805) 654-3078 
 
William M. Quest 
Senior Deputy Public Defender 
800 South Victoria Avenue, HOJ-207 
Ventura, CA 93009 
(805) 654-3032