Case Title: Hannon v. Armorel Sch. Dist. #9

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Glenda HANNON v. ARMOREL SCHOOL DISTRICT # 9,
aka Armorel Public Schools

96-1014                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered June 30, 1997


1.   Judgment -- order entered following hearing on summary-judgment motion
     treated as judgment following bench trial. -- Where the trial court's
     order of dismissal was entered following a hearing on a
     summary-judgment motion, the circuit court had heard testimony
     and by doing so went beyond the pleadings, discovery, and
     affidavits in reaching its decision; the supreme court will
     look to the wording of an order or a judgment to determine its
     essence; hence, the supreme court treated the circuit court's
     order as a judgment following a bench trial.

2.   Schools & school districts -- Teacher Fair Dismissal Act -- strict
     compliance with notice provisions required. -- The Teacher Fair
     Dismissal Act requires strict compliance with all its
     provisions; otherwise, a nonrenewal, termination, suspension
     or other disciplinary action by the School District is void;
     with respect to nonrenewal specifically, if notice of
     nonrenewal is not given to the teacher before May 1 of the
     contract year, the teacher's contract is automatically renewed
     for the next school year.

3.   Schools & school districts -- when cause for termination is arbitrary and
     capricious. -- A cause for termination is arbitrary and
     capricious if it is not supported by any rational basis.
4.   Schools & school districts -- appellant's termination was arbitrary and
     capricious -- school board relied exclusively on past conduct. -- The
     supreme court concluded that conduct in the preceding school
     year cannot be used exclusively to terminate a teacher at the
     beginning of the subsequent school year; Ark. Code Ann.  6-
     17-1507(a) (Repl. 1993) refers to termination during the term
     of a contract for any cause; the court construed this
     subsection to tie the questionable conduct to the current
     contract term; in this case, that was not done; without a
     ground for termination in the school year in which appellant
     was terminated, there was no basis for her termination; the
     supreme court held that appellant's termination by the school
     board, which relied exclusively on past conduct, was arbitrary
     and capricious.

5.   Schools & school districts -- termination -- specific conduct constituting
     pattern of conduct must be set out in notice of termination. -- The
     supreme court emphasized that, although a pattern of conduct
     spanning several contract years may be presented to a school
     board as the grounds for termination in addition to the
     conduct in the current school year, the specific conduct
     constituting the pattern and the years when it transpired must
     be set out in the notice of termination to meet the
     requirements of Ark. Code Ann.  6-17-1507.

6.   Schools & school districts -- termination must not be used as "backup" to
     flawed nonrenewal. -- The supreme court concluded that appellant's
     termination under Ark. Code Ann.  6-17-1507 was merely a
     subterfuge to enforce nonrenewal when the procedure for
     nonrenewal was void due to noncompliance with the statute;
     thus, the school district impermissibly sought to do
     indirectly that which nonrenewal provisions did not permit it
     to do directly; termination must not be used as merely a
     "backup" for a flawed nonrenewal; the supreme court reversed
     the trial court's order for this reason, as well.

7.   Schools & school districts -- circuit court's order reversed and remanded
     for determination of damages -- reinstatement issue moot. -- The supreme
     court reversed and remanded the order of the circuit court,
     with instructions for a determination of damages for the
     school year in which appellant was terminated; the court
     declined, however, to order appellant's reinstatement because
     the issue was moot.


     Appeal from Mississippi Circuit Court; David Burnett, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     Roachell Law Firm, by: Travis N. Creed, for appellant.
     W. Paul Blume, for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     Appellant Glenda Hannon raises three points on appeal in
connection with her termination under her school contract for the
1992-93 school year and the circuit court's dismissal of her
appeal: (1) the trial court erred in permitting appellee Armorel
School District to use conduct under a prior contract to terminate
her; (2) the General Assembly did not intend for termination
procedures to be a "backup" to violation of the nonrenewal
provisions; and (3) termination by the School District violated the
strict compliance provision of the Arkansas Teacher Fair Dismissal
Act.  We agree with Hannon, and we reverse and remand.
     Hannon had worked in the School District for the 1990-91 and
1991-92 school years as an elementary school teacher.  She taught
a gifted-and-talented class and instructed students in music and
reading.  In April 1992, then Superintendent Jim Thomas recommended
to the Armorel School Board that Hannon's contract not be renewed. 
The School Board accepted the recommendation and voted not to renew
Hannon's contract.  No notice was given to Hannon of these
proceedings.  On April 22, 1992, Hannon received a letter from
Superintendent Thomas that concluded she had not performed
adequately based on performance reports, complaints from parents of
students, and the superintendent's own observations.  Hannon then
filed a complaint with the School District about its failure to
give her a proper nonrenewal notice, and the School Board reversed
itself and elected to grant her a new contract on July 27, 1992. 
Next, in a letter dated August 12, 1992, Superintendent Thomas
informed Hannon that he was going to recommend her termination.  In
a follow-up letter dated August 17, 1992, Thomas informed Hannon
that she was suspended with pay pending the School Board's
decision.  A termination hearing was held, and Hannon was
terminated on September 24, 1992.  For the 1992-93 school year,
Hannon engaged in substitute teaching in another school district. 
In August 1993, she entered into a teaching contract with the
Helena School District.
     Hannon filed a notice of appeal to circuit court from her
termination and sought reinstatement and back pay.  After the
School District answered, she moved for summary judgment on the
same grounds raised in this appeal.  A hearing was held in circuit
court, and the court heard testimony about Hannon's performance in
the 1991-92 school year from Superintendent Thomas, Tom Gothard
(president of the Armorel School Board), Sydney Kennedy (high
school principal), and Kathy Lee (elementary school principal). 
Kathy Lee in particular testified that she received complaints
about Hannon from the parents of students, the students themselves,
and teachers.  The complaints from the teachers, according to Lee,
included "unfair treatment in the classroom, picking on other
students, out of control, having other teachers handle discipline
problems she should have handled in the classroom.  It was forcing
the other teachers to take their breaks and time off to handle the
discipline problems that Ms. Hannon should have handled."  Other
complaints also prompted Lee to investigate claims of Hannon's poor
performance.  Lee testified that she personally observed Hannon in
the classroom and that she worked out plans with Hannon to better
her performance.  For example, she assisted Hannon in attending
reading classes at Arkansas State University to improve her
teaching skills.  Lee testified that she saw no significant
improvement in Hannon's performance.  Sydney Kennedy, on the other
hand, also evaluated Hannon during the 1991-92 school year and gave
her above average marks for her teaching acumen.
     The trial court ruled from the bench.  The court considered
the testimony presented as well as the transcript of the prior
hearing before the School Board.  The court concluded that the
board would have been justified in either a nonrenewal or a
termination, that Hannon's due process rights were not violated,
and that the School Board's action was not arbitrary or capricious. 
The court denied Hannon's motion for summary judgment and dismissed
her appeal with prejudice.
     We first feel compelled to discuss the order of dismissal by
the trial court.  The order was entered following a hearing on a
motion for summary judgment in which the circuit court heard
testimony.  We recently had a similar situation in Honeycutt v.
City of Fort Smith, 327 Ark. 530, 939 S.W.2d 306 (1997), where we
concluded as follows:
     Although the order is styled Summary Judgment of
     Dismissal, the trial court received testimony from
     Honeycutt at the summary-judgment hearing, and by doing
     so, went beyond the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits
     in reaching its decision.  See Ark. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
     Thus, the court converted the matter from a proceeding
     for summary judgment to a bench trial on the question of
     whether Honeycutt was afforded his procedural rights
     before the Commission.  See Godwin v. Churchman, 305 Ark.
     520,