Case Title: State v. Joseph A. Lombard

Citation: 2004 WI 95

Docket Number: 2000AP003318

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 95 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-3318 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Joseph Lombard: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph A. Lombard,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 163 
Reported at:  266 Wis. 2d 887, 669 N.W.2d 157 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 1, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 12, 2004 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert DeChambeau 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by David R. Karpe, Madison, and oral argument by David R. Karpe. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2004 WI 95 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-3318  
(L.C. No. 
00 CI 1) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Joseph Lombard: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph A. Lombard,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Petitioner Joseph A. Lombard 
(Lombard) seeks review of a court of appeals' decision, State v. 
Lombard, 2003 WI App 163, 266 Wis. 2d 887, 669 N.W.2d 157, 
affirming a circuit court decision that rejected Lombard's 
contention that his Fifth Amendment1 rights were violated.  The 
                                                 
1 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states, in relevant part, "[no person] shall be compelled in any 
criminal 
case 
to 
be 
a 
witness 
against 
himself . . . ."  
Correspondingly, Article I, § 8(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states, in relevant part, "[no person] may be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself." 
No. 
00-3318   
 
2 
 
circuit court rejected Lombard's motion for a new trial, stating 
that 
the 
pre-petition 
interview 
process 
was 
sufficiently 
explained to him prior to his interview with the State 
evaluator.  Lombard appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.    
¶2 
We conclude that Lombard was not entitled to Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) warnings prior to his pre-
petition evaluation with the State's psychologist in regard to 
whether 
a 
ch. 
980 
petition 
should 
be 
filed.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 980.05(1m) (1999-2000)2 plainly contains the 
language "at the trial."  The plain language of the statute 
leads to the conclusion that the legislature intended that such 
constitutional rights would apply at Lombard's ch. 980 trial.  
Thus, Lombard did not have the right to Miranda warnings during 
his pre-petition interview with a State psychologist.  Because 
Lombard was not entitled to the warnings,3 we conclude that 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
not 
deficient, 
and, 
therefore, 
Lombard's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel fails. 
                                                 
2 All references to Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-2000 
edition.  Wisconsin Stat. § 980.05(1m) provides, in relevant 
part:  "At the trial to determine whether the person who is the 
subject of a petition under s. 980.02 is a sexually violent 
person, all rules of evidence in criminal actions apply.  All 
constitutional rights available to a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding are available to the person." 
 
3 While Lombard appears to insist that all of the Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) rights are applicable to ch. 980 
respondents, he chiefly focuses on the right to remain silent. 
No. 
00-3318   
 
3 
 
 
I 
 
¶3 
On March 4, 1981, Lombard was convicted of one count 
of first-degree sexual assault with concealed identity and five 
counts of second-degree sexual assault arising out of his 
assaults of eight women in the Cumberland, Wisconsin area 
between July 1978 and March 1980.  Lombard was sentenced to a 
total of 40 years in prison for five sexual assaults and 20 
years of probation for a sixth sexual assault.  Lombard was 
imprisoned from 1980 until March 1992, at which time he was 
released on parole.  However, Lombard's parole was revoked two 
and one-half years later, and he was returned to prison. 
 
¶4 
In late 1999, Lombard neared his mandatory release 
date.  In order to determine whether a ch. 980 petition should 
be filed in Lombard's case, the State sent Anthony Jurek Ph.D., 
a psychologist from the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, to 
interview Lombard.  Jurek interviewed Lombard from December 1-3, 
1999, at Columbia Correctional Institution where Lombard was 
serving his sentence.  On the first day of the interview, Jurek 
advised Lombard of the procedures involved in the ensuing 
evaluation and, after engaging in discourse with Lombard in 
order to ascertain his comprehension of the evaluation process, 
presented 
Lombard 
with 
a 
form 
entitled 
Chapter 
980 
Participation.  The form stated as follows: 
The purpose of this examination is to assess your 
appropriateness for commitment under Chapter 980 of 
the Wisconsin State Statutes concerning the commitment 
of sexually violent persons.  You have the right not 
No. 
00-3318   
 
4 
 
to participate in the examination or to answer any of 
the questions posed to you, but this refusal to answer 
will be used as part of the evaluation.  Nothing 
during the evaluation will be confidential and it may 
be repeated in testimony or written reports.  A report 
will be written concerning your potential commitment 
based on whatever relevant information may be obtained 
from your records, psychological testing and clinical 
interview, whether or not you choose to participate in 
the process. 
By signing below, you hereby acknowledge that the 
above information has been fully explained to you.4 
                                                 
4 We note that, as indicated by the State at oral argument, 
the abovementioned form is no longer used during pre-petition 
interviews.  Without objection, members of the court were 
provided with the Wisconsin Department of Corrections form 
presently being utilized.  The applicable form states, in 
relevant part: 
Prior to conducting a psychological assessment and 
evaluation, including an interview, Dr. [insert name] 
advised me of the following: 
The purpose of the evaluation is to assess whether or 
not I meet the requirements for commitment under 
Chapter 980, the Sexually Violent Persons Law, which 
provides 
for 
potential 
lifelong 
commitment 
for 
treatment. 
I have the right to not participate in the examination 
and assessment.  I may refuse to answer any questions 
posed to me in the form of direct interview or through 
the administration of psychological testing. 
Your decision regarding participation in the interview 
cannot be used against you. 
Nothing 
said 
during 
the 
evaluation 
would 
be 
confidential and might be repeated in testimony or 
written report. 
The examiner would be writing a report concerning 
potential commitment under WSS Chapter 980 based on 
whatever 
relevant 
information 
the 
examiner 
could 
obtain 
through 
review 
of 
any 
and 
all 
records 
pertaining to my sexual offense history, whether or 
No. 
00-3318   
 
5 
 
¶5 
Lombard signed and dated the form on December 1, 1999. 
¶6 
During the interview with Jurek, Lombard discussed the 
sexual assaults that he had committed, including his thoughts on 
them at the time of the interview.  Lombard also talked about 
the different treatment programs he had participated in while 
imprisoned.   
¶7 
Jurek ultimately concluded that Lombard was a sexually 
violent person who fit the diagnostic criteria for sexual 
sadism.  Jurek also concluded that Lombard had a personality 
disorder with antisocial features.  Based on his assessment of 
Lombard, Jurek recommended that ch. 980 proceedings be commenced 
in Lombard's case.  The State began ch. 980 proceedings and, at 
the probable cause hearing before the circuit court, the court 
found that there was probable cause to believe that Lombard was 
suffering from a mental disorder.  The court also found that 
there was a substantial likelihood that he would engage in acts 
of sexual violence in the future.   
¶8 
The issue of whether Lombard should be committed as a 
sexually violent person was tried before a jury beginning on 
October 16, 2000.  At the trial, three expert witnesses 
                                                                                                                                                             
not I agree to participate in the evaluation process.  
This includes any and all Presentence Investigations 
completed as part of my criminal offense history. 
We agree with the dissent that the new form correctly 
explains an individual's decision regarding participation 
in a pre-petition evaluation interview.  It clearly states 
that the decision regarding participation cannot be used 
against the individual.  See dissent, ¶74. 
No. 
00-3318   
 
6 
 
testified for Lombard.  Jurek was the sole expert witness for 
the State.  Jurek was the only witness to diagnose Lombard as a 
sexual sadist and conclude that Lombard was substantially likely 
to reoffend.  On October 20, 2000, the jury found Lombard to be 
a sexually violent person.  As a result of the jury's finding, 
Lombard was committed to an institution. 
¶9 
Lombard filed a notice of motions and motions after 
verdict relating to the State's use of Lombard's statements 
during Jurek's interview.  Lombard contended that his cross-
examination of Jurek was improperly restricted.  Lombard further 
asserted that he should have been allowed to cross-examine Jurek 
regarding the inconsistencies between the statements attributed 
to Lombard in Jurek's report and victim testimony regarding 
their interactions with Lombard during the assaults.  Lombard 
also contended that he did not give informed consent to be 
interviewed 
by 
Jurek 
during 
the 
pre-petition 
evaluation.  
Lombard requested that the court set aside that jury's verdict 
and, in the interest of justice, order a new trial.  After a 
hearing, the court denied these motions. 
¶10 Lombard then appealed from the finding that he was a 
sexually violent person, from the order committing him, and from 
the denial of his post-verdict motions.  At Lombard's request, 
the court of appeals remanded the matter to the circuit court 
for a determination of whether Lombard received ineffective 
assistance of counsel at trial.  Lombard then filed a motion for 
a 
new 
trial, 
alleging 
that 
he 
had 
received 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel at trial, because his counsel had failed 
No. 
00-3318   
 
7 
 
to object to the admission of Lombard's statements to Jurek, and 
because his counsel had stipulated that no police reports or 
transcripts of victim statements would be allowed in the jury 
room 
during 
deliberations. 
 
Lombard 
also 
requested 
an 
evidentiary hearing. 
¶11 The Dane County Circuit Court, Judge Robert A. 
DeChambeau 
presiding, 
denied 
Lombard's 
request 
for 
an 
evidentiary hearing and his request for a new trial.  The 
circuit court concluded that Lombard's Fifth Amendment rights 
were not violated because he was presented with, and signed, an 
advisement form prior to the interview.  The court noted that 
the evaluation process was explained to Lombard, and Lombard was 
told that he had a right not to participate in the evaluation if 
he so chose.  The court noted that Lombard was also informed 
that Jurek would consider a refusal to participate when 
reviewing the evaluation. 
¶12 Lombard appealed the judgment declaring him to be a 
sexually violent person and committing him under ch. 980.  
Lombard also appealed two orders denying his post-judgment 
motions.  Lombard asserted that his Fifth Amendment rights were 
No. 
00-3318   
 
8 
 
violated because the State used, at trial, statements Lombard 
made to Jurek during the pre-petition psychological evaluation.5 
¶13 With respect to the issue involving Lombard's alleged 
Fifth Amendment violation, Court of Appeals Judges David G. 
Deininger, Charles P. Dykman, and Paul Lundsten concluded that 
Lombard was not entitled to a Miranda warning before being 
evaluated by a State psychologist, since any statements Lombard 
made about his past crimes could not subject him to future 
prosecution.  The court of appeals relied on a portion of the 
State v. Zanelli (Zanelli II), 223 Wis. 2d 545, 589 N.W.2d 687 
(Ct. App. 1998) opinion, which stated: 
The fact that such statements can be used in a ch. 
980 . . . case does not mean that the statements could 
incriminate him in a pending or subsequent criminal 
prosecution 
as 
ch. 
980 
is 
a 
civil 
commitment 
proceeding, not a criminal proceeding.  Accordingly, 
the statements were admissible. 
Lombard, 266 Wis. 2d 887, ¶26 (citation omitted). 
¶14 The court of appeals noted that its holding in this 
case may appear to conflict with State v. Zanelli (Zanelli I), 
212 Wis. 2d 358, 569 N.W.2d 301 (Ct. App. 1997)  and Zanelli II.  
The court explained: 
                                                 
5 Lombard asserted other errors on appeal to the court of 
appeals, including:  (1) the circuit court failed to give the 
jury his requested instruction regarding "volitional control;" 
(2) the unconstitutionality of 1999 Wis. Act 9, which removed 
the court's authority to grant immediate supervised release; (3) 
the circuit court's instruction to the jury that sexually 
violent persons are eligible for supervised release; and (4) 
lack of sufficient evidence to establish grounds for his 
commitment.  However, we do not discuss these issues further 
since they are not the subject of this review. 
No. 
00-3318   
 
9 
 
We acknowledge that our present conclusion and 
those in Zanelli I and II regarding a Wis. Stat. ch. 
980 respondent's rights under the Fifth Amendment and 
Miranda may appear contradictory.  It is clear that a 
"person who is the subject of [a ch. 980] petition" 
has 
a 
statutory 
right 
to 
"[r]emain 
silent," 
Wis. Stat. § 980.03(2)(b), but we have concluded that 
this right "plainly does not apply" to a pre-petition 
examination.  Zanelli I, 212 Wis. 2d at 370.  We have 
also concluded, however, that the State may not 
comment at a ch. 980 trial upon a respondent's 
"refus[al] to participate in [a] formal evaluation 
made prior to the filing of a [ch. 980] petition."  
Id. at 369.   
Lombard, 266 Wis. 2d 887, ¶28. 
 
¶15 The 
court 
of appeals ultimately 
concluded 
that, 
regardless of whether the respondent was warned that his 
statements could be used by the State at his ch. 980 trial, the 
State could introduce statements a respondent made to a State 
psychologist during a pre-petition interview provided that such 
statements would not subject the respondent to future criminal 
prosecutions.  Id.   Since the court concluded that a Miranda 
warning was not required, it held that Lombard did not suffer 
any prejudice as a result of his counsel's failure to object to 
the psychologist's testimony and report.  Id., ¶23, n. 4.  Thus, 
the court denied Lombard's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. 
II 
 
¶16 We now consider whether a person such as Lombard is 
entitled to receive Miranda warnings prior to being interviewed 
by a State evaluator in regard to whether a ch. 980 petition 
should be filed.  We recognize that the crux of Lombard's claim 
rests on his assertion that he received ineffective assistance 
No. 
00-3318   
 
10 
 
of counsel.  However, it is first necessary to determine whether 
Lombard was entitled to receive such warnings, before we may 
evaluate whether counsel's assistance was ineffective due to his 
failure to object at trial to the admission of Lombard's 
statements to the State evaluator.  We will address the issue of 
whether Lombard received ineffective assistance of counsel in a 
subsequent section of this opinion. 
 
¶17 In considering whether a ch. 980 respondent is 
entitled to receive Miranda warnings prior to a pre-petition 
interview 
with 
a 
state 
evaluator, 
we 
must 
analyze 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m).  Statutory interpretation is a question 
of law, which we review de novo.  State v. Williams, 198 
Wis. 2d 516, 525, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996).  Nevertheless, this 
court benefits from the analyses of the circuit court and the 
court of appeals.  Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 86, 
¶13, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893.   
¶18 The purpose of statutory interpretation is to give 
effect to the plain meaning of the words in the statute.  State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, __ Wis. 2d __, 
__N.W.2d __.  "We assume that the legislature's intent is 
expressed in the statutory language."  Id., ¶44. 
¶19 When interpreting a statute, we first must examine its 
plain language.  Id., ¶45.  State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶13, 
259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416.  If the statute's language is 
clear and unambiguous, we will apply that language to the 
present case using intrinsic sources such as scope, context, and 
purpose, if necessary.  "(S)cope, context, and purpose are 
No. 
00-3318   
 
11 
 
perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an 
unambiguous statute as long as the scope, context, and purpose 
are ascertainable from the text and structure of the statute 
itself, rather than extrinsic sources, such as legislative 
history."  Kalal, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶47.  Extrinsic sources are not 
consulted unless the language of a statute is determined to be 
ambiguous.  Id., ¶49.  A statute is ambiguous when reasonable 
persons can interpret a statute in multiple ways.  Williams, 198 
Wis. 2d at 526. 
¶20 Lombard 
asserts 
that, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m), all constitutional rights available to 
criminal defendants are available to ch. 980 respondents.  The 
only exception, Lombard contends, is where the legislature has 
made a specific provision that conflicts with the constitutional 
rights of criminal defendants.  In that scenario, Lombard 
concedes that the dictates of ch. 980 would control the scope of 
a respondent's rights. 
¶21 Lombard contends that the United States Supreme Court 
in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), stated that 
Miranda was a constitutional rule applicable to criminal 
defendants in custody.  Since these are constitutional rights 
that criminal defendants possess, Lombard asserts that this 
court should conclude that ch. 980 respondents have these rights 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m).  While other jurisdictions 
may not require suppression for Miranda violations under sex 
predator laws, Lombard points out that this is because those 
jurisdictions do not have the equivalent to § 980.05(1m), which 
No. 
00-3318   
 
12 
 
guarantees that respondents have the same rights as criminal 
defendants, unless specified by the legislature. 
¶22 Lombard asserts that criminal defendants have a right 
to remain silent when interviewed by doctors on behalf of the 
State, and Zanelli I established that a ch. 980 respondent has a 
right to remain silent.  Moreover, Lombard states that Zanelli 
II does not control in this case because Lombard, unlike 
Zanelli, was in custody when he gave his statement.  Thus, in 
Zanelli II, Lombard asserts that there would have been no 
grounds for suppression under Miranda or Dickerson, even if it 
were a criminal matter. 
¶23 Finally, Lombard asserts that Jurek's interaction with 
Lombard 
was 
interrogation, 
and 
Lombard's 
responses 
were 
incriminating under Miranda.  Lombard states that the Fifth 
Amendment applies when a psychiatrist interviews an in-custody 
defendant; thus, a different rule should not apply simply 
because Lombard was a ch. 980 respondent who was interviewed by 
a state psychologist.  Lombard contends that he was compelled to 
speak to Jurek, because Jurek told him that if he failed to do 
so it would be used against him during the evaluation process.  
This was worse than failing to provide a Miranda warning, 
Lombard 
argues, 
because 
Jurek's 
statement 
was 
inherently 
coercive. 
¶24 The State contends that, without a statute stating 
otherwise, the Fifth Amendment does not apply in the context of 
civil commitments.  The State posits that two questions must be 
answered to determine if the Fifth Amendment is applicable in 
No. 
00-3318   
 
13 
 
this case:  (1) is the statement offered in a subsequent 
criminal or civil proceeding? and (2) was the testimony 
compelled?  With respect to the first prong, the State asserts 
that, in Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), the United 
States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not apply 
to commitment 
proceedings,6 
and statements 
admitted 
in a 
subsequent criminal proceeding are permissible as long as they 
are not compelled.  With respect to the second prong, the State 
contends that, unless some type of compulsion is uncovered, a 
person subject to a state examination must affirmatively assert 
his or her Fifth Amendment rights. 
¶25 The State contends that Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) does 
not require that Miranda warnings be given for pre-petition 
psychological evaluations.  The State asserts that ch. 980 
proceedings are civil in nature; thus, to claim that respondents 
have the same constitutional protections as those afforded to 
criminal defendants, pursuant to § 980.05(1m), would be to 
convert the commitment process into a criminal proceeding and 
frustrate the entire purpose of ch. 980.  The State contends 
that this proposition was recognized in several Wisconsin cases, 
including State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105 
(1995), and in the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
                                                 
6 In Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), the petitioner 
in that case was found to be a sexually dangerous person under 
the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act.  Although the 
dissent cites to Allen for support, we note that the only 
support it gathers for its position is from the dissenters in 
Allen.  See dissent, ¶71. 
No. 
00-3318   
 
14 
 
Allen. 
 
Moreover, 
the 
State 
asserts 
that 
the 
text 
of 
§ 980.05(1m) supports the proposition that the constitutional 
rights afforded to respondents are available only at trial, as 
every subsection deals with some aspect of the commitment trial.   
¶26  The State contends that Zanelli I is inapposite, as 
it involved a person's exercise of his right to silence, and did 
not involve statements made with or without warning.  The State 
further contends that Zanelli II applied Miranda because the 
individual made statements in two settings, during a pre-
sentence investigation and to investigating detectives, when he 
was a suspect in a criminal case.  Since there is no ongoing 
criminal investigation here, the State contends that Zanelli II 
is inapplicable. 
¶27 Finally, the State asserts that, even if this court 
decides that Miranda warnings are required in pre-petition 
evaluations 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m), 
they 
were 
not 
necessary here because, although Lombard was in custody, he was 
not interrogated by Jurek.  The State contends that, simply 
because Jurek was required to note if Lombard declined to 
participate in the interview, it was not a sufficient penalty so 
that Lombard was compelled or coerced to speak to Jurek.   
¶28 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) does not 
require that ch. 980 respondents be given Miranda warnings prior 
to pre-petition interviews with state evaluators. 
¶29 We believe it is necessary to begin our analysis by 
discussing the Miranda decision in some detail.  The Miranda 
decision was in response to what the majority characterized as 
No. 
00-3318   
 
15 
 
"the 
nature 
and 
setting 
of 
[the] 
in-custody 
interrogation . . . ."  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.  In its 
opinion, the United States Supreme Court cited numerous reports, 
cases, and even law enforcement manuals, which demonstrated that 
law enforcement tactics used on criminal suspects during 
custodial interrogation had, in certain instances, resulted in 
confessions 
from 
suspects 
subjected 
to 
physical 
and 
psychological coercion.  Id. at 445-50.  The Court noted that 
while physical tactics are employed less frequently today in the 
interrogation setting, the modern interrogation focuses on 
psychologically coercing the suspect to confess.  Id. at 448.  
Thus, the Court sought, with its opinion, to alleviate some of 
the pressures associated with incommunicado interrogation and 
noted that such tactics were "at odds with one of our Nation's 
most cherished principles——that the individual may not be 
compelled to incriminate himself."  Id. at 457-58. 
¶30 In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that 
"the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or 
inculpatory, stemming from 
custodial 
interrogation of the 
defendant 
unless 
it 
demonstrates 
the 
use 
of 
procedural 
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination."  Id. at 444.  The Court concluded that "there 
can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available 
outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect 
persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is 
curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to 
incriminate themselves."  Id. at 467.   
No. 
00-3318   
 
16 
 
¶31 The Court devised several safeguards which, when a 
suspect was informed of these rights, should alleviate the 
coercive element of custodial interrogation.  First, the Court 
concluded that every suspect should be advised that he or she 
has the right to remain silent.  Id. at 467-68.  Second, the 
suspect must be warned that anything he or she does say can and 
will be used against him or her in court.  Id. at 469.  Finally, 
the suspect must be informed that he or she has a right to 
counsel during interrogation and, if indigent, counsel will be 
appointed.  Id. at 471-73. 
¶32 After discussing the appropriate warning suspects 
should receive prior to interrogation, the Court then proceeded 
to discuss how a suspect could waive his or her rights under the 
Fifth Amendment.  As an initial matter, the Court noted that if 
the suspect indicated that he or she wishes to remain silent 
either prior to or during questioning, such request must be 
honored and the interrogation must cease.  Id. at 473-74.  The 
Court stated that while mere silence after the suspect has been 
warned will not constitute a waiver, an express statement by the 
suspect that he or she is willing to make a statement and 
declines an attorney, followed closely by a statement, may be 
enough to show waiver.  Id. at 475.   
¶33 Thirty-four years after Miranda was decided, the 
United States Supreme Court announced that its decision in 
Miranda was a constitutional rule.  In Dickerson, the Court 
concluded that Miranda announced a constitutional rule, which 
could not be superseded by an act of Congress that made 
No. 
00-3318   
 
17 
 
admission of incriminating statements at trial turn solely on 
whether those statements were made voluntarily.  Dickerson, 530 
U.S. at 432.  The Court noted that while it has supervisory 
power over the federal courts, it does not have such power over 
the states.  Id. at 438.  The Court stated that it had routinely 
applied Miranda to state court cases, and pointed to the fact 
that the Miranda opinion itself stated that the Court granted 
certiorari 
in 
that 
case, 
in 
part, 
"to 
give 
concrete 
constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and 
courts to follow."  Id. at 439 (emphasis omitted)(citation 
omitted). 
¶34 Wisconsin courts have had numerous occasions to apply 
the Miranda decision since its issuance.  In State v. La 
Fernier, 37 Wis. 2d 365, 375-78, 155 N.W.2d 93 (1967), this 
court applied the Miranda decision to preclude the admission of 
a suspect's statements to police when an investigator did not 
give the suspect his Miranda warnings, and the suspect confessed 
to the crime.  In State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 359, 588 
N.W.2d 606 (1999), we concluded that the incarcerated suspect 
was subjected to interrogation "from the moment he became a 
potential suspect" when the police were questioning him in a 
prison interview room, concerning the crime of homicide.  
Because he was not given Miranda warnings until after he made 
his incriminating oral statements, we concluded that the 
statements made prior to such warnings should be suppressed.  
Id.  But we held that the circuit court properly admitted the 
suspect's written statements because they were voluntary and 
No. 
00-3318   
 
18 
 
given after he was properly advised of his Miranda rights.7  Id. 
at 365.  More recently, in State v. Knapp, 2003 WI 121, 265 
Wis. 2d 278, 666 N.W.2d 881, we held that a defendant was 
entitled to have the physical evidence against him suppressed at 
trial, because the officer who came to the defendant's home 
asked the defendant what clothes he had been wearing on the 
night of the crime in question without first advising the 
defendant of his Miranda rights.  The officer intentionally 
omitted Miranda warnings, fearing if he gave them, he would not 
get the desired evidence.  Id., ¶73.  Certainly, we also have 
had numerous occasions to interpret and apply the Miranda 
decision in the many cases between the LaFernier and Knapp 
cases.       
¶35 While the discourses on the Miranda decision and its 
implications are voluminous, we provide the brief abovementioned 
history simply to emphasize our recognition of the importance of 
the Miranda decision and its progeny in guaranteeing that 
suspects' Fifth Amendment and Article I, § 8 rights will not be 
rendered ineffectual.   
                                                 
7 At first blush, it may be tempting to liken the 
circumstances in State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 359, 588 
N.W.2d 606 (1999), to those in the present case and conclude 
that Lombard was entitled to receive Miranda warnings.  Unlike 
the suspect in Armstrong, however, Lombard was not a suspect in 
a criminal investigation.  None of the statements Lombard made 
could subject him to a future criminal prosecution.  Lombard had 
already been convicted and sentenced for the crimes discussed 
during the evaluation.  The examiner's goal was to evaluate 
Lombard for a civil commitment proceeding, not to determine if 
he should be charged with a crime and subjected to a criminal 
prosecution. 
No. 
00-3318   
 
19 
 
¶36 In this case, Lombard contends that he was entitled to 
receive Miranda warnings prior to his pre-petition interview 
with the State evaluator.  Although Lombard locates this right 
as flowing from Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m), we conclude that the 
statute does not support such an interpretation.  Moreover, we 
conclude that Lombard's attempt to find support for his 
arguments in Wisconsin case law misses its mark.  
¶37 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) contains 
the words "at the trial" at the beginning of the subsection.  We 
agree with the State that, although those words did not begin 
the sentence referring to constitutional rights, a reasonable 
interpretation of the plain language of the statute leads to the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
that 
such 
constitutional rights would apply at respondent's trial.  The 
context also supports that conclusion.  Here, Lombard gave the 
statements in question during the pre-petition phase of the 
process.  Certainly, there is nothing within § 980.05(1m) to 
indicate that such constitutional protections must be afforded 
to potential respondents during the pre-petition phase, well 
before trial. 
¶38 This interpretation is bolstered by our decision in 
State ex rel. Seibert v. Macht, 2001 WI 67, ¶12, 244 
Wis. 2d 378, 627 N.W.2d 881, as revised in State ex rel. Seibert 
v. Macht, 2002 WI 12, ¶2, 249 Wis. 2d 702, 639 N.W.2d 707.  In 
Macht, we concluded that "[a]n alleged sexually violent person, 
subject to commitment under Chapter 980, is not a criminal 
defendant.  However, such a person has the same constitutional 
No. 
00-3318   
 
20 
 
rights as 
a 
criminal 
defendant 
at 
trial." 
 
Macht, 244 
Wis. 2d 378, ¶12 (emphasis added).  See also State v. Burris, 
2004 WI 91, ¶22, __Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __. 
¶39 Moreover, 
we 
agree 
with 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
harmonization of several applicable cases with the facts of this 
case.  In Zanelli I, the defendant appealed from an order that 
committed him as a sexually violent person.  A State evaluator 
performed a pre-petition evaluation on the respondent based 
solely on his medical and corrections records, as the respondent 
chose to exercise his right to silence.  Zanelli I, 212 
Wis. 2d at 364.  At the respondent's trial, both the prosecutor 
and the state evaluator commented on the respondent's choice to 
remain silent during the evaluation.  Id. at 369.  The court of 
appeals concluded that the state improperly commented on the 
respondent's choice to remain silent.  Id. at 372.  The court 
stated 
that 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment 
guarantee 
against 
self-
incrimination 
extends 
to 
pre-arrest 
silence 
and, 
since 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) provides that ch. 980 respondents share 
the same constitutional rights as criminal defendants, Zanelli 
possessed a constitutional right to remain silent.  Id. at 371-
72. 
¶40 While we recognize that Zanelli I stands for the 
proposition that a person subject to a pre-petition evaluation 
has 
the 
right 
to 
remain 
silent 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m), we think that Lombard's claim that 
Zanelli I supports his position that Miranda warnings are 
required prior to a pre-petition interview is too great a 
No. 
00-3318   
 
21 
 
stretch.  We agree with the court of appeals' conclusion:  "It 
does not necessarily follow, however, that a person who is being 
evaluated for the potential filing of a ch. 980 petition is 
entitled to a Miranda warning before being interviewed."  
Lombard, 266 Wis. 2d 887, ¶26.  
¶41 Moreover, 
we 
agree 
with 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
treatment of Zanelli II.  Id., ¶¶26-28.  In Zanelli II, the 
respondent contended that his statements to probation officers 
and a police investigator were "compelled by the threat of loss 
of liberty" and should not have been admitted at the trial.  
Zanelli II, 223 Wis. 2d at 567.  The court concluded that the  
statements to his probation officers were properly admitted, as 
the statements made were regarding crimes for which he had 
already been convicted; thus, he was not subject to future 
criminal prosecutions.  Id. at 568.  With respect to the 
statements made to the police investigator, the court concluded 
that he was not entitled to a Miranda warning because he could 
leave the police station whenever he desired and was not in 
custody for Miranda purposes.  Id. at 571. 
¶42 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
reasoning 
in 
Zanelli 
II, 
concerning crimes for which Zanelli had already been convicted, 
is directly applicable to this case.  Here, Lombard was already 
convicted for the underlying sexual assault offenses that led to 
his ch. 980 commitment as a sexually violent person.  Thus, any 
statements Lombard made to Jurek regarding those assaults could 
not be used against him in future prosecutions.  We agree with 
the court of appeals in this case that "(t)he purpose of the 
No. 
00-3318   
 
22 
 
examiner's interview was to evaluate Lombard for the purpose of  
a potential 'civil commitment proceeding, not a criminal 
proceeding,' and the examiner was not required to comply with 
Miranda's dictates."  Lombard, 266 Wis. 2d 887, ¶27 (citation 
omitted).   
¶43 In Carpenter, we rejected the assertion that the 
primary purpose of ch. 980 was criminal punishment.  Carpenter, 
197 Wis. 2d at 270.  In doing so, we drew from the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Allen.  We stated that "the 
legislature's decision 'to provide some of the safeguards 
applicable 
in 
criminal 
trials 
cannot 
itself 
turn 
these 
proceedings into criminal 
prosecutions.'"  
Carpenter, 197 
Wis. 2d at 270 (quoting Allen, 478 U.S. at 372.).  We continue 
to emphasize that since ch. 980 proceedings are civil in nature, 
Lombard was not in danger of being subjected to another criminal 
prosecution.   
¶44 It bears emphasis that, even though Lombard was 
neither constitutionally nor statutorily entitled to receive 
Miranda warnings, the State evaluator went to great lengths to 
ensure 
that 
Lombard 
was 
informed 
about 
the 
pre-petition 
evaluation process.  In fact, Jurek stated that nearly the 
entire first day of the three-day evaluation was spent educating 
Lombard about the ch. 980 process, including the pre-petition 
evaluation that Jurek would be conducting.  Jurek testified 
about how he acclimates a person to the pre-petition evaluation 
process: 
No. 
00-3318   
 
23 
 
There is an initial introduction where I tell the 
person hello, here is who I am, here is what I'm here 
to do, and enter into a discussion with them asking 
them what do you know about Chapter 980, what have you 
heard, what is your understanding of the process, and 
after that kind of discussion that they know what this 
is all about and what my role is and what I'm going to 
be doing, looking at the records, giving them an MMPI8 
and then having an interview with them. 
The next step is to introduce the idea that this is 
voluntary, that this is something they can do or they 
can choose not to do.  I emphasize they are able to 
participate in the entire process, that they can 
decide not to participate at any point, they can 
change their mind, that if they don’t want to do the 
MMPI, in particular, they can refuse to do that 
portion.  If there are any questions that are asked 
that they don’t want to answer, they can refuse to 
answer specific questions.  And then the third thing 
that happens is the form is introduced and then I 
literally read what is in the form. 
¶45 Jurek further testified that Lombard indicated that he 
"was willing to participate and was willing to share whatever 
information he could."  Thus, we feel that even though Lombard 
was not entitled to a Miranda warning, the State evaluator 
attempted to create an environment where Lombard understood that 
it was entirely his choice to decide if he wanted to participate 
                                                 
8 The MMPI, or Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, 
is an objective psychological test designed to reveal any 
psychopathologies or personality disorders that a subject may 
possess.  The most recent version of the MMPI was introduced in 
1989 and is referred to as the MMPI-2. 
No. 
00-3318   
 
24 
 
in the interview.9  Under such circumstances, there was no 
coercion. 
III 
 
¶46 We next address Lombard's claim that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  Ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims present a mixed question of fact 
and law.  State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, ¶19, 244 Wis. 2d 523, 
628 N.W.2d 801 (citing State v. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 127-
28, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990)).  The circuit court's findings of 
fact are upheld unless clearly erroneous.  Id.  The issue of 
whether counsel's performance was ineffective is a question of 
law that we review de novo.  Id. 
 
¶47 Lombard contends that because his counsel failed to 
challenge the use of Lombard's statements at trial until after 
the jury verdict, his counsel's performance fell below the range 
of competence.  Lombard asserts that, had this been a criminal 
case, this court would easily have concluded that counsel's 
performance was ineffective.  Lombard claims that without 
Jurek's testimony that Lombard made certain statements to him at 
the interview, and without Jurek's use of Lombard's statements 
to reach his conclusions, there was insufficient evidence to 
prove that Lombard was a sexually violent person.  Thus, had the 
                                                 
9 Although Lombard claims that he felt compelled to speak 
because his failure to do so could be used against him, Jurek 
periodically reminded Lombard that it was his decision whether 
he wanted to participate in the evaluation.  Lombard explicitly 
stated that he was willing to continue the evaluation and also 
continued to respond to Jurek's questions. 
No. 
00-3318   
 
25 
 
statements not been admitted, Lombard contends that the outcome 
certainly would have been different. 
 
¶48 The State asserts that Lombard cannot establish that 
he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  Since the State 
contends that Miranda warnings are either inapplicable or not 
required in this scenario, it argues that Lombard's counsel was 
not deficient for failing to object to the admission of 
Lombard's statements at trial.  The State further contends that 
Lombard cannot establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's 
failure to object because, even without a diagnosis of sexual 
sadism, a diagnosis of paraphilia not otherwise specified is 
enough to support a mental disorder that requires commitment 
under ch. 980.  The State asserts that the jury could also look 
at the fact that Lombard committed eight sexual assaults in 20 
months.  Moreover, the State contends that the evidence would 
have likely come before the jury even if Lombard's counsel had 
objected to its admission, because the State could use such 
evidence to impeach his testimony that the victim's suffering 
did not sexually excite him.  More specifically, Lombard told 
Jurek during his evaluation that, during the last sexual assault 
he committed before going to prison, he threatened the victim 
with a knife, struck her numerous times, and became enraged when 
she passed out during the assault. 
 
¶49 In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of 
counsel, two prongs must be satisfied.  First, a defendant must 
show that counsel's performance was deficient.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  The errors contemplated 
No. 
00-3318   
 
26 
 
under this standard must be so egregious that the attorney was 
not functioning as the defendant's counsel as guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment.  Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 127.  In evaluating 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the burden is on the 
defendant to demonstrate such deficient performance, and the 
court gives considerable deference to the decisions made by 
counsel.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89.  Second, the defendant 
must demonstrate that such deficient performance prejudiced his 
or her defense.  Id. at 692.  In order to satisfy this prong, 
counsel's errors must be so serious that, as a result of such 
errors, the defendant was deprived of a fair, reliable trial.  
Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 127.  More specifically, the defendant 
must show that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the 
trial would have been different.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
 
¶50 Because we earlier concluded that persons subject to 
ch. 980 pre-petition evaluations do not have a right to receive 
Miranda warnings, we must now conclude that Lombard's counsel 
did not render a deficient performance by failing to object to 
the admission of Lombard's pre-petition evaluation statements at 
trial.  The United States Supreme Court has stated that when an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be resolved on one 
prong, courts need not discuss, in every case, both counsel's 
performance and prejudice to the defendant.  Id. at 697.  
However, we also agree with the court of appeals' conclusion 
that Lombard suffered no prejudice as a result of his counsel's 
failure to object to the psychologist's testimony.  Because 
Lombard was not entitled to such Miranda warnings, he could not 
No. 
00-3318   
 
27 
 
have been prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to the 
admission of his testimony on grounds that his Miranda rights 
had been violated.10 
IV 
¶51 In summary, we conclude that Lombard was not entitled 
to Miranda warnings prior to his pre-petition evaluation with 
the State's psychologist in regard to whether a ch. 980 petition 
should be filed.  Wisconsin Stat. § 980.05(1m) plainly contains 
the language "at the trial."  The plain language of the statute 
leads to the conclusion that the legislature intended that such 
constitutional rights would apply at Lombard's ch. 980 trial.  
Thus, since the constitutional rights referred to are those 
within the trial context, Lombard did not have the right to 
Miranda warnings during his pre-petition interview with the 
State psychologist.  Because Lombard was not entitled to the 
warnings, we conclude that counsel's performance was not 
deficient, and Lombard's claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel fails. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶52 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate. 
 
 
                                                 
10 We strongly disagree with the dissent that counsel's 
performance was ineffective.  See dissent, ¶78.  We also 
strongly disagree with the dissent, for the reasons noted, that 
counsel's performance was prejudicial per se.  Id.   
No.  00-3318.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶53 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
I 
conclude that ch. 980 individuals are entitled to be advised at 
the pre-petition examination (1) that they have the right to 
remain silent, and (2) that their silence will not be used 
against then at any stage of the ch. 980 commitment proceeding.    
¶54 Lombard was advised that he had the right to remain 
silent (that is, that he had the right not to participate in the 
examination).  He was not advised that his silence could not be 
used against him.  I therefore conclude that the state 
psychologist should not have been allowed to testify to the 
conclusions he reached based on Lombard's statements.  Even more 
startling and prejudicial in the present case is that the 
psychologist incorrectly advised Lombard that his refusal to 
answer would be used as part of the evaluation and could be 
repeated in testimony at trial.  
¶55 I 
conclude 
that 
Lombard 
should 
prevail 
on 
his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Lombard should get a 
new trial on the issue of his ch. 980 commitment. 
¶56 The parties and the majority opinion frame the issue 
as involving Miranda11 rights because at issue in the present 
case is the right of an individual in custody to remain silent 
and the right of the individual to be advised that the State may 
not use his or her silence or statements in subsequent 
proceedings.    These rights are derived from the Miranda case 
                                                 
11 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
No.  00-3318.ssa 
 
2 
 
and other cases.  The present case does not involve any other 
"Miranda-like" right. 
¶57 This is a ch. 980 commitment case.  The prospective 
ch. 
980 
individual 
has 
statutory 
rights 
(as 
well 
as 
constitutional rights).  The statute in issue, Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.05(1m), provides that "all constitutional rights available 
to a defendant in a criminal proceeding are available to the 
person."       
¶58 As the majority recognizes, this case raises the 
following three issues:  
A. 
Does a prospective ch. 980 individual have the 
right 
to 
remain 
silent 
in 
a 
pre-petition 
examination?  
B. 
May a prospective ch. 980 individual's silence 
during a pre-petition examination be used against 
him or her at trial? and  
C. 
Is the State required to advise a prospective ch. 
980 individual at the beginning of the pre-petition 
examination about the right to remain silent and 
that silence cannot be used against the individual?   
¶59 I decide each of these issues as follows: 
¶60 A. 
I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion 
that 
a 
prospective ch. 980 individual has a right to remain silent at 
the 
pre-petition 
examination 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.05(1m).12  Zanelli I established this right.13  The majority 
opinion adheres to Zanelli I.      
                                                 
12 Majority op., ¶39.  
No.  00-3318.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶61 B. 
I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion 
that 
a 
prospective ch. 980 individual's silence during a pre-petition 
examination may not be used against the individual during 
trial.14   
¶62 This case does not involve silence.  Lombard spoke.  
The State used Lombard's speech against him at trial. 
¶63 C. I disagree with the majority opinion that a 
prospective ch. 980 individual need not be advised that he or 
she has a right to remain silent and that his or her silence 
will not be used against him or her at trial.15  I discuss this 
aspect of the case below. 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 State v. Zanelli, 212 Wis. 2d 358, 372, 569 N.W.2d 301 
(Ct. App. 1997) (Zanelli I). 
Zanelli I protects the respondent's right to silence at the 
ch. 980 trial, and bars testimony about or reference to the 
individual's silence during or before the trial.  At the ch. 980 
trial in Zanelli I both the prosecutor and the psychologist 
commented on Zanelli's silence during a pre-petition interview.13 
Zanelli I, 212 Wis. 2d at 369.  Zanelli argued that by 
commenting on his silence the State violated his constitutional 
right to remain silent.  Zanelli I, 212 Wis. 2d at 370.  The 
court of appeals concluded that when a witness and the 
prosecutor commented on Zanelli's silence, they violated the 
rule of State v. Fencl, 109 Wis. 2d 224, 325 N.W.2d 703 (1982), 
made applicable to Zanelli by virtue of § 980.05(1m).  Zanelli 
I, 212 Wis. 2d at 372. 
14 Majority op., ¶39; Zanelli I, 212 Wis. 2d at 371-72. 
15 I confess that I find it difficult to follow the 
reasoning of the majority opinion, much of which seems more 
applicable to the first two issues rather than this third issue. 
 
The majority opinion seems to rely on the "constitutional 
rights" granted by Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) as being limited to 
the trial.  Section 980.05(1m) provides in full as follows:  "At 
the trial to determine whether the person who is the subject of 
a petition under § 980.02 is a sexually violent person, all 
rules of evidence in criminal actions apply.  All constitutional 
No.  00-3318.ssa 
 
4 
 
I 
¶64 As I see it, implicit in the legislature's grant of 
the right to remain silent (a constitutional right of a criminal 
                                                                                                                                                             
rights available to a defendant in a criminal proceeding are 
available to the person."   
 
The first sentence of the provision refers to trial and 
evidence.  Evidence is a trial matter.  The second sentence does 
not refer to trial.  It addresses all constitutional rights in a 
"criminal proceeding."  Constitutional rights arise before, 
during, and after trial.  Thus the words "criminal proceeding" 
denote more than rights at trial.  To read the words "at the 
trial" from the first sentence into the second sentence 
conflicts with the words "criminal proceeding" in the second 
sentence.  
 
Reading 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) 
as 
limited 
to 
trials 
appears to make it redundant.  Wisconsin Stat. § 980.03 (2)(b) 
states the rights of a prospective ch. 980 individual, including 
the right to remain silent, at all hearings.  Therefore 
§ 980.05(1m) must provide more than simply a right to silence at 
trial. 
 
The majority opinion relies on State ex rel. Seibert v. 
Macht, 2001 WI 67, ¶12, 244 Wis. 2d 378, 627 N.W.2d 881, as 
revised by 2002 WI 12, ¶2, 249 Wis. 2d 702, 639 N.W.2d 707, to 
support its interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m).  In a 
motion for reconsideration in that case, the State asked the 
court to amend its decision because "the last sentence in 
§ 980.05(1m) may, but need not, be interpreted as applicable 
only to trial."  The State requested the court to refrain from 
defining the scope of § 980.05(1m) without discussing all the 
possible interpretations of the section and explaining why one 
interpretation is preferred.   
 
The court in Macht did not heed the state's warning and did 
not explain why it added the words "at trial."  The case at bar 
is the first case in which it has the opportunity to examine the 
statute closely and it does not.   
In other cases this court has treated  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.05(1m) as applying throughout the ch. 980 proceeding.  See 
State v. Sorenson, 2002 WI 78, ¶19, 254 Wis. 2d 54, 646 
N.W.2d 354; 
State 
v. 
Thiel, 
2001 
WI 
App 
32, 
¶15, 
241 
Wis. 2d 465, 626 N.W.2d 787.   
No.  00-3318.ssa 
 
5 
 
defendant) is the individual's right to be advised of the right 
to remain silent.  If an individual does not know of the right, 
the individual's right to pre-petition silence is meaningless.  
"[I]f a person in custody is to be subjected to questioning, 'he 
must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he 
has the right to remain silent,' so the ignorant may learn of 
this right and so that the pressures of the interrogation 
atmosphere will be overcome for those previously aware of the 
right."16   
¶65 The State "may not use statements, whether exculpatory 
or 
inculpatory, 
stemming 
from 
custodial 
interrogation . . . unless it demonstrates the use of procedural 
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination."17  Unless procedural safeguards to inform the 
person of his or her right of silence and a continued 
opportunity 
to 
exercise 
it 
are 
in 
place, 
"no 
statement 
obtained . . . can truly be the product of [the person's] free 
choice."18  In sum, "the privilege [against self-incrimination] 
is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right 'to 
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered 
exercise of his own will.'"19  
                                                 
16 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 6.5(b), at 
509 (2d ed. 1999) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966)). 
17 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
18 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458. 
19 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 
U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).  See also Fencl, 109 Wis. 2d at 236. 
No.  00-3318.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶66 Fundamental fairness and protection of the privilege 
against self-incrimination require a pre-examination warning of 
the right to remain silent.  The potential ch. 980 individual is 
in custody.20  The interview is conducted in prison by a 
psychologist acting on behalf of the state.  The interview is 
mandatory.  The prisoner's freedom, his liberty interest, is on 
the line.  Although a ch. 980 individual's potentially-for-life 
commitment is not, according to the legislature and this court, 
punishment for past criminal sexual conduct, but rather is 
treatment, the individual will feel compelled to speak unless 
advised that his silence will not be used against him.       
¶67 Without a warning that the individual can remain 
silent and that this silence cannot be used against the 
individual, 
the 
individual's 
free 
choice 
is 
eviscerated; 
compulsion is inherent in the circumstances.  Without advice 
about the right to remain silent the prospective ch. 980 
individual cannot make a free and deliberate choice whether to 
exercise his statutory (a criminal defendant's constitutional) 
right to remain silent.   
¶68 Relinquishment of a statutory right to remain silent 
(which is, according to the statute, comparable to a criminal 
accused's relinquishment of the constitutional right to remain 
silent) should be the product of free choice rather than the 
result of intimidation, coercion, or deception.  A valid waiver 
of a right to remain silent must be made with the awareness of 
                                                 
20 See State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 355, 588 
N.W.2d 606 (1999) (persons incarcerated are per se in custody).   
No.  00-3318.ssa 
 
7 
 
both the right being abandoned and the consequences of the 
decision to abandon that right.21  This rule safeguards the 
privilege of self-incrimination, regardless of whether the 
individual will incriminate himself.22 
¶69 This 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) 
is 
supported by Wis. Stat. § 51.20(9)(a)4., which specifies that 
prior to examination for civil commitment the individual shall 
be informed that his or statements can be used as a basis for 
commitment and that he or she has the right to remain silent.  
The issuance of such a warning establishes, by statute, a 
presumption that the individual understands that he or she need 
not speak to the examiner.    
¶70 This interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m) is 
further supported by Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986).  In 
Allen the court held that admissions obtained in an Illinois 
sexually-dangerous proceeding without Miranda warnings were 
properly received.  The court's conclusion was grounded on the 
civil label (although the label is not determinative) and the 
civil attributes of the statute and the fact that "[i]n short, 
the State has disavowed any interest in punishment, provided for 
the treatment of those it commits, and established a system 
under which committed persons may be released after the briefest 
time in confinement."23  Release "after the briefest of time in 
confinement" are not words that can be used to describe ch. 980 
                                                 
21 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.     
22 Id. at 444.   
23 Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 370 (1986). 
No.  00-3318.ssa 
 
8 
 
or the practice thereunder.  Wisconsin's ch. 980 committees have 
waited years before they were released on supervised release 
even though a court declared them eligible for such release.  
Thus one of the major grounds underlying the Allen majority is 
missing in the present case, and therefore the majority opinion 
in Allen does not, in my opinion, support the majority opinion 
in the present case.   
¶71 I conclude, as did the four dissenters in Allen, that 
the criminal law "casts so long a shadow on a putatively civil 
proceeding . . . that the procedure must be deemed a 'criminal 
case' within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment"24 and the 
Miranda warnings about silence must be given.  Chapter 980 relies 
heavily on the criminal justice system:  The proceedings are 
triggered 
by 
a 
criminal 
conviction; 
the 
proceedings 
are 
prosecuted by the state; the burden of proof is that applicable 
to the criminal law; the constitutional rights of a criminal 
defendant apply; the consequences of the proceedings are 
institutionalization for an indefinite time, possibly life.  
Justice Stevens in his dissent wrote:  "In my opinion, 
permitting a State to create a shadow criminal law without the 
fundamental protection of the Fifth Amendment conflicts with the 
respect for liberty and individual dignity that has long 
characterized, and that continues to characterize, our free 
society."25  
                                                 
24 Id. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
25 Id. at 384 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
No.  00-3318.ssa 
 
9 
 
 
II 
¶72 Even if a ch. 980 individual does not have a right to 
be warned that he or she has a right to remain silent and that 
silence cannot be used against him or her at any stage of the 
ch. 980 proceeding, as the majority opinion holds, an incorrect 
and misleading warning is unacceptable.  And that's what 
happened in this case.    
¶73 The 
majority 
opinion 
emphasizes 
that 
the 
state 
psychologist "went to great lengths to ensure that Lombard was 
informed about the pre-petition evaluation process,"26 and that 
"Lombard understood that it was entirely his choice to decide if 
he wanted to participate . . . ."27  Yet the majority opinion 
ignores the fact that the psychologist misstated the law about 
the use to which Lombard's silence may be put and thus misled 
Lombard. 
¶74 The psychologist advised Lombard that his silence will 
be used as part of his evaluation.  This information was 
erroneous.  The new form the State supplied the court correctly 
explains that the individual's decision regarding participation 
in the interview "cannot be used against [the individual]."28 
¶75 The psychologist also advised Lombard that "nothing 
during the evaluation will be confidential and may be repeated 
                                                 
26 Majority op., ¶44. 
27 Id., ¶45. 
28 Id., ¶4 n.4. 
No.  00-3318.ssa 
 
10 
 
in testimony or written response."29  The psychologist thus 
advised 
Lombard 
that 
even 
Lombard's 
silence 
during 
the 
evaluation would not be confidential.  This information too was 
erroneous.  The new form the State supplied the court correctly 
explains that "nothing said during the evaluation would be 
confidential."30 
¶76 It is one thing for the State not to advise a 
prospective ch. 980 individual about his right to remain silent 
and about the use to which the silence may (or may not) be put.  
It is another thing for the State to give the individual 
erroneous advice and then use the information the State obtains 
through this erroneous advice against the individual. 
¶77 This case can be boiled down to these important facts:  
Lombard was not advised of his statutory right to remain silent.  
In fact, Lombard received erroneous advice, advice contrary to 
the law of Wisconsin:  He was advised that his silence would be 
used against him.  The State thus misled Lombard into speaking.  
The state's misleading Lombard was, in my opinion, prejudicial 
error. 
¶78 I conclude that counsel should have, at a minimum, 
objected to the psychologist's testimony on the ground that 
Lombard was incorrectly advised about his right to remain 
silent, that this incorrect advice was misleading, and that 
Lombard's agreement to participate in the examination based on 
                                                 
29 The full written form Lombard signed, including these 
statements, appears in the majority opinion, ¶4. 
30 Majority op., ¶4 n.4 (emphasis added). 
No.  00-3318.ssa 
 
11 
 
this erroneous advice was invalid as a matter of law.  Trial 
counsel's failure to object to the psychologist's testimony was, 
I conclude, ineffective assistance of counsel and prejudicial 
per se.   
¶79 As a result of the majority opinion, a state agent 
(the psychologist) is free to mislead a prospective ch. 980  
individual to believe that his silence at the pre-petition 
examination can be used against him and thus induce the 
individual to speak.  I dissent. 
¶80 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
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