Case Title: MARTIN J. GOSS v. PAMELA J. GOSS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88-267

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-09-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARTIN J. GOSS v. PAMELA J. GOSS1989 WY 172780 P.2d 306Case Number: 88-267Decided: 09/06/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARTIN J. GOSS, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

PAMELA J. GOSS, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
court, NatronaCounty, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

Phillip T. 
Willoughby, Casper, for appellant.

John M. Burman 
and Ann B. Stevens, Faculty Supervisors, Linda L. Goff and Donald M. Gerstein, 
Student Legal Interns, Wyoming Legal Services, College of Law, University of 
Wyoming, Laramie, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY, and GOLDEN, JJ., and 
ROONEY, J., Retired.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The controlling issue 
here, guiding the resolution of this case, is whether sufficient service was 
made on an ex-wife (mother) of a Petition for Modification of Order Judgment and 
Decree to vest the district court with jurisdiction to enter a default judgment 
modifying the custody provisions of the Order, Judgment, and Decree in a divorce 
case. In this appeal, taken from a subsequent Order Awarding Legal Custody of 
the Minor Children to Defendant - Judgment for Past Due Child Support that was 
entered in a proceeding initiated by the mother, the parties choose to debate 
the merits of that order, and they do not question the validity of the earlier 
default. We have an obligation to raise questions of jurisdiction on our motion, 
however, and we conclude that the district court was without jurisdiction to 
enter the default judgment modifying the child custody provisions in the Order, 
Judgment and Decree. The effect of that lack of jurisdiction is that the order 
awarding the custody of the minor children to the father in the initial 
modification proceeding was void, and the subsequent proceeding initiated by the 
mother which resulted in the order from which this appeal is taken was 
unnecessary in terms of adjusting the status quo. The several claims of error 
can be considered only upon the assumption that the issues as joined 
contemplated an effort by the divorced husband (father) to obtain a valid order 
awarding custody of the minor children to him. We affirm the decision made by 
the district court awarding custody to the mother.

[¶2.]     In the Brief of 
Appellant Martin J. Goss, the father asserts the issues on appeal to 
be:

"1. Did the trial court 
err by failing to enforce its order of custody?

"2. Did the trial court 
err ruling the evidence presented was sufficient to award custody of the minor 
children to the appellee?

"3. Did the trial court 
err and abuse its discretion awarding custody of the minor children to the 
appellee?

"4. Did the trial court 
err as a matter of law by failing to consider the best interests of the children 
in a child custody dispute, and by considering instead only the best interests 
and wishes of the mother?"

In the Brief of 
Appellee, the mother submits her own statements of those issues as 
follows:

"Did the trial court 
properly exercise its discretion in awarding child custody to 
appellee?

"I. Did the trial court 
have legal justification to not enforce its earlier custody 
order?

"II. Was there sufficient 
evidence to find that appellee was the proper parent to receive 
custody?

"III. Did The trial court 
consider the best interests of the children?"

[¶3.]     We consider the issues 
framed by the parties in their respective briefs from the perspective that the 
case presents an effort by the father to gain custody. We address those issues 
from that perspective because, as stated, they assume the validity of an earlier 
order that modified the custody provision of the Order, Judgment and Decree by 
awarding custody to the father. Based upon that assumption, the parties argue 
the usual requirements for modifying custody from the premise that this 
subsequent proceeding initiated by the wife was designed to alter the status quo 
and, therefore, certain evidentiary burdens were imposed upon the mother. In the 
absence of jurisdiction in the district court to enter the first order that 
modified child custody, all of the assumptions in the case now before us are 
erroneous.

[¶4.]     By an Order, Judgment 
and Decree entered on July 30, 1981, the marriage of the parties was dissolved. 
A divorce was granted to the father, and custody of the three minor children of 
the parties was placed with the mother. The father was awarded reasonable rights 
of visitation, and he was required to pay child support in the amount of $100 
per month per child. Each of the parties subsequently remarried and, in August 
of 1983, both were living in Germany. The father was stationed 
there as a member of the United States Army, and the mother was living there 
because of her new husband's duty assignment with the United States Army. The 
mother took the children to the father for a period of visitation that was to 
end prior to the beginning of their new school term on August 27, 1983. Although 
the father was aware of the mother's residence, he had not seen the children in 
the more than two years since the divorce. Three days before school was to 
begin, the mother asked the father to return the children to her, but he did not 
return them. Instead, on September 23, 1983, the father caused to be filed in 
the original divorce case a Petition for Modification of Order, Judgment and 
Decree in which he prayed for a modification granting him permanent care and 
custody of the children. In a letter to his counsel that is included in the 
record, the father refers to a letter from the attorney, dated August 5, 1983, 
requesting information about the children, which certainly supports an inference 
that the father planned to seek custody before the visitation period was 
initiated.

[¶5.]     The father attempted to 
serve process on the mother through notice by certified mail addressed to the 
army post office address of her new husband. That letter was returned by the 
postal service marked "refused by addressee." The father then attempted service 
upon the mother by publication in the Casper Star Tribune. The mother did not 
respond to the father's petition; her default was entered; and the order 
modifying custody was entered on January 27, 1984, awarding custody to the 
father. Meanwhile, in Germany, the mother had retrieved her 
children from the father's custody with the help of German police. That occurred 
a short time before the filing of the modification order. From the time the 
children were returned until December of 1987, the father provided no child 
support, contacted the children only once, and made no request for visitation 
with them. During that period, he knew where to contact the mother and the 
children.

[¶6.]     On March 20, 1987, the 
mother, continuing in the original divorce proceeding, filed a Petition for 
Modification - Motion for Order Granting Temporary Custody - Motion for Order 
Granting Permanent Custody - Motion to Set Child Support and Enter Income 
Withholding Order. Personal service of that pleading was made upon the father. 
The petition alluded to the order entered on January 27, 1984 and sought 
permanent custody of the minor children for the mother. The issues in the 
proceeding then were joined by an Answer, a Motion for Order to Require Physical 
and Mental Examination of the Minor Children, and a Motion for Physical Custody, 
pursuant to which the father sought enforcement of the earlier order, all filed 
on June 4, 1987.

[¶7.]     The trial on the 
mother's petition was commenced on January 11, 1988, but it was not finished and 
the proceedings were continued until April 28, 1988. In the meantime, a 
Temporary Custody and Support Order Continuance had been entered on September 3, 
1987, awarding temporary custody to the mother. When the proceedings were 
recommenced on April 28, 1988, the father presented evidence that the mother had 
been dating and had intended to marry a man who recently had plead guilty to a 
charge of sexually assaulting the female child. The father contended that the 
mother was maintaining her relationship with that individual, and he argued that 
her behavior demanded that custody of the three children be immediately changed 
to him. The district court considered the mother's continuing association with 
the sexual offender a threat to the welfare of the children, and it concluded 
that it would be appropriate to allow the mother some time to decide whether 
she, in fact, would continue that association. Temporary custody then was 
granted to the father until the trial could be completed. The father later 
sought a further continuance, and the court then returned temporary custody to 
the mother while, at the same time, setting the trial for August 1, 
1988.

[¶8.]     After the trial, the 
court announced its decision:

"I don't have any doubt 
that each of these parties love the children in their own way. However, I seldom 
see a case like this.

"There can be no excuse 
for the Mother's activities as far as those involving Mr. Patterson. I think she 
continued a relationship when one would have thought there would be hate rather 
than that.

"But on the other hand, 
there can be no excuse for Mr. Goss to ignore the children for years and leave 
the Mother alone with the children to raise the children.

"There can be no excuse 
for either party thinking of themselves as better and disregarding the welfare 
of the children.

"And there can't be any 
excuse for the Father and his conduct with the children when he had them in 
discussing the case 

with them belittling the 
Mother as he did.

* * * * * 
*

"Back in '83, apparently 
the Mother asked for some help and left the children with the father for a 
period of what, six months. I know there was an argument about whether she could 
get them back or whether she couldn't. But as I followed the evidence, the attempts at modification after that 
should not hold because I think he could have found the Defendant had the 
Plaintiff wanted to find her.

"It will be the ruling of 
the Court that the Mother be awarded the custody of the children. She gave birth 
to the children. She was there for those years all alone. I can't forget 
that.

"No evidence has really 
been shown out of the Patterson thing that she isn't a good and loving Mother." 
(emphasis added).

The trial court 
then found that it was in the best interests of the children to award permanent 
custody to the mother, conditioned upon her avoiding any further contact with 
Patterson. Its order to that effect was entered on August 18, 1988, and it is 
from that order that the appeal to this court is taken.

[¶9.]     As noted in the 
recitation of his issues, the father asserts error in the decision of the 
district court to grant custody to the mother. His argument is that he had 
legitimately gained custody of his three children in 1984 and that the mother 
had failed to establish the requisite grounds for modification of that earlier 
modification order. We conclude, however, that the order of January 7, 1984, 
awarding custody to the father, was void. It follows that, at the time the 
mother initiated the instant proceedings, she still had legal custody of the 
children. For that reason, we need not determine whether the mother produced 
sufficient evidence of a change of circumstances to warrant a modification, or 
whether the district court could reasonably conclude that those changes 
necessitated the return of custody to the mother in the best interests of the 
children.

[¶10.]  Our rule is that we can uphold the 
decision of a district court if it is sustainable on any theory supported by the 
record. Milton v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 372 
(Wyo. 1988); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 739 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1987); Walker v. Karpan, 726 P.2d 82 (Wyo. 1986). Furthermore, 
this court has recognized its inherent power, independent of any statutory 
authority, to vacate a void judgment when its invalidity is apparent on the face 
of the record. A void judgment is a nullity, and we refuse to give effect to a 
nonexistent judgment. Matter of TRG, 665 P.2d 491 (Wyo. 1983); 2-H Ranch Co., Inc. v. Simmons, 658 P.2d 68 
(Wyo. 1983). A 
custody modification proceeding is filed under the same docket number as the 
original divorce action, but it is considered a separate and distinct 
proceeding. Nicholaus v. Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338 (Wyo. 1988); Macy v. Macy, 714 P.2d 774 (Wyo. 1986); Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713 (Wyo. 1965). In such 
custody modification proceedings, as is true with respect to all judicial 
proceedings, the principles of due process demand that a party called upon to 
answer a complaint, or a petition for modification, be furnished notice of the 
allegations against him and a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the issues. 
Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P.2d 213 (Wyo. 1985); 
Hall v. Hall, 708 P.2d 416 (Wyo. 1985); Tanner 
v. Tanner, 482 P.2d 443 (Wyo. 1971). The court may permit those 
fundamental due process rights to be infringed only to the extent permitted by 
legislative or judicially promulgated rules of procedure. Hall. The general rule 
is that it is necessary to comply strictly with statutes or rules setting forth 
the requirements for service of process. Midway Oil Corp. v. Guess, 714 P.2d 339 
(Wyo. 1986). 
More particularly, statutes permitting the service of process upon nonresidents, 
because those statutes are in derogation of the common law, are to be strictly 
construed. This is true as well of court rules permitting service by 
publication, and strict and full compliance with them is demanded. Duncan v. Duncan, 776 P.2d 758 (Wyo. 1989); In re Lonquest's Estate, 526 P.2d 994 (Wyo. 1974); National Supply Company 
v. Chittim, 387 P.2d 1010 (Wyo. 1964).

[¶11.]  In the course of these proceedings, the 
father, following an attempt to serve the mother by certified mail with his 
petition for custody modification, then attempted to serve her by publication. 
The version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act adopted by the 
Wyoming 
legislature requires with respect to the initiation of such 
proceedings:

"Before making a decree 
under this act reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to 
the contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously 
terminated and any person who has physical custody of the child. If any of these persons are outside this 
state notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given pursuant to W.S. 
20-5-106. Section 20-5-105, W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.) (emphasis added). 
"Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction over a person outside this 
state shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, 
and may be:

"(i) By personal delivery 
outside this state in the manner prescribed for service of process within this 
state;

"(ii) In the manner 
prescribed by the law of the place in which the service is made for service of 
process in that place in an action in any of its courts of general 
jurisdiction;

"(iii) By any form of 
mail addressed to the person to be served and requesting a receipt; 
or

"(iv) As directed by the court including 
publication if other means of notification are ineffective." Section 20-5-106(a) 
(June 1987 Repl.) (emphasis added).

The father 
concedes that, at the time he attempted service of his petition, the mother was 
not in the state of Wyoming and that he did not accomplish service 
upon her either personally or by mail.

[¶12.]  If the district court, pursuant to the 
statute, had directed the father to accomplish service by publication (the 
record is silent with respect to any such direction by the court) the service 
should have been accomplished in accordance with Rule 4, W.R.C.P. That rule 
provides, in pertinent part:

"(e) Service by publication. - Service by 
publication may be had where specifically provided for by statute, and in the 
following cases:

. . . . 
.

"(9) In suits for 
divorce, for alimony, to affirm or declare a marriage void, or the modification 
of any decree therefor entered in such suit, when the defendant is a 
non-resident of the state, or his residence cannot be ascertained, or he 
conceals himself in order to avoid service of process;

. . . . 
.

"(f) Requirements for service by publication. 
- Before service by publication can be made, an affidavit of the party, his agent or 
attorney, must be filed stating that 
service of a summons cannot be made within this state, on the defendant to 
be served by publication, and stating his 
address, if known, or that his address is unknown and cannot with reasonable 
diligence be ascertained, and that the case is one of those mentioned in 
paragraph (e) of this rule; and when such affidavit is filed, the party may 
proceed to make service by publication." (emphasis added).

The affidavit in 
the record, executed by the father's attorney, states:

"1. An attempt was made 
to serve the Defendant in the above entitled matter by certified mail, return 
receipt requested. Such letter was returned to Affiant's office marked by the 
post office as `refused by addressee.'

"2. Defendant is not a 
resident of the State of Wyoming, living in the Country of 
Germany.

"3. The minor children in 
this matter are residents of the State of Wyoming, living in the Country of Germany with 
their natural father.

"4. The natural father in 
this matter is a resident of the State of Wyoming, but is living in the Country of 
Germany. 

"5. This action was 
originally commenced as a divorce action under the above-Civil Action Number, 
and the Court has continuing jurisdiction over this matter inasmuch as this is a 
request of modification of the Decree of Divorce.

"6. Inasmuch as the 
Defendant has refused service, and is in a foreign country and is avoiding 
service, that is that Plaintiff has no other method available to serve the 
Defendant, and because there is a dire need, as evidenced in the file and 
Complaint, for the Court to hear this matter, your affiant states that this is 
an appropriate case for service under Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 
4(e)(9)."

[¶13.]  The affidavit is sufficient to establish 
that the mother could not be served within Wyoming and that the case was a proper case 
for service by publication (assuming that the court had so directed). The 
affidavit does not comply with the requirements of Rule 4(f), W.R.C.P. It is 
silent with respect to the mother's address, and it does not state in the 
alternative (because counsel could not) that the mother's address is unknown and 
cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence.

[¶14.]  We have pointed out that requiring such 
an affidavit, prior to permitting service by publication, assists in assuring 
that service by publication will occur only where service by other means, more 
certain to give a party actual notice, is either unreasonable or impractical. 
Lonquest, 526 P.2d  at 998. With respect to the filing of such an affidavit, our 
rule is that the requirements of Rule 4(f), W.R.C.P. are minimal and demand 
strict compliance. Thus, even where the affidavit states the last known address 
of the defendant, it is deficient if it does not also state a present address or 
that the present address cannot be ascertained through due diligence. We have 
held that such a deficiency deprives the district court of jurisdiction over the 
person to be served and prevents it from entering a valid and binding judgment. 
The effect of that rule is that a deficiency, like that reflected by the 
affidavit of counsel for the father in this instance, makes the service by 
publication invalid and, therefore, any judgment purportedly grounded upon that 
service is rendered void. Lonquest; Emery v. Emery, 404 P.2d 745 (Wyo. 1965); National 
Supply, 387 P.2d 1010. Upon determining that a judgment is void, the court has 
no discretion with respect to such a judgment, but it must exercise its inherent 
power and grant relief from that judgment. Emery, 404 P.2d  at 
749.

[¶15.]  The father failed to effect proper 
service of his petition to modify the custody provisions of the divorce decree 
upon the mother. The district court, for that reason, did not acquire personal 
jurisdiction over the mother and could not enter a valid default judgment 
against her because of her failure to appear. The order transferring custody of 
the three children from the mother to the father was void and of no effect. At 
the time the mother commenced this proceeding with her petition to modify 
custody, she still had legal custody over the children pursuant to the original 
Order, Judgment and Decree. While the father did not deem it necessary to seek 
affirmative relief in his response to the mother's petition, to the extent that 
any issues were present for the court to adjudicate, the burden of establishing 
a substantial change in circumstances so as to warrant a modification of the 
original Order, Judgment and Decree had to be assigned to the father, not the 
mother. All the foregoing is consistent with the ultimate disposition by the 
district court and, indeed, some of the comments in the record manifest the 
trial court's recognition and adoption of these 
principles.

[¶16.]  We are willing to assume that the trial 
court may have recognized amendments to the pleadings sufficient to raise issues 
as to the propriety of awarding custody to the father. The rules with respect to 
the action of the district court in such matters are well established. The party 
seeking to modify the provisions of a child custody decree must assume the 
burden of demonstrating to the court a substantial change in the circumstances 
affecting the child's welfare occurring subsequent to the entry of the initial 
decree. Not only must the court find that those changes are so substantial and 
material to the well being of the child as to warrant modification, but it also 
must conclude that the desired modification will be in the best interest of the 
child. Ayling v. Ayling, 661 P.2d 1054 (Wyo. 1983); Tanner, 482 P.2d 443; Leitner, 402 P.2d 713. We will not disturb the decision of the trial court in this regard in 
the absence of some serious procedural error, a violation of a principle of law, 
or a clear and grave abuse of discretion. The trial court does not abuse its 
discretionary authority if, under the circumstances found from the record, it 
could have reasonably concluded as it did. Kreuter v. Kreuter, 728 P.2d 1129 
(Wyo. 1986); Fanning v. Fanning, 717 P.2d 346 
(Wyo. 1986); 
Ayling. Our perusal of the record in this case persuades us that, assuming the 
court was considering a claim by the father of the propriety of modifying 
custody, it still could have reasonably concluded as it 
did.

[¶17.]  The order of the district court, 
continuing custody of the children in the mother, is 
affirmed.

ROONEY, J., Retired, files a 
dissenting opinion.

ROONEY, Justice, Retired, 
dissenting.

T[¶18.]            
he majority opinion properly recites the fact that

"We will not disturb the 
decision of the trial court in this regard [modification of child custody] in 
the absence of some serious procedural error, a violation of a principle of law, 
or a clear and grave abuse of discretion."

[¶19.]  Here there is not only a "serious 
procedural error," but, more importantly, there is a "clear and grave abuse of 
discretion" and a "violation of a recognized principle of 
law."

PROCEDURAL 
ERROR

[¶20.]  The majority opinion considers "the 
controlling issue here" to be whether an earlier modifying judgment1 awarding custody of the children to 
appellant was void because the court lacked jurisdiction to enter such judgment. 
The majority of the court decides that such modifying judgment was void because 
appellee was not properly served with appellant's petition to modify the child 
custody provisions of the original divorce decree.2 The majority opinion then notes 
that, since appellee already had legal custody of the children when she 
initiated this proceeding to obtain such custody, she did not have the burden of 
establishing a change of circumstances to warrant a modification of the decree. 
The record is not positive as to whether the award in this matter in favor of 
appellee was because she was required to carry such burden and did so, or 
whether it was because such burden was on appellant and he failed to carry it.3 We should not presume either to 
have been the case. Certainly, the parties had no clear understanding in this 
respect, and this procedural defect could have had an effect on the rational 
presentation of the evidence.

[¶21.]  The majority opinion recognizes this 
procedural error as serious and as a "controlling issue." Accordingly, it should 
not simply be disregarded. The error should be corrected by having the 
substantive issues tried under a correct procedure wherein the court and the 
parties understand and agree on the procedural status of the matter. The error 
is sufficiently serious to prevent the trial court and this court from resolving 
the substantive issue. 

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND 
VIOLATION OF A PRINCIPLE OF LAW

[¶22.]  The fact that the "welfare and best 
interests" of the children are of paramount consideration in determining their 
custody has become a recognized principle of law. Linch v. Harden, 26 Wyo. 47, 
176 P. 1546 (1918); Crummer v. Crummer, 44 Wyo. 1, 7 P.2d 223 (1932); Burt v. 
Burt, 48 Wyo. 19, 41 P.2d 524 (1935); Curran v. Curran, 51 Wyo. 217, 65 P.2d 243 
(1937); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 76 Wyo. 188, 301 P.2d 377 (1956); Butcher v. Butcher, 
363 P.2d 923 (Wyo. 1961); Henson v. Henson, 384 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1963) (visitation 
question); Taylor v. Taylor, 388 P.2d 192 (Wyo. 1964); Wilson v. Wilson, 473 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 1970).

[¶23.]  A corollary thereto is that consideration 
of the real or supposed derelictions of one parent or the other is pertinent 
only as such may pertain to the "welfare and best interests" of the children and 
not for the purpose of punishing or rewarding one of the parents. Curless v. 
Curless, 708 P.2d 426 (Wyo. 1985); Wilson, 473 P.2d  at 595; Henson, 
384 P.2d  at 721.

[¶24.]  In this case, the evidence and the 
consideration thereof emphasized the parental faults without relating such 
faults to the "welfare and best interests" of the children - excepting the 
damage inflicted upon the daughter of the parties as a result of appellee's 
immorality.

[¶25.]  The uncontradicted evidence was that 
appellee brought one Terry Patterson, a convicted felon, into her home and lived 
with him without marriage. The children observed this immoral situation. Terry 
Patterson was, and is, a pervert, and he sexually assaulted one of the children, 
S.G., a female, age 11 years, over the period of one and a half years. Finally 
S.G. reported the assaults to her teacher - not to her mother. In the note to 
her teacher, she said, "I need help can you help us plese [sic]?" The note 
resulted in Patterson's arrest and subsequent plea of guilty to second decree 
assault4 on S.G. He was sentenced to a term 
of one to two years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. He acknowledged that he 
had a problem with molesting young girls.

[¶26.]  The uncontradicted evidence also reflected 
that the children received poor grades in school when in custody of appellee, 
causing them to be held back a grade, whereas the grades improved considerably 
when the children were in the temporary custody of appellant. Such evidence 
further reflected that the children and their clothes were "filthy" when 
appellee delivered their temporary custody to appellant.

[¶27.]  The uncontradicted evidence also indicated 
that appellant did not exhibit much interest in the children in the nature of 
telephone calls, presents, etc., subsequent to the time they left 
Germany with 
appellee.

[¶28.]  The emphasis placed on all of this 
evidence at the trial was directed at the fault of the parties rather than its 
effect on the "welfare and best interests" of the children. For example, the 
trial court commented on appellant's failure to exhibit much interest in the 
children after they left Germany as a dereliction on his part. 
The "welfare and best interests" of the children could well have been served by 
this failure if contacts by appellant simply created arguments and tensions 
having adverse effects on the children. The receipt of the children by appellant 
from appellee in a "filthy" condition could have been caused by an isolated 
occurrence on that particular day.

[¶29.]  The reason that S.G. did not confide in 
her mother with reference to the assault on her could bear on S.G.'s "welfare 
and best interests." The explanation given to the children for, and their 
understanding of, the immoral relationship between appellee and Patterson could 
bear on the children's "welfare and best interests." Evidence was received 
concerning appellee's contacts with Patterson subsequent to his arrest and to 
her allowing the children, other than S.G., to accompany Patterson when he was 
out on bond before sentencing. The more pertinent consideration concerning the 
"welfare and best interests of the children" would be appellee's propensity to 
associate intimately with others of a character similar to Patterson's.5 These and like concerns could have 
been presented at the trial if the emphasis there had been on the "welfare and 
best interests" of the children.

[¶30.]  At trial, the parties and the court 
referred to the rule relative to the "welfare and best interests" of the 
children, and the trial court made a ruling that such was served by placing 
custody in appellee.

[¶31.]  Normally, the trial court's findings are 
presumed correct, and such findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, or contrary to the great 
weight of the evidence. Wangler v. Federer, 714 P.2d 1209 (Wyo. 1986); Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119 (Wyo. 1985); Yost v. Harpel Oil Co., 674 P.2d 712 
(Wyo. 1983); City of Rock 
Springs v. Police Protection Association, 610 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1980). In 
considering the sufficiency of the evidence, this court assumes that the 
evidence in favor of the successful party is true, leaves out of consideration 
entirely the evidence presented by the unsuccessful party that conflicts with 
the successful party's evidence and gives the evidence of the successful party 
every favorable inference that may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it. 
Broyles, 711 P.2d  at 1119; City of Rock 
Springs, 610 P.2d  at 975.

[¶32.]  In this case there was little conflict in 
the evidence. Since the only evidence favorable to appellee was appellant's 
failure to exhibit interest in the children when they were in appellee's 
custody, the finding that the "welfare and best interests" of the children were 
served by awarding custody to appellee was not sustained by the evidence and is 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence as the evidence now 
exists.

[¶33.]  Therefore, the result reached by the 
trial court was not reasonable under the circumstances. There exists an abuse of 
discretion.

"`A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances.' Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980).

"An abuse of discretion 
is that which shocks the conscience of the court and appears so unfair and 
inequitable that a reasonable person could not abide it. Paul v. Paul, Wyo., 616 P.2d 707 
(1980)."

Waldrop v. 
Weaver, 702 P.2d 1291, 1293 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶34.]  Accordingly, I would reverse and remand 
this case for a new trial in which the procedural status of the parties is well 
defined, and in which the evidence concerning custody is directly related to the 
"welfare and best interests" of the children.

FOOTNOTES

1 The appellant was 
plaintiff in the original divorce 
action wherein custody of the children was given to 
appellee.

2 Of interest is whether 
or not the mailing, without more, of 
such petition of appellant under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act is 
sufficient for jurisdiction when the notice is returned marked, as here, 
"refused by addressee [appellee]." Such Uniform Act provides that such notice 
may be:

"By any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and 
requesting a receipt[.]"

W.S. 
20-5-106(a)(iii) (emphasis added).

3 The trial court was 
additionally handicapped by the fact that the trial was interrupted and delayed 
for long periods of time on more than one occasion and by the fact that some of 
the witnesses testified out of order.

4 The plea was to an 
information charging violation of second degree sexual assault as defined in 
W.S. 6-2-303(a)(v) and W.S. 6-2-306(a)(ii). W.S. 6-2-303(a)(v) 
provides:

"(a) Any actor who 
inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the second 
degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first 
degree:

* * * * * 
*

"(v) At the time of the 
commission of the act the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age and the 
actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim[.]"

"Sexual intrusion" is 
defined as follows in W.S. 6-2-301:

"(a) As used in this 
article:

* * * * * 
*

"(vii) `Sexual intrusion' 
means:

"(A) Any intrusion, 
however slight, by any object or any part of a person's body, except the mouth, 
tongue or penis, into the genital or anal opening of another person's body if 
that sexual intrusion can reasonably be construed as being for the purposes of 
sexual arousal, gratification or abuse; or

"(B) Sexual intercourse, 
cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus or anal intercourse with or without 
emission."

W.S. 6-2-306(a)(ii) 
provides the punishment for second degree sexual assault to be not more than 20 
years.

5 The trial court ruled 
that appellee's future association with Patterson would be a basis for further 
consideration of the custody statutes. In any event, Patterson cannot inflict 
further harm on the children until he is released from confinement.