Case Title: State ex rel. Rocky Ridge, LLC v. Winters

Citation: 2017-Ohio-7678

Docket Number: 2017-0321

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2017-09-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Rocky Ridge Dev., L.L.C. v. Winters, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-7678.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-7678 
THE STATE EX REL. ROCKY RIDGE DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., ET AL. v. WINTERS, 
JUDGE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Rocky Ridge Dev., L.L.C. v. Winters, Slip Opinion 
No. 2017-Ohio-7678.] 
Prohibition—Writ sought to prevent judge from ruling in case seeking declaratory 
judgment and injunction—Writ granted as to issues over which 
Environmental Review Appeals Commission has exclusive jurisdiction—
Writ denied as to all claims involving township’s local ordinances or 
allegations of public nuisance. 
(No. 2017-0321—Submitted June 6, 2017—Decided September 21, 2017.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Relators, Rocky Ridge Development, L.L.C., and Custom Ecology of 
Ohio, Inc., d.b.a. Stansley Industries, Inc., seek a writ of prohibition against 
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respondent, Ottawa County Common Pleas Court Judge Bruce Winters.  We grant 
the writ in part. 
I. Background 
{¶ 2} On November 13, 2014, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency 
(“OEPA”) approved a Land Application Management Plan (“LAMP”) permitting 
Stansley to use spent lime in a soil blend as general fill to increase elevation and 
improve drainage on its property.  The permit was issued “[p]ursuant to the 
authority of the Director under ORC Chapter 6111,” which governs water pollution.  
OEPA issued a second LAMP permit on February 14, 2017, expressly modifying 
and superseding the first.  The new permit added Rocky Ridge as a permittee, 
modified certain conditions that OEPA had imposed on the operation, and specified 
the property on which the fill operations were authorized. 
{¶ 3} On February 23, 2017, Benton Township filed a complaint for 
declaratory and injunctive relief against Rocky Ridge and Stansley in Ottawa 
County Common Pleas Court.  Benton Township alleged that the companies were 
violating the terms of the LAMP, were in violation of Benton Township local 
zoning ordinances and state law, and were creating a public nuisance. 
{¶ 4} On February 23, 2017, Judge Winters issued a temporary restraining 
order against Rocky Ridge and Stansley.  The order enjoined them “from operating 
in Benton Township until and unless they are in compliance with the Benton 
Township Zoning Resolution and the laws of the State of Ohio.” Specifically, the 
actions prohibited by the temporary restraining order  
 
include[] but [are] not limited to the digging of a borrow pit and/or 
constructing a farm pond, spreading, burying or mixing of waste, 
removing topsoil where such removal is a conditional use, changing 
the drainage of the property, placing any material into waters of the 
January Term, 2017 
 
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state and/or otherwise violating the zoning laws of Benton 
Township. 
 
{¶ 5} On March 6, 2017, Rocky Ridge and Stansley (collectively, “Rocky 
Ridge”) commenced this original action for a writ of prohibition against Judge 
Winters.  This court denied their motion for an emergency stay and issued an 
expedited alternative writ.  148 Ohio St.3d 1422, 2017-Ohio-902, 71 N.E.3d 295. 
This court imposed an expedited briefing schedule, id., which the parties modified 
by agreement.  The matter is now fully briefed. 
II. Legal analysis 
{¶ 6} A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy that is granted in 
limited circumstances “with great caution and restraint.”  State ex rel. Corn v. 
Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 554, 740 N.E.2d 265 (2001).  There are three elements 
necessary for a writ of prohibition to issue: the actual or imminent exercise of 
judicial power, the lack of authority for the exercise of that power, and the lack of 
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 
144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13.  But if the trial judge’s 
lack of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, prohibition will lie notwithstanding 
the availability of an adequate remedy by way of appeal.  State ex rel. Vanni v. 
McMonagle, 137 Ohio St.3d 568, 2013-Ohio-5187, 2 N.E.3d 243, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 7} Rocky Ridge’s demand for a writ of prohibition rests upon two 
concepts.  The first is exclusive original subject-matter jurisdiction: a writ of 
prohibition will issue to prevent a trial court from exercising jurisdiction over 
matters expressly delegated to an administrative agency.  See State ex rel. Dir., 
Ohio Dept. of Agriculture v. Forchione, 148 Ohio St.3d 105, 2016-Ohio-3049, 69 
N.E.3d 636, ¶ 29 (writ of prohibition issued because the director of agriculture has 
exclusive jurisdiction to seize or quarantine dangerous wild animals).  Rocky Ridge 
contends that prohibition is appropriate in this case because the matters before 
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Judge Winters fall within the exclusive statutory jurisdiction of the Environmental 
Review Appeals Commission (“ERAC”). 
{¶ 8} Alternatively, Rocky Ridge relies on the concept of preemption: a 
municipal ordinance must yield to a state statute if the ordinance is an exercise of 
the police power, the state statute is a general law, and the ordinance is in conflict 
with the statute.  State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 143 Ohio St.3d 271, 
2015-Ohio-485, 37 N.E.3d 128, ¶ 15.  According to Rocky Ridge, the general state 
statutory scheme for OEPA regulation of natural resources preempts the conflicting 
local ordinances. 
A. 
Exclusive statutory jurisdiction 
{¶ 9} ERAC “has exclusive original jurisdiction over any matter that may, 
under this section, be brought before it.”  R.C. 3745.04(B).  The question is, what 
matters may be brought before ERAC?  This court has issued a writ of prohibition 
to prevent a common pleas court from exercising jurisdiction over an action for 
declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the OEPA director’s application of 
certain regulations to the plaintiff’s foundry.  State ex rel. Williams v. Bozarth, 55 
Ohio St.2d 34, 36-37, 377 N.E.2d 1006 (1978).  We noted that under R.C. 3745.04, 
ERAC has exclusive jurisdiction to review an action of the OEPA director.  Id. at 
37.  “Action” is defined in R.C. 3745.04(A) as including the issuance of a permit. 
{¶ 10} Without question, some of the allegations in the Benton Township 
complaint directly challenge the wisdom of the LAMP permit and therefore fall 
squarely within the jurisdiction of ERAC.  For example, the township claims that 
the LAMP was issued to an improper party, that Rocky Ridge is violating the 
express terms of the LAMP, and that Rocky Ridge is conducting operations in 
violation of state law.  These allegations all directly challenge the validity of the 
LAMP or Rocky Ridge’s compliance with the LAMP and so fall under ERAC’s 
exclusive jurisdiction.  Warren Molded Plastics, Inc., v. Williams, 56 Ohio St.2d 
January Term, 2017 
 
5
352, 384 N.E.2d 253 (1978) (common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to hear 
constitutional challenge to OEPA director’s regulation). 
{¶ 11} Judge Winters patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to 
consider these matters, and so we hereby issue a writ of prohibition as to these 
allegations. 
B. Preemption of local zoning ordinances 
{¶ 12} The underlying lawsuit alleged that Rocky Ridge has violated the 
Benton Township Zoning Resolution in at least four1 ways: 
(1) 
The Zoning Resolution requires a zoning certificate from the Board of 
Zoning before removing topsoil from an A-3 Agricultural area.  Part of the 
Rocky Ridge property is zoned A-3, and operations have commenced 
without the required permit. 
(2) 
A conditional permit is also required before using property zoned M-3 
Manufacturing for waste disposal.  Rocky Ridge has commenced waste 
disposal on M-3 Manufacturing property without a permit. 
(3) 
Section 103.7 of the Benton Township Zoning Resolution forbids dumping 
or spreading of sewage or industrial waste within the jurisdiction.  Rocky 
Ridge has disposed of industrial waste at its property.2   
(4) 
Section 103.8 of the Zoning Resolution forbids landfills for solid-waste 
disposal or other waste material within the jurisdiction.  Rocky Ridge has 
disposed of solid waste on its property. 
Rocky Ridge asserts that state law preempts all these local ordinances, meaning 
that ERAC has exclusive jurisdiction and Judge Winters has no jurisdiction.3 
                                                 
1 Paragraph 51 of the complaint charges Rocky Ridge with violating seven additional sections of 
the Zoning Resolution, but the complaint provides no explanation of the nature of the violations.  
2 Benton Township withdrew its claims based on Section 103.7 at the hearing on the temporary 
restraining order.   
3 It is notable that the original LAMP expressly provided that “[i]ssuance of this permit does not 
relieve Stansley of the duty to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, ordinances, 
and regulations, except as specifically exempted herein.”  But when OEPA issued the modified 
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{¶ 13} The doctrine of preemption under state law is narrower than its 
federal counterpart.  State law is preempted when Congress intends federal law to 
occupy the field, even if there is no direct conflict between the state and federal 
rules.  See Crosby v. Natl. Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 120 S.Ct. 
2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000).  Under state law, by contrast, a local ordinance is 
preempted only when a general law of the state directly conflicts with it.  Morrison, 
143 Ohio St.3d 271, 2015-Ohio-485, 37 N.E.3d 128, at ¶ 24.  “A conflict exists if 
‘the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, or 
vice versa.’ ”  Id., quoting Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 
(1923), paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 14} Assuming (without deciding) that Benton Township’s zoning 
regulations are preempted, we nevertheless decline to grant a writ of prohibition on 
that basis, because preemption does not create a jurisdictional defect in the trial 
court.  By way of example, Morrison, our most recent pronouncement on state/local 
preemption, was not a prohibition case.  Rather, the trial court ruled on the 
enforceability of the local ordinances, and the case proceeded through the normal 
avenues of appeal on the merits.  Likewise, the cases cited in Morrison regarding 
home-rule preemption were not prohibition cases.  See, e.g., Mendenhall v. Akron, 
117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255 (certified question of state law 
stemming from federal action challenging city’s use of traffic cameras); State ex 
rel. Mill Creek Metro. Park Dist. Bd. of Commrs. v. Tablack, 86 Ohio St.3d 293, 
714 N.E.2d 917 (mandamus action against county officials). 
{¶ 15} We hold that in a case alleging preemption of local zoning 
ordinances due to conflict with state law, the trial court has jurisdiction to determine 
whether such a conflict exists.  Preemption is not a question committed to the 
                                                 
LAMP, it imposed a duty to conduct activities “in compliance with all applicable state and federal 
laws and regulations pertaining to environmental protection,” deleting the reference to local 
ordinances and regulations.     
January Term, 2017 
 
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exclusive jurisdiction of ERAC, as Rocky Ridge assumes.  We therefore deny the 
requested writ as to any claims based on violations of the Benton Township Zoning 
Resolution. 
C.  Nuisance 
{¶ 16} Lastly, Benton Township’s complaint alleges that operations at the 
site are causing various nuisances by, among other things, excavating the land down 
to bedrock, thereby endangering groundwater and well water, spilling industrial 
waste onto roadways (creating slippery and hazardous road conditions), and 
causing erosion and flooding on adjacent properties   
{¶ 17} Here again, Rocky Ridge asserts that ERAC has exclusive 
jurisdiction to consider these complaints.  But we see no statutory support for that 
claim. 
{¶ 18} To the contrary, the Revised Code expressly preserves the traditional 
authority of the common pleas courts to hear nuisance suits. 
 
[R.C. Chapter 3734, governing solid and hazardous wastes,] 
does not abridge rights of action or remedies in equity, under 
common law, or as provided by statute or prevent the state or any 
municipal corporation or person in the exercise of their rights in 
equity, under common law, or as provided by statute to suppress 
nuisances or to abate or prevent pollution. 
 
R.C. 3734.10.  Citing that statute, we have affirmed that political subdivisions may 
seek injunctive relief against licensed waste facilities “in the narrow areas of 
nuisance and pollution prevention and abatement.”  Atwater Twp. Trustees v. B.F.I. 
Willowcreek Landfill, 67 Ohio St.3d 293, 296, 617 N.E.2d 1089 (1993). 
{¶ 19} This is not to suggest that the law of nuisance will always and 
automatically enable localities to circumvent the jurisdiction of ERAC or shut down 
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state-licensed facilities.  At least one intermediate appellate court has held that 
although a political subdivision may seek an injunction in common pleas court 
when a solid-waste-disposal facility creates a nuisance by violating the terms of its 
permit, it cannot seek relief if the facility is acting within the terms of its permit, 
even if in doing so the facility creates what the political subdivision deems to be a 
nuisance.  Bates v. GSC Principals, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-07-1185, 2008-Ohio-
2211, ¶ 18, 21.  In other words, at least in the view of the Sixth District, the common 
pleas court lacked jurisdiction because a licensed facility acting within the scope of 
its permit, by definition, cannot be a nuisance. 
{¶ 20} The viability of the Bates distinction is beyond the scope of this case.  
Rocky Ridge has not proved that the nuisances alleged by Benton Township are the 
unavoidable consequence of normal licensed operations.  We are therefore not 
compelled to decide whether that is a legally relevant distinction.  For present 
purposes, it is sufficient to say that Judge Winters does not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction to determine whether the alleged nuisances are a 
result of permissible operations or a consequence of Rocky Ridge breaching the 
conditions in its LAMP, that Rocky Ridge has an adequate remedy by way of appeal 
from any decision he renders, and that a writ of prohibition as to the nuisance claims 
is not proper on this record. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 21} For the foregoing reasons, we hereby grant a limited writ of 
prohibition to prevent Judge Winters from deciding any issues that properly belong 
to ERAC, such as the wisdom or propriety of issuing the LAMP or Rocky Ridge’s 
compliance with the LAMP.  However, we deny the writ as to all claims involving 
alleged violations of Benton Township’s local ordinances or allegations that the 
operation is creating a public nuisance. 
Writ granted in part 
and denied in part. 
January Term, 2017 
 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, O’NEILL, FISCHER, 
and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Eastman & Smith, Ltd., Reginald S. Jackson Jr., Barry W. Fissel, Matthew 
D. Harper, and Brian P. Barger, for relator Rocky Ridge Development, L.L.C. 
Goranson, Parker & Bella Co., L.P.A., and Christopher F. Parker, for relator 
Custom Ecology of Ohio, Inc., d.b.a. Stansley Industries, Inc. 
James J. VanEerten, Ottawa County Prosecuting Attorney; and Baker & 
Hostetler, L.L.P., Richard M. Knoth, James H. Rollinson, and Douglas L. Shively, 
for respondent. 
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