Case Title: Cabe v. Lunich

Citation: 1994-Ohio-4

Docket Number: 19931458

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1994-10-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
CABE ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. LUNICH, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Cabe v. Lunich (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 598.] 
Motor vehicles — Civil action for bodily injuries — Punitive damages may 
be awarded, when — Evidence that negligent driver consumed 
alcohol prior to vehicular accident admissible to justify award of 
punitive damages — Trial court abuses its discretion in failing to 
instruct jury that it may award punitive damages, when. 
1.  In a civil action for bodily injuries caused by the defendant’s operation of 
a motor vehicle, where liability is determined and compensatory 
damages are awarded, punitive damages may be awarded upon a 
showing of actual malice, i.e., (1) that state of mind under which a 
person’s conduct is characterized by hatred, ill will or a spirit of 
revenge, or (2) a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other 
persons that has a great probability of causing substantial harm. 
(Preston v. Murty [1987], 32 Ohio St.3d 334, 512 N.E.2d 1174, 
approved and followed.) 
2.  Evidence that a negligent driver had consumed alcohol prior to a 
vehicular accident is relevant and admissible to establish whether the 
driver acted with actual malice justifying an award of punitive 
damages. (Detling v. Chockley [1982], 70 Ohio St.2d 134, 24 O.O.3d 
239, 436 N.E.2d 208, overruled to the extent inconsistent herewith.) 
3.  Where a chemical test administered in accordance with R.C. 4511.19 and 
4511.191 reveals that a defendant was driving with an alcohol 
concentration level in his or her body at or above the applicable 
statutory limits specified in R.C. 4511.19, a trial court abuses its 
discretion in failing, upon the plaintiff’s motion, to instruct the jury 
that it may find an award of punitive damages to be appropriate if it 
finds that the driver acted with actual malice in driving subsequent to 
having consumed alcohol.  (Detling v. Chockley [1982], 70 Ohio St.2d 
134, 24 O.O.3d 239, 436 N.E.2d 208, overruled to the extent 
inconsistent with Preston v. Murty [1987], 32 Ohio St.3d 334, 512 
N.E.2d 1174.) 
4.  If, following a vehicular accident, evidence exists that a defendant driver 
refused to submit to a chemical test administered in accordance with 
R.C. 4511.19 and 4511.191, and evidence exists that the defendant 
had consumed alcohol prior to the accident, a trial court abuses its 
discretion in refusing to instruct the jury that it may award punitive 
damages if the jury finds that the driver acted with actual malice in 
driving subsequent to having consumed alcohol. (Detling v. Chockley 
[1982], 70 Ohio St.2d 134, 24 O.O.3d 239, 436 N.E.2d 208, overruled 
to the extent inconsistent with Preston v. Murty [1987], 32 Ohio St.3d 
334, 512 N.E.2d 1174.) 
(No. 93-1458 — Submitted May 17, 1994 — Decided October 26, 1994.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Portage County, No 92P0073. 
On December 20, 1989, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Jean Wilson Cabe 
(“Cabe”), appellant, was injured when the vehicle she was driving was 
struck in the rear by a vehicle operate by Dana L. Lunich, appellee.  Officers 
Bobby Brown and Greg Francis of the Ravenna City Police Department 
arrived at the scene of the accident and detected the odor of alcohol on 
appellee.  Appellee was arrested and was asked by police to submit to a 
chemical test to determine the concentration of alcohol in her body.  
Appellee refused to take the test.  According to appellee, she ultimately 
“pled out and was found guilty,” and was convicted of driving under the 
influence of alcohol. 
 
On June 14, 1991, Cabe filed a complaint for negligence against 
appellee in the Court of Common Pleas of Portage County.  Cabe’s husband, 
Coe Neil Cabe, appellant, joined in the complaint and asserted a claim for 
loss of consortium.  In the complaint, Cabe and her husband (collectively 
“appellants”), sought recovery against appellee for compensatory and 
punitive damages.  Appellants’ claim for punitive damages was based upon 
information that appellee had been driving under the influence of alcohol at 
the time of the collision.  Appellee responded to the complaint and admitted 
negligence, but denied allegations of wanton misconduct. 
 
On March 19, 1992, appellee moved for summary judgment on the 
claim for punitive damages.  The trial court denied appellee’s motion.  
Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial before a jury.  At the commencement 
of the trial court proceedings, the court instructed the jury as follows: 
 
“Ladies and gentlemen, you are instructed that the defendant admits 
that she was negligent, and that her negligence caused injury to the plaintiff.  
The issue you will be called upon to decide is an amount of money which 
will compensate the Plaintiff for the injuries proximately caused by this 
defendant’s negligence. 
 
“You may be called upon to determine whether punitive damages 
should be awarded.” 
 
Appellee testified that she had consumed four to five alcoholic 
beverages prior to the accident.  She admitted that her consumption of 
alcohol, together with her failure to maintain control of the vehicle, was 
reckless.  The evidence at trial indicated that appellee neither swerved nor 
attempted to avoid the collision with Cabe.  Evidence was also presented 
which, if accepted, indicated that appellee may have been driving without 
her headlights on at the time of the collision, and that appellee should have 
been able to see Cabe’s vehicle for some distance before the collision 
occurred.  Officer Francis testified that appellee was arrested for driving 
under the influence of alcohol and that she refused to submit to a chemical 
test to determine the concentration of alcohol in her body. 
 
At the close of appellants’ case-in-chief, appellee moved for a 
directed verdict on the claim for punitive damages.  The trial court granted 
the motion and dismissed the claim, stating, in part: 
 
“* * * [T]he law of course is clear that driving while under the 
influence of alcohol in and of itself is not sufficient to bootstrap a case of 
negligence into punitive damages; there has to be shown some other matters. 
* * * 
 
“* * * 
 
“There has to be some showing of actual malice and that just was not 
done.” 
 
Following the trial court’s ruling, which removed the issue of punitive 
damages from the jury’s consideration, appellee chose not to present any 
witnesses in her defense. 
The jury returned its verdict in favor of appellants and against appellee, 
awarding Cabe $2,870 in compensatory damages.  The jury awarded nothing 
to Cabe’s husband on the claim of loss of consortium.  The trial court 
entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict.  Thereafter, 
appellants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the 
alternative, a motion for a new trial.  In support, appellants urged that the 
award of compensatory damages was inadequate to compensate them for the 
losses they suffered as a result of appellee’s negligence.  Appellants also 
urged, among other things, that the issue of punitive damages should have 
been submitted to the jury.  The trial court denied appellants’ motion. 
On appeal, the court of appeals, citing Detling v. Chockley (1982), 70 Ohio 
St.2d 134, 24 O.O.3d 239, 436 N.E.2d 208, rejected appellants’ contention 
that the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of appellee on the 
issue of punitive damages, holding that “the evidence presented to the trial 
court did not demonstrate surrounding circumstances to prove the required 
intent to create a jury question of malice.  Cabe’s assertion that evidence of 
intoxication alone should constitute malice has been rejected by the Supreme 
Court [of Ohio].”  The court of appeals also rejected appellants’ contention 
that they were entitled to a new trial on the issues of compensatory and 
punitive damages.  Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment 
of the trial court. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
motion to certify the record. 
__________________ 
 
Scanlon & Henretta Co., L.P.A., Lawrence J. Scanlon and Ann Marie 
O’Brien; Colopy & Calalinuovo and Daniel M. Colopy, for appellants. 
 
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs Co., L.P.A., Orville L. Reed III 
and James M. Lyones, Jr., for appellee. 
 
McCarthy, Palmer, Volkema & Becker and Jeffrey D. Boyd, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
__________________ 
 
A WILLIAM SWEENEY, J.  Under current Ohio Statutory law, liability 
for punitive damages in a tort action is determined by the trier of fact 
(generally a jury), and once the factfinder determines that punitive damages 
should be awarded, the amount of punitive damages is determined by the 
court.  R.C. 2315.21(C).1  The legislature has specifically established that 
the burden of proving entitlement to an award of punitive damages in a tort 
action is upon the plaintiff, and must be satisfied by clear and convincing 
                                                          
 
1. 
The constitutionality of R.C. 2315.21 has not been considered by this court.  See Moskovitz v. Mt. 
Sinai Med. Ctr. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 638, 654, 635 N.E.2d 331, 345, at fn. 7. 
evidence.  R.C. 2315.21(C)(3).2  Punitive damages may not be awarded in 
Ohio absent proof of actual damages.  See, e.g., Shimola v. Nationwide Ins. 
Co. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 84, 25 OBR 136, 495 N.E.2d 391. 
 
Actual malice is necessary for an award of punitive damages, but 
actual malice is not limited to cases where the defendant can be shown to 
have had an “evil mind.”  We held in Preston v. Murty (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 
334, 512 N.E.2d 1174, that actual malice is present where the defendant 
possessed either (1) that state of mind under which a person’s conduct is 
characterized by hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge, or (2) a conscious 
disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great 
probability of causing substantial harm.  In Preston, we noted that the latter 
category of actual malice includes “extremely reckless behavior revealing a 
conscious disregard for a great and obvious harm.”  Id. at 334, 512 N.E.2d at 
1175.  The policy of awarding punitive damages in Ohio is both to punish 
the offending party and to set him up as an example to others, thereby 
deterring others from similar behavior.  Id. at 335, 512 N.E.2d at 1176, 
citing Detling v. Chockley (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 134, 24 O.O.3d 239, 436 
N.E.2d 208. 
                                                          
 
2. 
R.C. 2315.21(C)(3) provides: 
 
“In a tort action, the burden of proof shall be upon the plaintiff in a question, by clear and 
convincing evidence, to establish that he is entitled to recover punitive or exemplary damages.” 
 
Something more than mere negligence is always required before an 
award of punitive damages may be made.  “This concept is reflected in the 
use of such terms as ‘outrageous,’ ‘flagrant,’ and ‘criminal.’  The concept 
requires a finding that the probability of harm occurring is great and that the 
harm will be substantial.”  Preston, 32 Ohio St.3d at 335-336, 512 N.E.2d at 
1176. 
 
In Detling v. Chockley (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 134, 24 O.O.3d 239, 436 
N.E.2d 208, we held that evidence of intoxication, standing alone, is 
insufficient to justify submitting the question of punitive damages to the 
jury.  This court found no error where the trial court had disallowed 
evidence of the defendant’s having operated his motor vehicle while under 
the influence of alcohol where the defendant had admitted negligence in 
causing the accident.  We today overrule Detling to the extent that it 
precludes introduction of evidence of voluntary alcohol consumption of a 
defendant driver in the punitive damages phase of a civil trial.  We are 
convinced that the conduct of drinking and driving may well, under the 
circumstances of each individual case, constitute the kind of reckless, 
outrageous behavior justifying a jury to conclude that the defendant 
possessed a willful indifference to the rights and safety of others justifying 
an award of punitive damages.  We hold that evidence that a negligent driver 
had consumed alcohol prior to a vehicular accident is relevant and 
admissible to establish whether the driver can be deemed to have acted with 
actual malice justifying the award of punitive damages. 
 
We also take judicial notice of the fact that the more alcohol one 
consumes, the more likely it is that he or she is impaired by alcohol 
intoxication.  We concur with those courts that have recognized that, where 
punitive damages are sought based on drunk driving, “ ‘[a]s the degree of 
impairment by the voluntary consumption of alcohol increases, the need for 
other aggravating circumstances lessens, and vice versa.’ ”  Seymore v. 
Carcia (1991), 24 Conn.App. 446, 452, 589 A.2d 7, 11 (citing Nast v. 
Lockett [1988], 312 Md. 343, 362, 539 A.2d 1113, 1122).  The legislature of 
this state has established that no person may operate a vehicle where his 
blood-alcohol level is equal to .10 percent by weight.  R.C. 4511.19(A).  The 
General Assembly has thus set this level of alcohol consumption as being 
indicative of a level of intoxication beyond which it is not safe to drive.  
Accordingly, we hold today that where a chemical test administered in 
accordance with R.C. 4511.19 and 4511.191 reveals that a defendant was 
driving with an alcohol concentration level in his or her body at or above the 
applicable statutory limits specified in R.C. 4511.19, a trial court abuses its 
discretion in failing, upon the plaintiff’s motion, to instruct the jury that it 
may find an award of punitive damages to be appropriate if it finds that the 
driver acted with actual malice in driving subsequent to having consumed 
alcohol. 
 
Similarly, the legislature has determined that a police officer with 
reasonable grounds to believe that a driver is under the influence of alcohol 
may request that driver to undergo a blood-alcohol test.  R.C. 4511.191(A).  
Statutory consequences flow from a driver’s refusal to take such a test.  R.C. 
4511.191(E).  Consistent with this legislative framework, we hold that where 
evidence exists that following a vehicular accident a defendant driver 
refused to submit to a chemical test administered in accordance with R.C. 
4511.19 and 4511.191, a trial court abuses its discretion in refusing to 
instruct the jury that it may award punitive damages if the jury finds that the 
driver acted with actual malice in driving subsequent to having consumed 
alcohol.3 
                                                          
 
3. 
Our holdings today are not meant to necessarily impact existing law involving the admissibility of 
evidence of alcohol use for purposes other than establishing a basis for a punitive-damages instruction.  Cf. 
Osler v. Lorain (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 345, 28 OBR 410, 504 N.E.2d 19, and Parton v. Weilnau (1959), 169 
Ohio St. 145, 8 O.O.2d 134, 158 N.E.2d 719.  The Ohio Rules of Evidence, Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Rules of Criminal Procedure remain in full effect in tort actions in which alcohol consumption is involved.  
Accordingly, pleas of no contest to a criminal charge of violation of R.C. 4511.19 may not be introduced as 
an admission against interest in a subsequent civil trial.  See Crim.R. 11(B)(2) (“The plea of no contest is 
not an admission of defendant’s guilt, but is an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment, 
information, or complaint and such plea or admission shall not be used against the defendant in any 
subsequent civil or criminal proceeding.”  [Emphasis added.]).  However, evidence of blood-alcohol test 
results may be relevant to the determination of the existence of negligence (as are the other factual 
circumstances surrounding the occurrence of an accident) and thus admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 402, and 
submission of those results is not precluded by Crim.R. 11(B)(2). 
 
We note as well that Civ.R. 42(B) authorizes a trial court to order claims to be tried separately in 
order to avoid prejudice.  (“The court, after a hearing * * * to avoid prejudice, * * * may order a separate 
trial of any claim or issue, * * * always preserving inviolate the right to a trial by jury.”)  Where a punitive-
 
In the case at bar appellee had several alcoholic beverages prior to 
driving her vehicle into the rear of the vehicle operated by Cabe.  Appellee 
was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and refused to submit 
to a chemical test.  Thus, the trial could erred in refusing to submit the issue 
of punitive damages to the jury, and Cabe, who was found to have suffered 
compensable harm as a result of appellee’s negligence, is entitled to a new 
trial on the issue of punitive damages, since he was awarded no 
compensatory damages on his claim for loss of consortium. 
 
As a final matter, appellants suggest that they are entitled to a new 
trial on the issue of compensatory damages.  We find nothing manifestly 
unreasonable in the amount of the jury’s verdict, and the record is devoid of 
any indication of passion or prejudice.  Therefore, we reject appellants’ 
arguments in this regard. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals, in part, and we reverse it in part.  We remand this cause to the trial 
court to conduct a new trial on Cabe’s claim for punitive damages.  On 
remand, a jury, if one is impanelled for this purpose, shall be instructed that 
it should find the defendant liable for punitive damages if it finds by clear 
and convincing evidence, under all the circumstances including alcohol 
                                                                                                                                                                             
damages instruction is warranted based on the precedent established in this case, that claim for punitive 
damages may, depending on the particular facts of the case, be best considered separately from the 
consumption prior to driving, that defendant acted with conscious disregard 
for the rights and safety of other persons that had a great probability of 
causing substantial harm. 
Judgment affirmed in part, 
reversed in part 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., 
CONCUR. 
 
WRIGHT, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
WRIGHT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I concur in the 
opinion except as to paragraph four of the syllabus to which I dissent.  I do 
not believe that a plaintiff should be entitled automatically to an instruction 
on punitive damages because a defendant exercised his or her statutory right 
to refuse to submit to a chemical test in accordance with R.C. 4511.19 and 
4511.191.  Ohio’s implied consent law may justify the suspension of the 
driving privileges of a driver who refuses to take the test, but in my view the 
implied consent law simply has no relation to whether a driver acted with 
actual malice, nor should we so hold. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
determination of the defendant’s liability based on traditional tort principles. 
 
Rather, the plaintiff should be required to submit evidence of the 
defendant’s intoxication.  In the present case, the appellee’s own admission 
and other evidence indicated she was intoxicated.  Therefore, I concur in the 
judgment not because appellee refused to take the test, but because the 
evidence of intoxication makes it a jury question whether appellee acted 
with “actual malice” as defined in Preston v. Murty (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 
334, 512 N.E.2d 1174.