Case Title: People v. Alexander

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93952

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 93952-Agenda 6-March 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								KENNETH ALEXANDER, Appellee.
Opinion filed May 22, 2003.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	The sole issue in this case is whether our state's prohibition
of so-called virtual child pornography suffers from the same
constitutional infirmity that doomed the federal prohibition of
virtual child pornography in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
535 U.S. 234, 152 L. Ed. 2d 403, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002). We hold
that it does, but that it is severable from the remainder of the child
pornography statute. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings.



BACKGROUND
	On February 27, 2002, the defendant was indicted in the
circuit court of Lake County on 45 counts of child pornography
under section 11-20.1(a)(1)(ii) and 9 counts of child pornography
under section 11-20.1(a)(6) of the Criminal Code of 1961. See
720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(1)(ii), (a)(6) (West Supp. 2001). The
indictment charged that the defendant possessed and intended to
distribute computer depictions of children that he knew or
reasonably should have known to be under 18 years of age
engaged in various sexual activities.
	The defendant entered a guilty plea to the first five counts in
exchange for a seven-year sentence, but later withdrew his plea
after the United States Supreme Court decided Ashcroft. He then
filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, asserting that sections
11-20.1(a)(1) and 11-20.1(a)(6) facially violated the federal and
state constitutions. The defendant argued that the "depict by
computer" language in section 11-20.1(a)(1) and the "depiction by
computer" language in section 11-20.1(a)(6) prohibit virtual child
pornography protected by Ashcroft. According to the defendant,
"These Illinois statutes extend Illinois' prohibition against child
pornography to sexually explicit images that appear to depict
minors but were produced by computer without using any real
children."
	On May 15, 2002, the trial court granted the defendant's
motion, finding sections 11-20.1(a)(1) and 11-20.1(a)(6)
unconstitutional. The court stated:
			"Inasfar as the Illinois statute is concerned, the statute
was, of course, created before the pronouncements of the
Supreme Court in the Ashcroft case. I find the Illinois
statute to be *** as overbroad as the federal statute
because it allows for someone possessing a computer-generated image to be convicted as if he were to have
possessed a real child's picture, and that's something that
the Constitution does not allow. That's something that the
U.S. Supreme Court does not allow.
			I read the Illinois statute to be similar to the federal
statute, where a computer-generated picture might show
someone that appears as a minor or conveys the
impression that the material is a minor. *** [B]ecause the
Illinois statute allows someone to be prosecuted and
convicted because he possesses a depiction by computer
of any child and does not make the distinction of real
child or live child or an identifiable child; thus, the
Illinois statute constitutionally fails gravely.
* * *
			Therefore, insofar as this indictment pertains to those
two sections of the statute that involve virtual children,
that involve computer-generated images or children
depicted by computer, this motion to dismiss will be
granted." (Emphases added.)
The State appealed directly to this court. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 603.

ANALYSIS
	In an appeal from an order declaring a statute
unconstitutional, our review is de novo. In re Adoption of K.L.P.,
198 Ill. 2d 448, 453 (2002).


1. The First Amendment, Child Pornography, and Ashcroft


	The first amendment (see U.S. Const., amend. I), which
applies to state actions through the fourteenth amendment (see
U.S. Const., amend. XIV; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364,
81 L. Ed. 278, 282, 57 S. Ct. 255, 260 (1937)),(1) prohibits content-based restrictions on speech which do not survive so-called strict
scrutiny. Strict scrutiny requires a court to find that the restriction
is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest. People v. Sanders, 182 Ill. 2d 524,
530 (1998); Tully v. Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297, 304-05 (1996).
	The United States Supreme Court has held that content-based
restrictions on certain categories of speech satisfy strict scrutiny.
The first amendment's "vast and privileged sphere" (Ashcroft, 535 U.S.  at 244, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at 417, 122 S. Ct. at 1399) does not
extend to incitement (see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430, 89 S. Ct. 1827 (1969)), fighting words (see
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 86 L. Ed. 1031, 62 S. Ct. 766 (1942)), defamation (see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 86 L. Ed. 2d 593, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985)), or obscenity (see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973)).
	In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113,
1126, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3358 (1982), the Court added child
pornography as another category of speech outside the protection
of the first amendment. Content-based restrictions on child
pornography satisfy strict scrutiny because child pornography is
"intrinsically related" to child sexual abuse, and states have a
compelling interest in safeguarding physical and psychological
health of children. Ferber, 458 U.S.  at 756-59, 73 L. Ed. 2d  at
1122-24, 102 S. Ct.  at 3354-56. Additionally, the value of child
pornography is "exceedingly modest, if not de minimis." Ferber,
458 U.S.  at 762, 73 L. Ed. 2d  at 1126, 102 S. Ct.  at 3357. The
Court observed that there are parameters on the category of child
pornography, and consequently on the states' ability to regulate it:
"As with all legislation in this sensitive area, the conduct to be
prohibited must be adequately defined by the applicable state law,
as written or authoritatively construed. Here the nature of the harm
to be combated requires that the state offense be limited to works
that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified
age." (Emphasis omitted.) Ferber, 458 U.S.  at 764, 73 L. Ed. 2d 
at 1127, 102 S. Ct.  at 3358.
	Today, however, as technological advances test the truth of
the old saw that the camera does not lie (see 4 R. Rotunda & J.
Nowak, Constitutional Law §20.61(b), at 79 (3d ed. Supp. 2003)),
what falls within the category of child pornography has become
increasingly unclear. As Congress has recognized, " 'new
photographic and computer imagining [sic] technologies make it
possible to produce by electronic, mechanical, or other means,
visual depictions of what appear to be children engaging in
sexually explicit conduct that are virtually indistinguishable to the
unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographic images of
actual children engaging in sexually explicit conduct.' " 18 U.S.C.
§2251, Congressional Findings, note (5) (2000), quoting Pub. L.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. In response, Congress targeted the
growing traffic in this virtual child pornography with the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA).
	In Ashcroft, an adult entertainment industry trade association
challenged the facial validity under the first amendment of two
definitional sections of the CPPA. Section 2256(8)(B) defined
child pornography as "any visual depiction, including any
photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by
electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit
conduct where *** such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." (Emphasis added.)
18 U.S.C. §2256(8)(B) (2000). Section 2256(8)(D) defined child
pornography as "any visual depiction, including any photograph,
film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or
picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or
other means, of sexually explicit conduct where *** such visual
depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the
material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct." (Emphasis added.) 18 U.S.C.
§2256(8)(D) (2000). In short, section 2256(8)(B) addressed virtual
child pornography, and section 2256(8)(D) addressed materials
pandered or marketed as child pornography. The trade association
asserted that these sections were overbroad and had a chilling
effect, preventing its members from producing constitutionally
protected works. The federal district court granted summary
judgment to the government; the court of appeals reversed (Free
Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999)).
	The Court affirmed, holding that these sections were
overbroad and violative of the first amendment. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 
at 256, 258, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at 425, 426, 122 S. Ct.  at 1405, 1406.
The Court noted that, unlike actual child pornography, virtual
child pornography "do[es] not involve, let alone harm, any
children in the production process" (Ashcroft, 535 U.S.  at 241, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at 415, 122 S. Ct. at 1397); virtual child pornography has
no link to the crime of child sexual abuse. The Court elaborated:
			"In contrast to the speech in Ferber, speech that itself
is the record of sexual abuse, the CPPA prohibits speech
that records no crime and creates no victims by its
production. Virtual child pornography is not 'intrinsically
related' to the sexual abuse of children, as were the
materials in Ferber. 458 U.S., at 759. While the
Government asserts that the images can lead to actual
instances of child abuse [citation], the causal link is
contingent and indirect. The harm does not necessarily
follow from the speech, but depends upon some
unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts."
Ashcroft, 535 U.S.  at 250, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at 421, 122 S. Ct. 
at 1402.
	The Court rejected the government's argument that such
indirect effects were sufficient to pass constitutional muster
because the value of child pornography is de minimis:
			"Ferber did not hold that child pornography is by
definition without value. On the contrary, the Court
recognized some works in this category might have
significant value [citation], but relied on virtual
images-the very images prohibited by the CPPA-as an
alternative and permissible means of expression: '[I]f it
were necessary for literary or artistic value, a person over
the statutory age who perhaps looked younger could be
utilized. Simulation outside of the prohibition of the
statute could provide another alternative.' [Ferber, 458 U.S.  at 763, 73 L. Ed. 2d  at 1126, 102 S. Ct.  at 3357].
Ferber, then, not only referred to the distinction between
actual and virtual child pornography, it relied on it as a
reason supporting its holding. Ferber provides no support
for a statute that eliminates the distinction and makes the
alternative mode criminal as well." Ashcroft, 535 U.S.  at
251, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at 421-22, 122 S. Ct.  at 1402.
In short, sections 2256(8)(B) and 2256(8)(D) did not pass strict
scrutiny because, unlike the child pornography statute at issue in
Ferber, they were not narrowly tailored to advance the
government's compelling interest in protecting actual children
from sexual abuse.

2. The Illinois Child Pornography Statute
	We turn now to examine the effect of Ashcroft on the Illinois
child pornography statute. Section 11-20.1(a) provides in relevant
part:
			"(a) A person commits the offense of child pornography
who:
				(1) films, videotapes, photographs, or otherwise
depicts or portrays by means of any similar visual
medium or reproduction or depicts by computer any
child whom he knows or reasonably should know to be
under the age of 18 or any severely or profoundly
mentally retarded person where such child or severely
or profoundly mentally retarded person is:
					***
					(ii) actually or by simulation engaged in any act
of sexual contact involving the sex organs of the
child or severely or profoundly mentally retarded
person and the mouth, anus, or sex organs of another
person or animal; or which involves the mouth, anus
or sex organs of the child or severely or profoundly
mentally retarded person and the sex organs of
another person or animal; or
* * *
				(6) with knowledge of the nature or content thereof,
possesses any film, videotape, photograph or other
similar visual reproduction or depiction by computer of
any child or severely or profoundly mentally retarded
person whom the person knows or reasonably should
know to be under the age of 18 or to be a severely or
profoundly mentally retarded person, engaged in any
activity described in subparagraphs (i) through (vii) of
paragraph (1) of this subsection[.]" 720 ILCS
5/11-20.1(a) (West Supp. 2001).
	Section 11-20.1(f) provides definitions of, inter alia, "depict
by computer," "depiction by computer," and "child":
			"(4) 'Depict by computer' means to generate or create,
or cause to be created or generated, a computer program
or data that, after being processed by a computer either
alone or in conjunction with one or more computer
programs, results in a visual depiction on a computer
monitor, screen, or display.
			(5) 'Depiction by computer' means a computer program
or data that, after being processed by a computer either
alone or in conjunction with one or more computer
programs, results in a visual depiction on a computer
monitor, screen, or display.
			***
			(7) 'Child' includes a film, videotape, photograph, or
other similar visual medium or reproduction or depiction
by computer that is, or appears to be, that of a person,
either in part, or in total, under the age of 18, regardless of
the method by which the film, videotape, photograph, or
other similar visual medium or reproduction or depiction
by computer is created, adopted, or modified to appear as
such. 'Child' also includes a film, videotape, photograph,
or other similar visual medium or reproduction or
depiction by computer that is advertised, promoted,
presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that
conveys the impression that the film, videotape,
photograph, or other similar visual medium or
reproduction or depiction by computer is of a person
under the age of 18." (Emphases added.) 720 ILCS
5/11-20.1(f) (West Supp. 2001).(2)
	The current child pornography statute is a reenactment of an
earlier statute, which was struck down because it violated the
single-subject rule (see People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d 80
(1999)), with two modifications: "One is that possession of child
pornography must be voluntary in order to be considered
criminally liable of that violation, and it expands the definition of
a 'child.' This is intended to address the issue of morphing, where
they morph different parts of bodies." (Emphasis added.) 91st Ill.
Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 11, 1999, at 36 (statements
of Senator Sullivan).
	This description of morphing is less than clear. In Ashcroft,
the Court described computer morphing as
			"a more common and lower tech means of creating
virtual images ***. Rather than creating original images,
pornographers can alter innocent pictures of real children
so that the children appear to be engaged in sexual
activity. Although morphed images may fall within the
definition of virtual child pornography, they implicate the
interests of real children and are in that sense closer to the
images in Ferber." Ashcroft, 535 U.S.  at 242, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at 416, 122 S. Ct.  at 1397.
	The computer-morphing provision of the CPPA bars
depictions of identifiable children. See 18 U.S.C. §2256(8)(C)
(2000). The definition of "child" in section 11-20.1(f)(7), by
contrast, does not refer to identifiable children, and, accordingly,
does not proscribe computer morphing as defined by the Court.
Instead, section 11-20.1(f)(7) goes beyond morphing to attack the
same virtual and pandered child pornography targeted by sections
2256(8)(B) and 2256(8)(D) of the CPPA. The parties seem to
agree in their briefs that section 11-20.1(f)(7) is unconstitutional
because its language is indistinguishable from the language of the
CPPA invalidated in Ashcroft. At first glance, then, this case
seems straightforward: apply Ashcroft, strike the statute, and
affirm. A closer review of the record reveals that our task is not so
easy.
	In his motion to dismiss, the defendant challenged the
constitutionality of sections 11-20.1(a)(1) and 11-20.1(a)(6), not
section 11-20.1(f)(7). The defendant, however, discussed Ashcroft
and noted that the Court was troubled by the CPPA's "appears to
be" and "conveys and impression" language. The trial court clearly
recognized that this constitutionally problematic language also
appeared in the state statute: "I read the Illinois statute to be
similar to the federal statute, where a computer-generated picture
might show someone that appears as a minor or conveys the
impression that the material is a minor."  (Emphasis added.)
Though the court did not strike section 11-20.1(f)(7), which
contains this language, and, instead, struck two entirely separate
provisions, which simply define the substantive offense of child
pornography, the court's comments were broad enough to bring
the issue of the constitutionality of section 11-20.1(f)(7) before
this court. Section 11-20.1(f)(7), not sections 11-20.1(a)(1) and
11-20.1(a)(6), raises the concerns voiced in Ashcroft. Section
11-20.1(f)(7), not sections 11-20.1(a)(1) and 11-20.1(a)(6), is
unconstitutional. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5) ("In all appeals the
reviewing court may, in its discretion, and on such terms as it
deems just, *** enter any judgment and make any order that ought
to have been given or made").
	The State contends that section 11-20.1(f)(7) is severable
from the remainder of the child pornography statute. Public Act
91-229, which added section 11-20.1(f)(7), did not contain its
own specific severability provision. Accordingly, we look to the
Statute on Statutes' general severability provision: "If any
provision of an Act *** is held invalid, such invalidity does not
affect other provisions *** of the Act which can be given effect
without the invalid *** provision, and to this end the provisions
of each Act *** are severable, unless otherwise provided by the
Act." 5 ILCS 70/1.31 (West 2000). Severability involves a two-part inquiry. First, we must determine "whether the valid and
invalid portions of the statute are essentially and inseparably
connected in substance." See Fiorito v. Jones, 39 Ill. 2d 531, 540
(1968). Second, we must determine whether the legislature would
have enacted the valid portions without the invalid portions. See
People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 372 (1996). This inquiry is a
question of legislative intent.
	Section 11-20.1(f)(7) is not inseparably connected to the child
pornography statute because the statute existed for 16 years
without the definition of "child." Further, the General Assembly
would have enacted the child pornography statute without section
11-20.1(f)(7); it did just that in 1984. We conclude that the
General Assembly would prefer to leave the remaining portions of
the statute in effect. Accordingly, we strike only section
11-20.1(f)(7). See People v. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d 133, 151 (1998)
(holding that a statutory provision was severable where it was
added six years after the statute was enacted); see also United
States v. Kelly, 314 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that
Ashcroft invalidated only two definitions of virtual child
pornography and left in tact a valid definition of traditional child
pornography under which the defendant was convicted).
	The defendant contends that this holding does not dispose of
this case. He claims that what remains of section 11-20.1 after
severing the definition of "child" is still unconstitutional. Because
each of the 54 counts against the defendant allege that he
possessed a "depiction by computer" of a child engaged in sexual
activity, he assails the definitions of "depict" and "depiction by
computer" in sections 11-20.1(f)(4) and 11-20.1(f)(5). The
defendant asserts that these definitions, and sections 11-20.1(a)(1)
and 11-20.1(a)(6), which mention these terms, are not limited to
actual children. Consequently, argues the defendant, the state
statute, like the federal statute in Ashcroft, fails strict scrutiny
under Ferber.
	"In determining the constitutionality of a statute, a reviewing
court must first ascertain the statute's meaning by applying
ordinary rules of construction and then decide whether, as
construed, the statute comports with constitutional requirements."
In re Application for Judgment & Sale of Delinquent Properties
for the Tax Year 1989, 167 Ill. 2d 161, 168 (1995). That is, before
we can determine whether sections 11-20.1(f)(4) and
11-20.1(f)(5)-and concomitantly sections 11-20.1(a)(1) and
11-20.1(a)(6)-are impermissible content-based restrictions on
speech warranting strict scrutiny, we must determine what they
mean. In interpreting a statute, the primary rule of construction is
to ascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent. See Kraft, Inc.
v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). We look to the language of
the statute as the best indication of this intent, and we give the
statutory terms their ordinary meaning. Opyt's Amoco, Inc. v.
Village of South Holland, 149 Ill. 2d 265, 277 (1992).
	Because we have concluded that the definition of "child" in
section 11-20.1(f)(7) is constitutionally infirm, we must resort to
plain language. "Child" means "a young person of either sex esp.
between infancy and youth." See Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 388 (1993). "Person," in turn, means "an
individual human being" or "a human being as distinguished from
an animal or thing." See Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1686 (1993); see also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par.
11-20a(a)(3) (child pornography " '[m]atter' " means "any
photographic product depicting actual human models or actors,
whether in the form of still photographs, motion pictures, or
videotape" (emphasis added)). "Child" means young human being;
child means actual child. Further, sections 11-20.1(a)(1) and
11-20.1(a)(6) both require that the defendant "knows or
reasonably should know" that the child depicted is under the age
of 18. See 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(1), (a)(6) (West Supp. 2001). In
the context of virtual child pornography, the State could never
satisfy this scienter requirement because a virtual child is ageless.
We hold that sections 11-20.1(a)(1) and 11-20.1(a)(6) prohibit,
inter alia, making and possessing sexually explicit computer
depictions of any actual child under 18 years of age. Accordingly,
these sections pass strict scrutiny under Ferber.
	Statutory interpretation aside, the defendant's argument is
essentially a flawed syllogism: Ashcroft invalidated content-based
restrictions on virtual child pornography; virtual child
pornography often contains computer-graphic images; therefore,
Ashcroft invalidated restrictions on computer depictions of child
pornography. But not all computer depictions of child pornography
are virtual child pornography. In fact, the depict/depiction-by-computer provisions have nothing to do with the content of the
images-whether actual or virtual-and everything to do with the
method by which they are displayed. See 88th Ill. Gen. Assem.,
Senate Proceedings, December 1, 1994, at 45 (statements of
Senator Dudycz) (Senate Bill 1153, which added the
depict/depiction-by-computer provisions, "expands child
pornography to include computer distributed pornography"
(emphasis added)). The addition of computer images to the statute
simply recognized the technological reality that child pornography
could be memorialized in a computer's memory at least as easily
as it could be memorialized on paper, film, or videotape. This
reading is entirely consistent with Ashcroft, which did not strike
that part of the CPPA defining "child pornography" as "any visual
depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or
computer or computer generated image or picture, whether made
or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means."
(Emphasis added.) 18 U.S.C. §2256(8) (2000).
	Ashcroft addressed only the question of whether a criminal
prohibition of virtual child pornography-child pornography
produced without using actual children-violated the first
amendment. It did not invalidate all child pornography laws. We
need not revisit the issue of whether criminalizing child
pornography of actual, not virtual, children violates the first
amendment. That issue was answered conclusively and
convincingly in Ferber, and the Illinois child pornography statute
comports with that case. See People v. Lamborn, 185 Ill. 2d 585,
590 (1999).

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons that we have discussed, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
 
 
1.      1See also Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §4 ("All persons may speak, write
and publish freely, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty").

2.      2We note that section 11-20.1(f)(7) contains a serious syntax
problem. If we insert this definition of "child" into the substantive
offense of child pornography, the statute proscribes filming,
videotaping, photographing, or depicting by other similar visual media
or by computer any film, videotape, photograph, other similar visual
media, or computer depiction. The statute becomes circular; it bans
pictures and movies of pictures and movies.
	In oral argument, the State acknowledged this anomaly and
intimated that the definition of "child" is actually a definition of "child
pornography." This interpretation is not entirely satisfactory because
section 11-20.1(a) in a sense already defines child pornography, but the
statute is similar to the federal statute at issue in Ashcroft in this regard.
We presume the General Assembly did not intend an absurd result (A.P.
Properties, Inc. v. Goshinsky, 186 Ill. 2d 524, 532 (1999)), and we read
the definition of "child" as a definition of "child pornography" (see
People v. Garrison, 82 Ill. 2d 444, 455 (1980) (holding that a court may
alter, supply, or modify words to correct obvious legislative drafting
mistakes)).