Case Title: Magruder v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 070762

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2008-02-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, 
and Agee, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
MICHAEL RICARDO MAGRUDER 
 
v.  Record No. 070762 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA               OPINION BY 
JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
SHELDON A. CYPRESS  
            February 29, 2008 
 
v.  Record No. 070815 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
MARK A. BRISCOE 
 
v.  Record No. 070817 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In each of these appeals, the defendant claims that 
the admission into evidence, pursuant to Code § 19.2-187, 
of a certificate of analysis in the absence of testimony at 
trial from the person who performed the particular analysis 
and prepared the certificate violated his rights under the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.  Because the 
procedure provided in Code § 19.2-187.1 adequately protects 
a criminal defendant’s rights under the Confrontation 
Clause and because the defendants in these appeals failed 
to utilize that procedure, we conclude that they waived the 
challenges under the Confrontation Clause to the 
admissibility of the certificates of analysis.  We will 
therefore affirm the judgments of the Court of Appeals 
upholding the various convictions at issue. 
I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Although these appeals involve a common dispositive 
question of law, which we review de novo, Torloni v. 
Commonwealth, 274 Va. 261, 267, 645 S.E.2d 487, 490 (2007), 
their facts and procedural histories differ.  Therefore, we 
will first summarize the relevant facts of each case and 
then analyze the dispositive issue that the appeals share.  
The appeal by Mark A. Briscoe involves one additional issue 
that we will address separately following the analysis of 
the dispositive issue. 
A. Magruder v. Commonwealth 
During a consensual search of Michael Ricardo 
Magruder, Officer William Catlett of the City of Winchester 
Police Department discovered an “off-white rock-like 
substance” in the right front pocket of Magruder’s pants.  
Catlett suspected the substance was crack cocaine.  Catlett 
took possession of the “rock” and submitted it to a 
forensic laboratory for testing.  A forensic analyst with 
the Department of Criminal Justice Services, Division of 
Forensic Science, tested the substance and reported in a 
certificate of analysis that it was “0.022 gram[s]” of 
cocaine.  In the certificate, the analyst also attested 
 
2
that he had performed the analysis and that the certificate 
was “an accurate record of the results of that analysis.” 
Magruder was subsequently indicted in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Winchester for possession of cocaine, 
in violation of Code § 18.2-250(A).  At a bench trial, the 
Commonwealth offered into evidence the certificate of 
analysis.  Relying on the decision in Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), Magruder objected, 
asserting that the admission of the certificate of analysis 
would violate his Sixth Amendment right to confront the 
witness against him.  The circuit court overruled 
Magruder’s objection, stating: “Crawford only applies to 
testimonial evidence.  You have a right to call [the 
forensic analyst] if you want to.”  Magruder did not call 
the forensic analyst to testify and presented no evidence 
refuting the accuracy of the analysis of the substance 
seized from him, as reported in the certificate of 
analysis.  The circuit court convicted Magruder of 
possession of cocaine and sentenced him to a suspended term 
of one year and six months of incarceration, with two years 
of supervised probation. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed Magruder’s conviction in 
an unpublished opinion.  Magruder v. Commonwealth, Record 
No. 1982-05-4 (March 13, 2007).  Relying on its decision in 
 
3
Brooks v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 155, 638 S.E.2d 131 
(2006), the Court of Appeals held that the procedures set 
forth in Code §§ 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1 adequately 
protected Magruder’s Confrontation Clause rights and that 
Magruder’s failure to notify the Commonwealth of his desire 
to cross-examine the forensic analyst at trial waived his 
right to do so.  Magruder, slip op. at 1.  Thus, the Court 
of Appeals concluded that the circuit court did not err in 
admitting the certificate of analysis in the absence of 
testimony from the person who performed the analysis.  Id. 
On appeal to this Court, Magruder presents two 
assignments of error: 
I. 
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding 
that . . . Code § 19.2-187.1 sets out a 
reasonable procedure to be followed in order 
for a defendant to exercise his right to 
confront a particular limited class of 
scientific witnesses at trial. 
 
II. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding 
that a defendant’s failure to timely notify 
the Commonwealth of his desire to confront 
the forensic analyst at trial constitutes a 
waiver of that right. 
 
B. Cypress v. Commonwealth 
Sheldon A. Cypress was a passenger in an automobile 
being driven by his cousin when a trooper with the Virginia 
State Police stopped the vehicle because of its improperly 
tinted windows.  The driver consented to a search of the 
 
4
vehicle.  During that search, the trooper found, among 
other things, two plastic bags – one under the driver’s 
seat and one under the passenger’s seat – each containing a 
“chunky white substance” that the trooper suspected was 
crack cocaine.  Subsequent forensic testing at the 
Department of Forensic Science revealed that the substance 
was cocaine, totaling 60.5 grams.  A certificate of 
analysis reporting those results bore the signature of the 
forensic analyst who conducted the testing and included an 
attestation that she had performed the analysis. 
Cypress was indicted in the Circuit Court of the City 
of Chesapeake for possession of cocaine with the intent to 
distribute, having previously committed the offense of 
distribution or possession with the intent to distribute, 
in violation of Code § 18.2-248(C).  At a bench trial, the 
Commonwealth moved to admit the certificate of analysis 
into evidence.  Cypress objected, arguing that under the 
holding in Crawford the certificate fell into a core class 
of testimonial evidence and was therefore inadmissible in 
the absence of testimony from the person who performed the 
analysis of the seized substance.  The circuit court 
overruled the objection, holding that “the scientific 
results stated in the certificate of analysis are not 
 
5
testimonial statements as that term is defined or described 
in Crawford v. Washington.”1 
Cypress did not call the forensic analyst as a witness 
and presented no evidence.  The circuit court convicted 
Cypress of possession of cocaine with the intent to 
distribute, second or subsequent offense, and sentenced him 
to imprisonment for 15 years, with 10 years suspended, and 
a fine of $1,000.2 
 
The Court of Appeals denied Cypress’ appeal in an 
unpublished per curiam order.  Cypress v. Commonwealth, 
Record No. 1547-06-1 (January 3, 2007).  Citing its 
decision in Brooks, the Court of Appeals stated: “assuming 
a certificate of analysis constitutes testimonial evidence 
under Crawford, a defendant’s confrontation rights are 
nonetheless protected by the procedures provided by Code 
§§ 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1.”  Id., slip op. at 2.  The 
Court of Appeals, however, held that Cypress waived his 
right to confront the forensic analyst who prepared the 
                     
1 Cypress renewed his Confrontation Clause challenge to 
the admissibility of the certificate of analysis again in 
motions to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence, in a post-
trial motion, and at sentencing.  The circuit court denied 
the renewed motions for the reasons originally stated. 
2 There appears to be a discrepancy between the 
conviction order of April 19, 2006 and the sentencing order 
of June 26, 2006.  The conviction order states that Cypress 
was convicted of distributing cocaine, a second or 
 
6
certificate of analysis because he did not utilize the 
procedure set forth in Code § 19.2-187.1.  Id.  For the 
reasons stated in the January 3, 2007 order, a three-judge 
panel of the Court of Appeals also denied the petition for 
appeal.  Cypress v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1547-06-1 
(March 23, 2007). 
Now on appeal to this Court, Cypress raises two 
assignments of error: 
I. 
The trial court erred by allowing into 
evidence the certificate of analysis over 
Defendant’s objection that its introduction 
violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause rights as articulated in Crawford v. 
Washington and its progeny; the trial court 
erred by finding Cypress guilty of 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine 
where the only evidence that he possessed 
cocaine came from this drug certificate 
which should have been excluded from 
evidence[.] 
 
II. The Court of Appeals erred by ruling that 
Defendant waived his Confrontation Clause 
rights by declining to subpoena the chemist 
who prepared the certificate and this ruling 
impermissibly, and unconstitutionally, 
required Defendant to take affirmative steps 
to safeguard his Confrontation Clause 
rights[.] 
 
C. Briscoe v. Commonwealth 
 
 
Police officers with the City of Alexandria Police 
Department executed a search warrant for the apartment of 
                                                             
subsequent offense.  The sentencing order, however, states 
that he was convicted of distributing cocaine. 
 
7
Mark A. Briscoe.  During the search, the officers seized 
suspected cocaine scattered about in the apartment’s 
kitchen area, as well as two scales, a razor blade, a 100-
gram weight, a box of plastic sandwich bags, and a plate.  
Many of these items appeared to have deposits of drug 
residue on them.  In a search of Briscoe’s person, the 
police seized a white, rock-like substance wrapped in 
plastic from the pocket of his shorts. 
The police submitted the items of suspected cocaine to 
the Department of Criminal Justice Services, Division of 
Forensic Science, for testing.  In two certificates of 
analysis, a forensic analyst reported that the confiscated 
substances were “solid material” cocaine totaling 36.578 
grams.  The certificates also contained the analyst’s 
signature and attestation that she performed the analyses 
and that the certificates accurately reflected the results 
of those analyses. 
Briscoe was indicted in the Circuit Court of the City 
of Alexandria for possession with the intent to distribute 
cocaine, in violation of Code § 18.2-248(C), unlawful 
transportation of cocaine into the Commonwealth with the 
intent to distribute, in violation of Code § 18.2-248.01, 
and conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in violation of Code 
§§ 18.2-248 and 18.2-256.  During a bench trial, the 
 
8
Commonwealth sought to admit into evidence the two 
certificates of analysis.  Briscoe objected, arguing that 
their admission, without the forensic analyst present to 
testify, violated his confrontation rights under the Sixth 
Amendment.  Relying on the decision in Crawford, Briscoe 
asserted that the certificates were testimonial because 
they contained solemn declarations or affirmations that the 
Commonwealth sought to use in order to establish an element 
of the charged offenses.  Briscoe also claimed that the 
procedure provided in Code § 19.2-187.1 permitting a 
defendant to call a forensic analyst as an adverse witness 
does not protect his confrontation rights and actually 
imposes an unconstitutional affirmative step that he must 
take in order to assert his Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation. 
The circuit court overruled Briscoe’s objection, 
holding that the procedure in Code § 19.2-187.1 preserved 
his right to cross-examine the forensic analyst.  In 
response to the circuit court’s ruling, Briscoe further 
argued that the statutory right to call the forensic 
analyst as an adverse witness does not satisfy his 
constitutional right to confront the Commonwealth’s witness 
and also impermissibly shifts the burden to produce 
 
9
evidence to a criminal defendant.  The circuit court did 
not change its ruling. 
Briscoe did not call the forensic analyst to testify 
and presented no evidence.  The circuit court convicted 
Briscoe of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine 
and transportation of cocaine into the Commonwealth with 
the intent to distribute.  The court sentenced Briscoe to a 
total of 20 years of incarceration, with all but 5 years 
and 8 months suspended. 
 
The Court of Appeals denied Briscoe’s appeal in an 
unpublished per curiam order.  Briscoe v. Commonwealth, 
Record No. 1478-06-4 (January 18, 2007).  Assuming, without 
deciding, that the certificates of analysis constituted 
“testimonial” evidence under Crawford, the Court of Appeals 
held that Briscoe’s right to confront the forensic analyst 
was protected by the procedure provided in Code § 19.2-
187.1.  Id., slip op. at 2 (citing Brooks, 49 Va. App. at 
161, 638 S.E.2d at 134).  The court further held that, by 
failing to follow that statutory procedure, Briscoe waived 
his constitutional right to confront the forensic analyst 
who prepared the certificates.  Id.  Briscoe sought review 
of the Court of Appeals per curiam order, and a three-judge 
panel denied that petition for appeal for the reasons 
 
10
stated in the January 18, 2007 order.  Briscoe v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 1478-06-4 (March 26, 2007). 
On appeal to this Court, Briscoe raises this 
assignment of error with regard to the certificates of 
analysis:3 
I. 
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the 
trial court’s finding that Defendant’s 
constitutional right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses was not violated 
by the admission of the certificates of drug 
analysis into evidence. 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Confrontation Clause 
The dispositive issue before us is whether the 
procedure set forth in Code § 19.2-187.1 adequately 
protects a criminal defendant’s rights under the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and if so, 
whether Magruder, Cypress, and Briscoe (collectively, the 
defendants) waived their Confrontation Clause challenges to 
the admissibility of the respective certificates of 
analysis by failing to utilize that procedure.  Before 
resolving that issue, we first turn to the decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Crawford v. 
Washington, since the defendants relied on it in claiming 
                     
3 Briscoe presents an additional, unrelated assignment 
of error that the Court will address in a separate section 
of this opinion. 
 
11
that admission into evidence of the certificates of 
analysis violated their confrontation rights.  Prior to 
that decision, the Confrontation Clause had not been 
construed to bar the admission of an unavailable witness’ 
hearsay statement against a criminal defendant if the 
statement bore sufficient “indicia of reliability” either 
by falling within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or by 
“a showing of particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  
In Crawford, the Supreme Court rejected the Roberts 
analysis and held that “[w]here testimonial evidence is at 
issue, . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the common 
law required: unavailability [of the witness] and a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.”  541 U.S. at 68; accord 
Hodges v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 418, 428-29, 634 S.E.2d 
680, 685 (2006). 
Now, under Crawford, the question whether admission of 
a hearsay statement against a criminal defendant violates 
the Confrontation Clause turns on whether the statement is 
“testimonial” in nature.  See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 274 
Va. 469, 478, 650 S.E.2d 702, 707 (2007) (in Confrontation 
Clause challenges since Crawford, the inquiry has been 
whether a hearsay statement is testimonial); Riner v. 
Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 322, 601 S.E.2d 555, 570 (2004) 
 
12
(to decide whether admission of a hearsay statement 
violates the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court 
distinguished between “testimonial” and “non-testimonial” 
hearsay).  The Supreme Court declined to provide a 
comprehensive definition of the term “testimonial” in 
Crawford, but it did state that the term “applies at a 
minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before 
a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police 
interrogations.”  541 U.S. at 68; see also Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, ____ (2006) (holding that 
“[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of 
police interrogation under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is 
to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency 
[but] [t]hey are testimonial when the circumstances 
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and the primary purpose of the interrogation is 
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution”). 
In these appeals, it is not necessary to decide 
whether a certificate of analysis is “testimonial.”  Even 
if we assume the certificates in the cases at bar are 
testimonial, the decision in Crawford did not address the 
issues before us, i.e., whether a prescribed statutory 
 
13
demand procedure adequately protects a criminal defendant’s 
rights under the Confrontation Clause and whether failure 
to follow that procedure waives the right to confront a 
particular witness.  See Brown v. State, 939 So.2d 957, 960 
(Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (“Crawford speaks to the issue of 
the meaning and scope of the Confrontation Clause; it does 
not, however, speak to the issues of preservation and 
waiver of a criminal defendant’s confrontation right.”); 
Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 668 (Colo. 2007) 
(“Crawford did not alter the fact that the right to 
confrontation can be waived.”). 
We now begin our analysis by examining the two 
relevant statutes, Code §§ 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1.  The 
first statute permits a certificate of analysis, when “duly 
attested” by the “person performing an analysis or 
examination” in certain laboratories, to be admitted into 
evidence “[i]n any hearing or trial of any criminal offense 
. . . as evidence of the facts therein stated and the 
results of the analysis or examination referred to 
therein.”  Code § 19.2-187.  The only proviso is the 
requirement that the certificate of analysis be “filed with 
the clerk of the court hearing the case at least seven days 
prior to the hearing or trial.”  Id.  The second statute, 
Code § 19.2-187.1, establishes a procedure that presents an 
 
14
accused with the opportunity to question the person 
performing the analysis or examination as an adverse 
witness.  That statute states: 
The accused in any hearing or trial in which 
a certificate of analysis is admitted into 
evidence pursuant to § 19.2-187 or § 19.2-187.01 
shall have the right to call the person 
performing such analysis or examination or 
involved in the chain of custody as a witness 
therein, and examine him in the same manner as if 
he had been called as an adverse witness.  Such 
witness shall be summoned and appear at the cost 
of the Commonwealth. 
 
C
 
ode § 19.2-187.1. 
In each of the cases before us, the Court of Appeals 
relied on its decision in Brooks to hold that the 
defendants waived their right to confront the forensic 
analysts who prepared the certificates of analysis admitted 
into evidence at their respective trials because they 
failed to utilize the statutory procedure available to 
them.  In Brooks, the accused objected to the introduction 
of certificates of analysis into evidence on the basis that 
“the Commonwealth’s failure to call the forensic scientist 
who tested the substances denied him his constitutional 
right to confrontation under Crawford.”  49 Va. App. at 
158, 638 S.E.2d at 133.  The Court of Appeals rejected that 
argument, holding that “Code § 19.2-187.1 sets out a 
reasonable procedure to be followed in order for a 
 
15
defendant to exercise his right to confront a particular 
limited class of scientific witnesses at trial and that a 
defendant’s failure to follow this procedure amounts to a 
waiver of the constitutional right to confront such 
witnesses.”  Id. at 164-65, 638 S.E.2d at 136. 
Noting that an accused can voluntarily waive the right 
of confrontation and that reasonable requirements may be 
attached to the assertion of federal constitutional rights, 
the Court of Appeals reasoned that, in light of the 
decision in Crawford, “Code §§ 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1[] 
are merely a request to the defendant to stipulate to the 
admissibility of the contents of any properly filed 
certificates of analysis” and that when an accused “waits 
until trial to assert his right to cross-examine the 
analyst who prepared a particular certificate, he accepts 
the request to stipulate and waives his right to confront 
that witness.”  Id. at 167, 638 S.E.2d at 137; see also 
State v. Cunningham, 903 So.2d 1110, 1119 (La. 2005) 
(holding such statutes “are a formalized means of 
effectuating a stipulation to the admissibility of matters 
which often are not in dispute”).  Continuing, the Court of 
Appeals explained that, if an accused does not wish to 
accept the requested stipulation, “Code § 19.2-187.1 
provides the mechanism by which he may reject the request 
 
16
and have the analyst summoned to appear at trial at the 
cost of the Commonwealth in order to be subject to cross-
examination.”  Brooks, 49 Va. App. at 167-68, 638 S.E.2d at 
138. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the argument 
claiming the procedure in Code § 19.2-187.1 
unconstitutionally places the burden on an accused to 
present evidence in order to exercise his confrontation 
rights was not before it because the defendant did not 
summon the forensic analyst or ask the Commonwealth to do 
so.  Id. at 168, 638 S.E.2d at 138.  Thus, according to the 
Court of Appeals, the trial court never had the occasion to 
rule on any challenge regarding the order of proof.  Id. 
The defendants here assert that Brooks was wrongly 
decided and argue that they did not waive their Sixth 
Amendment right to confront the forensic analysts by 
failing to call those persons as adverse witnesses under 
the provisions of Code § 19.2-187.1.  According to the 
defendants, the procedure provided in Code § 19.2-187.1 
does not adequately protect the Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation for several reasons: (1) the statute requires 
an accused to take impermissible affirmative steps to 
secure the right to confront the forensic analyst; (2) the 
statute does not provide any notice that failure to utilize 
 
17
its provisions will automatically waive the right to 
confront the forensic analyst; (3) the statute does not 
insure that a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to 
confront the forensic analyst is knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent; (4) the statute by its terms addresses the 
order of proof and impermissibly requires an accused to 
present evidence in order to preserve confrontation rights; 
and (5) the statute allows an accused to cross-examine the 
forensic analyst only after a certificate of analysis has 
already been admitted into evidence.4 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States provides that, “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  
U.S. Const. amend. VI.  This guarantee is enforced against 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 401 (1965).  The Confrontation Clause 
                     
4 Additionally, Magruder claims that the Court of 
Appeals re-wrote Code § 19.2-187.1 because its provisions 
do not mention a stipulation or require notice by an 
accused to the Commonwealth or trial court that he wishes 
to have the forensic analyst present at trial. 
Cypress also asserts that the Court of Appeals erred 
by addressing the waiver issue sua sponte.  That alleged 
error is not, however, the subject of an assignment of 
error.  See Rule 5:17(c). 
 
 
18
secures the “literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the 
time of trial.”  California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 
(1970).  “The substance of the constitutional protection is 
. . . seeing the witness face to face, and . . . subjecting 
him to the ordeal of a cross-examination.”  Mattox v. 
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895); see also United 
States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) (“[t]he 
Confrontation Clause guarantees only ‘an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination’”) (quoting Kentucky v. 
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987) (emphasis in original)); 
James v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 95, 98, 487 S.E.2d 205, 207 
(1997) (“The Confrontation Clause . . . grants a criminal 
defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses called by 
the prosecution.”). 
The right to confront “(1) insures that the witness 
will give his statements under oath . . . ; (2) forces the 
witness to submit to cross-examination . . . ; [and] (3) 
permits the jury that is to decide the defendant’s fate to 
observe the demeanor of the witness in making his 
statement.”  Green, 399 U.S. at 158.  “The combined effect 
of these elements of confrontation – physical presence, 
oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the 
trier of fact – serves the purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause by ensuring that evidence admitted against an 
 
19
accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial 
testing that is the norm of Anglo-American criminal 
proceedings.”  Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990); 
see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (the “ultimate goal” of 
the Confrontation Clause “is to ensure reliability of 
evidence . . . by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination”). 
With this understanding of the Confrontation Clause, 
the question whether the procedure provided in Code § 19.2-
187.1 adequately protects a criminal defendant’s right to 
confront the forensic analyst turns on whether the statute 
supplies the “elements of confrontation – physical 
presence, oath, cross-examination, and observation of 
demeanor by the trier of fact.”  Craig, 497 U.S. at 846.  
We conclude that it does.  Pursuant to Code § 19.2-187.1, 
the defendants could have insured the physical presence of 
the forensic analysts at trial by issuing summons for their 
appearance at the Commonwealth’s cost, or asking the trial 
court or Commonwealth to do so.  At trial, the defendants 
could have called the forensic analysts as witnesses, 
placed them under oath, and questioned them as adverse 
witnesses, meaning the defendants could have cross-examined 
them.  See Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 479, 643 
S.E.2d 708, 721-22 (2007) (noting that a witness called as 
 
20
an adverse witness can be subjected to cross-examination); 
Smith v. Lohr, 204 Va. 331, 335, 130 S.E.2d 433, 436 (1963) 
(same).  The trier of fact would then have had the 
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.  In 
short, if the defendants had utilized the procedure 
provided in Code § 19.2-187.1, they would have had the 
opportunity to cross-examine the forensic analysts.  See 
Owens, 484 U.S. at 559 (the Confrontation Clause guarantees 
opportunity for cross-examination).  Contrary to the 
defendants’ position, the Confrontation Clause does not 
insure that opportunity before a certificate of analysis is 
admitted into evidence.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 
(the Confrontation Clause “does not bar admission of a 
statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to 
defend or explain it”). 
Nevertheless, the defendants argue that this statutory 
procedure impermissibly burdens the exercise of their right 
under the Confrontation Clause by requiring them to take 
certain affirmative steps in order to assert that right.  
While “[m]ost . . . Sixth Amendment rights arise 
automatically on the initiation of the adversary process 
and no action by the defendant is necessary to make them 
active in his or her case,” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 
400, 410 (1988), “the right to confront and to cross-
 
21
examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow 
to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal 
trial process.”  Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 
(1973); see also Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243 (noting that the 
right to confront a witness “must occasionally give way to 
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the 
case”).  For example, “‘trial judges retain wide latitude’ 
to limit reasonably a criminal defendant’s right to cross-
examine a witness ‘based on concerns about, among other 
things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the 
witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or 
only marginally relevant.’”  Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 
145, 149 (1991) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 
673, 679 (1986)); see also James, 254 Va. at 98, 487 S.E.2d 
at 207 (“The Confrontation Clause . . . does not grant a 
defendant an unlimited right to cross-examination.”).  Even 
after Crawford, the Confrontation Clause does not bar the 
admission of testimonial hearsay statements if the 
declarant is unavailable, so long as the accused had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.  541 U.S. 
at 68. 
Moreover, “[a] state procedural rule which forbids the 
raising of federal questions at late stages in the case, or 
by any other than a prescribed method, has been recognized 
 
22
as a valid exercise of state power.”  Williams v. Georgia, 
349 U.S. 375, 382-83 (1955).  Virginia has adopted several 
provisions that require criminal defendants to take certain 
procedural steps in order to exercise or vindicate a myriad 
of constitutional rights.  Pursuant to Code § 19.2-266.2, 
an accused must file a written motion to suppress evidence 
allegedly obtained in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, or 
Sixth Amendments no later that seven days before trial.  
See also Rule 3A:9.  Failure to follow this statutory 
requirement results in a waiver of an accused’s 
constitutional challenge to the admissibility of the 
evidence.  Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 145-46, 
547 S.E.2d 186, 199 (2001).  Similarly, the provisions of 
Code § 18.2-67.7 impose notice-and-hearing requirements in 
order to introduce evidence concerning a victim’s past 
sexual conduct with a person other than the accused.  Such 
requirements are not unconstitutional but “serve[] 
legitimate state interests in protecting against surprise, 
harassment, and undue delay.”  Lucas, 500 U.S. at 152-53. 
An accused must also, upon request of the 
Commonwealth, disclose whether he intends to introduce 
evidence to establish an alibi.  Rule 3A:11(c)(2).  In 
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Supreme Court 
held that a similar alibi-notice rule did not violate the 
 
23
Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 85.  The Court observed that the 
rule, “[a]t most, . . . only compelled [the defendant] to 
accelerate the timing of his disclosure, forcing him to 
divulge at an earlier date information that the [defendant] 
from the beginning planned to divulge at trial.”  Id.; see 
also United States v. Sanchez, 361 F.2d 824, 825 (2nd Cir. 
1966) (the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial attaches 
upon arrest or the filing of formal charges but failure to 
demand a speedy trial waives the constitutional right); 
State v. Jestes, 448 P.2d 917, 920 (Wash. 1968) (same). 
“The test is whether the defendant has had ‘a 
reasonable opportunity to have the issue as to the claimed 
right heard and determined by the state court.’”  Michel v. 
Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 93 (1955) (quoting Parker v. 
Illinois, 333 U.S. 571, 574 (1948)).  The provisions of 
Code § 19.2-187.1 pass this test.  We agree with the 
holding of the Court of Appeals in Brooks: “Code § 19.2-
187.1 sets out a reasonable procedure to be followed in 
order for a defendant to exercise his right to confront a 
particular limited class of scientific witnesses at trial.”  
49 Va. App. at 164, 638 S.E.2d at 136. 
 
Legislatures may pass laws regulating, 
within reasonable limits, the mode in which 
rights secured to the subject by bills of right 
and constitutions shall be enjoyed, and if the 
 
24
subject neglects to comply with these regulations 
he thereby waives his constitutional privileges. 
State v. Berg, 21 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Iowa 1946).  
Furthermore, nothing in the records before us suggest that 
any defendant was somehow precluded from utilizing the 
procedure provided in Code § 19.2-187.1 or that the 
procedure was unduly burdensome. 
The defendants do, however, claim that the statutory 
procedure, by its terms, shifts the burden of producing 
evidence and requires a criminal defendant to call the 
forensic analyst in order to exercise his right to confront 
that witness.  This argument is not cognizable under the 
Confrontation Clause.  See Owens, 484 U.S. at 559 (“[T]he 
Confrontation Clause guarantees only ‘an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination.’”) (alterations and emphasis 
in original).  Instead, it raises due process concerns that 
are not properly before us in these appeals.  Because the 
defendants did not avail themselves of the opportunity to 
require the presence of a particular forensic analyst at 
trial, they were never in the position of being forced, 
over their objection, to call a forensic analyst as a 
witness.  In other words, no defendant said to the 
respective circuit court, “the forensic analyst is here to 
testify but the Commonwealth must first call the witness.”  
 
25
Like the situation in Brooks, “the trial court never had 
occasion to address the proper order of proof.”  49 Va. 
App. at 168, 638 S.E.2d at 138; but see Belvin v. State, 
922 So.2d 1046, 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) 
(“[S]tatutory provision, [providing defendant with the 
opportunity to subpoena breath test operator,] does not 
adequately preserve the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
to confrontation” because it impermissibly shifts the 
burden to the defendant to produce evidence.); State v. 
Birchfield, 157 P.3d 216, 220 (Or. 2007) (“[I]t is clear 
that the transfer of legal responsibility to secure the 
attendance of the declarant from the state to the defendant 
cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.”). 
Finally, it is undisputed that a criminal defendant 
can waive the right to confrontation.  See Taylor v. United 
States, 414 U.S. 17, 19 (1973) (confrontation rights waived 
by voluntary absence from the trial); Illinois v. Allen, 
397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970) (loss of confrontation rights 
through misconduct in the courtroom); Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (confrontation rights waived by a 
guilty plea); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 450-51 
(1912) (waiver by consent to admission of absent witness’s 
testimony); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359-
60 (8th Cir. 1976) (a defendant’s intimidation of a grand 
 
26
jury witness waived confrontation rights).  The decision in 
Crawford did not alter that fact.  Hinojos-Mendoza, 169 
P.3d at 668.  Indeed, a criminal defendant can waive a 
panoply of constitutional rights.  See Muhammad v. 
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 507, 619 S.E.2d 16, 48 (2005) 
(the right to present mitigating testimony “may be as 
venerated as the right to a jury, the right to counsel, the 
right against self-incrimination, and the right to 
exclusion of evidence seized in an unconstitutional 
manner,” all which are “within the panoply of 
constitutional rights that may be waived by the accused”); 
Fails v. Virginia State Bar, 265 Va. 3, 8, 574 S.E.2d 530, 
533 (2003) (noting that a criminal defendant may waive the 
right to demand counsel or a jury trial); Commonwealth v. 
Washington, 263 Va. 298, 304-05, 559 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2002) 
(double jeopardy rights can be waived expressly or by 
implication); see also Code § 19.2-266.2 (an accused waives 
his right to challenge the admission of evidence allegedly 
obtained in violation of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments if he does not file a written motion to suppress 
at least seven days before trial); Code § 18.2-67.7(B) 
(rape shield statute imposes notice-and-hearing 
requirements in order to secure the right to present 
certain evidence); Rule 3A:11(c)(2) (requiring defendant to 
 
27
disclose intent to present alibi evidence prior to trial or 
risk waiving the right to do so). 
The defendants, however, contend that any waiver of 
confrontation rights cannot be presumed from a silent 
record and that, given the absence of any notice of a 
waiver in Code § 19.2-187.1, they did not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waive their Sixth Amendment 
right to confront the forensic analysts.  This Court, 
however, has never held that the record, in all 
circumstances, must affirmatively reveal that a criminal 
defendant personally waived his right to confrontation.  In 
Bilokur v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 467, 474, 270 S.E.2d 747, 
752 (1980), we concluded that a defendant’s “silence was 
tantamount to assent” that an incriminating extrajudicial 
statement would be admitted by stipulation.  Id.  We held 
“that the defendant, acting through counsel, waived his 
right to invoke the constitutional guarantee of 
confrontation.”  Id.; see also United States v. Stephens, 
609 F.2d 230, 232-33 (5th Cir. 1980) (counsel in a criminal 
case may waive a defendant’s right of confrontation by 
stipulating to the admission of evidence); cf. Washington, 
263 Va. at 304-05, 559 S.E.2d at 639 (“defendant implicitly 
consented to the [trial] court’s declaration of a mistrial 
[and thereby] waived his double jeopardy rights”). 
 
28
We recognize that “[w]aiver is ordinarily an 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right 
or privilege.”  Allen v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 105, 111, 
472 S.E.2d 277, 280 (1996).  “What suffices for waiver 
depends on the nature of the right at issue.”  New York v. 
Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000).  As the Supreme Court 
explained: 
“Whether the defendant must participate 
personally in the waiver; whether certain 
procedures are required for waiver; and whether 
the defendant’s choice must be particularly 
informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at 
stake.”  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 
733 (1993).  For certain fundamental rights, the 
defendant must personally make an informed 
waiver.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458, 464-465 (1938) (right to counsel); Brookhart 
v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966) (right to plead 
not guilty).  For other rights, however, waiver 
may be effected by action of counsel.  “Although 
there are basic rights that the attorney cannot 
waive without the fully informed and publicly 
acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer 
has -- and must have -- full authority to manage 
the conduct of the trial.”  Taylor v. Illinois, 
484 U.S. 400, 417-418 (1988).  As to many 
decisions pertaining to the conduct of the trial, 
the defendant is “deemed bound by the acts of his 
lawyer-agent and is considered to have ‘notice of 
all facts, notice of which can be charged upon 
the attorney.’”  Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 
626, 634 (1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 
320, 326 (1880)).  Thus, decisions by counsel are 
generally given effect as to what arguments to 
pursue, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 
(1983), what evidentiary objections to raise, see 
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965), 
and what agreements to conclude regarding the 
admission of evidence, see United States v. 
McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 226-227 (CA1 1993).  Absent 
 
29
a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsel’s 
word on such matters is the last. 
 
Id. at 114-15. 
 
The provisions of Code §§ 19.2-187 and 19.2–187.1 
adequately inform a criminal defendant of the consequences 
of the failure to exercise the right to have a forensic 
analyst present at trial for cross-examination.  Pursuant 
to Code § 19.2-187, a “duly attested” certificate of 
analysis that has been timely filed with the appropriate 
clerk of court is “admissible in evidence as evidence of 
the facts therein stated and the results of the analysis or 
examination referred to therein.”  The provisions of Code 
§ 19.2-187.1 then inform a criminal defendant about what 
steps to take in order to secure the physical presence of 
the forensic analyst and subject that person to an oath, 
cross-examination, and a credibility determination by the 
trier of fact - the elements of confrontation.  Once the 
forensic analyst appears at trial for cross-examination, 
any Confrontation Clause problem disappears.  See Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (“[W]hen the declarant appears for 
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places 
no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial 
statements.”). 
 
30
Based on the provisions of Code §§ 19.2-187 and 19.2–
187.1, no criminal defendant can seriously contend that he 
is not on notice that a certificate of analysis will be 
admitted into evidence without testimony from the person 
who performed the analysis unless he utilizes the procedure 
provided in Code § 19.2-187.1.  Failure to use the 
statutory procedure obviously waives the opportunity to 
confront the forensic analyst.  Additionally, “everyone is 
conclusively presumed to know the law – that is, he is 
estopped from denying such knowledge.”  King v. Empire 
Collieries Co., 148 Va. 585, 590, 139 S.E. 478, 479 (1927).  
Thus, we reject not only the defendants’ contention that 
the statutes need to contain an explicit notice outlining 
the consequences of failing to utilize the procedure set 
forth in Code § 19.2-187.1, but also the assertion that 
their waiver of confrontation rights was not voluntary, 
intelligent, and knowing.  Confrontation Clause rights are 
waived every day in this Commonwealth when a criminal 
defendant’s attorney chooses not to object to the admission 
of hearsay evidence or stipulates to the admission of 
evidence.  See, e.g., People v. Campbell, 802 N.E.2d 1205, 
1213 (Ill. 2003) (holding that “defense counsel may waive a 
defendant’s right of confrontation as long as the defendant 
does not object and the decision to stipulate is a matter 
 
31
of trial tactics and strategy”); Waldon v. State, 749 So.2d 
262, 265-66 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (same); Carr v. State, 
829 S.W.2d 101, 102-03 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (same); State v. 
Bromwich, 331 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Neb. 1983) (same).  We have 
never required, nor should we, that the record 
affirmatively reflect a defendant’s knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent agreement to such waivers.  See Bilokur, 221 
Va. at 474, 270 S.E.2d at 752. 
Thus, we hold that the procedure in Code § 19.2-187.1 
adequately safeguards a criminal defendant’s rights under 
the Confrontation Clause and that the defendants’ failure 
in these cases to utilize that procedure waived their right 
to be confronted with the forensic analysts, i.e., to enjoy 
the elements of confrontation.5  Other courts have reached 
                     
5 In light of our holding, Cypress’ argument that there 
was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction because 
the only evidence proving he possessed cocaine was the 
“inadmissible” certificate of analysis is without merit. 
 
We are also not persuaded by the defendants’ argument 
that, if the procedure in Code § 19.2-187.1 adequately 
protects a criminal defendant’s confrontation rights, the 
Commonwealth could present all its evidence by affidavit 
and require a defendant to subpoena the witnesses in order 
to cross-examine them.  We are not willing to engage in the 
sort of speculation urged by the defendants.  Furthermore, 
the provisions of Code § 19.2-187 obviate the need for the 
Commonwealth to call one of the limited number of forensic 
analysts to testify in every case in which a certificate of 
analysis is being offered into evidence if the defendant 
chooses not to exercise his confrontation rights by 
utilizing the procedure provided in Code § 19.2-187.1. 
 
32
similar conclusions.  For example, in Hinojos-Mendoza, the 
court addressed a Colorado statute that makes “ ‘[a]ny 
report . . . of the criminalistics laboratory’ ” admissible 
into evidence “ ‘in the same manner and with the same force 
and effect as if the employee or technician . . . had 
testified in person.’ ”  169 P.3d at 665 (quoting Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 16-3-309(5)).  The court noted that pursuant 
to the statute, “ ‘[a]ny party may request that such 
employee or technician testify in person at a criminal 
trial on behalf of the state . . . by notifying the witness 
and other party at least ten days before the date of such 
criminal trial.’ ”  Id. (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-3-
309(5)).  Failure to make a timely request was held to 
amount to a waiver of the right to confront the technician.  
Id. at 668.  In concluding that the statute does not run 
afoul of the Confrontation Clause, the court explained that 
the statutory procedure “for ensuring the presence of the 
lab technician at trial does not deny a defendant the 
opportunity to cross-examine the technician, but simply 
requires that the defendant decide prior to trial whether 
he will conduct a cross-examination.  The statute provides 
the opportunity for confrontation – only the timing of the 
defendant’s decision is changed.”  Id. 
 
33
The court further noted that when “a defendant chooses 
not to take advantage of the opportunity to cross-examine a 
witness, the defendant has not been denied his 
constitutional right to confrontation.”  Id.  Thus, the 
court held that, “where a defendant . . . is represented by 
counsel, the failure to comply with the statutory 
prerequisites . . . waives the defendant’s right to 
confront the witness just as the decision to forgo cross-
examination at trial would waive that right.”  Id. at 670; 
see also Brown, 939 So.2d at 961 (failure to make a timely 
objection in accordance with statutory requirements to the 
admissibility of a certificate of analysis waived the issue 
for appeal); Cunningham, 903 So.2d at 1121 (finding that 
the defendant’s failure to follow statutory procedure and 
subpoena the person who performed the analysis waived his 
right of confrontation and explaining that, “[f]rom a 
practical standpoint, these statutes are no different from 
a situation in which the State offers hearsay evidence at 
trial [in that if the] defendant does not contemporaneously 
object, the hearsay is allowed into evidence”); City of Las 
Vegas v. Walsh, 124 P.3d 203, 209 (Nev. 2005) (holding that 
statutory scheme adequately preserved the right of the 
accused under the Confrontation Clause and that “[f]ailure 
to exercise confrontation rights [under the statute] will 
 
34
act as a waiver of those rights with regard to the 
affidavits”); State v. Campbell, 719 N.W.2d 374, 378 (N.D. 
2006) (criminal defendant’s failure to subpoena forensic 
scientist as provided by statute and to avail himself of 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness waived any Sixth 
Amendment violation); Deener v. State, 214 S.W.3d 522, 528 
(Tex. App. 2006) (“Because [defendant] did not file a 
written objection to the use of the affidavits and 
certificate of analysis at least ten days before trial, his 
objection at trial was not timely and he forfeited his 
right of confrontation.”). 
We recognize that some courts have reached contrary 
conclusions, but we are not persuaded by their rationales.  
See e.g., Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 20 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (holding that confrontation rights may be waived 
if record shows constitutionally valid waiver); People v. 
McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470, 478 (Ill. 2000) (“[S]tatute 
impermissibly requires a defendant to take a procedural 
step to secure his confrontation rights or be deemed to 
have waived them, and does not require that the waiver of 
this fundamental constitutional right be a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary act.”); State v. Laturner, 163 
P.3d 367, 377 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (The statute in question 
violated a defendant’s confrontation rights because “the 
 
35
defendant is deemed to have waived the Sixth Amendment 
confrontation right if the defendant fails to take 
affirmative steps to assert it.”); State v. Caulfield, 722 
N.W.2d 304, 313 (Minn. 2006) (“At a minimum, any statute 
purporting to admit testimonial reports without the 
testimony of the preparer must provide adequate notice to 
the defendant of the contents of the report and the likely 
consequences of his failure to request the testimony of the 
preparer” in order for the defendant to make a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his confrontation 
rights.). 
Therefore, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not 
err in affirming the judgments of the circuit courts 
admitting into evidence the respective certificates of 
analysis at issue in these appeals.  We turn now to the 
unrelated issue raised by Briscoe. 
B.  Sufficiency of Evidence to Prove Corpus Delicti 
 
In his remaining assignment of error, Briscoe asserts 
that “[t]he Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial 
court’s finding the evidence was sufficient to prove the 
corpus delicti of the offense of transporting cocaine into 
the Commonwealth.”  He argues that his uncorroborated 
confession was not sufficient to prove an essential element 
 
36
of this crime, specifically that he brought cocaine into 
the Commonwealth in violation of Code § 18.2-248.01.6 
 
In any criminal prosecution, the Commonwealth must 
prove the corpus delicti, “that is, the fact that the crime 
charged has been actually perpetrated.”  Cherrix v. 
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 305, 513 S.E.2d 642, 651 (1999).  
However, when an accused has fully confessed to commission 
of the crime, “only slight corroboration of the confession 
is required to establish corpus delicti beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Id. (emphasis added); accord Clozza v. 
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 124, 133, 321 S.E.2d 273, 279 (1984); 
Campbell v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 825, 833, 75 S.E.2d 468, 
473 (1953).  While an accused cannot be convicted based 
solely on his or her confession, “[i]t is not necessary, 
however, that there be independent corroboration of all the 
contents of the confession, or even of all the elements of 
the crime.  The requirement of corroboration is limited to 
the facts constituting the corpus delicti.”  Watkins v. 
Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341, 348, 385 S.E.2d 50, 54 (1989).  
In addition, “corroborative facts supporting the corpus 
                     
6  In relevant part, the provisions of Code § 18.2-
248.01 make it “unlawful for any person to transport into 
the Commonwealth by any means with the intent to sell or 
distribute one ounce or more of cocaine, coca leaves or any 
salt, compound, derivative or preparation thereof.” 
 
 
37
delicti may be furnished by circumstantial evidence as 
readily as by direct evidence.”  Id. at 349, 385 S.E.2d at 
54 (citing Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 229, 294 
S.E.2d 882, 891 (1982)). 
Following his arrest and being advised of his Miranda 
rights, Briscoe told police that everything taken from his 
apartment during the search, including the cocaine, the 
crack, and the plastic bags, belonged to him.  He stated 
that the cocaine found in the kitchen sink should have been 
about 40 grams and that he got it from “[his] man in 
[Washington,] D.C. two weeks ago” and brought it back to 
Alexandria.  Briscoe confessed that his most recent 
purchase consisted of approximately 62 grams of cocaine and 
that the cocaine was hard, not powder, when he bought it.  
When asked where he obtained cocaine, Briscoe named “three 
main guys” in Washington, D.C. as his sources.  He also 
named five dealers to whom he sells the cocaine and 
explained the frequency of those sales and the profit he 
makes from the cocaine he buys.  All of these statements 
were admitted into evidence during Briscoe’s trial. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ holding that 
“[Briscoe’s] confession that he brought the [cocaine] from 
D.C. to Alexandria, along with the evidence seized from his 
person and his apartment, sufficiently established the 
 
38
corpus delicti of the transportation offense.”  Briscoe v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 1478-06-4, slip op. at 4 (January 
18, 2007).  The “solid material” cocaine seized from 
Briscoe’s apartment was consistent with the type of cocaine 
he admittedly purchased two weeks before the search and the 
remaining 36.578 grams was consistent with the amount he 
purchased and the frequency of his sales during a two-week 
period.  The presence of the cocaine, scales, weights, and 
plastic bags inside Briscoe’s apartment provided more than 
the slight evidence necessary to corroborate Briscoe’s 
confession and establish the corpus delicti beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Cherrix, 257 Va. at 305, 385 S.E.2d 
at 651. 
Contrary to Briscoe’s argument, the Court’s decision 
in Phillips v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 207, 116 S.E.2d 282 
(1960), is distinguishable.  There, the defendant confessed 
to the crime of sodomy.  Id. at 209, 116 S.E.2d at 283.  We 
held that, while the victim’s possession of the defendant’s 
vehicle corroborated the defendant’s statement that he and 
the victim were in each other’s presence at a particular 
time, “it furnishe[d] no corroboration that the actual 
crime of sodomy for which [the defendant] was convicted was 
committed.”  Id. at 211, 116 S.E.2d at 285.  The victim’s 
possession of the vehicle neither established the 
 
39
commission of the crime nor corroborated the defendant’s 
confession that he committed the crime of sodomy.  Id. at 
212, 116 S.E.2d at 285.  As we have already explained, the 
items seized during the search of Briscoe’s apartment 
provided the necessary corroboration to establish the 
corpus delicti. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals in each of these appeals. 
 
 
 
 
 
Record No. 070762 – Affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Record No. 070815 – Affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Record No. 070817 – Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE KEENAN, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE HASSELL and JUSTICE 
KOONTZ join, dissenting. 
 
Today the majority holds that a defendant’s failure to 
exercise a statutory right under Code § 19.2-187.1 results 
in the forfeiture of his Sixth Amendment right “to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”  In my view, 
this analysis confuses the waiver of a statutory right with 
the waiver of a constitutional right.  Because the 
certificates of analysis at issue were “testimonial” 
hearsay, within the meaning of Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813 (2006), and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004), their admission into evidence under Code § 19.2-187 
in the prosecution’s cases in the absence of supporting 
 
40
testimony from certificates’ authors, violated the 
defendants’ Confrontation Clause rights.  Thus, I disagree 
with the majority’s holding that Code § 19.2-187.1 
preserves a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights, or 
that a defendant’s failure to exercise rights accorded 
under that statute results in the surrender of 
Confrontation Clause rights. 
I.  “TESTIMONIAL” CHARACTER OF EVIDENCE 
I would hold that the certificates of analysis are 
“testimonial” hearsay based on the Supreme Court’s analysis 
of that term in Davis and Crawford.  In particular, the 
analysis in Davis instructs us to examine the purpose for 
which a non-testifying witness initially made the 
statements that were later introduced in evidence at a 
criminal trial, and to inquire whether the person making 
the hearsay statements was “testifying” and “acting as a 
witness.”  See Davis, 547 U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2277. 
In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment forbids the admission in a criminal trial of 
“testimonial” hearsay statements made against an accused by 
a witness who does not testify at the trial, unless the 
witness is unavailable or the defendant had a prior 
opportunity to cross examine that witness.  541 U.S. at 68.  
At the defendant’s criminal trial in Crawford, the trial 
 
41
court admitted in evidence a tape-recorded statement that 
the defendant’s wife made to police officers during a 
police investigation of the crime for which the defendant 
was charged.  Id. at 38-39, 68-69.  The Supreme Court held 
that the defendant’s confrontation rights were violated by 
admission of his wife’s tape-recorded statement because the 
statement was “testimonial” in nature and the wife did not 
testify at trial.  Id.  Although the Supreme Court in 
Crawford declined to provide a comprehensive definition of 
the term “testimonial,” the Court indicated that some 
statements would always be categorized as “testimonial,” 
including ex parte testimony given at a preliminary hearing 
and statements taken by police officers during the course 
of a police interrogation.  Id. at 52, 68. 
In Davis, the Supreme Court revisited the definition 
of “testimonial” hearsay.  The Court held that: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course 
of police interrogation under circumstances 
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet 
an ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose 
of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution. 
 
547 U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74. 
 
 
42
In Davis, the Court considered two separate situations 
in which the statements of a witness, who did not testify 
at trial, were admitted in evidence concerning a 
defendant’s illegal conduct.  Id., 547 U.S. at ___, 126 
S.Ct. at 2271-73.  In the first situation, the Court held 
that statements made to law enforcement personnel during a 
“911” emergency telephone call were not “testimonial” in 
nature because the purpose of the statements was to elicit 
assistance during an ongoing emergency.  Id. at ___, 126 
S.Ct. at 2277.  The Court reasoned that the speaker was not 
“acting as a witness” or “testifying” because, unlike a 
witness, she was describing events “as they were actually 
happening, rather than describ[ing] past events.”  Id. at 
___, 126 S.Ct. at 2276-77 (emphasis and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
The second situation in Davis concerned statements 
recorded in an affidavit obtained by police following a 
domestic dispute.  Id., 547 U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2272-73.  
The Court concluded that these statements were 
“testimonial” in character because the declarant’s purpose 
in making the statements was not to describe an ongoing 
emergency situation, but to supply information in a police 
investigation about past criminal conduct.  Davis, 547 U.S. 
at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2278.  The Court concluded that the 
 
43
statements were “inherently testimonial” because they were 
“an obvious substitute for live testimony,” and they did 
“precisely what a witness does on direct examination.”  Id. 
(emphasis omitted). 
Based on the holdings in Davis and Crawford, I would 
conclude that a certificate of drug analysis, in function, 
“acts as a witness” against an accused.  See Davis, 547 
U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2277; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.  
Much like any other expert witness, the scientist preparing 
a certificate of analysis does so based on a factual 
foundation supplied from past events.  See Santen v. 
Tuthill, 265 Va. 492, 498, 578 S.E.2d 788, 792 (2003); 
Countryside Corp. v. Taylor, 263 Va. 549, 553, 561 S.E.2d 
680, 682 (2002).  Thus, the certificate admitted under Code 
§ 19.2-187.1 functions in the same manner as expert witness 
testimony because the certificate describes the scientist’s 
procedures and conclusions concerning the material 
submitted for analysis.  See Thomas v. United States, 914 
A.2d 1, 12-13 (D.C. App. 2006). 
The holding in Davis further reinforces the 
“testimonial” nature of a certificate of analysis, because 
the certificate is created “to establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”  
See Davis, 547 U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2274; Thomas, 914 
 
44
A.2d at 12-13; Belvin v. State, 922 So.2d 1046, 1050-51 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).  A forensic scientist prepares 
the certificates in these cases for the purpose of proving 
a critical element of a criminal offense, namely, that the 
chemical sample submitted for analysis is an illegal 
substance.  See Davis, 547 U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2274-
76; Crawford, 451 U.S. at 51; Commonwealth v. Allen, 269 
Va. 262, 274, 609 S.E.2d 4, 12 (2005); Santen, 265 Va. at 
498, 578 S.E.2d at 792; Countryside Corp., 263 Va. at 553, 
561 S.E.2d at 682; Thomas, 914 A.2d at 12-13; Belvin, 922 
So.2d 1046, 1050-51; State v. Laturner, 163 P.3d 367, 376-
77 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007); State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 
666 (Mo. 2007); State v. Miller, 144 P.3d 1052, 1058 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2006).  In the parlance of Davis, the certificates 
of analysis in the present cases functioned as “an obvious 
substitute for live testimony,” because the Commonwealth 
introduced them in lieu of the scientists’ testimony, and 
otherwise would have been required to establish the illegal 
nature of the substances by presenting actual testimony 
from the scientists themselves.  See Davis, 547 U.S. at 
___, 126 S.Ct. at 2278; Thomas, 914 A.2d at 12-13; State v. 
Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 309 (Minn. 2006); March, 216 
S.E.3d at 666; State v. Berezansky, 899 A.2d 306, 312 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006). 
 
45
Applying additional rationale employed by the Supreme 
Court in Davis, I also observe that the forensic 
scientists’ analyses were not performed under circumstances 
of an emergency or contemporaneously with the commission of 
the crimes, but were accomplished well after the criminal 
events had transpired.  See Davis, 547 U.S. at ___, 126 
S.Ct. at 2276-77, 2278; Thomas, 914 A.2d at 12-13; Hinojos-
Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 667 (Colo. 2007); 
Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 309; March, 216 S.W.3d at 666; 
Berezansky, 899 A.2d at 312; City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 
124 P.3d 203, 208 (Nev. 2005); People v. Rogers, 780 
N.Y.S.2d. 393, 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Miller, 144 P.3d 
at 1060.  In fact, the scientists prepared the certificates 
in response to police investigations.  See Davis, 547 U.S. 
at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2276-79; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 68; 
Thomas, 914 A.2d at 12-13; Hinojos-Mendoza, 169 P.3d at 
667. 
Moreover, the certificates fall into the category of 
“formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,” 
which the Supreme Court in Crawford included in its 
examples of the types of statements that would be 
considered testimonial.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.  
The certificates contain a “solemn declaration or 
affirmation” by the forensic scientists who prepared them, 
 
46
in conformance with the requirement of Code § 19.2-187 that 
such certificates be “duly attested” before being admitted 
in evidence.  See id., 541 U.S. at 51. 
Based on the holdings in Davis and Crawford, I would 
conclude that the certificates of analysis admitted in 
evidence in the present cases served to “bear testimony” 
against the defendants and, therefore, were “testimonial” 
evidence within the meaning of those holdings.  I would 
further conclude that the defendants in these cases had a 
Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the testimony 
of the forensic scientists who prepared the certificates, 
because the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that the 
scientists were unavailable or that the defendants had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine them.  See Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 68.∗ 
II.  VIOLATION OF CONFRONTATION CLAUSE RIGHTS 
I would further hold that the defendants’ 
Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the 
certificates of analysis were admitted in evidence under 
Code § 19.2-187.  The Confrontation Clause is worded in the 
passive, rather than in the active, voice.  See U.S. 
Const., amend. VI.  Thus, under that constitutional 
guarantee, an accused enjoys the right “to be confronted” 
by the prosecution with the witnesses against him.  Id.  
 
47
As the majority correctly observes, the Sixth 
Amendment confrontation right has long been held to include 
a defendant’s “opportunity for effective cross-
examination.”  See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 
559-60 (1988)(quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 
739 (1987)); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965); 
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).  This 
opportunity is “one of the safe-guards essential to a fair 
trial,” and is “a right long deemed so essential for the 
due protection of life and liberty that it is guarded 
against legislative and judicial action by provisions in 
the Constitution.”  Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404 (quoting Kirby 
v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55-56 (1899); and Alford v. 
United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931)).  The 
Confrontation Clause “ensure[s] that evidence admitted 
against an accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous 
adversarial testing that is the norm of Anglo-American 
criminal proceedings.”  State v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 
(1990). 
This Court consistently has recognized that in 
criminal trials, the Confrontation Clause preserves for a 
defendant the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses.  
See Bilokur v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 467, 470, 270 S.E.2d 
747, 750 (1980); Moore v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 667, 669, 
 
48
119 S.E.2d 324, 327 (1961).  The opportunity for effective 
cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, however, 
presupposes that a defendant has an opportunity to cross-
examine those witnesses during the prosecution’s case.  
Thus, preservation of the Sixth Amendment confrontation 
right requires that the prosecution call a defendant’s 
accusers as witnesses to actively confront the defendant.  
See Owens, 484 U.S. at 557, 559; Kirby, 174 U.S. at 55-56; 
Thomas, 914 A.2d at 16; Lowery v. Collins, 988 F.2d 1364, 
1369-70 (5th Cir. 1993); State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 
332-33 & n.23 (Md. 2005). 
Code § 19.2-187 forces a defendant to relinquish his 
right “to be confronted” in the prosecution’s case in 
chief, because the statute permits a timely-filed 
certificate of analysis to be admitted automatically in the 
absence of testimony from the scientist who prepared the 
certificate.  See id.  That statute allows admission of the 
certificate irrespective whether a defendant chooses to 
call the forensic scientist to testify in his own case 
under the provisions of Code § 19.2-187.1.  Thus, I would 
conclude that a Confrontation Clause violation occurred in 
the present cases because the defendants were not able to 
subject the contents of the certificates of analysis to 
 
49
adversarial scrutiny before the prosecution concluded its 
cases in chief. 
III.  WAIVER INAPPLICABLE 
The provisions of Code § 19.2-187.1 did not remedy 
this Confrontation Clause violation.  That section provides 
a criminal defendant the statutory right to call the 
forensic scientist who prepared a certificate of analysis 
as a witness in the defendant’s own case.  See id.  Thus, 
Code § 19.2-187.1 merely provides a criminal defendant the 
opportunity to seek evidence in his favor by questioning 
the scientist who prepared the certificate that has already 
been admitted in evidence against him. 
The majority asserts, however, that the present cases 
are analogous to other situations in which we have held 
that criminal defendants are required to take “certain 
procedural steps” in order to preserve their constitutional 
rights.  In my opinion, this argument misconstrues the very 
nature of Code § 19.2-187.1.  No “procedural step” under 
Code § 19.2-187.1 will preserve a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment confrontation right, because that section merely 
establishes a separate, statutory right for a defendant to 
call the forensic scientist as a witness in a defendant’s 
own case.  Thus, Code § 19.2-187.1 does not impact a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right “to be confronted” by the 
 
50
witnesses against him, because the statute cannot revive a 
defendant’s right to be confronted by the prosecution with 
the scientist’s evidence.  See Belvin, 922 So.2d at 1054; 
State v. Birchfield, 157 P.3d 216, 220 (Or. 2007). 
The majority seeks to avoid this dilemma by stating 
that the defendants failed to raise a due process challenge 
alleging that Code § 19.2-187.1 impermissibly shifted the 
burden of producing evidence to the defendants, which is a 
claim not cognizable under the Sixth Amendment.  This 
argument, however, is unavailing because the majority 
confuses the issue whether a defendant may be required to 
produce evidence in a criminal trial with the issue whether 
the statutory mechanism at issue in this case, which 
requires a defendant to produce evidence, is capable of 
preserving his Confrontation Clause rights. 
A defendant’s constitutional right to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him arises automatically, and 
the state may not require a defendant to take an 
affirmative action to preserve this right.  See Taylor v. 
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, & n.14 (1988); People v. 
McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470, 475 (Ill. 2000); Birchfield, 
157 P.3d at 219-20.  While a defendant’s failure to act 
under Code § 19.2-187.1 may constitute a waiver of his 
statutory right under that Code section to call the 
 
51
forensic scientist in the defendant’s case, the fact that 
he chooses not to exercise this statutory right is 
insufficient to establish a waiver of his separate 
constitutional confrontation right that is guaranteed to 
him throughout his criminal trial.  See City of S. Boston 
v. Halifax County, 247 Va. 277, 282, 441 S.E.2d 11, 14 
(1994); Thomas, 914 A.2d at 16; Collins, 988 F.2d at 1369-
70; Snowden, 867 A.2d at 332-33. 
A defendant cannot waive a right that he has already 
been denied.  The extent of a defendant’s waiver of a right 
under Code § 19.2-187.1 necessarily is limited to rights he 
possesses under the statute.  See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 
719, 725 (1968); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).  Thus, the 
defendants in these cases could not have waived under Code 
§ 19.2-187.1 rights that had already been denied by 
operation of Code § 19.2-187. 
Even if the majority were correct, however, that Code 
§ 19.2-187.1 offers a defendant the protection of a 
confrontation right, the record does not support a 
conclusion that these defendants waived that right.  A 
waiver of a constitutional right requires a clear showing 
that there was an “intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege.”  Barber, 390 
 
52
U.S. at 725; Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 4; Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 
464; Allen v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 105, 111, 472 S.E.2d 
277, 280 (1996).  The record fails to establish a “knowing 
and intelligent” waiver under Code § 19.1-187.1 because 
that Code section does not provide a defendant with notice 
that if he fails to avail himself of the statute’s 
provisions, he waives his Sixth Amendment right.  See 
Brookhart, 284 U.S. at 4.  This Court should not presume a 
defendant’s waiver of his Confrontation Clause rights from 
a silent record.  See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242; Laturner, 
163 P.3d at 377; cf. Barber, 390 U.S. at 725. 
I would hold that a constitutional application of Code 
§ 19.2-187 requires that if the prosecution wishes to 
introduce in evidence a certificate of analysis 
contemplated by Code § 19.2-187, the prosecution must 
obtain from a defendant a stipulation regarding the 
admissibility of the contents of that certificate, or an 
affirmative waiver by a defendant of his Confrontation 
Clause rights regarding the certificate.  In the absence of 
such a stipulation or affirmative waiver, the Sixth 
Amendment requires that the prosecution call in its case in 
chief the forensic scientist who prepared the certificate 
to present this “testimonial” evidence.  See Davis, 547 
U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2277; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; 
 
53
 
54
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243; Laturner, 163 P.3d at 377; cf. 
Barber, 390 U.S. at 725.  Because there were no such 
affirmative waivers or stipulations in the cases before us, 
and the forensic scientists did not testify regarding the 
contents of the certificates in the prosecution’s cases in 
chief, I would hold that the certificates of analysis in 
these cases were admitted in violation of the defendants’ 
Confrontation Clause rights.  Therefore, I would reverse 
the defendants’ convictions and remand the cases for new 
trials, if the Commonwealth be so advised. 
                     
∗ In reaching this conclusion, I recognize that courts 
in various jurisdictions have reached differing results in 
deciding the question whether certificates of scientific 
analysis are “testimonial” in character, within the meaning 
of Davis and Crawford.  Compare, Thomas v. United States, 
914 A.2d 1, 12-13 (D.C. App. 2006) (holding that chemist’s 
report was testimonial because it was akin to expert report 
and primary purpose was to substitute for chemist’s 
testimony in prosecution of accused); Hinojos-Mendoza v. 
People, 169 P.3d 662, 665-66 (Colo. 2007) (holding that 
laboratory report was testimonial because it was prepared 
at direction of police, solely for purposes of prosecution, 
and introduced in evidence to establish element of 
offense); Martin v. State, 936 So.2d 1190, 1192 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2006) (holding that drug certificate was 
testimonial because it was created for criminal 
prosecution); Belvin v. State, 922 So.2d 1046, 1050 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (deciding that breath test affidavits 
were testimonial because they were generated by law 
enforcement for later use at criminal trial); State v. 
Laturner, 163 P.3d 367, 376-77 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) 
(holding that laboratory report was testimonial because 
scientist was witness, statements in report were testimony, 
and scientist knew statements would be used in later trial 
against accused); People v. Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d 610, 619-21 
(Mi. 2005) (concluding that crime lab report was 
 
55
                                                             
testimonial because person preparing report would 
reasonably expect it to be used in prosecution);  State v. 
Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 309 (Minn. 2006) (deciding that 
laboratory report was testimonial because analyst attested 
to findings, report was equivalent of testimony, and report 
was prepared at police request for purpose of prosecution); 
State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Mo. 2007) (holding 
that laboratory report was testimonial because it was 
prepared at request of law enforcement, created for 
purposes of prosecution, intended to prove element of 
offense, and offered in lieu of testimony); State v. 
Berezansky, 899 A.2d 306, 312 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2006) (concluding that blood test analysis was testimonial 
because it was prepared to prove element of offense in lieu 
of calling technician to testify); City of Las Vegas v. 
Walsh, 124 P.3d 203, 208 (Nev. 2005) (holding that nurse’s 
affidavit stating name, time, and manner of blood 
withdrawal was testimonial because it was made for later 
use at trial); People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d. 393, 396-97 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (holding that blood test report was 
testimonial because it was initiated by prosecution to 
discover evidence against the accused); State v. Crager, 
844 N.E.2d 390, 396 (Ohio App. 2005) (holding that DNA 
analysis was testimonial because it was prepared as part of 
police investigation and reasonable people would conclude 
that report would later be used at trial); State v. Miller, 
144 P.3d 1052, 1058 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding that 
laboratory report was testimonial because it contained 
solemn declarations produced in response to police inquiry 
for purpose of establishing critical element at later 
criminal prosecution); Deener v. State, 214 S.W.3d 522, 526 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (deciding that certificates of 
analysis were core testimonial evidence); with, United 
States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230-32 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that report of data analyzing blood sample was not 
testimonial statement of lab technician because statement 
was generated by machine); United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 
920, 926-27 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that certificates of 
blood and urine analysis were non-testimonial even though 
person creating records knew records may be used for 
criminal prosecution, because records were created in 
ordinary course of business and technicians were not 
testifying and were not acting as witnesses); Pruitt v. 
State, 954 So.2d 611, 617 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) 
(concluding that certificate of analysis was non-
testimonial because it was created by inherently 
 
56
                                                             
trustworthy and reliable scientific testing rather than 
opinionated assertions, speculation, or guesswork); 
Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 129 P.3d 471, 475-78 (Ariz. App. 
2006) (holding that record of regular testing of 
breathalyzer equipment was non-testimonial business record 
because it was kept in ordinary course of business and not 
for purposes of litigation); People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 
140 (Ca. 2007) (concluding that DNA report was not 
testimonial because observations in report were 
contemporaneous recordations rather than documentation of 
past events); People v. Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230, 233 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (deciding that laboratory report was 
not testimonial because it did not function as equivalent 
of in-court testimony); State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 
753-54 (Iowa 2006) (stating that HIV test performed two 
years prior to trial and not for purposes of prosecution 
was non-testimonial); Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 
701, 705 (Mass. 2005) (holding that laboratory report was 
merely report of scientific data and therefore was non-
testimonial business record); Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 
821, 837-46 (Md. 2006) (concluding that factual, routine, 
and non-analytical findings in autopsy report were non-
testimonial); State v. Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137, 144 (N.C. 
2006) (holding that blood sample analysis was not 
testimonial because it did not “bear witness” against 
accused and was not prepared exclusively for trial); State 
v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628, 635-36 (N.M. 2004) (concluding 
that blood alcohol report was not testimonial because not 
prepared for purpose of prosecution); Commonwealth v. 
Carter, 932 A.2d 1261, 1268 (Pa. 2007) (holding that blood 
alcohol tests were not testimonial because they were basic, 
routine, and contained precise calculations).