Case Title: Tyvessel Tyvorus White v. State of Florida (Remand)

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC88-813

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1999-11-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
1See §§ 932.701-.704, Fla. Stat. (1993).
Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. 88,813
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TYVESSEL TYVORUS WHITE,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[November 24, 1999]
PER CURIAM.
This case is before us on remand from the United States Supreme Court
following its decision on certiorari review of White v. State, 710 So. 2d 949 (Fla.
1998).  In White we had held that, in the absence of exigent circumstances, the
Fourth Amendment required law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant prior to
seizing White's automobile pursuant to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.1  The
Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the search and seizure of White's
2Article I, section 9 provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be
compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against oneself.
-2-
automobile did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers had probable
cause to believe that the automobile was "contraband" subject to the Act and the
automobile's ease of mobility required the officers to act promptly.  See Florida v.
White, 119 S. Ct. 1555, 1559 (1999).  In addition, the Supreme Court reasoned that
the Fourth Amendment accords "law enforcement officials greater latitude in
exercising their duties in public places."  Because the officers seized White's
automobile in a public place–White's employer's parking lot–the warrantless seizure
did not invade White's privacy.  See id. at 1559-60. 
On remand, White now argues that due process principles contained with
Article I of the Florida Constitution independently requires a pre-seizure ex parte
hearing.2   However, the State asserts, and White does not contest, that this
argument was not raised to the trial court or to the district court of appeal during the
direct appeal from his conviction.  Thus we decline to consider this argument
because White has not preserved this issue for review. 
We also reject White's argument that our decision in White gives this Court
jurisdiction to review this new argument.  We accepted jurisdiction in White on the
3See White v. State, 680 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
-3-
basis of a certified question from the district court.3  That question asked us to
consider whether the warrantless seizure of White's automobile under the Forfeiture
Act, absent exigent circumstances, violated the Fourth Amendment so as to render
the evidence seized in a subsequent inventory search of the automobile inadmissable
in a criminal prosecution.  See White, 710 So. 2d at 950. In light of the holding of
the United States Supreme Court we answer this question in the negative, with the
express condition that the seizure take place in a public place. White did not argue
and we did not address whether due process independently requires an ex parte
warrant.  As such, White's argument on remand is procedurally barred. 
Accordingly, in light of the United States Supreme Court's opinion, we now
approve the result in the district court.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., SHAW, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., and OVERTON, Senior
Justice, concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
-4-
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified Great
Public Importance
First District - Case No. 94-2823 
(Bay County)
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and David P. Gauldin, Assistant Public Defender,
Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; James W. Rogers, Bureau Chief, Criminal
Appeals; Carolyn Snurkowski, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, and Daniel A.
David, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent