Case Title: Melendez v. San Francisco Baseball Associates LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: S245607

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
GEORGE MELENDEZ et al., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S245607 
 
First Appellate District, Division Three 
A149482 
 
San Francisco City and County Superior Court 
CGC-13-530672, CGC-15-549146 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
April 25, 2019 
 
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
 
1 
MELENDEZ  v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC 
S245607 
 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
Under California’s labor laws, “[i]f an employer discharges 
an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of 
discharge are due and payable immediately.”  (Lab. Code, § 201, 
subd. (a).)  Plaintiffs, security guards at what used to be named 
AT&T Park in San Francisco and is now named Oracle Park (the 
park), are suing San Francisco Baseball Associates LLC (the 
Giants) for allegedly violating this provision.  They claim they 
are discharged after every Giants homestand, at the end of the 
baseball season, and after other events at the park, and they are 
entitled under Labor Code section 201 to receive their unpaid 
wages immediately after each such discharge.  The Giants deny 
that the security guards are discharged on those occasions.  
They contend that Labor Code section 204, which generally 
requires semimonthly payment of employees’ wages, applies to 
the guards. 
The merits of this action are not now before us.  Rather, 
we must consider the Giants’ contention that this lawsuit 
requires interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement 
(hereafter sometimes CBA) that the guards’ union has entered 
into with the Giants.  If so, this lawsuit is preempted under 
federal law and must be submitted to arbitration.  (See, e.g., 
Livadas v. Bradshaw (1994) 512 U.S. 107 (Livadas).) 
We conclude that, although the agreement between the 
union and the Giants may be relevant to this lawsuit and may 
MELENDEZ  v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
2 
need to be consulted to resolve it, the parties’ dispute turns on 
an interpretation of state law — namely, the meaning of 
“discharge” under Labor Code section 201 — rather than an 
interpretation of the agreement itself.  Because no party has 
identified any provision of the agreement whose meaning is 
uncertain and that must be interpreted to resolve plaintiffs’ 
claim, this lawsuit is not preempted and state courts may decide 
it on the merits.  We reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal, which concluded otherwise. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
We draw these facts, which are generally undisputed, 
primarily from the Court of Appeal opinion.  (Melendez v. San 
Francisco Baseball Associates LLC (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 339 
(Melendez).) 
George Melendez, a security guard at the park, is the lead 
plaintiff in this putative class action against the Giants.  He 
“contends that he and other security guards were employed 
‘intermittingly’ for specific job assignments (baseball games or 
other events) and were discharged ‘at the end of a homestand, 
at the end of a baseball season, at the end of an inter-season 
event like a fan fest, college football game, a concert, a series of 
shows, or other events,’ and that therefore under Labor Code 
section 201 [they] were entitled to but did not receive immediate 
payment of their final wages upon each such ‘discharge.’ ”  
(Melendez, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 341.)  Plaintiffs seek to 
recover penalties under Labor Code section 203 for the Giants’ 
failure to pay them immediately after each such discharge. 
The Giants contend that the “security guards are not 
intermittent employees but are ‘year-round employees who 
remain employed with the Giants until they resign or are 
MELENDEZ  v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
3 
terminated pursuant to the CBA.’ ”  (Melendez, supra, 16 
Cal.App.5th at p. 341.)  To support this contention, they cite 
provisions of the agreement entered into between the Giants 
and the union that represents the security guards, the Service 
Employees International Union, United Services Workers West 
of San Francisco.  (Ibid.) 
As relevant here, the Giants moved to compel arbitration, 
arguing that the action is preempted by the Labor Management 
Relations Act of 1947.  The trial court denied the motion.  It 
“held that resolution of the controversy does not require 
interpretation of the CBA, but simply a determination of 
whether the security guards are discharged within the meaning 
of Labor Code section 201 at the conclusion of an event or series 
of baseball games.”  (Melendez, supra, 16 Cal.App. 5th at pp. 
345-346.)  The Giants appealed.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1294, 
subd. (a) [an aggrieved party may appeal from “[a]n order 
dismissing or denying a petition to compel arbitration”].) 
The Court of Appeal agreed with the Giants and reversed 
the order denying the motion to compel arbitration.  It explained 
that, “[a]lthough no provision of the CBA provides an explicit 
answer, the duration of the employment relationship must be 
derived from what is implicit in the agreement.”  (Melendez, 
supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 346.)  It cited numerous provisions 
of the agreement that it believed must be interpreted to resolve 
this controversy:  “There are numerous provisions from which 
inferences may logically be drawn.  The classification of 
employees is based on the number of hours worked in a year, 
itself suggesting that employment is considered to continue 
beyond the conclusion of each event.  Continued classification as 
a ‘regular’ employee requires at least 1,700 hours of work in a 
year.  ‘All employees shall be probationary employees for their 
MELENDEZ  v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
4 
first five hundred (500) hours of work with the Giants.’  
Employees rise to ‘senior’ and ‘super senior’ status by working a 
minimum of 300 hours each year for the last five or 10 years, 
hardly possible if each event is deemed a separate 
employment. . . . [T]he CBA provides that ‘All new applicants for 
employment as security personnel shall be subject to prehire 
drug screening and background investigation’; the language 
seems to imply that such screening and investigation will occur 
only once prior to the start of a single employment, and practice 
under the agreement confirms this interpretation.  The 
specification of holidays in the CBA certainly implies yearlong 
employment.  And under the CBA, the Giants have the right to 
discharge an employee only for cause.  Other provisions may 
also support inferences as to the intended term of employment.”  
(Id. at pp. 346-347.) 
We granted plaintiffs’ petition for review limited to the 
question of whether this action is preempted because it requires 
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 
1947 (29 U.S.C. § 185(a)) (hereafter section 301(a)) provides:  
“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 
organization representing employees in an industry affecting 
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor 
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United 
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the 
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the 
parties.”  (See Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. (1988) 
486 U.S. 399, 403 (Lingle).)  “Courts typically refer to the 
statutory provisions at issue as ‘section 301(a)’ rather than by 
MELENDEZ  v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
5 
citation to the United States Code.”  (Knutsson v. KTLA, LLC 
(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1126.) 
“In a series of opinions, the Supreme Court concluded that 
§ 301’s jurisdictional grant required the ‘complete preemption’ 
of state law claims brought to enforce collective bargaining 
agreements.”  (Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. 
(9th Cir. 2000) 208 F.3d 1102, 1107 (Balcorta).)  The main 
policies behind this preemption rule are to “ensure nationwide 
uniformity with respect to the interpretation of collective 
bargaining agreements and preserve arbitration as the primary 
means of resolving disputes over the meaning of collective 
bargaining agreements.”  (Sciborski v. Pacific Bell Directory 
(2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1163 (Sciborski), citing Lingle, 
supra, 486 U.S. at p. 404, Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985) 
471 U.S. 202, 211, 219 (Allis-Chalmers).) 
After reviewing the high court opinions that developed the 
preemption rule, the Balcorta court explained that “[a]lthough 
the language of § 301 is limited to ‘[s]uits for violation of 
contracts,’ courts have concluded that, in order to give the 
proper range to § 301’s policies of promoting arbitration and the 
uniform interpretation of collective bargaining agreement 
provisions, § 301 ‘complete preemption’ must be construed to 
cover ‘most state-law actions that require interpretation of labor 
agreements.’  [Citations.]  One reason for expanding complete 
preemption beyond the textual confines of § 301 is that any 
claim the resolution of which requires the interpretation of a 
collective bargaining agreement presents some risk to the policy 
of uniformity if state law principles are employed in that 
interpretation, even if the claim is not one for breach of contract.  
[Citing Lingle, supra, 486 U.S. at pp. 405-406, Livadas, supra, 
512 U.S. at pp. 121-123.]  Moreover, extending complete 
MELENDEZ  v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
6 
preemption to cover claims involving interpretation of collective 
bargaining agreements promotes the federal policy favoring 
arbitration of labor disputes . . . .”  (Balcorta, supra, 208 F.3d at 
p. 1108, fn. omitted.) 
Critically, Balcorta also explained that “[t]here is another 
strand to this aspect of federal labor law, however.  Despite the 
breadth of § 301 complete preemption, ‘not every claim which 
requires a court to refer to the language of a labor-management 
agreement is necessarily preempted.’  [Citation.]  In order to 
help preserve state authority in areas involving minimum labor 
standards, the Supreme Court has distinguished between 
claims that require interpretation or construction of a labor 
agreement and those that require a court simply to ‘look at’ the 
agreement.  See Livadas, supra, 512 U.S. at 123-126, 124, 114 
S.Ct. 2068 (“[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not subject 
to dispute, the bare fact that a collective bargaining agreement 
will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does 
not require the claim to be extinguished.”).  We have stressed 
that, in the context of § 301 complete preemption, the term 
‘interpret’ is defined narrowly — it means something more than 
‘consider,’ ‘refer to,’ or ‘apply.’ ”  (Balcorta, supra, 208 F.3d at p. 
1108.)  Moreover, “ ‘look[ing] to’ the CBA merely to discern that 
none of its terms is reasonably in dispute does not require 
preemption.”  (Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. (9th 
Cir. 2001) 255 F.3d 683, 692 (en banc) (Cramer), citing Livadas, 
supra, 512 U.S. at p. 125.) 
“Preemption does not arise when interpretation is 
required only by a defense.  [Citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams 
(1987) 482 U.S. 386, 398-399, Cramer, supra, 255 F.3d at p. 690.]  
Preemption occurs when a claim cannot be resolved on the 
merits without choosing among competing interpretations of a 
MELENDEZ  v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
7 
collective bargaining agreement and its application to the claim.  
The determination of whether a claim is preempted depends on 
the particular facts of each case.”  (Sciborski, supra, 205 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1164-1165.)  “The primary point of reference 
in the preemption analysis is . . . not state law writ large . . . but 
the plaintiff’s pleading.”  (Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke (9th 
Cir. 2018) 898 F.3d 904, 923 (en banc) (Alaska Airlines).)  The 
inquiry is not “into the merits of a claim; it is an inquiry into the 
claim’s ‘legal character’ — whatever its merits — so as to ensure 
it is decided in the proper forum. . . .  Our only job is to decide 
whether, as pleaded, the claim ‘in this case is “independent” of 
the [CBA] in the sense of “independent” that matters for . . . pre-
emption purposes:  resolution of the state-law claim does not 
require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.’ ”  (Id. 
at p. 924.) 
The high court has also said that preemption applies 
“when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent 
upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the 
parties in a labor contract.”  (Allis-Chalmers, supra, 471 U.S. at 
p. 220.) 
These concepts are not bright lines.  “ ‘[T]he line between 
reference to and interpretation of an agreement may be 
somewhat hazy’ ” (Balcorta, supra, 208 F.3d at p. 1108), and 
“ ‘[s]ubstantial dependence’ on a CBA is an inexact concept, 
turning on the specific facts of each case . . . .”  (Cramer, supra, 
255 F.3d at p. 691.)  But “the totality of the policies underlying 
§ 301 — promoting the arbitration of labor contract disputes, 
securing the uniform interpretation of labor contracts, and 
protecting the states’ authority to enact minimum labor 
standards — guides our understanding of what constitutes 
‘interpretation.’ ”  (Balcorta, at pp. 1108-1109.) 
MELENDEZ  v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
8 
  As an overarching principle, the high court has also 
“emphasized that ‘pre-emption should not be lightly inferred in 
this area, since the establishment of labor standards falls within 
the traditional police power of the State.’ ”  (Lingle, supra, 486 
U.S. at p. 412.)  Although a policy exists in ensuring uniformity 
of interpretation of collective bargaining agreements, no such 
policy exists in favor of uniformity of state labor standards.  
Federal law “does not provide for, nor does it manifest any 
interest in, national or systemwide uniformity in substantive 
labor rights.”  (Alaska Airlines, supra, 898 F.3d at p. 919.) 
Sciborski summarized the analytical process a court 
should use to apply these principles.  “Under section 301 
preemption analysis, it is helpful to apply a two-part test to 
determine whether a claim is preempted.  First, the court should 
evaluate whether the claim arises from independent state law 
or from the collective bargaining agreement.  If the claim arises 
from the collective bargaining agreement, the claim is 
preempted as a matter of law.  [Citation.]  However, if the claim 
arises from independent state law, the court must then proceed 
to the second step.  In this step, the court determines whether 
the claim requires ‘interpretation or construction of a labor 
agreement,’ or whether a collective bargaining agreement will 
merely be ‘reference[d]’ in the litigation.  [Citations.]  A state 
law claim is preempted if a court must interpret a disputed 
provision of the collective bargaining agreement to determine 
whether the plaintiff’s state law claim has merit.”  (Sciborski, 
supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164; see Kobald v. Good 
Samaritan Regional Medical Center (9th Cir. 2016) 832 F.3d 
1024, 1032-1033 [similar].)  “At this second step of the analysis, 
‘claims are only preempted to the extent there is an active 
dispute over “the meaning of contract terms.” ’ ”  (Curtis v. Irwin 
MELENDEZ  v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
9 
Industries, Inc. (9th Cir. 2019) 913 F.3d 1146, 1153, quoting 
Alaska Airlines, supra, 898 F.3d at p. 921; see McCray v. 
Marriott Hotel Services, Inc. (9th Cir. 2018) 902 F.3d 1005, 1013 
[a “speculative possibility” that a collective bargaining 
agreement dispute may arise later in the course of litigation will 
not preempt a state law claim when none of the collective 
bargaining agreement’s terms are presently in dispute].) 
The first step in this analytical process is easy in this case.  
Plaintiffs’ claim arises solely from independent state law — 
Labor Code section 201 — and is not based on the collective 
bargaining agreement. 
Because the difference between interpreting and merely 
referencing a collective bargaining agreement is inherently 
“ ‘hazy’ ” (Balcorta, supra,  208 F.3d at p. 1108), the second step 
is more difficult.  But, bearing in mind that preemption should 
not be lightly inferred because establishing minimum labor 
standards comes within a state’s traditional police power, we 
conclude this lawsuit is not preempted.  The parties’ dispute 
turns on an interpretation of California’s independent labor 
laws, not on an interpretation of the collective bargaining 
agreement. 
As noted, Labor Code section 201, subdivision (a), 
provides, “If an employer discharges an employee, the wages 
earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable 
immediately.”  In Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77 
(Smith), we construed the word “discharge” in this statute.  
There, L’Oreal USA, Inc. hired the plaintiff to be a “hair model” 
working for a single day.  At the end of that day, the employment 
relationship ended.  But L’Oreal failed to pay her for more than 
two months.  She sued, claiming a violation of Labor Code 
MELENDEZ  v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
10 
section 201.  Because the employment relationship was 
voluntarily terminated, L’Oreal argued she was not discharged 
under the statute.  We stated the issue as “whether the 
discharge element of [Labor Code sections 201 and 203] requires 
an involuntary termination from an ongoing employment 
relationship, such as when an employer fires an employee, or 
whether this element also may be met when an employer 
releases an employee after completion of a specific job 
assignment or time duration for which the employee was hired.”  
(Smith, at p. 81.)  We concluded that “the statutory element 
contemplates both types of employment terminations.”  (Ibid.) 
In reaching this conclusion, we noted that a “commonly 
understood meaning of ‘discharge’ includes the action of an 
employer who, having hired an employee to work on a particular 
job or for a specific term of service, formally releases the 
employee and ends the employment relationship at the point the 
job or service term is deemed complete.”  (Smith, supra, 39 
Cal.4th at p. 84.)  We held that “discharge” in this context 
includes this commonly understood meaning.  (Id. at p. 90.) 
The parties debate at length how Smith, supra, 39 Cal.4th 
77, applies here.  The Giants argue that “[a]n employee cannot 
be simultaneously discharged under statute while continuing to 
remain continuously and gainfully employed by contractual 
agreement.”  They contend that “[t]his is a case about which 
Labor Code protections apply.”  In their view, Labor Code 
section 204 — which applies to wages not governed by other 
provisions such as Labor Code section 201, and which requires 
semimonthly wage payments and places strict limits on the time 
that may elapse between performance of labor and payment for 
that labor — governs security guards.  They also rely on a 
declaration by the Giants’ senior director of security explaining 
MELENDEZ  v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
11 
the employment process that, they contend, shows plaintiffs are 
not continually discharged.  Plaintiffs argue that they are 
“temporarily laid off” every time a specific job assignment ends, 
and such layoffs are discharges within the meaning of Labor 
Code section 201.  They are willing to concede that, by the terms 
of the collective bargaining agreement, their employment 
relationship with the Giants is a continuing one.  But they 
contend that “[e]ven if the CBA contained an undisputed term 
providing that security guards are employed for life, the layoffs 
they endure would still trigger the employer obligations 
contained in Labor Code section 201.”  The parties also discuss 
the legislative history behind the statute and the meaning and 
significance of interpretations of it by the Division of Labor 
Standards Enforcement. 
These are credible arguments, and they will have to be 
considered when the trial court resolves the merits of this 
lawsuit on remand.  But they are arguments concerning the 
meaning of “discharge” under Labor Code section 201, not 
concerning the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement.  
The parties have pointed us to no disagreement concerning the 
meaning of any provision of the agreement.  
Closely on point is Balcorta, supra, 208 F.3d 1102.  In that 
case, the plaintiff, an electrical rigger in the film industry, 
“worked several short-term ‘calls’ ” for Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corporation.  (Id. at p. 1104.)  He sued the corporation, 
claiming a violation of Labor Code former section 201.5, which, 
he alleged, required him to be paid within 24 hours of each call.  
As here, the reviewing court had to decide whether the lawsuit 
was preempted under section 301(a).  The court held it was not. 
MELENDEZ  v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
12 
Balcorta concluded that the collective bargaining 
agreement in that case had to be consulted but not interpreted.  
“Although the provisions do detail fairly complicated procedures 
and contain a hefty dose of industry jargon, their meaning is 
neither uncertain nor ambiguous.  A court may be required to 
read and apply these provisions in order to determine whether 
an employee was discharged from his ‘call’ at the end of his shift, 
but no interpretation of the provisions would be necessary.”  
(Balcorta, supra, 208 F.3d at pp. 1109-1110.)  “[D]etermining 
whether Balcorta was discharged does not require a court to 
interpret the collective bargaining agreement . . . , and thus does 
not render Balcorta’s claims subject to complete preemption.”  
(Id. at p. 1110.) 
Balcorta also explained that labor law rights such as that 
under Labor Code former section 201.5, are not negotiable and 
that section “301 does not permit parties to waive, in a collective 
bargaining 
agreement, 
nonnegotiable 
state 
rights . . . .”  
(Balcorta, supra, 208 F.3d at p. 1111; see Lab. Code, § 219 [“no 
provision of this article can in any way be contravened or set 
aside by a private agreement, whether written, oral, or 
implied”].)  Accordingly, the collective bargaining agreement did 
not have to be interpreted to determine whether it waived the 
right to timely payment of wages under state law.  (Balcorta, at 
pp. 1111-1112.) 
Although this case involves Labor Code section 201, not 
Labor Code former section 201.5, we believe the same result 
applies.  The collective bargaining agreement must be consulted 
or referenced, but not interpreted.  Nor is resolution of the state 
law claim “substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms 
of” the collective bargaining agreement.  (Allis-Chalmers, supra, 
MELENDEZ  v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
13 
471 U.S. at p. 220.)  Instead, Labor Code section 201 must be 
interpreted. 
The Court of Appeal in this case concluded that plaintiffs’ 
claim was preempted based on “inferences . . . drawn” from 
several provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.  
(Melendez, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 346.)  It cited provisions 
that define seniority and wage levels, pre-hire drug screening 
and background investigation, and annual holidays.  Those 
provisions may be relevant, but none directly address whether 
the Giants, at the end of each event or series of home games, 
“discharge” plaintiffs pursuant to Labor Code section 201.  As 
the Court of Appeal recognized, no provision of the agreement 
“provides an explicit answer.”  (Melendez, at p. 346.)  Nor do 
those provisions require interpretation in the narrow sense in 
which that word is used for preemption purposes.  The parties 
have not identified any provision of the collective bargaining 
agreement whose meaning is “ambiguous” (Balcorta, supra, 208 
F.3d at p. 1109) or subject to “active dispute.”  (Alaska Airlines, 
supra, 898 F.3d at p. 921.)  Indeed, nothing in the agreement 
addresses the timing of wage payments, which shows that 
plaintiffs’ complaint is aimed at an issue separate from the 
benefits bargained for in the agreement. 
Our finding that the action is not preempted is consistent 
with the policies underlying section 301(a).  Allowing a state 
court to interpret Labor Code section 201 does not threaten the 
policies of “promoting the arbitration of labor contract disputes” 
or “securing the uniform interpretation of labor contracts.”  
(Balcorta, supra, 208 F.3d at pp. 1108-1109.)  But, importantly, 
it does “protect[] the states’ authority to enact minimum labor 
standards.”  (Id. at p. 1109.)  It is up to state courts, not an 
MELENDEZ  v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
14 
arbitrator, to interpret state labor law standards applicable to 
all workers. 
We express no view on the parties’ interpretations of 
Labor Code section 201 or the ultimate merits of this lawsuit, 
which are not before us in this appeal from the denial of the 
motion to compel arbitration, and on which no court has yet 
ruled.  We hold only that section 301(a) does not preempt this 
lawsuit.  The merits will have to be resolved when the matter is 
remanded to the trial court. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly denied the motion to compel 
arbitration.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeal and remand the matter to that court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
CHIN, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Melendez v. San Francisco Baseball Associates LLC 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 16 Cal.App.5th 339 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S245607 
Date Filed: April 25, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Francisco 
Judge: Curtis E. A. Karnow 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Nancy Pritikin, Babak Yousefzadeh, Karin Dougan Vogel and 
Brian S. Fong for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Richard J. Simmons, Jason W. Kearnaghan, Daniel J. McQueen 
and Ryan J. Krueger for Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, Athletics Investment Group LLC, Padres L.P., and 
San Jose Arena Management, LLC, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Sahag Majarian II; Moss Bollinger and Dennis F. Moss for Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Karin Dougan Vogel 
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton 
Four Embarcadero Center, 17th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94111-4109 
(415) 434-9100 
 
Dennis F. Moss 
Moss Bollinger 
15300 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 207 
Sherman Oaks, CA  91403 
(310) 773-0323