Case Title: People v. Carney

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90549

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90549-Agenda 15-March 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 								BARNETT CARNEY, Appellee.
Opinion filed June 21, 2001.

	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County,
defendant Barnett Carney was convicted of first degree murder
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 1996)) and armed robbery (720 ILCS
5/18-2 (West 1996)). Defendant had been charged with intentional
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1996)), knowing murder
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 1996)), and felony murder (720
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1996)), with the armed robbery count as
the predicate felony. The circuit court sentenced defendant to
consecutive terms of 29 years' imprisonment for murder and 10
years' imprisonment for armed robbery. The consecutive sentences
were imposed pursuant to section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code of
Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1996)).
	The appellate court affirmed defendant's convictions (317 Ill.
App. 3d 806, 817), but vacated his sentences and ordered them to
run concurrently, finding section 5-8-4(a) of the Code
unconstitutional under the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435,
120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), and the First District decision in People v.
Clifton, 321 Ill. App. 3d 707 (2000). Defendant advanced other
arguments on appeal that were not addressed by the appellate
court. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.
2d R. 315). Consistent with our decision in People v. Wagener,
No. 88843 (May 24, 2001), we now reverse the appellate court and
remand for consideration of these issues.



BACKGROUND
	Defendant and a codefendant, Sean Tucker, were charged
with the murder and armed robbery of Richard Frazier. On the
evening of September 26, 1997, Frazier and Charles Epps were
playing a game of dice outside a residence in Chicago. Epps'
girlfriend, Tamika Johnson, was standing nearby watching out for
police. Three men approached Frazier and Epps. One of the men
wore a Halloween mask and the other two wore hooded
sweatshirts pulled tightly around their faces. Johnson, who was
approximately 15 feet from the group, saw the man with the mask
take money from Frazier, while holding a gun on him. She saw
Frazier struggle with the man and then heard a shot. Frazier fell to
the ground and the men ran away. Frazier died two weeks later
from complications of the gunshot wound he sustained.
	Police officers recovered a shell casing from the crime scene
and spoke with Johnson and Epps. Defendant's mother gave
consent to a search of her home. In defendant's bedroom, officers
found a Halloween mask that belonged to defendant's sister. They
recovered a handgun and clip from Tucker's home. A firearms
expert testified that the shell casing found at the scene of the
shooting had been fired by the gun retrieved from Tucker's home.
	Defendant testified that after he was arrested, he declined to
speak to the officers or to a woman who identified herself as an
attorney. In rebuttal, Assistant State's Attorney Kathleen Muldoon
testified that defendant agreed to speak to her on the day he was
arrested. He told her that he and Tucker were driving around on
the night of the shooting. They had a Halloween mask and a gun
with them in the car. They saw the dice game between Frazier and
Epps and stopped. Epps walked up to the car and told defendant
and Tucker that Frazier was "sweet," meaning that he was an easy
target. Defendant parked the car and he and Tucker walked over
to the dice game. Tucker was wearing the mask and had the gun.
Defendant pretended to rob Epps, while Tucker held the gun on
Frazier. Defendant saw the two men struggle with each other and
then Tucker shot Frazier.
	The jury returned verdicts of guilty on first degree murder and
armed robbery, using general verdict forms. The circuit court
entered judgment on the counts of intentional murder and armed
robbery. At the sentencing hearing, the circuit court found that
defendant had inflicted severe bodily injury on Frazier. Noting that
defendant had been convicted of armed robbery, a Class X felony,
the court imposed consecutive sentences.



ANALYSIS
	Section 5-8-4(a) of the Code provides in pertinent part:
			"When multiple sentences of imprisonment are
imposed on a defendant at the same time, or when a term
of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already
subject to sentence in this State or in another state, or for
a sentence imposed by any district court of the United
States, the sentences shall run concurrently or
consecutively as determined by the court. *** The court
shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which
were committed as part of a single course of conduct
during which there was no substantial change in the
nature of the criminal objective, unless, one of the
offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class
X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe
bodily injury *** in which event the court shall enter
sentences to run consecutively." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a)
(West 1996).
The appellate court relied on Apprendi in finding section 5-8-4(a)
of the Code unconstitutional. In Apprendi, pursuant to a plea
agreement, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of second
degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one
count of third degree unlawful possession of an antipersonnel
bomb. The first offense carried a sentence of 5 to 10 years in
prison, while the second offense carried a penalty range of 3 to 5
years in prison. New Jersey's hate crime statute allowed the
sentencing judge to increase the sentence for a particular offense
beyond the statutory maximum if the judge found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant, in committing
the offense, acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or
group of individuals on the basis of, inter alia, race. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 468-69, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 442, 120 S. Ct.  at 2351. The plea
agreement permitted the State to request imposition of a higher
sentence on the second degree offense on the ground that
defendant had acted with a biased purpose, as described in the hate
crime statute. Defendant reserved the right to challenge the hate
crime sentence enhancement on constitutional grounds. Following
an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that defendant's crime was motivated by racial
bias and that defendant's actions were taken with a purpose to
intimidate. The circuit court rejected defendant's constitutional
challenge to the hate crime statute and imposed a 12-year prison
term on the second degree offense, a sentence equivalent to that
permitted for commission of a first degree offense. This decision
was upheld by the appellate division of the New Jersey superior
court and affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Apprendi,
530 U.S.  at 471-72, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 443-44, 120 S. Ct.  at 2352-53.
	The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding the
sentence enhancement provisions of New Jersey's hate crime
statute unconstitutional under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S.
Const., amend. XIV. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 476, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at
446, 120 S. Ct.  at 2355. In doing so, the Court held that "[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455, 120 S. Ct.  at
2362-63.
	In addition to Apprendi, the appellate court in the instant case
relied on its decision in People v. Clifton, 321 Ill. App. 3d 707
(2000). There, the defendant was sentenced to consecutive prison
terms of 55 years for murder and 25 years for attempted murder.
The consecutive sentences were imposed under section 5-8-4(a)
of the Code. On appeal, defendant argued that this section is
unconstitutional under the rationale of Apprendi, because the
finding of severe bodily injury must be made by a jury and not the
circuit court. The appellate court agreed, observing that it would
be "anomalous" to hold that a statute that enhances a sentence
based upon certain factors comes within the purview of Apprendi,
while a statute that requires an extended period of imprisonment
based upon the existence of certain factors does not. Section
5-8-4(a) of the Code, while not enhancing the sentence for any
particular offense, has the effect of increasing the total amount of
time a defendant will serve in prison. The practical effect of the
application of section 5-8-4(a) is that a factual finding of severe
bodily injury by a circuit court will increase the actual sentence
which a defendant may receive for "a given course of conduct."
Clifton, 321 Ill. App. 3d at ___. According to the Clifton court,
this is precisely the type of result the Apprendi holding was
intended to encompass. The court noted that the focus in Apprendi
was on the effect of the statute, rather than its form.
	The Clifton court also noted that the penalties for the
defendant's "collective offenses" were increased when the circuit
court made the finding of severe bodily injury. With that finding,
consecutive sentences were mandated. The court concluded that
the stigma and loss of liberty are greater where section 5-8-4(a)
of the Code applies and it would be "unduly narrow and arbitrary"
to hold that Apprendi does not apply to section 5-8-4(a) of the
Code.
	Our appellate court is divided on the question of whether
Apprendi applies to consecutive sentences under section 5-8-4(a)
of the Code. In addition to Clifton, other cases have held that
section 5-8-4(a) of the Code is unconstitutional under Apprendi.
See, e.g., People v. Harden, 318 Ill. App. 3d 425 (2000); People
v. Mason, 318 Ill. App. 3d 314 (2000); People v. Waldrup, 317 Ill.
App. 3d 288 (2000). Other cases have held that Apprendi does not
apply to consecutive sentences. See, e.g., People v. Primm, 319 Ill.
App. 3d 411 (2000); People v. Lucas, 321 Ill. App. 3d 49 (2001);
People v. Hayes, 319 Ill. App. 3d 810 (2001); People v. Maiden,
318 Ill. App. 3d 545 (2001).
	In Primm, defendant was convicted of first degree murder,
attempt (first degree murder), and aggravated battery with a
firearm. Primm, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 414. The circuit court
sentenced him to 50 years on the first degree murder conviction,
but did not impose sentence on the attempt (first degree murder)
conviction. Primm, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 414.
	Defendant appealed and the State cross-appealed. In its cross-appeal, the State argued that the circuit court erred in failing to
impose consecutive sentences under section 5-8-4(a) of the Code.
Noting that this section requires imposition of consecutive
sentences under the factors set forth therein, the appellate court
found the factors to apply. It vacated the 50-year sentence and
remanded for imposition of consecutive sentences for first degree
murder and attempt (first degree murder). Primm, 319 Ill. App. 3d
at 429. Defendant argued that section 5-8-4(a) is unconstitutional
under Apprendi. Primm, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 427. The appellate
court rejected this argument, noting that consecutive sentences
determine only the manner in which the sentences for each
individual offense will be served and do not increase the
maximum sentence that may be imposed for each separate offense.
The court followed its decision in People v. Sutherland, 317 Ill.
App. 3d 1117, 1131 (2000), where it held that Apprendi does not
apply to consecutive sentencing under section 5-8-4(a) of the
Code. The appellate court also cited our decision in Thomas v.
Greer, 143 Ill. 2d 271, 278 (1991) (Primm, 319 Ill. App. 3d at
428), where we stated that when consecutive sentences are
imposed, a new single sentence is not formed under section
5-8-4(e) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(e) (West 1998)). While
noting the opposite result reached in Clifton, the appellate court
deemed itself bound by this court's Thomas decision. Primm, 319
Ill. App. 3d at 428.
	In the instant case, the State argues that Apprendi does not
apply to consecutive sentences, noting this court's previous
statements that such sentences do not form a single sentence, but
merely determine the manner in which a defendant will serve the
sentences.
	We first note that the question of whether a statute is
constitutional is subject to de novo review. People v. Malchow,
193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000). Statutes carry a strong presumption of
constitutionality and the party asserting the unconstitutionality of
a statute has the burden of rebutting this presumption. People v.
Maness, 191 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (2000)."[I]t is our duty to construe
acts of the legislature so as to uphold their constitutionality and
validity if it can reasonably be done, and, further, that if their
construction is doubtful, the doubt will be resolved in favor of the
validity of the law attacked." Illinois Crime Investigating Comm'n
v Buccieri, 36 Ill. 2d 556, 561 (1967).
	Apprendi does not proscribe all judicial fact finding at
sentencing, even though it may result in an increase in a
defendant's punishment, provided the statutory maximum
sentence for the offense is not exceeded. Indeed, the Apprendi
Court recognized that judges have long exercised discretion in
considering various factors relative to both the offense and the
offender in imposing sentence within the range prescribed by
statute. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 481, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 449, 120 S. Ct. 
at 2358.
	Section 5-5-3.2(a) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a) (West
1998)) identifies several aggravating factors that the circuit court
may consider in imposing a more severe sentence on an offender.
Some of these statutory factors involve a determination by the
judge of the nature or seriousness of the defendant's conduct.
Examples include where (1) the defendant's conduct caused or
threatened serious harm (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(1) (West 1998));
(2) in committing certain delineated offenses when the victim was
under the age of 18 years, the defendant held a position of trust or
supervision, such as, but not limited to, family member, teacher,
scout leader, baby-sitter, or day care worker (730 ILCS
5/5-5-3.2(a)(14) (West 1998)); and (4) the defendant committed
an offense related to the activities of an organized gang (730 ILCS
5/5-5-3.2(a)(15) (West 1998)).
	The fact-finding process implicated by these aggravating
factors does not offend the constitutional protections identified in
Apprendi because, in applying the factors, the judge may not
impose a sentence that exceeds the prescribed statutory maximum
for each offense. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a) (West 1996). Thus, the
defendant is not subjected to additional punishment not
contemplated by the substantive offense statute or the sentencing
statute associated therewith. The Supreme Court in Apprendi
explicitly recognized the legitimacy of such judicial fact finding
when it noted that "nothing in [the] history [of the common law]
suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise
discretion-taking into consideration various factors relating both
to offense and offender-in imposing a judgment within the range
prescribed by statute." (Emphasis in original.) Apprendi, 530 U.S. 
at 481, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 449, 120 S. Ct.  at 2358.
	The New Jersey sentencing scheme invalidated in Apprendi
involved more than simple judicial fact finding. The fact
determined by the sentencing judge in that case involved the
defendant's intent or purpose in committing the offense. The
Apprendi Court noted that a defendant's intent in committing an
offense "is perhaps as close as one might hope to come to a core
criminal offense 'element.' " Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 493, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 457, 120 S. Ct.  at 2364. The sentencing judge's fact
finding resulted in the defendant's being sentenced to a longer
prison term than allowed by the statute defendant was convicted
of violating. A second degree offense was, in effect, transformed
into a first degree offense. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 491, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455-56, 120 S. Ct.  at 2363. Yet, the jury had convicted
defendant of only the second degree offense. The Supreme Court
characterized such judicial fact finding as " 'a tail which wags the
dog of the substantive offense.' " Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 495, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 458, 120 S. Ct.  at 2365, quoting McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88, 91 L. Ed. 2d 67, 77, 106 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (1986). The Court noted that when a defendant is
subjected to additional punishment beyond that provided by statute
where the offense was committed under certain specified
circumstances, "it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the
stigma attaching to the offense are heightened." Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 484, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 451, 120 S. Ct.  at 2359.
	The appellate court in this case rejected the State's argument
that Apprendi only applies to facts that increase the penalty for an
offense beyond the statutory maximum sentence. In doing so, the
court relied on statements made by the Supreme Court in Apprendi
that "[d]espite what appears to us the clear 'elemental' nature of
the factor here, the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of
effect-does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?"
Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 494, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 457, 120 S. Ct.  at
2365. The appellate court read this passage to mean that it is the
effect of the statute, not its form, that controls in any inquiry into
whether consecutive sentences increase a defendant's punishment.
317 Ill. App. 3d at 813.
	However, reading the quoted statements in context makes
clear that the Apprendi Court was referring to the "constitutionally
novel and elusive distinction" (Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 494, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 457, 120 S. Ct. at 2365) between elements of an offense
and sentencing factors. Thus, it is the effect of the particular fact
to be decided by the judge on a defendant's punishment and not
the label attached to the fact that controls in any inquiry under
Apprendi. Nowhere in Apprendi did the Supreme Court state or
imply that the determination of a fact that does not result in a
defendant's being sentenced in excess of the statutory maximum
must be decided by a jury.
	This court has long held that consecutive sentences constitute
separate sentences for each crime of which a defendant has been
convicted. In People v. Elliott, 272 Ill. 592 (1916), we upheld the
imposition of consecutive sentences of a fine and imprisonment
for 70 separate convictions of unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor
(Elliott, 272 Ill. at 600), finding the individual sentences not to be
disproportionate to the nature of the offenses. We held that the
Illinois constitutional provision requiring that all penalties shall be
proportionate to the nature of the offense does not apply to the
aggregate of the punishments inflicted for different offenses. We
there stated:
		"The only reason that the fines aggregate a large sum and
the imprisonment is for a long period is because there
were so many violations of the law prosecuted under one
indictment, but the punishment under each count must be
considered by itself. The state may join misdemeanors of
the same character in the same indictment and the court
may fix separate punishment upon each count on which
there is a conviction. [Citations.] This practice has been
approved by this court rather than to require separate
indictments for each offense. The constitutional provision
does not apply in any manner to the aggregate of the
punishments inflicted for different offenses." Elliott, 272 Ill.  at 600.
More recently, we held in Thomas, 143 Ill. 2d  at 278-79, that when
consecutive sentences are imposed, they do not form a single
sentence for any purpose other than determining the manner in
which the sentences are to be served for the purpose of
determining an offender's eligibility for parole.
	In People v. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d 439 (1995), the circuit
court imposed consecutive sentences of nine and six years'
imprisonment for two separate offenses. On defendant's motion to
reconsider, in which he argued that consecutive sentences were not
warranted, the circuit court vacated the sentences and imposed a
single sentence of 15 years in prison on the two offenses.
Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d  at 441. On appeal to this court, we noted
that section 5-8-1(c) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(c) (West
1994)) prohibits circuit courts from increasing a sentence once it
has been imposed. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d  at 442. We held that,
although the total number of years defendant would be
incarcerated was unchanged, consecutive sentences are not treated
as a single sentence. Thus, the circuit court's action effectively
increased defendant's sentences for each offense to 15 years.
Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d  at 446-47.
	Our jurisprudence, therefore, makes it clear that consecutive
sentences do not constitute a single sentence and cannot be
combined as though they were one sentence for one offense. Each
conviction results in a discrete sentence that must be treated
individually. Though section 5-8-4(e) of the Code (730 ILCS
5/5-8-4(e) (West 1998)) instructs the Department of Corrections
(Department) to treat consecutive sentences as a single sentence
for purposes of determining the manner in which those sentences
will be served, we held in People v. Goffman, 65 Ill. 2d 296, 302
(1976), that this provision is directed to the Department and not to
the judiciary.
	Defendant argues here that the proper inquiry is not whether
consecutive sentences form a single discrete sentence, but rather
whether consecutive sentences constitute increased punishment
under the rationale of Apprendi. In support, defendant cites the
Apprendi Court's concern with the heightened loss of liberty and
heightened stigma attached to an offense where a defendant is
subjected to increased punishment. However, the Apprendi
Court's concern was limited to situations in which a defendant is
sentenced to a punishment that exceeds the statutory maximum
sentence. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 484, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 451, 120 S.
Ct at 2359. It is not the increased punishment itself that triggers
the constitutional protections of Apprendi; rather, the fact must be
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt only
when the punishment exceeds the statutory maximum for the
particular offense. A holding that the mere fact of increased
punishment implicates Apprendi would place in jeopardy the use
by judges of aggravating factors to increase a defendant's sentence
beyond the statutory minimum, even though the punishment does
not exceed the maximum permissible for the offense. The holding
of Apprendi clearly does not extend to this situation.
	We also reject defendant's argument that consecutive
sentences must now, under Apprendi, be treated as a single
sentence. We are unwilling to cast aside established case law
holding that each consecutive sentence constitutes a distinct
sentence for one particular offense and that consecutive sentences
may not be lumped together as one. Nothing in Apprendi mandates
such a result. While, undeniably, a defendant who receives
consecutive sentences will serve a longer period of imprisonment
than a defendant who receives identical concurrent sentences, this
fact alone does not make Apprendi applicable. The application by
a judge of the factors identified in section 5-8-4(a) of the Code
determines only the manner in which a defendant will serve his
sentences for multiple offenses. The defendant is not exposed to
punishment beyond that authorized by the jury's verdict, provided
that the sentence for each separate offense does not exceed the
maximum permitted by statute for that offense.
	Defendant contends that our decisions in Kilpatrick and
People v. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d 367 (1995), support, rather than refute,
his argument that imposition of consecutive sentences can result
in an unlawful increase in sentence. He asserts that, in these cases,
we did not decide that imposition of consecutive sentences could
never be interpreted to constitute an increase in penalty. Defendant
notes that, in reaching our decision in Kilpatrick that defendant's
new 15-year sentence circumvented the language of section
5-8-4(c) of the Code, we discussed People v. Muellner, 70 Ill.
App. 3d 671 (1979). Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d  at 444. In Muellner,
defendant was convicted of two counts of rape and two counts of
deviate sexual assault. The circuit court sentenced him to
concurrent terms of four to eight years in prison. However, several
days later, the circuit court ordered that the sentences for the rape
convictions be served consecutively to the sentences for the
deviate sexual assault convictions. Muellner, 70 Ill. App. 3d at
673. The appellate court rejected the State's argument that the
circuit court did not increase defendant's sentence, but merely
modified it. The court held that the resentencing to consecutive
terms was, for practical purposes, an increase in the length of
defendant's sentence, because his earliest possible parole release
would thereby be delayed to a later point in time. Muellner, 70 Ill.
App. 3d at 683.
	The statement by the Muellner court that an order imposing
consecutive sentences on resentencing constituted an increase in
the length of defendant's sentence was dictum, as such an order
was not at issue in Kilpatrick. The citation to Muellner served only
to illustrate the conflict among the districts of the appellate court
on the issue addressed in Kilpatrick.
	Of more significance is Kilpatrick's citation with approval of
the appellate court's decision in People v. Rivera, 212 Ill. App. 3d
519 (1991). There, on resentencing after defendant violated his
probation, the circuit court divided defendant's six burglary
convictions into three groups and imposed concurrent terms of
four years' imprisonment on each conviction in each group. The
court also imposed a four-year prison term for an escape
conviction. The four-year terms on each group of burglary
convictions were to run consecutively, as was the prison term on
the escape conviction, for a total of 16 years' imprisonment. Upon
a motion for reconsideration, the circuit court divided the burglary
convictions into two groups and imposed concurrent terms of six
years' imprisonment for each conviction in each group. The four-year term for the escape conviction remained. All three groups of
sentences were to run consecutively to one another for a total of 16
years' imprisonment. Rivera, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 520-21. The
appellate court noted that, although the total number of years for
all sentences remained unchanged, the sentences in each
consecutive group did not constitute one sentence. The fact that
the total number of years for all convictions remained the same
due to their consecutive nature does not alter the fact that each
individual sentence within the groups was increased. Thus, the
circuit court impermissibly increased defendant's sentences under
section 5-8-4(c) of the Code. Rivera, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 525.
	Similarly, in Jones, the defendant was sentenced to
consecutive prison terms of 25 years on two felonies. Upon
defendant's motion to reconsider the sentences, the circuit court
determined that it had neglected to admonish defendant of the
possibility of consecutive sentences. The court vacated the
sentences and resentenced defendant to a single term of 30 years
on one of the felony convictions. On appeal, defendant argued that
the circuit court was not authorized to increase the term of
imprisonment from 25 years to 30 years. The appellate court
affirmed the circuit court's decision. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d  at 370.
Relying on Kilpatrick, we held that the imposition of the 30-year
sentence constituted an impermissible increase in defendant's
sentence, even though the total amount of prison time was
decreased. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d  at 371-72. While it is true that in
neither Kilpatrick nor Jones did we decide that consecutive
sentences can never constitute an increased penalty, this fact does
not assist defendant. In those cases, we were concerned with the
"improper chilling effect" that an increased sentence for a
particular offense would have on a defendant's decision to
challenge a consecutive sentence. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d  at 447.
	Defendant further argues that section 5-8-4(a) of the Code
does more than lengthen the time of a defendant's imprisonment.
In addition, he says, it extends the maximum penalties to which a
defendant can be exposed for a given course of conduct by
controlling whether the defendant will serve his sentences
concurrently or consecutively. However, Apprendi, as defendant
notes, applies only where a legislature removes from the jury the
assessment of facts that increase the " 'prescribed range of
penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.' " Apprendi,
530 U.S.  at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455, 120 S. Ct.  at 2363, quoting
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311,
332, 119 S. Ct. 1215, 1228 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring). The
prescribed range of penalties is that set forth in the statute defining
each separate offense of which a defendant has been convicted or
the associated sentencing statute. Consecutive sentences, taken
together, do not constitute a "range of penalties" to which
Apprendi applies.
	In McMillan, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to
Pennsylvania's mandatory minimum sentencing statute. Pursuant
to this statute, a person convicted of certain felonies was subject
to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment if
the sentencing judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the person visibly possessed a firearm during commission of
the offense. McMillan, 477 U.S.  at 80-81, 91 L. Ed. 2d  at 73, 106 S. Ct.  at 2413. Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault. The
State gave notice of its intent to invoke the statute. However, the
circuit court found the statute to be unconstitutional. McMillan,
477 U.S.  at 82, 91 L. Ed. 2d  at 73-74, 106 S. Ct.  at 2414. The
state's highest court found the statute constitutional. McMillan,
477 U.S.  at 83, 91 L. Ed. 2d  at 74, 106 S. Ct.  at 2414. The
Supreme Court agreed, noting, as to defendant's complaint that the
statute increased the punishment for the offense, that the statute
"neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor
creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it operates
solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a
penalty within the range already available to it without the special
finding of visible possession of a firearm." McMillan, 477 U.S.  at
87-88, 91 L. Ed. 2d  at 77, 106 S. Ct.  at 2417.
	Defendant asserts that section 5-8-4(a) of the Code is not
subject to the "limited holding" of McMillan because the Supreme
Court emphasized there that the statute did not expose the
defendant to greater or additional punishment. Defendant insists
that section 5-8-4(a) of the Code does indeed expose a defendant
to greater punishment by altering the maximum penalty available
by requiring consecutive sentences. However, McMillan, as well
as Apprendi, spoke in terms of exposing a defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized for the particular offense.
Consecutive sentences do not expose a defendant to punishment
exceeding the statutory maximum for each conviction.
	On a final note, the State has filed a motion for leave to cite
additional authority, citing two very recent cases that it believes
are relevant to our inquiry here. We now allow this motion. The
cases are Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. ___, 149 L. Ed. 2d 197, 121 S. Ct. 1276 (2001), and United States v. White, 240 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2001). We have reviewed these cases and, because
they do not add to our analysis of the instant case, we will not
comment on them.



CONCLUSION
	In summary, we hold that consecutive sentences imposed
under section 5-8-4(a) of the Code do not violate the due process
rights of defendants and that the Supreme Court's Apprendi
decision does not apply to such sentences. We therefore reverse
the decision of the appellate court and affirm the circuit court as
to this issue. We remand this cause to the appellate court for
consideration of other issues raised there by defendant and not
addressed by that court.
Appellate court reversed,
circuit court affirmed in part;
cause remanded.