Case Title: State v. Jones

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1991-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 90-393


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
Joanne M. Jones                              Unit No. l, Rutland Circuit

                                             October Term, 1991


Francis B. McCaffrey, J.

Peter R. Neary, Rutland County Deputy State's Attorney, Rutland, for
plaintiff-appellant

Matt Harnett of Lorentz, Lorentz & Harnett, Rutland, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     DOOLEY, J.    Defendant, Joanne Jones, was charged with selling one-
eighth ounce of cocaine to an undercover informant.  The State moved for a
continuance when the case was called to trial.  After the court denied the
continuance, the State dismissed the case.  On motion of defendant, the
court ruled that the dismissal was with prejudice so that the State could
not refile.  The State appeals that order.  We affirm.
     Defendant was arraigned on July 31, 1989.  A number of issues had to be
resolved prior to trial.  The most significant surrounded the use of an
informant who was wired with a transmitter when the drug purchase occurred
in defendant's home.  The court denied defendant's motions to suppress on
May 25, 1990.  On June 4th, the court set the case for calendar call on June
26th with jury drawing and trial to commence the following day.  At an off-
the-record conference held on June 26th, the State orally requested a con-
tinuance because a police officer witness was on annual leave.
     The trial court questioned the need for the witness.  The officer had
been on the scene when the informant returned from the drug purchase, had
taken the cocaine from the informant, and was directly involved in defend-
ant's arrest.  At least one other officer had been present, however, at the
time of the absent witness officer's activities.  The State agreed to
review whether the trial could go on without him, but again requested a
continuance on the next day at 1:00 p.m.  After hearing the State's
request, the court stated that it understood that "other witnesses . . . can
testify to what this guy can testify to" and denied the continuance.  The
court also denied a motion to amend the information to charge defendant with
aiding and abetting the commission of the crime, concluding that it changed
the theory of the case and came too late to allow defendant to prepare.
The deputy state's attorney then stated:
          In light of that, Judge, and in light of the fact that
          the State feels it needs Officer Pockette, the State at
          this time is filing a dismissal without prejudice and is
          going to reinstitute the charge with a citation for
          July 23d, 1990.

He then filed with the court a dismissal of the prosecution, indicating it
was a dismissal "WITHOUT PREJUDICE" and reciting the reason for the dis-
missal as the unavailability of the officer.  Defendant promptly moved for a
dismissal with prejudice but the court indicated that it didn't have the
right to do that.  As defendant left the court room, an officer served her
with a citation to appear on July 23, 1990.  The officer who cited defendant
had been alerted at 11:00 a.m. by the deputy state's attorney to be present
for that purpose.
     Later that day, defendant moved in writing for dismissal of the pro-
secution "prior to her arraignment on July 23, 1990."  Defendant argued
that her right to a speedy trial was being violated and that dismissal would
serve the interest of justice.  The court heard the motion on June 28, 1990.
On July 18, 1990, the court issued findings and conclusions dismissing the
case under V.R.Cr.P. 48(b).  It concluded that defendant's speedy trial
rights were not violated but that dismissal with prejudice would "serve the
ends of justice" and ensure "the effective administration of the court's
business" because the State's actions were entirely motivated to obtain a
continuance to which it was not entitled.
     Before reaching the State's specific claims of error, it is instructive
to examine the rules under which the court and the parties operated.  In
dismissing the information, the State was exercising its right under
V.R.Cr.P. 48(a) to nolle prosequi (nol pros) a case prior to trial.  When
the attorney for the State dismisses an information in writing, "the pro-
secution shall thereupon terminate."  Id.
     The court acted under V.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(2) and 50(c).  Rule 48(b)(2)
authorizes the court to dismiss a case if it "concludes that such dismissal
will serve the ends of justice and the effective administration of the
court's business."  Under a 1989 amendment to this rule, the dismissal is
without prejudice unless, as occurred in this case, the court specifies that
the dismissal is with prejudice.
     Continuances are governed by V.R.Cr.P. 50.  Rule 50(b) requires that a
motion for a continuance be filed two days before calendar call.  If based
on absence of a witness, Rule 50(c) requires that the motion be accompanied
by an affidavit showing "the substance of the testimony which he is expected
to give, and the grounds for such expectation; and the measures taken to
procure his attendance or deposition, to the end that the court may judge
whether due diligence has been used for that purpose."  Although the State
did not comply with Rule 50(c)(1) by filing an affidavit, the court did not
rely on this violation and obtained much of the needed information from
representations of the deputy state's attorney. (FN1) The main reason that the
court denied the continuance was that the State "failed to establish that
[the officer] . . . was a necessary witness."
     The State's two claims on appeal are that (1) the State's dismissal of
the information under V.R.Cr.P. 48(a) deprived the court of jurisdiction to
enter an order under Rule 48(b) dismissing the case with prejudice, and (2)
the court could not dismiss the case with prejudice without forewarning the
deputy state's attorney that such an action could result from the failure of
the State to proceed to trial.  The State's first claim is based on Rule
48(a), which sates that when dismissed by the State, the "prosecution shall
thereupon terminate."  In the State's view, its dismissal of the case
removed it from the court's consideration, ending the court's jurisdiction
for further action.  See State ex rel. Griffin v. Smith, 363 Mo. 1235, 1241,