Case Title: Dawn K. Roberts v. Corrine Brown

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-1362 
____________ 
 
DAWN K. ROBERTS, etc., et al.,  
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
CORRINE BROWN, et al.,  
Respondents. 
 
[August 31, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Interim Secretary of State Dawn Roberts has filed an extraordinary writ 
petition that invokes this Court‘s all writs jurisdiction.  Secretary Roberts also 
seeks a writ of prohibition on the basis that the Second Judicial Circuit Court is 
acting in excess of its jurisdiction by accepting jurisdiction to consider a pre-
election action for declaratory and injunctive relief that seeks to remove two 
citizen-initiative proposed constitutional amendments from the November ballot.  
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(7), Fla. Const.  For the reasons discussed, 
we grant the petition and direct the circuit court to dismiss the pre-election 
proceedings below on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   
 
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
FairDistrictsFlorida.org, a registered political committee, invoked the 
citizen-initiative process of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution to 
propose two constitutional amendments designed to delineate mandatory standards 
to be applied to the establishment of legislative and congressional district 
boundaries.  On January 29, 2009, this Court approved the proposed amendments 
for placement on the ballot and determined that the proposed amendments satisfied 
the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3, and that the accompanying 
ballot titles and summaries complied with section 101.161, Florida Statutes (2008).  
See Advisory Op. to Att‘y Gen. re Standards for Establishing Legis. Dist. 
Boundaries, 2 So. 3d 175, 191 (Fla. 2009).  The legislative amendment was 
designated ―Amendment 5‖ by the Division of Elections, and the congressional 
amendment was designated ―Amendment 6.‖  See Fla. Dep‘t of State Division of 
Elections: Initiatives/Amendments/Revisions, 
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/initiativelist.asp?year=2010&initstatus=AL
L&MadeBallot=Y&ElecType=GEN (last visited August 31, 2010).   
 
On June 23, 2010, plaintiffs Corrine Brown and Mario Diaz-Balart, both 
members of the United States House of Representatives, filed an amended 
complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the circuit court against Secretary 
Roberts and FairDistrictsFlorida.org which challenged the validity of only 
 
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Amendment 6.  The Florida House of Representatives and the Florida Senate 
attempted to intervene as plaintiffs.  The intervenors attempted to challenge a 
different provision, the ballot summary of Amendment 5.  The intervenors also 
sought to inject two different claims—that the proposed amendments would violate 
the federal Voting Rights Act and that the amendments are ―vague, conflicting, and 
unworkable.‖  Notwithstanding these significant differences, the circuit court 
permitted the addition of these claims even though they were different and beyond 
the scope of the original proceeding.    
Secretary Roberts, FairDistrictsFlorida.org, and intervening defendant Bob 
Graham filed motions to dismiss the complaint on the basis of lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  The motions to dismiss asserted that the Florida Supreme 
Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine pre-election challenges to proposed 
citizen-initiative amendments, and that this Court‘s advisory opinion approving 
Amendments 5 and 6 for ballot placement precluded this additional litigation.  
Governor Charlie Crist, as amicus curiae, filed a memorandum of law in support of 
Secretary Roberts‘ motion to dismiss.     
 
The circuit court conducted a hearing on July 8, 2010, and issued a written 
order denying the motions to dismiss on July 12, 2010.  The circuit court held that 
even though the Florida Constitution was amended in 1986 to create the advisory 
opinion review process for citizen-initiative amendments, the adoption of these 
 
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provisions did not divest the circuit courts of jurisdiction to consider pre-election 
declaratory actions that challenge such amendments.  The circuit court relied on 
the language from Florida League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1992): 
When [the constitutional provisions creating the advisory opinion 
process] were under consideration before the 1986 Legislature, the 
accompanying legislative staff summaries stated a belief that any 
advisory opinion regarding initiative petitions would not be binding 
precedent and would only constitute persuasive authority as to any 
other adversarial legal challenge that might later be raised.  Staff of 
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, CS/HJR 71 (1986), Staff Analysis 2 
(March 6, 1986) (available from Fla. Div. of Archives); Staff of Fla. 
H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, PCS/HJR 71 (1986), Staff Analysis 2 (Feb. 
18, 1986) (available from Fla. Div. of Archives).  This necessarily 
implies that other legal challenges would continue to be permissible 
under existing precedent; and our precedent clearly holds that a 
petition for mandamus is an appropriate method for challenging an 
allegedly defective proposed amendment to the Constitution. 
Id. at 398-99 (footnotes omitted).  Based upon this reference to legislative staff 
summaries, the circuit court below accepted the argument that any method of 
challenging initiative amendment proposals that existed prior to 1986 survived the 
1986 constitutional revision.  The trial judge ultimately concluded that circuit 
courts retained full jurisdiction pursuant to sections 26.012(3) and 86.011, Florida 
Statutes, to consider pre-election declaratory and injunctive actions that challenged 
the validity of citizen initiative amendment proposals.  The circuit court also relied 
 
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upon Lane v. Chiles, 698 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1997), in which this Court held that a 
post-election challenge to an initiative ballot summary was untimely.1 
 
Secretary Roberts subsequently filed an extraordinary writ petition with this 
Court, which was joined by defendant Graham, and asked this Court to either 
exercise its all writs jurisdiction or issue a writ of prohibition to preclude the 
circuit court from proceeding with pre-election subject matter jurisdiction of the 
action challenging Amendments 5 and 6.   
ANALYSIS 
All Writs and the Writ of Prohibition  
 
As a preliminary matter, the doctrine of all writs is not an independent basis 
for this Court=s jurisdiction.  See Besoner v. Crawford, 357 So. 2d 414, 415 (Fla. 
1978).  Rather, its use is restricted to preserving jurisdiction that has already been 
invoked or protecting jurisdiction that likely will be invoked in the future.  See, 
e.g., United Servs. Auto. Ass‘n v. Goodman, 826 So. 2d 914, 915 (Fla. 2002) 
(exercising all writs jurisdiction where circuit court orders ―encroach[ed] upon this 
Court‘s ultimate jurisdiction to adopt rules for the courts, see article V, section 
2(a), specifically Rules of Judicial Administration, Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar‖); Arbelaez v. Butterworth, 738 So. 2d 326, 326 
                                          
 
 
1.  The order of the circuit court also dismissed FairDistrictsFlorida.org as a 
party to the proceeding. 
 
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(Fla. 1999) (considering all writs petition based upon Court=s jurisdiction over 
death penalty cases); Wild v. Dozier, 672 So. 2d 16, 17-18 (Fla. 1996) (finding 
independent basis to review judicial assignment exists where Court has Aexclusive 
jurisdiction to review such assignments under its article V, section 2(a) authority to 
oversee the administrative supervision of all courts@); Florida Senate v. Graham, 
412 So. 2d 360, 361 (Fla. 1982) (finding underlying basis for jurisdiction to 
challenge Governor=s authority to limit a special apportionment session; that is, the 
Court=s constitutional authority in the second year following each decennial census 
to review a legislative plan of apportionment).   
Here, Secretary Roberts contends that we should exercise our all writs 
jurisdiction to protect our exclusive authority pursuant to article V, section 
3(b)(10) of the Florida Constitution to consider pre-election challenges to the 
validity of citizen-initiative petitions.  Thus, to determine whether the use of our all 
writs jurisdiction is warranted, we must determine whether our jurisdiction over 
such matters is exclusive. 
 
With regard to prohibition, this Court has explained the limited applicability 
of the writ as follows: 
Prohibition may only be granted when it is shown that a lower court is 
without jurisdiction or attempting to act in excess of jurisdiction.  It is 
preventive and not corrective in that it commands the one to whom it 
is directed not to do the thing which the supervisory court is informed 
the lower tribunal is about to do.  Its purpose is to prevent the doing of 
something, not to compel the undoing of something already done. 
 
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English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293, 296-97 (Fla. 1977).  The applicability of the 
writ of prohibition in this case hinges upon the identical issue that is determinative 
of whether the doctrine of all writs applies; that is, the exclusiveness of this Court‘s 
jurisdiction to consider pre-election challenges to proposed citizen-initiative 
constitutional amendments.  If this Court maintains exclusive jurisdiction over 
such challenges, the circuit court is acting in excess of its jurisdiction by accepting 
jurisdiction to consider the declaratory action filed by the respondents, thereby 
warranting prohibition relief. 
 
We conclude that, based upon the history of the advisory opinion 
amendments to the Florida Constitution and case precedent, our jurisdiction with 
regard to such pre-election matters is indeed exclusive, and therefore, use of our all 
writs and prohibition jurisdiction is both necessary and appropriate.  
The 1986 Constitutional Amendments 
 
 
In 1986, the Florida Constitution was amended to create the advisory 
opinion review process for citizen-initiative petitions.  The purpose of the process 
―is to allow the Court to rule on the validity of an initiative petition before the 
sponsor goes to the considerable effort and expense of obtaining the required 
number of signatures for placement on the ballot.‖  Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 
2d 7, 13 n.18 (Fla. 2000); see also Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151, 157 (Fla. 
1982) (Overton, J., specially concurring) (noting with regard to the Court‘s 
 
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removal of a legislatively proposed amendment from the ballot, ―It concerns me 
that the public is being denied the opportunity to vote because no process has been 
established to correct misleading ballot language in sufficient time to change the 
language.  To avoid future situations in which this Court may again have to 
exercise this extraordinary power of striking an amendment from the ballot due to 
misleading ballot language, the legislature and this Court should devise a process 
whereby misleading language can be challenged and corrected in sufficient time to 
allow a vote on the proposal.‖).   
Article IV, section 10 of the Florida Constitution provides that ―[t]he 
attorney general shall, as directed by general law, request the opinion of the 
justices of the supreme court as to the validity of any initiative petition circulated 
pursuant to Section 3 of Article XI,‖ the provision of the Constitution which 
addresses amendment by citizen initiative.  Article V, section 3(b)(10), provides 
that this Court ―[s]hall, when requested by the attorney general pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 10 of Article IV, render an advisory opinion of the justices, 
addressing issues as provided by general law.‖  (Emphasis supplied.)  General law 
requires this Court to address and determine the single-subject requirement 
delineated in article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, and the requirements 
for the ballot title and summary delineated in section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes 
(2009).  See Advisory Op. to Att‘y Gen. re 1.35% Property Tax Cap, Unless Voter 
 
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Approved, 2 So. 3d 968, 971 (Fla. 2009).  Our review of these requirements is 
governed by two principles: 
First, the Court will not address the merits or wisdom of the proposed 
amendment.  Advisory Op. to Att‘y Gen. re Treating People 
Differently Based on Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So. 2d 888, 891 (Fla. 
2000).  Second, ―[t]he Court must act with extreme care, caution, and 
restraint before it removes a constitutional amendment from the vote 
of the people.‖  Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151, 156 (Fla.1982). 
Id.  This Court has previously explained that the Florida Constitution expressly 
authorizes judicial review of constitutional amendments that are proposed by 
citizen initiative only in this Court.  See Armstrong, 773 So. 2d at 14 n.18.  Thus, 
the one constitutional provision that expressly addresses the jurisdiction of the 
judiciary for pre-election review of proposed constitutional amendments affords 
that jurisdiction exclusively to this Court with regard to citizen initiative 
amendments.  Contrary to the position of the dissent, the Florida Constitution 
simply does not contemplate that the validity of an initiative petition will be 
challenged pre-election in any proceeding other than that expressly authorized by 
the Constitution, which permits this Court exclusively to address pre-election 
challenges when an advisory opinion is requested by the attorney general.  See art. 
V, § 3(b)(10), Fla. Const. 
Exclusive Jurisdiction of this Court 
 
This Court in unequivocal terms has stated on at least two separate occasions 
that it has exclusive jurisdiction to consider the validity of citizen-initiative 
 
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petitions.  See Advisory Op. to Att‘y Gen. re Stop Early Release of Prisoners, 661 
So. 2d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 1995) (―The Attorney General of Florida has requested this 
Court to review a proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution, as it is his duty 
to do . . . . We have original and exclusive jurisdiction.‖ (emphasis supplied)); 
Advisory Op. to Att‘y Gen. re Stop Early Release of Prisoners, 642 So. 2d 724, 
725 (Fla. 1994) (―The Attorney General of Florida has petitioned this Court to 
review a proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution, as it is his duty to do.  
We have original and exclusive jurisdiction.‖ (emphasis supplied) (citation 
omitted)).   
Further, although the circuit courts may be courts of general jurisdiction 
under the Florida Constitution and have the general authority to consider 
declaratory actions and issue injunctions, under rules of constitutional construction 
a specific statement that jurisdiction over one type of legal matter exists in another 
court removes jurisdiction from the circuit court to consider such matters.  See 
McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994) (―[A] specific statute covering a 
particular subject area always controls over a statute covering the same and other 
subjects in more general terms.  The more specific statute is considered to be an 
exception to the general terms of the more comprehensive statute.‖ (citations 
omitted)); see also Coastal Florida Police Benev. Ass‘n, Inc. v. Williams, 838 So. 
2d 543, 548 (Fla. 2003) (―The rules which govern the construction of statutes are 
 
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generally applicable to the construction of constitutional provisions.‖).  Thus, 
article V, section 3(b)(10), which provides that this Court shall consider the 
validity of citizen-initiative amendments, indicates that no other Florida court has 
jurisdiction to consider these types of pre-election petitions.  Indeed, we adopted 
such an interpretation in the Stop Early Release of Prisoners opinions.  See, e.g., 
661 So. 2d at 1205 (―We have original and exclusive jurisdiction.‖). 
Moreover, when attempts to challenge citizen initiatives in other courts have 
surfaced, we have previously transferred pre-election declaratory actions 
challenging initiative proposals to our Court, an action which is entirely consistent 
with our holding today that we possess exclusive jurisdiction to consider such 
matters.  In Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General—Fee on Everglades Sugar 
Production, 681 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 1996), a declaratory action was filed in the 
circuit court while advisory opinion proceedings were pending in this Court with 
regard to three proposed initiative amendments.  See id. at 1126-27.  The sponsor 
of the proposed amendments, Save Our Everglades (SOE), petitioned this Court for 
an extraordinary writ, contending that  
[t]he . . . opponents have brought an action in the Leon County 
Circuit Court, which is improper, has no jurisdictional basis, and 
subverts the electoral process.  SOE brings this petition to stop this 
invalid action and to preserve this Court‘s jurisdiction over the 
initiative petition process. 
 
. . . [I]t is unquestionable that this Court has sole jurisdiction 
over the initiative petition process.  See Article XI, Section 3 and 5(a); 
Article IV, Section 10; Article V, Section 3(b)(10), Florida 
 
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Constitution.  This power is not vested in the Leon County Circuit 
Court or any other Circuit Court in the State.  Additionally, the 
advisory opinion/initiative petition process has already begun in this 
Court.  . . .  This Court has the authority and obligation to enter an 
order transferring the lower court case to this Court for consideration. 
Petition for Constitutional Writ at 1-2, Advisory Opinion to the Attorney 
General—Fee on Everglades Sugar Production, 681 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 1996) (No. 
SC88343) (citation and footnote omitted).  After considering the all writs petition, 
this Court ordered transfer of the declaratory action, demonstrating our agreement 
with SOE that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the 
validity of the proposed amendments. 
 
Of necessity, a pre-election challenge to a citizen initiative proposed 
constitutional amendment is always in the nature and form of requesting an 
advisory opinion, which is specifically contemplated and addressed in the Florida 
Constitution to be exclusively within the authority of this Court.  Further, there is 
no jurisdiction in any circuit court to render in the form of a declaratory judgment a 
determination with regard to the impact of a citizen initiative, which pre-election 
would be an advisory opinion addressing merely the possibility of legal injury 
based on purely hypothetical facts which have not arisen and are only contingent, 
uncertain and rest entirely on future possible facts.  See, e.g., Santa Rosa County v. 
Admin. Comm‘n, 661 So. 2d 1190, 1193 (Fla. 1995) (―[A]bsent a bona fide need 
for a declaration based on present, ascertainable facts, the circuit court lacks 
 
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jurisdiction to render declaratory relief.‖ (emphasis supplied)); Martinez v. 
Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167, 1170 (Fla. 1991) (―[A]lthough a court may entertain a 
declaratory action regarding a statute's validity, there must be a bona fide need for 
such a declaration based on present, ascertainable facts or the court lacks 
jurisdiction to render declaratory relief.‖ (emphasis supplied)); Bryant v. Gray, 70 
So. 2d 581, 584-85 (Fla. 1954) (holding that circuit court lacked jurisdiction to 
enter a declaratory decree on the issue of whether an individual who desired to run 
for governor in 1954 to serve the unexpired term of a deceased governor would be 
eligible to seek re-election during the general election of 1956; the Court explained 
that ―[n]o present right is involved.  His question is hypothetical and is too remote 
as to time and too uncertain as to contingencies.  He does not allege that he will be 
nominated or elected to either the unexpired term or a full term. There is no 
certainty that he will be.‖ (emphasis supplied)). 
Florida League of Cities v. Smith and Lane v. Chiles 
 
Despite this constitutional and case law, the circuit court concluded below 
that it retained jurisdiction to consider the respondents‘ declaratory action based 
primarily on statements in Florida League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 
1992), and the decision in Lane v. Chiles, 698 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1997).  However, 
neither of these decisions supports the assertion that following the 1986 
 
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amendments to the Florida Constitution, circuit courts retained jurisdiction to 
consider pre-election challenges to amendments proposed by citizen initiative. 
In Smith, we had previously approved a citizen-initiative proposal that 
governed homestead exemptions for placement on the ballot.  See 607 So. 2d at 
398.  Shortly before the date of the election, two entities that had not participated 
in the earlier advisory opinion proceeding filed a petition for writ of mandamus 
with this Court contending that, if adopted, the proposed amendment would trigger 
a repeal of a portion of the Florida Constitution that governed the homestead 
exemption.  See id.  A party asserted that the repeal of this provision would have 
extreme and significant consequences for Florida taxpayers and local governments 
which the proposed ballot summary did not mention and sought to remove this 
proposed amendment from the ballot.  See id.    
This Court first addressed whether the earlier advisory opinion would 
operate as a procedural bar to this Court considering the subsequent challenge.  See 
id. (―Initially, we must address the question of whether our earlier advisory opinion 
precludes us from considering the present cause.‖ (emphasis supplied)).  In 
determining this issue, this Court relied upon legislative staff summaries and wrote 
the language that the circuit court relied upon below: 
When those provisions were under consideration before the 1986 
Legislature, the accompanying legislative staff summaries stated a 
belief that any advisory opinion regarding initiative petitions would 
not be binding precedent and would only constitute persuasive 
 
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authority as to any other adversarial legal challenge that might later be 
raised.  Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, CS/HJR 71 (1986), 
Staff Analysis 2 (March 6, 1986) (available from Fla. Div. of 
Archives); Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, PCS/HJR 71 
(1986), Staff Analysis 2 (Feb. 18, 1986) (available from Fla. Div. of 
Archives).  This necessarily implies that other legal challenges would 
continue to be permissible under existing precedent. 
Id. at 398-99 (footnotes omitted).  This Court ultimately concluded that ―our 
precedent clearly holds that a petition for mandamus is an appropriate method for 
challenging an allegedly defective proposed amendment to the Constitution.‖  Id. 
at 399 (emphasis supplied). 
Although the language used in the opinion relied on legislative staff 
summaries, the Smith case only addressed this Court‘s ability to revisit an initiative 
proposal that it had previously approved for placement on the ballot.  Indeed, there 
is no indication whatsoever that our analysis applied beyond a discussion of our 
own jurisdiction.  See id. at 399 (―We emphasize, however, that relitigation of 
issues expressly addressed in an advisory opinion on a proposed amendment is 
strongly disfavored and almost always will result in this Court refusing to exercise 
its discretionary jurisdiction.‖ (emphasis supplied)).  More recently we addressed 
the doctrine of law of the case and res judicata in this context.  See Advisory Op. to 
Att‘y Gen. re Referenda Required for Adoption & Amendment of Local Gov‘t 
Comprehensive Land Use Plans, 938 So. 2d 501, 505 (Fla. 2006). 
 
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Further, although this Court relied on the legislative staff material in 
concluding that its advisory opinions are not ―binding,‖ the Smith decision 
inadvertently paraphrased those legislative staff analyses such that their actual 
meaning was obscured.  The legislative staff summaries specifically provided: 
It should be noted, however, that an advisory opinion would not be 
binding on a challenge brought subsequent to the adoption of the 
proposed amendment.  Nonetheless, to the extent the challenge raises 
issues addressed in the advisory opinion, the opinion would, as a 
practical matter, prove to be extremely persuasive. 
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, CS for HJR 71 (1986) Staff Analysis at 2 (March 6, 
1986); Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, PCS for HJR 71 (1986) Staff Analysis at 2 
(Feb. 18, 1986) (emphasis supplied).  Thus, the discussion of advisory opinions as 
non-binding in the staff summaries referred to challenges raised after adoption of 
the proposal, not before.  Those legislative staff summaries do not support 
jurisdiction pre-election in any other court. 
The ambiguous reference in Smith to the availability of ―other legal 
challenges‖ appears to have led the circuit court here to erroneously conclude that 
all pre-election means of challenging citizen-initiative amendments in any Florida 
court survived the 1986 constitutional amendments.  However, our later clear 
proclamation of exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of citizen-initiative 
proposals pre-election in the Stop Early Release of Prisoners opinions and Land 
Use Plans demonstrates that such a broad interpretation of Smith was not intended.  
 
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Further, despite our description in Smith of advisory opinions as non-binding 
precedent, we later clarified in Ray v. Mortham, 742 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1999), that 
an ―advisory‖ opinion produces significant consequences:  
[T]he amici have suggested that advisory opinions from this Court 
have little precedential value and are only persuasive . . . .  However, 
none of these cases concern advisory opinions required by section 
16.061, Florida Statutes (1997) [governing initiative proposals].  At 
the outset, we point out that when our ―advisory‖ opinions conclude 
that there is a defect in the ballot title and summary or a violation of 
the single-subject requirement, the effect of our ―advice‖ is the 
removal of the amendment from the ballot.  
Id. at 1284.  We also addressed the doctrine of law of the case and res judicata in 
Land Use Plans. 
The respondents‘ reliance on Lane v. Chiles, 698 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1997), is 
similarly unavailing.  In Lane, individuals challenged in the circuit court a fishing 
―net ban‖ amendment that previously had been adopted through an initiative 
petition.  See id. at 262.  In addition to procedural and substantive challenges, the 
individuals challenged the sufficiency of the ballot summary.  See id.  After the 
trial court granted summary judgment, upheld constitutionality of the amendment, 
and found that the time to challenge the ballot summary had passed, this Court 
accepted pass-through review of the trial court‘s order.  See id.  With regard to the 
challenge to the sufficiency of the ballot summary, this Court stated in full: 
We find this claim to be untimely and without merit.  In addition to 
the fact that this Court specifically approved the ballot summary, the 
general rule is that a challenge to the form of a proposed amendment 
 
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must be made before the amendment is adopted.  Sylvester v. Tindall, 
18 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1944).  Lane filed this challenge on June 20, 1995, 
eight months after the amendment was adopted by a vote of the people 
and less than two weeks before the amendment was to be effective on 
July 1, 1995. 
Id. at 265 (footnote omitted).   
Contrary to the respondents‘ assertions, this brief analysis does not 
constitute a holding that the circuit court maintains jurisdiction to consider pre-
election ballot initiative challenges.  Notably, our decision in Lane was issued in 
1997, only two years after we proclaimed our original and exclusive jurisdiction 
over these matters.  See Stop Early Release of Prisoners, 661 So. 2d at 1205.  Had 
we intended to overrule our prior declaration of exclusive jurisdiction, we would 
have done so in a more definite and express manner than the aforementioned 
language in Lane.  As we previously explained in Puryear v. State, 810 So. 2d 901 
(Fla. 2002): 
[T]his Court does not intentionally overrule itself sub silentio.  Where 
a court encounters an express holding from this Court on a specific 
issue and a subsequent contrary dicta statement on the same specific 
issue, the court is to apply our express holding in the former decision 
until such time as this Court recedes from the express holding. 
Id. at 905 (emphasis supplied).  We have not receded from the Stop Early Release 
of Prisoners opinions, and our express statement of exclusive jurisdiction in those 
cases prevails.   
 
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We conclude that to hold that an advisory opinion pursuant to article V, 
section 3(b)(10) is not an exclusive and final determination of the pre-election 
validity of an initiative proposal would be contrary to the Florida Constitution, the 
intent behind the 1986 amendments, and precedent from this Court.  As a matter of 
policy, the purpose for the advisory opinion amendments was to allow citizen- 
initiative sponsors time to correct, if necessary, an invalid proposal in time for the 
proposed amendment to appear on the ballot.  See Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 
7, 14 n.18 (Fla. 2000); Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary, CS for HJR 0071 (1986) Staff 
Analysis at 1-2 (May 20, 1986).  To interpret the 1986 amendments in any other 
manner would be to simply nullify them and encourage serial attacks on citizen 
initiatives to thwart consideration indefinitely because the advisory opinion process 
would no longer serve its intended purpose.  An opponent would be permitted to 
challenge an initiative proposal immediately before an election in an effort to 
remove that proposal from the ballot before it could ever be voted upon, thereby 
frustrating the democratic process.  Thus, a pre-election declaratory challenge to an 
initiative proposal would be nothing less than a veiled attempt to re-write the 
Constitution and remove this Court‘s exclusive responsibility to issue advisory 
opinions pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(10).  Circuit courts are not authorized 
to issue advisory opinions.  See Dep‘t of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d 717, 
721 (Fla. 1994) (―[P]arties must not be requesting an advisory opinion except in 
 
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those rare instances in which advisory opinions are authorized by the 
Constitution.‖ (citation omitted)).  The interpretation of the 1986 amendments 
advanced by the respondents would eviscerate any protections to ballot initiatives 
that those amendments were intended to ensure.  We conclude that this 
interpretation is incorrect. 
Application to this Case 
 
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the circuit court‘s determination that it 
retains subject matter jurisdiction to consider a pre-election declaratory challenge 
to an initiative proposal is erroneous.  By continuing to consider the respondents‘ 
challenges to Amendments 5 and 6, the circuit court is encroaching on this Court‘s 
exclusive jurisdiction and is acting in excess of its jurisdiction.  With this 
conclusion we need not address additional issues concerning the propriety of the 
intervention, law of the case, or res judicata.  Our limited determination here 
requires that we grant the petition and order the circuit court to dismiss the 
declaratory action. 
The respondents have not demonstrated that the present matter is a ―truly 
extraordinary case[]‖ as required by our cases or that they have raised a ―vital 
issue‖ that was not addressed in the prior advisory opinion.  Smith, 607 So. 2d at 
399.  The respondents do not contend that adoption of the amendments will negate 
or vitiate a portion of the Florida Constitution.   The challenges asserted in the 
 
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amended complaint do not present a significant, undiscovered issue of potential 
internal constitutional conflict such as was asserted in Smith, so the high standard 
we have established for reopening citizen-initiative validity proceedings has not 
been satisfied.2  We instead conclude that dismissal of the declaratory action will 
protect the integrity of the citizen-initiative process by precluding last-minute 
ballot challenges that seek to remove initiative amendments from the ballot where 
those challenges could have easily been presented during the advisory opinion 
process. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we grant the petition and utilize our jurisdiction under article 
V, section 3(b)(7) of the Florida Constitution to preclude the circuit court from 
taking any further pre-election action in this matter other than to dismiss the 
proceedings below.   We trust that the circuit court will comply with our direction, 
and therefore, we withhold issuance of the writ.   
 
It is so ordered. 
                                          
 
2.  Further, certain claims raised by the respondents involve challenges to 
the constitutionality of the amendments, which are not now justiciable under this 
Court‘s exclusive jurisdiction to review initiative proposals.  See Advisory Op. to 
Att‘y Gen.—Limited Political Terms in Certain Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d 225, 
227 (Fla. 1991) (stating that challenges other than whether a proposed amendment 
and ballot title and summary comply with article XI, section 3, Florida 
Constitution, and section 101.161, Florida Statutes, are ―not justiciable in the 
instant proceeding‖).   
 
 
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CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, J., concurs with an opinion. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
PARIENTE and PERRY, JJ., recused. 
 
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED. 
 
 
QUINCE, J., concurring. 
 
 
I concur in the majority opinion because the only issues that can be raised 
that will result in the striking of either one or both proposed amendments from the 
ballot are whether the proposals violates the single subject requirement and 
whether the ballot title and summary are misleading.   Those issues have already 
been addressed by this Court, resulting in the placement of these two proposals on 
the ballot.  The other issues raised by the parties are premature and cannot serve as 
a basis to remove the proposals from the ballot.  The wisdom and feasibility of a 
proposal are not matters that a court, even initially, can take into consideration in 
determining whether a measure should be on the ballot.  These issues may well be 
the subject of litigation if the proposals are voted on favorably by the elector.  
 
 
POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I would partially grant Interim Secretary of State Roberts‘ petition and direct 
the circuit court to dismiss any claims involving the single-subject requirement of 
article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution or the ballot title and summary 
 
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requirements of section 101.161, Florida Statutes.  However, because this Court‘s 
exclusive jurisdiction over initiative petitions does not extend beyond these single-
subject and ballot title and summary issues,3 I do not believe that this Court can 
direct the circuit court to dismiss the other pre-election claims raised by the parties 
by exercising our all writs jurisdiction or granting a prohibition petition.  In 
addition, I disagree with the majority‘s determination that the other claims are not 
justiciable.   
Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part. 
I. 
As the majority accurately notes, the applicability of the doctrine of all writs 
and the applicability of the writ of prohibition in this case depends upon this Court 
having exclusive jurisdiction over the challenges involved.  See majority op. at 7.          
Article V, section 3 of the Florida Constitution outlines this Court‘s 
jurisdiction as follows: 
  
(b) JURISDICTION.––The supreme court: 
  
. . . . 
 
(10) Shall, when requested by the attorney general pursuant to 
the provisions of Section 10 of Article IV, render an advisory opinion 
of the justices, addressing issues as provided by general law. 
 
                                          
 
 
3.  This Court‘s precedent may also support exclusive jurisdiction to review 
the financial impact statements of ballot initiatives.  See Advisory Op. to Att‘y 
Gen. re Referenda Required for Adoption & Amendment of Local Gov‘t 
Comprehensive Land Use Plans, 963 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2007). 
 
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And section 10 of article IV states: 
SECTION 10.  Attorney General. ––The attorney general shall, 
as directed by general law, request the opinion of the justices of the 
supreme court as to the validity of any initiative petition circulated 
pursuant to Section 3 of Article XI.  The justices shall, subject to their 
rules of procedure, permit interested persons to be heard on the 
questions presented and shall render their written opinion no later than 
April 1 of the year in which the initiative is to be submitted to the 
voters pursuant to Section 5 of Article XI. 
(Emphasis added.)  Based upon the plain language of these provisions, this Court 
has original and exclusive jurisdiction to render advisory opinions to the attorney 
general regarding the validity of initiative petitions circulated under section 3 of 
article XI.  See Advisory Op. to Att‘y Gen. re Stop Early Release of Prisoners, 661 
So. 2d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 1995); Advisory Op. to Att‘y Gen. re Stop Early Release 
of Prisoners, 642 So. 2d 724, 725 (Fla. 1994). 
 
Importantly, however, our precedent indicates that this exclusive jurisdiction 
is quite limited.  Specifically, ―[t]he Court‘s inquiry, when determining the validity 
of initiative petitions, is limited to two legal issues:  whether the petition satisfies 
the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3, Florida Constitution, and 
whether the ballot titles and summaries are printed in clear and unambiguous 
language pursuant to section 101.161, Florida Statutes (1999).‖  Advisory Op. to 
Att‘y Gen. re Protect People, Especially Youth, from Addiction, Disease, & Other 
Health Hazards of Using Tobacco, 926 So. 2d 1186, 1190 (Fla. 2006) (quoting 
Advisory Op. to Att‘y Gen. re Amendment to Bar Gov‘t from Treating People 
 
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Differently Based on Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So. 2d 888, 890-91 (Fla. 2000)); see 
also Advisory Op. to Att‘y Gen.—Ltd. Political Terms in Certain Elected Offices, 
592 So. 2d 225, 227 (Fla. 1991).  Therefore, this Court only has exclusive 
jurisdiction over determinations regarding the single-subject requirement and the 
ballot title and summary requirements.  Neither our precedent nor the plain 
language of the constitution supports the majority‘s expansion of our exclusive 
jurisdiction to include every possible pre-election challenge of an initiative 
petition. 
II. 
 
In addition to ruling that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-
election challenges to initiative petitions, the majority rules that the other claims 
brought by the parties (those that do not involve the single subject, ballot title, and 
summary requirements) are not justiciable.  See majority op. at 21 n.2.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the majority cites Advisory Opinion to Attorney General—Limited 
Political Terms in Certain Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d at 227.  This Court, in that 
term limits opinion, ruled that other claims, like the constitutional claims brought 
in the instant case, cannot be heard in an advisory opinion proceeding, which is 
limited to whether a ballot title and summary comply with article XI, section 3 of 
the Florida Constitution and section 101.161, Florida Statutes.  592 So. 2d at 227 
(―[W]e find that those issues are not justiciable in the instant proceeding.  
 
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(emphasis added)).  The Court did not hold that these other claims could not be 
brought in a different proceeding in circuit court.4   
Circuit courts in Florida routinely address constitutional issues pre-election 
to determine whether a proposed amendment should go on the ballot.  For 
example, in Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of St. Pete Beach, 940 So. 2d 
1144, 1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (quoting W. Palm Beach Ass‘n of Firefighters, 
Local Union 727 v. Bd. of City Comm‘rs, 448 So. 2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1984)), the Second District noted that ―[i]f the opponent of a proposed amendment 
‗in good faith questions the constitutionality of the ordinance in its entirety and on 
its face[,] the court may properly consider that question in advance of an election 
concerning its approval.‘ ‖   The Second District went on to hold that the circuit 
court had jurisdiction to entertain the declaratory action.  Citizens for Responsible 
Growth, 940 So. 2d at 1147; see also Gaines v. City of Orlando, 450 So. 2d 1174 
(Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (holding that a circuit court may make a pre-election 
determination of the facial constitutionality of any proposed amendment).  No 
jurisdictional infirmities exist, and none are specifically created by the Florida 
Constitution for citizen initiative amendments that would cause them to be 
different than other proposed amendments.  Therefore, the circuit court has 
                                          
 
 
4.  This Court‘s holding in the term limits case is consistent with this Court‘s 
ruling in Florida League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397, 399 n.3 (Fla. 1992), 
that advisory opinions do not act as precedent over issues ―not addressed at all in a 
prior advisory opinion.‖   
 
- 27 - 
jurisdiction before the election to determine whether a citizen-initiative amendment 
is constitutional, just as the circuit court has jurisdiction before the election to 
determine whether other proposed amendments are constitutional.  
The majority justifies its decision in part by referencing the rule of law that a 
circuit court does not have jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion based on 
hypothetical facts.  See majority op. at 12.  But this entirely misses the point of 
who gets to decide whether the claims are based on hypothetical facts.  The 
majority‘s ruling is in violation of the well-settled law that a court itself decides 
whether it has jurisdiction or not.  ―Every court has judicial power to hear and 
determine the question of its own jurisdiction, both as to parties and as to subject 
matter, and necessarily does so by proceeding in the cause.‖  State ex rel. B. F. 
Goodrich Co. v. Trammell, 192 So. 175, 177 (Fla. 1939) (quoting 15 C.J. § 170, at 
851 (1918)).  Here, the majority unjustifiably takes the claims not yet decided by 
the circuit court and decides they are not justiciable without giving the circuit court 
an opportunity to rule on them or determine whether they are justiciable.  The 
majority has overreached.   
Arguments could be made as to whether the various claims raised by the 
parties in this case are justiciable for determination prior to adoption.  But the 
petitioners did not raise those arguments in their motions to dismiss; therefore, the 
trial court did not address the issue in its Order on Motions to Dismiss subject to 
 
- 28 - 
the writ filed in this Court.  Instead, as the trial court noted, the petitioners argued 
that this Court has present mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-
election challenges to voter initiative petitions to amend the Florida Constitution.  
Accordingly, I do not decide this justiciable issue because it is not properly before 
us.  Those arguments and any related facts should be decided by the circuit court 
rather than by this Court in an original writ proceeding.  See art. V, § 5(b), Fla. 
Const.; §§ 86.011, 86.051, Fla. Stat. (2009); Davis v. Gulf Power Corp., 799 So. 2d 
298, 299 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (ruling that Gulf Power stated a claim for 
declaratory relief regarding tax treatment of a proposed electric power plant 
expansion, citing section 86.051, which provided that ―[a]ny declaratory judgment 
rendered pursuant to this chapter may be rendered by way of anticipation with 
respect to any act not yet done or any event which has not yet happened‖).   
III. 
 
 To summarize, based upon the Florida Constitution and our precedent, this 
Court only has exclusive jurisdiction over initiative petition claims involving the 
single-subject, ballot title, and summary requirements.  Therefore, I would only 
direct the circuit court to dismiss the parties‘ claims involving the single-subject 
requirement of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution and the ballot title 
and summary requirements of section 101.161, Florida Statutes.  The majority has 
decided that (i) this Court, not the circuit court, has jurisdiction over whether the 
 
- 29 - 
other claims, never addressed by any court, are justiciable, and (ii) these claims, on 
the merits, are not justiciable.  There is no jurisdictional transport into the Florida 
Supreme Court provided by the Florida Constitution or otherwise for the majority 
to make such an expansive ruling.  There is no basis for determining that this Court 
has exclusive jurisdiction over every possible pre-election matter.   
I do not understand as a matter of law how the parties‘ challenges to the 
proposed amendment, not yet ruled on, may be procedurally or substantively 
barred on jurisdictional grounds.  Moreover, it is not somehow preferable to wait to 
rule until after the citizens of Florida have voted to approve an amendment.  See, 
e.g., Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2000).   
 
Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.   
 
 
 
Original Proceedings – Petition for All Writs 
 
John S. Mills of The Mills Firm, Jacksonville, Florida, Michael G. Tanner and 
Thomas E. Bishop of Tanner Bishop, Jacksonville, Florida, C. B. Upton, General 
Counsel, Florida Department of State, Tallahassee, Florida; Mark Herron and 
Robert J. Telfer, III of Messer, Caparello and Self, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, 
Ronald G. Meyer, Jennifer S. Blohm, and Lynn C. Hearn of Meyer, Brooks, 
Demma and Blohm, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, and Stephen S. Dobson, III of 
Dobson, Davis, and Smith, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioners 
 
Stephen Michael Cody, Palmetto Bay, Florida; James A. Scott, Edward J. 
Pozzuoli, Stephanie Alexander, and Brady J. Cobb of Tripp Scott, P.A., Fort 
 
- 30 - 
Lauderdale, Florida; George N. Meros, Jr., Andy Bardos, and Jeffrey T. Kuntz of 
GrayRobinson, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondents 
 
James W. Gustafson of Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley, 
Tallahassee, Florida, Charles G. Burr of Burr and Smith, LLP, Tampa, Florida, 
Alicia Hancock Apfel, Miami, Florida, and Paul M. Smith and Michael B. 
DeSanctis of Jenner and Block, LLP, Washington, D.C., on behalf of Florida State 
Conference of NAACP Branches and Democracia  Ahora; and Douglas F. Eaton of 
Eaton and Wolk, P.L., Miami, Florida, on behalf of The League of Women Voters 
of Florida, 
 
 
as Amici Curiae