Case Title: Hoagland v. State

Citation: 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 37

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2010-10-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
426 Nev, Advance Opinion 37
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

RICHARD WILLIAM HOAGLAND, No, 52704
Appellant, FIL ED
‘THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent. ocr 97 au10
Appeal from a judgment of conviction, purfuant to an Alford
plea, of driving andlor being in actual physical control of a vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Bighth Judicial District Court,
Clark County; Kenneth C. Cory, Judge.
Affirmed,

  
  
    
  

Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and Philip David Westbrook and Casey
A. Landis, Deputy Public Defenders, Clark County,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez, Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger,
District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and
Lawrence James O'Neale, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,

for Respondent.

BEFORE HARDESTY, DOUGLAS and PICKERING, JJ

OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.

In this appeal, we consider whether necessity may be asserted
as a defense to a charge of driving a vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor (DUD). Because necessity is a common law defense and

the Legislature has not limited its use, we conclude that necessity is

0-093

 
available as a defense to a charge of DUI. However, we conclude that the
district court did not commit error in this case by refusing to instruct the
jury on necessity because appellant Richard Hoagland’s offer of proof was
insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy an element of the defense.

FACTS

Hoagland was sleeping in his truck in an “employee parking”
stall at the Salvation Army in Las Vegas. A security officer for the
Salvation Army approached the truck and informed Hoagland that he
could not sleep on the property and requested that Hoagland move his
truck to another location. Hoagland was living out of his truck and
believed that if he did not move his truck, it would be towed and
impounded with all of his belongings.

Hoagland, attempting to comply with the request, backed into
another parked vehicle. Although he never left the parking lot, Hoagland
drove to the other side of the building only to return within minutes to the
scene of the accident. The security officer called the Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department (Metro), blocked the driveway exiting the
parking lot, and ordered Hoagland to park his truck. When the Metro
officer arrived, he conducted a field sobriety test, which Hoagland failed.
Hoagland was subsequently arrested and charged with driving and/or
being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.

During his opening statement at trial, Hoagland asserted the
defense of necessity. He informed the jury that he had no other choice,
under the circumstances, but to operate his truck while intoxicated. After
the State presented its case, the court recessed, and the parties settled

[jury instructions in the judge's chambers. Hoagland offered a necessity

instruction patterned after jury instructions from other jurisdictions;

 

 
ose ie

 

however, the State contested the jury instruction, arguing that it was an
inaccurate statement of the law and that the defense of necessity was not
applicable in Nevada. The district court agreed and reasoned that because
there is no Nevada caselaw allowing necessity as a defense to a DUI
charge, it would not permit Hoagland to offer the jury instruction or
present evidence to the jury to support the defense of necessity.

Being denied the ability to present his theory of defense,
Hoagland elected to enter an Alford plea! on the condition that his right to
appeal the district court's decision would be preserved. In conjunction
with his Alford plea, Hoagland made an offer of proof: that prior to the
security officer's request that he move his truck, he had no intention of
driving while intoxicated; he had no means to drive his truck because his
keys were with another party and were only given to him after he was
instructed to move his truck; and he feared that if his truck was
impounded, he would lose his shelter and personal possessions and would
be unable to pay the impound fees. Therefore, according to Hoagland, it
was necessary for him to move his truck while intoxicated. Hoagland now
appeals.

DISCUSSION

Hoagland argues that the district court violated his due
process rights by refusing to instruct the jury on a necessity defense and
prohibiting him from offering evidence to support his defense theory.
‘Traditionally, a district court has broad discretion to settle jury
instructions, and we review that decision for an abuse of discretion or

 

 

\North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 26 (1970) (permitting a plea of
guilt even though the defendant still maintains his claim of innocence).

 
 

[judicial error. Crawford v, State, 121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 P.8d 582, 585
(2005). When, as here, the issue involves a question of law, this court
applies de novo review. Berry v, State, 125 Nev. __, __, 212 P.3d 1085,
1091 (2009); U.S. v, Perdomo-Espana, 522 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2008),

As an initial matter, the State relies on Whisler v, State, 121
Nev. 401, 116 P.3d 59 (2005), to argue that a DUI violation is a strict
liability offense, which would preclude Hoagland from presenting a
Inecessity defense. We conclude that the State’s reliance on Whisler is
‘misplaced and improperly expands our holding in that case. In Whisler,
the appellant made two arguments concerning a jury instruction on the
defense of involuntary intoxication. 121 Nev. at 407-08, 116 P.3d at 63-64.
First, the appellant argued that the State must prove that he was
‘knowingly or willingly intoxicated and, second, that a DUI violation is not
a strict liability offense. Id. at 407, 116 P.3d at 63.

Determining that appellant's arguments were without merit,
we held that the State is not required to prove a defendant's knowledge of
his intoxication because it would place too heavy a burden on the State
since a defendant is often unaware of his intoxication “precisely because of
the intoxicating effects of the substance he has ingested.” Id. at 408, 116
P.3d at 64. Our holding is silent, however, regarding whether DUI is a
strict liability offense. Therefore, the State's reliance on Whisler is
misguided, and we cannot agree with the State's contention that Whisler
concluded that DUI is a strict liability offense. We do not address the
issue further at this time, as neither party has provided any relevant legal
lor statutory analysis to allow this court to reach a meaningful disposition
lof the issue. Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987)

 

 

 
(explaining that this court need not consider arguments that have not
been adequately briefed or supported by relevant legal authority).

However, necessity is a common law defense. See United
[States _v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 490
(2001); U.S. v, Ridner, 612 F.3d 846, 849 (6th Cir. 2008). It is also a
utilitarian defense that “justifies criminal acts taken to avert a greater
farm, maximizing social welfare by allowing a crime to be committed
where the social benefits of the crime outweigh the social costs of failing to
lcommit the crime.” U.S. v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1991). Tt is
typically applied in situations where the illegal action is considered to be
the “lesser of two evils” and the circumstances were not the result of the
Jdefendant’s own conduct. Perdomo-Espana, 522 F.3d at 987 (quoting
United States v. Bailev, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980); Bodner v. State, 752
A.2d 1169, 1174 (Del. 2000). Accordingly, the necessity defense is limited
and should be narrowly construed. Ridner, 512 F.3d at 849.

Although the necessity defense derives from common law,
several states have codified the defense. See Reeve v. State, 764 P.2d 324,
325 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); Bodner, 752 A.2d at 1174; People v. Kucavik,
854 N.E.2d 255, 259 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); State v. Fee, 489 A.2d 606, 607
(NH. 1985); Com, v. Capitolo, 498 A.2d 806, 808 (Pa. 1985). While the
Jnecessity defense has not been codified in Nevada, we have previously

 

 

 

jadopted a restricted common law definition of the elements when offered
Jas a defense in an escape-from-custody crime, See Jorgensen v, State, 100
INev. 541, 543, 688 P.2d 308, 309 (1984) (citing People v. Lovercamp, 118
[Cal. Rptr. 110 (Ct. App. 1975)). We recognize that common law necessity
is generally applicable unless specifically limited by the Legislature. See

JOakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. at 491 (explaining that

 

 
on ae

 

“defense cannot succeed when the legislature itself has made a
[determination of values’) (internal quotations omitted); State v. Cram, 600
A.24 733, 735 (Vt. 1991) (“[T]he necessity defense is not applicable if it has
Jben legislatively precluded”). Since the Nevada Legislature has not
precluded the use of necessity as a defense, we conclude that it is available
land can be asserted as a defense to a DUI violation, However, we decline
to formulate all of the elements required for a necessity defense at this
time because, as analyzed below, the facts of this case do not support a
Inecessity defense as a matter of law.

In this case, the district court refused to instruct the jury on
ithe necessity defense and precluded Hoagland from offering evidence to
support his theory of defense. The court reasoned that because there was
Ino prior Nevada authority expressly applying necessity as a defense to
DUL, it could not recognize such a defense in Hoagland’s case. We affirm
the district court's decision to not instruct the jury on the necessity
ldefense, but provide an alternate reasoning for our conclusion. See St.
James Village, Inc, v. Cunningham, 125 Nev. _, _, 210 P.3d 190, 196
(2009) (affirming the district court's decision, although the court “relied on
different grounds in reaching its decision”).

“Due process requires that there be an opportunity to present
levery available defense” Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972)
(quoting American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932));
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). ‘The notion of fundamental
fairness is interpreted as requiring that a defendant be “afforded a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” California v.
|Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). It is well established that a
|defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on his theory of the case, so long

 
Jas there is evidence to support it, regardless of whether the evidence is
|weak, inconsistent, believable, or incredible. Rosas v, State, 122 Nev.
1258, 1266, 147 P.3d 1101, 1107 (2006); Banks v, Sunrise Hospital, 120
Nev. 822, 832, 102 P.3d 52, 59 (2004). However, a defendant must proffer
sufficient evidence to support each element of the defense. Ridner, 512
F.3d at 849; U, Hill, 893 F. Supp. 1044, 1045 (N.D. Fla. 1994);
Williams v, State, 91 Nev. 533, 535, 539 P.2d 461, 462 (1975). Where the
levidence is legally insufficient to sustain an element of the defense, the

 

 

Jdistrict court is not required to instruct the jury on that defense or
burden{] {the jury] with testimony supporting other elements of the
ldefense.” Bailey, 444 US. at 416; see also Ridner, 512 F.3d at 849-50;
U.S, v, Holliday, 457 F.3d 121, 128 (1st Cir. 2006); Schoon, 971 F.2d at
195; Cram, 600 A.2d at 734.

While we have not formulated the elements of the necessity
defense to DUI, authority from other jurisdictions consistently include one
lclement—whether the defendant presented sufficient evidence to show
that he did not substantially contribute to the emergency or create the
situation. See Ridner, 612 F.3d at 850 (one supporting element of the
Inecessity defense is whether sufficient evidence was presented showing
[that the defendant did not place himself in a situation requiring him to
[choose to commit a criminal act); Bodner, 752 A.2d at 1174 (a supporting

 

jelement of the necessity defense is whether sufficient evidence was
jpresented showing that the defendant's conduct did not create the
jemergency); Kucavik, 854 N.E.2d at 258 (a supporting element of the

 

Inecessity defense is whether sufficient evidence was presented showing
|that the defendant is blameless for creating the situation); Cram, 600 A.2d

Jat 735 (a supporting element of the necessity defense is whether sufficient

 

 
 

Jevidence was presented showing that the defendant was without fault for
creating the emergency).

Hoagland’s offor of proof shows that he parked his truck in a
prohibited parking stall at the Salvation Army. Hoagland’s actions of
[parking in a prohibited stall created the situation requiring him to operate
his truck while under the influence. As a result, Hoagland’s offer of proof
does not satisfy the clement that the defendant did not substantially
contribute to the situation. Cf, Kucavik, 854 N.E.2d at 258.59
(determining that the defendant presented evidence to support a finding
that, although intoxicated while driving a short distance, she did not
jcreate the emergency or the situation of the vehicle left. in the middle of
{the road); Bodner, 752 A.2d at 1174-75 (concluding that it was for the jury

 

ito determine the credibility of the defendant's evidence that she did not
contribute to the emergency of the vehicle being stalled on a railroad
track). Therefore, we conclude that the district court was not required to
instruct the jury on the necessity defense.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

[bento J.

 

Hardesty
We concur:
4.
Dowglas
od
Pickering
8