Case Title: Delaware v. Robinson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 232, 2018

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendant-Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 232, 2018 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  
JACQUEZ ROBINSON,  
 
§ 
Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
 
 
Plaintiff-Below,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID. No. 1411017691 A&B (N) 
 
Submitted: 
February 20, 2019 
Decided: 
April 16, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, 
Justices.  Constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and 
REMANDED. 
 
Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for 
Appellant. 
 
Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, Collins & Associates, Wilmington, Delaware for Appellee. 
 
 
2 
 
VALIHURA, Justice, for the Majority: 
 
I. 
Introduction 
In this case, we consider whether the State violated Jacquez Robinson’s Sixth 
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, and if we agree with the trial court 
that it did, whether the trial court erred in dismissing his indictment for first degree murder.  
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”1  This right is 
“indispensable to the fair administration of our adversarial system of criminal justice.”2  It 
“safeguards the other rights deemed essential for the fair prosecution of a criminal 
proceeding.”3  When the State deliberately invades that right, the integrity of the adversarial 
process is threatened. 
On March 2, 2015, the State indicted Robinson on charges for his alleged 
involvement in separate shooting incidents on November 25 and 26, 2014, which left two 
people injured and one person dead.4  Charges related to the alleged assault on November 
25th (the “Assault Case”) were severed from the charges related to the alleged murder on 
November 26th (the “Murder Case”).  The Superior Court scheduled the Murder Case for 
trial on July 11, 2017, but the court did not schedule the Assault Case for trial.  
                                            
1 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
2 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168 (1985). 
3 Id. at 169. 
4 The charges consisted of: two counts of Murder First Degree, Robbery First Degree, seven counts 
of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Conspiracy Second Degree, two 
counts of Reckless Endangering First Degree, and two counts of Assault First Degree, among other 
related charges.   
3 
 
Additionally, the State separately indicted Robinson in a multi-defendant action 
concerning his alleged participation in the “Touch Money Gang” (the “TMG Case”).  That 
case had been scheduled for trial in October 2016.5  Natalie Woloshin served as Robinson’s 
counsel in all three cases. 
On August 24, 2016, the Superior Court entered a protective order in the TMG Case 
(the “Protective Order”).6  The Protective Order prohibited Woloshin from giving 
Robinson any documents containing summaries and transcripts of witness interviews or 
documents containing identifying witness information.  However, the Protective Order also 
permitted Woloshin to discuss the “content” of those documents with Robinson.  Woloshin 
sought clarification from the State about her ability to discuss “content” on August 4, 2016.  
The State explained that it allowed her “to discuss/provide summaries of the materials 
under the protective order.”7  After another discussion between Woloshin and the State on 
August 22, 2016, Woloshin wrote to the State to memorialize her understanding of the 
Protective Order boundaries: “[t]he State takes the position that there is no violation of the 
protective order by me sending summaries of reports and transcripts of statements of 
                                            
5 That trial was continued, and it has since been stayed pending the outcome of the Murder Case.   
6 The Superior Court also entered a protective order in the Murder Case on June 12, 2017, which 
expired by its own terms on July 6, 2017.  Only the TMG Protective Order, which was in effect 
during the time relevant here, is at issue on appeal. 
7 App. to Opening Br. at A40–41 (August 4, 2016 Emails between Woloshin and Deputy Attorney 
General Ipek Medford). 
4 
 
witnesses to my client so long as no identifying information is provided in the summaries.  
If this is not accurate, please let me know.”8  The State did not respond. 
Due to a May 2017 tip from an inmate housed in the same facility as Robinson, the 
two prosecutors assigned to the Murder Case, John Downs and Mark Denney, became 
concerned that Woloshin had violated the Protective Order.  On June 30, 2017, without 
notifying Woloshin, applying for a warrant, or otherwise seeking judicial guidance or 
approval, the State seized and reviewed all of the documents and notes in Robinson’s cell—
including his communications with Woloshin and personal notes containing trial strategy.  
When Woloshin learned of the search from Robinson nearly a week later, she notified the 
court and filed a motion to dismiss on July 7, 2017, arguing that the State had violated 
Robinson’s Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. 
The Superior Court issued a Memorandum Opinion on September 19, 2017 (the 
“September 2017 Opinion”), setting forth the basic facts and legal framework for 
establishing a Sixth Amendment violation in this context and calling for an in camera 
review of Robinson’s documents.9  The court then held hearings on October 25, 2017 and 
November 21, 2017, where the court heard testimony from most of the individuals involved 
in the June 30, 2017 search and seizure.10  In its May 1, 2018 opinion (the “May 2018 
                                            
8 Id. at A42 (August 22, 2016 Email from Woloshin to Deputy Attorney Generals Ipek Medford 
and John Downs). 
9 See generally State v. Robinson, 2017 WL 4675760 (Del. Super. Sept. 19, 2017) [hereinafter 
September 2017 Opinion]. 
10 At the time of their testimony in this matter, John Downs was the Unit Head of the Homicide 
Division at the DOJ (App. to Opening Br. at A305), Mark Denney was a Deputy Attorney General 
(id. at A441), Joseph Grubb was the Chief Prosecutor for New Castle County (id. at A395), John 
Ciritella was the Chief Investigator for the DOJ Criminal Division (id. at A404), Jamie Prater was 
5 
 
Opinion”), the Superior Court held that the State had violated Robinson’s Sixth 
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, and it granted the motion to dismiss his 
indictment.11  The State appealed. 
II. 
Factual Background12  
In May 2017, an inmate incarcerated with Robinson wrote to the State claiming to 
have information relevant to the Murder Case.  Downs interviewed the inmate on May 10, 
2017.  The informant-inmate stated that sometime in April 2017, Woloshin may have 
shown Robinson documents that were subject to the Protective Order.  He also claimed 
that Robinson had used another inmate’s pin number to call Woloshin regarding the 
protected documents.  As a result, Downs and Denney became concerned that Woloshin 
may have violated the Protective Order.  On May 16, 2017, Downs interviewed the inmate 
whose pin number had allegedly been stolen by Robinson to make phone calls, but the 
inmate denied allowing anyone to use his pin number for outgoing calls.   
Beginning on June 9, 2017, Downs issued a series of subpoenas for Robinson’s 
phone records.  Each subpoena sought “any and all available approved phone number lists, 
outgoing call log entries and conversations.”13  Sometime before June 28, 2017, the 
                                            
a paralegal assigned to the DOJ Homicide Unit (id. at A526–27), and Keith Marvel was a DOJ 
Special Investigator for the Criminal Division in Sussex County (id. at A587).  Grubb, Downs, 
Denney, Ciritella, and Prater testified on October 25, 2017, and Marvel testified on November 21, 
2017. 
11 State v. Robinson, 2018 WL 2085066, at *1 (Del. Super. May 1, 2018) [hereinafter May 2018 
Opinion]. 
12 We rely primarily on the Superior Court’s findings in its September 19, 2017 and May 1, 2018 
opinions, and on its findings in the 2017 hearings, unless otherwise stated. 
13 App. to Opening Br. at A51–52, A55 (State’s June 2017 Subpoenas). 
6 
 
Delaware Department of Corrections (“DOC”) produced recordings of Robinson’s phone 
calls to the Delaware Department of Justice (“DOJ”).  Thomas Dempsey, a DOJ 
investigator, listened to the recordings of Robinson’s phone calls to determine if Robinson 
possessed material in violation of the Protective Order.  The phone calls consisted of 
Robinson’s conversations with his father, brother, and mother, and with three other 
individuals.14  Dempsey provided transcripts of those calls to Downs and Denney on June 
28, 2017.  Additionally, the call logs revealed that someone had used the inmate’s pin 
number to call Woloshin’s office on three occasions.15  
Until late June 2017, Downs and Denney coordinated the Protective Order 
investigation without establishing a “taint team.”16  Specifically, they “conducted 
interviews, issued subpoenas, listened to phone calls, and reviewed call logs.”17  It was not 
until June 28, 2017—less than two weeks before the July 11 murder trial—that Denney 
                                            
14 See id. at A131–53 (Call Transcripts).   
15 Downs testified that inmate calls to attorneys, including the calls to Woloshin’s office, are not 
recorded.  See id. at A328, A330–31 (Downs’s Testimony).  Downs and Denney later interviewed 
the inmate on June 30, 2017, who admitted that he allowed “Quez” or “Quiz” to use his number.  
Downs claimed that this interview was not for the Protective Order investigation.  Rather, he stated 
that it was “to get information that could be used to attack the credibility of a prison informant, 
and to confront that with the records that we had, and to see whether he was going to change his 
story or not.”  Id. at A378. 
16 A taint team usually consists of colleagues of the government’s prosecution team, such as agents 
and prosecutors.  See Robert J. Anello & Richard F. Albert, Government Searches: The Trouble 
with Taint Teams, 256 N.Y. L. J. No. 108, 1 (2016).  The taint team independently reviews and 
identifies documents protected by the attorney-client privilege to prevent the disclosure of 
privileged information to the prosecution team.  Id.; see also United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 
834, 836–39, 841 n.14 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting that “at the very least, the ‘taint team’ procedures 
create an appearance of unfairness,” but describing an extensive taint team procedure that satisfied 
Sixth Amendment concerns). 
17 May 2018 Opinion, 2018 WL 2085066, at *10. 
7 
 
and Downs alerted the Chief Prosecutor for New Castle County, Joseph Grubb, of their 
concerns.  However, they did not inform Grubb that the State had previously clarified the 
parameters of the Protective Order for Woloshin.  The same day that Downs and Denney 
raised their concerns, Grubb appointed Chief Special Investigator John Ciritella to 
coordinate the search of Robinson’s cell.18  Grubb and Downs met with Ciritella on June 
28 or 29, 2017, where they instructed him to look for any documents in Robinson’s cell 
that might suggest a violation of the Protective Order.19  But they did not provide 
                                            
18 In its discovery material provided to Woloshin up to that point, the State had identified only one 
witness by name, and that witness was identified pursuant to the State’s Brady obligations—in 
other words, that witness was likely exculpatory or helpful to Robinson.  The State referenced the 
other witnesses only by using letter designations, and it redacted all other identifying information.   
19 According to Downs’s testimony, the instructions that he and Grubb provided to Ciritella in their 
face-to-face meeting were limited.  See App. to Opening Br. at A356–57 (Downs’s Testimony) 
(Q: “So what do you recall telling Ciritella about items provided to Natalie Woloshin?”  Downs: 
“That in the TMG case we had given witness statements, and that they were labeled by letters, like 
AA, BB, CC.  And materials that had been provided and witness statements that had been provided 
relating to the Jacquez Robinson trial under a protective order.”); id. at A379 (Q: “Was [Ciritella] 
provided copies of documents?”  Downs: “I did not provide him with anything.”  Q: “Did you 
show him discovery letters?”  Downs: “I did not.  I just described it.”  Q: “[W]as there any email 
correspondence among you, Mr. Grubb, Ciritella regarding this topic of the investigation, that you 
know about?”  Downs: “None that I am aware of.”  Q: “It was all just face-to-face meetings?”  
Downs: “Yes.”).   
Grubb’s testimony revealed a similar lack of detailed instruction.  See id. at A406–07 (Grubb’s 
Testimony) (Q: “And did you provide instructions to Special Investigator Ciritella about what he 
was supposed to do in the investigation?”  Grubb: “Yes.  I asked him to coordinate the search of 
Jacquez Robinson’s cell, to review the specific documents that may be violative of the protective 
order, and to let me know what he found.  And most specifically, only tell me; leave Denney and 
Downs completely out of it for the reasons we have already discussed.  I explained to him how we 
wanted to create that wall between what we were doing and the trial preparation for Jacquez 
Robinson’s murder trial.”  Q: “And did you task him with going to the prison where Mr. Robinson 
was an inmate?”  Grubb: “I didn’t specifically task with him going to the prison, I just tasked him 
with leading the investigation.  The nuts and bolts of how that occurs I leave to him.”); id. at A409 
(Q: “Before Special Investigator Ciritella reviewed the documents found in Mr. Robinson’s cell, 
did you provide any parameters about what he was going to be looking for?”  Grubb: “Well, yes.  
Like I said before, we are only looking for any document that would be in violation of the 
protective order with the witness identifiable information.”).  In fact, Grubb testified that he did 
8 
 
instructions regarding the attorney-client privilege or even limit the search to documents 
concerning witnesses.20  In fact, Ciritella “understood that he was looking for attorney-
client communications.”21   
On June 30, 2017, without contacting Woloshin, applying for a search warrant, or 
seeking judicial approval, Ciritella instructed the DOC to search Robinson’s cell.  That 
same day, DOC officers seized all documents and notes from Robinson’s cell, placed them 
in garbage bags, and brought them to Ciritella in a conference room at the Sussex 
Correctional Institute.22  Ciritella testified that, after emptying the bags onto the conference 
room table, he divided the pile of documents seized from Robinson’s cell with Keith 
Marvel, a State investigator based in Sussex County, whom Ciritella had enlisted to help 
review Robinson’s documents.23  Marvel, like Ciritella, did not receive any training on the 
attorney-client privilege, nor did he even know that the search involved a potential 
protective order violation.  According to Marvel, Ciritella informed him that they were 
looking for “written communication from [Woloshin’s] office that w[ere] in the cell.”24  
                                            
not even instruct Ciritella to bring any questionable documents back to the DOJ in Wilmington.  
See id. at A433–34. 
20 See id. at A432 (Grubb’s Testimony) (Q: “Before Ciritella obtained documents from the cell, 
did you give him any information about what would constitute protected attorney-client 
communications?”  Grubb: “I did not, no.”).   
21 May 2018 Opinion, 2018 WL 2085066, at *5.  Although Grubb testified that he was “sensitive” 
to the attorney-client privilege, he admitted that “we were looking for documents that, according 
to the prison calls, came from his attorney.”  App. to Opening Br. at A405 (Grubb’s Testimony). 
22 It is unclear whether the officers used one or multiple garbage bags.  Compare App. to Opening 
Br. at A472–73 (Ciritella’s Testimony) with id. at A595 (Marvel’s Testimony). 
23 See id. at A471–72 (Ciritella’s Testimony). 
24 Id. at A594 (Marvel’s Testimony).  At first Ciritella claimed that he did not look for, review, or 
read anything pertaining to Robinson’s trial strategy or communications between Robinson and 
9 
 
Marvel also testified that “[a]nything that had a header of an attorney’s office or was in an 
envelope of an attorney’s office” is what he considered pertinent, which he then flagged 
for Ciritella’s review.25  Ciritella and Marvel testified that they kept virtually no record of 
the contents of the seized documents or how they went about reviewing the documents.26  
Ciritella took “twelve manila envelopes and five letter-sized envelopes that all bore 
Defense Counsel’s letterhead, as well as a larger envelope that contained a federal 
                                            
Woloshin.  Id. at A475 (Ciritella’s Testimony).  But he later admitted that he reviewed letters from 
Woloshin to Robinson, and that he took some of those letters back to Wilmington.  Id. at A485, 
A512. 
25 Id. at A610, A613 (Marvel’s Testimony).  Marvel also clarified that he was looking for any 
attorney-client communications—not only those from Woloshin.  See id. at A616 (Q: “So it was 
just attorneys, period, in the general sense, not a particular person?”  Marvel: “That’s the way I 
was doing it, yes.”). 
26 See id. at A474 (Ciritella’s Testimony) (Q: “Did you make a listing of each and every document 
that was provided to you from - - within that clear bag?”  Ciritella: “No.”  Q: “And did you count 
and document the number of pages or papers that were provided in that bag?”  Ciritella: “No.”); 
id. at A486–87 (Q: “Were any of the documents that you reviewed photocopied?”  Ciritella: “No, 
sir.”  Q: “[I]s there any other record of the documents, or copies of the documents themselves, that 
were retained by the [DOJ]?”  Ciritella: “Not that I’m aware of.”); id. at A504 (Q: “Out of the 
documents that you ended up taking out of the prison, did Marvel flag any of those documents?”  
Ciritella: “I don’t recall.  We were separating the documents, and then I had final, I guess, look-
through to see what would be taken.”); id. at A510 (Q: “What methodology did you use to go 
through all of those documents in an hour?”  Ciritella: “Well, some of the documents could have 
been drawings, could have been religious materials.  I didn’t think that they would be breaking the 
protective order, so I pushed those to the side.  Again, it was just sifting through documents that, 
you know, had been a part of a cell search before; again, looking to see what, maybe paperwork, 
would be that of importance.”); id. at A516 (Q: “Did you and Marvel divide up the work in any 
particular kind of way in terms of, You take this stack of manila envelopes, and I’ll take this other 
stack over here?”  Ciritella: “No, sir, we did not.”  Q: “You just kind of divvied up the pile and 
went to work?”  Ciritella: “Yes, sir.”); see also id. at A596 (Marvel’s Testimony) (Q: “And at the 
end of your time there that day, did you make any notes or write any documents pertaining to your 
activity that day?”  Marvel: “I did not, no.”).  In fact, it appears that the only documentation of the 
first review is Ciritella’s handwritten summary of documents seized and brought to Wilmington 
for additional review.  See id. at A485 (Q: “Is this [located at A69–70] the sum and substance of 
your documentation of the tasks that Mr. Grubb assigned you with respect to Jacquez Robinson’s 
cell?” Ciritella: “That is correct.”). 
10 
 
transcript and pages of Defendant’s handwritten notes, and brought them back to the DOJ 
in Wilmington for further review.”27  At the DOJ, Grubb did not set up a taint team at this 
point to review the seized documents, but instead selected Jamie Prater to review them.  
Prater testified that Grubb did not instruct her regarding what to review and she was not 
instructed by anyone to avoid privileged material.28   
Prater, a paralegal assigned to the Murder and TMG Cases, was integral to 
Robinson’s prosecution team.  According to Downs, she “controlled the paperwork flow,” 
“kept record of what was sent out,” “would redact the statements that we wanted redacted,” 
and “would prepare discovery as it would go out, and present that to us to be sent to defense 
counsel.”29  And according to Denney, Prater “had to do some heavy lifting to organize the 
voluminous discovery,” and “she assisted in scheduling all of [the State’s] witness 
interviews.”30  Similarly, Prater testified that she generally helps schedule witness 
interviews and in-court appearances, and sometimes even has direct contact with 
                                            
27 See May 2018 Opinion, 2018 WL 2085066, at *5.  Ciritella testified that he gave DOC officers 
the remaining documents to return to Robinson’s cell.  App. to Opening Br. at A476 (Ciritella’s 
Testimony).   
28 See App. to Opening Br. at A533 (Prater’s Testimony) (Q: “And were you provided any 
instructions, other than Mr. Ciritella’s request of you, as to what you were looking for in the 
documents that he presented you with in that conference room?”  Prater: “I was not provided with 
any direct instructions, besides that there was a potential violation of a protective order, and I 
should figure out if we have anything that shows that.”); id. at A556 (Q: “Before you start your 
review of the documents, were you instructed by anyone to avoid confidential attorney-client 
communications?”  Prater: “I was not. . . .”  Q: “How about defense work product?”  Prater: “I was 
not.”). 
29 Id. at A341–42 (Downs’s Testimony).  See also id. at A364–65 (Q: “Would it be fair to say that 
[Prater] was kind of the person on your team who marshaled all of the discovery, and disclosures, 
and things like that?”  Downs: “Yes.”). 
30 Id. at A454–55 (Denney’s Testimony). 
11 
 
witnesses.31  However, she could not remember whether she helped draft the witness list 
in the Murder Case.32  Additionally, Denney testified that Prater would sometimes sit in 
prosecution strategy meetings to talk about the case.33  Indeed, Grubb testified that it was 
because of Prater’s intimate involvement with the case that Grubb assigned her to the 
review.34   
On June 30, 2017, Prater reviewed Robinson’s documents in the seventh floor 
conference room at the DOJ in Wilmington—the same floor that, according to Ciritella, 
housed offices for all prosecutors and investigators in the Wilmington office.35  When the 
documents were not in the conference room for review, Ciritella testified that he secured 
the documents in his office, and that there was no evidence that anyone had tampered with 
or broken the lock.36   Like Ciritella and Marvel, Prater testified that she did not record or 
inventory what she reviewed.37      
                                            
31 Id. at A554 (Prater’s Testimony). 
32 Id. at A564. 
33 Id. at A456–57 (Denney’s Testimony). 
34 See id. at A409–10 (Grubb’s Testimony) (Q: “[W]hen Special Investigator Ciritella reported 
back to you that he didn’t think anything violated the protective order, but he wasn’t sure about 
some, did you make the decision to involve Miss Prater?”  Grubb: “Yes, we did.  In my opinion, 
she knew the material best in the sense that I couldn’t go to Denney or Downs.  And I could take 
a look, but I wouldn’t really know either.  Ciritella was in a better spot than me.  So the thinking 
was Jamie Prater was in the best spot to be that second layer of review.”). 
35 See id. at A465–66, A516 (Ciritella’s Testimony). 
36 Id. at A487. 
37 See id. at A534 (Prater’s Testimony) (Q: “Did you make any notes of any of the documents that 
you reviewed?”  Prater: “I did not.”  Q: “Did you make an inventory of what it was you reviewed?”  
Prater: “I did not.”); id. at A536 (Q: “Did you take any notes of the substance of any of those letters 
[to and from Woloshin]?”  Prater: “I did not.”). 
12 
 
Based on the Superior Court’s findings from its in camera review, the seized 
documents included privileged attorney-client communications and Robinson’s 
handwritten notes containing trial strategy.38  The court’s findings were consistent with 
Robinson’s motion to dismiss, in which he claimed that the content of the documents 
included “Counsel’s assessment of the State’s case; persons who were interviewed and the 
content of their statements, and legal strategies,” and “a folder of notes that Mr. Robinson 
kept that memorialized his communications with legal counsel and legal research he 
conducted at the prison law library.”39  Prater likewise testified that she reviewed 
handwritten notes on a yellow legal pad and loose papers, which, she admitted, reflected 
information that Robinson received from Woloshin.40  By reviewing those documents, 
Prater “learned details of Defendant’s defense strategy.”41  Ultimately, however, Prater 
                                            
38 The State has explained that it did not dispute in the record or at oral argument that the documents 
it seized contained trial strategy because it declined the opportunity to review Robinson’s 
documents during the hearings below.  See id. at A574 (October 25, 2017 Hearing) (The court: 
“[D]oes Mr. Lugg get the opportunity to see what I am seeing [in the in camera review], or - - ”  
The State: “For the reasons stated now, as to seeing it, I would not want to see that because . . . I 
would not want to see something in my role that would be somehow a privileged or confidential 
communication.”); 
Oral 
Argument 
Video 
at 
20:52–21:24, 
https://livestream.com/DelawareSupremeCourt/events/8570210/videos/187665632 (The Court: 
“Does the State dispute the finding of the trial court that the documents that were reviewed did in 
fact disclose trial strategy?”  The State: “We do not.  We affirmatively chose not to see those 
documents at all . . . so that he could go forward with a fair trial without any possibility of further 
taint.  We elected not to see them.”). 
39 App. to Opening Br. at A96 (Robinson’s Motion to Dismiss). 
40 Id. at A538–42, A568–69 (Prater’s Testimony) (Prater: “The notes that I remember reviewing 
at the time that I wrote this [July 5, 2017] e-mail did not involve Miss Woloshin.  They were notes 
of, I assume, Mr. Robinson.  They didn’t mention Miss Woloshin or her co-counsel.”  The Court: 
“But you concluded that the notes reflected information he received from her?”  Prater: “Yes.  That 
was . . . my conclusion.”).  Prater also testified, however, that she did not note or retain the 
substance of Robinson’s notes.  Id. at A539, A541–42. 
41 May 2018 Opinion, 2018 WL 2085066, at *1. 
13 
 
concluded from her review that Robinson was not in possession of any documents 
prohibited by the Protective Order.42   
On July 1, 2017, the day after Prater’s review of Robinson’s documents, she emailed 
Grubb suggesting that they return the documents to Robinson.43  Grubb replied and said 
that her suggestion made sense, but no one at the DOJ or DOC had notified Woloshin or 
the Superior Court of the State’s investigation.44  Rather, on July 5, 2017, Robinson notified 
Woloshin that the DOC had seized his legal papers.  Woloshin emailed Judge Parkins that 
same day to notify him that the DOC had seized “all correspondence from Counsel, 
motions sent to him and a notebook that he kept to memorialize conversations with counsel 
                                            
42 In an email to Grubb on July 5, 2017, Prater described her findings: 
Mr. Robinson was in possession of co-defendant transcripts, which he is entitled 
to.  There were no witness transcripts or police reports in Mr. Robinson’s 
possession at the time that the search was conducted.  However, there was one copy 
of a two page redacted FBI report in Mr. Robinson’s possession as well as several 
pages of hand written notes detailing specific facts, witness statements, and other 
evidence all of which could have only been obtained via the police reports.  It is my 
conclusion that Ms. Woloshin shared the redacted police reports with Mr. 
Robinson.  The redacted police reports were not under protective order however, as 
the State always does, we had asked Ms. Woloshin not to share the redacted police 
reports with her client, she did so anyways. 
App. to Opening Br. at A89.  Prater testified that she did not provide her written findings until five 
days following her review because four of the intervening days consisted of the weekend, a 
personal vacation day, and Independence Day, a State holiday.  Id. at A544 (Prater’s Testimony). 
43 See id. at A73 (July 1, 2017 Email between Prater and Grubb). 
44 See id. at A423–24 (Grubb’s Testimony) (Q: “Did you consider asking Miss Woloshin about 
the issue?”  Grubb: “Yes, I considered it.”  Q: “Why didn’t you?”  Grubb: “Miss Woloshin’s 
conduct was at the heart of the potential protective order violation.  I didn’t think it would be 
fruitful in bringing it to her attention if she was, in fact, violating protective orders as Jacquez 
Robinson said in his calls.” . . .  Q: “Did you consider bringing the issue to the trial judge’s 
attention?”  Grubb: “I did.  I thought it was premature to do that because, at this point in 
time . . . we had concerns.  But until we have reviewed the documents, I didn’t think they were 
substantiated concerns.”).  
14 
 
and legal research at the prison library.”45  She also asserted in that initial communication 
that “the actions of DOC violate Mr. Robinson’s right to counsel under both the Delaware 
and federal constitutions,” and she requested that the court “take action in order to protect 
Mr. Robinson’s right to counsel.”46 
Within an hour of Woloshin’s email, Grubb emailed Downs and Denney to say that 
Ciritella was supposed to have returned the documents two days earlier on July 3, 2017, 
but wrote, “I heard he is back tomorrow when the items will be returned.”47  The next day, 
on July 6, 2017, Woloshin sent a follow-up letter to Judge Parkins reiterating the points in 
her July 5 email and attaching a proposed order to require the DOC to return Robinson’s 
material.  Additionally, and separate from the confiscation of Robinson’s documents, 
Woloshin raised concerns about Robinson’s housing status leading up to trial.  Judge 
Parkins responded within an hour at about 1 p.m., stating that he needed a response from 
the State by noon the next day, July 6, 2017.48   
Prompted by Judge Parkins’s email, Downs emailed Grubb, who in turn emailed 
Ciritella, to follow-up on the status of Robinson’s documents.  Ciritella responded at about 
2 p.m. that the documents would be sent to Deputy Warden Truman Mears at Sussex 
Correctional Institute that afternoon.  He also stated that Deputy Warden Mears was “aware 
of [the] investigation and has made the proper contacts for the internal delivery” to 
                                            
45 Id. at A71 (July 5, 2017 Email to Judge Parkins). 
46 Id. at A71–72.   
47 Id. at A73 (July 5, 2017 Email from Grubb to Downs and Denney). 
48 See id. at A111 (July 6 Email from Judge Parkins to the Parties). 
15 
 
Robinson.49  Downs then responded to Grubb, stating that the return of documents should 
be done “[a]s soon as possible.”50 
On the morning of July 7, 2017, Ciritella reported that the documents had been 
dropped off at Sussex Correctional Institute with Deputy Warden Mears.51  Grubb 
forwarded Ciritella’s status update to Downs within a few minutes.  Downs then asked 
Grubb whether Deputy Warden Mears knew that the materials “should be returned ASAP,” 
and Grubb replied: “[H]e does.  I asked Ciritella to make sure everything got back to 
Robinson immediately.  I told [Deputy Attorney General] Greg Smith the same thing last 
night.  I cannot confirm Robinson has the material, but I can confirm we relayed the 
importance.”52  Downs then emailed Judge Parkins at 9:55 a.m. the same morning.  His 
single-sentence email stated: “I have been advised that materials taken from Robinson’s 
cell has [sic] already been or will be returned to him today.”53  Separately, Smith responded 
on behalf of the DOC confirming that it had seized materials from Robinson’s cell, 
including legal materials, and that the DOC had returned all of those materials between 
                                            
49 Id. at A74 (July 6, 2017 Email between Ciritella to Grubb, Dempsey, and Prater). 
50 Id.  
51 Id. at A77 (July 7, 2017 Email from Ciritella to Grubb, Dempsey, and Prater). 
52 Id. at A84 (July 7, 2017 Email from Grubb to Downs).  In a separate email to Smith on July 6, 
2017, Ciritella likewise explained to Smith that he would be dropping the documents off personally 
(rather than sending them) and that they should be returned to Robinson as soon as possible.  Id. 
at A87–88. 
53 Id. at A114 (July 7, 2017 Email from Downs to Judge Parkins, and copying Woloshin).  Downs 
testified that he thought Grubb may have also responded separately, but he did not know.  See id. 
at A353–55 (Downs’s Testimony).  Grubb did not testify to this point, nor is there any 
correspondence in the record suggesting that he responded to Judge Parkins. 
16 
 
July 6 and July 7, 2017.54  Thus, the State “remained in possession of [Robinson’s] legal 
documents until four days before trial was scheduled to begin, despite having no evidence 
that [Robinson or his counsel had] engaged in any wrongdoing.”55 
Meanwhile, following her review, Prater continued her involvement in final trial 
preparations, and the prosecution team continued to copy her on emails regarding witnesses 
and evidence for trial.56  In fact, Downs did not officially remove Prater from the 
prosecution team until July 14, 2017, after the Superior Court had continued the trial.57  
Although she had been removed from the Robinson prosecution team, Prater testified that 
she continued to work with Downs and Denney on other murder cases.58 
Robinson moved to dismiss his indictment on July 7, 2017, arguing that the seizure 
of his legal documents violated his Sixth Amendment rights. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
54 See id. at A117–18 (July 7, 2017 Letter from Deputy Attorney General Gregory E. Smith).  This 
letter also addressed, in more detail, the issues concerning Robinson’s housing that Woloshin 
raised in her July 6, 2017 email and letter, which are unrelated to this appeal.  
55 May 2018 Opinion, 2018 WL 2085066, at *13. 
56 The State disputes this finding and contends that Prater did not actively participate in the trial 
preparation 
after 
her 
review. 
 
Oral 
Argument 
Video 
at 
2:10–2:29, 
https://livestream.com/DelawareSupremeCourt/events/8570210/videos/187665632. 
 
Prater 
testified that she was in “limbo” for a few days after the review of Robinson’s documents and that 
she did not do any work on the Robinson case because there was not much left to be done so close 
to trial.  App. to Opening Br. at A546–47.    
57 See May 2018 Opinion, 2018 WL 2085066, at *6. 
58 App. to Opening Br. at A556 (Prater’s Testimony). 
17 
 
III. 
The Superior Court Proceedings 
 
A. 
The September 19, 2017 Decision 
The Superior Court issued a preliminary Memorandum Opinion on September 19, 
2017, to explain the framework for assessing whether the State violated Robinson’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.59  Specifically, the court evaluated the impact of three significant Sixth 
Amendment cases in the context of privileged communications: Weatherford v. Bursey,60 
United States v. Levy,61 and United States v. Morrison.62   
The Superior Court concluded that, under the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Weatherford, “there must be a showing that Robinson suffered prejudice as a 
result of the warrantless seizure of his legal materials from his cell to establish that there 
was a Sixth Amendment violation.”63  Despite suggestions in various cases that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison had called into question the Third Circuit’s decision 
in Levy, the Superior Court held that “[p]rejudice can only be presumed under Levy if there 
was actual disclosure of Robinson’s defense strategy to the prosecution team.”64  
Additionally, the court held that it “may find that there was a Sixth Amendment violation 
if there was a deliberate attempt to interfere with Robinson’s attorney-client 
                                            
59 See September 2017 Opinion, 2017 WL 4675760 at *1–*6. 
60 429 U.S. 545 (1977). 
61 577 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1978). 
62 449 U.S. 361 (1981). 
63 September 2017 Opinion, 2017 WL 4675760, at *6. 
64 Id.  
18 
 
relationship.”65  If Robinson could not establish that there was a disclosure of his defense 
strategy or a deliberate attempt to interfere with his attorney-client relationship, then he 
would have the burden to show prejudice.66  Finally, the court ordered an in camera review 
of the documents that the State had seized from Robinson’s prison cell.  
B. The Hearings in October and November of 2017 
Following its September 2017 Opinion and prior to conducting its in camera review, 
the Superior Court held a hearing on October 25, 2017, to hear testimony from the State’s 
witnesses—Downs, Denney, Grubb, Prater, and Ciritella—and to clarify which documents 
were seized and reviewed.67  During the October hearing, the court learned that the State 
had failed to properly produce its emails or identify Marvel as one of the individuals who 
reviewed Robinson’s documents.  Thus, the court ordered a second document production 
and a second hearing, which took place on November 21, 2017. 
1. 
The State’s Deficient Discovery Responses  
 
 During the October hearing, the Superior Court questioned why the State had not 
previously disclosed Marvel’s involvement in the review of Robinson’s documents: 
How come Keith Marvel has not been identified prior to today as one of the 
people who reviewed the documents, when I had specifically identified the 
scope of inquiry that I wanted to hear from all of the people who reviewed 
the documents, and Joe Grubb testified today that the only people that had 
access to the documents were Jamie Prater, himself, and John Ciritella.  That 
now turns out to be inaccurate. . . .  Mr. Grubb was asked specifically on 
                                            
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
67 See App. to Opening Br. at A287 (September 26, 2017 Office Conference Transcript).  Sean 
Lugg and Carolyn Hake conducted direct examination for the State, and Patrick Collins, as 
Robinson’s counsel, cross-examined the State’s witnesses.   
19 
 
Direct Examination and on Cross who had access to the documents.  He did 
not identify Keith Marvel. . . .  But now we know that is not correct.  Now 
we know Keith Marvel did review the documents.68 
 
In response, the State claimed it was unaware until Ciritella’s testimony that Marvel had 
reviewed the documents.69  The record indicates that even Grubb may have been unaware 
that Marvel reviewed the documents, although he never expressly testified on that point.70 
 
 The court also learned that the State had not properly searched and produced its 
emails.71  The court discovered this shortcoming through Prater’s testimony, where she 
stated that she had not searched her emails for correspondence or memoranda relevant to 
the review of Robinson’s documents—even though she admitted that there may have been 
                                            
68 See id. at A505–07 (October 25, 2017 Hearing).  In addition to his testimony, Grubb’s July 10, 
2017 affidavit does not mention Marvel as a person who was involved in the search or had access 
to the seized documents.  Id. at A128. 
69 Id. at A506–07 (State Prosecutor Sean Lugg: “I can say this, I asked, in speaking with the witness 
for his preparation, Officer Ciritella about Marvel’s involvement.  Until today his involvement was 
to accompany Mr. Ciritella to the facility.  But his assistance was not to the level of reviewing 
documents.  That’s what we heard today.  So that’s the best I could tell you.”). 
70 Grubb and Ciritella both testified consistently with the State’s position.  See, e.g., id. at A407 
(Grubb’s Testimony) (Q: “And did you task him with going to the prison where Mr. Robinson was 
an inmate?”  Grubb: “I didn’t specifically task with him going to the prison, I just tasked him with 
leading the investigation.  The nuts and bolts of how that occurs I leave to him.”); id. at A503 
(Ciritella’s Testimony) (Q: “Who directed Sergeant Marvel what to do?”  Ciritella: “That was me.”  
Q: “So he did not participate in any briefings with Mr. Grubb or any prosecutor?”  Ciritella: “No, 
sir.”).  Carolyn Hake, counsel for the State, also told the court that she had asked Grubb about 
Marvel’s involvement, but that from her understanding, Grubb did not think that Marvel had 
reviewed Robinson’s documents.  See id. at A507.   
71 Id. at A576–77 (October 25, 2017 Hearing) (Judge Rocanelli: “But the other piece of information 
that surprised me today was Miss Prater’s testimony that she had not done an e-mail search, and 
that she had not been asked to do a[n] email search.  I think that is inconsistent with what my 
expectations were, because Mr. Collins, I think, made a request for documents. . . .  [T]he Court 
expected that the State would produce all of the documents responsive to Mr. Collins’s requests.”).   
20 
 
relevant emails with Grubb and Ciritella.72  Prior to the October hearing, the State had only 
produced three emails, which it uncovered from individual email searches by Grubb, 
Prater, and Ciritella of their own accounts.73   
 
 On November 7, 2017, the Superior Court instructed the State to “conduct a 
statewide document and email search for any documents and/or email messages addressing 
in any manner the search and seizure and/or the review of Defendant’s documents as well 
as any staffing changes that occurred as a result thereof, and shall produce those documents 
and email messages . . . .”74  In a November 16, 2017 letter, the State replied that it had 
conducted a two-prong search.  First, it requested “each of the individuals involved in this 
matter (Messrs. Downs, Denney, Grubb, Ciritella, Dempsey, and Ms. Prater) to provide 
any identified electronic files.”75  Second, the State represented that the Delaware 
Department of Technology and Information (“DTI”)  searched and produced emails “from 
the accounts of [Downs, Denney, Grubb, Ciritella, Dempsey, and Prater] that may meet the 
criteria set by the Court.”76  For the individually-conducted searches, the State reported that 
                                            
72 See id. at A551–52 (Prater’s Testimony) (Q: “Have you searched through your e-mails to 
determine if any other e-mails, memos, correspondence exists about the Jacquez Robinson 
document preview [sic]?”  Prater: “I have not.”  Q: “Could there potentially be e-mails between 
you and Mr. Grubb about this topic? . . .”  Prater: “There could potentially be.”  Q: “How about 
with you and Mr. Ciritella?”  Prater: “[T]here could potentially be.”). 
73 See App. to Answering Br. at B58–59 (November 16, 2017 Letter from State to Judge Rocanelli) 
(“Pursuant to [the court’s August 21, 2017 order], Mr. Grubb reviewed his electronic files and 
instructed Ms. Prater and Mr. Ciritella to do the same.  Three emails were identified and provided 
to Mr. Collins . . . .”).   
74 Id. at B56 (November 7, 2017 Letter from Judge Rocanelli to Counsel). 
75 Id. at B59 (November 16, 2017 Letter from State to Judge Rocanelli).  
76 Id.  
21 
 
“no qualifying files were identified.”77  However, “a review of the emails provided by DTI 
revealed” approximately thirty-seven relevant emails.78 
 
 It appears from the State’s November 16 letter that the State did not include 
Marvel’s email account in its search and production.  The court had ordered a “statewide” 
search of any relevant material, not merely a search of those six accounts.  On November 
21, 2017, the Superior Court heard Marvel’s testimony and closed the evidentiary record. 
2. The State’s Testimony Concerning the Possibility of “Taint” 
 
 In the October and November hearings, the witnesses testified concerning whether 
the contents or substance of the documents had been disclosed to Downs and Denney, or 
to other individuals outside of those involved with the Protective Order investigation.  
Overall, the weight of the evidence suggests that Robinson’s privileged information was 
not divulged to those involved with the Murder Case, other than Prater.    We summarize 
the record next.   
 
 Downs and Denney testified that neither Prater nor Ciritella shared information 
about the review with them.79  Additionally, they broadly testified that they did not hear 
                                            
77 Id. 
78 Id. at B59–60. 
79 See App. to Opening Br. at A343 (Downs’s Testimony) (Q: “Has [Prater] provided you any 
information based upon anything that she did with respect to that portion of the case?”  Downs: 
“No.”); id. at A344–45 (Q: “Has [Ciritella] provided any information to you following [the search 
of Robinson’s cell]?”  Downs: “No.”  Q: “Did he even tell you whether he did or did not do that?”  
Downs: “He did not, no.”  Q: “And has he had any involvement in the investigation of the 
prosecution cases that you have described?”  Downs: “No, he has not been involved in the active 
New Castle City case, the TMG case, or the severed Browntown shooting.”).  
See also id. at A449 (Denney’s Testimony) (Q: “And has [Prater] ever communicated - - are you 
aware that she reviewed any documents that were found in Mr. Robinson’s cell?”  Denney: “I do 
know that she was one of the people that looked at the documents.”  Q: “And has she ever 
22 
 
about the contents of Robinson’s documents from any other source.80  That testimony was 
consistent with the affidavits that Downs and Denney filed on July 10, 2017, in which both 
prosecutors stated that they were not involved in the search of Robinson’s cell, had not 
been told about or seen the contents of anything found in Robinson’s cell, and did not know 
the status of the investigation beyond their initial involvement.81 
                                            
communicated anything to you concerning her review of the documents?”  Denney: “[N]ot at all.”  
Q: “And has Special Investigator Ciritella ever communicated anything to you?”  Denney: “No, 
he has not.”).   
80 See id. at A339–40 (Downs’s Testimony) (Q: “And the next line, Paragraph 7 [of Downs’s 
affidavit], indicates that you were not involved in the planning, preparation, or execution of the 
search of Mr. Robinson’s cell.  Is that true?”  Downs: “That’s true.”  Q: “And finally, have you 
been told about any of the information that was gathered from Mr. Robinson’s cell; either what 
was gathered, or the substance of anything that was gathered from his cell?”  Downs: “No. . . .”  
Q: “And, in fact, the final paragraph indicates you have no knowledge of the status of that 
investigation; is that correct?”  Downs: “That’s correct.”  Q: “Other than sitting here today, 
knowing that this is - - somehow relates to that, do you have any other knowledge about the status 
of that investigation?”  Downs: “No, I do not.”).  
See also id at A447–48 (Denney’s Testimony) (Q: “And after you met with Mr. Grubb, were you 
provided with any further information by anyone about the status of the investigation into possible 
violations of the protective order?”  Denney: “No.  I remember having an additional quick 
conversation with Joe Grubb after - - I was copied on an e-mail that Ciritella had sent out, and I 
went down to Joe’s office when I saw that e-mail and told him, like, I got copied on something 
from Ciritella, and he essentially said, I’ll handle it.  Other than that, no[.]  Not involved in 
planning, preparation, or execution of the search. . . .”  Q: “And has anyone told you about the 
contents of anything that was found in Mr. Robinson’s cell?”  Denney: “No, not at all.”  Q: “And 
have you seen anything that was found in Mr. Robinson’s cell?”  Denney: “No, not at all.”).  The 
record indicates that the email on which Ciritella copied Denney was for scheduling purposes with 
the DOC.  Further, Ciritella testified that it was the only email on which he copied Downs or 
Denney because Grubb re-instructed him not to include them in anything concerning the review.  
See id. at A470 (Ciritella’s Testimony).   
81 Specifically, Downs and Denney stated in their affidavits that they were “not involved in the 
planning, preparation or execution of the search of Jacquez Robinson’s cell,” had “not been told 
of, nor have [they] seen, the contents of anything that was found in Jacquez Robinson’s cell,” and 
they “have no knowledge of the status of the investigation into the violation of the Court Protective 
Order,” beyond the initial investigation prior to the search of Robinson’s cell.  See id. at A120–21 
(Denney’s July 10, 2017 Affidavit), A122–23 (Downs’s July 10, 2017 Affidavit). 
23 
 
 
 Of those actively involved with the investigation after June 28, 2017, Ciritella and 
Marvel testified that they did not share information with Downs or Denney, or with anyone 
else generally.82  Ciritella and Marvel further testified that they no longer remembered the 
substance of Robinson’s documents.83   
 
 The questioning and testimony of Grubb and Prater was less thorough than the 
questioning of Downs, Denney, Ciritella, and Marvel.  First, Grubb was not asked whether 
he shared information about the review with anyone, nor did he address that question in his 
affidavit.84  Rather, he testified that he did not review the documents and that neither 
                                            
82 See id. at A486 (Ciritella’s Testimony) (Q: “Did you, following the work that you did on the 
30th of June, that Friday, did you adhere to the instructions that Mr. Grubb gave you to not speak 
to anyone about this case?”  Ciritella: “That’s correct, I did.”  Q: “And, particularly, did you speak 
with either Mr. Downs or Mr. Denney about anything that you did with respect to Mr. Robinson’s 
cell?”  Ciritella: “No, sir, I did not.”). 
See also id. at A597–99 (Marvel’s Testimony) (Q: “Were you provided any directions or 
instructions as to who you could or could not speak to about the things you were doing on the 
30th?”  Marvel: “I was told by Mr. Ciritella that it was a sensitive investigation and I was not to 
discuss it.”  Q: “Okay.  With anybody?”  Marvel: “With anyone, yes.”  Q: “Have you discussed 
what you did on the 30th with anyone?”  Marvel: “No.”  Q: “Have you discussed the substance of 
any documents you reviewed?”  Marvel: “No. . . .”  Q: “Did you speak to [Downs or Denney] at 
any point about this?”  Marvel: “No. . . .”  Q: “Did you ever speak to Jaime Prater about what you 
did on the 30th?”  Marvel: “No. . . .”  Q: “How about Joseph Grubb?  Did you speak with him 
about your work in this matter?”  Marvel: “Prior to or . . .”  Q: “Prior to.  Let’s start with that.”  
Marvel: “No.”  Q: “How about after?”  Marvel: “Just to be here today.”  Q: “Okay.  You testified 
that you haven’t talked about your activity at SCI regarding Mr. Robinson’s case with anyone; do 
I have that right?”  Marvel: “Correct.”).   
83 See id. at A523 (Ciritella’s Testimony) (Q: “And, as you sit here today, do you have any 
independent recollection of the substance of either set of documents that you were reviewing with 
Miss Woloshin’s letterhead?”  Ciritella: “No, sir, I do not.”).  See also id. at A596 (Marvel’s 
Testimony) (Q: “Were you or did you read the material that you were working through for 
substance?”  Marvel: “I did not, no.”  Q: “Do you recall the substance of any of the documents 
that you were looking through that day?”  Marvel: “I don’t, no.”).   
84 See id. at A124–29 (Grubb’s July 10, 2017 Affidavit). 
24 
 
Ciritella nor Prater informed him of the substance of the documents.85  But there is an 
inconsistency in the testimony that the Superior Court did not resolve.  Ciritella testified 
that, upon Prater’s request, he brought Robinson’s documents from his office to the seventh 
floor conference room so that Grubb could review them himself.86  Ciritella also testified 
that, to the best of his knowledge, Grubb actually reviewed the documents.87  Further, 
Grubb’s July 10, 2017 affidavit is silent as to whether he reviewed the documents.88  
Prater’s testimony, however, directly contradicted Ciritella’s claim that she had said that 
Grubb asked to review the documents.89  
                                            
85 See id. at A411 (Grubb’s Testimony) (Q: “And did Miss Prater report on anything substantive 
to you that was taken from Mr. Robinson’s cell?”  Grubb: “No.  I didn’t ask her to.  The only thing 
I asked her was let me know if you see any of the materials that violate the protective order, and 
she told me no.”); id. at A416–17 (Q: “And did you ever review or see any of the documents taken 
from Mr. Robinson’s cell yourself?”  Grubb: “I went into the room that Ciritella put the documents, 
and I recall Ciritella holding up one document and saying, ‘It’s a bunch of this type of stuff, none 
of which is in violation of the protective order.’  But, I myself, never reviewed anything.”  Q: “And 
were you provided, by either Special Investigator Ciritella or Miss Prater, with any information 
regarding Mr. Robinson’s defense strategy?”  Grubb: “No.”  Q: “Did either [Ciritella] or Miss 
Prater advise you of anything they saw regarding Mr. Robinson’s defense strategy?”  Grubb: “No.”  
Q: “And besides Miss Prater, [Ciritella], and what you have just testified to about yourself, has 
anyone else reviewed any of the documents seized from Mr. Robinson’s prison cell on the State’s 
behalf?”  Grubb: “Not that I am aware of.”). 
86 See id. at A518–19 (Ciritella’s Testimony).   
87 See id. Ciritella stated that he was not with Grubb during the alleged review, however.  Id. at 
A519 (Q: “Were you with him when he looked over the documents?”  Ciritella: “I was not, no.”). 
88 Instead, Grubb’s affidavit states that “[t]he documents were reviewed,” and that he had access 
to them, but he did not specify who, other than Ciritella, did the reviewing—only that “[t]he trial 
prosecutors never saw any of the seized items, nor were they informed as to the content of any 
seized items.”  Id. at A128 (Grubb’s July 10, 2017 Affidavit). 
89 See id. at A557 (Q: “[D]id you tell Ciritella to get the documents back out again and put them 
in the Homicide conference room?”  Prater: “To get them out and put them back in the Homicide 
conference room?  No.”  Q:  “That never happened?”  Prater: “No.”  Q: “Did you ever tell Ciritella 
that Joe Grubb wanted to look at the documents?”  Prater: “No.”  Q: “Did Joe ever tell you he 
wanted to look at the documents?”  Prater: “No.”). 
25 
 
 
 Second, Prater testified that she reviewed Robinson’s notes, which reflected 
information that he received from Woloshin.  Although Prater testified that she did not 
share any information with Downs or Denney,90 when asked whether she shared 
information about the documents with any other person, she identified Grubb.  She did not, 
however, expressly state that Grubb was the only person she communicated with about the 
review.91  Further, Prater testified that, while she did not remember the substance of 
anything she reviewed at the time of her testimony, she “remembered easily what [she] had 
reviewed” immediately following her review.92  Notably, the record is unclear as to when 
Grubb may have instructed Prater to refrain from communicating with Downs and 
Denney—that is, whether it was before Downs removed her from the Murder case, or after 
her removal, which was nearly two weeks after her review of Robinson’s documents.93 
                                            
90 See id. at A549–50 (Prater’s Testimony) (Q: “During that discussion [with Downs about her 
removal from the Murder Case], did you have any reason, or did you inform Mr. Downs of 
anything that you found?”  Prater: “I did not.”  Q: “Since that point in time, or at any time since 
the 30th of June of this year, have you had any discussions with Mr. Downs or Mr. Denney 
concerning the tasks that you were asked to perform with respect to documents taken from Mr. 
Robinson’s cell?”  Prater: “Absolutely not.”).   
91 Id. at A537–38 (Prater’s Testimony) (Q: “Did you share any of the information that you gleaned 
from that review of witnesses with anyone else in the Department of Justice?”  Prater: “Joe Grubb.”  
Q: “Did you share it with either John Downs or Mark Denney?”  Prater: “No.”  Q: “How about 
Cliff Dempsey?”  Prater: “No.”  Q: “And did you discuss any of your assessment with John 
Ciritella?” Prater: “I did not.  I think I turned to him and said I didn’t find anything.  And that’s 
what I told Mr. Grubb, as well.”); id. at A539 (Q: “Were you reading and noting any of the 
substance of what was contained on that legal pad?” Prater: “I read through the legal pad.  I was 
not noting or retaining the substance.”  Q: “Did you take any notes of that?”  Prater: “No.”  Q: 
“Did you provide a summary to anyone at all following your review of that material?”  Prater: “I 
provided a general summary to Joe, but not of the substance; just basically what I reviewed.”). 
92 Id. at A534, A537 (Prater’s Testimony). 
93 See id. at A416–17 (Grubb’s Testimony) (Q: “And after you removed [Prater], did you provide 
any instructions to her about her communications with the trial prosecutor?”  Grubb: “I did.  She 
was not to communicate with them at all.” (emphasis added)).  In fact, during the gap between her 
26 
 
C. The May 1, 2018 Decision 
After considering the relevant testimony, reviewing Robinson’s documents in 
camera,94 and considering additional briefing by the parties, the Superior Court issued its 
May 2018 Opinion dismissing Robinson’s indictment with prejudice.  The court held that 
the State’s seizure of attorney-client material was improper and could not be legally 
justified for several reasons. 
First, the State’s Fourth Amendment justification was misplaced.  The State had 
argued that the search and seizure was constitutionally valid because defendants do not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in prison cells.95  But the court explained that the 
State failed “to appreciate the substantial differences between Fourth and Sixth 
                                            
review of the documents and Grubb’s instructions not to communicate with Downs or Denney, 
Prater emailed Downs at least twice with non-substantive updates on the return of Robinson’s 
documents.  See App. to Answering Br. at B94 (July 6, 2017 Email from Prater to Downs) (“Just 
so you know . . .  On Saturday I mentioned to [Ciritella] and Grubb that we should return the 
documents, Grubb agreed and I thought it had been done.”); id. at B101 (July 7, 2017 Email from 
Prater to Downs) (“FYI documents were returned/delivered to [Sussex Correctional Institute] this 
morning.”). 
94 Although it is unclear when the court conducted its in camera review, the record indicates that 
it initially occurred between the October 25 and November 21 hearings.  See App. to Opening Br. 
at A634–35 (Nov. 21, 2017 Hearing Transcript).   
95 See id. at A233 (State’s Sur-Reply to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss) (“Robinson argues that 
the State acted improperly by requesting the Department of Corrections conduct a search of his 
prison cell and seize his protected legal communications with his attorneys without obtaining 
permission from the Court, applying for a search warrant, or establishing probable cause to conduct 
the search.  This argument fails.  Robinson has no Fourth Amendment privacy rights in his prison 
cell.  Robinson is well aware of this fact, as this Court, in this case, had issued a ruling earlier this 
year to that effect.” (citation omitted)); see also id. at A424–25 (Grubb’s Testimony) (Q: “Why 
not just get a search warrant?”  Grubb: “Didn’t need to.”  Q: “Why?”  Grubb: “Well, you know as 
well as I do, you legally do not need to. . . .  [Y]ou legally do not need a search warrant to search 
an inmates cell.”).   
27 
 
Amendment jurisprudence” applicable here.96  For example, the court noted that prisoners 
are afforded their right to assistance of counsel, which bars prison officials from listening 
to or reading attorney-client communications.  Nonetheless, a member of the prosecution 
team (Prater) reviewed privileged communications containing defense strategy. 
Second, the State’s reliance on the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client 
privilege was improper because “application of the crime-fraud exception . . . requires 
judicial oversight and approval,” which the State did not seek.97  But even if the State had 
sought judicial approval, the court stated that it would have denied the request: 
The Court’s inquiry would have revealed that there was no basis to intrude 
on the attorney-client privilege because no witness names had been produced 
by the State, Defense Counsel had permission to share the “content” of 
witness statements with her client, and the record evidence would have 
demonstrated that Defense Counsel had steadfastly refused to provide 
information to her client that would have violated the TMG Protective 
Order.98 
 
Additionally, the Superior Court held that the State should have applied for a search 
warrant, but that the warrant would not have issued regardless because the State did not 
have probable cause for the same reasons the court would not have granted judicial 
                                            
96 May 2018 Opinion, 2018 WL 2085066, at *6. 
97 Id. at *7. 
98 Id. at *8.  The phone calls that the State relied on as evidence to search Robinson’s cell at least 
partially suggested that Woloshin had complied with the Protective Order and that neither she nor 
Robinson knew the identities of the witnesses.  For example, in response to a question from his 
mother during a phone call about whether Woloshin knew the witnesses, Robinson replied, “[y]eah 
she don’t even know.”  App. to Opening Br. at A65 (April 18, 2017 Phone Transcript).  In the 
same call, he indicated that he was making assumptions about witnesses: “while I’m making 
assumptions of who they are [Woloshin] was like, ah, you can’t tell nobody who they are. . . .  So 
I can’t tell you who the witnesses are.”  Id. at A67.   
28 
 
approval.  Further, the court rejected the State’s contention that it had to conduct a search 
immediately to protect witness safety, as the State only sought evidence of a Protective 
Order violation, not actual witness intimidation, and it displayed no urgency in conducting 
the investigation.99 
Third, and finally, the State failed to employ a taint team.  Instead, “the State took 
no steps to screen the Prosecution Team to protect the integrity of the attorney-client 
privilege.”100  The prosecutors led the Protective Order investigation until less than two 
weeks before trial in the Murder Case, and even after that point, the court found that the 
State’s claims that the prosecutors were screened from the case were not supported by the 
record.  Additionally, Prater helped review the privileged documents and remained on the 
trial team for nearly another two weeks to assist with final trial preparations.  
Thus, the court held that Robinson had suffered both presumed and actual prejudice 
because the State had deliberately interfered with Robinson’s Sixth Amendment rights, 
“which could cause a chilling effect on [Robinson’s] attorney-client communications in the 
future.”101  Additionally, the court held that Robinson suffered prejudice because: (i) Grubb 
selected a member of the prosecution team (Prater) to review Robinson’s documents, which 
included letters from Woloshin and his handwritten notes reflecting communications from 
                                            
99 For example, although the State suspected the possible sharing of witness information with 
Robinson by May 10, 2017, “the State did not take any further action in this investigation until 
June 9, 2017 when it issued the first subpoena for Defendant’s phone records.  Two more weeks 
elapsed before the State issued the additional subpoenas.”  May 2018 Opinion, 2018 WL 2085066, 
at *9. 
100 Id. at *10. 
101 Id. at *13 (citation omitted). 
29 
 
Woloshin;102 (ii) Prater remained on the prosecution team until the scheduled start of the 
trial;103 (iii) Downs and Denney were not effectively screened from the Protective Order 
investigation, given that they “conducted interviews, issued subpoenas, listened to phone 
calls, and reviewed call logs” leading up to the search;104 and (iv) the “the State’s actions 
have caused a significant delay in [Robinson’s] prosecution” during which time he “has 
been detained.”105 
With these facts in mind, the court turned to a remedy.  The State argued that 
Robinson was not entitled to any remedy because trial had not yet taken place and, thus, 
any prejudice he suffered could be rectified before trial.  But the State failed to propose 
any alternative remedies to dismissal throughout the entirety of the Superior Court 
proceedings.106  Regardless, the court rejected State’s argument, explaining that: 
                                            
102 Id. at *5 (“[Grubb] chose to place the documents in a large conference room for review by 
[Prater].  [Prater] reviewed the documents, which included letters from [Woloshin] to [Robinson] 
and [Robinson’s] handwritten notes on a legal pad and loose pieces of paper.  [Prater’s] review 
was detailed enough to conclude that [Woloshin] discussed the substance of redacted police reports 
with [Robinson] and [Prater] reported her conclusions to [Grubb].”). 
103 Id. at *10; see also id. at *11 (“The State did not . . . even remove [Prater] until July 14, 2017, 
after the trial had already been continued.”). 
104 Id. at *10 (“[Downs and Denney] were not effectively screened from the State’s Protective 
Order Investigation.  For example, [Downs] directly met with [Grubb] and [Ciritella] before the 
search to tell [Ciritella] what to search for in the cell.  In addition, [Downs and Denney] 
interviewed the Intermediate Inmate for the second time on June 30, 2017, the same day as the 
search, seizure, and review.  Moreover, [Downs and Denney] were responsible for responding to 
the Court’s initial inquiries about the search of [Robinson’s] cell, and facilitated the return of 
[Robinson’s] documents to him.”). 
105 Id. at *16. 
106 See, e.g., App. to Opening Br. at A251–53 (State’s Sur-Reply to Defendant’s Mot. to Dismiss 
Indictment) (arguing that Robinson was not entitled to dismissal, but not proposing any alternative 
remedy); 
Oral 
Argument 
Video 
at 
18:50–19:09, 
https://livestream.com/DelawareSupremeCourt/events/8570210/videos/187665632 (Court: “If 
you don’t prevail on the only argument you fairly presented below, why don’t they win?”  State: 
30 
 
[T]he State’s position would mean that it can intentionally review a 
defendant’s privileged attorney-client communications at any time before 
trial without any consequences.  Such a rule would vitiate the fundamental 
importance of a defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel and give the 
State a license to violate the Sixth Amendment rights of defendants in the 
future.107 
 
Despite the State’s failure to propose a remedy, the court identified several potential 
alternatives to dismissal, including replacing the entire prosecution team, destroying all of 
the State’s work product, releasing Robinson on pretrial supervision, and barring Grubb, 
Ciritella, and Marvel from working on any of Robinson’s cases.   
The court ultimately determined that alternative remedies were inadequate because 
“the prejudice to Defendant is much broader, and the affront to the rule of law is more 
profound, than can be addressed by these limited remedies.”108  For example, the court 
noted that according to Ciritella’s testimony, the State may have carried out similar 
searches in the past: 
Q: Have you ever done a search like this before?   
 
Ciritella: Yes, sir.   
 
Q: So let me be specific.  Have you done . . . a seizure and review of an 
inmate’s legal paperwork?  
  
Ciritella: Yes.   
 
Q: Okay.  And I don’t want you to say case names, or anything.  To your 
knowledge, were those pursuant to a search warrant, or anything like that?  
                                            
“The State did present an argument that dismissal was not appropriate.”  Court: “As a remedy?”  
State: “As a remedy.”  Court: “And you proposed what alternative remedy?”  State: “We proposed 
that there need not be a remedy.”). 
107 May 2018 Opinion, 2018 WL 2085066, at *16. 
108 Id. at *17. 
31 
 
 
Ciritella: No, sir, they were not.  
  
Q: So you have experience in going through client documents—pardon me, 
attorney-client documents to determine if a protective order has been 
violated?   
 
Ciritella: If there is probable cause to believe that there is some type of 
violation, yes.  
. . .  
 
Q: Before the Jacquez Robinson review that you conducted, how many times 
would you say that you looked through documents from cells of inmates 
looking for things that may have violated a protective order? 
 
Ciritella: I think maybe one other time.109 
 
Further, the court held that the State did not fully accept responsibility for the shortcomings 
in its investigation or “demonstrate concern for Defendant’s right to a fair trial,” and it 
“demonstrated a seeming indifference to the serious constitutional issues at stake 
throughout these proceedings.”110  For example, the State failed to comply with the court’s 
                                            
109 App. to Opening Br. at A500–02 (Ciritella’s Testimony).   
110 May 2018 Opinion, 2018 WL 2085066, at *13–*14.  The Superior Court also criticized the 
State’s baseless accusations against Woloshin during the motion to dismiss proceedings: 
[D]espite having no evidence in support of its argument, the State has continued to 
suggest that Defense Counsel engaged in improper behavior.  For example, in its 
most recent submission to this Court, the State wrote, “Apparently, to gain trust, 
[Woloshin] either violated the TMG Protective Order or duped her client into 
believing she was providing him more than was permitted.”  The Court finds that 
the State’s ad hominem attacks against Defense Counsel are disrespectful and 
unprofessional, falling short of the Court’s expectations for professionalism and 
civility for Delaware lawyers.   
Id. at *13 n.92 (citation omitted).  We agree.  At the outset, the State could have raised any concerns 
with Woloshin, which is what happened in In re Koyste, 111 A.3d 581 (Del. 2015).  There, the 
defense lawyer admitted to violating a protective order and self-reported to the judge the same day.  
As officers of the Court and members of the Delaware Bar, this option merited more serious 
consideration by the State. 
32 
 
order to identify each person who reviewed Robinson’s documents, conduct a 
comprehensive email search, and produce responsive emails. 
Thus, while noting that dismissal was a “severe” and “unfortunate” result, the 
Superior Court held that it was the only adequate remedy “because any lesser sanction 
would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the State’s actions and the extent to which the 
State’s actions put at risk the most fundamental constitutional requirements.”111  Further, 
the court held that dismissal was the only remedy that would “deter the State from violating 
the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants in the future.”112   
On May 2, 2018, the day after the Superior Court’s decision, the State filed its notice 
of appeal. 
IV. 
Claims on Appeal 
The State appeals the Superior Court’s dismissal of Robinson’s indictment on two 
grounds.  First, the State claims that it did not violate Robinson’s Sixth Amendment right 
to assistance of counsel because Robinson’s ability to defend himself was not affected in 
any way by the State’s warrantless search and seizure of his documents.  Specifically, the 
State claims that its seizure of Robinson’s documents did not prejudice him because it 
returned the documents, trial was continued, no records of the material were retained, and 
no privileged documents were conveyed to Downs or Denney.  Second, even assuming that 
                                            
111 May 2018 Opinion, 2018 WL 2085066, at *17. 
112 Id.  
33 
 
its actions did prejudice Robinson, the State contends that dismissal was an inappropriate 
remedy in the absence of any demonstrable, irreparable prejudice to Robinson. 
Robinson disputes both of the State’s arguments.  He contends that the Superior 
Court not only correctly presumed prejudice, but correctly found actual prejudice caused 
by the State’s intentional intrusion into his attorney-client relationship, and by learning the 
details of his trial strategy only eleven days before the murder trial.  Further, while 
acknowledging that dismissal is an extreme sanction, Robinson argues that it is warranted 
here because of the affront to the rule of law and as a means of curbing future misconduct 
by the State.  
V. 
Standard of Review 
The State’s arguments concerning Robinson’s alleged Sixth Amendment violation 
are issues of law that we review de novo.113  Further, we review de novo the Superior 
Court’s application of the law to these facts,114 along with the “embedded legal 
conclusions” in the court’s remedy analysis.115  We will not disturb the Superior Court’s 
factual findings if they are supported by competent evidence.116  
 
 
                                            
113 See Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 840 (Del. 2009). 
114 See Lewis v. State, 2018 WL 619706, at *1 (Del. Jan. 29, 2018) (TABLE) (“‘Where it is alleged 
that the Superior Court erred in formulating and applying the law to undisputed facts, we exercise 
de novo review.’” (quoting Pendleton v. State, 990 A.2d 417, 419 (Del. 2010))). 
115 North River Ins. Co. v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 105 A.3d 369, 380–81 (Del. 2014). 
116 See Gattis v. State, 955 A.2d 1276, 1287 (Del. 2008).   
34 
 
VI. 
Analysis 
A. 
The State Violated Robinson’s Sixth Amendment Rights 
 
Any discussion addressing governmental interference with a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel must acknowledge the centrality of the attorney-client 
privilege, which is fundamental to the exercise of that right.  The privilege was designed 
to encourage full disclosure by a client to his or her attorney in order to facilitate the 
rendering of legal advice.117  For the adversary system to function properly, any such advice 
must be shielded from exposure to the government.118  That did not happen here.  In fact, 
the State deliberately invaded Robinson’s attorney-client privilege by searching for, 
seizing, and reviewing his legal materials. 
 
In this case, the parties have debated intensely about what is required to establish a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment.119  That debate is understandable given that the federal 
                                            
117 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting that the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege “is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients 
and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of 
justice”); Levy, 577 F.2d at 209 (“The fundamental justification for the sixth amendment right to 
counsel is the presumed inability of a defendant to make informed choices about the preparation 
and conduct of his defense.  Free two-way communication between client and attorney is essential 
if the professional assistance guaranteed by the sixth amendment is to be meaningful.”).  The 
United States Supreme Court has also noted that “conferences between counsel and 
accused . . . sometimes partake of the inviolable character of the confessional.”  Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932). 
118 See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368 (1993) (stating that the essential purpose of the 
sixth amendment right to counsel is to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial); United States 
v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (“[T]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is 
recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to 
receive a fair trial.”). 
119 Robinson has not advanced an argument on appeal that the State has violated the Delaware 
Constitution.   
35 
 
courts are divided on important aspects of the analysis, including whether a showing of 
prejudice to the defendant is required to establish a violation when the government 
intentionally invades a defendant’s privileged communications.  Courts have also differed 
as to who bears the burden of proof and the standard of proof in analyzing prejudice in the 
remedy analysis.120 
 
In Weatherford, the United States Supreme Court held that a threat of significant 
harm to the defendant was a critical element of a non-deliberate violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.  There, attendance by an undercover agent at a meeting with the criminal 
defendant and his attorney did not constitute a Sixth Amendment violation.  The Court, 
rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s per se rule, reasoned that “[a]t no time did [the agent] discuss 
with or pass on to his superiors or to the prosecuting attorney or any of the attorney’s staff 
‘any details or information regarding the plaintiff’s trial plans, strategy, or anything having 
to do with the criminal action pending against plaintiff.’”121   
                                            
120 See Cutillo v. Cinelli, 485 U.S. 1037, 1037 (1988) (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and 
O’Connor, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari) (noting a three-way circuit 
split on the “issue of who bears the burden of persuasion for establishing prejudice or lack thereof 
when the Sixth Amendment violation involves the transmission of confidential defense strategy 
information”); People v. Alexander, 235 P.3d 873, 913 n.23 (Cal. 2010) (“We are aware of no 
decision by the high court in the intervening years that has answered the questions left unresolved 
in Weatherford—what showing of injury to the defendant or benefit to the State is, in the 
affirmative, required to prove a Sixth Amendment violation, and who bears the burden of 
persuasion.” (citing Cutillo, 485 U.S. at 1037)), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 945 (2011). 
121 Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 548.  The Fourth Circuit’s per se rule provided that “whenever the 
prosecution knowingly arranges or permits intrusion into the attorney-client relationship the right 
to counsel is sufficiently endangered to require reversal and a new trial.” Bursey v. Weatherford, 
528 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1975). 
36 
 
 
But the Supreme Court suggested four factors that could strongly indicate a Sixth 
Amendment violation, namely: 
[1] Had [the agent] testified at [the defendant’s] trial as to the conversation 
between [the defendant] and [his attorney]; [2] had any of the State’s 
evidence originated in these conversations; [3] had those overheard 
conversations been used in any other way to the substantial detriment of [the 
defendant]; or even [4] had the prosecution learned from [the agent] the 
details of the [attorney-client] conversations about trial preparations, [the 
defendant] would have had a much stronger case.122 
 
 
In Weatherford, the government did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel because “[n]one of these elements [were] present.”123  It stated further that 
“[u]nless [the agent] communicated the substance of the [attorney-client] conversations 
and thereby created at least a realistic possibility of injury [to defendant], or benefit to the 
State, there can be no Sixth Amendment violation.”124  Thus, in Weatherford, where there 
was a significant investigative justification, the Supreme Court did not consider whether 
an intentional invasion of the privilege by the government might constitute a per se 
violation of the Sixth Amendment.125  But the Court appeared to recognize that the 
prejudice requirement it articulated does not necessarily govern intentional intrusions by 
the prosecution that lack a legitimate purpose.   
                                            
122 Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 554 (footnote omitted). 
123 Id. at 555. 
124 Id. at 558 (emphasis added). 
125 See 3 Wayne R. LaFave et. al., Criminal Procedure § 11.8 (b) (4th ed. 2018) (“Weatherford 
also does not answer the question of whether a per se Sixth Amendment violation can be 
established, where the prosecutorial intrusion into the lawyer-client relationship clearly lacks any 
legitimate justification.”). 
37 
 
 
Three years later, in Morrison, the Supreme Court did consider the appropriate 
remedy for the government’s deliberate intrusion into the attorney-client relationship when 
the intrusion did not prejudice the defendant’s representation.  There, federal drug agents 
met with the defendant twice without her attorney’s knowledge, although they were aware 
that she had retained counsel.126  The agents sought her cooperation, disparaged her 
attorney, and threatened her with more severe penalties if she refused to cooperate.127  
However, she did not cooperate or provide them with any incriminating information about 
herself or her case.  She also maintained her relationship with her counsel.128  
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that this conduct 
violated the defendant’s right to counsel, even if the government’s conduct had not 
adversely impacted her representation.  It dismissed the indictment with prejudice.129 
 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.  In doing so, it did not address the 
government’s contention that no Sixth Amendment violation occurs unless its conduct 
prejudices the defendant.  Rather, the Court assumed that the government had violated the 
Sixth Amendment, but held that the Third Circuit had erred in dismissing the        
indictment.130  It stated that “absent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, 
                                            
126 Morrison, 449 U.S. at 362–63. 
127 Id. at 362. 
128 Id. at 362–63. 
129 Id. at 363. 
130 Id. at 364 (“The United States initially urges that absent some showing of prejudice, there could 
be no Sixth Amendment violation to be remedied.  Because we agree with the United States, 
however, that the dismissal of the indictment was error in any event, we shall assume, without 
deciding, that the Sixth Amendment was violated in the circumstances of this case.”). 
38 
 
dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have 
been deliberate.”131 
 
The Supreme Court held that remedies for the Sixth Amendment violations should 
be tailored to the injury suffered.  It stated that the “premise of our prior cases is that the 
constitutional infringement identified has had or threatens some adverse effect upon the 
effectiveness of counsel’s representation or has produced some other prejudice to the 
defense,” and that “[a]bsent such impact on the criminal proceeding, however, there is no 
basis for imposing a remedy in that proceeding.”132  Because the defendant had not 
established any “transitory or permanent” prejudice,133 the government’s violation did not 
justify interfering in the proceedings.  Thus, Morrison makes clear that dismissal of an 
indictment is a drastic remedy for a Sixth Amendment violation absent a showing of actual 
prejudice or a substantial threat of prejudice to the defendant’s representation.  
 
Following Weatherford and Morrison (both decisions authored by Justice White), 
some courts and commentators have suggested that because the Supreme Court did not 
address the government’s argument that a showing of prejudice was needed to establish a 
Sixth Amendment violation, “Morrison ‘left open the possibility that the Court might adopt 
a per se standard for those state invasions of the lawyer-client relationship that are not 
supported by any legitimate state motivation.’”134  This might be the case, for example, 
                                            
131 Id. at 365 (footnote omitted). 
132 Id.  
133 Id. at 366. 
134 State v. Bain, 872 N.W.2d 777, 786 (Neb. 2016) (quoting 3 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal 
Procedure § 11.8(b) at 848–49 (3d ed. 2007)); see also United States v. Morales, 635 F.2d 177, 
39 
 
where the prosecution acts intentionally and without legitimate purpose.135  The federal 
appellate courts are divided on this issue. 
 
 The United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and Tenth Circuits have held 
that intentional intrusions by the prosecution into the defendant’s attorney-client privileged 
information, at least without a legitimate purpose, constitute a per se violation of the Sixth 
Amendment with no need to demonstrate that the defendant has suffered prejudice as a 
                                            
179 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[B]ecause the in camera evidence, now unsealed, does not disclose an 
intentional, governmentally instigated intrusion upon confidential discussion between appellants 
and their attorneys, the evidence does not support appellants’ claim of a per se violation of their 
right to counsel.” (citations omitted)). 
135 See, e.g., Briggs v. Goodwin, 698, F.2d 486, 493 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that “[a] 
deliberate attempt by the government to obtain defense strategy information or to otherwise 
interfere with the attorney-defendant relationship through the use of an undercover agent may 
constitute a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment” (citations omitted)), reh’g granted, opinion 
vacated, and on reh’g, 712 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  
40 
 
result of the disclosure.136  The Sixth,137 Eighth,138 and Ninth139 Circuits have held that even 
where the government intentionally intrudes in the attorney-client relationship, the 
defendant must demonstrate prejudice to establish a Sixth Amendment violation 
warranting a remedy.  The First Circuit has adopted a “middle position” in which it requires 
the government to prove the absence of prejudice upon the defendant’s prima facie 
showing of prejudice.140  As the First Circuit has observed, “[t]he burden on the 
                                            
136 See Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that an intentional 
intrusion into the attorney-client relationship “must constitute a per se violation of the Sixth 
Amendment,” and that if the government “lacks a legitimate justification for doing so, a prejudicial 
effect on the reliability of the trial process must be presumed”); Levy, 577 F.2d at 209 (holding 
that “the inquiry into prejudice must stop” where defense strategy material is actually disclosed to 
the prosecution or the government intentionally sought such confidential information).  At least 
one state has followed this approach.  See, e.g., State v. Quattlebaum, 527 S.E.2d 105, 109 (S.C. 
2000) (reversing conviction for new trial and holding that “a defendant must show either deliberate 
prosecutorial misconduct or prejudice to make out a  violation of the Sixth Amendment, but not 
both,” and that “[d]eliberate prosecutorial misconduct raises an irrebuttable presumption of 
prejudice”).  
137 See United States v. Collins, 1991 WL 23558, at *13 (6th Cir. Feb. 26, 1991) (TABLE) (“‘Even 
where there is an intentional intrusion by the government into the attorney-client relationship, 
prejudice to the defendant must be shown before any remedy is granted.’” (quoting United States 
v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1984))). 
138 See United States v. Johnson, 47 F.3d 272, 275 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that dismissal was 
improper because, even assuming the government intentionally violated the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights, he had failed to “demonstrate a nexus between this intrusion and any benefit 
derived by the prosecution” (citing United States v. Davis, 646 F.2d 1298, 1303 (8th Cir. 1981))); 
United States v. Singer, 785 F.2d 228, 234 (8th Cir. 1986) (“To establish a sixth amendment 
violation, a criminal defendant must show two things: first, that the government knowingly 
intruded into the attorney-client relationship; and second, that the intrusion demonstrably 
prejudiced the defendant, or created a substantial threat of prejudice.” (citations omitted)). 
139 See United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1071 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]n this circuit we fold 
the prejudice analysis into the analysis of the Sixth Amendment right itself when the prosecution 
has improperly interfered with the attorney-client relationship and thereby obtained information 
about trial strategy.  We have construed Weatherford to mean that there is no Sixth Amendment 
violation unless there is prejudice.”). 
140 United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting that “[l]ike the District 
of Columbia and Third Circuits, we believe that placing the entire burden on the defendant to prove 
both disclosure and use of confidential information is unreasonable,” but “[l]ike the Ninth Circuit, 
41 
 
government is high because to require anything less would be to condone intrusions into a 
defendant’s protected attorney-client communications.”141 
As for the courts that presume prejudice to the defendant, some have held that the 
government’s possession of a defendant’s privileged information is a per se Sixth 
Amendment violation requiring dismissal of the conviction.  Others have held that the 
presumption of prejudice is rebuttable.  As for this latter category, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court, for example, has held that the presumption of prejudice resulting from an invasion 
of a defendant’s privileged communications, whether intentional or not, can be rebutted by 
the State.  The State must show by clear and convincing evidence that no person with 
knowledge of the communications was involved in the investigation or prosecution, that 
the communications contained minimal privileged information, or that it has access to all 
of the information from other sources.142  The Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the same 
                                            
however, we believe that there are certain circumstances in which the revelation of confidential 
communications by the informant is harmless”); see also United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 
36, 64 (1st Cir. 2008) (“‘[T]he government’s intrusion into the attorney-client relationship’ is not 
a per se Sixth Amendment violation; there must also be some demonstration of resulting prejudice. 
Because such intrusions pose a serious risk to defendants’ constitutional rights, and because it 
would be unreasonably difficult for most defendants to prove prejudice, we only require 
defendants to make a prima facie showing of prejudice by ‘prov[ing] that confidential 
communications were conveyed as a result’ of the government intrusion into the attorney-client 
relationship.  The burden then shifts to the government to show that the defendant was not 
prejudiced; that burden is a demanding one.” (quoting Mastroianni, 749 F.2d at 907–08)). 
141 Mastroianni, 749 F.2d at 908.  Courts employing this approach reason that it is virtually 
impossible for a defendant to demonstrate prejudice because a defendant can only guess at whether 
and how the information has been used.   
142 See State v. Lenarz, 22 A.3d 536, 542 (Conn. 2011).  Other states have adopted different 
standards of proof to rebut a presumption of prejudice or taint.  See State v. Robins, 431 P.3d 260, 
271–72 (Idaho 2018) (holding that a presumption of prejudice exists where the prosecutor gained 
access to privileged information, and that the presumption was rebuttable by a preponderance of 
the evidence showing that her arguments during trial had a source independent from the privileged 
material); State v. Taylor, 49 N.E.3d 1019, 1027 (Ind. 2016) (holding that an irrebuttable 
42 
 
standard in State v. Bain,143 holding that a presumption of prejudice exists when the 
government becomes privy to a defendant’s trial strategy, and that the presumption can be 
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence—“at least when the State did not deliberately 
intrude into the attorney client relationship.”144 
As for the former category, in Levy (decided after Weatherford but before 
Morrison), for example, the Third Circuit viewed Weatherford as “suggesting by negative 
inference that a sixth amendment violation would be found where, as here, defense strategy 
was actually disclosed or where, as here, the government enforcement officials sought such 
confidential information.”145  In other words, “when actual disclosure occurred,” the court 
found no need to inquire into prejudice.146   
The Third Circuit viewed speculation about possible prejudice to the defense 
resulting from actual disclosure of confidential communications to the government as 
                                            
presumption of prejudice “crosses the line from rightly shielding [defendant] from actual prejudice 
to granting him a windfall against a potentially still-viable murder prosecution,” and that “a 
presumption of taint, rebuttable only beyond a reasonable doubt, strikes a better balance”); State 
v. Fuentes, 318 P.3d 257, 262 (Wash. 2014) (“[W]e hold that the presumption of prejudice arising 
from such eavesdropping is rebuttable. . . .  The proper standard the trial court must apply is proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt with the burden on the State.”).   
143 872 N.W.2d 777 (Neb. 2016). 
144 Id. at 791.  In Bain, a prosecutor reported that while going through discovery materials, he came 
across documents containing confidential communications of defendant’s original trial counsel 
that revealed the defense’s strategy at that time.  Id. at 781. 
145 Levy, 577 F.2d at 210.  In Levy, the defendant was represented by an attorney who was also 
representing a co-defendant.  Id. at 202–03.  Unknown to the defendant or the attorney, that co-
defendant was an informer to the DEA, who attempted to gain information from the informant 
about the defendant’s trial preparation.  Id. 
146 Id. (emphasis added).   
43 
 
dangerous if the court were to adopt a test weighing the prejudice on a case-by-case 
basis.147  It reasoned: 
[I]t is highly unlikely that a court can, in [a pretrial] hearing, arrive at a 
certain conclusion as to how the government’s knowledge of any part of the 
defense strategy might benefit the government in its further investigation of 
the case, in the subtle process of pretrial discussion with potential witnesses, 
in the selection of jurors, or in the dynamics of trial itself. 
. . . . 
   
[T]he interests at stake in the attorney-client relationship are unlike the 
expectations of privacy that underlie the fourth amendment exclusionary 
rule.  The fundamental justification for the sixth amendment right to counsel 
is the presumed inability of a defendant to make informed choices about the 
preparation and conduct of his defense.  Free two-way communication 
between client and attorney is essential if the professional assistance 
guaranteed by the sixth amendment is to be meaningful.  The purpose of the 
attorney-client privilege is inextricably linked to the very integrity and 
accuracy of the fact finding process itself. . . .  In order for the adversary 
system to function properly, any advice received as a result of a defendant’s 
disclosure to counsel must be insulated from the government. . . .  We think 
that the inquiry into prejudice must stop at the point where attorney-client 
confidences are actually disclosed to the government enforcement agencies 
responsible for investigating and prosecuting the case.  Any other rule would 
disturb the balance implicit in the adversary system and thus would 
jeopardize the very process by which guilt and innocence are determined in 
our society.148 
 
The Third Circuit concluded that the prosecutor’s knowledge of the defendant’s trial 
strategy required a per se reversal of a subsequent conviction, since the prosecution’s 
strategic responses to this defense strategy were now in the public domain and known to 
any subsequent prosecution.  Thus, it concluded that dismissal of the indictment was the 
                                            
147 Id. at 208 (“The dangers of speculating about possible prejudice are demonstrated most 
forcefully by the facts of the instant case.”). 
148 Id. at 208–09 (emphasis added). 
44 
 
only appropriate remedy.149  The court expressly declined to decide whether dismissal 
would be required when defense strategy has been disclosed to government agents but has 
not become public information.150  As the trial court aptly observed in this case, “[t]here 
has been some confusion over whether Levy is still good law” following Morrison.151  The 
following discussion of Third Circuit cases makes the point. 
Six years after Levy, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Costanzo,152 applied 
Weatherford in deciding another case involving an alleged Sixth Amendment violation.153  
Citing the “three branches of the Weatherford test,” the court stated that the government 
violates a person’s Sixth Amendment rights when it:  
(1) Intentionally plants an informer in the defense camp; (2) when 
confidential defense strategy information is disclosed to the prosecution by 
a government informer; or (3) when there is no intentional intrusion or 
disclosure of confidential defense strategy, but a disclosure by a government 
informer leads to prejudice to the defendant.154 
 
Although none of those circumstances was present in Costanzo, the Third Circuit implied 
that Levy was still viable after Morrison, concluding that “the Levy rule does not apply to 
                                            
149 Id. at 210. 
150 Id.  
151 September 2017 Opinion, 2017 WL 4675760, at *4. 
152 740 F.2d 251 (3d Cir. 1984). 
153 Id. at 254–57 (applying the Weatherford test but finding that the facts of the trial court’s findings 
did not implicate Levy because the government “did not intentionally invade confidential attorney-
client conversations”). 
154 Id. at 254 (citing Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 554).  
45 
 
petitioner’s case,” given the findings of the district court that no defense strategy had been 
disclosed.155 
 
But in 1996, in United States v. Voigt,156 the Third Circuit questioned whether Levy 
was still good law, and observed in a footnote that “to the extent that Levy can be read as 
holding that certain government conduct is per se prejudicial, we note that the Supreme 
Court has since [in Morrison] held to the contrary.”157 
 
The Third Circuit further explained its holding in Levy in its 2012 opinion, United 
States v. Mitan.158  In its analysis, the Third Circuit stated that “Levy crafted a three part 
test examining: (1) intentional government conduct, (2) attorney-client privilege, and (3) 
the release of confidential legal strategy.  When those circumstances coalesce, Levy 
dispenses with an inquiry into whether the defense was prejudiced.”159  But, in Mitan, the 
Third Circuit declined to address the question of whether Morrison precludes Levy’s 
presumption of prejudice approach because it found that the defendant could not show the 
factual predicate for the presumption, namely, an intentional invasion by the government 
into any attorney-client relationship.  The Third Circuit assumed that Levy’s approach 
remained viable, but it observed, again in a footnote, that “[its] interpretation of 
Weatherford in Levy, however, was called into question just two years later when the 
                                            
155 Id. at 257. 
156 89 F.3d 1050 (3d Cir. 1996). 
157 Id. at 1070–71 n.9 (citing Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365–66); see also United States v. Boffa, 89 
F.R.D. 523, 533 (D. Del. 1981) (stating that Morrison “effectively repudiated” Levy’s per se rule). 
158 499 Fed. App’x 187 (3d Cir. 2012). 
159 Id. at 192. 
46 
 
[United States Supreme Court] declared in United States v. Morrison that ‘absent 
demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly 
inappropriate, even though the [Sixth Amendment] violation may have been 
deliberate.’”160   
Understandably, the parties here vigorously dispute whether prejudice still may be 
presumed under Levy.  But that is a question we need not definitively resolve today because 
the Superior Court did not merely presume prejudice.161  Instead, it concluded that the 
Defendant had “suffered substantial prejudice as a result of the State’s conduct.”162   
Specifically, the trial court found that the State selected Prater to review the seized 
documents containing Defendant’s privileged attorney-client communications in detail, 
including letters from Woloshin and handwritten notes reflecting Woloshin’s 
communications, from which Prater learned details of the defense trial strategy.163  Prater 
was then allowed to “remain on the Prosecution Team and work with the Trial Prosecutors” 
on the State’s final trial preparations, and the court found that the State did not implement 
any process to effectively screen the Trial Prosecutors from the investigation.164  Further, 
Downs and Denney continued their involvement in the investigation until the eve of the 
                                            
160 Id. at 192 n.6 (quoting Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365). 
161 As discussed above, the trial court concluded that, under Weatherford, a defendant must show 
prejudice to establish a Sixth Amendment violation.  However, it assumed Levy’s continued 
viability and concluded that prejudice may be presumed if defense strategy was actually disclosed 
to the prosecution team.  It also held that a deliberate interference with the attorney-client 
relationship can constitute a Sixth Amendment violation even without a showing of prejudice. 
162 May 2018 Opinion, 2018 WL 2085066, at *14 (citing Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365). 
163 Id. at *5, *10. 
164 Id. at *16. 
47 
 
search of Robinson’s cell, including conducting interviews, issuing subpoenas, listening to 
phone calls, reviewing call logs, and speaking with Ciritella about what to search for in 
Robinson’s cell.  The trial court also observed that the State’s actions caused “a significant 
delay in Defendant’s prosecution” while Defendant remained in detention.165 
In addition to these findings of prejudice, the trial court found that the State 
demonstrated “a seeming indifference to the serious constitutional issues at stake 
throughout these proceedings,” pointing to the fact that “[Grubb], who authorized the 
search, seizure, and review,” also appeared as “counsel for the State’s response to the 
motion to dismiss until specifically instructed by the [c]ourt to involve [other] counsel who 
would not be called to testify as a witness.”166  The trial court also considered the State’s 
various discovery failures, and the fact that the State’s reasons for the intrusion, namely, 
its stated concerns about witness safety, were not supported by the record.  Moreover, the 
trial court was seriously concerned that the “State’s persistent refusal to accept 
responsibility for improper conduct in this matter” without a “significant sanction” would 
likely allow the State to “engage in additional abuses in the future.”167  This concern was 
warranted, in the trial court’s view, because “[Ciritella] testified that he ha[d] previously 
conducted similar searches targeting a defendant’s legal documents in other cases, 
                                            
165 Id.  
166 Id. at *14. 
167 Id.  
48 
 
suggesting that the State may have engaged in other unauthorized reviews of attorney-
client communications.”168   
In sum, because the trial court made findings of actual prejudice, and because the 
State has not shown that those findings of actual prejudice are clearly erroneous, we need 
not broadly decide whether prejudice should be presumed in any case where the 
government obtains defendant’s privileged materials.169  Rather, we limit our holding to 
the facts here, where the State has deliberately invaded a defendant’s attorney-client 
privilege and has obtained defendant’s trial strategy information, and the defendant has 
suffered prejudice as a result.  Based upon this aspect of the record, we affirm the Superior 
Court’s holding that the State violated Robinson’s Sixth Amendment rights and that he 
suffered actual prejudice.  Accordingly, we affirm that aspect of the September 2017 
Opinion. 
 
                                            
168 Id.  The State interpreted Ciritella’s testimony to mean that he had merely conducted standard 
cell-raids in the past, rather than searches targeting privileged material.  See Oral Argument Video 
at 
14:22–15:08, 
https://livestream.com/DelawareSupremeCourt/events/8570210/ 
videos/187665632. 
169 In its Opening Brief on appeal, the State argued that the several of the trial court’s factual 
findings are not supported by the record.  Specifically, it challenges the court’s findings that (1) 
the State took no steps to screen the prosecution team, (2) Prater learned the details of Robinson’s 
defense strategy, or (3) the State purposefully intruded upon Robinson’s confidential 
communications to gain access to defense strategy or to hamper Robinson’s ability to prepare for 
trial.  See Opening Br. at 38, 43.  Regarding the first two challenges, the Superior Court’s findings 
are not clearly erroneous.  As to the third contention, the trial court did not find that the State 
intentionally attempted to gain an advantage by invading Robinson’s attorney-client information.  
Rather, it found only that the State had intentionally searched for and reviewed his privileged 
material.  Any other challenges to the trial court’s factual findings have been waived.  See Murphy 
v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993) (“The failure to raise a legal issue in the text of the 
opening brief generally constitutes a waiver of that claim on appeal.” (citations omitted)). 
49 
 
B. 
Tailoring the Remedy to the Injury Suffered 
This leads us to the next question: was dismissal of the indictment with prejudice 
sufficiently “tailored” to the prejudice Robinson suffered as Morrison requires?  In 
Morrison, the Supreme Court offered general guidance on remedies in this context. The 
Court first recognized that upholding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is often in 
tension with respecting society’s interest in the administration of criminal justice: 
Our cases have accordingly been responsive to proved claims that 
governmental conduct has rendered counsel’s assistance to the defendant 
ineffective.  At the same time and without detracting from the fundamental 
importance of the right to counsel in criminal cases, we have implicitly 
recognized the necessity for preserving society’s interest in the 
administration of criminal justice.  Cases involving Sixth Amendment 
deprivations are subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored 
to the injury suffered for the constitutional violation and should not 
unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.  Our relevant cases reflect this 
approach. . . .  None of these deprivations, however, resulted in the dismissal 
of the indictment. 
. . . .  
 
[W]hen before trial but after the institution of adversary proceedings, the 
prosecution has improperly obtained incriminating information from the 
defendant in the absence of his counsel, the remedy characteristically 
imposed is not to dismiss the indictment but to suppress the evidence or order 
a new trial if the evidence has been wrongfully admitted and the defendant 
convicted.170      
 
                                            
170 Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364–65 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also id. at 364 (“This 
right [to have the assistance of counsel], fundamental to our system of justice is meant to assure 
fairness in the adversary criminal process.” (citations omitted)); Robins, 431 P.3d at 269–70 
(“[T]he prosecution’s intrusion into the privileged strategic communications between a client and 
his attorney weakens the essential and demanding protections inherent in the constitutional right 
to counsel and undermines the balance necessary in our society’s adversarial system of justice.”); 
Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1083 (Del. 1987) (“The right of an accused person to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense is fundamental to our system of justice and is meant to assure 
fairness in the adversary criminal process.” (citing Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–44 
(1963))). 
50 
 
 
Accordingly, identification of a Sixth Amendment violation does not, alone, suggest 
that dismissal of the indictment is appropriate.  Rather, the remedy for that violation must 
be “tailored to the injury suffered.”171  In tailoring the remedy, “[t]he interests supporting 
the sixth amendment right, meant to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process, must 
be reconciled with society’s competing interest in prosecuting criminal conduct.”172  Thus, 
the Supreme Court emphasized in Morrison that its preferred approach “has thus been to 
identify and then neutralize the taint by tailoring relief appropriate in the circumstances to 
assure the defendant the effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial.”173  It explained that 
the premise of its prior cases “is that the constitutional infringement identified has had or 
threatens some adverse effect upon the effectiveness of counsel’s representation or has 
produced some other prejudice to the defense.”174  “Absent such impact on the criminal 
proceeding, however, there is no basis for imposing a remedy in that proceeding, which 
can go forward with full recognition of the defendant’s right to counsel and a fair trial.”175   
 
 Dismissal with prejudice—an extreme remedy—is the only remedy Robinson 
sought.  In Morrison, the Supreme Court held that dismissal is a “drastic” form of relief, 
                                            
171 Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364; see also United States v. Walker, 839 F.2d 1483, 1487 (11th Cir. 
1988) (“[E]ven if we were to deem this a constructive denial of counsel–and we refrain from so 
deciding–we cannot ignore the mandate of Morrison that the relief must be tailored to the wrong.”); 
LaFave et al., supra note 125 (“Of course, under Morrison, even should the unjustified invasion 
be deemed a per se Sixth Amendment violation, the issue of prejudice becomes relevant in the 
assessment of the appropriate remedy, which must be ‘tailored to the injury suffered.’”).  
172 Singer, 785 F.2d at 234 (citing Wainright, 372 U.S. at 344). 
173 Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365. 
174 Id. 
175 Id.  
51 
 
and that “absent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the 
indictment is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have been 
deliberate.”176  Rather, “[t]he remedy in the criminal proceeding is limited to denying the 
prosecution the fruits of its transgression.”177  Thus, the Court held that dismissal was 
inappropriate. 
In Shillinger v. Haworth,178 the Tenth Circuit observed that “dismissal of the 
indictment could, in extreme circumstances, be appropriate.”179  Other courts have 
observed that dismissal of a criminal case is a draconian remedy “of last resort.”180  The 
                                            
176 Id. at 365, 367 (emphasis added). 
177 Id. at 366–67.  See also United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966) (“Even if we assume 
that the Government did acquire incriminating evidence in violation of the Fifth Amendment, Blue 
would at most be entitled to suppress the evidence and its fruits if they were sought to be used 
against him at trial. . . .  Our numerous precedents ordering the exclusion of such illegally obtained 
evidence assume implicitly that the remedy does not extend to barring the prosecution altogether.  
So drastic a step might advance marginally some of the ends served by exclusionary rules, but it 
would also increase to an intolerable degree interference with the public interest in having the 
guilty brought to book.” (citations omitted)).  We also have recognized that the suppression of 
evidence may leave the government with no case to prosecute.  See Rogers v. Morgan, 2019 WL 
1446838, at *8 (Del. Apr. 2, 2019) (“Had the Superior Court granted the motion to suppress—
thereby eliminating the evidence of events that occurred in the home—the State would have no 
evidence to support its case for resisting arrest.” (citation omitted)). 
178 70 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1995). 
179 Id. at 1143 (citations omitted).  The Tenth Circuit pointed to United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904 
(10th Cir. 1994) as an example of an extreme circumstance where an indictment was dismissed 
because the government destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence.  
180 United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365); see 
also United States v. Orozco, 916 F.3d 919, 925 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding that the district court 
abused its discretion in dismissing an indictment with prejudice based on a Sixth Amendment 
violation rather than ordering a new trial, noting that dismissal is an extraordinary remedy “only 
used in cases of serious and flagrant prosecutorial misconduct,” and holding that dismissal was 
inappropriate because “less drastic remedies were available to address the district court’s 
concerns”); Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming Appellate 
Division’s reversal of trial court’s dismissal of an indictment, and stating, “in all jurisdictions, 
dismissal with prejudice is in practice a rare sanction for any constitutional violation,” and noting 
52 
 
cases uniformly suggest that dismissal of the indictment is appropriate only where the 
injury is irreparable.181  For example, courts have held that dismissal is the appropriate 
remedy where the information has been disclosed to the public domain following trial,182 
                                            
that its “research discloses no case where a federal appellate court upheld dismissal with prejudice 
as a remedy for a Brady violation” (citation omitted)); United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1097 
(9th Cir. 1992) (“Dismissal of an indictment with prejudice is the most severe sanction possible.”); 
United States v. Solomon, 679 F.2d 1246, 1248–51 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that the “drastic 
remedy” of dismissal was inappropriate even though the government’s conduct was “highly 
improper” and “reprehensible”); United States v. Broward, 594 F.2d 345, 351 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(“[T]he sanction [of dismissal] is so drastic that, especially where serious criminal misconduct is 
involved, it must be reserved for the truly extreme cases”). 
181 See United States v. Syed, 1995 WL 216874, at *1 (7th Cir. Apr. 11, 1995) (TABLE) 
(interpreting Morrison to mean that “indictments must not be dismissed unless the government’s 
conduct following the commission of the crime not only is unlawful but also causes irreparable 
prejudice to the defense of the charge” (emphasis added)); Bohl, 25 F.3d at 914 (dismissing the 
indictment because of the government’s destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence and 
violation of defendant’s due process rights); Robins, 431 P.3d at 272 (“[D]ismissing the charges 
should remain an option if the circumstances are such that prejudice arising from the State’s prior 
transgression cannot be completely purged or escaped.”); Bailey, 521 A.2d at 1086 (“In the 
absence of demonstrable irreparable prejudice, dismissal of an indictment is inappropriate, even 
though there has been interference with the right to be assisted by counsel.” (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted)); State v. Pecard, 998 P.2d 453, 462–63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that 
trial court abused its discretion in dismissing indictments as a result of Sixth Amendment 
violations since it should have considered lesser remedies assuring defendant a fair trial); LaFave 
et al., supra note 125 (“Apparently, only prejudice that is indelible and holds open the possibility 
of an unjust conviction would justify the dismissal with prejudice sought in Morrison.” (citations 
omitted)).   
182 See Levy, 577 F.2d at 210 (suggesting that the prejudice to the defendant was irreparable 
because the disclosed information was in the public domain); Lenarz, 22 A.3d at 539, 558 (holding 
that because the prosecutor had reviewed a “detailed, explicit road map of the defendant’s trial 
strategy,” and had tried the case to conclusion, “the case is irreversibly tainted” and “the only 
available appropriate remedy is dismissal of the charge of which he was convicted”).   
53 
 
where the government has effectively diminished the ability of the defendant to mount a 
full defense,183 or where the government’s misconduct secured the indictment.184 
 
In contrast to Robinson’s demand for dismissal, the State steadfastly adhered to its 
position that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred and that dismissal of the indictment 
was not warranted.  It never proposed an alternative remedy.  Thus, the trial court was 
faced with diametrically opposite “all or nothing” proposals on the remedy spectrum.  But 
even so, the trial court appropriately considered several alternative remedies sua sponte, 
including replacing the entire prosecution team, destroying all of the State’s work product, 
releasing Robinson on pretrial supervision, and barring Grubb, Ciritella, or Marvel from 
working on any of Robinson’s cases.185  The court concluded, however, that those remedies 
were inadequate.  We explain next why this conclusion was error.  
 
                                            
183 See Stein, 541 F.3d at 144–46 (holding that harm was irreparable, and therefore dismissal was 
required, where the government hampered the defendants’ ability to defend against the indictment 
by threatening their employer, who had planned to advance legal expenses without any conditions, 
unless the employer agreed to limit its advancement to the defendants). 
184 United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1524–28 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (dismissing 
indictment where government schemed with defendant’s attorney to secure the indictment and the 
defendant’s cooperation). 
185 Other courts have held that it is incumbent on the court, sua sponte, to devise an adequate 
remedy to cure any prejudice to the defendant, even in the absence of any request by the parties.  
See, e.g., Bain, 872 N.W.2d at 793 (“[W]hen a court is presented with evidence that the State has 
become privy to a defendant’s confidential trial strategy, it must sua sponte conduct an evidentiary 
hearing that requires the State to prove that the disclosure did not prejudice the defendant, and it 
must also give the defendant an opportunity to challenge the State’s proof.”).  Given that 
Robinson’s Sixth Amendment rights must be balanced against the competing interest in the 
administration of justice, and even if faced with an “all or nothing” proposal from the parties, the 
trial court should, sua sponte, and as required by Morrison, consider what remedies might be 
appropriately tailored to the harm. 
54 
 
1. 
The Record on “Taint” Does Not Support Dismissal 
The overwhelming weight of the case law, including Morrison, which is binding on 
this Court, holds that dismissal of an indictment with prejudice (the most severe remedy) 
should not be imposed absent findings of irreparable prejudice.  The overwhelming weight 
of the evidence here suggests that any “taint” was contained and did not infect the 
prosecutors.  Downs and Denney both testified that they were unaware of the status of the 
investigation or of the contents of Robinson’s documents.  Further, of the four individuals 
who had access to the documents, Prater, Ciritella, and Marvel testified that they did not 
share information about the review with Downs or Denney.  Grubb, the only other 
individual with access to the documents, testified that he did not review the documents 
himself and that he attempted to screen Downs and Denney from the Protective Order 
investigation.  The case had not yet gone to trial and no evidence suggests that any 
privileged information found its way into the public domain. 
 
We acknowledge that the record is not airtight.  We do not have a high level of 
confidence in the completeness of the State’s email production, for example.  In addition, 
the questioning of Grubb and Prater could have more thoroughly explored the issue of taint.  
And it is unclear whether Grubb actually reviewed the documents, given the conflicting 
testimony on that point.186  But based upon the record developed after two evidentiary 
hearings, we conclude that the record does not remotely come close to establishing 
irreparable taint or prejudice.   
                                            
186 See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
55 
 
2. 
There is Insufficient Evidence of a “Pattern” of Misconduct 
The Supreme Court in Morrison did suggest in a footnote that a more severe remedy 
might be appropriate even in cases where the harm is not irreparable, but where there is a 
pattern of misconduct.187  Although the State’s conduct here was egregious, the evidentiary 
record does not sufficiently establish such a pattern of misconduct. 
To the extent the trial court justified dismissal based upon the State’s potentially 
similar misconduct in other cases, there is virtually no record evidence other than Ciritella’s 
limited, ambiguous testimony on that issue.  His testimony sheds no light on when any 
such cell searches occurred, who was involved in any such searches, whether the State used 
a taint team, whether the search occurred during or was related to an ongoing case, whether 
the State notified opposing counsel or the court, and whether the legal paperwork that was 
seized was actually privileged.  Although, in this case, the State compounded its violation 
of Robinson’s Sixth Amendment rights with its discovery failings and lack of fulsome 
disclosure to the Court and counsel, the record before us does not sufficiently establish “a 
pattern of recurring violations” of defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights in criminal 
proceedings.  
We are aware of the Superior Court’s 2011 transcript ruling in State v. Cannon.188  
In Cannon, unlike here, the State attempted to avoid intruding on the defendant’s right to 
                                            
187 It noted that the record did “not reveal a pattern of recurring violations by investigative officers 
that might warrant the imposition of a more extreme remedy in order to deter further lawlessness.”  
Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365 n.2. 
188 Case ID No. 1001007728 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2011) (Ex. C to Opening Br.).  Both parties 
cite to several post-Morrison Sixth Amendment decisions in Delaware, namely: Bailey, Cannon, 
and Puryear v. State, 2000 WL 975055 (Del. May 30, 2000) (TABLE).  Those cases, however, 
56 
 
counsel by obtaining a search warrant that excluded attorney-client communications.  
Moreover, when the prosecutors learned that the detective had seized a notebook 
containing privileged information, they immediately and successfully took steps to prevent 
their exposure to the content of a notebook.189  In fact, the Superior Court concluded that 
the investigating detective did not “knowingly, probably not even recklessly,” violate the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.  The Superior Court followed this Court’s approach 
in Bailey v. State190 of fashioning “a remedy short of dismissal to match or meet the 
prejudice.”191  Based upon Cannon’s distinguishable facts, it would be inaccurate to say 
that the State’s conduct in Cannon, occurring more than eight years ago, along with its 
conduct in this case, constitute a “pattern” of misconduct sufficient to justify dismissal of 
Robinson’s first degree murder indictment. 
To be clear, we do not condone the State’s misconduct.  But given that we must 
carefully balance the competing interests of protecting the constitutional rights of 
defendants against the competing interests of all Delaware citizens (including victims and 
their families) in the administration of criminal justice, we conclude that the most extreme 
remedy possible, namely, dismissal, was unwarranted.  A remedy less severe than dismissal 
                                            
are factually distinguishable in important ways.  First, in none of them did the State specifically 
target attorney-client privileged communications.  Second, there was no indication that any 
member of the prosecution teams reviewed privileged material.  
189 Cannon, Case ID No. 1001007728, at 4–5, 7–8. 
190 521 A.2d 1069 (Del. 1987). 
191 App. to Answering Br. at B141. 
57 
 
of Robinson’s indictment can properly be tailored to ensure that Robinson’s right to a fair 
trial is protected.192 Accordingly, we reverse.   
To eliminate what we perceive as a remote possibility of any taint or unfair 
advantage to the State, and as a sanction for the State’s misconduct, we will require the 
disqualification of Downs, Denney, Prater, Grubb, Ciritella, Marvel, and Dempsey from 
participation in Robinson’s trial, along with anyone else who has been exposed through 
review, discussion, or otherwise of Robinson’s privileged materials.  In addition, the State 
is required to destroy all trial work product developed thus far in this case.  Notwithstanding 
the practical implications of these sanctions, this Court expects the State to proceed with 
appropriate dispatch given the delays that it has caused already in these proceedings.   
VII. 
Conclusion 
In sum, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the State violated Robinson’s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a result of its wrongful and unjustified intrusion into 
his attorney-client privileged materials.  But based upon our assessment of the record, and 
on our interpretation of Morrison’s requirement that the remedy must be tailored to the 
harm, we reverse the Superior Court’s dismissal of the indictment.  Although the Superior 
Court has discretion to sanction litigants, it failed to tailor its remedy to the violation and 
                                            
192 For example, a new prosecution team with no exposure to this case could try the case without 
any potential threat to the fairness of the trial, particularly since this case was still in its pretrial 
stage.  See Singer, 785 F.2d at 232 (denying motion to dismiss where the government knowingly 
gained access to the defendant’s trial strategy, and instead limiting the possible taint by prohibiting 
the involvement of any government attorney or investigator previously involved and by appointing 
out-of-state federal prosecutors); Quattlebaum, 527 S.E.2d at 109 (reversing murder conviction 
and disqualifying prosecutor’s office that intentionally eavesdropped on privileged conversations 
from participating in the defendant’s retrial). 
58 
 
actual prejudice that it found.  The trial court’s dismissal of the indictment failed to 
adequately “preserv[e] society’s interest in the administration of criminal justice.”193 
Make no mistake that we condemn the State’s behavior.  We warn the State that any 
further instances of such intentional misconduct may well lead to dismissal of the case in 
which the misconduct occurs, in addition to other possible sanctions.194  We are troubled 
that even during this appeal, the State continued to trivialize the wrongfulness of its 
conduct.195  In the event the State again invades a defendant’s privileged materials, the 
State must bring to the trial judge’s attention this Opinion for the purpose of factoring in 
this case in determining whether the State engaged in a pattern of misconduct. 
The fairness of our judicial system is called into question by prosecutorial 
misconduct of the type that occurred here.  Prosecutors are ministers of justice—not merely 
                                            
193 Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364; see also United States v. Gonzalez, 164 F.3d 1285, 1292–93 (10th 
Cir. 1999) (upholding the district court’s finding that the government’s conduct was the product 
of extreme bad faith, but concluding that the court abused its discretion in imposing the most severe 
sanctions of complete suppression of witnesses’ statements for discovery violations since prejudice 
to the defendants was not irreparable). 
194 We do not mean to rule out the possibility of other possible sanctions for the wrongdoing here.  
Based upon the representations made to this Court during oral argument, we trust that the Attorney 
General is actively reviewing this matter and will ensure that measures are taken within the DOJ 
(including a departmental review of the conduct and development of appropriate policies and 
training) to ensure against further such misconduct. 
195 See, e.g., Opening Br. at 23 (“Even if the State improperly intruded on the attorney-client 
privilege in this case and/or Robinson’s seized documents contained ‘defense strategy,’ the court 
wrongly presumed prejudice.”); id. at 38 (“[W]hile the State could have done things better in this 
case, as it conceded at the evidentiary hearing, nothing in the record supports the court’s finding 
that Robinson suffered any prejudice.”); Reply Br. at 11 (“As discussed in the State’s opening 
brief, all witnesses testified that, while not perfect, the ad hoc screen was effective.”); Oral 
Argument 
Video 
at 
1:05, 
https://livestream.com/DelawareSupremeCourt/events/8570210/videos/187665632 (“[W]hile the 
procedure could have been better, it was ultimately effective.”).   
59 
 
advocates.196  “[T]he prosecutor ‘represents all the people, including the defendant who 
was being tried,’” and “‘[i]t is equally his duty to see that justice be done by giving 
defendant a fair and impartial trial.’”197  
This Court bears ultimate responsibility for protecting the rights of the accused.  
And because “only this Court has the power and responsibility to govern the Bar,”198 we 
also bear ultimate responsibility for upholding the high standards of professional conduct 
that we have established for lawyers practicing in this State.  In order for our criminal 
justice system to function fairly, all of those charged with enforcing our laws must act 
within the confines of our constitutional boundaries.  But in the rare case when that does 
not happen, as here, we are also charged with balancing the harm from such transgressions 
against the interests that all Delaware citizens (including victims of crime and their 
families) have in the fair administration of criminal justice and enforcement of our laws.  
As this Court has said concerning situations involving interference with the assistance of 
counsel, the remedy “should be tailored to the injury suffered and should not unnecessarily 
                                            
196 See McCoy v. State, 112 A.3d 239, 262 (Del. 2015) (recognizing that “a prosecutor has ‘special 
responsibilities’ as ‘a minister of justice and not simply . . . an advocate’”  (quoting Del. Lawyers’ 
R. Prof’l Conduct 3.8 cmt. [1])); see also Del. Lawyers’ R. Prof’l Conduct R. 4.4(a) (“In 
representing a client, a lawyer shall not . . . use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal 
rights of such a person.”); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States 
Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
done.”). 
197 McCoy, 112 A.3d at 262 (quoting Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 204 (Del.1980)). 
198 In re Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 216–17 (Del. 1990). 
60 
 
infringe upon society’s competing interest in the administration of criminal justice.”199  For 
the reasons set forth above, we reverse the dismissal of the indictment. 
We therefore AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the Superior Court’s 
September 19, 2017 and May 1, 2018 opinions, and REMAND for further proceedings 
consistent with this Opinion. 
 
 
                                            
199 Bailey, 521 A.2d at 1084 (citations omitted). 
61 
 
STRINE, Chief Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part, with TRAYNOR, Justice, 
joining:   
 
We dissent in part from our colleagues’ excellent opinion.  Like our colleagues, we 
find the State’s failure to acknowledge the wrongfulness of its conduct and the seriousness 
of its intentional, and furtive, violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights disturbing 
and inexcusable.200  Even on appeal, the State appears not to understand that what it did 
was wrong.    
We also respect the majority’s determination that dismissal was too severe a 
remedy.  The decision of how to remedy a situation like this is difficult, especially when 
dismissal could result in the defendant being excused from culpability for a serious crime 
he may have in fact committed.  But our trial courts must make difficult judgments like 
this, and the trial judge here grounded her dismissal order in the record evidence before 
her, informed by the precise arguments the parties made to her.  Because, in our view, her 
remedial determination is reasonably supported by the record and justified by the 
seriousness of the misconduct it addresses, we would affirm.   
To explain why we would affirm, we start with the way the parties themselves 
approached the issue before us.  The Superior Court was faced with a motion to dismiss, 
and the State opposed that motion largely on the frivolous ground that its intentional and 
                                            
200 We agree and concur with our colleagues “that the State violated Robinson’s Sixth Amendment 
rights and that he suffered actual prejudice.”  Majority Opinion at 48.   
62 
 
secretive invasion of the defendant’s attorney-client communications was not a Sixth 
Amendment violation.201  The State proposed no remedy for its breach at all.202 
As our colleagues acknowledge, the Superior Court did not lightly grant dismissal, 
but considered the behavior of the State so problematic that it warranted a correspondingly 
severe remedy.  One of the reasons why the behavior was problematic in a remedy-relevant 
way was that it was not novel and reflected a failure of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
to learn from past experience.   
As the Superior Court found, one of the State’s witnesses—the prosecution’s chief 
investigating officer—testified that he had engaged in behavior of this kind before.203  
                                            
201 See State v. Robinson, 2018 WL 2085066, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. May 1, 2018) (“The State 
argues that it was legally justified to conduct an independent and unauthorized search, seizure, and 
review of Defendant’s attorney-client communications.  Specifically, the State contends that it was 
not obligated to seek a warrant for its search because inmates have no Fourth Amendment 
protections in prison cells.”); App. to Opening Br. at A717 (State’s Answering Post-Hearing Brief 
(Jan. 26, 2018)) (“[T]he State did not purposefully intrude upon confidential communications 
between Robinson and his attorney.”).   
202 App. to Opening Br. at A723–30 (“Thus, even assuming a Sixth Amendment violation, 
Robinson fails to establish that he suffered prejudice of any kind, either transitory or permanent, 
to the ability of his counsel to provide adequate representation in these criminal proceedings or to 
his right to receive a fair trial.  There is thus no factual basis supporting the drastic relief [dismissal] 
sought by Robinson.”).   
203 Robinson, 2018 WL 2085066, at *14 (“[A] State’s witness testified that he has previously 
conducted similar searches targeting a defendant’s legal documents in other cases.”); see also App. 
to Opening Br. at A500 (Chief Investigative Officer Ciritella’s Testimony (Oct. 25, 2017)) (“Q:  
Have you ever done a search like this before.  A:  Yes, sir.  Q:  So let me be specific.  Have you 
done a, I am going to call it a seizure and review of an inmate’s legal paperwork?  A:  Yes.  Q:  
Okay.  And I don’t want you to say case name, or anything.  To your knowledge, were those 
pursuant to a search warrant, or anything like that?  A:  No sir, they were not.”); id. at A501–02 
(“Q:  So if a person is not supposed to have their police reports, they have their police reports 
anyways and you found them in cells?  A:  You’re asking if I have ever done it before.  Yes, I 
have.  But there’s other documents that I also look for.  Q:  Okay.  Before the Jacquez Robinson 
review that you conducted, how many times would you say that you looked through documents 
from cells of inmates looking for things that may have violated a protective order?  A:  I think 
maybe one other time.”).   
63 
 
Perhaps because the DOJ acted in the same deceptive manner that characterized its 
behavior here, that prior invasion, or perhaps incursion, was not caught or called out.  To 
our minds, it was not the trial judge’s job to open the record for the State to show that its 
actions were, taken over time, aberrational, when its own witness said that what they did 
in this case was a repeat of past behavior.  This evidence of recidivist invasions of the 
attorney-client relationship is particularly troubling because the Superior Court already 
addressed analogous, if far less extreme, behavior in Cannon v. State.  In Cannon, the State 
inadvertently seized attorney-client privileged materials from a defendant’s cell after 
obtaining a search warrant to seize certain other items from the cell.  Because the State 
promptly alerted the trial court to the violation and immediately returned the attorney-client 
privileged material, the Superior Court found that the appropriate remedy was to limit the 
testimony of the individual who saw the attorney-client material.204  But the Superior Court 
did suggest that a “process [ ] be developed if it has not been already so that in the future 
we don’t find ourselves in a similar situation.”205  Despite the warning in Cannon, the State 
nonetheless proceeded blithely and aggressively in this case.  The trial judge was well 
within her discretion to be concerned that the DOJ did not respond to Cannon’s admonition 
appropriately and, worse yet, continued to be insensitive to the impropriety of its behavior. 
As to this point, the majority elides an issue that the trial judge likely found telling.  
Upon learning that Robinson’s legal materials had been taken from his cell, his attorney 
                                            
204 See State v. Cannon, No. 1001007728, slip. op. at 12–13 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2011); see also 
Exhibit C to Opening Br. at 12–13. 
205 See Cannon, slip. op. at 7; see also Exhibit C to Opening Br. at 7. 
64 
 
immediately alerted the Superior Court and requested that the materials be returned.206  
Once this came to the Superior Court’s attention, the trial judge requested a prompt 
response from the State and received two letters.  The first, from the lead prosecutor, failed 
to acknowledge the prosecution’s role in the seizure of Robinson’s papers and merely 
stated that “I have been advised that materials taken from Robinson’s cell has [sic] already 
been returned or will be returned to him today.”207  Without the second letter from the 
Department of Correction (“DOC”) advising the Superior Court that “[a]t the request of 
Department of Justice investigators, the DOC did conduct a search of Robinson’s cell on 
June 30, 2017, and did remove materials from his cell, including legal materials,” the 
Superior Court—and Robinson—might never have learned the full story about the State’s 
unlawful behavior.208  This lack of candor from the criminal division of the DOJ 
underscores the concerns the Superior Court cited as motivating the severity of its 
remedy.209 
This lack of candor extends to other aspects of the record and also has the effect of 
undercutting the confidence the Superior Court could have in crafting an alternative 
                                            
206 App. to Opening Br. at A71–72 (email from Natalie Woloshin to Judge Parkins et. al. (July 5, 
2017)) (alerting the court to the fact that on June 30, 2017 Robinson’s materials were taken from 
his cell and requesting the court take action to protect Robinson’s right to counsel).   
207 Id. at A114 (email to Judge Parkins from John Downs (July 7, 2017)).     
208 Id. at A117 (letter to Judge Parkins from Gregory Smith (July 7, 2017)).   
209 Robinson, 2018 WL 2085066, at *13 (observing that “[t]he State’s conduct was also in direct 
conflict with the fundamental role and duty of prosecutors”); id. at *14 (“The State has ignored 
the fundamental importance of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel and the 
attorney-client privilege, has demonstrated a disregard for Defendant’s constitutional rights, and 
has exhibited a cavalier approach to the proceedings addressing its conduct.”).   
65 
 
remedy—a remedy the trial judge considered, despite the State’s failure to propose any 
remedy, and specifically rejected.210  For example, the State failed to produce all relevant 
documents even after the trial court ordered their production.211  After producing only three 
emails and two-pages of handwritten notes, the State asserted that these were “the entirety 
of the documents that exist discussing the search and seizure that the Court had ordered.”212  
But at an October hearing, the trial judge was surprised to learn that a witness had not been 
instructed to search for emails related to this case per the court’s prior order.213  The 
Superior Court again ordered the State to produce these documents,214 and after completing 
                                            
210 Id. at *16–17 (“Although the State has not even suggested an alternative remedy, the Court has 
considered, for example, requiring that all members of the Prosecution Team be replaced on any 
of the cases involving Defendant and that any work product they developed be destroyed so that a 
new prosecution team would have to develop a new strategy without any taint from the Protective 
Order Investigation . . . . This Court concludes, after careful review of the record and after much 
consideration, that these remedies are inadequate because the prejudice to Defendant is much 
broader, and the affront to the rule of law is more profound, than can be addressed by these limited 
remedies.”).   
211 See State v. Robinson, 2017 WL 4675760, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2017) (“As a starting 
point, the State must respond to Robinson’s Motion Counsel’s request for production of 
documents.”); id. at *6 n.43 (“The Court addressed discovery in its August 21, 2017 office 
conference.  Presumably, all relevant documents have already been produced, including email 
messages discussing the search and seizure. If said production has not yet taken place, the State 
shall produce documents responsive to Motion Counsel’s request within five (5) business days of 
this order.”); see also App. to Opening Br. at A226 (Reply to State’s Answer to Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss (Aug. 11, 2017)) (requesting production of “all communications between the 
DOJ and DOC regarding the seizure and review of the legal documents produced” and “any 
memoranda, notes, or other documents drafted by the review team be produced”); id. at A277 
(Office Conference (Aug. 21, 2017)) (the Superior Court ordering a production hold on all e-mails 
and text messages).  
212 App. to Opening Br. at A284 (Transcript of Court Decision (Sept. 26, 2017)).   
213 Id. at A577 (Transcript of Hearing (Oct. 25, 2017)) (“THE COURT: . . . [T]he Court expected 
that the State would produce all of the documents responsive to [defense counsel’s] requests.”).   
214 Id. at A576 (“THE COURT:  . . . But the other piece of information that surprised me today 
was [the paralegal’s] testimony that she had not done an e-mail search, and that she had not been 
asked to do a e-mail search.  I think that is inconsistent with what my expectation were, because 
66 
 
a proper search, the State produced more than 37 additional, relevant documents.215  
Attorneys, as officers of the court, should take any command from the court seriously, and 
especially in a case about potential constitutional violations, the State’s failure to promptly 
and thoroughly comply with a court order is alarming and undercuts our confidence in the 
State’s ability to implement a “clean team” solution.   
But this was not the only instance in which the State failed to adhere to the Superior 
Court’s commands.  Despite prior instructions from the trial court to have “all of the people 
who reviewed [Robinson’s] documents” testify at an October hearing,216 the State failed to 
produce an investigator who, along with the chief investigator, initially reviewed 
Robinson’s documents at the jail.217  Because of the State’s failure to follow the trial 
judge’s earlier command to have everyone involved testify, she held another hearing a 
month later to hear from this missing witness.218  In this instance, the State not only failed 
to comply with the Superior Court’s earlier command, but also delayed the resolution of 
this case by at least a month because the trial court had to schedule another hearing to 
complete the record.  And the State’s continued insistence, both below and on appeal, that 
the prosecution’s paralegal who reviewed Robinson’s legal materials did not participate in 
                                            
[defense counsel], I think, made a request for documents.”); id. at A578 (“THE COURT: . . . I 
want the e-mail search done if it hasn’t been done, and I want all of the documents produced.”).  
215 See App. to Answering Br. at B59–60 (Letter from the State to Judge Rocanelli (Nov. 16, 
2017)).   
216 App. to Opening Br. at A505 (Transcript of Hearing (Oct. 25, 2017)).   
217 Id. at A502.   
218 See generally id. at A582–661 (Transcript of Hearing (Nov. 21, 2017)).   
67 
 
the case after she reviewed the documents,219 evidences a combination of less than ideal 
candor, a failure to “get it,” and a mindset that cuts against reposing undue confidence in 
the DOJ to faithfully implement a more tailored remedy.  The record is indisputable that 
the paralegal continued to be included in all of the trial team’s e-mail traffic about the case 
until at least July 7, 2014220 and “was not officially removed from the prosecution team 
until July 14, 2017, after the Court continued the [originally scheduled] July 11 scheduled 
trial.”221  If the criminal division took Cannon seriously, it is difficult to understand why 
the paralegal was not immediately removed from all distribution lists, formal instructions 
were not given to exclude her from all communications regarding the case, and a stringent 
clean team approach was not implemented.  Instead of conjuring up a clean team remedy 
on its own initiative, a remedy that would not have been supported by any reasoned input 
or suggestions from the DOJ and that would require the faithful and diligent 
                                            
219 See, e.g., Oral Argument at 2:21–30 (“She [the paralegal] did not participate in actively in the 
case after her review of the records.”).  Answering Br. at 15–16; App. to Opening Br. at A711–12 
(State’s Answering Post-Hearing Br. (Jan. 26, 2018)); id. at A722–23 (“Although [the paralegal] 
did have access to the seized materials, the evidence---affidavits and hearing testimony—
establishes that [the paralegal] did not discuss with or pass on any details or information regarding 
Robinson’s trial plans, strategy, or the contents of anything that was found in Robinson’s cell to 
the trial prosecutors.  [The paralegal] communicated her findings exclusively to [the Chief 
Investigator] and the [Chief Prosecutor].  [The paralegal] has been removed from this case and 
will not provide any assistance to the prosecutors.”) (footnote omitted).   
220 See generally App. to Answering Br. at B61–132 (State’s Final Response to Order for 
Production (Nov. 16, 2017)).   
221 Robinson, 2018 WL 2085066, at *6 (footnote omitted); see also App. to Answering Br. at B44–
45 (email from John Downs to Judge Parkins (July 7, 2017)) (discussing jury instructions and 
copying the paralegal on the email after she had reviewed Robinson’s documents); id. at B64 
(email from John Downs to Jamie Prater et. al. (July 14, 2017)) (removing the paralegal from the 
prosecution team); id. at B94 (email from Jamie Prater to John Downs (July 6, 2017)) (discussing 
the case after the paralegal had reviewed the documents).     
68 
 
implementation by an organization (the DOJ) that did not seem to believe it did anything 
wrong, the Superior Court decided that granting the motion to dismiss was the most 
equitable and sufficient option to remedy the State’s serious misconduct.  Given this record 
and the State’s failure to propose any viable remedy, we should not second-guess the 
Superior Court’s conclusion that dismissal was appropriate.   
Our friends in the majority are right that dismissal has been said to be a disfavored 
remedy.222  But this is not a case about an isolated piece of evidence that the State got 
improperly and could be remedied by exclusion at a new trial.  This is a case where the 
State gained access to the defendant’s trial strategy,223 did so secretly, did not come clean 
when caught, did not exclude a key professional from the trial team until over a week after 
the violation, and when called to account by the Superior Court, responded in a seemingly 
guileful and inept manner.  For these reasons, we fully understand and cannot fairly second-
guess the trial judge’s view that crafting some sort of “clean team” remedy going forward 
would not only fail to deter the State from repeating its admittedly already repetitious 
behavior, but would require the court to repose confidence that the same group of people 
who still fail to “get it” would implement with fidelity and skill a clean team remedy.224  
                                            
222 See, e.g. Morrison v. United States, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981) (referring to dismissal as a 
“drastic” remedy).   
223 During the two evidentiary hearings and briefing below, the State did not argue that its 
investigators did not come upon Robinson’s trial strategy during its review of Robinson’s attorney-
client communications.  And at oral argument in this Court, the State confirmed that it cannot 
dispute the Superior Court’s factual finding that the document review disclosed Robinson’s trial 
strategy.  Oral Argument at 20:47–21:23.   
224 Robinson, 2018 WL 2085066, at *16–17 (“Although the State has not even suggested an 
alternative remedy, the Court has considered, for example, requiring that all members of the 
Prosecution Team be replaced on any of the cases involving Defendant and that any work product 
69 
 
Forging a clean team solution in any situation like this is challenging; doing so when the 
organization that has to execute it has not proposed a viable approach of its own, 
fundamentally does not believe it did anything wrong, and already fumbled its first try at 
something like it is an exercise necessarily fraught with risk.  The trial judge’s decision 
that this risk should not be imposed upon the defendant at the instance of the party whose 
wrongful conduct gave rise to the problem needing solution—and the party that never 
proposed any alternative solution—is reasonable and deserves respect. 
So too is the trial judge’s view that without a stringent remedy the State has poor 
incentives to improve its behavior.225  In a future case, perhaps the State won’t be caught.  
And if it is, it can just insist that there is no harm, and propose no remedy.  Even if it loses 
on that argument, it will get a do over with a new trial team.   
This case is like a football team secretly stealing the other team’s game plan, not 
being honest about it when caught, and asking for the game to be played at a later time on 
a “just trust us, the folks who read your game plan will not be involved” basis.  Except that 
the stakes here involve a criminal defendant’s trial strategy and if the game is played later, 
                                            
they developed be destroyed so that a new prosecution team would have to develop a new strategy 
without any taint from the Protective Order Investigation . . . . This Court concludes, after careful 
review of the record and after much consideration, that these remedies are inadequate because the 
prejudice to Defendant is much broader, and the affront to the rule of law is more profound, than 
can be addressed by these limited remedies.”).   
225 Id. at *17 (“The constitutional rights of criminal defendants must be respected by the State and 
the rule of law demands accountability of prosecutors to the Court.  The nature of the violations 
of this Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel require dismissal 
of the Indictment because any lesser sanction would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the 
State's actions and the extent to which the State’s actions put at risk the most fundamental 
constitutional protections.”) (footnote omitted).   
70 
 
the defendant will not only face a serious delay in his trial and the corresponding staleness 
in memories of witnesses, but the quite rational concern that in fact the State’s prosecution 
team will have benefited from having access to his trial strategy and can use that access to 
improve its chances of convicting him. 
In this case, the State itself created the stark choice the trial judge faced.  Its 
obstinacy, lack of forthrightness, and failure to propose a confidence-inspiring remedy, or 
any remedy at all, was its own choice.  Confronted with the record the parties created, the 
trial judge made a tough and well-reasoned decision to remedy serious misconduct with a 
correspondingly serious remedy.  We would affirm.