Case Title: Governo Law Firm LLC v. Bergeron

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12948

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12948 
 
GOVERNO LAW FIRM LLC  vs.  KENDRA ANN BERGERON & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 6, 2021. - April 9, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Consumer Protection Act, Unfair or deceptive act, Trade secret.  
Conversion.  Practice, Civil, Instructions to jury, 
Injunctive relief, Interest.  Injunction.  Judgment, 
Interest.  Interest. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 27, 2016. 
 
 
The case was tried before Kenneth W. Salinger, J., an 
amended judgment was entered by him, a motion to deposit funds 
into court to satisfy a money judgment was considered by him, 
and a motion to modify a permanent injunction was also 
considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Kurt B. Fliegauf for the plaintiff. 
 
Peter F. Carr, II, for the defendants. 
 
 
 
1 Jeniffer A.P. Carson, Bryna Rosen Misiura, David A. 
Goldman, Brendan J. Gaughan, John P. Gardella, and CMBG3 Law 
LLC. 
2 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  Over the course of more than two decades 
representing clients in asbestos litigation, the plaintiff 
Governo Law Firm LLC (GLF) systematically created the contents 
of a research library, a treasure trove of materials amassed 
from GLF's own matters as well as other sources, that gave it a 
competitive edge in attracting and providing legal services to 
clients in this specialized field.  GLF also built electronic 
databases to render the library readily searchable, facilitating 
retrieval of the information.  In the fall of 2016, these 
proprietary materials were taken by a group of nonequity 
employees at GLF (attorney defendants) as they prepared to start 
a new law firm, the defendant CMBG3 Law LLC (CMBG3), in case 
their planned purchase of GLF proved unfruitful.  The attorney 
defendants took turns secretly downloading the library and 
databases, as well as GLF's employee handbook, other 
administrative materials, and client lists, onto high-capacity 
"thumb drives";2 the attorneys then surreptitiously removed these 
materials from GLF's offices.  They subsequently made an offer 
to GLF's sole owner, David Governo, to buy GLF, stating that 
they would resign if the offer were not accepted that day.  
Governo rejected the offer that same day and locked the attorney 
 
 
2 A "thumb drive" is an electronic data storage device.  See 
United States v. Burdulis, 753 F.3d 255, 258 (1st Cir. 2014).  
3 
 
defendants out of GLF's computer systems.  The next day, the 
attorney defendants opened for business under the previously 
incorporated CMBG3, where they used the stolen materials and 
derived profits therefrom.  
 
GLF filed a complaint in the Superior Court asserting 
claims against its former employees and CMBG3.  A jury found 
some or all of the defendants liable on the claims for 
conversion, breach of the duty of loyalty, and conspiracy,3 and 
none of the defendants liable for unfair or deceptive trade 
practices in violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 11.  The jury awarded 
GLF $900,000 in damages, calculated based on the defendants' net 
profits.  The judge then issued a permanent injunction enjoining 
the defendants from using the library and databases, and 
ordering those materials removed from the defendants' computers. 
 
In GLF's appeal from certain of the judge's instructions at 
trial, as well as his posttrial rulings, we first address the 
question whether the attorney defendants, who misappropriated 
proprietary materials from their employer during their 
employment, and subsequently used those materials to compete, 
may be liable for unfair or deceptive trade practices pursuant 
to G. L. c. 93A, § 11, for actions that were, in part, taken 
while still employed by GLF.  We conclude that that they, and 
 
 
3 The jury found CMBG3 liable for conversion and civil 
conspiracy.  
4 
 
their new firm, may be.  Because the judge erroneously 
instructed the jury that the defendants' preseparation conduct 
was not relevant to GLF's claim under G. L. c. 93A, § 11, and 
because GLF has shown that its rights were affected thereby, the 
matter must be remanded for a new trial on the G. L. c. 93A, 
§ 11, claim.  We next address the scope of the permanent 
injunction.  Although the jury found that the defendants were 
liable for conversion of GLF's proprietary materials, the judge 
issued a permanent injunction precluding the defendants' use of 
only a subset of these materials.  We conclude that the judge 
abused his discretion.  Finally, we consider GLF's claims with 
respect to pre- and postjudgment interest.  We conclude that 
prejudgment interest was not required under G. L. c. 231, § 6H, 
but that GLF is entitled to postjudgment interest. 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts in the light most 
favorable to GLF.  See Linkage Corp. v. Trustees of Boston 
Univ., 425 Mass. 1, 4, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1015 (1997).  
 
In 2016, the attorney defendants -- each a nonequity 
partner at GLF -- were considering acquiring GLF from its sole 
owner, Governo.  GLF was a law firm that specialized in 
representing insurance companies in asbestos litigation.  While 
the attorney defendants considered a potential purchase, they 
simultaneously pursued the possibility of starting their own 
firm, the defendant CMBG3.   
5 
 
 
In October of 2016, three of the attorney defendants began 
downloading materials from their GLF computers onto high-
capacity thumb drives.  The attorney defendants kept the copying 
secret from Governo, believing that, had he been aware of it, 
Governo would have prevented the copying.4  One of the attorney 
defendants indicated that it would have been to CMBG3's business 
detriment not to copy the material. 
 
The materials copied included three different types of 
information:  a research library, databases, and administrative 
files.  The research library contained over 100,000 documents 
relevant to asbestos litigation, including witness interviews, 
expert reports, and investigative reports, and was known within 
GLF as the "8500 New Asbestos Folder" (8500 folder).  The 
library was developed by GLF over a period of twenty years, at a 
cost of more than $100,000.5  According to testimony by GLF's 
expert, these materials were "extremely valuable" and provided a 
competitive advantage to GLF over other law firms within the 
field of asbestos litigation. 
 
 
4 At the time the files were copied, no client had agreed to 
transfer representation to (or was even aware of) the potential 
new firm. 
 
 
5 After each matter was closed, GLF would take whatever 
materials had been helpful in the litigation and put them in the 
8500 folder for potential use as a resource in future cases.  
Governo collected these materials over the course of his career.  
Some of the materials also came from attorneys within the 
asbestos litigation defense bar who had shared them with GLF.  
6 
 
 
The second category of copied materials, the databases, 
organized the GLF resources from the 8500 folder and elsewhere 
into categories, sortable by multiple criteria, such as legal 
theory or client.  One database, for instance, housed all 
materials related to the state-of-the-art defense as it is used 
in asbestos litigation.6  Another database contained literature, 
historical information, and scientific information concerning 
talc, a potential cause of mesothelioma.7  These databases, 
which, like the research library, were developed at a cost of 
over $100,000, were, according to GLF's expert, also extremely 
valuable and provided GLF a competitive advantage.  The third 
category of copied documents, the administrative files, included 
a manual on office procedures, an employee handbook, marketing 
materials, and client lists.  
 
Once the materials were downloaded onto the removable 
electronic devices, the defendants took the devices from GLF's 
offices.  After one of the attorney defendants had removed some 
 
 
6 The state-of-the-art defense precludes a manufacturer from 
being held liable "under an implied warranty of merchantability 
for failure to warn or provide instructions about risks that 
were not reasonably foreseeable at the time of sale or could not 
have been discovered by way of reasonable testing prior to 
marketing the product."  Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 
428 Mass. 1, 23 (1998). 
 
 
7 Mesothelioma is a deadly disease that can be caused by 
exposure to asbestos.  See Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co., 481 Mass. 529, 530-531 (2019).  
7 
 
materials himself, he sent a text message to another attorney 
defendant informing the attorney that she should bring a gym bag 
when she removed materials, in order not to arouse the 
suspicions of building security.  The attorney defendants then 
uploaded the copied information onto a laptop computer they had 
purchased for their new law firm. 
 
The attorney defendants incorporated CMBG3 on November 1, 
2016.  On November 18, 2016, they "hijack[ed]" the scheduled GLF 
partners' meeting and offered Governo $1.5 million in cash, plus 
net profits for some of the attorneys' work performed through 
the end of the year, to buy GLF.8  The attorney defendants gave 
Governo until 5 P.M. that day to respond and told Governo that 
if he rejected their offer, they would resign in thirty days. 
 
Governo rejected the offer that same day.  Two days later, 
on November 20, 2016, Governo sent an electronic mail message to 
the attorney defendants asking them to confirm that they had not 
taken and were not in possession of any GLF data.  The attorney 
defendants did not respond.  Governo then secured the attorney 
defendants' computer login information so they could not access 
 
 
8 An outside consultant had valued the firm at around $10 
million. 
 
8 
 
the GLF computer systems.9  The last day the attorney defendants 
were employed by GLF was November 20, 2016. 
 
By November 21, 2016, the attorney defendants were 
officially operating CMBG3.  They accessed GLF's materials (now 
on CMBG3's laptop) to assist in their representation of clients 
in paid legal work for CMBG3.  An analysis of the laptop 
computer suggested that users of it interacted with tens of 
thousands of the files.   
 
2.  Discussion.10  a.  General Laws c. 93A, § 11.  GLF first 
maintains that the judge provided an erroneous instruction to 
 
 
9 Governo allowed at least some of the attorney defendants 
access through November 29, 2016, in order to transition client 
work. 
 
 
10 The defendants contend, as they did in the Superior 
Court, that GLF's appeal insofar as it concerns its G. L. c. 93A 
claim and its claim to prejudgment interest is untimely.  On 
September 27, 2019, the trial judge allowed GLF's motion to find 
its notice of appeal, filed on September 18, 2019, timely filed.  
In a civil action, a party has thirty days to file a notice of 
appeal from "the date of the entry of the judgment . . . or 
adjudication appealed from."  Mass. R. A. P. 4 (a) (1), as 
appearing in 481 Mass. 1606 (2019).  "[A]bsent special 
authorization . . . an appellate court will reject attempts to 
obtain piecemeal review of trial rulings that do not represent 
final disposition on the merits" (citation omitted).  Theisz v. 
Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 481 Mass. 1012, 1014 (2018).  A 
judgment is not final for purposes of Mass. R. A. P. 4 (a) until 
all claims against all parties have been resolved.  See Jones v. 
Boykan, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 213, 218 (2009).  In this case, GLF's 
demand for equitable relief was not resolved until September 13, 
2019.  See Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 419 (2008) (order 
resolving liability but leaving unresolved demand for injunctive 
relief was not final); National Corn Growers Ass'n v. Bergland, 
611 F.2d 730, 732-733 (8th Cir. 1980) (judgment not final where 
it left undetermined issues concerning injunctive relief).  At 
9 
 
the jury in connection with GLF's G. L. c. 93A claim.  The 
instruction provided: 
"Conduct is part of trade or commerce, as a general matter, 
if it takes place in a business context and it's not 
personal or private in nature.  But by law an employee and 
employer are [not] in trade or commerce with each other for 
purposes of the statute.  That means that [G. L. c.] 93A 
does not apply to anything a defendant did toward the 
Governo Firm while they were still employed there.  So 
anything that happened before the 20th of November, 2016, 
whether it was negotiations, copying of materials, anything 
else[,] that's all irrelevant for purposes of [the G. L. 
c. 93A claim].  Instead for this claim the Governo Firm 
must prove the defendants did something to compete with the 
Governo Firm after they left that firm that was unfair or 
deceptive.  So given the evidence in this case, the Governo 
Firm must convince you that the defendant[s] used 
confidential information or documents belonging to the 
Governo Firm, to compete against that firm in an [unfair] 
or deceptive manner and that they did so after their 
employment at the Governo Firm had [ended]." 
 
GLF asserts that the instruction was erroneous because it 
precluded the jury from considering a critical aspect of the 
misconduct of the attorney defendants, that is, their copying 
and taking GLF's proprietary materials while they were GLF's 
employees.11 
 
that time, the judge "finally adjudicat[ed] the rights of the 
parties affected by the judgment."  Mass. R. Civ. P. 54 (a), 365 
Mass. 820 (1974).  It is clear, as the trial judge found, that 
GLF's notice of appeal, filed on September 18, 2019, was well 
within the thirty days provided by Mass. R. A. P. 4 (a) (1).  
 
 
11 The defendants mount an additional procedural challenge 
to GLF's G. L. c. 93A appeal, arguing that GLF did not preserve 
this issue for appeal.  See Mass R. Civ. P. 51 (b), 365 Mass. 
816 (1974).  To the contrary, GLF timely objected to the G. L. 
c. 93A instruction, repeatedly bringing to the judge's attention 
(both prior to and immediately following the jury charge) its 
10 
 
 
In examining whether an instruction "adequately explain[s] 
the applicable law," Kelly v. Foxboro Realty Assocs., LLC, 454 
Mass. 306, 316 (2009), we consider the "adequacy of the 
instructions as a whole," Selmark Assocs., Inc. v. Ehrlich, 467 
Mass. 525, 547 (2014).  "We review objections to jury 
instructions to determine if there was any error, and, if so, 
whether the error affected the substantial rights of the 
objecting party" (citation omitted).  Dos Santos v. Coleta, 465 
Mass. 148, 153-154 (2013).  "An error in jury instructions is 
not grounds for setting aside a verdict unless the error was 
prejudicial -- that is, unless the result might have differed 
absent the error."  Blackstone v. Cashman, 448 Mass. 255, 270 
(2007).  See Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 
432 Mass. 107, 118-119 (2000).  
 
General Laws c. 93A, § 11, provides,  
"Any person who engages in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce and who suffers any loss of money or 
property . . . as a result of the use . . . by another 
person who engages in any trade or commerce of . . . an 
unfair or deceptive act or practice[12] . . . may . . . bring 
an action in the [S]uperior [C]ourt . . . ."   
 
objections.  Indeed, the judge acknowledged GLF's objection and 
stated the instruction would stand.  There can be no doubt that 
GLF provided the judge with notice of the issue.  See Rotkiewicz 
v. Sadowsky, 431 Mass. 748, 751 (2000); Flood v. Southland 
Corp., 416 Mass. 62, 66-67 (1993).  
  
 
12 "[A] practice or act [is] unfair under G. L. c. 93A, § 2, 
if it is (1) within the penumbra of a common law, statutory, or 
other established concept of unfairness; (2) immoral, unethical, 
oppressive, or unscrupulous; or (3) causes substantial injury to 
11 
 
 
In order for G. L. c. 93A, § 11, to apply to a given dispute, 
there must be "a commercial transaction between a person engaged 
in trade or commerce and another person engaged in trade or 
commerce, such that they were acting in a 'business context.'"  
Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 563 (2008).  
See Szalla v. Locke, 421 Mass. 448, 451 (1995); Begelfer v. 
Najarian, 381 Mass. 177, 190-191 (1980).  Thus, purely intra-
enterprise disputes fall outside the reach of G. L. c. 93A, 
§ 11.  See Linkage Corp., 425 Mass. at 23 n.33.  See, e.g., 
First Enters., Ltd. v. Cooper, 425 Mass. 344, 347-348 (1997) 
(G. L. c. 93A, § 11, was inapplicable to internal business 
dispute between parties in same venture); Szalla, supra at 452 
(G. L. c. 93A, § 11, was inapplicable to dispute between 
partners in business venture); Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 402 Mass. 
650, 662–663 (1988) (G. L. c. 93A, § 11, was inapplicable to 
disputes between parties to joint venture and shareholders in 
close corporation); Riseman v. Orion Research Inc., 394 Mass. 
311, 313–314 (1985) (G. L. c. 93A, § 11, was inapplicable to 
corporate stockholder claims against corporation stemming from 
 
competitors or other business people" (citation omitted).  
Morrison v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 441 Mass. 451, 457 (2004).  
Likewise, a practice or act is "deceptive" for purposes of G. L. 
c. 93A "if it possesses a tendency to deceive" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., 442 Mass. 
381, 394 (2004). 
12 
 
dispute as to internal corporate governance of corporation).  
Accordingly, G. L. c. 93A, § 11, does not apply to employer-
employee disputes arising out of the employment relationship.13  
See Manning v. Zuckerman, 388 Mass. 8, 13-14 (1983).  
 
Importantly, however, the inapplicability of G. L. c. 93A, 
§ 11, to disputes arising from an employment relationship does 
not mean that an employee never can be liable to its employer 
under G. L. c. 93A, § 11.  To the contrary, we have recognized 
that G. L. c. 93A "is a statute of broad impact."  Slaney v. 
Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 693 (1975).  In carving out 
certain employment disputes from the otherwise broad reach of 
G. L. c. 93A, § 11, we have explained that such intracompany 
disputes are not "marketplace transactions," and instead concern 
"the ordinarily cooperative circumstances of the employment 
 
 
13 Of course, the inapplicability of G. L. c. 93A to 
disputes arising out of the employment relationship does not 
preclude application of G. L. c. 93A to CMBG3, which was not 
GLF's employee.  See, e.g., Augat, Inc. v. Aegis, Inc., 409 
Mass. 165, 172 (1991) (rejecting "the defendants' suggestion 
that, because an . . . employee could not be liable to 
[employer] under G. L. c. 93A," those participating in 
employee's breach "also may not be liable under G. L. c. 93A"); 
Peggy Lawton Kitchens, Inc. v. Hogan, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 937, 939 
(1984) (new company was liable under G. L. c. 93A for former 
employee's trade secret theft because new company "was never an 
employee" of plaintiff employer).  The challenged jury 
instruction did not differentiate between the conduct of the 
attorney defendants and CMBG3, erroneously suggesting that the 
jury could not consider the preseparation conversion by the 
attorney defendants when determining whether CMBG3 was liable 
under G. L. c. 93A, § 11.  
13 
 
relationship between an employee and the organization of which 
he [or she] is a member."  Manning, 388 Mass. at 13.  Where an 
employee misappropriates his or her employer's proprietary 
materials during the course of employment and then uses the 
purloined materials in the marketplace, that conduct is not 
purely an internal matter; rather, it comprises a marketplace 
transaction that may give rise to a claim under G. L. c. 93A, 
§ 11.  See, e.g., Specialized Tech. Resources, Inc. v. JPS 
Elastomerics Corp., 80 Mass. App. Ct. 841, 847 (2011) (employee 
who obtained trade secret during course of employment and 
misappropriated it in violation of confidentiality provision of 
employment contract was liable under G. L. c. 93A, § 11); Peggy 
Lawton Kitchens, Inc. v. Hogan, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 937, 939-940 
(1984) (employee who misappropriated trade secret while employed 
by plaintiff and then used trade secret to start his own 
competing business was liable under G. L. c. 93A, § 11).14  That 
the individuals were employees at the time of the 
misappropriation does not shield them from liability under G. L. 
c. 93A, § 11, where they subsequently used the ill-gotten 
materials to compete with their now-former employer.  
 
 
14 Compare Informix, Inc. v. Rennell, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 161, 
162-163 (1996) (former employee's violation of geographic 
proscription in noncompetition agreement was not subject to 
claim under G. L. c. 93A, § 11, because claim, which involved no 
theft of proprietary or confidential information, arose solely 
from employment relationship).   
14 
 
 
Here, the judge instructed the jury that G. L. c. 93A did 
not apply to "anything" the defendants did "while they were 
still employed" by GLF, and that the copying of GLF's materials, 
because it occurred prior to the attorney defendants' last day 
as GLF's employees, was "irrelevant" to the jury's determination 
of G. L. c. 93A liability.  In effect, the jury were instructed 
to ignore how the attorney defendants obtained GLF's materials 
in determining whether the subsequent use of those materials was 
unfair or deceptive.  Yet, the G. L. c. 93A, § 11, claim 
required the jury to consider that the attorney defendants stole 
GLF's materials in order to determine whether the subsequent use 
of these materials was unfair or deceptive.15  See Jet Spray 
Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 361 Mass. 835, 839 (1972) (explaining 
"basic principles of equity" as foundation for rule that 
employee "may be enjoined from using or disclosing confidential 
information" entrusted to employee during course of employment 
[citation omitted]).  
 
 
15 GLF's theory of liability under G. L. c. 93A, § 11, was 
not that its former employees could not plan and establish a 
competing law firm.  "[A]t-will employees should be allowed to 
change employers freely and competition should be encouraged."  
Augat, Inc., 409 Mass. at 172.  Nevertheless, there are "certain 
limitations on the conduct of an employee who plans to compete 
with his employer."  Id.  GLF's theory of liability under G. L. 
c. 93A, § 11, was that the attorney defendants crossed that 
line.  See Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 361 Mass. 835, 
839 (1972) (employee may not use or disclose confidential 
information learned during course of employment). 
 
15 
 
 
The erroneous instruction was prejudicial.  Had the jury 
considered the attorney defendants' conduct during their 
employment -- in particular, their conversion of GLF 
property16 -- the jury well might have reached a different 
result.17  Had they not been told to disregard this conversion, 
the jury could have found that the defendants' subsequent use of 
the converted materials was an unfair or deceptive act, 
rendering the defendants liable under G. L. c. 93A, § 11.  If 
the jury had done so, GLF would have been entitled to attorney's 
fees and potentially double or treble damages.  See G. L. 
c. 93A, § 11.  The error in the jury instruction thus affected 
GLF's substantial rights.  See Dos Santos, 465 Mass. at 153-154.  
Because GLF was prejudiced by the error, a new trial on GLF's 
G. L. c. 93A, § 11, claim is warranted.  See Pfeiffer v. Salas, 
360 Mass. 93, 101 (1971) (new trial warranted where jury 
instruction was not sufficiently clear). 
 
 
16 The jury found that each of the defendants converted GLF 
property.   
 
 
17 Applying the judge's instructions to disregard the 
attorney defendants' conduct prior to their termination, all 
that the jury could have considered was the defendants' conduct 
in maintaining a repository of helpful litigation documents and 
using those documents to recruit or represent clients, 
activities which do not fall within any ordinary definition of 
unfairness.  
 
16 
 
 
b.  Permanent injunction.  The jury found the defendants 
liable for conversion of GLF's proprietary materials -- the 
research library, databases, and administrative files.  The 
judge, however, only permanently enjoined the defendants with 
regard to the research library and the databases, apparently 
leaving the defendants free to continue their unrestricted 
access and use of the administrative files.18  Believing the 
omission of the administrative files from the scope of the 
permanent injunction to be inadvertent, GLF moved to modify the 
injunction.  The judge denied the motion, offering no 
explanation other than to observe that a trial judge has broad 
discretion to determine the appropriate scope of permanent 
injunctive relief and that he had entered the permanent 
injunction he deemed to be appropriate and equitable based on 
the evidence presented at trial.  As GLF contends, this was an 
abuse of discretion.  See LightLab Imaging, Inc. v. Axsun 
Techs., Inc., 469 Mass. 181, 194 (2014) (appellate standard of 
review of scope of permanent injunction is abuse of discretion).   
 
 
18 The injunction explicitly excluded files that had been 
transferred to the defendants or the defendants' clients after 
November 20, 2016, and any files the defendants had obtained 
from other sources.  GLF correctly concedes that it is not 
entitled to any client files where the clients requested to 
transfer their representation to CMBG3.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.15A (b), 480 Mass. 1316 (2018) (lawyer must make client's file 
available to client or former client).  
 
17 
 
 
While the scope of equitable relief is within the sound 
discretion of the trial judge, Commonwealth v. Adams, 416 Mass. 
558, 566 (1993), such discretion is not without limit, see 
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co., 381 Mass. 1, 
10 (1980).  Here, without explanation and with no evident basis 
in the record,19 the judge allowed the defendants to continue to 
use GLF's administrative files and thereby improperly permitted 
them to continue to benefit from their theft.  See Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition § 44 (1995).  See also Maxham v. 
Day, 16 Gray 213, 215 (1860) (common-law remedy of replevin 
allows owner to recover property that was wrongfully taken).  
 
 
19 The record supports the jury's finding that GLF was the 
rightful owner of the administrative files.  See Matter of 
Hilson, 448 Mass. 603, 611 (2007) (conversion requires finding 
plaintiff owns res).  The files included an employee handbook, 
an office procedures manual, a billing procedures manual, an 
asbestos litigation procedures manual, marketing materials, 
training materials for new employees, and GLF's client lists.  
The office procedures manual and employee handbook were 
developed "special[y]" for GLF and involved what Governo 
described as a great deal of effort.  The employee handbook was 
created in consultation with an employment attorney, and GLF 
made clear when it distributed the handbook that it was GLF's 
property.  Even where the underlying information is not 
confidential, materials a business creates can be proprietary to 
that business.  See DiAngeles v. Scauzillo, 287 Mass. 291, 297-
298 (1934).  Further, the administrative file included client 
lists, comprising over 300 pages and containing names, physical 
addresses, electronic mail addresses, and telephone numbers for 
each contact, as well as notes discussing many of the contacts.  
See New England Overall Co. v. Woltmann, 343 Mass. 69, 77-78 
(1961).  The record also supports the jury's finding that the 
defendants converted the administrative files; indeed, two 
defendants expressly acknowledged having copied these materials. 
18 
 
Accordingly, the exclusion of the administrative files from the 
scope of the permanent injunction was an abuse of discretion. 
 
c.  Prejudgment interest.  GLF maintains that the judge 
erred by vacating the assessment of prejudgment interest; GLF 
contends that the award of prejudgment interest was mandatory 
under G. L. c. 231, § 6H, which provides:  
"In any action in which damages are awarded, but in which 
interest on said damages is not otherwise provided by law, 
there shall be added by the clerk of court to the amount of 
damages interest thereon . . . from the date of 
commencement of the action . . . ."  
  
General Laws c. 231, § 6H, is a "catch-all interest provision," 
see Herrick v. Essex Regional Retirement Bd., 465 Mass. 801, 807 
(2013), that "reflects the Legislature's intent that prejudgment 
interest always be added to an award of compensatory damages," 
George v. National Water Main Cleaning Co., 477 Mass. 371, 378 
(2017).  GLF argues that this statute requires the addition of 
prejudgment interest to all monetary awards including where, as 
here, the monetary relief does not compensate GLF for its loss 
and instead is based on a defendant's profits.  Our review of 
this legal issue is de novo.  See Anastos v. Sable, 443 Mass. 
146, 149 (2004). 
 
In assessing whether G. L. c. 231, § 6H, requires the 
assessment of prejudgment interest on the disgorgement of the 
defendants' profits in this case, we are guided by the 
difference between compensatory damages, on the one hand, and 
19 
 
restitutionary remedies, on the other.  Under the common law of 
torts, at the time of an accident, an injured party accrues a 
right to be made whole and compensated for injuries wrongfully 
inflicted by the tortfeasor.  See Smith v. Massachusetts Bay 
Transp. Auth., 462 Mass. 370, 375 (2012).  There almost always 
is a delay, however, between the time of the tortious injury and 
the resolution of the resulting lawsuit.  See id.  "As a result 
of such delay, the plaintiff incurs additional injury, including 
the depreciation of his [or her] eventual recovery.  The award 
of [prejudgment] interest compensates the [injured party] for 
this additional injury."  (Citations omitted.)  Id.  See 
Anastos, 443 Mass. at 155 (prejudgment interest is awarded "so 
that a person wrongfully deprived of the use of money should be 
made whole for his [or her] loss" [citation omitted]); Conway v. 
Electro Switch Corp., 402 Mass. 385, 390 (1988) (prejudgment 
interest is "awarded to compensate a damaged party for the loss 
of use or the unlawful detention of money").  Thus, prejudgment 
interest "ensure[s] that a party is fully compensated for its 
injuries."  Boston Children's Heart Found., Inc. v. Nadal-
Ginard, 73 F.3d 429, 442 (1st Cir. 1996).   
 
Not every form of monetary relief, however, is compensatory 
in nature.  A monetary award based on disgorgement of profits, 
for example, is measured by the defendant's gain, rather than by 
the plaintiff's loss.  Such restitutionary recoveries are not 
20 
 
designed to make the plaintiff whole; as such, they are 
"distinct from damages, which measures compensation for loss 
rather than disgorgement of the defendant's gain."  See 3 D.B. 
Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 12.1(1), at 9 (2d ed. 1993).  See also 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 51 
(2011) (object of restitution in certain contexts is to 
eliminate profit from wrongdoing).  Thus, in USM Corp. v. Marson 
Fastener Corp., 392 Mass. 334, 349 (1984), we held that G. L. 
c. 231, § 6B,20 does not require the addition of prejudgment 
interest to a monetary award where the award is based on the 
defendant's profits.  We reasoned that, whereas prejudgment 
interest is designed to make a plaintiff whole, monetary relief 
based on a defendant's profits is not.  See USM Corp., supra.   
 
Moreover, a restitutionary award based on the defendant's 
gain can account for the delay between the filing of a cause of 
action and the eventual recovery by including in the calculation 
unjust profits earned subsequent to the filing of the complaint.  
See Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 377 Mass. 159, 182 n.21 
 
 
20 General Laws c. 231, § 6B, provides,  
 
"In any action in which a verdict is rendered or a finding 
made or an order for judgment made for pecuniary damages 
for personal injuries to the plaintiff or for consequential 
damages, or for damage to property, there shall be added by 
the clerk of court to the amount of damages interest 
thereon . . . from the date of commencement of the action 
. . . ."   
21 
 
(1979) (Jet Spray II).  Thus, in USM Corp., 392 Mass. at 349, we 
concluded that, because a monetary award based on disgorgement 
of the defendant's profits already accounted for the defendant's 
gain after commencement of the action, unlike a typical tort 
action where damages accrue at the time of injury, imposing 
prejudgment interest pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 6B, on the 
award of unjustly obtained profits from the commencement of the 
action would be misplaced.     
 
For the same reasons, prejudgment interest under G. L. 
c. 231, § 6H, does not apply to the monetary award here.  
Prejudgment interest applies to awards of compensatory damages 
because both prejudgment interest and compensatory damages seek 
to make a plaintiff whole.  See Smith, 462 Mass. at 375-376; 
Fontaine v. Ebtec Corp., 415 Mass. 309, 327 (1993).  In the 
circumstances of this case, however, GLF's recovery was based on 
the defendants' wrongful gains rather than on GLF's own losses.  
Accordingly, the jury's award did not seek to make GLF whole.  
Moreover, the jury award included the defendants' unjust profits 
gained during the time period that the case was pending.  
Providing prejudgment interest on the award, which already 
accounted for the profits during the pendency of the suit, would 
produce a windfall for GLF.  Compare Sterilite Corp. v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 397 Mass. 837, 841 (1986) ("The common law 
was particularly sensitive to the possibility that a liberal 
22 
 
award of prejudgment interest could result in a windfall for 
plaintiffs amounting, in essence, to an award of punitive 
damages").  GLF will not be "unfairly deprived of compensation," 
and the defendants will not be "unjustly enriched," if they are 
not required to pay prejudgment interest.  See Jet Spray II, 377 
Mass. at 183-184.  Accordingly, the jury's monetary award does 
not constitute damages within the meaning of G. L. c. 231, § 6H, 
and an assessment of prejudgment interest was not required.21   
 
d.  Postjudgment interest.  GLF contends that it is 
entitled to postjudgment interest and that the judge erred in 
determining that the defendants' deposit of funds with the court 
satisfied the judgment in full.  A decision on a motion to 
deposit funds is left to the sound discretion of the motion 
judge, see Commerce Ins. Co. v. Szafarowicz, 483 Mass. 247, 258 
(2019) (Szafarwicz); however, we review de novo the judge's 
 
 
21 The judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to 
award prejudgment interest under common-law principles.  A 
nonstatutory award of prejudgment interest depends on a 
balancing of the equities.  See USM Corp., 392 Mass. at 350.  
Here, the equities weigh against the imposition of prejudgment 
interest.  While prejudgment interest is meant to compensate a 
party for the delay between the commencement of a lawsuit and 
the eventual recovery, see Smith, 462 Mass. at 376, in this case 
the delay effectively was taken into account because GLF was 
able to argue that the defendants continued to receive unjust 
profits during the pendency of the litigation.  An award of 
interest thus is not necessary to compensate GLF for the delay 
between the date when the suit was filed in 2016 and the date 
that judgment entered in 2019.  Accordingly, the judge did not 
abuse his discretion in declining to award prejudgment interest 
under common-law principles.  
23 
 
legal conclusion that the defendants' deposit of funds 
terminated the accrual of postjudgment interest, see Brown v. 
Office of the Comm'r of Probation, 475 Mass. 675, 677 (2016).  
 
Postjudgment interest serves to compensate the prevailing 
party for any delay in payment.  See Anderson v. National Union 
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh PA, 476 Mass. 377, 383 (2017).  
Postjudgment interest accrues daily, see Trinity Church in 
Boston v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 405 Mass. 682, 684 
(1989), until the judgment is fully satisfied, see City Coal Co. 
of Springfield v. Noonan, 434 Mass. 709, 717 (2001) (Noonan).  
In this case, the defendants proposed to deposit $915,937.23 
with the court pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 67, 365 Mass. 835 
(1974); they were not willing to pay the funds directly to GLF 
if GLF pursued an appeal and asserted that the deposit would 
terminate the accrual of all postjudgment interest.  The judge 
allowed the defendants' motion to deposit funds and later 
clarified that he intended "both that those funds would 
constitute sufficient post-judgment security and that the 
payment would satisfy the judgment in full if the judgment is 
affirmed on appeal."  The defendants then deposited $915,937.23 
with the court. 
 
Contrary to the judge's determination, defendants may not 
escape the accrual of postjudgment interest by making an offer 
to satisfy the judgment conditioned on a party forgoing its 
24 
 
appellate rights.  See Szafarwicz, 483 Mass. at 261 ("unlike 
some other jurisdictions, rule 67 in Massachusetts does not 
expressly provide for abatement of postjudgment interest when 
money is deposited with the court").  The second amended 
judgment awarded GLF $915,937.23; until that judgment is 
satisfied, postjudgment interest will continue to accrue.  See 
Noonan, 434 Mass. at 717.   
 
3.  Conclusion.  So much of the judgment as concerns the 
denial of the claim under G. L. c. 93A, § 11, is vacated and set 
aside, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for a 
new trial on that claim.  The remainder of the judgment, and its 
exclusion of prejudgment interest, is affirmed.   
 
On remand, the permanent injunction issued on September 13, 
2019, shall be modified consistent with this opinion to include 
the return of the administrative files the defendants copied 
from GLF, the deletion of those files and any copies from 
CMBG3's electronic devices, and a certification from the 
defendants to that effect.   
 
The order that the defendants' deposit of funds with the 
court satisfies the judgment in full is vacated.  Postjudgment 
interest shall accrue at the statutory rate of twelve percent 
from the date of entry of the initial judgment on June 18, 2019, 
until the judgment is paid in full.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.