Case Title: Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP002489

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2489 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Deutsches Land, Inc.,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
City of Glendale,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  215 Wis. 2d 549, 573 N.W.2d 535 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 16, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 9, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
William J. Haese 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Prosser, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
 
 
part (opinion filed) 
 
 
Wilcox, J., joins 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Hugh R. Braun, Jeffrey L. Janik and Godfrey, Braun 
& Frazier, Milwaukee and oral argument by Hugh R. Braun. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
John F. Fuchs, City Attorney, Alan Marcuvitz, Robert L. Gordon 
and Weiss, Berzowski, Brady & Donahue, LLP, all of Milwaukee and 
oral argument by Robert L. Gordon. 
 
 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Sandra Stone Ruffalo, 
Milwaukee, for the Milwaukee Turners, Inc. 
 
 
Àmicus curiae was filed by Dominic H. Frinzi, 
Milwaukee, for the Italian Community Center, Inc. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Grant F. Langley, city 
attorney, Gregg C. Hagopian, assistant city attorney, Curtis A. 
Witynski and League of Wisconsin Municipalities, John E. Meyer 
and Wisconsin Association of Assessing Officers, all of 
Milwaukee, for the City of Milwaukee, League of Wisconsin 
Municipalities and Wisconsin Association of Assessing Officers. 
 
No.  96-2489 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
No. 96-2489 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Deutsches Land, Inc.,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Glendale,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
APR 16, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Deutsches 
Land, Inc. ("Deutsches Land") seeks review of a published 
decision of the Court of Appeals1 which reversed the circuit 
court's grant of exemptions from real property taxes.  Deutsches 
Land argues that as a benevolent association its property is 
entitled to exemption from Wisconsin property taxes under Wis. 
Stat. § 70.11 (1995-96).2  Because we find that Deutsches Land 
has not offered sufficient evidence to support its requested 
exemptions, we affirm the court of appeals. 
¶2 
Deutsches Land is a non-stock, non-profit corporation 
organized in 1967 under chapter 181 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  
                     
1 Deutsches Land v. City of Glendale, 215 Wis. 2d 549, 573 
N.W.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1997) (reversing judgment of Circuit Court 
for Milwaukee County, William J. Haese, Judge). 
2 Unless otherwise noted, all further references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes will be to the 1995-96 version.  
No.  96-2489 
 
2 
It primarily serves as a holding corporation for the real estate 
and fixed assets of five incorporated non-stock, non-profit 
benevolent associations.  See Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(2). 
 These five benevolent associationsD'Wendelstoana (dancing), 
D'Oberlandler 
(dancing), 
Gesang 
Verein 
Bavaria 
(singing), 
Vergnuegungs Club (social), and the Bavarian Soccer Club 
(soccer) (collectively, "the benevolent associations")exist for 
the purpose of preserving Germanic heritage and culture. 
¶3 
For 
the 
benefit 
of 
the 
benevolent 
associations, 
Deutsches Land holds title to roughly 14 acres of property 
located in the City of Glendale.  Though the property officially 
comprises a single parcel, Deutsches Land treats this 14-acre 
property as if it were four "lots."3  Two of the lots have 
buildings upon them and the remaining two lots, totaling 
approximately five and one half acres, are soccer fields. 
¶4 
One of the two lots containing buildings is called 
"Old Heidelberg Park" which covers almost four and a half acres. 
 Old Heidelberg Park is the site at which the benevolent 
associations conduct two major public festivals, Volksfest and 
Oktoberfest.  These festivals are a significant source of fund-
raising income for the benevolent associations.  Additionally, a 
                     
3 The record indicates that at some time in the past 
Deutsches Land had taken the preliminary steps to platting and 
subdividing the 14 acres into four lots.  For whatever reason, 
that process was never completed.  Nevertheless, the fiction of 
the four lots is immaterial to our analysis for purposes of this 
case, and we will treat the single parcel as if it were divided 
in four. 
No.  96-2489 
 
3 
12,000 square foot "Fest Hall" and other minor outbuildings are 
located in Old Heidelberg Park.  Any one of the benevolent 
associations may use the park and the Fest Hall.  In the winter 
months, the Fest Hall is used at various times by the soccer 
club for indoor practice.   
¶5 
While Deutsches Land does not officially lease the 
park to any entity, Deutsches Land allows Bavarian Waldhaus, 
Inc. ("Waldhaus") to use it on approximately 20 occasions 
annually.  Waldhaus is a for-profit corporation created by the 
benevolent associations to isolate their for-profit activities 
and owned by the benevolent associations in five equal shares.  
On those 20 yearly occasions, Waldhaus uses the park to host 
corporate picnics at which it supplies the food and beverage.  
The corporations that arrange with Waldhaus to hold their event 
in Old Heidelberg Park do not need to be, and as a rule are not, 
affiliated with the benevolent associations in any way.   
¶6 
The Bavarian Inn lot of four acres contains a parking 
area for the entire 14-acre parcel as well as a significant 
structure that houses the Bavarian Inn restaurant, which is a 
full-service, for-profit bar and banquet facility open to the 
general public.  The Bavarian Inn building has two floors.  The 
main floor contains a bar, dining area, and banquet hall in 
addition to the kitchen, rest rooms, coatroom, and other 
miscellaneous space associated with a restaurant.  The lower 
floor, which is accessible both from the main floor and from a 
separate outdoor entrance, is divided into three more banquet 
rooms (named the "Rathskeller," "Weinstube," and "Edelweiss"), 
No.  96-2489 
 
4 
the offices of the Bavarian Inn, and a storage area for the 
benevolent associations.   
¶7 
Though Deutsches Land owns the land on which the 
Bavarian Inn sits as well as the building itself, it contracts 
with Waldhaus to operate the Bavarian Inn restaurant.  Waldhaus 
has in the past entered into a formal lease with Deutsches Land 
for the entire Bavarian Inn building, although the lease terms 
required Waldhaus to allow the benevolent associations to use 
any part of the facility without charge.  The last formal lease 
expired in 1990.  However, the relationship between Waldhaus, 
the benevolent associations, and Deutsches Land has remained 
essentially the same since that time.   
¶8 
The record, though not altogether clear, indicates 
that most areas of the Bavarian Inn are used at certain times by 
members of the benevolent associations and at other times by 
Waldhaus.  For example, while the benevolent associations most 
often use either the Rathskeller, Weinstube, or Edelweiss for 
their gatherings, it is not uncommon for them to also use the 
banquet hall on the main floor.  Similarly, while Waldhaus 
normally uses the facilities on the main floor, it is not 
uncommon for Waldhaus to occupy the Rathskeller, Weinstube, or 
Edelweiss for banquets.  The record indicates that the only 
space in the Bavarian Inn used solely by the benevolent 
associations is the storage area in the lower level of the 
building.  All other areas are used both by Waldhaus and the 
benevolent associations. 
No.  96-2489 
 
5 
¶9 
Although this arrangement between Deutsches Land and 
Waldhaus has been in place since 1967, Deutsches Land first 
sought an exemption from Wisconsin property taxes in 1993.  
Specifically, Deutsches Land now seeks a full exemption for the 
soccer fields and Old Heidelberg Park and a 25% exemption for 
the Bavarian Inn building for the years of 1993-95.  Glendale 
denied the applications and Deutsches Land filed suit in the 
Circuit Court of Milwaukee County.  The circuit court ruled that 
Deutsches Land was entitled to a full exemption on the soccer 
fields and Old Heidelberg Park and a 25% exemption for the 
Bavarian Inn building.4   
¶10 Glendale appealed and the court of appeals reversed.  
The court of appeals determined that Deutsches Land had not 
satisfied the "used exclusively" requirement of Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.11(4) and thus could not receive an exemption for Old 
Heidelberg Park and the Bavarian Inn lot.  Citing the same 
subsection, it also concluded that there was no evidence in the 
record that the soccer fields were necessary for the location 
and convenience of any building that was exempt from taxation.  
Accordingly, it held that Deutsches Land was not entitled to a 
real property tax exemption on any of its property. 
¶11 In asking this court to rule that it is entitled to an 
exemption from real property taxes, Deutsches Land necessarily 
                     
4 The circuit court determined that no part of the land of 
the Bavarian Inn lot was eligible for exemption because such an 
exemption would exceed the 10-acre maximum exemption of Wis. 
Stat. § 70.11(4). 
No.  96-2489 
 
6 
requires us to construe Wis. Stat. § 70.11.  The construction of 
statutes is a question of law which we review independent of the 
legal conclusions reached by the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  Colby v. Columbia County, 202 Wis. 2d 342, 349, 550 
N.W.2d 124 (1996).  While we grant deference to the circuit 
court's factual findings, we review de novo the application of 
those facts to the law.  Peplinski v. Fobe's Roofing, Inc., 193 
Wis. 2d 6, 19, 531 N.W.2d 597 (1995). 
¶12 In interpreting statutes, our primary purpose is to 
give effect to the legislature's intent.  State ex rel. Angela 
M.W. v. Kruzicki, 209 Wis. 2d 112, 121, 561 N.W.2d 729 (1997).  
To this end, we look first to the language of the statute, and 
if that language is unambiguous, we construe the statute in 
accordance with its ordinary meaning.  If, on the other hand, 
the statutory language is ambiguous, we look to the legislative 
history in order to ascertain both the legislature's purpose for 
enacting the statute and its intent as to the statute's meaning. 
 Stockbridge School Dist. v. Department of Public Instruction, 
202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996). 
¶13 In Wisconsin, the taxation of property is the rule and 
exemption 
is 
the 
exception. 
 
Engineers 
& 
Scientists 
of 
Milwaukee, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 38 Wis. 2d 550, 553, 157 
N.W.2d 572, 574 (1968); Trustees of Indiana Univ. v. Town of 
Rhine, 170 Wis. 2d 293, 299, 488 N.W.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1992).  In 
general, we apply a "strict but reasonable construction" to tax 
exemption statutes.  Columbia Hospital Association v. City of 
Milwaukee, 35 Wis. 2d 660, 668, 151 N.W.2d 750 (1967); Madison 
No.  96-2489 
 
7 
Aerie No. 623 F. O. E. v. City of Madison, 275 Wis. 472, 476, 82 
N.W.2d 207 (1957).  Since exemption from the payment of taxes is 
an act of legislative grace, the party seeking the exemption 
bears the burden of proving that it falls within a statutory 
exemption.  Pulsfus Farms v. Town of Leeds, 149 Wis. 2d 797, 
811, 440 N.W.2d 329 (1989).  Consequently, any doubt under the 
"strict but reasonable" construction rule must be resolved 
against the party seeking the exemption.  Columbia Hospital, 35 
Wis. 2d at 668. 
Old Heidelberg Park 
¶14 The 
bulk 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.11 
delineates 
organizations and institutions that have the possibility of an 
exemption.  As a threshold requirement, an organization that 
seeks an exemption under § 70.11 must fall within one or more of 
the specified categories outlined in the statute.  See Frank 
Lloyd Wright Foundation v. Town of Wyoming, 267 Wis. 599, 606-
08, 66 N.W.2d 642 (1954). 
¶15 Deutsches Land seeks a total exemption from real 
property taxes on Old Heidelberg Park and the Fest Hall.  It 
claims that it is entitled to such an exemption under Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.11(4).  The relevant statutory language is as follows: 
 
 
70.11 Property exempted from taxation.  The 
property described in this section is exempted from 
general property taxes . . . . 
 
 
(4) 
EDUCATIONAL, 
RELIGIOUS 
AND 
BENEVOLENT 
INSTITUTIONS; WOMEN'S CLUBS; HISTORICAL ASSOCIATIONS; 
FRATERNITIES; 
LIBRARIES. 
Property 
owned 
and 
used 
exclusively 
by . . . educational 
or 
benevolent 
associations, . . . but not exceeding 10 acres of land 
No.  96-2489 
 
8 
necessary for location and convenience of buildings 
while such property is not used for profit . . . . 
¶16 We have on prior occasions stated that, to qualify for 
a total exemption under Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4), an organization 
must 
show 
three 
facts: 
 
(1) 
that 
it 
is 
a 
benevolent 
organization, (2) that it owns and exclusively uses the 
property, and (3) that it uses the property for exempt purposes. 
 See Milwaukee Protestant Home v. City of Milwaukee, 41 Wis. 2d 
284, 293, 164 N.W.2d 289 (1969).  Both Deutsches Land and 
Glendale are in agreement that the five associations noted above 
are 
benevolent 
associations 
for 
purposes 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.11(4).5  However, the parties' agreement goes no further.  
Specifically, Glendale and Deutsches Land are in disagreement 
over the requirements that the property be "used exclusively" 
for "exempt purposes." 
¶17 Glendale argues that Deutsches Land has not satisfied 
the "used exclusively" requirement of Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4) 
because Waldhaus used the park to host for-profit corporate 
picnics on approximately 20 occasions annually.  The court of 
appeals agreed, stating that 
 
[s]ection 70.11(4), Stats., requires as a condition to 
the 
tax 
exemption 
it 
grants 
to 
"benevolent 
associations" that the property be "used exclusively 
by" those benevolent associations and not for profit. 
 This 
condition 
is 
not 
ambiguous: 
the 
term 
"exclusively" brooks no exceptions.   
                     
5 Though it does not dispute that the Bavarian Soccer Club 
is a benevolent association, Glendale disputes that the playing 
and teaching of soccer is done for a benevolent or educational 
purpose.  We will assume, without deciding, that such activity 
is covered by Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4).   
No.  96-2489 
 
9 
Deutsches Land, 215 Wis. 2d at 554 (citations omitted).  While 
the court of appeals' "brooks no exceptions" statement is an 
appealing rhetorical pronouncement, we ultimately cannot agree 
with such an interpretation.   
¶18 The fact of the matter is that we have brooked 
exceptions 
to 
the 
requirement 
that 
exempted 
property 
be 
exclusively used by the benevolent organization so that the 
"plain intent of the statute" is not frustrated.  Catholic 
Woman's Club v. City of Green Bay, 180 Wis. 102, 105, 192 N.W. 
479 (1923).  In Northwestern Publishing House v. City of 
Milwaukee, 177 Wis. 401, 408-09, 188 N.W. 636 (1922), we 
concluded that the phrase "used exclusively" did not preclude a 
religious association from occasionally engaging in commercial 
publishing where that publishing constituted less than one 
percent of its business.  Similarly, in Cardinal Publishing Co. 
v. City of Madison, 205 Wis. 344, 347-48, 237 N.W. 265 (1931) 
("Cardinal Publishing I"), we determined that "used exclusively" 
did not preclude "inconsequential or incidental uses of the 
property for gain."  See also Columbia Hospital, 35 Wis. 2d at 
671. 
¶19 If our construction of the phrase "used exclusively" 
has brooked some exceptions, those exceptions have not swallowed 
the rule.  In Gymnastic Association of the South Side of 
Milwaukee v. City of Milwaukee, 129 Wis. 429, 109 N.W. 109 
(1906), we concluded that the Gymnastic Association did not 
exclusively use their entire property when they leased out 
portions of the building to the purveyors of a public saloon and 
No.  96-2489 
 
10
barbershop.  We noted a legitimate distinction between use that 
is "incidental to and promotive of the main purpose for which a 
building is primarily devoted and the permanent leasing of parts 
of the building for uses having no relation to the owner's 
principal purpose."6  Id. at 437.  Similarly, in Cardinal 
Publishing Co. v. City of Madison, 208 Wis. 517, 519, 243 N.W. 
325 (1932) ("Cardinal Publishing II"), we stated that commercial 
publishing 
income 
of 
roughly 
ten 
percent 
of 
an 
exempt 
organization's total income "cannot be claimed as incidental, 
negligible, or inconsequential" and, as a result, the property 
was not used exclusively under the statute. 
¶20 In general, the relevant question is this:  How 
consequential was the questionable activity when compared to the 
total activity on the property?  See, e.g., Cardinal Publishing 
I, 205 Wis. at 347; Cardinal Publishing II, 208 Wis. at 519.  
This fact-specific question can only be answered on a case-by-
case basis. 
¶21 We have, on prior occasions, held that the proper 
comparison is actual non-exempt use as against actual exempt 
use.  Alonzo Cudworth Post No. 23 v. City of Milwaukee, 42 
Wis. 2d 1, 13, 165 N.W.2d 397 (1969); see also Trustees of 
                     
6 At the time we decided Gymnastic Association of the South 
Side of Milwaukee v. City of Milwaukee, 129 Wis. 429, 109 N.W. 
109 (1906), the statute did not contain a partial exemption 
provision:  the property was either completely exempt or 
completely taxed.  We declined to judicially create such a 
provision, instead deferring the consideration of that task to 
the legislature.  Id. at 438. 
No.  96-2489 
 
11
Clinton Lodge v. Rock County, 224 Wis. 168, 172, 272 N.W. 5 
(1937).  Requiring a benevolent association to show how the 
property is actually used is merely a part of the association's 
burden to show that it falls "within the terms of the 
exemption."  Alonzo Cudworth, 42 Wis. 2d at 13 (quoting 
Methodist Episcopal Church Baraca Club v. City of Madison, 167 
Wis. 207, 167 N.W. 258 (1918)).  In order to sustain its burden 
of proof, Deutsches Land must show its actual exempt use. 
¶22 Benevolent ownership of property is not enough to 
satisfy the dictates of Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4); benevolent use of 
that property is also required.  State ex rel. State Ass'n. of 
Y.M.C.A. v. Richardson, 197 Wis. 390, 392, 222 N.W. 222 (1928); 
Dominican Nuns v. City of La Crosse, 142 Wis. 2d 577, 581, 419 
N.W.2d 263 (Ct. App. 1987).  Just as a benevolent association 
can own title to property without actually using it for 
benevolent purposes, a benevolent association can own title to 
property without actually using it at all.  See, e.g., Green Bay 
& Mississippi Canal Co. v. Outagamie County, 76 Wis. 587, 591, 
45 N.W. 536 (1890).  In either case, the benevolent association 
is not entitled to an exemption from property taxes.  See, e.g., 
Men's Halls Stores, Inc. v. Dane County, 269 Wis. 84, 69 N.W.2d 
213 (1955); Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 76 Wis. at 591.  
It is therefore necessary for a benevolent association to detail 
its use of the property so that tax assessors know what types of 
activities, if any, are occurring on the property.   
¶23 In many situations a benevolent association will 
demonstrate that its use of the property is so pervasive that 
No.  96-2489 
 
12
the association should be treated as if it is in continual use 
of the property.  That is to say, a school will likely not 
receive only a 75% exemption because classes are not held in the 
summer months.  While such treatment may not be unusual, it is 
not as the dissent would have it automatic.  Dissent at 13, 18. 
 As with every aspect of property tax exemptions, the burden to 
demonstrate the use of the property lies with the party seeking 
the exemption.  See Pulsfus Farms, 149 Wis. 2d at 811; Alonzo 
Cudworth, 42 Wis. 2d at 13; Methodist Episcopal Church Baraca 
Club, 167 Wis. at 211.  The benevolent association that uses its 
property only occasionally and allows it to lie fallow at all 
other times will have any exemption reflect its actual usage.  
Similarly, the benevolent association that uses it property only 
occasionally and allows others to use it for profit at other 
times will have any exemption reflect its actual usage. 
¶24 Deutsches Land maintains, and the dissent agrees, that 
its use of Old Heidelberg Park is so pervasive that the 
occasional 
use 
of 
the 
park 
for 
corporate 
picnics 
is 
inconsequential.  That may in fact be the case, but it is not so 
based on this record.7   
                     
7 Even assuming that Deutsches Land had offered sufficient 
evidence to show that its usage of the park was so pervasive to 
warrant a comparison of 20 days of corporate use to 345 days of 
benevolent use, we maintain doubts with the dissent's contention 
that this percentage of for-profit activityroughly 6%is 
inconsequential or incidental.  Dissent at 12.  Compare 
Northwestern Publishing House v. City of Milwaukee, 177 Wis. 
401, 408-09, 188 N.W. 636 (1922) (for-profit income .00277% of 
total income deemed inconsequential); with Cardinal Publishing 
Co. v. City of Madison, 208 Wis. 517, 519, 243 N.W. 325 (1932) 
(for-profit income 10.7% of total income not inconsequential).   
No.  96-2489 
 
13
¶25 Deutsches Land argues that the 20 days of corporate 
use ought to be measured against the remaining 345 days of the 
year.  To substantiate its claim that the corporate use of the 
park consisted of approximately 20 occasions annually, Deutsches 
Land properly proffered copies of business records reflecting 
this usage.  From these records, Glendale and the circuit court 
obtained concrete information upon which to base this part of 
the calculation.  However, to substantiate its claim that the 
benevolent societies' use of the park was so pervasive so as to 
be calculated at 345 days, Deutsches Land offered only the 
testimony of benevolent association members who made generalized 
assertions about the associations' use.  Although apparently it 
keeps a calendar and other records of the park's usage, 
Deutsches Land did not attempt to solidify those generalized 
assertions by introducing those records or reports generated 
from those records.  As a result, Glendale and the circuit court 
could do nothing but speculate on the actual benevolent use of 
the park. 
¶26 As is more fully detailed in the discussion of the 
Bavarian Inn below, such unsupported opinion testimony, absent 
more, insufficiently demonstrates the actual use of the property 
in order to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 70.11.  Deutsches Land offered 
sufficient evidence of only the actual corporate use of Old 
                                                                  
Even if Old Heidelberg Park was ineligible for a total 
exemption this would not, as we explain later, preclude 
Deutsches Land from seeking a partial exemption for the park.  
To do so successfully, of course, it must adequately prove its 
case.   
No.  96-2489 
 
14
Heidelberg Park; it did not do so for the actual benevolent use 
of the park.   
¶27 Alonzo Cudworth dictates that Deutsches Land is not 
entitled to an exemption for Old Heidelberg Park or the Fest 
Hall on this record.  42 Wis. 2d at 13.  In allowing such 
exemption, the dissent overrules Alonzo Cudworth sub silentio 
and replaces it instead with a "benevolent control" test.  
Dissent at 9.  It is unclear where the dissent derives its 
contention that exercising "control" of property entitles a 
benevolent association to an exemption.  Such a new test is not 
supported by our existing case law. 
¶28 We 
have 
repeatedly 
stressed 
that 
a 
benevolent 
association must do more than own or control property to claim 
an exemption; it must also use that property for benevolent 
purposes.  See, e.g., Alonzo Cudworth, 42 Wis. 2d at 12-13; 
Men's Halls Stores, Inc., 269 Wis. at 89; Clinton Lodge, 224 
Wis. at 172-73; Richardson, 197 Wis. 2d at 392; Green Bay & 
Mississippi Canal Co., 76 Wis. at 591; Evangelical Lutheran 
Synod, 125 Wis. 2d at 545 n.3; Dominican Nuns, 142 Wis. 2d at 
581.  The dissent's alteration of our long-standing precedent is 
unwarranted.  Deutsches Land, like any other entity seeking an 
exemption, must show that its actual use of the property was for 
benevolent purposes.  On this record, Deutsches Land did not 
adequately make this showing and the exemption must be denied. 
Bavarian Inn 
¶29 Deutsches Land also sought a property tax exemption on 
its activities at the Bavarian Inn.  It recognized that 
No.  96-2489 
 
15
Waldhaus' for-profit activity at the Bavarian Inn meant that the 
Inn did not qualify for a total exemption.  Instead, Deutsches 
Land sought a partial exemption of 25% of the building based on 
the activities that the benevolent associations conduct at the 
Bavarian Inn.  Deutsches Land claimed its entitlement to a 
partial exemption under Wis. Stat. § 70.11(8),8 which provides in 
relevant part: 
 
(8) TAXED IN PART. Property that is exempt under this 
section and that is used in part in a trade or 
business for which the owner of the property is 
subject to taxation under sections 511 to 515 of the 
internal revenue code, as defined in s. 71.22(4m), 
shall be assessed for taxation at that portion of the 
fair market value of the property that is attributable 
to the part of the property that is used in the 
unrelated trade or business.  This subsection does not 
apply to property that is leased by an exempt 
organization to another person . . . .9 
                     
8 In 1997, the legislature repealed and recreated Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.11(8) as § 70.1105.  1997 Wis. Act 35 § 243.  That 
legislative action only altered the placement of the statutory 
provision and did not alter its substance in any way.  Since 
this case involves the years 1993-95, we will refer to the 
placement of the provision as § 70.11(8) rather than as its 
current statutory designation. 
9 We note that Wis. Stat. § 70.11(8) begins with "Property 
that is exempt under this section . . . ."  Read literally, this 
phrase may require property to be totally exempt under the 
statute in order for subsection (8) to apply.  This would mean 
that the property needs to be "used exclusively" by the exempt 
organization 
for 
exempt 
purposes. 
 
However, 
such 
an 
interpretation would render subsection (8) meaningless.  The 
reason an exempt organization seeks a partial exemption is 
precisely because it does not exclusively use its property for 
exempt purposes.  Our interpretation of subsection (8) must give 
effect to the subsection's overall purpose of allowing an exempt 
organization to claim partial exemptions. 
No.  96-2489 
 
16
¶30 Since 1931, this state has recognized the ability of 
an exempt organization to receive a property tax exemption on 
only part of its property.  See § 2, ch. 302, Laws of 1931.  
Under the statutory scheme in place from 1931 until 1991, 
determining the taxable part of an exempt organization's 
property was accomplished by calculating how much of the 
property was used for "pecuniary profit."  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.11(8) (1989-90); Trustees of Clinton Lodge, 224 Wis. at 
171-173.   
¶31 However, in 1991, the legislature repealed the "taxed 
in part" subsection and recreated it with the language that 
appears above.  1991 Wis. Act 39, § 1706t.  Two important 
changes were instituted by the 1991 recreation.  First, the 
legislature replaced the "pecuniary profit" test with the 
"unrelated business taxable income" test borrowed from the 
Internal Revenue Code.  As noted in a report from the 
legislative history, this change was driven by a legislative 
desire to remove advantages that exempt organizations were 
perceived to have under the pecuniary profit test: 
 
[t]he primary objective of adopting the unrelated 
business income tax law was to eliminate a source of 
unfair competition by placing the unrelated business 
activities of certain exempt organizations upon the 
same tax basis as the nonexempt business endeavors 
with which they compete. 
Report:  Shared Revenue, Property Taxes and Tax Relief, p. 5. 
(drafting file, 1991 Wis. Act 39, § 1706t). 
¶32 Second, the legislature made Wis. Stat. § 70.11(8) 
inapplicable where an exempt organization leases its property.  
No.  96-2489 
 
17
The inescapable conclusion drawn from the language of subsection 
(8) is that an exempt organization that leases a portion of its 
property cannot claim a partial exemption under subsection (8). 
¶33 These two changes are embodied in the post-1991 
versions of the Property Assessment Manual for Wisconsin 
Assessors ("Assessment Manual") published by the Department of 
Revenue.10  The Assessment Manual describes what constitutes 
unrelated business taxable income and offers examples of 
activities that are considered for-profit and taxable. See 
Assessment Manual, 22-6, 22-7 (revised 12-95).  Notably, the 
examples offered in the Assessment Manual demonstrate that Wis. 
Stat. § 70.11(8) does not apply to situations where an exempt 
organization leases a part of its property to another entity 
that engages in for-profit activity.11  Rather, subsection (8) 
                     
10 Because 
the 
legislature 
charged 
the 
Department 
of 
Revenue, in light of its special expertise in this area, with 
interpreting and applying the recreated Wis. Stat. § 70.11(8), 
we 
accord 
weight 
to 
the 
agency's 
interpretation 
in 
the 
Assessment Manual.  See Hagen v. LIRC, 210 Wis. 2d 12, 18-20, 
563 N.W.2d 454 (1997); 1991 Wis. Act 39, § 1897t, codified at 
Wis. Stat. § 73.03(2a).  
11  A couple of the manual's examples adequately demonstrate 
the point: 
Examples of activities that are considered unrelated 
trade or business are: 
• a lodge operates a restaurant which is regularly 
open to the public. 
• a university owned printer which primarily prints 
material for the university also regularly does 
printing for the public. 
 
No.  96-2489 
 
18
applies to those situations where the exempt organization itself 
engages in the for-profit activity. 
¶34 In 
such 
situations, 
the 
Department 
of 
Revenue, 
pursuant to its charge of interpreting and applying Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.11(8), has set forth three methods of calculating a partial 
exemption under subsection (8).  Where only a defined and 
segregated 
part 
of 
the 
property 
is 
used 
in 
for-profit 
activities, 
the 
partial 
exemption 
can 
be 
calculated 
by 
subtracting the square footage of that part of the property used 
in the for-profit activity from the square footage of the entire 
property.  Assessment Manual, 22-6, 22-7.  Conversely, where the 
entire property is used part of the time in for-profit 
activities, the partial exemption can be calculated in one of 
two ways.  The partial exemption can either be determined by 
comparing the percentage of income attributable to the for-
profit 
activity 
versus 
the 
total 
income 
of 
the 
exempt 
organization, 
or 
by 
comparing 
the 
percentage 
of 
time 
attributable to the for-profit activity versus the total time 
the property is used.  Id.   
¶35 An exempt organization's ability to get a partial 
exemption 
under 
the 
recreated 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.11(8) 
is 
                                                                  
Assessment Manual, 22-6 (Revised 12/95).  Neither any example 
nor any statement of general principles set forth in the manual 
even hints that the subsection would apply to a situation where 
an exempt organization leases a part of its facility to another 
person who engages in for-profit activity.  Instead, if the 
lodge itself operates a restaurant or an exempt printer itself 
does commercial printing, subsection (8) can apply.   
No.  96-2489 
 
19
substantially limited by that subsection's "no lease" sentence. 
 However, both the testimony of the City of Milwaukee's chief 
assessor, Peter Weissenfluh,12 and the joint amicus brief of the 
City of Milwaukee, the League of Wisconsin Municipalities, and 
the Wisconsin Association of Assessing Officers ("the joint 
amici"), indicate that assessors who process partial exemption 
applications look beyond subsection (8) in their analysis.  
According to Weissenfluh and the joint amici, it is the well-
established practice and the standard methodology of assessors 
in this state to look additionally to the introductory phrase of 
§ 70.11, which is also referred to by the parties as the 
"preamble."  The relevant language is as follows: 
 
 
70.11 Property exempted from taxation.  The 
property described in this section is exempted from 
general property taxes. Leasing a part of the property 
described in this section does not render it taxable 
if the lessor uses all of the leasehold income for 
maintenance of the leased property, construction debt 
retirement of the leased property or both and if the 
lessee would be exempt from taxation under this 
chapter if it owned the property.  Any lessor who 
claims that leased property is exempt from taxation 
under this chapter shall, upon request by the tax 
assessor, provide records relating to the lessor's use 
of the income from the leased property.  (emphasis 
added) 
¶36 Construing what we refer to as the "preamble partial 
exemption provision" is a matter of first impression for this 
                     
12 Weissenfluh's particular expertise was noted by both 
Deutsches Land and the City of Glendale.  Not only has 
Weissenfluh been an assessor for 25 years, he also has been the 
chief assessor in the state's largest city which annually 
receives 500 applications and administers 7,000 exemptions. 
No.  96-2489 
 
20
court.  The preamble does not explicitly allow an exempt 
organization to lease a part of its property to a for-profit 
organization and still maintain the exemption on the non-leased 
part.  However, that consequence reasonably follows from the 
expressed language.   
¶37 The 
preamble 
language 
states 
that 
an 
exempt 
organization may lease a part of its property and still be 
exempt from property taxes on that leased part so long as 
certain conditions are met.  Those conditions are (1) the exempt 
organization must use the leasehold income for maintenance of 
the property, construction debt retirement, or both (the "rent 
use condition") and (2) the lessee would itself be entitled to 
an exemption if it owned the property (the "lessee identity 
condition").  If the exempt organization uses the rental income 
in ways other than provided for by the statute, no exemption can 
be claimed on the leased part of the property.  Likewise, if the 
lessee itself is not an exempt organization but rather a for-
profit organization, no exemption can be claimed on the leased 
part of the property. 
¶38 Under the preamble to Wis. Stat. § 70.11, an exempt 
organization that leases a part of its property retains a total 
exemption so long as it meets both the rent use condition and 
the lessee identity condition.13  Consequently, if a lease by an 
                     
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.11(4) adds a third "racial non-
discrimination" condition to the two contained in the preamble: 
 "in addition to the requirements specified in the introductory 
phrase of this section, the lessee does not discriminate on the 
basis of race." 
No.  96-2489 
 
21
exempt organization fails either of these two conditions, the 
exempt organization loses its total exemption but retains a 
partial exemption on the property that is not leased. 
¶39 In reality, the only material distinction between the 
Wis. Stat. § 70.11(8) partial exemption provision and the 
preamble partial exemption provision is whether a lease is in 
existence.  If a lease is not present, the exempt organization 
should 
seek 
a 
partial 
exemption 
under 
subsection 
(8).  
Conversely, if a lease is present, the exempt organization 
should seek a partial exemption under the preamble.  In other 
respectssuch as sufficiency of proofpartial exemptions are 
treated the same whether they are derived from the preamble or 
§ 70.11(8).  
¶40 According to the brief of the joint amici and the 
testimony of Weissenfluh, the methodologies set forth in the 
Assessment Manual for calculating a partial exemption under Wis. 
Stat. § 70.11(8) are the same methodologies used by assessors 
for 
calculating 
a 
partial 
exemption 
under 
the 
preamble.  
Therefore, under either the preamble or subsection (8), the 
amount of the partial exemption can be determined by calculating 
the percentage of space or time used in for-profit activities or 
                                                                  
Thus, an organization that claims its exemption under 
subsection (4) and leases a part of its property must satisfy 
three conditions to maintain its total exemption:  (1) the rent 
use condition; (2) the tenant identity condition; and (3) the 
"racial non-discrimination" 
condition. 
 
Should 
the 
exempt 
organization's lease fail any of these three conditions, the 
leased part of the property loses its exemption.  
No.  96-2489 
 
22
the percentage of income that is attributable to the for-profit 
activity.  See Assessment Manual, 22-6, 22-7. 
¶41 The dissent fails to discern that in practical terms, 
the existence of a lease makes little difference in the ultimate 
determination of whether an organization is entitled to a 
partial exemption.  It contends that if a lease were present, 
Deutsches Land would be ineligible for an exemption under either 
Wis. Stat. § 70.11(8) or the § 70.11 preamble.  Dissent at 17 
n.7.  This misses the full purpose of the preamble.  If the 
dissent were correct, a benevolent association could only lease 
"a discrete part"apparently meaning a discrete geographical 
part 
of 
its 
propertywithout 
completely 
destroying 
its 
exemption.  Id.  According to the dissent, the benevolent 
association that leases the entire geography of its property 
only part of the time (and uses the entire geography of its 
property the balance of the time) does not lease its property 
"in part" and therefore cannot hope to claim any exemption. 
¶42 Curiously, the dissent fails to articulate why the 
word "part" in the preamble only references a geographic 
subdivision of the benevolent association's property.  "Part" is 
not so limited by its context in the preamble.  Moreover, the 
word "part" in Wis. Stat. § 70.11(8) encompasses a broader 
meaning than the dissent is willing to attribute to it as seen 
in the word's interpretation in the Assessment Manual, 22-7.  
Why should the legislature's use of "part" in the preamble be 
treated differently than its use of "part" in § 70.11(8)?  The 
dissent fails to offer an answer. 
No.  96-2489 
 
23
¶43 Additionally the dissent's interpretation, aside from 
its failure to consider the language of the preamble and its 
relationship with Wis. Stat. § 70.11(8), would have serious 
practical repercussions for many exempt organizations in this 
state.  For example, under the dissent's interpretive scheme, 
one of the three benevolent organizations Peter Weissenfluh 
identified at trial as offering sufficient documentation for its 
exemption application would in future years nonetheless be 
categorically ineligible for any exemption whatsoever because it 
leased its entire property to a for-profit entity at limited 
times while using the property for its activities at all other 
times.  The dissent leaves a whole category of benevolent 
organizations ineligible to obtain any sort of exemptionfull or 
partialin the future.  That approach represents a significant 
and unwarranted departure from both the statutory provisions as 
well as the current practices.   
¶44 Regardless of which of the two partial exemption 
provisions is applicable in a particular case, the organization 
seeking the exemption retains the burden to show that it has 
satisfied the evidentiary requirements of the statute.  On this 
record, 
Deutsches 
Land 
did 
not 
sufficiently 
prove 
its 
entitlement to a partial exemption under either of the two 
partial exemption provisions.  It sought and received from the 
circuit court a 25% exemption on the Bavarian Inn building based 
primarily on two facts:  the square footage of the main and 
lower floors of the Bavarian Inn and the testimony by the 
general manager of the Bavarian Inn detailing the percentage of 
No.  96-2489 
 
24
usage by the benevolent associations.  These evidentiary 
offerings are not sufficient to entitle Deutsches Land to a 
partial exemption.   
¶45 First, since the record reflects that both the main 
and lower floors were used by both the benevolent associations 
and Waldhaus, both floors were used for exempt and for for-
profit activity.14  Therefore, under these facts, comparing the 
square footage of the main floor with the square footage of the 
lower floor does not provide support for its claim of exemption. 
  
¶46 Second, Deutsches Land's evidence of the Bavarian 
Inn's 
percentage 
of 
for-profit 
use 
did 
not 
adequately 
demonstrate how the Inn was actually used.  Deutsches Land's 
evidence primarily consisted of the testimony of the general 
manager of the Bavarian Inn.  She testified that every facility 
in the Inn was used at least part of the time by the public.  In 
opining that the benevolent associations used approximately 40% 
of the Bavarian Inn and the public used approximately 60%, she 
relied on her general observations and recollections.  Reviewing 
an excerpt of her testimony demonstrates its deficiencies:   
 
                     
14 The record does indicate that a storage area of some sort 
exists on the lower floor that is used only by the benevolent 
associations.  However, nothing in the record indicates the size 
of this room.  Deutsches Land, if it desired to claim an 
exemption based the size of this space, needed to provide the 
proper evidence to support its exemption claim.  Again, it has 
not done so. 
No.  96-2489 
 
25
Q. 
Do you keep any records of how many events these 
clubs as clubs have in thethe main banquet room 
. . . ? 
 
A. 
Yes, I do. 
 
Q. 
How does that break down as between the use by 
the public? 
 
A. 
For the ballroom only? 
 
Q. 
For the ballroom only. 
 
A. 
I really don't have that, you know, the knowledge 
right now.  I'd have to look at my records. 
¶47 The general manager's opinion of 40% exempt use and 
60% for-profit use was not documented by supporting evidence.  
Rather, as the general manager herself stated, it was based 
entirely on her "observations" from a year of employment as the 
Bavarian Inn's general manager.  While the general manager 
hinted that her observations were informed by business records, 
Deutsches Land did not offer into evidence any records or any 
reports created from those records.  Unfortunately, as this 
record exists, we are left with no way to know how accurately 
the general manager's memory corresponds with the actual usage. 
¶48 The insufficiency of Deutsches Land's evidence is 
amplified when it is compared to the evidence other exempt 
organizations have proffered to support their applications for 
partial exemptions.  At trial, Chief Assessor Weissenfluh 
testified about the documentation certain exempt organizations 
in Milwaukee have offered to support their applications.  A few 
of the responses are enlightening: 
 
No.  96-2489 
 
26
Q. 
[I]f there were to be 20,000 square feet of 
usable 
space 
in 
the 
building, 
did 
the 
[exempt 
organization] come and say, of that 20,000 square feet 
available for use in the building, 15,000 square feet 
or some such number is what is exclusively used for 
our purposes and 5,000 square feet is devoted to 
another purpose or something like that? 
 
A. 
They had it broken down in more detail than that. 
 
Q. 
In other words, room by room detail? 
 
A. 
Maybe not room by room, but banquet hall, museum, 
gift shop, separate areas of the building specifically 
with those sizes and with the percentage of time it 
was used for. 
 
Q. 
Well now, let me get to the percentage of time.  
What kind of information did they give you as to 
percent that supported percentages of time? 
 
A. 
They actually spelled out the percentages of time 
that was used forfor for-profit activities and then 
the corollary would be the not-for-profit, their own 
use.  
 
. . .  
 
Q. 
And . . . how were you able to determine the 
question of area of use and degree of use? 
 
A. 
Again, theI requested full documentation by the 
[exempt organization] relative to the amount of space 
used by the [exempt organization].  And what they gave 
me was a breakdown of how often thethethe facility 
was 
used, 
by 
whom, 
specifically 
the 
[exempt 
organization], and other not-for-profit organizations. 
. . .  
 
Q. 
As I understand it, the applicant for exemption 
for [the exempt organization's property] provided a 
calendar which accounted for every minute of every day 
by every entity; is that correct? 
 
A. 
That's right, it was a very detailed document. 
No.  96-2489 
 
27
¶49 In comparison, we conclude that the general manager's 
"recollections" and "observations" fail to satisfy Deutsches 
Land's burden of proof.  An exempt organization must base its 
claim for an exemption on more than merely unsupported opinion 
testimony. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion in awarding a partial exemption on these facts.  
Brabec v. Brabec, 181 Wis. 2d 270, 283, 510 N.W.2d 762 (Ct. App. 
1993); see also Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 
N.W.2d 16 (1981).  
Soccer Fields 
¶50 Deutsches Land sought a full exemption on the soccer 
fields.  It asserts that because those fields are used 
exclusively by the benevolent soccer organization, they are 
entitled to a total exemption under Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4).   
¶51 While the soccer fields may be used exclusively by the 
soccer club, that fact alone does not automatically dictate an 
exemption.  Wisconsin Stat. § 70.11(4) requires that even if a 
benevolent 
association 
exclusively 
uses 
its 
property 
for 
benevolent purposes, the benevolent association is only entitled 
to 
an 
exemption 
on 
property 
"not 
exceeding 
10 
acres 
. . . necessary for location and convenience of buildings while 
such property is not used for profit."   
¶52 The exemption of land is tied to, and follows from, 
the exemption of buildings.  This means that land devoid of 
buildings cannot qualify for an exemption under Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.11(4).  See Richardson, 197 Wis. at 392; Green Bay & 
Mississippi Canal Co., 76 Wis. at 591.  Similarly, if no part of 
No.  96-2489 
 
28
a building qualifies for an exemption, then no part of the land 
"necessary for [the] location and convenience" of that building 
will qualify for an exemption.  
¶53 Based on this record, Deutsches Land is not entitled 
to an exemption on the soccer fields. No building exists on the 
soccer fields that could reasonably be considered to require 
such an expanse of land for its necessity and convenience.  The 
dissent contends that a 1,500 square foot locker room/rest room 
facility that apparently is located near one of the soccer 
fields satisfies the statute.  Dissent at 6-7.  It is odd that 
the dissent is willing to hang its hat on this relatively minor 
building 
when 
the 
existence 
of 
the 
facility 
was 
only 
tangentially mentioned at trial.  Indeed, in its brief to this 
court Deutsches Land does not even mention this building, let 
alone contend that it satisfies the dictates of Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.11(4).   
¶54 It is hard to imagine that expansive soccer fields are 
"necessary for location and convenience" of a locker room/rest 
room facility.  One would reasonably assume that such a facility 
was constructed for the convenience of the soccer fields and not 
the other way around.  However, the statute does not allow 
exemptions for "buildings necessary for the location and 
convenience of lands."   
¶55 As a result, to satisfy the building requirement, the 
soccer fields would need to be necessary for the location and 
convenience of some building located elsewhere on the 14-acre 
parcel that qualifies for an exemption.  However, as discussed 
No.  96-2489 
 
29
above, under this record Deutsches Land is not entitled to any 
exemption on either Old Heidelberg Park or the Bavarian Inn.  
Since there are no buildings eligible for an exemption on this 
record, it necessarily follows that the soccer fields are not 
entitled to an exemption.15 
Conclusion 
¶56 In summary, we conclude that Deutsches Land has not 
sufficiently shown that it is entitled to an exemption from real 
property taxes for the years of 1993-95.  Deutsches Land is a 
benevolent association under Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4).  This was 
never in dispute.  However, Deutsches Land did not produce 
sufficient evidence showing that the corporate use of Old 
Heidelberg Park was incidental in comparison to the benevolent 
use of the park.  Similarly, Deutsches Land did not sustain its 
burden of proving entitlement to a real property tax exemption 
for the Bavarian Inn.  It failed to produce sufficient evidence 
to measure a comparison between for-profit and exempt use of 
space, time, or income.  Because of its evidentiary failure to 
support an exemption for any building, Deutsches Land is not 
                     
15 Because we dispose of Deutsches Land's claim on these 
grounds, we do not need to resolve other issues raised by the 
parties.  In Interest of Courtney E., 184 Wis. 2d 592, 603, 516 
N.W.2d 422 (1994).  Namely, we do not decide whether the playing 
and teaching of soccer is indeed a benevolent or educational 
activity contemplated by Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4).  See Kickers of 
Wisconsin, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 197 Wis. 2d 675, 541 
N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1995).  Also, we do not decide whether the 
acreage of the soccer fields was land "necessary for location 
and convenience" of the Bavarian Inn building or Fest Hall.  See 
Friendship Village Milwaukee v. City of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 
787, 795, 535 N.W.2d 111 (Ct. App. 1995).  
No.  96-2489 
 
30
entitled to an exemption on the soccer fields.  It failed to 
show that the soccer fields are "necessary for [the] location 
and convenience" of any building that is exempt under § 70.11.  
Accordingly, although we disagree with some of its rationale, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
1 
¶57 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, 
J.    
(Concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part).  I concur in the majority's conclusion that 
Deutsches Land is not entitled to a 25 percent property tax 
exemption on the Bavarian Inn; but I dissent from its denial of 
exemptions for Lots 1, 3, and 4.  Because this case is highly 
fact-intensive, some of the facts will be restated. 
¶58 Deutsches Land, Inc. is a benevolent association which 
holds 14 acres of property in the City of Glendale for five 
other benevolent associations.  Under Wisconsin law, benevolent 
associations may seek exemption from property tax for up to 10 
acres of their property, but they must satisfy the conditions 
set out in the statute. 
¶59 On December 30, 1994, Deutsches Land brought an action 
in the circuit court of Milwaukee County seeking a declaratory 
judgment that it was entitled to a total tax exemption on Lots 
1, 3, and 4 of its Glendale property and a partial tax exemption 
on the improvements to Lot 2 of its Glendale property.  The 
action 
was 
commenced 
after 
Deutsches 
Land 
had 
filed 
an 
unsuccessful claim with the city and had attempted to secure a 
full or partial exemption through negotiation. 
¶60 After a bench trial, Circuit Judge William J. Haese 
determined that "Lots 1, 3, and 4 of the property of Deutsches 
Land, Inc. located at 700 W. Lexington Boulevard . . . are 
exempt form [sic] real property taxation under sec. 70.11(4), 
Stats., for the years 1993, 1994 and 1995."  The court also 
ruled that 25 percent of the Bavarian Inn on Lot 2 was exempt 
from property taxation.  These determinations were all reversed 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
2 
by the court of appeals, and it is that decision which is under 
review by this court. 
I. 
 
¶61 Lots 1 and 4 of Deutsches Land's Glendale property are 
soccer fields.  Together, they total about 5.6 acres.  Lot 4, on 
the north end of the property, contains a full-sized soccer 
field and a 1,500 square foot locker room with showers and 
washroom facilities.  Lot 1, on the south end of the property, 
is a soccer practice area.  Lots 1 and 4 are used by the 
Bavarian Soccer Club, one of the five benevolent associations 
which own Deutsches Land.  The circuit court found that: 
 
The Bavarian Soccer Club was founded in 1929 and 
conducts a year-round program for its 600 members.  It 
has progressed from soccer played primarily by its own 
adult members to a recreational activity of choice for 
male German immigrants to include an elaborate youth 
program recently developed for the children of members 
and as an outreach to other children in the community. 
 Today 13 youth teams with approximately 15 members 
per team participate in soccer on the fields located 
on Lexington Avenue.  There are six adult teams, a 
women's team, a major competitive team, an over-30 
team, and interestingly, an under-100 team.  The 
club's announced purpose and activities serve to 
perpetuate an interest in the game of soccer as part 
of the Bavarian tradition and to train Germanic youth 
in the game of soccer and provide them with a 
wholesome recreational outlook.  The languages of the 
club are both English and German.  It makes daily use 
of the outdoor soccer facilities on Lots 1 and 4 
during the season from early spring to mid fall.  
Practices and tournaments continue throughout the year 
and require practice sessions.  Winter practice takes 
place in Fest Garden [Fest Hall], located in Old 
Heidelberg Park.  Petitioner's Appendix at 112-13. 
 
 
 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
3 
 
 
A. 
 
¶62 The city contends that Deutsches Land may not claim 
exemption for Lots 1 and 4 because the playing and teaching of 
soccer are not exempt activities under Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4).  
For this proposition, the city relies on Kickers of Wisconsin, 
Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 197 Wis. 2d 675, 541 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. 
App. 1995).  The majority assumes, without deciding, that the 
playing and teaching of soccer are covered by § 70.11(4).  I 
would determine that the activities here are covered by the 
statute and that Kickers is distinguishable. 
 
¶63 In Kickers, the organization seeking a tax exemption 
did not own the land for which it sought exemption.  Rather, it 
leased the land from the Robert A. Uihlein, Jr. 1976 Trust.  
City of Milwaukee Chief Assessor Peter C. Weissenfluh advised 
Kickers of Wisconsin, after reviewing the materials submitted by 
the organization "and the relevant assessment case law," that he 
had "no doubts that if Kickers owned the property it would 
qualify for the ten acre exemption.  I still have doubts about 
the ownership issue, and have denied the exemption on that 
basis."  Letter of July 20, 1993, from Peter C. Weissenfluh to 
Timothy C. Frautschi.  Exhibit C, Appellant's Appendix in 
Kickers of Wisconsin, supra.  
 
¶64 When Kickers went to court, the City of Milwaukee took 
the position that a soccer club did not qualify for the 
exemption; and the circuit court agreed, holding that Kickers 
did not qualify as an "educational association" entitled to the 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
4 
property tax exemption under § 70.11(4).  This decision was 
affirmed by the court of appeals in a 2 to 1 decision.  The 
majority declared that the case "presents a relatively 'close 
call' in determining whether Kickers is 'substantially and 
primarily devoted to educational purposes.'"  Kickers, 197 Wis. 
2d at 685.  But the court said the organization failed to meet 
the two-step test for "educational associations" set out in 
Janesville Community Day Care Ctr., Inc. v. Spoden, 126 Wis. 2d 
231, 376 N.W.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1985).16  The court also noted that 
while Kickers of Wisconsin claimed it qualified as a benevolent 
association, "Kickers fails to specifically support its argument 
with reference to a benevolent association."  Kickers, 197 Wis. 
2d. at 681 n.2. 
                     
16  In his dissent, Judge Ralph Adam Fine wrote: 
In my view, the uncontroverted evidentiary submissions 
establish 
without 
a 
doubt 
that 
the 
Kickers 
of 
Wisconsin, Inc., is an "educational association" as 
that term is used in § 70.11(4), STATS. . . .  It is 
settled that "educational" is not limited to "'formal 
academic curricula.'" . . .  The Kickers have an 
admirable record of teaching our state's youngsters 
not 
only 
the 
principles 
of 
soccer, 
but, 
more 
significantly, 
the 
principles 
of 
sportsmanship, 
teamwork, and life.  In my view, this is not a 
"relatively 'close call,'" as the Majority believes. 
 
Kickers of Wisconsin, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 197 Wis. 
2d 675, 687, 541 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
5 
 
¶65 There are clear differences between this case and 
Kickers.17  The Bavarian Soccer Club is one of the owners of 
Deutsches Land which owns the lots; and both Deutsches Land and 
the 
Bavarian 
Soccer 
Club 
are 
indisputably 
benevolent 
associations.  These benevolent associations are using Lots 1 
and 4 for exactly the purpose expected and intended by their 
benevolent status.  Consequently, the Kickers case does not 
control here, and this court would be hard pressed to deny a tax 
exemption on Lots 1 and 4 to Deutsches Land on grounds that the 
organization does not satisfy the criteria for a benevolent 
association engaging in appropriate activity.18 
B. 
¶66 Even though it is a benevolent association, Deutsches 
Land must satisfy another condition in the statutes, i.e., that 
its "land" (Lots 1 and 4) is "necessary for location and 
convenience of buildings while such property is not used for 
profit."  Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4).   
¶67 In its argument, Deutsches Land attempted to establish 
that the Bavarian Inn was a partially exempt building and that 
                     
17 Peter C. Weissenfluh testified as a witness for Deutsches 
Land in this case.  He explained some of the differences between 
Deutsches Land and Kickers of Wisconsin as organizations and 
stated that Kickers had not directly applied to Milwaukee for a 
tax exemption but rather had raised the issue on appeal.   
18 Peter C. Weissenfluh testified that Milwaukee recognizes 
boccie ball as an authorized exempt activity at the Italian 
Community Center and gymnastics as an authorized exempt activity 
at Turner Hall.  Cf. Gymnastic Association of the South Side of 
Milwaukee v. City of Milwaukee, 129 Wis. 429, 109 N.W. 109 
(1906).   
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
6 
the soccer fields were necessary for location and convenience of 
this building where the soccer club frequently congregates.  
This argument fails because the Bavarian Inn did not qualify as 
exempt. 
¶68 There are, however, two other buildings that may serve 
as the foundation for the exemption of Lots 1 and 4.  First, 
there is the 1,500 square foot "restroom-locker room" with 
shower facilities for soccer players located on Lot 4.  This 
building is listed in the Tax Exemption Reports filed by 
Deutsches Land with the city in 1993, 1994, and 1995, and it was 
described in testimony at trial.  Second, there is Fest Hall, 
the 12,000 square foot building used for indoor soccer during 
the winter months.  This building is located on Lot 3, which is 
substantially contiguous to Lots 1 and 4.  
¶69 For the Bavarian Soccer Club, soccer is a year-round 
activity.  It is played outdoors "daily . . . from early spring 
to mid fall."  It is played indoors during the winter. 
¶70 A benevolent association which seeks to promote soccer 
as a year-round activity would likely locate a building for 
indoor practice near land available for outdoor practice and 
competition.  In addition, a building that is used for indoor 
soccer practice in winter is theoretically available for indoor 
soccer practice in summer during inclement weather.  Fest Hall 
on Lot 3 and any building on Lot 3 which provides storage for 
outdoor soccer equipment are convenient to Lots 1 and 4; and, 
conversely, Lots 1 and 4 are convenient to Fest Hall and to any 
storage buildings.  Lots 1 and 4 are clearly convenient to the 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
7 
relatively new building with washroom, locker room, and shower 
facilities on Lot 4, which would have been purposely located 
near the outdoor soccer areas.  The relationship between the 
land and these buildings is symbiotic.  Hence, Lots 1 and 4 are 
wholly or partially exempt from property taxation if any of the 
buildings to which they are convenient are wholly or partially 
exempt. 
II. 
A. 
¶71 The new "restroom-locker room" with showers for soccer 
players is designed to advance the exempt purpose of the 
benevolent association; and it is not used for any inconsistent 
purpose.  The building is not used for profit by either members 
or non-members.  It is not leased.  The record reveals no reason 
why this soccer-related building should not be exempt from 
taxation and thereby qualify Lots 1 and 4 for exemption. 
B. 
¶72 The exact status of Fest Hall is a more difficult 
question.  Fest Hall, where indoor soccer is played, is part of 
Lot 3, Old Heidelberg Park.  Lot 3 has 4.4 acres and includes a 
number of small buildings in addition to Fest Hall.  The five 
benevolent associations use Lot 3 in their activities, and Lot 3 
is the site of two major festivals that raise funds for these 
organizations. 
¶73 The status of Lot 3 is in dispute because Deutsches 
Land permits Bavarian Waldhaus Inn, Inc., the profit-making 
entity which operates the Bavarian Inn on Lot 2 for the 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
8 
benevolent associations, to use Old Heidelberg Park, including 
Fest Hall, on approximately 20 occasions annually for such 
Bavarian Inn customers as the Milwaukee Medical Clinic, Mortgage 
Guaranty Insurance Corporation, W. H. Brady Co., Master Lock, 
and Johnson Controls. 
¶74 The requirements for total exemption are set out in §  
70.11(4): 
 
. . . Property exempted from general property taxes 
is: 
 
(4) . . . Property owned and used exclusively by . . . 
benevolent associations . . . but not exceeding 10 
acres of land necessary for location and convenience 
of buildings while such property is not used for 
profit. . . .  Property that is exempt from taxation 
under this subsection and is leased remains exempt 
from taxation only if, in addition to the requirements 
specified in the introductory phrase of this section, 
the lessee does not discriminate on the basis of race. 
 (Emphasis added).19 
¶75 To qualify Fest Hall and Lot 3 for total exemption 
under this subsection, Deutsches Land was required to satisfy 
several statutory criteria.  The key criteria were summarized by 
the city in its brief, drawing on language from Milwaukee 
Protestant Home v. City of Milwaukee, 41 Wis. 2d 284, 293, 164 
N.W.2d 289 (1969), to wit:  ". . . a property owner claiming 
exemption has the burden to demonstrate (1) that it is a 
                     
19 The requirements in the "introductory phrase of this 
section" include the following:  "Leasing a part of the property 
described in this section does not render it taxable if the 
lessor uses all of the leasehold income for maintenance of the 
leased property, construction debt retirement of the leased 
property or both and if the lessee would be exempt from taxation 
under this chapter if it owned the property." 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
9 
benevolent 
association; 
(2) 
that 
the 
property 
is 
used 
exclusively for the association's benevolent purpose; and (3) 
that the property is not used for profit."  Defendant-
Appellant's brief at 11.  We are concerned here with the second 
and third points. 
"USED EXCLUSIVELY" 
¶76 The court of appeals declared that § 70.11(4) requires 
"that the property be 'used exclusively by' those benevolent 
associations and not for profit. . . .  This condition is not 
ambiguous:  the term 'exclusively' brooks no exceptions."  
Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 215 Wis. 2d 552, 557, 
573 N.W.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1997).   
¶77 The 
majority 
properly 
disagrees 
with 
this 
characterization of the law.  Majority op. at 9.  Instead, it 
declares that the relevant question is, "How consequential was 
the questionable activity when compared to the total activity on 
the property?"  Majority op. at 10. 
¶78 In answering this question, the facts are completely 
clear.  In 1993, Old Heidelberg Park was used by customers of 
the Bavarian Inn 17 times; in 1994, 21 times; in 1995, 20 times. 
 The customers included not only several major corporations but 
also a labor union, a high school class reunion, and two 
weddings.  The benevolent associations controlled Lot 3 at all 
other times.  In 1993, the benevolent associations exercised 
control over their property 348 days; in 1994, 344 days; in 
1995, 345 days, and during these days, the property was 
available exclusively for their use.  It may have been available 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
10
for their non-exclusive use on some of the other days.  During 
winter months, Fest Hall was used daily or almost daily for 
indoor soccer practice.  During summer months, the entire lot 
was used for a variety of benevolent association activities 
including festivals, picnics, fish fries, and ceremonies, and 
Fest Hall could have been used for occasional soccer practice.  
There was no use of Old Heidelberg Park by non-members in the 
months of January, February, March, April, May, October, 
November, and December in 1993, 1994, or 1995. 
¶79 Several cases help define the element of exclusive 
use.20  In Cardinal Publishing Co. v. City of Madison, 205 Wis. 
344, 347-48, 237 N.W. 265 (1931) ("Cardinal Publishing I"), this 
court said: 
 
If there is no segregation of property and devotion of 
a portion of it to purposes outside of the corporate 
objects, but if the whole property in a physical sense 
is 
primarily 
devoted 
to 
the 
purposes 
of 
the 
organization, then the fact that there are occasional 
or incidental uses of the property for gain, which is 
devoted to the purposes of the society claiming the 
exemption, will not destroy the exemption. 
In another case, Northwestern Publishing House v. Milwaukee, 177 
Wis. 401, 409, 188 N.W. 636 (1922), the court said: 
 
. . . the departure in this case is so slight as to be 
negligible and therefore to be disregarded . . . [It] 
does not amount to a sufficient departure to warrant 
                     
20  See also Catholic Woman's Club v. Green Bay, 180 Wis. 
102, 192 N.W. 479 (1923).  The club was not operated for profit, 
but the club was used by non-members and its auditorium was 
frequently rented to other organizations and for "private 
dancing parties."  The non-member activities did not nullify its 
exemption. 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
11
us in saying that the property is not used exclusively 
for educational and benevolent purposes, particularly 
where such work is done as incidental to its main 
purpose. 
Applying these cases to the facts above, I find that non-member 
uses of Lot 3 were inconsequential or de minimis. 
USE FOR PROFIT 
¶80 Use for profit is a separate element.  The circuit 
court found that Deutsches Land did not profit from the 
occasional uses of its property by non-members.  It found that 
Waldhaus Inn used Old Heidelberg Park "without charge."  It 
stated: 
 
Waldhaus Inn, Inc., in the years in question, held 
approximately 20 non-member events in Old Heidelberg 
Park without charge.  Waldhaus Inn realized income 
which was duly reported by Waldhaus Inn, Inc. on its 
tax returns.  None of the income from non-member 
events was distributed to Deutsches Land, United 
German Societies or any of the five societies.  
(Emphasis added.) 
Petitioner's Appendix at 114.  The dates in June, July, August, 
and September each year when Lot 3 was used by non-members 
produced no revenue for Deutsches Land.  They produced zero 
percent of Deutsches Land's budget.   
¶81 The circuit court explicitly found that Deutsches 
Land's sources of income were rent obtained from Waldhaus Inn, 
Inc. and income from Volksfest and Oktoberfest in Old Heidelberg 
Park.  Moreover, all this income was used for the purpose of 
maintaining buildings and grounds of the complex and the payment 
of taxes and insurance.  Id. 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
12
¶82 During the three years at issue, there was no lease 
from Deutsches Land which authorized the Bavarian Inn to use Old 
Heidelberg Park on 20 days per year.  Deutsches Land simply had 
an understanding with Bavarian Waldhaus which permitted the Park 
to be used from time to time by Deutsches Land's affiliated 
organization.  These occasional uses of Old Heidelberg Park by 
non-member customers of the Bavarian Inn did not increase the 
rent paid to Deutsches Land, a fact which relates to the profit 
element.  
¶83 To sum up,  on an average of 20 out of 365 days per 
year, Old Heidelberg Park was used by an affiliated organization 
which did not charge its customers extra money for use of the 
Park and did not pay Deutsches Land extra money for use of the 
Park.  Deutsches Land did not lease a portion of Old Heidelberg 
Park to some other entity.  The occasional uses of its property 
by non-members did not constitute a consequential percentage of 
Deutsches 
Land's 
income 
because 
Deutsches 
Land 
was 
not 
compensated for these uses. 
¶84 I believe these facts show that Deutsches Land was 
entitled to a total exemption for Lot 3 as a matter of law.  The 
uses 
of 
Lot 
3 
by 
non-members 
were 
"comparatively 
inconsequential."  Alonzo Cudworth Post No. 23 v. Milwaukee, 42 
Wis. 2d 1, 12, 165 N.W.2d 397 (1969).  These inconsequential 
uses did not result in any explicit gain and did not destroy the 
exemption. 
¶85 In 
any 
event, 
the 
established 
facts 
provide 
a 
sufficient basis for this court to determine whether Deutsches 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
13
Land was eligible for a total exemption on Lot 3 because any 
"questionable" non-member activities were inconsequential, or, 
conversely, whether it was ineligible for a total exemption 
because those activities must be regarded as "consequential."  
No additional proof was necessary. 
¶86 The majority takes a different tack, as though 
Deutsches Land were a direct beneficiary of every use of Old 
Heidelberg Park by customers of the Bavarian Inn.  It asserts 
that Deutsches Land did not offer sufficient evidence to answer 
the question of how consequential the 20 uses were.  The 
majority writes, "Deutsches Land offered sufficient evidence of 
only the actual corporate use of Old Heidelberg Park; it did not 
do so for the actual benevolent use of the park."  Majority op. 
at 14. 
¶87 The majority takes the position that, in analyzing a 
claim for total exemption, once a benevolent association permits 
any use of its property by others, it is required to prove not 
only the extent of the property's use by others but also the 
extent of the property's use by itself.  This means actual use. 
 The 
association's 
ownership 
of 
the 
property 
and 
the 
availability of the property for association use count for 
nothing, while any non-use of the property, any inactivity, 
counts against the association.  I cannot agree that this is a 
correct statement of the law. 
¶88 To be sure, the property claiming exemption must be 
used for a benevolent purpose.  The property may not be 
undeveloped land, which is "quite a long distance" from 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
14
buildings and "had never been used at all."  Green Bay & 
Mississippi Canal Co. v. Outagamie County, 76 Wis. 587, 590, 45 
N.W. 536 (1890).  The premises may not be "wholly vacant and 
unoccupied."  State ex rel. State Assoc. of Y.M.C.A. v. 
Richardson, 197 Wis. 390, 392, 222 N.W. 222 (1928).  An 
exemption cannot even be claimed for fully developed property 
with multiple buildings which has been "vacated" and whose 
former 
occupants 
have 
"permanently 
relocated 
elsewhere."  
Dominican Nuns v. City of LaCrosse, 142 Wis. 2d 577, 581, 419 
N.W.2d 270 (1987).  Exempt property must be used. 
¶89 But these cases do not support the proposition that 
the owner of developed property which is steadily and frequently 
used for exempt purposes must document the amount of time 
devoted to exempt use as well as the amount of time consumed in 
non-exempt use, and then have added to the non-exempt use the 
total time in which the property is not used in order to arrive 
at a reduced percentage of exemption. 
¶90 In 
assessing 
whether 
"questionable 
activity" 
is 
consequential or inconsequential, assessors and courts have 
often looked to the revenues derived from the "questionable 
activity" 
in 
relation 
to 
total 
revenues. 
 
See 
Cardinal 
Publishing Company v. City of Madison, 208 Wis. 517, 243 N.W. 
325 (1932) ("Cardinal Publishing II"); Northwestern Publishing 
House, 177 Wis. 2d 401.  Assessors and courts may also look to 
the percentage of space in a property that has been leased or 
committed to non-exempt use.  Gymnastic Association of the South 
Side of Milwaukee v. City of Milwaukee, 129 Wis. 429, 109 N.W. 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
15
109 (1906); Cardinal Publishing I, 205 Wis. 2d at 347.  In 
theory, assessors and courts who cannot evaluate either revenue 
or space may have to examine the amount of time exempt property 
is used for non-exempt purposes.  But it does not follow that 
unused time should be counted against the owner any more than 
unused space is counted against an owner.  A rural church used 
only one day per week does not lose its full property tax 
exemption.  A tax exempt soccer field does not lose its exempt 
status on those winter and spring days when soccer has to be 
played indoors.  Hence, with respect to the "use" element, so 
long as exempt property is used on a regular basis for an 
appropriate exempt purpose, it is entitled to a total exemption, 
unless its use for non-exempt purposes is not "inconsequential." 
III. 
¶91 If, for the sake of argument, this court were unable 
to find a total exemption for Lot 3, the question would become 
whether Deutsches Land is entitled to a partial exemption under 
either § 70.11(8) or the § 70.11 preamble.  At trial, Deutsches 
Land was willing to agree to a partial exemption of Lot 3 in 
order to resolve the case.  Petitioner's brief at 22-23.  It 
should not lose everything simply because the circuit court 
awarded the benevolent association 100 percent.  Under these 
circumstances, the appropriate remedy would be to remand the 
case to the circuit court for a determination of the precise 
percentage of partial exemption. 
¶92 The city contends that Deutsches Land is ineligible 
for any partial exemption of Lot 3 under § 70.11(8) because 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
16
Deutsches Land leases Old Heidelberg Park to Bavarian Waldhaus 
Inn, Inc.  This position is consistent with the finding of the 
court of appeals that:  "Both the Bavarian Inn and Old 
Heidelberg Park are leased to Bavarian Waldhaus, for the for-
profit corporation."  Deutsches Land, 215 Wis. 2d at 558.  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶93 In my view, however, this finding is not supported by 
the record.  The circuit court found that Bavarian Waldhaus Inn, 
Inc. "leases the first floor of the Bavarian Inn from Deutsches 
Land.  This lease is an oral lease."  Petitioner's Appendix at 
113-14.  The circuit court never found that Bavarian Waldhaus 
Inn, Inc. leases Old Heidelberg Park. 
¶94 Deutsches Land's last written lease expired in 1990.  
That lease did not mention Old Heidelberg Park (unless one is 
prepared to construe the term "restaurant and banquet facility" 
- singular - as applying to Fest Hall in Old Heidelberg Park).   
¶95 Wis. Stat. § 704.01 defines "lease" and several other 
terms in a "landlord and tenant" context.21  By comparing these 
                     
21 704.01  Definitions. . . . 
(1) "Lease" means an agreement, whether oral or 
written, for transfer of possession of real property, 
or both real and personal property, for a definite 
period of time.  A lease is for a definite period of 
time if it has a fixed commencement date and a fixed 
expiration date or if the commencement and expiration 
can be ascertained by reference to some event, such as 
completion of a building.  A lease is included within 
this chapter even though it may also be treated as a 
conveyance under ch. 706.  An agreement for transfer 
of possession of only personal property is not a 
lease. 
 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
17
statutory terms, the most appropriate term for the situation 
involving the occasional use of Lot 3 by the Bavarian Inn is 
"tenant at will."  By definition, a tenant at will does not have 
a valid lease.  If the Bavarian Inn was a tenant at will in Old 
Heidelberg Park, then the court of appeals was mistaken and 
Deutsches Land is eligible for a partial exemption under 
§ 70.11(8).  If, on the other hand, the majority believes that 
Deutsches Land actually "leased" Old Heidelberg Park to Bavarian 
Waldhaus Inn, Inc., then it should say so.  If that were the 
situation, Deutsches Land would be ineligible for an exemption 
                                                                  
(2) "Periodic tenant" means a tenant who holds 
possession without a valid lease and pays rent on a 
periodic basis.  It includes a tenant from day-to-day, 
week-to-week, month-to-month, year-to-year or other 
recurring 
interval 
of 
time, 
the 
period 
being 
determined by the intent of the parties under the 
circumstances, with the interval between rent-paying 
dates normally evidencing that intent. . . . 
 
(5) "Tenant at will" means any tenant holding with the 
permission of his landlord without a valid lease and 
under circumstances not involving periodic payment of 
rent; but a person holding possession of real property 
under a contract of purchase or an employment contract 
is not a tenant under this chapter.  (Emphasis added) 
 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
18
under either § 70.11(8) or the § 70.11 preamble,22 and this would 
not be a sufficiency of evidence case. 
¶96 The majority notes that the proof required from an 
applicant for a partial exemption may be quite detailed.  It 
writes:  "[W]here the entire property [Lot 3] is used part of 
the time in for-profit activities, the partial exemption can be 
calculated in one of two ways.  The partial exemption can either 
be determined by comparing the percentage of income attributable 
to the for-profit activity versus the total income of the exempt 
organization, 
or 
by 
comparing 
the 
percentage 
of 
time 
attributable to the for-profit activity versus the total time 
the property is used."  Majority op. at 18-19. 
¶97 Here the income approach would not work because 
Deutsches Land received no income.  Hence, the time method would 
have to be employed.  But, as noted above, Deutsches Land has 
                     
22 If there were a lease covering all of Lot 3, as alleged, 
Deutsches Land would be ineligible for the exemption under the 
§ 70.11 preamble because the lessee (Bavarian Waldhaus Inn., 
Inc.) would not "be exempt from taxation under this chapter if 
it owned the property."  Moreover, Deutsches Land probably could 
not show that it used "all of the leasehold income for 
maintenance of the leased property, construction debt retirement 
of the leased property or both. . . ."  Deutsches Land would be 
ineligible for exemption for Lot 3 under § 70.11(8) because, by 
definition, subsection (8) "does not apply to property that is 
leased by an exempt organization to another person . . ."  I 
agree that if Deutsches Land leased a discrete part of Lot 3 to 
the Bavarian Inn, that "part" would be subject to tax and the 
unleased part would remain exempt.  In addition, a benevolent 
association like Deutsches Land may lease its entire property to 
another and still retain its exemption if the lessee satisfies 
the two tests set out in the preamble as well as the non-
discrimination test in § 70.11(4). 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
19
already established how many days the Bavarian Inn and its non-
member customers used Lot 3.  All other time should be 
attributed to the benevolent associations. 
¶98 At the trial, Peter Weissenfluh was asked about the 
issue of calculating time at the Italian Community Center: 
 
Q: 
Well, now let me get to the percentage of time.  
What kind of information did they give you as to 
percent that supported percentages of time? 
 
A: 
They actually spelled out the percentages of time 
that was used for – for for-profit activities and 
then the corollary would be the not-for-profit, 
their own use.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶99 There are not three classifications of time - (1) 
actual time used by the associations, (2) actual time used by 
others, and (3) dead time, which is counted against the 
benevolent associations when they are not using their property. 
 There are only two classifications of time.  In apportioning 
time to determine the percentage of a partial exemption, a 
benevolent association may prove the time its property was used 
by others and then, as a sensible corollary, claim the remaining 
time for itself, so long as it is actively using its property.  
Any other result would penalize an association for not using its 
property 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 52 weeks a year. 
¶100 I dissent because Lots 1 and 4 satisfy the statutory 
criteria of Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4).  They are owned by a 
benevolent association and used for its exempt purposes.  These 
lots 
are 
necessary 
for 
location 
and 
convenience 
of 
the 
locker/shower facility on Lot 4 and Fest Hall, where indoor 
No. 96-2489.dtp 
 
20
soccer is played.  The locker/shower facility is exempt; and Lot 
3, including Fest Hall, is also exempt because it is not leased, 
its use by non-members is not compensated, and its infrequent 
occasional 
use 
by 
non-member 
customers 
of 
an 
affiliated 
organization is so de minimis, negligible, and comparatively 
inconsequential that it does not destroy the exemption.  If the 
de minimis use of Lot 3 did impair its total exemption, the lot 
would clearly be entitled to a substantial partial exemption 
under § 70.11(8) and the case would have to be remanded for a 
determination of the exact percentage. 
¶101 I am authorized to state that Justice Jon P. Wilcox 
joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion. 
 
 
 
 
1