Case Title: Ex Parte Alfab, Inc.

Citation: 586 So. 2d 889

Docket Number: 1901295

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1991-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
586 So. 2d 889 (1991)
Ex parte ALFAB, INC.
Re ALFAB, INC. v. Raymond E. MURRAY, et al.
1901295.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 23, 1991.
Joe S. Pittman and J. Stafford Pittman, Jr. of Pittman, Whittaker & Pittman, Enterprise, for appellant.
*890 J. Fairley McDonald III of Copeland, Franco, Screws & Gill, Montgomery, for appellee.
HOUSTON, Justice.
Alfab, Inc., has petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Honorable Gary McAliley, Judge of the Coffee County Circuit Court, to set aside his order staying execution on Alfab's judgment against Raymond E. Murray, insofar as that judgment pertains to certain funds that were previously held in an escrow account under the supervision and control of Herbert A. Barr and that are now held in an account under the supervision and control of the circuit court clerk ("the escrowed funds"). The writ is denied.
The pertinent facts, which were adequately set out in Alfab's petition, are as follows:
The sole issue before this Court is whether Alfab is entitled to immediate possession of the escrowed funds, or, stated another way, whether the trial court had the authority to stay execution on the escrowed funds pending Murray's appeal.
It is well established that mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court. Ex parte Loeb & Co., 349 So. 2d 9 (Ala.1977).
Alfab contends that the trial court had no authority to stay execution on the escrowed funds because at the time the order staying execution was entered those funds had been transferred to the circuit court clerk pursuant to a writ of execution. Alfab further contends that the order staying execution on the escrowed funds was invalid because, it says, Murray failed to post an adequate bond under Rule 8(a), A.R.App.P. Alfab also asserts that the trial court's order prohibited it from receiving that portion of the escrowed funds that was the subject of the settlement agreement between it and the Solomons, and that the trial court had no authority to freeze those funds.
At common law, the execution on a judgment had to be superseded prior to the levy under a writ of execution or else the execution on the judgment could continue.[1] This rule was based on the theory that the judgment was fully executed from the time of the levy. However, although the execution on the judgment was allowed to continue when it was not superseded prior to the levy under a writ of execution (e.g., the sale of goods was permitted when the goods were seized under a writ of execution prior to the issuance of a writ of supersedeas), a writ of supersedeas issued after the levy, but prior to satisfaction of the judgment, stayed the disbursement of any proceeds generated by the execution. See 4 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 372 (1962); 4A C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 667 (1957); United States v. Dashiel, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 688, 18 L. Ed. 268 (1865); Meriton v. Stevens, Willes 271, 125 Eng.Rep. 1168 (1741). The common law rule appears to have been widely abrogated by statute, at least partially, and the rule now in effect in most jurisdictions is that a proper supersedeas becomes effective notwithstanding a levy, and stays any further proceedings under the writ of execution. 4 Am.Jur.2d, supra, § 372; 4A C.J.S., supra, § 667:
In Alabama, Rule 62(d), Ala.R.Civ.P., provides:
(Emphasis added.) In Osborn v. Riley, 331 So. 2d 268, 274 (Ala.1976), this Court, quoting Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Torian, 221 Ala. 131, 133, 127 So. 829, 831 (1930), stated that "[t]he purpose of a supersedeas bond is `to keep the parties in status quo pending the appeal.'" The Court went on to note that the preemptive effect of a supersedeas bond on the right to execute on a judgment "`reach[es] not only to possession of the property, but [to] every other consequence of the judgment.'" See, also, North Birmingham Trust & Savings Bank v. Hearn, 211 Ala. 18, 99 So. 175 (1924).
Under the foregoing authorities, we hold that the trial court in the present case had the authority under Rule 62(d), upon the filing of a supersedeas bond in sufficient form and amount, to stay the execution on the escrowed funds and to maintain the status quo between Alfab and Murray by requiring the circuit court clerk to keep those funds in an interest-bearing account for the protection of the parties pending Murray's appeal to this Court.
Furthermore, we have carefully examined the supersedeas bond posted by Murray and we cannot agree with Alfab's contention that the bond is inadequate. Specifically, Alfab makes the following argument:
The bond, however, is sufficient in form and Murray's obligation thereunder, contrary to Alfab's contention, is secured by an irrevocable letter of credit from South-Trust Bank of Tampa, Florida, in the amount of $10,000. Because the funds sought by Alfab will be maintained by the circuit court clerk in an interest-bearing account pending Murray's appeal, we can find no abuse of discretion on the trial court's part in setting the bond at $10,000 pursuant to Rule 8(a)(3).[2] Alfab's assertion *893 that $10,000 is an insufficient amount to fully protect it is not supported by the record.
Furthermore, from our review of the record, we are uncertain as to whether the trial court actually intended to deny Alfab access to any funds that were the subject of the settlement agreement between Alfab and the Solomons. The settlement agreement provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Alfab filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider its order staying execution on the escrowed funds and, for all that appears in the record, argued for the first time in that motion that, even upon the filing of a proper supersedeas bond by Murray, the trial court had no authority to deny it access to any funds that were the subject of the settlement agreement between it and the Solomons. The trial court had not ruled on that motion at the time this petition was filed. We cannot issue a writ of mandamus in the absence of a clear showing that the trial court denied Alfab access to funds as to which it is entitled to immediate possession.
In conclusion, we note Alfab's contention that the stay should be lifted to enable the former escrow agent, Barr, and Alfab's attorneys, the firm of Pittman, Whitaker & Pittman, to be reimbursed for their respective expenses and compensated for their services rendered, from the escrowed funds. We point out, however, that neither Barr nor Alfab's attorneys are parties before this Court; therefore, we cannot issue a writ of mandamus with respect to any claims that they may have to immediate possession of a portion of the escrowed funds.
Having found no support in the record for Alfab's contention that it is entitled to the relief sought in its petition, we must deny the writ.
WRIT DENIED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
[1]  A levy under a writ of execution is defined in 30 Am.Jur.2d Executions § 221 (1967) as follows:

"Generally, it may be stated that a levy under a writ of execution to enforce a judgment for money is an act of dominion over specific property by an authorized officer of the court which, but for the writ under which he proceeds, would be a trespass, conversion, or other unlawful invasion of a property right, and which results in the creation of a legal right to subject the debtor's interest in the property to the satisfaction of the debt of his judgment creditor, to the exclusion of others whose rights are inferior. Hence, the levy of execution is an absolute appropriation in law of the property levied upon to the payment of the judgment debt."
[2]  Rule 8 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

"(a) Stay by supersedeas bond. The appellant shall not be entitled to a stay of execution of the judgment pending appeal (except as provided in ARCP Rule 62(e)) unless he executes bond with good and sufficient sureties, approved by the clerk of the trial court, payable to the appellee (or to the clerk or register if the trial court so directs), with condition, failing the appeal, to satisfy such judgment as the appellate court may render, when the judgment is:
". . . .
"(3) Only for the performance of some act or duty, or for the recovery or sale of property or the possession thereof (or if the judgment includes the payment of money and appellant does not wish to supersede the judgment in that respect), in such sum as the trial court may in writing prescribe."
The judgment from which Murray appealed, insofar as it pertained to the escrowed funds, was for the recovery of personal property within the meaning of Rule 8(a)(3), and the trial court properly treated it as such.