Case Title: MCGRATH v DORE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1978-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13919 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 GEORGE D. McGRATH, Petitioner and Respondent, RAYMON E . DORE, Director Montana Department of Revenue, Respondent and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District, Honorable James Freebourn, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: R . Bruce McGinnis, Dept. of Revenue, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Barry J. Hjort, Helena, Montana Cause submitted on briefs. Filed: Submitted: April 5, 1978 Decided: JUL 1 2 1 3 7 8 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P e t i t i o n e r brought t h i s a c t i o n i n t h e District Court, S i l v e r B o w County, seeking a w r i t of mandamus and a declara- t o r y judgment a g a i n s t respondent Department of Revenue. Respondent moved f o r a change of venue t o L e w i s and Clark County. The D i s t r i c t Court, Honorable James D. Freebourn presiding, denied t h e motion. Respondent appeals. The p e r t i n e n t f a c t s a r e : P e t i t i o n e r i s t h e S i l v e r B o w County Assessor. By h i s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t of mandamus and a f f i d a v i t i n support, p e t i t i o n e r contends respondent i s responsible t o pay him t h e f u l l amount of h i s s a l a r y , a l l e g e d t o be $13,347 per year, and has refused t o do so. Respondent paid p e t i t i o n e r a t a r a t e of only $12,706 per year. Respondent's motion f o r change of venue and t h e a f f i - d a v i t of i t s d i r e c t o r a l l e g e t h a t a l l p a y r o l l functions of t h e Department of Revenue a r e c a r r i e d o u t a t its headquarters i n Lewis and Clark County. The s i n g l e i s s u e i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n denying respondent's motion f o r change of venue. The p a r t i e s agree t h a t s e c t i o n s 93-2906(1) and 93- 2902(2), R.C.M. 1947, a r e a p p l i c a b l e t o a determination of proper venue i n t h i s case. Section 93-2906(1) provides: "The c o u r t o r t h e judge must, on motion, change t h e p l a c e of t r i a l i n t h e following cases: "1. When t h e county designated i n t h e com- p l a i n t i s not t h e proper county." Section 93-2902(2) provides: "Actions f o r t h e following causes must be t r i e d i n t h e county where t h e cause, o r some p a r t t h e r e o f , arose, s u b j e c t t o t h e l i k e power of t h e c o u r t t o change t h e place of t r i a l : "2. Against a p u b l i c o f f i c e r , o r persons s p e c i a l l y appointed t o execute h i s d u t i e s f o r an a c t done by him i n v i r t u e of h i s o f f i c e ; o r a g a i n s t a person who, by h i s command o r i n h i s a i d , does anything touching t h e d u t i e s of such o f f i c e r . " The Department of Revenue contends t h e cause of a c t i o n arose i n Lewis and Clark County because t h e a l l e g e d wrongful a c t s by department o f f i c i a l s occurred i n t h a t county. P e t i - t i o n e r responds t h a t t h e s a l a r y w a s a l l e g e d l y s e t i n S i l v e r Bow County, and t h e wrong occurred when p e t i t i o n e r received h i s check f o r t h e wrong amount, a l s o i n S i l v e r B o w County. There is no d i s p u t e t h a t a change of venue pursuant t o t h e s t a t u t e s h e r e t o f o r e noted is n o t a matter of d i s c r e - t i o n with t h e D i s t r i c t Court, but i s mandatory i f t h e county i n which t h e a c t i o n was f i l e d " i s n o t t h e proper county." Guthrie v. Montana Department of Health and Environmental Sciences, (1977) , M o n t . - , 561 P. 2d 913, 34 St.Rep. 155, 159. Our d e c i s i o n i n Guthrie a l s o e s t a b l i s h e s t h e general test r e l a t i n g t o proper venue: "Thus t h e answer t o t h e question of proper venue under s e c t i o n 93-2902(2), R.C.M. 1947, l i e s i n t h e a n a l y s i s of two dependent v a r i - a b l e s , t h e nature of t h e cause of a c t i o n and t h e time and place where it springs i n t o existence." 561 P.2d 916. The cause of a c t i o n herein, although incorporating a claim f o r r e l i e f i n t h e form of d e c l a r a t o r y judgment, is e s s e n t i a l l y one of mandamus. W e note t h e D i s t r i c t Court found a s a f a c t t h a t t h e i n s t a n t a c t i o n i s f o r mandamus. It i s c l e a r p e t i t i o n e r seeks t o e s t a b l i s h a duty on t h e p a r t of t h e respondent t o pay t h e f u l l amount of h i s s a l a r y , and t h e neglect o r r e f u s a l of t h e respondent t o do so. It is the general rule that venue in a mandamus action is proper in the county where the public official, whose act the petitioner seeks to compel, resides. In Lunt v. Divi- sion of Workmen's Compensation, (1975), 167 Mont. 251, 537 P.2d 1080, the plaintiff applied for a writ of mandate to compel the Division to set a hearing on his claim for com- pensation benefits. This Court held venue was proper in Lewis and Clark County, where the Division is headquartered and from which it operates, rather than the county in which the hearing would take place. In so holding, the Court relied on State ex rel. State Dry Cleaners' Board v. Dis- trict Court, (Okla. 1959), 340 P.2d 939, 942, which held: "I* * * Since the cause of action arises where the neglect or refusal on the part of the public official takes place, it might be argued that the alleged neglect in this case took place in Nowata County where the Board failed to hold the hearing. However, we are of the opinion that in an action for mandamus the cause of action arises in the county where the public official officially resides. It is at that place where he of- ficially refuses to act or neglect to act.'" 167 Mont. 254. In discussing our holding in Lunt in the case of Guthrie, we stated: "* * *[In Lunt] the action was for mandamus. It is difficult to imagine mandamus, based as it is on neglect or refusal by a public official to perform a ministerial duty, which did not arise as the Court said in Lunt I"* * * in the county where the public official officially resides. It is at that place where he officially refuses to act or neglects to act."'" 561 P. 2d 916. Here, petitioner contends the alleged wrong occurred in Silver Bow County when petitioner began receiving paychecks for less that the claimed amount. We conclude, however, that the alleged wrongful act on the part of respondent, i.e., the neglectful or intentional failure to pay the full amount of wages allegedly due petitioner, occurred in Lewis and Clark County, hence giving rise to petitioner's cause of action in mandamus. The District Court erred in denying respondent's motion for a change of venue. The cause is reversed. We Concur: / I g i e f justice Justices /