Case Title: B.T.E. v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 36S05-1711-JV-711

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2018-10-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 36S05-1711-JV-711 
B.T.E., 
Appellant, 
–v– 
State of Indiana, 
Appellee. 
Argued: January 11, 2018 | Decided: October 11, 2018 
Appeal from the Jackson Superior Court 
The Honorable Bruce A. MacTavish, Judge 
No. 36D02-1601-JD-3 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 36A05-1607-JV-1702 
Opinion by Justice Slaughter 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, and Goff concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Oct 11 2018, 12:10 pm
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Slaughter, Justice. 
For several months B.T.E., a juvenile, plotted to shoot up and blow up 
his high school, and he targeted two of his classmates to die. B.T.E. took 
several steps to implement his plot. The trial court adjudicated B.T.E. a 
juvenile delinquent on two counts, one of which is relevant here: 
attempted aggravated battery, a level 3 felony if committed by an adult.  
We consider whether, under Indiana’s criminal-attempt statute, B.T.E. 
took the required “substantial step” toward committing aggravated 
battery—or whether his actions were “mere preparation”. After 
considering several factors, we hold there was sufficient evidence of the 
“substantial step” element and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 
Factual and Procedural History 
Appellant, B.T.E., was a sophomore at Seymour High School during the 
2015-16 school year. During the fall semester, he began plotting an attack 
at his school in the spring semester of his senior year. He targeted two of 
his classmates: G.M., the object of B.T.E.’s unrequited affection; and J.R., a 
rival suitor. B.T.E. chose April 20, 2018, as the date of his planned attack—
the anniversary of the 1999 massacre at Columbine High School in 
Colorado, a shooting spree during which 13 people were murdered, many 
more were injured, and the two student gunmen committed suicide. 
In January 2016, a school resource officer at Seymour High School 
learned that B.T.E. had liked a Facebook page called “Columbine High 
School Massacre”. The officer reported this information to the Seymour 
Police Department, which began its own investigation. During an 
interview, police told B.T.E. of the allegations against him, and he became 
visibly upset and teary-eyed. B.T.E. admitted talking to other students 
about possibly “shooting up the school”. And he admitted having a crush 
on G.M. and a strong animus toward J.R., whom he thought G.M. 
preferred. Although B.T.E. acknowledged plotting with his friend and 
classmate, M.V., he claimed their scheme was just a long-running joke. 
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B.T.E. was arrested shortly afterward. The State charged B.T.E. with 
juvenile offenses that would be crimes if an adult committed them: 
attempted murder, attempted aggravated battery, conspiracy to commit 
murder, and conspiracy to commit aggravated battery. 
At the juvenile-delinquency proceeding, the trial court admitted into 
evidence statements B.T.E. made to M.V. and other juveniles via Facebook 
chat. B.T.E. repeatedly expressed his wish to torture or kill J.R. and 
occasionally mentioned killing G.M., too. In exchanges with his friend and 
co-conspirator M.V., B.T.E. claimed he had “figured out how to make pipe 
bombs” and described the weapons he might use against J.R.  
B.T.E.: I could steal a knife … and kill [J.R.] with it and then 
take out as many people as possible. 
M.V.: Or you could buy a gun. 
. . . . 
B.T.E.: Or I could attempt to break into my dads [sic] gun safe 
so I wouldn’t have to buy a weapon. 
The Facebook chat logs also show B.T.E. solicited M.V. and a student from 
a different school, D.H., to assist with violent acts. 
B.T.E. disclosed the date of his planned attack when he said in a 
Facebook chat, “four twenty eighteen (4/20/18). Some people will find out 
what the state of nothingness is like.” B.T.E. told police he chose that 
particular date because it was the anniversary of the Columbine school 
massacre. When police asked B.T.E. about the significance of 2018, he 
responded that was his senior year and he had done a large amount of 
research on school massacres including the Columbine shooting and its 
perpetrators.  The two Columbine student-gunmen were high-school 
seniors when they carried out their deadly attack. 
The court also admitted into evidence a diagram B.T.E. made of one of 
the classrooms depicting the seating arrangement, marking the exits, and 
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indicating an “x” where one of his intended victims sat. And the trial 
court admitted B.T.E’s “death note”, which was to be read after B.T.E. 
died carrying out his plan. The trial court adjudicated B.T.E. a delinquent 
for attempted aggravated battery and conspiracy to commit aggravated 
battery but not for the other charges. The court sentenced B.T.E. to 
probation until his eighteenth birthday with a suspended commitment to 
the Indiana Department of Correction. 
A divided Court of Appeals reversed the attempt finding but affirmed 
the conspiracy finding. B.T.E. v. State, 82 N.E.3d 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). 
On the attempt issue, the majority held that “the State did not present 
evidence that B.T.E. completed a substantial step toward the commission 
of the crime of aggravated battery”, id. at 279, because “the conduct . . . 
did not go beyond mere preparation and was not strongly corroborative 
of his stated intent”, id. at 278. The dissent would have affirmed the trial 
court’s findings on both the conspiracy and attempt charges. Id. at 282 
(Bradford, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
We granted transfer, thus vacating the Court of Appeals’ decision. We 
provide additional facts below. 
Standard of Review 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile 
adjudication, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. 
K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 543 (Ind. 2006) (citation omitted). We consider 
only the evidence favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences 
supporting it. Id. We will affirm a juvenile-delinquency adjudication if a 
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the defendant was guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Moran v. State, 622 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ind. 
1993) (citations omitted). 
Discussion and Decision 
We hold there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s 
adjudication of B.T.E. as a juvenile delinquent on the charge of attempted 
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aggravated battery. He engaged in conduct that would constitute a 
substantial step toward the crime of aggravated battery if committed by 
an adult. In addition, we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals’ 
disposition of two other issues: that the State’s continuance did not 
deprive B.T.E. of a speedy hearing under Indiana Code section 31-37-11-2, 
and that there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s 
finding of conspiracy to commit aggravated battery. 
Sufficient evidence supports B.T.E.’s delinquency 
adjudication for attempted aggravated battery. 
In Indiana, a person commits aggravated battery, a level 3 felony, if he 
“knowingly or intentionally inflicts injury on a person that creates a 
substantial risk of death or causes: (1) serious permanent disfigurement; 
(2) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or 
organ; or (3) the loss of a fetus”. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.5. And a person 
commits the crime of attempt when, “acting with the culpability required 
for commission of the crime, the person engages in conduct that 
constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime.” Id. § 35-41-
5-l(a). See also State v. Van Cleave, 674 N.E.2d 1293, 1304 (Ind. 1996). 
“Whether a substantial step has occurred is a question of fact, to be 
decided by the jury, based on the particular circumstances of each case.” 
State v. Lewis, 429 N.E.2d 1110, 1116 (Ind. 1981) (citations omitted). 
There is no doubt B.T.E. acted with the scienter required to commit 
aggravated battery. The object of his intentions, which included killing 
two of his classmates, qualifies as aggravated battery, and he does not 
argue otherwise. The only unresolved issue is whether B.T.E. took a 
“substantial step” toward committing that offense. 
A. We consider several factors when assessing whether the 
defendant took a “substantial step” toward completion of 
the underlying offense. 
 What qualifies as a “substantial step” under the attempt statute is not 
amenable to a hard-and-fast definition but is based on context. Whether a 
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step is substantial “must be determined from all the circumstances of each 
case”. Zickefoose v. State, 270 Ind. 618, 622-23, 388 N.E.2d 507, 510 (1979). 
Although in rare circumstances a defendant’s actions may be insubstantial 
as a matter of law, a step’s substantiality is generally a fact question based 
on the totality of the circumstances. See Lewis, 429 N.E.2d at 1116. 
The substantial-step “requirement is a minimal one, often defined as 
any ‘overt act’ in furtherance of the crime.” Van Cleave, 674 N.E.2d at 1304. 
Still, the overt act must go “beyond mere preparation”. Jackson v. State, 683 
N.E.2d 560, 566 (Ind. 1997). But this requirement is not so strict that it 
forecloses some “preventive action by police and courts to stop the 
criminal effort at an earlier stage”. Zickefoose, 270 Ind. at 622, 388 N.E.2d at 
509. Instead, the attempt statute enables law enforcement to “minimiz[e] 
the risk of substantive harm without providing immunity for the 
offender.” Id. We focus on “the substantial step that the defendant has 
completed, not on what was left undone.” 270 Ind. at 623, 388 N.E.2d at 
510. 
Renowned jurists have long struggled with where to draw the line 
between mere planning and preparation, which are insufficient to 
establish the crime of attempt, and a substantial step, which is sufficient. 
As Judge Hand observed, “The decisions are too numerous to cite, and 
would not help much anyway, for there is, and obviously can be, no 
definite line” between preparation and attempt. United States v. Coplon, 
185 F.2d 629, 633 (2d Cir. 1950). 
Like Judge Hand, we are unable to capture the difference between mere 
preparation and a substantial step in a pithy, bright-line rule. Rather than 
pronounce a clear delineation, we can only describe and apply the 
relevant criteria. Of necessity, we balance several factors:  
(1) whether the defendant’s acts strongly corroborate his 
criminal intent;  
(2) the severity of the charged crime;  
(3) proximity to the underlying crime;  
(4) the examples listed in Model Penal Code section 5.01(2); and 
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(5) whether the defendant’s multiple acts, viewed together, 
indicate he attempted a crime.  
We trust that these factors and their application here will, in true 
common-law fashion, add incrementally to the tapestry of decisional law. 
At all times, however, we proceed cautiously to ensure that prosecutors 
and police, in discharging their duty to snuff out serious threats to public 
safety, do not infringe upon protected activity, particularly freedom of 
conscience and expression. Our criminal law does not punish evil 
thoughts. A guilty mind, by itself, does not subject the actor to criminal 
liability. Such liability attaches only to those with a guilty mind who also 
perpetrate a wrongful deed.  
1. Strong corroboration 
Since the enactment of Indiana’s modern attempt statute, we have said 
that the defendant’s conduct, to qualify as a substantial step, “must be 
strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant’s criminal intent.” 
Zickefoose, 270 Ind. at 623, 388 N.E.2d at 510. The Model Penal Code’s 
authors found this factor essential, reasoning “that if the defendant 
manifests a purpose to engage in the type of conduct or to cause the type 
of result that is forbidden by the criminal law, he has sufficiently exhibited 
his dangerousness to justify the imposition of criminal sanctions.” Am. 
Law Inst., Model Penal Code and Commentaries Part I 303 (1985). According 
to one academic, “The actus reus of an attempt to commit a specific crime 
is constituted when the accused person does an act which is a step 
towards the commission of the specific crime, and the doing of such act 
can have no other purpose than the commission of that specific crime.” 
Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law Vol. 2 § 11.4(d) (3d ed. 2017) 
quoting J.W. Cecil Turner, Attempts to Commit Crimes, 5 Cambridge L.J. 
230, 236 (1934).  
2. Severity of the crime 
In assessing substantiality, we look at the nature and severity of the 
offense. “[T]he more serious the crime attempted . . . , the further back in 
the series of acts leading up to the consummated crime should the 
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criminal law reach in holding the defendant guilty for attempt.” Ward v. 
State, 528 N.E.2d 52, 54 (Ind. 1988) quoting Francis Bowes Sayre, Sr., 
Criminal Attempts, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 821, 845 (1928). An act that is 
insubstantial for an attempt conviction on a less serious charge may well 
be substantial for more serious crimes. For example, a reconnaissance 
mission in furtherance of stealing a target’s wallet may be insufficient to 
convict for attempted theft. But the same mission in furtherance of killing 
the target could be sufficient to convict for attempted murder. 
3. Proximity and remoteness 
The third factor we consider is the proximity (or remoteness) of the 
actor’s conduct to his intended crime. Proximity and remoteness, 
sometimes viewed as opposite sides of the same coin, have both temporal 
and geographic dimensions. If the actor’s conduct is sufficiently proximate 
in time and place to the planned offense, then he is more likely guilty of 
attempt. But the reciprocal proposition does not necessarily follow. Just 
because the actor’s completed conduct may be remote in time or place to 
the underlying crime does not mean there was no attempt. The reason for 
treating these complementary concepts differently is that Indiana “focuses 
on the substantial step that the defendant has completed, not on what was 
left undone.” Zickefoose, 270 Ind. at 623, 388 N.E.2d at 510. If the completed 
acts represent a substantial step, then there was an attempt, even if one or 
both dimensions of proximity are unsatisfied.  
4. The Model Penal Code 
Like Indiana’s attempt statute, I.C. 35-41-5-1(a), the Model Penal Code 
considers whether the defendant took a “substantial step” toward 
commission of the underlying crime. Section 5.01(2) of the Model Penal 
Code lists examples of conduct that may qualify as a substantial step: 
(a) lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated 
victim of the crime; 
(b) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of the 
crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission; 
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(c) reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission 
of the crime; 
(d) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure in which 
it is contemplated that the crime will be committed; 
(e) possession of materials to be employed in the commission of 
the crime, that are specially designed for such unlawful use or 
that can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the 
circumstances; 
(f) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be 
employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place 
contemplated for its commission, if such possession, collection 
or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the 
circumstances; 
(g) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct 
constituting an element of the crime. 
Model Penal Code § 5.01(2) (Am. Law Inst. 2018). A person who engages 
in one or more of these recited acts may be subject to liability under 
Indiana’s criminal-attempt statute. We do not hold that a trial court that 
acquits despite the presence of one of these acts commits error. But it is 
difficult to imagine reversing a trial court that convicts in the presence of 
one of these acts.  
5. Aggregate conduct 
Last, we consider the cumulative effect of all the defendant’s actions 
taken together. In other words, the factfinder should consider the totality 
of the circumstances instead of isolating each fact that the State raises 
about the defendant’s conduct. 
B.  There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to 
determine B.T.E. attempted to commit aggravated battery. 
The trial court determined that B.T.E.’s conduct over four months 
satisfied the substantial-step requirement. We hold on this record that 
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s adjudication of B.T.E. as a 
juvenile delinquent for attempted aggravated battery.  
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Our attempt test comprises the five factors outlined in Section A. We 
balance those factors, keeping in mind our deferential standard of review. 
The test is not conjunctive, but embraces a sliding scale. If the State shows 
the defendant’s acts were strongly corroborative of his criminal intent, 
that lessens the need for proximity. Thus, the absence of one or more 
factors is not fatal to a finding of attempt. Conversely, just one or two 
factors, if compelling enough, can lead to a finding of attempt. 
1. Strong corroboration 
As discussed next, B.T.E.’s solicitations, drawings and diagrams, and 
death note strongly corroborate his criminal intent. 
a. Solicitations 
As mentioned, B.T.E. recruited M.V. to help carry out his planned 
attacks at Seymour High School, including sharing with M.V. detailed 
notes outlining his research into how to make a pipe bomb, debating what 
murder weapon would be best for killing J.R., and discussing tips for 
avoiding suspicion. And B.T.E. urged D.H., who lived elsewhere and was 
suicidal, to travel to Seymour to kill J.R. before taking his own life. B.T.E. 
had also sent D.H. a picture of J.R. 
B.T.E.’s solicitation of M.V. and D.H. manifests his commitment to 
carrying out his planned offense of aggravated battery in two respects. 
First, discussing his plans with potential accomplices brought B.T.E. closer 
to committing a crime. He discussed the logistics of getting away with 
murder with his friend M.V., and he discussed how to obtain a murder 
weapon. And, in his conversations with D.H., he actively urged D.H. to 
commit the crime. These solicitations reveal the tenacity with which B.T.E. 
was pursuing his goal of harming J.R. Second, the solicitation subjects 
B.T.E. to potential adverse consequences for his violent desires. By telling 
his friends, he risked being reported to school officials, his parents, or 
police. So firm was B.T.E. to committing aggravated battery that he was 
willing to take that risk to carry out his plan.  
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The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that B.T.E.’s solicitations 
were not a substantial step, relying on Ward, 528 N.E.2d 52. There, we 
adopted two tests for assessing whether solicitation is an attempt. One test 
asks whether the underlying offense is a “sufficiently serious crime” that 
it makes sense to treat even early steps toward completion of the offense 
as substantial. Id. at 54. The other test, cited by the panel majority below, 
requires (among other things) that any solicitation must urge the 
commission of a crime “at some immediate time and not in the future”. 
B.T.E., 82 N.E.3d at 278 (quoting Ward, 528 N.E.2d at 54). Because B.T.E.’s 
planned crimes at Seymour High School against his two classmates were 
not imminent, the Court of Appeals held B.T.E.’s solicitations did not 
qualify as an attempt under Ward. We respectfully disagree and hold that 
Ward does not govern here for two reasons. 
First, the narrow issue in Ward was whether an adult defendant’s 
solicitations of two underage boys to engage in sexual activity were a 
substantial step toward completion of the underlying offenses of child 
molesting and thus qualified as attempted child molesting. Ward did not 
address the very different issue here, which is whether a defendant’s 
solicitations in conjunction with other affirmative steps together can 
satisfy the substantial-step requirement. We hold they can. B.T.E.’s 
solicitations were not the only overt acts he committed. Ward does not 
foreclose treating solicitation as a substantial step even for remote-in-time 
offenses if they would be substantial when viewed alongside other overt 
acts. 
Second, Ward’s holding involved two-party solicitations. As we 
observed, the underlying crime of child molesting “is a two-party offense, 
which requires the cooperation or submission of the child being solicited.” 
528 N.E.2d at 55. Ward expressly excluded from its solicitation-as-attempt 
test the three-party solicitation at issue here: “This specific evaluation of 
the solicitation, therefore, excludes three-party solicitations, where A 
solicits B to murder C.” Id. at 54 n.3 (emphasis added). The Court of 
Appeals believed this statement from Ward—which it said “precisely 
describes” B.T.E.’s solicitations, 82 N.E.3d at 279—to mean that B.T.E. did 
not take a substantial step toward the crime of aggravated battery. Again, 
we disagree with this narrow interpretation of Ward. Our focus is on the 
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steps taken toward completing the underlying crime and not on the steps 
remaining. We reject a categorical rule that A’s solicitation of B to commit 
a crime against C can never amount to attempt. 
b. Drawings and diagrams 
In addition to his solicitations of the two other students, B.T.E. drew a 
pair of diagrams that represent affirmative steps toward fulfilling his 
planned Columbine-style attacks on the high school. One diagram depicts 
the high-school building where the attacks were to occur. The other shows 
the specific classroom that B.T.E. targeted. This latter diagram reveals the 
location of the room’s entrance and exit, and it contains a crude seating 
chart with two of the chairs highlighted and another chair marked with an 
“x”. The preparation of these diagrams is among several acts strongly 
corroborative of B.T.E.’s criminal intent to commit aggravated battery. 
c. Death note 
B.T.E. also prepared a seven-page, single-spaced note that M.V. was to 
share at school after B.T.E.’s death. It included messages of varying 
lengths expressing his sentiments about more than a dozen of his 
classmates. Some of the messages are cold and crass: “kill yourself”. 
Others are warm and even affectionate: “I like you a lot and always will.” 
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ dissent that this note appears to 
show that B.T.E. is “put[ting] his affairs in order” in anticipation of his 
planned attack and, thus, is “strongly corroborative of the firmness of his 
intent to attack J.R. in school.” 82 N.E.3d at 284 (Bradford, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part). 
In sum, B.T.E.’s solicitations and other acts strongly corroborate his 
criminal intent. This factor weighs heavily in favor of the trial court’s 
attempt adjudication. 
2. Severity of the offense 
We observed in Ward that the line between mere preparation and a 
substantial step depends on the seriousness of the offense. There, the 
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Court had “little difficulty” concluding that child molesting “is a 
sufficiently serious crime to justify drawing a fairly early line to identify 
and sanction behavior as an attempt.” 528 N.E.2d at 54.  
For B.T.E.’s proposed crimes against his school and two of his 
classmates, we conclude that aggravated battery also is “sufficiently 
serious” that it warrants drawing an “early line” to assess whether B.T.E. 
“attempted” aggravated battery. B.T.E.’s affirmative steps included his 
prolonged solicitation of M.V. and D.H. In numerous Facebook chats over 
several weeks, B.T.E. said he would do things to J.R. that “would make 
even the sociopathic of sociopaths shake and stutter [sic]”; that he would 
kill J.R. and “[i]f [J.R.] dates [G.M.] then I will seriously kill him” and “I’ll 
kill her too”; that he “should kill [J.R.] to prove that I never fail”; that he 
would kill J.R., his dogs, his parents, and burn down his house with him 
in it; that he would “HELP [J.R.] CATCH PERMANENT ZZZ … OR 
IMPALE HIM LIKE VLAD THE IMPALER DID”; that “[h]opefully [J.R.] 
kills himself because I’m going to get myself arrested if he doesn’t”; that it 
was too bad he didn’t have a benevolent mind or J.R. would make it past 
high school; that G.M. should hope he never gets to his father’s gun or he 
would kill her and J.R., saying “that’s two people I want to kill in 
Seymour high”; that he wanted to get a “bowl cut” and “become famous 
after I’m arrested”, an apparent reference to the hairstyle of mass 
murderer Dylann Roof; and that he wanted J.R. to get “nonstop” sleep. 
B.T.E. also wrote more explicitly vile messages that are part of this record, 
but we omit them in the interest of decorum. In addition to these 
solicitations are B.T.E.’s school drawings and death note—all of which 
strongly corroborate his plan to fulfill his intended crime. And they 
support the trial court’s conclusion that B.T.E.’s acts were a substantial 
step toward committing aggravated battery. B.T.E.’s discussions with 
friends over Facebook were not idle chatter or the venting of frustrations 
after one bad day. His threats were both serious and sustained over a 
period of months, revealing the palpable danger he posed to his 
classmates. The severity of his crime—a school shooting—weighs heavily 
in favor of the trial court’s attempt adjudication. 
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3. Proximity and remoteness 
Like the Court of Appeals, we pause when presented with a finding of 
attempt against an offender who says he will commit his crime two years 
in the future. But a distant date is not dispositive on this record for two 
reasons. First, regardless of the acts that remain, B.T.E.’s completed 
conduct is sufficiently dangerous and corroborative of a seriousness of 
purpose that the law can reasonably reach back and treat it as a 
substantial step. 
Second, some of B.T.E.’s own words and deeds suggest he might carry 
out an attack much sooner than his senior year in high school. One 
example is B.T.E.’s conversations with D.H., in November 2015, in which 
he solicits his potentially suicidal friend to come to Seymour High School 
and murder J.R. before taking his own life. The solicitation seems to be a 
present-tense command. And nothing in the record suggests D.H. had any 
reason to believe B.T.E.’s plan called for an attack in April 2018. In one 
conversation, D.H. suggested killing a friend of B.T.E.’s—a student at 
Seymour High School. D.H. even asked B.T.E. to send a picture of the 
friend. In response, B.T.E. suggested that D.H. kill J.R., and he sent a 
picture of J.R. so that D.H. could identify him. The next week, when D.H. 
told B.T.E. he was suicidal, B.T.E. encouraged him to come to Seymour 
High School and kill J.R. before killing himself. 
D.H.:  I’m so close to killing myself. 
B.T.E.:  No no kill someone else not yourself. 
B.T.E.:  Come to Seymour and kill that fucker and then kill 
yourself. 
. . . . 
D.H.:  I’m gonna kms. 
. . . . 
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B.T.E.:  Don’t do that. 
B.T.E.:  Kill others before yourself. 
On its face, this solicitation appears to urge violence against J.R. much 
sooner than B.T.E.’s proposed date in April 2018. 
Additionally, B.T.E.’s classroom drawing in which two seats are shaded 
and another is marked with an “x” hints at more imminent violence. As 
students change classes and classrooms from one year to the next—and 
almost certainly change their seating assignments—B.T.E.’s map would 
presumably have no value for a crime planned two years in the future.  
Finally, B.T.E.’s “death note” also indicates an attack may be more 
imminent. The note does not discuss the nature of B.T.E.’s eventual crime. 
But its mere existence speaks to both the seriousness of B.T.E.’s plot and 
its timing. After all, B.T.E.’s note written in 2015 or 2016 would not 
necessarily reflect his feelings about his classmates in April 2018.  
We find it instructive to compare this case to a recent, strikingly similar 
case from Vermont also involving a prospective school shooter. In State v. 
Sawyer, 187 A.3d 377 (Vt. 2018), a recent graduate was alleged to have 
planned a shooting at his former high school. The defendant allegedly 
wrote detailed journals expressing his wishes and plans for committing a 
school massacre and procured a shotgun in service of those plans. Id. at 
380-81. He also sent Facebook messages to friends suggesting he was a 
threat to his former school and admitted to police that he planned to 
attack the school. Id. And like B.T.E., Sawyer planned “a mass shooting on 
the anniversary of the date of the Columbine school shooting”. Id. at 381. 
The Vermont Supreme Court held Sawyer’s actions likely did not 
amount to an attempt under Vermont law, which “requires an intent to 
commit a crime, coupled with an act that, but for an interruption, would 
result in the completion of a crime.” Id. at 382 (citing State v. Hurley, 64 A. 
78 (Vt. 1906)). Sawyer recognized the difference between Vermont’s 
attempt statute and those statutes, like Indiana’s, that require merely a 
substantial step. In doing so, the Vermont Supreme Court noted that 
Sawyer might be guilty of attempt under a substantial-step attempt 
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statute. Id. at 385-86. “The substantial-step analysis presents a lower bar 
regarding the kind of act required to show that a defendant has attempted 
to commit a crime”. Id. at 385. Ultimately, unlike Vermont, Indiana 
adjudges a person preparing to commit a crime guilty of attempt much 
earlier along the continuum. 
We also note that some Indiana caselaw on attempt focuses 
substantially more on proximity and, in particular, remoteness than we do 
here. Each of the defendants in Calvert v. State, 930 N.E.2d 633 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2010), Collier v. State, 846 N.E.2d 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), and State v. 
Kemp, 753 N.E.2d 47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied, were closer in time 
or space to committing their underlying respective crimes when arrested 
than was B.T.E. In Calvert, the defendant drove around a liquor store to 
scout it for a holdup with a shotgun in his car. 930 N.E.2d at 639-40. In 
Collier, the defendant told his neighbor he was going to murder his ex-
wife and staked out her workplace while possessing an ice pick, box 
cutter, and pair of binoculars. 846 N.E.2d at 342-43. And in Kemp, which 
has since been superseded by statute, the defendant was alleged to have 
met with an undercover officer posing as an underage girl to engage in 
sexual activity. 753 N.E.2d at 51. Yet in all three cases, the Court of 
Appeals held there was no substantial step and thus no attempt. To the 
extent that Calvert, Collier, or Kemp would have foreclosed finding a 
“substantial step” under these facts, we disapprove of these cases. Lack of 
proximity is not dispositive. 
4. Model Penal Code 
B.T.E. engaged in some conduct that may be held a substantial step, 
according to Model Penal Code section 5.01(2). He unquestionably was 
“soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element 
of the crime”, Model Penal Code § 5.01(2)(g), by asking D.H. to kill J.R. 
before killing himself. 
True, the Model Penal Code also refers to “reconnoitering the place 
contemplated for the commission of the crime”. § 5.01(2)(c). And Judge 
Bradford’s dissent views B.T.E.’s drawings of his school building and 
classrooms as reconnoitering under section 5.01(2)(c). But on this record, 
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Page 17 of 18 
we conclude B.T.E. was not undertaking a reconnaissance mission at his 
school; by law, he had to be there during school hours. I.C. § 20-33-2-4. 
Even so, the drawings are strongly corroborative of B.T.E.’s criminal 
intent. 
5. Aggregate conduct 
Last, we consider B.T.E.’s conduct in the aggregate. The State’s 
evidence shows a young man with a clear intention to commit violence at 
his school, along with affirmative acts that strongly corroborate that 
intent. On their own, B.T.E.’s conversations with his friend M.V. might be 
viewed as a long-running “joke”, albeit one extremely offensive and in 
poor taste; his drawings of the school building and classroom the reckless 
doodles of a bored student; and his death note a dramatic diary entry. But 
together these acts reflect a young man who, despite knowing the 
difference between right and wrong, both conjured up a horrific scene at 
school involving death and mayhem to fellow classmates and then took 
affirmative actions toward carrying out that plan. Based on our 
consideration of all the evidence, we cannot say the juvenile court 
committed reversible error in adjudicating B.T.E. a delinquent on the 
charge of attempted aggravated battery. 
Conclusion 
B.T.E. did more here than simply think evil thoughts. What may have 
begun as mere ruminations about his hatred for J.R. turned into a plot to 
kill him along with another classmate, and then extended beyond mere 
planning and preparation. The planning, the solicitations, the bomb 
research, the drawings depicting the target classroom, and the death note 
together justify the trial court’s conclusion that B.T.E.’s affirmative 
conduct amounts to a substantial step toward the commission of 
aggravated battery. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s 
judgment. 
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
R. Patrick Magrath 
Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP 
Madison, Indiana 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Katherine Cooper 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana