Case Title: Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Stamper

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1987-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Stamper1987 WY 13732 P.2d 534Case Number: 86-153Decided: 02/11/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
COMMERCIAL UNION 
INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
JAMES L. STAMPER, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

 
 
J.N. Murdock of Reeves 
& Murdock, Casper, for appellant 
(defendant).

 
 
Richard H. Peek, 
Casper, for appellee 
(plaintiff).

 
 
Before BROWN, C.J.,* THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., and GUTHRIE, 
J., Retired.

 
 

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal presents 
the question whether an insured, under a single automobile insurance policy 
encompassing several vehicles may "stack" or "pyramid" uninsured-motorists and 
medical-payment provisions for recovery of injury and medical expenses sustained 
in an accident involving one of the covered vehicles.

 
 

[¶2.]     The plaintiff-appellee, 
James L. Stamper, was involved in an automobile collision with an uninsured 
motorist, and sustained bodily injuries. At the time, he had an automobile 
insurance policy issued to him as named insured by the defendant-appellant, 
Commercial Union Insurance Company (the insurer), covering three vehicles with 
uninsured-motorists and medical-payments provisions with the face amount of 
$20,000 and $500, respectively. The trial judge held for Stamper by granting 
summary judgment, and determined the recovery to be the aggregate sum of 
coverage for all vehicles of $60,000 uninsured-motorists liability and $1,500 
for medical benefits. This appeal is from that judgment.

 
 

[¶3.]     The stated issues 
are:

 
 
I. Does public policy of 
Wyoming 
prohibit the limitation of damages that will be paid for any one accident under 
a single insurance policy pursuant to its uninsured-motorists and 
medical-payments provisions so that a policy provision to the contrary is 
void?

 
 
II. Did the trial court 
err in finding as a matter of law that the insurance policy was ambiguous 
regarding total coverage, and by granting summary judgment to the insured by 
stacking or aggregating the policy coverage for each vehicle to achieve the 
totals of $60,000 and $1,500?

 
 

[¶4.]     The insurer argues that 
Stamper should not have the benefit of coverage as to all three vehicles but can 
recover only the amount provided for the single vehicle which was occupied at 
the time of the occurrence - or $20,000 for uninsured-motorists coverage and 
$500 for medical payments.

 
 

[¶5.]     We agree, and will 
reverse.

 
 
Summary 
Judgment

 
 

[¶6.]     The standard of review 
for summary judgment appeals has been well established by this 
court.

 
 
"`When reviewing a 
summary judgment on appeal, we review the judgment in the same light as the 
district court, using the same information. Randolph v. Gilpatrick Construction Company, Inc., 
Wyo., 702 P.2d 142 (1985); and Lane Company v. 
Busch Development, Inc., Wyo., 662 P.2d 419 (1983). A party moving for 
summary judgment has the burden of proving the nonexistence of a genuine issue 
of material fact. Dudley v. East Ridge Development Company, Wyo., 694 P.2d 113 
(1985). Material fact has been defined as one which, if proved, would have the 
effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action 
or defense asserted by the parties. Samuel Mares Post No. 8, American Legion, 
Department of Wyoming v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of 
Converse, Wyo., 697 P.2d 1040 (1985). Upon examination of a summary judgment, we 
view the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion, giving him all favorable inferences which may be drawn from the facts. 
Bancroft v. Jagusch, 
Wyo., 611 P.2d 819 (1980).' Garner 
v. Hickman, [Wyo.] 709 P.2d 407, 410 (1985)." Schutkowski 
v. Carey, Wyo., 725 P.2d 1057, 1059 
(1986).

 
 

[¶7.]     The litigants here 
agree on the essential facts, so that separate inquiry into the facts is not 
necessary in application of the law for appeal 
disposition.

 
 

[¶8.]     In applying the 
applicable stage analysis of a summary-judgment situation as enunciated in 
Cordova v. Gosar, Wyo., 719 P.2d 625 (1986), we find that this case encompasses 
a substantive legal issue disposition or a Stage Five summary 
judgment.

 
 
"Stage Five: legal issue disposition. 
Resolution in many cases is accommodated at this time by a determination that 
the issue between the parties is not factual in nature, but rather involves a 
contested issue of law which consequently will decide the case. This stage 
resolution involves interpretation of 
unambiguous contracts, suits on rationally uncontested promissory notes, and 
a variant kind of circumstance where the facts are not in dispute but the legal 
principles are otherwise at issue. Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor, Wyo., 716 P.2d 334 (1986); City of Casper v. International Association of Firefighters, 
Wyo., 713 P.2d 1187 (1986); Duffy v. Brown, 
Wyo., 708 P.2d 433 (1985); Sannerud v. First National Bank of Sheridan, Wyo., 708 P.2d 1236 (1985)." (Emphasis added.) 
719 P.2d  at 636.

 
 

[¶9.]     With the parties only 
disagreeing on the interpretation and scope of the insurance agreement, we have 
for disposition questions of law involving the application of public policy, and 
the interpretation and construction of the contract. Western Utilities 
Contractors, Inc. v. City of Casper, Wyo., 731 P.2d 24 (1986); Burk v. 
Burzynski, Wyo., 672 P.2d 419 (1983); Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, Inc., 
Wyo., 664 P.2d 27 (1983); Rouse v. Munroe, Wyo., 658 P.2d 74 (1983); Tate v. 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., Wyo., 647 P.2d 58 (1982); Busch 
Development, Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, Wyo., 645 P.2d 65 (1982); and Amoco 
Production Company v. Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463 
(1980).

 
 
Public 
Policy

 
 

[¶10.]  In delineating public policy, the key is 
found in our identifying and giving force and effect to that public policy of 
the State of Wyoming announced through applicable statutes 
or controlling precedent. Allstate Insurance Company v. Wyoming Insurance Department, 
Wyo., 672 P.2d 810, 815 (1983). A 
statutory review is necessary, since, although "parties have the right to embody 
in their insurance contract whatever lawful terms they wish," Alm v. Hartford 
Fire Insurance Company, Wyo., 369 P.2d 216, 217 (1962), citing Rosenblum v. Sun 
Life Assurance Company of Canada, 51 Wyo. 195, 65 P.2d 399, 109 A.L.R. 911 
(1937), "the insurance agreement must not conflict with pertinent statutes or 
public policy," Allstate Insurance Company v. Wyoming Insurance Department, 
supra 672 P.2d  at 816, citing McKay v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the 
United States, Wyo., 421 P.2d 166 (1966), and Cincinnati Insurance Company v. 
Mallon, Ind. App., 409 N.E.2d 1100 (1980).

 
 

[¶11.]  The Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage Act 
(§§ 31-10-101 through 31-10-104, W.S. 1977) provides in § 31-10-101 
that:

 
 
"No policy insuring 
against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death 
suffered by any natural person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use 
of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with 
respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state 
unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in limits for 
bodily injury or death as approved by W.S. 31-9-102(a)(x), under provisions 
approved by the insurance commissioner for the protection of persons insured 
thereunder or legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators or 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, 
including death resulting therefrom. The 
named insured may reject the coverage. Unless the named insured requests the 
coverage in writing, the coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a 
renewal policy where the named insured had rejected the coverage in connection 
with the policy previously issued to him by the same insurer." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶12.]  Furthermore, § 31-9-102(a)(x), W.S. 1977, 
states:

 
 
"(x) `Proof of financial 
responsibility' means proof of ability to respond in damages for liability, on 
account of accidents occurring subsequent to the effective date of said proof, 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, in the 
amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death 
of one (1) person in any one (1) accident, and subject to said limit for one (1) 
person, in the amount of twenty thousand dollars dollars ($20,000.00) because of 
bodily injury to or death of two (2) or more persons in any one (1) accident, 
and in the amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) because of injury to or 
destruction of property of others in any one (1) accident."1

 
 
"* * * [T]he words 
employed by the legislature in announcing the law must be given their plain and 
ordinary meaning. McArtor v. State, Wyo., 699 P.2d 288, 292 (1985); Hurst v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1130 
(1985)." Scadden v. State, Wyo., 732 P.2d 1036, 1042 
(1987).

 
 

[¶13.]  Taking the plain meaning of the words 
used in reading and interpreting the applicable statutes as promulgated and 
enacted by the Wyoming legislature, it is apparent that the purpose of 
uninsured-motorists insurance coverage is to provide to innocent automobile 
accident victims an opportunity to 
procure a means of insulating themselves from damages incurred as a result of 
unfortunate and far too frequently occurring automobile collisions with 
uninsured motorists. Under Wyoming law, the purchase of 
uninsured-motorists insurance is not mandatory, but is a matter of discretion 
for the individual. The legislature intended that the insured be given the 
opportunity of subscribing to such coverage, and set a minimum coverage, 
allowing the insured to elect that minimum or any greater 
amount.

 
 
"[T]he uninsured motor 
vehicles act is calculated to protect a restricted category of drivers - namely, 
those insured owners who are involved in accidents with drivers who do not carry 
insurance. "Compulsory insurance, on the other hand, is intended to be but one 
of the conditions for driving upon the highways of the state and its purpose is 
to benefit the motoring public as a whole (see 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance 
§ 20, p. 466, infra), not just a restricted class of persons who have shown 
themselves to be `bad drivers' or the limited class of insured motorists who are 
involved in accidents with those who do not carry 
insurance.

 
 
"Therefore, while the 
fallout benefits of Wyoming's financial responsibility law and the uninsured 
motor vehicles act may be similar to those of the compulsory insurance statute, 
i.e., the protection of various classes of motorists from drivers on the 
highways of the state, it is clear that the uninsured motor vehicles act and the 
financial responsibility law are intended to `benefit' a very limited category 
of drivers, while the compulsory insurance statute, on the other hand, is 
intended to protect all motorists who drive upon the highways of the state. It 
can therefore be seen that the avowed legislative purpose of the two acts is not 
the same and the classes of those who are intended to be benefited both in kind 
and in numbers are different." Allstate Insurance Company v. Wyoming Insurance 
Department, 672 P.2d  at 818.

 
 

[¶14.]  At the date of the accident the policy 
met the statutory requirement as a minimum coverage, and there is no stated 
statutory public policy requiring aggregating which would vitiate clear 
insurance policy terms. Ample supporting authority exists. E.g., Kracl v. Aetna 
Casualty and Surety Co., 220 Neb. 869, 374 N.W.2d 40 (1985). See also 
Martin v. Christensen, 22 Utah 2d 415, 454 P.2d 294 
(1969).

 
 

[¶15.]  The cases are many and the results 
varied, as is demonstrated by the comprehensive annotations in 25 A.L.R.4th 6 
(uninsured motorists), and 29 A.L.R.4th 49 (medical payments). Ascertainable 
confusion and dispute among the authorities, although in some cases attributable 
to particular statutes, can be related philosophically to result-oriented 
applications which create coverage that was not provided by the insurance 
agreement from which benefits are to be derived. In general, we do not find any 
logical or statutory basis for distinguishing the coverage available to the 
named insured from other insureds under the extended-coverage provisions of 
automobile insurance policies. Each permissive user should be equally insured in 
coverage amount. Lyon v. Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971); Kennedy v. 
American Hardware Mutual Insurance Co., 255 Or. 425, 467 P.2d 963 
(1970).

 
 

[¶16.]  The insured argues, however, that 
established Wyoming precedent, Ramsour v. Grange Insurance Association, Wyo., 
541 P.2d 35 (1975), dictates that any limitation-of-damages provision with 
regard to uninsured-motorists insurance must be stricken as against public 
policy, and thereby contends that uninsured-motorists insurance benefits must be 
allowed to be stacked or to be aggregated. The position adopted in oral argument 
by appellee was that stacking occurred only in benefit of the named insured, so 
that the dilemma of extreme coverages for fleet policies would not be created, 
as might be the case with state employees, for example, where an aggregated 
coverage of hundreds of times the stated amount would otherwise result. See 
Cunningham v. Insurance Company of North America, 213 Va. 72, 189 S.E.2d 832 
(1972).

 
 

[¶17.]  While we do not specifically overrule the 
decision or reasoning used in Ramsour v. Grange Insurance Association, supra, we 
do not find that case to be controlling here. Any assumption that Ramsour stands 
for the broad contention of public policy prohibiting insurance policy 
limitations in uninsured-motorists or medical-benefits provisions, or that these 
coverages must be allowed to be stacked in all cases, is unjustified. A case in 
which there were both separate policies and a comparison fleet damage issue is 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Howard, 288 S.C. 5, 339 S.E.2d 501 (1985). 
See also Insurance Law, 38 S.C.L.Rev. 133 at 140 (1986).

 
 

[¶18.]  The decision in Ramsour is based on 
narrow grounds and will not now be extended. The facts in Ramsour were 
different, involving aggregation of benefits found in separate insurance 
policies, whereas this case involves a single insurance policy. See Cunningham 
v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 90 S.D. 530, 243 N.W.2d 172 (1976). We do 
not find, either by statutory provision or compelling precedent, that public 
policy in Wyoming requires uninsured-motorists or 
medical-payments insurance benefits in one policy to be aggregated in all cases 
where an insured has an unfortunate automobile accident with an uninsured 
motorist. If the legislature intends a contrary result, it can supply the 
requirement by express statute, showing its clear intent, and recognizing the 
underwriting principle and costs which result. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. 
Andrews, N.D., 321 N.W.2d 483, 29 A.L.R.4th 1 (1982).

 
 
"We acknowledge that the 
legislature, not the judiciary, ought to make the decision and, accordingly, if 
we have failed in our effort to detect legislative intent in this highly 
specialized area of insurance, the legislature is invited to reevaluate the 
statute and the consequences and to clearly spell out its intent, as may be 
dictated by the best interest of the people of this state." 321 N.W.2d  at 
486.

 
 

[¶19.]  In adhering to the general rule accepted 
in this state, we recognize that

 
 
"* * * freedom on the 
part of insurance companies to include any desired provision in insurance 
contracts is limited to that which is not prohibited by statute or public 
policy. McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943); Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954); Oldman v. Bartshe, Wyo., 480 P.2d 99 (1971); and Vosler v. Peterson, Wyo., 480 P.2d 393 (1971)." Allstate Insurance 
Company v. Wyoming Insurance Department, 672 P.2d  at 
823-824.

 
 
Since the insurance 
agreement in this case neither circumvented pertinent Wyoming statutes nor 
otherwise established public policy, we will defer to the language of the 
insurance policy itself to establish the existence of any limitations of 
liability.

 
 
Insurance Policy 
Interpretation

 
 

[¶20.]  General principles of construction will 
be followed when interpreting conditions of an insurance agreement. Basic tenets 
stated in McKay v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, supra, 421 P.2d  at 168, and 
applied in controversies involving insurance policies in the State of Wyoming 
are:

 
 
1. "[T]he words used will 
be given their common and ordinary meaning. 13 Appleman, Insurance Law and 
Practice, § 7402 (1943). * * * Neither will the language be `tortured' in order 
to create an ambiguity. Malanga v. Royal Indemnity Company, 4 Ariz. App. 150, 418 P.2d 396, 399 [1966]; 13 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 7384 
(1943)."

 
 
2. "The intention of the 
parties is the primary consideration and is to be ascertained, if possible, from 
the language employed in the policy, viewed in the light of what the parties 
must reasonably have intended. Wilson v. Hawkeye Casualty Co., [67 Wyo. 141], 215 P.2d [867] 
at 873-875 [1950]."

 
 
3. "Such [insurance 
policy] contracts should not be so strictly construed as to thwart the general 
object of the insurance. Miles v. Continental Casualty Company, Wyo., 386 P.2d 720, 722 
[1963]."

 
 
"* * * [T]he parties have 
the right to employ whatever lawful terms they wish and courts will not rewrite 
them. Alm v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Wyo., 369 P.2d 216, 217 
[1962]."

 
 
4. "Absent ambiguity, 
there is no room for construction and the policy will be enforced according to 
its terms. Addison v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, Wyo., 358 P.2d 948, 950 
[1961]."

 
 
5. "* * * [W]here such 
[insurance policy] contracts are so drawn as to be ambiguous and uncertain and 
to require construction, the contract will be construed liberally in favor of 
the insured and strictly against the insurer. Also, if the contract is fairly 
susceptible of two constructions, the one favorable to the insured will be 
adopted. [Wilson 
v. Hawkeye Casualty Co., supra 215 P.2d  at 867.]"

 
 

[¶21.]  Stamper contends that "since the policy 
in question is ambiguous, when read in light of the declarations section and the 
endorsement page specifying the vehicles covered, the types of coverage, and the 
charges for said coverage, it should be resolved against its maker and construed 
in favor of coverage." Similarly, the trial court stated in its decision 
letter:

 
 
"While the language of 
the clause is clear on its face as to what is intended, when this clause is read 
together with the declaration sheet it becomes unclear and ambiguous. * * * 
Since the policy is ambiguous, the `limits of liability' clause is ineffective 
and `stacking' under the policy shall be permitted."

 
 
We do not 
agree.

 
 

[¶22.]  The insurance policy, including the 
declaration sheet and endorsement sheet, when read as a whole, cannot be 
construed as ambiguous. Giving the words used their common and ordinary meaning, 
it is clear that the limitation on damages comprised in both the declaration 
sheet and endorsement sheet clearly limits coverage under the 
uninsured-motorists provision to $20,000, and under the medical-payments 
provision to $500. Holland v. Hawkeye Security 
Insurance Co., Ia., 230 N.W.2d 517 
(1975).

 
 

[¶23.]  The uninsured-motorists and 
medical-payments insurance endorsement sheets respectively 
state:

 
 
"Regardless of the number 
of covered autos, insureds, claims made or vehicles involved in the accident, 
the most we will pay for all damages resulting from any one accident is the 
limit of UNINSURED MOTORISTS INSURANCE shown in the declarations." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
"Regardless of the number 
of covered autos, insureds, claims made or vehicles involved in the accident, 
the most we will pay for bodily injury for each insured injured in any one 
accident is the limit of AUTO MEDICAL PAYMENTS shown in the declarations." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
The declarations sheet 
provides in graph form under the headings "LIMIT - THE MOST WE WILL PAY FOR ANY 
ONE ACCIDENT OR LOSS" and "UNINSURED MOTORISTS INSURANCE" - "$20,000," and under 
"LIMIT - THE MOST WE WILL PAY FOR ANY ONE ACCIDENT OR LOSS" and "AUTO MEDICAL 
PAYMENTS INSURANCE" - "$500."

 
 

[¶24.]  A reasoned construction reveals that the 
parties intended that both the endorsement sheets and declaration sheets would 
conjunctively make up the total policy, and that, in the terms of the specific 
provision, the amount of coverage on each accident would be limited to $20,000 
uninsured-motorist coverages and $500 medical-payments coverage. See Hansen v. 
Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 116 Ga. App. 528, 157 S.E.2d 768 (1967); 
Nissenbaum v. Liberty Mutual Insurance, 16 Mass. App. 996, 454 N.E.2d 922 
(1983); Eckert v. Green Mountain Insurance Co., 118 N.H. 701, 394 A.2d 55 
(1978); Sisson v. Travelers Insurance Companies, 94 A.D.2d 953, 464 N.Y.S.2d 77 
(1983).

 
 

[¶25.]  Stamper argues in the alternative that, 
because he made separate premium payments for each automobile covered under each 
of the disputed provisions, each automobile paid for constitutes a separate 
policy, and therefore stacking should be allowed. We find the argument to be 
unpersuasive, as have other courts. Hansen v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 
supra; Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Decenzo, 18 Mass. App. 973, 469 N.E.2d 1316 (1984), aff'd 396 Mass. 692, 488 N.E.2d 405 (1986); Castle v. United 
Pacific Insurance Group, 242 Or. 44, 448 P.2d 357 (1968).

 
 

[¶26.]  The declarations sheet shows a total 
premium of $16 for uninsured-motorists insurance and $46 for medical-payments 
insurance. Furthermore, while an attached Fleet Schedule breaks down the premium 
to be paid by each vehicle under each provision, a total under each provision is 
arrived at in computing the total policy payments. Neither the payment 
provisions nor the language of the insurance agreement demonstrates anything but 
a single and individual policy. Likewise, no discernable difference is found 
between the uninsured-motorists provision and the medical-payments provision. 
See 25 A.L.R.4th, supra at 6, and 29 A.L.R.4th, supra at 49. Cf. Bogart v. Twin 
City Fire Insurance Company, 473 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1973).

 
 

[¶27.]  In finding that one single and individual 
policy exists, and that the common and ordinary meaning of the words used by the 
parties evidences their intent to limit liability coverage to $20,000 and $500 
under the uninsured-motorists and medical-payments provisions, we then discern 
no ambiguity in the insurance policy. "Absent ambiguity, there is no room for 
construction and the policy will be enforced according to its terms. Addison v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, [supra]." McKay 
v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 
supra, 421 P.2d  at 168.

 
 

[¶28.]  Representative cases denying stacking 
include State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Williams, 123 Ariz. 455, 
600 P.2d 759 (1979); M.F.A. Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wallace, 245 Ark. 230, 431 S.W.2d 742 (1968); Rudder v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 107 Cal. App. 3d 158, 165 Cal. Rptr. 562, 21 A.L.R.4th 205 (1980); McLellan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co., Fla.App., 366 So. 2d 811 (1979); Doerpinghaus v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., 124 Ga. App. 627, 185 S.E.2d 615 (1971); Jeffries v. Stewart, 159 
Ind. App. 701, 309 N.E.2d 448 (1974); Nall v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co., La., 406 So. 2d 216 (1981); Trimble v. Safeco Insurance Co. of 
America, 96 Mich. App. 291, 292 N.W.2d 193 (1980); Pettid v. Edwards, 195 Neb. 
713, 240 N.W.2d 344 (1976); Wachovia Park & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire 
Insurance Co., 276 N.C. 348, 172 S.E.2d 518 (1970); Lemoi v. Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Co., R.I., 453 A.2d 758 (1982); Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Bair, 257 S.C. 551, 186 S.E.2d 410 (1972); and Goodville Mutual Casualty Co. v. 
Borror, 221 Va. 967, 275 S.E.2d 625 (1981).

 
 
Conclusion

 
 

[¶29.]  In this case, the right to aggregate 
coverages is neither required by ascertainable public-policy concerns nor 
permitted by the insurance policy by its clearly stated terms. We find that the 
lower court erred in its decision granting summary judgment in favor of 
appellee, and, recognizing this court's precedents that summary judgment is 
proper where the language of an agreement is plain and unambiguous, Hensley v. 
Williams, Wyo., 726 P.2d 90 (1986); and Cordova v. Gosar, supra, hold that 
summary judgment for appellant should be granted.

 
 

[¶30.]  Reversed and 
remanded.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Pursuant to Ch. 234, § 
2, S.L. of Wyoming 1985, the amounts have been raised to 
$25,000, $50,000, and $20,000, respectively.