Case Title: State v. Delebreau

Citation: 2015 WI 55

Docket Number: 2013AP001108-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 WI 55 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP1108-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jesse J. Delebreau, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 352 Wis. 2d 647, 843 N.W.2d 441 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No: 2014 WI App 21 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 16, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 5, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Brown 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas J. Walsh 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., concurs. (Opinion Filed.) 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, BRADLEY, JJ. dissent. (Opinion 
Filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Stephen P. Hurley, Marcus J. Berghahn, and Hurley, Burish & 
Stanton, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Stephen P. Hurley. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Jacob 
J. Wittwer, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 55
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2013AP1108-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2011CF453) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jesse J. Delebreau, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 16, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, affirming a judgment of 
conviction in the Brown County Circuit Court, Mark A. Warpinski, 
Judge.1  The case presents questions related to the right to 
counsel for defendants who have been charged with a crime. 
¶2 
Jesse J. Delebreau (Delebreau) was convicted of one 
count of delivering heroin (less than three grams), second or 
                                                 
1 State v. Delebreau, 2014 WI App 21, 352 Wis. 2d 647, 843 
N.W.2d 441. 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
2 
 
subsequent offense, as a repeater and as party to a crime.2  The 
circuit court entered a judgment of conviction following a jury 
trial in which the State utilized statements Delebreau made to 
investigators while he was incarcerated at the Brown County 
Jail.  These statements were made after the charge against 
Delebreau had been filed and after Delebreau had appeared in 
court with appointed counsel. 
¶3 
The focus of Delebreau's appeal is that the statements 
he made to police after his initial appearance should have been 
suppressed in accord with State v. Dagnall, 2000 WI 82, 236 
Wis. 2d 339, 612 N.W.2d 680.  In Dagnall, this court observed 
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches when criminal 
charges are filed.  Id., ¶52.  It then stated that, "[a]fter an 
attorney represents the defendant on particular charges, the 
accused may not be questioned about the crimes charged in the 
absence of an attorney."  Id., ¶53. 
¶4 
Since 
Dagnall, 
however, 
the 
legal 
landscape 
has 
changed.  In 2009 the United States Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009), holding 
that a defendant's waiver of his or her Miranda3 rights is 
sufficient to waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, even 
though Miranda rights are grounded in the Fifth Amendment.  Id. 
                                                 
2 Contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1)(d)1, 961.48(1)(b), 
939.62(1)(b), and 939.05.  All subsequent references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-12 version unless otherwise 
indicated. 
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
3 
 
at 786-87.  The Court further held that a defendant's waiver 
need not be presumed invalid simply because the defendant is 
represented by counsel.  Id. at 789.  The Court's holding 
overruled Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986)——on which 
Dagnall heavily relied——and seriously undercut our holding in 
Dagnall.  
¶5 
Following 
Montejo, 
we 
addressed 
the 
new 
legal 
landscape in State v. Forbush, 2011 WI 25, 332 Wis. 2d 620, 796 
N.W.2d 741.  However, our decision in Forbush featured such a 
marked lack of consensus among the justices that it left 
Wisconsin law somewhat unclear.  Hence, we take this opportunity 
to clarify the law on waiver of the right to counsel after a 
defendant has been charged with a crime. 
¶6 
First, we reaffirm the position of a majority of 
justices in Forbush that Montejo effectively overruled Dagnall 
by establishing that a waiver of Miranda rights is sufficient to 
waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and that such a 
waiver is not presumed invalid simply because the defendant is 
already represented by counsel.  Second, we hold that that 
Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution does not 
provide greater protections than the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution in the context of a waiver of the 
right to have counsel present during questioning.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶7 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  This case stems 
from the Brown County Drug Task Force's (the Task Force) use of 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
4 
 
a confidential informant to arrange for the purchase of drugs.  
In exchange for not being charged with possession of drug 
paraphernalia, 
B.J. 
(the 
informant) 
agreed 
to 
act 
as 
a 
confidential informant for the Task Force.  On February 21, 
2011, the informant arranged a meeting with Christopher Woodliff 
(Woodliff) to buy crack cocaine and heroin.  The informant knew 
Woodliff through prior drug deals between the two.  The Task 
Force outfitted the informant with a surveillance wire and gave 
him $200 to purchase drugs from Woodliff. 
¶8 
Once 
inside 
Woodliff's 
home, 
the 
informant 
saw 
Woodliff, two other men, and a woman.  The informant had not met 
Delebreau before, but he identified him at trial as one of the 
other men he saw inside Woodliff's home.  The informant asked 
Woodliff for two bags of crack cocaine and two bags of heroin.  
He gave Woodliff the $200 provided by the Task Force.  Woodliff 
returned $80, then asked Delebreau if he had "any bindles left."  
Delebreau replied that he did, and the informant gave him the 
remaining $80. 
¶9 
After the exchange of money, Woodliff and Delebreau 
left the room.  When they returned, Delebreau handed the 
informant two baggies of what the informant believed to be 
heroin.  Woodliff provided the informant with the crack cocaine.  
The informant stayed inside Woodliff's home for about 45 
minutes. 
¶10 Once he left Woodliff's home, the informant met with 
one of the investigators from the Task Force and turned over the 
recording equipment along with the four baggies of drugs.  The 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
5 
 
two baggies of heroin were later weighed at the State Crime 
Laboratory and found to have a combined weight of 0.013 grams. 
¶11 Delebreau was taken into custody on March 31 on a 
probation hold.  He was held at the Brown County Jail.  Sometime 
between April 7 and April 9, Delebreau sent a note to jail 
officials requesting to speak with a narcotics investigator in 
the Task Force about his involvement. 
¶12 On April 14, Delebreau was charged with the delivery 
of heroin stemming from the February 21 transaction.  That same 
day, Delebreau made his initial appearance in court4 where he was 
represented 
by 
Attorney 
William 
M. 
Fitzgerald, 
a 
public 
defender.5 
¶13 The 
next 
day, 
April 
15, 
Delebreau 
met 
with 
investigator Roman Aronstein from the Task Force at the jail.  
Aronstein later testified that he was the person who previously 
referred charges related to Delebreau's involvement in the 
February 21 incident to the District Attorney's office but that 
he was unaware of the status of those charges.  Aronstein also 
testified that at the time of the meeting he believed that 
Delebreau was at the jail on a probation hold.  Aronstein did 
not check with the District Attorney's office about his criminal 
referral and he did not ask Delebreau whether he had actually 
                                                 
4 Court Commissioner Lawrence L. Gazeley presided. 
5 Shortly after Delebreau's initial appearance, it was found 
that 
Fitzgerald 
had 
a 
conflict 
of 
interest 
because 
he 
represented a co-defendant.  A new attorney was appointed to 
represent Delebreau. 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
6 
 
been charged.  Before beginning the interview, Aronstein 
activated the audio/video equipment at the jail and read 
Delebreau his Miranda rights.  Delebreau waived his rights and 
did not ask for counsel.  In this interview, Delebreau admitted 
to having sold drugs.6  However, Delebreau could not remember 
anything about the February incident even after being shown 
video of the transaction. 
¶14 Aronstein returned three days later (April 18) to 
interview Delebreau a second time.  Again, Aronstein did not 
check whether charges had been filed against Delebreau or 
whether he had counsel.  Before the interview took place, 
Aronstein turned on the audio/video equipment and read Delebreau 
his Miranda rights.  Aronstein testified that Delebreau stated 
during the interview that "he wasn't going to be able to beat 
these charges" and that "he was going to end up going to prison 
anyway so he might as well just cooperate with law enforcement."  
Aronstein testified that he believed from this exchange that 
Delebreau had no intention of meeting with an attorney.  
Aronstein 
had 
prepared 
a 
statement 
for 
Delebreau, 
which 
Delebreau signed.  The statement acknowledged that Delebreau was 
the person in the video and based on the transaction shown, he 
must have been the one who sold heroin to the informant.  
However, Delebreau claimed he had no memory of the incident. 
                                                 
6 Aronstein started the meeting by introducing himself and 
Delebreau immediately said "he wished to resolve the matter at 
hand and [knew] that he [was] guilty of something." 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
7 
 
¶15 The 
two 
interviews 
were 
used 
as 
evidence 
in 
Delebreau's trial.  Before the trial, Brown County Circuit Judge 
Mark A. Warpinski denied Delebreau's motion to suppress the 
statements he made in the interviews.  The court of appeals 
denied Delebreau's petition for leave to appeal the order 
denying the suppression motion because Delebreau failed to meet 
the criteria for an interlocutory appeal. 
¶16 At trial, a jury found Delebreau guilty of delivery of 
heroin, 
and 
the 
court 
sentenced 
him 
to 
eight 
years 
of 
imprisonment consisting of four years of initial confinement and 
four years of extended supervision.  The court of appeals 
affirmed 
Delebreau's 
conviction 
and 
the 
denial 
of 
his 
suppression motion, determining that Montejo controlled and that 
Delebreau's Miranda waiver was thus sufficient to waive his 
right to counsel.  State v. Delebreau, 2014 WI App 21, 352 
Wis. 2d 647, ¶19, 843 N.W.2d 441. 
¶17 Delebreau petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on May 22, 2014. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 Whether Delebreau's right to counsel was violated is a 
question of constitutional fact.  When reviewing issues of 
constitutional fact, we undertake a two-step analysis.  State v. 
Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶17, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552.  
First, we accept the circuit court's findings of evidentiary or 
historical fact in a suppression matter unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Id., ¶18.  Second, we independently review the 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
8 
 
application of constitutional principles to the facts.  Id., 
¶17. 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
¶19 We begin our analysis with a discussion of the legal 
background surrounding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.7 
¶20 On April 1, 1986, the United States Supreme Court 
issued its decision in Jackson.  Jackson had been convicted of 
second-degree murder based, in part, on a statement he made to 
police following his request at arraignment that counsel be 
appointed for him.  Jackson, 475 U.S. at 628.  Police had gone 
to see Jackson after the arraignment, read Jackson his Miranda 
rights, and upon waiver, elicited a statement from Jackson.  Id. 
¶21 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, held that 
the statement should have been suppressed.  Id. at 628-29.  It 
relied heavily on Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), which 
held that "an accused person in custody who has 'expressed his 
desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not 
subject to further interrogation by the authorities until 
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused 
himself 
initiates 
further 
communication, 
exchanges, 
or 
conversations with the police.'"  Jackson, 475 U.S. at 626 
(quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85).  The Court reasoned that, 
although Edwards was a Fifth Amendment case, its extension to 
                                                 
7 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states, in pertinent part, "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of 
counsel for his defense."  U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
9 
 
cover the Sixth Amendment was appropriate because "the reasons 
for prohibiting the interrogation of an uncounseled prisoner who 
has asked for the help of a lawyer are even stronger after he 
has been formally charged with an offense than before."  Id. at 
631. 
¶22 The Jackson decision was not unanimous.  Chief Justice 
Burger concurred in the judgment on the basis of stare decisis, 
but asserted that "plainly the subject calls for reexamination."  
Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636-37 (Burger, C.J., concurring).  Justice 
Rehnquist, 
joined 
by 
two 
justices, 
vigorously 
dissented, 
contending that Edwards created a prophylactic rule to protect a 
defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination——not a rule to bar a defendant's waiver of his 
Miranda rights merely because the defendant had requested the 
appointment of counsel.  Jackson, 475 U.S. at 637-39 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting).   
¶23 In 2000 this court followed the Jackson majority in 
Dagnall.  Dagnall was charged with first-degree intentional 
homicide in Wisconsin and was arrested for that charge on a 
warrant in Florida.  Dagnall, 236 Wis. 2d 339, ¶5.  On the day 
of his arrest, a Wisconsin attorney delivered a letter to the 
authorities in Dane County stating that he represented Dagnall 
and that the sheriff's department was not to interrogate Dagnall 
about the homicide.  Id., ¶6.  Two officers, at least one of 
whom was aware of the attorney's letter, traveled to Florida to 
speak with Dagnall and return him to Wisconsin.  Id., ¶7. 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
10 
 
¶24 During 
their 
first 
interview, 
Dagnall 
told 
the 
officers, "My lawyer told me that I shouldn't talk to you guys."  
Id., ¶9.  The officers read Dagnall his Miranda rights and 
Dagnall agreed to talk up to the point he thought he might 
incriminate himself.  Id., ¶¶10-11.  The following day the 
officers conducted a second interview after they read Dagnall 
his Miranda rights and Dagnall agreed to waive them.  Id., ¶12.  
One of the officers, Detective Kevin Hughes, talked to Dagnall 
two more times after returning him to Wisconsin.  Id., ¶13-14.  
The last time, Dagnall asked if his attorney knew he was back in 
Wisconsin; the detective said he didn't know and ended the 
interrogation.  Id. 
¶25 We held that Dagnall did not need to invoke his right 
to counsel because he was formally charged with a crime and 
represented by counsel.  Id., ¶4.  The officers knew Dagnall was 
represented by counsel and therefore did not have the authority 
to question Dagnall about the crime.  Id., ¶¶62, 64.  We also 
held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the 
initiation of charges, and that the accused invokes the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel either by retaining counsel or by 
having counsel appointed.  Id., ¶¶52, 60.  We explained that 
authorities may not "knowingly exploit the opportunity to 
confront the accused without accused's counsel being present."  
Id., ¶51 (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)).   
¶26 As in the Supreme Court, there was a vigorous dissent.  
Justice 
Crooks 
argued 
against 
a 
total 
prohibition 
on 
interrogations after a defendant is formally charged and 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
11 
 
represented by counsel.  Dagnall, 236 Wis. 2d 339, ¶68 (Crooks, 
J., dissenting). 
Such a bright line rule means that law enforcement 
officials may not even question a person . . . once 
charges are filed and the person has an attorney.  
According to the majority, it makes no difference that 
such an individual is given Miranda warnings, waives 
his or her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, and 
agrees to talk to police officers about the crime 
charged. 
Id., ¶69. 
¶27 Nine years after Dagnall, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed course in Montejo.  Montejo was arrested in 
connection with a robbery and murder.  He waived his Miranda 
rights, and after police interrogated him for two days, he 
confessed to the murder.  Montejo, 556 U.S. at 781.  Later, 
Montejo was brought before a judge for Louisiana's equivalent of 
a preliminary hearing.  He was charged with the crime, and the 
court ordered appointment of counsel.  Id. 
¶28 Following the hearing, two police detectives visited 
Montejo and asked him to take them to where he had disposed of 
the murder weapon.  Id. at 781-82.  The detectives read Montejo 
his Miranda rights and he agreed to go on the trip.  Id. at 782.  
During the trip, Montejo penned a letter of apology to the 
victim's widow.  Id.  After the trip, Montejo met with his 
attorney for the first time.  Id.  The letter he had written was 
admitted into evidence at trial, and Montejo was convicted.  Id. 
¶29 In reviewing the case, the Court overruled Jackson and 
its presumption that waivers of the right to counsel are invalid 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
12 
 
when given after defendants assert their right to counsel.  The 
Court also clarified that all defendants have the right to 
counsel 
during 
critical 
stages 
of 
the 
criminal 
process, 
including interrogations, so that a valid waiver of Sixth 
Amendment rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  
Id. at 786.  However, the Court held that a represented 
defendant may waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel after 
receiving proper Miranda warnings without consulting counsel.  
Id. 
¶30 We addressed this development in Forbush in 2011.  The 
State charged Forbush with second-degree sexual assault and 
false imprisonment.  Forbush, 332 Wis. 2d 620, ¶3.  Forbush was 
arrested in Michigan and made a court appearance there in which 
he was represented by his brother, a lawyer.  Id., ¶6.  He was 
subsequently returned to Wisconsin where the Sheboygan County 
District Attorney's office and a detective with Sheboygan County 
Sheriff's 
Department 
had 
been 
notified 
that 
Forbush 
was 
represented by counsel.  Id., ¶3. 
¶31 Before his first court appearance in Sheboygan County, 
Forbush 
was 
approached 
by 
a 
different 
Sheboygan 
County 
detective.  The detective began by reading the Miranda rights to 
Forbush and then asked whether Forbush would be willing to waive 
his right to counsel.  Id., ¶4.  Forbush waived his rights and 
began 
answering 
questions. 
 
Immediately 
following 
the 
questioning, Forbush was taken to his initial appearance where 
he was represented by local counsel as well as his brother.  
Id., ¶5. 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
13 
 
¶32 Before trial, Forbush moved to suppress the statements 
and the circuit court granted the motion.  Id., ¶7.  The circuit 
court found that authorities had violated Forbush's Sixth 
Amendment rights because they knew he was already represented by 
counsel at the time of questioning.  Id. 
¶33 The court of appeals reversed,8 noting that Montejo had 
overturned Jackson, and "held that the Sixth Amendment does not 
prevent 
police 
from 
questioning 
charged 
and 
represented 
defendants."  Id., ¶8.  The court of appeals determined that the 
circuit 
court 
based 
its 
decision 
on 
Dagnall, 
which 
was 
effectively overruled by Montejo.  Id. 
¶34 We reversed the court of appeals in a case that 
produced five separate opinions.  The lead opinion, authored by 
Justice Roggensack, narrowly interpreted Montejo as removing the 
presumption of a Sixth Amendment violation for represented 
defendants in cases where it is unclear whether they invoked 
their right to counsel.  Id., ¶51.  Chief Justice Abrahamson, 
joined by Justice Bradley, conceded that Montejo superseded the 
state's previous interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel in Dagnall.  Forbush, 332 Wis. 2d 620, ¶64 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., concurring).  However, the Chief Justice contended that 
the right to counsel under the Wisconsin Constitution is more 
robust than the right under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.  Id., ¶71. 
                                                 
8 State v. Forbush, 2010 WI App 11, 323 Wis. 2d 258, 779 
N.W.2d 476. 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
14 
 
¶35 A third opinion noted that Montejo was not in effect 
at the time of Forbush's interrogation by the Sheboygan 
detective.  Id., ¶103 (Prosser, J., concurring).  Thus, Dagnall 
constituted the law of Wisconsin for law enforcement at that 
time.  Id., ¶88.  Under Dagnall, Forbush would not need to re-
invoke his Sixth Amendment right because he was already 
represented by counsel.  Id., ¶92.  However, the third opinion 
observed that Montejo "is unquestionably the current controlling 
law on the subject of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."  
Id., ¶116. 
¶36 In dissent, Justice Crooks, joined by Justices Ziegler 
and Gableman, contended that Montejo overruled Dagnall and that 
a defendant's knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the 
right to counsel could be achieved through the Miranda warnings.  
Id., ¶¶152-53 (Crooks, J., dissenting).  In a separate dissent, 
Justice Ziegler, joined by Justice Gableman, reasoned that even 
though Dagnall articulated a sound, fair, and workable standard, 
Montejo overruled Dagnall because Dagnall was grounded in the 
Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, not Article I, Section 
7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Id., ¶157 (Ziegler, J., 
dissenting). 
¶37 The common thread throughout this evolution of Sixth 
Amendment case law is the need to balance police flexibility in 
investigating criminal activity with the fundamentally fair 
treatment of criminal defendants.  Cases like Jackson and 
Dagnall noted the special role of counsel after a suspect has 
been charged and formally become a criminal defendant.  E.g., 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
15 
 
Jackson, 475 U.S. at 632 (acknowledging criminal defendants' 
"right to rely on counsel as a 'medium' between [them] and the 
State" after they are charged) (citation omitted); Dagnall, 236 
Wis. 2d 339, ¶36.  These cases equated the request for or 
appointment of counsel as the equivalent of a defendant's 
invocation of the right to counsel. 
¶38 Contrary holdings have not been grounded in the idea 
that the role of counsel after the initiation of charges is 
somehow not important or even critical.  Rather, the concerns 
were more practical and recognized a defendant's authority to 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights.  For 
example, one dissent in Dagnall offered the hypothetical of a 
criminal defendant who "is given Miranda warnings, waives his or 
her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, and agrees to talk to 
police officers about the crime charged."  Dagnall, 236 
Wis. 2d 339, ¶69 (Crooks, J., dissenting).  A bright line rule 
prohibits the officers from speaking with such a defendant, thus 
frustrating their investigatory role, even though the defendant 
willingly consents to talk.9 
                                                 
9 As Chief Justice Burger put it: 
The 
urge 
for 
"bright-line" 
rules 
readily 
applicable to a host of varying situations would 
likely relieve this Court somewhat from more than a 
doubling of the Court's work in recent decades, but 
this urge seems to be leading the Court to an 
absolutist, mechanical treatment of the subject.  At 
times, it seems, the judicial mind is in conflict with 
what 
behavioral——and 
theological——specialists 
have 
long recognized as a natural human urge of people to 
confess wrongdoing. 
(continued) 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
16 
 
¶39 Practical 
concerns 
also 
underpinned 
the 
Court's 
decision in Montejo.  There, the Court observed that a vast 
number of criminal defendants are indigent, and different states 
treat counsel appointments for indigent defendants in different 
ways.  Montejo, 556 U.S. at 784-85.  Some states automatically 
appoint counsel for indigent defendants, while others require 
indigent defendants to request counsel.  Id.  This difference in 
practice makes a bright line rule unworkable, in part because 
"[p]olice who did not attend the [preliminary] hearing would 
have no way to know whether they could approach a particular 
defendant; and for a court to adjudicate that question ex post 
would 
be 
a 
fact-intensive 
and 
burdensome 
task, 
even 
if 
monitoring were possible and transcription available."  Id. at 
785. 
¶40 Keeping in mind that courts——including this court——
have sought to strike a balance between these considerations, we 
turn to the current state of the law. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
¶41 We first examine whether Delebreau's waiver of his 
Miranda rights was sufficient to waive his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel, as well as whether we should presume that his waiver 
was invalid because he was represented by counsel.  This 
requires us to determine what law controls. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636-37 (1986) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring). 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
17 
 
¶42 Our holding in Dagnall was grounded in the Sixth 
Amendment; the only issue we considered was "whether Dagnall 
properly 
invoked 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
right 
to 
counsel."  
Dagnall, 236 Wis. 2d 339, ¶3 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, our 
analysis relied extensively on United States Supreme Court case 
law.10  We did not discuss the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶43 The United States Supreme Court, however, has final 
authority over questions of federal constitutional law.  Its 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment supersedes our own.11  The 
question is therefore whether the Court superseded our holding 
in Dagnall with its decision in Montejo and effectively 
overruled the Dagnall decision. 
¶44 The answer, quite simply, is "yes." 
¶45 Montejo was decided on May 26, 2009.  The published 
decision of the court of appeals in State v. Forbush, 2010 WI 
App 11, 323 Wis. 2d 258, 779 N.W.2d 476, was released on 
December 29, 2009, and it said that Montejo had overruled 
Dagnall, and that Forbush's waiver of his right to counsel was 
therefore valid.  This court's decision in Forbush did not come 
                                                 
10 E.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991); Patterson 
v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988); Jackson, 475 U.S. 625; Maine 
v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 
477 (1981); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
11 "[T]he Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 
compels adherence to United States Supreme Court precedent on 
matters of federal law . . . ."  State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, 
¶3, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142. 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
18 
 
until after the relevant questioning in this case.12  Thus, our 
decision in Forbush did not control the operative facts here.  
In any event, a careful reading of the court's five opinions in 
Forbush would have provided very little encouragement to 
Delebreau. 
¶46 In Forbush, every member of this court agreed that 
Montejo had an effect on Dagnall.  Five concluded that Montejo 
effectively overruled Dagnall.  See Forbush, 332 Wis. 2d 620, 
¶¶64, 81 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); Id., ¶¶137, 155 
(Crooks, J., dissenting).  One stated that the decision in 
Montejo 
"undercut 
many 
of 
the 
major 
underpinnings 
of 
Dagnall . . . ."  Id., ¶96 (Prosser, J., concurring).  Finally, 
the lead opinion "agree[d] with the State that Montejo did 
modify Dagnall such that there is no presumption of a Sixth 
Amendment violation due to police interrogation of a represented 
defendant when the 'certain circumstances' of defendant match 
those of defendant-Montejo."  Id., ¶51 (lead opinion). 
¶47 The 
upshot 
of 
Forbush 
was 
that 
"Montejo 
is 
unquestionably the current controlling law on the subject of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel."  Id., ¶116 (Prosser, J., 
concurring). 
¶48 The Supreme Court's holding in Montejo is clear that a 
defendant is sufficiently apprised of his or her Sixth Amendment 
                                                 
12 Our decision in Forbush was released on April 29, 2011.  
State v. Forbush, 2011 WI 25, 332 Wis. 2d 620, 769 N.W.2d 741.  
The relevant questioning in this case took place on April 15 and 
April 18, 2011. 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
19 
 
right to counsel by the Miranda warnings, and that a valid 
Miranda waiver effectively waives the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel as well as the Fifth Amendment right to counsel.  
Montejo, 556 U.S. at 786-87.  Defendants are not entitled to a 
presumption that their waiver of the presence of counsel is 
invalid, even if they are already represented by counsel.  Id. 
at 789-90. 
¶49 Given the above, the first of Delebreau's arguments——
that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated——is 
easily resolved.  Delebreau makes no attempt to argue that his 
Miranda waiver was invalid.  Rather, he argues that the Miranda 
waiver was insufficient to waive his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.  The United States Supreme Court disagrees.  Therefore, 
we hold that Delebreau's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was 
not violated.13 
B. Wisconsin Constitution 
¶50 Our inquiry does not end with the Sixth Amendment.  
Delebreau also argues that his questioning violated his right to 
counsel 
under 
Article 
I, 
Section 
7 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
                                                 
13 Delebreau also contends that his appearance in court with 
an attorney was sufficient to invoke his right to counsel, such 
that police could not even approach him and request that he 
waive his right.  However, he later concedes that "the rule 
adopted by [Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009)] allows 
police to interrogate a defendant after he has appeared in court 
with counsel and requires the defendant to assert his right to 
counsel in every contact with police."  Therefore, it is of no 
consequence that Delebreau's request to speak with police came 
before his appearance in court with an attorney and that police 
questioned him after that appearance. 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
20 
 
Constitution.  To determine if he is correct, we first ask 
whether the Wisconsin Constitution provides the same post-charge 
right-to-counsel protections as the Sixth Amendment.  If our 
constitution 
provides 
greater 
protections 
than 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment, we would be confronted with whether Delebreau's 
statements should have been suppressed under Article I, Section 
7. 
¶51 It is well understood that a state's constitution may 
provide criminal defendants with rights beyond those afforded by 
the United States Constitution.  However, as a general rule, we 
have expanded the Wisconsin Constitution's protections beyond 
the scope of the federal constitution "only in cases where 
either the state constitution or 'the laws of this state require 
that greater protection of the citizens' liberties . . . be 
afforded.'"  State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 180, 593 
N.W.2d 427 (1999) (quoting State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 172, 
254 N.W.2d 210 (1977)).  "Where . . . the language of the 
provision in the state constitution is 'virtually identical' to 
that of the federal provision or where no difference in intent 
is discernible, Wisconsin courts have normally construed the 
state constitution consistent with the United States Supreme 
Court's construction of the federal constitution."  Id. at 180-
81 (citing State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 133, 423 
N.W.2d 823 (1988)). 
¶52 Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right to be heard by himself and counsel . . . ."  Its 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
21 
 
federal analogue in the Sixth Amendment states, "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
the assistance of counsel for his defense."  We see no 
discernible difference between these two provisions as they 
relate to the right to counsel.  Nothing suggests that "the 
right to be heard by . . . counsel" should be any more expansive 
than "the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel . . . ." 
¶53 Delebreau holds up State v. Bevel, 745 S.E.2d 237 (W. 
Va. 2013), and State v. Lawson, 297 P.3d 1164 (Kan. 2013), as 
possible avenues for finding greater rights under the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  In Lawson, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that 
a Kansas statute provided greater protections than the Sixth 
Amendment.  Id. at 1173-74.  Wisconsin does not have a similar 
statute, so Lawson does not advance Delebreau's argument.  In 
Bevel, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that West 
Virginia's own constitution provided greater protections than 
those afforded by the Sixth Amendment under Montejo despite a 
history of interpreting the right under the West Virginia 
Constitution as consistent with the right under the Sixth 
Amendment.  Bevel, 745 S.E.2d at 247.  While this is similar to 
the situation in Wisconsin, the holding in West Virginia is 
inconsistent 
with 
our 
precedent 
regarding 
constitutional 
interpretation.  In any event, the question is not whether a 
state may offer greater protections than those in Montejo but 
whether Wisconsin does. 
¶54 As the State notes, the various opinions in Forbush 
indicate that a majority of the court held that the Wisconsin 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
22 
 
Constitution and the United States Constitution provide the same 
protections in this context.  We need not dissect the opinions 
in Forbush to say that that holding is consistent with 
precedent. 
¶55 In State v. Klessig, we said: 
A criminal defendant in Wisconsin is guaranteed this 
fundamental right to the assistance of counsel for his 
defense by both Article I, § 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution . . . .  The scope, extent, and, 
thus, interpretation of the right to the assistance of 
counsel is identical under the Wisconsin Constitution 
and the United States Constitution. 
State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 201-03, 465 N.W.2d 716 (1997) 
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).  See also State v. 
Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d 219, 226, 548 N.W.2d 69 (1996) ("The 
language of the Wisconsin provision, on its face, does not 
appear 
to 
differ 
so 
substantially 
from 
the 
federal 
Constitution's guarantee of the right to counsel so as to create 
a different right."). 
¶56 Delebreau touts the importance of the right to 
counsel, but does not explain how the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the right under the Sixth Amendment 
fails to protect it.  We see no reason to deviate from our prior 
practice of interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution's right to 
counsel as coextensive with the right under the federal 
constitution. 
¶57 Accordingly, because we hold that Delebreau's right to 
counsel was not violated under the Sixth Amendment, we also hold 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
23 
 
that his right to counsel was not violated under Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
C. Other Considerations 
¶58 Before concluding, we pause briefly to note that 
today's ruling should not be viewed as a sea change in the law.  
As the United States Supreme Court explained, the Jackson rule 
(and consequently, our rule in Dagnall) was a fourth layer of 
prophylaxis deemed unnecessary by the Supreme Court because of 
other protections——undisturbed by Montejo——already in place.  
See Montejo, 556 U.S. at 793-95.  "Under the Miranda-Edwards-
Minnick line of cases (which is not in doubt), a defendant who 
does not want to speak to the police without counsel present 
need only say as much when he is first approached and given the 
Miranda warnings."14  Id. at 794. 
¶59 Police still may not badger defendants into waiving 
their right to counsel.  See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 
285, 292 n.4 (1988).  Police still must cease questioning of 
criminal defendants when these defendants invoke their right to 
counsel.  See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484.  After a defendant 
invokes the right to counsel, police still may not resume 
questioning until counsel is present or 14 days have passed.  
See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010); Minnick v. 
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990). 
                                                 
14 Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990). 
No. 
  2013AP1108-CR 
24 
 
¶60 Our holding merely clarifies that a valid Miranda 
waiver is sufficient for a criminal defendant to waive the right 
to have counsel present during questioning, and that courts need 
not presume any waiver is involuntary simply because the 
defendant is already represented by counsel. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶61 First, we reaffirm the position of a majority of 
justices in Forbush that Montejo effectively overruled Dagnall 
in establishing that a waiver of Miranda rights is sufficient to 
waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and that such a 
waiver is not presumed invalid merely because the defendant is 
already represented by counsel.  Second, we hold that Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution does not provide greater 
protections than the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution in the context of a waiver of the right to have 
counsel present during questioning.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
¶62 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2013AP1108-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶63 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (concurring).  I 
write in concurrence because I conclude that Jesse Delebreau's 
constitutional right to counsel was not violated by Detective 
Roman Aronstein's interviews on April 15 and 18 because 
Delebreau initiated contact with law enforcement and was given 
Miranda1 warnings before each interview.  In addition, I agree 
that the right to counsel under Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution provides the same protections as does the 
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.2  State v. Forbush, 2011 WI 25, ¶15, 332 Wis. 2d 
620, 796 N.W.2d 741; State v. Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d 219, 226, 548 
N.W.2d 69 (1996).   
¶64 I write separately because I conclude that the 
majority opinion overstates the United States Supreme Court's 
holdings in Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009).  Montejo 
directs that a defendant who has been charged with a crime must 
take affirmative action in order to invoke his or her Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, and that without an invocation by 
the defendant, no violation of a defendant's constitutional 
right to counsel occurs when a defendant is questioned.  Id. at 
797.  
                                                 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2 Because I write in concurrence and because this is not a 
new conclusion, I do not further detail that the Sixth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution provide the same protections to a 
defendant who has been charged with criminal conduct.   
No.  2013AP1108-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶65 On March 31, 2011, Jesse Delebreau was taken into 
custody on a probation hold.  Shortly thereafter, he gave a jail 
employee a written request to speak with a drug enforcement 
officer.   
¶66 On April 14, Delebreau was charged with a sale of 
heroin; he appeared via video-conferencing from the jail on that 
charge.  Attorney William Fitzgerald, of the State Public 
Defenders Office, also appeared.  However, Attorney Fitzgerald 
was uncertain whether he could represent Delebreau due to a 
potential conflict of interest.   
¶67 On April 15, Detective Aronstein, a member of the Drug 
Task Force, met with Delebreau in response to Delebreau's 
written request.  Aronstein met with Delebreau again on April 
18.  Aronstein gave Delebreau Miranda warnings before the start 
of each interview.  In response to those warnings, Delebreau 
affirmatively waived his right to counsel.   
¶68 Delebreau made incriminating statements during both 
interviews.  He also signed a written statement admitting that 
he 
sold 
heroin, 
based 
on 
his 
self-identification 
as 
a 
participant in a video of the drug sale.   
¶69 On April 27, a rescheduled initial appearance was 
held.  Delebreau and Attorney Peter Kraft appeared in court, 
whereupon the court noted, "He's making an appearance for the 
first time with the attorney that will be representing him as 
No.  2013AP1108-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
this case goes forward."3  However, again, the record does not 
establish whether Delebreau took any affirmative steps that 
caused Attorney Kraft or any other attorney to appear on his 
behalf on the pending drug charges. 
¶70 Prior to trial, Delebreau moved to suppress his 
statements, claiming Aronstein's interviews violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  At the hearing on Delebreau's 
motion, Attorney Fitzgerald testified that as an attorney for 
the Public Defenders Office, he would have received notice when 
"probation and parole indicates that they're going to commence 
revocation proceedings, and a person from our office goes there 
to see if those people want to be interviewed for eligibility 
determination."  At this point Attorney Wendy Lemkuil of the 
Brown County District Attorney's Office interrupted Attorney 
Leonard Kachinsky's questioning of Attorney Fitzgerald to offer 
a stipulation.   
¶71 After 
accepting 
the 
proposed 
stipulation 
that 
established April 14 as the date on which formal charges were 
filed, Attorney Kachinsky said, "Perhaps there [are] a few more 
questions as to Mr. Delebreau actually requesting counsel I need 
to ask."  Attorney Kachinsky then asked, "When you interviewed 
Mr. Delebreau, do the records of your office indicate whether or 
not he requested the services of the State Public Defender to 
represent him on criminal charges?"  Attorney Lemkuil objected 
                                                 
3 The record reflects that on May 5, 2011, Delebreau and 
Attorney Genelle Johnson appeared.  A waiver of the preliminary 
hearing was made and accepted.   
No.  2013AP1108-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
on relevancy grounds, to which objection Attorney Kachinsky 
explained, "I think the issue is whether or not he requested 
counsel as opposed to the State Public Defender just jumping 
in."  Attorney Kachinsky accurately perceived the Montejo issue. 
¶72 Unfortunately, Attorney Kachinsky's question was never 
answered and consequently, the record does not conclusively 
establish whether Delebreau took affirmative action to invoke 
his right to counsel and the date or dates on which any such 
action may have taken place.   
¶73 The circuit court denied the motion to suppress.  
Delebreau was convicted by a jury that was presented with his 
statements to Aronstein. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶74 Whether a defendant who has been charged with a crime 
has invoked his or her right to counsel is a two-part question.  
Forbush, 332 Wis. 2d 620, ¶10.  "We uphold the circuit court's 
findings of historical or evidentiary fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous."  Id.  In addition, we independently review 
the application of constitutional principles to facts found.  
Id.   
¶75 Whether a defendant has waived his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel by initiating contact with law enforcement is 
also a question of law for our independent review.  Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). 
No.  2013AP1108-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
B.  Right to Counsel 
1.  General principles 
¶76 A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel arises 
when he or she is charged with a crime.  Patterson v. Illinois, 
487 U.S. 285, 290 (1988) (explaining that "[t]here can be no 
doubt that petitioner had the right to have the assistance of 
counsel at his postindictment interviews with law enforcement").  
Under United States Supreme Court precedent, once charges are 
filed, the "Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to 
have counsel present at all 'critical' stages of the criminal 
proceedings."  Montejo, 556 U.S. at 786.   
¶77 However, the Sixth Amendment right must be invoked 
before its protections will be afforded.  Id. at 789 (reasoning 
that "a defendant who never asked for counsel has not yet made 
up his mind in the first instance").  Once a defendant 
affirmatively invokes his right to counsel, law enforcement 
cannot badger him into waiving that right.  Id. at 794-95 
(explaining that a defendant who invokes his right to counsel is 
protected because "[a]t that point, not only must the immediate 
contact end, but 'badgering' by later requests is prohibited.").   
¶78 The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment can be 
waived, just as the Fifth Amendment right can.  Id. at 786.  
Therefore, when a defendant has been given Miranda warnings, 
which advise as to the right to counsel and the consequences of 
proceeding in the absence of counsel and the defendant chooses 
to answer questions, Miranda warnings are sufficient to provide 
the foundation for waivers of both the Fifth and the Sixth 
No.  2013AP1108-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
Amendments rights to counsel.  Id.; Patterson, 487 U.S. at 296.  
The right to counsel also can be waived before or after its 
invocation by a defendant who initiates contact with law 
enforcement and volunteers a statement.  State v. Kramar, 149 
Wis. 2d 767, 785-86, 440 N.W.2d 317 (1989).   
2.  Delebreau's rights 
¶79 At the time Delebreau spoke to Aronstein, the record 
does not reflect whether Delebreau had affirmatively invoked his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Attorney Kachinsky recognized 
that although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches when 
criminal charges are filed, Delebreau nevertheless had the 
obligation 
to 
invoke 
that 
right 
before 
Sixth 
Amendment 
protections would be afforded to him.  Montejo, 556 U.S. at 797 
(concluding that "[i]f Montejo made a clear assertion of the 
right to counsel when the officers approached him about 
accompanying them on the excursion for the murder weapon, then 
no 
interrogation 
should 
have 
taken 
place 
unless 
Montejo 
initiated it").  However, Attorney Kachinsky's questioning of 
Attorney Fitzgerald left in doubt whether Delebreau had invoked 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.    
¶80 Here, however, even assuming arguendo that Delebreau 
did affirmatively invoke his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
Delebreau's statements to law enforcement were initiated by his 
written request to speak with drug enforcement personnel.  
Aronstein's interviews with Delebreau on April 15 and April 18 
occurred in direct response to Delebreau's written request.  
Furthermore, prior to each interview, Aronstein read Delebreau 
No.  2013AP1108-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
Miranda warnings and Delebreau affirmatively chose to proceed.  
Those warnings were sufficient protection for Delebreau's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  Id. at 786; Patterson, 487 U.S. at 
296.  Therefore, no constitutional right was violated when 
Aronstein interviewed Delebreau, and the circuit court did not 
err in denying Delebreau's suppression motion. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶81 Delebreau's constitutional right to counsel under 
state and federal constitutional provisions was not violated by 
Aronstein's interviews because Delebreau initiated contact with 
law enforcement and he was given Miranda warnings before each 
interview.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur to the majority 
opinion.   
 
 
 
No.  2013AP1108-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶82 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  On April 
14, 2011, the defendant was charged with delivering heroin and 
made his initial appearance in court, where he was represented 
by 
a 
public 
defender. 
 
The 
defendant 
thereafter 
made 
incriminating statements during two custodial interrogations. 
¶83 The core issue presented is whether Article I, Section 
7 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which affords the defendant the 
right to counsel, requires suppression of the defendant's 
incriminating statements.1  I conclude that it does. 
¶84 The 
law 
enforcement 
agent 
who 
interrogated 
the 
defendant was apparently unaware that charges had been filed 
against the defendant and that the defendant was represented by 
counsel.  The agent did not contact the defendant's attorney and 
the defendant's attorney was not present for the interrogations.  
Instead, the agent read the defendant his Miranda rights,2 which 
the defendant waived. 
¶85 In considering whether the custodial interrogations of 
the defendant were permissible under the Wisconsin Constitution 
in light of the defendant's Miranda waiver, and thus whether the 
defendant's incriminating statements were admissible at trial, I 
would adhere to this court's reasoning in State v. Dagnall, 2000 
WI 82, 236 Wis. 2d 339, 612 N.W.2d 680. 
                                                 
1 "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 
right to be heard by himself and counsel . . . ."  Wis. Const. 
Art. 1, § 7. 
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that 
before a law enforcement officer can interrogate a person in 
custody, that person must be informed of specified rights). 
No.  2013AP1108-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶86 Dagnall established that once an accused is formally 
charged with a crime and is represented by counsel on that 
charge, the accused need not unambiguously invoke the right to 
counsel to be protected from police-initiated interrogation.3  
Rather, subsequent police-initiated interrogation is necessarily 
improper.  Any statements made by a defendant during such 
interrogation must be suppressed.4  A waiver of the defendant's 
Miranda rights will not render the interrogation constitutional 
or the defendant's statements admissible.5 
¶87 As Justice Ziegler and Justice Gableman have written, 
Dagnall articulated a "sound, fair, and workable standard."6 
¶88 Further, the Dagnall rule fits with Wisconsin's long 
and cherished history of recognizing and protecting an accused's 
right to an attorney under the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶89 In 1859, just 11 years after Wisconsin achieved 
statehood, this court declared that an accused has a fundamental 
right to an attorney under the Wisconsin Constitution.7  The 
court reasoned that the right to a full and fair trial afforded 
by the Wisconsin Constitution is meaningless when the accused 
                                                 
3 State v. Dagnall, 2000 WI 82, ¶61, 236 Wis. 2d 339, 612 
N.W.2d 680. 
4 Id., ¶¶64-66. 
5 Id., ¶65. 
6 See majority op., ¶36. 
7 Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 249 (*274) (1859).  See 
also County of Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis. 654 (*585), 656-57 (*586-
88) (1851). 
No.  2013AP1108-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
cannot obtain counsel.8  Accordingly, the court instructed 
counties to appoint attorneys to represent indigent felons at 
government expense.9 
¶90 It was not until 1963, a full 104 years later, that 
the United States Supreme Court recognized a similar right under 
the federal constitution.10 
¶91 Given this history, there can be no question that the 
state constitutional right to counsel stands apart from, and has 
meaning independent of, the corollary right under the federal 
constitution.  The longstanding state constitutional right to 
counsel must be protected irrespective of the United States 
Supreme 
Court's 
evolving 
interpretation 
of 
the 
federal 
constitution.  As explained in State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 
172, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977), this court "will not be bound by the 
minimums which are imposed by the Supreme Court of the United 
                                                 
8 Carpenter, 9 Wis. at 251 (*276) ("[W]ould it not 
be . . . mockery 
to 
secure 
to 
a 
pauper 
these 
solemn 
constitutional guaranties for a fair and full trial . . . and 
yet say to him when on trial, that he must employ his own 
counsel, who could alone render these guaranties of any real [] 
value to him[?]"). 
9 Carpenter, 9 Wis. at 252 (*277) ("It seems eminently 
proper and just that the county . . . should pay an attorney for 
defending a destitute criminal."). 
10 Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[I]n our 
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into 
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a 
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.").  See also 
State v. Forbush, 2011 WI 25, ¶71, 332 Wis. 2d 620, 796 
N.W.2d 741 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); State v. Jennings, 
2002 WI 44, ¶65, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., dissenting). 
No.  2013AP1108-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
States if it is the judgment of this court that the Constitution 
of 
Wisconsin . . . require[s] 
that 
greater 
protection 
of 
citizens' liberties ought to be afforded." 
¶92 Thus, although the United States Supreme Court has 
rejected the Dagnall rule in its interpretation of the federal 
constitution,11 this court need not and should not do the same in 
its interpretation of the state constitution.12  Unlike the 
approach taken by the majority opinion today, the Dagnall rule 
meaningfully protects "an accused's right to counsel in pre-
trial interrogation," which is "imperative to protect the trial 
rights of an accused and to enhance the integrity of the fact-
finding process."13 
¶93 I would adhere to Dagnall and would continue this 
court's 156-year history of steadfastly protecting defendants' 
right to counsel under the state constitution. 
¶94 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶95 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
                                                 
11 See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009). 
12 See Forbush, 332 Wis. 2d 620, ¶¶66-71 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring). 
13 Id., ¶78 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
No.  2013AP1108-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1