Case Title: Walters v. State

Citation: 503 S.W.2d 895

Docket Number: CR 73-116

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1974-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
503 S.W.2d 895 (1974) Jimmie L. WALTERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No. CR 73-116. Supreme Court of Arkansas. January 21, 1974. *896 J. H. Cottrell, Jr., and Floyd J. Lofton, Little Rock, for appellant. Jim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., by Alston Jennings, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee. BYRD, Justice. Based upon the conduct of the trial court in discharging a jury and granting a new trial, the appellant Jimmie L. Walters seeks to set aside his subsequent second degree murder conviction upon the ground of former jeopardy or at least to reduce the conviction thereof to a degree not greater than involuntary manslaughter. The record before us as to what occurred in the first trial is rather meager. The portion upon which appellant relies is set forth in a motion to dismiss as follows: The doctrine of former jeopardy has been set forth in Atkins v. State, 16 Ark. 568, 578 (1855) in this language, quoting from the still leading case of United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 6 L. Ed. 165 (1824): We do not read anything in Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 81 S. Ct. 1523, 6 L. Ed. 2d 901 (1961), nor in United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 91 S. Ct. 547, 27 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1970), as holding to the contrary. Because of the fact the trial court went beyond the determination that the jury was hung between guilt and innocence and determined that they were hung between a verdict of involuntary manslaughter and not guilty, appellant suggests there was a preoccupation by the trial court in helping the prosecution obtain a conviction. While we must admit that the inquiry was inadvisable, we cannot read appellant's suggestion into this meager record. It appears to us that the trial court had already indicated that he was going to grant a mistrial before making the inquiries as to involuntary manslaughter and not guilty. On the meager record before us we cannot say that the trial court abused his discretion in determining that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked. Consequently, we need not speculate as to what our conclusion would have been had such information been first obtained or had the record shown how long the jury had been deliberating. Neither can we agree with appellant that the first trial resulted in an implied acquittal of all degrees in excess of involuntary manslaughter. The statements between the trial court and the jury foreman cannot be considered under the circumstances as a verdict of the jury. See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43-1226 (Repl.1964). Affirmed. HARRIS, C. J., not participating.