Case Title: Jefferson County Commission et al. v. Jessica Edwards et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1080496

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2009-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 09/18/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 SPECIAL TERM, 2009
_________________________
1080496
_________________________
Jefferson County Commission et al.
v.
Jessica Edwards et al.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-07-900873)
On Application for Rehearing
LYONS, Justice.
On August 25, 2009, this Court issued its opinion on
original submission in an appeal by the Jefferson County
Commission 
and 
several 
officials 
of 
Jefferson 
County
1080496
A decision of the Jefferson Circuit Court, Judge William
1
A. Jackson, in Jefferson County Employees' Association et al.
v. Jefferson County, Alabama, et al. (CV-00-0297), holding Act
No. 99-669, Ala. Acts 1999, unconstitutional, which, in our
August 25, 2009, opinion we held was void for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction.
2
(hereinafter 
collectively 
"the 
County") 
upholding 
the 
decision
of the Jefferson Circuit Court that effectively repealed
Jefferson County's authority to impose an occupational tax.
The County states in its application for rehearing:
 "[The County] argued before the trial court
that the JCEA decision,
and the subject matter of
[1] 
that court, was unassailable by collateral attack.
This Court's holding foreclosing [the County] from
making arguments in support of that position is both
unnecessarily draconian and incorrect as a matter of
law."
County's rehearing application, at 2.  The County advanced,
for the first time on appeal, its contention that so long as
a court's subject-matter jurisdiction is merely arguable, the
court's decision is not subject to collateral attack.  Without
becoming bogged down in the semantics of what constitutes a
new theory and what constitutes merely an argument in support
of an existing theory, as well as whether confining an
appellant to issues presented to the trial court is
"Draconian," suffice it to say that we reject on its merits
the rule from Fafel v. DiPaola, 399 F.3d 403, 411 (1st Cir.
1080496
3
2005) (citing Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 65 (2d Cir.
1986)), that if a court has merely an "'arguable basis' for
concluding that it has subject-matter jurisdiction, the
judgment it enters may not be collaterally attacked as void."
We decline to engraft such a limitation on our existing
precedent as expressed in Randolph County v. Thompson, 502 So.
2d 357, 362 (Ala. 1987), cited as controlling by both the
County and the taxpayers challenging the occupational tax, the
plaintiffs in the trial court.  This Court in Randolph County
quoted with approval 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 414 (1947), which
recognized the right of a stranger to the proceeding in which
the judgment was entered to impeach the validity of the
judgment in a collateral proceeding when the judgment is void.
Either subject-matter jurisdiction exists or it does not
exist, and the concept of a "twilight zone" that would
immunize a judgment from collateral attack when in truth the
court issuing the judgment had no subject-matter jurisdiction
is inconsistent with our precedent. 
The remaining issues raised by the County having been
thoroughly considered on original submission, the application
for rehearing is overruled.  
1080496
4
APPLICATION OVERRULED.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Smith, Parker, and Shaw, JJ.,
concur.
Woodall, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., recuse themselves.