Case Title: Johnson v. Butterworth

Citation: 713 So. 2d 985

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
713 So. 2d 985 (1998)
Terrell M. JOHNSON, Appellant,
v.
Robert A. BUTTERWORTH, Appellee.
No. 89022.

Supreme Court of Florida.
March 19, 1998.
Rehearing Denied July 9, 1998.
Gregory C. Smith, Capital Collateral Regional CounselNorthern District, and Martin J. McClain, Litigation Director, Office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel Southern District, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Charlie McCoy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Terrell M. Johnson, a prisoner under a sentence of death, appeals a final order of the circuit court denying his complaint for the disclosure of public records by the Attorney General's Office. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. We affirm the trial court's order denying Johnson's complaint for disclosure.
Pursuant to chapter 119,[1] the Office of the Capital Collateral Representative (CCR) requested access to all of the Attorney General's files that pertain to Johnson. After the Attorney General denied this request, CCR filed a chapter 119 civil complaint for the disclosure of the documents in the Second Judicial Circuit in Leon County. The documents consisted of outlines, time lines, page notations regarding information in the record, and similar items. The Attorney General's position was that the requested documents were either not public records or were exempt from disclosure based on section 119.07(3)(l), Florida Statutes. That section states in relevant part:
§ 119.07(3), Fla. Stat. (1995).
The trial court reviewed the requested documents in camera. At the hearing on the complaint for disclosure, the trial court denied Johnson's request. The trial court reasoned that the requested documents were either exempt from disclosure or not public records.
Johnson claims that the circuit court erred in holding that the requested documents were not subject to disclosure and that the requested materials were not covered by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Johnson also asserts that section 119.07(3)(l) is unconstitutional because it violates due process and equal protection in so far as it distinguishes between death-sentenced inmates and all other inmates.
We begin our analysis by pointing out that upon request, the State is obligated to disclose any document in its possession which is exculpatory. Brady, 373 U.S.  at 87-88. This obligation exists regardless of whether a particular document is work product or exempt from chapter 119 discovery.
We agree with the circuit court to the extent that it held that the withheld documents are not public records. In State v. Kokal, 562 So. 2d 324 (Fla.1990), this Court stated:
We do agree with the state attorney that some of the documents in his files are not public records. In Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Associates, Inc., 379 So. 2d 633, 640 (Fla.1980), we pointed out:
Further, not all trial preparation materials are public records. [Note]
[Note:] Of course, the state attorney is obligated to disclose any document in his files which is exculpatory. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).
We agree with Orange County v. Florida Land Co., 450 So. 2d 341, 344 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 458 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1984), which described certain documents as not within the term "public records":
Id. at 327. The documents in question are "simply preliminary guides intended to aid the attorneys when they later formalized the knowledge." Id. (quoting Orange County v. Florida Land Co., 450 So. 2d 341, 344 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 458 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1984)). The documents are not "final evidence of knowledge obtained in connection with the transaction of official business." Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633, 640 (Fla.1980). Thus, the documents do not fall within the definition of public record. Therefore, we find that the trial judge did not err in denying Johnson's request.[2]
Further, we find no error in the dismissal of Johnson's Brady claim. As stated earlier, the State is under a continuing obligation to disclose any exculpatory evidence. Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215. In Roberts v. Butterworth, 668 So. 2d 580 (Fla.1996), this Court reiterated the standard for when a defendant makes only a general request for exculpatory material under Brady:
668 So. 2d  at 582. Johnson's request in this case was no more than a general request under Brady. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Johnson's Brady claim.
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's order denying Johnson's complaint for disclosure of public records.
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.
[1]  Public records law in Florida is governed by chapter 119, Florida Statutes (1995). Generally, "all state, county, and municipal records shall be open for personal inspection by any person." § 119.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). However, there are statutory exemptions to this policy. See § 119.07(3), Fla. Stat. (1995).
[2]  We decline to address Johnson's claim that section 119.07(3)(l), Florida Statues (1995), is unconstitutional. After determining that the requested documents are not public records, this section becomes inapplicable to this case.