Case Title: Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90340

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90340-Agenda 24-May 2001.
BELLEVILLE TOYOTA, INC., Appellee, v. TOYOTA								MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed March 15, 2002.
	 
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiff, Belleville Toyota, Inc., sued defendants, Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., and Toyota Motor Distributors, Inc.
Defendants are, respectively, the authorized importer and the
wholesale distributor of new Toyota vehicles in the United States.
Plaintiff claimed that defendants breached certain dealership
agreements by allocating to plaintiff less than the full number of
Toyota vehicles to which plaintiff was entitled. Plaintiff also
claimed that defendants' conduct violated the Motor Vehicle
Franchise Act (Act) (815 ILCS 710/1 et seq. (West 2000)).
Following a jury trial, the circuit court of St. Clair County entered
a multi-million dollar judgment against defendants. On appeal, the
appellate court rejected defendants' numerous claims of error and
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 316 Ill. App. 3d 227. We
granted defendants' petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part and reverse in
part the judgment of the appellate court and remand this matter to
the circuit court for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND
	In 1973, Bill Newbold acquired an ownership interest in a
Toyota dealership in Belleville, Illinois, and took over the
dealership's day-to-day operations. The dealership, doing business
under the name Bill Newbold Toyota, was one of approximately
100 Toyota dealerships in the five-state Chicago region. Bill
Newbold, along with his son, Kent, operated the dealership under
a series of dealer agreements with defendants. The earliest of the
dealer agreements at issue in this litigation was executed in June
1980, and provided for a six-year term. Under the 1980 agreement,
plaintiff was required to submit orders for Toyota products on
forms supplied by defendants. In the event of a shortage of Toyota
products, the "unit allocation" provision of the contract required
that vehicles be allocated to plaintiff "principally on the basis of
sales performance during the most recent representative period of
adequate supply."
	In 1986, upon expiration of the1980 agreement, the parties
entered into a new dealer agreement with a one-year term. In 1987,
the parties entered into another one-year agreement, and in 1988,
entered into a six-year agreement. Under the 1986, 1987 and 1988
agreements, defendants were to use their "best efforts" to provide
Toyota products to plaintiff, subject to available supply. In the
event of a shortage, defendants were required to allocate Toyota
products among its dealers in a "fair and equitable manner."
	In June 1989, defendants notified plaintiff of their intent to
open a new Toyota dealership in Collinsville, Illinois. In response,
on August 8, 1989, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants
under the Act, seeking to enjoin them from establishing a
Collinsville dealership. Plaintiff twice amended its complaint to
include claims for breach of contract and additional violations of
the Act. Plaintiff alleged that defendants failed to allocate Toyota
vehicles in the quantities contractually required and that
defendants fraudulently concealed their conduct. According to
plaintiff, defendants' breach was not discovered until the fall of
1990. Plaintiff further alleged that, in violation of the Act,
defendants' allocation of vehicles was arbitrary, capricious, in bad
faith, and unconscionable; defendants concealed their arbitrary and
capricious allocation system; and defendants' conduct was willful
and wanton. The trial court dismissed with prejudice plaintiff's
claim for injunctive relief and denied defendants' motions
challenging, inter alia, the timeliness of plaintiff's claims. In
1997, following several years of discovery, the parties proceeded
to trial.
	At trial, plaintiff maintained that, as the result of certain
import restrictions under a voluntary restraint agreement (VRA)
between the United States and Japan, there was a shortage of
Toyota vehicles during the 1980s. Plaintiff contended that, due to
this shortage, defendants were obligated, under the "unit allocation
provision" contained in the 1980 dealer agreement, to allocate
Toyota vehicles to the dealers based on "sales performance during
the most recent representative period of adequate supply."
According to plaintiff, defendants failed to do so. In the
alternative, plaintiff maintained that, even absent a shortage of
Toyota vehicles, the allocation system defendants used, which they
described to plaintiff as a "turn and earn" system, did not comply
with the 1980 agreement requiring an order system. Plaintiff
further maintained that defendants' so-called "turn and earn"
system, which purportedly allocated cars based on how quickly a
dealer moved its inventory, did not function in this way. Rather,
the vehicle allocation system was arbitrary and subject to
manipulation, and was used in a discriminatory way, all in
violation of the Act, as well as the four dealer agreements at issue
in the litigation. Plaintiff's damage expert estimated that, during
the 1980s, plaintiff was shorted thousands of vehicles by
defendants, resulting in lost profits of $5 million to $11 million.
	Defendants maintained at trial that there was no shortage of
Toyota vehicles, and that its allocation system, which defendants
referred to as a "balanced day supply" system, was clear and fair.
Under a "balanced day supply"system, allocations are made based
on a dealer's past sales performance, rate of sales, and remaining
inventory. Each dealer is allocated a "days supply" of vehicles,
i.e., that number of vehicles needed so that all dealers,
theoretically, exhaust their inventory on the same day. Defendants
also maintained that, unlike the domestic automobile
manufacturers, they never used a custom order system. Defendants
also asserted that plaintiff, by its conduct, waived any claims
against defendants; plaintiff's claims were barred by its own
breach of the dealer agreements; and pursuant to the parties'
course of performance, defendants' conduct did not constitute a
breach of the dealer agreements.
	After a two-week trial, which included testimony from 30
witnesses, the jury entered a verdict in favor of plaintiff, awarding
damages of $2.5 million on plaintiff's breach of contract count,
and $2.25 million on plaintiff's count under the Act. The trial
court denied defendants' post-trial motion. Based on the jury's
special finding that defendants' conduct was willful or wanton, the
trial court granted plaintiff's motion for treble damages under the
Act and entered judgment on that count in the amount of $6.75
million. See 815 ILCS 710/13 (West 2000) ("Where the
misconduct is willful or wanton, the court may award treble
damages"). The trial court also ruled that "judgment on Count I
[breach of contract] shall be deemed satisfied upon payment of an
amount on Count II [violation of the Act] which is equivalent to
the judgment on Count I plus interest." Finally, the trial court
reserved ruling on plaintiff's motion for attorney fees and costs
under the Act (see 815 ILCS 710/13 (West 2000)) and for
discovery sanctions, pending appeal, and made a Rule 304(a)
finding of appealability (see 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)).
	The appellate court rejected defendants' numerous claims of
error and affirmed the circuit court judgment. We granted
defendants' petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS
I. Act's Limitations Period
	Defendants first argue that plaintiff's claim under the Act was
barred based on the four-year limitations period contained in the
statute. 815 ILCS 710/14 (West 2000). Defendants contend that
where, as here, a plaintiff's cause of action is purely statutory, and
the statute contains its own "built-in" limitations period,
compliance with the limitations period is an element of the
plaintiff's case and a jurisdictional prerequisite to the plaintiff's
right to sue. See Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337, 366-67 (1995); Demchuk v. Duplancich, 92 Ill. 2d 1, 6-7
(1982). Defendants argue that because plaintiff failed to comply
with the limitations period set forth in the Act, plaintiff's cause of
action under the statute was extinguished.
	Plaintiff initially counters that defendants' position before this
court is contrary to their position at trial and, therefore, defendants
are precluded from making this argument. See McMath v. Katholi,
191 Ill. 2d 251, 255 (2000). Plaintiff also asserts that the
limitations period contained in section 14 of the Act functions as
an ordinary statute of limitations and is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit. See People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1, 8-10
(1999).
	Ordinarily, principles of waiver do not permit a party to
complain of an error where to do so is inconsistent with the party's
position taken in an earlier court proceeding. McMath, 191 Ill. 2d 
at 255. Defendants' argument, however, implicates the subject
matter jurisdiction of the circuit court. The issue of subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived. Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 157
(1992); People ex rel. Compagnie Nationale Air France v.
Giliberto, 74 Ill. 2d 90, 105 (1978). Therefore, the issue may be
raised at any time. Berg v. Allied Security, Inc., 193 Ill. 2d 186,
188 n.1 (2000); Dubin v. Personnel Board, 128 Ill. 2d 490, 496
(1989). Moreover, this court has an obligation to take notice of
matters which go to the jurisdiction of the circuit court in the case
then before us. Eastern v. Canty, 75 Ill. 2d 566, 570 (1979); see In
re Estate of Gebis, 186 Ill. 2d 188, 192 (1999). Accordingly, we
will consider the issue of whether the limitations provision of the
Act was an element of plaintiff's case and a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit.
	Simply stated, "subject matter jurisdiction" refers to the
power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class
to which the proceeding in question belongs. People v. Western
Tire Auto Stores, Inc., 32 Ill. 2d 527, 530 (1965); Van Dam v. Van
Dam, 21 Ill. 2d 212, 216 (1961); 14 Ill. L. & Prac. Courts §16, at
183 (1968); see also Faris v. Faris, 35 Ill. 2d 305, 309 (1966);
Restatement (Second) of Judgments §11 (1982). With the
exception of the circuit court's power to review administrative
action, which is conferred by statute, a circuit court's subject
matter jurisdiction is conferred entirely by our state constitution.
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §9; In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523,
529 (1996); In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 65 (1993). Under section
9 of article VI, that jurisdiction extends to all "justiciable matters."
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §9. Thus, in order to invoke the subject
matter jurisdiction of the circuit court, a plaintiff's case, as framed
by the complaint or petition, must present a justiciable matter. See
People ex rel. Scott v. Janson, 57 Ill. 2d 451, 459 (1974) (if a
complaint states a case belonging to a general class over which the
authority of the court extends, subject matter jurisdiction attaches);
Western Tire, 32 Ill. 2d  at 530 (the test of the presence of subject
matter jurisdiction is found in the nature of the case as made by the
complaint and the relief sought); Ligon v. Williams, 264 Ill. App.
3d 701, 707 (1994) (court's authority to exercise its jurisdiction
and resolve a justiciable question is invoked through the filing of
a complaint or petition).
	Our current constitution does not define the term "justiciable
matters," nor did our former constitution, in which this term first
appeared. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §9; Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI,
§9 (amended 1964). Generally, a "justiciable matter" is a
controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it is
definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot,
touching upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. See Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. County of
Cook, 6 Ill. 2d 419, 422 (1955); Health Cost Controls v. Sevilla,
307 Ill. App. 3d 582, 587 (1999); City of Chicago v. Chicago
Board of Education, 277 Ill. App. 3d 250, 261 (1995). The
legislature may create new justiciable matters by enacting
legislation that creates rights and duties that have no counterpart
at common law or in equity. M.M., 156 Ill. 2d  at 65. Through the
legislature's adoption of the Act in 1979, the legislature created a
new justiciable matter. The legislature's creation of a new
justiciable matter, however, does not mean that the legislature
thereby confers jurisdiction on the circuit court. Article VI is clear
that, except in the area of administrative review, the jurisdiction
of the circuit court flows from the constitution. Ill. Const. 1970,
art. VI, §9. The General Assembly, of course, has no power to
enact legislation that would contravene article VI. See Tully v.
Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297, 308 (1996).
	Some case law, however, suggests that the legislature, in
defining a justiciable matter, may impose "conditions precedent"
to the court's exercise of jurisdiction that cannot be waived. E.g.,
In re Marriage of Fields, 288 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1057 (1997);
People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 268 Ill. App.
3d 420, 422-23 (1994); In re Estate of Mears, 110 Ill. App. 3d
1133, 1138 (1982). We necessarily reject this view because it is
contrary to article VI. Characterizing the requirements of a
statutory cause of action as nonwaivable conditions precedent to
a court's exercise of jurisdiction is merely another way of saying
that the circuit court may only exercise that jurisdiction which the
legislature allows. We reiterate, however, that the jurisdiction of
the circuit court is conferred by the constitution, not the
legislature. Only in the area of administrative review is the court's
power to adjudicate controlled by the legislature. Ill. Const. 1970,
art. VI, §9; Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d  at 529; M.M., 156 Ill. 2d  at
65; see also In re Custody of Sexton, 84 Ill. 2d 312, 319-21 (1981)
(holding that statutory affidavit provision, although mandatory,
was not "jurisdictional" in the sense that it could not be waived).
	The legislature's limited role, under our current constitution,
in defining the jurisdiction of the circuit court stands in stark
contrast to the significant role previously exercised by the
legislature under our former constitution. See Mears, 110 Ill. App.
3d at1134-38 (tracing the development of jurisdiction from a
purely legislative concept embodied in the 1818 constitution, to
the concept now in force under the 1970 constitution). Under our
former constitution, adopted in 1870, the circuit court enjoyed
"original jurisdiction of all causes in law and equity." Ill. Const.
1870, art. VI, §12. The court's jurisdiction over special statutory
proceedings, i.e., matters which had no roots at common law or in
equity, derived from the legislature. See People v. Graw, 363 Ill. 205, 208 (1936) (circuit court's constitutionally derived
jurisdiction did not apply to special statutory proceedings); Selden
v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 239 Ill. 67, 74 (1909) (court of
general jurisdiction may have a special statutory jurisdiction
conferred upon it). Thus, in cases involving purely statutory causes
of action, we held that unless the statutory requirements were
satisfied, a court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested.
See, e.g., Martin v. Schillo, 389 Ill. 607, 609-10 (1945); People ex
rel. Kilduff v. Brewer, 328 Ill. 472, 479-84 (1927); Sharp v. Sharp,
213 Ill. 332, 334-36 (1904).
	In 1964, however, amendments to the judicial article of the
1870 constitution became effective. These amendments radically
changed the legislature's role in determining the jurisdiction of the
circuit court. See M.M., 156 Ill. 2d  at 74 (Miller, C.J., concurring,
joined by Bilandic, J.) (the sources and scope of the circuit court's
jurisdiction changed "dramatically" with the 1964 amendments to
the judicial article); Mears, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 1137 (a
"revolution" was wrought by the 1964 amendments to the juridical
article); see also Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514,
529-30 (2001) (discussing the change, under the 1964
amendments, from courts of limited jurisdiction to courts of
general jurisdiction in a single integrated system). Under the new
judicial article, the circuit court enjoyed "original jurisdiction of
all justiciable matters, and such powers of review of administrative
action as may be provided by law." Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI, §9
(amended 1964). Thus, the legislature's power to define the circuit
court's jurisdiction was expressly limited to the area of
administrative review. The current Illinois constitution, adopted in
1970, retained this limitation. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §9.
	In light of these changes, the precedential value of case law
which examines a court's jurisdiction under the pre-1964 judicial
system is necessarily limited to the constitutional context in which
those cases arose. See M.M., 156 Ill. 2d  at 74 (Miller, C.J.,
concurring, joined by Bilandic, J.) ("terminology employed in
earlier [pre-1964] decisions must be viewed in the constitutional
context in which those cases were decided"); People v. Valdez, 79 Ill. 2d 74, 84-85 (1980) (rationale of cases decided under 1870
constitution were not applicable in determining whether circuit
court had jurisdiction under 1970 constitution). Nonetheless, pre-1964 rules of law continue to be cited by Illinois courts, without
qualification, creating confusion and imprecision in the case law.
	Defendants in the present case rely on a rule of law that has its
roots in the pre-1964 judicial system. Under this rule, as presently
articulated by this court, a limitations period contained in a statute
that creates a substantive right unknown to the common law, and
in which time is made an inherent element of the right, is more
than an ordinary statute of limitations; it is a condition of the
liability itself and goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the
court. See Wright, 189 Ill. 2d at 7-9; Pasquale, 166 Ill. 2d  at 366-67, citing Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202 (1985); see also Demchuk, 92 Ill. 2d at 6-7; Wilson v. Tromly, 404 Ill. 307, 310-11 (1949); Smith v. Toman,
368 Ill. 414, 418-20 (1938); North Side Sash & Door Co. v. Hecht,
295 Ill. 515, 519-20 (1920); Hartray v. Chicago Rys. Co., 290 Ill. 85, 86-87 (1919). This rule of law may have been appropriate
under the pre-1964 judicial system when the court's jurisdiction to
hear and determine purely statutory causes of action was conferred
and limited by the legislature, and the failure to conform strictly to
the statutory requirements prevented the court from acquiring
subject matter jurisdiction. To the extent this proposition has any
relevance today, it is confined to the area of administrative
review-the only area in which the legislature still determines the
extent of the circuit court's jurisdiction. This principle is
illustrated in this court's decision in Fredman Brothers.
	Fredman Brothers arose under our administrative review law.
At issue was whether the 35-day period for filing an administrative
appeal was jurisdictional. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par.
3-103. We recognized a distinction between ordinary statutes of
limitations and statutes which both confer jurisdiction and fix a
time within which such jurisdiction may be exercised. Fredman
Brothers, 109 Ill. 2d  at 209. We noted that where the court is in
the exercise of special statutory jurisdiction, "if the mode of
procedure prescribed by statute is not strictly pursued, no
jurisdiction is conferred on the circuit court." Fredman Brothers,
109 Ill. 2d  at 210. Because the circuit court was exercising special
statutory jurisdiction under the administrative review law, we
concluded that the filing period was jurisdictional and that judicial
review of the administrative decision was barred if the complaint
was not filed within the time specified. Fredman Brothers, 109 Ill. 2d  at 211.
	Fredman Brothers also referenced the early rule that
" 'statutes which create a substantive right unknown to the
common law and in which time is made an inherent element of the
right so created, are not statutes of limitation.' " Fredman
Brothers, 109 Ill. 2d  at 209, quoting Smith, 368 Ill.  at 420. Such
statutes, according to the opinion, "set forth the requirements for
bringing the right to seek a remedy into existence," and are
"jurisdictional, not mandatory." Fredman Brothers, 109 Ill. 2d  at
210. Plainly, Fredman Brothers' reference to the early rule
regarding statutory causes of action was not necessary to decide
the case. To the extent, however, that Fredman Brothers suggests
that such rule still has vitality today, it is limited to the area of
administrative review, the context in which Fredman Brothers was
decided and the only context, under our current constitution, that
such rule could apply. We observe, however, that Illinois courts,
in numerous cases outside the administrative review area, have
incorrectly cited Fredman Brothers as authority for the proposition
that a limitations period contained in a statutory cause of action is
jurisdictional. See, e.g., Wright, 189 Ill. 2d  at 7-9 (Post-Conviction
Hearing Act); Pasquale, 166 Ill. 2d  at 366-67 (Wrongful Death
Act); Denault v. Cote, 319 Ill. App. 3d 886, 889 (2001)
(Residential Real Property Disclosure Act); In re Estate of
Goodlett, 225 Ill. App. 3d 581, 589 (1992) (Probate Act); People
v. Ross, 191 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1053 (1989) (section 2-1401 of the
Code of Civil Procedure); Bradford v. Soto, 159 Ill. App. 3d 668,
674-75 (1987) (Dramshop Act); see also JoJan Corp. v Brent, 307
Ill. App. 3d 496, 507 n.4 (1999) (citing Pasquale for the
proposition that the time limitation in the Mechanics Lien Act is
a prerequisite to the court's exercise of jurisdiction). Without
calling into doubt the outcomes reached in these cases, we
emphasize that the rule set forth in Fredman Brothers and earlier
case law, under which time limitations in statutory actions are
deemed jurisdictional, is not a rule of general applicability to all
statutory causes of action. Rather, the rule is limited by the
constitutional context in which it first arose.
	In contrast to Fredman Brothers, the present litigation did not
arise under our administrative review law. The circuit court,
therefore, was not exercising special statutory jurisdiction. Rather,
the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear and determine plaintiff's
claim because it was among the general class of cases-those
presenting a claim under the Act, a justiciable matter-to which the
court's constitutionally granted original jurisdiction extends. Even
if plaintiff's complaint defectively stated its claim under the Act,
the circuit court would not have been deprived of subject matter
jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction does not depend upon the
legal sufficiency of the pleadings. Scott, 57 Ill. 2d  at 459; Western
Tire, 32 Ill. 2d  at 530; 14 Ill. L. & Prac. Courts §28, at 201-02
(1968); see also DeLuna v. Treister, 185 Ill. 2d 565, 579 (1999)
(technical pleading requirements are not jurisdictional). Similarly,
subject matter jurisdiction does not depend upon the ultimate
outcome of the suit. A party may bring unsuccessful as well as
successful suits in the circuit court. Based on the foregoing, we
conclude that the limitations period contained in the Act is not a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.
	Our conclusion, while firmly rooted in our constitution, is also
consistent with the trend of modern authority favoring finality of
judgments over alleged defects in validity. See In re Marriage of
Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 175-77 (1998), citing Restatement
(Second) of Judgments §12 (1982); see also Fields, 288 Ill. App.
3d at 1060, citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments §12 (1982).
Labeling the requirements contained in statutory causes of action
"jurisdictional" would permit an unwarranted and dangerous
expansion of the situations where a final judgment may be set
aside on a collateral attack. See 3 R. Michael, Illinois Practice
§2.3, at 21 n.39 (1989). Even if the statutory requirement is
considered a nonwaivable condition, the same concern over the
finality of judgments arises. Once a statutory requirement is
deemed "nonwaivable," it is on equal footing with the only other
nonwaivable conditions that would cause a judgment to be void,
and thus subject to collateral attack-a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, or a lack of personal jurisdiction. See Mitchell, 188 Ill. 2d  at 174. As our appellate court has observed, "[b]ecause of
the disastrous consequences which follow when orders and
judgments are allowed to be collaterally attacked, orders should be
characterized as void only when no other alternative is possible."
In re Marriage of Vernon, 253 Ill. App. 3d 783, 788 (1993); see
also Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d  at 177 (recognizing that numerous child
support orders could be subject to collateral attack if the subject
order were found void based on trial court's failure to strictly
follow the statute). Our concern regarding the finality of
judgments is all the more acute given the plethora of justiciable
matters created by our legislature.
	Having rejected defendants' argument that the limitations
period in the Act is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, we next
examine defendants' related argument that the limitations period
is an element of plaintiff's claim, which plaintiff must plead and
prove (see Hamilton v. Chrysler Corp., 281 Ill. App. 3d 284, 287
(1996)), rather than an ordinary limitations period, which provides
a technical defense to the claim (see Sundance Homes, Inc. v.
County of Du Page, 195 Ill. 2d 257, 267-68 (2001); Hartray, 290
Ill. at 87). Our determination of this issue is a matter of statutory
construction. "[T]he judicial role in construing statutes is to
ascertain legislative intent and give it effect. To aid in
accomplishing this, a court will seek to determine the objective the
legislature sought to accomplish and the evils it desired to
remedy." People v. Scharlau, 141 Ill. 2d 180, 192 (1990); see also
West American Insurance Co. v. Sal E. Lobianco & Son Co., 69 Ill. 2d 126, 129 (1977) (statutes of limitations, like other statutes,
must be construed in light of their objectives, quoting Geneva
Construction Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co., 4 Ill. 2d 273,
289 (1954)). Because the language of a statute is the best evidence
of legislative intent (In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000)), our inquiry
begins with the language of the Act.
	The Act regulates motor vehicle manufacturers, distributors,
wholesalers and dealers doing business in this State. 815 ILCS
710/1.1 (West 2000). In pertinent part, the Act defines and
declares unlawful certain "unfair methods of competition and
unfair and deceptive acts or practices." 815 ILCS 710/4 (West
2000). Among those practices declared unlawful is any action by
a manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor or dealer, with respect to
a franchise, which is "arbitrary, in bad faith or unconscionable and
which causes damage to any of the parties or to the public." 815
ILCS 710/4(b) (West 2000). The Act also makes it unlawful for a
manufacturer, wholesaler, or distributor "to adopt, change,
establish or implement a plan or system for the allocation and
distribution of new motor vehicles to motor vehicle dealers which
is arbitrary or capricious or to modify an existing plan so as to
cause the same to be arbitrary or capricious." 815 ILCS
710/4(d)(1) (West 2000). Significantly, section 13 of the Act
provides that a franchisee or motor vehicle dealer "who suffers any
loss of money or property" as a result of the employment by a
manufacturer, wholesaler or distributor "of an unfair method of
competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice declared
unlawful" by the Act, "may bring an action for damages and
equitable relief, including injunctive relief." 815 ILCS 710/13
(West 2000).
	Section 14 of the Act sets forth the limitations period
applicable to actions for damages and equitable relief:
			"§14. Limitations. Except as provided in Section 12,(1)
actions arising out of any provision of this Act shall be
commenced within 4 years next after the cause of action
accrues; provided, however, that if a person liable
hereunder conceals the cause of action from the
knowledge of the person entitled to bring it, the period
prior to the discovery of his cause of action by the person
entitled shall be excluded in determining the time limited
for the commencement of the action. If a cause of action
accrues during the pendency of any civil, criminal or
administrative proceeding against a person brought by the
United States, or any of its agencies under the antitrust
laws, the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C. §41
et seq. (2000)], or any other federal act, or the laws or to
franchising, such actions may be commenced within one
year after the final disposition of such civil, criminal or
administrative proceeding." 815 ILCS 710/14 (West
2000).
	Section 14 does not expressly state an intent by the legislature
that the limitations provision be treated as an element of a
plaintiff's cause of action. In addition, section 14 provides that
actions arising out of any provision of the Act "shall be
commenced within 4 years next after the cause of action accrues."
(Emphasis added.) 815 ILCS 710/14 (West 2000). Such accrual
language is typical of ordinary statutes of limitations. See
Fredman Brothers, 109 Ill. 2d  at 209-10. Moreover, section 14
provides for tolling of the limitations period where the person
liable under the Act "conceals the cause of action from the
knowledge of the person entitled to bring it." 815 ILCS 710/14
(West 2000). The doctrine of equitable estoppel is also typically
associated with ordinary statutes of limitations. See generally
Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Leydig, Voit & Mayer, 158 Ill. 2d 240,
251-52 (1994); Hagney v. Lopeman, 147 Ill. 2d 458, 462-66
(1992) (discussing concealment of cause of action sufficient to toll
statute of limitations); Goodlett, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 590
(recognizing that concepts of equitable estoppel, tolling and
waiver usually apply to statutes of limitations). Thus, the language
of section 14 militates in favor of its treatment as an ordinary
limitations period.
	Such treatment comports with the purpose of the Act. In
general terms, the Act is intended "to promote the public interest
and welfare," "to prevent frauds, impositions and other abuses
upon its citizens, to protect and preserve the investments and
properties of the citizens of this State, and to provide adequate and
sufficient service to consumers generally," through regulation of
motor vehicle manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers and dealers.
815 ILCS 710/1.1 (West 2000). More particularly, section 13 of
the Act is intended to protect motor vehicle dealers and
franchisees from unfair and deceptive acts and practices employed
by manufacturers, wholesalers, or distributors by creating a private
right of action. 815 ILCS 710/13 (West 2000). Construction of
section 14 as an ordinary statute of limitations, which provides a
technical defense which may be waived, better facilitates this
purpose. See Knauz Continental Autos, Inc. v. Land Rover North
America, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1034, 1037 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (the Act
must be liberally construed to honor the General Assembly's intent
to protect automobile dealers). Accordingly, we reject defendants'
argument that compliance with section 14 was an element of
plaintiff's claim.



II. Continuing Violation Rule
	Defendants argue, in the alternative, that even if the
limitations provision in the Act is not a jurisdictional prerequisite
to suit, plaintiff's claim under the Act was time-barred. Underlying
defendants' argument is their contention that the so-called
"continuing violation rule" was erroneously applied to toll the
running of the four-year limitations period.
	Under the "continuing violation rule," embraced by our
appellate court, where a tort involves a continuing or repeated
injury, the limitations period does not begin to run until the date
of the last injury or the date the tortious acts cease. See Roark v.
Macoupin Creek Drainage District, 316 Ill. App. 3d 835, 847
(2000); Bank of Ravenswood v. City of Chicago, 307 Ill. App. 3d
161, 167-68 (1999); Hyon Waste Management Services, Inc. v.
City of Chicago, 214 Ill. App. 3d 757, 763 (1991); City of Rock
Falls v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 13 Ill. App. 3d 359, 364
(1973). The trial court found that plaintiff had alleged a continuing
course of conduct and, therefore, that the applicable limitations
period would run from the date defendants' wrongful conduct
ceased. Relying on this court's decision in Cunningham v.
Huffman, 154 Ill. 2d 398 (1993), the appellate court affirmed. 316
Ill. App. 3d at 243-44. Whether the limitations period set forth in
the Act is subject to tolling under a "continuing violation" rule is
a question of law which we review de novo. See Woods v. Cole,
181 Ill. 2d 512, 516 (1998).
	In Cunningham, we held that a medical malpractice claim is
not barred by the statute of repose where plaintiff demonstrates
that there was a continuous and unbroken course of negligent
treatment, and that the treatment was so related as to constitute one
continuing wrong. Cunningham, 154 Ill. 2d  at 406. The statute of
repose provided that no action could be brought "more than 4
years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or
occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of such
injury or death." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 13-212(a). We
found it improbable that the legislature intended the word
"occurrence," as used in the statute of repose, to be limited to a
single event, in light of the unjust results that could follow from
such a narrow construction.
		"[I]f the word occurrence were interpreted to mean a
single isolated event, patients who discovered that they
were gravely injured due to negligent or unnecessary
exposure to X-ray radiation or administration of
medication over a span of years might be able to recover
little, if any, in the way of damages. This would be so
because a single dosage of radiation or medicine might be
harmless, whereas treatment over time might be either
disabling or even fatal. *** If the statute of repose were
read to start on day one of the treatment in a span
covering many years, a plaintiff could only seek recovery
for the final four years. It is conceivable that the damage
caused in the last four years might be either negligible or
a small fraction of the harm caused over the continuum of
negligence; thus, the recovery of damages would be
negligible compared to the actual injury. Surely, the law
could not contemplate such an unjust result."
Cunningham, 154 Ill. 2d  at 405-06.
	In the present case, the appellate court determined that the
Cunningham analysis also applied to plaintiff's statutory claim.
According to the appellate court, cumulative medical negligence
that, over time, results in injury that might otherwise be
insignificant, is not unlike defendants' willful and wanton
violation of the Act that, over a period of years, results in a loss to
plaintiff that at some point becomes intolerable. 316 Ill. App. 3d
at 243-44. The appellate court concluded that because defendants'
conduct was of a continuing nature, the limitations period was
tolled, and plaintiff's claim was timely. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 244.
We cannot agree.
	The Cunningham opinion did not adopt a continuing violation
rule of general applicability in all tort cases or, as here, cases
involving a statutory cause of action. Rather, the result in
Cunningham was based on interpretation of the language
contained in the medical malpractice statute of repose. In the
present case, plaintiff has not identified any language in the Act
which would require a similar result. Moreover, we discern no
"unjust results" in the present case, like those we sought to avoid
in Cunningham, which would militate in favor of applying a
continuing violation rule.
	In addition, defendants maintain that the continuing violation
rule, as applied by the appellate court, is inconsistent with our
discovery rule. Generally, under the discovery rule, a cause of
action accrues, and the limitations period begins to run, when the
party seeking relief knows or reasonably should know of an injury
and that it was wrongfully caused. Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603,
608 (2000); Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 415
(1981). The Act provides that the four-year limitations period
begins to run "after the cause of action accrues." 815 ILCS 710/14
(West 2000).
	In its second amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that
defendants concealed their wrongful conduct and it was not until
the fall of 1990 that plaintiff "discover[ed] its entitlement" to
bring a cause of action under the Act.(2) Assuming, arguendo, the
veracity of this statement, under the discovery rule, the four-year
limitations period would have commenced, at the latest, in the fall
of 1990. The appellate court, however, determined that, under the
continuing violation rule, the limitations period never commenced
because defendants' wrongful conduct "never stopped." 316 Ill.
App. 3d at 244. Thus, the application of a continuing violation rule
in this case tolled the limitations period indefinitely beyond the
time that the discovery rule would have permitted. We find it
unnecessary, however, to resolve the tension between the
discovery rule, on the one hand, and the continuing violation rule
adopted by our appellate court, on the other hand, because we
conclude that the wrongful conduct at issue in this case did not
constitute one continuing violation of the Act.
	In its second amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that
defendants' allocation of motor vehicles to plaintiff was arbitrary,
in bad faith or unconscionable, all in violation of section 4 of the
Act. Section 4 of the Act makes it unlawful for defendants to
adopt or implement a vehicle allocation system which is arbitrary
or capricious (815 ILCS 710/4(d)(1) (West 2000)), or to engage in
any action with respect to plaintiff which is arbitrary, in bad faith
or unconscionable (815 ILCS 710/4(b) (West 2000)). Although
defendants argue that the only conduct at issue is this litigation
was the one-time adoption of their vehicle allocation system in the
early 1970s, plaintiff's complaint put at issue both the adoption of
the system and the individual vehicle allocations under that
system. The evidence adduced at trial established that defendants
made allocations to plaintiff two to four times per month. Each
individual allocation was the result of discrete decisions by
defendants regarding the numerous adjustable parameters that
drove the computerized allocation system. Although we recognize
that the allocations were repeated, we cannot conclude that
defendants' conduct somehow constituted one, continuing,
unbroken, decade-long violation of the Act. Rather, each
allocation constituted a separate violation of section 4 of the Act,
each violation supporting a separate cause of action. Based on the
foregoing, we agree with defendants that the appellate court erred
in affirming the trial court's application of the so-called continuing
violation rule.
	We reject, however, defendants' related contention that
plaintiff's statutory claim was barred in its entirety. Because each
allocation would have supported a separate cause of action,
plaintiff may recover damages for the four-year period prior to the
filing of its complaint. See Meyers v. Kissner, 149 Ill. 2d 1, 10-11
(1992) (continuing private nuisance gave rise over and over again
to causes of action, and limitations period merely specified the
window in time for which monetary damages may be recovered
prior to the filing of the complaint); Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City,
911 F.2d 1102, 1103 (5th Cir. 1990) (where initial statutory
violation outside the limitations period is repeated later, each
violation begins the limitations period anew and recovery may be
had for at least those violations that occurred within the limitations
period). Plaintiff's second amended complaint, in which plaintiff
first alleged a claim under the Act, was filed July 20, 1992. The
trial court determined, however, that plaintiff's claim under the
Act related back to plaintiff's initial complaint filed August 8,
1989. Defendants have not challenged the trial court's relation-back ruling in this court. Thus, the relevant period for measuring
damages under the Act is the four-year period ending August 8,
1989. Before determining whether it is appropriate to remand this
matter to the circuit court for a new trial limited to the issue of
damages, we consider defendants' other claims of error.

III. Contract Claim Limitations Period
	Defendants argue that plaintiff's claim for breach of the dealer
agreements was barred under the four-year statute of limitations
contained in article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
(810 ILCS 5/2-725 (West 2000)). The trial court determined that
the UCC did not apply, implicitly ruling that the 10-year
limitations period for written contracts governed plaintiff's
contract claim. See 735 ILCS 5/13-206 (West 2000). This ruling,
together with the trial court's determination that the continuing
violation rule governed plaintiff's statutory claim, resulted in the
two claims being essentially co-extensive. Thus, the appellate
court found it unnecessary to address defendants' argument that
the contract claim was time-barred. The appellate court explained
that because the jury found for plaintiff on both claims, and
because the trial court ruled that the award on the breach-of-contract claim could be satisfied by a payment of the award on the
statutory claim, it was unnecessary to rule on the statute-of-limitations defense on the breach-of-contract claim. 316 Ill. App.
3d at 242.
	As discussed in section II, however, we have rejected
application of the continuing violation rule to plaintiff's claim
under the Act, and have limited plaintiff's recovery on that claim
to the four-year period prior to the filing of the complaint on
August 8, 1989. If the 10-year statute of limitations governs
plaintiff's contract claim, then the statutory claim and the contract
claim are no longer co-extensive, i.e., contract damages would be
recoverable for several years in addition to those covered by
plaintiff's statutory claim, and payment of the award on the
statutory claim would not fully satisfy an award on the contract
claim. Therefore, unlike the appellate court, we find it necessary
to address defendants' argument and resolve whether plaintiff's
contract claim was time-barred. We review this legal issue de
novo. See Woods, 181 Ill. 2d  at 516.
	Plaintiff first alleged a breach of contract in its amended
complaint filed January 30, 1991. The trial court ruled, however,
that the contract claim related back to plaintiff's initial complaint
filed August 8, 1989. Defendants have not challenged that ruling
in this court. Thus, if the four-year UCC limitations period applies,
contract claims arising prior to August 8, 1985, would be time-barred.
	Plaintiff's contract claim involved four successive dealer
agreements, executed in 1980, 1986, 1987, and 1988. It is apparent
that claims arising under the 1986, 1987, and 1988 agreements
would not be barred by a four-year limitations period, i.e., claims
under those three agreements could not have arisen prior to August
8, 1985, because the agreements were not executed and did not
become effective until after that date. Only claims arising under
the 1980 dealer agreement could be barred by a four-year
limitations period. Thus, we confine our review to the 1980
agreement.
	The 1980 agreement contained a choice of law provision
stating that California law governs.(3) Generally, choice of law
provisions will be honored. Hofeld v. Nationwide Life Insurance
Co., 59 Ill. 2d 522, 528-29 (1975); see also Hartford v. Burns
International Security Services, Inc., 172 Ill. App. 3d 184, 187
(1988). As to procedural matters, however, the law of the forum
controls. Marchlik v. Coronet Insurance Co., 40 Ill. 2d 327, 329-30 (1968); see also Cox v. Kaufman, 212 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1062
(1991). Statutes of limitations are procedural, merely fixing the
time in which the remedy for a wrong may be sought, and do not
alter substantive rights. Fredman Brothers, 109 Ill. 2d  at 209; see
also Cox, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 1062. Accordingly, Illinois law
governs the timeliness of plaintiff's claim under the 1980 dealer
agreement.
	The 10-year statute of limitations that generally governs
claims on written contracts contains an express exception for
actions governed by section 2-725 of the UCC. 735 ILCS
5/13-206 (West 2000). Section 2-725 of the UCC provides that
"[a]n action for breach of any contract for sale must be
commenced within 4 years after the cause of action has accrued."
810 ILCS 5/2-725(1) (West 2000). "A cause of action accrues
when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of
knowledge of the breach." 810 ILCS 5/2-725(2) (West 2000).
Only contracts which fall within the scope of article 2 of the UCC
are subject to the four-year limitations period. Article 2 is limited
to "transactions in goods." 810 ILCS 5/2-102 (West 2000).
Defendants argue that the 1980 dealer agreement was principally
for the sale of goods and that the agreement therefore comes
within the ambit of article 2. Plaintiff contends, however, that the
dealer agreement is a personal services contract and is not
governed by article 2.
	Where, as here, a contract provides both for the sale of goods
and for the rendition of services, Illinois courts apply the
"predominant purpose" test in determining whether the contract
falls within article 2 of the UCC. See Zielinski v. Miller, 277 Ill.
App. 3d 735, 741 (1995); Tivoli Enterprises, Inc. v. Brunswick
Bowling & Billiards Corp., 269 Ill. App. 3d 638, 646 (1995);
Yorke v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 130 Ill. App. 3d 220, 223 (1985);
Executive Centers of America, Inc. v. Bannon, 62 Ill. App. 3d 738,
742 (1978); see also Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 26, §2-102, Illinois Code
Comment, at 45 (Smith-Hurd 1992 Supp.) ("Illinois reviewing
courts have taken what may be called a 'dominant purpose'
view"). Under this test, if the contract is predominantly for the sale
of goods, with services being incidental thereto, the contract will
be governed by article 2. Conversely, if the contract is
predominantly for services, with the sale of goods being incidental
thereto, the contract will not fall within article 2. See Zielinski,
277 Ill. App. 3d at 741; Tivoli Enterprises, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 646-47.
	Numerous jurisdictions have held that distributor and dealer
agreements, including automobile dealer agreements, are
predominantly for the sale of goods and are thus governed by the
UCC. See Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Products Co., 801 F.2d 1001, 1005-06 (7th Cir. 1986) (collecting cases); Old Country
Toyota Corp. v. Toyota Motor Distributors, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 167
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that Toyota dealer agreement was
governed by the UCC); Paulson, Inc. v. Bromar, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1329, 1333 nn.1 through 16 (D. Haw. 1991) (collecting cases);
Kirby v. Chrysler Corp., 554 F. Supp. 743, 749-50 (D. Md. 1982)
(collecting cases and holding that direct dealer agreement with
Chrysler was governed by UCC).
	Significantly, in Old Country Toyota, a federal district court
analyzed the provisions of a Toyota dealer agreement executed
during the 1980s which, if not identical, is strikingly similar to the
one at issue here. The federal court concluded that the dealer
agreement was predominantly for the sale of goods and was thus
governed by article 2. Old Country Toyota, 966 F. Supp.  at 170.
The federal court noted the prominence of the word "sales" in the
agreement's title, "Toyota Dealer Sales and Service Agreement,"
and stated that the "heart" of the agreement concerned the "Sales
of Toyota Products to Dealers" (section VI), and "Promoting and
Selling Toyota Products" (section X). Old Country Toyota, 966 F. Supp.  at 169. Most of the agreement, according to the federal
court, reflected the intent to secure a continuum of sales-first from
Toyota to the dealer, then on to the public-and the fact that the
dispute concerned Toyota's allocation of vehicles to be purchased
by the dealer "underscore[d] that intent." Old Country Toyota, 966 F. Supp.  at 169. The federal court determined that the "unit
allocation provision" in the agreement contained the core
attributes of a requirements contract (see 810 ILCS 5/2-306 (West
2000)), under which Toyota agreed to supply vehicles to the dealer
in the quantities and types ordered, subject to available supply. Old
Country Toyota, 966 F. Supp.  at 169. Finally, the federal court
determined that the service and other provisions in the agreement
were collateral to the primary purpose of facilitating sales between
Toyota and the dealer. The court stated:
		"Other than sales and sales promotions, the Agreement's
substantive provisions concern premises maintenance,
accounting methods, maintenance of net working capital,
service, and display of Toyota marks. The premises
maintenance and accounting provisions are housekeeping
matters with little bearing on the Court's analysis. The
Agreement does not actually address the only substantive
matter not related to sales-the maintenance of net
working capital-at all; the parties are directed to address
that issue in a separate Working Capital Agreement. The
trademark provision merely grants Old Country [the
dealer] the right to use the Toyota mark, and then only in
connection with 'selling' or 'offering for sale' Toyota
products. [Citation.] Though the service provisions are
substantial, their overarching purpose is to 'protect the
interests' [citation] and 'secur[e] and maintain[ ] the
goodwill' [citation] of the buying public. Again, this is at
bottom the language of sales." Old Country Toyota, 966 F. Supp.  at 170.
	We agree with the analysis of the federal court and similarly
conclude that the 1980 dealer agreement at issue in this litigation
is governed by article 2 of the UCC. Accordingly, the four-year
limitations period set forth in section 2-725 applies to plaintiff's
contract claim.
	In an attempt to avoid the effect of a four-year limitations
period, plaintiff argues that defendants' wrongful allocations under
the 1980 agreement should be considered one breach that did not
become actionable until the contract expired in 1986. In effect,
plaintiff advocates the application of a "continuous breach" rule,
not unlike the "continuing violation" rule on which it also relied.
The only authority cited by plaintiff is Berg & Associates, Inc. v.
Nelsen Steel & Wire Co., 221 Ill. App. 3d 526, 532 (1991). Berg,
however, stands only for the proposition that construction
contracts are typically considered a "single endeavor" and that the
statute of limitations for claims under the contract does not begin
to run until the endeavor is complete, rather than on the date the
monetary installments are due on the contract. Berg, 221 Ill. App.
3d at 532. The instant case does not involve a construction
contract.
	Based on the foregoing, we conclude that any breach of the
1980 agreement occurring outside the four-year UCC limitations
period was time-barred, and the trial court erred by permitting
evidence of claims outside the four-year period.



IV. Denial of Summary Judgment
	We next consider defendants' contention that the trial court
erred in denying their motion for summary judgment based on a
mutual release of liability provision contained in the 1986, 1987
and 1988 dealer agreements. The appellate court determined that
the release issue involved a factual dispute and that the trial
court's denial of summary judgment merged with the judgment
order and was not appealable. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 234.
	As a general rule, when a motion for summary judgment is
denied and the case proceeds to trial, the denial of summary
judgment is not reviewable on appeal because the result of any
error is merged into the judgment entered at trial. See Labate v.
Data Forms, Inc., 288 Ill. App. 3d 738, 740 (1997); People v.
Strasbaugh, 194 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1016 (1990); Gaskin v.
Goldwasser, 166 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1013 (1988). The rationale for
this rule is that review of the denial order would be unjust to the
prevailing party, who obtained a judgment after a more complete
presentation of the evidence. Strasbaugh, 194 Ill. App. 3d at 1016-17, quoting In re Marriage of Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d 595, 607
(1988). Defendants contend, however, that their summary
judgment motion presented a legal issue for determination by the
court, rather than a factual issue for determination by the jury, and
that under these circumstances, review of the denial of summary
judgment is appropriate. See Battles v. La Salle National Bank,
240 Ill. App. 3d 550, 558 (1992).
	In their summary judgment motion, defendants argued that
plaintiff had released defendants from all claims pursuant to
section XXIII of the 1986, 1987 and 1988 dealer agreements.
Section XXIII provides that the parties release each other "from
any and all claims, causes of action or otherwise that it may have
against the other for money damages arising from any event
occurring prior to the date of execution of th[e] Agreement."
Significantly, section XXIII also states that "the release does not
extend to claims which either party does not know or reasonably
suspect to exist in its favor at the time of execution of th[e]
Agreement."
	Whether plaintiff knew or should have reasonably suspected
that, at the time the dealer agreements were executed, it had a
claim against defendants was an issue of fact. Accordingly, any
error in the denial of defendants' summary judgment motion was
merged into the trial result and is not reviewable on appeal. See
Labate, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 740; Strasbaugh, 194 Ill. App. 3d at
1016; Gaskin, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 1013.



V. Damages
	Defendants next argue that plaintiff failed to prove, with a
reasonable degree of certainty, that it sustained any financial losses
or lost profits due to defendants' conduct and that defendants are
entitled to entry of judgment in their favor. Alternatively,
defendants argue that they are entitled to a new trial on damages.
Defendants submit several bases for their argument, each of which
the appellate court rejected. Before considering defendants'
several contentions, we briefly review the testimony of plaintiff's
damage experts.
	Plaintiff's principal damage expert, Dr. Lyman Ostlund,
testified regarding four different damage models. In the first
model, Ostlund sought to demonstrate that defendants' vehicle
allocation system, which defendants described to plaintiff as a
"turn and earn" system, did not in fact function as a "turn and
earn" system. According to Ostlund, although defendants'
communications to dealers frequently referenced the need to
increase their "turnover rate"-a concept imbedded in a "turn and
earn" system-there was no relationship between the extent to
which a dealer succeeded in having a high average turnover rate
and the extent to which the dealer had a strong positive sales trend
over time. If the allocation system was functioning as a "turn and
earn" system, there would have been a strong statistical
relationship between a dealer's turnover rate and sales growth.
Based on a 25-dealer sample from the Chicago region, Ostlund
saw no relationship between the two variables. Ostlund calculated
the number of vehicles plaintiff would have been allocated, if
defendants' allocation system had functioned as a "turn and earn"
system, and compared that number to plaintiff's actual allocation.
The difference, which Ostlund termed "lost units," was then
converted into lost profits.
	The second damage model was tied to plaintiff's contention
that there was a shortage of Toyota vehicles during the 1980s due
to import restrictions under the VRA. Ostlund agreed that a
shortage existed. Where a shortage of vehicles existed, vehicles
were to be allocated, under the 1980 agreement, "principally on
the basis of sales performance during the most recent
representative period of adequate supply," and under later
agreements, in a "fair and equitable manner." Ostlund determined
that the "most recent representative period of adequate supply"
was the period June 1980-when the 1980 dealer agreement
became effective and plaintiff moved into a new facility-through
March 1981-when the VRA became effective. Ostlund determined
that during this period plaintiff's sales of 423 units represented
1.14% of Chicago region sales. Assuming plaintiff would have
achieved the same 1.14% of Chicago region sales in subsequent
years if defendants had allocated an appropriate number of
vehicles to plaintiff, Ostlund determined the number of vehicles
plaintiff should have been allocated and compared that figure to
the actual allocation. The lost units were then converted into lost
profits.
	The third damage model was described as a "penetration rate"
model and was related to plaintiff's contention that it should have
been treated comparably to the Toyota dealers in St. Louis,
Missouri. Expert witness James Little testified that Toyota dealers
in the St. Louis "Metropolitan Statistical Area," which includes
Belleville, Illinois, are part of a "geographically integrated market"
and that there was no economic or business logic in placing
dealers on the Illinois side in a different administrative region than
the dealers on the Missouri side. In addition, Ostlund testified that
Toyota dealers on the other side of the river in the "St. Louis
Metro" area, as defined by Toyota, received a higher level supply
of vehicles, resulting in a higher penetration rate within the import
vehicle market. According to Ostlund, if more vehicles had been
allocated to plaintiff, i.e., if defendant had been treated
comparably to the St. Louis dealers, then it is reasonable to assume
that the same penetration rate would have occurred in the
Belleville market as occurred on average on the Missouri side. In
his third damage model, Ostlund calculated the penetration rate in
the "St. Louis Metro" for each of the years in question, and
calculated plaintiff's expected allocation of vehicles based on
achieving the same penetration rate in the Belleville market. The
lost units-the difference between the expected allocation and
actual allocation-were then converted into lost profits.
	The fourth and final damage model was based on the concept
of an order system, which plaintiff contended was the system
required under the 1980 dealer agreement, in the event the jury
found there was no shortage of Toyota vehicles. Through the
fourth damage model, Ostlund calculated the number of vehicles
plaintiff would have ordered and sold if an order system had been
in place. The lost units were again converted into lost profits.
	Under each model, lost profits were calculated by multiplying
the number of lost units for each year at issue by the contribution
margin per unit. The contribution margin was derived from data
contained in plaintiff's financial statements, and represented the
difference between the customer price and the dealer price,
adjusted for plaintiff's variable and fixed expenses, including sales
commissions, delivery expenses, advertising, inventory
maintenance, personnel training, freight, supplies, salaries, payroll
taxes, employee benefits, rent, utilities, and over two dozen other
items. That figure was then adjusted to reflect the extent to which
additional profits would have reduced plaintiff's borrowing. The
four models resulted in damage calculations ranging from
$5,014,201 for the turnover model, to $6,818,506 for the order
model. In addition, each damage model contained a separate
damage calculation based on the assumption that plaintiff would
have reinvested additional profits into the business. Ostlund's
reinvestment calculation produced a range of damages
significantly higher: $6,327,434 to $11,119,872.
	In addition to the expert testimony of Ostlund and Little,
computer consultant Robert Benson testified regarding defendants'
allocation system. Benson testified that the computer program
under which allocations were made was a parameter-based system.
He identified 25 parameters which could affect an allocation.
Although Benson testified that the system could be used in a
discriminatory way, he could not determine whether, in fact, it was
used to discriminate against plaintiff. Benson further testified,
however, that his inability to determine whether discriminatory use
occurred was the result of the lack of an "audit trail." An audit trail
would have allowed an allocation result to be traced back. In other
words, of the 25 parameters which could be adjusted and
manipulated with any allocation, it was impossible to determine
how the parameters were set for a particular allocation. Benson
opined that, from a resource allocation perspective, it was unusual
to have this much ability to manipulate an allocation system and
also unusual that no audit trail existed.
	The jury awarded plaintiff $2.5 million on its breach of
contract claim, and $2.25 million on plaintiff's claim under the
Act.
	Defendants first maintain that plaintiff's experts "admitted"
that they could not establish that defendants' conduct caused any
damage to plaintiff, and that plaintiff's experts could not quantify
the number of vehicles plaintiff allegedly lost as a result of any act
or omission by defendants. Thus, defendants argue that plaintiff's
evidence of damages was pure speculation. We disagree.
	The record does not support defendants' characterization of
the testimony of plaintiff's experts. Although computer consultant
Benson could not conclude that the allocation program had been
used in a discriminatory fashion, the plain thrust of Ostlund's
testimony was to the contrary. Further, Ostlund quantified
plaintiff's damages under each of his four damage models,
translating lost units into lost profits. That there is some
uncertainty as to the accuracy of Ostlund's projections is not fatal
to plaintiff's claims.
	Lost profits, by their very nature, will always be uncertain to
some extent and incapable of calculation with mathematical
precision. Midland Hotel Corp. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp.,
118 Ill. 2d 306, 315-16 (1987). For this reason, the law does not
require that lost profits be proven with absolute certainty. Rather,
the evidence need only afford a reasonable basis for the
computation of damages which, with a reasonable of degree of
certainty, can be traced to defendant's wrongful conduct. Midland
Hotel, 118 Ill. 2d  at 315-16. Defendants should not be permitted
to escape liability entirely because the amount of the damage they
have caused is uncertain. To do so would be to immunize
defendants from the consequences of their wrongful conduct. See
Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 58 Ill. 2d 289, 310 (1974).
	Defendants also contend that plaintiff's submission of eight
different damage awards (two different awards under four different
models) demonstrates the speculative nature of plaintiff's damage
claim. According to defendants, "[t]here cannot be eight different
ways of calculating 'actual' damages for the same injury with
reasonable certainty."
	We agree that each damage model calculated damages for the
same general injury-lost profits due to improper vehicle
allocations. Plaintiff, however, presented more than one theory
regarding the allocations. Each damage model involved a different
theory and, as discussed above, involved a different factual finding
by the jury. Thus, the mere fact that eight different potential
awards were submitted to the jury does not, under the
circumstances of this case, demonstrate that plaintiff's damages
were speculative. Rather, we agree with the appellate court that
because different theories were involved, it was appropriate to
submit different estimates of damages to the jury. See Arch of
Illinois, Inc. v. S.K. George Painting Contractors, Inc., 288 Ill.
App. 3d 1080, 1082 (1997) ("The determination of which measure
of damages to apply is usually a question for the jury"); Hills of
Palos Condominium Ass'n v. I-Del, Inc., 255 Ill. App. 3d 448,
470-71 (1993) ("only the jury could determine which measure of
damages to apply because the alternative measure could only be
applied after a factual finding ***"); John Morrell & Co. v. Local
Union 304A of the United Food & Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 544, 559 (8th Cir. 1990) (trial court did not err in permitting
expert to discuss eight damage models producing a range of lost
profits from $20 million to $35 million because the expert
explained the different assumptions upon which each model was
premised).
	Defendants also contend that there was no historical basis for
certain of Ostlund's assumptions regarding the level of sales
plaintiff would have achieved under the different damage models,
and that Ostlund's use of similar assumptions has been rejected by
another court. See Thoroughbred Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
908 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. App. 1995). In Thoroughbred Ford, the
Missouri Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff dealership failed
to prove with reasonable certainty that any damage occurred due
to Ford Motor Company's alleged misrepresentations that it would
relocate the dealership. In so doing, the court of appeals rejected
Ostlund's testimony regarding lost profits at the new location
because a Ford dealership had never existed at that location and
there was no rational way to estimate anticipated future profits of
the hypothetical dealership. Thoroughbred Ford, 908 S.W.2d  at
735-36. The present case, unlike Thoroughbred Ford, does not
involve a hypothetical dealership. Further, the record reveals that
the assumptions underlying Ostlund's damage models were tested
thoroughly on cross-examination, and challenged by defendants'
own expert witnesses.
	Defendants argue that plaintiff also failed to establish
damages with reasonable certainty in that plaintiff failed to
consider the numerous intersecting factors that affect the
performance of an automobile dealership in general and that
affected plaintiff's performance in particular. See Midland Hotel,
118 Ill. 2d  at 317. Ostlund testified, however, that his turnover
model captured the performance of plaintiff, because it reflected
what the dealership should have received in terms of vehicle
allocations, commensurate with the dealership's actual
performance, i.e., its ability to turn the product. Ostlund further
testified that plaintiff's actual performance was reflected in the
contribution margin which considered what this dealer would
make, if it sold one more unit, based on how it operates. That
defendants are not in agreement with Ostlund's conclusions does
not persuade us that plaintiff's damage evidence was unduly
speculative.
	Finally, defendants argue that Ostlund's "reinvestment
theory" was a thinly veiled, improper attempt to secure
prejudgment interest and inflate its claimed damages. See
Department of Transportation v. New Century Engineering &
Development Corp., 97 Ill. 2d 343, 353 (1983) ("this court has
consistently held that the right to interest must be found in the
contract between the parties or in the statute"); Sterling Freight
Lines, Inc. v. Prairie Material Sales, Inc., 285 Ill. App. 3d 914,
921 (1996) (plaintiff's attempt to adjust lost profits award by an
"inflationary factor" was improper attempt to secure prejudgment
interest). Plaintiff does not dispute that it is not entitled to
prejudgment interest. Rather, plaintiff maintains that Ostlund
merely provided an alternative damage award under each model
based on the assumption that, had plaintiff received all the
vehicles to which it was entitled, plaintiff would have reinvested
any additional profits in the dealership. Ostlund made this
assumption, however, despite knowledge that, historically,
plaintiff had not reinvested all of its profits in the dealership.
Further, Ostlund testified that his reinvestment theory took into
account "the time value of money" and that he used the bank rate
of interest as the projected rate of return. Based on this record, we
agree with defendants that Ostlund's alternative damage awards
based on his reinvestment theory was prejudgment interest in
another guise and should not have been submitted to the jury.
	We also agree with the appellate court, however, that any
error did not rise to the level of reversible error. "New trials can be
ordered only when the evidence improperly admitted appears to
have affected the outcome. *** While we would like all trials to
be conducted error free, no useful purpose would be served by
granting a new trial when the record reveals that the errors did not
change the result reached by the jury." J.L. Simmons Co. ex rel.
Hartford Insurance Group v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 108 Ill. 2d 106, 115 (1985). Ostlund was asked, on cross-examination,
to recalculate the damage awards, but without taking into account
reinvestment of profits and other items defendants questioned. The
recalculation produced a damage range of $2.1 million to $3.7
million. The jury awards of $2.25 million and $2.5 million are
each within that range. Moreover, they do not approach the $6.3
million minimum award under Ostlund's reinvestment theory.
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the improper admission of
this evidence affected the outcome of the trial. Even if it could be
said that Ostlund's reinvestment theory improperly influenced the
jury's damage award, as discussed below, this matter will be
remanded to the circuit court for a new hearing on damages. We
are confident that this error-whether harmless or not-will not
recur on remand.
VI. New Hearing on Damages
	Having determined that no issue raised by defendants requires
reversal of the judgment in its entirety, we return now to the issue
of whether it is appropriate to remand this matter for a new trial on
damages alone, as defendants suggest. A court may order a new
trial solely on the issue of damages "where the damage issue is so
separable and distinct from the issue of liability that a trial of it
alone may be had without injustice." Paul Harris Furniture Co. v.
Morse, 10 Ill. 2d 28, 46 (1956); see also Robbins v. Professional
Construction Co., 72 Ill. 2d 215, 224 (1978). Notwithstanding
some of the complexities of this case, we believe, based on our
review of the record, that the issue of damages is severable from
the issue of liability. We therefore remand this matter to the circuit
court for a new trial solely on the issue of damages. Consistent
with our discussion above, any damage award is limited to the
four-year period prior to the filing of plaintiff's complaint on
August 8, 1989.


CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in
part the judgments of the circuit and appellate courts and remand
this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Judgments affirmed in part and reversed
in part; cause remanded with directions.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
	 The issue raised in this case is simply a question as to how
the limitation period contained in the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act
(Franchise Act) (815 ILCS 710/14 (West 1992)) is to be construed.
We are asked to determine whether that limitation period may be
tolled by continuing acts of capricious allocation or continuing
illegal modifications of dealer agreements. The trial judge in this
case mistakenly believed that the period could be tolled in that
manner. Unfortunately, that erroneous ruling affected,
detrimentally, the manner in which the parties tried the case. In
light of that fact, I do not believe that defendants have changed
their position on appeal, nor do I believe that plaintiff abandoned
its fraudulent concealment position. In my view, the errors made
by the circuit court necessitate a remand for a new trial in its
entirety, and not just for damages, as the court today concludes. I
therefore respectfully dissent.
Factual Background
	The dispute at issue in this case grew from a single-count
complaint for injunctive relief filed by plaintiff against defendants
on August 8, 1989. Plaintiff is a Toyota dealership, and defendants
are Toyota distributors. Plaintiff sought, pursuant to the Franchise
Act, to enjoin defendants from allowing a competing a dealership
to open in nearby Collinsville.
	Plaintiff amended its complaint in January 1991 to include a
breach of contract claim for damages in addition to the injunctive
relief previously sought. Plaintiff alleged that, on or about
February 12, 1975, it entered into a written Toyota "Dealer Sales
and Services Agreement" with a predecessor to defendants.
According to plaintiff, the 1975 agreement established plaintiff's
right to sell and service motor vehicles in addition to related parts
and accessories. The agreement also included an allocation
provision for the distribution of vehicles to the dealership. At
some time during the fall of 1978 or the winter of 1979,
defendants came into existence and assumed liability of the
predecessor. Plaintiff claimed that from at least January 22, 1979,
through June 1, 1986, the dealership agreement between
defendants and plaintiff contained the same "unit allocation"
provision as set forth in the 1975 agreement. Plaintiff alleged that
defendants breached their agreement with, and their
representations and promises to, plaintiff in that they failed to
provide and/or allocate Toyota products to plaintiff either in the
quantities required under the allocation provision or as defendants
orally represented and promised to plaintiff.
	After the original count for injunctive relief was voluntarily
dismissed with prejudice, defendants moved to dismiss the
remaining breach of contract claim, arguing that it was time-barred. Defendants asserted that the action was governed by the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) (810 ILCS 5/2-725 (West
1992)) because a dealership contract such as the one at issue is a
contract for the sale of goods. As such, the four-year statute of
limitations contained in the UCC acted to bar the claim.
	The circuit court had not ruled on defendants' motion to
dismiss before plaintiff filed yet another amended complaint. This
complaint contained three counts. The first count was for breach
of contract and essentially mirrored the count contained in the first
amended complaint. Plaintiff alleged that from January 29, 1979,
through June 1, 1986, defendants failed to provide or allocate
Toyota products to plaintiff in such quantities as required under
the allocation provision of the parties' agreement. Moreover,
plaintiff alleged that defendants fraudulently concealed their
actions from plaintiff and plaintiff did not discover those actions
until approximately the fall of 1990.
	In count II, plaintiff alleged that defendants interfered with
plaintiff's prospective economic advantage. In count III, plaintiff
alleged that defendants violated section 4 of the Franchise Act.
According to plaintiff, from January 22, 1979, through June 1,
1986, defendants' allocation of motor vehicles to plaintiff was
arbitrary, capricious, in bad faith, and unconscionable, all in
violation of the Franchise Act. In addition, plaintiff alleged that
defendants concealed their arbitrary and capricious allocation
system from plaintiff's knowledge so that plaintiff was unable to
discover its entitlement to bring the cause of action until the fall of
1990.
	On the same day that it filed its second amended complaint,
plaintiff filed a response to defendants' outstanding motion to
dismiss the amended complaint. In that response, plaintiff
maintained that the UCC did not apply to its claim of breach of
contract. The circuit court eventually ruled as a matter of law that
the breach of contract claim was not governed by the UCC; rather,
the 10-year statute of limitations was applicable. The circuit court
also found that the amended complaint related back to the first
complaint filed in August 1989.
	Defendants thereafter filed a second motion to dismiss, in
which they reiterated their contention that the four-year limitation
contained in the UCC applied to the breach of contract claim.
Thus, defendants contended that even if the claim did relate back
to the filing date of the original complaint (August 8, 1989),
plaintiff was foreclosed from asserting breaches that occurred prior
to August 8, 1985. In addition, defendants argued that the question
of fraudulent concealment was irrelevant because under the UCC,
lack of knowledge does not serve to toll the limitation period.
	As to count III, which alleged Franchise Act violations,
defendants argued that section 14 of the Act contains a four-year
limitation period which begins to run after the cause of action
accrues. According to count III of the complaint, the last allocation
alleged by plaintiff occurred on or before June 1, 1986. Because
plaintiff first asserted the claim more than four years after June 1,
1986 (July 20, 1992), the claim was barred in its entirety.
Defendants also claimed that plaintiff failed to allege any facts
showing fraudulent concealment. For these reasons, defendants
argued that plaintiff was not entitled to relief under the Franchise
Act.
	In response, plaintiff repeated its contention that the breach of
contract claim was governed by the 10-year statute of limitations.
As to the Franchise Act violation, plaintiff contended that the
claim was not time-barred due to the fact that defendants' conduct
consisted of a continuing violation. Plaintiff contended that, under
that doctrine, the limitations period began to run upon the
cessation of the conduct. As a result, the claim was not time-barred. In the alternative, plaintiff argued that defendants'
fraudulent conduct tolled the four-year limitation period because
defendants' actions prevented plaintiff from discovering the
violations until 1990.
	In ruling on the motion, the circuit court first found that all the
claims related back to the date the original complaint was filed,
August 9, 1989. Moreover, the court found that plaintiff had
alleged a continuing course of conduct and as matter of law "any
Statute of Limitations period runs from the date of the cessation of
said continuous conduct." As a result, the claims were not time-barred. This analysis applied to all claims, including those brought
under the Franchise Act.



Analysis
	The foregoing procedural history of this dispute reveals that
defendants have long maintained that (i) plaintiff's Franchise Act
claim is time-barred and (ii) plaintiff's breach of contract claim
was governed by the statute of limitations contained in the UCC.
These contentions were repeatedly rejected by the trial judge. The
record also reveals that plaintiff alleged fraudulent concealment in
its complaint and establishes that plaintiff knew of its statutory
duty of pleading, at least at one point in the early stages of the
litigation. Indeed, the trial judge's ruling that the continuing
violation doctrine applied to the violations at issue caused plaintiff
to abandon its effort to show how defendants had fraudulently
concealed the violations of the Franchise Act until 1990.
	Notwithstanding the above, the court today implies that
defendants have changed their position on appeal and thus have
waived their argument. See slip op. at 4. I do not believe that
defendants' position before this court is contrary to their position
at trial. Defendants maintain here, as they did below, that plaintiff
brought this the action too late to recover statutory damages under
the Franchise Act and too late to recover for any alleged breach of
the dealership agreements under the UCC. In fact, the court agrees
with defendants to an extent, in holding that the trial judge erred
in calculating the limitations period in both respects. Thus, there
is simply no reason to discuss principles of waiver here nor is
there anything about defendants' argument that "implicates the
subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court." Slip op. at 5.
	We granted leave to appeal in this case in order to decide
whether the continuing violation doctrine could be applied to
actions brought under the Franchise Act. The question concerns
whether the language of section 14 of the Franchise Act is
consistent with the policy considerations which underscore the
continuing violation doctrine. I believe that the question is a fairly
narrow one, the resolution of which does not require the court to
expound on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. In addition to
my belief that the court's discussion (see slip op. at 5-11) on
jurisdiction is unnecessary, I also believe that it is wrong. The
questions regarding jurisdiction were answered in this court's
opinion in In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53 (1993). Today's opinion, at
the very least, calls into question 30 years of this court's long-standing precedent and, at most, flatly overrules that precedent.
This is done despite the fact there is not any discernible conflict or
confusion amongst the lower courts as to this matter nor is there
any other reason which would warrant this court to ignore stare
decisis in the manner that it does. See Heimgaertner v. Benjamin
Electric Manufacturing Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152 (1955) (recognizing that
doctrine of stare decisis may be overturned only by a showing of
good cause).
	Leaving aside the discussion about jurisdiction, I strongly
disagree with the court's holding that the provisions in section 14
of the Franchise Act do not constitute an element of the cause of
action to be pled and proved by the plaintiff, but act rather as an
"ordinary statute of limitations." Slip op. at 14. I remind my
colleagues in the majority that this court just recently reaffirmed
the notion that the General Assembly is free to impose limitations
and conditions on the availability of relief under the statutory
causes of actions that it creates. In re Marriage of Kates, 198 Ill. 2d 156 (2001). Given that the Franchise Act provides automobile
dealerships with a statutory cause of action against arbitrary and
unfair allocations made by distributors-a claim unavailable under
our common law-it is not unreasonable that the legislature chose
to impose time requirements on the availability of this legislatively
created relief. See, e.g., Varelis v. Northwestern Memorial
Hospital, 167 Ill. 2d 449, 454 (1995) (and cases cited therein). The
court today appears to take the position that the changes that were
wrought by the 1964 amendments to the 1870 Illinois Constitution
did away with the legislature's right to impose preconditions to the
statutory causes of actions that it creates. I disagree. Those
changes did not in any way affect the legislature's power to
impose such limits or preconditions. See M.M., 156 Ill. 2d  at 75
(Miller, C.J., concurring, joined by Bilandic, J.) We, as the highest
court, have no right to transform an element of the plaintiff's case
into an affirmative defense to be pled and proved by the defendant.
	Notwithstanding this court's long-standing recognition of the
legislature's ability to impose limits or preconditions upon the
right to relief under a statutory cause of action, I do not believe
that the plain language of the Franchise Act, as the court holds,
compels the conclusion that the four-year limitation period is an
ordinary statute of limitation. The wording of the statute is similar
to language found in other legislatively created remedies. See, e.g.,
235 ILCS 5/6-21 (West 2000); 740 ILCS 180/2 (West 2000). This
court has construed the provisions in these statutes as elements of
the plaintiff's case. Lowrey v. Malkowski, 20 Ill. 2d 280 (1960);
Wilson v. Tromly, 404 Ill. 307 (1949). I believe that the same result
should obtain here. In addition, statutes of limitations that the
legislature intends to be raised as affirmative defenses are
ordinarily placed by the General Assembly in the Code of Civil
Procedure. See 735 ILCS 5/13-201 et seq. (West 2000). Had the
legislature intended for section 14 of the Franchise Act to serve as
an affirmative defense, it would have added it to the limitations
section of the Code of Civil Procedure, particularly in light of the
fact that this court has historically given a limitation period
contained in a statutory remedy a construction that places the
burden on the plaintiff.
	Section 14 of the Franchise Act allows an aggrieved party to
toll the four-year limitation if it can establish that the alleged
violations were concealed from the aggrieved party's knowledge.
In this case, plaintiff's complaint alleged such conduct. However,
the trial court's ruling that the section 14 limitation period was
tolled by the continuing violation doctrine made the fraudulent
concealment element of plaintiff's claim irrelevant, and plaintiff,
not surprisingly, presented no proof on the subject at trial.
Nevertheless, the trial court allowed recovery even though the
statute's requirement with respect to concealment was not met.
Thus, the question that must be resolved here is whether the trial
court was correct in tolling the four-year limitation period due to
the continuing violation doctrine. Defendants claim the court erred
because it eliminated the concept of knowledge from the case.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the doctrine is applicable
here under the facts of the case.
	The General Assembly enacted the Franchise Act in 1979 as
part of its police power in order to promote, inter alia, service to
consumers generally. 815 ILCS 710/1.1 (West 1992). Under
section 4(d) of the Franchise Act, a motor vehicle distributor
cannot "adopt, change, establish or implement a plan or system for
the allocation and distribution of new motor vehicles to motor
vehicle dealers which is arbitrary or capricious or *** modify an
existing plan so as to cause the same to be arbitrary or capricious."
815 ILCS 710/4(d)(1) (West 1992). Section 14 provides that
			"actions arising out of any provision of this Act shall be
commenced within 4 years next after the cause of action
accrues; provided, however, that if a person liable
hereunder conceals the cause of action from the
knowledge of the person entitled to bring it, the period
prior to the discovery of his cause of action by the person
entitled shall be excluded in determining the time limited
for the commencement of the action." 815 ILCS 710/14
(West 1992).
Thus, an aggrieved party has four years after the cause of action
accrues to bring suit under the Franchise Act, unless the violation
was concealed.
	In my view, the statutory language makes clear that
knowledge of the violation is essential to the time limitation
contained in the Franchise Act. That the sole exception to the four-year limitation period is for concealment underscores the
legislature's desire that an action be brought as soon as the person
entitled to bring it has knowledge of the violation. An exception
based on a theory of continuing violations takes the concept of
knowledge out of the equation, as this case aptly demonstrates.
"Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court
must give it effect as written, without 'reading into it exceptions,
limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express.' "
Garza v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 378 (1996), quoting Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer
Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83 (1994).
	Moreover, had the legislature intended for continuing
violations to serve as an exception to the four-year limitation
period, it would have explicitly made it a part of the language of
section 14. Our General Assembly has provided for such an
exception to the limitation periods contained in several statutory
causes of action. See, e.g., 225 ILCS 425/9.5 (West 2000) ("[a]
continuing violation will be deemed to have occurred on the date
when the circumstances first existed which gave rise to the alleged
continuing violation"); 225 ILCS 457/120 (West 2000) ("[a]
continuing violation will be deemed to have occurred on the date
when the circumstances last existed that gave rise to the alleged
continuing violation"). The absence of such language in section 14
reflects the General Assembly's specific rejection of the doctrine
as a basis for tolling the limitation period in Franchise Act cases.
For these reasons, I agree with my colleagues in the majority that
the trial court erred in applying the continuing violation doctrine
to this case. Slip op. at 18. However, I do not agree with their
ultimate conclusion regarding the disposition of this case, as I
explain below.
	As I read the court's opinion, each improper allocation by
defendants served as a specific violation of the Franchise Act. See
slip op. at 18 (stating that "each allocation constituted a separate
violation of section 4 of the Act, [with] each violation supporting
a separate cause of action"). If this is so, I am confused by the
court's holding that because "each allocation would have
supported a separate cause of action, plaintiff may recover
damages for the four-year period prior to the filing of its
complaint." Slip op. at 18. Specifically, I question why my
colleagues are limiting plaintiff's recovery to the four-year period
prior to the filing of plaintiff's complaint. If each allocation of
Toyota products by defendants constituted a separate violation of
the Franchise Act, plaintiff had, under the statute, four years from
the date of each improper allocation to bring suit under the
Franchise Act, unless it could show fraudulent concealment. Each
four-year "clock" began to run on the date of the alleged improper
allocations. However, under section 14, each "clock" could be
tolled if it could be shown that the person liable for the conduct
"conceal[ed] the cause of action from the knowledge of the person
entitled to bring it." 815 ILCS 710/14 (West 1992). Plaintiff
alleged in its second amended complaint that, from January 29,
1979, through June 1, 1986, defendants' allocation of motor
vehicles to plaintiff was arbitrary, capricious, in bad faith, and
unconscionable, all in violation of the Franchise Act. In addition,
plaintiff alleged that defendants concealed their arbitrary and
capricious allocation system from plaintiff's knowledge so that
plaintiff was unable to discover its entitlement to bring the cause
of action until the fall of 1990. If, as the court holds, each
allocation of Toyota's products served to constitute a separate
cause of action, i.e., the accrual of a cause of action, then under
section 14, plaintiff had four years from the date of each allocation
to file suit, unless prevented from doing so by fraudulent
concealment. Thus, it is possible that plaintiff can pursue recovery
for alleged improper allocations prior to 1985. I fail to see why any
potential recovery should be limited to the four-year period prior
to the filing of plaintiff's original complaint. The court's remedy
here is inconsistent with its premise that each allocation serves as
a separate cause of action.
	I believe that the trial judge's erroneous application of the
continuing violation doctrine served to complicate this litigation.
As noted, plaintiff, in its second amended complaint, alleged that,
because of defendants' fraudulent concealment, it did not learn
that it was entitled to bring any statutory cause of action until the
fall of 1990. After defendants challenged the timeliness of the
action, the circuit court ruled that plaintiff's cause of action under
the Franchise Act was timely filed as a matter of law. In so ruling,
the circuit court applied the continuing violation doctrine to this
case with the result being that plaintiff's knowledge of the
violations was irrelevant. Thus, plaintiff had no reason to pursue
its theory of fraudulent concealment at trial. Therefore, the
erroneous ruling, in my view, prevented plaintiff from proving that
defendants' fraudulent actions tolled the four-year limitation
period for alleged violations preceding 1985. I therefore cannot
agree with the court's conclusion that plaintiff "did not pursue" the
theory of fraudulent concealment and abandoned it at trial. Slip op.
at 17 n.2. In the wake of the trial judge's application of the
continuing violation doctrine to this case, any pursuit of fraudulent
concealment on plaintiff's part was simply unnecessary.
	Due to the adverse effects of the trial judge's ruling,
defendants were also harmed because they were unable to have the
jury determine the question of when, if ever, plaintiff knew of the
allegedly improper allocations. My review of the trial testimony
reveals that there was some discrepancy as to when plaintiff,
through its representatives, knew of the improprieties with respect
to the allocations, which presents a question of fact that can only
be resolved by the jury. For these reasons, I am of the view that the
trial judge's erroneous pretrial rulings had an adverse effect on the
litigation as a whole and that the correct approach here would be
to remand the matter so that the case can be retried within the
framework of the proper limitations periods. This ensures that both
parties are allowed to present their theories of the case to the jury.
Parenthetically, I would note that in litigation such as this, an
interlocutory appeal might have been of some assistance to both
the trial judge and the litigants in preventing the remand ordered
today. I note that the record contains an attempt by defendants for
Rule 308 certification, a procedure which, had it been allowed,
might have lessened the obfuscation which surrounded the
construction of the statute of limitations at issue. Suffice it to say,
the circuit court's incorrect ruling that the continuing violation
rule applied to this case caused much confusion as to proving
when precisely these alleged violations occurred. It resulted in an
absence of proof concerning plaintiff's knowledge of the alleged
violations and defendants' alleged fraudulent concealment of
them. This view is only reinforced by this court's holding that the
circuit court also erred in finding the four-year UCC statute of
limitations inapplicable to this action. Slip op. at 23. Time and
knowledge were no longer issues in the trial that followed these
rulings.
	After reviewing the record carefully, I cannot agree that a new
trial on damages is all that is necessary to rectify these errors. As
Justice Bilandic once noted while a member of our appellate court,
"[a]fter a shirt or blouse is incorrectly buttoned, the solution is to
unbutton it completely and start all over." Morrey v. Kinetic
Services, Inc., 133 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 1005 (1985). The same must
be said for the case at bar.

	JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this dissent.
1.      1Section 12 provides, inter alia, that certain disputes may be
submitted to arbitration. 815 ILCS 710/12 (West 2000). The provisions
of section 12 are not at issue in this appeal.

2.      2The appellate court determined, and we agree, that plaintiff did not
pursue his fraudulent concealment theory at trial. 316 Ill. App. 3d at
244. Thus, plaintiff's "discovery" of defendants' wrongful conduct was
not at issue.

3.      3The 1986, 1987, and 1988 agreements all provide that the agreement
shall be governed by the laws of the state where the dealer is
located-Illinois.