Case Title: DONEY v. STATE, BROWN v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
DONEY v. STATE, BROWN v. STATE2002 WY 18259 P.3d 730Case Number: 01-73, 01-89Decided: 12/18/2002
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

WILLIAM 
JEFFERY DONEY,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

VINCENT 
LEROY BROWN,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellants:

 

            
Kenneth Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; 
Diane Courselle, Director, Defender Aid Program; and Kirk Morgan, 
Intern.

 

 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. 
Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Lloyd D. Rickenbach, 
Intern.

 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

*  Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      In 2001, Vincent 
Leroy Brown (Brown) and William Jeffery Doney (Doney) were arrested on probation 
revocation warrants.  Brown first 
appeared before a judicial officer forty-eight days after the warrant was 
executed against him and Doney first appeared before a judicial officer eighteen 
days after the warrant was executed against him.  In both appeals, we conclude that, based 
on the records before us, these delays were unnecessary and violated the 
W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(2) requirement that a "probationer arrested on a warrant and 
taken into custody shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary 
delay."  To remedy this violation, 
we remand to the district court for modification of its sentencing orders to 
credit Brown and Doney for time served against their respective minimum and 
maximum sentences, beginning when each was arrested and ending the date each 
first appeared before a judicial officer.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      We rephrase the 
issues stated by Brown and Doney as follows:

 

            
1.         
Considering the circumstances of these particular appeals, was the 
W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(2) requirement that "[a] probationer arrested on a warrant and 
taken into custody shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary 
delay" violated?

 

            
2.         
If so, what constitutes an appropriate remedy?

 

FACTS

 

            
Brown

 

[¶3]      In 1998, Brown 
pled guilty to one count of burglary, a felony.  The district court deferred acceptance 
of that plea pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301 (Lexis 1999), and 
conditionally placed him on probation for five years.  In February 1999, Brown admitted to 
violating this probation.  The 
district court revoked the probation, accepted Brown's guilty plea, and 
sentenced him to a three-to-five year prison term with a recommendation that he 
be placed at the Wyoming Conservation Camp.  After Brown graduated from the Wyoming 
Conservation Camp, the district court suspended the balance of his sentence and 
conditionally placed him on supervised probation for three 
years.

 

[¶4]      On September 26, 
2000, the State petitioned the district court to revoke Brown's probation.  That same day, the district court issued 
a warrant for Brown's arrest.  The 
Fremont County sheriff's office arrested Brown on the warrant on January 26, 
2001.  In orders filed the same day, 
the district court appointed a public defender to represent Brown in the 
revocation proceeding and ordered Brown to appear on March 15, 2001, for a 
"hearing."  Brown remained in 
jail.

 

[¶5]      At the hearing on 
March 15, 2001, the district court advised Brown of the allegations contained in 
the revocation petition and of the items listed in W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(3).  The district court also informed Brown 
that since he was in custody, a revocation hearing "must be held within 15 days 
from today, unless for good cause these limits are extended by the Court."  Brown then admitted to violating the 
terms of his probation.  The 
district court revoked Brown's probation, imposed the three-to-five year prison 
term, suspended that sentence and ordered Brown to apply for placement at a 
community alternative center in Wyoming.  
Upon his successful completion of that program, the district court 
ordered that Brown again be conditionally placed on supervised probation for 
three years.  The district court 
decided that Brown should not receive credit for the time he served between his 
January 26, 2001, arrest and the March 15, 2001, hearing.

 

            
Doney

 

[¶6]      In 1999, Doney 
pled guilty to one count of forgery, a felony.  The district court sentenced Doney to a 
three-to-five year prison term, but suspended that sentence and conditionally 
placed him on supervised probation for three years.  On February 2, 2001, the State 
petitioned the district court to revoke Doney's probation.  The district court issued a warrant for 
Doney's arrest on February 2, 2001, and it appears that the Fremont County 
sheriff's office arrested Doney on the warrant that same day.1  Doney filed a financial affidavit on 
February 5, 2001, and, in an order filed February 6, 2001, the district court 
appointed the public defender to represent him in the revocation 
proceeding.

 

[¶7]      In an Order for 
Hearing also filed on February 6, 2001, the district court ordered Doney to 
appear for a "hearing" on February 20, 2001.  At that hearing, the district court 
advised Doney of the allegations contained in the revocation petition and of the 
items listed in W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(3).  
Doney then admitted to violating the terms of his probation.  The district court revoked Doney's 
probation, again conditionally placed him on supervised probation for three 
years, and ordered that he successfully complete a community alternative center 
program.  The district court decided 
that Doney would "not receive credit for the twenty-six (26) days pre-revocation 
incarceration."2

 

[¶8]      Brown and Doney 
appeal from the orders imposing their respective probation revocation sentences, 
which appeals were consolidated for our review.  The appellate issues raised by Brown and 
Doney involve questions of law, which we review de novo.  Worcester v. State, 2001 WY 82, ¶ 
13, 30 P.3d 47, 52 (Wyo. 2001).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      Brown and Doney 
first argue that W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(2) was violated in their cases because neither 
of them was taken before a judicial officer "without unnecessary delay" 
following their arrests on probation revocation warrants.  To remedy this violation, Brown and 
Doney seek credit against their sentences for the time they remained 
incarcerated pending their appearances before a judicial officer.  We find the analysis of this issue to be 
dispositive in both appeals, rendering additional arguments presented by both 
parties moot.

 

[¶10]   However, we will briefly address 
the State's contention that Brown and Doney waived our consideration of the 
claimed W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(2) violation because both admitted to violating the 
terms of their respective probations.  
To support this argument, the State cites to a single case for the 
general proposition that a "plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional 
defenses."3  We decline to consider the merits of 
this argument, absent a more detailed analysis or citation to additional 
authority pertinent to the particular circumstances of the instant appeals.4

 

            
Historical Context of 
W.R.Cr.P. 39

 

[¶11]   Prior to 1991, the criminal rule 
governing probation revocations provided:

 

The 
court shall not revoke probation except after a hearing at which the defendant 
shall be present and apprised of the grounds on which such action is 
proposed.  The defendant may be 
admitted to bail pending such hearing.

 

W.R.Cr.P. 
33(f) (1968).  The 1991 criminal 
rules revision (effective March 24, 1992) created Rule 39 to govern probation 
revocations, which rule provided, in pertinent part:

 

            
(a)       
Revocation of probation.Proceedings for revocation of probation shall be 
initiated by a petition for revocation filed by the attorney for the state, 
setting forth the conditions of probation which are alleged to have been 
violated by the probationer and the facts establishing the 
violation.

 

            
(1)       
Process.If it appears from a verified petition to revoke probation, or 
from an affidavit or affidavits filed with the petition, that there is probable 
cause to believe the probationer violated the terms of probation, the court 
shall order the probationer to appear before the court on a date and time stated 
to answer to the allegations in the petition.  Upon the written request of the attorney 
for the state demonstrating good cause therefor, the court may issue a warrant 
for the probationer.  A copy of the 
petition for revocation shall be served upon the probationer along with the 
order to appear or warrant.

 

            
(2)       
Appearance.A probationer arrested on a warrant and taken into custody 
shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay, but in any 
event within 48 hours of arrest.

 

            
(3)       
Advice to Probationer.At the probationer's first appearance before the 
court, the court shall advise the probationer of the allegations of the petition 
for revocation and of the contents of any affidavits and shall further advise 
the probationer:

 

            
(A)       
Of the probationer's right to retain counsel and, where applicable, the 
right to appointed counsel;

 

            
(B)       
That the probationer is not required to make a statement and that any 
statement made could be used against the probationer;

 

            
(C)       
Of the right to a hearing before a judge without a 
jury;

 

            
(D)       
Of the state's burden of proof;

 

            
(E)       
Of the probationer's right to confront adverse witnesses, to call other 
witnesses and have court process to obtain the testimony of reluctant witnesses 
and to present other evidence at the hearing; and

 

            
(F)       
If the probationer is in custody, of the general circumstances under 
which release may be secured pending a hearing.

 

[(4)]     Plea.The probationer 
shall be given a copy of the petition for revocation of probation before being 
called upon to plead.  The 
probationer shall be called upon to admit or deny the allegations of the 
petition for revocation.  If the 
probationer admits the allegations of the petition, the court may proceed 
immediately to disposition, or may set a future date for disposition.  If the petitioner denies the allegations 
of the petition, or declines to admit or deny, the court shall set the matter 
for hearing.

 

            
(A)       
If further proceedings are to follow the first appearance, the court may 
commit or release the probationer as provided in Rule 
46.2.

 

            
(B)       
A hearing on the petition shall be held within the following time 
limits:

 

            
(i)         
If the probationer is in custody because of the probation revocation 
proceedings, a hearing upon a petition for revocation of probation shall be held 
within 15 days after the probationer's first appearance before the court 
following the filing of the petition.  
If the probationer is not in custody because of the probation revocation 
proceedings, a hearing upon the petition shall be held within 30 days after the 
probationer's first appearance following the filing of the petition.  For good cause the time limits may be 
extended by the court.

 

            
(ii)        Where 
it appears that the alleged violation of conditions of probation consists of an 
offense with which the probationer is charged in a criminal proceeding then 
pending, the court may continue the probation revocation proceedings until the 
termination of the criminal proceeding if the probationer consents, or 
regardless of consent, if the probationer is not in custody because of the 
probation revocation proceedings.

 

            
[(5)]     
Hearing.At the hearing upon the petition for revocation of probation, 
the state must establish the violation of the conditions of probation alleged in 
the petition by a preponderance of the evidence.

 

            
(A)       
The probationer shall have the right to appear in person and by counsel, 
and to confront and examine adverse witnesses.

 

            
(B)       
The Wyoming Rules of Evidence shall apply to the adjudicative phase of 
probation revocation hearings, but not to the dispositional 
stage.

 

[(6)]     Findings.If the court 
finds a violation of conditions of probation and revokes probation, it shall 
enter an order reciting the violation and the disposition.

 

W.R.Cr.P. 
39 (effective March 24, 1992).

 

[¶12]   We noted in Cooney v. White, 
845 P.2d 353, 366 n.18 (Wyo. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 813 
(1993) that

 

W.R.Cr.P. 
39 (effective March 24, 1992) in rewriting the prior judicial probation 
revocation rule, W.R.Cr.P. 33(f), recognized in specific provisions the due 
process concerns created by the Cooney litigation.  The rule includes an alternative process 
of an order to appear instead of a bench warrant and arrest.  The rule then requires that if arrested, 
the individual is given the right to a mandatory forty-eight hour judicial 
appearance.[5]

 

At 
issue in Cooney was what immunity a prosecutor was entitled to receive 
based on the following facts, which facts also reveal the referenced "due 
process concerns:"

 

Chris 
J. White, assistant prosecuting attorney (prosecutor) in Park County, Wyoming, 
directed a probation officer, resident in Evanston, Uinta County, Wyoming, to 
prepare a false and perjured petition for revocation of probation against Thomas 
Russell Cooney.  Cooney was working 
in the oil patch at Bairoil, Wyoming, a corner of Sweetwater County, Wyoming, 
which is an area under the supervision of the parole office in Rawlins, Carbon 
County, Wyoming.  The prosecutor, 
knowing that revocation was improper and that the form which he, as deputy 
county attorney (county official), had directed the probation officer (state 
official) to prepare was untrue, arranged for the form to be filed in the 
district court.  Based upon this 
false complaint, the prosecutor secured the issuance of a bench warrant 
resulting in the incarceration of Cooney for thirty-eight days without 
opportunity to post bail, be arraigned, secure the assistance of counsel or to 
obtain any hearing.

 

Id. 
at 355.

 

[¶13]   The 1991 revision, and subsequent 
amendments, apparently incorporated procedures designed to meet the federal due 
process requirements established by Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973) and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972), 
as well as other requirements established under Wyoming law.  See, e.g., Pearl v. State, 996 P.2d 688 (Wyo. 2000) (right to counsel, state constitution); 
Mapp v. State, 929 P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1996) (due process 
requirements); 
Gailey v. State, 882 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1994) (probation revocation procedure 
and due process requirements); 
Reese v. State, 866 P.2d 82 (Wyo. 1993) (right to a speedy hearing, state 
constitution); 
Krow v. State, 840 P.2d 261 (Wyo. 1992) (due process rights 
requirements); 
Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279 (Wyo. 1992), overruled on other 
grounds by Daugherty v. State, 2002 WY 52, 44 P.3d 28 (Wyo. 2002) (due 
process requirements and judicial function);  Swackhammer v. State, 808 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1991) (due process requirements generally and preliminary hearing 
requirement satisfied by probable cause determination in issuing arrest 
warrant); 
Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051 (Wyo. 1981) (due process 
requirements); 
Weisser v. State, 600 P.2d 1320 (Wyo. 1979) (due process requirements 
generally and preliminary hearing); 
and Knobel v. State, 576 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1978).

 

            
Application of 
W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(2)

 

[¶14]   The version of W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(2) 
applicable to the instant appeals states that a "probationer arrested on a 
warrant and taken into custody shall be taken before a judicial officer without 
unnecessary delay."  W.R.Cr.P. 
39(a)(2) (effective until September 1, 2001) (Rule 39).  We have said that the phrase "without 
unnecessary delay" contained in W.R.Cr.P. 5(a) is

 

not 
subject to precise definition, nor does it call for mechanical obedience.  Application of the limits of the term is 
dependent upon both the facts and circumstances of the particular case, viewed 
in light of the purpose of the rule.

 

Cherniwchan 
v. State, 
594 P.2d 464, 466 (Wyo. 1979).  It is evident from the plain language of 
Rule 39(a)(2), and its historical context, that one purpose of the rule is to 
prevent the "unnecessary" restraint of a probationer's personal liberty between 
the time he is arrested on a probation revocation warrant and his subsequent 
appearance before a judicial officer of the court from which the warrant was 
issued.  We note also that a timely 
appearance is integral to ensuring that a probationer is advised of, and 
promptly receives consideration regarding, the items listed in Rule 
39(a)(3).  This is especially true 
concerning a probationer's right to a "speedy disposition of the charges against 
him" because Rule 39(a)(4)(B) requires that if "the probationer is in custody 
because of the probation revocation proceedings, a hearing upon a petition for 
revocation of probation shall be held within 15 days after the probationer's 
first appearance before the court following the filing of the 
petition."  (Emphasis 
added.)  See also 
Reese, 866 P.2d  at 84.

 

[¶15]   Viewing the facts and circumstances 
of Brown's and Doney's appeals in light of this purpose, we conclude that Rule 
39(a)(2) was violated.6  The probation revocation arrest warrant 
was executed on Brown on January 26, 2001, and, according to the record before 
us, he remained incarcerated until his next appearance before the district 
court, that being the March 15, 2001, hearing.  The probation revocation arrest warrant 
was executed on Doney on February 2, 2001, and, according to the record before 
us, he remained incarcerated until his next appearance before the district 
court, that being the February 20, 2001, hearing.  The record does not reference any other 
instance that Brown or Doney appeared before a judicial officer, and the 
district court did not provide for bond on the face of either arrest 
warrant.

 

[¶16]   Given the substantial length7 of these delays, forty-eight and 
eighteen days, respectively, we are unable to discern any justification in the 
record to support their "necessity," even allowing for some reasonable delay due 
to docket management or the logistics inherent in the arrest and judicial 
processes.  Both probation 
revocation arrest warrants were executed in Fremont County, the county in which 
the district court sits, not another jurisdiction, and Brown and Doney were 
arrested exclusively on the probation revocation warrants, not for any other 
purpose.  The record contains no 
evidence that the district court's schedule necessitated the delays, although it 
is difficult to conceive of a scheduling difficulty that would necessitate 
forty-eight or eighteen days in taking a probationer before a judicial officer 
for what typically amounts to a brief first appearance.8  The fact that the district court set 
Doney's hearing nearly three weeks earlier than Brown's, although Brown was 
arrested prior to Doney, certainly would undermine such a contention in the 
instant appeals.  The record 
contains no evidence that the delays were attributable to either Brown or 
Doney.  Accordingly, we can conclude 
only that the delays were unnecessary and violated Rule 
39(a)(2).

 

            
Appropriate Remedy for Rule 
39(a)(2) 
Violation

 

[¶17]   Rule 39 does not provide a specific 
remedy for violating subsection (a)(2).  
However, this Court's rulemaking power expressly governs "provisional and 
final remedies . . .."  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 5-2-115(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2001).  
See also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-2-114 (LexisNexis 2001).  Should a Rule 39(a)(2) violation require 
a remedy, we prefer to tailor that remedy to the circumstances of each case in 
light of the harm the rule was promulgated to prevent.

 

[¶18]   W.R.Cr.P. 2 states 
that

 

[t]hese 
rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal 
proceeding.  They shall be construed 
to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the 
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.

 

Given 
the lengthy, unnecessary delays in the instant appeals, during which delays 
Brown and Doney remained in custody, and the referenced purpose of Rule 39(a)(2) 
and its important nexus to subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4), we conclude that Brown 
and Doney are entitled to a remedy.  
Yet, Brown and Doney received copies of the revocation petitions at the 
time the arrest warrants were executed, the district court did appoint Brown and 
Doney counsel promptly thereafter, and Brown and Doney did eventually appear 
before the district court and, after the district court advised them in 
accordance with Rule 39(a)(3), both chose to admit violating the terms of their 
respective probations and forego a further adjudicatory hearing.  The circumstances do not appear to 
warrant dismissing with prejudice Brown and Doney's probation revocations,9 and Brown and Doney have not asked 
that we do so.  Therefore, we find 
it particularly appropriate in the instant appeals to remand to the district 
court for modification of its sentencing orders to credit Brown and Doney for 
time served against their respective minimum and maximum sentences, beginning 
when each was arrested and ending the date each first appeared before a judicial 
officer.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1The return indicates that the 
Fremont County sheriff's office served the warrant on January 2, 2001.  However, this appears to be a 
mistake.  The State filed the 
revocation petition on February 2nd, the district court issued the 
arrest warrant on February 2nd, and the arrest warrant is stamped 
"RECEIVED" by the sheriff's office on February 2nd.

  2The State represented to the 
district court that Doney had "been in jail since January 26.  I count 26 days of incarceration."  For purposes of this appeal, it does not 
appear that Doney was arrested pursuant to a warrant until February 2, 
2001.

  3See Smith v. State, 871 P.2d 186 (Wyo. 1994).

  4Indeed, the State concedes that "if 
Appellants were entitled to credit against their sentences based simply upon the 
fact of their prehearing detention, their admissions would not foreclose 
challenge to a denial of that credit."

  5In 1993, the 1991 version of 
W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(2) was amended, deleting ", but in any event within 48 hours of 
arrest."

  6The State appears to concede that 
Rule 39(a)(2) was violated in the following statement in its appellate 
brief:  "While the court's failure 
to comply with Rule 39(a)(2) is not excused by Appellants' inaction, at the same 
time Appellants should not add their own inaction to that of the court and 
expect to profit thereby."

  7For context purposes only, and 
noting the absence in the record of any apparent "necessity" for these delays, 
the delays exceeded the fifteen days within which to hold a probation revocation 
hearing for a probationer in custody pursuant to Rule 39(a)(4)(B)(i), the ten 
days within which to hold a preliminary examination for a defendant in custody 
pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 5(c), and although Brown remained in custody, the delay in 
his case exceeded the thirty days within which to hold a probation revocation 
hearing for a probationer not in custody pursuant to Rule 39(a)(4)(B)(i), and 
the twenty days within which to hold a preliminary examination for a defendant 
in custody pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 5(c).

  8At Doney's February 20, 2001, 
hearing, it took the district court twenty-eight minutes to address Doney, 
advise Doney of the allegations contained in the revocation petition and in 
accordance with Rule 39(a)(3), receive and establish a factual basis for Doney's 
admission of the petitioner's allegations, revoke Doney's probation, hear 
sentencing recommendations and arguments from the State, Doney's counsel, Doney, 
and Doney's probation officer, and sentence Doney.  At Brown's March 15, 2001, hearing, it 
took the district court twenty-one minutes to complete these same 
tasks.

  9See, e.g., Reese, 866 
P.2d at 84-85 and Murray v. State, 855 P.2d 350 
(Wyo. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1045 (1994).