Case Title: Floridians Against Increased Rates, Inc. v. Clark

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC2021-1761, SC2022-0012

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2023-09-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2021-1761 
____________ 
 
FLORIDIANS AGAINST INCREASED RATES, INC., 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
GARY F. CLARK, etc., et al., 
Appellees. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2022-0012 
____________ 
 
FLORIDA RISING, INC., et al., 
Appellants, 
 
vs. 
 
GARY F. CLARK, etc., et al., 
Appellees. 
 
September 28, 2023 
 
COURIEL, J. 
 
We have for review a decision of the Public Service 
Commission relating to rates charged by Florida Power & Light 
 
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Company (FPL) for the provision of electric service.1  We find that 
the Commission has not supplied a basis for meaningful judicial 
review of its conclusion that the settlement agreement at issue 
“provides a reasonable resolution of all issues raised, establishes 
rates that are fair, just, and reasonable, and is in the public 
interest.”  So we remand this case to the Commission for an 
explanation of its decision consistent with the governing law as set 
forth in our case law and reiterated here.2 
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const.; see 
also § 366.10, Fla. Stat. (2023). 
 
2.  Appellants raise other arguments in opposition to the 
Commission’s approval of the settlement agreement.  These 
arguments include challenges to the Commission’s statutory 
authority to approve various pieces of the settlement agreement: the 
Storm Cost Recovery Mechanism; the Reserve Surplus Amortization 
Mechanism; the Asset Optimization Incentive, which includes the 
monetization of renewable energy credits; a corporate tax 
adjustment; the Solar Base Rate Adjustment mechanism (SoBRA); a 
construction incentive for solar generation sites constructed 
pursuant to SoBRA; and cost recovery related to the Green 
Hydrogen Pilot Program and a consummation payment FPL made to 
Jacksonville Electric Authority concerning the retirement of a coal-
fired power generation unit.  To the extent any of these challenges 
to the Commission’s statutory authority is preserved, none gives us 
a reason to set aside the order under review.  
 
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I 
The Commission approved a settlement agreement among FPL 
and seven parties that intervened in this matter.  The settlement 
agreement, which took effect in January 2022, permits FPL to 
increase rates annually for (at least) four years and offer the same 
rate schedules throughout its service area.3  It allows FPL to 
increase its base rates and service charges such that FPL could 
generate an additional $692 million in revenue in 2022 and an 
additional $560 million in revenue in 2023.  It also allows for 
incremental increases in rates related to the construction of certain 
solar projects; rates are estimated to increase by $140 million in 
both 2024 and 2025.4  The settlement agreement authorizes an 
 
 
3.  Gulf Power Company was merged into FPL in January 
2021.  The settlement agreement allows FPL to offer the same rate 
schedules to all post-merger customers.  But because it will at first 
be more expensive for FPL to service customers residing in pre-
merger Gulf Power service areas, the settlement agreement allows 
FPL, for five years, to apply transition riders to the bills of those 
customers and a corresponding transition credit to the bills of 
customers in pre-merger FPL service areas. 
 
4.  When this case was before the Commission in August 
2021, a witness predicted that, as a result of all the rate increases 
authorized in the settlement agreement, a typical 1,000-kWh 
residential bill for customers serviced by FPL before the merger with 
 
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equity-to-debt ratio of 59.6%,5 and a return on equity (ROE)6 
between 9.7% to 11.7%, with a midpoint of 10.6%.7  It further 
 
Gulf Power would rise from $101.70 in January 2021 to $107.78 in 
January 2022 and would be $115.34 by January 2025. 
 
5.  A utility company finances its operations with both 
shareholder investment (equity) and debt.  The equity-to-debt ratio 
describes a company’s capital structure by explaining how much of 
its financing comes from shareholder investment and how much 
comes from borrowing.  See Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regul. 
Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  Typically, the more 
an electric utility company’s financing comes from equity, the 
higher its rates will be, as equity investors often require a higher 
rate of return than creditors, or debt investors, do.  Id. at 1376-77.  
In this case, the requested ratio provides that 59.6% of FPL’s 
financing will come from equity, and 40.4% will come from debt. 
 
6.  Return on equity is the rate of return that a shareholder 
receives on an investment in the company.  See Sierra Club v. Fed. 
Energy Regul. Comm’n, 38 F.4th 220, 229 (D.C. Cir. 2022).  Courts 
have said that companies in this regulated industry can expect a 
rate of return to shareholders comparable to the rates offered by 
similar companies in the industry, and that the authorized rate of 
return should be high enough to allow the company to maintain its 
financial health and attract additional capital investment.  See Fed. 
Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).  By 
establishing both a midpoint and range, “the commission is 
acknowledging the economic reality that a company’s rate of return 
[on equity] will fluctuate in the course of a normal business cycle.”  
United Tel. Co. of Fla. v. Mann, 403 So. 2d 962, 967-68 (Fla. 1981).   
 
7.  If the average 30-year U.S. Treasury Bond yield rate is at 
least 50 basis points greater than the yield rate on August 10, 
2021, the date the settlement agreement was filed with the 
Commission, for any period of six straight months, then FPL is 
authorized under the settlement agreement to increase its ROE 
range to 9.8% to 11.8%, with a mid-point of 10.8%.  An increase in 
 
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provides that FPL can charge a minimum base bill of $25.00 to 
residential customers and certain business customers with low 
energy usage. 
The settlement agreement authorizes increased investment in 
FPL’s power generation facilities, transmission and distribution 
systems, and several pilot programs for electric vehicles (EV) and 
renewable energy.  It includes the expansion of SolarTogether, an 
additional solar program to the one mentioned above, which 
allocates newly built solar capacity to different customer classes 
and allows customers to subscribe to a portion of this capacity in 
exchange for a credit funded by the general body of ratepayers.  It 
permits FPL to adopt new depreciation timelines and continue using 
the Reserve Surplus Amortization Mechanism (RSAM).8  
 
the ROE range and midpoint resulting from the implementation of 
this provision would not, under the terms of the settlement 
agreement, result in a corresponding increase in base rates.  
 
8.  A depreciation reserve surplus occurs when a company 
collects a higher amount than needed to cover depreciation 
expenses given new information revealing that an asset, like a 
plant, has a longer-than-expected service life.  According to one 
witness, with the RSAM, FPL can use its depreciation reserve 
surplus to “absorb changes primarily in cash revenues and 
 
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Additionally, FPL can adjust rates incrementally if costs change 
because of a named tropical system or its successor, like a 
hurricane, or a permanent change in federal or state corporate tax 
rates.  And FPL is allowed to share in the savings that result from 
an expanded version of its asset optimization program.  The 
settlement agreement also extends, from ten years to twenty, the 
time over which FPL can recover the cost of certain retired assets.  
The Commission heard arguments in favor of and against the 
settlement agreement.  Appellants, who did not sign the settlement 
agreement, argued that it was not in the public interest and would 
result in unreasonably high rates.  They questioned the need for the 
rate increases in the settlement agreement, contended that both the 
ROE range and the amount of equity in the equity-to-debt ratio 
were excessive, and asserted that the RSAM unfairly deprives 
customers of a surplus created by funds they supplied.  Appellants 
also argued that FPL’s projected rate base investments and pilot 
programs were unreasonable, and that the settlement agreement—
 
expenses while maintaining a pre-established ROE within its 
authorized range without an increase in customer rates.” 
 
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including the expanded SolarTogether program and the minimum 
bill—favored commercial and industrial customers at the expense of 
residential and small business customers.  As for the minimum bill 
specifically, Appellants stated that it requires some customers to 
pay for more electricity than they use.  Appellants also challenged 
the settlement agreement’s extension of time for FPL’s recovery of 
retirement costs of certain assets; the extension, they contended, 
would lead to increased costs and force ratepayers to pay for 
obsolete assets. 
In response, FPL and other signatories to the settlement 
agreement contended that it would provide customers with stable, 
predictable, and reasonable rates.  FPL settled for a smaller rate 
increase than it first sought, including for residential customers in 
2022 and 2023.  Signatories defended the reasonableness of the 
ROE range and equity-to-debt ratio.  They argued that the RSAM 
allows FPL to handle changes in revenue and expenses during the 
settlement agreement’s term without having to seek more rate 
increases, benefitting both FPL and customers.  Signatories 
maintained that the increased investment in both cost-effective 
clean energy programs and improvements to the rate base, such as 
 
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installing new power generation facilities and expanding 
transmission and distribution systems, was reasonable.  They 
asserted that the settlement agreement as a whole, including the 
expanded SolarTogether program, did not result in unfair and 
discriminatory rates for any customer classes.  Signatories pointed 
out that the settlement agreement complies with the Commission’s 
gradualism principle,9 and claimed that it moved all major rate 
classes closer to parity.  They also argued that the expanded 
SolarTogether program was in the interest of all ratepayers: only 
participants are projected to pay for the expanded program as a 
whole, yet the general body of ratepayers is projected to receive 45% 
of the benefits.   
As to the minimum bill, signatories said it ensures that all 
customers, including those that use only a small amount of 
electricity, contribute toward their fair share of fixed system costs 
necessary to connect and service customers.  Regarding the 
 
 
9.  As one witness described it, the Commission’s gradualism 
principle limits the increase in the amount of revenue allocated to 
“each rate class to 1.5 times the system average increase in 
revenue,” and does not “allow[] any class to receive a decrease” in 
the amount of revenue for which it is responsible. 
 
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extended cost recovery period for certain retired assets, signatories 
argued that it would reduce current revenue requirements without 
resulting in a significant difference in costs for ratepayers over the 
twenty-year term of the extended period.  Signatories also argued 
that it was fair to ask future ratepayers to bear some of the 
retirement costs, as they will still benefit from the retirement of the 
included assets. 
Having heard all this, the Commission concluded that the 
settlement agreement “provides a reasonable resolution of all issues 
raised, establishes rates that are fair, just, and reasonable, and is 
in the public interest.”  In support of this conclusion, the 
Commission cited FPL’s quality of service, reliability, and 
performance; the benefits to customers of the consolidation of FPL’s 
and Gulf Energy’s systems; the $428 million reduction in requested 
base rate increase in the settlement agreement when compared to 
FPL’s as-filed case; FPL’s typical 1,000-kWh residential bill, which 
is projected to remain 21% below the current national average; the 
various mechanisms in the settlement agreement that allow for a 
four-year rate plan, providing stability for customers and financial 
security for FPL; the increased investment in both solar and EV 
 
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programs; and the fact that the Office of Public Counsel10 and other 
signatories representing a broad section of FPL’s customer classes 
supported the settlement agreement. 
The Commission’s reasoning about whether all this is in the 
public interest covers less than two pages of the over 70,000 in the 
record we have for review. 
II 
A 
The Public Service Commission has the power to “determine 
and fix fair, just, and reasonable rates that may be requested, 
demanded, charged, or collected by any public utility for its 
service.”  § 366.06(1), Fla. Stat. (2021); see also § 366.05(1)(a), Fla. 
Stat. (2021) (“[T]he commission shall have power to prescribe fair 
and reasonable rates and charges . . . .”).  In doing so, the 
Commission must act in the “public interest,” section 366.01, 
Florida Statutes (2021), and ensure that no public utility gives “any 
 
 
10.  The Office of Public Counsel is the “statutorily created 
representative of all FPL ratepayers” in proceedings before the 
Commission.  Sierra Club v. Brown, 243 So. 3d 903, 915 (Fla. 
2018); see §§ 350.061, 350.0611, Fla. Stat. (2021). 
 
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undue or unreasonable preference or advantage” to any customer, 
section 366.03, Florida Statutes (2021). 
We have repeatedly recognized the “broad legislative grant of 
authority” afforded to the Commission and the “considerable 
license” it enjoys in fixing fair, just, and reasonable rates.  Citizens 
of State v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 425 So. 2d 534, 540 (Fla. 1982).11  In 
exercising this authority, when it reviews a settlement agreement, 
the Commission does two things.  First, it makes factual findings 
 
 
11.  Our dissenting colleagues are correct that the 
Commission is an “arm of the legislative branch of government,” 
section 350.001, Florida Statutes (2021), but it does not follow from 
that observation that we can wash our hands of the judicial review 
that is our constitutional responsibility, or that “the role of our 
Court and federal courts fundamentally differ when dealing with 
our respective administrative processes,” Francis dissenting opinion 
at 36.  Our Constitution vests the legislative power in the Florida 
Legislature, article III, section 1, Florida Constitution, and we have 
made clear that “fundamental and primary policy decisions shall be 
made by members of the legislature who are elected to perform 
those tasks,” Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 925 
(Fla. 1978).  The Legislature expressly tasked us with reviewing the 
Commission’s decisions.  § 366.10.  We exercise judicial review to 
ensure that the Commission exercised its authority in line with the 
Legislature’s policy decisions, and the Florida Constitution.  See 
Askew, 372 So. 2d at 918 (“In the final analysis it is the courts, 
upon a challenge to the exercise or nonexercise of administrative 
action, which must determine whether the administrative agency 
has performed consistently with the mandate of the legislature.”). 
 
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based on the evidence presented by the parties.  § 120.569(2)(l)-(m), 
Fla. Stat. (2021).  We sustain these findings if they are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence in the record.  § 120.68(7)(b), Fla. 
Stat. (2021). 
Second, the Commission decides whether the settlement 
agreement, in light of its findings of fact, is in the public interest 
and results in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable.  Despite 
what we have indicated in the past, see, e.g., Sierra Club, 243 So. 
3d at 914-15, this decision is not a pure finding of fact that we are 
able to review by searching for competent, substantial evidence in 
the record.  Instead, as suggested by the qualitative words with 
which it is described, the Commission’s decision that a settlement 
agreement is in the public interest and results in rates that are fair, 
just, and reasonable rests on both facts in the record and policy 
judgments guided by its “specialized knowledge and expertise in 
this area.”  Gulf Coast Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Johnson, 727 So. 2d 259, 
262 (Fla. 1999); see also Utilities Operating Co. v. Mayo, 204 So. 2d 
321, 324 (Fla. 1967) (the Commission’s determination that “a 
particular rate is sufficient to produce a ‘fair return’ is a mixed 
question of law and fact.”).  We thus review the decision to ensure it 
 
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is within the range of discretion given to the Commission by the 
Legislature.  § 120.68(7)(e)1.; see also § 120.68(7)(e)4.; cf. also 
Island Harbor Beach Club, Ltd. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 495 So. 2d 209, 
218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (“[A]n agency’s exercise of delegated 
legislative authority will not be disturbed on appeal unless shown 
by a preponderance of the evidence to be arbitrary, capricious, or 
an abuse of administrative discretion.”). 
The Commission’s decisions arrive here “with the presumption 
that they are reasonable and just.”  W. Fla. Elec. Coop. Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Jacobs, 887 So. 2d 1200, 1204 (Fla. 2004).12  To determine whether 
 
 
12.  This presumption is no rubber stamp.  “Ultimately, the 
Commission’s actions are conditioned by statute,” Citizens of State 
v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n (Citizens I), 146 So. 3d 1143, 1153 (Fla. 
2014), and, as Justice Francis recognizes, Francis dissenting 
opinion at 40, we review them to ensure that they are in line with 
these conditions.  This review requires a well-reasoned explanation, 
not simply a lengthy record.  Our requiring of this explanation and 
our review of the Commission’s work does no violence to the 
presumption; it just means the presumption is not a conclusion in 
presumption’s clothing.  Notably, even when this presumption was 
of statutory force, see section 350.12(2)(m), Florida Statutes (1975) 
(repealed by chapter 76-168, section 3, Laws of Florida, and chapter 
81-170, section 6, Laws of Florida), we still sometimes remanded for 
further explanation when the Commission’s orders failed to identify 
the factual basis for its decisions.  See, e.g., Greyhound Lines, Inc., 
S. Greyhound Lines Div. v. Mayo, 207 So. 2d 1, 4-5 (Fla. 1968).  But 
 
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the Commission has exercised its discretion within the range 
delegated to it by the Legislature, we look to the reasons given by 
the Commission for its decision.  Were we to do otherwise, we might 
upset the carefully constructed constitutional and statutory process 
applicable here by ourselves supplying a basis for the Commission’s 
action that the Commission, with its expertise, did not offer—in 
essence propelling “the court into the domain which [the 
Legislature] has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.”  
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 
196 (1947); see § 120.68(7)(e) (“[T]he court shall not substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency on an issue of discretion.”); Order at 
2, LULAC Fla. Educ. Fund, Inc. v. Clark, No. SC2021-0303 (Fla. 
May 27, 2022) (“[I]t is not this Court’s job to substitute our policy 
views for the Commission’s.”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“We may 
not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency 
itself has not given.” (citing Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196)); cf. Ryder 
 
see Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. King, 143 So. 2d 313, 316-18 (Fla. 
1962). 
 
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Truck Lines, Inc. v. King, 155 So. 2d 540, 541 (Fla. 1963) (“It would 
not be proper for this Court to delve into the transcript of the 
testimony ‘in order to resolve opposing contentions as to what it 
shows or to spell out and state such conclusions of fact as it may 
permit.’ ”) (quoting Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 215 
(1931)). 
The Commission must therefore give us something to work 
with: a decision that is reasoned and articulated enough to allow us 
to assess on what basis it has concluded that the settlement 
agreement is in the public interest and results in rates that are fair, 
just, and reasonable.  See Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196-97 (“It will 
not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying 
the agency’s action; nor can a court be expected to chisel that 
which must be precise from what the agency has left vague and 
indecisive.”); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941) 
(“All we ask of the Board is to give clear indication that it has 
exercised the discretion with which Congress has empowered it.”). 
Judicial review presupposes such an explanation.  See Citizens of 
State v. Graham (Citizens II), 213 So. 3d 703, 711 (Fla. 2017) 
(“Judicial review proceedings under Section 120.68 . . . press for 
 
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[crystallization] of agency discretion.”) (quoting McDonald v. Dep’t of 
Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)); cf. Hardy 
v. City of Tarpon Springs, 81 So. 2d 503, 506-07 (Fla. 1955), holding 
modified by Pierce v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 279 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1973) 
(“The failure to set forth a proper statement of facts precludes 
intelligent judicial review of this order.  Not being advised what 
constituted the basis for the decision, any effort on our part to 
determine its correctness would be more guesswork.”). 
We have said that, while the Commission need not “resolve 
every issue independently” in its final order when it is reviewing a 
settlement agreement, it must nonetheless “discuss[] the major 
elements of the settlement agreement and explain[] why it [is] in the 
public interest.”  Sierra Club, 243 So. 3d at 914; see Citizens I, 146 
So. 3d at 1153.  That includes considering the competing 
arguments made by the parties below in light of the factors relevant 
to the Commission’s decision, and supplying, given these 
arguments and factors, an explanation of how the evidence 
presented led to its decision.  See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., 
Inc., 463 U.S. at 43 (“[T]he agency must examine the relevant data 
and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 
 
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rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); In re Permian 
Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968) (“Judicial review 
of the Commission’s orders will . . . function accurately and 
efficaciously only if the Commission indicates fully and carefully the 
methods by which, and the purposes for which, it has chosen to 
act . . . .”).  In other words, not only must the Commission’s 
decision be reasonable, but it also must be “reasonably explained.”  
Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 
1150, 1158 (2021). 
B 
The Legislature has provided that the Commission, in “fixing 
fair, just, and reasonable rates for each customer class, . . . shall, to 
the extent practicable, consider the cost of providing service to the 
class, as well as the rate history, value of service, and experience of 
the public utility; the consumption and load characteristics of the 
various classes of customers; and public acceptance of rate 
structures.”  § 366.06(1).  The Commission “shall also consider the 
performance of each utility pursuant to [the Florida Energy 
Efficiency and Conservation Act] when establishing rates for those 
 
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utilities over which the commission has ratesetting authority.”  § 
366.82(10), Fla. Stat. (2021).  A reasonably explained decision from 
the Commission must reflect that those factors have been 
considered to the extent practicable.   
Other factors are discretionary: the Commission can consider 
“the efficiency, sufficiency, and adequacy of the facilities provided 
and the services rendered; the cost of providing such service and 
the value of such service to the public; the ability of the utility to 
improve such service and facilities; and energy conservation and 
the efficient use of alternative energy resources.”  § 366.041(1), Fla. 
Stat. (2021).  And the Legislature has made clear that “it is in the 
public interest to promote the development of renewable energy 
resources in this state.”  § 366.91(1), Fla. Stat. (2021).  Evidence 
that these factors have been considered—where they are germane to 
determining whether the settlement agreement is in the public 
interest and results in rates that are fair, just, and reasonable—
permits meaningful judicial review of the Commission’s 
conclusions. 
The Commission can also consider non-statutory factors if it 
explains why they are relevant and how they relate to the 
 
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Commission’s “historical and statutory role.”  Sierra Club, 243 So. 
3d at 911.  For example, in the order under review, the Commission 
supported its decision by stating that “FPL’s residential 1,000 kWh 
bill [is] projected to remain 21% below the current national average” 
under the settlement agreement.  Assuming that it can explain the 
relevance of this metric in light of “the purpose of the Commission,” 
id., the Commission can permissibly consider it in making its 
decision. 
C 
In this case, after hearing from 60 witnesses and receiving 635 
exhibits into evidence, the Commission produced an explanation of 
its public interest determination that spanned little more than a 
page.  The order provides conclusory statements about the virtues 
of the settlement agreement, not the reasoned explanation required 
for our review.13   
 
 
13.  Justice Francis says we have jurisdiction to review the 
Commission’s “action[s],” not its orders.  Francis dissenting op. at 
42.  Orders of the Commission “constitute agency action” for the 
purposes of article V, section 3(b)(2) and section 366.10.  City Gas 
Co. of Fla. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 501 So. 2d 580, 581 (Fla. 
1987).  And the Legislature defined “agency action,” as relevant 
here, to mean “the whole or part of a[n] . . . order.”  § 120.52(2), Fla. 
Stat. (2021).  Because an agency’s action “must be upheld, if at all, 
 
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The Commission provided no indication that it considered the 
statutory factors set out in sections 366.06(1) and 366.82(10).  
Even a cursory statement of the Commission having weighed all of 
these factors would be more than what we have here; our judicial 
review, however, requires more: a statement of the Commission’s 
reasons for deciding as it did in light of record evidence relevant to 
each of these factors.  See Citizens II, 213 So. 3d at 711 (“[T]o the 
extent that agency action depends on nonrule policy, Section 
120.68 requires its exposition as a credential of [the agency’s] 
expertise and experience.”) (quoting McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 583); 
§ 120.68(7)(e). 
And while “the Commission is not required by statute or case 
law to address each issue of disputed fact in its final order,” 
Citizens I, 146 So. 3d at 1150, or to “resolve every issue 
independently,” Sierra Club, 243 So. 3d at 914, it should provide at 
least some written assessment of the parties’ main disagreements 
 
on the basis articulated by the agency itself,” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n of U.S., Inc., 463 U.S. at 50, we look to the Commission’s 
reasoning as expressed in its order, rather than try to discern it by 
piecing together stray remarks found in the record or appellate 
briefs.   
 
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reflected in the record.  The Commission should explain why it 
reached its conclusions and how those conclusions factored into its 
public interest determination.  Here it did not. 
On appeal, the Commission and FPL assure us that the 
Commission’s decision was warranted considering the evidence in 
the record.  But it is not enough to point to the pile of paper 
memorializing these proceedings and say, “It’s in there.”  Instead, 
the Commission must do the job with which the Legislature has 
tasked it by showing, in its final order, how the paper in that pile 
supports its decision.  In other words, the Commission must show 
that its decision results from the application of its “specialized 
knowledge and expertise” to the facts here.  Gulf Coast Elec. Coop., 
Inc., 727 So. 2d at 262.  Only then can we ensure that the 
Commission considered the relevant factors in light of the record 
evidence when it made its decision without ourselves usurping the 
Commission’s prerogatives by offering up a basis for the decision on 
appeal that the Commission did not offer below.  See Cent. Truck 
Lines, Inc. v. King, 146 So. 2d 370, 373 (Fla. 1962) (“Were we to 
uphold [the order under review], we would by such action invade 
the legislative field, contra to our fundamental concept of three 
 
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separate, distinct and independent branches of government.”); Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 88 
(1943) (“If an order is valid only as a determination of policy or 
judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and which 
it has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service 
for an administrative judgment.”). 
III 
In our review of final agency action, we may remand a case for 
further agency proceedings.  See § 120.68(6)(a)1.  On other 
occasions, we have recognized our authority to remand cases to the 
Commission when it “fail[s] to perform its duty to explain its 
reasoning.”  Citizens II, 213 So. 3d at 714; see Order at 3, LULAC, 
No. SC2021-0303.  Accordingly, we remand this matter to the 
Commission for further proceedings consistent with our decision, 
including, if the Commission shall determine that the settlement 
agreement is in the public interest and fixes fair, just, and 
reasonable rates in light of the statutory factors, a consideration of 
the parties’ main disagreements reflected in the record.14  From the 
 
14.  One such disagreement is whether the SolarTogether 
program is unduly preferential to program participants in violation 
 
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order we have, we cannot conclude that the Commission exercised 
its discretion in accordance with the standards that the Legislature 
has provided.  See Int’l Truck & Engine Corp. v. Cap. Truck, Inc., 872 
So. 2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“An agency action that is 
arbitrary stands outside the range of discretion delegated to the 
agency for purposes of review under section 120.68.”); § 120.68(7)(e) 
(allowing for remand when an agency’s exercise of discretion, 
among other things, was “[o]utside the range of discretion delegated 
to the agency by law” or “[o]therwise in violation of a constitutional 
or statutory provision”). 
Subject to any statutory requirements, the form of the 
proceedings on remand will be up to the Commission, including the 
decision whether to allow the parties to present additional evidence. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and LABARGA and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which FRANCIS, J., 
concurs. 
FRANCIS, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
of section 366.03.  Whatever the Commission ultimately decides 
with respect to whether the settlement agreement establishes rates 
that are fair, just, and reasonable, an assessment of the 
SolarTogether program would seem indispensable to a reasonable 
resolution of the issues raised by the settlement agreement, and 
whether it is in the public interest. 
 
- 24 - 
SASSO, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
CANADY, J., dissenting. 
 
I agree with Justice Francis that remand for further 
proceedings is not required by the Commission’s failure to provide a 
more expansive explanation of its decision to approve the settlement 
agreement.  As Justice Francis explains, nothing in section 120.68, 
Florida Statutes (2021), or any other provision of Florida law gives 
this Court the authority to remand for further proceedings simply to 
require that the Commission elaborate on the reasons for the 
decision it has rendered.  The majority’s decision to remand here for 
further explanation is inconsistent with the presumption of 
correctness accorded orders of the Commission—which operates as 
“an arm of the legislative branch of government,” § 350.001, Fla. 
Stat. (2021)—and the concomitant burden placed on challengers to 
establish based on the record and the law that the presumption is 
defeated. 
 
The Commission’s determination that the “[s]ettlement 
provides a reasonable resolution of all issues raised, establishes 
 
- 25 - 
rates that are fair, just and reasonable, and is in the public 
interest” is supported by competent, substantial evidence and has 
not been shown to be affected by any legal error.  I therefore would 
affirm the Commission’s final order. 
FRANCIS, J., concurs. 
FRANCIS, J., dissenting. 
The majority opinion, in my view, expands our judicial 
authority over the Public Service Commission (Commission)—a 
legislative creature—without textual authority to do so, and in the 
process of so doing, invalidates an order that satisfies our current 
precedent.  For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
I. 
Citing federal administrative precedent for much of its 
reasoning, majority opinion at 12-14, the majority has interpreted 
section 120.68 of the Florida Administrative Procedure Act (Florida 
APA)—titled “Judicial Review”—broadly to conclude that insufficient 
explanation in a Commission’s order is per se absence of 
consideration, and thus grounds for remand.  
That’s a tortured reading that isn’t supported by the text of 
section 120.68, which lays out when a court must remand a case.  
 
- 26 - 
In fact, far from explicitly requiring the Commission to make 
exhaustive written findings, the statutory procedure for rate-making 
only requires that the Commission consider the factors “to the 
extent practicable.”  § 366.06(1).15  By choosing the word 
“practicable,” the Legislature expressed that the Commission would 
have to prioritize which portions of the settlement required detailed 
findings and justification.  Practicable, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th 
ed. 2019) (“1. (Of a thing) reasonably capable of being 
accomplished”); see also supra note 15.  And the Legislature 
declined to make the Commission’s prioritization of certain factors 
or challenges to the settlement part of our review.   
 
 
15.  To be sure, there are circumstances in Florida 
administrative law where an agency exceeds the range of its 
discretion triggering a remand.  For example, when a statute 
empowers an administrative agency to decide one question and the 
agency opines on subjects beyond that question’s scope, that 
agency exceeds its discretion.  See, e.g., Gugelmin v. Div. of Admin. 
Hearings, 815 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding that 
administrative law judge for the Neurological Injury Compensation 
Association exceeded its statutory discretion when it went beyond 
determining whether a claim was compensable and determined the 
effect of its findings upon the claimant’s common law rights and 
remedies).  This example illustrates the plain meaning of the 
provision the majority claims the Commission violated: an agency 
strays outside of its discretion when it acts on an area of law not 
authorized by the statute. 
 
- 27 - 
This is not an insignificant concern.  The Legislature has 
struck a balance between thoroughness and expedient decision-
making in the rate-making statute.  That balance is reflected in the 
procedural deadlines the Legislature imposed on the Commission 
throughout chapter 366, Florida Statutes, to draft rate-making 
orders and adjust rates in the interim to reimburse utilities for 
incurred expenses.  The Commission’s deadlines for taking agency 
action under chapter 366 generally fall within 12 months, with 
some deadlines being much shorter.16  A 12-month timeframe is 
 
 
16.  See, e.g., § 366.06(3) (requiring that Commission deliver 
notice of withholding consent within 60 days of a utility’s requested 
rate increase, but mandating that withholding can last no longer 
than 8 months; requiring that Commission take final action and 
enter final order within 12 months of the commencement date for 
final agency action; requiring that commencement date or 
statement of deficiencies be determined within 30 days of receipt of 
the utility’s application); § 366.06(4) (generally requiring that 
Commission act within 5 months of the commencement of final 
agency action unless protested; if protested, requiring Commission 
to act within 8 months); § 366.071(2)–(3) (generally requiring that 
Commission act within 60 days of a requested interim rate increase 
or decrease); § 366.072 (requiring that rate adjustment orders be 
reduced to writing within 20 days). 
Another example of the Legislature’s balancing of practicality 
and expediency: the Legislature established an entire provision and 
docket—inaptly named the “fuel clause”—to expeditiously 
compensate utilities for both fuel expenses and other cost recovery 
methods while the rate agreement is still effective.  See, e.g., 
Citizens of State v. Graham (Citizens II), 213 So. 3d 703, 714 (Fla. 
 
- 28 - 
considered by the Legislature to be an expedited timeframe in other 
contexts.  See, e.g., § 39.001(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2023) (stating that one 
of the purposes of Florida’s dependency system is to ensure “that 
no child remains in foster care longer than 1 year.”); § 39.621(1), 
Fla. Stat. (2023) (“Time is of the essence for permanency of children 
in the dependency system.  A permanency hearing must be held no 
later than 12 months after the date the child was removed from the 
home or within 30 days after a court determines that reasonable 
efforts to return a child to either parent are not required, whichever 
occurs first.”). 
By substituting its judgment for the Commission’s in how to 
weigh what portions of the settlement deserve thorough 
explanation, the Court is in effect directly “substitut[ing] [its] policy 
views for the Commission’s” as to what portions of the settlement 
deserved greater attention and how to balance the Legislature’s 
 
2017) (quoting In re Petition by Fla. Power & Light Co. to Recover 
Scherer Unit 4 Turbine Upgrade Costs Through Env’t Cost Recovery 
Clause or Fuel Cost Recovery Clause (Scherer Unit 4), No. PSC–11–
0080–PAA–EI, at 6, 2011 WL 339538 (Fla. P.S.C. Jan. 31, 2011)).  
The fuel docket’s purpose “is to prevent regulatory lag . . . which 
has historically been a problem for utilities because of the volatility 
of fuel costs.”  Id.  
 
- 29 - 
deadlines.  See Order at 2, LULAC Fla. Educ. Fund, Inc. v. Clark, No. 
SC2021-0303 (Fla. May 27, 2022) (remanding case to Commission); 
§ 120.68(7)(e) (“[T]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that 
of the agency on an issue of discretion.”).  There is no statutory or 
constitutional support for us to assume this role of project manager 
for the Commission.  Rather, “[w]e must assume that these agencies 
will follow the mandates of the Constitution and the laws in the 
discharge of their duties.”  Odham v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 128 So. 
2d 586, 593 (Fla. 1961).  Otherwise, our “[p]romiscuous 
intervention . . . in the affairs of these administrative agencies . . . 
w[ill] inevitably result in the dethronement of the commissions and 
the substitution of the courts in their place and stead.”  Id.  I would 
simply affirm. 
Perhaps the broad interpretation of the Florida APA is 
understandable when one considers that the majority relies heavily 
on several federal administrative law cases interpreting the federal 
APA’s broad judicial review statute.  Majority op. at 10-15.  
But the two are not the same.  Unlike the Florida APA, the 
federal APA expressly permits the courts broad authority to reverse 
arbitrary and capricious decisions where the agency fails to give 
 
- 30 - 
adequate explanation in its orders.  Compare 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) 
(2018) (“The reviewing court shall . . . (2) hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be–(A) 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law”), with § 120.68(7)(e) (limiting our Court’s 
judicial review of an agency’s exercise of discretion to whether the 
order was “1. Outside the range of discretion delegated to the 
agency by law; 2. Inconsistent with agency rule; 3. Inconsistent 
with officially stated agency policy or a prior agency practice, if 
deviation therefrom is not explained by the agency; or 4. Otherwise 
in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision”).  Section 
120.68(7) authorizes Florida courts to set aside “actions” if it finds 
that the agency violates one of the specific grounds listed in 
subsection (7) but lacks the same catch-all language in the federal 
APA allowing federal courts to set aside actions “otherwise not in 
accordance with the law.”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also § 120.68(8) 
(“Unless the court finds a ground for setting aside, modifying, 
remanding, or ordering agency action or ancillary relief under a 
specified provision of this section, it shall affirm the agency’s 
action.”).   
 
- 31 - 
These textual differences make the majority’s reliance on 
federal administrative law principles misplaced.  Florida courts have 
recognized that “[s]mall definitional differences between the Florida 
and federal acts . . . prevent too great a reliance on federal 
decisions.”  Dep’t of Corrs. v. McCain Sales of Fla., Inc., 400 So. 2d 
1301, 1302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), superseded by ch. 91-30, § 3, 
Laws of Fla.; see also 2 Fla. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 6 (2022) 
(“Due to small definitional differences between the Florida 
Administrative Procedure Act and the analogous Federal Act, 
Florida courts may not place too great a reliance on federal 
decisions in construing the Act in particular cases.” (footnotes 
omitted)).17  When Florida courts have looked to federal case law for 
 
 
17.  Florida courts have also explicitly and implicitly relied on 
the principle that differences between the APAs prevent us from 
heavily relying on federal caselaw when applying parts of the 
Florida APA that have materially different federal counterparts.  
See, e.g., Peden v. State Bd. of Funeral Dirs. and Embalmers, 189 
So. 2d 526, 527 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) (declining to adopt the federal 
“substantial evidence” standard when Florida APA did not establish 
a standard of review for agency decisions in favor of the Florida 
common law rule); State, Dep’t of Env’t Regul. v. Falls Chase Special 
Taxing Dist., 424 So. 2d 787, 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (Smith, C.J., 
dissenting) (arguing that there was neither need nor justification for 
supplanting Florida’s firm exhaustion principle with the federal 
import because of Florida’s “varied and abundant remedies for 
administrative error”) (quoting State ex rel. Dep’t. of Gen. Servs. v. 
 
- 32 - 
guidance on an administrative principle, they have felt the need to 
justify their reliance by holding that the relevant provisions amount 
to one another.  See Fla. Home Builders Ass’n, 412 So. 2d at 353 
n.5 (“We believe that the standing requirement of this statute is so 
similar to the ‘substantially affected’ requirement of section 
120.56(1) that we are justified in looking to federal case law for 
guidance in formulating our rule regarding associational standing 
under section 120.56.”).  Had the Legislature wanted the 
Commission to address specific statutory factors in writing or face 
remand, it could have said so as it has in several other contexts.18  
 
Willis, 344 So. 2d 580, 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)).  But see Fla. Home 
Builders Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor & Emp. Sec., 412 So. 2d 351, 353 
n.5 (Fla. 1982) (applying the federal standing rule only because 
both statutes recognized a form of associational standing).  
 
18.  See, e.g., § 775.21(3)–(5), Fla. Stat. (2023) (expressly 
requiring a trial court to make written finding that an offender is a 
sexual predator or a sexually violent offender); § 63.089(3), (5)–(7), 
Fla. Stat. (2023) (expressly requiring written findings of fact in a (3) 
final judgment terminating parental rights, (5) dismissal order, (6) 
judgment terminating parental rights pending adoption, and (7) 
order on relief from judgment terminating parental rights); § 
61.075(3), Fla. Stat. (2023) (expressly requiring written findings of 
fact in contested dissolution action addressing distribution of assets 
and liabilities); § 61.30(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2023) (expressly requiring 
written findings when trier of fact orders payment of child support 
that varies more than five percent from guideline amounts); § 
985.255(2), (3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2023) (expressly requiring written 
 
- 33 - 
We know this because the Legislature previously empowered this 
Court with the authority to remand as “seemed necessary and 
proper” to establish an adequate record for review, accord the 
parties their various rights, and to accomplish the purposes and 
objective of the law that initiated the administrative proceeding; the 
majority now claims this power absent this language.  § 
120.31(2)(a)-(d), Fla. Stat. (1967), repealed by ch. 74-310, § 4, Laws 
of Fla.19  And by extension, had the Legislature wanted to empower 
 
findings to place juvenile offender in (2) secure detention when the 
risk assessment instrument reflects secure detention inappropriate 
or (3)(b) in more restrictive placement than the risk assessment 
instrument states); § 61.08(8)–(9), Fla. Stat. (2022) (expressly 
requiring written findings in awarding permanent alimony and in 
justifying exceptional circumstances for leaving payor with 
significantly less income than recipient); § 921.142(5), Fla. Stat. 
(2023) (expressly requiring written findings on aggravators and 
mitigators in death penalty cases).  Our Court has engaged in this 
type of comparative analysis before when reviewing other statutes.  
See Cason v. Fla. Dep’t of Mgmt. Servs., 944 So. 2d 306, 315 (Fla. 
2006) (“In the past, we have pointed to language in other statutes to 
show that the Legislature ‘knows how to’ accomplish what it has 
omitted in the statute in question.”) (citing Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 
So. 2d 294, 298 (Fla. 2000)); see also Pizzarelli v. Rollins, 704 So. 2d 
630, 633 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (looking to language in a different 
statute to conclude that “[w]hen the Florida Legislature wishes to 
provide for set-offs for future benefits it well knows how to express 
itself”). 
 
 
19.  This textual difference also undermines the majority’s 
only historic example of our Court remanding for an insufficient 
 
- 34 - 
us to remand administrative orders for failing to comprehensively 
discuss the statutory factors, it would have said so.   
But even assuming for the sake of argument there was not a 
significant textual difference between the federal and state APAs, we 
should hesitate to adopt federal administrative law principles in 
reviewing the Commission’s order because of the structural 
differences between the federal and state constitutions.  
 At the federal level, courts are tasked with ensuring that 
administrative agencies—which are part of the executive branch—
comply with the Legislature’s requirements to properly exercise 
wholly legislative power.  See Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2269–72 (2001) (describing 
 
explanation, Greyhound Lines, Inc., S. Greyhound Lines Div. v. 
Mayo, 207 So. 2d 1, 4-5 (Fla. 1968), since the statute at the time 
empowered us to do so (and the orders at issue in Greyhound Lines 
lacked any factual findings).  See majority op. at 13 note 12 (citing 
Greyhound Lines, 207 So. 2d at 4-5); Greyhound Lines, 207 So. 2d 
at 5 (“The orders here under attack were totally devoid of any 
factual findings.  The respondent concludes that the public 
convenience and necessity justify its order but it fails to tell us how 
or why.”) (relying on § 120.25(8), Fla. Stat. (1967), repealed by ch. 
74-310, § 4, Laws of Fla.); see also  § 120.31(2)(a)–(d), Fla. Stat. 
(1967), repealed by ch. 74-310, § 4, Laws of Fla. (authorizing broad 
judicial review of agency action).  
 
- 35 - 
federal court’s role as largely enforcing the mechanisms by which 
federal agencies make decisions); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n 
of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) 
(“The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard 
is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of 
the agency.  Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant 
data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action” 
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 
168 (1962))).  Yet even federal courts will “uphold a decision of less 
than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.”  
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc., 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting 
Bowman Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 
286 (1974)). 
But in Florida, the Commission is a legislative creature.  § 
350.001 (“The Florida Public Service Commission has been and 
shall continue to be an arm of the legislative branch of 
government.”).  And this Court has expressly held that the 
Commission is not part of the executive branch.  See Chiles v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n Nominating Council, 573 So. 2d 829, 832 (Fla. 1991) 
(rejecting assertion that Commission is an entity of the executive 
 
- 36 - 
branch and finding that Commission “is an entity of the legislative 
branch and, as such, the legislature has the authority to establish 
by law how legislative branch officials, including these Public 
Service Commission members, may be selected”). 
That is why the role of our Court and federal courts 
fundamentally differ when dealing with our respective 
administrative processes.  Federal courts are tasked with ensuring 
an executive agency is not usurping legislative power by failing to 
obey congressional procedures.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., 
Inc., 463 U.S. at 43 (“[T]he agency must examine the relevant data 
and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 
‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ ” 
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc., 371 U.S. at 168)).  Our Court 
is not tasked—either by legislative request or constitutional 
structure—with the same need to provide oversight and maintain 
compliance to prevent executive overreach.  Rather, our role—as 
defined by statute and our constitutional system—is to verify that 
the Commission does not stray outside the bounds of its defined 
authority as the Legislature’s rate-making body.  See Odham, 128 
So. 2d at 592-93 (“The courts have been extremely reluctant to 
 
- 37 - 
interfere with the actions of such bodies in the proper performance 
of their duties and responsibilities in the absence of a clear and 
unmistakably flagrant violation of a constitutional or statutory 
right of the affected party.”) (emphasis added).  Because we do not 
act as a neutral arbiter between two co-extensive branches of 
government in our scheme, we should recognize that federal 
administrative principles do not fit the Florida administrative law 
system.20   
 
 
20.  The majority expresses an understandable concern that 
our Court would be abdicating a core judicial responsibility by not 
remanding this order.  See majority op. at 11 note 11 (“Our 
dissenting colleagues are correct that the Commission is an ‘arm of 
the legislative branch of government,’ . . .  but it does not follow 
from that observation that we can wash our hands of the judicial 
review that is our constitutional responsibility . . . .”).  But 
respectfully, the bounds of our constitutional responsibility are 
established by the Florida Constitution’s text and the Legislature’s 
stated scope of review.  Nowhere in the Constitution nor in the 
phrase “[o]utside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by 
law” is the power to remand for an unsatisfyingly terse order.  § 
120.68(7)(e).  Our Legislature’s choice to curtail our authority in the 
judicial review statute nearly fifty years ago undermines this 
sullying of our hands by plowing the deeply rooted balance the 
Legislature has established in the face of textual evidence to the 
contrary.  § 120.31, Fla. Stat. (1967), repealed by ch. 74-310, § 4, 
Laws of Fla. 
 
- 38 - 
Instead, it appears to me that with today’s opinion, the 
majority has imposed additional requirements on the Legislature’s 
own subordinate body, becoming, in essence, the Commission’s 
project manager.  In doing so, the majority upsets a legislatively 
weighed balance between detail and expediency set out in the 
Commission’s authorizing statute and the Florida APA.  See 
§ 366.06(1) (requiring that the Commission consider the factors in 
the statute “to the extent practicable”) (emphasis added); see also 
§ 120.569(2)(m) (requiring that findings of fact “be accompanied by 
a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts of record 
which support the findings”).  The majority’s efforts are not made in 
service to the language of some constitutional or statutory 
command, but to ease the troublesomeness on our review.  See art. 
V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const. (limiting our jurisdiction to review “action of 
statewide agencies relating to rates or service of utilities providing 
electric, gas, or telephone service” to that provided by the 
Legislature through general law); see also Ocala Breeders’ Sales Co., 
Inc. v. Fla. Gaming Ctrs., Inc., 731 So. 2d 21, 25 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1999), aff’d, 793 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2001) (“The legislature has broad 
 
- 39 - 
discretion to establish statutory classification schemes in general 
laws.”). 
 Stepping into the Legislature’s province demands far more 
constitutional support than the majority provides.  
In short, neither party challenging this order can show the 
Commission departed from the Florida APA’s essential 
requirements.21  The majority’s claim of authority to remand on 
these grounds rests on federal principles that overlook the 
significant textual and conceptual differences between the federal 
and Florida administrative states.  Remanding here is an unwise 
incursion into the Legislature’s role to mandate standards for the 
Commission and supervise the rate-making process.  
 
 
21.  Even if the majority is in effect abrogating the rule that 
agencies need not discuss every statutory factor and all contested 
issues in orders on settlements—a reversal brought on in part by 
the majority’s overly broad understanding of review—we should be 
more transparent about the novelty of our demand.  See Sierra Club 
v. Brown, 243 So. 3d 903, 912 (Fla. 2018) (holding that requiring 
the Commission to expound on every issue “would convert a short 
order into a boundless tome, despite the fact that the Commission 
found the settlement agreement to be in the public interest—a 
finding  . . .  afford[ed] great deference.”).  Otherwise, we subject the 
Commission to a perpetual Sisyphean fate of rolling its orders up 
our hill praying that it has complied with our previously stated 
standard, only for us to roll its order back down on remand.     
 
- 40 - 
II. 
Finally, our precedent cloaks the Commission’s orders with a 
presumption of correctness and an assumption that the agency 
considered all relevant statutory factors—absent evidence to the 
contrary.  See W. Fla. Elec. Coop. Ass’n, Inc. v. Jacobs, 887 So. 2d 
1200, 1204 (Fla. 2004) (“Commission orders come to this Court 
clothed with the presumption that they are reasonable and just.”).  
“To overcome these presumptions, a party challenging an order of 
the Commission on appeal has the burden of showing a departure 
from the essential requirements of law and the legislation 
controlling the issue, or that the findings of the Commission are not 
supported by competent, substantial evidence.”  S. All. for Clean 
Energy v. Graham, 113 So. 3d 742, 752 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Crist v. 
Jaber, 908 So. 2d 426, 430 (Fla. 2005)).22   
In concluding that the Commission unlawfully exceeded its 
discretion, the majority focuses on the Commission’s failure to 
 
 
22.  I agree with the majority that this presumption of validity 
does not accord the Commission a “rubber stamp” from the 
Legislature or this Court.  Majority op. at 13 note 12.  I disagree, 
however, with my respected colleagues that finding the 
Commission’s order violated the APA is within the conditions 
defined by statute.  As I stated before, the Legislature has curtailed 
 
- 41 - 
discuss two of the enumerated statutory factors provided in the 
statute.  See majority op. at 20 (citing §§ 366.06(1), 366.82(10)); see 
also § 120.68(7)(e) (providing that a court may remand an agency 
order when “[t]he agency’s exercise of discretion was: 1. Outside the 
range of discretion delegated to the agency by law”).  Embedded 
throughout the majority’s opinion is an implicit dissatisfaction with 
the order’s terseness.  I get it.23 
 
the scope of our review of agency orders over the past fifty years.  
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  Remanding to force the 
Commission to produce a more comprehensive order than 
demanded by law vitiates the presumption of consideration—it 
unfairly punishes the agency for failing to guess that more is 
required of it than law or precedent demand.  See supra note 20.  
Put another way, how are we fairly presuming the Commission’s 
order was valid when the agency is unaware that we employ stricter 
standards than those demanded by statute or precedent?  The 
Commission can only rely on the statutory language and our 
precedents interpreting that language.   
 
23.  Though, one could argue that the Commission’s decision 
to spend most of its order focusing on statutory support for various 
parts of the settlement was a rational response to Appellants’ 
arguments before the Commission.  Appellants challenged the 
Commission’s statutory authority to approve a variety of cost 
recovery mechanisms in the proposed settlement.  See majority op. 
at 2 note 2 (detailing the various challenges to the Commission’s 
statutory authority that the majority rejects as meritless).  If this 
Court had found any of those arguments persuasive (the majority 
did not, see majority opinion at 2 note 2), major elements of the 
settlement would have been invalidated as beyond the scope of the 
Commission’s discretion.  See, e.g., supra note 15.  It is possible the 
 
- 42 - 
But article V, section 3(b)(2) gives us jurisdiction to review 
agency “action.”  See also § 366.10.  Though the agency’s “action” is 
memorialized by an order, we are at bottom reviewing what the 
agency does, not how detailed its order is.  To do otherwise is 
simply elevating form over substance.24   
 
Commission assessed the threat of losing authority to properly 
reimburse utilities for grid improvements as a grave threat to the 
proper functioning of the Florida utility system.  This threat was 
also heightened since the Commission recently lost any deference to 
its interpretation of its statutory authority, as reflected in the 
Appellants’ argument here.  See art. V, § 21, Fla. Const. (eff. Nov. 6, 
2018). 
 
24.  The majority characterizes this portion of my opinion as 
defining the Court’s jurisdiction “to review the Commission’s 
‘action[s],’ not its orders.”  Majority op. at 19 note 13 (emphasis 
added).  This is simply a misreading of the text above.  Recognizing 
our review touches not just the text of the written order but also 
how the agency arrived at that order does not exclude orders from 
our review.  And clearly, we do not review an order alone to 
determine whether an agency has complied with the statute; else 
the Legislature would have used “agency action” rather than 
“exercise of discretion” when authorizing us to remand agency 
action.  See § 120.68(7)(e) (“(7) The court shall remand a case to the 
agency for further proceedings . . . when it finds that: (e) The 
agency’s exercise of discretion was 1. Outside the range of discretion 
delegated to the agency by law.”) (emphasis added)).  Nor would the 
Florida APA have included reviewing whether hearings were held 
before final agency action; whether the action was supported by 
competent, substantial evidence during hearings; whether the 
fairness of the proceeding was impaired by a material error; or 
whether the agency misinterpreted law that compelled a particular 
 
- 43 - 
And the failure to discuss these two factors does not translate 
to the Commission failing to consider the relevant statutory factors 
sufficient to impair “[t]he fairness of the proceedings or the 
correctness of the action” below.  § 120.68(7)(c); see also § 366.06(1)  
(requiring the Commission’s consideration “to the extent 
practicable”); Consider, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
(1966 ed.) (“1. to reflect on: think about with a degree of care or 
caution . . . 2. to think of, regard, or treat in an attentive, solicitous, 
or kindly way . . . 4. to think of: come to view, judge, or classify.”).25   
To the contrary, the Commission’s consideration of all the 
statutory factors was shown by the admission of extensive evidence 
during the administrative process, and discussion of most statutory 
factors in its order.  And FPL pointed to the record evidence in this 
appeal proving the settlement was in the public interest.  Although 
 
action if the order was the sole concern of the Legislature.  See § 
120.68(7)(a)-(e). 
 
25.  Perhaps the Commission would have to provide a more 
thorough order were we reviewing the Commission’s interpretation 
of a rule or statute de novo under article V, section 21 of the Florida 
Constitution.  But it is clear the Commission’s order is entitled to 
deference based on well-settled law.  Jacobs, 887 So. 2d at 1204; 
Odham, 128 So. 2d at 592-93. 
 
- 44 - 
the portion of the order discussing the public interest is terse, the 
nearly 70,000 pages of record evidence establishes that the 
Commission thoroughly considered considerable information in 
coming to its decision that the factors justified the settlement order.  
Indeed, this order resembles orders this Court affirmed in 
Citizens I and Sierra Club; if anything, the Commission’s order here 
provides more of an explanation as to why it considers the 
settlement to be in the public interest.  Citizens of State v. Fla. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n (Citizens I), 146 So. 3d 1143, 1153 (Fla. 2014)  
(discussing the Commission’s final order and quoting fewer than 
200 words of findings); Sierra Club, 243 So. 3d at 914 (affirming the 
final order because the order “discussed the major elements of the 
settlement agreement and explained why it was in the public 
interest” without further analysis or discussion of the order).  Even 
the order at issue in LULAC, where we remanded for additional 
explanation, failed to meaningfully discuss the main challenge to 
the sole program at issue in that case (Clean Energy Connection) 
rather than a comprehensive rate setting order like the one here.  
Order at 1-3, LULAC, No. SC2021-0303. 
 
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By all the benchmarks established by our case law and the 
statute, the agency provided enough support and explanation for us 
to review the settlement and determine that the proceeding was fair 
and the order correct.  § 120.68(7)(c).  I therefore fail to see how 
remanding this matter will enable more meaningful review than the 
record already before us.  
Further, we are to affirm “[u]nless the court finds a ground for 
setting aside, modifying, remanding, or ordering agency action or 
ancillary relief under a specified provision of this section . . . .”  
§ 120.68(8) (emphasis added).  Remanding because an order lacks 
our unclear preferred amount of detail doesn’t satisfy this statutory 
mandate. 
I respectfully dissent. 
An Appeal from the Florida Public Service Commission 
John Thomas LaVia, III and Robert Scheffel Wright of Gardner, Bist, 
Bowden, Dee, LaVia, Wright, Perry & Harper, P.A., Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant Floridians Against Increased Rates, Inc. 
 
Bradley Marshall and Jordan Luebkemann of Earthjustice, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
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for Appellants Florida Rising, League of United Latin American 
Citizens, and Environmental Confederation of Southwest 
Florida 
 
Keith C. Hetrick, General Counsel, Samantha M. Cibula, Attorney 
Supervisor, and Douglas D. Sunshine, Senior Attorney, Florida 
Public Service Commission, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Appellee Florida Public Service Commission 
 
Stuart Singer and Pascual A. Oliu of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Jason Gonzalez and Amber Stoner 
Nunnally of Lawson, Huck, Gonzalez, PLLC, Tallahassee, Florida; 
Daniel E. Nordby of Shutts & Bowen LLP, Tallahassee, Florida; and 
John T. Burnett, Maria Jose Moncada, and Joel Baker of Florida 
Power & Light Company, Juno Beach, Florida, 
 
for Appellee Florida Power & Light Company