Case Title: Mt. San Jacinto etc. v. Super. Ct.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S132251

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 2/22/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
MT. SAN JACINTO COMMUNITY 
)  
COLLEGE DISTRICT, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
S132251 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/2 E035868 
 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF  
) 
RIVERSIDE COUNTY, 
) 
 
) 
Riverside County 
 
Respondent; 
) 
Super. Ct. No. RIC349900 
 
 
) 
AZUSA PACIFIC UNIVERSITY, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Party in Interest. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
When the government exercises its power of eminent domain, and 
condemns or damages private property for public use, it must pay “just 
compensation” to the owner.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 19.)1  The just compensation is 
aimed at making the landowner whole for a governmental taking or damage to the 
                                              
1 Article I, section 19 of the California Constitution provides that “Private 
property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation, 
ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the 
owner.  The Legislature may provide for possession by the condemnor following 
commencement of eminent domain proceedings upon deposit in court and prompt 
release to the owner of money determined by the court to be the probable amount 
of just compensation.”  (See also, U.S. Const., 5th Amend. [private property shall 
not “be taken for public use without just compensation”].) 
 
2
owner’s property.  (Redevelopment Agency v. Gilmore (1985) 38 Cal.3d 790, 797 
(Gilmore); see Escondido Union School Dist. v. Casa Suenos De Oro, Inc. (2005) 
129 Cal.App.4th 944, 958 (Escondido).)  In other words, “ ‘the owner is entitled 
[to] the full and perfect equivalent of the property taken.’ ”  (Gilmore, supra, 38 
Cal.3d at p. 797, quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. U.S. (1923) 261 U.S. 299, 304 
(Seaboard).)     
California’s statutory Eminent Domain Law (Code Civ. Proc., § 1230.010 
et seq.)2 provides that if the compensation issue “is brought to trial within one year 
after commencement of the proceeding, the date of [property] valuation is the date 
of commencement of the proceeding.” (§ 1263.120.)  The condemner may, 
however, take early possession of the property before litigation is concluded 
“upon deposit in court and prompt release to the owner of money determined by 
the court to be the probable amount of just compensation.”  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 
19; see § 1255.410.)  The immediate possession procedure is also known as a 
“quick-take” eminent domain action.  (Escondido, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 
960.)  Because compensation is immediately available to the property owner in a 
quick-take action, the date of valuation of the property is statutorily required to be 
no later than the date the condemner deposits “probable compensation” for the 
owner.  (§ 1263.110 et. seq.)  The deposit earns statutory interest until it is 
withdrawn.  (§ 1268.310.)  The property owner can immediately withdraw the 
funds, but by doing so waives all rights to dispute the taking other than the right to 
challenge the amount of just compensation.  (§ 1255.260.)   
This case involves a quick-take eminent domain action.  We address two 
constitutional issues.  First, does a statutory property valuation date that occurs at 
                                              
2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless 
otherwise indicated.  
 
3
the time the condemner deposits the probable compensation in court under section 
1263.110, et seq. deny the property owner just compensation under the California 
Constitution when litigation in the eminent domain action is not expected to end 
until several years after the deposit is made?  Second, is the owner’s statutory 
waiver of rights after withdrawing the funds an unconstitutional condition on the 
statutorily required “prompt release” of the deposit?  
We conclude that the statutory date of valuation at the time the probable 
compensation is deposited is constitutional, and that the requirement of a waiver 
of claims and defenses for receipt of deposited probable compensation is 
constitutional.  We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The facts are summarized from the Court of Appeal opinion and the record.  
In October 2000, Mt. San Jacinto Community College District (the District) 
commenced an eminent domain action against Azusa Pacific University (the 
University), seeking to condemn approximately 30 acres of vacant land in 
Riverside County. On December 15, 2000, the District deposited $1.789 million 
into court as probable compensation for the property.  In October 2001, the 
District applied for a prejudgment order for possession.  The trial court granted the 
application effective upon the University’s completion of improvements to the 
property.3  The District took possession of the property in January 2002.  The 
                                              
3 The University began constructing the improvements (educational facilities) in 
May 2001, after summons was served in this eminent domain action.  Section 
1263.240 provides that improvements made after the date the summons is served 
“shall not be taken into account in determining compensation” unless, for 
example, the improvements are made with the plaintiff’s written consent or are 
authorized by court order.  (§ 1263.240, subds. (b) & (c).)  The University did not 
obtain the District’s written consent and did not seek advance court approval 
before constructing the improvements as required under the statute.  Therefore, the 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
4
University did not move to stay the order for possession on hardship grounds or 
pending the trial court’s adjudication of the District’s right to take the property.  In 
addition, the University did not withdraw any portion of the deposited funds.  
In February 2002, the University petitioned the court to increase the deposit 
of probable compensation from $1.789 million to $4.2 million.  The University 
argued that the property was worth $4.2 million when the deposit was made in 
December 2000.  The trial court determined that the amount of probable 
compensation on December 15, 2000 was $1.789 million, and denied the 
University’s petition.  
The trial court bifurcated the issues of the District’s right to take possession 
of the property and the amount of just compensation.  The court ruled in June 
2002 that the District had the right to take the property.  
The parties filed cross-motions in limine to determine the date of valuation 
before trial.  The trial court recommended they seek a ruling from the appellate 
court, as there was a “controlling question of law as to which there are substantial 
grounds for difference of opinion.”  The University petitioned the Court of Appeal 
for a writ of mandate requesting the court resolve the issue.  The Court of Appeal 
denied the petition without prejudice, stating that the question of whether the 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
trial court found that the University could not recover the value of the 
improvements.  The University filed a separate inverse condemnation action 
seeking the value of the improvements, but the Court of Appeal issued a writ 
directing the trial court to enter summary judgment in the District’s favor.  (Mt. 
San Jacinto Community College Dist. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 
98, 110.)  The court reasoned that the University could not recover on the 
improvements because it failed to seek advance court approval for them in the 
present eminent domain action, as required under section 1263.240.  (117 
Cal.App.4th at p. 110.)   
 
5
statutory date of valuation should be disregarded was dependent on the facts of the 
case, and that the record was “not sufficiently developed” to allow the court to 
rule.  Following further briefing by the parties, the trial court ruled that the 
property should be valued as of the date trial commenced—December 6, 2004.  
The District then petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate directing 
the trial court to vacate its order and enter a new order setting the valuation date on 
December 15, 2000.   
The Court of Appeal initially observed that “[u]pon further consideration of 
[the] issues, we conclude that the issues raised in [the University’s] prior petition, 
and in [the District’s] present petition, are questions of law which did not, as we 
previously stated, require further development of the record.”  The court then 
compared the valuation principles that apply in a quick-take proceeding with those 
in a straight condemnation action, in which no deposit of probable compensation 
is made and immediate possession is not sought.  The court observed that the 
statutory valuation rules reflect the principle that a taking occurs when the 
property owner is paid.  Applying this principle to a quick-take proceeding, the 
court reasoned that the property should be valued on the date the plaintiff makes 
the probable compensation available to the owner by depositing it with the court.  
The Court of Appeal acknowledged, however, that the valuation must 
satisfy constitutional requirements.  The court considered the University’s 
contention that the principle of just compensation entitled it to the property’s value 
as of the date of the compensation trial, not the date of the deposit.  The University 
argued that because section 1255.260 required it to waive its right to litigate the 
legality of the taking if it availed itself of the deposited funds, the University was 
effectively precluded from withdrawing the deposited funds.  Therefore, the 
University argued, the property should be valued at the time of the commencement 
of trial.  The Court of Appeal found that the University received just compensation 
 
6
on the date of deposit, despite the requirement that it waive its statutory defenses if 
it withdrew the funds.  The court issued an alternative writ, granting the District’s 
petition, and directing the trial court to set the date of valuation as of December 
15, 2000.  The University now challenges the date of valuation (§ 1263.110) and 
the waiver of claims and defenses (§ 1255.260) as unconstitutional.  
DISCUSSION 
There is a “strong presumption in favor of the Legislature’s interpretation 
of a provision of the Constitution.”  (Methodist Hospital of Sacramento v. Saylor 
(1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 692.)  “ ‘When the Constitution has a doubtful or obscure 
meaning or is capable of various interpretations, the construction placed thereon 
by the Legislature is of very persuasive significance.’ ”  (Methodist Hospital, 
supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 693.)  “ ‘For the purpose of determining constitutionality, we 
cannot construe a section of the Constitution as if it were a statute, and adopt our 
own interpretation without regard to the legislative construction.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting 
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Indus. Acc. Com. (1932) 215 Cal. 461, 464.)  We 
therefore must consider the Legislature’s construction of the pertinent 
constitutional provisions.  
A. Development of Quick-take Procedure 
As adopted in 1879, the California Constitution provided only that 
“[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation having been first made . . . .”  (Cal. Const., art. I, former § 14, 
repealed Nov. 5, 1974.)  No constitutional provision allowed prejudgment 
possession.  Instead, it was statutorily provided under former section 1254 that a 
condemner could take possession of the land as the condemnation proceeding was 
pending if it deposited probable compensation into court.  Under the statute, the 
defendant was allowed to “apply to the court for the money,” but the condemner 
 
7
could take possession even without the court approving the payment.  (Steinhart v. 
Superior Court (1902) 137 Cal. 575, 576, 577 (Steinhart).)   
Steinhart considered the constitutionality of this early possession provision.  
As the Constitution at the time required that just compensation must have “first 
[been] made,” the court held that a preliminary possession “cannot be authorized 
until the damage . . . has been judicially determined and the amount has been paid 
or tendered to the owner.”  (Steinhart, supra, 137 Cal. at p. 578.)  As the owner 
could not immediately withdraw the funds, nor had the amount of compensation 
yet been decided by a jury, the deposit statute was declared unconstitutional.  (Id. 
at pp. 578-579.)  
In response to the Steinhart decision, California voters amended the 
Constitution to authorize certain public agencies to take immediate possession of 
the condemned property without first making payment to the owner.  (See Taking 
Possession and Passage of Title in Eminent Domain Proceedings (Oct. 1960) 3 
Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1961) p. B-10 (Commission Report).)  Owners had 
no right to withdraw the money,4 and were left to “vacate the property, locate new 
property to replace that taken and move to the new location at a time when there 
[was] little or no money available from the condemnation.”  (Id. at p. B-7.)   
In 1956, the California Law Revision Commission (Commission) was 
authorized to study whether condemnation law should be revised to better 
safeguard private property rights.  (Commission Report, supra, at p. B-1.)  Its 
findings were incorporated into Proposition 7, which was passed by the voters in 
1974.  (Gates v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 481, 522-523.)  
                                              
4 If the property was taken for highway purposes, it was provided that the owner 
could withdraw 75 percent of the deposit.  (See Commission Report, supra, at p. 
B-7.)   
 
8
Proposition 7 repealed and replaced the former just compensation clause in article 
I, section 14 of the California Constitution with the current clause in article I, 
section 19.   
The Commission concurrently recommended revision of a number of 
statutory measures relating to eminent domain and the right to immediate 
possession.  (Commission Report, supra, at pp. B-12 to B-25.)  The Legislature 
enacted many of these recommendations into law.  (See People ex rel. Department 
of Transportation v. Southern California Edison (2000) 22 Cal.4th 791, 799-800; 
Miro v. Superior Court (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 87, 99-100.)   
The Commission concluded that a constitutional amendment was 
necessary, as “the policy underlying the Steinhart decision and the original 
provisions of the 1879 Constitution is sound and the contrary policy of the present 
provisions of the Constitution [under article I, former section 14] is undesirable.”  
(Commission Report, supra, at p. B-10.)  Under former article I, section 14, an 
owner had no assurance he or she would actually receive compensation at the time 
the property taking occurred.  “A person’s property should not be taken from him 
unless he has the right to be paid concurrently for the property, for it is at the time 
of the taking that he must meet the expenses of locating and purchasing property 
to replace that taken and of moving to the new location.”  (Commission Report, 
supra, at p. B-10.)  The Commission recommended that the condemnee be 
allowed to withdraw the entire deposit when the condemner takes actual 
possession of the property.  (Id. at p. B-7.)   
The Commission reasoned that immediate possession proceedings were 
more beneficial to both condemners and owners than straight condemnations.  The 
public interest would be promoted by shortening the delay between the beginning 
of the condemnation proceeding and the actual taking of possession.  “While the 
need for public improvements of all kinds has become increasingly clear, the 
 
9
construction of these improvements has often been delayed for excessive periods 
of time, largely because of the inability of the condemnor to expedite the taking of 
possession.”  (Commission Report, supra, at p. B-29.)  These delays resulted in an 
increase in the cost of the development, which in turn led to increased taxes.  
(Ibid.)  Because bond issues finance many developments, “the inability to take 
immediate possession may cause inability to meet the bonding requirements and, 
consequently, may not only retard but completely prevent the construction of the 
improvement.”  (Ibid., fn. omitted.)     
The Commission also observed that, “Upon commencement of 
condemnation proceedings, a landowner is deprived of many of the valuable 
incidents of ownership.  He can no longer place improvements upon the property 
for which he may be compensated.  He is practically precluded from selling or 
renting the property for few persons want to purchase a law suit.”  (Commission 
Report, supra, at p. B-12.)  In ordinary condemnation proceedings, the owner 
received no compensation until the end of litigation.  (Ibid.)  The Commission 
proposed that in quick-take or immediate possession proceedings, the owner 
should have the right to withdraw compensation when the condemner actually 
takes possession of the property, and therefore have the money available 
immediately to use when planning for the future.5  (Id. at p. B-12.)  
                                              
5 The Commission also examined the effect these changes would have on an 
owners’ right to challenge the taking.  It reasoned that “[t]he right of the 
condemner to take the property is rarely disputed” and “the only question for 
judicial decision in virtually all condemnation actions is the value of the property.”  
(Commission Report, supra, at p. B-11.)  Under the former law, “many vitally 
needed public improvements [were] delayed even though there [was] no real issue 
in the case of the public’s right to take the property.”  (Id. at p. B-12.)  “If the 
property owner can be insured just compensation, there is little, if any, 
justification for delaying public improvements and, thereby, increasing the tax 
burden on the public.”  (Id. at p. B-29.) 
 
10
The Commission suggested few alterations to the waiver provision when it 
proposed the aforementioned constitutional and statutory changes, recommending 
only that former section 1254.7 be amended and renumbered as (former) section 
1243.7, and that the waiver of claims and defenses in subdivision (g) be retained.6  
(Commission Report, supra, at pp. B-15 to B-16.)  The Legislature followed this 
recommendation and retained the waiver provision when it enacted section 
1243.7.  (Stats. 1961, ch. 1613, § 4, pp. 3444, 3446.)   
The Commission later discussed the proper date of valuation.  Before 1974, 
the rule had been to value the property as of the date the summons was issued.  
(Recommendation:  Eminent Domain Law (Oct. 1974) 12 Cal. Law Revision 
Com. Rep. (1974) pp. 1605, 1645-1646 (1974 Commission Report).)  The 
Commission again noted the condemning agency’s need for certainty:  “In 
acquiring property for public use, it is frequently essential that there be a definite 
future date as of which all property needed for the public improvement will be 
available.  An undue delay in acquiring even one essential parcel can prevent 
construction of a vitally needed public improvement and can complicate financial 
and contractual arrangements for the entire project. . . . In general, the need of the 
condemnor is not for haste but for certainty in the date of acquisition.  The 
variable conditions of court calendars and the unpredictable period required for the 
                                              
6 California owners wishing to withdraw compensation have been required to 
waive claims and defenses, with the exception of a claim for greater 
compensation, since 1897.  When the Legislature amended former section 1254 to 
authorize prejudgment possession after a deposit was made, this section contained 
a provision that a withdrawal waived all claims and defenses except a claim for 
greater compensation.  (Stats. 1897, ch. 127. § 1, p. 187.)  While that statute was 
struck down in Steinhart, it was not due to the waiver provision, but because 
compensation was neither determined by a jury nor available for immediate 
withdrawal by the owner.  (Steinhart, supra, 137 Cal. at pp. 578-79.)   
 
11
trial of the issue of compensation preclude any certainty in the date of acquisition 
if that date is determined solely by entry of judgment in the proceeding.”  (Id. at p. 
1658.) 
The Commission considered the “oft-made proposal” that the date of 
valuation should be the date trial commences in all cases.  (1974 Commission 
Report, supra, at p. 1645.)  “It would seem more appropriate to ascertain the level 
of the general market and the value of the particular property in that market at the 
time the exchange of the property for ‘just compensation’ actually takes place.  
Also, in a rapidly rising market, property values may have increased so much that 
the property owner cannot purchase equivalent property when he eventually 
receives the award. . . . Nonetheless, the existing California rules appear to have 
worked equitably in most cases.  The alternative rule might provide an undesirable 
incentive to condemnees to delay the proceedings to obtain the latest possible date 
of valuation.  And, as a matter of convenience, there is merit in fixing the date of 
valuation as of a date certain, rather than by reference to the uncertain date that the 
trial may begin.”  (Id. at pp. 1645-1646, fn. omitted.)  The Commission 
recommended retention of the existing rule.  “In addition to providing a needed 
incentive to condemnors to deposit approximate compensation, the rule would 
accord with the view that the property should be valued as of the time payment is 
made. . . . A date of valuation thus established should not be subject to change by 
any subsequent development in the proceeding.”  (Id. at p. 1646.) 
Procedural safeguards under current eminent domain laws ensure the 
deposit closely approximates the amount that a jury would actually award, and the 
owner is guaranteed a jury trial on the award amount if requested.  (Cal. Const., 
art. I, § 19.)  The owner’s constitutional right to receive just compensation for the 
property “ ‘cannot be made to depend upon state statutory provisions.’ ”  
(Gilmore, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 797, citing Seaboard, supra, 261 U.S. at p. 306; 
 
12
see also Kirby Forest Industries Inc. v. United States (1984) 467 U.S. 1, 17 
(Kirby).)  The Legislature does have the power to place additional restrictions on 
the exercise of eminent domain.  (Saratoga Fire Protection Dist. v. Hackett (2002) 
97 Cal.App.4th 895, 905-906 (Saratoga); see also Kelo v. City of New London 
(2005) 544 U.S. 469, 489 [“ ‘Once the question of the public purpose has been 
decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need 
for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the 
legislative branch’ ”].)  The Legislature has incorporated a number of these 
restrictions into its statutory scheme.  (See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders 
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 60, pp. 64-65, 69.)  But state and federal statutory provisions 
have been invalidated when necessary to ensure just compensation to the owner.  
(See, e.g., Kirby, supra, 467 U.S. 1; Gilmore, supra, 38 Cal.3d 790; Saratoga, 
supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 905-906.)   
The statutory procedural safeguards in place today include a property 
appraisal requirement.  (§ 1255.010)  A recent statute requires the condemner to 
offer to pay the reasonable costs (up to $5,000) of an independent appraisal that 
the property owner orders at the time the condemner offers to take the property.  
(§ 1263.025, subd. (a).)  Once the deposit is made, the owner may petition the 
court to “determine or redetermine” whether it equals the probable compensation 
that will be awarded.  (§ 1255.030, subd. (a).)  If the deposit does not meet the 
amount of probable compensation and is not increased within the time allowed, 
the deposit is void and will not be used to determine the date of valuation.  
(§ 1263.110, subd. (b).)   
 
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B.  University’s Contentions 
As discussed ante, at page 2, section 1263.110 would require that the 
University’s property be valued on the date of deposit, or December 15, 2000.  
The University asserts that due to fluctuations in the real estate market, using the 
deposit date as the valuation date would deny its constitutional right to just 
compensation.  The University’s point is that if a property owner chooses to 
challenge the condemner’s right to take the property, the condemner can set an 
early valuation date by depositing funds, “and then reap the benefit of a large rise 
in property values when the valuation trial does not occur for several years (while 
retaining the option to abandon the action if values fall).”  The University claims 
the date of valuation should be the date trial on the just compensation issue 
commenced, even though the District deposited the probable compensation on 
December 15, 2000.  The University’s contention is based on the fact that the 
parties agree that the property has increased in value since the date of the deposit.  
The University relies on Saratoga to assert that the statutory date of 
valuation must be invalidated in this case.  (Saratoga, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
905-906.)  Saratoga involved a straight condemnation proceeding where the Court 
of Appeal held that section 1263.120 was unconstitutional as applied.  (Saratoga, 
supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 905-906.)  In Saratoga, trial on the compensation 
issue began 11 months after the date the proceeding commenced, during which 
time the fair market value of the property increased from $2 million to $3.2 
million.  (Id. at pp. 897-898.)  Even though section 1263.120 required the property 
be valued as of the date the proceeding commenced, Saratoga held the principal of 
just compensation required it be valued on the date of trial.  (Ibid.) 
As the Court of Appeal here stated, it is of critical importance that Saratoga 
was a straight condemnation proceeding where there was no deposit of probable 
compensation before trial.  In order to provide just compensation, the court in 
 
14
Saratoga had to value the property closer to when payment would finally be made 
available to the owner.  Section 1263.120 had to be disregarded to ensure the 
owner received just compensation at the time payment was tendered and the 
property was actually taken.   
In contrast to the condemner in Saratoga, the District here deposited the 
probable amount of compensation well before the start of trial.  As noted, the 
University had the option to withdraw the funds at that time.  (§ 1255.210.)  The 
deposit was supported by an appraisal, as required under section 1255.010.  
Indeed, when the University made a motion under section 1255.030 to increase the 
amount of the deposit, the trial court found that the amount deposited was 
sufficient.  When recommending the law, the 1960 Commission wanted to ensure 
that the owner had the right to withdraw compensation when the condemner 
actually takes possession of the property.  (Commission Report, supra, at p. B-12.)  
The University had this right but did not exercise it.   
The University’s comparisons to Kirby, another straight condemnation 
proceeding, are similarly misplaced.  (Kirby, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 16-17.)  In 
Kirby, the condemned property was valued at trial in 1979, yet the deposit was not 
made until 1982.  (Id. at p. 16.)  The owner retained the rights to sell the land or 
profit from it during that three-year period.  (Id. at pp. 14-15.)  The court held that 
a condemnation award must be modified “when there is a substantial delay 
between the date of valuation and the date the judgment is paid, during which time 
the value of the land changes materially.”  (Id. at p. 18.)   
No credible reason exists to invalidate the statutory date of valuation here, 
when a deposit was made before trial and the owner had access to the money at 
that time. 
The fact that the 1974 Commission specifically rejected using the date of 
trial as the date of valuation in quick-take proceedings is significant.  Although it 
 
15
considered the possibility of the issue before us today (see 1974 Commission 
Report, supra, at p. 1645 [“in a rapidly rising market, property values may have 
increased so much that the property owner cannot purchase equivalent property 
when he eventually receives the award”]), the Commission emphasized the public 
need for certainty when valuing land for condemnation proceedings.  A date of 
valuation based on a variable date of trial would not provide this certainty.  In 
addition, the Commission observed that a rule valuing property on the date trial 
commenced “might provide an undesirable incentive to condemnees to delay the 
proceedings to obtain the latest possible date of valuation.”  (Id. at pp. 1645-1646.)  
We agree with the Commission’s observation.  If the date of valuation could be 
delayed until the date of trial, owners in a rising market would have a considerable 
incentive to delay proceedings for as long as possible to ensure a greater return on 
their property.7   
C.  The Waiver of Claims and Defenses 
Section 1255.260 provides: “If any portion of the money deposited 
pursuant to this chapter is withdrawn, the receipt of any such money shall 
constitute a waiver by operation of law of all claims and defenses in favor of the 
persons receiving such payment except a claim for greater compensation.”  This 
waiver includes the right to contest the condemner’s right to take the property.  
(Clayton v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 28, 33.)  
                                              
7 The University’s contention that the Court of Appeal ignored Saratoga, supra, 
97 Cal.App.4th 895, and its determination that an owner must be allowed to prove 
that the statutory scheme does not provide adequate compensation under the facts 
of a particular case is without merit.  The court did not establish an inflexible rule 
requiring that the issue of the proper valuation be resolved as a matter of law, and 
clearly considered the facts in determining the date of valuation here.  
 
16
The University contends that even though the District made a deposit here, 
and the University did not withdraw the money, the deposited amount was 
effectively rendered unavailable because the University could not withdraw it 
without waiving its right to fully and finally litigate the condemner’s right to take 
the property.  Thus, the University claims it is left without either the property or 
the deposit, an unconstitutional choice.  The University contends that this aspect 
of the Legislature’s quick-take process violates article I, section 19, and allows the 
government to take possession of the property while withholding the deposit from 
the property owner, thus violating the governing principle of eminent domain 
proceedings: financial equivalency.  The University asserts that in order to avoid 
this “Catch-22” situation, we should value the property on the date of trial, not the 
date of the deposit.  We disagree.  
The University initially looks to Steinhart for support.  Specifically, it relies 
on the court’s observation that in an immediate possession proceeding, the money 
must be deposited into court “for the owner,” and that this has not happened until 
the owner can actually take it.  (Steinhart, supra, 137 Cal. at p. 579.)   
When Steinhart was decided, the California Constitution stated that 
“[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation having been first made . . . .”  (Cal. Const., art. I, former § 14, 
repealed Nov. 5, 1974.)  The parties in that case were governed by former article I, 
section 14, which did not authorize a condemner to take immediate possession 
before trial or to deposit the likely amount of just compensation.  In Steinhart, a 
statute allowed a condemner to take possession before trial if it had made a 
deposit, but did not allow the owner to withdraw the funds.  (Steinhart, supra, 137 
Cal. at p. 576.)  The court declared that statute unconstitutional under former 
article I, section 14, as just compensation had not “first [been] made” if the owner 
could not withdraw the deposit.  (Steinhart, supra, 137 Cal. at pp. 578-579.) 
 
17
Steinhart is inapposite.  As previously discussed, the 1974 enactment of 
article I, section 19 of the state Constitution authorizes the Legislature to provide 
for prejudgment possession by the condemner upon deposit in court and prompt 
release to the owner of its probable compensation.  (Cal. Const. art. I, § 19.)  In 
addition, unlike the applicable statute in Steinhart, an owner under the present 
statutory scheme has the ability to withdraw the deposit soon after it is made.  
(§§ 1255.210-1255.240.)   
The only constitutional limitations on the right of eminent domain are that 
the taking be for a public use, and that just compensation be paid.  (City of 
Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 64; People v. Chevalier 
(1959) 52 Cal.2d 299, 304.)  “A litigant can be heard to question the validity of a 
statute only when and in so far as it is applied to his disadvantage.”  (Rindge Co. v. 
Los Angeles County (1923) 262 U.S. 700, 709-710.)  The University does not 
claim that the condemnation is not for a public use.  In addition, section 1255.260 
does not require waiving a claim for greater compensation with withdrawal of the 
deposit.  Thus, the University is not being forced to waive a constitutional right.   
As the Court of Appeal recognized, the University’s argument has been 
advanced and rejected in several cases.  In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior 
Court (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 321 (PG&E), the condemner made a deposit after 
trial on the compensation issue.  The owner appealed, and the condemner sought 
an order for possession pending the appeal.  (Id. at p. 324.)  The owner argued that 
allowing the condemner to take possession pending the appeal would deprive it of 
just compensation, since it could not withdraw the deposited funds without 
waiving its right to a final adjudication on appeal of the condemner’s right to take 
the property.  (Id. at pp. 324-329.) 
The court disagreed.  The deposit of funds satisfied the owner’s right to just 
compensation at the time of the taking, that is, at the time the condemner had a 
 
18
right to take possession following judgment.  (PG&E, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 
327.)  “The fact that statutory limitations or conditions are imposed upon a 
property owner’s ability to withdraw [deposited] funds in relation to his exercise 
of his solely statutory right to appeal, does not operate so as to constitute a denial 
of just compensation.”  (Ibid.)  The same reasoning applies here.  The condemner 
had a right to immediate possession of the property, and made a deposit of 
probable compensation.  The owner had the right immediately to withdraw that 
deposit.  The existence of conditions on withdrawal on the owner’s solely 
statutory right to further litigate the legality of the taking does not deny the owner 
just compensation.   
PG&E also rejected the related argument that the owner was placed in a 
position which required it “to give up one constitutional right, the right to just 
compensation, in order to protect another, the right to take a meaningful appeal.”  
(PG&E, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 328.)  The University makes a similar claim 
here, asserting that in order to receive the constitutionally required “prompt 
release” of the deposit, it must give up its statutory right to fully litigate the 
District’s right to take.   
Here, no constitutional right to an appeal exists, only a statutory one.  
(PG&E, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at pp. 328-329.)  This statutory right to appeal may 
be made subject to reasonable conditions.  (Id. at p. 329; see also Redevelopment 
Agency v. Goodman (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 424, 431-432.)  In addition, as the 
Court of Appeal observed in this case, “having to leave funds on deposit is a 
reasonable condition to place on a condemnee’s statutory right to further litigate 
the right to take issue, or pursue a final adjudication of the issue on appeal.  In 
enacting section 1255.260, the Legislature could have reasonably concluded that a 
condemnee who denies the condemner’s right to take should not be able to 
withdraw the probable amount of its just compensation. . . .  [¶] Indeed, it would 
 
19
be inconsistent for [the University] to insist on adjudicating the [District’s] right to 
take its property, while it enjoys the use and benefit of the probable amount of its 
just compensation.”  “A condemnee who denies the condemner’s right to take 
cannot have it both ways.  He cannot withdraw the deposit and challenge the right 
to take.  It is reasonable to require him to choose one or the other.”  
In addition, the statutory scheme does provide for prompt resolution of 
whether the condemner has the right to take the property in question.  The owner 
may request the issue be heard in a bifurcated proceeding, and the matter is 
entitled to priority on the civil trial calendar.  (§§ 1260.010, 1260.110.)  The 
owner may seek review of the issue by extraordinary writ.  (§§ 598, 904.1; Plaza 
Tulare v. Tradewell Stores, Inc. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 522, 523-524.)  The 
federal and state Constitutions also require that if the amount of compensation 
finally determined in the proceeding exceeds the amount of the deposit of 
probable just compensation, the property owner will be compensated for the delay 
in payment by prejudgment interest on the balance owed.  (U.S. Const., 5th 
Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 19.)  The condemner must also pay prejudgment 
interest on both the balance owed and any portion of the deposit that the property 
owner chose not to withdraw, running from the date the condemner was 
authorized to enter into possession of the property.  (§§ 1268.310-1268.360.) 
Thus, whatever the owner chooses to do, in view of the procedural due 
process safeguards in place, the waiver rule of section 1255.260 in no way impairs 
the owner’s constitutional right to a prompt release of the deposited funds or 
imposes an unconstitutional choice on the owner.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 19; 
§ 1255.210, et seq.; see Perry v. Sindermann (1972) 408 U.S. 593, 597 [right of 
access to government benefit may not be conditioned on relinquishing 
Constitutional right.].)  
 
20
In sum, the Legislature reasonably could have found that it would be 
inconsistent for an owner to deny the condemner’s right to take with one hand 
while it withdraws and uses the condemner’s deposit with the other.  An owner 
cannot have it both ways.  It is reasonable to require the owner to choose one or 
the other:  either to deny the condemner’s right to take the property and litigate, or 
to take the deposit. 
CONCLUSION 
Where, as here, a deposit of probable compensation is made, and the trial 
court determines that the deposit equals or exceeds the probable amount of the 
owner's just compensation, the property must be valued on the date of the deposit.  
(§ 1263.110.)  The value of the property on the date of the deposit is a fair amount 
to award the owner for the taking of its property.  A greater award would be unjust 
to the condemner.  “ ‘The just compensation required by the Constitution to be 
made to the owner is to be measured by the loss caused to him by the 
appropriation.  He is entitled to receive the value of what he has been deprived of, 
and no more.  To award him less would be unjust to him; to award him more 
would be unjust to the public.’ ”  (Los Angeles County Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority v. Continental Development Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 
694, 715, quoting Bauman v. Ross (1897) 167 U.S. 548, 574.) 
In addition, as long as a probable compensation deposit based on such 
valuation remains available to the property owner for “prompt release,” the further 
imposition of a waiver of the right to challenge the validity of the taking if the 
owner elects to withdraw the deposit does not undermine the constitutionality of 
the statutory scheme nor the legislature’s chosen method of valuation. 
 
21
Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment and 
remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this conclusion.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Mt. San Jacinto Community College District v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 126 Cal.App.4th 619 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S132251 
Date Filed: February 22, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Riverside 
Judge: Robert George Spitzer 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Redwine and Sherrill, Justin M. McCarthy, David F. Hubbard, Steven B. Abbott, Scott R. Heil; Atkinson, 
Andelson, Loya, Rudd & Romo and John W. Dietrich for Petitioner. 
 
Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Schneider and Katherine E. Stone for League of California Cities, 
California State Association of Counties and Metropolitan Water District of Southern California as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Bruce A. Behrens, Thomas C. Fellenz and Richard B. Williams for The People of the State of California, 
acting by and through the Department of Transportation, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
California Eminent Domain Law Group and Arthur J. Hazarabedian for Los Angeles Unified School 
District and The Education Alliance of the California School Board Association as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Petitioner. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, George M. Soneff and Michael M. Berger for Real Party in Interest. 
 
Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, Gregory H. Halliday, Geoffrey K. Willis and Gregory E. Woodward 
for Transcan Riverside LLC as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
James S. Burling for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Steven B. Abbott 
Redwine and Sherrill 
1950 Market Street 
Riverside, CA  92501-1720 
(951) 684-2520 
 
Richard B. Williams 
Department of Transportation 
1120 N Street 
Sacramento, CA  95812-1438 
(916) 654-2630 
 
Michael M. Berger 
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips 
11355 West Olympic Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA  90064-1614 
(310) 312-4000