Case Title: The People v. Pacquette

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2011-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 112  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Dean Pacquette,
            Appellant.
Steven R. Bernhard, for appellant.
Solomon Neubort, for respondent.
READ, J.:
On the evening of April 19, 2007, one man was shot to
death and another was wounded (he was shot in the buttocks) in a
shooting incident that took place outside an abandoned building 
on Bainbridge Street in Brooklyn, which had become a hangout for
a group of young men.  The body of the deceased victim was
discovered in the building's basement, to which he evidently
retreated after he was hit.  Defendant Dean Pacquette was
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No. 112
indicted for second-degree murder (intentional) (Penal Law §
125.25 [1]); second-degree assault (Penal Law § 120.05 [2]); and
second-degree weapon possession (two counts) (Penal Law § 265.03
[1] [b], [3]) in connection with the shooting.  He moved to
suppress inculpatory statements that he made to the police on the
ground that they were obtained in violation of his right to
counsel.
At the ensuing Huntley hearing, Detective Alan
Killigrew testified that he identified defendant as a suspect
because of information he received shortly after the shooting
from two eyewitnesses.  Then on May 17, 2007, he learned that
defendant had been arrested for a drug crime in Manhattan. 
Detective Richard Amato traveled to Manhattan to "pick up"
defendant and bring him to the precinct in Brooklyn for a lineup. 
Amato found defendant in a holding cell in Manhattan, waiting to
be arraigned, and arranged through the New York City Police
Department for him to be released temporarily into his custody.
A few hours after Amato arrived at the precinct in
Brooklyn with defendant, the police conducted two separate
lineups -- one for each of the two eyewitnesses.  Both
eyewitnesses identified defendant.  Before these lineups, at
about 9:00 P.M., Miranda warnings were issued to defendant, who
claimed that he knew nothing about the shooting; after the
lineups, Killigrew advised defendant that he was "charged with
homicide."  Amato and Detective Erick Parks then escorted
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No. 112
defendant back to Manhattan for arraignment for the drug crime. 
During the ride back, Amato "probably" let defendant know that he
had been identified in both lineups.
Upon arrival in Manhattan, Amato spoke to prosecutors
to clear defendant's release on his own recognizance after
arraignment so that he could be taken back to Brooklyn. 
Meanwhile, Parks accompanied defendant to the courtroom.  When
Amato later joined them, defendant sat between the two detectives
in the front row, waiting for his case to be called.  At some
point before defendant's arraignment, attorney Daniel Scott was
assigned to represent him on the drug charge.  While Scott, Amato
and Parks agree that they met and spoke in the Manhattan
courtroom, their accounts of exactly what was said differ in
certain respects.
  
According to Amato, Scott introduced himself as "the
attorney for the arraignment on this case," meaning
"[defendant's] drug case."  Scott did not indicate that he
represented defendant in any other case.  Amato "took [Scott's]
business card," which is how Amato later recalled Scott's name. 
When Scott asked Amato if he could speak to defendant "in
private," Amato moved two rows back and Parks slid down the row
and away from defendant so as to accommodate this request.
 
After defendant was arraigned and released on his own
recognizance, Amato arrested him "for the homicide."  The
detectives then took defendant back to where he had been sitting
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No. 112
in the courtroom because "the attorney . . . wanted to speak to
him."  Amato testified that he overheard Scott tell defendant
that he was "not going across the bridge into Brooklyn to
represent him," and that he didn't
"represent him in the other case.  He represents him in
the drug case.  He'll have an attorney for his new case
in Brooklyn.  He also said, I advise you not to speak
to the police because I can't tell you that you cannot
speak to the police but I'm advising you not to."
Amato added that Scott did not at any time tell him that he was
representing defendant on the homicide charge; Amato gave Scott
his business card at Scott's request.
Parks testified that he, Amato and defendant were
sitting in the front row of the courtroom waiting for defendant
to be arraigned when someone he assumed to be a Legal Aid
attorney (whose name Parks did not recall) "approached" defendant
and "asked if he could have a word with" him.  He and Amato then
"moved [their] position" so as to allow the attorney to interview
defendant while they still kept an eye on him.  Parks also
testified that at some point after the arraignment Amato had a
"brief" conversation with the attorney, and that Amato informed
him that he had overheard the attorney tell defendant that "he
represent[ed] him on the Manhattan case," and "doesn't go over
the bridge," and was "not representing him in Brooklyn, that
he'll represent him in the Manhattan case."  According to Parks,
the attorney never told him that defendant was represented by
counsel, and never directed him not to question defendant.
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No. 112
Scott testified that when he was assigned to represent
defendant in the drug case, he was notified by the clerk of the
night court that two Brooklyn detectives had brought defendant to
the courtroom.  The clerk asked him to expedite the arraignment
"because the detectives had brought [defendant] in."  The clerk
also alerted Scott to the "agreement between the detectives and
the district attorney's office [for defendant to] be released
into the detectives' custody."  Scott introduced himself to
defendant, who was sitting between the two detectives, and gave
him his business card.  He "may or may not have given" business
cards to the detectives, but, in any event, "it was apparent who
[he] was and what [he] was doing there."
Scott did not interview defendant, because "there was
no privacy whatsoever."  He simply read the felony complaint and
asked defendant if he understood what he was being charged with;
there was "no reason to discuss . . . bail because his ROR had  .
. . previously been worked out."  Scott, who was not on the 18B
panel in Kings County, testified that he "clearly" recalled
warning the detectives that defendant "was represented by counsel
and that they should not question him."  Similarly, he advised
defendant not to "discuss any legal matter with [the detectives]
whatsoever."1
1Although defendant insists that Scott made these remarks
post-arraignment, his hearing testimony is, at best, ambiguous on
the matter of timing.  As relevant to this point, Scott testified
that all his conversation with defendant took place within
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No. 112
Scott denied telling defendant or the detectives that
he would not cross over the Brooklyn Bridge; he conceded,
however, that he never indicated to defendant that he would be or
was considering representing him in the homicide case, although
he might have commented that he "would be happy to represent
him."  In answers to questions posed by the judge, Scott
confirmed that he was not defendant's attorney for the homicide,
and never told the detectives otherwise:
"THE COURT:  I just want to be clear, Mr. Scott, did
you tell the detectives from Brooklyn who brought
[defendant] over for his arraignment in Manhattan that
you were representing [defendant] at any time?  Did you
tell them that?
"THE WITNESS:  Yes, I did, aside from it being -- 
"THE COURT:  Okay.
"THE WITNESS:  Yes, I said he is represented by
counsel, do not question him.
"THE COURT:  As far as the drug case or the homicide
case or both?
"THE WITNESS:  I didn't specify.
"THE COURT:  You didn't specify.  So you had been
engaged to represent him as an 18 B for the drug sale
case in Manhattan, correct?
earshot of the two detectives, and lasted from five to 10 minutes
"[t]otal]," since "[i]t was just a question of informing
[defendant] of the charges, never mind the bail, and advising him
not to speak" (emphasis added).  He also testified that "in the
past" in similar situations he had "asked the judge while we were
all in the well of the courtroom" -- i.e., during arraignment --
"to advise or reinforce the advisement not to question [his]
client." 
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No. 112
"THE WITNESS:  Correct.
"THE COURT:  You had not been engaged by anybody to
represent him in the homicide case, correct?
"THE WITNESS:  Correct.
"THE COURT:  And you did not tell the detectives that
you were representing him in the homicide case,
correct? 
"THE WITNESS:  Correct."
On the way back to the precinct in Brooklyn, Amato
mentioned to defendant that he 
"found it kind of funny that this guy was telling [him]
that he wasn't coming to Brooklyn to represent him.  I
didn't think it was right.  I said, you know what?  I
said, I wouldn't look out for you like that.  I said,
you know what?  If you tell us what happened, you know,
maybe we can help you out."
Amato acknowledged that he was "try[ing to] get [defendant] to
say exactly what happened the day of the homicide."  Defendant
was noncommittal, remarking that "he would have to think about
it."  As Parks put it, defendant "had already been in a lineup so
he understood what the purpose of going back to the precinct was. 
We spoke to him about . . . his attorney, that the attorney
doesn't represent him here in Brooklyn.  If he'd like to make a
statement to Detective Killigrew, that's his choice."
Amato and Parks arrived at the precinct with defendant
around 1:30 or 2:00 A.M. on May 18, 2007.  At about 2:30 A.M.,
defendant announced to Amato and Killigrew that he wanted to talk
about what happened.  Amato contacted the assistant district
attorney on duty to "make sure that [defendant's] right to
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No. 112
counsel didn't attach because of the [Manhattan drug] case."  The
prosecutor advised Amato that he could speak to defendant
"because he [did not] have counsel attached in this case.  He
[had] counsel attached in the drug case."  Amato related this
advice to Killigrew and, after Killigrew reminded defendant that
"he was still under the Miranda warnings that we issued earlier,"
defendant gave an oral statement, which Killigrew took down.
Defendant admitted to shooting -- first with a shotgun,
until it jammed, and then with a handgun, until it, too, became
inoperable -- in the direction of the door at the Bainbridge
Street building, causing those standing on the front stoop to
scatter or run inside.  He claimed that he only meant to scare
these hangers-on, one of whom he feared on account of a previous
run-in, and had been unaware until the following day that anyone
had died.  Defendant then repeated substantially the same
statement on videotape to an assistant district attorney.  At the
beginning of the videotaped statement, defendant again waived his
Miranda rights; near the end, he answered "No" when asked if he
was represented by a lawyer in the homicide case.
In a May 30, 2008, decision and order, the judge denied
defendant's motion to suppress his statements.  He reasoned that
"[a]ssuming arguendo that Scott told the Detectives not to
question Defendant," that instruction was nugatory because even
though "Defendant was represented by counsel on the Manhattan
narcotics charges, he was not in custody on those charges, having
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No. 112
been released on his own recognizance.  Scott did not represent
Defendant on the homicide charge, nor did he advise the
Detectives that he did." 
Defendant was tried by a jury before another judge. 
The two eyewitnesses testified.  Killigrew read his transcription
of defendant's statement, and the jury viewed the videotape. 
Scott was the only witness called by the defense.  He again
testified that he instructed the detectives not to question
defendant.  In the following series of questions and answers on
cross-examination, however, he once more conceded that he did not
represent defendant on the homicide charge at the time defendant
gave his statements:
"Q  Did you represent [defendant] on the homicide
matter in this county, in Brooklyn?
"A  I was not assigned to represent him.
"Q  That is a simple question.  You stood there in
Manhattan Criminal Court.  You had a conversation.  
    "When you did that, did you represent this man on
the homicide matter that these detectives had a duty
and desire to investigate?
     "Yes or no?
"A  No."
   
The jury acquitted defendant of intentional murder
(Penal Law § 125.25 [1]) and convicted him of the weapon charge
based upon possession of a loaded firearm outside the home or
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No. 112
business (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]).2  The judge subsequently
sentenced defendant to 15 years of imprisonment followed by five
years of postrelease supervision.  Defendant appealed.  He argued
that his indelible right to counsel had attached because Scott
let the detectives know that he was represented by counsel and
was not to be questioned, and he challenged his sentence.
In a decision and order dated May 18, 2010, the
Appellate Division concluded that comments made by the sentencing
court "demonstrated that it improperly considered" the murder
count "as a basis for sentencing" (73 AD3d 1088, 1088 [2d Dept
2010]), and so vacated the sentence and remitted the matter to
Supreme Court for resentencing.3  The Appellate Division
otherwise affirmed, deciding that any error in not suppressing
defendant's statements was harmless because "the evidence of
defendant's guilt . . . was overwhelming, and there [was] no
reasonable possibility that the alleged error might have
contributed to [his] conviction" (id.).  A Judge of this Court
granted defendant permission to appeal (15 NY3d 808 [2010]), and
we now affirm.
Defendant urges us to send this case back to the
hearing court for the judge to decide whether Scott, in fact,
2The judge did not submit the assault and other weapon
possession count to the jury.
3On July 21, 2010, Supreme Court resentenced defendant to
the same sentence originally imposed. 
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No. 112
told the detectives that defendant "was represented by counsel
and that they should not question him."  In defendant's view, if
Scott made this assertion and gave this direction, the right to
counsel indelibly attached, and the statements subsequently given
by defendant in the absence of counsel must be suppressed even
though Scott did not, in fact, represent defendant in the murder
case at the time (or ever, for that matter); or, put slightly
differently, defendant contends that Scott's neglect to "specify"
to the detectives whether he represented defendant in "the drug
case or the homicide case or both," created an ambiguity causing
the indelible right to counsel to attach.  We have never held
that an attorney may unilaterally create an attorney-client
relationship in a criminal proceeding in this fashion, and
decline to do so now.  
People v Ramos (40 NY2d 610 [1976]), for example, is
not "virtually identical" to the situation here, as defendant
contends.  Ramos, who was wanted by the police in relation to a
shooting in Manhattan, was subsequently arrested in the Bronx on
a narcotics charge.  At the arraignment in the Bronx on the drug
matter, Ramos's attorney proclaimed in open court, in the
presence of a detective from Manhattan who was waiting to take
the defendant into custody, that "[f]or the record, [he had]
advised [Ramos] not to make any statements to these police
officers who are taking him into custody" (id. at 612).  Ramos
was then escorted to Manhattan, where he made an incriminating
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No. 112
statement to an assistant district attorney.  At the outset of
this interrogation, he was equivocal about whether he wanted a
lawyer -- stating, for example, "What I can tell about this here
I can tell you myself just like it happened.  It can go against
me, I would like a lawyer.  I can tell you that myself, I hope it
don't go against me, I am trying to get out of this jam" --
before finally saying to the assistant district attorney "Go
ahead, ask me some questions" (id. at 613).4
We held that the statement taken by the assistant
district attorney should be suppressed because "the defendant was
represented by counsel at the time of his interrogation" (id. at
618) by virtue of "the attorney's affirmative and direct action"
-- i.e., his statements on the defendant's behalf in front of the
judge in open court -- "relative to the interrogation which was
about to be commenced in connection with" the shooting (id. at
617).  Further, we noted that Ramos's "specific although perhaps
confused request: 'It can go against me, I would like a lawyer,'
[gave] testimony to his need and desire for legal advice from a
lawyer representing his interests" (id. at 618 [emphasis added]). 
4When Ramos agreed to talk to the assistant district
attorney, he was well-aware that he had earlier made
incriminating statements to three Bronx police officers who
questioned him about the shooting while he was awaiting
arraignment on the drug charge: he told the assistant district
attorney "I already talked to detectives, if they got that record
already it don't make no difference" whether he again implicated
himself in the shooting (40 NY2d at 613).  The admissibility of
these statements was not raised on the appeal (id. at 612).
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No. 112
   
Here, by contrast, Scott made no statements during the
arraignment on the drug crime even arguably related to the
homicide.  If he had said in open court that defendant "was
represented by counsel and that [the police] should not question
him," the prosecutor (or the judge) would have had the occasion
and the opportunity to ask him flat out whether he was
defendant's lawyer in the murder case, as the judge and the
prosecutor later did at the Huntley hearing and the trial,
respectively.  Moreover, there is no ambiguity here, as there was
in Ramos, about whether defendant may have intended to invoke his
right to counsel before making the inculpatory statements.
Indeed, in People v Marrero (51 NY2d 56, 59 [1980]), 
the other case principally relied upon by defendant, we equated
the defendant's conduct to "a verbal request for counsel." 
Marrero, believing that he was being sought in a homicide
investigation, asked a lawyer to contact the police and arrange
for his surrender.  As a result, the police took Marrero into
custody in the attorney's office with the lawyer present.  There
was no doubt that the lawyer represented the defendant at that
juncture of the homicide investigation.  Later at the police
station, Marrero made incriminating statements.
 
We held that the statements should be suppressed,
observing that "[b]y consulting a lawyer to contact the police,
and then surrendering in the attorney's office with counsel
present, the defendant had manifested his own view that he [was]
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No. 112
not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice"
(id. at 59 [internal quotation marks and internal citation
omitted]).  Further, we observed that the police did not know
about the limited nature of the attorney's representation. 
Rather, "[a]ll they knew was that the defendant had sought the
assistance of counsel in connection with the charge they were
investigating" (id. (emphasis added); see also People v West, 81
NY2d 370, 380 [1993] [citing Marrero for the proposition that
"(a)bsent some indication that the representation had ceased, the
police could not question defendant concerning the very matter as
to which they knew he had a lawyer"] [emphasis added]).  Here,
however, nothing about defendant's conduct suggests that he meant
to invoke his right to counsel before he made the statements,
and, also unlike the situation in Marrero, Scott had not already
conspicuously represented defendant in an aspect of the homicide
matter, causing the indelible right to attach.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
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People v Dean Pacquette
No. 112
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge (dissenting):
In the decision and order we now review the Appellate
Division affirmed portions of a Kings County Supreme Court
judgment convicting defendant of criminal possession of a weapon
in the second degree.  It did so over defendant's claim that his
conviction had been obtained based on an inculpatory statement
that should have been suppressed since it was given by him to
Brooklyn police detectives in pursuance of an invalid waiver of
his right to counsel.  Although that claim was fully litigated at
a pretrial Huntley hearing, the Appellate Division did not
address its merits.  It held instead that if it had been error to
deny suppression of defendant's statements, the error was
harmless in light of what it viewed as the overwhelming properly
received evidence of defendant's guilt (73 AD3d 1088 [2010]).  
This Court has now evidently concluded that the evidence was not
so overwhelming as the Appellate Division thought and,
accordingly, that the validity of defendant's waiver and ensuing
confession should have been determined as a necessary antecedent
to affirming the judgment convicting him.  Having so concluded,
the Court apparently undertakes to do what the Appellate Division
did not upon a hearing record which, although well developed,
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No. 112
raises certain factual issues not yet resolved by a court with
jurisdiction to do so.  The testimony from which those issues
arise may be briefly summarized. 
Daniel Scott, the attorney assigned to represent
defendant at his Manhattan arraignment on narcotics charges,
testified that, in the presence of the Brooklyn detectives who
had escorted defendant to the arraignment, and not privately, he
"told [defendant] not to discuss any legal matter with them [the
Brooklyn detectives] whatsoever."  He also testified that he
separately "advised [the detectives] that Mr. Pacquette was
represented by counsel and that they should not question him."  
He stated as well that he never told Mr. Pacquette that he would
not represent him on the Brooklyn homicide with which he was
about to be charged.  The Brooklyn detectives, on the other hand,
testified that defendant and Scott conferred privately but that
portions of the attorney-client exchange were nonetheless
overheard by Detective Amato.  Amato reported that he heard Scott
tell defendant that he would not represent him in his new case in
Brooklyn.  Amato and his partner Detective Parks both stated that
Scott never advised them that defendant was represented by
counsel and that they should not question him.
The hearing court did not decide whether Scott did in
fact tell defendant in front of the detectives that he was not to
speak with them about any legal matters or whether he told the
detectives that they should not question his client.  Nor did the
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No. 112
hearing court decide whether Scott told defendant that he would
not represent him in the Brooklyn homicide matter.  This was
because the court found dispositive Scott's acknowledgements that
he was not ultimately engaged to represent defendant in the
homicide and that he did not, in so many words, tell the Brooklyn
detectives that he represented defendant in that case.       
The majority, although declaring that Scott could not
have unilaterally created an attorney-client relationship with
defendant respecting the Brooklyn matter, does not go so far as
to say that Scott in the course of representing defendant at his
Manhattan arraignment could not have effectively signaled his
entry into that matter, thus triggering, with respect to the
homicide investigation, his client's indelible right to counsel. 
That, of course, would not be consistent with our decision in  
People v Ramos (40 NY2d 610 [1976]), which, on facts remarkably
like those at bar, clearly recognizes that a defendant's attorney
is, through "affirmative and direct action relative to [an]
interrogation . . . about to be commenced" (id. at 617), capable 
of precluding an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel in an
unrelated matter, even one in which the attorney does not
ultimately represent the defendant.1  Rather, it appears to be
1We specifically rejected in Ramos the People's contention
that Ramos's counsel could not have acted to prevent his
prearraignment interrogation in an unrelated murder prosecution
because he "never appeared at the defendant's murder arraignment
or any other proceeding in connection with [that] case" (Ramos,
40 NY2d at 617).    
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No. 112
the majority's position that what Scott said was not adequate to
communicate to the detectives his entry into the Brooklyn 
matter.  In taking this position, it must be supposed that the
majority assumes for the purposes of its argument that Scott did
in fact tell defendant in the detectives' immediate presence that
he was "not to discuss any legal matter with them whatsoever" 
and that he did not tell defendant that he would not represent
him in Brooklyn.  It must also be supposed that the majority is
assuming, also for the sake of argument, that Scott did instruct
the detectives "that Mr. Pacquette was represented by counsel and
that they should not question him."
Having made these assumptions in defendant's favor in
lieu of sending the matter back for factual findings that this
Court may not make, the majority then says that "Scott made no
statements during the arraignment on the drug crime even arguably
related to the homicide" (majority opn at 12).  Even viewed in
isolation, simply for their semantic content, Scott's directives
unambiguously communicated to the detectives that his client was
not to discuss with them "any legal matter . . . whatsoever"
(emphasis supplied) and, accordingly, that "they should not
question [defendant]" about any legal matter whatsoever.  A
homicide is a legal matter. 
Even if there were some doubt as to what Scott's words
themselves meant, and really there should be none, the context in
which they were spoken could have left absolutely no doubt that
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No. 112
Scott was directing the Brooklyn homicide detectives quite
specifically not to question defendant about the Brooklyn
homicide they were investigating.  At the time, all concerned
knew that defendant was a suspect in a Brooklyn homicide, and,
indeed, Scott was well aware that his client was, by
prearrangement, to be immediately returned to the custody of the
Brooklyn detectives at the conclusion of his expedited
arraignment so that he could be timely arraigned on homicide
charges in Brooklyn.  Given this scenario, Scott's concern could
not have been principally that defendant would be questioned in
his absence about matters pertinent to the New York County drug
case, something which his entry as counsel at defendant's
Manhattan arraignment itself precluded, but that he would during
the interval before his arraignment on the Brooklyn homicide
charges be interrogated and make imprudent admissions with
respect to that homicide.  Certainly the Brooklyn homicide
detectives, who had no interest in defendant's New York County
drug case, would have understood that Scott's directives to them
concerned the case that they were investigating and in which
Scott's client would, in the coming hours, be a natural candidate
for custodial interrogation.
Although the majority characterizes Scott's
intercession as an attempt unilaterally to create an attorney-
client relationship, defendant was already represented by Scott
and no competent defense attorney would simply abandon a client
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No. 112
about to be interrogated as a suspect in a homicide.  That Scott
should have sought to enter the homicide case, if only
temporarily to interpose himself between his client and the
Brooklyn homicide detectives until formal appointment of counsel
at the impending homicide arraignment in Brooklyn, was entirely
appropriate.  Whether Scott could have effectively accomplished
that purpose by admonishing defendant and the Brooklyn detectives
as he testified he did, is an inquiry that would seem to be
controlled by Ramos.  
In Ramos, we held that the statement by the lawyer
appearing on Ramos's behalf at his Bronx arraignment on charges
of drug possession -- that he had "advised Mr. Santiago [Ramos]
not to make any statements to these police officers who are
taking him into custody" (Ramos, 40 NY2d at 616) -- sufficed to
signal to the officers the lawyer's entry into Ramos's unrelated 
Manhattan homicide case, and thereby triggered Ramos's indelible
right to counsel in that case.  The admonitions of attorney Scott
in this case, both literally and contextually virtually identical
to those of Ramos's attorney, are, if precedent is a constraint
upon what we do, entitled to be accorded the same legal effect. 
Although the majority finds it important that in Ramos the
attorney placed his directive on the record, there appears no
reason why Scott's admonitions should be deemed less effective
than those of Ramos's lawyer simply because they were not placed
on the record.  As we noted in Ramos, the critical inquiry is
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No. 112
whether "an attorney has communicated with the police for the
purpose of representing the defendant"  (id. at 615, quoting
People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325, 329 [1968] [internal quotation
marks omitted]).  Accordingly, what was crucial in Ramos and what
should be here as well is the circumstance, necessarily assumed
in appellant's favor at this juncture, that the defendant's
attorney took "affirmative and direct action relative to [an]
interrogation . . . about to be commenced" (id. at 617) "in the
presence of the police officer[s] taking [his client] into
custody" (id. at 616).2
Even if there were some residual ambiguity as to
whether Scott in his admonitory statements referred to the
Brooklyn homicide, that ambiguity would not redound to the
prosecution's benefit.  We were very clear about this in Ramos
where we said:
"If, in fact, the prosecution was in doubt as
to whether an attorney had entered the
proceeding, the burden should rest squarely
on it to insure that the defendant's right to
be represented by counsel be protected. The
ambiguity of the lawyer's statement or the
manner in which the defendant's attorney went
about representing his client cannot be
seized by the prosecution as a license to
play fast and loose with this precious right.
2While the majority urges that if Scott had placed his
admonitions on the record the prosecutor or judge might have
clarified the extent of his representation of defendant, there
was obviously nothing to prevent the detectives from pursuing the
matter with Scott directly either at the arraignment or
subsequently.  As the majority recounts, "Amato 'took [Scott's]
business card'" (majority opn at 3).
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No. 112
A defendant's right to counsel cannot be made
to depend on whether in the sole judgment of
the prosecution there has been sufficient
activity and conduct of a proper character so
as to compel a conclusion that the lawyer has
entered the proceedings. Nor can we agree
with the prosecutor that the defendant has an
affirmative burden to point out to the
prosecution that an attorney has entered the
proceedings on his behalf. To hold otherwise
would violate our prior holdings and
seriously undermine this constitutionally
guaranteed right"  (id. at 617-618).
And, in the more recent case of People v Marrero (51 NY2d 56
[1980]), citing Ramos we again emphasized that
"[o]nce an attorney has appeared on the
defendant's behalf we have refused to allow
the police to rely on arguable ambiguities in
the attorney-client relationship in order to
justify police questioning of the defendant
without the attorney being present (see,
e.g., People v Ramos, 40 NY2d 610). We have
indicated that if the police are uncertain as
to the scope of the attorney's
representation, the defendant should not be
questioned (People v Coleman, 42 NY2d 500,
507)" (id. at 59).
While the majority understands these principles to
apply only where the police do not know about the "limited nature
of the attorney's representation" (majority opn at 14), it is
difficult to understand how that posited condition lends support
to its position in this case, since, even if it were true that
limited representation could not trigger representational rights,
and manifestly it is not, there is no permissible basis for a
supposition that the Brooklyn detectives knew, at the time they
obtained defendant's waiver of his right to counsel, about the
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No. 112
"limited nature" of attorney Scott's representation of defendant. 
Only by making credibility findings on the disputed issues of
what was said by Scott to defendant and what Amato overheard,
would it be possible to conclude that the Brooklyn detectives had
some reliable basis for believing that Scott would not represent
defendant in the Brooklyn case.  If such a finding is to be made
and relied upon in disposing of defendant's motion, the case
should be remitted for that purpose; the finding may not be made
in the first instance by this Court and, obviously, what the
detectives knew is not appropriately assumed adversely to
appellant as a basis for our denial of his appeal and our
accompanying statement of the law.  
It is also suggested that Ramos and Marrero should not
control here because in those cases the defendants manifested a
need for legal assistance in the matters being investigated while
defendant did not.  It is, however, a basic and longstanding
principle of our right-to-counsel jurisprudence that, if an
attorney has entered a matter, the right to counsel indelibly
attaches rendering it irrelevant, in the event of a subsequent
uncounseled custodial waiver of the right, whether the defendant 
was, in interacting with his or her interrogators, not evidently
averse to speaking or whether there was some manifestation by the
defendant of a need for a lawyer.  As we reiterated in People v
Hobson (39 NY2d 479, 481 [1976]) and has since been the governing
rule of law, "[o]nce a lawyer has entered a criminal proceeding
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No. 112
representing a defendant in connection with criminal charges
under investigation, the defendant in custody may not waive his
right to counsel in the absence of the lawyer."  If Scott entered
his client's homicide case, the uncounseled waiver subsequently
obtained from his client in that case was invalid and the
confession consequently elicited must be suppressed.  Because it
is not possible to say on any properly assumed set of facts
considered in light of Ramos that Scott did not effectively enter
the proceeding, the matter should be remitted so that the factual
findings necessary to a proper determination of defendant's
suppression motion can be made.  
Defendant would undoubtedly have been protected from
making an uncounseled waiver of his right to counsel if he had
not by careful prearrangement been "released" from custody on the
represented New York County matter to the Brooklyn detectives
(who promptly rearrested him).  It is questionable whether this
artifice should be deemed effective to avoid attachment of the
indelible right under People v Rogers (48 NY2d 167 [1979]) where,
as here, the detectives were obviously aware of the extant
representational relationship, having been present at its
inception, and fully intended in the hours after defendant's
"release" to subject him to custodial questioning.  But accepting
that the "release" of defendant was not a contrivance simply to
avoid the triggering of a representational right, it is clear
that the situation was one involving great peril to defendant's
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No. 112
legal interests and, accordingly, one which defendant's lawyer
could not treat with indifference as it unfolded before him. 
Although there may not have been an automatic entitlement to
counsel in the homicide case by reason of the unrelated
representation in the designedly non-custodial New York County
matter, there was, as we have recognized in Ramos, certainly in
this situation a need and a corresponding prerogative on the part
of the lawyer affirmatively to act to protect his client's
interests.  On this record, I do not think it possible for this
Court to conclude that he did not do so, indeed, if it were
necessary, that he did not do so "conspicuously."
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Read.  Judges Ciparick,
Graffeo, Smith and Pigott concur.  Chief Judge Lippman dissents
in an opinion in which Judge Jones concurs.
Decided June 7, 2011
    
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