Case Title: Commonwealth v. Bonnett

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11496 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DARKENS BONNETT. 
 
 
 
Essex.     November 6, 2018. - August 23, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, New trial, Capital case.  
Evidence, Exculpatory. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 15, 2010. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 472 Mass. 827 (2015), a 
motion for a new trial, filed on July 11, 2016, was heard by 
Thomas Drechsler, J., and a motion for reconsideration was 
considered by him. 
 
 
 
Amy M. Belger for the defendant. 
 
David F. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant, convicted of murder in the first 
degree in the 2009 shooting death of Vincent Gaskins, appeals 
from the denial of his second motion for a new trial.  The 
defendant previously brought a consolidated appeal from the 
2 
 
 
denial of his first motion for a new trial and his conviction.  
He claimed error in, among other grounds, the Commonwealth's 
failure or inability to disclose to him the name of a 
confidential informant who appeared to have information about 
the murder.  While otherwise rejecting the claims of error at 
trial as to the record then before us and declining to provide 
relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we agreed that the defendant's 
pretrial motion to obtain the identity of a confidential 
informant had been denied without proper appraisal.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 472 Mass. 827, 849-851 (2015) (Bonnett 
I).  We accordingly remanded for a hearing under the framework 
set forth in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).  
See Bonnett I, supra at 846–850.  We noted that if "new 
circumstances permit[ted] the informant's identity to be 
disclosed . . . , the defendant [could] seek a new trial upon a 
showing that newly discovered evidence would probably have been 
a real factor in the jury's deliberations."  Id. at 850 n.26. 
 
Because the requisite disclosures concerning the identity 
of the confidential informant had been made by the time of the 
rehearing, the defendant did not pursue a full Roviaro inquiry; 
he instead brought a second motion for a new trial in light of 
the newly available evidence.  The new evidence in essence 
consisted of inculpatory statements assertedly made to three 
individuals by the now-deceased Brandon Payne, who also was 
3 
 
 
present on the night of the shooting.  After an evidentiary 
hearing on the motion for a new trial, in which a judge heard 
from the previously confidential informant and from two of the 
defendant's friends, the motion judge found that the defendant 
had not met his burden of showing that the new evidence was 
material and credible, or that it cast real doubt on the justice 
of his conviction. 
 
On appeal before us, the defendant argues that the motion 
judge abused his discretion in denying the second motion for a 
new trial.  Discerning no clear error or abuse of discretion, we 
affirm the judge's decision.  We also decline to exercise our 
power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict or to 
grant a new trial. 
 
1.  Background and procedural posture.  The facts 
underlying the defendant's conviction are set forth in detail in 
Bonnett I, 472 Mass. at 828-832.  We focus our discussion on 
pertinent facts, supplementing as necessary, where relevant to 
the issues in this appeal. 
 
a.  The trial.  On November 22, 2009, at approximately 
1 A.M., the victim was shot and killed in a parking lot across 
the street from a nightclub in Lynn.  Surveillance footage taken 
from establishments located near the crime scene showed the 
shooting from a distance; the footage, however, was grainy and 
of poor quality. 
4 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth's case at trial centered on the testimony 
of the victim's cousin, Sheffery Johnson, who described the 
events that night.1  Johnson testified that, on the evening of 
the shooting, she picked up Brandon Payne in her truck and they 
drove to a parking lot located across the street from the 
nightclub.2  As they sat talking, Johnson saw the victim leaving 
the nightclub with his girlfriend.  They were with or near a 
"dark skinned" man wearing a gray sweat suit, who Johnson 
identified at trial as the defendant.3 
 
The victim and his girlfriend walked over to Johnson's 
truck, where several others had congregated after leaving the 
nightclub.  As there had been tension between Payne and the 
victim following an altercation several months earlier, the two 
began arguing, and eventually ended up outside, at the back of 
the vehicle.  Johnson watched them through the rear view mirror, 
and then got out to join them.  Shortly thereafter, she noticed 
                                                          
 
 
1 Prior to trial, Sheffery Johnson had been shot and 
seriously injured.  A 2016 affidavit from one of the new 
witnesses claimed that Brandon Payne said he did not want 
Johnson to testify, and that he "wanted her taken care of so she 
couldn't." 
 
 
2 At the time, Johnson apparently was beginning a 
relationship with Payne. 
 
 
3 On cross-examination, Johnson was impeached with the fact 
that she had been unable to identify the defendant in a 
photographic array, conducted in the weeks following the 
shooting. 
5 
 
 
someone "pass [her]" and join the group; she was not focused on 
who it was. 
 
During the argument, the victim suggested that he and Payne 
go around the corner and fight.  After Johnson announced that 
there would be no fighting, she grabbed Payne and swung him 
around to get back into the vehicle.  As soon as her back was 
turned, Johnson testified that she heard a "pop" from the 
direction in which the victim had been standing.  When she 
turned around to face the victim, she saw the defendant standing 
over him, tucking a gun into his pants, and then running toward 
Tremont Street, with a group of about ten others.4  At that 
point, Johnson was screaming at Payne because his friend had 
just shot her cousin. 
 
Although no other witnesses who had been present that night 
were called to testify at trial, Johnson's testimony was 
corroborated, in part, by statements the defendant later made to 
Joseph Burns.  Burns and the defendant knew each other because 
the defendant typically bought guns from Burns, in exchange for 
                                                          
 
 
4 At trial, Johnson was impeached with her grand jury 
testimony.  Before the grand jury, she had testified that she 
saw the defendant put "something" in his pants.  A police 
officer also testified that, during an interview after the 
shooting, Johnson had said that she did not see a gun.  Neither 
Payne nor the victim's girlfriend testified at the trial. 
 
6 
 
 
drugs.5  When the defendant and Burns met up after the shooting, 
Burns inquired about that night.  The defendant said that he and 
the victim "had words after the club," and that the defendant 
subsequently "shot him in the face."  Burns also provided 
details about the shooting that were not public knowledge at the 
time.6  The Commonwealth presented testimony from the defendant's 
roommate, Thomas Arrington, who had seen the defendant with guns 
in the apartment on several occasions.  Arrington had asked the 
defendant if he was involved in the shooting, and the defendant 
shrugged. 
 
The testimony also was corroborated by forensic evidence.  
A .22 caliber firearm, which had been discarded in nearby bushes 
on Tremont Street, was discovered by police shortly after the 
shooting.  Two latent prints and a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
profile were recovered from the firearm.  A forensic examiner 
opined that the palm print, found on the back of the firearm, 
                                                          
 
 
5 Burns stated that he was cooperating in the hopes of 
reducing the Federal sentence he was then serving. 
 
 
6 Burns testified that the defendant said words to the 
effect of going "around the corner" during an altercation with 
the victim.  Burns also knew that the gun "didn't have a clip to 
it so there was only one round in it, in the chamber."  The 
public was never informed about the victim's having said 
anything about going around "the corner" to fight, or that the 
firearm did not have a magazine in it when it was recovered. 
 
7 
 
 
matched the defendant's.7  The major DNA profile taken from the 
firearm also matched the defendant's.8  The jury returned a 
verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of 
deliberate premeditation. 
 
b.  Disclosure of the confidential informant.  Shortly 
before trial, the defendant's counsel had received a copy of a 
redacted report prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI).  The report stated that a "cooperating witness" had heard 
that the "word on the streets of Lynn" was that "PAYNE shot and 
killed [the victim]," and that, at Payne's request, the 
defendant had disposed of the weapon after the shooting. 
 
Defense counsel moved for an order requiring disclosure of 
the informant's identity, and a judge asked the Commonwealth to 
inquire whether the officials were able to disclose the 
information.  After speaking with Federal officials, the 
prosecutor reported that the government was unable to disclose 
the informant's identity at that time, due to an ongoing 
investigation.9  The judge stated that he could not compel the 
                                                          
 
 
7 The second latent print was not of sufficient quality or 
quantity to allow the analyst to render an opinion. 
 
 
8 Payne could not be excluded as a potential contributor to 
the deoxyribonucleic acid mixture taken from the firearm. 
 
 
9 The prosecutor reported that the informant might be "in a 
position to testify" at some later date, once the investigation 
had concluded. 
8 
 
 
Federal government, as a "separate sovereign," to disclose the 
information, and accordingly denied the defendant's motion.  
Defense counsel was precluded from inquiring at trial about the 
contents of the report or the informant's identity. 
 
Following the remand in Bonnett I for a proper 
determination whether disclosure of the informant's identity was 
necessary, the Commonwealth provided the defendant with the 
informant's name, Victor Bizzell, along with a recording of a 
recent police interview with Bizzell.  The defendant also 
obtained an unredacted copy of the FBI report.  In light of 
this, the Commonwealth, the defense, and the judge appeared to 
agree that the Roviaro issue was "sort of a moot point." 
 
c.  Roviaro hearing.  In June 2016, a Superior Court judge 
nonetheless conducted the first stage of a Roviaro hearing as 
though the case were being heard in 2012.10  The agent who 
prepared the FBI report in 2012 testified; he reported that the 
FBI had established a special task force to investigate gang 
activities on the North Shore.  As part of the investigation, 
officers from the Lynn police department were granted "Title 21 
and Title 18 authority to conduct [F]ederal investigations."  
The FBI provided them with various resources, including money to 
                                                          
 
 
10 With the trial judge having retired, a different Superior 
Court judge held the Roviaro hearing. 
9 
 
 
pay "cooperating witnesses" to conduct controlled "buys."  The 
task force used Bizzell as one such cooperating witness.11 
 
During one of their daily conversations, Bizzell told the 
agent that the "rumor on the street" was that Payne was taking 
responsibility for the victim's death in this case.  The FBI 
agent subsequently pressed Bizzell for details surrounding the 
shooting, but Bizzell maintained that it was an unsourced rumor; 
that "everyone on the street [knew] it."  A redacted version of 
the agent's report of this conversation had been provided to the 
defendant's counsel in advance of trial in 2012.12 
 
The judge found that, notwithstanding the proper invocation 
of informant privilege, the defendant also established that the 
                                                          
 
 
11 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) now refers to 
all witnesses as "confidential human source[s]."  The agent 
noted, however, that, at the time of the investigation, the FBI 
distinguished between a "cooperating witness" and a 
"confidential informant"; the former was in a position to 
testify at trial, while the latter was not.  The terminology 
used within the report meant that Victor Bizzell would be in a 
position to testify, once the FBI's investigation had concluded 
and the suspects had been indicted.  At the time of the 
defendant's trial, however, the investigation had not yet 
concluded.  The agent testified further that, because Bizzell's 
life would have been in danger and the FBI's gang investigations 
would have been compromised, the FBI would have been unable to 
disclose his identity at the time of the defendant's trial in 
2012. 
 
 
12 The redacted version of the report contained information 
about the defendant's and Payne's involvement in the shooting of 
the victim.  The unredacted version provided the names of 
several individuals to whom Payne had spoken concerning other 
gang matters the FBI was investigating.  Neither the redacted 
report nor the unredacted report mentioned Bizzell's name. 
10 
 
 
nondisclosure interfered with his right to present a defense.  
The judge, however, left the decision whether to continue with 
the second stage of the Roviaro inquiry to the parties, given 
its apparent mootness.  The defendant did not pursue further 
findings; he instead filed a second motion for a new trial, 
based on newly available evidence. 
 
d.  Second motion for a new trial.  In February and March 
of 2017, a third Superior Court judge held evidentiary hearings 
on the defendant's second motion for a new trial.  The judge had 
before him the following:  a redacted copy of the FBI report 
(given to the defendant before his trial in 2012); an unredacted 
copy of the FBI report (given to the defendant upon remand); a 
recording and transcript of a subsequent police interview with 
Bizzell (from May 2016); and an article that Payne had been shot 
and killed by Lynn police in 2012.  The judge also had 
supporting affidavits from two new witnesses, Robert Brown and 
Bernard Edwards. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, the judge heard testimony from 
Bizzell, Brown, Edwards, and the defendant's trial counsel.  The 
judge credited trial counsel but made detailed factual findings 
regarding his reasons for strongly discrediting the testimony 
from Bizzell, Brown, and Edwards; central among them was a clear 
motive to assist the defendant by implicating a now-deceased 
individual.  Because the defendant had not met his burden of 
11 
 
 
showing that the newly discovered evidence was "material and 
credible, or cast[] real doubt on the justice of his conviction 
for first degree murder," the judge denied the defendant's 
second motion for a new trial.  The defendant timely appealed.13 
 
2.  Discussion.  We review the denial of a motion for a new 
trial "only to determine whether there has been a significant 
error of law or other abuse of discretion."  Commonwealth v. 
Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986).  Where, as here, "the motion 
judge did not preside at trial, we defer to that judge's 
assessment of the credibility of witnesses at the hearing on the 
new trial motion, but we regard ourselves in as good a position 
as the motion judge to assess the trial record."  Commonwealth 
v. Drayton, 479 Mass. 479, 486 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Cousin, 478 Mass. 608, 615 (2018). 
 
a.  Newly available evidence.  To prevail on a motion for a 
new trial based on new evidence, a defendant must establish 
"both that the evidence is newly discovered [or newly available] 
and that it casts real doubt on the justice of the conviction." 
Grace, 397 Mass. at 305.  See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 
                                                          
 
 
13 Because the defendant preserved the Roviaro issue, we 
stated that "the reconsidered decision on the merits of his 
pretrial motion -- and, if that motion is allowed, the decision 
as to whether information uncovered as a result warrants a new 
trial -- will be appealable as decisions on a postconviction 
motion filed before direct appeal."  Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 
472 Mass. 827, 851 (2015). 
12 
 
 
Mass. 340, 350 (2014).14  "The evidence said to be new not only 
must be material and credible but also must carry a measure of 
strength in support of the defendant's position" (citation 
omitted).  Grace, supra.  The defendant also must show "that any 
newly discovered evidence is admissible."  See Commonwealth v. 
Weichell, 446 Mass. 785, 799 (2000).  In evaluating whether 
newly discovered evidence casts real doubt on the justice of a 
conviction, "[t]he motion judge decides not whether the verdict 
would have been different," Grace, supra at 306, "but whether 
the evidence probably would have been a 'real factor' in the 
jury's deliberations."  Sullivan, supra at 350-351, quoting 
Grace, supra. 
 
The motion judge here assumed, and the Commonwealth agrees, 
that the evidence at issue constitutes newly discovered 
material.15  The Commonwealth also does not dispute that the 
                                                          
 
 
14 The standard applied when reviewing a motion for a new 
trial based on newly available evidence is the same as that 
applied to such a motion based on newly discovered evidence.  
See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 Mass. 340, 350 n.6 (2014). 
 
 
15 Because Bizzell's identity was made unavailable to the 
defendant at the time of his trial due to an informant 
privilege, it is newly available.  Cf. Sullivan, 469 Mass. at 
350 n.6 (newly available evidence is that which is unavailable 
at time of trial for reasons such as assertion of privilege).  
We similarly conclude that Bernard Edwards's testimony was new, 
because the defendant could not have uncovered it without access 
to the unredacted FBI report.  Finally, because Robert Brown's 
conversation with Payne occurred after the defendant's trial had 
concluded, it was, necessarily, unavailable to the defendant at 
his trial. 
13 
 
 
evidence is admissible.16  The defendant's main challenge on 
appeal, then, is to the judge's conclusions regarding the effect 
of the new evidence and whether it casts doubt on the justice of 
the conviction.  We begin by setting forth the contents of the 
new evidence considered by the motion judge. 
 
At the hearing, the judge heard testimony from Bizzell, a 
fellow member of the gang to which the defendant and Payne 
belonged.17  In contrast to Bizzell's 2012 statement to the FBI, 
in which he reported that the "rumor on the street" was that 
Payne shot the victim, Bizzell suggested at the evidentiary 
hearing that he had specifically spoken with Payne about the 
shooting on two occasions.  Bizzell characterized those 
discussions as Payne just taking "credit for [the shooting]" 
among fellow gang members, and saying that the killing was "work 
he put in."  Bizzell also reported that, when he and others in 
the gang spoke to Payne about the shooting, they had been 
                                                          
 
 
16 Payne's statements likely would be admissible as a 
statement against his penal interest given that (1) the 
declarant is deceased and unavailable; (2) the statement tends 
to subject him to criminal liability such that a reasonable 
person "would not have made the statement unless he believed it 
to be true"; and (3) the statement, offered to exculpate the 
defendant, could meet the relatively low bar for corroborating 
circumstances indicating its trustworthiness (citation omitted).  
See Commonwealth v. Weichell, 446 Mass. 785, 802-803 (2000). 
 
 
17 At the hearing, Bizzell was reluctant to respond to any 
questions posed to him; when he did participate, his testimony 
appeared to contradict what he said in 2012 and, at times, what 
he reported in a 2016 police interview. 
14 
 
 
"clowning," or teasing him, and were giving him "grief" for 
having had the defendant "do the work for him."  It was in 
response to their taunting that Payne claimed responsibility for 
shooting the victim.  Bizzell relayed also that the defendant 
had confessed that he shot the victim, notwithstanding Payne's 
attempts to convince their fellow gang members otherwise. 
 
Brown, a family friend of Payne, also testified at the 
hearing; he stated that, after the defendant had been convicted, 
Brown agreed to drive Payne to pick up money to send to someone.  
While the two were driving, Payne told Brown that he had "caught 
a body,"18 and that someone else "went down for it."  Brown 
testified that he later came to understand that Payne was 
referring to the defendant, and that they were picking up money 
to send to the defendant.  Brown came to this realization when 
he met the defendant in prison, at which time he and the 
defendant became aware of their mutual connection in Payne.19 
 
The judge also heard testimony from Edwards, a fellow 
member of the gang, who relayed that he had had three 
conversations with Payne concerning the shooting.  Edwards 
reported that, in the first conversation, he asked Payne about 
                                                          
 
 
18 Brown testified that the term "caught a body" meant that 
he had killed someone. 
 
 
19 At the time of his testimony, Brown was incarcerated; he 
had met the defendant while they were incarcerated together at a 
different location. 
15 
 
 
the events at the nightclub, and Payne responded that he "had to 
get [him] up out of here."  Edwards remembered Payne saying in 
the second conversation that "he felt bad" that "his boy was 
doing time . . . for him."  Edwards could not recall any 
specific statements that Payne had made in the third 
conversation, but Edwards could tell by Payne's body language 
that he felt badly about the situation and that he was "f'd up 
about it." 
 
In a detailed memorandum of decision, the judge deemed the 
testimony submitted by these witnesses to be contradictory, 
insincere, and not credible, ultimately concluding that the 
evidence did not carry support for the defendant's position that 
Payne had shot the victim.20  Specifically, the judge did not 
credit Bizzell's testimony, due, in part, to his poor demeanor, 
inability to remember details, apparent insincerity, and 
contradictory testimony on numerous occasions.  Nor did the 
judge credit the testimony presented by Brown, in part, because 
of his admission that he was there to "help" the defendant.  The 
judge similarly did not give credence to the story presented by 
Edwards, in part because Edwards admitted that he would lie for 
a fellow gang member, "depend[ing] on the person."  Noting that 
                                                          
 
 
20 The judge explicitly noted that the only witness he 
credited was the defendant's trial counsel, who testified, in 
relevant part, that he had not interviewed or been contacted by 
any of these three men prior to trial. 
16 
 
 
Payne had died in 2012 and, accordingly, could be blamed for any 
incident without fear of reprisal, the judge concluded that 
these individuals had a motive to assist the defendant -- as a 
friend, acquaintance, or fellow gang member -- with their 
statements.  As the new evidence was not deemed sufficiently 
material or credible, the judge concluded that it did not cast 
real doubt on the justice of the defendant's conviction.  See, 
e.g., Grace, 397 Mass. at 305. 
 
In this appeal, the defendant contends that the judge's 
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses at the hearing on 
the second motion for a new trial constituted an abuse of 
discretion.  We have long held, however, that a motion judge 
must assess whether new evidence is "credible" to warrant the 
grant of a new trial.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lessieur, 472 
Mass. 317, 331-332, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 418 (2015); 
Commonwealth v. Rosario, 460 Mass. 181, 195-196 (2011); 
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 458 Mass. 405, 415-416 (2010); Grace, 
397 Mass. at 305-306.  Indeed, the function of a judge assessing 
live testimony at a new trial hearing is to consider its 
credibility and materiality, as well as the appropriate weight 
given to it, in light of the entire trial record.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Sparks, 433 Mass. 654, 661 (2001) (judge's 
assessment of witness credibility at evidentiary hearing on 
motion for new trial is "final and conclusive"); Commonwealth v. 
17 
 
 
Bernier, 359 Mass. 13, 16 (1971) ("The credibility of the 
affiant and the witnesses [is] a preliminary matter for decision 
by the trial judge and his decision thereon is final"). 
 
The cases upon which the defendant relies in support of his 
argument that it is an abuse of discretion for a motion judge to 
assess a witness's credibility at a hearing on a motion for a 
new trial are inapposite here.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Galloway, 404 Mass. 204, 208 (1989); Commonwealth v. Nutbrown, 
81 Mass. App. Ct. 773, 779-780 (2012).  Those cases address the 
threshold inquiry whether evidence is admissible at trial, 
specifically, whether an unavailable declarant's statement 
against penal interest is admissible.  "An out-of-court 
statement 'is admissible under the penal interest exception [to 
the hearsay rule] if (1) the declarant's testimony is 
unavailable; (2) the statement so far tends to subject the 
declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable person in his 
position would not have made the statement unless he believed it 
to be true; and (3) the statement, if offered to exculpate the 
accused, is corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating its 
trustworthiness.'"  Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 17 
(2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Charles, 428 Mass. 672, 677 
(1999).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 804(b)(3) (2019). 
 
The defendant is correct that a trial judge errs in 
considering a witness's credibility when making a preliminary 
18 
 
 
determination as to the admissibility of a statement against 
interest.  See Galloway, 404 Mass. at 208 (when evaluating 
admissibility of declarant's statement against interest, judge 
determines whether underlying statement is corroborated by 
evidence indicating its trustworthiness, while jury assess 
credibility of witnesses); Nutbrown, 81 Mass. App. Ct. at 773, 
779-780 (motion judge "impermissibly considered the credibility 
of the witnesses rather than that of [the declarant]" in 
evaluating admissibility of statement against interest).  "[T]he 
inquiry into whether the defendant has satisfied the new trial 
standard," however, "is conceptually distinct from the threshold 
inquiry into whether [a witness's] affidavit [or testimony] is 
admissible" (citation omitted).  See Drayton, 479 Mass. at 489.  
As to whether a new trial is warranted, it is well established 
that a motion judge may consider the credibility of proffered 
evidence, which here includes witness testimony, in determining 
whether the evidence casts real doubt on the justice of the 
conviction.  See Grace, 397 Mass. at 305-306. 
 
We thus defer to the motion judge's assessment of the 
various witnesses' credibility at the hearing on the motion for 
a new trial, but we need not accord deference to his review of 
the documentary evidence or trial transcripts, which we review 
independently.  See Drayton, 479 Mass. at 486; Grace, 397 Mass. 
at 307.  We regard ourselves in as good a position as the motion 
19 
 
 
judge to assess the record.  See Drayton, supra; Grace, supra.  
The Commonwealth's case at trial included a confession made by 
the defendant, to Burns, that he had shot the victim in the head 
following an altercation outside a nightclub.  The victim's 
cousin, who was with Payne when they heard the gunshot go off, 
also testified that she observed the defendant tucking a gun 
into his pants and running from the scene.  The firearm later 
recovered from the bushes contained a palm print and DNA, both 
of which matched the defendant's. 
 
Although the new witnesses suggest that Payne shot the 
victim, the judge did not credit their testimony.  Even assuming 
that the judge had credited Bizzell, part of his testimony was 
that the defendant had admitted to killing the victim.  In any 
event, the testimony of the three witnesses was not inconsistent 
with Payne merely taking credit for a shooting that he had asked 
his friend to carry out, and about which he later felt badly as 
his request had resulted in the defendant's incarceration.  In 
light of the strength of the forensic and testimonial evidence 
offered against the defendant at trial, we discern no abuse of 
discretion in the motion judge's conclusion that the new 
witnesses, who, years later, offered testimony implicating 
someone else, were neither credible nor material, and did not 
cast real doubt on the justice of the defendant's conviction.  
See Sullivan, 469 Mass. at 351, quoting Commonwealth v. Cintron, 
20 
 
 
435 Mass. 509, 517 (2001) ("In the absence of a constitutional 
error, the granting of a motion for a new trial on the ground of 
newly discovered evidence rests in the sound discretion of the 
judge").  Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the defendant's 
second motion for a new trial. 
 
b.  Extraordinary relief.  The defendant also asks us to 
exercise our extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
order a new trial or to reduce the verdict.  Pursuant to our 
duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we have reviewed the entire 
record carefully, and we discern no cause to exercise our 
extraordinary power in this case. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The defendant's conviction and the order 
denying his second motion for a new trial are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.