Case Title: The Sierra Club v. The Department of Transportation of the State of Hawaii. S.Ct. Order, filed 08/23/2007 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order, filed 09/05/2007 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 10/01/2007 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order, filed 10/26/2007 [pdf].

Citation: 115 Haw. 299

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

00:
‘THE SIERRA CLUB, a California non-profit corporation

registered to do business in the State of Hawai'i; MAUI
TOMORROW, INC., a Hawai'i non-profit corporation; and the

KAHULUI HARBOR COALITION, an unincorporated association,
Plaintiffs-Appellants

 

 

THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE STATE OF
HAWAI'I; BARRY FOXUNAGA, in his capacity as Director of
‘the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE STATE OF
HAWAI'I; MICHAEL FORMBY in his capacity as Deputy Director
for Harbors of the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OF
THE STATE OF HAWAT'I;! and HAWAII SUPERFERRY, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

 

No. 27407

O34

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO. 05-1-0114)

90-218 te sry eae

 

AUGUST 31, 2007

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, Je

(20001,

 

Pursuant to Hawai'i Roles of Appellate Procedure Rule 43(c)
Berry Fukunaga, the current Director of the Department of Transportation, has

been substituted fer Bodney Harage, and Michael Formby, the current Deputy
Director for Harbors, hee Been substituted for Barry Fukunaga, who previously

held that position.
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Plaintiffs-Appellants the Sierra Club, Maui Tomorrow,
Inc., and the Kahului Harbor Coalition? appeal from the July 12,
2005 final judgment of the circuit court of the second circuit,”
ruling in favor of Defendants-Appellees State of Hawai'i
Department of Transportation (DOT or HOOT): Rodney Haraga, in his
capacity as Director of DOT (substituted by Barry Fukunaga, see
supra note 1); Barry Fukunaga, in his capacity as Deputy Director
for Harbors of DOT (substituted by Michael Formby, see supra note
1); and Hawaii Superferry Inc. The underlying dispute in this
Litigation is whether DOT was required to perform an
environmental assessment (BA), under Hawai'i Revised Statutes
(HRS) chapter 343 (1993 & Supp. 2004), commonly referred to as
the Hawai'i Environmental Protection Act (HEPA),* before
approving various harbor improvements and permits associated with
the Hawaii Superferry project, or whether its determination that
the project was exempt from chapter 343 requirements was proper.
The circuit court granted the separate motions of the

state and Superferry to dismiss or, in the alternative, for

+ the Sierra Club is a California non-profit corporation registered to
0 business in the State of Hawai'i; Maui Tonerrow, Inc. is a Hawaii nonprofit
Corporation; and the Kahului Harbor Coalition 4a an unincorporated
seeociation-

 

 

> the Honorable Joseph £. Cardoza presided over this matter.

« athough the original bill was called "A Bill for an Act Relating to
Environmental Impact Statenents,”" 1974 Haw. Sess. L, Act 246, and HRS chapter
5G} is entitled “Envirenmental fnpact Statements,” che law has long been
feferred to, by the public and this court, as the Hawai'l Environmental
Protect ion Act
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summary judgment, ruling that: (1) Plaintiffs lack standing;
(2) DOT's actions complied with HRS chapter 343; (3) Plaintiffs’

claim relating to the Draft EA for the Kahului Commercial Harbor

 

Improvements was premature; and (4) Plaintiffs’ request for a
continuance to permit discovery was insufficient under Hawai'i
Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 56(f).

On appeal, Appellants argue thai

 

(2) the circuit
court erred in dismissing Appellants’ claim on the basis of
standing because Appellants are among those injured by potential
adverse impacts caused by the Hawaii Superferry project, and also
because they suffer a procedural injury; (2) the edrcuit court
erred in granting sunmary judgment in favor of Appellees by
ruling that they complied with HEPA, because the exenptions were
illegal and did not apply; (3) the circuit court erred in
dismissing, as premature, Appellants’ claim that the Havaii
Superferry project must be incorporated into the ongoing EA for
Kahului Harbor Improvements, because the harbor exenptions vere
unlawfully segnented from the already initiated but inccaplete
EA: and (4) the circuit court erred in refusing to continue the
hearing to permit further discovery because there was a factual
Gispute as to what was before DOT in making its exemption
determination.

On August 23, 2007, we issued an order reversing the
July 12, 2005 circuit court judgnent, holding that Dot's

3
   

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determination that the improvements to the Kahului Harbor are

exempt from the requirements of HRS chapter 343 was erroneous

 

a matter of law, and instructing the circuit court to enter
sunmary judgment in favor of Appellants on their claim as to the
request for an EA. We maintained concurrent jurisdiction to
issue this opinion.
1. BACKGROUND

The Hawaii Superferry project generally involves an
inter-island ferry service between the islands of O'shu, Maui,
Kaua'i, and Hawai'i, using harbor facilities on each island.
according to a permit application filed with the Public Utilities
commission (PUC) on July 22, 2004,* Hawaii Superferry, Inc. has
proposed to develop and operate a high-speed roll-on/roll-off
ferry service, using two vessels, capable of carrying up to 866
passengers and 282 cars, or 26 trucks or buses and 65 cars per
trip. As a result of negotiations between the State and Hawaii

+ te application was for a “Certificate of Public Convenience and
necessitye to Gperate se a water carrier of passengers and property, which was
wecetea'hy the FUC on December 30, 2004, In its decision and order, the FUC
Kferred the iesve of environmental review, stating:
we Believe that eithough these are inportant issues that should be
addressed, they need not be addressed in this particular decision and
eeEe Since the determination of whether the proposed ferry service and
Ste"teeccts on the hazbore and surrounding ares require an
ANuleiScneal asseconent ie currently being reviewed and addressed by
shuttgnand che Legislature has determined that this Application should
be processed expeditiously.
the Poe further scondition[ed it’s} authorization in this docket upon
WegrfeGne's chewing, to the satiefaction of the commission, that Applicant has
replfed with all oppliceble federal and state laws, rules and regulations
SEBEL Iter without fiaitation, matters relating to the Environmental inpact
incledine a (oEIS"), under Chapter 343 HRS, Co the extent applicable to
Shure that sll such requirenents are appropriately addressed.”

 

 

 

 

‘
 

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Superferry, Ine., DOT concluded that several improvenents to
Kahului Harbor were necessary to accommodate the Superferry
project, including the construction of a renovable barge to Pier
2 of the harbor and other inprovenents to assist in Superferry
operations. According to DOT, “{t]he state anticipates the barge
will cost as much as $10 million,” and the State of Haval'l has
allocated a total of approximately $40,000,000 in state funds for
improvements to the four harbors that will be utilized by the
Superferry project.

pppellants, consisting of two nonprofits and one
unincorporated association, are environmental groups whose
nenbers use the area around Kahului harbor in various ways. The
Sierra Club is one of the nation’s largest environmental
organizations, with over 700,000 mesbers, approximately 5,000 of
which live in Hawai'i. The Sierra Club has a Hawai'i Chapter and
@ Maui group, which are involved in educating the public about
Hawaii's natural resources through hikes, exploring wild places
and natural resources, restoring and preserving eco-systens
through service trips, and protecting open space through lcbbying
and litigation. Maui Tonorrow is described by a menber as a
“Maui island-wide environmental group which has participated in
humerous environmental issues including but not limited to the
environmentally sound growth of {] airport and harbor

infrastructures.” The Kahului Harbor Coalition is “an

 
 

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organization of farmers, businessmen, recreational users and
citizens formed out of concern about the increased risks of alien
species introductions through Kahulul Harbor.”

Appellants challenge, pursuant to HRS $ 343-7(a)
(1993), DOT’s determination that the improvenents to Kahului
Harbor to accommodate the Superferry project are exempt from the
requirenents of HEPA, thus obviating the need for an EA.
a Hawai" ntal Proce

HEPA, which was patterned after the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370(£)
(2000), was passed into law in 1974, 1974 Haw. Sess. L. Act 246,
and codified in HRS chapter 343. The law requires that EAs and
environmental impact statements (EIS) be prepared for development
projects that meet certain criteria. According to A Guidebook
for the Havaii State Environnental Review Process, a publication
of the Office of Environmental Quality Control (OEQC),

the Jew requires that government give systematic
considerstion to the environmental, social and economic
Consequences of proposed development projects prior to
Shlowng construction to begin. The law also sesures
Public the right to participate in planning projects that
Bay affect their community.

  

 

office of Environnental Quality Control, State of Hawai"i, &
Guidebook for the Hawaii State Environmental Review Process 6
(2004) (hereinafter Guidebook], available at

http://www. state hi .us/health/ceqc/publications/guidebook. pdf.
 

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‘The basic framework of HEPA consists of various stages
of assessment by the proposing or accepting agency, each of which
may entail additional review procedures.

First, it must be determined whether a project or
program is subject to the environmental review process in the
first place. Projects are subject to the law if they (1) are
either initiated by a government agency (“agency actions”) or by
a private party who requires government approvals for the project
to proceed (“applicant actions”), and (2) propose one or more of
nine enumerated lend uses or administrative acts, known as
“triggers.” See HRS § 343-5(a)(1)-(9); Guidebook, supra, at 9.
If a triggering event occurs, an EA must be prepared, unless the

program or project is declared exempt.

+ the statute specifies thet envixcnnental assesenents shall be
required for certain “actions.” Gag BRS § 343-5 (Supp. 2004). An “action” is
Gefined under HEPA to mean “any program oF project tobe initiated by any
agency or applicant.” HRS § 2432 (Supp. 2004). Therefore, the subject of an
EA 'may be variously described as an action, a project, of a program.

‘an important preliminary step in assessing whether an “ection” ie
subject to environmental review is defining the action itself, This can be
perticularly relevant uhen the project unser consideration consists of a
Sgroup of actions.” HEPA regulations provide that

‘A group of actions proposed By en agency or an applicant shall be

treated as single action when:

‘the conpenent actions are phat
fotel undersakings
2, An individual preject Se
project:
An individual project repre
project) oF
4. The actions in question are essentially identical and a
single statenent will adequately address the impacts of each
Indivigsal action and these of the group of actions as a
whole.
Mawai"t Adainistrative Rules (HAR) § 11-200-7 (1996).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

or increnents of @ larger

 

necessary precedent for a larger

     

snE® a commitment te a larger

 

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Exemption determinations are governed by HRS
§ 343-6(7) (1993), which delegates to the Envircnmental Council”
the responsibility to “adopt, amend, or repeal” rules which
shall “[e]stablish procedures whereby specific types of
actions, because they will probably have minimal or no
significant effects on the environment, are declared exempt
from the preparation of an assessment.” HRS § 343-6(7). The
exemption rules provide for 10 classes of exempt action,
specified in HAR § 11-200-8(A)(1)-(10) (1996), available at
http://www. state.hi.us/health/about/rules/11-200.html.*

 

7 she Envirennental Council is conpcsed of fifteen nenbers appointed by

the covernor, and is charged with rulemaking for various parte of HEPA.
Seq cenerally HRS $§ S41-S(c}, ~€; HAR chapter 11-201, “Environmental Council
Roles of Practice ¢ Procedure, available at, http://yw#.state.hi.us/health/
about/rules/i1-201;ntel. The various rules it hee adopted sake up HAR title
Li, chapter 200, “Envircnnental Inpact Statenent Roles” [hereinafter “EIS
Rules"l-

 

 

 

 

AR § 12-200-8(A) providk

Chapter 343, HRS, states that @ list of classes of actions shall be
Grew up which, because they will probably have mininal or no
significant effect on the eavireanent, may be declared exenpt by the
reposing agency or approving agency from the preparation of an
Environmental. steesenent provided that agencies declaring an action
Guenpt onder this section shall obtain the edvice of other cuteide
agencies or individuals having jurisdiction or expertise as to the
propriety of the exemption. Actions ceciared exe=pt. from the preparation
Sf an environmental assestrent under this section are not exempt from
Sppliceble statute or rule. The following list
1s Sf action:
1. Operations, repsire, or maintenance of existing structures,
facilities, equipment, or topographical features, involvin
negligible of no expansion or change of se beyond that
previously existing
Replacenent or reconstruction of existing structures and
facilities where the new structure will be located generally
fon the same site and will have substantislly the same
Purpose, capacity, density, height, and dimensions as the
Etrocture replaced,

 

 

    

 

 
 

   

 

(continved...)
 

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Agencies are also directed to develop their own lists of specific

types of actions that fall within the exenpt classes, which are

reviewed by the Environmental Council and must be “consistent

*(.seontinued)

3

 

 

Construction and location of single, new, small facilities
Gr structures and the alteration and modification of the
Sane and installation of new, small, equipment. and
facilities and the siteration and modification of sane,
including, But not limited to:

A. Single-family residences less than 3,500 square
feet not in conjunction with the building of two
of sore such unit

b.  Multi-unte structures designed for not more than
Four dheliing unite af not in conjunction with,
the bullding of two OF ore such structure!

c. Stores, offices, and restaurants designed for
Eotel cceupant load of tuenty persons oF 1
per strocture, Sf net in conjunction with the
Buliding of two or nore such structures; and

4. Water, cewage, electrical, gas, telephone, and
ther essential public utiiiey’ services
Extensions to serve such structures oF
facilities; accessory oF appurtenant structures
including gerages, carports, patios, swinning
pools, and fences} and, acquisition of utility

ions in the conditions of land, water, or

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Basie data collection, research, experinental managenent,
and resource evslustion activities which do not result in &
Serious of naor disturbance to an cnvironnental resource;
construction or placenent of minor structures accessory to
existing facilith

Interior alterations involving things euch es partitions,
Plusbing, and electrical conveyances?

Denolition of structures, except those structures lccated on
ny pistoric site as designated in the paticnal register or
Howeil register ss provided for in the Bigteric
Preservation Act of 1966, Public Law 89-665, 16 U.S.C. §470,
as anended, or chapter 62, HRS?

Zoning variances except shoreline set-back variances: and

Continuing administrative activities including, but aot
Uinitea to purchase of supplies and personnel-related

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

with both the letter and intent expressed in the exempt classes
lof the BIS Rules] and chapter 343." HAR § 11-200-8(D).

An agency may declare an action exempt from the
preparation of an EA provided that the agency obtains the advice
of “other outside agencies or individuals having jurisdiction or
expertise as to the propriety of the exemption.” HAR § 11-200-
8(A). The exemption classes do not apply when “the cumulative
impact of planned successive actions in the same place, over
time, is significant, or when an action that is normally
insignificant in its impact on the environment may be significant
in a particularly sensitive environment.” HAR § 11-200-8 (8).

The exemption process is discussed in more detail infra, in
Section II.c.

When no exemption applies and one of the triggers of
HRS § 343-5(a) is met, environmental review begins with the
development of a draft FA. Guidebook, supra at 6. An EA,
Gefined in HRS § 343-2, is an informational document prepared by
either the agency proposing an action or a private applicant,

which is used to evaluate the possible environmental effects of a

 

proposed action. Id, It must give a detailed description of the
proposed action or project and evaluate direct, indirect, and
cumulative impacts, as well as consider alternatives to the
proposed project and descrite any measures proposed to mininize

potential inpact:

 

Id. Once completed, the public has thirty

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days to review and comment on a draft EA, After the draft EA is
finalized and public comments responded to, the agency proposing
or approving the action reviews the final EA to determine if any
“significant” environmental impacts are anticipated. If the
agency determines that there will be no significant environmental
impact, it issues a finding of no significant impact (FONSI),
allowing the project to proceed without further study, although a
FONSI determination may be challenged. However, if the agency

determines that an action may hi

 

ve a significant impact, a nore
detailed EIS must be prepared. E18 preparation begins with a
notice and comment period to define the scope of the draft EIS.
Following this, the EIS is prepared in draft form by the
proposing agency or applicant and becomes finalized after review
by public and government agencies and a period for public conment
and response. The final SIS must then be accepted, by the
Governor or Mayor for agency actions, and by the approving agency
for applicant actions. Once the EIS is accepted, the action may
be implemented. Id.

HEPA provides for judicial review at various stages of
the process: (1) when no EA is prepared, (2) when a FONSI is

prepared, (3) and when an EIS is accepted. HRS § 343-7(a)-(c).

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B. The Project
1, Harbor Improvenonts

In addition to the certificate of public convenience
and necessity received by the PUC, Superferry also received a
“letter of intent” from the Harbors Division of DoT, dated
December 9, 2004, which outlines the general terms, arrangenents,
and conditions of a formal agreement that DOT intended to enter
with Superferry.” The letter sets out the terms for use of state
harbors by Superferry as well as any equipment used at the
harbor: fees, charges, and rents to be paid to the State by
Superferry? various improvenents to the harbors that the State
“deem[ed] necessary to accommodate the start up” of Superferry’s
operations, and which will be the responsibility of DoT; and
various provisions related to indemnification, insurance, the
assignment of rights or obligations under the agreement,
termination of the agreement, the agreement's term, and other
matters.

As eventually determined by DOT, the Superferry project
requires the following inprovenents at Kahului Harbor, the locus

of Appellants’ HEPA challenge: (1) the construction and

 

+ the final agrecnent se not in the record. In the State’s ansver, it
stated that the State "adsite thet it and NSF (Superferry) presently intend to
Guecute an operating Agrecnent” but denied that it had been executed as of the
filing of the answer, 2005." However, in a March 2, 2005 letter
fo the chelr of the fa ‘on Transportation and Government
Gperations, Hawaii Superferry's CEO referred to an "operating agreenent™
fEtween the conpany and the State. fee infra Section T

2

 

   
    

 

   
 

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utilization of a removable barge (floating platform) that will be
noored at Pler 2 to provide a platform between the vessel and the
pier for passenger leading and off loading, and which will be
configured with a removable ranp for, safe vehicle leading and off
loading and (2) operational support to acconnodate the Superferry
project, which will include (a) the provision of utility services
(water, power, and Lighting) on or adjacent to the piers (b)
security fencing; (c) pavement striping (d) the placenent of
boarding gangway ramps; and (e) the installation of tents at
inspection points or customer waiting areas." Several of these
improvenents are also proposed in the “Facility Layout study”
prepared for Hawaii Superferry by outside consultants end dated
Novenber 22, 2004.

Sometime after 1997, DOT prepared a document known as
the Kahului Harbor 2025 Master Plan ("Master Plan”). Pursuant to
2 directive in the EIS Rules, DOT also developed a draft EA,
dated June 2004, for the “proposed short-term inprovenents” at
the Kahului Harbor identified in the Master Plan, also described
fas “those inprovenents which will be necessary within the next
ten (10) years.” The draft EA, which precedes the letter of
intent, makes no reference to the Hawaii Superferry project and

does not include an analysis of the improvements associated with

 

 pccording to Appellants, “HOOT and the Hawai'i Superferry have
steadfastly refused to make public sny actual written plans or map plans
wing in detail how each harbor will be used.”

  

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it." As both parties attest, the draft EA has not yet been made
into a final EA.

2. DOT's Exemption Deteraination

 

Prior to its exemption determination, DOT had consulted
with OEQC regarding whether an exemption from the envizonnental
review process was appropriate for the proposed inprovenents. In
a letter to Genevieve Salmonson dated Novenber 15, 2004, Fukunaga
stated that DOT “request [s] confirmation from the (CEQC] that the
intended improvenents fall within the approved Exenption Classes
Established for the State Department of Transportation.” In a
reply letter dated Novenber 23, 2004, and with the subject
“Hawaii Superferry Improvenents," Salnonson wrote that “OEQC

believes that the proposed improvenents fall within the scope of

 

4H the drafe EA makes clear thet it is linited to the “proposed
project,” which “only includes these short-term projects recommenced in the
EOT“HAR'vahului Connerelal arbor 2028 Master Flan.” These projects include
the "Pler 1 extension (Pier 10),” “Pier 1 comfort stations and sewer lin
“Plex 3 expansion," "new pier 4)" “new Pler 2¢ extension, including &
pacsenger tersinel, readvay and bridge,” end “structural pavement, access
Bridge end utilitics at “Puunene Yord./" “The “Proposed Project Description”
Section of the draft EA algo conteined the following?

‘The projects will maintain Harbor operations Based on the existing and

forecast maritine Genands for cargo and passengers. Other projects

contained in the 2025 Master Plan nay or may not be completed, snd doe
fo the long-range nature of these intermediate and longrterm projects,
the projects are not yet ripe for decision making. Therefore, in the
future, a8 these projects becone ripe for decision naking, environmental
anslyses will be performed prior to design in order to seternine what,
if any, additional environnental documentation 18 required.

Hewever, Appellees take incensistent positions with respect to whether
the harbor inprovenents are part of the Master Plan. In its reply memorandum
in support of ite action to dismiss or for sumary jucgnent, Hawals
Superferry, Inc. vefers to “(t]he taction’ that Dor is seeessing” es “certain
Faholul Cenmereiel lerbor inprovenents .
(Guphssis added.) DOT, however, in the reply nendrancum in support of ite
notion, etates that “the minor changes at sesue are not pert of the master
plan.

 

 

 

 

   

 

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++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
work described in the Departnent of Transportation’ s approved
exemption List.” Salmonson’s letter states OEQC’s

“understand[ing]” that DOT would take the following actions with

 

respect to Kahului Harbor: “DOT plans to demolish a portion of

one side of the tip of pier 2 to create a notch in the pier. 007
has received comments on the master plan EA for Kahului Harbor.”
‘the letter continues by stating that “[t]he above actions
generally fall under exemption class 6 number @ and exenption
class 8 number 1 of DOT’s approved exemption list dated November
15, 2000.7 The letter also states that OEQC “believes that
minor projects that have independent utility may be declared
exempt even though an on-going environmental assessment may not
have been finalized." Salmonson concluded her letter by stating
“[ajccordingly, we believe that the Department of Transportation
has authority to declare the actions described above as exempt

from the requirement to prepare an environmental assessment.”

1 ALthough DOT, dn Les exenption determination letter, expressly
relied on exenption class 6 punber 8, see infra, it did not refer to exeaption
Ease @ nuaber 1 cited by Salmensen in her letter on behalf of OEQC, That
Exenption provides as follow
EXEMPTION CLASS 1 Cenolition of structures, except those structures
Yoeated on any historic site as designated in the National Register or
Rowell Register a2 proviced for in the National Mistoric Preservation
Ret of 1586, Public Law €5-€85, of Chapter G&, Hawai! Revised statutes.
1. “Dinolition of existing structures under Departnent of
Tansportation jurisdiction except seavalls and other coastal
Structures and those structures located on any historic site =
Seaignated in the National Mstoric Preservation Act of 1966,
Poblic Law 5-695, oF chapter 6£, Hawail Revised Statutes.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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DoT also sent identical letters to two agencies
regarding the Kahului Harbor, the Department of Public Works and
Waste Management for the County of Maus and the Department of
Planning for the County of Maui, expressing its intention to
proceed with the Superferry project, as well as explaining the
contemplated improvements and soliciting comments.

on February 23, 2005, in a letter to OEQC Director
Salmonson, DOT expressed its determination that “the operation of
Hawaii Superferry at Kahului Harbor . . . meets conditions that
permit exemption from environmental review at such location based
on the method of operation planned.” The letter described the
action under review as “the requirements and needs associated
with harbor access and use of pier facilities by Hawaii

Superferry Inc., at Kshului Harbor on the Island of Maui.” It

 

set forth its decision as follow

Following discussions with Hawaii Superferry. and
congultation with state and County agencies regarding the
Intended use of the harbor facility and in consideration of
the provisions of chapter 343, Hawaii Raviced statutes, and
Chapter 11-200, Hawaii Administrative Rules, we have
Getermined that the cperation of Havail Superferry at
Kanuist Harbor conforns with the intended tse and porpese of
the harbor and meets conditions that permit exemption from
envirennental review at such location based on the method of
eperation planned. The ferry activity at Kshulat Harbor
Will use equipment appropriate for a harbor, ineluse only
minor facilities inprovenente end will be conducted at af
existing pier facility that is consistent with the purpose
Gnd reason for which it wes originally developed,

 

 

DoT also noted that

‘The installation and result of the minor inprovenents noted
will not produce or create any adverse air quality, noise or
Never quality impact, All changes, modifications, additions

 

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or adjuctrente renain conpatible with the uses established
for the harbor and ite piers, fall within raritine
activities that were identified {n environsental reviews
Scndveted in conjunction with the original developeent of
fhe facilities and conform to the purpose for watch the
harbor wes built.

 

 

oT explained the legal basis of this decision” as follows:

Pursuant to chapter 343, Hawaii Revised Statutes, and
Chapter 11-200, Hewaii Administrative Rules, the Department
of Praneportation hae determined that the subject property
Wil have minimal or no significant effect on the
Grvlrcanent and ie therefore exenpt from the preparation of
Sn environmental seseetnent. The determination is Based on
the following Exemption Classes as listed on the
[otorehensive fvenstion List for the state of saws
Bepartnent of Transnortation asended Novenber 15,2000.

The epplicable exexption classes ere es follows:

 

 

 

Exenotion Clase 34 Construction and lecation of
Single, new, email facilities or structures and the

 

 

Alteration and modification of sane and installation
of new, snail, equiprent and faciiities and the
Siteration and nedification of the same including but
hot Linited to:

item 3. Installation of security and safety
equipnent.

Exenoticn Clase €: Construction or placenent of minor

Structures accessory to existing facilities.

 

Item 6. Alteration or addition of inprovenents
With adscelated veilities, which are incidental
fo existing herbor and best ramp eperations, in
accordance with master plans that have met the
Eequirenents of Chapter 343, Hawaii Revised
Statutes, Such Inprovenents and associat
Utilities include concessions, ‘comfort stations,
‘Svilions, paving, rock walls, fencing

‘huaye, leading docks, warehouses, "Bic
offices, ‘contsiner freight stations, eran:
fel iines, Lighting, sprinkler and’ drainage
system.

 

   

 

    

 

 

 

Dg noted by Appellants, “{t]he exemption determinations do not
disclose the site oF the scope of the Hawal'l Superferry project.”

Mme exenption List prepared by DOT is @ seven-page document that
Liste more specific exanples for each of the exempt classes of action
Gelineated Sn HAR 11-200-8. Seq DOT, Comprehensive Exenption List for the
State of avail Departaent of Transportation (Nov. 15, 2000),

https une, state.hi -Us/health/ceqe/exenptions/sdoti100.pdf.

 

 

"7
 

‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAY

 

REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **#

Before this determination, the County councils of Maui, Kaua'i,

and

 

ai'i each adopted Resolutions recognizing potential
adverse impacts of the Superferry and calling for the preparation
of an EIS to address and mitigate these impacts. Various other
individuals, including Superintendent Donald W. Reeser, of the
Haleakala National Park, National Park Service; the Maui Invasive
Species Conmittee; and the Pacific Whale Foundation, expressed
similar views to government officials.

3. Hawaii Superferry’s Representations Regarding
Superferry Operations

In March 2005, John L. Garibaldi, CEO of Hawaii
Superferry, Inc., submitted a letter to the Chair of the Hevat't
Senate Committee on Transportation and Governsent Operations,
urging the Senator to oppose a Senate Bill that would have
required Hawaii Superferry, Ine. to prepare an EIS for the
Superferry. In the letter, Garibaldi discussed plans undertaken
by Hawaii Superferry, Ine. and DOT and expressed his view that
“Hawaii Superferry complies with all Hawaii and Federal
environmental regulations.”

The letter specifically addresses plans regarding the
envizonnent, stating:

Under the terns of an operating agrecnent with the state
await Superferry will subsit cetailed operational
rior to the ccmencenent of services to the Harbors
fon. The operaticnal plone will cover all aspects of
the interisland ferzy service operations snd will be jointly
prepared by Hornblower Marine Services, Inc.y the ferty's
1d CH2MHI1, new, consulting engineers. Harbor

a

 

   

 

1
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WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

Divisione will require thet, the operational plane cover
eperations at each harbor,
shvixoonant such as schedules rt

s+ Bagardous

‘Screening and soricultural inseection
Esterial bandling, . . ; and traffic control, as well. as
Bier and dock rege policies and procedures in general,
Felating to Hawaii Superferry and other harbor users. and
irbor employees. In addition to the requirenents of
Harbors Division, the operational plans will cover other
envircnnental topics of utnost importance to lawais
Soperferry such #2 alien ceat species, uhsle avoidance and
) anong others.

 

   

   

 

 

Garibaldi also discussed his company’s work with “the State
Departnent of Agriculture, environsental and community groups to
cevelop {Hewaii Superferry’ s] environmental policies.” Garibaldi
further attested that Hawaii Superferry “ha(s) policies in place
. . to help stop the migration of alien species.” Lastly, the
letter stated that Hawaii Superferzy’s “whale avoidance policy is
much stricter than what is required by federal regulations” and

that Hawaii Superferry is “committed to . . . procedures in

 

mitigating the movement of invasive species and ensuring the
safety of marine mammals... .
C. Procedural History

on March 21, 2005, Appellants, by complaint, sought a
determination that an EA must be prepared for the Hawaii
Superferry project and challenged the exemption determinations
nade by DOT. The first amended complaint, styled as a complaint
“for declaratory, injunctive and other relief,” was based on the

relevant HEPA section, HRS § 343-7; the declaratory judgment
   

AI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HA

 

statute, HRS § 632-1; and article XI, section 9 of the Hawai'i
State Constitution. Appellants’ first amended complaint
presented the following claims for relief: (1) that an EA, at a
minimum, is required; (2) that the Hawaii Superferry project must
be incorporated into the ongoing BA for Kahului Harbor
Improvements; (3) that the exemptions are illegal, void, or
voidable; (4) that an EA must be prepared at the earliest
practicable tine and may not be deferred until after decision-
making; and (5) that any approval granted without the required BA
is void as a matter of law.

In addition to a determination regarding each of these
claims, Appellants prayed that the court, among other things:
(1) issue 2 mandatory injunction or stay ordering DOT and
Superferry “either to abandon the proposed project or to prepare
an EA that fully complies with Chapter 343"; (2) issue a
“tenporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and
permanent injunction and/or stay” that would “[rlestrain{] [DOT
and Superferry] from proceeding with the short-term Harbor

improverent and/or the Hawaii Superferry project, from

 

although an affizmative statute of Limitations defense war not
raised, we note that the iausuit wae filed on March 21, 2005, which was
Stithin one hondred twenty cays of the agency's decision to carry cut or
approve the action,” HRS § 343-7(a), taking the date of that cecision as
Febrosry 23, 2008, when Dor officially determined that the harbor improvenents
would be exempt from the requirenente of HEPA.

   

M article XI, section 9 of the Hawai'i State Constitution is discussed
infia, in Section IEAL1-b.

20
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implenenting the projects in any way, from seeking or granting
any further approvals for the projects, or from selecting any
particular alternatives . . . until and unless an acceptable EA
is prepared.”

on May 12, 2005, COT filed a “notion to dismiss or, in
the alternative, for sunmary judgment,” in which it argued that
Appellants lacked standing, and that the State was entitled to
Giomissal or summary judgment on the merits, because DOT's
determination vas corzect and should be accorded deference. on
the same date, Superferry filed a similar motion, in which it
axgued that: (1) “plaintiff's first amended complaint must be
dismissed as a matter of law,” on the general grounds of standing
and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Count
IT of Appellants’ first anended complaint and (2) that “sumary
judgnent in favor of Hawai'i Superferry should be granted as a
matter of law,” because DOT followed proper procedures in making
its exenption determination, that its substantive determination
was proper, and that Plaintiffs’ claims that the exenptions are
“illegal, void or voidsble” are without basis. The matter was
heard on July 6, 2005.

on duly 12, 2005, the circuit court issued an order
granting both motions, and made the following findings relevant

to this appeal:

a
++** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***,

1, Plaintiffs lack standing to poreve the clains in
their First Azenced Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive

id Other Relief filed April 2, 2005... .., and all counts
of the First Asended Complaint are therefore diemissed.

 

    

2, In the alternative, assuming Plaintifes have

umsary Juguent is granted as Defendant state of
Hawai's Cepartnent of Transportation complied with Chapter
303" oe the Hauall Sevised Seacate

   

 

 

3. ith regard to Count 17 of Plaintiffs! First
Amended’ Complaint, to the extent Count iI alleges a claim
Felating to the Crafe Environsental hesesenent for the
Kanulul Commereial Harbor Inprovenents dated June 2004, such
‘a claim is premature and therefore dismissed.

 

 

4. Plaintiffs’ request for 2 continuance is
spouetictent pursuant to Rule S6(4) of the Hawai! Rules of
Civil Procedure and ie therefore sensed.

 

Final judgment was entered on the same day. This timely appeal
folleved. Oral argurent for this case was held on August 23,
2007.

on that day, we issued an order reversing the July 12,
2008 cixcust court judgment, holding that DOT's determination
that the inprovenents to the Kahului Harbor, on the Island of
Maui, are exenpt from the requirements of HRS chapter 243 was
erroneous as a matter of law. Me further instructed the circuit
court to enter surmary judgnent in favor of Appellants on their
clain as to the request for an EA.

linile we remanded this case to the circuit court, we
retained concurrent jurisdiction to enter an opinion and

judgment.

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TT, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judoment
A circuit court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss is

reviewed de nove. Bremner v, City & County of Honolulu, 96
Hawas's 134, 138, 26 P.3d 350, 354 (App. 2001). Likewise, ve

 

review the circuit court's grant or denial of sunmary judgnent de
novo. HawaS'{ Conmunity Federal Credit Union v, Keka, 94 Havad't
213, 222, 11 P.3d 1, 9 (2000).

In this case, DoT and Superferry each filed a Motion to
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgnent. Although
the court, in Sts order, treated sone of Appellants’ cleims as
dismissed, because it also stated that summary judgment was
granted, and was presented with matters outside of the pleadings
that it did not exclude, this court should treat the motion, for
purposes of review, as one for surmary judgment. HRCP Rule 12(b)
("I£, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss
for failure of the pleading to state a claim vpon which relief
can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the notion shall be treated as one for
summary judgnent and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material nade pertinent to such 2 motion by Rule 56.”), See also
Bally, State, 7 Haw. App. 274, 280, 756 P.2d 1048, 1053 (1988)
(*[S)ince in deciding the Motion To Dismiss, which was entitled
     

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAW.

alternatively as a motion for summary judgnent, matters outside
the pleading were considered by the lover court, the court really
granted sunnary judgnent under Rule $6, HRCP, and not a dismissal
under Rule 12(b) (6), HRCP.").

B. Motion fo: a

‘The stondard for granting @ motion for summary judgment ie
dettled?

[s)unnary judgnent is appropriate if the pleadings,
Gepositions, answere to interrogatories, and
Schisaions on file, together with the affidavits, if
Sny, show thet thete ig no cenuine issue a8 to any
faterial fect and that the moving party is entitied to
Nigguent ose satter of lew. A fact is material if
proof of that fact would have the effect of
Ettgeiishing or refuring one of the essential elenents
Of a couse ef action of defense asserted by the

Parties. “the evidence must be viewed in the light
Rost favorable to the nonenoving party. In other
words, we most view all of the evidence and the
[nketences drawn therefrom in the Light most fevorable
to the party opporing the motion.

 

 

 

 

 

Ida (citations and internal quotation marks onitted).

= i cunty of Honoluly, 98 Hewai'i 233, 266-45, 47
$o3a-Sia, S89-¢0 {2002} (second alteration in original).

v county of Honolulu, 104 Hawas's 468, 474, 92 P.3d
477, 483. (2004).
c. Review of Ms xenption dete: "
1. Which Standard should Apply
The parties dispute the stendard of review and level of
deference te the agency's determination that should apply in this
case.
The circuit court granted summary judgment, in the

alternative, because it concluded that DOT “complied with” HEPA.
++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

This is a legal conclusion, In order to prevail, Appellants must
show that this conclusion was erroneous as a matter of law,
either because there were material facts in dispute which bear on
the question of DOT’s compliance with HEPA, or because, based on
undisputed facts, DOT did not comply with HEPA, However, our law
is not settled on the standerd of review that the circuit court
should have applied to the agency determination, and that we
should apply when assessing DOT's exemption determination in our
de novo review of the circuit court's judgment.

Appellants argue that the exemption determinations
should be reviewed as a matter of law, because the issue
presented is whether the agency has complied with the applicable
statutory and regulatory mandates. They argue that DOT is not
entitled to deference in its exemption determination, for two
reasons: (1) because this case was brought as an original action
and did not arise from a contested case, citing Hawaii's Thousand
Exiends v, City and County of Honolulu, 7 Haw. 237, 248, 858
P.2d 726, 732 (1993) (stating that “[t]herefore, the circuit
court was not required to defer to the DLU's determination on the
potential environmental impact of the park project . . . (but)
could make its own independent findings regarding the salient
facts of the instant case”); and (2) because following Paul's

1 she court in Hausii's Thousand Friends went on to apply the clearly

rroneous standard of review €0 the circuit court's factual finding, sn that
(Centinved. =.)

   

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+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Electrical Service, Inc, v. Befitel, 104 Hawai'i 412, 91 P.3d 494
(2004), deference is only applied when “the legislature {has]
empowered the agency with discretion to make a particular
determination,” id. at 417, 91 P.3d at 499, and the applicable
statutes and rules “do[] not include any language providing
agencies with any discretion in making exenption
detexminations.“

Although Appellees agree that whether DOT complied with
HEPA is a legal question, they argue that the circuit court and
this court should give deference to the determinations of O50C
and DOT with regard to the exemption at issue. They argue that
cur review should be limited to whether DOT “followed all proper
procedures in making and {sewing the exemption determination,”
which they interpret as the requirenent, in HAR § 11-200-8, that
agencies declaring an action exenpt “obtain the advice of other
outside agencies or individvals having jurisdiction or expertise

2 (. . scontinved)
case, “that the overall park project may have significant
SSpace," in variance with DLU’s contrary conclusion. 75 M
ar'752, However, in thie case the circuit court made no factual
Ecterninations to which the clearly erroneous standard of review might epply.
father, the question is unat #tancard of review should apply to the agencv'g.
Stersinetion in the first instance. Secause in this case we review, de DOV,
the circuit court's legal conclusion that OOF complied with NEFA, we mist
Hifse determine what standard the circuit court should have applieg to the
agency's determination.

Hironmental
268, 858 Pad

 

 

 

 

% nppellants algo argue that 0OT has a duty to take a “hard look” at
environmental factors in making exemption determinations, a standard drawn
flo feerel Jaw that wae cited in Price v. Osavachi Hawaii Corp, 61 Fam.
ify tee ned2, 914 P.2a 1364, 1375 ne22- (1996) (quoting Stop Hes -Ass"n wy

duis, 538 F-Supp- 143, 155 (0. Haw. 1562). See infra Section 111.B.2.¢.

   

26
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2 to the propriety of the exenption.”” They further argue that
Lf the court finds that such procedures were followed, we should
give deference to DOT's and CEGC’s determination regarding the
propriety of the exenpticns based on Paul's Electrical Service,
because the legislature, they claim, “authorized OEQC to define
the parameters of HEPA,” and DOT followed those rules when making

ite determination.” Appellees also cite to Lee v. Elbaum, for

 

the proposition that “[a]n administrative agency’s interpretation
of its own rules is entitled to ‘deference unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the underlying legislative

purpose,/” 17 Haw. 446, 457, 867 P.2d 656, 667 (App. 1993)

 

4% Later dn their brief, appellees argue that “the ise
court 18 not the propriety of the exesption (s.e, whether DOT's decision was
Eight of wrong], Sut uhether the Circuit Court properly found that 007
followed ol proper procedures in making ita determinations.”

  

 

% appellees’ assertion mischaracterizes the role of OEGC. OEOC was
created by HRS § 24173 Co "inplonent” HRS chapter 341, to “perform ite Guth
Under chapter 343 [HEPA],” and to "serve the governor in an advisory capacity
on ail matters relating to enviremental quality control." INS § 341-3
(i983). "She eizector of OsQC “shall have such powers delegated by the
governor as are necessary to coordinate and, when requested by the governor,
fo direct pursuant to chapter 91 all state governnent

concerning enviromental quality,” HRS § 3¢1-4(a), and
Fesponsibilities specified in HRS § 3¢1-¢(b) -

‘CEQC's “duties under” HEPA are set out mainly in HRS chopter 343-3,
spublie records and notice,” end include: (1) making available for public
inspection all statenents, EAs, end other documents prepared onder HEPA, ERS §
543-3(a) (Supp. 2004); (2) informing the public of notices filed by agencies
Eagarding the svaslobility of the for review and conments, determizations that
Enges are or aren't required, the availability of Eises for review and
Censients, and the acceptance or ncnacceptance of statenents, HRS § 343-3(b)7
(3) inforsing the public of cpecific public processes or hearings related to
the federal Endangered Species Act, URS § 345-3 (e}7 and (4) publishing &
Periodic Hulletin conteining the sforenentioned notices, HRS'§ 343-3(d).

‘Therefore, while OEQC hes a significant role in the smplenentation of
uePA, it does not “define (its) paroneters,” as Appellees assert. Ratner, the
Envérennental Council is entrusted with that rele through ste ruienaking
powers. se@ supra note 7,

 

 

 

     

 

 

 
++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

(quoting Int'1 Bhd, Of Flec, Workers, Loca} 1357 v, Hawaiian Tels
Cou, 68 Haw. 316, 323, 713 P.2d 943, 950 (1986)), and Obavasht,

corp., for the proposition that “[t]he court does not wish
to substitute its judgnent for that of an agency within the
executive branch of government... .” 61 Haw, at 162.12, 914
P.2d at 1375 1.12.

HEPA does not provide direct guidance as to what
standards of review should apply to an agency's determination
that a project is exempt from the preparation of an EA."
Therefore, this court must decide which standard of review to
apply. Based on this review of the statutory framework and our
caselaw, we conclude that the appropriate stendard of review
depends on the specific question under consideration. In
general, agency exemption determinations that involve factual
questions should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.

Fr Hawaii nashore ant

 

Warchouse Union, Loca] 142, 112 Hawai’

1076°(2006) (“AIn agency’s] conclusion of law that presents mixed

48, 499, 146 P.3d 1066,

questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous

 

4 mis case de not a secondary ppeal under HRS chapter $1, but was
brought as an original action under {RS § €32-1 and HRS § 543-7(a), which
frovides for Judicial proceedings, “the subject of which 1s the lack of
Eleescnent required under section 943-5." ARS § 343-7(a).. While we may still
Glow from the stonderds of review set out, in HRS § 91-14(@), 208 Ince
Esbert's Toure § Transp., Ines, 104 Hawai'i 98, 102, 8 P.sd 623, €27 (2008)
Sie tee ne Fearon why the ttandarde of review for an agency decisicn should
Gutter depending on Whether the eppeal arises froma contested of &
roncenterted case ning that the court has jurisdiction to hear the
Tppesi-"], the question here 4s which of the varius standards should epply.

 

 

 

 

2
+*% FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
standard because the conclusion is dependent upon the facts and

circumstances of the particular case.” (Internal quotation and

 

brackets removed.)). However, as discussed below, whether or not

or considered the

 

an agency has followed proper procedurs
appropriate factors in making its determination is a question of
law, and will be reviewed de novo, Cf. id. (*[U]nder HRS §
91-14(g), conclusions of law are reviewable under subsections
(2), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural defects: under
subsection (3); findings of fact under subsection (5); and an
agency's exercise of discretion under subsection (6).”).

2. The Factors that Agencies Making Exemption Decisions
Most Consider

The exemption authority derives from HRS § 343-6(7),
which states that the Environmental Council “shall adopt, snend,
or repeal necessary rules . . . which shall . . . (7) Establish

procedures whereby specific types of actions, because they vill

 

probably have minimal or no significant effects on the
environment, are declared exenpt from the preparation of an
assessment.” HRS § 343-6(7). Pursuant to this’ statute, the
Envivonnental Council promulgated a rule governing exenption
deterninations: HAR § 11-200-8, “Exempt Classes of Action.” See
supra note 8. The rule sets out ten exempt classes of action,
and specifies that a proposing or approving agency may declare an

action exempt, “provided that” the agency “shall obtain the

29
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advice of other outside agencies or individuals having
jurisdiction or expertise as to the propriety of the exenption,”
and the action falls within one of the exenpt classes specified
in the rule. Before making this determination, an agency must
make @ preliminary conclusion to determine whether a “group of
actions” should be “treated as a single action,” based on HAR §
11-200-7, Additionally, HAR 11-200-8(B) specifies that “all
exemptions . . . are inapplicable when the cumulative inpact of
planned successive actions in the same place, over time, is
significant, or when an action that {s normally insignificant in
it Ampact on the environment may be significant in a
particularly sensitive environment.” HAR § 11-200-8(B). Lastly,
HAR § 11-200-8(D) directs agencies to develop their own lists of
“specific types of actions which fall within the exempt classes,”
which require approval of the Environnental Council and must be
“consistent with both the letter and intent expressed in the
exempt classes (of the EIS Rules} and chapter 343.” HAR § 11-
200-8(D). DOT has developed its ovn exemption list. See supra
note 13.

Therefore, an agency considering whether an action is
euenpt must make the following determinations: (1) whether the
action being considered is part of a “group of actions” which
must be “treated as a single action,” HAR § 11-20-77 (2) whether
it falls within an exenpt class of action, either under its omn

30
 

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AWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
List developed pursuant to HAR § 11-200-8(D) or that set out in
HAR § 11-200-B(A); and (3) whether the exenption is inapplicable
because of the cumulative impact of an action or its impact on a
particularly sensitive environment. In addition to these
determinations, an agency must comply with the requirement that
it seek advice.

There is a fourth, additional determination that is
implied from the legislative and rule-based framework. HRS §
343-6(7) delegated to the Environmental Council the authority to
rake exemption rules for actions “because they will probably have

minimal or no significant effects on the environment.” The

 

Environmental Council, in HAR § 11-200-8(D), directed other
agencies to develop lists of specific types of actions, “as long
as these lists are consistent with both the letter and intent
expressed in these exempt classes and chapter 343, HRS.”

Moreover, EIS regulations define “exempt classes of action” as

 

“exceptions from the requirenents of chapter 343, HRS, to prepare
environmental assessments, for a class of actions, based ona
determination by the pra approvine ao hy

the class of actions wil nininal or

sianificant effect on the environment.” HAR § 11-200-2. In
other words, an agency making an exemption determination must, at

least implicitly, determine that the action will “probably have

2
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nininal or no significant effects on the environnent” ~~ not
nerely that it fits the description of the exenption category.
This approach is consistent with our caselaw. In
Kahana Sunset Ovners Ass'n v. County of Maui, 86 Hawai'i 66, 947
P.2d 378 (1997), this court examined the decision of the Maui
County planning comission to grant a special managenent area
(SMA) use permit to a developer without requiring an EA. The
development, a 312-unit multi-family residential developnent on
the island of Maui, required the SMA use permit to install a
drainage Line beneath a public road that would connect it to an
existing culvert beneath the highway. Ida at 68, 71, 947 P.2d at
200, 383, In analyzing whether the HEPA exenption applied, this
court stated that the “exenption approved by the council .
must be consistent with both the letter and the intent contained
within the administrative rule exenption.”? Id, at 71, 947 P.2d
at 363. Having established that “[1]t 4s apparent from the
context of the exenptions that the regulations intend to exempt
only very minor projects from the anbit of HEPA,” the court
concluced that installation of the new drainage system was

“qualitatively incompatible with the types of projects contained

 

4 nppellante rake on snalogovs argunent, that HEPA exenptions should
be narrowly construet (don the "well settled rule of statstory.
CSnetfuction thet exceptions to legislative enactnents must be strictly
SShetrued.” State v, Sissel, 62 Haw, 474, 480, 617 P.2d €4, 88 (1980). This
Stggestion to nersawly construe exceptions is consistent with the requirenent
that exenptions be Consistent with the letter and intent of HEPA.

   

   

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An” the exemption list, and therefore “inconsistent with both the
letter and intent of the administrative regulations.” Id, at 72,
947 P.2d at 384. Therefore, Kahana Sunset Owners Ass’n makes
clear that not only must the exemption List be developed with
regard to the letter and intent of HEPA and its regulations, but
s0 also must individual exemption determinations. The agency
must make a preliminary determination that the action to be
declared exempt is a “ninor project” that will “probably have
minimal of no significant effects on the environnent.” This
conclusion is further supported by OEQC’s Guidebook, which, in a

sample exemption memo entitled “Declaration of Exemption,”

 

suggests use of the following statenent: “I have considered the
potential effects of the shove listed project as provided by

Chapter 343, HRS and Chapter 11-200, HAR. I declare that this
project will probably have minimal or no significant effect on
the environnent and is therefore exempt from the preparation of

an environmental assessment.”

ce
ont

 

Although this court's review in Kahana Sunset ow 1a was
pursuant to HRS chapter 91, a8 a secondary appeal of the planning comm:
Gecision, its analysis of ¢xenption determinations 1a not limited to that

 

re should be emphasized that, as this sample meno suggests, the
preliminary determination is only a cursory one, and falle far short of the
Fequirenents for preparing an EA, uhich are set out in HAR § 11-20-10. Th
nest cases the fact that en action to be declared exenpt will probebly have
only mininal envireonental affects should be cbviou

‘ie therefore do not give much credit to Appellces’ axgunent that
vappellants would have this Court believe that a full EIS of the entire
project needs to be prepared each tine an cxenption is declared under HEPA.“
The question is not the level of docunentation required, but what factors must

continued...)

 

 

 

 

33
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3. Whether Courts Should Defer to Agency Exemption
Determinations

Regarding the question of deference, our caselaw

 

instructs that we do not apply “deference” per se, but may choose

a more or less deferential standard of review."* We have applied

¥(.. continued)
be considered in making # determination

Moreover, ‘sithoogh, Appellees cite various cases in support of their
argunent that docusentation of an exemption decision nay be short, their

 

   

 

Guotetions are selective, In tf % the courty in
SSdition to stating that “[djocurentation of reltance on a categorical
exclusion s + need only be long encugh to indicate toa reviewing court that

the agency indéed considered unether or not a categorical exclusion spplied
and concisded that it did,” 375 F.34 1085, 1095 (1ith Cir. 2008), alse
Spprevingly cited a inth Clrcult case suggesting that docunentation should
Seon that the agency coneidered the environmental consequences of ite action
Gnd decided to apply a categcrical exclusion to the facts of « particular
Seession.” Id. (gue! ee ‘ght F.3a 1262, 2175. (ote Cir
S602)). It ie clear that the determinative question Ls not the level of the
Socunentation of an cxenption decision, but whether it shows that the
Sppropriste factors were considered.

 

 

 

      

  

although this has been 2 point of contention on this court,
our cpingons are in accord with the view that when we speak of defes
{siushally in recara to the fact that the “abuse of discretion” standard is,

) for example, than the "da nova” standard. As Justice Accba

    

 

Bas witten,
Tt is not clear how a “deferential” sbuse of discretion standard differs
from the “abuse Of discretion” standard as Listed in RS § 91-1409).
Sinilarly, it is not apparent how affording ‘deference’ adds anything
hore to the fact that the agency must make clear findings of fact and
conclusions of law.

 

 

 

Ine Seeterence” to be given agency decisions already inheres in the
Specific enumerated grounds.
‘Ine Water Use Permit Roclicaticna, 108 Hewas's 1, 26, 93 P.34 643, 670
(2008) (aeeba, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The confusion, it sens
items fiom the phfase "deferential abuse of discretion” si
{s perhaps misleading, as the standard speaks for itself,
Separately interpreted In our casclaw with @ specific seanin
Sold that discretion ts a “flexible” concept, snd that
‘A strong showing is required to establish an abuse [of
asscretion], and each case must be decided on its om facts... . The
nest commonly repested definition was first articulated in
Eneseol, 48 Haw. 268, 292, 367 P.2d21, 13 (2961)]:_ "[Gleneraliy, ‘to
Ecnstitace an abuse it ust sppear that the court clearly exceeded the
bounds of reason oF disregarded rules or principles of law or practice
fo the substantial detrinent of a party litigant.” This definition ts
appropriate Eecsuse it highlights the great deference appellate courts
(cont inved.-

 

      

   

 

   

ey
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the “abuse of discretion” standard only after determining that
the legislature intended that a decision be a matter of
discretion. In applying that standard, we analyze whether the
exercise of “discretion” is within the boundaries of discretion
established by the legislature, as well as the more direct
question of whether the bounded discretion was abused. See
Paul's Elec. Serv., 104 Hawai'i at 417, 91 P.3d at 499.

As review of the HEPA statutory framework makes clear,
blind deference to agency exenption determinations is not
appropriate. An agency making an exemption determination must
make four determinations (defining the action, whether it fits
into an exenpt class, whether an exclusion to the exenption
applies, and whether the exemption is consistent with the letter
and intent of HEPA because it will “probably have minimal or no
significant effects on the environment”), and comply with the
procedural consultation requizenent. Although these

determinations may involve factual questions, the final

 

continued)
and conveys the high burden
E muse Reet to overcome,

    

Howl's Elec, Serv, 108 Hawas's at 419, 91 F.3d at S01 (alteration in
original) (quoting Michael J. Yoehil, 20 ds of Review in Sawai,

To, Haw. L. Rev. 273, 292-93 (1988)}.

Nowever, while characterizing the abuse of discretion standard
néeferential,* we have never suggested that there is an additional
Geferential above of discretion” standard. fea dd. ("A ‘high burden,’ @
sbeavy burden,’ and ‘eference’ are all ways of expressing this sane concept:
that a determination nade by sn administrative agency ecting within the
Boundaries of its delegated authority will not be overturned unless
‘srbitrary, or capricicus, or charecterizeé by.» - [a] clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.”

   

 

 

3s
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conclusion that an action is exempt is a legal one. Moreover,
whether or not an agency has followed the correct procedures or
considered the appropriate factors in making its determination is
a question of law. Therefore, a reviewing court must determine
whether the agency's factual determinations were clearly
erroneous, and whether it otherwise complied with HEPA and its
implementing regulations, as a matter of law.

Although HAR § 11-200-8 makes an exemption
determination discretionary, see HAR § 11-200-8 (actions .

may be declared exempt . -

 

, the rule delegating exemption
decisions to the proposing or accepting agency was made by the
Environnental Council. This delegation was not made by the
legislature. See Paul's Elec. Serv., 104 Hawai'i at 417, 91 P.3d
at 499 ("[Z]E 2 statute does not grant an agency discretion with
which to interpret or implenent that statute, then that agency's
legal conclusions will be reviewed de novo.” (Emphasis added.)).
Moreover, while CEQC may have discretion in various areas of its
expertise, it has no statutory role in reviewing exenption
determinations to which this court must defer. See supra note
20. Exemption determinations made by proposing or accepting
agencies should therefore be reviewed as a matter of law, under

the standards elaborated above. Cf, Citizens Acainst Reckless
% california courts employ de nove review when reviewing excnption

Getorminations under their sinilar statute, the California Environmental
(eontinved...)

36
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Develonment v, Zoning Ad, of Appeals of Honolulu, 114 Hawai'i

184, 194-95, 159 P.3d 143, 153-54 (2007) ("By empowering agencie:
generally with the authority to adopt rules regarding the manner
in which declaratory ruling petitions shali be considered and
disposed of, the legislature has granted agencies discretion with
regard to the consideration of declaratory rulings . . . [but
t)he boundaries of that discretion . . . are established. . .
by reading the statute and the agency rules in tandem.
also Paul's Elec. Serv.

500 ("The boundaries of an agency's discretion are established by

 

+ See
104 Hawai" at 417-18, 91 P.3d at 499~

 

the legislature . . . and these statutory boundaries will likely
assist a reviewing court in defining ‘discretion’ when the court
examines an agency's action for an sbuse of discretion.”);

Dixector, Dep't of Labor and Indu "

Cos, 104 Hawai'i 22, 32, 84 P.34 530, 540 (Hawai'i App. 2004)
(The Key to especial deference to an agency's interpretation of

its own rules and regulations, then, is the agency's legislative

#(. . .continved)
Quality AEE (CEQA), Cal. Pub. Rea. Code $6 22000-21177. See Santa Manica
ber of C < aie, 102 Cel. App. tth 766, 152, 124

Guin iptes 2a 751, 736 (Cals Gk. Reps 2002) ("in reviewing City’s
Getexmination that the legislation fell within a categorical exemption to CEOA
Feview, the task of the trial court was, and ours is, to determine whether, 38
sraatter of lew, the legislation net the definition of a categorically exehet,
Broject .. . [iJn other words, we apply a de novo standard of review. -
(Citations onitted.))/ Centinela Horn, Aae’a v, City of Inolewead, 228 'ca1.
App. 301586, 1599, 275 Cal. Rpty. 901, 910 (Cal. Ce. App. 1990) ("The scope
Of an exenption provided by statute is\s question of statutory interpretation
and also che of law. In reviewing the trial court's ruling, the appellate
Coart hae an independent fonction, and need not defer to the trial court's
Foling.” (Quotation signals onietec

 

 

 

 

 

”
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prerogative and the expertise it acquires, in promulgating as
well as enforcing its own rules and regulations.”).
IIT. DISCUSSION

A. Standing

Appellants assert that they have standing in this case
based on two grounds: (1) traditional injury in fact and (2)
“procedural” standing. As discussed infra, our caselaw has
endorsed both theories, We believe that Appellants have
established standing baced on either theory, and herein review
both grounds.

1, The Law of Standing
a. general principles of standing
“Standing 1s concerned with whether the parties have the

right to bring suit.” nse Fund v. Pun _
Venture, 77 Hawal't 64, 67, G02 F.2d 1210, 213 11998)

Snt ie"wei settied that the crvcial inquiry with regard to
standing is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a
Perscnal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
Nazrant his or her invocation of the court's jufiedietion
dnd to justify exercise of the court's renedial powers on
his or her bereits” atsce Naviaat
Corp, 81 Sevaii 270, 275, 916

 

 

 

 

Préd 680, 688 11996).
Mottl v. Mivahira, 95 Hawai'i 361, 389, 23 P.3d 716, 724 (2001)
(quoting Akinaka v, Discliplinary Bd, of Hawai'i Supreme Court,

91 Hawai't 51, $5, 97 P.2d 1077, 1081 (1999).

 

To determine whether a plaintiff has the requisite
stake, we employ a three-part standing test, requiring that the

plaintiff satisfy the following questions in the affirmative:

Fy
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(2) has the plaintsee suffered an actual or threatened
injury’... 70") (2) de the injury fairly traceable to the
defendant's’ actions; and (3) would a favorable decision
ikely provide relic for plaineife's injury.

 

   

 

Motel, 95 Hewai'i at 389, 23 P.3d at 724.

The standing doctrine described above is based on this
court's prudential rules of judicial self-governance. As this
court stated in Life of the land v. Land Use Commission, 63 Haw.
166, 623 P.2d 431 (1981):

‘Though the courte of Hawaii are not subject to a “cases or
controversies” Linitation ike that inposed upon the federal
judiciary by Article 111, § 2 of the United States
Goneticution, we revertholess believe Judicial power to
Fesolve public disputes in a systen of governnent where
there is'a separation of powers should be linited to those
Questions capable of Judicial resolution and presented in
Eserssry context. “Reliable Collection asency, Lea,
2803, 810, 864 F.2d 107, 111 (1918). For
ules" of Judicial self-governance “founded in
ited role of courte

 

       

 

 

 

in'a denceratie society” 21
Marth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 450, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2157, 2204, 45
Litd.2a'343 (1375). See alee Schleaincer v. Reserviate
Gcmnittes to Stop the War, #18 0.8. 208, Z2i-27, 94 S.Ct.
3825, 2932-38, 41 1.83.24 706 (1978). And even’ én the
Bbsehce of constitutional restrictions, courts still
Carefully weigh the wisdom, efficacy, snd tineliness of an
exercise of their pouer before acting, especially where
there say be an intrusion into areas committed £0 cther
Branches of governsent. In short, judicial intervention dn
2 dispute is normally contingent upon the presence of a
“susticiable” controversy, gee State v. Maxell, 62 Haw.
586, $62, €17 P.2d 816, 820 (1580); Mong vy, Beard of

62 Maw. 391, 594-95, 616 F.20 201, 203-05 (1380)

Regents,
snd cases cited therein; Schuab v, Arivoshi, 5€ Haw. 25, 37,

 

 

    

 

the original quote included the additional phra a result of
the defendant's wrengfel conduct.” Hewever, because the second prong deals
with caurstion, oF the “traceability” of the injury to the defendant's
Sctiong, there Se no need to include this elenent within the first prong,
sich focoren on the nature of the injury asserted by the plaintiff” Sap.

iblic Acces a, 78 Hawa
Gt acid gos feoe Late, 1285 acts Co98) ibe nectssory tlenents
Majury in fact’ ineiude: 1} an actual or threatened injury, whieh 2) <3
traceable to the chsllenged action, and 3) is likely to be reneaied by
fevorable judicial action.” (Esphaeie onitted.)).

 

 

 

 

 

      

 

39
 

+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

S64 P.2d 135, 142-43 (1977); Territory v, tam, 36 Haw. 32,
35 (1542).

Ida at 171-72, 623 P.2d at 438.

However, in addition to this court's judicially
Geveloped standing rules, this court must take guidance from
applicable statutes or constitutional provisions regarding the
right to bring suit, See id, at 172 6 n.5, 623 P.2d at 438 6 n.5
(stating that “stending requisites . . . may also be tenpered, or
even prescribed, by legislative and constitutional declarations
of policy,” and citing to the declaratory judgment statute, HRS
chapter 632, and the Hawai'i Constitution, article XI, section 9,
Environnental Rights) «

We have also stated on many occasions that the
“touchstone” of this court’s notion of standing is “the needs of

4d, at 176, 623 P.2d at 441, cited in Mottl, 95 Hawai't

 

justicn
at 389-90, 23 P.3d at 724-25, and that “standing requirements

should not be barriers to justice

 

” Rather, quoting the words of
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, we have endorsed the view that
“[o]ne whose legitimate interest is in fact injured by illegal
action of an agency or officer should have standing because
justice requires that such a party should have a chance to show
that the action that hurts his interest is illegal.” Nahuiki v.
Planning Commission, 65 Haw. 506, 512-13, 654 P.2d 874, 878
(1982) (alteration in original) (quoting East Diamond Head Ass'n

«
 

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AWEST’S HAWAT'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Ys Zoning Ecard of Appeals, $2 Haw, 518, 523 n.5, 479 P.2d 796,
799 n.$ (1971) (quoting Kenneth C. Davis, The Liberalized Law of
Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450, 473 (1970))).

b. standing in environmental cases generally

As this court hes recognized, “the appellate courts of
this state have generally recognized public interest concerns
that warrant the lowering of standing barriers in. . . cases

«+ pertaining to environmental concerns.” Mottl, 95 Hawai'i

at 393, 23 P.3d at 728 (citing cases). See also Citizens for
Prot. of North Kohala Coastline v. County of Hawai'i, 91 Haw. 94,
100-01, $79 P.2d 1120, 1126-27 (2999) ("[W]here the interests at
stake are in the realm of environmental concerns[,] ‘we have not
been inclined to foreclose challenges to administrative
determinations through restrictive applications of standing
requirenents."" (Quoting Mahuiki v. Planning Comm'n, 65 Haw. at
512, 654 P.2d at 878.) (Bracketed comma in original.)). In
Sierra Club v, Hawai'i Tourism Authority, Justice Acoba described

the manner in which standing requirements have been eased in such

 

cases, as composed of three transitions in the law:

this court's opinions have [(1)] moved “from ‘legal right"
to ‘insury in fact’ as the... standard’. . for judging
whether a plaintits's stake in 4 dispute 42 iufficient to
Invoke Judicial intervention(,)" “Life of the Land v, Land
Use Comm'n, 63 Ham. 166, 174, €23 P.2d 431, 438 (1581),
[l@)] from “economic harm . |. (to inclusion of]
N[alesthetic and envirenental vell-being’* as interests
deserving of protection, si +56 Haw.
260, 265 358 P.20 1102, 1108 m. 1 (1998) (quoting

United States'v, Students Challencing Reaulatory Aoency
Hiscedures GCSAPL, 422 018. G63, €oe, 39 S.Ct. 2408, 97

   

 

     

a
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L.fd.24 284 (1973)), ond [(3)] to the recognition that "a
manber of the public has standing to ‘enforce the
Fights of the public even though his (or her] injury is not
Gifferent in kind from the public's generally, if he [or
She] can show that he [or she] has suffered an injury in
fect(-]" ksu'y, Olshana Corp., 68 Haw. 363, 366, 652 .24
3150, 113¢ (1382)

 

 

  

 

100 Hawai'i 242, 251, 59 P.34 677, 686 (2002) (plurality opinion)
(alterations in original, except for addition of bold nunbers).
Therefore, environsental plaintiffs must meet the three-part
standing test, descrited above, although there will be no
requirenent that their asserted injury be particular to the
plaintiff, and the court will recognize harms to a plaintiff's
environnental interests as injuries that may provide the besis
for standing.

The less rigorous standing requirenent this court
applies in environmental cases draws support from the Havai"t
Constitution, article XI, section 9. Entitled “Environmental
Rights," that section states

Tach person has the right to a clean and healthful
envireonent, as defined by laws relating to enviromental
quality, including control of pollution and conservation,
Protection and entancenent of hatural resources. Any person
ay enforce this right agsinat any party, poblic or private
ThEough eppropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable
Limitations and regulation as provided by law.

     

 

        

Haw. Const., art. XI, § 9, cited in Life of the Land, 63 Haw. at
271 n.5, 623 P.2d at 438 n.5 and Hawai‘i Tourism Auth., 100

Hawai'i at 276, 59 P.3d at 911 (Moon, J., dissenting); see also

avis K, Poai, Recent Developments, Hawai'i’s Justiciability
Doctrine, 26 U. Haw. L. Rev. 537, 563 n.214 (2004) (stating that

a
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“the most persuasive argument for environmental standing is that
it has been constitutionally recognized,” and citing article XI,
section 9, of the Hawai'i Constitution).

c Soe 4 .

Because “standing requisites (may be] prescribed [] by
legislative . . . declarations of policy,” Life of the Land, 63
Haw. at 172, 623 P.2d at 438, it is important to examine the HEPA
statute in order to determine whether and in what fashion it
modifies the standing inquiry outlined above. Based on the
statute and our caselaw, we conclude that HRS § 243-7 grants a
plaintiff standing to sue either on the basis of a traditional

injury in fact or on the basis of a procedural injury.

4% Although thie court has cited this anendnent os support for our
approach to standing in envircnmental cases, see, ¢.d. Life of the tang, 63
Haws at 277 n15, 629 #20 at 443 nis, thls Court has not directly
Interpreted the text of the anendnent,” But see 48 a,
Sa ar5' (Sine canner Sn uhich Brenerés Fights unter article A may be
enforced, however, 18 governed by section 9° qualification that any such
Segal proceeding be ‘subject to yessonable Linitations and regulation as
proviced by lew.’ How. Const. art. XI, § 9. Because Hawai Reviced Statutes
bhe'343 proviges ressosable Limitations and regulations for adjudicsting
Eiiputes involving environmental sssessnents, Brenner's failure to comply with
its" provisions forecicees further consideration of his constitutional
Cilin"). Because the HEPA statute has specific language regarding who may
Gaforce the law, snd the parties have not discussed the constituticnal,
provision in their appellate briefs, further discussion of the meaning of
Ereicle XI, section 9 of, the Constitution ie not warranted.

hans wuners Aesth v. Waui County Council, 86 Hawaii 132, 134, 348
P.2d 122, 124 (1997) (citing to legislative history of HRS § 607-25, in which
the legislature nade reference to the constitutional enendnent, stating that
S[tihe legislature finds that article XI, section 9, of the constitution of
the State of (Hawai'i) has given the public standing to use the courts to
Enforce lene intended fo protect the environment” (Alteration in original.)
(Emphasis odded.)).

   

   

   

 

 

 

    

 
     

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i. “injuzy” in general

Of critical importance in assessing whether a plaintiff
has standing to sue is assessing the nature of the injury
alleged, as each element of the standing test depends on the
theory of injury presented by the plaintiff and adopted by the
court. See Cnty, Treatment Ctrs, v. City of Westland, 970 F.
Supp. 1197, 1208 (E.D. Mich. 1997) ("[T]he resolution of a
standing question often depends on how the court characterizes
the alleged injury.”).

Furthermore, although a plaintiff may be injured in any
number of ways, the injury prong of the standing inguiry requires
an assertion of a judicially-cognizable injury, that is, a harm
to some legally-protected interest. See Bremer, 96 Hawai'i at
140, 28 P.3d at 356 ("{A] plaintiff’s ‘personal stake’ in the
outcome of a controversy may arise from a defendant's
nfrincenent of personal or special interests that is separate
and distinct from the traditional basis of infringement of legal
rights or privileges.” (Enphasis added.) (Citing Life of the
land, 63 Haw. at 172-77, 623 P.2d at 438-41.)); Hawai'i Tourism
Auth,, 100 Hawai'i at 251, 59 P.3d at 686 (plurality opinion)
("This court's opinions have moved from ‘legal right’ to ‘injury
in fact’ as the. . . standard . . . for judging whether a
plaintiff's stake in a dispute is sufficient to invoke judicial
intervention.” (Quotation signals removed.)}. Cf. Raines ve

“
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Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997) ("We have also stressed that the
alleged injury must be legally and judicially cognizeble.”)
Luian ¥. Defonders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ("First,
the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ -- an
nvasion of a legally protected interest . . . .” (Emphasis
added.)); 13 Charles A. Wright, et al. Federal Practice &
Procedure § 3531.2, at 922 (Supp. 2007) ("The injury element of
constitutional standing requirenents may be denied, despite a
showing of injury in fact, if the injury is not ‘judicially
cognizable.!”).

‘This court has recognized a variety of interests that,
if injured, can form the basis for standing. In environmental
cases, injuries to recreational and aesthetic interests have been
acknowledged as forming the basis for a plaintiff's standing.
See, e.0., Akau v. Olohana Corp,, 65 Haw. 363, 390, 652 P.2d
1130, 1135 (1962) (finding that plaintiffs had standing to bring
class action to enforce rights-of-way along once public trails to
the beach that crossed defendants’ property because “difficulty
in getting to the beach hampers the use and enjoyment of it and
may prevent or discourage use in sone instances”); Citizens for
Prot. of North Kohala Coastline, 91 Hawai'i at 101, 979 P.2d at
1127 (holding that citizen group had standing to challenge
agency's issuance of special managenent area permit for
construction of coastline resort because the group's menbers,
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although not owning land adjoining the project area, were “long
time and frequent users” of the coastline, for such uses as
fishing, “picnics, . . . swinning and boating,” and therefore
“injury to its members’ quality of life is threatened”); Bele
Def. Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai'i 64, 70, 881 P.2d
1210, 1216 (1994) (finding that Pele Defense Fund, which had
appealed the grant of certain permits to the geothermal venture,
“clearly denonstrated an ‘injury in fact’" based on its assertion
of “potential harm including diminished property values,
deterioration of air quality, odor nuisance, and possible
physical injury resulting from the permitted operations”). In
addition, although plaintiffs must show that some
environmentally-related interest was injured, the ultimate
Inquiry depends on injury to the plaintiffs themselves, not the
environment. See, ¢.c., Hawai'i Tourism Auth., 100 Hawai'i at
271, 89 P.3d at 906 (Moon, J., dissenting) (stating that
organizational plaintiff must show that its “plaintiff members -~
not the environment -- have been or will be harmed”); id. at 251
n.15, $9 P.3d at 886 n.15 (plurality opinion) (stating that
“actual or threatened injury is that set forth in the affidavits
of Petitioner's members,” but evaluating the claim of harm to the
environment as a means of assessing whether Plaintiffs suffered
an actual or threatened injury); cf. Friends of the Barth, Inc.
vs Envtl, Servs. (70¢), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000) (“The
 

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relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing . . . is

not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.”).
44. “procedural injury”

A majority of our court has also recognized the concept

of “procedural injury” as a basis for standing.” See Hawai’
Tourism Auth., 100 Hawai'i at 265, 59 P.3d at 900 (Nakayama, J.,

concurring) ("Procedural standing is appropriate for cases
alleging violations of HRS Chapter 343."); id at 272, 59 P.3d at
907 (Moon, J., dissenting, joined by Levinson, J.) (*{Alny

alleged injury resulting from HTA’s purported failure to follow
the provisions of chapter 343 is in the nature of a ‘procedural’

injury.”). This subset of standing doctrine -- known as

 

“procedural standing” -- derives from footnote seven of the

United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Lujan, in which the
court stated that “[t]he person who has been accorded a
procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert

that right without meeting all the normal standards for

tn Hawai'i Tourism Authority, Justice Accba wrote the plurality
opinion, joined by Justice Ramil, in which they opined that the plaintiffs
SEcleg Standing and that “procedural standing” was net available under HEPA.
The dissent, written by Chief Justice Moon end Joined by Justice Levinscn,
iosld have found that plaintiffs had established standing Bese on the theory
Of sprocedursl standing.” Justice Wakayana wrote the decisive concurrence,
Which endorsed the viebiliey of "procedural standing” under HEPA, bot
iG that plaintiffs had failed to establish standing under that theory
‘Therefore, as discussed infra, despite
(t standing wae not established in ssuai't Tourism Authority, the
fabiishing standing on the basie of a “procedural injury”
joreed by 2 majority of the mesbers of the court.

 

 

    
 
 

     

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redressability and innediacy." 504 U.S. at $729.7." The
procedural standing doctrine was recently reaffirmed by the
United States Supreme Court in Mageachusetts v, Environsental
votection , 127 $.Ct 1438, 1441 (2007) (IA Litigant to
whom Congress has ‘accorded a procedural right to protect his

concrete interests,’ -- here, the right to challenge agency

 

action unlawfully withheld -- ‘can assert that right without
meeting all the normal standards for redressability and
immediacy.’ (Citations omitted.) (Quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572

aT) s

 

sed on the statements in Lujan, federal courts have
created various tests to determine whether a plaintiff has
established standing based on a procedural injury. while these

tests modify the manner in which the traditional three-part

standing test is met, see Friends of the Farth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
EnvtL. Serve., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (three-part

Article III standing test); Mottl, 95 Hawai'i at 389, 23 P.3d at
724 (three-part Hawai'i standing test), they still require that a
plaintiff show an injury, which is fairly traceable to the

Gefendant’s actions, and which is redressable by court action.

 

in footnote eight of Ste opinion, the Court clarified that an
individual can enforce procedsral rights “so long as the procedures in
Gueation are designed to protect sone threatened concrete interest of his that.
We"the watinate basis of his stanaing.” S04 U.S. at 573 9.8, This concrete
Interest requirerent tas been enmeshed {n the procedural standing test a5
Geveleped in cther federal courte, discussed intra.

 

 

 

 
 

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)RTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.

Regarding the injury-in-fact requirement in procedural
standing cases, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a pre-
Lujan case, stated that

‘The procedural injury implicit in agency failure to prepare
an EIS —~ the creation of a risk that serious environmental
Enpacts will be overlooked ~~ is iteelfa sufficient "injury
in fact" ‘to support standing, provided this injury is
alleged by a plaintiff having & sufficient geographical
nexus to the site of the challenged project that he may be
Sapected to suffer whatever environmental consequences the
project may has

 

 

    

 

 

City of Davis v. Coleman, 21 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975).
Later, in Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir.
1995), denied, 516 U.S. 1042 (1996), the Ninth Circuit
incorporated the United States Supreme Court's statements in
Iuian, and boiled procedural standing down to “two essential
elements”: that the person seeking suit on the basis of a
procedural injury (1) is a “person who has been accorded a
procedural right to protect [his or her] concrete interests and

(2) . « « has some threatened concrete interest that is the

 

% this formulation, which focuces on risk, i¢ siniler to that proposed
by Chief Justice Woon in Bawa for evaluating procedural
injuries under HRS chapter 243. Seq 100 Hawai’ at 272, 89 P.3d at 307
(Cit}he alleged injury{, in a challenge to an agency’s failure to conduct an
Eas] is that ene agency’ acte without considering potentially teignificant
effects! of the envircmmental consequences of its actions, irrespective of
Whether there is actual environmental harm.”).

 

 

™ tn Poualas County, the County had “assert{ed] that it has standing
led upon ite procedural injoziee resulting from the [government's] failure
to prepare an environmental decunent that explores @ range of alternatives and
Conulative effecte.’” 48 F.3d at 1500. The County was challenging, under
NEPA, the Secretary of the Interior's decision that St need not prezare an ER
hen’ st designated certain federal land a8 "eritical habitat” for the Rorthern
Spotted Onl. Id, at 1458-99. Therefore, the underlying procedural injury was
the allegation that a procedoral requirement of NEFA =~ conducting an EA =~
es not followed.

 

 

 

 
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ultimate basis of [his or her] standing.” Id. at 1500, cited in

aii Tourism Auth., 100 Hawai"t at 274, $9 P.3d at 909 (Moon,

 

dissenting). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that the
concrete interest “nust be within the zone of interests NEPA was
designed to protect,” id, at 1501, and explained that a “concrete
interest” could be denonstrated by showing that a plaintiff has a
“geographic nexus” to the site of the challenged project. Id at
1800 n.5. See also Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Deo’t of
Barics, 241 F.3d 961, 971 (9th Cir. 2003) ("In NEPA cases, ve
have described [the] ‘concrete interest’ test as requiring a
‘geographic nexus’ between the individual asserting the claim and
the location suffering an environnental impact." (Quoting Public
Citizen v. Dep't of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1015 (Sth Cir.
2003)).). The Tenth Circuit has framed the procedural standing
inguiry in a similar way, stating that:

lan agency's failure to follow the National Environsental
Poiiey Act"s prescribed procedures creat
Serious envircnnental consequences of the egency
ot be brought to the agency decissonnaker's attention: ‘The
Gnjury of an incressed risk of harm due to an agency”
uninformed decision is precisely the type of injury t
National Environnental Policy Act mas designed to prevent.
Snder the Neticnal Environmental Policy Act, an niury
Of alleged increased envircnnental Fisks due to an agency's
uninforned decisicnsaking nay be the foundation for injury
in fact under Article ITT.

 

     

 

   

 

Comm, to Save the Bio Hondo ¥, Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 448-49 (ZOth
Cir, 1996). The Tenth Circuit has also described the additional
requirenent of showing a threat to one’s concrete interests as

necessary to show that a “plaintiff [18] among the injured.” Id.

so
 

{tL FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***_
at 449, See alse Hawai'i Tourism Auth., 100 Hawai'i at 276, 59
P.3d at 876 (Moon, J., dissenting) (*(A] particular plaintiff
must be among the injured”).
In more recent cases, the Ninth Circuit has required

that plaintiffs seeking “to show a cognizable injury in fact

+ must allege . . . that (1) the agency violated certain
procedural rules; (2) these rules protect a plaintiff’s concrete
interests; and (3) it {s reasonably probable that the challenged

action will threaten their concrete interests.” City of

to v. O'NeilL, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004)
(brackets omitted) (quoting Citizens for Better Forestry, 341

F.3d at 969-70).
Taken as a whole, these cases illustrate that although
the requizenents for asserting a cognizable procedural injury may
be framed differently by different courts, at a minimum, a
plaintifé must suffer some procedural wrong as well as a threat
to underlying conerete interests. See also Ashlev Creek
hate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir, 2005) ("A
free-floating assertion of a procedural viclation, without @
concrete Link to the interest protected by the procedural rules,
dees not constitute an injury in fact.”),
With regard to other elements of the standing inquiry,
the Ninth Circuit has stated that “[olnce a plaintiff has
established an injury in fact under NEPA, the causation and

Bs
 

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redreseability requirenents are relaxed." Citizens for Better
Forestry, 341 F.3d at 975. The causation element concerns
whether the asserted injury is fairly traceable to the
defendant's actions, and thus it has been said that “(t]o
establish causation, a plaintiff need only show its increased

risk is fairly traceable to the agency’s failure to comply with

[NEPA].” Comm, to Save Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 452. See also
Citizen's for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 975 ("[CJausation

=. + 4s only Smplicated where the concern is that an injury
caused by a third party is teo tenucusly connected to the acts of
the defendant.”); Idaho Conservation Leaque v. Munna, 956 F.2d

1508, 1518 (9th Ciz. 1992) ("The causation question concerns only
whether plaintiffs’ injury 1s dependent upon the agency's policy,
or is instead the result of independent incentives governing [al

third part [y's] decisionmaking process.”).”

® tn Ballz, Norton, the Ninth Circuit stated that the causation
requizenent Ss satisfied 1f the plaintiff establishes « “reasonable
Erdbabilitye ofa threst to the plaintiff's concrete interests. 266 F. 2d
Bea, 376 (ach Cir. 2001). However, the “reasonable probability” issue
Conterns whether an injury in fact has occurred, as later Ninth Circuit cases
Scinewtedge by adopting thet lengusge from Hall as the third prong of the
Gnjury-inefact test. See alag Com, to Save Rio Honda, 102 F.3d at 451-52
Cihether an incrested rise will or will not occur due to the agency action
determines whether a plaintiff has suffered injury in fact, not causation.
Corteialy, wnser the injury-in-fact prong, @ plaintiff cannot merely allege
Ghat sone highly attencated, fanciful environnental risk will result from the
Sgeney decision? the risk sist be actual, threatened or inminent. However,
l20°%ne plainsiff has established the 1ikelihood of the increased risk for
furpeses of dajury in fact, to establish causation, as the Connittee has her
Exetpinintiff eed only trace the risk of harm co the agency's alleged failure
to foliom the kaesonal Envirersentel Policy Act's procedures.

82

 

 

 

 

 

 

     

  
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With regards to the redressability prong of the
standing analysis, the Ninth Circuit has stated, in conjunction
with other circuits, that a plaintiff “who asserts inadequacy of
2 government’ s environmental studies . . . (need not show that
further analysis by the government would result in a different
conclusion. It suffices that the agency’s decision could be

influenced by the environmental considerations that the relevant

statute requires an agency to study.” Citizens for Better
Forestry, 341 F.3d at 976. See also Massachusetts v. EPR, 127

S.Ct. at 1453 (“When a litigant is vested with a procedural
right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility
that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to

reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.“);

Ela, Audubon Soc'y v, Bentsen, 94 F.3d 653, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(en banc) (noting that procedural injuries are “easily
redressable, as 2 court may order the agency to undertake the
procedure.").

Although other federal circuit courts have developed

different tests for procedural standing,* on the whole the

* see, e.g, Sierra co johnson, 436 F.3d 1268, 1278 (13th cir.
2006) ("we conclude that a plaintiff hae established procedural. injury
standing if he has esteblished that the clained violation of the procedural
Fight caused @ concrete injury in fact to an interest of the plaintiff that
the statute wae designed to protects"); *
Aviation Adain,, 465°F.3d 1281, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (We have SVE THE ‘Lal
Violation of the procedural requirenents of a statute is sufficient to avant h
plaintife standing to sue, so long 3 the procedural’ sequiresent was sesigned
to protect sone threstened concrete interest of the plaintiff.’” (Alteration
(cont inved: -.)

 

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various approaches denonstrate that the procedural standing
doctrine is a means of acconnodating the standing inquiry to the
special circumstances created by injuries to statutory procedural
rights.

Therefore, in summary, three important features of the

procedural standing doctrine may be noted:

 

(2) it 1s based ona
specific characterization of a plaintiff's injury, namely the
Genial of sone procedures mandated by law; (2) whether there is a
procedural injury in turn depends on whether the plaintiff has
been accorded a procedural right, an analysis which by its nature
focuses on the statutory franework in question; and (3) the
plaintiff’s procedural right must be coupled with an underlying
concrete interest.
444. procedural standing under HRS § 343-7
There is procedural standing for menbers of the public
under HEPA because it is a procedural statute that accords
Procedural rights. See Life of the Land, 63 Haw. at 172, 623
P.2d at 438 ("[S]tanding requisites... may. . . be tempered,
oF even prescrited, by legislative and constitutional
declarations of policy.”).
%(,. continued)
nstans. U.Ss Forsat Ser. $00 Foe 948, 382-83" (Fen Cas, 2008)
proceciral Fight can be fesecled hy & fecteat court only ween the tndfessent

‘who has been Geprived of that right can demonstrate that deprivation of that
Fight is related to ancther concrete injury."

    

 

 

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ICREPORTER ***
The specific HEPA provision at issue in this case is
HRS § 343-7, entitled “Limitation on actions,” subsection (a),
which concerns challenges to decisions not to provide an
environmental assessment. That subsection provides:

Any judicial proceeding, the subject of which is the lack of
aesegsnent required under section 343-5, shall be initisted
Within one hundred twenty days of the agency's decision to
Carry cut oF approve the action, or, if a proposed action is
Gndefteken without a formal determination by the agency that
2 statenent is or is not required, a Judicial proceeding
Shall be instieutes within one hundred ewenty Says after the
Proposed action ie started. The council or Office, any
Sgeney responsible for approval of the action, or the
applicant shall be adjudged an aggrieved party for the
purposes of bringing judicial acticn under this subsection.

 

 

 

   

 

 

RS § 343-7(a) (emphasis added) .
With respect to standing, HRS § 343-7(a) differentiates
two sets of parties with respect to their status as “aggrieved
part [ies] for the purposes of bringing judicial action” under the
subsection: (1) the council or office, any agency responsible
for approval of the action, or the applicant,” who “shall be
adjudged an aggrieved party"; and (2) “others” who “nay be

adjudged aggrieved,” “by court action.” As noted by the

 

% Both the text and the legislative history of HRS § 343-7 indicate
that se concerns “standing requisites.” In its original version, as passed by
the legislature in 1974, the reference to standing vas explicit. The original
“Ulnitation on Actions” section, whieh corresponds to HRS § 343-7 today, did
not include any statenents that could be construed to relate to standing for
Ssbeeceions (a) and (b), that is, judicial proceedings to challenge the Lack
of an EA of determinations regarding whether or not an EIS will be required.
Rewever; in the third subsection, concerning review of the “acceptability” of
an BIS, the original law included the proviso that “only affected scencies, oF
sad By 8 proposed action and who provides written
Ccanenta to such a stetenent during the designated review period shall nave
to file suit.” HRS § 343-6(c) (1976) (enphacis acced) (current
Yersion at HAS § 343-7(c) (1993)). The report of the Senate Connittes on
(cont insed.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ss
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plurality in Haw thority, “{t]he distinction drawn
in HRS § 343-7(a) is between those named parties who could be

said to have an unquestioned right of action and ‘others,’ who

 

must show that they are aggrieved in some way, in a court
action.” 100 Hawai'i at 263, 59 P.3d at 898 (emphasis added).

Under procedural standing, the language of HRS § 343+
‘T(a) ~- in particular the legisleture’s use of the unique phrase

“nay be adjudaed aggrieved," -~ may be viewed as suggesting
that the legislature specifically intended that the determination

of whether an “other” party is aggrieved in the requisite sense

 

%(,- continued)
Ecology, Envircnment and Recreation that considered the bill also demonstrates
that the committee clearly viewed che “Judicial Review" section se sealing
th standing concerns. Thus, the conuittes report described the effect of
the szencnent ss "provid{ing] '@ citizen standing to sue only when he nas
previcusly been involved in the public vevsew process of the envirnnental
[spact etacenent and when his conmente at that tine desit with the seeves
Gescribed in the suit,” and also stated that “(h]owever, his standing would be
recognized after exhausting the existing renedies open to hin as specified in
Chapter 91." Sen. Comm. Rep. S$6-74, in 1974 Senate Journal, at 1126-27.

‘Bnalogous sections regarding who nay being
subsections (a) and (b) in 1978, whi
Incidentally, at this tine the te
to sue" from Section 343-7(c], instead referring te these who “shall be
adjudged aggrieved partios ‘
this subsection." 1979 Haw. Sess. L. Act 197, § 6, at 412-13 (emphasis
Seed). However, there ie ho relevant legislative history on these chenges,
fe major changes of the 1979 law focused on other ereas ~~ the renainder being
Characterized by the Senate Committee Report as “primarily hoveekeeping
Ghanges.” Sen. Comm. Rep. 628, in 1979 Senate Journal, at 1268.

‘Therefore, although the iegisiative history of HRS § 343-7 is not
porticularly enlightening with respect to what standing requirenente must be
fulsiiled in order for a party to bring judicial action uncer EFA, ‘the
legislative history dees clearly indicate that the subsection is directed at
the question of standing to sue.

 

 

 
 

  

 

 

   

 

% me plurality noted in Hsual" Touriem Authority that the phrase
“{o)thers, by court action nay be sdjodged aggrieved is sui generis, not
appearing’ in any cther state or federal statute. 100 Hawal'i at 269 1.92, $9
Pisa ae 898 nai.

 

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be left with the courts, once such a pasty has initiated a “court
action.”” Because standing in Hawai'i is a judicial rule of
self-restraint, it has been the role of our courts in the first
Instance to determine the types of interests and injuries that
give a party standing to sue. See, e.g., Life of the Land, 63
Maw, a8 273, 174, 623 #2 at 439 (stating that Howas't deciatons
have paralleled, in avbstance, the evolution of federal
doctrine,” which has undergone “transition from ‘Legal right!
to “njury in fact’ as the federal standard in the realm of
envixonmental concerns for Judging whether a plaintift’s stake in
a dispute is sufficient to invoke judicial intervention”). See
also Int'] Prinate Prot, Lesoue v. Adm’ es of Tulane Educ, Fund,
S00 U.8. 72, 77 (2991) ("[sitanding 12 gauged by the specific
common-law, statutory of constitutional claims that a party
presents.), suzerseded on other arounds by statute, Federal
courts Inprovenent Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-917, § 206, 110
stat, 2847, 2850; Valley Forge College v. Anericans United, 454
U.S, 464, 492 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Neither
“palpable injury’ nor ‘causation’ is @ texm of unvazying seaning.
There is much in the way of “mutual understandings’ and
‘conmon-law traditions’ that necessarily guides the definitional
ana ¢ 343-010) may be cond an indicating that the legisiature
So"enguce that Seeker" partien seat the ainiaal Sequirenent of being.”

Saggrieved,” clarifying and distinguishing euch parties from the named parties
whe would have an automatic right of action.

 

 

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inguiry.”). Therefore, under the concept of procedural standing,

 

an “other” party may demcnstrate that it is “aggrieved” on the
basis of a procedural injury.

There is evidence that the legislature may have
understood HEPA to be procedural in nature, and thus affording a
procedural right unto parties who seek to challenge nonconformity
with its requirements. See Fernandez v, Brock, 840 F.2d 622, 629
(9th Cir. 1988) ("[1]n order to determine whether Congress
intended to create procedural rights from the imposition of
statutory duties, we should look for evidence in the statutory
language, the statutory purpese, and the legislative history.”).

Indeed, in Hawai'{ Tourism Authority Justice Nakayama st

“federal courts’ construction of procedural standing is

 

a that

appropriate as applied to HEPA because, similar to its federal
counterpart, NEPA, HEPA sets forth various requirements that are
inherently procedural.” Hawai'{ Tourism Auth., 100 Hawai'i at
266, 59 P.3d at 901 (Nakayama, J., concurring). The inherently
procedural nature of HEPA’s requirements was amply demonstrated
in Justice Nakayama’s concurrence:

‘The sain thrust of HEPA is to require agencies to
consider the environmental effecte of projects befere action
is taken. Te coos co by proviaing & procedural mechanisn to
review environmental concerns. HRS §°343-1 (1993). The
legislature explained that HEFA provides an “environmental
review process [that] will integrate the review of
environmental concerns with existing planning proces
the State and Counties and alert decision naxers to
slanificant enviromental effects which may result from the
mentation of certain scticns.”” HRS § 343-1. One of
the prececurel Coole ef HERR ie an EA, hich de aed’ eo

    

 

of

 

 
 

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determine circumstances under which a particelar action will
have @ significant effect on the environment. HRS § 363-2
(Sopp. 2001). Tf the EA concludes that a significant impact
in expected, an Environmental Tmpact Statement (E18), among
other things, ‘must be prepared. HRS § 243-2) ERS §
543-5 (b). TE po significant effect is expected, the agency
Subsite a craft EA that sust be available for public cement
and review. HRS § 343-S(b). ("Whenever an agency proposes,
section (a); ... + hat agency shall prepare

fan environsental assesezent’ for such action at the earliest,
practicable tine to deternine uhether an envirorsental

‘Statenent shall be required. For environental
nents fOr which a finding of no significant impact is
anticipated, a draft environmental cssessnent shall be made
available for public review and coment for a period of
thirty days.*)" Consequently, HEPA does not confer
substantive rights or renedies, To insist that =
prospective plaintiff denonstrate substantive standing
Pursuant tos statute that confers only procedural rights
Tgnores the plain language of HRS § 343-7(a)

 

 

 

     

 

 

Id, at 266-67, 59 P.3d at 901-02 (Nakayama, J., concurring)

(alterations in original) (footnotes omitted). The dissent

expressed a similar view of HEPA:

[t]he provisions of chapter 343 are procedural, not
substantive ~~ i.e, uncer chapter 343, the agency must
Consider the potential environmental consequences of ite
actions ang allow public participation in the review
Process, but chapter 343 neither compels the agency to

yy from undertaking, any
Sobstantive action.

  

Id, at 272, 59 P.3d at 907 (Moon, J., dissenting). The dissent

concluded that “[a]ccordingly, any alleged injury resulting from

HTA's purported failure to follow the provisions of chapter 343

is in the nature of a ‘procedural’ injury.” Id.

Other parts of chapter 343 may be viewed as according a

procedural right to merbers of the public. In the “Findings and

 

In her opinion, Justice Nakayana distinguished “substantive

standing,” which referred to the injury-in-fact standing test, from
“procedural sterding,” the test enunciated in Lujan. Seg Hawaii Touriem
ithe, 100 Hawai at 266 n.3, 89 Psd at 901 n.d.

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" section, the legislature states its finding that “the

 

pres
process of reviewing enviromental effects 18 desirable becaus
environpental consciousness is enhanced, cooperation and
coordination are encouraged, and public participation during the
review process benefits al parties involved and society as &
whole.” RS § 343-1 (1993) (emphasis added). The definition of
E18 describes that “[t}he initial statement [1s] filed for public
review" and that the final statenent “is the document that has
incorporated the public's coments and the responses to those
conments.” HRS § 2432, A section entitled “Public records and
notice” states that Of9¢ “shall inform the public of notices
fed by agencies of the availability of environmental
essessnents for review and comments, of determinations that
statements are required or not required, of the availability of
statements for review and coments, and of the acceptance or
nonacceptance of statements,” and also includes specific notice
requirenents. HRS § 343-3. These sections, vhich provide for
public notice and consent as to actions under HEPAY s anbit,
farther suggest that HEPA accords a procedural right unto menbers
of the public. Cf, Dowalas County, 48 F.3d at 1501 ("The County
has been ‘accorded a procedural right’ because NEPA provides that
Socal agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce
environsental standards’ may comment on the propeséd federal

action.”).
 

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By requiring that a party seeking to establish
procedural standing also have an underlying concrete interest

that is threatened

 

and which has been called “the ultimate

basis of its standing” ~

 

the court ensures that the standing
requirement serves its purpose of ensuring that only parties who
have suffered an injury may resort to the court system.” We now
turn to whether Appellants have demonstrated sufficient injury to
establish standing in this case
2, Whether Appellants Have Established Standing

Appellants contend that the circuit court erroneously
concluded that they lack standing, because they have adduced
numerous declarations alleging harms they will suffer due to the
Superferry project, and also because they meet the standards of
procedural standing. Appellees Superferry and State of Hawai'i
argue, in reply, that the circuit court properly found that
Appellants failed to establish standing, for four substantive

reasons: (1) that the injuries claimed by Appellants “are

 

% indeed, as the Ninth Circuit has stated, “(t]he nature of the
Article TI standing inquiry Se not fundamentally changed by the fact that. .
{the party] asserts a. "procedural,’ rather than ‘substantive,’ injury."
386 F.3d at 1197. Although cur standing doctrines are not
Bosed on Article i11 of the United states Constitution, see supra Section
TIEA.iva, the recognition of procedural Anjury similarly does not effect
fundamental change to # less-restrictive standing doctrine.

 

 

 

“© contrary to Appellees’ assertion, the phrase “adjudged aggrieved"
does not present an acaiticnal procedural hurdle, beyond desonstrating that &
party i "eggrieved,” over which plaintiffs must jump.
Therefore, we disagree with the azgunent of Appellees Hawail Superferry,
Ine. and the State of Hawai'i, that appellante’ “faii{ure) to ceek a finding
(continued.

 

 

a
‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
purely speculative and do not rise to an actionable injury” and
are in this regard “virtually identical” to the clained injuries
that were found insufficient to confer standing in Hawas‘s
‘Tourism Authority; (2) that Appellants have failed to establish
that the alleged injuries are attributable to the harbor
Amprovenents or the Hawaii Superferry? (3) that Appellants have
failed to establish that the alleged injury is likely to be
remedied by a favorable decision, because “there is nothing in
the record to indicat {e] thet an alternative to air travel
between islands would necessarily increase any burdens on the
Appellants’ interests"; and (4) that Appellants do not qualify
for “group standing” because the alleged injuries are
personalized injuries that “are not injuries which were/will be
suffered by the menbership of the Sierra Club in general.”

We agree that Appellants have established standing in
this case and that Hawai'i Tourism Authority is distinguishable.

Appellants have suffered both threatened injuries under either a

 

(...continved)
by the Court that [they] were aggrieved parties” is fatel to their case. In
Fact, wo hove interpreted the “adjudged” sepect of this phrase to mean no nore
than’ that a party “ost show Ln a court action brought under § 343-7(a) that
they are aggrieved and must be adjucged aggrieved, in concext with a challenge
to the lack of an TA statenent.” Havaid Tourism Auth, 100 fawai at 262, $9
Pisa st 97 (plurality opinion) (enphesis added). No special finding 1s
Fequired =- Dut a plaineife most bear the burden of establishing standing
they would in any Gther matter. See alee Kepo'e v. Hane, 106 Hewal't 270, 265,
103'P'34 938, 984 (2008) (Finding that plaintiff-intervenors hed standing to
sue under HRS § 343-7(b}, as they net the standing test and “the [lower] ceurt
prarently ‘adiudged’ [them] ‘aggrieved’ within the seaning of SRS § 342-7(b)"
By allowing then to intervene in the case).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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traditional injury-in-fact test or procedural injuries based on a
procedural right test. The threatened injury in fact is due to
DOT's decision to go forward with the harbor improvements and
allow the Superferry project to operate at Kahului harbor without
conducting an EA. Similarly, the procedural injury is based on
the various interests Appellants have identified that are
threatened due to the violation of their procedural rights under
HEPA, Appellants have also demonstrated that the threatened
substantive injuries and procedural injuries were caused by
Appellees and may be redressed by this court. See Mottl, 95
Hawai'i at 369, 23 P.3d at 724. Because the threatened injury in
this case and the procedural injury are virtually the sane, they
are analyzed together.

a. ippellants have established standing based both on

i ‘and pro.
Appellants claim that DOT's approval of an exemption
from the requirenent to prepare an EA was in violation of HEPA,
and caused injury to Appellants’ interests in the following ways:
(1) potential adverse impacts to endangered species caused by
high-speed ferries; (2) threatened increase in the introduction
of alien species through the inplenentation of the Hawaii
superferry project; (3) adverse inpacts to recreational interests
of menbers who “use and enjoy Kehului Harbor for surfing, diving

and canoeing”; and (4) adverse traffic impacts caused by the

6
 

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Hawaii Superferry project to menbers who are “regular vehicular
veers of Kaahumanu Avenue, near the Kahului harbor.”

A threatened injury under the traditional injury-in-
fact test may be shown based on direct personal interests in the
site of a project coupled with concerns of actual injury should
the project go forvard without adequate environmental review.

For example, in Kepo', this court found that the president of a
homeowners’ association and the association itself had standing
to challenge, under HRS § 343-7(b), an EA that had been conducted
for the proposed construction and operation of a cogeneration
power plant and that had found no significant impact, thus
obviating the requirement of an EIS. 106 Hawai'i at 284-85, 103
P.3d at 953-54, The Mauna Kea residential conmunity, which was
represented by the association, vas located two miles away froma
proposed power plant. Id, at 285, 103 P.3d at 954. The
president and the association asserted that they had a “direct
personal interest in whether the potential adverse environmental
impacts of the proposed plant are thoroughly considered.” Id.
‘The president regularly surfed and swam in the coastal waters
near the proposed plant. Moreover, he and the association were
“concerned that the proposed plant will (1) cause air and water
pollution which in turn will injure their health and diminish
property values and (2) attract heavy industry which could
further aggravate these problems.” Id, Based on these facts, we
 

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concluded: “[s]uch factors which would appear to satisfy an
Anjury-in-fact requirement." Id. See also Akau, 65 Haw. at 388,
390, 652 P.2d at 1134, 1135 (holding “that a menber of the public
has standing to sue to enforce the rights of the public... if
he can show that he has suffered an injury in fact” by
“demonstrat [ing] scme injury to a recognized interest such as
economic or aesthetic, and is hinself anong the injured end not
merely airing a political or intellectual grievance”).

In order to establish a procedural injury, in accord
with both federal precedent and our caselaw, a plaintiff must
show that: (1) they have been accorded a procedural right, which
was violated in sone way, see City of Sausalito, 386 F.3d at 1197
(requiring that “the agency violated certain procedural rules”),
gigs, as here, a failure to conduct an EA; (2) the procedural
right protects a plaintiff's concrete interests; and (3) the
procedural violation threatens plaintiff’s concrete interests,
thus affecting the plaintiff “personally,” which may be
denonstrated by showing (a) a “geographic nexus” to the site in
question and (b) that the procedural violation increases the risk

of harm to the plaintiff’s concrete interests.”

 

a Inia sppecich £2 consonant with shat proposed by the diasent in
Hawai'4 tourism Authority. See 100 Hawai't at 282, 59 P.3d at 927 (Noon, J.,
Eissenting)- The "sone of interests” test proposed by the dissent is
encempested within the second prong, requiring that the procedural right,
ISTE Seeivca trem statute, is meant to protect the conerete interests st
Steve, For exemple, several ave used such a distinction to find that a
(Cont inved,

   

 

 

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Ae discussed above, HEPA accords procedural rights to
members of the public and protects the types of interests we have
recognized in past environmental cases, such as aesthetic and
recreational interests and other environmental concerns.

See supra Section IIT.A.1.c.i.

Therefore, the remaining question regarding either form
of injury is whether Appellants’ concrete interests were
threatened by the decision to exempt the harbor improvenents from
the environmental review process. See Hawai'i Tourism Auth., 100
Hawai'i at 251 n.14, 59 P.3d at 686 9.14 (plurality opinion)

(stating that concrete interest requirement of procedural

*(,..continued)
plaintiff challenging an action on the basis of NEPA, of a state analogue,
fost show injury to sone envirconental interest, rather than a purely economic
One: ‘See, eeaey Gaty. Pres, Ce TEL Ne¥.8.20€03, 607 (N.Y. APP.
Div, ood) (t]he presence of an scononic sotive alone does not constitute
Grounds for standing ina SEQRA (State Environmental Quality Review Act)
Sction."); Waste Mont. Inc, of Alareda County, Inc, v. County of Aleneda, 79
6h, app, 4th 1223, 1229" (2000) (°waste Managements Commercial and
Ecnpetitive sntereste are not within the zone of interests CEQA was intended
toipreserve or protect and cannot serve af a beneficial interest for purposes
of the standing requirenant.").
in addition, the Minth Circuit's requirenent that it be "reasonably

probable that the challenged action will threaten the() (plaintiffe’] concrete
interests, 386 F.3d at 1197, which addresses th

Thelinesg of harm to the underlying interests, is similar to the third
prong’ reguizenent that the procedural viclation increase the risk of harm to
Eiplaintiff's concrete interests, thie requirenent ensures that there is an
Ectual threat to plaintiff's concrete interests. See Yawal't Tourtes Auth,
$00 Hawai'i at 201, 59°P.36 at 916 (Moon, Ju, dissenting) ("(E]n order to
Gnaure that the injury 1s concrete and particularized, ‘Sierra Club must show
that the incressed ritk of s significant effect on environmental quelity
Injures Ste neater personally by denonstrating a ‘geographic nexus” between
individual menbers and the site of the injury."). Although it may be caid
that lack of en EA aluavg increases the risk, this is not the case where it is
[olay certain that the sncerlying project poses no threat to a plaintife’s
Concrete interests. Ih other words, there must be at least a nontrivial rick
of hare

     

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
   

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standing doctrine “is essentially encompas:

 

din the injury-in-
fact test”).

By declaration, several of the menbers of the appellant
groups have demonstrated a concrete interest based on a
geographic nexus to the Kahului Harbor area. aren Chun, a
member of the Kshului Harbor Coalition, is the coach for a canoe
club in Kahului Harbor. She has expressed concerns that the
docking of the Superferry at the harbor -~ and the subsequent
wait while cars unload -- will impinge upon the outrigger cance
race course and training azea, and also has concerns, as
driver, about increased traffic near the Harbor. Hannah Bernard,
a Sierra Club menber, is a marine biologist who has been
“employed to study marine life including threatened and
endangered marine species in the ocean waters in and around Maui
including those waters through which the Hawaii Superferry would
travel,” and also enjoys watching marine life in those areas.

a member of the Kahului Harbor Coalition who

 

Gregory Westcott ii
surfs at Kahului Harbor and is “concerned about the effects of
Hawaii Superferry upon the air and water quality in Kahului

Harbor and the effects of expanded security zones on limiting

access and use of Kahului Harbor as a surf sit

 

"clearly, each
of these menbers has demonstrated recreational and aesthetic
interests in the Kahului Harbor area of the type we have
recognized in past cases, and which bear a geographic nexus to

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the harbor. E.gs, Akau, 65 Haw. at 390, 652 P.2d at 1135
(xecognizing standing to enforce rights-of-way because

“digeiculty in getting to the beach hanpers the use and enjoyment

 

of it and may prevent or discourage use in some instances”
Citizens for Prot. of North Kohala Coastline, 91 Hawai'i at 101,
979 P.2d at 1127 (holding that citizen group had standing where
members were “long tine and frequent users” of the coastline, for
such uses as fishing, “picnics, . . . swimming and boating,” and
therefore “injury to its members’ quality of life is
threatened”); Bele Def. Fund, 77 Hawai'i at 70, 881 P.2d at 1216
(recognizing “potential harm including diminished property
values, deterioration of air quality, odor nuisance, and possible
physical injury resulting from the permitted operations”). see
also East Diamond Head Ass’n., 52 Haw. at $21, 479 P.2d at 798-99
(2971) (holding that appellants had standing to challenge novie
operation because “evidence of an increase in noise, traffic, and
congestion . . -, inconvenience by electrical and telephone work
crews, and a fear that studio's facilities would pernanently
remain and detract from the sesthetic residential character of
the neighborhood”): Soc'y Hill Towers Ownera’ Ass'n v, Rendell,
210 F.3d 168, 176 (34 Cir. 2000) (holding that “[t]he Residents
have alleged concrete and particularized injury in the form of
Increased traffic, pollution, and noise”); Bublic Citizen, 316
F.3d at 1016 (recognizing “evidence of a credible threat to the
   

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plaintift’s physical well-being from airborne pollutants (as)
fall{ing) well within the range of injuries to cognizable
interests that nay confer standing,” including such threats as
increased traffic, pollution, noise, and auto emissions).

Other menbers of the appellant groups have demonstrated
additional concrete interests connected to the Kehului Harbor
area. Jeffrey Parker, also 2 menber of the Kahului Harbor
Coalition, is the president of Tropical Orchid Farm and concerned
about the potential inpact of the Superferry on increasing
traffic, possible increase in the movenent of drugs, and possible
effects on recreational users of the harbor. As a farmer, he is
also concerned sbout the negative effects that alien species
introductions would have on his business. Ann Fielding, a board
menber of the Maui group of the Sierra Club and a menber of Maui
‘Tomorrow, operates @ business, “Ann Fielding’s Snorkel Maui,”
that offers educational shoreline snorkeling tours that focus on
the coral reef, She attests that the introduction of alien
marine species potentially caused by the Superferry would have a
negative effect on the marine tourism industry, including her
business. These business interests, which stem from
environmental concern, are concrete and tied to the Superferry's
operations at the harbor.

In addition to these alleged facts, several of the
declarants above have also discussed the manner in which the

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Superferry may affect the interests expressed. Bernard discussed
the potential for the Superferry to strike and harm whales, sea
turtles, and monk seals that travel between Maui and Molokai, as
well as the possibility of indirect effects due to the increased
ease of access for fishers and hunters to Maui. Chun stated
specific concerns about the ability of the Superferry to turn and
dock itself in an already tight harbor without requiring that the
cance club's activities be dislocated. Fielding explained in
detail the specific marine algae and jellyfish-type organisms
that could be transported to Maui from O'ahu by the Superferry
vessel or by travelers who may bring trailer boats, nets, and
dive gear. Parker discussed the specific pests from other
islands that are not endemic to Maui but could be inadvertently
introduced to Maui by users of the Superferry traveling with
their cars and other vehicles.

In short, each of these declarations show that menbers

of the appellant groups have concrete interests in the Kahulut

 

Harbor area and Superferry’s operation there, and demonstrate

that should the project -- insofar

 

it depends on the
construction and utilization of harbor improvenents -- proceed
without an EA the risk of harm to these interests is increased.
appellants have also established causation and
redressability. The injuries they assert are traceable to the
actions of DOT in exempting Superferry from preparing an EA. See

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Comm, to Save Rio Honde, 102 F.3d at 452 (“To establish
causation, a plaintiff need only show its increased risk is
fairly traceable to the agency's failure to comply with the
National Envircnmental Policy Act.”). The threat of increased
risk is clearly redressable by the preparation of an BA, which
would allow the threatened injuries raised by Appellants to be
addressed and potentially mitigated or avoided. See Citizens for
Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 976 (holding that a party “who
asserts inadequacy of a government's environmental studies -
[nJeed not show that further analysis by the government would
result in a different conclusion . . . It suffices that the
agency’s decision could be influenced by the environmental
considerations that the relevant statute requires an agency to
study.”); Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 $.Ct. at 1453 (“When a
litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has
standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief
will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision
that allegedly harmed the litigant.); Ela, Audubon Soc'y, 94
F.3d at 668 (en banc) (noting that procedural injuries are
“easily redreseable, as a court may order the agency to undertake

the procedure”).

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b. this case is distinquishable from Hawai'i Tourism

‘Authority

Appellees assert various reasons for why Appellants
have failed to establish standing, most of which depend on their
analogizing of Appellants’ asserted injury to that found
insufficient to confer standing in Hawai'i Tourism Authority.
First, however, they argue that Appellants must demonstrate
actual or threatened injury based on “the improvements at Kahului
Harbor . . . and DOT's exemption regarding the improvements,”
rather than the Hawaii Superferry project in general. As
developed more fully in discussion of the merits, the two are not
20 easily separable, as the harbor improvenents were deemed by
DoT to be “necessary to accommodate the start up” of the
Superferry. Moreover, Appellants have identified potential harms
to their use of the harbor area which the improvenents directly
facilitate, such as reduction of the quality of water for
recreational use and the potential to dislodge recreational
paddlers and surfers.

The remainder of Appellees’ arguments depend on their
interpretation of Hawai'i Tourism Authority. Thus, Appellees
argue that: (1) the threatened injuries in this case are
“virtually identical” to the insufficient injuries clained in
Hawai'i Tourism Authority, because Appellants lack evidence to

show that the improvenents to Kahului Harbor or the Superferry

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project will (a) increase visitor arrivals, (b) have any effect
on traffic, or (c) interfere with the recreational use of the
waters at Kahului Harbor “to any greater extent than is already
being used for conmercial purposes”; (2) there is no causal
connection between the asserted injuries and the harbor
improvements or Hevaii Superferry, because Appellants rely on “a
chain of conjecture, ultimately resting on the independent
actions of third parties such as the actions of hypothetical
tourists not before this court,” citing Hawai"! Tourism
Authority, 100 Hawai'i at 254, 59 P.3d at 889 (plurality
opinion); and (3) Appellants have failed to establish that their
alleged injury is likely to be renedied by a favorable decision,
because “there is nothing in the record to indicate that an
abandonment of the Hawai'i Superferry would obviate the burden on
Appellants’ interests,” because airlines, cruise ships,
containerships, and other vessels would continue to carry
visitors and cargo to and from Maui.

In Hawai'i Tourism Authority, petitioner Sierra Club
challenged the Hawai'i Tourism Authority’s (HTA) approval of the
expenditure of $114 million in state funds on a tourism marketing
plan without first conducting an EA. Id, at 248, 59 P.3d at 663
(plurality opinion). In denying standing, both the concurrence
and the plurality opinion focused on the lack of a connection
between the asserted environmental injuries and HTA’s failure to

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prepare an EA, See id, at 251-82, $9 P.3d at 886-87 (plurality
opinion) (finding that it was “not evident” that the marketing
program would result in the increase in the number of visitors
alleged by petitioner, that there was no basis to conclude that
increased traffic and use of recreational areas was due to
marketing program, and that the program therefore had not
“concretely affected or threatened” petitioner’s interests); id.
at 268, 59 P.3d at 903 (Nekayama, J., concurring) ("Sierra Club
does not have procedural standing because the nexus between the
expenditure of funds and harm to the areas designated by Sierra
Club members is attenuated.”). The concurrence also expressed a
concern that the challenged project in Hawai'i Tourism
Authority lacked “a close correlation between agency action and
use of land” apparent in federal cases recognizing procedural
standing. Id, (Nakayama, J., concurring). As the concurrence
explained, the plaintiff in Hawai'i Tourism Authority

alleges that HTA's proposed marketing plan would incresse

 

of the be
Fa Club, the
uncbetructed by visitors 1h areas used by nenbers of Sierra
Club, the inability to enjoy the ocean and air without being
interrapted by visitors using helicopters and vater-cratte
in areas used by nenbers of Sierra Club, the introduction of
non-native plants to llewaii’e hiking trails used by menbere
of Sterza Club, and the destruction of foliage to Hawaii's
hiking trails used by nenbers of Sierra Club. However, all
of the proposed possible effects on the resdvays, beaches,
and hiking trails used by Sierra Club nenbers cannct be
Girectly steributable to HIA's expenditure of funds

Rather, it is dependent upon the acts of independent actions
of thitd parties not before this court =~ the visitors who,
435 8 direct response to HTA's marketing plan, must choose to
frequent Hawai'i, specifically the areas used by Sierra Club

   

 

 

 

 

  

 

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mesbers, in ineressed numbers. This is not akin to the
Bropesed agency prosects that involve the construction of @
FEeeway, commercial ose of land during previously off-peak
Seasons, er designation of land as critical habitat.

  

 

 

Id. at 270, 59 P.3d at 905 (Nakayama, J.» concurring). In other
words, the challenged action was not sufficiently linked to the
use of lend, and would only affect the plaintiffs’ interest in
the land if tourists visited the sane locations to which the

plaintiffs had a geographic nexus.

Unlike Hawai'i Tourism Authority, Appellants have
established a geographic nexus to a particular area -- the

 

Kahului Harbor area -- which is the direct site of the challenged
activity. Because of this, there is a clear causal connection
between (1) DOT's decision to exempt the harbor improvements and
associated Superferry activity from environmental review and
(2) the risk that harm to Appellants’ interests will not be
addressed. Moreover, the potential harm alleged by Appellants
does not depend on speculations about the “independent actions of
third parties” -- the potential harms would arise from the actual
operations of the Superferry in the Kahului Harbor area, such as
by unloading large nunbers of cars, trucks, and trailers at a
specified point, diverting paddlers and surfers, and increasing
the risk of invasive species that would negatively affect the
Jand and water near the harbor.

Therefore, the potential harms alleged by Appellants do
not depend, as in Hawai'i Touriem Authority, on the precise

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number of individuals who choose to use the Superferry service,
but on the nature of the operation itself. For the same reason,
the Superferry presents particular risks that are not borne by
the existing methods of transportation cited by Appellants, and
thus Appellees’ argument that the injury is not likely to be
remedied by a favorable decision to Appellants is inapt.
appellees’ argument that Appellants have failed to establish “any
evidence” that improvements to Kahului Harbor or the Superferry
project will increase visitor arrivals, affect traffic, or
Anterfere with the recreational use of the waters at Kahului
Harbor is likewise without merit.

Appellants have established all that can be asked of
them in a HEPA case -- they have: (1) shown both procedural and
threatened injury in that the lack of an EA increases the risk of
harm to their concrete interests; (2) established that they have
concrete interests based on 2 geographical nexus to the Kahului
Harbor area; and (3) articulated clear chains of causation
explaining the manner in which the unmitigated activity may have
an effect on their interests -~ demonstrating that the threat to
their interests is at least nontrivial. If these Appellants do
not have standing to bring this claim, it is hard to imagine who,

if anyone, would.

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. group standing

Appellees also contend that the injuries alleged by
Appellants are “perscnalized injuries” “which were/will be
suffered by the menbership of the Sierra Club” so that Appellants
do not have standing to sue based on injury to its members or
officers. In reply, Appellants assert that “{w)hen some members
of the group have standing, the group has standing.”

In support of Appellees’ proposition, they cite to
Hawaii's Thousand Friends v, Anderson, 70 Haw. 276, 768 P.2d 1293
(1989), for their assertion that in order for a non-profit
organization to bring suit on behalf of their membership, “the
injury alleged by the organization must be suffered by the
menbership in ceneral and the renedy provided to the organization
would also remedy the injury suffered by the menbers
individually.”

In addition to the fact that Anderson is

distinguishable, our law on organizational standing has been

 

© ppperte rt, without any explanation, that Appellants’ alleged
injuries are “personalized.” In Anderson, the injuries, which were in the
nature of misrepresentetion, were cercribed as “personalized” because “very
few of (the organizational plaineife’s) menbers were injured in this way” ~
Sfelach menber who claine to have been nisled would have undertaken different
actions upon reliance on the misrepresentation,” and "[t]he resultant injury,
Therefore, would be different for each person.” Id. at 204-05, 768 P.26 at
1300." Thie'is unlike the case here, uhere the individual nenbers have alleged
2 commen injury ~~ the lack of an EA and attendant increased risk of
Unnitigated environmental harm =~ to concrete interests that are also shared
by various nenbers of the respective appellant groups, including recreational
ihtereste such ae eurfing and paddling, and environsental and economic
interests that are threatened by the potential introduction of invasive
species on Maul. These interests are snared by other menbers of the appellant
(Continued,

 

        

 

 

 

 
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substantially revised by a case decided after this appeal wa
fled, paw on ys Hae ce Asa!
Inca, 113 Hawai" 77, 148 P.34 1279 (2006). tn Hawai Medica:
Ass'n, this court found that a state medical association had
standing to bring an action against a health insurer for clains
of unfair competition and tortious interference with econonic
advantage both on its own behalf and on behalf of participating
physicians.

In so doing, this court explicitly adopted the approach
taken by federal courts, stating that

An association may sue on behalf of ite nenbers
‘even though it hag not itself been injured == she
Renbers would otherwise hi

 

(a) ite
standing to sue dn their own
ight; (B) the interests it ceeks to protect sre germane to
the organization's purpose: and (c) neither the claim
Eeterted nor the relief requested requizes the participation
Of individual senbers in the lawsuit.

 

 

   

Ida at 95, 148 P.3d at 1197 (block quote formatting altered)
(quoting Hunt v, Wash, Apple Adver, Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343
(1977)). Because Appellants meet this test, this court need not
consider whether Appellants have demonstrated organizational
standing based on injury to the appellant groups thenselves,

separate from any injury to their menbers, See id, at 100, 148

 

 

continved)
groups, and not particularized to the declarants who ratsed them. Moreover
the Fenedy of an fA would redress their concerns of an unmitigeted risk of
harm, S28 id ("Nore important (to recogniting the ability of a non-profit,
crganization to bring suit on behalf of ite nesbers], the renedy which could
bbe provided to the organization by a favorsble judicial decision would siso
Fenedy the injury suffered by the nenbers individvelly.”).

   
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P.3d at 1202 ("An organization also has standing to sue for
Injury to its own interests, separate from any injury to its
menbers, inasmuch as standing may be established in an individual
or representative capacity.”)

“gach of the three Hunt requirements must be met by a
Litigant asserting organizational standing.” Id, at 95, 148 P.3d
‘at 1197 (brackets removed). As demonstrated by the concrete
interests and common injury caused by the lack of an EA
elaborated above, the appellant groups’ nenbers would have
standing to sue on their own behalf, All declarants expressed
their view that an EA is required to mitigate the risk of

environmental harm

 

thus expressing a connon injury. Moreover,
the various interests expressed -- recreational interests in
surfing and paddling, aesthetic interests in snorkeling and
whalewatching, envizonnental interests resulting from the

potential introduction of alien species, and related business

 

interests that may be affected -- are shared by other menbers of
the groups involved, To the extent that Appellees suggest that
all members of @ group must be injured in order for that group to
have standing, such a proposition defies common sense and has

been repudiated by federal courts applying the Hunt framework.

See, e.a., JR Distribs., Inc, v, Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482, 485

 

n.2 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he ACLU has standing to sue in this case
Af any one of its members suffers or is threatened with injuries

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that would create a justiciable cai

 

"), overruled on other
grounds by Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491
(2985); Cf. Playboy Enter,, Inc, v. Pub, Serv, Comm'n, 906 F.24

25 (1st Cir. 1990) (allowing standing based on injury suffered by
one member of a trade association).

Appellees do not appear to contest the second prong,
and it is apparent that this lawsuit seeks to protect interests
that are germane to the organizational purposes of the Maui Group
of the Sierra Club, Maui Tomorrow, Inc., and the Kahului Harbor
Coalition. See supra Section IIT.R.2.a.

With regard to the third prong, there is no reason to
believe that the claim asserted or the relief requested “requires
the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Havaii
Med. Ass'n, 113 Hawai'i at 95, 148 P.3d at 1197. Individual
participation may be required in cases where the plaintiffs
request money damages (which may require proof of individual
injuries), see id. at 96, 148 P.3d at 1198 ("Because claims for
monetary damages would require the significant participation of
individual members, such factor would fatally undercut a request
for organizational standing.”), or where there are conflicts of
interest or great divergence between menbers of the organization
or between the organization and its members, anong other reasons.
13 Wright, et al., supra, § 3531.9, at 618 (citing, inter alia,
Harris _v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), Int’) Union, United Auto

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Workers of America v, Dana Corp., 679 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1962)).
But Appellants do not request money damages in this suit, and
there is no other reason to believe that individual participation
in this lawsuit would be required.

‘Therefore, Appellants have met each prong of the Hunt
test, and have satisfied the requirements of organizations to sue
on behalf of their menbers.

B. The Merits: wf Appellees, er of Law,

 

on the merits," Appellants argue that DOT's exemption
determinations were in violation of the law because: (1) DOT
failed to review the secondary and cumulative impacts of the
project as a whole; (2) DOT failed to apply the significance
criteria to the Superferry projects (3) Appellees admit that
Superferry may have significant adverse impacts, so that an EA is
required; (4) the exemptions violate the intent of the
categorical exexptions; ($) DOT failed to consult with agencies

and individuals with expertise about the propriety of the

 

© nppellees appear to concede that the Appellants’ requested renedy is
not one that would fail to renedy the injury suffered by menbers of the
Gppelient groupe, ae they discess this rule but do not argue that it would
sply. While Appellents’ argunents that the injuries in this case are
seericnabized” ay be relevant to the "individual partictpetion” prong of the
iint test, they have provided no bosis for this assertion, and there is no

Haat nto believe thet the asserted injury is of a personalized nature. See.
supra note 42.

   

    

 

“ rated srguuent, that HEPA’s exenptions should
be narrowly construed, ig nore skin to an argutent about the standard of
Pielew aad is accordingly dealt with in thet section. Seq supra note 22.

 

 

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exemptions; and (6) the two selected exemptions relied on are
inapplicable as a matter of fact and law.

Appellees make two principal arguments for upholding
the circuit court’s conclusion that DOT complied with HEPA:
(1) that DOT followed a11 proper procedures in issuing its
exemption decision, and therefore met the requirements of HEPA
and HAR § 11-200-8 and (2) that Appellants’ arguments regarding
the propriety of the exemptions are irrelevant and without merit,
because DOT’s determination was supported by the record

Before discussing Appellants’ points of error, we
address Appellees’ first argument, the essence of which has
already been discussed in the standard of review section.
Appellees appear to argue that HAR § 11-200-8, the rule governing
exemptions, allows agencies to declare an action falling within a
Gesignated class exempt “provided only” -- they claim -- “that
the agency obtain the advice of other agencies or individuals
having jurisdiction or expertise as to the propriety of the
exemption.“ In other words, they equate compliance with the
consultation proviso as satisfaction of the administrative rule,

and do not believe it is within the province of the courts to

 

While the rule does have a proviso requiring that “agencies declaring
an action exenpt . . . shail cbtain the advice of other outside agencies OF
Individvals having juftadiction or expert to the propriety of the
exemption,” HAR § "21-2008, it does not indicate that this is tre enly
requirenent of a proper exception, as Appellees seen to suggest in their
onewering brief, ‘See supra note 6

      

 

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Anguire into the propriety of DOT’s exemption determination.
Accordingly, Appellees argue that they have met the consultation
requirement, because DOT sought and received OEQC's advice
specifically pertaining to the harbor inprovenents, and also
sought advice from the Maul Department of Public Works and Waste
Menagement as well as the Maui Department of Planning.

Appellees’ axgunent is akin to their position,
discussed supra Section II.C, that the courts should defer to
agency determinations regarding exemptions. However, as
elaborated above, HEPA and its inplenenting regulations require
more than facial compliance with the consultation proviso and a
determination that an action falls within an exempt class. In
addition, an agency must consider the exclusions to the exerption
spelled out in HAR § 11-200-8(B), and whether the exemption is
consistent with the letter and intent of HEPA because it will
“probably have minimal or no significant effects on the
environment,” both of which aze disputed by Appellants. Because
Appellees have incorrectly characterized the requirenents of HEPA

and the EIS rules regarding exemption determinations, Appell

 

argunent for limited review of DoT’s actions is unwarranted.
We now tuzn to Appellants’ principal argument, and in
our view the crux of this case, that the circuit court erred in
ruling that DOT had complied with HEPA, because under the
regulatory and statutory framework DOT was required, “in making

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exemption determinations, to review all phases of a project as a
whole, without segnentation, and to review the secondary and
cumulative impacts of the project.” In short, the dispute is
whether DOT was correct to analyze only the harbor improvements
in making its exemption determination, or was also required to
consider the potential environmental impacts caused by the Hawaii
Superferry project.

Appellants’ argument on this point is composed of three
subparts: (1) DOT failed to review and analyze the environmental
impacts of the Hawaii Superférry project as whole/connected
actions; (2) DOT failed to review the secondary impacts of the
Hawaii Superferry project; and (3) DOT failed to address the
exclusions to the exemptions, which Appellants assert are
applicable.

Before addressing these arguments, we note that this

issue is dispositive of the case. It is not disputed that the

 

harbor improvenents ~~ which propose the use of state funds and
state lands -- are a triggering “action” under HEPA; the only
question is whether an exenption applied. If DOT was required to
consider the Superferry project itself, as opposed to the harbor
inprovenents alone, in making this exemption determination, it is
clear that the exenption would not apply. The fact that Hawaii
Superferry, Inc. has undertaken operating plans and developed
policies to minimize its effect on the environsent, see supra
   

FOR PUBI

 

“ATION IN WEST’S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,
Section 1.B.3, although laudatory, indicates a probability that
absent these voluntary policies, the ferry's operations would
have more then minimal environmental effects. Although we do not
take Garibaldi's comments to that effect as a direct admission
that the Superferry will cause significant effects on the
environment, they make clear that the Superferry project itself
-- were its envizonnental effects considered -- does not meet the
standard of an exempt action, i.e., a “minor project” thet will
“probably have minimal or no significant effects on the
environment.” See supra Section I1.C; HAR § 11-200-2; Kahana
Sunset Owner's Ass'n, 86 Hawai'i at 71, 947 P.2d at 383.
1. Connected Actions Under HAR § 11-200-7

Appellants argues that DOT committed legal error in its
exemption determination because it failed to consider the
Superferry project and the harbor improvements as a “single
action.” In support of this contention, Appellants cite to
Kahana Sunset Ouners Ass'n, which discussed the application of
HAR § 11-200-7 in the context of exemption determinations. As
discussed supra, Section II.C, in Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n this
court considered whether installation of a drainage pipe under a
public street required environmental review under HEPA, or would
fall within an exemption for “[i]nstallation of drains, sewers
and waterlines within streets and highways,” on the list of
exempt classes of action developed by the Maui Planning

6
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Commission, 86 Hawai'i at 71, 947 P.2d at 383. The context of
this determination was a request, by the developer, for an SMA
use permit to install a drainage line beneath a public road that

would connect it to an existing culvert beneath the highway

 

and provide a drainage system for the 312-unit residential
development. After determining that the exemption did not apply,
based on the letter and intent of the adninistrative regulations,
see infra Section II.C, so that an EA was necessary, the court
went on to consider the “scope” of the EA. Applying HAR § 11-
200-7, the court concluded that an EA must address the
environmental effects of the entire proposed development, not
just the drainage system, reasoning as follows:

HAR § 11-200-7 provides that “[a] group of actions proposed

    

 

 

by an agency or an applicant shall bet ‘ae a single
action when! (1) The component actions are phases oF
increnents of 2 larger total undertaking; [or] (2) An

Individual project. ts a necessary precedent for a larger
project.” In the instant case, the action propesed by JGL
is the entire Napilinau developaent. The proposed drainage
system is part of the larger project and is a “necessi
precedent” for the developnent.. The drainage system
Endependent utility, it mould not be constructed except 0s
Fart of the larger developsent. Isolating only that
Fartiealar component of the developsent for environmental
Eeccsenant would be improper segmentation of the project:

Id, at 74, 947 P.2d at 387.
Based on Kahana Sunset Owners Ass‘n, Appellants argue

that: (1) HAR § 11-200-7 should apply in this case and (2) when

 

 

   

applied, the rule would require that DOT, in making its exemption

determination, consider the environmental effects of the Hawaii
 

FOR PUBI

 

"ATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTE]

 

Superferry project, because the harbor improvenents are a

“necessary precedent” to a larger action. Appellees do not

 

provide any argunent regarding whether HAR § 11-200-7 should
apply to DOT's exenption determination. Rather, Appellees seek
to factually distinguish Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n, stating that
in that case

the court specifically distinguished [the ‘completely new

systen serving over 300 residences," id, At 73, 947

362) from minor change to existing facilities, which

would have ‘This letter situation is what is at
iRinor inprovenent

such minor changes to an existing

    

  
  

   

It appears that Appellees do not contest that agencies
making exemption determinations must consider HAR § 11-200-7 as a
prelininary step in defining the action at issue. See
supra Section I1.C, Rather, they contest its applicebility to
the facts of the cose, HAR § 11-200-7 is part of subchapter 5 of
the EIS Rules, which is entitled “Applicability.” The rule
conmands that “[a] group of actions proposed by an agency or an
applicant shall be treated as a single action” when one of four
conditions is met. HAR § 11-200-7. Although this court in

ana Sunset Own 1 applied HAR § 11-200-7 wher
considering the scope of the EA that would be required, both the
nature of the rule and its placement within the larger schene of
the EIS rules indicate that it {s a threshold determination that

must be nade in order to define how to “treat” the action under

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+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

consideration, We therefore conclude that it should be applied

to exemption determinations.

on these facts, houever, there is no “group of actions”
to be treated as a single action. Therefore, HAR § 11-200-7 does
not apply. HAR § 11-200-7, entitled “Multiple or Phased
Applicant or Agency Actions” mandates that:

A group of actions proposed by an agency or an

Spplicent shall be trested ag a single action when?
"the component sections ere phases oF

Inerenente of 8 lerger total undertakin

An individsel project ts a necessary precedent

for a larger project:

An individsal project represents a

Geanitsent to 6 larser projects

The actions in question

[dentical anda single stetenent will

adequately sddrese the inpacte of each

Gnetvidual action and those of the group

of actions 2s 2 whole.

     

   

    

      

HAR 11-200-7. The rule discusses situations when a “group of
actions . . . shall be treated as a single action.” The word

“action” is defined in the BIS rules as “any program or project

 

to be initiated by an agency or applicant.” HAR § 11-200-2.
While the harbor improvements certainly constitute an “action,”
because they were initiated by DoT (an “agency”*), Appellants
have produced no argument to demonstrate that the Superferry

project itself is an “action”

 

either because it was initiated

by an agency or an applicant. Appellants have not identified an

 

 

“t sagency" is defined by the rules as “any department, office, beard,
or commission of the state or county goverment which is part of the executive
Eranch of that government.” HAR § 11=200~2-

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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.
official request for approval that was required in order for the
project to proceed, making the Superferry itself a “project . . «
initiated by an. . . applicant." HAR § 11-200-2. Therefore,
HAR § 11-200-7 does not apply, es there is no “group of actions”
that may be treated as a single action.

Rules Like HAR § 11-200-7 are meant to keep applicants
or agencies from escaping full environmental review by pursuing
projects in 2 pieceneal fashion. See Guidebook at 19 (“The
propesed action must be described in its entirety and cannot be
broken up into component parts which, if each is taken
separately, may have minimal inpact on the environment.
Segmenting @ project in this incremental way to avoid the
preparation of an environmental impact statement is against the
law.); Kenneth A. Manaster 6 Daniel P. Selmi, 2 State
Envizonmental Lay $ 13.10 (2006) (discussing the problem of

“segmentation” or “piecemealing” of projects, including

 

© an “epplicant” is defined
ordinance, or role, officially requests appro
Seeions™ WAR § 11°200-2, "Approval," in turn,
"scene a discretionary consent fequired from an’agency prior to actual
Teplenentation of an action. Discretionary consent means a consent,
Sonetion, oF reccnmendstion from an agency for which judgnent and free
Sill may be exercised by the leeuing agency, as distinguished from a
Einistefial consents Ministerial consent means @ consent, sanction, oF
Feccnendation from an agency upon a given set of facts, as prescribed
by law of Tole without the use of Judgment or discretion.
Id, Although Sewell Superferry, Ine, spplied for and received a certificate
FEE public convenience and neceteity from the POC, sag gupra note 5,
Repellents did not challenge this approval directly nor argue that it
‘constituted an “action.”

any person who, pursuant to statute,
‘from'an agency for a propesed

   

 

 

 

 

    

 

 

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0% FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
“situations . . . in which the agency tries to mask the full
nature of its project or divides up what is clearly a larger
action into smaller pieces that will be implenented
simultaneously," “where @ private applicant plainly has definite
plans for additional, related projects in the future," or where
Ya project unquestionably will give rise to later, secondary
actions by other individuals{.]"). However, because the rule for
assessing multiple actions depends on the formal requizexent of
discrete “actions,” it would appear not to apply to projects such
as this one where government plays a facilitative role for a
private project that itself does not constitute an applicant
action.
2. Secondary Impacts

Appellants next argue that the Superferry project must
be considered as a secondary impact of the harbor improvements.
Appellants thus contend that the cireuit court's decision should
be reversed because “HOOT, in its exemption determination, never
analyzes the environmental impacts that the{) harbor
improvenents, in facilitating the Havaii Superferry project, will
have... .” Appellants’ argument with respect to secondary
McGlone v. Inaba, 64 Haw. 27, 636
P.2d 158 (1981), and Ocean Advocates v, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 402 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2005).

 

impacts relies on two cases

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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAFT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.

 

a. MeGlone

In MeGlone, a group of concerned persons brought suit
to enjoin the Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) from
approving construction of underground utilities on conservation
land without an BIS. 64 Haw. at 28, 636 P.2d at 160. The BLNR
had approved a conservation district use application (CDUA) filed
by landowners on a residential lot near the Paiko Lagoon Wildlife
sanctuary in East O'ahu, to construct and install underground
utilities through an adjacent, state-owned lot -- over which they
had a perpetual non-exclusive easement -- in order to serve a
house they planned to build on the residential lot. Id. at 29,
636 P.2d at 160. In approving the CDUA, the ELNR determined that
an EIS was not required because the proposed activity fell under
an exemption of the then-applicable EIS Rules. Id, at 29, 636
P.2d at 161, Although the court ultimately found that the
exemption was proper, in the course of its analysis it explained
several concepts relevant to review of exemption determinations
generally.

First, the court discussed the term “significant

 

effect,” a term that was then and is currently used in
determining which types of actions may be declared exempt. See
HRS § 343-6(7) (1993) (delegating to the environmental council

the establishment of procedures “whereby specific types of

0
 

+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.

actions, because they will probably have minimal or no
sianificant effects on the environment, are declered exenpt from
the preparation of an assessment” (Emphasis added.))." In
reference to the concept of “significant effect,” the court
stated that “an agency making such a determination must consider
every phase and every expected consequence of the proposed
action,” citing EIS regulations.” 64 Haw. at 35, 636 P.2d at
164. The concerned citizens had argued that an exclusion to the
exemption should apply because the wildlife sanctuary was a
“particularly sensitive environnent” which would be significantly

affected by the construction of the underground utilities and the

 

© lthough the pre-1979 HEPA statute, which governed in MeGlone,
varied in significant ways, the basic structure for exe=ptions appears to be
"inilar fn teem to the present structure, The ofiginal HEPA statute
Scthorized another Bocy “to establish guidelines specifying classes of actions
Which will be exempt from the preparation ef an EIS because such actions will
frobobly have sinimal or no significent effect oh the environment.” Meslone,
Ge lieu. at 35, 636 F.2d at 164 (citing HRS § 343-5). The exenpt classes
themselves appear to be the gene or sinslar to the present Iist embodied in
HAR § 112006. Seg id, at 36 n.11, 636 P.2d at 165 n.i1.

The sajer difference between the original statute and the post-1979
version is thet the original did not require the production of EAs. Instead,
an EIS was required for any action whieh "will probably have significant
enrirenmentsl effects,” and also had a connection to state land or funds. HRS
Sts-4 (1976), The “eignificant effect” term was algo ured in reference co the
foles for establishing exenpt classes, using the sane language 22 the current
ARS'§ 343-6(7). Id, at 35, 636 P.2d at 166

 

   

 

 

 

© mie statement is similar to that embodied in HAR § 11-20-12,

“signiticance Criteria,” which states in part
In determining whether an action say have @ significant effect on the
environment, ‘the agency shall consider every phase of @ proposed ection,
the expected consequences, both primary and secondary, and the
Cumulative as well as the short-term and long-term effects of the

an § 21-20

 

 

2218).

 

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PORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
construction, use, and occupancy of the house. Id, at 36, 636
P.2d at 165.

‘The BLNR had found that the proposed activities would
not have a significant effect on the sanctuary. Id, at 37, 636
P.2d at 165. In reviewing this determination, the court followed
the BLNR’s designation of the construction of the underground
utilities as the “primary impact,” id. at 37 n. 14, 636 P.2d at
165 n.14, and the construction, use, and occupancy of the house
as the “secondary impact” -- because the latter was “incident to
and a consequence of the primary impact.” Id. at 38 n.16, 636
P.2d at 166 n.16. The court thus stated that “the effects of
such ‘secondary impacts’, like ‘primary impacts’, must be
considered in determining the relative environmental effects.”
Ida at 38 n.16, 636 P.2d at 166 n.16. Reviewing the alleged
effect of these impacts on the Paiko Lagoon, the court held that
the BINR had not erred in ite finding, and that the exemption was
therefore proper. Id. at 39, 636 P.2d at 166-67.

‘The court in McGlone also discussed what it termed “the
Limited nature of categorical exemptions”:

As noted earlier, these activities are designated exempt
Because it is presumed that under ordinary circumstances
there eccurs negligible enviroreentel ispact. However, what
Ig noreally presumed to be innocuous activities may
Constitute actione which will significently affect. the
Shvironsent when dene in “sensitive” areas or under varying
circonstances. Me suse the ities ber

 

  

house and the suet jee are a

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the totality of circumstances.
Id, at 36 n.12, 636 P.2d at 165 n.12 (emphasis added).

 

Therefore, according to NcGlone, an agency making an
exemption determination must look beyond an actions facial
compliance with an exenption class, and also determine that the
activity will probably not have a significant effect. This is
consistent with the view expressed in Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n
that exemption determinations “must be consistent with both the
letter and the intent contained within the administrative rvle
exemption,” 96 Hawai‘i at 71, 947 P.2d at 383, discussed supra in
Section 11.C. Moreover, McGlone makes clear that in making this
determination, the agency must consider not just the effect of an
action on the direct site to which the exemption applies (the
“primary impact”), but also secondary impacts that are “incident
to and a consequence of the primary impact.”

Based on McGlong, Appellants argue that “{a]ny

purported exempt activity must, by law, include an analysis of

 

that activity’s potential connected actions, secondary impacts,
significant effects and cumulative impacts.” Because the agency

did not analyze this totality of circumstances, Appellants

 

contend, “the exemption is illegal and void.” Appellants also

assert that “the harbor improvements are a condition precedent to

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the Hawaii Superferry project and the impacts of the Hawaii
Superferry project must also be addressed.”

In response to these arguments, Appellees contend that
McGlone is not controlling because the case “was based on the pre
1979 version of HEPA which did not include the concept of EAS or
draft EAs.” While this is true, Appellees provide no argument as
to why the subsequent changes in the HEPA statute make McGlone’s
analysis inapplicable to the case at hand. To the contrary,
because MeGlone specifically concerned an exemption determination
under a similar statutory and regulatory scheme, see supra note
48, the statements of the court in that case regarding exemptions
have persuasive force in interpreting the requirements of HEPA
today.

b. Ocean Advocates

Appellants also rely on Ocean Advocates, a Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals case in which an environmental group
challenged, under NEPA, the issuance and extension of a permit by
the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) that allowed for the
construction of an additional platform to an existing oil
refinery dock off the coast of Washington state, at Cherry Point
in northeast Puget Sound. 402 F.3d at 855-58. At issue was
whether the pier extension would “facilitate an increase in

tanker traffic and product handling, thereby increasing the

95
 

likelihood of a major oil spill.” Id, at 855. The Corps granted
the permit at issue and made a finding of no significant impact,
determining that the pier addition “will not significantly affect
the quality of the human environnent,” and that an EIS was not
required. Id, at @56. The environmental group, Ocean Advocates
(A), having twice asked the Corp to reopen the permit it had
granted in order to perform a more complete evaluation of the
cumulative impacts that the new platform would have on vessel
traffic safety, was twice rebuffed. Id. at 856-57, Several
years later, when the developer requested a one-year extension to
its permit to complete the dock construction, OA and other groups
again expressed concerns to the Corps about the harbor extension,
and filed suit after the Corps again concluded that an EIS was
not required. Id, at 857-58.

Reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit held
that the Corps must complete an EIS, because it found that a
“reasonably close causal relationship” existed between the Corps’
issuance of the permit, the environmental effect of increased
vessel traffic, and the attendant increase risk of oil spills.
‘Id, at 867-68. It thus concluded:

Increased tanker traffic elevates the risk of of1
spills == an undeniable and patently apparent risk of harm
£0 Fuget Scund. An cil spill could destroy and dieropt

jens and kill or injure critical nunbera of threatened
‘nd endangered species that live, and thrive, in the cherry
Point Region.
ernitted sctivi nee

    

 

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an exror shout the fundsnental nature ond severity of the
‘the dock exten ld have. The cbvicus

‘Severity of the impact that increased tanker traffic pores
{S"chougn to werrent reversal on OA's NEPA claim. Were we
unconvinced, however, ome of the Council on Environmental
Quality factors also’ denonstrate the significance of
Gnereased tanker traffic on this ecologically sensitive
ancas perticulerly cumulative significant inpacts and
Gheertein envireanental impact!

 

 

Id. at 968 (enphasis added). Although the dock extension had
aiready been conpleted, the court nevertheless required that the
corps conduct an EIS, because the Corps could revoke the permit
or “inpose restrictions on the operation of the dock or require
other mitigating measures.” Id, at 871. The Ninth Circuit
remanded to the district court to consider OA's request that the
district court “issue an injunction freezing any vessel traffic
to and from the facility at pre-2000 levels pending completion of

the NEPA proce:

 

"Id, at 973-72.

Appellants argue that DOT's limitation of its
consideration to the direct effects of the harbor improvenents,
rather than of the Superferry operations at Kahului harbor, is
similar to the Corps’ failure to recognize the potential for
increased tanker activity due to the dock extension in Ocean
Advocates. Accordingly, Appellants state:

DOr, in its exemption determination, dots not disclose that
are conditions precedent to the

ferry project. Most
ly, HOOT, in se exemption determination, never
ansiyses the envitonmental impecte that, these hazbor
[nprovenente, in facilitating the Hawai'i Superferry
project, will have on slready congested state harbors and
Pegdway systems, a2 well as on threatened and endangered
[pecies, an increase in the rate of alien specie:

 

 

     

 

  

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Antroductions, and the curtainent of restriction of
recreational snd cultural uses. All of these are clear
errors requiring reversal...

 

Appellees, for their part, argue that Ocean Advocates is
inapplicable, because it involved the adequacy of the Corps’
analysis in its Final A, and did not involve a “decision not to
Prepare an EAY a9 Appellants state in their brief. appellees
also take issue with Appellants’ citation of Advocates as
support for its assertion that “uncertainty about the impacts of
a project have been sufficient to requize EISs and to reverse
exemptions.”

Appellees’ attempts to minimize the applicability of
Qcean Advocates miss the point. Regardless of Appellants’
apparent misstatenents regarding the case, Ocean Advocates is
persuasive authority regarding how a factually-similar scenario
is treated under NEPA, and provides an exemple of a court
analyzing the secondary effects of harbor alterations, nanely,
what effect they will have on the activity of ocean vessels.

c. application to this case

Kahana Sunset Ovners Acs'n and McGlone make clear that
when an agency considers an exemption it must determine that the
action will probably have minimal or no significant effects on
the environnent, and NcGlone teaches that in additicn to the

direct site of impact the agency must also consider other impacts
 

FOR PUBI

 

that are “incident to and a consequence of the primary inpact.”
considered together with these Hawai'i precedents, Ocean
Advocates provides @ concrete analogy to the legal error
conmitted by DOT.

por’s written exemption determination is restricted to
the harbor improvements and does not consider the secondary
impacts that may result from the use of Hawaii Superferry in
conjunction with Kahului Harbor. Rather, DOT treats the physical
improvements in isolation, fitting them into two exenption
classes related to “security and safety equipment,” (exemption
class 3 item 3) and “alteration or addition of improvenents with
associated utilities, which are incidental to existing harbor and
boat ramp operations, in accordance with master plans [that
comply with HEPA]” (exemption class 6 item 8). See supra Section
1.8.2, Although DOT, in its exenption determination letter, does
reference the Hawaii Superferry ("we have determined that the
operation of Hawaii Superferry at Kahului Harbor conforms with
the intended use and purpose of the harbor and meets conditions
that permit exemption from environmental review at such location

based on the method of operation planned”), it r

 

ericte its
analysis to the harbor equipment that will be employed in order
to facilitate the Superferry’s operation (“ferry activity at

Kahului Harbor will use equipment appropriate for a harbor,

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include enly minor facilities improvements and will be conducted
at an existing pier facility that is consistent with the purpose
and reason for which it was originally developed”). See id. The
exemption letter does not consider whether Superferry operation
independent of the harbor will have any significant effect on the
environment. Rather, DOT appears to studiously restrict its
consideration of environmental impact to the physical harbor
improvenents themselves, Although DOT does say that “(t]he
installation and reevlt of the minor improvements noted will not
produce or create any adverse air quality, noise or water quality
impact,” which could imply a reference to the Superferry itself,
as the “result” of the harbor improvements, this statement is
oblique and does not indicate that secondary impacts were
considered. Purposely or not, DOT ignores the more direct
language suggested by OFQC in its sample exemption memorandum,
wherein an agency director would state that he or she “ha(s)
considered the potential effects of the above listed project as
provided by Chapter 343, HRS and Chapter 11-200, HAR. . . [and]
declare{s] that thle] project will probably have minimal or no
significant effect on the environment and is therefore exempt
from the preparation of an environmental assessment.” Guidebook,

supra at 50.

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As suggested by Appellees, it is not the province of
this court “to substitute its judgment for that of an agency
within the executive branch of government . . . .” Obavashi
Howail Corp, 81 Haw. at 182 n.12, 914 P.2d at 1975 n.12, The
flipside of this caution, however, is that this court “nust
ensure thet the agency has taken a ‘hard look’ at environmental
factors.” Id. at 182 n.12, 914 P.2d at 1375 n.12 (quoting Stop
He3 Ass'n vs Lewis, 538 F.Supp. at 159).

The applicable standard of review requires that this
court determine, as a matter of law, whether or not DOT has
followed the correct procedures and considered the appropriate
factors in making its determination that the harbor improvenents
nade to Kahului harbor to facilitate the Superferry project
should be exenpted from the requirenents of HRS chapter 343. See
supra Section 11.¢.3.

stated simply, the record in this case shows that DOT
aid not consider whether its facilitation of the Hawaii
Superferry Project will probably have minimal or no significant
impacts, both primary and secondary, on the environment.
Therefore, based on this record, we can only conclude that DOT's
determination that the improvements to Kahului Harbor are exempt
from the requirements of HEPA was erroneous as a matter of law.

‘The exemption being invalid, the EA requirement of HRS § 343-5 is

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applicable. This issue being dispositive, we need not consider
Appellants’ other argunents."*
TV. concwuston

The stated purpose of HEPA 1s “to establish a system of
environmental review which will engure that environmental
concerns are given appropriate consideration in decision making
along with economic and technical considerations.” HRS § 343-1.

In enacting HEPA and establishing a system of
environmental review, the legislature expressly emphasized the
importance of public participation in the process:

The legislature further finds that the process of reviewing

       

envirorsental effects is desirable because envizcnnental
Conscioveness is enhanced, cooperation and coordination are
enceursged, and public ea in

brscass benefits a1] parties involved and society ogg
shsle

Id, (emphasis added).
Contrary to the expressly stated purpose and intent of
HEPA, the public was prevented from participating in an
environmental review process for the Superferry project by Dot's
grant of an exenption to the requirenents of HRS chapter 343.

The exemption was erroneously granted as DOT considered only the

% Rithough we hold that the harbor inprovenente were not @ proper
candidate for exemption becouse of thelr
Ifthe harbor Snprovenents were cone!ce:
of facts which would indicate that DOT"
iPplicable, because there is no evidence that the smprovenents were “An,
with master plane that have net the requirements of Chapter 343,
id Statutes.” Conprehensive Exemption List for the stete of
ii Department of Transportation, susra note 13. See supra note 1+

 

    

 

  

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physical improvenents to Kahului harbor in isolation and did not
consider the secondary impacts on the environment that may result
from the use of the Hawaii Superferry in conjunction with the
harbor inprovenents. “ALl parties involved and society as a
whole” would have benefitted had the public been allowed to
participate in the review process of the Superferry project, as
was envisioned by the legislature when it enacted the Hawai'i
Environmental Protection Act.

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the circuit court's
Joly 12, 2005 final judgment. As indicated in our August 23,
2007 order, we have instructed the circuit court to enter sunmary

judgment in favor of Appellants on their claim as to the request

 

for an environmental assessment and remanded the case for such
other and further disposition of any remaining claims as may be

appropriate.

on the briefs:

Isaac Hall
for plaintiffs-appellants
The Sierra Club, Maui

 

Tenortoe, These’ and. the :
Kahului Harbor Coalition BERS Larcso—_
witiien 9. syohofe, Precee Cornet arse

Deputy Attozney General,
for defendants-appellees

The Department of

Transportation, of the

State of Hawai's; Barry

Fukunaga, in his capacity Yous. Oni

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as Director of the Department
of Transportation of the State
of Hawai'i; Michael Formby,

in his capacity as Deputy
Director for Harbors of the
Department of Transportation
of the State of Hawai'i

Lisa Woods Munger,
Lisa A, Bail, and
Jill Murakami Baldenor
(of Goodsill Anderson
Quinn & Stifel) for
defendant-appellee
Hawaii Superferry, Inc.

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