Case Title: Commonwealth v. Johnson

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11660

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11660 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WILLIAM P. JOHNSON 
(and a companion case1). 
 
 
 
Essex.     September 3, 2014. - December 23, 2014. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Criminal Harassment.  Constitutional Law, Freedom of speech and 
press.  Practice, Criminal, Required finding, Discovery, 
Disclosure of evidence, Loss of evidence by prosecution, 
Promise by prosecutor, Argument by prosecutor, Speedy 
trial, Venue.  Evidence, Authentication. 
 
 
 
 
Complaints received and sworn to in the Lawrence Division 
of the District Court Department on October 16, 2008.  
 
 
Motions to dismiss were heard by Anthony P. Sullivan, J., 
Mark A. Sullivan, J., and James D. Barretto, J.; and the cases 
were tried before Michael A. Uhlarik, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Robert S. Sinsheimer (Lisa A. Parlagreco & Ronald J. Ranta 
with him) for William P. Johnson. 
 
Valerie A. DePalma (Susan H. McNeil with her) for Gail M. 
Johnson. 
                     
 
1 Commonwealth vs. Gail M. Johnson. 
2 
 
 
David F. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Daniel J. Lyne & Theodore J. Folkman, for Eugene Volokh, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  This case concerns the constitutionality of the 
criminal harassment statute, G. L. c. 265, § 43A (a), and its 
application to acts of cyberharassment among others.  
Specifically, we consider whether a pattern of harassing conduct 
that includes both communications made directly to the targets 
of the harassment and false communications made to third parties 
through Internet postings solely for the purpose of encouraging 
those parties also to engage in harassing conduct toward the 
targets can be constitutionally proscribed by the statute.  We 
also consider whether, to the extent that this pattern of 
conduct includes speech, that speech is protected by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or is unprotected 
speech integral to the commission of the crime. 
 
The defendants, William and Gail Johnson, were both 
convicted of criminal harassment.  William2 was also convicted of 
making a false, or "frivolous," report of child abuse, G. L. 
c.  119, § 51A (c).  Among other things, the defendants' conduct 
included posting information about the victims online along with 
                     
 
2 The defendants and the victims are both married couples. 
Where appropriate the defendants and the victims are referred to 
by their first names given the common last name between each 
married couple. 
3 
 
false statements about items that the victims allegedly either 
had for sale or were giving away, with the object of encouraging 
unwitting third parties to repeatedly contact and harass the 
victims at their home and on their telephone.  The defendants 
also anonymously sent hostile and ominous communications 
directly to the victims.   
 
William claims that the criminal harassment statute is 
facially unconstitutional, arguing that it regulates protected 
speech and does not provide sufficient notice of the type of 
conduct that is proscribed.  Additionally, both defendants argue 
that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to their conduct 
because they did not engage in "fighting words," an unprotected 
category of speech that we held could be constitutionally 
proscribed under the statute in Commonwealth v. Welch, 444 Mass. 
80 (2005), abrogated on another ground by O'Brien v. Borowski, 
461 Mass. 415 (2012).3  Further, both defendants contend that 
their conduct did not meet the statutory requirements because 
their actions were not actually directed at the victims and 
there was inadequate evidence that their conduct caused any 
serious alarm to the victims.  We conclude that the Legislature 
drafted a sufficiently specific statute that is not 
unconstitutional on its face; that the defendants' conduct 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Eugene 
Volokh. 
4 
 
included speech that was not protected by the First Amendment, 
but rather was integral to criminal conduct; and, accordingly, 
that the statute is not unconstitutional as applied to the 
defendants.  We also conclude that the defendants' conduct as 
established at trial met all of the statutory requirements for a 
guilty verdict.   
 
Background.  We summarize the facts that the jury could 
have found, reserving certain details for our analysis of the 
issues raised on appeal.  The victims, James "Jim" J. Lyons, 
Jr., and his wife, Bernadette, have lived on the same street as 
the defendants in Andover since around 2000.  In 2003, the 
defendants acquired a tract of land abutting the Lyonses' 
property and intended to subdivide and develop it.  The Lyonses, 
along with other neighbors, objected to the proposed development 
and years of litigation ensued between the parties.  By 2008, 
the relationship between the families had become strained and 
communication between them was infrequent. 
 
Gerald Colton, a childhood friend of the Johnsons, did not 
know the Lyons family prior to 2008.  Throughout the 1990s and 
early 2000s, William hired Colton to work as a handyman on an 
hourly basis and to identify lots for potential real estate 
5 
 
development.  If William later developed a lot Colton had 
identified, Colton would collect a finder's fee.4   
 
In either late February or early March, 2008, William 
telephoned Colton and enlisted him to play a series of "pranks" 
on Jim.  The ideas for these "pranks" were generated in several 
ways:  (1) William would directly instruct Colton or convey 
ideas through Gail; (2) the Johnsons would provide information 
about the Lyons family to Colton so that he could use this 
information to harass them; or (3) the Johnsons would prompt 
Colton to think of ideas.   
 
Over the course of thirty-five days in late March and early 
April, 2008, the defendants, directly and through Colton, 
engaged in a series of acts directed at the Lyons family.  The 
Commonwealth alleged four separate acts of harassment in 
addition to the false report of child abuse, and Colton was 
called as its key witness at the trial. 
 
The first alleged act occurred on March 18, 2008, when 
Colton posted from his computer an advertisement that appeared 
on the Internet site "Craigslist."  The advertisement provided 
the Lyonses' home telephone number and address and stated that 
                     
 
4 Gerald Colton identified lots for William Johnson by 
placing his initials next to vacant lots on the sheets of the 
town of Andover's board of assessors.  At trial, Colton admitted 
that his initials appeared to be next to the lot that later 
became the focus of litigation between the Johnsons and the 
Lyonses, but suggested that the initials had been forged. 
6 
 
there were free golf carts available at this location on a 
"first come, first serve" basis.  The Lyonses did not own any 
golf carts and had never used Craigslist.  When Bernadette 
arrived home at 2:30 P.M. that same day, there were strangers in 
both her driveway and on the street near her home.  These 
individuals informed her about the advertisement and explained 
that they were looking for golf carts.  In total, about thirty 
to forty people arrived at the Lyonses' house that afternoon, 
causing Bernadette to be "scared" and "fearful."   
 
When Jim arrived home later that evening, he telephoned the 
police, as Bernadette was in a state of "uneasiness" and Jim 
felt the incident was "really unusual" and "bizarre."  Andover 
police Sergeant Chad Cooper responded and advised Jim to contact 
Craigslist to remove the advertisement and get the Internet 
protocol address for the computer that posted it.  In Sergeant 
Cooper's presence, Jim received numerous telephone calls from 
people inquiring about the golf carts.  When William learned 
that the Craigslist advertisement had been removed, he asked 
Colton to "put it back up" and Colton complied.  After 
reposting, Colton testified that he and William "laughed" about 
it and Colton said that he would post another advertisement.   
 
The second alleged act occurred on March 19, when Colton 
posted a different Craigslist advertisement, selling "my late 
son's" motorcycle and directing interested parties to call Jim 
7 
 
on his cellular telephone after 10 P.M.5  Colton then told 
William about the posting.  That night, Jim received "non-stop" 
telephone calls regarding the advertisement, approximately 
twenty every ten minutes.  Sergeant Cooper responded again.  
These late night calls continued for months after the posting.   
 
The third alleged act occurred one week later on March 26, 
when Colton sent an electronic mail message (e-mail) to the 
Lyonses from a fictitious account.  The subject of the e-mail 
read, "It's just a game for me," and the text stated, "Let The 
Games Begin!"  The e-mail contained Jim and Bernadette's 
personal identifying information, including names, home 
telephone number and address, social security numbers, e-mail 
address, bank name and location, and Jim's date of birth and 
cellular telephone number.  At the bottom, the e-mail stated:  
"Remember, if you aren't miserable, I aint happy!  Let's Play."  
Colton testified that Gail had sent him an e-mail with the 
Lyonses' personal information.   
 
The following evening, William arrived at Colton's home and 
told Colton that he wanted to call and "turn [Jim] in."  William 
had a piece of paper with a hotline telephone number written on 
it and proceeded to use Colton's home telephone to call the 
Department of Children & Families (DCF) to file a false report 
alleging child abuse by Jim.  William later telephoned Colton to 
                     
 
5 Neither Jim nor Bernadette had a son who had passed away. 
8 
 
report that a police cruiser and another vehicle were at the 
Lyonses' home.6   
 
Investigator Carrie Riley of the DCF testified that an 
after-hours "child abuse hotline" had received a call from 
someone using fictitious information and reporting that Jim was 
physically abusing his son.  Riley and another investigator 
arrived at the Lyonses' home at 10:30 P.M. and said they had to 
examine their son.  Jim testified that he and Bernadette were 
"panicked" and "frightened," but that, acting on the advice of 
their attorney, he awakened their son and permitted Riley to 
inspect him.  Riley examined his body for marks and bruises.  
The DCF case was closed as the son denied any abuse and the 
investigators found no signs of it.   
 
The fourth alleged act occurred on April 3, 2008, when 
Colton sent another anonymous e-mail to the Lyonses from another 
fictitious e-mail account.  The subject line was "Brian," and 
the text read, "What have you done James? . . . or . . . Why 
James?  You stole the innocence of a young man."  Shortly 
thereafter, Jim received a letter by postal mail purportedly 
sent from an individual named "Brian."  Brian claimed to have 
worked for Jim when he was fifteen years of age, accused Jim of 
sexually molesting him as a teenager, and threatened to press 
                     
 
6 The jury were instructed that this alleged conduct was to 
be considered only in connection with the false report charge 
(G. L. c. 119, § 51A [c]) and not the harassment charge. 
9 
 
charges against him.  Colton testified that William told Colton 
that he had sent the letter.7  Even though the allegations were 
false, reading the letter was "very tough" and "absolutely 
alarmed [Jim]."   
 
Throughout this entire time period, Colton consistently 
kept in contact with both defendants, letting them know what he 
was doing or had done to the Lyons family.  William and Gail 
acquiesced to Colton's conduct and encouraged him to do more.    
 
Procedural history.  Police traced the relevant Internet 
activity back to Colton, who was charged on June 5, 2008, with 
stalking and identity fraud.  Colton spent seventeen days in 
jail before posting bail.  On August 14, 2008, Colton made a 
statement taking responsibility for the Internet postings and e-
mails and implicating the defendants in the scheme.   
 
The Johnsons were charged on October 16, 2008, in Lawrence 
District Court with making a false report of child abuse (G. L. 
c. 119, § 51A [c]); identity fraud (G. L. c. 266, § 37E); 
conspiracy (G. L. c. 274, § 7); and criminal harassment (G. L. 
c. 265, § 43A [a]).  Colton entered into a written plea 
                     
 
7 On cross-examination, Colton acknowledged that, in a 2008 
statement, he told police that William showed him a copy of this 
letter in person while meeting with him somewhere near the 
Andover office of the Internal Revenue Service, and that, in a 
2010 statement, he stated that William had called him and read 
aloud a "sick letter" that he had already sent to Jim. 
10 
 
agreement with the Commonwealth in exchange for his testimony 
against the Johnsons.   
 
During pretrial proceedings, the defendants filed motions 
to dismiss, asserting that (1) the Commonwealth failed to 
provide discovery; (2) there was no probable cause that the 
defendants had committed any crime; (3) the destruction of 
evidence caused by the Commonwealth warranted dismissal; (4) the 
defendants' right to a speedy trial was violated; (5) venue for 
the charge of making a false report was improper; and (6) there 
was prosecutorial misconduct.  All of these motions were denied.  
 
At the close of the Commonwealth's case, the Johnsons moved 
for required findings of not guilty on all of the charges.  The 
judge entered a finding of not guilty on the charge of identity 
fraud, but denied the defendants' motion in all other respects.  
The judge also denied the defendants' motion at the close of all 
of the evidence.  The charge of conspiracy was dismissed at the 
Commonwealth's request.   
 
On December 1, 2011, a jury convicted the defendants of 
criminal harassment and convicted William of making a false 
report of child abuse.  On the harassment charge, William was 
sentenced to two and one-half years in the house of correction, 
eighteen months to be served with the balance suspended until 
December 1, 2014, with probation conditions; on the charge of 
making a false report of child abuse, he was fined $1,000.  Gail 
11 
 
was sentenced to two years in the house of correction, six 
months to be served with the balance suspended until December 1, 
2014, with probation conditions, and fined $1,000.  We 
transferred the defendants' appeal to this court on our own 
motion.    
 
Discussion.  On appeal, the defendants make multiple claims 
of error regarding the Commonwealth's compliance with discovery 
rules, alleged prosecutorial misconduct, choice of venue, 
evidentiary rulings at trial, the sufficiency of the evidence, 
statements made in closing argument, and the right to a speedy 
trial.  We conclude that the judge's rulings were correct and 
these claims are without merit. 
 
We begin, however, with a discussion of the defendants' 
challenges to the constitutionality of G. L. c.  265, § 43A (a) 
(§ 43A [a]), both facial8 and as applied to them.  Such 
constitutional challenges are questions of law that we review de 
novo.  Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 301 (2014).   
 
A criminal conviction under § 43A (a) requires proof that  
"(1) the defendant engaged in a knowing pattern of conduct or 
speech, or series of acts, on at least three separate occasions; 
(2) the defendant intended to target the victim with the 
harassing conduct or speech, or series of acts, on each 
occasion; (3) the conduct or speech, or series of acts, were of 
                     
 
8 Only William raises a facial claim on appeal. 
12 
 
such a nature that they seriously alarmed the victim; (4) the 
conduct or speech, or series of acts, were of such a nature that 
they would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial 
emotional distress; and (5) the defendant committed the conduct 
or speech, or series of acts, 'willfully and maliciously'" 
(citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. McDonald, 462 Mass. 236, 
240 (2012).   
 
Although this court has previously construed the criminal 
harassment statute, it has not yet considered its application to 
the type of conduct at issue here.  An analysis of whether the 
defendants' actions amounted to criminal harassment necessarily 
includes the consideration whether their conduct satisfied the 
statutory requirements and whether they engaged in 
constitutionally protected speech.  
 
1.  Facial challenge.  William argues that § 43A (a) is 
both unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.  He contends that 
the statute is dangerously susceptible of application to 
constitutionally protected speech and is so vague that it leaves 
the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits.  His 
challenge fails on two accounts. 
 
First, the claim is raised for the first time on appeal, 
and consequently is waived.  See Commonwealth v. Dockham, 405 
Mass. 618, 632-633 (1989).  Although, as the defendant notes in 
his reply brief, we are nevertheless not prevented from 
13 
 
considering his claim, we "rarely exercise[]" this power and 
only do so in instances where a "serious and obvious" mistake 
poses a "substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice."  
Commonwealth v. Oakes, 407 Mass. 92, 94-95 (1990).     
 
Second, the challenge fails because the statute is neither 
overbroad nor vague.  William bears the burden of showing "'from 
the text of [the law] and from actual fact' . . . that 
substantial overbreadth exists" (citation omitted).  Virginia v. 
Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122 (2003).  As an initial matter, 
§ 43A (a) is a statute directed at a course of conduct, rather 
than speech, "and the conduct it proscribes is 'not necessarily 
associated with speech'" (citation omitted).  United States v. 
Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 856 (8th Cir. 2012) (considering similar 
statute).  In particular, § 43A (a) specifically criminalizes "a 
knowing pattern of conduct or series of acts  . . . directed at 
a specific person, which seriously alarms that person and would 
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional 
distress" (emphases added).  As the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Osinger, 
753 F.3d 939, 944 (9th Cir. 2014), when considering a similar 
statute, because § 43A (a) "proscribes harassing and 
intimidating conduct, the statute is not facially invalid under 
the First Amendment."  
14 
 
 
Further, as the statute requires both malicious intent on 
behalf of the perpetrator and substantial harm to the victim, 
"it is difficult to imagine what constitutionally-protected 
speech would fall under these statutory prohibitions."  Id., 
citing Petrovic, 701 F.3d at 856.  Contrary to William's claim, 
the statutory elements such as "seriously alarms" "are not 
esoteric or complicated terms devoid of common understanding."  
Osinger, supra at 945.  Rather, these elements are similar to 
those that have led courts in other jurisdictions to uphold 
their criminal harassment statutes as constitutionally 
permissible.  See, e.g., State v. Brown, 207 Ariz. 231 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2004); Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235 (Fla.), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 894 (1995).   
 
Together the component parts of the statute provide 
adequate notice and safeguards to prevent its application to 
protected speech.  Contrary to William's claim that the statute 
leaves it to the hearer of the speech to determine what conduct 
is criminal, the Commonwealth must prove that a defendant knew 
he or she was engaged in a pattern of conduct that intentionally 
targeted a victim for the purpose of harassment with acts of 
such a nature that they would cause a reasonable person to 
suffer substantial emotional distress.  This scienter 
requirement undermines William's claim that he could be liable 
under § 43A (a) if his actions were accidental and that putative 
15 
 
harassers are at the mercy of a hearer's sensitivities.  
Moreover, William has offered no meaningful evidence to show 
that the statute has a real and substantial deterrent on 
protected speech or that it actually denies fair notice of what 
conduct is proscribed.  The required elements are clearly 
delineated such that § 43A (a) leaves no putative harassers 
wondering what is prohibited.  Accordingly, William's facial 
challenge to § 43A (a) fails. 
 
2.  As-applied challenge.  The defendants' as-applied 
constitutional challenge also fails because the conduct in 
question was not protected speech, but rather a hybrid of 
conduct and speech integral to the commission of a crime.  
Accordingly, § 43A (a), as applied to the defendants, does not 
implicate constitutionally protected speech rights. 
 
"[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of 
speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely 
because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried 
out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed."  
United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 433 (1st Cir. 2014), 
quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 
(1949).  The defendants do not claim that creating fictitious 
Internet postings and sending a letter falsely accusing someone 
of a crime constitute legal conduct.  Their conduct served 
solely to harass the Lyonses by luring numerous strangers and 
16 
 
prompting incessant late-night telephone calls to their home by 
way of false representations, by overtly and aggressively 
threatening to misuse their personal identifying information, 
and by falsely accusing Jim of a serious crime.  Where the sole 
purpose of the defendants' speech was to further their endeavor 
to intentionally harass the Lyonses, such speech is not 
protected by the First Amendment.  "The [F]irst [A]mendment does 
not provide a defense to a criminal charge simply because the 
actor uses words to carry out his illegal purpose."  United 
States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 842 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 
In this respect, we are guided by the reasoning of the 
United States Supreme Court and several circuit courts of the 
United States Court of Appeals.  In Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498, 
cited with approval in United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 
468-469 (2010), the United States Supreme Court held that speech 
or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a 
valid criminal statute is not protected by the First Amendment.  
Following the holding in Giboney, in Sayer, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the defendant's 
posting of fictitious Craigslist advertisements to induce 
anonymous third parties seeking casual sexual encounters to 
harass the victim amounted to unprotected speech integral to the 
criminal conduct proscribed by the Federal cyberstalking 
17 
 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012 & Supp. I 2013).9  748 F.3d at 
433-434. 
 
Similarly, in Petrovic, 701 F.3d at 854-856, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that 
§ 2261A was properly applied to a defendant who created a Web 
site with links to images of the victim nude or engaged in sex 
acts with him, where the sole purpose of the communications was 
to carry out the defendant's threats to harass and humiliate the 
victim if she ended their sexual relationship.  As integral to 
the commission of the crime of cyberstalking, the defendant's 
communication, although speech, fell outside the purview of the 
First Amendment. 
 
The speech here, much as the speech at issue in Giboney, 
Sayer, and Petrovic, was also "integral to criminal conduct," 
serving only to implement the defendants' purpose to harass and 
cause substantial emotional distress to the Lyonses in violation 
                     
 
9 Section 2261A(2) of 18 U.S.C. (2012 & Supp. I 2013) 
defines cyberstalking, in relevant part, as follows:  "Whoever -
- with the intent to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place 
under surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or 
intimidate another person, uses the mail, any interactive 
computer service or electronic communication service or 
electronic communication system of interstate commerce, or any 
other facility of interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a 
course of conduct that . . . causes, attempts to cause, or would 
be reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional distress 
to . . . [that person], [an immediate family member of that 
person] or [a spouse or intimate partner of that person], shall 
be punished as provided in [§] 2261(b) of this title" (emphases 
added). 
18 
 
of § 43A (a).10  The defendants point to no lawful purpose of 
their "communications" that would take them outside of the 
exception delineated in Giboney.  To the extent that any of the 
harassing contacts were composed of words, they were used "so 
close in time and purpose to a substantive evil as to become 
part of the ultimate crime itself."  United States v. Freeman, 
761 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1120 
(1986).  In such instances, "where speech becomes an integral 
part of the crime, a First Amendment defense is foreclosed."  
Id.  While the content of the speech in question certainly 
affected the Lyonses, much of the alarming impact was the 
product of the frightening number, frequency, and type of 
harassing contacts with which the defendants bombarded the 
Lyonses.  In these circumstances, the application of § 43A (a) 
to the defendants fully withstands constitutional scrutiny.11 
                     
 
10 The Commonwealth also argues that the speech here is 
"speech that unjustifiably invades privacy."  We agree with the 
defendants, however, that there is no criminal invasion of 
privacy statute in Massachusetts.  This ultimately proves 
irrelevant given our holding that the speech at issue falls 
under another category of speech not subject to First Amendment 
protection. 
 
 
11 We disagree with the defendants' contention that their 
conviction for criminal harassment rests solely on incidents of 
pure speech.  In Commonwealth v. Welch, 444 Mass. 80, 86-87 
(2005), we noted that courts have long recognized that speech 
and conduct "frequently overlap and may be incapable of precise 
differentiation" and that "the criminal harassment statute was 
intended to proscribe harassing conduct encompassing 'speech.'"  
It is apparent that cyberharassment will consistently involve a 
19 
 
 
Nonetheless, the defendants attempt to argue that they are 
entitled to a required finding of not guilty on the criminal 
harassment charge because none of their speech constituted 
"fighting words," which they contend was the only form of speech 
punishable at the time of the offense under our interpretation 
of the statute in Welch.  See generally 444 Mass. at 93-100.  
This argument is meritless.  While the focus of our decision in 
Welch was centered on the "fighting words" doctrine, we 
expressly noted that "[a]ny attempt to punish an individual for 
speech not encompassed within the 'fighting words' doctrine (or 
within any other constitutionally unprotected category of 
speech) would of course offend our Federal and State 
Constitutions" (emphasis added).  Id. at 99.  These well-defined 
and limited categories of speech "are not protected because they 
are 'no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of 
such slight social value as a step to truth' that whatever 
meager benefit that may be derived from them is 'clearly 
outweighed' by the dangers they pose."  Borowski, 461 Mass. at 
422, quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 
                                                                  
hybrid of speech and conduct.  There is content within the 
communications, but the very act of using the Internet as a 
medium through which to communicate implicates conduct.  In 
Welch, supra at 99 n.15, we did "not suggest that incidents of 
harassment that consist of more than pure speech should be 
exempted from punishment."  Here, the conduct and speech 
together "constituted a single and integrated" course of action 
in violation of a valid law.  See Giboney v. Empire Storage & 
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949). 
20 
 
(1942).  Speech integral to criminal conduct is one such long-
standing category that is constitutionally unprotected, directly 
applicable to the defendants' conduct here, and permissibly 
proscribed by § 43A (a).12  Accordingly, the denial of the 
defendants' motion for a required finding of not guilty on the 
basis that they engaged in protected First Amendment activity 
was not error. 
 
3.  Sufficiency of evidence.  The defendants contend that 
there was insufficient evidence of their joint venture to 
criminally harass the victims, arguing that both the "directed 
at" and "seriously alarms" prongs of the statute were not met.  
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the 
facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see 
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), and 
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found 
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the statutory elements.   
                     
 
12 To the extent that the defendants read our holding in 
O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415 (2012), to establish the 
principle that no constitutionally unprotected category of 
speech can be proscribed under G. L. c. 265, § 43A (a), unless 
we have explicitly articulated so in a previous case, they are 
misguided.  We broadened the scope of our § 43A (a) analysis to 
expressly include true threats in Borowski only because we had 
specifically stated that the true threats exception did not 
apply in the § 43A (a) context in Welch, 444 Mass. at 94 n.14.  
Consequently, clarification was needed in Borowski that is not 
needed for other unprotected categories of speech that have 
never been explicitly exempted from the application of § 43A 
(a). 
21 
 
 
a.  "Directed at" prong.  Section 43A (a) requires that the 
Commonwealth prove three or more predicate acts of harassment 
that were "directed at a specific person."  See McDonald, 462 
Mass. at 240.  The defendants argue that the Craigslist postings 
(two of the four acts supporting the harassment charge) were not 
directed at the victims, but were merely directed at the general 
public. 
 
This argument is without merit.  As a factual matter, the 
jury clearly could have concluded that the "directed at" prong 
was met.  While the defendants' methods were indirect, the false 
information in the Craigslist postings was intended solely to 
ensure that the victims were harassed as a consequence by 
unwitting third parties contacting them at all hours of the 
night by telephone and showing up at their home.  Essentially, 
the "sole immediate object" of the false advertisements was to 
create a marketplace for the guaranteed harassment of the 
victims.  See Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498. 
 
The defendants cite to Welch for the contention that 
statements made to a third party are not speech directed at a 
specific person.  444 Mass. at 92-93 (shouting abusive epithets 
in one's apartment and speaking in normal tone of voice to third 
party outside does not satisfy requirements of § 43A [a]).  The 
defendants' acts in the instant case are appreciably different 
than those at issue in Welch.  The Craigslist postings were the 
22 
 
equivalent of the defendants recruiting others to harass the 
victims and the victims alone.  The causation link is satisfied.  
The defendants cannot launder their harassment of the Lyons 
family through the Internet to escape liability.   
 
b.  "Seriously alarms" prong.  Section 43A (a) also 
requires the Commonwealth to prove that the acts of alleged 
harassment "seriously alarm[ed]" the victims.  The serious alarm 
required under § 43A (a) is a "demanding, subjective element of 
harm" that must be satisfied by a victim's testimony rather than 
conjecture.  Commonwealth v. Braica, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 244, 247 
(2007).  The defendants argue that (1) the Commonwealth offered 
insufficient proof that the victims were seriously alarmed, and 
(2) the victims did not experience serious alarm separately for 
each act, as required, rather than cumulatively as the result of 
the pattern of harassing acts.  We disagree with both 
contentions.   
 
First, the Lyonses' subjective feelings of fear and anxiety 
were actual (not hypothetical), significant, and well documented 
at trial.  As a general matter, Jim and Bernadette testified 
that they felt "bombarded," "attacked," and "very frightened" 
throughout the ordeal.  Jim described the thirty-five-day 
"odyssey" in which the defendants would "torture [them]," 
stating that he was concerned about the safety of his family and 
himself:  "The[y] attacked my business.  They attacked my 
23 
 
family.  And they tried to take my kids away from me."  
Bernadette described the situation as "very traumatic," stating 
that her family was in a "siege mentality where [e]very day 
something was happening so [they] got afraid."  The Lyonses were 
sufficiently alarmed to call the police "right away" after the 
very first harassing act.  Jim testified that the second act 
"stepped it up a notch" and made him feel "[t]errible," and that 
the correspondence that he received alleging sexual molestation 
was "very tough" and "absolutely alarmed" him.  The police took 
notice of and corroborated Jim's testimony that the defendants' 
conduct took a substantial emotional toll on him.   
 
The Lyonses' testimony of feeling frightened, tortured, and 
attacked more than meets the "seriously alarms" standard.  The 
victims testified to an abundance of distressing and alarming 
conduct that amounted to a serious invasion of their emotional 
tranquility.  Unlike the victims in Commonwealth v. Kessler, 442 
Mass. 770, 773-774 (2004), who offered no proof that they were 
"actually 'alarmed or shocked,'" but rather just "offended" by 
the defendant's indecent exposure, the Lyonses testified to 
having a level of fear and anxiety similar to the victims in 
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 444 Mass. 102, 105, 108 (2005) 
(serious alarm requirement met where, as result of harassment, 
victim felt vulnerable, son's grades dropped due to nervousness, 
and family felt constantly under surveillance).  See 
24 
 
Commonwealth v. O'Neil, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 294 (2006) 
(defendant's letters and telephone calls seriously alarmed 
victim who felt "concern[ed]" and "very scared," and asked State 
officials for assistance).  Here, the Lyons family did not 
merely experience uneasiness associated with day-to-day living, 
but rather, as the ominous and hostile acts perpetrated by the 
defendants continued to escalate, the totality of the situation 
evoked the type of "serious negative emotional experience" 
required under the statute.  Kessler, supra at 774. 
 
As for whether serious alarm must be shown for each 
individual act or may be measured cumulatively, we conclude that 
the statute's wording ties the requirement to the over-all 
pattern of conduct.  The statutory language of § 43A (a) 
requires that the "pattern of conduct" or "series of acts" 
"seriously alarms."  As a general rule of statutory 
construction, "words importing the plural number may include the 
singular."  G. L. c. 4, § 6, Fourth.  Accordingly, "acts" might 
refer to a single act as well as multiple acts.  However, the 
rules of grammar and proper subject-verb agreement instruct a 
reading of "alarms" to modify the singular noun of one "pattern" 
or one "series," rather than the noun "acts."13  The evidence at 
                     
 
13 Other States have also held that in similar criminal 
statutes where the actus reus of the crime is defined as a 
"series of acts," each act need not induce fear.  See, e.g., 
25 
 
trial was sufficient to support the verdict rendered by the 
jury. 
 
4.  Pretrial motions.  In three joint motions before the 
trial court, the defendants unsuccessfully asked for the case to 
be dismissed, alleging prosecutorial errors that caused undue 
delay and prejudice.  Specifically, they contended that 
dismissal was appropriate based on the Commonwealth's "loss" of 
Colton's telephone records and the Commonwealth's delayed 
disclosure of (1) promises, rewards, and inducements made to 
Colton in exchange for his cooperation; (2) Colton's statements 
regarding the location of the DCF call; and (3) a diary that 
Colton kept.   
 
While the Commonwealth has a duty to disclose all material, 
exculpatory evidence in its possession, see Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 
404-405 (1992), we agree with the motion judge that the 
Commonwealth did not withhold any such evidence here and that 
delays in disclosure did not result in prejudice. 
 
Colton's telephone records were potentially significant to 
the case because they could corroborate (or not) that a call was 
made from his telephone to the DCF hotline falsely reporting 
child abuse, and was not made from William's telephone.  In 
                                                                  
Cook v. State, 36 P.3d 710, 721 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001); People 
v. Payton, 161 Misc. 2d 170, 173-176 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1994). 
26 
 
November, 2009, the Commonwealth subpoenaed these records from 
Verizon and was notified that Colton's correct telephone service 
provider was Comcast.  However, it was not until June of 2010 
that the prosecutor attempted to obtain Colton's records from 
Comcast.  By then, the subpoenaed records were no longer 
available as they were outside the company's retention period.  
The defendants argue that this "loss" of records was prejudicial 
to their defense strategy.  We agree that the Commonwealth could 
have and should have attempted to obtain Colton's telephone 
records earlier, but, ultimately, these records would not have 
provided any exculpatory information and their "loss" was not 
prejudicial.  The Commonwealth had already disclosed the DCF 
hotline records to the defendants, which identified the 
telephone number of the caller as Colton's, thus establishing 
that a call was made to DCF from Colton's telephone number, not 
William's, precisely what Colton's telephone records would have 
established.  Further, the defendants had considerable 
opportunity and bases for cross-examining Colton even without 
his telephone records, "'effectively' remov[ing]" any prejudice 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Molina, 454 Mass. 232, 236-
237 (2009).  
 
Regarding promises, rewards, and inducements, well before 
trial, the prosecutor acknowledged Colton's preliminary 
discussions with the government.  Once an agreement was 
27 
 
formalized on September 22, 2010, the prosecutor properly 
disclosed its terms and filed a discovery packet including all 
of the Commonwealth's documents.  See Commonwealth v. Burgos, 
462 Mass. 53, 62-63, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 796 (2012) 
(prosecutor informed defendant before trial of formalized 
cooperation agreements).  Until the agreement was formalized, 
Colton received no promises, rewards, or inducements that the 
Commonwealth was obligated to disclose.   
 
With respect to the Commonwealth's delayed disclosure of a 
later statement Colton made about the DCF call, we disagree with 
the defendants that this statement was a critical change in his 
story.  In his initial statement to the police, Colton did not 
provide specific information about the location from which the 
DCF telephone call was made, and, later, Colton asserted that 
William had made the call from Colton's home telephone.  The 
defendants had adequate notice of this assertion in the 
Commonwealth's bill of particulars, a supplemental police 
report, and Colton's follow-up interview report.  The 
information was provided long before trial, permitting ample 
time for the defense to weave it into its over-all strategy and 
counsel's cross-examination of Colton.  See Commonwealth v. 
Baldwin, 385 Mass. 165, 175 (1982) ("disclosure was sufficiently 
timely to allow the defendant 'to make effective use of the 
28 
 
evidence in preparing and presenting his case'" [citation 
omitted]).  
 
Regarding the alleged delay in disclosing Colton's diary, 
the prosecutor promptly disclosed it to the defendants on 
learning of its existence in May, 2011, again, well before 
trial.  This provided the defendants with a sufficient 
opportunity to investigate its contents and conduct a meaningful 
cross-examination of Colton.   
 
Finally, the defendants' due process rights were adequately 
protected given the defendants' unhampered ability to 
extensively cross-examine Colton and the jury's instruction to 
carefully weigh his testimony.  The defendants have not 
demonstrated that any delays in receiving information 
legitimately prejudiced their opportunity to effectively prepare 
their defense.   
 
5.  Venue.  During pretrial proceedings and prior to jury 
empanelment, William moved for dismissal of the charge of making 
a false report of child abuse, asserting lack of jurisdiction 
and improper venue under G. L. c. 277 § 57A.14  He argued that 
since the telephone call to DCF (located in Suffolk County) was 
made from Colton's home (in Middlesex County), the charge should 
                     
 
14 As only William was convicted of making a false report, 
Gail does not raise this argument on appeal. 
29 
 
have been tried in either Suffolk or Middlesex County.  The 
motion was denied.   
 
Article 13 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
grants the Legislature "discretion . . . to establish venue 
requirements for criminal trials," Opinion of the Justices, 372 
Mass. 883, 897 (1977), but acknowledges "that fairness to a 
defendant normally requires that the defendant not be 
transported far away for trial but rather be tried where there 
is access to witnesses and evidence for the defense."  
Commonwealth v. Brogan, 415 Mass. 169, 174 (1993).  Since the 
statute at issue, G. L. c. 119, § 51A (c), does not include a 
venue provision, the question of venue here "is one of common 
law within any limitation that art. 13 may impose."  Brogan, 
supra at 173. 
 
The defendant has made no showing that the trial in Essex 
County "was in any way prejudicial to [his] defences on the 
merits, or otherwise disadvantageous to [him]."  Commonwealth v. 
Libby, 358 Mass. 617, 620 n.2 (1971).  It is not as though the 
crime is unrelated to Essex County:  William lived in Essex 
County, as did the victims, and the child abuse investigation 
became fully manifested there.  William has not demonstrated 
that he was "unduly hampered by being required to appear" in 
30 
 
Essex County.  Commonwealth v. Adelson, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 585, 
589 (1996).15   
 
6.  E-mail authentication.  The defendants moved in limine 
on the first day of trial to exclude e-mail correspondence 
between Gail and Colton, arguing that the circumstances were 
insufficient to permit authentication or confirm Gail's identity 
as the sender.  During voir dire on the issue, Colton testified 
that the defendants shared a joint e-mail account with which he 
had exchanged many friendly e-mails for nearly a decade.  
Regarding the proposed evidence, Colton testified that he 
understood these e-mails to be from Gail, on William's behalf, 
as they were sent after William had enlisted Colton in the 
scheme, were signed using Gail's typical signature, and 
referenced Colton's responses to inquiries about the harassment 
scheme.16  The judge ruled that the preponderance of the evidence 
authenticated the e-mails and laid a foundation for their 
admissibility.  We agree. 
                     
 
15 As we are not reversing William's harassment conviction, 
there is no need to address his related argument that any 
"prejudicial spillover" from evidence introduced in support of 
that charge would require a new trial on the false report 
charge. 
 
 
16 These inquiries included references to Craigslist 
postings, a telephone conversation between Colton and Gail, the 
Lyonses' personal identifying information, and "Mr. Meany," 
which Colton understood to be Gail's way of referencing Jim. 
31 
 
 
"Evidence may be authenticated by direct or circumstantial 
evidence, including its '[a]ppearance, contents, substance, 
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics.'"  
Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 447-448 (2011), quoting 
Mass. G. Evid. § 901(b)(4) (2013).  The voir dire of Colton 
presented sufficient evidence that some of the e-mails sent to 
Colton were authored by Gail given the long-standing 
relationship between Colton and the defendants, the defendants' 
prior use of the e-mail address at the time of the scheme, and 
the referencing of the harassing acts in the e-mails.17      
 
7.  Closing argument.  In summarizing the evidence for the 
jury, the prosecutor stated:  "Now, how in the world can the 
Johnsons explain to you why . . . ."  William argues on appeal 
that this statement could be interpreted as a comment on the 
defendants' failure to take the stand.  Viewed in context, the 
prosecutor's rhetorical question was merely an attempt to 
illustrate the point that the defendants' conduct could not be 
reconciled with their defense.  It was a "fair, unemotional 
response to defense counsel's argument," grounded in both the 
                     
 
17 These electronic mail messages (e-mails) (in addition to 
telephone conversations between Gail and Colton) were also 
sufficient to establish that Gail knowingly participated in the 
harassing conduct with the same malicious intent as her husband.  
Accordingly, the evidence of Gail's involvement as a joint 
venturer in the scheme was sufficient to survive a motion for a 
required finding of not guilty.  The judge's ruling to this 
effect was not in error. 
32 
 
evidence and its reasonable inferences.  See Commonwealth v. 
Duguay, 430 Mass. 397, 404 (1999).  There was no improper burden 
shifting. 
 
Additionally, William contends that the prosecutor argued 
facts not in evidence in two instances, amounting to reversible 
error.  Specifically, the prosecutor mistakenly stated that 
people came to the Lyonses' home in response to the motorcycle 
advertisement (they only had telephoned), and that the Lyonses 
received the letter alleging sexual molestation before rather 
than following the e-mail sent by "Brian."18  The prosecutor's 
two misstatements of fact did not result in a substantial risk 
of a miscarriage of justice.  The facts were many and varied, 
and none of the misstatements "went to the heart of the case."  
Commonwealth v. Coren, 437 Mass. 723, 731 (2002).  Further, the 
judge properly instructed the jury that closing arguments are 
not evidence.  Consequently, reversal is not required.  
 
8.  Speedy trial claim.  Approximately two years after the 
defendants were charged, they moved for a dismissal pursuant to 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 36, as amended, 422 Mass. 1503 (1996), due to 
speedy trial violations.  The motion judge acted well within his 
discretion in declining to accept defense counsels' unsworn 
                     
 
18 While it remains unclear from the record whether the 
"Brian" letter or e-mail arrived at the Lyonses first, we 
acknowledge there is a chance the prosecutor might have confused 
the sequence of events. 
33 
 
representations regarding various continuances, and in denying 
the motion.  We agree with the motion judge that the defendants 
did not undertake a proper rule 36 calculus or sufficiently 
develop their argument, leaving the court unable to adequately 
assess their claim.  Accordingly, it is waived. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.