Case Title: Rhonda Miller v. Craig J. Thomack

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1995AP001684

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-1684 and 95-1766 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
95-1684: 
Rhonda Miller, Richard Miller and Kay Miller, 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
Craig J. Thomack, 
 
Defendant, 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
a foreign corporation, 
 
Defendant-Co-Appellant, 
James D. Thomack, ABC Insurance Company, 
as insurer of James Thomack, Michelle Melberg, 
DEF Insurance Company, as insurer of Michelle 
Melberg, 
 
Defendants, 
Kimberly Ransom, 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
Fire Insurance Exchange, 
 
Defendant-Petitioner, 
Kurt D. Pamperin, Sr., Kurt Pamperin, Jr., 
United Fire & Casualty Company, a foreign 
corporation, Waupaca County, as agent for 
the State of Wisconsin, Brian Clary, GHI 
Insurnace, as insurer of Brian Clary, John Doe, 
Susan Roe, 
 
Defendants, 
Karen Miller, 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
NOP Insurance, as insurer of Karen Miller, 
 
Defendant, 
Craig J. Thomack, 
 
Third Party Plaintiff-Co-Appellant, 
James D. Thomack, 
 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
Jason Beattie, 
 
Third Part Defendant-Respondent, 
Lee Beattie, Carol Beattie and KLM Insurance 
Company, as insurer of Jason Beattie, Lee 
Beattie and Carol Beattie, 
 
Third Party Defendants. 
--------------- 
95-1766: 
Rhonda Miller, Richard Miller and Kay Miller, 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
Craig J. Thomack, 
 
Defendant-Appellant, 
State Farm Mutual Automobile, James D. Thomack, 
ABC Insurance Company, Michell Melberg, DEF 
Insurance Company, Kimberly Ransom, Fire 
Insurance Company, Waupaca County, Brian  
Clary, GHI Insurance Company, John Doe, 
Susan Roe, Karen Miller, and NOP Insurance 
Company, 
 
Defendants. 
Craig J. Thomack and James D. Thomack, 
 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
Kurt D. Pamperin, Sr., Kurt Pamperin, Jr. and  
United Fire and Casualty Company, 
 
Defendants-Appellants, 
Jason Beattie, Lee Beattie, Carol Beattie, 
and KLM Insurance Company, an insurer of 
Jason Beattie, Lee Beattie and  
Carol Beattie, 
 
Third Party Defendants. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  204 Wis. 2d 242, 555 N.W.2d 130 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 13, l997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 30, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waupaca 
 
JUDGE: 
Philip M. Kirk 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, Kimberly 
Ransom & defendant-petitioner, Fire Insurance Exchange, there 
were briefs by George F. Savage and Everson, Whitney, Everson & 
Brehm, S.C., Green Bay, and oral argument by George F. Savage. 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, Karen 
Miller, there was a brief by Chirstopher R. Bandt, William R. 
Wick and Nash, Spindler, Dean & Grimstad, Manitowoc and oral 
argument by Tom Rusboldt. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants, Rhonda Miller, 
Richard Miller & Kay Miller, there was a brief by Peter S. 
Nelson, Robert N. Duimstra and Menn, Nelson, Sharratt, Teetaert & 
Beisenstein, Ltd., Appleton and oral argument by Peter S. Nelson. 
 
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-1684 & No. 95-1766 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
No. 95-1684 
 
Rhonda Miller, Richard Miller and Kay  
Miller,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Craig J. Thomack,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance  
Company, a foreign corporation,  
 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant, 
 
James D. Thomack, ABC Insurance Company,  
as insurer of James Thomack, Michelle  
Melberg, DEF Insurance Company, as  
insurer of Michelle Melberg,  
 
          Defendants, 
 
Kimberly Ransom,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Fire Insurance Exchange,  
 
          Defendant-Petitioner, 
 
Kurt D. Pamperin, Sr., Kurt Pamperin,  
Jr., United Fire & Casualty Company, a  
foreign corporation, Waupaca County, as  
agent for the State of Wisconsin, Brian  
Clary, GHI Insurance, as insurer of Brian  
Clary, John Doe, Susan Roe,  
FILED 
 
JUN 13, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
2 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Karen Miller,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
NOP Insurance, as insurer of Karen  
Miller,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
Craig J. Thomack,  
 
          Third Party Plaintiff-Co- 
          Appellant, 
 
James D. Thomack,  
 
          Third Party Plaintiff, 
 
Jason Beattie,  
 
          Third Party Defendant- 
          Respondent, 
 
Lee Beattie, Carol Beattie and KLM  
Insurance Company, as insurer of Jason  
Beattie, Lee Beattie and Carol Beattie,  
 
          Third Party Defendants. 
------------------------------------------ 
 
No. 95-1766 
 
Rhonda Miller, Richard Miller and Kay  
Miller,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Craig J. Thomack,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
State Farm Mutual Automobile, James D.  
Thomack, ABC Insurance Company, Michelle  
Melberg, DEF Insurance Company, Kimberly  
Ransom, Fire Insurance Exchange, Waupaca  
 
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
3 
County, Brian Clary, GHI Insurance  
Company, John Doe, Susan Roe, Karen  
Miller, and NOP Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendants, 
 
Craig J. Thomack and James D. Thomack,  
 
          Third Party Plaintiffs, 
 
Kurt D. Pamperin, Sr., Kurt Pamperin,  
Jr., and United Fire & Casualty Company,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Jason Beattie, Lee Beattie, Carol  
Beattie, and KLM Insurance Company, an  
insurer of Jason Beattie, Lee Beattie and  
Carol Beattie,  
 
          Third Party Defendants.  
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals reversing 
an order of the Circuit Court for Waupaca County, Philip M. 
Kirk, Judge.
1 The circuit court granted the motions for summary 
judgment of Karen Miller, Kimberly Ransom and Jason Beattie
2 and 
their insurers (hereafter "the defendants"), holding that they 
                     
1 Miller v. Thomack, 204 Wis. 2d 242, 555 N.W.2d 130 (Ct. 
App. 1996). 
2 Mr. Beattie and his insurer did not participate in this 
review. 
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
4 
did not violate Wis. Stat. § 125.07(1)(a)1 (1987-88),
3 which 
provides that "[n]o person may procure for, sell, dispense or 
give away any alcohol beverages to any underage person. . . ." 
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court, 
concluding that one who contributes money for the sole purpose 
of purchasing alcohol beverages knowing that they will be 
consumed by an underage person is procuring alcohol beverages 
for the underage person within the meaning of § 125.07(1)(a)1.  
¶2 
Several issues were presented in petitions for review. 
The court, however, limited its grant of review to a single 
issue: whether a person who contributes money for the purpose of 
purchasing beer knowing that the beer will be consumed by an 
underage person
4 procures alcohol beverages for the underage 
person in violation of § 125.07(1)(a)1. We conclude that a 
person who contributes money with the intent of bringing about 
the purchase of alcohol beverages for consumption by an underage 
person whom the person knows, or should know, is under the legal 
drinking age, procures alcohol beverages for the underage person 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 125.07(1)(a)1 
and 
125.035(4). 
I. 
                     
3 All further statutory references are to the 1987-88 
volumes, the statutes in effect at the time of the allegedly 
negligent 
acts, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
The 
statutory 
sections at issue, Wis. Stat. §§ 125.07(1)(a)1 and 125.035(2) 
and (4)(a) and (b), have remained unchanged since the 1987-88 
volumes. 
4 The statutory term "underage person" is defined as a 
person who has not attained the legal drinking age of 21. Wis. 
Stat. §§ 125.02(8m) and 125.02(20m). 
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
5 
¶3 
For purposes of this review on motions for summary 
judgment, the facts may be simply stated and are undisputed. On 
the evening of June 12, 1990, Rhonda Miller,
5 the plaintiff, 
solicited Brian Clary, who had attained the legal drinking age, 
to buy beer for herself, Craig Thomack and the defendants, all 
of whom were under the legal drinking age.  
¶4 
Kimberly Ransom contributed about $5.00 toward the 
purchase of the beer. The deposition testimony differs with 
regard to whether Karen Miller contributed money to the purchase 
of the beer, but for purposes of the summary judgment motion and 
this review it is conceded that she did. Others also may have 
contributed money. Brian Clary purchased the beer and placed it 
on the back seat of the Thomack vehicle. 
¶5 
The plaintiff and defendants went to a cabin and then 
to a beach and parking lot area. At the beach, the beer either 
remained in the back of the car or was placed near or on the 
car. At both locations, the beer was available to all; no one 
distributed any of the beer; those who drank beer helped 
themselves to it.  
¶6 
In the early morning of June 13, 1990, Craig Thomack, 
intoxicated from the beer drinking, lost control of the car he 
was driving. The plaintiff, Thomack's passenger, was seriously 
injured in the resulting crash.  
¶7 
The plaintiff and her parents brought a negligence 
action against the defendants, Craig Thomack
6 and others. The 
                     
5 Rhonda Miller, Karen Miller and Kimberly Ransom are 
cousins.  
6 Mr. Thomack is a defendant in the action but is not 
involved in this review. 
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
6 
defendants moved the court for summary judgment contending, 
among other grounds, that they could not be found causally 
negligent for the plaintiff's injury simply for contributing 
money to the purchase of beer that was later consumed by Craig 
Thomack, an underage person, whose consumption of the beer was a 
substantial factor in the plaintiff's injury. 
II. 
¶8 
In reviewing motions for summary judgment an appellate 
court applies the standards set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) 
(1995-96) in the same manner as the circuit court. Grams v. 
Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980). Summary 
judgment is properly granted when there is only a question of 
law at issue and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. The court concludes, and the parties agree, that 
this case presents a question of law, namely the interpretation 
and application of statutes to undisputed facts. An appellate 
court determines questions of law independently, benefiting from 
the analyses of the circuit court and court of appeals. 
¶9 
Whether the complaint in this case can withstand a 
motion for summary judgment depends on the plaintiff's ability 
to prove that the defendants violated § 125.07(1)(a)1.
7 If the 
                     
7 Section 125.07(1)(a)1 provides as follows:  
125.07 Underage and intoxicated persons; presence on 
licensed premises; possession; penalties. (1) ALCOHOL 
BEVERAGES; RESTRICTIONS RELATING TO UNDERAGE PERSONS. 
(a) Restrictions. 1. No person may procure for, sell, 
dispense or give away any alcohol beverages to any 
underage person not accompanied by his or her parent, 
guardian or spouse who has attained the legal drinking 
age. 
 
It is undisputed that "alcohol beverages" includes beer. See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 125.02(1) and (6). 
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
7 
defendants did not violate § 125.07(1)(a)1, they would be immune 
from civil liability by virtue of Wis. Stat. § 125.035.
8 Section 
125.035(2) provides persons with immunity from civil liability 
arising out of the act of procuring alcohol beverages for 
another person. However, § 125.035(4) provides an exception to 
the immunity statute. Under § 125.035(4) a person
9 is not immune 
from civil liability arising out of the act of procuring alcohol 
beverages for another if the person knew or should have known 
that the other was under the legal drinking age and if the 
                                                                  
The 
court 
has 
stated 
that 
proof 
of 
violation 
of 
§ 125.07(1)(a)1 is negligence per se. Paskiet v. Quality State 
Oil Co., Inc., 164 Wis. 2d 800, 809, 476 N.W.2d 871 (1991).  
8 Section 125.035 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
125.035 Civil liability exemption: furnishing alcohol 
beverages. 
 
. . . .  
 
 
(2) A person is immune from civil liability arising 
out of the act of procuring alcohol beverages for or 
selling, dispensing or giving away alcohol beverages 
to another person. 
 
. . . .  
 
 
(4)(a) In this subsection, "provider" means a 
person, 
including 
a 
licensee 
or 
permittee, 
who 
procures alcohol beverages for or sells, dispenses or 
gives away alcohol beverages to an underage person in 
violation of s. 125.07(1)(a). 
 
 
(b) Subsection (2) does not apply if the provider 
knew or should have known that the underage person was 
under the legal drinking age and if the alcohol 
beverages provided to the underage person were a 
substantial factor in causing injury to a 3rd party.  
 
9 A "person" for purposes of § 125.07(1)(a)1 includes both 
adults and children. Smith v. Kappell, 147 Wis. 2d 380, 385-86, 
433 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1988). 
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
8 
alcohol beverages provided to the underage person were a 
substantial factor in causing injury to a third person. 
Therefore, read together, §§ 125.07(1)(a)1 and 125.035(4) allow 
a complaint to survive a motion for summary judgment when the 
plaintiff raises genuine issues of fact with regard to the 
following three elements: (1) the defendant procured alcohol 
beverages 
for 
an 
underage 
person 
in 
violation 
of 
§ 125.07(1)(a)1; (2) the defendant knew or should have known 
that the underage person had not attained the legal drinking 
age; and (3) the alcohol beverages provided to the underage 
person were a substantial factor in causing injury to a third 
party.  
¶10 For purposes of this case we need only construe the 
word procure
10 as it is used in §§ 125.07(1)(a)1 and 125.035(4) 
because only this first element is raised in this review.
11  
                     
10 The plaintiff makes an abbreviated argument that the 
defendants' actions also constitute selling. Brief for plaintiff 
at 10-11. Because we conclude that the defendants' actions 
constitute procuring we need not address this argument. 
11 Another question may be whether the injured party, the 
plaintiff here, is a "3rd party" under § 125.035(4)(b). The 
scope of the term third party is not apparent in the statute. 
The defendants did not seek review on or fully argue this 
question. 
Accordingly, we decline to address: (1) whether a person 
who participates in the procuring of alcohol for an underage 
person may be a third party so as to be able to allege a 
violation of § 125.07(1)(a); and (2) whether an underage person 
who consumes alcohol may be a third party so as to take 
advantage of the immunity exception of § 125.035(4)(b).  
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
9 
III. 
¶11 Our task is to construe the word procure. Section 
125.07(1)(a)1 provides that "no person may procure for, sell, 
dispense or give away alcohol beverages to any underage person." 
(emphasis 
added). 
The 
immunity 
statute, 
§ 125.035(4), 
establishes liability for specified providers; a provider is one 
who procures alcohol beverages for an underage person in 
violation of § 125.07(1)(a).  
¶12 The statutes do not define the word procure and the 
legislative history is silent. We construe the statutory 
language to effectuate the intent of the legislature. One rule 
of construction is to assume that the legislature intended to 
use words and phrases according to their ordinary and accepted 
meanings. 
¶13 The 
court 
of 
appeals' 
analysis 
relied 
on 
the 
dictionary definition of procure to discern the ordinary and 
accepted meaning of the word and thus the legislative intent. 
The dictionary definition is as follows: 
 
1a(1) to get possession of: OBTAIN, ACQUIRE . . . esp. 
to 
get 
possession 
of 
by 
particular 
care 
or 
effort . . . and sometimes by devious means . . . . 
                                                                  
In the court of appeals, a party no longer involved in this 
case argued that Kwiatkowski v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 157 Wis. 
2d 768, 774-777, 461 N.W.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1990), bars an 
underage consumer of alcohol from benefiting from the exception 
to immunity set out in § 125.035(4)(b). Court of appeals brief 
for Pamperins at 9-11 and reply brief for Pamperins at 4-6. The 
court of appeals in deciding the present case construed and 
withdrew language from Kwiatkowski to find the exception to 
immunity provided by § 125.035(4)(b) applicable in the present 
case. Miller, 204 Wis. 2d at 261-65. But see Doering v. WEA Ins. 
Group, 193 Wis. 2d 118, 
142-43, 
532 
N.W.2d 
432 
(1995) 
(discussing Kwiatkowski). 
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
10
2a(1) to cause to happen or to be done: bring about: 
EFFECT . . . . 
 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1809 (1961); Miller 
v. Thomack, 204 Wis. 2d 242, 258, 555 N.W.2d 130 (Ct. App. 
1996). 
¶14 The defendants argue that one who merely contributes 
funds to a pool of money does not fall within the dictionary 
definition of the word procure. A mere contributor of funds does 
not, according to the defendants, possess the alcohol, obtain 
the alcohol, acquire the alcohol or cause to happen, bring about 
or effect the purchase of alcohol. The defendants urge that 
contributing money may give an opportunity to another to meet 
the 
dictionary 
definition 
of 
procure, 
but 
the 
act 
of 
contributing money does not in and of itself constitute 
procuring. Procure is used in the statutes, the defendants 
reason, in its common and accepted meaning, to actively 
participate in causing a particular event to happen, not to 
contribute money. 
¶15 To put it another way, the defendants contend that 
procuring requires an affirmative act of physical possession and 
transfer of the alcohol itself. According to the defendants, to 
procure implies to acquire, to exercise possession or control, 
rather than merely to fund. The defendants urge that the 
legislature intended § 125.07(1)(a)1 to require additional steps 
beyond contributing 
money 
to constitute procuring alcohol 
beverages.  
¶16 The 
plaintiff's 
position 
is 
that 
without 
the 
defendants' money there would have been no beer. The defendants 
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
11
furnished the money with the intent that beer be acquired for 
themselves and Thomack, all underage persons. Had one person 
purchased the beer personally and provided it to Thomack she 
would be liable. The plaintiff urges that the defendants' 
collective purchase of the alcohol beverages and the use of a 
21-year-old person as a go-between should not insulate the 
defendants from liability.  
¶17 Prior Wisconsin cases defining the word procure in 
other contexts relied on dictionary definitions similar to that 
used by the court of appeals in this case. Approving a jury 
instruction which used the word, the court has stated: "Procure 
means to obtain by any means; to bring about. It has no 
different significance in the law. The [trial] court evidently 
used the word 'procure' as synonymous with 'aid' or 'abet,' and 
the jury could hardly have understood it otherwise." Vogel v. 
State, 138 Wis. 315, 332, 119 N.W. 190 (1909) ("procuring" a co-
defendant to commit an act)(citations omitted). In another case, 
citing a law dictionary, the court stated that "[t]o 'procure' 
is 'to initiate,' 'to instigate,' or 'to cause a thing to be 
done.'" In re Estate of Kamesar, 81 Wis. 2d 151, 165, 259 N.W.2d 
733 (1977) ("procuring" the drafting of a will as used in a 
statute)(citation omitted). 
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
12
¶18 No Wisconsin decision has construed or applied the 
word procure as it is used in § 125.07(1)(a)1.
12  
¶19 Courts in a number of other jurisdictions have 
construed distinct but similar statutory language and generally 
have concluded that contributing money for the purchase of 
alcohol beverages consumed by an underage person is not 
furnishing or providing alcohol beverages to the underage 
person.  
¶20 In Bennett v. Letterly, 141 Cal. Rptr. 682, 684 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1977), the California Court of Appeal ruled as a matter 
of law that an underage individual who did nothing more than 
contribute between $2 and $5 to a common fund intended to be 
used for the purchase of liquor for consumption by his underage 
friends, did not violate a statute which made liable "[e]very 
person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, 
furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverages to any person 
under the age of 21 years." The court noted that the defendant 
neither purchased, exercised control over, nor even handled, the 
liquor. The word "furnish," as used in the California statute, 
was held 
to 
imply some 
type of 
affirmative 
act 
beyond 
contributing money. Id. 
                     
12 The words sell and give away used in § 125.07(1)(a)1 have 
been construed to proscribe selling beer to an underage person 
who gives the beer to another underage person who then causes 
injury, Paskiet v. Quality State Oil Co., Inc., 164 Wis. 2d 800, 
809, 476 N.W.2d 871 (1991) (applying "sell"), and handing beer 
to an underage person who then causes injury, Smith v. Kappell, 
147 Wis. 2d 380, 384, 433 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1988) (applying 
"give away"). 
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
13
¶21 A later California decision concluded that a defendant 
who, in addition to contributing to a common fund for the 
purchase of beer, directed someone to pick up the beer kegs and 
then 
attached 
the 
kegs 
to 
a 
dispenser, 
"sufficiently 
participated in the stream of beer availability for it to be 
said he furnished the beer." Sagadin v. Ripper, 221 Cal. Rptr. 
675, 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). These acts were sufficient to 
satisfy the requirement of Bennett that an affirmative act be 
taken beyond contributing money. 
¶22 The defendants view Lather v. Berg, 519 N.E.2d 755 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1988), as the most persuasive case supporting 
their position. In that case, four minors persuaded an adult to 
buy them liquor with funds loaned by defendant Bailey. Later, 
Murphy, one of the minors, drove his car at a high rate of speed 
while intoxicated, killing a police officer.  
¶23 The court ruled that "furnishing" money for alcohol is 
not furnishing alcohol, and because Bailey had neither taken 
possession of nor exerted control over the liquor itself, his 
conduct did not constitute furnishing alcohol to a minor in 
violation of the Indiana statute. Id. at 763. The court 
reasoned: "While we acknowledge that Bailey may have supplied a 
preliminary link in the chain of events leading to Murphy's 
ultimate intoxication, we have found no legal basis on which to 
conclude that he violated the statute." Id.  
¶24 Although the words and structure of these other 
states' statutes are not identical to the Wisconsin statute, 
they are similar. Words such as furnish and provide are similar 
to procure in the Wisconsin statute. Procure, however, distinct 
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
14
from furnish or provide, may encompass a greater range of 
circumstances.
13 In any event, these cases are not conclusive on 
the meaning of Wisconsin's statutory language.  
¶25 The defendants urge us to adopt the "additional 
affirmative act" requirement as other states have done when the 
person alleged to be liable contributes funds that are used to 
purchase alcohol beverages for underage persons. While the 
additional affirmative act requirement has superficial appeal, 
we conclude that it is not a workable requirement.  
¶26 The additional affirmative act rule becomes arbitrary 
in application. Claimants and courts will look for minor conduct 
that can be characterized as the affirmative act in addition to 
the contribution of money. Under the defendants' interpretation, 
for example, one who contributes money would be afforded 
immunity so long as he or she had not touched the beer that an 
underage person consumed while one who contributes money and 
carries the beer a few feet might incur liability.  
¶27 The defendants further caution that the court of 
appeals' construction of § 125.07(1)(a)1 extends the statute to 
any person who, by contributing funds, has provided any 
conceivable link, no matter how remote, in the chain of ultimate 
                     
13 Were we to interpret procure as requiring an affirmative 
act beyond contributing money, such as taking and transferring 
possession, the word procure would be surplusage because the 
other statutory words "sell, dispense or give away" encompass 
the affirmative acts the defendants seek to require. Nothing in 
the text of the statutes requires an affirmative act in addition 
to the affirmative act of contributing money. 
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
15
consumption by the underage person who causes injury.
14 They pose 
the following hypothetical: a parent who, when asked by his son 
for $5.00 to go to the movies, gives him the money despite 
having a suspicion that the son might use it to buy alcohol 
beverages. The defendants contend that such a parent would be 
vulnerable because an issue could be raised whether the parent 
                     
14 The defendants argue that in a tort action, even when 
based on statutes, a court may deny recovery on public policy 
grounds. In a tort action where there is a complete chain of 
causation between negligence and damage a court may nevertheless 
deny recovery on the following public policy grounds:  
(1) The injury is too remote from the negligence; or 
(2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the 
culpability of the negligent tort-feasor; or (3) in 
retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that 
the negligence should have brought about the harm; or 
(4) because allowance of recovery would place an 
unreasonable burden on the negligent tortfeasor; or 
(5) because allowance of recovery would be too likely 
to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) 
allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no 
sensible or just stopping point.  
 
Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 540-41, 247 N.W.2d 
132 (1976).  
The defendants argue that when liability is based solely on 
contributing money to the purchase of alcohol that is consumed 
by an underage person, the injury is too remote from the 
negligence: A small amount of money is contributed; the 
individual contributing the money has no control over the amount 
or time of consumption or what the underage person who consumes 
the alcohol will do; and the potential liability is wholly out 
of proportion to the culpability.  
Assuming that the public policy doctrine is applicable in 
this type of case, we are not persuaded that the act of 
contributing money and the injury in this case are too remote or 
that the culpability and liability are so out of proportion 
that, as a general matter, public policy would be violated.  
 
For a discussion of the public policy rationale previously 
applied to the common law liability of purveyors of alcohol 
beverages and for the public policy rationale underlying the 
statutes, see Doering, 193 Wis. 2d at 133-137, 145-48. 
 
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
16
"should have known" that the money would be used to purchase 
alcohol.  
¶28 We conclude that the parent in the defendants' 
hypothetical does not come within the statutory definition of 
procure because we interpret the word procure as requiring, when 
contributing funds, the intent of bringing about the purchase of 
alcohol beverages for consumption by an underage person.  
¶29 This 
interpretation 
is 
consistent 
with 
Wisconsin 
public policy expressed in the statutes and judicial decisions.
15 
The nature and extent of the problem of underage drinking
16 
                     
15 In Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 
(1984), and Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 
(1985), the court reversed the previous common law rule of non-
liability for those who provide alcohol beverages to an underage 
person who causes injury while intoxicated. As the court has 
said "[b]oth these cases and the early legislation they construe 
informed the legislature's enactment of sec. 125.035." Doering, 
193 Wis. 2d at 137. Section 125.035(4) provides immunity to 
those who procure alcohol beverages for adults but imposes 
liability on those who knowingly procure alcohol beverages for 
an underage person. 
See 
also 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 125.07(1)(a)3 
("No 
adult 
may 
knowingly permit" consumption of alcohol beverages by underage 
person on premises controlled by adult); Wis. Stat. §§ 125.07(6) 
and 125.035(4)(b) (providing defenses to liability when one who 
procures alcohol beverages does so unwittingly as a result of 
misrepresentations by underage person). 
16 Alcohol 
abuse 
is 
the 
leading 
cause 
of 
hospitalization and death of youth (11-25 year olds). 
Drinking is involved in 55% of all teenage deaths, 
including 39% of suicides, 40% of "falls," 43% of 
drownings, 43% of automobile crashes, and 75% of all 
fatal drug overdoses. . . . Alcohol is Wisconsin's 
drug problem. . . . This is reflected in our children, 
whose 
pattern 
of 
abusive 
drinking 
significantly 
exceeds the national average. 
 
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
17
suggest that the legislature intended to broadly proscribe acts 
which lead to underage drinking. Thus, we see no indication that 
the legislature intended to require an affirmative act beyond 
contributing money. We discern limits, however, in the statutory 
language. 
¶30 The statutes, §§ 125.07 and 125.035, limit liability 
to when alcohol beverages are knowingly provided to underage 
persons.
17 See Doering v. WEA Ins. Group, 193 Wis. 2d 118, 138-
144, 532 N.W.2d 432 (1995). In enacting § 125.07(1)(a)1 and 
§ 125.035(4) the legislature 
was 
evidently 
concerned 
with 
deterring dangerous behavior by placing liability on only those 
who are culpable, that is, those who know or should have known 
the person was underage.  
¶31 Reading procure as requiring intent that the funds 
contributed be used for purchase of alcohol beverages for 
consumption by underage persons limits the range of persons who 
may be liable to those who are culpable. Therefore, when one 
contributes money with the intent of bringing about the purchase 
                                                                  
State 
of 
Wisconsin, 
Department 
of 
Justice, 
Office 
of 
Transportation Safety, Report and Recommendations of the Task 
Force on Underage Violator Programs in Wisconsin, 1 (1995) 
(emphasis in original). See also Legislative Reference Bureau 
Brief 95-3, The Minimum Drinking Age in Wisconsin (1995) 
(discussing the history of efforts to control underage drinking 
and the nature of the problem). 
17 As 
noted 
at 
the 
outset, 
§ 125.035(4)(b) 
expressly 
contains a state of mind element: liability only attaches when a 
person who procured alcohol beverages knew or should have known 
that the underage person was under the legal drinking age. Our 
conclusion does not affect this element but adds another to the 
prior determination of whether the person procured alcohol 
beverages for an underage person. 
 
 
Nos. 95-1684 & 95-1766 
 
 
18
of alcohol beverages for consumption by an underage person, one 
acts in a manner that this statute seeks to proscribe.  
¶32 Accordingly, we conclude that a person who contributes 
money with the intent of bringing about the purchase of alcohol 
beverages for consumption by an underage person whom the person 
knows, or should know, is under the legal drinking age, procures 
alcohol beverages for the underage person under the statutes. We 
therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.