Case Title: Christine M. Jones v. Jerry A. Jones

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Christine M. JONES v. Jerry A. JONES

95-1150                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered November 4, 1996


1.   Appeal & error -- review of chancery cases -- more stringent
     standards imposed for modifications. -- In reviewing chancery
     cases, the appellate court considers the evidence de novo but
     does not reverse a chancellor's findings unless they are
     clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the
     evidence; generally, courts impose more stringent standards
     for modifications than for initial determinations of custody.

2.   Parent & child -- custody -- best interest of child. -- Child
     custody is determined by what is in the best interests of the
     child, and it is not altered absent a material change in
     circumstances.

3.   Parent & child -- custody -- parent living in statistically
     safer area should not have advantage in custody disputes. --
     It has never been the law in Arkansas that the parent living
     in the statistically safer neighborhood, town, or city should
     have an advantage in custody disputes, and the supreme court
     refused to make such an inequitable principle part of its
     jurisprudence; in determining support awards, the supreme
     court has encouraged divorced spouses to acquire financial
     independence; where appellant, in an effort to support herself
     and her child, had moved to Little Rock after obtaining a job
     there, the supreme court stated that it would be inconsistent
     for it to allow courts to impose a custody penalty as a price
     of compliance with its policy of encouraging economic
     autonomy.  

4.   Parent & child -- custody -- move to another city not material
     change in circumstances. -- The supreme court was not
     persuaded that appellant's move to Little Rock, in and of
     itself, was a material change in circumstances; the court held
     that, to the extent that the chancellor relied on this faulty
     premise in making his decision on the permanent custody issue,
     his ruling was in error.

5.   Parent & child -- custody -- change of circumstances of
     noncustodial parent not sufficient to justify modifying
     consent. -- While the supreme court has previously held that
     the remarriage of one of the parties is a factor that may be
     considered when deciding what is in a child's best interest,
     it has applied this principle to modifications of support
     obligations; regarding matters of child custody, the supreme
     court noted the majority view that a change of circumstances
     of the noncustodial parent, including a claim of an improved
     life because of a recent marriage, is not sufficient to
     justify modifying custody.

6.   Parent & child -- custody -- appellee's remarriage did not
     constitute material change in circumstances. -- The supreme
     court held that appellee could not use the circumstances that
     he had created as grounds to modify custody; given appellee's
     awareness of the circumstances at the time he voluntarily
     entered into the agreement to award custody of the parties'
     minor child to appellant, the supreme court could not agree
     that appellee's remarriage constituted a material change in
     circumstances.

7.   Parent & child -- custody -- when award may be modified. -- A
     judicial award of custody should not be modified unless it is
     shown that there are changed conditions that demonstrate that
     a modification of the decree is in the best interest of the
     child or when there is a showing of facts affecting the best
     interest of the child that were either not presented to the
     chancellor or were not known by the chancellor at the time the
     original custody order was entered.

8.   Parent & child -- custody -- party seeking modification of
     order has burden of showing material change in circumstances.
     -- The party seeking modification of the child-custody order
     has the burden of showing a material change in circumstances. 

9.   Parent & child -- custody -- agreement of parties tends to
     show attitude at time original divorce suit was filed. --
     While an agreement of the parties regarding custody is not
     binding on the courts, it is of some importance as tending to
     show attitude at the time the original divorce suit was filed.

10.  Parent & child -- custody -- ex parte communication improper -
     - letters from two doctors should not have been considered by
     chancellor. -- Ex parte communication between an expert and a
     judge is improper; the faxed letters from two doctors
     recommending that the minor child not be returned to appellant
     were not under oath and should not have been considered by the
     chancellor. 

11.  Parent & child -- custody -- chancellor cannot delegate
     judicial function to someone outside court. -- Chancery courts
     have subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the custody,
     support, and visitation of a child born of the marriage; the
     supreme court held that, while it is permissible for a
     chancellor to base an award of custody or visitation after
     hearing the opinions of experts, the chancellor cannot
     delegate this judicial function to someone outside the court,
     especially to an expert employed by one of the parties.

12.  Parent & child -- custody -- chancellor erroneously shifted
     burden of proof to appellant. -- The chancellor's finding that
     appellant had not proven that she was able to provide an
     emotional and stable home environment for the minor child
     convinced the supreme court that he had erroneously shifted
     the burden of proof to appellant; the chancellor's repeated
     entry of ex parte orders, his reliance on ex parte
     communications from appellee's expert, and his failure to
     appoint a neutral expert to examine the child, led the supreme
     court to the conclusion that appellee was somehow relieved of
     the legal burden to prove that a material change of
     circumstances and the best interest of the child warranted
     modification of the initial custody order.

13.  Parent & child -- custody -- chancellor's decision to change
     custody was clearly erroneous -- reversed and remanded. -- To
     have upheld the chancellor's shifting of the burden of proof
     in this case would have been to undermine the very purpose of
     the supreme court's elevated standard of proof in modification
     proceedings, which is to promote stability and continuity in
     the life of the child; in sum, when viewing together the
     repeated entry of ex parte orders, the erroneous shift of the
     burden to appellant to prove her emotional stability, and the
     chancellor's faulty reliance on her move to Little Rock and
     appellee's remarriage as material changes in circumstances,
     the supreme court concluded that the chancellor's decision to
     change custody to appellee was clearly erroneous; the matter
     was reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the
     original custody order. 


     Appeal from Faulkner Chancery Court, Third Division; Andre
McNeil, Chancellor; reversed and remanded.
     The Perroni Law Firm, P.A., by: Samuel A. Perroni and Mona J.
McNutt, for appellant.
     Grinder Law Firm, by: Helen Rice Grinder, for appellee.

     Bradley D. Jesson, Chief Justice.
     This is a child-custody modification case.  On Sunday morning,
December 13, 1992, after receiving ex parte letters from a
psychologist and psychiatrist employed by appellee Dr. Jerry A.
Jones, the chancellor entered an emergency order providing that Dr.
Jones was not required to return the parties' minor child, Cameron,
to the custodial parent, appellant Christine Jones.  Two additional
ex parte orders and one ex parte communication later, Ms. Jones was
also deprived of weekday visitation.  Following yet a fourth ex
parte order and a hearing on Dr. Jones's petition for permanent
change of custody, the chancellor found that the following changes
in circumstance warranted changing custody to Dr. Jones: (1) Ms.
Jones was unable to provide for Cameron's emotional needs; (2) Ms.
Jones had moved from Conway, where Dr. Jones lived, to the higher
crime area of Little Rock; and (3) Dr. Jones had recently remarried
and thus had a more stable family situation.  Ms. Jones appealed,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor's ruling in Jones
v. Jones, 51 Ark. App. 24, 907 S.W.2d 745 (1995).  We granted
review pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(11) and (f)(1), as we
have decided a previous appeal involving the parties.  See Jones v.
Jones, 320 Ark. 449,