Case Title: MICHAEL O'DONNELL v. CITY OF CASPER, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; ET AL.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
MICHAEL O'DONNELL v. CITY OF CASPER, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; ET AL.1985 WY 42696 P.2d 1278Case Number: 83-107Decided: 03/18/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
MICHAEL O'DONNELL, 
APPELLANT, (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

CITY OF CASPER, A MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION; ET AL., APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
W.W. Reeves and 
John C. Brooks of Vlastos, Reeves, Murdock & Brooks, Casper, for appellant.

Richard L. 
Williams and Frank D. Neville of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., 
Casper, for appellee City of 
Casper.

Michael J. 
Sullivan and J. Kenneth Barbe of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Massey & Sullivan, 
Casper, for appellees Suzuki Motor 
Co., Ltd. and U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp.

Before THOMAS, C.J., 
ROSE, ROONEY and BROWN, JJ., and RAPER, J. (Retired). 

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant was seriously 
injured in a motorcycle accident in Casper, Wyoming. In a lawsuit that followed appellant 
asserted that the City of Casper was negligent in the maintenance of its 
streets, and that Suzuki Motor Company had negligently designed the motorcycle 
involved and was also liable on the theory of strict liability. The trial court 
granted a summary judgment in favor of appellees.

[¶2.]     We will 
reverse.

[¶3.]     The issues 
are:

1. "Whether the district 
court erred in concluding that Casper was not negligent as a matter of 
law.

2. "Whether the district 
court erred in concluding that Suzuki Motor Company, Ltd. and U.S. Suzuki Motor 
Corporation were not negligent as a matter of law.

3. "Whether the district 
court erred in failing to apply the strict products liability standard set forth 
in § 402A of the Restatement of Torts to the plaintiff's claim against 
defendants Suzuki Motor Company, Ltd. and U.S. Suzuki Motor 
Corporation."

[¶4.]     On July 8, 1977, 
appellant Michael O'Donnell was driving Darryl Davis' motorcycle, with 
permission, on Mariposa 
Boulevard in Casper, Wyoming. Appellee, City of Casper, had resurfaced 
Mariposa 
Boulevard about a month before, and gravel left over 
from the project remained on the street.1 As a result of vehicular travel on 
Mariposa, ridges and piles of gravel accumulated. As appellant proceeded along 
the boulevard about five to ten miles per hour, Donald Walford suddenly pulled 
his automobile from a parking place on the street and into the path of 
appellant. In order to avoid hitting the Walford vehicle appellant veered to the 
left, and then had to correct back to the right to avoid hitting vehicles parked 
on the other side of the street. In making those two quick manuevers appellant 
rode into loose gravel which caused him to "fishtail" and run into a larger 
accumulation of gravel. Appellant felt his choices were to lay the motorcycle 
down, or run into a parked automobile on the opposite side of the gravel. He 
chose the latter alternative. After hitting the parked vehicle appellant rolled 
across its hood, falling to the ground, and was engulfed in 
flames.

[¶5.]     Suit was brought 
against appelleeCity of Casper (City hereinafter) for negligent failure 
to maintain its streets. Suit was also filed against appellees Suzuki Motor 
Company, Ltd. and U.S. Suzuki Motor Corporation (Suzuki hereinafter) for breach 
of warranty and strict liability in the design, manufacture and sale of its 
motorcycles. Later, negligent design of the motorcycle was added as an 
issue.

[¶6.]     We have established 
certain basic principles that are applicable in reviewing the propriety of 
granting a summary judgment. Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that is not 
frequently granted, and as a general rule is not appropriate in negligence 
actions. Keller v. Anderson, Wyo., 
554 P.2d 1253 (1976). When a summary judgment is granted by the trial court we 
must review the entire record in order to determine whether summary judgment was 
proper. Wyoming Insurance Department v. Sierra Life Insurance Company, 
Wyo., 599 P.2d 1360 (1979). This court has the same duty as the trial court; assuming the 
record is complete, we have the same material before us as the trial court. Seay v. Vialpando, Wyo., 567 P.2d 285 (1977); and Minnehome Financial 
Company v. Pauli, Wyo., 565 P.2d 835 
(1977).

[¶7.]     An appellee has a heavy 
burden in defending a summary judgment because appellate courts must look at the 
record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, 
giving him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in 
affidavits, exhibits, depositions and testimony. Dubus v. Dresser Industries, Wyo., 649 P.2d 198 (1982); and Bancroft v. Jagusch, Wyo., 
611 P.2d 819 (1980). Summary judgment is proper only when it is clear that no 
issue of material fact is involved and inquiry into the facts is not desirable 
to clarify application of law. Stephens v. Sheridan Public Employees Federal Credit Union, 
Wyo., 594 P.2d 473 (1979). See also Rule 56, Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, the 
party seeking the summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact, and as a matter of law the movant is entitled 
to judgment. Gilliland v. Steinhoefel, Wyo., 
521 P.2d 1350 (1974).

I

[¶8.]     A municipal corporation 
in Wyoming 
owes a duty to the traveling public to keep its streets and sidewalks in a 
reasonable safe condition and in reasonably good repair. Bieber v. City of Newcastle, 242 F. Supp. 457 (D.Wyo. 1965).

"* * * The most generally 
accepted rule in this country is that municipalities, which have full and 
complete control over the streets within their corporate limits * * * are liable 
for damages for injuries sustained in consequence of their failure to use 
reasonable care in keeping them in a reasonably safe condition for public travel 
* * *." Opitz v. Town of City of Newcastle, 35 
Wyo. 358, 362, 
249 P. 799, 800 (1926).

[¶9.]     The trial court in the 
case before us was of the opinion that the City had no duty to the traveling 
public if the dangerous condition of the street was known and obvious. The 
court, referring to the obvious danger rule, said:

"* * * [W]henever the 
danger is obvious or at least as well known to the plaintiff as the defendant, 
there is no duty to remove the danger or warn of its 
existence."

[¶10.]  We will address three reasons why the 
rule announced by the trial court is inappropriate: 1) cases previously decided 
by this court can be distinguished from the case before us; 2) the rule was 
developed before comparative negligence was adopted in Wyoming; and 3) the rule 
recited in prior cases was overbroad and not dispositive of those 
cases.

[¶11.]  The history of the obvious danger rule in 
Wyoming 
reveals that its nature is unclear and its application inconsistent.2 In one context the obvious danger 
rule has had the effect of negating any duty owed by a defendant. In another 
context the rule is a species of contributory negligence or assumption of 
risk.

[¶12.]  A majority of earlier cases discuss the 
obvious danger rule, treating it as a factor in determining whether the 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk of the danger. Loney v. Laramie Auto Co., 36 Wyo. 339, 255 P. 350 (1927); Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Ott, 
33 Wyo. 200, 237 P. 238 (1925); In Carney Coal Co. v. Benedict, 22 
Wyo. 362, 140 P. 1013 (1914). In 1966, in the context of when a directed verdict would be 
upheld, we determined that a defendant's duty could be negated by an obvious 
danger. McKee v. Pacific Power and Light 
Company, Wyo., 417 P.2d 426 (1966). In two later cases 
we said that an obvious danger is a factor to be considered in determining 
contributory negligence. Continental 
Motors Corporation v. Joly, Wyo., 483 P.2d 244 (1971); and Berry v. IowaMid-WestLand and Livestock Company, 
Wyo., 424 P.2d 409 (1967).

[¶13.]  Before the advent of comparative 
negligence it did not make any difference whether an obvious danger was viewed 
as negating a defendant's duty, or whether it constituted contributory 
negligence or assumption of risk. The result was the same; contributory 
negligence or assumption of risk barred a plaintiff's 
recovery.

[¶14.]  Since comparative negligence was adopted 
it makes a great difference how an obvious danger is viewed. If an obvious 
danger negates a duty, a defendant cannot be negligent. On the other hand, if a 
duty is not negated, then the obvious danger is a factor to be considered by the 
trier of fact in comparing plaintiff's and defendant's negligence. This court 
has not been consistent in its application of the obvious danger rule since 
comparative negligence.3

[¶15.]  In Bluejacket v. Carney, Wyo., 550 P.2d 494 
(1976), plaintiff was a guest at defendant's resort cabin. Plaintiff knew that 
the path there was icy, unlit, and rough, but used it anyway, and fell down. 
Plaintiff brought suit for damages for his injuries against the owner. Summary 
judgment for defendant was affirmed. The court found that the obvious danger 
rule relieved defendant of a duty to remove the ice and snow from the path. 
Justice Rose in his dissenting opinion observed that the obvious danger rule was 
not always an absolute bar to plaintiff's recovery, and should be a factor in 
determining plaintiff's percent of negligence.

[¶16.]  In Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532 
(1979), plaintiff was injured when the sides of an excavation in which he was 
working fell on him. The majority held that plaintiff assumed the risk of such 
accidents, and reasoned that since under comparative negligence, plaintiff's 
assumption of risk is to be compared to defendant's negligence, the jury verdict 
must stand finding plaintiff contributorily negligent. The court acknowledged 
that the pit was obviously dangerous because the sides were neither shored nor 
sloped, and thus likely to cave in. The obvious danger rule, however, was not 
invoked to remove defendant's duty. Rather, the obviousness went to the question 
of plaintiff's contributory negligence. Justice Rose dissented, but he, too, 
consistent with his position in Bluejacket, would have evaluated plaintiff's 
behavior in light of the nature of the condition. The entire court thus treated 
the obvious danger rule as an expression of contributory negligence rather than 
negation of duty.

[¶17.]  We have never come to grips with the 
impact of comparative negligence on the obvious danger rule. We have not made it 
clear whether the obvious danger rule negates a duty of the defendant or whether 
the plaintiff assumes the risk of a known and obvious danger. If the plaintiff 
assumes the risk, then the obvious danger rule is a form of contributory 
negligence which should be compared with the defendant's negligence by the trier 
of fact.

[¶18.]  The obvious danger rule announced by the 
trial court, which was dispositive of the case against the City, was reiterated 
recently in Sherman v. Platte County, 
Wyo., 642 P.2d 787, 789 (1982):

"* * * First there is a rule that no duty 
exists which requires either the removal of an obvious danger or a warning of 
its existence. Second is the rule 
that no duty exists to remove the natural accumulation of snow and ice. * * *" 
(Emphasis added.)

In support of 
these two rules we cited Johnson v. 
Hawkins, Wyo., 
622 P.2d 941 (1981); Bluejacket v. Carney, supra, and earlier cases. 
See also, Norman v. City of Gillette, 
Wyo., 658 P.2d 697 (1983). It is noted, however, that 
although the first rule was recited in Sherman, Johnson and Bluejacket, they were decided on the 
second rule. Therefore, the first rule was not the law of the case in those 
decisions.

[¶19.]  Sherman and the cases just mentioned involved 
slip and fall situations resulting from a natural accumulation of ice and snow. 
In Sherman we said the known and obvious danger 
rule applied because there was no duty to remove the natural accumulation of ice 
and snow. The trial court in the case before us extended the rule of the slip 
and fall cases beyond a hazardous condition resulting from natural causes to a 
situation where the known and obvious danger was created in the first instance 
by the City. Although we have said that a city does not have a duty to correct 
an obvious and known danger resulting from natural causes, we have never said 
that a city does not have a duty to correct an obvious danger of its own making. 
The City had a duty to maintain the streets. A rule of law which provides that 
one who creates a known and obvious danger has no duty to correct it because it 
is known and obvious is not rational.

[¶20.]  An extension of that idea would be that 
the greater and more obvious the danger, the lesser the duty on the part of 
those otherwise responsible. Such a rule would not discourage a city from 
creating or allowing the continued existence of a great and obvious danger. It 
is not logical to hold that if the city digs an immense hole in the road that 
can be seen a block away, that its duty to keep the roads safe vanishes. On the 
other hand, if the city digs a small hole not easy to see, its duty remains. In 
other words, the bigger the hole the lesser the duty. This is not the intent of 
the known and obvious danger rule.

[¶21.]  The obvious danger rule, precluding 
recovery, has been narrowly limited. In Cervelli v. Graves, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1032, 
1039 (1983), the trial court instructed the jury, "`There is no liability for 
injuries from dangers that are obvious, reasonably apparent, or as well known to 
the person injured as they are to any other parties.'" We held that this 
statement was erroneous.

"The instruction is 
basically the type of instruction given in a slip and fall case dealing with the 
known and obvious danger of natural accumulation of ice and snow. We have, on 
numerous occasions upheld the known and obvious danger rule in appropriate slip 
and fall cases. [Citations.] Those cases (slip and fall cases) all dealt with 
suits brought by the injured party against the owner of the premises where the 
fall occurred. The thrust of our known and obvious danger rule decisions has 
been that the danger presented by the accumulations of snow and ice does not 
generally create liability for a possessor of property because of their natural 
character. We have never, however, applied that rule to an automobile collision 
case where the parties involved were not in control of the premises where the 
accident occurred.

"Here the trial court 
incorrectly applied the known and obvious danger rule to a negligence action 
between two drivers on an icy highway. The rule does not apply in such a case. 
To apply such a rule to the case at bar abrogates Wyoming's comparative 
negligence statute. * * *" Id., at 1039.

According to Cervelli the known and obvious danger 
rule is not applicable in all negligence cases, or even all ice and snow cases. 
Cervelli does not preclude other 
negligence cases from being exempt from the obvious danger 
rule.

[¶22.]  The rationale of Cervelli is applicable here. In the slip 
and fall cases the danger presented by the accumulation of ice and snow does not 
generally create liability for the possessor of property. This is because the 
accumulation is natural. Here, however, the accumulation of gravel on the road 
was not natural, but was placed there and allowed to accumulate into ridges and 
piles by the City.

[¶23.]  The broad rule derived from Sherman and the 
cases cited therein and used by the trial court4 to decide this case was adopted by 
this court before the advent of the comparative negligence statute. Some of the 
language employed before comparative negligence has spilled over into cases 
decided by this court after comparative negligence was adopted. The rule cited 
by the trial court in this case was compatible with the pre-comparative 
negligence doctrine that contributory negligence was a complete bar to recovery. 
An inflexible rule that a known and obvious danger is an absolute bar to 
recovery is not compatible with the doctrine of comparative 
negligence.

[¶24.]  The City may have been negligent by not 
properly maintaining the streets, and the negligence of the City, if any, should 
be compared with the negligence of appellant. Because appellant knew of the 
obviously dangerous condition of the road he may very well have been negligent, 
but that is for the trier of fact to determine, and the relative degree of 
negligence is all important under comparative negligence. Gone are the days when 
a scintilla of negligence by the plaintiff will bar 
recovery.

[¶25.]  The trier of fact, in considering the 
negligence of plaintiff, may properly consider the known and obvious danger of 
the street in determining the percent of plaintiff's negligence. However, the 
known and obvious danger does not result in the disappearance of the City's duty 
or automatically absolve it from any liability.

[¶26.]  The City points out in detail appellant's 
own negligence and that the condition of the road was known to him. It may be 
that upon trial the trier of fact will find appellant's negligence equal to or 
exceeded by that of the City. However, appellant has the right to submit the 
issue of negligence to the trier of fact and have his negligence compared to 
that of the City.

[¶27.]  We hold that the known and obvious danger 
rule does not negate the City's duty to keep its streets and sidewalks in a 
reasonably safe condition and in reasonably good repair, and that the obvious 
danger of the streets may be considered by the trier of fact to determine 
plaintiff's percentage of negligence.

[¶28.]  We believe there was a genuine issue of 
material fact created on the question of the condition of the streets at the 
time and place of the accident. In his deposition appellant 
testified:

"A I was having a very 
difficult time controlling the bike in the very deep gravel between the two 
streets here. I had - I could not turn the bike because to do that would have 
meant laying the bike down. There was not enough traction to do 
so.

* * * * * 
*

"* * * And the paths of 
traffic had forced the excess gravel into piles that were in the center of the 
street between the lanes of traffic that were actually in the middle of the car 
lane where the two tires would make a track. And between those two tire tracks 
would be a mound of gravel. And also between these two intersections there is an 
area there approximately triangularly shaped that did not receive an awful lot 
of gravel. And all of the excess gravel seemed to be finding its way into an 
area, and it was very deep and uneven and very difficult to - to drive 
through."

[¶29.]  Appellant's father described the 
condition of the street thusly:

"3. At the time of the 
accident, July 8, 1977, and for a period of three to four weeks prior to said 
date, the material deposited on the street by the City of Casper had been moved 
by the traffic and become piled or windrowed, primarily on the north side of 
Mariposa Street, to a depth of approximately three to four 
inches."

[¶30.]  Furthermore, Professor Judson Mathias, 
Ph.D., teaching at ArizonaStateUniversity, stated in his 
affidavit that the City was remiss in allowing the gravel to windrow to the 
extent it did. Furnished with a copy of the police report of the accident, the 
complaint filed, appellant's affidavit, and other relevant information, 
Professor Mathias concluded:

"6. Affiant has checked 
with various agencies, including City of Tempe, and it is affiant's opinion that 
the maintenance of the street upon which plaintiff was travelling at the time of 
the accident was faulty and created a dangerous condition and was not up to the 
standards of the industry in the following respects:

"a) The City of Casper 
allowed gravel to windrow and remain in a windrowed condition for a period in 
excess of four (4) weeks;

"b) The City of Casper 
failed to provide signs warning vehicular traffic of the 
hazard;

"c) The City of Casper failed to spread 
windrowed material evenly across the street at regular intervals in an effort to 
avoid the hazardous conditions existing at the time of this 
occurrence."

 

[¶31.]  To the contrary is the deposition of 
Wilbur Kiegley, safety officer for the City of Casper, who visited the scene of the accident 
two days after it occurred, and stated:

"A. Well, toward the 
right and left sides of the street there is always a certain amount of 
windrowing of loose chips that haven't adhered to the pavement. It was a very 
moderate amount of loose chips on the center of the street. I didn't observe any 
unusual amounts in the intersection. That is a T intersection 
there.

"Q. Okay. And the 
windrowing, the pile of chips, how deep were they?

"A. At best less than two 
inches.

"Q. And that was right at 
the area of the accident?

"A. No, not necessarily 
so. I would say that they were closer to the curb than the area of the 
accident.

"Q. How about the 
windrowing in the middle of the street? How deep was that?

"A. Oh, very nil, I would 
say. Just a scattering of it there."

[¶32.]  We believe the above testimony creates a 
genuine issue of material fact and therefore summary judgment was improper. Stephens v. Sheridan Public Employees 
Federal Credit Union, supra. We have previously defined material fact as one 
which, if proved, would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the 
essential elements of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. Shrum v. Zeltwanger, Wyo., 
559 P.2d 1384 (1977).

II

[¶33.]  The motorcycle driven by appellant at the 
time of the accident was a 1969 TS 250, manufactured by Suzuki. The fuel tank, 
filler neck and gas cap, component parts of the motorcycle claimed to be 
defectively designed, were not recovered after the accident, and therefore, were 
never available for identification, inspection and 
testing.

[¶34.]  A manufacturer owes a duty of care to 
those who use its product. The manufacturer is required to exercise reasonable 
care in the planning, design, and manufacturing of a product in order to insure 
that it is reasonably safe to use. Caterpillar Tractor Company v. Donahue, Wyo., 674 P.2d 1276 (1983); and Maxted v. Pacific 
Car & Foundry Company, Wyo., 527 P.2d 832 
(1974).

[¶35.]  A plaintiff alleging a design defect 
must, as a preliminary matter, establish a standard of conduct or 
duty.

"* * * Before any duty, 
or any standard of conduct, may be set, there must first be proof of facts which 
give rise to it; and once the standard is fixed, there must be proof that the 
actor has departed from it * * *." Prosser and Keaton, Law of Torts § 37, pp. 
235-236 (5th ed. 1984).

Until the 
standard of conduct or duty is established, there is no question of a conflict 
of material facts. Wells v. Jeep 
Corporation, Wyo., 532 P.2d 595 (1975); Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Company, 
supra. A determination of the standard of conduct or duty is a question to 
be decided as a matter of law. Caterpillar Tractor Company v. Donahue, 
supra.

[¶36.]  In support of its motion for summary 
judgment, Suzuki filed the affidavit of A.F. Wilson, its national product 
liability manager. According to Wilson, the gas cap manufactured and designed 
for the motorcycle involved in this case is known as a bayonet cap and will not 
come off unless turned manually:

"* * * The gas cap which 
was manufactured and designed for the gas tank for the TS 250 involved in the O'Donnell accident is what is known in 
the motorcycle industry as a bayonet cap, which if put on the tank properly will 
not come off except by being turned manually to the open position by hand until 
released by the interworkings of the cap, neck and tank; and the only manner in 
which it can be otherwise forced off once properly engaged is by destruction of 
the tank neck and cap at the point where the cap is engaged to the tank. This 
latter assertion is based upon affiant's technical training, knowledge and 
experience with bayonet caps on this and other models of motorcycles, regardless 
of whether made by Suzuki or other manufacturers. Affiant is very familiar with 
the industry standards pertaining to the design and manufacture of motorcycle 
gas caps, filler necks and gas tanks and can state that within the motorcycle 
industry, this bayonet cap system was considered by motorcycle designers and 
manufacturers to be, at the time of the manufacture of the motorcycle in the O'Donnell accident, the safest system 
for this type of motorcycle."

The affidavit 
states further that Suzuki's records reflect only one other claim involving the 
disengagement of this type of gas cap during an accident. The thrust of this 
affidavit is that Suzuki did not breach its duty to design a reasonably safe 
product or to warn users of latent dangers in its fuel 
systems.

[¶37.]  In opposition to Suzuki's motion for 
summary judgment, appellant filed the affidavit of Dr. Harry Peterson, professor 
of mechanical engineering at the Colorado School of Mines. Based on his studies 
and testing of motorcycle design, manufacture, and crashworthiness from 1968 to 
the present, Dr. Peterson testified as to the known need for a fuel system safer 
than the one installed on 1969 Suzuki 250 motorcycles:

"3. The fuel tank on the 
Suzuki motorcycle involved in the instant case is constructed of thin sheet 
metal and crushes easily and deforms upon minimal impact. It is positioned above 
the frame, in front of the rider with the filler hole and gasoline filler cap on 
top of the tank. The gasoline tank is vented to the atmosphere through holes in 
the gas cap, directly in front of the operator, and between the operator's 
knees. Because of the manner and place of venting, gasoline and gasoline vapors 
will in all probability be discharged in an accident or impact directly in front 
of and onto the operator. When the gas tank, filled to its capacity with 
gasoline (100% full), is struck, dented, and its volume decreased, very high 
pressures are created and are relieved by gasoline squirting out the breather 
holes in the cap, by the cap blowing off, or by the rupture of the tank, thus 
creating an extreme hazard and danger of fire.

"4. In an accident, 
impact or upset, gasoline is discharged from the fuel system of this type 
motorcycle into the atmosphere approximately 60% of the instances. Fire results 
when the gasoline vapor mixes with the atmosphere in proper proportions and 
ignition occurs from the filament of a light broken in the accident, torn 
wiring, sparks, or some other source. * * *

"5. Experimental crashes 
involving motorcycles of this type show that the problem of fuel system 
integrity is a serious one. Gas tank caps open or come off, and the fuel tanks 
may rupture during impact. Fuel sprays on the rider as he moves over the cycle. 
* * *"

[¶38.]  Dr. Peterson's affidavit further stated 
that technology was available in 1969 for the design and manufacture of stronger 
fuel containers, vented away from the rider. Available technology, according to 
the affiant, permitted the design of a fuel tank with an air space or filler 
neck that would prevent filling to capacity. He further testified that 
modification kits would have been a feasible means of correcting existing fuel 
systems.

[¶39.]  The foregoing statements represent the 
opinions of an expert in the field of motorcycle design and crashworthiness 
indicating that a need existed for a system capable of containing fuel on impact 
and that technology available in 1969 afforded a feasible means of incorporating 
such a system into new and existing motorcycles. These opinions find support in 
tests conducted and reported by the expert affiant and in information 
accumulated through his study of motorcycle design, manufacture, and 
crashworthiness for fifteen years. Therefore, these opinions may not properly be 
characterized as "categorical assertions of ultimate facts without supporting 
evidence" which, we have held, cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment on 
the issue of defective product design. Wells v. Jeep Corporation, supra; and Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Company, 
supra. Opinion testimony of the nature presented here, offered by a 
qualified expert in opposition to the manufacturer's evidence that no defect 
exists, presents a material question of fact for trial and is entitled to 
evaluation by the fact finder. Hughes v. 
American Jawa, Ltd., 529 F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1976).

[¶40.]  Appellant's expert testified further that 
as a result of tests conducted in Japan, the United 
States, and England, Suzuki had knowledge of the 
fire hazards associated with motorcycle accidents and failed to warn users 
against filling the fuel tank to capacity. This testimony presents a question of 
fact as to the extent of Suzuki's knowledge concerning the integrity of its fuel 
system in the event of an accident. This factual matter bears on the issue of 
whether Suzuki breached its duty, recognized by this court in Parker v. Heasler Plumbing & Heating 
Company, Wyo., 388 P.2d 516 (1964), to warn users of known, latent 
dangers.

[¶41.]  In its brief, Suzuki suggests problems of 
proof because the alleged defective parts, that is, the fuel tank, filler neck, 
and gas cap were never found. However, neither the affidavit of Suzuki's expert 
nor any other evidence in support of summary judgment refutes the allegation in 
the complaint that the fuel system at issue was a Suzuki product. Accordingly, 
the contention in the pleadings concerning Suzuki's responsibility for the 
allegedly defective motorcycle parts is deemed admitted for purposes of this 
appeal, and appellant had no obligation to produce any evidence on this point in 
order to withstand the motion for summary judgment.

[¶42.]  To prevail at trial, of course, appellant 
will have to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the fuel system was 
defectively designed by Suzuki and that the defect in design caused or enhanced 
his injuries. Anton v. Ford Motor 
Company, 400 F. Supp. 1270 (S.C.Ohio E.D. 1975). See also, Ford Motor Company v. Stubblefield, 171 
Ga. App. 331, 
319 S.E.2d 470 (1984). However, the allegedly defective product need not 
necessarily be introduced into evidence in order to establish grounds for 
recovery. Valentine v. Ormsbee 
Exploration Corporation, Wyo., 665 P.2d 452 
(1983); and Colorado Serum Company v. 
Arp, Wyo., 
504 P.2d 801 (1972). Circumstantial evidence can establish that a manufacturer's 
defective product caused a mishap and associated injuries. Ford Motor 
Company v. Arguello, Wyo., 
382 P.2d 886 (1963).

[¶43.]  In awarding summary judgment, the trial 
court concluded that appellant had failed to adequately counter Suzuki's 
evidence that it exercised reasonable care in designing the fuel system 
installed on the motorcycle operated by appellant at the time of the accident. 
The court concluded that appellant had not established the use by other 
manufacturers of a safer design or the feasibility of a safer design not yet in 
use, pursuant to our holdings in Wells v. 
Jeep Corporation, supra, and Maxted 
v. Pacific Car & Foundry Company, supra.

[¶44.]  Since the summary judgment in this case 
was granted, we have decided Caterpillar 
Tractor Company v. Donahue, supra. In that case, the issue was whether 
Caterpillar was liable for failing to install a roll-over protection device on 
its front-end loaders in 1966. We affirmed the jury's finding of negligence on 
the part of Caterpillar, and followed the principles of the Maxted case, 
stating:

"In Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry, 
supra, we discussed what factors should be considered by the fact finder in 
deciding whether a manufacturer exercised reasonable care in not incorporating 
particular safety features on a product. One of the more significant factors 
there was whether other manufacturers of the same product had included the 
features. But, as we said, that consideration was merely a factor; it was not 
determinative on the issue of negligence. * * *" Id., at 1281.

It is the law in 
Wyoming that 
evidence of other manufacturers' use of certain safety features on a product is 
a significant, but not determinative, factor to be considered on the issue of 
negligence.

[¶45.]  We have previously held that a 
manufacturer has a duty to design and construct his product reasonably and 
prudently to protect against injuries in case of collision. Chrysler Corporation v. Todorovich, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1123 (1978). And in Maxted v. 
Pacific Car & Foundry Company, supra, at 835, 836, it was 
said:

"`In addition to 
liability for negligent construction, a manufacturer is required to exercise 
ordinary care in planning or designing his product so that it is reasonably safe 
for the purposes for which it is intended. * * *' 1 Frumer & Friedman, 
Products Liability, § 7.01, p. 104.46 (1973).

* * * * * 
*

"`In the determination of 
whether or not a manufacturer has in fact exercised the care and skill of an 
expert, several matters are to be considered. One of the most significant 
factors is whether others in the field are using the same design, or a safer 
design. Other factors to be considered are whether a safer design not yet in use 
is known to be feasible, and whether in the case of a new product there has been 
adequate testing. [Citations.]'"

[¶46.]  In the summary judgment proceedings of 
this case, appellant had a right to stand on his pleadings insofar as the 
alleged defective fuel system was a Suzuki product. With respect to the 
contention that Suzuki breached its duty to design a reasonably safe product, 
appellant established the existence of a genuine issue of material 
fact.

[¶47.]  Appellant has asserted as an alternative 
cause of action strict products liability as set out, in pertinent part, in the 
Restatement of Torts:

"(1) One who sells any 
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer 
or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to 
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

"(a) the seller is 
engaged in the business of selling such a product, and

"(b) it is expected to 
and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition 
in which it was sold." Restatement (Second) Torts 2d § 402A, pp. 347-348 
(1965).

[¶48.]  The summary judgment in the district 
court was based upon appellant's cause of action for negligent design. 
Therefore, we decline to address strict products liability for the first time in 
this court.

[¶49.]  Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1 Some loose gravel is 
purposely left on the road in a resurfacing project. The gravel is worked into 
the seal coat by vehicular traffic.

2 See Assumption of Risk 
and the Obvious Danger Rule, 18 Land & Water Law Review, 374 (1983), for an 
informative article tracing the history of the obvious danger 
rule.

3 Section 1-1-109, W.S. 
1977 (comparative negligence), originally enacted as Ch. 28, § 1, S.L. of 
Wyoming, 1973.

4 Whenever the danger is 
obvious or, at least as well known to the plaintiff as the defendant, there is 
no duty to remove the danger or warn of its existence. Sherman v. Platte County, Wyo., 
642 P.2d 787 (1982).

ROONEY, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, with whom RAPER, Justice, Retired, 
joins.

[¶50.]  I concur with that part of the majority 
opinion having to do with Suzuki, but I dissent from that part of the opinion 
having to do with the City of Casper.

THE MAJORITY 
OPINION

[¶51.]  The majority opinion abandons logic, and 
it abandons the wisdom of our predecessors on the basis of theoretical 
exploration commonly indulged in by law professors to challenge the thinking of 
law students, but from which the law professors generally retreat in the final 
solution of the law problem in favor of the practical and common sense solution 
of it.

[¶52.]  The majority opinion would dissect 
negligence by removing one of its essential elements and then treat the 
remaining elements as a viable whole in comparing them with the dissected 
element. Negligence consists of a duty, a violation of the duty, proximately 
causing the injury. ABC Builders, Inc. v. 
Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925, 931 (1981); Beard v. Brown, Wyo., 616 P.2d 726, 734 (1980); Danculovich v. Brown, Wyo., 593 P.2d 187, 195 
(1979). The majority opinion sets "duty" off from "negligence" and then 
discusses the presence, or absence, of "negligence" without one of its component 
parts. 

[¶53.]  The majority opinion will completely 
change the status of negligence law in this state. If its reasoning is applied 
to questions of degrees of duty, i.e., re dangerous instrumentalities, contract 
duty, statutory duty, trespasser-licensee-invitee duty, of unavoidable accident, 
of notice of created nuisance or danger, of intervening cause, of res ipsa 
loquitur, etc., all of the past understanding relative thereto is 
abandoned.

[¶54.]  The majority opinion concerns itself with 
duty only in so far as it is involved in the well-established requirement that 
the City must use reasonable care in maintaining the streets and sidewalks in a 
reasonably safe condition. The dilemma in this case arises from the fact that 
the City was exactly fulfilling this duty in resurfacing the street and thereby 
making its condition safe for the traveling public. Under the majority opinion, 
a city would be foolish to attempt to repair any street in the manner accepted 
in the past, i.e., remove and replace or reinforce the hard surface, seal it 
with sealant and gravel, traffic compress the gravel, and then remove the excess 
gravel. Under the majority opinion, any accident occurring on that street during 
the repair process could result in city exposure to liability. To repair a 
street under the majority opinion, some other means would have to be invented to 
compact the gravel, all at great inconvenience to the public and at considerable 
increase in expense. As noted ante, the duty to be considered here is not a duty 
to maintain safe streets per se, but it is the duty to make repairs to the 
streets in a reasonably safe manner. The duty may be to post warning notices or 
warning lights of a dangerous situation temporarily occasioned by repair, or the 
duty may be the obligation to remove excess gravel within a reasonable time. In 
this connection, I believe it to be logical, not illogical, as said in the 
majority opinion, to impose a duty to warn of a danger occasioned by a small 
hole not easy to see and not to impose a duty to warn against driving over a 
cliff or a 300-foot hole which is obvious to the driver from a great distance. 
It seems logical not to impose a duty to warn someone from walking through a 
doorway when the door is obviously closed without first opening it, whereas it 
would be logical to impose a duty to warn against walking through a doorway into 
a contaminated area.

[¶55.]  The majority opinion indulges in 
considerable discussion about the existence of a duty which the known and 
obvious danger of a situation does away with or negates. Of course, such is not 
the known and obvious danger rule at all. If there is a known and obvious danger 
there is no duty in the first instance to negate. For example, there is simply 
no duty in the first instance to tell a person, when delivering a gun to him, 
that if he loads it and points it at himself and pulls the trigger, he could be 
hurt; or if he drives his car over a 300-foot embankment, he could be hurt; or 
if he slips on a perceptibly icy and snowy street or sidewalk, he could be hurt; 
or if he rides a motorcycle on gravel it could slip from under him and he could 
be hurt.

"* * * The law imposes 
upon a person, sui juris, the obligation to use ordinary care for his own 
protection, the degree of which is commensurate with the dangers that are to be 
avoided; and one who voluntarily and unnecessarily assumes a position of danger 
the hazards of which he understands and appreciates, or of which he should be 
aware, cannot recover for an injury from a risk incident to the position in 
which he has placed himself. * * *" 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 319, p. 721 
(1971).

See Sherman v. Platte County, Wyo., 
642 P.2d 787 (1982).

[¶56.]  The majority opinion does not distinguish 
between "assumption of risk" and the "known and obvious danger" rule. There is 
an important distinction. In the first place, we have not recognized "assumption 
of risk" in Wyoming as an independent defense to a 
negligence action. We have considered it as being embraced in contributory 
negligence. Ford Motor Company v. 
Arguello, Wyo., 382 P.2d 886, 891 (1963). Yet, we have always 
recognized the independent defense of "obvious danger." Bluejacket v. 
Carney, Wyo., 550 P.2d 494, 497 (1976); Continental Motors Corporation v. Joly, 
Wyo., 483 P.2d 244, 246 (1971); McKee v. Pacific Power and Light 
Company, Wyo., 417 P.2d 426, 427 (1966). In the second 
place, assumption of risk is an act of volition by the plaintiff which will 
defeat, or lessen, his recovery for negligence of the 
defendant.

"* * * [T]he term 
`contributory negligence' necessarily presupposes negligence for which the 
defendant is liable, which would be actionable but for the concurrence of the 
contributory negligence. * * *" Stanolind 
Oil & Gas Co. v. Bunce, 51 Wyo. 1, 62 P.2d 1297, 1301 
(1936).

Whereas, the 
"known and obvious danger" rule is premised on there being no negligence on the 
part of the defendant in the first instance. In other words, the "assumption of 
risk" or contributory negligence aspect is something which results from the plaintiff's position, whereas the 
"obvious danger" aspect results from the defendant's position, i.e., there can 
be no negligence on his part if the danger is obvious to everyone including the 
plaintiff. A duty on the part of 
defendant never arises. I commented on this distinction in my specially 
concurring opinion in Sherman v. Platte 
County, supra, 642 P.2d at 790:

"I must elaborate 
somewhat on that said in the majority opinion relative to appellant's contention 
that the obvious-danger rule as set forth in Instruction No. 17[1] has been 
`abrogated' by the adoption of the comparative negligence statute in 
Wyoming.

"The fallacy in 
appellant's argument is in reading into the instruction a direction to the jury 
for an assumption of risk by appellant 
rather than reading therein a definition of the duty owed by appellee. Even before enactment of the 
comparative negligence statute in Wyoming, a distinction between assumption of 
risk and contributory negligence was not recognized. Assumption of risk was but 
a form of contributory negligence. Subsequent to enactment of the comparative 
negligence statute, assumption of risk, as a form of contributory negligence, is 
only a basis for apportionment of fault. Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532 
(1979).

"In a negligence action, 
the jury is now called upon to ascertain the fact of negligence, if any, on the 
part of each of the parties, and then to apportion such negligence between 
them.

* * * * * 
*

"The adoption of the 
comparative negligence statute did not `abrogate' any duty or standard of care. 
It simply directed consideration of `comparative fault.'" (Emphasis in original 
and footnote 2 omitted.)

Footnote 1 in 
the first paragraph of this quotation reads:

"1. Instruction No. 17 
reads:

"`An owner or occupant of 
land or premises does not have an obligation to protect his invitees against 
dangers that are known to them or that are so obvious and apparent that they may 
reasonably be expected to discover such dangers.'"

CITY 
LIABILITY

[¶57.]  This case is not complicated; it requires 
only the simple application of established law. Summary judgments are seldom 
granted in negligence cases. Keller v. 
Anderson, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1253, 1257 (1976); Gilliland v. Steinhoefel, Wyo., 
521 P.2d 1350, 1352 (1974). But they should be granted when the summary judgment 
requirements are definitely met. Keller v. Anderson, supra. Since 
"duty" is a necessary element of negligence, a negligence action cannot be 
maintained if there is no "duty," and duty is a question of law to be determined 
by the court. Moewes v. Farmers Insurance 
Group, Wyo., 641 P.2d 740, 744 (1982); Vassos v. Roussalis, Wyo., 
625 P.2d 768, 772 (1981), appeal after remand 658 P.2d 1284 
(1983).

[¶58.]  This does not mean that in all instances 
summary judgment is proper when the question involves the existence of a duty. 
There may be factual determinations necessary to the decision on the issue of 
duty. If so, a summary judgment would not be proper. Rather, the court should 
present the factual issues to the jury and, from the jury resolution of such 
issues, make a decision on the existence of a duty. This is normally 
accomplished by instructions which direct "If you find x, then you shall * * *." 
"If you find y, then you shall * * *."

"The determination of any 
question of duty - that is, whether the defendant stands in such relation to the 
plaintiff that the law will impose upon him an obligation of reasonable conduct 
for the benefit of the plaintiff - has been held to be an issue of law for the 
court and never one for the jury. However, where fact issues arise in the 
application of the rule, or the drawing of varying inferences from the facts in 
evidence is possible, a question for the jury may arise, but the enunciation of 
the duty upon the facts found is for the court, not the jury. * *" 57 Am.Jur.2d 
Negligence § 34, p. 381 (1971).

[¶59.]  A fact issue relative to the known and 
obvious danger, and thus the duty, is not present in this case. The fact that it 
was a known and obvious danger is not disputed. Appellant's knowledge of the 
presence of the gravel and the danger resulting therefrom was before the court 
in appellant's deposition. Appellant was giving a party at the home of his 
parents. He borrowed the motorcycle of one of his guests to take a "spin" around 
a few blocks. As he returned and was going by the house, the accident occurred. 
He testified in his deposition:

"I accelerated out of the 
intersection. I remember thinking to myself at that point be careful because 
there is gravel on a turn, something like it's the easiest place to lose a 
bike."

"* * * And in my mind 
flashed a couple alternatives of things I could do. One was I was going to lay 
the bike down and slide into the car. I didn't want to do that because I'd heard of people sliding on 
gravel, and they had to get it picked out. * * *" (Emphasis 
added.)

"Q. And as I understand, 
you don't recall exactly when the streets were graveled, but it was some time 
before?

"A. It was sometime 
before the accident.

"Q. A few days 
before?

"A. I did not see the 
gravel being put down. I don't know.

"Q. But you were aware it 
was there. You'd been driving over it to and from work?

"A. I was aware the 
gravel was there."

"Q. How fast were you 
driving the bike?

"A. I remember 
particularly being very cautious that day. The street was - had gravel all over 
it, and in fact a good deal of the neighborhood did around there as I was riding 
the bike. And motorcycles are very difficult to control on a street that has 
gravel on it."

"Q. And then as I 
understand you gave, at the very beginning of your deposition, a number of 
streets that you went on and the number of turns.

"A. 
Yes.

"Q. Throughout your 
travel that area, were all those streets graveled?

"A. As I recall, 
yes.

"Q. As I understand, 
you've indicated you did not go any faster than 30 miles an 
hour.

"A. No, because as I 
stated earlier, because of the nature of the streets, all the gravel on it, 
there would have been a great deal of risk involved in that of losing control of 
the bike.

"Q. It's a little harder 
to control the bike under those circumstances, correct?

"A. Yes, it 
is."

[¶60.]  Inasmuch as the danger was known and 
obvious to appellant, the City owed him no duty with reference to the gravel on 
the street, and the summary judgment was proper.

"* * * Thus, although a 
duty rests upon a municipality, where an obstruction is permitted to remain in a 
highway or street, to give notice to the traveling public of its presence, yet, 
no other notice is needed than a view of the obstruction itself, where it can be 
seen in ample time to avoid injury. * * *" 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 126, p. 477 
(1971).

[¶61.]  As an aside I must note that even 
assuming for the sake of argument an existence of a duty on the part of the 
City, there was nothing before the trial court to establish a question of fact 
relative to the violation of such duty. Unless a res ipsa loquitur approach is 
proper, the only facts set forth in the depositions and affidavits reflected 
reasonable action by the City under the circumstances. Witness Keigley testified 
that the City followed a well recognized and nationally approved procedure in 
resurfacing the streets and that the procedure was used in this instance. The 
operation was performed on June 7, a month before the July 8 accident. He 
explained that the weather, street conditions, and traffic determined the length 
of time the gravel was to be left on the street. He said that the gravel is 
normally swept back at regular intervals. He testified:

"Q. Was there any - was 
anything else done to the street from June 7 to July 8, the day of the 
accident?

"A. Only the routine 
brooming back on it, the bare areas of oil, what we call bleeding through where 
the chips did not adhere in the well traveled path of the road. We go in there 
with a sweeper, street sweeper, and use a broom to swirl and sweep it back over 
there.

"Q. When was 
that?

"A. I can't give you an 
exact date on that, but it may have been done two or three different 
times.

* * * * * 
*

"A. The traffic is 
allowed to travel on that for impregnation of the aggregate into the road bed 
anywhere from it could be one day to a month, depending on the conditions. 
Because if it's hot, we have bleeding on the street, we have to broom back. The 
chips are left on the road surface pruposely so that they can protect, you know, 
not only the street surface that we have sealed but to protect the vehicles from 
picking up and carrying a lot of oil on to the bodies of the 
car[s].

"Q. 
Okay.

"A. After they have had a 
sufficient time - now, these streets are checked daily by a foreman to see how 
they are curing, and all, and to see what the conditions are. And when we feel 
that there is no further need for the excess chips, then we send the sweepers in 
there to remove them. And there again, there is really no set time on it. If you 
were asking for a normal, a normal could be anywhere from five days to five 
weeks.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. Do you have any 
personal knowledge as to whether or not the street Mariposa in the area of the 
accident and in that area was ever - material was ever swept back into the 
street from June 7 to July the 8th of 1977?

"A. I observed them 
sweeping in that area; but what days it was, it was shortly thereafter because 
we were still working that whole area up there for additional seal 
coating.

"Q. Shortly thereafter 
the accident or after the seal coating?

"A. Well, shortly 
thereafter they seal coated.

"Q. On how many occasions 
did you personally observe that?

"A. I would say at least 
twice, three times.

"Q. So you have personal 
knowledge that the area where the accident occurred was swept at least twice, 
maybe three times from June 7 to July the 8th 1977?

"A. Undoubtedly, yes. At 
least that.

"Q. I'm not sure that's 
-

"A. Well, what I mean 
there is, because of the traffic in there, the brooming operation has to take 
place because you don't get a hundred percent coverage of the fresh oil the 
first time around. And it could be two or three or four days later before the 
bare spots show up. Then you have to broom it back in there. "So there is no 
doubt in my mind that we were back in there at least two or three different 
times.

"Q. I understand that. 
But my question is your personal knowledge. Not what you believe had to have 
happened, but what you actually know happened.

"A. I couldn't say 
-

"MR. NEVILLE: Just a 
second. He's asking you if you yourself through your own eyes saw sweepers on 
Mariposa or at the scene of the accident between June 7 to July 8. With your own 
eyes.

"THE DEPONENT: I would 
have to say yes, I did observe sweepers in there.

"Q. (BY MR. MILLER) On 
two occasions?

"A. At least two 
occasions."

[¶62.]  Keigley testified that accompanied by 
J.C. Jackson, he observed the scene of the accident on the second day after it 
occurred, and that:

"Q. All right. 
Approximately how long after the accident occurred did he ask you to look into 
it?

"A. Well, he and I took a 
ride, I believe it was, two days after the accident happened. We looked at the 
area.

"Q. All right. What did 
you observe when you got there?

"A. I didn't observe 
anything unusual. I was asked to take a look specifically at the condition of 
the street, the presence of, you know, stone chips from a previous sealing 
operation. I didn't see anything unusual.

"Q. Had anything been 
with [sic] done to the street between the time of the accident and the time you 
observed it?

"A. Nothing that I could 
tell.

"Q. Was there still 
material on the street that had been left there from the sealing 
operation?

"A. I would say a 
moderate to a normal amount, yes.

"Q. Give me some idea of 
-

"A. Well, toward the 
right and left sides of the street there is always a certain amount of 
windrowing of loose chips that haven't adhered to the pavement. It was a very 
moderate amount of loose chips on the center of the street. I didn't observe any 
unusual amounts in the intersection. That is a T intersection 
there.

"Q. Okay. And the 
windrowing, the pile of chips, how deep were they?

"A. At best less than two 
inches.

"Q. And that was right at 
the area of the accident?

"A. No, not necessarily 
so. I would say that they were closer to the curb than the area of the 
accident.

"Q. How about the 
windrowing in the middle of the street? How deep was that?

"A. Oh, very nil, I would 
say. Just a scattering of it there."

[¶63.]  There was nothing in the record to refute 
the testimony of Mr. Keigley to the effect that the street was swept two or 
three times between the application of the seal and the time of the accident. 
Judson S. Matthias, a professor at Arizona State University, furnished an 
affidavit in which he stated that the maintenance of the street was faulty 
because the gravel was allowed to remain in a windrowed condition "for a period 
in excess of four (4) weeks" and because the gravel had not been brushed at 
regular intervals. The affidavit was not based on personal knowledge of such 
fact but was premised on a review of the City's answers to interrogatories, 
appellant's deposition, and the police report of the accident. None of them 
reflect the fact that the windrows were allowed to remain for four weeks or that 
the gravel had not been brushed for four weeks. Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P., provides 
that "[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge."

[¶64.]  There is nothing specific in the record 
to counter Mr. Keigley's testimony as to the specific depth of the gravel at the 
place of the accident. Appellant described the depth of the gravel in general 
terms - see quotation, supra. The nearest he came to specifying the amount of 
gravel was: 

"A. * * * And the paths 
of traffic had forced the excess gravel into piles that were in the center of 
the street between the lanes of traffic that were actually in the middle of the 
car lane where the two tires would make a track. And between those two tire 
tracks would be a mound of gravel. And also between these two intersections 
there is an area there approximately triangularly shaped that did not receive an 
awful lot of gravel. And all of the excess gravel seemed to be finding its way 
into an area, and it was very deep and uneven and very difficult to - to drive 
through."

[¶65.]  Appellant's father, in his affidavit, 
fixed the depth of the gravel on the 
north side of the street at approximately three to four 
inches:

"3. At the time of the 
accident, July 8, 1977, and for a period of three to four weeks prior to said 
date, the material deposited on the street by the City of Casper had been moved 
by the traffic and become piled or windrowed, primarily on the north side of 
Mariposa Street, to a depth of approximately three to four 
inches."

The testimony 
was that the accident happened on the south side of the street and appellant did 
not drive north of the westbound traffic lane. Of course, both appellant and his 
father were in the unenviable position of contending for the presence of 
excessive gravel to establish negligence on the part of the City and in doing so 
also establishing a known and present danger which would absolve the City from 
liability. Either lack of excessive gravel or the danger of excessive gravel 
being known and present would justify the summary 
judgment.

[¶66.]  Appellant testified that he was 
proceeding west on Mariposa Street in the westbound lane and when he reached a 
point in front of his house, an automobile driven by Walford1 pulled away from the north curb and 
into the westbound lane of traffic, forcing appellant to turn into the eastbound 
lane of traffic. He lost control of his motorcycle and continued westbound for a 
short distance before hitting a parked automobile on the south side of the 
street.

SUZUKI 
LIABILITY

[¶67.]  I concur with the majority opinion with 
reference to the existence of error in granting summary judgment in favor of 
Suzuki. Under the majority opinion, the verdict form, for the purpose of 
apportioning negligence, will request determination of degrees of negligence on 
the part of appellant, the City, Suzuki and Walford. I would not include the 
City on such form by virtue of affirming the trial court's summary judgment in 
favor of the City.

1 Walford, one of the 
guests at the party and described by appellant as intoxicated while at the 
party, was originally named a defendant but settled for $25,000, the limits of 
his insurance policy.