Case Title: RaNAYE HANEY and DUANE HANEY, individually and as husband and wife V. STEVE D. CRIBBS, personally; and DRM, INC., a Wyoming Corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
RaNAYE HANEY and DUANE HANEY, individually and as husband and wife V. STEVE D. CRIBBS, personally; and DRM, INC., a Wyoming Corporation2006 WY 158148 P.3d 1118Case Number: 05-279, 06-69Decided: 12/20/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
RaNAYE 
HANEY and DUANE HANEY, individually and as husband and 
wife,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
STEVE D. 
CRIBBS, personally; and DRM, INC., a Wyoming Corporation,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Jeremy 
D. Michaels of Michaels & Michaels, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming; and 
Heather Noble, Jackson, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Patrick 
J. Murphy and Michael J. Lansing of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., 
Casper, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument of Case No. 05-279.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In these 
consolidated appeals, we consider Appellants', RaNaye Haney and Duane Haney (the 
Haneys), contention that the district court erred in dismissing their personal 
injury complaint against Appellees, Steven D. Cribbs1 and DRM, Inc. (collectively DRM), 
for the reason that the Haneys served it on the Wyoming Attorney General and the 
Director of the Wyoming Department of Employment by regular U. S. Mail, rather 
than by certified mail return receipt requested.  This case is docketed as Case No. 
05-279.

 
 
[¶2]      The district 
court's order dismissing the Haneys' case, followed by the Haneys' filing of a 
renewed and identical complaint on October 31, 2005 (this time properly served 
on the attorney general and the director, by certified mail return receipt 
requested), prompted the Haneys to urge the district court to submit two 
certified questions to this Court.  
In case No, 06-69, we agreed to answer:  (1)  Whether or not Wyoming's savings statute 
allowed the Haneys to refile their personal injury case even though the 
applicable statute of limitations had expired in the meantime; and (2) whether 
or not, for purposes of invoking the savings statute, the Haneys' civil action 
was "commenced by the filing of [their] complaint with the 
court."

 
 
[¶3]      We will affirm 
the district court's order dismissing the complaint in Case No. 05-279.  In Case No. 06-69, we will answer the 
first certified question in the affirmative, i.e., the savings statute does 
allow the re-filing of the Haneys' complaint under the circumstances presented 
here.  We will decline to answer the 
second question because our answer to the first question is dispositive, and it 
renders any answer to the second question unnecessary.  See Carlson v. Flocchini Investments, 2005 
WY 19, ¶ 25, 106 P.3d 847, 857 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶4]      By order entered 
on July 18, 2006, this Court consolidated these appeals for the purpose of 
issuing this opinion.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS PERTINENT TO BOTH APPEALS

 
 
[¶5]      On June 25, 2001, 
RaNaye Haney was operating a City of Gillette 
garbage truck in Campbell 
County, Wyoming.  She was struck from the rear by a truck 
driven by Steve Cribbs who was employed by DRM.  Because her injuries occurred within the 
course and scope of her employment, Mrs. Haney received worker's compensation 
benefits of over $196,000.00.  On 
June 14, 2005, just days before the statute of limitations expired, the Haneys 
filed a complaint against DRM seeking to recover all damages she suffered in the 
accident.  Such a suit is authorized 
by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(a) (LexisNexis 2005), although the attorney 
general and the department (or the worker's compensation division) must be given 
notice of it so that the State may perfect a limited lien on any damages 
awarded.2  The statute of limitations applicable to 
this case is that found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (LexisNexis 
2005), which is four years.  

 
 
[¶6]      The complaint was 
served on DRM on June 16, 2004.  
Prior to the filing of the Haneys' complaint, the attorney general and 
the worker's compensation division received notice from counsel for the Haneys, 
of their intent to file the lawsuit at issue here.  Later, a copy of the complaint was sent 
to the attorney general and to the worker's compensation division in a timely 
manner.  DRM answered the complaint 
on July 27, 2005, and raised, among other issues, the district court's subject 
matter jurisdiction as a general defense (the specific theory it relied upon was 
not articulated in the answer).  
That answer was served on the Haneys, but not on the attorney general or 
the worker's compensation division.

 
 
[¶7]      On August 19, 
2005, after the statute of limitations for the filing of the Haneys' complaint 
had expired by force of the combined effect of § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C), W.R.C.P. 
3(b), § 27-14-105, and our decision in Terex, infra, DRM filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaint (and/or for summary judgment) for the reason that the 
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105 
(LexisNexis 2005), the Haneys  were 
required to serve, by certified mail, return receipt requested, a copy of the 
complaint filed in any such lawsuit, on the Wyoming Attorney General, and the 
Director of the Department of Employment:

 
 
§ 27-14-105.  Action 
against third party; notice; subrogation; legal representation; payment under 
reservation of rights; actions by department.

 
 
            
(a)  If an employee 
covered by this act receives an injury under circumstances creating a legal 
liability in some person other than the employer to pay damages, the employee if 
engaged in work for his employer at the time of the injury is not deprived of 
any compensation to which he is entitled under this act.  He may also pursue his remedy at law 
against the third party or the coemployee to the extent permitted by  W.S. 27-14-104(a).  Except as provided by subsections (b), (e) 
and (f) of this section, if the employee recovers from the third party or the 
coemployee in any manner including judgment, compromise, settlement or release, 
the state is entitled to be reimbursed for all payments made, or to be made, to 
or on behalf of the employee under this act but not to exceed one-third (1/3) of 
the total proceeds of the recovery without regard to the types of damages 
alleged in the third-party action.  
All money received by the state under this section shall be credited to 
the worker's compensation account and considered in computing the employer's 
experience rating.

            
(b)  The director and 
the attorney general shall be served by certified mail return receipt requested 
with a copy of the complaint filed in any suit initiated pursuant to subsection 
(a) of this section.  Service of 
the complaint on the director and attorney general is a jurisdictional 
requirement in order to maintain the suit.  The director and the attorney general 
shall be notified in writing by certified mail return receipt requested of any 
judgment, compromise, settlement or release entered into by an employee.  Before offering settlement to an employee, 
a third party or its insurer shall notify the state of the proposed settlement 
and give the state fifteen (15) days after receipt of such notice in which to 
object.  If notice of proposed 
settlement is not provided, the state is entitled to initiate an independent 
action against the third party or its insurer for all payments made to and any 
amount reserved for or on behalf of the employee under this act.  If there is a settlement, compromise or 
release entered into by the parties in claims against a person other than the 
employer, the attorney general representing the director shall be made a party 
in all such negotiations for settlement, compromise or release.  The attorney general and the director, 
for purposes of facilitating compromise and settlement, may in a proper case 
authorize acceptance by the state of less than the state's claim for 
reimbursement.  The proceeds of any judgment, settlement, 
compromise or release are encumbered by a continuing lien in favor of the state 
to the extent of the total amount of the state's claim for reimbursement under 
this section and for all current and future benefits under this act.  The lien shall remain in effect until 
the state is paid the amount authorized under this section.  In addition the person paying the 
settlement remains liable to the state for the state's claim unless the state 
through the attorney general signs the release prior to payment of an agreed 
settlement.

            
(c)  If the injury causes the death of the employee, the rights 
and remedies in this section inure to and the obligations are binding upon the 
personal representative of the deceased employee for the benefit of his 
dependents.

            
(d)  Any attorney who 
fails to notify the director and attorney general of any settlement or fails to 
ensure the state receives its share of the proceeds of any settlement or 
judgment under subsection (a) of this section shall be reported to the grievance 
committee of the Wyoming state bar.

            
(e)  At any time before 
the statute of limitation bars an employee or his estate from commencing a claim 
for personal injury or wrongful death, and upon the unsolicited written request 
of the employee or estate, the department may commence such an action on behalf 
of the employee or his estate.  From any amounts recovered under this 
subsection, the state is entitled to an amount equal to all sums awarded as 
benefits to the employee or his estate and all anticipated future medical 
costs.  Any excess recovery shall be 
paid to the injured employee or his estate.

            
(f)  The department 
or employer shall have an additional six 
(6) month limitation period beyond the date on which the employee or his estate 
is barred under the statute of limitations from commencing a claim for personal 
injury or wrongful death, in which to commence such an action on behalf of the 
employee or his estate.  From any 
amounts recovered under this subsection, the state is entitled to an amount 
equal to all sums awarded as benefits to the employee or his estate, all 
anticipated future medical costs and all costs of litigation.  Any excess recovery shall be paid to the 
injured employee or his estate.

            
(g)  For purposes of subsections (e) and (f) of this section, 
nothing in this section prohibits any third party from reimbursing the worker's 
compensation account for medical or temporary total disability costs without 
prejudice prior to any judgment, settlement or release.  [Emphases added.]

 
 
[¶8]      The Haneys did 
not serve copies of the complaint on the Wyoming Attorney General or the 
Director of the Department of Employment in the manner required by § 
27-14-105(b).  However, as noted 
above, both the attorney general and the department received actual written 
notice of the Haneys' lawsuit.   
On October 26, 2005, the district court granted DRM's motion to 
dismiss.  In its decision letter, 
the district court wrote:

 
 
            
Having "indulged leniency to respondent's affidavits," and after looking 
at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to [the Haneys] and affording 
them of all favorable inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in the 
affidavits and exhibits, it appears that [the Haneys] sent by regular mail 
copies of the summons and complaint in this matter to the attorney general and 
the Division.

            
If that were all that the law required, the court would conclude that it 
has jurisdiction.  However, the 
statutory language is specific and unambiguous with respect to this matter.  Under the clear language of the statute 
this court does not obtain jurisdiction over any case unless notice is provided 
to both the attorney general and the Division via certified mail return receipt 
requested.  In other words, 
constructive notice  or even actual notice improperly effectuated  is 
insufficient.

            
[The Haneys] have attempted to show compliance with what might be termed 
"the spirit" of the statute, i.e., they provided evidence tending to show that 
the attorney general and the Division probably had notice of their lawsuit.  And, for the purposes of this matter the 
court assumes that [the Haneys] mailed, via regular United States 
mail, the complaint and summons to the statutorily required 
parties.

            
As a matter of law, this court must find that the notice provided by [the 
Haneys] in this instance is insufficient.

            
The provisions of Wyoming Statute § 27-14-105(b) are analogous to 
statutory claims presentment requirements, which the Wyoming Supreme Court has 
continually and virtually without exception determined to be conditions 
precedent.  See, e.g., Wooster v. Carbon County School Dist. No. 1, 
2005 WY 47, 109 P.3d 893 (Wyo. 2005).  
The Act's provisions are designed to provide a mechanism that will ensure 
the preservation of the rights maintained by the State of Wyoming.  Terex, ¶ 9.  Therefore, strict compliance with the 
statutory provisions is required.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
            
The provisions of the Act are to be viewed as a "sword" for use by the 
State of Wyoming, and not as a "shield" for third party 
tortfeasors.  See Terex, ¶ 9.  Notwithstanding, the statutory 
requirements for notice are clear and unambiguous.  Here, [the Haneys] failed to demonstrate 
compliance and their arguments that notice was provided via alternative means, 
while garnering [the] sympathy of this court, are legally 
unpersuasive.

            
Because [the Haneys] failed to strictly comply with the statutory 
conditions precedent to undertaking the matter, this court is deprived of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  
[DRM's] motion to dismiss must be, and hereby is, granted.  [113-14]

 
 
[¶9]      The Haneys filed 
their notice of appeal challenging that order on November 3, 
2005.

 
 
[¶10]   On October 31, 2005, the Haneys 
refiled their complaint in a form which did comply with § 27-14-105.  DRM filed a motion to dismiss asserting 
that the statute of limitations had run on the Haneys' personal injury 
action.  The district court 
certified the questions that we have agreed to answer in an order entered on 
March 27, 2006.

 
 
ISSUES  
Case No. 05-279

 
 
[¶11]   In Case No. 05-279, the Haneys 
raise this issue:

 
 
In a 
case involving personal injuries to an employee covered by worker's compensation 
against third party tortfeasors where notice to the State of Wyoming is required 
under W.S. § 27-14-105(b), did the district court err in dismissing the case 
when the State received a copy of the complaint by regular mail, rather than 
certified mail return receipt requested?

 
 
DRM 
restates the issue thus:

 
 
Where 
[Mrs. Haney] suffered bodily injuries within the scope of her employment with a 
contributing employer, and where she then received Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
benefits for those injuries, did the district court properly dismiss her 
personal injury complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where [the 
Haneys] failed to comply with the statutory requirement that they serve the 
Director and [the] Attorney General with copies of their complaint by certified 
mail, return receipt requested, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(b) and 
Terex Corporation v. Hough, 2002 WY 
112, 50 P.2d 317 (Wyo. 2002)? 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶12]   The district court ruled as a 
matter of law that the Haneys' complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  This presents 
a question of law which we review de 
novo.  Anderson v. Hernandez, 2005 WY 142, ¶ 6, 
122 P.3d 950, 951 (Wyo. 2005).  By 
de novo, we mean that we evaluate the 
propriety of a dismissal by employing the same standards and by examining the 
same material as did the district court, without a presumption of correctness as 
to the conclusions reached below.  
Askvig v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
2005 WY 138, ¶ 11, 121 P.3d 783, 787 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
Was 
Actual Receipt of Notice of the Lawsuit Adequate in Light of the State's 
Interest in this Litigation

 
 
[¶13]   The Haneys contend that a judicious 
reading of the statute bears out that it was enacted primarily for the benefit 
of the State of Wyoming's worker's compensation fund, as well 
as for employers who might residually benefit from its effect.  Thus, their argument continues, it is an 
absurd result to require dismissal on jurisdictional grounds, because the 
legislative intention must logically have been to preserve the State's interest 
in the litigation by depriving the district court of jurisdiction only of the 
State's interest, not the litigation as a whole.  If the Haneys are successful in their 
suit against DRM, then it is possible that the worker's compensation fund will 
be reimbursed for all monies paid to Mrs. Haney by worker's compensation on 
behalf of her employer (as well as future such benefits), and the employer's 
experience rating will be adjusted accordingly (resulting in a savings to the 
employer).

 
 
[¶14]   The State has not directly 
participated in this matter.  
However, its indirect involvement to date appears to have been contrary 
to the best interest of the State.  
The State is entitled to its recovery whether the injured employee 
recovers "out of court," or by formal judgment or settlement in the context of 
litigation.  The legislature's 
decision to require that service be accomplished by certified mail, on the 
attorney general and the department, "a jurisdictional requirement in order to 
maintain the suit," is not designed to protect tortfeasors from suit by an 
injured employee, but only to protect the State's interest in its share of any 
recovery.  See, Terex Corporation v. Hough, 2002 WY 112, 
50 P.3d 317, 321-22 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Streeter v. Amerequip Corp., 968 F. Supp. 624 (D. Wyo. 1997; and overruling the substance of Makinen v. PM PC, 893 P.2d 1149 (Wyo. 
1995)).  Even several weeks before 
the original filing of the Haneys' case, the attorney general was aware that 
this matter was in the offing.  Yet, 
the attorney general never became proactive in safeguarding the State's rather 
significant interest in it.  Indeed, 
the attorney general at first sided with DRM, even though that position turned 
out to be contrary to the facts extant.

 
 
[¶15]   In Terex we also decided that, although § 
27-14-105(b) imposed no time limit in which service on the attorney general and 
the director had to be accomplished, a reasonable time needed to be 
prescribed.  We turned to an 
analogous rule, W.R.C.P. 3(a), and concluded that such service must be achieved 
within sixty days of the filing of the complaint.  W.R.C.P. 3(b) 
provides:

 
 
(b)  When Commenced. -- For purposes of 
statutes of limitation, an action shall be deemed commenced on the date of 
filing the complaint as to each defendant, if service is made on the defendant 
or on a co-defendant who is a joint contractor or otherwise united in interest 
with the defendant, within 60 days after the filing of the complaint.  If such service is not made within 60 
days the action shall be deemed commenced on the date when service is made.  The voluntary waiver, acceptance or 
acknowledgment of service, or appearance by a defendant shall be the same as 
personal service on the date when such waiver, acceptance, acknowledgment or 
appearance is made.  When service is 
made by publication, the action shall be deemed commenced on the date of the 
first publication.

 
 
[¶16]   Service was not accomplished until 
more than sixty days after filing of the complaint.  Thus, under Terex, this action was not deemed 
commenced until service was actually perfected.  As it turns out, that was after the 
expiration of the statute of limitations and, therefore, this action arguably is 
barred by the statute of limitations.

 
 
[¶17]   The Haneys ask that we treat their 
notices to the attorney general and the director as substantial compliance.  In light of our precedents, and the 
nature of the requirement set out in § 27-14-105(b), we decline to treat the 
notices at issue here as "substantial compliance."  See, e.g.,  Lavatai v. State, 2005 WY 133, ¶ 8, 
121 P.3d 121, 124 (Wyo. 2005); Bell v. 
Schell, 2004 WY 153, ¶¶ 31-39, 101 P.3d 465, 475-77 (Wyo. 2004) 
(holding that statutory "conditions precedent" or standards characterized as 
"jurisdictional" cannot be surmounted by logic or reason).

 
 
[¶18]   Because of these circumstances, we 
affirm the district court's order dismissing the 
complaint.

 
 
ISSUES  
Case No. 06-69

 
 
[¶19]   In our Notice of Agreement to Answer Certified 
Questions, entered on April 4, 2006, we articulated the questions to be 
answered as follows:

 
 
            
1.  Does the savings statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118, apply 
to allow a  plaintiff to refile a 
personal injury case which was filed within the time afforded by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-3-105(a(iv)(c) (four years) of the accident, but which was eventually 
dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, where the 
action is refiled within one year of the dismissal of the original action but 
not within four years of the date of the action causing the 
injury?

 
 
            
2.  Rule 3(a) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure states 
that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."  For the purposes of invoking the savings 
statute, is a lawsuit "commenced" by mere filing, even where, as here, a court 
does not have subject matter jurisdiction within the statutory period for the 
bringing of the action?

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶20]   First we are called upon to 
determine whether Wyoming's savings statute operates so as to 
"save" the Haneys' refiled complaint from also being dismissed.  Their complaint was refiled on October 
31, 2005, and, thereafter, properly served on the attorney general and the 
department.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-118 (LexisNexis 2005) provides:

 
 
If in an 
action commenced in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the 
plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits and the time limited for the 
commencement of the action has expired at the date of the reversal or failure, 
the plaintiff, or his representatives if he dies and if the cause of action 
survives, may commence a new action within one (1) year after the date of the 
failure or reversal.  This provision 
also applies to any claim asserted in any pleading by a 
defendant.

 
 
[¶21]   In this case, if this statute does 
apply, then the Haneys had one year in which to commence a new action (the 
action which we have characterized as having been refiled).  That year began to run from the date on 
which the district court dismissed their original action, i.e., October 26, 
2005.  Of course, the action that 
they commenced on October 31, 2005, readily meets that deadline.  Because that action was commenced anew 
and is now pending in the district court, we need not decide here whether or not 
this opinion affirming the district court, but answering this certified 
question, would also cause that one-year time period to commence again on the 
date the mandate issued in these consolidated matters.

 
 
[¶22]   Here, the Haneys' original 
complaint was filed in due time.  It 
failed other than "on the merits," and the applicable "time limited for the 
commencement of the action ha[d] expired at the date of thefailure."  Therefore, they may commence a new 
action within one year after the date of the failure of their original 
action.  That is the teaching of Clause v. Columbia Savings and Loan 
Association, 16 Wyo. 450, 95 P. 54, 58-60 (1908) and our very recent opinion 
in Hoke v. Motel 6 Jackson, 2006 WY 
38, ¶¶ 12-20, 131 P.3d 369, 376-80 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir 1982), certiorari denied, 464 U.S. 821, 
104 S. Ct. 85, 78 L. Ed. 2d 94 (1983)).

 
 
[¶23]   In Hoke, we concluded that the benefits of 
the savings statute did not rescue Hoke from her plight, but we did so for 
reasons that are not applicable to the Haneys' circumstances.  In Hoke, we ascertained that her case 
differed from the Rosa case in that, 
in Rosa the defendant had 
deliberately attempted to avoid service.  
The instant case differs from both Hoke and Rosa in that all parties 
entitled to notice of the lawsuit were given ample notice of it.  What was lacking was not notice, but 
only the quality of the notice.  
However, the pivotal difference here is that the district court had 
jurisdiction of this case at the time the case was filed.  Section 27-14-105(b) is unambiguous in 
its language that "service of the complaint on the director and attorney general 
is a jurisdictional requirement in order to maintain the suit."  Had the attorney general and the 
director been served by certified mail, return receipt requested, within the 
sixty days mandated by Terex, then 
all would have been well and the suit could have been maintained (i.e., the suit 
was not void ab initio).  There is 
no concern here that the action was not ever commenced, because we determined in 
Terex that a plaintiff has sixty days 
to meet the requirement of § 27-14-105.  
Thus, the "jurisdictional" issue at stake here is not one of traditional 
subject matter jurisdiction (it cannot be gainsaid that the district court is 
the proper court in which to file a suit premised on § 27-14-105), and it is 
certainly not one of personal jurisdiction.  Moreover, we must also keep in mind that 
the service rules only speak in terms of service on a "defendant," and certainly 
no argument can be made here that the State is in any way a defendant.  Indeed, if the State were to be 
categorized, it is most like a plaintiff in these 
circumstances.

 
 
[¶24]   In light of our discussion above, 
we find it unnecessary to answer the second certified question.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶25]   We affirm the district court's 
order in Case No. 05-279.  In Case 
No. 06-69, we answer the first certified question "yes."  The savings statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-118,  does apply to allow a  plaintiff to refile a personal injury 
case which was filed within the time afforded by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (four years) of the accident, but which was eventually 
dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because of 
the restrictions found in § 27-14-105(b), where the action is refiled within one 
year of the dismissal of the original action.  It is unnecessary for us to answer the 
second certified question.  This 
matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The Haneys 
failed to achieve service of their complaint on Cribbs and he never became a 
party below or to this appeal.

 
 

2The worker's 
compensation division is a part of the Department of Employment.  The Department of Employment is headed 
by the director of the Department of Employment.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-2-108 and 109 
(LexisNexis 2005).  Perhaps the 
legislature should clarify this statute, but we opine that service by certified 
mail, return receipt requested, either to the department itself, or to the 
worker's compensation division, would satisfy the statutory 
requirement.