Case Title: Howard v. Miami Twp. Fire Div.

Citation: 2008-Ohio-2792

Docket Number: 20070873

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Howard v. Miami Twp. Fire Div., 119 Ohio St.3d 1, 2008-Ohio-2792.] 
 
 
HOWARD, APPELLEE, ET AL., v. MIAMI TOWNSHIP FIRE DIVISION ET AL., 
APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Howard v. Miami Twp. Fire Div.,  
119 Ohio St.3d 1, 2008-Ohio-2792.] 
R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) — Accumulation of ice on a roadway not an “obstruction” — 
Judgment reversed. 
(No. 2007-0873 — Submitted March 11, 2008 — Decided June 18, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County,  
No. 21478, 171 Ohio App.3d 184, 2007-Ohio-1508. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal presents a discrete issue:  Is an accumulation of ice on 
a roadway an “obstruction” within the meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(3).  We hold 
that it is not. 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Because this case was decided on a motion for summary judgment, 
we view the facts in the light most favorable to appellee, Donald Howard, as 
administrator of the estate of Christopher Howard, against whom the trial court 
entered summary judgment.  State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins (1996), 75 
Ohio St.3d 447, 448, 663 N.E.2d 639. 
{¶ 3} On January 24, 2004, appellant Miami Township Fire Department 
conducted a day-long training exercise at 5460 Bear Creek Road in Miami 
Township, Montgomery County.  The training involved various crews and 
engines from the fire department responding to real fires deliberately set by fire 
officials in a former dwelling on the burn site. 
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{¶ 4} The burn site is an elevated area accessed by a driveway that runs 
from Bear Creek Road, a gently rolling rural road.  Bear Creek road has several 
curves, and many yellow caution signs are posted along it to indicate the type of 
curve that lies ahead and the recommended speed at which the curve should be 
negotiated.  One such sign, located near the burn site’s driveway, indicates a sharp 
right curve ahead and recommends a speed of 30 miles per hour. 
{¶ 5} Water used by firefighters during the training ran from the burn 
site down to Bear Creek Road.  At the conclusion of the training, a deputy fire 
chief on duty at the burn site ordered the fire department’s crews to periodically 
visit the burn site that evening to ensure that the fire was out and to apply road 
salt as needed to Bear Creek Road.  He also requested that local police patrol the 
area that evening. 
{¶ 6} Although firefighters who visited the burn site at approximately 
6:00 p.m. did not find ice on the road, they spread a five-gallon bucket of salt 
where water had run down from the burn site onto the roadway.  When they left 
the scene, the portions of the road that were wet were “well salted.” 
{¶ 7} The firefighters returned to the site at about 7:30 p.m. and 
remained there for approximately 30 minutes, again checking the road for water 
and ice.  None was found, and no salt was added to Bear Creek Road at that time. 
{¶ 8} Police also patrolled the area, and there was evidence that at 
approximately 9:00 p.m., the northbound side of the road was wet. 
{¶ 9} At approximately 10:00 p.m., appellee’s 16-year-old son, 
Christopher Howard, drove his car northbound on Bear Creek Road with a friend, 
Robyn Butler, as his passenger.  According to Butler, Christopher had 
successfully managed to negotiate the curve near the burn site while traveling at 
50 m.p.h. approximately ten minutes earlier and was attempting to repeat that feat 
at a higher rate of speed, 60 m.p.h. – twice the speed recommended for the curve. 
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{¶ 10} After entering the left-hand curve just past the burn site, Howard 
lost control of the car.  His vehicle yawed across the roadway, traveled up a berm, 
and vaulted into the air before crashing into a tree near a culvert.  Howard died 
instantly; Butler survived. 
{¶ 11} The first police officer to arrive at the accident scene noticed icy 
conditions on the roadway.  He found water running onto the road and noted that 
it had frozen in some places and had turned slushy in others.  Other officers 
dispatched to the accident scene also observed water, slush, and ice on the 
roadway, as well as fresh water flowing onto the roadway from the drive to the 
burn site.  For summary judgment purposes, we proceed with the assumption that 
there was ice on Bear Creek Road and that the ice was the result of water used by 
the fire department at the burn site. 
{¶ 12} After investigating the accident, police concluded, “Stricken with 
water, rock salt, and some ice, [Christopher] failed to negotiate the left-hand 
curve, over-corrected, and locked up the brakes.  Unable to maintain or regain 
control, he crossed the center-line, striking a sign post and coming to final rest 
roof first around a tree.” 
{¶ 13} The sensing diagnostic module (“SDM”) in the air-bag sensor in 
Christopher’s car was recovered after the accident.  It confirmed that Christopher 
had been traveling at a rate of 60 m.p.h. five seconds before the accident.  
Although appellee’s expert witness and accident reconstructionist, Fred Lickert, 
agreed that Christopher had attempted to make the turn in Bear Creek Road at a 
“careless” rate of speed, he concluded that the roadway itself presented a 
hazardous condition to its ordinary users.  Lickert’s opinion is that it is possible 
for a vehicle, under optimal conditions, to negotiate the curve at speeds in excess 
of 70.9 m.p.h.  He concluded that “the actions and inactions of the Miami 
Township Fire Department in failing to address the hazardous condition of the 
roadway were a proximate and contributing cause of this fatal accident.” 
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{¶ 14} Appellee brought suit against the appellants, Miami Township and 
the Miami Township Fire Division, alleging that the township was liable for 
Christopher’s death because Christopher had lost control of his vehicle when it hit 
“black ice” that had formed on the roadway due to Miami Township’s negligence.  
The township moved for summary judgment, asserting that it was immune from 
liability by operation of R.C. 2744.02, the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act.  
The trial court agreed, concluding that general blanket immunity applies to the 
township and that no exception to that immunity applies to this case. 
{¶ 15} Critical to our analysis is the trial court’s finding that the ice on 
Bear Creek Road did not amount to an “obstruction” as that term is used in R.C. 
2744.02(B)(3).  The trial court found that the term “obstruction” should be given 
its ordinary definition—something that “blocks or closes up by obstacle.”  
Because passage through Bear Creek Road had not been blocked by any obstacle, 
the trial court determined that the water and ice on the road did not amount to an 
“obstruction” and held that the township was not liable for Christopher’s death. 
{¶ 16} Howard appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals, which 
reversed.  The court of appeals held that the term “obstruction” should be 
construed broadly to include any object that has the potential to interfere with the 
safe passage of motorists on public roads. 
{¶ 17} We accepted the township’s discretionary appeal, which asserted 
two related propositions:  that an “obstruction” as used in R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) 
should be given the plain and ordinary meaning of an “obstacle” or “something 
that blocks or closes up by obstacle,” and that a political subdivision’s duty 
extends only to obstacles that block a roadway for usual and ordinary modes of 
travel. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 18} Our analysis of whether a township is immune from liability 
pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744 is familiar.  First, we begin with the understanding 
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that political subdivisions are not liable generally for injury or death to persons in 
connection with a township’s performance of a governmental or proprietary 
function.  R.C. 2744.02(A)(1).  Second, we consider whether an exception to that 
general rule of immunity applies.  R.C. 2744.02(B).  If an exception does apply, 
we must determine whether the township can still establish immunity by 
demonstrating another statutory defense.  R.C. 2744.03.  The case before us turns 
on the second prong of the analysis (whether an exception to the general rule 
applies). 
{¶ 19} Pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), an exception for immunity exists 
for injuries or death caused by a township’s “negligent failure to keep public 
roads in repair and other negligent failure to remove obstructions from public 
roads.”  As the trial court recognized, the critical inquiry here is whether the ice 
on Bear Creek Road was an “obstruction.”  The legislature did not define that 
term in the statute, nor have we done so in our prior decisions. 
{¶ 20} In interpreting the statute now, we again apply familiar rules.  
“[W]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is the duty of the 
court to enforce the statute as written, making neither additions to the statute nor 
subtractions therefrom.” Hubbard v. Canton City School Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio 
St.3d 451, 2002-Ohio-6718, 780 N.E.2d 543, ¶ 14. “If it is ambiguous, we must 
then interpret the statute to determine the General Assembly’s intent.  If it is not 
ambiguous, then we need not interpret it; we must simply apply it.”  State v. 
Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 21} The plain and ordinary meaning of “obstruction” is “1. an 
obstructing or being obstructed; 2. anything that obstructs; hindrance.”  Webster’s 
New World Dictionary (1988) 936. “Obstruct” is defined as “1. To block or stop 
up (a passage) with obstacles or impediments; dam; clog; 2. to hinder (progress, 
an activity, etc.); impede; 3. to cut off from being seen; block (the view).”  Id.  If 
the definition of obstruction meant only to“block or stop” or to dam or clog, there 
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would be no ambiguity and no debate that the ice on Bear Creek Road was not an 
obstruction, because there is no evidence before us that the road was not passable 
as a result of the ice.  Accord, Parker v. Upper Arlington, Franklin App. No. 
05AP-695, 2006-Ohio-1649, 2006 WL 832523, at ¶ 14, quoting Webster’s Third 
International Dictionary (1961) 1559 (stop signs, painted crosswalks, and 
sidewalk ramps are not obstructions because they do not “block up” or present 
“obstacles or impediments to passing” through the public roadways); Monroeville 
v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 152 Ohio App.3d 24, 2003-Ohio-1420, 786 
N.E.2d 504, ¶ 17 ( “Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed.1996) 
803, defines ‘obstruct’ as follows:  ‘to block or close up by an obstacle; to hinder 
from passage, action or operation; to cut off from sight’ ” and concluding that 
R.C. 5589.20 and R.C. 5589.21, which prohibit railroads from obstructing a 
public street or roadway, “require[] a complete blockage”). 
{¶ 22} But the dictionary definitions of obstruction also include the 
concepts of hindering and impeding – concepts that do not necessarily require a 
complete blockage. Seizing that language, and applying opinions of the Ohio 
Attorney General from 25 years ago —  see, e.g., 1980 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 
80-071, at 2-282 —  the court of appeals held that “ ‘obstruction,’ as it is used in 
R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), should be interpreted to mean any object placed or erected in 
a public roadway that has the potential of interfering with the public’s use of that 
roadway. An interference occurs when the public’s safe use of the roadway is 
jeopardized.”  Howard v. Miami Twp. Fire Div., 171 Ohio App.3d 184, 2007-
Ohio-1508, 870 N.E.2d 197, ¶ 23-24.  It then concluded, “[A]n icy mixture on a 
public roadway has the potential of interfering with the public’s safe use of the 
roadway by creating an opportunity for loss of traction and/or loss of control of a 
vehicle” and that “the township was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
under R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), because the political subdivision had a duty of care to 
remove this obstruction from the road.”  Id. at ¶ 26.  We reverse this holding. 
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{¶ 23} The court of appeals’ conclusion ignores what we believe is a 
critical aspect of the analysis – the statutory history of this subsection. 
{¶ 24} The current version of R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) was amended in part by 
Senate Bill 106 (“S.B. 106”), effective April 2003.  Prior to that date, R.C. 
2744.02(B)(3) read, “[P]olitical subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to 
person or property caused by their failure to keep public roads, highways, streets, 
avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, aqueducts, viaducts, or public grounds within 
the political subdivisions open, in repair, and free from nuisance * * * .”  
(Emphasis added.)  See 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3500, 3508. 
{¶ 25} Contrary to appellee’s counsel’s suggestion at oral argument in this 
case and to the Sixth District’s decision in Floering v. Roller, Wood App. No. 
WD-02-076, 2003-Ohio-5679, 2003 WL 22417127, at ¶ 27 (interpreting the 
current version of R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) as imposing the same duty of care on 
political subdivisions as it did when the statute’s language included “free from 
nuisance”), we believe that the General Assembly purposely replaced the phrase 
“free from nuisance” with “other negligent failure to remove obstructions.”  To 
find otherwise is to conclude that the legislature’s action in amending the statute 
was a superfluous act. 
{¶ 26} We are persuaded that the legislature’s action in amending R.C. 
2744.02(B)(3) was not whimsy but a deliberate effort to limit political 
subdivisions’ liability for injuries and deaths on their roadways. 
{¶ 27} As we noted in Harp v. Cleveland Hts. (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 506, 
509, 721 N.E.2d 1020, fn.1, the General Assembly had attempted previously to 
make the same amendment to R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) as part of one of its tort-
liability-limitation measures, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 
3867, 3987, effective January 27, 1997.  See State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial 
Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 458, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (holding 
that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350 was unconstitutional because it violated the 
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separation-of-powers doctrine and the single-subject rule).  Indeed, we presume 
that at the time it enacted Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, the legislature was aware of 
judicial decisions interpreting the term “nuisance” broadly to reach an array of 
acts or omission that endanger life or health.  For example, prior to the 
legislature’s passing Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, we had interpreted former R.C. 
2744.02(B)(3)’s use of the term “nuisance” to include “conditions that directly 
jeopardize the safety of traffic on the highway” even if they did not appear on the 
roadway itself.  Manufacturer’s Natl. Bank of Detroit v. Erie Cty. Road Comm. 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 318, 322-323, 587 N.E.2d 819. 
{¶ 28} We have adhered to that precedent after Sheward, continuing to 
construe “nuisance” in broad terms.  Thus, in Harp, 87 Ohio St.3d at 512, 721 
N.E.2d 1020, we held that a defective tree limb threatening to fall on a public 
roadway, but not actually on the roadway, could constitute a nuisance under R.C. 
2744.02(B)(3) and that a political subdivision’s duty of care extended beyond 
merely removing obstructions from public roads.  Later, in Sherwin-Williams Co. 
v. Dayton Freight Lines, Inc., 112 Ohio St.3d 52, 2006-Ohio-6498, 858 N.E.2d 
324, ¶ 16, we held that a political subdivision could be held liable for injuries 
sustained outside the political subdivision if the injuries were caused by a 
nuisance that arose within its territory.  In so doing, the majority in Sherwin-
Williams noted that “the General Assembly is perfectly capable of limiting the 
reach of a political subdivision’s liability to injuries or losses that occur on 
property within the political subdivision,” id. at ¶ 17, and the dissenting justice 
invited the legislature to clarify the meaning of R.C. 2744.07(B).  Id. at ¶ 33 
(Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 29} Given the General Assembly’s prior inclusion of the same 
language in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, our precedent that broadly defines the term 
“nuisance,” and that S.B. 106 also limited the definition of “public roads” from a 
more expansive reading that included “berms, shoulders, rights-of-way, or traffic 
January Term, 2008 
9 
control devices” to one that focused solely on the roadway itself, see Howard, 171 
Ohio App.3d 184, 2007-Ohio-1508, 870 N.E.2d 197, ¶ 17, we discern a 
legislative intent to limit political-subdivision liability for roadway injuries and 
deaths.  The General Assembly, in furtherance of its goal, used the word 
“obstructions” in a deliberate effort to impose a condition more demanding than a 
showing of a “nuisance” in order for a plaintiff to establish an exception to 
immunity. 
{¶ 30} We conclude that for purposes of R.C. 2744.02(B)(3), an 
“obstruction” must be an obstacle that blocks or clogs the roadway and not merely 
a thing or condition that hinders or impedes the use of the roadway or that may 
have the potential to do so.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and reinstate the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor 
of appellants. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 31} As the majority states, the critical issue in this case is whether ice 
that has accumulated on a public road can be considered an “obstruction” 
consistent with the meaning of the term in R.C. 2744.02(B)(3).  Because I believe 
that ice can qualify as such an obstruction, I respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 32} R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) provides exceptions to the general concept of 
political subdivision immunity, stating that “political subdivisions are liable for 
injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by their negligent failure * * * 
to remove obstructions from public roads * * *.”  The majority defines 
“obstruction” as “anything that obstructs” and notes that the definition of 
“obstruct” is “1. To block or stop up (a passage) with obstacles or impediments; 
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dam; clog; 2. to hinder (progress, an activity, etc.); impede; 3. to cut off from 
being seen; block (the view).”  Webster’s New World Dictionary (1988) 936.  
Under the plain meaning of the second definition of “obstruct,” a political 
subdivision could be liable for its negligent failure to remove an object that 
hinders or impedes safe travel on the road.  Ice that has accumulated on a roadway 
can certainly have this effect.  Because we are duty-bound to follow the plain 
meaning of statutes as written, I would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals.  See State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, 
¶ 9. 
{¶ 33} However, the majority believes that this definition creates 
ambiguity and refers to the statutory history of the subsection for clarification.  
Looking to the previous version of the statute, the majority finds that that 
provision formerly stated that “political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, 
or loss to person or property caused by their failure to keep public roads * * * 
open, in repair, and free from nuisance * * *.”  (Emphasis added.) 149 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 3500, 3508.  The majority acknowledges that our prior cases 
broadly read “free from nuisance” to include conditions both on and off the public 
roads.  However, it concludes that the General Assembly purposely replaced the 
phrase “free from nuisance” with “other negligent failure to remove obstructions” 
so as to limit political subdivision liability to circumstances in which an obstacle 
blocks or clogs the roadway, as opposed to merely hindering or impeding safe 
travel on it. 
{¶ 34} I disagree.  Our broad reading of the words “free from nuisance” in 
prior cases meant that political subdivisions could be liable for the presence of 
objects outside the actual roadway that altered travel upon the roads.  See, e.g., 
Manufacturer’s Natl. Bank of Detroit v. Erie Cty. Rd. Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio 
St.3d 318, 587 N.E.2d 819, paragraph one of the syllabus (“a permanent 
obstruction to visibility” along a road [here, a cornfield located in the right-of-
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way] could be a nuisance within the meaning of the statute); Harp v. Cleveland 
Hts. (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 506, 512, 721 N.E.2d 1020 (a tree limb that hung over 
and threatened to fall onto a public road could be a nuisance).  A political 
subdivision was therefore liable for failing to remedy a condition outside the 
roadway even if travel on the road itself remained unhindered. 
{¶ 35} The more reasonable interpretation of the new “obstruction” 
language is that the language is an attempt by the General Assembly to limit 
political subdivision liability to conditions on the roadway itself that either block 
or impede safe travel.  This interpretation recognizes the majority’s argument that 
the General Assembly purposely changed the language to limit political 
subdivision liability (by removing liability for conditions existing outside the 
roadway) and gives full effect to the definition of the terms “obstruction” and 
“obstruct.” 
{¶ 36} Reading the statute in this manner also comports with common 
sense.  Under the majority’s interpretation of the word “obstruction,” Miami 
Township could be liable if it negligently leaves a large oil drum in one lane of a 
public road, but not if it negligently leaves a large quantity of oil on the road, 
because the former would block the road and the latter would not.  However, the 
latter situation would be at least as dangerous as the former.  It makes little sense 
to hold political subdivisions liable for negligence that makes travel impossible 
while excusing liability for negligence that merely makes travel treacherous.  
“R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) imposes on political subdivisions a duty of care to keep 
highways open and safe for public travel,” Manufacturer’s Natl. Bank of Detroit, 
63 Ohio St.3d at 321, 587 N.E.2d 819, not just a duty to ensure that traffic flows 
freely. 
{¶ 37} I would therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and 
hold that ice may be an obstruction for the purposes of R.C. 2744.02(B)(3).  I 
would also remand for further proceedings, holding that defendant-appellant 
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Miami Township may be liable if plaintiff-appellee Donald Howard can 
demonstrate that the township negligently failed to remove the ice from the road 
at issue in this case. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Dyer, Garofalo, Mann & Schultz, L.P.A., and John A. Smalley, for 
appellee. 
 
Surdyk, Dowd & Turner Co., L.P.A., Robert J. Surdyk, and Dawn M. 
Frick, for appellants. 
 
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul Flowers; and Gibson & O’Keefe 
Co., L.P.A., and Stephen P. O’Keefe, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio 
Association for Justice. 
______________________