Case Title: Todd Nommensen v. American Continental Insurance Company

Citation: 2001 WI 112

Docket Number: 1999AP003018

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 112 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-3018 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Todd Nommensen,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
American Continental Insurance Company and Saint 
Mary's Medical Center, Inc., a Wisconsin 
corporation,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 230 
Reported at:  239 Wis. 2d 129, 619 N.W.2d 137 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 12, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 30, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Kreul 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
WILCOX, J., joins currence. 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there was 
a brief by John Barry Stutt and Stewart, Peyton, Crawford, 
Crawford & Stutt, Racine, and oral argument by John Barry Stutt. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
by John A. Nelson, Timothy W. Feeley and von Briesen, Purtell & 
 
2 
Roper, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by John A. Nelson. 
 
2001 WI 112 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-3018 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Todd Nommensen,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
American Continental Insurance Company  
and Saint Mary's Medical Center, Inc., a  
Wisconsin corporation,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, Nommensen v. American 
Continental Insurance Co., 2000 WI App 230, 239 Wis. 2d 129, 619 
N.W.2d 137, which affirmed a judgment by the circuit court for 
Racine County, Richard J. Kreul, Judge.  The case involves an 
alleged error in the jury instructions in a medical negligence 
trial.  The sole issue is whether the circuit court erred in 
failing to grant the plaintiff's request to modify the standard 
jury instruction on the ordinary burden of proof in a civil case 
by substituting the word "probability" for the word "certainty." 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
2 
¶2 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
decision to give the standard instruction.  Wisconsin JI——Civil 
200 (civil jury instruction 200 or instruction 200) states the 
quantum of evidence required in an ordinary civil case——that is, 
"the greater weight of the credible evidence."  It also provides 
a standard for the degree of certitude required of the fact 
finder——that is, "reasonable certainty."  These two elements are 
combined in the second sentence of the instruction, which we 
place in context: 
 
The 
burden 
of 
proof . . . rests 
upon 
the 
party 
contending that the answer to a question should be 
"yes."  This burden is to satisfy you to a reasonable 
certainty by the greater weight of the credible 
evidence that "yes" should be the answer. 
Wis JI——Civil 200 (emphasis added). 
 
¶3 
The 
plaintiff-petitioner 
contends 
that 
this 
instruction is ambiguous or confusing and constitutes an 
erroneous statement of the burden of proof.  He argues that the 
problem would be solved by replacing the word "certainty" in the 
instruction with the word "probability." 
¶4 
In 
making 
this 
argument, 
the 
petitioner 
raises 
important and disquieting questions that have been debated in 
this court for more than a century.  We take these questions 
seriously.  Yet, we are not convinced that the present jury 
instruction on the ordinary burden of proof is erroneous as a 
matter of law, that the petitioner's formulation of a new 
instruction would resolve the suggested dilemma, or that the 
petitioner has made the case for a new trial.  We are especially 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
3 
convinced that this court should not assume the responsibility 
of writing a new jury instruction on the burden of proof.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶5 
As we reach this conclusion, we respectfully urge the 
Wisconsin Civil Jury Instructions Committee to revisit Wis JI——
Civil 200 to explore whether the instruction can be improved 
without abandoning precedent on the two-element approach to the 
ordinary burden of proof. 
¶6 
The petitioner fails to persuade us to grant the 
specific relief he requested——a new trial on the issue of 
liability.  However, the issue of whether instruction 200 is a 
satisfactory instruction is well developed in the parties' 
briefs and is of such statewide import that it requires our 
attention.  We are mindful that we must maintain a wide-angle 
view of the instruction and its role in assisting juries to 
reach the proper answers to verdict questions. 
 
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶7 
Todd Nommensen was a patient for chest surgery at St. 
Mary's Medical Center in Racine.  He claims that during his 
recovery, he suffered nerve damage when he received an injection 
of the pain medication Toradol in the front of his right thigh. 
 He contends that the front of the thigh is an improper body 
location to administer an injection because there is a nerve 
that runs across the leg that can be struck by a needle.  He 
alleges that the pain and numbness resulting from the nerve 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
4 
damage is particularly troublesome to him because he is blind 
and 
the 
injury 
interferes 
with 
his 
non-sight 
sensory 
perceptions. 
¶8 
When Nommensen filed proposed jury instructions with 
the circuit court, he asked the court to replace the word 
"certainty" 
with 
the 
word 
"probability" 
in 
civil 
jury 
instruction 200 on the ordinary burden of proof.  The circuit 
court declined to do so. 
¶9 
Thus, 
the 
circuit 
court 
charged 
the 
jury 
with 
instruction 200 without modification.  This instruction read as 
follows: 
 
The burden of proof, other than on question ____ 
 (e.g., comparison of negligence) and the damage 
questions in the verdict, rests upon the party 
contending that the answer to a question should be 
"yes."  This burden is to satisfy you to a reasonable 
certainty by the greater weight of the credible 
evidence that "yes" should be the answer. 
 
By the greater weight of the evidence is meant 
evidence which when weighed against evidence opposed 
to it has more convincing power.  Credible evidence is 
evidence which in the light of reason and common sense 
is worthy of your belief. 
 
If you have to guess what the answer should be 
after discussing all evidence which relates to a 
particular question, then the party having the burden 
of proof as to that question has not met the required 
burden. 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
5 
Wis JI——Civil 200 (emphasis added).1 
 
¶10 The jury was then asked to answer three questions in a 
special verdict.  The jury answered "yes" to the question 
whether St. Mary's was negligent through its employees.  The 
jury answered "no" to the question whether St. Mary's negligence 
caused injury to Nommensen.  Finally, the jury wrote that 
$95,000 would "fairly and adequately compensate" Nommensen "for 
past and future pain, suffering and disability." 
¶11 On appeal, Nommensen raised three issues.  All were 
rejected by the court of appeals. 
¶12 First, the court of appeals ruled that the circuit 
court properly admitted testimony from nurse Ellen Buggy on 
behalf of St. Mary's about certain properties of Toradol and its 
propensities for causing discomfort or harm even when properly 
injected.  Nommensen had argued that this testimony spoke to a 
superseding cause for his injury which St. Mary's had not pled 
as an affirmative defense.  Second, the court ruled that the 
circuit court properly instructed the jury when it used Wis JI-
Civil 200 without modification.  Third, the court ruled that the 
five-sixths verdict requirement had been met, despite dissents 
by various jurors on all three verdict questions. 
                     
1 The circuit court used the version of Wis JI——Civil 200 
that was in effect at the time of Nommensen's trial in 1999, the 
1991 version.  The instruction has changed slightly since then, 
with a revision in the year 2000.  The first sentence of the 
instruction now reads: "The burden of proof on questions ______ 
rests upon the party contending that the answer to a question 
should be ‘yes.’"  The recent change does not affect this case. 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
6 
 
¶13 Only the second issue is before this court.  The court 
of appeals indicated that it was bound by precedent on the 
validity of the burden of proof jury instruction.  Nommensen, 
239 Wis. 2d 129, ¶16.  However, Presiding Judge Richard S. Brown 
wrote a lengthy concurring opinion suggesting that this court 
reevaluate the use of the phrase "reasonable certainty" within 
Wis JI——Civil 200.  Id. at ¶¶25-48 (Brown, P.J., concurring).  
Judge Brown's concurrence weighed the pros and cons of the 
current instruction and found it wanting.  His exegesis on the 
subject requires a thoughtful response.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
¶14 This case presents a single issue for our review: Did 
the circuit court erroneously instruct the jury when it used 
Wis——JI Civil 200, the standard civil jury instruction on the 
ordinary burden of proof? 
¶15 This issue is of great import to all civil trials in 
this state because the focus of criticism applies not only to 
the ordinary burden of proof (instruction 200) but also to the 
middle burden of proof (Wis JI——Civil 205).  Thus, the legal 
issue posed must be analyzed against the backdrop of all civil 
litigation. 
¶16 Wisconsin JI——Civil 200 embodies two related elements: 
(1) degree of certitude and (2) quantum of evidence.  State ex 
rel. Brajdic v. Seber, 53 Wis. 2d 446, 448, 193 N.W.2d 43 
(1972).  There appears to be no dispute that the appropriate 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
7 
quantum of evidence in an ordinary civil case is "the greater 
weight of the credible evidence."  This expression of the 
required quantum of evidence "is an exact synonym for 'fair 
preponderance' and much more understandable by the average 
juror."  Wis JI——Civil 200 cmt. (citing Wangen v. Ford Motor 
Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 299, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980)). 
¶17 The criticism of the instruction is thus pointed 
toward the other element——the degree of certitude.  Nommensen 
argues in essence that the present instruction is confusing, 
potentially misleading, and substantively wrong.  In this 
criticism he is supported by Judge Brown and a provocative 
article by Attorney Alan E. Gesler.  Alan E. Gesler, The Burden 
of Proof: How Certain is Reasonable?, 14 The Verdict 11 (1991). 
 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
 
¶18 Nommensen argues that the precedent supporting use of 
the phrase "reasonable certainty" is based on an erroneous 
understanding of the law.  He is joined in this criticism by 
Judge Brown and Attorney Gesler. 
¶19 The current version of Wis JI——Civil 200 "Burden of 
Proof: Ordinary" dates from 1972.  It follows an earlier version 
of 
the 
instruction 
adopted 
by 
the 
Wisconsin 
Civil 
Jury 
Instructions Committee in 1960.  The committee stated in both 
its 1960 and 1972 comments to instruction 200 that the phrase 
"satisfied to a reasonable certainty" had been used since Kausch 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
8 
v. Chicago & Milwaukee Electric Railway Co., 176 Wis. 21, 26, 
186 N.W. 257 (1922). 
 
¶20 In 1967 in Savina v. Wisconsin Gas Co., Justice E. 
Harold Hallows wrote for the court: 
 
In this type of civil case the burden of the plaintiff 
is only to satisfy the jury to a reasonable certainty. 
 The 
plaintiff 
is 
not 
required 
to 
remove 
all 
uncertainty.  Kausch v. Chicago & M.E. Ry. Co. (1922), 
176 Wis. 21, 186 N.W. 257.  However, in instructing 
generally on burden of proof the court correctly 
informed the jury that it was to be satisfied or 
convinced by a fair preponderance of the evidence to a 
reasonable certainty. 
36 Wis. 2d 694, 703, 154 N.W.2d 237 (1967) (citation omitted). 
¶21 By January 4, 1972, Justice Hallows had become Chief 
Justice, and on that date he wrote in State ex rel. Brajdic v. 
Seber: 
 
Every standard burden of proof, other than the 
standard applied to criminal cases, is composed of two 
elements:  (1) The degree of certitude required of the 
trier of the fact, i.e., reasonable certainty, and (2) 
either the quantity of the evidence, i.e., the greater 
weight or convincing power, or the quality of the 
evidence, i.e., clear, satisfactory, and convincing. 
53 Wis. 2d at 448. 
¶22 This is very close to what Justice Hallows had written 
in 1960 in Kuehn v. Kuehn: "We do not believe there is any 
substantial difference in the two statements of the rule, both 
have two elements, reasonable certainty and the required 
quantity and quality of the evidence."  11 Wis. 2d 15, 29-30, 
104 N.W.2d 138 (1960). 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
9 
¶23 In Kuehn, Justice Hallows quoted from Will of Ball: 
Ball v. Boston, 153 Wis. 27, 35, 141 N.W. 8 (1913), to the 
effect that "in ordinary civil matters the person on whom the 
burden of proof rests may rely upon evidence establishing the 
facts to a reasonable certainty," but in specific civil cases 
with a higher burden, such as "'where fraud is the gist of the 
matter, then he must go further,——not to the extent of 
establishing the charge with the highest degree of certainty, 
but to that one which rests, not only in reasonable certainty, 
but on evidence which is clear and satisfactory.'"  Kuehn, 11 
Wis. 2d at 29 (quoting Ball, 153 Wis. at 35). 
¶24 We do not know whether the committee on civil jury 
instructions adopted the analysis of Justice Hallows from Kuehn 
in 1960 or Brajdic in 1972, or whether Justice Hallows borrowed 
from the work of the committee, which was created and had been 
working since 1959; but there is certainly an overlap of 
analysis and wording in Wis JI——Civil 200. 
¶25 The instruction on the ordinary burden of proof has 
remained essentially unchanged since 1972.2  It was specifically 
                     
2 Wisconsin JI——Civil 200 has undergone a variety of minor 
changes since its inception.  According to the instruction's 
comment, it was first approved in 1972 and underwent changes in 
1989, 1991, and 2000, Wis JI——Civil 200 cmt, though the 
Wisconsin State Law Library also holds a Wis JI——Civil 200 
published in 1960.  The 1960 instruction differs significantly 
from the post-1972 instructions, but it too contains the phrase 
"to a reasonable certainty, by the greater weight of the 
credible evidence." 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
10
embraced by this court in Victorson v. Milwaukee & Suburban 
Transportation Corp., 70 Wis. 2d 336, 356-57, 234 N.W.2d 332 
(1975).  Justice Leo Hanley, the author of Victorson, was a 
member of the court when it decided both Savina and Brajdic.  He 
cited Savina in his analysis.  Victorson, 70 Wis. 2d at 357. 
¶26 We 
think 
the 
Wisconsin 
Civil 
Jury 
Instructions 
Committee was standing on solid ground when it commented that 
"The Committee believes the term 'reasonable certainty' has been 
firmly established in our case law and accurately reflects the 
degree of certitude jurors must reach in answering verdict 
questions."  Wis JI——Civil 200 cmt. 
¶27 The linkage between the old preponderance standard and 
"reasonable certainty" predates Kausch, as evidenced in Will of 
Ball.  For example, in Grotjan v. Rice in 1905, the court 
observed: 
 
What is meant by "preponderance of the evidence," the 
manner in which the jury should proceed in solving 
disputed propositions on evidence, and the degree of 
certainty to which they should arrive before rendering 
a 
verdict, 
are 
elementary. . . . The 
term 
"preponderance of the evidence" suggests the quality 
of outweighing in convincing power.  So it means 
preponderance in the convincing power of the evidence. 
 In the orderly way of determining the truth from 
evidence, the jury first consider the same and 
determine on which side of the dispute there is the 
                                                                  
The 1989 revision added the current third paragraph of the 
instruction.  The 1991 revision added the word "your" to the 
last sentence of the second paragraph.  Finally, the 2000 
revision changed the format of the first sentence of the 
instruction.  None of these revisions is particularly pertinent 
to this case, but they underscore the civil instruction 
committee's attention to detail. 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
11
greater 
weight 
thereof, 
the 
more 
convincing 
indications as to where the truth lies.  They next 
determine 
whether 
such 
greater 
indications 
are 
sufficiently convincing to satisfy them of the truth 
of the matter, not beyond a reasonable doubt, for no 
such 
degree 
of 
certainty 
in 
civil 
cases 
is 
required, . . . but satisfied of 
the truth 
to 
a 
reasonable 
certainty. 
That 
doctrine 
has 
been 
frequently announced in this court. 
124 Wis. 253, 258, 102 N.W. 551 (1905) (citations omitted). 
¶28 Favorable 
reference 
to 
reasonable 
certainty 
was 
reiterated in Thoma v. Class Mineral Fume Health Bath Co. in 
1943, where the court approved an instruction that read: 
 
"If you are convinced by the preponderance of the 
evidence to a reasonable certainty that you should 
answer this question 'Yes,' then make that your 
answer. If you are not so convinced, your answer to 
this question should be 'No'." 
244 Wis. 347, 355, 12 N.W.2d 29 (1943). 
¶29 In Kausch this court emphasized the importance of the 
phrase "reasonable certainty": 
 
Error is assigned because the court did not 
charge the jury with reference to the burden of proof. 
 The questions were so framed that the burden of proof 
was on the affirmative side in each instance.  With 
reference to each question the jury were told that 
before they could return an affirmative answer they 
must be satisfied to a reasonable certainty by a 
consideration of all the evidence that the fact 
inquired about existed.  If not so satisfied, they 
were directed to answer the question "No."  This most 
effectually placed the burden of proof upon the party 
required to prove the affirmative of each question 
propounded, and made a charge with reference to the 
burden of proof unnecessary.  The trial judge, in his 
opinion upon the motions after verdict, stated that 
this was his uniform practice, and expressed the 
opinion that it was a better and safer practice than 
to attempt to define the terms "burden of proof" and 
"preponderance of evidence."  It appears to be a 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
12
simple and effective way of impressing upon the jury 
the rule which should govern them in arriving at their 
determination, 
and 
rendered 
an 
instruction 
with 
reference to the burden of proof unnecessary. 
176 Wis. at 26.  Kausch has drawn criticism for straying from 
the two-element analysis of Brajdic.  The Kausch approach may 
not square entirely with the two-element analysis, but it 
certainly does not invalidate "reasonable certainty" as an 
essential element of the burden of proof. 
 
¶30 Other cases could be cited.  Consequently, we disagree 
with the criticism that "reasonable certainty" is not firmly 
established in our case law, or that it is not well supported by 
the cases that adopted it.  Reasonable certainty is one of the 
two essential elements of the ordinary burden of proof in this 
state. 
 
POTENTIAL TO MISLEAD 
 
 
¶31 A more serious criticism of Wis JI——Civil 200 is that 
it is misleading as written, that it confuses the jury as to the 
plaintiff's burden of proof.  This criticism is best summarized 
by Judge Brown when he writes that "using the term 'reasonable 
certainty' in the instruction creates too high of a risk that 
jurors will hold a plaintiff to a higher burden of proof than 
intended."  Nommensen, 239 Wis. 2d 129, ¶25 (Brown, P.J., 
concurring). 
 
¶32 Both 
Judge 
Brown 
and 
Attorney 
Gesler 
turn 
to 
dictionary definitions of certainty.  Gesler cites Black's Law 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
13
Dictionary 205 (5th ed. 1979) for the definition that certainty 
means "absence of doubt."  Gesler, supra, at 12.  Judge Brown 
quotes The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 
Unabridged 339 (2d ed. 1987) that certainty means "an assured 
fact" and "without a doubt."  Nommensen, 239 Wis. 2d 129, ¶27 
(Brown, P.J., concurring).  They support their premise with a 
statistical study from The New England Journal of Medicine.  
Augustine Kong et al., How Medical Professionals Evaluate 
Expressions of Probability, 315 New Eng. J. Med. 740, 740-44 
(1986).  Citing this study, Gesler writes that "[u]se of the 
word certainty produces in the hearer an expectation of 
probability of over 90%."  Gesler, supra, at 12.  Judge Brown 
writes of the study: 
 
The word "certain" had a probability rating of 99%.  
When the adverb "almost" was added to the adjective 
"certain," the median moved from 99% to 94%.  The data 
thus points to the unescapable conclusion that words 
matter and a person being asked to find something to a 
"certainty" thinks of the task as being asked to find 
something to a 99% degree of probability or higher. 
Nommensen, 239 Wis. 2d 129, ¶29 (Brown, P.J., concurring) 
(citations omitted). 
¶33 Nommensen 
contends 
that 
the 
term 
"reasonable 
certainty" means "without a doubt."  He argues that the 
 
instruction makes no attempt to explain how jurors are 
to deal with two different, separate pieces of 
information presented to them: 1) that the jurors must 
be convinced in their own mind and 2) that they must 
be convinced that one side's evidence is probably more 
true than the other side's.  There is no explanation 
in the jury instruction as to how to weigh the 
evidence.  This absence of explanation creates the 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
14
very real danger that a juror will use the "reasonable 
certainty" language as a method by which to analyze 
the two pieces of information.  Presently, a jury can 
easily understand the instruction to say that unless 
the plaintiff's evidence is true to a "reasonable 
certainty" he may not be considered right enough for 
the plaintiff to win.  The use of the term "reasonable 
certainty" creates too high a danger that jurors will 
hold the plaintiff to a higher proof standard than 
intended and that they may believe they need to be 
satisfied to a greater than required degree of 
precision. 
 
¶34 Judge Brown comes to the same conclusion.  He writes: 
 
I 
am 
convinced 
that 
a 
reasonable 
juror 
could 
understand 
the 
instruction 
to 
say 
as 
follows: 
"Plaintiff's 
evidence 
is 
weighed 
against 
the 
defendant's and the job of deciding whose evidence has 
more weight is yours.  But before you may find that 
the plaintiff's evidence has more weight, you must 
first be satisfied that the plaintiff has provided you 
with evidence that is absolutely true or nearly 
absolutely true." 
Nommensen, 239 Wis. 2d 129, ¶45 (Brown, P.J., concurring). 
¶35 Nommensen's solution to all this is to substitute the 
word "probability" for the word "certainty" in the instruction. 
 He also picks up an idea from the Gesler article that perhaps 
the mental element should be dropped from the instruction 
altogether.3  He urges the court to rewrite the instruction. 
 
¶36 The purpose of a jury instruction is to fully and 
fairly inform the jury of a rule or principle of law applicable 
to a particular case.  Grube v. Daun, 213 Wis. 2d 533, 549, 570 
                     
3 Gesler pointed out that in 1918 this court said that the 
phrase "reasonable certainty" "is not essential" in a burden of 
proof instruction.  Alan E. Gesler, The Burden of Proof: How 
Certain is Reasonable?, 14 The Verdict 11, 12 (1991) (citing 
Sullivan v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Sainte Marie Ry. Co., 
167 Wis. 518, 527, 167 N.W. 311 (1918)).  
No. 99-3018 
 
 
15
N.W.2d 851 (1997); Nowatske v. Osterloh, 198 Wis. 2d 419, 428, 
543 N.W.2d 265 (1996).  We agree with Judge Brown that the job 
of an instruction is not only to state the law accurately but 
also to "explain what the law means to persons who usually do 
not possess law degrees."  Nommensen, 239 Wis. 2d 129, ¶45.  
Thus, a jury instruction should be as clear and simple as 
reasonably possible to aid the jury in understanding the law. 
 
¶37 The jury instruction committees play a vital role in 
Wisconsin's system of justice.  Kim v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
176 Wis. 2d 890, 896-97, 501 N.W.2d 24 (1993).  Their often 
unheralded work is indispensable to the successful operation of 
the courts.  The desirability of uniform instructions for most 
cases is not open to debate because uniformity, supported by 
scholarship and attention to detail, tends to assure that 
litigants will be treated fairly and equally in the court 
system. 
 
¶38 Crafting jury instructions is demanding and meticulous 
work.  It invites constructive comment and suggestion so as 
better to appreciate the clarity and workability of each 
instruction. 
¶39 We are impressed with an observation in Grotjan v. 
Rice, 124 Wis. at 258: "Efforts to state elementary principles 
in ways not found in the books are quite liable to work harm.  
The better way is not to depart from those definitions which 
have received judicial approval."  We do not mean by this to 
suggest that the formulations of existing jury instructions 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
16
cannot be improved.  We do mean to say that revising jury 
instructions on fundamental principles requires caution. 
¶40 It is not the role of the supreme court to draft jury 
instructions, particularly instructions that have the potential 
of affecting every civil trial in Wisconsin.  We have often 
referred difficult instruction issues to the jury instruction 
committees.  State v. Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183, 199, 556 N.W.2d 
90 (1996); Nowatske, 198 Wis. 2d at 449; State v. Garcia, 192 
Wis. 2d 845, 860 n.6, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995); Foley v. City of 
West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 495, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983). 
¶41 In this instance, the change petitioner seeks in 
instruction 200 would require adjustments in many other civil 
jury instructions.  Neither the petitioner nor the respondents 
have discussed the effect of the proposed change in instruction 
200 on other jury instructions. 
¶42 According to our computer search of the instructions, 
the words "reasonable certainty" appear in about 60 jury 
instructions, in addition to Wis JI——Civil 200.  Most of these 
instructions read as instruction 200 does: "to a reasonable 
certainty by [or "from"] the [or "a"] greater weight of the 
credible evidence."  Wis——JI Civil 107 (Submission on Ultimate 
Fact Verdict); 108 (Submission on Ultimate Fact Verdict When 
Court Finds One or More Parties at Fault); 350 (Presumptions: 
Conflict as to Existence of Basic Fact; Evidence Introduced from 
Which Nonexistence of Presumed Fact May be Inferred); 352 
(Presumptions: Existence of Basic Fact Uncontradicted; Evidence 
Introduced from Which Nonexistence of Presumed Fact May be 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
17
Inferred); 
353 
(Presumptions: 
Deceased 
Person 
was 
not 
Negligent); 1001 (Negligence: Fault: Ultimate Fact Verdict); 
1023 (Medical Negligence); 1023.8 (Professional Negligence: 
Chiropractor——Treatment); 
1023.10 
(Professional 
Negligence: 
Dental); 1026 (Bailment: Negligence of Bailee May be Inferred); 
1114 (Duty of Preceding Driver to Following Driver: Lookout); 
1580 (Comparative Negligence: Plaintiff Driver and One or More 
Defendant Drivers); 1585 (Comparative Negligence: Plaintiff-
Guest 
and 
Host-Defendant 
Negligent); 
1590 
(Comparative 
Negligence: Plaintiff-Guest Passively Negligent; Host (or Other 
Driver) 
Negligent); 
1591 
(Comparative 
Negligence: 
Guest 
Passively 
Negligent; 
Claims 
Against 
and 
Among 
Drivers; 
Apportionment from One Comparative Negligence Question); 1592 
(Comparative 
Negligence: 
Guest 
Passively 
Negligent; 
Claims 
Against 
and 
Among 
Drivers; 
Apportionment 
of 
Comparative 
Negligence from Two Questions); 1600 (Servant: Driver of 
Automobile 
(Presumption from 
Ownership 
of 
Vehicle)); 
1723 
(Enhanced Injuries); 1730 (Damages: Duty to Mitigate; Physical 
Injuries); 1731 (Damages: Duty to Mitigate); 2501 (Defamation: 
Private Individual Versus Private Individual, No Privilege); 
2507 (Defamation: Private Individual Versus Private Individual 
with 
Conditional 
Privilege); 
2509 
(Defamation: 
Private 
Individual Versus Media Defendant (Negligence Standard)); 2552 
(Invasion 
of 
Privacy: 
Publication 
of 
a 
Private 
Matter: 
Conditional Privilege); 2760 (Bad Faith by Insurance Company 
(Excess Verdict Case)); 2780 (Intentional Interference with 
Contractual Relationship); 3725 (Damages: Future Profits); 5001 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
18
(Paternity: Child of Unmarried Woman) (recommending burden of 
proof instruction "[i]f the statistical probability of paternity 
is 99.0% or higher"); 8060 (Adverse Possession Not Found on 
Written Instrument (Wis. Stat. § 893.25)). 
¶43 Other instructions reverse the order of the element of 
certitude and the necessary quantum of evidence.  These 
instructions read: "by the greater weight of the credible 
evidence to a reasonable certainty."  Wis JI——Civil 1001 
(Negligence: Fault: Ultimate Fact Verdict) (also contains an 
inverted version of the phrase); 1381 (Negligence: Teacher: Duty 
to Supervise Students); 2006 (Battery: Self-Defense); 2006.5 
(Battery: Defense of Property); 2770 (Termination of Dealership 
(Dealer/Plaintiff——Grantor/Defendant)); 3260 (Strict Liability: 
Duty of Manufacturer to Ultimate User). 
¶44 Eliminating 
the 
phrase 
"reasonable 
certainty" 
in 
instruction 200 would affect other instructions in an assortment 
of ways.  Wis JI——Civil 50 (Preliminary Instructions Before 
Trial) (explaining that burden of proof cannot be met absent 
"reasonable certainty"); 1026.5 (Bailment: Negligence of Carrier 
Presumed) ("to a reasonable certainty by a fair preponderance of 
the evidence that it is more probable"); 1054 (Equipment and 
Maintenance of Vehicles: Brakes) ("from all of the credible 
evidence, you are satisfied to a reasonable certainty"); 2610 
(Malicious Prosecution: Advice of Counsel as Defense) ("The 
burden is upon (defendant) to satisfy you to a reasonable 
certainty . . . ."); 3725 (Damages: Future Profits) (using 
"reasonable certainty" in numerous ways). 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
19
¶45 Finally, 
some 
comments 
to 
existing 
instructions 
contain references to the phrase "reasonable certainty" in the 
context of discussing the applicable burden of proof.  E.g., 
Wis——JI Civil 200 (Burden of Proof: Ordinary); 1006 (Gross 
Negligence: Defined) (alternative instruction); 2100 (False 
Imprisonment: 
Definition); 
4000 
(Agency: 
Definition) 
(recommending 
burden 
of 
proof 
instruction 
in 
certain 
circumstances).4 
                     
4 In addition, many instructions that relate to the middle 
burden of proof read: "to a reasonable certainty by [or "from"] 
evidence 
that 
[or 
"which"] 
is 
clear, 
satisfactory, 
and 
convincing."  Wis JI——Civil 205 (Burden of Proof: Middle); 2004 
(Assault); 2005 (Battery (Physical Harm)); 2151 (Federal Civil 
Rights 
Actions: 
§ 1983 
Actions); 
2500 
(Defamation); 
2511 
(Defamation: Public Figure Versus Media Defendant or Private 
Figure with Constitutional Privilege (Actual Malice)); 2520 
(Defamation: Punitive Damages); 2760 (Bad Faith by Insurance 
Company (Excess Verdict Case)) (also contains an instruction on 
the 
lower 
burden); 
2780 
(Intentional 
Interference 
with 
Contractual Relationship) (also contains an instruction on the 
lower burden); 2800 (Conspiracy: Defined); 2802 (Conspiracy: 
Proof of Membership); 2804 (Conspiracy: Indirect Proof); 2810 
(Conspiracy: 
Overt 
Acts); 
3074 
(Estoppel) 
(withdrawn 
instruction; language contained in note for trial judges); 7060 
(Protective Placement); 7070 (Commitment of an Alcoholic).  Some 
instructions state the middle burden in a different but 
substantially similar manner, though also employing the phrase 
"reasonable certainty."  Wis JI——Civil 2155 (Federal Civil 
Rights: 
Excessive 
Force 
in 
Arrest 
(In 
Maintaining 
Jail 
Security)); 7050 (Mentally Ill). 
Changing or eliminating the phrase "reasonable certainty" 
for cases involving the ordinary burden of proof (greater weight 
of the credible evidence) might also require changing the phrase 
in cases involving the "middle" burden of proof ("clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing" evidence).  Wis JI——Civil 205.  
This concern is outside the scope of this case. 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
20
¶46 If we were to rewrite instruction 200, as Nommensen 
suggests, by substituting the word "probability" for the word 
"certainty," we would in effect be deciding to substitute that 
word in many other instructions.  This would require an impact 
analysis that we are ill equipped to undertake.  It would be far 
better for an expert committee of circuit judges and scholars, 
working without an artificial deadline, to decide how to 
accomplish such wide-sweeping changes, if there were a consensus 
that such changes were warranted. 
¶47 It is important to keep in mind that Nommensen's 
proposal to substitute the word "probability" for the word 
"certainty" in Wis JI——Civil 200 has been rejected by the 
Wisconsin Civil Jury Instructions Committee in the past.  Wis 
JI——Civil 200 cmt.  ("Suggestions have . . . been made to the 
Committee and to trial judges during instruction conferences 
that the certainty element ('to a reasonable certainty') should 
be replaced with the term 'reasonable probability.' . . . The 
Committee believes that the term 'reasonable certainty' has been 
firmly established in our case law and accurately reflects the 
degree of certitude jurors must reach in answering verdict 
questions.").  While the decisions of the civil instructions 
committee are not binding upon this court, we generally find the 
committee's work insightful and persuasive. 
¶48 Another 
of 
Nommensen's 
proposals——to 
eliminate 
discussion of the degree of certitude altogether——runs contrary 
to well-established case law.  Even if we were to accept this 
proposal, the work of rewriting the instructions would be a 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
21
daunting task.  The degree of certitude appears in so many 
instructions, and is written in so many different ways, that to 
follow Nommensen's suggestion would require that we effectuate 
deep and fundamental revisions in many instructions, as well as 
minor deletions in others.  This is not our institutional role. 
 In addition, this idea of Nommensen's does not square with this 
state's long-standing two-element approach to the burden of 
proof.  The Wisconsin Civil Jury Instructions Committee also has 
expressly rejected this proposal.5  Accordingly, we decline to 
rewrite instruction 200 in the manner proposed by Nommensen. 
 
NOMMENSEN'S BURDEN ON APPEAL 
 
                     
5 The comment to Wis JI——Civil 200 provides: 
Some 
have 
suggested, 
pointing 
to 
decisions 
predating 1920, that the dual component civil burdens 
can be abbreviated by simply dropping the mental 
element. See Sullivan v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & 
S.S.M.R. Co., 167 Wis. 518, 167 N.W. 311 (1918).  The 
Committee disagrees with such proposals and follows 
the rationale expressed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
in Kuehn v. Kuehn, supra, in which Chief Justice 
Hallows said: 
 
The statement of the complete rule of the burden of 
proof 
contains 
both 
the 
element 
of 
reasonable 
certainty and some degree of preponderance of the 
evidence. It is possible the contestant having the 
burden of proof may have the preponderance of the 
evidence fair, clear, or otherwise in his favor and 
still 
fall 
short 
of 
convincing 
the 
jury 
to 
a 
reasonable certainty of the existence of the facts for 
which he is contending.  11 Wis. 2d at 28. 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
22
¶49 Nommensen fails to establish that the giving of 
instruction 200 constituted an erroneous exercise of discretion 
by the circuit court in his case.  He has not shown that his 
"substantial rights" were affected by the instruction, which is 
the burden he is required to meet on appeal. 
¶50 A circuit court has broad discretion when instructing 
a jury.  White v. Leeder, 149 Wis. 2d 948, 954, 440 N.W.2d 557 
(1989).  As a general matter, if we determine "that the overall 
meaning communicated by the instruction as a whole was a correct 
statement of the law, and the instruction comported with the 
facts of the case at hand, no grounds for reversal exists."  Id. 
at 954-55. 
¶51 Even if we determine that a circuit court has 
committed an error in administering a jury instruction, we must 
assess whether the miscue constitutes reversible error, that is, 
whether the "substantial rights" of a litigant have been 
affected. 
¶52 For an error "to affect the substantial rights" of a 
party, there must be a reasonable possibility that the error 
contributed to the outcome of the action or proceeding at issue. 
 Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, ___ Wis. 2d 
___, ___ N.W.2d ___; Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 
525, 543, 547, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985).  A reasonable possibility 
of a different outcome is a possibility sufficient to "undermine 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
23
confidence in the outcome."  Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 544-45 
(quotation omitted).6 
¶53 Nommensen did not persuade this court how the circuit 
court committed error in administering a jury instruction with 
language that has been in place in this state for more than a 
century.  The circuit court followed an instruction that this 
court has sanctioned in the past, Victorson, 70 Wis. 2d at 357, 
and it declined to modify the instruction in a way previously 
rejected by the Wisconsin Civil Jury Instructions Committee.  
Wis JI——Civil 200 cmt.  Under the circumstances presented, we 
cannot find that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion. 
                     
6 In previous cases, we have stated the standard for 
harmless error in jury instruction cases in a variety of ways.  
Nowatske v. Osterloh, 198 Wis. 2d 419, 429, 543 N.W.2d 265 
(1996) ("[W]hen the circuit court has given an erroneous 
instruction or has erroneously refused to give an instruction, a 
new trial is not warranted unless the error is prejudicial. 
'[A]n error relating to the giving or refusing to give an 
instruction is not prejudicial if it appears that the result 
would not be different had the error not occurred.'"); Victorson 
v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 70 Wis. 2d 336, 357, 234 
N.W.2d 332 (1975) ("[I]nstructions are to be judged as a whole 
and prejudicial error will not be found unless the instructions 
'would probably, not possibly, mislead the jury.'"). 
Nevertheless, we find that the "reasonable possibility" 
test applied in the recent cases of this court——Green, Koffman, 
Martindale——correctly describes the proper test to measure 
whether the substantial rights of Nommensen have been affected. 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
24
¶54 Assuming arguendo that the circuit court did commit 
error in giving in Wis JI——Civil 200, Nommensen has not shown 
that his substantial rights were affected.  He has not shown 
there is a reasonable possibility that the result of the trial 
would have been different.  He makes minimal argument about the 
facts and he does not present a cogent analysis of how 
instruction 200 affected the outcome of his case.7  Even if 
Nommensen had argued that his substantial rights were affected, 
the jury's finding of negligence upon the part of St. Mary's 
undercuts his contention. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
¶55 We conclude that Nommensen has not made a case for 
granting him a new trial because he did not establish that the 
circuit court administered an erroneous jury instruction or that 
if the instruction were error in his case, his substantial 
rights were affected.  We have carefully considered petitioner's 
argument that there is potential for juror confusion in Wis JI——
Civil 200, with respect to the elements of degree of certitude 
and quantum of evidence.  With this in mind, we respectfully 
request the Wisconsin Civil Jury Instructions Committee to 
revisit the instruction for a thorough review.  We do not 
                     
7 As the petitioner, Nommensen filed the first brief in this 
court.  Even after the respondents argued in their response 
brief to this court that Nommensen had failed to discuss the 
substantial rights standard, Nommensen did not address this 
issue.  Instead, he declined to file a reply brief. 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
25
necessarily agree with Judge Brown that "the instruction fails 
miserably."  However, we appreciate the spirit in which his 
message was delivered.  We recognize that jury instructions must 
be designed for the lay people on a jury.  We support Alan 
Gesler's statement that the purpose of all jury instructions is 
not only to "accurately state the law, but to clearly state the 
law."  Gesler, supra, at 12. 
¶56 Changing 
"reasonable 
certainty" 
to 
"reasonable 
probability" in the instruction is not the proper tonic for 
potential juror confusion and would be inconsistent with 
precedent.  However, we concur with Nommensen that instruction 
200 as written is deserving of a thorough review.  Such a review 
should consider all legitimate reformulations of the current 
instruction, so long as the instruction maintains the two-
element approach to the burden of proof. 
¶57 In examining instruction 200, the committee should 
make every effort to remedy one of the most troubling aspects of 
the instruction: the juxtaposition of the two elements of the 
burden of proof.  The ordinary juror could be misled into 
thinking 
that 
the 
burden 
of proof 
is to 
a 
"reasonable 
certainty."  Yet, immediately following that phrase, another 
seemingly contradictory aspect of the burden of proof is set 
forth: "by the greater weight of the credible evidence."  This 
juxtaposition has the potential to confuse the ordinary juror.  
The committee might well revise this instruction in a way that 
separates the two elements of the burden of proof and that 
No. 99-3018 
 
 
26
allows 
an 
ordinary 
juror 
to 
discern 
the 
meaning 
and 
interrelation of the two elements. 
¶58 The goal of any revision or rewrite should be to 
inform jurors of both elements of the burden of proof in the 
simplest and most understandable manner, while explaining each 
concept distinctly and relating the role of each element in 
deciding verdict questions. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-3018.ssa 
 
1 
¶59 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  I 
join the majority opinion.  I wrote a concurrence on the issue 
of harmless error in In re the Termination of Parental Rights to 
Jayton S.: Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110 ¶¶37-42, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J. concurring).  My 
views on harmless error expressed in that concurrence apply to 
the present case as well.  Rather than repeat the concurrence 
verbatim in the present case, I refer the reader to the Evelyn 
C.R. case. 
 
 
 
 
No.99-3018.npc 
 
1 
¶60 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.    (concurring).  I concur in 
the majority's decision to affirm the court of appeals because, 
as the majority concludes, Nommensen failed to establish that 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in giving 
Wis JICivil 200.  Majority op. at ¶49.  I disagree, however, 
with the majority's harmless error analysis. 
¶61 First, I take issue with the majority's standard for 
harmless error.  That standard, which is repeated in five other 
decisions from this court,8 is whether there is "a reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to the outcome," and that 
a "reasonable possibility" is one "sufficient to 'undermine 
confidence in the outcome.'"  Id. at ¶52 (quoting State v. 
Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 544-45, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985)).  Since 
the standard for harmless error is the same for civil, as well 
as criminal, cases (Town of Geneva v. Tills, 129 Wis. 2d 167, 
184-85, 384 N.W.2d 701 (1986)), it is imperative that the 
standard be accurately conveyed.  
¶62 For at least the past 35 years, this court has 
wrestled with formulating a standard for harmless error.  See, 
e.g., Pulaski v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 450, 456-57, 129 N.W.2d 204 
                     
8 See also Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 
111, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 
WI 113, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; and Evelyn C.R. v. 
Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  (I 
have written dissents or concurrences in these cases.)  But see 
State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 81, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ 
(Strickland's probability sufficient to undermine the confidence 
in the outcome test used to determine ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim). 
No.99-3018.npc 
 
2 
(1964); State v. Spring, 48 Wis. 2d 333, 339-40, 179 N.W.2d 841 
(1970); Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 356-57, 204 N.W.2d 482 
(1973); State v. Grant, 139 Wis. 2d 45, 406 N.W.2d 744 (1987).  
In an attempt to formulate a single, uniform test for harmless 
error, Dyess "conclude[d] that the test of prejudice as 
formulated in Strickland subsumes the various statements of the 
harmless error test that this court has used over the years."  
Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 545.9  The Strickland case referred to is 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984), and the test 
is whether "there is a reasonable probability" that "but for" 
the error, "the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome."  466 U.S. at 694 
(emphasis added).   Dyess obviously adopted that test, but 
incorrectly assumed that there was no real difference between 
using 
"reasonable 
possibility" 
instead 
of 
"reasonable 
probability." 124 Wis. 2d at 544.  Granted, Dyess applied its 
test by stating that "[i]n the present case, the probability to 
be weighed is whether the defendant would have been acquitted." 
 Id. at 546 (emphasis added).  However, as evident in the 
                     
9 Dyess' single test for harmless error standard has not 
been without controversy.  State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 370 
N.W.2d 222 (1985).  In addition to the majority opinion's 
discussion of Dyess' harmless error standard, authored by 
Justice Day, in State v. Grant, 139 Wis. 2d 45, 406 N.W.2d 744 
(1987), 
Chief 
Justice 
Heffernan, 
Justice 
Day, 
Justice 
Abrahamson, and Justice Callow separately concurred on the Dyess 
issue.  The controversy has continued.  See State v. Dodson, 219 
Wis. 2d 
65, 
92-98, 
580 
N.W.2d 
181 
(1998) 
(Crooks, 
J., 
concurring, joined by Justice Steinmetz and Justice Wilcox).    
No.99-3018.npc 
 
3 
majority's opinion here today, Wisconsin courts have frequently 
used the term "reasonable possibility," and have not indicated 
that, in the context of a harmless error standard, possibility 
means probability.10   
¶63 There can be no doubt that there is a significant 
difference between what is reasonably probable and what is 
reasonably possible.  "A possibility test is the next thing to 
automatic reversal."  Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 356-57, 204 
N.W.2d 482 (1973).11  While I agree that the focus should be "on 
whether the error 'undermine[s] confidence in the outcome,'" 
(Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 545 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694)), if that error need only possibly undermine the confidence 
in the outcome, rather than probably, appellate courts, and 
circuit courts considering motions after verdict and post-
convictions motions, will find themselves invading the purview 
of the jury.  A cornerstone of the common law is deference to 
the jury, which is diluted by determining whether the alleged 
error possibly, and only possibly, may have affected the jury's 
decision.  
                     
10 According to my research, on few occasions since Dyess 
has this court, in a majority opinion, noted that reasonable 
possibility 
means 
reasonable 
probability. 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 372 n.40, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999); see 
also State v. Huntington, 216 Wis. 2d 671, 695-96, 575 N.W.2d 
268 (1998).  However, several court of appeals opinions have 
applied the Dyess harmless error test using the correct 
"reasonable probability" standard.  See, e.g., State v. A.H., 
211 Wis. 2d 561, 569, 566 N.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Joseph P., 200 Wis. 2d 227, 237, 546 N.W.2d 494 (Ct. App. 1996). 
11 Wold's "reasonable probability" test for harmless error 
was replaced by Dyess' "reasonable possibility" test.  
No.99-3018.npc 
 
4 
¶64 I do not take issue with the term "reasonable 
possibility," so long as it is made clear that this term means 
reasonable probability, and probability is the standard to be 
applied.  Accordingly, I offer the following test for harmless 
error, which makes clear that Dyess' use of the term "reasonable 
possibility" is intended to require "reasonable probability": 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 805.18(2) provides that an error 
requires reversal only where it has "affected the 
substantial rights of the party" claiming error.  We 
have long recognized that the focus of a court's 
analysis under this statute is whether, in light of 
the 
applicable 
burden 
of 
proof, 
the 
error 
is 
significant enough to "undermine confidence in the 
outcome" of the trial.  Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 544-45. 
 An 
error 
is 
significant 
enough 
to 
undermine 
confidence in the outcome if there is a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome without the error. 
 Dyess 
made 
it 
clear 
that 
"probability" 
is 
substantially 
the 
same 
as 
"possibility" 
under 
Wisconsin law.  Id. at 544. 
¶65 The majority's opinion presents an apt example of how 
using a "reasonable possibility" test, as opposed to "reasonable 
probability" test, is problematic.  The majority concludes that 
there is "potential" for jury confusion in using Wis JICivil 
200, and, on that basis, "urge[s]" the Wisconsin Civil Jury 
Instructions Committee to review the instruction.  Majority op. 
at ¶¶5, 55.  If there is a "potential" that the jury would be 
confused, then it is "possible" that the jury was confused.  See 
Grant, 139 Wis. 2d at 78 (Day, J., concurring) (one definition 
of possible is "having an indicated potential").  In turn, if 
there is a possibility that the jury was confused or mislead, 
No.99-3018.npc 
 
5 
then there was prejudicial error.  Yet, this is not what the 
majority concluded. 
¶66 Moreover, 
this 
analysis 
runs 
counter 
to 
other 
decisions from this court, as noted by the majority (at ¶52 
n.6), which hold that "instructions are to be judged as a whole 
and prejudicial error will not be found unless the instructions 
'would probably, not possibly, mislead the jury.'"  Victorson v. 
Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 70 Wis. 2d 336, 357, 
234N.W.2d 332 (1975) (quoting Savina v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 36 
Wis. 2d 694, 154 N.W.2d 237 (1967)) (emphasis added); see also 
Brown v. Dibbell, 227 Wis. 2d 28, 595 N.W.2d 358 (1999) ("where 
an instruction is erroneous and tends to mislead or probably 
misleads the jury, such misstatement of the law constitutes 
prejudicial 
error"). 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
characterizes 
Victorson's standard as one of a "variety of ways" this court 
has "stated the standard for harmless error in jury instruction 
cases."  Majority op. at ¶52 n.6.  Yet, Victorson and Savina 
plainly foreclose the consideration of whether the error 
"possibly" misled the jury.  Indeed, the effect of the 
majority's adoption of a "reasonable possibility" harmless error 
standard, without acknowledging that "reasonable possibility" 
means 
"reasonable 
probability," 
is 
to 
overrule 
Savina, 
Victorson, and Brown v. Dibbell sub silentio.   
¶67 That Wisconsin courts have often used "reasonable 
possibility" rather than "reasonable probability" should not 
dissuade the court from correcting such missteps today.  See, 
e.g., State v. Sullivan 216 Wis. 2d 768, 792, 576 N.W.2d 30 
No.99-3018.npc 
 
6 
(1998); State v. Alexander, 214 Wis. 2d 628, 653, 571 N.W.2d 662 
(1997).  There is no time like the present——dum fervet opus12——
when the court has before it five cases wherein it discusses the 
harmless error standard, to clarify Dyess.   
¶68 For the reasons stated herein, I respectfully concur. 
¶69 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this opinion. 
 
 
                     
12 "While the action is fresh; in the heat of action."  
Black's Law Dictionary 518 (7th ed. 1999).  
No.99-3018.npc 
 
1