Case Title: Penney v. Penney et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2021-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: August 27, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2021
____________________
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____________________
Sandra Penney
v.
Michael Shay Penney and Emily Penney
Appeal from Marshall Circuit Court
(CV-19-900053)
STEWART, Justice.
Sandra Penney appeals from a judgment of the Marshall Circuit
Court ("the trial court"), entered after bench trial, concluding, among
other things, that Sandra, Michael Shay Penney ("Shay"), and Emily
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Penney had been partners in an implied partnership to operate a poultry-
farming business in Marshall County.   For the reasons explained below,
we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
Shay and Emily ("the plaintiffs") sued Sandra in the trial court
asserting a claim of unjust enrichment and requesting injunctive relief. 
The plaintiffs sought title to certain farm property or, in the alternative,
compensation from Sandra.  Sandra is Shay's mother and Emily's mother-
in-law. Thomas Penney, who died in 2017, was Sandra's husband and
Shay's father. 
In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged the following facts. In 2002,
Thomas, Sandra, Shay, and Emily (hereinafter referred to collectively as
"the Penneys"), borrowed money from Alabama Farm Credit ("AFC") to
purchase multiple parcels of farmland. The security agreement associated
with that loan, and the mortgage on the purchased properties, were signed
by the Penneys. In 2003, Thomas and Sandra purchased, in part with
funds borrowed from AFC, a farm that would become known as the
"Windmill Road farm." That property was deeded to Thomas and Sandra
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as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. However, soon after, that
property was used as collateral to secure another loan to help finance the
Penneys' poultry-farming operations. The promissory note and mortgage
associated with the loan were signed by the Penneys. The Windmill Road
farm is adjacent to a farm owned by the plaintiffs ("the plaintiffs' farm").
From the time they were purchased, both farms have been used to conduct
poultry-farming operations. 
In 2006, the Penneys signed an additional loan agreement. The
funds from that loan were to be used to upgrade equipment on the farms.
Over the next decade, the Penneys obtained a series of additional loans for
similar purposes. Those loans were often secured by both the Windmill
Road farm and the plaintiffs' farm. In 2017, the plaintiffs' residence was
destroyed in a fire. Due to the priority of the Penneys' debt obligations to
the AFC, the insurance proceeds paid out as a result of the fire, instead
of being used to rebuild the residence, were largely applied toward
Thomas and Sandra's debt on the Windmill Road farm. The plaintiffs later
obtained a separate loan to rebuild their residence. 
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According to the complaint, the Windmill Road farm, on which
Thomas and Sandra resided, and the plaintiffs' farm, on which the
plaintiffs resided, were operated as one poultry farm. The approximate
value of the poultry-farming business was $820,000, and the remaining
balance on various loans associated with the poultry-farming business was
approximately $470,000.  The plaintiffs had worked and maintained the
poultry farm for the previous 15 years. The plaintiffs had made payments
on the various loans and the property taxes on the farmland for over five
years using the income from the poultry-farming business. Sandra
contributed no labor to the poultry-farming business. 
The complaint further alleged that Thomas had intended for the
Windmill Road farm to pass to the plaintiffs upon his death. The
complaint states that the Windmill Road farm was devised to the
plaintiffs in Thomas's will. Thomas, however, did not seek legal counsel
in drafting his will, and he was unaware that his desire to devise the
Windmill Road farm could not be accomplished because the deed to that
property listed  Sandra as a co-owner with the right of survivorship. 
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In the complaint, the plaintiffs requested an injunction to prevent
Sandra from selling the Windmill Road farm. Additionally, the plaintiffs
sought ownership of the Windmill Road farm. In the alternative, the
complaint asked for damages in the amount required to compensate the
plaintiffs for the money and labor they had invested in the Windmill Road
farm. The plaintiffs also sought a restraining order to prevent Sandra
from going onto the plaintiffs' farm. Sandra denied the averments in the
complaint and made no counterclaims. On March 29, 2019, the trial court
entered a temporary injunction that prevented Sandra from selling the
Windmill Road farm until a final judgment was entered. 
The trial court held a bench trial on January 30, 2020, at which it
received testimony from a number of witnesses. Kristi Beavers testified
that she had witnessed Thomas sign a document, which purported to be
his will, expressing his intent to devise the Windmill Road farm to the
plaintiffs upon his death. The document was admitted into evidence
despite Sandra's objection. The trial court specified that it was making no
findings regarding the validity of the purported will and that it would
leave that matter to be decided in the probate court.
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Greg Copeland, an executive of AFC, testified that he had had
dealings with the Penneys since the 1990s and that Thomas and Sandra
had purchased the Windmill Road farm. He noted that the Windmill Road
farm was adjacent to the plaintiffs' farm. Copeland testified that Thomas
and Sandra had made a down payment of $37,315 on the Windmill Road
farm. Later, he said, Thomas, Sandra, and the plaintiffs entered into loans
with AFC pursuant to which the Windmill Road farm and the plaintiffs'
farm were used to secure the loans. Copeland testified that, "from a
security standpoint," the Penneys "were tied together," although the deed
to the Windmill Road farm was in the name of Thomas and Sandra only.
Copeland also testified that money from the plaintiffs' insurance proceeds
stemming from the house fire had been applied to AFC loans for the
Windmill Road farm and that the plaintiffs had had to secure separate
funding to rebuild their residence.  Copeland further testified that the
plaintiffs primarily ran the poultry-farming operations and that he
primarily interacted with Emily.  Copeland also explained that "farm-
type" loans differed from traditional loans, noting that repayment of a
"farm-type" loan is matched with the income stream of the farm operation
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and that payments are made directly from the "poultry assignment" -- i.e.,
when chicken purchasers make payment for chickens from the farm at
regular intervals, a preset amount is paid directly to AFC. A record of the
assignment account for the poultry-farming operations conducted on the
Penneys' farms was admitted into evidence. 
Lindsey Goodwin, an employee of AFC from 2012 to 2018, testified
that, during her time of employment with AFC, Thomas and Sandra were
in poor health and that the plaintiffs oversaw the poultry-farming
operations conducted on the Windmill Road farm and the plaintiffs' farm. 
Sandra testified that Thomas quit his job as a truck driver shortly
after they had purchased the Windmill Road farm so he could focus on the
farm.  Sandra stated that, after her health and Thomas's health declined
around 2013, they relied on several individuals, including Shay, Emily,
and hired help, to perform labor on their farm. Sandra explained that,
when she and Thomas purchased the Windmill Road farm, she paid
$40,000 as a down payment after placing $10,000 to hold it. She testified
that the mortgage on the Windmill Road farm was paid entirely through
the "chicken house check" and that she and Thomas had paid their
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household bills themselves. Sandra testified that she had moved from the
Windmill Road farm a few months after Thomas died and that she
planned to sell the farm. She stated that she believed Shay wanted to sell
the Windmill Road farm, based upon conversations she had had with him. 
During cross-examination, Sandra confirmed that the deed to the
Windmill Road farm listed her and Thomas as co-owners with the right of
survivorship. The deed was admitted into evidence. Sandra testified that
there were two chicken houses on the Windmill Road farm and two
chicken houses on the plaintiffs' farm. She stated that Thomas had
entered into his own contracts to sell chickens raised on their farm.
Sandra further testified that the plaintiffs did not start operating the
chicken houses on their farm until after Thomas was diagnosed with
leukemia in 2014. At that point, according to Sandra, the plaintiffs began
retaining all income from the poultry-farming operations. 
Kenneth Gunnin, a family friend of the Penneys for about 30 years,
testified that he had known Thomas when he was a truck driver and that
Thomas had quit working as a truck driver  shortly after the purchase of
the Windmill Road farm because of his failing health. He testified that
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Thomas had been limited in what he could do physically and that the
majority of the labor involved in the poultry-farming operations was
performed by the plaintiffs and their children. That labor, according to
Gunnin, was performed by the plaintiffs, "[f]rom day one, because it was
their chicken houses." 
Regarding the poultry-farming operations, Shay testified that he
held "[a]ll responsibilities except for the paperwork," which, he said, was
Emily's responsibility. Shay testified that, when he signed the mortgage
relating to the Windmill Road farm, he believed that he and Emily would
be put on the deed to that farm. He further testified that he would not
have signed the mortgage if he thought otherwise. Shay stated that the
Penneys had agreed that he and Emily would oversee the poultry-farming
operations on the Windmill Road farm and on the plaintiffs' farm. He
testified that, "from day one," he was told by Thomas that the Windmill
Road farm would belong to him and Emily after Thomas died. When asked
what was currently being held as collateral to secure the loans the
Penneys had made with AFC, he replied: "Everything we own." Shay
stated that he and Emily had paid household bills for Sandra until she
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had moved off the Windmill Road farm. Shay further testified that
Sandra's only contribution to the poultry-farming operations was signing
the various loan documents. 
Lugenia Penney, Sandra's daughter, testified that Sandra and
Thomas had paid their household bills and that Thomas had performed
the daily operations on the Windmill Road farm until he became ill in
2013. After 2013, she said, Shay and his son performed those operations. 
Emily testified that she and Shay had primarily overseen the
poultry-farming operations on the Windmill Road farm since that farm
was purchased in 2003. Thomas, she said, assisted when his health
permitted. Emily stated that the Penneys had planned to run the adjacent
farms as essentially one poultry-farming business. She further testified
that she had believed she and Shay would be listed as co-owners on the
deed to the Windmill Road farm when they signed the mortgage relating
to that farm and that she did not realize they were not listed on the deed
until around 2017. 
Emily testified that she and Shay had paid the utility bills for
Sandra's residence located on the Windmill Road farm starting around
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2013. Payment stubs from 2015, showing payments made by Emily for
utilities for the Windmill Road farm, were entered into evidence over
Sandra's objection. Sandra objected on the ground that some of those
payments included utilities expenses for the poultry-farming operations
conducted on the Windmill Road farm and that, since 2014, the plaintiffs
had been retaining all the proceeds from those operations. Emily admitted
in her testimony that, until 2013, contracts to sell chickens from the
Windmill Road farm had been in Thomas's name. She explained that that
had been done for income-reporting purposes. In 2013, she said, Thomas
sought to claim disability benefits, so all the contracts were then put in
Emily's name and the plaintiffs "absorb[ed] the income tax." Emily also
testified that, when the plaintiffs' house was destroyed by fire in 2017, the
plaintiffs' insurer paid them $320,000. Emily explained, however, that
$271,000 of the insurance proceeds were applied to debt associated with
the Windmill Road farm. 
Emily testified regarding additional loans the Penneys obtained
from AFC, which were secured by mortgages on the Windmill Road farm,
the plaintiffs' farm, and a third farm that the plaintiffs had owned ("the
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Hebron Road farm"), which they sold in 2015. She stated that she and
Shay remain obligated on those loans. According to Emily, the money
received through those loans was used on upgrades to and maintenance
of the three farms. She testified that the farms operated as one large farm
and stated that chickens arrived at each farm at the same time and were
sold from each farm at the same time. During cross-examination, Emily
testified that she and Shay had been the direct recipients of proceeds
derived from poultry-farming operations conducted on the Windmill Road
farm and that they were also making all the payments related to the
Windmill Road farm and the plaintiffs' farm. She also testified that
Thomas had been unaware that she and Shay were not named on the deed
to the Windmill Road farm.
The trial court entered a judgment stating that the loan entered into
by the parties in 2002 was the first of a series of loans through AFC in a
joint venture among the plaintiffs, Sandra, and Thomas. The trial court
determined that the joint venture consisted of the poultry-farming
operations conducted on the three farms, until the Hebron Road farm was
sold in 2015. The trial court further determined that the Penneys had
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ultimately formed a general partnership in which the members shared in
the profits and losses. Sandra's contribution to the partnership was found
to be the $37,315.14 down payment the trial court determined she had
made on the Windmill Road farm. The trial court stated that a general
partnership was implied through the Penneys' actions and that Sandra
had communicated her intent to leave the partnership by moving off the
Windmill Road farm and expressing an intent to sell it. The trial court
gave the plaintiffs six months to buy Sandra's interest in the partnership,
which it concluded amounted to $37,315.14, at which point Sandra would
be required to deed the Windmill Road farm to the plaintiffs. In the
alternative, the trial court stated that the plaintiffs could dissolve the
partnership, sell the partnership assets, pay all the partnership debts, and
distribute any remaining proceeds to the partners according to their
contributions. 
Standard of Review
This case was heard by the trial court without a jury, and the ore
tenus standard of review applies. "Under [the] ore tenus standard of
review, the trial court's findings carry a presumption of correctness which
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will not be disturbed on appeal unless palpably wrong, without supporting
evidence, or manifestly unjust." International Paper Co. v. Whilden, 469
So.2d 560, 564 (Ala. 1985). 
Discussion
On appeal, Sandra argues that the trial court erred in holding that
the plaintiffs had proved that an implied general partnership existed.1
1As noted earlier, the trial court, before concluding that the Penneys
had formed an implied general partnership, found that the Penneys had
initially entered into a joint venture. Specifically, the trial court
determined that the 2002 loan was the first of a series of loans in a joint
venture among the Penneys.  On appeal,  Sandra argues that no joint
venture was proven to exist. Sandra points to the fact that, between 2003,
when the Windmill Road farm was purchased, and 2013, when Thomas
began receiving disability benefits, the parties held separate contracts for
the sale of chickens. Sandra further asserts that there was no sharing of
"joint profits" between the plaintiffs and Thomas or Sandra. Based upon
our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court's factual finding
that the Penneys entered into a joint venture in 2002 is supported by the
evidence. See Charles J. Arndt, Inc. v. City of Birmingham, 547 So. 397,
399-400 (Ala. 1989)(holding that "[w]hat constitutes a joint venture is a
question of law, but whether a joint venture exists has been held to be a
question of fact," and setting forth the elements necessary for the creation
of a joint venture). The trial court, however, made a subsequent
determination that the Penneys'  relationship evolved from a joint venture
into an implied partnership.  The trial court's conclusion that the Penneys
eventually formed a general partnership renders moot, for purposes of this
appeal,  the trial court's determination that a joint venture existed at the
outset. Thus, we see no basis to reverse the trial court's determination
that, at one time, a joint venture existed.
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Sandra also asserts that the trial court erred when it treated the Windmill
Road farm as partnership property and when it calculated her
contribution to the partnership. Finally, Sandra argues that the judgment
was inequitable and contrary to the Alabama Partnership Law, §10A-8A-
1.01, et seq., Ala. Code 1975.2 
I. Implied General Partnership
Sandra argues that the plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of an
implied general partnership. Sandra asserts that there was no implied or
express agreement among the Penneys to establish a partnership. She
further asserts that there was no sharing of the profits from the poultry-
farming operations within the meaning of § 10A-8A-2.01, Ala. Code 1975.
In its judgment, the trial court made findings that, beginning in 2002, the
Penneys had signed various loan documents, including the mortgage on
the Windmill Road farm, had entered into contracts to grow chickens for
2Effective January 1, 2019, approximately one month before the
plaintiffs filed their complaint, the legislature repealed the Alabama
Uniform Partnership Law, former § 10A-8-1.01, Ala. Code 1975, and
replaced it with the Alabama Partnership Law. We cite and quote from
the applicable provisions of the Alabama Partnership Law in this opinion,
but the corresponding provisions of the former Alabama Uniform
Partnership Law were substantially the same. 
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Koch Farms, LLC, and had operated a poultry-farming business with the
intent to share in the profits and losses of the business. The trial court
concluded that the Penneys' intent to form a general partnership was
implied by those actions.  
Formation of a partnership is governed by the provisions of § 10A-
8A-2.01. A partnership is formed by the association of two or more persons
"to carry on as co-owners of a business for profit ... whether or not the
persons intend to form a partnership." § 10A-8A-2.01(a)(1). Much of the
current law in Alabama governing business partnerships is originally
derived from  the Alabama Partnership Act of 1971. Act No. 1513, Ala.
Acts 1971. Section 10A-8A-2.01(a)(1) closely tracks the language of § 6(1)
of Act No. 1513, except that the phrase "whether  or not the persons
intend to form a partnership" is absent from § 6(1) of Act No. 1513.
This Court has stated that "[t]here is no arbitrary test as to whether
a partnership exists." McCrary v. Butler, 540 So. 2d 736, 739 (Ala. 1989)
(citing Adderhold v. Adderhold, 426 So. 2d 457 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983)).
Instead, this Court looks to all the attendant circumstances in
determining the existence of a partnership. Id.  "A partnership arises only
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from an express or implied agreement among the parties and is never
established by implication or by operation of law."  Id. Indicia of the
existence of a partnership can include intent and agreement to be
partners, sharing of profits and losses, sharing management and
community of interest, as well as other surrounding circumstances. See
Adderhold, 426 So. 2d at 460.
Section 10A-8A-2.01(c)(3) states that "[a] person who receives a
share of the profits of a business is presumed to be a partner in the
business" but this presumption does not apply when profits are received
in payment of, among other things, a debt, rent, or interest or other
charge on a loan.
In Adderhold, supra, a case concerning the existence of an implied
partnership, the Court of Civil Appeals explained:
"Where there is no written agreement between the parties,
and the question is whether as between the two a partnership
existed, the question is one of part law and part fact. Bailey v.
Bailey, 345 So. 2d 304 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977). Where there is a
conflict of evidence, the ore tenus rule applies in partnership
cases as in all others. Bailey v. Bailey, supra. On appeal, the
circuit court's judgment can only be disturbed if it is so
unsupported by the evidence as to be clearly unjust and
palpably wrong. Coffelt v. Coffelt, 390 So. 2d 652 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1980)."
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426 So. 2d at 458. Ore tenus evidence regarding the existence of a
partnership was presented at trial. This Court therefore presumes that
the trial court's judgment is correct and will reverse the judgment "only
if, after consideration of the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom, the judgment is found to be plainly and palpably
wrong." Robinson v. Hamilton, 496 So. 2d 8, 10 (Ala. 1986). Furthermore,
the trial court is in a better position than this Court to make credibility
determinations and to consider all the evidence. See Ex parte Patronas,
693 So.2d 473, 475 (Ala. 1997). It is not for this Court to reweigh the
evidence. Id.
At trial, evidence was presented demonstrating that the Penneys
had agreed to conduct a poultry-farming business for profit. Both plaintiffs
testified that, around the time the Windmill Road farm was purchased,
the Penneys orally agreed to operate a poultry-farming business together. 
Both plaintiffs also testified that they signed the mortgage on the
Windmill Road farm believing that their names would be on the deed to
that property and that they would not have done so if they had believed
otherwise. Shay testified that he had had an agreement with Thomas to
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"take care of everything" relating to the poultry-farming operations on the
Windmill Road farm. In return, Shay explained, that farm would become
his and Emily's upon Thomas's death so that they could continue
operating the poultry-farming business. Shay also testified that the
Windmill Road farm and the plaintiffs' farm were run as one large farm.
Emily testified that it was her understanding that there was an
agreement with Thomas and Sandra that they would all conduct the
poultry-farming operations together, with her and Shay as the primary
managers of the operation. She also claimed that she and Shay were not
aware that they were not named on the deed to the Windmill Road farm
until around 2017.  Emily testified that the Penneys' plan was to combine
the two adjacent farms. She explained in her testimony that, before 2013,
separate poultry-sale contracts existed for each farm for tax purposes. The
trial court apparently found the plaintiffs' testimony to be credible,
although it conflicted with the Sandra's testimony. As noted earlier,
because the trial court was in a better position to evaluate the witnesses'
credibility, this Court will not disturb its determination. See Ex parte
Patronas, 693 So. 2d at 475.
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The circumstances surrounding the Penneys' relationship also 
support the trial court's finding of the existence of an implied general
partnership. The testimony of Greg Copeland, Kenneth Gunnin, and the
plaintiffs indicated that, after acquiring the farms, the poultry-farming
operations on the farms, including performing labor and administrative
duties and negotiating contracts, were primarily overseen by the
plaintiffs. Copeland testified that he dealt primarily with Emily regarding
the AFC loans associated with the Windmill Road farm. Gunnin, a family
friend, testified that the plaintiffs had worked on the Windmill Road farm
"[f]rom day one." In further testimony, Gunnin indicated that he had
understood that the chicken houses on the Windmill Road farm belonged
to the Penneys jointly. This Court has previously indicated that testimony
indicating that parties are perceived to be in a partnership can constitute
evidence of  "surrounding circumstances" indicating the existence of an
implied partnership. See Adderhold, 426 So. 2d at 460. 
 The evidence in the record also supports the finding that the
Penneys shared in losses resulting from the poultry-farming operations.
Testimony and other evidence revealed that the documents evidencing
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and securing the 2002 loan were signed by all four individuals. Documents
evidencing and securing additional loans, including the mortgage on the
Windmill Road farm used to secure funding for upgrades and maintenance
of the farms, were also signed by all four. Because each individual signed
the pertinent loan documents, they were each liable for the debts.
Moreover, the loans were secured not just by the Windmill Road farm but
also by property deeded to Shay and Emily. As Copeland testified, "from
a security standpoint," the Penneys were "tied together."  In fact,
insurance proceeds from the plaintiffs' burned-down house were applied
to debts secured by the Windmill Road farm, according to lien priority.
Failure to continue making payments on the loans could have resulted in
foreclosures on both the Windmill Road farm and the plaintiffs' farm.
Copeland testified that the money owed to AFC was paid directly from the
proceeds derived from the poultry-farming operations. Consequently, the
evidence indicated that losses from the poultry-farming operations would
have been shared by all.
Additionally, evidence in the record supports the finding that Sandra
shared in the profits derived from the poultry-farming operations. Her
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residence on the Windmill Road farm was paid for through the proceeds
derived from the poultry-farming operations. And, although Sandra
disputed such evidence, testimony and pay stubs revealed that the
plaintiffs had paid many of the ordinary bills associated with Sandra's
residence, at least from 2013 on. The sharing of profits, alone, creates a
presumption that the Penneys were part of a partnership. § 10A-8A-2.01. 
Sandra argues that any payment she received from the poultry-
farming operations did not make her a partner because such payments fell
under one of the exceptions listed in § 10A-8A-2.01(c)(3)(i)-(vi).
Specifically, she asserts that, because proceeds from the poultry-farming
operations were used to pay the mortgage on the Windmill Road farm, any
payment of such proceeds should be considered the payment of a "debt."
Sandra appears to misinterpret § 10A-8A-2.01(c)(3)(i). The "debt"
exception refers to use of profits to make debt payments in a lender-
borrower relationship when the lender and the borrower are alleged to be
in a partnership together. Sandra, however, is not in a lender-borrower
relationship with the plaintiffs. Instead, Sandra and the plaintiffs are co-
borrowers, each obligated to pay the lender, AFC, for shared business
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loans. AFC is not alleged to be a partner in the poultry-farming business.
Proceeds from the poultry-farming operations were received by Sandra,
which were then used to pay off loans from AFC. As between Sandra and
the plaintiffs, the debt exception is irrelevant. 
Sandra also argues that any proceeds from the poultry-farming
operations used to pay off the mortgage on the Windmill Road farm should
be excluded under the "rent" exception. See § 10A-8A-2.01(c)(3)(iii).  She
appears to contend that the payments she received from the poultry-
farming operations could be characterized as rent due to her from the
plaintiffs for their use of the Windmill Road farm. This argument is also
unpersuasive.  The trial court, aided by sufficient testimony and evidence
in the record, found that the plaintiffs' use of the Windmill Road farm was
for the purpose of operating the poultry-farming business. The evidence
supports the conclusion that such use of the Windmill Road farm was
necessary to the success of the poultry-farming business, from which
Sandra and plaintiffs both benefited by being able to maintain their loan
payments. Sandra points to nothing in the record to indicate that a rental
agreement between herself and the plaintiffs existed and that she was
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acting as a landlord by allowing the plaintiffs to use the Windmill Road
farm for the poultry-farming operations.
Finally, Sandra asserts that any proceeds she received from the
poultry-farming operations should not give rise to the presumption of a
partnership because they were payments intended to "increase the value
derived from loan collateral."  See § 10A-8A-2.01(c)(3)(v). Sandra does not
expand upon this assertion in her appellate brief, and the relevance of this
provision to the facts of this case is unclear. Therefore, we will not address
this argument further.  See Rule 28, Ala. R. App. P.
There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's
finding that an implied general partnership existed. Specifically, the
record contains evidence of an agreement to operate in a partnership, the
sharing of profits and losses, and other surrounding circumstances
indicative of a partnership. Although some of that evidence was disputed
by Sandra, the trial court was in a better position than this Court to
determine the credibility of the witnesses. We hold that the trial court's
judgment, insofar as it determined that a partnership did in fact exist,
was not "plainly and palpably wrong." Robinson, 496 So. 2d at 10. 
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II. Partnership Property
Sandra next argues that, even if there was an implied general
partnership,  the trial court erred in treating the Windmill Road farm as
partnership property. Sandra notes that she and Thomas were the sole
contributors to the down payment, are the only individuals named on the
deed, and that she holds the right of survivorship. She further asserts that
mere use by a partnership of property does not make it partnership
property. 
The trial court found that the Windmill Road farm was partnership
property that was originally shared by the Penneys. The plaintiffs argue
that this finding is correct because the purchase of the Windmill Road
farm was financed using the credit of all four, subsequent loans to the four
were used to repair and upgrade the farm, and the plaintiffs had regularly
worked the farm. In addition, the plaintiffs point out that, after their
residence burned down, the resulting insurance proceeds were used to pay
the balance owed on the Windmill Road farm rather than to rebuild their
residence. 
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Section 10A-8A-2.04 states that "[p]roperty acquired by a partnership
is property of the partnership and not of the partners individually." Section
10A-8A-2.05 elaborates on when property is to be considered partnership
property rather than property owned by an individual partner. Of
relevance here, § 10A-8A-2.05(c) provides: 
"Property is presumed to be partnership property if purchased
with partnership assets, even if not acquired in the name of the
partnership or of one or more partners with an indication in the
instrument transferring title to the property of the person's
capacity as a partner or of the existence of a partnership." 
This Court has noted that, "generally, in order to make land partnership
property its acquisition must have been with partnership funds or on
partnership credit for the uses of the partnership." Cooper v. Cooper, 289
Ala. 263, 270-71, 266 So. 2d 871, 878-79 (1972). Although the purchase of
property with partnership assets creates the presumption that the
property belongs to the partnership, the mere use of partnership assets to
purchase the property, alone, does not make the property partnership
property. See, e.g., Reed v. Crow, 496 So. 2d 15, 17-18 (Ala. 1986).
Resolving whether property belongs to an individual or a partnership that
the individual is a member of depends upon the intention of the parties at
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the time the property was purchased. Id. The intention of the parties is a
question of fact and is determined by the circumstances attending the
transaction. See Strother v. Strother, 436 So. 2d 847, 849-850 (Ala. 1983).
Evidence of the parties' intention can come in the form of testimony. See
Cooper, 289 Ala. at 271, 266 So. 2d at 879. 
 
Additionally, the fact that title to property is in the name of an
individual, and not the partnership, does not preclude the property from
being treated as partnership property. See Norman v. Bozeman, 605 So. 2d
1210, 1213 (Ala. 1992). If, in viewing the surrounding circumstances of the
transaction, it appears to be the intention of the parties that the property
was purchased for and treated as partnership property, then  " 'that
presumption of ownership arising from the face of the deed will be
overcome, and the property will be treated as belonging to the
partnership.' " Strother, 436 So. 2d at 849 (quoting Goldthwaite v. Janney,
102 Ala. 431, 438, 15 So. 560, 562 (1894)).
In briefing this issue, Sandra relies principally upon this Court's
decision in Strother, supra, to assert that the plaintiffs have no interest in
the Windmill Road farm as members of a partnership. In Strother, a
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mother asserted that she was entitled to a portion of certain lands.  The
deeds to the lands all named the mother's three sons, either as individuals
or as members of a partnership, as grantees. None of the deeds named the
mother as a grantee. In affirming the trial court's judgment denying the
mother's request to establish a constructive trust in her favor as to a
portion of the lands, this Court held that the mother was not entitled to
any interest in the lands. Id. at 850. The Court explained that "no detailed
factual presentation was made to support the contention that [the mother]
was an equal partner with her sons and that the land was partnership
property bought with partnership funds or on partnership credit." Id. at
849-50.
In contrast to Strother, the plaintiffs in this case offered extensive
evidence to support their contention that they had contributed to the
acquisition of the Windmill Road farm. The plaintiffs do not deny that 
Sandra and Thomas alone made the down payment on the Windmill Road
farm. It is undisputed, however, that all four individuals signed the loan
documents, including the mortgage on the Windmill Road farm, making
each one liable for the debt secured by that farm. The testimony of several
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witnesses regarding the mortgage was corroborated by the terms of the
mortgage. Thus, the evidence supported the finding that the credit of all
four was used to obtain the Windmill Road farm. 
In addition, testimony by multiple witnesses, including  disinterested
witnesses, indicated that the plaintiffs routinely had worked on the
Windmill Road farm in connection with the poultry-farming operations.
Use of partnership credit to obtain property that is then used for
partnership purposes creates the presumption that the property belongs
to the partnership --  not the individual partners. § 10A-8A-2.05(c); see also
Cooper, 289 Ala. at 270-71, 266 So. 2d at 878-79. 
That presumption can be overcome when the surrounding
circumstances show that it was not the intention of the parties to make the
property that of the partnership. See Reed, 496 So. 2d at 17-18.  The trial
court heard testimony regarding the intentions of the Penneys when the
Windmill Road farm was purchased. Specifically, the plaintiffs each
testified that he or she believed that, after signing the mortgage, their
names were to be placed on the deed to the Windmill Road farm. 
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There was ample evidence on which the trial court could have relied
to determine that the Penneys had intended that the Windmill Road farm
be partnership property. Under the ore tenus standard of review, this
Court will not disturb the trial court's findings unless they are palpably
wrong, without supporting evidence, or manifestly unjust. Applying that
standard, this Court holds that there is no basis for reversing the trial
court's conclusion that the Windmill Road farm was partnership property. 
In the alternative, Sandra asserts that, if the Windmill Road farm is
in fact partnership property, she retains widow's rights to claim a one-
third elective share of Thomas's estate, which, she asserts, includes his
interest in the Windmill Road farm. She asserts this right under § 43-8-
70(a), Ala. Code 1975, which gives a surviving spouse the right  of election
to take the lesser of either "[a]ll of the estate of the deceased reduced by
the value of the surviving spouse's separate estate" or "[o]ne-third of the
estate of the deceased."
Section 10A-8A-2.04, Ala. Code 1975, states that "[p]roperty acquired
by a partnership is property of the partnership and not of the partners
individually." Therefore, Sandra's elective-share rights apply only to
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property owned exclusively by Thomas, not to the Windmill Road farm
which belongs to the partnership. See Peden v. Peden, 972 So. 2d 102 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2007)(concluding that a former husband had no individual
interest in property owned by his partnership). This conclusion is further
supported by the Alabama Comment to § 10A-8A-2.04, which explicitly
provides that "[t]he ... rights of a partner's spouse ... inure to the property
of the partners, and not to partnership property, as no ... partner's spouse
... [has] any right to the property of the partnership itself." Thus, Sandra's
claim to  an elective share of Thomas's estate does not include a right to
share in the ownership of the Windmill Road farm. 
III. Partner Contribution
Sandra argues that the trial court's calculation of her contribution to
the partnership is plainly and palpably wrong. The trial court declared
that Sandra's interest in the partnership was $37,315.14, an amount
equivalent to the down payment on the Windmill Road farm. Sandra puts
forth a number of arguments as to why her contribution to the partnership
was in fact greater than $37,315.14., including that her credit was used to
help secure loans that benefited the partnership, that she remains liable
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on those loans, that the property has appreciated since she made the down
payment, and that Thomas performed poultry-farming work until 2013.
To comply with Rule 28, Ala. R. App. P., an appellant is required to
cite supporting authority.  Reciting a mere general proposition of law is not
sufficient to comply with Rule 28. See  Unger v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P.
279 So. 3d 546, 552 (Ala. 2018); see also S.B. v. Saint James Sch., 959 So.
2d 72, 89 (Ala. 2006)("It is well established that general propositions of law
are not considered 'supporting authority' for purposes of Rule 28.").
"Further, it is well settled that ' "[w]here an appellant fails to cite any
authority for an argument, this Court may affirm the judgment as to those
issues ...." ' " Id. (quoting Spradlin v. Birmingham Airport Auth., 613 So.
2d 347, 348 (Ala. 1993), quoting in turn Sea Calm Shipping Co., S.A. v.
Cooks, 565 So. 2d 212, 216 (Ala. 1990).
 In support of this contention, Sandra cites only to this Court's
decision in Deloney v. Chappell, 570 So. 2d 622 (Ala. 1990). Relying on
Deloney, Sandra asserts the general proposition that "[a]n order
purporting to dissolve a partnership must be fair." She fails to cite
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authority applicable to her specific arguments.  This argument is therefore
waived. 
IV. Conformity With the Alabama Partnership Law
Sandra last argues that the trial court's judgment was inequitable
and contrary to the Alabama Partnership Law. See note 2, supra. She
asserts, again, that her calculated partnership interest of $37,315.14 is
inadequate considering the overall value of the Windmill Road farm.
Sandra also notes that the trial court's judgment does not require the
plaintiffs to hold Sandra harmless from payment of debts secured by the
Windmill Road farm after the deed to that property is transferred to them.
Sandra contends that her partnership share must be determined and paid
pursuant to § 10A-8A-7.01, which she says entitles her to the fair value of
her interest in the partnership at the date of her dissociation. In addition
to additional payment, she asserts that she is entitled to a statement of
partnership assets and liabilities, the latest available partnership balance
sheet and income statement, an explanation of how the amount of any
payment to her is calculated, and written notice that any payment to her
is in full satisfaction of her partnership interest. 
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Aside from her reference to § 10A-8A-7.01, Sandra again fails to cite
supporting authority for her contentions. It is not clear  why she believes
the cited statute applies here, and her briefing of this issue does not
comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P. (requiring an appellant to
support an argument on appeal with appropriate citations to legal
authority). 
Regarding her assertion involving § 10A-8A-7.01, Sandra appears to
be claiming the benefit of § 10A-8A-7.01(g). That subsection however,
refers only to payments made in accordance with § 10A-8A-7.01(e) and §
10A-8A-7.01(f). Neither of those subsections apply in this case. Section
10A-8A-7.01(e) applies when a dissociated partner makes a written
demand for payment. No such demand can be found in the record. § 10A-
8A-7.01(f) is applicable only when a partner is wrongfully dissociated and
a deferred payment is authorized.  The trial court's judgment, however,
states that Sandra left the partnership voluntarily when she moved from
the Windmill Road farm with the intention of selling it. Moreover, she
makes no claims that she was wrongfully dissociated. 
Conclusion
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Based on the foregoing, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., concurs.  
Bolin, Wise, and Sellers, JJ., concur in the result.
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