Case Title: Collins v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015-SC-000675-DG

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
RENDERED: APRIL 27, 2017
‘10 BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2015-SC-000675-DG

SYCILLA COLLINS, INDIVIDUALLY AND APPELLANTS
AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF
LEONARD E. COLLINS, JR., DECEASED

ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
v. CASE NO. 2014-CA-000688-MR
LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT NO. 11-CI-00350

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, ‘APPELLEE
‘TRANSPORTATION CABINET,
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS

Appellant, Sycilla Collins, individually and as administratrix of her
husband, Leonard Collins, Jr's, estate, appeals the Court of Appeals’ decision
to reverse an order of the Letcher Circuit Court reversing and remanding the
Board of Claims’ (the “Board) order of dismissal.

‘The facts underlying this appeal concern a motor vehicle accident that
occurred on September 20, 2000. On that day, Mr. Collins was operating a
school bus on U.S. Highway 119 in Letcher County, Kentucky. The particular
stretch of highway where the accident occurred narrows and meanders across

Pine Mountain. This portion of the highway is classified as “non-designated.”
Pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute ("KRS") 189.221, the width and length
restrictions for non-designated highways are limited to vehicles under ninety-
seven inches in width and fifty-four feet in length. Despite these restrictions,
an oversized tractor-trailer, measuring at 102 inches in width and sixty-eight
school bus, resulting in his death.

 

feet in length, collided with Mr. Colli

Approximately one year later, Appellant filed a claim with the Board
alleging that the Commonwealth of Kentucky Transportation Cabinet's
Department of Highways (‘Department of Highways”) was negligent in failing to
enforce the length and width restrictions on U.S. Highway 119 and that such
negligence resulted in Mr. Collins’ death. An evidentiary hearing was held
during which Appellant supplied evidence that only four citations were issued
on Pine Mountain between 1998 and 2000. Appellant also proffered
Department of Vehicle Enforcement Officer Jeff Jacobs’ testimony that even
though he was in charge of patrolling Letcher County, he had never actually
traveled across Pine Mountain. Following the hearing, the Board Hearing
Officer made his Recommended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment. The Recommendation stated that while the Department of
Highways had a ministerial duty to enforce the length and width restrictions,
this duty only required the Department of Highways to act reasonably, not to
halt every oversized vehicle on the highway. In other words, Appellant had
failed to demonstrate that the Department of Highways was negligent in
performing its duty to enforce the vehicle size restrictions. The Board accepted
the Hearing Officer's Recommendation on April 17, 2008.

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Appellant subsequently appealed to the Letcher Circuit Court who
remanded the case back to the Board. The trial court instructed the Board to
investigate whether the size restrictions were being equally enforced on U.S.
Highway 119 compared to other areas in the state during the relevant time
period. On July 7, 2011, a Board Hearing Officer once again recommended
denying Appellant's claim. As instructed by the trial court, the Hearing Officer
focused on the number of citations distributed in other Kentucky counties,
such as McCracken, Jefferson, Fayette, and Madison. The Hearing Officer
determined that enforcement on U.S. Highway 119 was equally comparable to
the other counties. The Hearing Officer also concluded that there was no
causative relationship between the Department of Highways’ actions, or lack of,
actions, and Appellant's damages. Once again, after the Board accepted the
Hearing Officer’s Recommendation, Appellant sought an appeal in the Letcher
Cireuit Court.

(On April 1, 2014, the Letcher Circuit Court reversed the Board's ruling
‘as not being supported by substantial evidence. First, the trial court explained
that the Department of Highways had a ministerial duty to enforce the size
restrictions on U.S. Highway 119 pursuant to KRS 189.221. The trial court
further stated that the hearing testimony supported a conclusion that the
Department of Highways negligently performed this duty when it failed to pull
the oversized tractor-trailer over. ‘The trial court ultimately remanded the case
back to the Board for it to apportion liability. The Department of Highways
subsequently filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.

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On October 30, 2015, the Court of Appeals reversed the Letcher Circuit
Court's ruling and affirmed the Board's decision to dismiss Appellant's claim,
However, unlike the previous dispositions, the Court of Appeals found that no
duty existed on which to base liability. More specifically, the Court of Appeals
explained that the Department of Highways owed a general duty to the public
‘at large, not to Appellant or her husband individually. In formulating its
conclusion, the Court of Appeals quoted, at length, the case of Ashby v. City of
Louisville, 841 S.W.2d 184 (Ky. App. 1992). This case stands for the
proposition that absent a “special relationship” a governmental agency does not
owe individual citizens a duty to protect them from crime. Therefore, the Court
of Appeals held that while Appellee owed a general duty to the public to enforce

the width and length restrictions on U.S. Highway 119, it did not owe Mr.

 

Collins a specific duty to prevent his accident. Appellant sought discretionary
review with this Court, which we summarily granted.

Our analysis begins with the necessary elements of an actionable
negligence claim. In order to establish negligence, Appellant is required to
prove: (1) a duty on the part of the Department of Highways; (2) a breach of
that duty; and (3) consequent injury. Commonwealth of Kentucky
Transportation Cabinet Department of Highways v. Shadrick, 956 S.W.2d 898,
900 (Ky. 1997}. This Court will apply a de novo review to these issues of law.
Rowan County v. Sloas, 201 $.W.3d 469, 475 (Ky. 2006); see KRS 44.150.

‘Throughout the history of this case, the trial court and Board have both
delved into the question of whether the Department of Highways has availed

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itself to suit by virtue of negligently performing a ministerial duty. In doing so,
these lower courts have assumed the existence of a duty on the part of the
Department of Highways. However, similar to the Court of Appeals, this Court

believes a more intensive analysis is necessary. In reviewing Appellant's

 

complaint, she alleges that the “Department of Highways was at fault because
it failed to enforce the length and width restrictions for U.S. Highway 119
thereby acting negligently and violating its duty of care.” The only evidence
Appellant has supplied to establish that the Department of Highways had a
duty to enforce the size restrictions on U.S. Highway 119 is KRS 189.221. This

is the statute proscribing the width and length restrictions on non-designated

 

highways. Nowhere in this statute is the Department of Highways, or the

 

‘Transportation Cabinet for that matter, named as the enforcing agency. Again,
‘we must underscore, that Appellant failed to supply any statutory or regulatory
evidence that the Department of Highways is charged with the duty to enforce
KRS 189.221

important to note, although neither party has cited this statute, that

  

It
KRS 281.765 imposes upon “peace officers” the specific statutory duty of
“enforce[ing] the provisions” of the motor vehicle laws of the Commonwealth.
Peace officers, within the meaning of the statute, include almost all law
enforcement agents, including Vehicle Enforcement Officers (“VEO”). See KRS
281.765. In 2000, when Mr. Collins’ accident occurred, the Department of
‘Transportation's Division of Motor Vehicle Enforcement, a division of the

Department of Vehicle Regulation, had administrative authority over VEO's.

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Yet, Appellant is not arguing that a specific VEO negligently performed his or
her job. To do so, would require proof that a VEO was patrolling that specific
stretch of highway and ignored the tractor-trailer’s oversized load. Nor did
Appellant name the Division of Motor Vehicle Enforcement as a defendant in
this action.’ Thusly, we assume Appellant's claim is predicated on a duty that
the Department of Highways was required to secure a patrolling VEO on the

is Court has

 

mountain in order to enforce the size restrictions. However, as

already explained, there is no evidence from which it can be ascertained that

 

the Department of Highways was responsible for enforcement. Moreover, this
Court has seen no evidence indicating that the Department of Highways had
the power to allocate VEO’s, or that it maintained appointing or managing

authority over VEO's. Consequently, we must conclude that the Department of

 

Highways was not charged with a statutory or regulatory duty to enforce KRS
189.221's vehicle size restrictions.

Of course, statutes and regulations are not the only sources from which
duties may be imposed upon state agencies and officers. See Gaither v. Justice
and Public Safety Cabinet, 447 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Ky. 2014). Indeed, in
‘Shadrick the Court stated that “case law imposes a duty upon the Department
[of Highways] to maintain the Commonwealth's highways in a reasonably safe

condition for those members of the traveling public “who exercise due care for

* On Page “i” of Appellant's brief to this Court, Appellant wrongly claims that
sshe is seeking an award of damages against the Division of Vehicle Enforcement. Our
records indicate that the Division of Vehicle Enforcement was not named as a
defendant at any stage of litigation.

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their own safety.” 956 S.W.2d at 900 (quoting Swatzell v. Commonwealth,
441 S.W.2d 138 (Ky. 1969) (emphasis added)}; see Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Transportation Cabinet, Department of Highways v. Guffey, 244 S.W.3d 79, 81
(ky. 2008) (acknowledging that the Department of Highways has a common law
duty to keep the roadway in a reasonably safe condition)

Encompassed within the Department of Highways’ duty to keep our
highways in a reasonably safe condition is the duty to conduct maintenance
and remove dangers that were known or should have been known. See
Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet, Bureau of Highways v. Roof, 913
Guffey, 244

 

S.W.2d 322 (Ky. 1996) (duty to construct and maintain guardrail
'S.W.3d 79 (duty to remove a cable stretched across a roadway); Commonwealth
of Kentucky, Department of Highways v. Automobile Club Insurance Company,
467 S.W.2d 326 (Ky.1971) (duty to erect warning signs and maintain barriers
or guardrails at dangerous places on the highway); Dillingham v. Department of
Highways, 253 8.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1952) (no duty to “keep highway shoulders in
reasonably safe condition for travel, except as to defects which are obscured

[and] inherently dangerous

 

Based on the aforementioned guiding case law, we cannot conclude that
the Department of Highways’ common law duty extends to ensuring
‘compliance with the size restrictions of KRS 189.221. The key inquiry into the
Department of Highways’ common law duty is reasonableness. It is reasonable
to expect the Department of Highways to remove a deadly cable stretched
across the highway, or to place guardrails on dangerous curves. On the other

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hand, it would be unreasonable to confer a duty upon the Department of
Highways to enforce all traffic laws and to forestall the negligence of third party
drivers. Cyf. Shadrick, 956 S.W.2d 898 (no duty to remove an illegally parked
‘truck within the road’s right-of-way).

In summation, Appellant has failed to demonstrate, by way of statute,
regulation, or common law, that the Department of Highways had a duty to
enforce compliance with the motor vehicle laws of the Commonwealth.

While we reach the same result as the Court of Appeals, we differ in our
reasoning. Consequently, we must address the Court of Appeals’ holding that
‘a duty did not exist based on the special relationship test espoused in Fryman
v. Harrison, 896 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1995). In Fryman, our predecessor Court
ruled that public officials, in the performance of their official duties, do not
have an affirmative duty to protect the public from the criminal acts of others
absent “a special relationship between the victim and the public officials.” Id. at
910. A special relationship exists when (1) the victim is either in state custody
or otherwise restrained by the state when the injury occurred and (2) the
negligent conduct was committed by a state actor. Id. (citing Ashby, 841
S.W.2¢ at 190).

In reviewing our authoritative case law, this Court must disagree that the
special relationship test has applicability to the case before us. To illustrate
the proper use of the special relationship test, and the policy implications
behind it, we look to the case of City of Florence, Kentucky v. Chipman, 38
S.W.3d 387 (Ky. 2001). The facts of that case are intensive. To summarize,

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two officers conducted a traffic stop after suspecting that the driver was under
the influence. Id. at 389. Despite signs that the driver and victim were drunk,
the officers allowed the parties to proceed. Jd. Shortly thereafter, the driver
crashed the car and the passenger suffered fatal injuries. Id. at 390. The estate
of the deceased passenger brought suit against the two officers. Id. The Court
‘was unable to find an affirmative duty on which to base liability since there
was no special relationship between the deceased and the defending officers.
Id, at 392. The Court explained its reasoning as follows:

We agree with the officers that imposing a duty in this case in the

absence of a special relationship as required by Fryman would be

tantamount to establishing a universal duty of care on the police to
prevent any third party harm to each and every citizen with whom

they have contact regardless of how slight the interaction or brief

the duration. As argued by the officers, the result would be exactly

what the Court of Appeals suggested which would be to avoid

potential liability, officers will simply drive past situations they

encounter instead of stopping or investigating. Such a result is not

in the public interest and is not required by the law.

Id. at 393.

What we garner from Chipman is that the special relationship test applies
to the general duty of safeguarding the public from criminal acts that result
from the negligence of a specific officer or official. See Fryman, 896 S.W.2d at
909. This test may have had applicability if Appellant had named the Office of
Vehicle Enforcement or a particular VEO as the defendant. In the case before
us, however, Appellant's suit is not based on the negligence of any particular

officer, nor is it based on the universal duty of law enforcement to keep the
public safe from crime. Consequently, we find the special relationship test

 

inapposi

Having determined that the Department of Highways did not owe
Appellant a duty to enforce the size restrictions found within KRS 189.221, the
action must be dismissed. Therefore, we hereby affirm the Court of Appeals’
opinion, although on different grounds, and remand this case to the Letcher
Circuit Court with instructions that it dismiss Appellant's appeal of the Board
of Claim’s dismissal.

Minton, C.J.; Cunningham, Hughes, Keller, VanMeter, and Venters, JJ.,

sitting, All concur, Wright, J., not sitti

 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Darrell Hall

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Bridget Leigh Dunaway
John Carter
TOOMS & DUNAWAY, PLLC

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