Case Title: People v. Millsap

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87096

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Opinion filed January 27, 2000.
JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a jury trial, defendant, Derrick Millsap, was convicted of home 
invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(2) (West 1996)) and robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) 
(West 1996)). The court sentenced him to 20 years' imprisonment. Defendant 
appealed, arguing that his due process rights were violated when the trial court 
gave the jury an accountability instruction after the jury had begun 
deliberating. The appellate court affirmed. No. 1-98-0388 (unpublished order 
under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted defendant's pro se petition 
for leave to appeal.
BACKGROUND
The victim, Helen Drwiega, testified that she was 85 years old and lived 
alone. On November 21, 1996, at about 4 a.m., she was asleep on her couch when 
she was awakened by a rough, wet glove pushing down on her face. The person who 
had his hand over her face told her not to scream and that he would not hurt 
her. Drwiega had a hard time breathing and could not see anything. Drwiega could 
not be sure if there was more than one intruder in her house. The person who had 
his hand over her face said, "look over there," and Drwiega had a feeling that 
he was talking to another person. The person who had his hand over her face told 
her that he wanted her money. Drwiega responded that she did not have any 
money.
While keeping his gloved hand over Drwiega's face, the intruder rummaged 
through several purses Drwiega kept underneath a coffee table. The gloved hand 
was very tight over Drwiega's face, and the rough surface left a scratch on her 
face. Drwiega testified that the person who had his hand over her face told her 
that "they" were leaving and instructed her to stay on the couch for a few 
minutes and not to make any noise. A pouch-type wallet that contained several 
bills and over $2,000 in cash belonging to Drwiega's brother had been taken from 
one of the purses underneath the coffee table.
Drwiega rose from the couch several minutes later and saw someone climbing 
out of her kitchen window. Her telephone was inoperable so she went to a 
neighbor's house and asked the neighbor to call 911. Upon returning from the 
neighbor's house, Drwiega discovered that the intruder had returned. He demanded 
Driwega's wallet, and she recognized the voice as that of the man who had put 
his gloved hand over her face. Drwiega told the intruder that she did not have a 
wallet. When police sirens sounded outside, the intruder crawled out of 
Drwiega's window. A police officer came to the front door, and Drwiega told him 
that the intruder was crawling out of her window. The police later returned 
accompanied by a man and carrying the pouch-type wallet. Drwiega could not 
identify the man, but she identified the wallet and the money it contained.
Chicago police officer George Porter testified that, while on patrol on the 
date in question, he received a radio transmission of a burglary in progress on 
South Emerald Avenue. He arrived at the address 10 to 20 seconds later and other 
officers arrived after another 10 seconds. Drwiega told the officers that the 
offenders were going out the back of her home. Officer Porter looked down the 
gangway and saw a man in dark clothing running from the rear area of the house. 
Officer Porter pursued the man down an alley and into a yard six to eight houses 
away. Porter found defendant lying against the side of a house with his jacket 
pulled up over his head. Defendant had a black wallet in his right pocket, which 
Drwiega later identified as belonging to her. The wallet contained the $2,000 
that belonged to Drwiega's brother. Defendant also had some bills in his pocket; 
the bills had Drwiega's address on them. Officer Porter further testified that 
defendant was wearing the same clothes as the person he saw both in Drwiega's 
backyard and running through the alley. Porter searched the victim's backyard 
and discovered that a ladder had been placed beneath her kitchen window and that 
the window had been removed.
Chicago police detective Mark Hofer also responded to the 
burglary-in-progress call and spotted defendant in an alley behind Drwiega's 
garage. There was a street light in the alley, and Hofer could see defendant's 
face. Hofer subsequently saw Officer Porter pursuing defendant down the alley 
and next saw defendant lying on the ground at 12124 South Emerald. After 
defendant was arrested, Hofer went inside Drwiega's residence. He observed a 
scratch on Drwiega's face, saw that her kitchen window had been removed, and 
noticed that a table under the window on the inside had muddy footprints on it. 
Hofer also observed two fresh sets of shoe prints going in different directions 
in the wet snow outside the window. Hofer believed that the sets of shoe prints 
might have been different and testified that there were two offenders. Hofer 
also stated that one set of prints ended in the yard where defendant was 
arrested and the other set led into a vacant lot and towards Halsted Street.
Walter Kryszak, an expert in the field of shoe impression comparisons, 
testified that he had examined a photograph of impressions left inside the 
victim's residence and compared them with a photograph of the soles of 
defendant's shoes. Kryszak concluded that one of the overlapping impressions 
from inside Drwiega's house was not from defendant's shoes and that the second 
impression contained many similarities to defendant's shoes. Nevertheless, 
because of the poor quality of the photograph of the shoe impressions, he could 
not say with certainty that the impressions came from defendant's shoes.
The State at no time pursued an accountability theory. Defendant's robbery 
and home invasion indictments charged him with taking the money and wallet from 
Drwiega and causing the injury to her face, and the State did not request that 
the jury be instructed on accountability. Further, neither side argued to the 
jury with respect to accountability. The State argued that defendant caused the 
injury to Drwiega's face and that defendant took her money.
Forty minutes into its deliberations, the jury sent the judge a note that 
read, "Is the accomplice just as guilty at [sic] the offender who 
causes an injury in a home invasion?" The trial judge proposed answering the 
question by instructing the jury on accountability. Defendant's attorney 
objected, arguing that there had been no evidence presented on the elements of 
accountability and that he had not had a chance to argue about accountability. 
Because the accountability issue was "coming out of left field," defendant's 
attorney proposed telling the jurors they already had everything. The trial 
judge gave the following instruction, reasoning that there was evidence that a 
second person had been present at the crime scene:
The jury subsequently returned guilty verdicts on both charges.
Defendant appealed, arguing that the court erred in instructing the jury on a 
new theory after the jury had begun deliberations. The appellate court affirmed. 
The court held that an accountability instruction would have been appropriate on 
these facts, and that a trial court has a duty to answer jurors' questions when 
the jurors request clarification on a point of law.
Defendant appeals the appellate court's judgment, arguing that he was 
deprived of his due process right to a fair trial when the court instructed the 
jury on a new theory after deliberations had begun. The basis of defendant's 
argument is that the trial court's action deprived him of his right to address 
the accountability theory in his closing argument.
ANALYSIS
The general rule when a trial court is faced with a question from the jury is 
that the court has a duty to provide instruction to the jury when the jury has 
posed an explicit question or requested clarification on a point of law arising 
from facts about which there is doubt or confusion. People v. Childs, 
159 Ill. 2d 217, 228-29 (1994). Nevertheless, a trial court may exercise its 
discretion to refrain from answering a jury question under appropriate 
circumstances. People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 39 (1990). Appropriate 
circumstances include when the instructions are readily understandable and 
sufficiently explain the relevant law, where further instructions would serve no 
useful purpose or would potentially mislead the jury, when the jury's inquiry 
involves a question of fact, or where the giving of an answer would cause the 
court to express an opinion that would likely direct a verdict one way or 
another. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d  at 39-40. Further, the court should not 
submit new charges or new theories to the jury after the jury commences its 
deliberations. People v. Gramc, 271 Ill. App. 3d 282, 288-89 (1995), 
overruled in part on other grounds, People v. Garcia, No. 
84354 (November 18, 1999).
The State argues that the trial court responded to the jury's question 
appropriately because an accountability instruction was justified by the 
evidence. According to the State, the evidence suggested that a second offender 
was present. The State relies on People v. Batchelor, 202 Ill. App. 3d 
316, 331 (1990), in which the court held that even slight evidence of guilt by 
accountability is sufficient to support giving that instruction, regardless of 
whether that theory was advanced by the State in its case in chief. The State's 
argument is misplaced. The issue is not whether the trial court could have given 
an accountability instruction based on the evidence, but whether the court 
violated defendant's due process rights by giving the accountability instruction 
after the jury had already begun its deliberations.
Defendant argues that the timing of the trial court's instruction deprived 
him of his right to address the accountability issue in his closing argument. 
The closest case factually that our research discloses is People v. 
Jamison, 207 Ill. App. 3d 565 (1991). In Jamison, the defendant 
was charged with residential burglary. Evidence suggested that there might have 
been two offenders involved in the burglary. The parties focused their closing 
arguments on whether defendant was guilty as a principal, and the trial court 
did not give the jury an accountability instruction. The jury sent the judge a 
question that asked, "Can a person who was an accomplice to Residential Burglary 
not entering into the home be charged with Residential Burglary?" Over the 
defendant's objection, the trial court instructed the jury on accountability. 
Jamison, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 567.
The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion in giving 
an accountability instruction after the jury had begun its deliberations. The 
court noted that the instructions referred only to the defendant's guilt as a 
principal, and therefore the parties limited their arguments to whether 
defendant was guilty as a principal. The Jamison court held that the 
supplemental instruction allowed the defendant to be convicted on a theory that 
was never addressed. The court also rejected the State's argument that the error 
was harmless. Jamison, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 568. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in United 
States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1988). In Gaskins, the 
defendant was charged with possessing and manufacturing methamphetamine. The 
prosecution tried the defendant as a principal. At the close of the evidence, 
the trial court denied the prosecution's request that the jury be instructed on 
aiding and abetting. In response to a jury question, the prosecution again asked 
that the jury be instructed on aiding and abetting. The court gave the 
instruction over the defendant's objection, and the jury convicted the 
defendant. Gaskins, 849 F.2d  at 455-57.
On appeal, the defendant argued that his attorney's argument to the jury had 
been based on the prosecution's theory that he was guilty as a principal. His 
attorney did not have a chance to respond to the aiding and abetting theory. The 
government argued that the instruction was not prejudicial because the court 
merely clarified the instructions at the jury's request. The Ninth Circuit 
agreed with the defendant and reversed his conviction. The court relied on Rule 
30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires the trial court to 
inform the parties how the jury will be instructed before the attorneys give 
their closing arguments. The court held that the defendant had been prejudiced 
by the Rule 30 violation because the elements necessary to convict a defendant 
as a principal are different from those necessary to convict him as an aider and 
abettor, and the defendant had not been given a chance to address the aiding and 
abetting theory. Because the court could not conclude that the effectiveness of 
the defendant's defense was not hampered by the defendant's inaccurate 
information regarding the court's instructions, the court held that the 
defendant must be given a new trial. Gaskins, 849 F.2d  at 458-60.
We agree with Jamison and Gaskins. Illinois has a provision 
similar to Rule 30. Section 2-1107(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 
5/2-1107(c) (West 1998) (made applicable to criminal cases by Supreme Court Rule 
451(c) (177 Ill. 2d R. 451(c))) requires that jury instructions be settled 
before the attorneys give their closing arguments:
The purpose of this section is obvious: it allows the attorneys to know the 
law on which the jury will be instructed so that the attorneys can tailor their 
arguments accordingly. Because the court in this case instructed the jury on 
accountability after the jury had begun its deliberations, defendant's attorney 
was entirely deprived of an opportunity to defend against that theory.
Significantly, the court's response to the jury's question not only violated 
a statutory procedure, it impinged upon a constitutional right. The United 
States Supreme Court held in Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857-59, 
45 L. Ed. 2d 593, 598, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 2553-54 (1975), that a defendant's right 
to make a closing argument is guaranteed by the Constitution. The 
Herring Court quoted with approval the following passage from Yopps 
v. State, 228 Md. 204, 178 A.2d 879 (1962):
The Supreme Court further elaborated:
In Herring, the defendant was completely denied the opportunity to 
make a closing argument. Here, defendant was not completely deprived of his 
right to make a closing argument, but he was denied his right to address the 
theory of guilt upon which he may have been convicted. The jury's question 
showed that the jury had some doubt as to whether defendant was the person who 
injured Drwiega's face. The jury apparently believed that there was a second 
intruder and that defendant might have been the second intruder. Defendant 
argues on appeal that the evidence of a second intruder was sketchy and that he 
was denied the opportunity to argue that there was no second intruder. There 
would have been no reason for him to make that argument in the absence of an 
accountability instruction; the State charged him with being the person who 
injured Drwiega and argued that to the jury.
Further, the elements that the State would have had to prove to establish 
defendant's guilt as an accomplice are different from those necessary to prove 
his guilt as a principal. To prove his guilt as a principal, the State would 
have had to prove the statutory elements of home invasion and robbery. See 720 
ILCS 5/12-11(a)(2), 18-1(a) (West 1996). To prove his guilt as an accomplice, 
the State would have had to prove (1) that defendant solicited, ordered, abetted 
or attempted to aid another in the planning or commission of the crime; (2) that 
defendant's participation took place before or during the commission of the 
crime; and (3) the defendant had the concurrent, specific intent to promote or 
facilitate the commission of the crime. 720 ILCS 5/5-2 (West 1996). 
Defendant was denied his right to address the jury on these elements.
When faced with the jury's question, the court should have told the jurors 
that they had the instructions applicable to this case and that they should keep 
deliberating. The State elected to charge defendant as a principal and to argue 
that defendant was guilty as a principal. If, as the State insists, an 
accountability instruction was appropriate in this case, the State should have 
asked for such an instruction at the proper time. It was too late for the State 
to change its theory of the case after the case had been sent to the jury. The 
court should not submit new charges or new theories to the jury after the jury 
commences its deliberations. Gramc, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 288-89.
The State argues that any error in the instruction was harmless because 
defendant's theory of the case was that he had nothing to do with the offense. 
The State points out that defendant never contested that there were two 
offenders.
Clearly, the court's error was not harmless. The Constitution guarantees 
defendants the right to make a closing argument, no matter how " 'simple, 
clear, unimpeached, and conclusive the evidence may seem.' " 
Herring, 422 U.S.  at 860, 45 L. Ed. 2d  at 599, 95 S. Ct.  at 2554, 
quoting Yopps, 228 Md. at 207, 178 A.2d  at 881. The State charged 
defendant as a principal and argued to the jury that defendant injured Drwiega 
and took her money. In response to a jury question that indicated that the jury 
was having doubts whether defendant injured Drwiega, the court gave an 
accountability instruction. The jury then convicted defendant. On these facts, 
defendant was possibly convicted based upon a theory that he was never given a 
chance to address. Defendant was entirely deprived of his right to make a 
closing argument controverting one of the State's theories of guilt. As the 
Supreme Court said in Herring:
Defendant was deprived of his due process right to a fair trial. 
Consequently, his convictions must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new 
trial.
Judgments reversed;
cause remanded.