Case Title: United States v. Franklin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018AP001346-CQ

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2019-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2019 WI 64 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP1346-CQ 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
United States of America, 
          Plaintiff-Appellee, 
     v. 
Dennis Franklin and Shane Sahm, 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 6, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 11, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendants-appellants, there were briefs filed by 
Shelley M. Fite and Federal Defender Services of Wisconsin, 
Madison. There was an oral argument by Shelly M. Fite. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellee, there was a brief filed by 
Laura A. Przyblinski Finn, Scott C. Blader, and United States 
Attorney’s Office, Madison. There was an oral argument by Laura 
A. Przyblinski. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of State of 
Wisconsin by Amy C. Miller, solicitor general, with whom on the 
brief were Ryan J. Walsh, chief deputy solicitor general, and 
Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. There was an oral argument by 
Amy C. Miller. 
 
 
2019 WI 64
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP1346-CQ 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
United States of America, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
     v. 
 
Dennis Franklin and Shane Sahm, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
FILED 
 
JUN 6, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION of a question of law from the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  Certified question 
answered and cause remanded.     
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   This case is before the 
court on a certified question from the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  United States v. Franklin, 895 
F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 2018); see Wis. Stat. § 821.01 (2017-18).1  
The question certified for determination is:   
Whether the different location subsections of the 
Wisconsin burglary statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1m)(a) 
-(f), identify alternative elements of burglary, one 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP1346-CQ   
 
2 
 
of which a jury must unanimously find beyond a 
reasonable doubt to convict, or whether they identify 
alternative means of committing burglary, for which a 
unanimous finding beyond a reasonable doubt is not 
necessary to convict?    
¶2 
Our answer to this certified question will aid the 
Seventh Circuit in determining the appropriate sentences for 
Dennis Franklin and Shane Sahm (together, the defendants), who 
had their sentences enhanced pursuant to the federal Armed 
Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).  
¶3 
The defendants pleaded guilty to violations of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possessing firearms after having been 
previously convicted of a felony.  Based upon their previous 
Wisconsin burglary convictions, the defendants were classified 
as armed career criminals and sentenced to a mandatory minimum 
of 15 years in prison pursuant to the ACCA.  The defendants 
objected to their status as armed career criminals on appeal to 
the Seventh Circuit, where their cases were consolidated.  A 
three-judge 
panel 
of 
the 
Seventh 
Circuit 
held 
that 
the 
defendants' prior burglary convictions were predicate violent 
felonies under the ACCA because each of the locations set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1m)(a)-(e) identify alternative elements 
for the crime of burglary making them each distinct crimes.2  The 
defendants filed a petition for rehearing en banc.  They 
                                                 
2 While the Seventh Circuit "put aside subsection (f)" of 
Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1m), reasoning that the appeals "present no 
issue under it," the court acknowledged that subsection (f) 
overlaps each of the other subsections in § 943.10(1m).  United 
States v. Franklin, 884 F.3d 331, 335 (7th Cir. 2018), reh'g 
granted, judgment vacated, 895 F.3d 954 (2018).   
No. 
2018AP1346-CQ   
 
3 
 
asserted 
that 
because 
the 
locational 
alternatives 
in 
§ 943.10(1m)(a)-(f) provide alternative means of committing one 
element of the crime of burglary, the Wisconsin burglary statute 
is too broad to fall within the definition of burglary as a 
predicate violent felony under the ACCA.  The Seventh Circuit 
granted the petition for rehearing, vacated its prior opinion, 
and certified the question of Wisconsin state law to this court.   
¶4 
To answer the certified question, we examine the four 
factors set forth in Derango:  (1) the statutory text; (2) the 
legislative history and context of the statute; (3) the nature 
of the conduct; and (4) the appropriateness of multiple 
punishments.  State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶¶14-15, 236 Wis. 2d 
721, 
613 
N.W.2d 
833. 
 
We 
conclude 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.10(1m)(a)-(f) identifies alternative means of committing 
one element of the crime of burglary under § 943.10(1m).  
Accordingly, a unanimous finding of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt as to a locational alternative in subsections (a)-(f) is 
not necessary to convict.   
I 
¶5 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for a 
person who has been convicted of a felony to possess a firearm.  
The sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm under § 922(g) 
is a maximum of ten years in prison.  See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).  
The penalty increases, however, to a 15-year mandatory minimum 
under the ACCA for certain federal defendants who have three 
prior convictions for a "violent felony," including "burglary, 
arson, or extortion."  18 U.S.C. § 924(e).  Section 924(e) does 
No. 
2018AP1346-CQ   
 
4 
 
not define burglary.  Consequently, for purposes of the ACCA, 
the United States Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 
U.S. 575 (1990), adopted the following "generic" definition of 
burglary:  "an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining 
in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a 
crime."  Id. at 598.  To determine whether a defendant's past 
offense counts as an ACCA predicate, courts compare the elements 
of the crime of conviction with the elements of the "generic" 
definition of the crime, employing the "categorical approach."  
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2247-48 (2016).  The 
prior offense qualifies as an ACCA predicate if its elements are 
the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense.  
Id. at 2247.  However, if the crime of conviction covers more 
conduct than the generic offense, then it does not qualify as an 
ACCA 
predicate, 
even 
if 
the 
defendant's 
actual 
conduct 
indisputably fits within the generic offense's boundaries.  Id. 
at 2248.   
¶6 
The categorical approach can be difficult to apply if 
a statute is phrased alternatively, like Wisconsin's burglary 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1m).  As the United States Supreme 
Court has explained, alternatively phrased statutes come in two 
types:  (1) those that list alternative elements (defining more 
than one crime within a single statute); and (2) those that list 
alternative factual means of committing a single element of a 
crime.  See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249.  "'Elements' are the 
'constituent parts' of a crime's legal definition——the things 
the 'prosecution must prove to sustain a conviction.'"  Id. at 
No. 
2018AP1346-CQ   
 
5 
 
2248 (quoted source omitted).  In contrast, means "spell[] out 
various factual ways of committing some component of the 
offense," that a jury need not unanimously find.  Id. at 2249.  
The appropriate sentences for the defendants turn on whether the 
locational alternatives set forth in subsections (a)-(f) of 
§ 943.10(1m) are alternative means of committing one element of 
burglary or are alternative elements of burglary.   
II 
¶7 
When 
faced 
with 
the 
question 
of 
whether 
the 
legislature "create[d] multiple offenses or a single offense 
with multiple modes of commission," this court has analyzed the 
following four factors:  (1) the language of the statute; (2) 
the legislative history and context of the statute; (3) the 
nature of the proscribed conduct; and (4) the appropriateness of 
multiple punishments for the conduct.  Derango, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 
¶¶14-15; see also State v. Hammer, 216 Wis. 2d 214, 220, 576 
N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1997); Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 413, 
422, 304 N.W.2d 729 (1981).  The objective of this inquiry is to 
determine 
whether 
the 
legislature 
"intend[ed] 
to 
create 
multiple, separate offenses, or a single offense capable of 
being committed in several different ways."  Derango, 236 Wis. 
2d 721, ¶15; see also Manson, 101 Wis. 2d at 422.   
¶8 
In Derango, this court was faced with the question of 
whether Wis. Stat. § 948.07 "creates multiple offenses or a 
single offense with multiple modes of commission."  Derango, 236 
Wis. 2d 721, ¶14.  Section 948.07 read: 
No. 
2018AP1346-CQ   
 
6 
 
Whoever, with intent to commit any of the following 
acts, causes or attempts to cause any child who has 
not attained the age of 18 years to go into any 
vehicle, building, room or secluded place is guilty of 
a Class BC felony: 
(1)  Having sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
the child in violation of s. 948.02 or 948.095. 
(2)  Causing the child to engage in prostitution. 
(3)  Exposing a sex organ to the child or causing the 
child to expose a sex organ in violation of s. 948.10. 
(4)  Taking a picture or making an audio recording of 
the child engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 
(5)  Causing bodily or mental harm to the child. 
(6)  Giving or selling to the child a controlled 
substance or controlled substance analog in violation 
of ch. 961. 
Id., ¶16.  The Derango court examined the four factors and 
determined that the statute created one offense of causing a 
child to go into a secluded place "with any of six possible 
prohibited intents."  Jury unanimity as to intent was therefore 
not required.  Id., ¶17.   
¶9 
The defendants argue that application of the four 
Derango factors leads to the conclusion that the legislature 
intended to create a single offense of burglary with multiple 
means of commission.3  The federal government asserts that the 
Derango factors support its position that subsections (a)-(f) 
identify 
alternative 
locational 
elements 
requiring 
jury 
unanimity yet also maintains that the holding in Derango should 
                                                 
3 The four factors were first enunciated in Manson v. State, 
101 Wis. 2d 413, 422, 304 N.W.2d 729 (1981).   
No. 
2018AP1346-CQ   
 
7 
 
be limited to the child enticement statute at issue in that 
case.  We analyze  the Derango factors and conclude that Wis. 
Stat. § 943.10(1m)(a)-(f) sets forth alternative means of 
committing one element of burglary.  
¶10 We begin with an examination of the plain language of 
the statute.  Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1m)(a)-(f) provides: 
Whoever intentionally enters any of the following 
places without the consent of the person in lawful 
possession and with intent to steal or commit a felony 
in such place is guilty of a Class F felony:  
(a)  Any building or dwelling; or  
(b)  An enclosed railroad car; or  
(c)  An enclosed portion of any ship or vessel; or  
(d)  A locked enclosed cargo portion of a truck or 
trailer; or  
(e)  A motor home or other motorized type of home or a 
trailer home, whether or not any person is living in 
any such home; or  
(f)  A room within any of the above. 
The straightforward language of § 943.10(1m) creates one offense 
with multiple means of commission.  Burglary can be broken down 
into the following elements:  intentional entry, without 
consent, and with intent to steal or commit a felony.4  
                                                 
4 Wisconsin JI——Criminal 1424 (2001) lists the four elements 
that the State must prove: 
1.  The defendant intentionally entered a building. 
2.  The defendant entered the building without the 
consent of the person in lawful possession. 
(continued) 
No. 
2018AP1346-CQ   
 
8 
 
Subsections (a)-(f) list "any of the following places" of entry 
and thus provides the means of commission for the element of 
entry.  The crime is the act of the burglarious entry into one 
of the listed locations, regardless of which particular location 
is entered.   
¶11 Moreover, 
similar 
to 
the 
alternative 
prohibited 
intents set forth in the child enticement statute in Derango, 
Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1m) does not create different penalties for 
the possible locational alternatives set forth in subsections 
(a)-(f).  See Derango, 236 Wis. 2d 721, ¶16.  Instead, 
regardless of which of the six locations a burglar enters, the 
punishment is determined by the offense's status as a Class F 
felony.  The absence of different penalties for the locational 
alternatives weighs against the federal government's argument 
that § 943.10(1m)(a)-(f) contains separate elements.  See 
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256 ("If statutory alternatives carry 
                                                                                                                                                             
3.  The defendant knew that the entry was without 
consent. 
4.  The defendant entered the building with intent to 
commit (state felony), [that is, that the defendant 
intended to commit (state felony) at the time the 
defendant entered the building]. 
While the elements include the word "building," note 2 to 
the instruction indicates that "[t]he model instruction is 
drafted for a case involving entry into a 'building.'  It must 
be modified if entry involved any of the other places listed in 
[Wis. Stat.] § 943.10(1)(a) through (f)."  Wis JI——Criminal 1424 
at n.2 (2001). 
No. 
2018AP1346-CQ   
 
9 
 
different punishments, then under Apprendi5 they must be 
elements.").  The plain text of § 943.10(1m) thus supports the 
conclusion that the statute creates a single crime of burglary 
with multiple means of commission, rather than multiple, 
separate offenses.   
¶12 The second Derango factor instructs the court to 
examine the legislative history and context of the statute.  We 
recognize that Derango was decided prior to State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110, 
this 
court's 
seminal 
case 
on 
statutory 
interpretation.6  As this court stressed in Kalal, statutory 
interpretation begins with the language of the statute.  Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
¶45. 
 
Where 
the 
statutory 
language 
is 
unambiguous, we generally do not consult extrinsic sources of 
interpretation like legislative history.  Id., ¶46.  However, as 
we clarified in Kalal, "legislative history is sometimes 
                                                 
5 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
6 At oral argument, counsel for the defendants acknowledged 
that the second factor in State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, 236 
Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833, was "different than how this court 
usually articulates statutory interpretation" since, pursuant to 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110, "and the more modern discussion 
of statutory interpretation," context and purpose are analyzed 
alongside the statutory language whereas legislative history 
may  be consulted separately.  Therefore, the concurrence's 
allegation that we resolve this issue "spontaneously, and 
incautiously" sua sponte is not entirely accurate.  Concurrence, 
¶31.  Instead of ignoring Kalal as suggested by the concurrence, 
we read Derango in accordance with Kalal.   
No. 
2018AP1346-CQ   
 
10 
 
consulted to confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation."  
Id., ¶51.  We determine that Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1m) is 
unambiguous and thus as a part of the second Derango factor we 
will examine the legislative history to confirm our plain-
meaning interpretation.   
¶13 We also observe that Kalal does not disturb this 
court's ability to inquire into statutory context under the 
second Derango factor.  Evaluation of the context of a statute 
is part of a plain-meaning analysis and includes a review of the 
language of "surrounding or closely-related statutes," id., ¶46, 
as well as "previously enacted and repealed provisions of a 
statute."  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 
309 
Wis. 2d 541, 
749 
N.W.2d 581; 
see 
also 
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶52 n.9.    
¶14 A review of the legislative history and context of the 
statute 
further 
supports 
our 
conclusion 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.10(1m) creates one crime of burglary with alternative 
means of commission.  The burglary statute "was created as part 
of the comprehensive revision of the Wisconsin Criminal Code" 
that was intended to simplify the criminal law and state each 
section in "clear, concise and definite language so that the 
scope of the section will be plain."  Champlin v. State, 84 
Wis. 2d 621, 624-25 & n.1, 267 N.W.2d 295 (1978).  The original 
draft of the statute defined burglary using the following 
general locational language:  "[w]hoever enters any structure 
without the consent of the owner and with intent to steal or 
commit a felony therein may be imprisoned not more than 10 
No. 
2018AP1346-CQ   
 
11 
 
years."  Id. at 625 (quoting 1951 S.B. 784) (emphasis added); 
see also § 343.10, ch. 623, Laws of 1953.  The comments to the 
proposed section stated in part:  "As far as the basic elements 
of burglary are concerned . . . There must be (1) an entry of a 
structure, (2) the entry must be without consent of the owner, 
and (3) the entry must be made with intent to steal or commit a 
felony in the structure."  See 1950 Report of Wisconsin 
Legislative Council, Vol. VII, Report on the Criminal Code (Apr. 
1951) at 81-82; see also Champlin, 84 Wis. 2d at 625.  This 
version of the statute defined "structure" as "any [e]nclosed 
building or tent, any [e]nclosed vehicle (whether self-propelled 
or not) or any room within any of them."  § 339.22, ch. 623, 
Laws of 1953.   
¶15 The legislature's advisory committee subsequently made 
several changes to incorporate the various locations within the 
definition of "structure" into the burglary statute:  "building, 
dwelling, enclosed railroad car or the enclosed portion of any 
ship or vessel, or any room therein."  See Wisconsin Legislative 
Council, Meeting of the Criminal Code Advisory Committee at 9 
(July 23, 1954).  Thereafter the committee sent the statute back 
to the technical staff to have it formatted in an "a-b-c 
fashion."  Wisconsin Legislative Council, Meeting of the 
Criminal Code Advisory Committee at 11 (July 24, 1954).  
Ultimately when the law was enacted in 1955 it read: 
(1)  Whoever intentionally enters any of the following 
places without the consent of the person in lawful 
possession and with intent to steal or commit a felony 
therein may be imprisoned not more than 10 years: 
No. 
2018AP1346-CQ   
 
12 
 
(a)  Any building or dwelling; or 
(b)  Any enclosed railroad car; or 
(c)  An enclosed portion of any ship or vessel; or 
(d)  A locked enclosed cargo portion of a truck or 
trailer; or 
(e)  A room within any of the above. 
§ 943.10, ch. 696, Laws of 1955.7  
¶16 As is clear from the legislative history and context 
of the statute, the legislature did not intend for the crime of 
burglary to include a separate locational element.  The statute 
originally included the element of entry of "any structure," 
which was eventually replaced with the entry of "any of the 
following places" listed in subsections (a)-(f).  The locational 
alternatives added to the burglary statute thus "replace[d] and 
clarif[ied]" the general language and did not take what was once 
a single crime and replace it with multiple crimes.  See 
Derango, 236 Wis. 2d 721, ¶20.  Examination of the legislative 
history and context of Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1m) thus confirms the 
conclusion that the locational alternatives set forth in 
subsections (a)-(f) are means of committing one element of 
burglary and do not create alternative elements of burglary for 
which jury unanimity is required.   
¶17 Finally, 
our 
assessment 
of 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
proscribed 
conduct 
and 
the 
appropriateness 
of 
multiple 
                                                 
7 The statute has remained virtually the same with only 
minor changes made by the legislature since 1955. 
No. 
2018AP1346-CQ   
 
13 
 
punishments leads us to conclude that the legislature intended 
to create one crime of burglary with multiple means of 
commission.  "We have previously concluded that acts warrant 
separate punishment when they are separate in time or are 
significantly different in nature."  Derango, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 
¶21 (citing State v. Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d 486, 499-500, 485 
N.W.2d 1 (1992)).  The proscribed conduct here is entering a 
specified location without consent and with intent to steal or 
commit a felony.  Regardless of which location is entered, there 
is only one act of burglary.   
¶18 If we adopt the position of the federal government, a 
defendant could receive multiple punishments for the same act in 
violation of the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and 
Wisconsin constitutions.  Derango, 236 Wis. 2d 721, ¶26; U.S. 
Const. amend. V; Wis. Const. art. I, § 8.8  For example, if a 
defendant burglarized a houseboat, he or she could be convicted 
of four crimes for one act:  burglary of a dwelling under 
Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1m)(a), 
burglary 
of 
a 
vessel 
under 
§ 943.10(1m)(c), burglary of a room within a dwelling under 
§ 943.10(1m)(f), and  burglary of a room within a vessel under 
§ 943.10(1m)(f).  The federal government disputes the frequency 
                                                 
8 The double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state 
constitutions are "intended to provide three protections:  
protection against a second prosecution for the same offense 
after acquittal; protection against a second prosecution for the 
same offense after conviction, and protection against multiple 
punishments for the same offense."  State v. Sauceda, 168 
Wis. 2d 486, 492, 485 N.W.2d 1 (1992). 
No. 
2018AP1346-CQ   
 
14 
 
of such overlap.  Undoubtedly, however, a defendant will 
oftentimes enter both a location specified under subsections 
(a)-(e) and a room within that location under subsection (f), 
resulting in more than one potential punishment for the same 
act. 
¶19 Recently, in denying an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim for failure to object to jury instructions, we 
confirmed that the locational alternatives in Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.10(1m)(a)-(f) are alternative factual means:  "[w]hile the 
circuit court could have used the phrase 'a room within a 
building' instead of the words 'office' or 'building,' the facts 
adduced would not confuse the jury as to what it was called upon 
to decide regardless of which of these words might be used."  
State v. Pinder, 2018 WI 106, ¶60, 384 Wis. 2d 416, 919 N.W.2d 
568.9  Ultimately, we upheld the defendant's conviction for 
burglary of locked rooms within a building regardless of 
"[w]hether one would consider that an office, a building, or a 
room within a building."  Id.  We conclude that based upon the 
nature of the proscribed conduct and the appropriateness of 
multiple 
punishments, 
the 
legislature 
intended 
that 
                                                 
9 Pinder claimed that the building entryways were open at 
the time of the alleged entry and therefore the instructions 
were legally incorrect because they referred to a situation that 
was not a violation of the law.  State v. Pinder, 2018 WI 106, 
¶¶58-59, 384 Wis. 2d 416, 919 N.W.2d 568.  Pinder further argued 
that 
the 
word 
"office" 
is 
not 
listed 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.10(1m)(a)-(f).  Id. 
No. 
2018AP1346-CQ   
 
15 
 
§ 943.10(1m)(a)-(f) set forth alternative means of committing 
one element of burglary and not elements of distinct crimes.   
 
 
III 
¶20 In sum, after analysis of the statutory text, the 
legislative history and context of the statute, the nature of 
the conduct, and the appropriateness of multiple punishments, we 
conclude 
that 
the 
locational 
alternatives 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.10(1m)(a)-(f) identify alternative means of committing one 
element 
of 
the 
crime 
of 
burglary 
under 
§ 943.10(1m).  
Accordingly, a unanimous finding of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt as to subsections (a)-(f) is not necessary to convict.  We 
therefore remand the cause to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit. 
By 
the 
Court.—Certified 
question 
answered 
and 
cause 
remanded.     
No.  2018AP1346-CQ.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶21 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority that Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1m) identifies a 
single crime with multiple modes of commission.   
¶22 I write separately, however, to address the majority's 
imprudent, sua sponte decision to modify the legal test adopted 
by this court in State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶¶14-15, 236 
Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833.   
¶23 In Derango, this court held that the following four 
factors should be considered when determining whether the 
legislature intended to create multiple offenses or a single 
offense with multiple modes of commission:  "1) the language of 
the statute, 2) the legislative history and context of the 
statute, 3) the nature of the proscribed conduct, and 4) the 
appropriateness of multiple punishment for the conduct."1 
¶24 Subsequently, in State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110, this court limited the circumstances under which 
legislative history could be consulted in interpreting a 
statute's meaning.  The Kalal court announced that "extrinsic 
sources 
of 
statutory 
interpretation" 
such 
as 
"items 
of 
legislative history" should not be consulted "except to resolve 
an ambiguity in the statutory language . . . ."2  "If the meaning 
                                                 
1 State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶15, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 
N.W.2d 833 (emphasis added); see also Manson v. State, 101 
Wis. 2d 413, 422, 304 N.W.2d 729 (1981); State v. Hammer, 216 
Wis. 2d 214, 220, 576 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1997). 
2 State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 
WI 58, ¶¶50-51, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
No.  2018AP1346-CQ.ssa 
 
2 
 
of the statute is plain," the inquiry ordinarily stops and 
extrinsic sources of statutory interpretation need not be 
consulted.3 
¶25 The majority concludes that "[t]he straightforward 
language of § 943.10(1m) creates one offense with multiple means 
of commission."4  Isn't this ordinarily the end of the inquiry 
under Kalal?5 
¶26 The majority attempts to reconcile Derango with Kalal 
by highlighting that, under Kalal, "legislative history is 
sometimes consulted 'to confirm or verify a plain-meaning 
interpretation'" of an unambiguous statute.6  The majority then 
examines the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1m) and 
confirms its "plain-meaning interpretation" that the statute 
creates a single offense with multiple modes of commission.7 
¶27 In my view, the majority has muddied that which it 
sought to clarify.  By hastily disposing of a significant legal 
issue8 without the benefit of adversarial briefing,9 the majority 
has raised more questions than it answered.  
                                                 
3 Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 
2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659). 
4 Majority op., ¶10. 
5 Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
¶45 
(quoting 
Seider, 
236 
Wis. 2d 211, ¶43). 
6 Majority op., ¶12 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51). 
7 See majority op., ¶¶12-17. 
8 That is, the effect of Kalal on Derango's four-factor 
test. 
No.  2018AP1346-CQ.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶28 For example, if the "straightforward language" of a 
statute creates one offense with multiple modes of commission, 
but the statute's legislative history suggests otherwise, what 
weight, if any, should be afforded to the legislative history?  
Under such circumstances, should the court disregard the 
legislative history altogether?   
¶29 Further, does it remain proper for courts to examine 
and give analytical weight to Derango's third and fourth 
factors?  That is, if the statute's language is plain and its 
plain meaning is confirmed by the statute's legislative history 
and context, what possible effect could the nature of the 
conduct or the appropriateness of multiple punishments have on 
the court's analysis? 
¶30 These are important and complicated legal questions.  
The people of Wisconsin deserve careful and considered answers 
to them, and in my view, "[t]he rule of law is generally best 
developed when matters are tested by the fire of adversarial 
briefs and oral arguments."10  "The fundamental premise of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Adversarial briefing of legal issues is important for the 
court to reach a sound decision.  Responding to a question at 
oral argument is unlikely to supply the requisite analytical 
detail to comprehensively resolve the issue.     
10 Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, ¶120, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 
N.W.2d 866 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
& 
Crooks, 
J., 
concurring) 
(overruled on other grounds by Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients 
Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216); see 
also Springer v. Nohl Elec. Prods. Corp., 2018 WI 48, ¶51, 381 
Wis. 2d 438, 912 N.W.2d 1 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); Data Key 
Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶70, 356 
Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
No.  2018AP1346-CQ.ssa 
 
4 
 
adversary process is that these advocates will uncover and 
present more useful information and arguments to the decision 
maker than would be developed by a judicial officer acting on 
his own in an inquisitorial system."11   
¶31 Because the majority makes the unwise decision to 
deviate 
from 
adversarial 
process 
by 
spontaneously, 
and 
incautiously, answering a complicated legal question on its own, 
I concur. 
  
                                                 
11 Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God:  A 
Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 
Tenn. L. Rev. 245, 247 (2002) (citing United States v. Burke, 
504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)); see also 
Allan D. Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 
27 Ford. L. Rev. 477, 493-94 (1958-59): 
When the appellate court considers a matter sua sponte 
for the first time it means that the litigants have 
not been given an opportunity to consider the matter 
and urge arguments in support of and against the 
position adopted by the reviewing court.  If the 
question 
had 
been 
raised 
there 
is 
at 
least 
a 
possibility that other facts or other authorities 
might have been presented which might have changed the 
court's attitude on the matter. 
No.  2018AP1346-CQ.ssa 
 
 
 
1