Case Title: Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Ryherd

Citation: 628 P.2d 557

Docket Number: 3635

State: alaska

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Date: 1981-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
628 P.2d 557 (1981) KENAI PENINSULA BOROUGH, Appellant, v. Clarence RYHERD, Appellee. No. 3635. Supreme Court of Alaska. May 22, 1981. *558 Andrew R. Sarisky, Soldotna, for appellant. Albert Maffei, Anchorage, for appellee. Before RABINOWITZ, C.J., and CONNOR, BURKE and MATTHEWS, JJ. MATTHEWS, Justice. In this case the Kenai Peninsula Borough Planning Commission sitting as a platting board disapproved a plat submitted by Ryherd. This disapproval was affirmed by the Borough Assembly sitting as a board of adjustment. On appeal from the decision of the Assembly the superior court reversed and remanded the case to the Assembly for remand to the Commission with directions to approve the plat. The Borough has appealed from the order of the superior court. We agree with the superior court that a remand is necessary, but we conclude that the court erred in directing the approval of the plat. The subdivision in question is called River Vista Subdivision. It is located within the City of Soldotna adjacent to the Kenai River. It consists of five blocks each of which roughly parallels the river; Block 5 is on the river bank and Block 4 abuts a high water slough. Ryherd proposed to dredge the slough and convert it into a private small boat harbor. According to the plat the 12 lots of Block 5, the 9 lots of Block 4, and a part of each of 7 lots of Block 3 lie within the flood plain of the Kenai River. The preliminary plat of River Vista Subdivision was submitted by Ryherd on July 1, 1975. With his submittal Ryherd noted that "Blocks 4 and 5 are intended for recreational use only, with no sewage disposal on the lots (chemical toilets or similar containers only)." The plat was first considered by the Planning Commission on July 7, 1975 and tabled at that time. At the July 7 meeting Ryherd stated that providing city water and sewer to all of the subdivision was not monetarily feasible. On July 21, 1975, the Planning Commission gave preliminary approval to the subdivision subject to, among other things, the recommendations of the City of Soldotna, obtaining required permits prior to the development of the boat harbor, and "The Kenai Peninsula Borough Planning Commission policy concerning the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation Wastewater Disposal Regulations." On February 17, 1976, Ryherd submitted a plat of Blocks 4 and 5 of the subdivision which he designated as River Vista Subdivision No. 1 for final approval to the Borough Planning Commission. The Commission disapproved the plat on February 23. According to the minutes of the meeting of that date, when the Planning Commission voted its disapproval Mr. Ryherd asked the Commission what its reasons for denial were so he could possibly cure them. The minutes reflect that after this request the following transpired: On March 1, 1976 Ryherd again sought final approval of the plat of Blocks 4 and 5. In his letter of submittal he noted that "[d]ue to the severe building restrictions on Blocks 4 and 5, dwelling construction is very unlikely in the near future. Summer recreation use of these lots is feasible, meanwhile." He submitted a letter from the State Department of Environmental Conservation, dated March 5, 1976 stating: The Commission met to consider Ryherd's renewed application on March 15, and again failed to approve the plat. Two of the members in the majority stated their reasons which are reflected in the following excerpt from the minutes: Ryherd appealed the Planning Commission's decision to the Borough Assembly sitting as a board of adjustment. The Assembly heard the appeal on April 6, 1976. At this hearing Mr. Ryherd, his attorney and his surveyor made statements as did Mrs. Dimmick, Planning Commission Chairman and Mr. Best, Planning Director. The statements of the surveyor, Mr. Parker, and Mrs. Dimmick are relevant to this appeal. As reflected in the minutes, they said: The minutes also note the following: The Assembly thereupon denied the appeal. On appeal to the superior court the case was submitted on briefs prepared by the parties based on the administrative record. The rationale of the trial court is reflected in the following extract from the court's written decision: After quoting the statement of Mrs. Dimmick as reflected in the minutes of the Assembly meeting of April 6, 1976, quoted above, the court continued: AS 29.33.150 provided, at the times relevant herein: AS 29.33.160(a) provided, at the times relevant herein: AS 29.33.245 provides: AS 29.33.080(b)(3) provides that the Planning Commission shall prepare and recommend to the Assembly, among other things, a subdivision ordinance. The subdivision ordinance of the Kenai Peninsula Borough is contained in Title 20 of the Code of Ordinances of the Borough. The first section of Title 20 states the purpose of the ordinance: KPB § 20.04.010. KPB 20.12.010 describes the purpose of the preliminary platting process: KPB 20.12.090 describes the effect of approval of a preliminary plat: KPB 20.16.170 concerns approval of a final plat. It provides: KPB 2.40.080 provides, in pertinent part: The basis for the trial court's decision is that the Assembly did not articulate any reasons for disapproval of the plat. There is no statute or ordinance requiring the Assembly to explain its action in these circumstances. However, the trial court's conclusion is consistent with previous decisions of this court. Thus in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Local Boundary Commission, 518 P.2d 92, 97 n. 11 (Alaska 1974), we stated: In Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 36-37 (Alaska 1976), at issue was a statute requiring the Director of the Division of Lands to find that the interests of the State would be best served by a proposed land disposition before making the disposition. We held that although the Director was not expressly obligated to make a formal written finding, at a minimum he was required to establish a record which reflected the basis for his decision. We noted that the purpose of this requirement would be "to ensure that [the decision] was not arbitrary, capricious, or prompted by corruption." Ibid. n. 20. The administrative action taken in Moore was informal, not adjudicative. Here, by contrast, the proceeding was of a formal and adjudicative character. In such cases findings and reasons have with near uniformity been required in other jurisdictions, see K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 1605, 444 (1958), while in cases such as Moore involving informal administrative action, more varied results have been reached. See K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies § 1600-9, 139-41 (1977 Cum. Supp.). We, therefore, have no hesitation in concluding that the superior court was correct in finding that the Assembly's action was defective because of the absence of a statement of reasons. With respect to the actions of the Commission there is a specific requirement. It is imposed by AS 29.33.160(a) which states in relevant part: Section 20.16.170(a) of the Kenai Peninsula Borough Ordinances elaborates on this requirement: *563 In this case the planning commission complied with the statute, at least minimally. It delivered to Ryherd a form entitled "Notice of Planning Commission Action" referring to the meeting of February 23, 1976 which stated: Attached to the form were the minutes of the meeting and included in the minutes were reasons given by two of the Planning Commissioners for their opposition to the plat as well as the statement of the Planning Director.[1] A similar practice was followed with respect to the March 15, 1976 Planning Commission meeting at which the plat was again disapproved. However, the Planning Commission did not comply with that portion of the ordinance which requires that the Commission note those sections of the subdivision ordinance on which the Commission is basing its action. Thus, the Planning Commission's conduct was also defective. In our view, the appropriate remedy in this case is to remand the case to the superior court with directions to remand the case to the Planning Commission. That is the course of action typically followed where an agency which has a duty to make written findings and conclusions has failed to do so. See, e.g., Public Service Commission v. Fort Wayne Union Railway Co., 232 Ind. 82, 111 N.E.2d 719 (1953); Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Site Evaluation Committee, 115 N.H. 163, 337 A.2d 778 (1975); Abbotts Dairies, Inc. v. Armstrong, 14 N.J. 319, 102 A.2d 372 (1954); State Board of Equalization v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 457 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 1969). In view of the considerable delay which has taken place since the Commission's last action, the Planning Commission should be instructed to hold an additional hearing, the proceedings of which should be recorded, on the request for final approval. If the Commission determines that denial is appropriate it should express its reasons and the underlying findings on which those reasons are based and, as required by the ordinance, it should cite the sections of the ordinance on which it relies. If the Commission determines that the plat should be approved, it should grant approval and express its reasons for that action.[2] *564 REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. COMPTON, J., not participating. BURKE, Justice, dissenting. I dissent. According to the borough's own ordinances, when a final subdivision plat is disapproved, "The [planning] commission ... shall transmit to the subdivider a copy of the minutes containing the commission's action and the commission's official statement of findings and reasons for [the] denial." KPC § 20.16.170(A) (emphasis added). The commission is also required to "note in its motion those sections of [the borough subdivision ordinances] with which the proposed final plat does not comply and the grounds for finding noncompliance." Id. (emphasis added). These requirements, I believe, are both procedural and substantive in nature. The procedural requirements are those requiring notice of the reasons for disapproval; they are obviously intended to inform the subdivider of what he must do in order to present an acceptable plan. The substantive requirement that I see is that the proposed plat must be approved unless it is found not to comply with some specific provision of the borough's subdivision ordinances. This, I believe, is reflected by the procedural requirement of notice of such non-compliance in every case where approval is denied. In the case at bar, the planning commission largely ignored these requirements, as did the borough assembly when it heard Ryherd's application de novo. Ryherd was notified, in writing, of the planning commission's disapproval of the final plat that he had submitted. Such notice, however, stated only: "Disapproved for the reasons listed in the attached minutes." The minutes attached to the notice were those of the commission's meeting at which final approval had been denied. Although they appear to reflect generally what took place at that time, including statements by several commission members of their individual reasons for voting against approval, they contain nothing that, in my opinion, could be considered an "official statement," by the commission of the commission's "findings and reasons [for] the denial." Nor do they note "those sections of [the borough's subdivision ordinances] with which the proposed final plat [failed to] comply" or any "grounds for finding noncompliance." Thus, the planning commission failed to comply with the procedural requirements of KPC § 20.16.170(A). When the matter came before the borough assembly, a majority of the members present voted not to approve the final plat, thereby affirming the planning commission's action. Again, however, there was no compliance with the requirements of KPC § 20.16.170(A). *565 Another provision of the borough's subdivision ordinances provides that if an application for approval of a final plat is "not acted upon within [a specified number of days] of receipt, the plat shall be deemed to have been approved and a certificate to the [sic] effect shall be issued by the commission on demand; provided, however that the applicant for plat approval may consent to the extension of such period." KPC § 20.16.170(B) (emphasis added). I interpret the foregoing section to mean that the plat shall be deemed to have been approved unless acted upon, within the time permitted, in accordance with the requirements of KPC § 20.16.170(A).[1] In the case at bar, those requirements appear to have been violated in the following respects. Procedurally, the borough failed to give notice of the findings and reasons for the denial, notice of those particular sections of the subdivision ordinance with which the plat failed to comply, and a statement of the grounds for the finding of non-compliance. This left the subdivider with no clear indication of what he was required to do in order to present an application that would be acceptable to the borough. Substantively, there is no indication that the disapproval was based upon the plat's failure to comply with any particular provision of the borough's subdivision requirements. Thus, I conclude that Ryherd was entitled to have his final plat "deemed approved." KPC § 20.16.170(B). I would affirm the judgment of the superior court. [1] The relevant portion of the minutes is set forth on pages 558-559 of this opinion. [2] A majority of the court believes that the question whether under the existing ordinance the Commission had authority to reject a subdivision because it is located in a flood plain need not be discussed. While entertaining serious reservations as to whether such authority exists as the ordinance is now drawn, the majority believes that a discussion of the point is unwarranted because it is not central to the case and would be merely advisory, and because it is not adequately briefed by the parties. The author of the opinion believes that the point should be reached, and, while the ordinance could be made more explicit, that there is authority under the ordinance for denying subdivision requests for lands located in a flood plain where there is a substantial showing that permitting the subdivision would pose significant health or safety hazards. One of the express purposes of the subdivision ordinance is to "protect and improve the health, safety and general welfare of the people." KPB 20.04.010. I view this clause as an implied grant of authority to the Commission to consider health and safety matters. It is conceivable that permitting a residential subdivision in a flood plain would pose significant health or safety problems. Therefore, I believe that the Planning Commission could conclude on a proper record that locating a residential subdivision in an area known to be particularly susceptible to flooding would pose such a significant health or safety problem that the plat proposed for such an area should not be approved. The authorities from other jurisdictions are divided as to whether a planning commission may disapprove a plat for general health and safety reasons. Authorities denying that power include Snyder v. Owensboro, 528 S.W.2d 663 (Ky. 1975) and Pieper v. Planning Board of Southborough, 340 Mass. 157, 163 N.E.2d 14 (1959). Authorities recognizing such a power include Pearson Kent Corp. v. Bear, 28 N.Y.2d 396, 322 N.Y.S.2d 235, 271 N.E.2d 218 (1971) and Forest Const. Co. v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n. of Bethany, 155 Conn. 669, 236 A.2d 917 (1967). In Pearson Kent the court stated: But the commission is not limited, in disapproving a subdivision, to an intrinsic evaluation of the subdivision itself. It may consider, among other things, the "safety" and "general welfare" of the county, including adjacent areas. 322 N.Y.S.2d at 236, 271 N.E.2d at 219. In Forest Const. Co. the court said with reference to a general regulation giving the planning commission the right to reject an application which might be "hazardous to the health and welfare" of the community, It is unreasonable to demand detailed standards which are impracticable or impossible ... Although some of the standards may be general in their terms, they are reasonably sufficient to identify the criteria to be evaluated in their enforcement in order to meet the many variables involved since it would be impossible to establish one standard which would adequately cover all future cases. 236 A.2d at 923. Antieau, has quoted the immediately foregoing statement with approval, noting: Planning boards would be confronted with an impossible task if they were obligated to narrowly state the standards which a subdivider must comply with in order to secure plat approval. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law, § 8 A. 03, p. 8A-8 Supp. to Volume 1A (1980). I agree with this position. The ordinance could be improved by specifying and, so far as possible, quantifying, those health and safety hazards which can justify disapproval of a subdivision. However, in the final analysis, I believe that a general catch-all clause will be necessary because there are so many circumstances related to health and safety which might justify denying a particular subdivision in a particular place that it is not possible to provide with specificity for each one. [1] It should be emphasized that only "the applicant for plat approval may consent to the extension of such period." KPC § 20.16.170(B) (emphasis added).