Case Title: Re Chittenden Recycling Services

Citation: 162 Vt. 84, 643 A.2d 1204

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-05-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
RE_CHITTENDEN_RECYCLING_SERVICES.93-419; 162 Vt. 84; 643 A.2d 1204

[Opinion Filed May 27, 1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 93-419


 Re Chittenden Recycling Services             Supreme Court
 and Chittenden Solid Waste District
 (Casella Waste Management, Inc.,
 Appellant)
                                              On Appeal from
                                              Waste Facility Panel

                                              March Term, 1994



 Elizabeth Courtney, Chair

 Charles F. Storrow of Kimbell & Storrow, Montpelier for appellant

 Jon T. Anderson and Andrew H. Montroll of Burak & Anderson, Burlington, for
   appellee

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and John W. Kessler, Assistant
    Attorney General, Montpelier, for amicus curiae State



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      JOHNSON, J.   Casella Waste Management, Inc. appeals from an order of the
 Environmental Board Waste Facility Panel denying it party status in proceedings
 under Act 250 and Act 78 to permit and certify a materials recovery facility 
 proposed by the Chittenden Solid Waste District (District).  We affirm.
      The District is a union municipal district, formed in 1987 to comply with
 Act 78 and representing all of the organized municipalities in Chittenden 
 County except Bolton and Underhill.  Its purpose is to provide for the 
 management of solid waste generated by its member municipalities.  To advance

 

 its recycling program, the District planned a recycling center
 called a material recovery facility (MRF), designed to accept and process
 recyclables in mixed rather than in presorted form, which, according to the
 District, offers benefits to consumers and haulers.
      The District applied for two permits to operate the MRF, an Act 78
 interim certification from the Agency of Natural Resources (Agency) and an
 Act 250 land use permit from the District #4 Environmental Commission.
 Casella opposed interim certification of the MRF under Act 78, as proposed
 by the secretary of the Agency.  When interim certification was granted,
 Casella sought party status as an appellant before the Waste Facility Panel,
 arguing that under 10 V.S.A. { 6102(c), "a person shall be entitled to
 participate as a party under the standards for party status in [V.R.C.P.
 24]" and that it qualified.  The Panel denied Casella party status.
      Casella also moved to intervene as a party in the Act 250 permitting
 process.  The Commission allowed Casella to participate as a provisional
 party, postponing a final ruling until after the hearing.  At that time the
 Commission denied party status, concluding that Casella "failed to show how
 its property interest would be affected by the project," and that it "failed
 to show how it could materially assist the Commission by providing testimony
 or cross-examination."  The Commission issued the Act 250 Permit to the
 District, and Casella appealed to the Waste Facility Panel of the Environ-
 mental Board.(FN1)

 

      The Waste Facility Panel consolidated Casella's appeals and concluded
 that its interests were insufficient to support party status in either the
 Act 78 or the Act 250 proceeding.  The present appeals followed and are
 consolidated for review.
                                 I.  Act 78
      Casella argues that it was entitled to party status in the Act 78
 interim certification process of the Agency under 10 V.S.A. { 6102(c), which
 provides in part that "a person shall be entitled to participate as a party
 under the standards for party status in [V.R.C.P. 24]."(FN2) Casella argues
 that it qualifies under Rule 24(a)(2).  To qualify under that rule, Casella
 had to establish that (1) it had "an interest relating to the property or
 transaction which is the subject of the action," (2) the disposition of the
 proceeding before the Panel might "impair or impede [its] ability to protect
 that interest," and (3) its interest was not adequately represented by
 existing parties.
      The Panel concluded that Casella did not meet the Rule 24(a)(2)
 elements and denied Casella party status as to the Agency's certification.
 The Panel reasoned:
           [A]ppellant's interest in preventing illegal flow
           control does not constitute an interest in the MRF or
           Certification for purposes of V.R.C.P. 24(a)(2).  The
           Appellant is not financially liable in any respect for
           the MRF or its operation pursuant to the terms and con-
           ditions of the Certification and Permit.  While the
           Appellant has an economic interest at stake as a com-

 

           petition to the Permittees, it is not one which gives
           rise to an interest in the Certification or MRF.

     We note at the outset that the standard of review in this matter is
 abuse of discretion.  Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v.
 Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 1992) (construing parallel federal
 rule).  Abuse of discretion requires a showing that the Panel "withheld its
 discretion entirely or that it was exercised for clearly untenable reasons
 or to a clearly untenable extent."  Vermont Nat'l Bank v. Clark, 156 Vt.
 143, 145, 588 A.2d 621, 622 (1991).  Casella has failed establish that the
 Panel abused its discretion.
      As to the first element required for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2),
 we agree that Casella has no interest in either the "property" comprising
 the MRF or the "transaction" involving interim certification of MRF.
 Casella claims no ownership interest, mortgage, liens or attachments or any
 other similar interest in the property in question.  Neither does Casella
 demonstrate a greater interest in the subject matter of the interim certi-
 fication -- preventing illegal flow control -- than any other member of the
 public.  Casella's memorandum of law before the Panel acknowledged as much,
 stating as follows:
           Casella's pre-existing recycling enterprise will be
           directly impacted by the interim certification of the
           District's recycling facility because operation of the
           District's recycling facility will be in direct com-
           petition with Casella's facility.  At a minimum, Casella
           has an interest in assuring that any interim certifi-
           cation that might be issued by the Panel be conditioned
           to prohibit the exercise of illegal flow control by the
           District in the operation of the facility.

 The first sentence of the memorandum indicates only that Casella has an
 "interest" in its own facility, and the second states an "interest" that

 

 Casella shares with members of the public who might be affected by the
 results of any illegal flow control activities by MRF.
               It is true that 10 V.S.A. { 6605b(b)(1) and (2) set forth
 certification criteria that touch on economics:
             (b) The secretary shall not issue an interim certifi-
              cation without affirmatively finding:

              (1) that the operation of the solid waste manage-
              ment facility is necessary and will result in some
              public benefit;

              (2) that there is no present, reasonable, alter-
              native means for waste disposal; . . . .

 It is also true that the existence of Casella's facilities bears on this
 determination.  But these economic issues look to the protection of the
 general public, not to competitors of the MRF.  Cf. In re Vt. Pub. Power
 Supply Auth., 140 Vt. 424, 432,