Case Title: Britt v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2008-09-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Britt v. State1987 WY 35734 P.2d 980Case Number: 86-207Decided: 04/01/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
Micky D. 
BRITT, Appellant (Defendant)

 
 
v.

 
 
The 
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff)

Wyoming 
Public Defender Program: Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender; Martin J. 
McClain, Deputy State Public Defender; Cheyenne; Wyoming Defender Aid Program: 
Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, and Matthew H. Mead, Student Intern, Laramie, for 
Appellant.

 
 
A.G. 
McClintock, Attorney General; Allen C. Johnson, Deputy Attorney General; John W. 
Renneisen, Senior Assistant Attorney General; S. Jane Caton, Assistant Attorney 
General, Cheyenne, for Appellee. 

 
 
Brown, 
C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ. 

 
 
Brown, 
Chief Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal is from the 
DistrictCourtofFremontCounty after appellant was 
found guilty of aggravated burglary, and sentenced to a term of not less than 
five nor more than ten years in the penitentiary.

 
 

[¶2.]     The issues on appeal 
are:

 
 
"I

"Is a 
gun for purposes of Wyoming Statute Section 
6-1-104(iv) (1977) always to be considered a deadly weapon without regard 
to the manner it is used or is intended to be used?

 
 
"II

"Is it 
proper to convict a person under Wyoming Statute 
Section 6-3-301(a)(c)(i) (1977) when the only weapons in the possession 
of the defendant are weapons obtained in the course of the 
burglary?

 
 
"III

"Where 
the statute may be read in two equally reasonable ways, is the defendant 
entitled under the rule of lenity to have the doubt resolved in his 
favor?"

 
 

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

 
 

[¶4.]     On October 13, 1985, at 
about 10:30 p.m., appellant Micky Britt and two companions went to The Depot, a 
complex containing three businesses: the Frontier Gun Shop, The Breadboard and 
the Chamber of Commerce office. Earlier they had decided to burglarize the gun 
shop. After parking their vehicle a short distance from The Depot appellant 
threw a stone through The Breadboard window, apparently to see if there was a 
burglar alarm. He then ran back to the car where the others were waiting. The 
three drove around for about fifteen minutes, and then went back to The Depot. 
At The Depot they went through the window to get inside The Breadboard, thence 
into the adjoining Frontier Gun Shop.

 
 

[¶5.]     Once inside the 
Frontier Gun Shop, the trio took ten weapons, some semi-automatic, and some 
fully automatic, and ammunition. One weapon was a Beretta .22 caliber automatic 
with silencer. Thereafter, a loaded gun was taken by Billie DeHerrera. During 
the burglary none of the three used nor threatened to use the 
guns.

 
 

[¶6.]     While appellant 
admitted to the facts just recited, he maintains that he is not guilty of 
aggravated burglary. He argues that a gun is not a deadly weapon unless it is 
used in a manner or intended to be used in a manner reasonably capable of 
producing death or serious bodily injury. Appellant contends that an aggravated 
burglary conviction is improper when guns gained in the course of the burglary 
are taken as loot, and not used or intended to be used in a manner reasonably 
capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. Appellant also argues that 
if there is an ambiguity in the deadly weapon statute it must be resolved in his 
favor.

 
 

[¶7.]     In a trial before the 
court, sitting without a jury, appellant was found guilty of aggravated burglary 
as charged.

 
 
I

 
 

[¶8.]     Section 6-1-104(a)(iv), 
W.S.1977 (June 
1983 Replacement), provides:

 
 
"'Deadly 
weapon' means but is not limited to firearm, explosive or incendiary material, 
motorized vehicle, an animal or other device, instrument, material or substance, 
which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is reasonably capable 
of producing death or serious bodily injury."

 
 

[¶9.]     In Meadows v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 551 S.W.2d 253, 256 (1977), the court 
cited with approval:

 
 
"The 
established rule on the subject is that where the weapon is of such character as 
to admit of but one conclusion in that respect, the question whether or not it 
is deadly * * * * is one of law; but where the weapon employed is such that its 
deadly character depends upon the manner and circumstances of its use, the 
question is one of fact for the jury. [Citations.]" Owens v. Commonwealth, 187 Ky. 207, 218 S.W. 719, 720 
(1920).

 
 
See 
also, Simmons v. State, Wyo., 674 P.2d 1294 
(1984); Evanson v. State, Wyo., 546 P.2d 412 
(1976); Shafsky v. State, Wyo., 526 P.2d 60 
(1974).

 
 

[¶10.]  According to Black's Law Dictionary, p. 
359 (5th Ed. 1979) a "deadly weapon per se" is defined as "[a] weapon which of 
itself is deadly or one which would ordinarily result in death by its use; e.g., 
gun."

 
 

[¶11.]  The court heard ample testimony to 
conclude that these guns were "deadly weapons."

 
 
"(THE 
WITNESS): This is a Beretta .22 automatic with a silencer on the front of it. * 
* * * But it is not fully automatic, but it is very silent, and I guess that's 
what it's used for, assassinations, if you've seen them on television or some of 
the movies and stuff.

"THE 
COURT: Is there any logical use that a sportsman would have for a 
silencer?

"* * * 
*

"Q. 
Under the laws of the State of Wyoming, a silenced weapon is not legal for 
hunting; is it, sir?

"A. I 
don't believe it is, no. It's not legal to hunt.

"THE 
COURT: So this gun is just used for one purpose, and that's to kill 
people?

"THE 
WITNESS: Yes, Ma'am. That's the only thing I can think it would be used 
for."

 
 

[¶12.]  It is difficult to imagine that the 
weapons stolen in this burglary, particularly the gun with a silencer, had any 
purpose other than to kill people.

 
 

[¶13.]  We hold, therefore, that the trial court 
correctly determined that, as a matter of law as well as a matter of fact, the 
guns stolen from the gun shop were "deadly weapons" as defined by § 6-1-104(a)(iv).

 
 
II

 
 

[¶14.]  In his second issue appellant argues that 
the weapons were merely "loot" and that he did not intend to use them in the 
burglary; therefore, he cannot be guilty of aggravated 
burglary.

 
 

[¶15.]  Section 6-3-301(c)(i), 
W.S.1977 (June 
1983 Replacement), provides:

 
 
"* * * 
*

"(c) 
Aggravated burglary is a felony punishable by imprisonment * * * * if, in the 
course of committing the crime of burglary, the person:

 
 
"(i) Is 
or becomes armed with or uses a deadly weapon or a simulated deadly 
weapon."

 
 

[¶16.]  According to the statute there are 
several different acts that may constitute aggravated burglary -- one being that 
when, in the course of committing a burglary, the actor "becomes armed with" a 
deadly weapon. A plain reading of the statute indicates that using a deadly 
weapon is not required in order to constitute aggravated 
burglary.

 
 
"* * * * 
A person is 'armed' with a deadly weapon when such weapon is within his 
immediate control and available for use in the crime." State v. Romero, 135 
Ariz. 102, 659 P.2d 655, 658 (1982).

 
 

[¶17.]  Appellant seems to suggest that there is 
a meaningful distinction between possession of a deadly weapon and "armed with a 
deadly weapon." Under the circumstances of this case, however, there is no 
significant difference between being in possession and being armed.1

 
 

[¶18.]  By enhancing the penalty for burglary, 
while armed with a deadly weapon, the legislature apparently intended that both 
the use and the possession of a deadly weapon be deterred. Possession of a 
deadly weapon inside a building or fleeing from the building certainly tends to 
escalate a dangerous situation. A burglar might very well enter a building not 
intending to use a weapon but if he were confronted by the police or owner of 
the building while inside or fleeing, use of the weapon in some manner would 
likely follow. It seems obvious that the legislature intended that any 
possession of a deadly weapon be discouraged. Potential dangerousness is a 
distinguishing factor between simple burglary and aggravated burglary. Meadows v. Commonwealth, supra.

 
 

[¶19.]  The notion that guns taken as "loot" in a 
burglary are not "deadly weapons" was addressed in State v. Luna, 99 
N.M. 76, 653 P.2d 1222 (1982). There the New Mexico court determined that such a 
contention failed to recognize the legislative intent of the aggravated burglary 
statute which was aimed at deterring both the stealing of guns and the use of 
firearms during the perpetration of a burglary. We agree with the New Mexico 
court.

 
 
III

 
 

[¶20.]  In appellant's third issue he contends 
that if there is any ambiguity in § 
6-1-104(a)(iv), it must be resolved in favor of appellant. We do not 
disagree. In this case, however, the statute which defines "deadly weapon" is 
not ambiguous. See § 6-1-104(a)(iv). The 
intent of the legislature in passing the aggravated burglary statute, § 6-3-301(c)(i), would be defeated if the strained 
interpretation of the "deadly weapon" statute that the appellant proposes were 
to prevail.

 
 

[¶21.]  As stated earlier in State v. Luna, 
supra, the defendants asserted that because they took guns as "loot" they 
were not armed with a deadly weapon. That court, however, found that such an 
interpretation failed to recognize the legislative intent of the aggravated 
burglary statute to deter both the stealing of guns and the possession or use of 
firearms during the course of a burglary. Id., at 1223. The court explained 
that:

 
 
"The 
adoption of several statutes (classifying aggravated burglary), evinces a clear 
legislative intention to deter the commission of burglaries and the possession 
of firearms during such crimes. The legislature has provided that a defendant 
who commits a crime when armed with a deadly weapon or who arms himself with a 
firearm during the perpetration of the crime should receive a greater sentence * 
* * *." Id. at 1223.

 
 

[¶22.]  This court recently addressed the issue 
of statutory interpretation in Oakley v. 
State, Wyo., 715 P.2d 1374 (1986), quoting the principles 
explained in State v. Stern, Wyo., 526 P.2d 344 (1974), 
stating,

 
 
"'* * * 
* that where legislative intent is discernible a court should give effect to 
that intent [Citation.] and that while generally speaking penal statutes are to 
be strictly construed, they need not be given over narrow meanings in disregard 
of the obvious purpose of the legislative body [Citations.].'" Id., at 1380.

 
 

[¶23.]  As stated in Oakley v. State, 
supra, at 1380: "This court seeks to avoid absurd results otherwise 
occasioned by strained interpretations. * * * *" It would be absurd for this 
court to determine that the items stolen from the Frontier Gun Shop did not fit 
in the category, "deadly weapons."

 
 

[¶24.]  We hold that appellant was properly 
charged and convicted under the aggravated burglary 
statute.

 
 

[¶25.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Arguably, under some circumstances (not 
present here), it might be appropriate to make a distinction between being in 
possession and being armed with a deadly weapon. Appellant might be asking this 
court to give him guidance by describing circumstances under which a burglar 
could steal guns and not be subject to the aggravated burglary statute. We 
decline to give this advice.