Case Title: Mary Aiello v. Village of Pleasant Prairie

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1995AP001352-FT

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1996-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-1352-FT 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :               
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Mary Aiello, 
Robert Styles and 
Marcia Styles, 
 
 
Petitioners-Appellants-
Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
 
Village of Pleasant Prairie, 
 
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 19, 1996 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded. 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, Aiello v. Village of 
Pleasant Prairie, 196 Wis. 2d 972, 540 N.W.2d 236 (Ct. App. 
1995), affirming an order of the circuit court for Kenosha 
County, Michael S. Fisher, Judge. The circuit court dismissed the 
appeal of property owners Mary Aiello and Marcia and Robert 
Styles from the special assessment of the Village of Pleasant 
Prairie for installation of municipal water and sewer services. 
The sole question of law presented in the circuit court, 
court of appeals and this court is whether the circuit court may 
proceed to hear an appeal from the Village’s special assessment 
when the property owners, instead of executing a bond in 
 
 
No.  95-1352-FT 
 
 
2
accordance with the text of Wis. Stat. § 66.60(12)(a) (1993-94),
1 
posted a cash deposit. We determine questions of law de novo, 
benefiting from the analyses of the circuit court and court of 
appeals. 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 66.60(12)(a), when read with 
Wis. Stat. § 895.346, authorizes a cash deposit in lieu of a 
bond. Accordingly we conclude that the circuit court may proceed 
with the appeal. The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings. 
For the purposes of this review the facts are not in 
dispute. In 1992 the Village of Pleasant Prairie extended 
municipal water and sewer services to the property owners. When 
the work was complete, the Village levied a special assessment 
against each property, one in the amount of $27,841.75 and the 
other in the amount of $52,481.90. 
                     
1 Wis. Stat. § 66.60(12)(a) provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
If any person having an interest in any parcel of land 
affected by any determination of the governing body, 
pursuant to sub. (8)(c), (10) or (11), feels aggrieved 
thereby that person may, within 90 days after the date 
of the notice or of the publication of the final 
resolution pursuant to sub.(8)(d), appeal therefrom to 
the circuit court of the county in which such property 
is situated by causing a written notice of appeal to be 
served upon the clerk of such city, town or village and 
by executing a bond to the city, town or village in the 
sum of $150 with 2 sureties or a bonding company to be 
approved with the city, town, or village clerk, 
conditioned for the faithful prosecution of such appeal 
and the payment of all costs that may be adjudged 
against that person.  
All further statutory references are to the 1993-94 
Statutes.  
 
 
No.  95-1352-FT 
 
 
3
On December 5, 1994, the owners of each of the two parcels 
of real estate made $150 cash payments to the Kenosha County 
Clerk of Circuit Court for their appeal under § 66.60(12). The 
clerk accepted the payment and issued a receipt stating, “BOND 
$300 FOR APPELLANTS SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS.”  
The Village sought dismissal of the proceeding, asserting 
that because the property owners failed to comply with the bond 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 66.60(12)(a) the circuit court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Section 66.60(12)(a) provides 
that a person with an interest in a parcel may appeal “by 
executing a bond to the . . . village in the sum of $150 with 2 
sureties or a bonding company to be approved by the . . . village 
clerk, conditioned for the faithful prosecution of such appeal 
and the payment of all costs that may be adjudged against that 
person.” The property owners posted a cash deposit rather than 
executing 
a 
bond 
conforming 
to 
the 
requirements 
of 
§ 66.60(12)(a). Nothing in § 66.60(12)(a) expressly authorizes a 
cash deposit in lieu of a bond.  
The circuit court held that the bond was a jurisdictional 
requirement which had not been satisfied and that therefore the 
circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s order of 
dismissal on the ground of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
The court of appeals relied on Bialk v. City of Oak Creek, 98 
Wis. 2d 469, 297 N.W.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1980), in which the party 
did not comply with § 66.60(12)(f) and § 66.60(12)(a). Bialk held 
that paragraphs (f) and (a) of § 66.60(12) make compliance with 
 
 
No.  95-1352-FT 
 
 
4
procedures stated in § 66.60(12) mandatory for maintenance of 
such an appeal. Id. at 474.  
Paragraph (f) of § 66.60(12) requires payment of the special 
assessment and mandates dismissal of the appeal if such payment 
is not made. Bialk relied on Atkins v. City of Glendale, 67 Wis. 
2d 43, 53-54, 226 N.W.2d 190 (1975), and Singer Bros. v. City of 
Glendale, 33 Wis. 2d 579, 584-85, 148 N.W.2d 100 (1967), which 
concluded that failure to comply with § 66.60(12)(f) causes a 
dismissal of the appeal.  
Paragraph (a) of § 66.60(12), in addition to requiring a 
bond, requires that notice of appeal be served within a 90-day 
period. Section 66.60(12)(a) has no language similar to the 
language in § 66.60(12)(f) requiring a dismissal if the bond or 
90-day period are not met. The Bialk court concluded, however, 
that because the party failed to comply with the 90-day period 
the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
2 The 
§ 66.60(12)(a) bond requirement in issue in the present case was 
not in issue in Bialk. 
Thus Bialk, Atkins and Singer are distinguishable from the 
case at bar. 
The right of the property owners to proceed in the circuit 
court is set forth in § 66.60(12). Section 66.60(12)(e) provides 
that "[a]n appeal under this subsection shall be the sole remedy 
of any person aggrieved by a determination of the governing 
body." If the statutory requirements for processing an appeal are 
                     
2 Bornemann v. City of New Berlin, 27 Wis. 2d 102, 109-11, 
133 N.W.2d 328 (1965), also suggests that the time requirement of 
§ 66.60(12)(a) must be strictly adhered to.  
 
 
No.  95-1352-FT 
 
 
5
to have meaning, they must be adhered to. Compliance with the 
statutory provisions prescribing the manner for proceeding in the 
circuit court serves the public policy of maintaining an orderly 
and uniform way of conducting court business.  
The property owners argue that a cash deposit fulfills the 
purposes of the statutorily required bond.
3 The Village argues 
that if a cash deposit may substitute for a § 66.60(12)(a) bond, 
the cash deposit must be authorized by statute, not by the court. 
We conclude that a cash deposit is authorized by statute. 
While § 66.60(12)(a) does not authorize a cash deposit to serve 
as a bond, another statute does. Section 895.346 authorizes a 
cash deposit in lieu of “any bond or undertaking . . . in any 
civil or criminal action or proceeding.”
4 The court of appeals 
erred by failing to consider Wis. Stat. § 895.346 in interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 66.60(12)(a). 
We agree with the reasoning and conclusion of court of 
appeals Judge Nettesheim’s dissent in this case, 196 Wis. 2d at 
                     
3 An appeal bond is meant to protect one in whose favor a 
judgment is rendered and to prevent frivolous and vexatious 
litigation. We do not discuss whether a cash deposit meets the 
objectives of an appeal bond, because reliance on the argument 
that a substitute is as effective as the statutorily required 
mechanism is not needed to decide the issue presented. 
4 Wis. Stat. § 895.346 provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
Bail, deposit in lieu of bond. When any bond or 
undertaking is authorized in any civil or criminal 
action or proceeding, the would-be obligor may, in lieu 
thereof and with like legal effect, deposit with the 
proper court or officer cash or certified bank checks 
or U.S. bonds or bank certificates of deposit in an 
amount at least equal to the required security.  
 
 
No.  95-1352-FT 
 
 
6
977-80. Sections 66.60(12)(a) and 895.346 relate to the same 
subject matter; they should be construed together and harmonized. 
Cornell University v. Rusk Co., 166 Wis. 2d 811, 481 N.W.2d 485 
(Ct. App. 1992). The two statutes, read together, offer 
alternative methods by which a party may provide the requisite 
surety. We adopt Judge Nettesheim’s dissent as our opinion.  
The Village disputes the harmonization of §§ 895.346 and 
66.60(12)(a). First, the Village contends that the title of 
§ 895.346, “bail, deposit in lieu of bond,” evidences the 
legislative intent that § 895.346 be applicable only to bail and 
not to bonds generally. Although titles are not part of statutes, 
Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6), they may be helpful in interpretation. 
Nevertheless text must control over title. The text of § 895.346 
is not limited to bail bonds; it expressly applies to “any bond”. 
Second, the Village argues that the Comment to § 895.346, 
prepared in 1947 by the Advisory Committee on Rules of Pleading, 
Practice and Procedure to the Supreme Court, demonstrates the 
legislature's intent that § 895.346 be limited to bail bonds. The 
Comment states in full: “There is a need of a rule to permit the 
deposit of cash or its equivalent in lieu of a bail bond.”
5 
Neither the 1947 report of the Advisory Committee nor the 
Village’s brief gives us any further information about the 
Advisory Committee’s draft of § 895.346 or the import of its 
Comment on § 895.346. That a rule is needed to permit the deposit 
of cash in lieu of a bail bond does not necessarily mean that the 
                     
5 The Comment is reprinted in West’s Wis. Stats. Ann. 
§ 895.346 (1983). 
 
 
No.  95-1352-FT 
 
 
7
statute was intended to be limited to bail bonds. The text of 
§ 895.346 extends beyond bail bonds. The Advisory Committee’s 
enigmatic Comment cannot, without more, be used to contradict the 
words of the statute.  
Third, the Village asserts that the text of § 895.346 
applies to bonds that are “authorized,” rather than to bonds that 
are “required.” Because the § 66.60(12)(a) bond in the case at 
bar is required, the Village asserts that § 895.346 does not 
apply to it. The Village argues that had the legislature intended 
§ 895.346 to apply to bonds that are “required” it would have 
used the language it used in § 895.345 referring to bonds that 
are either “authorized or required.” Sections 895.345 and 895.346 
cover different subjects. There is nothing to indicate that the 
legislature intended the difference in the language of the two 
statutes to have the significance that the Village attributes to 
it. 
The arguments of the Village challenging Judge Nettesheim’s 
dissenting opinion are not persuasive. We adopt the dissenting 
opinion 
and 
read 
§§ 66.60(12)(a) 
and 
895.346 
together. 
Accordingly we conclude that the property owners’ cash deposit in 
the case at bar is in compliance with § 66.60(12)(a) when 
correctly read with § 895.346. We therefore reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals.  
 
By the Court.The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded.  
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
 
95-1352-FT 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Mary Aiello, Robert Styles and Marcia Styles, 
 
 
 
 
Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Village of Pleasant Prairie, 
 
 
 
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  196 Wis. 2d 972, 540 N.W.2d 236 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed:  
December 19, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
October 18, 1996 
Oral Argument:  
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
 
MICHAEL FISHER 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For 
the 
petitioners-appellants-petitioners 
there were briefs and oral argument by James F. Kracmer, 
Kenosha. 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief by James 
H. Baxter, III and Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee and oral 
argument by James H. Baxter, III.