Case Title: P. v. Dungo

Citation: 

Docket Number: S176886M

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 12/12/12 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S176886 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C055923 
REYNALDO SANTOS DUNGO, 
) 
 
 
) 
San Joaquin County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SF100023A 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
 
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND 
DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING 
THE COURT: 
The opinion in this case, filed October 15, 2012, and appearing at 55 Cal.4th 608, 
is modified as follows: 
1.  The third full paragraph of text on page 613 of 55 Cal.4th is modified to 
read:  
 
The police arrested defendant, and he eventually admitted killing Pina.  He 
said:  After he and Pina left the Torres‘s home the night of April 14, 2006, 
they argued at Pina‘s home.  Pina told him to leave and began throwing 
some of his belongings in a box.  She punched defendant lightly on the 
chin, pushed him, and threw some children‘s toys at him.  He grabbed her 
by the throat and strangled her.  He then wrapped her body in a blanket, put 
it in her SUV, and drove around aimlessly, eventually abandoning the SUV 
on the Stockton street where the police later found it. 
2.  Footnote 5, at page 620 of 55 Cal.4th, is modified to read:   
 
Defendant contends that even if the statements in nontestifying Dr. 
Bolduc‘s autopsy report lacked the requisite formality, the Sixth 
Amendment‘s confrontation right also applies to what Justice Thomas 
called ― ‗technically informal statements‘ ‖ if those statements were ― ‗used 
to evade the formalized process.‘ ‖  (Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. ___, 
fn. 5 [132 S.Ct. at p. 2260, fn. 5] (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.).)  Defendant 
argues that this exception applies here.  We need not decide the issue, 
however.  Justice Thomas has made clear, in the language quoted above, 
that any such exception applies only to the formality requirement for 
testimonial out-of-court statements.  But formality is not enough to make an 
extrajudicial statement testimonial; the statement must also have a primary 
purpose pertaining to the investigation and prosecution of a crime.  
(People v. Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th 569, 582 [―all nine high court justices 
agree that an out-of-court statement is testimonial only if its primary 
purpose pertains in some fashion to a criminal prosecution‖ (italics 
added)].)  As we will explain (see text discussion, post), the autopsy 
statements upon which Dr. Lawrence relied for his opinions had no such 
primary purpose. 
These modifications do not affect the judgment. 
The petition for rehearing is denied. 
 
Corrigan, J., is of the opinion the petition should be granted. 
 
 
 
1 
Filed 10/15/12 (unmodified version) (see lead case, S177046, and companion case, S176213, also filed 10/15/12) 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S176886 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C055923 
REYNALDO SANTOS DUNGO, 
) 
 
 
) 
San Joaquin County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SF100023A 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants a criminal 
defendant the right to confront adverse witnesses.  This is the second in a trio of cases 
before us involving that right.  The two companion cases are People v. Lopez (Oct. 15, 
2012, S177046) ___ Cal.4th ___, and People v. Rutterschmidt (Oct. 15, 2012, S176213) 
___ Cal.4th ___. 
At defendant Reynaldo Santos Dungo‘s murder trial, a forensic pathologist 
testifying for the prosecution described to the jury objective facts about the condition of 
the victim‘s body as recorded in the autopsy report and accompanying photographs.  
Based on those facts, the expert gave his independent opinion that the victim had died of 
strangulation.  Neither the autopsy report, which was prepared by another pathologist 
who did not testify, nor the photographs were introduced into evidence.  Unlike the Court 
of Appeal, we conclude that the expert‘s testimony did not give rise to a right by 
defendant to question the preparer of the autopsy report.   
 
 
 
2 
I 
A.  Facts 
Defendant and Lucinda Correia Pina became romantically involved in 2005.  Pina 
lived in Stockton, San Joaquin County, and was in the process of divorcing her husband.  
Defendant and his daughter also lived in Stockton, but his wife and son were staying with 
his wife‘s grandparents in Seaside, Monterey County.  Defendant‘s wife viewed this as a 
temporary separation, and she talked regularly to defendant, but defendant told Pina that 
he and his wife were divorced. 
In April 2006, defendant‘s friends noticed that he was exhibiting ―controlling 
behavior‖ towards Pina.  Pina told friends and relatives that defendant was ―smothering 
her‖ and she wanted to end their relationship.  That same month, defendant, while at 
Pina‘s house, answered a telephone call to Pina from Isaac Zuniga, who had a prior 
sexual relationship with Pina; defendant threatened to kill Zuniga if he continued to call 
Pina.  Later, on April 14, Zuniga told Pina about the call.  That evening, defendant and 
Pina went to visit Felipe and Angelique Torres.  Pina complained to Angelique that 
defendant had told Zuniga to stop calling her, and Pina said she was considering raising 
the issue with defendant.   
The next morning, defendant went to see Pina‘s mother and asked if she knew 
where Pina was.  Defendant said that while he was at Pina‘s house the previous night, 
Pina received a telephone call from Zuniga and then left to meet Zuniga.  Pina‘s sport 
utility vehicle (SUV) was not at her house.  Pina‘s mother then tried repeatedly to reach 
Pina on her cellphone, without success.  That afternoon, the mother called the police.   
Local news media reported Pina‘s disappearance, and they described Pina and her 
SUV.  Thereafter, a Stockton resident told the police that an SUV matching the 
description was parked on her street.  Police officers found Pina‘s body in the vehicle.   
The police arrested defendant, and he eventually admitted killing Pina.  He said:  
After he and Pina left the Torres‘s home the night of April 14, 2006, they argued at 
 
3 
Pina‘s home.  Pina punched defendant lightly on the chin, pushed him, and threw some 
children‘s toys at him.  She told him to leave and began throwing some of his belongings 
in a box.  He grabbed her by the throat and strangled her.  He then wrapped her body in a 
blanket, put it in her SUV, and drove around aimlessly, eventually abandoning the SUV 
on the Stockton street where the police later found it.   
B.  Trial Court Proceedings 
Defendant was charged with Pina‘s murder.  Before trial, the prosecution informed 
the trial court that pathologist George Bolduc, who had performed the autopsy of Pina‘s 
body, would not be called as an expert witness.  Instead, the prosecution‘s witness would 
be forensic pathologist Robert Lawrence, who at the time of trial was Dr. Bolduc‘s 
employer.1  The prosecution did not indicate that Dr. Bolduc was unavailable to testify.  
Defendant objected to the prosecution‘s proposed substitution of its expert witness and 
asked for an evidentiary hearing on the matter.  (See Evid. Code, § 402, subd. (b).)  The 
trial court granted the request.   
At the pretrial evidentiary hearing, Dr. Lawrence testified on cross-examination by 
the defense that Dr. Bolduc had at one point been a coroner in Kern County but ―was 
fired,‖ a fact not disclosed in Bolduc‘s résumé.  Also, in his previous employment as a 
coroner for Orange County, Dr. Bolduc had resigned ―under a cloud.‖2  As a result of 
these incidents, Dr. Lawrence said, some newspaper articles asserted that Dr. Bolduc was 
                                              
1  
At trial, Dr. Lawrence testified to being a pathologist for the San Joaquin County 
coroner‘s office and owning Forensic Consultants Medical Group, which provides 
pathologists, including Dr. Bolduc, to act as coroners in several counties and also offers 
private consultation.   
2  
In People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, an Orange County capital murder case, 
Dr. Bolduc performed an autopsy of the murder victim but did not testify at trial.  Our 
opinion affirming the judgment of death mentioned that the trial court in that case ―was 
aware that Dr. Bolduc had apparently left the [Orange County] coroner‘s office under 
unfavorable conditions‖ (id. at p. 979), and we noted testimony by a pathologist that Dr. 
Bolduc had caused ― ‗quite a bit of consternation‘ in a prior murder case by basing his 
conclusion regarding the cause of death on a police report rather than on medical 
evidence.‖  (Ibid.)  
 
4 
incompetent, and prosecutors in several counties in California refused to use him as an 
expert witness in homicide cases.  Dr. Lawrence had seen ―no evidence that [Dr. Bolduc] 
ever did anything incompetent.‖  He said the allegations against Dr. Bolduc were 
―generated by people who don‘t know what they‘re talking about,‖ and he described 
much of the criticism of Dr. Bolduc as ―ridiculous‖ and ―patently absurd.‖  Dr. Lawrence 
agreed with the conclusion in Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy report that Pina died from ―asphyxia 
due to neck compression.‖   
The trial court ruled that at trial the prosecution could have Dr. Lawrence testify 
about the cause of Pina‘s death, but that the defense could cross-examine Dr. Lawrence 
about Dr. Bolduc‘s qualifications as a pathologist, as this was relevant to the 
trustworthiness of the facts stated in Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy report.   
At the jury trial, Dr. Lawrence testified that after reviewing Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy 
report and the accompanying autopsy photographs, he concluded that Pina had died from 
asphyxia caused by strangulation.  He pointed out that Pina had ―hemorrhages in the neck 
organs consistent with fingertips during strangulation‖ and that she had ―pinpoint 
hemorrhages in her eyes,‖ indicating a lack of oxygen.  Also supporting strangulation as 
the cause of Pina‘s death, Dr. Lawrence testified, were ―the purple color of her face,‖ the 
―absence of any natural disease that can cause death,‖ and the fact that Pina had bitten her 
tongue shortly before death.  Dr. Lawrence stated that because Pina‘s hyoid bone was not 
fractured, Pina was strangled for ―more than two minutes.‖  Had a fracture occurred, 
Dr. Lawrence explained, death could have occurred sooner.   
Dr. Lawrence did not describe to the jury Dr. Bolduc‘s opinion about the cause of 
Pina‘s death; instead, he only gave his own independent opinion as a forensic pathologist.  
Dr. Lawrence did not say whether his description of Pina‘s body at the time of the 
autopsy (the hemorrhages in Pina‘s face and eyes, the purplish color of the face, the bite 
marks on the tongue, and the absence of a fracture of the hyoid bone) was based solely on 
the autopsy photographs, solely on Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy report, or on a combination of 
 
5 
them.  Neither the autopsy photographs nor Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy report was admitted 
into evidence.3  On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Dr. Lawrence 
regarding his views about the cause of Pina‘s death, but not about Dr. Bolduc‘s 
qualifications. 
Testifying on his own behalf, defendant said that on the night he killed Pina, he 
told her of his suspicion that she might be resuming her relationship with Isaac Zuniga.  
Defendant and Pina began swearing at each other, and Pina told defendant:  ―I‘ll fuck 
whoever I want. . . . [i]f I want to fuck Isaac, if I want to fuck Anul [Pina‘s husband], I 
will do whatever I want.‖  Defendant grabbed Pina‘s arm, after which Pina punched him 
on the chin and bit his arm, saying:  ―You‘re not even a good father.  You‘re a lousy 
fucking father . . . you‘re a worthless piece of shit.‖  Defendant ―snapped.‖  He grabbed 
Pina‘s neck and strangled her, saying:  ―Fuck you, Lucinda.  I‘m a good dad.  I‘m a good 
dad.  I‘m not a bad father.  Fuck you.‖   
In closing argument, defense counsel conceded defendant‘s killing of Pina but 
argued that the murder was without malice as it occurred in a sudden quarrel or heat of 
passion, and that therefore defendant was guilty only of voluntary manslaughter, not 
murder.4  The prosecutor, citing Dr. Lawrence‘s testimony that Pina was strangled for 
―more than two minutes,‖ argued that defendant could not have been acting in the heat of 
passion for that length of time, and that therefore the killing was murder rather than 
manslaughter.   
                                              
3  
We grant the district attorney‘s motion, which defendant does not oppose, that we 
take judicial notice of the autopsy report.  (See People v. Castillo (2010) 49 Cal.4th 145, 
157 [a court may take judicial notice of a public record when it does not consider the 
record for the truth of matters stated therein]; Dixon v. Superior Court (2010) 170 
Cal.App.4th 1271, 1278 [an autopsy report is a public record].) 
4  
―Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought.‖  
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)  When an unlawful killing occurs ―upon a sudden quarrel 
or heat of passion‖ (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) the killer lacks malice, and the crime is 
voluntary manslaughter, a lesser offense necessarily included within the crime of murder.  
(See People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 549.) 
 
6 
C.  Verdict and Appeal 
The jury convicted defendant of second degree murder, and the trial court 
sentenced him to a prison term of 15 years to life.   
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment.  It concluded that Dr. Lawrence‘s 
trial testimony about the cause of Pina‘s death violated defendant‘s federal Sixth 
Amendment right to confront and cross-examine Dr. Bolduc, and that the error was 
prejudicial.  We granted the district attorney‘s petition for review.  
II 
Like the two companion cases, this case presents a Sixth Amendment 
confrontation right issue with complexities that are far from easy to resolve in light of the 
widely divergent views expressed by the justices of the United States Supreme Court in a 
recent quartet of cases we must consider here.  Those cases are:  (1)  Crawford v. 
Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford), a seven-to-two decision; (2) Melendez-Diaz 
v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305 (Melendez-Diaz), a five-to-four decision; (3) 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) 564 U.S. ___ [131 S.Ct. 2705] (Bullcoming), a five-to-
four decision; and (4) Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. ___ [132 S.Ct. 2221] 
(Williams), a four-one-four decision.   
Well before Crawford, the high court had, in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 
66, construed the federal Constitution‘s confrontation right as allowing the use at trial of 
any out-of-court statements that were within a ―firmly rooted hearsay exception‖ or had 
―particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.‖  But some 25 years later, in Crawford, the 
high court abandoned that approach and adopted this general rule:  The prosecution may 
not use ―[t]estimonial statements‖ of a witness who does not appear at trial, unless the 
witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.  (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59.) 
The Crawford majority explained that the Sixth Amendment‘s confrontation right 
pertains to those who give ―testimony,‖ defined as ― ‗[a] solemn declaration or 
 
7 
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.‘ ‖  (Crawford, 
supra, 541 U.S. at p. 51.)  Crawford mentioned several possible definitions, by several 
sources, of statements that are testimonial in nature, including ― ‗extrajudicial statements 
. . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions,‘ [citation]; [and] ‗statements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial . . .‘ [citation].‖  (Id. at pp. 51-52.)  
But Crawford did not adopt a particular definition, noting only that ―some statements 
qualify under any definition.‖  (Id. at p. 52.) 
Five years later, in 2009, came the high court‘s decision in Melendez-Diaz, which 
extended Crawford‘s holding to forensic reports.  There, at the defendant‘s trial for 
cocaine distribution and trafficking, the prosecution introduced into evidence a 
laboratory‘s ―certificates of analysis‖:  sworn statements that a substance found in plastic 
bags in the defendant‘s car was determined to be cocaine.  (Melendez-Diaz, supra, 557 
U.S. at p. 308.)  The high court held that the laboratory certificates were ―within the ‗core 
class of testimonial statements,‘ ‖ making them inadmissible under the reasoning of 
Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36.  (Melendez-Diaz, supra, at p. 310.)  The Melendez-Diaz 
majority explained:  Each certificate was (1) ―a ‗ ―solemn declaration or affirmation 
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact‖ ‘ ‖ (ibid.), (2) ―functionally 
identical to live, in-court testimony‖ (id. at pp. 310-311), (3) ― ‗made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that [it] 
would be available for use at a later trial‘ ‖ (id. at p. 311), and (4) created ―to provide 
‗prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight‘ ‖ (ibid.) of the 
substance found in the plastic bags seized from the defendant‘s car.   
Two years later, in 2011, the high court decided Bullcoming, which involved a 
charge of driving while intoxicated.  At trial, the prosecution introduced into evidence a 
report by laboratory analyst Curtis Caylor.  The report included Caylor‘s ―certificate of 
 
8 
analyst‖ (Bullcoming, supra, 564 U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 2710]) stating the 
correctness of his report‘s conclusion that a blood sample taken at the defendant‘s arrest 
had an illegally high level of alcohol.  Caylor did not testify.  Instead, the prosecution 
called as a witness a colleague of Caylor‘s — an analyst who, although familiar with the 
laboratory‘s testing procedures, had neither participated in nor observed the testing by 
Caylor.  The high court held that the admission at trial of Caylor‘s laboratory report 
violated the defendant‘s right to confront and cross-examine Caylor.  The court noted that 
unlike the laboratory certificates in Melendez-Diaz, supra, 557 U.S. 305, which were 
statements sworn before a notary public attesting to the truth of the reported test results, 
Caylor‘s certificate was not a sworn declaration.  Nevertheless, the high court pointed 
out, ―Caylor‘s certificate [was] ‗formalized‘ in a signed document‖ (Bullcoming, supra, 
564 U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 2717]) — the laboratory report — and the report made 
reference to New Mexico court rules that ―provide for the admission of certified blood-
alcohol analyses‖ (ibid.).  These ―formalities‖ (ibid.) the high court concluded, were 
―more than adequate‖ (ibid.) to qualify Caylor‘s laboratory report as testimonial in 
nature.   
In June of this year, 12 days after we heard oral argument in this matter and while 
it was pending before us, the high court decided Williams, supra, 567 U.S. ___ [132 S.Ct. 
2221].  At issue in Williams was testimony by Illinois State Police forensic biologist 
Sandra Lambatos that a DNA profile (derived from semen on vaginal swabs taken from a 
rape victim) produced by a Maryland laboratory matched a DNA profile (derived from a 
sample of the defendant‘s blood) produced by the Illinois State Police Laboratory.  
The plurality opinion in Williams, authored by Justice Alito, was signed by the 
Chief Justice as well as Justices Kennedy and Breyer; in a separate concurring opinion 
Justice Breyer explained why he joined Justice Alito‘s opinion ―in full‖ (Williams, supra, 
567 U.S. at p. ___ [132 U.S. 2221, 2252] (conc. opn. of Breyer, J.)).  The plurality 
concluded on two alternative grounds that Lambatos‘s expert testimony did not violate 
 
9 
the federal Constitution‘s confrontation right.  First, the plurality reasoned that 
Lambatos‘s testimony was constitutionally permissible because it was admitted not for its 
truth but only for the limited purpose of explaining the basis of Lambatos‘s independent 
conclusion, based on her expertise, that the defendant‘s DNA matched the DNA in the 
semen found on the vaginal swabs.  (Id. at p. ___ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2228] (plur. opn. of 
Alito, J.).)  Alternatively, the Williams plurality reasoned, there was no confrontation 
right violation because the Maryland laboratory‘s report was prepared for the primary 
purpose of finding a dangerous rapist who was still at large, not ―for the primary purpose 
of accusing a targeted individual.‖  (Id. at p. ___ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2243] (plur. opn. of 
Alito, J.).)  In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Thomas agreed with the plurality‘s 
conclusion that Lambatos‘s expert testimony did not offend the Sixth Amendment‘s 
confrontation right, but for a completely different reason:  The Maryland laboratory 
report on which Lambatos relied ―lack[ed] the solemnity of an affidavit or deposition‖ 
and was therefore not ―testimonial.‖  (Id. at p. ___ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2260] (conc. opn. of 
Thomas, J.).)  A dissenting opinion by Justice Kagan, and signed by Justices Scalia, 
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, disagreed with the reasoning of both the plurality and Justice 
Thomas, and concluded that Lambatos‘s testimony violated the defendant‘s confrontation 
right.  These widely divergent views, none of which was able to garner majority support 
— as reflected in the four-one-four decision — highlight the complexity of the issue. 
III 
We noted earlier that at defendant‘s murder trial, Dr. Lawrence gave his 
independent opinion as to the cause of Pina‘s death.  Dr. Lawrence reached that opinion 
after reviewing an autopsy report (with accompanying photographs) prepared by 
Dr. Bolduc, who did not testify and thus could not be confronted by defendant.  The 
Court of Appeal concluded that Dr. Lawrence‘s testimony violated defendant‘s right to 
confront and cross-examine Dr. Bolduc.  
 
10 
Limiting our inquiry are two significant points.  First, here (unlike in the 
companion case of People v. Lopez, supra, __ Cal.4th ___), Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy report 
was not introduced into evidence.  Thus, we need not decide whether that entire report is 
testimonial in nature.  Second, Dr. Lawrence‘s testimony never described the conclusions 
in Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy report as to the cause of Pina‘s death.  Thus, we need not 
determine whether such testimony, if it had been given, would have violated defendant‘s 
right to confront Dr. Bolduc.   
Dr. Lawrence did, however, describe to the jury the condition of Pina‘s body at the 
time of the autopsy:  the hemorrhages in Pina‘s eyes and neck organs, the purple color of 
her face, the absence of any natural disease causing death, the fact that she had bitten her 
tongue shortly before death, and the absence of any fracture of the hyoid bone.  This 
description was based on Dr. Lawrence‘s review of Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy report and its 
accompanying photographs.  (As we have noted earlier (see p. 5, ante), the record before 
us does not indicate whether Dr. Lawrence based his description solely on the autopsy 
photographs, solely on Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy report, or on a combination of the two.)  The 
issue before us is whether Dr. Lawrence‘s testimony about these objective facts entitled 
defendant to confront and cross-examine Dr. Bolduc. 
As we discussed in the companion case of People v. Lopez, supra, __ Cal.4th at 
page ___ [p. 13], the prosecution‘s use of testimonial out-of-court statements ―ordinarily 
violates the defendant‘s right to confront the maker of the statements unless the declarant 
is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.‖  
Although the high court has not agreed on a definition of ―testimonial,‖ testimonial out-
of-court statements have two critical components.  First, to be testimonial the statement 
must be made with some degree of formality or solemnity.  Second, the statement is 
testimonial only if its primary purpose pertains in some fashion to a criminal prosecution.  
The high court justices have not, however, agreed on what the statement‘s primary 
purpose must be.   
 
11 
We begin with the issue of formality.  An autopsy report typically contains two 
types of statements:  (1) statements describing the pathologist‘s anatomical and 
physiological observations about the condition of the body, and (2) statements setting 
forth the pathologist‘s conclusions as to the cause of the victim‘s death.  The out-of-court 
statements at issue here — pathologist Bolduc‘s observations about the condition of 
victim Pina‘s body — all fall into the first of the two categories.  These statements, which 
merely record objective facts, are less formal than statements setting forth a pathologist‘s 
expert conclusions.  They are comparable to observations of objective fact in a report by 
a physician who, after examining a patient, diagnoses a particular injury or ailment and 
determines the appropriate treatment.  Such observations are not testimonial in nature.  
(Melendez-Diaz, supra, 557 U.S. at p. 312, fn. 2 [―medical reports created for treatment 
purposes . . . would not be testimonial under our decision today‖].)5 
Defendant argues that the statements in nontestifying Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy report 
were sufficiently ―formal‖ because:  (1) a detective was present when the autopsy of Pina 
was performed, (2) the autopsy was statutorily mandated, (3) Dr. Bolduc was required by 
statute to report his findings, (4) Detective Fain disclosed defendant‘s confession to 
Dr. Bolduc before the autopsy report was written, and (5) Dr. Bolduc was statutorily 
required to notify law enforcement if he determined that there were reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the death was a homicide.  But those circumstances have little to do with the 
formality and solemnity of the statements.  Rather, they pertain to the second of the two 
categories mentioned above:  the primary purpose of the statements in the report. 
                                              
5  
Defendant contends that even if the statements in nontestifying Dr. Bolduc‘s 
autopsy report lacked the requisite formality, the Sixth Amendment‘s confrontation right 
also applies to what Justice Thomas called ― ‗technically informal statements‘ ‖ if those 
statements were ― ‗used to evade the formalized process.‘ ‖  (Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at 
p. ___, fn. 5 [132 S.Ct. at p. 2260, fn. 5] (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.).)  Defendant argues 
that this exception applies here.  But he did not raise this argument at trial, and therefore 
the trial court did not determine whether the statements at issue here were ― ‗used to 
evade the formalized process.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  Thus, this argument can only be made, if at all, 
in a habeas corpus petition. 
 
12 
For example, the presence of a detective at the autopsy and the fact that the 
detective told the pathologist about defendant‘s confession do not make the statements of 
objective fact in the autopsy report into formal and solemn testimony; but those 
circumstances do support defendant‘s argument that the primary purpose of the autopsy 
was the investigation of a crime.  Similarly, the fact that the autopsy was mandated by a 
statute that required public findings and notification of law enforcement does not imply 
that the statements of objective fact in the report are formal and solemn testimony, but it 
does imply that the primary purpose of the autopsy was forensic.  Therefore, we turn now 
to the question of primary purpose. 
The preparation of an autopsy report is governed by California‘s Government 
Code section 27491, which requires a county coroner to ―inquire into and determine the 
circumstances, manner, and cause‖ of certain types of death.  Some of these deaths (such 
as deaths from alcoholism, ―sudden infant death syndrome,‖ and ―contagious disease‖) 
result from causes unrelated to criminal activities, while other deaths (such as deaths 
resulting from ―criminal abortion,‖ deaths by ―known or suspected homicide,‖ and 
―deaths associated with a known or alleged rape‖) result from the commission of a crime.  
(Ibid.)  With respect to all of the statutorily specified categories of death, however, the 
scope of the coroner‘s statutory duty to investigate is the same, regardless of whether the 
death resulted from criminal activity.   
The usefulness of autopsy reports, including the one at issue here, is not limited to 
criminal investigation and prosecution; such reports serve many other equally important 
purposes.  For example, the decedent‘s relatives may use an autopsy report in 
determining whether to file an action for wrongful death.  And an insurance company 
may use an autopsy report in determining whether a particular death is covered by one of 
its policies.  (See, e.g., People v. Rutterschmidt, supra, ___ Cal.4th ___.)  Also, in certain 
cases an autopsy report may satisfy the public‘s interest in knowing the cause of death, 
 
13 
particularly when (as here) the death was reported in the local media.  In addition, an 
autopsy report may provide answers to grieving family members. 
In short, criminal investigation was not the primary purpose for the autopsy 
report‘s description of the condition of Pina‘s body; it was only one of several purposes.  
The presence of a detective at the autopsy and the statutory requirement that suspicious 
findings be reported to law enforcement do not change that conclusion.  The autopsy 
continued to serve several purposes, only one of which was criminal investigation.  The 
autopsy report itself was simply an official explanation of an unusual death, and such 
official records are ordinarily not testimonial.  (Melendez-Diaz, supra, 554 U.S. at 
p. 324.) 
In summary, Dr. Lawrence‘s description to the jury of objective facts about the 
condition of victim Pina‘s body, facts he derived from Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy report and its 
accompanying photographs, did not give defendant a right to confront and cross-examine 
Dr. Bolduc.  The facts that Dr. Lawrence related to the jury were not so formal and 
solemn as to be considered testimonial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment‘s 
confrontation right, and criminal investigation was not the primary purpose for recording 
the facts in question.  In holding that defendant‘s confrontation right was violated here, 
the Court of Appeal erred. 
 
14 
 
Disposition 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
I concur in the reasoning and result of the majority opinion, which I have 
signed.  I write separately to explain in more detail why the anatomical and 
physiological observations recorded by a forensic pathologist in an autopsy report 
should not be considered testimonial, as that term has been used in Crawford v. 
Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford) and its progeny. 
As the majority explains (maj. opn., ante, at p. 11), the autopsy report by 
Dr. George Bolduc, who conducted the autopsy but did not testify at trial, was not 
admitted into evidence; the question of whether the autopsy report itself was 
testimonial is thus not before us.  In addition, the testifying pathologist, Dr. Robert 
Lawrence, gave his own expert opinions as to the cause and manner of death 
rather than relaying those reached by Dr. Bolduc; hence, the question of whether 
such recorded conclusions are testimonial is also not before us.  Like the majority, 
therefore, I focus exclusively on Dr. Lawrence‘s repetition to the jury of 
anatomical and physiological observations Dr. Bolduc recorded in his report, upon 
which Dr. Lawrence based his conclusions.  Of these, the most significant was Dr. 
Bolduc‘s recorded observation that the victim‘s larynx and hyoid bone were both 
unbroken, from which Dr. Lawrence concluded the victim was strangled for ―a 
period of minutes . . . certainly more than two minutes.‖1  Dr. Lawrence‘s opinion 
                                              
1  
Dr. Lawrence‘s reasoning was that in the absence of a fracture that might 
have blocked the victim‘s airway, it was ―unlikely that she was just briefly 
 
2 
became, in turn, the basis for prosecutorial argument to the jury that the killing 
was intentional and premeditated. 
The question of what out-of-court statements are and are not testimonial 
has divided the justices of the United States Supreme Court, whose decisions have 
not yet yielded a clear definition or test.  But the justices have consistently 
considered two factors in deciding whether a given statement sufficiently 
resembles the English court abuses that gave rise to the confrontation clause, 
primarily the use at trial of witness statements obtained through ex parte 
examination:  (1) the degree of formality or solemnity with which the statement 
was made and (2) the degree to which it was produced for use at trial.  The more a 
statement resembles the ― ‗solemn declaration or affirmation‘ ‖ that is testimony, 
commonly understood, and the more it was expected, when made, ― ‗to be used 
prosecutorially‘ . . . ‗at a later trial,‘ ‖ the more centrally it is located within the 
―core class of ‗testimonial‘ statements.‖  (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 51-52.)   
Throughout the high court‘s exploration of the issue, Justice Thomas has 
maintained that solemnity or formality is the sine qua non of the testimonial 
statement.  This focus is demonstrated in his separate opinions in Davis v. 
Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 838 (Davis) and Michigan v. Bryant (2011) 562 
U.S. ___, ___ [131 S.Ct. 1143, 1167] (Bryant), both asserting that statements 
resulting from a witness‘s informal conversation with police officers are not 
testimonial, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305, 330 
(Melendez-Diaz), where Justice Thomas concurred with the majority that 
certificates of chemical content were affidavits and hence testimonial, and in 
Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. ___, ___, ___ [132 S.Ct. 2221, 2255] 
(Williams), where he argued a DNA profile report was not testimonial because it 
                                                                                                                                      
 
squeezed and then let go and went on to die.  I think there was pressure applied for 
a longer period.‖ 
 
3 
lacked solemnity and formality (id. at p. 2260).  Other opinions, primarily majority 
opinions, have relied on this factor as well.  (See Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at 
p. 53, fn. 4 [witness‘s ―recorded statement, knowingly given in response to 
structured police questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition‖ of 
interrogation, and was hence testimonial]; Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 830 
[though not so formal as in Crawford, police questioning was ―formal enough‖]; 
Melendez-Diaz, supra, 557 U.S. at p. 310 [certificates of chemical content ―are 
incontrovertibly a ‗ ―solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact‖ ‘ ‖]; Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) 564 
U.S. ___, ___ [131 S.Ct. 2705, 2717] (Bullcoming) [though not sworn before a 
notary public, certificates were ―[l]ike the Melendez-Diaz certificates . . . 
‗formalized‘ in a signed document‖]; Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. ___ [132 
S.Ct. at p. 2242] (plur. opn. of Alito, J.) [testimonial hearsay typically consists of 
―formalized statements such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions‖].)  
The critical hearsay statement in this case—Dr. Bolduc‘s recorded 
observation that the victim‘s larynx and hyoid bone were unbroken—lacked the 
solemnity and formality that characterize statements the high court deems 
testimonial.  Although Dr. Bolduc signed and dated his autopsy report, it was not 
sworn or certified in a manner comparable to the chemical analyses in Melendez-
Diaz and Bullcoming.  The report contrasts in this respect with the coroner‘s or 
attending physician‘s ―[c]ertification and signature‖ on a death certificate, by 
which the declarant ―attest[s] to [the] accuracy‖ of ―the portion of the certificate 
setting forth the cause of death.‖  (Health & Saf. Code, § 102875, subd. (a)(7).)  
Though the cause of death declared on a death certificate is to be ―in conformity 
with‖ the ―facts ascertained‖ by autopsy or other investigation (Gov. Code, 
§ 27491.5), the two documents, autopsy report and death certificate, are distinct, 
 
4 
and only the latter bears a formal certification mandated by statute.  Certainly, no 
certification or solemn attestation accompanied the portions of Dr. Bolduc‘s 
autopsy report containing his observations as to the unbroken state of the 
decedent‘s larynx and hyoid bone. 
In cases involving the declarations of percipient witnesses rather than 
laboratory reports, the high court has looked to the degree of formality and 
structure of the circumstances in which the statement was made, using this 
analysis to help determine whether the statement is akin to the products of ex parte 
examinations.  (See Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 50-53 & fn. 4 [contrasting 
nontestimonial ―off-hand, overheard‖ remarks with the testimonial products of 
―structured‖ police interrogation]; Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 830 [as in 
Crawford, formal police interrogation of witness bore a ― ‗striking resemblance‘ ‖ 
to ex parte examinations]; Bryant, supra, 562 U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1155] 
[where ―state actors are involved in formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness 
to obtain evidence for trial,‖ resulting statements are considered testimonial].)  
Looking beyond the question of certification to the formality or lack thereof in the 
circumstances in which Dr. Bolduc‘s anatomical observations were made and 
recorded, the statements again appear to lack the requisite formality. 
As the majority observes, autopsy reports typically (and in this case) have 
two parts:  ―(1) the objective forensic autopsy with its findings including 
toxicological tests, special tests, microscopic examination, etc., and (2) the 
interpretations of the forensic pathologist including cause and manner of death.‖  
(Nat. Assn. of Medical Examiners, Forensic Autopsy Performance Standards 
(2005, as amended, Aug. 11, 2011) std. H31, p. 25 (hereafter NAME Standards); 
see maj. opn., ante, at p. 12.)  Whatever one might say of the latter portion (again, 
that issue is not before us here because Dr. Lawrence testified to his own 
conclusions as to cause and manner of death, not to Dr. Bolduc‘s), the former does 
 
5 
not resemble the ex parte examinations of historical example or the structured 
police interrogations of Crawford and Davis.  Though there is a structure to the 
autopsy examination process, it is largely that of a medical examination, not an 
interrogation.  ―Performance of a forensic autopsy is the practice of medicine.‖  
(NAME Standards, supra, std. B4, p. 10.)  A professionally prepared autopsy 
report should record the pathologist‘s observations of the external examination 
and, where performed, the internal examination of the decedent‘s body, with a 
description of all internal and external injuries observed ―in sufficient detail to 
support diagnoses, opinions, and conclusions.‖  (Id., std. H31.8, p. 25.)  The 
process of systematically examining the decedent‘s body and recording the 
resulting observations is thus one governed primarily by medical standards rather 
than by legal requirements of formality or solemnity.  
On the second factor going to a statement‘s testimonial character, the 
primary purpose behind the statement‘s production, a consensus appears to exist 
that a statement is more testimonial to the extent it was produced under 
circumstances making it likely to be used in place of live testimony at a future 
criminal trial.  (See Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. ___ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2243] 
(plur. opn. of Alito, J.) [―the primary purpose of the Cellmark report, viewed 
objectively, was not to accuse petitioner or to create evidence for use at trial‖]; id. 
at p. ___ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2273] (dis. opn. of Kagan, J.) [court has asked ―whether a 
statement was made for the primary purpose of establishing ‗past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution‘—in other words, for the purpose 
of providing evidence‖]; Bullcoming, supra, 564 U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at 
p. 2717] [―A document created solely for an ‗evidentiary purpose‘ . . . made in aid 
of a police investigation, ranks as testimonial.‖]; Bryant, supra, 562 U.S. at p. ___ 
[131 S.Ct. at p. 1155] [confrontation clause not implicated when ―a statement is 
not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial 
 
6 
testimony‖]; Melendez-Diaz, supra, 557 U.S. at p. 311 [observing that ―under 
Massachusetts law the sole purpose of the affidavits was to provide ‗prima facie 
evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight‘ of the analyzed 
substance‖]; Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 830 [statements made under formal 
police interrogation are ―an obvious substitute for live testimony‖].)   
Assessing the degree to which Dr. Bolduc‘s observations on the state of the 
victim‘s larynx and hyoid bone were produced for use at trial, I conclude the 
nontestimonial aspects of these anatomical observations predominate over the 
testimonial.  A California coroner or medical examiner2 has, by statute, the duty of 
investigating certain categories of deaths, regardless of whether the death is also 
the subject of a criminal investigation.  (Gov. Code, § 27491; see maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 13.)  Speaking generally, the coroner or medical examiner investigates a 
death ―cooperatively with, but independent from, law enforcement and 
prosecutors‖ with the goal of producing a ―neutral and objective medical 
assessment of the cause and manner of death.‖  (NAME Standards, supra, std. A1, 
p. 7.)  The investigation of deaths through autopsies in appropriate cases ―protects 
the public interest and provides the information necessary to address legal, public 
health, and public safety issues in each case.‖  (Id., std. B3, p. 9.)   
To be sure, an autopsy physician documents his or her observations of the 
decedent‘s injuries partly ―to provide evidence for court,‖ but detailed 
documentation of the pathologist‘s observations is also important ―to support or 
refute interpretations‖ and ―to serve as a record.‖  (NAME Standards, supra, std. 
E13, p. 15.)  A competent autopsy physician describes the decedent‘s observed 
injuries and condition as a matter of course; an autopsy report that lacked such 
                                              
2  
A California county may choose to employ an appointed medical examiner 
in place of a coroner.  In such a county, the medical examiner exercises the 
statutory powers and duties of the coroner.  (Gov. Code, § 24010.) 
 
7 
documentation would not meet minimum professional standards.  (Id., §§ D-F, 
pp. 13-21.)  That Dr. Bolduc reported his findings concerning the condition of the 
victim‘s larynx and hyoid bone primarily for use as trial evidence is doubtful. 
A statement should also be deemed more testimonial to the extent it was 
produced through the agency of government officers engaged in a prosecutorial 
effort, and less testimonial to the extent it was produced for purposes other than 
prosecution or without the involvement of police or prosecutors.  ―Involvement of 
government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial 
presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time and again 
throughout a history with which the Framers were keenly familiar.‖  (Crawford, 
supra, 541 U.S. at p. 56, fn. 7.)  The high court has made clear a witness‘s 
statement may be testimonial even if it does not by itself inculpate the defendant 
(Melendez-Diaz, supra, 557 U.S. at pp. 313-314), and a majority of the justices 
have rejected a very narrow definition of testimonial statements as limited to those 
―prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual‖ (Williams, 
supra, 567 U.S. at p. ___ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2243] (plur. opn. of Alito, J.); see id. at 
p. ___ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2262] (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.); id. at pp. ___-___ [132 
S.Ct. at pp. 2273-2274 (dis. opn. of Kagan, J.)).  Nonetheless, the court‘s 
Crawford jurisprudence suggests that testimonial character depends, to some 
extent, on the degree to which the statement was produced by or at the behest of 
government agents for use in a criminal prosecution. 
As the court explained in Bryant, certain types of hearsay are considered 
nontestimonial because, having been produced primarily for purposes other than 
use in a criminal trial, they pose a significantly reduced ―prospect of fabrication.‖  
(Bryant, supra, 562 U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1157].)  Among these are 
business and public records ― ‗created for the administration of an entity‘s 
affairs.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. ___, fn. 9 [131 S.Ct. at p. 1157, fn. 9].)  In contrast, when law 
 
8 
enforcement agents solicit statements from witnesses for the purpose of using 
those statements against a person, the prospect for fabrication is at its greatest.  
Even without telling a witness what to say, government agents intent on building a 
criminal case against a suspect may consciously or unconsciously bias a witness‘s 
responses by verbal and nonverbal cues.  It is the accusatory context that makes 
the production of such out-of-court testimony especially dangerous and demands 
the resulting statements be considered ―testimonial under even a narrow standard.‖  
(Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 52; see also id. at p. 53 [―The involvement of 
government officers in the production of testimonial evidence presents the same 
risk, whether the officers are police or justices of the peace.‖].)  A process in 
which government agents may prompt a witness to make inherently inculpatory 
statements is more dangerous, and should more readily lead to classification of the 
statements as testimonial, than one in which a witness acts independently to record 
observations made as a regular part of the witness‘s business or profession, even if 
those observations turn out to be helpful to the prosecution in a particular case.   
Focusing once more on Dr. Bolduc‘s recorded observations on the 
decedent‘s injuries, in particular the observation that her larynx and hyoid bone 
were unbroken, it does not appear Dr. Bolduc‘s record of that observation was 
produced through a prosecutorial effort to obtain evidence against defendant, or 
anyone else, for use at trial.  As previously discussed, a medical examiner‘s duty 
to investigate the victim‘s death is independent of any police inquiry or 
prosecutorial effort.  (See U.S. v. Feliz (2d Cir. 2006) 467 F.3d 227, 237 [relying  
on medical examiner‘s independent statutory duty ―to conduct autopsies in various 
situations‖ to show autopsy report was nontestimonial public record].)  While a 
police detective was apparently present at the autopsy, there is no evidence he 
asked Dr. Bolduc to investigate possible breaks in the victim‘s larynx or hyoid 
bone, or to answer any other particular question about the condition of the 
 
9 
decedent‘s body.  As a matter of standard practice, a competent autopsy physician 
will describe and document possible blunt force injuries to skeletal and other 
structures.  (NAME Standards, supra, std. F24, p. 21.)  The record does not show 
or suggest that Dr. Bolduc was prompted by prosecutorial agents to make any of 
the statements at issue, or indeed that he was guided in his conduct and 
documentation of the autopsy by anything other than professional medical 
practices and standards. 
For the above reasons as well as those given by the majority, I conclude the 
trial court did not err in admitting Dr. Lawrence‘s testimony over a confrontation 
clause objection.  Dr. Lawrence relayed to the jury certain physical observations 
recorded by Dr. Bolduc in his report of the autopsy, using those observations to 
support Dr. Lawrence‘s own expert opinions as to the cause and manner of death.  
Dr. Bolduc‘s observations were introduced for their truth, and since Dr. Bolduc 
was not shown to be unavailable and had not been subject to prior cross-
examination on this matter by defendant, his statements, were they testimonial, 
would have been inadmissible under Crawford.  But because they neither bore 
sufficient indicia of formality or solemnity nor were produced primarily for use 
instead of live evidence at a criminal trial, they were not testimonial, and the 
confrontation clause did not bar their use.  We need not decide here—and the 
majority does not decide—whether an autopsy report itself, or the examining 
pathologist‘s conclusions as to cause and manner of death, would be similarly 
admissible without the testimony of the examining pathologist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J.  
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
I concur fully in the majority opinion, which I have signed.  I write 
separately to explain why Dr. Lawrence‘s testimony did not violate defendant‘s 
federal confrontation rights under the United States Supreme Court‘s recent 
decision in Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 2221] (Williams). 
Unfortunately, as the majority opinion explains (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 9-
10), the high court had a majority for its result in Williams, but there was no 
majority explanation for this result.  It took a combination of two opinions — each 
containing quite different reasoning — to achieve the majority result:  (1) the 
plurality opinion authored by Justice Alito and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Kennedy and Breyer, and (2) Justice Thomas‘s opinion concurring in the 
judgment.  Neither the plurality‘s nor Justice Thomas‘s reasoning gained majority 
support.  Indeed, a majority of the court (Justice Thomas and the four dissenters) 
disagreed with the plurality‘s reasoning.  (See People v. Lopez (Oct. 15, 2012, 
S177046) __ Cal.4th __ [maj. opn., pp. 9-12].)  This situation makes it difficult to 
determine what to make of that decision. 
―When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‗the holding of the Court 
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds. . . .‘ ‖  (Marks v. United States (1977) 430 
U.S. 188, 193.)  This rule does not work particularly well, if at all, unless ―one 
opinion can be meaningfully regarded as ‗narrower‘ than another,‖ that is, unless 
 
2 
―one opinion is a logical subset of other, broader opinions.‖  (King v. Palmer 
(D.C. Cir. 1991) 950 F.2d 771, 781 (in bank).)  Here, neither the plurality opinion 
nor Justice Thomas‘s concurring opinion can be viewed as a logical subset of the 
other.  Indeed, to some extent they are contradictory.  One court has said that 
―[w]hen it is not possible to discover a single standard that legitimately constitutes 
the narrowest ground for a decision on that issue, there is then no law of the land 
because no one standard commands the support of a majority of the Supreme 
Court.‖  (U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (2d Cir. 2003) 315 F.3d 179, 189.)  Is that 
the situation here?  Are we to discern no law of the land from the Williams case?  I 
do not believe so.  We can discover the narrowest ground for a decision.  We can 
discover a standard that commands majority support. 
We know what the result was in Williams, supra, 567 U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 
2221]:  The testimony at issue did not violate the confrontation clause.  This is 
because a majority of the court so concluded.  Four justices (the plurality) found 
no violation for their reasons.  One justice (Justice Thomas) found no violation for 
his different reasons.  This means that a majority of the Williams court would find 
no violation of the confrontation clause whenever there was no violation under the 
plurality‘s and under Justice Thomas‘s reasoning.  This is exactly what happened 
in Williams itself.  ―We need not find a legal opinion which a majority joined, but 
merely ‗a legal standard which, when applied, will necessarily produce results 
with which a majority of the Court from that case would agree.‘ ‖  (U.S. v. 
Williams (9th Cir. 2006) 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 [unrelated opn.].)  If there is no 
confrontation clause violation under both the plurality and Justice Thomas‘s 
opinion, a majority of the high court‘s Williams case would agree with the 
result — no confrontation clause violation.  To adapt the Ninth Circuit‘s analysis 
to this case, ―we must identify and apply a test which satisfies the requirements of 
 
3 
both Justice [Alito‘s] plurality opinion and Justice [Thomas‘s] concurrence.‖  
(U.S. v. Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 1157.) 
Accordingly, we must determine whether there was a confrontation clause 
violation under Justice Thomas‘s opinion and whether there was a confrontation 
clause violation under the plurality‘s opinion.  If there was no violation under both 
opinions, then the result (finding no confrontation clause violation) would 
command the support of a majority from the high court‘s Williams case.  Such a 
test satisfies the requirements of both the plurality opinion and Justice Thomas‘s 
concurrence. 
Justice Thomas would find no violation if the out-of-court statements lack 
the necessary formality and solemnity to be testimonial.  (Williams, supra, 567 
U.S. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2255] (conc. opn. of Thomas J.).)  As the majority in 
this case explains, the statements here are not sufficiently formal to meet this test.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 12-13.) 
The Williams plurality opinion stated two reasons for its finding of no 
confrontation clause violation.  The second reason applies here.  In the 
introductory portion of its opinion, the plurality summarized this second reason:  
―The Cellmark report is very different from the sort of extrajudicial statements, 
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, and confessions, that the 
Confrontation Clause was originally understood to reach.  The report was 
produced before any suspect was identified.  The report was sought not for the 
purpose of obtaining evidence to be used against petitioner, who was not even 
under suspicion at the time, but for the purpose of finding a rapist who was on the 
loose.  And the profile that Cellmark provided was not inherently inculpatory.‖  
(Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2228] (plur. opn. of Alito, J.).)  
(All further citations to Williams will be to the plurality opinion unless otherwise 
indicated.) 
 
4 
Later, the plurality explained its reasoning in greater detail.  It said that the 
―abuses that the Court has identified as prompting the adoption of the 
Confrontation Clause shared the following two characteristics:  (a) they involved 
out-of-court statements having the primary purpose of accusing a targeted 
individual of engaging in criminal conduct and (b) they involved formalized 
statements such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.‖  
(Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2242], italics added.) 
The Williams plurality cites cases involving reports that did have the 
purpose of accusing a targeted person of a crime, such as a report having the 
purpose of showing the ―defendant‘s blood-alcohol level exceeded legal limit‖ or 
that a ―substance connected to [the] defendant contained cocaine.‖  (Williams, 
supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2242].)  But, the plurality said, the report 
in its case ―is very different.  It plainly was not prepared for the primary purpose 
of accusing a targeted individual.  In identifying the primary purpose of an out-of-
court statement, we apply an objective test.  [Citation.]  We look for the primary 
purpose that a reasonable person would have ascribed to the statement, taking into 
account all of the surrounding circumstances.  [Citation.] 
―Here, the primary purpose of the Cellmark report, viewed objectively, was 
not to accuse petitioner or to create evidence for use at trial.  When the [Illinois 
State Police] lab sent the sample to Cellmark, its primary purpose was to catch a 
dangerous rapist who was still at large, not to obtain evidence for use against 
petitioner, who was neither in custody nor under suspicion at that time.  Similarly, 
no one at Cellmark could have possibly known that the profile that it produced 
would turn out to inculpate petitioner — or for that matter, anyone else whose 
DNA profile was in a law enforcement database.  Under these circumstances, there 
was no ‗prospect of fabrication‘ and no incentive to produce anything other than a 
 
5 
scientifically sound and reliable profile.  [Citation.]‖  (Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at 
p. __ [132 S.Ct. at pp. 2243-2244], italics added.) 
The plurality continued:  ―When lab technicians are asked to work on the 
production of a DNA profile, they often have no idea what the consequences of 
their work will be.  In some cases, a DNA profile may provide powerful 
incriminating evidence against a person who is identified either before or after the 
profile is completed.  But in others, the primary effect of the profile is to exonerate 
a suspect who has been charged or is under investigation.  The technicians who 
prepare a DNA profile generally have no way of knowing whether it will turn out 
to be incriminating or exonerating — or both.‖  (Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ 
[132 S.Ct. at p. 2244].) 
The out-of-court statements in the autopsy report that Dr. Lawrence relied 
on to form his opinion are not testimonial under this test.  They did not have the 
primary purpose of accusing defendant or any other targeted individual of 
engaging in criminal conduct.  The primary purpose of the portions of the report 
that Dr. Lawrence relied on was to describe the condition of the body.  (See also 
maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13-14; conc. opn. of Werdegar, J., ante, at pp. 4-5.)  In 
describing the condition of the body, there was no prospect of fabrication or 
incentive to produce anything other than a scientifically reliable report.  The 
purpose of this part of the autopsy report is ―simply to perform [the pathologist‘s] 
task in accordance with accepted procedures.‖  (Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ 
[132 S.Ct. at p. 2244].) 
The plurality opinion in Williams indicates that practical considerations 
helped inform its conclusion.  ―If DNA profiles could not be introduced without 
calling the technicians who participated in the preparation of the profile, economic 
pressures would encourage prosecutors to forgo DNA testing and rely instead on 
older forms of evidence, such as eyewitness identification, that are less reliable.  
 
6 
[Citation.]  The Confrontation Clause does not mandate such an undesirable 
development.‖  (Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2228].) 
Similar practical considerations support finding that autopsy reports, or at 
least the objective, factual observations included in those reports, are not 
testimonial for these purposes.  A holding that everything in autopsy reports is 
testimonial — and, accordingly, that only the pathologist who prepared the report 
may testify about it — would have serious adverse consequences.  ―Years may 
pass between the performance of the autopsy and the apprehension of the 
perpetrator.  This passage of time can easily lead to the unavailability of the 
examiner who prepared the autopsy report.  Moreover, medical examiners who 
regularly perform hundreds of autopsies are unlikely to have any independent 
recollection of the autopsy at issue in a particular case and in testifying invariably 
rely entirely on the autopsy report.  Unlike other forensic tests, an autopsy cannot 
be replicated by another pathologist.  Certainly it would be against society's 
interests to permit the unavailability of the medical examiner who prepared the 
report to preclude the prosecution of a homicide case.‖  (People v. Durio 
(N.Y.Sup.Ct. 2005) 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 869.)  Much harm would be done to the 
criminal justice system, with little accompanying benefit to criminal defendants, if 
all reliance on autopsy reports were banned. 
Justice Breyer discussed the practical considerations concerning autopsy 
reports in a separate concurring opinion in Williams.  ―[T]o bar admission of the 
out-of-court records at issue here could undermine, not fortify, the accuracy of 
factfinding at a criminal trial.  Such a precedent could bar the admission of other 
reliable case-specific technical information such as, say, autopsy reports.  
Autopsies, like the DNA report in this case, are often conducted when it is not yet 
clear whether there is a particular suspect or whether the facts found in the autopsy 
will ultimately prove relevant in a criminal trial.  Autopsies are typically 
 
7 
conducted soon after death.  And when, say, a victim‘s body has decomposed, 
repetition of the autopsy may not be possible.  What is to happen if the medical 
examiner dies before trial?  [Citations.]  Is the Confrontation Clause 
‗ ―effectively‖ ‘ to function ‗ ―as a statute of limitations for murder‖ ‘?  
[Citation.]‖  (Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2251] (conc. opn. 
of Breyer, J.).)  Justice Breyer spoke only for himself, but his observations are 
entirely consistent with the plurality opinion that he joined. 
Some of the attendant circumstances in this case support the argument that 
the autopsy report was prepared with the primary purpose of accusing defendant of 
a crime.  Unlike the situation in Williams, defendant was a suspect at the time the 
autopsy report was prepared.  An investigator was present during the autopsy, and 
the pathologist had been told of defendant‘s confession before the autopsy report 
was written.  Although the plurality in Williams stated that the defendant in that 
case happened not to be a suspect or in custody at the time the report was 
prepared, nothing in its opinion suggests this is a requirement rather than merely 
one of the ―surrounding circumstances‖ of which the court must take account.  
(Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ [132 at p. 2243].)  Because of these 
circumstances, a statement in the autopsy report expressing the opinion, for 
example, that the victim had been strangled for two minutes might have been 
prepared with the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual.  But here, Dr. 
Lawrence, the testifying witness, offered that opinion.  Defendant had full 
opportunity to confront and cross-examine Dr. Lawrence regarding that opinion. 
The autopsy report itself was not introduced into evidence.  Rather, in 
forming his opinion, Dr. Lawrence merely relied on information regarding the 
condition of the body that was detailed in that report, such as that the victim‘s 
larynx and hyoid bone had not been fractured.  But these statements are objective 
observations of the type routinely placed into autopsy reports, whether or not a 
 
8 
specific suspect exists.  They are not statements with a primary purpose of 
accusing defendant, or anyone else, of criminal conduct.  The fact that the larynx 
and hyoid bone were not broken, like most of the other observations memorialized 
in the report, ―was not inherently inculpatory.‖  (Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ 
[132 S.Ct. at p. 2228].)  There was no prospect of fabrication or incentive to 
produce anything other than an accurate description of the state of the body.  (Id. 
at p.__ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2244].) 
The trial court did not have to allow defendant to confront Dr. Bolduc, the 
pathologist who prepared the autopsy report, regarding his observations, including 
that the larynx and hyoid bone were not broken.  Indeed, such confrontation would 
undoubtedly have been futile.  It seems unlikely a pathologist who conducts many 
autopsies would specifically remember a detail such as that.  If called to testify, 
Dr. Bolduc, like Dr. Lawrence, would undoubtedly have had to rely on the report, 
rather than his memory, in this regard.  (See People v. Durio, supra, 794 N.Y.S.2d 
at p. 869, quoted ante.)  That is one of the purposes for preparing and preserving 
written autopsy reports. 
For these reasons, I conclude the Williams plurality would find no 
confrontation clause violation in this case.  Because Justice Thomas would also 
find no confrontation clause violation, albeit for different reasons, we may not do 
so either.  Dr. Lawrence‘s reliance on portions of someone else‘s autopsy report in 
forming his opinions did not violate defendant‘s right to confront the witnesses 
against him. 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent.  I would hold that Dr. George Bolduc‘s autopsy 
report was sufficiently formal and primarily made for an evidentiary purpose, as 
the United States Supreme Court has explicated those terms to date.  Dr. Bolduc‘s 
report contained anatomical observations about which another forensic pathologist 
testified.  High court authority compels the conclusion that admitting this 
testimony violated defendant‘s confrontation rights. 
Dr. Bolduc performed an autopsy on Lucinda Pina and prepared an autopsy 
report with accompanying photographs.  We have taken judicial notice of that 
report, which is not certified.  The prosecution did not call Dr. Bolduc as a 
witness, presenting instead Dr. Robert Lawrence.  The prosecution did not indicate 
that Dr. Bolduc was unavailable, and defendant objected to the witness 
substitution.  Defense counsel‘s hearsay objection to Dr. Lawrence‘s testimony 
was overruled.  
Dr. Lawrence told the jury that he relied on Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy report 
and accompanying photographs as a basis for his testimony.  Neither the report nor 
photographs were admitted in evidence.  Although he had not been present during 
the procedure, Dr. Lawrence testified about the condition of Pina‘s body at the 
time of the autopsy.  These statements about the body‘s condition were presented 
as facts, about which Dr. Lawrence had no personal knowledge.   
 
2 
Whether Dr. Lawrence‘s testimony violated defendant‘s Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation turns on whether Dr. Lawrence related testimonial hearsay.  
In Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford), the Supreme Court 
established that it is the ―testimonial‖ nature of a statement that gives rise to Sixth 
Amendment protections.1  The Supreme Court has yet to clearly define just what 
the term ―testimonial‖ means. 
Nevertheless, I agree with the majority that the Supreme Court‘s Crawford 
jurisprudence reflects the importance of two factors in determining whether a 
statement is testimonial:  (1) the degree of formality or solemnity of the statement 
and (2) the primary purpose for which the statement is made. 
Applying those two factors, I conclude the anatomical observations 
contained in Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy report were testimonial statements.  The 
prosecution asked Dr. Lawrence to relate facts about the condition of Pina‘s body.  
To the extent those facts were drawn from Dr. Bolduc‘s report, as opposed to 
observations based on the autopsy photographs,  Dr. Lawrence related testimonial 
hearsay in violation of defendant‘s federal constitutional right to confront and 
cross-examine Dr. Bolduc.   
Although the majority notes that Dr. Lawrence also relied on autopsy 
photographs for his testimony, the record is insufficient to establish that the 
photographs provided an independent basis for Dr. Lawrence‘s testimony.  
 
A.  Dr. Bolduc’s Recorded Observations Were Sufficiently Formal  
In Crawford, the Supreme Court made clear that ―not all hearsay implicates 
the Sixth Amendment‘s core concerns.‖  (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 51.)  
The court observed that core testimonial statements covered by the confrontation 
                                              
1  
The circumstances surrounding the prosecution‘s decision to call Dr. 
Lawrence, rather than presenting Dr. Bolduc and subjecting him to cross-
examination, certainly raise concerns.    
 
3 
clause include ― ‗ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent,‘ ‖ using 
an affidavit as an example.  (Crawford, at p. 51.) 
Applying the Crawford analysis to forensic evidence, the United States 
Supreme Court has determined that affidavits reporting results of forensic analysis 
are sufficiently formal (Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305, 
310-311) (Melendez-Diaz), as are unsworn certificates (Bullcoming v. New Mexico 
(2011) 564 U.S. __, __ [131 S.Ct. 2705, 2717]) (Bullcoming).  In Melendez-Diaz, 
a Massachusetts statute allowed state crime laboratory technicians to record their 
test results in a sworn affidavit.  Under the statute, these affidavits were admitted 
to prove the test results.  The technicians did not testify and thus were not subject 
to cross-examination.  (See Melendez-Diaz, at pp. 308-309.)  Similarly in 
Bullcoming, New Mexico applied municipal and magistrate court rules that 
allowed certified reports into evidence without a technician‘s testimony.  (See 
Bullcoming, supra, at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at p. 2717].)  These state-created procedures 
were quite similar, in some respects, to the ex parte procedure of the Marian 
statutes, which the Crawford court observed was the ―principal evil at which the 
Confrontation Clause was directed.‖  (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 50.) 
However, whether uncertified reports are sufficiently formal to be 
considered testimonial remains an open question.  In Williams v. Illinois (2012) 
567 U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 2221] (Williams), the high court considered statements 
made in an uncertified Cellmark laboratory report, relied upon by an expert 
witness for her testimony.  The report was not introduced into evidence.  (Id. at 
p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2235].)  Before considering whether the Cellmark report 
amounted to testimonial hearsay, the plurality opined that the report was not 
hearsay at all because its contents were not admitted for their truth.  (Williams, 
 
4 
supra, at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2228] (plur. opn. of Alito, J.).)2  This conclusion 
did not garner a majority.  Five justices explicitly repudiated that analysis.  (See 
Williams, at pp. __-__ [132 S.Ct. at pp. 2256-2259] (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.); id. 
at pp. __-__ [132 S.Ct. at pp. 2268-2272] (dis. opn. of Kagan, J.).)3   
The Williams plurality offered an alternative analysis as well.  Even if the 
Cellmark report had been introduced for its truth, the report failed to satisfy the 
plurality‘s formulation of primary purpose.  (Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ 
[132 S.Ct. at p. 2243] (plur. opn. of Alito, J.).)  The primary purpose test is 
discussed below.  What is important to note here is that, in offering its alternative 
analysis, the plurality did not discuss whether the Cellmark report was sufficiently 
formal.  
Justice Thomas provided the dispositive fifth vote in Williams.  He did so 
only because the Cellmark report ―lacked the requisite ‗formality and solemnity‘ 
to be considered ‗ ―testimonial.‖ ‘ ‖  (Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. 
at p. 2255] (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.).)  In joining the plurality‘s outcome, Justice 
                                              
2  
See Evidence Code section 1200, subdivision (a), which provides that 
― ‗[h]earsay evidence‘ is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a 
witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the 
matter stated.‖  
3  
Two points are important here.  There are, of course, many instances in 
which out-of-court statements are not offered for their truth.  The longstanding 
rule that unless a statement is admitted for its truth it is not hearsay remains 
unchanged.  The question is whether a statement is admitted for its truth.  When an 
expert witness treats as factual the contents of an out-of-court statement, and 
relates as true the contents of that statement to the jury, a majority of the high 
court in Williams, supra, 567 U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 2221], rejects the premise that the 
out-of-court statement is not admitted for its truth. 
 
Second, it should be noted that Crawford and its progeny are grounded 
squarely in the Sixth Amendment, which provides that ―[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him . . . .‖  Thus, the Crawford limitations do not apply in civil 
cases nor do they apply when evidence is not offered against a criminal defendant.       
 
5 
Thomas emphasized his strict position ―that the Confrontation Clause reaches 
‗ ―formalized testimonial materials,‖ ‘ such as depositions, affidavits, and prior 
testimony, or statements resulting from ‗ ―formalized dialogue,‖ ‘ such as 
custodial interrogation.‖  (Id. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2260].)  Justice Thomas has 
articulated this position in Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 836-837 
(dis. opn. of Thomas, J.) (Davis); Melendez-Diaz, supra, 557 U.S. at page 329; 
and Michigan v. Bryant (2011) 562 U.S. __, __ [131 S.Ct. 1143, 1165] (conc. opn. 
of Thomas, J.) (Bryant).  Under Justice Thomas‘s interpretation, ―although the 
[Cellmark] report was produced at the request of law enforcement, it was not the 
product of any sort of formalized dialogue resembling custodial interrogation.‖  
(Williams, supra, at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2260] (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.).)    
Justice Kagan, writing for the dissenters, expressly rejected Justice 
Thomas‘s formality analysis.  Comparing the Cellmark report to the unsworn 
report in Bullcoming, supra, 564 U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 2705], Justice Kagan stated:  
the differences ―amount[] to (maybe) a nickel‘s worth of difference:  The 
similarities in form, function, and purpose dwarf the distinctions.  [Citation.]  Each 
report is an official and signed record of laboratory test results, meant to establish 
a certain set of facts in legal proceedings.  Neither looks any more ‗formal‘ than 
the other; neither is any more formal than the other. . . .  The difference in labeling 
—a ‗certificate‘ in one case, a ‗report of laboratory examination‘ in the other—is 
not of constitutional dimension.‖  (Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at 
p. 2276] (dis. opn. of Kagan, J.).)    
So the question remains:  For purposes of the Sixth Amendment 
confrontation clause, can a statement in an uncertified document be formal enough 
to qualify as testimonial?  In the absence of any Supreme Court majority 
definitively answering this question, we must do so.  We answer it in light of the 
entire Crawford jurisprudence and our own application of it.   
 
6 
The Crawford court explained that testimony ―is typically ‗[a] solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact.‘ ‖  (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 51, italics added.)  ―Various formulations 
of this core class of ‗testimonial‘ statements exist:  ex parte in-court testimony or 
its functional equivalent — that is, material such as affidavits, custodial 
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or 
similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially,‘ [citation]; ‗extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions,‘ [citation]; ‗statements that were made under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial,‘ [citation].‖  (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 51–
52.)  
But the high court emphasized that ―[s]tatements taken by police officers in 
the course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow standard.‖  
(Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 52, italics added.)  ―The statements are not sworn 
testimony, but the absence of oath was not dispositive.‖  (Ibid.) 
In Davis, supra, 547 U.S. 813, the court again emphasized that testimonial 
hearsay is not limited to ―the most formal sort — sworn testimony in prior judicial 
proceedings or formal depositions under oath . . . .‖  (Id. at p. 826.)  ―[W]e do not 
think it conceivable that the protections of the Confrontation Clause can readily be 
evaded by having a note-taking policeman recite the unsworn hearsay testimony 
of the declarant, instead of having the declarant sign a deposition.‖ (Davis, at 
p. 826.)  ―The product of [police] interrogation, whether reduced to a writing 
signed by the declarant or embedded in the memory (and perhaps notes) of the 
interrogating officer, is testimonial.‖  (Ibid.)  The court noted that ―[t]he solemnity 
of even an oral declaration of relevant past fact to an investigating officer is well 
 
7 
enough established by the severe consequences that can attend a deliberate 
falsehood.  [Citations.]‖  (Ibid.) 
Davis, supra, 547 U.S. 813, involved two consolidated cases in which 
domestic violence victims made statements to government authorities.  In one of 
those cases, Hammon v. Indiana, police responded to a domestic violence report 
and came upon the defendant‘s wife standing outside her house.  Although 
frightened, she told the officers that ― ‗ ―nothing was the matter.‖ ‘ ‖  (Davis, at 
p. 819.)  The officers eventually interviewed her inside the home, keeping her 
separated from her husband in another room.  She wrote and signed a ― ‗battery 
affidavit,‘ ‖ summarizing an assault.  (Id. at p. 820.)  When the wife failed to 
appear at her husband‘s trial, her oral and written statements were admitted 
through the police officer who had questioned her.  (Davis, at pp. 820-821.)   
 
The Supreme Court concluded the statements were ―formal enough‖ to 
qualify as testimonial because of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.  
(Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 830.)  The statements were made during organized 
and structured questioning in a separate room; inquiry focused on past events that 
were potentially criminal; and the officer received the wife‘s replies for use in the 
investigation.  (Ibid.)  ―Such statements under official interrogation are an obvious 
substitute for live testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does on 
direct examination; they are inherently testimonial.‖  (Ibid.)    
The other case decided in Davis concerned statements made by a domestic 
violence victim to a 911 operator.  In concluding that these statements were not 
sufficiently formal, the court contrasted them with Crawford‘s police station 
interrogation:  ―Crawford was responding calmly, at the station house, to a series  
 
8 
of questions, with the officer-interrogator taping and making notes of her 
answers; [the Davis victim‘s] frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an 
environment that was not tranquil, or even (as far as any reasonable 911 operator 
could make out) safe.‖  (Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 827.) 
In People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, this court applied Davis to 
determine whether a victim‘s hearsay statements to a sheriff‘s deputy were 
testimonial.  We explained that Davis demonstrates that ―though a statement need 
not be sworn under oath to be testimonial, it must have occurred under 
circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity 
characteristic of testimony.‖  (Cage, at p. 984, italics added.)  In Cage, a sheriff‘s 
deputy interviewed an assault victim at a hospital emergency room, more than an 
hour after the assault.  (Id. at p. 985.)  The circumstances of the interview ―were 
relatively informal, but they were no less formal or structured than the residential 
interview of Amy Hammon in Davis.  Here, as there, the requisite solemnity was 
imparted by the potentially criminal consequences of lying to a peace officer.‖  
(Cage, at p. 986, fn. omitted.) 
In Bryant, supra, 562 U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 1143], police came upon a man 
lying in a parking lot, bleeding from gunshot wounds. The Supreme Court 
majority concluded his statements identifying his shooter were not testimonial 
because their primary purpose was to enable police to respond to an ongoing 
emergency.  (Id. at pp. __-__ [131 S.Ct. at pp. 1163-1167].)  Addressing the issue 
of formality, the court noted that questioning occurred in an exposed, public area, 
in a disorganized fashion, before emergency medical services arrived.  Thus, the 
circumstances were factually distinguishable from a formal station house 
interrogation.  The court cautioned that ―informality does not necessarily indicate 
the presence of an emergency or the lack of testimonial intent.‖  The Bryant 
majority referred to Davis‘s explanation that attempting to keep a written 
 
9 
interrogation ―informal‖ by not asking the declarant to sign it will not serve to 
evade confrontation clause protections.  (Bryant, supra, at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at 
p. 1160], citing Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 826.)   
In Bullcoming, supra, 564 U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 2705], the high court refused 
to distinguish between the unsworn laboratory certificate before it and the 
affidavits offered in Melendez-Diaz.  The court noted Crawford‘s observation that 
the absence of an oath is not controlling when determining whether a statement is 
testimonial.  (Bullcoming, supra, at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at p. 2717].)  The court 
pointed out that the analyst‘s certificate was ― ‗formalized‘ in a signed document, 
[citation], headed a ‗report.‘ ‖  The report form contained a legend referring to the 
applicable court rules permitting admission of certified blood-alcohol analyses.  
―In sum, the formalities attending the ‗report of blood alcohol analysis‘ are more 
than adequate to qualify [the analyst‘s] assertions as testimonial.‖  (Ibid., italics 
added.)  
With this background in mind, we turn to the autopsy report prepared by 
Dr. Bolduc.  During the autopsy, he examined Pina‘s body and ultimately included 
his observations as to her physical condition in his written report.  At trial, Dr. 
Lawrence gave his opinion that Pina died by strangulation.  In explaining that 
conclusion, he related, as matters of fact, Dr. Bolduc‘s observations of Pina‘s body 
as they were set out in the autopsy report.  In particular, Dr. Lawrence mentioned 
the hemorrhages in Pina‘s eyes and neck, the purple color of her face, the absence 
of any natural disease causing death, the fact that she had bitten her tongue shortly 
before death, and the absence of any fractures in the larynx and hyoid bone.  As to 
the latter, Dr. Bolduc wrote:  ―There are no fractures of the hyoid bone, thyroid or 
cricoid cartilages.‖  
The majority states:  ―An autopsy report typically contains two types of 
statements:  (1) statements describing the pathologist‘s anatomical and 
 
10 
physiological observations about the condition of the body, and (2) statements 
setting forth the pathologist‘s conclusions as to the cause of the victim‘s death.  
The out-of-court statements at issue here — pathologist Bolduc‘s observations 
about the condition of victim Pina‘s body — all fall into the first of the two 
categories.  These statements, which merely record objective facts, are less formal 
than statements setting forth a pathologist‘s expert conclusions.  They are 
comparable to observations of objective fact in a report by a physician who, after 
examining a patient, diagnoses a particular injury or ailment and determines the 
appropriate treatment.  Such notations are not testimonial in nature.‖  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 12.)4   
The majority creates a distinction between two kinds of statements in the 
autopsy report: observations and conclusions.  The majority appears to suggest 
that while conclusions may be formal, observations are not.  There are several 
problems with this analysis.  First, it conflates the two prongs of the testimonial 
determination:  formality and primary purpose.  The formality prong looks to the 
circumstances under which the statement is made and any efforts to enhance the 
statement‘s formality by having it sworn (Melendez-Diaz, supra, 557 U.S. 305), 
certified (Bullcoming, supra, 564 U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 2705]), or signed (Davis, 
supra, 547 U.S. 813).  The formality prong turns on the circumstances of the 
statement‘s production and preservation rather than its content.5 
                                              
4  
Of course there are several ways in which the statements are not 
comparable.  An autopsy report reflects the examination of a dead body rather than 
a live patient.  The autopsy surgeon is conducting an official inquiry, while a 
physician is treating his or her patient, not assisting in a governmental 
investigation. 
5  
The high court made clear that the content of a statement may be quite 
important in determining the primary purpose for which it is made.  (See, e.g., 
Bryant, supra, 562 U.S. at pp. __-__ [131 S.Ct. at pp. 1160-1161, 1165-1166].) 
 
11 
Second, the distinction the majority offers here was rejected in Bullcoming, 
supra, 564 U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 2705].  Justice Ginsburg, joined by four other 
justices on this point, wrote:  ―Most witnesses, after all, testify to their 
observations of factual conditions or events, e.g., ‗the light was green,‘ ‗the hour 
was noon.‘  Such witnesses may record, on the spot, what they observed.  Suppose 
a police report recorded an objective fact—Bullcoming‘s counsel posited the 
address above the front door of a house or the read-out of a radar gun.  [Citation.]  
Could an officer other than the one who saw the number on the house or gun 
present the information in court—so long as that officer was equipped to testify 
about any technology the observing officer deployed and the police department‘s 
standard operating procedures?  As our precedent makes plain, the answer is 
emphatically ‗No.‘ ‖  (Id. at pp. __-__ [131 S.Ct. at pp. 2714-2715].)   
Further, the Bullcoming majority noted that while ―[t]he New Mexico 
Supreme Court stated that the number registered by the gas chromatograph 
machine called for no interpretation or exercise of independent judgment on [the 
analyst‘s] part,‖ the ―analysts who write reports that the prosecution introduces 
must be made available for confrontation even if they possess ‗the scientific 
acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Teresa.‘ ‖  (Bullcoming, supra, 
564 U.S. at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at p. 2715].) 
We are not called upon in this matter to determine whether every aspect of 
the autopsy report was testimonial.  The question here is whether anatomical 
observations Dr. Bolduc made are sufficiently formal in light of the circumstances 
in which they were made and the document in which they were recorded.  In many 
cases, Government Code section 27491.4, subdivision (a) gives a coroner 
discretion whether to conduct an autopsy.  Once that discretion is exercised, the 
statute requires: ―The detailed medical findings resulting from an inspection of the 
body or autopsy by an examining physician shall be either reduced to writing or 
 
12 
permanently preserved on recording discs or other similar recording media, shall 
include all positive and negative findings pertinent to establishing the cause of 
death in accordance with medicolegal practice and this, along with the written 
opinions and conclusions of the examining physician, shall be included in the 
coroner‘s record of the death.‖  (Gov. Code, § 27491.4, subd. (a).)    
Dr. Bolduc performed this autopsy and prepared a report in compliance 
with Government Code section 27491.4, subdivision (a).  He was working for the 
Sheriff-Coroner of San Joaquin County, and the report is identified as a document 
filed with the San Joaquin County Sheriff-Coroner‘s Office.  An autopsy report is 
a public record.  (See Dixon v. Superior Court (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1271, 
1278.) 
Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy report consists of seven pages.  The top of the first 
page bears the preprinted notation ―Office of Sheriff-Coroner, County of San 
Joaquin.‖  That same page contains a reproduction of the badge of the San Joaquin 
County Sheriff, below which is the name ―Robert Heidelbach, Sheriff-Coroner, 
Public Administrator.‖   
Additionally, the first page of the autopsy report identifies the document as 
―Coroner‘s Autopsy Report.‖  In the upper right-hand corner of each subsequent 
page is the identification ―Coroner‘s Autopsy Report.‖  Dr. Bolduc‘s name is 
printed on the bottom of each page.  
The report provides a detailed summary of the external examination of the 
victim, concluding with ―Findings Consistent With Neck Compression.‖  The 
report then provides a detailed summary of the internal examination, including the 
description of the injuries to the neck and the absences of fractures ―of the hyoid 
bone, thyroid or cricoid cartilages.‖  
The report concludes with nine ―Autopsy Findings.‖  The first ―finding‖ 
states:  ―The autopsy findings are consistent with neck compression for the 
 
13 
following reasons,‖ and list six reasons.  The report states, ―Cause of Death:  
Asphyxia (minutes) [sic]; Due to: Neck compression.‖  The report is signed by 
―George E. Bolduc, M.D.,‖ and dated June 8, 2006.  
In terms of formality, Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy report comports closely with 
the court‘s description of ―testimonial‖ in Bullcoming, supra, 564 U.S. __ [131 
S.Ct. 2705].  There, the analyst‘s certificate, although unsworn, was ― ‗formalized‘ 
in a signed document, [citation], headed a ‗report,‘ ‖ and these attendant 
formalities were found ―more than adequate to qualify [the analyst‘s] assertions as 
testimonial.‖  (Id. at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at p. 2717].)  Although Dr. Bolduc‘s 
―Coroner‘s Autopsy Report,‖ is not certified, it is signed and dated.  It is 
manifestly an official report, prepared by Dr. Bolduc as an agent of the Sheriff-
Coroner and in compliance with the Government Code.  I believe the document 
and the circumstances of its preparation reveal that the statements at issue here are 
sufficiently formal to satisfy that prong of the Supreme Court‘s testimonial test.  
B.  Dr. Bolduc’s Recorded Observations Satisfy the Primary Purpose Test 
In Williams, supra, 567 U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 2221], all members of the 
Supreme Court agreed that the primary purpose for which a statement is made is 
an important prong of the testimonial test.  Beginning with Crawford, supra, 541 
U.S. 36, the high court has declined to provide a firm definition of ―testimonial.‖  
In Williams, three different formulations were given. 
Justice Alito, for the plurality, wrote that even if the Cellmark report had 
been introduced for its truth, it was not testimonial because it was not prepared for 
―the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual.‖  (Williams, supra, 567 
U.S. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2243] (plur. opn. of Alito, J.).)  This formulation 
garnered a total of four votes, as Justice Alito was joined by Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Kennedy and Breyer.  (Id. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2227].).  Under the 
 
14 
plurality‘s definition, a statement is not testimonial unless it was made to accuse a 
specific person. 
Justice Thomas rejected that definition.  He agreed that for a statement to 
qualify as testimonial, it must be made with a requisite primary purpose, which he 
described thusly:  ―[F]or a statement to be testimonial within the meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause, the declarant must primarily intend to establish some fact 
with the understanding that his statement may be used in a criminal prosecution.‖  
(Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2261] (conc. opn. of Thomas, 
J.).)6  He criticized the accusatory statement concept newly formulated by the 
plurality because it ―lacks any grounding in constitutional text, in history, or in 
logic.‖  (Williams, at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2262].) 
Justice Kagan, in a dissent joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and 
Sotomayor, also rejected the plurality‘s definition of the primary purpose test.  
Justice Kagan wrote, ―Where that test comes from is anyone‘s guess.  Justice 
Thomas rightly shows that it derives neither from the text nor from the history of 
the Confrontation Clause.  [Citation.]  And it has no basis in our precedents.  We 
have previously asked whether a statement was made for the primary purpose of 
establishing ‗past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution‘—in 
other words, for the purpose of providing evidence.  Davis, 547 U.S., at 822, 126 
S.Ct. 2266; see also Bullcoming, 564 U.S., at __, 131 S.Ct., at 2705; Bryant, 562 
U.S., at ___,___, 131 S.Ct. 1143, at p. 1157; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S., at 310-311, 
129 S.Ct. 2527; Crawford, 541 U.S., at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354.  None of our cases 
has ever suggested that, in addition, the statement must be meant to accuse a 
                                              
6  
Justice Thomas cautioned that such a test must be coupled with the 
solemnity requirement.  Otherwise ―it sweeps into the ambit of the Confrontation 
Clause statements that lack formality and solemnity and is thus ‗disconnected 
from history.‘ ‖  (Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2261] (conc. 
opn. of Thomas, J.).) 
 
15 
previously identified individual; indeed, in Melendez–Diaz, we rejected a related 
argument that laboratory ‗analysts are not subject to confrontation because they 
are not ―accusatory‖ witnesses.‘  557 U.S., at 313, 129 S.Ct. 2527.‖  (Williams, 
supra, 567 U.S. at pp. __-__ [132 S.Ct. at pp. 2273-2274] (dis. opn. of Kagan, J.).)   
In Williams, supra, 567 U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 2221], the high court failed to 
articulate any reasoning accepted by a majority of that court.  ― ‗When a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result 
enjoys the assent of five Justices, ―the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest 
grounds . . . .‖ ‘ (Marks v. United States (1977) 430 U.S. 188, 193.)‖  (Del Monte 
v. Wilson (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1009, 1023.)  ―This rule only works in instances where 
‗one opinion can meaningfully be regarded as ―narrower‖ than another — only 
when one opinion is a logical subset of other, broader opinions,‘ King v. 
Palmer, . . . 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C.Cir. 1991) (en banc), that is to say, only when 
that narrow opinion is the common denominator representing the position 
approved by at least five justices.  When it is not possible to discover a single 
standard that legitimately constitutes the narrowest ground for a decision on that 
issue, there is then no law of the land because no one standard commands the 
support of a majority of the Supreme Court.  [Citation.]  [¶] . . . The only binding 
aspect of such a splintered decision is its specific result . . . .‖  (U.S. v. Alcan 
Aluminum Corp. (2d Cir. 2003) 315 F.3d 179, 189.) 
As Justice Kagan wrote in Williams, supra, 567 U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 2221], 
― . . . I call Justice Alito‘s opinion ‗the plurality,‘ because that is the conventional 
term for it.  But in all except its disposition, his opinion is a dissent:  Five Justices 
specifically reject every aspect of its reasoning and every paragraph of its 
explication.‖  (Id. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2265] (dis. opn. of Kagan, J.).)   
 
16 
Because the high court failed to articulate any reasoning carrying a majority 
of that court, Williams provides no authoritative reasoning for us to follow.  
Nevertheless, despite the fractured voting, Williams represents the first time that 
all nine justices agree that primary purpose is a significant part of the 
―testimonial‖ analysis.  So how do we determine whether the ―primary purpose‖ 
for which a statement was given satisfies that prong of the testimonial test?  
We must apply the high court‘s binding decisions in this area.  The four 
dissenting justices in Williams continue to adhere to the primary purpose test 
articulated in Davis, supra, 547 U.S. 813. (See Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ 
[132 S.Ct. at p. 2274] (dis. opn. of Kagan, J.).)  As set out above, ante at page 5, 
Justice Thomas provides a definition slightly different from that endorsed by the 
dissenters.  While future developments may clarify whether those differences 
result in a legally significant distinction, the similarity between the two 
formulations is sufficient to consider them together here. 
The primary purpose test of Davis was again applied by the Supreme Court 
majority in Bryant, supra, 562 U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 1143].  The court further 
explained that ―[a]n objective analysis of the circumstances of an encounter and 
the statements and actions of the parties to it provides the most accurate 
assessment of the ‗primary purpose of the interrogation.‘  The circumstances in 
which an encounter occurs . . . are clearly matters of objective fact.‖  (Bryant, 
supra, at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1156].)7 
                                              
7  
In Bullcoming, supra, 564 U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 2705], Justice Ginsburg, 
writing for the majority, included this footnote:  ―To rank as ‗testimonial,‘ a 
statement must have a ‗primary purpose‘ of ‗establish[ing] or prov[ing] past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. __ [131 S. Ct. 
at p. 2714, fn. 6], quoting Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 822.)  Justice Thomas, a 
member of the majority, did not join in the footnote.   
 
17 
In view of the binding precedent of the high court, I suggest the appropriate 
inquiry is whether, viewed objectively, a sufficiently formal statement was made 
for the primary purpose of establishing or proving past facts for possible use in a 
criminal trial.  
Turning to Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy, the majority states:  ―The usefulness of 
autopsy reports, including the one at issue here, is not limited to criminal 
investigations and prosecution; such reports serve many other equally important 
purposes.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)   
Such a blanket approach is not supported by controlling precedent.  While 
some autopsies may be conducted for purposes unrelated to a criminal 
prosecution, other autopsies conducted under different circumstances may well 
result in the production of testimonial statements.  In Bryant, supra, 562 U.S. __ 
[131 S.Ct. 1143], Justice Sotomayor, writing for the majority, notes that the 
primary purpose for which a statement is made will often be highly fact 
dependent.8  Indeed, the primary purpose may change as events evolve.  The 
Bryant court, citing Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at page 828, pointed out that a 
conversation initially concerning the need for emergency assistance may evolve to 
produce testimonial statements.9  Further, a statement may be made or recorded 
                                              
8  
For example, the majority noted, ―[W]hether an emergency exists and is 
ongoing is a highly context-dependent inquiry.‖  (Bryant, supra, 562 U.S. at p. __ 
[131 S.Ct. at p. 1158].)  ―In determining whether a declarant‘s statements are 
testimonial, courts should look to all of the relevant circumstances.‖  (Id. at p. __ 
[131 S.Ct. at p. 1162].)   
9  
As the majority explained in Bryant:  ―This evolution may occur if, for 
example, a declarant provides police with information that makes clear that what 
appeared to be an emergency is not or is no longer an emergency or that what 
appeared to be a public threat is actually a private dispute.  It could also occur if a 
perpetrator is disarmed, surrenders, is apprehended, or, as in Davis, flees with little 
prospect of posing a threat to the public.  Trial courts can determine in the first 
instance when any transition from nontestimonial to testimonial occurs, and 
exclude ‗the portions of any statement that have become testimonial, as they do, 
 
18 
for multiple purposes. (See Bryant, supra, at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1161].)  
However, it is the primary purpose that must be determined and that determination 
will drive the analysis.   
Thus, the question is whether this autopsy report was made for the primary 
purpose of establishing past facts for possible use in a criminal trial.  Answering 
that question, ―we objectively evaluate the circumstances‖ in which the report was 
generated.  (Bryant, supra, 562 U.S. at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1156].)   
An objective consideration of this autopsy report reveals the following.  Dr. 
Bolduc‘s autopsy of Pina‘s body took place over two days during a homicide 
investigation.  There is no dispute that the victim, whose body was discovered in 
her parked car after a police search, was a homicide victim.  The report reveals 
that homicide detective Robert Faine was present throughout the autopsy.  It 
indicates that, at various times during the second day of the procedure, another 
police officer, an evidence technician, and a Department of Justice representative 
were also present.  Faine testified at the preliminary hearing that he told Dr. 
Bolduc about the position and appearance of Pina‘s body in the car.  Dr. Bolduc‘s 
autopsy report relates:  ―This woman, dressed in pajamas and socks, was found on 
the rear floorboard of her SUV covered by a blanket.  The windows were closed 
and the doors were locked.‖  The report also notes:  ―History from police 
Detective Faine that someone confessed to manually strangling the deceased from 
the front and putting the body in her SUV and driving around for a while.‖  In 
light of all these circumstances, I conclude that when Dr. Bolduc wrote this 
                                                                                                                                      
 
for example, with unduly prejudicial portions of otherwise admissible evidence.‘ ‖ 
(Bryant, supra, 562 U.S. at pp. __-__ [131 S.Ct at pp. 1159-1160, fn. omitted].) 
 
19 
autopsy report, his primary purpose was to make the statements at issue to 
establish facts for possible use in a criminal trial.10 
While Justice Werdegar joins the majority opinion, she writes separately to 
explain in more detail why Dr. Bolduc‘s statements are not testimonial.  The 
explanation offered is problematic.   
First, on the issue of formality, the concurrence relies on standards 
attributed to the National Association of Medical Examiners (NAME Standards).  
Those standards appear nowhere in the record.  The trial court did not rely on 
them.  No statute mentions them. We cannot determine from this record whether 
those standards are widely accepted in California.  We have no basis to conclude 
those standards are implicated in this case.  
On the primary purpose question, the concurrence asserts there is a 
―consensus‖ that a statement is more testimonial ―to the extent it was produced 
under circumstances making it likely to be used in place of live testimony at a 
future criminal trial.‖  (Conc. opn. of Werdegar, J., ante, at p. 5.)  It is inaccurate 
to say there is a consensus among the justices as to the definition of ―primary 
purpose.‖  The definition has been formulated variously in Crawford and 
subsequent cases.  As noted, three different formulations are contained in the 
Williams opinion alone.  
The precise phrasing of the test is important, even if the high court has yet 
to agree upon one.  Articulating the test in different ways gives rise to confusion.  I 
                                              
10  
I note that because defendant had already confessed to strangling Pina at 
the time Dr. Bolduc prepared his autopsy report, the primary purpose formulation 
embraced by the Williams plurality is also satisfied.  The autopsy statements were 
made for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual, the confessing 
defendant.  (See Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2242] (plur. 
opn. of Alito, J.).)  
 
20 
suggest it is unwise for us to try and synthesize the court‘s many formulations to 
urge there is a consensus, where plainly one does not exist. 
The concurrence again places heavy reliance on the NAME Standards to 
conclude that a medical examiner may make a ― ‗neutral and objective medical 
assessment,‘ ‖ when doing an autopsy.  (Conc. opn. of Werdegar, J., ante, at p. 6.)  
Regardless of how an association may characterize what some medical examiners 
may generally do, the question before us is what this doctor did, and for what 
primary purpose he wrote this autopsy report.  There is no evidence in this record 
that Dr. Bolduc followed the NAME Standards, or relied on them in any way.  As 
explained in the majority opinion (ante, at pp. 3-4) the pretrial evidentiary hearing 
contains assertions that Dr. Bolduc was fired as a coroner in Kern County, did not 
reveal that fact in his resume, and resigned his coroner‘s position in Orange 
County ― ‗under a cloud.‘ ‖  Dr. Lawrence acknowledged at that hearing that 
prosecutors in several counties refused to use him as an expert witness.   
The concurrence‘s statement that there is no indication that Dr. Bolduc 
―was guided in his conduct and documentation of the autopsy by anything other 
than professional medical practices and standards‖ (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J., 
ante, at p. 9) rests on complete speculation.  Indeed, it is precisely those questions 
that could have been pursued during his cross-examination had the prosecution not 
declined to call Dr. Bolduc as a witness.    
C.  Prejudicial Effect of the Error 
The majority notes that Dr. Lawrence did not say whether his description of 
Pina‘s body at the time of the autopsy was based solely on the autopsy 
photographs, solely on Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy report, or on a combination of the 
two.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.)  The existence of multiple sources is important. 
Autopsy photographs are not hearsay.  Hearsay is an out-of-court 
―statement.‖  (See Evid. Code, § 1200.)  Evidence Code section 225 defines 
 
21 
―statement‖ as oral or written verbal expression or nonverbal conduct of a person.  
Only people can generate hearsay.  Machines, animals, chemical reactions cannot.  
(See Simons, Cal. Evidence Manual (2012 ed.) §2.2, pp. 74-75.)  Therefore, to the 
extent Dr. Lawrence had used properly authenticated autopsy photographs to 
explain his testimony, he would not have disclosed testimonial hearsay.11   
On this record, supplemented by our review of the judicially noticed 
autopsy record, it cannot be determined if the autopsy photographs would have 
independently supported Dr. Lawrence‘s testimony.  The photographs were not 
admitted in evidence, and Dr. Bolduc‘s report did not mention them other than to 
note that ―[m]ultiple photographs are taken.‖  Defendant objected to Dr. 
Lawrence‘s testimony as hearsay.  It was the prosecution‘s burden, as proponent 
of the challenged evidence, to establish its admissibility.  (See Pen. Code, § 1096.)  
It failed to do so.   
When the erroneous admission of evidence against a criminal defendant 
violates a right under the federal Constitution, the judgment must be reversed 
unless the prosecution shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have 
been the same notwithstanding the error.  (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 
18, 24.)  Applying that test here, I conclude that the erroneously admitted 
testimony of Dr. Lawrence was prejudicial.  
As the Court of Appeal explained, Dr. Lawrence‘s opinion that Pina was 
strangled for at least two minutes was a crucial part of the prosecution‘s case:  
―While defendant admitted strangling Pina to death, he said he did so only after he 
was provoked to the point of losing control and argued he was guilty of at most 
voluntary manslaughter.  The prosecution‘s argument that defendant was guilty of 
intentional murder, and not voluntary manslaughter, was based in large part on the 
                                              
11  
I assume Detective Faine, who attended the autopsy, could have 
authenticated the autopsy photographs.  
 
22 
theory that during the time it took for defendant to strangle Pina, what may have 
begun as passion shaded into intent.  The only evidence offered by the prosecution 
in support of this theory was Dr. Lawrence‘s testimony that Pina was strangled for 
at least two minutes before she died, which he based on Dr. Bolduc‘s report.  The 
prosecutor relied on that testimony during her closing argument in arguing 
defendant was guilty of murder and not voluntary manslaughter.‖   
Dr. Lawrence description of Pina‘s body, drawn from the hearsay contained 
in Dr. Bolduc‘s autopsy report, violated defendant‘s right to confront and cross-
examine Dr. Bolduc.  Had the trial court excluded that description, there would 
have been no evidence supporting Dr. Lawrence‘s opinion regarding the length of 
Pina‘s strangulation.12  Without such evidence, the jury might have rejected the 
prosecutor‘s argument (maj. opn., ante, at p. 6) that defendant could not have 
killed Pina in the heat of passion because any such passion would have dissipated 
during the two minutes it took to strangle her. 
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.  
In reaching this conclusion I note that various Supreme Court justices have 
written at length describing how the court‘s Crawford jurisprudence has created 
serious and complicated problems, the full significance of which continues to 
evolve.13  As Justice Alito observed in Williams, ―Experience might yet show that 
                                              
12  
Dr. Lawrence might have testified that he could base his opinion on 
nonhearsay photographs.  He did not.  Had he done so, his claims that the 
photographs were sufficient for that purpose would have been subject to cross-
examination as well as being potentially rebuttable by independent defense 
evidence to the contrary.   
13  
See, for example, the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined 
by Justice O‘Connor in Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pages 69-76; the dissenting 
opinion of Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Breyer 
and Alito, in Melendez-Diaz, supra, 557 U.S. at pages 330-357; and the 
concurring opinion of Justice Breyer in Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at pages __-__ 
[132 S.Ct. at pages 2244-2255].   
 
23 
the holdings [in Crawford‘s progeny] should be reconsidered for the reasons, 
among others, expressed in the dissents the decisions produced.‖  (Williams, 
supra, 567 U.S. at p. __, fn. 13 [132 S.Ct. at p. 2242, fn. 13] (plur. opn. of Alito, 
J.).) 
Application of Supreme Court precedent is further complicated by the fact 
that the tests propounded are expressed in various formulations and are modified 
in ensuing opinions with shifting levels of agreement among the justices.  As 
Justice Breyer pointed out in his Williams concurrence:  ―Answering the 
underlying general question . . . , and doing so soon, is important.  Trial judges in 
both federal and state courts apply and interpret hearsay rules as part of their daily 
trial work. . . .  Obviously, judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers have to know, 
in as definitive a form as possible, what the Constitution requires so that they can 
try their cases accordingly.  [¶]  The several different opinions filed today embody 
several serious, but different, approaches to the difficult general question.  Yet 
none fully deals with the underlying question as to how, after Crawford, 
Confrontation Clause ‗testimonial statement‘ requirements apply . . . .‖  (Williams, 
supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2248] (conc. opn. of Breyer, J.).)  The 
problem is reflected in the various opinions our court offers here. 
 
24 
Nevertheless, a majority of the Supreme Court has propounded a series of 
rules founded squarely on a federal constitutional guarantee.  Lower courts must 
conscientiously apply those constitutionally mandated principles, as best we can 
discern them, whether or not we agree with their wisdom or their logic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
I CONCUR: 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Dungo 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 176 Cal.App.4th 1388 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S176886 
Date Filed: October 15, 2012 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Joaquin 
Judge: Charlotte J. Orcutt 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Ann Hopkins, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Bartell & Hensel, Donald J. Bartell, Lara J. Gressley; and John N. Aquilina for California DUI Lawyers 
Association and California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, David A. Rhodes and Daniel E. 
Bernstein, Deputy Attorneys General; James P. Willett, District Attorney, Edward J. Busuttil, Assistant 
District Attorney, and Ronald J. Freitas, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
W. Scott Thorpe; and Albert C. Locher, Assistant District Attorney (Sacramento) for California District 
Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Dolores A. Carr, District Attorney (San Jose) and John Chase, Deputy District Attorney, for California 
Association of Crime Laboratory Directors as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Ann Hopkins 
P.O. Box 23711 
Oakland, CA  94623 
(510) 530-8774 
 
Ronald J. Freitas 
Deputy District Attorney 
222 East Weber, Room 202 
Stockton, CA  95202 
(209) 468-2400