Case Title: In re Chittenden Solid Waste District

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2011-072

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Chittenden Solid Waste District (2011-072)
 
2012 VT 10
 
[Filed 07-Feb-2012]
 
ENTRY
  ORDER
 
2012 VT 10
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2011-072
 
OCTOBER  TERM, 2011
 
In re Chittenden Solid Waste
  District
}
APPEALED FROM:
 
}
 
 
}
Superior Court, Chittenden Unit,
  
 
}
Civil Division
 
}
 
 
}
DOCKET NO. S1054-92
  CnC
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge: Helen M. Toor
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
This condemnation case was filed in July 1992, making it very, very
old.  We are currently reviewing this matter for the fourth time, asked to
determine whether the superior court abused its discretion when it declined to
find that there had been a material increase in the value of a sand pit owned
by Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Company (HS&G) between 2000 and 2009. 
We conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm
the court's denial of HS&G's motion to amend the final judgment.
¶ 2.            
The complete factual and procedural history of this case was recited in In
re Chittenden Solid Waste District, 2007 VT 28, 182 Vt. 38, 928 A.2d 1183 (CSWD
III).  To address the claims currently before the Court, we need
provide only a brief review of the facts.  The Chittenden Solid Waste
District filed a petition pursuant to 24 V.S.A. § 2299a to condemn
HS&G's sand pit for use as a landfill.  This Court affirmed the trial
court's finding of necessity for the taking, Chittenden Solid Waste Dist. v.
Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co., 169 Vt. 153, 154, 730 A.2d 614, 615 (1999)
(CSWD II), and the case progressed to a trial on damages in 2003. 
At trial, the court instructed the jury that it should find fair market value
for the sand pit as of January 1, 2000.  This arbitrarily chosen date had
previously been agreed upon by both parties.  At the time of trial, the
parties knew that CSWD would not actually enter the land until at least 2007,
so HS&G could continue operating the sand pit until at least that
time.  The jury awarded $4 million for the property and $4.8 million for
the value of the business loss.  In 2005, the court granted the District's
motion for judgment as a matter of law, striking the award for business
loss.  The court ruled that HS&G was collaterally estopped from
raising issues concerning the quality and quantity of sand, that the business
loss incurred was not to "business on the property" as required by law, and
that "valuing the property as a landfill and then obtaining compensation for
business loss associated with its use as a sand pit would constitute double
recovery."  CSWD III, 2007 VT 28, ¶ 10.  The court entered a
final judgment awarding HS&G $4 million in damages.  
¶ 3.            
 HS&G appealed the final judgment award, and, in 2007, this
Court affirmed in CSWD III, 2007 VT 28, ¶ 35. 
One of HS&G's arguments on appeal in CSWD III was that it was
entitled to an updated valuation of the land, because the valuation
dateJanuary 1, 2000was four years old at the time of trial, and seven years
old at the time of the appeal.  It argued that the failure to update the
property's valuation to the actual time payment was tendered was
unconstitutional.  The Court noted that HS&G never objected to the January
1, 2000 valuation date, and there was no record before it as to whether
HS&G suffered any injury from this valuation date.  We therefore
rejected HS&G's argument.  However, the issue raised prompted us to
adopt a procedure to ensure that the landowner receives "just compensation for
the value of the condemned land at the time of the taking."  CSWD
III, 2007 VT 28, ¶ 32 (emphasis added) (citing United States v.
Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970)).  We recognized that in cases such
as this, if there is a significant time lapse between the valuation date and
the actual date of taking, "the court-determined valuation may no longer
suffice as just compensation."  Id.  Some procedure would
therefore be needed to "updat[e] the compensation award to reflect fair market
value at the time of the taking."  Id.
¶ 4.            
We reviewed the procedure used in federal condemnation cases as
established by Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 457 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1984):
[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 60(b) empowers a
federal court, upon motion of a party, to withdraw or amend a final order for "any . . . reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment."  This provision seems to us expansive enough
to encompass a motion, by the owner of condemned land, to amend a condemnation
award.  The evidence adduced in consideration of such a
motion would be very limited.  The parties would not be permitted to
question the adjudicated value of the tract as of the date of its original
valuation; they would be limited to the presentation of evidence and arguments
on the issue of how the market value of the property altered between that date
and the date on which the judgment was paid by the Government.  So
focused, the consideration of such a motion would be expeditious and relatively
inexpensive for the parties involved. 
Recognizing that
Federal Rule 60 is substantially identical to its Vermont cousin, but that in
Vermont, compensation is determined by a jury (not by the court as in a federal
case), we adopted the Kirby Forest procedure by creating a two-step
process:
In
the first [step], the property owner must demonstrate to the [trial] court that
grounds exist to grant relief from judgment under [Vermont] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 60(b)(6): that is, that
there has been a material change in the value of the property between the date
of the valuation and the date of the tender of compensation.  Assuming
that the court finds grounds for relief, the narrow question of the increase in
value can be submitted to the jury.
CSWD III, 2007 VT 28, ¶ 33. 
This procedure is at the heart of the issue currently before the Court.
¶ 5.            
CSWD finally took the property by tendering payment to HS&G in
February 2009.  HS&G then moved to amend the final order in December
2009, arguing that there was a material change in the value of its property
between January 2000 and February 2009.  The trial court noted that
HS&G's Rule 60(b) motion was less than two pages long, and unsupported by
any affidavit or evidence.  The court stated that it would normally deny
such an unsupported motion, but given the "history of the case" (that is, its
lengthy and litigious nature), the court gave HS&G ten days to provide
evidentiary support for its motion.  Based on the filing, it would then determine
whether an evidentiary hearing was warranted. 
¶ 6.            
To meet its burden of showing a material change in value under the
procedure set forth in CSWD III, HS&G next submitted an affidavit
from Richard Sterner, a solid-waste facility appraiser.  Sterner analyzed
the property from the perspective of its income value as a landfill and
concluded that it was worth $15,803,354 as of February 2009.  Sterner's
analysis did not include what the property's income value as a landfill would
have been on January 1, 2000.  CSWD argued in response that Sterner's
method of valuation was entirely different from the methods used by the experts
at the compensation trialwhere both sides used a sales comparison approachso
the comparison of values would be of no use to the court.  At trial, both
parties' experts testified that the income approach is not a valid methodology
for valuing landfills.  HS&G's own expert at trial explicitly rejected
the income approach because properties like the subject that are vacant land
"do not usually generate a defined income stream." 
¶ 7.            
HS&G did not dispute that Sterner's income valuation methodology
differed from the sales comparison approach and responded by submitting a
supplemental affidavit from Sterner asserting his opinion that the value of the
sand pit site increased materially between 2000 and 2009 regardless of the
method of appraisal.  Sterner reiterated his belief that the income
approach is the most useful way to value the property but again did not include
any opinion of the income value as of January 1, 2000.  In its ruling on
the motion to amend, the trial court held that it would not use the offered
income approach to establish the property's current value because the sales
comparison approach was used to establish the 2000 value of the sand pit.
 It noted that the values were reached in "completely different ways, with
no ability to compare them."  The court also rejected a letter that
HS&G submitted from a purported appraiser stating that overall commercial property
sales prices in Chittenden County increased seventy percent from 2000 to 2009,
ruling that it was not admissible evidence as it was not sworn to, it was a
draft, and the author's credentials were not established.  Further, the
court held that HS&G failed to establish anything about the actual
valuation of the subject property.  The court concluded that HS&G's
submissions failed to establish, as we required in CSWD III, that there
was a material change in the value of the property between 2000 and 2009.
 It therefore denied HS&G's motion to amend final judgment.
¶ 8.            
HS&G then filed a motion to reconsider.  The court denied the
motion, ruling that HS&G had again failed to submit on a
timely basis sufficient evidence in support of its motion.  We
review decisions on Rule 60(b) motions, including questions on whether a
hearing should have been held, for an abuse of discretion.  Altman v. Altman, 169 Vt. 562, 564, 730 A.2d 583, 585 (1999)
(mem.).  "The burden is on the party challenging the denial to
demonstrate an abuse of discretion."  Id. 
¶ 9.            
The crux of HS&G's argument on appeal is that, based on its Rule
60(b) motion and expert affidavits, it was entitled to a hearing on whether the
value of its property materially increased from 2000 to 2009.  It presents
numerous cases from Vermont and other jurisdictions holding that "the court
deciding the Rule 60(b) motion must hold a hearing to allow oral
argument and, if necessary, the taking of evidence."  Goshy v. Morey,
149 Vt. 93, 99, 539 A.2d 543, 547 (1987) (emphasis added); see also Greater
Kan. City Laborers Pension Fund v. Paramount Indus., Inc., 829 F.2d 644,
646 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding when a Rule 60(b) motion states a "cognizable
claim," a court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the merits of the
motion).  When the grounds for a Rule 60(b) motion are "frivolous or
totally lacking in merit" or "the explanations offered by a party are
unreasonable," a court may deny the motion without a hearing.  Sandgate
Sch. Dist. v. Cate, 2005 VT 88, ¶ 12, 178 Vt. 625, 883 A.2d 774.  HS&G claims that it followed the procedural steps
outlined in CSWD III, and since its motion was not frivolous or totally
lacking in merit, the trial court erred in denying it without an evidentiary hearing.
 HS&G contends that because a jury (not the court) is to determine the
actual increase in value, it need present only evidence that there was a
material increase in value to proceed to the second step and argues that the
affidavits submitted support a finding that an increase in value has
occurred.  
¶ 10.         Generally,
"[t]he law favors the disposition of disputes after a hearing on the
merits."  Altman, 169 Vt. at 564, 730 A.2d  at 586.
 However, our rules and case law "plainly require that a moving party who
wishes to present evidence must submit a request for a hearing with the motion
or within five days thereafter, together with a statement of the evidence to be
offered."  Id. (citing V.R.C.P. 7(b)(4)
and 78(b)(2)); see also Reporter's Notes1990 Amendment, V.R.C.P. 7 ("[T]he
right to an evidentiary hearing will guarantee that every motion under Rule
60(b) will result in a hearing if requested." (emphasis
added)).  In this case, HS&G stated in its motion that it was
"prepared to demonstrate to the Court that [a material change in value of the
subject property] has occurred through the expert testimony of its consultant,
in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in this matter."  This
statement does not suffice as a request for a hearing.  In its motion for
reconsideration, it similarly argued that it was entitled to a jury
determination of the increase of value of its property, but it never requested
a hearing on the merits of its motion.
¶ 11.         Even
if HS&G had properly requested a hearing, the trial court was still within
its discretion to deny the Rule 60(b) motion without a hearing.  A trial
court has "broad discretion" in deciding a Rule 60(b) motion, Altman,
169 Vt. at 564, 730 A.2d  at 586, and that decision "will stand on review unless
the record clearly and affirmatively indicates that such discretion was
withheld or otherwise abused."  Id. at 563-64,
730 A.2d  at 585 (quotation omitted).  A review of the procedural
history of HS&G's Rule 60(b) motion reveals the trial court was well within
its discretion to deny the motion without a hearing.
¶ 12.         In
this case, HS&G repeatedly failed to provide the court with satisfactory
support for its conclusory allegations that there had been an increase in the
value of the property.  HS&G submitted affidavits that provided the
court with valuations reached using a methodology that differed from the
valuation evidence relied upon at trial and provided no means of comparison
with the value found by the jury.  While the income approach is an
acceptable method when used in the proper context, it can produce significantly
different values for the same property than a comparable sales approach.* 
In his affidavit Sterner based his opinion on three factors: (1) changes in the
local solid waste market; (2) changes in the local real estate market; and (3)
changes in the regional and national solid waste markets.  He failed to
explain how any of these factors affected or related to the subject property's
value.  However difficult it may be to value land such as the sand pit,
the trial court must have before it some way to compare values during the
relevant period.  Sterner's supplemental affidavit did nothing to aid the
court in determining whether there had been a material increase.  The
judge was still left to compare apples and oranges.  
¶ 13.         Finally,
HS&G submitted a draft letter (not an affidavit) from a purported appraiser
stating that commercial real estate prices increased seventy percent between
2000 and 2009 in Chittenden County.  The court properly rejected this
letter as inadmissible.  Further, the letter failed to establish anything
about the value of the subject property.  At the close of the briefing
period, therefore, HS&G failed to meet its burden of establishing that
grounds existed to support the grant of relief from judgmentthat is, that
there had been a material increase in value such that the issue could be
submitted to a jury.  
¶ 14.          HS&G
was given multiple opportunities to proffer evidence upon which a jury could
evaluate whether the property increased materially in value.  HS&G
repeatedly failed to provide evidentiary support for its request to amend the
final judgment.  The judge was well within her discretion to deny the
motion without a hearing.  The judge was similarly within her discretion
to deny HS&G's motion for reconsideration.  HS&G submitted the
motion without any timely supporting evidence.  Only with its late-filed
reply brief did it submit an affidavit.  
¶ 15.         Because
HS&G did not meet its burden under CSWD III to show that there was a
material change in the value of the property between the date of valuation and
the date of the tender of compensation, the trial court did not err in denying
HS&G's motion to amend the final judgment.
Affirmed.
 
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber, Chief
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Denise R. Johnson, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 

* 
For instance, HS&G's valuation expert at the damages trial determined that
the subject property was worth $1.8 million on January 1, 2000 under the
comparable sales approach.  HS&G's motion to amend relied on Sterner's
valuation of $15.8 million on February 12, 2009 using the income approachmore
than an 800% increase.