Case Title: Wright-Jones v. Missouri Ethics Commission

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC95796

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2018-02-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc
ROBIN WRIGHT-JONES, and   
      ) 
WRIGHT-JONES FOR SENATE, 
      ) 
      ) 
Appellants,           
      ) 
      ) 
v.    
      ) 
No. SC95796 
      ) 
MISSOURI ETHICS COMMISSION, 
      ) 
      ) 
            Respondent. 
      ) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS CITY 
The Honorable David M. Dowd, Judge 
PER CURIAM. 
Robin Wright-Jones (“Wright-Jones”) and Wright-Jones for Senate (collectively, 
“Appellants”) seek review of the Administrative Hearing Commission’s (“AHC”) 
decision affirming the Missouri Ethics Commission’s (“MEC”) imposition of fees arising 
from Appellants’ failure to comply with the rules of chapter 130, RSMo 2000.1  
Appellants also challenge the circuit court’s judgment finding no constitutional 
violations.  The AHC’s decision and circuit court’s judgment are affirmed.  This Court 
1 All further statutory references are to RSMo 2000, as supplemented.  
Opinion issued February 13, 2018
2 
 
has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the validity of a statute.  Mo. 
Const. art. V, sec. 3. 
Factual and Procedural History2 
When Wright-Jones announced her candidacy for the Missouri State Senate, she 
formed a campaign committee called Wright-Jones for Senate, which later was changed 
to Wright-Jones for Missouri, to assist her in supporting her candidacy in the 2008 
election and future elections.  Wright-Jones was elected to the Missouri State Senate in 
the November 2008 general election.   
The MEC is a Missouri agency established to enforce chapter 130’s campaign 
finance and disclosure laws.  Pursuant to section 105.961, the MEC investigated 
Appellants’ campaign finance records, bank statements, reports filed, and other records.  
The MEC concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe there were reporting 
violations.  The MEC convened a closed hearing pursuant to section 105.961.3.   
 
On May 14, 2013, the MEC issued its decision, finding probable cause existed that 
Appellants violated multiple statutes.  The MEC charged Appellants with multiple 
violations in eight counts.  Appellants appealed this decision to the AHC pursuant to 
section 105.961.5.   
                                                 
2 Appellants fail to comply with Rule 84.04(c) because they do not cite any specific page 
reference within the record on appeal in their statement of facts.  “Compliance with Rule 
84.04 briefing requirements is mandatory in order to ensure that appellate courts do not 
become advocates by speculating on facts and on arguments that have not been made.”  
Brown v. Ameristar Casino Kansas City, Inc., 211 S.W.3d 145, 147 (Mo. App. W.D. 
2007) (quoting Bridges v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 146 S.W.3d 456, 458 (Mo. App. 
W.D. 2004)).  Failure to comply with Rule 84.04 may constitute grounds for dismissal.  
Bethman v. Faith, 462 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015). 
3 
 
At the AHC hearing, the MEC relied upon thousands of pages of reporting and 
financial data to support its decision.  There was also testimony from Appellants’ prior 
treasurer and one of the MEC’s investigative supervisors.   
The AHC found Appellants committed multiple violations of chapter 130.  For 
each violation, Appellants were either reprimanded, assessed a fee of $1,000, or assessed 
an amount equal to the expenditure determined to be a violation.  The AHC determined 
Appellants were jointly and severally liable for all fees incurred.  In total, Appellants 
were assessed $229,964 in fees for violations of chapter 130.  Of that total, $22,996 was 
ordered to be paid within 90 days.  The remainder of the fees were stayed, provided 
Appellants paid the 10 percent of the total fee, filed all required campaign finance 
disclosure reports and amendments, and committed no further campaign finance 
disclosure law violations under chapter 130.   
Appellants filed a petition for review in the circuit court challenging the findings 
and raising constitutional claims.  The circuit court affirmed the AHC’s decision and 
found section 105.961.4(6) was not unconstitutional.  Appellants appeal. 
Standard of Review 
“Appellate review of an agency decision is limited to determining whether the 
agency’s findings are supported by competent and substantial evidence on the record as a 
whole ….”  Cmty. Bancshares, Inc. v. Sec’y of State, 43 S.W.3d 821, 823 (Mo. banc 
2001); see also Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 18; section 536.140.  A decision is unsupported by 
competent and substantial evidence when an appellant demonstrates the decision is 
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contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.  Albanna v. State Bd. of 
Registration for Healing Arts, 293 S.W.3d 423, 428 (Mo. banc 2009). 
This Court reviews constitutional challenges to the validity of a statute de novo.  
Impey v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n, 442 S.W.3d 42, 44 (Mo. banc 2014); Geier v. Mo. Ethics 
Comm’n, 474 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Mo. banc 2015).  “Statutes are presumed constitutional 
and will be found unconstitutional only if they clearly contravene a constitutional 
provision.”  Hill v. Boyer, 480 S.W.3d 311, 313-14 (Mo. banc 2016).  The party 
challenging the statute bears “the burden of proving the act clearly and undoubtedly 
violates the constitutional limitations.”  Impey, 442 S.W.3d at 44 (quoting State v. 
Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Mo. banc 2013)).   
Delegation of Authority 
Appellants claim the monetary fees assessed by the MEC are in violation of 
Missouri Constitution article I, section 31.  Appellants assert, pursuant to section 
105.961.4(6), the MEC may not assess fines for violations of state statutes, regulations, or 
rules.  Appellants emphasize the MEC assessed a fine, but their reasoning provides 
overbroad statements and minimal support to demonstrate a constitutional violation 
regarding the MEC’s ability to assess fees. 
 
Article I, section 31 provides:  “That no law shall delegate to any commission, 
bureau, board or other administrative agency authority to make any rule fixing a fine or 
imprisonment as punishment for its violation.”  Simply stated, this constitutional 
provision “prohibits the legislature from delegating to any administrative agency the 
5 
 
power to make rules which establish fines for their violation.”  City of Pleasant Valley v. 
Baker, 991 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999). 
Appellants mischaracterize the language of section 105.961.4(6) at issue.  
Appellants refer to the monetary fees assessed against them as a “fine” as a means to 
invalidate the statute.3  Yet, section 105.961.4(6) clearly states the MEC has “the power 
to seek fees for violations in an amount not greater than one thousand dollars or double 
the amount involved in the violation.”  (Emphasis added).  The MEC and the AHC 
decisions both state Appellants were assessed fees for the violations.  Appellants are the 
only party referring to a “fine.” 
“The MEC is an administrative body established by the General Assembly to 
administer and enforce a number of ethics-related laws, including those relating to 
lobbyists, public officials, and campaign finance disclosure.”  Impey, 442 S.W.3d at 44; 
see also section 105.955.  The MEC only acts as it is directed to do so by the General 
Assembly.  See State v. Davis, 450 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Mo. 1970) (finding the delegation 
of authority by the General Assembly to the Department of Health and Welfare to prepare 
a list of “barbiturate” or “stimulant” drugs was not an unlawful delegation of authority in 
                                                 
3 Any unspoken argument Appellants may have been trying to make to connect the 
payment of fees with criminal activity is specious.  Prior to issuing its decision, the MEC 
conducted a hearing on the alleged violations because the suspected violations were non-
criminal.  Section 105.961.3.  Any allegations presented at the hearing could not lead to 
criminal penalties.  Geier, 474 S.W.3d at 570; c.f. section 105.961.2 (detailing the 
procedure the MEC must follow when there are reasonable grounds to believe a criminal 
violation occurred). 
6 
 
violation of article I, section 31).  The MEC assessed fees against Appellants for their 
violations as prescribed by the General Assembly.   
Appellants offer no authority or reasoning to support their conclusion the MEC 
acted in manner that was not permitted constitutionally.  There was no improper 
delegation of authority to the MEC.   
Improper Procedure pursuant to Section 105.961.4(6) 
Appellants assert the MEC’s assessment of a monetary fee was unauthorized by 
law.  Appellants claim the MEC had no legal authority to assess fees because they did not 
agree to any monetary penalty and no court imposed a penalty as required by section 
105.961.4(6).  
Section 105.961.4(6) allows the MEC to “seek fees” through reconciliation 
agreements or through civil action.4  While Appellants are correct the MEC did not seek 
to enforce its determination of fees through a reconciliation agreement or civil action, 
Appellants incorrectly try to use section 105.961.4(6) as a means to invalidate the 
imposition of fees.  Section 105.961.4(6) is not applicable. 
Prior to any judicial action the MEC may have initiated to enforce its decision 
pursuant to section 105.961.4(6), Appellants initiated these proceedings and appealed the 
MEC’s determination to the AHC pursuant to section 105.961.5.  When Appellants 
initiated the AHC appeal, any action the MEC may have taken to enforce its 
                                                 
4 Appellants and the MEC both misquote section 105.961.4(6) in their briefs.  This Court 
cautions attorneys to not rely on one party’s citation but to verify the actual wording 
before quoting any statute or case. 
7 
 
determination was stayed.  Section 105.961.5.  Such an attempt to cite statutory 
provisions in isolation to create error is inappropriate.   
Fees Supported by the Record 
 
Appellants argue the assessment of “fines” against them should have been limited 
to $1,000 for each violation or double the amount of the violation pursuant to section 
105.961.4(6).  Appellants reiterate they did not agree to any “fines” and no “fines” were 
imposed by a civil action.  They believe the amount of the assessed “fines” are 
unsupported by the record.   
 
In this case, the AHC entered findings of fact and conclusions of law detailing 
Appellants’ violations in a 50-page decision and a 33-page appendix itemizing 
contributions and expenditures.  Appellants fail to indicate, and this Court was unable to 
independently locate, any evidence in the record demonstrating the AHC’s decision was 
against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.   
For every statutory violation Appellants committed, they were assessed a fee as 
prescribed by section 105.961.4(6).  They were never assessed double the amount of any 
violation, even though that would have been an authorized statutory penalty.  Appellants 
fail to present any violation wherein the assessed fees exceeded these statutory 
limitations.  The AHC’s decision was supported properly.   
Excessive Fees 
 
Appellants claim the fees assessed for violations of the campaign finance 
disclosure laws were in excess of the amounts that may be assessed under section 
105.961.4(6).  Appellants do not argue the fees described in section 105.961.4(6) are 
8 
 
excessive and violate the constitution.  Rather, they assert there “is no standard for double 
the sum provision” in section 105.961.4(6), and the statute places a ceiling of $1,000 as a 
maximum penalty.  Therefore, Appellants believe the fees assessed against them were 
excessive and violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
“Although the Missouri and United States Constitutions prohibit the imposition of 
excessive fines, the Missouri General Assembly has always had wide latitude to decide 
the severity of civil penalties for violations of law.”  State v. Spilton, 315 S.W.3d 350, 
358 (Mo. banc 2010).  This Court has found when there is a statute authorizing a range of 
civil penalties as punishment, as a matter of law, civil penalties within that range of 
punishment are not excessive.  Id.  “A statutory punishment will not be considered an 
excessive fine in contravention of the Eighth Amendment unless it is so disproportionate 
as to ‘shock the moral sense of all reasonable [persons].’”  Id. (quoting Barker v. Barker, 
98 S.W.3d 532, 534 (Mo. banc 2003)).    
Appellants assert there “is no standard for double the sum provision” in section 
105.961.4(6).  However, section 105.961.4(6) explicitly provides the MEC “power to 
seek fees for violations in an amount not greater than one thousand dollars or double the 
amount involved in the violation.”  The fees assessed against Appellants are within the 
range permitted by the statute.  For every statutory violation Appellants committed, they 
were assessed a fee as prescribed by section 105.961.4(6).  Further, Appellants were 
ordered to pay 10 percent of the total fee, allowing the remainder to be stayed provided 
they did not commit any further violation of the campaign finance disclosure law.  The 
assessed fees were not excessive.   
9 
 
Conclusion 
 
The AHC’s decision and the circuit court’s judgment are affirmed. 
 
All concur.