Case Title: Allen v. totes/Isotoner Corp.

Citation: 2009-Ohio-4231

Docket Number: 20080845

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Allen v. totes/Isotoner Corp., Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4231.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-4231 
ALLEN, APPELLANT, v. TOTES/ISOTONER CORPORATION, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Allen v. totes/Isotoner Corp.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4231.] 
Employment discrimination — Burden of proof — Summary judgment — Failure 
to follow directions is a legitimate reason for discharge — Judgment 
affirmed. 
(No. 2008-0845 — Submitted March 11, 2009 — Decided August 27, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Butler County, No. CA2007-08-196. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This case arises from a grant of summary judgment in favor of 
totes/Isotoner Corp., LaNisa Allen’s employer, on a discrimination complaint 
arising out of the Ohio Fair Employment Practices Act, R.C. Chapter 4112, as 
amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 138 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1430, 
1431-1432.  We originally accepted Allen’s discretionary appeal, which sought 
review of the issue of whether Ohio law prohibits an employer from 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
discriminating against a female employee because of or on the basis of lactation. 
For the reasons stated below, we find that summary judgment was properly 
granted for appellee, totes/Isotoner Corp., against appellant, LaNisa Allen, on her 
claims for wrongful termination. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
{¶ 2} In its opinion affirming the grant of summary judgment to the 
employer, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals ruled that Allen had failed to 
establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, and it 
concluded that Allen’s termination does not violate Ohio public policy against 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.  The appellate court ruled that Allen 
“was simply and plainly terminated as an employee at will for taking an 
unauthorized, extra break.”  Allen v. totes/Isotoner (Apr. 7, 2008), Butler App. 
No.  CA2007-08-196, ¶ 3. 
{¶ 3} The record in the case demonstrates that Allen admitted in her 
deposition that for approximately two weeks, she had taken breaks without her 
employer’s knowledge or authorization to do so and that her supervisor had told 
her that she was being terminated for her failure to “follow directions.” 
{¶ 4} As a general matter, if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of 
disparate-treatment employment discrimination under R.C. Chapter 4112, the 
burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its treatment of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Plumbers & 
Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Commt. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1981), 66 
Ohio St.2d 192, 197-198, 20 O.O.3d 200, 421 N.E.2d 128; St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. 
v. Hicks (1993), 509 U.S. 502, 506-507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 
(analyzing the federal employment-discrimination statute). The ultimate burden of 
persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally discriminated against 
the plaintiff based upon an impermissible category remains on the plaintiff. Id. at 
507. 
January Term, 2009 
3 
 
{¶ 5} Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons in Ohio law include 
insubordination. Hood v. Diamond Prods., Inc. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 298, 302, 
658 N.E.2d 738. If the employer carries its burden of articulating a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision, the plaintiff must prove 
that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons were a pretext for 
impermissible discrimination. Id.; see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 
519, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407. If an employment-discrimination plaintiff 
fails to establish a triable factual issue on an essential element of her case, 
summary judgment for the employer is appropriate. See, e.g., Simpson v. Des 
Moines Water Works (C.A.8, 2005), 425 F.3d 538, 542. 
{¶ 6} In this case, the evidence in the record demonstrates that Allen 
took unauthorized breaks from her workstation, and Isotoner discharged her for 
doing so. Thus, the record as it was developed in the trial court fails to provide a 
basis from which a jury could conclude that Isotoner’s articulated legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for Allen’s termination—failure to follow directions—
was a pretext for discrimination based on Allen’s pregnancy or a condition related 
to her pregnancy. This determination defeats Allen’s sex-discrimination claim 
under R.C. 4112.02 as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the trial court properly 
granted summary judgment to Isotoner. Consequently, this court does not reach 
the issue of whether alleged discrimination due to lactation is included within the 
scope of Ohio’s employment-discrimination statute, R.C. 4112.02, as sex 
discrimination under R.C. 4112.01(B). 
{¶ 7} Because summary judgment was properly entered against Allen, 
we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, J., concur in judgment only. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
 
LANZINGER, J., would dismiss the appeal as having been improvidently 
accepted. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring. 
{¶ 8} I concur in the judgment affirming the summary judgment in 
totes/Isotoner’s favor, because totes/Isotoner discharged LaNisa Allen for taking 
an unauthorized break from her scheduled employment. That fact is undisputed in 
the record before us, and Allen failed to carry her burden of proving either that 
totes/Isotoner had a discriminatory motive or that its reason for discharging her 
was a pretext for discrimination.  Consequently – and necessarily in accordance 
with long-standing prudential considerations widely utilized by the courts – I 
would not reach the issue of whether adverse differential treatment because of 
postpregnancy lactation falls within actionable discrimination as defined by the 
General Assembly in R.C. Chapter 4112. 
{¶ 9} It is the long-standing practice of courts to decide only issues 
presented by the facts and to refrain from deciding issues that the facts do not 
place directly in issue.  Because of the relevant and determinative facts of this 
case, the resolution of the dispute of the parties before us does not turn on whether 
R.C. 4112.02 encompasses alleged discrimination due to lactation.  Because the 
court need not reach this issue, any opinion expressed on the issue would be 
merely advisory and not in accord with the long-standing practice of courts to 
decline to render advisory opinions. 
{¶ 10} It is well-settled law that this court will not issue advisory 
opinions.  State ex rel. White v. Kilbane Koch, 96 Ohio St.3d 395, 2002-Ohio-
4848, 775 N.E.2d 508, ¶ 18, citing State ex rel Baldzicki v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 238, 242, 736 N.E.2d 893; Egan v. Natl. 
Distillers & Chem. Corp. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 176, 25 OBR 243, 495 N.E.2d 
904, syllabus.  “It has been long and well established that it is the duty of every 
January Term, 2009 
5 
 
judicial tribunal to decide actual controversies between parties legitimately 
affected by specific facts and to render judgments which can be carried into 
effect.”  Fortner v. Thomas (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14, 51 O.O.2d 35, 257 
N.E.2d 371.  Because the court need not reach the issue of whether discrimination 
on the basis of lactation is prohibited by R.C. 4112.02, it should not do so.  See 
PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement Admin. 
(C.A.D.C.2004), 362 F.3d 786, 799 (Roberts, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment.) (“[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is 
necessary not to decide more”). 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and CUPP, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 11} I agree that summary judgment was properly entered against the 
appellant, LaNisa Allen, and thus I concur in the judgment.  Because I also concur 
in Justice O’Connor’s separate discussion of the merits, I join her opinion, not the 
per curiam opinion. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 12} LaNisa Allen’s complaint alleged that Isotoner discriminated 
against her on the basis of pregnancy, “a condition of gender,” in violation of 
Ohio’s Fair Employment Practices Act, Chapter 4112 (“FEPA”), as amended by 
Ohio’s Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), 138 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1430, 
1431-1432; that her termination was against public policy; and that her “medical 
condition, the act of lactating, constitutes a ‘handicap’ ” for purposes of the FEPA 
and that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her handicap under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 
{¶ 13} We asserted discretionary jurisdiction to review three propositions 
of law that arise from the claims in this case, Allen v. totes/Isotoner Corp., 119 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
Ohio St.3d 1443, 2008-Ohio-4487, 893 N.E.2d 515, including the assertion that 
“lactation is a physical condition associated with pregnancy and childbirth, hence 
the FEPA, as amended by the Ohio PDA, prohibits discrimination against females 
because they are lactating.” 
{¶ 14} I agree that appellee Allen failed to develop a record from which a 
jury could find in her favor.  But because the trial and appellate courts 
erroneously applied inapposite federal precedent in their analysis of Allen’s 
claims, I believe that this court should reach the merits to clarify the law.  I 
therefore concur in judgment only.  I write separately to set forth why I would 
hold that lactation falls within the scope of R.C. 4112.01(B) and that the statute 
prohibits employment discrimination against lactating women.  R.C. 4112.02.  In 
doing so, I am fully aware of the assertion that my opinion is advisory.  I disagree.  
The lead opinion’s failure to address the legal framework in which this case arises 
is disappointing, and it is even more troubling that we fail to address the scope of 
Ohio law under the guise that reaching the merits would result in an advisory 
opinion. 
{¶ 15} The bald assertion that any opinion analyzing Allen’s claim would 
be advisory is patently unpersuasive.  Indeed, the cases cited by the concurring 
justice, essentially, are ones in which we found an issue to be moot on appeal and 
therefore refused to provide advisory opinions.  The cases cited are wholly 
distinguishable from this appeal, however.  See State ex rel. White v. Kilbane 
Koch, 96 Ohio St.3d 395, 2002-Ohio-4848, 775 N.E.2d 508, ¶ 18 (holding that 
relators’ appeal, which arose from the denial of extraordinary writs to prevent a 
trial judge from proceeding with a temporary restraining order that enjoined 
relators from using taxpayer funds to communicate with the public about an 
election issue, was moot because the election had passed); State ex rel. Baldzicki 
v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 238, 242, 736 N.E.2d 
893 (declining to reach the merits of the relators’ claim for a writ of prohibition in 
January Term, 2009 
7 
 
an election protest after concluding that the writ would not lie because the 
respondents had not engaged in quasi-judicial acts); Egan v. Natl. Distillers & 
Chem. Corp. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 176, 25 OBR 243, 495 N.E.2d 904, syllabus 
(in an employer intentional-tort claim, holding, “Where the grant of summary 
judgment favorable to a defendant neither considers nor awards damages, an issue 
pertaining to damage setoffs raised by the defendant-appellant for the first time on 
appeal to the Supreme Court will not be entertained because it is not a justiciable 
issue”). 
{¶ 16} In the cases cited, we properly refused to entertain the question 
presented because the question need not be answered to give proper resolution to 
the case.  But that is not the dynamic in this case. 
{¶ 17} A case or controversy is lacking and the “case is moot ‘when the 
issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable 
interest in the outcome.’ ”  Los Angeles Cty. v. Davis (1979), 440 U.S. 625, 631, 
99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642, quoting Powell v. McCormack (1969), 395 U.S. 
486, 489, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491.  “Not every conceivable controversy is 
an actual one.  * * *  In order for a justiciable question to exist, ‘[t]he danger or 
dilemma of the plaintiff must be present, not contingent on the happening of 
hypothetical future events * * * and the threat to [her] position must be actual and 
genuine and not merely possible or remote.’ ”  Mid-American Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Heasley, 113 Ohio St.3d 133, 2007-Ohio-1248, 863 N.E.2d 142, ¶ 9, citing 
League for Preservation of Civ. Rights & Internal Tranquility, Inc. v. Cincinnati 
(1940), 64 Ohio App. 195, 197, 17 O.O. 424, 28 N.E.2d 660, quoting Borchard, 
Declaratory Judgments (1934) 40. 
{¶ 18} “ ‘No actual controversy exists where a case has been rendered 
moot by an outside event.  “It is not the duty of the court to answer moot 
questions, and when, pending proceedings in error in this court, an event occurs, 
without the fault of either party, which renders it impossible for the court to grant 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
any relief, it will dismiss the petition in error.”  Miner v. Witt (1910), 82 Ohio St. 
237, 92 N.E. 21, syllabus.’ ”   McLead v. McLead, Washington App. No. 
06CA67, 2007-Ohio-4624, ¶ 13, quoting Tschantz v. Ferguson (1991), 57 Ohio 
St.3d  131, 133, 566 N.E.2d 655.  “ ‘A cause will become moot only when it 
becomes impossible for a tribunal to grant meaningful relief, even if it were to 
rule in favor of the party seeking relief.’ ”  Id., quoting Joys v. Toledo (Apr. 29, 
1997), Franklin App. No. 96APE08-1040, 1997 WL 217581, *3. 
{¶ 19} In this appeal, the issues are live ones, not remote possibilities or 
based on controversies that may never occur.  See Heasley, 113 Ohio St.3d 133, 
2007-Ohio-1248, 863 N.E.2d 142, at ¶ 11, quoting Bilyeu v Motorists Mut. Ins. 
Co. (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 35, 37, 65 O.O.2d 179, 303 N.E.2d 871.  Allen, a 
lactating employee, was terminated from employment for not following directions 
— i.e., for taking an unauthorized break from her work station in order to use a 
breast pump.  The determination of whether that action was lawful cannot be 
made in a vacuum.  Rather, the determination depends on the facts she marshals 
as well as the state of the law in Ohio, not the state of federal law as defined in the 
federal courts. 
{¶ 20} The principle of judicial restraint, that “ if it is not necessary to 
decide more, it is necessary not to decide more,” PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. 
United States Drug Enforcement Admin. (C.A.D.C.2004), 362 F.3d 786, 799 
(Roberts, J., concurring in part and in judgment), is an important one.  But here, it 
is inapplicable because it is necessary to decide “more.” 
{¶ 21} The question of whether Ohio law recognizes discrimination 
claims based on lactation is one of great general interest.  Allen and Isotoner, as 
well as all Ohio’s employees and employers, are entitled to the answer and to 
guidance on the contours of Ohio’s employment laws.  It is our duty to provide 
that guidance and to answer the questions posed in this controversy.  Fortner v. 
Thomas (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14, 51 O.O.2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 371 (“[I]t is the 
January Term, 2009 
9 
 
duty of every judicial tribunal to decide actual controversies between parties 
legitimately affected by specific facts and to render judgments which can be 
carried into effect”).  I thus proceed. 
I 
{¶ 22} In entering summary judgment against Allen, the trial court found 
that Allen had not been discriminated against on the basis of pregnancy.  
According to the trial court, “Allen gave birth over five months prior to her 
termination from [Isotoner].  Pregnant [women] who give birth and chose not to 
breastfeed or pump their breasts do not continue to lactate for five months.  Thus, 
Allen’s condition of lactating was not a condition relating to pregnancy but rather 
a condition related to breastfeeding.  Breastfeeding discrimination does not 
constitute gender discrimination.  See Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 374 F.3d 
428, 439 (6th Cir. 2004).”  Upon that finding, the court found that postpartum 
lactation and the discomfort associated with it are not disabilities. 
{¶ 23} The court of appeals affirmed.  In a conclusory decision, it held 
that Allen had not presented a prima facie case of sex discrimination on the basis 
of pregnancy and that her termination did not offend Ohio public policy.  Allen v. 
totes/Isotoner Corp. (Apr. 7, 2008), Butler App. No. CA2007-08-196.  According 
to the court of appeals, “appellant was not terminated because she was lactating, 
pumping breast milk, or needed to take a break to pump breast milk.  Rather, she 
was simply and plainly terminated as an employee at will for taking an 
unauthorized, extra break (unlike the restroom breaks which were authorized and 
available to all of the employees, appellant included).” 
II 
Pregnancy and Lactation as Objects of Sex Discrimination 
{¶ 24} Among other things, the FEPA prohibits an employer from 
discharging or discriminating against a person in the tenure, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment because of the person’s sex or disability.  R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
4112.02(A).  Through the PDA amendments to the FEPA, which became 
effective in 1980, the General Assembly has made clear that the statutory phrases 
“because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” include all claims “because of or on the 
basis of pregnancy, any illness arising out of and occurring during the course of a 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.  Women affected by 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for 
all employment-related purposes * * *.”  R.C. 4112.01(B).  The amended 
statutory framework now embodied in Ohio’s FEPA developed similarly to its 
federal counterpart, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 2000e(k), 
Title 42, U.S.Code, the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. 
{¶ 25} In the wake of the controversial decision Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert 
(1976), 429 U.S. 125, 139-140, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343, in which the United 
States Supreme Court rejected a disparate-treatment sex-discrimination claim 
based on a disability insurance plan’s refusal to cover pregnancy-related 
disabilities, Congress amended Title VII to make clear that sex-discrimination 
includes discrimination based on pregnancy.  See, e.g., California Fed. S. & L. 
Assn. v. Guerra (1987), 479 U.S. 272, 284-285, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613; 
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm. 
(1983), 462 U.S. 669, 678, 103 S.Ct. 2622, 77 L.Ed.2d 89. 
{¶ 26} The federal PDA explicitly expanded the terms “because of sex” 
and “on the basis of sex” to include the concepts “because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or other related conditions” and to affirm that “ ‘women 
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated 
the same for all employment-related purposes * * * as other persons not so 
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.’ ”  Fortier v. U.S. Steel 
Corp. (June 4, 2002), W.D.Pa. No. 01-cv-2029, 2002 WL 1797796,* 3, quoting 
Section 2000e(k), Title 42, U.S.Code.  The essential command of the PDA is that 
an employer must maintain the same neutrality towards an employee’s pregnancy 
January Term, 2009 
11 
 
as it would an employee’s race, gender, or other protected-class status.  Pacourek 
v. Inland Steel Co. (N.D.Ill.1994), 858 F.Supp. 1393, 1400.  And the legislative 
history of the federal PDA suggests strongly that neutrality must be maintained 
before, during, and after a pregnancy.  Id. at 1402, citing 123 Congressional 
Record 29385 (1977). 
{¶ 27} Soon after Congress enacted the PDA amendments to Title VII, 
Ohio followed suit.  Derungs, 374 F.3d at 436 (after Gilbert and the passage of 
the federal PDA, the Ohio General Assembly amended R.C. 4112.02(A) by 
adopting the Ohio PDA, Section 4112.01(B), in 1980).  The Ohio General 
Assembly’s unambiguous intent in passing the Ohio PDA is well understood.  
“Having incorporated the [federal] PDA’s language almost verbatim into the 
definitional provisions of § 4112, it is clear to us that the Ohio Legislature was 
aware of the meaning and rationale of Gilbert, as well as being aware of the PDA.  
The Legislature made a conscious choice to extend the definition of 
discrimination to include pregnancy even though there cannot be a class of 
similarly situated males.”  Derungs, 374 F.3d at 436. 
{¶ 28} In evaluating Allen’s claims, the trial and appellate courts ignored 
the foregoing history.  Rather, central to both courts’ analysis is the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in Derungs, a public-accommodations case brought by a 
woman who had been prohibited from breast-feeding her infant while sitting on a 
bench near a dressing room in a Wal-Mart store.  Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 
(S.D.Ohio 2000), 141 F.Supp.2d 884, 886.  In that case, the district court granted 
partial summary judgment in favor of Walmart on the plaintiff’s claims for sex 
and age discrimination in violation of R.C. 4112.02(G), and the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed.  Derungs, 374 F.3d at 440. 
{¶ 29} In rendering their decisions, the federal courts applied the Gilbert 
analysis that had been rejected expressly by both Congress and the Ohio 
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Legislature.  See Derungs, 141 F.Supp.2d at 889-892.  In doing so, the federal 
courts decided the case on federal case law.  Id. at 889-893. 
{¶ 30} Significantly for purposes here, Derungs did not involve 
employment discrimination, but rather, a claim for discrimination in public 
accommodations.  And as the federal courts recognized, when the Ohio General 
Assembly passed the PDA, it did not amend the public-accommodations portion 
of Chapter 4112.  See Derungs, 141 F.Supp.2d at 889, fn. 7; see also Derungs, 
374 F.3d at 436. 
{¶ 31} I find that fact significant.  Derungs is inapposite here because its 
analysis revolves around a portion of Chapter 4112 that was not amended by the 
PDA.  And evidently, Derungs did not reflect Ohio legislators’ view of the law:  
after Derungs was decided, the Ohio General Assembly enacted R.C. 3781.55, 
which permits a mother to breastfeed her child in a place of public 
accommodation. 
{¶ 32} I recognize that the federal courts’ analysis in Derungs is not 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
federal 
courts’ 
continued 
reliance 
on 
Gilbert 
notwithstanding the PDA.  Reasonable minds may differ about the merit of the 
rule set forth in Gilbert.  But given our legislature’s clear and unambiguous 
rejection of the Gilbert analysis, I decline to apply those rationales in our analysis 
of pregnancy-discrimination claims brought under the gender-equity prong of the 
FEPA.1  Given the clarity with which our legislature has spoken on this issue and 
its insistence that gender-based discrimination can include pregnancy-based 
discrimination, we should engage in a meaningful analysis centered on the 
statutory language. 
                                                 
1.  I am aware of the debates that surround breastfeeding in forums as divergent as law reviews, 
public health journals, and the popular press.  But our role as judges is not to substitute our own 
views of those issues for those of the legislature as they are embodied in the Revised Code.  
Rather, we must follow the laws as written by the legislature and interpret them accordingly. 
January Term, 2009 
13 
 
{¶ 33} Ohio’s PDA affords protection to employees “because of or on the 
basis of pregnancy” and states that “[w]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, 
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related 
purposes * * * as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work * * *.”  R.C. 4112.01(B).  That language is broad. 
{¶ 34} “Related” and “affected” are expansive terms.  Related means 
“connected by reason of an established or discoverable relation,” and “relation” 
means “an aspect or quality (as resemblance) that connects two or more things or 
parts as being or belonging or working together or as being of the same kind.”  
Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed.1993) 987.  “Affected,” the 
past tense of “affect,” means “[having] produce[d] an effect upon” and “[having] 
produce[d] a material influence upon.”  Id. at 19. 
{¶ 35} Despite this broad language, the trial court found that 
discrimination on the basis of lactation is not the same as discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy because “Allen’s condition of lactating was not a condition 
relating to pregnancy but rather a condition relating to breastfeeding.”  I find that 
conclusion curious and inaccurate. 
{¶ 36} Lactation – the formation and secretion of milk by the mammary 
glands – is believed to be stimulated by prolactin, a hormone. 1 Russ, Freeman, & 
McQuade, Attorneys Medical Advisor (Aug.2008) Section 4:5.  During 
pregnancy, the level of prolactin in a woman is inhibited by high levels of 
estrogen and progesterone.  Id. at Section 14:228.  Following delivery, levels of 
estrogen and progesterone in the woman fall while the level of prolactin remains 
high.  Id. at Section 14:26.  Prolactin then stimulates and maintains the production 
of milk.  Id. at Section 4:5. 
{¶ 37} Colostrum, a substance that contains more protein and less fat and 
sugar than breast milk, is secreted by the breasts during pregnancy and in the days 
immediately following childbirth.  Russ, Section 14:228.  Milk production begins 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
thereafter, usually on the third or fourth postpartum day, and breast milk appears. 
Id. at Section 14:26. 
{¶ 38} As the trial court found, lactation obviously is linked to 
breastfeeding.  But given the physiological aspects of lactation, I have little 
trouble concluding that lactation also has a clear, undeniable nexus with 
pregnancy and with childbirth.  Therefore, it necessarily follows that lactation is 
“because of or on the basis of pregnancy” and that women who are lactating are 
women “affected by pregnancy [or] childbirth.”  Accord Pacourek, 858 F.Supp. at 
1402, quoting House Report (1978), No. 95-948, 95th Congress, 2d Session 5, 
concluding that a liberal construction of the federal PDA is proper, given its 
legislative history, and that “ ‘the bill makes clear that its protection extends to the 
whole range of matters concerning the childbearing process.’ ” Accordingly, I 
would hold that gender-discrimination claims arising from lactation are 
cognizable under Ohio’s FEPA as amended by the PDA.  But the analysis of this 
appeal does not end with that conclusion. 
{¶ 39} Allen’s claims of discrimination appear predicated on a disparate-
treatment theory.  She asserts, “The workrule that [she] allegedly violated was the 
one that restricted the time she could pump her breast milk to her lunch break. 
Totes placed no such restrictions on any other employee who needed to leave his 
or her workstation to tend to a bodily function or bodily discomfort, only upon 
lactating women.  The work rule was itself discriminatory, since it placed extra 
restrictions on women experiencing a physical act of pregnancy.”  The appellate 
court implicitly addressed that claim, holding that Allen “was simply and plainly 
terminated as an employee at will for taking an unauthorized, extra break (unlike 
the restroom breaks which were authorized and available to all of the employees, 
appellant included).”  Allen, Butler App. No. CA2007-08-196, 2-3. 
III 
January Term, 2009 
15 
 
{¶ 40} In order to establish a prima facie case for disparate treatment 
based upon pregnancy discrimination in the workplace, the plaintiff must show 
that (1) she was pregnant; (2) she satisfactorily performed the duties required by 
the position for which she was hired; (3) she was discharged; and (4) her position 
was ultimately filled by an employee who was not pregnant.  See Donaldson v. 
Am. Banco Corp., Inc. (D.Colo.1996), 945 F.Supp. 1456, 1463, citing McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 
668.  I would find that a plaintiff may satisfy the first element of this prima facie 
test by showing that she was affected by pregnancy or an illness or medical 
condition related to pregnancy. 
{¶ 41} As with other discrimination claims, a prima facie case gives rise 
to a presumption of discrimination and shifts the burden of production to the 
defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its treatment of 
the plaintiff.  St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks (1993), 509 U.S. 502, 506-507, 113 
S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407.  Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the 
action taken by the employer include insubordination on the part of the employee 
claiming discrimination.  Hood v. Diamond Prods., Inc. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 
298, 302, 658 N.E.2d 738. 
{¶ 42} If the defendant carries that burden of production, the presumption 
of discrimination drops from the case.  Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, 
Inc. (D.Kan.1996), 922 F.Supp. 465, 471, fn. 7.  The plaintiff must then directly 
prove that the employer acted on a discriminatory motive or indirectly prove that 
the employer’s reasons were a pretext for discrimination.  Id.  If she fails to do so, 
summary judgment is appropriate. Id. 
{¶ 43} The undisputed evidence here is that Allen took unauthorized 
breaks from her work station.  Isotoner asserts that it discharged her for doing so. 
{¶ 44} Although Allen’s unauthorized breaks may have been to pump 
milk, Allen could not properly engage in such actions without her employer’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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knowledge and permission.  The FEPA and the PDA mandate that an employer 
treat pregnancy with neutrality, but not preferentially. 
{¶ 45} Allen argues that the break policy discriminates against lactating 
women because other employees are able to use the bathroom freely to attend to 
bodily functions like menstruation and urination. But Allen was not forbidden to 
take similar breaks, nor has she presented any evidence that any other employee 
routinely used the bathroom for 15-minute breaks on a scheduled basis each day.  
Thus, the record in this case would not support a reasonable jury’s verdict in 
Allen’s favor on a disparate-treatment theory.  Summary judgment was properly 
entered against her. 
IV 
Pregnancy and Lactation as Disability 
{¶ 46} I turn now to the issue of whether pregnancy and lactation are 
disabilities for purposes of disability-discrimination analysis.  I would hold that 
they are not. 
{¶ 47} To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that she is disabled, (2) that an adverse employment 
action was taken by an employer, at least in part, because of the disability, and (3) 
that the plaintiff, though disabled, can safely and substantially perform the 
essential functions of the job in question. Hazlett v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc. (1986), 
25 Ohio St.3d 279, 281, 25 OBR 331, 496 N.E.2d 478.  Here, there is no showing 
that Allen satisfied the first prong of the test, i.e., that she was disabled by virtue 
of her pregnancy or lactation. 
{¶ 48} The courts that have considered this issue have found uniformly 
that pregnancy, by itself, is not a disability per se for purposes of ADA claims 
because “[s]hort term, temporary restrictions are not substantially limiting and do 
not render a person disabled.”  Kucharski v. Cort Furniture Rental 
(D.Conn.2007), 536 F.Supp.2d 196, 202, reversed on other grounds, 
January Term, 2009 
17 
 
(D.Conn.2008), 594 F.Supp.2d 207.  See also Wenzlaff v. NationsBank 
(D.Md.1996), 940 F. Supp. 889, 890; Villareal v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc. 
(S.D.Tex.1995), 895 F.Supp. 149, 152.  That conclusion is supported by the 
interpretative guidelines issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, which state that conditions such as pregnancy are not the result of a 
physiological disorder and are not impairments.  Id., citing 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(h).  
Furthermore, the ADA’s express language defines a disability as a “physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities 
of [an] individual.” Section 12102(1)(A), Title 42, U.S.Code.2  State appellate 
courts have reached the same conclusion, rejecting arguments that pregnancy-
discrimination claims are cognizable under state laws forbidding disability 
discrimination.  See, e.g., Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., Inc. (2007), 162 
Wash.2d 340, 344, 172 P.3d 688 (“An employer who refuses to hire a job 
applicant because of her pregnancy is liable for sex discrimination * * *, not * * * 
accommodation analysis like that applicable to disability related employment 
discrimination claims.” 
{¶ 49} I agree.  “The implicit reasoning in these decisions is persuasive 
and sound.  Pregnancy is a physiological condition, but not a disorder.”  
Gudenkauf, 922 F. Supp. at 473.  Similarly, “[i]t is simply preposterous to 
contend a woman’s body is functioning abnormally because she is lactating.”  
Bond v. Sterling, Inc. (N.D.N.Y.1998), 997 F. Supp. 306, 311. 
{¶ 50} To hold that a woman is “disabled” because she is pregnant or 
lactating evokes the paternalistic judicial attitudes toward working women that 
                                                 
2.  We may look to federal regulations and case law for guidance in interpreting comparable Ohio 
law.  “Although we are not bound to apply federal court interpretation of federal statutes to 
analogous Ohio statutes, we have looked to federal case law when considering claims of 
employment discrimination brought under the Ohio Revised Code.”  Coryell v. Bank One Trust 
Co. N.A., 101 Ohio St.3d 175, 2004-Ohio-723, 803 N.E.2d 781, ¶ 15.  See also Columbus Civ. 
Serv. Comm. v. McGlone (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 569, 573, 697 N.E.2d 204. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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were apparent in early twentieth century cases.  See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon 
(1908), 208 U.S. 412, 422, 28 S.Ct. 324, 52 L.Ed.2d 551.  Where, as here, there is 
not a medical condition related to pregnancy that would satisfy the definition of 
disability, I would hold that pregnancy-related discrimination claims are not 
cognizable under the disability-discrimination provisions in the ADA. 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 51} This is the Supreme Court, and when the opportunity arises, we 
should answer the questions that Ohioans need answered.  In this case, we are 
asked whether breastfeeding mothers can be fired from their jobs for pumping 
their breasts in the workplace.  That is, in its protection of pregnant workers in 
R.C. 4112.01(B), did the General Assembly include protection of women who are 
dealing with the aftereffects of their pregnancy?  The lead opinion dodges the 
opportunity to provide an answer. 
{¶ 52} Any court’s method of analyzing cases should be (1) whether the 
plaintiff stated a cognizable cause of action and (2) whether the facts of the case 
support the alleged cause of action.  It is unclear why, on this question of great 
general interest, this court has embarked on a backwards analysis, letting stand the 
appellate court’s holding that LaNisa Allen was fired for leaving her post without 
permission rather than for pumping her breasts in the employee washroom, thus 
leaving unanswered the question of whether she even asserted a cognizable cause 
of action.  The trial court proceeded properly, although its conclusion was 
incorrect: it found as a matter of law that Ohio’s pregnancy discrimination laws 
do not apply to protect breastfeeding mothers once their babies are born.  It did as 
it should in ruling on a summary judgment motion: it gave the benefit of the facts 
to Allen and ruled on the law. 
January Term, 2009 
19 
 
{¶ 53} Somehow, the appellate court lost its way, and this court has 
followed.  In its six-paragraph decision, the appellate court concludes that Allen 
was not fired for pumping her breasts: “Rather, she was simply and plainly 
terminated as an employee at will for taking an unauthorized, extra break (unlike 
the restroom breaks which were authorized and available to all of the employees, 
appellant included).” Allen v. totes/Isotoner Corp. (Apr. 7, 2008) Butler App. No. 
CA2007-08-196.  The appellate court does not explain why Allen’s trips to the 
restroom outside scheduled break times were different from the restroom trips 
other employees made outside scheduled break times.  There is no evidence in the 
record about any limit on the length of unscheduled restroom breaks and no 
evidence that employees had to seek permission from a supervisor to take an 
unscheduled restroom break.  There is evidence only that unscheduled bathroom 
breaks were allowed and that LaNisa Allen was fired for taking them.  What made 
her breaks different?   
{¶ 54} We accept cases not necessarily because of how the result might 
affect the parties in the individual case, but because of how a holding might affect 
other persons similarly situated.  Ohio’s working mothers who endure the 
uncomfortable sacrifice of privacy that almost necessarily accompanies their 
attempt to remain on the job and nourish their children deserve to know whether 
Ohio’s pregnancy-discrimination laws protect them. 
{¶ 55} I would hold in this case that employment discrimination due to 
lactation is unlawful pursuant to R.C. 4112.01(B), that clear public policy justifies 
an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine for women fired for reasons 
relating to lactation, and that LaNisa Allen deserves the opportunity—due to the 
state of the record—to prove her claim before a jury. 
__________________ 
 
Repper, Pagan, Cook, Ltd. and John H. Forg III, for appellant. 
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Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, Timothy Reilly, and Daniel J. Hoying, for 
appellee. 
______________________