Case Title: North Dakota v. Brickle-Hicks

Citation: 

Docket Number: 20180004

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 2018-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH
DAKOTA 2018 ND 194State of North
Dakota, Plaintiff and Appelleev.Morris Jerome Brickle-Hicks, Defendant and
AppellantNo. 20180004Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh
County, South Central Judicial District, the Honorable
John W. Grinsteiner, Judge.AFFIRMED.Opinion of the Court by McEvers, Justice.Julie A. Lawyer, Assistant State's Attorney, Bismarck,
ND, for plaintiff and appellee.James R. Loraas,
Bismarck, ND, for defendant and appellant.State v.
Brickle-HicksNo. 20180004McEvers,
Justice.[¶1] Morris Brickle-Hicks appeals from a criminal
judgment entered after the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence and a jury found
him guilty of murder. Brickle-Hicks argues the court erred in denying his motion to suppress
incriminating statements made by him to law enforcement officers and physical evidence he
provided to the officers. We conclude the court's denial of Brickle-Hicks' motion to suppress is
supported by sufficient competent evidence and is not contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence. We affirm.I[¶2] According to
Bismarck police officers, shortly after 5 a.m. on April 14, 2016, they responded to a call from the
Sanford Hospital emergency room, where Brickle-Hicks reported that he had been assaulted in
south Bismarck. Brickle-Hicks had blood on his clothes and shoes, and the officers took a
statement from him about that assault before he was discharged from the emergency room and
allowed to leave the hospital.[¶3] At about 8:50 a.m. on April 14,
2016, Bismarck police officers received a report of a deceased female with visible injuries to her
face and body near a business in south Bismarck. An officer eventually contacted Brickle-Hicks'
girlfriend and informed her that he wanted to speak with Brickle-Hicks about his assault report.
Brickle-Hicks' girlfriend brought him to the police department shortly after 12 a.m. on April 15,
2016, where he was read his Miranda rights and signed a waiver of those rights.
Officers conducted a two and one-half hour recorded interview of Brickle-Hicks, in which he
made incriminating statements about the female's death. During the interview, Brickle-Hicks also
provided the officers with items of his clothing for testing.[¶4]
The State charged Brickle-Hicks with murder, a class AA felony under N.D.C.C. §
12.1-16-01(1), alleging he intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another on April 14,
2016, or caused the death of another under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to
the value of human life. Brickle-Hicks moved to suppress all statements made by him to law
enforcement officers during the interview, arguing his Miranda rights were violated
and his statements were involuntary under the totality of the circumstances. He also sought to
suppress the clothing seized from him during the interview.[¶5]
After an evidentiary hearing at which the parties stipulated to the introduction into evidence of
the recording of the officers' interview of Brickle-Hicks, the district court denied his motion to
suppress. The court ruled Brickle-Hicks' statements were voluntary, his Miranda
rights were not violated, and he consented to giving his clothing to the officers for testing. The
court found that the recorded interview negated Brickle-Hicks' claim that he was susceptible to
manipulation, that Brickle-Hicks was capable of understanding the consequences of his
statements made during the interview, and that the officers did not use improper deception or
questioning tactics to coerce a confession. The court determined that the verbal and written
Miranda warnings given to Brickle-Hicks substantially complied with the
requirements of Miranda and that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived
his Miranda rights. The court also found Brickle-Hicks voluntarily consented to
giving his clothing to the officers for testing. A jury thereafter found Brickle-Hicks guilty of
murder.II[¶6] Brickle-Hicks argues the district
court erred in denying his motion to suppress. In State v. Goebel, 2007 ND 4, ¶ 11, 725 N.W.2d 578 (citations omitted),
we described our standard of review of motions to suppress:When
reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the district court's findings
of fact and resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance. We recognize that the district
court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence.
Generally, a district court's decision to deny a motion to suppress will not be reversed if there is
sufficient competent evidence capable of supporting the district court's findings, and if its
decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Questions of law are fully
reviewable on appeal, and whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of
law.III[¶7] Brickle-Hicks
argues he did not validly waive his Miranda rights and the district court should have
suppressed his statements made during the recorded interview.[¶8] The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and N.D. Const. art.
I, § 12, provides that "[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966), the
United States Supreme Court held that a person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to
the following specific warnings to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination.[1] He must be warned prior to any questioning that he
has the right to remain silent, [2] that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law,
[3] that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and [4] that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires.[¶9] Before law enforcement officers
interviewed Brickle-Hicks, they informed him of his Miranda rights both verbally
and in writing, and he signed a waiver of his rights which provided:STATEMENT OF RIGHTSYOU HAVE THE RIGHT
TO REMAIN SILENT. ANYTHING YOU SAY CAN AND WILL BE USED AGAINST YOU
IN A COURT OF LAW. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO TALK TO A LAWYER AND TO
HAVE HIM PRESENT WITH YOU WHILE YOU ARE BEING QUESTIONED. IF YOU
CANNOT AFFORD TO HIRE A LAWYER, ONE WILL BE APPOINTED TO REPRESENT
YOU BEFORE ANY QUESTIONING, IF YOU WISH. YOU CAN DECIDE AT ANY TIME
TO EXERCISE ANY OF THESE RIGHTS AND NOT ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS OR
MAKE ANY STATEMENTS.WAIVER OF
RIGHTSI HAVE READ AND FULLY UNDERSTAND MY RIGHTS
AS LISTED ABOVE AND HEREBY MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT OF MY OWN
FREE WILL WITHOUT THREATS OR PROMISES FROM ANYONE. AT THIS TIME, I
WILLINGLY WAIVE THESE RIGHTS.[¶10] Brickle-Hicks argues that his signature on the written waiver does not in
itself establish he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights
and that under the totality of the circumstances, including the officers' alleged deception and
coercion during the interview and his diminished cognitive abilities, he did not voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.[¶11] A defendant's waiver of Miranda rights must be made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. State v.
Webster, 2013 ND 119, ¶
20, 834 N.W.2d 283. We have recognized voluntariness challenges are based either on due
process grounds or on self-incrimination grounds. Id. The due process analysis for voluntariness
considers the totality of the circumstances, which is the same standard applicable to determine
whether a defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived Miranda rights
under the Fifth Amendment. Id. In
Webster, at ¶ 21 (quoting Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)), we described the focus of the analysis for claims
about whether a defendant has voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived
Miranda rights:First, the relinquishment of the right must
have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision
to abandon it. Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal both
an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that
the Miranda rights have been waived.[¶12] Here, the district court determined the verbal and written advisory
complied with the Miranda requirements and considered whether Brickle-Hicks'
waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. After reviewing the recording of
Brickle-Hicks' interview and hearing conflicting medical testimony about his cognitive ability,
the court found the law enforcement officers' questioning and tactics did not amount to deception
or coercion and his waiver was voluntary under the first prong of the waiver analysis. The court
also found the second prong of the waiver analysis was satisfied because Brickle-Hicks
possessed sufficient verbal and reading comprehension to understand the consequences of his
waiver and he had had substantial previous interaction with law enforcement based on his
lengthy criminal record. The court explained Brickle-Hicks understood the interview questions,
articulated coherent responses, and on multiple occasions corrected the officers and provided
clarifications if the officers suggested details contrary to his story. The court found that
Brickle-Hicks was capable of understanding the consequences of his statements during the
interview, that the setting for the police interview was not coercive, and that the officers did not
use improper questioning tactics. The court also found the evidence indicated Brickle-Hicks was
malingering in response to certain cognitive tests. The court thus found Brickle-Hicks
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda  rights.[¶13] We conclude there is sufficient competent evidence supporting the district
court's findings and the court's decision that Brickle-Hicks voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his Miranda rights is not contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence.IV[¶14] Brickle-Hicks also argues
his statements during the interview should have been suppressed because they were
involuntary.[¶15] In Goebel, 2007 ND 4, ¶ 16, 725 N.W.2d 578 (citations omitted),
we discussed the standards for challenging the voluntariness of a confession under due
process:When a confession is challenged on due process grounds, the
ultimate inquiry is whether the confession was voluntary. A confession is voluntary if it is a
product of the defendant's free choice rather than a product of coercion. To assess voluntariness,
we look at the totality of the circumstances. Our inquiry focuses on two elements: (1) the
characteristics and conditions of the accused at the time of the confession, including age, sex,
race, education level, physical and mental condition, and prior experience with police; and (2) the
details of the setting in which the confession was obtained, including the duration and conditions
of detention, police attitude toward the defendant, and the diverse pressures that sap the accused's
powers of resistance or self-control.[¶16] As
we explained earlier, the district court reviewed Brickle-Hicks' recorded interview in conjunction
with conflicting medical testimony about his cognitive ability and found that he was not
susceptible to manipulation and interrogation tactics, that he understood the interview questions,
that he articulated coherent responses, and that he was capable of understanding the
consequences of his statements during the interview. The court thus concluded Brickle-Hicks'
interview statements were voluntary under the first element of the due process
analysis.[¶17] The court also found the interview setting was not
coercive and the officers did not use any improper questioning tactics or coerced his statements.
The court explained that Brickle-Hicks voluntarily appeared at the police station after officers
contacted his girlfriend, that the officers maintained a non-aggressive and friendly attitude during
the interview, and that their tactics qualified as proper investigation strategies rather than
coercion.[¶18] We conclude there is sufficient competent
evidence supporting the district court's findings, and its decision that Brickle-Hicks' statements
during the interview were voluntary is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. We
therefore conclude the court did not err in denying Brickle-Hicks' motion to suppress his
statements made during the interview.V[¶19]
Brickle-Hicks argues his clothing seized by the officers during the interview should have been
suppressed because the officers did not obtain a search warrant and because the clothing should
have been excluded as the fruit of the poisonous tree.[¶20]
Absent an exception to the warrant requirement, the Fourth Amendment and N.D. Const. art. I,
§ 8, generally require a warrant for the seizure of physical evidence. State v. Nickel, 2013 ND 155, ¶ 22, 836 N.W.2d 405. Consent is an
exception to the warrant requirement and is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances.
State v. Morin, 2012 ND 75, ¶ 7, 815 N.W.2d 229. The exclusionary
rule generally requires the suppression of evidence derived as a result of a constitutional violation
as fruit of the poisonous tree. State v.
Wahl, 450 N.W.2d 710, 714 (N.D.
1990).[¶21] Here, the district court found Brickle-Hicks
voluntarily consented to giving his clothing to the law enforcement officers. We conclude there is
sufficient competent evidence in the record supporting the court's finding and the court's decision
is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. We therefore conclude Brickle-Hicks'
clothing was not seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and because we have
rejected his other constitutional claims, we conclude the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is not
applicable.VI[¶22] The district court's order
denying Brickle-Hicks' motion to suppress is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence,
and we affirm the judgment.[¶23] Lisa Fair McEversDaniel J. CrothersJerod E.
TufteJon J. JensenGerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.