Case Title: MOGARD v. CITY OF LARAMIE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
MOGARD v. CITY OF LARAMIE2001 WY 8832 P.3d 313Case Number: 00-217Decided: 09/24/2001

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

BENNIE 
J. MOGARD, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

CITY OF 
LARAMIE, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
R. 
Michael Vang of Kirkwood, Nelson & Vang, Laramie, 
Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee: 

            
Devon 
O'Connell Coleman of Corthell and King, P.C., Laramie, 
Wyoming.

 

Representing 
State of Wyoming as Amicus Curiae: 

            
Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Vicci Colgan, Chief Deputy Attorney General; Martin 
Hardsocg, Assistant Attorney General; and Matthew J. Fermelia, Special Assistant 
Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 [¶1]      The appellant, 
Bennie J. Mogard, was arrested in Laramie for driving while under the 
influence.  Upon being advised of 
the implied consent to chemical testing provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-6-102(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001), the appellant asked to speak to an attorney 
before submitting to the test.  That 
request was denied.  Subsequently, 
based upon this denial, he filed a Motion to Suppress Breath Test in the 
municipal court.  Citing Wheeler 
v. State, 705 P.2d 861, 863 (Wyo. 1985), the 
municipal judge denied the motion on the ground that there is no constitutional 
right to counsel prior to taking a breath test.  The appellant then utilized W.R.Cr.P. 
11(a)(2) to enter a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the 
specific issue raised in his motion.

 

[¶2]      In the district 
court, the appellant and the City of Laramie filed a Joint Motion for 
Certification of Question to the Wyoming Supreme Court.  The district court obliged with an Order 
Certifying Question to the Wyoming Supreme Court.  This Court agreed to accept 
certification, and we granted leave to the State of Wyoming to file a brief as 
amicus curiae.

 

THE 
CERTIFIED QUESTION

 

Does 
Article 1, Section 10 of the Wyoming Constitution give a defendant a limited 
right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to 
chemical testing for blood alcohol?

 

THE 
STATUTORY CONTEXT

 

[¶3]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-233 (LexisNexis 2001) forbids what is commonly known as driving while under 
the influence (DWUI).1  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(a)(i) 
provides that, when someone is arrested for DWUI, he is "deemed to have given 
consent, subject to the provisions of this act, to a chemical test or tests of 
his blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol 
concentration or controlled substance content of his blood."  Before a chemical test may be 
administered to the arrested person, he must be advised of certain legal effects 
of either taking or refusing to take the test.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-6-102(a)(ii).  These 
implied consent statutes are the exclusive procedures to be followed in 
determining the blood-alcohol level of a person arrested for DWUI.  Van Order v. State, 600 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Wyo. 1979) (citing State v. Chastain, 594 P.2d 458, 461 (Wyo. 1979), overruled on other grounds by Olson v. 
State, 698 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 
1985)).

 

STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

 

[¶4]      This Court has 
previously held that neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution grants an accused a right to counsel before deciding whether 
to submit to chemical testing upon an arrest for DWUI.  Nesius 
v. State Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, Motor Vehicle Div., 
791 P.2d 939, 942-44 (Wyo. 1990); 
Wheeler, 
705 P.2d  at 863-64.  However, in several cases in recent 
years, we have indicated an interest in performing a separate state 
constitutional analysis when issues arise under both the federal and state 
constitutions.  That is what the 
appellant now seeks.

 

[¶5]      Our "separate 
state constitutional analysis" jurisprudence has undergone a fairly rapid 
transformation.  Saldana 
v. State, 
846 P.2d 604 (Wyo. 1993), 
illustrates the various views of state constitutional analysis then held by 
members of this Court.  The primary 
issue in Saldana 
was the reasonableness of a search and seizure.  Interestingly enough, Saldana raised 
this issue solely under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4, rather than the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.   Writing for the majority, Justice 
Thomas relied almost exclusively on the Fourth Amendment and federal precedent 
in finding the search and seizure constitutional, and he dismissed the notion of 
finding any greater protections in the state constitution.  Saldana, 
846 P.2d  at 610-12.  In a special concurrence, however, 
Justice Macy forcefully rejected "the idea that in the future we will blindly 
follow the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution when we interpret the Wyoming 
Constitution."  Saldana, 
846 P.2d at 621 (Macy, J., specially concurring).  Perhaps even more forcefully, Justice 
Urbigkit issued a forty-page dissenting opinion, in which he dismissed the idea 
that state constitutional provisions necessarily were meant to mirror their 
federal counterparts.  Id. 
at 624-64 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).  
Finally, Justice Golden concurred, but identified an "analytical 
technique" whereby litigants could, in the future, present a separate state 
constitutional analysis.  Id. 
at 621-24 (Golden, J., concurring).2

 

[¶6]      Three years 
later, in a unanimous opinion, this Court rejected a separate state 
constitutional analysis of a search and seizure issue, but only because the 
"assertion, unaccompanied by authority or argument, is insufficient to persuade 
us to consider whether the Wyoming Constitution's Art. 1, § 4 should be 
independently interpreted as offering greater protection than its federal 
counterpart."  Gronski 
v. State, 
910 P.2d 561, 565 (Wyo. 1996).  See also 
Guerra v. State, 
897 P.2d 447, 451 (Wyo. 1995) (limiting the application of separate state 
constitutional analysis to the extent the appellant actually developed the 
analysis).  Finally, in Vasquez 
v. State, 
990 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1999), 
the separate state constitutional analysis doctrine met up with an appellant 
prepared to utilize the analytical technique identified in Justice Golden's 
concurrence in Saldana.  Vasquez 
represents a significant step in the development of state constitutional 
analysis in Wyoming, inasmuch as it finds the same to be "required unless a 
party desires to have an issue decided solely under the Federal 
Constitution."  Vasquez, 
990 P.2d  at 485.

 

APPLYING 
THE SALDANA 
TEST

 

[¶7]      We should not 
lose focus of the limited issue before us.  
We determined in Wheeler, 
705 P.2d  at 863, 
that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which reads as 
follows, does not create a right to counsel before a DWUI arrestee decides 
whether to take a chemical test:

 

            
In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  The question we now face is 
whether Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10, which reads as follows, provides such a 
right:

 

            
In all 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
defend 
in person and by 
counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation, to have a copy thereof, to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process served for 
obtaining witnesses, and to a speedy trial, by an impartial jury of the county 
or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed.  When the location of the offense cannot 
be established with certainty, venue may be placed in the county or district 
where the corpus delecti [delicti] is found, or in any county or district in 
which the victim was transported.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  We will answer the question 
by applying the six criteria identified in Saldana, 
846 P.2d  at 622 (Golden, J., concurring):

 

            
1.         
The textual language.

            
2.         
The differences in the texts.

            
3.         
Constitutional history.

            
4.         
Pre-existing state law.

            
5.         
Structural differences.

            
6.         
Matters of particular state or local concern.

 

            
Textual Language/Differences 
in the Texts/Structural Differences

 

[¶8]      These three 
factors are intertwined.  
Juxtaposition of the emphasized phrases from the two constitutional 
provisions reveals that they are substantially similar in wording.  Another similarity is that the right to 
counsel is one right among several others, those others also being substantially 
similar between the two constitutional provisions.  A notable similarity is that the right 
to counsel exists under both constitutions "in all criminal 
prosecutions."

 

[¶9]      One difference 
between the two provisions is that the right to counsel is the last right listed 
in the Sixth Amendment, while it is the first right listed in Wyo. Const. art. 
1, § 10.  The appellant contends 
that, by placing the right to counsel at the beginning of the provision, the 
framers of the Wyoming Constitution meant to give it "special 
significance."  He presents no 
authority for this proposition.  We 
are not convinced that constitutional protections should be given different 
values or priorities based solely upon their placement in the document.  Likewise, the slight textual differences 
between the Sixth Amendment and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 demonstrate 
little.  Vasquez, 
990 P.2d  at 485.  In short, we cannot discern from the 
text or structure of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 any intent to offer greater 
protection than the Sixth Amendment.

 

            
Constitutional 
History

 

[¶10]   As every American schoolchild 
should know, our federal constitution was adopted in the years after the 
Revolutionary War to supplant the Articles of Confederation, the Articles having 
failed to create a sufficiently strong national government.  Not everyone was convinced, however, 
that a strong national government was necessarily a good thing, so the Bill of 
Rightsthe first ten amendmentswas added to ensure that this new government did 
not interfere with the identified rights.  
A hundred years later, when Wyoming adopted its constitution, the rights 
of the people were "declared" in the first article of that document, rather than 
being appended as amendments.

 

[¶11]   In his brief, the appellant recites 
at length the debates of the Wyoming Constitutional Convention as they appear in 
the Journal 
and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of 
Wyoming 
(1889).  While this effort is laudable, it casts 
little light on the comparison between the right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment and the right to counsel under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10.  Ironically, the one material revelation 
noted from the Journal 
and Debates 
is that, on September 26, 1889, Art. 1, § 10 was amended by a majority vote upon 
the following recommendation:

 

Mr. 
CAMPBELL:  I have another amendment 
which I wish to offer.  Sec. 10, I 
believe that was not amended.  Now, 
Mr. President, I don't think this committee here can improve on the language of 
the United States statute on this subject, and I therefore move to amend by 
striking out the words "to meet the witnesses opposed face to face," and put in 
the language which everybody understands, "to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him."  That is the language 
that has been passed upon by the courts, and we all know what it 
means.

 

Journal 
and Debates 
at 726.  The replacement language is, of course, 
not the language of a "United States statute," but is the language found in the 
Sixth Amendment.  In this instance, 
at least, Wyo.  Const. art. 1, § 10 
was pointedly drafted to mirror the words and intent of the Sixth 
Amendment.

 

[¶12]   In truth, there is little that 
constitutional history can do to help answer the question before 
us:

 

No 
state constitutional history exists which would lead us to believe that Wyoming 
initially included individual rights as a strong statement of societal values or 
because it intended to provide greater protection of individual rights.  The most that can be definitely 
ascertained from the differences in the constitutional histories of the two 
documents may well be explained by the simple fact that it was the prevailing 
view that protection of individual rights was considered to be the province of 
the state and the federal rights acted only upon the federal government, and the 
Wyoming drafters acted accordingly.

 

Vasquez, 
990 P.2d at 484 (citing 
State v. Peterson, 
27 Wyo. 185, 213, 194 P. 342, 350 (1920)).  The Bill of Rights has its roots in the 
years of conflict between Britain and the colonies, and in the hundreds of years 
of development of Anglo-American law.  
The parties have not brought to our attention any events or circumstances 
in Wyoming in the latter half of the nineteenth century from which we may infer 
an intent that the protections contained in Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 were meant 
to be more broad than their counterparts in the Sixth 
Amendment.

 

            
Pre-Existing State 
Law

 

[¶13]   The six factors identified in 
Saldana 
were taken from State v. 
Gunwall, 
106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (1986).  Saldana, 
846 P.2d  at 622 (Golden, J., concurring).  The Gunwall 
court gave the following justification for looking to pre-existing state law to 
help determine the relative breadth of state constitutional 
protections:

 

Previously 
established bodies of state law, including statutory law, may also bear on the 
granting of distinctive state constitutional rights.  State law may be responsive to concerns 
of its citizens long before they are addressed by analogous constitutional 
claims.  Preexisting law can thus 
help to define the scope of a constitutional right later 
established.

 

Gunwall, 
720 P.2d  at 812.

 

[¶14]   The appellant's investigation into 
Wyoming's pre-constitutional law focuses upon portions of the territorial 
criminal code in effect just prior to statehood.  He cites numerous statutes in outlining 
the complaint and warrant, indictment, arrest, preliminary hearing, and 
arraignment procedures established in that code.3  Unfortunately, there is little in the 
appellant's analysis, or in the Revised Statutes of Wyoming of 1887 for that 
matter, that does much to aid us in comparing the Sixth Amendment to Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 10.  In fact, the almost 
complete lack of any mention of a defendant's right to counsel in the 1887 code 
may be the most revealing aspect of this analysis.  No statement of, or recognition of, any 
exceptional right to an attorney can be found.  The only references to the defendant's 
attorney occur in Wyo. Rev. Stat. ch. 8, §§ 3258 and 3259 (1887), which deal 
with the service of a grand jury indictment upon a defendant or his attorney, 
and the bringing of the defendant into court, where an attorney will be 
appointed for him if he is indigent.  
Since the succeeding sections detail the formal responses to the 
indictment available to the defendantmotion to quash, plea in abatement, 
demurrer, and plea on the meritsit seems clear that the statutory intent is to 
allow the defendant to have the advice of counsel in making these "plea" 
decisions.  Wyo. Rev. Stat. ch. 8, 
§§ 3260-3275 (1887).  See 
James v. State, 
27 Wyo. 378, 196 P. 1045, 1046 (1921).  There is nothing in the 1887 criminal 
code from which we could conclude that, in the state constitution adopted a few 
years later, the framers meant something broader in their use of the phrase "in 
all criminal prosecutions" than did the framers of the United States 
Constitution.

 

            
Matters of Particular State or 
Local Concern

 

[¶15]   Once again, it is helpful to refer 
to Gunwall 
in applying this factor:

 

Is 
the subject matter local in character, or does there appear to be a need for 
national uniformity?  The former may 
be more appropriately addressed by resorting to the state 
constitution.

 

Gunwall, 
720 P.2d  at 813 (footnote omitted).  As examples of matters of local concern, 
the Gunwall 
court cites to Coyle v. 
Smith, 
221 U.S. 559, 31 S. Ct. 688, 55 L. Ed. 853 (1911) ("each state has the power to locate its 
own seat of government, to determine when and how it shall be changed from one 
place to another, and to appropriate its own public funds . . .") and Cooley 
v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, to Use of Soc for Relief of 
Distressed Pilots, Their Widows and Children, 
53 U.S. 299, 13 L. Ed. 996 (1851) ("pilotage does not require uniform 
national rule").  Gunwall, 
720 P.2d  at 813 n.11.

 

[¶16]   The subject matter here, of course, 
is the right to counsel prior to chemical testing in a DWUI prosecution.  Unlike the location of the seat of a 
local government, or pilotage rules, the right to counsel is a fundamental 
personal right identified in both the federal and the state constitutions.  In that regard, we have previously held 
that, while the federal constitution sets the minimum standards to be followed, 
states are free under their own constitutions to "enlarge" rights.  Shongutsie 
v. State, 
827 P.2d 361, 367 (Wyo. 1992), receded 
from on other grounds by Murray v. State, 
855 P.2d 350 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting 
Richmond v. State, 
554 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Wyo. 1976)).  At the same time, however, it cannot be 
said that the right to counsel in the chemical testing situation is particularly 
a matter of local or state concern, so no presumption or inference arises that 
the state would have some particular interest in setting a different standard 
than did the framers of the federal constitution.  All citizens of every state in the union 
share the need for this protection.  
Stated conversely, we know of nothing to suggest that the people of 
Wyoming are in greater need of the right to counsel under these circumstances 
than are the people of any other state.

 

[¶17]   The appellant contends in his brief 
that the more limited matter of particular state concern is driving while under 
the influence.4  Rather than developing that independent 
theme, however, he argues the importance to any arrested person of the 
availability of counsel.  But to follow up on the appellant's theme, we 
note that we have previously identified the objectives of the implied consent 
laws:

 

"(1) to discourage individuals from driving an automobile 
while under the influence of intoxicants[;] (2) to remove the driving privileges 
from those individuals disposed to driving while inebriated[;] and (3) to 
provide an efficient means of gathering reliable evidence of intoxication or 
nonintoxication.'"

 

Farmer v. State, Dept. of Transp., 986 P.2d 165, 167 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Department of Licensing v. Lax, 125 Wash. 2d 818, 888 P.2d 1190, 1193 (1995)).  We also concluded that a delay in chemical 
testing "generally favors the DWI suspect by giving time for the body to "burn 
off" alcohol.'"  
Farmer, 986 P.2d  at 167 (quoting Lax, 888 P.2d at 1193).  We have made it clear that the implied 
consent statutes are meant to assist the state in achieving these objectives, 
not to give additional rights to arrestees:

 

"The implied Consent Law was not designed to give greater 
rights to a suspected drunken driver than were constitutionally afforded before 
its passage.  
Its purpose was intended to impose a condition on the right to operate a 
motor vehicle on the streets and highways of this state.  The condition 
requires that a driver, by so operating a vehicle in Wyoming, consents to submit 
to chemical tests for intoxication under statutorily determined 
circ[u]mstances.  
The refusal to submit to a test can result in revocation of a driver's 
license.  It 
was intended to facilitate the tests for intoxication and not to inhibit the 
ability of the state to remove drunken drivers from the highways of our 
state.  In 
light of this purpose, it must be liberally construed to effectuate its 
policies."

 

State v. Marquez, 638 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Wyo. 1982), overruled on other grounds by Olson v. 
State, 698 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting Chastain, 594 P.2d at 461).  The policy considerations behind the implied 
consent statutes would seem to mitigate against finding a particular state need 
or desire to enlarge the right to counsel in this context.

 

 

[¶18]   The right to counsel is only one of 
many protections afforded by both the United States Constitution and the Wyoming 
Constitution.  
Over the years, this Court has been called upon many times to analyze 
different rights under both constitutions.  The result has not exactly been a seamless 
web of constitutional analysis.  A few examples may suffice.  In State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1129 (Wyo. 1993), where the issue was double jeopardy in the context of a 
requested lesser included offense instruction, we stated that Wyo. Const. art. 
1, § 11 "assures the same protection as" the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  
In adopting the statutory elements test for lesser included offenses, we 
then followed United States Supreme Court guidance.  Two years later, 
however, in analyzing a defendant's right not to incriminate himself under the 
same state constitutional provision and the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, we noted the "broader protections" of our state constitution and 
reiterated our abandonment of the federal due process analysis in 
"comment-upon-silence" cases.  Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 389-90 (Wyo. 1995) (citing Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1978), overruled on other grounds by Richter v. 
State, 642 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1982)).5

 

[¶19]   In two cases in 1999, this Court 
recognized some difficulties in applying the Saldana factors in Wyoming.  In Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 483-84, we stated:

 

Those courts independently analyzing their state 
constitutions to determine the permissible scope of an automobile search 
incident to the arrest of its driver or passengers usually have either a long 
tradition of such independent analysis or have sufficient constitutional history 
to permit departing from federal precedent through principled reasoning.

 

            
In the case of Wyoming's search and seizure provision, there is little 
constitutional history available to provide clues as to the framers' intent when 
drafting it.  
Further hampering our analysis is the fact that this Court both initiated 
and then all but abandoned independent analysis of the state constitutional 
provision during the 1920s and 1930s and began determining search and seizure 
issues under the Fourth Amendment with strict adherence to United States Supreme 
Court decisions.

 

Despite the disclaimer, this Court concluded that the 
"national citizenry rationale" of federal precedent did not fit Wyoming, 
adopting instead a "narrower application" of the automobile search incident to 
arrest doctrine.  
Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 489.  A month later, in Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 308 (Wyo. 1999), we again pointed out that Wyoming is lacking in both a 
long tradition of state constitutional analysis and sufficient constitutional 
history to allow departure from federal precedent.  We concluded that, 
"[a]lthough we are not bound by the Fourth Amendment decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court in this case, we may certainly follow its lead when we find 
its reasoning persuasive."  Almada, 994 P.2d  at 309.  We then adopted that federal reasoning in 
finding that "participant monitoring" of conversations does not violate the 
Wyoming Constitution.  
Almada, 994 P.2d  at 311.

 

[¶20]   Analysis of the specific issue before 
the Courtwhether Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 gives a DWUI arrestee a limited right 
to counsel before deciding whether to take a breathalyzer testmust begin with 
Wheeler, 705 P.2d 861.  As mentioned previously herein, Wheeler held that there is no such right under the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.  Wheeler, 705 P.2d  at 863.  The opinion in Wheeler, 705 P.2d  at 863, does not directly reference the Sixth Amendment, but the 
cases from other states relied upon in the decision are Sixth Amendment cases 
which utilize a "critical stage" analysis.  See Svedlund v. Municipality of Anchorage, 671 P.2d 378 (Alaska App. 1983) and State ex rel. Webb v. City Court of City of Tucson, Pima 
County, 25 Ariz.App. 214, 542 P.2d 407 (1975).

 

[¶21]   There are many Wyoming cases that have 
addressed Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10, and the Sixth Amendment, both in relation to 
the right to counsel and other constitutional rights.  Most of the cases 
that dealt with the right to counsel have followed a "critical stage" analysis 
in determining whether the right to counsel had accrued at a particular point in 
the proceedings.  
The developing path of state constitutional analysis as it pertains to 
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 can be shown by reference to pertinent portions of 
these cases:

 

We do not underestimate the importance to a defendant of 
the right to advice of counsel at the arraignment, which is an important step in 
the prosecution.

 

James, 196 P.  at 1046.

 

[O]ur constitution contains another section that guarantees 
the right of trial by jury in criminal cases.  That section [Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10] is 
similar to the 6th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.

 

State v. Yazzie, 67 Wyo. 256, 218 P.2d 482, 484 (1950).

 

            
In 1967 the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution made its Sixth Amendment guarantee 
of a speedy trial applicable to all states.  Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S. Ct. 988, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1967).  Hence, 
in recognition of the supreme law of the land, the United States Supreme Court 
decisions on speedy trials are accorded full credit in deciding the question 
presented in this portion of the appeal.  In addition, it becomes the duty of this 
court to re-examine the previous decisions of this court in the light of our own 
constitutional guarantee and the recent and later United States Supreme Court 
interpretations of the constitutional guarantee of speedy trials.

 

Stuebgen v. State, 548 P.2d 870, 872 (Wyo. 1976).

 

            
That a defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel at all stages 
of the proceeding is without question.

 

Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, 350 (Wyo. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977).6

 

            
A criminal defendant's right to effective counsel is inviolate and the 
court has a duty to provide such counsel.  This duty "is not discharged by an assignment 
at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of 
effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case."  Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 65, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 
527; Avery v. State of Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 60 S. Ct. 321, 322, 84 L. Ed. 377; United States ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 3 Cir., 428 F.2d 10, 13.  The right of assistance by counsel 
necessarily includes a reasonable and adequate time for counsel to prepare * * 
*.

 

* * *

 

* * *  [T]his court feels compelled to do as the 
United States Supreme Court has done in its approach to these cases to make our 
disposal based upon the factual situation which appears in each case without 
reliance upon per se rules or assumed presumptions.

 

Adger v. State, 584 P.2d 1056, 1058-59 (Wyo. 1978).

 

            
The person accused of the commission of a crime has the constitutional 
right to be represented by an attorney of his own choice.  Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 75 S. Ct. 1, 99 L. Ed. 4 (1954); Adger v. State, Wyo. 584 P.2d 1056 [(1978)].  This is the 
construction given to the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States of America, and the same construction must be given Art. 1, § 10 of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming.

 

Irvin v. State, 584 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Wyo. 1978).

 

Section 10, Art. 1 of the Wyoming Constitution likewise 
provides for the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions and tracks the 
federal provision.

 

Auclair v. State, 660 P.2d 1156, 1159 n.6 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 909 (1983).  "The basic contours of the right are 
identical in both state and federal contexts."  Id. at 1160.

 

            
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only when adversarial 
criminal proceedings against an accused have been commenced.

 

Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024, 1029 (Wyo. 1983).  "Prior to the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel attaching, no violation of that Sixth Amendment right to counsel can 
occur."  
Id. at 1030.

 

            
We decline to extend the right to representation by counsel guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 10 of the 
Wyoming Constitution to the preindictment lineup stage of the criminal 
proceedings, and consequently we affirm.

 

Charpentier v. State, 736 P.2d 724, 724 (Wyo. 1987).

 

[T]he Wyoming Supreme Court has been confronted with a 
number of cases involving the question of when the right to counsel 
attaches.  * * 
*  In each 
case, we applied the rule and rationale set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court in Kirby [v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1972)].  Most recently in 
State v. Heiner, 683 P.2d [629] at 637 [(Wyo. 1984)], we said:

 

"It is clear that in this jurisdiction a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel attaches only when adversarial criminal proceedings have been 
commenced against an accused.  It follows that * * * evidence obtained * * *  prior to the filing of the criminal complaint 
[was] not obtained in violation of [the defendant's] Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel."  (Emphasis added and citation omitted.)

 

Charpentier,  736 P.2d  at 725.7

 

            
In pursuing his claim that the inculpatory statements should have been 
suppressed, Best invokes both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Art. 1, §§ 10 and 11 of the Wyoming Constitution.  The critical 
interrogation occurred prior to the filing of criminal charges against Best, and 
for that reason, his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and the parallel provision, Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming 
Constitution, which also affords the right to counsel, are not implicated.  A request for 
counsel made prior to the commencement of adversarial criminal proceedings does 
not invoke the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  
Brown v. State, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1024 (1983).  The same result 
must pertain under Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution.  This view is 
consistent with that of the Supreme Court of the United States.

 

Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739, 742 (Wyo. 1987).

 

            
With respect to Jandro's claim that he was denied his right, under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 10 of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming, to confront witnesses against him, we 
adopt the rule articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States.

 

Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512, 523 (Wyo. 1989).

 

Article 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution likewise 
provides for the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions and tracks the 
federal provision.

 

Nelson v. State, 934 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Wyo. 1997).

 

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel accrues at the time 
adversary judicial proceedings are initiated against the defendant.  * * *  Counsel is required 
not just at trial, but at "critical stages" both before and after trial in which 
the substantial rights of the accused may be affected.  Duffy [v. State], 837 P.2d [1047] at 1052 [(Wyo. 1992)] (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967)); 
Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Wyo.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 2967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1980).

 

Nelson, 934 P.2d  at 1240.

 

            
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed to the criminally accused by 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made obligatory on the 
states by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 460 (Wyo.1979).  This right is also 
secured by Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution.  Id.  
Although compliance with Rule 48 will go a long way in protecting a 
defendant's right to a speedy trial, it is also necessary to examine speedy 
trial issues in light of the constitutional factors which provide the 
underpinnings of the rule.  Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Wyo.1996).

 

[In that regard], [w]e have accepted the balancing test set 
out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 
(1972) * * *.

 

Almada, 994 P.2d  at 304.

 

[T]he Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel, and accordingly required the states to make appointed counsel 
available to indigent defendants in all "criminal prosecutions."  * * *  Article 1, § 10 of 
the Wyoming Constitution . . . tracks the federal provision.

 

Pearl v. State, 996 P.2d 688, 689 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 
(1963)).

 

[W]e hold that the Sixth Amendment requires appointment of 
counsel for indigent probationers when the indigent probationer was entitled to 
be represented by an attorney [at judicial probation revocation 
proceedings].

 

Pearl, 996 P.2d  at 692.

 

[¶22]   These cases have been cited at length 
because they establish the precedent for our decision herein.  Several 
generalizations may be made.  First, in many of the cases, there is only a 
Sixth Amendment analysis, with no Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 analysis.  Second, even where 
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 is cited, there is no separate state constitutional 
analysis.  
Third, where there is mention of both constitutions, the Sixth Amendment 
and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 are almost uniformly considered to be "parallel 
provisions" with consistent interpretation and application.  Fourth, even after 
Saldana in 1993, neither litigants nor this Court strayed much 
from federal precedent and the Sixth Amendment in addressing Wyo. Const. art. 1, 
§ 10.  And 
fifth, reference back to the Sixth Amendment and reliance upon United States 
Supreme Court precedent has been necessitated by the dearth of state 
constitutional history and the resulting failure to develop a "long tradition of 
independent analysis."

 

[¶23]   One other case deserves special 
mention.  In 
Shongutsie, 827 P.2d  at 366-67, we held that, in conflict of interest cases involving one 
attorney's representation of multiple defendants, we would not follow the 
minimal federal standard under the Sixth Amendment of requiring an appellant to 
show prejudice by such multiple representation if he had failed to object in the 
trial court.  
Instead, we chose to enlarge the right to effective assistance of counsel 
under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 by holding that prejudice would be presumed in 
all instances of such multiple representation.  Shongutsie, 827 P.2d  at 366-67.  This result was based not so much on any 
discernment that the right to counsel is different in Wyoming as on the 
perception that the federal rule was difficult to implement.  We preferred the 
ease of application of a presumptive rule, and the public policies it 
promoted.8

 

 

[¶24]   In urging this Court to find a limited 
right to be represented by counsel before making the decision to submit to 
chemical testing, the appellant cites several cases from other states that have 
found such a right to exist.  Yerrington v. Anchorage, 675 P.2d 649, 650 (Alaska App. 1983) (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 (1984)) (a statute and a court rule both require a 
reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before chemical testing, the 
right being defined as a "limited statutory right"); State v. Juarez, 161 Ariz. 76, 775 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (1989) (a criminal rule requires counsel "as soon as 
feasible after a defendant is taken into custody," but it also violates the 
Sixth Amendment and the state constitution not to allow access to counsel before 
the breath test); Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 481 A.2d 192, 196-98 (1984) (taking a chemical sobriety test is not a 
critical stage requiring a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the state constitution requires a reasonable 
opportunity to communicate with counsel before making the decision); Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Minn. 1991) (the chemical testing decision is a critical 
stage in the criminal proceeding, so there exists a state constitutional right 
to counsel); State v. Sadek, 552 N.W.2d 71, 73 (N.D. 1996) (right to counsel not derived from federal or 
state constitution, but from state statute); State v. Spencer, 305 Or. 59, 750 P.2d 147, 154-56 (1988) (a person taken into formal custody is 
confronted with the full legal power of the state, regardless of whether a 
formal charge has been filed, and at that time, the person is "ensnared in a 
criminal prosecution'" and has the right to counsel); City of Bellevue v. Ohlson, 60 Wash. App. 485, 803 P.2d 1346, 1349 (1991) (a criminal rule requires an arrestee to be 
provided reasonable access to an attorney prior to submitting to chemical 
testing); see also Busch v. Commissioner of Public 
Safety, 614 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Minn.App. 2000).

 

[¶25]   Other states have reached a contrary 
result.  Based 
on its own precedent of finding no distinction between the Sixth Amendment and 
the parallel provision of the New Mexico Constitution, the New Mexico Supreme 
Court has held that there is no basis for interpreting that state's 
constitutional provision more broadly than the Sixth Amendment.  State v. Woodruff, 124 N.M. 388, 951 P.2d 605, 609-11 (1997).  The court also found that there is no 
separate due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment because, in this 
situation, the right to counsel and the right to due process protect the same 
value, that being the right to fundamental fairness in the proceeding.  Woodruff, 951 P.2d  at 609-11.  Likewise, the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
held that there is no state or federal constitutional right to counsel before 
the decision whether to submit to chemical testing.  State v. Leavitt, 107 N.J. 534, 527 A.2d 403, 405 (1987).

 

[¶26]   The implied consent decision is not a 
critical stage of the criminal prosecution under Sixth Amendment analysis, and 
there are no independent state grounds that require a different result.  Id. at 407.  The same determination was made in State v. Allen, 485 A.2d 953, 955-56 (Me. 1984); Fulmer v. Jensen, 221 Neb. 582, 379 N.W.2d 736, 740 (1986); and Dunn v. Petit, 120 R.I. 486, 388 A.2d 809, 810-13 (1978).  In Missouri, a DWUI arrestee's right to 
counsel at the chemical testing decision stage is statutory and not 
constitutional.  
Brown v. Director of Revenue, 34 S.W.3d 166, 171 (Mo.App. 2000).  In Idaho, the implied consent scenario is 
considered to be civil, rather than criminal, in nature, so the right to counsel 
has not been recognized under either the Sixth Amendment or the Idaho 
Constitution.  
Matter of Triplett, 119 Idaho 193, 804 P.2d 922, 923-24 (1990).

 

[¶27]   As outlined in the Wyoming cases 
previously cited, this Court has followed the lead of the United States Supreme 
Court in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411 
(1972), in finding that the right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment does not accrue until "adversarial criminal proceedings" have been 
initiated.  The 
states that find there is no federal or state constitutional right to counsel at 
the time of the chemical testing decision generally follow the same reasoning in 
finding that the decision is not a critical stage in the criminal proceeding, 
and in finding that adversarial criminal proceedings do not begin until the 
formal charge has been filed.  See, e.g., State v. Hoch, 500 So. 2d 597, 598-99 (Fla.App. 1986); Allen, 485 A.2d at 955-56; State v. Delisle, 137 N.H. 549, 630 A.2d 767, 767-68 (1993); Leavitt, 527 A.2d  at 405; Dunn, 388 A.2d at 810-13; and McCambridge v. State, 778 S.W.2d 70, 71-77 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990).

 

[¶28]   There are three reasons why the 
chemical testing stage is not a critical stage in criminal proceedings.  First, the function 
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is to preserve the defendant's right to 
a fair trial, once adversarial criminal proceedings have been commenced by the 
filing of a formal charge.  Charpentier, 736 P.2d  at 725; Delisle, 630 A.2d  at 768; McCambridge, 778 S.W.2d  at 74.  Second, the chemical testing decision is 
"not essentially "a lawyer's decision" but, on the contrary, can be made by a 
defendant in the absence of the assistance of counsel without any substantial 
prejudice to [the accused's] rights under the sixth amendment.'"  Delisle, 630 A.2d  at 768 (quoting State v. Petkus, 110 N.H. 394, 397, 269 A.2d 123, 125 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971)).  And third, the "right" to refuse the test is 
not a right at all, but is, at most, a statutory privilege or an "option" which 
may be strictly regulated by the state.  Hoch, 500 So.2d at 600-01; State v. Reitter, 227 Wis.2d 213, 595 N.W.2d 646, 659 (1999).9

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶29]   We find persuasive those cases that 
have declined to find in their state constitution an "enlarged" right to counsel 
that would extend to the time at which a DWUI arrestee is deciding whether to 
submit to chemical testing of his blood alcohol or controlled substance 
content.  As in 
New Mexico, we have no basis in Wyoming for interpreting our state's 
constitutional provision as providing more protection than the Sixth 
Amendment.  
Wyoming has no constitutional history or pre-constitutional statutory law 
that suggests such an enlargement was intended by the framers of our 
constitution.  
There are no special circumstances in Wyoming that necessitate a broader 
right than what is provided by the Sixth Amendment.  We have no 
significant precedent of such an interpretation.10  As we said in 
Charpentier, 736 P.2d  at 725, the appellant has "failed to demonstrate any compelling 
reason why this Court should depart from the established rule . . .."

 

[¶30]   There are also some specific reasons 
not to expand the right to counsel beyond its traditional extent and into the 
investigative, evidence-gathering period before a formal charge is brought.  Such an extension 
would destroy the "bright line" rule whereby access to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 is only required once charges are filed, 
leaving law enforcement wondering on a case-by-case basis whether counsel is 
required.11  See McCambridge, 778 S.W.2d  at 75-76.  Further, the door would be opened to the 
difficulty of finding and appointing counsel for indigent defendants at all 
hours of the day and night for pre-chemical-testing advisements.

 

[¶31]   The answer to the certified question is 
"no."  Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 10 does not give a defendant a limited right to consult with an 
attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to chemical testing for blood 
alcohol.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

1As used herein, DWUI 
refers to any allegation under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233 to which the implied 
consent statutes apply.

  2The 
details of this "analytical technique" will be discussed later herein.

  3The Revised Statutes of Wyoming of 1887 contained 
fifty-four titles.  
Title 39 was entitled "ProcedureCriminal."  The separate 
chapters in Title 39 with potential relevance to our inquiry are Chapter 3 
(Arrest), Chapter 4 (Examinations), Chapter 6 (Grand jury proceedings), Chapter 
7 (Indictments and process thereon), and Chapter 8 (Pleas to 
indictmentArraignmentChange of venue).

  4In 
determining whether a state constitutional provision was drafted with particular 
matters of local interest in mind, we first look to matters that existed when 
the constitution was drafted.  At the same time, however, we must apply the 
constitution's language in the context of the times in which we live.  See Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Hall, 46 Wyo. 380, 
391, 26 P.2d 1071, 1073 (1933).

  5Three 
years before Clenin, while finding that the right 
not to be a witness against oneself was "firmly established in this state," and 
was not the "peculiar province" of the federal courts, we at the same time 
recognized that the right is "ancient," which seems to imply that it also is not 
the "peculiar province" of the state constitution.  Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483, 490-93 (Wyo. 
1975).

  6The 
majority opinion does not specify whether this right is based upon the state or 
the federal constitution.  In a dissent, Justice Rose emphasizes the 
right to counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings, citing the Sixth 
Amendment and United States Supreme Court precedent.  Hoskins, 552 P.2d at 351-54 (Rose, J., dissenting).

  7In his 
dissent, Justice Urbigkit opined that, "[t]he fiction adopted in the recent 
United States Supreme Court opinions aside, a criminal prosecution is 
comprehensively commenced when the individual is arrested and hauled off to the 
local confinement facility.  The accusatory stage and its intrinsic 
jeopardy has then commenced."  Charpentier, 736 
P.2d at 727 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).  He relies upon Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 10, as well as other state constitutional provisions to contend 
that adequate legal representation is "constrained" by the majority 
opinion.  Charpentier, 736 P.2d at 725 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).

  8These 
policies were identified as discouraging dual advocacy by attorneys, the 
effective administration of justice, and assurance that all defendants will be 
fully apprised of their constitutional right to counsel free of any conflict of 
interest.  Shongutsie, 827 P.2d  at 367-68.

  9Some 
cases intermingle Sixth Amendment critical stage concepts and Fourteenth 
Amendment due process concepts along with their state constitution 
equivalents.

 

The [United States] Supreme Court has not yet 
expressly reconciled the constitutional duality of the right to counsel 
guarantees as expressly provided in the Sixth Amendment and implicitly provided 
in the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee a fair hearing . . ..  Despite their often 
combining, and therefore confusing, the two principles . . ., it appears that at 
least since Gideon v. Wainright, [372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963)], the due process guarantee of counsel has been 
restricted to civil proceedings . . ., quasi-civil proceedings . . ., or appeals 
. . ..  The 
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel on the other hand has been restricted to 
proceedings that are identified in the Sixth Amendment"criminal 
prosecutions."

 

McCambridge, 778 S.W.2d  at 74.  In Reitter, 595 N.W.2d  at 659, the 
court reiterated its prior holding that there is no Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel at this stage, but then added that the due process protections of the 
Wisconsin Constitution do not extend to a DWUI arrestee who refuses to submit to 
a chemical test, because refusal is not a right, but a privilege.

  10Shongutsie, 827 P.2d 361, is a fact-driven departure from our general rule of 
equating the Sixth  
Amendment and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10.

  11The 
accused at this stage does have the protections of the Fifth Amendment, Miranda, and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11.  For a thoughtful 
discussion of the differences between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to 
counsel, the critical stage concept, and an analysis of implied consent as a 
search and seizure issue, see Friedman, 473 N.W.2d 
at 838-47 (Coyne, J., dissenting).  Similar reasoning 
is found in Delisle, 630 A.2d  at 767-68, where the critical stage 
analysis of implied consent cases is used in holding that the taking of blood 
and hair samples via a search warrant is not a critical stage in the criminal 
prosecution.