Case Title: State v. Badzinski

Citation: 2014 WI 6

Docket Number: 2011AP002905-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 6 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2905-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Darryl J. Badzinski, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 345 Wis. 2d 398, 824 N.W.2d 928 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Unpublished)     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 29, 2014   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 22, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis Cimpl   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.   
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Basil M. 
Loeb and Schmidlkofer, Toth, & Loeb, LLC, Wauwatosa, and oral 
argument by Basil M. Loeb. 
  
 
 
2014 WI 6
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2011AP2905-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2009CF4756) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,   
 
 
v. 
 
Darryl J. Badzinski,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant.   
FILED 
 
JAN 29, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The State of Wisconsin seeks 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals that 
reversed both a judgment of conviction and a circuit court order 
denying post-conviction relief.1   
¶2 
The defendant, Darryl Badzinski, was charged with 
sexually assaulting his niece, A.R.B.  At trial, A.R.B. 
testified that the assault occurred in the laundry room at a 
family gathering.  During jury deliberations, the jury asked the 
circuit court if it needed to agree on the location of the 
                                                 
1 State v. Badzinski, No. 2011AP2905-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2012) reversing a judgment and order 
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Dennis R. Cimpl, 
Judge. 
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
2 
 
assault.  The court responded "no."  The court of appeals 
determined, however, that this permitted the jury to speculate 
beyond the evidence and remanded the case for a new trial. 
¶3 
The State argues that the court of appeals erred in 
reversing the circuit court.  It contends that the jury did not 
have to unanimously agree on the location because it is not an 
essential element of the crime charged.  The State further 
asserts that the court's response of "no" did not mislead the 
jury into speculating beyond the evidence. 
¶4 
In reply, Badzinski maintains that the circuit court's 
response of "no" deprived him of a unanimous verdict.  He 
further argues that the circuit court's response of "no" 
violated his due process rights in that it impermissibly misled 
the jury into believing that the victim's credibility was 
irrelevant and that it could speculate beyond the evidence. 
¶5 
We conclude that the circuit court's response of "no" 
did not deprive Badzinski of a unanimous verdict.  Jury 
unanimity is required only on the essential elements of the 
crime.  Here, the location of the crime was not one of those 
elements.  Thus, it was not something that the jurors needed to 
agree upon unanimously. 
¶6 
We further conclude that Badzinski failed to show that 
the court's response of "no" was ambiguous or reasonably likely 
to cause the jury to apply the jury instructions in a manner 
which violates due process.  Given the evidence presented, the 
parties' closing arguments, and the court's other instructions, 
the response was unlikely to mislead the jury into believing 
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
3 
 
that the victim's credibility was irrelevant and that it could 
speculate beyond the evidence.   
¶7 
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals. 
I 
 
¶8 
In 2006, Badzinski's then 15-year-old niece, A.R.B., 
told a sheriff's deputy that she had a history of sexual abuse 
but declined to provide any details.  Three years later, A.R.B. 
revealed to her mother that Badzinski molested her when she was 
five or six years old. She said that it happened at a holiday 
gathering held at her grandparents' house. 
 
 
¶9 
After A.R.B. and her mother reported the incident to 
the police, the State charged Badzinski with first-degree sexual 
assault of a child.  The complaint and information alleged that 
the assault occurred either at Christmas or Easter time between 
October 2, 1995, and April 30, 1998.  After Badzinski objected, 
the State filed an amended information limiting its case to the 
six dates between 1995 and 1998 when A.R.B.'s grandparents 
hosted Easter and Christmas gatherings.    
¶10 In support of the charges, the State had four 
witnesses testify at trial: A.R.B., Dr. Liz Ghilardi, Deputy 
Steven Schmitt, and A.R.B.'s mother.   
 
¶11 A.R.B. testified that during a Christmas or Easter 
gathering, when she was four to six years old, she stumbled upon 
Badzinski in the laundry room in her grandparents' basement.   
A.R.B. did not recall why she entered the laundry room, but 
guessed she may have been playing hide-and-seek.  She remembered 
that she was looking for a place to hide.  She stated that when 
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
4 
 
she 
entered, 
Badzinski 
was 
sitting 
against 
the 
freezer 
masturbating.  Badzinski then closed the door to the room, had 
her sit next to him, told her his penis was a toy, and tried to 
make her touch it.  At one point he took her hand and placed it 
on his penis.  She did not recall how long the incident lasted 
or how it ended.  
 
¶12 Dr. Ghilardi testified as an expert witness on child 
sexual abuse victims.  When discussing their ability to recall 
events, she explained that it is not uncommon for victims to 
have trouble remembering peripheral details outside the fact of 
the assault itself: 
 
It is quite common they will remember the core details 
of the assault itself and what happened to their 
bodies or what they were made to do, whatever the case 
may be.  But they may not be able to remember all of 
what we call peripheral details, the things going on 
around them, the party, who was there, what they were 
wearing, what the perpetrator was wearing, where the 
dog was, those kind of things.  Those memories may 
fall off more quickly for them than the core event, 
because that is something that really stood out in 
their mind.  
Dr. Ghilardi further explained that it was quite common for 
child victims to delay reporting the abuse.  She also testified 
that children who have not disclosed the abuse might manifest 
their distress in other ways, such as abusing drugs or alcohol 
or engaging in other self-harming behavior like cutting.  
 
¶13 Deputy Schmitt testified that in April 2006 he was 
dispatched to the Children's Hospital to do an emergency 
detention evaluation of A.R.B., who was 15 years old at the 
time.  After noticing numerous cuts on her body, he asked her if 
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
5 
 
she was an abuse or assault victim.  A.R.B. responded "yes," but 
refused to talk about it.  The only detail Deputy Schmitt was 
able to get was that the abuser was a male family member. 
 
¶14 Likewise, A.R.B.'s mother testified that she was 
unable to get any information about the incident from A.R.B. at 
that time.  It was not until 2009, after another family 
gathering, that A.R.B. told her mother that Badzinski had been 
the perpetrator.  
¶15 Badzinski had 11 family members testify on his behalf.  
Their stories were largely consistent.  The family got together 
for Christmas and Easter at A.R.B.'s grandparents' house.  
Approximately 20 to 25 people would attend.  The house was a 
one-story ranch home with a finished basement and three bedrooms 
upstairs.2  The gatherings mainly took place in the basement.  
The laundry room was in the basement and it contained a freezer.  
Guests would regularly go to the laundry room to get ice from 
the freezer and frosted beer mugs.  They would also pass by the 
laundry room when going to the bathroom, which was located next 
to it.  The witnesses agreed that the door to the laundry room 
was usually kept open.  None of the witnesses saw the assault or 
believed it could have occurred in the laundry room. 
 
¶16 Some of the witnesses also indicated that they were 
not always in the basement during these gatherings.  Some of the 
witnesses testified that on Easter, if the weather was nice, the 
                                                 
2 The witnesses used the term "upstairs" to refer to the 
first floor. 
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
6 
 
family would go outside on the deck. Badzinski's sister stated 
that the children would play games like hide-and-seek upstairs 
during the events.  His brother-in-law agreed that there were 
other rooms in the house, such as the upstairs bedrooms, where 
someone could masturbate unnoticed. 
 
¶17 After the close of evidence, the court read the 
instructions to the jury.  These included the instruction that 
the jury must follow all the jury instructions and "consider 
only the evidence received during this trial."  The court 
informed the jury that the State must prove: "One, that this 
defendant had sexual contact with [A.R.B.].  Two, that [A.R.B.] 
was under the age of 13 years at the time of alleged sexual 
contact."  It stated that "[t]he burden of establishing every 
fact necessary to constitute guilt is upon the State."  It 
further instructed "[d]raw your own conclusions from the 
evidence and decide upon your verdict according to the evidence, 
under the instructions given to you by the court." 
¶18 The jury instructions also addressed the issue of 
credibility.  The court told the jurors that they "are the sole 
judges of credibility." It suggested numerous factors that the 
jurors could consider in determining credibility, in addition to 
"all other facts and circumstances during the trial which tend 
to support or discredit testimony."  The court concluded that 
instruction by stating, "[i]n every day life you determine for 
yourselves the reliability of the things people say to you.  You 
should do the same here."  
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
7 
 
¶19 After closing arguments the court reminded the jurors 
that "it is a violation of the juror's oath . . . [to] rely on 
any information outside the evidence."  It then indicated that 
if the jury had any questions during deliberations, it should 
send a note and the court would respond either orally or in 
writing. 
 
¶20 During deliberations the jury asked the judge if it 
must agree where the assault occurred. With the parties' 
consent, the judge responded that the jury must agree that the 
assault took place at the address of the gathering.3  The jury 
subsequently asked if it needed to agree that the assault 
occurred in the laundry room.  Over the defendant's objections, 
the judge responded, "no."  
¶21 The jury found Badzinski guilty.  Badzinski filed a 
motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that the long delay 
in reporting by the victim and the non-precise nature of the 
allegations prevented him from being able to properly prove a 
defense.  He further argued that no rational trier of fact would 
have believed the victim and that the real controversy had not 
been tried.   
¶22 The State responded that the time period of the 
alleged assault was sufficiently specific.  It further asserted 
that the verdict was supported by the evidence, as the jury 
                                                 
3 At oral argument, the State maintained that this initial 
response was error, but that the error was harmless.  It stated 
that the judge "gave a wrong answer, with the consent of both 
parties, and the error inured to Mr. Badzinski's benefit." 
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
8 
 
could have chosen to believe A.R.B.  In addition, the State 
averred that the real controversy was fully tried because the 
jury did not have to agree on the location of the assault, only 
that the elements of the offense were met.  The State advanced 
that a juror may be convinced that the crime occurred while 
maintaining a question about a non-essential or peripheral fact.  
Further, the jury was not required to believe all of A.R.B.'s 
testimony.  The circuit court denied Badzinski's motion, 
adopting the the arguments in the State's brief. 
¶23 On appeal, Badzinski argued that: (1) the amended 
information was unconstitutionally vague because it gave six 
possible dates over three years on which the allegation could 
have occurred, (2) there was insufficient evidence to support 
the conviction, (3) the real controversy was not fully tried, 
and (4) he was denied his right to an unanimous verdict when the 
trial court told the jurors that they did not need to agree on 
whether the sexual assault occurred in the laundry room.  State 
v. Badzinski, No. 2011AP2905-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶8 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2012). 
¶24 Although the judges on the court of appeals were in 
agreement on the conclusion that the amended information was 
sufficiently clear, they were split on the other arguments 
before them. Id., ¶32.  Two of the three judges departed from 
the lead opinion4 and joined in a "concurring" opinion that 
ordered a new trial.  Id., ¶37.   
                                                 
 
4 The court of appeals refers to the opinion written by 
Judge Brennan as "the Lead Opinion." Badzinski, No. 2011AP2905-
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
9 
 
¶25 The "concurrence" determined that the circuit court's 
response to the questions from the deliberating jury permitted 
the jury to speculate beyond the evidence:   
 
[t]he only evidence that Badzinski assaulted his 
niece, more than a decade before the 2009 trial, was 
that the assault happened in a room where, if jurors 
believed Badzinski's witnesses, that was not possible 
. . . [I]f the jurors believed Badzinski's niece, the 
assault did not happen anywhere other than in the 
basement laundry room.  The trial court, in effect, 
told the jury to ignore this, and let the jurors pick 
any room in the house. 
Id., ¶35 (emphasis in original).  It reasoned that a guilty 
verdict cannot rest on matters beyond the evidence.  Id., ¶36.  
Accordingly, the court reversed the circuit court and concluded 
it was error to tell the jury that it did not have to agree on 
the room where the incident occurred. Id., ¶34.   
II 
¶26 This case presents two questions for our review.  
First, we must determine whether the circuit court's response of 
"no" to the jury's question deprived Badzinski of a unanimous 
verdict.  Whether jury unanimity requires jurors to agree on a 
particular fact is a question of law.  State v. Giwosky, 109 
Wis. 2d 446, 452, 326 N.W.2d 232 (1982).  We review questions of 
law independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  State v. West, 2011 WI 83, ¶21, 
336 Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929.  
                                                                                                                                                             
CR at ¶33.  The "concurring" opinion written by Judge Fine and 
joined by Judge Curley is the opinion of the majority. 
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
10 
 
¶27 Second, 
we 
must 
determine 
whether 
the 
response 
violated Badzinski's due process rights by misleading the jurors 
into believing that the victim's credibility was irrelevant and 
that they could speculate beyond the evidence.  Whether a jury 
instruction given by the circuit court violates a defendant's 
due process rights is a question of law, which this court 
reviews independently of the determinations rendered by the 
circuit court and the court of appeals.  State v. Kuntz, 160 
Wis. 2d 722, 735, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991); State v. Zelenka, 130 
Wis. 2d 34, 43, 387 N.W.2d 55 (1986). 
III 
¶28  We begin our analysis by turning first to the issue 
of unanimity.  "In criminal cases, the right to a jury trial 
implies the right to a unanimous verdict on the ultimate issue 
of guilt or innocence."  State v. Tulley, 2001 WI App 236, ¶14, 
248 Wis. 2d 505, 635 N.W.2d 807.  However, "[u]nanimity is 
required only with respect to the ultimate issue of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence of the crime charged, [it] is not 
required with respect to the alternative means or ways in which 
the crime can be committed."  State v. Holland, 91 Wis. 2d 134, 
143, 280 N.W.2d 288 (1979); State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶14, 
236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833 (quoting Holland, 91 Wis. 2d at 
143); Giwosky, 109 Wis. 2d at 453-54 (quoting Holland, 91 Wis. 
2d at 143).5   
                                                 
5 Our cases have suggested that where a statute creates one 
crime with alternative modes of commission, unanimity may be 
required if the alternative modes are conceptually distinct. 
State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶22, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
11 
 
¶29 The United States Supreme Court illustrated this rule 
using a hypothetical where the element to be proven was threat 
of force, and the jurors disagreed on whether the defendant used 
a knife or a gun to make that threat.  Richardson v. United 
States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999) (citing McKoy v. North 
Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 (1990)).  The Court explained "that 
disagreement -- a disagreement about means -- would not matter 
as long as all 12 jurors unanimously concluded that the 
Government had proved the necessary related element, namely that 
the defendant had threatened force."  Id.  As such, it is 
ultimately the elements of the crime charged that must be 
accepted by a unanimous jury and not the peripheral details.   
 
¶30 The crime charged in this case was sexual assault of a 
child.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e)6, "[w]hoever has 
sexual contact with a person who has not attained the age of 13 
                                                                                                                                                             
833; State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis. 2d 582, 592, 355 N.W.2d 583 
(1983).  For example, in Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 412, 304 
N.W.2d 729 (1981), this court looked at whether Wis. Stat. § 
943.32, which made robbery by force or by threat of force a 
crime, created a unanimity problem.  It determined that 
unanimity was not an issue because force and the threat of force 
were conceptually similar.  Id. at 429-30.  More recently, the 
court has reframed the analysis to look at whether a statute's 
definition of a crime including multiple modes of commission 
represents fundamentally unfair or irrational policy choices.  
State v. Norman, 2003 WI 72, ¶¶62-63, 262 Wis. 2d 506, 664 
N.W.2d 97. 
 
This is not the type of issue we address in this case.  
Here only one mode of commission of the crime is alleged: that 
Badzinski placed A.R.B.'s hand on his penis.   
6 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
12 
 
years is guilty of a Class B felony."  Thus, the elements of the 
offense are: (1) that the defendant had sexual contact with 
A.R.B. and (2) that A.R.B. was under the age of 13 years at the 
time of the alleged sexual contact.  Wis JI——Criminal 2102E 
(2008).  It is these elements that the jury must have agreed 
upon unanimously. 
 
¶31 Badzinski argues that the jury could not unanimously 
agree that the sexual contact occurred unless there was also 
agreement that it occurred in the laundry room.  He asserts that 
because the only evidence of the crime was A.R.B.'s testimony, 
and that A.R.B. testified that the assault occurred in the 
laundry room, it is a fact necessary to prove an essential 
element of the crime. 
 
 ¶32  We disagree.  The location of the room is not a fact 
necessary to prove either of the essential elements in this 
case.  A.R.B. testified that Badzinski's actions occurred in the 
laundry room.  The contrary evidence regarding the location of 
the assault was relevant to A.R.B.'s credibility. See Kohlhoff 
v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 148, 154, 270 N.W.2d 63 (1978).  However, a 
jury does not need to accept a witness's testimony in its 
entirety.  State v. Balistreri, 106 Wis. 2d 741, 762, 317 N.W.2d 
493 (1982); State v. Kimbrough, 2001 WI App 138, ¶29, 246 Wis. 
2d 648, 630 N.W.2d 752.  The jury could have believed A.R.B.'s 
testimony about the sexual contact itself without believing that 
it occurred in the laundry room.  Indeed, Dr. Ghilardi testified 
that child victims do not always remember the peripheral details 
of the assault.   
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
13 
 
¶33 Furthermore, contrary to Badzinski's assertion, there 
was evidence in the record from which the jury could have 
concluded that the assault occurred elsewhere in the house.  
A.R.B. indicated that the assault occurred when she was playing 
hide-and-seek.  Badzinski's sister testified that the children 
would play games such as hide-and-seek upstairs.  His brother-
in-law testified that it would be possible for someone to 
masturbate in one of the upstairs bedrooms without anyone 
noticing.  The jury could have reasonably inferred from this 
evidence that the assault occurred somewhere other than in the 
laundry room.   
¶34 Regardless of whether the assault occurred in the 
laundry room or some other room, the exact location was not a 
fact necessary to prove that the sexual contact occurred.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court's response of 
"no" did not deprive Badzinski of a unanimous jury.   
IV 
¶35 We turn next to whether the circuit court's statement 
to the jury that it did not have to agree that the assault 
happened in the laundry room violated Badzinski's due process 
rights.  We start with the premise that if there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury applied an instruction in a manner that 
violates the constitution, a defendant is entitled to a new 
trial.  State v. Burris, 2011 WI 32, ¶45, 333 Wis. 2d 87, 797 
N.W.2d 430.  "A jury is unconstitutionally misled if there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the instruction was applied in a 
manner that denied the defendant 'a meaningful opportunity for 
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
14 
 
consideration by the jury of his defense. . . . to the detriment 
of a defendant's due process rights.'" Id., ¶50 (quoting State 
v. Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183, 192, 556 N.W.2d 90 (1996)).  Such is 
the case if the jury believes an instruction precludes the 
consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. Id., ¶50 
(citing Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)).   
¶36 Badzinski claims that is what occurred here.  He 
asserts that by telling the jury it did not have to agree on the 
location of the assault, the court impermissibly misled the jury 
to believe that it did not have to consider the victim's 
credibility.  According to Badzinski, the court's instruction 
allowed the jury to disregard A.R.B.'s testimony that the 
assault occurred in the laundry room.  Therefore, he concludes, 
the jury was allowed to speculate beyond the evidence,7 denying 
him a meaningful opportunity to have the jury consider his 
defense that the assault did not happen because it could not 
have happened in the laundry room. 
¶37 To 
prevail 
on 
an 
argument 
that 
the 
jury 
was 
unconstitutionally misled in violation of a defendant's due 
process rights, a defendant must show: (1) "that the instruction 
was ambiguous" and (2) "that there was a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved the 
State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond 
                                                 
7 Although Badzinski's brief focused on the speculation 
aspect of his argument, at oral argument he spent a substantial 
amount of time discussing credibility.  To the extent that both 
arguments relate to whether the court's instruction deprived him 
of due process, we address them together here.  
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
15 
 
a reasonable doubt."  Burris, 333 Wis. 2d 87, ¶48 (quoting 
Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190 (2009)).   
¶38 In 
evaluating 
these 
factors, 
we 
consider 
the 
instruction "in light of the proceedings as a whole, instead of 
viewing 
a 
single 
instruction 
in 
artificial 
isolation."  
Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d at 193.  For example, in Burris, the court 
determined that it was not reasonably likely that a potentially 
confusing 
instruction 
led 
the 
jury 
to 
apply 
it 
in 
an 
unconstitutional manner.  333 Wis. 2d 87, ¶23.  Burris argued 
that the judge's instruction regarding "utter disregard" misled 
the jury into minimizing the weight of the defendant's post-
shooting behavior.  Id., ¶43.  The court concluded that Burris 
did not prove the instruction led to a misapplication in light 
of the "extensive evidence of Burris's after-the-fact conduct 
presented at trial, counsel's focus on this evidence in closing 
statements, and language in both the pattern and supplemental 
jury instructions indicating that it could consider this conduct 
in its determination."  Id., ¶63.  Thus, there was no due 
process violation. 
¶39 Similarly, in Lohmeier, the court found that a 
potentially confusing instruction on contributory negligence did 
not lead the jury to believe that it could not consider evidence 
of an affirmative defense.  Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d at 187.  In 
that case, most of the evidence presented at trial related to 
the affirmative defense, as did the defendant's opening and 
closing arguments.  Id. at 197.  The State also addressed the 
affirmative defense in its rebuttal and closing statement. 
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
16 
 
Additionally, the court instructed the jury to consider all of 
the instructions as a whole, twice instructing the jury on the 
affirmative defense.  Id.  On this record, the court concluded 
that a single instruction did not negate the emphasis on the 
evidence throughout the proceedings.  Id.  Therefore the 
instruction did not violate the defendant's due process rights.  
Id. at 200. 
¶40 Following the examples in Burris and Lohmeier, our 
analysis here considers the evidence presented at trial, the 
parties' closing statements, the initial jury instructions, the 
jury's question, and the court's response.  Burris, 333 Wis. 2d 
87, ¶51.  Looking at the challenged language in light of the 
rest of the proceedings, we conclude that Badzinski has not 
shown that the instruction was ambiguous, or that it was 
reasonably likely to cause the jury to ignore the victim's 
credibility and rely on speculation in violation of his due 
process rights.   
¶41 The State's main evidence in this case was A.R.B.'s 
testimony.  She testified that during a family gathering at her 
grandparents' house Badzinski took her hand and placed it on his 
penis.  According to A.R.B. this occurred in the laundry room, 
which she probably entered while playing hide-and-seek.  The 
State's expert witness further testified that a child victim 
would remember the assault, but not necessarily the peripheral 
details. 
¶42 Badzinski's defense focused on his assertion that an 
assault could not have occurred in the laundry room.  Multiple 
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
17 
 
family members testified on his behalf that the gatherings 
mainly took place near the laundry room, that the door was kept 
open, and that the family members would regularly go into the 
laundry room to get ice and frosted beer mugs. 
¶43  The State's closing argument focused on A.R.B.'s 
testimony and why the jury should find her credible.  It 
stressed that the core event was Badzinski placing A.R.B.'s hand 
on his penis, and that was not something she was likely to 
forget.  Badzinski's closing argument also focused on A.R.B.'s 
credibility.  He sought to undermine it with the fact that 
according to his witnesses, the assault could not have occurred 
in the laundry room.   
¶44 In giving the jury instructions, the court stressed 
that the jurors could consider only the evidence presented at 
trial.  It gave the elements of sexual assault and stated that 
it was the State's burden to prove each element beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The jury instructions also spoke at length 
about credibility and stressed that it was an issue for the 
jurors.  The court later reiterated that the jury was not to 
rely on evidence outside of the record. 
¶45 During deliberations, the jury asked if it must agree 
where the assault occurred.  The court responded that it must 
agree that the assault took place at the location of the 
gathering.  The jury subsequently asked if it must agree that 
the assault occurred in the laundry room.  The court responded 
"no." 
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
18 
 
¶46 In this context, the circuit court's instructions were 
not ambiguous.  It told the jury what elements the State needed 
to prove, that it could rely only on the evidence, that 
credibility was for the jury to decide, and that it did not have 
to agree on the room where the assault occurred.  The court's 
instructions were accurate.  As long as the jury followed the 
instructions literally, it would be prevented from speculating 
beyond the evidence and would not be required to ignore evidence 
that may discredit A.R.B. 
¶47 Even if the instructions were potentially ambiguous, 
considering the proceeding as a whole, it is not reasonably 
likely that the jury believed it could not consider the victim's 
credibility and could reach conclusions based on speculation.  
The focus of the trial was on credibility and the room in which 
the assault occurred.  Further, the jury instructions informed 
the jurors that credibility was an issue for them to decide, and 
required them to base their decisions on evidence and not rely 
on evidence outside the record.  Under the instructions, the 
jury was free to consider and weigh all of the evidence 
presented at trial, including A.R.B's credibility.  It is 
unlikely that a single word answer from the court during 
deliberations would negate everything that preceded it. 
¶48 Contrary to Badzinski's assertions, the jury's guilty 
verdict does not show that it speculated beyond the evidence.  
Juries are allowed to draw reasonable inferences based on the 
evidence.  See State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 506, 451 
N.W.2d 752 (1990) ("It is the function of the trier of 
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
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fact . . .  to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, to 
weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic 
facts to ultimate facts."); Johnson v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 144, 
147, 197 N.W.2d 760 (1972) ("Reasonable inferences drawn from 
the evidence can support a finding of fact.").  
¶49 Here, there was evidence from which the jurors could 
have inferred that the assault occurred somewhere else in the 
house and found Badzinski guilty.  A.R.B. testified that the 
assault occurred at one of the family gatherings in her 
grandparents' house.  She indicated that it may have occurred 
while she was playing hide-and-seek.  There was evidence that 
the children played hide-and-seek upstairs at the gathering and 
that an individual could have masturbated in one of the upstairs 
bedrooms.  From this evidence, the jury could infer that the 
assault occurred upstairs.  
¶50 Because we conclude that the circuit court's response 
of "no" to the jury was not ambiguous and was not reasonably 
likely to cause the jury to misapply the instruction in an 
unconstitutional manner, Badzinski has not met his burden.  In 
light of the facts of this case, we reverse the court of 
appeals' determination that the instruction unconstitutionally 
misled the jury.  
V 
¶51 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court's response 
of "no" did not deprive Badzinski of a unanimous verdict.  Jury 
unanimity is required only on the essential elements of the 
crime.  Here, the location of the crime was not one of those 
No.  2011AP2905-CR 
   
 
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elements.  Thus, it was not something that the jurors needed to 
agree upon unanimously. 
¶52 We further conclude that Badzinski failed to show that 
the court's response of "no" was ambiguous or reasonably likely 
to cause the jury to apply the jury instructions in a manner 
which violates due process.  Given the evidence presented, the 
parties' closing arguments, and the court's other instructions, 
the response was unlikely to mislead the jury into believing 
that the victim's credibility was irrelevant and that it could 
speculate beyond the evidence.   
By the Court.–The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
  
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