Case Title: In re JL

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-99-3

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re JL1999 WY 144989 P.2d 1268Case Number: C-99-3Decided: 11/05/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE INTEREST OF JL, ES, and TL, minors: RS and LS, Appellants 
(Respondents),

v.

JOHNSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT 
OF FAMILY SERVICES, Appellee (Petitioner).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Johnson County, Honorable John C. Brackley, 
Judge.

Hardy H. Tate, 
Sheridan, WY. Argument by Mr. Tate, representing 
Appellants.

Gay Woodhouse, 
Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Dan S. Wilde, 
Assistant Attorney General; and Christopher Petrie, Special Assistant Attorney 
General. Argument by Mr. Petrie, representing 
Appellee.

Sean P. Durrant 
of Palmerlee & Durrant, Buffalo, WY. Guardian ad 
litem.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1]      After seven years 
of rehabilitative efforts, Appellee, Johnson County Department of Family 
Services (DFS), brought an action to terminate the parental rights of 
Appellants, LS (Mother) and RS (Father), to their daughter, ES, and Mother's 
daughter, TL, and son, JL. Appellants challenge the sufficiency of evidence to 
justify terminating their parental rights to each of the children. We find clear 
and convincing evidence to support the trial court's decision, and thus affirm 
the judgment of the district court.

ISSUE

[¶2]      Appellants 
present one issue for review which is essentially reiterated by 
Appellees:

Did the district 
court err in determining that clear and convincing evidence was presented to 
terminate parental rights as applied to each of the three 
children[?]

FACTS

[¶3]      At the age of 15, 
Mother was sexually abused by her stepfather.1 As a result, Mother moved to Oregon 
to live with her natural father. While in Oregon, Mother was diagnosed with 
depression and subsequently received medication and attended counseling. In 
1987, when Mother was 17 years old, she moved in with RL (father of the two 
oldest children), whom she later married.

[¶4]      The first child, 
TL, was born on October 10, 1990. In January of 1992, the Washington Family 
Service Agency contacted the family due to reports of domestic violence and 
possible child abuse. Three months after the initial involvement of the 
Washington agency, the second child, JL, was born. As an infant, JL was 
diagnosed with agnosed with "failure to thrive."

[¶5]      When the family 
moved to Wyoming in early June, 1992, DFS contacted them at the request of the 
Washington agency. Shortly thereafter, on June 12, DFS received a complaint 
regarding an occurrence of domestic violence and possible child abuse. In the 
fall of 1992, Mother admitted RL was abusive toward her and the children. She 
filed for a divorce and moved with the children into a trailer. When the divorce 
was finalized in 1993, Mother was awarded primary custody.

[¶6]      In early 1993, 
DFS employees John Notebloom and Sandy Rubottom investigated a report of 
possible child neglect made by Madonna Esponda, a social worker who lived next 
door to Mother. The investigation led to the first case plan for Mother in April 
of 1993, citing family preservation as the goal. The plan included anger 
management counseling twice weekly and in-home parenting instruction four hours 
per week. Mother was once again diagnosed with depression and in March, 1994, 
was evaluated as having a below normal intelligence.

[¶7]      Mother and Father 
were married in June, 1994. Although Father initially refused to be involved in 
the DFS plan prior to the marriage, he later agreed and was included in the 
services provided to the family. Mother's and Father's daughter, ES, was born on 
April 6, 1995.

[¶8]      Between 1993 and 
1996, additional services were offered to the family due to the lack of 
Appellants' progress. The services included day care for TL and JL at the 
Buffalo Children's Center, transportation for members of the family, when 
necessary, and increased parenting classes and counseling. During this time, TL 
and JL were diagnosed with reactive attachment disorder stemming from neglect 
and abuse, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and oppositional defiant 
behavior.

[¶9]      The parents 
became increasingly agitated by the constant surveillance by DFS, culminating in 
the assignment of another home aide. The tension also affected the marriage, 
with the blame going to the two older children. In April of 1995, DFS began 
receiving allegations of physical child abuse. There were also indications of 
spousal abuse, and in July of 1995, Father was arrested for assault on 
Mother.

[¶10]   In December of 1995, Mother and 
Father placed TL with her grandmother because Father threatened to leave if TL 
stayed in the home. Although TL was allegedly benefitted by this arrangement, 
DFS raised concerns regarding TL's proximity to the perpetrator of Mother's past 
sexual abuse. However, DFS was assured that stepfather would not be alone with 
TL.

[¶11]   In May of 1996, when JL arrived at 
day care with a bruised back and buttocks, Mother and Father were charged with 
three counts of felony child abuse. JL and ES were immediately placed into 
protective custody. Appellants pleaded guilty to one count and were placed on 
probation. Although ES had been returned to the home several days after the 
arrest, she was again placed with JL's foster family in April of 1997 due to 
Appellants' failure to follow the probation requirements concerning her 
supervision. In June of 1997, the oldest child, TL, was placed in therapeutic 
foster care when DFS learned that Mother's stepfather was being left alone to 
supervise TL.

[¶12]   A series of case plans were devised 
over the years, but Appellants' behaviors and skills remained substantially the 
same. Even after the children were removed from the home, Appellants continued 
to receive counseling and other services, as well as supervised visitation. In 
the meantime, the children's physical and mental well-being greatly improved 
while in foster care.

[¶13]   In February of 1998, the county 
attorney saw no progress in Appellants' behaviors and skills and filed a 
petition to terminate their parental rights due to a failure to rehabilitate. A 
trial was held on December 1, and 2, 1998, wherein the district court heard 
testimony from social workers, day care providers, teachers, neighbors, 
counselors, and Appellants. The district court concluded that clear and 
convincing evidence demonstrated that all three children were abused and 
neglected by Appellants; that the children's health and safety would be 
seriously jeopardized if returned to Appellants' custody; and that termination 
of Appellants' partental rights was in the children's best interests. This 
timely appeal followed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶14]   We have held that the right to 
associate with one's family is a fundamental liberty under both the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 2, 6, 7, and 36 of the Wyoming 
Constitution. DS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911, 918 (Wyo. 1980). In Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 982 (Wyo. 1984) our 
standard of review was set forth as follows:

Strict scrutiny 
is the test which will be employed when balancing a fundamental right against a 
compelling state interest, which interest is, in this case, the welfare of the 
children. The compelling state interest having been established, it is necessary 
to prove that the method sought to achieve it is the least intrusive of those 
methods by which the state's interest can be fulfilled. State in Interest of C, 
Wyo., 638 P.2d 165 (1981) [citations omitted].

[¶15]   The evidence which will countenance 
a termination must be clear and convincing (§ 14-2-309(a), supra). We explained 
what we mean by "clear and convincing" evidence in Thomasi v. Koch, Wyo., 660 P.2d 806, 811-812 (1983), where we said:

"* * * This 
court previously has adopted language to this effect:

"`* * * When the 
evidence is such that the mind readily reaches a satisfactory conclusion as to 
the existence or nonexistence of a fact in dispute, then the evidence is, of 
necessity, clear and satisfactory.' Continental Sheep Co. v. Woodhouse, 71 Wyo. 
194, 202, 256 P.2d 97 (1953), quoting language found in Good Milking Mach. Co. 
v. Galloway, 168 Iowa 550, 150 N.W. 710, 712 (1915).

"We further have 
said that clear and convincing evidence is 'that kind of proof which would 
persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the contention is highly probable.' 
MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., Wyo., 612 P.2d 830, 839 
(1980)."

See also Matter 
of ZKP, 979 P.2d 953 (Wyo. 1999). We accept as true the evidence of the 
successful party, leave out of consideration the evidence of the unsuccessful 
party in conflict therewith, and give the evidence of the successful party every 
favorable inference which may fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom. Id.; DS, 
607 P.2d  at 918.

DISCUSSION

[¶16]   Wyoming's 
termination-of-parental-rights statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) 
(LEXIS 1999), provides in relevant part:

§ 14-2-309. 
Grounds for termination of parent-child legal relationship; clear and convincing 
evidence.

(a) The 
parent-child legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the 
following facts is established by clear and convincing 
evidence:

. . . 
.

(iii) The child 
has been abused or neglected by the parent and reasonable efforts by an 
authorized agency or mental health professional have been unsuccessful in 
rehabilitating the family or the family has refused rehabilitative treatment, 
and it is shown that the child's health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the 
parent[.]

Section 14-2-308 
refers to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-202(a)(ii) (LEXIS 1999) for a definition of 
"abuse," which states:

(ii) . . . 
"Abuse" with respect to a child means inflicting or causing physical or mental 
injury, harm or imminent danger to the physical or mental health or welfare of a 
child other than by accidental means, including abandonment, excessive or 
unreasonable corporal punishment, malnutrition or substantial risk thereof by 
reason of intentional or unintentional neglect, and the commission or allowing 
the commission of a sexual offense against a child as defined by 
law[.]

Appellants claim 
that there was insufficient evidence to prove clearly and convincingly that each 
of the children was abused and neglected by them, and that each child's health 
and safety would be seriously jeopardized by the maintenance of the parent-child 
relationship between them and each of the children. We 
disagree.

A. Neglect and 
Abuse

[¶17]   Neglect was established by the 
presentation of evidence demonstrating inadequate care, maintenance, and 
supervision. Testimony from neighbors and care providers established that the 
home was filthy, and that garbage and dirty clothes were strewn throughout the 
trailer and within the children's access. A single mattress, placed on an 
unclean floor, constituted sleeping arrangements for the children. Dangerous 
medications were left in reach of the children in a drawer containing candy, 
despite consistent warnings to avoid this problem.

[¶18]   TL and JL were often so dirty when 
they arrived at day care that the other children refused to associate with them 
because they smelled of urine. Dried feces would be found on their diapers and 
clothing. TL and JL also were often inappropriately dressed for the weather, 
arriving without a coat or socks on snowy days. Both children were extremely 
difficult to control, exhibiting violent behavior and inappropriate language 
directed toward the teachers and other children. The children routinely arrived 
at day care unfed. Appellants failed to give the children their medication, or 
neglected to administer the proper dosage, and failed to send the medication to 
day care when necessary.

[¶19]   Appellants' inappropriate physical 
punishment of both TL and JL was also a subject of ongoing concern. Violence in 
the home occurred frequently in the presence of all the children. Neighbors 
testified that there were daily fights, screaming, and verbal 
abuse.

[¶20]   Foster mother for ES and JL 
testified that when the children came to her home, they were deeply troubled. In 
addition to the aggressive behaviors of JL recited above and his diagnosis of 
reactive attachment disorder stemming from neglect and abuse, he was afraid of 
being outside alone, afraid of thunder, and afraid of the dark. When ES arrived 
in 1997, she exhibited an eating disorder and would take food from the garbage 
or off the street. She would not sleep in a bed and attempted to wander through 
the house at all hours of the night. She had severe ear infections and dental 
problems, and when around adults, she would scream.

[¶21]   It is undisputed that TL also 
suffered from reactive attachment disorder stemming from neglect and abuse. In 
addition, foster mother for TL testified that when TL arrived, she had few 
social skills and would go into rages two or three times a day, "screaming, 
hitting, and cussing." TL also exhibited facial ticks which have all but 
disappeared since she has been in foster care.

[¶22]   Appellants concede that there may 
be sufficient evidence of abuse and neglect in the cases of JL and TL, but not 
for ES. However, ample evidence proved that ES was clearly exposed to a 
dangerous environment, and her physical needs were being ignored. As we said in 
DS, "[i]t would, indeed, be a sad commentary upon the law if it were unable to 
come to the aid of an abused or neglected child until there was an actual 
manifestation of some serious damage." 607 P.2d  at 922-23. See also In re ZKP, 
979 P.2d 957-58, and Matter of GP, 679 P.2d  at 1007.

B. Efforts to 
Rehabilitate

[¶23]   We now turn to the second statutory 
consideration: whether "reasonable efforts by an authorized agency or mental 
health professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family." 
Testimony from numerous social workers and mental health professionals detailed 
the extensive efforts to assist Appellants in developing nurturing behaviors. 
In-home and outreach classes utilized every feasible educational approach to 
communicate with Appellants. Appellants were given parenting classes, anger 
management counseling, individual counseling, and job counseling for a period 
extending over six years. While Appellants accepted these services, the 
providers unanimously testified that no significant progress was made during 
that time and, in fact, Appellants' behaviors seemed to regress as the 
Appellants' increasing anger toward the providers engendered a resistance to 
these efforts. Thus, the evidence was clear and convincing that the 
rehabilitative efforts made by authorized agencies were 
unsuccessful.

C. Future Health 
and Safety of the Children

[¶24]   Finally, we direct our attention to 
whether the health and safety of the children would be seriously jeopardized by 
returning to Appellants. It is clear that the children were significantly 
troubled and in need of constant care and supervision to recover from their 
earlier trauma. We quote from the testimony of Linda McNeill, a psychologist who 
attended to the entire family:

Q. When you say, 
you know, the health and safety of the children, what types of things would you 
expect if the children were returned to the home? What would you expect to see 
on the professional level?

A. I think that 
their negative behavior would escalate. I think they would be extremely defiant 
with the parents and with other people. I don't think [Appellants] can provide 
the nurturing, but also the strong discipline that needs to be done without 
using physical discipline.

. . . 
.

Neither of these 
children can tolerate physical discipline or shouldn't have physical discipline, 
because they are so aggressive themselves and interact in aggressive ways with 
their peers. . . . And sometimes its very hard to stick to those kind of 
guidelines.

. . . 
.

[In regard to 
ES], it was at about three-and-a-half that I first evaluated each, [JL] and 
[TL]. And that's when each of their behaviors had escalated to a point that 
somebody was asking me to evaluate. But I think at this point she would also 
create the kind of difficulty for them of a child who has her own will and is 
testing it and being active and exuberant.

And I fear that 
they would not provide appropriate discipline or watch her, . . . I don't see 
them providing the physical care.

There is no 
doubt that after the intensive but unsuccessful efforts made on behalf of 
Appellants, these children's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized if 
they were to be returned to the same environment which necessitated their 
removal in the first place.

CONCLUSION

[¶25]   Strict scrutiny of the application 
of the parental-rights-termination statute in this case demonstrates clearly and 
convincingly that the State's compelling interest in protecting the welfare of 
these three children can be met only by terminating Appellants' parental rights 
with respect to each child.

[¶26]   The judgment of the district court 
is affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Stepfather 
was convicted and sentenced to prison for sexual assault on Mother when she was 
a minor.