Case Title: Fielding v. SC ELECTION COMMISSION

Citation: 305 S.C. 313, 408 S.E.2d 232

Docket Number: 

State: south-carolina

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1991-07-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
305 S.C. 313 (1991) 408 S.E.2d 232 Bernard FIELDING, Petitioner v. SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTION COMMISSION, The South Carolina Board of State Canvassers, The Charleston County Election Commission, The Charleston County Board of Canvassers, and Chris Merrill, Respondents. 23443 Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard June 13, 1991. Decided July 23, 1991. *314 Lucas C. Padgett, Jr., of McNair Law Firm, P.A., Daniel E. Martin, Jr., and Armand Derfner, Charleston, for petitioner. David C. Eckstrom, of Nexsen, Pruett, Jacobs & Pollard, and Asst. Atty. Gen. Treva G. Ashworth, Columbia, for respondents South Carolina Election Com'n and South Carolina Bd. of State Canvassers. Joseph S. Mendelsohn, Charleston, for respondents Charleston County Election Com'n and Charleston County Bd. of Canvassers. W. Robert Kinard, North Charleston, and Pamela J. Polzin, Charleston, for respondent Chris Merrill. Heard June 13, 1991. *315 Decided July 23, 1991. CHANDLER, Justice: From an order of the South Carolina Board of State Canvassers (State Board) overturning a probate judge election in Charleston County, we granted certiorari. We reverse. In the election for the office of Charleston County probate judge Petitioner Bernard Fielding (Fielding), the Democratic party candidate, received 29,492 votes; his opponent, Respondent Chris Merrill (Merrill), the Republican party candidate, received 29,038 votes. From a protest by Merrill, the Charleston County Board of Canvassers (County Board) conducted a full evidentiary hearing, after which it upheld the election. Thereupon, Merrill filed a protest with the State Board, alleging voting irregularities in the McClellanville 2 and Wadmalaw Island precincts. After a hearing, the Board ordered a new election. The essential evidence of irregularity and impropriety relied upon by the State Board is summarized as follows: Throughout the entire election no documentation of the above allegations was obtained or preserved for appellate review and, likewise, no challenges were made to any votes at either the McClellanville 2 or Wadmalaw Island precincts. *317 2. When must challenges to voting irregularities be made? The scope of appellate review of the State Board's order "is limited to corrections of errors of law; findings of fact will not be overturned unless wholly unsupported by the evidence." Knight v. State Board of Canvassers, 297 S.C. 55, 374 S.E. (2d) 685 (1988); Simms v. Hamm, 275 S.C. 369, 271 S.E. (2d) 316 (1980); Berry v. Spigner, 226 S.C. 183, 84 S.E. (2d) 381 (1954). Every reasonable presumption in favor of sustaining a contested election will be employed and irregularities or illegalities which do not appear to have affected the result of the election will not be allowed to overturn it. Id. In Berry, supra, this Court found that general allegations of illegal activity will not support the burden of establishing that the irregularity flawed the election. Averting to the record here, it is patently clear that the evidence relied upon by the State Board falls far short of that required for the invalidation of an election. Viewing it in the light most favorable to candidate Merrill, the evidence rises, at best, to the level of conjecture, speculation, and surmise: no poll manager or poll watcher who testified could identify a definitive number of alleged illegal votes cast; the testimony concerning vote-buying was totally without substantiation as to either the giver or receiver of the monies; the testimony concerning illegal assistance was based upon the subjective opinion of the poll watcher; and, finally, no documentation whatsoever of any of the alleged irregularities was presented, only the uncorroborated opinions of individuals. S.C. Code Ann. § 7-13-810 (Supp. 1990) which establishes the procedure for challenging votes, provides that any elector, watcher, or manager may challenge the vote of any person suspected of not being a qualified voter. Although this must be done before the person is handed the ballot or enters the voting machine, the statute further provides that votes may be challenged based on evidence discovered after the vote is cast. See Hill v. South Carolina Election Comm'n, ___ S.C. ___, 403 S.E. (2d) 309 (1991). *318 Moreover, the Poll Manager's Handbook for Conduct of General Elections[2] sets out the procedure by which poll managers lodge a vote challenge based upon illegal assistance. Merrill complains that egregious vote-buying occurred at McClellanville 2 precinct; however, not a single challenge was made to any vote allegedly bought or sold. When asked why challenge was not made, the poll watcher testified "if you challenged every ballot, every questionable ballot in McClellanville 2, the election would last a week." As to the charges of illegal voter assistance at Wadmalaw Island precinct, again no challenges were made. The poll manager testified she failed to follow the procedure for challenge because "[w]e would have never voted everyone that day." It is noted that those responsible for making appropriate challenges at both precincts assign excessive time consumption as the reason for failing to do so. Nothing in the case law of this Court, in statutory law, or in the Poll Managers Handbook holds that a slowdown in the electoral process brings about a waiver of the requirement to challenge. To the contrary, the making of a challenge is essential to the preservation of an adequate record upon which appellate review can be had. While corruption-free elections are imperative to the very survival of the republic, it is equally essential that, where corruption is charged, a documented record be established upon which alleged wrongdoing may receive appellate review. As indicated earlier, the record before us is comprised only of conjecture, speculation, and surmise; it clearly does not sustain the burden enunciated in Berry that "every reasonable presumption will be indulged to sustain [the election]." See Berry, supra, 226 S.C. at 189, 84 S.E. (2d) at 384. Indeed, the evidence here is strikingly similar to that rejected by the Court in Berry, as "laid in most general terms." Berry, 226 S.C. at 192, 84 S.E. (2d) at 385. *319 Accordingly, the order of the State Board is reversed, and the decision of the County Board, upholding the election, is reinstated. Reversed GREGORY, C.J., and HARWELL, FINNEY and TOAL, JJ., concur. [1] "Only those persons who are unable to read or write or who are physically unable to incapacitated from preparing a ballot or voting shall be entitled to receive assistance of any kind in voting." S.C. Code Ann. § 7-13-780 (1976). [2] The Poll Manager's Handbook is prepared and distributed by the State Election Commission. It was submitted to the Court, without objection, during oral argument.