Case Title: Ex parte Valentina Lugo de Vega et al. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS:CIVIL (In re: Valentina Lugo de Vega et al. v. Tom Shelton et al.)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1091491

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 12/17/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
____________________
1091491
____________________
Ex parte Valentina Lugo de Vega et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Valentina Lugo de Vega et al.
v.
Tom Shelton et al.)
____________________
1091495
____________________
Ex parte Wilson's Diesel Service, L.L.C., et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Valentina Lugo de Vega et al.
v.
Tom Shelton et al.)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division, CV-07-1290)
1091491, 1091495
2
SMITH, Justice.
Valentina Lugo de Vega, the widow of Sylvestre Vega, and
Sylvestre Vega, Jr., Valeria Maria Vega, Jesus Eduardo Vega
Lugo, and Matthew Luke Vega Lugo, the children of Sylvestre
Vega (collectively, "the plaintiffs"), petition this Court for
a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to
vacate its order transferring the plaintiffs' claims against
Tom Shelton, James Shelton, and Jay Electric Company, Inc., to
Tuscaloosa County (no. 1091491).  Defendants John Wilson and
Wilson's Diesel Service, L.L.C., on their own behalf and also
on behalf of defendants Debco Diesel, Cottondale Diesel
Repair, Inc., John Wilson d/b/a Debco Diesel, and John Wilson
d/b/a Cottondale Diesel Repair, Inc. (collectively, "the
Wilson defendants"), also petition this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to transfer the
plaintiffs' claims against them to Tuscaloosa County (no.
1091495).  We grant the plaintiffs' petition and issue the
writ, and we deny the Wilson defendants' petition.
Facts and Procedural History
This action arises from an accident that occurred on
August 3, 2007, in which Sylvestre Vega was fatally
1091491, 1091495
3
electrocuted by a generator for a lighting system at a
drilling site.  At the time of the accident, Vega was employed
as a laborer for Capstone Drilling Company at a methane-gas
drilling site in Jefferson County.  The principal place of
business of Capstone Drilling is in Tuscaloosa County.  
As a result of the fatal accident, the plaintiffs,
residents of Tuscaloosa County, sued Tom Shelton, a resident
of Tuscaloosa County, in the Bessemer Division of the
Jefferson Circuit Court on October 5, 2007.  In the complaint,
the plaintiffs alleged that "Tom Shelton is the owner of
Capstone Drilling and has been at all times material herein"
and that "[Tom Shelton] is responsible, in whole or in part,
for the condition of the generator machine."  Without
specifying the identity of Vega's supervisor at the methane-
gas drilling site, the plaintiffs further alleged that "[Vega]
was asked by his superior to climb a generator light pole to
move the focus of a generator light" and that, "[w]hile
climbing the generator light pole, [Vega] came in contact with
an energized male plug coming from the generator, which
resulted in a fatal electrical current going through his body
1091491, 1091495
4
and resulting in his death."  The complaint contains only one
count, "Willfulness," which states:
"The plaintiff[s] further allege[] that all of
the generator lights on the subject generator were
wired incorrectly in that the male end of the plugs
were energized and the female end of the plugs were
non-energized.
"The plaintiff[s] further allege[] that at the
female end of an electrical plug is a guard on
generators, and other electrical machines, to keep
someone from being shocked or electrocuted while
coming in inadvertent contact with the energized
portion of the electrical system.
"The plaintiff[s] further allege[] that the
incorrect, or backwards, wiring of the subject
generator was the result of the removal, failure to
maintain, 
and/or 
failure 
to 
install 
proper
electrical plugs, where the female end should have
been energized and the male end non-energized.  In
this case, the male plug, in violation of the
National Electrical Code, was energized.
"The plaintiff[s] bring[] suit against the
Defendant Tom Shelton pursuant to Alabama Code § 25-
5-11 for his willful conduct in removing, failing to
maintain, and/or failing to install proper guarding
on the electrical generator.
"The plaintiff[s] further allege[] that it is
the direct and proximate result of the removal,
failure to maintain and/or failure to install proper
electrical 
circuitry, 
and 
plugs, 
resulted 
in
plaintiff[s'] 
decedent, 
Sylvestre 
Vega, 
being
fatally electrocuted, when he came in inadvertent
contact of the male end of the plug, which was
erroneously energized." 
1091491, 1091495
5
Tom Shelton answered the plaintiffs' complaint on December 11,
2007, raising various defenses, including the affirmative
defense "that venue is improper in this court."
In February 2008, the plaintiffs filed a first amended
complaint to assert claims against Cowin Equipment Company,
Inc.  The plaintiffs alleged that Cowin Equipment "sold the
subject light generator (light plant) which fatally injured
Mr. Sylvestre Vega, to Mr. Vega's former employer, Capstone
Drilling."  The plaintiffs asserted claims against Cowin
Equipment under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability
Doctrine ("the AEMLD"), as well as claims of negligence and
wantonness.  The trial court dismissed Cowin Equipment as a
party to this action in July 2009 pursuant to a "stipulation
of pro tanto dismissal" filed by Cowin Equipment.
In April 2008, the plaintiffs filed a second amended
complaint to assert claims against Terex Amida Corporation.
The plaintiffs alleged that "the Terex Amida Corporation
manufactured, designed, sold, and/or marketed the light
generator which electrocuted Sylvestre Vega."  The plaintiffs
asserted claims against Terex Amida under the AEMLD, as well
as claims of negligence and wantonness.  The trial court
1091491, 1091495
6
dismissed Terex Amida as a party to the action in August 2009
pursuant to a "stipulation of pro tanto dismissal" filed by
Terex Amida.
In May 2008, the trial court entered a scheduling order,
setting the discovery deadline for June 1, 2009, the
dispositive-motion deadline for July 1, 2009, and the trial
date for October 19, 2009.
In August 2008, the plaintiffs filed a third amended
complaint to assert claims against James Shelton and Jay
Electric Company.  The plaintiffs alleged that "[James
Shelton] is the owner of Capstone Drilling Company" and that
"[he] had electrical work done on his company's light plant
generator which electrocuted Sylvestre Vega."  Like the claim
against Tom Shelton, the plaintiffs alleged a willfulness
claim against James Shelton "pursuant to Alabama Code § 25-5-
11 for the willful conduct in removing, failing to maintain,
and/or failing to install proper guarding (the male and female
plugs) on the light plant generator."  The plaintiffs also
alleged that "Jay Electric Company, Inc., performed electrical
work on the light generator," and they alleged claims of
negligence and wantonness against Jay Electric.  James Shelton
1091491, 1091495
7
and Jay Electric answered the plaintiffs' complaint on October
28, 2008, and November 6, 2008, respectively, each raising the
affirmative defense "that venue is improper in this court." 
In February 2009, the plaintiffs filed a fourth amended
complaint to assert claims against Burgess Equipment Repair,
LLC.  The plaintiffs alleged that "Burgess Equipment Repair,
LLC, did electrical work on the light generator in 2007 and
that said work was a result in the failure to maintain and/or
failure to install proper electrical circuitry and plugs."
The plaintiffs asserted negligence and wantonness claims
against Burgess Equipment Repair based upon its servicing the
generator.  Burgess Equipment is not a party in the petitions
before this Court.
In July 2009, the plaintiffs filed a fifth amended
complaint to assert claims against the Wilson defendants.  The
plaintiffs alleged that the Wilson defendants "did electrical
work on the light generator in 2007 and that said work was a
result in the failure to maintain and/or failure to install
proper electrical circuitry and plugs."  The plaintiffs
asserted negligence and wantonness claims against the Wilson
1091491, 1091495
8
defendants based upon the Wilson defendants' servicing of the
generator.
In August 2009, Tom Shelton and James Shelton moved for
a summary judgment.  From all that appears before this Court,
that motion is still pending in the trial court.
The Wilson defendants answered the complaint on September
8, 2009.  The Wilson defendants did not specifically assert
that venue in Jefferson County was improper.  Rather, the
Wilson defendants asserted: "The Wilson defendants expressly
reserve the right to assert any and all additional defenses,
including Rule 12b defenses" and "[t]he Wilson defendants
adopt and incorporate herein any and all defenses that may be
asserted by any other defendant or defendants which may later
be named in this case."
On September 9, 2009, the day after the Wilson defendants
answered the complaint, the trial court entered an amended
scheduling order, stating that "amendments to the pleadings
must be filed within 90 days of the date of this Order;
otherwise, only [by] leave of [the] court," and setting the
discovery deadline for June 1, 2010, and the trial date for
August 23, 2010.
1091491, 1091495
Rule 82(b)(1)(A), Ala. R. Civ. P., states:
1
"Actions against an individual or individuals having
a permanent residence in this state:
"(A) Must be brought in the county
where 
the 
defendant 
or 
any 
material
defendant resides at the commencement of
the action, except that if the action is a
personal action other than an action on a
contract, it may be brought either in the
county where the act or omission complained
of occurred, or in the county of the
permanent residence of the defendant or one
of them ...." 
Alabama's forum non conveniens statute, § 6-3-21.1(a),
2
Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:
"With 
respect 
to 
civil 
actions 
filed 
in 
an
9
On January 5, 2010, nearly four months after answering
the complaint, the Wilson defendants moved for a change of
venue to Tuscaloosa County under Rule 82(b)(1)(A), Ala. R.
Civ. P.  The Wilson defendants asserted that venue in
Jefferson County was improper because, they argued, venue in
Jefferson County was improper as to the only defendant named
at 
the 
commencement 
of 
the 
action, 
Tom 
Shelton.1
Alternatively, the Wilson defendants argued that, if venue in
Jefferson County is proper, the action should be transferred
to Tuscaloosa County based on the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.   Then, on January 22, 2010, the Wilson defendants
2
1091491, 1091495
appropriate venue, any court of general jurisdiction
shall, for the convenience of parties and witnesses,
or in the interest of justice, transfer any civil
action or any claim in any civil action to any court
of general jurisdiction in which the action might
have been properly filed and the case shall proceed
as though originally filed therein. ..."
10
filed an amended answer to the complaint, without leave of the
trial court.  In the amended answer, the Wilson defendants
specifically "preserve[d] all defenses pursuant to Rule 12(b)
of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, including ...
improper venue."  
On February 11, 2010, the plaintiffs responded to the
Wilson defendants' motion for a change of venue and moved to
strike the amended answer of the Wilson defendants on the
ground that it was untimely.  See Rule 15(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.
(requiring a party to obtain leave of court to amend a
pleading less than 42 days before a trial setting).  The next
day, February 12, 2010, the trial court denied the plaintiffs'
motion to strike the Wilson defendants' amended answer and
ordered the Wilson defendants to reply to the plaintiffs'
response to the motion for a change of venue by February 26,
2010.  The Wilson defendants then moved the trial court to
stay the briefing on the motion for a change of venue until
1091491, 1091495
11
the deposition of John Wilson occurred.  In the motion, the
Wilson defendants asserted that "[c]ounsel for plaintiffs
expressed a need to depose John Wilson in order to fully
respond to the venue issue before this court."  The trial
court granted the motion to stay.
On May 28, 2010, the Wilson defendants replied to the
plaintiffs' response to the motion for a change of venue of
the action.  Then on June 1, 2010, Jay Electric also moved the
trial court for a change of venue to Tuscaloosa County.  Jay
Electric adopted the Wilson defendants' motion for a change of
venue, and it reasserted that venue was improper in Jefferson
County because venue was improper there as to the original
defendant, Tom Shelton.  Two weeks later, on June 15, 2010,
Tom Shelton and James Shelton moved to join the motions for a
change of venue filed by the Wilson defendants and Jay
Electric.  
On June 18, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on the
motions for a change of venue.  After the hearing, the trial
court entered an order, stating:
"Defendants John Wilson and Wilson['s] Diesel
Service, L.L.C., motions to transfer are denied as
the court finds that said defendants waived their
1091491, 1091495
From all that appears, Burgess Equipment Repair did not
3
move the trial court to transfer the plaintiffs' claims
against it to Tuscaloosa County.  The plaintiffs include a
footnote in their petition stating: "Although the claims
against Burgess are still pending, plaintiffs will contest its
motion for summary judgment."  The plaintiffs' petition, at p.
8 n.10.
12
right to transfer by not timely filing a request for
the same.  
"As to all other defendants, however, the court
grants their respective motions to transfer and
directs the circuit clerk to transfer their causes
to the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama."
The plaintiffs have timely petitioned this Court for a
writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to
vacate its order transferring their claims against Tom
Shelton, James Shelton, and Jay Electric to Tuscaloosa
County.   The Wilson defendants have timely petitioned this
3
Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit
Court to transfer the plaintiffs' claims against them to
Tuscaloosa County.  See Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P.
Standard of Review
"A petition for the writ of mandamus is the
appropriate means by which to challenge a trial
court's order regarding a change of venue.  The writ
of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy; it will not
be issued unless the petitioner shows '"'(1) a clear
legal right in the petitioner to the order sought;
(2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the
1091491, 1091495
13
lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.'"' Ex parte
Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 153, 156 (Ala.
2000) (quoting Ex parte Gates, 675 So. 2d 371, 374
(Ala. 1996)); Ex parte Pfizer, Inc., 746 So. 2d 960,
962 (Ala. 1999)."
Ex parte Children's Hosp. of Alabama, 931 So. 2d 1, 5-6 (Ala.
2005). 
Applying the general rules to a petition for a writ of
mandamus challenging a ruling related to venue, this Court has
held: "The burden of proving improper venue is on the party
raising the issue and on review of an order transferring or
refusing to transfer, a writ of mandamus will not be granted
unless there is a clear showing of error on the part of the
trial judge."  Ex parte Finance America Corp., 507 So. 2d 458,
460 (Ala. 1987).  "Our review is limited to only those facts
that were before the trial court."  Ex parte Kane, 989 So. 2d
509, 511 (Ala. 2008).
Analysis
A. The Plaintiffs' Petition (Case no. 1091491)
The plaintiffs contend that Tom Shelton, James Shelton,
and Jay Electric each waived the right to contest venue in
Jefferson County as a matter of law because, they say, the
motions to change venue under Rule 82(d)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
1091491, 1091495
14
"came far too late."  The plaintiffs' petition, at p. 8.
Alabama law is well settled that "the appropriate method to
attack improper venue is to appear and make timely motion, and
on a failure to do so the improper venue is waived."  Jordan
v. Guaranty Pest Control, Inc., 292 Ala. 601, 606, 298 So. 2d
244 (1974) (footnote omitted; emphasis added).  Here, the
plaintiffs note that the motions for a change of venue by the
Sheltons and Jay Electric were filed "after the discovery
deadline, less than 3 months prior to the trial date, 29
months after Tom Shelton filed his answer, over 19 ½ months
after James Shelton filed his answer, 19 months after Jay
[Electric] filed its answer, and nearly a year after the
Sheltons filed their motion for summary judgment."  The
plaintiffs' petition, at p. 8.  
We first consider whether venue in Jefferson County is
proper.  In Ex parte Walter Industries, Inc., 879 So. 2d 547,
548-49 (Ala. 2003), this Court noted:
"'The question of proper venue for an action is
determined at the commencement of the action.' Ex
parte Pratt, 815 So. 2d 532, 534 (Ala. 2001).  'If
venue is not proper at the commencement of an
action, then, upon motion of the defendant, the
action must be transferred to a court where venue
would be proper.'  Ex parte Overstreet, 748 So. 2d
194, 196 (Ala. 1999)." 
1091491, 1091495
We note that the plaintiffs did not amend the complaint
4
to substitute the true name of a fictitiously named defendant
in accordance with Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P.  To invoke the
relation-back principle of Rule 15(c)(4), a plaintiff
"(1) must state a cause of action against the party
named fictitiously in the body of the original
complaint and (2) must be ignorant of the identity
of the fictitiously named party, in the sense of
having no knowledge at the time of the filing that
the later-named party was in fact the party intended
to be sued."
Crawford v. Sundback, 678 So. 2d 1057, 1059 (Ala. 1996).
Here, the plaintiffs did not state causes of action against
fictitiously named parties.
15
At the commencement of the instant action Tom Shelton was the
only named defendant.  Therefore, if venue in Jefferson County
was improper to him, "then, upon motion of [a] defendant, the
action must be transferred to a court where venue would be
proper."  Ex parte Overstreet, 748 So. 2d 194, 196 (Ala.
1999).  Later amendments to the complaint to add parties or
claims, with the exception of substituting the true name of a
fictitiously named party, are not considered in determining
whether venue is improper at the commencement of the action.
See Rule 15(c)(4) ("relation back is permitted by principles
applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule
9(h)").   
4
1091491, 1091495
16
Therefore, we must first determine whether venue as to
Tom Shelton, the original defendant, is proper in Jefferson
County.  We look to § 6-3-2, Ala. Code 1975, which governs the
proper venue in civil actions against individuals.  Section 6-
3-2(a)(3) provides that venue in "proceedings of a legal
nature against individuals" is proper in either the county in
which the defendant resides or "in the county in which the act
or omission complained of may have been done or may have
occurred."  See also Rule 82(b)(1)(A), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Here,
it is undisputed that Tom Shelton resides in Tuscaloosa
County; therefore, the issue is whether the "act or omission
complained of" in the initial complaint may have occurred in
Jefferson County.
As referenced above, the initial complaint contained only
one count, willfulness, against Tom Shelton.  The plaintiffs
specifically alleged that "plaintiff[s] bring[] suit against
the Defendant Tom Shelton pursuant to Alabama Code § 25-5-11
for his willful conduct in removing, failing to maintain,
and/or failing to install proper guarding on the electrical
generator."  The complaint does not specify where this alleged
wrongful conduct occurred, and the Sheltons and Jay Electric
1091491, 1091495
17
presented the trial court with substantial evidence showing
that Tom Shelton did not take any actions in Jefferson County
related to the generator and Vega's death.  
In moving for a change of venue, the Sheltons and Jay
Electric argued that all the acts or omissions alleged against
Tom Shelton occurred in Tuscaloosa County because, they said,
"neither James Shelton [n]or Tom Shelton worked on the subject
crew" with Vega and that, "while the injury may have occurred
[in Jefferson County], all of the acts or omissions made the
basis of this case occurred in Tuscaloosa County."  Further,
in support of their motion for a change of venue, the Sheltons
submitted an affidavit of James Shelton in which he testified
that "at the time of [Vega's] fatal accident of August 3, 2007
... neither my son, Tom Shelton, nor I were present at the job
site."  The plaintiffs have not disputed this contention.
Further, in the Sheltons' motion for a summary judgment, filed
more than nine months before the Sheltons moved for a change
of venue to Tuscaloosa County, the Sheltons asserted that "Tom
Shelton has repeatedly stated that he is not, and has never
been, involved in the maintenance of the light plants; neither
1091491, 1091495
18
does he have knowledge of when and how the wires were
reversed."  
The plaintiffs have not disputed the assertion that Tom
Shelton was not in Jefferson County when the accident
occurred.  Rather, the plaintiffs took the following position
in the trial court:  
"Because the generator was used in the course of
Capstone Drilling's business on the day of [Vega's]
death in the Bessemer Division, the wrongful conduct
of Tom (and James) Shelton in failing to maintain
and install the safety devices on the machine at
their Tuscaloosa shop is not the only wrongful act
or omission that they have committed.  To the
contrary, they also wrongfully failed to maintain
and install the safety devices on the generator
while it was in the Bessemer Division."  
This argument fails because the "acts or omissions complained
of" in the initial complaint are based upon the "willful and
intentional" conduct of Tom Shelton, and the trial court had
no evidence before it that such conduct occurred in Jefferson
County.  Under § 6-3-7, "the inquiry is not the location of
the injury, but the location of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim."  See Ex parte Suzuki Mobile, Inc., 940 So.
2d 1007, 1009-10 (Ala. 2006).  Because Tom Shelton has
demonstrated that he took no action related to the generator
in Jefferson County, we conclude that venue in Jefferson
1091491, 1091495
As noted, the underlying action was brought in the
5
Bessemer Division of the Jefferson Circuit Court.  This Court
has advised that, when determining whether venue is proper
within the Bessemer Division,
"the court first asks whether venue is proper in
Jefferson County under the applicable venue laws.
Ex parte Alabama Mobile Homes, 468 So. 2d 156 (Ala.
1985).  If it is, the court then determines in which
division venue is proper: 'the Bessemer Division can
hear only cases that have "arisen" within the
territorial boundaries of that division.' [Ex parte]
Walter Indus.[, Inc.], 879 So. 2d [547] at 551
[(Ala. 2003)].  If the cause of action did not arise
within the territorial boundaries of the Bessemer
Cutoff, then venue is in the Birmingham Division."
Ex parte Children's Hosp. of Alabama, 931 So. 2d at 7 n.6.
Our conclusion that venue was improper in Jefferson County
under the applicable venue laws necessarily pretermits
consideration of whether venue was proper in the Bessemer
Division. 
19
County was improper.  See Ex parte Children's Hospital of
Alabama, 931 So. 2d at 7 n.6.5
Although we have determined that venue is improper in
Jefferson County, we must consider whether the Sheltons and
Jay Electric waived the defense of improper venue.  Because
the Sheltons and Jay Electric pleaded improper venue in their
respective answers to the complaint, they preserved their
right to file a timely motion for a change of venue under Rule
82, Ala. R. Civ. P.  See Ex parte Movie Gallery, 31 So. 3d
104, 111 (Ala. 2009).  Specifically, Rule 82(d)(1), Ala. R.
1091491, 1091495
In Ex parte Michelin North America, Inc., [Ms. 1081268,
6
August 13, 2010] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2010), this Court held
that "Rule 82(d) does not impose a 30-day time limit for
filing a motion for a change of venue when venue is improper
at the commencement of the action."  See Ex parte Movie
Gallery, 31 So. 2d at 109 (holding that "[n]either subsection
(i) nor (ii) [of Rule 82(d)(2)(C), Ala. R. Civ. P.,] apply to
a motion for a change of venue at the commencement of the
action").  
20
Civ. P., states: "When an action is commenced laying venue in
the wrong county, the court, on timely motion of any
defendant, shall transfer the action to the court in which the
action might have been properly filed and the case shall
proceed as though originally filed therein."  (Emphasis
added.)  Rule 82 does not define what constitutes a "timely
motion" for a change of venue, but Rule 1(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
provides us with the general instruction that the Alabama
Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be construed and administered
to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action."   This Court has addressed the timeliness of a
6
motion for a change of venue under Rule 82(d)(1), Ala. R. Civ.
P., on several occasions, and we turn to those cases for
further guidance in determining whether the motions for a
change of venue filed by the Sheltons and Jay Electric were
timely filed.  See Ex parte Starr, 419 So. 2d 222, 223 (Ala.
1091491, 1091495
21
1982); Ex parte Movie Gallery, 31 So. 3d at 111; and Ex parte
Michelin North America, Inc., [Ms. 1081268, August 13, 2010]
___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2010).
In Ex parte Starr, this Court held: "The first time the
defendant raised the venue issue came some nine months after
the complaint was filed.  This is not a timely objection under
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 82."  419 So. 2d at
223.  In that case, the defendant moved to set aside a default
judgment against him on the ground that his "failure to file
an answer was due to inadvertence or mistake."  Id.  The trial
court set aside the default judgment, and the plaintiffs
challenged its ruling by a petition for a writ of mandamus to
this Court.  After this Court denied the plaintiffs' petition
for a writ of mandamus, the defendant moved the trial court to
transfer the action under Rule 82.  The trial court denied the
motion on the basis that it was untimely filed, and the
defendant then petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the trial court to transfer the action.  This Court
denied the petition, concluding that, "[u]nder these facts, we
hold that [the defendant's] objection to venue comes too
late."  419 So. 2d at 223.  In explaining its decision, this
1091491, 1091495
22
Court noted that the defendant had "put the plaintiffs to
considerable expense, both in terms of time and money, and has
sought and received relief from a default judgment" and that
"[o]nly after the plaintiffs failed in this Court to have the
judgment reinstated did he raise the venue issue."  Id. 
In Ex parte Movie Gallery, the plaintiff sued the
defendants in the Montgomery County, asserting claims of
slander 
and 
intentional 
inference 
with 
business 
relationships.
For unknown reasons, the plaintiff agreed to extend the
defendants' time in which to answer the complaint.  The
defendants then answered the complaint, raising the defense of
improper venue, and, nearly two months after answering the
complaint, the defendants moved for a change of venue.  The
trial court denied the motion for a change of venue, and the
defendants then petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the trial court to transfer the action.  This Court
granted the petition and issued the writ, in part, holding:
"[The defendants] filed [a] motion for a change of venue 81
days after [the] answer would have been due, absent the
agreement, and 55 days after [the] answer was filed pursuant
to the agreement.  Under the facts as presented to this Court,
1091491, 1091495
23
the motion was not untimely."  Ex parte Movie Gallery, 31 So.
3d at 111.
In Ex parte Michelin, the plaintiff filed an AEMLD action
against the defendants in Barbour County.  The defendants
answered the complaint, raising the defense of improper venue.
The plaintiff then filed first and second amended complaints,
which the defendants answered, each time raising the defense
of improper venue.  Two and a half months after the defendants
answered the plaintiff's second amended complaint, the
defendants moved to transfer the action to Autauga County.
The trial court denied the motion to transfer the action, and
the defendants then petitioned this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the trial court to transfer the action.  
In responding to the petition, the plaintiff argued that
the defendants' motion for a change of venue was untimely
because, the plaintiff said, the defendants were neither
vigilant nor diligent in moving to transfer the action.
Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that the defendants had
"'waited over seven (7) months before [they] sought to
transfer venue under Rule 82 despite knowing that venue was
improper when [they were] was first served with the
1091491, 1091495
24
Complaint.'" ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting the plaintiff's
petition).  This Court held that the defendants' motion for a
change of venue was timely.  Relying on Ex parte Movie
Gallery, this Court held that the passage of two and a half
months between the time the defendants answered the second
amended complaint and the filing of the motion for a change of
venue did not render the motion untimely.  In supporting the
holding, this Court noted that "[a] defendant may need at
least some time to marshal evidence to prove the allegation
that venue is improper," ___ So. 3d at ___, and cited 14D
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3829 (2007):
"On occasion a party who has raised a proper objection to
venue will make use of discovery before pressing for a
decision 
on 
the 
venue 
objection. 
The 
service 
of
interrogatories and the taking of depositions is not, in
itself, a waiver of the venue defense."  This Court summarized
its holding as follows:
"In 
short, 
[the 
defendants] 
consistently
preserved [the] right to file a timely motion for a
change of venue in each of [their] answers to [the
plaintiff's] complaint and amended complaints. [The
defendants] then engaged in discovery aimed at
supporting such a motion.  Upon completion of that
1091491, 1091495
25
discovery, [the defendants] filed a motion for a
change of venue on the alternative bases of improper
venue and forum non conveniens. [The plaintiff] has
conceded in the circuit court and on appeal that
venue is improper in Barbour County, and the circuit
court noted in its order that there was no evidence
indicating that venue was proper in Barbour County
at the time the action was filed.  Under these
circumstances, we conclude that [the defendants']
motion for a change of venue was not untimely and
that the circuit court erred in denying [the
defendants'] motion on that basis."
___ So. 3d at ___.  
Under the facts of this case, we conclude that the
motions for a change of venue filed by the Sheltons and Jay
Electric were untimely.  Simply, venue in Jefferson County was
clearly improper as to Tom Shelton at the commencement of the
action, and Tom Shelton, James Shelton, and Jay Electric have
not demonstrated a reasonable basis for waiting 29 months, 19
½ months, and 19 months, respectively, between preserving the
right to file a timely motion to transfer the action and
filing 
the 
motion. 
 
Further, 
the 
Sheltons 
have 
not
demonstrated a reasonable basis for waiting nearly nine months
after moving for a summary judgment in Jefferson County before
moving to transfer the action to Tuscaloosa County.  These
unreasonable delays in filing the motions to transfer the
action constitute a waiver of the improper-venue defense. 
1091491, 1091495
We pretermit discussion of the defendants' arguments
7
related to the doctrine of forum non conveniens because the
doctrine of forum non conveniens "has a field of operation
only where an action is commenced in a county in which venue
26
We note that the Sheltons and Jay Electric argue that
they necessarily waited until the deposition of John Wilson
occurred in May 2010 before moving for a change of venue,
because, they say, John Wilson was "most critical to the issue
of venue."  Sheltons' brief, at p. 14.  We disagree.  As
discussed in detail above, venue in Jefferson County was
clearly improper at the commencement of this action, and the
testimony of John Wilson was unnecessary in demonstrating that
venue was improper in Jefferson County.  The plaintiffs
alleged a claim against Tom Shelton for his alleged acts and
omissions related to the generator, and, upon receipt of the
complaint, he should have been immediately aware that he had
not engaged in any willful conduct related to the generator in
Jefferson County and, therefore, that venue in Jefferson
County was improper. 
Because the motions to transfer the action to Tuscaloosa
County filed by the Sheltons and Jay Electric were untimely,
the plaintiffs have a clear legal right to an order vacating
the trial court's order granting those motions.7
1091491, 1091495
is appropriate."  Ex parte New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 663
So. 2d 952, 956 (Ala. 1995). 
Rule 12(g), Ala. R. Civ. P., states:  
8
"A party who makes a motion under this rule may join
with it any other motions herein provided for and
then available to the party. If a party makes a
motion under this rule but omits therefrom any
defense or objection then available to the party
which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the
party shall not thereafter make a motion based on
the defense or objection so omitted, except a motion
as provided in subdivision (h)(2) hereof on any of
the grounds there stated."
27
B. The Wilson Defendants (Case no. 1091495)
The Wilson defendants also petition this Court for a writ
of mandamus directing the trial court to transfer the
plaintiffs' claims against them to Tuscaloosa County.  As
referenced 
above, 
the 
trial 
court 
denied 
the 
Wilson
defendants' motion for a change of venue on the ground that
they "waived their right to transfer by not timely filing a
request for the same."  
Rule 12(h)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., states:  
"A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person,
improper 
venue, 
insufficiency 
of 
process, 
or
insufficiency of service of process is waived (A) if
omitted from a motion in the circumstances described
in subdivision (g),
 or (B) if it is neither made
[8]
by motion under this rule nor included in a
responsive 
pleading 
or 
an 
amendment 
thereof
1091491, 1091495
28
permitted by Rule 15(a) to be made as a matter of
course."
Here, the Wilson defendants neither raised the defense of
improper venue by motion under Rule 12 nor included the
defense of improper venue in their initial answer to the
complaint.  Instead, in their initial answer, they stated that
"[t]he Wilson defendants expressly reserve the right to assert
any and all additional defenses, including Rule 12b defenses"
and "[t]he Wilson defendants adopt and incorporate herein any
and all defenses that may be asserted by any other defendant
or defendants which may later be named in this case."
(Emphasis added.)  This is not sufficient pleading of a
defense of improper venue in a responsive pleading because
both assertions are merely  reservations of the right to raise
any defenses in the future, rather than the assertion of a
certain defense.  We recognize that the Wilson defendants
filed an amended answer that specifically raised the defense
of improper venue after they moved for a change of venue and
that the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion to strike
the amended answer, but we hold that the assertion of the
defense in the amended answer was not in compliance with Rule
12(h) because the amended answer was not "permitted by Rule
1091491, 1091495
29
15(a) ... as a matter of course."  The trial court's
scheduling order required leave of court to amend a pleading,
and the Wilson defendants did not obtain leave of court before
filing the amended answer.  Because the Wilson defendants did
not preserve the right to file a motion for a change of venue
in accordance with Rule 12(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., the Wilson
defendants waived the right to move for a change of venue.
Accordingly, we hold that the Wilson defendants do not have a
clear legal right to a writ of mandamus directing the trial
court to transfer the plaintiffs' claims against them to
Tuscaloosa County. 
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the plaintiffs' petition for the
writ of mandamus is granted, and the Wilson defendants'
petition for the writ of mandamus is denied.
1091491--PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.  
1091495--PETITION DENIED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Parker, and Shaw, JJ., concur.