Case Title: State v. Jones

Citation: 

Docket Number: S47520

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  July 6, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
		Petitioner on Review,
	v.
VIRGINIA L. JONES,
	Respondent on Review.
(CC 97CR0663FE; CA A100934; SC S47520)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.* 
	Argued and submitted November 7, 2000.
	Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. 
With him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Meredith Allen, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review.  With her on
the briefs was David E. Groom, Public Defender.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs Justices.**  
	LEESON, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The order
of the circuit court is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Douglas County Cirguit Court, 
Robert C. Millikan, Judge. 165 Or App 55, 995 P2d 571 (2000).
	**Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case.  De Muniz J., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
		LEESON, J.
		The state seeks review of a Court of Appeals decision
that affirmed a pre-trial order suppressing evidence.  State v.
Jones, 165 Or App 55, 995 P2d 571 (2000).  The issue is whether
an officer who has a valid arrest warrant but no other legal
justification may enter and search a private residence for a
person named in the warrant without probable cause to believe
that the person is inside the residence.  The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's suppression order.  For the reasons
that follow, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and
the order of the trial court.  
		The relevant facts are undisputed.  On February 7,
1997, the state filed a complaint of contempt of court in Douglas
County Circuit Court seeking punitive sanctions against Robert
Getzelman for failure to complete a jail sentence.  On February
12, 1997, the circuit court issued a warrant for Getzelman's
arrest. (1)  The warrant listed Getzelman's home address as 205
Berry Lane in Roseburg, Oregon.
		On February 20, 1997, Roseburg police officer
Koberstein received an anonymous telephone call from an informant
who had called Koberstein on previous occasions.  The caller told
Koberstein that someone named "Robert" was at 972 Glenn Street in
Roseburg.  Koberstein knew Getzelman from previous encounters and
believed that the anonymous caller was referring to Getzelman.  
Koberstein also knew that defendant is Getzelman's mother and
that 972 Glenn Street is defendant's home address. 
		Based on the arrest warrant, the anonymous informant's
telephone call, and another informant's tip that Getzelman lived
with defendant, Koberstein and Detective Admire went to
defendant's house.  Before approaching the house, they went to a
nearby side street and watched the house for approximately half
an hour.  They did not see Getzelman or any indication that he
was inside defendant's house.  Koberstein then knocked on the
front door of the house and defendant answered.  She admitted
that Getzelman lived there, but she told Koberstein and Admire
that Getzelman was not at home.  According to the officers,
defendant appeared nervous when she made that statement. 
Suspecting that Getzelman was inside, the officers asked for
permission to search the house for him.  Defendant refused to
consent to a search and tried to shut the door.  Koberstein
blocked the door jam with his foot, and he told defendant that he
and Admire were entitled to search the house for Getzelman and
that defendant could be charged with hindering prosecution for
denying them access.  Defendant eventually stopped trying to
close the door.  Koberstein and Admire then entered the house,
found Getzelman, and arrested him.  Thereafter, defendant was
charged with hindering prosecution because of her attempt to hide
Getzelman.  ORS 162.325(1)(a). (2)
		Before trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence that
the officers had found Getzelman inside her house.  Relying on
this court's opinion in State v. Jordan, 288 Or 391, 605 P2d 646
(1980), discussed later in this opinion, the trial court reasoned
that the police were required to have probable cause to believe
that Getzelman was inside defendant's house before they lawfully
could enter it to search for him.  The state conceded that the
officers did not have probable cause.  Accordingly, the trial
court granted defendant's motion.
		The state appealed.  See ORS 138.060(3) (state may
appeal "[a]n order made prior to trial suppressing evidence"). 
It argued that, under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution, (3) and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, (4) a police officer who has a valid arrest warrant
needs to have only a reasonable belief that the person named in
the warrant is inside a private residence to be entitled to enter
the residence to search for the person.  The Court of Appeals
rejected that argument, relying on Jordan and State v. Davis, 313
Or 246, 834 P2d 1008 (1992).  It reasoned that those cases
"confirm that, in the absence of a search warrant or other legal
authority, probable cause to believe that the subject of an
arrest warrant is within is not merely sufficient but is also
necessary * * *."  Jones, 165 Or App at 60 (emphasis in
original).  Accordingly, it held that Koberstein's and Admire's
entry into defendant's house violated Article I, section 9, and
that the trial court properly had granted defendant's motion to
suppress.  Id. at 61.  Because the Court of Appeals resolved the
matter on the basis of the Oregon Constitution, it did not
address the state's argument under the Fourth Amendment.  Id.
		One judge dissented, arguing that Jordan and Davis
neither controlled the outcome in this case nor resolved the
precise level of suspicion that police must possess to search a
residence lawfully when they possess a valid arrest warrant.  Id.
(Linder, J., dissenting).  In the dissent's view, "a valid arrest
warrant provides judicial protection against indiscriminate and
unjustified police conduct," so an officer armed with such a
warrant should be permitted to enter a person's house if the
officer has only a "reason to believe" -- not probable cause --
that the suspect is inside.  Id. at 64 (Linder, J., dissenting).
		We allowed the state's petition for review.  As is our
practice, we first address the Oregon constitutional question
that is presented, namely, whether Article I, section 9, required
the officers to have probable cause to believe that Getzelman was
inside defendant's house before they entered it to search for
Getzelman for the purpose of serving him with the arrest warrant. 
See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 262-65, 666 P2d 1316 (1983)
(court addresses issues of state law before considering federal
law).  
		Article I, section 9, protects the right of the people
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  This court
has explained that Article I, section 9, protects a person's
privacy and possessory interests as well as a person's liberty
interest.  See State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 206, 729 P2d 524
(1986) ("Article I, section 9, protects privacy and possessory
interests."); State v. Holmes, 311 Or 400, 409, 813 P2d 28 (1991)
(seizure of a person interferes with individual's liberty
interest).  It is well established that the search of a private
residence without a search warrant that has been issued by a
neutral magistrate based on probable cause is presumed to be
unreasonable.  State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 237, 666 P2d 802
(1983).  There are certain exceptions to the search warrant
requirement, however, one of which is at issue in this case.
		This court has held that, if a police officer has a
valid arrest warrant, then that officer lawfully may enter a
private residence to make an arrest if the officer has probable
cause to believe that the subject of the warrant is inside the
residence.  See Jordan, 288 Or at 402 (so holding under both
Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment); Davis, 313 Or at
255 (so holding under Article I, section 9).  Relieving an
officer who has a valid arrest warrant of the requirement to
procure a search warrant acknowledges the practical necessity
that the police might need to act quickly to execute the warrant:
		"Judicial scrutiny of probable cause to search
every place where the suspect may be located would
unduly hamper the police in the performance of their
duties.  Apprehending a criminal suspect is not the
same as searching for evidence or contraband.  A
suspect will not stay in one place; he will attempt to
avoid capture.  And this inherent mobility to escape
often presents unforeseeable dangers that necessitate
swift police action."
Jordan, 288 Or at 400-01.  Nonetheless, a valid arrest warrant
means only that an officer has legal authority to seize the
person named in the warrant.  Davis, 313 Or at 255.  The
authority to arrest does not, standing alone, permit the police
to search a private residence.  See Davis, 295 Or at 237 (search
of house without a search warrant per se unreasonable unless
search falls within exception to search-warrant requirement).  As
this court explained in Jordan, "an arrest warrant is valid only
for the purpose of making the arrest and not for the purpose of
conducting a general search."  Jordan, 288 Or at 402.
	It follows, as this court stated in Jordan, that the
exception to the search warrant requirement when an officer has a
valid arrest warrant does not relieve the officer of the
constitutional requirement to have probable cause to search.  288
Or at 401-02.  The requirement that the police have probable
cause to search protects the right of the people to be free from
unreasonable searches, but the exception to the search-warrant
requirement when an officer has a valid arrest warrant assures
that the police can act quickly to arrest the person named in the
warrant who otherwise might avoid capture.  See Jordan, 288 Or at
400-01 (explaining exception).
	The state, like the dissent at the Court of Appeals,
urges this court to construe the requirements of Article I,
section 9, in the same manner that the state asserts the United
States Supreme Court construed the Fourth Amendment in Payton v.
New York, 445 US 573, 100 S Ct 1371, 63 L Ed 2d 639 (1980), and
Steagald v. United States, 451 US 204, 101 S Ct 1642, 68 L Ed 2d
38 (1981).  It reasons that, in Jordan, this court "merely was
adopting [for Article I, section 9,] what it perceived to be the
then-prevailing standard" under the Fourth Amendment.  The state
reads Payton and Steagald, which the Supreme Court decided after
Jordan but before Davis, as holding that an officer who has a
valid arrest warrant needs only a reasonable belief that the
person named in the warrant is inside a private residence to
lawfully enter the residence to search for the person. (5)    
	We decline to depart from the unambiguous requirement
in Article I, section 9, that the search of a private residence
is not permissible unless the officer conducting the search has a
valid arrest warrant and probable cause to believe that the
person sought is inside the residence.  Relieving an officer who
has a valid arrest warrant of the burden of obtaining a search
warrant is an exception to the warrant requirement that does not
undermine the constitutionally mandated probable-cause
requirement.  However, relieving the officer of the probable-cause requirement, as the state asks us to do, is not.  That
federal courts arguably have come to a different conclusion under
the Fourth Amendment is of no moment.
	We turn to an analysis of this case.  Although
Koberstein and Admire had a valid warrant to arrest Getzelman for
contempt of court when they went to defendant's house, that
warrant did not authorize them to search for Getzelman inside
defendant's house.  See Davis, 295 Or at 237 (search of house
without search warrant per se unreasonable unless search falls
within exception to search-warrant requirement).  Under the
exception that permits an officer who has a valid arrest warrant
to search private premises if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the person named in the warrant is inside,
Koberstein and Admire could have entered defendant's house
lawfully if they had had probable cause to believe that Getzelman
was there.  However, the state has conceded throughout these
proceedings that the officers lacked probable cause to believe
that Getzelman was in defendant's house and it offers no other
justification for the search that would obviate the probable-cause requirement.  Accordingly, the officers' search of
defendant's house violated Article I, section 9, and there is no
question that suppression is the proper remedy for such a
violation.  See State v. Tanner, 304 Or 312, 321, 745 P 2d 757
(1987) ("[r]esidence in a house is uniformly deemed to be a
sufficient basis for concluding that the violation of the privacy
of the house violated the residents' privacy interests").  The
evidence that the officers obtained -- Getzelman -- was derived
directly from the officers' improper search.  Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence that the officers had located Getzelman
inside her house. (6)
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
order of the circuit court is affirmed and the case is remanded
to that court for further proceedings.



1. 	The parties dispute whether the warrant for Getzelman's
arrest was a felony or a misdemeanor warrant.  Defendant contends
that the warrant was for contempt of court, which she argues is
an unclassified misdemeanor.  The state maintains that the
warrant was for a felony because, it asserts, the underlying
crime for which Getzelman had failed to complete his jail
sentence was felony possession of a controlled substance.  The
record provides no basis for resolving that dispute, and its
resolution would have no bearing on our holding in this case.

2. 	ORS 162.325 provides, in part:
		"(1) A person commits the crime of hindering
prosecution if, with intent to hinder the apprehension,
prosecution, conviction or punishment of a person who
has committed a crime punishable as a felony, or with
the intent to assist a person who has committed a crime
punishable as a felony in profiting or benefiting from
the commission of the crime, the person:
		"(a) Harbors or conceals such person[.]"

3. 	Article I, section 9, provides:
		"No law shall violate the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized."

4. 	The Fourth Amendment provides:
		"The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized."

5. 	In the state's view, the probable-cause requirement
discussed in Jordan was dictum, because that case did not present
the question whether the lesser standard of a reasonable belief
is sufficient under Article I, section 9.  The state
mischaracterizes Jordan.  The issue in Jordan was "whether a
police officer may enter a private dwelling to execute an arrest
warrant without obtaining a search warrant."  288 Or at 393.  As
noted, the Jordan court explained that a search warrant is not
necessary to protect "constitutional rights * * * as long as any
arrest on private premises is supported by the judicial
authorization of an arrest warrant and the police officer's
probable cause to believe that the arrestee is within the
premises."  Id. at 401-02 (emphasis added).  Thus, this court's
answer to the question presented in Jordan was that a search
warrant is not necessary only under specified circumstances,
namely, if the police have a valid arrest warrant and probable
cause to believe that the person named in the warrant is within
the premises.  An arrest warrant alone is not sufficient.  The
probable-cause requirement announced in Jordan and followed in
Davis was part of the holding and was necessary to the decision
of the case.  This court's statement regarding that issue was
not, as the state argues, dictum.

6. 	In light of that holding, we need not address the
state's arguments under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.