Case Title: Morris v. Kadrmas

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Morris v. Kadrmas1991 WY 84812 P.2d 549Case Number: 91-7Decided: 06/03/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
GREG D. MORRIS, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

WAYNE KADRMAS AND SHIRLEY 
KADRMAS, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

Micheal K. Shoumaker, 
Sheridan, for appellant.

Stuart S. Healy of Healy 
& Kinnaird, Sheridan, for appellees.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
THOMAS, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and ROONEY, Retired Justice.

ROONEY, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1.]     Appellant brought this 
action against appellees requesting relief in the form of injunction and 
monetary damages for violations of the protective covenants on the Valley West 
Subdivision near Sheridan. The action was also against the 
Valley West Subdivision Land Owners Committee in the form of mandamus and 
declaratory judgment for failure to enforce the covenants. The district court 
dismissed the action against the Committee. Appellant appeals from a subsequent 
grant of appellees' motion for summary judgment and denial of appellant's 
similar motion. Appellant owns lot 23 in the subdivision. Appellees own lot 24 
therein.

[¶2.]     We reverse and 
remand.

[¶3.]     The issues presented by 
appellant in this appeal are whether or not appellees violated the protective 
covenants by placing a 60' X 40' garage and shop building on lot 24 without (1) 
an accompanying residential structure, (2) with only a 12-foot set back from the 
lot line, and (3) with a metal roof. There is no issue of fact in this case. 
Appellees acknowledge the erection of the 60' X 40' metal-roofed garage and shop 
building without accompanying residential structure, and with only a 12-foot set 
back from the lot line, but they contend that such was proper since it had 
Committee approval. They word the issues on appeal:

     "A. Did the District 
Court properly grant summary judgment to Appellees in view of the uncontroverted 
evidence that the Control Committee charged with the duty to approve 
construction and enforce the protective covenants of the subdivision did, in 
fact, review and approve the building plans and specifications submitted by 
Appellees in accordance with what the Committee perceived to be its delegated 
authority?

     "B. If not, does the 
failure of the Appellant to appeal from the `Order of Dismissal' granted to the 
Control Committee nevertheless prevent him from perfecting this 
appeal?"

[¶4.]     The Declaration of 
Protective Covenants, executed and recorded by the original owners of the land 
and developers of the subdivision, provided in pertinent part:

     "Said conditions, 
restrictions, covenants and reservations are imposed upon said above described 
realty as an obligation or charge against the same for the benefit of each and 
every lot, tract and parcel therein contained and the owner or owners thereof, 
and with the right of enforcement vested in the owner or owners of any one or 
more of the other lots above described, and said conditions, restrictions, 
covenants and reservations will be imposed upon each and every lot in said above 
described real estate, and are as follows:

"(1) That said lots shall 
be used for residence purposes exclusively and only one residence shall be 
permitted on each lot and that no buildings or structures, other than one-family 
residences with the customary out buildings, including a private garage and one 
barn, shall be erected, maintained or permitted on any such lot. * * * No 
residence building thereon shall exceed one and one-half stories in height, 
except with prior approval of * * * the Control Committee * * *. At the time 75% 
of the lots in the Subdivision shall have been sold and conveyed by the 
undersigned owners, the purchasers (owners) of said lots shall elect a Control 
Committee consisting of three (3) members who shall then replace the undersigned 
owners or their successors in interest as the approval authority for the 
provisions of these covenants.

* * * * * *

"(2) That no residence or 
other allowable structure erected upon any of said lots shall be erected, 
maintained or located nearer than 25 feet to the front lot line, nor nearer than 
25 feet to any side lot line, except with the prior approval of the approval 
authority.

* * * * * *

"(4) * * * All pitched 
roofs shall have cedar shingles or shakes, except flat and low-pitched roofs may 
have natural gravel or shale roofs; exceptions: Sierra Forest Tone by Flintkote 
or as approved by the approval authority. * * *

* * * * * *

"(12) The approval 
authority shall have the right to vary the limitations provided by these 
restrictions and covenants to the extent of 10% of the requirements, and shall 
have the right to enforce these covenants.

* * * * * *

"(21) These covenants are 
to run with the land and shall be binding on all parties and all persons 
claiming under them for a period of twenty-five (25) years from the date these 
covenants are recorded, after which time said covenants shall be automatically 
extended for successive periods of ten (10) years unless an instrument signed by 
75% of the then owners of the lots has been recorded, agreeing to change said 
covenants in whole or in part.

"(22) The approval 
authority shall have the sole and exclusive right and authority to determine 
compliance with the covenants contained herein and allocate and assess the costs 
for the improvements, maintenance and repair of all utilities and roadways. Upon 
the violation of any covenants or upon the failure to pay any assessments, 
written notice of such violation or failure shall be directed to the violator 
who shall have ten (10) days after receipt of said notice or after said notice 
should have been received in the ordinary course of mail, to correct the 
violation or pay the assessment due. If said violation is not corrected or 
payment is not made, owner or the approval authority may re-enter and take 
possession of the violator's premises and correct the violation at the 
violator's sole expense. In addition, damage may be assessed at the option of 
the owner or approval authority against the violator at the rate of $25.00 per 
day for each day the violation continues after the said 10-day notice. In the 
event suit is required to collect any sums due or enjoin the violation of any of 
the covenants contained herein, the violator, in addition to any of the other 
penalties provided herein or which may be assessed by the Court shall be liable 
for all attorney fees and costs incurred by the owner or approval authority in 
bringing such action."

[¶5.]     We review a summary 
judgment in the same light as the district court, using the same materials and 
following the same standards. Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341 (Wyo. 1989).

COMMITTEE 
APPROVAL

[¶6.]     Appellees' contention 
that approval of the building plans and specifications by the Committee was 
sufficient authorization to disregard the covenants running with the land to the 
extent that the violations thereof were contained in such plans and 
specifications is incorrect. The Committee has no authority to vary the terms of 
the covenants other than as provided in the Declaration of Protective Covenants 
themselves.

[¶7.]     Covenant No. 1 requires 
the existence of a residence for accompanying "customary out buildings." 
Authority is not given to the Committee to make an exception to this 
requirement. The only authority given to the Committee in the covenant to 
approve a variance is with reference to the requirement that no residence 
building shall exceed one and one-half stories in height. An effort by the 
Committee to approve a variance in the requirement that an outbuilding must have 
an accompanying residence is without legal force or effect. Appellees are in 
violation of this covenant. We held in Sutherland v. Bock, 688 P.2d 157 
(Wyo. 1984) 
that, under a covenant such as this one, an outbuilding cannot be justified 
without the existence of a residential structure on the lot. The covenant is 
specific in providing that the only building or structure shall be a "one-family 
residence with customary out buildings." (Emphasis added.)

[¶8.]     Covenant No. 2 provides 
that no structure "shall be erected, maintained or located * * * nearer than 25 
feet to any side lot line" except "with the prior approval" of the Committee. 
However, the extent to which the Committee can exercise this approval is limited 
by Covenant No. 12 which allows a variance of the covenants "to the extent of 
10% of the requirements." Accordingly, the Committee cannot authorize a set back 
of less than 22.5 feet. An effort by the Committee to approve a set back of 12 
feet is without legal force or effect. Appellees are in violation of this 
covenant.

[¶9.]     Covenant No. 4 requires 
all pitched roofs to have cedar shingles or shakes "or as approved" by the 
Committee. Again, it may be said that Covenant No. 12 limits the extent to which 
the committee could exercise the approval. However, the application of Covenant 
No. 12 is obviously only to the limitations capable of being restricted in 
degree or in percentage. The limitation relating to the type of roof lacks this 
capability. The Committee did not exceed its authority in approving a metal roof 
on the building. Appellees suggest that Covenant No. 12 creates an ambiguity in 
the Declaration. There is no ambiguity under our holding that the obvious intent 
of the declarants was that the covenant applies only to the limitations capable 
of being restricted in degree or in percentage. If covenants number 12 creates a 
conflict or ambiguity in the covenants as suggested by appellees, the following 
reasoning used by us with reference to contract interpretation is applicable. We 
have held that a construction leading to a conclusion that a contract 
encompasses inconsistent provisions is to be avoided if that is reasonably 
possible, and provisions which apparently conflict must be reconciled, if such 
can be done by any reasonable interpretation, before a construction is adopted 
nullifying any provisions of that instrument. See, e.g., Shepard v. Top Hat Land 
& Cattle Co., 560 P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1977).

PROPRIETY OF 
APPEAL

[¶10.]  Appellees argue that "Appellant's 
quarrel, if any, is with the Control Committee for the action it took in 
approving the building plans and authorizing" the construction of the building 
in accordance therewith - although in violation of the covenants - and that 
appellant's failure to appeal the order dismissing his complaint against the 
Committee is "fatal" to this appeal. In effect, appellees contend that any error 
by the district court was in dismissing the complaint against the Committee and 
not with granting appellees' motion for summary judgment.

[¶11.]  Such argument and contention is faulty 
for more than one reason. It is premised on the false assumption that 
appellant's injury could result only from the action of the Committee and not 
from the action of appellees or from the actions of both. Appellees recognized 
the correct potential by filing, as an alternative to the motion to dismiss, a 
third party complaint1 for the purpose of making the 
Committee liable for any judgment against them in favor of appellant; but the 
summary judgment made it unnecessary to consider the issues resulting therefrom. 
The lack of authority in the Commission to approve the erection of the 
outbuilding without the previous, concurrent, or imminent erection of a 
residence, and the lack of its authority to vary the set back from the lot line 
to the extent it did makes pertinent consideration by the trial court of 
appellees' third party complaint, but it does not prevent appellant from 
pursuing a legal claim against appellees.

[¶12.]  The introductory paragraph to the 
covenants recites that they are for the "benefit of each and every lot * * * and 
the owner or owners thereof, and with the right of enforcement vested in the 
owner or owners." Although Covenant No. 22 gives the Committee "sole and 
exclusive right and authority to determine compliance with the covenants," it 
also recognizes the legal right, among others, of the owner to "correct 
the violation at the violator's sole expense," and to hold the violator "liable 
for all attorney fees and costs incurred" in bringing an action to enjoin the 
violation of any of the covenants.

[¶13.]  The motion of the Committee to dismiss 
appellees' claim recited as the basis for dismissal that "[p]ursuant to the 
Covenants, the right of enforcement is vested in the owner or owners of any one 
or more of the lots." The district court granted the Committee's motion to 
dismiss. In granting appellees' motion for summary judgment against appellant, 
the court did so upon the finding that "the Control Committee approved the 
building of the lot and that the land owners are stuck with what the Control 
Committee did." If the right of enforcement is vested in appellant, it is 
difficult to understand why he cannot use the right rather than being "stuck 
with" whatever action the Committee decides to take. The two holdings are 
inconsistent.

[¶14.]  Additionally, an appeal can be taken only 
from a final order. W.R.C.P. 41(a)(2) states that a dismissal is without 
prejudice "unless otherwise specified in the order." There was no such 
specification in the order dismissing the Committee from the action. W.R.C.P. 54 
provides in pertinent part:

     "(a) A judgment is the 
final determination of the rights of the parties in action. * * *

     "(b) * * * [W]hen 
multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final 
judgment as to one (1) or more but fewer than all of the * * * parties only upon 
an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment."

See Wheatland Irrigation 
District v. Two-Bar Muleshoe Water Co., 431 P.2d 257 (Wyo. 1967).

[¶15.]  Appellees note that they spent money in 
erecting the building and indicate that estoppel may prevent action against 
them. However, they did not plead such as an affirmative defense. W.R.C.P. 8(c) 
provides: "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively * * * estoppel, * * * waiver." Estoppel must be pleaded. Prazma v. 
Kaehne, 768 P.2d 586 (Wyo. 1989).2

[¶16.]  Injunctive relief is available to 
appellant. A covenant can be enforced without regard to the amount of damages 
which would result from a breach and even if there is no substantial monetary 
damage. It is proper even in the absence of a showing of irreparable harm or 
uncompensable injury. Dice v. Central Natrona County Improvement & Service 
District, 684 P.2d 815 (Wyo. 1989). The propriety of the injunctive 
relief here requested is also provided in the covenants. Covenant No. 1 states 
that no structure, other than a one-family residence with customary 
outbuildings, shall be "erected, maintained, or permitted on any such 
lot." (Emphasis added.) Covenant No. 2 states that no structure "erected on any 
of said lots shall be erected, maintained, or located nearer than 25 feet 
to any side lot line." (Emphasis added.) The introductory paragraph to the 
covenants provides that the right of enforcement of the covenants is vested in 
"the owner or owners of any one or more of the" lots, and that covenant number 
22 provides for corrective action for violation of the covenants to be available 
to "the owner or approval authority."

REMAND

[¶17.]  Accordingly, we reverse the summary 
judgment entered in favor of appellees and direct a grant of appellant's motion 
for summary judgment and the issuance of an injunction directing appellees to 
cause the barn to be razed (1) unless construction of a residence is commenced 
within 30 days of the mandate herein, with completion within a reasonable time, 
and (2) unless the barn is moved within 30 days of the mandate herein to 
comply with the ten percent requirement of Covenant No. 2. Since our reversal 
makes pertinent the issues presented in appellees' proposed third party 
complaint, we direct the grant of (1) appellees' motion for leave to file the 
same, and (2) the conduct of the usual resulting proceedings.

[¶18.]  Reversed and 
remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1 A third party complaint 
was filed rather than a crossclaim inasmuch as the trial court had previously 
granted the Committee's motion to dismiss.

2 
The elements of estoppel may not here exist even if properly pleaded by 
appellees. In estoppel, the court can presume assent to an adverse right by one 
who has knowledge of relevant facts and acquiesces for an unreasonable length of 
time in asserting the right. Marken v. Goodall, 357 F. Supp. 317 (1972) aff'd 
478 F.2d 1052 (D.Wyo. 1973). Appellant lives in Ranchester. His lot in this 
subdivision is vacant. In his deposition, he testified that he purchased the lot 
on January 14, 1976 for $12,600, that he considered the transaction an 
investment which could be hurt by the covenant violations of appellees, that he 
might want to trade the lot and that he might decide to build on it. He further 
testified that he gets "out there a couple of times a summer" and first saw the 
barn on one of these trips in May of 1989, at which time the building was 
"almost completed," and that, within a week thereafter, he telephonically told 
appellee Wayne Kadrmas that he objected to the covenant violations. Appellant's 
attorney sent a notice letter to appellees on October 24, 1989, and this action 
was filed on February 12, 1990. Of interest is the deposition testimony of Gary 
Laughton, a member of the Committee, in which he said to appellee Wayne Kadrmas 
at the time Kadrmas was staking out the barn location that the set back "had to 
be twenty-five feet. I said that is what the covenants said it had to be." 
Kadrmas responded, "I have equipment coming in and I have staked it out and this 
is about where it has to be built."