Case Title: In re T.D.S.

Citation: 2024-Ohio-595

Docket Number: 2022-0359

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2024-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re T.D.S., Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-595.] 
 
 
 
                                                                
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-595 
IN RE T.D.S. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re T.D.S., Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-595.] 
Admissibility of evidence—Statements made by juvenile after he was read his 
Miranda rights were properly admitted at trial because he knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights—Court of appeals’ judgment 
affirmed. 
(No. 2022-0359—Submitted May 3, 2023—Decided February 21, 2024.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 110471, 2022-Ohio-525. 
__________________ 
DETERS, J. 
{¶ 1} T.D.S., a juvenile, contends that the juvenile court should have 
granted a motion to suppress all the statements that he made to police officers when 
they were investigating the homicide of another juvenile.  After reviewing the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding T.D.S.’s statements, the Eighth District 
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Court of Appeals concluded that T.D.S. had waived his Miranda rights knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.  We agree, so we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} In September 2019, Cleveland police officer Luther Roddy and his 
partner responded to a report of shots fired in an apartment building.  While 
searching the building, the officers discovered a male juvenile—later identified as 
14-year-old S.G.—with a gunshot wound to his chest and one to his leg.  S.G. later 
died of his injuries.  Based on information received from a high school principal, 
police investigators’ attention turned to T.D.S., who was then 15 years old. 
{¶ 3} Detectives Aaron Reese, Michael Legg, and Luis Rivera went to 
T.D.S.’s mother’s house to ask T.D.S. about the shooting.  The encounter in the 
house, which lasted an hour and 37 minutes, was captured on Detective Rivera’s 
body-worn camera. After getting permission from T.D.S.’s mother, Detective 
Reese asked T.D.S. where he had been on the day S.G. was shot. 
{¶ 4} Initially, T.D.S. denied having been at the apartment building where 
S.G. was found and challenged the detectives’ assertions that a person matching his 
description had been seen leaving the building.  But after about 35 minutes of 
questioning by the detectives, T.D.S. asked whether he and the detectives could go 
somewhere else.  In response, his mother left the room (but remained close by) and 
Detective Legg also left.  T.D.S. then told Detective Reese that he, S.G., and a third 
person had been in the building and that the third person had had a gun.  T.D.S. 
repeatedly told the detectives this version of the story, and he continued to deny 
that he was the person whom witnesses had seen leaving the building.  He 
maintained that the third person had shot the gun. 
{¶ 5} Upon further questioning by the detectives, T.D.S. told them that he 
had accidentally shot S.G. while playing with a gun.  He also agreed to show 
Detective Reese where he had thrown the gun after he had left the building.  After 
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these statements, Detective Reese told T.D.S. that he was going to read him his 
rights.  The detective asked T.D.S.’s mother to sit by the juvenile.  After Detective 
Reese informed T.D.S. of his rights under Miranda, the detective asked him 
whether he understood.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).  T.D.S. nodded his head. 
{¶ 6} The remainder of the recording—about 30 minutes—shows 
Detectives Reese and Rivera asking an occasional question as the detectives wait 
for uniformed officers to transport T.D.S. to the field where he said he had thrown 
the gun.  The recording ends when two uniformed police officers arrive. 
{¶ 7} After searching the field where T.D.S. said he had thrown the gun—
which was never recovered—the detectives took T.D.S. to the apartment building 
so that he could show them where the shooting had occurred.  While there, T.D.S. 
told the detectives that he had been sitting on a crate when he accidentally shot S.G.  
He then described walking toward S.G. and accidently shooting him a second time. 
{¶ 8} Next, according to Detective Reese, the detectives accompanied 
T.D.S. to the police station and interviewed him there.  (Although a recording of 
that interview—Exhibit 402—was viewed during the adjudicatory hearing and 
entered into evidence, the recording is not in the record that was provided to this 
court.)  Detective Reese testified about T.D.S.’s interview.  According to Detective 
Reese, T.D.S. told the detectives that S.G. had stolen a gun from a person named 
Vaughn and that Vaughn had reached out to T.D.S. and asked him to retrieve it. 
{¶ 9} Other evidence lends credibility to T.D.S.’s assertions about Vaughn.  
Text messages between Vaughn and S.G. reflect Vaughn’s asking S.G. about the 
gun.  And S.G.’s cousin testified that a few days before S.G. was killed, he heard 
T.D.S. tell S.G. that someone had offered him $1,000 to kill S.G. but that he wasn’t 
going to go through with it. 
{¶ 10} T.D.S. was charged with murder, two counts of felonious assault, 
tampering with evidence, and having a weapon while under a disability and with 
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an accompanying serious-youthful-offender specification.  The juvenile court 
determined that T.D.S. was amenable to treatment in the juvenile system and 
declined to transfer his case to adult court.  The court also determined, following a 
hearing, that T.D.S. was competent to stand trial. 
{¶ 11} T.D.S.’s counsel filed a motion to suppress his statements to the 
detectives.  During a hearing on the motion, the state argued that the statements 
made by T.D.S. before he was informed of his Miranda rights were admissible 
because he was not in custody when he made them.  T.D.S.’s counsel, on the other 
hand, maintained that he was in custody the entire time and that he had not 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right against self-
incrimination. 
{¶ 12} Following the hearing, the juvenile court entered an order 
concluding that “the statements of [T.D.S.] up to the point where he was given his 
Miranda warning and advisement of rights are suppressed.” 
{¶ 13} The case proceeded to an adjudicatory trial.  Before testimony began, 
the assistant prosecuting attorneys confirmed with the juvenile court that they could 
use T.D.S.’s statements that were made after he was informed of his Miranda rights.  
The judge replied, “I was not presented evidence of statements made during the 
station interrogation as part of the Motion to Suppress, so I make no findings as to 
the station interrogation.”  When defense counsel protested that she was “asserting 
that any subsequent statements that he made at the police station or anywhere to the 
police were fruit of the poisonous tree,” the juvenile court replied, “But you didn’t 
submit or present that interview [at the suppression hearing].” 
{¶ 14} After the presentation of evidence, the court adjudicated T.D.S. 
delinquent for felony murder, felonious assault, tampering with evidence, and 
having a weapon while under a disability and found him to be a serious youthful 
offender.  The court imposed an aggregate adult prison sentence of 15 years to life, 
with an additional 3-year consecutive sentence for firearm specifications.  Those 
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sentences were stayed on the condition that T.D.S. successfully complete his 
juvenile sentence.  For his juvenile disposition, T.D.S. was committed to the Ohio 
Department of Youth Services until age 21. 
{¶ 15} T.D.S. appealed his adjudication and disposition to the Eighth 
District.  He argued that he had been incompetent to stand trial, that his adjudication 
was not supported by credible evidence, that he had been denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because his defense counsel had not filed a motion to dismiss 
some charges against him, and that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion 
to suppress, in part because he had not voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.  The 
court of appeals affirmed his adjudication and disposition, finding none of his 
claims to have merit.  T.D.S. appealed to this court, challenging the court of 
appeals’ judgment but asserting arguments related only to the admission of his 
statements.  We accepted jurisdiction over the case to consider two propositions of 
law: 
 
Proposition of Law I:  When the police employ a deliberate 
two-step interrogation where they question first, and warn later, a 
child’s post warning statements are presumed inadmissible. 
Proposition of Law II:  Courts must assess the totality of the 
circumstances, including the child’s age, experience, education, 
background, intelligence, and capacity to understand when 
determining whether a child knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived their Miranda rights in a question first, warn 
later scenario. 
 
See 167 Ohio St.3d 1518, 2022-Ohio-3214, 195 N.E.3d 139. 
 
 
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II.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 16} T.D.S. challenges the use of his post-Miranda statements during trial 
on two related fronts.  He argues that he did not waive his Miranda rights 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  And he maintains that the statements 
made after the warning should have been presumed inadmissible under this court’s 
reasoning in State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985.  
Neither argument has merit.  The totality of the circumstances shows that his waiver 
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  And his argument regarding Farris fails 
for multiple reasons: he did not preserve the issue for our consideration, he did not 
provide an adequate record for us to review his claim, and he stretches our 
reasoning in Farris too far. 
A.  T.D.S. waived his rights knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
{¶ 17} Only T.D.S.’s statements following the Miranda warnings are at 
issue here; the prewarning statements were all suppressed.  For his postwarning 
statements to be admissible, the state needed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that T.D.S. waived his rights knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  
State v. Garrett, 171 Ohio St.3d 139, 2022-Ohio-4218, 216 N.E.3d 569, ¶ 101. 
 
In construing whether a juvenile defendant’s confession has 
been involuntarily induced, courts should consider the standard set 
forth in State v. Edwards [49 Ohio St.2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1051 
(1976), vacated in part on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 
3147, 57 L.Ed.2d 1155 (1978)], which looks to the totality of the 
circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior criminal 
experience of the accused; the length, intensity and frequency of 
interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; 
and the existence of threat or inducement. 
 
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In re Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 86, 89-90, 548 N.E.2d 210 (1989).  See also Fare v. 
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (“This 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has 
been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved.  We discern no 
persuasive reasons why any other approach is required where the question is 
whether a juvenile has waived his rights * * *”).  “[A] waiver is not involuntary 
unless there is evidence of police coercion, such as physical abuse, threats, or 
deprivation of food, medical treatment, or sleep.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State v. Wesson, 
137 Ohio St.3d 309, 2013-Ohio-4575, 999 N.E.2d 557, ¶ 35. 
1.  Under the totality of the circumstances, T.D.S.’s waiver was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
{¶ 18} T.D.S. maintains that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waive his rights.  T.D.S. claims in his brief that “[a]s the warnings were 
being given, [he] was crying and burying his head into his mother’s chest.”  The 
video recording, however, tells a different story.  T.D.S. did throw himself into his 
mother’s arms as Detective Reese began to read the warnings, but both Detective 
Reese and T.D.S.’s mother told him that he needed to listen.  His mother went so 
far as to separate him from her before the warnings were read. 
{¶ 19} After reading the Miranda warnings to T.D.S., Detective Reese 
asked whether he understood them.  T.D.S. nodded his head and continued to 
answer the detective’s questions.  T.D.S. points out that he was not given a written 
copy of the warnings and that he did not sign a waiver, but there is no requirement 
that a waiver be written.  State v. Myers, 154 Ohio St.3d 405, 2018-Ohio-1903, 114 
N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 68.  That T.D.S. indicated that he understood his rights and that he 
spoke with detectives after being informed of his rights shows that he waived them.  
Id., citing Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 
1098 (2010).  Nevertheless, T.D.S. maintains that his waiver was not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary. 
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{¶ 20} In support of his argument, T.D.S. emphasizes that he has a low I.Q.  
But Dr. Terry Pinsoneault, one of the psychologists who evaluated T.D.S.’s 
competency to stand trial, opined that T.D.S.’s communications skills were 
somewhat better than his I.Q. might reflect.  Even T.D.S. admitted during 
questioning at his mother’s house that his behavior in school was a cause of his 
academic struggles.  In any event, as we have noted, “deficient intelligence is but 
one factor in the totality of the circumstances that must be considered in 
determining the voluntariness of a waiver.”  State v. Ford, 158 Ohio St.3d 139, 
2019-Ohio-4539, 140 N.E.2d. 616, ¶ 190. 
{¶ 21} Courts also look to a juvenile’s prior criminal experience.  T.D.S. 
minimizes his prior contact with the juvenile system.  As recognized by the court 
of appeals, his adjudications of delinquency for attempted arson in 2014 and theft 
and falsification in 2019 must be considered as part of the totality of the 
circumstances. 2022-Ohio-525, ¶ 5, 20.  Dr. Steven Neuhaus, another psychologist 
who evaluated T.D.S.’s competency, stated that T.D.S. had a “good understanding” 
of his prior adjudications. 
{¶ 22} Our consideration of the “length, intensity and frequency” of 
T.D.S.’s interrogation, see Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d at 90, 548 N.E.2d 210, is limited 
by the record we have before us.  The questioning at T.D.S.’s mother’s house lasted 
about an hour and six minutes before he was read his Miranda rights.  The recording 
continued for about another half hour, but Detectives Reese and Rivera asked only 
a couple of follow-up questions during that time.  For example, Detective Reese 
asked whether T.D.S. was sure that the gun was not at his house.  And Detective 
Rivera asked how much of the story the alleged third person at the murder site 
knew. 
{¶ 23} The questioning at the house leading up to the Miranda warnings 
was not intense.  T.D.S.’s mother was in the room except briefly after T.D.S. 
indicated that he wanted to talk to detectives without his mother present.  And even 
January Term, 2024 
 
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then, she was nearby and can be heard speaking during the questioning.  T.D.S. did 
not seem intimidated by the detectives.  He even went so far as to challenge them.  
For example, at one point, T.D.S. asked Detective Reese, “Which way did I go into 
the building and which did I come out?  * * * You tell me, you got so much 
evidence.”  Moreover, the detectives accommodated T.D.S.’s request that Detective 
Legg leave. 
{¶ 24} The only other recording of T.D.S.’s statements that was included in 
the record shows him and the detectives walking toward and standing in the 
building where the shooting occurred.  As T.D.S. is walking, an unidentified officer 
asks him whether he needs to stop and if he is all right.  While in the building, the 
detectives asked where the shooting happened, and T.D.S. explained how he had 
shot S.G. two times accidentally.  The recording of that encounter is 6 minutes and 
25 seconds long.  The detectives’ questions about how the shooting had occurred 
were asked in conversational tones.  Again, there was no intensity to the 
questioning. 
{¶ 25} The total length of time of the questioning, which began at his 
mother’s house and ended at the police station, cannot be determined from the 
record.  But the recordings that were admitted at trial and included in the record 
here—the questioning at the house and the visit to the scene of the shooting—add 
up to approximately an hour and 45 minutes.  Although Detective Reese stated that 
the detectives and T.D.S. had spent “a few hours” in the field looking for the gun 
that T.D.S. had allegedly thrown, the detective later told the court that they had 
spent two hours in the field.  And according to an assistant prosecuting attorney’s 
statement during the trial, the recording of the interview at the police station was 
37 minutes long. 
{¶ 26} In short, T.D.S.’s prior experience in the juvenile system, his 
understanding of that system, and his communication with detectives indicate that 
his waiver of his Miranda rights was done knowingly and intelligently.  Moreover, 
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nothing about the tone or length of the questioning resulted in his will being 
overborne.  But T.D.S. maintains that the detectives’ actions amounted to coercion. 
2.  T.D.S.’s statements were not coerced by the detectives 
{¶ 27} Much of T.D.S.’s argument focuses on what he maintains were 
“coercive tactics” used by the police detectives.  Again, we are limited in what we 
have before us to review—the statements he made during the interview in his 
mother’s house, which were, for the most part, suppressed by the juvenile court, 
and T.D.S.’s statements while at the scene of the shooting.  Neither setting reveals 
evidence of police coercion. 
{¶ 28} T.D.S. claims that detectives lied to him—telling him that witnesses 
had identified him by name, that his DNA was found on S.G., and that gunshot 
residue was found on his property.  But T.D.S. does not direct us to these statements 
in the record.  Rather, in the recording from his mother’s house, Detective Reese 
can be heard asking T.D.S. whether there would be any reason his DNA would be 
on S.G.’s clothing and whether gunshot residue would be found on his clothes.  As 
to the statement about gunshot residue, T.D.S.’s clothes were not seized until after 
he was Mirandized and after his mother had given her consent for them to be taken, 
so T.D.S. knew that the officers had no such evidence. 
{¶ 29} Likewise, another of T.D.S.’s claims—that he was isolated from his 
mother and sister—is not borne out by the recording.  Throughout the questioning 
in her house, T.D.S.’s mother was either in the room where he was being 
interviewed or nearby.  And contrary to T.D.S.’s claim that he was made to sit alone 
while waiting for the uniformed police to take him to the field, his mother and sister 
are seen with him until the end of the video recording. 
{¶ 30} There was no indication of physical abuse or threats or deprivation 
of food, medical treatment, or sleep.  See Wesson, 137 Ohio St.3d 309, 2013-Ohio-
4575, 999 N.E.2d 557, at ¶ 35.  While Detective Reese did grab T.D.S.’s arm when 
he started to get up from the couch, he did not grab him roughly.  At that point, 
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Detective Reese had decided to make an arrest; T.D.S. was not free to leave.  
Moreover, Detective Reese told T.D.S.’s mother to sit with him on the couch.  And 
while T.D.S. was waiting for the uniformed police officers, he was drinking from a 
bottle of water provided by his mother.  In short, nothing that occurred in his 
mother’s house showed police coercion.  The video recording taken while at the 
scene of the shooting is only a few minutes long.  But no threats or mistreatment 
occurred then. 
{¶ 31} T.D.S. made two other assertions that merit comment.  First, during 
oral argument, his counsel suggested that T.D.S.’s mother’s presence during his 
questioning was not a benefit to him but was instead coercive.  Besides 
contradicting his claim in his brief that he had been isolated from his mother, his 
suggestion stands in contrast to this court’s statement that “[a] juvenile’s access to 
advice from a parent * * * also plays a role in assuring that the juvenile’s waiver is 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”  State v. Barker, 149 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-
2708, 73 N.E.3d 365, ¶ 24.  His mother urged him to talk to detectives if he knew 
something.  Setting aside whether a mother’s telling her son to talk to the detectives 
if he knows something is coercive, the comments from T.D.S.’s mother do not 
amount to police coercion when determining whether a waiver of rights was 
voluntary.  “Absent police conduct causally related to the confession, there is 
simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal 
defendant of due process of law.”  (Emphasis added.)  Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157, 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). 
{¶ 32} T.D.S. also proposes that a juvenile’s race be taken into account 
when considering the voluntariness of his waiver.  We note our deep discomfort 
with the suggestion that the ability to understand one’s Miranda rights depends on 
one’s race.  Moreover, it’s hard to see how such an argument could withstand an 
equal-protection challenge.  But in any event, T.D.S. did not make this argument 
below, so he has forfeited it.  The court of appeals correctly determined, based on 
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the totality of the circumstances, that T.D.S. knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. 
B.  T.D.S.’s Farris argument 
{¶ 33} T.D.S.’s claims regarding police coercion fold into his first 
proposition of law.  He argues that this court should apply Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 
519, 2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985, to this case and presume that the statements 
he made after being informed of his Miranda rights are inadmissible.  The problem 
is that T.D.S. never raised this argument in either the juvenile court or in his merit 
brief in the court of appeals, so it is forfeited.  And even if he had preserved the 
argument, he overstates the holding in Farris.  The court in Farris did not change 
the rule that uncoerced statements following a Miranda warning constitute an 
implied waiver. 
1.  State v. Farris 
{¶ 34} In Farris, this court considered the constitutionality of admitting into 
evidence the statements that Stephen Farris made to a police officer during a traffic 
stop for speeding.  The defendant first made inculpatory statements while in 
custody in a police cruiser before having been informed of his Miranda rights.  
Farris at ¶ 3.  After the statements were made, a police officer immediately 
informed Farris of his rights and repeated the same questions that had elicited the 
incriminating statements from him.  Id. at ¶ 4. 
{¶ 35} This court held that the defendant’s statements made before being 
informed of his rights should have been excluded because he was in custody at the 
time.  Id. at ¶ 14.  Then we turned our attention to whether a Miranda warning cured 
the problem, making his postwarning statements admissible.  Farris at ¶ 30.  We 
reasoned that “[t]emporally and substantively, [the officer’s] questioning of Farris 
constituted a single interrogation,” id., so that “Farris’s postwarning statements 
were not the result of an informed choice and [were] therefore inadmissible,” id. at 
¶ 36. 
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2.  T.D.S. waived any argument regarding Farris 
{¶ 36} T.D.S. asks this court to apply its reasoning in Farris and hold that 
his postwarning statements are presumed inadmissible.  But “[a] first principle of 
appellate jurisdiction is that a party ordinarily may not present an argument on 
appeal that it failed to raise below.”  State v. Wintermeyer, 158 Ohio St.3d 513, 
2019-Ohio-5156, 145 N.E.3d 278, ¶ 10.  Despite T.D.S.’s argument to the contrary, 
he did not preserve this argument in either the juvenile court or the appellate court. 
{¶ 37} In the juvenile court, T.D.S. argued in his motion to suppress that he 
was in custody when he gave his statements at his mother’s house and that, in any 
case, his statements were involuntary.  He did not mention Farris or a presumption 
of inadmissibility.  True, toward the end of his motion, T.D.S. asked the court to 
suppress “any and all purported statements obtained in contravention of his legal 
rights, as well as the subsequent statements and identification as the fruit of such 
tainted evidence.”  But that request was not sufficient to put forth an argument 
under Farris, especially because the cases underlying the reasoning in Farris—
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004), and 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985)—eschewed 
the “fruit of the poisonous tree” justification for excluding a postwarning 
confession following an unwarned statement.  Farris at ¶ 21-22.  “[The Elstad] 
court explained that evidence can be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree only 
after a constitutional violation and that a failure to give Miranda warnings is not 
equivalent to a violation of the Constitution * * *.”  Farris at ¶ 25. 
{¶ 38} The motion-to-suppress hearing focused on the arguments made in 
T.D.S.’s motion.  Again, there was no suggestion that Farris applied.  And as the 
juvenile court noted at the adjudicatory trial, during the motion-to-suppress hearing, 
there was no mention of statements other than those that were made by T.D.S. while 
at his mother’s house. 
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{¶ 39} Although T.D.S. claims in his brief to this court that he raised Farris 
in his argument to the court of appeals, the pages of his court of appeals’ brief to 
which he cites contain no mention of the case.  Instead, it appears the case was 
raised for the first time in his reply brief.  “Appellate courts generally will not 
consider a new issue presented for the first time in a reply brief.”  State v. 
Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 18.  Thus, it 
is not surprising that the court of appeals did not address any argument regarding 
Farris. 
{¶ 40} Moreover, because T.D.S. did not raise Farris in his merit brief in 
the court of appeals, he prevented vetting of the juvenile court’s decision with 
respect to custody—an issue central to the Farris analysis.  Farris applies when a 
suspect makes statements while in custody before being given Miranda warnings.  
Here, the juvenile court determined that T.D.S. was in custody when he made 
statements in his mother’s house.  But as the state points out, it could not appeal 
from this judgment, because it could not certify that the ruling to suppress T.D.S.’s 
statements had “rendered the state’s proof * * * so weak in its entirety that any 
reasonable possibility of effective prosecution [had] been destroyed.”  Crim.R. 
12(K)(2). So, the court of appeals considered the issue forfeited by the state.  2022-
Ohio-525 at ¶ 18.  The only way the appellate court could have reviewed the 
custody determination, then, was for T.D.S. to put the pre-Miranda statements at 
issue.  But he didn’t.  Because the issue that T.D.S. put before the court of appeals 
addressed only the post-Miranda statements, the court of appeals never decided 
whether the juvenile court correctly determined that T.D.S. was in custody when 
he was questioned by the detectives in his mother’s house. 
3.  The record does not support T.D.S.’s Farris argument 
{¶ 41} Even if T.D.S. had argued Farris in the court of appeals, the record 
would not have supported his argument.  Farris discussed the factors to be 
January Term, 2024 
 
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considered in determining whether a Miranda warning given after unwarned, 
custodial statements are made can be effective:   
 
“[T]he completeness and detail of the questions and answers 
in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the 
two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second, 
the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the 
interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous 
with the first.” 
 
Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985, at ¶ 28, quoting 
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643. 
{¶ 42} The factors discussed in Farris reveal the flaw in T.D.S.’s proposal 
that the case be applied here to create a presumption of inadmissibility of his 
postwarning statements.  Farris should be understood as one part of the 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding a waiver of Miranda 
rights.  Farris did not eliminate the general rule that “[w]here the prosecution shows 
that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an 
accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain 
silent.”  Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098. 
{¶ 43} In any event, because T.D.S. did not raise the application of Farris’s 
“question first, warn later” analysis during the hearing on his motion to suppress, 
the record is not fully developed to consider the factors laid out in Farris.  We do 
not know how all the statements before and after the Miranda warning overlap.  
(What we do know is that T.D.S. gave varying versions of the shooting throughout 
the questioning.)  And as discussed above, the timing and the setting of the post-
Miranda statements are also not clear.  Moreover, because we do not have a 
recording of the interview at the police station in our record, we do not know 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
whether the detectives “treated the second round as continuous with the first,” see 
Seibert at 615.  Given the record and T.D.S.’s failure to preserve the issue, we are 
unable to further consider the applicability of Farris to the statements made by 
T.D.S. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 44} The Eighth District Court of Appeals determined that T.D.S.’s 
statements made after he was read his Miranda rights were admissible because he 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights.  We agree and affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
BRUNNER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by STEWART, J. 
_________________ 
DONNELLY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 45} After reviewing this case with the benefit of a complete record and 
briefing from the parties, I have come to believe that this appeal should be 
dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
{¶ 46} The conclusions reached in both the majority opinion and Justice 
Brunner’s dissenting opinion turn on the application of settled law to the facts of 
the case.  And in the majority opinion, this application leads to the same result that 
a unanimous panel of the Eighth District Court of Appeals reached when reviewing 
this case.  See 2022-Ohio-525, ¶ 18-20.  Further, it appears that the more novel 
issue—whether this court’s holding in State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 2006-
Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985, should apply here—has not been properly preserved 
for our review.  See majority opinion, ¶ 36-43  And while I share the concerns 
expressed in Justice Brunner’s dissenting opinion about some of the tactics that the 
January Term, 2024 
 
17 
police used in their interrogation of T.D.S., I do not believe that this case is a proper 
vehicle for addressing those concerns. 
{¶ 47} At bottom, the majority’s resolution of this case provides nothing 
new to either the bench or bar except a fact-specific assessment of the legality of 
the police’s interrogation of T.D.S.  For that reason, I respectfully dissent. 
_________________ 
 
BRUNNER, J., dissenting. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
{¶ 48} In 2019, appellant, T.D.S., a 15-year-old with an IQ of 60 who was 
on juvenile probation but who otherwise had little previous criminal-justice 
experience, became a suspect in a murder after Cleveland police detectives received 
information from a school administrator.1  When three detectives, relying primarily 
on this information, went to T.D.S.’s home, his mother let them in and ordered 
T.D.S. to tell the detectives the truth.  Before administering Miranda warnings to 
T.D.S., see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 
(1966), at least one of the detectives repeatedly lied and told T.D.S. that they had 
evidence of his guilt, repeatedly insisted that they knew he was guilty, repeatedly 
threatened him with life in prison, and rejected each of T.D.S.’s denials of 
 
1. The detective testified at trial as follows:  
 
“Q: Okay. And what was your first order of business if you recall when 
you were assigned to that case? 
A [detective]: We always do in completing our original investigation, 
start digging into, you know, the information relating to the initial call, looking at 
9-1-1 calls, radio dispatch tapes and logs, but we had received some information 
from a high school principal that caused us to follow up immediately on what he 
had told us. 
Q: And did you go speak with that individual? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And after speaking with him, had you developed a suspect? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And who was that? 
A: [T.D.S.]. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
involvement.  The record shows that the detectives used psychological tactics to 
manipulate the low-IQ 15-year-old to get him to admit to the crimes—suggesting 
that the death of the victim might have been an accident and falsely promising 
numerous times that they would help him.  For the first hour of questioning, T.D.S. 
denied that he had been involved in the murder, but he eventually confessed that he 
had accidentally shot the victim, and he agreed to show the detectives where he had 
disposed of the gun. 
{¶ 49} Only after T.D.S. made this confession did one of the detectives 
verbally give him Miranda warnings, and the warnings were given only after the 
detective made the following statement: “Listen, I gotta read you your rights, OK.  
But we’re still gonna talk.  We ain’t done.”  (Emphasis added.)  At no point did any 
detective give T.D.S. any written warnings.  And T.D.S. never expressed that he 
waived his rights, either orally or in writing.  Following the recitation of the 
Miranda warnings, the detective asked again to be shown where the gun had been 
discarded—a gun which police did not find when they went to the empty field 
T.D.S. had identified, even though they excavated portions of the field with heavy 
equipment.  No further Miranda warnings were ever administered, and law-
enforcement personnel did not obtain an oral or written waiver of rights at any other 
point in the interrogations.  During the post-Miranda interrogations, the detectives 
obtained additional confessions at two different locations from T.D.S. following 
his initial confession made before the Miranda warnings were given. 
{¶ 50} The juvenile court suppressed T.D.S.’s pre-Miranda-warnings 
confession after determining that the interview of T.D.S. at his home had turned 
into a custodial interrogation before T.D.S. made that confession.  The court 
rejected the detective’s argument that T.D.S. could not have been in custody at the 
time of his first confession because there was no probable cause to arrest him until 
he initially confessed.  Even though the basis for initially questioning T.D.S. was 
information from the school administrator, and even though the substance and 
January Term, 2024 
 
19 
process of giving the Miranda warnings was substandard (never in writing) and 
inadequate (having been given after the preamble: “Listen, I gotta read you your 
rights, OK.  But we’re still gonna talk.  We ain’t done.”  [Emphasis added.]), the 
juvenile court did not suppress T.D.S.’s post-Miranda-warnings confessions, which 
ended up being the key—and nearly the only—evidence used to adjudicate T.D.S. 
delinquent for felony murder and other offenses.  I disagree with the majority 
opinion’s determination that the post-Miranda confessions were properly admitted.  
It is unfair for the majority opinion to gloss over the manner in which the detectives 
obtained all the confessions made and instead focus on the manner in which 
T.D.S.’s counsel challenged his post-Miranda confessions in the juvenile court and 
in the court of appeals.  Concluding that the objections raised by T.D.S.’s counsel 
did not specifically address the detectives’ question-first-warn-later approach to 
Miranda and that T.D.S. had therefore forfeited that objection is a stretch, based on 
this record. 
{¶ 51} This case involves a mix of circumstances that when considered 
without a strong focus on the constitutionally mandated right to a fair trial, will 
harm the future application of the law, especially for juveniles accused of adult 
crimes.  The circumstances here are troubling: a murder—someone’s life had been 
violently taken; the suspect, T.D.S., was a 15-year-old who was on juvenile 
probation and has a low IQ of 60; T.D.S.’s mother permitted three detectives to 
enter her home and ask questions of her son when, unbeknownst to her, they were 
proceeding largely on information received from a school administrator about 
T.D.S.; T.D.S.’s mother sternly instructed T.D.S. to tell the truth when speaking to 
the detectives; T.D.S.’s mother left him alone with the three detectives for a 
significant period of time, and during that time, the interview became custodial;2 
 
2. The juvenile court determined that the questioning became a custodial interrogation after TDS’s 
mother left the room.  It noted: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
the detective leading the questioning used psychological pressure and other 
coercive tactics of interrogation on T.D.S; the detectives failed to provide Miranda 
warnings before the interrogation began and a confession was obtained, and when 
the warnings were verbally administered, after at least an hour of questioning, the 
detective qualified the warnings by saying, “We ain’t done [talking]”; the record 
contains neither verbal nor written indication from T.D.S. that he consented to 
proceeding without an attorney or that he wished to keep speaking to the detectives 
rather than remain silent; and the detectives made threats of life imprisonment to 
the 15-year-old T.D.S., whom they outnumbered three to one, to keep him talking. 
{¶ 52} Again, these circumstances are troubling, and unfortunately, the 
majority did not resist the temptation to find that this type of interrogation process 
resulting in a confession was acceptable under the law and in accord with the United 
States Constitution.  After all, T.D.S. had confessed, hadn’t he?   
{¶ 53} But it’s not that simple.  And that’s not what we need to determine 
here.  The appropriate question is: Were T.D.S.’s rights adequately protected?  The 
Eighth District Court of Appeals and a majority of this court say yes.  I respectfully 
disagree. 
{¶ 54} The facts in this case do not support the Eighth District’s or the 
majority’s conclusions.  There has not been enough scrutiny in the majority opinion 
of the weaknesses of the Miranda process employed by law-enforcement personnel 
 
At that point in the videoed interview [after TDS’s mother left the room], the 
Court noted that the child’s body language or response began to change; that one 
of the three detectives in the home moved to the couch where the child was seated, 
as the interviewing detective remained on the child’s other side on an adjacent 
couch.  The Court cannot conclude that the child knew or had reasonable cause to 
believe that he could terminate the interview or leave.  The interview was 
conducted in his home, and his mother did not challenge the stages of the 
interview as its focus moved from interview to interrogation for a confession or 
adverse statements made by the child.  His attempt to move was curtailed as he 
was encouraged to return to the couch and continue the interview.  Subjectively, 
he did not present as being able to leave.  The Court finds that the child at this 
point was detained in the custody of the officers in his home. 
January Term, 2024 
 
21 
in this case.  That defense counsel sought to have T.D.S.’s confessions suppressed 
but perhaps did not use specific legal terminology in doing so is not a basis for 
ignoring the truth that the Miranda process did not pass constitutional muster and 
that T.D.S. did not waive his rights.  T.D.S.’s pre-Miranda-warnings confession 
should have been, and was rightly, suppressed.  But his post-Miranda-warnings 
confessions also should have been suppressed.  Thus, I respectfully dissent.  I would 
reverse the Eighth District’s judgment and remand T.D.S.’s case to the juvenile 
court for further proceedings, with instructions that T.D.S.’s confessions and any 
evidentiary fruit of them are constitutionally infirm and cannot be used to 
adjudicate him delinquent for committing the offenses with which he is charged. 
II.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 55} On September 4, 2019, 15-year-old T.D.S. was arraigned in the 
juvenile division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas on a complaint 
charging him with murder with firearm specifications, felony murder with firearm 
specifications, two counts of felonious assault with firearm specifications, 
tampering with evidence, and having weapons while under a disability.  In 
accordance with R.C. 2152.13, he was subsequently indicted for felony murder with 
firearm and serious-youthful-offender (“SYO”) specifications, two counts of 
felonious assault with firearm and SYO specifications, tampering with evidence, 
and having weapons while under a disability.  The juvenile court found that T.D.S. 
was amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system and declined to bind him over 
to adult court.  During the amenability hearing and again during a competency 
hearing, the juvenile court heard testimony that T.D.S.’s “full-scale IQ” was 60. 
{¶ 56} As the case proceeded in juvenile court, T.D.S. filed a motion to 
suppress the statements he had made to the police, arguing in part that he had not 
been given the warnings required by Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694, and that, therefore, his statements were inadmissible.  The motion 
also requested the suppression of “subsequent statements and identification as the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
fruit of such tainted evidence.”  During a hearing on the motion, a Cleveland police 
detective testified that he and two other detectives had gone to T.D.S.’s house to 
question him.  They were admitted to the house by T.D.S.’s mother.  The detectives 
did not tell her why they wanted to speak to her son and did not offer her time to 
discuss the matter with him first.  The three detectives then questioned T.D.S. 
without first reading him the warnings required by Miranda.  During the hearing, 
the detective took the position that T.D.S. was not in custody during that round of 
questioning, that at that time he and his colleagues did not have evidence sufficient 
for probable cause to arrest T.D.S., and that the questioning was not a custodial 
interrogation.  Nevertheless, the detective admitted lying to T.D.S. in an attempt to 
provoke an emotional response from him, telling T.D.S. that he would spend the 
rest of his life in prison if he did not tell the detectives what happened, and 
attempting to sway him to admit that he had shot the victim by accident as a way to 
get T.D.S. to admit guilt.  While the audio portion of video of the interrogation is 
faint, it is clear enough to be able to discern that the detective’s testimony about his 
questioning of T.D.S. considerably understates the deceptive and adversarial nature 
of the interrogation. 
{¶ 57} The video of the interrogation reflects that the detectives questioning 
T.D.S. repeatedly indicated to him that they already had strong evidence of his guilt 
in the form of witnesses, video of T.D.S. at or near the crime scene, gunshot residue, 
and DNA on the victim and at the murder scene.  These assertions were untrue; as 
admitted by the detective in his testimony at trial, the detectives went to T.D.S.’s 
house to question him, primarily going on information from a school administrator 
about T.D.S.  The detectives repeatedly and falsely indicated to T.D.S. that they 
knew that he had caused the death of the victim and that they were just trying to 
figure out if the killing was a murder or an accident.  They repeatedly threatened 
him with adult penalties, including life in prison.  Contrary to the detective’s 
testimony at the suppression hearing that he lacked probable cause when he arrived 
January Term, 2024 
 
23 
at T.D.S.’s home to question him, he repeatedly told T.D.S. that he and the other 
detectives already had sufficient evidence to arrest and even to convict T.D.S.  The 
detective rejected every attempt by T.D.S. to deny his involvement in the victim’s 
death.  At one point, he touched T.D.S. on the chest, felt his heart, and indicated to 
the low-I.Q. 15-year-old that his fast pulse showed that he was lying.  The detective 
asserted that negative assumptions would be drawn from T.D.S.’s silence, and he 
even made sniffing gestures before saying, “Smell that?  Smells like some bullshit.”  
The detective also switched tactics throughout the questioning, repeatedly and 
falsely telling T.D.S. that he was there to help him and that T.D.S. had only this 
one opportunity to help himself by telling the truth—even indicating that his mother 
would no longer support him if he did not tell the truth. 
{¶ 58} After an hour of denying involvement and then changing his 
statements to conform to the evidence that the police claimed to have, T.D.S. 
admitted that he had accidentally shot the victim while playing with a gun.  Just 
after he confessed, he asked to see his mother, and when she subsequently came 
into the room, he fell into her arms, sobbing.3  He then agreed to show the police 
where he had disposed of the gun.  He denied that he had had any intention to hurt 
the victim.  His mother was not present for his actual confession, having left him 
alone in the room with the three detectives approximately 36 minutes after the 
questioning began.  However, even when T.D.S.’s mother was present, she 
exhorted T.D.S. to tell the police the truth.  Only after T.D.S’s first confession did 
the detective leading the questioning finally administer the required Miranda 
warnings, but he prefaced them with the following statement: “Listen, I gotta read 
you your rights, OK.  But we’re still gonna talk.  We ain’t done.”  The detective 
 
3. Immediately after making his pre-Miranda-warnings confession, T.D.S. asked if he could talk to 
his mother.  He was told that he could, but when he started to stand up to go to her, a detective 
prevented him from leaving the room.  At that point, his mother reentered the room and sat with 
him. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
then followed up the warnings by asking again to be shown where the gun had been 
discarded, telling T.D.S. that it was “in the spirit of [his] continu[ing] cooperation.”  
The detective did not provide written warnings or ask for or obtain from T.D.S. any 
oral or written waiver of his constitutional rights. 
{¶ 59} After this interview, T.D.S. was transported to the field where he had 
supposedly discarded the gun, but a two-hour search involving a K-9 unit and a 
backhoe failed to uncover the weapon.  T.D.S. was also taken to the crime scene, 
where he gave an additional confession of how he had accidentally shot the victim.  
He then provided a further confession at the police station.  It is undisputed that the 
only Miranda warnings given were those given by the detective after an hour of 
questioning T.D.S. at his home and after he already confessed in response to 
questioning that had been initiated primarily because of information received from 
a school administrator. 
{¶ 60} The juvenile court suppressed “the statements of the child up to the 
point where he was given his Miranda warning and advisement of rights.”  The 
juvenile court, having heard the testimony at the suppression hearing, held that the 
interview at T.D.S.’s home was “an interrogation, complete with police 
interviewing techniques, emotional pleas, superficial promises, and finally, a 
characterization of the possible consequences of his failure to tell them the truth 
[being] life in prison.”  The juvenile court adjudged, based on the evidence it 
considered at the suppression hearing, that T.D.S. did not know or have “reasonable 
cause to believe that he could terminate the interview or leave.”  The juvenile court 
noted that the interrogation took place in T.D.S.’s home, that his mother had not 
challenged the accusatory nature of it, and that on video, T.D.S. “did not present as 
being able to leave,” and thus found that T.D.S. had been “detained in the custody 
of the officers in his home.” 
{¶ 61} The juvenile court’s ruling did not plainly or separately address the 
suppression of the post-Miranda statements.  However, at the outset of trial, the 
January Term, 2024 
 
25 
juvenile court made clear that despite the defense’s broad suppression request, only 
the pre-Miranda statements were suppressed and that all other statements and 
evidence were unaffected by the suppression ruling.  During the trial, when the 
prosecutor sought to introduce T.D.S.’s post-Miranda-warnings statements, 
defense counsel objected and again explained that that evidence was contaminated 
by the pre-Miranda confession and that any waiver of Miranda rights that the state 
argues T.D.S. made was invalid.  However, the juvenile court declined to change 
its ruling. 
{¶ 62} Ultimately, no witnesses to the shooting or physical evidence 
connecting T.D.S. with the offenses was produced at trial and the evidence used to 
prove his delinquency was primarily T.D.S.’s post-Miranda confessions, which 
were played and testified to at trial.  The juvenile court found T.D.S. delinquent for 
having committed all five counts charged, based almost entirely on his confessions.  
The juvenile court then committed T.D.S. to the legal custody of the Ohio 
Department of Youth Services until his 21st birthday and also imposed a serious-
youthful-offender sentence of 18 years to life, which it stayed on the condition that 
T.D.S. successfully complete the juvenile portion of his sentence. 
{¶ 63} On appeal, the Eighth District affirmed the juvenile court’s 
judgment.  2022-Ohio-525.  One of the issues challenged on appeal was whether 
the juvenile court erred in refusing to suppress the post-Miranda statements.  Id. at 
¶ 18-19.  In its decision, the appellate court did not apply the existing question-first-
warn-later caselaw in analyzing the juvenile court’s failure to suppress T.D.S.’s 
post-Miranda confessions.  Instead, the appellate court examined whether, 
notwithstanding the Miranda warnings, T.D.S.’s will was overborne by the police 
interrogation.  Id. at ¶ 19-20.  It distinguished his case from others and found that 
T.D.S.’s post-Miranda confessions had been properly admitted.  Id.  The Eighth 
District also found that the detectives’ questioning had not been coercive, even 
though it simultaneously recognized that the use of deceit and psychological 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
techniques and the exertion of improper influences or direct or implied promises 
are coercive law-enforcement tactics under the law.  Id. at ¶ 20. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 64} Caselaw instructs that when reviewing a decision on a motion to 
suppress, the reviewing court must afford deference to the trial court’s factual 
determinations, but it must not afford deference to the trial court’s legal 
determinations (questions of law call for the application of the law to the facts de 
novo).  See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 
L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-5307, 897 N.E.2d 
629, ¶ 50; State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, 
¶ 8. 
{¶ 65} Generally speaking, regarding the rights of a suspect during an 
interrogation, this court has stated: 
 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a person 
be notified of his or her right to remain silent and the right to the 
presence of an attorney prior to a custodial interrogation.  Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 
(1966).  “Where a suspect speaks freely to police after 
acknowledging that he understands his rights, a court may infer that 
the suspect implicitly waived his rights.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State v. 
Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 519, 747 N.E.2d 765 (2001).  “The 
determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of 
[the] right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular 
facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the 
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”  Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). 
 
January Term, 2024 
 
27 
(Emphasis added and brackets sic.)  State v. Cepec, 149 Ohio St.3d 438, 2016-Ohio-
8076, 75 N.E.3d 1185, ¶ 35.  Due process also protects juveniles, and Miranda 
warnings must be given to juveniles.  Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55, 87 S.Ct. 
1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). 
{¶ 66} The requirement that a suspect be given Miranda warnings is 
triggered when the suspect is “in custody.”  J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 
269-270, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011).  Determining whether a person 
was “in custody” during an interrogation involves determining whether under the 
circumstances of the interrogation a “ ‘reasonable person [would] have felt he or 
she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’ ”  (Brackets sic.)  
Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012), 
quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 
(1995).  The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that when 
determining whether a juvenile was in custody during an interrogation, his or her 
age is an important consideration because “a reasonable child subjected to police 
questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would 
feel free to go.”  J.D.B. at 272. 
{¶ 67} In T.D.S.’s case, he was 15 years old, was already on juvenile 
probation, and was confronted in his home by three detectives who were much 
larger than he was and who informed him from the beginning and repeatedly 
thereafter that he “need[ed]” to talk to them and was required to tell the truth.  His 
mother was present for part of the interrogation,4 but she instructed her son against 
the exercise of his unwarned rights to remain silent and to speak to an attorney, 
ordering T.D.S. to talk to the police and tell them what he knew.  It is abundantly 
clear that a reasonable person of T.D.S.’s age would not have felt free to terminate 
 
4. The court of appeals stated, contrary to video footage that shows otherwise, that “T.D.S.’s mother 
was present during the entire interview.”  2022-Ohio-525, ¶ 20. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
the interrogation and leave, and as the juvenile court concluded, T.D.S.’s 
confession occurred while his constitutional rights were being violated.  The 
juvenile court stated that it could not conclude that “the child knew or had 
reasonable cause to believe that he could terminate the interview or leave” and that 
despite the detective’s statement that T.D.S was a smart kid, “this 
acknowledgement did not translate to his ability to know or act upon ‘his rights’ at 
or during the interview.”  See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 
L.Ed. 224 (1948) (plurality opinion) (“[W]hen, as here, a mere child—an easy 
victim of the law—is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used.  
Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race.  He cannot be judged by 
the more exacting standards of maturity.  That which would leave a man cold and 
unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens”).  Thus, Miranda 
warnings were required. 
{¶ 68} And not only were Miranda warnings required: the timing of the 
warnings mattered.  Warnings given after a confession are ineffective.  Both this 
court and the United States Supreme Court have explicitly denounced the question-
first-warn-later tactic that was used in this case.  State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 
519, 2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985, ¶ 19-36; Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 
617, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (plurality opinion) and id. at 618 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment only).  In Seibert, four justices of the United 
States Supreme Court joined an opinion that states: 
 
[T]he reason that question-first is catching on is as obvious as its 
manifest purpose, which is to get a confession the suspect would not 
make if he understood his rights at the outset; the sensible 
underlying assumption is that with one confession in hand before 
the warnings, the interrogator can count on getting its duplicate, with 
trifling additional trouble.  Upon hearing warnings only in the 
January Term, 2024 
 
29 
aftermath of interrogation and just after making a confession, a 
suspect would hardly think he had a genuine right to remain silent, 
let alone persist in so believing once the police began to lead him 
over the same ground again.  A more likely reaction on a suspect’s 
part would be perplexity about the reason for discussing rights at 
that point, bewilderment being an unpromising frame of mind for 
knowledgeable decision.  What is worse, telling a suspect that 
“anything you say can and will be used against you,” without 
expressly excepting the statement just given, could lead to an 
entirely reasonable inference that what he has just said will be used, 
with subsequent silence being of no avail. 
 
(Footnote omitted.)  Id. at 613 (plurality opinion).  Moreover, this court has held 
that the Ohio Constitution provides more protection than the United States 
Constitution in these situations—all evidence recovered as fruit of unwarned 
confessions is to be excluded in Ohio: 
 
[E]vidence obtained as the direct result of statements made in 
custody without the benefit of a Miranda warning should be 
excluded.  We believe that to hold otherwise would encourage law-
enforcement officers to withhold Miranda warnings and would thus 
weaken Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  In cases like 
this one, where possession is the basis for the crime and physical 
evidence is the keystone of the case, warning suspects of their rights 
can hinder the gathering of evidence.  When physical evidence is 
central to a conviction and testimonial evidence is not, there can 
arise a virtual incentive to flout Miranda.  We believe that the 
overall administration of justice in Ohio requires a law-enforcement 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
environment in which evidence is gathered in conjunction with 
Miranda, not in defiance of it.  We thus join the other states that 
have already determined after Patane[5] that their state constitutions’ 
protections against self-incrimination extend to physical evidence 
seized as a result of pre-Miranda statements.  State v. Knapp (2005), 
2005 WI 127, 285 Wis.2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899; Commonwealth v. 
Martin (2005), 444 Mass. 213, 827 N.E.2d 198.  Thus, the physical 
evidence obtained as a result of the unwarned statements made by 
Farris in this case is inadmissible pursuant to Section 10, Article I 
of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
Farris at ¶ 49. 
{¶ 69} In this case, a psychologically coercive custodial interrogation took 
place for more than an hour before the Miranda warnings were administered.  The 
detectives questioning T.D.S., a 15-year-old with an IQ of 60 and little previous 
criminal-justice experience, repeatedly lied and told T.D.S. about evidence they had 
of his guilt, repeatedly insisted that they knew he was guilty, repeatedly threatened 
him with life in prison, rejected every attempt by T.D.S. to deny involvement, 
intentionally manipulated his emotions, suggested that the victim’s death may have 
been accidental as a ploy to obtain a confession, and repeatedly and falsely 
promised to help him.  After T.D.S.’s repeated denial of involvement, he finally 
confessed to accidentally shooting the victim and agreed to show the police where 
he had disposed of the gun.  And only after this confession did a detective give the 
Miranda warnings, but he prefaced the warnings with the statement, in 
contradiction of the rights to silence and to an attorney, “Listen, I gotta read you 
 
5. We noted in Farris that in United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 159 L.Ed.2d 
667 (2004), the United States Supreme Court concluded that “the Miranda rule protects against 
violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, but does not apply to nontestimonial 
physical evidence.”  Farris at ¶ 37. 
January Term, 2024 
 
31 
your rights, OK.  But we’re still gonna talk.  We ain’t done.”  He then followed up 
the warnings by asking again to be shown where the gun had been discarded, “in 
the spirit of [T.D.S.’s] “continu[ing] cooperation.”  He did not provide written 
warnings or ask for or obtain any sort of waiver, oral or written.  The detectives 
then obtained repeated confessions at two different locations without administering 
any further Miranda warnings. 
{¶ 70} Because, as Justice Kennedy stated in his opinion in Seibert, 
“Miranda’s clarity is one of its strengths,” Seibert at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in judgment only), and because (1) only one set of Miranda warnings was 
administered, (2) the warnings were given after T.D.S. confessed, (3) the warnings 
were given only verbally, not in writing, and (4) there is no evidence that the 15-
year-old T.D.S. waived his Miranda rights, both Seibert and Farris support 
suppressing T.D.S.’s post-Miranda statements.  The concurring opinion in Seibert 
applied a narrower test than the plurality opinion—one that is applicable “only in 
the infrequent case * * * in which the two-step interrogation technique was used in 
a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning.”  Seibert at 622 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment only).  Based on the evidence and the admonishment from 
the detective questioning T.D.S.—“Listen, I gotta read you your rights, OK.  But 
we’re still gonna talk.  We ain’t done”—I would find the detective’s technique, 
even under the narrower test used by Justice Kennedy (whose concurrence in the 
judgment in Seibert provided the crucial fifth vote), violative of Miranda. 
{¶ 71} The majority opinion posits that T.D.S. “did not preserve the issue 
for our consideration, he did not provide an adequate record for us to review his 
claim, and he stretches our reasoning in Farris too far.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 16.  
The majority opinion states that “T.D.S. never raised [the question-first-warn-later] 
argument in either the juvenile court or in his merit brief in the court of appeals, so 
it is forfeited.”  Id. at ¶ 33.  I do not agree with these conclusions. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
32 
{¶ 72} T.D.S. filed a motion to suppress the statements that he made to the 
police on the grounds that he had not been read the Miranda warnings and his 
statements were not voluntary.  The motion also requested the suppression of 
“subsequent statements and identification as the fruit of such tainted evidence.”  
The juvenile court granted that motion “in pertinent part.”  Then, at the outset of 
trial, the juvenile court made clear that despite defense counsel’s broad suppression 
request, the suppression ruling applied only to the pre-Miranda statements and that 
all other statements and evidence were unaffected by the ruling.  Defense counsel 
objected, stating: 
 
Your Honor, I did in my Motion to Suppress, at the end of 
my motion I do ask that the Court suppress any and all purported 
statements obtained in contravention of the legal rights as well as 
the subsequent statements and identification as the fruit of such 
tainted evidence. 
So I am asserting that any subsequent statements that he 
made at the police station or anywhere to the police were fruit of the 
poisonous tree. 
 
Moreover, when the prosecutor sought to introduce the post-Miranda statements 
made by T.D.S., T.D.S.’s counsel objected and again explained that T.D.S’s post-
Miranda statements were contaminated by the pre-Miranda confession and that any 
waiver of Miranda rights that T.D.S. may have made was invalid. 
{¶ 73} Contrary to the majority’s assertion, T.D.S. also raised these issues 
on appeal.  For example, in his brief to the Eighth District, he noted that the juvenile 
court had suppressed the pre-Miranda statements, but he argued that it should also 
have suppressed the post-Miranda statements: 
 
January Term, 2024 
 
33 
T.D.S. was interviewed in four different locations on 
September 3, 2019.  First, he was interviewed in his home.  After he 
was interviewed for over an hour, he was Mirandized, then arrested 
and taken to a field on Corlett Avenue where he was questioned.  
Then, he was interviewed at the crime scene—an abandoned house 
on Gay Street.  Finally, still under arrest, he was taken to the police 
station and interrogated. 
T.D.S. was in custody for all of these interviews—the 
juvenile court found as much during its analysis of the motion to 
suppress.  And, the juvenile court suppressed all the statements that 
T.D.S. made to the police before the Miranda warnings were given, 
finding them to be the product of police coercion.  But, the court did 
not undergo any analysis on whether the statements T.D.S. made 
after the Miranda warnings were voluntary.  When T.D.S. received 
his one and only Miranda warnings about an hour into a 6-hour long 
interview, the slate was not wiped clean.  The vulnerabilities that 
existed within T.D.S. still existed after Detective Aaron Reese 
recited the warnings, without catering to T.D.S.’s abilities or 
checking for understanding.  And, rather than “curing” the interview 
of its coerciveness, the warnings served as another tool in a wide 
array of psychological tactics that the police used against T.D.S. that 
day. 
 
(Record citations omitted.)  Later in the same section of his appellate brief, T.D.S. 
argued: “The Miranda warnings were not given again before T.D.S. was asked to 
give another statement.”  And this argument was made within the context of a 
discussion concerning the juvenile court’s suppression of T.D.S.’s pre-Miranda 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
34 
statements—leaving the post-Miranda statements as the only statements that T.D.S. 
could have been challenging on appeal. 
{¶ 74} And T.D.S.’s reply brief before the Eighth District leaves no doubt: 
 
T.D.S. argues that the juvenile court got it right in 
suppressing his statements pre-Miranda.  And, [the] essence of this 
assignment is that the suppression should have extended to the post-
Miranda statements because the factors the juvenile court relied on 
in granting the motion continued to exist—and even got worse—
after the warnings were given.  These factors prevented T.D.S. from 
validly waiving his rights.  Further, the suppression of the post-
Miranda statements is required under the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
decision in State v. Farris.  State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 
2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985, ¶ 17-20.  The essential facts were 
almost identical to the situation here: Mr. Farris was interrogated by 
the police with no Miranda warnings when he gave incriminating 
statements, then Miranda warnings were given and Mr. Farris gave 
the exact same statements again.  Id. at ¶ 1-5.  The court reasoned: 
“The overarching concern when considering the sufficiency 
of a Miranda warning is whether it is given in a manner that 
effectuates its purpose of reasonably informing a defendant of his 
rights.  The words themselves are not magical and are not curative 
of interrogation mistakes that occur before it is given: 
“ ‘Just as “no talismanic incantation [is] required to satisfy 
[Miranda’s] strictures,” California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359, 
101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981) (per curiam), it would be 
absurd to think that the mere recitation of the litany suffices to 
satisfy Miranda in every conceivable circumstance.  “The inquiry is 
January Term, 2024 
 
35 
simply whether the warnings reasonably ‘conve[y] to [a suspect] his 
rights as required by Miranda.’ ”  Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 
195, 203, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989) (quoting 
California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 361, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 
L.Ed.2d 696 (1981)).’  Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611, 124 
S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004). 
“In a question-first scenario in which the Miranda warning 
is withheld and the suspect makes inculpatory statements, the risk is 
that the warning will mean less when it is eventually recited: 
“ ‘The threshold issue when interrogators question first and 
warn later is thus whether it would be reasonable to find that in these 
circumstances the warnings could function “effectively” as Miranda 
requires.  Could the warnings effectively advise the suspect that he 
had a real choice about giving an admissible statement at that 
juncture?  Could they reasonably convey that he could choose to 
stop talking even if he had talked earlier?  For unless the warnings 
could place a suspect who has just been interrogated in a position to 
make such an informed choice, there is no practical justification for 
accepting the formal warnings as compliance with Miranda, or for 
treating the second stage of interrogation as distinct from the first, 
unwarned and inadmissible segment.’  Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611-612, 
124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643.”  [Farris] at ¶ 17-20. 
Here, the warnings did not function effectively.  The one and 
only recitation of T.D.S.’s Miranda warnings were just a few 
seconds out of a continuous 6 hour long plus interview.  The 
warnings were delivered by a police officer who had just threatened 
T.D.S. with life in prison.  They were given to a 15-year-old who 
had documented intellectual deficits.  They were quietly and rotely 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
36 
recited to a child who was actively sobbing into his [mother’s] arms, 
who was not looking at the person delivering them or nodding along 
in acknowledgement or understanding.  The officer did not tell 
T.D.S. that he could stop talking, even though he had previously 
talked.  Then, contrary to the state’s assertion, T.D.S. did not “agree 
to accompany” the police to the field, he was arrested and taken 
there in handcuffs.  As such, this Court must find that the juvenile 
court erred in denying the motion to suppress in part. 
 
(Emphasis sic; second and third set of brackets added in Seibert; fourth and fifth 
set of brackets added in Duckworth.) 
{¶ 75} Even if T.D.S. was not as artful as the majority would have liked him 
to be in preserving the question-first-warn-later issue, a fair review of the record 
tells the truth of the matter—he did not forfeit the issue in either the juvenile court 
or the court of appeals.  And because the juvenile court suppressed the pre-Miranda 
statements, the only statements T.D.S. could have been challenging in the juvenile 
court and on appeal were his post-Miranda statements.  Based on both federal and 
state caselaw, the question-first-warn-later issue is dispositive and cannot be 
ignored or discarded. 
{¶ 76} Even the state recognizes that the substance of the question-first-
warn-later issue needs to be addressed in this case.  It asserts in its brief to this court 
that the United States Supreme Court’s caselaw on this point is not clear.  In Oregon 
v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), the court declined 
to suppress a post-Miranda confession that followed a prewarning admission.  But 
the facts in Elstad are notably different from those in Seibert, Farris, and the case 
at bar.  In Farris, we described Elstad’s facts as follows: 
 
January Term, 2024 
 
37 
In Elstad, police officers went to the home of the 18-year-
old defendant with a warrant for his arrest.  While one officer went 
to the kitchen to explain to the suspect’s mother that her son was 
being arrested for the burglary of a neighbor’s residence, another 
officer stayed with Elstad in the living room and had a brief 
discussion with him.  The officer explained that the neighbor’s 
house had been robbed and that he thought Elstad was involved.  
Elstad stated to the officer, “Yes, I was there.”  Elstad, 470 U.S. at 
301, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222. 
The officers then transported Elstad to the sheriff’s 
department, and about one hour later, interviewed him in the office 
of one of the officers.  One officer advised Elstad for the first time 
of his Miranda rights, reading from a standard card, without 
mentioning Elstad’s previous statement.  Elstad waived his rights 
and then made a full, detailed statement, explaining that he had 
known that the neighbors would be out of town and that he had been 
paid to help several people gain entry through a defective sliding 
glass door. 
 
Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985, at ¶ 23-24.  The full 
extent of the pre-Miranda interaction at issue in Elstad was described by the officer 
as follows: 
 
“I sat down with Mr. Elstad and I asked him if he was aware 
of why Detective McAllister and myself were there to talk with him.  
He stated no, he had no idea why we were there.  I then asked him 
if he knew a person by the name of Gross, and he said yes, he did, 
and also added that he heard that there was a robbery at the Gross 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
38 
house.  And at that point I told Mr. Elstad that I felt he was involved 
in that, and he looked at me and stated, ‘Yes, I was there.’ ” 
 
Elstad at 301.  The pre-Miranda conversation at issue in Elstad was brief, and 
Elstad’s confession was essentially spontaneous.  In contrast, for T.D.S., the pre-
Miranda confession occurred after an hour-plus-long psychologically coercive 
interrogation that reduced the accused child to a sobbing heap.  Clearly, the cases 
are factually distinguishable from each other. 
{¶ 77} Even when Miranda warnings are not required or are validly waived, 
a confession is not admissible unless it is voluntary.  Dickerson v. United States, 
530 U.S. 428, 444, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000).  The burden of 
establishing the voluntariness of a confession is on the state,  State v. Dixon, 101 
Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-1585, 805 N.E.2d 1042, ¶ 25, and in the case of a 
juvenile, “ ‘the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was 
voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it 
was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or 
despair,’ ” State v. Barker, 149 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-2708, 73 N.E.3d 365,  
¶ 41, quoting Gault, 387 U.S. at 55, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527.  Regarding 
juvenile confessions, we have explained: 
 
In deciding whether a juvenile’s confession is involuntarily 
induced, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances, 
including the age, mentality and prior criminal experience of the 
accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; and 
the existence of physical deprivation or inducement. 
 
In re Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 86, 548 N.E.2d 210 (1989), paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  Several appellate courts, including the Eighth District in this case, have 
January Term, 2024 
 
39 
set forth which tactics by law-enforcement personnel are coercive, especially when 
they are used on juvenile suspects; these tactics include, but are not limited to, 
“ ‘ “physical abuse, threats, deprivation of food, medical treatment or sleep, use of 
certain psychological techniques, exertion of improper influences or direct or 
implied promises, and deceit.” ’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  2022-Ohio-525 at ¶ 20, 
quoting In re M.J.C., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-05-124, 2015-Ohio-820, ¶ 18, 
quoting In re N.J.M., 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2010-03-026, 2010-Ohio-5526,  
¶ 20; In re D.F., 2015-Ohio-2922, 38 N.E.3d 1202, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.), quoting N.J.M. 
at ¶ 20, which cited State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 189, 702 N.E.2d 866 (1998).  
And the United States Supreme Court has stated: 
 
By its very nature, custodial police interrogation entails 
“inherently compelling pressures.”  Miranda, 384 U.S., at 467, 86 
S. Ct. 1602[, 16 L.Ed.2d 694].  Even for an adult, the physical and 
psychological isolation of custodial interrogation can “undermine 
the individual’s will to resist and * * * compel him to speak where 
he would not otherwise do so freely.”  Ibid.  Indeed, the pressure of 
custodial interrogation is so immense that it “can induce a 
frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they 
never committed.”  Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 321, 129 
S.Ct. 1558, 1570, 173 L.Ed.2d 443, 458 (2009) (citing Drizin & Leo, 
The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 
N.C.L.Rev. 891, 906-907 (2004)); see also Miranda, 384 U.S., at 
455, n. 23, 86 S.Ct. 1602[, 16 L.Ed.2d 694].  That risk is all the more 
troubling—and recent studies suggest, all the more acute—when the 
subject of custodial interrogation is a juvenile.  See Brief for Center 
on Wrongful Convictions of Youth et al. as Amici Curiae 21-22 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
40 
(collecting empirical studies that “illustrate the heightened risk of 
false confessions from youth”). 
 
(Ellipsis sic.)  J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 269, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L.Ed.2d 310. 
{¶ 78} Given (1) T.D.S.’s low IQ, (2) his youth, (3) the psychologically 
coercive nature of the interrogation, and (4) the fact that the police never found the 
gun where T.D.S. said that he had discarded it, the possibility that this coerced 
confession was also a false confession cannot be ignored.  There was little evidence 
presented at trial to corroborate T.D.S.’s confessions.  Some testimony established 
that the victim’s life was under threat from an adult referred to as “Vaughn” from 
whom the victim had allegedly stolen a gun.  There was also testimony that before 
the homicide, T.D.S. was overheard telling the victim that “Vaughn” had offered 
T.D.S. $1,000 to kill the victim but T.D.S. then reassured the victim that he would 
not do it.  Though the state suggests that that testimony shows a motive for murder, 
the testimony actually cuts both ways because it also is evidence that there was at 
least one gun-owning adult who was interested in causing the victim’s death.  
Additionally, other testimony at trial, including from the victim’s family, 
established that T.D.S. and the victim were friends. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 79} T.D.S. was subjected to a psychologically coercive custodial 
interrogation for over an hour before he yielded to pressure and confessed.  The 
coercive tactics used by the interrogating detective included offering to help T.D.S. 
and suggesting that T.D.S. may have accidentally killed the victim.  Only after 
confessing under this pressure was T.D.S. administered Miranda warnings, but 
along with the Miranda warnings, he was told by the detective that his rights to 
remain silent and to consult an attorney—the indisputable rights of Miranda—were 
not unconditional and that his assertion of those rights would not terminate the 
interrogation: “Listen, I gotta read you your rights, OK.  But we’re still gonna talk.  
January Term, 2024 
 
41 
We ain’t done.”  T.D.S. then was led to confess twice more without receiving 
renewed warnings and without an understanding that his prior confession could not 
be used against him.  These circumstances should give any court pause.  T.D.S. was 
15 years old.  He was also a child who was psychologically and mentally vulnerable 
with a low IQ.  Inescapably, the methods used by the detectives in this case to elicit 
T.D.S.’s first and subsequent confessions were unconstitutional.  And the 
objections made by his counsel regarding both the pre-Miranda and post-Miranda 
statements were made with sufficient clarity and were not forfeited.  T.D.S.’s 
confessions, the key evidence used to adjudicate him delinquent, were 
unconstitutionally obtained and must be excluded under Farris.  To suggest that 
this issue was not preserved is absurd in light of the record before us.  The post-
Miranda statements should have been excluded as unconstitutional fruits of the pre-
Miranda custodial interrogation and confession.  Because the majority opinion 
endorses an interrogation that flouts precedent, I dissent. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristen 
Hatcher, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Elizabeth R. Miller, Ohio Public Defender, and Lauren Hammersmith, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
_________________