Case Title: Dudley v. Franklin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Dudley v. Franklin1999 WY 98983 P.2d 1223Case Number: 98-147Decided: 07/08/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
JENNIE M. DUDLEY, Appellant (Plaintif),

v.

ROBERT C. FRANKLIN; AND 
NELL D. COMBS, a/k/a DARLINE COMBS, DARLENE COMBS and N. DARLENE MARKLEY, 
Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Fremont County, The Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, 
Judge.

Joel M. Vincent 
of Vincent & Vincent, Riverton, WY., Representing 
Appellant.

Sky D Phifer of 
Phifer Law Office, Lander, WY., Representing 
Appellees.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      In this dispute 
over a .16 acre roadway, appellant Jennie Dudley (Mrs. Dudley) challenges the 
district court's entry of summary judgment quieting title in the appellees (the 
Franklins). She also challenges the district court's refusal to set aside the 
summary judgment despite her submission of additional evidence. Because we 
conclude the summary judgment was proper and the additional evidence submitted 
by Mrs. Dudley does not constitute newly discovered evidence, we 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Mrs. Dudley 
succinctly states the following issues:

1. Whether 
summary judgment in defendants' favor was proper.

2. Whether the 
trial court properly denied the appellants' motion for new 
trial.

The Franklins 
adopt Mrs. Dudley's statement of the issues and add the 
following:

Whether the 
Supreme Court should certify that there was no reasonable cause for appeal and 
award costs and penalties pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05.

FACTS

[¶3]      This case centers 
around a .16 acre parcel of land that contains a roadway. In April of 1996, Mrs. 
Dudley filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to the .16 acre parcel and 
another .84 acre parcel. She also sought a declaration that the Franklins do not 
hold an easement over the .16 acre parcel. The Franklins answered and denied 
Mrs. Dudley's claim.

[¶4]      Both parties 
moved for summary judgment. In the materials submitted in support of their 
motion for summary judgment, the Franklins included three deeds. The deeds 
revealed three conveyances between the Franklins and the Dudleys (Mrs. Dudley 
and her now deceased husband). On August 6, 1981, the Dudleys quit claimed to 
the Franklins a 1.85 acre parcel of land that included the disputed .16 acre 
parcel. This deed also recited that A[t] his tract of land is subject to a 40 
foot roadway on the west boundary. " On May 28, 1982, the Franklins quit claimed 
1.69 acres of the same parcel back to the Dudleys. The disputed .16 acre parcel 
was thus retained by the Franklins. On June 15, 1982, the Dudleys conveyed, by 
warranty deed, the 1.69 acre parcel back to the Franklins, leaving the Franklins 
as the sole owners of the entire 1.85 acre parcel. This third deed provided: 
"This includes the right of grantees [Franklins] to use the 40 foot roadway 
easement on west side of property. " Relying on the three deeds, the district 
court granted the Franklin motion for summary judgment.

[¶5]      Before the 
district court entered a quiet title decision, Mrs. Dudley moved to set aside 
the summary judgment based on newly discovered evidence. As newly discovered 
evidence, Mrs. Dudley relied on an August 17, 1981, quit claim deed of the 1.85 
acre parcel from the Franklins to the Dudleys. Mrs. Dudley also submitted an 
affidavit stating she has paid property tax on the property since 1955. The 
district court denied Mrs. Dudley's motion, finding that she had failed to 
establish any ground under W.R.C.P. 59 that entitled her to relief, specifically 
finding that the deed and affidavit did not constitute newly discovered 
evidence. The district court then quieted title to the 1.85 acre parcel, 
including the disputed .16 acre parcel, in the Franklins. The court further 
ruled that Mrs. Dudley does not own an easement over the .16 acre parcel. Mrs. 
Dudley's timely appeal followed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶6]      Our standard for 
reviewing summary judgment is well established. Summary judgment is appropriate 
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56(c); White v. University of 
Wyoming, 954 P.2d 983, 985 (Wyo. 1998). This court evaluates the propriety of 
summary judgment using the same standards and materials used by the district 
court, affording no deference to the district court's decision on issues of law. 
Id.

DISCUSSION

[¶7]      Mrs. Dudley 
challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment, claiming that title 
to the .16 acre parcel should be vested in her. In the alternative, she claims 
that the district court incorrectly determined she does not own an easement over 
the .16 acre parcel. We reject these contentions.

[¶8]      We first examine 
whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment quieting title to 
the .16 acre parcel in the Franklins. In support of their motion for summary 
judgment, the Franklins submitted the following materials: an affidavit from the 
Franklins; three deeds; and two real estate contracts. The deeds reveal that, 
after a number of conveyances between the Dudleys and the Franklins, the 
Franklins eventually were deeded the 1.85 acre parcel, including the disputed 
.16 acre. With these deeds, the Franklins established their claim of ownership 
to the .16 acre parcel. To test the propriety of summary judgment, however, we 
must examine the materials submitted by Mrs. Dudley to ascertain their legal 
effect.

[¶9]      Mrs. Dudley's 
summary judgment materials included a map of the property; a quit claim deed 
from Mrs. Franklin to Mr. Franklin of the 1.69 acre parcel; two affidavits of 
survivorship establishing the death of Mrs. Dudley's spouse; and an ownership 
and encumbrance report1 prepared by a title company. After 
reviewing these materials, we conclude they neither establish ownership of the 
property in Mrs. Dudley's favor nor contradict the Franklin's claim of title to 
the property. First, neither the map nor the quit claim deed between the 
Franklins is helpful to our determination of who is the owner of the .16 acres 
because neither grants Mrs. Dudley any interest in the property. The two 
affidavits of survivorship are also of little help; both refer to parcels of 
land adjacent to the 1.85 acre parcel. Finally, the ownership and encumbrance 
report suffers from similar deficiencies: it refers to parcels adjacent to the 
1.85 acre parcel and does not establish ownership of the .16 acre parcel. 
Despite her protests, Mrs. Dudley has failed to establish her claim of title or, 
much less, Acolor of title. " Hirsch v. McNeill, 870 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Wyo. 
1994). With these materials before it, the district court reached the only 
conclusion that could be reached: it entered summary judgment quieting title to 
the disputed .16 acre parcel in the Franklins. The district court's decision on 
this issue is affirmed.

[¶10]   The next question is whether the 
district court correctly determined that Mrs. Dudley does not hold an easement 
over the .16 acre parcel. In attacking the district court's determination, Mrs. 
Dudley relies on (1) easement references in two deeds, and (2) an affidavit of 
survivorship. After reviewing these materials, we conclude that the materials do 
not establish an easement in Mrs. Dudley's favor.

[¶11]   Turning first to the two deeds, we 
note that the district court concluded neither of the deeds establishes the 
location of the easement with the particularity required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
34-1-141 (Lexis 1999).2 In this case, we need not decide 
whether the descriptions in the deeds are sufficient to locate the easements. 
This is because neither of the deeds Mrs. Dudley relies upon establishes that 
she has been granted an easement. The first deed states that the property is 
subject to" an easement, but does not indicate who holds the easement over the 
property. The second deed establishes the right of the Franklins, not the 
Dudleys, to use an easement over the property. Because neither of the deeds 
establishes a grant of an easement to Mrs. Dudley, the district court was 
correct in determining that the two deeds were not sufficient to establish an 
easement for Mrs. Dudley.

[¶12]   We next examine the legal effect of 
the affidavit of survivorship. The affidavit does mention an easement over the 
.16 acre parcel and describes its location with particularity. Like the two 
deeds, however, the affidavit of survivorship does not establish the grant of an 
easement. Indeed, an affidavit of survivorship does not grant anything. Rather, 
such a document merely establishes that the affiant has succeeded to the 
interest of a deceased joint owner. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-9-102 (Lexis 1999). As 
such, it is not a grant and does not establish Mrs. Dudley's claim to an 
easement. Because Mrs. Dudley has not produced any materials to establish a 
grant of an easement, we conclude that the district court correctly determined 
Mrs. Dudley does not own an easement across the .16 acre parcel. 

Motion to Alter 
or Amend Judgment Under Rule 59(e), W.R.C.P.3

[¶13]   Nine days after summary judgment 
was entered in Franklin's favor, Mrs. Dudley moved to set aside the order based 
on newly discovered evidence. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, 
the parties debate the propriety of the district court's action against the 
guidelines contained in W.R.C.P. 59(a), which governs motions for new trial. 
However, it is well established under Rule 59's federal counterpart that A[a] 
postjudgment motion to reconsider summary judgment based on subsequently 
produced evidence is treated as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). " Webber v. Mefford, 43 F.3d 1340, 1345 (10th Cir. 1994); 
Dupre v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 930 F. Supp. 248, 250 (E. D. La. 1996); Medley v. 
Westpoint Stevens, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 697, 698-99 (M. D. Ala. 1995) (compiling 
cases); Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d §§ 
2810.1, 2817 (1995). The decision to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) 
is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Webber v. Mefford, 
43 F.3d  at 1345; Dupre v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 930 F. Supp.  at 250; see also 
Walton v. Texasgulf, Inc., 634 P.2d 908, 913 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶14]   In respect to motions under Rule 
59(e), we have written:

In order to 
qualify for treatment as a motion to alter or amend a judgment, the motion must 
articulate a new ground which could not have been brought before the court 
during the action and upon which the trial court should utter a different 
ruling. The motion to alter or amend cannot be invoked simply to argue matters 
already presented and disposed of by the trial court. Appropriate new grounds 
are: 1) an intervening change in controlling law; 2) the availability of new 
evidence not available at the time the case was originally heard; or 3) the need 
to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest 
injustice.

Sherman v. Rose, 
943 P.2d 719, 721 (Wyo. 1997) (citations omitted).

[¶15]   In this case, the only permissible 
Rule 59(e) ground recited by Mrs. Dudley is newly discovered evidence. Testing 
the evidence submitted by Mrs. Dudley (a deed and affidavit) against the newly 
discovered evidence standard, it is clear that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying her motion to set aside the summary judgment. The deed 
that Mrs. Dudley relies on was recorded August 17, 1981. With the deed of public 
record for over 15 years, it was clearly available at the time the case was 
heard, and it thus cannot be considered newly discovered evidence. In addition, 
Mrs. Dudley's affidavit contains evidence that has long been available. The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mrs. Dudley's motion to 
alter or amend the judgment.

CONCLUSION

[¶16]   The decision of the district court 
is affirmed. We decline to certify there was no reasonable cause for appeal, 
adhering to our general rule that certification is not proper when an appellant 
challenges a discretionary ruling. Wood v. Wood, 964 P.2d 1259, 1268 (Wyo. 
1998).

Footnotes

1 In their 
briefs, the parties address the issue of whether the unsworn ownership and 
encumbrance report meets the requirements of W.R.C.P. 56(e) and whether this 
court should consider it. Because the Franklins never objected to the district 
court's consideration of the report, they have waived their objection. Boller v. 
Key Bank of Wyoming, 829 P.2d 260, 266-67 (Wyo. 1992); Matter of Estate of Obra, 
749 P.2d 272, 276 (Wyo. 1988).

2 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 34-1-141 (Lexis 1999) provides in pertinent 
part:

(a) 
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, easements across land 
executed and recorded after the effective date of this act which do not 
specifically describe the location of the easement are null and void and of no 
force and effect.

* * 
*

(d) 
For purposes of this act [section] the specific description required in an 
easement shall be sufficient to locate the easement and is not limited to a 
survey.

In 
1981, this statute appeared as Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-101, with an effective 
date of May 20, 1981. It was renumbered Wyo. Stat. § 34-1-141 by 1982 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 62, § 1. Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 
852 n. 1 (Wyo. 1996). If recorded before May 20, 1981, an easement is valid even 
if its location is not described with specificity. Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 505 (Wyo. 1994).

3 Rule 59(e), 
W.R.C.P. provides:

Motion to alter or amend judgment. C Any motion to alter or amend a 
judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the 
judgment.