Case Title: DeStafney v. University of Alabama

Citation: 413 So. 2d 391

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1982-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
413 So. 2d 391 (1981)
Jan Elizabeth DeSTAFNEY, individually and as the mother and custodial parent of Joseph Michael DeStafney
v.
The UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, et al.
80-431.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 4, 1981.
On Rehearing February 5, 1982.
Second Rehearing Denied May 21, 1982.
Jack Drake of Drake & Pierce, University, for appellant.
Paul E. Skidmore, University, for appellee the University of Alabama and President David Mathews.
James J. Jenkins, of Phelps, Owens, Jenkins, Gibson & Fowler, Tuscaloosa, for appellee Gabrielle Martinez.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed on the authority of Gill v. Sewell, 356 So. 2d 1196 (Ala.1978), and Milton v. Espey, 356 So. 2d 1201 (Ala.1978).
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C. J., and MADDOX and ALMON, JJ., concur.
EMBRY, BEATTY and ADAMS, JJ., concur in the result.
FAULKNER and JONES, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.
SHORES, J., not sitting.
JONES, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I concur with the per curiam summary affirmance on the trial court's order of dismissal with respect to Defendants University of Alabama and Dr. David Mathews. I dissent as to the dismissal of Defendant Gabrielle Martinez on the ground that I do not construe § 14 of our State Constitution as affording immunity from suit to an employee of the State for tortious injury.
FAULKNER, J., concurs.
JONES, Justice.
Appellant's brief in support of rehearing contains the following succinct "Statement of the Case":
This Court preliminarily granted rehearing as to the individual defendant, Gabrielle Martinez; withdrew submission; and ordered the case set for oral argument on October 19, 1981.
Upon reconsideration of the briefs and arguments of counsel, we reaffirm our agreement with the trial court's order granting summary judgment as to the University of Alabama and David Mathews, as President of the University of Alabama. We grant rehearing and reverse and remand as to the defendant Gabrielle Martinez, individually.
Upon further study and re-evaluation of Gill v. Sewell, supra, and Milton v. Espey, supra, we are of the opinion that these cases do not mandate our rejection of the Plaintiffs' claims for tortious injury against the individual employee of the University of Alabama. We hold, therefore, that the defense of sovereign immunity afforded by Ala.Const. 1901, § 14, to the University of Alabama and its President, Dr. Mathews, does not extend to Gabrielle Martinez as an employee whose alleged tortious act is the basis of the claim.
We must recognize at the outset that our cases have interpreted § 14 as affording absolute immunity to some State officials, as well as to the State itself, and extending a qualified immunity to others. This accords with the majority rule with respect to public officials and employees, even in those states that have no comparable constitutional immunity. See, for example, Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561, 98 S. Ct. 855, 859, 55 L. Ed. 2d 24 (1977). No Alabama case, however, has ever held that a State employee may never be sued for simple negligence committed in the line and scope of his or her employment. Indeed, significantly, neither Gill nor Milton so held.
Our review of the cases, keeping in mind that claimants have traditionally sought to circumvent the absolutism of § 14 by naming individual State officials and employees as parties defendant, puts the issue in perspective. As early as 1907 (§ 14, though under a different section number, first appeared in the 1875 State Constitution), this Court in Elmore v. Fields, 153 Ala. 345, 45 So. 66 (1907), addressed employee immunity:
The Elmore view was restated in St. Clair County v. Town of Riverside, 272 Ala. 294, 128 So. 2d 333 (1961):
Six years later Wallace v. Board of Education of Montgomery, 280 Ala. 635, 197 So. 2d 428 (1967), cited with approval the St. Clair County language quoted above.
Then, in Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 250 So. 2d 677 (1971), where the Plaintiff claimed a right of way through a public park, the Court held the action was barred by § 14 as not falling within any of the four recognized exceptions to § 14:
In Aland, where the issue arose in a non-tort context, the Court rejected claimant's attempt to circumvent § 14 by naming several State officials as parties defendant. The Aland Court quoted with approval the rationale of Southall v. Stricos Corporation, 275 Ala. 156, 153 So. 2d 234 (1963), which case held:
In summary, our cases, as well as the case law of other State immunity jurisdictions, adhere to the view that the State has an interest such as will prohibit suit against the State official or employee where the action is in effect against the State. A good statement of this rule appears in Ford Motor Company v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 65 S. Ct. 347, 89 L. Ed. 389 (1945):
Aland left unchanged, however, the tort liability rule of Elmore and St. Clair County. The tort liability rule with respect to public officials and employees, as proposed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 895D, Public Officers (1974), is as follows:
Generally speaking, our own case law development accords with the Restatement's Comment to this Section, which states, in part:
We find the holdings and rationale of Milton and Gill consistent with the general rule of our cases, as well as with the overall concept of tort liability expressed in § 895D of the Restatement.
Gill, addressing that aspect of the suit against certain named defendants in their official capacities, states:
As to the only State officer-defendant sued in his individual capacity, Gill concludes:
Unquestionably, Gill falls squarely within § 895D(3)(a) of the Restatement.
Milton, released the same date as Gill, likewise upheld the dismissal of those statements of the claim based upon the State employee's exercise of discretionary functions, but remanded the cause for further proceedings with respect to the tort claim of fraud.
Milton's rationale is particularly pertinent:
Here, again, the tort concept of the Restatement is fully preserved. Milton`s statement of the claim based upon fraud is not covered by the exceptions listed under § 895D(3); thus, the Restatement's language, "... a public officer is not immune from tort liability," is applicable.
In the instant case, then, the dispositive issue is twofold: 1) Is the suit against the individual State employee, in effect, a suit against the State? and 2) Under the allegations of tortious injury, is the employee defendant entitled to substantive immunity because she was engaged in the exercise of a discretionary public function?
Clearly, under the guidelines of Gill and Milton, a claim for personal injury based upon the alleged negligent conduct of a State employee, even when committed in the line and scope of employment, is not within the ambit of § 14's protection. Such a claim, by virtue of its nature and the relief demanded, in no way seeks to circumvent the prohibition of § 14. Any state interest affected by the suit is far too incidental to supply the requisite nexus for extension of constitutional immunity to the individual employee defendant. This suit, and the legal effects incident thereto, are strictly between the named parties plaintiff and the individual defendant. In no sense can it be said that Gabrielle Martinez is a mere nominal party defendant.
This is not to say, however, that every act or performance of duty by a state official or employee, by virtue of its characterization as negligence, necessarily falls outside the immunity doctrine. Even absent the requisite identity between the State and the state official or employee defendant to invoke absolute immunity, the Restatement`s doctrine of substantive immunity may yet be invoked if the official or employee 1) is engaged in the exercise of a discretionary function; 2) is privileged and does not exceed or abuse the privilege; or 3) is not negligent in the performance of his responsibility.
As the Restatement`s Comment f to § 895D suggests:
*396 Comment f then discusses seven separate and several factors which may be helpful in determining what is a discretionary function and its consequences. While each of these factors is worthy of consideration, particularly in deciding the more difficult cases, they serve merely to demonstrate that the averments of the instant claims bring this case within those which are protected neither by Section 14 nor by the broader substantive immunity doctrine of the Restatement. See, also, Comment b, § 895D.
Although we accede to the proposition that, under certain circumstances, public policy considerations afford immunity to entities not otherwise constitutionally protected,[3] under the factual averments of the instant case, we find that no valid public policy will be served by immunizing from liability a public employee whose tortious conduct results in personal injury to another.
We affirm as to the granting of summary judgment on behalf of the University of Alabama and David Mathews, as president of the University of Alabama. We reverse as to the granting of summary judgment on behalf of the individual Defendant Gabrielle Martinez; and we remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
APPLICATION FOR REHEARING OVERRULED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
FAULKNER, ALMON, SHORES, EMBRY, BEATTY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
TORBERT, C. J., and MADDOX, J., concur in the result.
[1]  Both the mother and her son are Plaintiffs.
[2]  Arguably, under appropriate circumstances, these exceptions may now be enlarged to include inverse condemnation (Ex parte Carter, 395 So. 2d 65 (Ala.1981)). While Unzicker v. State, 346 So. 2d 931 (Ala. 1977), may be interpreted as adding yet another, the bad faith conduct addressed in Unzicker falls outside the non-tort context of the exceptions outlined in Aland.
[3]  For a case applying substantive immunity to a municipality, see Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So. 2d 385 (Ala. 1982).