Case Title: James D. Hanlon v. Town of Milton

Citation: 2000 WI 61

Docket Number: 1999AP001980-CQ

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 61 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-1980-CQ 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
James D. Hanlon,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Town of Milton, Town Board of Milton,  
William Cunningham, Harold Traynor,  
Ronald Kaiser, Gerald Fredrick, James  
Clark and Kenneth Hull,  
 
Defendants-Appellees.  
 
 
CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE 7TH CIRCUIT 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 21, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
January 7, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there were briefs by 
J. Ric Gass, John F. Hovel, Joseph S. Goode, Michael D. Rosenberg 
and Kravit, Gass, Hovel & Leitner, s.c., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Joseph S. Goode. 
 
 
For the defendants-appellees, there was a brief 
by Ted Waskowski, Meg Vergeront and Stafford, Rosenbaum, Rieser & 
Hansen, Madison, and oral argument by Ted Waskowski. 
 
2000 WI 61 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 99-1980-CQ 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
James D. Hanlon, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Town of Milton, Town Board of Milton, 
William Cunningham, Harold Traynor, Ronald 
Kaiser, Gerald Fredrick, James Clark, and 
Kenneth Hull, 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION of a question of law from the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  Certified question 
answered and cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   This is a certification of a 
question of law from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 821.01 (1997-98).1  
                     
1  Wis. Stat. § 821.01 (1997-98). Power to answer.   
The supreme court may answer questions of law 
certified to it by the supreme court of the United 
States, a court of appeals of the United States or the 
highest appellate court of any other state when 
requested by the certifying court if there are 
FILED 
 
JUN 21, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Acting Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-1980-CQ 
 
 
2 
Hanlon v. Town of Milton, 186 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 1999).  The 
question of law certified for determination is: 
 
Whether 
a 
litigant 
challenging 
an 
administrative 
determination according to the provisions set forth in 
Chapter 68 may bring an equal protection claim and 
whether the reviewing Wisconsin court may consider the 
merits of such a claim under this chapter when the 
claim arises from the same transaction forming the 
basis for the administrative determination so that the 
failure to raise such a claim invokes the doctrine of 
claim preclusion. 
¶2 
We review questions of law independently.  In re 
Badger Lines, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 646, 653, 590 N.W.2d 270 (1999). 
 When interpreting a statute, our goal is to discern the intent 
of the legislature.  Reyes v. Greatway Ins. Co., 227 Wis. 2d 
357, 365, 597 N.W.2d 687 (1999). 
¶3 
The Town of Milton (Town)2 asserts that James D. Hanlon 
(Hanlon) is precluded from bringing his equal protection claim 
for one of two reasons.  The Town argues that Hanlon's failure 
to bring his equal protection claim within his Wis. Stat. ch. 68 
certiorari review precludes him from now asserting that claim; 
                                                                  
involved in any proceeding before it questions of law 
of this state which may be determinative of the cause 
then pending in the certifying court and as to which 
it appears to the certifying court there is no 
controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme 
court and the court of appeals of this state. 
 
All subsequent statutory references are to the 1997-98 
volume of the statutes, unless noted otherwise. 
2  Defendants in this case are the Town of Milton, the Town 
Board of Milton, William Cunningham, Harold Traynor, Ronald 
Kaiser, Gerald Fredrick, James Clark and Kenneth Hull, all of 
whom we will refer to collectively as "the Town." 
No. 
99-1980-CQ 
 
 
3 
alternatively, the Town argues that Hanlon's failure to join his 
equal protection claim with his ch. 68 certiorari review 
precludes him from asserting that claim.  We do not agree with 
either reason. 
¶4 
We conclude that a litigant cannot bring a claim for 
money damages grounded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983)3 in a 
certiorari proceeding brought under Wis. Stat. ch. 68.  We 
further conclude that although Hanlon could have joined his 
§ 1983 claim with his ch. 68 certiorari review, he was not 
required to do so.  Failure to join these actions does not 
preclude him from now bringing his § 1983 claim.   
Procedural History 
¶5 
The procedural facts giving rise to this question of 
law can be briefly recounted.  In 1990 Hanlon sought a 
conditional use permit from the Town of Milton Planning and 
Zoning Committee (Committee).  Hanlon wanted to operate a gravel 
quarry on his agricultural property.  The Committee held one 
meeting in February 1990 at which it considered Hanlon's 
application as well as two other applications for conditional 
use permits.  These two applicants, defendants James Clark and 
                     
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:   
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, 
regulation, 
custom, 
or 
usage, 
of any 
State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress. 
No. 
99-1980-CQ 
 
 
4 
Gerald Fredrick, were members of the Planning and Zoning 
Committee.  Fredrick was not in attendance at the meeting.  
Clark abstained from voting on both Hanlon's application as well 
as his own permit request.  
¶6 
Hanlon's 
application 
met 
with 
significant 
public 
opposition and was denied primarily on this basis.  The two 
remaining applications were approved.  Local residents raised no 
objection to these permit requests.  
¶7 
Hanlon appealed.  In September 1990 the Town of Milton 
Town Board (Board) affirmed the decision of the Committee.   
¶8 
In October 1990 Hanlon sought certiorari review in 
Rock County Circuit Court, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 68.13 (1989-
90).  In an order issued in November 1991 the circuit court 
reversed the Board's decision.  The circuit court found the 
Board's decision to have been arbitrary, oppressive, and 
unreasonable 
and 
that 
the 
Board 
failed 
to 
comply 
with 
requirements for conducting a hearing on administrative review 
as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 68.11 (1989-90).  The circuit court 
ordered that a new hearing be held in compliance with the 
statute. 
¶9 
On 
remand, 
a 
hearing 
was 
conducted 
before 
an 
independent hearing examiner.  After taking evidence, the 
examiner denied Hanlon's application in September 1994.   
¶10 In October 1994 Hanlon again sought certiorari review. 
 In November 1995 the circuit court reversed the hearing 
examiner's decision.  The Town appealed.  In an unpublished 
decision issued in September 1996 the court of appeals reversed 
No. 
99-1980-CQ 
 
 
5 
this ruling and upheld the Town's decision to deny Hanlon's 1990 
application for a conditional use permit.  This court denied 
Hanlon's subsequent petition for review. 
¶11 In September 1997 Hanlon brought an action in federal 
district court under § 1983, alleging that the defendants 
deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process and 
equal protection of the law by denying his conditional use 
permit application, and seeking money damages.  The Town moved 
for summary judgment, which was granted.  Hanlon appealed.  
Subsequently the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit certified to this court the question we now address. 
Analysis 
¶12 We have been asked to address a narrow question of 
law: when a municipal administrative determination gives rise to 
an equal protection claim for money damages actionable under 
§ 1983, must this equal protection claim be brought and heard in 
a Wis. Stat. § 68.13 certiorari proceeding brought by the 
litigant? The Town argues that failure to assert the § 1983 
claim within the Wis. Stat. ch. 68 proceeding, or to join these 
claims arising from the same transaction, results in claim 
preclusion.  See Northern States Power v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 
541, 550, 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995).  We disagree with both 
arguments. 
¶13 We first address the Town's argument that Hanlon's 
§ 1983 claim for money damages must be brought in his Wis. Stat. 
No. 
99-1980-CQ 
 
 
6 
§ 68.13 certiorari proceeding.4  The Town contends that the 
purpose of Wis. Stat. ch. 68 is to provide a constitutionally 
sufficient process for the review of municipal determinations 
that implicate rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.  Wis. Stat. § 68.001.5 Although 
we agree that litigants can raise constitutional objections to 
municipal determination in certiorari review, we do not agree 
that a claim for money damages based upon § 1983 may be brought 
in this forum. 
¶14 In a certiorari proceeding a litigant may argue that 
his or her constitutional right to equal protection has been 
violated 
in 
an 
effort 
to 
establish 
that 
a 
municipal 
determination was not made according to law or is unreasonable, 
arbitrary and oppressive.  Tateoka v. City of Waukesha Bd. of 
Zoning Appeals, 220 Wis. 2d 656, 662, 670-72, 583 N.W.2d 871 
                     
4 Under Wis. Stat. § 68.16 a municipality may elect to opt 
out of all or part of Wis. Stat. ch. 68.  In its brief the Town 
asserts that it has exercised its option of not being covered 
under ch. 68 and judicial review was available to Hanlon through 
common-law, not statutory, certiorari.  Hanlon disagrees with 
this assertion by the Town.  The scope of our inquiry in this 
case is limited to the question of law certified to this court 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
and we therefore do not reach the parties arguments on this 
issue. 
5 Wis. Stat. § 68.001 Legislative purpose.   
The purpose of this chapter is to afford a 
constitutionally 
sufficient, 
fair 
and 
orderly 
administrative procedure and review in connection with 
determinations by municipal authorities which involve 
constitutionally protected rights of specific persons 
which are entitled to due process protection under the 
14th amendment to the U.S. constitution.  
No. 
99-1980-CQ 
 
 
7 
(Ct. App. 1998) (equal protection challenge considered in Wis. 
Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10 certiorari review); Madison Landfills, 
Inc. v. Dane County, 183 Wis. 2d 282, 285, 292-96, 515 N.W.2d 32 
(Ct. App. 1994) (challenging a zoning board decision on equal 
protection grounds in certiorari review); Shannon & Riordan v. 
Zoning Board, 153 Wis. 2d 713, 722, 724-31, 451 N.W.2d 479 (Ct. 
App. 1989) (denial of equal protection and due process rights 
argued 
in 
certiorari 
review 
brought 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 62.23(7)(e)10, (I) and 753.04).   
¶15 However, and key to understanding this issue, there is 
a distinction between presenting an equal protection argument in 
a Wis. Stat. ch. 68 certiorari proceeding and asserting an equal 
protection claim for money damages under § 1983.   
¶16 One purpose of a § 1983 claim is to create a tort 
remedy for the deprivation of federal constitutional rights by 
government action.  Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 115 
Wis. 2d 289, 297, 340 N.W.2d 704 (1983).  The relief available 
to a litigant from the circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 68.13(1) 
is limited.  Under § 68.13(1) the court can only affirm, 
reverse, or remand for additional proceedings in accord with the 
court's judgment.6  In contrast, remedies demanded by Hanlon in 
                     
6 Wis. Stat. § 68.13 Judicial review.   
(1) Any party to a proceeding resulting in a final 
determination may seek review thereof by certiorari 
within 30 days of receipt of the final determination. 
 The 
court 
may 
affirm 
or 
reverse 
the 
final 
determination, or remand to the decision maker for 
further 
proceedings 
consistent 
with 
the 
court's 
decision. 
No. 
99-1980-CQ 
 
 
8 
his § 1983 claim included monetary damages and reasonable 
attorney fees.7   
¶17 According to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments: 
 
The general rule [concerning claim splitting] is 
largely 
predicated 
on 
the 
assumption 
that 
the 
jurisdiction in which the first judgment was rendered 
was one which put no formal barriers in the way of a 
litigant's presenting to a court in one action the 
entire claim including any theories of recovery or 
demands for relief that might have been available to 
him [or her] under applicable law.  When such formal 
barriers in fact existed and were operative against a 
plaintiff in the first action, it is unfair to 
preclude him from a second action in which he can 
present those phases of the claim which he was 
disabled from presenting in the first. 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(c), cmt. c (1982). 
¶18 Because the issue of monetary damages could not have 
been litigated in the Wis. Stat. ch. 68 proceeding, we conclude 
that Hanlon's § 1983 claim could not have been brought by him 
within his ch. 68 certiorari review.8  
¶19 We turn next to the Town's alternative argument.  The 
Town points out that Wis. Stat. ch. 68 provides that the 
remedies within ch. 68 "shall not be exclusive."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 68.01.  The Town asserts that Hanlon could have joined a 
§ 1983 claim to his statutory certiorari claim. The Town 
                                                                  
 
7 See Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, ¶43, ___ Wis. 2d 
___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  
8 The Town argues that Hanlon did raise equal protection 
arguments in the certiorari proceedings.  Because this argument 
appears 
to 
address 
issue 
preclusion, 
rather 
than 
claim 
preclusion, we decline to address it here. 
No. 
99-1980-CQ 
 
 
9 
contends because Hanlon failed to join these actions, the 
doctrine of claim preclusion bars Hanlon's claim presently 
before the federal courts.  
¶20 Claim preclusion "is designed to draw a line between 
the meritorious claim on the one hand and the vexatious, 
repetitious and needless claim on the other hand."  Northern 
States Power, 189 Wis. 2d at 550 (quoting Purter v. Heckler, 771 
F.2d 682, 689-90 (3rd Cir. 1985)).  Key objectives of the 
doctrine of claim preclusion are to promote judicial economy and 
to "conserve the resources the parties would expend in repeated 
and needless litigation of issues that were, or that might have 
been resolved in a single prior action."  Stuart v. Stuart, 140 
Wis. 2d 455, 461, 410 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1987), aff'd by, 143 
Wis. 2d 347, 352, 421 N.W.2d 505 (1988) (In Stuart, this court 
expressly adopted the reasoning of the court of appeals 
regarding the legal principles underlying claim preclusion.  
Stuart, 140 Wis. 2d at 460-64).  We conclude that the principles 
underlying the doctrine of claim preclusion cannot be achieved 
by joining a § 1983 claim with a certiorari proceeding brought 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 68.  Therefore, failing to join these 
claims does not bar Hanlon's present cause of action. 
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 68 certiorari is a limited form of 
review, while a claim under § 1983 exists as a "uniquely federal 
remedy" that "is to be accorded a sweep as broad as its 
language."  Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988) (quoting 
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972) and United States v. 
Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966)).   
No. 
99-1980-CQ 
 
 
10
¶22 Certiorari 
proceedings 
are 
distinct 
from 
civil 
actions, which are filed to resolve a controversy between the 
parties.  Merkel v. Village of Germantown, 218 Wis. 2d 572, 580, 
581 N.W.2d 552 (Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 220 Wis. 2d 367, 
585 N.W.2d 159 (1998).  Additional fact finding by the circuit 
court is not permitted by Wis. Stat. § 68.13.  See State ex rel. 
Hemker v. Huggett, 114 Wis. 2d 320, 323, 338 N.W.2d 335 (Ct. 
App. 1983) (holding that the circuit court may not conduct a 
factual inquiry on statutory certiorari unless the statute 
authorizes the court to take evidence).  The court's scope of 
review is limited to the record produced in the proceeding 
below.  Wis. Stat. § 68.13.   
¶23 If the scope of review on certiorari is not enlarged 
by statute, then the traditional standards of common-law 
certiorari review apply:  
 
(1) Whether the board kept within its jurisdiction; 
(2) whether it acted according to law; (3) whether its 
action was arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable and 
represented its will and not its judgment; and (4) 
whether the evidence was such that it might reasonably 
make the order or determination in question. 
State ex rel. Ruthenberg v. Annuity & Pension Bd., 89 Wis. 2d 
463, 472, 474, 278 N.W.2d 835 (1979). 
¶24 Claims brought under § 1983 involve the presentation 
of evidence and the finding of facts.  In a § 1983 action, 
plaintiff has a right to demand a jury trial.  Mansfield v. 
Chicago Park Dist. Group Plan, 946 F. Supp. 586, 595 (N.D.Ill 
1996).  Hanlon demanded a jury trial in his complaint to the 
federal district court.  Wisconsin Stat. ch. 68 certiorari and a 
No. 
99-1980-CQ 
 
 
11
§ 1983 action do not fit together within the fundamental 
structure of bringing one judicial action.  The objectives of 
claim preclusion, therefore, cannot be attained.   
¶25 In 
addition, 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 68.13(1), 
an 
individual has 30 days after receiving a final determination 
from a municipality in which to seek certiorari review.  However 
a six-year statute of limitation governs § 1983 claims.  
Hemberger v. Bitzer, 216 Wis. 2d 509, 519, 574 N.W.2d 656 
(1998).  If claim preclusion barred Hanlon's § 1983 claim for 
money damages, then the 30-day limitation period for ch. 68 
certiorari would apply.  Such a result would undermine the 
policies supporting the § 1983 cause of action. 
¶26 Requiring Hanlon to join his § 1983 claim for money 
damages when he filed his Wis. Stat. ch. 68 review would unduly 
complicate the procedure established by the legislature to 
provide 
for 
an 
orderly 
review 
of 
a 
municipality's 
determinations. 
 
In 
addition, 
joinder 
of 
claims 
and 
counterclaims is permissive, not mandatory, in Wisconsin.  Wis. 
Stat. § 803.02. 
¶27 We conclude, therefore, that although Hanlon could 
have joined his § 1983 claim with his ch. 68 certiorari review, 
he was not required to do so.  Failure to join these actions 
does not preclude him from bringing his § 1983 claim. 
By the Court.—Question answered and cause remanded to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No. 
99-1980-CQ 
 
 
12
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-1980-CQ 
 
 
1