Case Title: Commonwealth v. Corey

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12100

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2024-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12100 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JULIE A. COREY. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     December 8, 2023. – March 18, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Assistance of counsel, Motion for a 
required finding, Appeal by Commonwealth, Psychiatric 
examination, Capital case.  Cellular Telephone.  Felony-Murder 
Rule.  Kidnapping.  Evidence, Expert opinion, Inference. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 17, 2009. 
 
The case was tried before Janet Kenton-Walker, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on February 8, 2019, was heard by 
her. 
 
 
Janet Hetherwick Pumphrey for the defendant. 
Ellyn H. Lazar, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The defendant, Julie A. Corey, was convicted of 
murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate 
premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder 
with a predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping in violation of 
2 
 
G. L. c. 265, § 26.  Following her conviction, the defendant 
filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that she received 
ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed 
to call a cell phone expert to testify about her location on the 
night of the murder.1  Her motion also included a request that 
the motion judge enter a required finding of not guilty.  The 
motion judge, who was also the trial judge, denied the 
defendant's motion for a new trial.  The judge, however, vacated 
the defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on a 
theory of felony-murder after finding that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove the defendant committed the predicate 
felony of aggravated kidnapping. 
 
The defendant now appeals from the denial of her motion for 
a new trial, again raising the argument that she received 
ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed 
to call a cell phone expert.  The defendant also requests that 
we exercise our powers pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E (§ 33E), 
to reduce her conviction.  The Commonwealth, in turn, appeals 
from the judge's order vacating the defendant's felony-murder 
conviction.  We disagree with the defendant that she received 
 
 
1 The defendant also argued that she received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to call a 
psychiatric expert to testify about her alleged postpartum 
depression at the time of the murder.  She does not raise this 
specific claim of ineffective assistance on appeal. 
 
3 
 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Trial counsel's decision not 
to call a cell phone expert was not ineffective, nor would it 
have likely influenced the jury's conclusions.  Additionally, we 
agree with the Commonwealth that there was sufficient evidence 
to find the defendant guilty of felony-murder with a predicate 
felony of aggravated kidnapping, and so we reinstate that 
conviction.  Finally, after reviewing the entire record, we find 
no basis upon which to reduce the defendant's conviction and 
therefore decline to exercise our § 33E powers. 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts as the jury could have 
found them, reserving some details for later discussion. 
 
a.  The Commonwealth's case.  On July 27, 2009, the 
landlord of an apartment building on Southgate Street in 
Worcester (Southgate) entered the apartment of Darlene Haynes 
(victim), in response to concerns about the victim's pets.  Upon 
entering, he perceived a "[v]ery foul" smell.  He went into the 
victim's bedroom, walked over to the closet, and pulled on a 
blanket.  A leg fell out.  The body was later identified as the 
victim's.  An autopsy of the victim revealed blunt force trauma 
to her head, an electrical cord wrapped twice around her neck 
causing strangulation, a nine-inch incision of her abdomen, and 
missing reproductive organs.  The victim was pregnant at the 
time she was killed, due anytime. 
4 
 
 
The victim and the defendant had briefly been neighbors at 
Southgate, where the defendant resided with her boyfriend, Alex 
Dion.  The defendant and Dion dated on and off for about two 
years.  In the spring of 2008, the defendant and Dion broke up.  
They got back together when the defendant became pregnant.  
During their relationship, the defendant was jealous and 
frequently accused Dion of cheating on her.  Sometime in 2008, 
while they were living at Southgate, the defendant had a 
miscarriage.  Soon afterwards, the defendant and Dion again 
broke up and then moved out of Southgate. 
 
In February of 2009, the defendant and Dion resumed 
communications.  The defendant told him that she was once again 
pregnant with his baby -- a girl -- and was due on June 20.  
After getting back together, Dion and the defendant were 
frequently fighting about whether she was or was not pregnant, 
with the defendant trying to convince Dion by showing him 
pregnancy tests and having him listen to a baby monitor.  The 
defendant, however, would not let Dion attend doctor's 
appointments with her.  On April 13, 2009, the defendant was 
taken to the hospital complaining of pain.  Dion was asked to 
leave the defendant's hospital room.  Medical records from the 
visit indicated that the defendant was thirty weeks pregnant and 
that there was good fetal activity.  The defendant told the 
doctor that she was in a fight with her boyfriend and that she 
5 
 
was afraid he would return to his wife.  She eventually left the 
hospital against medical advice. 
 
The defendant's due date came and went.  When June 20 
passed, she told Dion that her due date was instead July 2.  
When July 2 passed, the defendant told Dion she was due on July 
4.  When that date also passed, she told Dion she was scheduled 
for a cesarean section but was then "bumped off the list."  
Eventually, she told Dion her cesarean section was scheduled for 
July 24.  The defendant similarly gave friends and family 
changing due dates. 
 
On July 23, the defendant and Dion were together at home, 
which was then the house of Dion's uncle, Kevin Dion.  The two 
had prepared for the defendant's cesarean section the next day, 
packing Dion's car with an overnight bag.  In the afternoon, the 
defendant left, telling Dion that she was going to a friend's 
house.  She later called Dion and told him she planned to give 
the victim a ride to the store.  Dion found this odd because, as 
he and another witness testified, the defendant and the victim 
were not friends.  The victim's landlord saw the victim getting 
into a car with the defendant in the afternoon, around 3:30 P.M.  
That evening, the defendant returned home, but left again to 
visit an unidentified friend.  At around 8 P.M., the victim was 
seen at a package store near Southgate, with Dion's car in the 
parking lot. 
6 
 
 
Between 8:45 P.M. and 11:20 P.M., the victim sent text 
messages to her friend, saying that another friend was coming 
over to spend the night.  In one text message, the victim said 
that she was going to have a wine cooler.  In the final text 
message sent at 11:20 P.M., the victim said "[g]ood night." 
 
Meanwhile, at around 10 P.M., the defendant began calling 
Dion to tell him she was having stomach pains.  Around 11:30 
P.M., she called Dion to say that her water had broken and that 
a friend was going to take her to a hospital in Framingham.  One 
or two hours later, she told him that she had a baby girl.  The 
defendant was calling Dion frequently throughout the night on 
his uncle's telephone.  During these telephone calls, the 
defendant complained about the hospital, expressing frustration 
with the way doctors were treating her and the baby, and telling 
Dion she planned to leave against medical advice.  Telephone 
records for the uncle's telephone number suggested that the 
defendant called twelve times.  At one point, Dion received a 
call on his uncle's telephone from the victim's cell phone 
number.  Dion testified that the victim had never before called 
him. 
 
On July 24 from 2 A.M. to 2:30 A.M., neighbors across the 
hall from the victim's apartment heard banging noises coming 
from the apartment.  It sounded like someone was picking up 
furniture and moving it around.  From 3 A.M. to 4 A.M., they 
7 
 
heard water running on and off in the victim's apartment.  They 
did not go to the victim's apartment or contact anyone. 
 
Between 7 A.M. and 8 A.M. on July 24, the defendant arrived 
home with a baby.  The defendant was wearing a new set of 
clothes.  Dion noticed that the baby had dried blood in the 
creases of her arms and neck, and around her ears.  He also 
noticed that the umbilical cord did not have a plastic clip like 
the hospital typically provided but was instead tied off with a 
string.  When Dion asked the defendant about the string, the 
defendant said she had asked the doctor to take the plastic clip 
off because it was too heavy. 
 
The defendant began telling others she had a baby and 
introducing the baby to them.  She called her best friend and 
told her.  She invited a neighbor over to see the baby.  The 
neighbor also noted blood on the baby and the string tied around 
her umbilical cord.  The neighbor took the defendant and Dion to 
the store to buy formula because the two had no money.  Others 
also saw the defendant with the baby on July 24, making note of 
the baby's small size, of the string tied around the umbilical 
cord, and that the baby was very cold. 
 
On July 26, the defendant and Dion moved to New Hampshire, 
where the defendant's father resided.  They packed their 
possessions and put them in Dion's car.  When the two arrived at 
the defendant's father's house, however, they were told they 
8 
 
could not stay.  They were given money for a motel and the next 
day sought assistance from a welfare office in New Hampshire.  
The defendant had been receiving benefits due to her pregnancy.  
She told a case technician with the welfare office that she had 
little money but could not work.  When the case technician asked 
for a birth certificate or crib card for the baby, the defendant 
said she did not have either.  The defendant and Dion eventually 
found a shelter where they could stay. 
 
At various points during their time in New Hampshire, the 
defendant became distressed about the baby.  At a doctor's 
visit, the defendant became aggravated when the doctor asked to 
take a picture of the baby.  She abruptly left with the baby 
before the doctor could return with the camera.  While 
discussing the doctor's appointment at the shelter, the 
defendant leaned against a wall and said, "Nobody's taking this 
child away from me." 
 
Later investigation revealed that the baby in the 
defendant's care was not hers, but the biological child of the 
victim and the victim's boyfriend, Roberto Rodriguez.  A review 
of hospitals in Framingham and Natick produced no records of the 
defendant delivering a baby.  In Dion's car, investigators found 
a falsified birth certificate for the baby, listing Dion and the 
defendant as her parents and a birthplace of Framingham.  Police 
also found a document from the defendant's health center, 
9 
 
stating that she would receive benefits during her pregnancy and 
that she would need to reapply for benefits after her delivery.  
Other documents from the Massachusetts Department of 
Transitional Assistance were found in the car, including a 
document requesting that the defendant attend a scheduled 
appointment and bring the baby's birth certificate and stating 
that, if she did not do so, she could lose her benefits. 
 
Back in Massachusetts, law enforcement began investigating 
and documenting the victim's apartment.  In the bedroom where 
the victim's body was found, red-brown stains saturated both 
sides of the mattress on the bed.  Red-brown stains were found 
on other items in the bedroom and in the kitchen.  Investigators 
also found a "Smirnoff" bottle in the living room.  When tested 
for the presence of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), the defendant 
matched the major profile.  Another "Smirnoff" bottle was found 
in the victim's bedroom.  The defendant's fingerprint was 
discovered on the bottle. 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth alleged that by July 23 the 
defendant had lost her own baby and was distraught.  The 
Commonwealth contended that the defendant was concerned Dion 
would leave her if she did not have a baby and that she would 
lose her benefits.  The Commonwealth argued that the defendant, 
seeking a solution for her problems, decided to kill the victim 
and take the victim's baby as her own. 
10 
 
 
b.  The defendant's case.  At trial, the defendant 
vigorously argued that, even if she took the baby, she did not 
kill the victim.  The defendant argued that it would not be 
possible for her to commit the murder, clean up the victim's 
apartment, dispose of the evidence, and take care of the baby, 
all while repeatedly calling Dion. 
 
Rather, the defendant argued that Rodriguez, the victim's 
boyfriend and the father of the baby, committed the murder 
because he was angry with the victim and no longer wished to be 
in a relationship with her.  The defense suggested that 
Rodriguez, after murdering the victim, saved his baby and then 
gave her to the defendant.  The defendant further argued that 
law enforcement's investigation of the murder, including 
Rodriguez's involvement, was inadequate (a so-called Bowden2 
defense). 
 
As part of these defenses, the defendant introduced 
evidence that Rodriguez had previously been violent toward the 
victim, allegedly kicking her in the stomach and pushing her 
into a glass coffee table.  This altercation resulted in the 
victim obtaining a restraining order against Rodriguez.  The 
defense also called a former girlfriend of Rodriguez, who 
testified about an incident where Rodriguez became jealous and 
 
 
2 Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980). 
 
11 
 
angry, grabbing her by the neck and pulling her into another 
room.  She testified that Rodriguez then grabbed a belt, wrapped 
it around her neck, and proceeded to choke her.  He allegedly 
told her that he was going to hang her and that it would only 
hurt for "a second."  The altercation only ended when the 
telephone rang and Rodriguez left the room to answer it.  In 
closing argument, the defendant argued that Rodriguez's actions 
toward both the ex-girlfriend and the victim demonstrated a 
pattern of violence consistent with the murder. 
 
The defendant presented additional evidence allegedly 
connecting Rodriguez to the murder.  The jury heard testimony 
that a first-aid kit taken from the victim's apartment contained 
DNA from both Rodriguez and the baby.  The jury also heard the 
testimony of an individual who saw Rodriguez on July 24 walking 
"from the direction of the [nearby] cemetery."  The witness 
attempted to say hello to Rodriguez, but Rodriguez rushed away.  
Rodriguez appeared disgruntled, dirty, and sweaty.  The 
defendant, in closing argument, suggested that Rodriguez could 
have buried missing evidence, including the victim's 
reproductive organs, at the cemetery.  Finally, the jury heard 
evidence that, during his first interview with the police 
following the discovery of the victim's body, Rodriguez did not 
inquire whether the baby had survived. 
12 
 
 
Arguing that law enforcement failed to adequately 
investigate the murder, the defendant introduced evidence that 
the police learned people were present in the victim's apartment 
between July 23 and the day her body was discovered.3  The 
defendant called a detective to discuss a statement from the 
victim's neighbor.  The neighbor told police that on the evening 
of July 23, she saw the victim and the defendant smoking on the 
back porch with an unknown male.  The male was described as 
white, roughly six feet tall, having tattoos, and wearing a 
white "wife beater" T-shirt.  When shown a photographic array, 
the neighbor picked out a photograph of William Daviau, a friend 
and former roommate of the victim and Rodriguez.  The neighbor 
also told the detective that around 4:45 A.M. on July 24, she 
saw someone crawling through the window of the victim's 
apartment who she believed was Daviau.  The detective 
subsequently interviewed Daviau about his whereabouts on July 23 
and 24.  Daviau stated that he was in a "drug rehab facility," 
where he was obligated to stay at night.  Neither the detective 
nor -- to his knowledge -- any other officer checked Daviau's 
alibi. 
 
 
3 The evidence was introduced not for the truth of the 
matter, but to demonstrate what was known by law enforcement, 
pursuant to Bowden.  See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 
Mass. 782, 802 (2009). 
 
13 
 
 
Another neighbor of the victim testified that on the night 
of July 24, she saw an individual in the victim's apartment.  
She recognized him as the friend of people who lived downstairs 
and thought his name was "Tim."  When Tim noticed the neighbor 
looking, he pulled down the blinds.  Later, on July 26, the same 
neighbor saw a person climbing into the victim's window from the 
front porch.  She heard water being dumped over the porch.  When 
she went to investigate, she saw Tim standing in front of 
another person who was trying to hide his or her face.  The two 
were returning from the porch, with Tim carrying a fish tank.  
The neighbor mentioned that the victim had promised her a table.  
When the neighbor and her friend tried to enter the victim's 
apartment to get the table, Tim would not let them enter.  The 
jury later learned that Tim was Timothy Tripp, a friend of 
Rodriguez.  Tripp testified that on the night of July 26, he 
went to the victim's apartment to obtain a fish tank that 
Rodriguez had promised him.  He stated that he only remained in 
the apartment long enough to retrieve the fish tank.  Tripp did 
not remember if the police ever inspected the fish tank. 
 
The defendant also argued that law enforcement failed to 
adequately search for evidence.  Law enforcement did not search 
the cemetery from which Rodriguez was seen walking.  After 
finding a debit card belonging to Rodriguez in the victim's 
apartment, an officer testified that he was not aware of anyone 
14 
 
in law enforcement analyzing the card's transactions to 
determine whether it was recently left there.  Neither 
Rodriguez's apartment nor his car was searched.  The defense 
also elicited testimony that law enforcement did not test a 
number of items found in the victim's apartment for 
fingerprints.  Although the victim was found with an electrical 
cord wrapped around her neck, the police did not test a lamp 
with a missing electrical cord for fingerprints. 
 
In closing argument, trial counsel suggested that law 
enforcement "left a lot of stones unturned."  Based on this 
argument, trial counsel successfully sought jury instructions as 
to both third-party culprit and Bowden defenses.  The jury were 
instructed that they could consider law enforcement's failure to 
investigate leads or perform tests in evaluating the defendant's 
guilt or innocence.  The jury were also told that they may 
substantively consider evidence about Rodriguez in evaluating 
whether another person committed the murder. 
 
c.  Verdict.  After hearing all the evidence, the jury 
convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on 
theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, and felony-murder. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  
The defendant contends that the judge erred in denying her 
motion for a new trial because she received ineffective 
15 
 
assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to call a cell 
phone expert to testify at trial.  Specifically, the defendant 
alleges that an expert would have testified that the defendant 
was traveling throughout Worcester on the night of the killing 
and was rarely connected to cell towers near Southgate.  She 
argues this evidence would have demonstrated to the jury that 
she could not have committed the murder and then cleaned up 
afterwards. 
 
In support of her motion for a new trial, the defendant 
submitted an affidavit by a cell phone expert retained 
postconviction.  In the affidavit, the defendant's expert 
described his review of the defendant's cell site location 
information (CSLI) records from July 23, 2009, at 7 A.M. to July 
24, 2009, at 6 A.M.  The expert stated that there were two cell 
towers near Southgate to which the defendant's cell phone 
connected during this period:  one near Holy Cross College (Holy 
Cross tower) and one near Main Street (Main Street tower).  
According to the expert, the defendant's cell phone connected to 
the Holy Cross tower on July 23 at 1:30 P.M. and then 8:59 P.M.  
The defendant's cell phone connected to the Main Street tower at 
7:49 P.M. that same day.  The defense expert also noted that the 
defendant's cell phone connected to a tower on the other side of 
Interstate Route 290 (Oak Hill tower) from Southgate on July 23 
at 10:42 P.M. and on July 24 at 4:06 A.M.  Finally, the expert 
16 
 
explained that there were no records in the early morning of 
July 24, meaning that it was "impossible" to know where the cell 
phone was located at the time. 
 
In opposition to the defendant's motion for a new trial, 
the Commonwealth filed an affidavit by its own expert about the 
CSLI data and the analysis of the defendant's expert.  The 
Commonwealth's expert agreed that there was no location data on 
July 24 from approximately 12 A.M. to 2 A.M. or from 
approximately 4 A.M. to 6 A.M., and that it was therefore 
impossible to know where the defendant's cell phone was located 
during these hours.  The Commonwealth's expert, however, 
disagreed about connections to the Holy Cross tower, finding 
additional connection times on July 23 at 8:24 P.M., 8:58 P.M., 
and 8:50 P.M.  The Commonwealth's expert also disagreed with the 
defendant's expert's description of the distance between 
Southgate and the Oak Hill tower on the other side of Interstate 
Route 290.  According to the Commonwealth's expert, a cell phone 
does not always connect to the closest cell tower, meaning that 
the distance of a cell tower is not always determinative of the 
cell phone's location.  He opined that it was possible that the 
defendant's cell phone was connected to the Oak Hill tower while 
she was located at Southgate.  Finally, the Commonwealth's 
expert stated that, during a review of the victim's cell phone 
records, three calls were made on July 24 (at 5:16 A.M., 7:25 
17 
 
A.M., and 7:32 A.M.) using the "*67" prefix, which prevents the 
recipient of the call from viewing the outgoing telephone 
number.  The first call was made to Kevin Dion's telephone and 
the last two calls were made to the defendant's cell phone. 
 
The defendant also submitted an affidavit from trial 
counsel.  Trial counsel stated that he considered calling a cell 
phone expert to testify, but decided not to because he believed 
the third-party culprit and Bowden defenses were so strong.  
Trial counsel further noted that the defendant, in her 
affidavit, did not dispute that she was at the victim's 
apartment on the night of the killing.  The judge held an 
evidentiary hearing limited to the defendant's other claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.4  See note 1, supra.  Although 
 
 
4 To the extent that the defendant suggests that the judge 
was required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of 
trial counsel's failure to call a cell phone expert, we 
disagree.  A judge may rule on a motion for a new trial without 
a further evidentiary hearing "if no substantial issue is raised 
by the motion or affidavits."  Commonwealth v. Upton, 484 Mass. 
155, 161 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 442 Mass. 
341, 348 (2004).  For an issue to be substantial, "the 
defendant's submissions need not prove the [motion's] factual 
premise . . . but they must contain sufficient credible 
information to cast doubt on the issue" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Upton, supra at 162.  Where the motion judge was also 
the trial judge, the judge may use his or her "knowledge and 
evaluation of the evidence at trial" to "consider whether 
holding a hearing will add anything to the credibility or 
materiality of the affidavits submitted" (quotation and 
citations omitted).  Id.  We discern no abuse of discretion in 
the judge's decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of trial counsel's failure to call a cell phone expert.  
As discussed supra, the defendant's and the Commonwealth's 
18 
 
trial counsel testified at that hearing, he did not testify 
about his decision not to call a cell phone expert.  Following 
the hearing, the judge denied the defendant's motion for a new 
trial, finding that trial counsel's failure to call a cell phone 
expert was not ineffective assistance. 
 
Absent a constitutional error, we review the denial of a 
motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion.  Commonwealth 
v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 672 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 
(2017).  See Commonwealth v. Upton, 484 Mass. 155, 162 (2020) 
(abuse of discretion standard applied where judge denied motion 
for new trial without holding evidentiary hearing).  Where the 
motion judge was also the trial judge, "we give 'special 
deference' to the judge's findings of fact and the ultimate 
decision on the motion."  Kolenovic, supra at 672-673, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Lane, 462 Mass. 591, 597 (2012).  The judge has 
the discretion to weigh the credibility and import of affidavits 
submitted in support of a motion for a new trial.  Commonwealth 
v. Grace, 370 Mass. 746, 751-752 (1976).  The judge's findings, 
 
experts were largely in agreement.  Additionally, the judge 
oversaw the trial and was thus intimately familiar with the 
Commonwealth's case and any potential defenses.  An evidentiary 
hearing on this point would add nothing to aid the judge in 
assessing the strength of the defendant's claim.  See Goodreau, 
supra at 348-349 ("If the theory of the motion, as presented by 
the papers, is not credible or not persuasive, holding an 
evidentiary hearing to have the witnesses repeat the same 
evidence . . . will accomplish nothing"). 
 
19 
 
therefore, will be accepted if supported by the record.  
Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. 213, 224 (2005). 
 
When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
brought on an appeal from a conviction of murder in the first 
degree, we first examine whether there has been a "serious 
failure by trial counsel."  Commonwealth v. Tolan, 453 Mass. 
634, 645 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Harbin, 435 Mass. 654, 
656 (2002).  We then consider whether that failure resulted in a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Tolan, 
supra.  Under this standard, we must ask whether the error "was 
likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion."  Walker, 443 
Mass. at 225, quoting Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 
(1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
 
Strategic or tactical decisions by trial counsel will only 
be considered ineffective if they were manifestly unreasonable 
at the time made.  Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 62 
(2018).  "The decision to call, or not to call, an expert 
witness fits squarely within the realm of strategic or tactical 
decisions."  Id. at 63.  Such a decision is only manifestly 
unreasonable if it is one that "lawyers of ordinary training and 
skill in criminal law would not consider competent" (citation 
omitted).  Id. at 62.  When assessing trial counsel's decisions, 
"reasonableness does not demand perfection. . . .  Nor is 
20 
 
reasonableness informed by what hindsight may reveal as a 
superior or better strategy."  Kolenovic, 471 Mass. at 674. 
 
Trial counsel's decision not to call a cell phone expert 
was not ineffective assistance because the decision was not 
manifestly unreasonable at the time it was made.  At the time 
trial counsel decided not to call a cell phone expert, the 
defendant had viable defenses based on evidence of third-party 
culprits and law enforcement's failure to investigate.  This 
evidence was used to show that others were at the victim's 
apartment at the time of the killing, and that the defendant 
could not have both committed the murder and cleaned up 
afterwards.  Trial counsel forcefully argued as much during his 
closing argument.  An expert may have been able to provide some 
limited evidence that would help corroborate the defendant's 
case, but we do not assess trial counsel's decision from the 
benefit of hindsight.  See Kolenovic, 471 Mass. at 674 (our 
review "limits the effect of hindsight by requiring a focus on 
the point in time when counsel made the challenged strategic 
decision").  Additionally, trial counsel was aware that CSLI 
records could also corroborate the Commonwealth's case that the 
defendant was at the victim's apartment.  We cannot say it was 
manifestly unreasonable for trial counsel to choose not to get 
into the weeds of the defendant's comings and goings, especially 
where he believed that the other defenses were more persuasive.  
21 
 
See Ayala, 481 Mass. at 63-65 (not manifestly unreasonable for 
trial counsel to fail to call eyewitness identification expert 
where trial counsel "vigorously challenged" identification 
through other means).  There was no error by trial counsel. 
 
We also conclude that the expert testimony, had it been 
presented, would not likely have influenced the jury's result.  
Contrary to the defendant's contentions, her cell phone expert's 
affidavit does not prove that she was somewhere else at the time 
of the murder.  Rather, the expert noted that the defendant's 
only connections to a cell tower between July 23 at 10:42 P.M. 
and July 24 at 4:06 A.M. were to the Oak Hill tower, which he 
suggested was far from Southgate.  But as the Commonwealth's 
cell phone expert noted, a cell phone does not always connect to 
the closest tower.  The defendant's expert thus could not have 
conclusively placed her far from Southgate on the night of the 
killing.  Additionally, the defendant's expert noted several 
significant gaps in cell phone activity during those critical 
hours of the night.  In contrast, the Commonwealth's expert 
found records of calls placed through the victim's cell phone 
during these gaps, including a telephone call at 5:16 A.M. on 
July 24, which Dion claimed was a call from the defendant, not 
the victim, as the victim had never called him before.  The CSLI 
records, therefore, weakly supported the defendant's case, while 
also corroborating parts of the Commonwealth's case.  We cannot 
22 
 
say that in these circumstances the expert's testimony about the 
defendant's cell phone location would have influenced the jury's 
conclusion.  See Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 491 Mass. 339, 350-
351 (2023) (any error in failing to call barber experts to 
contradict identifications of defendant based on hairstyle was 
unlikely to influence jury's conclusion where experts could not 
conclusively rule out that defendant possessed such hairstyle).  
See also Commonwealth v. Moore, 489 Mass. 735, 747-748 (2022) 
(trial counsel not ineffective for failing to use defendant's 
CSLI data to cast doubt on testimony placing defendant at 
killings where data did not conclusively show defendant was 
elsewhere and was "arguably inculpatory"); Commonwealth v. 
Gonzalez, 443 Mass. 799, 811 (2005) (trial counsel's failure to 
call expert to testify that victim's wounds were caused by 
right-handed assailant was not ineffective where "claim is 
entirely speculative" and "no evidence or affidavit indicat[es] 
that an expert could make such a determination"). 
 
We therefore hold that trial counsel was not ineffective in 
failing to call a cell phone expert.  Accordingly, it was not an 
abuse of discretion for the judge to deny the defendant's motion 
for a new trial. 
 
b.  Felony-murder conviction.  At trial, the Commonwealth 
sought to convict the defendant of murder in the first degree 
under several theories, including felony-murder with a predicate 
23 
 
felony of aggravated kidnapping, in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 26 (§ 26).  After significant debate between the parties, the 
judge instructed the jury on felony-murder and the jury returned 
a verdict of guilty on this theory. 
 
Following her conviction, the defendant filed a motion for 
a new trial that included a request for entry of a finding of 
not guilty pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), as amended, 
420 Mass. 1502 (1995), without specifying the grounds on which 
such relief was warranted.  The judge allowed the defendant's 
motion as to the conviction of murder in the first degree on a 
theory of felony-murder.  The judge concluded that the evidence 
at trial failed to prove that the defendant inflicted serious 
bodily injury on the baby, as required by § 26.  The 
Commonwealth now appeals. 
 
Our review of the judge's ruling on the motion for a 
required finding of not guilty is a question of law.  See 
Commonwealth v. Doucette, 408 Mass. 454, 456 (1990).  The 
question before us, as it was for the judge, is "whether, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" 
(emphasis in original).  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 
378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).  A conviction may be sufficient where 
it is based on "circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn 
24 
 
therefrom," so long as the inferences are "reasonable and 
possible" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Trotto, 487 Mass. 
708, 716 (2021).  Although inferences "need not be necessary or 
inescapable," a conviction "may not rest on the piling of 
inference upon inference or on conjecture and speculation" 
(quotation and citations omitted).  Id. 
 
To convict the defendant on the theory of felony-murder, 
the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the homicide while engaged in the 
commission of aggravated kidnapping.  See Commonwealth v. 
Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 502 (1982).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Fredette, 480 Mass. 75, 86 (2018) (aggravated kidnapping may 
serve as predicate felony for felony-murder conviction without 
violating merger doctrine).  Aggravated kidnapping, in turn, 
required that the Commonwealth prove that the defendant 
kidnapped the baby "while armed with a dangerous weapon and 
inflict[ed] serious bodily injury thereby upon [the baby]."  
G. L. c. 265, § 26, third par.  Section 26 defines "serious 
bodily injury" as "bodily injury which results in a permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of a bodily 
function, limb or organ or substantial risk of death."  Id. 
 
The judge found, and the defendant urges on appeal, that 
there was insufficient evidence to prove serious bodily injury 
to the baby.  The judge reasoned that there were no visible 
25 
 
signs of injury or trauma to the baby.  Although a medical 
expert testified about the effects of the injuries to the victim 
on the baby and the effects of removal of the baby from the 
victim, the judge found that the alleged injury to the baby 
rested on knowledge outside the jury's expertise.  Additional 
expert testimony, according to the judge and the defendant, was 
required for the Commonwealth to prove aggravated kidnapping 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
The judge and the defendant correctly note that a 
conviction may not rest on conjecture or speculation.  See 
Trotto, 487 Mass. at 716.  Accordingly, expert testimony is 
needed where an issue is outside the general knowledge and 
experience of the jury.  Commonwealth v. Scott, 464 Mass. 355, 
364 & n.9 (2013).  In Scott, we concluded that the Commonwealth 
would not be able to meet its burden of proof as to the severity 
of an injury merely through medical records containing technical 
terminology, because such terminology was not in the jury's 
common knowledge or experience.  Id. at 363-364. 
 
This case, however, is unlike Scott.  Viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 
Commonwealth did not need additional testimony to establish that 
there was both a bodily injury to the baby and that this injury 
created a substantial risk of death.  The victim, who was the 
mother of the baby, was killed, and the baby was removed from 
26 
 
the victim's womb, along with all of the victim's reproductive 
organs, by someone without medical training.5  This was done at 
the crime scene itself, and obviously not in a sterile 
environment. 
 
The jury received evidence of the significant injuries to 
the victim, including fatal blunt force trauma to her head, 
asphyxia by ligature strangulation, and incision of her abdomen.  
The Commonwealth's expert in obstetrics testified that the death 
of a mother would create a loss of blood flow and oxygen to the 
fetus.  The jury were also told that the longer this loss 
continues, the more harm and danger there would be to the baby.  
We conclude that the loss of blood and oxygen, caused by the 
killing of the mother, presents a bodily injury to the fetus.  
Indeed, we have previously recognized, in other contexts, the 
effects to a fetus of injuries to the mother.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Ronchi, 491 Mass. 284, 296 (2023) (holding that 
injuries need not be inflicted directly on viable fetus for 
defendant to be criminally liable for death of fetus); 
Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 806-807 (1984) (for 
 
 
5 As part of her third-party culprit defense, the defendant 
suggests that Rodriguez had the medical knowledge to remove the 
baby because he was a personal care assistant for an elderly 
person.  Nothing about being a personal care assistant for an 
elderly person suggests Rodriguez had the necessary medical 
training. 
 
27 
 
purposes of vehicular homicide statute, recognizing that 
infliction of injuries upon mother that results in death of 
viable fetus is homicide).  With the obstetrician's expert 
testimony, the jury could reasonably infer that the injuries to 
the victim also inflicted bodily injury on the baby.  See 
Trotto, 487 Mass. at 716 (jury permitted to draw "reasonable and 
possible" inferences from circumstantial evidence [citation 
omitted]).  This inference did not require knowledge or 
experience outside that of the jury's or beyond that established 
through testimony. 
 
Likewise, the jury could reasonably conclude that the 
inflicted bodily injury created a substantial risk of death.  As 
explained above, the Commonwealth's expert obstetrician 
testified that the loss of a mother's heartbeat creates 
significant dangers to a fetus.  He explained that the fetus 
then loses blood, and therefore oxygen, needed to survive.  He 
further explained that there is a narrow window of time during 
which the fetus can be removed from the mother's body before the 
fetus will also die.  Additionally, the forcible removal of the 
baby from the mother was not performed according to recognized 
medical procedures, such as a cesarean section.  Nor was it 
performed by a trained professional in a sterile environment.  
Rather, it was performed by the victim's murderer at a crime 
scene.  The jury did not need additional expert testimony to 
28 
 
conclude that such actions would create significant risks to the 
baby, including a risk of death.  The jury could use their 
common sense to draw such a conclusion. 
 
The Commonwealth thus presented sufficient evidence at 
trial that the defendant inflicted serious bodily injury upon 
the baby during the commission of the kidnapping.  A "rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt."  Doucette, 408 Mass. at 456, 
quoting Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677.  We therefore reverse the 
order allowing the defendant's motion for a required finding of 
not guilty and reinstate her conviction of murder in the first 
degree on a theory of felony-murder. 
 
c.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, the 
defendant asks that we exercise our powers under § 33E to reduce 
the verdict to a lesser degree of guilt.  The defendant proposes 
several bases upon which we may choose to exercise this 
extraordinary relief:  (1) that the defendant was suffering from 
postpartum depression and psychosis at the time of the murder, 
which contributed to her decision to take the baby; (2) that 
Rodriguez had a stronger motive for killing the victim than the 
defendant; (3) that the victim's murder was more consistent with 
Rodriguez's past actions than with the defendant's; (4) that 
multiple men were present at the victim's apartment between the 
night the victim was murdered and the day her body was 
29 
 
discovered; (5) that law enforcement's investigation was 
inadequate and failed to uncover evidence inculpating Rodriguez; 
(6) that Rodriguez's actions after the murder suggested he was 
guilty; (7) that the defendant could not have been involved in 
the extensive clean-up following the killing; (8) that the 
defendant's cell phone records indicated that she was not near 
the crime scene; (9) that Rodriguez, as a personal care 
assistant, could have had the skills to remove the baby; and 
(10) that the defendant and the victim were friends with no 
animosity between them. 
 
"This court has used its extraordinary authority pursuant 
to § 33E sparingly and with restraint, reducing convictions only 
in the most compelling circumstances" (quotations and citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Yat Fung Ng, 491 Mass. 247, 272 
(2023).  Such relief is only warranted if, after review of the 
entire case and considering "a broad range of factors," we 
conclude that the defendant's "conviction of murder in the first 
degree was a miscarriage of justice that warrants a reduction in 
the degree of guilt."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Concepcion, 
487 Mass. 77, 94, cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 408 (2021).  "In 
exercising our powers under . . . § 33E, we do not act as a 
second jury."  Commonwealth v. Sawyer, 389 Mass. 686, 704 
(1983). 
30 
 
 
In her request for relief under § 33E, the defendant raises 
many issues that were presented at trial and argued to the jury.  
As discussed supra, the defendant successfully introduced 
evidence suggesting that Rodriguez was a violent man with a 
motive to kill the victim.  The defendant argued at trial that 
Rodriguez's failure to inquire about the status of the baby when 
questioned by the police indicated that he already knew what 
happened to her.  The jury heard about Rodriguez's actions 
around the date of the murder, including his walking from the 
cemetery.  The jury also heard evidence that several men were 
seen at the victim's apartment, including one man seen climbing 
through the victim's window.  The victim's neighbor also 
testified about her interactions with one of the men who 
appeared nervous.  Additionally, the jury heard extensive 
testimony about law enforcement's failure to thoroughly inquire 
into each of these leads, to investigate Rodriguez, or to test 
evidence at the victim's apartment.  Finally, the defendant 
argued that she could not have possibly committed the murder and 
then cleaned up the evidence.  There was, however, also 
overwhelming evidence of the defendant's own involvement in the 
murder of the victim, which we have described supra. 
 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three theories 
of murder, even after being presented with well-developed third-
party culprit and Bowden defenses.  The jury were also properly 
31 
 
instructed to consider both defenses.  "[Because] the issue of 
the defendant's criminal responsibility was fully and fairly 
before the jury, . . . justice does not require that their 
verdict be disturbed."  Commonwealth v. Lunde, 390 Mass. 42, 50 
(1983). 
 
On appeal, the defendant only raises three issues for our 
consideration that were not considered by the jury:  that cell 
phone records indicated she was not present at the crime scene, 
that she was suffering from mental illness, and that she had no 
animosity toward the victim.  We have already considered the 
first of these issues supra and determined that the records do 
not exculpate the defendant.  We do not believe either of the 
other two bases warrants a reduction in the jury's verdict. 
 
At her motion for a new trial, the defendant alleged 
counsel was ineffective for failing to call a psychiatric expert 
to testify about her mental illness at the time of the killing.  
While the defendant does not renew this argument on appeal, she 
urges us to consider evidence presented to the judge about her 
mental state.  Specifically, the defendant submitted with her 
motion two affidavits from an expert in psychiatry who had 
reviewed the defendant's medical and psychiatric records.  The 
expert opined that it was "probable" the defendant was suffering 
from postpartum depression and anxiety at the time of the 
murder.  The expert also noted that the defendant was at risk 
32 
 
for postpartum psychosis, based upon a history of psychiatric 
symptoms during pregnancy.  It was the expert's opinion that 
such mental illnesses "could have caused a delusional belief 
that keeping the victim's baby was appropriate and ethical."  
Importantly, the expert's opinion only focused on the 
defendant's actions in taking the baby, not in committing 
murder.  More specifically, the expert referred to the defendant 
as "taking the baby that was given to her and in believing that 
she could and should keep the baby as her own."  The expert did 
not specifically address whether such postpartum psychosis could 
cause the defendant to murder the victim, including in the cruel 
and atrocious manner that it occurred here. 
 
We have previously found a reduction in a jury's verdict to 
be more consonant with justice in cases involving a defendant 
with an impaired mental condition.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Dowds, 483 Mass. 498, 512-513 (2019); Commonwealth v. Colleran, 
452 Mass. 417, 432-434 (2008).  In Colleran, supra at 432, we 
reasoned that a defendant's mental illness "bears on the 
specific intent required for murder in the first degree based on 
deliberate premeditation."  We also reasoned that where a 
defendant's conduct was "driven by her mental condition," the 
killing was not committed in a manner "that judges and juries 
generally consider extremely atrocious or cruel."  Id. at 434.  
In Colleran, the defendant had impulsively murdered her own 
33 
 
child while experiencing profound depression and psychosis.  Id. 
at 420-422.  An expert in forensic psychiatry testified that the 
defendant's mental illness would typically make a person 
"commit[] acts profoundly contrary to the person's self-
interest," and that the illness impaired the defendant's ability 
to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law.  Id. at 
422. 
 
The defendant's mental condition in this case was not as 
severe as that at issue in Colleran.  Here, the defendant's 
expert could only opine that she was probably suffering from 
some form of postpartum depression and was at risk of postpartum 
psychosis.  As stated above, the expert did not address the 
relationship of postpartum depression or the risk of psychosis 
to the murder, as opposed to taking the baby.  Furthermore, 
nothing in the expert's affidavits suggest that the defendant 
was incapable of forming the specific intent necessary for 
deliberate premeditation, or that the defendant's actions were 
so impulsive that they could not be considered extremely 
atrocious or cruel.  See Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 460 Mass. 
409, 421 (2011) ("The defendant's psychological diagnosis, while 
significant, does not reach this level of severity, and there is 
no evidence that it was intertwined with the victim's killing").  
The crime, as evidenced by the photographic exhibits, was 
atrocious and cruel.  Also absent in the expert's affidavits are 
34 
 
any indications that the defendant lacked the capacity to 
conform her conduct to the requirements of the law or appreciate 
the wrongfulness of murdering an innocent victim to take her 
baby.  See Colleran, 452 Mass. at 427, quoting Commonwealth v. 
McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 547 (1967) (articulating McHoul standard 
for lack of criminal responsibility). 
 
Moreover, the defendant could have raised a mental 
impairment claim at trial.  Trial counsel discussed the 
possibility of doing so with the defendant, who was deeply 
involved in the development of her case.  The defendant, 
however, adamantly protested raising a mental impairment defense 
because she did not want to admit to any wrongdoing.  Thus, not 
only was there a dearth of evidence indicating that her alleged 
mental impairment contributed to the commission of the murder, 
but also the defendant rejected that claim herself.  On these 
facts, we cannot conclude that the defendant's conviction was a 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
Finally, the defendant asks that we take into consideration 
that she and the victim were friends and that there was no 
evidence of animosity between them.  Indeed, in Colleran, 452 
Mass. at 431, we noted that a lack of animosity may be a factor 
to consider in our review.  In Commonwealth v. Jones, 366 Mass. 
805, 808-809 (1975), we reduced the defendant's conviction to 
manslaughter where "there was no evidence that [the defendant 
35 
 
and the victim] had had prior trouble."  That factor, however, 
weighed in our analysis of whether the defendant possessed the 
requisite malice for a conviction of murder in the second 
degree.  Id. at 809.  The fact that the defendant and the victim 
were acquaintances with no animosity supported a conclusion that 
the killing was done "in the heat of sudden affray or combat" 
(citation omitted).  Id.  The same cannot be said here.  The 
jury heard evidence that the victim and the defendant were not 
friends.  The jury also heard evidence suggesting that the 
defendant thoughtfully planned the murder in order to possess 
the victim's baby.  This was not a case in which the lack of 
animosity negated the essential elements of the defendant's 
conviction. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, and after reviewing the entire 
record, we decline to exercise our powers under § 33E. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We hold that the defendant's trial counsel 
was not ineffective for failing to call a cell phone expert to 
testify about the location of the defendant's cell phone, where 
the decision was reasonably made and the evidence would not have 
affected the jury's conclusion.  We therefore affirm the order 
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial.  We reverse, 
however, the order entering a required finding of not guilty on 
the defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on the 
theory of felony-murder.  The evidence was sufficient for a fact 
36 
 
finder to conclude that the defendant committed aggravated 
robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.  We thus reinstate the 
defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory 
of felony-murder.  Finally, finding no reason to exercise our 
extraordinary powers pursuant to § 33E, we decline to disturb 
the jury's verdict in this case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.