Case Title: State v. Dennis J. Kivioja

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1997AP002932-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Dennis J. Kivioja,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 4, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 12, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac 
 
JUDGE: 
Henry B. Buslee 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Abrahamson, C.J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Bradley, J., joins 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by 
Mark G. Sukowaty and Sukowaty Law Office, Madison and oral 
argument by Mark G. Sukowaty. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Sandra L. Tarver, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James D. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Dennis J. Kivioja,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
MAY 4, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Fond du Lac 
County, Henry B. Buslee, Judge.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.   These consolidated cases are 
before the court on certification from the court of appeals, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1997-98).  Defendant-
appellant appeals an order by the Honorable Henry B. Buslee, 
Fond du Lac County Circuit Court. 
¶2 
The issue in this case, as certified, is the manner in 
which a circuit court should evaluate recantation testimony when 
it is offered as new evidence in support of a defendant's plea 
withdrawal prior to sentencing.  The more immediate issue, from 
the perspective of the defendant-appellant, Dennis J. Kivioja, 
is whether his offer of the recantation of the State's primary 
witness in the cases against him was a sufficient "fair and just 
reason" to support his motion to withdraw his plea. 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
2 
¶3 
This is a consolidated appeal of two 1995 cases in 
which Kivioja was charged with 37 crimes involving burglary and 
related matters.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Kivioja entered 
no contest pleas to five counts of party to the crime of 
burglary in each of the two cases.  Less than two weeks later 
the State's primary witness, Jody Stehle, recanted his earlier, 
non-sworn statements implicating Kivioja in the crimes to which 
Kivioja pled.  Kivioja moved to withdraw his pleas, but 
following an evidentiary hearing wherein Stehle testified under 
oath for the first time, recanting his accusations against the 
defendant, the circuit court denied the motion.  The defendant 
appealed, and the court of appeals certified the issue described 
to this court. 
I 
¶4 
On the evening of July 6, 1995, an officer of the Fond 
du Lac County Sheriff's Department observed a vehicle matching a 
witness-provided description of a car that had been spotted near 
a home that had been burglarized on July 3.  The officer 
followed the vehicle, which stopped shortly thereafter.  When 
the officer asked for identification, the driver explained that 
he had none, but stated that his name was John L. Smith.  The 
passenger, the defendant Kivioja, told the officer that the 
driver's name was really Jody Stehle.  The officer arrested 
Stehle upon determining that he had two active warrants for his 
arrest.  Kivioja was not arrested at that time. 
¶5 
Stehle subsequently confessed to sheriff's detectives 
that 
he 
and 
Kivioja 
together 
were 
responsible 
for 
many 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
3 
burglaries in Fond du Lac County during the previous two months. 
 In addition, he told detectives that Kivioja acted alone in a 
May 9, 1995, burglary, a date on which he stated that he himself 
had been in jail and could not have participated.  In this 
initial statement to detectives, Stehle explained that he had 
spoken to Kivioja from jail, and that Kivioja had admitted over 
the phone that he had stolen the $600 reported missing in the 
burglary. 
¶6 
In the officers' search of the vehicle in which Stehle 
and Kivioja had been stopped, they discovered numerous items 
which had been reported stolen from a home on July 6, the date 
of the stop.  In a search of Kivioja's apartment, officers found 
four items matching the descriptions of items reported stolen 
during the previous two months from various Fond du Lac County 
homes.  The serial numbers of the two electronic devices found 
had been removed. 
¶7 
Together with Stehle's statements, this evidence was 
used in support of the probable cause portion of the criminal 
complaint which led to Kivioja's arrest on July 10, 1995, when 
he was charged with five counts of party to the crime of 
burglary, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 939.05 and 943.10(1)(a). 
¶8 
On July 13, 1995, the prosecutor filed an information 
charging the same five counts of party to the crime of burglary, 
and also charged five counts of party to the crime of theft, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 939.05 and 943.20(1)(a), five counts 
of party to the crime of criminal damage to property, contrary 
to §§ 939.05 and 943.01(1), and five counts of bail jumping, 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
4 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(b), to which the defendant 
entered pleas of not guilty. 
¶9 
A second criminal complaint against Kivioja was served 
on November 6, 1995, charging him with 16 additional counts of 
party to the crime of burglary and one count of party to the 
crime of attempted burglary, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 939.05, 
939.32, and 943.10(1)(a).  As in the earlier complaint, the 
probable cause portion of this complaint was based in part on 
Stehle's statement that Kivioja was involved in the burglaries. 
 On December 1, 1995, Kivioja waived his preliminary hearing in 
regard to this second complaint and on February 5, 1996, Kivioja 
entered pleas of not guilty to all 17 of the counts. 
¶10 On August 14, 1996, on motion of the State, the two 
cases were joined and they were later scheduled for an October 
2, 1996, trial.  The trial was never held, however, as Kivioja 
decided to enter a plea.  At his October 3, 1996, plea hearing, 
Kivioja agreed to plead no contest to five counts of party to 
the crime of burglary in the first case, and five counts of 
party to the crime of burglary in the second case, in exchange 
for the dismissal of the remaining charges, which were to be 
read in for the purposes of sentencing.  Sentencing was 
scheduled for a later date. 
¶11 During the 15 months between Stehle's arrest and 
Kivioja's plea, the State's case against Stehle was also 
progressing.  Following his July 6, 1995, arrest, Stehle was 
held in the Fond du Lac County jail.  At one point, when both he 
and Kivioja were held there, Stehle requested a transfer, 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
5 
explaining to his attorney that Kivioja had threatened him and 
that he was concerned for his safety.  The request was met and 
Stehle was transferred to the Green Lake County jail, returning 
to the Fond du Lac County jail only after Kivioja was no longer 
there.1 
¶12 On October 17, 1995, nearly one year before Kivioja 
reached his plea agreement, Stehle reached his own plea 
agreement with the State pursuant to which Stehle pled no 
contest to ten of the counts with which he was charged and 
agreed to testify to Kivioja's involvement in the burglaries in 
exchange for which the additional charges against him would be 
dismissed and were to be read into the record for the purposes 
of sentencing and restitution.  The agreement further provided 
that both Stehle and the State would ask the court to delay 
Stehle's sentencing until after the completion of Kivioja's 
case.   
¶13 Following his conviction, but prior to Kivioja's case 
reaching a conclusion, at Stehle's request his attorney filed a 
number of motions requesting that the circuit court sentence 
him.  In September 1996, contrary to his own agreement with the 
State and just weeks prior to Kivioja's own agreement, the 
                     
1 The record discloses that subsequent to his July 10, 1995, 
arrest, and prior to the second criminal complaint served in 
November 1995, Kivioja was sentenced to the Wisconsin Prison 
System following his conviction of second degree sexual assault 
in a crime unrelated to those subject to this appeal.  Kivioja 
was held in the Fond du Lac County jail prior to being sentenced 
to the Wisconsin Prison System. 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
6 
circuit court sentenced Stehle to a total of 20 years in prison 
and ten years of probation and ordered him to pay more than 
$13,000 in restitution. 
¶14 On October 14, 1996, less than two weeks following 
Kivioja's pleas, Stehle wrote a 15-page letter recanting his 
earlier statements that Kivioja was involved in the burglaries 
for which Kivioja had pled no contest.  This letter was 
addressed to an investigator in Kivioja's employ who then 
directed the letter to Kivioja. 
¶15 In his recantation, Stehle wrote that he had lied to 
detectives when he told them that Kivioja had been involved in 
the 
burglaries. 
 
He 
offered 
two 
explanations 
for 
his 
incriminating statements.  First, he wrote that he had believed 
that placing blame for the burglaries on Kivioja would shift 
suspicion away from himself.  Second, he wrote that he had lied 
because he was upset that Kivioja had given the officers 
Stehle's true identity which led directly to his arrest.  He 
further explained that Kivioja had never been with him when he 
had committed the burglaries. 
¶16 In a separate letter to Kivioja's investigator, Stehle 
expressed what may be characterized as anger in response to the 
sentence he had received: 
 
[T]hey gave me 20 years with 10 years probation 
consecutive and ordered me to pay around $13,200.00 
worth of restitution, and I told on myself.  If I 
eve[r] get into anymore trouble again I'll know how to 
tell the cops to kiss my dick.  They better not even 
think of speaking to me again, all their promises of, 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
7 
'Oh, you'll get of [sic] easy and shit,' it was all 
bullshit. 
On October 23, 1996, Stehle signed a sworn statement reaffirming 
his recantation. 
¶17 Once Kivioja learned of the recantation, he obtained 
an attorney2 who, on January 15, 1997, filed a motion and 
affidavit to withdraw Kivioja's plea.  The affidavit which 
accompanied the motion stated in part that the defendant had 
entered a plea because he knew that Stehle was going to 
implicate him in the burglaries, and he had believed that due to 
his own [criminal] record, a jury would not have believed his 
protestations of innocence.  He further explained that he had 
entered a plea to reduce the maximum amount of time he would be 
incarcerated. 
¶18 On 
April 
10, 
1997, 
the 
circuit 
court 
held 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
on 
Kivioja's 
motion. 
 
The 
defendant 
explained that his reason for moving to withdraw his pleas and 
instead proceed with trial was based exclusively on the new 
evidence 
that 
Stehle 
had 
recanted 
his 
earlier 
statement 
implicating him.3  When asked by the prosecutor if he had any 
other evidence upon which his motion was based, Kivioja replied 
that he did not.  While he did explain that he had some evidence 
that would have contradicted Stehle's testimony at trial, 
                     
2 This retention was Kivioja's third attorney in these 
consolidated cases. 
3 A recantation is considered newly discovered evidence.  
See Dunlavy v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 21 Wis. 2d 105, 114 n.2, 
124 N.W.2d 73 (1963). 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
8 
Kivioja did not clarify when he found this evidence.  We read 
his motion, as the circuit court and the parties have, as one 
supported exclusively with Stehle's recantation. 
¶19 Stehle's testimony was in large part in accord with 
his letter of recantation, and he stated numerous times that 
Kivioja was not involved in any of the burglaries to which 
Kivioja had pled no contest.  As motive for his earlier 
statements, Stehle testified that he had been upset that Kivioja 
had 
provided 
the 
officers 
with 
Stehle’s 
real 
name 
and 
identification that had led to his arrest.  He further testified 
that knowing that some of the stolen items were in Kivioja's 
possession, he was certain that he could wrongly implicate 
Kivioja. 
¶20 In eliciting Stehle's testimony that Kivioja was not 
involved with the burglaries, Kivioja's counsel asked Stehle 
specific questions with respect to the items taken from the 
homes burglarized, a task with which Stehle had some difficulty, 
attributing his vague memories of the matter to the passage of 
time.  At one point during Stehle's testimony, the circuit court 
acknowledged its own difficulty in deciphering Stehle's answers: 
 "Everything he answers is vaguely and doesn't remember and 
couple of years ago, but he's not making any profound statements 
that I can put my hat on."  Kivioja's attorney responded that 
the profound statement was the testimony that Kivioja was not 
with Stehle at the time of any of the crimes. 
¶21 On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Stehle 
at some length regarding the one particular crime in which 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
9 
Stehle 
had 
earlier 
implicated 
Kivioja 
as 
being 
solely 
responsible.  As noted above, in his initial statement to 
officers, Stehle had stated that while he was in jail, Kivioja 
admitted over the telephone that he [Kivioja] had committed the 
burglary in which $600 cash was taken.  At the hearing, Stehle 
testified that in fact Kivioja had not committed the crime, but 
that he himself had committed the burglary just prior to going 
to jail; i.e., did it earlier in the day by himself. 
¶22 The prosecutor then pointed out an inconsistency 
between his testimony and his written recantation letter of 
October 1996.  The prosecutor noted that in the written 
statement, Stehle claimed that neither he nor Kivioja committed 
the burglary in question, attributing that crime to an unnamed 
third person.  The prosecutor read from Stehle's written 
statement:   
 
Question: Dennis also didn't do that six hundred 
dollar burglary, and I was not in jail.  A 
check with the jail should confirm this.  
What is that word? Oh, but also didn't do  
but also I didn't do that burglary, is that 
right? 
 
Answer: 
Yeah. 
 
Question: I later learned who did it though.  I 
remember me and Dennis were out job hunting 
on the day that I later learned from the guy 
who did this burglary, and one of the places 
we stopped out  was out in Marytown area, 
which is also to the best of my memory the 
area where this burglary occurred. 
In addition to confronting Stehle with this inconsistency within 
his recantations, the prosecutor also asked Stehle to explain 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
10
the fear he had of Kivioja while the two were being held at the 
Fond du Lac County jail.  Stehle explained that when he told his 
attorney to get him away from Kivioja he was not in fear of 
Kivioja (the reason for his request at the time made), but 
rather was an effort to make the case against Kivioja stronger. 
 Finally, the prosecutor elicited from Stehle that although he 
was jailed from June 1995 through his sentencing in September 
1996, it was not until after Stehle received his 20-year 
sentence that he found it necessary to recant his initial 
statement. 
¶23 Prior to reaching its decision, the circuit court read 
into the record that portion of Stehle’s letter in which he had 
expressed anger with the sentence he had received.  The court 
also found that Stehle,  
 
along with his [written] statement, shows so many 
marked 
inconsistencies, 
that 
reliability 
and 
credibility of the witness is seriously challenged.  
He has vague recollections, testifies that he served 
some time or at least they passed some time together 
in prison, and as I pointed out before, the testimony 
here is the fair and just reason, and as Mr. Nesmith 
points out in the brief, the recantation of a prior 
statement can contain sufficient facts and reasons to 
satisfy the requirement for corroboration of the 
recantation . . . .  
The court also found that “the various acts of burglary 
committed in [sic] supposedly by Stehle, by himself, are 
completely uncorroborated and unsubstantiated.” 
¶24 The circuit court then denied Kivioja’s motion.  The 
transcript from the hearing together with the written order 
which followed disclose that the circuit court applied the facts 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
11
of the case to two distinct tests:  first, the circuit court 
identified that a plea withdrawal prior to sentencing should be 
granted for any “fair and just reason.”  Second, noting that the 
reason defendant offered in support of his motion was new 
evidence in the form of a recantation, the circuit court 
identified as relevant the court of appeals' discussion in State 
v. McCallum, 198 Wis. 2d 149, 542 N.W.2d 184 (Ct. App. 1995)4, 
that whether a defendant could withdraw a plea following 
sentencing, based upon a recantation, in part depended upon 
“whether or not a jury could believe the recanted statement as 
opposed to the original statement.”  In its written order 
denying the motion to withdraw, the court wrote:  
 
1. 
a reasonable jury would not believe the recanting 
statement of accomplice Jody Stehle; 
 
2. 
there 
is 
no corroboration 
of 
Jody 
Stehle's 
recantation; 
 
3. 
the defendant has failed to present a fair and 
just reason for withdrawing his pleas. 
                     
4 The circuit court relied upon State v. McCallum, 198 Wis. 
2d 149, 542 N.W.2d 184 (Ct. App. 1995).  Approximately one month 
after the circuit court's written order, this court, in State v. 
McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997), affirmed in 
part and reversed in part the court of appeals' decision.  That 
part of the court of appeals decision which set forth the legal 
standard by which the circuit court is to determine whether a 
recantation supports a motion to withdraw a plea following 
sentencing was affirmed.  Our discussion which refers to 
McCallum refers to this court's decision unless otherwise 
explicitly stated. 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
12
On April 23, 1997, the circuit court sentenced Kivioja to 25 
years and ten years probation in accordance with Kivioja's plea 
agreement. 
¶25 Kivioja appealed and the court of appeals certified 
the question, requesting clarification of the test circuit 
courts should use in assessing the use of a recantation in a 
plea withdrawal prior to sentencing. 
 
 II 
¶26 A defendant seeking to withdraw a plea of guilty or no 
contest before sentencing must show that there is a "fair and 
just reason," for allowing him or her to withdraw the plea.  
Libke v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 121, 128, 208 N.W.2d 331 (1973).  
Should a defendant make this necessary showing, the court should 
permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea unless the 
prosecution has been substantially prejudiced.5  State v. Garcia, 
192 Wis. 2d 845, 861, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995).  While the circuit 
court is to apply this test liberally, the defendant is not 
entitled to an automatic withdrawal.  See id.; State v. Canedy, 
161 Wis. 2d 565, 582, 469 N.W.2d 163 (1991).   
¶27 As for the practical application of the test, this 
court has held that a "'fair and just reason'" contemplates the 
"'mere showing of some adequate reason for defendant's change of 
heart.'"  Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 583.  Whether a defendant's 
                     
5 The State has not argued that it was prejudiced and we do 
not address this point.  
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
13
reason adequately explains his or her change of heart is up to 
the discretion of the circuit court.  Id. at 584.  A circuit 
court's decision with respect to this discretionary ruling will 
not be upset on review unless it was erroneously exercised.  Id. 
 A reviewing court will uphold a discretionary decision on 
appeal if the circuit court reached a reasonable conclusion 
based on the proper legal standard and a logical interpretation 
of the facts.  State v. Salentine, 206 Wis. 2d 419, 429-30, 557 
N.W.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1996). 
¶28 On appeal, Kivioja argues that the circuit court erred 
both 
in 
requiring 
him 
to 
provide 
corroboration 
of 
the 
recantation and for considering whether a reasonable jury would 
believe Stehle's recantation.  In holding the defendant to these 
requirements, Kivioja argues, the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion because it applied the wrong legal 
standard to its analysis of his motion.   
¶29 Kivioja further argues that a defendant need provide 
the circuit court with only a fair and just reason for 
withdrawal, and believes further that a fair and just reason is 
provided when the defendant offers any "plausible” reason.  
Under this test, Kivioja argues that Stehle's recantation, which 
was Stehle’s only statement under oath, is "plausible," and, 
therefore, a fair and just reason entitling him to withdraw his 
plea. 
¶30 The State concedes that a defendant need not show that 
the recantation is corroborated by other evidence, nor that a 
reasonable jury would believe the recantation.  However, it 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
14
disagrees with the defendant that a recantation without more is, 
per se, a fair and just reason for withdrawals.  Instead, the 
State argues that the inherent unreliability of a recantation 
demands that it be supported by some reasonable indicia of 
reliability before it can be considered fair and just. 
¶31 At the outset, we agree with both parties that when a 
motion is supported by a recantation, a defendant need show 
neither corroboration of the recantation nor that a reasonable 
jury would believe the recantation.  This first requirement was 
established in McCallum and is applicable only when a defendant 
seeks to withdraw a motion following sentencing.  See McCallum, 
208 Wis. 2d at 473-474.  This second "requirement" is an 
incorrect statement of the requirement in McCallum that, 
correctly stated, requires that a defendant show that there is a 
reasonable probability that a jury, looking at both the 
accusation and the recantation, would have a reasonable doubt as 
to the defendant's guilt.  Id. at 468.  This requirement also is 
one which is applicable only when a defendant moves to withdraw 
a plea after sentencing. 
¶32 In McCallum, this court set forth the test a circuit 
court should apply in assessing whether a defendant was entitled 
to withdraw a plea following sentencing when his or her motion 
was supported with new evidence in the form of a recantation.  
We first acknowledged that following sentencing, a defendant 
shouldered a significant burden of establishing by clear and 
convincing evidence that he or she is entitled to withdraw the 
plea only if doing so is necessary to correct a "manifest 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
15
injustice."  McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 473.  We then explained 
that for new evidence to support a claim that a new trial was 
necessary to avoid a manifest injustice, that 
 
[f]irst, the defendant must prove, by clear and 
convincing 
evidence, 
that: (1) the evidence was 
discovered after conviction; (2) the defendant was not 
negligent in seeking evidence; (3) the evidence is 
material to an issue in the case; and (4) the evidence 
is not merely cumulative.  If the defendant proves 
these four criteria by clear and convincing evidence, 
the circuit court must determine whether a reasonable 
probability exists that a different result would be 
reached 
in 
a 
trial. 
 
Finally, 
when 
the 
newly 
discovered evidence is a witness's recantation, we 
have stated that the recantation must be corroborated 
by other newly discovered evidence.  Zillmer v. State, 
39 Wis. 2d 607, 616, 159 N.W.2d 669 (1968). 
Id. at 473-74. 
¶33 Manifest in the decision of the circuit court is its 
belief 
that 
Kivioja 
needed 
to 
satisfy 
the 
latter 
two 
requirements of McCallum.  However, in holding the defendant to 
that standard, it placed too substantial a burden upon the 
defendant. 
¶34 We previously have held that the burden a defendant 
faces 
when 
moving 
to 
withdraw 
his 
or 
her 
plea 
varies 
substantially with the timing of the motion.  It should be 
easier for a defendant to withdraw a plea before sentencing than 
after.  Libke, 60 Wis. 2d at 124.  When a defendant moves to 
withdraw his or her plea prior to sentencing, the circuit court 
is to look only for a fair and just reason and freely allow the 
withdrawal.  Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 582-83.  However, a 
defendant is held to a much more difficult burden when 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
16
requesting a plea withdrawal following sentencing, when he or 
she is required to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that the withdrawal is necessary to avoid a manifest injustice. 
 Libke, 60 Wis. 2d at 124-128.  Because Kivioja merely needed to 
meet the fair and just reason standard, the circuit court erred 
in holding him to the manifest injustice standard articulated in 
McCallum. 
¶35 While we find that the circuit court applied the wrong 
legal standard to the facts of this case, we will not reverse 
its erroneous exercise of discretion where we find that the 
facts of the record applied to the proper legal standard support 
its conclusion.  In re Paternity of Stephanie R.N., 174 Wis. 2d 
745, 767, 498 N.W.2d 235 (1993).   
¶36 While Kivioja argues that the circuit court applied 
the wrong legal standard to his motion by relying upon McCallum, 
his focus is primarily on the credibility assessment that the 
court engaged in when considering Stehle's recantation.  The 
defendant believes that a circuit court is precluded from 
considering the credibility of evidence a defendant offers in 
support of a motion to withdraw a plea prior to sentencing.  As 
support for this proposition, he points to State v. Shanks, 152 
Wis. 2d 284, 448 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1989), a decision in which 
the court of appeals reversed a circuit court order denying a 
defendant's plea withdrawal because the court of appeals found 
that "[f]air and just reasons, made plausible by the record, 
were offered in support" of the defendant's motion.  Shanks, 152 
Wis. 2d at 292.  Kivioja is emboldened by the court of appeals' 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
17
use of the term "plausible," which he believes precludes the 
circuit court from considering the credibility of the evidence 
offered in support of a motion to withdraw.  As we understand 
his argument, "plausible" evidence and "credible" evidence may 
be mutually exclusiveor at the least, a requirement to bring 
forward "plausible" evidence is a lesser threshold than a 
requirement to bring forward "credible" evidence. 
¶37 The defendant is in error for no other reason than 
that the term "plausible" is not as unrelated to the term 
"credible" as he believes.  The words are, in fact, synonymous 
terms, and are interchangeable in the context in which the court 
of appeals used the term in Shanks. 
¶38 First, as a practical matter, we note that the 
definition of plausible as found within the American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language, (3d ed., 1992), equates the 
two terms: 
 
Plausible:  1. Seemingly or apparently valid, likely, 
or acceptable; credible: a plausible excuse. 
Id. at 1388.  It further provides that the word "plausible" is 
synonymous with "credible", as well as the terms "believable" 
and "colorable": 
 
The central meaning shared by these adjectives is 
'appearing to merit belief or acceptance.':  a 
plausible pretext; a believable excuse; a colorable 
explanation; a credible assertion. 
Id.  For the purpose of providing evidence in support of a 
motion to withdraw a plea, we discern no difference between 
requiring a defendant to bring forward plausible evidence and 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
18
one requiring a defendant to bring forward credible evidence.  
Regardless of the term used, a defendant must bring forward 
evidence that the circuit court finds believable, without which 
any reason offered in support of withdrawal would not be fair 
and just. 
¶39 Second, the court of appeals' reasoning in Shanks does 
not support the defendant's position that a circuit court is 
precluded from evaluating the credibility of the defendant's 
proffered reason for plea withdrawal.  In writing that some 
courts have suggested that a fair and just reason must be 
plausible, the court of appeals cited United States v. Navarro-
Flores, 628 F.2d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 1980).  Far from 
precluding a credibility assessment, the court in Navarro-Flores 
explicitly embraced such an assessment, writing that "[i]n 
determining whether [the defendant] presented a plausible reason 
to support his motion, the weight to be given the evidence and 
the credibility of the witnesses 'is primarily a matter 
entrusted to the district court.'"  Navarro-Flores, 628 F.2d at 
1183-84 (citing United States v. Webster, 468 F.2d 769, 771-72 
(9th Cir. 1972))(emphasis supplied). 
¶40 Third, this court has consistently accepted circuit 
court evaluations of the credibility of evidence when they 
consider plea withdrawals.  As early as our decision in Libke, 
Justice Robert W. Hansen, in a concurring opinion, expressed the 
view that an evidentiary hearing on whether a defendant has 
presented a fair and just reason for a plea withdrawal is 
necessary to resolve "issues of fact and credibility."  Libke, 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
19
60 Wis. 2d at 130 (R. Hansen, J., concurring) (emphasis 
supplied).  We have recognized a circuit court's credibility 
assessment in numerous cases since. 
¶41 In Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d 565, for instance, we upheld 
the circuit court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea based 
upon the defendant's assertion that he did not understand the 
plea because "the court did not believe [the defendant's] 
asserted reasons for withdrawal of the plea, and therefore did 
not think they were fair and just.”  Id. at 585 (emphasis 
supplied).  We wrote further that  
 
the circuit court in the case before us did not 
believe Canedy's contention that he misunderstood the 
meaning of 'depraved mind' when he entered the plea.  
The court was of the opinion that the record did not 
support such a contention.  Canedy's counsel admits in 
his brief to this court that 'had the trial court in 
this case denied the defendant's motion on the grounds 
that he found the defendant's testimony incredible or 
otherwise unbelievable it is unlikely this appeal 
would ever have been brought.' [citation omitted]  In 
the case before us it is obvious from the record that 
the circuit judge did not believe that Canedy did not 
understand the charge to which he pled guilty. 
Id. at 585-86. 
¶42 In Dudrey v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 480, 247 N.W.2d 105 
(1976), a review of a circuit court's denial of defendant's 
motion based upon his claim that he did not understand his plea, 
this court accepted the circuit court's conclusion that "the 
defendant fully understood the nature of the negotiated plea and 
the nature of the proceedings at [the] time [of his plea]."  Id. 
at 483.  We held that the circuit court did not apply an 
incorrect standard in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
20
his plea when it "obviously disbelieved defendant's contention, 
and in effect found that no reason was offered for withdrawal of 
the guilty plea." Id. (emphasis supplied).  And in Garcia, we 
reaffirmed our holding in Canedy that "if the circuit court does 
not believe the defendant's asserted reasons for withdrawal of 
the plea, there is no fair and just reason to allow withdrawal 
of the plea."  Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 863 (emphasis supplied). 
¶43 These cases are evidence that credibility assessments 
are crucial to a determination of whether the evidence offered 
is a fair and just reason supporting withdrawal and they are 
consistent with the requirement that the defendant must do more 
than allege or assert a fair and just reason, that he or she 
must also show that the reason actually exists.  See  e.g., 
Canedy, 
161 
Wis. 2d 
at 
585 
("a 
misunderstanding 
of 
the 
consequences of a guilty plea is grounds for withdrawal, but the 
misunderstanding must actually exist").  In order to assess 
whether a reason actually exists, the circuit court must engage 
in some credibility determination of the proffered reason, 
without which withdrawal would be automatic, a matter of right. 
  
¶44 For 
instance, 
Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
held 
that 
"misunderstanding" a plea is a fair and just reason for 
withdrawal.  Dudrey, 74 Wis. 2d at 485; Shanks, 152 Wis. 2d at 
266.  However, it does not follow that any time that a defendant 
asserts that he or she misunderstood the plea, he or she is 
entitled to withdrawal.  The misunderstanding must be genuine.  
Our case law establishes that not all defendants who state that 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
21
they did not earlier understand their plea are entitled to 
withdraw their pleas.  See Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 585; Garcia, 
192 Wis. 2d at 862.  Because the reason offered must be genuine, 
the circuit court must determine whether the defendant's reason 
is credible or plausible or believable. 
¶45 Identifying 
recantation 
evidence 
as 
inherently 
unreliable, the State asks that we adopt a test with which 
circuit courts could assess the reliability of recantation in a 
manner 
that 
is 
more 
structured 
than 
the 
assessment 
of 
credibility engaged in by the circuit courts in those cases 
where a defendant alleges a misunderstanding of the plea.  
Whether recantation evidence ought to be treated in a manner 
different than other evidence a defendant offers as a fair and 
just reason for withdrawal is an issue of first impression. 
¶46 The State's position that recantation evidence, due to 
its 
unreliability, 
presents 
circuit 
courts 
with 
special 
difficulties when deciding motions to withdraw pleas is not 
without precedent.  In McCallum, this court observed that a 
recantation does present special circumstances requiring the 
circuit court to indulge in a greater degree of inquiry than it 
would for other forms of new evidence used in support of a 
defendant’s motion for a post-sentence plea withdrawal.  A 
recantation, we wrote, was inherently unreliable.  McCallum, 208 
Wis. 2d at 476 (citing Dunlavy, 21 Wis. 2d at 114).  We found 
the genesis of this conclusion in those cases in which a 
witness, under oath, recanted an earlier sworn statement, thus 
admitting to perjury.  See e.g., Dunlavy, 21 Wis. 2d at 114; 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
22
Loucheine v. Strouse, 49 Wis. 623, 6 N.W. 360 (1880).  In 
Loucheine, which considered a recantation in the context of a 
motion for a new trial, we explained our view that 
 
[t]he evidence of this witness on another trial, in 
contradiction of his evidence on the same point on the 
original trial, would be entirely unreliable and not 
entitled to any weight without corroboration by some 
credible evidence also newly discovered, and would 
not, of itself alone, amount to newly-discovered 
testimony. 
Loucheine, 49 Wis. at 624 (footnote omitted).  Our decision in 
McCallum reaffirmed this conclusion that due to its inherent 
unreliability, recantation testimony must be corroborated by 
other newly discovered evidence, without which it would not be 
sufficient reason to find the manifest injustice required to 
permit a defendant to withdraw a plea following his or her 
sentencing.  McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 476. 
¶47 Given the unreliability of recantation, the State has 
proposed tailoring the test articulated in McCallum to motions 
made before sentencing.  The defendant argues that the test 
articulated in McCallum ought not be followed in the instant 
case for two reasons, distinguishing that case from the facts 
here.  First, McCallum concerned the much more difficult burden 
a defendant faces in a post-sentencing plea withdrawal.  Second, 
unlike the witness in McCallum and the cases upon which it is 
based, Stehle's recantation is the only statement that he has 
made under oath, and by providing the recantation, Stehle has 
not perjured himself. 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
23
¶48 As our discussion above makes clear, we are in 
agreement with the defendant that the heightened burden a 
defendant faces under McCallum makes an unmodified application 
of that case to a presentence plea withdrawal involving 
recantation testimony much too burdensome and inconsistent with 
our precedent that has clearly drawn a distinction between a 
defendant's burden before sentencing and after sentencing.  
However, we disagree with the defendant that a recantation is 
only unreliable when both the earlier and the later statements 
are made under oath.  The court of appeals in State v. Mayo, 217 
Wis. 2d 217, 579 N.W.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1998), facing the reverse 
of what we face here, namely a recantation not made under oath 
following earlier trial testimony, found that despite the fact 
that the conflicting statements were not both made under oath, 
questions of credibility were still unanswered.  Id. at 229.  We 
find that the fact that Stehle may not have perjured himself 
when he testified at Kivioja's motion hearing cannot establish, 
per se, that his second statement, made under oath, is credible. 
¶49 The application of a modified McCallum test to plea 
withdrawals prior to sentencing will help circuit courts 
determine whether a recantation is worthy of belief and 
therefore a fair and just reason for withdrawal.  Such a test as 
described immediately below will preserve the liberal, though 
not automatic, application of the fair and just reason test 
appropriate to such motions, while at the same time providing a 
framework in which a circuit court can assure the reliability of 
otherwise inherently unreliable recantation evidence. 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
24
¶50 New evidence should constitute a fair and just reason 
where the defendant shows by a preponderance of the evidence 
that (1) the evidence was discovered after entry of the plea; 
(2) the defendant was not negligent in seeking the evidence; (3) 
the evidence is material to an issue in the case; and (4) the 
evidence 
is 
not 
merely 
cumulative. 
 
These 
first 
four 
requirements will not unduly burden a defendant offering 
recantation evidence as a recantation by its nature generally 
satisfies these criteria.  See State v. Terrance, 202 Wis. 2d 
496, 501, 550 N.W.2d 445 (Ct. App. 1996).  And when the new 
evidence is not recantation, holding the defendant to these 
requirements is reasonable, for if the defendant knew of 
evidence prior to the entry of a plea, or was negligent in 
seeking the evidence, it would not be fair and just to allow him 
or her to withdraw a plea.  Nor would it be fair and just to 
allow withdrawal where the evidence is not material and where it 
would be merely cumulative. 
¶51 In addition to meeting these four criteria, when the 
newly discovered evidence is a witness's recantation as it is 
here, the circuit court must determine that the recantation has 
reasonable indicia of reliability. 
¶52 The test we adopt differs from the more onerous 
McCallum test in significant ways.  First, a defendant will be 
held to demonstrate a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a 
plea by a preponderance of the evidence, less demanding than the 
clear and convincing standard required of a similar motion made 
after sentencing.  Second, a defendant need not show that there 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
25
is a reasonable probability of a different result at trial.  
Third, a defendant will not need to show other new evidence that 
corroborates the recantation.  In place of this last requirement 
found in McCallum, under the test we articulate here, the 
defendant 
will be 
held 
to 
the lesser showing 
that the 
recantation has reasonable indicia of reliabilitythat is, that 
the recantation is worthy of belief.  Should the court find that 
the first four criteria are met, and that the recantation is 
worthy of belief, the defendant will have provided a sufficient 
fair and just reason for withdrawal.   
¶53 The application of this modified McCallum test is 
justified prior to sentencing because the credibility and the 
reliability 
of 
recantation 
evidence 
is 
crucial 
to 
a 
determination of whether the fair and just reason offered by the 
defendant actually exists.  Regardless of when recantation is 
offered, its inherent unreliability is static.  If a recantation 
could be found unreliable after sentencing, we do not believe 
that that same recantation, equally unreliable if offered prior 
to sentencing, should entitle the defendant resting his or her 
motion solely on that recantation to plea withdrawal. 
¶54 Therefore, the circuit court must properly determine 
whether 
the 
recantation 
is 
credible, 
worthy 
of 
belief.  
McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 487 (Abrahamson, C.J. concurring).  The 
circuit court is to determine "whether [the witness] is worthy 
of 
belief, 
whether 
he 
or 
she 
is 
within 
the 
realm 
of 
believability, whether the recantation has any indicia of 
credibility persuasive to a reasonable juror if presented at a 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
26
[] trial."  Id.  Of course, should the circuit court find that 
the recantation is incredible or not worthy of belief, it may 
deny the defendant's motion to withdraw.  See McCallum, 208 Wis. 
2d at 487 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).  However, if a 
reasonable 
jury 
could 
believe 
the 
recantation, 
then 
the 
defendant is entitled to withdraw his or her plea, for the 
defendant does not have the added burden of showing that a 
reasonable jury would have a reasonable doubt about the 
defendant's guilt, as is required when a motion is made after 
sentencing. 
¶55 A circuit court may be guided in its evaluation of the 
reliability of a statement by looking to that which we have 
stated in other contexts are assurances of trustworthiness.  See 
State v. Brown, 96 Wis. 2d 238, 245, 291 N.W.2d 528 (1980).  
Assurances of trustworthiness can include the spontaneity of the 
statement, whether the statement is corroborated by other 
evidence in the case, the extent to which the statement is self-
incriminatory and against the penal interest of the declarant, 
and the declarant's availability to testify under oath and 
subject to cross-examination.  See Brown, 96 Wis. 2d at 243-45. 
 While no single factor is required, the presence of one or more 
may satisfy the circuit court that the recantation is reliable. 
 On the other side of the equation, a factor that may undercut 
the reliability of a statement is evidence that the statement 
may be the product of coercion or duress, see McCallum, 208 Wis. 
2d at 487 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring), and a circuit court 
should give consideration to that possibility as well.  Of 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
27
course, these indicia that support or oppose a finding of 
reliability are not exclusive, and a circuit court may find 
assurances of trustworthiness in a host of places. 
IV 
¶56 We have the authority to apply the proper legal 
standard to the facts of this case to determine whether Kivioja 
is entitled to withdraw his plea.  Libke, 60 Wis. 2d at 129.  
While we have at times declined to do so in favor of allowing 
the circuit court the opportunity to hold an evidentiary hearing 
on the basis that it alone is best-situated to observe the 
demeanor of the witnesses on issues that depend so heavily upon 
credibility, see McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 479-80, this is not 
such a case.  Here, as opposed to the situation we faced in 
McCallum, the cold record does provide a reflection of the 
witness's demeanor and credibility through the statements of the 
circuit court.  See McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 480. 
¶57 While the circuit court did not apply the test for 
assessing recantation evidence newly articulated here, we find 
that the circuit court's discussion that Stehle's statements 
show so many marked inconsistencies that his "reliability and 
credibility is seriously challenged" to be a finding that the 
recantation is incredible as a matter of law.  Its written 
finding that "a reasonable jury would not believe the recanting 
statement of accomplice Jody Stehle" is also a finding that the 
recantation is incredible as a matter of law.  While we agree 
with both parties that upon a motion to withdraw a plea prior to 
sentencing a defendant is not required to show that a reasonable 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
28
jury would believe the recantation, the circuit court's decision 
that a jury would not believe the recantation is tantamount to a 
finding that the reason offered by the defendant is incredible. 
 Such a finding is not inconsistent with either the lower burden 
a defendant faces upon his motion prior to sentencing, nor is it 
inconsistent with our holding in McCallum.   
¶58 In 
McCallum, 
we 
held 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
conclusion that a recantation was less credible than an initial 
accusation did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a 
reasonable jury could not have a reasonable doubt.  McCallum, 
208 Wis. 2d at 474-75.  However, we stated that "[a] finding 
that the recantation is incredible necessarily leads to the 
conclusion that the recantation would not lead to a reasonable 
doubt in the minds of the jury."  Id. at 474.  This distinction 
is important and comes into play under the circumstances the 
circuit court was facing here.  While Kivioja was not required 
to show that a jury would believe the recantation, he must be 
able to show that a jury could believe the recantation.  This 
requirement does no more and no less than that which requires 
that the reason a defendant offers in support of a motion to 
withdraw a plea be believable.  And as we have previously held, 
if the asserted reason offered by the defendant is not 
believable, the circuit court may in its discretion deny the 
defendant's motion to withdraw a plea for the defendant's 
failure to present a fair and just reason.  See Canedy, 161 Wis. 
2d at 585.  
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
29
¶59 Furthermore, while the circuit court judge did not 
look to any of the factors we have proposed above, our 
independent review of the record with an eye to those factors 
supports 
the 
circuit 
court's 
conclusion 
that 
Stehle's 
recantation does not constitute a fair and just reason to allow 
withdrawal of Kivioja's plea because it lacks reasonable indicia 
of reliability.   
¶60 First, Stehle gave a statement "clearing" Kivioja only 
after Stehle received what he considered to be an extremely 
harsh sentence in light of his earlier willingness to cooperate 
with the police.  Having received a lengthy sentence, Stehle 
expressed his anger with the police when he made his decision to 
recant.  The timing of Stehle's recantation, coming only days 
after his sentence but nearly 16 months since he first told 
officers of Kivioja's involvement in the crimes, seriously 
depreciates the statement's reliability. 
¶61 Second, Stehle's recantation was not corroborated by 
any other new evidence in the case.  While corroboration is not 
necessary to a finding that a recantation is reliable, it may 
serve to establish reliability, particularly in the absence of 
any other assurances of trustworthiness.  Stehle did testify 
that he had a motive for accusing Kiviojathe fact that Kivioja 
gave officers Stehle's real name which led directly to Stehle's 
arrest.  Stehle also testified that the police were to make 
things easier on him if he would implicate Kivioja.  Relying on 
McCallum, defendant argues that Stehle's motives to falsely 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
30
accuse 
defendant 
provides 
some 
evidence 
of 
internal 
corroboration for the recantation.   
¶62 However, Stehle's professed motives do not provide 
internal corroboration where, as here, his statement lacks other 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.  In McCallum, we 
held that "corroboration requirement in a recantation case is 
met if:  (1) there is a feasible motive for the initial false 
statement; and (2) there are circumstantial guarantees of the 
trustworthiness of the recantation."  McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 
477-78.  That is, internal corroboration alone will not suffice 
if 
there 
are 
no 
other 
circumstantial 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness. 
¶63 In particular, as the circuit court noted, the varied 
stories in the circumstances surrounding the May 9, 1995, crime 
is damning to Stehle's testimony as a whole.  In his first 
statement to the police, Stehle confessed to his involvement in 
all of the burglaries with which Kivioja was charged except the 
one on May 9, 1995.  In his recantation letter, Stehle wrote 
that, in fact, Kivioja did not commit the May 9, 1995, burglary 
and that he himself was not in jail on that date.  Stehle denied 
his own involvement in the crime, and explained that an unnamed 
third person who he happened to meet on the day of the burglary 
actually committed the burglary.  Stehle wrote then that he 
would not disclose the name of this third person unless he would 
be released immediately from prison and not be placed on parole. 
 Stehle provided yet a third version of this crime at Kivioja's 
motion for withdrawal of his plea when he explained that he 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
31
himself, alone, had committed the crime.  However, he was not 
able to explain how the six $100 bills that were stolen came 
into Kivioja's possession, nor could he explain why or how he 
had attributed the burglary to yet a third party when he did so 
in his recantation letter.  His varied stories are evidence of 
the internal inconsistency of Stehle's recantation that leads to 
the conclusion that his recantation is incredible. 
¶64 Third, 
Stehle's 
recantation 
does 
not 
bear 
the 
assurance of reliability that accompanies a statement against 
the penal interest of the declarant as it would if he had made 
both this and the earlier statement under oath.  Where 
conflicting statements are made under oath, the second statement 
serves as 
an 
admittance 
of 
perjury. 
 Having 
made 
both 
statements, the declarant has, in fact, perjured him or herself. 
 Stehle's statement is not against his penal interest.    
¶65 We do note the presence of a single indicium of 
reliability, and that is that Stehle's recantation was given 
under oath.  However, as we stated above, this single indicia, 
in and of itself, lends little reliability to the recantation.  
Either Stehle's original accusation or his recantation is false, 
and the fact that one was made under oath does not get us nearer 
to the answer of whether the latter statement is reliable. 
¶66 Our independent review of the record demonstrates that 
Stehle's recantation lacks reasonable indicia of reliability 
without which it does not constitute a fair and just reason to 
allow Kivioja's presentence plea withdrawal.   
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR 
 
32
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court for Fond du 
Lac County is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR.ssa 
 
1 
¶67 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
I agree with the majority opinion that the circuit court erred 
as a matter of law in holding that the defendant must prove that 
a reasonable jury would believe the recantation and that the 
recantation must be corroborated.  Because of these errors of 
law, I would reverse the order of the circuit court and remand 
the cause to the circuit court to exercise its discretion under 
the standard I set forth below. 
¶68 The law governing withdrawal of a guilty or no-contest 
plea before sentencing is easy to state.  First, a defendant 
does not have an absolute right to withdraw a plea before 
imposition of sentence.  A plea is not a meaningless formality 
when 
the 
circuit 
court 
makes 
a 
full 
inquiry 
into 
the 
circumstances of the plea.  Second, a circuit court should 
nevertheless allow a defendant to withdraw a plea before 
sentencing for "any fair and just reason" unless the prosecution 
has 
been 
substantially 
prejudiced 
by 
reliance 
upon 
the  
defendant's plea.6  Third, granting or denying the motion to 
withdraw the plea rests within the sound discretion of the 
circuit court.  
¶69 The law governing withdrawal of a guilty or no-contest 
plea before sentencing is, however, not so easy to apply.  The 
                     
6 State v. Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d 565, 579-584, 469 N.W.2d 163 
(1991).  The "any fair and just reason" test is set forth in the 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice—Pleas of Guilty, Standard 14-
2.1 (1980) and in Rule 32(e), Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. See Charles Alan Wright, 3 Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Criminal 2d, Rule 32 (1998 Pocket Part).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR.ssa 
 
2 
"any fair and just reason" standard "lack[s] any pretense of 
scientific exactness."  United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 
220 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975).  
Appellate decisions of state and federal courts give meaning to 
this standard.   
¶70 The court of appeals certified the present case to 
this court because it perceived inconsistencies in certain 
Wisconsin appellate decisions interpreting and applying the "any 
fair and just reason standard."  The majority opinion does not, 
I conclude, resolve these perceived inconsistencies.  
¶71 In its certification memorandum, the court of appeals 
asked this court "whether the plausibility approach of Shanks,7 
which precludes a credibility assessment, is the correct law in 
light of Canedy,8 which permits such an assessment of defendant's 
testimony 
in 
a presentence 
setting, 
and 
McCallum,9 
which 
contemplates an assessment of a recanter's testimony in a 
postsentence setting."   
¶72 The majority opinion does not, in my view, clearly 
distinguish between and describe the applicability of the 
standards of plausibility and credibility.  Similarly, the 
majority opinion fails to explain adequately the basis for the 
                     
7 State v. Shanks, 152 Wis. 2d 284, 448 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 
1989). 
8 Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d 565. 
9 State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR.ssa 
 
3 
distinction it makes between the corroboration of recantation 
testimony and the reliability of recantation testimony. 
¶73 Moreover, the majority opinion today departs from 
Wisconsin's tradition of applying federal case law to determine 
grounds for plea withdrawals10 and adopts a new four-part test 
used for motions for a new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence.11  The majority opinion is not clear about 
the relation of this new test to the rules set forth in our 
prior cases.  Also, I doubt that a test applicable to vacating a 
guilty verdict on the basis of new evidence should be a 
principal test to be applied to withdrawing a plea before 
sentencing.  The rationale for allowing a verdict to be vacated 
after trial is different from the rationale for allowing the 
withdrawal of a plea that has waived the defendant's right to 
trial.   
¶74 In a motion to withdraw a guilty or no-contest plea 
before sentencing I would apply the following test:  The circuit 
court should determine, as a matter of law, whether the 
recanter's testimony is worthy of belief by the jury.  The 
circuit court should not determine whether the recantation is 
true or false.  Instead, it should merely determine whether the 
testimony 
of 
the 
recanting 
witness 
has 
any 
indicia 
of 
credibility that would be persuasive to a reasonable juror if 
                     
10 See Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 582-83.  
11 For the test applicable to motions for a new trial, see 
State v. Terrance, 202 Wis. 2d 496, 501, 550 N.W.2d 445 (Ct. 
App. 1996).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR.ssa 
 
4 
the testimony were presented at trial.  Cf. State v. McCallum, 
208 Wis. 2d 463, 487, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997) (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring).  In my view, this assessment of a recanter's 
testimony should be identical to a circuit court's assessment of 
a witness's testimony at a preliminary hearing. 
¶75 I would remand the cause to the circuit court to 
determine whether, under the test I have set forth above, there 
is any fair and just reason to allow withdrawal of the no-
contest plea in the present case.  
¶76 For these reasons, I dissent. 
¶77 I am authorized to state that JUSTICE ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nos. 97-2932-CR & 97-2933-CR.ssa 
 
1