Case Title: Bennett v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 293, 2006, 303, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BRUCE BENNETT, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
Nos. 296/303, 2006 (Consolidated) 
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
Sussex County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
 Cr. ID. No. 0505019622 
 
 
§ 
 Cr. ID. No. 0505019765 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
_______________________________ 
SANDRA BENNETT, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
 
 
 
§ 
 
              v. 
 
§ 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
  
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  June 20, 2007 
 
 
Decided:     August 10, 2007 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 10th day of August 2007, upon consideration of the parties’ contentions 
at oral argument, the supplemental briefing and the record in this case, it appears to 
the Court that: 
  
 
2
1. 
The Appellants, Bruce and Sandra Bennett (“the Bennetts”), appeal 
from their Superior Court convictions of Exploitation of an Infirm Adult1 and 
Conspiracy in the Second Degree.2   The Bennetts’ sole contention on appeal is that 
the trial judge erred by denying their motion for judgment of acquittal after the 
State failed to produce any expert medical testimony to demonstrate that the 
victim, Charlotte Boyer (“Boyer”), was infirm.  Finding no merit to their argument, 
we affirm. 
2. 
Charlotte Boyer suffered a stroke in February 2003 at the age of 75.  In 
May of that year, she left the Millsboro Nursing Home to live with Angela and 
Douglas Gordon (“the Gordons”), her daughter and son-in-law.  In order to 
continue paying for specialized care, Boyer was forced to sell her home.  The 
home was sold by Boyer’s sister, Catherine Taylor, who held and exercised a 
power of attorney.  Because Boyer felt that the home was sold for less than it was 
worth, she revoked Taylor’s power of attorney and granted her power of attorney 
to the Gordons. 
3. 
In June 2004, Adult Protective Services (“APS”) began investigating 
allegations that the Gordons had improperly used $151,000 of Boyer’s money to 
finance their personal home renovations.  APS moved Boyer to Green Meadow 
                                          
 
1 31 Del. C. § 3913 (1997). 
 
2 11 Del. C. § 512 (2001). 
 
3
Assisted Living.  The Gordons were charged, and later plead guilty to, exploiting 
Boyer in August 2004.3  Several days later, Boyer inexplicably left Green 
Meadows and began living with the Bennetts, who are the parents of Angela 
Gordon. 
 
4. 
In October 2004, after Boyer had been living with the Bennetts for 
several months, the Bennetts agreed to purchase at auction a property located near 
the beach in Sussex County for $236,000.  The Bennetts contacted PNC Bank to 
obtain the necessary financing.  PNC Bank, however, would only loan the Bennetts 
$150,000.  Moreover, PNC Bank required a second mortgage on the Bennetts’ 
primary residence.  The Bennetts then contacted Wilmington Trust Company, 
which agreed to lend the Bennetts $120,000 subject to obtaining a first mortgage 
on the new property. 
 
5. 
During this period, Boyer transferred $151,000 to Bruce Bennett and 
received a second mortgage on the new property from the Bennetts.  Boyer then 
executed a codicil to her will providing that the $151,000 loan would be forgiven 
in the event of her death. 
 
6. 
Boyer suffered a second stroke on February 13, 2005.  After she was 
transferred to the Delaware Hospital for the Chronically Ill, the State of Delaware 
                                          
 
3 The Gordons were instructed by their attorney to return the $151,000 they took from Boyer.  
On behalf of the Gordons, the Bennetts deposited $151,000 in Boyer’s bank account at 
Wilmington Trust. 
 
4
petitioned for the appointment of a guardian for Ms. Boyer.  A later investigation 
of Ms. Boyer’s financial circumstances revealed the transfer of $151,000 of 
Boyer’s funds to the Bennetts.  In June 2005, the Bennetts were arrested for and 
charged with Exploiting the Resources of an Infirm Adult and Conspiracy Second 
Degree.  A Superior Court jury convicted the Bennetts of both charges.  The 
Superior Court sentenced the Bennetts to a total of six years imprisonment at Level 
V, suspended for 90 days of Level IV home confinement, followed by probation.  
Restitution and other special conditions were also ordered. 
 
7. 
On appeal, the Bennetts claim that the Superior Court erred in denying 
their motion for judgment of acquittal.  Specifically, they argue that medical 
testimony was required to satisfy the “infirm adult” element of the crime.  We 
review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal to determine “whether any 
rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”4 
 
8.  A person is guilty of exploiting an infirm adult in violation of 31 Del. C. 
§ 3913, if he or she “knowingly or recklessly exploits an infirm  adult by using the 
infirm adult’s resources. . . .”5  An infirm adult is defined as “any person 18 years 
                                          
 
4 Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1355 (Del. 1991). 
 
5 31 Del. C. § 3913 (1997) (“Any person who knowingly or recklessly exploits an infirm adult by 
using the infirm adult’s resources shall be guilty of a class [C felony] . . . if the value of the 
resources is $50,000.”). 
 
5
of age or over who, because of physical or mental disability, is substantially 
impaired in the ability to provide adequately for the person’s own care and 
custody.”6  “Physical or mental disability shall include any physical or mental 
disability and shall include, but not be limited to, mental retardation, brain damage, 
physical degeneration, deterioration, senility, disease, habitual drunkenness or 
addiction to drugs, and mental or physical infirmity.”7  Substantial impairment is 
defined as “the inability to perform or obtain for himself or herself essential 
services.8 
 
9. 
The General Assembly first recognized in 1982 that “many adult 
citizens of this State are subject to psychological or physical injury or exploitation 
because of physical or mental infirmity, disease or other causes which render them 
incapable of providing for their basic daily living needs.”9  Chapter 39 was 
intended to “establish a system of services for impaired adults designed to protect 
their health, safety and welfare.”10  Section 3913 was added in 1991 “to expand the 
criminal liability of any person who abuses, neglects, exploits, or mistreats an 
infirm adult in recognition of the fact that such illegal conduct may occur not only 
                                          
 
6 31 Del. C. § 3902(1) (1997). 
 
7 Id. at § 3902(2) (1997). 
 
8 Id. at § 3902(3) (1997). 
 
9 Forrest v. State, 721 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Del. 1999), citing 31 Del. C. § 3901 (1997). 
. 
10 Id. 
 
6
in a licensed facility by hired staff but also in private residences by family and 
friends.”11 
 
10. Any physical or mental disability that causes “substantial[] 
impair[ment] in the ability to provide adequately for the person’s own care and 
custody”12 will suffice as a “physical or mental disability” for purposes of Section 
3913.  Indeed, physical or mental disability “shall include, but not be limited to” 
those listed in 31 Del. C. § 3902(2).  Physical or mental disability is not limited to 
medically diagnosed diseases.  Although some of the illnesses included in the non-
exhaustive list of physical or mental disabilities may require expert medical 
testimony to prove, other physical or mental disabilities may be proven by lay 
testimony, so long as the testimony is rationally based on the witness’ own 
perception.13 
 
11. We need not resolve the claim that expert medical testimony was 
required to prove that Boyer was an “infirm adult,” because in this case the State 
                                          
 
11 Id., citing H.R. 190, 136th General Assembly (Del. 1991). 
 
12 31 Del. C. § 3902(2) (1997). 
 
13 See D.R.E. 701.  See, e.g., Raymond v. State, 2007 WL 66778 (Del. Mar. 6, 2006) (holding 
that expert medical testimony is not necessary to prove serious physical injury for purposes of 
the second degree assault statute).  The Bennetts rely primarily on State v. Sailer, 1996 WL 
111122, at *2 (Del. Super. Feb. 28, 1998), a case where the Superior Court suggested that expert 
medical testimony is required to prove the infirm adult element of the crime.  Sailer can be 
distinguished on its facts.  In that case, the State produced expert testimony to show that the 
victim was suffering from Alzheimer’s disease.  Id.  Here, the State argued that the adult was 
infirm due to a physical disability. 
 
7
produced sufficient admissible evidence to show that Boyer suffered from a 
physical disability that substantially impaired her ability to provide adequately for 
her own care.  Angela Gordon, her previous caretaker, testified that Boyer was 
unable to care for herself.  Indeed, when Gordon began caring for Boyer, Boyer 
was completely incontinent.  Ronald Inglis, Jr., the administrator of Green 
Meadows, testified that when Boyer arrived at that facility, she was diabetic, had 
balance problems and was sometimes confused. 
 
12. Boyer’s sister, Catherine Taylor, testified that Boyer suffered from a 
stroke in 2003, that Boyer was unable to drive, and that she relied on others to 
transport her to her doctors’ appointments.  Rosie Custis, a certified nurse’s 
assistant who cared for Boyer in 2004 and 2005, testified that Boyer was unable to 
cook for herself. 
 
13. Crystal Mehrenberg, an investigator with APS, testified that Boyer was 
unable to recall the day, date or year.  Mehrenberg further testified that Boyer’s 
mobility was limited and that she had a speech impediment.  Dr. E. Anne Riley 
testified that Boyer may not be able to handle her own financial affairs and 
recommended the appointment a guardian for Boyer’s property. 
 
14. During oral argument, Appellants contend that the State had proceeded 
under a theory that Ms. Boyer was mentally, and not physically, infirm.  This 
argument is contradicted by the record.  Although the record includes some 
 
8
evidence of dementia, the State argued that it was Boyer’s physical disability that 
rendered her infirm. During closing argument, the State argued: 
The State submits that the evidence has established that Mrs. Boyer is 
an infirm adult under the Statute; that she’s an infirm adult as the 
judge defined infirm adult to you.  And you know, infirm adult is 
different from incompetent. 
 
Now if this were about competency, it would be a different issue out 
there.  All right.  But the statute doesn’t say that the infirm adult has 
to be incompetent.  They are different.  It says infirm and it defines it.  
Can she take care of herself?  Can she live on her own?  Can she get 
the essential services?  Does she have a physical impairment that 
prevents her from taking care of herself completely, you know, why is 
that? 
 
Well, the evidence establishes that at her age, with her infirmities, her 
physical condition, her previous illnesses, that, you know, she is kind 
of vulnerable. 
 
 
Moreover, the trial judge rejected defense counsel’s argument that the State 
had improperly injected the issue of mental competency. 
 
15.  Based upon the evidence presented at trial concerning Boyer’s physical 
disabilities, the Superior Court did not err in denying the Bennetts’ motion for 
judgment of acquittal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the Superior 
Court are AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
         Justice