Case Title: Nowack v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Nowack v. State1989 WY 100774 P.2d 561Case Number: 87-74Decided: 05/09/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming

EVERETT 
NOWACK, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

 
 
Wyoming Public Defender 
Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Julie D. Naylor, Appellate 
Counsel, Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. 
Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Terry L. Armitage, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT, and MACY, 
JJ. and O'BRIEN, District Judge.

 
 

O'BRIEN, District 
Judge.

 
 

[¶1.]     On June 5, 1986, while 
drunk, Everett Nowack operated a vehicle on the streets of Casper, 
Wyoming. He 
drove across the median of Poplar 
Street and ran head-on into another vehicle. That 
collision resulted in serious injuries to one of the occupants of the other 
vehicle. For his acts he was criminally charged.

 
 

[¶2.]     On October 30, 1986, he 
pled guilty in Natrona County Court to causing serious bodily injury to another 
as a result of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in 
violation of § 31-5-233(a) and (g), W.S. 1977 (hereafter "injury-producing 
D.W.U.I."). On January 16, 1987, he was found guilty in District Court of 
aggravated assault and battery in violation of § 6-2-502, W.S. 1977. Both the 
guilty plea and the later conviction were based upon the events of June 5, 1986. 
This appeal comes from the aggravated assault and battery conviction.

 
 

[¶3.]     We are called upon to 
decide:

 
 
(1) 
Whether the existence of the injury-producing D.W.U.I. statute precludes the 
state from charging aggravated assault and battery when serious bodily injury 
results from an alcohol related vehicular accident, and

 
 
(2) 
Whether the double jeopardy clause of the United States or the Wyoming 
Constitution bars prosecution of the defendant for aggravated assault and 
battery after he has plead guilty to injury-producing D.W.U.I. for the same 
incident.

 
 

[¶4.]     The district court held 
that the State was not constrained from prosecuting the aggravated assault and 
battery. For the reasons stated below, the judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.

 
 

[¶5.]     On June 30, 1986, Nowack 
was charged in Natrona County Court with three criminal counts: first, causing 
serious bodily injury to another resulting from driving under the influence in 
violation of § 31-5-233(a) and (g), W.S. 1977; second, operating a motor vehicle 
without liability insurance in violation of § 31-4-103(a), W.S. 1977; and third, 
aggravated assault and battery in violation of § 6-2-502(a)(i), W.S. 1977. The 
first two counts are misdemeanors; the third is a felony.

 
 

[¶6.]     Upon motion by the State 
the two misdemeanors were dismissed on July 22, 1986, but the felony went to 
preliminary hearing. Following the preliminary hearing on July 28, 1986, Nowack 
was bound over for trial in the district court on the charge of aggravated 
assault and battery. After the preliminary hearing, and for reasons not 
disclosed in the record, the misdemeanors, earlier dismissed at the State's 
request, were refiled and Nowack pled guilty to both. He was sentenced by the 
county court for those offenses on October 30, 1986. Then, on November 18, 1986, 
he moved in district court to dismiss the aggravated assault and battery charge. 
In considering his motion the district judge said:1 "One problem 
with the argument of defendant is that it would reach an absurd result, whereby 
a person who was drunk and driving recklessly, resulting in serious bodily 
injury, would be guilty only of a misdemeanor, while a sober reckless driver 
causing serious bodily injury would be guilty of a felony." The motion was 
denied and the defendant was later found guilty after a bench trial.

 
 

[¶7.]     The first issue raised by 
appellant is whether the State can charge him with a felony, aggravated assault 
and battery,2 arising from a vehicular accident involving 
both reckless and drunken driving. He argues that the State must charge him with 
the statute which, in his view, specifically (and therefore exclusively) covers 
that conduct, to-wit § 31-5-233, W.S. 1977, driving or having control of a 
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or controlled 
substances.3 

 
 

[¶8.]     The United States Supreme 
Court has considered the circumstance of two statutes providing different 
penalties for identical criminal conduct. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S. Ct. 2198, 
60 L. Ed. 2d 755 (1979). The Court was called upon to construe conflicting penalty 
provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. In writing 
for a unanimous court Justice Marshall said [at 118, 99 S. Ct.  at 2201], "As we 
read the Act, each substantive statute, in conjunction with its own sentencing 
provision, operates independently of the other." The Court went on to say [at 
122-124, 99 S.Ct. at 2203-04]:

 
 
In 
resolving the statutory question, the majority below expressed "serious doubts 
about the constitutionality of two statutes that provide penalties for identical 
conduct." [U.S. v. 
Batchelder], 581 F.2d, [626] at 633-634 [(7th Cir. 1978)] (footnote omitted). 
Specifically, the court suggested that the statutes might (1) be void for 
vagueness, (2) implicate "due process and equal protection interest[s] in 
avoiding excessive prosecutorial discretion and in obtaining equal justice," and 
(3) constitute an impermissible delegation of congressional authority. 
Id., at 631-633. We find no 
constitutional infirmities.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
It 
is a fundmental tenet of due process that "[n]o one may be required at peril of 
life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes." 
[citation omitted] A criminal statute is therefore invalid if it "fails to give 
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is 
forbidden." [citations omitted] So too, vague sentencing provisions may pose 
constitutional questions if they do not state with sufficient clarity the 
consequences of violating a given criminal statute. [citations omitted]

 
 
The 
provisions in issue here, however, unambiguously specify the activity proscribed 
and the penalties available upon conviction. See supra 442 U.S.  at 119, 99 S. Ct.  at 
2201-02, 60 L.Ed.2d, at 761-762. That this particular conduct may violate both 
Titles does not detract from the notice afforded by each. Although the statutes 
create uncertainty as to which crime may be charged and therefore what penalties 
may be imposed, they do so to no greater extent than would a single statute 
authorizing various alternative punishments. So long as overlapping criminal 
provisions clearly define the conduct prohibited and the punishment authorized, 
the notice requirements of the Due Process Clause are satisfied.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
This 
Court has long recognized that when an act violates more than one criminal 
statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not 
discriminate against any class of defendants. [citations omitted]

 
 

[¶9.]     The same issue was 
presented to this Court with the same result. Kallas v. State, 704 P.2d 693 (Wyo. 1985). In Kallas the 
defendant, who was the father of the victim, was charged with second degree 
sexual assault, § 6-2-303(a)(v), W.S. 1977. On appeal he argued that he should 
have been charged under the incest statute, § 6-4-402, W.S. 1977, which carried 
a much more lenient sentence. In resolving the issues contrary to his 
contentions this Court relied upon United 
States v. Batchelder. After Kallas it would 
seem that the issue had been adequately put to rest. However, like a phoenix, it 
continues to resurrect itself. In Bueno-Hernandez v. State, 724 P.2d 1132, 1139 
(Wyo. 1986) the defendant was 
convicted of attempted second degree sexual assault under §§ 6-2-303(a) and 
6-1-301(a), W.S. 1977. He argued that he should have been charged with fourth 
degree sexual assault, § 6-2-305, W.S. 1977, or indecent liberties with a minor, 
§ 14-3-105, W.S. 1977. This Court again held that absent discriminatory 
prosecution, the State may charge any offense it can prove. In spite of those 
holdings, and for the third time in recent years we are again presented with the 
same argument. We will now conclusively deal with the issue.

 
 

[¶10.]  
Nowack suggests several rules of statutory construction to support his 
position. He argues that statutes on the same subject must be construed together 
to promote consistency and harmony, Capwell v. State, 686 P.2d 1148 (Wyo. 1984) and, presuming that the 
legislature does not intend futile acts, that statutes must be construed so as 
to give meaning to each and nullify neither. Sodergren v. State, 715 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1986); Attletweedt v. State, 684 P.2d 812 (Wyo. 1984); Haddenham v. City of 
Laramie, 648 P.2d 551 (Wyo. 1982); McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1980). We recognize the 
validity of those accepted rules of statutory construction, but fail to see 
their relevance to the issue presented. The thrust of the argument appears to be 
that consideration of the two statutes creates an ambiguity which should be 
resolved in favor of lenity.4 But, "[l]enity thus serves only as an aid for 
resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one. The rule comes into 
operation `at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, 
not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to 
wrongdoers.'" Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 342, 101 S. Ct. 1137, 1144, 67 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1981). We see no ambiguity either in the 
proscriptions of the statutes or in the punishments provided. Id. at 336, 101 S. Ct.  at 1141. 
Stripped of rhetorical gloss Appellant's argument distills to his claim that the 
injury-producing D.W.U.I. statute is specific and must be applied in this 
circumstance to the exclusion of the more general aggravated assault and battery 
statute. 

 
 

[¶11.]  
In dealing with a similar argument about various statutes which address 
sexual misconduct, Kallas v. State, 704 P.2d  at 693, we said [at 695]:

 
 
All 
three statutes (sexual assault, indecent liberties with a minor, and incest) 
concern sexual activities, but one cannot be said to be more specific than the 
other. The thrust of the second-degree sexual-assault statute and of the 
indecent-liberties-with-a-minor statute is age. They are more specific in this 
respect than is the incest statute. The thrust of the incest statute is family 
relationship. It is more specific in this respect than are the second-degree 
sexual-assault statute and the indecent-liberties-with-a-minor statute. There is 
overlap of elements among them, but the elements of the several offenses are not 
identical. Furthermore, United States v. Batchelder, supra, 
[442 U.S.  at 121, 99 S. Ct.  at 
2203] would permit the choice of charges by the prosecutor even if the elements 
of these offenses were identical.

 
 
So 
it is here, as well. The injury-producing D.W.U.I. statute is specific in that 
it deals with drunk driving, but the aggravated assault and battery statute is 
specific in dealing with the level of culpability involved in the conduct it 
proscribes and punishes, viz. acts done "recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." § 6-2-502(a)(i), 
W.S. 1977. While we point to the differences in the statutes and observe that 
those rational distinctions blunt Appellant's arguments, we hew to our holding 
that such a difference is an unnecessary predicate to prosecution under either 
statute.

 
 

[¶12.]  
Appellant relies on a line of cases which discussed the relationship of 
the manslaughter statute, § 6-4-107, W.S. 1977, and the vehicular homicide 
statute, § 31-5-1117, W.S. 1977, Sodergren v. State, 715 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1986); 
State v. Sodergren, 686 P.2d 521 (Wyo. 1984); Lopez v. State, 586 P.2d 157 (Wyo. 1978); Bartlett v. State, 569 P.2d 1235 (Wyo. 1977); 
Thomas v. State, 562 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 1977). Those cases have little effect upon the statutes, which 
have since been revised, but they contain language which seems to confound the 
issue presented here and may continue to be problematic. Indeed, those cases are 
central to the arguments advanced in other cases urging judicial restraint of 
prosecutorial discretion. Lopez, Bartlett, and Thomas were all decided before 
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S. Ct.  at 2199, and announced 
principles which are now at odds with the holding of the United States Supreme 
Court in that case and contrary to our holding in Kallas v. State, 704 P.2d 693 and 
Bueno-Hernandez v. State, 724 P.2d  at 1140. To the extent of that conflict, 
Lopez, Bartlett and Thomas are overruled. The fact that two statutes may provide 
different penalties for the same proscribed conduct does not constrain 
prosecution under either statute.5 But our inquiry does not end there. Because 
Nowack was sentenced under both statutes, another issue is presented.

 
 

[¶13.]  
Nowack argues that constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy were 
violated when the same misconduct was the basis for two convictions and two 
sentences under different statutes. The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." The 
double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment is made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 2062, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1969); Schultz v. State, 751 P.2d 367, 369 
(Wyo. 1988). The parallel provision 
of the Wyoming Constitution (Art. 1, § 11) provides that "[N]or shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Both constitutions protect the 
same interests and the meaning of the two provisions is the same, Vigil v. 
State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1350 (Wyo. 1977), but the 
issues have been more roundly debated in the federal decisions. Because of the 
redundancy of constitutional protections and the more prolific writing of the 
federal courts we rely heavily upon federal law.

 
 

[¶14.]  
Both the Federal and State constitutional provisions respecting double 
jeopardy protect three interests: They prohibit a second prosecution for the 
same offense after an acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after 
a conviction, and, finally, multiple punishments for the same offense.6 Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 777, 105 S. Ct. 2407, 2410, 85 L. Ed. 2d 764, reh. denied 473 U.S. 927, 106 S. Ct. 20, 87 L. Ed. 2d 698 (1985); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415, 100 S. Ct. 2260, 2264, 65 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1980); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 
2076, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969); Lauthern v. State, 769 P.2d 350 (Wyo. 1989); 
Birr v. State, 744 P.2d 1117, 1119 (Wyo. 
1987); Schultz v. State, 751 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1988); Tuggle v. State, 733 P.2d 610 (Wyo. 1987). 
We are concerned with the second of the three protections, freedom from a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction.

 
 
The 
constitutional prohibition against "double jeopardy" was designed to protect an 
individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction 
more than once for an alleged offense. . . . The underlying idea, one that is 
deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that 
the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make 
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby 
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live 
in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the 
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. Green v. 
United 
States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199, 78 S. Ct. 221 [223-224], 61 ALR2d 1119 (1957).

 
 
Expanding on that theme it has been argued that the 
government is obligated "to join at one trial all the charges against a 
defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or 
transaction." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-454, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1199-1200, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). But that 
was not the view of the majority, a point emphatically driven home by Justice 
Harlan, ibid. at 448, 90 S. Ct.  at 1196, and that notion has been subsequently 
rejected. In Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S.  at 790, 105 S. Ct.  at 
2417, the Court said: "We have steadfastly refused to adopt the `single 
transaction' view of the Double Jeopardy Clause." So it is in Wyoming, as well. State v. Carter, 
714 P.2d 1217, 1220 
(Wyo. 1986). Within limits set by 
the legislature the State may chose how and when it will charge different 
offenses arising from the same incident, but it may try the same offense only 
once.

 
 

[¶15.]  
The first step in the inquiry, then, is to decide whether the legislature 
intended to permit punishment under both statutes upon a single act or event.7 If we conclude that the legislature intended 
multiple punishments we must then decide whether the State could subject the 
defendant to multiple trials consistent with the double jeopardy provisions of 
the State and Federal Constitutions.

 
 

[¶16.]  
In attempting to discern legislative intent we start with the plain 
wording of the statutes. With respect to these statutes there is no clear 
statement that the legislature intended cumulative punishments. However, we are 
aided by a rule of statutory construction. "The presumption when Congress 
creates two distinct offenses is that it intends to permit cumulative sentences, 
and legislative silence on this specific issue does not establish an ambiguity 
or rebut this presumption. . . ." Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S.  at 793, 105 S. Ct.  at 
2419; accord, Lauthern v. State, 769 P.2d  at 354.8 Here we have 
separate offenses with separate penalty provisions that are contained in 
separate titles of the statutes. There is no ambiguity as to the reach of either 
of the two statutes or as to the punishments permitted. Albernaz v. 
United 
States, 450 U.S.  at 336, 101 S. Ct.  at 
1141.9

 
 

[¶17.]  
We also look for guidance in the purposes of the statutes. "Where 
independent but overlapping statutes are directed to separate evils, cumulative 
punishments are intended. Birr, 744 P.2d 1121; Albernaz, 450 U.S.  at 343 [101 S. Ct.  at 
1144]." Lauthern v. State, 769 P.2d  at 355. Both statutes are directed toward 
the prevention of bodily injury, however one statute protects against drunken 
drivers while the other protects against outrageous conduct, regardless of the 
actor's state of sobriety. Those are sufficiently separate purposes to trigger 
the inference of legislative intent to authorize cumulative punishments.

 
 

[¶18.]  
Legislative history is another source from which intent may be inferred. 
While there is no direct legislative history regarding the interplay of these 
two statutes, the legislature is obviously aware of the problems the drunk 
driver creates and it has responded with what can only be described as 
unmistakable clarity. It has given the matter serious attention and has exerted 
unrelenting pressure on drunken drivers. Upon review of the D.W.U.I. statute we 
are impressed with the interest the legislature has demonstrated.

 
 

[¶19.]  
In 1980 the legislature amended § 31-5-233, W.S. 1977. It increased the 
fine for D.W.U.I., provided for a minimum jail term for both the first and 
subsequent offenses and increased the maximum jail time for subsequent 
convictions. 1980 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 58, § 1. In 
1981 it again increased the fine, but removed the mandatory jail term for a 
first offense. 1981 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 12, 
§ 1. In 1982 it again increased the maximum jail sentence and fine for a first 
offense D.W.U.I., added injury causing D.W.U.I. to the statute, and created the 
D.W.U.I. homicide by vehicle statute (§ 31-5-1117, W.S. 1977). 1982 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 50, § 1. In 
1984 it made technical amendments to § 31-5-233, W.S. 1977 and, in a rather 
sharp comment upon the practice of "dealing" D.W.U.I. offenses, provided that a 
prosecutor could not dismiss or reduce a D.W.U.I. charge "unless the prosecuting 
attorney in open court moves or files a statement to reduce the charge or 
dismiss, with supporting facts, stating that there is insufficient evidence to 
sustain the charge." 1984 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 41, 
§ 2. In 1985 it made technical changes to clarify the penalties for 
injury-producing D.W.U.I. for a first offense (misdemeanor) or subsequent 
offense (felony). 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 39, 
§ 1. In 1985 it also raised the penalty (from 30 days driver's license 
suspension to six months suspension) for refusing a chemical test for alcohol 
upon a D.W.U.I. arrest. 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 211, § 1. In 
1987 it made additional technical amendments to the statute. 1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 131, § 1. In 
1989 it amended the statute to make it a "per se" violation of the statute if a 
driver's alcohol concentration is 0.10 or greater. 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 119, § 2. It 
also increased the maximum length of probation which might be imposed for a 
D.W.U.I. offense, raising it from six months to three years. 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 39, § 1.

 
 

[¶20.]  
In 1982 the Legislature amended § 31-5-233, W.S. 1977 to require the 
court to confiscate the driver's license of persons convicted of D.W.U.I. 1982 
Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 52, § 1. In December 1983, this Court invalidated that 
provision as violative of the separation of powers doctrine. State Ex Rel. Motor 
Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732 (Wyo. 1983). The legislature 
responded in the 1984 session by requiring the driver's license of a person 
arrested for D.W.U.I. be surrendered to the arresting officer [§ 
31-5-1205(k)].10 1984 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 41 § 3.

 
 

[¶21.]  
We are satisfied that the legislature contemplated two separate types of 
conduct in the statutes and intended cumulative punishments. In fact, we are 
persuaded that any other interpretation could not offer a sense of symmetry to 
the punishment scheme which most would regard as fair. To accept Nowack's 
argument that he could only be punished for the misdemeanor would render the 
absurd result the trial judge sought to avoid - that of punishing outrageous 
drunken driving less severely than the same outrageous driving by a sober 
person. Another alternative might be to leave the felony conviction to stand, 
but not both the felony and the misdemeanor. That approach treats the sober 
driver and the drunken driver the same, but it also frustrates the legislature's 
efforts in dealing with the problem of drunk drivers and ignores the 
legislature's purpose of reducing the carnage on our highways.11

 
 

[¶22.]  
Being satisfied that the legislature intended cumulative punishments we 
could end our inquiry if we were considering multiple punishments imposed after 
a single trial. But legislative intent alone is insufficient to pass muster 
under the double jeopardy restriction upon successive trials for the same 
offense. That brings us to our task, which is to determine whether aggravated 
assault and battery is the same offense as injury causing D.W.U.I.. The test for 
that determination has come to be the one announced in Blockburger v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932) at [304, 52 S. Ct.  at 
182].12 

 
 
The 
applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a 
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision 
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Gavieres v. 
United 
States, 220 U.S. 338, 342, 55 L. Ed. 489, 490, 31 S. Ct. 421 [422], and authorities cited. In that case this court 
quoted from and adopted the language of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 
Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433: "A single act may be an offense against 
two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the 
other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt 
the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other."

 
 
Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871), a multiple 
trial case, was thus the source of the "same evidence" test of double jeopardy 
relied upon in the Blockburger opinion. However the Blockburger opinion omitted 
language which aids an understanding of the test. In Morey the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court said:

 
 
A 
conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no bar to a subsequent conviction 
and sentence upon another, unless the evidence required to support a conviction 
upon one of them would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the 
other. The test is 
not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether 
he has been put in jeopardy for the same offence. [emphasis supplied]

 
 

[¶23.]  
Blockburger makes clear that its test centers upon statutory elements and 
allegations in the charging instruments, not upon the proofs to be adduced at 
trial. The United States Supreme Court has reinforced that idea more than once. 
Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S.  at 416, 100 S. Ct.  at 2265; Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 
at 166, 97 S. Ct.  at 2225; Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n. 17, 95 S. Ct. 1284, 1293 n. 17, 43 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1975). In Brown a plea of guilty to 
joyriding was held to bar a later prosecution for auto theft because joyriding 
was a lesser included offense of auto theft. Emphasizing that the Blockburger 
test required that each offense contain an element not present in the 
other, the Brown Court pointed out that the 
difference between the two offenses was the intent of the defendant. Auto theft 
required proof of an element not found in joyriding, intent to permanently 
deprive the owner of possession of his property. Thus auto theft required proof 
of an additional element, so the first half of the Blockburger test was 
satisfied. But since intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession was 
immaterial for joyriding, the second half of the Blockburger test was not met. 
Proof of auto theft necessarily proves joyriding. Since each offense did 
not contain a different element the Blockburger test was not satisfied and the 
second prosecution was improper under the Constitution. To the same effect is 
Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 97 S. Ct. 2912, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1054 (1977) and Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 9 S. Ct. 672, 33 L. Ed. 118 (1889). Both of those cases barred prosecution of a lesser included 
offense after a conviction of the greater offense. In this case application of 
the Blockburger test is straight forward - the two offenses are not the same. 
Even though both violations arose from the same incident and both have a common 
element (serious bodily injury caused by the defendant's conduct), each has an 
element not found in the other. The injury-producing D.W.U.I. requires proof of 
driving while intoxicated to a degree making him incapable of safely driving, 13 an element missing from aggravated assault and 
battery. On the other hand, aggravated assault and battery requires proof of an 
element not found in injury-producing D.W.U.I., that being reckless conduct 
"manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life."

 
 
     Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S. Ct. 2260, 
was a case similar to this one. Vitale was convicted of failing to reduce speed 
to avoid an accident in which two children were killed. After his speeding 
conviction, he was charged with involuntary manslaughter. The lower courts 
barred the second (manslaughter) trial under the double jeopardy clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reasoning that the lesser 
offense required no proof beyond that necessary for conviction of the greater. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for application 
of Illinois law in accordance with its 
analysis of the double jeopardy issues discussed. In applying the Blockburger 
test it focused on the statutory elements rather than the evidence to be 
presented at trial and concluded that the offenses were not necessarily the 
same. It said [447 U.S.  at 419, 100 
S.Ct. at 2266]:

 
 

The 
point is that if manslaughter by automobile does not always entail proof of a 
failure to [¶24.] 
slow, then the two offenses are not the "same" under the Blockburger 
test. The mere possibility that the State will seek to rely on all of the 
ingredients necessarily included in the traffic offense to establish an element 
of its manslaughter case would not be sufficient to bar the latter 
prosecution.

 
 
However, the Court also said [at 421, 100 S.Ct. at 2267]: 
"By analogy, if in the pending manslaughter prosecution Illinois relies on and 
proves a failure to slow to avoid an accident as the reckless act necessary to 
prove manslaughter, Vitale would have a substantial claim of double jeopardy 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution." 
The latter quote has caused some confusion regarding the extent to which the 
state may rely on the same evidence of misconduct in a second trial.14 Since then the Court has unequivocally held 
that the test of double jeopardy is statutory elements, not evidence produced at 
trial. Garrett v. United 
States, 471 U.S. 773, 105 S. Ct. 2407. 

 
 

[¶25.]  
In People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179, 
113 Ill.Dec. 71, 514 N.E.2d 983 (1987) the defendant entered pleas of guilty to 
D.W.U.I. and illegal transportation of alcohol. Later he was indicted on two 
counts of reckless homicide. One count alleged that he caused the death of 
another by reckless swerving which resulted in his vehicle hitting a tree. The 
other count alleged that his driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages 
caused his erratic driving which, in turn, caused the death of the passenger. 
The lower courts held that the homicide prosecution was barred on double 
jeopardy grounds. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, relying upon Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S. Ct. 2260. 
The court did a traditional Blockburger analysis focusing upon the elements 
rather than the evidence and concluded that the offenses were not the same. It 
decided that so long as the D.W.U.I. conviction did not automatically establish 
reckless conduct there was no double jeopardy. It went on to discuss the 
ramifications of presenting evidence of driving while intoxicated in the second 
(homicide) trial and concluded that the State could present evidence of driving 
under the influence in the second trial as evidence of recklessness even though 
that same evidence was necessary for the prior D.W.U.I. conviction.

 
 

[¶26.]  
In a different context the United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed 
that same principle. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S.  at 793, 105 S. Ct.  at 
2418-19. Garrett was tried and convicted in Florida of several drug offenses, 
one of which was engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 
848. To prove the latter charge, which requires three "predicate offenses," the 
government introduced proof of Garrett's drug smuggling. Included as one of the 
"predicate offenses" in the government's proofs were acts for which Garrett had 
been earlier convicted (upon his plea of guilty pursuant to a plea bargain) in 
the State of Washington. The Court distinguished 
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 
and held that the second trial did not violate the double jeopardy clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.

 
 

[¶27.]  
We continue to adhere to traditional Blockburger analysis. Lauthern v. 
State, 769 P.2d 350; State v. 
Carter, 714 P.2d 1217. In 
comparing the two charged offenses we conclude that each requires proof of an 
element not necessary for proof of the other. The fact that evidence of driving 
under the influence was relied upon in the aggravated assault and battery trial 
is of no moment.15 The defendant was not twice subjected to trial 
for the same offense.

 
 

[¶28.]  
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Judge Spangler 
heard and decided the motions. Judge Leimbeck conducted the trial.

 
 

2 In relevant 
part, § 6-2-502, W.S. 1977 provides:

 
 
(a) A person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if 
he:

 
 
(i) Causes serious bodily injury to another intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to 
the value of human life; . . .

 
 
(b) Aggravated assault and battery is a felony punishable 
by imprisonment for not more than ten years.

 
 

3 In relevant 
part, § 31-5-233, W.S. 1977 provides:

 
 
(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor, to a degree which renders him incapable of 
safely driving a motor vehicle, to drive or have actual physical control of any 
vehicle within this state.

 
 
* * * * * *

 
 
(g) As used in this subsection, "serious bodily injury" 
means bodily injury which creates a reasonable likelihood of death or which 
causes miscarriage or serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or 
impairment of any bodily member or organ. Whoever causes serious bodily injury 
to another person resulting from the violation of this section shall be punished 
upon conviction as follows:

 
 
(i) . . . by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars 
($5,000.00), imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, or both; . . . .

 
 

4 The argument 
is not new and was specifically addressed in United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S.  at 121-122, 99 S. Ct. 
at 2203, where the Court said:

 
 
In construing § 1202(a) to override the penalties 
authorized by § 924(a), the Court of Appeals relied, we believe erroneously, on 
three principles of statutory interpretation. First, the court invoked the 
well-established doctrine that ambiguities in criminal statutes must be resolved 
in favor of lenity. E.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S. Ct. 1056, 1059, 28 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1971); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347, 92 S. Ct. 515, 522, 30 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1971); United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 
379, 98 S. Ct. 1112, 1116, 55 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1978); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778-779, 99 S. Ct. 2077, 2084, 60 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1979); Dunn v. United 
States, 442 U.S. 100, 112-113, 99 S. Ct. 2190, 2197, 60 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1979). 
Although this principle of construction applies to sentencing as well as 
substantive provisions, see Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 14-15, 98 S. Ct. 909, 913-14, 55 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1978), in the instant case there is no 
ambiguity to resolve. Respondent unquestionably violated § 922(h), and § 924(a) 
unquestionably permits five years' imprisonment for such a violation. That § 
1202(a) provides different penalties for essentially the same conduct is no 
justification for taking liberties with unequivocal statutory language. See 
Barrett v. United 
States, 423 U.S. 212, 217, 96 S. Ct. 498, 501, 46 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1976). By its express terms, § 1202(a) limits its 
penalty scheme exclusively to convictions obtained under that provision. Where, 
as here, "Congress has conveyed its purpose clearly, . . . we decline to 
manufacture ambiguity where none exists." United States v. Culbert, supra, 435 U.S. 371, 379, 98 S. Ct. 1112, 1116, 55 L. Ed. 2d 349.

 
 
Nor can § 1202(a) be interpreted as implicitly repealing § 
924(a) whenever a defendant's conduct might violate both Titles. For it is "not 
enough to show that the two statutes produce differing results when applied to 
the same factual situation." Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., et al, 426 U.S. 148, 155, 96 S. Ct. 1989, 1993, 48 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1976). Rather, the legislative intent to repeal must 
be manifest in the "`positive repugnancy between the provisions.'" 
United 
States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 199, 60 S. Ct. 182, 188, 84 L. Ed. 181 (1939). In this case, however, the penalty provisions are 
fully capable of coexisting because they apply to convictions under different 
statutes.

 
 
Finally, the maxim that statutes should be construed to 
avoid constitutional questions offers no assistance here. This "`cardinal 
principle' of statutory construction . . . is appropriate only when [an 
alternative interpretation] is `fairly possible'" from the language of the 
statute. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 378 n. 11, 97 S. Ct. 1224, 
1228 n. 11, 51 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1977); see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S. Ct. 285, 
297, 76 L. Ed. 598 (1932); United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 693, 68 S. Ct. 331, 334, 92 L. Ed. 297 (1948); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 31, 68 S. Ct. 1375, 
1391, 92 L. Ed. 1787 (1948). We simply are unable to discern any basis in the 
Omnibus Act for reading the term "five" in § 924(a) to mean "two."

 
 

5 The Sodergren 
cases are, at most, marginally relevant to the issues presented here. They dealt 
with internal inconsistencies in the vehicular homicide statute. Aside from the 
fact that neither opinion gathered a majority of the Court, those cases turned 
upon construction of a statute which has since been repealed; they offer little 
to inform this debate. Appellant also argues that Capwell v. State, 686 P.2d 1148, supports 
his position, but we have previously distinguished that case from circumstances 
such as those presented here. Bueno-Hernandez v. State, 724 P.2d  at 1140.

 
 

6 In her 
concurring opinion in Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S.  at 796, 105 S. Ct.  at 
2420, Justice O'Connor observed:

 
 
Decisions by this Court have consistently recognized that 
the finality guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause is not absolute, but 
instead must accommodate the societal interest in prosecuting and convicting 
those who violate the law. [citations] The Court accordingly has held that a 
defendant who successfully appeals a conviction generally is subject to retrial. 
[citation] Similarly, double jeopardy poses no bar to another trial where a 
judge declares a mistrial because of "manifest necessity." [citation] Such 
decisions indicate that absent "governmental oppression of the sort against 
which the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect," [citation] the 
compelling public interest in punishing crimes can outweigh the interest of the 
defendant in having his culpability conclusively resolved in one proceeding. 
[citation]

 
 

7 In Garrett v. 
United 
States, 471 U.S.  at 778, 105 S. Ct.  at 
2411 the Court said:

 
 
Where the same conduct violates two statutory provisions, 
the first step in the double jeopardy analysis is to determine whether the 
legislature - in this case Congress - intended that each violation be a separate 
offense. If Congress intended that there be only one offense - that is, a 
defendant could be convicted under either statutory provision for a single act, 
but not under both - there would be no statutory authorization for a subsequent 
prosecution after conviction of one of the two provisions, and that would end 
the double jeopardy analysis. Cf. Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 11, 47 S. Ct. 250, 
253-254, 71 L. Ed. 505 (1927).

 
 

8 Appellant 
argues that a contrary rule of construction appears in the cases. He relies on 
language in Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692-693, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 
1438-1439, 63 L. Ed. 2d 715 (1980), repeated in Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 
366, 103 S. Ct. 673, 678, 74 L. Ed. 2d 535 (1983):

 
 
The assumption underlying the rule is that Congress 
ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different 
statutes. Accordingly, where two statutory provisions proscribe the "same 
offense," they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in the 
absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.

 
 
The argument confuses the Court's holding by equating acts 
and offenses. The presumption is not against cumulative punishments for the same 
act, it is 
against cumulative punishments for the same offense. Whether 
the charged offenses are the same depends upon the application of the test 
announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 
76 L. Ed. 306 (1932), discussed infra. Applying the Blockburger test to this case 
indicates that Nowack committed two offenses, albeit in the same transaction.

 
 

9 Appellant also 
implies that there is an ambiguity as to legislative intent in the application 
of the two statutes and that ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. 
But, the point made in Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S.  at 342, 101 S. Ct.  at 
1144 [quoted supra at ], is that the rule of lenity comes into play, if at all, 
after analysis of legislative intent, not before the analysis has even begun. 
The Blockburger test is the vehicle of reasoned analysis. Application of that 
test reveals no ambiguity.

 
 

10 It also 
required that a temporary license be issued pending trial and provided that the 
regular license be retained by the State upon conviction, but returned to the 
driver upon acquittal. [§ 31-7-138]. 1984 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 41, § 1; § 
3.

 
 

11 In considering 
D.W.U.I. related statutes we have noted the legislative purpose to reduce the 
carnage on the highways. Felske v. State, 706 P.2d 257, 261 
(Wyo. 1985); Small v. 
State, 689 P.2d 420, 426 
(Wyo. 1984), cert. denied 
469 U.S. 1224, 105 S. Ct. 1215, 
84 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1984).

 
 

12 While 
Blockburger involved multiple convictions in a single trial based upon the same 
conduct, the Court relied upon precedents involving successive prosecutions. In 
single trial/multiple punishment cases the Blockburger test is an aid to 
determining legislative intent in the absence of more meaningful criteria. See, 
Whalen v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 684, 691, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1437, 
63 L. Ed. 2d 715 (1980); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 101 S. Ct. 1137, 
1139, 67 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1981); Lauthern v. State, 769 P.2d 350 (1989); Birr 
v. State, 744 P.2d 1117 (Wyo. 1987); Schultz v. State, 751 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1988). But in successive trial 
cases the test has significance to the point of constitutional dimension. 
Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S. Ct. 2260; Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 
53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977). In other words, regardless of the intent of the 
legislature to impose multiple punishments for the same offense the double 
jeopardy clause would bar multiple trials. In this case application of the 
Blockburger test serves two purposes. First, it is a useful guide to legislative 
intent and, in that regard, reinforces our conclusion that the legislature 
intended cumulative punishments under the circumstances of this case. Second and 
more importantly, it is the test of whether multiple trials for these offenses 
are constitutionally permitted. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S.  at 166-167, note 6, 
97 S. Ct.  at 2226, note 6.

 
 

13 The essence of 
D.W.U.I. is not necessarily unsafe driving, but the inability to drive safely. 
We drew that distinction in Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 1985), where we said [at 
114-115]:

 
 
It is not required that he first drive in an unsafe manner 
and perhaps become involved in an accident before arrest for D.W.U.I. is 
possible. As stated by appellee: "There is no requirement under * * * law that a 
lifeless and mangled body be pulled from the twisted wreckage of an automobile 
before an individual is arrested for drunk driving." Proof of unsafe driving is 
not required although such is competent evidence to be considered with all of 
the other evidence in determining whether the driver is under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor to a degree that he is incapable of safely driving.

 
 

14 Some cases 
have held that double jeopardy standards are violated if the same evidence or 
conduct is used as proof in a subsequent trial. See, e.g., State v. Lonergan, 16 
Conn. App. 358, 548 A.2d 718 (1988); Lee v. Probate Court, 807 F.2d 512, 514 
(6th Cir. 1986); Flittie v. Solem, 775 F.2d 933, 938-39 (8th Cir. 1985); Jordan 
v. Virginia, 653 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1980); Pandelli v. United States, 635 F.2d 533, 539 (6th Cir. 1980); Jeffrey v. District Court, 626 P.2d 631, 636 (Colo. 
1981) (en banc); Baker v. State, 425 So. 2d 36, 40 (Fla.App. 1982) (Sharp, J., 
concurring); State v. Ferrell, 67 Md. App. 631, 508 A.2d 1023 (1986); State v. 
Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 340 S.E.2d 701 (1986); State v. DeLuca, 108 N.J. 98, 527 A.2d 1355 (1987); State v. Dively, 92 N.J. 573, 458 A.2d 502 (1983); State v. 
Carter, 291 S.C. 385, 353 S.E.2d 875 (1987); State v. Grampus, 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26 (1986); Ex parte Peterson, 738 S.W.2d 688 (Tex.Crim. App. 1987); May 
v. State, 726 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.Crim. App. 1987) (en banc); c.f. Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 290 S.E.2d 442 (1982); 
Haynes v. State, 249 Ga. 119, 288 S.E.2d 185 
(1982).

 
 
Several courts have held that Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S. Ct. 2260, 
reinforced the Blockburger rule of reliance on the elements, not the evidence. 
See, e.g., United States v. Genser, 710 F.2d 1426, 1429-31 (10th Cir. 1983); 
United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1005-1006 (5th Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Brooklier, 637 F.2d 620, 623-24 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980, 101 S. Ct. 1514, 67 L. Ed. 2d 81581214016 (1981); State v. Seats, 131 
Ariz. 89, 638 P.2d 1335 (1981) (en banc); Carlson v. State, 405 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 
1981); People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179, 113 Ill.Dec. 71, 514 N.E.2d 983 
(1987), overruling People v. Zegart, 83 Ill. 2d 440, 47 Ill.Dec. 336, 415 N.E.2d 341 (1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 948, 101 S. Ct. 3094, 69 L. Ed. 2d 961 (1981); People v. Walker, 109 Ill. 2d 484, 94 
Ill.Dec. 530, 488 N.E.2d 529 (1985).

 
 
In Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 104 S. Ct. 2916, 
82 L. Ed. 2d 23 (1984), the United States Supreme Court passed up an opportunity 
to clear the air. On federal habeus corpus, a homicide conviction was stuck 
because it was obtained after the defendant was convicted of reckless driving, 
driving while intoxicated, driving with a revoked license, and driving on the 
wrong side of the road. The lower federal courts held that the homicide 
conviction was barred on double jeopardy grounds. Roberts v. Thigpen, 693 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1982), The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
review that issue, but affirmed on grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness (the 
State indicted for homicide after the defendant appealed his four misdemeanor 
convictions in justice of the peace court and his case was transferred to a 
circuit court for trial de novo). In dissent Justice Rehnquist said [468 U.S.  at 34-35, 104 S.Ct. 
at 2924-25]:

 
 
I believe that 
the Court is obligated to confront the State's contention that the Court of 
Appeals misapplied the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment in this 
case. The Court being unwilling to undertake that obligation, I turn to it in 
dissent. . . .

 
 
In reaching this conclusion, I believe that the Court of 
Appeals mistakenly relied upon a mere form of expression in the Court's opinion 
in Illinois v. Vitale, [447 U.S. 410, 
100 S. Ct. 2260, 65 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1980)], to depart from all of our previous 
double jeopardy holdings in this area. The Court of Appeals apparently felt that 
the Vitale opinion changed governing double jeopardy law to permit a defendant 
to establish a substantial, and apparently dispositive, claim of double jeopardy 
merely by showing that the State actually relied upon the same evidence to prove 
both crimes. While there is one sentence in the Court's opinion in Vitale that 
supports this construction, I do not believe that construction is consistent 
with the opinion as a whole. Until the present case, the relevant question to be 
answered by any court is whether the evidence required to prove the statutory 
elements of crime is the same, not whether the evidence actually used at trial 
is the same.

 
 
In Vitale the Supreme Court of Illinois had held that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment barred the prosecution of a 
defendant for manslaughter because the defendant had previously pleaded guilty 
to a charge of failing to reduce speed arising out of the same incident. This 
Court vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, saying: "The point 
is that if manslaughter by automobile does not always entail proof of a failure 
to slow, then the two offenses are not the `same' under the Blockburger test. 
The mere possibility that the State will seek to rely on all of the ingredients 
necessarily included in the traffic offense to establish an element of its 
manslaughter case would not be sufficient to bar the latter prosecution." . . 
.

 
 
It seems to me that this is about as clear a statement as 
there can be of the principle that the double jeopardy inquiry turns on the 
statutory elements of the two offenses in question, and not on the actual 
evidence that may be used by the State to convict in a particular case. 
Nonetheless, the Court went on in Vitale to distinguish Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 [97 S. Ct. 2912, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1054] (1977), and in so doing stated: "By 
analogy, if in the pending manslaughter prosecution Illinois relies on and 
proves a failure to slow to avoid an accident as the reckless act necessary to 
prove manslaughter, Vitale would have a substantial claim of double jeopardy 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution." . 
. .

 
 
I cannot say that this last expression did not afford the 
Court of Appeals some ground for the views which it expressed, nor can I say 
that I think it is entirely consistent with the first quotation from the Vitale 
opinion. But I am reasonably sure that the Court did not intend to transmute the 
traditional double jeopardy analysis from an either "up or down" inquiry based 
on the evidence required to prove the statutory elements of a crime into a 
"substantial claim" inquiry based on the evidence that the State introduced at 
trial. I think that there are ambiguities in Illinois v. Vitale which urgently 
need resolution by this Court, that the present case affords an ample 
opportunity to do this, and that the Court's failure to do it is an unexampled 
abdication of its responsibility.

 
 
I would unambiguously reaffirm the statement in Brown v. 
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 [97 S. Ct. 2221, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187] (1977), relied upon in 
Illinois v. Vitale, supra, that "[t]he applicable rule is that where the same 
act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, 
the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, 
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." 
432 U.S., at 166, 97 S. Ct.  at 2225, 
quoting Blockburger v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 [52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306] (1932). . . . The actual evidence test which the Court 
of Appeals inferred from the single sentence in Vitale has never been applied to 
bar a second trial on grounds of double jeopardy." (Citations omitted)

 
 

15 At trial the 
State presented proof of Nowack's intoxication as well as other evidence of 
erratic, dangerous, and irresponsible driving. Had the defendant been acquitted 
in a prior trial it may have been necessary to determine if issues had been 
determined in the first trial which, under principles of collateral estoppel, 
would be barred from re-litigation. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 
25 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1970). But the matter to be determined would be issue 
preclusion, not evidence preclusion. Even if issues were barred from 
re-litigation that does not mean the State would necessarily be precluded from 
again presenting the same facts. Those facts would be properly admissible if 
they were probative of issues not fully adjudicated.