Case Title: JACKSON HOLE MOUNTAIN RESORT CORPORATION V. ALPENHOF LODGE ASSOCIATES,

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
JACKSON HOLE MOUNTAIN RESORT CORPORATION V. ALPENHOF LODGE ASSOCIATES,2005 WY 46109 P.3d 555Case Number: 04-142Decided: 04/14/2005
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
                                                                                                                                   

 
 
 
 

JACKSON 
HOLE 
MOUNTAIN RESORT

CORPORATION, 
a Wyoming 
corporation,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
ALPENHOF 
LODGE ASSOCIATES, a California

Limited 
Partnership,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
            
Joe M. Teig and Paula A. Fleck of Holland & Hart, LLP, Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
            
Gerald R. Mason and Douglas J. Mason of Mason & Mason, P.C., 
Pinedale, Wyoming. 

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN and VOIGT, JJ., and GRANT, D.J., and STEBNER, D.J. 
Ret.

 
 
 
 
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a declaratory judgment entered against the servient owner in an easement 
dispute.  We 
affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      We will restate 
the issues as follows:

 
 

            
1.         
Is the owner of land burdened by a defined-width easement prohibited from 
making temporary use of the land by Lamb v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 
985 P.2d 433 (Wyo. 1999)?

 
 
            
2.         
Does the proposed use of the land burdened by the defined-width easement 
substantially interfere with the dominant owner's reasonable use of the 
easement?

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      Jackson Hole 
Mountain Resort Corporation (the appellant) owns certain property in TetonCounty.  In 1975, the appellant sold adjacent 
property to Rusticana, Inc. (Rusticana), also granting to Rusticana an easement 
over the appellant's property as follows:

 
 
Seller 
hereby agrees to grant to purchaser an easement of 20 feet width along the west 
side of Lot 2, Tracts X and Y, for the purpose 
of constructing a walkway not to exceed 6 feet in width.

 
 
In 1988, 
Rusticana sold the property and its easement rights to Alpenhof Lodge Associates 
(the appellee).

 
 

[¶4]      The appellant 
developed plans for certain improvements to its property, which plans included 
"encroachment" upon the easement.  
The appellee objected to the project and, when the dispute could not be 
resolved, the appellant filed this declaratory judgment action.1  The appellant sought summary judgment on 
the ground that, as servient owner, it had retained the right to use the 
easement in any manner that did not substantially interfere with the appellee's 
use of the easement.  See Bard 
Ranch Co. v. Weber, 557 P.2d 722, 730 ( Wyo. 1976).  Attached to the summary judgment motion 
was the affidavit of the project's architect, describing the "encroachment" as a 
building overhang nine feet above ground, supported by nine 
columns.

 
 
[¶5]      The appellee 
responded with its own motion for partial summary judgment directed specifically 
to the issue of the support columns.  
A reply affidavit of the project's architect stated that the overhang 
would extend only ten feet into the twenty-foot wide easement.  The appellee then filed the affidavit of 
another architect, contending that an overhang nine feet high would not leave 
sufficient clearance for the appellee's proposed walkway.  After a hearing, the district court 
denied the appellant's motion and granted partial summary judgment to the 
appellee, finding that the support columns would be an inappropriate 
encroachment on the easement.  The 
appellant then filed a motion for leave to amend its complaint to substitute a 
cantilevered structure unsupported by columns.2

 
 
[¶6]      In preparing for 
trial, the appellee deposed the appellant's architect.  The appellee then filed another motion 
for partial summary judgment in regard to the following additional 
"encroachments" discovered during that deposition:

 
 
(a)       The roof of 
the basement will extend out into the easement for 10 feet and will be above the 
surface for the entire length of the easement.  . . .

 
 
(b)       The roof 
will be used as a concrete sidewalk with two sets of stairs, handrails and 
supporting walls between the level of the sidewalk and the surface of the 
easement.  . . .  There is also a proposed concrete pad at 
the north end of the walkway.  . . 
.

 
 
(c)        Trees 
will be planted in the remaining ten feet of the easement.  . . .

 
 
(d)       The grade 
of the surface of the easement from east to west will be permanently changed to 
accommodate the sidewalk and to thereby move all of the slope originally in the 
20 feet width to the remaining 10 feet of width.  . . .

 
 
(e)       The grade 
of the south portion of the easement will be permanently changed to accommodate 
a roadway requiring cuts and fills.  
The roadway will be paved with asphalt.  . . .

 
 
(f)         
The east length of the easement will be excavated, during construction, 
to a depth of at least three feet for installation of several underground 
utilities.  . . .  Repair or maintenance of those utilities 
may require future excavation.

 
 
(g)       Scaffolding 
may have to be erected at a width of 15 feet into the easement during 
construction and for any future maintenance of the cantilevered portions of the 
construction.  . . 
.

 
 
(h)        The 
roof slopes are designed to deliver snow and waste water into the uncovered 
remaining 10 feet width of the easement.  
Waste water from the roof will be guttered but waste water (rain) from 
the side of the building will be directed into said ten feet.  No plan exists for handling this 
water.  Future, but not present 
plans, will purportedly seek to hold all of the snow on the roof, 
. . . but until a specific plan is designed and approved, its 
effectiveness cannot be judged.  
[N]o changes to the plans other than removal of the columns are 
contemplated.  . . .  At any rate, no waste water or snow 
should be allowed to be diverted onto the surface of the 
easement.

 
 
(i)         
The construction of the basement will require excavation for more than 
ten feet into the easement.

 
 
[¶7]      After a bench 
trial, the district court issued detailed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and entered judgment in favor of the appellee.  The district court found the easement 
language to be unambiguous and then made the following individual 
findings:

 
 
            
1.         
Construction of a proposed fire lane angling across the southern portion 
of the easement would require significant modification of natural grade, would 
result in a retaining wall across the easement that would be a substantial 
barrier to use of the easement as a walkway, and would violate the appellee's 
rights in the easement.

 
 
            
2.         
Excavation of the basement and construction of the cantilevered structure 
would require total obstruction of the easement for a period of eighteen to 
nineteen months and would violate the appellee's rights in the 
easement.

 
 
            
3.         
The proposed basement would extend ten feet into the twenty-foot wide 
easement for the entire length of the building, would have a concrete roof to be 
utilized as a sidewalk, would require steps and cheek walls and rails, would 
operate as a barrier between the sidewalk and the backfilled grade, would be 
above finished grade, and would violate the appellee's rights in the 
easement.

 
 
            
4.         
The project would drastically change the natural grade of the easement 
because the fire lane would require a cut bank and leveling with a retaining 
wall, and because the basement roof/sidewalk would require leveling of half the 
easement with the remainder made much steeper, which would substantially impair 
the use of the remaining portion by the appellee, and would violate the 
appellee's rights in the easement.

 
 
            
5.         
The placement of underground utilities in the half of the easement not 
taken up with the proposed basement may require surface facilities, which 
surface facilities would violate the appellee's rights in the easement, as would 
future repair and maintenance of the underground utilities if such would disrupt 
surface use.

 
 
            
6.         
The proposed planting of trees and shrubs in the half of the easement not 
taken up with the proposed basement would violate the appellee's rights in the 
easement.

 
 
            
7.         
The proposed cantilevered building would substantially restrict natural 
light to the easement area and, if the appellee constructs a meandering walkway 
that utilizes the entire width of the easement, would make the use of the 
easement substantially less convenient and beneficial to the 
appellee.

 
 
            
8.         
The roof design of the proposed building will divert water and snow onto 
the half of the easement not taken up with the proposed structure and 
ameliorative devices should be required to avoid that 
result.

 
 
            
9.         
The appellee's proposed ADA-compliant meandering walkway requires the 
entire twenty-foot width of the easement and may require elevation above present 
grade in some areas, is an appropriate use of the easement so long as the 
walkway surface does not exceed six feet, and does not exceed the appellee's 
rights in the easement.

 
 
[¶8]      Based upon these 
findings of fact, the district court then reached the following conclusions of 
law:

 
 
            
17.       
[The appellee] is entitled to the unencumbered use of the entire surface 
of the easement.  The [appellant's] 
right to use the easement in any way that does not substantially interfere with 
the purpose of the easement under Bard Ranch Co. v. Weber, 557 P2d 722 
(Wyo. 1976) does not allow the placement of any permanent or temporary objects 
on the surface of the easement under the doctrine of Lamb v. Wyoming Game and 
Fish, supra.  The placement of 
objects on the surface of the easement, as proposed by [the appellant], is a 
substantial interference with [the appellee's] rights in the defined easement 
area.

 
 
            
18.       
[The appellant] is generally entitled to make use of the surface of the 
easement in ways which are consistent with [the appellee's] rights.  For instance, [the appellant] can use 
any walkway constructed by [the appellee] on the surface of the easement for 
passage of its guests up and down the hill.

 
 
            
19.       
The easement, even though it contemplates the ultimate establishment of a 
6 foot wide walkway, is not a floating easement.  The easement location is established, 
its length and width are determined, and the location of the walkway within the 
easement is a matter of discretion for the [appellee] to determine.  The failure of the [appellee] to define 
that walkway to the present time does not terminate or change its rights 
therein, nor is [the appellant] entitled to designate the location of the 
walkway on the easement surface.

 
 
            
20.       
[The appellant] is entitled to make use of the subsurface so long as 
doing so does not interfere with [the appellee's] rights on the surface.  The obstruction of the easement area for 
excavation, and the drastic change of natural grade caused by the subsurface 
construction are examples of subsurface uses that do substantially interfere 
with [the appellee's] rights on the surface, and therefore, are prohibited.  The placement of underground utilities 
might be permitted, if they would not result in present or future obstruction of 
the surface of the easement.

 
 
            
21.       
The [appellant] is entitled to make use of the air above the easement, 
again so long as that does not constitute a substantial interference with [the 
appellee's] use of the surface.  
Anything which renders the use of the surface of the easement less 
convenient and beneficial to [the appellee] in some substantive way is a 
substantial interference.  The 
almost total loss of natural light, for instance, by the very low 9 foot 
overhang, violates [the appellee's] rights to use the surface.  It may be that an overhang two or three 
stories above the surface would not constitute a substantial interference.  That issue is not presently before the 
Court.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      The appellant 
appealed from the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment entered 
after the bench trial, but not from the summary judgment orders.  We review a district court's findings 
and conclusions after a bench trial under the following 
standard:

 
 
"We 
review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo.  The trial court's findings of fact are 
subject to the clearly erroneous standard:

 
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  While the findings 
are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing 
disputed evidence.  Findings of fact 
will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.'

 
 
Also, in 
reviewing a trial court's findings of fact,

 
 
we 
assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that 
party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from 
it.  We do not substitute ourselves 
for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings 
unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of 
law.

 
 
We 
affirm the trial court's findings if there is any evidence to support 
them.'"

 
 

Carlson 
v. Flocchini Investments, 2005 WY 
19, ¶ 10, 106 P.3d 847, 852 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Life Care Centers of America, 
Inc. v. Dexter, 2003 WY 38, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d 385, 389 (Wyo. 2003) (citations 
omitted)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   We will first establish the legal 
context for this discussion.  Nearly 
thirty years ago, we set forth a general statement as to the competing rights of 
the owners of the dominant estate and of the servient estate when an easement 
has been created:

 
 
"* * 
*  An owner of land who grants a 
right of way over it conveys nothing but the right of passage and reserves all 
incidents of ownership not granted; he may make any use of his land that does 
not interfere substantially with the created easement.  [Citing cases]"  Edwards v. Julian, 192 Pa.Super. 
121, 159 A.2d 547, 549 (1960).

 
 
* * 
*  "[A]ny incident of ownership not 
inconsistent with easement and enjoyment of same is reserved to the 
grantor."  2 Thompson on Real 
Property (1961 Repl., 1976 Supp.) p. 70.

 
 
            
Both owners possess rights and each must as far as possible respect the 
other's use.  As stated in 25 
AmJur2d Easements and Licenses § 72, p. 478:

 
 
"* * 
*  Though the rights of the easement 
owner are paramount, to the extent of the easement, to those of the landowner, 
the rights of the easement owner and of the landowner are not absolute, 
irrelative and uncontrolled, but are so limited, each by the other, that there 
may be a due and reasonable enjoyment of both the easement and the servient 
tenement.  The owner of the easement 
is said to have all rights incident or necessary to its proper enjoyment, but 
nothing more.  And, if he exceeds 
his rights either in the manner or in the extent of its use, he becomes a 
trespasser to the extent of the unauthorized use."

 
 

Bard 
Ranch Co., 557 P.2d  
at 730.  And further, "[t]he rights of any 
person having an easement in the land of another are measured and defined by the 
purpose and character of the easement.'"  
Id. at 731 (quoting 25 
Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 72 at 478).

 
 

[¶11]   With access easements, the general 
rule is that the question of the reasonableness of a restriction upon use of the 
easement is a question of fact.  
White v. Allen, 2003 WY 39, ¶ 13, 65 P.3d 395, 399-400 (Wyo. 
2003).  In White, the owners of the 
servient estate placed gates at each end of an access easement.  This Court held that "[w]hether such 
gates are reasonably necessary to the servient estate, or constitute an 
unreasonable inconvenience to the dominant estate, are questions of fact to be 
resolved by the fact finder in the light of all the evidence that may be 
presented by the parties."  
Id. at ¶ 16, 65 P.3d  at 400.  Reasonableness, however, is not the 
controlling factor where the "location, width, and length of the easement" is 
specified:

 
 
The 
landowners contend that the easements should be limited to the area reasonably 
necessary to walk along the river and fish.  We do not agree.  Generally, the owner of an easement has 
the right to the area or strip having definite boundaries unhampered by 
structures and objects placed thereon.  
. . .  This rule applies even 
when the structures do not "obstruct" the easement holder's use of the easement, 
. . . and what is reasonable or necessary is not decisive.

 
 

Lamb, 
985 P.2d  
at 437.  The general rule is that "the easement 
holder has the right to use the full width of the area or strip having definite 
boundaries unhampered by obstructions placed thereon.'"  Id. at 438 (quoting Flower v. 
Valentine, 135 Ill.App.3d 1034, 90 Ill.Dec. 703, 482 N.E.2d 682, 687 
(1985)).  More particularly,

 
 
[b]ecause 
the length, width, and location of the easements are defined with specificity, 
the district court did not err in concluding that the landowners must remove the 
structures and other objects from the easements.  Our ruling should not be read to 
preclude the landowners from using their land within the easements in any manner 
consistent with the purpose of the fishing easements.  Bard Ranch Co. v. Weber, 557 P.2d 722, 730 (Wyo.1976).  However, 
appropriate use does not include the placement of permanent structures and other 
objects.  If the landowners were 
permitted to do so, they would be given license to retake the easements in a 
piecemeal fashion.  We will not 
permit such a result.

 
 

Lamb, 
985 P.2d  at 438.

 
 
[¶12]   The appellant contends that the 
district court made two legal errors in applying the law to the facts in this 
case.  First, the appellant argues 
that the district court erred in ruling that Lamb prohibited even the 
temporary use or disturbance of the easement by appellant.  This allegation has reference to the 
conclusion of law identified as number seventeen above, in which the district 
court said that the appellant's "right to use the easement in any way that does 
not substantially interfere with the purpose of the easement . . . 
does not allow the placement of any permanent or temporary objects on the 
surface of the easement under the doctrine of 
Lamb[.]"

 
 
[¶13]   Indeed, Lamb dealt with 
obstructions3 that might be characterized as 
permanent, and did not go so far as to say that the servient owner could not, in 
any case, even temporarily block or impede the dominant owner's use of a 
defined-area easement.  We believe, 
however, that the appellant's reading of the findings of fact and conclusion of 
law in this case is too broad.  
While the district court did reach the conclusion mentioned above, that 
conclusion was immediately followed by this sentence:  "The placement of objects 
on the surface of the easement, as proposed by [the appellant], is 
a substantial interference with [the appellee's] rights in the defined easement 
area."  (Emphasis added.)  We read the full language of this 
conclusion of law as being limited to the facts then before the district court, 
and in particular, to placement of the objects described in the appellant's 
proposed project, rather than a broad statement that no use, even temporary, is 
allowed.  Furthermore, rather than 
dealing generically with "any temporary use," the district court was dealing 
solely and specifically with an identified construction period of eighteen to 
nineteen months.  In its second 
finding, the district court identified total obstruction of the easement for a 
period of eighteen to nineteen months as the feature that would violate the 
appellee's rights.  That is far from 
being a statement that any temporary use is prohibited.

 
 

[¶14]   The district court's second error 
of law, as alleged by the appellant, was application of an inappropriate legal 
standard in evaluating the appellant's proposed project.  The appellant contends that Bard 
Ranch Co., 557 P.2d  at 730, 
provides the correct standard:  the 
servient owner "may make any use of his land that does not interfere 
substantially with the created easement."  
The appellant alleges that the district court erred by applying a lesser 
standard:  that any use by the 
servient owner that makes the dominant owner's use "less beneficial and 
convenient" is prohibited.

 
 
[¶15]   Once again, we must examine the 
district court's findings and conclusions to determine what standard actually 
was applied.  It is true that, in 
the finding of fact labeled number seven above, the district court did use the 
phrase "less convenient and beneficial" in describing the effect of the proposed 
cantilevered building on the appellee's use of the easement.  And it is also true that the district 
court made the following statement in its conclusion of law number twenty-one 
above:  "Anything which renders the 
use of the surface of the easement less convenient and beneficial to [the 
appellee] in some substantive way is a substantial interference."  It is noteworthy, however, that the full 
phrase in the questioned finding of fact was "substantially less convenient and 
beneficial," making it the equivalent of the "substantial interference" 
mentioned in the conclusion of law.  
Clearly, the district court did not abandon the concept of substantial 
interference articulated in Bard Ranch Co.  Indeed, in its first finding of 
fact, the district court quoted the substantial interference standard of Bard 
Ranch Co., and its findings and conclusions are replete with references to 
the substantiality of the harm:  
"substantial barrier," "substantially impair," "substantially restrict," 
"substantially less convenient and beneficial," "substantial interference," 
"substantially interfere," "substantial interference," "in some substantial 
way," and "substantial interference."

 
 
[¶16]   It appears to us that, when taken 
as a whole, the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law clearly 
show the application of a "substantial interference" standard in evaluating the 
impact of the appellant's proposed structure on the appellee's use of the 
easement.  It is equally evident, 
however, that the district court recognized that this was not a generic access 
easement, but was a defined-area easement with the specialized purpose of a 
meandering walkway.  Consequently, 
in its evaluation of the proposed structure, the district court applied the 
dictates of Lamb.  That is, 
the district court recognized that "obstacles" that might meet the balancing and 
reasonableness tests of Bard Ranch Co. do not necessarily pass muster 
when scrutinized in the context of a defined-area 
easement.

 
 
[¶17]   Having determined that the district 
court applied the appropriate legal standard, we must now determine whether any 
of its findings of fact are clearly erroneous.  Preliminarily, we will note that the 
appellant does not contest the district court's findings of basic facts.  Rather, the appellant contends that the 
district court's erroneous view of the law "induced" erroneous findings of 
fact.  This is, in effect, an 
allegation that the district court's findings of ultimate facts or conclusions 
of law were erroneous.  An example 
will suffice.  The district court 
found that the project would require a cut bank and leveling for the fire lane's 
retaining wall, and that the basement roof/sidewalk would require leveling of 
half the easement, leaving the remainder with a steeper slope.  Those were findings of basic facts.  The district court then found that those 
changes would substantially impair the appellee's use of the easement.  That was a finding of ultimate 
fact.  And finally, the district 
court "found" that the changes would violate the appellee's rights.  That was a conclusion of law.  It is the second findingthe one of 
substantial impairmentwith which the appellant takes exception.  The appellant alleges that the district 
court did not apply the substantial interference standard of Bard Ranch 
Co. to the basic facts, but applied some lesser standard, resulting in a 
flawed determination of substantial impairment.  We have concluded, however, that the 
district court correctly applied the law, so there was no adverse impact upon 
its findings of ultimate facts.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶18]   Under the easement, the appellee 
now has the right to install a meandering six-foot-wide walkway anywhere it 
chooses within the twenty-foot-wide easement.  The appellant's proposed project would 
have (1) a fire lane with a retaining wall and modification of the remaining 
natural grade; (2) a basement roof/sidewalk extending ten feet into the 
easement, with steps, cheek walls, and rails, which would leave the remaining 
portion of the easement with a steeper grade; (3) underground utilities, 
possibly with surface structures, with future repair and maintenance needs; (4) 
trees and shrubs; (5) a cantilevered building hanging over the easement that 
would restrict natural light and would restrict use of the area for a walkway; 
(6) a roof design that would divert rain and snow onto the walkway area; (7) a 
construction period of eighteen to nineteen months, during which the appellee's 
access to the easement would be totally obstructed.  Clearly, this project would leave the 
appellee with a greatly diminished right.  
Instead of the possibility of a meandering walkway over the full 
twenty-foot unobstructed easement, the appellee would be left with a steeper 
area half that size, encumbered by numerous obstacles.  That is exactly what Lamb 
forbids.

 
 
[¶19]   The district court did not err in 
concluding that the appellant's proposed project would violate the appellee's 
rights in the easement.  
Affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1

Any 
person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings 
constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are 
affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a statute, municipal ordinance, 
contract or franchise, may have any question of construction or validity arising 
under the instrument determined and obtain a declaration of rights, status or 
other legal relations.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-37-103 (LexisNexis 2003).

2In 
anticipation of the motion for leave to amend complaint, the district court's 
summary judgment ruling included a finding that "reasonably contestable issues" 
remained concerning the overhang, even if cantilevered.  Leave to amend was subsequently 
granted.

3"[A] 
deck, a trailer, a clothesline, a rock pile, a fire pit, a satellite dish, a 
metal shed, a root cellar, garbage, fences, gardens, wood piles, wooden spools, 
water pumps, and some 50-gallon drums."  
Lamb, 985 P.2d  at 436.