Case Title: In the Matter of Virginia Parkhouse v. Scott M. Stringer, Borough President of Manhattan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 111  
In the Matter of Virginia 
Parkhouse, 
            Appellant, 
        v. 
Scott M. Stringer, Borough 
President of Manhattan, et al.,
            Respondents.
Whitney North Seymour, Jr., for appellant.
Alan G. Krams, for respondents.
New York Civil Liberties Union, amicus curiae.
SMITH, J.:
Petitioner's testimony at a public hearing before a New
York City agency prompted a complaint by a public official,
followed by a subpoena to petitioner from the New York City
Department of Investigation (DOI).  Petitioner seeks to quash the
subpoena, claiming that it exceeds DOI's investigative authority
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and interferes with her First Amendment rights.
We recognize the importance of protecting citizens who
speak publicly to their government from intrusion and harassment
that may result from official displeasure with what they say.  In
this case, therefore, we apply with special stringency the
general rule that an investigative subpoena will be upheld only
where sufficient facts are shown to justify the inquiry.  We
nevertheless hold that DOI has made a sufficient showing here,
and that its subpoena is valid.
I
Petitioner is associated with an organization known as
"Landmark West!", which seeks the preservation of historic
buildings on the Upper West Side of Manhattan.  In 2006, Landmark
West supported designating two stable buildings, the Mason/Dakota
Stables and the New York Cab Company Stables, as landmarks.  On
August 14, 2006, the Borough President of Manhattan, Scott
Stringer, wrote a letter to the Chair of the New York City
Landmarks Preservation Commission (LPC) that was generally
favorable to the proposed landmarking.  The letter said that the
buildings "are historic fixtures of Manhattan's Upper West Side
and should be preserved"; it urged the Chair "to calendar these
two important buildings for public hearing by the Landmarks
Preservation Commission" and to "protect an important part of the
history of the development of the Upper West Side."  The letter
did not say in so many words, however, that the Borough President
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thought the buildings should be landmarked.
The LPC did calendar the buildings for a public
hearing, which took place on October 17, 2006.  In the two months
between the letter and the hearing, the Borough President
apparently changed his mind and decided not to support the
landmarking of one of the buildings; the record does not show
whether petitioner or Landmark West knew of this change.  The
Borough President sent a representative to monitor the October 17
hearing, but did not seek to express any views at it.
Petitioner attended the October 17 hearing, signing a
"speakers' sign-in sheet" as a representative of Landmark West. 
Another Landmark West representative, Lindsay Miller, also
attended, signing in as a representative of Assemblymember Linda
Rosenthal.  Assemblymember Rosenthal later asserted, without
contradiction, that she never authorized Ms. Miller to represent
her.  Indeed, the Assemblymember said she sent a member of her
own staff to testify, but that person was not allowed to do so
because the LPC limits each organization to one speaker, and Ms.
Miller had usurped the slot.
Petitioner began her testimony by stating her name and
saying "I'm volunteering today to read the statement of Borough
President Scott Stringer."  She then read an altered version of
the Borough President's August 14 letter, without mentioning that
she had altered it.  She omitted the Borough President's request
that the LPC "calendar" the buildings for public hearing,
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presumably because the LPC had already done so.  More important,
she added to the letter an express request for landmarking.  The
last sentence of the letter, as written by the Borough President,
said: "I ask that you move to calendar these two buildings and
protect an important part of the history of the development of
the Upper West Side."  The sentence became, in petitioner's
reading: "I ask that you immediately protect the important part
of history of the Upper West Side and landmark these buildings." 
Ms. Miller also testified, reading a letter from Assemblymember
Rosenthal, which she altered to similar effect.
Borough President Stringer and Assemblymember Rosenthal
were unhappy when they heard of these events, and made their
displeasure known in letters to the LPC Chair.  The more relevant
letter for our purposes was written by the Borough President's
Counsel, and focuses on petitioner's role at the hearing.  The
letter says that petitioner was not authorized to speak for the
Borough President, and adds:
"We are concerned that any person and/or
organization may have falsely induced
reliance from a public agency based on
representations appearing to derive from the
authority of an elected official or public
servant.  Such conduct is highly
inappropriate and, if pursued with the intent
to mislead, a potential violation of New York
Penal Law Section 190.25 proscribing criminal
impersonation, an offense that includes
acting with intent to cause another to rely
upon pretended official authority."
After receiving the public officials' letters, the LPC
complained to DOI that petitioner and Ms. Miller had made
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misrepresentations at the public hearing, and DOI began an
investigation.  DOI asked petitioner to talk to it voluntarily,
and when she refused DOI served a subpoena to compel her
testimony.  Petitioner moved by order to show cause to quash the
subpoena; DOI cross-moved to compel compliance.  Supreme Court
denied the motion to quash and granted the motion to compel, and
the Appellate Division affirmed.  Petitioner appeals as of right
pursuant to CPLR 5601 (b) (1), and we now affirm.
II
DOI's powers under the New York City Charter are broad. 
Section 803 (b) of the Charter says:
"The commissioner [of DOI] is authorized and
empowered to make any study or investigation
which in his opinion may be in the best
interests of the city, including but not
limited to investigations of the affairs,
functions, accounts, methods, personnel or
efficiency of any agency."
Charter § 803 (d) says:
"the jurisdiction of the commissioner shall
extend to any agency, officer, or employee of
the city, or any person or entity doing
business with the city, or any person or
entity who is paid or receives money from or
through the city or any agency of the city." 
The latter subsection has not been read as a limitation
on the witnesses DOI may subpoena.  Matter of Weintraub v Fraiman
(30 AD2d 784 [1st Dept 1968], affd 24 NY2d 918 [1969]) holds that
"inquisitorial" power "reaches any person, even though
unconnected with city employment, when there are grounds present
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to sustain a belief such person has information relative to the
subject matter of the investigation" (30 AD2d at 784-785
[citation omitted]).  We thus reject petitioner's suggestion that
she is immune from subpoena by DOI merely because she is neither
a city employee nor a person doing business with the city.  The
harder question is whether the facts here provide an adequate
basis for subpoenaing her.
III
Myerson v Lentini Bros. Moving & Stor. Co. (33 NY2d 250
[1973]) establishes that public agencies do not have carte
blanche in issuing investigative subpoenas.  In that case, which
involved an investigation by the Department of Consumer Affairs
into alleged deceptive trade practices, we held "that a witness
subject to a 'non-judicial' subpoena duces tecum may always
challenge the subpoena in court on the ground it ... subjects the
witness to harassment" (id. at 256 [citation omitted]).  This
holding applies with equal force to a subpoena seeking testimony. 
In Myerson, we quashed a broad subpoena duces tecum, because of
the "slim showing made to support inquisitorial action" (id. at
260).  The question here is whether DOI has made a sufficient
showing of justification for its "inquisitorial action" in
seeking to compel petitioner's testimony.
In answering this question, we must take account of the
unusual subject matter of this investigation: the actions and
words of witnesses at a public hearing.  Petitioner, and the New
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York Civil Liberties Union as amicus, point out correctly that
speech of citizens to government officials requesting
governmental action is at the very core of the freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment.  "[T]here is practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment
was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs"
(Mills v Alabama, 384 US 214, 218 [1966]).  There is a danger
that subpoenas may be used to intimidate or harass participants
in such free discussion, and for that reason, we demand more to
support a subpoena in a case like this than in one like Myerson,
which involved alleged overcharges by a moving company.  We said
in Myerson that we would not require "a strong and probative
basis for investigation" (33 NY2d at 258); we do require it here. 
But after applying that demanding test, we conclude that the DOI
has presented enough facts to justify its subpoena.
IV
As we interpret the record, there are two subjects
about which DOI seeks to question petitioner: Ms. Miller's
allegedly deceptive conduct in signing in as a representative of
Assemblymember Rosenthal, and petitioner's misreading of Borough
President Stringer's letter.  We hold that DOI may properly ask
petitioner about both subjects, though the second presents a
closer question.
The information available to DOI indicated that two
representatives of Landmark West had spoken at the public hearing
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-- one, petitioner, acknowledging that she was a Landmark West
representative and the other, Ms. Miller, claiming falsely to
represent Assemblymember Rosenthal.  The result was that, though
LPC procedures called for one member to speak from each
organization, Landmark West got two speakers and Assemblymember
Rosenthal got none.  This apparent manipulation of the system was
a problem plainly within DOI's jurisdiction, which allows it to
investigate the "affairs ... methods ... or efficiency of any
agency" (NY City Charter § 803 [b]).  Nor can it plausibly be
argued that, if Landmark West did usurp Assemblymember's
Rosenthal's right to have a representative speak at the hearing,
that conduct was protected by the First Amendment.  Whether or
not the incident could be a basis for action against anyone, DOI
could reasonably investigate whether it showed a need for
improvement in LPC procedures.
There is no evidence that petitioner was at fault for
the way in which Ms. Miller signed in at the hearing, but DOI had
a reasonable basis for asking petitioner what she knew about that
subject.  There are obvious questions -- Did petitioner discuss
with Ms. Miller how she would sign in?  Did they discuss finding
a way by which both of them would be allowed to speak? -- to
which petitioner could be expected to know the answer.  If the
sole purpose of DOI's subpoena was to ask questions along these
lines, we would have no difficulty in holding it to be proper.
DOI's investigation of petitioner's own role at the 
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hearing is more troublesome.  DOI argues that in petitioner's
case, as in Ms. Miller's, it is investigating not the content of
testimony, but only an alleged misrepresentation of authority --
whether petitioner falsely claimed to represent Borough President
Stringer.  The Appellate Division apparently accepted this
argument, finding that "DOI is not conducting a content-based
inquiry by investigating or condemning the actual words spoken by
petitioner or other participants at the hearing" (Matter of
Parkhouse v Stringer, 55 AD3d 1, 7 [1st Dept 2008]).  But this
finding is not supported by the record.  There is no evidence
that petitioner claimed to be authorized to speak on Borough
President Stringer's behalf.  She signed in as a representative
of Landmark West, and said that she was "volunteering" to read
the Borough President's letter.  
DOI is plainly investigating the content of
petitioner's statement at the hearing.  The affidavit of DOI's
First Deputy Commissioner, submitted to explain the basis for the
investigation, quotes petitioner's testimony and attaches an
audio recording of it.  In fact, the only acts or words of
petitioner that appear to provide any reason to investigate are
her words at the hearing -- specifically, her inaccurate reading
of the Borough President's letter.
We tread with great care in holding that a city agency
may investigate testimony given at a public hearing.  The idea is
troubling in itself, and all the more so when the investigation
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was apparently prompted by the complaint of a public official
whom the person testifying had annoyed.  If the facts here were
slightly different -- if, for example, petitioner had not claimed
to read the letter, but to summarize it, even if her summary was
a gross distortion -- there would be a strong argument for
quashing the subpoena.  A government investigation should not be
allowed to trespass on the principle that "debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" (New York
Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 270 [1964]).
But petitioner did claim to read the letter verbatim,
and she did not do so.  She changed it in a way that arguably
made a significant difference.  We cannot say that DOI is
forbidden to investigate what seems to have been a knowingly
false statement of fact to a city agency, even one made at a
public hearing.  "Spreading false information in and of itself
carries no First Amendment credentials.  '[T]here is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact.'"  (Herbert v
Lando, 441 US 153, 171 [1979], quoting Gertz v Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 US 323, 340 [1974].)  What, if any, action might be
taken against petitioner for her statement is a different
question, but DOI was entitled to subpoena her and question her
about it.  Of course, as to any question she is asked, petitioner
may if she wishes assert any applicable privilege.  
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed, with costs.
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*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed, with costs. Opinion by Judge Smith. Judges
Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Pigott and Jones concur. Chief Judge
Lippman took no part.
Decided June 25, 2009