Case Title: DEREK J. LONG, II V. CRAIG DALY; SUE DALY; and BNSF COMPANY, a Delaware corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
DEREK J. LONG, II V. CRAIG DALY; SUE DALY; and BNSF COMPANY, a Delaware corporation2007 WY 69156 P.3d 994Case Number: 06-118Decided: 04/27/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
DEREK J. 
LONG, II,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
CRAIG 
DALY; SUE DALY; and BNSF COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofGoshenCounty

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Frank J. 
Jones, Wheatland, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees Craig and Sue Daly:

Patrick 
J. Murphy of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.

                                    

Representing 
Appellee BNSF Co.:

Paul 
Kapp and Kay Lynn Bestol of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Bestol.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Derek J. Long, II was injured when the 
vehicle he was driving struck a cow that was lying on the highway.  He filed a complaint for negligence 
against Craig and Sue Daly, the owners of the cow and the property from which it 
escaped, and Burlington Northern Santa Fe Company (BNSF), the owner of the 
railroad track located between the Dalys' pasture and the highway.  The district court granted summary 
judgment for both defendants.   
We affirm.                   

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  Mr. Long presents two issues for this 
Court's consideration:          

 
 
            
1.         
Are there genuine issues of material fact which preclude the granting of 
Summary Judgment in favor of Defendants in this negligence 
case?

 
 
            
2.         
Does the Defendant BNSF Company owe a duty of reasonable care to 
Plaintiff and did it breach that duty by failing to inspect, repair and maintain 
its right-of-way fence?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3] On 
February 28, 2004, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Mr. Long was driving his vehicle 
west on U.S. Highway 26 in Goshen 
County, Wyoming when he 
struck a cow on the road.  The cow 
was one of seven cows belonging to the Dalys that had escaped through a fence 
enclosing their pasture on the south side of the highway.  The fence separates the Dalys' pasture 
from the BNSF right of way that runs along the railroad track next to the 
highway.   Mr. Long was injured 
as a result of the accident.

 
 
[¶4]  On April 11, 2005, Mr. Long filed a 
complaint against the Dalys and BNSF alleging that they had a duty to construct, 
maintain and repair the fence to prevent livestock from running at large on the 
highway and that they breached that duty.  
He alleged that as a result of their negligence he sustained serious 
permanent injuries and loss of earnings.  
The Dalys and BNSF answered the complaint, generally denying the claims 
and asserting various affirmative defenses.  The parties proceeded with discovery, 
and  the Dalys and BNSF filed 
motions for summary judgment.  

 
 
[¶5]  In its motion, BNSF argued there was no 
evidence that it breached any duty owed to Mr. Long.  Alternatively, BNSF argued it owed no 
duty to Mr. Long or, assuming the existence of a duty, any breach of the duty 
was not the proximate cause of Mr. Long's injuries. The Dalys argued they were 
entitled to summary judgment because they exercised reasonable care in 
constructing and maintaining the fence and their conduct, as a matter of law, 
did not constitute negligence.

 
 
[¶6]  After a hearing, the district court 
granted the motions for summary judgment.  
The district court concluded BNSF owed no duty to Mr. Long.  The district court concluded the Dalys 
made a prima facie showing that they 
had exercised due care in constructing and maintaining the fence.  Consequently, the district court held, 
the burden shifted to Mr. Long to rebut the Dalys' showing.  The district court found Mr. Long's 
rebuttal evidence was based on conjecture and insufficient to establish the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact.      

    

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]  When reviewing an order granting summary 
judgment, we consider the record de 
novo.  Hincks v. Walton Ranch Co., 2007 WY 12, 
¶ 7, 150 P.3d 669, 670 (Wyo. 2007).  
Our review is governed by W.R.C.P. 56(c), which provides in pertinent 
part:  

 
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
[¶8]  We view the evidence offered in support 
of and opposition to the motion in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences 
which may be fairly drawn from the record.  
Hincks, ¶ 8, 150 P.3d  at 
670.  A genuine issue of material 
fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting an essential element of an asserted cause of action or 
defense.  Id.   Summary judgment is not favored in 
a negligence action and is, therefore, subject to more exacting scrutiny.  Jones v. Schabron, 2005 WY 65, ¶¶ 9-11, 
113 P.3d 34, 37-38 (Wyo. 2005).  We 
will affirm summary judgment in negligence cases, however, where the record 
fails to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.  Id.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]  In order to maintain a claim of 
negligence, a plaintiff must prove:  
1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care; 2) the 
defendant breached the duty; and 3) the defendant's breach was the proximate 
cause of injury or loss to the plaintiff.  
Andersen v. Two Dot Ranch, 
Inc., 2002 WY 105, ¶ 11, 49 P.3d 1011, 1014 (Wyo. 2002).  The existence and scope of a duty are 
questions of law for the court.  
Id.  Absent a duty, there is no actionable 
claim of negligence.  Id.  Additionally, absent evidence that the 
defendant breached the duty by failing to exercise reasonable care, a claim of 
negligence is not sustainable.  
Id.

 
 
            
1.         
BNSF Duty of Care

 
 
[¶10]   We begin our discussion with Mr. 
Long's claim that BNSF owed him a duty of reasonable care by virtue of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 37-9-304(a) (LexisNexis 2005), which provides in relevant 
part:  

 
 
            
All railway corporations, owning or operating a line of railway within 
the state, shall construct, maintain and keep in repair on each side of the 
track thereof, a sufficient fence which meets or exceeds department of 
transportation fencing standards, so connected with suitable cattle guards at 
all public road crossings as to prevent stock from getting on the railroad track 
of the corporation. 

 
 
Mr. Long 
argues this provision imposed a duty on BNSF to maintain the fence along the 
track, including the part of the fence where the cattle escaped.  He further asserts the duty the statute 
created was owed to him as a member of the traveling public.  BNSF argued, and the district court 
concluded, that the intent and scope of § 37-9-304(a) was to provide for 
recovery of damages when livestock is injured or killed on railroad tracks, not 
to impose a duty on railway companies such as BNSF to protect the motoring 
public.  We agree with BNSF's 
contention.    

 
 
[¶11]  We have long recognized that the 
standard of care of a reasonable person may be established by legislative 
enactment.  Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167, 171-72 
(Wyo. 
1981).  Even where a legislative 
enactment contains no express provision that its violation will result in tort 
liability, and no implication to that effect, the court may, and in certain 
types of cases customarily will, adopt the requirements of the enactment as the 
standard of conduct necessary to avoid liability for negligence.  Id.   

 
 
[¶12] 
The express language of § 37-9-304(a) makes it clear that the intent of the 
statute is to "prevent stock from getting onto the railroad track."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-9-305 (LexisNexis 
2005) further makes it clear that failure to comply with § 37-9-304 results in 
railroad liability to the owner of any livestock harmed as a result of its 
failure to comply.  Thus, the 
statute under consideration in the instant case contains an express provision 
that its violation will result in liability to livestock owners and there is no 
question the requirements of the statute establish the standard of care a 
railroad owes to livestock owners.             

 
 
[¶13]  Mr. Long would have this Court extend 
the duty of care established by the statute beyond the livestock owner to the 
traveling public at large.  Citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (2002), we have said the court may adopt as 
the standard of care of a reasonable person the requirements of a statute whose 
purpose is found to be exclusively to protect: 

 
 
(a) a 
class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, 
and

 
 
(b) the 
particular interest which is invaded, and

 
 
(c) that 
interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and

 
 
(d) that 
interest against the particular hazard from which the harm 
results.

 
 

Id.  We have also said the court may  not adopt as the standard of care a 
statute the purpose of which is exclusively to protect a class of persons other 
than the one whose interests were invaded.  Id.   

 
 
[¶14]  The purpose of § 37-9-304 is clearly to 
protect the livestock owner from harm to his livestock.  Mr. Long does not fall into the class of 
persons whose interest the statute was intended to protect.  Therefore, we decline to hold that § 
37-9-304 imposed a duty of care on BNSF to protect Mr. Long.  This result is consistent with other 
cases in which we have declined to adopt a statute as establishing a standard of 
care for the protection of persons outside the class the statute was intended to 
protect.   See Dubray v. Howshar, 884 P.2d 23, 28 (Wyo. 
1994), holding statutes relating to liquor licenses did not a create a standard 
of care for bar owners to protect patrons from physical injury; Burnett v. Imerys Marble, Inc., 2005 WY 
82, ¶ 15, 116 P.3d 460, 463-64 (Wyo. 2005), holding a Mine Safety and Health 
Administration regulation did not create a standard of care for mine owners to 
protect non-miners from injury.  We 
hold the district court correctly concluded BNSF owed no duty to Mr. Long and 
summary judgment was appropriate on his claim against BNSF.  

 
 

2.                  
Summary 
Judgment For the Dalys

 
 
[¶15]  Mr. Long also claims the district court 
erred in granting summary judgment for the Dalys because, he asserts, genuine 
issues of material fact existed as to the location and condition of the fence 
where the cattle escaped.  The Dalys 
respond that Mr. Daly's testimony established the location of the escape and 
that the fence at that location was reasonably constructed and maintained; Mr. 
Long failed to rebut the testimony with any evidence other than conjecture; 
therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment for them on Mr. 
Long's negligence claim.  

 
 
[¶16]  As the parties' respective arguments 
reflect, the dispute on appeal is not over the applicable law and whether the 
district court correctly applied it.  
The parties agree that under Wyoming law 
"no owner or person having custody or charge of livestock shall permit the 
livestock to run at large in any fenced public highways in Wyoming . . . ."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-24-108(a) (LexisNexis 
2005).  The parties also agree, 
however, that livestock owners are not liable for damages to an injured motorist 
unless the evidence shows the livestock owner negligently permitted his 
livestock to escape from a fenced pasture.  
As the Court said in Nylen v. 
Dayton, 770 P.2d 1112, 1116 (Wyo. 1989), the mere presence of livestock on 
the road does not establish a violation of § 11-24-108(a). Rather, in order to 
establish negligence on the part of a livestock owner, evidence must be 
presented showing how the livestock got onto the road and that the owner, by 
failing to exercise reasonable care, permitted that to happen.  Hincks, ¶ 18, 150 P.3d  at 672.           

 
 
[¶17]  Reviewed de novo, and in the light most favorable 
to Mr. Long, the evidence presented in support of and opposition to the summary 
judgment motion showed that Mr. Daly maintained the fence between his property 
and the railroad track in an exemplary manner.  After he purchased the property in 1997, 
he built a new four-strand1 barbed wire fence between his 
pasture and the track with double box corners and alternating wood and steel 
posts.  At the spot where the cattle 
escaped, "the water gap"  a low spot where water intermittently flowed under 
the fence, he used railroad ties as posts rather than regular wood or metal 
posts because they were stronger and more durable and withstood water damage 
better than other types of posts.  
Between the ties, starting at the bottom and continuing to the top, he 
ran three three-quarter inch steel rods horizontally at even intervals followed 
by four spans of barbed wire.  He 
also ran three long and four short stays vertically at four foot intervals 
between the ties along the barbed wire and the steel rods.  Underneath the bottom rod, he attached a 
log horizontally to the stays in a manner allowing it to move with the water 
flowing through the drainage to allow debris to pass under the fence without 
damaging the fence. 

 
 
[¶18] 
Mr. Daly further testified he had 122 head of cattle in this pasture for two 
months prior to the accident and there had been no problems.  The night of the accident, he followed 
his normal practice of driving through the pasture and checking the cattle and 
fence before dark.  He testified 
everything look normal.  Despite his 
efforts, on February 28, 2004, sometime between dark and 2:00 a.m., seven of the 
cattle escaped from the pasture.  

 
 
[¶19] At 
approximately 6:30 or 7:00 the next morning, Mr. Daly learned the cattle had 
gotten out.  He checked to see how 
many cattle were still in the pasture and then checked the fence.  He determined that the cattle had 
escaped through the fence where it crossed the water gap.  He testified there was no indication the 
cattle had escaped through any other part of the fence.  At the water gap, none of the barbed 
wire was down but the steel rods between the railroad ties were bent up and 
down, leaving a hole large enough for cattle to get through.   Mr. Daly believed something must 
have spooked the cattle because "this is a very, very good fence, and there 
would be no other reason why seven head would run through a section of fence and 
just tear a big hole in it."       

 
 
[¶20]  In addition to Mr. Daly's testimony, the 
Dalys presented affidavits from several neighbors attesting to the superior 
quality of the Dalys' fences and their practice of regularly maintaining and 
repairing them.  The Dalys also 
presented the affidavit of the insurance adjustor assigned by their insurer to 
investigate the accident.  As part 
of his investigation, he compared the condition of the Dalys' fence at the water 
gap where the cattle escaped and the requirements for a "lawful fence" found in 
§ 11-28-102 and concluded the Dalys' fence exceeded the statutory 
requirements.  Finally, the Dalys 
presented the affidavit of Melanie Hout, a professional fencing contractor, who 
also concluded the Dalys' fence at the water gap exceeded the statutory 
requirements and was constructed "pursuant to the standards that reasonable 
Wyoming cattle owners, property owners, and fence builders must exercise" when 
building similar fences in Wyoming.  

 
 
[¶21]  Given this evidence, we agree with the 
district court's conclusion that the Dalys made a prima facie showing that they exercised 
due care in constructing and maintaining the fence.  The burden then shifted to Mr. Long to 
present evidence refuting their evidence and establishing a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether they exercised reasonable care.  The evidence Mr. Long presented 
consisted of his father's and sister's testimony that they went out to the 
accident site the day after the accident and observed and photographed cow 
tracks between the railroad tracks and what they later learned was the Dalys' 
neighbor's  fence.  Mr. Long's father testified that a 
portion of that fence was "all brand-new shiny, still shiny, and spliced" and he 
"had suspicions that might be where [the cattle came] through."  Other than his father's speculation, Mr. 
Long presented no evidence with regard to when the neighbor's fence may have 
been repaired.  Additionally, for 
the Dalys' cattle to have come through the neighbor's fence bordering the 
railroad tracks, they would have had to first breach the boundary fence between 
the Dalys and their neighbors and enter the neighbor's pasture before then 
breaching their fence onto the railroad right of way.  No evidence was presented that the 
Dalys' fence bordering the neighbor's property was breached.  Evidence speculating that the cattle 
might have escaped through, what appeared to Mr. Long's father to be a newly 
repaired section of the neighbor's fence does not establish a genuine issue of 
material fact on the negligence claim against the Dalys. 

 
 
[¶22] 
The only evidence Mr. Long presented concerning the water gap fence was his 
father's testimony suggesting it was not in very good shape when he saw it after 
the accident and it must have been repaired later.  His statement was consistent with Mr. 
Daly's testimony that he had, immediately after the accident, performed 
temporary repairs to the fence.  By 
itself, Mr. Long's father's testimony that the water gap fence was not in very 
good shape after the accident simply was not sufficient to overcome the Dalys' 
prima facie case for summary judgment 
which showed they used reasonable care in constructing and maintaining the water 
gap fence before the accident.  This 
is particularly true given the father's testimony that he was looking at the 
neighbor's fence the day he and his daughter inspected the site and not the 
fence at the water gap.  Mr. Long 
also points to Mr. Daly's testimony indicating that other sections of his fence, 
between his and his neighbor's property, were in need of repair at the time of 
the accident; however, there was no evidence suggesting the cattle escaped from 
those locations.  Mr. Daly's 
testimony that he believed the cattle escaped from the water gap was undisputed 
and was supported by his observations of the bent rods the morning after the 
accident.  Absent evidence showing 
the cattle escaped from a different location, and that the Dalys failed to 
exercise reasonable care to maintain the fence at that location or at the water 
gap, the Dalys were entitled to summary judgment. 

 
 
[¶23]  After the parties filed their briefs 
with this Court, we issued our decision in Hincks, ¶ 18, 150 P.3d  at 672, which Mr. 
Long then cited as supplemental authority supporting his claim.  In Hincks, we reversed an order granting 
summary judgment for the livestock owner after concluding from the record that a 
question of material fact existed for jury determination as to whether the 
livestock owner exercised reasonable care to prevent cattle from escaping from 
his pasture onto a public highway.  
The evidence presented in Hincks was notably different from that 
presented in this case. 

 
 
[¶24] In 
support of its summary judgment motion in Hincks, Walton Ranch presented very 
little affirmative evidence showing the quality of the construction and 
maintenance of its fence and gate and whether it met statutory or industry 
standards.   Additionally, the 
evidence Walton Ranch presented concerning its inspection of the fence and gate 
prior to the cow's escape was vague at best.  In the face of evidence indicating one 
of its cows got onto the highway either through a particular damaged section of 
fence or an unsecured gate, we concluded Walton Ranch did not present sufficient 
evidence to make a prima facie 
showing that it exercised reasonable care in constructing and maintaining the 
fence and gate.  Because Walton 
Ranch failed to make a prima facie 
showing that it exercised reasonable care in the time frame of the accident to 
inspect and maintain the particular damaged portion of the fence or the 
unsecured gate where the evidence showed the cow escaped, the burden never 
shifted to Mr. Hincks to refute a prima 
facie showing and we held an issue of fact for jury determination existed as 
to whether Walton Ranch exercised reasonable care to prevent the cow from 
escaping.    

 
 
[¶25]  In contrast to Hincks, to support their summary 
judgment motion, the Dalys presented detailed affirmative evidence showing that 
the section of fence from which the cattle escaped was carefully and soundly 
built.  To support that evidence, 
the Dalys submitted the affidavits of neighbors confirming the care with which 
they constructed and maintained their fences and kept watch over their cattle 
and fences.  The Dalys also 
presented affidavits from an insurance adjustor and an expert witness firmly 
establishing that the water gap fence was soundly built, exceeding the statutory 
requirements for what constitutes a lawful fence in Wyoming. 

 
 
[¶26] 
The evidence the Dalys presented in support of summary judgment affirmatively 
showed that they exercised reasonable care in constructing and maintaining the 
only section of fence from which there was any evidence that the cattle could 
have escaped.  They made a prima facie showing and the burden 
shifted to Mr. Long to refute that showing.  Mr. Long's evidence was clearly 
insufficient to satisfy his burden because it was speculative and focused mostly 
on a section of fence that did not belong to the Dalys and over which they had 
no duty of care.  Given the 
substantial difference in the evidence presented, Hincks does not provide support for Mr. 
Long's claim.

 
 
[¶27]  We affirm the district court's order 
granting summary judgment for BNSF and the Dalys.   

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
11-28-102(a) (LexisNexis 2005) requires for a lawful fence "three (3) spans of 
barbed wire . . . ."