Case Title: Nobrega v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 051378

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton,∗ S.J. 
 
JOSEPH WALTER NOBREGA 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 051378 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
April 21, 2006 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
affirmed the convictions of Joseph Walter Nobrega in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Norfolk on two counts of rape of a child 
under age thirteen, Code § 18.2-61, and two counts of sexual 
abuse of the same child over whom he maintained a custodial or 
supervisory relationship, Code § 18.2-370.1.  Nobrega v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 0511-04-1 (May 10, 2005).  We awarded 
Nobrega this appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Code § 17.1-411.  Nobrega asserts three assignments 
of error.  First, Nobrega contends that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for an independent psychiatric or 
psychological examination of the complaining witness.  Second, 
Nobrega contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that 
the trial court lacked the authority to order the complaining 
witness to undergo a psychiatric or psychological examination.  
                     
∗ Senior Justice Compton participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case before his death on April 9, 2006. 
 
 
2
Third, Nobrega contends that the Commonwealth’s evidence was 
insufficient to support his convictions. 
BACKGROUND 
 
In November 2002, Nobrega’s daughter (“the child”), who was 
then eleven years of age, reported to her mother that Nobrega 
had sexual intercourse with her on two prior occasions. 
Thereafter, on February 5, 2003, a grand jury indicted Nobrega 
on two counts of rape and two counts of sexual abuse occurring 
on two occasions between March 1, 1998 and September 30, 2000.1 
 
Prior to trial, Nobrega filed a motion in the trial court 
seeking an order for an independent psychiatric or psychological 
examination of the child.  In support of the motion, Nobrega 
asserted that the child had “long-standing emotional and mental 
health issues” that caused the child to experience “auditory and 
visual hallucinations, suicidal ideations, ‘grandiose flight of 
ideas,’ and impulsive behavior.”  Nobrega further asserted that 
                                                                  
 
1 At the time these indictments were returned by the grand 
jury, Code § 18.2-61(A) provided, in relevant part, that “[i]f 
any person has sexual intercourse . . . (iii) with a child under 
age thirteen as the victim, he or she shall be guilty of rape.” 
 
Code § 18.2-370.1(A) provided, in relevant part, that 
“[a]ny person eighteen years of age or older who maintains a 
custodial or supervisory relationship over a child under the age 
of eighteen . . . who . . . (vi) sexually abuses the child as 
defined in § 18.2-67.10(6), shall be guilty of a Class 6 
felony.” 
 
 
3
the child had received treatment from numerous psychiatrists and 
psychologists, but that no “current, accurate and independent 
psychological and/or psychiatric evaluation” existed.  Nobrega 
contended that since the “mental health and instability” of the 
child would be a “crucial factor” to his defense, due process 
required the trial court to grant the motion. 
 
At a pretrial hearing, the Commonwealth argued that the 
motion was an attempt by Nobrega to have the examining 
psychiatrist testify at trial and comment on the child’s 
credibility as a witness.  Nobrega argued that his need to test 
the child’s “suggestibility” was the basis for the motion.  In a 
memorandum to the trial court, Nobrega elaborated that an 
examination was necessary “to determine [the child’s] capacity 
to differentiate reality from imagination and her susceptibility 
to outside influences.”  According to Nobrega, the examination 
was vital to his defense because the Commonwealth’s case hinged 
on the child’s uncorroborated testimony. 
 
Nobrega attached to his memorandum medical records 
documenting the child’s mental health history.  Those records 
supported Nobrega’s assertion that the child had been diagnosed 
with various psychological disorders and at times had exhibited 
dysfunctional behavior. 
 
 
4
 
The trial court held a second hearing on the motion.  At 
this hearing, Nobrega addressed the child’s competency as a 
witness for the first time, arguing that “this really is a 
competency issue . . . competency for her to testify.”  Nobrega 
maintained that the purpose of the requested psychological 
examination was to evaluate the child’s competency to testify at 
trial.  In doing so, Nobrega asserted that the examination was 
not for the purpose of testing the child’s credibility as a 
witness. 
 
The trial court denied Nobrega’s motion.  The trial court 
reasoned that, if the motion were granted, Nobrega would 
inevitably call the examining psychiatrist or psychologist as an 
expert witness to testify regarding the results of the 
examination.  The trial court concluded that an expert witness 
giving such testimony would usurp the responsibility of the 
trial court to determine the child’s competency to testify and 
the responsibility of the fact-finder to determine the child’s 
credibility as a witness.  The trial court further concluded 
that such expert testimony would be inadmissible because it 
would address an ultimate issue of fact, the credibility of the 
child as a witness. 
 
Subsequently, the trial was conducted without a jury.  
Under well-established principles, we view the evidence 
 
 
5
presented and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing 
party at trial.  Coles v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 585, 587, 621 
S.E.2d 109, 110 (2005). 
 
The child testified that the first incident occurred at the 
family’s home on Farrell Avenue in Norfolk when she was seven 
years of age.  She testified that she was alone in the home with 
her father while her mother was at work and her siblings were at 
school.  The child related that she was told by Nobrega to put 
on a white nightgown, not to wear underwear, and to lay on her 
mother’s bed.  The child further related that after Nobrega put 
a bandanna over her eyes, he “stuck his private part into mine.”  
Continuing, the child described the remainder of Nobrega’s 
actions as going “to the bathroom . . . [i]nside of me” and that 
it felt “warm and icky.”  The child testified that Nobrega’s 
actions caused her to bleed from her “private part.”  She 
further testified that Nobrega told her that he would kill her 
if she ever told anyone what had happened. 
 
The child testified that the second incident occurred when 
she was eight years of age and after the family had moved to a 
home on Randall Avenue in Norfolk.  Her account of this incident 
was nearly identical to the first.  The child related that 
Nobrega again told her to put on a white nightgown, instructed 
 
 
6
her to lay on her mother’s bed, and placed a bandanna over her 
eyes.  She further related that Nobrega then “opened my private” 
with his hand and “stuck his private part in[].”  She testified 
that Nobrega again threatened to kill her if she told anyone 
what had happened. 
 
The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of a 
physician who examined the child soon after the child reported 
the rapes.  The physician testified that the child’s genital 
anatomy revealed no evidence of prior injury or sexual contact.  
The physician opined that the absence of physical symptoms of 
prior sexual contact could be attributable to healing and pre-
adolescent development commonly occurring in girls of the 
child’s age. 
 
The trial court found Nobrega guilty on both counts of rape 
and both counts of sexual abuse as charged in the indictments.  
By order dated March 2, 2004, the trial court sentenced Nobrega 
to confinement for a total of 60 years, with 30 years suspended. 
 
Nobrega perfected an appeal from his convictions to the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia.  In that appeal, he asserted two 
issues:  (1) whether the trial court erred in denying Nobrega’s 
motion for an independent psychiatric or psychological 
examination of the complaining witness, and (2) whether the 
 
 
7
evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.  Nobrega, 
Record No. 0511-04-1, slip op. at 1. 
 
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s reasons 
for denying Nobrega’s motion were erroneous.2  Nevertheless, the 
Court of Appeals, relying on Clark v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 517, 
551 S.E.2d 642 (2001), held that the trial court lacked the 
authority to grant Nobrega’s motion and, thus, the trial court’s 
errors were not reversible.  Nobrega, Record No. 0511-04-1, slip 
op. at 9-14. 
 
The Court of Appeals then rejected Nobrega’s contention 
that the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to support his 
convictions and, accordingly, affirmed those convictions.  Id. 
at 11-13.  This appeal followed. 
 
 
                     
2 The Court of Appeals rejected the trial court’s finding 
that an examining psychiatrist’s testimony on a witness’ 
competence would usurp the trial court’s authority to determine 
competence because a trial court has the discretion to permit 
expert testimony in determining a witness’ competency.  Nobrega, 
Record No. 0511-04-1, slip op. at 6 (citing Helge v. Carr, 212 
Va. 485, 491, 184 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1971) and Turnbull v. 
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 328, 334, 218 S.E.2d 541, 546 (1975)).  
The Court of Appeals also concluded that expert testimony 
addressing a witness’ “mental disorder and the hypothetical 
effect of that disorder” on the witness can be admitted so long 
as it does not address the credibility of a witness’ testimony 
or an ultimate issue of fact.  Id. at 8 (citing Pritchett v. 
Commonwealth, 263 Va. 182, 187, 557 S.E.2d 205, 208 (2002)). 
 
 
8
DISCUSSION 
 
We begin our analysis in this appeal by first clarifying 
that the issue to be resolved with regard to Nobrega’s motion 
for an independent psychiatric or psychological examination of 
the complaining witness is a narrow one.  We are not called upon 
to consider the competency of this witness, which implicitly was 
resolved by the trial court when it permitted her to testify at 
Nobrega’s trial.  Nor must we decide whether the trial court 
should have exercised its discretion to appoint an expert to 
evaluate the mental health records of the witness in order to 
assist Nobrega in a challenge to the competency of the witness.  
The sole issue is whether the trial court had the authority to 
require the complaining witness to be examined by an appropriate 
mental health expert. 
 
The Court of Appeals resolved this issue based on our 
decision in Clark.  In that case, the defendant was charged with 
statutory rape and forcible sodomy of a child under thirteen 
years of age.  262 Va. at 518, 551 S.E.2d at 643.  Prior to 
trial, the defendant moved the trial court to order the 
complaining witness to undergo an independent medical 
examination of her sexual anatomy.  Id. at 519, 551 S.E.2d at 
643.  The trial court denied the motion, and we ultimately 
affirmed.  Describing the motion as a “discovery effort,” we 
 
 
9
found that “in Virginia, no authority exists permitting such 
discovery” by constitutional mandate, statute, rule of court, or 
case law.  Id. at 520, 551 S.E.2d at 644.  We expressly declined 
in Clark to create authority for a trial court to compel 
physical examinations of complaining witnesses in rape cases.  
Id.  
 
Nobrega distinguishes his case from Clark on several 
grounds.  He argues that an evaluation by a psychiatrist or 
psychologist would be less intrusive than a physical examination 
of the sexual anatomy of a complaining witness.  He further 
argues that, since the complaining witness in the present case 
had undergone numerous mental health examinations in the past, 
the requested examination would not traumatize her and would be, 
at most, a slight burden on her.  The thrust of his contention 
is that the requested examination should be allowed when, as 
here, it is established that the complaining witness in a rape 
case has a history of mental disorders and there is no 
corroboration that the crime occurred.  In the absence of any 
authority for this position in Virginia, Nobrega asks that we 
create that authority in this case.  We will not do so. 
 
We need not reach an opinion with regard to the merits or 
the significance of the obvious distinctions Nobrega notes 
between the circumstances of his case and those in Clark.  
 
 
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Specifically, we need not decide, as he contends, that a mental 
health examination of a complaining witness in a rape case is 
less intrusive than the requested genital examination of the 
complaining witness at issue in Clark.  We are of opinion, 
however, that mental health examinations are nevertheless highly 
intrusive and may violate a complaining witness’ sense of 
privacy.  See State v. Looney, 240 S.E.2d 612, 627 (N.C. 
1978)(psychological examination is “an inquisition into [the 
victim’s] most personal and private relations and past 
history”).  This is especially true with victims of sex crimes.  
See United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(stating that “the trauma that attends the role of complainant 
to sex offense charges is sharply increased by the indignity of 
a psychiatric examination”).  Moreover, no statute or rule of 
court in Virginia authorizes the psychiatric or psychological 
examination Nobrega requests in this case. 
 
The Constitution of Virginia establishes rights for both 
criminal defendants and crime victims.  Article 1, Section 8 
guarantees criminal defendants the right to “call for evidence 
in [their] favor.”  We have stated that this right includes “the 
right to prepare for trial . . . and to ascertain the truth.”  
Clark, 262 Va. at 520, 551 S.E.2d at 644 (quoting Bobo v. 
Commonwealth, 187 Va. 774, 779, 48 S.E.2d 213, 215 (1948)).  
 
 
11
With equal force, Article 1, Section 8-A guarantees that crime 
victims will be “treated with respect, dignity and fairness at 
all stages of the criminal justice system.”  Indeed, the need to 
ensure the fair treatment of crime victims is one reason why a 
criminal defendant’s right to call for favorable evidence is 
“not boundless.”  See Clark, 262 Va. at 520, 551 S.E.2d at 644 
(citing Lowe v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 670, 679, 239 S.E.2d 112, 
118 (1977)). 
 
In this case, Nobrega’s constitutional right to call for 
evidence in his favor is not implicated.  In Virginia, the trial 
court determines whether a witness is competent and in making 
that determination the court “may, but is not obligated to, 
consider the opinion evidence of experts.  It is a matter within 
the discretion of the trial court.”  Turnbull v. Commonwealth, 
216 Va. 328, 334, 218 S.E.2d 541, 546 (1975) (citation omitted).  
The reliance our common law places on the trial court’s 
determination of the competency of a witness reflects the 
balance between the constitutional rights of a criminal 
defendant and those of crime victims.  We are of opinion that 
altering that balance by authorizing a trial court to require   
a rape victim to undergo an independent psychiatric or 
psychological examination to assist in the determination of the 
 
 
12
victim’s competency to testify is a matter properly left to the 
General Assembly to consider as an issue of public policy. 
 
In the absence of such action by the General Assembly, we 
are unpersuaded by Nobrega’s contention that a majority of 
jurisdictions have adopted a “compelling need” test to authorize 
such examinations.  Under this approach, trial courts have the 
discretion to order a psychiatric or psychological examination 
of a complaining witness in a criminal case where the defendant 
demonstrates a “compelling need” for the examination.  See, 
e.g., State v. Nelson, 453 N.W.2d 454, 458 (Neb. 1990); Forbes 
v. State, 559 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn. 1977); State v. Jerousek, 
590 P.2d 1366, 1371 (Ariz. 1979); State v. Gregg, 602 P.2d 85, 
91 (Kan. 1979). 
 
We have no doubt that the possibility of undergoing court-
ordered psychiatric or psychological examinations as a 
consequence of reporting rapes could deter victims from coming 
forward.  See Looney, 240 S.E.2d at 627 (stating that the 
prospect of a psychological exam may “discourage the honest, 
innocent victim of a genuine assault from going to the 
authorities with a complaint”); Forbes, 559 S.W.2d at 320 (rule 
mandating rape victim’s participation in psychiatric exams 
sought by defendants would be “contrary to public policy” 
because it would “deter prosecution for this loathsome criminal 
 
 
13
act”).  Historically, rape victims have been particularly 
vulnerable to defense tactics that “put the victim on trial.”  
See Winfield v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 211, 218, 301 S.E.2d 15, 
19 (1983).  The General Assembly has furthered the public policy 
of encouraging victims to come forward by passing legislation to 
curb such tactics.  See Code § 18.2-67.7 (“rape shield” 
statute). 
 
Nevertheless, we recognize that the established history of 
mental illness of a particular complaining witness may create a 
heightened danger that the witness lacks the capacity accurately 
to observe, remember, and communicate facts.  Hopkins v. 
Commonwealth, 230 Va. 280, 291, 337 S.E.2d 264, 271 (1985); 
Helge v. Carr, 212 Va. 485, 487-91, 184 S.E.2d 794, 795-98 
(1971).  It is axiomatic that an individual accused of the crime 
of rape has a vital interest in ascertaining the competency of 
such a complaining witness to testify.  However, we believe that  
an accused’s ability to voir dire a complaining witness, the 
trial court’s skill and experience in observing testimony, and 
the presentation of the mental health records and expert 
testimony regarding those records provide adequate safeguards to 
the accused to test the competency of the complaining witness 
without a court-ordered mental health examination of that 
witness.  Thus, we hold that a trial court has no authority to 
 
 
14
order a complaining witness in a rape case to undergo a 
psychiatric or psychological evaluation.3 
 
We turn next to address Nobrega’s contention that the 
Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to support his 
convictions.  In accord with well-established principles, we 
will not reverse the judgment of the trial court unless it is 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.  Commonwealth 
v. Presley, 256 Va. 465, 466, 507 S.E.2d 72, 72 (1998).  We also 
accept the trial court’s determination of the credibility of 
witness testimony unless, “as a matter of law, the testimony is 
inherently incredible.”  Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 70-
71, 515 S.E.2d 565, 575 (1999). 
 
Nobrega does not dispute that, at the time of the alleged 
rapes, the child was under the age of thirteen and Nobrega was 
eighteen years or older.  See Code § 18.2-61(A)(iii)(rape 
includes sexual intercourse with a child under thirteen); Code 
§ 18.2-370.1 (applying to acts by an adult on a child under 
eighteen).  Furthermore, it is undisputed that when the alleged 
rapes occurred, Nobrega had a “custodial or supervisory 
relationship” with the child.  See Code § 18.2-370.1(A).  Thus, 
                     
3 Because we will affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that 
a trial court has no authority to order a complaining witness in 
a rape case to undergo a psychiatric or psychological 
 
 
15
if the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Nobrega engaged in sexual intercourse with the child, Nobrega’s 
contention that the evidence was insufficient to convict him 
under Code § 18.2-61 and Code § 18.2-370.1 must fail.   
 
The child testified that, on two occasions, Nobrega put his 
“private part” into her “private part” and “went to the 
bathroom” inside her.  A rational fact-finder certainly could 
understand the child’s detailed account of those acts to be a 
description of sexual intercourse.  Nobrega contends, however, 
that inconsistencies in the child’s testimony, the child’s 
history of mental illness, and the lack of physical evidence 
rendered the child’s testimony unworthy of belief.  We disagree. 
 
While the child’s testimony did contain minor 
inconsistencies, her testimony did not waiver with regard to the 
acts of sexual intercourse.  Although the child’s mental health 
history bears on the weight to be given her testimony, the trial 
court found her testimony to be credible.  The record does not 
support a conclusion that her mental health history rendered her 
testimony inherently incredible as a matter of law.  Finally, 
the testimony of the physician who physically examined the child 
showed that the lack of physical evidence of sexual intercourse 
                                                                  
examination, we need not address whether the reasons given by 
the trial court for denying Nobrega’s motion were erroneous. 
 
 
16
could have been the result of the natural healing and growth 
process of a girl of the child’s age. 
 
As we have stated, the victim’s testimony alone, if not 
inherently incredible, is sufficient to support a conviction for 
rape.  See Snyder v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 792, 796, 263 S.E.2d 
55, 57 (1980); Fogg v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 541, 546, 159 
S.E.2d 616, 620 (1968).  Since the child’s testimony that 
Nobrega engaged in sexual intercourse with her was not 
inherently incredible, the trial court was entitled to rely on 
her testimony.  Accordingly, we hold that the Commonwealth’s 
evidence was sufficient to support Nobrega’s convictions under 
Code § 18.2-61 and Code § 18.2-370.1. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the holding of the Court of 
Appeals that a trial court has no authority to order a 
complaining witness in a rape case to undergo a psychiatric or 
psychological examination was correct.  The Court of Appeals 
also correctly held that the Commonwealth’s evidence was 
sufficient to support Nobrega’s convictions under Code § 18.2-61 
and Code § 18.2-370.1.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals will be affirmed. 
Affirmed.