Case Title: MATTER OF R L S v BARKHOFF

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-089

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1983-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 83-89 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1983 IN THE MATTER OF THE CUSTODY OF R.L.S. and T.L.S., Petitioners and Respondents, VS . CARLA JEAN BARKHOFF, a/k/a ENGDAHL, Appellant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Fergus Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: William E. Berger, Lewistown, Montana For Respondents: Berger Law Firm, Billings, Montana Torger Oaas, Lewistown, Montana Submitted on Briefs: September 2, 1983 Decided: December 16, 1983 Filed: DEC I 6 1983 & & , * l L l & - , , , C Clerk Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal is the second time the custody dispute over these two children has reached this Court. The first decision, Sayer v . Barkhoff (Mont. 1981), 632 P.2d 703, 38 St.Rep. 1328, reversed the District Court ruling and remanded it for futher proceedings. On remand the Honorable Nat Allen assumed jurisdiction from the Honorable LeRoy McKinnon at the request of the parties, and a new trial was held. This appeal is taken from the District Court ruling granting attorney fees before the second trial, and from the ruling granting modification of a Wyoming custody decree. The second trial was a series of accusations and counter accusations as to the unfitness of the opposing party to raise the children. From the record the few uncontroverted facts appear as follows. Appellant, hereinafter Mother and respondent, hereinafter Father, are the natural parents of R.L.S., born October 7, 1975, and T.L.S., born October 1, 1976. When the children were born, the couple resided together in Sheridan, Wyoming, without the aid of marriage. They separated in the summer of 1979, and initially Father retained custody of the children. Following several extralegal attempts to gain custody, Mother petitioned a Wyoming District Court for, and was granted, a writ of habeas corpus giving her custody of the children. Finally the parties signed a custody agreement in settlement of a paternity suit brought by Father. The agreement established Father's paternity, but gave primary custody of the children to Mother and a reasonable r i g h t of v i s i t a t i o n t o F a t h e r . S p e c i f i c a l l y Mother was t o have t h e c h i l d r e n t h e f i r s t s i x months of each y e a r and F a t h e r t h e l a s t s i x months u n t i l each c h i l d reached s c h o o l age. When each c h i l d s t a r t e d a t t e n d i n g s c h o o l , Mother would have c u s t o d y d u r i n g t h e s c h o o l y e a r and F a t h e r d u r i n g t h e summer months. Sometime t h e r e a f t e r , Mother and t h e c h i l d r e n l e f t S h e r i d a n and moved t o Lewistown, Montana. F a t h e r p e t i t i o n e d t h e District Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Y e l l o w s t o n e C o u n t y , f o r a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e c u s t o d y d e c r e e , s e e k i n g primary custody. Mother answered and c r o s s p e t i t i o n e d s e e k i n g s o l e c u s t o d y h e r s e l f . Venue was s u b s e q u e n t l y changed t o t h e Tenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Fergus County, where a non-jury t r i a l was h e l d . On December 1, 1980, t h e D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d its f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f law, g r a n t i n g t h e Mother s o l e c u s t o d y of t h e c h i l d r e n , and l i m i t i n g t h e F a t h e r t o one month's v i s i t a t i o n d u r i n g t h e summer. The e v i d e n c e a t t h i s t r i a l was l i m i t e d t o t e s t i m o n y a b o u t e v e n t s o c c u r r i n g a f t e r t h e Wyoming d e c r e e was i s s u e d , and t h i s Court h e l d t h a t was e r r o r . On August 20, 1981, t h e c a s e was r e v e r s e d and remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s . Mother moved t h e District Court on September 23, 1981, t o g r a n t her a t t o r n e y f e e s f o r b o t h t h e f i r s t t r i a l and t h e a p p e a l . A f t e r a h e a r i n g t h e motion was g r a n t e d on J a n u a r y 28, 1982. The second t r i a l commenced on August 5, 1982. A t t h i s p o i n t t h e u n c o n t r o v e r t e d f a c t s n e a r l y d i s a p p e a r , and t h e p a r t i e s t e l l almost d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed s t o r i e s . A t t h e s e c o n d t r i a l , F a t h e r a t t e m p t e d t o show t h a t M o t h e r ' s h o u s e k e e p i n g s k i l l s were n i l l , t h a t s h e n e g l e c t e d t h e c h i l d r e n and b e a t them, t h a t s h e abused a l c o h o l and d r u g s , t h a t her l i v i n g arrangements were v e r y u n s t a b l e and posed a n u n h e a l t h y environment and s h e c o u l d n o t hold a job. Mother a t t e m p t e d t o show t h a t F a t h e r abused a l c o h o l , had a v i o l e n t temper and was brainwashing t h e c h i l d r e n i n t o b e l i e v i n g s h e had abandoned them. Both s i d e s p r e s e n t e d numerous w i t n e s s e s i n s u p p o r t of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e s t o r i e s . On October 25, 1982, t h e D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of law and o r d e r . The c o u r t found t h e environment i n t h e Mother I s home e n d a n g e r e d t h e i r p h y s i c a l , m e n t a l , m o r a l and e m o t i o n a l h e a l t h , t h a t any harm l i k e l y t o be caused t o t h e minor c h i l d r e n b y a c h a n g e t o F a t h e r ' s c u s t o d y , would b e outweighed by t h e a d v a n t a g e s and t h a t it was i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d r e n t o modify t h e d e c r e e . I t was o r d e r e d t h a t t h e c u s t o d y of t h e c h i l d r e n be changed t o F a t h e r and t h a t Mother have l i m i t e d r i g h t s o f r e a s o n a b l e v i s i t a t i o n . T h i s a p p e a l followed. Four i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d by t h e p a r t i e s : 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r by photocopying and a d o p t i n g v e r b a t i m F a t h e r I s proposed f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law? 2. Did F a t h e r show s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s from which t h e D i s t r i c t Court could o r d e r a m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e c u s t o d y d e c r e e p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 40-4-219, MCA? 3 . Did F a t h e r show s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s from which t h e D i s t r i c t Court could l i m i t M o t h e r w s v i s i t a t i o n p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 40-4-217, MCA? 4. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r by awarding a t t o r n e y fees and expenses to Mother for the first trial and appeal, and not the full amount of her attorney fees for the second trial? Mother also seeks an award of $1,000 for attorney fees of the present appeal. Mother asserts the trial court abused its discretion by photocopying Father's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and argues that since the evidence was conflicting the trial court should have been more careful to exercise its own judgment. Finally she points out certain facts found by the District Court which she claims are not supported by the record. This Court has consistently held that it is not good practice for the District Court to adopt verbatim one party's proposed finding of fact and conclusions of law because it may lead to error. Tomaskiev. Tomaskie (Mont. 1981), 625 P.2d 536, 38 St.Rep.416; In Re Marriage of Beck (Mont. 1981), 631 P.2d 282, 38 St.Rep. 1054. However, once the District Court adopts findings and conclusions they become the court's own, and may not be overturned on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P. Speer v. Speer (Mont. 1982), 654 P.2d 1001, 39 St.Rep. 2204. There is no more than a technical difference between photocopying one party's proposed findings and conclusions and adopting them verbatim, the legal effect is the same. As the cases cited above show, even if the District Court adopts one party's proposed findings and conclusions verbatim, the "clearly erroneous" standard applies on appeal. When the findings and conclusions are not clearly erroneous and are supported by the record, the judge has not abused his discretion by ratifying the proposals of one party. The record in the case at bar contains two stories, and it is difficult to imagine how they could be farther apart. We note that although Father requested the District Court to order an investigation of the "[Hlome, life style, living conditions and stability," of Mother by the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, no order was issued. Section 40-4-215, MCA, gives the District Court the discretion to order such an investigation, and we have ruled that absent an abuse of this discretion, it is not error to fail to make such an order. Schiele v. Sager (1977), 174 Mont. 533, 571 P.2d 1142. However, where the respective tales are nearly irreconcilable as here, it is possible that the true facts may not be ascertained by oral testimony alone, and an independent investigation may aid the court immensely. In the future though, District Courts would be well advised to make use of this tool to avoid having to rule simply by choosing between two incredible stories. Approximately five percent of the pertinent facts are agreed on by the parties, the remainder being stubbornly contested by both sides. When the testimony is conflicting and the credibility of the witnesses is the determinative factor, it is the function of the trier of fact to set forth the correct facts. Cameron v. Cameron (1978), 179 Mont. 219, 587 P.2d 939. On appeal this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and if there is substantial evidence to support the lower court's findings they will not be overturned, Cameron, supra. Though t h e evidence c o n f l i c t s w i t h o t h e r e v i d e n c e , it may still be s u b s t a n t i a l . Campeau v. Lewis ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 144 Mont. 543, 398 P.2d 960. I f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t J u d g e i n t h i s c a s e f o u n d F a t h e r ' s w i t n e s s e s more c r e d i b l e , t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t made were c l e a r l y n o t erroneous. S e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d t o Mother's s l o v e n housekeeping h a b i t s and l i f e s t y l e . She a d m i t s s h e h a s h e l d s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t j o b s i n t h e p a s t few y e a r s and was f i r e d from one f o r being h a b i t u a l l y l a t e . There was ample testimony of her abuse of a l c o h o l and d r u g s i n t h e presence of t h e c h i l d r e n s i n c e her move t o Lewistown. Mother admitted having changed r e s i d e n c e s a t l e a s t f i v e times i n t h e two y e a r s b e f o r e t r i a l , and is p r e s e n t l y r e c e i v i n g no s t e a d y income. T h e r e was a l s o p h y s i c a l evidence i n t h e form of photographs i n t r o d u c e d a t t r i a l , showing b r u i s e s on t h e body of R.L.S., along w i t h t e s t i m o n y t h a t one of t h e p e r s o n s w i t h Mother had b e a t t h e c h i l d . Mother p o i n t s o u t s p e c i f i c f a c t s which s h e c l a i m s a r e n o t supported by t h e r e c o r d . W e have examined t h e r e c o r d and f i n d her a s s e r t i o n s i n c o r r e c t . A t b e s t t h e r e is c o n t r a d i c t o r y evidence concerning each claimed e r r o r and a s s t a t e d above w e must d e f e r t o t h e judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t where t h e f i n d i n g s a r e based on c o n f l i c t i n g evidence. The record c o n t a i n s s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s o f f a c t a n d c o n c l u s i o n s of law. Viewing t h e r e c o r d i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y , t h e c o u r t c l e a r l y a c t e d w i t h i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n a s t r i e r of f a c t . The second i s s u e r a i s e d by Mother is whether t h e r e is a s u f f i c i e n t c h a n g e i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o w a r r a n t a m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e c u s t o d y d e c r e e p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 0) 40-4-219(c), MCA, which p r o v i d e s t h a t : h "The c o u r t s h a l l n o t m o d i f y a p r i o r c u s t o d y d e c r e e u n l e s s it f i n d s , upon t h e b a s i s of f a c t s t h a t have a r i s e n s i n c e t h e p r i o r d e c r e e o r t h a t were unknown t o t h e c o u r t a t t h e t i m e of e n t r y o f t h e p r i o r d e c r e e , t h a t a change h a s o c c u r r e d i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e c h i l d o r h i s c u s t o d i a n and t h a t t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n is n e c e s s a r y t o s e r v e t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t o f t h e c h i l d . I n a p p l y i n g t h e s e s t a n d a r d s t h e c o u r t s h a l l r e t a i n t h e c u s t o d i a n appointed p u r s u a n t t o t h e p r i o r d e c r e e u n l e s s : " ( c ) t h e c h i l d ' s p r e s e n t e n v i r o n m e n t endangers s e r i o u s l y h i s p h y s i c a l , m e n t a l , moral, o r emotional h e a l t h and t h e harm l i k e l y t o b e c a u s e d by a c h a n g e o f e n v i r o n m e n t is o u t w e i g h e d b y i t s advantages t o him." The s t a t u t e s e t s o u t a two p a r t test. The f i r s t p a r t of t h e test c o n t a i n s two s u b p a r t s which b e a r a q u a l i f y i n g r e l a t i o n t o each o t h e r . Gilmore v. Gilmore ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 166 Mont. 47, 530 P.2d 480. There must be a change o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s , b u t t h a t change is n o t measured i n a vacuum. The change must be s i g n i f i c a n t enough i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d t h a t t h o s e i n t e r e s t s a r e no l o n g e r s e r v e d by t h e d e c r e e i n f o r c e . The b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f t h e c h i l d i n a m o d i f i c a t i o n proceeding a r e judged by t h e c r i t e r i a of S e c t i o n 40-4-212, MCA. S c h i e l e v . Sager ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 174 Mont. 533, 571 P.2d 1142. The second p a r t of t h e t e s t a l s o i n v o l v e s two s u b p a r t s which bear less of a r e l a t i o n t h a n t h o s e above, b u t a r e i n t e r t w i n e d n o n e t h e l e s s . The primary c u s t o d i a n may n o t be changed u n l e s s t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h e enumerated d a n g e r s e x i s t , and t h e advantages of change outweigh t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e s . A s mentioned above, t h e f a c t s found by t h e t r i a l c o u r t a r e s u p p o r t e d by t h e r e c o r d and a r e thus applied to the test set out in the statute. The District Court did not enumerate the facts which met each part of the test. However, this court will look through the form to the substance of the trial court's findings. In Re the Marriage of A.R.C. v . C.K.C. (Mont. 1983), 661 P.2d 459, 40 St.Rep. 499. The facts, as found by the court, clearly show a change in circumstances of Mother and the children. Mother has removed the children from the Sheridan, Wyoming, area to Lewistown, Montana, several hundred miles from Father. When Mother was granted custody, she held a steady job in Sheridan, but since that time she has bounced from job to job and at the time of trial had no steady means of support. Mother has also developed a habit of changing residences every few months and maintained what could be termed "communal" living arrangements because of the large number of different persons residing with her on both temporary and permanent bases. The children have been left with a variety of young babysitters or with none at all. Mother was incarcerated and fined for conducting herself in a disorderly manner at a Lewistown bar during the time she had custody of the children. There was also evidence that both Mother and members of her household had struck and physically abused the children. This is by no means an exhaustive list of the changed circumstances; suffice it to say that the evidence clearly supports the District Court's conclusions of law numbers 2, 3 and 4. The children's environment with Mother, "endangers seriously their physical, mental, moral and emotional health." "[Tlhe harm likely to be caused to the minor children by a change of environment t o t h a t of t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r is most c e r t a i n l y outweighted by its advantages t o t h e minor c h i l d r e n ; " and " m o d i f i c a t i o n is n e c e s s a r y t o s e r v e t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e minor c h i l d r e n . " Next, Mother c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by l i m i t i n g her v i s i t a t i o n because t h e r e was no f i n d i n g t h a t v i s i t a t i o n would endanger t h e c h i l d r e n , nor would t h e r e c o r d s u p p o r t such a f i n d i n g . The Wyoming c u s t o d y d e c r e e g a v e b o t h p a r t i e s r e a s o n a b l e v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s w h i l e t h e c h i l d r e n were i n t h e c a r e of t h e o t h e r p a r e n t . Thus, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r e s t r i c t i o n of Mother's v i s i t a t i o n is governed by S e c t i o n 40-4-217(3), MCA, which sets o u t t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a n d a r d . A p a r e n t s ' v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s may n o t be r e s t r i c t e d u n l e s s t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e v i s i t a t i o n would, " [ e l n d a n g e r s e r i o u s l y t h e c h i l d ' s p h y s i c a l , m e n t a l , moral o r emotional h e a l t h . " W e n o t e t h a t t h i s is t h e same s t a n d a r d used t o judge t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n of c u s t o d y d e c r e e s i n S e c t i o n 40-4-219, MCA. Applying t h e f a c t s found by t h e t r i a l c o u r t , t h e r e is c l e a r l y no e r r o r h e r e . The f a c t s d i s c u s s e d i n d e c i d i n g t h e p r e v i o u s i s s u e a l l s u p p o r t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o l i m i t Mother's v i s i t a t i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y i n c o n c l u s i o n o f law number 2 , t h e c o u r t found, "That t h e minor c h i l d r e n s ' environment w i t h t h e n a t u r a l mother endangers s e r i o u s l y t h e i r p h y s i c a l , m e n t a l , moral and e m o t i o n a l h e a l t h . " T h i s Court w i l l look through t h e form t o t h e s u b s t a n c e of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g , A.R.C., s u p r a , and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a p p a r e n t l y f e l t t h a t t h i s u n h e a l t h y e n v i r o n m e n t e x i s t e d when t h e c h i l d r e n v i s i t e d Mother a s w e l l a s when s h e had c u s t o d y of them. The v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s were a d j u s t e d a c c o r d i n g l y , and we f i n d no e r r o r i n t h a t r u l i n g . The f o u r t h i s s u e i s r a i s e d by b o t h F a t h e r , who c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by g r a n t i n g Mother a t t o r n e y fees f o r t h e f i r s t t r i a l and a p p e a l , and Mother, who contends t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by n o t g r a n t i n g h e r t h e f u l l amount of a t t o r n e y f e e s r e q u e s t e d f o r t h e second t r i a l . The chronology of e v e n t s must be e l a b o r a t e d h e r e t o p r o v i d e a c o n t e x t f o r d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s i s s u e . The District Court e n t e r e d i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law and o r d e r f o r t h e f i r s t t r i a l on December 1, 1980. Mother had r e q u e s t e d a t t o r n e y f e e s i n h e r answer t o F a t h e r ' s p e t i t i o n f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n , b u t none were g r a n t e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n its December 1, 1980, o r d e r . F a t h e r f i l e d h i s n o t i c e of a p p e a l on December 30, 1980. T h i s Court r e v e r s e d t h e D i s t r i c t Court r u l i n g on August 20, 1981, and remanded f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s . On December 28, 1981, Mother moved t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o g r a n t h e r a t t o r n e y f e e s f o r t h e f i r s t t r i a l and a p p e a l , and f o r f u t u r e c o s t s of t h e second t r i a l . B r i e f s were submitted and arguments made b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , and t h e motion was g r a n t e d on J a n u a r y 28, 1982. F a t h e r was o r d e r e d t o p a y o v e r t o t h e c l e r k o f c o u r t $ 1 , 5 0 0 r e p r e s e n t i n g Mother's a t t o r n e y f e e s f o r t h e f i r s t t r i a l and a p p e a l , and $700 f o r f u t u r e a t t o r n e y f e e s . The money was d e p o s i t e d w i t h t h e clerk of c o u r t and Mother's a t t o r n e y r e c e i v e d t h e e n t i r e amount by August 23, 1982. The second t r i a l concluded on August 30, 1982 and t h i s a p p e a l followed. F a t h e r c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was w i t h o u t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o g r a n t a t t o r n e y f e e s f o r t h e f i r s t t r i a l and a p p e a l , and w e a g r e e . Mother's motion was made p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 40-4-110, MCA, which a l l o w s a t t o r n e y f e e s i n c e r t a i n d o m e s t i c r e l a t i o n s c a s e s . However, s i n c e t h e judgment d i d n o t p r o v i d e f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s , t h e judgment must have been amended b e f o r e e i t h e r p a r t y could be o r d e r e d t o pay t h o s e f e e s . A motion t o amend a judgment must be made w i t h i n t e n d a y s of its e n t r y , Rule 5 9 ( g ) M.R.Civ.P. T h i s r u l e a p p l i e s t o r e q u e s t s f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s , and is n o t o v e r r i d d e n by S e c t i o n 40-4-110, MCA. McDonald v. McDonald ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 3 Mont. 312, 599 P.2d 356. S i n c e Mother's motion was made more t h a n a y e a r a f t e r t h e judgment was e n t e r e d , it w a s u n t i m e l y and t h e District Court was w i t h o u t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o g r a n t a t t o r n e y f e e s f o r t h e f i r s t t r i a l . The D i s t r i c t Court was a l s o w i t h o u t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o g r a n t Mother a t t o r n e y f e e s on a p p e a l when t h e m a t t e r f i r s t appeared b e f o r e t h i s Court. The f i r s t o p i n i o n d i d n o t a d d r e s s t h e r e q u e s t , t h u s it is deemed d e n i e d . T h a t t a c i t d e n i a l is a s e f f e c t i v e as i f s e t o u t e x p l i c i t l y i n t h e o p i n i o n , and it is p a r t of t h e judgment of t h i s C o u r t . Lloyd v. C i t y of G r e a t F a l l s ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 107 Mont. 588, 87 P.2d 187. On remand, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t h a s no power t o modify t h e judgment of t h e Supreme Court. S t a t e Ex R e l . Vaughn v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 4 1 ) , 111 Mont. 552, 111 P.2d 810. S i n c e t h i s C o u r t e s s e n t i a l l y o r d e r e d each p a r t y t o b e a r its own a t t o r n e y f e e s , t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by o r d e r i n g F a t h e r t o pay Mother's a t t o r n e y f e e s . Mother claims t h a t t h e judgment i n t h e second t r i a l should have c o n t a i n e d an award of t h e remaining amount o f h e r a t t o r n e y f e e s i n c u r r e d f o r t h a t t r i a l . Her r e a s o n i n g is t h a t t h e J a n u a r y 28, 1982, o r d e r g r a n t e d h e r f u t u r e a t t o r n e y f e e s , which s h e i n t e r p r e t s t o mean a l l a t t o r n e y f e e s . However, the order granted a specific amount and did not make a blanket award. Section 40-4-110, MCA, gives the District Court discretion in awarding attorney fees, and absent an abuse of discretion its ruling will stand. Harris v . Harris (Mont. 1980), 616 P.2d 1099, 37 St.Rep. 1696. Finally, Mother requests an award of attorney fees incurred for this appeal. The record contains affidavits of both parties with respect to their financial affairs, which disclose that neither party is receiving an inordinate amount of income over their necessary expenses. In light of the foregoing opinion affirming the District Court, it is ordered that both parties bear their own attorney fees. From the record of this case, it is apparent that neither parent has provided an ideal environment for raising the children. Given that the District Court has continued jurisdiction over child custody matters, see Erhardt v. Erhardt (1976), 171 Mont. 49, 554 P.2d 758, the District Court is hereby ordered to direct the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services or other appropriate public body, to conduct periodic investigations and make reports of the living conditions and environment of both parents as it may relate to the welfare of the children. This order is made pursuant to Section 41-3-201, MCA, et seq., and is to remain in effect for one year from the date of its entry by the District Court, unless that court deems an extension necessary. Since the children will spend the majority of their time with their Father and thus may be in Wyoming, the District Court shall empower the Department to obtain whatever cooperation and assistance is necessary from the agencies of that state to carry out the order. Affirmed in part, reversing award of attorney fees. We concur: %Add. * z WQa? Chief Justice Justices Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea, specially concurring: Although I would affirm the result, I emphasize again that the process of adopting verbatim the proposed findings and conclusions of the prevailing party is demeaning to the judicial process.