Case Title: STATE v FEELEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13199 I N T H E S U P R E M E COURT OF THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1976 THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - ROBERT DAVID FEELEY, Defendant and Appellant, Appeal from: District Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. P Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Keefer and Roybal, B i l l i n g s , Montana J. Dwaine Roybal argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Charles Erdmann argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser,argued, County Attorney B i l l i n g s , Montana For Amicus Curiae: Charles M, Brown appeared, Helena, Montana Submitted: A p r i l 22, 1976 Decided : m[ S : g a ?-I fyT.7 Filed : ;:li 3 '3.c M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal by defendant Robert David Feeley from a judgment entered i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Yellowstone County, Hon. Charles Luedke presiding, following a jury v e r d i c t finding Feeley g u i l t y of t h e f t . Feeley was charged with t h r e e counts of horse t h e f t pursuant t o s e c t i o n 94-6-302(1), R.C.M. 1947. H e was found g u i l t y of one count, t h e f t of a horse owned by Glen Larsen, and sentenced t o t e n years i n t h e Montana S t a t e Prison. The jury heard t h i s testimony concerning t h e t h e f t : Glen Larsen t e s t i f i e d he owned a black mare with t h e letters "CLR" tatooed i n s i d e its lower l i p , a t a t o o which he s a i d would not be noticed i n a casual inspection, and t h e horse w a s pastured a t t h e Rob Stephens ranch on Blue Creek. A neighbor of Stephens, Goldie Patterson, t e s t i f i e d t h i s same horse wandered onto her p a s t u r e and i n an attempt t o i d e n t i f y t h e owner, she asked defend- a n t Feeley t o examine t h e horse. Defendant t o l d her he had not seen t h e horse before. O n January 8 o r 9, 1975, s h o r t l y a f t e r defendant's v i s i t t o Goldie P a t t e r s o n ' s ranch, t h e horse disappeared. O n February 3, 1975, Maxine Gibson, a p a r t t i m e inspector f o r t h e s t a t e of Montana, t e s t i f i e d she inspected a mare s i m i l a r i n c o l o r t o t h e horse i n question f o r defendant a t Rockvale, Montana. Not finding a brand, she assumed t h e horse belonged t o defendant and d i d not r e q u i r e a b i l l of s a l e b u t merely issued an annual permit l i s t i n g defendant as owner of t h e horse. On February 5, 1 9 7 5 , defendant brought t h e horse i n question t o t h e Lewistown Public Auction where J i m Arthur, a brand i n s p e c t o r f o r t h e s t a t e of Montana, inspected t h e horse but found no brand. A t t h i s time, Arthur t e s t i f i e d defendant t o l d him he had owned t h e horse f o r some t i m e . Defendant then sold t h e horse i n Lewistown using t h e l o c a l inspection permit obtained i n Rockvale a s evidence of t i t l e . Subsequent i n v e s t i g a t i o n by t h e Department - 2 - of Livestock disclosed t h e horse inspected a t Rockvale and sold a t Lewistown was i n f a c t , Glen Larsen's horse. Defendant's version regarding t h e manner he obtained t h e Larsen horse was: That while a t t h e Standard Bar i n B i l l i n g s , an u n i d e n t i f i e d person o f f e r e d t o s e l l him a horse, They t r a v e l e d t h a t n i g h t t o Pryor, Montana, where defendant bought t h e horse i n question. H e t e s t i f i e d he received a b i l l of s a l e a t t h a t t i m e , but it w a s subsequently destroyed by f i r e on March 2 , 1975. Defendant p r e s e n t s two i s s u e s t o t h i s Court f o r review: (1) W a s t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o s u s t a i n a conviction? (2) Does s e c t i o n 94-6-302 ( 4 ) , R.C.M. 1947, which makes t h e f t of a "commonly domesticated hoofed animal" a felony, deny defendant equal p r o t e c t i o n of law? Defendant contends t h e evidence was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o sus- t a i n a conviction f o r horse t h e f t i n Yellowstone County on two grounds : F i r s t , i n general t e r m s , t h e evidence a t b e s t gave mere grounds f o r suspicion and a s such was not s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y conviction of a crime. Second, and more s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e s t a t e f a i l e d t o prove a s an element of t h e crime, t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e a l l e g e d a c t i n t h a t no evidence was ever o f f e r e d t o prove defendant s t o l e a horse i n Yellowstone County. W e cannot agree with defendant's general contention of t h e l a c k of s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o convict. Defendant was charged and convicted of t h e offense of t h e f t a s defined i n s e c t i o n 94-6-302(1), R.C.M. 1947: " ( 1 ) A person commits t h e offense of t h e f t when he purposely o r knowingly o b t a i n s o r e x e r t s un- authorized c o n t r o l over property of t h e owner, and : " ( a ) has t h e purpose of depriving t h e owner of t h e property; o r " ( b ) purposely o r knowingly uses, conceals, o r abandons t h e property i n such manner a s t o deprive t h e owner of t h e property; o r " ( c ) uses, conceals, o r abandons t h e property knowing such use, concealment o r abandonment probably w i l l deprive t h e owner! of t h e property." The testimony a t t r i a l clearly. demonstrated defendant was i n possession of a black mare and had, i n f a c t , sold t h a t horse. Glen Larsen t e s t i f i e d t h e horse i n question c a r r i e d h i s L * t a t o o and was owned by him. Nowhere i n t h e t r a n s c r i p t i s t h e r e any i n d i c a t i o n defendant was a c t i n g f o r - t h e b e n e f i t of Larsen during t h e t i m e when he possessed and subsequently s o l d t h e horse. Therefore, s u b s t a n t i a l d i r e c t evidence e x i s t s t o i n d i c a t e defend- a n t exerted unauthorized c o n t r o l over of t h e owner s o deprive a s to/the owner, t h e criminal act contemplated i n s e c t i o n 94-6-302(1). A s t o evidence of criminal i n t e n t , " * * * knowingly * * * * . purposely * * *" , as contemplated by skction 94-6-302 (1) , an examination of t h e testimony l e a d s t o - t h e s e conclusions: Defend- a n t i n a l l h i s t r a n s a c t i o n s with o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s concerning t h i s horse, represented himself t o be t h e owner. He t e s t i f i e d he had t h e b i l l of s a l e f o r t h e horse in. question u n t i l March 2, 1975, y e t he d i d n o t produce t h a t bil'l.of s a l e a t t h e Rockvale inspection of February 3, 1975, o r t h e Lewistown s a l e of February 5, 1975. Defendant t o l d brand inspector J i m Arthur he had owned t h e horse f o r some time, while a month e a r l i e r he t o l d Goldie Patterson he had never seen t h e horse before. To be s u r e such evidence of i n t e n t is, by nature, c i r c u m s t a n t i a l , b u t t h i s Court has repeatedly held t h e element of criminal i n t e n t may be proven by c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence. S t a t e v. Cooper, 158 Mont. 102, 489 P.2d 99; S t a t e v. Gallagher, 151 Mont. 501, 445 P.2d 45; S t a t e b v. Madden, 128 Mont. 408, 276 P.2d 974. The r e a l question here is whether s u b s t a n t i a l c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence e x i s t e d t o prove i n t e n t . I n S t a t e v. F i t z p a t r i c k , 163 Mont. 220, 226, 516 P.2d 605, t h e Court said: "To f i n d a person g u i l t y beyond a reasonable doubt, each f a c t i n a chain of circumstances t h a t w i l l establish guilt need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. What must be ~ r o v e k i s that- . - - A . - - - - - - - - - - - - - there is not a reasonable doubt arising from consideration of all the evidence in the case." (Emphasis supplied. ) Here, examination of the circumstantial evidence in its totality clearly demonstrates defendant knew he possessed a horse belong- ing to someone else and did so with criminal intent to deprive the owner of the horse. There was sufficient substantial evi- dence to support the jury's verdict of guilty. Where substan- tial evidence exists to support the jury's verdict, it must stand. State v. Miner, Mont. , 546 P.2d 252, 33 St.Rep. 201; State v. Stoddard, 147 Mont. 402, 412 P.2d 827; State v. White, 146 Mont. 226, 405 P.2d 761. Defendant contends no evidence was offered to prove Yellowstone County was the location of the crime as charged in Count I of the Information; thus a necessary element of the crime of theft remained unproved. First,we note that location is not an element of the crime of theft as defined in section 94-6-302, R.C.M. 1947. Defendant apparently has confused elements of a crime with the doctrine of venue. Second, examination of the record reveals defendant failed to make any objection as to venue prior to trial. By neglecting to do so, defendant waived any objection he might have had as to the place of trial. Section 95-401, R.C.M. 1947. Defendant next contends section 94-6-302(4), R.C.M. 1947, is unconstitutional as being a denial of equal protection of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, United States Consti- tution and Article 11, Section 4, 1972 Montana Constitution. We find no merit in this contention. For purposes of discussion, we set forth section 94-6-302(4): "(4) A person convicted of the offense of theft of property not exceeding one hundred fifty dollars ($150) in value shall be fined not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500) or be imprisoned in the county jail for any term not to exceed six (6) mopths, or both. A person convicted of the offense of theft of property exceeding one hundred fifty dollars ($150) in value or theft of any commonly domesticated hoofed animal shall be imprisoned in the state prison for any term not to exceed ten (10) years." (Emphasis added.) Defendant bases his contention on the fact section 94-6-302(4) contains two classifications of felony theft. One pertains to "commonly domesticated hoofed animals" for which no minimum monetary value is required for felony conviction. The second pertains to other animals and inanimate objects for which a minimum monetary value in excess of $150 is required for felony conviction. With regard to legislative classifications such as this, this Court recently said in State v. Jack, Mont . , 539 P.2d 726, 729, 32 St.Rep. 858. " * * * Where the challenge extends only to the more general legislative classifications, the judicial inquiry must be limited to determining whether the distinction is justified by a rational basis. Stated another way, we can determine only whether the law has a sufficiently reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose so as not to be deemed arbitrary. * * * In connection with this standard, a classification having some reasonable basis does not deny equal protection merely because it is not made with precise math- ematical nicety or results in some inequality. One who attacks the legislation has the burden of proving the classification to be arbitrary." See also: Montana Land Title Ass'n v. First American Title, Mont . , 539 P.2d 711, 32 St.Rep. 874. Defendant failed to meet his burden of proving unreasonable and arbitrary the felony classification for theft of a "commonly domesticated hoofed animal". As the Amicus Curiae brief of the Department of Live- stock points out, this classification is both reasonable and necessary. Raising livestock is an important industry in Montana. Theft of livestock is a problem of some magnitude because of the state's large geographical area and small population. In recog- nition of these facts the legislature, as a deterrent, enacted severe penalties for such theft. That the legislature felt such classification was still necessary is evidenced by the fact it was carried over to the Montana Criminal Code of 1973, with only minor changes. In addition, we note other western states recently presented with this very issue have ruled such a felony classification for theft of livestock not to be a denial of equal protection. The rationale for so holding was substantially the same as that advanced here. See: State v. Pacheco, 81 N.M. 97, 463 P.2d 521; State v. Webb, 96 Ida. 325, 528 P.2d 669; People v. Thomas, 43 Cal.App.3d 862, 118 Cal.Rptr. 226. The judgment of the district c o y t is affirmed. , . ---- Ad% ----- -------------- --- Justice We concur: u n . R. D. McPhillips, district judge, sitting in place of Mr. Chief Justice James T. Harrison.