Case Title: Wayt v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95-38

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wayt v. State1996 WY 29912 P.2d 1106Case Number: 95-38Decided: 03/11/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

Mark Edward WAYT, 

Appellant (Defendant), 

 

v. 

 

The STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County; 

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge.

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Sylvia L. Hackl, State 
Public Defender; and Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and Lou Piccioni, Assistant Attorney 
General.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

TAYLOR, Justice. 

[¶1]      Sentenced to not 
less than three years nor more than five years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary 
for the crime of burglary, appellant complains he was the victim of an illegal 
sentencing procedure and wants credit for time served on unrelated offenses. 
Finding any defect to be harmless, we affirm.

 

I. 
ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant states 
his issues as follows:

I.          
Whether the presentence investigation report and sentencing proceeding 
violated appellant's right to due process and Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 
32.

 

II.          
Whether the trial court failed to award the appellant credit for 
presentence incarceration.

 

[¶3]      Appellee refines 
the issues with the following questions:

 

I.          
Did the trial court violate appellant's right to due process by relying 
on false or improper premises prior to imposing sentence?

 

II.          
Were the requirements of Rule 32(A)(3)(C) [sic] of the Wyoming Rules of 
Criminal Procedure applicable in this case?

 

III.         Was 
the appellant entitled to receive more than nineteen (19) days presentence 
confinement credit for the burglary conviction?

 

II. 
FACTS

 

[¶4]      At 4:20 a.m. on 
April 20, 1994, Mark Wayt (Wayt) was caught with a wheelbarrow full of supplies 
he was preparing to liberate from Kilwein Drilling. Charged that same day with 
burglary, Wayt was held in the Natrona County, Wyoming jail from April 20, 1994 
until May 5, 1994 (fifteen days). On May 5, 1994, Wayt waived his preliminary 
hearing and was admitted to bail.

 

[¶5]      On June 16, 1994, 
Wayt was arrested in Platte County, Wyoming for driving while under the 
influence (DUI), driving while under suspension, and possession of a controlled 
substance. As a direct consequence of that arrest, Wayt spent the next 
fifty-four days in the Platte County jail. On August 9, 1994, Wayt was sentenced 
in Platte County to six months confinement for each of his three Platte County 
offenses, with all but fifty-four days of that sentence suspended and credit for 
time served.

 

[¶6]      A nervous Natrona 
County bondsman revoked Wayt's bond on the burglary charge with news of his 
Platte County arrest, so his release from the Platte County jail was into the 
waiting arms of Natrona County authorities. In that moment of relative sobriety, 
Wayt pled guilty to the Natrona County burglary charge on August 9, 1994, and 
was, once again, admitted to bail three days later on August 12, 1994, pending a 
sentencing hearing set for November 29, 1994.

 

[¶7]      Returning to 
Wheatland, Wyoming, Wayt was again arrested in Platte County for DUI, driving 
while license suspended, and improper display of registration. Wayt pled guilty 
to the three charges and was sentenced on August 18, 1994 to three consecutive 
six month terms with credit for time served. Needless to say, the burglary bond 
was again revoked, but Wayt remained in the Platte County jail serving the 
justice court sentences until his November 29, 1994 sentencing for burglary in 
Natrona County.

 

[¶8]      On November 29, 
1994, fresh from the Platte County jail, Wayt was sentenced for the Natrona 
County burglary to a term of not less than three years nor more than five years 
in the state penitentiary. He was granted credit "for nineteen (19) days 
previously served in the Natrona County Detention Center."

 

[¶9]      Asserting 
entitlement to credit for time served in Platte County, Wayt also scores the 
sentencing court's failure to make a record concerning inaccuracies in his 
presentence investigation report (PSI). Specifically, Wayt complains that his 
PSI listed a conviction for wrongful disposition of property, despite reversal 
of that conviction in Wayt v. State, 
809 P.2d 802 (Wyo. 1991). Despite a motion for correction and colloquy at 
sentencing, the district court made no record of that 
correction.

 

[¶10]   Two aspects of the 1991 case 
instruct our deliberations in this matter: (1) the same district judge presided 
over both cases; and (2) Wayt's sentence in the first case was three to five 
years in the state penitentiary. Id. 
at 803.

 

III. 
DISCUSSION

 

A. FAILURE 
TO CORRECT PSI

 

[¶11]   W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C) reads as 
follows:

 

If the comments of the defendant and the defendant's 
counsel or testimony or other information introduced by them allege any factual 
inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report or the summary of the report 
or part thereof, the court shall, as to each matter controverted, 
make:

 

(i) A finding as to the allegation; 
or

 

(ii) A determination that no such finding is 
necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in 
sentencing. A written record of such findings and determinations shall be 
appended to and accompany any copy of the presentence investigation report 
thereafter made available to penal institutions.

 

[¶12]   The PSI shows Wayt's familiarity 
with juvenile courts, including at least two delinquency adjudications and a 
Boys' School placement for auto theft. The PSI also lists more than eleven adult 
offenses, including seven DUI convictions and thirty days of jail in Nebraska 
for "Fraud/Swindle, Property Damage." The wrongful disposition of property 
conviction was also listed, with no mention of subsequent appellate 
reversal.

 

[¶13]   Prior to sentencing, Wayt filed and 
served his objections to the PSI asserting, inter alia: (1) the Nebraska conviction 
was for property damage only; (2) his earlier wrongful disposition of property 
conviction had been overturned on appeal; and (3) he had pled guilty to an 
eighth DUI charge.

 

[¶14]   Wayt's counsel noted at sentencing 
that Wayt understood the district court to be "well aware" that the wrongful 
disposition of property conviction had been overturned. The district court made 
no mention of corrections prior to sentencing, stating only: "Mr. Wayt, the big 
problem I have with your case is that you have been in trouble with the law for 
nearly 25 years now."

 

[¶15]   Clearly, the PSI erred in failing 
to note that Wayt's wrongful disposition of property conviction had been 
overturned. Just as clearly, the district court erred in failing to make 
findings as to Wayt's proposed PSI corrections, as required by W.R.Cr.P. 
32(a)(3)(C).

 

[¶16]   Having demonstrated procedural 
error, however, Wayt remains obliged to show prejudice under "circumstances 
which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the 
public sense of fair play." Johnson v. 
State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo. 1990) (quoted with approval in Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1115 
(Wyo. 1993)). Further, it is his burden to "establish that the sentencing judge 
in fact rested the sentence on false or improper premises." Smallwood v. State, 771 P.2d 798, 802 
(Wyo. 1989). Johnson and Smallwood, although decided prior to 
adoption of the current Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, apply to review of 
due process challenges brought under the current W.R.Cr.P. 32. Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 
1115.

 

[¶17]   We do not approve of the district 
court's failure to comply with W.R.Cr.P. 32, but the sentence is well within the 
ten year maximum punishment for burglary and may not be set aside absent a clear 
abuse of discretion. Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-301(b) (1988); Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1024 
(Wyo. 1993). Wayt has neither established abuse of discretion nor demonstrated 
prejudicial harm.

 

[¶18]   It is a matter of record that the 
sentencing judge in this case presided at the earlier conviction of Wayt which 
was subsequently set aside by this court. Wayt acknowledged the district court's 
awareness that the earlier conviction had been overturned. Wayt is chargeable 
with the knowledge that a court may take judicial notice of its own records in 
cases closely related to the one before it. State in Interest of C, 638 P.2d 165, 
172 n. 10 (Wyo. 1981). However, Wayt mounted no effort to disqualify the 
district judge, either peremptorily or for cause pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
21.1.

 

[¶19]   More to the point than identity of 
courts is the identity of sentences imposed for the overturned conviction and 
the present offense. Like the 1994 burglary, wrongful disposition of property 
was, in 1989, a felony punishable, inter 
alia, by a maximum of ten years imprisonment. Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-403(a)(i) 
(1988). It is fair to infer that, were the district court considering Wayt's 
earlier overturned conviction as an aggravating factor in the burglary sentence, 
the burglary sentence would have been noticeably more severe than the earlier 
sentence.

 

[¶20]   Not having attacked the overturned 
sentence, Wayt is ill-situated, six years and three DUI's later, to complain 
that the district court was unduly harsh in its later identical sentencing decision. Wayt, 809 P.2d  at 803. This speaks not 
so much to waiver of the right to complain as it does to the inherent fairness 
of the later sentence.

 

[¶21]   Furthermore, it is abundantly clear 
that Wayt has, as the district court 
observed, been in trouble for twenty-five years, dating back to a 1970 
delinquence adjudication. A defendant's juvenile record and his adult record, including dismissed charges, are 
important clues to his character and are worthy of consideration for sentencing 
purposes. Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1117 
(quoting United States v. Madison, 
689 F.2d 1300, 1314-15 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117, 103 S. Ct. 754, 74 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1983)).

 

[¶22]   Under the circumstances, Wayt's 
three to five year sentence in this matter represents a model of judicial 
restraint.

 

B. CREDIT 
FOR TIME SERVED

 

[¶23]   Wayt wants credit against his 
burglary sentence for the 169 days of incarceration in the Platte County jail. 
Indeed, presentence confinement predicated upon inability to post bond should be 
credited against the sentence imposed by the confining court. Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491, 498 (Wyo. 
1990). Denial of credit for presentence confinement may constitute an illegal 
sentence. Eustice v. State, 871 P.2d 682, 684 (Wyo. 1994). However, presentence confinement credit does not include 
credit for confinement that would persist without regard to the defendant's 
bonding capacity in the court where he awaits sentencing. Wilson v. State, 896 P.2d 1327, 1328 
(Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶24]   One hundred and fifty-three days in 
the Platte County jail occurred in 
spite of Wayt's capacity to post 
bond in Natrona County rather than as a result of any incapacity. Wayt's 
bondsman did step in after each of his arrests in Platte County to revoke bond, 
but Wayt's misadventures in Platte County were the reason for his jail time 
there. His Platte County time was independent of the burglary charge we consider 
here.

 

[¶25]   In fact, it appears that Wayt's 
sentencing in the district court manifestly benefitted him by foreshortening the 
time he would otherwise have had to spend in the Platte County 
jail.

 

IV. 
CONCLUSION

 

[¶26]   Wayt's sentence is well 
circumscribed by the limits imposed by statute and he has received appropriate, 
if not somewhat excessive, credit for time served against that sentence. The 
amended judgment and sentence of the district court is hereby affirmed in all 
respects.