Case Title: The People v. James J. Carncross

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2010-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 38  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
James J. Carncross,
            Appellant.
Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., for appellant.
James P. Maxwell, for respondent.
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge:
In protecting a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, a
trial court may on occasion properly disqualify the attorney of a
defendant's choosing due to that attorney's conflicts, actual or
potential, even in the face of defendant's waiver of such
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conflicts.  This is such a case.  
In the late afternoon on April 23, 2006, defendant
drove away from his home in Onondaga County on his motorcycle. 
On felony probation at the time, defendant could not own or
operate a motor vehicle since he did not have his probation
officer's permission to do so, and he was not licensed to drive a
motorcycle in New York State.  As defendant traveled west on
Route 173 toward Jamesville, New York State Trooper Craig
Todeschini observed defendant speeding and began to pursue him. 
Defendant admitted that when he turned left on to Route 91, he
saw the trooper's vehicle behind him with its emergency lights
on, but, rather than pulling over to the side of the road, "took
off" in an attempt to "not get[] caught by the trooper." 
Various witnesses observed the motorcycle, followed by
the trooper's vehicle, traveling at a high rate of speed,
estimated between 90 and 120 miles per hour, and weaving in and
out of traffic along the two-lane country roads.  As Trooper
Todeschini entered the Hamlet of Pompey, still in pursuit of
defendant, he was unable to negotiate a turn in the road, lost
control of his vehicle, and collided head-on into a tree,
resulting in his immediate death.  Three days after the accident,
defendant voluntarily appeared at the New York State police
barracks for an interview and, after consulting with his
attorney, gave an inculpatory statement.   
Defendant was indicted on one count each of reckless
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driving, aggravated manslaughter in the second degree, and
aggravated criminally negligent homicide.  A jury acquitted him
of the aggravated manslaughter count, but convicted him on the
reckless driving and aggravated criminally negligent homicide
counts.  Defendant was sentenced as a predicate felon to seven
years in prison with five years' post release supervision.  The
Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction.  A Judge
of this Court granted defendant's application for leave to appeal
from that order.  We now affirm. 
I.
Defendant first argues that the evidence was legally
insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated criminally
negligent homicide.  In particular, defendant claims that there
was insufficient evidence to establish that he acted with the
requisite mens rea.  This claim, however, is unpreserved.  After
the People rested, and again at the close of all the proof,
defendant moved to dismiss the aggravated criminally negligent
homicide count, arguing only that the evidence was insufficient
to prove a "causal connection" between the defendant's conduct
and the trooper's death.  The court denied both motions.  At no
point did defendant argue, as he does now, that the evidence
failed to establish he acted with the requisite mens rea.  As we
have previously explained, "where a motion to dismiss for
insufficient evidence [is] made, the preservation requirement
compels that the argument be 'specifically directed' at the
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alleged error " (People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995], quoting
People v Cona, 49 NY2d 26, 33, n 2 [1979]).  Given defendant's
failure to argue with particularity that the evidence was legally
insufficient to prove that he acted with the requisite mens rea,
we are foreclosed from reviewing that claim here.  
Defendant also argues that the evidence is legally
insufficient to establish a causal connection between his conduct
and the death of the trooper.  Although plainly preserved, this
argument is without merit.
In People v DaCosta, we explained the law regarding
causation in this context:
“To be held criminally responsible for a
homicide, a defendant's conduct must actually
contribute to the victim's death by setting
in motion the events that result in the
killing.  Liability will attach even if the
defendant's conduct is not the sole cause of
death if the actions were a sufficiently
direct cause of the ensuing death.  More than
an obscure or merely probable connection
between the conduct and result is required.
Rather, an act qualifies as a sufficiently
direct cause when the ultimate harm should
have been reasonably foreseen”  
(6 NY3d 181, 184 [2006] [internal quotation marks, brackets and
citations omitted]).  In that case, we held that the evidence was
legally sufficient with respect to causation where a police
officer, while chasing the fleeing defendant across a busy
expressway, was struck and killed by a vehicle.  Similarly, in
People v Matos (83 NY2d 509 [1994]), evidence of causation was
legally sufficient where a police officer fell down an air shaft
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to his death in the course of pursuing the fleeing defendant up a
ladder and across a roof.  These cases establish that where a
defendant’s flight naturally induces a police officer to engage
in pursuit, and the officer is killed in the course of that
pursuit, the causation element of the crime will be satisfied.  
Defendant argues that the trooper was negligent by
excessively speeding and losing control of his vehicle and
violated state police pursuit policy and Vehicle and Traffic Law
§ 1104, and that these acts were an intervening and unforeseeable
causative circumstances.  However, it is plain that had defendant
not fled, the trooper would not have engaged in the high-speed
chase that resulted in his death.  Additionally, contrary to
defendant's contention, there is no requirement that a
defendant’s vehicle actually make contact with the trooper’s
vehicle in order for the causation element to be satisfied. 
Rather, the essential inquiry is whether defendant's conduct was
a sufficiently direct cause of the trooper's death, a question we
answer in the affirmative.  There can be no doubt that
defendant's conduct set in motion the events that led to the
trooper's death, and it was reasonably foreseeable that a fatal
accident would occur as a result of defendant leading the trooper
on a high-speed pursuit.  Accordingly, the evidence was legally
sufficient to establish a causal connection between defendant's
conduct and the trooper's death.   
II.  
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Defendant next argues that County Court erred in
granting the People's motion to disqualify his counsel.  When the
case was presented to the grand jury, the prosecutor called
defendant's father and girlfriend.  One of defendant's retained
attorneys, Mary Gasparini, represented these witnesses and
appeared with them in the grand jury room while they gave their
testimony.  Defendant's father testified that, on the evening of
the accident, defendant returned home after riding his motorcycle
and told his father not to let him ride his motorcycle until he
was properly licensed because he was nearly pulled over by the
police.  Defendant also told his father that he had seen flashing
lights, yet kept driving.  Defendant's girlfriend testified that
he called her shortly after the accident and said he was the
motorcyclist the police were looking for and that he thought he
was going to jail because the trooper had died.  The next day, he
called her and told her not to say anything about what he had
told her the night before. 
 
After the case had been presented to the grand jury,
and four months before trial, the People moved to disqualify
Gasparini and her partner, James Meggesto, on the ground that a
potential conflict of interest existed based on Gasparini's
representation at the grand jury of defendant's father and
girlfriend who would be prosecution witnesses at trial. 
Defendant argued that if there was any conflict at all, it was
only potential, and the issue could not be determined until after
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the testimony of the witnesses.  Further, the defense argued that
any potential conflict was waivable by defendant.  Indeed, in
open court, defendant indicated he was willing to waive any
conflict.  
At a subsequent court appearance, the court appointed
an independent attorney to advise the defendant with respect to
the conflict of interest and its implications.  After a
discussion with defendant, the independent counsel informed the
court that defendant understood the conflict and was willing to
waive it, after which defendant waived the conflict on the
record.  Nevertheless, the court granted the People's motion,
concluding that defense counsel "must be disqualified in order to
protect the defendant's rights to effective assistance of trial
counsel and a fair trial free of any conflict of interest."  
Although both defendant's father and girlfriend were
mentioned at jury selection as potential witnesses, in the end
neither actually testified.  On appeal, the Appellate Division
concluded that County Court did not abuse its discretion in
granting the People's motion to disqualify defense counsel.  We
agree.
When examining a defense counsel's possible conflict of
interest, a court must balance the defendant's constitutional
right to the effective assistance of counsel against the
defendant's right to be defended by counsel of his own choosing
(see People v Gomberg, 38 NY2d 307, 312 [1975]).  "A lawyer
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simultaneously representing two clients whose interests actually
conflict cannot give either client undivided loyalty" (People v
Ortiz, 76 NY2d 652, 656 [1990]), and, in such a case, the
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel may be
"substantially impaired" (Gomberg, 38 NY2d at 312).  Where there
is a question as to a possible conflict, although the court
"should not arbitrarily interfere with the attorney-client
relationship," the court "has a duty to protect the right of an
accused to effective assistance of counsel" (id. at 313).  Thus,
when the court is informed of a potential conflict, it must
“ascertain, on the record, whether each defendant has an
awareness of the potential risks in that course and has knowingly
chosen it” (id. at 313-314). 
In Gomberg, we explained that it is often difficult to
assess these conflicts prospectively, before the court is fully
aware of the “the evidence to be adduced, the strategies to be
followed and all defenses that may be plausibly asserted” (id. at
314).  Thus, a defendant's willingness to waive the conflict at
an early stage does not end the inquiry.  As the Supreme Court
has explained, even though there is a "presumption in favor of
[the defendant's] counsel of choice," that right is not absolute
and the court may decline to honor the defendant’s waiver of a
conflict: 
"[u]nfortunately for all concerned, a [lower]
court must pass on the issue whether or not
to allow a waiver of a conflict of interest
by a criminal defendant not with the wisdom
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of hindsight after the trial has taken place,
but in the murkier pretrial context when
relationships between parties are seen
through a glass, darkly.  The likelihood and
dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest
are notoriously hard to predict . . . For
these reasons we think the district court
must be allowed substantial latitude in
refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not
only in those rare cases where an actual
conflict may be demonstrated before trial,
but in the more common cases where a
potential for conflict exists which may or
may not burgeon into an actual conflict as
the trial progresses"
(Wheat v US, 486 US 153, 164, 162-163, [1988]).
Here, the trial court had the independent obligation to
ensure that defendant's right to effective representation was not
impaired.  Although defendant's father and girlfriend never
testified at trial, at the point in the proceedings when the
disqualification motion was made, the parties were operating
under the assumption that these witnesses might well be called. 
Specifically, the defense had indicated that it was possible they
would proceed with the theory that defendant was not the person
who had been driving the motorcycle.  The trial court reasonably
concluded that, if the defense chose this strategy at trial, it
was highly likely that the prosecution would call defendant's
father and girlfriend, who both possessed damaging evidence
indicating that defendant had, indeed, been driving the
motorcycle.  Further, the court properly found that, if these
witnesses were called, defense counsel would have been required
to cross-examine them.  An "attorney's decision whether and how
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best to impeach the credibility of a witness to whom he ...
owe[s] a duty of loyalty necessarily place[s] the attorney in a
very awkward position, where prejudice to defendant need not be
precisely delineated but must be presumed" (People v McDonald, 68
NY2d 1, 11 [1986] [internal quotation marks, citation and
brackets omitted]).  Moreover, had counsel not been disqualified
under these circumstances, counsel's ability to objectively
assess the best strategy for defendant to pursue may have been
impaired.  Defense counsel, obligated to maintain the confidences
of the father and the girlfriend, might choose the strategy least
likely to cause the prosecution to call them as witnesses,
thereby avoiding the need to cross-examine them.  It would be
difficult to repose confidence in counsel's single-minded
protection of defendant's interests in these circumstances.
Our dissenting colleagues embrace a seemingly
unworkable test in characterizing the conflict here as "more
theoretical than real" and "not serious, given the common
interest shared by defendant, his girlfriend and his father"
(dissenting op at 1).  Defendant's father and girlfriend may well
have shared with defendant the desire to see him exonerated and
avoid having the prosecutor call them to testify; indeed, that
may be why they retained the same lawyers in the first instance. 
Their identity of interest with defendant would dissolve,
however, upon either being called as a witness for the
prosecution or, as noted, could have dissolved even earlier if
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defense counsel opted for a strategy tailored to avoid having to
cross-examine them (see People v Wandell, 75 NY2d 951 [1990]
[excoriating defense counsel and the prosecutor for failing to
advise the trial court of defense counsel's representation of a
prosecution witness in a separate civil action]; see e.g. People
v Stewart, 126 AD2d 943 [4th Dept 1987] [concluding that a
conflict was presented by counsel's representation of both a
father and a son, and ordering a new trial on ineffective
assistance of counsel grounds where, as here, the son made
incriminating statements to his father who then provided
information against his son to authorities]).  More
fundamentally, the trial court was tasked with considering this
potential conflict without the benefit of hindsight, and the
approach taken by the dissent would too narrowly limit the
"substantial latitude" (Wheat, 486 US at 163) we all agree the
trial court possessed in exercising its discretion under these
circumstances.  
A review of the record here reveals that the court
carefully balanced defendant's right to counsel of his own
choosing against his right to effective assistance of counsel. 
The court was quite properly reluctant to disqualify counsel, but
acted well within the bounds of its discretion in concluding that
allowing counsel to continue would "severely undermine
[defendant's] ability to present a cogent defense."  Further,
there is no indication that the prosecution's disqualification
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request was manufactured in order to gain a tactical advantage
(see Wheat, 486 US at 163).  We also note that, contrary to
defendant's argument, the court was under no obligation to wait
until trial to see if defendant's father and girlfriend would
testify.  If the court were required to delay resolution of the
motion, and these witnesses were called to testify - which was a
possibility even when the trial began - a mistrial would likely
have been necessary at that late juncture.  
Indeed, the circumstances of this case highlight that
trial courts faced with a defendant willing to waive a conflict
are often placed in the very difficult position of having their
decision challenged regardless of the outcome.  As the Supreme
Court in Wheat explained, if the court honors the waiver, the
defendant can later claim he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel (see id. at 161).  On the other hand, if the trial
court refuses to honor the waiver, a defendant may well raise a
challenge like the one presented here (see id.).  Of course, the
rights that must be balanced - the right to counsel of a criminal
defendant's choosing and the right to effective assistance of
counsel free of conflicts - both inure to a defendant's benefit. 
At times, however, as here, circumstances are such that the
attorney a defendant chooses is also conflicted, in which case
these rights may not be enforced in perfect harmony.  Thus, as we
have observed, a trial court's 
"discretion is especially broad when the
defendant's actions with respect to counsel
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place the court in the dilemma of having to
choose between undesirable alternatives,
either one of which would theoretically
provide the defendant with a basis for
appellate review" 
(People v Tineo, 64 NY2d 531, 536 [1985]; see generally People v
Konstantinides, 2009 Slip Op 09311 [Dec. 17, 2009]).  We trust
that the trial courts, relying on their experience and sound
judgment, will carefully evaluate the circumstances presented in
such cases and strike an appropriate balance of the relevant
interests.  Under the circumstances presented here, the court did
not abuse its broad discretion in granting the motion to
disqualify defendant's counsel.
III.
Defendant further argues that his statement to the
police should be suppressed because his counsel was ineffective
in advising him to give the statement.  The record reveals that,
when defendant voluntarily arrived at the trooper barracks three
days after the accident, he was given Miranda warnings. 
Defendant spoke with troopers for a period of time, but then
invoked his right to counsel, at which point the questioning
immediately ceased.  Defendant's then attorney, David Savlov,
faxed a letter to the barracks indicating he represented
defendant, and appeared at the barracks shortly thereafter. 
After speaking with defendant, Savlov informed the troopers that
defendant was willing to speak with them.  The troopers again
administered Miranda warnings to defendant, who subsequently gave
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a statement implicating himself in the motorcycle chase. 
County Court denied defendant's motion to suppress the
statement, and the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that
"suppression was not required inasmuch as defendant received
meaningful representation" (59 AD3d 1114 [citation omitted]).   
Even assuming, without deciding, the right to effective
assistance of counsel attached prior to defendant's inculpatory
statement and that suppression is the appropriate remedy where a
statement is given as the result of ineffective assistance of
counsel (see People v Claudio, 83 NY2d 76 [1993]), defendant here
has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance. 
In determining whether a defendant has been deprived of effective
assistance of counsel, we must examine whether "the evidence, the
law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in
totality and as of the time of representation, reveal that the
attorney provided meaningful representation" (People v Baldi, 54
NY2d 137, 147 [1981]).  "[A]ll of the evidence must be weighed in
context and as of the time of representation to assess the
alleged deficient representation" (People v Hobot, 84 NY2d 1021,
1022 [1995]).  Although rare, a single, substantial error by
counsel may "so seriously compromise[] a defendant's right to a
fair trial [that] it will qualify as ineffective representation"
(id.).  Only where the single error is sufficiently "egregious
and prejudicial" will counsel be deemed ineffective (id.).  
The record reveals that, after arriving at the police
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barracks, Savlov was told by representatives of the District
Attorney's Office that the District Attorney would look favorably
upon defendant if he voluntarily gave a statement.  Further,
Savlov "was told that the police had received information that
the defendant was in fact the person being sought [and] the names
of other persons who had spoken to the defendant."  Thus, this
case is distinguishable from Claudio (83 NY2d at 78), in which we
noted that defendant's counsel was grossly incompetent for
advising defendant to give a statement despite that the police
had indicated they had insufficient evidence against defendant
and the prosecutor had informed the attorney that no plea bargain
would be offered.  Here, Savlov made the strategic decision to
encourage defendant to cooperate in order to receive favorable
treatment once charges were brought.  Under all the relevant
circumstances, we cannot say that defendant received less than
meaningful representation. 
IV.
We have considered defendant's other challenges to his
conviction and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
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People v James J. Carncross
No. 038
PIGOTT, J.(dissenting) :
Because, in my view, County Court committed reversible
error in disqualifying defendant's counsel, I respectfully
dissent.  The court disqualified counsel based upon its finding
that a potential conflict of interest--which was more theoretical
than real--would, in its opinion, infringe upon defendant's right
to the effective assistance of trial counsel. 
It is hornbook law that, the right to counsel being a
fundamental one, courts must "carefully scrutinize" the "judicial
restriction or governmental intrusion" upon its exercise (People
v Tineo, 64 NY2d 531, 536 [1985]).  While a trial court should be
accorded "substantial latitude" in refusing a defendant's waiver
of even a potential conflict (Wheat v United States, 486 US 153,
163 [1988]), it is evident from this record that any potential
conflict (which never came to fruition) was simply not serious,
given the common interest shared by defendant, his girlfriend and
his father.  
When the court questioned defendant about his waiver,
he remained steadfast that he wished to waive any potential
conflict.  The court then appointed an experienced criminal
lawyer as independent counsel to meet with defendant to explain
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the ramifications of this choice.  She met with defendant twice
and sent him a letter explaining his rights, including the risks
and benefits of waiving the conflict.  That attorney reported to
the court that it was her view that defendant understood the
risks of waiving the conflict and still wished to do so. 
Notwithstanding these facts, County Court disqualified counsel. 
What is remarkable here is that no one seems to have had an
objection to defendant retaining his counsel other than his
adversary and the court.
An element of a defendant's Federal and State
constitutional right to counsel (U.S. Const. 6th amend.; N.Y.
Const., art I, § 6) "is the right of [the] defendant who does not
require appointed counsel to choose who will represent him"
(United States v Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 US 140, 144 [2006]; see
People v Arroyave, 49 NY2d 264, 270 [1980]).  When a defendant is
wrongly deprived of that right, the deprivation is "complete" at
the time the defendant is erroneously prohibited from being
represented by the counsel of his choice, and such error is
considered a "structural" one not subject to harmless error
analysis (Gonzalez-Lopez, at 148, 150).  
In support of its holding here, the majority relies on
People v Ortiz (76 NY2d 652 [1990]) and People v Gomberg (38 NY2d
307 [1975]), both of which are "multiple representation" cases. 
The former case involved a garden-variety drug trial where
defense counsel's loyalties were divided between the defendant he
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was representing and a testifying witness whose interests
diverged from those of the defendant; the latter case involved a
situation where the same attorney represented three defendants
who were on trial for arson, and the defense asserted by one of
the defendants allegedly shifted the blame to the other
defendants.  Of course, as the United States Supreme Court has
recognized, "multiple representation of criminal defendants
engenders special dangers of which a court must be aware" (Wheat,
486 US at 159).  But that is not the situation we are presented
with here, where neither defendant's father nor his girlfriend
was facing a criminal charge, nor were they targets of the
investigation.
The Supreme Court has recognized "a presumption in
favor of [a defendant's] counsel of choice" which may be overcome
by either a showing of actual conflict or "a serious potential
for conflict" (Wheat, 486 US at 164).  It is undisputed in this
instance that, at most, there was a potential conflict because
defendant's interests might have placed defense counsel under
inconsistent duties in the future had defendant's father and
girlfriend been called as witnesses at trial (United States v
Perez, 325 F3d 115, 125 [2d Cir 2003] quoting United States v
Kliti, 156 F3d , 153 n3 [2d Cir 1998]).  But such a conflict,
waivable so long as the court is satisfied that it is knowing and
intelligent (Perez, 325 F3d at 125), could hardly be considered
serious, and clearly not enough to overcome the presumption in
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1  The second grand jury proceeding occurred in September
2006 after disqualification of defense counsel, the indictment
from the first grand jury proceeding having been dismissed due to
the alleged conflict.   
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favor of affording defendant his constitutional right to counsel
of his own choosing.  
The majority and the People latch onto the premise
that, at the time of the disqualification motion, it was the
defense's theory of the case that defendant was not the operator
of the motorcycle, and that the "damaging" testimony by
defendant's father and girlfriend before the grand jury all but
ensured that they would be called as witnesses.  However, the
defense advised the court that, without discovery, it had yet to
determine its trial strategy.  Moreover, a simple reading of the
grand jury testimony of defendant's father and girlfriend, who
were not called to testify before the second grand jury,1
indicates that their testimony was not substantially different
from the statement defendant made to the police just three days
after the crash.  If anything, the testimony of defendant's
father and girlfriend was no more damaging than defendant's own
statement to the police which, upon a fair reading, rendered it
unlikely that defendant would be pursuing a "mistaken identity"
defense as the court surmised in its decision and order
disqualifying defense counsel. 
In matters where there is an apparent conflict, the
trial courts have a duty to protect a defendant's right to the
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effective assistance of counsel without concomitantly
"arbitrarily interfer[ing] with the attorney-client relationship"
(Gomberg, 38 NY2d at 313).  Where, as here, the potential
conflict is theoretical at best because the witnesses are united
with the defendant and the defendant has been adequately apprised
of the risks of waiving any potential conflict and agrees to do
so, the defendant should not be deprived of his fundamental right
to counsel of his own choosing.  Absent any institutional
concerns, such as where the attorney's representation would
jeopardize the integrity of the judicial proceedings, courts
should not "assume too paternalistic an attitude in protecting
the defendant from himself" (Perez, 325 F3d at 125-126 quoting
United States v Curcio, 694 F2d 14, 25 [2d Cir 1982]).  
There being no indication that allowing disqualified
counsel to represent defendant in these circumstances would
jeopardize the integrity of the proceedings, I would reverse the
order of the Appellate Division and grant defendant a new trial
with counsel of his choosing.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Chief Judge Lippman.  Judges
Ciparick, Graffeo, Read and Jones concur.  Judge Pigott dissents
and votes to reverse in an opinion in which Judge Smith concurs.
Decided March 25, 2010