Case Title: Ex parte Chester Elton Berry et al. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: The Estate of Vera H. Berry, Deceased)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1070182

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 6/13/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1070182
____________________
Ex parte Chester Elton Berry et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Estate of Vera H. Berry, deceased)
(Cullman Circuit Court, CV-06-433)
SEE, Justice.
Chester Elton Berry, Robert Berry, Donald Berry, Henry
Berry, William Berry, Karen Berry Davis, and Randy Berry
(collectively "the Berrys") petition this Court for the writ
of mandamus directing Cullman Circuit Court Judge Don L.
Hardeman to grant the Berrys' motion for the dismissal of the
1070182
2
administration of the estate of Vera H. Berry, which had been
removed from the Cullman County Probate Court.  We grant the
petition and issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
The facts relevant to the disposition of this mandamus
petition are undisputed.  On August 16, 2006, Haskel R. Berry,
as executor, filed in the Cullman County Probate Court a
petition to probate the will of Vera H. Berry.  Haskel is the
son of Vera H. Berry, and her will designates him as the first
named executor of the estate.  The probate court scheduled a
hearing for September 22, 2006, to determine whether to
probate the will.  On September 1, 2006, the Berrys, who are
also Vera H. Berry's children and Haskel's siblings,
petitioned for the removal of the administration of the estate
from the probate court to the Cullman Circuit Court.  On
September 12, Judge Hardeman granted the Berrys' petition and
removed this action from the probate court to the Cullman
Circuit Court.
The Berrys subsequently moved the circuit court to
appoint Chester Elton Berry the executor and personal
1070182
Vera H. Berry's will designates Chester Elton Berry as
1
the alternative executor of her estate in the event that
Haskel is unable, is unwilling, or ceases to act as the
executor of the estate.
3
representative of the estate.   The circuit court denied that
1
motion.  The Berrys then moved the circuit court to dismiss
the administration of the estate, arguing that the circuit
court did not have jurisdiction to enter the order removing
the administration of the estate from the probate court to the
circuit court.  
The circuit court denied the Berrys' motion to dismiss
the administration of the estate.  The Berrys moved the
circuit court to alter, amend, or vacate its denial of the
motion to dismiss, and the circuit court denied that motion.
On October 19, 2007, the Berrys petitioned the Court of Civil
Appeals for mandamus relief.  The petition was transferred to
this Court because the Court of Civil Appeals did not have
subject-matter jurisdiction over the action.
Standard of Review
"'A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy,
and it "will be issued only when there is: 1) a
clear legal right in the petitioner to the order
sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the
lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court."'"
1070182
Section 12-11-41, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
2
"The administration of any estate may be removed
4
Ex parte Monsanto Co., 862 So. 2d 595, 604 (Ala. 2003)
(quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 176 (Ala. 2000),
quoting in turn Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So.
2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993)).  "[T]he question of subject matter
jurisdiction is reviewable by a petition for a writ of
mandamus." Ex parte Johnson, 715 So. 2d 783, 785 (Ala. 1998).
"Although this Court reviews a mandamus petition to determine
whether the trial court exceeded its discretion, this Court
reviews issues of law de novo." Ex parte Terry, 957 So. 2d
455, 457 (Ala. 2006).  A claim that a circuit court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction to rule on a removal petition is
a question of law. Ex parte Terry, 957 So. 2d at 457.
Analysis
The Berrys argue that the administration of the estate
had not yet begun in the probate court and that a circuit
court cannot assume jurisdiction over the administration of an
estate that has not yet begun.  In Ex parte Smith, 619 So. 2d
1374, 1375-76 (Ala. 1993), this Court recognized that under §
12-11-41, Ala. Code 1975,  a "circuit court cannot assume
2
1070182
from the probate court to the circuit court at any
time before a final settlement thereof, by any heir,
devisee, 
legatee, 
distributee, 
executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
of any such estate, without assigning any special
equity; and an order of removal must be made by the
court, upon the filing of a sworn petition by any
such heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
of any such estate, reciting that the petitioner is
such heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
and that, in the opinion of the petitioner, such
estate can be better administered in the circuit
court than in the probate court."
Section 12-13-1, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent
3
part:
"(a) The probate court shall have original and
general jurisdiction as to all matters mentioned in
this section ....
"(b) The probate court shall have original and
general jurisdiction over the following matters:
"(1) The probate of wills.
"(2) 
The 
granting 
of 
letters
testamentary and of administration and the
repeal or revocation of the same.
"(3) All controversies in relation to
the 
right 
of 
executorship 
or
5
jurisdiction over the administration of an estate when the
administration has not yet begun."  In Ex parte Smith, this
Court further recognized that under § 12-13-1, Ala. Code
1975,  a circuit court is not empowered to "initiate the
3
1070182
administration.
"...."
6
administration of an estate, because the initiation of
administration is a matter exclusively in the jurisdiction of
the probate court." 619 So. 2d at 1376.  Therefore, in order
to determine whether the Berrys are entitled to the mandamus
relief they seek, we must determine whether the probate court
had initiated the administration of the estate before the
Berrys filed the petition for removal.  
This Court stated in Ex parte Smith that "the mere filing
of a petition for the administration of an estate does not in
itself begin the administration; rather, the probate court
must act upon the petition and thereby activate the
proceedings, which may thereafter be subject to removal to the
circuit court." 619 So. 2d at 1376.  We determined that
mandamus relief was appropriate in Ex parte Smith because "the
probate court had taken no action whatever on Smith's
petition; therefore, the administration of [the] estate did
not begin and [the] petition for removal was premature." 619
So. 2d at 1376.
The Berrys contend that, in this case, the removal of the
1070182
7
administration of the estate from the probate court to the
circuit court was similarly premature because "[they] filed
the Petition for the Removal of the Administration of the
Estate of Vera H. Berry prior to the Probate Court's beginning
the 
administration 
of 
the 
Estate 
by 
issuing 
letters
testamentary or appointing anyone as the executor or personal
representative of the Estate." Berrys' petition at 6.
Therefore, the Berrys argue, Ex parte Smith is controlling and
they are entitled to mandamus relief.  Haskel argues, however,
that Ex parte Smith is distinguishable from this case because,
he says, the probate court in this case had acted upon the
petition and had initiated the administration of the estate by
scheduling a hearing to determine whether to probate the will.
Although Haskel does point out a difference between this case
and Ex parte Smith, we are not persuaded that that difference
legally distinguishes Ex parte Smith.
As we noted, this Court in Ex parte Smith held that
removal of the will proceeding from the probate court to the
circuit court was premature because the probate court had not
initiated the administration of the estate by acting on the
petition.  Specifically, this Court highlighted the fact that
1070182
8
the will proceeding was removed to the circuit court "[b]efore
the probate court had made any rulings" on the matter
regarding the probate of the will or the administration of the
estate.  Ex parte Smith, 619 So. 2d at 1375.  In this case,
the probate court scheduled a hearing to consider Haskel's
petition to probate the will; however, it took no action.  See
Ex parte Coffee County Dep't of Human Res., 771 So. 2d 485
(Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (holding that the appointment of a
guardian ad litem and the scheduling of a hearing to appoint
a conservator did not warrant removing the conservatorship
proceeding from the probate court to the circuit court).
Because the scheduling of a hearing, without further action,
does 
not 
indicate 
that 
the 
probate 
court 
began 
the
administration of the estate, we conclude that the Berrys have
demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief sought. See Ex
parte Monsanto Co., supra. 
Haskel argues that the Berrys are not entitled to
mandamus relief because, he argues, they have another adequate
remedy in that they could appeal the circuit court's order
removing the administration of the estate from the probate
court to the circuit court.  In support of his argument,
1070182
9
Haskel cites Ex parte Terry, in which this Court stated that
the administrator of the estate was not entitled to mandamus
relief because "the administrator may appeal the order of the
circuit court." 957 So. 2d at 459.  In Ex parte Terry, the
circuit court had a duty to grant the removal petition, but it
did not do so.  In the case before us today, on the other
hand, the circuit court did not improperly deny the removal
petition; instead, it improperly granted it in a case where
the probate court had not yet begun the administration of the
estate.  
The present case reaches this Court in a fundamentally
different posture than did Ex parte Terry.  In this case,
because the circuit court granted the removal petition, and
not as in Ex parte Terry effectively denied it, the case
remains pending in the circuit court.  The Ex parte Terry
opinion supported its statement that "the administrator may
appeal the order of the circuit court" with a citation to Ex
parte Kelly, 243 Ala. 184, 8 So. 2d 855 (1942), and the
statement in that case that "'[t]he effect of the decree
appealed from -- remanding the administration of the estate to
the probate court -- was to put this branch of the case out of
1070182
The administrator had moved the circuit court to vacate
4
its original order denying the petition to remove the case
from the probate court.  The circuit court was holding that
motion in abeyance during this Court's review of the
administrator's mandamus petition and the quoted statement was
made in contemplation of a denial of that pending motion after
this Court's decision on the mandamus petition.  Ex parte
Terry, 957 So. 2d at 459.
10
the circuit court, and was such final decree as will support
the appeal.'" Ex parte Terry, 957 So. 2d at 459 (quoting Ex
parte Kelly, 243 Ala. at 187, 8 So. 2d at 857).  In contrast
to the circumstances contemplated in Ex parte Terry,  there is
4
here no "final decree [such] as will support [an] appeal";
therefore, a petition for the writ of mandamus is appropriate.
See Smith v. Smith, 248 Ala. 49, 52-53, 26 So. 2d 553, 573
(1946) ("The case comes here by appeal with alternate petition
for writ of mandamus to be directed to the circuit judge to
vacate and annul the order of removal [from the probate
court].  The order is not appealable so the appeal will be
dismissed.  Mandamus, however, is the proper remedy ...."
(citing Ex parte Chapman, 225 Ala. 168, 171, 142 So. 540, 543
(1932) ("Inasmuch as the petitioner ... could not appeal from
the said order of the circuit judge [transferring the
guardianship from the probate court to the circuit court], her
1070182
11
only proper remedy was and is by mandamus."))).  Therefore, we
are not persuaded by Haskel's argument that the Berrys have an
adequate alternative remedy in an appeal.
Haskel finally argues that the Berrys have "waived any
objection to jurisdiction of the Circuit Court by their
participation and should be estopped from now denying
jurisdiction simply due to receiving an unfavorable ruling."
Haskel's response at 10.  Haskel's argument that the Berrys'
participation in the proceedings in the circuit court works a
waiver of any challenge by the Berrys to the circuit court's
exercise of jurisdiction appears to confuse the jurisdictional
discussion in Ex parte Smith.  
In stating in Ex parte Smith that "[t]he circuit court
cannot assume jurisdiction over the administration of an
estate when the administration has not yet begun," 619 So. 2d
at 1375-76, this Court was referring to subject-matter
jurisdiction.  "Subject matter jurisdiction concerns a court's
power to decide certain types of cases." Ex parte Seymour, 946
So. 2d 536, 538 (Ala. 2006).  Our decision in Ex parte Smith
relied on § 12-13-1, Ala. Code 1975, which grants probate
courts "original and general jurisdiction" over all matters
1070182
12
enumerated in that statute, including the probate of wills and
disputes over the right of executorship and administration.
"Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived by the
parties and it is the duty of an appellate court to consider
lack of subject matter jurisdiction ex mero motu." Ex parte
Smith, 438 So. 2d 766, 768 (Ala. 1983) (citing City of
Huntsville v. Miller, 271 Ala. 687, 688, 127 So. 2d 606, 608
(1958)).  Therefore, we reject Haskel's argument that the
Berrys have waived any objection to the circuit court's
exercise of jurisdiction over this case.
Conclusion
We hold that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over
the 
administration 
of 
the 
estate. 
 
The 
Berrys 
have
demonstrated (1) that they have a clear legal right to an
order 
directing 
the 
circuit 
court 
to 
dismiss 
the
administration of the estate, (2) that the circuit court
should have granted their motion to dismiss and did not, (3)
that they do not have another adequate remedy, and (4) that
jurisdiction in this Court is proper.  Ex parte Monsanto Co.,
supra.  Therefore, we grant the Berrys' petition and issue the
writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to dismiss the
1070182
Because we grant the petition and issue the writ of
5
mandamus, we do not reach the Berrys' argument that they are
entitled to mandamus relief directing the circuit court to
appoint Chester Elton Berry as the executor and personal
representative of the estate. 
13
administration of the estate.  
5
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.