Case Title: Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church

Citation: 

Docket Number: 003022

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
JAE-WOO CHA 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 003022 
November 2, 2001 
 
KOREAN PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF 
WASHINGTON, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Jonathan C. Thacher, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the First Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, § 16 
of the Constitution of Virginia prohibit the circuit court 
from resolving a former pastor's claims against a church and 
certain defendants who were involved in the church's 
governance. 
I. 
 
Jae-Woo Cha filed a motion for judgment against the 
Korean Presbyterian Church of Washington, Chi Whan Kim, Taek 
Yong Kim, Yong Ho Kim, David Kwang Soo Han, Do Sik Ko, and 
Jung Kook Kim.  The plaintiff alleged in his motion that the 
Korean Presbyterian Church wrongfully terminated him from his 
position as pastor, that certain defendants tortiously 
interfered with his contract of employment with the church, 
and that certain defendants committed acts of defamation 
against him. 
 
The individual defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff's motion for judgment, asserting that the circuit 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  They alleged that 
the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
and Article I, § 16 of the Constitution of Virginia prohibited 
the circuit court from evaluating or interfering in matters of 
internal church discipline, policy, administration, and 
governance. 
 
The circuit court considered the pleadings, memoranda, 
and argument of counsel.  The court concluded that the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 
I, § 16 of the Constitution of Virginia, which contain free 
exercise clauses, prohibited the court from interfering in 
ecclesiastical disputes when questions of faith or doctrine 
are involved.  The court held that adjudication of the 
plaintiff's claims would require that the court involve itself 
in ecclesiastical concerns and thus, the court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's motion for 
judgment.  The court entered a final judgment in favor of the 
defendants, and the plaintiff appeals. 
II. 
 
The plaintiff alleged the following relevant facts in his 
motion for judgment.  The Korean Presbyterian Church is an 
unincorporated association located in Fairfax County.  The 
church is affiliated with the Sejong Korean School and the 
Washington Theological Seminary.  The church is governed by a 
 
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committee called the Session, which is also referred to as the 
Elders Committee.  This committee "is composed of senior 
members of the church."  The committee's decisions were 
subject to the approval of the senior pastor, defendant Taek 
Yong Kim, who retired from that position in April 2000. 
 
Defendants Chi Whan Kim, David Kwang Soo Han, and Jung 
Kook Kim were members of the Elders Committee.  Chi Whan Kim 
also served as chairman of the church's Financial Committee. 
 
Defendants Yong Ho Kim and Do Sik Ko served as deacons of 
the church.  The office of deacon is a "powerful position" 
within the church. 
 
In October 1997, the church hired the plaintiff to serve 
as its educational pastor.  The plaintiff had an employment 
contract for a period of . . . years.  The plaintiff's "duties 
as an educational pastor . . . included, but were not limited 
to:  guiding the Church youth group; guiding the Friday 
evening prayer service; teaching as a professor at the 
[Washington Theological Seminary]; and, substituting for the 
senior pastor (the [d]efendant Taek Yong Kim) during the 
regular worship service when needed.  There were times in 
which the [p]laintiff's duties required him to lead the Church 
worship service and solicit collections from the congregation 
for the Church." 
 
3
 
The plaintiff also served as the church's administrative 
pastor and in October 1999, he met with members of the 
church's congregation who suspected "that certain Church 
members and Church leaders had participated in financial 
impropriety with regard to funds belonging to the Church, the 
Sejong Korean School and the [Washington Theological 
Seminary]."  The plaintiff and church parishioners who 
attended the meeting believed that an independent auditor 
should be retained to review the financial records of the 
church, the Sejong Korean School, and the Washington 
Theological Seminary. 
 
Subsequently, Elder Chi Whan Kim learned that the 
plaintiff had participated in the meeting, confronted the 
plaintiff, and informed him "that his future employment at the 
Church was in jeopardy if he did not cease his advocacy of 
full disclosure of the Church's financial records."  Senior 
Pastor Kim also learned that the plaintiff had participated in 
the meeting, and he "threatened the [p]laintiff.  The senior 
pastor told the [p]laintiff that his future employment at the 
Church was in jeopardy if he continued to advocate for 
financial disclosure of the Church's financial records."  
Defendants Chi Kim, Jung Kim, and David Han "began meeting 
. . . together to discuss ways in which they could prevent 
full disclosure of the relevant financial material."  
 
4
 
In November 1999, members of the church requested that 
"Senior Pastor [Kim] respond in writing to accusations that he 
participated in the misuse of Church funds."  During a meeting 
of the church's deacons in December 1999, defendant Do Sik Ko, 
"speaking to the entire meeting of [108] Deacons, [made] the 
following remarks to the [p]laintiff and the entire meeting of 
Deacons:  'One of our spiritual leaders, Reverend Cha, 
borrowed over $100,000 from believers and has not returned the 
money.' "  During that same meeting, defendant Yong Kim 
stated, "I have proof."  "Thus he implied that he had proof 
that the [p]laintiff borrowed over $100,000 from the 
congregation and had not repaid the money." 
 
Defendant Chi Kim informed the deacons that the Elders 
Committee would meet immediately to resolve the allegations.  
The Elders Committee met on December 5, 1999 to discuss the 
allegations against the plaintiff.  "During that meeting . . . 
[d]efendants Jung [Kook] Kim, [Chi Whan Kim], and David Kwang 
Soo Han reported to the Elders Committee that the [p]laintiff 
had borrowed approximately $165,000 from the congregation.  
The [d]efendants Jung [Kook] Kim, Chi Whan Kim, and David 
Kwang Soo Han had no proof to support their statements." 
 
On December 11, 1999, the Elders Committee voted to 
terminate the plaintiff's employment with the church if he did 
 
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not agree to resign.  The plaintiff refused to resign, and he 
was terminated on December 18, 1999. 
 
The plaintiff alleged in his motion for judgment that he 
had a contract of employment that could only be terminated for 
good cause, and that the church wrongfully terminated him.  He 
also alleged that he was terminated in violation of the public 
policy of this Commonwealth.  The plaintiff further alleged 
that Yong Ho Kim, Do Sik Ko, Chi Whan Kim, Jung Kook Kim, 
David Kwang Soo Han, and Taek Yong Kim tortiously interfered 
with his contract of employment with the church, and that Do 
Sik Ko and Chi Whan Kim committed acts of defamation against 
him. 
III. 
A. 
 
The plaintiff asserts that the circuit court erred by 
ruling it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider 
his wrongful termination claim against defendant Korean 
Presbyterian Church.  We disagree. 
 
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States provides in part that "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof."  Article I, § 16 of the Constitution 
of Virginia states, in part, that "religion or the duty which 
we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can 
 
6
be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or 
violence; and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the 
free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of 
conscience." 
 
The United States Supreme Court, applying the First 
Amendment, has held that generally civil courts are not a 
constitutionally permissible forum for a review of 
ecclesiastical disputes.  Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 
U.S. 440, 449 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); Gonzalez v. 
Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1929); Watson v. 
Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871).  Even though there 
are limited exceptions to this constitutional principle, it is 
well established that a civil court may neither interfere in 
matters of church government nor in matters of faith and 
doctrine.  Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116; Reid v. Gholson, 229 Va. 
179, 187, 327 S.E.2d 107, 111-12, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 824 
(1985). 
 
In Reid, we stated: 
 
"The constitutional guarantees of religious 
freedom have no deeper roots than in Virginia, where 
they originated, and nowhere have they been more 
scrupulously observed.  These principles prohibit 
the civil courts from resolving ecclesiastical 
 
7
disputes which depend upon inquiry into questions of 
faith or doctrine.  [Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
at 449].  The courts have, however, frequently been 
called upon to resolve disputes concerning the civil 
and property rights of religious bodies and church 
members.  In such cases, there is a danger that the 
power of the state may be called upon to aid a 
faction espousing a particular doctrinal belief, or 
to 'become entangled in essentially religious 
controversies.'  [Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 
426 U.S. at 709.]" 
 
229 Va. at 187, 327 S.E.2d at 111-12 (footnotes omitted). 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
has held, and we agree, that the "right to choose ministers 
without government restriction underlies the well-being of 
religious community . . . for perpetuation of a church's 
existence may depend upon those whom it selects to preach its 
values, teach its message, and interpret its doctrines both to 
its own membership and to the world at large.  Any attempt by 
government to restrict a church's free choice of its leaders 
thus constitutes a burden on the church's free exercise 
rights."  Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167-68 (1985), cert. denied, 478 
U.S. 1020 (1986) (footnote omitted); accord United Methodist 
Church, Baltimore Annual Conference v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 
794 (D.C. 1990).  See also Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116. 
 
We also observe that many courts have concluded that any 
attempt by civil courts to limit a church's choice of its 
religious representatives would constitute an impermissible 
 
8
burden upon that church's First Amendment rights.  See Minker 
v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 
F.2d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 
F.2d 392, 394 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986); 
Kaufmann v. Sheehan, 707 F.2d 355, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1983); 
Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 493-94 (5th Cir. 
1974); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560-61 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).  But see Moses v. 
Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 319-21 (Colo. 1993), cert. 
denied, 511 U.S. 1137 (1994); Marshall v. Munro, 845 P.2d 424, 
429 (Alaska 1993).  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit recently stated: 
"It has thus become established that the decisions 
of religious entities about the appointment and 
removal of ministers and persons in other positions 
of similar theological significance are beyond the 
ken of civil courts.  Rather, such courts must defer 
to the decisions of religious organizations 'on 
matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, 
or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law.'  [Serbian 
Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713].  The 
Supreme Court explained, 'It is the essence of 
religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are 
reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith 
whether or not rational or measurable by objective 
criteria.'  Id. at 714-15." 
 
Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 
1997). 
 
Applying the aforementioned principles, we hold that the 
circuit court correctly concluded that it lacked subject 
 
9
matter jurisdiction to review the plaintiff's claims against 
the Korean Presbyterian Church.  Resolution of the plaintiff's 
claims by a civil court would have required that the circuit 
court adjudicate issues regarding the church's governance, 
internal organization, and doctrine, and such judicial 
intervention would have limited the church's right to select 
its religious leaders.  The Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 
I, § 16 of the Constitution of Virginia do not permit a 
circuit court to substitute its secular judgment for a 
church's judgment when the church makes decisions regarding 
the selection or retention of its pastor. 
B. 
 
The plaintiff states that "he had an employment contract" 
and "at the very least, the [p]laintiff had an at-will 
employment relationship with the Church."  Continuing, the 
plaintiff contends that the circuit court had subject matter 
jurisdiction to consider his claim of tortious interference 
with contract against certain individual defendants.  We 
disagree with the plaintiff's contentions. 
 
Assuming that the plaintiff had an at-will employment 
contract with the Korean Presbyterian Church, he was required 
to establish 
 
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"(1) the existence of a valid contractual 
relationship or business expectancy; (2) knowledge 
of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the 
interferor; (3) intentional interference inducing or 
causing a breach or termination of the relationship 
or expectancy; and (4) resultant damage to the party 
whose relationship or expectancy has been 
disrupted." 
 
Duggin v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 226, 360 S.E.2d 832, 835 (1987) 
(quoting Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 120, 335 S.E.2d 97, 
102 (1985)).  Additionally, when "a contract is terminable at 
will . . . 'a plaintiff, in order to present a prima facie 
case of tortious interference, must allege and prove not only 
an intentional interference that caused the termination of the 
at-will contract, but also that the defendant employed 
"improper methods." ' "  Perk v. Vector Resources Group, 253 
Va. 310, 314, 485 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 
Without question, had the circuit court exercised subject 
matter jurisdiction of the plaintiff's motion for judgment, 
the court would have become entangled in issues regarding the 
church's governance as well as matters of faith and doctrine.  
And, as we have already held, ecclesiastical decisions 
regarding the appointment and removal of pastors are generally 
beyond the jurisdiction of secular courts.  Neither the 
federal Free Exercise Clause nor Article I, § 16 of the 
Constitution of Virginia permits a circuit court to decide 
whether the plaintiff had a valid contractual relationship or 
 
11
business expectancy to serve as a pastor of the Korean 
Presbyterian Church.1
 
The plaintiff argues that when, as in this case, 
defendants employ acts of fraud and collusion thereby "causing 
a church as an employer to decide to terminate a clergyman, 
the court should be able to exercise jurisdiction over such a 
case of tortious inference with contract rights."  This 
contention is without merit because the plaintiff did not 
allege facts to support an assertion that his termination was 
fraudulent or collusive. 
C. 
 
The plaintiff contends that the circuit court had subject 
matter jurisdiction to consider his defamation claims against 
the individual defendants.  We disagree.  The plaintiff 
alleged that "[a]n integral part of [his] position as an 
assistant pastor was to minister to the congregation and to 
assist in their spiritual growth" and that "these [d]efendants 
made statements which were defamatory to the [p]laintiff, 
                     
1 The plaintiff alleged in his motion for judgment that he 
had a contract of employment with the church terminable solely 
for just cause.  The plaintiff does not argue in his brief 
that he had a contract terminable solely for cause.  
Nonetheless, we conclude that even if the plaintiff were able 
to prove that he had a contract terminable solely for cause 
with the church, the circuit court would have lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to consider his claim because the court 
could not adjudicate such claim without considering issues 
regarding the church's governance, faith, and doctrine. 
 
12
impugning his honesty and integrity, values which are 
essential in his success as a pastor."  The plaintiff alleged 
that "[t]he words each [d]efendant used imputed an unfitness 
to discharge his duties as a pastor at the Church, implied 
that he lacked integrity to be a pastor at the Church, and 
that he was harming the very people to whom he had committed 
to minister.  As such[,] the words were defamatory per se." 
 
The plaintiff further alleged that the defamatory 
statements were made by Do Sik Ko, a deacon, during a meeting 
of the deacons.  The allegedly defamatory statements that 
defendant Chi Kim made were uttered during a meeting of the 
church's Elders Committee, of which Kim is a member.   
 
We have recently stated: 
 
"At common law, defamatory words which are 
actionable per se are: 
"(1) Those which impute to a person the commission 
of some criminal offense involving moral turpitude, 
for which the party, if the charge is true, may be 
indicted and punished.  (2) Those which impute that 
a person is infected with some contagious disease, 
where if the charge is true, it would exclude the 
party from society.  (3) Those which impute to a 
person unfitness to perform the duties of an office 
or employment of profit, or want of integrity in the 
discharge of the duties of such an office or 
employment. (4) Those which prejudice such person in 
his or her profession or trade." 
 
Perk, 253 Va. at 316, 485 S.E.2d at 144.  We have also stated 
that "a defamatory charge need not be made in direct terms; 
rather, it may be made 'by inference, implication[,] or 
 
13
insinuation.' "  Id. (quoting Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers, 
196 Va. 1, 7, 82 S.E.2d 588, 592 (1954)). 
 
Upon our review of the pleadings in this case, we hold 
that the plaintiff's allegations of defamation against the 
individual defendants cannot be considered in isolation, 
separate and apart from the church's decision to terminate his 
employment.  The individual defendants who purportedly uttered 
defamatory remarks about the plaintiff were church officials 
who attended meetings of the church's governing bodies that 
had been convened for the purpose of discussing certain 
accusations against the plaintiff.  We can only conclude that 
if a civil court were to exercise jurisdiction of the 
plaintiff's motion for judgment under these circumstances, the 
court would be compelled to consider the church's doctrine and 
beliefs because such matters would undoubtedly affect the 
plaintiff's fitness to perform pastoral duties and whether the 
plaintiff had been prejudiced in his profession.  Neither the 
Free Exercise Clause nor Article I, § 16 of the Constitution 
of Virginia permits a civil court to undertake such a role. 
 
Indeed, most courts that have considered the question 
whether the Free Exercise Clause divests a civil court of 
subject matter jurisdiction to consider a pastor's defamation 
claims against a church and its officials have answered that 
question in the affirmative.  See Hutchison, 789 F.2d at 392-
 
14
93; Simpson, 494 F.2d at 492-93; Higgins v. Maher, 258 Cal. 
Rptr. 757, 761 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1080 (1990) 
("[i]f our civil courts enter upon disputes between bishops 
and priests because of allegations of defamation . . . it is 
difficult to conceive the termination case which could not 
result in a sustainable lawsuit"); McManus v. Taylor, 521 
So.2d 449, 451 (La. Ct. App. 1988) ("[t]o allow defamation 
suits to be litigated to the fullest extent against members of 
a religious board who are merely discharging the duty which 
has been entrusted to them by their church could have a 
potentially chilling effect on the performance of those 
duties").2
D. 
 
The plaintiff also contends that "[t]he actions of the 
individual defendants were outside whatever agency 
relationship with the Church and therefore are not entitled to 
the protection of the First Amendment Establishment Clause, 
and their acts of defamation and tortious interference with 
contract should not be considered to be actions of a church."  
The plaintiff's contention is without merit. 
                     
2 We recognize that there may be rare situations in which 
a civil court may exercise jurisdiction of a plaintiff's tort 
claims against a church and its officials, but those 
circumstances are not present here. 
 
15
 
Initially, we observe that the plaintiff did not plead in 
his motion for judgment that the individual defendants' 
actions were outside any agency relationship that may have 
existed between the individual defendants and the church.  
Rather, a fair reading of the plaintiff's motion for judgment 
inescapably leads to the conclusion that the plaintiff 
strongly implied that the defendants were acting as church 
officials.  We will not permit the plaintiff to take one 
position in his motion for judgment and essentially disavow 
that position in his brief filed with this Court.  
Furthermore, questions regarding the scope of the individual 
defendants' duties within the church would require the court 
to entangle itself in issues of church governance, which is 
prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause and Article I, § 16 of 
the Constitution of Virginia. 
 
We have considered the plaintiff's remaining arguments, 
and they are without merit. 
IV. 
 
We will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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