Case Title: Finn v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12687

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-08-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12687 
 
JAMES FINN  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 2, 2019. - August 13, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Pretrial Detention.  Practice, Criminal, Arraignment.  Arrest.  
Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on January 8, 2019. 
 
 
The case was reported by Budd, J. 
 
 
 
Lisa S. Core for the petitioner. 
 
Catherine P. Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney 
(Christina P. Ronan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) 
for the Commonwealth. 
 
Benjamin H. Keehn & Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In this case, we consider whether G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A, allows the Commonwealth to seek a dangerousness 
hearing when a defendant appears before a Superior Court judge 
for arraignment pursuant to a postindictment summons, rather 
2 
 
 
than an arrest warrant.  We conclude that the language of the 
statute permits a Superior Court judge to conduct a 
dangerousness hearing upon a defendant's first appearance in 
that court, regardless of whether that appearance is pursuant to 
a summons or to an arrest warrant.1 
 
1.  Background.  In December of 2017, the defendant was 
arrested and charged by criminal complaint in the District Court 
with one count of indecent assault and battery on a child 
under the age of fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B; one count of 
open and gross lewdness, G. L. c. 272, § 16; and three counts of 
dissemination of obscene material to a minor, G. L. c. 272, 
§ 28.  The offense involved allegations concerning three 
children (two of whom were related) who lived in the defendant's 
apartment building.  At arraignment, the Commonwealth moved for 
pretrial detention pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, a District Court judge ordered that the 
defendant be held without bail.  The judge then allowed the 
defendant's motion for reconsideration, and ordered that the 
defendant could be released with conditions, including global 
positioning system monitoring, a "no contact" order with the 
alleged victims and the witnesses, and a prohibition on alcohol 
                     
1 We acknowledge the amicus letter submitted by the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
3 
 
 
and drug use.  The defendant was released under these conditions 
in January 2018. 
 
Approximately three weeks later, in February 2018, a grand 
jury indicted the defendant on three counts of indecent assault 
and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, and two counts 
of disseminating obscene material to a minor, for the same 
events underlying the December 2017 complaint.  The prosecutor 
arranged with defense counsel to schedule the defendant's 
arraignment in the Superior Court; no new arrest warrant was 
issued.  The defendant complied with a summons, and was 
arraigned in March 2018.  At arraignment, the Commonwealth moved 
for pretrial detention pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  The 
defendant opposed the motion on the ground that the Commonwealth 
lacked the right to seek a dangerousness hearing in the Superior 
Court because the defendant had not been "'subject to arrest' or 
'held under arrest' when he appeared for his arraignment, 
pursuant to [a] summons." 
 
In a written memorandum of decision, a Superior Court judge 
allowed the motion for pretrial detention, without prejudice.2  
                     
2 The judge sufficiently explained his reasoning, the 
options he considered, and how he reached his conclusion.  See 
G. L. c. 276, § 58A (5) (in determining "whether there are 
conditions of release that will reasonably assure the safety of 
any other individual or the community," judge "shall . . . take 
into account the nature and seriousness of the danger posed to 
any person or the community that would result by the person's 
release, the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, 
4 
 
 
The judge concluded that this court's interpretation of G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A, as set forth in Commonwealth v. Diggs, 475 
Mass. 79, 80 (2016), allowed the Commonwealth to seek a 
dangerousness hearing in the Superior Court notwithstanding the 
defendant's release on conditions following his arraignment in 
the District Court.  The judge considered and rejected the 
defendant's proffered conditions of release (including 
relocating to a motel), and found "that such conditions do not 
reasonably assure the safety of young children in the 
community."3  See G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3).  Approximately ten 
months later, the defendant filed an emergency petition for 
                     
the potential penalty the person faces, the person's family 
ties, employment record and history of mental illness, his 
reputation, the risk that the person will obstruct or attempt to 
obstruct justice or threaten, injure or intimidate or attempt to 
threaten, injure or intimidate a prospective witness or juror, 
his record of convictions, if any, any illegal drug distribution 
or present drug dependency, whether the person is on bail 
pending adjudication of a prior charge, whether the acts alleged 
involve abuse . . . or violation of a temporary or permanent 
[restraining] order . . . , whether the person has any history 
of [protective] orders issued against him [or her] . . . , [and] 
whether he [or she] is on probation, parole or other release 
pending completion of sentence . . ."). 
 
3 The judge determined that because the defendant could not 
identify a "suitable residence and custodian," the defendant 
would need to reside at a place of public accommodation; the 
judge then concluded that "[i]f children in a large apartment 
building were at risk, as this court has found probable cause to 
believe, children in an unsupervised place of public 
accommodation would also be at risk."  Nonetheless, the 
defendant "remain[ed] free to make a more significant 
presentation of a proffered custodian and residence." 
5 
 
 
interlocutory review in the county court, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, seeking to vacate the order of pretrial detention.  
The single justice reserved and reported the matter to the full 
court. 
 
2.  Discussion.  We confine our review to the legal 
question before us:  the defendant's argument that the 
Commonwealth lacked authority to move to detain him pursuant to 
G. L. c. 276, § 58A, because he was not "under arrest" or 
subject to arrest within the meaning of the statute when he 
appeared in the Superior Court pursuant to a summons.4  See 
Commonwealth v. Giang, 402 Mass. 604, 608 (1988).  We review 
this question of statutory interpretation de novo.  Diggs, 475 
Mass. at 81. 
 
We interpret a statute "according to the intent of the 
Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
                     
4 We note that this opinion likely will be released after 
the completion of the defendant's trial, meaning that the case 
will become moot.  Nonetheless, we address this issue because it 
is "of recurring importance to the administration of justice in 
the Commonwealth," and likely to evade review.  See Commonwealth 
v. Lester L., 445 Mass. 250, 253 (2005); Mendonza v. 
Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 777 (1996). 
6 
 
 
effectuated."  O'Brien v. Director of the Div. of Employment 
Sec., 393 Mass. 482, 487–488 (1984), quoting Industrial Fin. 
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 367 Mass. 360, 364 (1975). 
 
The primary purpose of G. L. c. 276, § 58A, is to 
"protect[] the public from the potential harm posed by persons 
who have been arrested or are subject to arrest, who have been 
found to be dangerous."  Diggs, 475 Mass. at 84.  Accordingly, 
the statute "permits pretrial detention of persons accused of 
certain crimes on the grounds of dangerousness, in order to 
protect public safety."  Commonwealth v. G.F., 479 Mass. 180, 
198 (2018), citing Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 778, 
782, 790 (1996). 
 
As relevant here, G. L. c. 276, § 58A (4), provides in 
pertinent part: 
"When a person is held under arrest for an offense listed 
in subsection (1) and upon a motion by the [C]ommonwealth, 
the judge shall hold a hearing to determine whether 
conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety of 
any other person or the community." 
 
In Diggs, 475 Mass. at 82, we noted that the statute does not 
provide a definition of the phrase "held under arrest," within 
the meaning of this subsection.  We rejected a strictly literal 
interpretation of the phrase, and observed that, in light of the 
statute's primary purpose to protect the public, "it is unlikely 
that the Legislature intended to draw arbitrary distinctions 
between individuals who have been released on bail by a 
7 
 
 
magistrate, those who are arrested and in physical custody, and 
those for whom an arrest warrant has issued, but has not been 
executed."  Id. at 84.  See Commonwealth v. Peterson, 476 Mass. 
163, 167 (2017) ("we do not adhere . . . to a literal reading of 
a statute if doing so would yield an 'absurd' or 'illogical' 
result" [citation omitted]).  We concluded in Diggs. supra at 
80, "that where a criminal defendant has been arrested or is 
subject to an outstanding arrest warrant for an enumerated 
offense, the defendant may be subject to pretrial detention 
under G. L. c. 276, § 58A (4), even if the defendant is not held 
in custody following the arrest, so long as the dangerousness 
hearing takes place 'immediately upon the person's first 
appearance before the court.'" 
 
The defendant nonetheless argues that the Superior Court 
judge lacked authority to detain him under G. L. c. 276, § 58A. 
The defendant maintains that he "was not 'held under arrest' -- 
as the terms of the 'dangerousness' statute requires -- or 
subject to arrest -- as interpreted by Diggs -- when he first 
appeared . . . in the . . . [S]uperior [C]ourt, notwithstanding 
that he was previously arrested and arraigned in the . . . 
[D]istrict [C]ourt."  We do not agree. 
 
The defendant would require the Commonwealth to rearrest 
any individual who previously had been released on conditions 
after a dangerousness hearing in the District Court, or released 
8 
 
 
under G. L. c. 276, § 58, should the Commonwealth seek a 
dangerousness hearing following an indictment and subsequent 
arraignment in the Superior Court.  This argument is unavailing 
and would produce illogical results.  It also is inconsistent 
with our existing precedent.  See Commonwealth v. Murchison, 428 
Mass. 303, 303 (1998) ("The Superior Court must hold a new 
hearing in order to determine whether a defendant previously 
subject to a pretrial detention order in a District Court may be 
detained without bail after an arraignment in the Superior 
Court").  See also Commonwealth v. Parella, 464 Mass. 274, 280 
(2013) ("an indictment and a complaint are the products of two 
distinct procedures, and are not interchangeable labels for the 
commencement of a criminal proceeding"); Commonwealth v. Madden, 
458 Mass. 607, 607 (2010) (Superior Court judge has "authority 
to review and modify pretrial conditions of release imposed on a 
defendant by a District Court judge pursuant to G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58A"); Commesso v. Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 368, 373 (1975) (G. 
L. c. 276, § 58A (4), "requires the Superior Court judge to 
consider the matter anew and to exercise his [or her] own 
judgment and discretion"). 
 
Moreover, subjecting a defendant to arrest is more 
disruptive to that defendant than is a mutual agreement to 
appear in court pursuant to a summons.  The defendant's reading 
would result in increased arrests, and unnecessary use of 
9 
 
 
Commonwealth and court resources, where an arrest may be 
unnecessary.  We discern "nothing in the history or purpose of 
the statute that justifies such an extreme and excessive 
result."  Peterson, 476 Mass. at 168. 
 
When a defendant is indicted, regardless of whether the 
indictment was preceded by a criminal complaint, that defendant 
is subject to the possibility of arrest on those charges if a 
court determines that the defendant is unlikely to "appear upon 
a summons alone."  See Reporters' Notes to Rule 6, Mass. Ann. 
Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1504 
(LexisNexis 2018).5  As the Commonwealth acknowledged at argument 
before us, however, requesting a defendant's presence in court 
through a summons is far preferable to arresting the defendant.  
See id. ("The preference for the issuance of summonses operates 
to conserve law enforcement resources by releasing the police 
for other duties, and conserves the resources of the court and 
parties").  See also Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 
634 (2013) (noting preference for summonses over warrants to 
arrest in juvenile context).  Practically, both an arrest and a 
                     
5 We note that the defendant in this case was indicted on 
two charges (involving the same conduct) for which no complaint 
had been filed in the District Court.  Accordingly, his 
appearance in the Superior Court pursuant to a summons was in 
fact his first appearance in any court with respect to two of 
the charges against him. 
10 
 
 
postindictment summons bring a defendant before a Superior Court 
judge for the first time for arraignment on indicted charges. 
 
Given that G. L. c. 276, § 58A, is intended primarily to 
protect the public, see Diggs, 475 Mass. at 84, citing 1994 
House Doc. No. 4305 and St. 1994, c. 68, the Legislature would 
not have intended to preclude the Commonwealth from being able 
to move for a dangerousness hearing should the Commonwealth seek 
the defendant's presence in court through a summons, as Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 6, 378 Mass. 842 (1979), encourages, where the 
defendant is likely to appear without being arrested.  See E.B. 
Cypher, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 3:35 (4th ed. 2014).  
Accordingly, we clarify that a Superior Court judge has 
authority to conduct a dangerousness hearing pursuant to G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A, regardless of whether a defendant appears before 
the judge for the first time pursuant to a postindictment 
summons or an arrest warrant; in either instance, the 
defendant's first appearance in the Superior Court constitutes a 
"first appearance" within the meaning of Diggs, supra at 85. 
 
The matter is remanded to the county court for entry of an 
order denying the defendant's petition for interlocutory relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.