Case Title: Brooks v. State

Citation: 231 N.E.2d 816, 249 Ind. 291

Docket Number: 30,903

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1967-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
249 Ind. 291 (1967)
231 N.E.2d 816
BROOKS
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,903.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed December 22, 1967.
*292 F. Laurence Anderson, Jr., of Gary, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, John F. Davis, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
HUNTER, J.
This is an appeal in a criminal action wherein the appellant, Foster Brooks, was first charged by affidavit in the Gary City Court as an agent for lottery. The affidavit was drawn under § 10-2302 Burns' Revised Statutes and reads as follows:
The statute under which the affidavit was drawn reads as follows:
The appellant was convicted in the Gary City Court of the offense charged after his motion to suppress the evidence was overruled. Thereafter the appellant filed an appeal bond and appealed the Gary City Court's findings and judgment in the Lake County Criminal Court. Prior to the trial in the Lake Criminal Court, a hearing was had on appellant's motion to suppress the evidence, previously filed in the city court, and upon the same issues raised there. His motion was again overruled. Later a trial to the court was had on the merits and resulted in the Lake Criminal Court finding the appellant guilty. Appellant's penalty was a $100.00 fine plus costs.
Thereafter the appellant filed a timely motion for new trial which was overruled. By his motion for new trial and the assignment of error presented here the appellant asserts the following errors:
The error asserted in this appeal resolves itself into one question: Was the evidence that was essential to the establishment of the offense as charged admissible against the defendant? This question was properly preserved by appellant's motion to suppress the evidence.
The thrust of the appellant's argument in this case centers around the actions and testimony of Gary Police Officer Louis Zervos, the arresting officer, who testified that when he first observed the appellant he saw policy slips hanging out of his pocket and, "I told him he was under arrest after I saw the policy slips hanging out of his pocket." Thus, at the time the arrest was made and before a search was made Officer Zervos had seen nothing more than "policy slips" hanging out of appellant's pocket. It is the appellant's contention that before the officer could make the arrest without a warrant, he would have to have seen a misdemeanor being committed by the appellant.
It has long been settled in this State and elsewhere that a peace officer has authority to make an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor only if the misdemeanor is committed within the view of the peace officer. Ind. Anno. Stat. § 9-1024 (1956 Repl.). Hart v. State (1924), 195 Ind. 384, 145 N.E. 492. Clearly, an unlawful arrest cannot be the foundation for a lawful search. Enlow v. State (1955), 234 Ind. 156, 125 N.E.2d 250.
For this Court to affirm the judgment we would be required to hold as a matter of law that:
With specific reference to No. 1 immediately above it should be noted that upon a careful reading of § 10-2302, supra, mere possession of "policy slips" does not constitute the offense of being an "agent for a lottery" nor does it constitute the offense of aiding or abetting, and therefore, appellant's arrest cannot be validated under that section.
With reference to No. 2 above, Ind. Anno. Stat. § 10-2312 (1956), provides:
It should be noted, however, that the more recent statutory definition of a "gambling device" is found in Ind. Anno. Stat. § 10-2330 (4), (Supp. 1967). We are constrained to hold that "policy slips" are not gambling devices within our statutory definition.
The appellee State cites the case of White v. State (1905), 37 Ind. App. 95, 76 N.E. 554 as support for the declaration that a "policy slip" is a "gambling device" pursuant to Burns' Ind. Anno. Stat. § 10-2312, supra. In White, it was held that a pair of dice constituted a "gambling device." The White case, decided before § 10-2330 (4), supra, was enacted, may or may not still be good law. It is clear, however, that a "policy slip" such as is involved in this case, is not a "gambling device" as contemplated by either § 10-2312, supra, or § 10-2330 (4), supra.
Thus it would seem to be readily apparent from the record in this case that one who merely possesses "policy slips" is not guilty of an offense within the purview of § 10-2302, supra, either as an agent or as aiding and abetting the commission of the offense of operating a lottery. Therefore, the search of the defendant subsequent to his arrest without a warrant was an illegal search and seizure since the arresting officer did not observe the appellant in the commission of a misdemeanor before arresting him.
And since the legislature has neither seen fit to specifically define a "policy slip" as a "gambling device," nor to declare that mere possession of "policy slips" is an offense under the lottery statute § 10-2302, supra, this Court can only hold that the appellant's motion to suppress the evidence should have been sustained by the trial court and, upon that basis, his motion for new trial should have been granted. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court must be reversed.
*297 Judgment reversed.
Jackson, C.J., Arterburn, Lewis, and Mote, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 231 N.E.2d 816.