Case Title: Ohio State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs.

Citation: 2002-Ohio-7213

Docket Number: 20012036

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Ohio State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 98 Ohio 
St.3d 214, 2002-Ohio-7213.] 
 
 
OHIO STATE BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL ET AL., 
APPELLANTS, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Ohio State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs., 98 Ohio St.3d 214, 2002-Ohio-7213.] 
Labor and industry — Public construction projects — Sections 8(e) and (f) of 
the National Labor Relations Act preempt R.C. Chapter 4116 — 
Enforcement of R.C. Chapter 4116 enjoined. 
(No. 2001-2036 — Submitted September 25, 2002 — Decided December 27, 
2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, Nos. 77242 and 77262, 
2001-Ohio-4228. 
_______________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Sections 8(e) and (f) of the National Labor Relations Act, as enacted by the 1959 
Landrum-Griffin Act, Sections 158(e) and (f), Title 29, U.S.Code, preempt 
R.C. Chapter 4116, as enacted by Am.H.B. No. 101 of the 123rd General 
Assembly, which flatly prohibits public authorities from entering into or 
enforcing project labor agreements on public construction projects. 
_______________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶1} 
This action for declaratory and injunctive relief challenges the 
constitutionality of R.C. Chapter 4116, which was enacted by Am.H.B. No. 101 of 
the 123rd General Assembly, effective October 11, 1999, “to prohibit public 
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2 
authorities from imposing certain labor requirements as a condition of performing 
public works.”  Preamble to 1999 Am.H.B. No. 101. 
{¶2} 
The following facts, though gleaned from scant evidence, are 
sufficient for purposes of the present inquiry.  Between September 1998 and July 
1999, defendant-appellee Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners (“board”) 
held several meetings with Loree Kenneth Soggs, executive secretary to plaintiff-
appellant Cleveland Building & Construction Trades Council (“CBCTC”), to 
discuss the propriety of establishing a project labor agreement (“PLA”) to govern 
construction of the county’s proposed new juvenile detention center. 
{¶3} 
As proposed by Soggs, the PLA for the detention center would be 
typical of PLAs that CBCTC had negotiated on other construction projects, which 
generally contain union security clauses, provisions establishing standard work 
rules and prohibiting strikes, lockouts, slowdowns, and other work stoppages 
during the course of construction, a provision regarding the use of CBCTC’s 
hiring halls to supply the project’s labor force, and possibly a requirement that the 
various contractors on site become signatory to individual collective bargaining 
agreements with the affiliated local unions of the CBCTC.  The board would then 
impose a requirement, presumably through its bid specifications and subsequent 
agreements with individual contractors, that “successful bidders agree to enter into 
a project labor agreement * * * [and] that contractors and/or subcontractors on the 
Project agree to abide by [its terms].” 
{¶4} 
In his testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing, Soggs 
indicated that the board was “very receptive” to the idea of developing such an 
agreement for the detention center project and stated that “the commissioners 
individually * * * told me they were in favor of the project labor agreement.”  As 
the board was considering the issue, however, Am.H.B. No. 101 was winding its 
way through the legislative process.  The bill was passed by the Ohio House of 
January Term, 2002 
3 
Representatives on May 12, 1999, and by the Ohio Senate on June 23, 1999.  
When Governor Bob Taft’s intention neither to sign nor veto the bill was 
announced in a release dated June 30, 1999, it was clear that Am.H.B. No. 101 
would become law without his signature pursuant to Section 16, Article II of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
{¶5} 
Accordingly, in a letter dated July 2, 1999, the county’s deputy 
administrator, Lee A. Trotter, informed Soggs as follows: 
{¶6} 
“As you know the County had been working toward developing a 
Project Labor Agreement for its proposed new Juvenile Detention Center since 
1998.  We have had several meetings and exchanged information geared toward 
identifying the key benefits of such an agreement for both the County and The 
Cleveland Building and Construction Trades Council. 
{¶7} 
“We have recently been informed of the passage of H.B. 101, 
prohibiting a public authority from requiring that a bidder, contractor, or 
subcontractor become a party to a project labor agreement as a condition of being 
awarded a public improvement project.  The passage of H.B. 101 prohibits the 
County from pursuing the development and execution of the proposed agreement.  
Should conditions change allowing Project Labor Agreements we will 
immediately revisit this issue.” 
{¶8} 
On September 9, 1999, CBCTC, along with plaintiffs-appellants 
Ohio State Building & Construction Trades Council and International Union of 
Operating Engineers, Local 18, commenced the present action by filing a verified 
complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas against the board and 
defendant-appellee state of Ohio.  The complaint essentially charges that Am.H.B. 
No. 101, as codified at R.C. Chapter 4116, is preempted by the National Labor 
Relations Act (“NLRA”), Section 151 et seq., Title 29, U.S.Code, and, therefore, 
violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 
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{¶9} 
Finding that the NLRA leaves the responsibility for “the 
negotiation and administration of * * * prehire collective bargaining agreements 
[to] labor organizations” and that “[t]hat responsibility * * * is precluded by 
Amended House Bill 101,” the trial court declared R.C. Chapter 4116 invalid 
under the Supremacy Clause and permanently enjoined its enforcement. 
{¶10} In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of 
the trial court.  In so doing, the court of appeals found that R.C. 4116.02 “does not 
on its face or by its application prohibit a public authority from entering into a 
PLA.”  Instead, the statute prohibits a public authority only “from entering into a 
PLA with objectionable terms,” as set forth in R.C. 4116.02(A) and (B).  
According to the appellate court, “a PLA can be drafted without these terms and 
still be valid and enforceable.”  Thus, the court concluded, “there is no real 
controversy that warrants declaratory relief.” 
{¶11} The court of appeals also considered whether the statute would be 
preempted by the NLRA if it were interpreted to preclude a public authority from 
entering into a PLA.  The court concluded that even under this interpretation, “the 
statute is not * * * preempted by the NLRA because the State is not acting as a 
market regulator but rather is acting as a market participant.”  The gist of the 
court’s reasoning is that the state, acting as proprietor, may choose whether to 
enter into a PLA without running afoul of the NLRA, and that this choice need not 
be made on a project-by-project basis.  Instead, the state may do as it has done in 
R.C. Chapter 4116, which is “to choose, in a summary manner, never to enter into 
a PLA on any public construction project when it acts as a market participant.”  
And since “[t]he statute does not impinge on the rights of any [private] entity to 
enter into a PLA * * *, it does not frustrate the intent of Congress to permit the 
use or non-use of PLAs to be ‘controlled by the free play of economic forces.’ “ 
January Term, 2002 
5 
{¶12} The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
{¶13} When Governor Taft announced his intention to allow Am.H.B. 
No. 101 to become law without his signature, he explained: 
{¶14} “I am concerned that this legislation would not survive a 
constitutional challenge based on the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution.  
Our legal research shows the courts have, in the past, found that the regulation of 
project labor agreements is a federal responsibility under the National Labor 
Relations Act and that the state is therefore preempted from legislating in this 
area.”  Communications Release (June 30, 1999), Office of the Governor. 
{¶15} For the reasons that follow, we agree with the Governor’s 
assessment of Am.H.B. No. 101’s constitutionality and hold that Sections 8(e) and 
(f) of the NLRA, as enacted by the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act, Sections 158(e) 
and (f), Title 29, U.S.Code, preempt R.C. Chapter 4116’s blanket prohibition 
against the enforcement of PLAs on public works. 
{¶16} Section 8(e) of the NLRA provides: 
{¶17} “It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and 
any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby 
such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, 
using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other 
employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or 
agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall 
be to such extent unenforcible [sic] and void:  Provided, That nothing in this 
subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an 
employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting 
of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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a building, structure, or other work.”  (Italics sic.)  Section 158(e), Title 29, 
U.S.Code. 
{¶18} Section 8(e) is aimed at so-called “hot cargo” agreements, that is, 
agreements between a union and employer that require the employer to boycott the 
goods or services of another party.  Natl. Labor Relations Bd. v. Internatl. 
Longshoremen’s Assn., AFL-CIO (1985), 473 U.S. 61, 74-75, 105 S.Ct. 3045, 87 
L.Ed.2d 47.  Prior to 1959, the NLRA provided certain protections against 
secondary boycotts, but there were gaps in those protections.  In particular, 
Section 8(b)(4)(A) prohibited a union from engaging in certain concerted activity 
to force an employer to cease doing business with a third party.  See 61 Stat. 141.  
In Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Natl. Labor 
Relations Bd. (1958), 357 U.S. 93, 98-99, 78 S.Ct. 1011, 2 L.Ed.2d 1186 (“Sand 
Door”), the United States Supreme Court indicated that a union was nevertheless 
free to persuade an employer to enter into a hot-cargo agreement so long as it 
refrained from prohibited concerted activity, and that an employer was legally 
permitted to comply with such an agreement as long as compliance was voluntary.  
“Section 8(e), which prohibits hot cargo agreements, was designed to eliminate 
the loophole created by the Sand Door decision.”  Woelke & Romero Framing, 
Inc. v. Natl. Labor Relations Bd. (1982), 456 U.S. 645, 655, 102 S.Ct. 2071, 72 
L.Ed.2d 398. 
{¶19} However, the construction-industry proviso to Section 8(e) was 
inserted to ensure that agreements limiting the contracting of construction site 
work remained legal.  “To the extent that subcontracting agreements were part of 
the pattern of collective bargaining in the construction industry [prior to 1959], 
and lawful, Congress wanted to ensure that they remained lawful.”  Woelke, 456 
U.S. at 657, 102 S.Ct. 2071, 72 L.Ed.2d 398. 
January Term, 2002 
7 
{¶20} In Woelke, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
construction-industry 
proviso 
applied 
to 
protect 
two 
union 
signatory 
subcontracting clauses that were sought or negotiated in the context of a collective 
bargaining relationship.  One of these clauses would have barred a construction 
contractor from subcontracting “any work to be done at the site of construction, * 
* * except to a person, firm or corporation, party to an appropriate, current labor 
agreement with the appropriate Union, or subordinate body signatory to this 
Agreement.”  Id., 456 U.S. at 649, 102 S.Ct. 2071, 72 L.Ed.2d 398, fn. 1.  The 
other provided that “[e]mployers shall not contract any work covered by this 
Agreement to be done at the site of the construction * * * to any person, firm or 
company who does not have an existing labor agreement with the Union covering 
such work.”  Id., 456 U.S. at 650, 102 S.Ct. 2071, 72 L.Ed.2d 398, fn. 3.  Finding 
“ample evidence [in the legislative history] that Congress believed that union 
signatory contract clauses of the type at issue here were part of the pattern of 
collective bargaining in the construction industry,” the court in Woelke affirmed 
the decision of the court of appeals “insofar as it holds that the clauses at issue 
here were sheltered by the proviso.”  Id., 456 U.S. at 666, 102 S.Ct. 2071, 72 
L.Ed.2d 398. 
{¶21} Section 8(f), which was also added to the NLRA by the 1959 
Landrum-Griffin Act, Section 158(f), Title 29, U.S.Code, states: 
{¶22} “It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and 
(b) of this section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and 
construction industry to make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, 
upon their employment, will be engaged) in the building and construction industry 
with a labor organization of which building and construction employees are 
members * * * because (1) the majority status of such labor organization has not 
been established under the provisions of Section 9 of this Act [Section 159, Title 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
29, U.S.Code] prior to the making of such agreement, or (2) such agreement 
requires as a condition of employment, membership in such labor organization 
after the seventh day following the beginning of such employment or the effective 
date of the agreement, whichever is later, or (3) such agreement requires the 
employer to notify such labor organization of opportunities for employment with 
such employer, or gives such labor organization an opportunity to refer qualified 
applicants for such employment, or (4) such agreement specifies minimum 
training or experience qualifications for employment or provides for priority in 
opportunities for employment based upon length of service with such employer, in 
the industry or in the particular geographical area: * * * Provided further, That 
any agreement which would be invalid, but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall 
not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to Section 9(c) or 9(e) [Section 159(c) or 
(e), Title 29, U.S.Code].”  (Italics sic.) 
{¶23} Section 8(f) authorizes so-called “prehire” agreements in the 
construction industry.  “Thus, § 8(f) allows construction industry employers and 
unions to enter into agreements setting the terms and conditions of employment 
for the workers hired by the signatory employer without the union’s majority 
status first having been established in the manner provided for under § 9 of the 
Act.”  Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd (1983), 461 U.S. 260, 266, 103 S.Ct. 1753, 75 
L.Ed.2d 830. 
{¶24} Although not entirely coincident, there is a corresponding 
relationship between the requirements that Section 8(f) permits to be imposed 
under a prehire agreement and the union signatory subcontracting clauses that are 
sheltered by the construction industry proviso to Section 8(e).  On the one hand, 
unions often seek protected Section 8(e) subcontracting clauses as part of a 
Section 8(f) prehire agreement.  Indeed, Section 8(f) agreements are “the most 
common and possibly the only effective means by which such [subcontracting 
January Term, 2002 
9 
clauses] may be obtained.”  Donald Schriver, Inc. v. Natl. Labor Relations Bd. 
(C.A.D.C.1980), 635 F.2d 859, 875.  On the other hand, “[w]hen a union obtains a 
subcontracting clause from a general contractor, subcontractors frequently attempt 
to ensure that they remain eligible for work by entering into a § 8(f) agreement—
known as a prehire agreement—with the union.”  Woelke, supra, 456 U.S. at 664, 
102 S.Ct. 2071, 72 L.Ed.2d 398. 
{¶25} In Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Assoc. 
Builders & Contrs. of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc. (1993), 507 U.S. 218, 
230-231, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565 (“Boston Harbor”), the high court 
explained: 
{¶26} “In 1959, Congress amended the NLRA to add § 8(f) and modify § 
8(e).  Section 8(f) explicitly permits employers in the construction industry—but 
no other employers—to enter into prehire agreements.  Prehire agreements are 
collective-bargaining agreements providing for union recognition, compulsory 
union dues or equivalents, and mandatory use of union hiring halls, prior to the 
hiring of any employees.  [Assoc. Builders & Contrs. of Massachusetts/Rhode 
Island v. Massachusetts Water Resources Auth.] 935 F.2d [345], at 356 [1991] 
[case below]; Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 265-266 [103 S.Ct. 1753, 
75 L.Ed.2d 830] (1983).  The 1959 amendment adding a proviso to subsection (e) 
permits a general contractor’s prehire agreement to require an employer not to hire 
other contractors performing work on that particular project site unless they agree 
to become bound by the terms of that labor agreement.  See Woelke & Romero 
Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 657 [102 S.Ct. 2071, 72 L.Ed.2d 398] 
(1982).  Section 8(f) contains a final provision that permits employees, once hired, 
to utilize the NLRB election process under §§ 9(c) and (e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.  
§§ 159(c) and (e), if they wish to reject the bargaining representative or to cancel 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
the union security provisions of the prehire agreement.  See NLRB v. Iron 
Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 345 [98 S.Ct. 651, 54 L.Ed.2d 586] (1978). 
{¶27} “* * * 
{¶28} “It is evident from the face of the statute that in enacting 
exemptions authorizing certain kinds of project labor agreements in the 
construction industry, Congress intended to accommodate conditions specific to 
that industry.  Such conditions include, among others, the short-term nature of 
employment which makes posthire collective bargaining difficult, the contractor’s 
need for predictable costs and a steady supply of skilled labor, and a long-standing 
custom of prehire bargaining in the industry.  See S.Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 28, 55-56 (1959); H.R.Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 19-20 (1959) 
[1959 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News p. 2318].” 
{¶29} The prehire collective bargaining agreement that was held to be a 
valid labor contract under Sections 8(e) and (f) in Boston Harbor was a PLA 
prescribing the terms and conditions of employment at a public construction site.  
That agreement, which was negotiated between the project manager and the 
building and construction trades council (“BCTC”) and then incorporated into a 
Massachusetts state agency’s solicitation of project bids, contained the following 
requirements:  “recognition of BCTC as the exclusive bargaining agent for all 
craft employees; use of specified methods for resolving all labor-related disputes; 
a requirement that all employees be subject to union-security provisions 
compelling them to become union members within seven days of their 
employment; the primary use of BCTC’s hiring halls to supply the project’s craft 
labor force; a 10-year no-strike commitment; and a requirement that all 
contractors and subcontractors agree to be bound by the Agreement.”  Id., 507 
U.S. at 221-222, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565.  Quoting Chief Judge Breyer’s 
dissent in the court of appeals, the Supreme Court found that this is “ ‘the very 
January Term, 2002 
11 
sort of labor agreement that Congress explicitly authorized and expected 
frequently to find.’ ”  Id., 507 U.S. at 233, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565. 
{¶30} This is also the very sort of labor agreement that the board was 
attempting to negotiate with CBCTC when Am.H.B. No. 101 was passed by the 
General Assembly and forwarded to the Governor.  As enacted by Am.H.B. No. 
101, R.C. 4116.02 provides: 
{¶31} “A public authority, when engaged in procuring products or 
services, awarding contracts, or overseeing procurement or construction for public 
improvements, shall ensure that bid specifications issued by the public authority 
for the proposed public improvement, and any subsequent contract or other 
agreement for the public improvement to which the public authority and a 
contractor or subcontractor are direct parties, do not require a contractor or 
subcontractor to do any of the following: 
{¶32} “(A) Enter into agreements with any labor organization on the 
public improvement; 
{¶33} “(B) Enter into any agreement that requires the employees of that 
contractor or subcontractor to do either of the following as a condition of 
employment or continued employment: 
{¶34} “(1) Become members of or affiliated with a labor organization; 
{¶35} “(2) Pay dues or fees to a labor organization.” 
{¶36} R.C. 4116.03 provides: 
{¶37} “No public authority shall do any of the following: 
{¶38} “(A) Award a contract for a public improvement in violation of 
section 4116.02 of the Revised Code; 
{¶39} “(B) Discriminate against any bidder, contractor, or subcontractor 
for refusing to become a party to any agreement with any labor organization on 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the public improvement that currently is under bid or on projects related to that 
improvement; 
{¶40} “(C) Otherwise violate section 4116.02 of the Revised Code.” 
{¶41} Yet the court of appeals found no “real controversy” in this case 
because R.C. Chapter 4116 “does not * * * prohibit a public authority from 
entering into a PLA.”  Instead, the court found that the statute restricts a public 
authority only from “entering into a PLA with objectionable terms,” that is, a PLA 
that requires a contractor or its employees to do any of those things listed in R.C. 
4116.02(A) and (B).  The court reasoned that “these very terms are [not] essential 
to * * * an effective PLA.  On the contrary, a PLA can be drafted without these 
terms and still be valid and enforceable.”  Thus, “the statute’s restrictions do not 
effectively prohibit a public authority from entering into a PLA.” 
{¶42} This result is surprising, considering that the sponsor of Am.H.B. 
No. 101, Rep. Ron Young (R-Leroy), in his testimony for the bill before the 
House Commerce and Labor Committee, specifically maintained that “[t]his 
important legislation will prohibit so-called ‘project labor agreements’ in the State 
of Ohio” and then proceeded to argue at length as to why “project labor 
agreements should be prohibited in Ohio.” 
{¶43} In any event, we fail to see the relevance of hypothetical prehire 
agreements that neither trigger the prohibitions in R.C. 4116.02 nor require the 
shelter of the construction industry exceptions in Section 8 of the NLRA.  This 
case does not involve some abstract or theoretical PLA that imposes none of the 
requirements or restrictions prohibited under R.C. Chapter 4116.  In this case, the 
board and CBCTC were attempting to negotiate an agreement that would 
incorporate the very requirements that the statute prohibits.  They are now asking 
whether the NLRA preempts the state from prohibiting this specific type of 
January Term, 2002 
13 
agreement and, with all due respect to the court of appeals, it is no answer to tell 
them that R.C. Chapter 4116 permits a different type of agreement. 
{¶44} As others have observed, the court of appeals’ position in this case 
“might be reasonable but for the fact that these ‘objectionable terms’ prohibited 
by [R.C. Chapter 4116] * * * are precisely the sorts of outcomes guaranteed to the 
construction industry through NLRA 8[f] pre-hire agreements.”  John Lund and 
Joe Oswald, Public Project Labor Agreements:  Lessons Learned, New Directions 
(Fall 2001), 26 Lab.Stud.J. 1, 3.  Regardless of whether R.C. Chapter 4116 leaves 
public authorities free to enforce some hypothetical PLA that is not involved in 
the present controversy, the fact remains that the statute expressly prohibits “the 
very sort of labor agreement that Congress explicitly authorized and expected 
frequently to find.”  Boston Harbor, supra, 507 U.S. at 233, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 
L.Ed.2d 565.  Thus, we find that there is a “real controversy” in this case as to 
whether R.C. Chapter 4116 is preempted by the NLRA. 
{¶45} Accordingly, it must be decided whether the NLRA precludes state 
regulation of PLAs in the construction industry and, if so, whether R.C. Chapter 
4116 is tantamount to regulation or constitutes proprietary conduct on the part of 
the state. 
{¶46} “Congress’ power to pre-empt state law is derived from the 
Supremacy Clause of Art. VI of the Federal Constitution.”  Allis-Chalmers Corp. 
v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 208, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206.  “In any case 
concerning preemption, congressional purpose must be the ultimate focus.  
Malone v. White Motor Corp. (1978), 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 1189-
1190, 55 L.Ed.2d 443, 450.  The National Labor Relations Act (‘NLRA’) contains 
no express preemption provision.  ‘Where the pre-emptive effect of federal 
enactments is not explicit, “courts sustain a local regulation ‘unless it conflicts 
with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme, or unless the courts discern 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
from the totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field to 
the exclusion of the States.’ “ ‘  Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts (1985), 471 
U.S. 724, 747-748, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 2393, 85 L.Ed.2d 728, 745, quoting Allis-
Chalmers Corp. [supra], 471 U.S. [at] 209, 105 S.Ct. [at] 1910, 85 L.Ed.2d [at] 
213-214.”  J.A. Croson Co. v. J.A. Guy, Inc. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 346, 350, 691 
N.E.2d 655. 
{¶47} But deciphering the extent to which national policy under the 
NLRA displaces state law requires “a more complicated and perceptive process 
than is conveyed by the delusive phrase, ‘ascertaining the intent of the legislature.’ 
“  San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon 
(1959), 359 U.S. 236, 239-240, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775.  Congress has 
established in the NLRA a comprehensive and integrated regulatory framework.  
In its attempt to devise workable NLRA preemption rules, the Supreme Court has 
necessarily “been concerned with conflict in its broadest sense; conflict with a 
complex and interrelated federal scheme of law, remedy, and administration.”  Id., 
359 U.S. at 243, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775. 
{¶48} Under this scheme, “Congress has entrusted administration of the 
labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency [the National 
Labor Relations Board], armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its 
specialized knowledge and cumulative experience.”  Id. at 242, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 
L.Ed.2d 775.  Thus, “Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law 
to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. * * 
* Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially 
designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its 
substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a 
variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies.”  Garner v. 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776 (1953), 346 U.S. 485, 
January Term, 2002 
15 
490, 74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228.  The rationale for NLRA preemption, therefore, 
is based largely on the notion that “when it set down a federal labor policy 
Congress plainly meant to do more than simply to alter the then-prevailing 
substantive law.  It sought as well to restructure fundamentally the processes for 
effectuating that policy.”  Amalgamated Assn. of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach 
Emp. of Am. v. Lockridge (1971), 403 U.S. 274, 288, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 29 L.Ed.2d 
473. 
{¶49} Nevertheless, Congress has neither exercised its full authority to 
occupy the entire field in the area of labor relations nor clearly delineated the 
extent to which state regulation must yield to this subordinating federal 
legislation.  See Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 468, 480-481, 75 
S.Ct. 480, 99 L.Ed. 546.  As the high court went on to explain in Lockridge, 
supra, 403 U.S. at 289-291, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 29 L.Ed.2d 473: 
{¶50} “This has, quite frankly, left the Court with few available options.  
We cannot declare pre-empted all local regulation that touches or concerns in any 
way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers, and unions; 
obviously, much of this is left to the States.  Nor can we proceed on a case-by-
case basis to determine whether each particular final judicial pronouncement does, 
or might reasonably be thought to, conflict in some relevant manner with federal 
labor policy.  This Court is ill-equipped to play such a role and the federal system 
dictates that this problem be solved with a rule capable of relatively easy 
application * * *.  Further, it is surely not possible for this Court to treat the 
National Labor Relations Act section by section, committing enforcement of some 
of its provisions wholly to the NLRB and others to the concurrent domain of local 
law.  Nothing in the language or underlying purposes of the Act suggests any basis 
for such distinctions.  Finally, treating differently judicial power to deal with 
conduct protected by the Act from that prohibited by it would likewise be 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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unsatisfactory.  Both areas equally involve conduct whose legality is governed by 
federal law, the application of which Congress committed to the Board, not 
courts. 
{¶51} “* * * In fact, varying approaches were taken by the Court in 
initially grappling with this pre-emption problem.  Thus, for example, some early 
cases suggested the true distinction lay between judicial application of general 
common law, which was permissible, as opposed to state rules specifically 
designed to regulate labor relations, which were pre-empted. * * * Others made 
pre-emption turn on whether the States purported to apply a remedy not provided 
for by the federal scheme, * * * while in still others the Court undertook a 
thorough scrutiny of the federal Act to ascertain whether the state courts had, in 
fact, arrived at conclusions inconsistent with its provisions * * *.  For the reasons 
outlined above none of these approaches proved satisfactory, however, and each 
was ultimately abandoned.  It was, in short, experience—not pure logic—which 
initially taught that each of these methods sacrificed important federal interests in 
a uniform law of labor relations centrally administered by an expert agency 
without yielding anything in return by way of predictability or ease of judicial 
application. 
{¶52} “The failure of alternative analyses and the interplay of the 
foregoing policy considerations, then, led this Court to hold in Garmon, 359 U.S., 
at 244 [79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775]: 
{¶53} “ ‘When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities 
which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor 
Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the 
federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield.  To leave the States 
free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal regulation 
January Term, 2002 
17 
involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and 
requirements imposed by state law.’ “  (Footnote omitted.) 
{¶54} This line of preemption analysis, which is known as “Garmon 
preemption,” “protects the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB to determine in the 
first instance what kind of conduct is either prohibited or protected by the 
NLRA.”  Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, supra, 471 U.S. at 748, 105 S.Ct. 
2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728.  When an activity “is arguably within the compass of § 7 or 
§ 8 of the Act, the State’s jurisdiction is displaced.”  Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246, 79 
S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775.  States may not, therefore, “regulate activity that the 
NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits.”  Wisconsin Dept. of 
Industry, Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc. (1986), 475 U.S. 282, 286, 106 
S.Ct. 1057, 89 L.Ed.2d 223. 
{¶55} Garmon preemption does not, of course, apply where the activity 
sought to be locally regulated falls beyond the arguable reach of Sections 7 and 8 
of the NLRA.  But it does not necessarily follow that activities ungoverned by 
these sections are, therefore, controllable by the states.  The NLRA does more 
than indicate Congress’s desire for centralized administration and uniformity in 
the application of its provisions.  It also reveals that certain concerted activities 
were intentionally left unprotected and unrestricted under the Act because 
Congress meant for them to be unfettered by the exercise of any governmental or 
regulatory power, including that of the NLRB.  “By the Taft-Hartley Act, * * * 
Congress formulated a code whereby it outlawed some aspects of labor activities 
and left others free for the operation of economic forces.”  Weber v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., supra, 348 U.S. at 480, 75 S.Ct. 480, 99 L.Ed. 546. 
{¶56} Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized “a second line of pre-
emption analysis * * * in cases focusing upon the crucial inquiry whether 
Congress intended that the conduct involved be unregulated because left ‘to be 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
controlled by the free play of economic forces.’ “  Lodge 76, Internatl. Assn. of 
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations Comm. 
(1976), 427 U.S. 132, 140, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 49 L.Ed.2d 396 (“Machinists”), quoting 
Natl. Labor Relations Bd. v. Nash-Finch Co. (1971), 404 U.S. 138, 144, 92 S.Ct. 
373, 30 L.Ed.2d 328.  This analysis reflects the NLRA’s broader purpose of 
restoring an equality of bargaining power between labor and management and is 
invoked primarily in cases involving the use of certain self-help economic 
weapons to which the parties occasionally resort in an effort to advance their 
respective bargaining goals.  See Machinists, 427 U.S. 132, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 49 
L.Ed.2d 396 (concerted refusal to work overtime); Gould, supra, 475 U.S. at 290, 
106 S.Ct. 1057, 89 L.Ed.2d 223 (boycott of repeat labor law violators).  States are 
prohibited from imposing additional restrictions on economic weapons of self-
help such as strikes or lockouts.  Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles 
(1986), 475 U.S. 608, 615, 106 S.Ct. 1395, 89 L.Ed.2d 616 (“Golden State I”); 
Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union v. Morton (1964), 377 U.S. 
252, 84 S.Ct. 1253, 12 L.Ed.2d 280 (peaceful secondary picketing). 
{¶57} As explained in Machinists, “[T]hese activities, whether of 
employer or employees, were not to be regulable by States any more than by the 
NLRB, for neither States nor the Board is ‘afforded flexibility in picking and 
choosing which economic devices of labor and management shall be branded as 
unlawful.’  [Natl. Labor Relations Bd. v. Ins. Agents’ Internatl. Union, AFL-CIO 
(1960), 361 U.S. 477, 498, 80 S.Ct. 419, 4 L.Ed.2d 454.]  Rather, both are without 
authority to attempt to ‘introduce some standard of properly “balanced” 
bargaining power,’ [id. at 497, 80 S.Ct. 419, 4 L.Ed.2d 454] or to define ‘what 
economic sanctions might be permitted negotiating parties in an “ideal” or 
“balanced” state of collective bargaining.’  [Id. at 500, 80 S.Ct. 419, 4 L.Ed.2d 
454.]”  Machinists, 427 U.S. at 149-150, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 49 L.Ed.2d 396.  Thus, 
January Term, 2002 
19 
“[t]he Machinists rule creates a free zone from which all regulation * * * is 
excluded.”  Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles (1989), 493 U.S. 103, 111, 
110 S.Ct. 444, 107 L.Ed.2d 420 (“Golden State II”). 
{¶58} We are initially urged by the state to find that neither Garmon nor 
Machinists provides the appropriate analytic framework for deciding this case.  
According to the state, “Garmon preemption does not apply to activity that is 
merely permissible under section 8 of the NLRA,” but instead applies only to 
“activity protected by section 7 of the NLRA.”  Thus, the state reasons, “Garmon 
preemption does not preempt R.C. [Chapter] 4116” because “prehire agreements * 
* * [are not] protected pursuant to section 7.”  We disagree. 
{¶59} As our discussion of Garmon and its progeny indicates, the various 
references made by the Supreme Court to those activities “protected by § 7” or 
“prohibited under § 8” are not by way of limitation.  The high court has time and 
again varied the language it used to indicate that this form of preemption applies 
when an activity is, e.g., “covered” or “governed by” “the subject of,” or 
“arguably” or “potentially subject to” or “within the compass of § 7 or § 8.”  In 
any event, there is certainly nothing that prevents Congress from choosing to 
protect an activity by way of exemption under Section 8 rather than by inclusion 
in Section 7, and we doubt seriously that the high court would, or could, preclude 
Congress from structuring its own legislation.  Moreover, it was the very 
construction-industry provisions embodied in Section 8 of the NLRA that the high 
court was relying on when it stated in Boston Harbor that “Congress explicitly 
authorized” PLAs.  Id., 507 U.S. at 233, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565. 
{¶60} The state also maintains that “Machinists preemption is completely 
inapplicable to R.C. [Chapter] 4116.”  According to the state, this form of 
preemption applies only where there is a labor dispute, and since appellants “have 
never identified a labor dispute * * * involving the negotiation of a PLA for the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
Cuyahoga County Juvenile Detention/Intervention Center * * *, there [is no] 
occasion * * * to consider whether Machinists preemption applies to R.C. 
[Chapter] 4116.”  The state takes the position that the Machinists rule is designed 
and applies only to protect against the regulation of “particular economic 
weapons, such as strikes and lockouts” and challenges appellants “to explain how 
PLAs constitute economic weapons.”  Moreover, the state continues, “economic 
weapons describe tactics,” whereas “union-only PLAs are not a tactic at all, but 
rather an outcome.” 
{¶61} The problem with the state’s analysis is that it draws on certain 
principles that are ultimately incompatible with its current position.  The NLRA’s 
stated purpose is to remedy “[t]he inequality of bargaining power between 
employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of 
contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of 
ownership association.”  Section 151, Title 29, U.S.Code.  The NLRA seeks to 
restore a more equitable balance of bargaining power “by encouraging the practice 
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers 
of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of 
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and 
conditions of their employment.”  Id.  In Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA (Sections 
157 and 158, Title 29, U.S.Code) Congress established a desired balance of 
bargaining power by protecting certain labor activities, prohibiting others, and 
leaving still others to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.  The 
Machinists doctrine protects activity in the third category against governmental 
regulation so as to preserve the balance of power that Congress has struck 
between labor and management in the NLRA. 
{¶62} In Machinists, the court explained that “state attempts to influence 
the substantive terms of collective-bargaining agreements are * * * inconsistent 
January Term, 2002 
21 
with the federal regulatory scheme * * *.  And indubitably regulation * * * of ‘the 
choice of economic weapons that may be used as part of collective bargaining 
[exerts] considerable influence upon the substantive terms on which the parties 
contract.’ “  Id., 427 U.S. at 153, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 49 L.Ed.2d 396, quoting Natl. 
Labor Relations Bd. v. Ins. Agents’, supra, 361 U.S. at 490, 80 S.Ct. 419, 4 
L.Ed.2d 454.  The Supreme Court has since noted, however, that while “[s]uch 
analysis initially had been used to determine whether certain weapons of 
bargaining neither protected by § 7 nor forbidden by § 8(b) could be subject to 
state regulation * * *, [i]t has been used more recently to determine the validity of 
state rules of general application that affect the right to bargain or to self-
organization.”  Metro. Life Ins. Co., supra, 471 U.S. at 749, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 
L.Ed.2d 728, fn. 27. 
{¶63} In determining whether state laws of general application are 
preempted under Machinists, the Supreme Court has indeed recognized that a 
distinction should be drawn between state regulation that interferes with the 
collective bargaining process itself and state regulation that affects only the 
substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements.  “The NLRA is concerned 
primarily with establishing an equitable process for determining terms and 
conditions of employment, and not with particular substantive terms of the 
bargain that is struck when the parties are negotiating from relatively equal 
positions.”  Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 753, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728.  Thus, 
there is no inconsistency between the NLRA, which is “designed to restore the 
equality of bargaining power, and state or federal legislation that imposes minimal 
substantive requirements on contract terms negotiated between parties to labor 
agreements, at least so long as the purpose of the state legislation is not 
incompatible with these general goals of the NLRA.”  Id., 471 U.S. at 754-755, 
105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
{¶64} These same principles dictate a different result, however, with 
regard to the attempted regulation of PLAs in the construction industry.  Given the 
1959 amendments to the NLRA that added the construction industry exemptions 
to Section 8, it cannot be said that Congress is unconcerned with the substantive 
terms of construction-industry PLAs.  To the contrary, these provisions not only 
address and authorize particular terms and conditions of employment, but also 
reflect Congress’s intent to strike a slightly different balance of power in order to 
accommodate conditions endemic to that industry.  In this regard, we are no 
longer attempting to ascertain the implications of congressional silence, which is 
usually the situation in a Machinists analysis.  Instead, we are dealing with an 
explicit congressional directive to leave construction-industry PLAs to the 
operation of economic forces. 
{¶65} Moreover, state laws of general application usually withstand 
Machinists scrutiny because “[m]ost significantly, there is no suggestion in the 
legislative history of the Act that Congress intended to disturb the myriad state 
laws then in existence that set minimum labor standards, but were unrelated in any 
way to the processes of bargaining or self-organization.”  Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 
U.S. at 756, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728.  In contrast, Congress believed that 
PLAs were both lawful and part of the bargaining process in the construction 
industry prior to 1959, and enacted the construction-industry exemptions 
specifically to preserve this pattern and practice.  Any state regulatory action that 
interferes with this pattern of collective bargaining in the construction industry 
would, therefore, be incompatible with the goals of the NLRA. 
{¶66} Thus, it is of little consequence whether a PLA is characterized as 
“an outcome” or an “economic weapon,” for it is exactly the sort of practice that 
Congress has preserved for the construction industry.  And in any event, the 
Supreme Court has already indicated that a Machinists analysis would apply in 
January Term, 2002 
23 
determining the validity of regulatory prohibitions of public-construction PLAs.  
See Boston Harbor, supra, 507 U.S. at 232, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565. 
{¶67} The state also argues that even if the NLRA is deemed to authorize 
certain kinds of PLAs in the construction industry, there is no indication that the 
1959 amendments “were intended to codify any activity other than labor 
organizations’ direct dealings with private sector contractors and subcontractors.”  
Similarly, amicus curiae Ohio Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., argues that 
“[b]ecause §§ 8(e) and 8(f) apply only to ‘employers,’ and public entities are not 
‘employers’ under the NLRA, the provisions applicable to ‘employers in the 
construction industry’ found in §§ 8(e) and (f) simply do not apply [to] the State 
of Ohio and its political subdivisions.” 
{¶68} However, as the high court explained in Boston Harbor, “Of 
course, the exceptions provided for the construction industry in §§ 8(e) and (f), 
like the prohibitions from which they provide relief, are not made specifically 
applicable to the State.  This is because the State is excluded from the definition 
of the term ‘employer’ under the NLRA, see 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) * * *.  
Nevertheless, the general goals behind passage of §§ 8(e) and (f) are still relevant 
to determining what Congress intended with respect to the State and its 
relationship to the agreements authorized by these sections.”  Id., 507 U.S. at 230-
231, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565. 
{¶69} At this juncture, we must conclude that Section 8(f) and the 
construction-industry proviso to Section 8(e) are clear manifestations of 
Congress’s intent to preclude the states from regulating PLAs in the construction 
industry.  Whether Congress also intended to preclude the NLRB from doing so is 
not an issue we need to decide.  The jurisdiction of the NLRB to regulate 
construction-industry PLAs is not implicated in the present controversy.  Thus, it 
makes no further difference whether we engage in a Garmon or Machinists 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
analysis.  The application of either rule necessitates a withdrawal of state power, 
except where the state acts as a market participant. 
{¶70} This brings us to the final and decisive issue in this case, which is 
whether R.C. Chapter 4116 amounts to government regulation or constitutes 
proprietary conduct on the part of the state. 
{¶71} In Boston Harbor, the Supreme Court held that the NLRA does not 
prevent a state agency from enforcing a PLA covering a particular public project.  
In so holding, the court explained: 
{¶72} “When we say that the NLRA pre-empts state law, we mean that 
the NLRA prevents a State from regulating within a protected zone, whether it be 
a zone protected and reserved for market freedom, see Machinists, or for NLRB 
jurisdiction, see Garmon.  A State does not regulate, however, simply by acting 
within one of these protected areas.  When a State owns and manages property, for 
example, it must interact with private participants in the marketplace.  In so doing, 
the State is not subject to pre-emption by the NLRA, because pre-emption 
doctrines apply only to state regulation.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id., 507 U.S. at 226-
227, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565. 
{¶73} The Supreme Court found that its “decisions in this area support 
the distinction between government as regulator and government as proprietor.”  
Id. at 227, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565.  The high court also found that the 
differences between private and state action “are far less significant when the 
State acts as a market participant with no interest in setting policy.”  Id. at 229, 
113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565.  The court then posed the question “whether a 
State may act without offending the pre-emption principles of the NLRA when it 
acts as a proprietor and its acts therefore are not ‘tantamount to regulation’ or 
policymaking.”  Id. 
{¶74} Answering this question in the affirmative, the court explained: 
January Term, 2002 
25 
{¶75} “Permitting the States to participate freely in the marketplace is not 
only consistent with NLRA pre-emption principles generally but also, in these 
cases, promotes the legislative goals that animated the passage of the §§ 8(e) and 
(f) exceptions for the construction industry. 
{¶76} “* * * 
{¶77} “There is no reason to expect these defining features of the 
construction industry to depend upon the public or private nature of the entity 
purchasing contracting services.  To the extent that a private purchaser may 
choose a contractor based upon that contractor’s willingness to enter into a prehire 
agreement, a public entity as purchaser should be permitted to do the same.  
Confronted with such a purchaser, those contractors who do not normally enter 
such agreements are faced with a choice.  They may alter their usual mode of 
operation to secure the business opportunity at hand, or seek business from 
purchasers whose perceived needs do not include a project labor agreement.  In 
the absence of any express or implied indication by Congress that a State may not 
manage its own property when it pursues its purely proprietary interests, and 
where analogous private conduct would be permitted, this Court will not infer 
such a restriction.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id., 507 U.S. at 230 and 231-232, 113 S.Ct. 
1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565. 
{¶78} Critically, however, Boston Harbor suggests that a state would be 
acting as a regulator or policymaker, rather than as a purchaser, proprietor, or 
market participant, were it to impose an across-the-board rule that either requires 
or prohibits the use of PLAs on all public construction projects.  Thus, the court 
carefully noted, on the one hand, that “the challenged action in this litigation was 
specifically tailored to one particular job, the Boston Harbor cleanup project,” and 
indicated, on the other hand, that “denying an option to public owner-developers 
that is available to private owner-developers itself places a restriction on 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
Congress’ intended free play of economic forces identified in Machinists.”  
Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 232, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565. 
{¶79} Several courts considering this issue have reached similar 
conclusions.  In United States Chamber of Commerce v. Reich (C.A.D.C.1996), 
74 F.3d 1322, the court held that the NLRA preempted a 1995 executive order 
issued by former President Clinton that barred the contracting agencies of the 
federal government from contracting with employers who permanently replace 
lawfully striking workers.  The district court had upheld the executive order, 
finding that NLRA preemption is inapplicable because the government was acting 
in a proprietary capacity.  According to the appellate court, the district court had 
interpreted Boston Harbor “as suggesting that if a private contractor were 
permitted to refuse to buy goods from an employer who permanently replaced 
strikers—which ordinarily he would be—then so should the federal government.”  
Id., 74 F.3d at 1336.  The government, in its arguments, had referred by analogy to 
two executive orders that were issued by former President Bush in 1992, one of 
which barred government contractors from entering into Section 8(f) prehire 
agreements, but neither of which had ever been challenged in court. 
{¶80} In dealing with these contentions, the appellate court explained as 
follows: 
{¶81} “The premise on which the [Boston Harbor] Court’s * * * analysis 
[of the character of the state’s actions] rested, then, was that the Massachusetts 
governmental entity [the Water Resources Authority], was not seeking to set 
general policy in the Commonwealth; it was just trying to operate as if it were an 
ordinary general contractor whose actions were ‘specifically tailored to one 
particular job, the Boston Harbor clean-up project.’  Id. at 232, 113 S.Ct. at 1198, 
122 L.Ed.2d 565.  Surely, the result would have been entirely different, given the 
Court’s reasoning, if Massachusetts had passed a general law or the Governor had 
January Term, 2002 
27 
issued an Executive Order requiring all construction contractors doing business 
with the state to enter into collective bargaining agreements with the BCTC or its 
Massachusetts-wide counterpart containing § 8(e) pre-hire agreements.  
Accordingly, we very much doubt the legality of President Bush’s Executive 
Order 12,818—since revoked, but upon which the government relies—that 
banned government contractors from entering into pre-hire agreements under § 
8(f). 
{¶82} “It does not seem to us possible to deny that the President’s 
Executive Order [in this case] seeks to set a broad [labor] policy * * *.  The 
President has, of course, acted to set procurement policy rather than labor policy.  
But the former is quite explicitly based—and would have to be based—on his 
views of the latter. * * * Whatever one’s views on the issue, it surely goes to the 
heart of United States labor relations policy.  It cannot be equated to the ad hoc 
contracting decision made by MWRA in seeking to clean up Boston Harbor.”  
(Footnotes omitted.)  Id., 74 F.3d at 1336-1337. 
{¶83} In Colfax Corp. v. Illinois State Toll Hwy. Auth. (C.A.7, 1996), 79 
F.3d 631, the court determined that the NLRA does not prevent the Authority 
from entering into a multiproject labor agreement that requires successful bidders 
to become parties to areawide collective bargaining agreements with the unions 
having jurisdiction over the relevant work.  Despite the scope of these agreements, 
the court found them to be more akin to the job-specific agreement allowed in 
Boston Harbor than the debarment statute struck down in Gould.  “The case 
before us * * * is much more like ‘Boston Harbor.’  Illinois has not enacted a 
statute [requiring PLAs on all public projects].  The Authority has not passed 
[such] a general rule.”  Id., 79 F.3d at 634.  The court cautioned, however, that it 
would refrain from questioning the Authority’s motives in these kinds of cases 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
only “[s]o long as * * * the frontier is pushed no farther from ‘Boston Harbor’ 
than it is here.”  Id., 79 F.3d at 635. 
{¶84} In Assoc. Builders & Contrs., Inc. v. San Francisco Airports 
Comm. (1999), 21 Cal.4th 352, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 981 P.2d 499, the Supreme 
Court of California held that the Airports Commission did not violate that state’s 
statute declaring the right of self-organization when it entered into a PLA in order 
to complete an expansion and renovation project involving the San Francisco 
International Airport.  In so holding, the court explained that “ABC’s argument 
fails to come to terms with the supremacy of federal labor law, embodied in 29 
United States Code section 158(f), which permits prehire agreements in the 
construction industry.  Any California law purporting to bar such agreements 
would raise serious questions of preemption under Machinists * * *, which 
prohibits state and municipal regulation of areas that have been left ‘ “to be 
controlled by the free play of economic forces.” ’ ”  Id., 21 Cal.4th at 379, 87 
Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 981 P.2d 499. 
{¶85} In Assoc. Builders & Contrs. of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Providence 
(D.R.I.2000), 108 F.Supp.2d 73, the court found the NLRA to preempt a city 
ordinance giving favorable tax treatment only to developers who execute PLAs on 
private construction projects with certain affiliated unions.  The city claimed that 
it was acting as a co-developer of the projects by making a contribution in the way 
of tax stabilization and that because its motives were labor-neutral, it should be 
found to have acted in a proprietary capacity pursuant to Boston Harbor.  After 
declining to “adopt the novel position that the City’s alleged labor policy-neutral 
motive can somehow transform its action into a form of market participation 
worthy of Boston Harbor protection,” 108 F.Supp.2d at 83, the court went on to 
explain: 
January Term, 2002 
29 
{¶86} “Even if the grant of favorable tax treatment may in some 
circumstances be considered participation in the marketplace or if a labor-neutral 
motive may save some non-proprietary governmental action from preemption, this 
case is not a good candidate for the application of those propositions.  The City’s 
action in this case is not limited to one particular project, but is rather a policy to 
be implemented on several projects.  This distinction has been important to courts 
refusing to apply the market participant exception, because a policy, regardless of 
the motive behind it, is more ‘regulatory’ than ‘proprietary’ in nature than a single 
contracting or, in this case, taxing decision.”  Id., 108 F.Supp.2d at 83-84. 
{¶87} Thus, as one writer succinctly stated, “state procurement law that 
does not allow project labor agreements on public works projects at all is a flat 
prohibition and thus takes state agencies out of any function as private purchasers 
of services and is ‘tantamount to regulation.’ ”  Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Keeping the 
Government Out of the Way:  Project Labor Agreements Under the Supreme 
Court’s Boston Harbor Decision (1996), 12 Lab.Law. 69, 88. 
{¶88} On the other hand, two cases have held to the contrary.  In George 
Harms Constr. Co., Inc. v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth. (1994), 137 N.J. 8, 644 
A.2d 76, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the NLRA does not 
preempt a state from prohibiting PLAs on public projects.  The court reasoned: 
{¶89} “Thus, under Boston Harbor, federal labor law does not prohibit a 
state entering the construction market from using the same construction-industry 
exception regarding project-labor agreements that private purchasers of 
construction labor use.  However, a state’s laws may prohibit a project-labor-
agreement specification in public contracts without running afoul of the NLRA.  
Garmon preemption does not apply because a state-law prohibition of project-
labor agreements on public projects is merely one way in which a state may 
choose to act as a market participant in the construction industry.  In other words, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
a state may choose to enter or not to enter a project-labor agreement just like any 
other purchaser of construction services.  Machinists preemption also does not 
apply because a state-law prohibition of project-labor agreements on public 
projects does not constitute impermissible regulation of an area that the NLRA 
contemplated would be left to the free play of economic forces.  Such a 
prohibition amounts to nothing more than the public equivalent of a corporation’s 
by-law regarding the purchase of construction services.  In short, when a state uses 
project-labor agreements on public projects, it is not acting as a regulator of 
private actors; rather, it is merely defining its role as a proprietor/purchaser of 
labor in the construction industry.”  Id., 137 N.J. at 26-27, 644 A.2d 76. 
{¶90} Similarly, in Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dept., AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh 
(C.A.D.C. 2002), 295 F.3d 28, petition for certiorari filed Oct. 2, 2002, 71 
U.S.L.W. 3283, No. 02-527, the court held that the NLRA does not preempt 
Executive Order 13,202, 66 F.R. 11225, issued by President George W. Bush on 
February 17, 2001, which prohibits federal agencies or recipients of federal 
funding from requiring or prohibiting PLA’s in the bid specifications or other 
authorizing documents for construction projects.  In so holding, the court never 
explained the obvious inconsistency between this decision and its previous 
discussion in Reich, supra, 74 F.3d at 1336-1337, regarding the legality of former 
President Bush’s Executive Order 12,818.  Instead, the court essentially reasoned, 
as did the New Jersey high court in George Harms Constr. Co., Inc., that the 
government acts as a proprietor, rather than a regulator, when it makes “just ‘the 
type of decision regarding the use of labor agreements that a private project owner 
would be free to make.’ ”  Allbaugh, 295 F.3d at 35, quoting the government’s 
brief.  According to the court, the government has acted in a propriety capacity 
despite the “blanket, across-the-board” prohibition of Executive Order 13,202 “ 
because “ ‘the only decisions governed by the executive order are those that the 
January Term, 2002 
31 
federal government makes as [a] market participant.’ ”  Id., quoting the 
government’s brief. 
{¶91} This reasoning, we believe, places the proverbial cart before the 
horse.  These courts assume that a state acts as a market participant by doing what 
a private actor may do under the NLRA.  But the gist of Boston Harbor is that a 
state may act as a private contractor would act when it acts as a market 
participant.  Otherwise, the state would be permitted to regulate within a 
protected zone because a private actor may do so.  As the New Jersey Supreme 
Court points out, for example, a private corporation may in its bylaws or 
elsewhere decide as a matter of policy never to utilize a PLA when purchasing 
construction services without running afoul of the NLRA.  But this is not because 
such a decision is inherently indicative of proprietary activity.  Indeed, the private 
contractor-developer in this situation would be acting not as a typical contractor 
would act in the furtherance of its proprietary interests, but as a “regulator” of the 
construction market.  Instead, a private corporation or other legal entity may make 
such a policy decision without violating the NLRA because the NLRA does not 
preclude a private actor from attempting to regulate in an area reserved for market 
freedom or NLRB jurisdiction. 
{¶92} Thus, as the Supreme Court explained in Boston Harbor: 
{¶93} “The conceptual distinction between regulator and purchaser exists 
to a limited extent in the private sphere as well.  A private actor, for example, can 
participate in a boycott of a supplier on the basis of a labor policy concern rather 
than a profit motive.  * * *  The private actor under such circumstances would be 
attempting to ‘regulate’ the suppliers and would not be acting as a typical 
proprietor.  The fact that a private actor may ‘regulate’ does not mean, of course, 
that the private actor may be ‘pre-empted’ by the NLRA; the Supremacy Clause 
does not require pre-emption of private conduct.  Private actors therefore may 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
‘regulate’ as they please, as long as their conduct does not violate the law.  As the 
above passage in Gould [475 U.S. 282, 106 S.Ct. 1057, 89 L.Ed.2d 223] makes 
clear, however, states have a qualitatively different role to play from private 
parties.  [Id.]  When the State acts as regulator, it performs a role that is 
characteristically a governmental rather than a private role, boycotts 
notwithstanding.  Moreover, as regulator of private conduct, the State is more 
powerful than private parties.  These distinctions are far less significant when the 
State acts as a market participant with no interest in setting policy.”  Id., 507 U.S. 
at 229, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565. 
{¶94} We cannot conceive of R.C. Chapter 4116 as anything but 
regulation.  R.C. Chapter 4116 is all about labor policy.  Its stated purpose is “to 
prohibit public authorities from imposing certain labor requirements as a 
condition of performing public works.”  Preamble to 1999 Am.H.B. No. 101.  
Rather than constituting proprietary conduct on the part of the state, R.C. Chapter 
4116 essentially prohibits the state, its contracting authorities, and any institution 
supported in whole or part by public funds from engaging in proprietary activity 
when purchasing construction services or directly employing labor by prohibiting 
them from entering into or enforcing a PLA on any public construction project 
regardless of economic or other proprietary concerns.  Indeed, as the Cuyahoga 
County Board of Commissioners itself bemoans, the statute “eliminates the 
discretion of local authorities to determine whether and when a project labor 
agreement would benefit local taxpayers and citizens by providing consistency 
and harmony in the vast array of labor and employment issues which arise during 
the course of a costly and time expansive public improvement project.” 
{¶95} R.C. Chapter 4116 is a blanket, across-the-board prohibition that 
precludes any sort of ad hoc determination as to the benefits or advantages of 
utilizing a PLA on a particular project.  It is, therefore, “ ‘tantamount to 
January Term, 2002 
33 
regulation’ or policymaking.”  Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 229, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 
122 L.Ed.2d 565.1 
{¶96} Accordingly, we hold that Sections 8(e) and (f) of the National 
Labor Relations Act, as enacted by the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act, Sections 
158(e) and (f), Title 29, U.S.Code, preempt R.C. Chapter 4116, as enacted by 
Am.H.B. No. 101 of 123rd General Assembly, which flatly prohibits public 
authorities from entering into or enforcing project labor agreements on public 
construction projects. 
{¶97} For all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court declaring R.C. 
Chapter 4116 preempted by the NLRA and enjoining its enforcement. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs separately. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in syllabus and 
judgment. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in judgment only. 
                                                 
1  Amici curiae Ohio ABC and National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation argue that R.C. 
4116.02(B) is a “right-to-work” law and, therefore, is saved from preemption by Section 14(b) of 
the NLRA, Section 164(b), Title 29, U.S.Code, which permits states, if they so choose, to prohibit 
“agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment.”  We 
find, however, that this is not an issue that has been properly raised in this case.  As the state 
informs us, it “has not advanced a right-to-work argument in its defense of R.C. [Chapter] 4116” 
and has no interest in this “hypothetical” and “academic” debate.  Instead, the state urges us to 
consider only those “arguments the State has actually made” and “not decide this theoretical 
issue.”  We point out also that while the court of appeals did briefly discuss Section 14(b), it did so 
only to bolster its view that R.C. Chapter 4116 does not “have the effect of prohibiting a public 
authority from entering into a PLA.”  In any event, we decline the invitation to construe R.C. 
Chapter 4116 as some cryptic prohibition of so-called “union shop” or “agency shop” agreements 
in Ohio.  But even if we did so construe R.C. 4116.02(B), we very much doubt the applicability of 
Section 14(b) in the circumstances of this case.  See Assoc. Gen. Contrs. of North Dakota v. Otter 
Tail Power Co. (C.A.8, 1979), 611 F.2d 684, 692-693. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring. 
{¶98} I concur with the exhaustive and well-reasoned opinion of Justice 
Resnick.  I write in support of the majority opinion. 
{¶99} When all of the layers of obfuscation of the issue now before us are 
peeled away, the core question is whether the state may, within constitutional 
limits, enact legislation that prohibits project labor agreements from being entered 
on public construction projects.  While R.C. Chapter 4116 does just that and, by 
so doing, effectively takes away the discretion of local elected officials to look out 
for the best interest of local taxpayers and citizens, and that, on its face, is bad 
public policy, it is not for us to decide policy.  It is our task, however, to test such 
legislation by the parameters laid down by case law of the United States Supreme 
Court, when applicable, and we are bound to follow and comply with such 
pronouncements. 
{¶100} In this matter, the pertinent case law, which we are required to 
apply and follow, might very well begin and end with Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council of Metro. Dist. v. Assoc. Builders & Contrs. of Massachusetts/Rhode 
Island, Inc. (1993), 507 U.S. 218, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565 (the “Boston 
Harbor” case).  Therein, the high court said that “[t]he 1959 amendment adding a 
proviso to subsection [8](e) [of the National Labor Relations Act, Section 158, 
Title 29, U.S.Code] permits a general contractor’s prehire agreement to require an 
employer not to hire other contractors performing work on that particular project 
site unless they agree to become bound by the terms of that labor agreement.”  Id. 
at 230, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565.  In addition, Section 8(f) of the Act 
unequivocally permits employers in the construction industry to enter into prehire 
agreements.  While it is true that the Act excludes the state from the definition of 
the term “employer,” Section 2(2), NLRA, Section 152(2), Title 29, U.S.Code, the 
January Term, 2002 
35 
court, nevertheless, went on to say that “the general goals behind passage of §§ 
8(e) and (f) are still relevant to determining what Congress intended with respect 
to the State and its relationship to the agreements authorized by these sections.” 
Id. at 231, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565. 
{¶101} It would seem to be axiomatic that what federal law gives to a 
person or entity, the state may not take away.  To remove from local officials the 
right to use a tool that, for the most part, guarantees that a local project will be 
completed by well-trained workers, within budget and on time, is short-sighted at 
best and devastating at worst.  Not much more, I believe, needs to be said to put to 
rest the arguments made here by appellees and their amici supporters. 
{¶102} Accordingly, I would pronounce as syllabus law in this case that 
“Am.H.B. No. 101, a regulation that prohibits public-sector project labor 
agreements in Ohio, is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, Sections 
151 et seq., Title 29, U.S.Code, and is, therefore, unlawful.”  I respectfully concur 
with the majority. 
_______________ 
 
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, L.L.P., N. Victor Goodman, 
Mark D. Tucker and Edward Kancler, for appellant Ohio State Building & 
Construction Trades Council. 
Goldstein & O’Connor and Joyce Goldstein, for appellant Cleveland 
Building & Construction Trades Council. 
Wuliger, Fadel & Beyer and William I. Fadel, for appellant International 
Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kathleen 
A. Martin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee Cuyahoga County Board 
of Commissioners. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Michael D. Allen and Peter M. 
Thomas, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee state of Ohio. 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Assoc. Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio AFL-CIO. 
 
Sherman, Dunn, Cohen, Leifer & Yellig, P.C., Laurence J. Cohen and 
Victoria L. Bor, urging reversal for amicus curiae Building & Construction Trades 
Dept., AFL-CIO. 
 
Coolidge, Wall, Womsley & Lombard, Fred A. Ungerman Jr. and Jill A. 
May, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Associated Builders & 
Contractors, Inc. 
 
Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., L.P.A., and Susan Carson 
Rodgers; National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. and William L. 
Messenger, urging affirmance for amicus curiae National Right to Work Legal 
Defense Foundation, Inc. 
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