Case Title: In re Leon

Citation: 

Docket Number: 123855

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2021-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 123,855 
 
In the Matter of DAVID PHILLIP LEON, 
Respondent. 
 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed December 10, 2021. Indefinite suspension.  
 
Kathleen J. Selzler Lippert, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Stanton A. 
Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, was with her on the formal complaint for the petitioner.  
 
Bruce A. Swenson, of Derby, argued the cause, and David Phillip Leon, respondent, argued the 
cause pro se. 
 
PER CURIAM:  This is an attorney discipline proceeding against David Phillip 
Leon, who was admitted to practice law in Kansas on April 23, 1993.  
 
On January 31, 2020, the Disciplinary Administrator's office filed a formal 
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC). This complaint related to alleged violations that arose from Leon's 
representation of three clients. On April 24, 2020, the Disciplinary Administrator's office 
filed an amended formal complaint, adding alleged violations of the KRPC arising from 
Leon's representation of a fourth client. The Disciplinary Administrator's office sent the 
respondent a copy of the formal complaint and the amended complaint by certified mail 
to the respondent's registration address. The respondent did not answer the first complaint 
and did not timely answer the amended formal complaint.  
 
2 
 
 
A panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys held a hearing on 
September 10, 2020. The respondent appeared with counsel, Bruce Swenson. The parties 
presented a 26-page joint stipulation. In the stipulation, the respondent admitted to many 
facts.  
 
As the hearing began, the Disciplinary Administrator's office announced it was not 
pursuing allegations relating to a violation of KRPC 3.3 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 385) 
(candor to the tribunal). The hearing panel thus dismissed that allegation.  
 
At the end of the hearing, the panel determined the respondent violated KRPC 1.1 
(2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 321) (competence), KRPC 1.3 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 325) (diligence), 
KRPC 1.5 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 327) (fees), KRPC 1.15 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 366) 
(safekeeping property), KRPC 3.2 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 384) (expediting litigation), 
KRPC 8.1 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 424) (cooperation), KRPC 8.4 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 427) 
(professional misconduct), former Supreme Court Rule 207 (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 246) 
(cooperation), and former Supreme Court Rule 211 (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 254) (answer). 
 
But the panel concluded the Disciplinary Administrator's office had not presented 
clear and convincing evidence to prove respondent violated KRPC 1.4 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. 
R. 326) (communication), KRPC 1.6 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 330) (confidentiality), and 
KRPC 1.16 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 372) (termination of representation).  
 
The panel set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, along with its 
recommendation on disposition, in a final hearing report, the relevant portions of which 
are set forth below. The respondent filed a statement "taking exception to the findings of 
fact or conclusion[s] of law in the Final Hearing Report." But respondent filed no brief, 
even though Supreme Court Rule 228(h) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 281) requires a party to do 
so if the party filed exceptions to the final hearing report. 
3 
 
 
"Findings of Fact 
. . . . 
"17. 
Based on the joint stipulation and the evidence presented at the hearing 
on the formal complaint, the hearing panel finds the following facts, by clear and 
convincing evidence:  
 
"DA13055 
 
 
"18. 
On November 2, 2019, C.F. hired the respondent to represent her in a 
pending criminal case in Sedgwick County, Kansas. That same day, C.F. completed and 
signed an 'information sheet' as requested by the respondent's office. The information 
sheet included, in bold lettering, that the fee was nonrefundable regardless of the amount 
of time spent on the case or the outcome of the case. The respondent also stated that there 
could be an additional fee if a trial is required. C.F. paid the respondent $500 and agreed 
to make two additional payments of $500 to the respondent prior to trial.  
 
 
"19. 
The respondent did not deposit the unearned fees into a trust account. 
The respondent used the $500 to pay his mother's bills. 
 
 
"20. 
In March, 2018, C.F. filed a complaint with the disciplinary 
administrator's office regarding the respondent. In her complaint, C.F. alleged that the 
respondent failed to inform her of a court date and, as a result, she was arrested and jailed 
for seven days. C.F. stated that after she was released from jail, she confronted the 
respondent at his office about why he did not inform her of the court appearance. The 
respondent told C.F. that he provided her with notice of the hearing by letter. C.F. asked 
the respondent for a copy of the letter. The respondent was unable to provide C.F. with a 
4 
 
copy of the letter. In the complaint, C.F. also complained that the respondent's strategy 
was 'to postpone trial for as long as possible before requesting a bench trial.'  
 
 
"21. 
On March 15, 2018, the disciplinary administrator's office directed the 
respondent to provide a written response to the initial complaint filed by C.F. within 20 
days. The respondent failed to provide a written response as directed.  
 
 
"22. 
The respondent provided two written responses to C.F.'s complaint, one 
on April 27, 2018, and a second one on September 28, 2018. In the respondent's second 
response, the respondent claimed that his use of the 'information sheet' was in error. 
Specifically, the respondent stated that he 'discovered that [his] assistant had utilized an 
older form for [sic] which had been previously discontinued from usage in [his] office.'. 
The respondent went on to say: 
 
'. . . I advised her that pursuant to the rules governing representation of 
client(s), we are not permitted to use the outdated form, and to not to 
[sic] ever use it again. Therefore, based upon this discussion and 
subsequent admonishment, all usage, either intended or unintended of the 
form containing the specific language referred to has been stricken and 
removed from any potential usage.' 
 
 
"23. 
Paula Langworthy, a volunteer attorney investigator, investigated this 
case. Ms. Langworthy requested that the respondent schedule a time to meet with her 
regarding the complaint. The respondent did not initially agree to do so. It was not until 
Ms. Langworthy repeatedly directed the respondent to do so before he finally agreed to 
meet with Ms. Langworthy regarding C.F.'s complaint. 
 
 
"24. 
At some point in time, the respondent provided Ms. Langworthy with a 
copy of a letter notifying C.F. of the February 14, 2018, court appearance.  
 
5 
 
 
"25. 
On June 28, 2018, Ms. Langworthy met with the respondent. When they 
met, Ms. Langworthy reviewed the respondent's client file regarding C.F. Ms. 
Langworthy was unable to locate the letter that the respondent previously provided to Ms. 
Langworthy and described in his attorney response dated April 27, 2018. The respondent 
blamed his staff for the missing document, the respondent claimed that a second file 
'probably contained those documents' and that the second file was probably in one of his 
other two vehicles that were in different mechanical repair shops or at his home office, 
and that he did not just create the letter that had been previously provided. When Ms. 
Langworthy questioned the respondent about the potential breach of confidentiality of 
client files left in vehicles in mechanical repair shops, the respondent stated that the 
second file was probably not in either of his other vehicles. Ms. Langworthy provided the 
respondent with additional time to provide the second file. The respondent did not 
provide Ms. Langworthy with a second file.  
 
 
"26. 
Later, William Delaney, special investigator with the disciplinary 
administrator's office was assigned to conduct additional investigation. The respondent 
told Mr. Delaney that he believed that C.F., her mother, or her boyfriend stole his 
(second) file. The respondent also explained to Mr. Delaney that he did not have a system 
to track bills and he relied on a verbal agreement and a handshake.  
 
"DA13203 
 
 
"27. 
T.F. retained the respondent to represent him in a criminal matter. T.F. 
paid the respondent $2,500 for the representation. The respondent did not deposit the 
$2,500 unearned fees into an attorney trust account.  
 
 
"28. 
On October 9, 2018, T.F. filed a complaint with the disciplinary 
administrator's office. On October 10, 2018, the disciplinary administrator's [office] 
wrote to the respondent, directing him to provide a written response to the complaint 
within 20 days. 
 
 
"29 
Dennis Phelps, a volunteer attorney investigator, was assigned to 
investigate this complaint. On October 22, 2018, Mr. Phelps wrote to the respondent 
6 
 
directing that the respondent provide a written response to the initial complaint within 60 
days. The respondent failed to provide a written response as directed.  
 
 
"30. 
In a letter received on January 22, 2019, T.F. told the disciplinary 
administrator's office that the respondent came to see him and asked T.F. to send the 
disciplinary administrator's office a letter that this was just a misunderstanding. T.F. 
stated that he told the respondent he would not do that until the respondent 'does the 
things he assured [him] he would do and get's [sic] [him] out.' Then, in a letter dated 
January 2, 2019, postmarked February 12, 2019, and received by the disciplinary 
administrator's office on February 14, 2019, T.F. wrote:  'I have been in contact with you 
regarding my attorney, David Leon. I wish to take back my complaint he has offered to 
take care of another case for me. He is making it right on his end.'  
 
 
"31. 
Mr. Delaney was also assigned to conduct some additional investigation 
into T.F.'s complaint. On September 24, 2019, Mr. Delaney wrote to the respondent 
reminding him of the previous deadlines to provide a written response to the initial 
complaint. Mr. Delaney directed the respondent to provide a written response by October 
11, 2019. The respondent prepared his response on October 9, 2019, however, the 
respondent misdirected the response. The respondent inadvertently sent the response to 
the investigator of DA13300 and DA13366 rather than the disciplinary administrator's 
office. Thereafter, on November 7, 2019, the disciplinary administrator's office received 
the respondent's written response to the complaint filed by T.F., dated October 9, 2019. 
 
"DA13300 
 
 
"32. 
The court appointed a public defender to represent G.D. in a criminal 
case. On July 22, 2016, the public defender requested that the court modify a bond 
condition to allow G.D. and his wife to have contact. On July 28, 2016, the court denied 
the public defender's request.  
 
 
"33. 
Thereafter, in October, 2016, G.D. retained the respondent to replace the 
public defender. G.D. paid the respondent an initial fee of more than $2,000. 
Additionally, during the representation, G.D. provided the respondent with additional 
cash payments. G.D. did not receive receipts for his cash payments. G.D. believes he paid 
7 
 
the respondent roughly $3,500. On October 26, 2016, the respondent entered his 
appearance on behalf of G.D.  
 
 
"34. 
The respondent did not deposit the unearned fees into an attorney trust 
account. Also, the respondent did not maintain any records to establish the amount of fees 
paid by G.D.  
 
 
"35. 
G.D. wanted the respondent to contact a witness who observed the 
incident. However, during the 15-month period of representation, the respondent did not 
contact the eyewitness.  
 
 
"36. 
G.D. wanted the respondent to seek to have a bond condition changed so 
that G.D. could have contact with his wife. The respondent took no action to have the 
bond condition changed during the 15 months that the respondent represented G.D.  
 
 
"37. 
According to G.D., the respondent told him to waive his right to a jury 
trial. G.D. did not understand the full implication of waiving his right to a jury trial. He 
did not want a court trial as he thought that he had witnesses that would appeal to a jury. 
However, on February 27, 2017, acting on the respondent's advice, G.D. waived his right 
to a jury trial.  
 
 
"38. 
G.D. stated that the respondent's defense was to obtain repeated 
continuances. The respondent confirmed that his strategy was to seek one continuance 
after another in the hopes that the district attorney would reduce the charges or dismiss 
the case. The respondent sought and obtained 12 continuances of trial settings, spanning 
15 months.  
 
 
"39. 
G.D. hired replacement counsel. On February 5, 2018, the respondent 
withdrew from his representation of G.D. and replacement counsel entered his 
appearance.  
 
 
"40. 
Replacement counsel filed a motion to modify G.D.'s bond conditions. 
On March 9, 2019, the court granted the motion to modify the bond conditions, stating 
that he never intended to have the bond condition last for two years.  
8 
 
 
"41. 
Replacement counsel also filed a motion to rescind the jury trial waiver. 
The court denied the motion, finding among other things, that G.D. had the advice of 
counsel when he waived his right to a jury trial. 
 
 
"42. 
On April 8, 2019, G.D. lodged a complaint with the disciplinary 
administrator's office against the respondent. Two days later, the disciplinary 
administrator's office sent the respondent a letter directing the respondent to provide a 
written response to the initial complaint within 20 days. The respondent did not provide a 
written response as directed.  
 
 
"43. 
R. Todd King, a volunteer attorney investigator was assigned to 
investigate G.D.'s complaint. Mr. King repeatedly requested that the respondent meet 
with him regarding G.D.'s complaint. Each time, the respondent put Mr. King off, 
explaining that the respondent was too busy. Mr. King was unsuccessful in getting the 
respondent to schedule an appointment for a meeting. The respondent, however, did 
speak with Mr. King by telephone.  
 
 
"44. 
Finally, on September 2, 2019, the respondent provided a written 
response to the initial complaint filed by G.D.  
 
"DA13366 
 
 
"45. 
T.C. retained the respondent to represent her boyfriend, W.A., who was 
in custody on a 2009 conviction. T.C. paid the respondent $3,300. The respondent did not 
deposit the unearned fees into an attorney trust account.  
 
 
"46. 
On December 11, 2018, the respondent entered into a fee agreement with 
T.C., on behalf of W.A. The fee agreement included the following statement, 'no portion 
of this fixed minimum fee shall ever be refunded to client.' (In the respondent's written 
response to C.F.'s complaint, dated September 28, 2018, the respondent acknowledged 
that he could not charge nonrefundable fees and indicated that he had taken steps to 
ensure that the language would not again be used in his fee agreements. Yet, six weeks 
9 
 
later, on December 11, 2018, the respondent again included language that a fee was 
nonrefundable. (See ¶ 22, above.)  
 
 
"47. 
During the eight months the respondent represented W.A., the 
respondent spent only 11 hours reviewing materials. 
  
 
"48. 
In July, 2019, T.C. informed the respondent that they were terminating 
the respondent's representation and they wanted the file returned so they could hire a new 
attorney. During that conversation, the respondent offered to refund $1,500 of the fees 
collected. Thereafter, T.C. was unable to reach the respondent to make arrangements to 
receive the $1,500 refund.  
 
 
"49. 
On September 3, 2019, T.C. filed a complaint against the respondent 
with the disciplinary administrator's office. T.C. complained that after the respondent 
received the attorney fees, the respondent did not keep her informed regarding the status 
of the representation. Additionally, T.C. questioned whether the respondent earned the 
attorney fees.  
 
 
"50. 
On September 6, 2019, the disciplinary administrator's office wrote to the 
respondent directing him to provide a written response to the complaint within 20 days. 
The respondent did not provide a written response within 20 days. On November 5, 2019, 
the disciplinary administrator's office again directed the respondent to provide a written 
response to the initial complaint filed by T.C., giving the respondent 10 additional days to 
do so. The respondent did not provide a written response within the extended deadline.  
 
 
"51. 
By Thanksgiving, 2019, the respondent refunded the entire amount paid 
by T.C. And, on December 5, 2019, the respondent finally provided a written response to 
the initial complaint filed by T.C.  
 
 
"52. 
Mr. King was also assigned to investigate T.C.'s complaint. Again, Mr. 
King requested that the respondent schedule a time to meet to discuss the complaint. 
Again, the respondent did not do so. The respondent spoke by telephone with Mr. King.  
 
10 
 
"Attorneys Fees and Bank Accounts 
 
 
"53. 
On October 26, 2000, the respondent opened an operating account at the 
Community Bank of Wichita. During the life of the account, it was in overdraft status the 
majority of the time. The respondent received daily notices due to the overdraft status. On 
August 14, 2015, the bank made the decision to close the account due to the large 
overdrafts and the lack of deposits. At that time, the account was overdrawn $3,607.60. 
Later, the bank received $2,636.10 toward the overdraft amount.  
 
 
"54. 
On June 29, 2004, respondent opened an IOLTA account with 
Community Bank of Wichita. The respondent deposited $990 into the account that day. 
Even though the respondent had the IOLTA account, he did not use it.  
 
 
"55. 
The balance in the IOLTA account remained $990 until the respondent 
withdrew $302 on December 23, 2009. Because there were no deposits or withdrawals 
for a year, the bank classified the account as dormant. The bank charges a monthly 
dormant fee. The bank and the respondent did not take note that the IOLTA account was 
being assessed a dormant fee. IOLTA accounts are not to be charged any service charges.  
 
 
"56. 
On the respondent's annual attorney registration form from recent years, 
the respondent indicated that he had an IOLTA account, that he is familiar with KRPC 
1.15, and that he is in compliance with KRPC 1.15.  
 
 
"57. 
During the disciplinary investigations, the investigators questioned the 
respondent regarding his attorney trust account. The respondent informed Mr. Delaney 
and Mr. King that his IOLTA account is with the Community Bank of Wichita.  
 
 
"58. 
Mr. Delaney requested that the respondent provide bank account and 
trust account records. The respondent did not provide Mr. Delaney with the requested 
documents. Mr. Delaney, however, was able to obtain some records via subpoena.  
 
 
"59. 
On May 29, 2019, in response to a suggestion made by Mr. Delaney, the 
respondent checked on the balance in his trust account and deposited $100. At that time, 
the respondent and the bank discovered that the IOLTA account had been charged the 
11 
 
automatic dormant fees. That day, the bank refunded the dormant fees and deposited the 
refund into the IOLTA account. 
  
 
"60. 
The respondent told Mr. King that while [he] has had a trust account, he 
rarely used it. The respondent also told Mr. King that he does not know how to handle the 
accounts. The respondent testified that prior to his father's death, his father handled the 
accounts.  
  
 
"61. 
The respondent told Mr. Delaney and Mr. King that he also has an 
account at Mid-America Credit Union. When asked whether the Mid-America Credit 
Union account is a trust account or an operating account, the respondent stated, 'a little bit 
of both.' The respondent admitted to commingling his funds with his client funds in the 
operating account. The respondent acknowledged that he needed help with the 'banking 
and account stuff.'  
 
 
"62. 
The respondent told Mr. Delaney that he also has an account with Intrust 
Bank. The respondent's Intrust Bank account was opened on September 18, 2015, and is 
used as a personal account and an operating account.  
 
 
"63. 
In 2020, the respondent's only open account with Community Bank of 
Wichita, was the IOLTA account. In addition to the IOLTA account, the respondent also 
had at least one business loan with the Community Bank of Wichita. On January 31, 
2020, the respondent visited Community Bank of Wichita, intending to make a payment 
of $1,000 on a business loan. However, the respondent's instructions to the tellers were to 
put the funds into his account. As a result, the bank deposited the $1,000 into the IOLTA 
account. The next day, the respondent's intentions were clarified and the $1,000 was 
removed from the trust account and applied to the loan. 
 
 
"64. 
Two weeks before the hearing on the formal complaint, on August 27, 
2020, the respondent deposited $1,260 in cash into the IOLTA account. On August 28, 
2020, he utilized a service called Square. Square deposited a penny into the IOLTA 
account and withdrew a penny from the IOLTA account to verify the account. On 
September 1, 2020, the respondent deposited $130 cash into the IOLTA account. 
 
12 
 
 
"65. 
At the hearing on this matter, the respondent testified that during the time 
period involved in the representation of the four complainants, he routinely deposited 
unearned attorney fees into his operating account. The respondent testified that on 
occasion, if a client paid him in cash, the respondent pocketed the cash without 
depositing it into any account. Finally, the respondent testified that he previously 
believed that he was in compliance with KRPC 1.15 because he had a trust account.  
 
"Pleadings 
 
 
"66. 
On January 24, 2020, the deputy disciplinary administrator filed a formal 
complaint in DA13055, DA13203, and DA13300. That same day, the deputy disciplinary 
administrator sent the respondent a copy of the formal complaint by certified mail to the 
respondent's registration address. The respondent failed to file an answer to the formal 
complaint as required by the Rules Relating to Discipline of Attorneys.  
 
 
"67. 
On April 24, 2020, the deputy disciplinary administrator filed an 
amended formal complaint, adding a four[th] complaint, DA13366. The deputy 
disciplinary administrator sent the respondent a copy of the amended formal complaint by 
certified mail to the respondent's registration address. The respondent failed to file an 
answer to the formal complaint as required by the Rules Relating to Discipline of 
Attorneys.  
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
 
"68. 
Based upon the findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a matter 
of law that the respondent violated KRPC 1.1 (competence), KRPC 1.3 (diligence), 
KRPC 1.5 (fees), KRPC 1.15 (safekeeping property), KRPC 3.2 (expediting litigation), 
KRPC 8.1 (cooperation), KRPC 8.4 (professional misconduct), Supreme Court Rule 207 
(cooperation), and Supreme Court Rule 211 (answer), as detailed below. 
 
 
"69. 
At the outset of the hearing, the deputy disciplinary administrator 
indicated that she would not be pursuing the allegations found at paragraphs 87(a), 87(b), 
88, 88(a), and 88(b). The allegations contained in those paragraphs relate to the deputy 
disciplinary administrator's allegation that the respondent violated KRPC 3.3 (candor to 
13 
 
the tribunal). Because the deputy disciplinary administrator did not pursue those 
allegations, the hearing panel dismisses the allegation that the respondent violated KRPC 
3.3 (candor to the tribunal).  
 
 
"70. 
The deputy disciplinary administrator also included allegations that the 
respondent violated KRPC 1.4 (communication), KRPC 1.6 (confidentiality), and KRPC 
1.16 (termination of representation) While the formal complaint included a reference to 
these violations and some factual allegations to consider these violations, the stipulation 
did not include facts to establish these violations and the deputy disciplinary 
administrator presented no evidence to establish these violations. Accordingly, the 
hearing panel concludes that clear and convincing evidence was not provided to establish 
that the respondent violated KRPC 1.4 (communication), KRPC 1.6 (confidentiality), 
KRPC 1.16 (termination of representation), and KRPC 3.3 (candor to the tribunal). 
 
"KRPC 1.1 
 
 
"71. 
Lawyers must provide competent representation to their clients. KRPC 
1.1. 'Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.' Id. Competent representation is 
not limited to just knowing how to handle a particular case. According to the language of 
the rule, it also requires thoroughness and preparation. In this case, the respondent did not 
provide competent representation to G.D. because rather than properly preparing for trial 
and interviewing an eyewitness, the respondent requested and received 12 continuances, 
over a 15[-]month period of time. The hearing panel concludes that because the 
respondent did not properly prepare for the representation, the respondent failed to 
provide competent representation to G.D., in violation of KRPC 1.1. 
 
"KRPC 1.3 
 
 
"72. 
Attorneys must act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing their clients. See KRPC 1.3. The respondent failed to diligently and 
promptly represent G.D. G.D. requested that the respondent interview an eyewitness to 
the criminal case. The respondent did not do so. Further, the respondent requested and 
received 12 continuances over a period of 15 months. Thus, the hearing panel concludes 
14 
 
that the respondent did not provide G.D. with diligent representation and, therefore, 
violated KRPC 1.3. 
 
"KRPC 1.5 
 
 
"73. 
KRPC 1.5 provides that '[a] lawyer's fee shall be reasonable.' The 
respondent's fee agreement with C.F. and the respondent's fee agreement with T.C., on 
behalf of W.A., included language that the fee for future services was nonrefundable. 
Nonrefundable fees are per se unreasonable. See In re Scimeca, 265 Kan. 742, 962 P.2d 
1080 (1998); KRPC 1.5 Comment 2; KRPC 1.16(d). Because the respondent charged a 
nonrefundable fee for future services, the hearing panel concludes that the fee was 
unreasonable and in violation of KRPC 1.5(a).  
 
"KRPC 1.15 
 
 
"74. 
Lawyers must properly safeguard the property of their clients and third 
persons. The respondent violated KRPC 1.15 in several ways. 
 
 
"75. 
 KRPC 1.15(a) provides: 
 
'A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in 
a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation 
separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a 
separate account maintained in the state of Kansas. Other 
property shall be identified as such and appropriately 
safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other 
property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a 
period of five years after termination of the representation.' 
 
Properly safeguarding the property of others necessarily requires lawyers to deposit 
unearned fees into an attorney trust account. The respondent systematically failed to 
utilize his attorney trust account. The respondent failed to deposit the fees paid by all four 
complainants into his attorney trust account. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes 
15 
 
that the respondent repeatedly violated KRPC 1.15(a) by failing to deposit unearned fees, 
thus, the property of others, into his attorney trust account.  
 
 
"76. 
Properly safeguarding the property of clients also necessarily requires 
that lawyers keep client money separate from the lawyer's own money. See KRPC 1.15(a) 
and KRPC 1.15(d)(1). Because the respondent deposited unearned fees into his operating 
accounts with the respondent's own money, the respondent commingled client funds. The 
hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.15(a) and KRPC 1.15(d)(1) 
by commingling client funds with his funds. 
 
 
"77. 
Attorneys must maintain 'complete records of all funds, securities, and 
other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render 
appropriate accountings to the client regarding them.' KRPC 1.15(d)(2)(iii). The 
respondent maintained no records to track the amount of attorney fees paid by his clients. 
As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.15(d)(2)(iii).  
 
 
"78. 
Under KRPC 1.15(d)(2)(v), attorneys must maintain attorney trust 
account records and produce the records upon request by the disciplinary administrator. 
The respondent failed to produce his attorney trust account records as requested by the 
disciplinary investigator, investigating the complaint on behalf of the disciplinary 
administrator. Therefore, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 
1.15(d)(2)(v).  
 
"KRPC 3.2 
 
 
"79. 
KRPC 3.2 requires an attorney to expedite litigation. In representing 
C.F., T.F., and G.D., the respondent failed to expedite litigation by repeatedly requesting 
continuances. Specifically, in representing G.D., the respondent requested and received 
12 continuances, spanning 15 months. Because the respondent repeatedly failed to 
expedite litigation, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 3.2.  
 
16 
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
 
"80. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent engaged in 
conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice when he employed a strategy 
of delay in his representation of C.F., T.F., and G.D. The respondent acknowledged that 
he repeatedly requested and received continuances in hopes that the prosecutor would 
eventually reduce the charges or dismiss the cases. The old legal maxim is applicable 
here; to delay justice is to deny justice. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent's 
strategy of delay amounts to professional misconduct that was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice, in violation of KRPC 8.4(d).  
 
"KRPC 8.1 and Supreme Court Rule 207(b) 
 
 
"81. 
Lawyers must cooperate in disciplinary investigations. KRPC 8.1(b) and 
Supreme Court Rule 207(b) provide the requirements in this regard. '[A] lawyer in 
connection with a . . . disciplinary matter, shall not: . . . knowingly fail to respond to a 
lawful demand for information from [a] . . . disciplinary authority, . . .' KRPC 8.1(b).  
 
'It shall be the duty of each member of the bar of this state to aid the 
Supreme Court, the Disciplinary Board, and the Disciplinary 
Administrator in investigations concerning complaints of misconduct, 
and to communicate to the Disciplinary Administrator any information 
he or she may have affecting such matters.' Rule 207(b). 
 
The respondent violated KRPC 8.1 and Rule 207(b) in all four cases. The respondent's 
lack of cooperation took a number of different forms. 
 
 
"82. 
First, the respondent did not provide the written responses to the initial 
complaints as directed. The respondent's initial written response to C.F.'s complaint was 
three weeks late. The respondent's written response to T.F.'s complaint was received 
nearly a year after it was originally due. The respondent's written response to G.D.'s 
17 
 
complaint was four months late. The respondent's written response to T.C.'s complaint 
was two months late.  
 
 
"83. 
Second, the respondent attempted to interfere with the disciplinary 
investigation of T.F.'s complaint. At a time when the respondent should have already 
provided his written response to T.F.'s complaint but had not, the respondent went to see 
T.F. and asked him to write to the disciplinary administrator's office and say that this was 
just a misunderstanding and to 'take back' his complaint. 
 
 
"84. 
Third, during the disciplinary investigations, Mr. Delaney directed the 
respondent to provide him with a copy of his trust account records. The respondent did 
not provide Mr. Delaney with any trust account records.  
 
 
"85. 
Finally, Mr. King repeatedly requested that the respondent meet with him 
during the investigations of G.D.'s complaint and T.C.'s complaint. The respondent did 
not do so. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent failed to 
cooperate and aid in the investigation as required by Supreme Court Rule 207(b).  
 
 
"86. 
The hearing panel concludes that the respondent repeatedly violated 
KRPC 8.1(b) and Supreme Court Rule 207(b).  
 
"Supreme Court Rule 211(b) 
 
 
"87. 
The Kansas Supreme Court Rules require an attorney to file an answer to 
a formal complaint. Supreme Court Rule 211(b) provides the requirements:  
 
'The respondent shall serve an answer upon the Disciplinary 
Administrator within twenty days after the service of the complaint 
unless such time is extended by the Disciplinary Administrator or the 
hearing panel.' 
 
 
The respondent violated Rule 211(b) by failing to file a timely written answer to the 
formal complaint. Additionally, the respondent violated Rule 211(b) when he failed to 
18 
 
file an answer to the amended formal complaint as required by the rules. Accordingly, the 
hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated Rule 211(b). 
 
"American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
 
"88. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors.  
 
 
"89. 
Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to his clients to provide 
competent and diligent representation. The respondent violated his duty to his clients and 
to the public to properly safeguard property. The respondent violated his duty to the legal 
profession and the legal system to refrain from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to 
the administration of justice. Finally, the respondent violated his duty to the legal 
profession to cooperate in disciplinary cases.  
 
 
"90. 
Mental State. The respondent knowingly violated his duties. 
 
 
"91. 
Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 
actual injury to the administration of justice and potential and actual injury to his clients. 
 
"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
 
"92. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
aggravating factors present: 
 
a. 
Prior Disciplinary Offenses. In 2012, the respondent participated 
in the attorney diversion program. In the diversion agreement, the 
19 
 
respondent admitted that he violated KRPC 1.1 (competence) in 
representing a client in a federal criminal matter. 
 
b. 
A Pattern of Misconduct. The respondent engaged in patterns of 
misconduct. The respondent committed similar misconduct in all four 
cases. In the four cases before the hearing panel, the respondent failed to 
deposit unearned fees into an attorney trust account, the respondent 
commingled his fund with his clients['] funds, the respondent failed to 
keep time records, the respondent failed to keep records of payments 
made by clients, and the respondent failed to keep trust account records. 
It is important to note that in the 2012 diversion case, the respondent also 
failed to keep time records. The respondent repeatedly engaged in delay 
tactics in three of the four cases. The respondent also failed to cooperate 
as required in all four cases. The hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent engaged in patterns of misconduct. 
 
c. 
Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule 
violations. The respondent violated KRPC 1.1 (competence), KRPC 1.3 
(diligence), KRPC 1.5 (fees), KRPC 1.15 (safekeeping property), KRPC 
3.2 (expediting litigation), KRPC 8.1 (cooperation), KRPC 8.4 
(professional misconduct), Supreme Court Rule 207 (cooperation), and 
Supreme Court Rule 211 (answer). Accordingly, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent committed multiple offenses.  
 
d. 
Bad Faith Obstruction of the Disciplinary Proceeding by 
Intentionally Failing to Comply with Rules or Orders of the Disciplinary 
Process. The respondent did not cooperate in the disciplinary process. He 
failed to timely provide written responses to the complaints in this case. 
He failed to provide the trust account records requested by Mr. Delaney. 
He refused to meet with Mr. King in the investigations of the complaints 
filed by G.D. and T.C. Finally, he contacted T.F. and asked T.F. to 
inform the disciplinary administrator's office that this was just a 
misunderstanding in an attempt to circumvent the disciplinary process. 
The respondent's conduct amounts to bad faith obstruction of the 
20 
 
disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules and 
orders of the disciplinary process.  
 
e. 
Submission of False Evidence, False Statements, or Other 
Deceptive Practices During the Disciplinary Process. During the 
disciplinary investigation of T.F.'s complaint, the respondent went to see 
T.F. and asked T.F. to send the disciplinary administrator's office a letter 
that this was just a misunderstanding. T.F. told the respondent he would 
not do that until the respondent 'does the things he assured [him] he 
would do and get's [sic] [him] out.' Then, in a letter dated January 2, 
2019, postmarked February 12, 2019, and received by the disciplinary 
administrator's office on February 14, 2019, T.F. wrote:  'I have been in 
contact with you regarding my attorney, David Leon. I wish to take back 
my complaint he has offered to take care of another case for me. He is 
making it right on his end.' While counsel for the respondent argued this 
evidence in mitigation, the hearing panel concludes that this is evidence 
in aggravation. The respondent appears to have attempted to disrupt the 
disciplinary investigation by asking T.F. to write to the disciplinary 
administrator's office, tell them that it was just a misunderstanding, and 
ask that the complaint be dropped. This conduct is part of the violation of 
KRPC 8.1(b) and Rule 207(b) and is also evidence that the respondent 
engaged in a deceptive practice during the disciplinary process. 
 
f. 
Vulnerability of Victim. C.F., T.F., G.D., and W.A. were 
vulnerable to the respondent's misconduct.  
 
g. 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas 
Supreme Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of 
Kansas in 1993. At the time of the misconduct, the respondent had been 
practicing law for more than 22 years.  
 
 
"93. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
21 
 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
a. 
Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes Have 
Contributed to Violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The respondent's brother died in 2014, the respondent's father died in 
2015, and the respondent's mother suffers financial difficulties. The 
death of his brother, the death of his father, and the ongoing financial 
difficulties of the respondent's mother created additional pressure on the 
respondent which may have contributed to the respondent's misconduct. 
Additionally, the deputy disciplinary administrator presented evidence of 
the respondent's significant gambling activities. It is unclear whether the 
respondent's gambling activities contributed to the misconduct in this 
case. 
 
b. 
Timely Good Faith Effort to Make Restitution or to Rectify 
Consequences of Misconduct. The respondent completed the 
representation of C.F. The respondent completed the representation of 
T.F. After T.C. filed a complaint against the respondent, the respondent 
returned the $3,300 attorney fee to T.C.  
 
c. 
The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His 
Cooperation During the Hearing and His Full and Free 
Acknowledgment of the Transgressions. While the respondent did not 
adequately cooperate during the disciplinary investigations, the 
respondent did stipulate to many facts in his untimely answer and in the 
written stipulation filed the day before the hearing on the formal 
complaint. 
 
d. 
Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community 
Including Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of 
the Character and General Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent is 
an active member of the bar of Wichita, Kansas. The respondent enjoys 
22 
 
the respect of his peers and generally possesses a good character and 
reputation as evidenced by several letters received by the hearing panel.  
 
 
"94. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards:  
 
'4.12 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or 
should know that he is dealing improperly with client property 
and causes injury or potential injury to a client.' 
 
'4.41 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when: 
 
(a) 
a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or 
potentially serious injury to a client; or 
 
(b) 
a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client 
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or 
 
(c) 
a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to 
client matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a 
client.' 
 
'4.42 
Suspension is generally appropriate when:  
 
(a) 
a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client 
and causes injury or potential injury to a client; or 
 
(b) 
a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes 
injury or potential injury to a client.'  
 
'7.2 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a 
professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the 
public, or the legal system.'  
23 
 
 
"Discussion 
 
 
"95. 
The respondent engaged in serious misconduct in this case. Even though 
the respondent has been practicing law for 27 years, the respondent lacks the ability to 
properly utilize an attorney trust account. The respondent failed to cooperate in the 
disciplinary investigations, refusing to schedule appointments to meet with Mr. King and 
providing written responses to complaints as much as one year late. Finally, the 
respondent’s strategy of systematically requesting continuances in the hope that the 
prosecutors would eventually reduce criminal charges or dismiss criminal cases was 
prejudicial to the administration of justice. Serious misconduct necessitates serious 
discipline.  
 
"Recommendation of the Parties 
 
 
"96. 
The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be 
disbarred.  
 
 
"97. 
The respondent recommended that he be allowed to continue to practice 
law subject to his proposed plan of probation. 
 
"Consideration of Probation 
 
 
"98. 
When a respondent requests probation, the hearing panel is required to 
consider Supreme Court Rule 211(g)(3), which provides:  
 
'(3) 
The Hearing Panel shall not recommend that the Respondent be 
placed on probation unless: 
 
(i) 
the Respondent develops a workable, substantial, and 
detailed plan of probation and provides a copy of the proposed 
plan of probation to the Disciplinary Administrator and each 
member of the Hearing Panel at least fourteen days prior to the 
hearing on the Formal Complaint; 
24 
 
 
(ii) 
the Respondent puts the proposed plan of probation into 
effect prior to the hearing on the Formal Complaint by 
complying with each of the terms and conditions of the probation 
plan; 
 
(iii) 
the misconduct can be corrected by probation; and 
 
(iv) 
placing the Respondent on probation is in the best 
interests of the legal profession and the citizens of the State of 
Kansas.' 
 
 
"99. 
The hearing panel is unable to recommend that the respondent be placed 
on probation because each of the conditions outlined in Supreme Court Rule 211 has not 
been met.  
 
 
"100. 
The respondent developed a workable plan of probation. However, the 
proposed plan is neither substantial nor detailed. And, while the respondent provided a 
copy of the proposed plan of probation to the disciplinary administrator and each member 
of the hearing panel at least 14 days prior to the hearing on the formal complaint, the 
respondent failed to put the proposed plan of probation into effect prior to the hearing on 
the formal complaint by complying with each of the terms and conditions of the 
probation plan. The misconduct, in this case, can be corrected by probation. However, 
placing the respondent on probation is not in the best interests of the legal profession and 
the citizens of the State of Kansas.  
 
"Recommendation of the Hearing Parties 
 
 
"101. 
Based upon the parties' stipulations, the findings of fact, the conclusions 
of law, and the Standards listed above, the hearing panel unanimously recommends that 
the respondent's license to practice law be indefinitely suspended.  
 
 
"102. 
Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator." 
25 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, we consider the evidence, the panel's findings, and 
the parties' arguments and determine whether KRPC violations exist and, if they do, the 
appropriate discipline. Attorney misconduct must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 
226(a)(1)(A) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 276). "'Clear and convincing evidence is "evidence that 
causes the factfinder to believe that 'the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.'"'" 
In re Murphy, 312 Kan. 203, 218, 473 P.3d 886 (2020). 
 
The Disciplinary Administrator's office gave respondent adequate notice of the 
amended complaint, to which he filed an untimely answer admitting many allegations. 
The respondent filed a statement "taking exception to the findings of fact or conclusion[s] 
of law in the Final Hearing Report." Supreme Court Rule 228(h) requires a party filing an 
exception to the final hearing report to follow up by filing a brief. But respondent did not 
do so. By operation of the rule, his failure to file the brief means he is "deemed to have 
admitted the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the final hearing report." Supreme 
Court Rule 228(h)(2)(E) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 283).  
 
As a result, we consider the panel's factual findings admitted. Supreme Court Rule 
228(g)(1), (2) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 281). The evidence before the hearing panel clearly 
showed the charged misconduct violated KRPC 1.1 (competence), KRPC 1.3 (diligence), 
KRPC 1.5 (fees), KRPC 1.15 (safekeeping property), KRPC 3.2 (expediting litigation), 
KRPC 8.1 (cooperation), KRPC 8.4 (professional misconduct), former Supreme Court 
Rule 207 (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 246) (cooperation), and former Supreme Court Rule 211 
(2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 254) (answer). 
 
26 
 
We next consider the only remaining issue, the proper discipline for the 
respondent's violations. The hearing panel unanimously recommended that we 
indefinitely suspend the respondent's license to practice law. Before us, the Disciplinary 
Administrator's office renewed its recommendation that we disbar the respondent.  
 
The respondent's mitigating evidence presents a picture of multiple personal 
tragedies in a brief time. That said, the violations reveal underlying issues existing before 
and after those tragic circumstances. Respondent's disciplinary history relating to his 
2012 diversion case informs us his failure to keep time records spans many years. And 
respondent admits he relied on his father and brother to handle the firm's trust accounting. 
Even if such reliance could excuse an attorney from such a basic ethical requirement, 
which it does not, it does not excuse his failure to keep time records detailing the fees 
earned from the clients' fee deposits. And the pattern of these four cases shows he took no 
steps to fill his knowledge gap after the deaths of his father and brother, and instead 
routinely deposited unearned attorney fees into his operating account and pocketed cash 
payments without depositing them into any account. These aggravating circumstances far 
outweigh the mitigating circumstances he presents.  
 
The serious nature of respondent's misconduct calls for serious discipline. His 
pattern of commingling his funds with his clients' funds in the four cases before us, each 
involving a vulnerable client, is very troubling. So, too, is his failure to cooperate with 
the disciplinary proceedings in all four cases. The panel found that respondent 
intentionally did not comply with the rules and orders of the disciplinary panel and 
engaged in bad-faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding. He also tried to disrupt 
the disciplinary investigation by asking one client to write to the Disciplinary 
Administrator's office and suggest the complaint be dropped because it had been a 
misunderstanding and that respondent was "making it right" by handling another case for 
the client. Finally, the cases reveal a pattern of repeatedly requesting continuances to 
27 
 
wear down the prosecutor and the prosecution's witnesses, thus impeding the 
administration of justice. 
 
Respondent's request for probation does not fit the seriousness of his offenses. 
And, as the panel aptly noted, although respondent presented a plan of probation, it was 
neither substantial nor detailed, nor did respondent make any effort to put the probation 
plan into effect before the formal hearing. Moreover, probation does not lend itself to 
preventing the misconduct, especially bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process, 
respondent committed. Nor is probation in the best interests of the legal profession and 
the citizens of the State of Kansas.  
 
After carefully considering the evidence presented, as well as the ABA Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, we adopt the panel's findings and conclusions and 
indefinitely suspend respondent under Supreme Court Rule 225(a)(2) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. 
R. 275). Respondent must comply with Supreme Court Rule 232 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 
287) if he later seeks reinstatement. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that David P. Leon is hereby disciplined by indefinite 
suspension under Rule 225(a)(2) for violating KRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 1.15, 3.2, 8.1, 8.4, and 
former Rules 207 and 211.  
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent must comply with Supreme Court Rule 
231 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 286) (notice to clients, opposing counsel, and courts of record 
following suspension). 
 
28 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.