Case Title: McCoy v. State

Citation: 397 So. 2d 589

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1981-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
McCoy v. State1994 WY 133886 P.2d 252Case Number: 93-273Decided: 11/30/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Patrick R. 
McCOY,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

 

v.

 

The STATE of 
Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Rehearing Denied December 
21, 1994.

Appeal from District 
Court, Campbell County, Terrence L. O'Brien, J.

 

Nicholas H. 
Carter, Gillette, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., D. Michael Pauling, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, Prosecution Assistance Program, Theodore E. Lauer, 
Director, Gayle E. Blakeley, Student Intern, Laramie, for 
appellee.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* MACY,**and TAYLOR, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      In this case we 
determine whether appellant's jury conviction and sentences for three counts of 
second-degree sexual assault and one count of indecent liberties with a minor 
require reversal because trial counsel's decisions concerning expert testimony 
violated his right to effective assistance of counsel. For the reasons explained 
below, we hold that reversal is not required.

ISSUES

[¶2]      McCoy states the 
issues as:

ISSUE # 
1:

Whether Trial Counsel 
failed to render effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the 
Constitution because of his following errors:

1. A failure to properly 
file a motion with the District Court for the payment of necessary costs for 
expert witnesses when trial counsel was aware that the Appellant had no funds 
for costs and the need for an expert was evident.

2. His failure to 
properly investigate the possible use of an independent expert witness when he 
was aware that the prosecution intended to use expert testimony at 
trial.

3. His failure to request 
a continuance two weeks before trial to obtain an independent analysis of the 
report from the State's expert witness that he had just 
received.

4. His failure to call a 
witness whose testimony would have directly contradicted that of the alleged 
victim.

ISSUE # 
2:

Whether it is reasonably 
probable that but for Trial Counsel's deficient performance the trial result 
would have been different.

The state presents the 
issues as:

Did Appellant's trial 
counsel provide him with effective assistance despite counsel's alleged 
failure:

(A) To seek funds from 
the court to provide expert witnesses for Appellant;

(B) To investigate 
Appellant's case properly;

(C) To request a 
continuance of the trial; or

(D) To call Angela Karsky 
as a witness at the trial;

And did those alleged 
acts or omissions create a reasonable probability that, in their absence, the 
result of the trial would have been more favorable to 
Appellant?

FACTS

[¶3]      The charges 
against appellant Patrick R. McCoy followed his separation from his wife, 
Raylene, in July of 1992. Raylene, a devout Jehovah's Witness, took the couple's 
daughter to a "touch therapist" connected with the Jehovah Witness church. The 
therapist evaluated the daughter for sexual abuse by touching her in various 
places on her body. The daughter later told her mother that her father had 
touched her sexually when she was four years old.

[¶4]      Raylene then took 
the daughter to Dr. William Heineke, a counselor at Wyoming Regional Counseling 
Center in Gillette, Wyoming. After several sessions, he reported to the state 
that the daughter had been a victim of sexual abuse, and the Gillette police 
began an investigation. Shortly after learning of the allegations, McCoy secured 
legal representation and filed for divorce and child custody. He later alerted 
his counsel to the sexual abuse allegations. 

[¶5]      Two physical 
examinations of the daughter were conducted which arguably were inconclusive. In 
March of 1993, the police scheduled an interview with her. The evening before, 
the mother had her watch a video concerning a daughter's accusation against her 
father for child sexual molestation. The next day, the daughter told police 
investigators that in addition to the touching episode when she was four, her 
father had sexual vaginal intercourse with her three different times when she 
was six years, eight years, and ten years old. She also stated that her father 
had anally penetrated her during the episode when she was ten years old. This 
assault caused her to bleed, and she told her mother of the bleeding. Her mother 
testified that she remembered the incident because her daughter cried over what 
the mother believed was menstruation. This caused the mother to consult the 
school nurse to receive literature and advice for the daughter. The school nurse 
testified and confirmed that the mother had contacted her four years ago for the 
literature and advice. Both the mother and daughter testified that the daughter, 
now age 12, has not menstruated.

[¶6]      Following the 
daughter's police interview, charges were filed against McCoy. A third physical 
examination of the daughter was conducted by Dr. Susan Reichert of Children's 
Hospital in Denver, a pediatrician and member of the hospital's Child's Advocacy 
and Protection team. Dr. Reichert testified at trial that the results of her 
physical examination caused her to conclude the physical evidence showed 
repeated sexual intercourse over a long period of time and past sexual abuse. 
Dr. Heineke testified that in his opinion the daughter had been sexually abused. 
The state also presented testimony from the mother, daughter, and police 
investigator, Shane Shaw.

[¶7]      As its strategy, 
defense relied upon cross-examination of state witnesses to point the finger at 
another possible perpetrator and also to establish that the daughter's 
accusation against her father arose from anger at her father over the divorce. 
The defense contended that this anger, maternal coaching, and suggestive therapy 
made her vulnerable to the suggestion that her father had sexually abused 
her.

[¶8]      McCoy testified, 
denying that he had sexually assaulted his daughter. He claimed that his wife 
had coached his daughter to make the charges against him because the couple was 
engaged in a divorce and a custody dispute over the daughter. The defense called 
no other witnesses.

[¶9]      Following the 
jury's conviction, McCoy's trial counsel filed a motion for judgment of 
acquittal and/or a new trial, alleging insufficiency of the evidence. Before the 
hearing, trial counsel withdrew and was replaced. New defense counsel 
supplemented the motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and an 
evidentiary hearing was held.

[¶10]   After hearing testimony, the trial 
court denied the motions for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. This 
appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶11]   To establish that he has been 
denied effective assistance of counsel, a defendant is required to show that 
counsel's performance was deficient and that, but for this deficient 
performance, it is reasonably probable that the trial result would have been 
different. Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 1986) (citing Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 
(1984)).

[¶12]   In Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1987), we noted:

`[T]here are countless 
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case,' Strickland [466 
U.S.] at 689, 104 S.Ct. [at] 2065, unless consideration is given to counsel's 
overall performance, before and at trial, it will be `all too easy for a court, 
examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a 
particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.' Strickland [466 
U.S.] at 689, 104 S.Ct. [at] 2065.

Gist 
at 343 
(quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 2589, 
91 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1986)).

[¶13]   We said in Gist that this 
court does not evaluate the identified actions or omissions of counsel in 
hindsight but in light of all the circumstances; strongly presumes that counsel 
rendered adequate and reasonable assistance making all decisions within the 
bounds of reasonable professional judgment; and views each case in the total 
context of the representation afforded to determine if the defendant was denied 
his right to a fair trial. Gist, 737 P.2d  at 342.

FAILURE TO 
INVESTIGATE

[¶14]   McCoy contends on appeal that his 
trial counsel's performance was so deficient the adversarial process "broke down 
in this case." McCoy lists counsel's errors as:

1) failing to file a 
motion for the payment of costs for the retention and aid of expert 
witnesses,

2) failing to reasonably 
investigate the possible use or necessity of expert 
witnesses,

3) failing to make a 
motion to continue in order to properly investigate reports that he received 
from the prosecution close to the date of trial,

4) failing to call a 
witness whose testimony would have directly refuted the testimony of the alleged 
victim.

[¶15]   McCoy's first two listed errors are 
a contention that trial counsel failed to reasonably investigate the 
availability and necessity of expert testimony. This court has previously 
adopted the following with respect to the duty to 
investigate:

[S]trategic choices made 
after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent 
that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. 
In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to 
make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 
unnecessary.

The reasonableness of 
counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the 
defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, 
quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on 
information supplied by the defendant. * * * [W]hat investigation decisions are 
reasonable depends critically on such information. (Emphasis 
added).

Frias v. 
State, 
722 P.2d  at 145 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 691, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066, 
80 L.Ed.2d at 692).

[¶16]   McCoy, in his appellate brief, 
contends that trial counsel had reason to know that McCoy lacked funds for the 
necessary expense of investigation and expert witnesses and should have acted in 
one of three ways:

1) Filed a motion with 
the District Court pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 7-6-104 for the payment of costs 
necessary to obtain an expert to determine whether the appellant was a "needy 
person,"

2) withdrawn as counsel 
for the Appellant and referred him to the public defender's office since the 
Appellant could not afford to pay trial counsel's fee and for needed expert 
witnesses, or

3) paid for expert 
witnesses out of his fee.

McCoy relies 
upon People v. Danley, 758 P.2d 686 (Colo. App. 1988) for authority that 
this failure is ineffective assistance of counsel. However, we do not read 
Danley as characterizing this particular omission by trial counsel to be 
ineffective assistance of counsel per se.

[¶17]   Danley was charged with attempting 
to sell unneeded heating equipment to others following a "sting operation" 
engineered by the state. Danley paid his counsel a substantial fee believing the 
fee would include all investigation and witness fees. When he learned these 
expenses were not included, Danley made statements which caused his counsel to 
fail to make any inquiry respecting the availability or cost of securing 
favorable expert testimony. Even after it came to the attention of counsel that 
an expert had reported that one of the furnaces involved was defective, Danley's 
counsel failed to determine whether Danley would be prepared to pay for the cost 
of that expert's testimony.

[¶18]   This failure was prejudicial 
because the basic issue in the case was whether Danley had misrepresented 
whether the furnace was defective and expert testimony was available that the 
furnace involved in the "sting operation" was defective. In a similar case 
involving an identical charge and the same furnace, the defense presented such 
expert testimony, and a verdict of not guilty was returned. Based on these 
facts, the court determined that counsel's representation of Danley made it 
reasonably probable that, but for his ineffective assistance, the outcome of 
Danley's trial would have been different. Danley, 758 P.2d  at 
688.

[¶19]   Danley's conviction was reversed 
because the availability and necessity of the expert testimony were specifically 
shown and because of the prejudice to him. Prejudice is the second 
component of the Strickland test. If deficient performance did not 
prejudice the defendant, a conviction will not be 
reversed.

[¶20]   We agree with McCoy that trial 
counsel's duty to investigate included acting upon information that his client 
had become indigent and could not afford the necessary expenses of the trial. If 
trial counsel actually knew or had reason to believe his client was indigent, it 
is deficient performance not to investigate the options available to the client 
under WYO. STAT. § 7-6-104 (1987). An attorney is presumed to know the 
applicable law. However, McCoy's claim that this omission is ineffective 
assistance of counsel burdens him with making the specific showing that he was 
indigent. The showing requires factual evidence of indigency. It is insufficient 
to prove deficient performance by conclusory statements that appellant is 
indigent which are unsupported by facts. McCoy has only told us he is indigent 
without supplying any factual support. He has not met his burden of showing 
deficient performance.

[¶21]   At the post-trial hearing, trial 
counsel testified that he did not consult with any psychologists or counselors 
in an attempt to counter the state's expert testimony. McCoy contends this 
omission is a complete failure to properly investigate because child sexual 
abuse cases are so highly technical and there exist such wide ranging schools of 
thought concerning the evaluation, investigation, and determination of child 
sexual abuse, that it is vital to retain expert consultation to determine 
whether the state's experts' methods were appropriate. McCoy then again argues 
that this omission was ineffective assistance of counsel per 
se.

[¶22]   However, the omission is only 
ineffective assistance of counsel if McCoy has met his burden of showing that 
this omission amounted to deficient performance and he was prejudiced. As in 
Danley, McCoy's proof of deficient performance must specifically show the 
availability and necessity of such expert testimony. McCoy admits that he does 
not make this showing of specific facts when he states "it is left unknown 
without this consultation as to whether the methods that were used by the 
state's experts were appropriate or even possibly detrimental to the alleged 
victim in this case."

Deficient 
Performance

[¶23]   In effect, McCoy has argued without 
factual support that there was only one plausible line of defense, expert 
testimony. Applying our standard of reviewing counsel's overall performance to 
determine if McCoy was deprived of a fair trial whose result is reliable, we 
have carefully reviewed the record, and we find that it does not support McCoy's 
contention.

[¶24]   The record shows that until trial 
counsel was given the physical evidence report from Dr. Reichert, the planned 
defense strategy was to discredit the other two physical evidence reports as 
inconclusive, and argue the daughter's allegations resulted from maternal 
coaching devised as a ploy in the couple's custody battle over the 
daughter.

[¶25]   After receipt of Dr. Reichert's 
report, the defense counsel consulted with a local gynecologist, Dr. Leonel 
Zolessi, to determine if that defense strategy could still be plausible. In Dr. 
Zolessi's opinion, parts of the report which concluded that the presence of scar 
tissue and cysts indicated sexual abuse could be attacked upon cross-examination 
to force an admission that actually they were inconclusive as to abuse. 
However, it was his opinion that the reported condition of the hymen clearly 
indicated repeated sexual intercourse and that was a correct 
conclusion.

[¶26]   At the post-trial hearing, McCoy 
produced testimony from an expert witness who challenged the investigation and 
protocol methods employed in preparing Dr. Reichert's physical evidence report. 
However, the state elicited testimony from the defense's expert which 
discredited his own assertions that proper investigation and scientific protocol 
had not been followed in preparing the physical evidence report. In essence, it 
was discovered during the expert's testimony that he had misunderstood the 
report.

[¶27]   Trial counsel testified at the 
post-trial hearing that Dr. Zolessi's information clarified that the physical 
evidence could not be attacked to cast doubt on whether sexual penetration had 
actually occurred, but established that the basic issue involved at trial would 
be whether it was the defendant who was responsible for the sexual intercourse. 
The defense strategy anticipated that the only direct evidence of the 
perpetrator would be the daughter's accusation, meaning it would be defendant's 
word against the daughter's. The defense developed and executed a 
cross-examination strategy which produced testimony from the daughter and 
McCoy's ex-wife that the daughter first told of sexual abuse following a 
counseling session with the "Jehovah's Witness touch therapist." 
Cross-examination also revealed that the daughter told of the sexual assaults 
following months of counseling by Dr. Heineke of the Wyoming Regional Counseling 
Center, and just one day after watching a suggestive movie. The defense elicited 
admissions from Raylene and the daughter that at one time the daughter had 
accused her now 22-year old brother of perpetrating the sexual 
abuse.

Prejudice

[¶28]   At the post-trial hearing, McCoy 
contended that if the basic issue was "who had done it," it was critical that he 
explain why his daughter was accusing him of the sexual abuse. McCoy attacked 
the cross-examination strategy as insufficient, arguing it was ineffective 
assistance of counsel to not have testimony from a defense expert in a variety 
of areas. Now on appeal, McCoy focuses on testimony produced from the state's 
expert witness that parental coaching is called "parental alienation syndrome" 
and argues it was ineffective assistance of counsel not to produce an expert 
regarding "parental alienation syndrome."

[¶29]   The "parental alienation syndrome" 
was explained by the state's expert as sexual abuse allegations against one 
parent as a result of coaching and encouragement by the other parent. Based upon 
his counseling sessions with the daughter, the state's expert discredited the 
notion that the charges were fabricated or the result of coaching. McCoy made no 
showing against this conclusion and, as noted earlier, still has not made the 
requisite specific showing that expert testimony was available to show this 
conclusion is incorrect.

[¶30]   We agree with the trial court's 
conclusion that demonstrating both coaching and anger was employed as the 
defense strategy at trial, and that evidence was placed before the jury through 
cross-examination and emphasized during the closing argument by defense. 
Appellant has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel, just an 
unsuccessful defense strategy and is speculating that testimony from an expert 
would have been a more advantageous strategy.

OTHER 
WITNESSES

[¶31]   McCoy also contended that witnesses 
were not called to testify at trial concerning other crucial evidence including 
a prior inconsistent statement by the daughter, statements made during a police 
interview with McCoy, and McCoy's character. In support, McCoy produced 
testimony which indicated a physician's assistant could have disclosed a prior 
inconsistent statement where the daughter denied her father assaulted her; 
McCoy's son could have revealed police investigator statements promising to 
clear McCoy if he would admit to the assaults and threatening that police would 
coach the daughter if he did not so admit; and McCoy's employer could have 
stated that McCoy's job as an electrician for the school district frequently 
placed him in contact with young girls and no complaints had been received 
concerning his conduct.

[¶32]   The state showed, however, that the 
physician's assistant had conducted a physical examination of the daughter, and 
her complete testimony would have been that her examination did not confirm the 
daughter's denial because her examination indicated penetration other than 
digital penetration. The state also elicited testimony from Shane Shaw, another 
police investigator present during the interview with McCoy, who denied that the 
other officer had made promises to McCoy, and indicated that the assertions were 
based upon statements out of context.

[¶33]   There was no error involved in 
McCoy's final two contentions since the facts indicate that trial counsel did 
obtain an independent analysis of the report involved. Further, it appears to 
have been trial strategy to avoid the damaging cross-examination testimony which 
the state would have elicited from the physician's assistant had she testified. 
There was no deficiency and no prejudice.

CONCLUSION

[¶34]   Appellant has not met his burden 
that counsel's omissions in performance constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel.

[¶35]   Affirmed.

TAYLOR, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion in which CARDINE, J., joined.

TAYLOR, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom CARDINE, Justice, Retired, joins.

[¶36]   I respectfully 
dissent.

[¶37]   Several months before sexual 
assault charges were filed against Patrick R. McCoy (McCoy), he and his wife 
were involved in a bitter divorce and custody battle which involved the victim. 
During the pendency of the divorce and custody proceeding, McCoy's wife took 
their daughter to a "touch therapist" associated with the Jehovah Witness church 
who offered the opinion that the daughter had been sexually abused. Shortly 
before a scheduled police interview regarding the alleged sexual assault, the 
victim watched a movie depicting sexual child abuse. The following day, the 
victim stated to police investigators that McCoy had sexually abused her. 
Charges were filed against McCoy and a jury trial was 
held.

[¶38]   Defense counsel was advised during 
pretrial proceedings that the State would call a number of witnesses, two of 
which were experts in the field of psychology. Defense counsel listed McCoy as 
his only witness. Defense counsel's preparation of this case consisted of a few 
telephone conferences with his client and two or three office consultations. 
Relying upon his own knowledge of psychology obtained during undergraduate work 
in college and one brief conversation with a gynecologist, defense counsel 
sought no expert assistance in preparing McCoy's defense. Defense counsel relied 
upon maternal coaching, recognized in psychology as "parental alienation 
syndrome," as the cornerstone of his defense.

[¶39]   Defense counsel failed to call as a 
witness the counselor who was the first professional to interview the alleged 
victim concerning the allegations of sexual abuse. Had the counselor been called 
as a witness, her testimony would have revealed that the alleged victim's 
testimony at trial was inconsistent with and far more incriminating than what 
was originally related to the counselor. Defense counsel was remiss in not 
calling this witness whose testimony would have directly contradicted that of 
the alleged victim.

[¶40]   Defense counsel utterly failed to 
investigate and evaluate McCoy's case. Defense counsel declined to consult with 
any expert witness or seek professional assistance in evaluating the State's 
expert witnesses. Defense counsel also failed to call any witness other than 
McCoy, whose fate was a foregone conclusion in the face of the case presented 
unopposed by the State. Defense counsel accepted a substantial retainer, and 
then rested without calling any witnesses in support of his 
theory.

[¶41]   I would reverse and remand based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 

 

FOOTNOTES

*Retired July 6, 1994.

**Chief Justice at time of oral argument.