Case Title: Commonwealth v. Brum

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13383

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2023-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13383 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DANIEL BRUM. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     April 5, 2023.  -  August 10, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  Evidence, 
Testimony before grand jury, Identification, Prior 
inconsistent statement, Hearsay, Opinion, Videotape.  
Identification.  Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Practice, 
Criminal, Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 30, 2020. 
 
 
The case was tried before Robert C Cosgrove, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
John P. Warren for the defendant. 
Stephen C. Nadeau, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Anton Robinson, of New York, Katharine Naples-Mitchell, 
Eliza Lockhart-Jenks, Radha Natarajan, & Chauncey B. Wood, for 
Criminal Justice Institute at Harvard Law School & others, amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  The defendant, Daniel Brum, was found guilty 
of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon in 
connection with the August 30, 2020, stabbing of the victim, 
Jordan Raposo.  Prior to trial, the victim's then girlfriend, 
Shyla Bizarro, identified the defendant to the police as the 
victim's attacker from surveillance video footage.  She also 
testified to her identification of the defendant from the 
surveillance video before a grand jury. 
 
Prior to Bizarro's testimony at trial, however, a voir dire 
of Bizarro revealed that she intended not only to recant both 
her statements to police and her grand jury testimony but also 
to claim that the victim pressured her into making those prior 
statements.  As a result, the trial judge admitted substantively 
the portions of Bizarro's grand jury testimony that she had 
recanted, including her prior statements of identification.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. 431, 439-441 (2005); 
Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 75 (1984); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(1)(A), (C) (2023). 
 
On appeal, the defendant challenges whether the admitted 
portions of Bizarro's grand jury testimony fell within the 
hearsay exemptions for prior inconsistent statements, see Mass. 
G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(A), and statements of identification, see 
Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(C).  He also challenges the 
admissibility of portions of that testimony on other independent 
3 
 
grounds, including that it contains multilevel hearsay and 
inadmissible lay opinion testimony.  Additionally, the defendant 
raises various other evidentiary errors and asserts that 
portions of the prosecutor's closing argument were improper. 
 
For the reasons discussed infra, we conclude that the trial 
judge properly admitted portions of Bizarro's grand jury 
testimony in accordance with the hearsay exemption for prior 
inconsistent statements.  See Daye, 393 Mass. at 75; Mass. G. 
Evid. § 801(d)(1)(A).  We further conclude that the portions of 
Bizarro's grand jury testimony identifying the defendant in the 
surveillance video independently satisfied the hearsay exemption 
for statements of identification.  See Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. at 
439-441; Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(C).  In particular, we 
decline to adopt the defendant's argument that the statements of 
identification within Bizarro's grand jury testimony did not 
satisfy the requirements under our common law as nonhearsay 
under Cong Duc Le and Daye because Bizarro was not a percipient 
witness to the underlying crime.  Finding no grounds for 
reversal on that basis or in the defendant's remaining 
arguments, we affirm the defendant's conviction.1 
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Criminal 
Justice Institute at Harvard Law School, the New England 
Innocence Project, the Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, and the Innocence Project. 
4 
 
 
Facts.  "Because the defendant does not challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence at trial, we briefly summarize it, 
reserving certain details" for later discussion of the alleged 
errors.  See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 466 Mass. 742, 744, 
cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1125 (2014). 
 
Just before noon on August 30, 2020, the victim was stabbed 
while outside a convenience store in New Bedford.  Security 
camera video footage showed the victim walking out of the store, 
into the parking lot, and toward a minivan.  The perpetrator 
then jogged up to the victim, punched the victim, and jabbed his 
arm towards the victim's groin area.  After the attack, the 
perpetrator jogged away, climbed into a dark-colored sport 
utility vehicle (SUV), and drove out of the store parking lot.  
The injured victim then got into the minivan and drove off. 
 
Around the time of the attack, Maria Mattias and her 
husband, Andrew Brum, the defendant's brother, were at their 
home in New Bedford, along with their nephew, Carlos Santos.  
Mattias and Santos were in the back yard when they saw the 
victim enter the back yard, bleeding and stumbling.2  Blood was 
 
 
2 The defendant's brother and his wife were familiar with 
the victim.  The defendant's brother had worked with the victim 
as masons for several years and knew each other independent of 
the victim's relationship with the defendant.  As discussed 
infra, the defendant and the victim had been roommates earlier 
that summer, but animosity had grown between them after the 
victim kicked the defendant out of that living situation. 
5 
 
dripping from the victim's waist and, before collapsing and 
appearing to lose consciousness, he stated that he needed help.  
While they waited for emergency services, Mattias discovered 
that the victim was bleeding from a wound to his groin.  The 
minivan that the victim had driven to Mattias's and Brum's house 
was still running, and the door was open. 
 
Bizarro, the victim's girlfriend at the time, arrived at 
Mattias's and Brum's home soon after medical personnel.  Bizarro 
appeared shocked, upset, and frantic.  The victim was 
transported to Rhode Island Hospital, where it was determined 
that he had suffered four stab wounds:  one to the groin, one to 
his left leg, and two to his scrotum. 
 
In the aftermath of the stabbing, New Bedford police 
officers retrieved the convenience store's video surveillance 
footage that showed the attack.  The next day, a police officer 
discovered a Ford Edge SUV parked one-half mile away from the 
store that matched the description of the perpetrator's vehicle 
as seen in the surveillance video footage.  After police seized 
the Ford Edge, they determined that it had been rented by the 
defendant.  They conducted deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) tests on 
the Ford Edge; the defendant's DNA, as well as that of from 
three to five other potential contributors, was identified in 
6 
 
traces of occult blood3 in the Ford Edge.  The victim's DNA did 
not match any of the profiles. 
 
In October 2020, Bizarro testified before a Bristol County 
grand jury.  She testified that she had known the defendant for 
over fifteen years; they had grown up in the same area of New 
Bedford, and Bizarro had gone to the same school as the 
defendant and his brother.  Additionally, she testified that the 
defendant and the victim had been roommates that summer, and 
that there was animosity between them because the defendant felt 
that the victim had unfairly kicked the defendant out of their 
apartment.  Bizarro also testified that, although she did not 
recognize the Ford Edge seized by police, she knew that the 
defendant often drove rental cars. 
 
Bizarro further testified that, on the day of the stabbing, 
she had received a telephone call from the victim, where he 
claimed that "DB stabbed me."4  She stated to the grand jury that 
the victim sounded frantic and nervous on the telephone call, 
and he was breathing heavily.  Bizarro testified that on the day 
after the stabbing, she had spoken with police officers at the 
New Bedford police station, where she was shown the surveillance 
 
 
3 Occult blood is blood not visible to the naked eye.  See 
Commonwealth v. Marquetty, 416 Mass. 445, 446 (1993). 
 
 
4 Bizarro testified that the victim referred to the 
defendant as "DB" and that she knew the defendant by this 
nickname. 
7 
 
video footage.  Prior to viewing the footage, she had told 
officers that she knew who had stabbed the victim and that it 
was the defendant.  Bizarro further testified that, after 
viewing the footage at the police station, she told police that 
she was "[p]ositive" that the defendant was the perpetrator.  
When the surveillance video footage was played before the grand 
jury, Bizarro testified that she was able to identify the 
defendant from the video because of his "clothes," "hair," and 
"by the way he[ was] walking," as the defendant "has a very 
distinctive walk." 
 
Later that month, the grand jury indicted the defendant on 
a charge of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, 
in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b).  The defendant filed 
several pretrial motions concerning the anticipated evidence at 
trial.  Among those denied were motions to exclude the DNA test 
results and to exclude Bizarro's grand jury testimony where she 
identified the defendant from the surveillance video footage.  
The judge reserved for trial the defendant's motion to exclude 
Bizarro's grand jury testimony where she claimed that the victim 
told her, "DB stabbed me." 
 
The defendant was tried before a jury from June 22 to June 
25, 2021.  At trial, the judge conducted a voir dire of Bizarro 
prior to her testimony to ascertain, pursuant to the 
requirements in Daye, 393 Mass. at 75, whether Bizarro's grand 
8 
 
jury testimony was admissible substantively under the hearsay 
exemption for prior inconsistent statements.5  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§§ 104(a), 801(d)(1).6  During the voir dire, Bizarro recanted 
extensive portions of her grand jury testimony.  She denied her 
prior recollections of the day of the stabbing and any 
 
 
5 The voir dire of Bizarro was requested by defense counsel. 
 
 
6 Section 104(a) of the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence 
provides: 
 
"The court must decide any preliminary question about 
whether a witness is qualified or competent, a privilege 
exists, or evidence is admissible.  In so deciding, the 
court is not bound by the law of evidence, except that on 
privilege." 
 
Section 801(d) provides in pertinent part: 
 
"A statement that meets the following conditions is not 
hearsay:  
 
"(1) A declarant-witness's prior statement.  The declarant 
testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior 
statement, and the statement 
 
"(A)(i) is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony; 
(ii) was made under oath before a grand jury . . . ; (iii) 
was not coerced; and (iv) is more than a mere confirmation 
or denial of an allegation by the interrogator; [or] 
 
". . . 
 
"(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived 
earlier." 
 
 
Here, although portions of Bizarro's grand jury testimony 
ostensibly contained statements of identification, the trial 
judge relied solely on the hearsay exemption for prior 
inconsistent statements in determining that the testimony was 
substantively admissible nonhearsay. 
9 
 
recollection of her interactions with police the day after the 
stabbing, including her identification of the defendant from the 
surveillance video footage.  She likewise denied her 
identification of the defendant before the grand jury.  Finally, 
she maintained that any statements she had given to police or in 
her grand jury testimony were due to coercion by the victim, who 
she claimed was abusing her at the time. 
 
Based on his observations of Bizarro during the voir dire 
and contradictions in her anticipated testimony, the judge made 
the following findings:  that there was opportunity to cross-
examine her at trial; that her prior statements were in her own 
words and not coerced; and that she was feigning when she said 
she was unable to recall various events.  Based on those 
findings, the judge allowed inconsistent portions of Bizarro's 
grand jury testimony to be admitted for their truth.  The judge 
and counsel for each party then reviewed Bizarro's grand jury 
testimony together to determine which portions had been recanted 
and thus would be substantively admissible at trial.  During 
that process, defense counsel made contemporaneous objections to 
the admission of various parts of Bizarro's grand jury 
testimony. 
 
Bizarro testified before the jury consistent with her voir 
dire.  Among other things, she recanted her identification of 
the defendant from the surveillance video footage in the police 
10 
 
station and her grand jury testimony of that identification, 
claiming that she did not recall seeing the surveillance video 
footage at the police station.  Instead, she claimed that she 
could not tell the identity of the perpetrator from the footage, 
and that the perpetrator "look[ed] like a random tall white guy" 
who "could [have] be[en] anybody."  When shown still images from 
the video at trial, Bizarro remarked that she could not identify 
the attacker as the defendant and that it was "a very poor 
quality picture/video," a "horrible video."  Bizarro testified 
that she had only previously identified the perpetrator as the 
defendant because the victim pressured her into doing so.  The 
trial judge then allowed the substantive admission of the 
previously reviewed portions of her grand jury testimony and 
instructed the jury accordingly. 
 
The jury convicted the defendant of assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon, and the defendant was sentenced to 
a term of from four to seven years in State prison.  The 
defendant timely appealed, and we granted his application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial 
judge's substantive admission in evidence of portions of 
Bizarro's grand jury testimony that she recanted at trial, 
including her prior identifications of the defendant in the 
surveillance video.  The defendant also challenges admission of 
11 
 
portions of that grand jury testimony on independent evidentiary 
grounds, including the presence of multilevel hearsay and lay 
opinion testimony that he claims was improperly admitted.  The 
defendant also challenges the admission of testimony by a police 
officer who identified the defendant's vehicle from its license 
plate by "zooming in" on certain video footage; he challenges 
the admission of DNA and occult blood evidence; and he asserts 
reversible error arising from the prosecutor's closing argument.  
Addressing each of these claims in turn, we conclude there is no 
basis on which to reverse the defendant's conviction. 
 
1.  Standard of review.  At trial, the defendant raised 
timely objections to several of the errors now before us on 
appeal.  Where the defendant's objections were preserved, we 
review for prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 
488 Mass. 827, 835 (2022).  Where the defendant did not raise a 
timely objection, we review the alleged errors to determine 
whether they gave rise to a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Commonwealth v. Davis, 487 Mass. 448, 464 (2021), 
S.C., 491 Mass. 1011 (2023). 
 
2.  Substantive admission of Bizarro's grand jury testimony 
as nonhearsay.  a.  Prior inconsistent statements.  As a 
preliminary matter, we agree with the trial judge that all the 
admitted portions of Bizarro's grand jury testimony satisfied 
the requirements of the hearsay exemption for prior inconsistent 
12 
 
statements made under oath, see Daye, 393 Mass. at 73-74; Mass 
G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(A).  As noted supra, a prior inconsistent 
statement of a declarant witness is substantively admissible 
under Mass G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(A), if the "declarant testifies 
and is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and 
the statement (i) is inconsistent with the declarant's 
testimony; (ii) was made under oath before a grand jury . . . ; 
(iii) was not coerced; and (iv) is more than a mere confirmation 
or denial of an allegation by the interrogator."  See note 6, 
supra. 
 
Here, upon making a preliminary determination that Bizarro 
was feigning a lack of memory, the trial judge properly and 
carefully reviewed Bizarro's grand jury testimony -- with the 
assistance of counsel -- to determine which portions of that 
testimony qualified as "inconsistent" statements for purposes of 
the relevant hearsay exemption.  See Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 
432 Mass. 735, 742 (2000) (witness's claim of lack of memory 
qualifies as "inconsistent" for purposes of Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801[d][1][A]).  See also Mass G. Evid. §§ 104(a) (judge 
decides preliminary questions), 801(d)(1)(A) (hearsay exemption 
for prior inconsistent statements).  The defendant does not 
dispute this preliminary determination, nor does he dispute the 
trial judge's further determinations that Bizarro was subject to 
cross-examination, that the statements were made under oath 
13 
 
before a grand jury, and that the testimony was more than a mere 
confirmation or denial.  Rather, the defendant argues that the 
testimony was inadmissible under Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(A) 
because (1) there was an insufficient showing that the 
statements were "not coerced"; (2) the Commonwealth failed to 
introduce evidence corroborative of the grand jury testimony; 
and (3) the declarant (Bizarro) was not a percipient witness to 
the crime, see Daye, 393 Mass. at 73 n.18.  We discern no error. 
 
With respect to potential coercion, the record reflects 
that the judge conducted a careful and comprehensive voir dire 
of Bizarro and found that her prior statements were voluntary, 
and her lack of memory was feigned.  Although Bizarro testified 
to the abusive nature of her relationship with the victim, 
including that he told her to say certain things to police, the 
judge, as the fact finder, was not obligated to credit that 
testimony in finding that Bizarro's previous statements were 
made in her own words.  See Commonwealth v. DePina, 476 Mass. 
614, 622 (2017).  Bizarro claimed to lack any memory of 
previously identifying the defendant -- a claim which persisted 
even when presented with video of her prior identification and 
her signature and identifying marks on video still images.  
Under those circumstances, it was not erroneous for the judge to 
discredit Bizarro's voir dire testimony that she was either 
14 
 
unable to recall her prior identifications of the defendant or 
had not made the identifications in the first place. 
 
Second, the issue of corroborative evidence raised by the 
defendant has no bearing on the admissibility of Bizarro's grand 
jury testimony.  We stated in Daye, 393 Mass. at 74-75, that the 
Commonwealth must offer corroborative evidence where grand jury 
testimony relates to an essential element of the offense.  
However, we later clarified that such a requirement goes to the 
separate question of the "sufficiency of the evidence rather 
than to its admissibility."  DePina, 476 Mass. at 621 n.5, 
citing Commonwealth v. Clements, 436 Mass. 190, 193 (2002).  
Because the defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we decline to review it here and conclude that 
Bizarro's grand jury testimony was admissible under the hearsay 
exemption for prior inconsistent statements, irrespective of any 
corroborative evidence. 
 
Lastly, we address the defendant's claim that Bizarro's 
testimony failed to meet the requirements of the hearsay 
exemption for prior inconsistent statements because Bizarro was 
not a percipient witness to the crime.  For support, the 
defendant points to a footnote in our opinion in Daye, 393 Mass. 
at 73 n.18, which states: 
"We predicate probative use of prior inconsistent 
statements on a showing that the declarant was a percipient 
witness to the events in question.  If it is clear from the 
15 
 
context in which the statement was made that the statement 
was based on hearsay, rather than personal knowledge, the 
statement may not be admitted as probative evidence." 
 
 
The initial sentence of the footnote seems to restrict the 
use of prior inconsistent statements under Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(1)(A) to situations in which the declarant was a 
"percipient witness" to the "events in question," but it does 
not specify which events are the "events in question."  The 
sentence that follows, however, clarifies that the operative 
distinction is whether the prior statement "was based on 
hearsay, rather than personal knowledge."  Per the footnote in 
Daye, a prior inconsistent statement that is based on hearsay 
"may not be admitted as probative evidence."  In Daye itself, 
the relevant prior inconsistent statement also was a statement 
of identification, and the requirement of personal knowledge was 
satisfied when the witness observed the defendant during the 
commission of the crime.  Daye, 383 Mass. at 73. 
 
Nothing in Daye, however, or our subsequent case law limits 
the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements to 
circumstances where the testifying witness is present at the 
scene of a crime.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Trotto, 487 Mass. 
708, 723-725 (2021) (witness's grand jury testimony detailing 
conversation where defendant described circumstances of victim's 
death was admissible as prior inconsistent statements, despite 
witness's absence at scene); DePina, 476 Mass. at 621-623 
16 
 
(witness's grand jury testimony describing her seeing 
defendants' possession of handgun prior to shooting admissible, 
despite witness not being present at shooting); Commonwealth v. 
Noble, 417 Mass. 341, 347 (1994) (witness's grand jury testimony 
pertaining to codefendant's conversation of crime substantively 
admissible when witness was percipient witness to the 
conversation, not the crime); Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 54 
Mass. App. Ct. 363, 366, 370-371 (2002) (victim's statement of 
identification of defendant as shooter partially based on 
childhood spent together). 
 
The defendant asks us to interpret the footnote in Daye in 
a manner that would confound the current practice of courts and 
counsel, see, e.g., Trotto, 487 Mass. at 723-725, when 
considering the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements.  
We decline to do so.  Moreover, it is clear from the context of 
Daye that the limitation discussed in footnote 18 applied only 
to prior inconsistent statements of identification, not prior 
inconsistent statements in general.  As discussed infra, our 
treatment of statements of identification has evolved 
significantly since that opinion.  See part 2.b, infra.  See 
also Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. at 437-441; Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(1)(C) note. 
 
b.  Statements of identification.  Although this basis was 
not addressed by the trial judge, we note that the portions of 
17 
 
Bizarro's grand jury testimony where she identified the 
defendant in the surveillance video were independently 
admissible for their truth as nonhearsay under the exemption for 
prior statements of identification.  See Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. 
at 437-441; Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(C).  The defendant moved 
in limine to exclude this evidence and renewed his objection at 
trial; therefore, we review for prejudicial error.  See 
Gonsalves, 488 Mass. at 836. 
 
The admissibility of prior statements of identification is 
governed by the principles set forth in Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. 
at 436-437 (adopting Proposed Mass. R. Evid. § 801[d][1][C], and 
overruling Daye as to "limitations . . . placed on the use of 
extrajudicial identification evidence").  The defendant's 
primary argument regarding these statements echoes his argument 
concerning percipience and Daye addressed in part 2.a, supra:  
because our jurisprudence limits the substantive admission of 
prior statements of identification to identifications made by a 
percipient witness and not those contained in lay opinion 
testimony of a nonpercipient witness, Bizarro's identifications 
are inadmissible on these grounds.  The defendant first seeks 
support for this argument in the language of Cong Duc Le itself, 
namely, its requirement that the prior statement be "one of 
identification of a person [made] after perceiving him" 
(emphasis added).  See Cong Dug Le, supra; Mass. G. Evid. 
18 
 
§ 801(d)(1)(C) (to be admissible under this subsection, 
statement must "identif[y] a person as someone the declarant 
perceived earlier").  The defendant contends that the verb 
"perceive," as used in Cong Duc Le and Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(1)(C), is limited to perception of the person who is 
the subject of the identification during the commission of the 
crime. 
 
We disagree, as the rule we adopted in Cong Duc Le contains 
no such restriction.  Instead, the requirement that a statement 
be "one of identification of a person [made] after perceiving 
him" refers only to the fact that the declarant's basis for the 
identification must be personal knowledge, not hearsay.  In Cong 
Duc Le, 444 Mass. at 433, that personal knowledge arose from 
declarant's perception of the defendants during the commission 
of the crime, as well as his personal history with the 
defendants.  This requirement may be also satisfied where the 
sole basis for the declarant's identification is years of 
acquaintance with -- and perception of -- the subject, as 
Bizarro's was here.  See Commonwealth v. Raedy, 68 Mass. App. 
Ct. 440, 449 n.14 (2007) ("perceive" language in § 801(d)(1)(C) 
"focuses on the nature of the statement . . . identifying the 
person after the declarant has perceived that person," without 
limiting basis of perception). 
19 
 
 
Our precedent considering witness identifications more 
generally supports this understanding.  We have held that "[t]he 
probative value of [an] identification depends on the strength 
of its source."  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 473 Mass. 594, 601 
(2016) (considering fairness of out-of-court identifications).  
The strength of an identification's independent source is 
determined by different factors, including the "witness's prior 
familiarity with the person identified, where that person is a 
witness's family member, friend, or long-time acquaintance."  
Id. at 601-602.  As such, a witness's "long and close 
relationship" with the identified subject and "considerable 
familiarity" with the subject's physical characteristics may 
very well make an identification more reliable than "a 'single' 
or 'brief' exposure to a suspect in frightening conditions" 
immediately after the commission of a crime.  See Commonwealth 
v. Vasquez, 482 Mass. 850, 861 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Chamberlin, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 705, 713 (2014).  Cf. Commonwealth 
v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 242 (2014) (eyewitness's familiarity 
with defendant prior to crime "good reason" to allow in-court 
showup as initial identification procedure).  "When such 
familiarity is present," even without presence at the scene of a 
crime, "those witnesses may be able to discern identifying 
characteristics that others could not, rendering their visual 
20 
 
identifications, in some circumstances, less unreliable."  
Vasquez, supra. 
 
Turning to Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(C), which "has its 
origins in our common law of evidence," Commonwealth v. Adams, 
458 Mass. 766, 771 (2011), we note that appellate courts' 
consideration of out-of-court identifications focus on the 
reliability of the basis of the identification, rather than the 
identifying witness's presence at the criminal activity.  For 
example, in Adams, supra at 771, we held the admission of out-
of-court identifications was not limited to formal 
identification procedures, as an identifying witness who 
"kn[ows] the defendant well," like the defendant's brother, was 
a "more reliable pretrial statement of identification" than "a 
witness's selection of a photograph of someone he does not 
know."  Our common-law prioritization of an identification's 
reliability over the form of how that reliability is achieved is 
especially relevant for Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(C), which 
exempts statements from categorization as unreliable hearsay. 
 
We note finally that our interpretation of the current rule 
as adopted in Cong Duc Le is entirely consistent with the 
footnote in Daye as it pertains to Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(1)(A), discussed supra.  In sum, neither Cong Duc Le 
nor Daye (as modified in Cong Duc Le) requires that a prior 
statement of identification or a prior inconsistent statement 
21 
 
made under oath be based on a witness's perception of the 
individual during the commission of the crime. 
 
3.  Other challenges to admissibility of Bizarro's grand 
jury testimony.  In addition to raising the threshold issue of 
whether the entirety of Bizarro's grand jury testimony is 
admissible nonhearsay under Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(A), the 
defendant argues that specific portions of the grand jury 
testimony were inadmissible on other evidentiary grounds. 
 
a.  Lay opinion testimony identifying defendant in 
surveillance video.  The defendant contends that Bizarro's grand 
jury testimony identifying the defendant from the video footage 
was inadmissible lay opinion testimony because it was "not 
helpful" to the jury, see Commonwealth v. Pleas, 49 Mass. App. 
Ct. 321, 325 (2000), and any probative value was outweighed by 
its prejudicial effect, see Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 
Mass. 454, 477 (2019). 
 
A "witness's opinion concerning the identity of a person 
depicted in a surveillance [video] is admissible if there is 
some basis for concluding that the witness is more likely to 
correctly identify the defendant from the photograph [or video] 
than is the jury."  Commonwealth v. Vacher, 469 Mass. 425, 441 
(2014), quoting Pleas, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 326.  "Put another 
way, such testimony is admissible . . . when the witness 
possesses sufficiently relevant familiarity with the defendant 
22 
 
that the jury cannot also possess" (quotation omitted).  Vacher, 
supra, quoting Pleas, supra at 326-327. 
 
In denying the defendant's pretrial motion to exclude this 
portion of Bizarro's grand jury testimony, the trial judge 
reviewed the video footage and determined "that the 
identification testimony of one with some familiarity with the 
defendant would be helpful to the jury."  The judge elsewhere 
noted that the surveillance video footage was not excellent 
quality, but also was not "hopelessly obscure"; the footage 
showed a sunny day, with minimal blur.  See Pleas, 49 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 325.  Additionally, the judge was presented with facts 
that Bizarro knew the defendant since middle school and that the 
defendant recently had been her boyfriend's roommate.  See 
Vasquez, 482 Mass. at 861 (witnesses had long relationship with 
defendant as basis for video identification).  Bizarro also 
testified before the grand jury that she had been able to 
identify the defendant from the surveillance video by "his 
clothes, by the way he's walking, . . . everything."  See id. 
(witnesses had familiarity with defendant's "stature, gait, 
appearance, clothing, and features").  Even though both the jury 
and Bizarro were able to view the same surveillance footage, 
Bizarro was "specifically familiar with the defendant, such that 
[she] could provide special insight into his appearance."  Cf. 
Wardsworth, 482 Mass. at 476 (opinion identification testimony 
23 
 
from officers with no independent familiarity of defendant 
prejudiced defendant).  In these circumstances, the judge did 
not abuse his discretion in determining that Bizarro's testimony 
had a proper foundation and would be helpful to the jurors, who 
had the video and still images from the video before them. 
 
Nor are we persuaded by the defendant's alternative 
argument that, even if the testimony met the requirements for 
admission of lay opinion testimony, the probative value of the 
evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect 
where Bizarro recanted the testimony at trial.  Appellate courts 
reviewing the admission of lay opinion identification from a 
video only require that there be "some basis for concluding that 
the witness is more likely to correctly identify the defendant 
from the [video] than is the jury."  Vacher, 469 Mass. at 441, 
quoting Pleas, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 326.  The purpose of 
requiring such a foundation for lay opinion testimony is so the 
jury have enough information to allow them to "conduct an 
independent assessment of the accuracy and reliability of [the 
witness's] identifications."  Commonwealth v. Connolly, 91 Mass. 
App. Ct. 580, 592-593 (2017).  If subsequent testimony calls 
into question the "accuracy and reliability" of a witness's 
identification, that is a matter for the jury to resolve, not 
the judge.  See id.  This is especially the case for statements 
of identification that fall under Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(C), 
24 
 
which contemplates scenarios where the jury are "confronted with 
disputed testimony concerning identification."  Cong Duc Le, 444 
Mass. at 439-440.  Rather than prejudice the defendant, the fact 
that a prior identification is disputed is helpful to the jury 
"in evaluating the over-all evidence as to whether the defendant 
on trial was the one who committed the charged offense."  Id. at 
440-441.  This is so even when a prior identification is self-
disputed, as Bizarro's was here. 
 
b.  Multilevel hearsay.  The defendant argues that a 
statement made by the victim to Bizarro -- "DB stabbed me" -- 
and introduced through Bizarro's grand jury testimony should 
have been excluded under Daye as multilevel hearsay, because the 
declarant of the underlying statement was unavailable for cross-
examination.  Because the defendant objected before and at 
trial, we review the admission of this statement for prejudicial 
error.  See Gonsalves, 488 Mass. at 835.  Finding none, we 
conclude that the defendant's argument is without merit. 
 
Multilevel hearsay is admissible "only if each of the 
multiple hearsay statements falls within an exception to the 
hearsay rule."  DePina, 476 Mass. at 623, citing Commonwealth v. 
Gil, 393 Mass. 204, 218 (1984); Mass. G. Evid. § 805 (2023).  As 
discussed supra, the first layer of statements challenged as 
multilevel hearsay -- Bizarro's statement to the grand jury, 
which she recanted at trial -- is nonhearsay and admissible for 
25 
 
its substance as a prior inconsistent statement of a declarant 
witness.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(A).  The defendant's 
assertion that this statement is inadmissible because the victim 
was not available for cross-examination at trial, in 
contradiction of the requirements in Daye, rests on a 
misapplication of the rule.  Because it is Bizarro's statement 
that is of concern under Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(A), Bizarro 
is the declarant who must be, and was, available for cross-
examination at trial.  As explained infra, the underlying 
statement of the victim -- "DB stabbed me" -- that Bizarro 
repeated in her testimony is separately admissible as a 
spontaneous utterance.  Thus, cross-examination of the victim, 
as the declarant of that underlying statement, was not required 
for it to be admitted, unless that underlying statement violated 
the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights. 
 
"Out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the 
matter and asserted by a declarant who does not testify at trial 
must pass two 'distinct but symbiotic' tests to be admitted."  
Commonwealth v. Rand, 487 Mass. 811, 815 (2021), quoting United 
States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
548 U.S. 926 (2006).  "First, the statement must be admissible 
under our common-law rules of evidence as an exception [or 
26 
 
exemption] to the hearsay rule."  Rand, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Beatrice, 460 Mass. 255, 258 (2011).  "Second, 
the statement must be nontestimonial for purposes of the 
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment."  Rand, supra, 
quoting Beatrice, supra. 
 
The victim's statement that "DB stabbed me" is admissible 
under the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule.  
In reviewing whether an out-of-court statement comes within this 
exception, courts consider "whether there was an exciting event 
that would give rise to the exception," and then "whether the 
declarant displayed a degree of excitement sufficient to 
conclude that [the] statement was a spontaneous reaction to the 
exciting event, rather than the product of reflective thought."  
See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 437 Mass. 620, 624-625 (2002).  
Here, it is beyond dispute that being stabbed multiple times in 
the groin and scrotum constitutes an exciting event.  See 
Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 Mass. 236, 246 (2008) (stabbing 
qualifies as exciting event).  After being attacked, the victim 
drove away from the scene while bleeding.  He then stumbled into 
the back yard of acquaintances to seek help and care, leaving 
the engine of the car he had driven there still running and the 
door open.  On the telephone with Bizarro, when he gave the 
statement, the victim sounded "flustered."  Soon after, the 
victim nearly lost consciousness and had to be transported 
27 
 
directly to an out-of-State hospital due to the severity of his 
injuries.  It was unlikely that the circumstances facing the 
victim at that time were conducive to dispassionate, reflective 
thought. 
 
The victim's statement also was nontestimonial.  
"Testimonial statements are those made with the primary purpose 
of 'creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.'"  
Commonwealth v. McGann, 484 Mass. 312, 316 (2020), quoting 
Wardsworth, 482 Mass. at 464.  "The inquiry is objective, asking 
not what that particular declarant intended, but rather 'the 
primary purpose that a reasonable person would have ascribed to 
the statement, taking into account all of the surrounding 
circumstances.'"  Commonwealth v. Imbert, 479 Mass. 575, 580 
(2018), quoting Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 84 (2012). 
 
The victim's statement, taken together with the rest of his 
statements to Bizarro and his demeanor on the call, evinces that 
he was attempting to seek aid and have his girlfriend join him 
in a medical emergency.  See Rand, 487 Mass. at 817 ("when 
preoccupied by an ongoing emergency, a victim is unlikely to 
have the presence of mind to create a substitute for trial 
testimony").  The victim sounded frantic and nervous on the 
telephone call to Bizarro just after being attacked while en 
route to the house of an acquaintance to get help.  See McGann, 
484 Mass. at 318 (victim's "hysterical" statements to mother on 
28 
 
telephone calls after violent attack were nontestimonial).  
Again, almost immediately after getting to the home, with blood 
dripping from his waist, the victim collapsed and appeared to 
lose consciousness.  Given the circumstances, the victim's 
statement does not demonstrate an intent to create a substitute 
for trial testimony, see Rand, supra, and the judge did not err 
in admitting it. 
 
c.  Other portions of grand jury testimony.  The defendant 
also contends that three other specific portions of Bizarro's 
grand jury testimony should have been excluded because they were 
speculative, lacked proper foundation, and contained 
inadmissible hearsay:  her statement to police that she "knew 
who it was" who stabbed the victim, namely, the defendant; her 
statements to police that that she "knew" the defendant was 
driving a rental car on the date of the attack, "because he gets 
them often"; and her statements to police concerning the 
animosity between the defendant and victim as the defendant's 
motive for the attack.  Having reviewed the defendant's 
arguments and the record, consisting of Bizarro's grand jury 
testimony, her voir dire at trial, and her trial testimony, we 
conclude that any error in the admission of these statements did 
not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Desiderio, 491 Mass. 809, 817 (2023). 
29 
 
 
Bizarro's statements that she knew who the attacker was and 
that she knew the defendant was driving a rental car based on 
habit were cumulative of other, more powerful and properly 
admitted testimony; namely, the victim's statement that "DB 
stabbed me," see part 3.b, supra, and evidence of the 
defendant's rental car agreement, see part 5, infra.  See 
DePina, 476 Mass. at 623-624.7 
 
And while the portion of Bizarro's grand jury testimony 
concerning animosity between the defendant and victim lacked 
adequate foundation, its admission did not create a likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Moffat, 486 
Mass. 193, 200 (2020) ("Lay witnesses may only testify regarding 
matters within their personal knowledge").  Bizarro testified to 
the grand jury that she thought the defendant and victim had a 
falling out because the victim told the defendant that they 
could no longer be roommates; she "wasn't there" to see the 
defendant's reaction, but she "kn[e]w that they argued" and that 
the victim had not been answering the defendant's telephone 
calls for a while.  Earlier before the grand jury, Bizarro 
 
 
7 We note that our current law prohibits the use of evidence 
of an individual person's habit to prove action in conformity 
with that habit, see Commonwealth v. Wilson, 443 Mass. 122, 138 
(2004); Mass. G. Evid. § 406(b) (2023).  This case law is not in 
line with the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Fed. R. Evid. 
§ 406.  Nonetheless, we leave the consideration of our treatment 
of habit evidence for another day. 
30 
 
testified that she knew the defendant and victim had been 
roommates for about two months in the summer of 2020, but the 
Commonwealth did not elicit, either before the grand jury or at 
trial, foundational details regarding how Bizarro came to know 
of the disagreement between the two men. 
 
While the prosecutor touched upon Bizarro's grand jury 
testimony regarding motive in his closing argument -- stating 
that the jury had "heard . . . as to why [the victim] was 
stabbed" and that it was due to the "falling out" -- he also 
mentioned that the jury were instructed to scrutinize Bizarro's 
testimony as an immunized witness, and that motive was not an 
element of the crime.  Given that at trial, Bizarro directly 
contradicted this portion of her grand jury testimony, and that 
the prosecutor did not overly rely on this portion of Bizarro's 
testimony in making his case to the jury, we cannot say it 
substantially risked a miscarriage of justice to have the jury 
weigh these statements.  See DePina, 476 Mass. at 624-625. 
 
4.  Direct examination of Bizarro regarding her professed 
motivation to lie.  At trial, when the Commonwealth asked 
Bizarro about her previous identification of the defendant 
during her grand jury testimony, where she had signed her 
initials on still images of the surveillance video footage, 
Bizarro responded that she was "doing what [she] was told by 
[the victim]."  The defendant objected to this answer and moved 
31 
 
to strike Bizarro's response, which was overruled.  The 
Commonwealth continued to ask Bizarro about whom she had 
identified in the still images from the surveillance video 
footage; Bizarro responded that she "was told to say that it was 
[the defendant]," which the defendant did not object to.  On 
appeal, the defendant maintains that all of Bizarro's statements 
to that effect were hearsay that "had no proper purpose in 
advancing the Commonwealth's case," and even if properly 
admitted, risked unfair prejudice to the defendant.  See 
Gonsalves, 488 Mass. at 835. 
 
"An out-of-court statement introduced to impeach a witness, 
and not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is not 
hearsay."  Commonwealth v. Schoener, 491 Mass. 706, 729 (2023), 
citing Commonwealth v. Denson, 489 Mass. 138, 149 (2022).  
Parties may impeach their own witnesses, see Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 607 (2023), including via prior inconsistent statements, so 
long as a proper foundation is made.  See Commonwealth v. 
McAfee, 430 Mass. 483, 489-490 (1999), citing G. L. c. 233, 
§ 23. 
 
Here, the Commonwealth's line of questioning was 
permissible as a means of impeaching Bizarro, as it invited 
comparison of the inconsistencies between Bizarro's trial and 
grand jury testimonies, exposing her lack of credibility as a 
trial witness.  See Sineiro, 432 Mass. at 742.  The 
32 
 
Commonwealth's questions -- and Bizarro's responses -- 
juxtaposed Bizarro's inability to recall anything incriminating 
she had previously said about the defendant, with her only 
remaining memory:  that of the victim's supposed coercion.  The 
judge did not err in allowing the Commonwealth to ask questions 
that permitted the jury to "hear all of [Bizarro's] version of 
events" while deciding whether her testimony at trial or her 
testimony to the grand jury was the truth.  Id. at 743.  See 
Clements, 436 Mass. at 195 (determination of reliability of 
pretrial identification versus in-court disavowal is matter for 
jury); Daye, 393 Mass. at 73-74 (jury may use their "common 
sense" to weigh probative worth of identification, given their 
observation of witness and her "rejection on the stand of [her] 
prior statement"). 
 
Although no limiting instruction was provided for this 
impeachment evidence, the defendant did not request one, and 
there likely was no prejudice to the defendant from the 
admission of the statements.8  See Commonwealth v. Lester, 486 
 
 
8 Prior to Bizarro's testimony at trial, the defendant had 
requested "contemporaneous" instructions on the use of prior 
inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes.  Immediately 
prior to Bizarro's in-court testimony, the judge proceeded to 
give general instructions that the jury should limit the use of 
any prior inconsistent statements to consideration of a 
witness's credibility.  During Bizarro's direct examination, the 
defendant did not request limiting instructions in response to 
the Commonwealth's questions or Bizarro's answers.  Prior to 
 
33 
 
Mass. 239, 253 (2020) (party concerned about purpose for which 
impeachment testimony is admitted has burden of requesting 
appropriate instruction at time statement is admitted).  This is 
because, if Bizarro's answers were considered substantively by 
the jury, they arguably would be helpful to the defendant.  
Indeed, Bizarro's trial testimony indicated that her prior 
identifications of the defendant were made, at the very least, 
due to the victim's suggestions, if not his directives to 
outright lie.  If those answers were accepted for their truth by 
the jury, the defendant was not harmed, but arguably was helped 
by them.  See Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 759.  Moreover, the 
prosecutor's closing remarks invited the jury to "throw Ms. 
Bizarro's testimony out the window," and nothing elsewhere in 
the record indicated that either party wished the jury to 
consider these statements for their truth.  See Commonwealth v. 
Charles, 397 Mass. 1, 7 (1986).  "[W]e are substantially 
confident that, if the error had not been made, the jury verdict 
would have been the same."  Maldonado, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Ruddock, 428 Mass. 288, 292 n.3 (1998). 
 
5.  License plate testimony.  At trial, a detective 
testified to the process used by police in identifying the SUV 
 
Bizarro's grand jury testimony being read in evidence, the court 
gave updated instructions to the jury that they could consider 
Bizarro's grand jury testimony for its substance. 
34 
 
seen in the surveillance video footage as the Ford Edge rented 
by the defendant.  During that testimony, the detective 
indicated that he identified the license plate on the SUV in the 
surveillance video footage as being from Florida, the same State 
as the license plate on the defendant's rented Ford Edge.  The 
detective was able to identify the State of the SUV's license 
plate in the video by "zooming in" on the video (close-up video) 
and examining the license plate's characteristics closely.  
Because the defendant did not object to the detective's 
testimony at trial, we review its admission to determine whether 
it created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 721-722 (2016). 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the Commonwealth 
failed to lay a proper foundation for this portion of the 
detective's testimony.  Additionally, the defendant maintains 
that the detective's testimony was unduly prejudicial and had 
limited probative value, because the jury did not have the 
close-up video images of the license plate before them. 
 
As a condition of admissibility, the Commonwealth had to 
lay a sufficient foundation to demonstrate that a reasonable 
jury could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
close-up video was a genuine representation of what the 
detective claimed it to be; here, that foundational requirement 
would have been met by testimony from the detective describing 
35 
 
how the video footage was able to display indicators of the 
Florida license plate.  See Connolly, 91 Mass. App. Ct. at 587.  
The Commonwealth failed to do so; foundational details were 
admitted only upon cross-examination of the detective. 
 
While we agree that the officer's testimony lacked a proper 
foundation, it nevertheless did not give rise to a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice.  The jury here had before them 
several pieces of evidence that were probative of a comparison 
between the defendant's Ford Edge and the SUV in the 
surveillance video footage, independent of the detective's 
testimony concerning the license plate.  Cf. Connolly, 91 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 592-593 (defendant prejudiced by officer's testimony 
concerning unavailable surveillance video, which served as only 
substantive evidence of alleged crime).  For instance, the 
surveillance footage video and still prints of both vehicles 
were entered in evidence, indicating other distinguishing marks 
that the jury could compare for themselves, such as the emblems 
on the front grills and stickers on the front windshields of the 
vehicles.  The defendant's rental agreement and a stipulation by 
the defendant that he had rented the Ford Edge SUV were also 
before the jury.  Additionally, the lay opinion testimony 
concerning the close-up video was not extensive.  Cf. 
Wardsworth, 482 Mass. at 476-477 (four officers' extensive lay 
opinion testimony on video evidence contributed to improper 
36 
 
prejudice).  The jury were able to "conduct an independent 
assessment of the accuracy and reliability" of the detective's 
testimony about the license plate based on the evidence before 
them.  See Connolly, supra at 593.  Any harm to the defendant 
was therefore mitigated.  See Vacher, 469 Mass. at 442 
(erroneous admission of identification testimony harmless 
because "jury were capable of drawing the same conclusion" from 
photographs in evidence). 
 
6.  DNA and occult blood evidence.  The defendant argues 
that the judge erred in admitting DNA and occult blood evidence 
gathered from his rented Ford Edge, as the results of the 
forensic tests were inconclusive and bore little relevance to 
issues in the case.  In denying the defendant's motion in limine 
to exclude the results, the judge ruled that the presence of the 
defendant's DNA in the rented vehicle was probative of the 
Commonwealth's theory that the defendant fled the stabbing in 
the vehicle. 
 
At trial, the defendant consistently challenged the 
adequacy, thoroughness, and effort of the police investigation 
in opening and closing statements, as well in cross-examination 
of witnesses.  In particular, the defendant focused on a knife 
that had been present at the scene and had subsequently gone 
missing, rendering it unavailable for forensic testing, and the 
perceived failure of police to gather global positioning system 
37 
 
and cell site location information.  When faced with 
insinuations, the prosecution was entitled to introduce 
testimony to demonstrate that forensic analysis, including DNA 
testing, was performed, and that results, even inconclusive 
ones, were obtained, as was the case here.  See Commonwealth v. 
Barnett, 482 Mass. 632, 639 (2019), citing Commonwealth v. 
Mathews, 450 Mass. 858, 872 (2008) (inconclusive DNA results 
admissible where defense calls into question integrity of police 
investigation).  The admission of this evidence was not error.   
See Gonsalves, 488 Mass. at 835. 
 
7.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant contends 
that the prosecutor's direction in his closing argument that the 
jury should rely on the surveillance video footage was improper.  
See Davis, 487 Mass. at 467.  In the absence of an objection, we 
review for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  Id. 
In his closing, the prosecutor stated that the jury could 
rely on the surveillance video footage, and that from the 
footage the jury could discern characteristics of the 
perpetrator to determine that the defendant was the perpetrator.  
Specifically, the prosecution described the video as "rock-
solid," "a beautiful video . . . where you see [the defendant] 
and his skinny build, and his precise hairline, his round hair, 
his white skin"; "Who do you see in the video?  You see [the 
defendant]. . . .  I suggest to you it is [the defendant] in the 
38 
 
video."  "Although not dispositive, we consider the fact that 
the defendant did not object to the statements at trial as 'some 
indication that the tone [and] manner . . . of the now 
challenged aspects of the prosecutor's argument" did not create 
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. 
Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 669 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Lyons, 426 Mass. 466, 471 (1998).  See Commonwealth v. Kozubal, 
488 Mass. 575, 590 (2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2723 (2022). 
 
"[C]losing arguments must be viewed in the context of the 
entire argument, and in light of the judge's instruction to the 
jury, and the evidence at trial" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Barbosa, 477 Mass. at 670.  A prosecutor's closing 
argument may be based on "inferences that may reasonably be 
drawn from the evidence."  Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 
129 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516 
(1987).  A prosecutor can encourage the jury to use their 
observations to aid them in reaching their verdict.  See 
Barbosa, supra.  The prosecutor may also make remarks that 
amount to "enthusiastic rhetoric, strong advocacy, and excusable 
hyperbole" (citation omitted).  Lyons, 426 Mass. at 472.  If 
statements fall within this permissible rhetoric, they do not 
cross the line between fair and improper argument.  See id. 
 
The closing argument here is distinguishable from the 
opening statement at issue in Davis.  In Davis, 487 Mass. at 
39 
 
469, the prosecutor told the jury in the Commonwealth's opening 
that they would be able to identify the perpetrator as the 
defendant based on grainy video of an individual that only 
showed that the individual was a Black man with long hair in 
braids or dreadlocks.  The court held that the prosecutor's 
suggestion that the jury could identify the defendant based on 
the video was unreasonable, as the video's low resolution and 
distance from the shooter did not allow the jury to discern any 
features of the perpetrator's face.  Id., citing Vasquez, 482 
Mass. at 861. 
 
Here, the prosecutor's remarks, while hyperbolic at times, 
did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
The surveillance footage at issue here is of a quality such that 
facial features are discernable at times in addition to other 
physical characteristics, unlike the footage in Davis.  The 
video here is also of relatively high resolution, not 
"hopelessly obscure."  Given the circumstances of this specific 
video footage, the prosecutor's encouragement of the jury to 
identify the defendant from the video procedure was reasonable 
and did not amount to a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Cf. Davis, 487 Mass. at 469. 
 
Further, in discussing the video, the prosecutor informed 
the jury that they could not base any conviction on the video 
alone but had to consider the entire investigation and body of 
40 
 
evidence.  See Davis, 487 Mass. at 467-468 & n.25 (no error when 
prosecutor did not state jury could identify defendant from 
video alone).  The prosecutor pointed out that the evidence 
included Bizarro's conflicting testimony regarding her 
perceptions of the video and her ability to identify the 
defendant in it, and whether Bizarro's testimony should be 
credited was for the jury to decide.  See Commonwealth v. 
Holiday, 349 Mass. 126, 129 (1965) (acceptance or rejection of 
oral testimony is exclusive province of jury).  The prosecutor's 
encouragement to the jury to weigh Bizarro's credibility and 
examine the surveillance video footage was not unreasonable.  
See Davis, 487 Mass. at 467; Barbosa, 477 Mass. at 670 
(prosecutor properly encouraged jury to use observations to 
evaluate evidence in reaching verdict). 
 
Conclusion.  Finding that none of the alleged errors 
warrant relief, we affirm the defendant's conviction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.