Case Title: DONNELLY v. DONNELLY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 03-177

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
DONNELLY v. DONNELLY2004 WY 7292 P.3d 298Case Number: 03-177Decided: 06/24/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                
        

 

GAVIN 
DONNELLY,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff) 
,

 

v.

 

CONNIE 
DONNELLY,

 

Appellee(Defendant) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Kenneth Stebner, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Devon 
O'Connell Coleman and Eric R. Boyer of Pence and MacMillan LLC, Laramie, 
Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
M. Hunter of Casper, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Guardian Ad Litem:

John 
M. Burman, Faculty Supervisor; and Deborah L. Tyler, Student Intern, UW Legal 
Services, Laramie, Wyoming

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, and LEHMAN, JJ., and JAMES, D.J., and SKAVDAHL, 
D.J.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, Gavin 
Donnelly (Father), seeks review of the district court's decree of divorce that 
awarded primary custody of the parties' children to Appellee, Connie Donnelly 
(Mother).  The district court 
appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent the best interests of the 
parties' children in these proceedings.

 

[¶2]      Father contends 
that the district court erred in denying his motion for new trial, which was 
premised upon the basis that confidential statements he made during mediation 
were communicated to the parties and were made known to the judge during the 
trial to the court.  He also asserts 
that the district court abused its discretion when it granted primary custody to 
Mother based solely upon gender and contrary to the weight of the evidence.  In addition, Father challenges the 
district court's failure to include in its decision letter a ruling from the 
bench that he would be entitled to visitation with the children for not less 
than forty percent of their time.  
Mother asserts that the district court's rulings were entirely proper and 
that Father's appeal is without merit thus entitling her to an award of costs, 
attorney's fees, and a penalty.  We 
will affirm and decline to award Mother a penalty or attorney's fees under 
W.R.A.P. 10.05.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Father raises 
these issues:

 

            
I.          
Was it clearly erroneous for the district court to deny [Father's] motion 
for a mistrial due to the egregious release of confidential statements made 
during mediation; did the district court's denial result in manifest injustice 
to [Father]?

 

            
II.          
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it granted primary 
residential custody to [Mother] based solely on gender and contrary to the 
evidence?

 

III.         
Was it an abuse of discretion for the district court to rule from the 
bench that the non-custodial parent would not get less than forty percent of the 
time with the children, then rule to the contrary in its decision letter and 
subsequently deny [Father's] motion for amendment of 
judgment?

 

Mother 
couches the issues in these terms:

 

            
1.  Did the district court properly deny [Father's] motion for 
a mistrial, when it is clear that nothing regarding any activity or 
communications between the mediator and [Father] affected or influenced the 
district court's decision.

 

            
2.  Is it an abuse of discretion for the district court, in 
part, to base a custody decision on the gender based parenting roles the parties 
had adopted throughout the marriage, thereby minimizing the stress adjustment 
for the minor children.

 

            
3.  Did the district court rule from the bench on the 
appropriate amount of visitation.

 

            
4.  Is there no reasonable cause for appeal, for which the 
Supreme Court may award attorney's fees to [Mother].

 

The 
GAL filed a brief with this statement of the issues:

 

            
I.          
Did the district court act within its discretion in denying [Father's] 
motion for a mistrial?

 

            
II.          
Did the district court act within its discretion when it granted primary 
residential custody to [Mother]?

 

            
III.         
Did the district court rule only once and therefore properly deny 
[Father's] motion to amend the judgment?

 

FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 

[¶4]      Father's 
complaint seeking a divorce was filed on July 19, 2002.  Two children were born of the marriage, 
a girl born on April 14, 1997, and a boy born September 19, 1999.  On October 24, 2002, a guardian ad litem 
(GAL) was appointed to represent the children, and the district court provided 
detailed guidance to the GAL.1  By order entered on October 29, 2002, 
the district court awarded temporary residential custody to Mother during the 
school/work week (Sunday afternoon through Thursday), and to Father (Thursday 
evening through Sunday).  The 
district court's final decree made that arrangement 
permanent.

 

[¶5]      All matters with 
respect to the divorce were settled, with the exception of custody of the 
children.  Both Mother and Father 
sought to have residential (primary) custody of the children during the 
work/school week, with the other having as much visitation as possible.  Each parent considered the other to be a 
very good parent, and the record amply demonstrates that both were good 
parents.

 

[¶6]      On July 17, 2002, 
Mother abruptly left the marriage and the family home in Laramie, without notice 
to Father.  Mother moved to Casper 
to be near her sister and eventually set up a home there for herself and the 
children.  A few days later, she 
accepted that Father wanted to take the children back to Laramie for a 
visit.  When Mother went to Laramie 
to pick up the children and return with them to Casper, she and Father got into 
a heated quarrel about the children that both regretted.  Father reluctantly allowed Mother to 
take the children back to Casper.

 

[¶7]      Mother contended 
that she should be awarded residential (primary) custody on a permanent basis 
because she had traditionally been the "stay-at-home mom," who provided the 
children with day-to-day care, and she was able to fulfill that role in Casper 
even though she worked five days a week.  
Father contended that he should be awarded primary custody because 
Laramie had been the children's home all of their lives.  In addition, Father had a more stable 
life and a more flexible work schedule.  
Because of those factors, he could spend more time at home with the 
children during the week (i.e., there would be less day care, which had always 
been a goal of both parents).  
Mother lived in a two-bedroom apartment, without an adjoining yard 
(although it did have a communal yard with a playground and other child-friendly 
amenities), whereas Father owned the family's spacious home that had its own 
yard.  Father lived across the 
street from a school the children could attend, whereas in Casper the children 
were placed in a school that required them to ride a bus 40 miles per day.  We decline to set out Father's 
exhaustive critique of Mother, or Mother's more abbreviated critique of 
Father.  The district court's 
decision letter made clear that the evidence established that both were fit and 
proper parents to have custody of the children.  It is clear that the district court 
viewed their respective shortcomings as the ordinary frailties of all human 
beings, choosing instead to focus on the many positive qualities of both 
parents, and then making the daunting and challenging task of "dividing" the 
children between their parents.

 

[¶8]      After a two-day 
trial, the district court settled the custody issues making permanent the 
custody resolution detailed in the temporary custody order.  That order was entered on July 15, 
2003.

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

[¶9]      Before trial on 
the issue of custody, the parties engaged in voluntary mediation in an attempt 
to settle their dispute.  
Eventually, that mediation attempt ended without bearing fruit.  During a pretrial conference the 
district court indicated that what transpired during settlement negotiations 
would not be admissible at trial.  
Nonetheless, during the trial to the court, Mother's attorney asked 
Father questions about his communications with the mediator and some of those 
questions were answered.  The 
answers tended to cast Father in an unfavorable light.  The mediator conveyed that information 
to Mother's attorney, as well as to the GAL.  It is not necessary to set out the 
details or the tenor of those revelations, because to do so would only 
exacerbate a problem that this appeal is designed to resolve.  Father contends that he was so 
prejudiced by those revelations that the district court was duty bound to grant 
his motion for a mistrial, so that the case could be tried before a judge not 
tainted by that information.

 

[¶10]   Although pertinent authority does 
not support the contention that a new trial is mandated by these circumstances, 
the argument is premised on some interesting threads of argument.  In VJL v. RED, 2002 WY 25, ¶16 
n.3, 39 P.3d 1110, ¶16 n.3 (Wyo. 2002), we noted:

 

We 
make no ruling as to the propriety of the mediator's report.  We note only that the function of a 
mediator is to be a conciliator, to bring parties together in an effort to 
reconcile their differences.  
Interjecting oneself into court proceedings after the fact of the 
mediation as basically a witness to discredit the truthfulness and character of 
a party to the mediation would not seem to comport with the functions of a 
mediator.

 

Of 
course, the mediator was not a witness in this case, though it is clear that 
confidential information was communicated outside the confines of that mediation 
to Mother's attorney and the GAL, and eventually to the trial 
court.

 

[¶11]   Wyoming's mediation statute 
provides this guidance:

 

§ 
1-43-101. Definitions.

            
(a) As used in this act:

(i)  "Communication" 
means any item of information disclosed during the mediation process through 
files, reports, interviews, discussions, memoranda, case summaries, notes, work 
products of the mediator, or any other item of information disclosed during the 
mediation, whether oral or written;

 

. 
. . .

            

§ 
1-43-102. General rule of confidentiality.

            
Any communication is confidential if not intended to be disclosed to 
third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the 
mediation process or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the 
communication.

 

§ 
1-43-103. General rule of privilege; claiming privilege; 
exception.

            
(a) A party to the mediation has a privilege to refuse to disclose 
and to prevent all mediation participants from disclosing confidential 
communications.

            
(b) The privilege under this section may be claimed by a 
representative of the party or by a party, his guardian or conservator, the 
personal representative of a deceased party, or the successor, trustee or 
similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization, 
whether or not in existence.  The 
person who was the mediator may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the 
party.  The mediator's authority to 
do so is presumed in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary.

            
(c) There is no privilege under this section if any one (1) of the 
following conditions is met:

            
(i)  All the parties involved provide written consent to 
disclose;

(ii)  The 
communication involves the contemplation of a future crime or harmful 
act;

(iii)  The 
communication indicates that a minor child has been or is the suspected victim 
of child abuse as defined by local statute;

(iv)  The 
communication was otherwise discoverable prior to the 
mediation;

(v)  One 
of the parties seeks judicial enforcement of the mediated 
agreement.

 

[¶12]   The district court determined that 
it would not consider any of that evidence and, thus, the issues of 
confidentiality and privilege were not analyzed in detail by the trial 
court.2  The motion for mistrial could have been 
styled as a motion for new trial as well, and its posture as a motion for 
mistrial is unusual, given that this was a trial to the court.  On appeal from a trial to the court 
sitting without a jury, we presume that the district court disregarded any 
improperly admitted evidence unless the record affirmatively demonstrates that 
the court's decision was influenced by that evidence.  Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1033 (Wyo. 2000); Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255, 1261 (Wyo. 
1995).

 

[¶13]   In Feeney v. State, 714 P.2d 1229, 1230 (Wyo. 1986) we held:

 

On 
appeal it is presumed, in cases tried by a court without a jury, that the court 
in reaching its decision disregarded improperly admitted evidence unless the 
record affirmatively shows that the trial court's decision was influenced by 
improperly admitted evidence.  X 
v. Y, Wyo., 482 P.2d 688 (1971).

 

The 
reason behind the rule is amply explained in Yount v. Strickland, 17 Wyo. 
526, 101 P. 942, 944 (1909), which held that, since a trial judge can "sift the 
wheat from the chaff," in a case tried by a court without a jury, the admission 
of incompetent evidence is not presumed to be prejudicial.  Cooley v. Frank, 68 Wyo. 436, 235 P.2d 446 (1951);  Russell v. 
Curran, 66 Wyo. 173, 206 P.2d 1159 (1949);  Williams v. Yocum, 37 Wyo. 432, 
263 P. 607 (1928).  [Footnote 1 
omitted.]

 

This 
is the general rule as also expressed in 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1564(5), 
and 5A C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1728.

 

Thus, 
the rule presumes that the judge will disregard the inadmissible evidence in 
making a decision.  In this case, 
the trial judge even acknowledged on the record that the evidence that appellant 
refused to take a field sobriety test would be disregarded when making a 
decision.  There is sufficient 
evidence in the record absent the evidence that Feeney refused the test for 
proper conviction of driving while under the influence, and therefore no error 
was committed.  Herman v. Speed 
King Manufacturing Company, supra.2

 

2  We will not pursue the academic inquiry 
as to what occurs (or what it means) if the court in a nonjury trial should 
declare a mistrial for his improper admission of evidence.

 

Also 
see Holt v. Sarver, 
442 F.2d 304, 307 (8th Cir. 1971) ("In nonjury 
cases tried to the court it is well settled that we will not reverse for the 
erroneous reception of evidence unless it appears that the competent evidence is 
insufficient to support the judgment or that the court was induced by 
incompetent evidence to make an essential finding which it would not otherwise 
have made.").

 

[¶14]   This discussion from 21 Charles 
Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 
5041, at 227-29 (1977) is also instructive:

 

This 
model will need to be somewhat modified in cases tried without a jury.  Most of the required modifications 
follow from the absence of that separation of function between trier of fact and 
judge of admissibility.  Since it is 
impossible for the judge to rule on most objections without seeing the 
evidence--and a good deal of other material not strictly relevant to the case-- 
many objections become futile as a practical matter.  Moreover, the presumed sophistication of 
the judge is thought to permit him to do much of the work of weeding out weak 
evidence at the time of decision rather than at the point of introduction of the 
evidence.  This leads to a prejudice 
in favor of admissibility and an informal manner of handling objections summed 
up in the ominous ruling:  "I'll let 
it in for what it is worth"

 

            
It is important to note that the principal prop for this attitude toward 
the rules in court trials is a presumption on appeal that the judge did not 
consider any inadmissible evidence in reaching his decision.  Nowhere is there any explicit 
authorization to disregard the rules in nonjury cases.  Indeed, one can argue that the failure 
to limit the scope of the Evidence Rules to jury trials, as suggested by many 
commentators, constitutes an explicit rejection of the notion that the rules do 
not apply in trials without a jury.  
In a sense, then, the power of the judge to disregard the rules of 
evidence is like the power of the jury to disregard the substantive law; both 
flow from a failure to sanction the departure from the rules rather than a clear 
grant of power to ignore them.  
While it 
is true that departing from the rules of evidence is not as serious a matter as 
nullification of the substantive law, still it should be recognized that in each 
case the failure to prevent the departure is the result of an expectation that 
the de facto power thus conferred will be exercised in a responsible 
manner.

 

            
A responsible exercise of the court's ability to depart from the Rules in 
nonjury cases certainly entails more than just sloughing off objections with the 
hackneyed promise that it will only be considered for what it is worth.  The judge should consider the nature of 
the objection; it is appropriate to slide by the technical requirements of the 
best evidence rule but few would argue that the judge was justified in ignoring 
a claim of privilege.  If the 
objection involves probative worth, the judge might convert the 
admission-exclusion process into a consideration of what weight he should give 
the evidence.  Often the same 
factors that govern admissibility will be relevant in this inquiry.  If the evidence involves evidence that 
might prejudice a juror, the judge ought not lightly assume that he is immune 
from its emotional impact.  In some 
cases it may be appropriate to have the question of admissibility decided by 
another judge or by a master.

 

            
The judge must also keep in mind that the offer of proof in a nonjury 
case serves an additional purpose; it should not only show whether the exclusion 
of evidence is harmless, but also "provide the appellate court with material for 
a possible final disposition of the case in the event of reversal."  This argues for the greater use of the 
question-and-answer form of offer of proof in nonjury cases.  This makes quite attractive the 
procedure for admission and exclusion suggested by McCormack.  He proposes that the trial judge admit 
virtually all of the evidence, reserving questions of admissibility until the 
close of proof-taking.  Then should 
the judge decide to strike the evidence, it remains in the record as an offer of 
proof for the reviewing court.  This 
procedure probably produces better rulings since the parties can prepare their 
arguments with greater care and in light of the entire record.  It may save time since the parties may 
decide to abandon the less significant objections and the argument on 
admissibility can be combined with arguments on how the evidence should be 
evaluated on the merits.  The 
principal disadvantage of this method is the tendency to produce gargantuan 
records.

 

[¶15]   In this instance, the district 
court gave careful and thorough consideration to Father's motion for a mistrial 
in its decision letter.3  At the conclusion of that discussion, 
the district court forthrightly stated:

 

            
The mediation the parties entered into was not court ordered.  The Court appreciates the parties in 
fact made one more attempt to settle this matter before resorting to the 
adversarial process of litigation.  
The record indicates [Father] may have had a conversation with the 
mediator shortly before this trial.  
In that conversation he may have firedthe mediator.  Ultimately the mediation was 
unsuccessful and the matters are now before the Court.  Whether the conversation occurred before 
or after [Father] technically fired the mediator is irrelevant.  [Father] had the ability to terminate 
the services of the mediator.  
[Father] has every right to maintain the confidentiality of those 
proceedings.  Whatever behavior 
[Father] may or may not have engaged in during that conversation 
is also irrelevant.  The fact of the 
matter is that ultimately the mediation was unsuccessful and the issues of 
custody, support, and visitation are now before the Court.  Any evidence admitted relating to this 
conversation, or evidence relating to any part of negotiations of settlement for 
that matter, have absolutely no impact on decisions made pertaining to these 
issues.

 

            
. . . .

 

At 
no point during the trial were specific references to any settlement 
negotiations ever allowed into evidence.  
The Court remains unaware of any settlement or offers which may have been 
tossed around during negotiations.  
No evidence was placed before the Court regarding statements made during 
compromise negotiations.  The Court 
has not and will not consider allegations regarding the conduct of either party 
during negotiations or mediation, and will discuss custody, visitation, and 
related matters strictly on the evidence received at trial pertaining to these 
parties' ability to parent in accord with what is in the best interests 
of these children.  This was not a 
trial to a jury but was in fact a trial to this Court.  No evidence was presented which would 
necessitate a mistrial.  On the 
other hand, granting a mistrial would constitute grave and extreme prejudice to 
the children.  [Emphasis in 
original.]

 

[¶16]   The record is also clear that the 
GAL's recommendations were limited to the evidence adduced at trial and focused 
on the statutory factors that bear on a determination of what is in the best 
interests of the children.  There is 
no suggestion that the GAL's recommendations were colored by confidential 
information or that the district court was otherwise influenced by improper 
information.  The initial written 
report of the GAL's recommendations is not a part of the record.4  Father asks that we speculate that the 
report was favorable to him, whereas the GAL's closing argument recommended that 
Mother have primary custody, and was thus unfavorable to him.  Father then asks that we speculate 
further and conclude that the reason the GAL recommended as he did was because 
of the confidential information communicated to him by the mediator.  We decline to so speculate.  The GAL's closing argument, as well as 
his position in this appeal, are grounded in the evidence adduced at trial and 
focus solely upon the statutory factors pertinent to child custody 
determinations.  Moreover, the GAL's 
closing argument was a product of seeing and hearing all witnesses who testified 
and with access to all documentary evidence admitted at trial.  The GAL's argument to the district court 
is consistent with that evidence and supported by that 
evidence.

 

[¶17]   Based upon our careful and thorough 
review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not err, or in any 
way abuse its discretion, in denying the motion for mistrial under the 
circumstances of this case.  In 
addition, considering these circumstances in their totality we do not find the 
presence of a manifest injustice.  
Robbins v. Robbins, 2002 WY 80, ¶¶7-9, 46 P.3d 880, 882-83, ¶¶7-9; 
Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 261, 264 (Wyo. 1991).

 

Gender 
as Basis for District Court's Ruling

 

[¶18]   The governing statute is clear 
without equivocation in this regard:

 

§ 
20-2-201. Disposition and maintenance of children in decree or order; access to 
records.

(a)  In 
granting a divorce, separation or annulment of a marriage or upon the 
establishment of paternity pursuant to W.S. 14-4-401 through 14-2-907, the court 
may make by decree or order any disposition of the children that appears most 
expedient and in the best interests of the children.  In determining the best interests of the 
child, the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the following 
factors:

(i)  The 
quality of the relationship each child has with each 
parent;

(ii)  The 
ability of each parent to provide adequate care for each child throughout each 
period of responsibility, including arranging for each child's care by others as 
needed;

(iii)  The 
relative competency and fitness of each parent;

            
(iv)  Each parent's willingness to accept all responsibilities 
of parenting, including a willingness to accept care for each child at specified 
times and to relinquish care to the other parent at specified 
times;

(v)  How 
the parents and each child can best maintain and strengthen a relationship with 
each other;

(vi)  How 
the parents and each child interact and communicate with each other and how such 
interaction and communication may be improved;

(vii)  The 
ability and willingness of each parent to allow the other to provide care 
without intrusion, respect the other parent's rights and responsibilities, 
including the right to privacy;

(viii)  Geographic 
distance between the parents' residences;

            
(ix)  The current physical and mental ability of each parent to 
care for each child;

(x)  Any 
other factors the court deems necessary and relevant.

            
(b) In any proceeding in which the custody of a child is at issue 
the court shall not prefer one (1) parent as a custodian solely because of 
gender.

            
(c) The court shall consider evidence of spousal abuse or child 
abuse as being contrary to the best interest of the children.  If the court finds that family violence 
has occurred, the court shall make arrangements for visitation that best 
protects the children and the abused spouse from further 
harm.

            
(d) The court shall order custody in well defined terms to promote 
understanding and compliance by the parties.  Custody shall be crafted to promote the 
best interests of the children, and may include any combination of joint, shared 
or sole custody.

            
(e) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the noncustodial parent 
shall have the same right of access as the parent awarded custody to any records 
relating to the child of the parties, including school records, activities, 
teachers and teachers' conferences as well as medical and dental treatment 
providers and mental health records.

            
(f) At any time the court may require parents to attend appropriate 
parenting classes, including but not limited to, parenting classes to lessen the 
effects of divorce on children.  
[Emphasis added.] 

 

[¶19]   Custody matters are committed to 
the sound discretion of the trial court.  
The welfare and needs of the children are to be given paramount 
importance.  We will not overturn 
the decision of the trial court unless we are convinced that it constitutes an 
abuse of discretion or violates some legal principle.  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria.  It means exercising sound judgment with 
regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily 
or capriciously.  Our review 
includes an evaluation of the evidence to support the trial court's decision, 
and we afford the prevailing party every favorable inference while omitting any 
consideration of evidence presented by the unsuccessful party.  We cannot sustain findings of fact that 
are not supported by the evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the 
great weight of the evidence.  An 
abuse of discretion is present when a material factor deserving significant 
weight is ignored.  Consideration of 
gender is not prohibited in a custody determination.  The governing statute simply prohibits 
gender from being the "sole" basis of a custody award.  Every case requires careful weighing of 
relevant factors, looking to the unique and individual family relationships, in 
order to reach a resolution that is in the best interests of the children.  To determine whether a district court 
has abused its discretion, we must rely upon the district court's articulation 
of the factors that were considered and how those factors support its 
conclusions.  Pace v. Pace, 
2001 WY 43, ¶¶9-13, 22 P.3d 861, ¶¶9-13 (Wyo. 2001).  We have held that a gender based, 
maternal preference in custody awards is a mistake of law, requiring 
reversal.  Basolo v. Basolo, 
907 P.2d 348, 355 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶20]   Father's contentions in this regard 
are founded in the district courts description of the roles played by the two 
parents during their marriage.  
Mother, was a "stay at home mom" who "bathed, dressed, and fed the 
children.  She maintained the home, 
prepared the meals and did all other housework.  She read to the children, helped them 
with basic educational skills, took them to the park, and provided 
transportation to their extracurricular activities."  Father was a very engaged parent and 
helped Mother with most of the child rearing tasks.  He "more naturally fit into a 
traditional fatherhood role.  He 
worked forty (40) plus hours a week.  
He traveled to attend seminars, training sessions, and worked on special 
projects toward enhancing his experience and career, with [Mother] staying at 
home with the kids."  The difficult 
decision that the district court confronted is captured in this excerpt from its 
decision letter:

 

            
Perhaps one of the most difficult decisions is the determination of 
custody and visitation when both parents display qualities of propriety and 
fitness that these parties demonstrate.  
This is not a situation where one parent "wins" and the other parent 
"loses."  To the contrary, they 
remain the parents of [the children], and they are obligated to act in their 
best interests at all times.  
Regardless of the outcome, [the children] will "win" if their parents 
determine to make this Court's decision work and if they set aside their own 
differences in favor of the children.  
[The children] will "lose" if their parents do otherwise.  Neither is this a matter where the Court 
is called upon to determine that one parent is "better" than the other.  Both parties love their children.  Nevertheless, the Court must make a 
determination as to custody and visitation.

 

            
The evidence indicated that [Mother] has served as [the children's] 
primary caretaker since their births.  
This is not, of course, determinative, but it is a consideration that the 
Court bears in mind.  [The children] 
have good relationships with both parents, and both parents care deeply for 
them.  Both presently are capable of 
caring for [the children], and both are willing and eager to accept that 
responsibility.  When the children 
are with their father, the evidence demonstrated a positive, rewarding 
experience for both father and children.  
Likewise, the kids do equally well with their mother.  Any unusual behavior exhibited by either 
child after a transfer from one party to the other is probably in the nature of 
a temporary, situational issue rather than any sort of long-term fundamental 
problem.  [The children] are both 
intelligent, happy children who seem to be adjusting to their parents' 
separation.

 

            
The parties agree that if they were to reside in the same city, now or in 
the future, a shared or joint custody arrangement would be possible.  Obviously, since [Father] is in Laramie 
and [Mother] is in Casper, this is an infeasible solution.  Therefore, each party has asserted the 
desire for primary custody with liberal and frequent visitation available to the 
other.  Both parents have excellent 
relationships with their children.  
Both parents are fit and competent to provide adequate care, physically, 
emotionally, mentally, culturally, spiritually, and educationally, to these 
children.  [Mother] cannot be 
"faulted" for geographically relocating to Casper, while [Father] cannot be 
"faulted" for staying in Laramie or opting not to move to Casper upon 
retirement.  Both parties have 
indicated they plan to stay in their current locations.  Both [Father] and [Mother] have 
exhibited good moral behavior and positive lifestyles crucial to the healthy 
upbringing of these children.  
[Father] had friends, family and day-care providers attest on his 
behalf.  [Mother] likewise had 
family and child care providers testify as to her fitness as a person and a 
mother.

 

            
However, when considering the totality of the situation and the overall 
best interests for these children, the Court finds the children need stability 
which mimics the traditional parenting roles these parents have held in [the 
children's] lives rather than focusing on the physical location of the 
parties.  [Mother] has been the 
"need" provider, [Father] has been the "wants" provider.  Each has and can perform the other's 
role.  However, the Court finds the 
best interests of these children would best be served by [Mother] continuing to 
be the primary caretaker during the week, while permitting [Father] the ability 
to continue offering all of the enhancements and opportunities for growth and 
happiness to the children which he has done in the past.  While the Court is cognizant that each 
parent would prefer more time with their children than any separation 
will allow, the children's time is now best served in a fashion similar 
to that which the children are accustomed.  
[Emphasis in original.]

 

            
While [Father] has argued that his home in Laramie would better suit such 
a situation, the Court disagrees.  
Marce Nesslinger, a licensed counselor, met with the children at the 
request of [Father].  Ms. Nesslinger 
testified either parent could adequately be the primary caretaker, so long as 
the children had a "home-base" for purpose of stability.  She stated the physical building was not 
what comprised the "home base," but rather where the children felt comfortable, 
safe and nurtured and able to foster their relationships with both parents.  The evidence indicated [Mother's] 
residence adequately furnishes the physical needs for the children.  [The children] are well situated, aside 
from typical adjustments needed after visitations and travel occur.  The children have become comfortable 
residing in Casper due in large part to [Mother's] diligence.  The GAL, likewise, recommends such an 
arrangement.

 

[¶21]   The district court's decision 
letter is ten pages long.  We are 
unable to discern in it a decision based solely on gender.  Indeed, while to some extent described 
in gender-specific nouns, the district court is very clear that the roles he 
discusses are not peculiar to one sex or the other; rather, it is strictly a 
matter of function.  The decision 
reached by the district court is not a violation of § 20-2-201(b).  The district court relied upon objective 
criteria in reaching its decision and did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  We have carefully 
reviewed the evidence in its entirety and, when we view that evidence in a light 
most favorable to Mother, we are compelled to sustain the district court's 
decision.  The district court's 
findings are fully supported by the evidence, and the district court neither 
considered an impermissible factor, nor did it fail to consider any factor 
material to a resolution of this case.

 

Denial 
of Motion to Amend the Judgment (the Forty Percent 
Issue)

 

[¶22]   Near the close of the trial, the 
district court made a fleeting reference to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-304(c) 
(LexisNexis 2003).  That statute 
provides:

 

(c) When 
each parent keeps the children overnight for more than forty percent (40%) of 
the year and both parents contribute substantially to the expenses of the 
children in addition to the payment of child support, a joint presumptive 
support obligation shall be determined by use of the tables.  After the joint presumptive child 
support obligation is derived from  
column  three  of the tables, that amount shall be 
divided between 
the parents in proportion to the net income of each.  The proportionate share of the total 
obligation of each parent shall then be multiplied by the percentage of time the 
children spend with the other parent to determine the theoretical support 
obligation owed to the other parent.  
The parent owing the greater amount of child support shall pay the 
difference between the two (2) amounts as the net child support 
obligation.

 

Based 
upon that fleeting reference, Father contends that the district court made a 
binding oral ruling that Father was entitled to visitation for at least 40% of 
the children's time.  Continuing, 
Father contends that because the final decree does not allow him 40% of the 
children's time, the district court is duty bound to amend its judgment to 
conform to that oral pronouncement.  
Of course, the record is not clear what percentage of the time Father has 
spent, or will spend, with the children over the course of time.  The decree is clear that Father's time 
with the children is to be as generous as possible, and Mother has pledged to 
make that happen to the extent it is feasible, consistent with 
circumstances.  In addition to being 
illogical, this argument is not supported by cogent argument or pertinent 
authority, and we will not consider it further.  Odegard v. Odegard, 2003 WY 67, 
¶31, 69 P.3d 917, ¶31 (Wyo. 2003).

 

Is 
this Appeal without Merit

 

[¶23]   W.R.A.P. 10.05 
provides:

 

If 
the judgment or appealable order is affirmed in a civil case, appellee shall 
recover the cost for publication of the brief with the cost to be computed at 
the rate allowed by law for making the transcript of the evidence.  If the court certifies there was no 
reasonable cause for the appeal, a reasonable amount for attorneys' fees and 
damages to the appellee shall be fixed by the appellate court and taxed as part 
of the costs in the case.  The 
amount for attorneys' fees shall not be less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) 
nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00).  The amount for damages to the appellee 
shall not exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000.00).

 

[¶24]   Sanctions under this rule are 
generally not available when the appeal challenges a discretionary ruling.  We do not consider sanctions appropriate 
in this case.  Dorsett v. 
Moore, 2003 WY 7, ¶¶13-14, 61 P.3d 1221, ¶¶13-14 (Wyo. 2003); Wood v. 
Wood, 964 P.2d 1259, 1268 (Wyo. 1998).
  

CONCLUSION

 

[¶25]   The district court did not err in 
denying the motion for mistrial.  
The district court's custody determination was not based solely upon 
gender and was not contrary to the evidence.  The district court did not make an oral 
ruling that Father was entitled to at least 40% of the children's time.  We decline to impose sanctions or award 
attorney's fees in this matter.  The 
Decree of the district court is affirmed in all respects.

 

FOOTNOTES

   1The district 
court's explicit instructions to and the thorough performance of the GAL were 
superlative in this case.  See 
Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶¶21-26, 22 P.3d 861, ¶¶21-26 (Wyo. 
2001).

 

   2Although Mother 
and the GAL argue that the disputed evidence/information was admissible and was 
not confidential or privileged as contemplated by the governing statutes, we 
find it unnecessary to definitively address that issue.  Moreover, this matter was not 
sufficiently developed by the parties below so as to allow for a definitive 
resolution.  Clearly the better 
practice would have been for all parties and the mediator to fully comply with 
the mediation statutes and for any issues in that regard to be settled before 
the subject became a target of questioning.

 

   3Father also 
contends that the district court erred in not granting a request for a hearing 
on the mistrial motion.  We readily 
conclude that whether to hold a hearing is a matter of discretion, and that 
discretion was not abused under these 
circumstances.

 

   4The initial 
report was appended to Father's pretrial memorandum.  However, ultimately that report was not 
included in the record.  That 
initial report was prepared prior to trial and before the GAL had the 
opportunity to hear all of the admissible evidence and observe the testimony of 
all witnesses.