Case Title: State v. Mariner

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 102

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 102 
Docket: 
Cum-16-371 
Argued: 
March 2, 2017 
Decided: 
May 23, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
GARY MARINER 
 
 
SAUFLEY, C.J. 
[¶1]  The State appeals from an order entered by the trial court 
(Cumberland County, Wheeler, J.) suppressing evidence seized from Gary 
Mariner, his vehicle, and his residence after the court determined that the 
warrant that authorized the search and the seizure of that evidence was not 
supported by probable cause.  We conclude that the warrant affidavit provided 
the necessary substantial basis for the warrant judge’s finding of probable 
cause, and we vacate the suppression order. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  On October 1, 2015, Portland police applied for a warrant to search 
Gary Mariner, his Lyman residence, and his 2010 Toyota Corolla for evidence 
 
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related to an alleged sexual assault that occurred two weeks before.  The 
supporting affidavit alleged the following facts.   
[¶3]  On September 19, 2015, a woman reported to police that she had 
been the victim of a sexual assault, perpetrated on the night of September 15, 
2015.  On that night, the victim was working as a prostitute on Congress Street 
in Portland.  Sometime between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m., a car she described as a 
silver Toyota Corolla with a model year from 2002 to 2008 drove by her, and 
the male driver yelled “something at her about anal sex.”  Around forty-five 
minutes later, the same vehicle, with the same driver, passed by again and 
picked up the victim on Boynton Street.   
 
[¶4]  Once she was in the vehicle, the driver showed the victim a 
camouflage wallet containing a gold star-shaped police badge with the State of 
Maine seal and the words “Cape Elizabeth” and “Retired.”  She described the 
male as “older, maybe 60 years of age, bad skin, a mustache, grayish / light 
colored eyes,” and “wearing a baseball cap, plaid flannel button up shirt and a 
wedding ring.”  The victim asked the driver whether she was under arrest and 
he told her that she could “work it off.”  When she responded that he should 
“take [her] to jail, then,” the driver told her that he had been brought back from 
retirement by the State Police and asked her to help him find other prostitutes.  
 
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[¶5]  He drove her to the parking lot across from the Concord Trailways 
station and backed the car up to the fence near the rear of the lot, facing the 
entrance.  The victim saw an automatic handgun in the driver’s side door 
pocket.  The male “wanted to engage in anal sex with [the victim] and said he 
didn’t get it at home.”  The victim “talk[ed] him down” to oral sex.  He placed 
the gun on top of his lap, pointing in the direction of the front passenger-side 
headlight.  The male unfastened his belt, removed his penis, and the victim 
performed oral sex on him.  Before he let her out of the car on St. John Street, 
he told her that it had been “against [his] better judgment” and that “in 25 years 
[it] was the first time [he had] let anyone go.”   
 
[¶6]  On September 22, 2015, police spoke with an identified Concord 
Trailways employee “who was able to locate video for this incident.”  The 
employee was able to determine the license plate number for the “suspect 
vehicle.”  Police determined that Mariner was a joint owner of the vehicle. 
 
[¶7]  The vehicle registration, indicating that the car was a tan-colored 
2010 Toyota Corolla, was attached to the affidavit.  Mariner’s motor vehicle 
record was also attached, indicating that he was fifty-seven years old and 
including his photograph.  After obtaining the motor vehicle information, police 
determined that although Mariner had taken a preliminary test toward 
 
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becoming a police officer, there was no record of him having been a police 
officer in Maine.  Mariner’s father, however, was a retired Cape Elizabeth police 
chief.   
 
[¶8]  A search warrant was issued by the court (Portland, Eggert, J.) on 
October 1, 2015, authorizing police to search Mariner’s home, car, and person.  
Police executed the warrant that same day and seized a Cape Elizabeth police 
badge inscribed with the word “Retired” and a camouflage tri-fold wallet, along 
with other items that the victim had described.   
[¶9]  On October 2, 2015, Gary Mariner was charged by complaint with 
gross sexual assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(A) (2016), and 
impersonating a public servant (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 457(1) (2016).  He was 
later indicted for these crimes.  Mariner filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained from the search, arguing that the search warrant was not supported 
by probable cause.  The court (Cumberland County, Wheeler, J.) found that there 
was no probable cause to search Mariner or his home because there was no 
information that Mariner was the operator of the vehicle or that the victim had 
identified Mariner as her assailant.  Accordingly, the court granted Mariner’s 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained from Mariner and his home—but not 
his vehicle.   
 
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[¶10]  The State filed a motion for further findings of fact and conclusions 
of law.  In response to the State’s motion, the court found that the information 
obtained from the Concord Trailways employee was “too general and did not 
provide a reliable basis for the court to conclude that the video captured the 
suspect vehicle and the plate number of the suspect vehicle on the date and at 
the time in question.”  The court amended its suppression order to also 
suppress the evidence obtained from Mariner’s vehicle.   
[¶11]  With the Attorney General’s approval, the State timely appealed 
from the suppression order.  See 15 M.R.S § 2115-A(1), (5) (2016); M.R. 
App. P. 2(b)(2)(A), 21(b). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶12]  The State contends that the information presented in the warrant 
affidavit was sufficient for the warrant judge to find that there was probable 
cause to believe that Gary Mariner sexually assaulted the alleged victim, and 
that evidence of that crime would be found in his car, in his home, and on his 
person.  Mariner maintains that there was no probable cause because that 
 
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determination depended on what he alleges was a “completely conclusory” 
statement by the Concord Trailways employee. 
[¶13]  In order to discern whether probable cause has been presented, a 
magistrate reviewing a warrant request applies the “totality of the 
circumstances” test, as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).  State v. Gurney, 2012 ME 14, ¶ 32, 36 A.3d 
893.  Pursuant to the totality of the circumstances test, a finding of probable 
cause requires “a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of 
knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”  
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; see also Gurney, 2012 ME 14, ¶ 32, 36 A.3d 893. 
[¶14]  “To meet the standard for probable cause, the warrant affidavit 
must set forth some nexus between the evidence to be seized and the locations 
to be searched.”  State v. Samson, 2007 ME 33, ¶ 15, 916 A.2d 977.  The nexus 
may “be inferred from the type of crime, the nature of the items sought, the 
extent of an opportunity for concealment and normal inferences as to where a 
criminal would hide [evidence of a crime].”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).   
 
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[¶15]  When probable cause for the issuance of a warrant is challenged 
on appeal, “we directly review the finding of probable cause made by the 
magistrate who issued the warrant.”  State v. Simmons, 2016 ME 103, ¶ 11, 143 
A.3d 819 (quotation marks omitted).  “Our inquiry on appeal is limited to 
whether there is a substantial basis for the probable cause finding.”  Id. ¶ 12.  
“We review only the information within the ‘four corners’ of the affidavit, but 
we do so construing the information in the affidavit in a positive light and 
allowing for ‘reasonable inferences that may be drawn to support the 
magistrate’s determination.’”  Id. (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Johndro, 
2013 ME 106, ¶ 9, 82 A.3d 820); see also Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 
732-33 (1984); State v. Knowlton, 489 A.2d 529, 532-33 (Me. 1985). 
[¶16]  In this matter, contrary to Mariner’s contention, the existence of 
probable cause did not depend on a wholly conclusory statement.  The warrant 
judge could reasonably infer that police provided the victim’s description of the 
incident to the Concord Trailways employee who reported the license plate 
number of a vehicle matching those details on a surveillance video.  Because the 
employee was a disinterested party, whose account was not “inherently 
unreliable,” the warrant judge was entitled to rely on the information provided 
by that individual.  See Johndro, 2013 ME 106, ¶ 11, 82 A.3d 820.  Moreover, 
 
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after receiving the license plate information from the employee, police 
continued their investigation by reviewing information contained in motor 
vehicle and other records. 
[¶17]  The affidavit set forth detailed information about the alleged 
victim’s description of her assailant and the circumstances of the alleged 
assault.  In addition to the information received from the Concord Trailways 
employee, the affidavit provided substantial additional factual information that 
reinforced the employee’s information and corroborated the victim’s report.  
Based on Mariner’s physical appearance matching the victim’s description, his 
vehicle being similar to the one the victim described and appearing on video at 
the time and place that the alleged assault occurred, and his father once holding 
the position indicated by the badge Mariner showed to the victim, the warrant 
judge could reasonably determine that the totality of the information set forth 
in the affidavit created a fair probability that Mariner was the assailant and that 
evidence of the crime would be found at his home, in his car, and on his person. 
[¶18]  Further, the warrant judge could reasonably infer that the badge 
and other items identified in the warrant and the supporting affidavit—
including a wallet, backpack, and handgun—were the kind of items that a 
person would normally carry, conceal, or store in the pockets of clothing, in a 
 
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vehicle, or in the person’s home.  See Gurney, 2012 ME 14, ¶ 33, 36 A.3d 893.  
Viewed in a positive light and allowing for reasonable inferences, there was a 
substantial basis for the warrant judge’s probable cause determination.  See 
Simmons, 2016 ME 103, ¶ 12, 143 A.3d 819. 
The entry is: 
Suppression order vacated.  Case remanded for 
further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stephanie Anderson, District Attorney, and Jonathan T. Sahrbeck, Asst. Dist. 
Atty. (orally), Office of the District Attorney, Portland, for appellant State of 
Maine 
 
Neale A. Duffett, Esq., (orally), Cloutier, Conley & Duffett, PA, Portland, for 
appellee Gary Mariner 
 
 
Cumberland County Unified Criminal Division docket number CR-2015-5918 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY