Case Title: E-Z Roll Off, L.L.C. v. County of Oneida

Citation: 2011 WI 71

Docket Number: 2009AP000775

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 WI 71 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP775 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
E-Z Roll Off, LLC, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
County of Oneida, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2010 WI App 76 
Reported at: 325 Wis. 2d 423, 785 N.W. 2d 645 
(Ct. App. 2010 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 2, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Oneida 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick F. O’Melia 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendant-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Michele M. Ford, Crivello Carlson, S.C., Milwaukee, 
with whom on the brief was John T. Juettner. 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument by James B. Connell, Crooks, Low & Connell, S.C., 
Wausau. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 71
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP775 
(L.C. No. 
2006CV124) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
E-Z Roll Off, LLC, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
County of Oneida, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit 
court order granting summary judgment in favor of Oneida County.1  
This case concerns an agreement between Oneida County and Waste 
Management, Inc., (Waste Management) for the disposal of 
municipal solid waste.  The agreement allowed Oneida County to 
charge Waste Management a $5.25 fee for each ton of municipal 
solid waste that Waste Management delivered to the Oneida County 
                                                 
1 E-Z Roll Off, LLC v. Cnty. of Oneida, 2010 WI App 76, 325 
Wis. 2d 423, 785 N.W.2d 645. 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
2 
 
Solid Waste Facility (the Facility).  The agreement in turn 
allowed Waste Management to charge Oneida County $24.50 per ton 
to remove all loaded transfer trailers from the Facility and 
transport them to an approved landfill. 
¶2 
E-Z Roll Off, LLC (E-Z), which was paying a fee of 
$54.00 to Oneida County for each ton of municipal solid waste it 
delivered to the Facility, brought suit against Oneida County 
alleging that the agreement created an illegal restraint of 
trade in violation of Wis. Stat. § 133.03(1) (2005-06).2  The 
circuit court, the Honorable Patrick F. O'Melia presiding, held 
that E-Z could not bring suit because E-Z had not filed a timely 
notice of claim in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a).  
The court of appeals reversed, holding that antitrust actions 
brought pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 133.18 are exempt from the 
notice of claim requirements found in § 893.80(1).  The question 
before us therefore is whether the notice of claim requirements 
found in § 893.80(1) apply to antitrust actions brought pursuant 
to § 133.18.  If the notice of claim requirements apply, we must 
next consider whether E-Z satisfied these requirements. 
¶3 
We hold that antitrust actions brought pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 133.18 are not exempt from the notice of claim 
requirements found in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1).  Additionally, we 
hold that E-Z did not meet the requirements of § 893.80(1)(a) 
when it failed to give Oneida County notice of its claim within 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
3 
 
the 120-day limitations period.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
court of appeals and conclude that the circuit court properly 
granted summary judgment in favor of Oneida County. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
E-Z was founded in 1996 by its owners Todd and Paula 
Laddusire.  E-Z was in the business of collecting solid waste 
from residential and commercial customers.  From 1996 to 2003, 
E-Z was one of several companies that hauled solid waste to the 
Facility.  During this time, Oneida County charged all haulers a 
$54.00 tipping fee for each ton of municipal solid waste that 
was delivered to the Facility.3  A hauler who delivered at least 
100 tons of municipal solid waste to the Facility could qualify 
for a $10 per ton rebate each year.  E-Z regularly qualified for 
this rebate. 
¶5 
On June 25, 2003, Oneida County executed an agreement 
with Waste Management.  Pursuant to this agreement, Oneida 
County charged Waste Management a $5.25 tipping fee for each ton 
of municipal solid waste that it delivered to the Facility.  All 
other haulers (including E-Z) continued to pay a $54.00 tipping 
fee.  The agreement also required Waste Management to remove all 
loaded transfer trailers from the Facility and transport them to 
an approved landfill.  Under the agreement, Oneida County paid 
                                                 
3 "Tipping 
fees 
are 
disposal 
charges 
levied 
against 
collectors who drop off waste at a processing facility.  They 
are called 'tipping' fees because garbage trucks literally tip 
their back end to dump out the carried waste."  United Haulers 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 
330, 336 n.1 (2007). 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
4 
 
Waste Management $24.50 for each ton of municipal solid waste 
that was loaded onto Waste Management trucks for transportation 
to such a landfill. 
¶6 
The parties dispute the point in time when E-Z learned 
of Oneida County's agreement with Waste Management.  E-Z 
contends that it first learned of the agreement in February 2004 
when one of its employees was present at the Facility and saw a 
scale ticket that showed the lower tipping fee charged to Waste 
Management.  Oneida County claims that E-Z received notice of 
the agreement via a public request for proposals that was 
published in April 2003.  In addition, Oneida County claims that 
Todd Laddusire attended a meeting in June 2003 in which Oneida 
County Solid Waste Director Bart Sexton advised interested 
haulers of the proposed $5.25 tipping fee as well as the other 
terms which were eventually incorporated into Oneida County's 
contract with Waste Management. 
¶7 
It is undisputed that on February 17, 2004, the 
Laddusires met with Sexton to present their concerns regarding 
Oneida County's agreement with Waste Management.  The focus of 
the Laddusires' concern was the $5.25 tipping fee Waste 
Management paid to Oneida County under the agreement.  The 
Laddusires were upset that Waste Management's tipping fee was 
dramatically less than the $54.00 tipping fee E-Z paid to Oneida 
County.  At the February 17, 2004 meeting, the Laddusires told 
Sexton that they believed the agreement created a "monopoly."  
They demanded that E-Z's tipping fee be reduced to $24.50 per 
ton.  Sexton refused to reduce E-Z's tipping fee. 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
5 
 
¶8 
In April 2004, E-Z filed a written complaint with the 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Agriculture, 
Trade 
and 
Consumer 
Protection (DATCP).  The complaint alleged that the agreement 
between Oneida County and Waste Management constituted a 
monopoly, and that E-Z should be "reimbursed" for the tipping 
fees it had paid to Oneida County in excess of $5.25 per ton 
since that agreement was executed.  The complaint alleged that 
this "reimbursement" totaled "about $98,000." 
¶9 
On May 4, 2004, the DATCP forwarded the complaint to 
Sexton, who responded by letter on May 20.  In his response 
letter, Sexton disputed each of E-Z's charges and went on to 
state that the contract bidding process had been conducted in 
accordance with appropriate state statutes.  Additionally, 
Sexton stated that E-Z, along with any other business entity, 
would have had the right to submit a bid during the bidding 
process. 
¶10 On September 28, 2005, E-Z filed a "Notice of Injury" 
and "Statement of Claim" with the Oneida County Clerk of Courts.  
In its Notice of Injury, E-Z asserted that it was injured when 
Oneida County entered into a conspiracy to restrain trade in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 133.03 by executing the agreement with 
Waste Management.  In its Statement of Claim, E-Z claimed 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
6 
 
$239,814.69 for loss of past earnings and $959,285.76 for loss 
of future earnings.4  Oneida County denied E-Z's claim. 
¶11 On April 20, 2006, E-Z filed suit against Oneida 
County in the Circuit Court for Oneida County, the Honorable 
Robert E. Kinney then presiding,5 seeking (1) a declaratory 
judgment that Oneida County's agreement with Waste Management 
constituted an illegal restraint of trade in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 133.03(1),6 and (2) treble damages, attorneys fees, and 
costs pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 133.18. 
¶12 On September 29, 2008, Oneida County filed a motion 
for summary judgment, arguing that E-Z failed to comply with the 
                                                 
4 As we discuss in ¶20, in order to sue a governmental 
entity, a plaintiff must file a "notice of the circumstances of 
the claim" within 120 days of the event giving rise to the claim 
and must also file a separate "claim containing the claimant's 
address and relief sought."  For the sake of clarity, we use the 
phrase "notice of claim" to refer to the "notice of the 
circumstances 
of 
the 
claim" 
required 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(a).  Further, we use the phrase "statement of claim" 
to refer to the "claim containing the address of the claimant 
and an itemized statement of the relief sought" found in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1)(b). 
5 Judge Kinney retired during the pendency of this action 
and Judge O'Melia presided over the motion for summary judgment. 
6 Wis. Stat. § 133.03(1) states that: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce is illegal.  Every person who makes any 
contract or engages in any combination or conspiracy 
in restraint of trade or commerce is guilty of a Class 
H felony, except that, notwithstanding the maximum 
fine specified in s. 939.50(3)(h), the person may be 
fined not more than $100,000 if a corporation, or, if 
any other person, may be fined not more than $50,000. 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
7 
 
notice of claim requirements found in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1).  
Specifically, Oneida County argued that E-Z served its notice of 
claim 
well 
beyond 
the 
120-day 
time 
limit 
provided 
in 
§ 893.80(1)(a).  The circuit court agreed with Oneida County and 
rejected E-Z's argument that antitrust actions brought pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 133.18 are exempt from the notice of claim 
requirements found in § 893.80(1).  The circuit court found that 
the 120-day limitations period began to accrue on June 25, 2003, 
when the agreement was signed, and that the Laddusires' 
September 28, 2005 notice of claim was untimely.  Additionally, 
the circuit court found that E-Z had failed to establish that 
Oneida County had actual knowledge of the claim and further 
found that E-Z had failed to establish that Oneida County was 
not prejudiced by the untimely notice.  As a result, the circuit 
court granted summary judgment in favor of Oneida County. 
¶13 E-Z appealed and, in a published decision, the court 
of appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court.7  Applying 
the three-factor test set forth in Town of Burke v. City of 
Madison, 225 Wis. 2d 615, 625, 593 N.W.2d 822 (Ct. App. 1999), 
the court of appeals concluded that (1) Wis. Stat. § 133.18 
contained a specific statutory scheme for antitrust actions,8  E-
Z Roll Off, 325 Wis. 2d 423, ¶18;  (2) applying the notice of 
                                                 
7 E-Z Roll Off, 325 Wis. 2d 423. 
8 As we explain in Part III.A.1., a "specific statutory 
scheme" exists when the terms of a specific statute conflict 
with the general notice of claim requirements found in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1)(a). 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
8 
 
claim requirements to antitrust actions brought pursuant to 
§ 133.18 would hinder the legislature's preference for prompt 
resolution of antitrust claims,  Id., ¶24; and (3) the purposes 
of providing a notice of claim would not be furthered if the 
notice of claim requirements were applied to antitrust actions.  
Id., ¶27.  The court of appeals held that antitrust actions are 
exempt from the notice of claim requirements.  Id., ¶32.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court. 
¶14 Oneida County then petitioned this court for review, 
which we granted. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 This case comes before us on summary judgment.  "We 
review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, and 
apply the methodology specified in Wis. Stat. § 802.08.  That 
is, we determine whether there is any genuine issue as to any 
material fact, and if not, which party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law."  Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v. Jackson 
Cnty., 2010 WI 95, ¶11, 328 Wis. 2d 613, 785 N.W.2d 615. 
¶16 This case also involves the interpretation of the 
notice of claim statute, found in Wis. Stat. § 893.80, and the 
interpretation of the antitrust damages statute, found in Wis. 
Stat. § 133.18.  The interpretation of a statute is a question 
of law that we review de novo.  Hocking v. City of Dodgeville, 
2010 WI 59, ¶17, 326 Wis. 2d 155, 785 N.W.2d 398. 
¶17 Whether a governmental entity had actual notice of a 
plaintiff's claim presents a mixed question of fact and law.  
Olsen v. Twp. of Spooner, 133 Wis. 2d 371, 377, 395 N.W.2d 808 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
9 
 
(Ct. App. 1986).  What the governmental entity knew about the 
plaintiff's claim is a factual finding and may not be overturned 
unless clearly erroneous.  Id.  Whether the governmental 
entity's knowledge constituted actual notice under the law is a 
legal conclusion we review de novo.  Id.  The plaintiff bears 
the burden of proving actual notice.  Weiss v. City of 
Milwaukee, 79 Wis. 2d 213, 227, 255 N.W.2d 496 (1977). 
¶18 Whether a governmental entity suffered prejudice is 
also a mixed question of fact and law.  Olsen, 133 Wis. 2d at 
378.  We uphold the circuit court's factual findings unless 
clearly erroneous.  Id. at 378-79.  How these facts fit the 
statutory concept of prejudice is a question of law we review de 
novo.  Id. at 379.  The plaintiff bears the burden of proving 
lack of prejudice.  Weiss, 79 Wis. 2d at 227. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
¶19 This case requires us to examine two issues.  First, 
we consider whether antitrust claims brought pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 133.18 are exempt from the notice of claim requirements 
found in Wis. Stat. § 893.80.  Second, we consider whether E-Z 
satisfied the notice of claim requirements set forth in 
§ 893.80(1).  We discuss each issue in turn. 
A.  Antitrust Claims Brought Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 133.18 Are 
Not Exempt from the Notice of Claim Requirements Found in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1) 
 
¶20 In order to commence a lawsuit against a governmental 
entity, a claimant must, as a precursor to actually filing suit, 
serve written notice of the circumstances of the claim within 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
10 
 
120 days after the happening of the event.9  Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1).  Additionally, a claimant must present a written 
claim to an appropriate official.  § 893.80(1)(b).  When such a 
                                                 
9 Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) reads in relevant part:  
 (1) Except as provided in subs. (1g), (1m), (1p) and 
(8), no action may be brought or maintained against 
any volunteer fire company organized under ch. 213, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency thereof nor against any officer, official, 
agent or employee of the corporation, subdivision or 
agency for acts done in their official capacity or in 
the course of their agency or employment upon a claim 
or cause of action unless: 
(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the 
event giving rise to the claim, written notice of the 
circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent 
or attorney is served on the volunteer fire company, 
political corporation, governmental subdivision or 
agency and on the officer, official, agent or employee 
under s. 801.11. Failure to give the requisite notice 
shall not bar action on the claim if the fire company, 
corporation, subdivision or agency had actual notice 
of 
the 
claim 
and 
the 
claimant 
shows 
to 
the 
satisfaction of the court that the delay or failure to 
give the requisite notice has not been prejudicial to 
the defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision 
or agency or to the defendant officer, official, agent 
or employee; and 
(b) A claim containing the address of the 
claimant and an itemized statement of the relief 
sought is presented to the appropriate clerk or person 
who performs the duties of a clerk or secretary for 
the defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision 
or agency and the claim is disallowed. 
We discuss exceptions to this general rule in Part III.B.2. 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
11 
 
claim is disallowed, a claimant has six months to bring suit.  
§ 893.80(1g).10 
¶21 We initially recognized in Department of Natural 
Resources v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 191, 515 
N.W.2d 888 (1994), the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 893.80: 
"[t]he language of the statute clearly and unambiguously makes 
the notice of claim requirements applicable to all actions."  
However, we subsequently recognized in Auchinleck that our 
holding in Waukesha had been "too broad."  State ex. rel 
Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 597, 547 
N.W.2d 587 (1996) (exempting claims for open records violations 
and open meetings violations from the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80). 
¶22 A 
number 
of 
cases 
following 
Auchinleck 
created 
additional exceptions to the application of the notice of claim 
requirements.  See Gillen v. City of Neenah, 219 Wis. 2d 806, 
822-23, 580 N.W.2d 628 (1998) (exempting actions to enjoin 
violations of the public trust doctrine under Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.294); Little Sissabagama Lake Shore Owners Ass'n, Inc., v. 
Town of Edgewater, 208 Wis. 2d 259, 265, 559 N.W.2d 914 (Ct. 
App. 1997) (exempting actions to appeal a county board's 
determination regarding the requirements for tax-exempt status 
under Wis. Stat. § 70.11(20)(d)); Gamroth v. Vill. of Jackson, 
                                                 
10 A claim may be disallowed in two ways.  First, the 
governmental entity may serve a written notice of disallowance 
on the claimant.  Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1g).  Second, if the 
governmental entity fails to act within 120 days, the claim is 
considered disallowed.  Id. 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
12 
 
215 Wis. 2d 251, 259, 571 N.W.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1997) (exempting 
actions 
to 
appeal 
special 
assessments 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.60(12)(a)). 
¶23 In Town of Burke, 225 Wis. 2d 615, the court of 
appeals provided a structure for analyzing our notice of claim 
jurisprudence.  After examining our prior notice of claim case 
law, the court of appeals concluded that three factors should be 
considered when determining whether to exempt a specific statute 
from the notice of claim requirements: (1) whether there is a 
specific 
statutory 
scheme 
for 
which 
the 
plaintiff 
seeks 
exemption; (2) whether enforcement of the notice of claim 
requirements found in Wis. Stat. § 893.80 would hinder a 
legislative preference for a prompt resolution of the type of 
claim under consideration; and (3) whether the purposes for 
which § 893.80 was enacted would be furthered by requiring that 
a notice of claim be filed.  Id. at 625.  Applying this 
framework, the Town of Burke court concluded that the municipal 
annexation procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. § 66.021 were 
exempt from the notice of claim requirements.  Id. at 626. 
 
¶24 The three factors articulated in Town of Burke have 
since become the accepted framework by which our appellate 
courts have considered exceptions to the notice of claim 
requirements found in Wis. Stat. § 893.80.  See Ecker Bros. v. 
Calumet Cnty., 2009 WI App 112, ¶6, 321 Wis. 2d 51, 722 
N.W.2d 240; Oak Creek Citizen's Action Comm. v. City of Oak 
Creek, 2007 WI App 196, ¶7, 304 Wis. 2d 702, 738 N.W.2d 168; 
Nesbitt Farms, LLC v. City of Madison, 2003 WI App 122, ¶9, 265 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
13 
 
Wis. 2d 422, 665 N.W.2d 379.  We therefore apply the Town of 
Burke test to determine whether antitrust actions brought 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 133.18 are exempt from the notice of 
claim requirements found in § 893.80. 
1.  Specific Statutory Scheme 
 
¶25  The first factor we consider is "whether there is a 
specific 
statutory 
scheme 
for 
which 
the 
plaintiff 
seeks 
exemption" from the notice of claim requirements found in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80.  Town of Burke, 225 Wis. 2d at 625.  If a 
statute provides a specific statutory scheme that conflicts with 
the general intent behind the 120-day time limit provided in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80, then the specific statutory scheme will 
take precedence.  City of Racine v. Waste Facility Siting Bd., 
216 Wis. 2d 616, 625, 575 N.W.2d 712 (1998). 
¶26 In the instant case, the court of appeals relied on 
our decision in Gillen v. City of Neenah to conclude that the  
statutory scheme for antitrust actions brought pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 133.18 takes precedence over the general notice of claim 
requirements of § 893.80(1).  We disagree.  In Gillen, we held 
that when a statute allows a claimant to seek immediate 
injunctive relief, that statute irreconcilably conflicts with 
the general notice of claim provisions of Wis. Stat. § 893.80, 
"which requires a plaintiff to provide a governmental body with 
a notice of claim, and to wait 120 days or until the claim is 
disallowed before filing an action."  Gillen, 219 Wis. 2d at 
822.  The Gillen court concluded that, because application of 
the 120-day time limit imposed by Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(b) 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
14 
 
clearly frustrated the plaintiffs' specific right to immediate 
injunctive relief, the procedures setting forth injunctive 
relief took precedence over the general notice provisions of 
§ 893.80. 
¶27 As illustrated in Gillen, our appellate courts have 
generally concluded that a specific statutory scheme conflicts 
with the notice of claim requirements found in Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80 when the specific statute contains a more restrictive 
limitations 
period 
than 
the 
120-day 
notice 
of 
claim 
requirements.  See id. at 821-22 (specific statute allowed 
immediate injunctive relief); Auchinleck, 200 Wis. 2d at 592 
(specific statute allowed an action to be commenced within 20 
days); Town of Burke, 225 Wis. 2d at 625 (specific statute 
required an action to be commenced within 90 days); Little 
Sissabagama, 208 Wis. 2d at 266 (specific statute required an 
action to be commenced within 90 days); Oak Creek Citizen's 
Action Comm., 304 Wis. 2d at 709 (specific statute required 
clerk to take action within 15 days and common council to take 
action within 30 days). 
¶28 While 
we 
find 
the 
reasoning 
of 
Gillen 
to 
be 
instructive, we conclude that its holding is inapplicable to the 
present case.  In contrast to the plaintiffs in Gillen, E-Z does 
not seek immediate injunctive relief under § 133.16.  Rather, E-
Z seeks declaratory relief and damages under Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
15 
 
§ 133.18.11  Unlike immediate injunctive relief, which "is 
designed to prevent injury," Gillen, 219 Wis. 2d at 821, 
declaratory relief is not, by its nature, in conflict with 
providing governmental entities a 120-day period to review a 
claim.12  We note that the Declaratory Judgment Act, found in 
Wis. Stat. § 806.04, provides no statute of limitations.  We 
further note that § 133.18 provides a six-year limitations 
period for actions seeking damages for violations of antitrust 
                                                 
11 The prayer for relief contained in E-Z's complaint 
requests only (1) a declaratory judgment that the agreement is 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 133.03(1), and (2) damages, 
attorneys fees, and costs pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 133.18.  E-Z 
made no request for an injunction under Wis. Stat. § 133.16.  
The circuit court clarified this at the summary judgment 
hearing: 
[Counsel for E-Z]:   . . . We're asking, Your Honor, 
for injunctive relief so this method of operation 
stops and stops immediately. 
[The Court]: See, I didn't read your complaint as 
asking for injunctive relief, but perhaps I missed 
that. 
[Counsel for E-Z]: Let me find it.  Well, maybe it 
would be better stated as to——as to declaratory 
relief, that is declaring the contract by illegal I 
think is the way I phrased it in my complaint. 
12 "Declaratory relief" is "a binding adjudication that 
establishes the rights and other legal relations of the parties 
without providing for or ordering enforcement."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 846 (7th ed. 1999).  In contrast, "injunctive relief" 
entitles a party to "a court order commanding or preventing an 
action," Id. at 788, and "is usually requested simultaneously 
with, or soon after, commencing an action by a motion for a 
temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction."   
Gillen, 219 Wis. 2d at 821. 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
16 
 
law.13  Accordingly, neither E-Z's claim for declaratory relief 
nor E-Z's claim for damages is brought pursuant to a specific 
statute whose terms conflict with the general notice of claim 
requirements found in Wis. Stat. § 893.80. 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 133.18(1)(b) states that "[n]o damages, 
interest on damages, costs or attorney fees may be recovered 
under this chapter from any local governmental unit or against 
any official or employee of a local governmental unit who acted 
in an official capacity."  Subsection (1)(b) is seemingly in 
tension with § 133.18(6), which caps the amount of monetary 
damages a plaintiff may recover in a suit against a governmental 
entity.  The circuit court, relying on subsection (1)(b), struck 
E-Z's request for treble damages, costs, and attorney fees under 
§ 133.18(1)(a).  However, the circuit court expressly reserved 
the question of whether the language of subsection (1)(b) 
"precludes recovery of any monetary damages against [Oneida] 
County for violations alleged under any provision in Wis. Stat. 
ch. 133."  Neither the circuit court nor the court of appeals 
further addressed this tension because both courts concluded 
that the question of whether the notice of claim statute applied 
was dispositive.  This issue was not briefed before this court 
and we therefore need not address whether E-Z pled a viable 
claim for damages against Oneida County pursuant to § 133.18. 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
17 
 
 
¶29 We therefore hold that § 133.18 does not contain a 
specific statutory scheme in conflict with the notice of claim 
requirements found in § 893.80.14 
2.  Legislative Preference for Prompt Resolution 
 
¶30 The second factor we consider is "whether enforcement 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.80 would hinder a legislative preference for 
a prompt resolution of the type of claim under consideration."  
Town of Burke, 225 Wis. 2d at 625.  We therefore examine whether 
the legislature has expressed a preference for prompt resolution 
of antitrust damages actions pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 133.18 
and, if so, whether applying the 120-day notice of claim 
requirements would somehow hinder that preference. 
 
¶31 Wisconsin Stat. § 133.18(5) requires that "[e]ach 
civil action under this chapter and each motion or other 
proceeding in such action shall be expedited in every way and 
shall be heard at the earliest practicable date."  This language 
demonstrates 
the 
legislature's 
preference 
for 
the 
prompt 
                                                 
14 The court of appeals also relied on Nesbitt in holding 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 133.18 
actions 
constituted 
a 
specific 
statutory scheme.  Nesbitt Farms, LLC v. City of Madison, 2003 
WI App 122, 265 Wis. 2d 422, 665 N.W.2d 379.  In Nesbitt, the 
court of appeals considered whether condemnation appeals brought 
under Wis. Stat. § 32.05 were subject to the notice of claim 
requirements.  The Nesbitt court held that Wis. Stat. § 32.05 
provided a detailed "procedure and deadline for commencing 
[condemnation] actions, as well as specifying other matters, 
such as how other interested parties may join the appeal and 
what issues may be tried."  Id., ¶10.  Wis. Stat. § 133.18 
contains no such detailed procedures.  Instead, § 133.18 merely 
creates a cause of action, defines the damages, and provides a 
lengthy six-year statute of limitations.  Nesbitt is, therefore, 
easily distinguishable. 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
18 
 
resolution of antitrust claims brought pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 133.18.  E-Z argues that applying the notice of claim 
requirements found in Wis. Stat. § 893.80 to antitrust actions 
brought pursuant to § 133.18 hinders prompt resolution of such 
claims.  As the circuit court correctly recognized, applying the 
notice of claim requirements to antitrust actions brought 
pursuant 
to 
§ 133.18 
promotes, 
rather 
than 
hinders, 
the 
legislature's preference for expediency in the adjudication of 
such claims. 
¶32 This is so because ordinarily a plaintiff has six 
years to seek damages pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 133.18.  See 
§ 133.18(2).  However, if a plaintiff advances a claim against a 
governmental entity, it is subject to the notice of claim 
requirements.  See Wis. Stat. § 893.80.  In that case, the 
plaintiff would be required to serve written notice of the claim 
upon the governmental entity within 120 days after the event 
giving rise to the claim.  See § 893.80(1)(a).  If the claim is 
disallowed, the plaintiff whose claim has been denied would have 
only six months, as opposed to the six years otherwise afforded 
by Wis. Stat. § 133.18(2), to file the complaint.  See 
§ 893.80(1g).  It is clear that such timelines encourage, rather 
than hinder, the prompt resolution of § 133.18 actions. 
¶33 Accordingly, we hold that enforcing the general notice 
of claim requirements found in Wis. Stat. § 893.80 promotes, 
rather than hinders, the legislature’s preference for prompt 
resolution of such claims. 
3.  Furthering the Purposes of the Notice of Claim Statute 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
19 
 
 
¶34 The third factor we consider is "whether the purpose 
for which § 893.80(1) was enacted would be furthered by 
requiring that a notice of claim be filed."  Town of Burke, 225 
Wis. 2d at 625.  We have previously held that the notice of 
claim statute serves two purposes: (1) to give governmental 
entities the opportunity to investigate and evaluate potential 
claims, and (2) to afford governmental entities the opportunity 
to compromise and budget for potential settlement or litigation.  
Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, ¶¶23, 28, 235 Wis. 2d 610, 
612 N.W.2d 59. 
¶35  E-Z argues that the legislative purpose of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1) was furthered when Oneida County was given the 
opportunity to settle and negotiate the dispute.  Thus, E-Z 
argues, applying § 893.80(1) to bar its claim would thwart the 
very purpose of § 893.80(1) because E-Z would be punished for 
attempting to negotiate with Oneida County before resorting to 
the judicial system. 
¶36 We find E-Z's argument unpersuasive.  First, applying 
the notice of claim statute to antitrust actions brought 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 133.18 clearly allows governmental 
entities a greater opportunity to investigate and evaluate 
potential claims by requiring claimants to file their notice of 
claim within 120 days of the event giving rise to the claim.  If 
the notice of claim statute were not applied to § 133.18 
antitrust actions, claimants would have six years to file their 
complaint. 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
20 
 
¶37 The 
additional 
sixty-eight 
months 
during 
which 
claimants could bring their actions would obviously hamper a 
governmental entity's ability to investigate and evaluate 
claims.  See, e.g., Olsen, 133 Wis. 2d at 380 (holding in a 
condemnation action that three years of vegetative growth made a 
determination of any damages difficult).  It is axiomatic that a 
governmental 
entity 
can 
more 
effectively 
investigate 
the 
circumstances surrounding a claim that accrued within the 120 
days preceding the receipt of notice than it can investigate a 
claim that accrued up to six years in the past.  In a similar 
vein, it is more likely that with the passage of time such 
investigation and evaluation will become more problematic as 
governmental employees leave their posts, memories fade, and 
witnesses become unavailable. 
¶38 Second, applying the notice of claim statute to 
antitrust actions brought pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 133.18 allows 
governmental entities a greater opportunity to compromise and 
budget for potential settlement or litigation.  If the notice of 
claim statute were not applied to antitrust actions brought 
pursuant to § 133.18, governmental entities would no longer be 
provided with a 120-day period in which to review the claim 
before the claimant could file suit.  We are compelled by the 
nature of E-Z's argument to note the obvious: it is easier for a 
governmental entity to compromise with a claimant when the 
governmental entity has the 120-day period required by the 
notice of claim statute in which it may review the claim and 
negotiate with the claimant prior to the commencement of 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
21 
 
litigation.  Further, this period grants governmental entities 
120 days in which to adjust budgets to account for potential 
settlement or litigation.  As a result, the purposes for which 
the notice of claim statute was enacted would be fulfilled if 
parties filing antitrust actions pursuant to § 133.18 were 
required to follow the general notice of claim requirements. 
 
¶39 Applying the three-factor Town of Burke test, we 
conclude that Wis. Stat. § 133.18 antitrust actions are not 
exempt from the notice of claim requirements set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80.  We therefore next discuss whether E-Z satisfied 
the notice of claim requirements. 
B.  Notice of Claim Requirements 
 
¶40 Under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1), no action may be brought 
against a governmental subdivision unless paragraphs (a) and (b) 
are satisfied: 
 
(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the 
event giving rise to the claim, written notice of the 
circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent 
or 
attorney 
is 
served 
on 
the . . . governmental 
subdivision . . . .  Failure to give the requisite 
notice 
shall 
not 
bar 
action 
on 
the 
claim 
if 
the . . . subdivision . . . had actual notice of the 
claim and the claimant shows to the satisfaction of 
the court that the delay or failure to give the 
requisite 
notice 
has 
not 
been 
prejudicial 
to 
the . . . subdivision . . . ; and 
 
(b) A claim containing the address of the 
claimant and an itemized statement of the relief 
sought is presented to the appropriate clerk or person 
who performs the duties of a clerk or secretary for 
the defendant . . . subdivision . . . and the claim is 
disallowed. 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
22 
 
¶41 First, we consider whether the notice of claim was 
filed within 120 days of the "happening of the event."  Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1)(a).  This requires us to consider whether the 
continuing violation doctrine applies in Wisconsin.15  Second, we 
consider whether Oneida County had actual notice of the claim 
and whether it suffered prejudice. 
1.  120-Day Notice Requirement 
 
¶42 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1) requires that E-Z serve 
its notice of claim on Oneida County "[w]ithin 120 days after 
the happening of the event giving rise to the claim . . . ."  
Oneida County argues that the "event" giving rise to E-Z's claim 
was the signing of the agreement with Waste Management on June 
25, 2003.  E-Z contends that its cause of action did not accrue 
until discovery of the agreement and that such discovery did not 
occur until February 2004.  See Wis. Stat. § 133.18(4). 
¶43 We need not decide when E-Z's cause of action began to 
accrue because, in either case, E-Z's notice of claim was 
untimely.  E-Z filed its notice of claim with the Oneida County 
Clerk of Court on September 28, 2005, well over 120 days after 
both the date on which the agreement was executed (June 25, 
2003), as well as the date E-Z contended it learned of the 
agreement (February 2004).   
                                                 
15 The "continuing violation doctrine" holds that "each time 
a plaintiff is injured by an act of the defendants a cause of 
action accrues to him to recover the damages caused by that act 
and that, as to those damages, the statute of limitations runs 
from the commission of the act."  Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338-39 (1971). 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
23 
 
¶44 E-Z also argues that each time it paid a higher 
tipping fee than Waste Management, a new cause of action accrued 
to E-Z.  Consistent with this assertion, E-Z argues that the 
notice of claim that it filed on September 28, 2005, was timely 
because the notice was filed within 120 days of E-Z having paid 
a higher tipping fee than Waste Management. 
 
¶45 In support of this assertion, E-Z cites Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971).  In that 
case, the United States Supreme Court concluded that in the 
context of a continuing conspiracy to violate the federal 
antitrust laws, "each time a plaintiff is injured by an act of 
the defendant a cause of action accrues to him to recover the 
damages caused by that act and that, as to those damages, the 
statute of limitations runs from the commission of the act."  
Id. at 338. 
 
¶46 E-Z, however, fails to cite any authority applying the 
continuing violations doctrine to the notice of claim statute 
under Wisconsin law.  More importantly, E-Z also ignores a 
purpose of the notice of claim statute, which is to afford 
governmental entities the opportunity to compromise and budget 
for potential settlement or litigation.  See Thorp, 235 Wis. 2d 
610, ¶¶23, 28.  If the continuing violations doctrine were to 
apply, it would be much more difficult for governmental entities 
to budget for potential litigation.  For example, under E-Z's 
theory, a cause of action would accrue to E-Z each time it paid 
a higher tipping fee during the 10-year length of Oneida 
County's agreement with Waste Management.  The legislature did 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
24 
 
not intend for governmental entities to be exposed to indefinite 
periods of liability for potential violations of Wis. Stat. 
§ 133.18.16  Such a result would be unreasonable given the 
purposes of the notice of claim requirements found in § 893.80.17 
 
¶47 E-Z filed its notice of claim with the Oneida County 
Clerk of Court on September 28, 2005, well over 120 days after 
both the date on which the agreement was executed (June 25, 
2003), as well as the date E-Z contended it learned of the 
agreement (February 2004).  Having concluded that E-Z did not 
satisfy the first sentence of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a), we must 
next consider whether the actual notice and prejudice exception 
contained in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a) applies. 
2.  E-Z Failed to Show That Oneida County Suffered No Prejudice 
 
¶48 An exception to the general 120-day rule exists when a 
claimant demonstrates that two conditions are met: (1) the 
governmental entity "had actual notice of the claim," and (2) 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1)(a) provides that a claimant 
must give notice "[w]ithin 120 days after the happening of the 
event giving rise to the claim . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  We 
recognize that the general rule under Wis. Stat. § 990.001(1) is 
that we are to interpret the singular word "event" to include 
the plural "events" unless this "would produce a result 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature."  The 
manifest intent of the legislature in Wis. Stat. § 893.80 is not 
to expose governmental entities to potentially infinite periods 
of liability.  We therefore conclude that the general rule in 
§ 990.001(1) is inapplicable in the instant case. 
17 "We attempt, whenever possible, to give reasonable effect 
to every word in a statute, avoiding both surplusage and absurd 
or unreasonable results."  Hocking v. City of Dodgeville, 2010 
WI 59, ¶18, 326 Wis. 2d 155, 785 N.W.2d 398. 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
25 
 
the governmental entity has not been prejudiced by the delay or 
failure to give notice.  Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a).  Because we 
determine that E-Z failed to show that Oneida County suffered no 
prejudice, we need not address whether Oneida County received 
actual notice of E-Z's claim.  We therefore address only whether 
E-Z met its burden to produce evidence that Oneida County 
suffered no prejudice because of the delayed notice. 
¶49 In Olsen v. Spooner Township we held that prejudice 
"refers to a delay which results in the inability of claimants 
to adequately defend their case."  133 Wis. 2d at 379 (internal 
citations omitted).  This holding emphasized that one of the 
purposes of the notice of claim statute "is to ensure that 
governmental 
units 
have 
sufficient 
opportunity 
to 
escape 
prejudice by promptly investigating claims."  Id. at 380.  As 
the party opposing summary judgment, E-Z "may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of the pleadings . . . ."  Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08(3).  "The ultimate burden [] of demonstrating 
that there is sufficient evidence . . .  to go to trial at all 
(in the case of a motion for summary judgment) is on the party 
that has the burden of proof on the issue that is the object of 
the motion."  Transp. Ins. Co. v. Hunzinger Constr. Co., 179 
Wis. 2d 281, 290, 507 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1993).  E-Z bears the 
burden of proving that Oneida County suffered no prejudice.  
Weiss, 79 Wis. 2d at 227.  Therefore, E-Z "must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" 
on the issue of prejudice.  § 893.08(3). 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
26 
 
 
¶50 The circuit court found that E-Z set forth no facts 
showing that Oneida County suffered no prejudice.  The circuit 
court went so far as to state that E-Z "provides no evidentiary 
citation" for its entire prejudice argument.  We agree. 
 
¶51 E-Z bore the burden to produce evidence that the 
delayed notice of claim did not harm Oneida County's ability to 
adequately defend its case.  E-Z introduced no such evidence.  
The depositions of Todd Laddusire and Bart Sexton——the only 
significant evidentiary materials introduced at the summary 
judgment proceeding——did not touch on the issue of prejudice. 
¶52 The circuit court cautioned the parties early in the 
litigation that the issue of prejudice would require substantial 
discovery.  When the circuit court denied Oneida County's motion 
for judgment on the pleadings, it cautioned both parties that: 
The determination as to whether E-Z is barred from 
bringing this action for failing to comply with the 
notice of claims requirements is a complex issue that 
would likely necessitate extensive factual support.  
Specifically, failing to comply with the time limits 
in § 893.80 does not serve as an automatic bar to an 
action.  Even if plaintiff fails to satisfy these time 
requirements, 
an 
action 
still 
survives 
if 
the 
plaintiff can show that the defendant had actual 
notice of the claim and that the defendant was not 
prejudiced by a delay of, or failure to provide, the 
requisite notice.  § 893.80(1)(a).  The determination 
of whether the County had actual notice of the claim 
and whether any prejudice exists are intensive factual 
issues that will likely require extensive discovery.   
Despite having received such guidance from the circuit court, E-
Z inexplicably failed to conduct any discovery on the issue of 
prejudice. 
No. 
2009AP775   
 
27 
 
¶53 E-Z could have asked Sexton a number of questions to 
determine whether Oneida County did or did not suffer prejudice 
because of the delayed notice.  For example, E-Z never 
questioned Sexton to determine whether Oneida County suffered 
from an inability to investigate the claim because of the 
delayed notice.  In addition, E-Z never asked whether either 
Sexton or Oneida County had difficulty finding documents or 
other witnesses relevant to the proceedings.  E-Z simply failed 
to introduce evidence on the issue of prejudice.  Because of 
this, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in 
favor of Oneida County. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶54 We hold that antitrust actions brought pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 133.18 are not exempt from the notice of claim 
requirements found in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1).  Additionally, we 
hold that E-Z did not meet the requirements of § 893.80(1)(a) 
when it failed to give Oneida County notice of its claim within 
the 120-day limitations period.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
court of appeals and conclude that the circuit court properly 
granted summary judgment in favor of Oneida County. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2009AP775.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶55 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (dissenting).  Appellate 
courts apply a three-part test to determine whether the notice 
requirement of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) (2009-10)1 applies to the 
claim under review.  Oak Creek Citizen's Action Comm. v. City of 
Oak Creek, 2007 WI App 196, ¶7, 304 Wis. 2d 702, 738 N.W.2d 168.  
I conclude that E-Z Roll Off, LLC (E-Z) makes a restraint of 
trade claim under ch. 133 of the Wisconsin Statutes that meets 
the three-part test for an exception to the requirements of 
§ 893.80(1):  (1) ch. 133 provides a specific statutory scheme 
for the identification and resolution of claims; (2) compliance 
with § 893.80(1) would hinder the legislature's preference for 
prompt action on ch. 133 claims; and (3) the purposes for which 
§ 893.80(1) was enacted would not be furthered by requiring a 
notice of claim to be filed for ch. 133 claims.  Accordingly, I 
would affirm the court of appeals and I respectfully dissent 
from the majority opinion.    
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶56 E-Z was in the solid waste hauling business.2  It 
provided 
waste 
containers 
to 
residential, 
commercial 
and 
construction customers.  E-Z hauled the waste it collected to 
the Oneida County landfill, and Oneida County charged E-Z a per 
ton tipping fee to utilize the landfill.   
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated.  (The 2005-06 
are applicable to the notice question presented; however, the 
2009-10 statutes referenced herein are the same as the 2005-06 
version of § 893.80(1) in all relevant parts.) 
2 E-Z went out of business in May, 2008. 
No.  2009AP775.pdr 
 
2 
 
¶57 E-Z paid a $54 per ton tipping fee for its use of the 
landfill, less a $10 per ton discount when E-Z brought a 
sufficient volume of waste to Oneida County's landfill.  In 
February 2004, an employee of E-Z saw a receipt from the Oneida 
County landfill that showed Waste Management Wisconsin, Inc. 
(Waste Management) was being charged only $5.25 per ton as a 
tipping fee by Oneida County.   
¶58 Apparently, the lower tipping fee accorded to Waste 
Management was part of the June 25, 2003 contract3 between Waste 
Management and Oneida County wherein Waste Management agreed to 
transport municipal solid waste for Oneida County for $24.50 per 
ton and Oneida County agreed to charge Waste Management only a 
$5.25 tipping fee rather than the usual $54 per ton rate.  
¶59 On February 17, 2004, the Laddusires, who own E-Z, met 
with Bart Sexton, the Oneida County Solid Waste Director, to 
complain about the high tipping fee E-Z was paying and to 
request a reduction of its tipping fee.  Sexton refused their 
request, and in April 2004 E-Z filed a written complaint with 
the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer 
Protection (Consumer Protection agency).  Although the Consumer 
Protection agency forwarded E-Z's complaint to Oneida County on 
May 4, 2004, the Consumer Protection agency took no further 
action on the complaint.  
¶60 On September 28, 2005, E-Z filed a "Notice of Injury" 
with Oneida County, in which it alleged that the preferential 
tipping fee that Oneida County granted to Waste Management was a 
                                                 
3 Compl., ¶3. 
No.  2009AP775.pdr 
 
3 
 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 133.03(1).  It alleged that it had 
lost past and future earnings due to the lower prices that Waste 
Management was able to charge its customers because of the lower 
tipping fee that Waste Management was accorded by Oneida County 
for the tipping it did at the landfill.   
¶61 E-Z filed this action on April 20, 2006.  Oneida 
County moved to dismiss, alleging that E-Z failed to comply with 
the notice of claim requirements of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1), and 
the circuit court dismissed E-Z's claim.  The court of appeals 
reversed, concluding that ch. 133 claims were excepted from 
compliance with § 893.80(1).  E-Z Roll Off, LLC v. Cnty. of 
Oneida, 2010 WI App 76, ¶1, 325 Wis. 2d 423, 785 N.W.2d 645.  
II.  DISCUSSION  
A.  Standard of Review 
¶62 The circuit court dismissed E-Z's claim on summary 
judgment.  We review summary judgment using the same methodology 
as did the circuit court and the court of appeals.  Grygiel v. 
Monches Fish & Game Club, Inc., 2010 WI 93, ¶12, 328 Wis. 2d 
436, 787 N.W.2d 6.  This summary judgment turns on statutory 
interpretation.  Statutory interpretation presents a question of 
law for our independent review, in which we benefit from the 
discussions in previous court decisions.  Richards v. Badger 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶14, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581.  
As 
we 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1), 
we 
assess 
its 
interaction with the ch. 133 claim made herein.  The interaction 
of E-Z's ch. 133 claim with the obligations set out in 
§ 893.80(1) presents a question of law for our independent 
No.  2009AP775.pdr 
 
4 
 
consideration.  Nesbitt Farms, LLC v. City of Madison, 2003 WI 
App 122, ¶4, 265 Wis. 2d 422, 665 N.W.2d 379.   
B.  E-Z's Contention 
¶63  E-Z contends that Oneida County violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 133.03(1) through its contract with Waste Management.  Oneida 
County contracted to pay Waste Management $24.50 per ton for 
solid waste removal, and combined that payment with a $5.25 per 
ton tipping fee that Oneida County charged Waste Management.  
This contractual tipping fee of $5.25 is a $49.75 per ton 
reduction in charges on the solid waste that Waste Management 
dumped into the Oneida County landfill, not just solid waste 
that is hauled for Oneida County.  E-Z alleged that the contract 
was an unreasonable restraint of trade in that it "permits Waste 
Management, Wisconsin, Inc., to under bid and drive out 
competition in Oneida County and the areas which the Oneida 
County Transfer Station has traditionally served,"4 because Waste 
Management was charged $49.75 less per ton to dump solid waste 
at the Oneida County landfill than were other users of the 
landfill.  
¶64 Stated otherwise, E-Z alleges that if Waste Management 
had been required to pay the $54 per ton tipping fee as E-Z was, 
Waste Management would have had to increase the prices it 
offered to customers for whose business E-Z was competing.  It 
is argued that the lower tipping fee permitted Waste Management 
to compete unfairly with E-Z.  
                                                 
4 Compl., ¶¶3,4,6,7. 
No.  2009AP775.pdr 
 
5 
 
¶65 In regard to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1), E-Z does not 
argue that it timely filed a notice of claim.  Rather, E-Z 
contends that it is not required to comply with § 893.80(1) 
because its ch. 133 claim falls outside of the scope of 
§ 893.80(1)'s command, and further, even if it were required to 
comply with § 893.80(1), Oneida County had actual notice of its 
claim.  The court of appeals agreed with E-Z's first argument, 
concluding that ch. 133 claims are not required to comply with 
§ 893.80(1).  E-Z Roll Off, 325 Wis. 2d 423, ¶1.  I agree with 
the court of appeals.   
C.  Statutory Concerns 
1.  Notice of claim 
¶66 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(1) provides in relevant part:  
Except as provided in subs. (1g), (1m), (1p) and (8),5 
no action may be brought or maintained against any 
. . . political corporation, governmental subdivision 
or agency thereof . . . for acts done in their 
official capacity or in the course of their agency or 
employment upon a claim or cause of action unless: 
(a) Within 120 days after the happening of the 
event giving rise to the claim, written notice of the 
circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent 
or 
attorney 
is 
served 
on 
the 
. . . 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or agency . . . 
under s. 801.11.  Failure to give the requisite notice 
shall not bar action on the claim if . . . the 
claimant shows to the satisfaction of the court that 
the delay or failure to give the requisite notice has 
not been prejudicial to the defendant . . .; and 
(b) A claim containing the address of the 
claimant and an itemized statement of the relief 
sought is presented to the appropriate clerk . . . and 
the claim is disallowed. 
                                                 
5 None of these listed exceptions apply here.  
No.  2009AP775.pdr 
 
6 
 
¶67 Although we once stated that Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) 
applies to all types of actions, not just to tort actions, DNR 
v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 191, 515 N.W.2d 888 
(1994), we have modified that statement as being overly broad. 
State ex rel. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 
597, 547 N.W.2d 587 (1996).  In addition, numerous appellate 
opinions have identified various exceptions to the statutory 
notice of claim requirements.  See id. at 596 (noting that 
§ 893.80(5) expressly states that specific rights and remedies 
provided by other statutes take precedence over the provisions 
of § 893.80 and concluding that § 893.80(1) does not apply to 
claimed violations of the open records law); see also Gillen v. 
City of Neenah, 219 Wis. 2d 806, 822-23, 580 N.W.2d 628 (1998) 
(concluding that § 893.80(1) does not apply to actions under 
Wis. Stat. § 30.294 to enjoin violations of the public trust 
doctrine); Oak Creek, 304 Wis. 2d 702, ¶2 (concluding that 
§ 893.80(1) does not apply to an action to compel a city to 
comply with the direct legislation statute); Town of Burke v. 
City of Madison, 225 Wis. 2d 615, 617-18, 593 N.W.2d 822 (Ct. 
App. 1999) (concluding that actions objecting to annexation 
brought under Wis. Stat. § 66.021 are not required to comply 
with § 893.80(1)); Gamroth v. Vill. of Jackson, 215 Wis. 2d 251, 
259, 571 N.W.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that special 
assessment appeals brought under Wis. Stat. § 66.60(12)(a) fall 
outside of § 893.80(1)'s requirements).   
¶68 Based on our analysis in Auchinleck, a three-part test 
has evolved by which courts assess whether the claimant is 
No.  2009AP775.pdr 
 
7 
 
required to comply with Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) for the claim 
presented.  Oak Creek, 304 Wis. 2d 702, ¶7 (citing Nesbitt 
Farms, 265 Wis. 2d 422, ¶9.  This three-part test provides: 
"(1) whether there is a specific statutory scheme for 
which the plaintiff seeks exemption; (2) whether 
enforcement of § 893.80(1), Stats., would hinder a 
legislative preference for a prompt resolution of the 
type of claim under consideration; and (3) whether the 
purposes for which § 893.80(1) was enacted would be 
furthered by requiring that a notice of claim be 
filed." 
Id. (quoting Nesbitt Farms, 265 Wis. 2d 422, ¶9).  Accordingly, 
I begin with Wis. Stat. § 133.03(1), the claim herein made. 
2.  Wisconsin Stat. § 133.03(1) 
¶69 E-Z claims anticompetitive conduct that it alleges is 
regulated by ch. 133, specifically Wis. Stat. § 133.03(1).  
Section 
133.03(1) 
addresses 
anticompetitive 
contracts 
in 
restraint of trade.  Section 133.03(1) provides in relevant 
part:  "Unlawful contracts; conspiracies.  (1)  Every contract 
. . . in restraint of trade or commerce is illegal."  It is this 
§ 133.03(1) claim that the circuit court dismissed on summary 
judgment because the notice of claim provisions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1) had not been met. Accordingly, I consider the 
viability of E-Z's ch. 133 claim in light of § 893.80(1) and the 
requisite three-part test for exceptions thereto.   
a.  Specific statutory scheme 
¶70 Chapter 133 sets out a specific statutory scheme that 
addresses anticompetitive conduct that is quite comprehensive.  
First, it defines those who are covered by the prohibitions 
contained therein.  Wis. Stat. § 133.02(3).  Second, it sets out 
No.  2009AP775.pdr 
 
8 
 
various prohibited practices:  Wis. Stat. § 133.03 (unlawful 
contracts; 
conspiracies), 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 133.04 
(price 
discrimination; intent to destroy competition), Wis. Stat. 
§ 133.05 (secret rebates; unfair trade practices) and Wis. Stat. 
§ 133.06 (interlocking directorates).  Third, ch. 133 provides 
for discovery in regard to alleged violations.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 133.13.  Fourth, remedies are established for contraventions 
of ch. 133:  Wis. Stat. § 133.14 (illegal contracts are void); 
Wis. Stat. § 133.16 (injunctive relief, temporary and permanent, 
and attorney fees may be accorded); and Wis. Stat. § 133.18 
(damages and attorney fees are available).   
¶71 The enforcement of a claim for relief due to an 
alleged restraint of trade by contract has been specifically 
provided for by the legislature in Wis. Stat. § 133.03(1).  Not 
only is such a claim proscribed, but the legislature has 
specified various types of relief that a court can award.  See 
e.g., Wis. Stat. § 133.14 (illegal contracts are void); Wis. 
Stat. § 133.16 (injunctive relief, temporary and permanent, and 
attorney fees may be accorded); and Wis. Stat. § 133.18 (damages 
and attorney fees are available).  Accordingly, I conclude that 
E-Z's § 133.03(1) claim is part of a specific statutory scheme 
No.  2009AP775.pdr 
 
9 
 
and therefore, it satisfies the first part of the requisite test 
for an exception to the directives of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1).6 
b.  Preference for prompt resolution 
¶72 The next step is to assess whether enforcement of Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(1) would contravene a legislative preference for 
prompt resolution of ch. 133 claims.  Wisconsin Stat. § 133.18 
assists me in this assessment.  Section 133.18(5) requires that 
"[e]ach civil action under this chapter and each motion or other 
proceeding in such action shall be expedited in every way and 
                                                 
6 In concluding that ch. 133 contains a specific statutory 
scheme, the court of appeals relied on Gillen v. City of Neenah, 
219 Wis. 2d 806, 580 N.W.2d 628 (1998).  E-Z Roll Off, LLC v. 
Cnty. of Oneida, 2010 WI App 76, ¶18, 325 Wis. 2d 423, 785 
N.W.2d 645.  The majority opinion concludes that the reasoning 
of Gillen is "instructive," yet "inapplicable to the present 
case."  Majority op., ¶28.  In so concluding, the majority 
states that "[i]n contrast to the plaintiffs in Gillen, E-Z does 
not seek immediate injunctive relief under Wis. Stat. § 133.16.  
Rather, E-Z seeks declaratory relief and damages under Wis. 
Stat. § 133.18."  Id.  However, the distinction between the 
remedy sought by the plaintiffs in Gillen and the remedy E-Z 
sought in its complaint is not relevant to the determination of 
whether ch. 133 comprises a specific statutory scheme.  Surely, 
a specific statutory scheme can include more than one section of 
a 
chapter. 
 
Here, 
the 
entirety 
of 
ch. 
133 
addresses 
anticompetitive conduct.  The scheme is quite specific and quite 
comprehensive.  Stated otherwise, the statutory scheme includes 
several statutory sections. 
Furthermore, 
by 
considering 
only 
a 
single 
statutory 
section, specifically Wis. Stat. § 133.18, rather than the 
entire statutory scheme set out in ch. 133 that proscribes 
anticompetitive conduct, the majority's focus is too narrow.  
For example, a Wis. Stat. § 133.03(1) claimant could seek both 
damages 
under 
§ 133.18 
and 
a 
temporary 
and/or 
permanent 
injunction under Wis. Stat. § 133.16.  Under the majority's 
reasoning, would that ch. 133 claim be an exception to the 
notice of claim provisions of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) given our 
decision in Gillen? 
No.  2009AP775.pdr 
 
10 
 
shall be heard at the earliest practicable date."  However, 
Oneida County has 120 days after the filing of a notice of claim 
under § 893.80(1) to respond to a contention that it has entered 
into an illegal contract in restraint of trade.  This time lag 
is in conflict with "expedited" procedures that the legislature 
has chosen for ch. 133 claims.  
¶73 Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 133.16 provides for both 
temporary and permanent injunctive relief.  It directs, "pending 
the filing of the answer . . . [a court] may, at any time, upon 
proper 
notice, 
make 
such 
temporary 
restraining 
order 
or 
prohibition as is just."  We have noted that a statutory scheme 
that provides for immediate injunctive relief is inconsistent 
with Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)'s requirements.  Gillen, 219 Wis. 2d 
at 822.  A party bringing a claim pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 133.03(1) has a statutory right to seek temporary and 
permanent injunctive relief.  Requiring a party to wait 120 days 
before being able to use the statutory remedies that the 
legislature set out would be contrary to the legislature's 
stated purpose that ch. 133 "be interpreted in a manner which 
gives the most liberal construction to achieve the aim of 
competition."  Wis. Stat. § 133.01.  Accordingly, I conclude 
that E-Z has satisfied the second part of the requisite test for 
an exception to the directives of § 893.80(1).   
c.  Purposes underlying Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)  
¶74 The third part of the test for assessing a claimed 
exception to the directives of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) is whether 
the purposes underlying § 893.80(1) would be furthered by 
No.  2009AP775.pdr 
 
11 
 
requiring that a notice of claim be filed.  The purposes 
underlying § 893.80(1) are to permit timely investigation of 
claims so that the facts are not stale and to facilitate 
settlement of those that are meritorious.  Thorp v. Town of 
Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, ¶¶23, 28, 235 Wis. 2d 610, 612 N.W.2d 59. 
However, as a party to the contract that E-Z alleges is in 
restraint of trade, little investigation would be needed by 
Oneida County, and settlement appears unlikely.   
¶75 In addition, in this step, it is worth noting that 
Wis. Stat. § 133.18(4) provides, "A cause of action arising 
under this chapter does not accrue until the discovery, by the 
aggrieved person, of the facts constituting the cause of 
action."  The circuit court concluded that the "event" that 
gives rise to the obligation to give notice within 120 days is 
the June 2003 signing of the contract between Waste Management 
and Oneida County.7  However, E-Z did not learn of the $5.25 
tipping fee that Waste Management was awarded as part of that 
contract until February 2004.  Therefore, by the time E-Z had 
knowledge of the facts giving rise to its ch. 133 claim, 120 
days had long since passed, if the circuit court is correct 
about the event leading to the notice of claim requirement.  
Stated otherwise, Oneida County could not timely investigate a 
                                                 
7 The majority concludes that it does not need to determine 
what "event" gave rise to the obligation to give notice, and 
consequently when the cause of action began to accrue.  The 
majority so concludes because even if it accepted E-Z's argument 
that the cause of action did not accrue until it learned of the 
agreement in February, 2004, more than 120 days passed between 
when the cause accrued and E-Z's filing of the notice of claim 
in September 2005.  Majority op., ¶43. 
No.  2009AP775.pdr 
 
12 
 
claim E-Z did not know it had.  That is what is alleged to have 
happened here.8   
¶76 Furthermore, if Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) were applied to 
E-Z's claim, it never could have employed the statutes that the 
legislature enacted to promote competition and to restrict 
restraints of trade.  A defendant could simply say that the 
complaining party learned of the violation too late and as a 
result, the defendant is not required to do anything about it.  
Surely, that is not what the legislature sought to achieve 
either under § 893.80(1) or ch. 133. 
¶77 Therefore, I conclude that E-Z has satisfied the third 
part of the requisite test for an exception to the directives of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1).  Accordingly, I conclude that E-Z's Wis. 
Stat. § 133.03(1) claim is excepted from § 893.80(1)'s notice 
requirements. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶78 I conclude that E-Z makes a restraint of trade claim 
under ch. 133 of the Wisconsin Statutes that meets the three-
part test for an exception to the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(1):  (1) ch. 133 provides a specific statutory scheme 
for the identification and resolution of claims; (2) compliance 
with § 893.80(1) would hinder the legislature's preference for 
prompt action on ch. 133 claims; and (3) the purposes for which 
                                                 
8 Although Oneida County implies that this may not be an 
accurate statement of fact, on a motion for summary judgment the 
facts are construed to favor the non-moving party.  DeHart v. 
Wis. Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI 91, ¶7, 302 Wis. 2d 564, 734 N.W.2d 
394.   
No.  2009AP775.pdr 
 
13 
 
§ 893.80(1) was enacted would not be furthered by requiring a 
notice of claim to be filed for ch. 133 claims.  Accordingly, I 
would affirm the court of appeals and I respectfully dissent 
from the majority opinion. 
¶79 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2009AP775.pdr 
 
 
 
1