Case Title: State ex rel. Shockley v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2006-Ohio-6502

Docket Number: 20052265

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-12-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Shockley v. Indus. Comm., 112 Ohio St.3d 81, 2006-Ohio-6502.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. SHOCKLEY, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Shockley v. Indus. Comm., 112 Ohio St.3d 81, 2006-Ohio-
6502.] 
Workers’ compensation — Recalculation of average weekly wage under the 
“special circumstances” provision of R.C. 4123.61 — Court of appeals’ 
judgment affirmed on the authority of State ex rel. Stevens v. Indus. 
Comm. 
(No. 2005-2265 — Submitted September 20, 2006 – Decided  
December 27, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 05AP-48, 2005 -Ohio-5706. 
__________________ 
{¶ 1} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed on the authority 
of State ex rel. Stevens v. Indus. Comm., 110 Ohio St.3d 32, 2006-Ohio-3456, 850 
N.E.2d 55. 
 
MOYER, C.J., LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 2} I wholeheartedly agree with the sentiments expressed in Justice 
Pfeifer’s dissent.  With the decision in State ex rel. Stevens v. Indus. Comm., 110 
Ohio St.3d 32, 2006-Ohio-3456, 850 N.E.2d 55, a majority of this court 
unjustifiably overruled well-reasoned precedents.  The holding in Stevens is 
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detrimental to all disabled workers who are now subject to its terms.  Would it be 
so terrible if such workers actually were treated fairly? 
{¶ 3} How refreshing it would be if the next scandal associated with the 
Bureau of Workers’ Compensation involved excessive payments to disabled 
workers.  Better that than to continue wasting funds on unsound investments and 
expensive dinners while disabled laborers are forced to subsist on boiled potato 
soup. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 4} R.C. 4123.61 states that “where there are special circumstances 
under which the average weekly wage cannot justly be determined by applying 
this section, the administrator * * *  shall use such method as will enable the 
administrator to do substantial justice to the claimants.”  Despite R.C. 4123.95, 
which provides that R.C. 4123.61 “shall be liberally construed in favor of 
employees,” this court recently narrowly construed R.C. 4123.61 as prohibiting 
claimants from showing that “a natural increase in wages over the course of an 
employee’s career” can ever be a special circumstance.  State ex rel. Stevens v. 
Indus. Comm., 110 Ohio St.3d 32, 2006-Ohio-3456, 850 N.E.2d 55, at ¶6. 
{¶ 5} In narrowly construing R.C. 4123.61, the court did little more than 
provide itself with an convenient way to say “no” to disabled workers.  Now 
when a claimant seeks relief on these grounds, the court can simply say “denied, 
see Stevens,” without the bother of reviewing the case to see whether an injustice 
has been done.  So much for a liberal application of R.C. 4123.61. 
{¶ 6} The Stevens opinion was issued per curiam, even though it effected 
a significant policy change by reversing a unanimous decision of this court that 
was less than eight years old.  Though Justice Resnick’s dissent (which I joined) 
cogently addressed the most substantial flaw of the Stevens rationale, id. at ¶ 15-
January Term, 2006 
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19, I find it necessary to revisit a couple of other issues because the Stevens 
opinion is so flawed, conclusory, and insubstantial. 
{¶ 7} The Stevens majority appeared to believe that R.C. 4123.61 applies 
when the average weekly wage cannot be determined.  It doesn’t.  R.C. 4123.61 
applies when “the average weekly wage cannot justly be determined.”  There is a 
significant difference between the two clauses, a difference, we must assume, that 
the General Assembly specifically intended.  R.C. 4123.61 also states that when 
the administrator acts pursuant to R.C. 4123.61, he is “to do substantial justice to 
the claimants.”  Twice the General Assembly purposely used a form of the term 
“just.”  The Stevens majority ignored both references, apparently not finding it 
important enough to discuss.  It is not possible to properly interpret, let alone 
“liberally” construe, R.C. 4123.61 while ignoring such significant terms.  Stevens 
was wrongly decided, and I would use this opportunity to revisit and reverse it. 
{¶ 8} This court, however, cannot reverse itself, because as narrow, 
inequitable, and wrong as the Stevens decision is, it has the dubious virtue of 
being easy to apply.  Whenever a court-imposed interpretation of the law is easy 
to apply, it doesn’t matter how wrong or inequitable it is according to Westfield 
Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, it can 
never be overturned by this court.  Though Galatis is widely known as an 
insurance case, its long-term import is the extent to which it seeks to limit this 
court’s ability to reconsider its own reasoning.  This court exists to provide 
substantial justice to the parties before it and should never bind itself in Gordian 
knots.  The majority compounds the mistake today by relying on Stevens, which 
so perfunctorily discarded the unanimous State ex rel. Lemke v. Brush Wellman, 
Inc. (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 161, 702 N.E.2d 420.  See Stevens, 110 Ohio St.3d 32, 
2006-Ohio-3456, 850 N.E.2d 55, ¶ 1. 
{¶ 9} What a pity that this court refuses to even consider the plea of the 
permanently disabled Stella Shockley.  Shockley is before us making the rather 
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unremarkable argument that her workers’ compensation disability benefits should 
reflect her increased earnings.  See State ex rel. Wireman v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 
49 Ohio St.3d 286, 287, 551 N.E.2d 1265; State ex rel. Price v. Cent. Servs., Inc., 
97 Ohio St.3d 245, 2002-Ohio-6397, 779 N.E.2d 195, at ¶ 17.  When Shockley 
was initially injured in 1982, her average weekly wage was $171.77.  Admirably, 
she continued working despite increasingly severe lower back pain until 1999, 
and shortly thereafter had back surgery.  That surgery was unsuccessful, and 
Shockley was granted compensation for permanent total disability in 2001.  
Shockley is seeking an award for permanent total disability of $304.55 per week, 
which is two thirds of her final average weekly wage of $456.33.  It is unjust to 
grant a weekly permanent total disability award of $149 based on Shockley’s 
earnings in 1982.  Pursuant to the statutory mandate of R.C. 4123.95, I would 
liberally construe the special-circumstances provision of R.C. 4123.61 and grant 
an award based on Shockley’s final average weekly wage. 
{¶ 10} Is there a reason for the great state of Ohio to treat its disabled 
workers in such an unseemly manner?  The General Assembly doesn’t think so.  
It enacted the special-circumstances provision and mandated a liberal construction 
in favor of claimants to protect people like Shockley.  It could not have foreseen 
the vacuous parsimony of this court.  I dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Agee, Clymer, Mitchell & Laret and Robert M. Robinson, for appellant. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., and Christopher C. Russell, for 
appellee Kauffman-Lattimer. 
__________________