Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DRIVER'S LICENSE ACTION INVOLVING JOSEPH H. HITTNER: JOSEPH H. HITTNER V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0262

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DRIVER'S LICENSE ACTION INVOLVING JOSEPH H. HITTNER: JOSEPH H. HITTNER V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING2008 WY 91189 P.3d 872Case Number: S-07-0262Decided: 08/01/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DRIVER'S LICENSE ACTION 
INVOLVING JOSEPH H. HITTNER: JOSEPH H. 
HITTNER,Appellant(Petitioner),v.STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMINGDEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Frank 
R. Chapman and Tamara K. Schroeder of Chapman Valdez, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General and Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Joseph 
H. Hittner (Hittner), seeks review of an order of the district court, which 
affirmed orders of the Office of Administrative Hearings upholding the "implied 
consent" suspension of Hittner's driver's license and upholding Hittner's 
commercial vehicle disqualification, as imposed by the Wyoming Department of 
Transportation (WYDOT).  WYDOT's 
orders were based on the circumstance that Hittner refused to submit to required 
chemical testing when, on March 22, 2006, he was arrested for driving while 
under the influence of alcohol as prohibited by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b) 
(LexisNexis 2007).  Hittner argues 
in this appeal that the arresting officer had a duty to inform him that he had no right to consult with an 
attorney prior to submitting to chemical testing and the arresting officer 
failed to do that.  In addition, he 
claims the hearing officer's conclusion that Hittner "refused" chemical testing 
is not supported by substantial evidence.  
We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Hittner posits 
this statement of the issues on appeal:

 
 
I.  Did 
the hearing examiner err in finding that the Wyoming Department of 
Transportation has met its burden of proof by [proving] all elements necessary 
to uphold an implied consent suspension pursuant to W.S. § 31-6-101 et seq. by a 
preponderance of the evidence?

            
A.  The hearing examiner and the district court erred as a 
matter of law by concluding that the arresting officer had no duty to 
inform [Hittner] that he had no right 
to consult an attorney prior to submitting to chemical 
testing.

            
B.  The hearing examiner erred by finding that [Hittner] 
refused chemical testing.

 
 
The 
State reformulates the issues this way:

 
 
Did 
the district court correctly affirm the hearing officer's finding that the 
[arresting] officer did not err in failing to inform the driver he was not 
entitled to an attorney?

 
 
Did 
the district court correctly affirm the hearing examiner's finding that 
[Hittner] refused the chemical test?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      Hittner was 
observed by a sheriff's deputy driving westbound on I-80, between T-Joe's 
Restaurant near Archer and Cheyenne, at 7:50 p.m. on March 22, 2006.  Hittner was traveling at approximately 
85 miles per hour and crossed the fog line at least three times.  The deputy attempted to stop him by 
activating her emergency lights, but Hittner failed to stop for three minutes, 
traveling at 80 miles per hour, changing lanes, and applying his brakes over the 
course of approximately two miles.  
For this reason, the deputy considered Hittner's conduct to constitute an 
attempt to elude a police officer.  
Hittner had an open beer container in the console of his car, and he 
appeared to be intoxicated.  The 
deputy stopped Hittner at 7:53 p.m.  
His breath exuded a moderate odor of alcoholic beverage.  His face was flushed and ruddy.  His speech was slurred.  His balance was described as swaying and 
stumbling.  His attitude was 
sarcastic and he had no apparent handicaps.  Hittner initially indicated that he was 
not taking any medications, but later said that he was on heavy medication for 
the flu and his lungs.  The deputy 
sheriff placed Hittner under arrest at 8:12 p.m.

 
 
[¶4]      Upon his arrest, 
Hittner was handcuffed for officer safety because he had attempted to elude the 
deputy.  Standard field sobriety 
tests were not performed because Hittner was handcuffed and generally 
uncooperative and argumentative.  
Hittner claimed he was unable to look into the deputy's flashlight so 
that the horizontal gaze nystagmus test could be performed.  The deputy's report indicated that the 
Wyoming 
implied consent advisement was read to Hittner at 8:13 p.m. and that he agreed 
to take a chemical breath test.  He 
gave an initial sample which revealed a BAC of .14.  Thereafter, Hittner "refused" to give an 
additional, confirmatory sample.1  The deputy's report indicates that after 
several attempts, Hittner failed to blow/provide a sufficient sample, and that 
he was sucking on the plastic mouthpiece and not following her directions.  Her report also stated that Hittner told 
her that he could not blow hard enough because he was sick and on 
medication.  Hittner smelled of 
alcohol and admitted to having three beers.  One half-full container of beer was 
found on the center console of Hittner's car.  He admitted to coming from the bar 
(T-Joe's).  He also admitted to 
taking medications, all of which had a warning sticker "DO NOT USE WITH 
ALCOHOL."  The medications were 
Cymbalta, Alprazolam, Skelaxin and Celebrex.

 
 
[¶5]      Wyoming's implied consent 
laws are found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-6-101 through 31-6-108 (LexisNexis 2007) 
(some portions of those statutes were amended after the date of Hittner's 
offense, but none of those amendments are pertinent to this appeal).  We set out a portion of § 31-6-102 
because it contains the part of that act which is most directly pertinent to the 
issues raised in this appeal:

 
 
§ 
31-6-102. Test to determine alcoholic or controlled substance content of blood; 
suspension of license.

 
 
            
(a)  If arrested for an offense as defined by W.S. 
31-5-233:

                        
(i)  Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of 
a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway in this state is deemed to have 
given consent, subject to the provisions of this act, to a chemical test or 
tests of his blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol 
concentration or controlled substance content of his blood.  The test or tests shall 
be:

                                    
(A)  Incidental to a lawful arrest;

                                    
(B)  Given as promptly as possible after the 
arrest;

                                    
(C)  Administered at the direction of a peace officer who has 
probable cause to believe the person was driving or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway in this state in violation of 
W.S. 31-5-233(b) or any other law prohibiting driving under the influence as 
defined by W.S. 31-5-233(a)(v).  The 
peace officer who requires a test for alcohol concentration pursuant to this 
section may direct that the test shall be of blood, breath or urine.  However, if the officer directs that the 
test be of the person's blood or urine, the person may choose whether the test 
shall be of blood or urine.  The 
person shall not have the option if the peace officer has probable cause to 
believe there is impairment by a controlled substance which is not subject to 
testing by a breath test in which case a blood or urine test may be required, as 
directed by the peace officer.

                        
(ii)  For tests required under this act, the arrested person 
shall be advised that:

                                    
(A)  His failure to submit to all required chemical tests 
requested by the peace officer shall result in the suspension of his Wyoming 
driver's license or his privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a period of six 
(6) months for a first offense or eighteen (18) months for a second or 
subsequent offense as provided by W.S. 31-6-107;

                                    
(B)  If a test is taken and the results indicate the person is 
under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, he may be subject to 
criminal penalties and his Wyoming driver's license or his privilege to operate 
a motor vehicle shall be suspended for ninety (90) days;

                                    
(C)  After submitting to all required chemical tests requested 
by the peace officer at a place and in a manner prescribed by and at the expense 
of the agency employing the peace officer, the arrested person may go to the 
nearest hospital or clinic and secure any additional tests at his own 
expense;

                                    
(D)  If he refuses to take all required tests, he shall not be 
eligible for limited driving privileges.

 
 
Also 
see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-307 (LexisNexis 2007).

 
 
[¶6]      In addition, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-7-305(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2007) provides:

 
 

(a)  Any 
person is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of 
not less than one (1) year if convicted of a first violation arising from 
separate incidents of:

                        
(i)  Driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance to a degree which 
renders him incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle;

                        
(ii)  Driving or in actual physical control of a commercial 
motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration of the person's blood, breath or 
other bodily substance is four one-hundredths of one percent (0.04%) or 
more;

                        
(iii)  Knowingly and willfully leaving the scene of an accident 
involving a motor vehicle driven by the person;

                        
(iv)  Using a motor vehicle in the commission of any 
felony;

                        
(v)  Refusal to submit 
to a test to determine the driver's alcohol concentration while driving or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle;

                        
(vi)  Driving a commercial vehicle when, as a result of prior 
convictions, the driver's driving privileges are cancelled, suspended or 
revoked, or the driver is disqualified from operating a commercial motor 
vehicle; or

                        
(vii)  Causing a fatality through the negligent operation of a 
commercial vehicle, including but not limited to homicide by motor vehicle, 
negligent homicide, motor vehicle manslaughter or a similar local ordinance or 
similar state law from another jurisdiction.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶7]      Because Hittner 
was deemed to have refused a chemical test as required by the implied consent 
statutes, he received two notices from WYDOT, under the date of March 28, 
2006.  One informed him that his commercial driver's license was 
"disqualified/cancelled." The second informed him that his driver's license was 
suspended.  As was his right, 
Hittner sought an evidentiary, contested case hearing as to both 
matters.

 
 
[¶8]      Hittner's hearing 
was held on June 21, 2006.  He 
appeared by telephone and gave testimony.2  WYDOT did not appear, but submitted its 
certified record for the hearing officer's consideration.3  Hittner did not subpoena any witnesses, 
including the arresting officer whose report he wished to impeach.  See State Department of Revenue and Taxation v. 
Hull, 751 P.2d 351, 352-57 (Wyo. 1988) (the affected driver has the right 
and the obligation to subpoena such witnesses).  The hearing officer upheld both of 
WYDOT's actions.

 
 
[¶9]      Although these 
matters were separated for purposes of disposition, we will summarize the 
hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law as though those two 
sets of findings comprise a single document.  From the perspective of WYDOT, the 
hearing officer found the facts to be precisely as we have set them out above, 
and all of that information came from 
the arresting officer's report.  In 
his testimony, Hittner claimed that he did not believe he had violated any 
traffic laws, and the only reason he did not immediately pull over was because 
he did not think his was the vehicle the deputy intended to stop.  He claimed the arresting officer treated 
him unprofessionally and unfairly.  
Hittner testified that he has some hearing loss and tends to speak 
loudly, which the arresting officer mistook as being yelling and 
argumentative.  He also contended 
that he could not properly follow the instructions for the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus test because he was facing the spotlight on her car.  Three individuals who were with him at 
T-Joe's, or observed him at T-Joe's, wrote letters on Hittner's behalf 
indicating that they did not perceive him to be intoxicated or impaired when he 
left that establishment.  Hittner 
claimed he was not told by the arresting officer that he did not have a right to 
consult with an attorney before taking the breath test, or of the consequences 
of refusing such a test on his commercial driver's license.  Hittner submitted a report from his 
treating physician indicating that he was being treated for low back pain and 
that he was taking medication for it (the report lists Celexa, Xanax, and 
Celebrex).  In his telephonic 
testimony, Hittner claimed that he was taking Baxil to treat his pneumonia.  He claimed that he had great difficulty 
in breathing at that time and that he told the arresting officer about that 
problem.  He claimed he blew in the 
testing device to the best of his ability.  
However, that factor was not corroborated by his medical 
documentation.  Hittner also 
submitted evidence that he had entered pleas of guilty to attempting to elude (§ 
31-5-225(a)), open container (§ 31-5-235), and failure to maintain single lane 
of travel/crossing the fog line (§ 31-5-209).  The DWUI charge 
(§ 31-5-233(b)(ii)(A)) was dismissed without prejudice for a period of 
three years, and the State reserved the right to refile the charge if Hittner 
was convicted of a similar such charge during that three-year period.  The hearing officer rejected Hittner's 
protestations and found the facts to be as presented in the arresting officer's 
report.

 
 
[¶10]   Hittner then further appealed, 
filing a petition for review under W.R.A.P. 12 in the district court.  The district court affirmed the hearing 
officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law along the same lines as the 
hearing officer.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   The applicable standard of review 
is set out in detail in Dale v. S & S 
Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶¶ 8-27, ___ P.3d ___, ____ (Wyo. 
2008).  In this case, the review 
standard is straight forward.  We 
give no deference to the district court's order affirming the hearing examiner, 
and we peruse the record before the hearing examiner to ascertain whether there 
is substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's findings of fact.  We review conclusions of law de novo.

 
 
Duty 
to Inform Hittner That He Had No Right to Consult With Attorney Before Breath 
Test

 
 
[¶12]   Hittner asserts that we must 
reverse the district court's and the hearing examiner's orders because the 
arresting officer failed to inform 
Hittner that he had no right to consult with an attorney before taking the 
breath test.  This contention rests 
on our holding in Nesius v. State 
Department of Revenue and Taxation, 791 P.2d 939, 943-44 (Wyo. 1990).  There, we said:

 
 
We 
continue to adhere to our previous ruling:

 
 
[I]f 
the arrested person is reasonably informed of his rights, duties and obligations 
under our implied consent law and he is neither tricked nor misled into thinking 
he has no right to refuse the test to determine the alcohol content in his 
blood, urine or breath, the test will generally be held 
admissible.

 
 

Olson 
v. State, 
698 P.2d 107, 113 (Wyo.1985).

 
 
            
Our ruling, today, is simply this:  
In an attempt to prevent future claims of "confusion," police officers, 
whether or not they give a Miranda warning to the individual, should4 include a brief statement 
that the individual has no right to an attorney before taking a chemical 
test.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
[¶13]   Hittner claims there is nothing in 
the record to support a finding that the warning "required" by Nesius was given by the arresting 
officer.  No issue has been raised 
in this case concerning Miranda 
warnings.

 
 
[¶14]   Of central importance here, 
Hittner's contention is belied by his testimony at the administrative 
hearing.  There, he stated that he 
was told he could not contact an attorney.  
Moreover, the arresting officer indicated that the implied consent 
advisement was read to Hittner.  
Thus, we are presented with a situation in which the hearing officer had 
to determine the credibility of the two competing witnesses, and we will not 
second guess that judgment under the substantial evidence standard of 
review.

 
 
[¶15]   In conclusion, we hold that there 
is substantial evidence in the record to sustain a conclusion that Hittner was 
given complete implied consent advisements and most assuredly that he was not 
misled in any way about what his rights were.

 
 
Refusal 
of Test

 
 
[¶16]   Hittner claims that he did not 
refuse the second breath test; he was just physically unable to do the 
procedures required of him because of ill health.  Once again, we must employ the 
substantial evidence test in its purest form.  We have carefully examined the record 
with respect to this issue.  
Hittner's argument is not preposterous by any means, but it only serves 
to contradict the arresting officer's view of the circumstances of Hittner's 
March 22, 2006 arrest for DWUI and the subsequent breath testing.  The hearing officer found that the 
arresting officer's evidence was more credible than that given by Hittner and we 
cannot, and will not, second guess that factual finding.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   The district court's order, 
affirming the hearing officer's orders with respect to Hittner's driver's 
licenses, is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1No issue is 
raised in this regard, but for purposes of background we note that the rules and 
regulations of the Wyoming Department of Health require that duplicate breath 
specimens must be analyzed and if those tests are not within the prescribed 
ranges, a third test must be given.  
7 Weil's Code of Wyoming Rules, Department of Health Chemical Analysis of 
Blood Alcohol, Standards for Chemical Analysis of Blood Alcohol Testing, Chapter 
III, Procedures for Analysis, Section 1, Procedural controls, 048-055-011-3 and 
011-4 (2004).

 
 

2A formal 
transcript of the hearing was not created.  
The hearing was tape-recorded rather than reported.  A transcript of the tape recording was 
created by Hittner and attached to his brief in the district court.  No objection was raised about the 
"transcript" either in the district court or in this appeal.  Indeed, the State relied on the 
informal transcript to support its 
arguments.  So that no misunderstanding is created 
about such a transcript, we note that this method of proceeding is not 
authorized by the governing rules and could serve as grounds for not considering 
such a transcript as part of the record on appeal.

 
 

3We have held 
that WYDOT may defend such cases in that manner, but we question whether it is 
still a prudent method, given changes in both the law and established procedures 
since that line of decisions was published.  See Drake v. State ex rel. Department of Revenue 
and Taxation, 751 P.2d 1319, 1321-23 (Wyo. 
1988); and see Nesius v. State Department 
of Revenue and Taxation, 791 P.2d 939, 944-45 (Wyo. 1990) (dissenting 
opinion). 

 
 

4Although the 
question is not clearly joined and, thus, we will not specifically address it 
here, "should" generally connotes that the directive "ought" to be done, but not 
necessarily that it "must" be done.  
See "should," Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 2104 
(1986).