Case Title: People v. Salazar

Citation: 

Docket Number: S077524

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
SEE CONCURRING OPINION 
 
Filed 5/26/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S077524 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
MAGDALENO SALAZAR, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BA081564 
 
____________________________________) 
 
A jury convicted defendant Magdaleno Salazar of the first degree murder of 
Enrique Guevara, with personal use of a firearm.1  Defendant admitted the truth of 
a special circumstance allegation that he had a prior murder conviction.  After a 
penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death, and the court imposed that 
sentence.  We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
 
1.  Prosecution 
Around 2:30 a.m. on July 25, 1993, Kathy Mendez and her friend Cynthia 
Bonilla were at a Jack in the Box restaurant.  They met defendant, whom Mendez 
                                              
1  
Penal Code sections 187, subdivision (a) and 12022.5, subdivision (a).  
Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
The jury also made a finding under section 12022, subdivision (a)(1) that a 
principal was armed with a firearm when the murder was committed. 
2 
 
knew as ―Toy,‖ and Enrique Echeverria, whom she knew as ―Rascal.‖  Mendez, 
defendant, and Echeverria were all members of the Harpys gang, based in 
southwest Los Angeles.  Defendant drove the four of them to another restaurant, 
the Yoshinoya Beef Bowl, at the corner of Figueroa and 30th Streets.  The Beef 
Bowl was on the fringe of Harpys territory, and was sometimes frequented by 
members of other gangs. 
Mendez, defendant, and Echeverria were the only Harpys gang members 
present in the Beef Bowl.  Defendant was wearing a white shirt and Echeverria a 
black one.  Mendez heard the men say they needed to ―take care of the 
neighborhood,‖ and should not be ―caught slipping.‖  This meant they intended to 
control the Beef Bowl as gang territory, and not be caught unaware by rival gang 
members. 
Two other customers testified that they were approached in the Beef Bowl  
that night and ―hit up‖ by gang members asking where they were from, a way of 
seeking their gang identification.  Arnold Lemus said he was eating with two 
friends when ―some guys came over and they hit us up.‖  The man doing the 
talking was wearing a white shirt.  Lemus told him that he and his friends were a 
―party crew,‖ meaning a group that hung out together and went to parties.  The 
man in the white shirt ―thr[ew] out‖ the name ―Harpys,‖ to which Lemus 
responded ―it was cool, because I didn‘t have nothing against nobody like that.‖  
Juan Salazar, one of Lemus‘s companions, had difficulty remembering on the 
witness stand.  In a statement to police at the time of the events, he had said that 
one of the people who approached them was wearing a white shirt and looked like 
a gang member.  At trial, he recalled only that one of the men ―hit [Lemus] up,‖ 
asking ―where we from,‖ meaning ―what neighborhood are you from, what gang.‖ 
While Mendez waited in a line of customers, defendant and Echeverria left 
the restaurant and stood just outside.  As the door opened, Mendez heard 
3 
 
defendant tell Echeverria to get the ―cuete,‖ a slang term for a gun.  Echeverria 
retrieved something from the car and put it in his waistband.  Mendez then saw a 
man walk past the Beef Bowl.  He was shirtless, had a cast on his leg, and to 
Mendez he looked like a gang member.  Defendant and Echeverria confronted this 
man in front of the Beef Bowl and began wrestling with him.  The front of the 
restaurant was glass from floor to ceiling.  Mendez heard gunshots, and saw 
defendant shooting in the direction of the café next door, the Au Rendezvous.  She 
threw herself to the floor.  There were ―a lot of shots,‖ maybe eight or nine. 
When the shooting stopped, Mendez went outside.  Defendant was half-
carrying Echeverria toward the car.  Drops of blood marked their path.  Defendant 
was holding what looked like a 9 millimeter pistol.  He helped Echeverria into the 
car and drove away.  Mendez went into the Au Rendezvous, where the man with 
the cast on his leg was lying face down.  There was a lot of blood. 
Emilio Antelo was the Beef Bowl security guard.  He was standing outside, 
between the Beef Bowl and the Au Rendezvous, when a car pulled up and parked.  
A teenaged passenger got out and entered the Beef Bowl.  As the driver 
approached, Antelo prepared to stop him because Beef Bowl policy required 
customers to wear shirts.  Antelo then heard a ―metallic sound,‖ turned, and saw a 
man cocking a pistol.  The gunman walked past Antelo and toward the shirtless 
man.  Antelo heard another pistol being cocked, and saw a second gunman 
approach the shirtless man, who appeared to be unarmed.  Both guns were 
semiautomatic pistols.  All three men were Hispanic.  The gunmen said something 
to the other man, which Antelo could not understand.  Antelo went inside the Beef 
Bowl, and heard gunfire.  When the shooting stopped, he told the cook to call the 
police, went outside, and saw the shirtless man on the ground. 
A third eyewitness, Patrick Turner, was walking past the Beef Bowl on his 
way to the Au Rendezvous.  Turner had great difficulty recalling the events; most 
4 
 
of his testimony was reconstructed from his statement to police at the scene.  He 
saw a small car drive up and park.  The passenger went into the Beef Bowl, but the 
driver was confronted by two men, one wearing a white shirt and the other a black 
one.  They asked him, ―don‘t I know you from somewhere?‖  The three began 
―arguing and scuffling.‖  They wrestled with each other, moving into the Au 
Rendezvous.  The man in the black shirt stood in the doorway shooting.  He and 
the man in white, who was limping, then went to a car and drove off.  The black-
shirted man was in the driver‘s seat. 
The victim was Enrique Guevara.  His cousin, Giovanni Guevara, was with 
him on the night of the shooting but had succumbed to a fatal disease by the time 
of trial.  The parties stipulated that Giovanni would have testified as follows:  
When he and his cousin went to the Beef Bowl, Enrique was not wearing a shirt 
and had a cast on his leg.  Enrique parked the car in front of the Au Rendezvous.  
As Giovanni entered the Beef Bowl, he saw ―two gangster-looking guys.‖  
Moments later he heard gunshots, but did not see who was shooting.  He was told 
his cousin had been shot to death. 
Sabino Nungaray, a Harpys gang member, testified that around 3:00 on the 
morning in question, defendant knocked on his door and told him that Echeverria 
had been shot.  Nungaray went with them to a hospital.  As he helped Echeverria 
into the building, defendant drove away. 
Fifteen bullet casings were recovered, both inside and outside the Au 
Rendezvous.  Twelve were 9 millimeter, fired from the same gun, and three were 
.25 caliber, fired from another weapon.  Guevara had been shot nine times, in the 
chest, the back, the tops of both shoulders, the back of the head, the neck, the back 
of the upper arm, the forearm, and the hand.  There was no soot or stippling 
around the wounds, indicating that they were inflicted from a distance of greater 
5 
 
than two feet.  Three of the bullet fragments recovered from Guevara‘s body were 
from a 9 millimeter weapon.  Six others could not be assigned a caliber. 
 
2.  Defense 
Echeverria testified for the defense.  He told the jury that he had shot and 
killed Guevara, had been convicted of the killing, and was currently in prison.  He 
said he and defendant were standing outside the Beef Bowl when a car drove by.  
The occupants were ―staring us down‖ and ―looked like gang-bangers.‖  
Echeverria went to his car, retrieved a 9 millimeter automatic, cocked it, and 
placed it in his waistband.  The other car parked, and the passenger went into the 
Beef Bowl.  Defendant followed him inside.  The driver emerged, shirtless, and 
appeared to be ―under the influence.‖  He produced a .25 caliber automatic and 
said something to Echeverria including the word ―Trece,‖ which Echeverria took 
as a gang reference.  Then the man began shooting. 
Echeverria said he was shot three times.  As he reached for his gun, his 
assailant came closer and shot him three more times.  Echeverria grappled with the 
man and fired all 14 rounds in his clip as the two wrestled.  Echeverria fell on top 
of his attacker in the Au Rendezvous.  Defendant appeared and helped him to the 
car.  Echeverria had dropped his gun, which defendant retrieved.  Defendant drove 
to Nungaray‘s house, then to the hospital. 
A defense investigator testified that during an interview in the prosecutor‘s 
office shortly before trial, Kathy Mendez had said she did not actually see anyone 
firing a gun.  Someone else had told her who was shooting.  On cross-
examination, the investigator acknowledged that Mendez said this before she was 
able to review her earlier statements.  Mendez then acknowledged that her 
memory of the events had been better when she gave those statements. 
6 
 
The parties stipulated that Guevara had gunshot residue particles on his 
hands.  Defendant admitted the special circumstance allegation that he had a prior 
conviction of first degree murder. 
B.  Penalty Phase 
 
1.  Prosecution 
The deputy district attorney who prosecuted defendant for the prior murder 
testified about the circumstances of that crime.  Defendant and two fellow Harpys 
were visiting friends when they saw a neighbor leave the apartment building.  
Believing he might be a drug dealer who had money, they decided to rob him 
when he returned.  The victim was shot and killed in the hallway.  The theory of 
the prosecution was that defendant was an aider and abettor, not the shooter. 
Guevara‘s mother and sister testified about the impact his death had on 
them. 
 
2.  Defense 
Defendant‘s mother and sister, and a longtime friend, testified on his 
behalf.  His family spoke about his affectionate nature, and their attempts to keep 
him from associating with gang members.  Defendant‘s friend said he had 
counseled her to stay away from gangs, and helped change her life. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
A.  Pretrial Issues 
 
 
1.  Use of Juvenile Murder Conviction as a Special Circumstance  
Defendant was 17 years old when he committed the prior murder, but was 
tried and convicted as an adult.  He contends the Eighth Amendment barred the 
prosecution from alleging that conviction as a special circumstance, because he 
was a juvenile at the time of the crime.  Defendant concedes in his opening brief 
that prior violent conduct by a juvenile, including murder, is properly considered 
at the penalty phase as an aggravating circumstance.  (People v. Bivert (2011) 52 
7 
 
Cal.4th 96, 122-123 (Bivert), and cases therein cited.)2  However, he notes that the 
special circumstance provided by section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2) is different 
from the aggravating factor provided by section 190.3, factor (b).  The special 
circumstance serves the narrowing function of determining eligibility for the death 
penalty, whereas the aggravating factor allows consideration of prior criminal 
activity as part of an individualized penalty determination.  (People v. Bacigalupo 
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 468-469.) 
Defendant asks us to apply the Eighth Amendment‘s ban on imposing the 
death penalty for crimes committed by juveniles, established in Roper v. Simmons 
(2005) 543 U.S. 551, to preclude the state from seeking the death penalty ―solely 
on the basis of a crime [he] committed while still a minor.‖3  The flaw in this 
argument is that defendant did not face the death penalty as punishment for the 
crime he committed as a juvenile.  He faced that penalty for murdering Guevara 
when he was an adult, having suffered a prior murder conviction.  (Cf. Bivert, 
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 123.)  ―As we have previously noted, Roper v. Simmons, 
supra, 543 U.S. 551, spoke only to the question of punishment for juvenile 
offenses . . . .‖  (Bivert, at p. 122, citing People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 
1239.)  Defendant provides no authority for the proposition that it is 
                                              
2  
In a supplemental brief, defendant argues that the Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments barred the use of his juvenile conviction as an 
aggravating circumstance.  We have long rejected that claim, and defendant fails 
to persuade us to alter our view.  (Bivert, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 122.) 
3  
Defendant also cites Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 and, in a 
supplemental brief, Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 2455].  In 
Graham, the court held that juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses cannot 
constitutionally be sentenced to life without possibility of parole.  In Miller, the 
court reached the same conclusion with regard to murders committed by juveniles.  
Neither case addresses the permissible punishment for adults, or the use of prior 
juvenile convictions as special circumstances. 
8 
 
unconstitutional to base a special circumstance on a prior conviction for a murder 
committed as a juvenile.  Adults who commit first degree murder despite having a 
previous murder conviction, whether or not the prior offense occurred when they 
were juveniles, are a distinct subclass of murderers that can ―with reliability be 
classified among the worst offenders.‖  (Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 569; see 
People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 467-468.) 
Furthermore, defendant offers no persuasive reason why it should be 
constitutional for a jury to consider a murder committed as a juvenile for the 
purpose of its penalty determination, but unconstitutional for the state to include 
convictions for such murders in the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance.  
It is true that special circumstances and aggravating factors serve different 
functions in our capital scheme, but in neither instance is the defendant being 
punished for juvenile misconduct.  In both instances, the past conduct only serves 
as a guiding consideration:  a preliminary one, as a special circumstance 
determining death eligibility for a murder committed as an adult, and an ultimate 
one, as an aggravating factor to be weighed in the final determination of the 
appropriate penalty for that murder.  In People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, we 
noted that basing an aggravating factor on a conviction for a felony committed as a 
juvenile did not amount to added punishment for the prior crime.  Rather, the jury 
was properly allowed to weigh the fact that the defendant committed the capital 
crime undeterred by his prior conviction.   (Id. at p. 257.) 
It does not violate the Eighth Amendment for the Legislature to conclude, 
as a matter of policy, that an adult who murdered as a juvenile, failed to learn from 
that experience, and killed yet again, is a person ―within the narrowed class of 
murderers for whom death would be an appropriate penalty.‖  (People v. 
Bacigalupo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 468.)  The punishment is not imposed for the 
9 
 
juvenile offense, but for the crime committed as an adult, considered in light of the 
defendant‘s criminal history. 
Defendant argues that section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2) creates an 
―unsupportable and unreliable distinction‖ between two classes of adult capital 
defendants who have previously committed murder as juveniles:  those whose 
prior murders were tried in juvenile court and those whose prior murders were 
tried in superior court.  However, he fails to support this equal protection claim 
with a showing that the classification affects similarly situated groups.  (See 
Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568 (Manduley).)  Equal 
protection principles do not foreclose the Legislature from concluding that those 
who commit a capital crime after being convicted of a juvenile murder in superior 
court are more culpable than those whose prior murder was adjudicated in juvenile 
court. 
Defendant also contends that the use of juvenile murder convictions as 
special circumstances violates the Eighth Amendment and the constitutional 
guarantees of due process and equal protection because California‘s juvenile 
transfer policies permit prosecutors and juvenile courts to exercise arbitrary 
discretion over which homicides result in murder convictions instead of juvenile 
court adjudications.  At the time of defendant‘s prior conviction, he was 
presumptively unfit for treatment under the juvenile court law, due to the serious 
nature of the charged crime.  (See Manduley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 548-549.)  In 
Manduley, reviewing subsequent changes in the governing statutes that broadened 
the circumstances in which minors over the age of 14 can be prosecuted as adults, 
and increased the discretion of prosecutors to file such proceedings, we held that 
the expanded procedures violated neither due process nor equal protection 
principles.  (Id. at pp. 562-573.)  Our reasoning applies with even greater force to 
the policies in place when defendant was prosecuted as a juvenile. 
10 
 
Defendant seeks to distinguish Manduley on the basis that it says nothing 
about the constitutionality of juvenile transfer procedures in the context of 
rendering a defendant eligible for the death penalty.  He claims that because a 
juvenile‘s culpability, maturity, and capacity for treatment and consideration as an 
adult are not individually considered in the transfer process, a resulting conviction 
may not constitutionally serve as a special circumstance.  We are not persuaded.  
The prior-murder special circumstance does not turn on the procedures underlying 
the prior conviction, but on the gravity of the conduct that is the necessary 
predicate of that conviction.  
In People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, we held that a prior murder 
committed in Texas when the defendant was 15 years old was a proper basis for a 
special circumstance finding, even though the defendant could not have been 
prosecuted as an adult in California at the time of that murder.  We noted that 
under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2), ―the focus is on the conduct, not the age or 
other personal circumstances of the person who engaged in that conduct.  It is the 
offense, and not necessarily the offender, that must satisfy statutory 
requirements . . . .‖  (Trevino, at p. 241.)  Trevino rejected the idea that ― ‗every 
time the prosecution allege[s] a murder conviction from a foreign jurisdiction, the 
trial court must determine whether the guilt ascertainment procedures of that 
jurisdiction afforded the same procedural protections as those in California.‘ ‖  (Id. 
at p. 243, quoting  People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 222.)  ―Because the 
age of the offender is not an element of first or second degree murder under 
California law, the prior-murder special circumstance may be based on a 
conviction in another jurisdiction for a crime for which the defendant could not 
have been tried as an adult in California.‖  (Trevino, at p. 244.) 
 
11 
 
Thus, the procedures for trying juveniles as adults have no bearing on 
whether a prior murder conviction qualifies as a special circumstance, so long as 
there is no constitutional infirmity in the procedures themselves.  (See Manduley, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 573 [rejecting claim that prosecutorial discretion in 
charging juveniles as adults violates equal protection clause].)  The high court‘s 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on punishment for crimes committed by 
juveniles does not speak to the question of special circumstances for crimes they 
commit later as adults.  When a murder committed by a juvenile results in an adult 
criminal conviction, there is no legal proscription against the use of that conviction 
as a special circumstance if the defendant murders a second victim after reaching 
the age of majority. 
 
 
2.  Adequacy of Voir Dire 
 
 
a.  Background 
At an early stage of the pretrial proceedings, the court brought up the 
subject of voir dire.  Defense counsel said he had a questionnaire, ―unless you 
have your own you like to use.‖  The court replied that in the absence of pretrial 
publicity, it did not find questionnaires especially helpful.  It had ―done it both 
ways,‖ but told counsel it was inclined to do the questioning itself.  The court 
invited counsel to watch it conduct such an oral voir dire in an upcoming case, 
adding that they could review the transcript if they were unable to attend.  At a 
subsequent hearing, the court reaffirmed that it would handle the voir dire.  
Defense counsel stated, ―that is fine,‖ and noted that he had sent the court a 
questionnaire that it ―might want to take a look at.‖  Counsel said, ―I am not 
strongly advocating a questionnaire, but . . . it might be helpful.‖  The case was 
continued for further pretrial discussions.  
Several weeks later, the court proposed bifurcating the special circumstance 
question from the rest of the guilt phase.  If defendant were to be convicted, the 
12 
 
special circumstance would be tried at a second phase.  For purposes of the death-
qualification voir dire, the jury would be informed of the charges against 
defendant, and told there was a special circumstance allegation, but the nature of 
that allegation would not be specified.  The court thought this was the fairest way 
to ―minimize potential prejudice‖ to defendant.  Defense counsel agreed.  The 
court then described in some detail the manner in which it would conduct voir 
dire, and asked counsel if there were any particular topics they wanted the court to 
explore.  It said it would be happy to consider any questions they submitted. 
Defense counsel objected to questioning prospective jurors in the presence 
of the other panelists.  The court observed that ―the law has been changed, as you 
know,‖ and said, ―if I feel it‘s not going well, then we‘ll reconsider.  But I‘m 
comfortable we can do it that way.‖  Counsel maintained his objection, and 
brought up the questionnaire he had submitted.  The court said it would review the 
questionnaire ―for any particular questions,‖ but was not inclined to ask the jurors 
to complete it.  Counsel lodged an objection.  
Jury selection began on January 25, 1999.  The court excused some 
panelists for hardship, personal knowledge of witnesses, or close ties to law 
enforcement.  It gave the remaining candidates a clear, detailed, and 
conversational explanation of the voir dire process and the procedures followed in 
capital cases.  It emphasized the importance of finding jurors who could be 
impartial and objective.  It urged the panelists to give true and complete answers, 
telling them that if they wanted to discuss an answer privately they could do so at 
side bar.  The court said the most important thing was for them to ―tell us what 
you think,‖ not ―what you think we want to hear.  There are no right answers to 
the questions that I am going to be asking you this morning.‖  It added that it was 
―important that we learn what‘s on your mind,‖ and advised the panelists not to be 
affected by the answers of others. 
13 
 
The court then explained the presumption of innocence, the prosecutor‘s 
burden, the defendant‘s right not to testify, and the jurors‘ obligation to avoid 
prejudgment.  Periodically, the court stopped to ask if anyone had a problem with 
the concepts it was discussing.  It next described the phases of a capital trial, 
telling the panel that if defendant was found guilty of murder, it would next 
consider the special circumstance allegation.  Only if the jury found it true would 
there be a penalty trial.  If defendant was found not guilty, or the special 
circumstance not true, ―we go home.‖  The court noted, ―now, some of you might 
be saying, my goodness, judge, why are you even talking about this when the 
defendant is presumed to be innocent?  Well, I talk about it because this is the only 
chance we have to talk to you about it.  We don‘t want to surprise you.  And it is 
important for us to get your views and feelings about the death penalty.‖ 
The court paused to make sure it was ―getting through to folks,‖ calling on 
a panelist at random to ask if its explanations were clear.  It then explained how 
the penalty phase would operate, generally describing the mitigating evidence the 
defense might put on (―the good things in the defendant‘s life and background‖) 
and the aggravating evidence the prosecution might present (―any bad things in the 
defendant‘s background‖).  The only choices before the jury would be life in 
prison without parole, ―which means the defendant will not be released,‖ and the 
death penalty, which is ―normally done by lethal injection.‖  The court emphasized 
that if the mitigating evidence outweighed the aggravating evidence, or if the 
balance was equal, ―the jury must vote for life.‖  Only if the aggravating evidence 
substantially outweighed the mitigating evidence could the death penalty be 
considered, and ―even then the jury . . . is not required to vote for death.‖ 
The court advised the panel that the cost of incarceration was an irrelevant 
consideration, that the jury must accept the death penalty as more severe than life 
in prison, and that penalty considerations could not be allowed to affect the guilt 
14 
 
determination.  It then explained why the candidates‘ feelings about the death 
penalty were important.  ―Jurors who would automatically vote for death are not 
allowed to sit in this kind of case, just as those who would automatically vote for 
life are not permitted to sit,‖ because ―that kind of juror is incapable of weighing 
the mitigating evidence against the aggravating evidence.‖  ―What we need are 
jurors who can consider all the evidence and make a decision based on the 
evidence.‖  The court added that it would be giving the panelists some time to 
think over what it was telling them. 
In the court‘s experience, people ―break down into four categories.‖  Those 
in category one do not believe in the death penalty and could never vote to 
sentence someone to death.  Persons in category two are strong proponents of the 
death penalty and would always vote for death if someone took a life.  Those in 
category three believe in the death penalty, but could not bring themselves to vote 
for it in a particular case, even if they agreed that the aggravating evidence 
substantially outweighed the mitigating evidence.  The court described in detail its 
past experience with jurors who, during the proceedings, discovered that the 
burden of sitting in judgment on the life of another was simply too much for 
them.4  It advised the candidates, ―this is a serious matter, folks.  Please think 
                                              
4  
―I had a case years ago, two boys were stabbed to death in the desert.  We 
went through a lengthy selection process of jurors. . . . The People were seeking 
the death penalty.  And yes, the jurors answered all the questions.  Yes I believe in 
the death penalty.  Yes I could weigh the mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances.  And we ended up selecting the jury.  And I was over talking to the 
attorneys at side bar about some matter.  And the clerk pointed out that one of the 
jurors was crying.  She hadn‘t even heard any evidence, but suddenly the enormity 
of the idea that she was going to be sitting in judgment on another human being 
had come home to her.  And she couldn‘t do it.  And I would call her a category 
three person, somebody who says, yes, I believe in the death penalty, but when 
you get right down to it, it‘s too much, too much for her.‖ 
15 
 
about this, give a lot of thought to it.‖  Category four candidates were those who 
could keep an open mind, consider all the evidence, and return a verdict of either 
life in prison or death. 
The court told the panel that unlike at the guilt phase, where the prosecution 
would bear the burden of proof, there would be no burden of proof at the penalty 
phase.  ―It is up to the jurors to weigh all the evidence, to consider the arguments 
and to make a decision.‖  The court emphasized that it did not mean to tell the 
candidates how to decide the case, but needed to ascertain their feelings about the 
death penalty.  It then took a recess, asking them to ponder their views in light of 
the court‘s explanations. 
After the recess, the court questioned the prospective jurors individually.  It 
began by asking their reactions upon learning this was a capital case, giving them 
an open-ended opportunity to describe their thoughts, before asking which 
category they placed themselves in.  When this pattern had been established, the 
court no longer directly asked for general reactions but simply called on the 
panelists and let them speak.  If any panelist expressed any misunderstanding of 
the process, the court used the occasion to clarify the point for them and the panel 
as a whole.  When the candidates identified the category to which they belonged, 
the court restated the views that characterized that category.  It also periodically 
reaffirmed the serious nature of the process, and encouraged candid and 
independent answers. 
After 27 jurors had been questioned, defense counsel objected to the way 
the court was conducting voir dire.5  He said, ―It is too fast.  I can‘t follow it.  You 
                                              
5   
Of the panelists questioned to this point, 19 placed themselves in category 
four, though a number of those expressed reservations about voting for death.  
Three individuals put themselves in category three, and five in category one. 
16 
 
are asking, are you number one, two, three, four.  It is just meaningless except 
[for] your definition that is recorded in memory before we took a break.  I think 
you have to delve into these individuals a little more in depth.‖  The court 
disagreed, noting that the most recent panelist had explained ―why she is a number 
one,‖ and declaring itself ―very comfortable with the way this voir dire is going.‖ 
After completing the questioning of the first panel, the court called counsel 
to the bench and said it intended to excuse all those who had placed themselves in 
categories one and three.6  Defense counsel objected again, this time on the 
ground that the court had not attempted to ―rehabilitate‖ the prospective jurors in 
category three, instead asking leading questions as to their inability to impose the 
death penalty that allowed them to simply say, ―that is right.‖  The court 
responded that it had no ―obligation to rehabilitate anybody on this very serious 
issue.‖  It noted that the panelists had categorized themselves, its follow-up 
questions were intended to clarify their views, and they had provided a variety of 
responses with no indication of being influenced by the process.  The court was 
―comfortable with excusing these people because I do believe that they have 
honestly told us that they have feelings that would substantially impair their ability 
to serve as jurors in this case.‖ 
The court excused the 21 panelists who declared they were either opposed 
to the death penalty in all cases or unable to vote for death despite having no 
categorical objection to capital punishment.  It then questioned the remaining 
candidates on matters unrelated to the penalty determination.  When the voir dire 
was finished, it invited counsel to submit follow-up questions.  Neither did, except 
                                              
6  
A total of 13 prospective jurors had identified themselves as category three, 
eight as category one, and 35 as category four.  No one on this panel considered 
themselves to be in category two. 
17 
 
for the prosecutor asking the court to ascertain whether one candidate who had 
previous experience on a capital case had participated in a penalty phase.  There 
were no challenges for cause.  The court moved then to peremptory challenges. 
The next day, the court followed substantially the same procedure with a 
second panel of prospective jurors, providing a detailed introductory discussion 
and then questioning each panelist individually.7  Six candidates were excused 
because they did not believe in the death penalty and would never vote for it, two 
because they would always vote for death, including one person who volunteered 
that he would always vote for death if the defendant had a prior murder 
conviction, and two because they were not necessarily opposed to the death 
penalty but could not impose it themselves.  Fifteen prospective jurors in this 
panel put themselves in category four, able to weigh the evidence and reach either 
result.  However, the court failed to question three members of the second panel as 
to their death penalty views.  These omitted candidates were included in the next 
round of voir dire on general topics.  None of them spoke up to say they had not 
been asked for their death penalty views, nor did either attorney bring the omission 
to the court‘s attention at any point. 
At the end of the second panel‘s general voir dire, the court again asked 
counsel if they had follow-up questions.  Defense counsel obtained clarification on 
the nature of a criminal case in which one candidate had served as a juror, and 
asked the court to advise the panel not to draw adverse inferences because 
defendant was in custody or because the trial was being held on a floor of the 
                                              
7  
With the second panel, the court did not take a break between its general 
explanations and the individual questioning.  It did, however, pause during the 
explanations to admonish the jury to think about what it was saying, and remind 
them that it would be talking to each one of them about their views.  
18 
 
courthouse with extra security screening.  The court gave these advisements.  
Again there were no challenges for cause, and the court moved on to peremptories.  
The last juror seated, Juror No. 10, was one of those whose death penalty views 
were not explored. 
 
 
 
b.  Analysis 
Defendant raises a series of challenges to the conduct of voir dire.  He 
claims:  (1) Questioning prospective jurors as a group about their views on the 
death penalty is an unconstitutional practice in general;8 (2) the court erred in this 
case by denying his particular request for sequestered voir dire; (3) the manner in 
which the court conducted voir dire made it impossible to determine whether the 
candidates held disqualifying views about capital punishment;9 (4) the four 
categories framed by the court for the candidates were defective; (5) relying on 
jurors‘ self-assessments was improper; (6) the incomplete voir dire resulted in the 
seating of a juror who was not death qualified; and (7) the court‘s questioning on 
general topics was flawed because it relied on panelists coming forward with 
information instead of being asked specific questions, particularly on the subject 
of gang membership. 
Code of Civil Procedure section 223, adopted by initiative measure in 1990, 
requires the court to conduct voir dire in criminal cases.  At the time of trial, 
section 223 stated in pertinent part:  ―In a criminal case, the court shall conduct the 
examination of prospective jurors.  However, the court may permit the parties, 
upon a showing of good cause, to supplement the examination by such further 
                                              
8  
He cites the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and sections 7, 15, 16, and 
17 of article I of the California Constitution. 
9  
In challenging the adequacy of the voir dire, defendant generally relies on 
the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
19 
 
inquiry as it deems proper, or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors upon 
such a showing, such additional questions by the parties as it deems proper.  Voir 
dire of any prospective jurors shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the 
other jurors in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases.‖  (Added by Prop. 
115, as approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990).)10  Here, the court 
invited counsel to submit follow-up questions, without seeking a showing of good 
cause. 
We have repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to the statutory 
authorization of group voir dire in capital cases.  (People v. Chism (2014) 58 
Cal.4th 1266, 1286; People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1011; People v. 
Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 789.)  Defendant does not convince us to alter our 
view on this point.  Indeed, the record in this case demonstrates the advantages of 
group voir dire.  Panelists provided a variety of responses reflecting divergent 
views on the death penalty and their ability to serve on a capital jury.  The court 
was able to educate each panel as a whole by explaining misconceptions reflected 
in some prospective jurors‘ comments.  The court emphasized to all that it was 
seeking each panelist‘s own views, that there were no right or wrong answers, and 
that each person was in the best position to evaluate his or her own views.  
                                              
10 
Effective January 1, 2001, the statute was amended to give counsel for each 
party an expanded but not unlimited right to examine prospective jurors through 
direct oral questioning ―[u]pon completion of the court‘s initial examination.‖   
(Code Civ. Proc., § 223, as amended by Stats. 2000, ch. 192, § 1, p. 2216.)  The 
provision requiring group voir dire where practicable remained unchanged, as did 
the specification that the trial court‘s exercise of its discretion over the manner in 
which voir dire is conducted ―shall not cause any conviction to be reversed unless 
the exercise of that discretion has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, as specified 
in Section 13 of Article VI of the California Constitution.‖  (Ibid.) 
20 
 
Instructions of this sort are more effectively delivered in a group setting than in 
individual interviews. 
Nor does defendant show that the court abused its discretion in denying his 
request for individual questioning in this case.  Defense counsel made a blanket 
objection to the conduct of group voir dire, without any specific claim that it 
would be ―impracticable‖ under the particular circumstances.  (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 223.)  The court stated its willingness to reconsider its decision if ―it‘s not going 
well.‖  Counsel interposed no further objection to questioning the candidates in 
groups. 11  No error appears.  (See People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 
863 (Capistrano), affirming the denial of a ―generic, boilerplate‖ motion for 
sequestered voir dire ―that made no attempt to show specifically why open court 
voir dire in this case was not practicable.‖) 
Next, defendant contends the method of voir dire employed by the court 
was insufficient to reliably determine whether the panelists‘ views would 
disqualify them from serving as jurors at a penalty trial.  ―Recent decisions of this 
court have emphasized the importance of meaningful death-qualifying voir dire.  
We have reminded trial courts of their duty to know and follow proper procedure, 
and to devote sufficient time and effort to the process.  [Citations.]  At bottom, 
                                              
11  
On appeal, defendant asserts that the prospective jurors‘ answers were 
influenced by the group questioning, arguing that the first 13 candidates in the first 
panel all placed themselves in category four, meaning they could keep an open 
mind and make a decision based on the aggravating and mitigating evidence.  
However, there was considerable variety in the responses of these candidates.  
Two said they were between categories three and four, and others expressed 
doubts about their ability to vote for death, or volunteered that they would vote for 
death only in an extreme case, or only if they were convinced of guilt beyond a 
shadow of a doubt.  Thus, the record does not support defendant‘s suggestion that 
the prospective jurors were taking cues from the responses of others.  (See People 
v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1053.) 
21 
 
both the court and counsel ‗must have sufficient information regarding the 
prospective juror‘s state of mind to permit a reliable determination as to whether 
the juror‘s views [on capital punishment]  would ― ‗prevent or substantially 
impair‘ ‖ the performance of his or her duties.‘  [Citation.] . . .  [¶]  Nonetheless, 
the trial court has broad discretion over the number and nature of questions about 
the death penalty.  We have rejected complaints about ‗hasty‘ [citation] or 
‗perfunctory‘ voir dire.‖  (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 539–540; 
accord, Capistrano, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 856; see Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 
U.S. 412, 424 (Witt).)  ―Unless the voir dire ‗is so inadequate that the reviewing 
court can say that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair, the manner in 
which voir dire is conducted is not a basis for reversal.‘ ‖  (People v. Contreras 
(2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 143 (Contreras).) 
Defendant claims that in cases where we have rejected claims of hasty or 
perfunctory voir dire, the courts used written questionnaires as a supplement.  
(People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 538-540; People v. Navarette (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 458, 486-488.)  However, in People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 
855-856, we rejected such a claim without mentioning a questionnaire.  And in 
Capistrano, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pages 854-856, we found no error in the court‘s 
assertedly perfunctory dismissal of a number of prospective jurors based on oral 
questions about their death penalty views, before a questionnaire was passed out.  
We have never held that a questionnaire is required for purposes of voir dire.  
(People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 353; see People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 
Cal.4th 622, 652 (Fuiava).)  There is no magic formula for qualifying prospective 
jurors in a capital case.  Questionnaires may be problematic if couched in legalistic 
terms that are rigid or confusing.  What is important is a process that allows the 
court and counsel to ascertain the panelists‘ honest views about the death penalty 
and their ability to perform a juror‘s duty. 
22 
 
The court‘s approach in this case was personal and conversational, both 
with the panels as a whole and during individual questioning.  It provided the 
panels with a comprehensive description of the trial process in a capital case, 
followed by specific inquiries about each candidate‘s views on the question of 
penalty.  This process was within the limits of the broad discretion our trial courts 
exercise over methods of voir dire.  The introductory explanation of the juror‘s 
role in a capital case was informal, clear, and detailed.  The court took care to 
ensure that the concepts being conveyed were understood, and to impress on the 
panelists that it was not seeking to influence their answers or ultimate votes, 
should they be seated on the jury.  It repeatedly emphasized the seriousness of the 
task at hand, as well as the personal and normative nature of penalty deliberations. 
Once individual questioning began, many prospective jurors were asked an 
initial open-ended question about how they felt when they learned this was a 
capital case.  The court carefully ascertained each candidate‘s self-assessment.  No 
panelist expressed confusion or professed inability to self-classify.  Nor, contrary 
to defense counsel‘s claim when he lodged his objection to the process, were the 
panelists simply asked to assign themselves a number.  If a candidate referred to a 
number without describing the category, the court followed up with a clarifying 
question to ensure that the classification properly reflected the candidate‘s views.  
And because the questioning took place in a group setting, everyone heard the 
description of the classifications many times. 
Defendant‘s complaints about the court‘s failure to ―rehabilitate‖ 
prospective jurors who said they would be unable to impose the death penalty are 
misplaced.  Counsel are entitled to ascertain a prospective juror‘s true views on the 
death penalty.  Once those views have been made clear, the court is not obliged to 
question them further.  Nor do counsel have the right to try to influence or 
characterize those views to gain a strategic advantage in the selection process.  ―If 
23 
 
a prospective juror states unequivocally that he or she would be unable to impose 
the death penalty regardless of the evidence, the prospective juror is, by definition, 
someone whose views ‗would ―prevent or substantially impair the performance of 
his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.‖ ‘  (Witt, 
supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.)  Further inquiry concerning the juror‘s ability to follow 
the law is not required.‖  (Capistrano, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 859.) 
Defendant faults the court for not asking a number of the questions 
proposed in the questionnaire submitted by defense counsel.  But merely 
proffering a questionnaire is no substitute for making specific objections to the 
court‘s failure to ask certain questions.  We have held that ―a defendant may not 
challenge on appeal alleged shortcomings in the trial court‘s voir dire of the 
prospective jurors when the defendant, having had the opportunity to alert the trial 
court to the supposed problem, failed to do so.  It is not sufficient . . . for a 
defendant merely to suggest that particular questions be asked, and then silently 
stand by when the trial court suggests and subsequently takes a different course — 
a trial court reasonably could view such silence as constituting assent to the 
court‘s approach.‖  (Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 653; accord, Contreras, supra, 
58 Cal.4th at p. 144.) 
Here, while defense counsel objected to the speed of the court‘s questioning 
and its failure to ―rehabilitate‖ prospective jurors who placed themselves in 
category three, he did not object to the court‘s failure to ask any particular 
question.  Accordingly, defendant‘s claims in this regard are forfeited.  (Fuiava, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 653; People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 640 
(McKinnon); People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1324.)12  Moreover, 
                                              
12 
For example, defendant complains that the court did not ask the prospective 
jurors if they would invariably vote for the death penalty when the defendant has 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
24 
 
defendant‘s complaints about the questioning of individual panelists regarding 
their death penalty views fails to account for the court‘s lengthy prefatory remarks, 
describing the nature of the penalty phase and the jurors‘ responsibility to weigh 
the evidence in aggravation and mitigation without allowing their personal views 
to predetermine the outcome.  
We emphasize that the prospective jurors were properly informed of the 
extent of their discretion.  Importantly, the trial court correctly and repeatedly 
instructed them that they were not required to vote for death.  (See People v. 
Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 538–544.)  In one representative instance, it told the 
panelists, ―nobody is telling you you have to vote for death, okay.  The law says 
that there is a presumption in favor of life, actually. . . .  And [it] only allow[s] the 
jury to vote for death if the aggravating evidence so substantially outweighs the 
mitigating evidence that the jury believes that death is appropriate . . . .‖  The court 
reminded them that ―[i]t is only if you have substantial disparity in favor of the 
aggravating [factors] that death can even be considered.‖  The court‘s accurate 
descriptions of the extent of juror discretion informed the candidates‘ self-
categorization.  In particular, the court‘s explanations made it unlikely that 
panelists would have placed themselves in category three merely because they 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
been convicted of more than one murder.  However, after the court declined to use 
the questionnaire submitted by defense counsel, counsel did not ask the court to 
explore that subject.  Indeed, counsel specifically agreed with the court‘s 
suggestion not to inform the jury that the special circumstance in this case was a 
prior murder, in order to avoid prejudicing defendant at the guilt phase.  In any 
event, the court did not bar counsel from inquiring about that or any other subject.  
(Compare People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 721.) 
25 
 
were reluctant to vote for death, or apprehensive that the law would require them 
to vote for death even if they thought it inappropriate in the particular case. 
Even if it were preserved, there is no merit in defendant‘s claim that the 
court failed to inquire whether the prospective jurors would always favor the death 
sentence over life without parole whenever the two alternatives are available.  The 
court thoroughly explained to the panels that these would be the alternatives 
before the jury in a penalty phase.  Its inquiry as to whether the candidates would 
always favor the death penalty was premised on that consideration.  Similarly, 
while defendant faults the court for not questioning the jurors about their ability to 
fairly evaluate the evidence at the guilt phase, the court‘s introductory comments 
emphasized that the guilt and penalty phases were separate, that the defendant was 
presumed innocent, and that ―you can‘t be looking over your shoulder‖ at the guilt 
phase by considering its implications as to penalty. 
Defendant‘s objections to the way the court framed its four categories 
likewise fail, in light of the court‘s comprehensive review of what would be 
required of jurors during penalty deliberations.  In that context, the categories were 
sufficient for the purpose of death-qualification voir dire.13  Defendant also 
complains that the voir dire unduly relied on prospective jurors‘ self-assessments.  
Again the court‘s explanations sufficiently focused the inquiry.  When they were 
asked to categorize themselves, the candidates had in mind the court‘s descriptions 
                                              
13  
Defendant claims the second panel was never given a definition of category 
four, comprising jurors who could make a penalty determination based on the 
evidence.  However, the court thoroughly described the qualities needed to serve 
on a penalty jury before questioning this panel.  When individual voir dire began, 
the court made it plain that ―what I would call a category four person‖ was one 
who ―would be able to consider all the mitigating evidence and all the aggravating 
evidence and to weigh them and to make a decision.‖  No prospective juror in the 
second panel displayed any confusion as to category four. 
26 
 
of the penalty phase and the qualities required of jurors.  Further, the voir dire 
process necessarily depends to a significant degree on self-assessment.  No one is 
in a better position to know the panelists‘ views and inclinations than they 
themselves.  Here the court sought direct, unequivocal answers from the 
candidates regarding their death penalty views, encouraging them to be honest and 
to keep in mind the importance of the matter.  It was able to observe not only the 
content of the responses, but also the manner in which they were conveyed. 
―[W]e apply a ‗rule of deference‘ [citation] based on the trial court‘s ability 
to assess the demeanor and credibility of the prospective [juror].‖  (Capistrano, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 859.)  ― ‗[A] trial judge who observes and speaks with a 
prospective juror and hears that person‘s responses (noting, among other things, 
the person‘s tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor), gleans 
valuable information that simply does not appear on the record.  [Citation.]  As the 
high court observed in Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 428, ―the question whether a 
venireman is biased has traditionally been determined through voir dire 
culminating in a finding by the trial judge concerning the venireman‘s state of 
mind . . . based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are 
peculiarly within a trial judge‘s province.‖ ‘ ‖  (Capistrano, at pp. 855-856.) 
Accordingly, we reject defendant‘s challenges to the court‘s method of 
conducting the death-qualification voir dire in this case.  A closer question arises 
from the court‘s failure to apply its method consistently with the second voir dire 
panel.  It appears the court questioned these 28 panelists as they sat in the 
spectator section of the courtroom.  In so doing it overlooked three candidates, 
including the one who became Juror No. 10.  Defense counsel did not bring the 
oversight to the court‘s attention, however, and therefore this claim of error is 
forfeited.  Although at the time of defendant‘s trial no objection was required to 
preserve a claim that a prospective juror was improperly excused based on his or 
27 
 
her views of capital punishment, that rule has never been applied to other jury 
selection issues, including claims of inadequate voir dire.  (McKinnon, supra, 52 
Cal.4th at pp. 637, 640.) 
The court and both attorneys must bear a share of blame for failing to 
ensure that all panelists were questioned.  However, the primary responsibility for 
protecting defendant‘s interests lay with defense counsel.  There is no excuse for 
his failure to alert the court that some candidates had been passed over.  Contrary 
to defendant‘s suggestion that the speed of the process was such that it was 
―virtually impossible‖ for counsel to keep track, it was a simple matter to record 
the prospective jurors‘ identities and the category to which they assigned 
themselves.  When the questioning of the second panel was completed, the court 
conferred with counsel about which candidates were in categories one and three, 
and neither attorney expressed any discomfort with his ability to monitor the 
classifications as they had occurred. 
Juror No. 10 was questioned during the voir dire covering general subjects.  
She did not mention that she had been overlooked during the previous round, but 
at that point it should have been clear to all that her views on the death penalty had 
not been ascertained.  Defense counsel was offered a chance to pose follow-up 
questions at the end of the general voir dire, but did not explore the matter.  He 
had a peremptory challenge available when he agreed to accept Juror No. 10, the 
last panelist to be seated.  We cannot overlook the possibility that counsel was 
aware of the court‘s omission, and refrained from pointing it out for tactical 
purposes.  Based on Juror No. 10‘s answers, the defense may have decided she 
was inclined in its favor, or at least not negatively disposed.  A high school 
graduate, she and her husband both worked as mail handlers for the post office.  
She had a brother serving a long prison sentence for a purse snatching, with a prior 
conviction for ―hijacking.‖  She had served on both civil and criminal juries.  She 
28 
 
belonged to no organizations and had never been in the military.  Though she did 
not own a gun, she had ―no problem‖ with gun ownership.  
The consideration that counsel may have chosen to take a chance with this 
panelist and create a claim of penalty phase error goes to the heart of the forfeiture 
rule.  ―[A]s a general rule, ‗the failure to object to errors committed at trial relieves 
the reviewing court of the obligation to consider those errors on appeal.‘  
[Citations.]  This applies to claims based on statutory violations, as well as claims 
based on violations of fundamental constitutional rights.  [Citations.]  [¶]  The 
reasons for the rule are these:  ‗ ―In the hurry of the trial many things may be, and 
are, overlooked which would readily have been rectified had attention been called 
to them.  The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and 
of calling the judge‘s attention to any infringement of them.  If any other rule were 
to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to his objections 
until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few 
judgments would stand the test of an appeal.‖ ‘ ‖  (In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 
193, 198; accord, McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 638.)  Accordingly, defendant 
did not preserve this claim of inadequate voir dire.  (People v. Taylor (2002) 48 
Cal.4th 574, 608.) 
Ordinarily we proceed to consider the merits of forfeited claims of 
insufficient voir dire, as we did in People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at page 608.  
However, counsel‘s inaction leaves us with no basis for doing that here.  Juror No. 
10 may have been biased against the death penalty, or perfectly neutral.  This 
record affords no grounds for us to conclude that the trial was ― ‗fundamentally 
unfair.‘ ‖  (Contreras, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 143.)  To establish that the erroneous 
inclusion of a juror violated the right to a fair and impartial penalty phase jury, a 
defendant must show that an incompetent juror actually sat on the jury that 
imposed the death sentence.  (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 742; see 
29 
 
People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 919-920.)  Here, defendant failed to make 
a record that would permit us to evaluate his claim. 
Defendant‘s final challenge to the voir dire process concerns the 
questioning on general topics.  He claims the court failed to adequately explore the 
candidates‘ views about gang members, asking one prospective juror only, ―do 
you know anybody in a gang?‖  However, defense counsel made no objection.  
Furthermore, shortly after this question the court explained to the panel how gang 
evidence might properly be used at trial.  It cautioned:  ―But I want to make sure I 
don‘t have a bunch of jurors that are going to say, well, gee, the fellow‘s a gang 
member, therefore, he‘s guilty. You‘ve got to keep an open mind.  Wait to hear 
what the evidence is.‖  This claim of error is meritless as well as forfeited.  
(Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 653-655.) 
 
 
3.  Constitutionality of Death Qualification Process 
 ―Citing the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal 
Constitution and article I of the California Constitution, defendant contends that 
the death qualification of juries in California is unconstitutional.  The claim is 
forfeited by defendant‘s failure to raise it below.  (People v. Howard (2010) 51 
Cal.4th 15, 26 (Howard).)  It is also meritless.  
 ― ‗The death qualification process is not rendered unconstitutional by 
empirical studies concluding that, because it removes jurors who would 
automatically vote for death or for life, it results in juries biased against the 
defense.  [Citations.]  [¶]  Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162 . . . , which 
approved the death qualification process, remains good law despite some criticism 
in law review articles.  [Citations.]  ―We may not depart from the high court ruling 
as to the United States Constitution, and defendant presents no good reason to 
reconsider our ruling[s] as to the California Constitution.‖  [Citation.]  [¶]  The 
impacts of the death qualification process on the race, gender, and religion of the 
30 
 
jurors do not affect its constitutionality.  [Citations.]  Nor does the process violate 
a defendant‘s constitutional rights, including the Eighth Amendment right not to 
be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, by affording the prosecutor an 
opportunity to increase the chances of getting a conviction.  [Citations.]  
Defendant claims the voir dire process itself produces a biased jury.  We have held 
otherwise.  [Citation.]  [¶]  Death qualification does not violate the Sixth 
Amendment by undermining the functions of a jury as a cross-section of the 
community participating in the administration of justice.  [Citations.]  Finally, 
defendant‘s constitutional rights were not violated by the prosecutor‘s use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors with reservations about capital 
punishment.‘  (Howard, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 26–27; see People v. Taylor, 
supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 602–603.)  We adhere to the views expressed in these 
decisions and reject defendant‘s claims.‖  (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 
1066; see also, e.g., Capistrano, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 864.) 
 
B.  Guilt Phase Issues 
 
 
1.  Exclusion of Evidence That Echeverria Was Convicted of   
 
 
     Manslaughter 
Before his opening statement, defense counsel approached the bench and 
told the court he and the prosecutor had discussed whether the jury should be 
informed that Echeverria had been convicted of manslaughter for Guevara‘s 
killing.  Counsel said he intended to do that, though he conceded the prosecutor 
―may be right‖ that the conviction was irrelevant.  The prosecutor objected.  The 
court ruled that ―you cannot tell them this guy got manslaughter because it was a 
different case, different evidence . . . .‖  The court suggested counsel stipulate that 
Echeverria was convicted of the killing, without mentioning a specific crime.  
Counsel so stipulated. 
31 
 
Nevertheless, immediately before calling Echeverria to the witness stand, 
defense counsel renewed his request to inform the jury that Echeverria had been 
convicted of voluntary manslaughter.  The prosecutor objected again, and again 
the court sustained the objection.  It explained that the difficulty ―this poses for the 
People is a suggestion that if one person who is involved in this was convicted of a 
particular crime, then the other participant allegedly involved should be convicted 
of the same crime.  And this is an entirely different case.  I think that it would be 
inviting the jury to speculate as to . . . why he was convicted of voluntary 
manslaughter as opposed to what the proper verdict might be in this case.  And it 
might be . . . manslaughter.  I believe he should be limited to stating that yes, I was 
convicted of something that arose from the same incident without specifying what 
felony.‖ 
Defendant claims the exclusion of evidence as to the nature of Echeverria‘s 
conviction violated his due process right to present a defense.  He relies on cases 
holding that defendants must be allowed to present evidence that another person 
may have committed the charged crime.  (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 
U.S. 284; Cudjo v. Ayers (9th Cir. 2012) 698 F.3d 752.)  These cases are 
inapposite; defendant presented Echeverria‘s testimony that it was Echevarria who 
killed Guevara.  Defendant argues that the jury was required to speculate about 
Echeverria‘s level of culpability.  Not so; the jury heard the evidence and was 
fully equipped to determine for itself the relative levels of Echeverria‘s and 
defendant‘s culpability.  It could not know what evidence was presented at 
Echeverria‘s trial, nor what theories were pursued by the prosecution and the 
defense in that case.  The trial court properly ruled that evidence of the specific 
crime of which Echeverria was convicted was irrelevant and misleading.  (Evid. 
Code, § 352.) 
 
32 
 
 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the Evidence  
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt of 
first degree murder.  The claim fails. 
―Our task in deciding a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is a 
well-established one.  ‗[W]e review the whole record in the light most favorable to 
the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — that 
is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a 
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  
[Citations.]  In cases in which the People rely primarily on circumstantial 
evidence, the standard of review is the same.  [Citations.]‘  (People v. Thomas 
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 514.)  ‗ ―An appellate court must accept logical inferences 
that the jury might have drawn from the evidence even if the court would have 
concluded otherwise.  [Citation.]‖ ‘  (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 
419.)‖  (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 811-812.) 
Defendant disputes the credibility of Kathy Mendez‘s testimony, arguing 
that from her vantage point inside the Beef Bowl she could not have seen 
defendant and Echeverria wrestling with Guevara on the sidewalk, or defendant 
shooting into the Au Rendezvous Café next door.  However, Mendez testified that 
she was standing at the end of a long line, nearly at the door of the Beef Bowl, and 
that the entire front wall of the restaurant was glass.  The photographic evidence 
confirms that a person standing near the front of the restaurant would have a clear 
view of the sidewalk outside.  Defendant also claims Mendez was mistaken when 
she said she saw Guevara walk by the Beef Bowl before the confrontation began.  
He notes that Guevara‘s car was parked in front of the Au Rendezvous, not the 
Beef Bowl, and that Emilio Antelo, the security guard who was standing outside 
near the Beef Bowl door, testified that Guevara had just begun to approach the 
Beef Bowl after getting out of his car when defendant and Echeverria accosted 
33 
 
him.  While Mendez‘s testimony is inconsistent with the other evidence on this 
point, it is not an important detail.  Furthermore, the jury was properly instructed 
on how to weigh conflicts in the testimony.  (CALJIC Nos. 2.21.1 & 2.22.) 
Defendant notes that Mendez gave inconsistent statements, both to the 
police and on the stand, about whether she saw him shooting.  But when reminded 
of her second statement to the police, Mendez testified on direct, cross, and 
redirect examination that she saw defendant doing the shooting.  It was for the jury 
to determine the credibility of her statements. 
Defendant challenges Mendez‘s account of the wrestling on the sidewalk, 
claiming Antelo did not confirm it.  Antelo, however, testified that he went inside 
the Beef Bowl as soon as the second armed man approached Guevara, because he 
―immediately thought there was going to be a problem.‖  The third prosecution 
eyewitness, Patrick Turner, confirmed that the wrestling began on the sidewalk 
and continued into the Au Rendezvous.14  Echeverria gave a similar account in his 
testimony, though he claimed that only he wrestled with Guevara. 
 Defendant contends the physical evidence was consistent with Echeverria‘s 
testimony.  In fact, the evidence refuted his account and supported the conclusion 
that it was defendant who shot Guevara and inflicted some of Echeverria‘s 
wounds.  As defendant concedes, the casings recovered at the scene established 
                                              
14  
Defendant claims Turner was an entirely unreliable witness.  It is true that 
Turner was unable to remember much on the witness stand, and appeared to 
confuse the color of defendant‘s and Echeverria‘s clothing.  If he were the only 
witness, it is doubtful this case would have gone to trial.  But he was not the only 
witness, and his statements to the police on the night of the shooting about the 
wrestling on the sidewalk, followed by a man shooting into the doorway of the Au 
Rendezvous, were consistent with Mendez‘s account and the shell casing 
evidence.  The jury could reasonably have accepted Turner‘s testimony on this 
point as corroborative. 
34 
 
that only two weapons were used, a .25 caliber that left three casings and a 9 
millimeter that left 12.  Echeverria claimed he shot Guevara at very close range as 
they were wrestling, but there was no stippling around Guevara‘s wounds, 
indicating they were inflicted from a distance of greater than two feet.  Echeverria 
said he was shot six times with a .25 caliber gun, but only three .25 caliber casings 
were recovered.  The pattern of Guevara‘s wounds was consistent with being shot 
from medium range as he rolled on the floor of the Au Rendezvous, wrestling with 
Echeverria. 
The prosecution‘s theory was that Guevara had managed to wrestle the .25 
caliber weapon away from Echeverria and shoot him several times, explaining the 
soot found on Guevara‘s hands.  Thereafter, defendant shot at both men from the 
doorway of the Au Rendezvous.  This theory was consistent with the shell casing 
evidence.  It was supported by Mendez‘s testimony that defendant had a 9 
millimeter weapon and Echeverria had his gun when they confronted Guevara.  It 
was also consistent with Antelo‘s testimony that the men who approached 
Guevara outside the Beef Bowl carried guns while Guevara did not.  
Defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to show that the killing was 
not justified by Echeverria‘s lawful self-defense, or defendant‘s defense of 
Echeverria.  The jury was instructed that the prosecution bore the burden of 
proving the homicide was not justifiable.  It was also instructed that the right of 
self-defense is only available to a person who initiates an assault if that person (1) 
tries in good faith to refuse to continue the fight, and (2) clearly informs his 
opponent both that he wants to stop fighting, and that he has done so.  Defendant 
does not dispute the correctness of this instruction, or its logical application to the 
defense of another.  Here, there was ample evidence from which the jury could 
have found that defendant and Echeverria initiated the assault and never attempted 
to stop fighting with Guevara. 
35 
 
Defendant also claims the evidence of malice was insufficient, because the 
prosecution failed to disprove that he acted in a sudden quarrel, under heat of 
passion, in unreasonable self-defense, or in mutual combat.  Again, however, the 
evidence strongly supported a finding that defendant acted as a deliberate 
aggressor in the confrontation.  Thus, the jury could have found that the quarrel 
was not sudden, but intentionally provoked by defendant and Echeverria, and any 
heat of passion was not the sort that would be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily 
reasonable person, as the instructions required.  The instructions also informed the 
jury that unreasonable self-defense has no application when a defendant‘s 
wrongful conduct created the circumstances that justified his adversary‘s use of 
force.  Defendant does not challenge the propriety of these instructions. 
Defendant further argues, at length, that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish deliberation and premeditation.  We disagree.  ―In the context of first 
degree murder, premeditation means ‗ ―considered beforehand‖ ‘  (People v. 
Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767) and deliberation means a ‗ ―careful weighing 
of considerations in forming a course of action . . . ‖ ‘  (People v. Solomon (2010) 
49 Cal.4th 792, 812).  ‗The process of premeditation and deliberation does not 
require any extended period of time.‘  (Mayfield, at p. 767 [the true test of 
premeditation is the extent of the reflection, not the length of time].)  ‗ ―Thoughts 
may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be 
arrived at quickly . . . .‖ ‘  (Ibid.; see id. at pp. 767–768 [where defendant wrested 
the gun from and fatally shot an officer during a brief altercation, the jury could 
reasonably conclude that ‗before shooting [the officer] defendant had made a cold 
and calculated decision to take [the officer‘s] life after weighing considerations for 
and against‘]; People v. Rand (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 999, 1001–1002 [aiming 
weapon at victims whom shooter believed to be rival gang members constituted 
36 
 
sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation].)‖  (People v. Shamblin 
(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1, 10.) 
Here, defendant brought a loaded gun with him to the Beef Bowl, 
demonstrating preparation.  (See People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 636.)  He 
told Echeverria to get his gun when they saw Guevara in the parking lot, which is 
substantial evidence of planning.  (See People v. Thomas, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 
517.)  Echeverria testified that he armed himself because Guevara looked like a 
gang member, supplying evidence of motive for provoking a lethal confrontation.  
Defendant and Echeverria both cocked their guns as they approached Guevara, 
strongly suggesting they were contemplating a shooting.  (See People v. Rand, 
supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1001–1002.)  The fact that Guevara was shot nine 
times at close range also supports the conclusion that the killing was deliberate.  
(See Lee, at p. 637; People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 295.) 
Even ―assuming a reasonable jury could have found the evidence did not 
support premeditation and deliberation and returned a verdict of second degree 
murder, [defendant‘s conviction] must stand because, as we have stated, ‗[i]f the 
circumstances reasonably justify the jury‘s findings, the reviewing court may not 
reverse the judgment merely because it believes that the circumstances might also 
support a contrary finding.‘ ‖  (People v. Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at 
p. 295.) 
 
3.  Use of Former CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72 
The jury was given the 1996 revised versions of CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 
8.72.  The first of these instructions informed the jury:  ―If you are convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt and you unanimously agree that the crime of murder 
has been committed by a defendant, but you unanimously agree that you have a 
reasonable doubt as to whether the murder was of the first or of second degree, 
you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict fixing 
37 
 
the murder as of the second degree.‖  The second gave the same guidance 
regarding the distinction between murder and manslaughter verdicts:  ―If you are 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and you unanimously agree that the killing 
was unlawful but you unanimously agree that you have a reasonable doubt 
whether the crime is murder or manslaughter, you must give the defendant the 
benefit of that doubt and find it to be manslaughter rather than murder.‖ 
In People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386 (Moore), decided long after 
defendant‘s trial, we advised that ―the better practice is not to use the 1996 revised 
versions of CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72, as the instructions carry at least some 
potential for confusing jurors about the role of their individual judgments in 
deciding between first and second degree murder, and between murder and 
manslaughter.  The references to unanimity in these instructions were presumably 
added to convey the principle that the jury as a whole may not return a verdict for 
a lesser included offense unless it first reaches an acquittal on the charged greater 
offense.  [Citation].  But inserting this language into CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72, 
which address the role of reasonable doubt in choosing between greater and lesser 
homicide offenses, was unnecessary, as CALJIC No. 8.75 fully explains that the 
jury must unanimously agree to not guilty verdicts on the greater homicide 
offenses before the jury as a whole may return verdicts on the lesser.‖  (Moore, at 
pp. 411-412.) 
We did not hold in Moore that the 1996 revised versions of CALJIC Nos. 
8.71 and 8.72 were erroneous.  We discussed People v. Gunder (2007) 151 
Cal.App.4th 412, where the Court of Appeal decided that any confusion arising 
from these instructions was dispelled by CALJIC No. 17.40, which tells the jurors 
not to ― ‗decide any question in a particular way because a majority of the jurors, 
38 
 
or any of them, favor that decision.‘ ‖  (Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 411; see 
Gunder, at p. 425.)15  Although CALJIC No. 17.40 was also given in Moore, we 
found it unnecessary to decide whether Gunder was correct, because any error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Moore jury‘s true findings on burglary-
murder and robbery-murder special circumstances left no room for the lesser 
offenses of second degree murder and manslaughter.  (Moore, at p. 412.) 
The jury here was also given CALJIC No. 17.40, which stated in relevant 
part:  ―The People and the defendant are entitled to the individual opinion of each 
juror.  Each of you must consider the evidence for the purpose of reaching a 
verdict, if you can do so.  Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but 
should do so only after discussing the evidence and instructions with the other 
jurors.  Do not hesitate to change an opinion if you are convinced it is wrong.  
However, do not decide any question in a particular way because a majority of the 
jurors, or any of them, favor that decision.‖  The jury was additionally instructed 
with CALJIC No. 8.74:  ―Before you may return a verdict in this case, you must 
agree unanimously not only as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, but 
also if you should find him guilty of an unlawful killing, you must agree 
unanimously as to whether he was guilty of murder of the first degree, murder of 
the second degree, or voluntary manslaughter.‖  The jury was further told, ―you 
may find it productive to consider and reach a tentative conclusion on all charges 
and lesser crimes before reaching any final verdict.  However, the court cannot 
accept a guilty verdict on a lesser crime unless you have unanimously found the 
defendant not guilty of the charged crime.‖  (CALJIC No. 17.10.) 
                                              
15  
As also noted in Moore, the Gunder court followed its earlier decision in 
People v. Pescador (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 252, where a different combination of 
instructions was given.  (Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 410-411.) 
39 
 
Defendant argues that the 1996 revised versions of CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 
8.72 required unanimous agreement on reasonable doubt as to guilt of the greater 
offense before an individual juror could give him the benefit of the doubt and find 
him guilty of the lesser.  This, he claims, violated his right to due process by 
reversing the state‘s burden of proof and making the greater offenses the ―default‖ 
verdicts.  Defendant‘s interpretation of the instructions is a tortured one.  If 
anything, they skewed the deliberations in his favor.  They could reasonably be 
understood to tell the jurors that if they all agreed there was reasonable doubt as to 
the degree of the crime, because some jurors were not convinced, then defendant 
was entitled to the benefit of the doubt and a verdict of the lesser offense.  No 
logical reading of the instructions leads to a compelled verdict of first degree 
murder. 
We did not accept defendant‘s reading of the instructions in Moore, though 
it was also proposed by the defendant there.  (Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 410.)  
We said only that the instructions created ―at least some potential for confusing 
jurors about the role of their individual judgments in deciding between‖ the greater 
and lesser offenses.  (Id. at p. 411.)  While the language to which defendant 
objects may be confusing because it is unclear how the phrase ―unanimously agree 
that you have a reasonable doubt‖ applies to individual jurors‘ views, a reasonable 
juror in this case, considering the instructions as a whole, would have understood 
that these terms reflect the principle stated in CALJIC No. 17.10:  ―the court 
cannot accept a guilty verdict on a lesser crime unless you have unanimously 
found the defendant not guilty of the charged crime.‖  (See Moore, at p. 411.)  
It is a familiar proposition that ― ‗[t]he correctness of jury instructions is to 
be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of 
parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.‘  [Citation.]‖  (People v. 
Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1220; see Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 
40 
 
U.S. 62, 72 [alleged ambiguity in instructions must be viewed in light of the 
instructions as a whole and the entire record].)  Defendant‘s reading assumes the 
jury would disregard not only CALJIC Nos. 8.74 and 17.10, but also the explicit 
directions of CALJIC No. 17.40 emphasizing each juror‘s duty to decide the case 
as an individual.  Accordingly, while we have disapproved the unanimity 
terminology in the 1996 revised versions of CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72 because 
of the potential for confusion, the instructions were not erroneous in this case 
when considered with the rest of the charge to the jury.  Defendant‘s claim of 
instructional error lacks merit. 
Defendant points out that on the third day of deliberations, the jury sent the 
court a note reading:  ―Clarification from The Court:  What happens if jury is 
unanimous for verdict of murder but cannot agree on 1st or 2nd degree?‖  The 
court, after consulting with counsel and obtaining their approval, responded in 
writing as follows:  ―The jury‘s attention is directed to instruction 8.71 on page 57 
of the instructions.‖  Thus, the jury would have read:  ―If you are convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt and you unanimously agree that the crime of murder 
has been committed by a defendant, but you unanimously agree that you have a 
reasonable doubt whether the murder was of the first or of the second degree, you 
must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict fixing the 
murder as of the second degree.‖  The following day, the jury returned a verdict of 
first degree murder. 
The Attorney General correctly contends that defense counsel‘s agreement 
to refer the jury to this instruction forfeited defendant‘s claim of error on this 
point.  The court noted for the record that ―the clerk called counsel and read the 
proposed response.  And counsel agreed that that was an appropriate response.‖  
We have held that counsel‘s affirmative agreement with the court‘s reply to a note 
from the jury forfeits a claim of error.  (People v. DeBose (2014) 59 Cal.4th 177, 
41 
 
207.)  Here, the court‘s answer was not responsive to the jury‘s question.  Former 
CALJIC No. 8.71 did not address the circumstance in which the jury found itself, 
which was disagreement over the degree of murder.  But defense counsel did not 
take the opportunity to suggest an alternative.  His endorsement of the court‘s 
proposal effectively foreclosed further exploration of possible responses to the 
jury‘s question.  Therefore, his claim on this point has not been preserved. 
On appeal, defendant contends the court should have deleted the references 
to unanimity, or given the jury CALJIC No. 17.11:  ―If you find the defendant 
guilty of the crime of murder, but have a reasonable doubt as to whether it is of the 
first or second degree, you must find him guilty of that crime in the second 
degree.‖  But such instruction would have been equally nonresponsive to the 
jury‘s concern.  Plainly, some jurors had tentatively resolved their doubts in favor 
of second degree murder, while others leaned in favor of first degree murder.  The 
jury as a whole could not return a verdict on the lesser degree when some jurors 
were convinced defendant was guilty of the greater.  What the jury was conveying 
to the court was that it was hung on the question of degree.  The proper response 
would have been to direct the jurors to continue deliberating in an effort to achieve 
unanimity, one way or the other. 
 
4.  Other Alleged Instructional Errors  
 
 
 
a.  Self-defense 
Defendant claims the self-defense instructions were incomplete because 
they did not include the principle that ― ‗where [a] counter assault is so sudden and 
perilous that no opportunity be given to decline further to fight and [the defendant] 
cannot retreat with safety he is justified in slaying in self-defense.‘ ‖  (People v. 
Gleghorn (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 196, 201; see People v. Quatch (2004) 116 
42 
 
Cal.App.4th 294, 303.)16  However, as the Gleghorn and Quatch courts made 
clear, this qualification only applies where the defendant commits a simple assault.  
(Gleghorn, at p. 201; Quatch, at p. 301.)  ―[I]f one makes a felonious assault upon 
another, or has created appearances justifying the other to launch a deadly 
counterattack in self-defense, the original assailant cannot slay his adversary in 
self-defense unless he has first, in good faith, declined further combat, and has 
fairly notified him that he has abandoned the affray.  (People v. Hecker (1895) 109 
Cal. 451, 463.)‖  (Gleghorn, at p. 201, italics added.)  Here the evidence did not 
support a finding that defendant was guilty only of simple assault when he 
initiated the confrontation by approaching the victim with a cocked gun.17 
 
 
 
b.  Statements by Defendant 
Defendant also claims the court should have given CALJIC No. 2.71.1, 
warning the jury to view his statements before the offense with caution.18  He 
                                              
16  
The jury was given CALJIC No. 5.56, which provides:  ―The right of self-
defense is only available to a person who engages in mutual combat if he has done 
all the following:  One, he has actually tried in good faith to refuse to continue 
fighting; two, he has clearly informed his opponent that he wants to stop fighting; 
three, he has clearly informed his opponent that he has stopped fighting; and four, 
he has given his opponent the opportunity to stop fighting.  After he has done 
these four things, he has the right to self-defense if his opponent continues to 
fight.‖ 
17  
According to defense witness Echeverria, defendant took no part in the 
assault.  Thus, even if this testimony were accepted by the jury, it afforded no 
basis for the instruction defendant claims should have been given. 
18  
The instruction states:  ―Evidence has been received from which you may 
find that an oral statement of [intent] [plan] [motive] [design] was made by the 
defendant before the offense with which [he] is charged was committed.  It is for 
you to decide whether the statement was made by [the] defendant.  Evidence of an 
oral statement ought to be viewed with caution.‖ 
 
We have noted that ―[t]he rationale behind the cautionary instruction 
suggests it applies broadly.  ‗The purpose of the cautionary instruction is to assist 
the jury in determining if the statement was in fact made.‘  [Citation.]  This 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
43 
 
notes the testimony by Arnold Lemus and Juan Salazar, customers in the Beef 
Bowl, who said that defendant had ―hit them up‖ and inquired about their gang 
affiliation; Kathy Mendez‘s testimony that defendant and Echeverria had spoken 
about ―tak[ing] care of the neighborhood‖ and not being ―caught slipping,‖ as well 
as her report that defendant had told Echeverria to get the ―cuete,‖ meaning his 
gun; and Patrick Turner‘s testimony that he heard defendant or Echeverria ask 
Guevara, ―don‘t I know you from somewhere?‖  Defendant also notes 
Echeverria‘s testimony that defendant said ―Harpys‖ when Guevara‘s cousin first 
got out of the car and entered the Beef Bowl. 
In People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176 (Diaz), we reconsidered the 
requirement that the cautionary principle reflected in CALJIC No. 2.71.1 must be 
imparted to the jury in any case where the evidence would warrant it.  We decided 
that ―in light of a change in the law that requires the general instructions on 
witness credibility to be given sua sponte in every case, the cautionary instruction 
is not one of the general principles of law upon which a court is required to 
instruct the jury in the absence of a request.  The cautionary instruction does not 
reflect a legal principle with which jurors would be unfamiliar absent the 
instruction, and the defendant may not always want the instruction to be given.‖  
(Diaz, at p. 1189.)  However, we did not decide whether this holding applies 
retroactively, finding no prejudice to Diaz from the court‘s failure to give the 
instruction.  (Id. at p. 1195.)  We reach the same conclusion here. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
purpose would apply to any oral statement of the defendant, whether made before, 
during, or after the crime.‖  (People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 392-
393.) 
44 
 
―We apply the standard for state law error:  whether it is reasonably 
probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to defendant had the 
instruction been given.  [Citation.]  Failure to give the cautionary instruction is not 
a violation of federal due process warranting the ‗more stringent standard‘ of 
review for federal constitutional error.  [Citation.]  ‗Since the cautionary 
instruction is intended to help the jury to determine whether the statement 
attributed to the defendant was in fact made, courts examining the prejudice in 
failing to give the instruction examine the record to see if there was any conflict in 
the evidence about the exact words used, their meaning, or whether the 
[statements] were repeated accurately.‘  [Citation.]‖  (Diaz, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 
1195.)  ―Where there was no such conflict in the evidence, but simply a denial by 
the defendant that he made the statements attributed to him, we have found failure 
to give the cautionary instruction harmless.‖  (People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th  
884, 906.)  Furthermore, when the general instructions on witness credibility were 
given, and witnesses were extensively impeached so as to raise the credibility 
issues to which those instructions were pertinent, we have reasoned that ―the jury 
was unquestionably aware their testimony should be viewed with caution.‖  (Id. at 
pp. 906-907.) 
Here there was little conflict in the evidence.  Lemus and Salazar agreed on 
the gist of their conversation with defendant and Echeverria.  While Echeverria 
denied ―hitting them up,‖ he admitted that he and defendant ―went to go talk to‖ 
strangers in the Beef Bowl, and he said these people would have known they were 
talking to Harpys gang members.  The jury was given the standard witness 
credibility instructions.  Mendez, Turner, and Echeverria were each thoroughly 
cross-examined with reference to their prior statements.  There is no reasonable 
probability that defendant‘s jury failed to appreciate the need to carefully evaluate 
45 
 
their testimony.  Accordingly, any error in the failure to give CALJIC No. 2.71.1 
was harmless. 
 
 
 
c.  Accessory After the Fact 
The trial court denied defense counsel‘s request for an instruction on 
liability as an accessory after the fact, noting that a recent decision by this court 
had foreclosed instruction on such lesser related offenses.  Defendant 
acknowledges that the court was referring to People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108 
(Birks), in which we discarded the former rule that defendants are entitled to 
instructions on lesser related offenses.  (Id. at p. 136, overruling People v. Geiger 
(1984) 35 Cal.3d 510.)  However, he claims Birks held that trial courts retain 
discretion to give such instructions, and the trial court erred here by failing to 
exercise its discretion in that regard.  We did not so hold.  We noted only that our 
decision did ―not foreclose the parties from agreeing that the defendant may be 
convicted of a lesser offense not necessarily included in the original charge.‖  
(Birks, at p. 136, fn. 19.)  Here there was no such agreement.  
Defendant asks us to reconsider our holding that Birks applies retroactively.  
(Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 136-137.)  We decline to do so.  In Birks we 
considered and rejected the argument that our decision should apply only 
prospectively.  ―[T]he new rule we announce today neither expands criminal 
liability nor enhances punishment for conduct previously committed.  [Citations.]  
On the contrary, our holding merely withdraws the procedural opportunity for 
conviction of a reduced offense not encompassed by the accusatory pleading and 
selected solely by the defendant.‖  (Birks, at p. 136; see People v. Rundle (2008) 
43 Cal.4th 76, 147.) 
 
 
 
46 
 
 
C.  Penalty Phase Issues 
 
 
1.  Echeverria’s Manslaughter Conviction as a Mitigating Factor 
 
Defendant claims he should have been allowed to use Echeverria‘s 
manslaughter conviction as a mitigating factor.  (See pt. II.B.1., ante.)  Defense 
counsel did not seek to introduce that evidence at the penalty phase; thus this 
claim is forfeited.  In any event, it is firmly established that ―[t]he sentence 
received by an accomplice is not constitutionally or statutorily relevant as a factor 
in mitigation.  Such information does not bear on the circumstances of the capital 
crime or on the defendant‘s own character and record.  ‗[T]he fact that a different 
jury under different evidence, found that a different defendant should not be put to 
death is no more relevant than a finding that such a defendant should be sentenced 
to death.  Such evidence provides nothing more than incomplete, extraneous, and 
confusing information to a jury, which is then left to speculate [on the matter].‘  
[Citation.]‖  (People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 857; see also, e.g., People 
v. Howard, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 40.) 
 
 
2.  Limitation of Witness Testimony 
When questioning defendant‘s mother, defense counsel asked if she thought 
defendant should be punished for murdering Guevara, and for his prior murder 
conviction.  She answered, ―I wouldn‘t want him to be punished because I am not 
certain that he did this, only God knows.‖  Counsel asked, ―if it was proven to you 
that he committed those crimes, do you think he should be punished for those 
crimes?‖  She said, ―well, let him stay a few years in jail.  But please, don‘t give 
him the death penalty.‖  Defendant‘s sister was the next witness.  Before she took 
the stand, the prosecutor approached the bench and questioned whether it was 
proper for witnesses to be asked about the appropriate sentence.  Defense counsel 
said he did not think he had asked that question.  The court said, ―Well, I thought 
it was in a gray area.  . . . I think it is permissible for him to say do you want him 
47 
 
to die as opposed to should he be executed.  That is a fine distinction.‖  The court 
advised defense counsel to ―try to stay away from that area.  Just get from her the 
impact that it has, that [she] loves [her] brother and will visit him in prison and he 
is a good guy.‖ 
Counsel proceeded to ask defendant‘s sister, ―do you feel that he should be 
punished in any way for what he did?‖  She answered, ―He‘s my brother.  I 
wouldn‘t want him to.‖  Counsel repeated the question, and she said, ―Give him 
time in prison but not his whole life and not the death penalty.‖  The prosecutor 
did not object. 
Defendant contends the court‘s limitation on questioning violated his right 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to present mitigating evidence.  The 
claim lacks any foundation in the record.  Counsel never sought to ask any witness 
about the appropriate sentence.  He asked both witnesses the same general 
question about whether defendant should be punished, and their answers were 
admitted into evidence.  Counsel gave no indication that he wanted to pursue any 
further questioning along these lines.  Defendant argues that the following witness, 
a friend of defendant‘s, was not asked any questions about the appropriate 
sentence.  However, given that counsel had freely questioned defendant‘s sister 
about her views on punishment, after hearing the court‘s advice on the matter, 
there is no basis for concluding that counsel‘s questioning of the next witness was 
unduly restricted. 
 
 
3.  The Prosecutor’s Argument 
 
At the outset of his closing statement the prosecutor told the jury:  ―One of 
the most important things to keep in mind is that this whole process, the whole 
trial process, the penalty phase process, the reason why you are here and [defense 
counsel] is here is essentially a truth-seeking mission.  It is to evaluate the facts 
48 
 
and determine what is true and what isn‘t true and what to do with those facts once 
you make that determination. 
 
―The judge talked to you at the beginning of this trial about the death 
penalty, about what would take place in the penalty phase and your job evaluating 
the mitigating factors versus the aggravating factors.  As the judge told you, there 
is no burden of proof but there is a standard to be applied with the aggravating 
factors and the mitigating, that . . . the aggravating substantially outweigh those 
mitigating factors.  That is something that you need to decide when you go back to 
deliberate.‖ 
 
Defendant notes that we have repeatedly characterized the jury‘s function at 
the penalty phase as ―inherently moral and normative, not factual.‖  (People v. 
Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 779; see also, e.g., People v. Wilson (2008) 44 
Cal.4th 758, 830.)  Accordingly, he claims it was misconduct for the prosecutor to 
describe the penalty phase as ―essentially a truth-seeking mission.‖  No objection 
was made below, and this claim is thus forfeited.  ― ‗In order to preserve a claim of 
misconduct, a defendant must make a timely objection and request an admonition; 
only if an admonition would not have cured the harm is the claim of misconduct 
preserved for review.‘  [Citation.]  When a claim of misconduct is based on the 
prosecutor‘s comments before the jury, ‗ ―the question is whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of 
remarks in an objectionable fashion.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 
29; accord, People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1294.)  Here, any 
prejudice to defendant could easily have been dispelled by an admonition from the 
bench. 
 
In any event, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury was misled by the 
prosecutor‘s comments.  In context, they merely informed the jurors that it was 
their job to decide ―what to do with those facts‖ they had found to be true, by 
49 
 
weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation.  The prosecutor also 
emphasized that it was for the jury to decide how much weight to give the 
aggravating and mitigating factors.  That was clearly not a matter of truth or 
falsity.  Defendant‘s claim of misconduct is meritless as well as forfeited. 
 
 
4.  Failure to Instruct on Prior Conviction as an Aggravating Factor 
 
Defendant claims his prior murder conviction was improperly used both as 
a special circumstance under section 190.2, subdivision (a) and as an aggravating 
factor under section 190.3, factors (b) and (c).  He contends the jury should have 
been instructed not to ―double count‖ the conviction in this fashion.  He 
acknowledges that in People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 550 (Proctor), we 
held such an instruction is only available upon request, but asks us to reconsider 
that rule and hold the instruction must be given whenever the evidence raises the 
possibility of improper double counting. 
 
To the extent defendant argues that the same incident may not be 
considered as a special circumstance and as an aggravating factor, he is incorrect.  
(People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 323; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 
764, 820-821.)  To the extent he argues that an instruction on double counting an 
aggravating factor is required in the absence of a request, we are not persuaded to 
change our settled view.  (Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 550, citing People v. 
Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 997; People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 224; 
and People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 768; see McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th 
at pp. 694-695.) 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
5.  Challenges to the Death Penalty Statute  
 
Defendant raises a series of constitutional challenges to the death penalty 
statute, all of which we have rejected in past cases.  We do so again here.19 
 
―The death penalty law adequately narrows the class of death-eligible 
defendants.  [Citations.]‖  (People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 723 (Boyce); 
see also, e.g., People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1214 (Linton).) 
 
― ‗The sentencing factor of ―circumstances of the crime‖ (§ 190.3, factor 
(a)) is not unconstitutionally vague and does not result in the arbitrary and 
capricious imposition of the death penalty.‘  [Citation.]‖  (People v. Scott (2015) 
61 Cal.4th 363, 407 (Scott); see also, e.g., People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 
1, 105-106.)  
 
― ‗Neither the federal nor the state Constitution requires that the penalty 
phase jury make unanimous findings concerning the particular aggravating 
circumstances, find all aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, or find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating 
factors.  [Citation.]  The United States Supreme Court‘s recent decisions 
interpreting the Sixth Amendment‘s jury-trial guarantee [citations] do not alter 
these conclusions.  [Citations.] 
 
―Neither the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth 
Amendment, nor the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires 
that jurors in a capital case be instructed that they must find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that aggravating circumstances exist or that aggravating circumstances 
                                              
19  
We need not address defendant‘s claim that the use of unadjudicated 
criminal activity as an aggravating factor violated his constitutional rights.  The 
only prior criminal activity introduced at the penalty phase was defendant‘s earlier 
murder, which was adjudicated. 
51 
 
outweigh mitigating circumstances or that death is the appropriate penalty.  
[Citations.]  Indeed, trial courts ‗should not instruct the jury regarding any burden 
of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase.‘  [Citation.]  ‗ ―Unlike the guilt 
determination, ‗the sentencing function is inherently moral and normative, not 
factual‘ [citation] and, hence, not susceptible to a burden-of-proof 
quantification.‖ ‘  [Citation.]‖  (Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 1215-1216; see 
also, e.g., Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 723-724.) 
 
―We have consistently held that the ‗so substantial‘ language in CALJIC 
No. 8.88 ‗is not inadequate or misleading.  By advising that a death verdict should 
be returned only if aggravation is ―so substantial in comparison with‖ mitigation 
that death is ―warranted,‖ the instruction clearly admonishes the jury to determine 
whether the balance of aggravation and mitigation makes death the appropriate 
penalty.‘  [Citations.]‖  (People v. Russell (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1228, 1273; see also, 
e.g., Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 724.)  
 
―The trial court is not required to instruct the jury that the absence of a 
mitigating factor cannot be considered as an aggravating factor [citation], [nor is it 
error] to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 8.85 without deleting inapplicable 
factors [citation].‖  (McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 692; see also, e.g., Scott, 
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 407.) 
 
―Neither federal nor state law requires the court to give a lingering doubt 
instruction because this ‗concept is encompassed in section 190.3, factor (k) and 
related [standard capital case] instructions.‘  [Citation.]‖  (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th 
at p. 408; see also, e.g., People v. Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 325-
326.) 
 
―CALJIC No. 8.88‘s language instructing the jury ‗to consider whether the 
circumstances ―warrant[ ]‖ death, rather than if death is the ―appropriate‖ penalty,‘ 
52 
 
does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  [Citation.]‖  (Boyce, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 724; see also, e.g., McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 693.) 
 
―The trial court is not required to instruct the jury . . . that if the mitigating 
evidence outweighs the aggravating evidence, the jury must return a verdict of life 
without the possibility of parole [citation] . . . .‖  (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 
407; see also, e.g., Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 724.) 
 
―The trial court was not required to instruct the jury that the defendant bears 
no burden to prove mitigating factors or that it need not be unanimous in finding 
the existence of any mitigating factor.  [Citations.]‖  (People v. Adams (2014) 60 
Cal.4th 541, 580; see also, e.g., People v. Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp.1068-
1069.) 
 
―Defendant was not entitled to an instruction that there is a presumption in 
favor of life without parole.  [Citation.]‖  (Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 724; see 
also, e.g., Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 407.) 
 
―Written findings by the jury are not constitutionally required.  [Citation.]‖  
(Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 407; see also, e.g., Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 
724-725.) 
 
 
― ‗Intercase proportionality review is not required.‘  [Citation.]  ‗The 
California death penalty scheme does not violate equal protection by treating 
capital and noncapital defendants differently.‘ [Citation.]  ‗. . . California‘s death 
penalty scheme does not violate international law and norms.‘  [Citation.]‖  (Scott, 
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 408; see also, e.g., Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 725.) 
 
D.  Cumulative Prejudice 
 
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of errors at all phases of his trial 
requires reversal of the guilt and penalty judgments.  We disagree.  Pretrial, the 
court erred by failing to conduct death-qualification voir dire of three prospective 
53 
 
jurors, but defendant forfeited his claim on this point by failing to object.  
Counsel‘s neglect leaves us with no record to support his assertion of prejudice. 
 
At the guilt phase, we have found no prejudicial error.  We have rejected 
defendant‘s claims of penalty phase error.  Accordingly, the claim of cumulative 
prejudice fails.  
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
 
 
A core premise of our legal system, grounded in our basic charters of 
governance, is that society distinguishes between juveniles and adults who commit 
crimes.  (E.g., Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. _, ___ [132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464] 
(Miller) [―children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 
sentencing‖]; see Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 548 
[discussing differential treatment of juveniles and adults].)  We draw such a 
distinction not only in the general domain of criminal sentencing, but in the 
specific context of the death penalty.  (E.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 
551 (Roper) [federal Const. precludes a death sentence for individuals who 
committed their crimes when under the age of 18]).  In light of the lines courts 
have drawn to distinguish between juvenile and adult conduct for sentencing 
purposes –– and, in particular, the limitations on imposition of the death penalty 
for conduct an individual committed as a juvenile –– defendant Magdaleno 
Salazar argues that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution bars 
imposition of the death penalty in this case.  Specifically, he claims that the federal 
Constitution prohibits use of his prior juvenile murder conviction as the sole basis 
for the special circumstance that made his first degree murder punishable by death. 
 
The majority opinion rejects this argument.  Although I concur with this 
conclusion, I write separately to address certain aspects of this claim and explain 
why the question is a close one. 
2 
 
 
A court or jury may consider a defendant‘s prior murder, even if committed 
when defendant was a minor, as an aggravating circumstance.  (People v. Bivert 
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 122-123, and cases cited therein.)  What defendant contends 
is that use of his prior juvenile murder conviction for the eligibility determination 
is different.  It is, in some respects, since the purpose of eligibility factors is to 
narrow the universe of individuals punishable by death.  (See Romano v. 
Oklahoma (1994) 512 U.S. 1, 7.)  In Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at page 569, the 
United States Supreme Court held that individuals who are under 18 when they 
commit murder ―cannot with reliability be classified amongst the worst offenders‖ 
who deserve execution.  The court identified three differences between juveniles 
and adults in support of this conclusion.  First, juveniles‘ immaturity and lesser 
sense of responsibility often result in ― ‗impetuous and ill-considered actions and 
decisions.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  Second, juveniles are more vulnerable to negative influences 
and outside pressures.  (Ibid.)  Third, juveniles have character traits that tend to be 
more malleable, and may prove less accurate as portents of future conduct.  (Id. at 
p. 570.)  In light of these differences, the court concluded that juveniles are 
categorically less culpable than adults.  (Id. at p. 561.) 
 
Defendant urges us to build on this foundation.  It is impossible, he claims, 
to reconcile two conclusions:  that such differences make juveniles categorically 
less culpable than adults, and that a court may nonetheless rely on a juvenile 
offense to establish a defendant‘s eligibility for a death sentence.  Indeed, it is 
―analytically incoherent,‖ defendant contends, to conclude that conduct presumed 
to be less culpable because it was committed during his youth (see Roper, supra, 
543 U.S. at p. 569) could nevertheless establish a special circumstance, thereby 
making it possible for him to receive the death penalty.  If a juvenile offender is 
categorically less culpable than an adult offender committing an equivalent 
offense, defendant questions how the Eighth Amendment permits an offense 
3 
 
committed by a juvenile to play precisely the same role in constituting the basis 
for a special circumstance as an offense committed by an adult.   
 
In light of the high court‘s decisions concerning the punishment of juvenile 
offenders (e.g., Miller, supra, 567 U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 2455] [Eighth Amend. 
forbids mandatory life imprisonment without possibility of parole (LWOP) 
sentences for murder committed by a juvenile]; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 
U.S. 48 [Eighth Amend. forbids LWOP sentences for non-homicide crimes 
committed by juveniles]; Roper, supra, 543 U.S. 551), I find the question to be a 
difficult one.  There is at least some tension between our jurisprudence concerning 
the culpability of juveniles (see, e.g., People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 
1375; People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 266) and the idea that a murder 
committed by a juvenile is no different from any other murder for purposes of 
applying the relevant special circumstance here.  (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(2); 
subsequent unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.)  Moreover, the 
relevant analysis of defendant‘s claim turns not only on what is rational for a 
Legislature to conclude, but also on what constitutes permissible punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment.  For example, it might conceivably be ―rational‖ for 
the Legislature to conclude that juveniles who commit multiple murders should 
receive mandatory LWOP sentences –– but that is a scheme the Eighth 
Amendment plainly forbids.  (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 2455].)     
 
By embracing defendant‘s claim, we would perforce embrace the 
conclusion that there is no way to reconcile the Legislature‘s approach to special 
circumstances with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.  What nonetheless 
seems quite relevant to the inquiry –– and cuts against defendant‘s argument –– is 
that section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2) does serve to narrow the class of individuals 
eligible for imposition of the death penalty.  Under this statutory provision, a 
narrower class of individuals is eligible for capital punishment relative to the full 
4 
 
range of individuals who commit a first degree murder –– and even relative to 
individuals who previously committed a murder as juveniles.  The latter narrowing 
occurs under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2) because only juvenile murders that 
result in criminal convictions, rather than juvenile adjudications, satisfy the special 
circumstance.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2) [requiring that defendant previously was 
―convicted‖ of first or second degree murder]; In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 43 
[juvenile adjudication is not a conviction].)  The distinctions drawn in application 
of the special circumstance reflect an aspect of the legislative design that is not 
plainly ruled out by the Eighth Amendment.  (Coker v. Georgia (1977) 433 U.S. 
584, 592 [describing the circumscribed scope of Eighth Amend. review].)  
Defendant is right that special circumstances and aggravating factors serve 
different functions.  (Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 971-972.)  Yet 
ultimately, defendant‘s argument fails to distinguish sufficiently between the 
permissible use of his prior juvenile murder as an aggravating circumstance and its 
allegedly improper use as a special circumstance. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Salazar 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S077524 
Date Filed: May 26, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Robert J. Perry 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Jessica K. McGuire, 
Assistant State Public Defender, Jolie S. Lipsig and Ellen J. Eggers, Deputy State Public Defenders; James 
S. Thomson and Nicholas J. Seymour for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler , Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Joseph P. Lee, Jaime L. Fuster and Ryan M. Smith, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
James S. Thomson 
819 Delaware Street 
Berkeley, CA  94710 
(510) 525-9123 
 
Ryan M. Smith 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2712