Case Title: State v. Jason L. McClaren

Citation: 2009 WI 69

Docket Number: 2007AP002382-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 69 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP2382-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Jason L. McClaren, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 118 
Reported at: 313 Wis. 2d 398, 756 N.W.2d 802 
(Ct. App. 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 15, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson   
 
JUDGE: 
Randy R. Koschnick   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Michael C. 
Witt and Criminal Defense & Civil Litigation, LLC, Jefferson, 
and oral argument by Michael C. Witt. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 69
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP2382-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2007CF144) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jason L. McClaren, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J.   This 
case 
concerns 
an 
interlocutory appeal before the court of appeals of a circuit 
court's pretrial order.  The order permitted the defendant-
appellant, Jason L. McClaren (McClaren), to introduce in 
connection with his claim of self-defense what is commonly 
referred to as "McMorris1 evidence"——evidence of violent acts the 
victim had committed which McClaren knew about at the time of 
the alleged crime, and which would bear on the reasonableness of 
                                                 
1 McMorris v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 144, 205 N.W.2d 559 (1973). 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
2 
 
the claim of self-defense——but only on the condition that he 
provide a summary of that evidence prior to trial so that the 
court could make a pretrial determination of its relevance and 
admissibility.  McClaren objected to that requirement on the 
grounds that the court had no authority to require disclosure of 
such evidence and that doing so violated certain constitutional 
rights.  He contended that the proper time to resolve concerns 
about admissibility would be after the testimony was elicited at 
trial and drew an objection.  He sought and was granted review 
of the non-final order at the court of appeals. 
¶2 
The court of appeals, in a published decision, held 
that the circuit court's order exceeded its authority because 
neither Wis. Stat. § 971.23 (2005-06),2 which sets forth limited 
pre-trial disclosure obligations for a defendant, nor Wis. Stat. 
§ 906.11, which authorizes a court to exercise control over the 
presentation of evidence, extended to an order to provide 
McMorris evidence in advance of trial.  State v. McClaren, 2008 
WI App 118, 313 Wis. 2d 398, 756 N.W.2d 802.  Because the court 
of appeals resolved the issue in favor of McClaren on statutory 
grounds, it did not reach McClaren's constitutional arguments. 
¶3 
For the reasons stated below, we reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals.  Wisconsin statutes provide the circuit 
court with the necessary authority for the order we consider 
here.  Wis. Stat. § 906.11 authorizes a judge to exercise 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
3 
 
control over the presentation of evidence so that the truth can 
be effectively ascertained and so that time will not be 
needlessly wasted.  To hold otherwise could frustrate a circuit 
court's efforts to try to be certain that a jury is presented 
with admissible, reliable evidence and to make pretrial rulings 
so that the trial runs smoothly.  The authority of a circuit 
court under Wis. Stat. § 906.11 fits within the broader context 
of a court's inherent powers "which must necessarily be used to 
enable the judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally or 
legislatively mandated functions."  City of Sun Prairie v. 
Davis, 226 Wis. 2d 738, 747, 595 N.W.2d 635 (1999) (citing State 
ex rel. Friedrich v. Dane County Cir. Ct., 192 Wis. 2d 16, 531 
N.W.2d 32 (1995)).  Foreseeing potential obstacles to a smoothly 
run trial and taking the necessary steps to avoid them is 
manifestly within the inherent power of a circuit court. 
¶4 
McClaren says that, in requiring him to tell prior to 
trial which instances of the victim's violent conduct he was 
aware of at the time of the incident, the order violates his 
Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent and not incriminate 
himself.  He says the order also runs afoul of the Due Process 
Clause because it imposes no reciprocal obligations on the 
State.  Finally, he argues that excluding evidence——the sanction 
the court stated would result for his not complying with the 
order——would violate his Sixth Amendment right to present a 
defense. 
¶5 
There is no constitutional bar to the exercise of the 
circuit court's authority in this case.  Ascertainment of the 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
4 
 
truth is the primary objective of a trial, and such an order 
serves that objective in a constitutionally permissible manner.  
Efficiency is a secondary objective of a trial, but where it can 
be attained with constitutionally permitted measures, it is 
highly desirable.  The United States Supreme Court has, on more 
than one occasion, upheld measures that ensure fair play and 
efficient use of trial court time.  Where, as here, the evidence 
to be disclosed is nothing more than what the defendant chooses 
and has indicated he will put on at trial, such an order does 
not invade constitutional protections under the Fifth Amendment.  
As the United States Supreme Court noted in an analogous case, 
the Constitution does not guarantee a criminal defendant the 
right to surprise the prosecutor.  Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 
78, 86 (1970) ("We decline to hold that the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination guarantees the defendant the right 
to surprise the State with an alibi defense.").  Nor does the 
order violate McClaren's constitutional rights to due process; 
United States Supreme Court case law holds that so long as 
disclosure requirements are equally imposed on both parties, 
there is no constitutional violation.  Wardius v. Oregon, 412 
U.S. 470 (1973).   
¶6 
A corollary to the question of the constitutionality 
of the order is the constitutionality of any sanctions available 
for a violation of the order.  McClaren contends that exclusion 
of evidence is simply not an option.  However, in Taylor v. 
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), the United States Supreme Court 
set forth the appropriate analysis for such a violation and 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
5 
 
established that sanctions up to and including exclusion of 
evidence are permissible if warranted.  It appears from the 
record that the circuit court intended to exclude from trial any 
evidence that McClaren attempted to offer at trial in violation 
of the order; we clarify here that while such a sanction may be 
permitted, lesser sanctions must be considered first, and that 
the extreme sanction of exclusion is permissible only after the 
circuit court has determined that the violation was "willful and 
motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage that would 
minimize the effectiveness of cross-examination and the ability 
to adduce rebuttal evidence," the test set forth in Taylor.  Id. 
at 415. 
¶7 
We therefore reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶8 
McClaren spent a spring evening drinking with his 
wife's ex-boyfriend, Conrad Goehl (Goehl), and the night ended 
with an altercation——arising, ironically, from a discussion of 
anger management counseling——in which McClaren hit Goehl with a 
pickaxe.  When the police arrived at the scene, Goehl said he 
had been attacked without provocation; McClaren claimed self-
defense.  McClaren was charged with several crimes, including 
attempted first-degree intentional homicide.  Prior to trial, 
which was scheduled to begin October 29, 2007, McClaren filed a 
motion in limine seeking a ruling on the admissibility of 
information about Goehl's extensive criminal record and time in 
prison, and evidence of his "dangerous character and prior acts 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
6 
 
of violence."  A hearing was held on McClaren's motion on 
October 2, 2007, four weeks before the day of trial. 
¶9 
Following the hearing, the Jefferson County Circuit 
Court, the Honorable Randy R. Koschnick presiding, ruled that 
McClaren would be allowed to introduce evidence about Goehl's 
violent past but gave McClaren a pretrial deadline to disclose 
to the State and to the court the nature of the evidence he 
intended to introduce.  The court required "a summary of all 
specific instances of the victim's violent conduct of which the 
defendant was aware and that the defendant intends to introduce 
at trial, including witnesses to such conduct and the date and 
place such conduct occurred."  The record showed that Goehl had 
11 prior convictions,3 and the circuit court expressed concern 
about the length of a mid-trial hearing, outside the jury's 
presence, on the admissibility of evidence of this nature.   
¶10 In its oral ruling, the circuit court imposed a 
reciprocal requirement that the State in turn provide a summary 
of any evidence it intended to use to rebut McClaren's McMorris 
evidence regarding Goehl.  
¶11 Since the order was not appealable as of right, 
McClaren filed a petition for leave to appeal the order, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.50, and the court of appeals 
granted the petition. 
                                                 
3 Of course, we note that the potential evidence of prior 
violent conduct could include conduct other than that which led 
to the convictions. 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
7 
 
¶12 The court of appeals reversed.  The court of appeals 
viewed the order, "in essence, as a discovery device," and thus 
centered its analysis on Wis. Stat. § 971.23, which addresses 
what evidence a prosecutor must disclose and what evidence a 
defendant must disclose.  McClaren, 313 Wis. 2d 398, ¶25.  
Because that statute has nothing to say about McMorris evidence, 
the court held that the order exceeded the circuit court's 
authority; it found Wis. Stat. § 906.11 inapplicable and, 
because it found no statute or case that required such 
disclosure, held that the order was not permitted.  Id.  It 
cited this court's holding in State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 
151 N.W.2d 157 (1967), that discovery in criminal cases was not 
a matter to be determined by case law but depended on statute or 
the rule-making process.  Id., ¶14. 
¶13 The State filed a petition with this court seeking 
review of the court of appeals' decision, and we granted review. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 This case involves questions of judicial authority, 
statutory interpretation, and constitutional issues, all of 
which are reviewed de novo.  Custodian of Records for the LTSB 
v. State, 2004 WI 65, ¶6, 272 Wis. 2d 208, 680 N.W.2d 792; State 
v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, ¶11, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155; In 
the interest of E.C., 130 Wis. 2d 376, 381, 387 N.W.2d 72 
(1986). 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
8 
 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶15 We begin by focusing on two things: the circumstances 
under which the order was made, and what evidence the order 
concerned. 
¶16 This case was proceeding toward trial.  The order 
McClaren challenges here arose at a hearing on a motion in 
limine brought by McClaren.  He was seeking, among other things, 
for the circuit court to rule that testimony concerning Goehl's 
violent history would be admissible on the grounds that it was 
relevant to McClaren's state of mind.4  The discussion turned to 
what specific evidence McClaren wanted to admit.  The court 
engaged counsel in extended discussion of the dilemma presented: 
how the court could control the evidence to ensure that the jury 
                                                 
4 McClaren's motion in limine requested: 
 
 . . . . 
3. 
That the court make a ruling out of the presence 
of the jury regarding the admissibility of Conrad 
Goehl's criminal convictions, as well as specific 
finding as to the number of Mr. Goehl's criminal 
convictions.  
4. 
That the Court make a ruling out of the presence 
of the jury regarding the admissibility of the 
type 
and 
factual 
basis 
for 
Mr. 
Goehl's 
convictions, as well as Mr. Goehl's dangerous 
character and prior acts of violence, as they 
directly relate to the reasonableness of the 
perceived threat Mr. Goehl posed to the defendant 
and 
the 
defendant's 
belief 
that 
force 
was 
necessary to terminate the interference with his 
person by Mr. Goehl.  
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
9 
 
heard only that which was relevant, not cumulative and not 
unfairly prejudicial.  Among Goehl's prior convictions, for 
example, was a conviction for sexual assault of a child, and the 
potential for that evidence to be submitted at trial raised 
multiple questions——its relevance to McClaren's state of mind 
(whether McClaren even knew about it), its relevance as to 
Goehl's violent character, and its highly prejudicial nature.  
Besides questions of admissibility there was also the question 
of how the State would be able to investigate and rebut evidence 
that was revealed for the first time at trial.  The circuit 
court concluded that the impracticality of deciding these issues 
at trial precluded that option.  The part of the written order 
relevant to this review was as follows: 
The defendant shall make written disclosure to the 
Court and the prosecution by the close of business on 
October 16, 2007, a summary of all specific instances 
of the victim's violent conduct of which the defendant 
was aware and that the defendant intends to introduce 
at trial, including witnesses to such conduct and the 
date and place such conduct occurred.  Such disclosure 
does not include acts of the victim referenced in the 
defendant's interrogation on March 31, 2007.  
¶17 In the oral ruling made at the hearing, the circuit 
court further stated: 
The ruling is, if any party intends to introduce 
evidence concerning an act by Mr. Goehl which is not 
covered in the interview, police interview with the 
defendant, the offering party needs to provide written 
notice to the Court and the opposing party by close of 
business on October 12th as to the particular acts; 
and 
that 
includes 
the 
location, 
the 
time, 
the 
witnesses and the behavior, the witnesses that the 
party intends to call at trial concerning that 
particular act.  That applies to both parties.  I 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
10 
 
can't conceive of a situation right now where the 
State would have evidence that falls into this 
category, but they might[,] and the same ruling 
applies to both parties. 
¶18 The court referred repeatedly to the fact that the 
ruling was based on its concern for using jurors' time 
effectively and avoiding unfair prejudice to either party.5  
¶19 As noted above, McClaren appealed the order on several 
grounds: first, that the circuit court was without authority for 
such an order; second, that it violated his Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination and right to remain silent 
because it compelled him to provide to the circuit court and the 
State an account of what he knew at the time of the incident 
about Goehl's prior violent acts; third, that in conditioning 
the admissibility of testimony of defense witnesses on prior 
disclosure, the order violated his due process rights because it 
imposed no reciprocal obligation on the State; and fourth, for 
                                                 
5 For example, the court stated, "I'm not concerned about 
sanctions on [McClaren] so much as I am concerned about not, you 
know, misleading the jury, allowing evidence to come in that's 
not 
properly 
admissible; 
it's 
likely 
to 
be 
unfairly 
prejudicial." Later in the hearing, the court said, "I don't 
want to take time with the jury sitting here to be processing 
this information during the trial, and it could be a pretty 
lengthy hearing that's required depending on what it is we're 
talking about. . . .  I don't want to end up in a situation 
where the jury is waiting in the jury room for two hours while I 
hear from three or four witnesses describing something allegedly 
done by Mr. Goehl . . . ."  
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
11 
 
the same reason, the order violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
present a defense.6  
¶20 We examine each of his arguments in turn but first 
briefly summarize the law on evidence supporting a claim of 
self-defense.  
¶21 It is well established that a defendant seeking to 
support a self-defense claim may attempt to "prov[e] prior 
specific 
instances 
of 
violence 
within 
[the 
defendant's] 
knowledge at the time of the incident."  State v. Wenger, 225 
Wis. 2d 495, 507, 593 N.W.2d 467 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting 
McMorris v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 144, 152, 205 N.W.2d 559 (1973)); 
see also Wis. Stat. §§ 904.04 and 904.05(2).  It is also well 
established that admissibility of evidence proffered to show the 
reasonableness of the self-defense claim is within the circuit 
court's discretion.  State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 
648 N.W.2d 413.  As with any "other acts evidence," the evidence 
is subject to the application of the balancing test involving 
the weighing of probative value against the danger of unfair 
prejudice, and considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.03. 
 
Assuming 
its 
probative 
value 
outweighs 
such 
considerations, we have in previous cases established the 
defendant's right to put on such evidence once a factual basis 
                                                 
6 The Sixth Amendment provides as follows: "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."  U.S. Const. 
amend. VI. 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
12 
 
has 
been 
set 
forth for a self-defense claim, and also 
established the circuit court's responsibility to vet the 
evidence prior to admission to be sure it is valid McMorris 
evidence.  See, e.g., McAllister v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 246, 246 
N.W.2d 511 (1976).  The question before us in this case is 
primarily a question of timing: whether a circuit court has the 
authority to order a defendant to disclose any planned McMorris 
evidence prior to trial, so that the factors involved in 
determining the evidence's admissibility can be weighed not only 
prior to admission, but also prior to trial.  
A.  Authority for the order 
¶22 McClaren argues that this court in Miller limited a 
court's authority to order disclosure of evidence in a criminal 
case to what is permitted by statute.  In Miller this court 
noted, "If we are to adopt a pretrial discovery procedure in 
criminal cases in this state we deem it would be best done by a 
rule of court or by legislative action rather than on a case to 
case basis by the court."  Miller, 35 Wis. at 478.  Finding no 
authority for the disclosure of McMorris evidence in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.23, which lists what parties in a criminal case are 
required to disclose, he argues that the inquiry is ended. 
¶23 The State gleans statutory authority for a circuit 
court to order disclosure of pretrial McMorris evidence from 
reading together Wis. Stat. §§ 906.11 and 901.04(3)(d).  Those 
statutes authorize a court to exercise reasonable control over 
the presentation of evidence and provide for hearings to be held 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
13 
 
outside the presence of the jury for "[a]ny preliminary matter 
if the interests of justice so requires."  § 901.04(3)(d). 
¶24 We do not view this case as presenting the kind of 
discovery question Miller was addressing.7  One significant 
difference is that the evidence covered by the order is nothing 
more than evidence that the party chooses to submit.  The order 
is, in essence, compelling advance notice of whatever McMorris 
evidence McClaren decides to offer solely for the legitimate 
purpose of establishing its admissibility in advance of trial. 
¶25 Here, the evidence in question presents the potential 
for multiple delays in the trial, if it is not resolved in 
advance of trial.  The rule McClaren advocates, which would 
render disclosure of any McMorris evidence impermissible until 
such time as the defendant chose to disclose it, could force not 
just one, but many mid-trial delays.  Under his approach, the 
court may not force him to disclose, even after the trial is 
underway, all of the specific acts at once; his argument is that 
any forced disclosure before the point at which he seeks to 
admit the evidence runs afoul of the Constitution.8  Multiple 
continuances while the State investigates each incident and 
                                                 
7 We do note, however, that State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 
151 N.W.2d 157 (1967), which was decided in 1967, predated both 
Wis. Stat. § 906.11, which gives a court broad powers to control 
the presentation of evidence, and Wis. Stat. § 971.23, which 
imposes disclosure requirements on both the State and criminal 
defendants.  Those statutes were adopted in 1973. 
8 At the motion hearing, McClaren's counsel said any 
evidence he would attempt to admit is "subject to objection" and 
would be dealt with at that moment in the trial. 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
14 
 
multiple hearings outside of the presence of the jury are a 
distinct possibility on the facts of this case: 11 prior 
convictions of the victim, Goehl, are known; the number of 
incidents of prior violent conduct that did not result in 
conviction is unknown.  Such an approach puts the control of the 
trial in the hands of the defendant rather than the court and 
introduces unnecessary uncertainty into an otherwise predictable 
trial process.  With no basis for an estimate of how long the 
trial will run, a judge would be unable to balance other 
calendar demands and unable to tell potential jurors during jury 
selection how long the trial is expected to last.  
¶26 Given the limited nature of the evidence covered in 
this order——that is, the requirement that McClaren give notice 
of the specific McMorris evidence he wants to introduce and 
which he was aware of on the night of the incident——this order 
fits comfortably into Wis. Stat. § 906.11's description of the 
court's sphere of control.  The court is, in fact, required to 
"exercise 
reasonable control" over the "present[ation of] 
evidence" so that it can be done effectively and with minimal 
wasted time.  See State v. Wallerman, 203 Wis. 2d 158, 168, 552 
N.W.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1996).  Both concerns were specifically 
mentioned by the circuit court with regard to this order.  This 
is precisely the type of admissibility of evidence questions 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
15 
 
that circuit courts should be attempting to resolve in advance 
of trial.9   
¶27 The United States Supreme Court has upheld a law 
requiring pre-trial notice of an alibi defense along with the 
specific location where the defendant claims to have been and 
names and addresses of alibi witnesses.10  Like such a law, this 
order merely moves the notification of the intent to introduce 
evidence from the heat of the trial to the relative calm of a 
pre-trial 
motion 
hearing. 
 
It 
enables 
more 
effective 
presentation of evidence, avoids needless waste of time while a 
jury is waiting, and gives a circuit judge the time to consider 
all the arguments and research the case law prior to making a 
ruling.11 
                                                 
9 For example, evidence the prosecution wishes to introduce 
against the defendant under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1)(b) and (2) is 
handled in a similar fashion.  See State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 
2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998). 
10 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
11 In State v. Wright, the court of appeals noted the common 
use of pretrial rulings in Wisconsin and other jurisdictions and 
noted that they are favored in a variety of circumstances: 
While the following list is not exhaustive, we view a 
motion in limine as proper where (1) the trial court 
has directed that the evidentiary issue be resolved 
before trial; (2) the evidentiary material is highly 
prejudicial or inflammatory and would risk a mistrial 
if not previously addressed by the trial court; (3) 
the evidentiary issue is significant and unresolved 
under existing law; (4) the evidentiary issue involves 
a significant number of witnesses or a substantial 
volume of material making it more economical to have 
the issue resolved in advance of trial so as to save 
the time and resources of all concerned; or (5) a 
party does not wish to object to the evidence in the 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
16 
 
¶28 Under the circumstances presented here, where McClaren 
seeks to introduce McMorris evidence in support of a self-
defense claim, the circuit court has the authority under Wis. 
Stat. § 906.11, in conjunction with Wis. Stat. § 901.04(3)(d), 
to order the defendant to disclose prior to trial any specific 
acts that he knew about at the time of the incident and that he 
intends 
to 
offer 
as 
evidence 
so 
that 
admissibility 
determinations can be made prior to trial. 
¶29 The 
United States Supreme Court's discussion of 
limitations on the defendant in presenting his or her evidence 
when the defendant pleases closely tracks the logic of Wis. 
Stat. § 906.11.  The linchpins of a fair trial are the "orderly 
presentation of facts" and "a fair opportunity" for each party 
to prepare evidence and rebuttal evidence.  Taylor, 484 U.S. at 
411. 
¶30 In Taylor, a case concerning a violation of a rule 
requiring advance notice of witnesses, the United States Supreme 
Court said: 
The principle that undergirds the defendant's right to 
present exculpatory evidence is also the source of 
essential limitations on the right. The adversary 
process 
could 
not 
function 
effectively 
without 
adherence to rules of procedure that govern the 
orderly presentation of facts and arguments to provide 
each party with a fair opportunity to assemble and 
                                                                                                                                                             
presence of the jury and thereby preserves the issue 
for appellate review by obtaining an unfavorable 
ruling via a pretrial motion in limine[.]  
State v. Wright, 2003 WI App 252, ¶40, 268 Wis. 2d 694, 673 
N.W.2d 386 (citations omitted). 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
17 
 
submit 
evidence 
to 
contradict 
or 
explain 
the 
opponent's case.  The trial process would be a 
shambles if either party had an absolute right to 
control the time and content of his witnesses' 
testimony.  
Id. at 410-11. (emphasis added). 
¶31 The Supreme Court noted as well: "In the exercise of 
[the right to present witnesses], the accused, as is required of 
the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and 
evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the 
ascertainment of guilt and innocence."  Taylor, 484 U.S. at 411 
n.15 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 
(1973)). 
¶32 The order in this case did nothing more than what was 
found permissible in the Taylor case: it was a procedure related 
to a rule of evidence designed to assure fairness.  
B.  Constitutionality of the order 
¶33 McClaren further argues that the order violates his 
rights against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  In essence, he 
argues, he is being compelled to provide the State, prior to 
trial, with what he knew about Goehl's violent character and 
when he knew it, even though he could ultimately choose at the 
close of the State's case not to testify. 
¶34 The State argues that no constitutionally protected 
right is violated because the order concerns only what McClaren 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
18 
 
chooses to disclose12 and merely accelerates the disclosure of 
information that would be presented at trial. 
¶35 In ruling that a defendant could be required to give 
notice of an alibi defense prior to trial, a defense analogous 
to self-defense, the United States Supreme Court said:  
Petitioner concedes that absent the notice-of-alibi 
rule the Constitution would raise no bar to the 
court's granting the State a continuance at trial on 
the ground of surprise as soon as the alibi witness is 
called. 
 
Nor 
would 
there 
be 
self-incrimination 
problems if, during that continuance, the State was 
permitted to do precisely what it did here prior to 
trial: take the deposition of the witness and find 
rebuttal evidence.  But if so utilizing a continuance 
is 
permissible 
under 
the 
Fifth 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments, then surely the same result may be 
accomplished through pretrial discovery, as it was 
here, avoiding the necessity of a disrupted trial.  We 
decline to hold that the privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination guarantees the defendant the right 
to surprise the State with an alibi defense.  
Williams, 399 U.S at 85 (emphasis added).  The same rationale 
supports our conclusion here. 
¶36 McClaren 
also 
argues 
that 
the 
order 
is 
constitutionally deficient because its lack of reciprocity 
violates the requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
                                                 
12 Any 
concerns 
that 
a 
defendant 
has 
concerning 
the 
disclosure potentially being used by the prosecutor in the case-
in-chief could be addressed by an in camera review by the 
circuit court. Such a mechanism has been endorsed by the United 
States Supreme Court as a fair way of resolving disclosure 
disputes.  See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 
(1987)(finding that both the defendant's and the State's 
interest "in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by 
requiring that the [evidence being sought] be submitted only to 
the trial court for in camera review" prior to a ruling on 
disclosure). 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
19 
 
Process Clause.  The United States Supreme Court struck down a 
criminal statute in Wardius that required a defendant to 
disclose 
an 
alibi 
defense 
without 
requiring 
reciprocal 
disclosure by the state of its rebuttal evidence.  Wardius, 412 
U.S. 470.  McClaren argues that the order presented here is 
equally deficient; the only way it could be made reciprocal is 
for the prosecutor to be ordered to disclose "all corroborating 
evidence of the alleged victim's concededly violent past 
implicated by the defendant's forced pre-trial disclosures, 
including the names of any additional witnesses to prior violent 
acts engaged in by the alleged victim."   
¶37 A careful comparison of Wardius and the oral ruling of 
the circuit court in this case shows that the flaw present in 
Wardius was not present here.  The statute at issue in Wardius 
contained no guarantee of disclosure of rebuttal evidence to the 
defendant.  The Court stated that "[a]lthough the Due Process 
Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which 
the parties must be afforded, it does speak to the balance of 
forces between the accused and accuser."  Wardius, 412 U.S. at 
474 (citation omitted).  The Court went on to say: 
The State may not insist that trials be run as a 
"search for truth" so far as defense witnesses are 
concerned, while maintaining "poker game" secrecy for 
its own witnesses. It is fundamentally unfair to 
require a defendant to divulge the details of his own 
case while at the same time subjecting him to the 
hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very 
pieces of evidence which he disclosed to the State.  
Id. at 475-76. 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
20 
 
¶38 Here the circuit court's oral ruling made more clear 
than the written order that reciprocity was absolutely required.  
The circuit court said:  
So what I have in mind is that the deadline for filing 
the written materials would be the 12th . . . . That 
would apply to the State and to the defense. If the 
State has evidence that would fall into the category 
of acts not covered in the police interview which are 
relevant to self-defense or the lack thereof, those 
acts would be covered as well for the same reasons.  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶39 It might have been more clear had the court explicitly 
called the evidence showing a lack of self-defense rebuttal 
evidence, but in any case, the court was explicit that its order 
applied to both parties. 
C.  Constitutionality of the potential sanction 
¶40 A conclusion that the circuit court has authority to 
issue such an order necessarily brings us to the question of the 
authority to enforce such an order. 
¶41 McClaren says that excluding evidence as a sanction 
for violating the court's order is impermissible because it 
would violate his constitutional right to present witnesses, and 
thus 
to 
present 
a 
defense, 
under 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment's 
compulsory process clause.13 
                                                 
13 The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, "In all 
criminal 
prosecutions, 
the 
accused 
shall 
enjoy 
the 
right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
in his favor . . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  In Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), the United States Supreme Court held 
that this right applies in state prosecutions. 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
21 
 
¶42 The State contends that such a sanction may be 
permitted depending on the facts and that Taylor controls the 
sanction for any violations.  Taylor upheld an Illinois court's 
refusal to allow testimony from a defense witness whose name was 
not 
disclosed 
prior to trial.  The Court rejected the 
defendant's assertion that excluding evidence was never a 
permissible sanction and established a framework for analyzing 
violations.  Taylor, 484 U.S. at 412-13. 
¶43 We agree with the State.  The United States Supreme 
Court has established a test for excluding evidence and has said 
that under certain circumstances, exclusion of evidence does not 
violate 
a 
defendant's 
constitutional 
rights. 
 
There 
are 
sanctions short of excluding evidence, of course.  The Court 
cited a case, for example, that "[gave] consideration to the 
effectiveness of less severe sanctions, the impact of preclusion 
on the evidence at trial and the outcome of the case, the extent 
of 
prosecutorial 
surprise 
or 
prejudice, 
and 
whether 
the 
violation was willful."  Taylor, 484 U.S. at 415 n.19 (citing 
Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1983)).  However, 
as Taylor makes clear, even the sanction of excluding evidence 
against a defendant is constitutionally permissible in certain 
cases, such as where there have been willful violations 
"motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage."  Taylor, 
484 U.S. at 415. 
¶44 As we noted above, Taylor states well the balancing of 
interests that goes into a court's oversight of a trial: 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
22 
 
It is elementary, of course, that a trial court may 
not 
ignore 
the 
fundamental 
character 
of 
the 
defendant's right to offer the testimony of witnesses 
in his favor.  But the mere invocation of that right 
cannot 
automatically 
and 
invariably 
outweigh 
countervailing public interests.  The integrity of the 
adversary 
process, 
which 
depends 
both 
on 
the 
presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of 
unreliable evidence, the interest in the fair and 
efficient administration of justice, and the potential 
prejudice to the truth-determining function of the 
trial process must also weigh in the balance. 
Id. at 414-15 (emphasis added). 
¶45 Whether a violation merits the extreme sanction of 
exclusion must be determined by a circuit court after a 
violation has occurred, and under the parameters set forth by 
the United States Supreme Court in Taylor.  
¶46 Here the circuit court noted in its oral ruling that, 
"As always, if new evidence is discovered at the last minute 
that may be the basis for an exception to the notice 
requirement."  The circuit court should have been more clear 
that the Taylor analysis would be applied and that exclusion was 
one of the sanctions available to the circuit court for a 
violation of its order; it was premature for the circuit court, 
in its oral ruling, to predict that the sanction for failure to 
abide by the order would necessarily be the exclusion of 
evidence. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶47 For the reasons stated, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals.  Wisconsin statutes provide the circuit court 
with the necessary authority for the order we consider here.  
Wis. Stat. § 906.11 authorizes a judge to exercise control over 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
23 
 
the 
presentation of evidence so that the truth can be 
effectively ascertained and so that time will not be needlessly 
wasted.  To hold otherwise could frustrate a circuit court's 
efforts to try to be certain that a jury is presented with 
admissible, reliable evidence and to make pretrial rulings so 
that the trial runs smoothly.  The authority of a circuit court 
under Wis. Stat. § 906.11 fits within the broader context of a 
court's inherent powers "which must necessarily be used to 
enable the judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally or 
legislatively mandated functions."  Davis, 226 Wis. 2d at 747.  
Foreseeing potential obstacles to a smoothly run trial and 
taking the necessary steps to avoid them is manifestly within 
the inherent power of a circuit court. 
¶48 McClaren says that, in requiring him to tell prior to 
trial which instances of Goehl's violent conduct he was aware of 
at the time of the incident, the order violates his Fifth 
Amendment rights to remain silent and not incriminate himself.  
He says the order also runs afoul of the Due Process Clause 
because it imposes no reciprocal obligations on the State.  
Finally, he argues that excluding evidence——the sanction the 
court stated would result for his not complying with the order——
would violate his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. 
¶49 There is no constitutional bar to the exercise of the 
circuit court's authority in this case.  Ascertainment of the 
truth is the primary objective of a trial, and such an order 
serves that objective in a constitutionally permissible manner.  
Efficiency is a secondary objective of a trial, but where it can 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
24 
 
be attained with constitutionally permitted measures, it is 
highly desirable.  The United States Supreme Court has, on more 
than one occasion, upheld measures that ensure fair play and 
efficient use of trial court time.  Where, as here, the evidence 
to be disclosed is nothing more than what the defendant chooses 
and has indicated he will put on at trial, such an order does 
not invade constitutional protections under the Fifth Amendment.  
As the United States Supreme Court noted in an analogous case, 
the Constitution does not guarantee a criminal defendant the 
right to surprise the prosecutor.  Nor does the order violate 
McClaren's constitutional rights to due process; United States 
Supreme Court case law holds that so long as disclosure 
requirements are equally imposed on both parties, there is no 
constitutional violation.   
¶50 A corollary to the question of the constitutionality 
of the order is the constitutionality of any sanctions available 
for a violation of the order.  McClaren contends that exclusion 
of evidence is simply not an option.  However, in Taylor, the 
United States Supreme Court sets forth the appropriate analysis 
for such a violation and establishes that sanctions up to and 
including exclusion of evidence are permissible if warranted.  
It appears from the record that the circuit court intended to 
exclude from trial any evidence that McClaren attempted to offer 
at trial in violation of the order; we clarify here that while 
such a sanction may be permitted, lesser sanctions must be 
considered first, and that the extreme sanction of exclusion is 
permissible only after the circuit court has determined that the 
No. 
2007AP2382-CR   
 
25 
 
violation was "willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a 
tactical advantage that would minimize the effectiveness of 
cross-examination and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence," 
the test set forth in Taylor.  
¶51 We therefore reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
¶52 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2007AP2382-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶53 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  (dissenting).   There is a name 
for mandatory pretrial disclosure of information that might be 
offered as evidence in a criminal proceeding: discovery.  
Although the majority attempts to label what is at issue in this 
case as merely the pretrial disclosure of information, I agree 
with a unanimous court of appeals that the order here "in 
essence, [is] a discovery device."  State v. McClaren, 2008 WI 
App 118, ¶25, 313 Wis. 2d 398, 756 N.W.2d 802.   
¶54 Our precedent is clear that discovery is governed by 
the criminal discovery statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.23.  Lynch v. 
County Court, 82 Wis. 2d 454, 466, 262 N.W.2d 773 (1978) (citing 
State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 478, 151 N.W.2d 157 (1967)).  
If a certain type of evidence is not enumerated in the statute, 
then mandatory disclosure is not authorized.   
¶55 The majority departs from this precedent.  Realizing 
that the discovery statute does not require pretrial disclosure 
of McMorris1 evidence, the majority ultimately turns to the 
inherent powers of the court.  See majority op., ¶3.   
¶56 By relying on inherent authority, the majority opens 
wide the gates of pretrial discovery in criminal cases.  Its 
rationale and holding stretch far beyond the disclosure of 
McMorris evidence.  Instead, the majority rests on an unlimited 
pronouncement that covers the pretrial disclosure of any 
information that might aid in ensuring a smoothly run trial: 
"Foreseeing potential obstacles to a smoothly run trial and 
                                                 
1 McMorris v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 144, 205 N.W.2d 559 (1973). 
No.  2007AP2382-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
taking the necessary steps to avoid them is manifestly within 
the inherent power of a circuit court."  Majority op., ¶3. 
¶57 I agree instead with the court of appeals that "the 
court's general authority under Wis. Stat. § 906.11 to exercise 
control over the mode and order of presenting evidence cannot be 
read to permit it to require pretrial discovery that it would 
otherwise not be permitted to require under [the criminal 
discovery statute]."  McClaren, 313 Wis. 2d 398, ¶1.  Although I 
share the majority's concern for the efficient and fair 
administration of a trial, I believe that any revision in the 
law should be brought about by legislative change and not by a 
resort to inherent authority of the court.2  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent.  
I 
¶58 In this case, the circuit court ordered the defendant 
to provide "a summary of all specific instances of the victim's 
violent conduct of which the defendant was aware and that the 
defendant intends to introduce at trial, including witnesses to 
such conduct and the date and place such conduct occurred."3  The 
                                                 
2 Because I conclude that the circuit court did not have the 
authority to enter the order, I need not address McClaren's 
constitutional arguments. 
3 See majority op., ¶16.  Throughout the opinion, the 
majority focuses on the court's oral ruling rather than focusing 
on the unilateral nature of the written order.  See majority 
op., ¶¶10, 17, 37, 38.  This focus is misguided.  Appeal is 
taken from a written order or judgment.  State ex rel. 
Hildebrand v. Kegu, 59 Wis. 2d 215, 216, 207 N.W.2d 658 (1973); 
Estate of Jackson v. Gray, 212 Wis. 2d 436, 442, 569 N.W.2d 467 
(Ct. App. 1997).     
No.  2007AP2382-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
court of appeals determined that the order for disclosure was 
governed by the discovery statute.  Finding no authority in the 
statute for the order, it reversed the circuit court. 
¶59 The majority, however, asserts that this is not a 
discovery case.  Majority op., ¶24.  Although it attempts to tie 
its analysis to evidentiary statutes, its conclusion is based on 
inherent 
authority: 
"Foreseeing 
potential 
obstacles 
to 
a 
smoothly run trial, and taking the necessary steps to avoid 
them, is manifestly within the inherent power of a circuit 
court."  Id., ¶3. 
¶60 Our cases have established that compelled pretrial 
disclosure of evidence by any other name is still governed by 
the discovery rules.  State v. Schaefer, 2008 WI 25, 308 
Wis. 2d 279, 746 N.W.2d 457.  In Schaefer, the defendant filed a 
                                                                                                                                                             
As a result, the majority does not squarely address 
McClaren's constitutional arguments.  The majority correctly 
sets 
forth 
the 
due 
process 
principle 
that 
disclosure 
requirements must be reciprocal: "It is fundamentally unfair to 
require a defendant to divulge the details of his own case while 
at the same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise 
concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he 
disclosed to the State."  Majority op., ¶37 (quoting Wardius v. 
Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 476 (1973). 
Nevertheless, the circuit court's written ruling required 
only the defendant to disclose information.  See majority op., 
¶16 ("The defendant shall make written disclosure to the Court 
and the prosecution . . . .")  The court's written order imposed 
no reciprocal disclosure requirement upon the State.  See id.  
In fact, it posed no requirement on the State at all. 
Given that the circuit court's order lacked reciprocity, it 
is 
unclear 
to 
me 
how 
the 
majority 
can 
affirm 
this 
constitutionally deficient written order. 
No.  2007AP2382-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
subpoena to obtain police reports before the preliminary 
examination.  Id., ¶1. 
¶61 We stated, "This is a discovery case, notwithstanding 
the defendant's protestations to the contrary."  Id., ¶18.  We 
determined that the subpoena should be quashed because "the 
scope of discoverable materials is set out in statute and 
compliance with the statute will be enforced by the court."  
Id., ¶77 n.17.  The lesson from Schaefer is clear.  If something 
looks like discovery, it is governed by the discovery statute. 
¶62 The policy reasons advanced by the majority for 
allowing the court to compel the production of McMorris evidence 
are based on the rationale underlying discovery.  The majority 
explains, "Besides questions of admissibility4 there was also the 
question of how the State would be able to investigate and rebut 
evidence that was revealed for the first time at trial."  
Majority op., ¶16.    
¶63 This is a general discovery rationale.  The purpose of 
discovery is to promote "the ascertainment of the truth and 
ultimate disposition of the lawsuit in accordance therewith[.]"  
Monier v. Chamberlain, 221 N.E.2d 410, 417 (Ill. 1966).  Through 
                                                 
4  The majority acknowledges that a court can satisfy its 
responsibility to vet McMorris evidence prior to its admission, 
even if the evidence is not produced prior to trial.  See 
majority op., ¶21: "The question before us in this case is 
primarily a question of timing: whether a circuit court has the 
authority to order a defendant to disclose any planned McMorris 
evidence prior to trial, so that the factors involved in 
determining the evidence's admissibility can be weighed not only 
prior to admission, but also prior to trial." 
No.  2007AP2382-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
discovery, mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts will be 
achieved.  See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).   
¶64 In addition to relying upon a discovery rationale, the 
majority cites to criminal discovery cases.  It relies primarily 
upon three United States Supreme Court opinions: Williams v. 
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 
(1973); and Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988).  In all 
three 
cases, 
the 
issue 
before 
the 
Court 
was 
the 
constitutionality of a discovery rule.   
¶65 The majority asserts that Williams is "analogous" to 
this case.  Majority op., ¶5.  In Williams, the Florida Rules of 
Criminal Procedure required a criminal defendant to provide 
notice of an alibi defense or risk discovery sanctions.5  The 
Court said, "Florida's notice-of-alibi rule is in essence a 
requirement that a defendant submit to a limited form of 
pretrial discovery by the State whenever he intends to rely at 
trial on the defense of alibi."  399 U.S. at 80.   
                                                 
5 See Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.200, reprinted in Williams v. 
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 104 (1970) (appendix to opinion of the 
Court) ("[A] defendant in a criminal case who intends to offer 
evidence of an alibi in his defense shall, not less than ten 
days before trial or such other time as the court may direct, 
file and serve upon such prosecuting attorney a notice in 
writing of his intention to claim such alibi, which notice shall 
contain specific information as to the place at which the 
defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense 
and, as particularly as is known to defendant or his attorney, 
the names and addresses of the witnesses by whom he proposes to 
establish such alibi.") 
Wisconsin has a similar rule, which is enumerated in the 
criminal discovery statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.23(8).   
No.  2007AP2382-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
¶66 The second case relied upon by the majority, Wardius, 
addressed a similar state rule.6  At the outset of the opinion, 
the Court framed the issue as follows: "This case involves 
important questions concerning the right of a defendant forced 
to 
comply 
with 
a 
'notice-of-alibi' 
rule 
to 
reciprocal 
discovery."  412 U.S. at 471.  The Court commented: "nothing in 
the Due Process Clause precludes States from experimenting with 
systems of broad discovery designed to achieve the[] goals" of 
reducing surprise and enhancing the fairness of a criminal 
trial.  Id. at 474. 
¶67 The third case, Taylor, is also a discovery case.  
There, the trial court excluded a witness's testimony because 
the defendant "fail[ed] to identify [the] defense witness in 
response to a pretrial discovery request."7  484 U.S. at 401.  
The question before the Court was whether "the Sixth Amendment 
bars a court from ever ordering the preclusion of defense 
evidence as a sanction for violating a discovery rule."  Id. at 
                                                 
6 See Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.875 (1973) ("If the defendant in 
a criminal action proposes to rely in any way on alibi evidence, 
he shall, . . . file and serve upon the district attorney a 
written notice of his purpose to offer such evidence, which 
notice shall state specifically the place or places where the 
defendant claims to have been at the time or times of the 
alleged offense together with the name and residence or business 
address of each witness upon whom the defendant intends to rely 
for alibi evidence.").   
7 The Illinois Supreme Court Rules require a defendant to 
disclose a list of witnesses that he intends to call at trial.  
This rule is one of several enumerated under the heading 
"Discovery."  Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Article IV: Rules on 
Criminal Proceedings in the Trial Court, Part B. Discovery, Rule 
413: Disclosure to Prosecution. 
No.  2007AP2382-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
406.  The Court concluded that the Constitution did not create 
an absolute bar to discovery sanctions.  
¶68 The majority relies on the analysis of these cases, 
yet it denies that the issue presented here is a discovery 
issue, governed by the discovery statute: "We do not view this 
case as presenting the kind of discovery question [other cases 
were] addressing."  Majority op., ¶24.   
¶69 To the contrary, I conclude that the issue presented 
to this court is squarely a discovery issue, and it is governed 
by the discovery statute.   
II 
¶70 We have long held that that there is no general right 
to discovery in criminal cases and that the court should not 
order discovery on a case-by-case basis: 
Wisconsin does not recognize a right [of a] defendant 
to a pretrial discovery of the prosecution's evidence.  
If we are to adopt a pretrial discovery procedure in 
criminal cases in this state we deem it would be best 
done by a rule of court or by legislative action 
rather than on a case to case basis by the court. 
Miller, 35 Wis. 2d at 478.  
¶71 Subsequent 
to Miller, the legislature adopted a 
comprehensive system of rules governing criminal discovery.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23.  After its enactment, Wisconsin courts 
affirmed the principle that pretrial discovery is prescribed by 
the statute.  See, e.g., Lynch, 82 Wis. 2d at 466 (vacating a 
court's order permitting a defendant to examine the State's 
files because it "would operate, in essence, as a discovery 
device, 
and 
would 
therefore 
be 
inconsistent 
with 
[the] 
No.  2007AP2382-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
principle" that "discovery procedures should be determined by 
statute or by rule of court").   
¶72 The criminal discovery statute provides limited and 
reciprocal discovery requirements.  Upon demand, a defendant 
"must disclose" the following: (1) a list of the names and 
addresses of witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial; 
(2) relevant written or recorded statements of the named 
witnesses including expert reports that the defendant intends to 
produce at trial; (3) the criminal records of the named 
witnesses; and (4) physical evidence the defendant intends to 
produce at trial.  Wis. Stat. § 971.23(2m).  McMorris evidence 
is not on the list. 
¶73 Aside from the mandatory disclosures enumerated above, 
"[o]ur discovery statute does not require a defendant to divulge 
the details of his or her own case."  State v. Konkol, 2002 WI 
App 174, ¶17, 256 Wis. 2d 725, 649 N.W.2d 300.  The statute 
provides just one exception to this rule.  If the defendant 
wishes to present an alibi defense, "the defendant shall give 
notice to the district attorney . . . stating particularly the 
place where the defendant claims to have been when the crime is 
alleged to have been committed together with the names and 
addresses of witnesses to the alibi, if known."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.23(8)(a).   
¶74 On the issue of notice of self-defense and disclosure 
of 
McMorris 
evidence, 
however, 
the 
statute 
is 
silent.  
Therefore, under the principle stated in Miller and reaffirmed 
No.  2007AP2382-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
in Lynch, notice and disclosure of this evidence is simply not 
required.   
¶75 Finding no authority in the statute for the compelled 
pretrial disclosure of McMorris evidence, I determine that the 
court was without authority to enter the order.  The court of 
appeals got it right when it determined that a circuit court's 
authority to exercise control over the mode and order of 
presenting evidence does not provide the authority to require 
pretrial discovery that it would otherwise not be permitted to 
require under the Wisconsin criminal discovery statute.  See 
McClaren, 313 Wis. 2d 398, ¶1. 
III 
¶76 Today, the majority permits a circuit court to compel 
pretrial disclosure of any manner of evidence, citing the 
court's inherent authority to take the necessary steps to avoid 
potential obstacles to a smoothly run trial.  See majority op., 
¶3.  The majority's attempt to fit a discovery issue into an 
inherent authority box has broad implications.   
¶77 A court may exercise its inherent authority to ensure 
"that the court functions efficiently and effectively to provide 
the fair administration of justice."  City of Sun Prairie v. 
Davis, 226 Wis. 2d 738, 749-50, 595 N.W.2d 635 (1999).  However, 
invoking inherent powers in order to trump legislatively enacted 
public policy should be a last resort.  See id. at 755.   
¶78 Here, 
the 
legislature 
has 
made 
policy 
choices 
regarding the evidence that is subject to compulsory pretrial 
disclosure.  It permits compulsory pretrial disclosure of 
No.  2007AP2382-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
certain types of evidence, including alibi evidence, but it is 
silent about McMorris evidence.  Nevertheless, the majority 
permits a circuit court to circumvent these legislative policy 
choices by invoking the court's inherent authority to ensure 
that it functions effectively and efficiently to provide for the 
fair administration of justice.    
¶79 I acknowledge that McMorris evidence may pose special 
difficulties for the court.  Perhaps the rationale underlying 
the statutory notice-of-alibi requirement applies to McMorris 
evidence as well.  There may be good policy reasons for a rule 
requiring pretrial discovery of this type of evidence.  If so, 
however, 
it 
would 
be 
preferable 
for 
the 
legislature 
to 
promulgate a new rule.  The advantage of a rule, rather than an 
opinion 
justified 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
the 
court's 
inherent 
authority, is that it could be strictly limited to this type of 
evidence.    
¶80 The majority attempts to limit its holding to cases 
involving similar facts: "Under the circumstances presented 
here, where McClaren seeks to introduce McMorris evidence in 
support of a self-defense claim, the circuit court has the 
authority" to order pretrial disclosure of the evidence.  See 
majority op., ¶28.  However, the majority's attempt to narrow 
the scope of its holding is undermined by its invocation of the 
court's broad inherent powers.  Consequently, neither its 
rationale nor its holding is limited to McMorris evidence.  
¶81 For the above stated reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  2007AP2382-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1