Case Title: James Pearson and Jeffery Pearson v. Clifton S. Price II

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1171129

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2019-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: August 23, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 SPECIAL TERM, 2019
_________________________
1171129
_________________________
James Pearson and Jeffery Pearson
v. 
Clifton S. Price II
Appeal from Jefferson Probate Court
(15-226751)
STEWART, Justice.
AFFIRMED. NO OPINION.
Shaw, Wise, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.  
Parker, C.J., and Bryan and Mitchell, JJ., dissent.
1171129
MITCHELL, Justice (dissenting).
In my view, the probate court improperly certified its
summary judgment as final under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. 
For that reason, I would dismiss the appeal, and I therefore
respectfully dissent.
"This Court looks with some disfavor upon certifications
under Rule 54(b)."  Schlarb v. Lee, 955 So. 2d 418, 419 (Ala.
2006). 
 
We 
have 
consistently 
held 
that 
Rule 
54(b)
certification is not proper when the claim presented on appeal
and a claim pending below "are so closely intertwined that
separate adjudication would pose an unreasonable risk of
inconsistent results."  Branch v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan,
N.A., 514 So. 2d 1373, 1374 (Ala. 1987).  This principle
furthers our policy against piecemeal appellate review, see
Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So. 2d 354, 363
(Ala. 2004), and necessitates dismissal of an appeal when Rule
54(b) certification creates a probability of "[r]epeated
appellate review of the same underlying facts."  Smith v.
Slack Alost Dev. Servs. of Alabama, LLC, 32 So. 3d 556, 562
(Ala. 2009).  The fact that two claims share even a single
common element can render the claims sufficiently intertwined
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1171129
to prevent Rule 54(b) certification.  See, e.g., Hammock v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 8 So. 3d 939, 942 (Ala. 2008) ("The ...
claim certified under Rule 54(b) ... and the ... claim that
remains to be adjudicated are 'intertwined' because of the
common element they share.").
A case this Court decided two years ago, Equity Trust Co.
v. Breland, 229 So. 3d 1091 (Ala. 2017), is instructive.  In
that case, the trial court entered a summary judgment that
disposed of several claims relating to the parties' interest
in real property and certified that judgment as final under
Rule 54(b), despite a pending slander-of-title counterclaim. 
On appeal, this Court observed that "the essence of the
plaintiffs' 
[certified] 
claims 
and 
the 
defendants' 
slander-of-
title ... [counterclaim] ... [was] the parties' competing
claims to rights in the ... property."  229 So. 3d at 1099. 
Under those circumstances, this Court concluded that it would
"without question" be forced to review the same underlying
facts if it later faced an appeal of the pending slander-of-
title counterclaim.  229 So. 3d at 1100.  Accordingly, it
dismissed the appeal.  Id.    
3
1171129
In this case, the appellants' certified declaratory-
judgment claim and a pending slander-of-title counterclaim
turn on a common factual question –– who owns the real
property at issue.  As a result, we will be forced to review
the same underlying facts if the judgment on the slander-of-
title counterclaim is eventually appealed.  Because the
probate court's Rule 54(b) certification threatens our policy
against piecemeal appellate review and creates a probability
of repeated appellate review of the same facts, I would
dismiss the appeal.
Bryan, J., concurs.
4