Case Title: STATE EX REL SANFORD v DISTRICT CO

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13361 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1976 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A ex r e l . RON SANFORD, Relator, THE DISTRICT C O U R T O F THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O F THE STATE OF M O N T A N A , i n and f o r t h e County of Carbon, and t h e H O N O R A B L E ROBERT H. WILSON, Respondents. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : Counsel of Record : For Relator : Moses, Kampfe, Tolliver and Wright, B i l l i n g s , Montana Pablo Perhacs argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondents: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Arthur W. Ayers, Jr. argued, County Attorney, Red Lodge, Montana Submitted: May 25, 1976 Decided : JUL - 8 1 9 7 6 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. R e l a t o r has f i l e d a n o r i g i n a l proceeding seeking a w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l t o review and r e v e r s e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of h i s motions t o d i s m i s s and suppress i n a c r i m i n a l prosecution a g a i n s t him i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Carbon County. R e l a t o r i s Ron Sanford who was charged with b u r g l a r y of t h e Stockman Bar and Cafe i n Bridger, Montana, a t a n u n s p e c i f i e d d a t e between March 25 and A p r i l 12, 1975. O n May 1, 1975, t h e Carbon County a t t o r n e y a p p l i e d f o r a search warrant of a house and garage i n Bridger occupied by defendant. The d i s t r i c t judge issued t h e s e a r c h warrant and it w a s executed t h e same day by t h e deputy s h e r i f f . Three i t e m s a l l e g e d l y s t o l e n i n t h e b u r g l a r y w e r e found on d e f e n d a n t ' s prem- ises and s e i z e d . O n May 15, 1975, t h e county a t t o r n e y f i l e d a d i r e c t information a g a i n s t r e l a t o r by l e a v e of c o u r t . Arraignment was set f o r May 29, b u t was continued t o June 26 by mutual agreement of t h e county a t t o r n e y and r e l a t o r ' s counsel. I n t h e meantime r e l a t o r f i l e d a motion t o quash t h e in- formation with supporting b r i e f and mailed c o p i e s of t h e same t o t h e county a t t o r n e y and p r e s i d i n g judge. On June 26, r e l a t o r was a p p a r e n t l y a r r a i g n e d , b u t t h e record i s s i l e n t concerning whether a p l e a was e n t e r e d . O n June 27, r e l a t o r requested t h e c o u r t t o set a hearing on t h i s motion. The record d i s c l o s e s t h a t nothing f u r t h e r t r a n s p i r e d u n t i l January 28, 1976, when r e l a t o r again requested t h e c o u r t t o set a hearing d a t e on h i s motion. O n January 30, 1976, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e n t e r e d a n o r d e r r e c i t i n g t h a t r e l a t o r ' s c a s e had been set f o r t r i a l a s t h e t h i r d c a s e on A p r i l 20, 1976, and set a l l pending p r e t r i a l motions f o r hearing on February 1 9 . R e l a t o r ' s motion t o quash t h e information was heard and denied on February 19. One month l a t e r r e l a t o r f i l e d a n o t i c e t o suppress a l l testimony and evidence r e s u l t i n g from issuance of t h e search warrant and noticed it f o r hearing on April 1. A t t h a t t i m e t h e motion w a s ordered submitted on b r i e f s . On A p r i l 15, t h e d i s - t r i c t c o u r t denied t h i s motion. I n t h e meantime on March 25, r e l a t o r f i l e d a motion t o dismiss t h e information on t h e ground t h a t he had been denied a speedy t r i a l . A t t h a t t i m e r e l a t o r f i l e d a supporting b r i e f and noticed h i s motion f o r hearing on April 1. O n t h a t d a t e r e l a t o r ' s motion t o dismiss w a s ordered submitted on b r i e f s . O n April 15 r e l a t o r ' s motion t o dismiss was denied. O n May 3 r e l a t o r applied t o t h i s Court f o r a w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l . The a p p l i c a t i o n was set f o r adversary hearing, heard on May 25, and taken under advisement by t h e Court. Two i s s u e s a r e presented f o r review: (1) Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t err i n denying r e l a t o r ' s motion t o suppress? ( 2 ) Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t err i n denying r e l a t o r ' s motion t o dismiss? W e hold t h a t d e n i a l of r e l a t o r ' s motion t o suppress w a s e r r o r . The search warrant was d i r e c t e d " t o any Peace O f f i c e r of t h i s S t a t e " . This p r a c t i c e has been condemned by t h i s Court i n t h e following cases: S t a t e v. Meidinger (1972), 160 Mont. 310, 502 P.2d 58; S t a t e ex r e l . S t i e f and Mankin v. D i s t . C t . Mont . (1975) I , 540 P.2d 968, 32 St.Rep. 942; S t a t e v. Snider (1975), Mont . , 541 P.2d 1204, 32 St.Rep. 1056. Also c f . S t a t e v. Tropf, 166 Mont. 79, 530 P.2d 1158, 32 St.Rep. 56. W e simply w i l l n o t t o l e r a t e f u r t h e r v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 95-703, R.C.M. 1947, t o permit incursions by law enforcement o f f i c e r s i n t o a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y protected a r e a . The motion t o suppress should have been granted. W e likewise hold t h a t d e n i a l of r e l a t o r ' s motion t o dismiss w a s e r r o r . I n f i n d i n g t h a t r e l a t o r has been denied h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l a s mandated by t h e United S t a t e s and Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n s , w e apply t h e balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L ed 2d 101, 116, 92 S.Ct. 2182. This test was approved by t h i s Court i n S t a t e v. Steward, Mont. , 543 P.2d 178, 181, 32 St.Rep. 1185, where w e quoted from Barker: " ' * * * The approach w e a c c e p t is a balancing test, i n which t h e conduct of both t h e prose- c u t i o n and t h e defendant a r e weighed. "'A balancing test n e c e s s a r i l y compels c o u r t s t o approach speedy t r i a l cases on an ad hoc b a s i s . W e can do l i t t l e more than i d e n t i f y some of t h e f a c t o r s which c o u r t s should assess i n determining whether a p a r t i c u l a r defendant has been deprived of h i s r i g h t . Though some might express them i n d i f f e r e n t ways, w e i d e n t i f y f o u r such f a c t o r s : Length of d e l a y , t h e reason f o r t h e delay, t h e defendant's a s s e r t i o n of h i s r i g h t , and p r e j u d i c e t o t h e defendant.'" H e r e t h e state admits a delay of 299 days, o r approximately 10 months, from r e l a t o r ' s arraignment on June 26, 1975 t o A p r i l 20, 1976, t h e d a t e set f o r t r i a l . Both United S t a t e s and Montana c o u r t s have previously held t h a t a d e l a y of one year between a r r e s t and t r i a l p r e s e n t s a claim of prima f a c i e m e r i t . See S t a t e v. Steward, supra, and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . W e now hold t h a t a d e l a y of 10 months between a r d g n m e n t and t r i a l e s t a b l i s h e s a prima f a c i e c a s e of d e n i a l of t h e r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . The record h e r e d i s c l o s e s no reason f o r t h e d e l a y charge- a b l e t o r e l a t o r . Relator requested of t h r e e d i f f e r e n t judges t h a t h i s motion be set f o r hearing: a t t h e t i m e of arraignment, June 26, 1975; on June 27, 1975; and again on January 28, 1976. I t was f i n a l l y heard and denied on February 19, 1976. I n any event t h e t r i a l d a t e of A p r i l 20, 1976 was set p r i o r t o d i s p o s i t i o n of any of r e l a t o r ' s motions. The burden of j u s t i f y i n g t h e d e l a y rests with t h e prosecution. U.S. v. Rucker, 464 F.2d 823. It is t r u e t h a t r e l a t o r made no s p e c i f i c demand t h a t h i s case be s e t f o r t r i a l . O n t h e other hand, r e l a t o r did noth- ing t h a t can be construed a s a waiver of h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . O n March 25, 1976, he moved t o dismiss f o r d e n i a l of a speedy t r i a l . H a s r e l a t o r been prejudiced by t h e delay? W e quote from Barker: " * * * Prejudice, of course, should be assessed i n t h e l i g h t of t h e i n t e r e s t s of defendants which t h e speedy t r i a l r i g h t was designed t o pro- tect. This Court has i d e n t i f i e d t h r e e such i n t e r e s t s : (i) To prevent oppressive p r e t r i a l incarceration; (ii) To minimize anxiety and con- cern of t h e accused; (iii) To l i m i t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e defense w i l l be impaired. * * *" The f i r s t i n t e r e s t is not present i n t h i s case. The second is c l e a r l y present here. The t h i r d cannot be established with any degree of c e r t a i n t y where, a s here, t h e r e has been no t r i a l . S t a t e v. Steward, supra. Considering t h e t o t a l i t y of t h e circumstances and con- s i d e r a t i o n s i n t h e balancing test, it appears t o us t h a t t h e r e has been an excessive delay i n bringing r e l a t o r t o t r i a l i n t h i s case; t h a t no v a l i d reason e x i s t s f o r such delay; t h a t t h e delay is not chargeable t o r e l a t o r ; and t h a t some prejudice has r e s u l t e d t o r e l a t o r by reason of t h e delay. Accordingly, w e hold t h a t r e l a t o r ' s motion t o dismiss f o r d e n i a l of a speedy t r i a l should have been granted. W e order dismissal of t h i s case with prejudice. J u s t i c e W e concur: , , - - - , , , - - ----L--------a--d---v Hon. Gordon Bennett, d i s t r i c t v Judge, s i t t i n g i n place of M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison. - 5 -