Case Title: CONNELY v. McCOLLOCH

Citation: 

Docket Number: 03-29

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-01-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
CONNELY v. McCOLLOCH2004 WY 583 P.3d 457Case Number: 03-29, 03-30Decided: 01/28/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

VERNON 
R. DRWENSKI, Deceased:

 

ERIN 
MARIE CONNELY, as Personal

Representative 
of the ESTATE OF VERNON R.

DRWENSKI; 
ERIN MARIE CONNELY,

Individually; 
and DRWENSKI, LLC, a

Limited 
Liability Company,

 

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

                                                                                                

M. 
SCOTT McCOLLOCH, ESQ.;

McCOLLOCH 
AND BURNS, a Partnership;

and 
MICHELLE McCOLLOCH BURNS, ESQ.,

 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

 

ERIN 
MARIE CONNELY, as Personal

Representative 
of the ESTATE OF VERNON R.

DRWENSKI; 
ERIN MARIE CONNELY,

Individually; 
and DRWENSKI, LLC, a

Limited 
Liability Company,

                                                                                                

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

 

M. 
SCOTT McCOLLOCH, ESQ.;

McCOLLOCH 
AND BURNS, a Partnership;

and 
MICHELLE McCOLLOCH BURNS, ESQ.,

                                                                                                

Appellees 
(Defendants) .

 

 

 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Eldon E. Silverman of Preeo Silverman Green & Egle, P.C., Denver, 
Colorado. 

 

Representing 
Appellees:

            
Timothy W. Miller of  Reeves 
& Miller Park Street Law Office, Casper, Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

KITE, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Vernon Drwenski 
died before his divorce was finalized.  
As a result, his widow, Trudy Drwenski, inherited money from the estate 
she would not have inherited if she and Mr. Drwenski had been divorced.  Mr. Drwenski's daughter, Erin Connely, 
sued her father's divorce attorney, Scott McColloch, because he failed to 
finalize the divorce before Mr. Drwenski died.  The district court granted Mr. 
McColloch's motion for summary judgment finding he owed no duty to Ms. Connely 
or to the estate.  We affirm the 
district court's judgment.

 

 

 

1.                  
Were 
there adequate facts in the record below to show that Connely individually, as a 
third-party beneficiary of her father, had a legal right to [make a] claim 
against Attorneys for legal malpractice occurring during the lifetime of her 
father?

 

2.                  
Did 
Connely, as Personal Representative of the Estate, have a cause of action to 
pursue the attorney malpractice case under the Wyoming survival 
statute?

 

3.                  
Should 
this matter be remanded in that the existence of a duty in a complex case such 
as this is a mixed issue of fact and law?

 

[¶3]      Mr. McColloch 
rephrases the issues as:

 

1.                  
Whether 
a lawyer who represents a client in a divorce owes a duty to his client's 
child?

 

2.                  
Whether 
an estate may pursue a claim where it has no damages?

 

[¶4]      In her reply 
brief, Ms. Connely raises the following issues:

 

1.                  
The 
duty of an attorney to an intended third-party beneficiary has yet to be decided 
in Wyoming and its acceptance would be consistent with good public policy and 
past Wyoming precedent.

 

 

2.                  
The 
cause of action for legal malpractice accrued prior to the client's death and 
thus the claims survive in his estate.

 

 

 

[¶5]      In 1999, Mr. 
Drwenski, suffering from cirrhosis of the liver, was trying to get his life in 
order.  First, he wanted a divorce 
from his wife, Trudy Drwenski.  He 
hired Mr. McColloch to represent him in this matter,1 and in April of 1999, he filed for 
divorce from Mrs. Drwenski.    

 

[¶6]      Four months 
later, Mr. Drwenski had a falling out with his daughter, Rian Smith,  and decided he wanted to change his 
will.  On September 2, 1999, he 
executed a new will leaving the bulk of his estate to another daughter, Ms. 
Connely, and named her personal representative for the estate.  Mr. Drwenski's new will recited the fact 
that he was seeking a divorce and recognized that Mrs. Drwenski would be 
entitled to twenty-five percent of his estate under Wyoming's elective share 
statute in the event his divorce was not final at the time of his death.  

 

[¶7]      In September of 
1999, Mrs. Drwenski offered to settle the divorce for $145,000.  Armed with a power of attorney, Ms. 
Connely encouraged Mr. Drwenski to accept the offer.  He chose not to do so.  Instead, he made a counter-offer of 
$100,000, which he later withdrew.  

 

[¶8]      Mr. Drwenski died 
on November 30, 1999, before the divorce was finalized, leaving an estate valued 
at over three million dollars.  
Because Mr. Drwenski was not divorced on the date of his death, Mrs. 
Drwenski was entitled to twenty-five percent of his estate under Wyoming's 
elective share statute.2  

 

[¶9]      Ms. Connely sued 
Mr. McColloch alleging, among other things, that he breached his duty of 
responsibility to Ms. Connely and to the estate.3  The gravamen of her complaint was that 
Mr. McColloch failed to do anything to obtain the divorce from the time he was 
retained in April 1999 until the time of Mr. Drwenski's death six months 
later.  Ms. Connely alleged Mr. 
McColloch knew that Mr. Drwenski's marriage to Mrs. Drwenski took place "late in 
life," his health was fragile, he was terminally ill, and given his particular 
vulnerability, he was in need of the utmost prompt, thorough, and competent 
legal representation.  The complaint 
further alleged, as evidence of Mr. McColloch's breach of his duty, that no 
discovery was undertaken, Mr. Drwenski's deposition was never taken, no request 
for a scheduling conference or trial date was ever made, and essentially no 
action was taken at all to further the progress of the divorce proceeding.   

 

[¶10]   The district court granted Mr. 
McColloch's motion for partial summary judgment holding that he had no legal 
duty under Wyoming law to a nonclient under these circumstances.  Further, the district court held the 
estate was not damaged because it did not suffer a financial loss.  

 

[¶11]   This appeal 
followed.

 

 

 

[¶12]   Our standard for reviewing 
summary 
judgments is well established:

 

Summary 
judgment 
is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. A genuine 
issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would 
have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of 
action or defense which the parties have asserted. We examine the record from 
the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we 
give that party the benefit of all the favorable inferences which may fairly be 
drawn from the record. We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same 
standards and by using the same materials as were employed and used by the lower 
court. We do not accord any deference to the district court's decision on issues 
of law.'

 

Mathewson 
v. City of Cheyenne, 
2003 WY 10, ¶ 4, 61 P.3d 1229, ¶ 4 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Andersen v. Two Dot 
Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 105, ¶ 10, 49 P.3d 1011, ¶ 10 (Wyo. 
2002)).

 

[¶13]   This Court has stated that summary 
judgments are not favored, especially in negligence actions. See, for 
example, Roitz v. Kidman, 913 P.2d 431, 432 (Wyo. 1996).  This is particularly true in malpractice 
actions.  DeHerrera v. Memorial 
Hospital of Carbon County, 590 P.2d 1342, 1345 (Wyo. 1979).  The mixed questions of law and fact 
usually involved in a negligence action concerning the existence of a duty, the 
standard of care and proximate cause "are ordinarily not susceptible to summary 
adjudication."  Hozian v. 
Weathermon, 821 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Wyo. 1991).  Whether a particular 
defendant's actions have violated the required duty is generally a question 
for the jury.  Bancroft v. 
Jagusch, 611 P.2d 819, 821 (Wyo. 1980).  The existence of a duty is, however, a 
question of law, "'making an absence of duty the surest route to summary 
judgment in negligence actions.'"  
Schuler v. Community First National Bank, 999 P.2d 1303, 1306 
(Wyo. 2000) (quoting Daily v. Bone, 906 P.2d 1039, 1043 (1995)).  One consequence of the fact that summary 
judgments are not favored in negligence actions is that, once granted, they are 
subject to "more exacting scrutiny" on appeal.  Woodard v. Cook Ford Sales, Inc., 
927 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Wyo. 1996).  

 

[¶14]     Questions relating to the parties' 
intent are usually factual, precluding summary judgment; however, where the 
parties' intent is clear such that reasonable minds could not differ, summary 
judgment is appropriate. Cordero 
Mining Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guarantee Insurance Co., 2003 
WY 48, ¶ 10; 67 P.3d 616, ¶ 10 (Wyo. 2003); see 
also Examination 
Management Services, Inc. v. Kirschbaum, 
927 P.2d 686 (Wyo. 1996); Detroit Institute of Arts Founders Society v. 
Rose, 127 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Conn. 2001).  

 

[¶15]   A properly drawn inference contrary 
to direct testimony can serve to structure a genuine issue of material 
fact.  This Court is required to 
review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, affording 
to that party all favorable inferences which may be drawn from the 
facts presented in the record.  
However, we have 
also stated:

 

"Guess-work 
cannot be substituted for evidence or inference, for 'an 
inference is 
the conclusion drawn on reason from premises established by proof. In a sense, 
it is the thing proved. Guess-work is not.' Whitehouse v. Bolster, 95 Me. 
458, 50 A. 240." Wright v. Conway, 34 Wyo. 1, 241 P. 369, reh. 
denied 34 Wyo. 42, 51, 242 P. 1107, 1110 (1925).

 

Whipple 
v. Northern Wyoming Community College Foundation of Sheridan (Estate of 
Roosa), 753 P.2d 1028, 1034 (Wyo. 1988).    

 

 

 

[¶16]   This case requires us to examine 
the current state of the law and determine whether there are any circumstances 
in which an attorney owes a duty to a nonclient.   Over 120 years ago, the United 
States Supreme Court held that absent fraud, collusion, or privity of contract, 
an attorney is not liable to a third party for professional malpractice.  Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, (1879).   Almost eighty 
years later, the California Supreme Court was the first to depart from that 
strict contractual privity rule.  In 
Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958), the court formulated the 
"balancing factors" test.  This test 
is "closely related to the analysis and policy reasons used to justify 
permitting a third-party beneficiary to recover in a contract action."  Wilson-Cunningham 
v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 725, 729 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42 
(Kan. 1990)).  California's balancing test requires the 
weighing of specific public policy considerations and closely mirrors the 
factors we adopted in Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986), to 
be utilized in considering whether new tort duties should be recognized.4  The Biakanja court held a duty to 
a nonclient could be found upon a balancing of the following six factors: (1) 
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) 
the foreseeability of harm; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's 
conduct and the injury suffered; (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant's 
conduct; and (6) the policy of preventing future harm.  Biakanja, 320 P.2d  at 19.  

[¶17]   The California court tailored its 
balancing test three years later in Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 
(Cal. 1961) by replacing the moral blame element with an inquiry into whether 
expansion of liability to the nonclient would place an undue burden on the legal 
profession.  Id. at 688.  The Lucas plaintiffs were 
beneficiaries under a will and brought an action against the attorney who  prepared it.  As a result of a drafting error, 
plaintiffs received a smaller share of the estate than the testator 
intended.  The court held the lack 
of privity between plaintiffs and the attorney did not preclude the intended 
beneficiaries, who lost their testamentary rights because of an attorney's 
failure to properly prepare the will, from recovering as third-party 
beneficiaries.  Since Lucas, 
courts all over the country have applied the six factors to determine 
whether the circumstances warrant finding an attorney owes a duty to a 
nonclient.    

[¶18]   However, the Lucas balancing 
test is not the only test utilized for determining attorney liability to 
nonclients.  Some courts  rely upon a third party beneficiary 
contract theory similar to that set forth in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 302 (1981).  
Jurisdictions adopting this approach include Illinois, Maryland, Oregon, 
and Pennsylvania.  (Pelham v. 
Griesheimer, 417 N.E.2d 882 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) aff'd, 440 N.E.2d 96 (Ill. 1982); Goerlich v. Courtney Industries, Inc., 581 A.2d 825 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1990); Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289 (Or. 1987); Guy v. 
Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983)).  

[¶19]   Under the third party beneficiary 
analysis, the inquiry is whether the client's intent to benefit the nonclient 
was the direct purpose of the attorney-client relationship.  Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618, 625 (Md. 1985).    
The duty does not extend to those incidentally deriving an indirect 
benefit.  Id. at 625-26.   Neither does it extend to those in 
an adversarial relationship with the client.  The third party beneficiary test 
requires the plaintiff to prove clearly that (1) the client intended to benefit 
the plaintiff by entering into a contract with the attorney, (2) the attorney 
breached his contract with the client by failing to perform under its terms, and 
(3) giving the plaintiff the right to stand "in the client's shoes" would be 
appropriate to give effect to the intent of the contract.  Guy, 459 A.2d  at 750-752. 

[¶20]   Interestingly, commentators have 
suggested that even in those jurisdictions that apply California's balancing 
approach, the predominant inquiry is generally whether a principal purpose of 
the attorney's retention to provide legal services was to provide a specific 
benefit to the plaintiff  in other words, the third party beneficiary 
test.    R. Mallen & 
V. Levit, Legal Malpractice § 81, at 161 (2nd ed. 1981).  

[¶21]   For example, an Illinois court 
concluded that the balancing test might be appropriate in some situations, but 
required the divorced client's children to prove that the attorney-client 
contract to obtain the divorce was entered into primarily for their 
benefit.  Pelham 417 N.E.2d  
at 886.  The Maryland court has gone 
even further in its adoption of the third party beneficiary test and added an 
additional requirement that the interests of the third party be identical to the 
interests of the client.  
Goerlich, 581 A.2d  at 827.  
Arizona clarifies the third party beneficiary test and requires 
plaintiffs to prove negligence by the attorney toward the client, not just a 
deleterious effect upon the beneficiary due to the attorney's negligence.  Franko v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 1345 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).

  

[¶22]   Only New York, Texas, Ohio and 
Nebraska continue to hold there is no recovery for nonclients.  See, for example, Conti v. 
Polizzotto, 243 A.D.2d 672 (NY App. Div. 1997); Barcelo v. Elliot, 
923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996); Simon v. Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d 636 (Ohio 
1987); and St. Mary's Church of Schuyler v. Tomek, 325 N.W.2d 164 (Neb. 
1982).  Weighing whether to adopt 
such a duty, the South Dakota court explained the disinclination to allow a 
nonclient to sue an attorney for malpractice:

 

There 
are several reasons courts are reluctant to relax the rule of privity in 
attorney malpractice cases. First, the rule preserves an attorney's duty of 
loyalty to and effective advocacy for the client. Simon v. Zipperstein, 
32 Ohio St. 3d 74, 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ohio 1987). Second, adding 
responsibilities to nonclients creates the danger of conflicting duties. John H. 
Bauman, A Sense of Duty: Regulation of Lawyer Responsibility to Third Parties 
by the Tort System, 37 S Tex L Rev 995, 1006 (1996). Third, once the privity 
rule is relaxed, the number of persons a lawyer might be accountable to could be 
limitless. Nat'l Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198, 25 L. Ed. 621, 
624 (1879).  Fourth, a relaxation of the strict privity rule would imperil 
attorney-client confidentiality. Noble v. Bruce, 349 Md. 730, 709 A.2d 1264, 1278 (Md.Ct.App. 1998).

Chem-Age 
Industries, Inc. v. Glover, 2002 SD 
122, ¶ 31, 652 N.W.2d 756, ¶ 31 
(S.D. 2002).

[¶23]   Courts that have refrained from 
adopting a duty to a nonclient are quickly becoming part of a thinning minority 
and some would say are being overprotective of the legal profession.   As one commentator explains: 

The modern 
trend in the United States is to recognize the existence of a duty beyond the 
confines of those in privity and the attorney/client contract.  Whatever the legal theory, however, 
there must be a duty of care owed by the attorney to the plaintiff . . . A duty 
exists under two principal theories.  
The first approach is the multi-criteria balancing test, which originated 
in California.  Another approach is 
the concept of a third-party beneficiary contract.

Mallen, 
supra, at 693-94.  

[¶24]   In Wyoming, we have not yet been 
presented with the precise question of whether there are any circumstances in 
which an attorney owes a duty to a nonclient.  We have held that an 
attorney/client relationship is the essential element for the maintenance 
of a legal malpractice lawsuit.  In 
Bowen v. Smith, 838 P.2d 186, 198 (Wyo. 1992) we held attorneys for a 
corporation and its majority shareholder who undertook litigation to recover 
money for the corporation did not represent the minority shareholders, who were 
separately represented, and owed no duty to them.  Also in Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196, 201 (Wyo. 1990), this Court found no duty existed to a nonclient and 
distinguished the facts in that case from those in cases which followed 
the "[California] balancing rule because the facts in those instances assume a 
third-party beneficiary whom the client clearly intended to favor by employing 
the services of the attorney."  
Id. at 201.  The 
dispute in Brooks  centered 
on the lease of a ranch that included an option to purchase.  Id. at 198.  This Court held that where the lessor's 
interests were adverse to the lessees', "it is fundamental" that the attorney 
for the latter could not have assumed a duty to the former.  While we recognized that some courts 
have elected to impose a duty to a nonclient in limited circumstances, we held 
no cause of action for negligence exists against an attorney for an 
adversary.  Id.  Thus, Brooks v. Zebre was not 
the appropriate circumstance for this Court to adopt a duty to a 
nonclient.

[¶25]   Bevan v. Fix, 2002 WY 43, ¶ 
47, 42 P.3d 1013, ¶ 47 (Wyo. 2002) is this Court's most recent iteration 
of the question of an attorney's duty.  
However, the question in Bevan was whether an attorney owed a duty 
to a former client rather than a nonclient.  In Bevan, we said that whether a 
legal duty exists is a question of law, and absent a duty, there is no 
liability.  Id., ¶ 47.  

[¶26]   While this Court has not been 
presented with circumstances which warranted finding attorneys owe any duty to 
third parties, we have recognized other professionals may owe such duties.  See Sundown, Inc., v. Pearson 
Real Estate Co., 8 P.3d 324 (Wyo. 2000); Fowler v. Westair Enterprises, 
Inc., 906 P.2d 1053 (Wyo. 1995); Rauh v. Kornkven, 852 P.2d 328 (Wyo. 1993) (duty of real estate agents to nonclient buyers); 
Century 
Ready-Mix Co. v. Campbell County School District, 816 P.2d 
795 (Wyo. 1991) (identifying a recognized duty of architects to 
nonclients).    In Erpelding v. Lisek, 2003 
WY 80, 71 P.3d 754 (Wyo. 2003), this Court utilized the duty analysis from 
Gates v. Richardson to determine whether a counselor, who was hired by an 
employer to evaluate an employee, owed a duty to the employee.  Erpelding, ¶ 18, (quoting 
Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wyo. 1986), quoting Tarasoff 
v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334, 342, (Cal. 
1976)).  While we found the 
counselor owed no duty to the employee under the facts of that case, we did note 
that, under some  circumstances, 
such a duty could exist.  
Erpelding, ¶ 18. 

 

[¶27]   This case presents the first 
opportunity we have had to address the question of an attorney's duty to a third 
party whom, it is alleged, was intended to benefit from the attorney's 
retention.  Given the obvious trend 
around the country and this Court's willingness to hold other professionals 
liable to nonclients in appropriate circumstances, we conclude it is time to 
apply the law equally to attorneys and recognize they can also be found to owe a 
duty to nonclients in limited circumstances.  We see no reason why attorneys deserve 
absolute immunity when their clients intend their services to directly benefit a 
nonclient.  "The law of professional 
malpractice should be uniform, unless it can reasonably be shown that one 
profession is more deserving of protection than another for valid policy or 
social reasons."  Steven K. Ward, 
Developments in Legal Malpractice Liability, 31 S. Tex. L. Rev. 121, 
142-43 (1990).  

[¶28]   We find the California balancing 
test adopted in Lucas v. Hamm an appropriate approach to take with regard 
to this issue.   As noted 
above, that test is similar to the test we adopted in Gates v. Richardson, 
albeit more narrowly tailored to fit its objective of determining an 
attorney's duty to a nonclient.  The 
public policy considerations of the balancing test appropriately require 
attorneys to exercise their position of trust and superior knowledge responsibly 
so as not to adversely affect persons whose rights and interests are certain and 
foreseeable.   Heyer, 70 Cal. 2d  at 228-229.  

[¶29]   This Court elects to further tailor 
the Lucas test by emphasizing the first factor, the extent to which the 
transaction was intended to directly benefit the plaintiff.  Thus, the threshold inquiry must be 
whether the plaintiff is an intended beneficiary of the transaction; if not, no 
further inquiry need be made.  
Strait v. 
Kennedy, 13 P.3d 671 (Wash. Ct. App.  2000).  We align with the Washington court, 
which stated: 

 

Put 
another way, if the plaintiff was not an intended beneficiary of the 
transaction, the plaintiff lacks standing to sue the attorney for legal 
malpractice. Leipham v. Adams, 77 Wn. App. 827, 832, 894 P.2d 576 (1995) 
(citing Trask, 123 Wn.2d at 842-43). An "intended beneficiary" of the 
transaction under Trask means just that--the transaction must have been 
intended to benefit the plaintiff; it is not enough that the plaintiff may be an 
incidental beneficiary of the transaction. See Trask, 123 Wn.2d  at 845. 

Id. 
at 674.

[¶30]   Whether a limited duty to a 
nonclient exists must be assessed on a case-by-case basis utilizing the 
following factors:  (1) the extent 
to which the transaction was intended to directly benefit the plaintiff; (2) the 
foreseeability of harm; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered 
injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and 
the injury suffered; (5) whether expansion of liability to the nonclient would 
place an undue burden on the legal profession; and (6) the policy of preventing 
future harm.        

[¶31]   While the answer to the threshold 
question of intent does not totally resolve the issue, no further inquiry need 
be made unless such intent exists.  
Trask v. 
Butler, 872 P.2d 1080 (Wash. 1994).  If the 
intent to benefit a third party is found, 
the multi-factor balancing test then requires specific public policy 
considerations before finding a duty to a third party.  Id. at 1089 (quoting 1 
R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice, § 7.9 (3d ed. 
1989)).  The policy considerations 
against finding a duty to a nonclient are the strongest where doing so would 
detract from the attorney's ethical obligations to the client.  Mallen, supra, at 709.  This occurs if a duty to a third person 
creates a material risk of divided loyalties because of a conflicting interest 
or of a breach of a confidence.  The 
potential for a conflict of interest is encompassed in the fifth policy 
consideration, whether expansion of liability to the nonclient would place an 
undue burden on the legal profession.   A Massachusetts court 
stated:

 

While 
an attorney may be found to owe a duty to a nonclient whom the attorney 
knows will rely on the services rendered to his or her client, Robertson v. 
Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, 404 Mass. 515, 524, 536 N.E.2d 344, cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 894, 107 L. Ed. 2d 192, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989), we "will not 
impose a duty of reasonable care on an attorney [to a nonclient] if such an 
independent duty would potentially conflict with the duty the attorney owes to 
his or her client." Lamare v. Basbanes, 418 Mass. 274, 276, 636 N.E.2d 218 (1994). 

Bratcher 
v. Moriarty, 
Donoghue & Leja, P.C., 
763 N.E.2d 556, 560 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).  

[¶32]   Like Massachusetts, this Court will 
not impose a duty on an attorney to a nonclient if such an independent duty 
would potentially conflict with the duty the attorney owes to his or her 
client.  An attorney owes no 
actionable duty to an adverse party emanating from the zealous representation of 
his own client.  Brooks 792 P.2d  at 201.   Such duty of 
care to a person whose relationship is adverse to the client is 
inappropriate.  Mallen, 
supra, at 711.

[¶33]   We now turn to the facts of this 
case.  The primary question is 
whether Mr. Drwenski specifically intended to benefit Ms. Connely when he 
retained Mr. McColloch to obtain his divorce.   After a careful review of the 
record which contains the fruits of a complete discovery process, we can find no 
evidence that Mr. Drwenski intended to benefit anyone other than himself when he 
retained Mr. McColloch to obtain his divorce.  Rather, the record only establishes that 
Mr. Drwenski filed for divorce and wanted his marriage to Mrs. Drwenski 
dissolved, for whatever reason.  We 
believe it is pivotal that Ms. Connely was not even a beneficiary of the estate 
at the time Mr. Drwenski initiated the divorce proceedings.  We are also persuaded that had he wanted 
a quick divorce to avoid his wife's inheritance rights under the statute, 
thereby leaving more for Ms. Connely, he would not have refused to settle the 
divorce in September 1999.  

[¶34]   While we recognize that a divorce 
client's children will be affected by the divorce, that fact alone is not 
sufficient to support a finding that the attorney hired to obtain the divorce 
owes a duty to the children of the client. For a duty to exist, the transaction 
must have been intended to benefit the plaintiff; it is not enough that the 
plaintiff may be an "incidental beneficiary" of the transaction.  Strait, 13 P.3d  at 674. Other 
jurisdictions that have considered whether an attorney representing one party in 
a divorce owes any duty to the client's children have held that the attorney 
does not owe such a duty.  In 
Strait, the decedent hired an attorney to represent her in her 
divorce.  Id. at 672.  However, her divorce was delayed over 
two years and not finalized before she died unexpectedly in an automobile 
accident.  Since she was still 
married at the time of her death, her husband was entitled to his intestate 
share of the decedent's estate, thereby reducing the daughters' portions of the 
estate.  The court applied the 
modified balancing factors test and concluded the daughters were not the 
intended beneficiaries of the divorce.  
The Washington court, in reaching its decision, quoted another 
jurisdiction which considered the same question.  The court said:

 

In 
Wilson-Cunningham, the Kansas Court of Appeals considered a claim very 
similar to the one at bar.  There, 
attorney Meyer represented Charles Wilson in a dissolution action.  A hearing was held and the parties 
testified that although they had nearly reached a property settlement agreement, 
they had not yet agreed on the division of certain items.  The parties also testified that they 
thought they could resolve their remaining issues but if they could not they 
would present the issues to the trial court for resolution.  The court granted the dissolution, 
approved the parties stipulations as to property division, maintenance, child 
custody and support, and provided that if the parties could not reach agreement 
as to the remaining issues the court would order a division at a later 
date.  A few weeks later, the 
parties agreed on the final disposition and both the parties signed the final 
decree.  The decree was ready to be 
filed on November 23, 1987.  At 
12:16 a.m. on December 4, 1987, Charles Wilson died intestate.  The decree was filed at 9 a.m. on 
December 4, 1987.  The divorce 
decree was ineffective to terminate the marriage because the decree was filed 
after Mr. Wilson's death.

Charles' 
children from a former marriage sued Meyer claiming that they received a smaller 
share of their father's estate because, due to the untimely filing of the 
divorce decree, his wife received a spousal share of his estate by intestate 
succession.  The children alleged 
tort and contract claims against Meyer, claiming that he owed them a duty as 
intended beneficiaries of the representation and, alternatively, as third-party 
beneficiaries on the contract between Charles and Meyer.

The 
Kansas Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the children were intended 
beneficiaries of the attorney-client relationship.  The court applied the multifactor 
analysis utilized by the California and Kansas courts (in which the first factor 
is the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff) and 
concluded that the purpose of the dissolution "was not to represent whatever 
future interests the plaintiffs might have had in Charles' estate."  Rather, the court found that the purpose 
of a dissolution is to sever a marital relationship, determine the respective 
rights to marital property, and provide for spousal maintenance and the support 
and custody of any minor children of the marriage."  The court found no indication in the 
record that Charles intended to use his divorce as an estate planning device . . 
. At most, Charles' children were only incidental beneficiaries of the contract, 
and "an incidental beneficiary cannot enforce the contract for his or her 
benefit.'"

Id. 
at 
674-675 (citations omitted).     

[¶35]   Likewise, the Washington court in 
Strait found no indication in the record that the decedent intended her 
marital dissolution action to serve as an estate-planning device.  Ms. Connely contends the Strait 
case is distinguishable from the present case because Mr. Drwenski intended 
to benefit Ms. Connely.  However, 
she presented no evidence of that fact.  
The only evidence Ms. Connely produced regarding Mr. Drwenski's intent is 
language from his will that he would leave Mrs. Drwenski "nothing" in the event 
they were divorced at the time of his death.  For two fundamental reasons,  that fact fails to prove anything with 
regard to his intent to benefit Ms. Connely when he retained his divorce 
attorney.  First, Ms. Connely was 
not a beneficiary of his will at the time he retained Mr. McColloch.  Second, unmistakably, Mr. Drwenski 
realized his death was a possibility before the divorce was final.  His will specifically addressed that 
eventuality by leaving Mrs. Drwenski "one-fourth of the property which will be 
subject to disposition under this will."  
That fact does not represent evidence of his intent to benefit Ms. 
Connely through his divorce.  On the 
contrary, it simply demonstrates he was aware of the ramifications of not 
obtaining the divorce before his death.

 

[¶36]   Ms. Connely claims that Mr. 
Drwenski's intent to finalize the divorce quickly, and thereby leave her a 
larger inheritance, can be inferred from the fact that he was ill when he filed 
for divorce.  And yet, it is 
undisputed that Mr. Drwenski had the opportunity to settle the divorce and make 
it final three months before his death, yet he chose not to do so.   Under these circumstances, we hold 
a jury could not reasonably infer Ms. Connely was the intended beneficiary of 
the divorce.  While questions 
relating to the parties' intent are usually factual, precluding summary 
judgment, where the parties' intent is clear such that reasonable minds could 
not differ, summary judgment is appropriate. Cordero 
Mining Co., ¶ 10; 
see also,  Examination 
Management Services, Inc., ¶ 10; 
Detroit Institute of Arts Founders Society, 127 F. Supp. 2d  at 
124.

 

[¶37]   We separate the formal and 
pretended from the genuine and substantial so only the latter may be considered 
in eliminating the burden of a formal trial if only questions of law are left to 
decide; there must be no issue of material fact to decide. Ahrenholtz 
v. Laramie Economic Development Corp., 2003 WY 
149, ¶ 16, ­­­79 P.3d 511, ¶ 16.   

 

Guesswork 
cannot be substituted for evidence or inference; and an inference cannot be 
based upon a mere possibility or probability; it can only be based upon a fact 
proved, or something known to be true. In more recent times we have had occasion 
to say no inference can be based on mere surmise, guess, speculation or 
probability. Tower v. Horn, Wyo., 400 P.2d 146, 147. Also, conjecture, 
speculation as to happenings, or the suggestion of a possibility cannot be made 
to take the place of evidence.  
Edwards v. Harris, Wyo., 397 P.2d 87, 91; Caillier v. City of 
Newcastle, Wyo., 423 P.2d 653, 656.

 

O'Brien 
v. Hunt, 
464 P.2d 306  (Wyo. 
1970).

 

[¶38]   Ms. Connely's position requires the 
threading 
together of weak inferences  
amounting to guesswork.  No 
evidence exists in the record for this Court to alter the district court's 
holding that the attorney owed no duty to Ms. Connely under the circumstances of 
this case.  Because 
the threshold question of our new balancing test is not met, we need not discuss 
the remaining factors.         

 

[¶39]   We affirm the district court's 
grant of Mr. McColloch's motion for summary judgment against Ms. Connely, but do 
so on the merits of our new test.  
This Court will affirm the district court's 
action on appeal if it is sustainable on any legal ground appearing in the record even if 
the legal ground or theory articulated by the 
district court 
is incorrect.  Heilig v. Wyoming 
Game and Fish Commission, 2003 WY 27, ¶ 8; 64 P.3d 734, ¶ 8 (Wyo. 
2003).  

 

 

[¶40]   The appellant's second issue is 
whether Ms. Connely, as personal representative of the estate, could pursue the 
attorney malpractice case under the Wyoming survival statute on behalf of the 
estate.  The district court held, 
"The Estate was not damaged.  The 
alleged failure to obtain the divorce did not reduce the estate assets."  We agree with the district court on this 
issue for two reasons: (1) because no claim could have existed on behalf of the 
estate while Mr. Drwenski was still alive, and, therefore, none survived, and 
(2) because the estate suffered no damages.

[¶41]   Wyoming's survival statute clearly 
states:

 

In addition 
to the causes of action which survive at common law, causes of action for mesne 
profits, injuries to the person, an injury to real or personal estate, or any 
deceit or fraud also survive. An action may be brought notwithstanding the death 
of the person entitled or liable to the same, but in actions for personal injury 
damages, if the person entitled thereto dies recovery is limited to damages for 
wrongful death.

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann., § 1-4-101 (LexisNexis 2003).  
The statutory language is clear that a cause of action must arise before 
death to survive after death.  
Survive, according to Black's Dictionary, means "to continue to live or 
exist beyond the life, or existence of; to live through; to live on after 
passing through; to remain alive."  
Black's Law Dictionary, 1297 (5th ed. 1979).  Thus, the survival statute cannot apply 
to harm allegedly done to an estate after death.  Ms. Connely cites to two cases 
"approving the concept that an attorney malpractice action arising during the 
life of the deceased survives in the estate."  See Nevin v. Union Trust Co., 726 A.2d 694 (Maine 1999) and Beastall v. Madson, 600 N.E.2d 1323 (Ill. App. 
1992).  Those cases, however, are 
not pertinent here because the alleged malpractice is that Mr. McColloch did not 
finalize the divorce for Mr. Drwenski before he died.  Mr. Drwenski's death triggered the 
alleged malpractice.  A cause of 
action, therefore, could not survive Mr. Drwenski's death because to do so, the 
cause of action would have had to occur during Mr. Drwenski's life.  A survival statute does not create a 
cause of action, but "merely permits a representative of the decedent to 
maintain those statutory or common law actions which have already accrued to the 
decedent before he or she died."  
Bryant v. Kroger Co., 570 N.E.2d 1209, 1210 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) 
(emphasis added).  

[¶42]   The estate's claim also fails 
because it suffered no damages. While Ms. Connely relies on Granquist v. 
Sandberg, 268 Cal. Rptr. 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) to support the estate's 
claim of damage, that case is distinguishable from the present facts.  In Granquist, the attorney 
represented the plaintiff in a personal injury case.  Since the case was not tried before the 
client's death, his estate could not recover damages for his pain, suffering and 
disfigurement under California law.  
The attorney's failure to expedite the case reduced the assets of the 
estate, giving the estate a cause of action.

[¶43]   This estate suffered no such 
loss.  Had Mr. Drwenski's divorce 
been final at the time of his death, the estate's assets would have been 
identical.  The estate has no 
interest in how its assets are distributed; stated another way, the estate has 
no damages.  See Bevan, ¶¶ 
62, 63.  We affirm the district 
court's grant of summary judgment  
as to claims on behalf of the estate.

FOOTNOTES

 

1Mr. 
McColloch was also hired to represent Mr. Drwenski in four other unrelated 
lawsuits.

 

2See 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2-5-101(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).

 

3In 
its entirety, the complaint contained seven allegations: (1) professional 
negligence regarding representation of deceased during his lifetime; (2) 
recovery of improper and excess fees; (3) breach of duty or responsibility to 
Ms. Connely; (4) declaratory judgment in favor of the estate; (5) professional 
negligence with regard to representation of the estate; (6) billing fraud and 
conversion; and (7) negligent misrepresentation.  Mr. McColloch's Motion for Summary 
Judgment addressed counts one, three, and five of Ms. Connely's 
complaint.

 

4The 
Gates v. Richardson factors are as follows:  (1) the foreseeability of harm to 
the plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's 
conduct and the injury suffered, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, (5) 
the policy of preventing future harm, (6) the extent of the burden upon the 
defendant, (7) the consequences to the community and the court system, and (8) 
the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk 
involved.