Case Title: Hedrick v. Commissioner of Dept. of Public Safety

Citation: 

Docket Number: 110199

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2013-11-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
HEDRICK v. COMMISSIONER OF DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY2013 OK 98Case Number: 110199Decided: 11/26/2013THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

KEVIN HEDRICK, Plaintiff/Appellant,v.THE COMMISSIONER OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Defendant/Appellee.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS DIVISION I
Honorable Gary Barger, Trial Judge
¶0 The Department of Public Safety (DPS) revoked Kevin Hedrick's driver's 
license for 180 days following his arrest for driving under the influence of 
alcohol or other intoxicants. He filed an appeal with the District Court of 
McClain County and attached a photocopy of the order which DPS mailed to him 
when it revoked his license. DPS objected to the trial court's jurisdiction, 
arguing that Hedrick had not provided the trial court with a certified copy of 
its revocation order. DPS refused to provide a certified copy, insisting that it 
was under no obligation to do so. The trial court dismissed the appeal, and the 
Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari to address whether a 
certified copy of a DPS order is required to perfect an appeal of a DPS 
revocation to the district court; and whether the appeal was timely. We hold 
that 47 O.S. Supp. 2007 
§2-111 expressly deems photocopies of DPS records to be considered originals 
for all purposes and to be admissible as evidence in all courts. Also, pursuant 
to 12 O.S. 2011 
§3004(3), a certified copy of the DPS order was not required. We also hold 
that the appeal was timely. 
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION 
VACATED;TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Michael L. Gardner, Purcell, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant.A. Deann 
Taylor, (Former) Assistant General Counsel, Department of Public Safety, Brian 
K. Morton, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Public Safety, Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee.
KAUGER, J.: 
¶1 The dispositive issues are whether the holder of a driver's license 
brought a timely appeal to challenge his driver's license revocation and whether 
he was required to provide the district court with a certified copy of a 
Department of Public Safety (DPS) revocation order when he appealed the 
revocation. We hold that: the appeal was timely; 47 O.S. Supp. 2007 §2-111 expressly deems 
photocopies of DPS records to be considered originals for all purposes and 
admissible as evidence in all courts;1 and that pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 §3004(3), a certified copy of 
the DPS order was not required.2 
FACTS
¶2 The defendant/appellant, Kevin B. Hedrick (Hedrick) was arrested for 
driving under the influence in McClain County, Oklahoma. Details as to the date 
and circumstances surrounding the arrest are not provided in the record.3 DPS held a hearing on 
September 2, 2009, and determined that Hedrick's driving privileges should be 
revoked for 180 days. DPS mailed Hedrick a copy of its revocation order on 
September 23, 2009. On October 30, 2009, Hedrick filed an appeal of the DPS 
revocation to the District Court of McClain County and attached a copy of the 
DPS revocation order which DPS had mailed him. Hedrick sought to set aside the 
revocation, or in the alternative, have it modified based on extreme and usual 
hardship.
¶3 When the matter came for trial on February 2, 2010, DPS objected to the 
trial court's jurisdiction to hear the appeal because Hedrick had not provided a 
certified copy of its order to the trial court. DPS also argued that the appeal 
was untimely, because it was filed thirty-seven days after it mailed the order 
to Hedrick.4 At the trial, DPS acknowledged that it issues thousands 
of these orders, but insisted that unless Hedrick provided a certified copy of 
the order, the trial court could not review the matter. 
¶4 Hedrick's attorney asked the DPS lawyer if she had a certified copy and 
she said it was not her burden to show that Hedrick had a right to be in the 
district court or that his appeal was timely. When the trial court asked if it 
could take judicial notice of the official business records of DPS, DPS 
contended that if it were not a certified copy, it was not sufficient 
evidence.5 DPS insisted that it was Hedrick's burden and that DPS 
was not required to provide a certified copy of its administrative order. The 
trial court recessed the matter and instructed the parties to submit briefs on 
the issues. 
¶5 DPS submitted a brief on February 22, 2010, and Hedrick replied on March 
22, 2010. On April 12, 2010, the matter was assigned to another trial judge, but 
nothing happened in the cause until nearly eighteen months later when DPS filed 
a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Hedrick's lawyer responded, 
explaining that: 1) the trial court did not reset the hearing; 2) all of his 
cases at DPS were reset because of DPS's shortage of attorneys; and 3) he was 
willing to get a court date, but DPS had not cooperated on setting a date.
¶6 On October 5, 2011, the trial court dismissed the case because Hedrick did 
not provide a certified copy of the DPS revocation order. It determined that: 1) 
Hedrick had the burden of proving jurisdiction and an uncertified copy of the 
DPS order was incomplete evidence to establish jurisdiction; and 2) the appeal 
was untimely. On October 17, 2011, Hedrick filed a motion to reconsider which 
the trial court denied on November 14, 2011. 
¶7 On December 14, 2011, Hedrick appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals in 
an unpublished opinion affirmed on May 10, 2013,6 holding that, while the 
trial court had jurisdiction to hear the case,7 the photocopy of the DPS 
order was incompetent to establish that DPS ever revoked Hedrick's driver's 
license under 47 O.S. Supp. 2006 
§6-211(F).8 Certiorari was granted on October 14, 2013, and 
assigned to these chambers.
I.TITLE 47 O.S. SUPP. 2007 §2-111 EXPRESSLY DEEMS 
PHOTOCOPIES OFDPS RECORDS TO BE CONSIDERED ORIGINALS FOR ALL PURPOSESAND 
ADMISSABLE AS EVIDENCE IN ALL COURTS. ALSO PURSUANT TO 12 O.S. 2011 §3004(3), A CERTIFIED COPY OF 
THE DPS ORDER WAS NOTREQUIRED.
A.
¶8 DPS contends that unless Hedrick attached a certified copy of its order to 
his petition in the district court, his appeal could not be perfected in the 
trial court. It insists that the photocopy of DPS's revocation submitted with 
his petition to the district court was incompetent evidence because it was 
neither certified, nor submitted with a certificate, pursuant to 
12 O.S. 2011 §30059 or 12 O.S. 2011 §2902.10 Hedrick argues that the copy he attached to his 
district court petition need not be a certified copy. He relies on an exception 
to these requirements, found at 12 O.S. 2011 §3004(3), which provides in 
pertinent part:
The original is not required, and a duplicate or other evidence of the 
contents of a record is admissible if:
….
3. At a time when an original was under the control of the party against whom 
offered, the party was put on notice, by the pleadings or otherwise, that the 
contents would be a subject of proof at the hearings and the party does not 
produce the original at the hearing…
Although neither party mentions 47 O.S. Supp. 2007 §2-111, we take judicial notice 
of the statute11 which provides in pertinent part:
C. 1. The Commissioner may cause any or all records kept by the Department of 
Public Safety to be photographed, microphotographed, photostated, reproduced on 
film, or stored on computer storage medium. The film or reproducing material 
shall be of durable material, and the device used to reproduce the records on 
the film or reproducing material shall accurately reproduce and perpetuate the 
original records in all detail.
2. The photostatic copy, photograph, microphotograph, photographic film or 
computerized image of the original records shall be deemed to be an original 
record for all purposes and shall be admissible as evidence in all courts or 
administrative agencies. A facsimile, exemplification, or certified copy thereof 
shall be deemed to be a transcript, exemplification, or certified copy of the 
original. (Emphasis supplied.)
B.
¶9 The trial court is required to examine all of the records in a DPS file 
relative to an offense committed.12 Section 2-111 clearly and unambiguously declares photo- 
copies of DPS records to be considered originals and admissible in any court. 
Applying this statute could end our inquiry but this is not the only dispositive 
statute applicable to this cause. Revocation appeal proceedings in the district 
court are exempt from the provision of the Oklahoma Pleading and Discovery 
codes, but they are not exempt from the Oklahoma Evidence Code.13 The requirements of 12 O.S. 2011 §3004(3) which are applicable 
here specifically allow admission of duplicates, or other secondary evidence, to 
prove the contents of a document, when the original document is: 
1) under the control of the party against whom it is offered; 2) the 
party was put on notice by the pleadings or otherwise that the contents 
would be a subject of proof at the hearings; and 3) the party does not 
produce the original at the hearing.14 
¶10 Title 12 O.S. 2011 
§3004, which is identical to Rule 1004 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
carves out specific exceptions to the normal rules of admissibility under the 
evidence code.15 These requirements have been met in this cause because: 
1) the original DPS revocation order was in the possession of DPS, against whom 
it was to be proffered; 2) DPS was put on notice by Hedrick's pleading that the 
contents of the revocation order would be a subject of proof at the hearing in 
the trial court; and 3) DPS did not produce the original at the hearing or any 
other time. 
¶11 Title 12 O.S. 2011 
§3004 does not require that a duplicate be certified if the necessary 
conditions are satisfied, nor does it recognize any degree of secondary 
evidence, such as first requiring a direct copy.16 The reason a certified copy is not required under this 
rule is because DPS has the original in their possession. If the authenticity of 
the copy is questioned they can easily introduce the original as proof.17 
¶12 This rule has long been a settled issue under Oklahoma law. Interpreting 
a prior incarnation of this rule in Security State Bank v. 
Lane, 1917 OK 
263, ¶3, 166 P. 160, we held:
In these circumstances the copy of the demand was admissible in evidence 
under the rule governing the admission of exhibits attached to pleadings and 
made a part thereof. Moreover, where, as in this and similar cases, the original 
paper is necessarily in the hands of the defendant, notice to produce the same 
is not required to allow a copy to be given in evidence where the form of the 
action and the allegations of the pleadings are such as to give notice that the 
production will be necessary at the trial.
¶13 We revisited this rule in Smith v. Arrow Drilling 
Co., 1942 OK 
337, ¶19, 130 P.2d 95, where we held that it was not an error to receive into evidence a 
carbon copy of an instrument, material to the issues, where it was shown that 
the original was in the hands of the adverse party. 
II.THE APPEAL WAS NOT UNTIMELY.
¶14 DPS argues that Hedrick's district court appeal was untimely because it 
must be filed within thirty days pursuant to 47 O.S. Supp. 2006 §6-211(E).18 DPS argues that his petition was filed October 30, 
2009, thirty-seven days after the order was mailed. The only evidence of this 
mailing date is found on the order itself, wherein it states the date it was 
mailed. Hedrick concedes that his petition must be filed within thirty days of 
service to him, but argues that DPS mailed the order through the United States 
mail and pursuant to 47 O.S. Supp. 2007 §2-116, when any notice is 
mailed by DPS, the notice is complete upon the expiration of ten days after it 
was mailed. 
¶15 Section 2-116 provides:
Whenever the Department of Public Safety is authorized or required to give 
any notice under this act or other law regulating the operation of vehicles, 
unless a different method of giving such notice is otherwise expressly 
prescribed, such notice shall be given either by personal delivery thereof to 
the person to be so notified or by deposit in the United States mail of such 
notice in an envelope with first class postage prepaid, addressed to such person 
at the address as shown by the records of the Department. The giving of notice 
by mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after such deposit of 
said notice. Proof of the giving of notice in either such manner may be made by 
the certificate of any officer or employee of the Department or affidavit of any 
person over eighteen (18) years of age, naming the person to whom such notice 
was given and specifying the time, place and manner of the giving thereof. 
Failure of the person to receive notice because of failure to notify the 
Department of a change in his or her current mailing address, as required by 
Section 6-116 of this title, shall not be sufficient grounds for the person to 
protest the notice.
Hedrick argues that his thirty day deadline did not begin to run until ten 
days after September 23, 2009 --- the date DPS mailed the order. Even though DPS 
does not dispute that it mailed the order to Hedrick, it insists this statute 
only comes into play in certain cases so that a presumption can be made that the 
notice would be received in, at most, ten days after mailing, but, without 
explanation, insists this is not one of those cases.
¶16 We disagree. When DPS follows the procedures authorized by 
47 O.S. Supp. 2007 
§2-116 and chooses to mail orders through the United States mail, it would be 
inconsistent with the statute to deny its application to extend the deadline for 
the person receiving the order through the mail to file an appeal with the 
district court. Hedrick had ten days after September 23, 2009, before his notice 
was considered complete. He filed his appeal on October 30, 2009. Hedrick's 
appeal was timely filed in the district court.
CONCLUSION
¶17 Title 47 O.S. Supp. 2007 
§2-111 clearly and unambiguously declares photocopies of DPS records to be 
considered originals and admissible in any court.19 
Even if it did not, the original DPS revocation order is in the possession of 
DPS. It mails, through the United States mail, copies of these orders to drivers 
whose licenses have been revoked. Pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 §3004(3), a driver challenging 
the revocation is not required to obtain a certified copy of the same order DPS 
mailed in order to file an appeal to the district court to put DPS on notice of 
its own decision.20 If for any reason the authenticity of the copy is 
called into question, DPS has the original to introduce as proof.
¶18 This procedure is no different than that followed by this Court. When the 
Court of Civil Appeals issues an opinion, it is mailed through the United States 
mail by the Supreme Court Clerk to the parties. If a party wishes to file a 
petition for certiorari, the party must attach a photocopy of the Court of Civil 
Appeals opinion to the petition, but it need not obtain a certified copy from 
our Clerk before filing the petition for certiorari. If the authenticity of the 
copy is called into question, the original is already in our possession via the 
Supreme Court Clerk.21 
¶19 DPS is legislatively authorized to mail orders through the United States 
mail pursuant to 47 O.S. Supp. 2007 § 
2-116. When it does, notice is not complete until 10 days after the order is 
mailed.22 
Once notice is complete, a driver has thirty days to file an appeal to the 
district court.23 
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION 
VACATED;TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED.
COLBERT, C.J., REIF, V.C.J., KAUGER, WATT, WINCHESTER, TAYLOR, COMBS, GURICH, 
JJ., concur.
EDMONDSON, J., concurs in result (by separate writing). 
FOOTNOTES
1 Title 47 O.S. 2007 §2-111 provides:
A. All records of the Department, other than those declared by law to be 
confidential for the use of the Department, shall be open to public inspection 
during office hours.
B. The Commissioner shall supervise the maintaining of all records of the 
Department and shall adopt rules concerning the destruction and retention of 
records. Records of the Department shall not be subject to the provisions 
of:
1. Sections 305 through 317 of Title 67 of the Oklahoma Statutes or be 
transferred to the custody or control of the State Archives Commission;
2. Section 590 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes; or
3. The Records Management Act, Sections 201 through 215 of Title 67 of the 
Oklahoma Statutes.
The Commissioner may, pursuant to an adopted rule, order destruction of 
records deemed to be no longer of value to the Department in carrying out the 
powers and duties of the Department.
C. 1. The Commissioner may cause any or all records kept by the Department of 
Public Safety to be photographed, microphotographed, photostated, reproduced on 
film, or stored on computer storage medium. The film or reproducing material 
shall be of durable material, and the device used to reproduce the records on 
the film or reproducing material shall accurately reproduce and perpetuate the 
original records in all detail.
2. The photostatic copy, photograph, microphotograph, photographic film or 
computerized image of the original records shall be deemed to be an original 
record for all purposes and shall be admissible as evidence in all courts or 
administrative agencies. A facsimile, exemplification, or certified copy thereof 
shall be deemed to be a transcript, exemplification, or certified copy of the 
original.
3. The photostatic copies, photographs, microphotographs, reproductions on 
film, or computerized images shall be placed in conveniently accessible files 
and provisions made for preserving, examining, and using the copies, 
photographs, microphotographs, reproductions on film and computerized images. 
The Commissioner of Public Safety is empowered to authorize the disposal, 
archival storage, or destruction of the original records or papers. (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
2 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §3004(3) provides: 
The original is not required, and a duplicate or other evidence of the 
contents of a record is admissible if:
1. All originals are lost or have been destroyed unless the proponent lost or 
destroyed them in bad faith;
2. No original can be obtained by any available judicial process or 
procedure;
3. At a time when an original was under the control of the party against whom 
offered, the party was put on notice, by the pleadings or otherwise, that the 
contents would be a subject of proof at the hearings and the party does not 
produce the original at the hearing; or
4. The record is not closely related to a controlling issue.
Because this statute remains unchanged since 2002, references are to the 
current version.
3 Title 47 O.S. Supp. 2005 §754 provides in pertinent 
part:
A. Any arrested person who is under twenty-one (21) years of age and has any 
measurable quantity of alcohol in the person's blood or breath, or any person 
twenty-one (21) years of age or older whose alcohol concentration is 
eight-hundredths (0.08) or more as shown by a breath test administered according 
to the provisions of this title, or any arrested person who has refused to 
submit to a breath or blood test, shall immediately surrender his or her driver 
license, permit or other evidence of driving privilege to the arresting law 
enforcement officer. The officer shall seize any driver license, permit, or 
other evidence of driving privilege surrendered by or found on the arrested 
person during a search. . . .
4 Title 47 O.S. Supp. 2006 §6-211(E) provides: 
E. The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days after the order has 
been served upon the person, except a petition relating to an implied consent 
revocation shall be filed within thirty (30) days after the Department gives 
notice to the person that the revocation is sustained as provided in Section 754 
of this title. It shall be the duty of the district court to enter an order 
setting the matter for hearing not less than fifteen (15) days and not more than 
thirty (30) days from the date the petition is filed. A certified copy of 
petition and order for hearing shall be served forthwith by the clerk of the 
court upon the Commissioner of Public Safety by certified mail at the Department 
of Public Safety, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
5 The trial court is required to examine all of the 
records on file in DPS relative to an offense committed. Title 47 O.S. Supp. 2006 §6-211(I) provides:
The court shall take testimony and examine the facts and circumstances, 
including all of the records on file in the office of the Department of Public 
Safety relative to the offense committed and the driving record of the person, 
and determine from the facts, circumstances, and records whether or not the 
petitioner is entitled to driving privileges or shall be subject to the order of 
denial, cancellation, suspension or revocation issued by the Department. The 
court may also determine whether or not, from the person's previous driving 
record, the order was for a longer period of time than such facts and 
circumstances warranted. In case the court finds that the order was not 
justified, the court may sustain the appeal, vacate the order of the Department 
and direct that driving privileges be restored to the petitioner, if otherwise 
eligible. The court may, in case it determines the order was justified, but that 
the period of the suspension or revocation was excessive, enter an order 
modifying the same as provided by law.
Title 47 O.S. Supp. 2005 
§2-110 provides in pertinent part:
C. The Commissioner and any other officers of the Department as the 
Commissioner may designate are hereby authorized to provide a copy of any record 
required to be maintained by the Department at no charge to any of the following 
government agencies when requested in the performance of official governmental 
duties:
… 2. Any court, district attorney or municipal prosecutor in this state or 
any other state;
6 The Court of Civil Appeals initially issued an opinion 
on March 15, 2013, and Hedrick filed for rehearing on April 4, 2013. In an order 
dated May 10, 2013, the Court of Civil Appeals withdrew the March 15th opinion 
and substituted it with the May 10th decision. We also 
note that after the substitute opinion was issued, the original DPS attorney 
withdrew from the case because she no longer worked for DPS. 
7 Okla. Const. art. 7, §7(a) provides:
(a) The State shall be divided by the Legislature into judicial districts, 
each consisting of an entire county or of contiguous counties. There shall be 
one District Court for each judicial district, which shall have such number of 
District Judges, Associate District Judges and Special Judges as may be 
prescribed by statute. The District Court shall have unlimited original 
jurisdiction of all justiciable matters, except as otherwise provided in this 
Article, and such powers of review of administrative action as may be provided 
by statute. Existing electing districts for all who are or who become District 
Judges and Associate District Judges under the terms of this Article shall 
remain as they are constituted for the offices formerly held by such persons on 
the effective date of this Article, until changed by statute. The Legislature 
may at any time delegate authority to the Supreme Court to designate by court 
rule the division of the State into districts and the number of judges.
Title 47 O.S. Supp. 2006 
§6-211(a) provides:
A. Any person denied driving privileges, or whose driving privilege has been 
canceled, denied, suspended or revoked by the Department, except where such 
cancellation, denial, suspension or revocation is mandatory, under the 
provisions of Section 6-205 of this title, or disqualified by the Department, 
under the provisions of Section 6-205.2 or 761 of this title, shall have the 
right of appeal to the district court as hereinafter provided. Proceedings 
before the district court shall be exempt from the provisions of the Oklahoma 
Pleading and Discovery codes, except that the appeal shall be by petition, 
without responsive pleadings. The district court is hereby vested with original 
jurisdiction to hear said petition.
The district court was vested with subject matter jurisdiction the moment 
Hedrick filed his petition in the trial court. Oklahoma Dept. 
of Public Safety v. Robinson, 1973 OK 80, ¶15, 512 P.2d 128.
8 Title 47 O.S. Supp. 2006 §6-211(F) provides:
F. At a hearing on a revocation by the Department pursuant to the implied 
consent laws as provided in Sections 6-205.1, 753 and754 of this title, the 
court shall not consider the merits of the revocation action unless a written 
request for an administrative hearing was timely submitted to the Department and 
the person actually exercised the opportunity to appear as provided in Section 
754 of this title and the Department entered an order sustaining the 
revocation.
9 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §3005 provides:
The contents of an official record or of a private record authorized to be 
recorded or filed in the public records and actually recorded or filed, if 
otherwise admissible, may be proved by a copy in perceivable form, certified as 
correct in accordance with Section 2902 of this title or testified to be correct 
by a witness who has compared it with the original. If a copy which complies 
with this section cannot be obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
other evidence of the contents may be admitted.
Because this statute remains unchanged since 2002, references are to the 
current version.
10 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §2902 provides in pertinent 
part:
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility 
is not required with respect to the following:
1. A document bearing a seal purporting to be that of the United States or of 
any state, district, commonwealth, territory or insular possession thereof, 
including the Panama Canal Zone, or the trust territory of the Pacific Islands, 
or of a political subdivision, department, office or agency thereof, and a 
signature purporting to be an attestation or execution;
2. A document purporting to bear the signature in his official capacity of an 
officer or employee of any entity included in paragraph 1 of this section, 
having no seal, if a public officer having a seal and having official duties in 
the district or political subdivision of the officer or employee certifies under 
seal that the signer has the official capacity and that the signature is 
genuine;
….
4. A copy of an official record or report or entry therein, or of a document 
authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a 
public office, including data compilations in any form, certified as correct by 
the custodian or other person authorized to make the certification, by 
certificate complying with paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of this section or complying with 
any statute or by rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory 
authority;
Because this statute remains unchanged since 2002, references are to the 
current version.
11 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §2201 provides in pertinent 
part;
A. Judicial notice shall be taken by the court of the common law, 
constitutions and public statutes in force in every state, territory and 
jurisdiction of the United States. . . . 
12 Title 47 O.S. Supp. 2006 §6-211(I) see note 5, supra. 
See also, 47 O.S. Supp. 2005 
§2-110 see note 5, supra. 
13 Title 47 O.S. Supp. 2006 §6-211(A) provides:
A. Any person denied driving privileges, or whose driving privilege has been 
canceled, denied, suspended or revoked by the Department, except where such 
cancellation, denial, suspension or revocation is mandatory, under the 
provisions of Section 6-205of this title, or disqualified by the Department, 
under the provisions of Section 6-205.2 or 761 of this title, shall have the 
right of appeal to the district court as hereinafter provided. Proceedings 
before the district court shall be exempt from the provisions of the Oklahoma 
Pleading and Discovery codes, except that the appeal shall be by petition, 
without responsive pleadings. The district court is hereby vested with original 
jurisdiction to hear said petition.
While this provision specifically exempts proceedings of this type from the 
Pleading and Discovery Codes, it is silent on the application of the Evidence 
Code. Additionally, this court stated in Oklahoma Dept. of 
Pub. Safety v. Robinson, see note 4, supra:
Although the hearing for revocation of a drivers license is an administrative 
proceeding, when the order of the commissioner is appealed to the district court 
it becomes a judicial proceeding. Any evidence sought to be introduced must 
conform with judicial standards.
DPS relies on Robinson in arguing that a photo copy was insufficient 
because a police officer's uncertified affidavit was not allowed in 
Robinson as admissible. The affidavit did not fall under the exceptions 
of 12 O.S. 2011 
§3004(3), nor did Robinson address its applicability to DPS 
proceedings.
14 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §3004(3) see note 4, supra. 

15 7 Okla. Prac., Trial Practice § 17:3 (2009 ed.), 
provides in pertinent part:
Even if § 3002 requires the proponent to introduce the original, § 3004 of 
the Oklahoma Evidence Code specifies "circumstances under which production of 
the original is excused" (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 1004, Adv. Comm. Note).
16 7 Okla. Prac., Trial Practice § 17:3 (2009 ed.); Fed. 
R. Evid. 1004, Adv. Comm. Note.
17 See Fed. R. Evid. 1004(3), Adv. Comm. Note, explaining 
the provision of the Federal Rules of Evidence identical to 12 O.S. 2011 §3004(3), which provides:
A party who has an original in his control has no need for the protection of 
the rule if put on notice that proof of contents will be made. He can ward off 
secondary evidence by offering the original. The notice procedure here provided 
is not to be confused with orders to produce or other discovery procedures, as 
the purpose of the procedure under this rule is to afford the opposite party an 
opportunity to produce the original, not to compel him to do so.
18 Title 47 O.S. Supp. 2006 §6-211(E), see note 4, supra. 

19 Title 47 O.S. Supp. 2007 §2-111, see note 1, supra.
20 Title 12 O.S. 2011 §3004(3) see note 4, supra 
21 Much like this Court takes judicial notice of orders on 
the dockets of the District Courts and Appellate Courts, the trial court could 
have taken notice of the DPS revocation order. See, 12 O.S. 2011 §2201, note 11, supra; 
Collier v. Reese, 2009 OK 86, ¶8, fn. 7, 223 P.3d 966. See also, 
State ex rel. Oklahoma State Board of 
Examiners of Certified Shorthand Reporters, 
2006 OK 91, ¶7 fn. 1, 
152 P.3d 202; Mehdipour v. 
State ex rel. Department of Corrections, 
2004 OK 19, ¶7 fn. 15, 
90 P.3d 546; Myers v. 
Lashley, 2002 OK 
14, ¶5, fn. 8, 44 P.3d 553. The District Court is required to 
consider and examine DPS records, see discussion note 3, supra.
22 Title 47 O.S. Supp. 2007 §2-116, see page 9, supra.
23 Title 47 O.S. Supp. 2006 §6-211(E), see note 4, 
supra.

EDMONDSON, J., Concurring In Result, and with GURICH, J., who Concurs 
with the Opinion of the Court and joins the separate writing by Edmondson, J. 

I. Introduction
¶1 I concur in the result of the Court's opinion which requires the District 
Court to hear Appellant's appeal on remand. I agree with the Court's opinion 
concerning application of the Evidence Code and the timeliness of the District 
Court appeal. However, I decline to join the Court's opinion because it leaves 
unaddressed public law issues that are briefed by the parties. These issues 
involve a fundamentally flawed District Court procedure that is not 
corrected by the Court's opinion and will no doubt be continued on remand after 
this Court's silence on these issues. This Court simply cannot remain silent 
when a state agency expressly advocates in this Court that the agency may revoke 
a state license deserving due process protection by utilizing a trial by ambush 
in a District Court.
¶2 Appellant's Brief-in-chief identifies the "Issues Under Review" and 
includes "Whether the lower court improperly shifted the burden of proof onto 
Appellant," and his brief contains argument on whether he had the burden to 
prove service of his petition for appeal of the revocation of appellant's 
driver's license.1 His brief also contains argument that he should have 
been given an opportunity to present evidence for a modification of his 
revocation. The Court's opinion points out that the Department of Public Safety 
(DPS) argues that the burden of producing part of the administrative record is 
upon Appellant. The Court's opinion notes that the District Court is 
required to examine the administrative record, but has no discussion on 
which party has the burden to provide the record, or its parts, to the District 
Court. 
¶3 A case was presented to this Court in 1990 with the issue whether the 
district court erred by failing to vacate a driver's license revocation order 
because it was not founded on administrative documentation that met the 
standards mandated by the governing statute.2 We explained in that case that we had granted 
certiorari "to provide guidance on an important, first-impression question of 
public law."3 
¶4 In the present controversy the DPS argues in its appellate brief that it 
is not required to provide any particular documents from the administrative 
record to the District Court unless the DPS decides to use them, and that the 
DPS is not merely allowed, but statutorily required, to engage in a trial by 
surprise or ambush when the parties appear in the District Court trial de 
novo. The parties' briefs present issues on burden of proof and the use of 
the administrative record by the District Court in the context of a trial by 
ambush. While Appellant does not take issue with a trial by ambush, he does 
object to how the DPS allocates burdens of proof. 
¶5 Whether the parties possess certain burdens of proof and whether a trial 
by ambush is a required procedure for a District Court present not merely public 
versus private law issues, but issues that are of immediate concern to the 
orderly administration of justice, and they are issues publici juris. 
These publici juris issues of public law are squarely before us for 
resolution, and like our opinion in 1990 the Court must not remain silent, but 
"provide guidance on an important, first-impression question of public law." 

¶6 In summary, all of the questions in this appeal ultimately center on which 
party has a burden to produce certain records for the District Court review and 
the form those records should take when they are produced. I agree with the 
Court's opinion that the District Court's order must be reversed because it is 
erroneous as a matter of law and unsupported by a required evidentiary 
foundation.4 However, my resolution of the issues before us requires 
the DPS to place the DPS administrative record in the District Court proceeding, 
and Appellant may rely upon documents appearing in that record to show 
appropriateness and timeliness of his District Court petition. 
II. Administrative Record and Burdens of Proof
¶7 The first two issues are (1) the scope of the administrative record 
to be produced in the District Court and (2) a party's burden to produce that 
record. For example, DPS argued that those portions of the administrative 
record introduced as exhibits by either party constitute the 
administrative record before the District Court.5 The scope of the record 
to be produced is determined by the language in 47 O.S.2011 § 6-211 (I).6 That paragraph states as 
follows:
I. The court shall take testimony and examine the facts and circumstances, 
including all of the records on file in the office of the Department of Public 
Safety relative to the offense committed and the driving record of the person, 
and determine from the facts, circumstances, and records whether or not the 
petitioner is entitled to driving privileges or shall be subject to the order of 
denial, cancellation, suspension or revocation issued by the Department. The 
court may also determine whether or not, from the person's previous driving 
record, the order was for a longer period of time than such facts and 
circumstances warranted. In case the court finds that the order was not 
justified, the court may sustain the appeal, vacate the order of the Department 
and direct that driving privileges be restored to the petitioner, if otherwise 
eligible. The court may, in case it determines the order was justified, but that 
the period of the suspension or revocation was excessive, enter an order 
modifying the same as provided by law.
This language clearly states that the trial court "shall . . . 
examine . . all of the records on file in the office of the 
Department of Public Safety relative to the offense committed and the driving 
record of the person . . . [and] may also determine . . . from the 
person's previous driving record,[if] the [DPS] order was for a longer period of 
time than such facts and circumstances warranted." Id. 47 O.S. § 6-211(I) (material omitted and emphasis added). 
In 1984, we noted this language and observed that the "[District] [C]ourt is 
mandated 'to examine into' the 'facts and circumstances' relative to the 
offense committed."7 
¶8 In summary, if this language in § 6-211(I) is considered in context 
with (1) the language in other paragraphs of § 6-211 and (2) several appellate 
court opinions, then § 6-211(I) describes a mandatory duty8 of the District Court to 
examine all of the records of DPS relative to the offense and driving record, 
and DPS has the burden to either file a certified copy of the record with the 
Clerk of the District Court for its incorporation into the record of that court, 
or to introduce this record at the District Court hearing. Further, if any 
part of the administrative record, including the person's previous driving 
record which the District Court may also consider, was not filed or 
introduced by the DPS, then the party challenging the DPS ruling may file or 
introduce any portion of that record with the District Court if he or she wants 
that court to consider it as part of its decision.
¶9 The appeal to the District Court is initiated by the person whose driving 
privileges have been canceled, denied, suspended or revoked. This person files a 
petition in the District Court and the Pleading and Discovery Codes do not 
apply. 47 § 6-211(A). The petition serves to invoke the original subject matter 
jurisdiction of the District Court to hear the petition. Id. This 
paragraph also states that this appeal "shall be . . . without responsive 
pleadings.'' Id. 
¶10 If no responsive pleadings are filed, then how are the legal and fact 
issues presented for the District Court to examine? The unique interpretation by 
the DPS is that both parties appear for the hearing and make their arguments 
with whatever supporting documents they desire to produce, and that a "trial by 
ambush" or surprise occurs because neither side knows with certainty what the 
other will argue or what evidentiary materials they will produce.9 The DPS combines this 
view with an indication that the appellant has the initial burden to prove error 
on the part of the DPS, and the DPS need only produce a record when forensically 
necessary to challenge the appellant's claims.10 This Court should expressly reject this view by the 
DPS, and explain that a "trial by surprise" is not the procedure for a trial de 
novo.
¶11 The simple answer for why no responsive pleadings are filed by the DPS is 
that (1) the DPS has the initial burden in District Court to show that 
its administrative decision was correct via a de novo showing of evidence 
(including the administrative record), and (2) the Legislature was of the 
opinion that the DPS record itself could be sufficient for presentation of 
facts in some circumstances when, for example, only questions of law are 
raised in the District Court appeal, and a District Court could sustain or 
vacate the DPS order using unchallenged facts appearing on the DPS record. 
¶12 A District Court review of a driver's license revocation is conducted 
de novo with a trial on both the law and the facts.11 Since 1975 our Court of Civil Appeals has explained 
that during this trial on both law and facts the DPS has the initial 
burden to show that driving privileges that were previously granted to a driver 
should now be canceled, denied, suspended or revoked.12 Our 1976 opinion in Peters v. Oklahoma Dept. of 
Public Safety affirmed a District Court order which had reversed a license 
suspension and found that the evidence submitted by DPS failed to meet the 
preponderance-of-evidence standard.13 In 2008, we again noted that in a District Court 
hearing the DPS's burden of proof is measured by a preponderance of the 
evidence.14 Although the DPS has an initial burden of proof for a 
driving privilege to be canceled, denied, suspended or revoked, the driver may 
bear a burden of proof depending upon the matter to be proved, such as a burden 
of showing an incapacity to refuse or submit to the test for alcoholic blood 
content.15 
¶13 Our characterization of the District Court proceeding as de novo is a 
correct shorthand label because that court takes testimony, makes determinations 
of fact, and uses the record of the administrative proceeding.16 Again, this Court has described the District Court 
proceeding as a trial de novo. Matter of Braddy, supra. We have 
explained that a trial de novo has a well-defined and generally understood 
meaning; it does not contemplate the framing of new and different issues in the 
appellate court, but requires that appeals be tried upon the original papers and 
upon the same issues as had below, the term "de novo" meaning "anew," "a second 
time."17 We have also said that a trial de novo is a complete 
examination of all issues, both law and fact, and the cause is adjudicated as if 
it had never been previously adjudicated.18 In both types of trial de novo, (1) a trial on original 
evidence and original issues, and (2) a trial on all evidence and issues 
presented regardless of their presentation in the first proceeding, the burdens 
of proof allocated to the parties do not change from the first trial to the 
trial de novo. This is because a burden of proof as to any particular fact rests 
upon the party asserting such fact,19 and a trial de novo does not alter this principle.20
¶14 May the District Court consider facts that do not appear on the face of 
the administrative record? Of course it may because the District Court is 
required to take testimony and examine the facts and circumstances 
"including all of the [DPS] records." 47 O.S. at § 6-211(I) (emphasis added). The 
term "including" when describing the administrative record is used in an 
accumulative or additive sense21 because what precedes it in the sentence is a reference 
to testimony taken in the District Court and not to testimony that is 
"included" in the administrative record.22 
¶15 This conclusion is supported by the Legislature's apparent reaction to 
Sipes v. State ex rel. Department of Public Safety, 1997 OK CIV APP 82, 950 P.2d 881.23 In Sipes v. State ex rel. Department of Public 
Safety, supra, our Court of Civil Appeals stated that in cases of 
refusal to submit to a blood test "the licensee may not present new evidence but 
must prove that the evidence adduced by DPS at the administrative level is 
facially deficient to satisfy the relevant statutory requirements." Id. 
at 884. The court's conclusion was based upon a 1988 amendment to § 6-211(A), 
then in effect, which stated that: " . . . the district court is hereby vested 
with appellate jurisdiction and shall hear said petition de novo" when hearing 
the case of an appeal from a driver license revocation under the implied consent 
laws. Id. The appellate court noted the difference between "original" and 
"appellate" jurisdiction and the Legislature's use of the latter term. Shortly 
after the 1997 opinion the Legislature amended 47 O.S. § 6-211, deleting the "appellate jurisdiction" 
application for driver license revocation appeals under the implied consent 
laws, and keeping the statutory language stating that a District Court had 
"original jurisdiction" in an appeal pursuant to § 6-211.24 The Oklahoma Legislature, apparently in response to the 
Sipes holding,25 amended § 6-211 so that facts outside the 
administrative record could be considered in the District Court appeal of a 
revocation under the implied consent laws.
¶16 May the District Court consider a legal issue raised by a party that does 
not also appear on the face of the administrative record? In summary, yes it 
may. Sipes is noteworthy because it relied upon one of the well-known 
general principles of appellate jurisdiction and procedure that a record on 
appeal constitutes the facts used by an appellate court when adjudicating an 
appeal,26 and it applied this principle to the meaning of 
statutory language then in effect. Another well-known general principle of 
appellate procedure is that legal issues adjudicated on appeal are those which 
were raised "either directly or by implication" in the lower tribunal.27 Raising an issue either directly or indirectly in the 
DPS administrative adjudication would include not only those issues actually 
raised by parties and adjudicated, but also those fairly comprised by the issues 
actually raised and the nature of the adjudication,28 as well as the mandatory legal requirements the DPS 
must satisfy and, on direct District Court review, affirmatively show on the 
face of the administrative record when denying, suspending, revoking or 
canceling a license.29 However, just as the District Court § 6-211 trial de 
novo is not limited to those facts appearing on the administrative record, the 
trial de novo is not limited to those legal issues raised by the parties and 
appearing on the administrative record. The Legislature's removal of language 
referring to "appellate jurisdiction" while retaining "original jurisdiction" 
for describing the proceeding in the District Court shows that the Legislature 
wants the District Court proceeding to be treated as an appeal on the record of 
the lower tribunal with an opportunity for additional facts and legal issues 
raised in the District Court.
¶17 This issue is raised by the DPS in its brief when it cites a federal 
appellate opinion for the proposition that "Plaintiff has the burden of proving 
the subject matter jurisdiction requirement of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies by competent evidence."30 The DPS's reliance on this authority raises two issues. 
The first is exhaustion of administrative remedies and its application requiring 
issues to be first presented to the administrative agency for resolution. The 
second involves the DPS's claim that proof of the exhaustion is a 
jurisdictional burden of proof that Appellant failed to meet in the 
District Court, so that the order of the District Court must be affirmed on 
appeal.
¶18 The exhaustion of administrative remedies principle ordinarily requires a 
plaintiff to pursue all available administrative relief before bringing a court 
action.31 There are several reasons for a judicial rule 
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, and we have noted that judicial 
efficiency is served when parties develop the material facts in the 
administrative proceeding and administrative factfinding results.32 This development of the facts is necessarily linked to 
the legal issues and claims presented for exhaustion in the administrative 
hearing. Of course, while development of an administrative record of facts 
may be necessary to support the application of legal issues, some legal 
issues are not subject to the exhaustion requirement because the issues are 
beyond the cognizance of the administrative body33 or particular circumstances do not require exhaustion 
of the issues.34 
¶19 The DPS's appellate brief argues that the District Court had no 
jurisdiction because Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof required by 
47 O.S. § 2-111(F). 
F. At a hearing on a revocation by the Department pursuant to the implied 
consent laws as provided in Sections 6-205.1, 753 and 754 of this title, the 
court shall not consider the merits of the revocation action unless a written 
request for an administrative hearing was timely submitted to the Department and 
the person actually exercised the opportunity to appear as provided in Section 
754 of this title and the Department entered an order sustaining the 
revocation.
47 O.S.2011 § 2-111(F).
We have explained that administrative exhaustion of remedies is 
jurisdictional when the Legislature requires it and provides a legally effective 
administrative procedure and remedy for the type of relief sought by a 
claimant.35 Paragraph "F" clearly states that the merits shall not 
be examined until the court determines that the licensee timely submitted a 
written request for a hearing, the licensee exercised his or her opportunity to 
participate in the hearing, and the DPS issued an order as a result of that 
hearing.
¶20 Subject matter jurisdiction is the "power to deal with the general 
subject involved in the action"36 or the nature of the cause of action.37 The Court has explained that subject matter 
jurisdiction of a court is invoked by pleadings filed with a court which show 
that the court has power to proceed in a case of the character presented, 
or power to grant the relief sought.38 Appellant pled in his petition that he made a timely 
demand for an administrative hearing, that the DPS sustained the revocation, and 
that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Section 6-211 (F) does not 
expressly state that performance of the administrative procedure is 
jurisdictional, or that proof of prior performance of the administrative 
procedure is for the purpose of obtaining or invoking District Court 
jurisdiction.39 Section 6-211(F) is not defining or limiting the 
character of the case to be heard by the District Court. Instead, the 
limiting language "the court shall not consider the merits of the revocation 
action unless . . ." appears to be either (1) mandatory language in the nature 
of the third element of jurisdiction40 and a jurisdictional condition precedent "to the 
operation of the statutory scheme"41 or (2) a nonjurisdictional condition precedent.42 
¶21 The Court need not engage in what would be an essentially academic 
exercise to determine which of these two options best fits the requirements of § 
6-211(F). Contrary to the DPS's brief, characterizing § 6-211(F) as 
jurisdictional is not determinative of burdens of pleading or proof.43 Generally, the burden of proof as to a particular fact 
rests upon the party asserting that fact, and whether a party has a burden to 
assert a particular fact often depends upon whether the fact is part of a claim 
or defense made by the party.44 Our Pleading Code makes lack of in personam and 
subject matter jurisdiction procedural defenses to be raised, for 
example, by responsive pleading and by motion.45 Section 6-211(A) expressly states that the proceeding 
in the District Court "shall be exempt from the provisions of the Oklahoma 
Pleading and Discovery codes, except that the appeal shall be by petition, 
without responsive pleadings." This procedure denies to both sides of the 
dispute the ability to file pleadings to give notice of the facts and law at 
issue.
¶22 The nature of the District Court proceeding is a review of the 
correctness of the DPS decision, and it is the DPS who has the burden to show 
that the decision was correct by producing the entire administrative record for 
the District Court's review. In 1986, we observed that the legislature may, of 
course, define the issues to be resolved in an administrative revocation 
hearing.46 We explained that the clear language of 
47 O.S. § 754(5) then in effect defined 
the range of inquiry for a § 754 license revocation hearing.47 The absence of a statutory requirement to 
support administrative license revocation may make a DPS order vulnerable to 
invalidation on a timely appeal.48 Obviously, the presence of the statutory 
requirements for revocation of a license appearing on the administrative 
record that is made part of the District Court trial de novo record will 
usually49 make the DPS order invulnerable to judicial 
invalidation on a timely appeal if the facts appearing in the 
administrative/District Court record are unsuccessfully challenged in the 
District Court trial de novo. The District Court's determination of the proper 
result based upon on the evidence is not independent of the DPS's order, but an 
adjudication whether the person "shall be subject to the [DPS's] order of 
denial, cancellation, suspension or revocation.. .." § 6-211(I) (emphasis and 
explanation added). This means that a judicial adjudication which agrees with 
the DPS order does not result in a District Court order that supplants the DPS's 
order with similar findings and result, but rather a District Court order that 
leaves intact the legal vitality of the DPS's order. In sum, the DPS 
administrative record must be before the District Court. 
¶23 The statutory restraint on pleading makes sense from a due process 
perspective only if the Legislature intended the District Court to have the 
complete administrative record before it when exercising review provided by § 
6-211, both review of the administrative exhaustion discussed in paragraph "F" 
and review of the merits discussed in paragraph "I". Due process is applicable 
to the District Court proceeding50 and each party is entitled to know what is being tried, 
or at least to the means to find out, and trial by ambush is not an acceptable 
method for revoking a state license.51 One reason for this is that a party must know what 
issues will be tried prior to the trial.52 At the very least, the administrative record must be 
made part of the District Court proceeding and this Court should provide that 
the parties be given an opportunity to know the nature of the opposing parties' 
claims at a pretrial conference.
¶24 Although I made this statement at the beginning of this opinion, it 
deserves repeating, this Court simply cannot remain silent when a state 
agency expressly advocates in this Court that the agency may revoke a state 
license deserving due process protection by utilizing a trial by ambush in a 
District Court. When the DPS follows its statutory mandate to produce the 
administrative record for District Court review, issues such as that decided by 
the Court today on whether the licensee must produce a certified copy of the DPS 
order should become moot because evidence in the administrative record showing 
exhaustion is necessary only for review to occur and not for invoking 
jurisdiction and commencement of the District Court appeal.53 
¶25 There is nothing novel about requiring the DPS, as an administrative 
agency, to produce an administrative record for a District Court. Article II of 
the current Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act requires an administrative 
agency to transmit the complete record, or a certified copy, of an individual 
proceeding to the District Court for appellate review within sixty days after 
service of the petition for review.54 In 1973 we explained that hearings before the 
Commissioner of Public Safety were "excluded" from the procedural provisions of 
the OAPA.55 The current Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act 
specifically exempts "driver license hearings" from the application of that 
OAPA.56 Although the OAPA procedure for filing an 
administrative record in the District Court does not apply to the DPS, 
47 O.S. § 6-211 requires the DPS to 
present the administrative record to the District Court for satisfaction of its 
burden of proof and for the District Court to adjudicate the correctness of the 
DPS decision. 
¶26 In summary, the DPS has an evidentiary burden to prove its case in the 
District Court in a trial de novo. Because (1) § 6-211 specifically requires all 
of the DPS records to be before the trial court for the trial de novo, (2) the 
trial court must determine if the DPS order was correct, (3) the Pleading Code 
does not apply and no responsive pleadings are filed by the DPS, and (4) no 
statute prohibits filing the DPS record with the Clerk of the District Court; 
the DPS must either file the original (or certified copy) of the administrative 
record, including driving record of the licensee, with the Clerk of the District 
Court prior to trial, or introduce that record into evidence at the District 
Court hearing. The order of the District Court should be reversed with 
instructions for the DPS to file the administrative record and the matter 
proceed on that record and any additional evidence the parties desire to submit. 

FOOTNOTES
1 Appellant's 
Brief-in-chief at pp. 1, 2, & 7-8. 
2 Chase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 
1990 OK 78, 795 P.2d 1048. 
3 Chase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 
795 P.2d  at 1049. 
4 Hollis v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 
2008 OK 31, n. 4, 183 P.3d 996, 999 ("Unless the lower court's rulings 
are found to be erroneous as a matter of law, or unsupported by evidentiary 
foundation, the appellate courts will not disturb the findings made."). 
5 See, e.g., Appellant's Brief in Chief, at 
p. 5., "Appellee [DPS] refused to provide these [DPS] records to the trial 
court." See, e.g., Appellee's Answer Brief, at pp. 11-12, "If 
Plaintiff desired any records of the Department of Public Safety to use as trial 
exhibits, he had the ability to make a request through the Records Division of 
the Department of Public Safety. . . . The statute requires the trial court to 
examine all the records on file with the Department of Public Safety that are 
submitted as evidence by either party." 
6 47 O.S.2011 § 6-211:
A. Any person denied driving privileges, or whose driving privilege has been 
canceled, denied, suspended or revoked by the Department, except where such 
cancellation, denial, suspension or revocation is mandatory, under the 
provisions of Section 6-205 of this title, or disqualified by the Department, 
under the provisions of Section 6-205.2 or 761 of this title, shall have the 
right of appeal to the district court as hereinafter provided. Proceedings 
before the district court shall be exempt from the provisions of the Oklahoma 
Pleading and Discovery codes, except that the appeal shall be by petition, 
without responsive pleadings. The district court is hereby vested with original 
jurisdiction to hear said petition.
B. A person whose driving privilege is denied, canceled, revoked or suspended 
due to inability to meet standards prescribed by law, or due to an out-of-state 
conviction or violation, or due to an excessive point accumulation on the 
traffic record, or for an unlawful license issued, may appeal in the county in 
which the person resides.
C. Any person whose driving privilege is canceled, denied, suspended or 
revoked may appeal to the district court in the county in which the offense was 
committed upon which the Department based its order.
D. A person whose driving privilege is revoked or denied or who is denied a 
hearing pursuant to Section 753 or 754 of this title may appeal to the district 
court in the county in which the arrest occurred relating to the test refusal or 
test result, as shown by the records of the Department.
E. The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days after the order has 
been served upon the person, except a petition relating to an implied consent 
revocation shall be filed within thirty (30) days after the Department gives 
notice to the person that the revocation is sustained as provided in Section 754 
of this title. It shall be the duty of the district court to enter an order 
setting the matter for hearing not less than fifteen (15) days and not more than 
thirty (30) days from the date the petition is filed. A certified copy of 
petition and order for hearing shall be served forthwith by the clerk of the 
court upon the Commissioner of Public Safety by certified mail at the Department 
of Public Safety, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
F. At a hearing on a revocation by the Department pursuant to the implied 
consent laws as provided in Sections 6-205.1, 753 and 754 of this title, the 
court shall not consider the merits of the revocation action unless a written 
request for an administrative hearing was timely submitted to the Department and 
the person actually exercised the opportunity to appear as provided in Section 
754 of this title and the Department entered an order sustaining the 
revocation.
G. Upon a hearing relating to a revocation or disqualification pursuant to a 
conviction for an offense enumerated in Section 6-205, 761, or 6-205.2 of this 
title, the court shall not consider the propriety or merits of the revocation or 
disqualification action, except to correct the identity of the person convicted 
as shown by records of the Department.
H. In the event the Department declines to modify, as provided in Section 
754.1 of this title, a revocation order issued pursuant to Section 753, Section 
754, paragraph 2 of subsection A of Section 6-205 or Section 6-205.1 of this 
title, which is subject to modification pursuant to Section 11-906.4 of this 
title or Section 6-205.1 of this title, a petition for modification may be 
included with the appeal or separately filed at any time, and the district court 
may, in its discretion, modify the revocation as provided for in Section 755 of 
this title; provided, any modification under this subsection shall apply to 
Class D motor vehicles only.
I. The court shall take testimony and examine the facts and circumstances, 
including all of the records on file in the office of the Department of Public 
Safety relative to the offense committed and the driving record of the person, 
and determine from the facts, circumstances, and records whether or not the 
petitioner is entitled to driving privileges or shall be subject to the order of 
denial, cancellation, suspension or revocation issued by the Department. The 
court may also determine whether or not, from the person's previous driving 
record, the order was for a longer period of time than such facts and 
circumstances warranted. In case the court finds that the order was not 
justified, the court may sustain the appeal, vacate the order of the Department 
and direct that driving privileges be restored to the petitioner, if otherwise 
eligible. The court may, in case it determines the order was justified, but that 
the period of the suspension or revocation was excessive, enter an order 
modifying the same as provided by law.
J. The testimony of any hearing pursuant to this section shall be taken by 
the court stenographer and preserved for the purpose of appeal and, in case the 
Department files notice of appeal from the order of the court as provided 
herein, the court shall order and direct the court clerk to prepare and furnish 
a complete transcript of all pleadings and proceedings, together with a complete 
transcript taken at said hearing at no cost to the Department, except the cost 
of transcribing.
K. In order to stay or supersede any order of the Department, the petitioner 
may execute and file a cash appeal bond in the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($250.00) with the clerk of the court, to be approved by the court clerk. A 
certified copy of the bond shall be served along with the notice of hearing and 
petition.
The bond shall be to the State of Oklahoma and conditioned that the 
petitioner will prosecute the appeal with due diligence and during pendency of 
the appeal abide by and not violate any of the laws of this state or any other 
state in the operation of a motor vehicle, and that the petitioner will abide by 
and perform the final judgment of the court therein, and in case the appeal is 
finally denied the appellant will pay all court costs incurred in the appeal in 
the district court. If the petitioner is convicted of a traffic offense during 
the pendency of the appeal or fails to prosecute the appeal with due diligence, 
the bond may be forfeited to the court fund upon application by the Department 
and after hearing before the court in which the appeal is pending.
L. After filing and approval of the appeal bond and the furnishing thereof to 
the Department as hereby provided, the Department shall restore driving 
privileges to the person if otherwise eligible, and the person shall be 
permitted to operate a motor vehicle pending the appeal, under terms and 
conditions as prescribed in the bond which shall include the installation of an 
ignition interlock device on every motor vehicle operated by the person, 
pursuant to Section 754.1 or 755 of this title, if the person was denied 
modification pursuant to any provision of paragraph 2 of subsection A of Section 
6-205 or Section 6-205.1, 753 or 754 of this title; provided, however, if the 
order of the Department is sustained in final judgment, the court shall, in such 
final judgment, enter an order extending the period of suspension or revocation 
for such time as the petitioner was permitted to operate motor vehicles under 
the provisions of an appeal bond, and the court shall also in such final 
judgment direct and require the immediate surrender of any driver license or 
licenses to the Department.
M. An appeal may be taken by the person or by the Department from the order 
or judgment of the district court to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma 
as otherwise provided by law.
7 Cascio v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 
1984 OK 30, 686 P.2d 282, 284 (emphasis and explanatory word 
added). 
8 The word "shall" is ordinarily interpreted as implying 
a command or mandate and "may" generally denotes permissive or discretional 
authority. However, a directory rather than mandatory construction may be given 
to the word "shall" upon a finding of strongly persuasive contrary 
legislative intent. Howard v. Zimmer, 2013 OK 17, n. 24, 299 P.3d 463, 469 (emphasis added). 
9 "These implied consent appeals are a lot like the old 
'trial by ambush' that existed prior to the Pleading and Discovery Codes. The 
Defendant is often surprised at trial by Plaintiff in these proceedings with 
unexpected exhibits, witnesses, claims and legal arguments." Appellee's Answer 
Brief at p. 8. 
10 For example, when the DPS addresses the requirement of 
47 O.S. § 6-211(I) that the District 
Court examine all records on file with the Department, it argues that it need 
not produce the administrative record because: "It is not the responsibility of 
Defendant's attorney to help Plaintiff make his case." Appellee's Answer Brief 
at p. 12. 
11 Appeal of Dungan, 1984 OK 21, 681 P.2d 750, 752 ("Appeals from implied consent 
revocation orders are heard de novo in the district court, with the 'trial de 
novo' being a trial of the entire case anew, both on the law and on the 
facts."); Matter of Braddy, 1980 OK 44, 611 P.2d 235, 237-238 ("Appeals from Implied Consent 
revocation orders are heard de novo in the district court. . . A trial de novo 
is a trial of the entire case anew, both on law and on facts.") (citations 
omitted). 
12 See, e.g., Appeal of Tucker, 
1975 OK CIV APP 40, 538 P.2d 626, 629 ("Appellant [DPS] carries the burden 
and must prove by a 'preponderance of the evidence' that appellee 'had been 
driving . . . while under the influence.'") (released for publication by order 
of the Court of Civil Appeals); Burris v. State, ex rel. Dept. of Public 
Safety, 1989 OK CIV APP 
64, 785 P.2d 332, 335 ("It is not necessary for the State to prove that the Appellant in 
fact was under the influence of intoxicants, only that the officer had 
reasonable grounds to believe so.") (released for publication by order of the 
Court of Civil Appeals); Collins v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 
1999 OK CIV APP 107, ¶ 4, 991 P.2d 557, 559 ("At that de novo hearing, DPS has 
the burden of proving that the licensee had been driving under the influence of 
alcohol.") (released for publication by order of the Court of Civil Appeals); 
Hollis v. State ex rel. Department of Public Safety, 2006 OK CIV APP 25, 131 P.3d 145, 146 ("To prove revocation is proper based 
on a licensee's refusal to submit to a breath or blood test, the State must 
prove the following four elements by a preponderance of the evidence . . . .") 
(released for publication by order of the Court of Civil Appeals). 
13 Peters v. Oklahoma Dept. of Public Safety, 
1976 OK 183, 557 P.2d 908, 909, 910 ("Evidence in support of the 
Department's claim Peters refused to submit to the test was found short of 
meeting the preponderance of the evidence test. . . We agree with the trial 
court."). 
14 Hollis v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 
2008 OK 31, ¶ 9, 183 P.3d 996, 998. 
15 See, e.g., Hollis v. State ex rel. 
Dept. of Public Safety, supra, 2008 OK 31, at ¶ 16, 183 P.3d  at 1000 ("Because 
Hollis failed to provide sufficient credible evidence that he was mentally 
incapable of giving a knowing and conscious refusal [to the test], the decision 
of the district court is reversed and remanded to affirm the revocation of 
Hollis' driving privileges."). 
16 47 O.S. § 6-211(I): "The court shall take testimony and 
examine the facts and circumstances . . . and determine from the facts . . . ." 

17 See Gould v. Smith, 1965 OK 112, 405 P.2d 82, 85, quoting Ex parte Morales, 53 S.W. 107, 108 (Tex.Cr.App.1899). 
18 Hargrave v. Tulsa Bd. of Adjustment, 
2002 OK 73, ¶ 6, 55 P.3d 1088, 1091, quoting Vinson v. Medley, 
1987 OK 41, 737 P.2d 932, 938 ("[The statute] required the district 
court to conduct a trial de novo . . . 'There must be a complete 
examination of all issues, both of fact and law. The cause stands as if it has 
never been resolved before.'"). 
19 Colton v. Huntleigh USA Corp., 2005 OK 46, ¶ 10, 121 P.3d 1070, 1073 
20 See, e.g., Hargrave v. Tulsa Bd. of 
Adjustment, 2002 OK 
73, at ¶ 6, 55 P.3d  at 1091, the Court noted that a party's burden of proof 
at the district court trial de novo did not change from the party's burden of 
proof before the board of adjustment. 
21 The word "including" may be used to classify an item 
that follows "including" as a part of the class of items which preceded the 
word. The word "including" may also be used as a term of enlargement to add an 
item to the class mentioned in the sentence and appearing before the word 
"including." See, e.g., Maben v. Rosser, 1909 OK 211, 103 P. 674 ("including" may be defined as classifying 
that which follows the term with that which has gone before, and in an 
accumulative sense that makes what follows the term in addition to that which 
has preceded the term); Argosy Limited v. Hennigan, 404 F.2d 14, 20 (5th 
Cir. 1968) ("The word 'includes' is usually a term of enlargement, and not of 
limitation."); Montello Salt Co. v. State of Utah, 221 U.S. 452, 
464-465, 31 S. Ct. 706, 55 L. Ed. 810 (1911) ("It [including] may have the sense 
of addition, as we have seen, and of 'also;' but, we have also seen, 'may merely 
specify particularly that which belongs to the genus.'"). 
22 If the Legislature had intended the testimony in the 
District Court to be a mere repetition of testimony in the administrative 
proceeding that was incorporated in the administrative record, then the term 
"including" would not have been followed by the term "all" which describes the 
sum total of the administrative record and not a kind of testimony. The 
Legislature would have instead specified that the administrative testimony was 
the testimony to be taken anew in the District Court if it had not wanted 
"including" to be given an additive meaning. 
23 Sipes was released for publication by order of 
the Court of Civil Appeals. Opinions released for publication by the Court of 
Civil Appeals have persuasive effect, but are not precedential. Tubbs v. 
State ex rel., Teachers' Retirement System of Okla., 2002 OK 79, n. 7, 57 P.3d 571, 575. 
24 1999 Okla. Sess. Laws, Ch. 139 § 3 (eff. Nov. 1, 1999). 
See also Davis v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 2001 OK CIV APP 154, ¶ 15, 37 P.3d 974, 978 (released for publication by order of 
the Court of Civil Appeals) ("In amending § 6-211(A), the legislature expanded 
the scope of district court review by striking the reference to 'appellate' 
jurisdiction in implied consent matters and vesting the district courts with 
'original' jurisdiction."). 
25 In the Matter of Baby Boy L., 2004 OK 93, ¶ 16 103 P.3d 1099, 1105 (The Court noted that within two 
years of a decision of this Court "the Oklahoma Legislature, apparently in 
response to our opinions" and in recognition of the teaching from a U. S. 
Supreme Court opinion, amended an Oklahoma statute.); White v. Heng Ly 
Lim, 2009 OK 
79, ¶ 16, 224 P.3d 679, 685 (Legislature's intent in amending a statute may be ascertained by 
looking to the circumstances surrounding the amendment). 
26 Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, 1986 OK 30, 720 P.2d 721, 723-724 ("This court may not consider as 
part of an appellate record any instrument or material which has not been 
incorporated into the assembled record by a certificate of the clerk of the 
trial court, nor may a deficient record be supplemented by material physically 
attached to a party's appellate brief."); Cumbey v. State, 
1985 OK 36, 699 P.2d 1094, 1099 ("A trial court's record constitutes 
the only means for communication of its proceedings to an appellate court."). 

27 Wilson v. Levy, 1929 OK 457, 282 P. 679, 681-682, quoting State Nat. Bank v. 
Lokey, 1925 OK 
792, 240 P. 101, 103 ("Where a proposition of law is not raised in the trial court 
either directly or by implication, and no objection or exception made or saved, 
there is nothing for this court to review, and the question cannot be presented 
in this court for the first time."). 
28 For certain purposes, an issue may be fairly comprised 
in a different issue that is expressly presented, or in a particular claim made 
by a pleading, or in a request for judicial relief, or when a necessary part of 
a particular adjudication requires adjudication of the fairly comprised issue 
because that issue is within the evidentiary record before the tribunal on its 
decision. See, e.g., Burrell v. Burrell, 2007 OK 47, n. 11, 192 P.3d 286, 289 ("An argument need not be artfully 
drawn as long as it is fairly comprised within the pleadings presented to the 
trial court."); Smedsrud v. Powell, 2002 OK 87, n. 37, 61 P.3d 891, 899 ("Before summary judgment may be 
given, the trial court is 'not only authorized but [indeed] required to rule out 
all theories of liability fairly comprised within the evidentiary materials 
before [it].'"); Slagell v. Slagell, 2000 OK 5, ¶ 8, 995 P.2d 1141, 1142 (points of law identified during 
hearing on motion for new trial may be reviewed on appeal since those points of 
law were fairly comprised in the general allegations of the motion for new 
trial); Whig Syndicate, Inc. v. Keyes, 1992 OK 95, 836 P.2d 1283, 1287 (issues raised on certiorari that 
were fairly comprised within the determination of the intermediate appellate 
court's decision were properly before the Supreme Court). 
29 Chase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 
1990 OK 78, 795 P.2d 1048, 1050 & n.9 ("This patent deficiency 
[on the face of the administrative proceedings] in the statutorily required DPS 
material does indeed make the Department's revocation order vulnerable to 
invalidation, on timely appeal, for failure to meet the minimum legislatively 
prescribed standards for the DPS paperwork on which its administrative action 
must be rested.") (emphasis in original and explanatory material from note 9 
added). 
30 Appellee's Answer Brief, at p. 3.
A federal court's allocation of a burden on a plaintiff to show subject 
matter jurisdiction does not necessarily show a burden for a plaintiff invoking 
jurisdiction of an Oklahoma District Court. Colton v. Huntleigh USA 
Corp., 2005 OK 
46, n. 4 , 121 P.3d 1070, 1073 (Court explained that "an allocation of a burden of proof in state 
court relating to a particular type of jurisdiction may, or may not, be 
analogous to federal court jurisprudence."). 
31 Oklahoma City Zoological Trust v. State ex rel. 
Public Employees Relations Bd., 2007 OK 21, ¶ 7,158 P.3d 461, 464. 
32 Atkinson v. Halliburton Co., 1995 OK 104, 905 P.2d 772, 774-775. 
33 See, e.g., Waste Connections, Inc. v. 
Oklahoma Dept. of Environmental Quality, 2002 OK 94, ¶ 9,61 P.3d 219, 223 (an administrative agency lacks power 
to adjudicate a legal issue presenting a constitutional question; however, if 
relief may be granted on non-constitutional grounds, the necessity of deciding 
constitutional issues may be avoided and exhaustion may be required). 
34 Waste Connections, Inc. v. Oklahoma Dept. of 
Environmental Quality, 2002 OK 94, ¶ 10, 61 P.3d  at 224 (Title 
75 O.S.2001, § 306 of the APA provides an 
exception to the exhaustion rule, and " . . . is intended to apply only to rules 
issued by an agency in its quasi-legislative function and not to orders in 
individual proceedings in its quasi-adjudicative function."); Walker v. Group 
Health Services, Inc., 2001 OK 2, ¶ 38, 37 P.3d 749, 762 ("Where administrative remedies are 
unavailable, ineffective or futile to pursue, the administrative process may be 
bypassed.). 
35 Atkinson v. Halliburton Co., 1995 OK 772, 
905 P.2d 772, 774 ("It is a long 
established doctrine in Oklahoma that exhaustion of statutory remedies is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite for resort to the courts."); Martin v. Harrah 
Independent School Dist., 1975 OK 154, 543 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Court stated rule and explained 
that it is only when a statutory administrative remedy is not adequate for the 
nature of the claim that failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be 
excused). Cf. Waste Connections, Inc. Oklahoma Dept. of Environmental 
Quality, 2002 OK 
94, at ¶ 8, 61 P.3d  at 223, (the Court noted that "In cases in which 
exhaustion of remedies is not required by statute, this Court has held that the 
requirement to exhaust administrative remedies is a prudential rule, rather than 
a jurisdictional bar."); Apache Corp. v. State, rex rel. Oklahoma Tax 
Commission, 2004 OK 
48, ¶ 10, 98 P.3d 1061, 1064 (exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prudential rule when 
not required by statute, but when Legislature requires exhaustion of a remedy 
for obtaining a tax refund that remedy must be used). 
36 Hobbs v. German-American Doctors, 
1904 OK 60, 78 P. 356, 357; Glacken v. Andrew, 
1918 OK 20, 169 P. 1096, 1097. 
37 Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308, 316 
(1870). 
38 State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Mothershed, 
2011 OK 84, ¶ 47, 264 P.3d 1197, 1215; State ex rel. Turpen v. A 1977 
Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 1988 OK 38, 753 P.2d 1356, 1359. 
39 See State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. 
Mothershed, 2011 OK 
84, nn. 60-61, 264 P.3d 1197, 1217, where we noted examples of statutes 
that expressly state jurisdictional requirements. 
40 See State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. 
Mothershed, 2011 OK 
84, n. 60, 264 P.3d 1197, 1217, where we noted that in Oklahoma Dept. of Securities ex rel. 
Faught v. Blair, 2010 OK 16, n. 22, 231 P.3d 645, 658, we explained that the third element 
of jurisdiction, jurisdictional power to render the particular judgment, was 
raised by the arguments in the case which focused on whether the judgment sought 
or obtained violated mandatory law. See, e.g., Gulfstream 
Petroleum Corp. v. Layden, 1981 OK 56, 632 P.2d 376 (compulsory statutory requirement 
antecedent to judgment or final order must be fulfilled to satisfy third element 
of jurisdiction); Abraham v. Homer, 1924 OK 393, 102 Okla. 12, 226 P. 45, 48 (facts showing compliance with a 
procedural statute mandatorily required for a judgment are material to the 
existence of the power of the court to render that judgment). 
41 Jurisdictional facts which may be jurisdictional "in 
the sense that their existence is a condition precedent to the operation of the 
statutory scheme" are determined by the District Court. U. S. Fidelity & 
Guar. Co. v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 2002 OK 42, n. 57, 54 P.3d 1010, 1022. 
42 See, e.g., Gurley v. Memorial Hosp. v. 
Guymon, 1989 OK 
34, 770 P.2d 573, 576 ("Compliance with notice of claim provisions [for a tort claims 
against political subdivisions] has been interpreted to be either a condition 
precedent to suit against a political subdivision, or a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to judicial intervention.") (explanatory phrase added and citations 
omitted). 
43 The DPS also relies upon opinions where we explained 
that notice of a plaintiff asserting long-arm jurisdiction should appear on the 
face of plaintiff's petition. In City of Muskogee v. Martin, 
1990 OK 70, n. 46, 796 P.2d 337, 344, we observed that a party's reliance 
upon (1) a long-arm in personam jurisdiction opinion and (2) the concept 
that a plaintiff had a pleading burden, "is clearly distinguishable" from an 
employment controversy involving an Oklahoma municipality and an Oklahoma 
resident. The same may be said in this dispute between a state agency and an 
Oklahoma resident. 
44 Colton v. Huntleigh USA Corp., 2005 OK 46, ¶ 10, 121 P.3d 1070, 1073 ("The burden of proof as to any 
particular fact rests upon the party asserting such fact."). 
45 12 O.S.2011 § 2012 (B), states in part:
"B. HOW PRESENTED. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in 
any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion:
1. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
2. Lack of jurisdiction over the person; . . . ." 
46 Price v. Reed, 1986 OK 43, 725 P.2d 1254, 1261. 
47 Price noted language in the 1982 version of § 
754(5)(a) which discussed the scope of issues at an administrative hearing. 
Price, 725 P.2d  at 1256, n. 2. Language similar to the 1982 version of § 
754(5)(a) is codified at 47 O.S. 2011 § 754 (F).
The 2011 version of § 754(F) (with emphasis added) states in part the 
following.
"F. . . . The hearing may be recorded and its scope shall cover the 
issues of whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person 
had been operating or was in actual physical control of a vehicle upon the 
public roads, highways, streets, turnpikes or other public place of this state 
while under the influence of alcohol, any other intoxicating substance, or the 
combined influence of alcohol and any other intoxicating substance as prohibited 
by law, and whether the person was placed under arrest.
1. If the revocation or denial is based upon a breath or blood test result 
and a sworn report from a law enforcement officer, the scope of the hearing 
shall also cover the issues as to whether:a. if timely requested by the 
person, the person was not denied a breath or blood test, b. the specimen 
was obtained from the person within two (2) hours of the arrest of the person, 
c. the person, if under twenty-one (21) years of age, was advised that 
driving privileges would be revoked or denied if the test result reflected the 
presence of any measurable quantity of alcohol, d. the person, if twenty-one 
(21) years of age or older, was advised that driving privileges would be revoked 
or denied if the test result reflected an alcohol concentration of 
eight-hundredths (0.08) or more, and e. the test result in fact reflects the 
alcohol concentration. 
2. If the revocation or denial is based upon the refusal of the person to 
submit to a breath or blood test, reflected in a sworn report by a law 
enforcement officer, the scope of the hearing shall also include 
whether:a. the person refused to submit to the test or tests, and b. the 
person was informed that driving privileges would be revoked or denied if the 
person refused to submit to the test or tests. 
48 Chase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 
1990 OK 78, 795 P.2d 1048, 1050 ("This patent deficiency in the 
statutorily required DPS material does indeed make the Department's revocation 
order vulnerable to invalidation, on timely appeal, for failure to meet the 
minimum legislatively prescribed standards for the DPS paperwork on which its 
administrative action must be rested.") (emphasis and authority deleted). 
49 Facts and legal authority outside the administrative 
record may be used to present a successful challenge to a revocation. 
47 O.S.2011 § 6-211(I). The District Court 
possesses a discretion, governed by relevant statutes, to modify a revocation in 
certain circumstances. For example, 47 O.S.2011 § 6-211 (H) provides that "the 
district court may, in its discretion, modify the revocation as provided for in 
Section 755 of this title." Section 755 provides that a district court "may 
modify" a revocation or denial in certain statutorily specified 
circumstances.
47 O.S.2011 § 755:
If the revocation or denial is sustained, the person whose license or permit 
to drive or nonresident operating privilege has been revoked or denied may file 
a petition for appeal in the district court in the manner and subject to the 
proceedings provided for in Section 6-211 of this title. The district court may 
modify the revocation or denial when it is determined by the court that the 
person whose license or permit to drive has been revoked or denied has no other 
adequate means of transportation and may enter a written order directing the 
Department of Public Safety to allow driving, subject to the limitations of 
Section 6-205.1 of this title and the requirement of an ignition interlock 
device as provided in Section 754.1 of this title; provided, any modification 
under this paragraph shall apply to Class D motor vehicles only. 
50 Price v. Reed, 1986 OK 43, 725 P.2d 1254, 1260 ("One's claim to a driver's license 
is indeed a protectible property interest that may not be terminated without due 
process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.") (authority omitted).
In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1971) 
the High Court observed that "Once licenses are issued, . . . their continued 
possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of 
issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests 
of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without 
that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment." 
51 Triad Elec. & Conrols, Inc. v. Power Systems 
Engineering, Inc., 117 F.3d 180, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). 
See Jimenez v. Tuna Vessel Granada, 652 F.2d 415, 420 (5th Cir.1981) (" . 
. . each party is entitled to know what is being tried, or at least to the means 
to find out. Notice remains a first-reader element of procedural due process, 
and trial by ambush is no more favored here than elsewhere."). See also 
Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545, 547 (W.D. Okla. 1979) ("Our modern 
jurisprudence no longer fosters 'trial by ambush.'"). 
52 Booth v. McKnight, 2003 OK 49, ¶¶ 20-21, 70 P.3d 855, 863 ("At the bare minimum, a 
constitutionally adequate notice must apprise one of the antagonist's pressed 
demands and of the result consequent upon default. . . . In order to accomplish 
that task, notice must provide one with more than the naked logistics of the 
hearing. For intelligently framing one's defense a person must know what 
issues one will be confronted with.") (emphasis added). 
53 Section 6-211(F) requires exhaustion, but it does not 
require the petition to plead exhaustion or require filing at a certain time a 
document showing exhaustion. The issue is similar to our former 
jurisprudence discussing appellate jurisdiction being based upon the existence 
of a judgment, but when no jurisdictional requirement existed on when 
that judgment must be filed before the appellate tribunal other than as 
necessary for appellate review. See, e.g., Willitt v. ASG 
Industries, 1978 OK 
1, 
572 P.2d 1296, 1297 ("If a fundamental 
document does not appear in the appeal record, the appellate court should 
require the record to show the document. If appellant neglected to make the 
record so show, after the court's order so directing, the appellate court may 
then justifiably dismiss the appeal."); Johnson v. Johnson, 
1983 OK 117, 674 P.2d 539, 542 (" . . . the legislature intended to 
make the inclusion of a 'recorded written' memorial a sine qua non of 
appellate review rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite to the 
commencement of an appeal.') (emphasis in original). We explained in 
Johnson that 12 O.S.1981 § 32.2 made the recorded 
judgment "a jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review." 674 P.2d  at 542. 
Even if one assumes for the purpose of argument that § 6-211(F) is 
jurisdictional, the statutory jurisdictional prerequisite of administrative 
exhaustion in § 6-211(F), like the statutory jurisdictional requirement of 
12 O.S.1981 § 32.2, need only appear in 
the record submitted to the reviewing court, and this would be accomplished 
when the DPS files or introduces into evidence the administrative record. 
54 75 O.S.2011 § 320: 
"Within sixty (60) days after service of the petition for review or 
equivalent process upon it, or within such further time as the reviewing court, 
upon application for good cause shown, may allow, the agency shall transmit to 
the reviewing court the original or a certified copy of the entire record of the 
proceeding under review. For purposes of this section, 'record' shall include 
such information as specified by Section 309 of this title. By stipulation of 
all parties to the review proceeding, the record may be shortened. Any party 
unreasonably refusing to stipulate to limit the record may be taxed by the court 
for the additional costs resulting therefrom. The court may require or permit 
subsequent corrections or additions to the record when deemed desirable." 
55 Oklahoma Dept. of Public Safety v. Robinson, 
1973 OK 80, 512 P.2d 128, 131 ("Hearings before the commissioner 
are controlled by the provision of the Motor Vehicle Code and by the general 
statutes. They are excluded as to procedural provisions from the Administrative 
Procedures Act by 75 O.S.1971 § 
325."). See also Chase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 
1990 OK 78, n. 2, 795 P.2d 1048, 1049 ("Adjudicative hearings in a 
driver's license revocation proceeding before the Public Safety Department are 
not governed by the Administrative Procedures Act."). 
56 The Department of Public Safety exemption from Article 
II of the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act is codified at 75 O.S.2011 § 250.4 (B) (14): "As specified, 
the following agencies or classes of agency activities are not required to 
comply with the provisions of Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act: . 
. . (14) The Commissioner of Public Safety only with respect to driver license 
hearings and hearings conducted pursuant to the provisions of Section 2-115 of 
Title 47 of the Oklahoma Statutes; . . . ."