Case Title: Parks v. Kownacki

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87834, 87839

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket Nos. 87834, 87839 cons.-Agenda 16-January 2000.
GINA TRIMBLE PARKS et al., Appellees, v. RAYMOND 
 								KOWNACKI et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed August 10, 2000.
	JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
	The issue presented is whether plaintiff's second amended
complaint, which contains 14 counts relating to her alleged sexual
abuse by a Roman Catholic priest, is barred by the statute of
limitations.
BACKGROUND
Summary of Proceedings Below
	On February 28, 1995, plaintiffs Gina and Douglas Parks filed
a complaint against defendants Reverend Raymond Kownacki, St.
Martin of Tours Roman Catholic Church (the Parish), and the
Catholic Diocese of Belleville (the Diocese) in the circuit court of
St. Clair County. Plaintiffs amended their complaint twice, and
plaintiffs' second amended complaint (the complaint) contained
14 counts. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment (735
ILCS 5/2-1005(b) (West 1998)) and motions to dismiss (735 ILCS
5/2-615, 2-619(a)(5) (West 1998)). The trial court denied the
motions for summary judgment but dismissed the action, finding
that plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of repose for
childhood sexual abuse claims (735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West
1992)) and the statute of limitations for personal injury claims
(735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 1998)). The appellate court affirmed
as to counts XIII and XIV of the complaint, which were loss of
consortium claims made by Douglas. 305 Ill. App. 3d 449, 462.
The appellate court reversed as to counts I through XI, holding that
equitable estoppel precluded defendants from asserting a statute of
limitations defense and that Gina was under a legal disability, and
remanded the cause for further proceedings. 305 Ill. App. 3d at
462 . Defendants filed petitions for leave to appeal, which we
allowed (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). Plaintiffs do not challenge the
dismissal of counts XIII and XIV. As a result, those counts are not
before this court.(1)



Complaint


	The following facts are alleged in the complaint, and we
accept them as true for purposes of our review of the rulings on
defendants' motions to dismiss. See Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 168 Ill. 2d 312, 325 (1995). 
	In 1970, Kownacki, an employee of the Diocese, was assigned
to work as a Roman Catholic parish priest at the Church of St.
Francis Xavier in St. Francisville. Plaintiff(2) and her family were
members of that church. Kownacki employed plaintiff as a
housekeeper at the St. Francis Xavier rectory. Plaintiff was 15
years old in 1970.
	One day during the fall of 1970, plaintiff was at the rectory
cleaning Kownacki's bedroom when Kownacki interrupted to
show her a "little voodoo trick." Kownacki instructed plaintiff to
chant, and he turned off the lights. He then raped plaintiff.
Afterwards, Kownacki told plaintiff that he loved her and that she
should trust him. He threatened that the Roman Catholic Church
would excommunicate plaintiff and her family if she revealed that
he had sexually assaulted her. From the time of this warning until
recently, plaintiff has felt that she could not report Kownacki to
anyone and that she had sinned through her relationship with
Kownacki. The rape negatively affected both plaintiff's academic
performance and her emotional state.
	In early 1971, Kownacki told plaintiff that he was being
transferred to the Parish, which is located in Washington Park. He
convinced plaintiff's parents that plaintiff should accompany him
to the Parish so that she could go to a school in Highland, where
she would receive a "higher" education and develop her artistic
talents. Kownacki also provided financial assistance to plaintiff's
family. Plaintiff did not want to accompany Kownacki but did so
because he had complete psychological control, domination, and
authority over her. After Kownacki arranged for plaintiff to move
to the Parish, he also arranged for plaintiff, who was 16, to
accompany him on a trip to his ailing mother's home in
Pinkneyville. There, plaintiff assisted Kownacki's mother with the
cleaning. While they were there, Kownacki touched plaintiff in a
sexual manner.
	In the summer of 1971, plaintiff moved with Kownacki to the
rectory at the Parish. The Parish is supervised by the Diocese, and
Kownacki was an employee of the Parish. While there, plaintiff
served as his housekeeper and his mistress. In addition, she
attended St. Paul's Catholic High School. When Kownacki
accepted the responsibility of plaintiff's care and education, he
took on the role of her guardian, even though he was not given that
title by a court. Kownacki instructed plaintiff to tell anyone who
asked about their relationship that she and Kownacki were distant
cousins. He also threatened to send nude photographs of plaintiff
to her parents if she refused Kownacki's sexual advances or told
anyone about the abuse. Moreover, after he took her to a sexually
explicit movie, Kownacki forced plaintiff to perform fellatio on
him. Fellatio then became his preferred method of sexual
gratification. In the fall of 1972, plaintiff began having problems
at school. The principal and a supervising employee of the Diocese
both asked her if Kownacki was sexually abusing her. Plaintiff
denied that she had been abused. 
	In January 1973, plaintiff had sexual intercourse with a boy
whom she had been dating for over a year. When she returned to
the rectory, Kownacki was in a drunken, angered state and accused
her of having had sex with the boy after Kownacki had instructed
her not to have sexual contact with anyone but him. Kownacki
then held a gun to his head. When plaintiff said that she would no
longer have sex with Kownacki, he put down the gun and held a
knife to her throat. He then pointed the gun at her and forced her
to drive him in the car, where he threatened to kill both her and
himself. When they returned home, Kownacki raped her and told
her never to see the boy again.
	Plaintiff later learned that she was pregnant. Kownacki had
told her that he had been given a vasectomy in Guatemala.
Consequently, she believed that the boy she had dated was the one
who had impregnated her. When she told the boy, the boy told her
that he would marry her and take care of her and the baby. Plaintiff
returned home late that day, and Kownacki "flew into a drunken
rage." He beat her head against the wall and beat her with a metal
chair. Plaintiff then told Kownacki that she was pregnant and that
she planned to marry the boy. She swore that she would keep
Kownacki's sexual abuse secret. Kownacki got angry again, and
plaintiff knocked him unconscious and attempted to run away. The
police returned her to Kownacki. Kownacki then gave plaintiff a
quinine mixture to drink that he characterized as a potion "used in
Central America to abort babies that are not wanted." After
drinking the mixture, plaintiff felt tired and weak so she went to
lie down. Kownacki then entered her bedroom and removed her
slacks and underpants. He reached into her vagina and squeezed
her uterus. 
	The next thing that plaintiff recalled was awakening to find
herself lying in a pool of blood. She found her way back to her
parents' home, where she aborted a dead fetus shortly after she
arrived. In March of 1973, plaintiff was treated at a hospital where
she had a dilation and curettage. She was also treated for
endometriosis and toxemia. At the hospital, plaintiff was told that,
had she been brought to the hospital any later, she would have
died.
	Plaintiff and her parents returned to the rectory at the Parish
in approximately April 1973 and gathered her belongings. While
they were there, Kownacki told them that no one could "touch
him" and that plaintiff's story would not be believed. He warned
plaintiff that she could not escape him.
	Father Dean J. Braun, an employee of the Diocese, had
become the new parish priest at St. Francis Xavier after Kownacki
was transferred. He took plaintiff and her parents to meet with
Bishop Albert Zuroweste, who was also an employee of the
Diocese. Plaintiff told Zuroweste of Kownacki's abuse. Zuroweste
told plaintiff that he would take care of the matter. After the
meeting, Braun advised plaintiff and her family that Zuroweste
would not discipline Father Kownacki and told her that she should
forgive Kownacki and forget about the abuse. In fact, Zuroweste
did not discipline Kownacki but instead assigned him to a new
parish in Salem. Neither Zuroweste nor Braun ever contacted the
criminal authorities about Kownacki's actions.
	After the meeting, Braun took plaintiff to the rectory at St.
Mary's Church in Mount Carmel, where he anointed her with oil
and again told her to forgive and forget. Braun intended that the
ceremony would cause plaintiff to forgive and forget Kownacki's
abuse and prevent her from pursuing claims against Kownacki and
the Diocese. Braun's actions changed plaintiff's brain functions;
plaintiff felt "as though a huge burden had been removed from her
shoulders."
	Since the ceremony, Kownacki has intentionally intimidated
plaintiff twice: by letter and through a contact by an unknown
individual to plaintiff's husband. Kownacki also had bragged
about having connections to organized crime. Braun advised
plaintiff that the CIA was investigating Kownacki. 
	Because of plaintiff's fear of Kownacki, Braun's ceremony,
Zuroweste's failure to discipline Kownacki, plaintiff's failure to
understand that Kownacki had caused her psychological injury, the
failure of Zuroweste and Braun to report Kownacki to the police,
and plaintiff's repressed memory of many events, plaintiff was
"psychiatrically incapable of pursuing her claims *** prior to the
filing of this complaint." Plaintiff did not realize that her sexual
relationship with Kownacki was sexual abuse or that she had been
injured by that abuse. Both Braun's ceremony and the failure of
Zuroweste to discipline Kownacki acted as a psychiatric restraint
on plaintiff, and she was unable "to make any decisions, or
exercise judgment, about any of the sexual and physical abuse that
she suffered at the hands of Father Kownacki." 
	In late 1994, plaintiff learned that Marjorie Menson of
Catholic Social Services was trying to contact her. When plaintiff
spoke to Menson in early 1995, Menson said that she was
contacting plaintiff on behalf of the Diocese. Menson asked
plaintiff if Kownacki had abused plaintiff, and plaintiff answered
in the affirmative. This contact caused plaintiff's memories of the
abuse to resurface and led her to relive the experiences of the
abuse. When plaintiff discovered that her disclosure had led to
Kownacki's removal from his ministry, plaintiff feared and still
fears retaliation. The psychiatric restraint created by Braun's
ceremony was in place until that 1995 contact with the Diocese.
Since the ceremony, plaintiff suffered from a "limited degree of
mental incompetence" that "constituted a legal disability resulting
in [plaintiff's] psychiatric inability to pursue a legal remedy ***
until such time as it was removed when the Diocese contacted
[plaintiff] in early 1995." 
	Plaintiff currently suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder.
She has suffered several other injuries as a result of defendants'
actions and inactions, including physical injuries relating to her
forced abortion, mental distress and anguish, loss of self-esteem,
and loss of enjoyment of life. Plaintiff was also unable to develop
her artistic talents and has lost income and earning potential. She
has suffered and continues to suffer from depression. In addition,
plaintiff has suffered from various physical injuries and has
suffered nightmares and lost sleep. Her companionship with her
husband, parents, and siblings has also been affected negatively by
defendants.
	Based on these facts, plaintiff argues several theories of
liability against defendants. Plaintiff advances claims against
Kownacki of childhood sexual abuse, breach of fiduciary duty,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and willful
and wanton conduct. Plaintiff's claims against the Parish are
breach of fiduciary duty, respondeat superior, failure to warn,
negligence, negligent supervision and retention, and willful and
wanton conduct. Plaintiff makes these same claims against the
Diocese and also claims negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
	The only claim that relates to any events after 1973 is the
portion of count XI that alleges negligent infliction of emotional
distress based upon the Diocese's 1995 contact with plaintiff
through Marjorie Menson. Plaintiff alleges that the Diocese had a
duty to refrain from making such an inquiry about Kownacki's
abuse without first assessing its effect on plaintiff. The inquiry
caused plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress and physical
injuries.
Motions to Dismiss
	Kownacki, the Parish, and the Diocese all filed motions to
dismiss under section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure
(the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 1998)), alleging that
plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the
statute of repose. The alleged abuse occurred from 1971 to 1973.
Plaintiff turned 18 in 1973; however, she did not file a complaint
until 1995, 22 years later. Defendants alleged that the complaint
makes clear that plaintiff was aware of her claims when she turned
18. The Diocese and the Parish also claimed that the complaint
should be dismissed under section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS
5/2-615 (West 1998)) because they were not vicariously liable for
Kownacki's sexual abuse for two reasons: (1) the sexual abuse
was outside of the scope of his employment; and (2) defendants
owed plaintiff no duty. Additionally, the Diocese and the Parish
argued that judicial inquiry into the hiring and discipline of
Kownacki by the Diocese and/or the Parish would constitute
unconstitutional excessive entanglement with religion. In
particular, the Diocese challenged count XI of the complaint,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, arguing that the
allegations were contradictory.
	Plaintiff responded to defendants' motions to dismiss. In
addition to directly responding to defendants' allegations, plaintiff
argued that plaintiff's legal disability tolled the statute of
limitations and that equitable estoppel precluded defendants from
raising a statute of limitations defense. 
	The affidavit of Dr. Frank Ochberg is attached to plaintiff's
response. Ochberg, a psychiatrist and neurologist, affies that
plaintiff was under the psychological power of Kownacki during
the entire time that Kownacki abused her. According to Ochberg,
plaintiff "regained her ability to report *** her victimization" after
the abortion, but Zuroweste's "promise to take care of the
problem" and Braun's "ritualistic ceremony" combined to
"psychiatrically prevent[]" plaintiff from pursuing a remedy. The
ceremony rendered plaintiff unable to make any decisions or
exercise any judgment concerning Kownacki's sexual abuse. As
a result, plaintiff was "psychiatrically incapable of taking any
action" against defendants from the time of the ceremony until
1995, when the Diocese contacted plaintiff. Plaintiff suffered
symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder before December of
1994 but since the Diocese contact has developed "full blown"
post-traumatic stress disorder. Plaintiff did not comprehend the
connection between the disorder and the sexual abuse for 21 years,
and she "has suffered from a limited degree of mental
incompetence between the time that Father Braun anointed her
with oil and told her to forgive and forget Father Raymond
Kownacki in 1973 and her conversation with the social worker,
hired by the Diocese of Belleville, in early 1995." Ochberg
concludes that plaintiff suffered a "legal disability resulting in
[her] psychiatric inability to pursue a legal remedy."
ANALYSIS
	Defendants ask us to reverse the appellate court, which
reversed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. We
review de novo the granting of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss.
Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116 (1993). Under section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, a defendant moves to dismiss because the "action was
not commenced within the time limited by law." 735 ILCS
2-619(a)(5) (West 1998). We must determine whether the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact should have precluded
the dismissal or, absent such issue, whether dismissal is proper as
a matter of law. Doyle v. Holy Cross Hospital, 186 Ill. 2d 104,
109-10 (1999).
Claims Based on Alleged Sexual Abuse
Statute of Limitations
	Defendants argue that the complaint is barred by the statute of
limitations because plaintiff failed to file her complaint within two
years of discovering that she had been sexually abused and that she
had been harmed by that abuse. Although plaintiff admits that she
was always aware of the abuse since the time it occurred, she
argues that the statute of limitations did not attach until the 1995
contact because, until then, she was not aware of the connection
between the abuse and her injuries. 
	An action for personal injury must be filed "within 2 years
next after the cause of action accrued." 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West
1998). If the plaintiff is a minor, "he or she may bring the action
within 2 years after the person attains the age of 18 years." 735
ILCS 5/13-211 (West 1998). 
	Under the discovery rule, the limitations period begins to run
when the party seeking relief "knows or reasonably should know
of his injury and also knows or reasonably should know that it was
wrongfully caused." Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407,
415 (1981). The limitations period begins running even if the
plaintiff does not know that the misconduct was actionable. Knox
College, 88 Ill. 2d  at 415. When a plaintiff alleging childhood
sexual abuse was aware of the abuse as it occurred and does not
allege that she repressed the memories of that abuse, the
limitations period begins to run at the time the plaintiff reaches the
age of majority. Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603, 610 (2000).
	In Clay, the plaintiff alleged that she had been sexually abused
by a priest from childhood into her teenage years. The abuse took
place in the early seventies. The complaint was not brought until
1996. Although the plaintiff admitted that her memories of the
abuse had not been repressed, she claimed that the statute of
limitations was tolled because she did not connect her injuries
with the abuse until 1994. Her psychologist affied that " 'she was
unable to comprehend that the tragic course that her life was on,
until quite recently, was, at least in part, due to what the priest did
to her.' " Clay, 189 Ill. 2d  at 609. 
	This court determined that, because the plaintiff was "always
aware of the misconduct charged," did not claim that her
memories of the abuse were repressed, and postponed filing her
complaint until 13 years after she reached the age of majority, her
complaint was time-barred as a matter of law. Clay, 189 Ill. 2d  at
610. Even though some of the plaintiff's injuries were not fully
apparent until years after the abuse, this court did "not believe that
the plaintiff's alleged failure to fully discover the nature of her
injuries is sufficient to delay the running of the limitations period."
Clay, slip op. at 6. 
	The facts in this case are almost identical to Clay. Plaintiff
alleges that Kownacki, a priest, sexually abused plaintiff in the
early seventies when plaintiff was a teenager. The last incident of
abuse occurred in early 1973. Although the complaint does not
allege plaintiff's exact date of birth, it does allege that she was 15
in 1970 and 16 in early 1971. Therefore, plaintiff had reached the
age of 18 by early 1973. She did not file her complaint until 1995. 
	Like the plaintiff in Clay, plaintiff alleges only that she failed
to make the connection between her injury and the abuse, not that
she did not remember that she had been abused. While she alleges
that she did not know that the sexual relationship was wrong, it is
clear from her actions-telling her parents, reporting Kownacki to
Zuroweste-that she knew that Kownacki had wronged her.
Plaintiff did plead that some details relating to the abuse were
repressed; however, she does not claim that this is the reason that
the limitations period is tolled. Instead, she contends that her
failure to realize that the abuse had caused her injuries tolled the
limitations period until 1995.
	Ochberg, like the psychiatrist in Clay, affied that plaintiff did
not understand the connection between her post-traumatic stress
disorder and the sexual abuse for 21 years. Although plaintiff was
not aware of her post-traumatic stress disorder until recently, one
particular injury that plaintiff claims, the forced abortion,
obviously was apparent when plaintiff went to the hospital and
was given a dilation and curettage. Plaintiff reasonably should
have been aware of that injury at that time as well as its likely
cause. As discussed above, she was also aware that Kownacki had
done something wrong to her. Because in this case it is even more
evident than in Clay that plaintiff was aware of both the cause and
some injury, we hold that plaintiff's failure to understand the
connection between the abuse and other injuries does not toll the
statute of limitations. As a result, the claims arising from
plaintiff's alleged sexual abuse are time-barred.
Legal Disability
	Plaintiff claims that, even if her claims would have been time-barred, the limitations period was tolled because she was under a
legal disability until the 1995 contact with the Diocese. According
to plaintiff, because of her psychiatric condition, she was unable
to pursue a remedy. She argues that this condition is a legal
disability sufficient to toll the statute of limitations under section
13-211 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13-211 (West 1998)).
	When a potential plaintiff has a legal disability, the statute of
limitations is tolled until the plaintiff is no longer disabled. 735
ILCS 5/13-211 (West 1998). A "person under legal disability" is
defined as a person who has some disability or incapacity that
prevents her from being "fully able to manage his or her person or
estate." 5 ILCS 70/1.06 (West 1998). Although a person need not
be adjudicated disabled to have a legal disability (Clark v. Jae Eun
Han, 272 Ill. App. 3d 981, 987-88 (1995); Estate of Riha v. Christ
Hospital, 187 Ill. App. 3d 752, 755 (1989)), she must have some
argument that her disability is one contemplated by the legislature
(see Bruso v. Alexian Brothers Hospital, 178 Ill. 2d 445, 456-57
(1997)).
	Here, plaintiff alleges only that defendants' conduct rendered
her "psychiatrically unable" to take legal action. She does not
allege that she has had any difficulty managing her person or her
estate. In fact, plaintiff specifically admitted in oral argument that
she does not make this claim. She argues only that the "ritual"
performed by a priest to induce her to forgive and forget the abuse
prevented her from filing a complaint. The gist of plaintiff's claim
is that, because she had some mental impairment that kept her
from filing a complaint and because that impairment was caused
by defendants, the limitations period should be tolled.
	Plaintiff's claim must fail. She admits that the only
manifestation of her alleged "legal disability" consists of an
inability to file a civil complaint. The inability to pursue a legal
remedy does not, standing alone, fall into any recognized category
of legal disability. Moreover, the fact that defendants may have
been responsible for plaintiff's inability to pursue legal relief does
not transform that inability into a legal disability. We therefore
hold that plaintiff has not pleaded facts sufficient to indicate that
the limitations period should be tolled.
Equitable Estoppel
	Plaintiff next argues that, even if her claims are barred by the
statute of limitations, equitable estoppel precludes defendants from
asserting a statute of limitations defense. Plaintiff contends that
defendants should not profit from acts that they have committed
that have harmed plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that, because
defendants' actions and inactions caused plaintiff to be unable
psychologically to file a complaint, they should be estopped from
asserting a statute of limitations defense. Plaintiff also claims that
the fiduciary duty between plaintiff and Kownacki requires that
equitable estoppel be applied. She bases this argument on the
premise that a fiduciary can commit fraud by failing to reveal facts
and need not commit an affirmative misrepresentation.
	To establish equitable estoppel, the party claiming estoppel
must demonstrate that: (1) the other party misrepresented or
concealed material facts; (2) the other party knew at the time they
made their representations that the representations were untrue; (3)
the party claiming estoppel did not know that the representations
were untrue when the representations were made and when they
were acted upon; (4) the other party intended or reasonably
expected the representations to be acted upon by the party
claiming estoppel or by the public generally; (5) the party claiming
estoppel reasonably relied upon the representations in good faith
and to their detriment; and (6) the party claiming estoppel has been
prejudiced by his reliance on the representations. Vaughn v.
Speaker, 126 Ill. 2d 150, 162-63 (1988). 
	Plaintiff clearly has not pleaded the elements of equitable
estoppel. She does not allege that any defendant misrepresented or
concealed any material fact. She alleges only that defendants asked
plaintiff to forgive them and to refrain from suing them. In fact, at
oral argument plaintiff admitted that she could not demonstrate a
misrepresentation or concealment. Without the misrepresentation
or concealment of a material fact, equitable estoppel does not
apply. McInerney v. Charter Golf, Inc., 176 Ill. 2d 482, 492
(1997); City of Jacksonville v. Padgett, 413 Ill. 189, 199 (1952).
Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege the elements
of equitable estoppel.
	Plaintiff's argument that a fiduciary duty between her and
Kownacki allows equitable estoppel to apply was not presented to
the trial court by plaintiff. Questions not raised in the trial court
cannot be argued for the first time on appeal. Ragan v. Columbia
Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 355 (1998). Therefore, this
issue is waived.
	Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the principles of
equitable estoppel prohibit defendants from raising the statute of
limitations as a defense.
Conclusion
	Plaintiff has neither demonstrated that a legal disability tolled
the limitations period nor shown that equitable estoppel prevents
defendants from raising the statute of limitations as a defense. As
a result, plaintiff's claims based on her allegations of sexual abuse
are time-barred, and we reverse the appellate court as to those
claims.
Claim Based on Diocese's 1995 Contact
Failure to State a Claim
	In part of count XI, plaintiff claims that the Diocese
negligently inflicted emotional distress when it contacted her in
1995. According to the complaint, plaintiff learned that the
Diocese was attempting to contact her through Menson in late
1994, and plaintiff contacted Menson in 1995. She alleges that the
Diocese failed to properly consider the effect such a contact would
have on plaintiff. She claims that this contact caused her severe
emotional distress and physical injuries.
	For a direct victim to state a claim of negligent infliction of
emotional distress, she must allege: (1) that defendant owed
plaintiff a duty; (2) that defendant breached that duty; and (3) that
plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by that breach. Corgan
v. Muehling, 143 Ill. 2d 296, 306 (1991). If plaintiff has not
alleged facts sufficient to impose a duty on defendant, plaintiff has
failed to state a claim, and the action should be dismissed. Cunis
v. Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 374 (1974).
	The duty that plaintiff alleges in this case is novel. According
to plaintiff, the Diocese owed a duty to assess the emotional and
psychological impact of an investigatory contact before making
that contact. We are unaware of any such duty under Illinois law,
and plaintiff fails to cite any authority in support of her allegation.
Accordingly, we hold that the portion of plaintiff's count XI that
alleges that the Diocese negligent inflicted emotional distress on
plaintiff through the 1995 contact fails to allege a legally
cognizable duty and therefore fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
Conclusion
	Plaintiff's claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress
based on the 1995 contact with the Diocese fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Although the Diocese argued
that the claim was time-barred and that adjudication of that claim
would be constitutionally impermissible, we do not reach those
arguments because we have already disposed of count XI.
CONCLUSION
	We reverse the decision of the appellate court and affirm the
decision of the trial court in which the trial court dismissed
plaintiff's complaint in its entirety.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
	I agree with the result in this case. I write separately because
I do not endorse the reasoning by which the majority arrives at its
conclusion. The majority determines that the victim's claims for
childhood sexual abuse are time-barred based solely on Clay v.
Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603 (2000). I continue to adhere to my belief that
Clay was wrongly decided. See Clay, 189 Ill. 2d  at 615-22
(Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Harrison, C.J.). Nevertheless,
the facts in this case differ so dramatically from the facts in Clay,
that I concur that dismissal is appropriate here.
	As the majority correctly holds, it is impossible to conclude
that the victim in this case was, as she contends, unaware of any
injury until early 1995. The victim specifically alleges in her
complaint that she was "filled with shame and guilt and horror" at
the thought of moving in with her abuser in 1971. Her abuser at
various times held a knife to her throat, threatened her with a gun,
beat her with his hands and a metal chair and engaged in sexual
activities with her by force. Moreover, after becoming pregnant
plaintiff aborted the fetus as a result of physical assault by her
abuser and, when taken to a hospital, was informed that she had
very nearly died. These facts differ markedly from those alleged in
the plaintiff's complaint in Clay. Cf. Clay, 189 Ill. 2d  at 608-09
(victim alleged that the sexual contact with her abuser was not
forcible and that she was never physically harmed). Accordingly,
the rule illegitimately applied in Clay correctly operates to bar
plaintiff's complaint in this case. See Clay, 189 Ill. 2d  at 611-13
("discovery rule" delays commencement of limitations period only
until the plaintiff becomes aware of some injury, not until the
plaintiff realizes the full extent of her injuries), citing Golla v.
General Motors Corp.,167 Ill. 2d 353 (1995).
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	I cannot concur in the majority's cursory disposition of count
XI of plaintiff's complaint. While the duty asserted by plaintiff in
that count may be novel, the mere absence of precedent does not
render it untenable. If the only cognizable legal principles were the
ones already acknowledged by the courts in this state, we could
not have abrogated sovereign immunity as to school districts (see
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11 (1959)) or abolished contributory negligence (see Alvis v.
Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1 (1981)). Indeed, our common law would never
have been able to advance beyond the doctrines in effect under the
English monarchs. Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 433 (1953).
	The outstanding characteristic of our system of judicial
decisionmaking is its adaptability and capacity for growth. Ours
" 'is a system of elementary rules and of general judicial
declarations of principles, which are continually expanding with
the progress of society, adapting themselves to the gradual changes
of trade, commerce, arts, inventions and the exigencies and usages
of the country.' " Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill.  at 433-34, quoting
Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 149 Ill. 496, 502 (1894). Accordingly,
where new situations arise which we have not considered, we
should not hesitate to consider whether the common law should be
extended or modified to cover them.
	Finding no precedent for the situation alleged in count XI, the
court should have undertaken its own analysis as to whether the
Diocese owed plaintiff a duty. There is nothing sacrosanct about
the legal concept of duty. Duty is no more than an expression of
the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law
to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. Lee v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 453 (1992).
	Whether a duty exists is a question of law and depends on
whether the defendant and plaintiff stood in such a relationship to
one another that the law imposed upon the defendant an obligation
of reasonable conduct for the benefit of plaintiff. Ward v. K mart
Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140 (1990). The factors relevant to the
courts' imposition of a duty include the likelihood of injury, the
reasonable foreseeability of such injury, the magnitude of guarding
against the injury, and the consequences of placing that burden on
the defendant. Jackson v. TLC Associates, Inc., 185 Ill. 2d 418,
425 (1998). 
	In this case, I think it quite likely and foreseeable that the
Diocese's contact with Mrs. Parks in 1995 would result in injury
to her. Any form of sexual abuse is potentially debilitating. The
type suffered by Mrs. Parks was especially horrific. The Diocese
should have realized that the social worker's investigation of the
matter would cause Mrs. Park's memories to resurface and
rekindle her fears of retaliation, triggering the type of severe
emotional distress, sleeplessness and nightmares she ultimately
experienced. The burden to the Diocese of assessing the effects of
the investigation on Mrs. Parks prior to making contact would not
have been significant, and there would have been no significant
adverse consequences if the Diocese had been required to make
such an assessment. I would therefore affirm the appellate court's
judgment reversing the circuit court's dismissal of count XI.
	In my view, we should also affirm that part of the appellate
court's judgment reversing the circuit court's dismissal of counts
I through X. Although the claims asserted in those counts were
filed beyond the applicable limitations and repose periods, the
record before us shows that Mrs. Parks was under duress. Father
Kownacki threatened her and her family, boasted of his ties to
organized crime and claimed he was untouchable, a claim
buttressed by the church's failure to take action against him.
	Where a defendant uses duress to prevent the plaintiff from
filing suit or otherwise enforcing her legal rights, as Kownacki is
alleged to have done here, the duress tolls the running of the
limitations period. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §92 (1987).
Based on the allegations in Mrs. Parks' complaint, Kownacki's
wrongdoing may be imputed to the Diocese and the Parish.
Accordingly, the duress applied by Kownacki tolled the time
limitations against those defendants as well. The circuit court
therefore erred in dismissing counts I through X, and the appellate
court was correct in reversing that part of the circuit court's
judgment.
1.      1Count XII is also not before us as the appellate court did not address
it, and its failure to do so was not challenged.

2.      2Because counts XIII and XIV were Douglas' only claims and are not
a part of this appeal, our use of the word "plaintiff" in the remainder of
this opinion will refer only to Gina.