Case Title: Mulkey v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR97-509

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
David Ray MULKEY v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-509                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered October 9, 1997


1.   Motions -- directed verdict -- standard of review. -- The appellate
     court treats the appeal of a denial of a motion for directed
     verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence; the
     test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is
     whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict;
     substantial evidence must be forceful enough to compel a
     conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion and
     conjecture; on appellate review, it is only necessary for the
     court to ascertain that evidence which is most favorable to
     appellee, and it is permissible to consider only that evidence
     which supports the guilty verdict.

2.   Criminal law -- intent necessary to sustain first-degree murder conviction
     -- may be inferred. -- A criminal defendantþs intent or state of
     mind is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence and must
     usually be inferred from the circumstances of the crime; the
     intent necessary to sustain a conviction for first-degree
     murder may be inferred from the type of weapon used, from the
     manner of its use, and the nature, extent, and location of the
     wounds.

3.   Evidence -- circumstantial evidence discussed. -- Circumstantial
     evidence of a culpable mental state may constitute substantial
     evidence to sustain a guilty verdict; for circumstantial
     evidence alone to constitute substantial evidence, however, it
     must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis consistent with
     innocence; once the evidence is determined to be sufficient to
     go to the jury, the question whether the circumstantial
     evidence excludes any other hypothesis consistent with
     innocence is for the jury to decide.

4.   Evidence -- proof of purposeful mental state -- jury could have inferred
     that appellant acted with purpose of causing victim's death -- directed-
     verdict motion properly denied. -- Where the jury could have easily
     inferred from the numerous blunt-force injuries to the
     victimþs skull, as well as from the autopsy evidence that she
     was strangled, that appellant acted with the purpose to cause
     the victimþs death; where evidence of an attempt to cover up
     a crime is properly admissible for consideration as proof of
     a purposeful mental state, and the jury heard evidence that
     appellant took the victimþs body to a dump site, set it on
     fire, and then left; and where it was within the juryþs
     province to believe or disbelieve appellantþs testimony, the
     jury could have reasonably inferred that appellant acted with
     the purpose of causing the victimþs death; the supreme court
     could not say that the trial court erred in denying
     appellantþs motion for directed verdict.

5.   Criminal law -- use of prior convictions -- State's burden -- test on
     appeal. -- The State has the burden of proving a defendantþs
     prior conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement; on
     appeal, the test is whether there is substantial evidence that
     the defendant was previously convicted of the felony in
     question.

6.   Evidence -- hearsay -- public-office record is not hearsay. -- Under
     Ark. R. Evid. 803(8), a record of a public office setting
     forth its regularly conducted and regularly recorded
     activities is not hearsay; thus, appellantþs argument that a
     certified copy of the trial courtþs docket notation was
     hearsay was without merit.

7.   Criminal law -- use of prior convictions -- standard of proof. -- While
     it is true that a docket notation is not the entry of a final
     judgment, Ark. Code Ann.  5-4-404(a) (Repl. 1993) provides that a previous
     conviction may be proved by any evidence that satisfies the trial court beyond a
     reasonable doubt that the defendant was convicted or found guilty.

8.   Criminal law -- use of prior convictions -- trial court did not err in allowing
     State to submit evidence of prior conviction. -- Where appellant made no
     suggestion that the certified docket sheet offered by the State did not correctly reflect that
     he had been convicted of burglary and theft of property in a 1987 case, and where
     appellantþs counsel in the earlier case did not dispute the conviction but recalled that
     appellant had pleaded guilty in the trial judgeþs chambers and had talked the trial judge
     out of sentencing him to a term of imprisonment, there was substantial evidence to satisfy
     the trial court beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had been previously convicted of
     the felonies in the case in question; the supreme court could not say that the trial court
     erred in allowing the State to submit evidence of this prior conviction to the jury for
     consideration in recommending appellantþs sentence.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Seventh Division; John B. Plegge, Judge; affirmed.
     Turbeville & Fowler, by: Lea Ellen Fowler, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Kent G. Holt, Asst. Att'y Gen., for appellee.

     W.H. "Dub" Arnold, Chief Justice.
     The appellant, David Ray Mulkey, was charged with capital murder for killing his former
stepmother, Martha þJuneþ Barnes.  Following a jury trial, he was found guilty of first-degree
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.  On appeal, appellantþs two points for reversal are
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and a challenge to the use of a prior conviction to
enhance his sentence.  We find that neither point has merit and affirm appellantþs conviction and
sentence.
     On New Yearþs Day 1996, the burned body of June Barnes was found at a dump site on
36th Street near Interstate 430 in Little Rock.  A lamp shade, some bed linens, and various blood-
stained personal items were found near the body.  Autopsy results indicated that the victim had
died earlier from blunt-force injuries and strangulation.  The pattern of injuries on her skull
indicated that she had been beaten with a lamp, and a laceration over her left eye appeared to
have resulted from having been struck by a telephone.  The victimþs former stepson, appellant
David Ray Mulkey, was eventually arrested and charged with Barneþs murder.
     At trial, appellant admitted that he killed the victim.  However, he maintained in his
motion for directed verdict at the close of the Stateþs case that the state failed to prove that he
purposely caused the victimþs death.  After the trial court denied his motion, appellant testified
during his case in chief that, on New Yearþs Eve, he went to a party where he became drunk and
high on marijuana.  After leaving the party, he telephoned the victim and received permission to
stay the night at her residence.  According to appellant, when he arrived at the victimþs home,
she began to verbally abuse him and call him names.  After the victim hit him in the head twice
with a telephone and began kicking him, he became enraged and hit her þat least five or six
timesþ with a lamp.  Appellant then þfreaked outþ when he saw that the victim was covered with
blood and heard her make a þgurgling sound.þ  When the sound stopped, appellant knew that she
was dead.  Panicked, appellant washed his hands, then gathered various blood-stained items and
carried them along with the victimþs body to her car.  He drove to Boyle Park, parked the car,
and dumped the body and evidence nearby.  He left the body and drove to a store to purchase
a jug of gasoline.  The appellant returned to the body, poured the gasoline on it, lit it on fire, and
left.  According to appellant, he located one of his þrunning buddiesþ and þstayed drunk and
highþ until he was eventually questioned by police.
     After a jury found appellant guilty of the lesser-included offense of first-degree murder,
the State submitted proof to the trial judge that appellant had been previously convicted of two
prior felony offenses.  Appellant objected to the submission of one of the priors to the jury. 
After the trial court instructed the jury that appellant had two prior felony convictions, they
recommended that appellant serve a life sentence for the murder.  The trial court entered
judgment accordingly, and appellant appeals.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
     We explained our standard of review for directed-verdict motions in Williams v. State, 325
Ark. 432, 436, 930 S.W. 2nd 297 (1996):
          This court treats the denial of a motion for directed verdict as a challenge
     to the sufficiency of the evidence.  The test for determining the sufficiency of the
     evidence is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict; substantial
     evidence must be forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other
     beyond suspicion and conjecture.  On appellate review, it is only necessary for this
     court to ascertain that evidence which is most favorable to appellee, and it is
     permissible to consider only that evidence which supports the guilty verdict

          See also Choate v. State, 325 Ark. 251, 254-55, 925 S.W.2d 409,
          411 (1996) (quoting King v. State, 323 Ark. 671, 916 S.W.2d 732
          (1996) (other citations omitted).
     
     To sustain a conviction for first-degree murder, the State was required to prove that the
appellant purposely caused the death of June Barnes.  See Ark. Code  5-10-102 (a) (2).  þA
person acts purposely with respect to his conduct or a result thereof when it is his conscious
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result[.]þ Ark. Code Ann.  5-2-202
(1) (Repl. 1993).
     A criminal defendantþs intent or state of mind is seldom capable of proof by direct
evidence and must usually be inferred from the circumstances of the crime.  Williams, 325 Ark.
At 437.  þThe intent necessary to sustain a conviction for first-degree murder may be inferred
from the type of weapon used, from the manner of its use, and the nature, extent, and location
of the wounds.þ  Id.; citing Walker v. State, 324 Ark. 106, 918 S.W.2d 172 (1996).
Circumstantial evidence of a culpable mental state may constitute substantial evidence to sustain
a guilty verdict.  Williams, 325 Ark. at 437; Crawford v. State, 309 Ark. 54,