Case Title: Honea v. State

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 32

Docket Number: 76621

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2020-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
136 Nev., Advance Opinion AZ
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JOSHUA RAY HONEA, ‘No. 76621
Appellant,

s FILED
‘THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent. JUN 18 2020

 

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury
verdict, of sexual assault of a minor under 16 years of age. Eighth Judicial
District Court, Clark County; Kathleen E. Delaney, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Jonathan E. MacArthur, P.C., and Jonathan E, MacArthur, Las Vegas;
Monique A. McNeill, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B, Wolfson, District
Attorney, Alexander G. Chen, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and Stacy L.

Kollins, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,
for Respondent.

BEFORE HARDESTY, STIGLICH and SILVER, JJ.

20-2210

 

 

 
OPINION

 

By the Court, STIGLICH,

In this opinion, we are asked to examine a previous version of
NRS 200.366 (2007), Nevada's sexual assault statute, to determine
whether age alone was determinative of nonconsent or of the vietim’s ability
to resist or understand the nature of the sexual conduct. Because NRS
200.366 did not contain an age of consent, the mere fact of a vietim's age did
not establish a lack of consent or an inability to resist or understand the
nature of the conduct. Therefore, the district court's instructions to the jury
that 16 was the age of consent to sexual penetration and that consent in fact
by a child under 16 years of age was not a defense to the crime of sexual
assault of a minor under 16 were incorrect statements of law and given in
error. Additionally, the district court erred in failing to give an inverse jury
instruction supporting the defendant's theory of defense. Because we
cannot say these errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we
reverse and remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

‘The State filed 52 charges against appellant Joshua Honea, all
relating to his relationship with the vietim, a minor. Honea was in his late
teens and early twenties during his relationship with the victim, who was
11 when she met Honea and 15 when their relationship concluded. The
victim told investigating officers, and testified at the preliminary hearing,
that she and Honea had a sexual relationship for years. However, when the

"Throughout this opinion, we refer to the version of the statute in
effect when appellant Joshua Honea was charged. See 2007 Nev. Stat., ch.
528, § 7, at 3255-56.

 

 

 
victim was 18 years old, she recanted her story during trial and stated the
two were just friends.

Before the district court submitted the case to the jury, Honea
requested the following jury instruction:

Physical force is not necessary in the

commission of sexual assault. The crucial question

is not whether a person was physically forced to

engage in a sexual assault but whether the act was

committed without her consent or under conditions

in which the defendant knew or should have

known, the person was incapable of giving her

consent or understanding the nature of the act.

Thus, if the State fails to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the person did not consent or

fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant knew or should have known the person

was incapable of giving her consent o fails to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that she did not

understand the nature of the act, you must find the

defendant not guilty of Sexual Assault.
‘The State proposed an instruction declaring, “[clonsent in fact of a minor
child under the age of 16 years to sexual activity is not a defense to a charge
of Sexual Assault with a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age.” Over Honea’s
objection, the district court gave the State’s instruction and rejected his
instruction. The district court also instructed the jury that, “(iln Nevada,
the age of consent to sexual penetration is sixteen.” A jury acquitted Honea
of all but one of the 52 charges, convicting him of Count 39, sexual assault

of a minor under 16 years of age?

2Count 39 alleged that Honea and the victim had sexual intercourse
sometime between June 30, 2013, and December 31, 2014. The evidence
adduced at trial showed that the vietim was 15 years old and Honea was 21
or 22 years old at the time of the conduct alleged in this count.

 

 

 
on

DISCUSSION

The victim's age, by itself, was not dispositive of any element of sexual
assault

Honea argues the district court erred by instructing the jury
that the age of consent to sexual penetration is 16 years old and that consent
is not a defense to the crime of sexual assault of a minor under the age of
16. While we review a district court’s decision to give a particular
instruction for an abuse of discretion or judicial error, we review de novo
whether a particular instruction is a correct statement of law. Cortinas v.
State, 124 Nev. 1013, 1019, 195 P.3d 315, 319 (2008). We agree with Honea
that the challenged jury instructions were incorrect statements of law.

In relevant part, the version of NRS 200.366(1) in effect when
Honea was charged defined sexual assault as:

‘A person who subjects another person to sexual
penetration, or who forces another person to make
a sexual penetration on himself{,] ....against the
will of the victim or under conditions in which the
perpetrator knows or should know that the vietim is
mentally or physically incapable of resisting or
understanding the nature of his conduct, is guilty of
sexual assault.

(Emphasis added.) This language provides two theories of criminal liability

 

for sexual assault. The first theory criminalizes sexual penetration made
against the victim’s will. The second theory criminalizes sexual penetration
‘made under conditions in which the perpetrator knew or should have known
that the victim was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or
understanding the nature of the conduct. Neither theory mentions the
victim's age.

We recognized the omission of the victim's age in Alotaibi v.
State, where we considered the same statutory language and concluded

 

 

 
statutory sexual seduction was not a lesser-included offense of sexual
assault of a minor. 133 Nev. 650, 404 P.3d 761 (2017), cert. denied, _U.S.
__, 138 S. Ct. 1555 (2018). We clarified that the age of the victim only
served to increase the maximum sentence the district court could impose
for sexual assault of a minor. Id. at 654, 404 P.3d at 766. Specifically, we
stated the following:

[The offense of sexual assault, regardless of
whether it was committed against a minor, has two
statutory elements: “(1) subjecting] another person
to sexual penetration . . . (2) against the will of the
victim or under conditions in which the perpetrator
knows or should know that the victim is mentally
or physically incapable of resisting or
understanding the nature of his conduct.”

Id, at 655-56, 404 P.3d at 766 (alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting 2007 Nev. Stat., ch. 528, § 7, at 3255 (NRS 200.366(1)). We
explained that the victim’s age was not an element of sexual assault or
“essential to a finding of guilt.” Id. at 655, 404 P.Sd at 765. Thus, the
victim's age, alone, does not establish the victim’s ability to consent or the
capacity to resist or understand the nature of the sexual conduct.
Nevertheless, the State argues that this court previously
determined that minors under 16 were incapable of giving consent when we
recognized “sixteen as the age of consent for sexual intercourse, anal
intercourse, cunnilingus or fellatio.” Manning v. Warden, 99 Nev. 82, 86
1.6, 659 P.2d 847, 849 n.6 (1983), We reject the State's argument that the
age of consent from a wholly separate statute could be assigned to the sexual
assault statute, The Manning decision referred to a previous version of
statutory sexual seduction that contained an element of consent. See 1979
Nev. Stat., ch. 349, § 1(3), at 572 (“Statutory sexual seduction’ means

ordinary sexual intercourse, anal intercourse, cunnilingus or fellatio

 

 
committed by a person 18 years of age or older with a consenting person
under the age of 16 years.” (emphasis added)). At the time Honea was
charged, the statute had been modified to delete the word “consenting” and
criminalized sexual acts based solely on the ages of those involved. See 2013
Nev. Stat., ch. 426, § 34(6X(a), at 2427. The modification eliminated the
element of consent and thus any previously recognized age of consent. Any
reliance on this language in Manning at Honea’s trial for sexual assault was
misplaced.

Our sexual assault statute has also undergone modifications,
and the legisl
conclusion that age was not determinative of any element in the statute at
the time Honea was charged. In 2015, the Legislature modified the sexual
assault statute to add an additional theory of liability:

 

ive history of the most recent amendment supports our

A person is guilty of sexual assault if he or she...

(>) Commits a sexual penetration upon a
child under the age of 14 years or causes a child
under the age of 14 years to make a sexual
penetration on himself or herself or another... .

2015 Nev. Stat., ch. 399, § 8, at 2235; NRS 200.366(1). The legislative
history surrounding this change demonstrates that, prior to 2015, “Itlo
prove a sexual assault occurred, the State [had to] show the child could not
have consented to the act based on lack of age, life experiences and
immaturity.” See Hearing on A.B. 49 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
‘78th Leg. (Nev., May 8, 2015) (statement of James Sweetin, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, Clark County District Attorney's Office). As explained,
the amendment would “no longer requirel ] the State to show a child under
the age of 14... did not understand the conduct in order to prove a sexual
assault.” Id. The new theory of liability allowed prosecution without a

showing of sexual penetration against the victim’s will or under conditions

6

 

 

 
in which the defendant knew or should have known the victim was
incapable of understanding or resisting but only where the victim was under
the age of 14. Prior to this amendment, the State was required to prove lack
of consent or an inability to resist or understand the nature of the sexual

 

conduct, no matter the victim's age. And as discussed above, the victim's
age, by itself, was not conclusive proof of either theory. Accordingly, the
district court’s instructions that 16 is the age of consent to sexual
penetration and that consent in fact of a victim under 16 is not a defense to
sexual assault of a minor under 16 were incorrect statements of law.
Honea was entitled to an inverse jury instruction

Honea also claims the district court erred by rejecting his
proposed jury instruction. We have “held that the defense has the right to
have the jury instructed on its theory of the casel,] ... no matter how weak
or ineredible that evidence may be.” Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 751,
121 P.3d 582, 586 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). And when a
defendant requests “specific jury instructions that remind jurors that they
may not convict the defendant if proof of a particular element is lacking,”
the district court must give those instructions. Id. at 753, 121 P.3d at 588.
But a defendant is not “entitled to instructions that are misleading,
inaccurate, or duplicitous.” Id, at 754, 121 P.3d at 589.

Honea’s proposed instruction stated the jury could not convict
him if the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the victim
did not consent, (2) Honea knew or should have known that the victim was
incapable of giving her consent, or (3) the victim did not understand the
nature of the act. As written, Honea’s proposed jury instruction partially
misstated the law. It is not only that the victim did not understand the
nature of the act but also that Honea knew or should have known the vietim

did not understand. But even where a defendant's proposed instruction is

 

 

 
poorly drafted, “the district court is ultimately responsible for . .. assuring
that the substance of the defendant's requested instruction is provided to
the jury” and is a correct statement of law. See id. at 754-55, 121 P.3d at
589. “[T)he district court may either assist the parties in crafting the
required instructions or may complete the instructions sua sponte.” Id. at
785, 121 P.3d at 589. Regardless of whether Honea’s instruction was poorly
drafted, Honea was entitled to a correctly worded instruction that reminded
the jury it could not find him guilty of sexual assault of a minor under 16
years of age unless the State established beyond a reasonable doubt that
sexual penetration occurred either (1) against the victim’s will, or (2) under
conditions in which Honea knew or should have known that the victim was
mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of
her conduct. Therefore, we conclude the district court abused its discretion
by not giving an inverse jury instruction that correctly stated the law.
The district court's jury-instruction errors were not harmless

“This court evaluates appellate claims concerning jury
instructions using a harmless error standard of review.” Mathews v. State,
134 Nev, 512, 517, 424 P.3d 634, 639 (2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The district court's errors pertaining to jury instructions will be
harmless only if “we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's,
verdict was not attributable to the error and that the error was harmless
‘under the facts and circumstances of this case.” Crawford, 121 Nev. at 756,
121 P.3d at 590. But “[ilf'a defendant has contested the omitted element lof
a criminal offense] and there is sufficient evidence to support a contrary
finding,” the instructional error is not harmless. Mathews, 134 Nev. at 517,
424 P.3d at 639 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

 

 
ox

 

‘As concluded above, Honea was entitled to a properly worded
jury instruction supporting his theory of defense. The district court's failure
to give such an instruction, on its own, may have been harmless. But the
resulting error was compounded by the instructions misstating the law
about an age of consent and the unavailability of consent as a defense. We
are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that these errors did not
contribute, at least in part, to the jury's verdict. Because these errors were

not harmless, we reverse and remand this matter for a new trial.’

pan D J.
Stiglich
We concur
rhe. -
Hardesty
QGed ;

sBecause we reverse and remand for a new trial, we do not consider
Honea’s argument that the district court erred by denying his motion for a
new trial based on juror misconduct and his motion for a judgment of
acquittal,

Additionally, Honea argues the State presented insufficient evidence
to sustain his conviction. After viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, we disagree and conclude a rational trier of fact could
have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the elements of sexual assault of a
minor under 16 years of age. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979); Jackson v. State, 117 Nev. 116, 122, 17 P.3d 998, 1002 (2001); see
also McNair v, State, 108 Nev. 58, 56, 825 P.2d 671, 573 (1992) (‘[I]t is the
jury's function, not that of the [reviewing] court, to assess the weight of the
evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses.)