Case Title: Converge v. Curran

Citation: 383 Md. 462

Docket Number: 13/04

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Converge Services Group, LLC v. Curran, No. 13, Sept. Term 2004.  Opinion by Harrell, J.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - APPROPRIATENESS OF DECLARATORY REMEDY
SOUGHT BY PARTY IN FACE OF PENDING ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST IT
BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY - PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOCTRINE 
Company that sold surety bond products to residential tenants in lieu of traditional security
deposits given to landlords sought declaratory relief in Circuit Court during a Consumer
Protection Division investigation of its activities concerning alleged violations of the
Consumer Protection Act, §§ 13-301 and 13-303, and the Security Deposit Law and
Application Fee Law, §§ 8-203 and 8-213 of the Real Property Article.  The Division moved
for dismissal because of the inappropriateness of declaratory judgment as it would not
terminate the entire controversy between all of the named parties in the administrative
proceedings and because the Division had primary jurisdiction over the Consumer Protection
Act claims after filing administrative charges alleging multiple violations of the same
provisions. A court may dismiss a complaint for declaratory relief when a more effective and
more appropriate administrative remedy is available.  Because the available administrative
remedy would provide a more complete resolution for subsequent judicial review and a
premature declaratory judgment would not terminate necessarily or conclusively the matter,
summary judgment was properly awarded in the declaratory judgment action in favor of the
Consumer Protection Division.
Circuit Court for Baltimore Cou nty
Case # C-03-011088
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 13
September Term, 2004
CONVERGE SERVICES GROUP, LLC
d/b/a SUREDEPOSIT
v.
J. JOSEPH CURRAN, JR., et al.
Bell, C.J.
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed:   November 8, 2004
An incipient dispute arose between Converge Services Group, LLC, d/b/a
SureDeposit, Inc. (“SureDeposit”) and the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the
Maryland Attorney General (“Division”) in 2002 when the Division commenced an
investigation of SureDeposit for the latter’s marketing and sale of a “surety bond product”
to Maryland residential real estate tenants to be used by the tenants in lieu of traditional
security deposits required by their tenancies.  After some administrative discovery occurred,
the Division notified SureDeposit in January 2003 that it believed SureDeposit’s trade
practices violated the M aryland Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code (1975, 2000 Repl.
Vol.), § 13-101, et seq., of the Commercial Law Article (“CPA”) and the Maryland Security
Deposit Law and Application Fee Law, Md. Code (1974, 2003 Repl. Vol.), §§ 8-203 and 8-
213 of the Real Property Article (collectively, “SDL”).  Not surprisingly, SureDeposit
disagreed.
SureDeposit and the Division engaged in some negotiations; but, apparently
unsatisfied with their course and facing a potential contested administrative process
regarding the Division’s probable filing of formal charges, SureDeposit filed on 9 October
2003 a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County seeking declaratory relief that
the SDL did not apply to SureDeposit’s “surety bond product” and, assuming that relief were
granted, that SureDeposit had not violated the CPA.
The Division, on 26 November 2003, filed an administrative statement of charges
against SureDeposit, alleging multiple violations of the CPA, some of which overlapped with
allegations of violations of the SDL.  After the parties exchanged some mutual paper
1In considering an appeal on bypass of the Court of Special Appeals, we “will
consider those issues that would have been cognizable by the Court of Special Appeals.”
Md. Rule 8-131(b)(2). 
2
discovery in SureDeposit’s Circuit Court action, the Division moved there for dismissal of
the complaint under Md. Rule 2-323(b)(2) on the basis that the declaratory judgments sought
would not resolve fully the entire controversy between the parties in accordance with § 3-
409(a) of the Declaratory Judgment Act and that the Division, as an administrative agency
with recognized expertise with regard to administering and interpreting the CPA, exercised
primary jurisdiction over the entire dispute.
The Circuit Court dismissed SureDeposit’s complaint on 4 February 2004.
SureDeposit noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  We issued a writ of certiorari,
on our initiative and before the intermediate court could decide the appeal, in order to
consider SureDeposit’s following questions, which we reword slightly for consistency.1 
I.  Does the Division have “primary jurisdiction” over the
subject matter of the complaint where the issues raised in the
complaint require interpretation of the Security Deposit Law,
not the Consumer Protection Act?
II.  If the Division does have primary jurisdiction, did the
Division waive that argument by affirmatively engaging in
discovery in the Circuit Court case?
III.  Does the Security Deposit Law apply to the marketing and
sale of SureDeposit’s surety bond product?
Based on our analysis of SureDeposit’s first issue, and the interplay between the
principles of primary jurisdiction and the statutory requirements of the Declaratory Judgment
2 We do not reach SureDeposit’s waiver argument, having resolved its appeal on an
alternative basis in addition to primary jurisdiction; nor do we interpret the Security Deposit
Law.
3 The Acknowledgment Form states that tenants “agree to purchase a security deposit
bond from Bankers Insurance Company....”  There is little evidence in the record as it reaches
us in the posture of this case distinguishing Bankers Insurance Company (“BIC”) and the
“primary claims pool” from SureDeposit.  In addition, First Community Insurance Company
(“FCIC”) is described as the surety on a separate contract between SureDeposit and the
landlord.  The Acknowledgment Form requires that payment for purchasing the security
deposit bond from BIC be made to SureDeposit.  Furthermore, in SureDeposit’s opposition
to the Division’s motion to dismiss, SureDeposit states that “SureDeposit, acting as an
independent third party, compensates the landlord for the damage claimed ... then
[SureDeposit] has the option of seeking reimbursement of subrogated amounts from the
tenant for amounts up to the bond coverage limit.”  Recognizing that SureDeposit may very
well stand as an agent on behalf of BIC or FCIC, we resolve the ambiguity in accordance
with SureDeposit’s filing and refer to SureDeposit as the surety throughout this opinion.
3
Act, Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), §§ 3-401 - 3-415 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, we shall affirm the Circuit Court’s judgment.2  
I.
A.
SureDeposit is a New Jersey corporation that offers nationwide a “surety bond
product” to residential rental tenants as an alternative to paying a security deposit to their
landlords.  Consumers purchase these surety bonds, usually at the commencement of the
tenancy, by signing a document entitled “SureDeposit Bond Acknowledgment Form”
(Acknowledgment Form) and paying a premium to their landlords.  The landlords collect the
premium and forward it to SureDeposit.  SureDeposit retains a portion of this premium as
profit while allotting a portion of it to a “primary claims pool”3 to satisfy damage claims filed
by landlords.  Another portion is returned to the landlords to compensate them for their
4
administrative expenses, although a landlord may elect to receive a portion of any excess
funds available in the claims pool in lieu of this payment.
SureDeposit characterizes its “surety bond product” as a surety contract where
SureDeposit is the surety, the tenant is the principal, and the landlord is the obligee.  The
surety bond product seems neither to protect nor insure the tenant from the typical landlord
claim most often satisfied from a tenant’s security deposit.  Rather, the surety bond product
allows a landlord to collect compensation for damages to the leased property from an
allegedly readily available “claims pool” in lieu of the traditional security deposit.  In
addition, according to the Acknowledgment Form signed by the tenant, the “surety bond
product” may be utilized by the landlord to pay for past due rent, fees, and any other charges
beyond “normal wear and tear” to the leased premises.  These charges include court costs,
expenses, and attorney’s fees. 
The Acknowledgment Form states that SureDeposit retains the right to seek
reimbursement from the tenant for sums paid to the landlord for damages.  In addition to
SureDeposit’s right to reimbursement, the Acknowledgment Form purports to protect the
landlord by waiving any landlord responsibility for SureDeposit’s collection activities.
Tenants also pre-authorize SureDeposit to collect “all requested information to assist in the
collection or monies paid by BIC as previously described,” from “anyone.”
B.
In 2001, SureDeposit began selling its surety bond product in Maryland.  Between
June 2002 and September 2002, the Division issued administrative subpoenas for production
4 The relevant portions of the CPA mentioned were §§ 13-301 (1) and 13-301(3).
They state that,
“Unfair or deceptive trade practices include any: (1) False,
falsely disparaging, or misleading oral or written statement,
visual description, or other representation of any kind which has
the capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading
consumers; ... (3) Failure to state a material fact if the failure
deceives or tends to deceive; ...”
 Md. Code (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol.) of the Commercial Law Article.  In addition,  §13-303
of the CPA prohibits violations of § 13-301.  
5 Section 8-203 of the Real Property Article defines security deposits as,
“any payment of money, including payment of the last month’s
rent in advance of the time it is due, given to a landlord by a
(continued...)
5
of documents and depositions of SureDeposit’s corporate officers.  SureDeposit complied
with the subpoenas for production of documents and offered up Dan Rudd, SureDeposit’s
Chief Financial Officer and Chief Operating Officer, for deposition on 10 September 2002.
Upon the conclusion of this discovery, SureDeposit began negotiation with the
Division about the investigation.  Two letters were sent to the Division, on 9 October 2002
and 19 December 2002, requesting an appointment to discuss any concerns surrounding its
surety bond product.  At some point during the investigation, SureDeposit voluntarily
suspended sale of its surety bond product in Maryland.
The Division responded on 10 January 2003 that it had “reason to believe” that
SureDeposit engaged “in trade practices that violate the Maryland Consumer Protection Act,
Md. Code Ann., Com. Law II, §13-101 et seq.,4 and the Maryland Security Deposit Law and
Application Fee Law, Md. Code Ann., Real Property, §§8-2035 and 8-2136 (2001 Supp.).”
5(...continued)
tenant in order to protect the landlord against nonpayment of
rent, damage due to breach of lease, or damage to the leased
premises, common areas, major appliances, and furnishings.” 
Md. Code (1974, 2003 Repl. Vol.), § 8-203 of the Real Property Article.
6 Section 8-213(b) states: 
(b) Fees other than security deposit. – (1)(i) If a landlord
requires from a prospective tenant any fees other than a security
deposit as defined by § 8 -203(a) of this subtitle, and these fees
exceed $25, then the landlord shall return the fees, subject to the
exceptions below, or be liable for twice the amount of the fees
in damages....
(2) The landlord may retain only that portion of the fees actually
expended for a credit check or other expenses arising out of the
application, and shall return that portion of the fees not actually
expended on behalf of the tenant making application.
Md. Code (1974, 2003 Repl. Vol.), § 8-213 of the Real Property Article.
6
On 21 January 2003, SureDeposit and the Division met to discuss a proposed
Assurance of Discontinuance that would require SureDeposit to halt permanently the sale of
its surety bond product, make restitution to its current clients, and pay the Division’s
administrative costs and a civil penalty.  That meeting was followed by another exchange of
letters.  SureDeposit sought further clarification of the allegations regarding violations of the
CPA and SDL.  The Division explained why it believed SureDeposit was in violation of
those laws and urged settlement through execution of the Assurance of Discontinuance.  In
the Division’s last letter on 25 July 2003, it stated that, “[t]ypically when we cannot reach an
7 Contrary to SureDeposit’s claim on appeal that it asked for declarations solely as to
the allegations of violation of the SDL, the complaint prayed the Circuit Court to issue a
declaratory judgment “that its surety bond program does not violate Md. Comm. L. Code
Ann. Section 13-301 or Section 13-303 or Md. Real Property Code Ann. Section 8-203 or
Section 8-213.”  
7
acceptable settlement, we bring an enforcement action pursuant to the Consumer Protection
Act.” 
The Division learned of SureDeposit’s response when, on 25 November 2003, it was
served with SureDeposit’s complaint for declaratory judgment,7 filed in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County on 9 October 2003, together with requests for production of documents,
admissions, and interrogatories.  The Division countered on 4 December 2003 by
propounding its own interrogatories and a request for production of documents. 
In a contemporaneous time frame, the Division filed an administrative statement of
charges against SureDeposit and two of its officers on 26 November 2003.  The Division’s
charges may be categorized in three groupings: 1) those alleging violations of the SDL
because the surety bond product is claimed to be a security deposit under § 8-203(a)(3); 2)
those alleging violations of the SDL because, alternatively, the surety bond product is
claimed to be a “fee other than a security deposit” under § 8-213(b); and 3) those alleging
violations of the CPA, some of which overlapped portions of the allegations regarding the
SDL.
Allegations supporting the assertion that the surety bond product is a security deposit
under § 8-203(a)(3) included: 1) SureDeposit did not disclose to the tenants their rights and
8 Section 8-203.1 requires that a tenant that pays a security deposit receive a receipt
that notifies the tenant of legal rights including the right to have the property inspected for
damages at the inception and termination of the tenancy, prompt written notice of damages
claimed and costs incurred by the landlord, and the right to receive up to three times the
security deposit withheld and attorney’s fees from the landlord should it violate the SDL.
Md. Code (1974 2003 Repl. Vol.) § 8-203.1 of the Real Property Article.
9 A landlord must return a § 8-213(b) fee to a tenant after deducting for actual fees
from a credit check of the tenant or other expenses “arising out of the application....”  Md.
Code (1974, 2003 Repl. Vol.) § 8-213(b) of the Real Property Article.
8
protections under the SDL;8 2) the surety bond product may expose tenants to liabilities that
exceeded those that landlords would normally claim against traditional security deposits; 3)
SureDeposit paid damage claims to landlords without requiring the landlords to submit
evidence or affording tenants the right to be present at the inspections or contest the claims;
4) SureDeposit paid damage claims without providing to tenants written lists of damages
claimed or costs incurred; and 5) the premiums paid by tenants for the surety bond products
were non-refundable.
The Division also alleged alternatively that, if the surety bond product was not a
security deposit, it was a fee “other than security deposit” under § 8-213(b).9  In that event,
the Division alleged that the surety bond product premiums were neither non-refundable nor
expended for actual expenses arising out of credit checks or the application process.
The Division lastly charged violations of the CPA.  One set of alleged violations
appear to be grounded on § 13-301(1) of the CPA, which protects consumers from false or
misleading statements that have the “capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading
consumers.”  Supporting allegations included: 1) the Acknowledgment Form did not disclose
9
adequately to consumers that they remained liable for damages due to nonpayment of rent,
breach of lease, or damages to the rental premises in excess of wear and tear; 2) the
Acknowledgment Form did not disclose adequately that, although the Surety is obligated to
satisfy the claims by the landlord up to the bond amount, the tenant is obligated to reimburse
the Surety for sums expended to pay those claims; 3) SureDeposit’s Acknowledgment Form
and advertising brochure promoted the benefit of its “bond product” without actually
delivering an actual copy of the SureDeposit “bond product” to the consumers; and 4) the
Acknowledgment Form did not disclose adequately that tenants may incur liabilities from
claims that may exceed what the landlords could have deducted legally from traditional
security deposits.
Another set of violations appear to be grounded on §13-301(3) of the CPA, which
protects consumers from a “[f]ailure to state a material fact if the failure deceives or tends
to deceive.”  Included in these charges were 1) SureDeposit did not disclose that landlords
received fees from SureDeposit for the sale of the surety bond product; 2) SureDeposit did
not provide the mandatory notice required upon receipt of a security deposit under § 8-203.1
of the Real Property Article; 3) the Acknowledgment Form failed to disclose that landlords
may obtain satisfaction of claims via the surety bond product without honoring the tenants’
rights under the SDL or submitting any evidence in support of their claims; and 4) the
Acknowledgment Form made no disclosure to tenants that the purchase of the surety bond
10 The memorandum of law referenced attached exhibits, which included the
Division’s  administrative statement of charges, a SureDeposit “Blanket Bond” agreement
between FCIC and a property owner, a SureDeposit Bond Acknowledgment Form, and a
SureDeposit advertising brochure.  
10
product would affect the tenants’ statutory rights and protections afforded them under the
SDL.
In its memorandum of law10 in support of its motion to dismiss SureDeposit’s
complaint in the Circuit Court, the Division explained that it had primary jurisdiction in the
matter because the dispute included an interpretation of a law in its area of specific expertise
–  the Consumer Protection Act.  Further, the Division argued that the action for declaratory
relief was inappropriate as it would not resolve fully the dispute between SureDeposit and
the Division.  Even if the Circuit Court declared that SureDeposit had not violated the SDL,
such a judgment would not address the alleged violations based solely on the CPA.  Lastly,
it contended that a declaratory judgment in favor of SureDeposit would not address any of
the alleged violations by SureDeposit’s officers named in the Division’s administrative
statement of charges because they were not named parties in the complaint.  
After receiving the Division’s responses to SureDeposit’s request for production of
documents, interrogatories, and admissions, SureDeposit filed on 14 January 2004 its
opposition to the Division’s motion to dismiss.  It claimed that the Division’s assertion of
primary jurisdiction was off-the-mark because SureDeposit’s complaint asked solely for a
declaratory judgment interpreting the SDL.  But see, supra, at 7, n. 7.  As SureDeposit’s
11 Without embellishment or requesting a specific remedy, Footnote 2 in
SureDeposit’s brief states, “[t]he consequences of such an action are plain in this case -
nobody knows the rationale for the trial court’s decision, and thus the parties to this appeal
must brief multiple issues to cover all bases.”
11
argument continued, concurrent jurisdiction also did not exist because the Division possessed
no particular expertise in matters of interpreting the SDL; thus, the Circuit Court
appropriately could interpret the SDL and issue the requested declaratory judgment.
SureDeposit also claimed that the Circuit Court’s declaration as to the SDL would dispose
completely of all of the Division’s claims in its administrative statement of charges.  This
was so because SureDeposit believed that all of the Division’s alleged violations of the CPA
were dependent on whether the SDL applied to SureDeposit’s conduct.
  
Upon receiving notice of the parties’ agreement to waive a hearing on the motion to
dismiss, the Circuit Court dismissed SureDeposit’s complaint on 4 February 2004 with a
simple order.  
II.
SureDeposit notes, by footnote in its brief, frustration with the “plain vanilla” order
employed by the Circuit Court to memorialize the grant of the Division’s motion to dismiss.11
Although the Division does not appear to have responded directly to this complaint in
SureDeposit’s brief (nor should it necessarily respond to a contention slipped into a footnote,
bereft of supporting authority), the point sounds a procedural note that an appellate court
must recognize, at the outset, in selecting the proper standard of review to be applied. 
12 We are aware that, as a matter of common legal practice, parties moving for
dismissal or summary judgment often attach to their pre-trial motions plainly and sparely
worded proposed orders for the court to sign.  The Court of Special Appeals, however,
previously has advised parties and trial courts to be specific when requesting relief from the
court on motions to dismiss.  Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Svcs. of Balt., Inc., 98 Md. App.
123, 133, 632 A.2d 463, 468 (1993); Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 93 Md. App.
772, 784, 614 A.2d 1021, 1027 (1992).  To do otherwise may be “risky business.”
Hrehorovich, 93 Md. App. at 784, 614 A.2d at 1027.
12
The sparely worded order used by the Circuit Court makes it somewhat ambiguous
as to which possible procedural vehicle the Circuit Court intended to employ to dispose of
SureDeposit’s complaint.12  Each of the two possible options, whether the Circuit Court
disposed of SureDeposit’s complaint pursuant to a Rule 2-322(b) motion to dismiss or
converted it into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 2-322(c) and Rule 2-501, has
consequences.
  
In our review of the grant of a motion for dismissal under Md. Rule 2-322(b) we
accept all well-pled facts in the complaint, and reasonable inferences drawn from them, in
a light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 374 Md. 402,
414, 823 A.2d 590, 597 (2003).  Typically, “[t]he object of the motion is to argue that as a
matter of law relief cannot be granted on the facts alleged.”  See Paul V. Niemeyer & Linda
M. Schuett, Maryland Rules Commentary, 206 (3d ed. 2003).  Thus, consideration of the
universe of “facts” pertinent to the court’s analysis of the motion are limited generally to the
four corners of the complaint and its incorporated supporting exhibits, if any. 
13
On the other hand, if a trial court treats a motion to dismiss as a “speaking demurrer”
under Md. Rule 2-322(c) and considers “matters outside the pleading” (see Niemeyer &
Schuett, supra, at 206-207, explaining that Rule 2-322(b) serves the same function as the
common law demurrer but also permits  a “speaking demurrer”) the trial court must treat (and
is presumed to have treated) the Rule 2-322(b) motion as a motion for summary judgment
under Md. Rule 2-501.  Md. Rule 2-322(c); Dual v. Lockheed Martin, Inc., __Md.__ (2004)
(No. 115, September Term 2003) (filed Sept. 13, 2004) (slip op. at 6-7); see Oak Crest
Village, Inc. v Murphy, 379 Md. 229, 239, 841 A.2d 816, 822 (2004) (observing that the trial
court treated a motion to dismiss as “one for summary judgment” under Md. Rule 2-322(c)).
Unless the court states to the contrary, it is presumed to have considered also the factual
allegations presented by the movant in its exhibits attached to the so-called motion for
dismissal.
Because the Circuit Court in the present case did not state, in its order of dismissal or
otherwise, that, in granting the Division’s motion to dismiss, it did not consider the factual
allegations and exhibits beyond those in SureDeposit’s complaint, the default provision
established by the pertinent Rules and our cases interpreting them dictate that we review the
action as the grant of summary judgment.
A motion for summary judgment is granted where “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Md. Rule 2-
501.  The standard for review is “whether the trial court was legally correct.”  Sadler v.
14
Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 378 Md. 509, 533, 836 A.2d 655, 669 (2003) (quoting
Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Balt., Inc., 343 Md. 185, 204, 680 A.2d 1067, 1076 (1996).  This
review must determine first if a “dispute of material fact exists.”  Todd v. Mass Transit
Admin., 373 Md. 149, 154-55, 816 A.2d 930, 933 (2003) (citations omitted).  If the record
reveals there is no material fact in dispute. then the motion may be granted if it is correct as
a matter of law.  Id. at 155, 816 A.2d at 933.  
In the case before us, no genuine dispute of a material fact was generated.  Thus, were
this other than an action for declaratory relief, we simply would move next to analysis of the
purely legal question(s) presented.  Because additional considerations apply to the proper
disposition of declaratory judgment actions, however, we must remind ourselves what those
additional considerations are and determine how they may apply to the present case.
III.
A.
A court “may grant a declaratory judgment;” therefore, declaratory judgment generally
is a discretionary type of relief.  Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-409(a) of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article.  The refusal to grant a discretionary order will be reversed
on appeal if the judge abused his or her discretion.  A.S. Abell Co. v. Sweeney, 274 Md. 715,
720, 337 A.2d 77, 81 (1975) (holding that “‘some discretion is left to the courts’ in granting
declaratory relief”(quoting Grimm v. County Comm’rs of Washington County, 252 Md 626,
632, 250 A.2d 866, 869 (1969)). 
15
We have “admonished trial courts that, when a declaratory judgment is brought, and
the controversy is appropriate for resolution by declaratory judgment, the court must enter
a declaratory judgment....”  Salamon v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 379 Md. 301, 308 n.7,
841 A.2d 858, 862 n.7 (2004) (quoting  Jackson v. Millstone, 369 Md. 575, 594-95, 801 A.2d
1034, 1045-46 (2002)).  We have found this standard instructive when reviewing appeals of
declaratory judgment actions dismissed on pre-trial motions.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Millstone,
369 Md. 575, 594-95, 801 A.2d 1034, 1045 (2002); Allstate v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 363 Md. 106, 117 n.1, 767 A.2d 831, 837 n.1 (2001); Bushey v. N. Assurance Co. of
Am., 362 Md. 626, 651, 766 A.2d 598, 611 (2001); Hartford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Woodfin
Equities Corp., 344 Md. 399, 414, 687 A.2d 652, 659 (1997).  Of equal importance, and
more instructive in this case, is the logical converse, that is, when a declaratory judgment
action is brought and the controversy is not appropriate for resolution by declaratory
judgment, the trial court is neither compelled, nor expected, to enter a declaratory judgment.
See Popham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 333 Md. 136, 140-41 n.2, 634 A.2d 28, 30 n.2
(1993). 
B.
The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to “settle and afford relief from
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.”  Md. Code
(1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-402 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  Section 3-
402 of the Declaratory Judgment Act states that it should be “liberally construed and
16
administered.”  In fact, the broad, inclusive language of §3-406 of the CPA reflects this
liberal application, granting courts the power to grant declaratory relief to, “[a]ny person
interested under a deed, will, trust, land patent, written contract, or other writing constituting
a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal
ordinance, administrative rule or regulation, contract, or franchise....”  
Declaratory relief, however, is barred by some statutory and judicially-crafted
restrictions in limited circumstances.  See Md.-Nat’l Capital Park and Planning Comm’n v.
Washington Nat’l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 595, 386 A.2d 1216, 1222 (1978).  For example,
declaratory relief in a given case is barred under §3-409(b) of the Declaratory Judgment Act
when a special form of remedy is otherwise provided by statute.  We have held that
declaratory relief is inappropriate in the absence of a justiciable controversy.  Md. State
Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Talbot County, 316 Md. 332, 339, 558 A.2d 724, 727 (1989)
(citations omitted) (explaining that declaratory judgment is inappropriate where issue is moot
or where it will not serve a useful purpose or terminate a controversy).  We also have held
that declaratory judgment is an inappropriate remedy where the primary jurisdiction doctrine
properly is implicated.  Luskin’s Inc. v. Consumer Prot. Div., 338 Md. 188, 657 A.2d 788
(1995).
Primary jurisdiction
is a judicially created rule designed to coordinate the allocation of functions
between courts and administrative bodies.  The doctrine is not concerned with
subject matter jurisdiction or the competence of a court to adjudicate, but
rather is predicated upon policies of judicial restraint: ‘which portion of the
17
dispute-settling apparatus--the courts or the agencies--should, in the interests
of judicial administration, first take the jurisdiction that both the agency and
the court have.’  It comes into play when a court and agency have concurrent
jurisdiction over the same matter, and there is no statutory provision to
coordinate the work of the court with that of the agency.
* * * * * *
[P]rimary jurisdiction is relevant only ... where the claim is initially cognizable
in the courts but raises issues or relates to subject matter falling within the
special expertise of an administrative agency.
Washington Nat’l Arena, 282 Md. at 601-602, 386 A.2d at 1225-26 (citations and footnote
omitted).  We have recognized that an additional concern of the primary jurisdiction doctrine
is the preservation of the “uniformity and integrity of the regulatory scheme....”  Id. at 603,
386 A.2d at 1227 (citing Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440, 27
S.Ct. 350, 355, 51 L.Ed. 553, 558-59 (1907)).  An administrative agency decision,
particularly in its area of special expertise, helps a court because the court usually relies on
the “special expertise and technical knowledge normally employed in administrative fact-
finding and rule-making.”  Id.  For example, in Fosler v. Panoramic Design, Ltd., we stated
that an “administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the
agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts.”
376 Md. 118, 136, 829 A.2d 271, 282 (2003) (quoting Md. Div. of Labor v. Triangle Gen.
Contractors, Inc., 366 Md. 407, 416, 784 A.2d 534, 539 (2001)).  This reliance, however,
is not blind.  A court does not err or abuse its discretion if it seeks to answer a purely legal
question that merely overlaps an available administrative remedy.  See Washington Nat’l
Arena, 282 Md. at 602-604, 386 A.2d at 1226-27.
18
As a result, a trial court, faced with a request for a judicial remedy such as declaratory
judgment in a situation where a related administrative agency action is pending, is usually
confronted with three possible courses of action.  First, the court may defer wholly to the
administrative regulatory scheme and terminate the petition or complaint, leaving the matter
to disposition by the administrative agency, without prior judicial intervention.  In that
situation, judicial review of the final agency decision usually will be available to an
aggrieved party.  
Secondly, the court may stay its consideration of the invoked judicial remedy and
await the result of the administrative proceedings before addressing the appropriateness of
the relief sought in the litigation.  Maryland Reclamation Assocs. v. Harford County, 382
Md. 348, 367, 855 A.2d 351, 362 (2004) (directing stay of judicial proceeding until
administrative remedies exhausted); Arroyo v. Bd. of Educ., 381 Md. 646, 660, 851 A.2d
576, 584-85 (2004) (observing that a party may file an independent judicial action during
pendency of primary administrative proceedings and the trial court may stay the judicial
action but, should not decide it until the “final administrative determination is made”);  Md.-
Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 18, 511 A.2d 1079, 1087-
88 (1986) (explaining that a stay by the trial court may be appropriate when an
administrative remedy and an independent judicial remedy beside judicial review of the
administrative decision arises).  Once the administrative process runs its course, the court
may then entertain the pending judicial action (with or without any subsequently filed action
13 The trial court should be alert to situations where exercising such discretion may
be contrary to the wisdom of the general rule requiring a party to “run the administrative
remedial course before seeking a judicial solution.”  Clinton v. Bd. of Educ., 315 Md. 666,
678, 556 A.2d 273, 279 (1989); but, compare the majority and dissenting opinions in
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Davis, 379 Md. 361, 842 A.2d 26 (2004), and Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Lichtenberg, 379 Md. 335, 842 A.2d 11 (2004).    
14 Section 13-101, et seq., of the Commercial Law Article specifically creates the
Division and enables it to enforce and administer the CPA.  While the CPA grants the
Division no explicit power to administer the SDL, the CPA does prohibit unfair practices
under § 13-301 in the sale, or offer for sale, of “any consumer goods, consumer realty, or
(continued...)
19
for judicial review), giving due weight and deference to the administrative agency’s decision
in its area of particular expertise.  Crawford, 307 Md. at 18, 511 A.2d at 1088.  
Third, the court may exercise its discretion, if appropriate to do so, and provide a
judicial remedy in advance of final action in the administrative proceeding.  This option is
best used when the court is faced with a purely legal question that is independent of or
merely overlaps an administrative agency’s area of expertise.  See Washington Nat’l Arena,
282 Md. at 603-604, 386 A.2d at 1226-27 (holding that evaluating the validity of a contract
clause that waived a party’s right to challenge whether real estate improvements were
subject to real estate taxes was a purely legal question that the Property Tax Assessment
Appeal Board had no expertise to resolve because its primary expertise lay in reviewing the
assessment and valuation of real property for tax purposes).13  
C.
SureDeposit here first questions whether the Division has primary jurisdiction
concerning the allegations of violations of the SDL.14  We summarized the three general and
14(...continued)
consumer services....”  §13-303.  We could find no parallel provisions in the Real Property
Article of the Code committing enforcement or administrative powers to any particular
executive branch agency with regard to the SDL.
15 We recognized a fourth category, not relevant in the present case, where the
administrative agency’s enabling statute expressly requires the judicial remedy to be
exhausted first.  Fosler, 376 Md. at 130-33, 829 A.2d at 278-80 (holding that § 8-408 of the
Home Improvement Law (Md. Code, Business Regulation Art.) explicitly requires stay of
the administrative action and exhaustion of the judicial remedy).
16   Analysis under the Declaratory Judgment Act reaches the same result.  Section 3-
409(b) states that if “a statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case,
that statutory remedy shall be followed in lieu of a proceeding under this subtitle.”  Md. Code
(1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  
20
relevant types of potentially overlapping administrative and judicial jurisdictional
considerations in Zappone v. Liberty Life Insurance Company.  349 Md. 45, 706 A.2d 1060
(1998).15  The first category addresses situations where the administrative remedy is intended
by the Legislature to be exclusive and must be exhausted before recourse may be appropriate
to the courts.  Id. at 60, 706 A.2d at 1067.  When a statute explicitly directs an administrative
process and remedy, our policy is set clearly by the General Assembly to maintain the
uniformity of the regulatory scheme.  Id.16  One  “special form” of statutory remedy is where
a party is required to submit its complaints to the exclusive remedy of an administrative
agency.  See Id. at 62, 706 A.2d at 1068-69 (listing exclusive remedy provisions).  As a
result, a preemptively or prematurely filed petition for declaratory judgment, where there is
provided an exclusive administrative remedy for the subject matter, should not then be
entertained, if at all, until the administrative remedy is exhausted.  
21
SureDeposit asserted at oral argument before us a proposition with which we must
agree, that the CPA specifies no exclusive administrative remedy committed to the Division
for resolution of a dispute involving the SDL.  SureDeposit’s complaint and the Division’s
statement of charges clearly implicate both the CPA and the SDL.  The Division’s
administrative statement of charges concedes that at least some of its charges are based on
denying tenants their rights under the security deposit laws because the surety bond product
constitutes either “security deposits pursuant to § 8-203 of the Real Property Article” or
“fees other than security deposits under the Application Fee Law.”  (emphasis added).  The
Division conceded further that, at most, only “the majority” of the charges are based solely
on allegations “that SureDeposit violated the Consumer Protection Act,” leaving at least a
minority of the charges based on the SDL.  This mixing of claimed violations from statutes
within and without the agency’s particular area of expertise, however, does not, on its face,
justify bifurcating the resolution of the global dispute in the way SureDeposit desires, as we
shall explain.
We next consider the second category embracing situations where the administrative
process and remedy is intended to be primary, but not exclusive, relative to seeking judicial
relief.  In that case, the party anxious for judicial involvement nonetheless must exhaust the
administrative remedy provided and then seek judicial review of the administrative action,
if available, before a court “can properly adjudicate the merits of the alternative remedy.”
17 The third category addressed in Zappone, fully concurrent jurisdiction, not relevant
here as our subsequent analysis reveals, permits the pursuit of “the judicial remedy without
the necessity of invoking and exhausting the administrative remedy.”  349 Md. at 61, 706
A.2d at 1068. 
22
Zappone, 349 Md. at 60, 706 A.2d at 1068.17  SureDeposit alleges that no administrative
remedy exists under the CPA for the present dispute because SureDeposit seeks only a
declaratory judgment regarding its conduct with regard to the SDL.  The Division disagrees,
asserting that, even if SureDeposit’s complaint sought only a resolution of the alleged SDL
violations, a significant number of the administrative charges are propounded in areas within
the Division’s acknowledged expertise in matters alleging CPA violations.
SureDeposit’s position obfuscates the plain language of its complaint which clearly
requests the Circuit Court to declare “that its surety bond program does not violate Md.
Comm. L. Code Ann. Section 13-301 or Section 13-303 or Md. Real Property Code Ann.
Section 8-203 or Section 8-213.”  Furthermore, even if one were to read-out of
SureDeposit’s complaint the request for a declaratory judgment regarding the claimed CPA
violations, an administrative determination by the Division as to the charges of
SureDeposit’s alleged violations of the CPA could be helpful to a court in considering the
facially related allegations as to violations of the SDL.  “Ordinarily, when there are two
forums available, one judicial and the other administrative, ... and no statutory directive
indicating which should be pursued first, a party is often first required to run the
18 Section 20-I of Article 83, the predecessor of §13-407, provided that a “[p]erson
who disagrees with or is aggrieved by any order or decision of the division may institute
legal proceedings as he deems necessary.”  1974 Md. Laws, Chap. 609 (emphasis added).
In the Revisor’s Notes the following year, it was explained that the textual language was
changed to “appropriate proceedings” to avoid confusion and make clear that a violator may
seek both appropriate remedies at law or equity.  1975 Md. Laws, Chap. 49. 
19 An administrative investigation pursuant to the CPA is initiated either after a
consumer complaint or by the Division on its own initiative.  §13-204 of the Commercial
Law Article.  An investigation may proceed from a complaint from any potential or actual
violation of the CPA; thus, the Division may begin an investigation on any complaint, even
one largely based on issues outside the CPA, if a potential violation of the CPA also
occurred. § 13-204.  In the course of the investigation of a potential CPA violation, the
Division may issue an administrative subpoena for a witness or compel production of
documents. § 13-405.  A public hearing may be held to determine if an alleged violator
actually violated the CPA. § 13-403(a).  This administrative hearing permits an alleged
violator to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. § 13-403(a)(3).  Regardless of
whether a violation of the CPA is found, the Division must state its findings of fact and law
after the hearing.  Only in the event that a violation of the CPA is found by a preponderance
of the evidence, may the Division order administrative remedies against the violator. § 13-
403(b).  Thus, regardless of the outcome of alleged violations of another statute, the Division
(continued...)
23
administrative remedial course before seeking a judicial solution.”  Clinton v. Bd. of Educ.,
315 Md. 666, 678, 556 A.2d 273, 279 (1989).  
The CPA provides, “[i]f a person is aggrieved by an order or decision of the Division,
he may institute any appropriate proceeding he considers necessary.”  Md. Code (1975, 2000
Repl. Vol.), § 13-407 of the Commercial Law Article.  Section 13-407 permits an alleged
violator ordinarily to obtain a judicial remedy only after the person is aggrieved by an order
or decision by the Division.18  
It is clear that an administrative remedy was available to resolve the alleged violations
of the CPA and even the related claims based on the SDL.19  The declaratory judgment as
19(...continued)
can only order a post-hearing administrative remedy under the CPA if the CPA itself is
violated.  Otherwise, it must issue an order dismissing the complaint. § 13-403(b)(2).
24
to the SDL claims sought by SureDeposit would not terminate the entire controversy, which
includes numerous independent allegations of violations of the CPA.  Even if SureDeposit’s
theory that an interpretation of the SDL would render an independent interpretation of the
claimed CPA violations unnecessary, it is not entirely clear on the record of this case at this
juncture, that the declaratory judgment sought could adjudicate the Division’s charges
against SureDeposit’s officers.  By the same token, as SureDeposit’s complaint includes a
request for a declaration as to the viability of the Division’s CPA claims, as it facially does,
it would be inappropriate for a court to accept that invitation in advance of the Division
being allowed to bring to bear, through the designated regulatory scheme, its particular
expertise to render a final administrative decision regarding the CPA matters.  There is little
doubt that a reviewing court would be in a better position to render global and appropriate
relief in this dispute were it to have the benefit of the Division’s final view on the panoply
of claims. 
In Maryland, “a court may grant a declaratory judgment or decree in a civil case, if
it will serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding....”  Md.
Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-409(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
When declaratory relief will not terminate a controversy, it should not be granted.  Hamilton
v. McAuliffe, 277 Md. 336, 340, 353 A.2d 634, 637 (1976) (recognizing the “well settled”
25
requirement for termination of the controversy).  We have also explained that declaratory
relief is inappropriate
... where another remedy will be more effective or appropriate under the
circumstances.  In these cases it is neither useful nor proper to issue the
declaration.  In some of these cases, ... the declaration is refused on
jurisdictional grounds.  In others, the refusal is justified on discretionary
grounds.
Haynie v. Gold Bond Bldg. Prods., 306 Md. 644, 651, 511 A.2d 40, 43 (1986) (quoting
Grimm v. County Comm’rs, 252 Md. 626, 637, 250 A.2d 866, 871-72 (1969) (quoting
Edwin Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, 302 (2d ed. 1941))).  As a result, when a court
believes “that more effective relief can and should be obtained by another procedure ... it is
justified in refusing a declaration because of the availability of another remedy.”  Borchard,
supra, at 303.
We find Professor Borchard’s observation particularly compelling in this case.  In the
present case, we have identified an administrative remedy prescribed by the Legislature that
is available and appropriate to address the alleged violations of the CPA and even the related
claims under the SDL.  A declaratory judgment in favor of SureDeposit on the SDL will not
terminate, necessarily or conclusively, the controversy regarding the alleged violations of
the CPA.  While the Division may not possess statutorily-recognized expertise regarding the
assessment of matters arising under the SDL, upon subsequent judicial review of the
agency’s final decision, if appropriate, the Division’s decisions regarding the SDL claims
may be reviewed in the same action even if those particular decisions are not entitled to the
26
deference accorded ones made within the agency’s area of special expertise. Thus, under §
3-409(a) of the Declaratory Judgment Act alone, declaratory judgment was inappropriate at
the time sought in this case.
D.
It is obvious in this case that Division review and action will be effective and efficient
because it will address the allegations concerning both the CPA and the SDL.  Thus, it is
impossible to conclude, as a matter of law, that the Circuit Court’s decision to reject
SureDeposit’s complaint is well removed from this Court’s declaratory judgment
jurisprudence decided over the last sixty years.  Lastly, it is no coincidence that this result
is consistent with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction that “a party is often first required to
run the administrative remedial course before seeking a judicial solution.”  Clinton, 315 Md.
at 678, 556 A.2d at 279.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED.   COSTS TO
BE PAID BY APPELLANT.