Case Title: Kriewitz v. Savoy Heating and Air Conditioning Co.

Citation: 396 So. 2d 49

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1981-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
396 So. 2d 49 (1981)
Karen Jill KRIEWITZ, a minor suing by and through her father John Kriewitz, as next friend; Donna J. Kriewitz and John Kriewitz
v.
SAVOY HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING CO. et al.
79-384 to 79-386.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 24, 1981.
*50 Joseph M. Matranga, Mobile, for appellants.
Jerry A. McDowell and Ronald L. Davis of Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, Mobile, for appellee Savoy Heating and Air Conditioning Co.
Peter V. Sintz of Sintz, Pike, Campbell & Duke, Mobile, for appellee Cedar Construction & Roofing Company, Inc.
MADDOX, Justice.
These appeals are from jury verdicts in favor of the defendants and against all plaintiffs. John Kriewitz, Donna Kriewitz and Jill Kriewitz, individually, brought actions against Cedar Construction and Roofing Company and Savoy Heating and Air Conditioning Company. These cases were consolidated for purposes of trial and appeal.
Each plaintiff alleged that on or about November 13, 1974, the defendant, Cedar Construction, contracted to make certain repairs to plaintiffs' house, and that defendant Savoy, in furtherance of the work being done by Cedar Construction, installed a gas furnace in the house. Plaintiffs claimed that the gas furnace was improperly installed, because when the furnace was in use it would cause carbon monoxide fumes to permeate the house.
The defendants filed answers denying any responsibility for the injuries and damages sought by the plaintiffs. Further, they contended that the furnace had been misused or changed in a substantial manner while it was in the hands of the plaintiffs.
The trial began on January 2, 1980, and concluded on January 14, 1980, with the jury returning a verdict in favor of the defendants in all three cases.
Plaintiffs, as appellants, raise three evidentiary issues on appeal. First, they contend that the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence of a conversation between John Kriewitz and M. D. Lowe, the owner of Cedar Construction. Second, they contend that the trial court erred in sustaining objections to questions asked an expert witness, a medical doctor specializing in psychiatry, on the likelihood of resulting brain damage to a person who had been subjected to the inhalation of carbon monoxide. Third, they contend that the trial court *51 erred in refusing to allow clinical psychologists to render opinions as to medical causation of brain damage.
During the course of the testimony of John Kriewitz, he was questioned concerning a conversation he had with M. D. Lowe, the owner of Cedar Construction. As to one question, the following occurred:
Q. What was the nature of the discussion between you and Mr. Lowe?
Appellants contend that since the testimony would have been admissible against Cedar Construction, the trial court erred in not admitting it over the objection of Savoy. Appellants cite McElroy's Alabama Evidence, 3d Edition, § 12.01, which states:
This same treatise speaks to this precise problem later in the text. It states:
McElroy's Alabama Evidence, 3d edition, § 425.01(9).
In the instant case, the question-propounding litigants, the appellants, failed to specifically offer the evidence against Cedar Construction and, likewise, failed to make an offer of proof. Therefore, the appellants have failed to show that the trial court erred to reversal in refusing to admit evidence of the conversation between Kriewitz and Lowe.
Appellants next contend that it was error for the trial court to refuse to let a psychiatrist testify concerning the likelihood of brain damage to a person who has been subjected to carbon monoxide poisoning.
The trial court did sustain objections of the defendant to testimony by the psychiatrist, but we have carefully examined the record and we are convinced that the appellants were able ultimately to get admitted the substance of the testimony to which objections were earlier sustained.
Thus, even if it was error for the trial court to refuse to admit the earlier testimony, that error was rendered harmless by the subsequent admission of similar testimony from the same witness. Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970).
Finally, the appellants contend that the trial court erred in refusing to allow two clinical psychologists to testify as to the cause of the appellants' condition. The psychologists were allowed to testify that the appellants had suffered brain damage and, in fact, one of the psychologists was permitted to state that Mr. Kriewitz had "organic brain syndrome."
What the psychologists were not allowed to express an opinion on was the medical causation of that condition. This is in line with Code 1975, § 34-26-1, which states:
Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to permit the psychologist to testify as an expert that in his opinion the physiological injury was caused by carbon monoxide poisoning.
The judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
JONES, SHORES, EMBRY and BEATTY, JJ., concur.