Case Title: Vsetecka v. Safeway Stores, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S49908

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-10-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  October 14, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Compensation of
Buzz Vsetecka, Claimant.
BUZZ VSETECKA,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
SAFEWAY STORES, INC.,
Respondent on Review.
(WCB 00-02916; CA A113353; SC S49908)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 9, 2003.
J. Michael Casey, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for petitioner on review.  With him on the briefs was
Edward J. Harri, Salem.
Ken Kleinsmith, of Meyers, Radler, Bohy, Replogle & Miller,
Lake Oswego, argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent
on review. 
G. Duff Bloom, of Cary, Wing, Bloom & Edmunson, P.C.,
Eugene, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association.
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of the
Workers' Compensation Board are reversed.  The case is remanded
to the Workers' Compensation Board for further proceedings.
*Judicial Review from the Workers' Compensation Board. 183 Or App 239, 51 P3d 688 (2002).
KISTLER, J.
In this workers' compensation case, the Workers'
Compensation Board (board) ruled that claimant had failed to give
his employer sufficient written notice of a workplace injury and
therefore did not reach the question whether the injury caused
claimant's condition.  The Court of Appeals agreed that the
notice was insufficient and affirmed.  Vsetecka v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 183 Or App 239, 51 P3d 688 (2002).  We hold that
the board and the Court of Appeals read the notice statute too
narrowly and that claimant's notice was sufficient.  We reverse
the Court of Appeals decision and the board's order and remand
for further proceedings.
Claimant works in a grocery warehouse.  On April 30,
1998, a 50-pound box of apples fell from the top of a pallet
stacked high with boxes of produce.  Claimant raised his right
arm to deflect the falling box, which hit his wrist.  Claimant
immediately felt soreness and stiffness in his wrist.
Claimant's employer requires its employees to report
workplace injuries orally to their supervisors and also to record
them in an injury log.  Consistently with employer's policy,
claimant immediately told his supervisor that a "box fell and hit
[his] wrist, and that [he] had pain in [his] wrist."  That same
day, claimant recorded the injury in employer's injury log, which
contains spaces for the employee's name, the date of the injury,
and a description of the injury.  Claimant wrote in the injury
log:  "Buzz V," "4/30/98," and "pain in right wrist."
Twice within the next month, claimant told his
supervisor that he continued to experience pain in his wrist. 
Both times, he recorded that problem in the injury log.  On
May 8, he wrote his name, the date, and "right wrist pain."  On
May 29, he wrote, along with his name and date, "right wrist pain
again."  Although he continued to experience pain in his wrist,
claimant did not seek medical treatment because he believed that
he had suffered a sprain that would improve over time.
In 1999, claimant's right wrist symptoms increased, and
he spoke with the company nurse, who suggested that he was
suffering from tendinitis.  Claimant's symptoms continued to
worsen, and he sought medical treatment from Dr. Lisook on
January 17, 2000.  Lisook referred claimant to a specialist, who
diagnosed him as suffering from "a non-union of the scaphoid
fracture, right wrist."  The specialist performed surgery to
correct that condition.
After claimant saw Lisook on January 17, 2000, he filed
a workers' compensation claim for the April 30, 1998, injury. 
Employer denied the claim on the ground that claimant had failed
to give it timely written notice in accordance with ORS
656.265. (1)
  That statute provides, in part:
"(1) Notice of an accident resulting in an injury
or death shall be given immediately by the worker or a
dependent of the worker to the employer, but not later
than 90 days after the accident.  The employer shall
acknowledge forthwith receipt of such notice.
"(2) The notice need not be in any particular
form.  However, it shall be in writing and shall
apprise the employer when and where and how an injury
has occurred to a worker.  A report or statement
secured from a worker, or from the doctor of the worker
and signed by the worker, concerning an accident which
may involve a compensable injury shall be considered
notice from the worker and the employer shall forthwith
furnish the worker a copy of any such report or
statement.
"(3) Notice shall be given to the employer by mail
* * * or by personal delivery to the employer or to a
foreman or other supervisor of the employer.  If for
any reason it is not possible to so notify the
employer, notice may be given to the Director of the
Department of Consumer and Business Services and
referred to the insurer or self-insured employer.
"(4) Failure to give notice as required by this
section bars a claim under this chapter unless the
notice is given within one year after the date of the
accident and:
"(a) The employer had knowledge of the injury or
death; [or]
"(b) The worker died within 180 days after the
date of the accident * * *.
"* * * * *
"(6) The director shall promulgate and prescribe
uniform forms to be used by workers in reporting their
injuries to their employers. * * * The failure of the
worker to use a specified form shall not, in itself,
defeat the claim of the worker if the worker has
complied with the requirement that the claim be
presented in writing."
Claimant requested a hearing.  Before the
administrative law judge (ALJ) and again before the board,
claimant and employer offered differing interpretations of ORS
656.265(2).  Focusing on the second sentence in ORS 656.265(2),
employer argued that notice must be in writing and "apprise the
employer when and where and how an injury has occurred to a
worker."  Employer contended that the written entries in the
injury log, although timely, identified only "when" the injury
occurred.  They did not identify "where" or "how" it occurred. 
It followed, employer reasoned, that the written notice was
insufficient. (2)

Pointing to the third sentence in ORS 626.265(2),
claimant contended that the question, properly understood, was
whether the entries in the log put employer on notice that his
workplace accident "may involve a compensable injury."  He argued
that the three entries that he made in the injury log gave
employer timely notice that he had been experiencing recurring
pain from his April 30, 1998, injury and thus that the injury may
be compensable.
The ALJ ruled that the entries in the injury log
constituted sufficient notice.  Relying in part on an admission
by claimant's supervisor, the ALJ concluded that the three
notations of right wrist pain in the injury log would have put a
reasonable employer on notice that claimant could have a
compensable injury.  Reaching the merits of the claim, the ALJ
found the injury compensable.
Employer appealed to the board, which reversed.  The
board did not reach the question whether the injury caused
claimant's wrist condition.  Rather, the board ruled that
claimant had failed to give his employer sufficient notice.  The
board started from the proposition that the notice must be in
writing and state when, where, and how the injury occurred.  It
found that the initial entry stated "when" the injury occurred --
April 28, 1998.  It also found that, given the location and
purpose of the injury log, a reasonable trier of fact could infer
"where" the injury occurred -- viz., in the workplace.  The board
concluded, however, that the phrase "right wrist pain" did not
identify "how" the injury occurred.  Because the written notice
satisfied only two of the three statutory criteria, the board
upheld employer's denial.
Claimant petitioned for review, and a divided panel of
the Court of Appeals affirmed.  Vsetecka, 183 Or App at 241. 
Starting from the proposition that the phrase "when and where and
how" entails three separate inquiries, the majority agreed with
the board that the written entries did not tell employer "how"
the injury occurred; that is, the statement "right wrist pain"
did not tell employer "in what manner" or "by what means or
process" the injury occurred.  Id. at 242-43.  The dissent
reasoned that claimant's act of noting the injury in the log
implied that claimant had injured his wrist at work.  Id. at 244
(Schuman, J., dissenting).  That was sufficient, the dissent
reasoned, to tell employer "how" claimant had injured his wrist -- he had injured it at work -- as well as "where" he had done so. 
Id.  We allowed review to consider the level of specificity that
ORS 656.265 requires.
On review, the parties' dispute reduces to a question
of statutory interpretation.  Focusing on the phrase "when and
where and how," employer argues that that phrase requires three
separate and discrete inquiries and that claimant's entries do
not pass the third hurdle; they do not communicate "how" the
injury occurred.  Claimant, for his part, focuses on the context
of the phrase "when and where and how," as well as its text.  In
claimant's view, the context makes clear that directing a worker
to tell an employer when, where, and how an injury occurred is
the same as asking a worker to explain generally what happened. 
He contends that the text, read in context, does not require
three discrete inquiries but reduces instead to a single
question:  Does the writing contain enough details about the
when, where, and how of an injury to put an employer on notice
that the injury may be compensable?
In analyzing the parties' differing interpretations of
ORS 656.265, we begin with the text and context of that statute. 
See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11,
859 P2d 1143 (1993) (describing statutory construction
methodology).  ORS 656.265(1) requires that a worker give his or
her employer notice of an accident that results in an injury or
death.  The first two sentences in ORS 656.265(2) address the
form and contents of that notice.  They provide:  "The notice
need not be in any particular form.  However, it shall be in
writing and shall apprise the employer when and where and how an
injury has occurred to a worker."  ORS 656.265(2).
Viewed in isolation, that text provides support for
employer's position.  Ordinarily, however, "text should not be
read in isolation but must be considered in context."  Stevens v.
Czerniak, 336 Or 392, 401, 84 P3d 140 (2004).  Context includes
other provisions of the same statute.  Id.  In addition to the
text on which employer focuses, ORS 656.265 identifies two other
ways in which a worker may notify his or her employer. (3)
  The
third sentence in subsection (2) provides that "[a] report or
statement secured from a worker, or from the doctor of the worker
and signed by the worker, concerning an accident which may
involve a compensable injury shall be considered notice from the
worker[.]"  The phrase "shall be considered notice" demonstrates
that the third sentence describes an alternative way of providing
notice; there would be no need for the legislature to state that
a report or statement that meets the requirements of the third
sentence "shall be considered notice" if the report or statement
also satisfied the criteria in the first two sentences of ORS
656.265(2).
Textually, the notice contemplated by the third
sentence of ORS 656.265(2) differs in at least two respects from
that described by the first two sentences.  The first two
sentences describe a writing that the worker gives the employer;
the third sentence refers to a statement or report that someone
(presumably the employer) secures from the worker or the worker's
doctor. (4)
  Additionally, the third sentence does not repeat
the phrase "when and where and how."  It rephrases that
requirement and provides that any report or statement "concerning
an accident which may involve a compensable injury" shall be
considered notice.
ORS 656.265(6) refers to yet another way of providing
notice of a work-related injury.  That subsection directs the
director of the Department of Consumer and Business Services
(department) to promulgate uniform forms for workers to use to
report workplace injuries to their employers.  It provides that
the failure to use the prescribed form "shall not, in itself,
defeat the claim of the worker if the worker has complied with
the requirement that the claim be presented in writing."  ORS
656.265(6).  The last sentence implies that submitting a
completed form will constitute notice even though, as claimant
notes, the form that the director has prescribed does not require
a worker to state "when and where and how" the injury occurred
but asks instead a more general question. (5)

The foregoing recitation of text and context leads to
three observations.  First, ORS 656.265 does not prescribe a
single form of notice.  Rather, the statute explicitly provides
that notice need not take a particular form and identifies three
ways of providing notice:  (1) a worker may give notice to the
employer; (2) an employer may secure a report or statement from
the worker or the worker's doctor; or (3) a worker may submit a
prescribed form to the employer.  Second, in identifying those
different ways of providing notice, the legislature has referred
to the contents of the notice in different ways.  The statute
refers to (1) giving notice that apprises an employer "when and
where and how" the injury occurred; (2) securing a report or
statement "concerning an accident which may involve a compensable
injury"; and (3) submitting a form that contains the information
that the director prescribes.  Finally, the one constant, which
the last sentence in subsection (6) makes clear, is that the
notice must be in writing.
When, as in this case, a statute contains multiple
provisions, ORS 174.010 directs us to read those provisions, if
possible, in a way that will give effect to all of them.  See
PGE, 317 Or at 611 (noting rule for construing text).  Following
that principle, we conclude that notice should tell an employer
when, where, and how an injury occurred.  That requirement is not
a technical one, however.  ORS 656.265 explicitly states that the
legislature did not intend to impose formalistic requirements on
notice.  As the various ways of phrasing the required contents of
the notice make clear, ORS 656.265 directs injured workers to
include enough information about the when, where, and how of an
injury to put an employer on notice that, as the third sentence
in subsection (2) puts it, the worker may have sustained a
compensable injury.
ORS 656.265 requires prompt notice so that an employer
can conduct a timely investigation into the nature and cause of a
worker's injury.  See Colvin v. Industrial Indemnity, 301 Or 743,
747, 725 P2d 356 (1986) (interpreting ORS 656.265).  As the court
explained in Colvin:
"Timely notice facilitates prompt investigation and
diagnosis of the injury.  It assures the opportunity to
make an accurate record of the occurrence, and
decreases the chance for confusion due to intervening
or nonemployment-related causes."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Parsing each word in the
phrase "when and where and how" separately, as employer would
have us do, is at odds with, and indeed may defeat, the purpose
of the notice statute, as the court explained it in Colvin. (6) The correct question, as the text and context make clear, is
whether the written information, viewed as a whole, provides
enough details about the when, where, and how of an injury to put
an employer on notice that the injury may be compensable and thus
that an investigation may be advisable.
Although the board and the Court of Appeals did not
apply the correct legal standard, we need not remand to permit
them to do so.  The relevant facts are not disputed, and we may
decide whether those undisputed facts comply with ORS 656.265. 
As noted, within 30 days after the accident, claimant made three
written entries in employer's injury log.  The board found that
those entries put employer on notice that claimant suffered a
right wrist injury at work on May 28, 1998.  Additionally, a fair
inference from that statement is that the injury occurred as the
result of a workplace accident.  Although not specific, the
inference that the injury occurred as a result of a workplace
accident provides some information about how the injury occurred. 
See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1097 (unabridged ed
1993) (defining "how," in part, as "by what means or process"). 
Finally, the three entries put employer on notice that claimant
continued to experience right wrist pain and that he could
require medical treatment as a result of the injury.
To be sure, the entries do not identify the specific
cause of the injury, but the entries were sufficient to put
employer on notice that claimant may have suffered a compensable
injury.  See ORS 656.005(7)(a) (defining compensable injury as
"an accidental injury * * * arising out of and in the course of
employment requiring medical services").  It follows that
employer was also on notice that it should undertake whatever
investigation of the nature and cause of his injury it believed
appropriate.  See Colvin, 301 Or at 747 (explaining purposes of
notice requirement).  To require greater specificity about the
cause of the injury would be to impose on the notice statute a
level of formalism that the words of ORS 656.265 do not support.
Although we hold that claimant's notice was sufficient,
the question that remains is whether the workplace injury caused
claimant's right wrist condition.  The board did not reach that
question, and it is necessary to remand the case to permit the
board to do so.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of
the Workers' Compensation Board are reversed.  The case is
remanded to the Workers' Compensation Board for further
proceedings.
1. Employer also denied the claim on the ground that the April 30, 1998, injury was
not the cause of claimant's right wrist condition.
2. Employer does not dispute that the workers' compensation claim that claimant
filed in 2000 was sufficient written notice.  However, because claimant did not give employer
that notice until more than a year after the accident occurred, claimant could not rely on the
savings provision in ORS 656.265(4).
3. The legislature enacted the relevant subsections as part of the same bill.  See Or
Laws 1965, ch 285, § 30a (enacting ORS 656.265 in substantially its present form).
4. The second independent clause in the third sentence directs the worker's employer
to give the worker "forthwith" a copy of the report or statement.  That direction implies that the
employer is the entity that secured the report or statement.
5. The department's 801 Form, which is part of the record, asks injured workers to
state the date and time of the injury.  It then directs them:  "Describe accident fully (please
print)."
6. Under employer's interpretation of the statute, an employer who received a timely
report from a doctor that a worker had lost a limb at work could deny worker's compensation
benefits because the report failed to identify the specific manner by which the workplace accident
had occurred.