Case Title: Brown v. State

Citation: 245 So. 2d 41

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1971-02-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
245 So. 2d 41 (1971)
Clifford Harry BROWN, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 39671.

Supreme Court of Florida.
February 10, 1971.
*42 Richard M. Gale, Miami, Rocco DeStefano, Hollywood, and Anthony Capodilupo, Miami, for petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reported at 234 So. 2d 161. The decision sought to be reviewed conflicts with Banks v. State, 136 So. 2d 25 (Fla.App. 1st 1962), giving this Court jurisdiction of the cause under the provisions of § 4, Article V of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A.
Petitioner, a twenty-year old college student, was convicted on a plea of guilty to illegal possession of marijuana. After a presentence investigation, during which the trial judge learned that petitioner had brought marijuana to the party in quantities larger than he would require for his own use and that he did sell at least one marijuana cigarette, the trial judge sentenced him to 3 years in prison. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion to set aside the judgment to permit him to change his plea from "guilty" to "not guilty."
A hearing was held on petitioner's motion to set aside his plea of guilty. The basis of that motion was that petitioner was misled into pleading guilty to the offense by representations made by the Court to counsel for petitioner in chambers and outside of petitioner's presence, which representations were then related to petitioner. As a result of petitioner's counsel's meeting with the judge and the prosecutor, petitioner was advised to change his plea of not guilty to guilty.
The trial court entered an order setting forth the facts and denying petitioner's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, stating in part as follows:
On appeal, the District Court affirmed Judge Owen dissenting, and held:[1]
In Banks v. State, supra, the defendant sought to withdraw his plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated assault. The trial court denied defendant's motion to set aside the judgment and the District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding:[2]
The Banks decision, supra, is in accord with the opinion of the dissenting judge in the instant case and in our view reaches the fairer result. It is important to recognize that the question is not one of a trial judge being bound by statements he may make regarding his policy in sentencing certain offenders. There is no question but that a judge is not bound in sentencing by any such statements. The question here is whether a defendant, who has been led to change his plea to guilty due to the honest misunderstanding on the part of counsel and misinformation on all sides, should be allowed to withdraw that plea and stand trial on the charge against him.
We agree with the statement of the majority of the District Court below that a judge is not bound to grant probation and that an accused cannot withdraw his guilty plea merely because the sentence did not conform to what he hoped it might be. However, the facts before us are more consistent with actual misunderstanding and mutual mistake resulting to a large extent from statements made at the conference *44 between trial counsel, the prosecutor and the judge. In accord with this view is the dissenting opinion of Judge Owen below, stating:[3]
We agree with the foregoing interpretation of the facts in this case as set out in the dissenting opinion of Judge Owen and hold that petitioner be allowed to withdraw his plea of "guilty" and stand trial on the charges.
This Court is aware of the changing attitudes of those concerned with criminal justice on the question of "plea bargaining." Many have considered it improper for a court directly, or through the prosecuting attorney, to negotiate with a defendant concerning the punishment to be imposed upon a plea of guilty. Present conditions, with almost universal representation of criminal defendants by counsel and a growing crime rate crowding of criminal courts, warrant the adoption of a more practical and reasonable approach to plea bargaining. If the State and defense counsel agree upon a specific statement of facts constituting the crime to be admitted and with the further understanding regarding the effect of subsequent presentence investigation, we see no reason why a judge should not, if he chooses, make a specific announcement of the sentence he will impose upon a guilty plea.
We repeat that a judge is never bound in sentencing by these negotiations. As to allowing withdrawal of a plea of guilty, however, a judge should be liberal in the exercise of his discretion and allow withdrawal of a plea of guilty where it is shown, as in the instant case, that the plea was based on a failure of communication or misunderstanding of the facts.
Accordingly, the decision of the District Court is quashed and the cause remanded with directions to remand to the trial court for the grant of petitioner's motion and substitution of a plea of not guilty for the plea of guilty.
It is so ordered.
ERVIN, Acting C.J., CARLTON and DREW (Retired) JJ., and SPECTOR, District Court Judge, concur.
[1]  Brown v. State, 234 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla.App.4th 1970).
[2]  Banks v. State, 136 So. 2d 25, 26 (Fla.App.1st 1962).
[3]  Brown v. State, 234 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla.App.4th 1970).