Case Title: Corrigan v. Illum. Co.

Citation: 2009-Ohio-2524

Docket Number: 20080708

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Corrigan v. Illum. Co., 122 Ohio St.3d 265, 2009-Ohio-2524.] 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN ET AL., APPELLEES, v. ILLUMINATING COMPANY, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Corrigan v. Illum. Co., 122 Ohio St.3d 265, 2009-Ohio-2524.] 
Public Utilities Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over vegetation-removal 
dispute between landowner and utility company. 
(No. 2008-0708 — Submitted February 3, 2009 — Decided June 4, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 89402, 175 Ohio App.3d 360, 2008-Ohio-684. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
I 
{¶ 1}  At first glance, this case appears to concern the fate of a single 
tree.  The larger issue, however, is who controls that fate – the court of common 
pleas or the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. 
{¶ 2} Appellant, the Illuminating Company (“the company”), is a public 
utility that provides electric service.  In order to provide safe and reliable delivery 
of electricity, the company must maintain its easements to keep vegetation from 
coming in contact with electricity lines.  On July 2, 2004, appellees, Mary-Martha 
and Dennis Corrigan, received a letter from the company stating that it was going 
to remove the silver maple located within its easement on the Corrigans’ property 
because the tree had the potential to interfere with the company’s 138,000-volt 
distribution line. 
{¶ 3} To prevent the removal of their tree, the Corrigans filed a 
complaint for injunctive relief against the company in the Cuyahoga County 
Court of Common Pleas on July 9, 2004.  The trial court granted the Corrigans a 
temporary restraining order that enjoined the company from clear-cutting “trees, 
shrubs, and other growth which exceed 10 feet or have the potential of reaching 
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10 feet in height, located within its easement relating to any property on Outlook 
Drive [the street on which the Corrigans live].” 
{¶ 4} The next week, the trial court held a hearing on the motion for 
preliminary injunction.  In its July 29, 2004 order granting a preliminary 
injunction, the trial court found: “[The company has begun] a ‘clear cut’ policy to 
deal with vegetation maintenance on its transmission line easements.  Such an 
approach may be a reasonable exercise of [the company’s] authority, but such 
authority is not unbridled nor is it arbitrary.”  It went on to find that evidence had 
been presented to show that the silver maple did not interfere or threaten to 
interfere with the transmission lines, and it set a date for a permanent-injunction 
hearing. 
{¶ 5} The company filed a motion to reconsider and a motion to dismiss, 
arguing in both that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the 
case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission of 
Ohio (“PUCO”).  The court denied these motions.  At the end of August 2004, the 
trial court held a hearing on the complaint for permanent injunctive relief.  Two 
years and four months later, the trial court granted the Corrigans a permanent 
injunction to enjoin the company from removing the silver maple. 
{¶ 6} The company appealed and asserted three assignments of error: (1) 
the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) the grant of a permanent 
injunction was an abuse of discretion, and (3) the findings of facts were against 
the manifest weight of the evidence.  The Eighth District Court of Appeals 
affirmed.  It held that the trial court did not lack subject-matter jurisdiction, 
because the removal of trees within an easement does not require PUCO’s 
administrative expertise and the dispute centered on the interpretation of the 
easement at issue.  Corrigan v. Illum. Co., 175 Ohio App.3d 360, 2008-Ohio-684, 
887 N.E.2d 363, ¶ 10.  In looking at the language of the easement, the appellate 
court determined that the company’s right to remove trees is limited.  Id. at ¶ 20.  
January Term, 2009 
3 
After noting that (1) the utility had not received a single citation or experienced 
any problems with the FAA or Army Corps of Engineers as a result of the tree, 
(2) the Corrigans had personally paid to have the tree pruned and to have a slow-
growth hormone implanted, and (3) the community had not experienced any 
service interruptions due to the Corrigans’ tree, the appellate court concluded that 
the tree does not pose a possible threat to the transmission lines. Id. at ¶ 24-32. 
{¶ 7} We accepted the company’s discretionary appeal. 
II 
{¶ 8} The General Assembly enacted R.C. 4901.01 et seq. to regulate the 
business activities of public utilities and created PUCO to administer and enforce 
these provisions. Kazmaier Supermarket, Inc. v. Toledo Edison Co. (1991), 61 
Ohio St.3d 147, 150, 573 N.E.2d 655.  R.C. 4905.26 provides that PUCO shall 
hear complaints filed against public utilities alleging that “any rate, fare, charge, 
toll, rental, schedule, classification, or service, or any joint rate, fare, charge, toll, 
rental, schedule, classification, or service rendered, charged, demanded, exacted, 
or proposed to be rendered, charged, demanded, or exacted, is in any respect 
unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory, unjustly preferential, or in violation 
of law, or that any regulation, measurement, or practice affecting or relating to 
any service furnished by the public utility, or in connection with such service, is, 
or will be, in any respect unreasonable, unjust, insufficient, unjustly 
discriminatory, or unjustly preferential.”  This “ ‘jurisdiction specifically 
conferred by statute upon the Public Utilities Commission over public utilities of 
the state * * * is so complete, comprehensive and adequate as to warrant the 
conclusion that it is likewise exclusive.’ ” State ex rel. N. Ohio Tel. Co. v. Winter 
(1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 6, 9, 52 O.O.2d 29, 260 N.E.2d 827, quoting State ex rel. 
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1934), 128 Ohio St. 
553, 557, 1 O.O. 99, 192 N.E. 787; see also Kazmaier, 61 Ohio St.3d at 152, 573 
N.E.2d 655. 
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{¶ 9} The broad jurisdiction of PUCO over service-related matters does 
not affect “the basic jurisdiction of the court of common pleas * * * in other areas 
of possible claims against utilities, including pure tort and contract claims.”  State 
ex rel. Ohio Edison Co. v. Shaker (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 209, 211, 625 N.E.2d 
608.  Consequently, we must determine whether the claims raised by the 
Corrigans in their complaint are within PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction or are pure 
tort and contract claims that do not require a consideration of statutes and 
regulations administered and enforced by the commission. 
{¶ 10} In making this determination, we are not limited by the allegations 
in the complaint.  State ex rel. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. v. Henson, 102 Ohio 
St.3d 349, 2004-Ohio-3208, 810 N.E.2d 953, ¶ 19.  Rather, we must review the 
substance of the claims to determine if service-related issues are involved.  Id. at ¶ 
20-21.  “In other words, ‘casting the allegations in the complaint to sound in tort 
or contract is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a trial court’ when the 
basic claim is one that the commission has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve.”  
State ex rel. Illum. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 97 Ohio St.3d 
69, 2002-Ohio-5312, 776 N.E.2d 92, ¶ 21, quoting Higgins v. Columbia Gas of 
Ohio, Inc. (2000), 136 Ohio App. 3d 198, 202, 736 N.E.2d 92. 
{¶ 11} This court recently adopted a two-part test from Pacific Indemn. 
Ins. Co. v. Illum. Co., Cuyahoga App. No. 82074, 2003-Ohio-3954, ¶ 15, to 
determine whether PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction over an action: “ ‘First, is 
PUCO’s administrative expertise required to resolve the issue in dispute?  Second, 
does the act complained of constitute a practice normally authorized by the 
utility?’ 
{¶ 12} “If the answer to either question is in the negative, the claim is not 
within PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction.”  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. 
Co., 119 Ohio St.3d 301, 2008-Ohio-3917, 893 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 12-13. 
January Term, 2009 
5 
{¶ 13} Although Allstate was decided after the appellate decision in this 
case, the Eighth District applied Pacific Indemn. and determined that the 
complaint did not fall within PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction:  “Here, the act 
complained of, namely, removing trees within the Illuminating Company’s 
easement, does not require PUCO’s administrative expertise to resolve the 
dispute.  What is required is an interpretation of the contractual language of the 
quitclaim deed establishing the easement at issue * * *.”  175 Ohio App.3d 360, 
2008-Ohio-684, 887 N.E.2d 363, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 14} Four months after the Eighth District rendered its decision, the 
Seventh District Court of Appeals addressed a similar matter.  DeLost v. First 
Energy Corp., 7th Dist. No. 07 MA 194, 2008-Ohio-3086.  In DeLost, the 
property owners sought an injunction to prevent Ohio Edison from cutting down 
white pine trees and other vegetation that had been planted within the utility 
company’s easement.  Id. at ¶ 2-3.  Based on this court’s decision in State ex rel. 
Illum. Co., 97 Ohio St.3d 69, 2002-Ohio-5312, 776 N.E.2d 92, the appellate court 
reasoned that when an issue raised in a complaint requires that statutes and/or 
regulations administered and enforced by PUCO be considered, the issue is not 
pure contract and is within the exclusive jurisdiction of PUCO.  DeLost, 2008-
Ohio-3086, ¶ 33-35.  The court went on to note that the Ohio Administrative 
Code chapter on electric service and safety standards, Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-10, 
requires that utility companies establish a right-of-way vegetation-control 
program to maintain safe and reliable service (Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-10-27(E)).  
Id. at ¶ 39.  Because vegetation management within an easement is necessary to 
ensure that reliable service is provided to consumers, the DeLost court concluded 
that cutting down vegetation is a practice relating to service as contemplated by 
R.C. 4905.26 and that it fell within PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction.  Id. at ¶ 40.  
Therefore we must determine whether the court of appeals in this case or in 
DeLost is correct. 
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{¶ 15} We agree with the DeLost court that this type of case falls within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of PUCO.  The first part of the Allstate test asks whether 
PUCO’s administrative expertise is required to resolve the issue in dispute.  Ohio 
Adm.Code 4901:1-10-27(D)(2) requires that each electric utility inspect its 
electric-transmission facilities (circuits and equipment) at least once every year.  
The inspections are to be conducted in accordance with written programs.  Ohio 
Adm.Code 4901:1-10-27(E)(1).  “These programs shall establish preventative 
requirements for the electric utility to maintain safe and reliable service.  
Programs shall include, but are not limited to, the following facilities: * * * (f) 
Right-of-way vegetation control * * *.”  Id.  The vegetation-management plan 
takes a number of factors into consideration such as arcing, sagging, and line 
voltage as well as regulatory requirements from OSHA, FAA, and the Army 
Corps of Engineers.  In addition, electric utilities are required to comply with the 
American National Standard Institute’s “National Electrical Safety Code.”  Ohio 
Adm.Code 4901:1-10-06.  Finally, electric utilities are required to submit their 
programs to the director of the consumer-services department for review and 
acceptance.  Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-10-27(E)(2).  If the electric utility and the 
director cannot agree on the details and contents of the plan, the electric utility is 
required to file a complaint with PUCO.  Id.  The company’s decision to remove a 
tree is governed by its vegetation-management plan, which is regulated by PUCO.  
Therefore, we conclude that PUCO’s administrative expertise is required to 
resolve the issue of whether removal of a tree is reasonable. 
{¶ 16} The second part of the Allstate test is whether the act complained 
of constitutes a practice normally authorized by the utility.  Vegetation 
management is necessary to maintain safe and reliable electrical service.  See 
Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-10-27(E)(2).  Thus, the second part of the test is satisfied.  
Having answered both Allstate questions in the affirmative, we determine that this 
case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of PUCO. 
January Term, 2009 
7 
{¶ 17} Despite the Corrigans’ argument that we are presented with a pure 
contract matter, this case is not about an easement.  There is no question that the 
company has a valid easement and that the tree is within the easement.  
Furthermore, the language of the easement is unambiguous and provides the 
company with the following rights: 
{¶ 18} “Said right and easement shall include the right of the Grantee, its 
successors and assigns, at all times to enter upon the right of way occupied by 
said transmission lines for the purpose of constructing, inspecting, protecting, 
repairing or removing said towers, wires, fixtures and appliances, together with 
full authority to cut and remove any trees, shrubs or other obstructions upon the 
above described property which may interfere or threaten to interfere with the 
construction, operation and maintenance of said transmission lines.”  (Emphasis 
added.)   
{¶ 19} This language grants the company the right to remove any tree 
within the easement that could pose a threat to the transmission lines.  See also 
Beaumont v. FirstEnergy Corp., 11th Dist. No. 2004-G-2573, 2004-Ohio-5295, ¶ 
22. 
{¶ 20} It is clear from the record that the Corrigans are not contesting the 
meaning of the language of the easement but rather the company’s decision to 
remove the tree instead of pruning it.  In 2000, the company changed its 
vegetation-management plan so that its policy was to remove vegetation that 
threatened to interfere with its lines.  Although the Corrigans disagree with this 
policy, the broad language of the easement granted to the company allows the 
utility to remove trees within its easement that may interfere or threaten to 
interfere with its power lines.  Therefore, the Corrigans’ complaint with the 
decision to remove the tree is really an attack on the company’s vegetation-
management plan.  That type of complaint is a service-related issue, which is 
within PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction. 
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III 
{¶ 21} We agree with the DeLost court.  The relevant sections of the Ohio 
Administrative Code show that vegetation management is manifestly service-
related.  DeLost, 2008-Ohio-3086, ¶ 39-40.  R.C. 4905.26 specifically confers 
exclusive jurisdiction upon PUCO to determine whether any service provided by 
a public utility is in any respect unjust, unreasonable, or in violation of the law.  
Columbia Gas, 102 Ohio St.3d 349, 2004-Ohio-3208, 810 N.E.2d 953, at ¶ 16.  
Therefore, whether the company’s decision that the silver maple interferes or 
threatens to interfere with its transmission line is reasonable is a service-related 
question within PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction. 
{¶ 22} The judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals is 
reversed. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 23} I respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 24} The central issue in this case is whether the Public Utilities 
Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”) has exclusive jurisdiction over the Corrigans’ 
claim that the Illuminating Company does not have the right to cut down a silver 
maple tree that stands on the Corrigans’ property, within an easement owned by 
the utility.  Unlike the majority, I am of the view that the utility’s right to remove 
the Corrigans’ tree depends on the terms of the easement, not the utility’s internal 
vegetation-management plan.  Because the PUCO has no special expertise with 
respect to interpretation of an easement, the court of common pleas properly 
exercised jurisdiction over this action for a permanent injunction to prevent the 
removal of the tree. 
January Term, 2009 
9 
{¶ 25} In addition, I would affirm the appellate court’s decision that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion when enjoining the utility from removing 
this tree.  We are obligated to give broad deference to the trial court’s factual 
findings, and in my view, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the 
trial court’s finding that the Corrigans’ tree does not threaten the transmission 
line. 
{¶ 26} The Illuminating Company operates an electric transmission line 
that crosses the Corrigans’ property, and pursuant to an easement, the utility has 
the right “at all times to enter upon the right-of-way occupied by said 
transmission lines * * * with full authority to cut and remove any trees, shrubs, or 
other obstructions * * * which may interfere or threaten to interfere with the 
construction, operation and maintenance of said transmission lines.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶ 27} A silver maple tree has stood within the bounds of this easement 
for at least the last 50 years.  From 1975, when the Corrigans’ bought the 
property, until 2000, utility employees would enter their property when necessary 
and prune the 50-foot tree away from the transmission line.  In 2000, however, the 
utility changed its policy in favor of removing any vegetation from within its 
easements.  Thus, the utility informed the Corrigans in 2004 that it intended to 
remove their silver maple, and in response, they filed the instant action in the 
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court seeking a permanent injunction against 
the Illuminating Company. 
{¶ 28} The first issue before us is whether the PUCO has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the Corrigans’ claim, and as the majority acknowledges, our 
decision in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 119 Ohio St.3d 301, 
2008-Ohio-3917, 893 N.E.2d 824, sets forth the applicable test in this regard: “ 
‘First, is PUCO’s administrative expertise required to resolve the issue in dispute?  
Second, does the act complained of constitute a practice normally authorized by 
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the utility?’ ”  Id. at ¶ 12-13, quoting Pacific Indemn. Ins. Co. v. Illum. Co., 
Cuyahoga App. No. 82074, 2003-Ohio-3954, ¶ 15.  As we stated, “If the answer 
to either question is in the negative, the claim is not within PUCO’s exclusive 
jurisdiction.”  Id. 
{¶ 29} In concluding that the PUCO has special expertise necessary to 
resolve this case, the majority characterizes the Corrigans’ claim as “an attack on 
the company’s vegetation-management plan,” which the utility is required to have 
pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-10-27(E).  Majority opinion at ¶ 20.  In my 
view, however, the central issue raised by the Corrigans’ complaint is whether 
their maple tree “may interfere or threaten to interfere” with the transmission line.  
This requires interpretation and application of the terms of the easement, not the 
utility’s vegetation-management plan, and as with any written agreement, the 
interpretation of an easement depends on its plain language.  See Murray v. Lyon 
(1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 215, 219, 642 N.E.2d 41, citing 36 Ohio Jurisprudence 
3d (1982) 414, Easements and Licenses, Section 25.  Moreover, the fact that Ohio 
Adm.Code 4901:1-10-27(E) requires a utility to have a vegetation-management 
plan does not mean that the Illuminating Company is authorized to implement that 
plan without regard to the terms of an easement. 
{¶ 30} The PUCO has no special expertise with respect to the 
determination of rights under an easement, and thus it does not have exclusive 
jurisdiction here.  As we explained in Allstate, “PUCO is not a court and has no 
power to judicially ascertain and determine legal rights and liabilities.”  119 Ohio 
St.3d 301, 2008-Ohio-3917, 893 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 6, citing  State ex rel. Dayton 
Power & Light Co. v. Riley (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 168, 170, 7 O.O.3d 317, 373 
N.E.2d 385.  Furthermore, the fact “[t]hat PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction over 
service-related matters does not diminish ‘the basic jurisdiction of the court of 
common pleas * * * in other areas of possible claims against utilities, including 
January Term, 2009 
11 
pure tort and contract claims.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., quoting State ex rel. 
Ohio Edison Co. v. Shaker (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 209, 211, 625 N.E.2d 608. 
{¶ 31} Accordingly, I would answer the first question in the Allstate 
analysis in the negative and hold that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction 
over the Corrigans’ action in this case. 
{¶ 32} Second, I would affirm the appellate court’s determination that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it enjoined the utility from removing 
the maple tree. 
{¶ 33} As we stated in Garono v. State (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 171, 173, 
524 N.E.2d 496, “[t]he grant or denial of an injunction is solely within the trial 
court’s discretion and, therefore, a reviewing court should not disturb the 
judgment of the trial court absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.”  Id., 
citing Perkins v. Quaker City (1956), 165 Ohio St. 120, 125, 59 O.O. 151, 133 
N.E.2d 595 (“unless there is a plain abuse of discretion on the part of trial courts, 
in granting or refusing injunctions, reviewing courts will not disturb such 
judgments”). 
{¶ 34} Moreover, we have emphasized that a reviewing court “must not 
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court where there exists some 
competent and credible evidence supporting the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law rendered by the trial court.” Myers v. Garson (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 610, 
616, 614 N.E.2d 742.  See also Fabe v. Prompt Fin., Inc. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 
268, 276, 631 N.E.2d 614.  Also, as we explained in State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio 
St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, under the civil manifest-weight-of-
the-evidence standard, “a court has an obligation to presume that the findings of 
the trier of fact are correct. * * * This presumption arises because the trial judge 
had an opportunity ‘to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures 
and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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proffered testimony.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 24, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland 
(1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 10 OBR 408, 461 N.E.2d 1273. 
{¶ 35} In this case, the trial court found that the Corrigans’ maple tree 
does not threaten the transmission line.  On appeal, the court of appeals reviewed 
the maps, photos, exhibits, and transcripts of expert and lay witnesses’ testimony 
in the record, and it stated that “the branches [of the maple tree] are * * * clearly 
distant from the power lines, even when taking into consideration the maximum 
sag lines, arc, and other testimony elicited from the Illuminating Company’s 
staff.”  Corrigan v. Illum. Co., 175 Ohio App.3d 360, 2008-Ohio-684, 887 N.E.2d 
363, ¶ 25-26.  Moreover, the appellate court observed that “most of the tree’s 
canopy hangs on one side of the tree, away from the power lines and toward the 
Corrigans’ home.  Neither party proved which direction the tree would likely fall, 
if ever, given the size and weight of the tree and the direction of the canopy.  
However, the Corrigans’ arborist expert testified that the tree is not leaning 
toward the transmission lines.” Id. at ¶ 27.  As the appellate court also recognized, 
the Corrigans have paid more than $1,200 for pruning and application of a 
hormone that will slow or stop the tree’s growth.  Id. at ¶ 25. 
{¶ 36} Thus, in my view, the record contains at least “some competent 
and credible evidence supporting the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
rendered by the trial court.” Garson, 66 Ohio St.3d at 616, 614 N.E.2d 742.  
Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion, and we may not 
substitute our judgment with respect to its findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
Id. 
{¶ 37} For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals in this case. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J., dissenting. 
January Term, 2009 
13 
{¶ 38} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that 
determining the scope of the easement held by the electric utility company in this 
case involves jurisdiction granted exclusively to the Public Utilities Commission 
of Ohio (“PUCO”).  In this regard, I join the dissenting opinion of Justice 
O’Donnell. 
{¶ 39} However, on the determination that the easement did not permit 
removal of the tree at issue herein, I agree with the dictum in the majority opinion 
that the trial court abused its discretion in applying the law to the facts of this 
case.  In this regard, I agree with the well-reasoned dissent from the appellate 
court opinion in this case: 
{¶ 40} “The majority appears to require evidence that the Corrigans’ tree 
* * * cannot threaten the transmission line unless the Illuminating Company first 
receives a citation or experiences problems with the FAA or the Army Corps of 
Engineers. Further, the majority relies heavily on the lack of any interruption in 
electrical service rather than on the threat that the tree ‘may interfere or threaten 
to interfere’ with the maintenance of the transmission lines, the specific language 
of the easement at issue. 
{¶ 41} “The Illuminating Company’s utility arborist testified that the 
Corrigans’ tree was near transmission lines, as opposed to distribution lines, so 
that if service was disrupted because the tree fell, the disruption would affect 
many people, not just the neighborhood. He opined that the tree could not be 
sufficiently pruned to maintain five years of clearance. He also testified that the 
‘accepted best practice’ used to be pruning, but in 2000, the Illuminating 
Company changed its accepted best practice to removal. 
{¶ 42} “The Corrigans’ arborist testified that if the tree fell, it would not 
hit the power lines. However, he conceded that his opinion was based only on 
visual estimates, because he had not taken any measurements. 
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{¶ 43} “Daniel Neff, an engineer, testified that the tree was 22 feet from 
the electric wires. He further testified that if the tree fell in the direction of the 
wires, the tree would hit the wires. 
{¶ 44} “Richard O’Callaghan, the director of engineering for FirstEnergy, 
with 24 years of electrical engineering experience, testified that the Illuminating 
Company attempts to maintain a 25-foot clearance to any vertical object, but it is 
required to maintain 21 feet of clearance by the National Electric Safety Code. He 
further testified that the tree ‘interferes with the maintenance and safe operation of 
the transmission line’ based upon the clearance, location, and height of the tree. 
He further testified that the tree is higher than the lower and possibly middle 
conductors and, if the tree were just to be trimmed, it would require that 16 feet be 
trimmed from it. But in his opinion, the tree must be removed. He explained that 
twice each year, the Illuminating Company does an aerial survey, and he 
described the process by which the company decides which trees need to be 
pruned and which trees need to be removed. 
{¶ 45} “The overwhelming testimony supported the tree’s removal. There 
was no testimony that the easement did not allow for removal. There was no 
argument that the easement was invalid. And the only person to testify that the 
tree was not or would not become a threat was the Corrigans’ arborist, who had 
taken no measurements. 
{¶ 46} “The Illuminating Company should be permitted to maintain its 
transmission conductors in accordance with industry guidelines. Since the 
easement allows for a tree to be removed if it threatens to interfere, the plain 
language of the contract allows the Illuminating Company to remove the tree.” 
Corrigan v. Illum. Co., 175 Ohio App.3d 360, 2008-Ohio-684, 887 N.E.2d 363, ¶ 
35-41 (Cooney, P.J., dissenting). 
{¶ 47} Therefore, I would affirm that part of the judgment of the appellate 
court that holds that jurisdiction to determine the issues raised in this case resides 
January Term, 2009 
15 
in the courts and not the PUCO, and I would reverse that portion of the judgment 
below that affirms the order granting a permanent injunction preventing the tree 
within the easement from being removed. 
__________________ 
 
Lester S. Potash, for appellees. 
 
Roetzel & Andress, Denise M. Hasbrook, Donald S. Scherzer, and Emily 
Ciecka Wilcheck, for appellant. 
______________________