Case Title: JESSEN v. BURRY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
JESSEN v. BURRY2000 WY 20813 P.3d 1118Case Number: 99-259Decided: 12/08/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
DENNIS JESSEN, 
Petitioner, v.RANDY BURRY and DEVOTA BURRY, d/b/a Diamond B Oilfield 
Service, d/b/a Diamond B. Casing, Respondents.

Writ of Certiorari 
Original Proceeding.

Dennis Jessen, 
Petitioner, Pro Se.Raymond D. Macchia of Patton & Davison, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Respondents.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY,* GOLDEN, and HILL, 
JJ.

* Retired June 2, 
2000.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] The 
conundrum presented by this case is how best to resolve an apparent conflict 
between the dollar amount limit on the jurisdiction of the county court1 and the requirement in the forcible 
entry and detainer statutes2 that a judgment be entered for the 
amount of rent due. The conflict is presented when the amount of rent claimed in 
the forcible entry and detainer action exceeds the dollar amount limit on the 
jurisdiction of the county court. Dennis Jessen (Jessen) filed an action for 
forcible entry and detainer in the county court, and the county court dismissed 
the case without prejudice because the Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer 
sought "an amount in excess of the monetary jurisdiction ($7,000.00) of this 
court." The Order Dismissing Case was entered in response to a Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Forcible Entry and Detainer Action, filed on behalf of Randy Burry 
and DeVota Burry (the Burrys). Jessen appealed the dismissal to the district 
court, and the district court entered an Order Affirming Dismissal for Failure 
to Meet the Jurisdictional Amount in the County Court. This Court then granted 
the Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. We reverse the Order Affirming 
Dismissal for Failure to Meet the Jurisdictional Amount in the County Court 
entered in the district court, and the Order

[¶2] Dismissing 
Case entered in the county court, and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.

[¶3] The 
Appellant's Brief in Writ of Certiorari From the District Court's August 16, 
1999, Order Affirming Dismissal for Failure to Meet the Jurisdictional Amount of 
County Court filed by Jessen offers this statement of the 
issues:

1. Was the amount sought 
in the complaint for Forcible entry & detainer action beyond the monetary 
jurisdiction of the court?

2. Was the court required 
to find amount of rent due, issue judgement [sic] for said amount and return 
possession of the property to Plaintiff?

[¶4] The 
Respondent's Brief, filed on behalf of the Burrys, states the issue 
as:

Whether the district 
court's decision affirming the county court's ruling dismissing the forcible 
entry and detainer action for lack of jurisdiction was proper under Wyoming 
law.

[¶5] Jessen 
commenced this action on May 27, 1999 when he filed a Complaint for Forcible 
Entry and Detainer in the County Court of Laramie County. Jessen sought relief 
in the form of a writ of restitution restoring the leased premises to him and 
judgment in the amount of $21,061.26 plus court costs of $50.00. The Burrys 
filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Forcible Entry and Detainer Action 
asserting among other grounds that the action was outside the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the county court because of the prayer for recovery in an amount 
exceeding $7,000.00. The Burrys relied upon the jurisdictional limits 
articulated in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-5-131(a) (Lexis 1999),3 and the county court entered its 
Order Dismissing Case without prejudice because an amount in excess of the 
court's monetary jurisdictional limit of $7,000.00 was sought. Jessen appealed 
the Order Dismissing Case to the district court, and that court affirmed the 
county court. Jessen then petitioned this Court seeking a writ of certiorari, 
and the petition was granted on October 7, 1999.

[¶6] Jessen's 
argument is premised upon his contention that the dismissal in the county court 
was improper because pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-5-131(a)(v), the county 
court is vested with exclusive original civil jurisdiction over "[a]ctions for 
forcible entry or detainer as provided by W.S. 1-21-1001 through 1-21-1016 * * 
*." The Burrys respond by reiterating their contention that because the monetary 
jurisdiction of the county court is limited to actions for amounts not exceeding 
$7,000.00 pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-5-131(a)(i), the action properly was 
dismissed as exceeding the subject matter jurisdiction of the county court. The 
Burrys assert that jurisdiction is properly found in the district court because, 
pursuant to Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 10, the district courts have original 
jurisdiction when no other court has exclusive 
jurisdiction.

[¶7] The 
controversy arises because of conflicting interpretations of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
5-5-131(a). When statutes appear to conflict, our charge is to attempt to 
harmonize them so as to give full effect to each. Cooper v. Town of Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 1200 (Wyo. 2000). We also endeavor to read statutes so that each word 
is afforded meaning and none is rendered superfluous. Basin Elec. Power Co-op. 
v. Bowen, 979 P.2d 503, 509 (Wyo. 1999).

[¶8] We perceive 
two solutions to this conundrum. One is suggested by the earlier case of Hurst 
v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943 (Wyo. 1963). In the Hurst case, this Court ruled that a 
justice of the peace court in an action for forcible entry and detainer could 
not enter judgment for an amount in excess of the constitutional monetary limit 
on its jurisdiction of $200.00. Id. at 950. In a separate action brought by the 
lessees against the lessor in district court, the lessor counterclaimed for rent 
in the amount of $600.00. Id. at 945. On appeal, the lessee contended that the 
district court could not award a judgment for rent because the lessor had split 
the cause of action by bringing the forcible entry and detainer action in the 
justice of the peace court. Id. at 947-48. The opinion 
explained:

The principal object of 
the statute under which this detainer action was brought was to give summary 
remedy against tenants who hold over after failure to pay rent and to save 
landlords from the need to resort to cumbersome, dilatory, and expensive suit in 
ejectment.

Id. at 949. The court 
then ruled that while an entry of judgment in the justice of the peace court in 
excess of $200.00 would clearly exceed the constitutional limit upon the 
monetary jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court, a finding of the 
correct amount of rent due would not violate the constitutional jurisdictional 
limit. Id. at 950. The court also ruled that the defense asserted that the 
lessor had split the cause of action was not available under the circumstances 
of that case. Id. at 949.

[¶9] Obviously, 
the Hurst case offers a solution to this problem that indeed would be 
appropriate. We could hold that the county court had jurisdiction under the 
statute; that it could not enter a judgment in excess of the amount of 
$7,000.00; but that it could clearly "find the amount of rent due and payable at 
the time of commencement of the action, together with the terms and conditions 
of the agreement between the parties in relation to the amount and time of 
payment of rent." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-1008(b). Jessen then could file an 
action in the district court for the purpose of collecting the balance of the 
rent due, and he would not be foreclosed by the prior judgment from the county 
court.

[¶10] The 
alternative solution would permit the county court to enter judgment for the 
full amount of the rent claimed and found to be due. The Laramie County Court 
read Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-5-131(a)(i) to the end that its jurisdiction in any 
action in which monetary relief was sought was limited to the sum of $7,000.00. 
It then ruled that it was without subject matter jurisdiction over a claim for 
monetary relief that exceeded $7,000.00. This was the reading of the statute 
that the district court followed.

[¶11] An 
examination of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-5-131(a) reveals that, in each of the 
subparagraphs describing the civil jurisdiction of the county court, the 
legislature reiterated the amount of $7,000.00 except in subparagraphs (iv) 
(relating to actions for small claims), and (v) (relating to actions for 
forcible entry or detainer as provided by Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-21-1001 through 
1-21-1016). That difference manifests an intention on the part of the 
legislature to resolve the problem first addressed in Hurst. It is obvious that 
if the $7,000.00 monetary limit provided in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-5-131(a)(i) 
applied to all of the following provisions, the repetition in other 
subparagraphs would be superfluous. We read our statutes to the end that no 
language is rendered superfluous. Basin Elec. Power Co-op., 979 P.2d  at 509. 
Since the monetary jurisdiction of the county court now is prescribed by statute 
rather than by a constitutional provision, we are not inhibited in the same 
fashion as the Hurst court was. We therefore hold that the $7,000.00 monetary 
jurisdictional limit that is set forth with respect to county courts applies 
only in those subparagraphs articulating jurisdiction in which the legislature 
specifically reiterated the amount.

[¶12] This 
resolution is compatible with efficiency and the conservation of judicial 
resources in accomplishing the purpose of this statute as articulated in Hurst. 
A requirement for a subsequent action in the district court in which the 
functions would be as much ministerial as adjudicative lends itself only to 
inefficient and duplicative utilization of judicial 
resources.

[¶13] We reverse 
the Order Affirming Dismissal for Failure to Meet the Jurisdictional Amount in 
the County Court, entered in the district court, and remand this case with 
instructions for the district court to reverse the Order Dismissing Case entered 
in the county court and order remand of the case to the county court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Footnotes

1 Pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 5-9-101 through 5-9-210 (Lexis Supp. 2000), effective July 1, 
2000, the county courts became circuit courts.

2 In the 
forcible entry and detainer statutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-1008 (Lexis 1999) 
provides for a judgment based on the finding of the amount of rent due and 
payable:

(a) If the 
action is not continued, the place of trial changed or if neither party demands 
a jury, upon the return day of the summons the justice shall try the action. If 
the justice concludes that the complaint is not true, he shall enter judgment 
against the plaintiff for costs. If he finds the complaint true, he shall render 
a general judgment in favor of the plaintiff for restitution of the premises and 
costs. If he finds the complaint true in part, he shall render judgment for 
restitution of that part only and the costs shall be taxed as deemed 
equitable.

(b) If the 
case is one based on failure to pay rent, the justice shall further find the 
amount of rent due and payable at the time of commencement of the action, 
together with the terms and conditions of the agreement between the parties in 
relation to the amount and time of payment of rent. If the trial is by jury the 
verdict shall contain a finding of these facts and the justice shall recite such 
findings in his docket entry of proceedings. The justice, upon these 
findings, in addition to entering judgment for the plaintiff to have 
restitution, shall render judgment in accordance with the findings for the 
amount of rent found due, together with costs, and shall issue execution 
separate from the writ of restitution for the rent found due and costs as in 
other actions.

(Emphasis added.)

3 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 5-5-131(a) reads:

(a) Each 
county court has exclusive original civil jurisdiction within the boundaries of 
the state for:

(i) An 
action where the prayer for recovery is an amount not exceeding seven thousand 
dollars ($7,000.00), exclusive of court costs;

(ii) Actions 
to recover specific personal property the value of which does not exceed seven 
thousand dollars ($7,000.00), exclusive of court costs and shall be prosecuted 
in accordance with W.S. 1-15-301 through 1-15-306;

(iii) 
Actions to foreclose or enforce a lien on or security interest in personal 
property perfected under the Uniform Commercial Code, W.S. 34.1-1-101 through 
34.1-10-104, when the amount claimed on the lien or security interest does not 
exceed seven thousand dollars ($7,000.00), exclusive of court 
costs;

(iv) Actions 
for small claims as provided by W.S. 1-21-201 through 
1-21-205;

(v) Actions 
for forcible entry or detainer as provided by W.S. 1-21-1001 through 
1-21-1016;

(vi) Actions 
to foreclose and enforce the following statutory liens only, when the amount 
claimed on the lien does not exceed seven thousand dollars ($7,000.00) exclusive 
of court costs:

(A) 
Construction liens as provided by W.S. 29-2-101 through 
29-2-109;

(B) Liens 
for labor and materials as provided by W.S. 29-4-101 through 
29-4-120;

(C) Liens 
for labor and services as provided by W.S. 29-5-101 through 29-5-106 and 
29-7-101 through 29-7-202; and

(D) Liens 
for taxes as provided by W.S. 39-15-108(d) and 
39-16-108(d).

(vii) 
Actions to dispose of an abandoned vehicle as provided by W.S. 31-13-112(e), 
regardless of the value of the abandoned vehicle.