Case Title: MARALEE A. HOLIDAY v. CRAIG D. HOLIDAY

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0160

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-01-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARALEE A. HOLIDAY v. CRAIG D. HOLIDAY2011 WY 12Case Number: No. S-10-0160Decided: 01/31/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

MARALEE 
A. HOLIDAY,Appellant (Defendant),v.CRAIG D. 
HOLIDAY,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Washakie County

The 
Honorable Robert E. Skar, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Robert 
W. Brown and Amanda K. Roberts of Lonabaugh and Riggs, LLP, Sheridan, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Wendy 
Press Sweeny, Worland, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  In this divorce action, the district 
court awarded Father primary custody of the parties' four children.  Mother appeals claiming the district 
court abused its discretion in declining to interview the oldest son about his 
preference to live with her and prohibiting Father's sister from testifying as 
to her opinion about which parent should have custody.  We conclude the district court erred in 
not considering the oldest son's preference and reverse.      

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]   Mother states the issues for this 
Court's determination as follows:

 
 
            
A.        The 
district court erred when it did not allow CBH to express his preferences 
regarding physical custody:

 
 
                        
i.          
Minor child's expression for custodial preference must be 
allowed;

 
 
                        
ii.         
The district court's interpretation of KES v. CAT, 2005 WY 29, 107 P.3d 779 
(Wyo. 2005) prevented the minor child from expressing his custodial preferences 
and prejudiced the Defendant.

 
 
            
B.        The 
district court erred when it would not allow Dawn Blanchard to give her opinion 
on the issue of who should have physical custody of the minor 
children.

 
 
Father 
asserts the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to 
interview the oldest son, declining to allow Ms. Blanchard to express her 
opinion about physical custody or awarding him custody of the children. 

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  Maralee A. Holiday (Mother) and Craig D. 
Holiday (Father) were married in Utah in 1996.  Four children, all boys, were born of 
the marriage.  Early in the 
marriage, Mother worked while Father completed school.  After the first child was born in 1999, 
Mother quit working to stay at home with him.  The other three children were born in 
2000, 2004 and 2008.  The family 
moved to Ten Sleep, Wyoming in 2007 after Father began working there.  In 2009, Father moved out of the marital 
home.

 
 
[¶4]  Shortly after he moved, Father filed a 
complaint for divorce.  He asked the 
district court to award the parties joint custody of the children.  Mother counterclaimed for divorce and 
sought custody of the children with visitation by Father and an order requiring 
him to pay child support.  Mother 
also filed a petition for temporary custody of the children, child support and 
possession of the marital home.  
After a hearing on Mother's petition, the district court entered an order 
awarding Mother temporary primary physical custody of the children and temporary 
possession of the marital home and requiring Father to pay child support.  The district court set the matter for 
trial in April 2010.  Prior to 
trial, in March of 2010, while attending a funeral in Utah, Mother decided not 
to return to Wyoming with the children but to remain in Utah where she would be 
closer to her family.    

 
 
[¶5]  In his pretrial memorandum, Father asked 
the district court to award joint legal custody and primary physical custody to 
him with liberal visitation by Mother if she returned to Ten Sleep.  Alternatively, he asked that he be 
awarded sole custody of the children with reasonable visitation by Mother.  In her pretrial memoranda, Mother 
renewed her request that primary physical custody be awarded to her.  Mother also designated two witnesses who 
are the focus of the issues raised on appeal:  the parties' oldest son, then 11 years 
old, and Father's sister, Dawn Blanchard.  
The son's witness designation stated as follows:

 
 
He 
resides with his mother . . . .  He 
has, in recent days, expressed a strong desire to speak with the Judge in the 
case and tell him his feelings as to where he would like to live primarily and 
the reasons why.  If he is allowed 
to speak with the Judge, [Mother] proposes that it take place in chambers, 
without either party being present, but only their attorneys being allowed to 
observe the conversation. 

 
 
The 
sister's designation stated she would testify concerning "her observations of 
the parties' interaction with the children, [Father's] plans to move to Utah if 
[Mother] were to move there with the minor children, and other matters 
pertaining to the issue of custody."  

 
 
[¶6]  On the morning of trial, Mother's 
counsel reiterated that the oldest son desired to speak with the judge.  He proposed the interview be conducted 
in the judge's chambers outside the presence of the parties with their attorneys 
present to hear what the boy said but not to ask questions or comment.  Citing KES, 2005 WY 29, 107 P.3d 779, Father's 
counsel responded that she had concerns about the son speaking with the judge 
and suggested the matter be discussed in chambers.  The district court stated it could not 
interview the child unless the parties agreed but left the matter for further 
discussion during the first break in the trial.    

 
 
[¶7]  The parties state that an unreported 
discussion did in fact take place during the break.  Mother asserts the district court 
decided during the discussion that it would not interview the child.  Father states the parties reached no 
agreement during the break to allow the court to interview the child, leaving 
Mother with the burden of coming up with an alternative method for presenting 
the child's preference. In any event, the trial continued after the break, and 
the transcript contains no further reference to the son speaking with the 
judge.  

 
 
[¶8]  Mother called Ms. Blanchard to testify 
during presentation of her case.  
Upon questioning by Mother's counsel, the following exchange 
occurred:

 
 
            
Q.        
Okay.  As you may know 
there's an issue or contest who should be the primary physical custodian of 
these children, in other words with whom should the children live 
primarily.  And I would ask you in 
your opinion who is the more appropriate person to have the primary physical 
custody of these children?

            
[Father's counsel]:  Your 
honor, I'm going to object to this witness testifying as to what is in the 
purview of the Court.  Number one, 
she's not an expert witness, two, there's no foundation for her testimony so we 
 and she only sees them twice a year, we would object to her testifying as to 
that conclusion.

            
****

            
[Mother's counsel]:  Your 
Honor, I'm not offering her as an expert in child custody matters, someone who 
has seen the children a total of 20 to 30 times, the children with their mother 
20 to 30 times, I'm merely asking who she thinks is the more appropriate person, 
her lay opinion is all I'm trying to elicit.

            
THE COURT:  I'm going to 
sustain the objection as the ultimate decision of this Court. 

 
 
On 
further questioning, Ms. Blanchard testified that she had witnessed both Mother 
and Father be wonderful parents to the children and had never witnessed Mother 
do anything that would be reason to take them away from her.  On cross-examination, she testified she 
likewise has never seen Father do anything that would justify him losing his 
children.    

 
 
[¶9]  After the trial, the district court 
issued a decision letter in which it concluded Father should have primary 
custody of the children.  The court 
entered a judgment and decree of divorce awarding him custody and ordering 
Mother to pay child support.  Mother 
timely appealed from the judgment and decree.   

    

 
 
 
 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]  We review district court determinations 
involving child interviews in custody proceedings for abuse of discretion.  KES, ¶ 22, 107 P.3d  at 786.  We likewise review district court 
rulings on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.  Comet Energy Servs., LLC v. Powder River Oil 
& Gas Ventures, LLC, 2010 WY 82 ¶ 10, 239 P.3d 382, 386 (Wyo. 
2010).  The ultimate question in 
determining whether an abuse of discretion has occurred is whether the district 
court reasonably could have concluded as it did.  Id.       

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 

1.    
Child 
Interview

 
 
[¶11]  Mother asserts the district court 
incorrectly interpreted KES as 
prohibiting it from interviewing the child once Father objected.  Father asserts that once he objected to 
the interview Mother had the burden of suggesting alternative procedures for 
presenting the child's preference.  
He contends she failed to meet that burden and simply failed to follow 
through with putting the child's preference before the district court.     

 
 
[¶12]  This Court has long held that a district 
court judge may interview a child to determine his or her preference for living 
with one or the other parent, provided that the child is of sufficient age to 
understand the effect of expressing a preference.   Douglas v. Sheffner, 331 P.2d 840, 844 
(Wyo. 1958), superseded by statute as 
recognized in In Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d 1369 (Wyo. 1990).  See also, Tytler v. Tytler, 15 Wyo. 319, 338, 89 P. 1, 6 (Wyo. 1907).  When a 
district court interviews a child, its decision should state the preference the 
child expressed and the extent to which it took the child's preference into 
consideration in arriving at a custody determination.  Douglas, 331 P.2d  at 845.  District courts should receive young 
children's statements with caution, keeping in mind that they may be easily 
influenced.  Id.  A child's expression of a preference is 
not conclusive.  Id. at 844.  Rather, a child's wishes are only one 
factor to be considered in determining custody.  Curless v. Curless, 708 P.2d 426, 429 
(Wyo. 1985).  However, consideration 
of a child's wishes aids the district court in making a custodial determination 
which is in the child's best interests.  
Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 
1290 (Wyo. 1993), quoting Yates v. 
Yates, 702 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Wyo. 1985).  A child's welfare is not served if his 
or her wishes are not considered by the district court.  Love, 851 P.2d  at 1291.  Though the child's preference is but one 
factor to consider, his or her preference should receive "serious 
consideration."  Id.

 
 
[¶13]  In cases like the present one where one 
parent objects to an interview, we have recognized due process implications if 
an interview is conducted without fashioning procedures to protect the parents' 
rights to be apprised of all of the evidence upon which the custody 
determination is based and have an opportunity to challenge or explain the 
child's statements.  KES, ¶ 16, 107 P.3d  at 784.  In KES, over the mother's objection, the 
district court conducted a private interview with a child.  On appeal, mother claimed the district 
court abused its discretion in conducting the interview.  We noted the procedure in place then, 
which allowed private interviews between a judge and a child in a custody 
proceedings but required the decision letter to reflect the child's preference 
and the weight it was given, did not protect the parents' due process 
rights.  We said:  

 
 
Under 
the current procedure, parents have no way of knowing the contents of the 
interview or of challenging the manner in which the interview was conducted or 
the reliability of the information revealed therein.

            
In order to ameliorate this problem, we hold that if one or both parents 
object to a private interview between the child and judge in a custody 
proceeding, no such interview should take place.  Rather, the parties or the district 
court should fashion a suitable alternate procedure for obtaining evidence of 
the child's custody preference.  In 
some instances, in-court testimony may be appropriate.  An interview with the child in chambers, 
either with counsel present or recorded in some fashion, may also suffice.  Additionally, a neutral third party may 
be appointed with the consent of the parties to speak with the child and to 
report to the court or to the parties.

 
 

Id., 
¶¶ 19-20, 107 P.3d  at 785.  We 
expressly stated the examples of procedures we provided in KES were not intended to be 
exhaustive.  To the 
contrary:

 
 
Because 
each custody case involves unique parties and circumstances, the parties or the 
district court may fashion any procedure that effectively protects the parents' 
due process rights and minimizes the stress and trauma to the child.  In doing so, the balance must weigh in 
favor of the child's best interests.  
Consequently, if the parties do 
not consent to a reasonable method of obtaining evidence of the child's 
preference, the court may conduct an interview in chambers, with counsel 
present, and with attention paid to the method most likely to preserve the 
parents' right to due process under the circumstances.   

 
 

Id., 
¶ 20, 107 P.3d  at 785 (emphasis added). We held the district court abused its 
discretion when it conducted a private interview with the child despite the 
mother's objection, reversed the custody determination and remanded for further 
proceedings.

 
 
[¶14]  As the above discussion makes clear, we 
did not hold in KES that no interview 
may occur unless both parents agree.  
Rather, we held that when a parent does not consent, the parties or the 
court should fashion a procedure that protects the parents' rights while 
minimizing the stress and trauma to the child with the balance weighing in favor 
of the child's best interests.  Id.  In the event the parents are not able to 
agree on a reasonable method of obtaining evidence of the child's preference, 
the district court may conduct an in-chamber interview with counsel present and 
with attention to protecting the parents' due process rights.  Id.  

 
 
[¶15]  In the present case, the result of 
Father's objection was that the district court did not consider the son's 
preference.  That is contrary to the 
rule in Wyoming that the child's expression of a preference must be 
considered.  The appropriate course 
of action upon Father's objection was for the parties or the district court to 
come up with a suitable procedure for obtaining the evidence of his 
preference.  Mother suggested an 
in-chambers interview with counsel present.  If Father objected to her suggestion and 
the parties were unable to agree on another reasonable method of obtaining the 
evidence, the district court could have conducted the interview in chambers with 
counsel, recorded the interview, required the child to testify in court, 
appointed a neutral third party to speak with the child and report back to the 
parties and the court, or fashioned another suitable procedure for presenting 
the evidence.  By not fashioning any 
procedure, not obtaining the evidence and consequently not considering the 
child's preference, the district court abused its discretion.          

 
 
 
 

2.    
Disallowing 
Ms. Blanchard's Opinion Testimony

 
 
[¶16]  Mother contends the district court erred 
in refusing to allow Ms. Blanchard to testify as to her opinion about which 
parent should have custody of the children.  Mother asserts that such lay opinion 
testimony is permitted under W.R.E. 704 even if it relates to an ultimate 
issue.  She contends the district 
court erred in excluding the testimony based upon an ultimate issue 
analysis.  

 
 
[¶17]  Father asserts any error in prohibiting 
the testimony was harmless because Ms. Blanchard ultimately testified that she 
thought both parents were good parents and had not seen either one of them do 
anything that would justify taking the children away from them.  Father also contends the district court 
properly disallowed Ms. Blanchard's opinion testimony because she testified that 
she saw Mother only two to three times per year; therefore, there was 
insufficient foundation for her to express an opinion.  Given her limited involvement with 
Mother, Father contends, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
sustaining the objection to her expressing an opinion about which parent should 
have custody of the children.  

 
 
[¶18]  W.R.E. 704 
provides:

 
 
Rule 
704.  Opinion on ultimate 
issue.

 
 
            
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is 
not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the 
trier of fact.

 

This 
Court has recognized that Rule 704 is designed to permit opinion evidence on an 
ultimate issue.  Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 66 (Wyo. 
1989), overruled on other grounds by 
Large v. State, 2008 WY 22, ¶ 30, 177 P.3d 807, 816 (Wyo. 2008).  We have said that Rule 704 in effect 
abolishes the "ultimate issue" objection.  
Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 66, 
citing Reed v. Hunter, 663 P.2d 513 
(Wyo. 1983).  We also have said:     

 
 
            
It was the intent of the framers of the Rules of Evidence to considerably 
relax the prohibition against receipt of opinion testimony both by expert and 
lay witnesses.  Generally, the rules 
should be liberally construed to allow the admission of such evidence.  Yet, on occasion, we recognize that 
certain opinion evidence may not be helpful or may have a potential for such 
mischief that it ought to be rejected.   

 
 

McCabe 
v. R.A. Manning Construction Company, 
674 P.2d 699, 705 (Wyo. 1983). 

 
 
[¶19]  We have not previously addressed 
ultimate issue opinion testimony in the context of a custody determination.  In Reed, homeowners brought an action 
against an insurance company for breach of contract or negligence in denying 
coverage after their home burned.  
At trial, the homeowners presented an expert witness who testified that 
in his opinion the insurance company "blew it" with respect to their insurance 
coverage.  On appeal, this Court 
found no error in the district court's decision to allow the witness to state 
his opinion concerning the ultimate issue.  
Reed, 663 P.2d  at 
518.

 
 
[¶20]  In McCabe, a contractor sued a property 
owner for the balance allegedly due on an oral construction contract.  One of the primary issues in the case 
was whether the parties abandoned the original cost-plus agreement and entered 
into a new fixed price contract.  
The property owner sought to introduce evidence that an architect he had 
employed on the project and who was present at the meeting when the parties 
allegedly discussed the new agreement was of the opinion that the parties 
abandoned the original agreement and entered into a new one.  McCabe, 674 P.2d  at 704.  The district court did not allow the 
opinion testimony.  This Court held 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the 
testimony.  Among the factors we 
considered in reaching that result were: the architect was employed by the 
property owner, helped in the preparation of his case and may have been biased 
in his favor; the issue of whether the parties made a new agreement was hotly 
contested; and the testimony of the parties as to what transpired at their 
meeting, what was said and what occurred, was clear and understandable and more 
than sufficient for the jury to reach its determination.  Id. at 705-06.

 
 
[¶21]  In the present case, the district court 
sustained the objection to the witness expressing her opinion as to who the more 
appropriate parent was to have primary custody of the child, stating that was a 
determination ultimately for the court to make.  While an ultimate issue objection is not 
an appropriate ground for excluding opinion testimony in light of Rule 704, the 
decision whether to admit or exclude evidence is within the district court's 
discretion.  WRE 701 allows a lay 
witness to testify in the form of an opinion if the opinion is:  1) rationally based on the perception of 
the witness and 2) helpful to understanding the witness's testimony or 
determining a fact in issue.  We 
conclude from the record before us the district court could have exercised its 
discretion to exclude the testimony on one of these grounds.  Although the district court phrased its 
ruling in terms of the ultimate issue, it seems just as likely it concluded Ms. 
Blanchard's opinion would not be helpful.  

 
 
[¶22]  We also are not persuaded Mother was 
prejudiced by the exclusion of Ms. Blanchard's opinion testimony.  Had the district court allowed her to 
testify which parent she thought should have custody of the children, it seems 
unlikely the result would have been different.  Although the district court did not hear 
her opinion, it likely surmised what her opinion was from the fact that she was 
Mother's witness and Mother sought to present the opinion testimony.  Under these circumstances, any error in 
excluding the testimony was harmless.  

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]  The district court abused its discretion 
in not considering the oldest child's preference for living with one parent over 
the other parent.  Any error in the 
exclusion of the sister's opinion testimony was harmless.  The custody order is reversed and the 
case is remanded for the parties or, if they remain unable to agree, the 
district court to fashion a method for presenting evidence of the oldest son's 
preference.  In the event the 
parties are unable to agree on an appropriate method, the district court may 
interview the child in the presence of the parties' attorneys, conduct a 
recorded interview or fashion another procedure protecting the parties' due 
process rights.  The parties shall 
then have the opportunity to challenge, rebut or explain the 
evidence.

 
 
[¶24]  Reversed and remanded for proceedings in 
accordance with this opinion.