Case Title: Brockway v. Brockway

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-11

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Brockway v. Brockway1996 WY 110921 P.2d 1104Case Number: 96-11Decided: 08/20/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Keith B. BROCKWAY,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Mary M. 
BROCKWAY,

 Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from The District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

S. Gregory 
Thomas of Patton & Davison, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Mary M. 
Brockway, appellee pro se.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice effective 
July 1, 1996.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      Keith B. Brockway 
(husband) appeals the district court's order on husband's declaratory judgment 
action to determine the meaning of the divorce decree provision "[wife] shall 
receive one-half (1/2) of [husband's] Air Force retirement." The district court 
ruled the phrase was not ambiguous and meant that Mary M. Brockway (wife) was 
entitled to one-half of husband's full retirement, including that portion 
attributable to his post-divorce Air Force service and that portion attributable 
to his Air Force service before the marriage. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant Keith 
B. Brockway states the issues as follows:

A.        Whether the 
language in the parties' property settlement agreement concerning the division 
of defendant's retirement, and the decree of divorce which incorporated said 
language, are ambiguous so as to permit the district court to consider extrinsic 
evidence and construe the meaning of the language.

B.        If the 
language is ambiguous, what is the proper construction of the 
language.

C.        Whether the 
district court had the authority to award plaintiff retirement which had not 
been earned by the defendant as of the date of the decree of 
divorce.

[¶3]      Appellee Mary M. 
Brockway states the issues in her pro se brief as follows:

A.        Whether the 
language in the parties' property settlement agreement concerning the division 
of defendant's retirement and the divorce decree which incorporated the 
language, are ambiguous so as to permit the consideration of extrinsic evidence 
and construe the meaning by the District Court.

B.        The 
Property Settlement Agreement is a written contract which meaning should be 
derived on its face.

FACTS

[¶4]      The husband 
joined the Air Force in November of 1974 and married his wife on June 9, 1977. 
The divorce decree at issue in this case was filed on February 2, 1990. The 
husband retired from the Air Force in October of 1994. The pertinent language in 
the property settlement agreement and subsequent divorce decree, incorporating 
the agreement, provides that the wife shall receive one-half of the husband's 
Air Force retirement.

[¶5]      In October, 1994, 
husband retired from the Air Force. He received the full amount of his 
retirement until May, 1995. Since then, U.S. Department of Defense, Defense 
Finance and Accounting Service, has sent each party one-half of the husband's 
Air Force retirement, based on the divorce decree. On April 10, 1995, the 
husband filed a declaratory judgment action, which he amended on May 19, 1995, 
asking the district court to interpret the language in the divorce decree. On 
December 1, 1995, the district court entered an order, ruling that the language 
of the decree was not ambiguous and the wife is entitled to one-half of 
husband's Air Force retirement. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶6]      The husband 
brought a declaratory judgment action to determine the meaning of a paragraph in 
the parties' divorce decree pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 1-37-103 (1988). Our review 
of orders and judgments entered in declaratory judgment proceedings is the same 
as in other civil actions. WYO. STAT. § 1-37-109 (1988). The husband argues that 
the divorce decree and the property settlement agreement which it incorporated 
are ambiguous; that his wife drafted the agreement and the ambiguous language 
should be interpreted against its drafter. Finally, he asserts that if the 
language is not ambiguous, then the district court did not have authority to 
distribute his retirement income earned after the divorce.

[¶7]      Whether a written 
instrument is ambiguous is a question of law for the courts to decide. Mountain 
View/Evergreen Imp. & Serv. Dist. v. Casper Concrete Co., 912 P.2d 529, 532 
(Wyo. 1996); Smith v. Nugget Exploration, Inc., 857 P.2d 320, 323 (Wyo. 1993). 
When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, we apply well-established 
principles which were summarized in Amoco Production Co. v. Stauffer Chemical 
Co. of Wyoming, 612 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1980):

Our basic purpose in 
construing or interpreting a contract is to determine the intention and 
understanding of the parties. If the contract is in writing and the language is 
clear and unambiguous, the intention is to be secured from the words of the 
contract. And the contract as a whole should be considered, with each part being 
read in light of all other parts. The interpretation and construction is done by 
the court as a matter of law.

If the contract is 
ambiguous, resort may be had to extrinsic evidence. An ambiguous contract "is an 
agreement which is obscure in its meaning, because of indefiniteness of 
expression, or because a double meaning is present." Ambiguity justifying 
extraneous evidence is not generated by the subsequent disagreement of the 
parties concerning its meaning.

Carlson v. Water 
Unlimited, Inc., 822 P.2d 1278, 1281 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Amoco, 612 P.2d  at 465 
(citations omitted)).

[¶8]  WYO. STAT. § 20-2-114 (1994)1 requires the trial court to make 
"such disposition of the property of the parties as appears just and equitable. 
. . ." We review the trial court's disposition of property under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Harkins v. Harkins, 917 P.2d 176, 177 (Wyo. 1996); 
Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 820 (Wyo. 1984).

DISCUSSION

[¶9]      The husband 
argues that the language in the divorce decree which states "[t]he [wife] shall 
receive one half (1/2) of the [husband's] Air Force retirement" is ambiguous. 
The husband claims there are three possible ways to read the language and he 
intended his wife to receive one-half of the retirement he earned while the 
parties were married. The husband asserts: 

The possible meanings of 
the phrase are threefold: (1) that Appellee is awarded one-half of Appellant's 
retirement earned during the marriage; (2) that Appellee is awarded 
one-half of Appellant's retirement accrued as of the date of divorce; or 
(3) that Appellee is awarded one-half of Appellant's retirement earned up to 
the time of his retirement.

[¶10]   The husband argues that he intended 
the first meaning, that his wife receive only one-half of the retirement he 
earned while they were married, when he signed the property settlement 
agreement. The wife argues that she intended to receive one-half of her 
husband's retirement. Disagreement by the parties concerning the decree's 
meaning does not make the language ambiguous. Carlson, 822 P.2d  at 1281. We 
affirm the district court's determination that the language is not ambiguous. It 
is not obscure or indefinite, nor does it hold a double meaning. Id. The decree 
awarded one-half of the husband's retirement to the wife and she is receiving 
one-half of the husband's monthly retirement check from the appropriate federal 
agency. Clearly, if the husband wanted to limit payment of his retirement to 
that earned during the marriage, he could have, and should have, said that in 
the property settlement agreement which the district court incorporated in its 
decree. Since we hold that the decree is not ambiguous, we need not address the 
husband's arguments concerning interpretation of an ambiguous 
contract.

[¶11]   Finally, the husband argues that 
the district court did not have the authority to distribute any retirement 
benefits he had not yet earned at the time of the divorce. In Broadhead v. 
Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 737 (Wyo. 1987), this Court determined that retirement 
benefits which would vest in the future were subject to property division in a 
divorce action. We also held that if possible and practicable, the trial court 
should allocate the retirement fund at the time of the divorce in order to sever 
the ties of the parties so that they may start their lives anew. Id. at 739. The 
trial court in Broadhead left the allocation open for later determination, 
depending on whether the husband terminated his employment or retired. Id. at 
733. If the husband retired, the wife would receive non-vested future employer 
contributions to the husband's retirement plan. Id. If the husband terminated 
his employment, the wife received only the vested employee contributions. Id. 
Broadhead adopted an approach to property settlement resolution which "reflects 
this state's predominant policy interest in the clear and timely finalization 
and severance of the marriage ties, except where either minimal remaining 
maturity time might remain, or practical economics prohibit any divorce time 
distribution or economic division." Broadhead, 737 P.2d  at 737 (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). The court found no uncontrollable reason for 
requiring a future allocation of the retirement fund, noting the husband 
requested a present division and was willing to undertake the accounting 
necessary to determine the reasonable value of the expectancy interest in the 
unvested portion of his retirement fund. Id. at 739.

[¶12]   We have no such request here. In 
fact, based on the limited assets discernable from the record, we find that it 
was probably impracticable to conduct a present division of the retirement fund 
at the time of the divorce, or a lump sum payment from the retirement fund at 
the time of retirement. Further, the parties agreed to the property distribution 
in their property settlement agreement. Therefore, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by making a fixed and certain percentage of husband's 
monthly retirement income payable to wife upon husband's retirement from the Air 
Force. See Broadhead, 737 P.2d  at 739. "It has been stated numerous times that 
the trial court has great discretion in marital property settlement, and that a 
trial court's discretion will not be disturbed except on clear grounds where an 
error of law is committed by the court under the circumstances." Id. at 737. 
"Given that this court cannot constitute itself as a court of first instance to 
divide property in divorce cases, we rely on the learned discretion of the trial 
court." Id. at 739.

CONCLUSION

[¶13]   The language in the divorce decree 
awarding the wife one-half of the husband's retirement was not ambiguous, nor 
was the award contrary to our policy interest in severing the marriage ties when 
a division of the retirement fund at the time of the divorce is impractical and 
the parties agreed to the division in a property settlement agreement. We 
affirm.

FOOTNOTE

1 WYO. STAT. § 20-2-114 
(1994) has not been changed since 1982 and is the same statute that was in 
effect at the time of the divorce in 1990. WYO. STAT. § 
20-2-114(1994).