Case Title: State v. Akins

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC10-896

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2011-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-896 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
MICHAEL EUGENE AKINS,  
Respondent. 
 
[May 26, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Second 
District Court of Appeal in Akins v. State, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D43 (Fla. 2d DCA 
Dec. 30, 2009).  In its decision the district court ruled upon the following question, 
which the court certified to be of great public importance: 
IF A DEFENDANT HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE A HABITUAL 
OFFENDER BEFORE THE IMPOSITION OF HIS INITIAL SPLIT 
SENTENCE, WHEN THE DEFENDANT LATER VIOLATES 
PROBATION AND HAS HIS PROBATION REVOKED, DOES 
THE DEFENDANT LOSE HIS STATUS AS A HABITUAL 
OFFENDER IF THE TRIAL COURT DOES NOT REPEAT THIS 
STATUS AT THE SENTENCING HEARING ON VIOLATION OF 
PROBATION? 
 
 
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Id. at D45.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the reasons 
expressed below, we answer the certified question in the affirmative. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On January 18, 1991, in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and 
for Pinellas County, Florida, Michael Eugene Akins was adjudicated guilty of the 
sale and possession of cocaine, a second-degree felony, and sentenced as a habitual 
felony offender1 (HFO) to thirty years in prison for the following reasons: 
                                          
 
 
1.  Pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1991), a habitual felony 
offender is defined as: 
(1) As used in this act: 
(a) “Habitual felony offender” means a defendant for whom the 
court may impose an extended term of imprisonment, as provided in 
this section, if it finds that: 
1. The defendant has previously been convicted of any 
combination of two or more felonies in this state or other qualified 
offenses; 
2. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was 
committed within 5 years of the date of the conviction of the last prior 
felony or other qualified offense of which he was convicted, or within 
5 years of the defendant's release, on parole or otherwise, from a 
prison sentence or other commitment imposed as a result of a prior 
conviction for a felony or other qualified offense, whichever is later; 
3. The defendant has not received a pardon for any felony or 
other qualified offense that is necessary for the operation of this 
section; and 
4. A conviction of a felony or other qualified offense necessary 
to the operation of this section has not been set aside in any post-
conviction proceeding. 
 
 
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[I]n ‟75 and ‟84 and ‟87, he had three felonies.  The ‟75 felony was a 
grand theft.  The ‟84 was a sale and possession.  The ‟87 was a sale 
and possession of marijuana.  His other prior record was a dealing in 
stolen property.  That was it.  But he classified because of the three 
prior felonies. 
Akins received a true split sentence, under which he was to serve the first 
twenty-years of his sentence in prison, and the remaining portion as a suspended 
sentence to be satisfied by probation.  The Second District affirmed Akins‟ 
judgment and sentence on direct appeal.  See Akins v. State, 591 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 
2d DCA 1991). 
 
After serving twelve years, Akins was released from prison in 2003.  
Subsequently, Akins committed technical violations of his probation twice by 
testing positive for cocaine.  The first violation occurred on July 15, 2003.  On 
September 26, 2003, Akins entered an admission to a charge of violation of 
probation (VOP) and the court continued him on probation.  As part of the court 
order, Akins entered the Goodwill rehabilitation treatment program.  According to 
the Department of Corrections (DOC) reports, Akins performed well and 
consistently tested negative for cocaine.  During this time, Akins completed the 
program, did not commit any new law violations, and made continual payments as 
required by the terms of his probation.  The State filed an affidavit of VOP, which 
Akins did not contest.  The second violation occurred on June 11, 2004, when 
Akins was arrested after again testing positive for cocaine.  Initially, Akins denied 
 
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the allegations, but on October 1, 2004, Akins entered a plea withdrawing his prior 
denial and entering an admission to the VOP charge. 
On November 19, 2004, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing.  
During the sentencing hearing, Akins‟ defense counsel presented mitigation and 
referred to Akins‟ designation as an HFO.  Defense counsel acknowledged that 
“Mr. Miglore [the prosecutor] [is] going to ask for the maximum, 10 years.”  
Akins‟ probation officer recommended that Akins be placed on community control 
for two years for the VOP.  Defense counsel then stated, “I‟m asking the court for 
an appropriate punishment and I‟m asking the court to consider several factors.  
First of all, the nature of his habitualization.”  Defense counsel asked the court to 
either terminate Akins‟ probation, or alternatively, to follow the recommendation 
of Akins‟ probation officer of two years community control.  The prosecutor 
directed the court‟s attention to the transcript of the hearing held on September 26, 
2003, on the prior VOP and the colloquy that transpired between the court and 
Akins.  The prosecutor asked the court to enforce the deal that Akins made with 
the State during that hearing.  The 2003 colloquy proceeded as follows: 
THE COURT:  You‟re familiar with the transcript of the last time that 
you were before the Court before you changed your plea? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  True, sir. 
. . . . 
 
THE COURT:  We acknowledged that you had been sentenced to 30 
years.  We acknowledged that you did 20. 
 
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THE DEFENDANT:  True, sir. 
 . . . . 
 
THE COURT:  Correct? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT:  All right.  And then I said, “You are 50 years old.” 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT:  And I said, “You are too old for that.” 
 
And you responded, “Yes, Sir.” 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  True. 
 
THE COURT:  I said, “We are going to give you one last chance.” 
 
You said, “Thank you, sir.” 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  True. 
 
THE COURT:  I said, “Dabble in drugs and you are going to do the 
last 10.”  Do you remember that? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT:  You answered, “Thank you, sir.” 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT:  I asked this question on page 10, line 14:  “Do you 
have any doubt that I will not impose that 10 years for you?” 
 
You answered, “No.” 
 
 
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I said, “I mean, you come back here on another dirty urine or I find 
out that you‟re doing something else unlawful, then we just say good-
bye,” right? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  True, sir. 
 
THE COURT:  And you said, “I appreciate it.” 
 
Akins acknowledged that the court gave him a fair warning at the 2003 
sentencing hearing.  He also acknowledged that the court told him if he tested 
positive for cocaine again, “we‟re going to say good-bye.”  Notwithstanding 
Akins‟ acknowledgment of the fair warning, the trial court decided not to impose 
the full balance of the suspended portion of Akins‟ original sentence.  The trial 
court explained: 
THE COURT:  I am going to take into consideration the fact that 
you‟ve entered a plea. 
. . . . 
THE COURT:  I‟m also going to take into consideration that the 
Department of Corrections is probably going to take away some of the 
gain time that you might have got on that additional -- the first 20 
years.  They‟re probably going to take some time away that you 
thought you had earned. 
. . . . 
THE COURT:  So what I‟m going to do is I‟m going to sentence you 
to five years.  And I‟m going to give you credit for the time that 
you‟ve served on the charge of violation of probation. 
The trial court found that Akins was entitled to 239 days credit for time served in 
the county jail since his arrest on the first VOP.  The judge went on to state: 
 
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THE COURT:  [T]he only reason I didn‟t give you the 10 is because I 
know that that [Department of Corrections] is going to take some 
[gain] time away from you on that 20 years that you‟ve already 
served. That‟s the way they work.  And I don‟t control the Department 
of Corrections, so I‟m trying to give you some equity here.  But I‟m 
also letting you know that you‟ve had your last chance the last time.  
So you -- in effect, out of the 10 years that you had, I‟ve imposed five. 
. . . .  
THE COURT:  And we‟re just going to leave it go at that. 
 . . . . 
THE COURT:  And you‟re not any longer going to be on probation.  
So when you get out of prison, you are on your own. 
That same day, the trial court filed a judgment adjudicating Akins guilty of 
the violation of probation.  At that time, the sentencing order did not contain any 
language regarding Akins‟ designation as an HFO. 
 
Subsequently, Akins filed a motion seeking additional jail credit.  On 
February 7, 2005, the trial court amended Akins‟ sentence to allow 270 days, 
instead of 239 days, of credit for time served. 
On April 29, 2005, on its own motion, the trial court amended the judgment 
to adjudicate Akins as an HFO.  The amended judgment reflects the following: 
* The defendant is adjudicated a habitual felony offender and is 
sentenced to an extended term in accordance with the provision of 
775.084(4)(a), Florida Statutes.  *amended 4/29/05 per court order 
dated 4/22/05. 
On November 20, 2005, Akins filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct 
judgment and sentence pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850, 
 
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3.800(a), and 3.800(b) in the trial court.  On January 16, 2006, Akins filed an 
amended motion to vacate, set aside, or correct judgment and sentence.  Akins 
alleged that it was illegal to sentence him as an HFO because there was no oral 
pronouncement or written judgment made at his VOP sentencing designating him 
as an HFO and that his due process rights were violated because he was not present 
when the amendment was made. 
Akins also filed an appeal in the Second District, seeking review of his 
3.800(a) motion and filed a motion seeking review of a nonappealable rule 
3.800(c) order.  See Akins v. State, 926 So. 2d 412, 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).  
Akins alleged that the amendment of his sentence offended double jeopardy.  Id. at 
413.  The Second District concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review Akins‟ 
double jeopardy claim because Akins‟ motion to mitigate and his appeal from the 
denial of the motion were filed before the amended sentence was rendered.  Id.  
Moreover, the Second District concluded that the record did not establish that 
Akins first challenged the amendment in the trial court.  Id.  Thus, the Second 
District dismissed the appeal without prejudice to his right to raise the issue in a 
rule 3.800(a) motion.  See id.   
On June 18, 2007, the trial court ordered the State to respond to Akins‟ 
January 16, 2006, amended rule 3.850 motion.  Later, on October 29, 2007, the 
trial court entered its final order denying defendant‟s amended motion to vacate, 
 
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set aside, or correct judgment and sentence.  In its order, the trial court 
acknowledged that it did not “specifically announce that the Defendant‟s sentence 
was as an HFO.”  However, the trial court explained that “a sentencing judge was 
not required to use the magic words „habitual felony offender‟ in order to 
effectuate a legal sentence where it was obvious from the record that the trial court 
found that the defendant qualified as an HFO and intended to and did impose an 
HFO sentence.”  The trial court concluded that “the fact that the Court 
acknowledged the Defendant‟s original HFO sentence and then sentenced him 
accordingly demonstrates that this Court‟s intention was to sentence the Defendant 
as an HFO.”   
On November 29, 2007, Akins filed a notice of appeal in the trial court 
regarding the final order summarily denying his motion to vacate, set aside, or 
correct judgment and sentence.  On December 18, 2007, Akins, through collateral 
counsel, filed his initial brief in the Second District.  In his initial brief, Akins 
alleged that the trial court erred in denying Akins‟ amended motion to vacate, set 
aside, or correct judgment and sentence because (1) Akins‟ sentence was illegal 
and he was entitled to have the HFO designation removed from his sentence; (2) 
the subsequent imposition of the HFO status amounted to a double jeopardy 
violation under this Court‟s decision in Ashley v. State (Ashley II), 850 So. 2d 
1265, 1267 (Fla. 2003); (3) the subsequent imposition of the HFO status is 
 
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inconsistent with the decisions in White v. State, 892 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2005), and Evans v. State, 675 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); (4) Akins is 
distinguishable from O‟Neal v. State, 862 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); (5) the 
trial court‟s amendments to Akins‟ sentence did not amount to the mere ministerial 
function of correcting a scrivener‟s error; and (6) the trial court‟s failure to make 
specific oral or written findings precluded the subsequent amendment to Akins‟ 
judgment and sentence designating him as an HFO.  On November 7, 2008, the 
Second District per curiam affirmed the trial court‟s denial.  See Akins v. State, 
996 So. 2d 860, 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (table).  Akins filed a motion for 
rehearing or clarification in the Second District, which was denied on December 9, 
2008.   
 
On December 15, 2008, Akins, pro se, filed a motion to correct sentence 
pursuant to rule 3.800(a) in the trial court.  Akins alleged that (1) it was illegal to 
retroactively sentence him as an HFO because there was no oral pronouncement or 
written judgment made at the time of his sentencing designating him as an HFO; 
(2) the April 29, 2005, amendment to his judgment adjudicating him as an HFO 
offended double jeopardy; and (3) the trial court‟s actions denied him due process 
because neither he nor his attorney was provided notice or an opportunity to 
respond to the amendment.  On December 30, 2008, the trial court issued an order 
denying Akins‟ motion to correct sentence.  The trial court found that the claim 
 
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was barred by res judicata and the law of the case doctrine because the trial court 
had previously heard and denied an identical claim from Akins.  The trial court 
further found that the claim was barred because, on appeal, the Second District per 
curiam affirmed the trial court‟s previous denial of Akins‟ identical motion.  See 
Akins, 996 So. 2d at 860.  The mandate issued on January 15, 2009.   
On January 8, 2009, Akins, pro se, filed a Notice of Appeal in the trial court, 
appealing the denial of his motion.  In his initial brief, he argued that the trial court 
erred in denying his pro se Motion to Correct Sentence, which was filed in the trial 
court on December 15, 2008.  Akins maintained that the trial court‟s amendment to 
his judgment, designating him as an HFO, was illegal, offended double jeopardy, 
and denied him due process.  He alleged that the increase in his designation gave 
the DOC the authority to forfeit 2673 days of earned gain-time.   
This time, the Second District reversed the trial court‟s denial and held that 
Akins‟ sentence was illegal because the trial court failed to announce that the 
sentence imposed on the VOP remained an HFO designation.  See Akins, 35 Fla. 
L. Weekly at D44.  The Second District relied on this Court‟s decision in Ashley II 
and the Fourth District‟s decision in Evans, which was approved by this Court‟s 
decision in Ashley II, in concluding that modification of Akins‟ sentence in 2005 
offended double jeopardy.  See Akins, 35 Fla. L. Weekly at D44.  Noting that the 
issue in Akins was not identical to Ashley II and that it appeared to be in conflict 
 
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with Mann v. State, 851 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), the Second District 
reversed and remanded the trial court‟s order denying Akins‟ December 15, 2008, 
motion to correct sentence and certified the aforementioned question as one of 
great public importance.  See Akins, 35 Fla. L. Weekly at D45.  
 
Pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330, the State filed a 
timely motion for rehearing with attachments on January 14, 2010.  The State 
raised the following arguments: (1) the Second District overlooked that Akins 
previously raised an identical claim which the Second District denied in Akins, 996 
So. 2d 860 (table); (2) collateral estoppel barred successive review of Akins‟ 
claim; (3) Akins‟ case did not contain a manifest injustice that would except it 
from collateral estoppel; (4) double jeopardy was not offended by the amendment 
because Akins had no expectation of finality regarding his sentence; (5) the Second 
District overlooked that double jeopardy does not apply to sentencing in a 
noncapital case where the sentence has been challenged; (6) the Second District 
overlooked that Akins was distinguishable from Ashley II and Evans; (7) 
sentencing a prisoner in a noncapital case pursuant to the habitual offender statute 
does not implicate double jeopardy concerns; (8) Akins received the enhanced 
punishment because of his recidivism, so neither due process nor double jeopardy 
were implicated; (9) neither the federal nor the state proscription against double 
jeopardy precluded clarification of Akins‟ designation as an HFO; and (10) the 
 
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Second District failed to consider the trial court‟s reference to Akins‟ original 
status as an HFO during the sentencing.  On January 25, 2010, Akins, pro se, 
timely filed a response to the state‟s motion for rehearing.  On April 22, 2010, the 
Second District denied rehearing without elaboration.     
 
On May 10, 2010, the State filed a Motion to Stay Mandate in the Second 
District.  On May 19, 2010, the Second District granted the motion and stayed 
issuance of the Second District‟s mandate until July 15, 2010.   
 
Meanwhile, on May 11, 2010, the State filed a Notice to Invoke 
Discretionary Jurisdiction in this Court.  This Court granted the State‟s motion to 
stay regarding the proceedings below on June 1, 2010.  The order to stay was 
issued on June 10, 2010.  That same day, this Court accepted jurisdiction and 
required only merits briefing.  This review followed. 
ANALYSIS 
Alleged Procedural Bars 
 
The State contends that the law of the case doctrine and collateral estoppel 
barred the Second District from addressing this claim below.  We disagree.  Under 
Florida law, appellate courts have “the power to reconsider and correct erroneous 
rulings [made in earlier appeals] in exceptional circumstances and where reliance 
on the previous decision would result in manifest injustice.”  Muehlman v. State, 3 
So. 3d 1149, 1165 (Fla. 2009) (alteration in original) (recognizing this Court‟s 
 
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authority to revisit a prior ruling if that ruling was erroneous) (quoting Parker v. 
State, 873 So. 2d 270, 278 (Fla. 2004)); see State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1121 
(Fla. 2004) (same); Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270, 278 (Fla. 2004) (same); see 
also Fla. Dep‟t of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 106 (Fla. 2001) (“[A]n 
appellate court has the power to reconsider and correct an erroneous ruling that has 
become the law of the case where a prior ruling would result in a „manifest 
injustice.‟ ” (quoting Strazulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1965))).  Because 
we conclude that the trial court‟s subsequent imposition of an HFO designation to 
Akins‟ judgment and sentence violated double jeopardy and amounted to an illegal 
sentence, we also conclude that the Second District was proper in addressing 
Akins‟ claim to correct his illegal sentence. 
The Certified Question 
 “A double jeopardy claim based upon undisputed facts presents a pure 
question of law and is reviewed de novo.”  Pizzo v. State, 945 So. 2d 1203, 1206 
(Fla. 2006).   
An illegal sentence is “one that imposes a punishment or penalty that no 
judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes and laws could impose under 
any set of factual circumstances.”  Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600, 602 (Fla. 
2007); see also State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 289 (Fla. 2003).  In the instant 
 
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case, we address a sentence that violates double jeopardy by a postsentencing 
enhancement that is clear from the record and is thus illegal.   
The federal proscription against double jeopardy provides: “[N]or shall any 
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” 
amend. V, U.S. Const.  Similarly, Florida‟s proscription against double jeopardy 
provides: “No person shall be . . . twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.”  Art. 
I, § 9, Fla. Const.  Generally, both the federal and state proscriptions apply to 
criminal cases and provide three separate constitutional protections: (1) they 
protect against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) they 
protect against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) 
they protect against multiple punishments for the same offense.  See Delemos v. 
State, 969 So. 2d 544, 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (citing United States v. 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980)).   
In the instant case, our focus is on the third type of constitutional 
protection— protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.  This 
protection is the genesis for the general rule that once a sentence has been imposed, 
the sentencing hearing has ended, and the defendant has begun to serve his 
sentence, the sentence may not thereafter be made more onerous, such as by 
extending the term of imprisonment.  See, e.g., Troupe v. Rowe, 283 So. 2d 857, 
859 (Fla. 1973).   
 
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We have explained that imposition of a true split sentence means that the 
trial court has effectively sentenced the defendant in advance for a probation 
violation and is not later permitted to order a period of incarceration to exceed the 
sentence because to do so would violate double jeopardy.  See Poore v. State, 531 
So. 2d 161, 164-65 (Fla. 1988), superseded by statute on other grounds, 
§ 948.06(6), Fla. Stat. (1989).   
In the case at bar, Akins received a true split sentence, which consists of a 
total period of confinement with a portion of the confinement period suspended 
and the defendant placed on probation for that suspended portion.  Here, Akins 
does not dispute that the trial court, at the time of sentencing, had the authority to 
sentence him up to ten years on the original suspended sentence and that its 
sentence of five years was within that limitation.  Rather, Akins argues that the 
five-year sentence should not have subsequently been amended to reflect an HFO 
designation because the trial court failed to impose that designation during the oral 
pronouncement when it revoked Akins‟ prior sentence and imposed a five-year 
sentence.   
“Generally, courts have held that a written order must conform to the oral 
pronouncement . . . because the written sentence is usually just a record of the 
actual sentence required to be pronounced in open court.”  Justice v. State, 674 So. 
2d 123, 125 (Fla. 1996) (citing Vasquez v. State, 663 So. 2d 1343, 1349 (Fla. 4th 
 
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DCA 1995)).  As a result, when there is a discrepancy between the written 
sentence and “the oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement prevails.”  Justice, 
674 So. 2d at 125.   
In Akins, the Second District concluded the trial court‟s failure to orally 
pronounce Akins‟ HFO designation and its subsequent modification of Akins‟ 
judgment and sentence to reflect an HFO designation constituted an illegal 
sentence and violated double jeopardy.  Akins, 35 Fla. L. Weekly at D44-45.  In so 
concluding, the Second District relied on Ashley II, 850 So. 2d 1265; Evans, 675 
So. 2d 1012; Barron v. State, 827 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); and White v. 
State, 892 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).   
In Ashley II, we granted discretionary review based on express and direct 
conflict between the First District‟s decision in Ashley v. State (Ashley I), 772 So. 
2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), and the Fourth District‟s decision in Evans, 675 So. 2d 
1012.  There, we observed that the issue in both Ashley I and Evans was whether 
double jeopardy is violated when a trial court vacates an imposed sentence and 
resentences the defendant to what amounts to a more onerous sentence after the 
defendant has begun serving the original sentence.  See Ashley II, 850 So. 2d at 
1266.   
In Ashley I, Ashley was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon.  Ashley I, 772 So. 2d at 42-43.  The State filed notice of intent to classify 
 
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Ashley as a habitual violent felony offender (HVFO).  Id. at 42.  There, the trial 
judge was presented with evidence of Ashley qualifying as an HVFO, and it was 
argued that the judge had discretion in deciding whether to sentence Ashley as an 
HVFO.  Id. at 42-43.  During the actual sentencing, the trial court failed to 
pronounce Ashley an HVFO; instead the court orally pronounced Ashley an HFO 
and sentenced him to twenty-five years.  Id. at 42.  However, the written judgment 
and sentence reflected that Ashley was sentenced as an HVFO and sentenced to 
twenty-five years with no minimum term.  Id.  Subsequently, Ashley reappeared in 
court and the trial judge orally resentenced Ashley as an HVFO to serve twenty-
five years with a ten-year minimum term.  Id.  On appeal, Ashley argued the 
alteration in the written judgment and sentence amounted to a double jeopardy 
violation.  The First District concluded that the trial court‟s imposition of an HFO 
sentence was “the result of a simple mistake about what had been noticed and then 
proven the day before.  It was not a discretionary judgment based on the facts to 
impose a lighter sentence.”  Id. at 43 (citing Harris v. State, 645 So. 2d 386, 388 
(Fla. 1994)). 
In Evans, Evans entered a plea agreement, whereby he agreed that he 
qualified as an HFO and that he would be sentenced as an HFO if he violated his 
probation.  Evans, 675 So. 2d at 1013.  Evans then committed a technical violation 
of his probation and was sentenced as an HFO.  Id.  Evans‟ sentences were 
 
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suspended and he was given probation, but his HFO designation was not set aside.  
Id.  Evans‟ sentences were vacated and he was resentenced on the initial VOP.  
However, at resentencing, the trial court did not state that Evans would retain his 
HFO designation.  See id. at 1014.  Two days later, the State filed a motion to 
clarify the sentence because it did not reflect Evans‟ HFO designation.  Id.  Evans 
objected, arguing that to amend his judgment and sentence to reflect the HFO 
designation amounted to a double jeopardy violation.  Id.  The trial court amended 
the judgment and sentence.  Id.  On appeal, the Fourth District concluded that even 
if the trial court‟s failure to impose the HFO designation during the oral 
pronouncement was an oversight, the trial court‟s subsequent clarification was 
erroneous.  Id.  The Fourth District reasoned that once a legal sentence is imposed, 
jeopardy attaches and the defendant cannot be sentenced to a greater term of 
imprisonment.  Id.   
On review, we agreed with the Fourth District‟s reasoning in Evans.  Ashley 
II, 850 So. 2d at 1267.  We considered our previous decision in Justice, in which 
we explained that pursuant to “judicial policy . . . the actual oral imposition of 
sanctions should prevail over any subsequent written order to the contrary.”  674 
So. 2d at 125 (citing Vasquez, 663 So. 2d at 1349).  There, this Court‟s conclusion 
was based, in part, on the proposition that “written sentences are usually just a 
record of the actual sentence required to be pronounced in open court.”  Ashley II, 
 
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850 So. 2d at 1268.  Thus, this Court approved Evans and disapproved Ashley I, 
noting that “[t]o hold otherwise does serious harm to the double jeopardy 
principles which have guided our courts for centuries.”  Ashley II, 850 So. 2d at 
1268-69. 
 
Furthermore, in White, the First District reversed the trial court‟s summary 
denial of White‟s rule 3.800(a) motion.  White, 892 So. 2d at 542.  There, White 
was originally sentenced as an HFO.  See id.  Subsequently, White committed 
technical violations of his probation and was sentenced to nine years‟ 
imprisonment.  Id.  However, White was not designated as an HFO at that time.  
Id.  The First District relied on this Court‟s holding in Ashley II and the Fourth 
District‟s decision in Evans in recognizing that “upon a revocation of probation, a 
trial court must orally pronounce habitual felony offender status, even when the 
appellant was initially sentenced as a habitual felony offender for the substantive 
offense and the designation has not been set aside.”  White, 892 So. 2d at 542.  In 
reversing, the First District explained that because the trial court failed to sentence 
White as an HFO at his revocation of probation hearing, his sentence was illegal 
since it exceeded the statutory maximum.  Id.  The First District‟s holding in White 
ultimately provides that upon revocation of probation, a trial court must orally 
pronounce habitual offender status, even when the defendant was initially 
sentenced as a habitual felony offender for the substantive offense and the 
 
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designation has not been set aside.  Otherwise, the limit of the defendant‟s sentence 
is prescribed by the statutory maximum.  White, 892 So. 2d at 542.  The Second 
District, in Barron, 827 So. 2d 1063, reached a similar result as the Fourth District 
did in Evans. 
 
Based on the aforementioned, we conclude that the trial court‟s subsequent 
imposition of the HFO designation in Akins constitutes an illegal sentence because 
Akins‟ sentence was made more onerous after he began serving it.  However, in its 
decision below, the Second District acknowledged that its holding in Akins was 
consistent with this Court‟s holding in Ashley II, but appeared to conflict with the 
Third District‟s decision in Mann, 851 So. 2d 901.   
The instant case is distinguishable from Mann.  In Mann, the trial court 
clearly misspoke during sentencing; the record revealed that both the state and 
defense acknowledged that Mann would be sentenced as a habitual violent felony 
offender (HVFO) and the trial court imposed the mandatory minimum for an 
HVFO during sentencing.  Mann, 851 So. 2d at 902.  Mann‟s sentence was not 
increased after it was imposed, and therefore double jeopardy was not offended.   
See id.  Thus, the Third District affirmed the trial court‟s denial of Mann‟s motion 
to correct illegal sentence.  See id.  This is unlike Ashley II, where the alteration to 
Ashley‟s judgment and sentence resulted in an increase to his sentence and thus 
violated double jeopardy.  Mann, 851 So. 2d at 903.  
 
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As this Court noted in Ashley II: 
Generally, the oral pronouncement prevails unless the oral 
pronouncement is in error due to a clerical error such as the 
calculation of jail credit.  See Martindale v. State, 678 So. 2d 883, 884 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1996). [n.3] 
[n.3]. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) 
specifically provides that a motion to correct a scrivener's 
error may be filed by the State.  A scrivener‟s error 
literally refers to a written error.  The definition for 
scrivener's error in Black‟s Law Dictionary directs the 
reader to “[s]ee clerical error.”  Black‟s Law Dictionary 
1349 (7th ed.1999).  However, we have defined 
scrivener‟s error as those “clerical or ministerial errors in 
a criminal case that occur in the written sentence, 
judgment, or order of probation or restitution.  The term 
scrivener‟s error refers to a mistake in the written 
sentence that is at variance with the oral pronouncement 
of sentence or the record but not those errors that are the 
result of a judicial determination or error.”  Amendments 
to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.111(e) & 3.800, 
761 So. 2d 1015, 1023 (Fla. 2000) (court commentary) 
(emphasis added). 
We recognize that the trial court‟s failure to state during its oral 
pronouncement of sentence that it was sentencing Ashley as a habitual 
violent felony offender may have been a simple mistake.  However, 
based on the prior precedent from this Court, we must approve the 
Fourth District‟s opinion in Evans and disapprove the First District‟s 
decision in Ashley, because the oral pronouncement of sentencing 
controls.  To hold otherwise does serious harm to the double jeopardy 
principles which have guided our courts for centuries.   
Ashley II, 850 So. 2d at 1268-69. 
 In both Akins and Evans, the trial court completely neglected to orally 
pronounce the HFO sentence or expressly designate defendant as an HFO in any 
way.  The parties did not agree to an HFO sentence during the hearing, and the trial 
 
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court did not use any language indicating that an HFO sentence was being 
imposed.  Similarly, in the instant case, the trial court‟s oral pronouncement, 
despite defense counsel‟s brief reference to Akins‟ habitualized status, does not 
definitively demonstrate any intent to designate Akins as an HFO: 
THE COURT:  [T]he only reason I didn‟t give you the 10 is because I 
know that that [Department of Corrections] is going to take some 
[gain] time away from you on that 20 years that you‟ve already 
served. That‟s the way they work.  And I don‟t control the Department 
of Corrections, so I‟m trying to give you some equity here.  But I‟m 
also letting you know that you‟ve had your last chance the last time.  
So you -- in effect, out of the 10 years that you had, I‟ve imposed five. 
. . . .  
THE COURT:  And we‟re just going to leave it at that. 
 . . . . 
THE COURT:  And you‟re not any longer going to be on probation.  
So when you get out of prison, you are on your own. 
The absence of any clear intent of designating Akins as an HFO and the trial 
court‟s subsequent imposition of an HFO status to Akins‟ VOP judgment and 
sentence after Akins began serving his sentence violated double jeopardy and 
amounted to an illegal sentence and manifest injustice.  Because Akins‟ sentence 
was illegal, the Second District was proper in correcting it.  Accordingly, we 
approve the Second District‟s decision in Akins and answer the certified question 
in the affirmative. 
It is so ordered. 
 
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PARIENTE, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result. 
CANADY, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
 
CANADY, C.J., dissenting. 
 
Because I conclude that the designation of a defendant as a habitual felony 
offender (HFO) with respect to a particular offense need not be reestablished in a 
sentencing upon revocation of probation, I would answer the certified question in 
the negative.  In line with that answer, I would quash the decision of the Second 
District on review; disapprove the decisions in White v. State, 892 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 
1st DCA 2005), Barron v. State, 827 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), and Evans 
v. State, 675 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); and recede from Ashley v. State, 
850 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 2003), to the extent that it approved Evans. 
 
In his opinion for the Second District in the case on review, Judge 
Altenbernd made the following observation: 
Once the trial court has determined that a defendant qualifies as a 
habitual felony offender and has announced a split sentence pursuant 
to that determination, we would think that the defendant‟s status as a 
habitual felony offender subject to an extended sentence remained his 
status without need of additional determinations or announcements at 
later proceedings. 
 
Akins v. State, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D43, D44-45 (Fla. 2d DCA Dec. 30, 2009).  
There is indeed no reason to think otherwise.  Judge Altenbernd went on to discuss 
the bearing of this fact on the double jeopardy claim raised by Akins: 
 
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For purposes of double jeopardy, once this [HFO] status has been 
formally determined and the trial court has announced that it will rely 
on this status for purposes of imposing a split sentence, we do not 
entirely understand why the trial court violates double jeopardy when 
it relies on that determination and announcement without repeating it 
at a sentencing or revocation of probation. 
 
Id. at D45.  The Second District‟s lack of understanding is entirely understandable. 
 
Nothing in section 775.084,  Florida Statutes (1989)—the statute which sets 
forth the HFO sentencing scheme—requires or suggests that an HFO designation 
imposed in connection with a split sentence lapses and must be reestablished or 
reannounced when the defendant is sentenced upon revocation of probation.  On 
the contrary, once the HFO determination has been made with respect to an offense 
committed by a defendant—unless that determination is affirmatively set aside—
the defendant remains subject to the consequences of the HFO designation 
throughout all subsequent proceedings with respect to that offense. 
 
Here, the failure of the 2004 sentencing order to reflect that Akins had HFO 
status was nothing more than a “scrivener‟s error” that was subject to correction 
under rule 3.800(b).  From the time that he was subjected to the split sentence in 
1991, Akins was on notice that he was being punished as a habitual felony 
offender.  When he violated his probation in 2004, he knew his HFO status and 
was chargeable with knowledge of the consequences of that status in his 
sentencing upon revocation of probation.  As the majority opinion reflects, in the 
probation revocation proceeding in 2004, counsel for Akins specifically referred to 
 
- 26 - 
“his habitualization.”  It is undeniable that Akins‟ counsel understood that the HFO 
designation had not lapsed but would be a predicate for the sentence to be imposed 
upon revocation of probation. 
 
Contrary to the majority‟s decision here, the Double Jeopardy Clause does 
not require that a determination bearing on a defendant‟s punishment which has 
been properly made and announced and has never been set aside must be 
reestablished or redeclared in a sentencing upon revocation of probation.  Given 
the continuing validity of the original HFO designation, the corrected sentencing 
order reflecting that designation did nothing to increase the punishment to which 
Akins was lawfully subject.  The recognition in that sentencing order of the HFO 
determination made in 1991 did not subject Akins to double jeopardy. 
 
This Court‟s decision in Ashley is distinguishable on its facts from the case 
on review.  In Ashley, there was a variation between the designation originally 
declared by the sentencing court (HFO) and the designation reflected in the written 
sentence (habitual violent felony offender).  Here, there is no such variation.  
Nonetheless, the decision here shows the foresight in the concern of the Ashley 
dissenters, 850 So. 2d at 1271 (Harding, Senior Justice, dissenting), that the 
majority‟s opinion there would “turn sentencing hearings into the game-like 
atmosphere that the United States Supreme Court condemned in [United States v. 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 135 (1980)],” where it observed that “the Constitution 
 
- 27 - 
does not require that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by the 
judge means immunity for the prisoner.” 
 
Akins is entitled to no relief.  The decision of the Second District should be 
quashed, and the order of the postconviction court denying the rule 3.800 motion 
should be upheld. 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D09-161 
 
 
(Pinellas County) 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Robert J. Krauss, Bureau 
Chief, and Patricia A. McCarthy, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Terry P. Roberts, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent