Case Title: Commonwealth v. Gonsalves

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12565

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12565 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANTWAN GONSALVES. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 8, 2021. - January 13, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Motive, Prior misconduct, Impeachment of 
credibility, Opinion, Hostile witness, Cross-examination, 
Religious beliefs.  Witness, Impeachment, Hostile witness, 
Cross-examination.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, New 
trial, Assistance of counsel, Cross-examination by 
prosecutor, Failure to object. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 30, 2015. 
 
The case was tried before Thomas P. Billings, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on July 11, 2019, was heard by 
Kathe M. Tuttman, J. 
 
 
Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant. 
Lindsay Russell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Antwan 
Gonsalves, of murder in the first degree based on extreme 
atrocity or cruelty for the stabbing of Tywann D. Jones.  The 
 
 
 
2 
defendant appeals from his conviction and from the denial of his 
motion for a new trial.  First, he argues that there was 
insufficient evidence to prove extreme atrocity or cruelty.  
Second, the defendant argues that it was prejudicial error to 
admit evidence that he sold marijuana as a potential motive for 
the crime.  Finally, he claims his trial counsel was ineffective 
for a variety of reasons, including (1) failing to impeach two 
important witnesses for the Commonwealth with their criminal 
records; (2) failing to object to testimony, and its reference 
by the Commonwealth during closing arguments, in which one 
witness said the defendant was a "murderer";(3) failing to 
object to a witness claiming she "spoke to God" before deciding 
to change her testimony to support the Commonwealth; and 
(4) failing to seek a curative instruction after the prosecutor 
asked a witness questions implying that he was afraid of the 
defendant and his brother and when the jury, allegedly in 
response to this line of questioning, sent a note during 
deliberations asking who had access to their personal 
information.  The defendant also requests that we exercise our 
power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce his conviction to 
murder in the second degree. 
We conclude that there was no reversible error.  Having 
thoroughly reviewed the record, we also conclude that there is 
no reason to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
3 
Background.  1.  Events surrounding the stabbing.  We begin 
by summarizing the facts as the jury could have found them, 
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth 
and reserving other facts for discussion of specific issues. 
The defendant was in the Central Square area of Cambridge 
on the night of September 11, 2015, into the early morning of 
September 12 with Georgette Bethune and Maurice Rascoe.  Bethune 
had known the defendant for two and one-half to three years, but 
had been dating him and letting him stay with her and her son at 
her apartment for a couple months.  Rascoe had known the 
defendant for about ten years and considered him a friend.  Both 
had met the defendant because he regularly sold them small 
amounts of marijuana.  Neither had met the other before, and 
they did not speak again after September 12, 2015. 
The two met up with the defendant at around 11 P.M. at a 
restaurant in Cambridge.  Bethune testified that the defendant 
was wearing khaki pants and a black shirt.  They then left to go 
to a bar in the defendant's car.  The car was a dark blue, two-
door Mercedes-Benz "hatchback."  It had a "for sale" sign in the 
rear passenger's side window.  Registry of motor vehicles (RMV) 
records show that the defendant owned a blue, two-door Mercedes-
Benz at the time. 
The three then went to a bar on Massachusetts Avenue.  They 
were only there about twenty minutes when Rascoe asked to be 
 
 
 
4 
driven home to Malden.  Around this time, Rascoe realized his 
cell phone's battery was dead, and borrowed the defendant's cell 
phone to call his girlfriend to let her know that he was coming 
home.  Cell phone records show two short calls from the 
defendant's cell phone to Rascoe's girlfriend's cell phone at 
1:35 A.M. and 1:36 A.M.; Rascoe testified that he made these 
calls either inside or in front of the bar as they were leaving.  
The three got into the car with the defendant in the driver's 
seat, Bethune in the front passenger's seat, and Rascoe in the 
back. 
Around this time, the victim was also socializing with some 
friends in Central Square.  At around 1:30 A.M., the group 
visited a convenience store on Massachusetts Avenue, near the 
bar.  The victim left to find a bathroom while his friends were 
still in the store. 
 
Devon Queen, who was smoking cigarettes outside the 
convenience store, approached the victim to ask him for 
marijuana.  He did not know the victim, but thought the victim 
sold marijuana because he could smell it on the victim.  The 
victim said to hold on and walked down the street to the 
defendant's car.  Queen could hear yelling, but not specifically 
what was being said, although he did hear the victim say 
something about drugs. 
 
 
 
5 
The victim had approached the front passenger's side 
window, where Bethune was sitting, and began talking about 
drugs.1  The victim said that he "got it all" and asked if they 
wanted "crack" cocaine.  According to Bethune, the defendant 
asked something like, "Why is this guy out here?" or "Why are 
you guys out here?"  Rascoe testified that he responded by 
laughing, but took it as an insult because he did not think the 
group looked like the type of people who would buy crack 
cocaine.  The defendant responded by saying, "Get the fuck away 
from my car."  He was not yelling, but his tone was serious.  
The victim backed up onto the sidewalk and did not initiate any 
further contact with the people in the car, but the defendant 
got out of the car and approached him, and Rascoe got out to 
follow the defendant.  Rascoe testified that the defendant was 
arguing with the victim with "arms flailing" and that the 
defendant brushed off Rascoe's attempts to pull him away from 
the altercation. 
Bethune saw the defendant "punching" the man with an 
underhand motion three times.  The man had one hand in or on his 
pocket and was holding the defendant by the shirt with his other 
hand.  She did not see anyone else involved in the fight, 
 
1 Rascoe testified that two people approached the car, but 
said that the second man was no longer at the scene when he and 
the defendant left the car or during the fight. 
 
 
 
6 
including Rascoe.  Rascoe also testified that, besides his 
attempts to pull the defendant away, no one tried to interfere 
with the fight. 
The victim came back towards the convenience store and fell 
down in front of Queen.  At some point Rascoe picked up the 
victim's cell phone.  He made conflicting statements on whether 
he picked it up from the ground, took it from the victim's 
pocket, or did not remember from where he got it.  He also said 
he did not know that it was the victim's cell phone, but 
admitted that he knew it was not his or the defendant's. 
The defendant and Rascoe reentered the car through the 
driver's side and made a U-turn to head towards Harvard Square.  
The defendant had a bloody knife in his hand, which he wiped off 
on his shirt and threw out the window at some point during the 
drive.  Bethune testified that it was a black switchblade with a 
dragon on the handle, and that she had seen the knife before.  
The defendant repeatedly said that he "poked the n---- up" or 
that he "poked the kid."  Bethune was upset that the defendant 
had gotten in a fight with the man in front of a group of 
people, and was worried that the man's friends would retaliate.  
Upon learning that the defendant had stabbed someone, Rascoe 
threw the cell phone he had picked up out of the window. 
The victim came back into the convenience store, bleeding 
but conscious, and collapsed again.  The cashier called 911 
 
 
 
7 
while the victim's friends attempted to help him.  Eventually 
some off-duty doctors who were in the area entered the store and 
began to treat the victim.  An ambulance arrived and took the 
victim to Massachusetts General Hospital.  He was pronounced 
dead at 4:21 A.M. 
 
The cause of death was stab wounds to the chest and 
abdomen.  The autopsy revealed five separate stab wounds.  The 
first stab wound was one and one-half to two inches deep and 
passed between two ribs at a slightly upward angle into the 
right lung, causing bleeding into the chest cavity and air to 
escape the lungs.  The second wound penetrated the sternum and 
pierced the heart.  The third penetrated about two inches into 
the victim at a slightly upward angle, and passed between two 
ribs into the liver.  The fourth penetrated four inches into the 
victim and hit both the liver and a major blood vessel.  The 
fifth wound was three inches deep and passed through the 
abdominal wall at an upward angle into the liver.  One of the 
stab wounds caused two separate injuries to the liver, 
indicating either that the victim moved while the knife was in 
his abdomen or that the knife was partially withdrawn and then 
stabbed inwards again.  Each of the stab wounds could have been 
independently fatal. 
2.  Defendant's movements after the stabbing.  The group 
drove to Rascoe's house in Malden, where they continued to 
 
 
 
8 
drink.  Bethune testified that the defendant changed his shirt 
at Rascoe's house.  The defendant and Bethune stayed for one to 
one and one-half hours before driving to Bethune's apartment. 
The next morning, the defendant was "uncomfortable and 
frantic."  He asked Bethune why she did not stop him from 
getting out of the car.  He said that he was going to get rid of 
his car and asked Bethune to remove the "for sale" sign from the 
window, although she did not comply.  He left Bethune's 
apartment that morning without telling her where he was going, 
and Bethune never saw him again until she testified at trial.  
At some point he called her to say that "the guy died," which, 
up to that point, Bethune did not know.  She communicated with 
the defendant a few more times by telephone over the next couple 
days, although he told her not to call him on his old number 
because it was "gone" and when he called Bethune his telephone 
number would appear as "unknown." 
At around the time the defendant left Bethune's apartment, 
Rascoe realized he had left his cell phone in the defendant's 
car.  Unaware of the victim's condition, he arranged to meet the 
defendant.  Rascoe brought along his girlfriend and two of their 
children.  The defendant arrived in the two-door Mercedes-Benz, 
but Rascoe noticed that the "for sale" sign had been removed.  
Thereafter, he did not see the defendant or have any contact 
 
 
 
9 
with him until trial, despite trying to get in touch with him 
after hearing about the death in Central Square. 
Later on September 12, the defendant went to a prearranged 
rendezvous in Framingham with Keila Gonzalez, another woman he 
had been seeing for a couple of weeks.  The two usually met up 
on weekends in Connecticut, where Gonzalez lived.  However, that 
weekend they were instead meeting in Framingham so that the 
defendant could go back to Cambridge for the sixtieth birthday 
party of Debra Gonsalves, his aunt and adoptive mother.  Without 
explaining why, the defendant canceled his plans to attend the 
party, and they spent the rest of the weekend in Hartford, 
Connecticut, instead.  The defendant left on the following 
Monday and did not contact Gonzalez again.  During this time, 
the defendant was driving the Mercedes-Benz, but Gonzalez did 
not mention seeing the "for sale" sign.  Police were unable to 
locate the vehicle. 
3.  Investigation into the killing.  The police requested 
surveillance footage from inside the convenience store and the 
surrounding streets.  None showed the stabbing or the fight that 
led up to it.  However, footage did show the victim fall down 
outside the doors of the store, where he was approached by a man 
wearing khaki pants and a man wearing a large watch, who bent 
over to pick something up.  It also showed a dark, two-door car 
 
 
 
10 
make a U-turn on Massachusetts Avenue and be driven away from 
the scene of the murder. 
Two witnesses that were on Massachusetts Avenue told police 
they saw a dark-colored, two-door Mercedes-Benz with a "for 
sale" sign around the time of the murder.  One said he saw a 
fight break out on the sidewalk before the Mercedes-Benz made a 
sharp turn and went towards Harvard Square.  The other, the 
doorman at the bar, remembered seeing the Mercedes-Benz being 
parked illegally in a handicap spot and telling the driver to 
move into a legal spot.  The driver, who the doorman described 
as "real small," told the doorman that his mother, "Debbie," was 
already at the bar.  Evidently, this led the police to Debra 
Gonsalves, and her adoptive son, the defendant.  RMV records 
revealed that the defendant was five feet, two inches tall and 
owned a car matching the descriptions given by the eyewitnesses. 
The defendant's cell phone records showed two calls to 
Rascoe's girlfriend's cell phone around the time of the murder.  
Police went to her apartment to interview her, but no one 
answered the door.  They noticed that the name "Rascoe" was on 
the mailbox.  When they returned later, they noticed that the 
name had been removed.  While interviewing Rascoe's girlfriend 
at her apartment, she revealed that Rascoe had been the one 
using the defendant's cell phone, and that Rascoe was upstairs.  
Rascoe went with the officers to the police station, where he 
 
 
 
11 
consented to having his cell phone searched, and gave a two and 
one-half hour long interview.  He initially denied witnessing or 
being involved in the murder, but later admitted that he got out 
of the car as a "peacemaker" and that the defendant said he 
"poked" the victim.  He also volunteered that he was the man 
wearing the large watch who could be seen removing something 
from the defendant's pocket in the convenience store's 
surveillance video recording. 
The police also attempted to interview Bethune.  At first 
she denied any knowledge of the stabbing.  The police seized her 
cell phone, so she bought a new one to get in touch with the 
defendant to tell him that the police "pretty much [knew] every 
single thing."  She was subpoenaed to appear before the grand 
jury but failed to appear and was arrested.  After spending the 
night in jail, she testified before the grand jury, admitting 
that she saw the defendant fighting with the victim, that he had 
a bloody knife when he got back into the car, and that he had 
admitted to the stabbing on the car ride to Rascoe's home. 
The defendant turned himself in to police on September 24. 
4.  Procedural history.  The defendant was indicted on a 
charge of murder in the first degree in October 2015.  He was 
tried before a jury in February 2017.  The Commonwealth 
proceeded on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  The trial judge denied motions for a 
 
 
 
12 
directed verdict of not guilty, both at the close of the 
Commonwealth's case and at the close of all evidence.  He 
declined the defendant's request for a manslaughter instruction, 
but he did instruct the jury on intoxication.  The defendant was 
convicted of murder in the first degree based on extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, but not deliberate premeditation.  He was 
sentenced to life in prison without parole. 
The defendant filed a notice of appeal in March 2017 and a 
motion for a new trial in July 2019.  The motion for a new trial 
was remanded to the Superior Court, to another judge, as the 
trial judge had retired.  After a nonevidentiary hearing, the 
motion was denied, and the defendant appealed.  The appeal from 
his motion for a new trial was consolidated with his direct 
appeal. 
Discussion.  1.  Direct appeal.  The defendant raises two 
issues on direct appeal:  (1) the sufficiency of the evidence of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty and (2) the admission of evidence 
that he sold marijuana. 
a.  Extreme atrocity or cruelty.  In evaluating the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we 
"determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, any rational finder of fact could 
have found each of the elements of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Commonwealth v. Andrade, 488 Mass. 522, 543 
 
 
 
13 
(2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Mass. 307, 316 
(2017). 
General Laws c. 265, § 1, defines murder in the first 
degree as "[m]urder committed with deliberately premeditated 
malice aforethought, or with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in 
the commission or attempted commission of a crime punishable 
with death or imprisonment for life."  The defendant's trial 
occurred in February 2017, before our decision in Commonwealth 
v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 865-867 (2020), prospectively 
changed the requirements of finding extreme atrocity or cruelty.  
As such, the jury were instructed to consider the seven so-
called Cunneen factors.  These include the "[1] indifference to 
or taking pleasure in the victim's suffering, [2] consciousness 
and degree of suffering of the victim, [3] extent of physical 
injuries, [4] number of blows, [5] manner and force with which 
delivered, [6] instrument employed, and [7] disproportion 
between the means needed to cause death and those employed."  
Cunneen v. Commonwealth, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983).  Under our 
case law as it existed at the time of the defendant's trial, a 
verdict could be sustained by a finding of the presence of at 
least one Cunneen factor.  See Commonwealth v. Hunter, 416 Mass. 
831, 837 (1994), S.C., 427 Mass. 651 (1998). 
The evidence before the jury could have supported a finding 
of extreme atrocity or cruelty based on at least three factors.  
 
 
 
14 
First, the defendant stabbed the victim five times in vital 
areas, and may have stabbed him a sixth time without fully 
withdrawing the blade.  Each could have been independently 
fatal, indicating the attack was "brutal and disproportionate."  
Commonwealth v. Rodriquez 461 Mass. 100, 104-105 (2011) (unarmed 
victim stabbed seven times in "areas in the body that were 
likely to cause serious injury and pain"). 
Also, after committing the stabbing, the defendant 
repeatedly said that he "poked the n---- up" or "poked the kid."  
This is evidence of indifference to the suffering he had just 
inflicted on the victim.  Moreover, Rascoe responded by calling 
him an "idiot" and asking if he was trying to impress his 
girlfriend, indicating that he interpreted the remark as a boast 
or celebration.  See Rodriquez, 461 Mass. at 104 (rejecting 
argument that defendant saying "I got him" after stabbing only 
reflected that defendant was "glad to have prevailed in the 
fight" because jury could have construed words to express 
pleasure in having killed victim); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 
Mass. 195, 202 (2005) (finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty 
supported by sufficient evidence where defendant said he 
"murked" victim and "got my body for the summer"). 
Finally, the victim's consciousness and degree of suffering 
is also apparent from the wounds inflicted on his chest and 
abdomen, the eyewitness accounts at the convenience store, and 
 
 
 
15 
the surveillance footage.  The victim was stabbed in the lungs, 
heart, and liver.  He was able to walk back down the sidewalk to 
the convenience store and into the store itself.  He knelt down, 
holding his stomach, and attempted to say something to his 
friends, although they "couldn't clearly hear what he was 
saying."  See Commonwealth v. Noeun Sok, 439 Mass. 428, 430-432 
(2003) (finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty supported where 
victim was chased after being stabbed and was "still conscious 
for some considerable period of time" and "experienced severe 
pain from his extensive internal injuries").  The evidence 
clearly supported the jury's verdict.2 
 
2 The defendant also argues that we should reduce his 
conviction to murder in the second degree pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, because, although our ruling in Castillo, 485 
Mass. at 863-864, was expressly made prospective, it clearly 
expresses disapproval of finding extreme atrocity or cruelty 
"based solely on the degree of the victim's conscious 
suffering."  But as explained above, there is ample evidence to 
support a finding of other Cunneen factors that relate to the 
"egregiousness of the defendant's conduct."  Id. at 864. 
 
Had the defendant's trial been held after our decision in 
Castillo, the jury would have been instructed to consider the 
following three factors: 
 
"1.  Whether the defendant was indifferent to or took 
pleasure in the suffering of the deceased; 2.  Whether the 
defendant's method or means of killing the deceased was 
reasonably likely to substantially increase or prolong the 
conscious suffering of the victim; or 3.  Whether the means 
used by the defendant were excessive and out of proportion 
to what would be needed to kill a person."  (Footnotes 
omitted.) 
 
 
 
 
16 
b.  Prior bad act evidence.  The defendant also challenges 
the admission of evidence that he sold marijuana to Bethune and 
Rascoe.  Trial counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude the 
evidence and objected to its introduction.  Therefore, we review 
for prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. Tavares, 482 Mass. 694, 
712 (2019).  "We must first determine whether the judge 
committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion."  Id.  An 
abuse of discretion is "a clear error of judgment in weighing 
the factors relevant to the decision, such that the decision 
falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 
n.27 (2014).  If the evidence was admitted in error, we next 
determine whether its admission was prejudicial.  Tavares, 
supra.  Evidence is not prejudicial if it "did not influence the 
jury, or had but very slight effect" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005). 
The Commonwealth cannot "introduce evidence that a 
defendant previously has misbehaved, indictably or not, for the 
purpose of showing his bad character or propensity to commit the 
crime charged."  Commonwealth v. Copney, 468 Mass. 405, 412 
(2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224-225 
 
Id. at 869-870 (Appendix).  The defendant's conduct would 
perhaps no longer meet the second factor, but still clearly 
meets the first and third. 
 
 
 
17 
(1986).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(1) (2021).  However, such 
evidence can be admitted to "prove common scheme, pattern of 
operation, identity, intent, or motive" or "where evidence of 
the prior bad acts is inextricably intertwined with the 
description of events of the killing" (quotation, citation, and 
alteration omitted).  Commonwealth v. Marrero, 427 Mass. 65, 67 
(1998).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(2).  However, in such cases 
"the evidence will not be admitted if its probative value is 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant."  
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014). 
The evidence that the defendant sold small amounts of 
marijuana was offered to prove one possible motive for the 
murder, which was that the defendant was a drug dealer concerned 
that the victim was encroaching on his territory.  Queen 
testified that the victim approached the car to discuss drugs, 
and Bethune testified that the defendant asked, "Why is this guy 
out here?" or "Why are you guys out here?"  Without the evidence 
on the defendant's own involvement in drug dealing, "the killing 
could have appeared to the jury as an essentially inexplicable 
act of violence."  Commonwealth v. Bryant, 482 Mass. 731, 735-
736 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 269 
(1982). 
The risk of prejudice from this evidence neither outweighs 
its probative value nor could have had more than a slight effect 
 
 
 
18 
on the jury.  Besides the fair and permissible use of the 
evidence to establish motive for this particular murder, there 
is no likelihood that the jury would have convicted him of 
murder based on his prior sales of small amounts of marijuana to 
the two witnesses.3  Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion in admitting this evidence. 
2.  Motion for a new trial.  The defendant moved for a new 
trial, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.4  When 
reviewing a conviction of murder in the first degree, "we first 
determine whether there was an error in the course of the trial 
and, if there was, whether that error was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion, such that it created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice" (quotations, 
citations, and alteration omitted).  Commonwealth v. Dowds, 483 
Mass. 498, 502 (2019).  Also, "where the motion judge is not the 
trial judge, and no evidence is taken, we are able to assess the 
 
3 As the Commonwealth points out, this trial occurred only a 
couple months after Massachusetts voters approved a referendum 
legalizing recreational marijuana use. 
 
4 Appellate counsel relies on the fact that trial counsel 
has been suspended from the practice of law for misconduct 
unrelated to her representation of the defendant.  This has 
limited, if any, relevance to our review of her effectiveness in 
this case.  See Commonwealth v. McGuire, 421 Mass. 236, 238-239 
(1995) ("Even where a suspension had been in effect, there is 
support for the conclusion that a defendant would not be 
entitled to a new trial unless he could show that his counsel 
committed some material error in representing him"). 
 
 
 
 
19 
trial record and conduct a de novo review" rather than review 
for an abuse of discretion.  Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 476 Mass. 
725, 742 (2017).5 
a.  Failure to impeach with criminal records.  The 
defendant first argues that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to impeach Rascoe and Bethune with their criminal 
records.6  As provided by G. L. c. 233, § 21, a witness's 
previous convictions "may be shown to affect his credibility," 
subject to certain conditions.  See Commonwealth v. Daley, 439 
Mass. 558, 563 (2003) ("[witness]'s earlier disregard for the 
law may suggest to the fact finder similar disregard for the 
courtroom oath" [citation omitted]).  At the time of trial, 
Rascoe had been convicted of larceny over $250, larceny from a 
person, two separate charges of assault and battery, witness 
intimidation, possession of a class D substance, possession of a 
class B substance with intent to distribute, disorderly conduct, 
and assault and battery on a police officer.  Of these 
 
5 As trial counsel has not cooperated with appellate 
counsel, we do not have the benefit of an affidavit from her 
explaining whether any claimed error stemmed from a "strategic 
or tactical decision."  Commonwealth v. Watt, 484 Mass. 742, 762 
(2020). 
 
6 Counsel did request the witnesses' criminal records, 
although there appears to be a factual dispute over whether she 
received them or not.  As we conclude that counsel successfully 
impeached the witnesses without the criminal records, we need 
not resolve this issue. 
 
 
 
20 
convictions, the jury only learned of the last one because 
defense counsel impeached Rascoe by revealing that he was still 
on probation for it when the murder occurred and during trial. 
Bethune was charged with assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon for an incident that occurred after the murder 
and her grand jury testimony but before she testified at trial.  
Arrests or indictments cannot be used to attack a witness's 
credibility in the same way that convictions can.  See G. L. 
c. 233, § 21.  See also Commonwealth v. Haywood, 377 Mass. 755, 
759 (1979) ("Arrest or indictment alone is insufficient for 
general impeachment purposes").  But pending charges can be used 
to show a witness's bias stemming from his or her expectation of 
favorable treatment for cooperation.  Commonwealth v. Connor, 
392 Mass. 838, 841 (1984). 
At the outset, we note that in most cases, "failing to 
impeach a witness in a particular way does not constitute 
ineffective assistance."  Commonwealth v. Watt, 484 Mass. 742, 
763 (2020).  This case is no exception to the general rule.  
Even conceding that defense counsel could or should have used 
this evidence, her failure to do so did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, because Rascoe and 
Bethune were already thoroughly impeached.  Id. at 764 ("In 
short, [witness's] shortcomings as a witness were thoroughly 
 
 
 
21 
exposed, especially with regard to his credibility and 
dishonesty"). 
Rascoe's probationary status for assault and battery on a 
police officer was presented to the jury.  Defense counsel also 
pointed out inconsistencies in his statements to the police and 
even in his trial testimony, "thereby casting doubt on the 
veracity of his over-all testimony."  Commonwealth v. Valentin, 
470 Mass. 186, 191 (2014).  His involvement in the crime and his 
motive to deflect blame from himself was also probed by defense 
counsel.  The jury were informed that he deleted text messages 
related to drugs from his cell phone before giving it to the 
police, and that, although he got out of the car supposedly to 
act as a "peace maker," he also reached into the victim's pocket 
to take his cell phone.  See Commonwealth v. Daigle, 379 Mass. 
541, 543-545 (1980) (defense counsel need not impeach witnesses 
with criminal records where "jury were aware at all times that 
the very reason why the accomplices were able to testify to the 
events of the crime in question was that they had participated 
in it").  Additionally, defense counsel emphasized that Rascoe 
was testifying pursuant to an immunity order, and the judge 
specifically instructed the jury on what an immunity order 
involved and the statutory requirement that they could not 
convict the defendant solely based on Rascoe's testimony, 
implying that it could be unreliable.  See G. L. c. 233, § 20I 
 
 
 
22 
("No defendant in any criminal proceeding shall be convicted 
solely on the testimony of, or the evidence produced by, a 
person granted immunity under the provisions of [§ 20E]"). 
Bethune's testimony and credibility were also attacked and 
undermined.  The fact that she first denied any knowledge of the 
stabbing, and then changed her testimony, was the subject of 
cross-examination by defense counsel.  Bethune also admitted to 
deleting text messages before giving her cell phone to the 
police, and attempting to contact the defendant to tell him what 
the police knew before being arrested herself for failure to 
appear at the grand jury.  Defense counsel explored her motive 
to give into police pressure, as she did not know who would take 
care of her son if she were arrested or sent to jail.  She also 
admitted to drinking heavily and smoking marijuana on the 
evening of the murder, and she said that she did not remember 
going to the bar and that the events of the night were "foggy."  
Thus, her contradictions, concealments, vulnerabilities to 
police pressure, and drinking and smoking on the night in 
question were all before the jury. 
Also, if the defendant had accused Bethune of being biased 
in light of a pending charge against her in another county, the 
judge could have allowed the Commonwealth to introduce prior 
consistent statements from "before the occurrence of the event 
indicating a bias."  Commonwealth v. Caruso, 476 Mass. 275, 284-
 
 
 
23 
285 (2017).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 613(b)(2).  Bethune's alleged 
assault occurred on November 7, 2016, and proceedings were 
initiated on January 9, 2017.  By this point, she had already 
given testimony at the grand jury that was very similar to her 
testimony at trial, including that she had seen the defendant 
"punch" the victim three times, that she saw him wipe the bloody 
knife on his shirt, that the defendant said he "poked him up," 
and that he called her the next day to say that "the guy died."  
See Commonwealth v. Henson, 394 Mass. 584, 586-587 (1985); 
Haywood, 377 Mass. at 762-763.  Therefore, the alleged bias 
evidence would have had very little significance to the jury, 
and would have only highlighted that Bethune made statements 
consistent with her trial testimony shortly after the murder 
occurred.  Commonwealth v. Carmona, 428 Mass. 268, 271 (1998). 
b.  Opinion testimony.  The defendant next challenges his 
trial counsel's failure to object when Bethune allegedly 
expressed an opinion that he was a "murderer."  When the 
statement is read in context, however, it has a different, 
equivocal meaning. 
While cross-examining Bethune, defense counsel attempted to 
elicit testimony that Bethune implicated the defendant at the 
grand jury in response to pressure by police.  Specifically, 
defense counsel asked if the police tried to speak to her in 
jail or while they were transporting her to the hearing: 
 
 
 
24 
Q.:  "On the way to Court, did they talk to you?" 
 
A.:  "About the fact that I was protecting a murderer.  
They didn't talk, they didn't want to have any conversation 
with me." 
 
Q.:  "So you did have another conversation with police?" 
 
A.:  "I wanted to talk to them, but they didn't want to 
have any conversation with me regarding this, they just 
wanted to bring me straight to the grand jury and told me 
to say what I had to say there." 
 
Q.:  "So they just basically wanted you to give them a 
statement about [the defendant], correct?" 
 
A.:  "In the car with the cops, they didn't ask me for 
anything I was in cuffs, they were transporting me, and 
they were just basically telling me that I need to be 
truthful and why am I protecting him." 
 
Q.:  "So they thought that you were protecting him at the 
time, is what they were saying to you and telling you to be 
truthful, correct?  That's what the police were telling 
you?" 
 
A.:  "Yeah." 
 
In this context, her statement about "protecting a 
murderer" is ambiguous at best.  She appears to be describing 
what the police were asking her, that is, why was she protecting 
a murderer?  It does not appear to be a statement of fact by her 
that she was protecting a murderer.  The question by the police 
would be of little to no import to the jury, as they knew that 
the police were investigating a murder and that she was present 
at the murder.  Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 439 
(2011).  In fact, this would lend further support to the 
defendant's argument that the police prematurely concluded that 
 
 
 
25 
he was the murderer and then pressured Bethune into giving 
statements that supported that theory. 
Even if Bethune were expressing her own opinion, it is 
unlikely to have made a difference to the jury, who had just 
heard her testify that she was an eyewitness to the murder and 
describe it in some detail.  Commonwealth v. Perez, 460 Mass. 
683, 694-695 (2011) (witness improperly opining that defendant 
committed murder did not warrant reversal where she had 
"provided extensive testimony regarding the defendant's 
inculpatory actions after the victim's murder, as well as the 
defendant's incriminating statements"). 
The defendant claims he was prejudiced by this comment 
because it allowed the prosecutor to "vouch" for Bethune's 
testimony during closing.  Specifically, the prosecutor said: 
"She told you, I only told the complete truth about what I 
know when I was under oath before the Grand Jury and I 
decided that I was no longer going to cover up for someone 
who committed a murder.  And I suggest to you, ladies and 
gentlemen, that that's what happened." 
Impermissible vouching is "when an attorney expresses a 
personal belief in the credibility of a witness or indicates 
knowledge independent of the evidence before the jury verifying 
a witness's credibility" (quotation, citation, and alterations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Morales, 440 Mass. 536, 549 (2003).  
Of course, an advocate can "provide the jury with the reasons 
why they should find a witness's observations to be accurate, 
 
 
 
26 
but she cannot tell the jury that the witness speaks the truth."  
Commonwealth v. Penn, 472 Mass. 610, 627 (2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 1656 (2016). 
The prosecutor's comments fall into the former category. 
They merely referred to Bethune's own explanation, which was 
already in evidence, for why her statements to the police 
changed.  Nor could the jury have taken this comment as the 
prosecutor's personal opinion.  Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 428 
Mass. 852, 857 (1999) ("use of the phrases 'I think' and 'I 
suggest' to preface some remarks did not, viewed in their proper 
context, imply that the prosecutor had personal knowledge or was 
stating a personal belief").  Rather, it was an attempt to 
counter the defendant's argument, repeated during closing, that 
the jury should credit Bethune's earlier statements to the 
police before she was pressured into changing her testimony.  
See Commonwealth v. Sanders, 451 Mass. 290, 297 (2008) ("Because 
defense counsel had placed [the witness's] credibility at issue 
both during his cross-examination of her and in his closing 
argument, the prosecutor was entitled to respond within the 
limits of the evidence and to provide the jury with reasons for 
believing [her]"). 
c.  Religious bolstering.  In a similar vein, the defendant 
argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object 
when Bethune claimed she "spoke to God" before deciding to 
 
 
 
27 
testify against him.  "We have long and consistently disfavored 
allowing evidence of the religious beliefs of a witness either 
to enhance or [to] discredit the credibility of a witness."  
Commonwealth v. Dahl, 430 Mass. 813, 822 (2000).  See Mass G. 
Evid. § 610. 
Again, it is important to look at Bethune's comments in 
context.  On cross-examination, defense counsel raised 
statements she had made to the police early in the investigation 
that were inconsistent with her trial testimony.  Bethune 
responded by saying, "I didn't start telling the truth until I 
took the oath."  After a few more questions, she continued, "I 
know that when I came from being locked up in jail so long, I 
decided that I spoke to God and I decided I was going to tell 
the truth. . . .  Everything I said before that was a lie." 
We cannot agree with the motion judge that Bethune's 
statement was merely the equivalent of saying she would "do the 
right thing" or that it was a reference to her grand jury oath.  
The specific statement that she spoke to God goes beyond that, 
and should have been struck given its potential prejudicial 
effect.  Nonetheless, counsel's failure to object and move to 
strike did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice.7 
 
7 Although, as noted above, we have no evidence that any of 
the claimed errors stemmed from a strategic or tactical 
 
 
 
28 
Although disfavored, such explicit references to religious 
motivation or bolstering have not been found to be grounds for 
reversal.  See, e.g., Dahl, 430 Mass. at 822-824 (no prejudice 
from religious bolstering despite witness testifying that she 
was studying to become nun, wanted to do "a godly thing," and 
held rosary beads during her testimony); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 
48 Mass. App. Ct. 143, 145-146 (1999) (error of allowing counsel 
to ask child witness if she attended catechism "entirely without 
consequence").  Bethune's reference to speaking "to God" was an 
explanation of why she decided to change her mind about 
testifying against the defendant, not an argument that people 
with certain religious beliefs are more or less trustworthy than 
others.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 693 
(1983) ("only apparent purpose of [questioning on defendant's 
religious beliefs on origins of races] was to inject racial 
hatred into the trial"); Commonwealth v. Buzzell, 16 Pick. 153, 
156-157 (1834). 
d.  Testimony on Queen's fear of reprisal.  Finally, the 
defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
repeatedly object when the prosecutor asked whether Queen 
changed his testimony out of fear, or to request a curative 
 
decision, it would not be unreasonable for counsel to allow such 
statements to stand to avoid alienating religious jurors, given 
the low risk of prejudice. 
 
 
 
29 
instruction when the jury asked during deliberations if anyone 
had access to their personal information. 
Queen was called by the Commonwealth, but he had to be 
arrested to be brought into court, and he was declared a hostile 
witness.  At trial, Queen testified that he could not remember 
the appearance of the assailant or the person who took something 
from the victim's pocket, or from where the assailant approached 
the victim.  Evidently, Queen had given a more specific and 
inculpatory statement to the police, specifically that after the 
victim walked away from the car, Queen saw the driver get out 
and approach him; that after the fight broke out, the victim was 
chased by a "short guy"; and that a "taller guy" had come over 
to take something out of the victim's pocket.  Despite being 
shown the police report with his statement, Queen claimed he 
could no longer remember these details at trial.  The prosecutor 
responded by asking him if he could "see that man seated in the 
courtroom with the glasses on and the braids?" 
Trial counsel immediately objected, noting at sidebar that 
the prosecutor seemed to be referring to the defendant's 
brother, who was in the gallery.  The prosecutor claimed that a 
victim-witness advocate had told her that Queen began claiming a 
poor memory when the brother entered the court room, to which 
defense counsel responded that the brother had been present 
every day of trial and that Queen claimed a lack of memory from 
 
 
 
30 
the start of his testimony.  The judge noted that evidence of 
any intimidation by the brother was "thin" and sustained the 
objection.8 
The prosecutor later asked Queen whether he recognized the 
defendant and asked why he kept looking at the defendant when 
answering questions.  Defense counsel objected, but was 
overruled, and Queen answered that he was not looking at the 
 
8 Contrary to the defendant's argument, this was not 
prosecutorial misconduct.  When cross-examining a witness, a 
prosecutor cannot ask a question "in bad faith or without 
foundation."  Commonwealth v. Christian, 430 Mass. 552, 561 
(2000), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Paulding, 
438 Mass. 1 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. White, 367 Mass. 
280, 285 (1975).  As explained infra, the Commonwealth was 
entitled to inquire into Queen's fear based on his changed 
testimony, and the prosecutor disclosed the basis for believing 
that this was due to the defendant's brother.  See Commonwealth 
v. Johnson, 441 Mass. 1, 5 (2004).  Although the judge 
appropriately concluded that the foundation was too "thin" to 
allow this particular line of questioning, that does not mean it 
was offered in bad faith. 
 
The objection was sustained, and the prosecutor refrained 
from referring to the defendant's brother again on cross-
examination or in closing argument.  See id. at 6 (no reversal 
required where "there was one question to which the defendant 
objected [and the judge sustained that objection], followed by 
somewhat different questions").  Queen did not answer the 
question related to the defendant's brother, but denied being in 
fear of testifying.  The jury had been given preliminary 
instructions that questions were not evidence, and the judge 
repeated similar instructions in the final charge.  A concurrent 
instruction, or a later, explicit instruction was not required.  
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 458 Mass. 405, 412-413 (2010) (trial 
judge was not required to give curative instruction where he 
sustained objection to question about witness's fear and 
instructing jury explicitly on issue would "inappropriately 
emphasize the matter"). 
 
 
 
31 
defendant.  The prosecutor also asked Queen whether he left 
Massachusetts after witnessing the murder because he was afraid, 
and again defense counsel unsuccessfully objected.  Queen 
answered that he was not afraid and that he had left because he 
was worried the police would think he was involved in the 
stabbing.  Finally, the prosecutor asked why he had not come to 
court to testify and had to be arrested.  There was no 
objection, and Queen answered that there was a warrant requiring 
him to appear at another court on the same day.  On cross-
examination, defense counsel got Queen to repeat his testimony 
that he was not afraid and the explanations for his seemingly 
evasive behavior.  She also elicited an alternative explanation 
for his lack of memory -- that he had been drinking and smoking 
marijuana, and in fact had repeatedly told police that he was 
"not completely sure what happened."  She also clarified some of 
his statements that the Commonwealth had seized on as 
inconsistent. 
Under the circumstances, it is difficult to see what more 
trial counsel could have done, or what difference further 
objections would have made.  Appellate counsel faults her 
failure to ask for a sidebar, after the judge overruled her 
objection, to argue that there was no foundation for the 
prosecutor to ask Queen why he was looking at the defendant.  
However, the trial judge, who was observing the examination, was 
 
 
 
32 
in the best position to determine whether there was any basis 
for the question.  In any event, Queen denied looking at the 
defendant or being afraid of anyone.  For the other questions 
related to Queen's alleged fear, the trial judge did not abuse 
his discretion in overruling counsel's objections.  Commonwealth 
v. Fitzgerald, 376 Mass. 402, 412 (1978) (repudiation of 
previous statements to law enforcement "required some attempt at 
explanation," and prosecutor did not need to accept witness's 
denial of fear).  Trial counsel's approach of reemphasizing his 
denials in cross-examination and providing other explanations 
for his lack of memory was not ineffective. 
Finally, the defendant alleges that his counsel was 
ineffective in her response to a question the jury sent during 
deliberations asking who had access to their personal 
information.  The trial judge, after consulting the prosecutor 
and defense counsel, answered the question by telling the jury 
that their personal information would be destroyed and that 
their confidential questionnaires could only be released after a 
hearing with good cause shown.  He also repeated his instruction 
that they must decide the case without "fear or favor" to either 
side.  We discern no error in the judge's response nor anything 
more that defense counsel should have done. 
3.  Section 33E review.  Having reviewed the record, we 
conclude that there is no reason to reduce the defendant's 
 
 
 
33 
conviction to murder in the second degree under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E. 
The defendant points to cases in which we have reduced a 
verdict of murder in the first degree where the killing arose 
from a "senseless brawl" in which alcohol was involved.9  
Although we have suggested that one "factor" that may be 
considered is "whether the homicide occurred in the course of a 
'senseless brawl'" (citation omitted), Commonwealth v. Colleran, 
452 Mass. 417, 431 (2008), it certainly does not entitle the 
defendant to a reduction in his sentence, where, as here, the 
evidence clearly established that the murder was committed with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty based on the number of stab wounds 
and the defendant's comments following the stabbing, see 
Commonwealth v. Libby, 405 Mass. 231, 236-237 (1989), S.C., 411 
Mass. 177 (1991) ("This case involves a senseless brawl, fueled 
by alcohol and other drugs.  The defendant and the victim were 
strangers.  Had there been but one stab wound, we might well 
 
9 There was evidence in the record that the defendant was 
drinking before the murder, but not heavily enough to impair his 
walking or driving.  The jury were specifically instructed on 
intoxication, including that they could consider it on the 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Bethune testified that 
the defendant said he was too drunk to drive home when they were 
leaving Rascoe's house in Malden to return to her apartment.  
However, it seems he did so without incident.  This was also 
hours after the murder, when the sun was coming up according to 
Bethune, after the defendant had continued to drink at Rascoe's 
house. 
 
 
 
34 
have regarded this case as one of a class not typically 
involving murder in the first degree.  Here, however, there were 
nine separate acts of stabbing . . ." [citations omitted]).  
Furthermore, the brawl here "was initiated, continued, 
escalated, and afterward celebrated by the defendant."  
Rodriquez, 461 Mass. at 111-112.  See Commonwealth v. Deconinck, 
480 Mass. 254, 273 (2018) (relief under § 33E was inappropriate 
where, inter alia, defendant and victim had been separated a 
number of times in drunken fight over allegedly stolen 
prescription medications); Anderson, 445 Mass. at 202, 215-216 
(denying relief pursuant to § 33E in case where defendant 
bragged about murder). 
Our review of the evidence reveals no reason to reduce the 
verdict under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We affirm the defendant's 
conviction and the order denying his motion for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.