Case Title: Commonwealth v. Dufresne

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13123

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13123 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LEON G. DUFRESNE. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 6, 2021. - February 24, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Abuse Prevention.  Protective Order.  Constitutional Law, 
Separation of powers, Assistance of counsel.  Due Process 
of Law, Assistance of counsel.  Practice, Civil, Assistance 
of counsel.  Practice, Criminal, Mistrial.  Evidence, Prior 
misconduct, Cross-examination. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Lowell Division of 
the District Court Department on September 27, 2017. 
 
 
The case was tried before John F. Coffey, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Jennifer H. O'Brien for the defendant. 
 
Konstantin Tretyakov, Assistant District Attorney (Jamie M. 
Charles, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Patrick R. Kessock, of New York, for National Coalition for 
a Civil Right to Counsel, was present but did not argue. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Anthony D. Gulluni, District Attorney, & Travis H. Lynch, 
Assistant District Attorney, for district attorney for the 
Hampden District. 
2 
 
 
David Rassoul Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
 
Kate Barry, Laura Gal, Andrea C. Kramer, Christina 
Paradiso, Cheryl Garrity, Nicole R.G. Paquin, & Adrianne Ramos 
for Women's Bar Association of Massachusetts. 
 
Deborah J. Manus for Boston Bar Association. 
 
Jamie Sabino for Massachusetts Law Reform Institute. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  Following a jury trial in the District Court, the 
defendant, Leon G. Dufresne, was convicted of violating an abuse 
prevention order.  On appeal, he argues that his conviction 
suffers from two constitutional infirmities, both of which 
allegedly arise from the criminal penalties imposed on him as a 
result of his violation of the order.  That is, while the 
defendant does not attack the validity of the underlying order, 
he challenges the consequences he faces for violating it.  
First, the defendant contends that G. L. c. 209A, § 7, the 
statute under which he was convicted, violates the 
constitutionally mandated separation of powers because it vests 
the executive branch with the power to enforce judicially issued 
abuse prevention orders.  Second, the defendant argues that the 
State and Federal Constitutions prohibit his criminal punishment 
for the violation of an abuse prevention order that was issued 
when he was uncounselled and afforded no right to court-
appointed counsel.  In the alternative, the defendant argues 
that his conviction should be set aside and a new trial ordered 
3 
 
because of abuses of discretion in several of the trial judge's 
rulings. 
 
We conclude that G. L. c. 209A, § 7, is constitutional 
under our separation of powers principles, and that neither the 
State nor Federal Constitution is violated where, as here, a 
constitutionally permissible proceeding -- even one to which the 
right to counsel does not apply -- provides a predicate for a 
subsequent incarcerable offense.  Discerning no abuse of 
discretion in the trial judge's challenged rulings, we affirm 
the defendant's conviction.1 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts as the jury could 
have found them.  The defendant was involved in a romantic 
relationship with the victim for nearly four years.  During that 
time, both parties lived in separate rooms within the same 
rooming house.  The relationship had ended by August 24, 2017, 
when the victim applied for and obtained a protective order 
under G. L. c. 209A.  After notice to the defendant and a 
hearing on September 6, 2017, at which both the victim and 
defendant were present, the order was extended for one year.  In 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the district 
attorney for the Hampden district in support of the 
Commonwealth, the Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) 
in support of the defendant, as well as those from the National 
Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel (NCCRC) and the Women's 
Bar Association of Massachusetts (WBA), and the amicus letters 
submitted by the Boston Bar Association and the Massachusetts 
Law Reform Institute. 
4 
 
addition to prohibiting the defendant from contacting or abusing 
the victim, the order required the defendant to vacate and stay 
away from the rooming house where the defendant had lived and 
where the victim continued to live. 
 
On September 25, 2017, another resident of the rooming 
house was standing outside the house smoking a cigarette when 
the defendant approached.  The defendant and the resident talked 
for approximately two minutes before the defendant asked to 
enter the house so that he could purchase cigarettes from the 
resident.  The resident refused, pointing out that the victim 
had an abuse prevention order against the defendant, and the 
defendant left the area.  The resident relayed this interaction 
to the victim, who reported the incident to police. 
 
The defendant was arrested and charged with violating an 
abuse prevention order under G. L. c. 209A, § 7.  The defendant 
moved to dismiss the criminal complaint, arguing that his 
conviction under G. L. c. 209A, § 7, violated the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and 
cognate provisions of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  
A District Court judge denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, 
and, following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty and 
sentenced to eighteen months of probation.  The defendant 
appealed, and we transferred the matter to this court on our own 
motion. 
5 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Abuse Prevention Act.  The Abuse 
Prevention Act was enacted as G. L. c. 209A over forty years ago 
to address the problem of domestic violence in the Commonwealth.  
C.O. v. M.M., 442 Mass. 648, 651 (2004).  To this end, c. 209A 
"provides a statutory mechanism by which victims of family or 
household abuse can enlist the aid of the State to prevent 
further abuse through [civil] orders prohibiting a defendant 
from abusing or contacting the victim" (citation and quotations 
omitted).2  MacDonald v. Caruso, 467 Mass. 382, 385 (2014).  See 
G. L. c. 209A, § 3A.  These civil orders commonly are known as 
"abuse prevention orders."  Abuse prevention orders can be 
obtained pursuant to G. L. c. 209A, §§ 3-5, in the Superior 
Court, the Boston Municipal Court, the District Court, or the 
Probate and Family Court.  G. L. c. 209A, § 2.  They can also be 
obtained in the Probate and Family Court as part of divorce 
proceedings pursuant to G. L. c. 208, § 18, 34B, or 34C; as part 
of adjudication between spouses pursuant to G. L. c. 209, § 32; 
 
 
2 General Laws c. 209A, § 1, defines broadly the type of 
relationship between a victim and a perpetrator that could give 
rise to "family or household abuse."  Specifically, such abuse 
may be between individuals who "(a) are or were married to one 
another; (b) are or were residing together in the same 
household; (c) are or were related by blood or marriage; (d) 
hav[e] a child in common . . . ; or (e) are or have been in a 
substantive dating or engagement relationship."  Id.  The 
Superior Court does not have jurisdiction over matters where the 
relationship between defendant and victim is one of substantive 
dating or engagement.  Id. 
6 
 
and as part of paternity actions pursuant to G. L. c. 209C, § 15 
or 20.  Chapter 209A additionally provides for enforcement of 
protection orders issued by another jurisdiction.  See G. L. c. 
209A, §§ 5A, 7 (providing filing and enforcement mechanisms for 
orders from other jurisdictions).  See also Guidelines for 
Judicial Practice:  Abuse Prevention Proceedings, § 1:00, at 20 
(rev. Oct. 2021) (Judicial Guidelines). 
 
In addition to prohibiting a defendant from abusing or 
contacting the plaintiff (i.e., the victim), an abuse prevention 
order may, inter alia, (1) require the defendant to vacate and 
remain away from the plaintiff's household or workplace; 
(2) award temporary support to the plaintiff and his or her 
children; (3) award compensation for any financial losses caused 
by the abuse; (4) order the defendant to surrender any firearms, 
licenses to carry, and firearm identification cards in his or 
her possession, (5) award the plaintiff temporary custody of any 
minor children shared by the plaintiff and defendant; or 
(6) order the defendant to stay away from the plaintiff's 
children.  G. L. c. 209A, §§ 3, 3B. 
 
Where an abuse prevention order issued in another court 
restricts a defendant's access to or custody of his or her 
children, the defendant may file a separate petition in the 
Probate and Family Court seeking custody or parenting time.  See 
Judicial Guidelines § 12:00, at 239.  An order from the Probate 
7 
 
and Family Court will supersede any contradictory provisions in 
the initial 209A order.  See G. L. c. 209A, § 3 ("such order may 
be superseded by a subsequent custody or support order issued by 
the probate and family court department, which shall retain 
final jurisdiction over any custody or support order"). 
 
Obtaining and maintaining an abuse prevention order under 
c. 209A generally involves three separate hearings:  an initial 
ex parte hearing, a notice hearing, and a renewal hearing.3  See 
G. L. c. 209A, §§ 3, 4.  The three hearings proceed in order: 
"[First, a] temporary abuse prevention order may issue ex 
parte for up to ten court business days where a plaintiff 
shows a 'substantial likelihood of immediate danger of 
abuse.'  G. L. c. 209A, § 4.  After hearing, the temporary 
order may be extended for no more than one year if the 
plaintiff proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the defendant has caused or attempted to cause physical 
harm, committed a sexual assault, or placed the plaintiff 
in reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm.  
G. L. c. 209A, § 3. . . .  [Finally, o]n or about the date 
the initial order expires, the plaintiff may seek to extend 
the duration of the order 'for any additional time 
necessary to protect the plaintiff' or to obtain a 
permanent order.  G. L. c. 209A, § 3."  (Footnote omitted.) 
MacDonald, 467 Mass. at 386.  At any point, either party may 
petition the court to terminate or otherwise modify an existing 
order.  G. L. c. 209A, § 3 ("The court may modify its order at 
 
 
3 Where a judge determines there is not a substantial 
likelihood of immediate danger of abuse, the judge may not 
conduct an ex parte hearing; instead, notice must issue so that 
the defendant can take part in the two-party notice hearing.  
See G. L. c. 209A, § 4; Judicial Guidelines, §§ 3:00, 3:01 
commentary, at 77-78. 
8 
 
any subsequent time upon motion by either party").  Defendants 
also may challenge an abuse prevention order in the Appeals 
Court.  Zullo v. Goguen, 423 Mass. 679, 681 (1996). 
 
Although the proceedings under G. L. c. 209A, §§ 3 and 4, 
establishing abuse prevention orders are civil in nature, see 
G. L. c. 209A, § 3A, violation of an abuse prevention order 
generally is a criminal offense, see G. L. c. 209A, §§ 3B, 7.4  
To prove such a violation of G. L. c. 209A, § 7, the 
Commonwealth must demonstrate that "(1) a valid [abuse 
prevention] order was entered by a judge and was in effect on 
the date of the alleged violation; (2) the defendant violated 
the order; and (3) the defendant had knowledge of the order."  
Commonwealth v. Kulesa, 455 Mass. 447, 452 (2009), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Silva, 431 Mass. 401, 403 (2000). 
 
b.  Constitutional challenges.  i.  Standard of review.  
The defendant challenges the statute under which he was 
convicted both facially and as applied.  "We review a challenge 
to the constitutionality of a statute de novo."  Commonwealth v. 
Feliz, 481 Mass. 689, 696 (2019), S.C., 486 Mass. 510 (2020).  
 
4 General Laws c. 209A makes it a criminal offense to 
violate an order to (1) surrender firearms, (2) vacate or remain 
away from the household, or (3) refrain from abuse or contact.  
See G. L. c. 209A, §§ 3B, 7; Commonwealth v. Delaney, 425 Mass. 
587, 596 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1058 (1998).  Violations 
of any of the other provisions of a c. 209A order are addressed 
through complaints for civil or criminal contempt.  Delaney, 
supra. 
9 
 
We begin "with a presumption of statutory validity."  Fifty-One 
Hispanic Residents of Chelsea v. School Comm. of Chelsea, 421 
Mass. 598, 606 (1996).  "The challenging party bears the burden 
of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no 
conceivable grounds which could support [the statute's] 
validity" (citation and quotation omitted).  Gillespie v. 
Northampton, 460 Mass. 148, 152-153 (2011).  "Further, we make 
an independent determination as to the correctness of the 
judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts as 
found" (citation and quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Caldwell, 487 Mass. 370, 374 (2021). 
 
ii.  Separation of powers.  The defendant contends that 
G. L. c. 209A, § 7, is facially unconstitutional under art. 30 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  He asserts that, by 
authorizing the executive branch to prosecute violations of 
abuse prevention orders, the statute strips the judiciary of its 
inherent power to enforce judicial orders, thereby violating the 
constitutionally required separation of powers.  We disagree. 
 
Article 30 mandates the separation of powers by prohibiting 
"interference by one department with the functions of another" 
(citation omitted).  Chief Admin. Justice of the Trial Court v. 
Labor Relations Comm'n, 404 Mass. 53, 56 (1989).  "[T]he 
executive and legislative branches . . . 'impermissibly 
interfere with judicial functions when they purport to restrict 
10 
 
or abolish a court's inherent powers, or when they purport to 
reverse, modify, or contravene a court order.'"  K.J. v. 
Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 488 Mass. 362, 366 
(2021), quoting Gray v. Commissioner of Revenue, 422 Mass. 666, 
671 (1996).  Nonetheless, the "separation of powers does not 
require three 'watertight compartments' within the government."  
K.J., supra, quoting Opinion of the Justices, 372 Mass. 883, 892 
(1977).  Rather, "[e]ach branch, to some extent, exercises 
executive, legislative, and judicial powers[, and so t]he 
critical inquiry here is whether the" actions of the other 
branches of government "would interfere with the functions" of 
the judiciary.  Opinion of the Justices, 375 Mass. 795, 813 
(1978). 
 
We have held that legislative and executive action do not 
interfere with the function of the judiciary when such action is 
consistent with a court order.  See K.J., 488 Mass. at 368 ("The 
flexibility inherent in art. 30 allows the legislative and 
executive branches to take actions consistent with a court 
order").  Indeed, such actions clearly do not "restrict" or 
"abolish" the power of the judiciary; rather, such actions give 
effect to the judiciary's exercise of its own power.  In Gray, 
422 Mass. at 673-674, for example, we held that it was 
constitutional for the executive branch to collect court-ordered 
child support arrearages from a defendant.  We reasoned that, 
11 
 
because "the department's seizure of [the defendant's] assets 
was not in conflict with the [court order] but was entirely 
consistent with it" (citation and quotation omitted), the 
executive branch's actions did not interfere with the judicial 
order.  Id. at 675.  So too here, because the criminal 
enforcement of G. L. c. 209A orders is "not in conflict with the 
[court order]" but, rather, "entirely consistent with it," the 
requirements of art. 30 are satisfied.  See id.  Cf. K.J., supra 
at 371-373 (where statute tasks judiciary with determining 
placement of civilly committed individuals, executive branch 
cannot be given "final veto" over that determination). 
 
Finally, we note that "the Legislature has great latitude 
in defining criminal conduct and in prescribing penalties to 
vindicate the legitimate interests of society" (citation and 
quotation omitted), as it did in G. L. c. 209A, §§ 3B and 7, and 
may choose to criminalize the violation of a civil order.  
Commonwealth v. Guzman, 446 Mass. 344, 346 (2006).  General Laws 
c. 209A, § 7, poses no separation of powers problems.5 
 
iii.  Right to counsel.  The defendant additionally argues 
that the State and Federal Constitutions prohibit criminal 
punishment for violations of a civil order issued via 
 
 
5 While G. L. c. 209A, § 3B, is not implicated in the 
instant case, we note that our reasoning and holding would 
extend to a facial challenge to that provision on this ground, 
as well. 
12 
 
proceedings for which defendants are not afforded a right to 
counsel.  Although much of the defendant's brief focuses on the 
underlying c. 209A civil proceedings and the interests at stake 
therein, the defendant states that he "is not collaterally 
attacking the validity of the abuse prevention order against 
him," nor asking the court to "decide whether counsel must be 
appointed to all indigent defendants in abuse prevention order 
matters."  The defendant also does not suggest that his criminal 
trial or conviction was tainted with any constitutional errors.  
Again, the defendant alleges fundamental constitutional defects 
not in either the civil or the criminal c. 209A proceedings but 
rather in the connection between them.6 
 
 
6 This understanding of the defendant's argument comes after 
careful analysis of the defendant's brief; the defendant's 
arguments proved hard to parse on this issue.  In addition to 
the statements quoted supra, the defendant's question presented 
and headings seem to focus on "[w]hether criminal punishment of 
a civil order requires that a defendant be represented by 
counsel when the order issues."  However, the defendant also 
seems to question more broadly the constitutionality of c. 209A 
and devotes much of his brief to an analysis of the civil 
c. 209A procedures under Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981), as if he were challenging the 
underlying procedures distinct from the possible imposition of 
criminal penalties. 
 
 
Reconciling these lines of argumentation, we think a 
reasonable interpretation of the defendant's charge to this 
court is that we must consider the right to counsel in abuse 
prevention order proceedings, where the defendant is later 
criminally punished for violating the order. 
13 
 
 
The defendant grounds his argument, without specificity, in 
the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments and in cognate 
provisions of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 
contending that some combination of these constitutional 
provisions required that he be represented by counsel -- and 
thus that counsel be appointed for him if necessary -- during 
his civil c. 209A proceedings because he was later criminally 
punished for violating the resulting order.  In other words, the 
defendant contends that defendants in abuse prevention order 
proceedings have a constitutional right to counsel if they are 
later to be prosecuted for violating the resulting order. 
 
The constitutional right to counsel generally originates 
from one of two sources.  First, under the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, "criminal defendants [enjoy] the right to 
counsel at all 'critical stages' of the prosecution" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Neary-French, 475 Mass. 167, 170 
(2016).  Second, the right to counsel may apply to civil 
proceedings under the Fourteenth Amendment or cognate provisions 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights where necessary to 
satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.  See, e.g., 
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981) 
(due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment may, in some cases, 
require appointment of counsel in proceedings terminating 
14 
 
indigent parent's rights); Department of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 
379 Mass. 1, 4 (1979) (art. 10 of Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights provides right to appointed counsel for indigent parents 
in proceedings seeking to terminate their parental rights). 
 
A.  Criminal right to counsel.  Under the Sixth Amendment 
and art. 12, a criminal defendant must be afforded a right to 
counsel in proceedings that do or could directly lead to "actual 
imprisonment."7  Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979).  
See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662-665 (2002) (counsel 
required where conviction would result in imposition of 
suspended sentence).  Cf. G. L. c. 211D, § 2B ("A person charged 
with a misdemeanor or a violation of a municipal ordinance or 
bylaw . . . shall not be appointed counsel if the judge, at 
arraignment, informs such person on the record that, if the 
person is convicted of such offense, the person's sentence shall 
not include any period of incarceration"); Lavallee v. Justices 
in the Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228, 239-240 (2004) 
(judges may exercise discretion when deciding whether to 
announce at arraignment that misdemeanor defendant faces no 
incarceration and thus no counsel need be appointed).  In the 
instant case, we read the defendant's invocation of the Sixth 
 
 
7 As the defendant faced the possibility of "actual 
imprisonment" under G. L. c. 209A, § 7, he properly was 
represented by counsel at all critical stages of his 
prosecution.  He ultimately received a sentence of probation. 
15 
 
Amendment and art. 12 as an argument that these constitutional 
provisions required that he be afforded the right to counsel in 
the earlier abuse prevention order proceeding because that 
proceeding led to the issuing of the abuse prevention order, the 
violation of which led to the subsequent criminal charges and 
risk of imprisonment.  We disagree. 
 
First, the right to counsel applies only to criminal 
defendants, and the initial c. 209A proceedings are civil in 
nature.  See G. L. c. 209A, § 3A.  Second, even if the right to 
counsel were extended to civil defendants who might later face 
criminal charges related to a civil proceeding, we conclude that 
there is no violation to such right to counsel when a distinct, 
constitutionally permissible -- albeit uncounselled -- 
proceeding provides a predicate for an entirely different, 
constitutionally permissible criminal proceeding.  Where both 
the predicate and subsequent proceedings are criminal in nature, 
"[t]he United States Supreme Court has squarely held that this 
[type of relationship between proceedings] is permissible under 
the Sixth Amendment."  Commonwealth v. Faherty, 93 Mass. App. 
Ct. 129, 132 (2018), citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 
738, 748-749 (1994) (prior operating while under influence [OUI] 
convictions, for which defendant went uncounselled and had no 
right to counsel because he faced no actual incarceration, could 
be used as predicates for subsequent OUI conviction as repeat 
16 
 
offender).  See United States v. Bryant, 579 U.S. 140, 151-156 
(2016) (prior uncounselled convictions of domestic abuse in 
tribal court, which were valid under Indian Civil Rights Act and 
did not violate Sixth Amendment, could be predicate offenses for 
felony domestic assault by habitual offender); Nichols, supra at 
746-747(prior uncounselled misdemeanor conviction, for which 
defendant had no right to counsel, could be used to enhance 
sentence at subsequent conviction). 
 
The defendant has not cited any reason to believe art. 12 
would provide any enhanced protection for criminal defendants in 
this context.8  See Faherty,  93 Mass. App. Ct. at 132 ("we see 
no reason why art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
would forbid the use of a constitutionally valid conviction in a 
subsequent case"); id. at 133, citing Commonwealth v. Martin, 
425 Mass. 718, 720-721 (1997) ("Respect for the defendant's 
constitutional rights, not increments in reliability, must be 
the touchstone here" [citation omitted]).  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Delorey, 369 Mass. 323, 329-330 (1975) (conviction obtained 
 
 
8 Although not dispositive in a constitutional analysis, it 
is worth noting that Massachusetts law contemplates this type of 
relationship between criminal proceedings.  See, e.g., G. L. 
c. 272, § 53 (b) (first offense of disorderly conduct punishable 
by fine only; second offense, for which first offense must be 
predicate, punishable by incarceration); G. L. c. 266, § 30A 
(first and second offenses of misdemeanor shoplifting punishable 
by fine only; third offense punishable by incarceration). 
17 
 
without counsel because defendant was found not indigent and 
declined to retain counsel could be admitted in subsequent 
proceeding). 
 
We see no reason why this reasoning should not extend to 
contexts in which the initial, predicate proceeding is merely a 
civil one.  Indeed, whether the predicate proceeding is civil or 
criminal in nature, the same logic applies.  Each proceeding 
arises from wholly different alleged conduct, and so the latter 
proceeding "do[es] not change the penalty [or other consequence] 
imposed for the earlier" conduct.  Nichols, 511 U.S. at 747.  
Compare Bryant, 579 U.S. at 141 (uncounselled tribal court 
convictions can serve as predicate offenses for felony 
conviction because felony conviction "punishes [defendant's] 
most recent acts . . . not his prior crimes prosecuted in tribal 
court"), with Shelton, 535 U.S. at 662 (counsel required where 
conviction would result in imposition of suspended sentence 
because "[o]nce the prison term is triggered, the defendant is 
incarcerated not for the probation violation but for the 
underlying offense"). 
 
Here, for example, an abuse prevention order was issued 
against the defendant due to conduct that occurred prior to the 
c. 209A civil proceeding (i.e., his abuse of the victim), while 
the defendant was later tried and convicted on the basis of 
conduct that occurred exclusively after the c. 209A civil 
18 
 
proceeding (i.e., his violation of the c. 209A order).  
Accordingly, the defendant's conviction and sentence were not 
for his prior abuse of the victim -- the issue before the court 
during the civil proceeding for which the defendant was 
uncounselled.  Thus, while the defendant's constitutional right 
to counsel required that he be represented at trial for his 
violation of the abuse prevention order (because he faced actual 
incarceration under G. L. c. 209A, § 7), it did not require that 
he be represented at the proceedings that led to the abuse 
prevention order being issued originally. 
 
B.  Procedural due process.  Next, the defendant contends 
that procedural due process requires the appointment of counsel 
for those indigent defendants in c. 209A hearings who will later 
be prosecuted for violating abuse prevention orders.  We again 
disagree. 
 
We conclude that there is no violation to defendants' 
constitutional right to due process where an underlying, 
constitutionally permissible -- albeit uncounselled -- 
proceeding later provides a predicate for a different, 
constitutionally permissible criminal proceeding.  In Bryant, 
579 U.S. at 156-157, for example, the Supreme Court held that 
there was no due process violation where the defendant's 
previous tribal court convictions were used to satisfy an 
element of the Federal offense of which he was convicted.  
19 
 
There, the defendant had been constitutionally convicted in 
tribal court without the assistance of counsel.  See id. at 143. 
("the Sixth Amendment does not apply to tribal-court 
proceedings").  Because the Indian Civil Rights Act provides for 
other procedural safeguards in tribal proceedings -- even absent 
the assistance of counsel -- the Supreme Court held that those 
tribal court proceedings "sufficiently ensure the reliability of 
tribal-court convictions[, and t]herefore[] the use of those 
convictions in a [subsequent] federal prosecution does not 
violate a defendant's right to due process."  Id. at 157.  
Accordingly, we reason that so long as the c. 209A civil 
proceeding and subsequent criminal proceeding at issue here met 
the requirements of due process, then it did not violate due 
process that the violation of the c. 209A order formed the basis 
for the subsequent criminal proceeding. 
 
We have already considered a challenge to the underlying 
c. 209A proceedings on constitutional due process grounds.  In 
Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592 (1995), overruled on another 
ground by Zullo, 423 Mass. at 681, we rejected such facial 
challenges to c. 209A, holding that "[t]he general pattern to be 
followed in G. L. c. 209A proceedings is both fair and 
reasonably clear.  Whether a defendant's constitutional rights 
have been violated will depend upon the fairness of a particular 
proceeding."  Frizado, supra at 598.  See Lonergan-Gillen v. 
20 
 
Gillen, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 746, 750 (2003) ("The due process 
rights of a defendant in a G. L. c. 209A proceeding are amply 
protected").  See Nollet v. Justices of the Trial Court of the 
Commonwealth of Mass., 83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 214 (D. Mass.), 
aff'd, 248 F.3d 1127 (1st Cir. 2000) ("the ex parte proceeding 
of [c.] 209A, § 4, provides all the procedural protections 
necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process of law").  
Moreover, as stated supra, the defendant does not argue that at 
the time his c. 209A proceeding occurred, the proceedings 
suffered from constitutional defects personal to him, nor does 
he ask us to reconsider generally the procedural safeguards 
provided for all civil defendants under G. L. c. 209A.9  The 
 
 
9 Although the defendant expressly has declined to ask us to 
consider generally the procedural safeguards in c. 209A civil 
proceedings, he and amici CPCS, WBA, and NCCRC cite to a line of 
this court's decisions, most of which were subsequent to 
Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, in which this court has concluded that 
due process requires a right to counsel in some cases 
implicating parental rights.  See, e.g., L.B. v. Chief Justice 
of the Probate & Family Court Dep't, 474 Mass. 231, 242-243 
(2016) (indigent parent has right to court-appointed counsel in 
contested proceeding to modify terms of guardianship); 
Guardianship of V.V., 470 Mass. 590, 592-594 (2015) (indigent 
parent has right to court-appointed counsel in contested, 
private guardianship proceeding); Adoption of Meaghan, 461 Mass. 
1006, 1007 (2012) (indigent parent has right to court-appointed 
counsel in contested adoption proceedings); J.K.B., 379 Mass. at 
2-5 (indigent parent has right to court-appointed counsel in 
State-initiated, contested proceeding to terminate parental 
rights).  But see G. L. c. 209C, § 7 (counsel may be appointed 
in contested private custody proceeding, but only when "the 
interests of justice require").  Accordingly, we take this 
opportunity to note that we need not and do not reach this issue 
 
21 
 
defendant also does not argue that any other aspect of the 
criminal proceedings to which he was subject separately violated 
due process. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant's right to due 
process was not violated when he was prosecuted criminally and 
convicted for violating an abuse prevention order that issued 
during a proceeding for which he was uncounselled and afforded 
no right to counsel. 
 
c.  Alleged trial errors.  i.  Standard of review.  In 
addition to his constitutional challenges, the defendant asserts 
that the trial judge erred by (1) denying his motion for a 
mistrial after the victim spontaneously stated that the 
defendant previously had assaulted her and (2) disallowing 
questions regarding the victim's continued possession of the 
defendant's personal belongings.  We review for an abuse of 
 
here.  In the instant case, there is no evidence that the 
defendant shared children with the victim, and the defendant 
makes no argument that the proceedings at issue implicated his 
parental rights. 
 
Likewise, the defendant and amicus CPCS note that 
defendants in abuse prevention order proceedings may face 
difficult decisions with regard to their Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination when they are also being prosecuted 
for the underlying abusive conduct.  The defendant in the 
instant case, however, was prosecuted for his subsequent 
violation of the abuse prevention order, not for the abuse that 
gave rise to the order.  No testimony from the prior abuse 
prevention order proceeding was introduced at his trial.  
Accordingly, we again note that we need not and do not reach 
this issue here. 
22 
 
discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Denton, 477 Mass. 248, 250 
(2017) (evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion); 
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 476 Mass. 186, 197 (2017) (denial of 
motion for mistrial reviewed for abuse of discretion). 
 
ii.  Denial of motion for mistrial.  Prior to trial, the 
defendant successfully moved in limine to exclude any evidence 
of "bad character, prior misconduct, subsequent misconduct, or 
alcohol abuse."  At trial, the Commonwealth asked the victim 
when her relationship with the defendant ended, to which the 
victim responded, "The night that he assaulted me the last 
time."  The judge immediately struck the statement and 
instructed the jury to "disregard the witness's answer."  The 
judge then denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial.  The 
defendant asserts that the denial was an abuse of discretion 
because the victim's statement was highly prejudicial, 
particularly in light of her later testimony that she had 
suffered brain damage caused by "blows to [her] head."  We 
disagree. 
 
"Where a party seeks a mistrial in response to the jury's 
exposure to inadmissible evidence, the judge may correctly rely 
on curative instructions as an adequate means to correct any 
error and to remedy any prejudice to the defendant."  
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 482 Mass. 731, 740 (2019).  "As long as 
the judge's instructions are prompt and the jury do not again 
23 
 
hear the inadmissible evidence," a mistrial may not be 
necessary.  Commonwealth v. Garrey, 436 Mass. 422, 435 (2002).  
 
Here, the statement "came as a surprise to both parties," 
without "any wrongful conduct by the prosecutor," Commonwealth 
v. Roby, 462 Mass. 398, 413 (2012), and was not repeated.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 223 (1983) (mistrial not 
required where improper remark "was apparently inadvertent, and 
was not repeated").  The judge gave a prompt and effective 
instruction immediately following the improper testimony, then 
reminded the jury in his final charge not to consider any struck 
testimony.  See Commonwealth v. Bolling, 462 Mass. 440, 455 
(2012).  Because "[w]e presume that the jury follow the judge's 
instructions," including instructions to disregard testimony, 
there is no reason to believe that the defendant was unduly 
prejudiced.  Commonwealth v. Cortez, 438 Mass. 123, 130 (2002). 
 
We do not agree with the defendant's assertion that the 
victim's statement, when viewed in conjunction with her 
testimony about her brain damage, was so prejudicial as to 
overcome our presumption that jurors follow the judge's 
instructions.  The victim's testimony about previous 
"assault[s]" and "blows to [her] head" was not relevant in 
determining the question before the jury, i.e., whether the 
defendant violated the existing c. 209A order.  See Roby, 462 
Mass. at 413 (no mistrial required where inadmissible testimony 
24 
 
"did not bear on the charged conduct").  In addition, prior to 
the statement, the jury already were aware that the victim had 
obtained an abuse prevention order against the defendant.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 408 Mass. 510, 517 (1990) (no abuse 
of discretion by judge in denying motion for mistrial after jury 
inadvertently learned that physical examination of defendant 
occurred in jail, where jury already knew defendant had been 
taken into police custody).  Thus, in the circumstances here, 
the judge's instructions cured any potential prejudice from the 
struck testimony, and there was no error in the denial of the 
defendant's motion for a mistrial. 
 
iii.  Limitation on cross-examination.  During cross-
examination, the defendant sought to question the victim about 
her retention of his belongings after he was forced to vacate 
the rooming house.  The judge permitted some questioning on the 
subject, and the defendant was able to establish that (1) he 
left property behind after moving out of the rooming house, 
(2) at the time of trial, the victim was still in possession of 
that property, and (3) the victim had agreed to give the 
defendant an opportunity to collect his property.  The judge 
subsequently prohibited questioning with respect to whether the 
victim (1) entered the defendant's former residence to retrieve 
the property, (2) currently had the defendant's belongings in 
her possession, or (3) had agreed to allow the defendant to 
25 
 
retrieve his property.  The defendant asserts that these 
prohibited questions would have tended to prove that the victim 
fabricated the violation of the abuse prevention order so that 
she could retain the defendant's property while he was 
incarcerated.  The defendant argues that, by prohibiting the 
proposed questions, the judge violated his right to present a 
defense under the Sixth Amendment and art. 12.  We disagree. 
 
The defendant is correct that "[c]ross-examination of a 
prosecution witness to show the witness's bias or prejudice is a 
matter of right under the Sixth Amendment . . . and art. 12" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Avalos, 454 Mass. 1, 6 
(2009).  Nonetheless, the right is not absolute, and we "have 
held that 'a judge does have discretion to limit cross-
examination concerning possible bias when further questioning 
would be redundant'" (alteration omitted).  Id. at 7, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Allison, 434 Mass. 670, 681 (2001).  So long as 
the defendant's allegations are "sufficiently aired," the right 
to present a defense under the Sixth Amendment and art. 12 is 
satisfied.  Avalos, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. LaVelle, 414 
Mass. 146, 154 (1993). 
 
Here, the victim had already provided testimony that went 
to what each of the prohibited questions sought to elicit.  
Before defense counsel asked the victim whether she retained 
possession of the defendant's belongings, the victim already had 
26 
 
testified that the defendant's belongings were "still there [in 
a closet]."  Similarly, only moments before being asked whether 
she had "agreed to allow [the defendant] to come pick up [his] 
property," the victim testified without objection that she had 
"agreed to give [the defendant] an opportunity to pick up his 
property."10  Finally, there was no abuse of discretion in the 
judge's decision to exclude the defendant's question as to 
whether the victim had entered his former residence to obtain 
his property:  while the victim's continued possession of the 
defendant's property might bear on bias, providing a possible 
motive for fabricating the violation, the way she obtained the 
property does not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
10 The abuse prevention order itself, which was admitted in 
evidence, provided that the defendant "may pick up [his] 
personal belongings in the company of police at a time agreed to 
by the [victim]."