Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Willard

Citation: 2009-Ohio-3629

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Willard, 123 Ohio St.3d 15, 2009-Ohio-3629.] 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. WILLARD. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Willard, 123 Ohio St.3d 15, 2009-Ohio-3629.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Partnering with nonlawyer organization — Six 
violations of the Disciplinary Rules — License suspension, partially 
stayed. 
(No. 2009-0465 — Submitted June 16, 2009 — Decided July 30, 2009.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 08-042. 
–––––––––––––––––– 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, John Thaddeus Willard of Hamilton, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0002125, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1966.  
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends that we 
suspend respondent’s license for one year, staying the suspension upon 
conditions, for his conduct in partnering with a nonlawyer organization to 
represent clients and for representing them with very little preparation or 
communication.  We agree that respondent committed the misconduct found by 
the board and find two additional violations of the Disciplinary Rules.  We also 
conclude that respondent’s reproachable acts warrant a harsher punishment than 
that recommended by the board and accordingly suspend respondent for one year 
with six months stayed. 
I.  Procedural History 
{¶ 2} Relator, Disciplinary 
Counsel, filed a complaint against 
respondent, alleging violations of six Disciplinary Rules based on respondent’s 
conduct in representing numerous clients referred to him by a foreclosure 
assistance service.  A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
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Discipline heard the case and concluded that respondent had committed four 
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, but that there was a lack of 
clear and convincing evidence that respondent had committed the other two 
alleged violations.  The panel recommended a suspension from the practice of law 
for one year, with the entire suspension stayed.  The board adopted the panel’s 
findings and sanction, recommending a stayed suspension of one year. 
{¶ 3} Relator filed objections to the board’s decision, arguing that there 
was sufficient evidence to support finding violations of the remaining two 
Disciplinary Rules and that respondent should be given a one-year suspension 
with only six months stayed. 
II.  Misconduct 
A.  Introduction 
{¶ 4} Respondent was contacted by Foreclosure Alternatives in 2004 to 
represent customers in foreclosure actions.  Foreclosure Alternatives is a company 
that solicits clients who are defendants in pending foreclosure proceedings by 
offering to intervene on their behalf and negotiate with the foreclosing lender.  
The company is not owned by attorneys, and to the parties’ knowledge, it has no 
attorney employees. 
{¶ 5} Foreclosure Alternatives sends direct-mail advertisements to these 
individuals.  Any customers who respond are contacted by an employee to 
schedule a meeting, and a packet of information is sent to the customer.  The 
packet includes a mediation agreement, which lays out the company’s fees, and 
instructions for the customer to deposit money in an account on a monthly basis to 
demonstrate to the lender the customer’s ability to make payments.  A limited 
power of attorney is also included in the packet, which provides authority to an 
unnamed attorney to take legal action on the customer’s behalf.  None of the 
information provided discloses the fee that will be paid to the attorney out of the 
general fee paid to Foreclosure Alternatives.  The information does state that the 
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3 
company is “here to make this dreadful process go away,” and the panel found 
that customers understood this phrase to mean that the company would resolve all 
foreclosure issues in their best interests. 
B.  Respondent’s Protocol for Cases from Foreclosure Alternatives 
{¶ 6} Respondent agreed to limited representation of customers referred 
by Foreclosure Alternatives for a fixed fee of $150 per case.  His representation 
was limited to filing responsive pleadings, because the company retained 
authority to negotiate with the lender.  Respondent participated in a minimum of 
28 cases referred by Foreclosure Alternatives. 
{¶ 7} Under respondent’s usual protocol for these cases, he would 
receive a copy of the foreclosure complaint filed against the client and the limited 
power of attorney from Foreclosure Alternatives.  He would then file an answer to 
the complaint or a motion to strike and send a copy to the client along with a letter 
stating: “This is a response I filed on your behalf.  I had a referral from 
Foreclosure Alternatives.  If there are any other defenses you can think of, feel 
free to call me.”  This letter was the first communication with the client, and, in 
fact, usually the first occasion for the client to learn the name of his attorney.  Out 
of the 28 or more Foreclosure Alternatives clients, respondent discussed cases 
with only three or four of them. 
{¶ 8} Negotiations with the lender were conducted by Foreclosure 
Alternatives; respondent was not even informed of their progress.  The next action 
respondent would take was to notify the company when he received a motion for 
summary judgment filed by the lender.  If the client had no defense, respondent 
sent a letter to the client stating: “A motion for summary judgment was filed.  I 
suggest that you consider a Chapter 13 bankruptcy or a bankruptcy.”  Respondent 
did not otherwise personally communicate with the client. 
C.  The Chandlers’ Case 
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{¶ 9} The foreclosure on the home of David and Annette Chandler led to 
this professional grievance.  The Chandlers contacted the company after receiving 
an advertisement.  They then received the typical packet of information and 
subsequently submitted a copy of the complaint filed against them by their lender, 
Wells Fargo, the signed power of attorney, and the signed mediation agreement. 
{¶ 10} After the Chandlers wrote a check for $450, half of the total fee, 
Foreclosure Alternatives notified them that the “attorney has filed plea [sic] and 
answered the complaint in your foreclosure case,” although the letter did not 
identify the attorney, and no answer was ever filed.  The company did not actually 
refer the case to respondent for another two months.  By the time respondent 
received the file, in October 2006, the court had already entered a default 
judgment against the Chandlers and had ordered that their house be sold.  Instead 
of contacting the clients, however, respondent told the company that it was too 
late to help the Chandlers; he agreed, however, to do “something” and accepted 
the fee.  Respondent filed a motion to strike the complaint and eventually 
contacted Wells Fargo.  The lender’s representative informed respondent that the 
sale of the Chandlers’ home would go forward as scheduled on October 23. 
{¶ 11} The Chandlers learned of the sale of their home through a 
newspaper notice only two weeks prior to the scheduled date.  Upon contacting 
Foreclosure Alternatives, the company informed them that everything was fine.  
But on October 20, Foreclosure Alternatives told the Chandlers that their situation 
was hopeless.  The Chandlers were not notified that a motion to strike had been 
filed, and they never received a copy of the motion.  The foreclosure sale took 
place as scheduled on October 23.  It was only in early December that the 
Chandlers learned respondent’s name by examining court documents.  The 
Chandlers wrote to respondent and requested that he forward their file to another 
attorney, who subsequently filed the grievance against respondent along with a 
civil suit against respondent and Foreclosure Alternatives. 
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D.  Disciplinary Rule Violations 
{¶ 12} The board first found respondent to have violated DR 2-103(C) (In 
general, a lawyer shall not request a person or organization to recommend or 
promote the use of the lawyer’s services).  We agree with the board’s finding.  
Respondent entered into an oral agreement with Foreclosure Alternatives whereby 
the company, which did not employ any attorneys, would solicit business from 
customers and refer the cases to respondent.  The company does not qualify as an 
authorized referral service as described in DR 2-103(C)(1).  Respondent had no 
contact with the clients prior to the referral, and he obtained the business only 
because of this agreement with the company.  In fact, the clients did not even 
know the identity of their attorney before he began work on their cases. 
{¶ 13} The board also found respondent to have violated DR 3-101(A) (A 
lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law).  “We have 
held that by advising debtors of their legal rights and the terms and conditions of 
settlement in negotiations to avoid pending foreclosure proceedings, laypersons 
engage in the unauthorized practice of law.”  Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Mullaney, 
119 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008-Ohio-4541, 894 N.E.2d 1210, ¶ 20, citing Cincinnati 
Bar Assn. v. Telford (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 111, 707 N.E.2d 462.  Though 
respondent provided in-court legal representation by filing pleadings on behalf of 
the Chandlers and other clients, all negotiations with creditors were performed by 
Foreclosure Alternatives.  This arrangement was part of the agreement between 
respondent and the company.  It is not contested that Foreclosure Alternatives 
does not employ any attorneys. 
{¶ 14} The board next found a violation of DR 3-102(A) (In general, a 
lawyer shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer).  The Chandlers and other 
customers paid a set fee to Foreclosure Alternatives to handle negotiations with 
foreclosing lenders and to provide advice regarding their situation.  This work 
amounts to the practice of law.  See Mullaney, 119 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008-Ohio-
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4541, 894 N.E.2d 1210, at ¶ 20.  The company then transferred $150 of the set fee 
paid by customers to respondent for each case he handled.  Because Foreclosure 
Alternatives does not employ attorneys, by his participation in this arrangement, 
respondent shared legal fees with a nonlawyer. 
{¶ 15} Finally, the board found a violation of DR 3-103(A) (A lawyer 
shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the 
partnership consist of the practice of law).  As we have explained, the actions of 
respondent and Foreclosure Alternatives constituted the practice of law by 
representing debtors facing foreclosure.  Respondent partnered with the company 
to provide these legal services, with respondent filing formal pleadings on the 
clients’ behalf and the company advising the clients and negotiating with lenders.  
Respondent has not filed objections to these findings, and we agree with the board 
that respondent violated these four Disciplinary Rules. 
{¶ 16} But the board found a lack of clear and convincing evidence to 
support alleged violations of both DR 6-101(A)(2) and 7-101(A)(1), and relator 
has now objected to their dismissal.  The objections are well taken. 
{¶ 17} DR 6-101(A)(2) prohibits a lawyer from handling a legal matter 
without adequate preparation.  The parties stipulated that respondent’s conduct 
violated this rule, but the board concluded that even a more prepared attorney 
could not have done more for the Chandlers because default judgment had already 
been entered against them.  The board assumed that the Chandlers’ circumstances 
did not allow for any form of relief from the default judgment.  But though a 
default judgment had been entered, respondent still accepted the case from 
Foreclosure Alternatives and filed a motion to strike without contacting his clients 
to learn about their situation and any possible defenses.  An attorney cannot be 
adequately prepared to represent clients if he has never even bothered to contact 
them. 
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{¶ 18} The board’s analysis of DR 6-101(A)(2) also ignored the other 
clients whom respondent represented on referral from Foreclosure Alternatives.  
The stipulated facts show that respondent typically filed an answer to a 
foreclosure complaint against clients without contacting them.  His initial contact 
involved a copy of the answer and a cover letter that put the burden on the clients 
to put forth any additional legal defenses.  Respondent discussed cases with only 
three or four actual clients, and he did not negotiate with the clients’ lenders.  
When a motion for summary judgment was filed against his clients, he simply 
sent a letter to the client notifying them of that fact and suggesting that they file 
bankruptcy.  These facts show a lack of preparedness in violation of the 
Disciplinary Rules for all Foreclosure Alternatives clients.  We hold that 
respondent violated DR 6-101(A)(2), as the parties stipulated. 
{¶ 19} DR 7-101(A)(1) prohibits a lawyer from intentionally failing to 
seek the lawful objectives of his client.  The board’s finding that this alleged 
violation is not supported by clear and convincing evidence is incorrect.  With 
respect to the Chandlers, respondent failed to seek their objectives by not 
contacting them to discover whether there remained any means to aid them in 
avoiding the pending foreclosure.  With respect to the other clients, respondent 
violated this rule by “surrendering [his] professional judgment to” the company.  
Mullaney, 119 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008-Ohio-4541, 894 N.E.2d 1210, at ¶ 23.  In 
Mullaney, we noted that “[c]ounseling debtors in financial crisis as to their best 
course of legal action requires the attention of a qualified attorney.”  Id. at ¶ 24, 
citing Columbus Bar Assn. v. Flanagan (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 381, 383, 674 
N.E.2d 681.  Here, however, respondent was involved in the cases only to the 
extent that he filed responsive pleadings in court.  All advising and negotiation 
were left to Foreclosure Alternatives.  Respondent “failed to evaluate [his] clients’ 
situations and develop a strategy to meet their individualized needs.”  Id. at ¶ 27.  
We hold that respondent also violated DR 7-101(A)(1). 
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III.  Sanction 
{¶ 20} The proper sanction for violations of the Disciplinary Rules is 
determined by consideration of “the duties violated, respondent’s mental state, the 
injury caused, the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and 
applicable precedent.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 497, 
501, 733 N.E.2d 609.  Each factor is addressed below. 
A.  Duties Violated and Injury Caused 
{¶ 21} Respondent’s representation of clients referred from Foreclosure 
Alternatives led to violations of six Disciplinary Rules.  Respondent arranged for 
an organization to promote his services, partnered with a nonlawyer to aid the 
other in the unauthorized practice of law and share legal fees, assumed cases 
without adequate preparation, and failed to seek the objectives of his clients.  He 
represented at least 28 clients with very little communication and little or no 
knowledge of each client’s particular circumstances.  He relegated the negotiation 
of his clients’ legal matters to nonlawyers, possibly leading to foreclosures on his 
clients’ homes.  Respondent’s misconduct may very well have resulted in clients’ 
losing their homes. 
B.  Mental State 
{¶ 22} Because there has been no evidence presented to the contrary, we 
presume that respondent’s mental state was healthy during the relevant period.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. McCord, 121 Ohio St.3d 497, 2009-Ohio-1517, 905 
N.E.2d 1182, ¶ 45. 
C.  Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances 
{¶ 23} A nonexhaustive list of the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances that may be considered in disciplinary cases is found in Section 
10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and 
Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  In mitigation, the board noted that respondent has no prior 
January Term, 2009 
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disciplinary record, that he displayed a cooperative attitude during the disciplinary 
process, that he lacked a dishonest or selfish motive, and that three letters were 
submitted to the panel attesting to respondent’s character and reputation.  BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (b), (d), and (e).  On the aggravation side, the board 
acknowledged the vulnerability and resulting harm to the victims of respondent’s 
misconduct.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(h).  The Chandlers were lay people who 
relied on an unnamed attorney to protect their interests in court as Foreclosure 
Alternatives negotiated with the lender.  Although respondent did not accept the 
case until after default judgment had been entered against the Chandlers, he still 
neglected to contact his clients, even after filing a motion to strike on their behalf.  
The Chandlers learned of the pending foreclosure sale of their home of 18 years 
through a newspaper notice. 
{¶ 24} The board found this aggravating factor alone to outweigh the 
mitigating factors, considering that many of the problems resulted from 
respondent’s initial agreement with Foreclosure Alternatives.  We also find two 
additional aggravating factors.  First, respondent committed multiple offenses in 
his representation of each individual client.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d).  
Second, respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct because he represented at 
least 28 clients referred from Foreclosure Alternatives over a two-and-a-half-year 
period when his typical protocol resulted in disciplinary violations.  BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c).  We adopt the aggravating and mitigating circumstances as 
found by the panel and board, with the addition of the two aggravating 
circumstances. 
D.  Applicable Precedent 
{¶ 25} The primary precedent is Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Mullaney, 119 
Ohio St.3d 412, 2008-Ohio-4541, 894 N.E.2d 1210.  In that case, three attorneys 
were disciplined for representing a total of approximately 2,000 clients in the 
manner under review here.  Id. at ¶ 5-18, 43-45.  The attorneys entered an 
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agreement with a company called Foreclosure Solutions, L.L.C., which similarly 
solicited customers that were defendants in foreclosure actions, offering to 
negotiate with the lender and provide an attorney to represent them in court.  Id. at 
¶ 8.  The company then referred a case to an attorney and transferred a portion of 
the fee paid by the customer.  Id. 
{¶ 26} The attorneys would then send each client a brochure describing 
the foreclosure process and file boilerplate pleadings in response to the 
complaints filed against their clients.  Id. at ¶ 15.  Copies of those pleadings 
would also be sent to the clients.  Id.  The attorneys did not typically meet with 
the clients or otherwise attempt to determine the circumstances of each client’s 
case for possible legal defenses.  Id. at ¶ 17.  Instead, one of their standard letters 
asked whether the client knew of any available defenses, similar to respondent’s 
letters here.  Id.  When judgment was entered against a client, the attorneys would 
notify the client of the pending foreclosure sale and recommend contacting a 
bankruptcy lawyer.  Id. at ¶ 15. 
{¶ 27} The facts in Mullaney are strikingly similar to those in the instant 
case.  Two of the attorneys in Mullaney were found to have violated the very six 
Disciplinary Rules that respondent violated.  Id. at ¶ 19-27.  We also took note of 
nearly the same aggravating and mitigating circumstances in Mullaney.  Id. at ¶ 
37-42.  One attorney in Mullaney was given a public reprimand because we found 
him to be an inexperienced associate who devoted many hours to his clients, but 
was constrained by the standard policies in place at the firm for representing 
clients referred by Foreclosure Solutions.  Id. at ¶ 40.  An injunction was ordered 
against a second attorney, who was not admitted to practice in Ohio, prohibiting 
him from practicing pro hac vice in the state for two years.  Id. at ¶ 42.  The third 
attorney, an experienced practitioner most similar to respondent, was given a one-
year suspension, all stayed on the condition of no further misconduct.  Id. at ¶ 41. 
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{¶ 28} Despite the similarities to Mullaney, the current case is 
distinguishable in ways that warrant a harsher punishment for respondent.  First, 
we adopted the recommendation of the board in Mullaney when neither party 
objected to it.  Id. at ¶ 1, 4.  The relator, here, did object to the board’s 
recommended sanction, asking us to hold that respondent had violated DR 6-
101(A)(2) and 7-101(A)(1), as we did above, and to order a one-year suspension 
with only six months stayed. 
{¶ 29} Second, respondent’s actions specifically relating to the Chandlers 
adds additional misconduct to the protocol followed with his other clients, which 
was nearly identical to that in Mullaney.  Respondent testified that when he 
received the Chandlers’ case file from Foreclosure Alternatives, he concluded that 
it was too late to help them because a default judgment had already been entered 
against them.  The problem is that respondent took the case anyway, accepted the 
fee, and filed a boilerplate motion to strike without even contacting the Chandlers.  
Respondent in fact never contacted the Chandlers during the entire period he 
represented them.  This total lack of communication is more egregious than the 
conduct we found objectionable in Mullaney. 
{¶ 30} We have held that an actual suspension is warranted in somewhat 
similar cases involving attorneys who represented clients through arrangements 
with companies that employed nonlawyers and marketed living trusts to 
customers.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Wheatley, 107 Ohio St.3d 224, 2005-Ohio-
6266, 837 N.E.2d 1188, ¶ 3, 40; Columbus Bar Assn. v. Fishman, 98 Ohio St.3d 
172, 2002-Ohio-7086, 781 N.E.2d 204, ¶ 1, 21; Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Kathman 
(2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 92, 93, 98, 748 N.E.2d 1091.  But see Cincinnati Bar Assn. 
v. Heisler, 113 Ohio St.3d 447, 2007-Ohio-2338, 866 N.E.2d 490, ¶ 18, 21 
(ordering six-month stayed suspension of attorney that accepted referrals from a 
nonlawyer company that marketed estate planning services, where attorney 
personally interviewed clients and exercised independent judgment regarding 
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each client’s circumstances).  In each case, the attorney received referrals from 
the companies after nonlawyer employees collected information from the 
customer or completed the living-trust documentation, which was then forwarded 
to the attorney for final preparation or approval of the legal documents.  Wheatley 
at ¶ 4-14; Fishman at ¶ 2-8; Kathman at 93-94.  The attorney had little or no 
direct communication with clients.  Wheatley at ¶ 5, 13-15; Fishman at ¶ 2-7; 
Kathman at 93-94.  Respondent’s conduct in the case before us similarly deserves 
an actual suspension. 
E.  Determination 
{¶ 31} Respondent’s conduct in this case constituted violations of six 
Disciplinary Rules and warrants an actual suspension from the practice of law.  
We therefore decline to adopt the board’s recommended sanction and instead 
order that respondent be suspended for a period of one year, with six months 
stayed on condition that he commit no further misconduct.  If respondent fails to 
comply with this condition, the stay will be lifted, and respondent will serve the 
one-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent and would suspend 
respondent from the practice of law in Ohio for one year, all stayed on conditions. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Carol A. Costa, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Reminger Co., L.P.A., and Rick L. Weil, for respondent. 
______________________