Case Title: People v. Brooks

Citation: 2017 IL 121413

Docket Number: 121413

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2017-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 IL 121413 
IN THE  
SUPREME COURT  
OF  
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS  
(Docket No. 121413) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
MICHAEL BROOKS, Appellee. 
Opinion filed November 30, 2017. 
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and 
Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
OPINION 
¶ 1 
The defendant, Michael Brooks, was charged with driving under the influence 
following a single-vehicle motorcycle accident. He filed a motion to suppress the 
results of blood-alcohol testing on the ground that the blood draw performed at the 
hospital after his accident was a governmental search conducted in violation of the 
fourth amendment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶ 2 
The circuit court granted defendant’s motion, and the appellate court affirmed 
(2016 IL App (5th) 150095-U). We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. 
Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Mar. 15, 2016). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the 
judgments of the lower courts. 
¶ 3 
Background 
¶ 4 
Defendant was charged in the circuit court of Effingham County with driving 
under the influence (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2014)) following a 
single-vehicle motorcycle accident on August 14, 2014. On October 30, 2014, 
defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of a blood-alcohol analysis that was 
performed at St. Anthony’s Memorial Hospital (St. Anthony’s) on the night of the 
accident. 
¶ 5 
In his motion, defendant briefly alleged that, after the accident, police officers 
forcibly “placed him in an ambulance and sent him to the hospital,” even though he 
had refused medical treatment. Citing People v. Armer, 2014 IL App (5th) 130342, 
the motion asserted that a blood draw subsequently performed at the hospital was a 
governmental search conducted without a warrant, without his consent, and in the 
absence of exigent circumstances. Thus, according to the motion, the blood draw 
violated defendant’s fourth amendment right to be free from an unreasonable 
search. Defendant’s motion did not challenge the legality of the police officers’ 
seizure of defendant when he was forced to go to the hospital. Rather, the motion 
contended only that the blood draw performed at the hospital was an unlawful 
search. 
¶ 6 
On December 9, 2014, while defendant’s motion was pending, the State issued 
a subpoena duces tecum to St. Anthony’s directing it to produce “[a]ll lab results 
(‘blood work’)” originating from defendant’s admission on or about August 14, 
2014. The subpoena requested that the hospital produce the results of defendant’s 
blood work in a sealed, clearly marked envelope and send it to the Effingham 
County circuit clerk. A docket entry reflects the court received a sealed envelope 
from the hospital on December 12, 2014. 
¶ 7 
Three days later, an evidentiary hearing was held on defendant’s motion to 
suppress. At the start of the hearing, the circuit court noted it was in possession of 
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an envelope from St. Anthony’s but that it had not been opened. Defendant’s 
counsel told the court he presumed the contents of the envelope were the subject 
matter of the motion to suppress. The State responded that it, too, presumed the 
envelope contained the results of medical blood work done on defendant when he 
went to the hospital. The parties, however, did not stipulate to the contents of the 
envelope, and the court did not open it. The hearing then began. 
¶ 8 
Defendant called police officer Thomas Webb from the Effingham police 
department. Webb testified that, on August 14, 2014, at approximately 11:54 p.m., 
he was dispatched to the scene of a single-vehicle motorcycle accident. When he 
arrived, Webb observed a motorcycle on a bush in the front yard of a house. He also 
saw an open-top Jeep across the street, approximately 100 feet from the 
motorcycle, where three other Effingham police officers were gathered. Webb 
walked across the street to the Jeep, which did not belong to defendant, and 
observed defendant sitting in the passenger seat with the door closed. Although 
none of the officers had seen defendant operating a motor vehicle, two witnesses 
who were present informed Webb defendant had been driving the motorcycle. 
¶ 9 
Webb spoke to defendant and, while doing so, noticed defendant’s speech was 
slurred, his eyes were red, and he had an odor of alcohol emitting from his mouth 
when he spoke or yelled at the police. According to Webb, defendant appeared 
agitated by the presence of law enforcement. Webb believed defendant’s leg was 
broken because his foot was “almost upside down.” Webb admitted he had little 
medical training and defendant was not bleeding, but he believed the injury was 
serious. When Webb asked defendant if he wanted to go to the hospital, defendant 
refused. Webb was concerned about defendant’s safety, as he appeared to not be 
thinking rationally because he was screaming and swearing at the police. 
¶ 10 
Emergency medical services (EMS) personnel who were present at the scene 
told Webb defendant needed to go to the hospital and requested Webb’s assistance 
in getting him there. Although defendant continued to decline medical services, 
Webb ordered defendant out of the Jeep. Defendant refused. Thereafter, Webb and 
another officer physically removed defendant from the Jeep, placed him on a 
gurney, and assisted EMS personnel in putting the gurney into the ambulance. 
¶ 11 
Webb reiterated that it was EMS personnel who wanted defendant to get 
medical treatment and that he did not direct anyone to treat defendant. When asked 
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why defendant was removed from the Jeep and forced to go to the hospital, Webb 
testified: “I briefly spoke with EMS and asked them if he was going to be 
transported to the hospital by them. Whenever a subject is intoxicated and a serious 
injury pursues, a lot of times or all the time in that case, ambulance services request 
or order basically that we assist them in removing a subject or putting them on the 
cot and transporting them to the hospital to make sure they get the medical attention 
that they need.” Webb was not in the ambulance when EMS personnel began 
transporting defendant to the hospital. 
¶ 12 
Webb testified that the ambulance stopped after traveling one or two blocks 
because defendant was trying to get out. EMS personnel again asked the police to 
help in transporting defendant. Webb stated that he was concerned at this time for 
the safety of EMS personnel, defendant, and himself. Webb placed defendant on 
the gurney, handcuffed him, and rode in the ambulance the rest of the way to the 
hospital. Webb then assisted EMS personnel in taking defendant into the 
emergency room. 
¶ 13 
At the hospital, Webb read the statutory “Warning to Motorists” to defendant 
and asked him to consent to blood or breath testing. Defendant refused. At that 
point, Webb issued defendant a citation for DUI. Webb stated he did not take a 
sample of defendant’s blood nor did he direct anyone at the hospital to do so. While 
Webb observed nurses working on defendant, he never spoke to them or any 
doctor. Webb stated he had no further contact with the hospital after he left and did 
not know whether defendant ever gave consent for a blood draw. 
¶ 14 
Defendant then testified. Defendant briefly stated that, at the hospital, he never 
consented to have his blood drawn. Every time he was asked to have his blood 
drawn, he refused. Medical staff set his leg, which was broken. Altogether, 
defendant stated he spent approximately 12 hours at the hospital. 
¶ 15 
Defendant rested, and the State called no witnesses. After hearing arguments, 
the circuit court took the matter under advisement and retained the sealed envelope 
from St. Anthony’s. Approximately one month later, the circuit court issued an 
order granting defendant’s motion to suppress. Citing Armer, 2014 IL App (5th) 
130342, the court concluded that a blood draw performed on defendant at 
St. Anthony’s was a governmental search that had been conducted without his 
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consent and that “the State failed to prove exigent circumstances were present to 
obtain a blood draw from Defendant absent a warrant.” 
¶ 16 
Thereafter, the State filed a motion to reconsider. During a hearing on the 
motion, the State maintained that defendant had failed to prove that his blood had, 
in fact, been drawn at the hospital, as there was no evidence introduced at the 
hearing on the motion to suppress which established that fact. In addition, the State 
asserted that, even assuming defendant’s blood was drawn, there was no fourth 
amendment violation because any blood draw performed at the hospital was a 
private search, not a governmental one, and thus there was no State action. 
¶ 17 
The circuit court rejected the State’s arguments. The court stated that under the 
circumstances, there was “some apparent agency” between the hospital and Webb 
and concluded that “the argument that somehow the State wasn’t responsible for 
the blood draw appears to me to be a form over substance argument.” Therefore, 
the court declined to modify its original order. The State filed a certificate of 
impairment and appealed (Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a)(1) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014)). The 
appellate court affirmed. 2016 IL App (5th) 150095-U. 
¶ 18 
The appellate court first rejected the State’s argument that defendant had failed 
to prove any blood draw was actually performed. The court explained that 
defendant filed a motion to suppress and “both parties proceeded to argue the 
merits of the underlying motion, with the understanding a blood draw had been 
performed on the defendant.” Id. ¶ 17. 
¶ 19 
The appellate court then addressed the State’s argument that the blood draw 
was a private search and not the result of State action. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. The court 
emphasized that, despite defendant’s refusal of medical treatment, Webb 
physically removed defendant from the Jeep, forcibly placed him on a gurney and 
into the ambulance, handcuffed him, rode to the hospital, and then assisted EMS 
personnel in delivering defendant to the emergency room. Id. ¶ 21. According to 
the appellate court, this was “ample evidence” that demonstrated “that the State 
participated in forcing defendant to receive medical treatment.” Id. The appellate 
court also noted that there were no exigent circumstances present. Id. ¶ 24. From 
this, the court concluded that “the warrantless blood draw violated defendant’s 
fourth amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search.” Id. ¶ 25 This 
appeal followed. 
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¶ 20 
Analysis 
¶ 21 
At issue before us is the correctness of the circuit court’s order granting 
defendant’s motion to suppress. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 
suppress evidence, we apply a two-part standard of review. People v. Cosby, 231 
Ill. 2d 262, 270-71 (2008). Under this standard, a circuit court’s factual findings are 
reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, while the 
court’s ultimate legal ruling as to whether suppression is warranted is reviewed 
de novo. Id. at 271. 
¶ 22 
When a defendant files a motion to suppress evidence, he bears the burden of 
proof at a hearing on that motion. People v. Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d 298, 306 (2003); 
725 ILCS 5/114-12(b) (West 2016) (“The judge shall receive evidence on any issue 
of fact necessary to determine the motion and the burden of proving that the search 
and seizure were unlawful shall be on the defendant.”). A defendant must make a 
prima facie case that the evidence was obtained by an illegal search or seizure. 
Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d at 306-07. A prima facie showing means that the defendant has 
the primary responsibility for establishing the factual and legal bases for the motion 
to suppress. People v. Berg, 67 Ill. 2d 65, 68 (1977). Where the basis for the motion 
is an allegedly illegal search, the defendant must establish both that there was a 
search and that it was illegal. Id. If a defendant makes a prima facie case, the burden 
shifts to the State to present evidence to counter the defendant’s prima facie case. 
Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d at 307. However, the ultimate burden of proof remains with the 
defendant. Id. 
¶ 23 
The sole allegation raised in defendant’s motion to suppress is that his fourth 
amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search was violated by a blood 
draw conducted at St. Anthony’s. The State contends on appeal that the circuit 
court erred in holding that defendant established a prima facie case that any blood 
draw conducted at the hospital was an illegal search. We agree with the State. 
¶ 24 
To make a prima facie case for suppression, defendant had to establish two 
things: first, that a search occurred in the form of a blood draw and, second, that the 
draw violated the fourth amendment. Defendant failed to establish either of these 
propositions. 
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¶ 25 
Defendant presented no evidence that his blood was actually drawn at the 
hospital. Although this was a matter within his personal knowledge, defendant 
never testified that he was subjected to a blood draw. Instead, he stated only that he 
refused to consent to having his blood drawn. Officer Webb testified that he went 
with defendant to the hospital and observed nurses working on him but stated he 
had no knowledge of whether a blood draw took place and no knowledge as to 
whether defendant ever consented to have his blood drawn. In addition, defendant 
did not call any witnesses from the hospital to testify that a blood draw was 
performed. Further, while an envelope was sent to the circuit court from 
St. Anthony’s, the parties did not stipulate to its contents, and it was never opened. 
Thus, no evidence was presented at the suppression hearing that a blood draw was 
actually performed at the hospital. 
¶ 26 
We cannot agree with the appellate court that, because defendant filed a motion 
to suppress evidence and the parties proceeded to argue the motion as if a blood 
draw was performed, defendant, in fact, established that a search took place. The 
mere filing of a motion is not proof that a search occurred. Defendant bore the 
burden at the suppression hearing of showing his blood was drawn but failed to 
offer any evidence to establish that fact. Accordingly, we conclude defendant failed 
to establish the first element of his prima facie case. 
¶ 27 
Moreover, even assuming a blood draw took place, defendant failed to establish 
any fourth amendment violation. The fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV) protects the “right of the people to be secure 
*** against unreasonable searches and seizures.” There is no dispute that a blood 
draw is a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Schmerber 
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 
148 (2013). A search conducted without a warrant is considered per se 
unreasonable under the fourth amendment unless it falls within one of a limited 
number of exceptions to the warrant requirement. People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 
513 (2004). No warrant was issued in this case, and the State does not contend that 
any exception to the warrant requirement is applicable. 
¶ 28 
However, the constitutional prohibition “against unreasonable searches and 
seizures does not apply to searches or seizures conducted by private individuals.” 
People v. Heflin, 71 Ill. 2d 525, 539 (1978) (citing Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 
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465 (1921)). Where a person performs a search independently of the police, the 
search is considered a private one and, because state action is not present, the fourth 
amendment is not implicated. See generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave, LaFave Search 
and Seizure § 1.8, at 356-57 (5th ed. 2012). 
¶ 29 
Defendant’s argument in this case rests on the presumption that any blood draw 
conducted at the hospital was a governmental search, not a private one. 
“The relevant factors involved in determining whether or not a particular 
search should be attributed to the government have been frequently discussed 
by the Supreme Court of the United States. [Citation]. Where a search is 
conducted by a private individual, the search will be subject to constitutional 
guarantees when the individual conducting the search can be regarded as acting 
as an agent or instrument of the State ‘in light of all the circumstances of the 
case.’ (Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 487 ***). 
Participation by the police in and of itself, then, does not automatically invoke 
the application of the guarantees against unreasonable government intrusions 
safeguarded by the fourth and fourteenth amendments.” Heflin, 71 Ill. 2d at 
539-40. 
¶ 30 
Thus, to establish a fourth amendment violation in this case, defendant had to 
demonstrate, “in light of all the circumstances,” that the private individual who 
conducted the alleged blood draw acted as an agent or instrumentality of the State 
when doing so. Defendant did not meet this standard. 
¶ 31 
Officer Webb testified he never asked anyone to draw blood. In fact, Webb 
stated he never spoke to any nurse or doctor and had no knowledge about the 
treatment defendant received. Thus, there was no evidence that Webb, or any other 
police officer, sought or encouraged a blood draw or was even aware that one had 
been done. Cf. Armer, 2014 IL App (5th) 130342 (state action was present where a 
police officer requested that hospital staff draw the defendant’s blood with a DUI 
kit). Further, and equally as important, defendant did not call any witnesses from 
the hospital to testify. Thus, there was no evidence that any individual who may 
have drawn defendant’s blood did so while acting at the behest, or under the 
influence, of the police. 
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¶ 32 
The appellate court below stressed the fact that defendant was physically forced 
to go the hospital and reasoned that, because defendant was compelled to go to the 
hospital, then any hospital employee who drew defendant’s blood necessarily did 
so under the guise of state action. This analysis is misplaced. 
¶ 33 
There is no question police forcibly seized defendant and helped transport him 
to the hospital. But defendant has never challenged the legality of the seizure. His 
challenge is only to the legality of a search, i.e., the blood draw that allegedly took 
place at St. Anthony’s. And, on this record, there is no evidence that a blood draw 
even took place, let alone that a hospital employee was acting as an instrumentality 
or agent of police when it was performed. 
¶ 34 
Defendant also emphasizes that he had a right to refuse medical treatment and 
that he never consented to any blood draw. Therefore, defendant reasons, any 
hospital personnel who drew his blood acted illegally, and any blood draw was 
necessarily unlawful under the fourth amendment. This argument is without merit. 
The private search doctrine applies “ ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable 
one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or 
with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official.’ ” (Emphasis 
added.) United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (quoting Walter v. 
United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by 
Powell, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.)); see also, e.g., United States v. Malbrough, 922 
F.2d 458, 462-63 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding a search by a private citizen who 
trespassed on another person’s property and viewed marijuana). 
¶ 35 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, even assuming blood was drawn 
from defendant at St. Anthony’s, it was a private search that did not implicate the 
fourth amendment. Accordingly, for this additional reason, the circuit court erred in 
granting defendant’s motion to dismiss. 
¶ 36 
Finally, we note that at the conclusion of the hearing held on the State’s motion 
to reconsider the circuit court’s suppression order, the circuit court briefly stated 
that it believed the State should not have been able to issue a subpoena duces tecum 
to St. Anthony’s. The court evidently concluded that, because any blood draw was 
the result of state action, the subpoena was improper. However, as we have 
explained, on this record, defendant failed to establish that any blood draw was 
conducted under the guise of state action. 
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¶ 37 
Conclusion 
¶ 38 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold the circuit court erred in granting 
defendant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the 
circuit and appellate courts. The cause is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
¶ 39 
Appellate court judgment reversed. 
¶ 40 
Circuit court judgment reversed. 
¶ 41 
Cause remanded. 
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