Case Title: KEITH JORDAN BOOTH V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0004

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
KEITH JORDAN BOOTH V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 3174 P.3d 171Case Number: S-07-0004Decided: 01/10/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
KEITH 
JORDAN BOOTH,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Donna D. 
Domonkos, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Pauling.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Keith 
Jordan Booth (Booth), seeks review of the district court's judgment and sentence 
which found Booth to be guilty of first-degree, felony murder and imposed a 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).1  Booth entered into a plea bargain 
wherein he agreed to plead guilty to felony murder in exchange for the State 
deleting the premeditation aspect of first-degree murder and dismissing Count II 
of the complaint (aggravated robbery as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-401 (LexisNexis 2007)).  
He contends that the State breached the plea agreement by introducing 
evidence of premeditation and that, therefore, this Court should direct that he 
be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.  
We will affirm the sentence as imposed.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Booth raises this 
issue:

 
 
Mr. 
Booth should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea since the State breached the 
spirit of the plea agreement by introducing prejudicial evidence of intent over 
defense counsel's objection.

 
 
The 
State rephrases thus:

 
 
Did the 
State breach the plea agreement at sentencing when it introduced evidence that 
[Booth] intended to shoot Mr. Clarkson?

 
 
In his 
reply brief, Booth contends:

 
 
The 
State has misstated the standard of review in this case and is wrong in labeling 
the issue as an evidentiary issue.  
The issue is whether or not the plea agreement was 
breached.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      This is a case 
involving inexplicable, random, and tragic violence.  On August 19, 2005, Casper Police 
Officer Robin Tuma filed in the circuit court an affidavit in support of a 
warrant to arrest Booth.  In the 
affidavit, Officer Tuma averred that on August 18, 2005, the victim, Gregory 
Clarkson, was working as a cab driver in Casper.  
After being dispatched to pick up a fare, Clarkson's radio traffic 
reported that he was being robbed, and that report was followed by "gurgling 
sounds."  This occurred between 6:00 
a.m. and 7:00 a.m.  Shortly 
thereafter, Clarkson was found by a co-worker in a Casper park.  He was dead and still strapped into his 
seat by his seat belt.  Clarkson was 
killed by a single gunshot wound to the torso.2  The contents of his pockets had been 
removed, and the money he should have had for his fares for that day was 
missing.  

 
 
[¶4]      In his 
confession, Booth indicated that Clarkson gave him about fifty dollars from a 
bank deposit bag.  Booth asked for 
everything in Clarkson's pockets as well, and Clarkson apparently had turned out 
his pockets to demonstrate that they were empty.  Booth's confession also indicated that 
he tried to knock out Clarkson so as to make his escape.  He attempted to achieve that result by 
striking Clarkson in the head with his pistol, and then again striking him in 
the head when the first blow did not suffice.  Mr. Clarkson was still able to strike a 
blow to Booth's face, although Booth was seated directly behind Clarkson in the 
backseat of the cab.  That blow 
bloodied Booth's lip.  Booth's 
reaction was to cock the pistol so that there was a round of ammunition in the 
chamber.  He said he did so to 
"scare" Clarkson, but he nonetheless proceeded to reach toward Clarkson with the 
pistol and fired one shot.  During 
his confession, Booth appeared not to know where the bullet had struck 
Clarkson.  He was informed by the interviewing officer that it struck 
Clarkson in the torso, as described in footnote 2.  Booth indicated that immediately after 
firing the shot, he jumped out of the cab and ran away.  During the course of his confession, 
Booth also indicated that he had associated himself with a "street gang" called 
"Sur 13," "Surenos 13," or "Surenos."

 
 
[¶5]      Near the scene of 
the crime, the police found a blue checked shirt and a grey hooded sweatshirt 
which appeared to have blood on it.  
The police also found a Glock .40 caliber, semi-automatic pistol.  A spent cartridge similar to ammunition 
used in such a Glock pistol was found in Clarkson's cab.  Anonymous witnesses informed the Casper Police Department that Booth told 
them that he had been involved in a robbery and "had done something bad and that 
he was going to prison for a long time."  
Those witnesses also stated that Booth had clothing similar to that found 
near the crime scene.  Another 
witness reported seeing a person, similar in description to Booth, and wearing 
similar clothing to that found near the crime scene, running from the crime 
scene area.  Booth was living near 
the crime scene area at the time these events occurred.  Police officers interviewed Booth and he 
admitted to robbing and killing Clarkson.

 
 
[¶5]      Pretrial 
proceedings were protracted by the need for a second preliminary hearing and by 
the need for two competency examinations.  
In a notice entered of record on March 13, 2006, Booth conceded that he 
was competent. On March 30, 2006, the district court directed the State to give 
notice of what penalty it intended to seek.  In a notice entered in the record on 
April 4, 2006, the State opted to seek LWOP, thus removing the death penalty as 
a potential disposition in this case.

 
 
[¶6]      On May 18, 2006, 
Booth changed his plea from not guilty, to guilty, as part of a plea 
agreement.  On August 30, 2006, the 
district court scheduled the sentencing hearing for October 11, 2006.  By notice filed of record on September 
29, 2006, the State informed Booth that it intended to use his confession, as 
well as tape recordings of telephone calls Booth had made from the NatronaCountyDetentionCenter, as evidence at the sentencing 
hearing.  The sentencing hearing was 
held as scheduled on October 11, 2006.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      Very recently we 
articulated our standard of review for circumstances such as these in Frederick v. State, 2007 WY 27, 
¶ 13, 151 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Wyo. 2007):

 
 
            
When a plea of guilty is entered as a result of a plea agreement, any 
promises made by the State must be fulfilled and whether a prosecutor has 
violated an alleged agreement is a question that is reviewed de novo.  Spencer v. State, 2005 WY 105, 
¶ 12, 118 P.3d 978, 982-983 (Wyo.2005).  A plea agreement is a contract between 
the defendant and the State to which the general principles of contract law are 
applied.  "When determining whether 
a breach of the plea agreement has occurred we:  '(1) examine the nature of the 
promise;  and (2) evaluate the 
promise in light of the defendant's reasonable understanding of the promise at 
the time the plea was entered.' "  
Ford v. State, 2003 WY 65, 
¶ 11, 69 P.3d 407, 410 (Wyo.2003).  
The prosecutor "must explicitly stand by" the terms of any agreement; and 
if the State is unable to carry out the terms, the correct remedy is withdrawal 
of the plea.  Ford, ¶ 18, 69 P.3d  at 412.   The State may not obtain the 
benefit of the agreement and at the same time avoid its obligations without 
violating either the principles of fairness or the principles of contract 
law.  Id.

 
 
[¶8]      Also pertinent to 
this appeal is W.R.Cr.P. 32(d), which provides:  "If a motion for withdrawal of a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere is made before sentence is imposed, the court may 
permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and 
just reason.  At any later time, a 
plea may be set aside only to correct manifest injustice."

 
 
[¶9]      At the sentencing 
hearing, Booth challenged the admissibility of his confession and the recorded 
telephone calls on the basis that those materials were not relevant to the 
punishment for the crime to which Booth entered his guilty plea.  Although the State proposes a different 
standard of review than that we set out above, we conclude from the context of 
the record on appeal that the objections made at the hearing suffice for this Court to consider the 
issue specifically raised in this appeal.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   At the outset, we note that Booth 
has not filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court.  Booth premises his appeal on facts that 
he was aware of, before sentence was imposed.  If such a motion were to be filed in the 
district court, it would have to be considered there in light of the manifest 
injustice standard, and if further review were sought here, that standard would 
also apply on appeal.  The only 
question clearly posed by this appeal, is if the State violated the terms of the 
plea agreement by offering evidence that Booth premeditated the crime, i.e., as 
if he were being sentenced for first-degree premeditated 
murder.

 
 
[¶11]   The thrust of Booth's argument is 
that, by operation of the principles set out in Frederick, this 
Court should direct that Booth be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.  He reasons that his actual motivation 
for the plea, and the only apparent basis upon which he would have agreed to 
such a plea bargain, was that the plea might increase the likelihood that he 
would receive a life sentence, rather that LWOP.  Those were the only two possible 
outcomes of his plea.  Continuing, 
the reason he thought he might get life, instead of LWOP, is that his plea 
agreement did not allow the State to offer proof of premeditation.  Furthermore, he asserts that, accepting 
Booth's recitation of the factual basis for his plea as the factual basis for 
sentencing, there is nothing in the guilty plea proceedings to indicate that he 
premeditated the murder or that he did not feel remorse for his crime.  During the guilty plea proceedings, 
Booth indicated that his shooting Mr. Clarkson was an "accident," and that he 
felt "bad that I did it because that wasn't my 
intentions."

 
 
[¶12]   Just before he provided the factual 
basis and entered the guilty plea, Booth articulated, through his attorney, his 
understanding of the plea agreement like this:

 
 
Mr. 
Booth proposes to change his plea to a plea of guilty with respect to Count 
I.  Count I will be amended to 
delete the premeditation aspect of first-degree murder, and he'll be 
entering a plea of guilty to felony murder.  Count II will be dismissed. [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
            
Sentencing will be at the discretion of the Court with the options of 
straight life or life without the possibility of parole.  We will argue and present evidence that 
he deserves a sentence of straight life rather than life without the possibility 
of parole.

 
 
The 
State also gave its summary of the terms of the plea 
agreement:

 
 
            
That's my understanding as well, Your Honor.

 
 
            
The operative language in 
Count I for the plea would provide 
that on or about the 18th of August 2005, in the County of 
Natrona, in the state of Wyoming, he did 
unlawfully, knowingly, and purposely, in the perpetration of any robbery kill 
another human being; namely, Gregory Clarkson, in violation of 6-2-101(a) 
and (b).

 
 
            
Conditioned upon that plea as outlined by counsel, we'd also move to 
dismiss Count II. [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶13]   Booth's argument is that he entered 
into the bargain believing that the State would not be permitted to offer 
evidence of the sort of premeditation which typically is used to support 
first-degree, premeditated murder.

 
 
[¶14]   Central to this argument is that 
Booth was born on July 5, 1987, and at the time of the crime, he was 18 years, 
one and one-half months old.  
Although the record does not contain much detail about this subject, 
Booth was released from the WyomingBoysSchool just a week before 
he committed the crime at issue here.   At the sentencing hearing, the 
State produced evidence which arguably was directed at the subject of 
premeditation, over the objection of the defense.  That evidence at least suggested he 
premeditated the murder of whomever the cab driver might have been who answered 
his call and, furthermore, that he did not feel remorse about the crime.  Of course, it also went to establishing 
that Booth had committed the robbery and murder "knowingly" and 
"purposely."  A tape recording of 
Booth's confession was played for the district court, as were recorded phone 
calls Booth made from the jail.  One 
of those phone calls suggested that Booth, or someone else at his behest, had 
taken pictures at Mr. Clarkson's funeral and that Booth expressed what might be 
described as a morbid curiosity about seeing those pictures.  The State also introduced photographs 
that were taken at the victim's funeral, either by Booth or by someone who took 
them on his behalf, and it was asserted that Booth laughed about them during the 
above-described telephone conversations, although Booth is correct that the 
recording is of poor quality.  The 
other call suggested that Booth harbored an intent to kill whoever it was he was 
going to rob, if that became necessary.  
Although the record is otherwise silent about it, that call also 
suggested that there was another person "behind" the robbery but that he was the 
one who did the robbing and killing.

 
 
[¶15]   In support of the imposition of a 
life sentence, Booth presented expert evidence which found much of its 
validation in the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 1183, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2005) (holding that the constitutional provision 
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment commanded that persons under the age of 
18 could not be subjected to capital punishment).  In 2004, Wyoming had abolished the death penalty for 
persons under the age of 18.  2004 
Wyo. Sess. 
Laws, ch. 29, § 1.  Thus, Booth was 
subject to application of the death penalty, had the State opted to pursue that 
penalty, because he was over 45 days past his 18th birthday.  Booth seeks to extend, somewhat, the 
arguments that prevailed in Roper, 
and in the Wyoming Legislature in 2004, by contending that his untreated drug 
addiction, his unstructured and abusive upbringing, and his lack of mental 
development and maturity counseled that he should not be subjected to LWOP 
either.  Rather, he contends, the 
evidence of his experts counseled that a life sentence (with the possibility of 
commutation to a term of years, and eventual parole) was the only appropriate 
penalty in this case.  LWOP removes 
the possibility of parole, but it does not remove the potential for a 
gubernatorial pardon.

 
 
[¶16]   Berton J. Toews, M.D. (certified by 
the American Board of Family Practice and by the American Society of Addiction 
Medicine, and also a Wyoming Licensed Addiction Therapist) provided this 
information in an affidavit:

 
 
3.  That 
your affiant has reviewed parts of the record, and the mental evaluation by the 
StateHospital and personally 
interviewed Mr. Keith Booth.

4.  That 
Mr. Booth has a long term history of drug and alcohol problems, for which he has 
never received the appropriate treatment, which would have consisted of 
intensive long term residential and outpatient treatment.

5.  The 
murder of Mr. [Clarkson] was a single impulsive event that was predicated by 
drug use.

6.  Mr. 
Booth could benefit from placement in a positive therapeutic community to treat 
his drug addictions.

7.  It 
is inappropriate to make judgment in 2006, that Mr. Booth will not be able to be 
rehabilitated at some point in the future.

8.  Mr. 
Booth initially portrays a streetwise demeanor, but this is not an accurate 
representation of his emotional development.  He is emotionally immature, as a 
consequence of his drug and alcohol addictions and chaotic lifestyle.  It is entirely possible that a lengthy 
period of incarceration with quality treatment will eventually produce a 
rehabilitated individual.

9.  It 
is morally and scientifically unfounded to permanently prejudge his 
rehabilitation potential at this time.

 
 
[¶17]   Arthur N. Merrel, M.D., a 
psychiatrist, gave testimony in a similar vein.  The district court also had available to 
it a lengthy report from the Wyoming State Hospital that detailed the horrific 
nature of Booth's life, from birth until the day of his sentencing, although it 
also detailed the opportunities Booth had for treatment, including the  two years at the Wyoming Boys School 
immediately preceding the murder.  
We note that Booth chose not to allocute on his own behalf during his 
sentencing.

 
 
[¶18]   In making its decision to hear the 
evidence offered by the State, the district court gave this 
reasoning:

 
 
Based 
upon Monjaras v. State found [at] 136 P.3d 162, at 165, Wyoming 2006 Supreme Court decision, in assessing the 
reasonableness of the sentence, consideration to be given to the crime, and its 
circumstances, and the character of the criminal.

In the 
passing upon sentencing today, I have to consider the crime and the 
circumstances as well as the history of Mr. Booth.  I believe that the information may be relevant.

At the 
time of the plea, there were discussions regarding what occurred and led to the 
events that gave rise to the death of Gregory Clarkson.  And in passing upon sentencing today, I 
believe that that information as 
proffered by the State is appropriate information for the State to  for the Court to 
consider.

I'd also 
note under Martinez v. State, 128 P.3d 652, the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed that the Court could consider 
filed reports and information as long 
as the defendant is given an opportunity to deny, dispute, or disprove that 
information.

In this 
case there was obviously notice provided by the State.  The items that are identified by the 
State and intended to be introduced were provided to the defendant, and it's not 
disputed as to their accuracy.

So at 
this time I'll overrule the objection, and we'll proceed forward on the issues 
of sentencing.  I'll allow the 
presentation in accordance with the victim impact or at a time the State deems 
appropriate.

 
 
[¶19]   When the proceedings came to a 
close, the district court articulated its basis for imposing the LWOP 
sentence:

 
 
Well, 
this is a tragic situation no matter which way I look at this case.  There has been the loss of a life in the 
form of Gregory Clarkson, a human being who will never walk the face of Earth as 
a result of the acts of Mr. Booth.

The 
question I'm faced with is whether Mr. Booth should have the opportunity to be 
considered for release or whether he should spend the rest of his days breathing 
the air of a penitentiary behind bars in a cell.

In 
passing upon this issue, the Court is mindful of the most recent pronouncement 
by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Monjaras 
v. State

Assessing 
the reasonableness of a sentencing, consideration is to be given to the crime, 
the circumstances, the character of the criminal.  In passing upon issues of sentencing in 
this matter, the Court must take into consideration the severity of the crime, 
the [intents] circumstances of that crime, and the character of the criminal, 
Mr. Booth, and his criminal history.

This 
Court would find the following significant in passing upon the sentence:  Prior criminal history of Mr. Booth, as, 
Mr. Skaggs, you've noted is fairly limited in the sense of the time 
frame.

His 
criminal history began  at least in terms of records before this Court  with 
reckless endangering, public intoxication, interference, property destruction in 
2003.

He 
eventually was revoked from his probation and sentenced to a term in the 
BoysSchool.  He spent two years in that program, 
essentially; I think he went in in October of 2003 and was released in August, 
one week before this incident on August 18th.  He was released on August 11th, 2005.  
One week later, he murdered Gregory Clarkson on August 18, 
2005.

This 
Court would also note that in December of 2005, Mr. Booth was charged and pled 
guilty to a battery on a fellow inmate in which he was sentenced to serve 180 
days in jail by the Circuit Court.

Mr. 
Booth's past reveals continued and repeated problems with abuse of alcohol 
beginning at age 11, controlled substances including marijuana at the age of 9, 
cocaine at the age of 14, and methamphetamine at the age of 16, which only serve 
to exacerbate the future and anxiety problems he's dealt with for most of his 
life.

The 
nature of the murder, it can only be classified as being atrocious and certainly 
[conscienceless].

The 
facts  and one of the reasons why I ruled the way I have with respect to the 
statement is because at the time of the plea in this matter, there was some 
issue as to what the events were in terms of Mr. Clarkson's death, whether there 
was a struggle resulting in the gun being discharged or during that struggle or 
whether this was a conscious act by the defendant.

That 
weight in terms of acceptance of responsibility in terms of this Court's 
evaluation, the record will reveal in the plea  change of plea, the defendant, 
Mr. Booth, stated that this was an accident, that it discharged in a fit of 
struggle.  Certainly, the confession 
as given by the defendant on the day following this event on August 19, 2005, 
does not demonstrate that it was a struggle.

Rather, 
it demonstrates, sadly, that after emptying his pockets and after giving Mr. 
Booth every penny that he had, Mr. Booth wanted to escape and wanted to conceal 
his identity, so he was going to strike Mr. Clarkson and knock him out.  When that didn't work the first time, he 
did it again.  Mr. Clarkson then at 
some point in time apparently reached back and tried to defend himself and gave 
Mr. Booth a bloody lip for which Mr. Clarkson paid his 
life.

In 
response to that, Mr. Booth changed his position in the car, jacked a round in 
the chamber and then jacked one into the side of Mr. Clarkson's body, killing 
him.  He didn't open the passenger 
door and leave after getting his money.  
He didn't have anyone forcing him to kill Mr. Clarkson.  He made a choice, a deliberate 
choice.

Now, why 
did he make that choice?  Was he 
high on meth?  Yes.  Was he raised in different families and 
foster care and abused physically and mentally during various times?  Yes.  But he made a choice, as sad as that 
choice is, it was one that was left to him.  There was no one holding his 
hand.

Maybe it 
was a choice he wouldn't have made had he had a different upbringing or wasn't 
high on meth.  But he made the 
choice to get high.  And then he 
made the choice that he needed more, and for that a man has paid his 
life.

Gregory 
Clarkson has been deprived of his fundamental opportunity of life.  He's been denied an opportunity to raise 
his children, to watch them attend school, or even tell them he loves them.  He will no longer be able to write a 
song or sing a song to his family or his friends which they can hear.  His untimely death has deprived his 
parents, his wife, his brothers, and sisters, and friends of his comfort and 
presence and love.  His humor and 
care and musical talent will never be shared with these people through his voice 
or through a song heard.

The 
crime for which Mr. Booth has been convicted is a heinous crime.  He selfishly and premeditated with 
malice removed from this world an innocent human being.  I  I have no doubt, as I noted before, 
that Mr. Booth's methamphetamine binge influenced his poor 
choice.

I also 
have no doubt that the choices Mr. Booth has made were a product from the 
environment  of the environment from which he came.

You 
never knew your biological father.  
Your mother was a drug addict and alcoholic.  You were bounced in and out of foster 
homes and ultimately abused by your adoptive parents.  At the age of 13, you came to reside 
with your aunt, [name deleted], after being kicked  based upon your history, 
sadly, it is not any wonder you stand before me today.

I 
struggled until one o'clock this morning trying to figure out how this should 
end, what conclusions should be made to this case, whether I should conclude a 
life with or without the possibility of parole and a 
commutation.

And even 
as I sit here today, Mr. Skaggs, I pass judgment on a man and make a 
determination as to his future.  
What is his likelihood of rehabilitation?  What is the likelihood that he will not 
commit this crime again?

Considering 
the history, considering all those factors, considering Dr. Merrell's testimony, 
Dr. Toews'  Paragraph 9 of his affidavit states that it is [morally] and 
scientifically unfounded to permanently prejudge his  Mr. Booth's  
rehabilitation potential at this time.

Well, I 
guess morally and scientifically we can all have our judgments.  I'm not learned in the science.  Morally, I have an obligation sitting 
here to make that determination by Legislature.

While 
Mr. Booth's prior history can explain his heinous act, it does not excuse 
it.  Each of us has to ultimately be 
responsible and be held accountable for the choices we make.  No one forced Mr. Booth to get high, to 
put a gun to Gregory Clarkson's head or body and ultimately pull the trigger 
ending his innocent life.  Mr. Booth 
made that choice.

And Mr. 
Booth's history is one that, absent institutionalization, he has demonstrated no 
ability or desire to abide by the rules of our society.  He selfishly thought to satisfy his own 
needs at the expense of society's rules and ultimately at the expense of the 
life of another human being.  
Despite being given opportunities and assistance to change, he chose not 
to.

Mr. 
Merrell  you asked Dr. Merrell the question about likelihood of his engaging in 
rehabilitation and therapy, Mr. Skaggs.

And Mr. 
Merrell -- Dr. Merrell was very forthright in the sense that his history does 
indicate that he may not but it's not determinative as to what likely will or 
will not occur.

I have 
no crystal ball.  I have no way with 
certainty to determine anything in this case.  But I have to look on the past and upon 
the history.

And what 
I have before me and having sifted through those reports and information 
provided, as well as hearing the arguments and the statements of counsel here 
today, the testimony of Dr. Merrell, and the exhibits as offered by the State, 
in an effort to discern whether you should be sentenced to life with or without 
the opportunity of parole, Mr. Booth, I can appreciate the arguments given your 
age, family history, and the opportunity  that an opportunity should remain for 
you.  And the sad reality is that by 
your selfish crime, Mr. Clarkson will never have the opportunity to sing a song 
or see his family again.

Considering 
all the sentencing options in this case including probation/parole and other 
options, given the circumstance and the choice, given the history, I cannot 
conclude that you should be given more opportunity than your victim, Gregory 
Clarkson, was given.

Based 
upon a careful consideration and examination of the Presentence Investigation 
Report, the information provided 
during the sentencing hearing, and having listened to the evidence and arguments 
of counsel and the recommendations, the victim impact statements, and the 
severity of this crime, its impact, and your history, the Court finds that you, 
Keith Jordan Booth, should be sentenced and hereby are sentenced to life without 
the opportunity of parole for the first-degree murder of Gregory 
Clarkson.

 
 
Did the 
State Breach the Plea Agreement

 
 
[¶20]   The plea agreement could best be 
described as "sketchy."  Booth asks 
that we read -- "delete the premeditation aspect of first-degree murder"-- to 
encompass a conclusion that the prosecution could not offer evidence which 
suggested that Booth did anything other than accidentally fire the pistol during 
the course of the robbery.  To be 
sure, it is evident that the State did not agree with that interpretation at the 
time defense counsel uttered the words he used to describe his understanding of 
the plea agreement, because the prosecutor stated that the operative language 
for consideration in the instant case was that Booth "unlawfully, knowingly, and 
purposely, in the perpetration of any robbery kill another human being."  It is, of course unfortunate, if not 
inexcusable, that a plea bargain of this magnitude, and in a case with such 
profoundly significant consequences, was not reduced to writing so that its 
perimeters could be better defined and understood.  Based on the record extant, and applying 
the standard articulated in Frederick, we do 
not perceive that the State breached either the letter or the spirit of the plea 
agreement.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   The judgment and sentence of the 
district court are affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301 
(LexisNexis 2007) states:

 
 
§ 6-10-301. Life 
imprisonment without parole.

            
(a)  Pursuant to article 3, section 53 of the Wyoming constitution, a 
sentence of life imprisonment without parole is created for specified crimes 
designated in the Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982.

            
(b)  A person sentenced to life imprisonment without parole 
shall not be eligible for parole and shall remain imprisoned under the 
jurisdiction of the department of corrections during the remainder of his life 
unless pardoned by the governor.

            
(c)  A sentence specifically designated as a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole is not subject to commutation by the governor.  A sentence of life or life imprisonment 
which is not specifically designated as a sentence of life imprisonment without 
parole is subject to commutation by the governor.  A person sentenced to life or life 
imprisonment is not eligible for parole unless the governor has commuted the 
person's sentence to a term of years.

 
 
Article 3, § 
53 of the Wyoming Constitution provides:

 
 
§ 53. 
Creation of criminal penalties not subject to governor's power to 
commute

 
 
            
Notwithstanding Article 4, Section 5 of this Constitution, the 
legislature may by law create a penalty of life imprisonment without parole for 
specified crimes which sentence shall not be subject to commutation by the 
governor.  The legislature may in 
addition limit commutation of a death sentence to a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole which sentence shall not be subject to further 
commutation.  In no event shall the 
inherent power of the governor to grant a pardon be limited or 
curtailed.

 
 
Article 4, § 
5 of the Wyoming Constitution deals with the pardoning power of the 
governor.

 
 

2The affidavit says that 
Mr. Clarkson was shot in the head.  
However, elsewhere in the record it is established that the victim was 
shot through the torso, the bullet passing from right to left through his 
body.