Case Title: In re C.P.

Citation: 2012-Ohio-1446

Docket Number: 2010-0731

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re C.P., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1446.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-1446 
IN RE C.P. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re C.P., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1446.] 
Juveniles—Sex offenders—Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment—Due process—R.C. 2152.86—Automatic, lifelong 
registration and notification requirements of R.C. 2152.86 violate due process 
and prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment for juvenile sex 
offenders tried within juvenile system. 
(No. 2010-0731—Submitted February 16, 2011—Decided April 3, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Athens County,  
No. 09CA41, 2010-Ohio-1484. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
To the extent that it imposes automatic, lifelong registration and notification 
requirements on juvenile sex offenders tried within the juvenile system, 
R.C. 2152.86 violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United 
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States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9, and the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 16. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case we determine the constitutionality of R.C. 2152.86, 
which creates a new class of juvenile sex-offender registrants: public-registry-
qualified juvenile-offender registrants.  These offenders are automatically subject 
to mandatory, lifetime sex-offender registration and notification requirements, 
including notification on the Internet.  We hold that to the extent that it imposes 
such requirements on juvenile offenders tried within the juvenile system, R.C. 
2152.86 violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9, and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio 
Constitution, Article I, Section 16. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} On June 26, 2009, a multicount complaint was filed in Athens 
County Juvenile Court against appellant, C.P., who was 15 years old at the time.  
The complaint alleged that C.P. was a delinquent child and charged him with two 
counts of rape and one count of kidnapping with sexual motivation, each count a 
first-degree felony if committed by an adult.  The victim was a six-year-old boy, a 
relative of C.P. 
{¶ 3} The state immediately moved the juvenile court to transfer 
jurisdiction to the Athens County Court of Common Pleas, General Division.  On 
July 29, 2009, the juvenile court held a hearing pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(B) to 
determine whether to retain jurisdiction over C.P.’s case.  The parties stipulated 
that there was probable cause to believe that C.P. had committed the alleged 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
offenses.  The court learned that at age 11, C.P. had been adjudicated delinquent 
in Utah for sexually abusing his half-sister, who was two years younger than C.P., 
and that C.P. had undergone over two years of sex-offender treatment there as a 
result of his adjudication. 
{¶ 4} At a hearing held on August 24, 2009, the court denied the state’s 
motion to transfer jurisdiction over C.P. to the general division to be tried as an 
adult.  The judge stated,  
 
I think we can have our best chance of working with [C.P.] 
in the juvenile system and I don’t think everything has been 
exhaustively tried there.  It doesn’t mean that there won’t be 
consequences and it doesn’t mean that there won’t be loss of 
freedom there certainly will be if convicted of this offense [sic], 
but I think we have time within the juvenile system and we have 
resources within the juvenile system to work with this boy.  So, I 
deny the state’s motion for transfer and we’ll continue to work 
with this within the juvenile system. 
 
{¶ 5} In ruling against transfer, the judge cited the factors in R.C. 
2152.12(E)(6) (“[t]he child is not emotionally, physically, or psychologically 
mature enough for the transfer”) and (E)(7) (“[t]he child has a mental illness or is 
a mentally retarded person”). 
{¶ 6} C.P. thus remained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.  The 
state sought to have C.P. sentenced as a serious youthful offender (“SYO”) 
pursuant to R.C. 2152.13(A)(4)(b), and on September 14, 2009, the grand jury 
returned an  indictment against him with an SYO specification attached to each of 
the three counts. 
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{¶ 7} On September 23, 2009, C.P. entered an admission to each charge in 
the indictment; because of the nature of his offenses, he was eligible for a 
discretionary SYO dispositional sentence pursuant to R.C. 2152.11(D)(2)(b).  At a 
subsequent hearing, the court found C.P. to be a delinquent child and designated 
him an SYO in relation to each offense, imposing a three-year minimum 
commitment to the Ohio Department of Youth Services on each count, to run 
concurrently.  As part of the SYO disposition, the court imposed three concurrent 
five-year prison terms, which were stayed pending C.P.’s successful completion 
of his juvenile dispositions. 
{¶ 8} Further, the court advised C.P. of the duties and classification 
automatically imposed upon him by R.C. 2152.86.  Pursuant to R.C. 
2152.86(A)(1), the court classified C.P. a juvenile-offender registrant and 
informed him of his duty to abide by the registration and notification requirements 
of R.C. Chapter 2950.  The court also classified C.P. a public-registry-qualified 
juvenile-offender registrant (“PRQJOR”).  Pursuant to R.C. 2152.86(B)(1), C.P. 
was automatically classified as a Tier III sex-offender/child-victim offender.  The 
judge further informed C.P. of his registration requirements: 
 
You are required to register in person with the sheriff of the 
county in which you establish residency within three days of 
coming into that county, or if temporarily domiciled for more than 
three days.  If you change residence address you shall provide 
written notice of that residence change to the sheriff with whom 
you are most recently registered and to the sheriff in the county in 
which you intend to reside at least 20-days prior to any change of 
residence address. * * * You are required to provide to the sheriff 
temporary lodging information including address and length of 
stay if your absence will be for seven days or more.  Since you are 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
a public registry qualified juvenile offender registrant you are also 
required to register in person with the sheriff of the county in 
which  you establish a place of education immediately upon 
coming to that county. * * * You are also required to register in 
person with the sheriff of the county in which you establish a place 
of employment if you have been employed for more than three 
days or for an aggregate of 14 days in a calendar year. * * * 
Employment includes voluntary services.  As a public registry 
qualified juvenile offender registrant, you * * * also shall provide 
written notice of a change of address or your place of employment 
or your place of education at least 20 days prior to any change and 
no later than three days after the change of employment. * * * 
[Y]ou shall provide written notice within three days of any change 
in vehicle information, e-mail addresses, internet identifiers or 
telephone numbers registered to or used by you to the sheriff with 
whom you are most recently registered.* * * [Y]ou are required to 
abide by all of the above described requirements * * * for your 
lifetime as a Tier III offender with in person verification every 90-
days.  That means for the rest of your life * * * every three months 
you’re going to be checking in with [the] sheriff where you live or 
work or both. * * * Failure to register, failure to verify on the 
specific notice and times as outlined here will result in criminal 
prosecution. 
 
{¶ 9} C.P. appealed his automatic classification as a Tier III juvenile-
offender registrant and PRQJOR to the Fourth District Court of Appeals, arguing 
that R.C. 2152.86 violated his rights to due process and equal protection and his 
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right against cruel and unusual punishment.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court. 
{¶ 10} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
Law and Analysis 
S.B. 10 as Punishment 
{¶ 11} This court has recently held, in a case involving an adult offender, 
that the enhanced sex-offender reporting and notification requirements contained 
in R.C. Chapter 2950 enacted by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (“S.B. 10”) are punitive in 
nature, making their retroactive application unconstitutional: “Following the 
enactment of S.B. 10, all doubt has been removed: R.C. Chapter 2950 is 
punitive.” State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 
1108, ¶ 16.  In this case we consider the constitutionality of the prospective, 
automatic application of those reporting and notification requirements to certain 
juvenile offenders. 
R.C. 2152.86 
{¶ 12} Pursuant to changes brought about by S.B. 10, R.C. 2152.86 
creates a new class of juvenile sex-offender registrants: public-registry-qualified 
juvenile-offender registrants.  PRQJORs are subject to more stringent registration 
and notification requirements than other juvenile-offender registrants.  Moreover, 
the requirements are imposed automatically rather than at the discretion of a 
juvenile judge. 
{¶ 13} Pursuant to R.C. 2152.86, PRQJOR status is assigned to juveniles 
who (1) were 14 through 17 years old when the offense was committed, (2) have 
been adjudicated a delinquent child for committing certain specified sexually 
oriented offenses, including rape, gross sexual imposition when the victim is 
under 12, sexual battery of a child under age 12, and aggravated murder, murder, 
or kidnapping with a purpose to gratify the sexual needs or desires of the 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
offender, and (3) have had a court impose on them a serious youthful offender 
(“SYO”) dispositional sentence under R.C. 2152.13. 
Ohio’s SYO Statutory Scheme 
{¶ 14} As we explained in State v. D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-
9, 901 N.E.2d 209, the nature of an SYO disposition requires that the juvenile 
remain under the continuing jurisdiction of a juvenile judge: 
 
A juvenile charged as a potential serious youthful offender 
does not face bindover to an adult court; the case remains in the 
juvenile court.  Under R.C. 2152.11(A), a juvenile defendant who 
commits certain acts is eligible for “a more restrictive disposition.”  
That “more restricted disposition” is a “serious youthful offender” 
disposition and includes what is known as a blended sentence—a 
traditional juvenile disposition coupled with the imposition of a 
stayed adult sentence. R.C. 2152.13.  The adult sentence remains 
stayed unless the juvenile fails to successfully complete his or her 
traditional 
juvenile 
disposition. 
R.C. 
2152.13(D)(2)(a)(iii).  
Theoretically, the threat of the imposition of an adult sentence 
encourages a juvenile’s cooperation in his own rehabilitation, 
functioning as both carrot and stick. 
 
Id. at ¶ 18. 
{¶ 15} Only further bad acts by the juvenile as he is rehabilitated in the 
juvenile system can cause the stayed adult penalty to be invoked:   
 
Any adult sentence that the trial court imposes through 
R.C. 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(i) is only a potential sentence—it is stayed 
pursuant to R.C. 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(iii) “pending the successful 
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completion of the traditional juvenile dispositions imposed.” R.C. 
2152.13(D)(2)(a)(ii) requires the court to impose a juvenile 
disposition when it imposes an adult sentence; how the juvenile 
responds to that disposition will determine whether the stay is 
lifted on the adult sentence. 
 
D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209, at ¶ 30. 
{¶ 16} R.C. 2152.86 changes the very nature of an SYO disposition, 
imposing an adult penalty immediately upon the adjudication.  The juvenile is not 
given the opportunity to avoid the adult portion of his punishment by successfully 
completing his juvenile rehabilitation.  Instead, he must comply with all of S.B. 
10’s reporting and notification requirements for Tier III sexual offenders 
contained in R.C. Chapter 2950. 
Reporting and Notification Requirements for PRQJORs 
{¶ 17} A PRQJOR must personally register with the sheriff within three 
days of coming into a county in which he resides or temporarily is domiciled for 
more than three days. R.C. 2950.04(A)(3)(a).  He must also register with the 
sheriff of any county he enters to attend school or any county in which he is 
employed for more than three days. R.C. 2950.04(A)(3)(b)(i), (ii), and (iii).  
PRQJORs must personally verify that information with the sheriff every 90 days. 
R.C. 2950.06(B)(3) and (C)(1).  Any time that information changes, the PRQJOR 
must notify the sheriff within three days. R.C. 2950.05(A). 
{¶ 18} At the time of registration, PRQJORs must provide information 
such as license-plate numbers of vehicles available to them and e-mail addresses, 
Internet identifiers, or telephone numbers registered to or used by them. R.C. 
2950.04(C)(6) and (10).  Any changes in that information must be reported to the 
sheriff within three days. R.C. 2950.05(D). 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
{¶ 19} PRQJORs 
must 
comply 
with 
the 
community-notification 
requirements of R.C. 2950.11(A) and (B).  As part of the notification 
requirements, local sheriffs disseminate the offender’s picture and personal 
information to neighbors, local children’s services agencies, school officials, day-
care centers, local universities, and volunteer organizations in contact with 
minors.  R.C. 2950.11(A).  The persons notified receive information regarding the 
youth’s residence, place of employment, and school, as well as information about 
the adjudicated offense and a photograph. R.C. 2950.11(B).  As a further 
requirement, PRQJORs must be included on the Ohio attorney general’s 
electronic sex-offender registration and notification database (“eSORN”). R.C. 
2950.13(A)(11). 
Differences Between PRQJORs and Other Juvenile-Offender Registrants 
{¶ 20} Both the method of assignment and the obligations of PRQJORs 
assigned to Tier III differ from those juveniles placed in Tier III as juvenile-
offender registrants (“JORs”).  For juveniles adjudicated delinquent through a 
traditional juvenile disposition and who were age 14 or older at the time of their 
delinquent act, an assignment to Tier III is not automatic.  Instead, if the juvenile 
court finds that the child is a JOR under R.C. 2152.82(A), the court holds a 
hearing to determine the JOR’s tier classification.  R.C. 2152.82(B).  (Juveniles 
under 14 are not subject to registration requirements, regardless of the offense.)  
Which tier such an offender is placed in rests within the juvenile court’s 
discretion.  Id.  If the court finds that the JOR is a Tier III sex-offender/child-
victim offender, then the court may impose certain notification requirements 
contained in R.C. 2950.10 and 2950.11.  R.C. 2152.82(B). 
{¶ 21} Though all JORs must register personally with the sheriff within 
three days of entering into a county where they will reside or be temporarily 
domiciled, R.C. 2950.04(A)(3)(a), a PRQJOR must comply with additional 
registration requirements.  PRQJORs must personally register with the sheriff of 
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any county in which they attend school or in which they are employed for more 
than three days or for 14 or more days in a calendar year, regardless of whether 
the juvenile resides in or has a temporary domicile in that county.  R.C. 
2950.04(A)(3)(b).  They must report within three days any change of vehicle 
information, e-mail addresses, Internet identifiers, and telephone numbers.  R.C.  
2950.05(D). 
{¶ 22} Notification requirements also differ significantly.  JORs assigned 
to Tier III are subject to community notification only if the juvenile court orders 
it, R.C. 2152.82(B), and to victim notification only if the victim requests it.  R.C. 
2950.10.  The registration information of JORs is not disseminated on the 
Internet.  For PRQJORs, on the other hand, the community- and victim-
notification requirements are automatic.  R.C. 2950.11(F)(1)(a); 2950.10(B)(2).  
Further, the state must place PRQJORs on its public Internet database. R.C. 
2950.13(A)(11). 
{¶ 23} The potential for reclassification varies greatly depending on 
whether the juvenile is a PRQJOR or a JOR.  For JORs, the juvenile court must 
conduct a hearing “upon completion of the disposition of that child” to determine 
whether the child should be reclassified. R.C. 2152.84(A)(1).  Additionally, a 
JOR may file a petition for reclassification three years after the court issues its 
order pursuant to that mandatory hearing, a second petition three years later, and 
further petitions every five years thereafter. R.C. 2152.85(B).  PRQJORs, in 
contrast, do not receive a reclassification hearing upon the completion of their 
juvenile disposition.  Instead, they are placed on a reclassification track similar to 
that of adult Tier III offenders.  They are not eligible for a reclassification hearing 
until 25 years after their statutory registration duties begin.  R.C. 2950.15(C)(2);  
2152.85(G). 
{¶ 24} In sum, for PRQJORs, Tier III classification imposes a lifetime 
penalty that extends well beyond the age at which the juvenile court loses 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
jurisdiction.  It is a consequence that attaches immediately and leaves a juvenile 
with no means of avoiding the penalty by demonstrating that he will benefit from 
rehabilitative opportunities. 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the United States Constitution 
{¶ 25} The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, 
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.”  That the Eighth Amendment prohibits torture is 
elemental. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136, 25 L.Ed. 345 (1878).  But the 
bulk of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence concerns not whether a particular 
punishment is barbaric, but whether it is disproportionate to the crime.  Central to 
the Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is the 
“precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and 
proportioned to [the] offense.” Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 
S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910). 
{¶ 26} Proportionality review falls within two general classifications: the 
first involves “challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences given all the 
circumstances in a particular case.”  The second, which until recently was applied 
only in capital cases, involves “cases in which the Court implements the 
proportionality standard by certain categorical restrictions.” Graham v. Florida, 
___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2021, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). 
{¶ 27} In this case, we address the second classification of cases.  Within 
that classification, there are two subsets, “one considering the nature of the 
offense, the other considering the characteristics of the offender.” Id. at ___, 130 
S.Ct. at 2022.  In regard to the nature of the offense, for instance, the court has 
held that capital punishment is impermissible for nonhomicide crimes against 
individuals. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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L.Ed.2d 525 (2008).  In this juvenile case, we are dealing with the second subset, 
the characteristics of the offender. 
{¶ 28} In recent years, the court has established categorical rules 
prohibiting certain punishments for juveniles.  In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), the court prohibited the death penalty 
for defendants who committed their crimes before the age of 18.  In Graham, the 
court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of a life-without-
parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.  It is 
important to note that in both Roper and Graham, the court addressed the cases of 
juveniles who had been tried as adults.  Here, we address the imposition of a 
sentence upon a child who remains under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
{¶ 29} The court engages in a two-step process in adopting categorical 
rules in regard to punishment: first, the court considers whether there is a national 
consensus against the sentencing practice at issue, and second, the court 
determines “in the exercise of its own independent judgment whether the 
punishment in question violates the Constitution.” Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 
S.Ct. at 2022, 176 L.Ed.2d 825. 
National Consensus 
{¶ 30} In 2006, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and 
Safety Act (“Adam Walsh Act”), P.L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, codified at 42 
U.S.C. 16901 et seq.  Section 16912(a) of the Adam Walsh Act “directs every 
jurisdiction to maintain a sex-offender registry conforming to the requirements of 
the Act.  And to ensure compliance, Congress directed that states that did not 
adopt the Adam Walsh Act risked losing ten percent of certain federal crime-
control funds that would otherwise be allocated to them. Section 16925(a).”  State 
v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 19.  These 
registry requirements are contained in the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (“SORNA”), Title I of the Adam Walsh Act. 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
{¶ 31} Ohio was the first state to implement SORNA.  Id. at ¶ 20.  By the 
start of 2011, only three other states were in substantial compliance with SORNA.  
(http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2011/SMART11054.htm)  
Then, on January 11, 2011, the United States attorney general issued 
Supplemental Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 76 
Fed.Reg. 1630 (“Supplemental Guidelines”).  These guidelines made significant 
changes to the National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
issued on July 2, 2008. 73 Fed.Reg. 38030. The attorney general promulgated the 
Supplemental Guidelines in furtherance of his key role in the implementation of 
SORNA; SORNA “charges the Attorney General with responsibility for issuing 
guidelines and regulations to interpret and implement SORNA and for 
determining whether jurisdictions have substantially implemented SORNA in 
their programs. See 42 U.S.C. 16912(b), 16925.” 76 Fed.Reg. at 1631. 
{¶ 32} In releasing the Supplemental Guidelines, the attorney general 
noted that one of the largest barriers to compliance by states was the fact that 
“SORNA includes as covered ‘sex offender[s]’ juveniles at least 14 years old who 
are adjudicated delinquent for particularly serious sex offenses.”  76 Fed.Reg. at 
1636.  An April 2009 50-state survey on SORNA conducted by the National 
Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics stated that “[t]he most 
commonly cited barrier to SORNA compliance was the act’s juvenile registration 
and reporting requirements, cited by 23 states.”  National Consortium for Justice 
Information and Statistics, Survey on State Compliance with the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) (2009) 2.  In 2008, the Council of 
State Governments promulgated a resolution against the application of SORNA to 
juveniles, stating that “[t]he Council of State Governments strongly opposes 
SORNA’s application to juvenile sex offenders and urges Congress to revise the 
law 
to 
more 
accurately 
address 
the 
needs 
of 
juvenile 
offenders.” 
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http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/CSG%20Resolution%20Opposing%20
SORNA%20Application%20to%20Juvenile%20Offenders.pdf. 
{¶ 33} In January 2011, because of that resistance by the states, the 
attorney general exercised his authority under 42 U.S.C. 16918(c)(4) “to provide 
that jurisdictions need not publicly disclose information concerning persons 
required to register on the basis of juvenile delinquency adjudications.” 76 
Fed.Reg. at 1632. 
{¶ 34} The change created a new discretionary exemption from public 
disclosure on the Internet.  Moreover, the attorney general announced that 
jurisdictions are also no longer required to provide registration information to 
“certain school, public housing, social service, and volunteer entities, and other 
organizations, companies, or individuals who request notification. * * * 
Accordingly, if a jurisdiction decides not to include information on a juvenile 
delinquent sex offender on its public Web site, as is allowed by these 
supplemental guidelines, information on the sex offender does not have to be 
disclosed to these entities.” 76 Fed.Reg. at 1637. 
{¶ 35} Thus, in response to the national foot-dragging on SORNA 
compliance, the attorney general completely lifted the requirement that juveniles 
be placed on eSORN and that certain entities be notified of their status: 
“[F]ollowing the issuance of these supplemental guidelines, there is no remaining 
requirement under SORNA that jurisdictions publicly disclose information about 
sex offenders whose predicate sex offense ‘convictions’ are juvenile delinquency 
adjudications.”  76 Fed.Reg. at 1632. 
{¶ 36} Thus, the attorney general acknowledged that to be SORNA 
compliant in January 2011 required less in the area of publication of a juvenile’s 
status than it had previously: 
 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
Given this change, the effect of the remaining registration 
requirements under SORNA for certain juvenile delinquent sex 
offenders is, in essence, to enable registration authorities to track 
such offenders following their release and to make information 
about them available to law enforcement agencies. * * * There is 
no remaining requirement under SORNA that jurisdictions engage 
in any form of public disclosure or notification regarding juvenile 
delinquent sex offenders.  Jurisdictions are free to do so, but need 
not do so to any greater extent than they may wish. 
 
76 Fed.Reg. at 1632. 
{¶ 37} This declaration is a major shift in policy, reflective of a national 
consensus against the very policy that Ohio imposed as part of its attempt to 
comply with SORNA.  In short, outside of three other states, the rest of the nation 
dealt with an entirely different landscape vis-à-vis SORNA.  The goalposts had 
been moved—after Ohio and other states had already instituted a system the rest 
of the nation resisted.  The assumption that a national consensus favored 
publication of juvenile sex offenders’ personal information had collapsed.  Even 
after the Supplemental Guidelines, as of December 2011, the United States Justice 
Department has reported that only 15 states are in substantial compliance with 
SORNA.  National Conference of State Legislatures, Adam Walsh Child 
Protection and Safety Act Compliance News, http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=12696 
(updated Dec. 14, 2011); http://www.governing.com/blogs/fedwatch/States-Find-
SORNA-Non-Compliance-Cheaper.html (Nov. 11, 2011). 
Independent Review 
{¶ 38} Although national consensus is an important factor in the 
determination of whether a punishment is cruel or unusual, this court must also 
conduct an independent review of the sentencing practice in question to determine 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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whether it fits within the constraints of the Eighth Amendment.  Graham, ___ 
U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2026, 176 L.Ed.2d 825, citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 575, 
125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1.  “The judicial exercise of independent judgment 
requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their 
crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question, 
* * * [and] whether the challenged sentencing practice serves penological goals.” 
Graham at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2026.  We thus undertake our own independent 
review addressing these factors. 
Culpability of Offenders 
{¶ 39} In regard to the culpability of the offenders, we note that Ohio has 
developed a system for juveniles that assumes that children are not as culpable for 
their acts as adults.  The court’s decision in Graham supports this self-evident 
principle: 
 
Roper established that because juveniles have lessened 
culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punishments. 
543 U.S., at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183. As compared to adults, juveniles 
have a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility”; they “are more vulnerable or susceptible to 
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer 
pressure”; and their characters are “not as well formed.”  Id., at 
569–570, 125 S.Ct. 1183.  These salient characteristics mean that 
“[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate 
between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet 
transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects irreparable corruption. Id., at 573, 125 S.Ct. 1183.  
Accordingly, “juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be 
classified among the worst offenders.”  Id., at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183.  
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
A juvenile is not absolved of responsibility for his actions, but his 
transgression “is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.” 
Thompson [v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815] at 835, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 
[101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988)] (plurality opinion). 
 
Graham, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2026, 176 L.Ed.2d 825. 
{¶ 40} Not only are juveniles less culpable than adults, their bad acts are 
less likely to reveal an unredeemable corruptness: 
 
Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and 
their actions are less likely to be evidence of “irretrievably 
depraved character” than are the actions of adults. Roper, 543 U.S., 
at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183. It remains true that “[f]rom a moral 
standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor 
with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s 
character deficiencies will be reformed.” Ibid. 
 
Graham, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2026-2027. 
{¶ 41} In this case we address a lifetime penalty—albeit open to review 
after 25 years—making the offender’s potential for redemption particularly 
relevant.  Juvenile offenders are more susceptible of change than adult offenders.  
And again, we are dealing in this case with juveniles who remain under the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.  Based on the review of a juvenile judge, 
juveniles deemed serious youthful offenders have been determined to be 
amenable to the rehabilitative aims of the juvenile system.  They are in a category 
of offenders that does not include the worst of those who commit crimes as 
juveniles. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
Nature of the Offenses 
{¶ 42} An important consideration in addressing culpability in an 
independent review of a punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes is the 
nature of the offenses to which the penalty may apply.  In this case, R.C. 2152.86 
applies to sex offenses, including rape.  R.C. 2152.86(A)(1)(a).  In Graham, the 
court stated that “defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will 
be taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment 
than are murderers.” Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2027, 176 L.Ed.2d 
825.  The court bluntly noted, “Although an offense like robbery or rape is ‘a 
serious crime deserving serious punishment,’ Enmund [v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782] 
at 797, 102 S.Ct. 3368, [73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982)], those crimes differ from 
homicide crimes in a moral sense.” Graham,___ U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2027. 
{¶ 43} Thus, as the court pointed out in Graham, a juvenile who did not 
kill or intend to kill has “twice diminished moral culpability” on account of his 
age and the nature of his crime. Id.  Thus, when we address the constitutionality 
of the penalties resulting from an application of R.C. 2152.86, we first recognize 
that those punishments apply to juveniles with a reduced degree of moral 
culpability. 
Severity of Punishment 
{¶ 44} The next step in the Eighth Amendment analysis is a consideration 
of the punishment.  In this case, as opposed to Roper and Graham, we are not 
dealing with the harshest and next-harshest possible sentences, death and life 
without possibility of parole.  Indeed, in this case, if C.P.’s behavior does not 
warrant the imposition of the adult portion of his SYO sentence, he will not spend 
time in an adult prison cell.  When his juvenile commitment is complete, he will 
no longer be confined.  However, his punishment will continue.  Registration and 
notification requirements for life, with the possibility of having them lifted only 
after 25 years, are especially harsh punishments for a juvenile.  In Graham, the 
January Term, 2012 
19 
 
court wrote that a life sentence for a juvenile is different from such a sentence for 
an adult; the juvenile will spend a greater percentage of his life in jail than the 
adult.  Graham, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2028, 176 L.Ed.2d 825. 
{¶ 45} Here, too, the registration and notification requirements are 
different from such a penalty for adults.  For juveniles, the length of the 
punishment is extraordinary, and it is imposed at an age at which the character of 
the offender is not yet fixed.  Registration and notification necessarily involve 
stigmatization.  For a juvenile offender, the stigma of the label of sex offender 
attaches at the start of his adult life and cannot be shaken.  With no other offense 
is the juvenile’s wrongdoing announced to the world.  Before a juvenile can even 
begin his adult life, before he has a chance to live on his own, the world will 
know of his offense.  He will never have a chance to establish a good character in 
the community.  He will be hampered in his education, in his relationships, and in 
his work life.  His potential will be squelched before it has a chance to show itself.  
A juvenile—one who remains under the authority of the juvenile court and has 
thus been adjudged redeemable—who is subject to sex-offender notification will 
have his entire life evaluated through the prism of his juvenile adjudication.  It 
will be a constant cloud, a once-every-three-month reminder to himself and the 
world that he cannot escape the mistakes of his youth.  A youth released at 18 
would have to wait until age 43 at the earliest to gain a fresh start.  While not a 
harsh penalty to a career criminal used to serving time in a penitentiary, a lifetime 
or even 25-year requirement of community notification means everything to a 
juvenile.  It will define his adult life before it has a chance to truly begin. 
Penological Justifications 
{¶ 46} Finally, in an Eighth Amendment analysis, we must consider the 
penological justifications for the sentencing practice. Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 
130 S.Ct. at 2028, 176 L.Ed.2d 825.  Since we are deciding a case involving a 
juvenile who has not been bound over to adult court, the goals of juvenile 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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disposition are relevant to our analysis.  R.C. 2152.01 establishes the purposes of 
any juvenile disposition: 
 
(A) The overriding purposes for dispositions under this 
chapter are to provide for the care, protection, and mental and 
physical development of children subject to this chapter, protect 
the public interest and safety, hold the offender accountable for the 
offender’s actions, restore the victim, and rehabilitate the offender.  
These purposes shall be achieved by a system of graduated 
sanctions and services. 
 
{¶ 47} Lifetime registration and notification requirements run contrary to 
R.C. 2152.01’s goals of rehabilitating the offender and aiding his mental and 
physical development.  Instead, lifetime registration and notification ensure that 
PRQJORs will encounter continued difficulties because of their offenses, long 
into adulthood.  Notification and registration anchor the juvenile offender to his 
crime. 
{¶ 48} As for protecting the public interest and safety, some might argue 
that the registration and notification requirements further those aims.  However, it 
is difficult to say how much the public interest and safety are served in individual 
cases, because the PRQJOR statutory scheme gives the juvenile judge no role in 
determining how dangerous a child offender might be or what level of registration 
or notification would be adequate to preserve the safety of the public. 
{¶ 49} The PRQJOR penalties do meet the statutory objective of 
accountability.  However, a major issue in this case is whether the depth and 
duration of the accountability that R.C. 2152.86 requires of a juvenile offender are 
excessive.  Another statutory goal, restoring the victim, is advanced only 
minimally by the requirements of R.C. 2152.86. 
January Term, 2012 
21 
 
{¶ 50} In addition to the penological considerations laid out by Ohio’s 
legislature, the Graham court set forth “the goals of penal sanctions that have 
been recognized as legitimate—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation” and considered whether any of those goals justified a sentence of 
life without parole for juveniles committing nonhomicide crimes. Id., ___ U.S. at 
___, 130 S.Ct. at 2028, 176 L.Ed.2d 825. 
{¶ 51} The court held that retribution could not support the sentence in 
that case because “ ‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal 
sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal 
offender,’ Tison [v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 
(1987)],” and because “ ‘[w]hether viewed as an attempt to express the 
community’s moral outrage or as an attempt to right the  balance for the wrong to 
the victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.’ 
[Roper,] 543 U.S., at 571, 125 S.Ct. 1183 [161 L.Ed.2d 1].” Graham, ___ U.S. at 
___, 130 S.Ct. at 2028, 176 L.Ed.2d 825.  As the court recognized in Graham, 
retribution does not justify imposing the same serious penalty on a less culpable 
defendant. 
{¶ 52} The court in Graham also discounted the penological goal of 
deterrence for the same reason we do in this case:   
 
[B]ecause juveniles “lack of maturity and underdeveloped 
sense of responsibility * * * often result in impetuous and ill-
considered actions and decisions,” Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 
367, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993), they are less likely 
to take a possible punishment into consideration when making 
decisions. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2028-2029, 176 L.Ed.2d 825.  Further, in 
this case, the significance of the particular punishment and its effects are less 
likely to be understood by the juvenile than the threat of time in a jail cell.  
Juveniles are less likely to appreciate the concept of loss of future reputation. 
{¶ 53} Incapacitation as a penological goal is not relevant in this case.  
The focus here is what happens to a juvenile once he has emerged from 
confinement. 
{¶ 54} Finally, as to the final penological goal—rehabilitation—we have 
already discussed the effect of forcing a juvenile to wear a statutorily imposed 
scarlet letter as he embarks on his adult life.  “Community notification may 
particularly hamper the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders because the public 
stigma and rejection they suffer will prevent them from developing normal social 
and interpersonal skills—the lack of those traits have been found to contribute to 
future sexual offenses.” Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender 
Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty Deprivation, and Unintended Results 
Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw.U.L.Rev. 788, 855-
856 (1996). 
{¶ 55} In addition to increasing the likelihood of reoffense, publication of 
a juvenile’s offense makes reintegration into society more difficult, due in part to 
the personal economic impact:  
 
Sex offender registration constitutes an additional form of 
punishment for juvenile sex offenders, perhaps more substantial 
than that experienced by adult sex offenders.  Many juvenile sex 
offenders are released back into society after completion of their 
court-imposed disposition at an age when they would ordinarily 
first be entering the workforce and find themselves unable to 
obtain employment due to their publicized “sex offender” label.  
January Term, 2012 
23 
 
Any job in education, health care, or the military is virtually 
impossible to get. 
 
Phoebe Geer, Justice Served? The High Cost of Juvenile Sex Offender 
Registration, 27 Developments in Mental Health Law 33, 48-49 (2008).  Any job 
that requires a background check is placed virtually out of reach. Id.  And 
although a PRQJOR’s employer’s name is not made public under R.C. 
2950.11(B)(2), the employer’s address is.  That fact can only harm a juvenile 
offender’s employment prospects. 
{¶ 56} The social response to publication of a juvenile’s sexual offenses 
also affects rehabilitation:  
 
When a sex offender registration and notification law 
requires 
door-to-door 
neighborhood 
notification, 
public 
announcements, or listing on a sex offender website, the likelihood 
that a juvenile offender’s peers and community will discover the 
offense is very high. Public disclosure may inspire “vigilantism, 
public shame, social ostracism, and various types of adverse legal 
action, including loss of employment and eviction.” 
 
Id. at 47, quoting Stacey Hiller, The Problem with Juvenile Sex Offender 
Registration: The Detrimental Effects of Public Disclosure, 7 B.U.Pub.Int.L.J. 
271, 287 (1998). 
{¶ 57} We conclude that the social and economic effects of automatic, 
lifetime registration and notification, coupled with an increased chance of 
reoffense, do violence to the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court process.  As 
the court decided in Graham in regard to a life sentence without parole for 
juvenile offenders, we find that penological theory “is not adequate to justify” the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
imposition of the lifetime registration and notification requirements of R.C. 
2152.86 for juveniles. Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2030, 176 L.Ed.2d 
825. 
Graham Factors 
{¶ 58} In sum, the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders 
who remain within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the severity of lifetime 
registration and notification requirements of PRQJOR status, and the inadequacy 
of penological theory to justify the punishment all lead to the conclusion that the 
lifetime registration and notification requirements in R.C. 2152.86 are cruel and 
unusual.  We thus hold that for a juvenile offender who remains under the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the Eighth Amendment forbids the automatic 
imposition of lifetime sex-offender registration and notification requirements. 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under Ohio Law 
{¶ 59} The Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9, contains its own 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  It provides unique protection 
for Ohioans:  
 
The Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force. 
In the areas of individual rights and civil liberties, the United 
States Constitution, where applicable to the states, provides a floor 
below which state court decisions may not fall.  As long as state 
courts provide at least as much protection as the United States 
Supreme Court has provided in its interpretation of the federal Bill 
of Rights, state courts are unrestricted in according greater civil 
liberties and protections to individuals and groups. 
 
January Term, 2012 
25 
 
Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993), paragraph one of 
the syllabus.  Thus, the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9, provides 
protection independent of the protection provided by the Eighth Amendment. 
{¶ 60} In its own jurisprudence regarding Article I, Section 9, this court 
has recognized that cases involving cruel and unusual punishments are rare, 
“limited to those involving [sanctions] which under the circumstances would be 
considered shocking to any reasonable person.” McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio 
St.2d 68, 70, 203 N.E.2d 334 (1964).  Lack of proportionality is a key factor: “A 
punishment does not violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishments, if it be not so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to 
shock the sense of justice of the community.” State v. Chaffin 30 Ohio St.2d 13, 
282 N.E.2d 46 (1972), paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 61} For juveniles who remain in the juvenile system, R.C. 2152.86 is 
striking in the disproportionate way it treats PRQJORs.  In In re Agler, 19 Ohio 
St.2d 70, 72,  249 N.E.2d 808 (1969), this court stated that “the decided emphasis 
[of juvenile courts] should be upon individual, corrective treatment.”  We trust 
judges to make the important calls in imposing the adult portion of the SYO 
sentence.  In discretionary SYO cases, juvenile judges determine whether an SYO 
denomination is appropriate.  But under R.C. 2152.86, the juvenile judge is given 
absolutely no discretion over the portion of the juvenile’s penalty that could 
extend for a lifetime.  There is none of the important, individualized work that 
juvenile judges do.  Instead, a lifetime punishment is imposed with no chance for 
reconsideration of its appropriateness for 25 years.  Compared to punishments for 
other juvenile offenders, whose cases are reevaluated when their juvenile 
disposition ends and at regularly scheduled intervals thereafter, this punishment is 
disproportionate. 
{¶ 62} Lack of proportionality is also evidenced by the very public nature 
of the penalty.  The punishment of lifetime exposure for a wrong committed in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
childhood runs counter to the private nature of our juvenile court system. 
Confidentiality has always been at the heart of the juvenile justice system.  That 
core principle is trampled by any requirement of public notification. Timothy E. 
Wind, The Quandary of Megan’s Law: When the Sex Offender is a Child, 37 
J.Marshall L.Rev. 73, 117 (2003).  Publicity is even more of a concern for 
PRQJORs, whose information is disseminated on the Internet. 
{¶ 63} Ohio’s juvenile system is designed to shield children from 
stigmatization based upon the bad acts of their youth:  
 
For delinquent children, “it is the law’s policy ‘to hide 
youthful errors from the full gaze of the public and bury them in 
the graveyard of the forgotten past.’ ”  In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 
1, 24, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1442, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 544.  In Ohio, we are 
required to liberally interpret the juvenile delinquency provisions 
to “protect the public interest in removing the consequences of 
criminal behavior and the taint of criminality from children 
committing delinquent acts and to substitute therefor a program of 
supervision, care, and rehabilitation.” See R.C. 2151.01(B). 
 
State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Geauga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 
Juv. Div., 90 Ohio St.3d 79, 83, 734 N.E.2d 1214 (2000). 
{¶ 64} “[T]raditionally juveniles have been shielded from the stigma of 
the proceedings by keeping hearings private and not publishing juveniles’ names. 
See Champion & Mays, Transferring Juveniles to Criminal Courts: Trends and 
Implications for Criminal Justice (1991) 38.” State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 
89, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (2000). 
January Term, 2012 
27 
 
{¶ 65} In this case, for instance, we refer to the juvenile by his initials, 
rather than by his full name.  But if R.C. 2152.86 is enforced, his name, offense, 
and addresses will be published on the Internet. 
{¶ 66} The Ohio Juvenile Rules also are designed to keep juvenile 
dispositions private.  Juv.R. 37(B) states, “No public use shall be made by any 
person, including a party, of any juvenile court record * * *, except in the course 
of an appeal or as authorized by order of the court or by statute.”  This court wrote 
in State ex rel. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of 
Common Pleas, Juv. Div., 73 Ohio St.3d 19, 22, 652 N.E.2d 179 (1995), that 
“[t]he purpose of Juv.R. 37(B) is to keep confidential juvenile court records 
involving children, since their welfare is at stake.” 
{¶ 67} Registration and notification requirements frustrate two of the 
fundamental elements of juvenile rehabilitation: confidentiality and the avoidance 
of stigma.  Confidentiality promotes rehabilitation by allowing the juvenile to 
move into adulthood without the baggage of youthful mistakes.  Public exposure 
of those mistakes brands the juvenile as an undesirable wherever he goes.  See  
Wind, 37 J.Marshall L.Rev. at 117. 
{¶ 68} The publication required by S.B. 10 causes the greatest possible 
stigmatization:  
 
Operating directly contrary to the rehabilitative goals of the 
juvenile justice system, sex offender registration and notification 
laws can publicly and permanently mark juvenile sex offenders as 
deviant criminals who should be feared and shunned. While many 
juvenile proceedings are confidential and sealed, sex offender 
registration and notification laws, by creating a public record, 
place the sexual offense of a juvenile directly and prominently in 
the public eye. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
 
[F]ew labels are as damaging in today’s society as 
“convicted sex offender.” Sex offenders are, as one scholar put it, 
“the lepers of the criminal justice system,” with juveniles listed in 
the sex offender registry sharing this characterization. The state’s 
interest in and responsibility for a juvenile’s well-being and 
rehabilitation is not promoted by a practice that makes a juvenile’s 
sex offenses public. 
 
(Footnotes omitted.) Geer, Justice Served?, 27 Developments in Mental Health 
Law at 47, quoting Robert E. Shepherd, Advocating for the Juvenile Sex Offender, 
Part 2 (2007), 21 Crim.Just. 52, 53. 
{¶ 69} S.B. 10 forces registration and notification requirements into a 
juvenile system where rehabilitation is paramount, confidentiality is elemental, 
and individualized treatment from judges is essential.  The public punishments 
required by R.C. 2152.86 are automatic, lifelong, and contrary to the rehabilitative 
goals of the juvenile system.  We conclude that they “shock the sense of justice of 
the community” and thus violate Ohio’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishments. 
Due Process 
{¶ 70} Appellant also argues that R.C. 2152.86 violates a juvenile’s right 
to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 16.  We agree. 
{¶ 71} “Constitutional procedural safeguards in the juvenile context find 
their genesis in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. ” D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 
209, ¶ 44.  Due process standards as they relate to juvenile proceedings are 
inexact; this court has held that “fundamental fairness is the overarching 
concern.” Id. at ¶ 51. 
January Term, 2012 
29 
 
{¶ 72} From a due process perspective, both this court and the United 
States Supreme Court have held that juveniles may be treated differently from 
adults. 
 
[O]ur acceptance of juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal 
justice system assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may 
be treated differently from adults.  * * * Viewed together, our 
cases show that although children generally are protected by the 
same constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations 
as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to 
account for children’s vulnerability and their needs for “concern, 
* * *, sympathy, and * * * paternal attention.”  [McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 
(1971)] (plurality opinion). 
 
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979).  The 
court has stated that “the applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings 
* * * is fundamental fairness.” McKeiver at 543. 
{¶ 73} In D.H., this court applied a fundamental-fairness standard in 
addressing due process concerns, holding that a balanced approach is required to 
preserve the special nature of the juvenile process.  We recognized the state’s 
stake in the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders and the state’s paternal role: 
 
The State has “a parens patriae interest in preserving and 
promoting the welfare of the child,” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
745, 766, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1401, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), which 
makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from an adult 
criminal trial.  We have tried, therefore, to strike a balance—to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
 
respect the “informality” and “flexibility” that characterize 
juvenile proceedings, In re Winship [397 U.S. 358, 366, 90 S.Ct. 
1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)], and yet to ensure that such 
proceedings comport with the “fundamental fairness” demanded 
by the Due Process Clause. Breed v. Jones [421 U.S. 519, 531, 95 
S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975)]; McKeiver, supra, 403 U.S., at 
543, 91 S.Ct., at 1985, [29 L.Ed.2d 647] (plurality opinion). 
 
D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209, ¶ 50, quoting Schell v. 
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984). 
{¶ 74} In D.H., we addressed whether fundamental fairness requires a jury 
to participate in the imposition of the adult portion of a sentence in an SYO case 
tried to a jury.  The court had previously held in a case involving sentences for 
adult offenders, State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 
470, that statutes violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury if they require 
judicial factfinding before imposition of consecutive sentences, sentence 
enhancements, or sentences greater than the maximum term authorized by a jury 
verdict or admission of the defendant.  In Foster, the statutes at issue required the 
trial judge, not a jury, to make factual determinations before imposing 
consecutive sentences and sentence enhancements; in D.H., the SYO statute 
required the juvenile judge to make factual determinations before imposing the 
adult portion of the SYO sentence. 
{¶ 75} In D.H., we held that fundamental fairness does not demand the 
same Sixth Amendment jury-trial rights for juveniles as required by Foster for 
adults.  This court based its decision on the special role of juvenile courts and 
juvenile judges. 
 
January Term, 2012 
31 
 
The court’s dispositional role is at the heart of the 
remaining differences between juvenile and adult courts. It is there 
that the expertise of a juvenile judge is necessary. The judge, given 
the factors set forth in R.C. 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(i), must assess the 
strengths and weaknesses of the juvenile system vis-à-vis a 
particular child to determine how this particular juvenile fits within 
the system and whether the system is equipped to deal with the 
child successfully.  That assessment requires as much familiarity 
with the juvenile justice system as it does familiarity with the facts 
of the case. To leave that determination to an expert, given the 
juvenile system’s goal of rehabilitation, does not offend 
fundamental fairness, especially since the adult portion of the 
blended sentence that the judge imposes upon a jury verdict is not 
immediately, and may never be, enforced. 
 
Id., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209, ¶ 59. 
{¶ 76} Thus, this court held that the discretionary role of the judge in the 
disposition of a juvenile case overrides the importance of the role of the jury.  The 
disposition of a child is so different from the sentencing of an adult that 
fundamental fairness to the child demands the unique expertise of a juvenile 
judge.  Id. 
{¶ 77} R.C. 2152.86 eliminates the discretion of the juvenile judge, this 
essential element of the juvenile process, at the most consequential part of the 
dispositional process.  R.C. 2152.86 requires the automatic imposition of a 
lifetime punishment—with no chance of reconsideration for 25 years—without 
benefit of a juvenile judge weighing its appropriateness.  It is contrary to the 
juvenile system’s core emphasis on individual, corrective treatment and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
 
rehabilitation. As we held in In re Caldwell, 76 Ohio St.3d 156, 157, 666 N.E.2d 
1367 (1996),  
 
The legislative purpose regarding [juveniles] has been laid 
out in R.C. 2151.01: to provide for the care, protection, and mental 
and physical development of children, to protect the public from 
the wrongful acts committed by juvenile delinquents, and to 
rehabilitate errant children and bring them back to productive 
citizenship, or, as the statute states, to supervise, care for and 
rehabilitate those children. Punishment is not the goal of the 
juvenile system, except as necessary to direct the child toward the 
goal of rehabilitation. 
 
{¶ 78} R.C. 2152.86(B)(1) requires the imposition of an adult penalty for 
juvenile acts without input from a juvenile judge.  Under R.C. 2152.86, the court 
cannot consider individual factors about a child or his background, cannot have a 
say in how often a child must register or where he must register, or determine how 
publication of the offense might affect rehabilitation.  An SYO offender remains 
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, but R.C. 2152.86 removes the 
juvenile court’s ability to exercise its most important role in rehabilitation.  
Fundamental fairness requires that the judge decide the appropriateness of any 
such penalty. 
{¶ 79} R.C. 2152.86’s automatic imposition of an adult punishment—
lifetime reporting and notification—stands in contrast to the R.C. 2152.14 process 
for invoking the adult portion of the sentence in an SYO disposition.  R.C. 
2152.14 installs procedural protections for juveniles before the adult portion of 
their disposition can be invoked.  For instance, the juvenile must commit a further 
bad act while in custody before the invocation process can begin.  A request must 
January Term, 2012 
33 
 
be filed showing that there is reasonable cause to believe that the “person 
committed an act that is a violation of the rules of the institution and that could be 
charged as any felony or as a first degree misdemeanor offense of violence if 
committed by an adult” or that the person “has engaged in conduct that creates a 
substantial risk to the safety or security of the institution, the community, or the 
victim.” R.C. 2152.14(A)(2)(a) and (b). 
{¶ 80} Once the request is filed, the adult portion of the sentence cannot 
be invoked without a public hearing.  R.C. 2152.14(D).  The juvenile has a right 
to counsel that may not be waived and the right to present evidence on his own 
behalf, “including evidence that [he] has a mental illness or is a mentally retarded 
person.”  Id.  If the person submits evidence that he has a mental illness or is 
mentally retarded, the court must consider that evidence in determining whether 
to invoke the adult portion of the SYO dispositional sentence. 
{¶ 81} Further, pursuant to R.C. 2152.14(E)(1), the court must find by 
clear and convincing evidence not only that the person serving the juvenile 
portion of an SYO dispositional sentence engaged in the conduct—the additional 
bad act—he is accused of, but also that the conduct “demonstrates that [he] is 
unlikely to be rehabilitated during the remaining period of juvenile jurisdiction.”  
And under R.C. 2152.14(E)(2), the juvenile court has the discretion to “modify 
the adult sentence the court invokes to consist of any lesser prison term that could 
be imposed for the offense.” 
{¶ 82} Thus, for the bulk of Ohio’s SYO scheme, the juvenile court retains 
discretion to deal individually with juvenile offenders, and procedural protections 
are in place before adult punishment can be invoked.  Even after additional bad 
acts by a juvenile, the judge has the discretion not to invoke the adult sentence, or 
to lessen the one imposed at the time of the juvenile disposition.  On the other 
hand, even for a juvenile who is amenable to rehabilitation and commits no 
further bad acts during his juvenile disposition, the adult consequences of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
 
registration and notification attach immediately.  PRQJORs have no right to 
present evidence or even be heard on the issue of their classification. 
{¶ 83} Once the juvenile court makes its SYO determination, the juvenile 
judge never gets an opportunity to determine whether the juvenile offender has 
responded to rehabilitation or whether he remains a threat to society.  Even if the 
adult portion of his sentence is not invoked, the sex-offender classification is 
irrevocable.  The timing of the classification—immediately upon the imposition 
of SYO status—leaves no room for the judge to determine whether the juvenile 
offender has been rehabilitated.  And the automatically imposed punishment lasts 
far longer than the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
{¶ 84} Again, we are dealing with juveniles who remain in the juvenile 
system through the decision of a juvenile judge—a decision made through the 
balancing of the factors set forth in R.C. 2152.12(B)—that the juvenile at issue is 
amenable to the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile system.  The protections 
and rehabilitative aims of the juvenile process must remain paramount; we must 
recognize that juvenile offenders are less culpable and more amenable to reform 
than adult offenders. 
{¶ 85} The requirement in R.C. 2152.86 of automatic imposition of Tier 
III classification on a juvenile offender who receives an SYO dispositional 
sentence undercuts the rehabilitative purpose of Ohio’s juvenile system and 
eliminates the important role of the juvenile court’s discretion in the disposition of 
juvenile offenders and thus fails to meet the due process requirement of 
fundamental fairness.  In D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 
209, ¶ 59, we held that because of the central role of the juvenile judge in a 
juvenile’s rehabilitative process, fundamental fairness did not require the same 
jury-trial rights for juveniles as we required for adults in Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 
2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470.  In this case, we determine that fundamental 
fairness is not a one-way street that allows only for an easing of due process 
January Term, 2012 
35 
 
requirements for juveniles; instead, fundamental fairness may require, as it does 
in this case, additional procedural safeguards for juveniles in order to meet of the 
juvenile system’s goals of rehabilitation and reintegration into society. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 86} R.C. 2152.86 creates a classification of juvenile offenders called 
public-registry-qualified juvenile-offender registrants.  R.C. 2152.86 imposes 
upon that classification of juvenile offenders an automatic, lifetime requirement 
of sex-offender registration and notification, including placement on a public 
Internet registry.  Such requirements are imposed upon juveniles without the 
participation of a juvenile judge.  We conclude that R.C. 2152.86 is 
unconstitutional because the penalty it imposes violates the prohibitions against 
cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9.  Further, we 
hold that R.C. 2152.86 is unconstitutional because the procedure involved in 
imposing the punishments violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, 
Section 16. 
{¶ 87} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, and MCGEE 
BROWN, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 88} Respectfully, I dissent. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
 
{¶ 89} In State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 
N.E.2d 1108, I expressed my view in a dissenting opinion, that consistent with 
prior holdings of this court, the registration and notification requirements of S.B. 
10 are civil in nature and part of a regulatory scheme designed to protect the 
public from known sex offenders.  Id. at ¶ 24-61.  Because application of those 
requirements to juveniles pursuant to R.C. 2152.86 does not alter S.B. 10’s 
nonpunitive purpose, that view also applies to juveniles such as C.P. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 90} In 2005, the state of Utah filed a petition charging C.P., then age 
11, with destruction of property, sodomy, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, and 
rape of a child.  The three latter charges stemmed from allegations that when C.P. 
was nine and ten years old, he had engaged in sexual conduct with his half-
sister—three years younger—for several years.  That conduct included making his 
sister perform strip acts, forcing her to perform and receive oral sex, exposing 
himself, and forcibly raping her.  C.P. admitted to the charges of destruction of 
property, sodomy, and sexual abuse of a child, a charge which the state had 
reduced from aggravated sexual abuse of a child.  The Utah juvenile court placed 
C.P. in the temporary custody of the Division of Child and Family Services for 
foster care, committed him to the Department of Juvenile Justice Services for 30 
days, and ordered him to obtain sex-specific counseling.  During a 
neuropsychological evaluation conducted in 2006, C.P. admitted the allegations 
involving his half-sister and also admitted to having “touched five or six other 
young girls inappropriately.” 
{¶ 91} While in foster care in Utah, C.P. left his second foster home after 
being accused of touching a girl’s breast at school.  He was then placed in the 
Youth Track residential program for juvenile sex offenders, where he received 
inpatient residential care from June 1, 2006, through November 3, 2008, when he 
returned home to live with his mother.  C.P. participated in outpatient counseling, 
January Term, 2012 
37 
 
but discontinued taking his medications because he did not like how they made 
him feel. 
{¶ 92} Thereafter, C.P.’s parents agreed that he might benefit from living 
with his father in Ohio, and in June 2009 he moved to Ohio.  Within nine days of 
his arrival, C.P., then age 15, secluded himself with his six-year-old nephew and 
orally and anally raped him. 
{¶ 93} The day after the incident, the state filed a complaint against C.P. 
in the Athens County Juvenile Court, charging him with two counts of child rape 
and one count of kidnapping with sexual motivation, each count a first-degree 
felony if committed by an adult.  The state filed a motion pursuant to R.C. 
2152.10(A)(1)(b), which sought to transfer jurisdiction of the case to the common 
pleas court to prosecute C.P. as an adult.  After holding an amenability hearing, 
the trial court denied the state’s motion.  The state then obtained an indictment 
against C.P. that contained a serious-youth-offender (“SYO”) specification for 
each count. 
{¶ 94} C.P. subsequently entered an admission to each charge in the 
indictment, and due to his age and the nature of his offenses, he was eligible for a 
discretionary SYO dispositional sentence pursuant to R.C. 2152.11(D)(2)(b).  The 
court found him to be a delinquent child and designated him an SYO in relation to 
each offense.  It committed C.P. to the Ohio Department of Youth Services for 
concurrent commitments on each count of a minimum period of three years and a 
maximum period not to exceed age twenty-one.  As part of the SYO disposition, 
the court imposed three concurrent five-year prison terms that were stayed 
pending C.P.’s successful completion of his juvenile dispositions.  The court 
further classified C.P. as a public-registry-qualified juvenile-offender registrant 
(“PRQJOR”) pursuant to R.C. 2152.86(A)(1) and a Tier III sex-offender/child-
victim offender pursuant to R.C. 2152.86(A)(1), and advised him of the duties 
imposed by that statute. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
 
{¶ 95} C.P. appealed his classification as a Tier III offender and PRQJOR 
to the Fourth District Court of Appeals, arguing that R.C. 2152.86 violated his 
rights to due process and equal protection, as well as his right against cruel and 
unusual punishment.  The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court. 
The Majority Opinion 
{¶ 96} The majority reverses the judgment of the court of appeals, finding 
that the registration and notification requirements of R.C. 2152.86 constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9.  The majority 
further finds that because the statute imposes those requirements automatically 
rather than at the discretion of a juvenile judge, it also violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the 
Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 16. 
{¶ 97} The Ohio General Assembly passed 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 
(“S.B. 10”) in accordance with legislation enacted by the United States Congress 
in an effort to create a national, uniform system of sex-offender registration.  
Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 25.  
Amended by S.B. 10, R.C. 2950.02(B) declares the intent of the General 
Assembly “to protect the safety and general welfare of the people of this state” in 
providing for the registration and community notification of certain sex offenders, 
and it specifically included public-registry-qualified juvenile-offender registrants, 
such as C.P., among them.  Id.  It is undisputed that the General Assembly is “the 
ultimate arbiter of public policy” and the only branch of government charged with 
fulfilling that role.  Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-
Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 21, quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. 
of Gannett Satellite Information Network v. Dupuis, 98 Ohio St.3d 126, 2002-
Ohio-7041, 781 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 21.  And prior to this court’s abandonment of 
January Term, 2012 
39 
 
precedent in the majority opinion in Williams, we have historically construed 
registration statutes as part of a civil regulatory scheme and nonpunitive in nature. 
{¶ 98} Accordingly, in my view, the General Assembly constitutionally 
enacted R.C. 2152.86 and imposed registration and notification requirements on 
certain juvenile sex offenders based on concerns for public safety and public 
welfare.  Those requirements are not punitive and do not offend the Constitution.  
To the extent that any policy concern exists regarding the registration of juvenile 
sex offenders, it is within the sole province of the legislature to address that issue. 
R.C. 2152.86 is not Punitive 
{¶ 99} In State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. 
of Edn., 111 Ohio St.3d 568, 2006-Ohio-5512, 857 N.E.2d 1148, ¶ 20, 73, this 
court reiterated that the constitutionality of a statute starts with a presumption of 
constitutionality based in part upon this court’s deference to the legislative branch 
on matters of public policy.  The strong presumption of constitutionality is further 
supported by the requirement that before we can declare a statute unconstitutional, 
it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional 
provisions are clearly incompatible.  State v. Carswell, 114 Ohio St.3d 210, 2007-
Ohio-3723, 871 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 7.  With respect to determining whether a 
registration statute is punitive, “ ‘only the clearest proof could suffice’ ” to 
override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil 
remedy into a criminal penalty.  United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249, 100 
S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980), quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 
617, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960). 
{¶ 100} The majority opinion begins with the premise that R.C. Chapter 
2950 is punitive, and then it applies the two-part analysis discussed by the 
Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2021, 176 
L.Ed.2d 825 (2010).  Graham held that a juvenile offender’s sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for convictions of non-homicidal 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
 
crimes violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The 
majority opinion today relies on Graham to conclude that the registration and 
notification requirements of R.C. 2152.86 constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
{¶ 101} The majority bases its conclusion on several factors: the lack of a 
national consensus favoring the publication of juvenile sex offenders’ personal 
information, its belief that juvenile sex offenders are less culpable and more 
susceptible to change than adult sex offenders, and its position that the 
requirements of the statute are especially harsh because a juvenile offender will 
begin adulthood with the stigma associated with being labeled a sex offender, 
which in turn will hamper education, relationships, and employment 
opportunities.  The majority further finds that R.C. 2152.86 does not advance 
penological goals.  Under the guise of exercising the independent judgment 
permitted by the test in Graham, the majority impermissibly supplants the 
judgment of the General Assembly with its own beliefs. 
{¶ 102} Registration has historically been viewed as a regulatory measure 
and not as a form of punishment.  See, e.g., R.W. v. Sanders, 168 S.W.3d 65, 69 
(Mo.2005), citing Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229, 2 L.Ed.2d 228, 78 
S.Ct. 240 (1957); In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204, 213 (R.I.2008) (sex-offender 
registration requirement for juveniles did not constitute punishment and was 
found constitutional).  In Smith v. Doe, the court rejected analogies between sex-
offender registration and "shaming punishments of the colonial period."  538 U.S. 
84, 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.E.2d 164 (2003).  “Our system does not treat 
dissemination of truthful information in furtherance of a legitimate governmental 
objective as punishment.”  Id. at 98. 
{¶ 103} As applied to juveniles, courts have rejected the argument that 
statutes subjecting juveniles to public registration are punitive because of the 
unpleasant consequences that may flow from registration or the length of time a 
January Term, 2012 
41 
 
juvenile may be required to report.  In United States v. Juvenile Male, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected the conclusion reached here by the 
majority, determining that the registration and notification requirements imposed 
by the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) on 
juveniles do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.  9th Cir. Nos. 09-30330, 
09-30273, and 09-30365, 2012 WL 206263, *9 (Jan. 25, 2012).  After noting that 
“[t]he bar for cruel and unusual punishment is high,” the court went on to explain: 
 
Although defendants understandably note that SORNA 
may have the effect of exposing juvenile defendants and their 
families to potential shame and humiliation for acts committed 
while still an adolescent, the statute does not meet the high 
standard of cruel and unusual punishment.  The requirement that 
juveniles register in a sex offender database for at least 25 years 
because they committed the equivalent of aggravated sexual abuse 
is not a disproportionate punishment.  These juveniles do not face 
any risk of incarceration or threat of physical harm.  In fact, at least 
two other circuits have held that SORNA’s registration 
requirement is not even a punitive measure, let alone cruel and 
unusual punishment.  See United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 920 
(8th Cir.2008) ("SORNA’s registration requirement demonstrates 
no congressional intent to punish sex offenders"); see also United 
States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199, 204-05 (5th Cir.2009). 
 
Id. 
{¶ 104} In the case of In re Ronnie A., the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina reiterated its prior holding that “sex offender registration, regardless of 
the length of time, is non-punitive” and saw no reason to distinguish juvenile sex 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
 
offenders.  355 S.C. 407, 409, 585 S.E.2d 311 (2003).  Although the juvenile at 
issue did not have to be placed on the public registry because he was under 12 
years of age at the time of his adjudication, the statute being challenged, S.C. 
Code Ann. 23-3-490, required public registration for offenders above 12 years old 
for certain offenses. 
{¶ 105} Additionally, although the Supreme Court of South Dakota struck 
down that state’s public-registration statute on equal protection grounds, it 
reiterated its position that public registration is not punitive.  See In re Z.B., 2008 
S.D. 108, 757 N.W.2d 595, ¶ 24.  “Such measures are not penal; they are 
regulatory.”  Id.  South Dakota amended its sex-offender registration statute in 
2010, and the current version still requires juveniles over the age of 14 to publicly 
register as sex offenders for certain offenses.  S.D. Codified Laws 22-24B-2. 
{¶ 106} Although the majority finds juvenile sex offenders less culpable 
than their adult counterparts, juveniles commit more than 25 percent of all sex 
offenses and more than 35 percent of all sex offenses against children.  Finkelhor, 
Ormrod & Chaffin, Juveniles Who Commit Sex Offenses Against Minors, Office 
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preventions, Juvenile Justice Bulletin 3 
(Dec.2009).  In fact, C.P. was a repeat offender and all of his victims were other 
juveniles; by invalidating R.C. 2152.86, as applied to juveniles such as C.P., the 
majority leaves the public unaware of a significant number of sex offenders who 
are capable of reoffending, directly contrary to the intent of the General Assembly 
and contrary to our precedent and determinations of constitutionality that exist in 
our sister states. 
{¶ 107} Moreover, this court has previously recognized that an offense 
committed as a juvenile may have adverse consequences on the offender as an 
adult.  In State v. Adkins, 129 Ohio St.3d 287, 2011-Ohio-3141, 951 N.E.2d 766, 
we held that a juvenile adjudication could serve as one of the five prior similar 
offenses necessary to enhance a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under 
January Term, 2012 
43 
 
the influence of alcohol because R.C. 2901.08 expressly includes juvenile 
adjudications among the offenses that may be used for penalty enhancement.  We 
specifically noted that “R.C. 2901.08 did not change [the] juvenile adjudication; it 
merely added another type of legal violation as an aggravating offense under R.C. 
4511.19(G)(1)(d).”  Id. at ¶ 17.  Similarly, the requirements of R.C. 2152.86 do 
not convert a public-registry-qualified juvenile-offender registrant’s adjudication 
into a criminal one. 
{¶ 108} With respect to the argument that public registration constitutes 
punishment because of the potential for adversely affecting a juvenile’s future 
employment, the Supreme Court of the United States has held occupational 
debarment to be regulatory, and therefore civil in nature.  See, e.g., Hudson v. 
United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104-105, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997); De 
Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960); 
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898). 
{¶ 109} Nor is R.C. 2152.86 at odds with the goals promoted by R.C. 
2152.01.  The legislative intent underlying the enactment of R.C. 2152.86 was to 
protect the public, and that goal is shared by R.C. 2152.01(A).  The majority 
questions whether R.C. 2152.86 actually furthers public interest and public safety 
because juvenile judges have no discretion in determining if a juvenile is 
dangerous or what level of registration or notification would be adequate.  
“Questions concerning the wisdom of legislation are ‘for the legislature, and 
whether the court agrees with it in that particular or not is of no consequence.’ ”  
Butler v. Jordan, 92 Ohio St.3d 354, 376, 750 N.E.2d 554 (2001) (Cook, J., 
concurring in judgment), quoting State Bd. of Health v. Greenville, 86 Ohio St. 1, 
20, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912). 
{¶ 110} R.C. 2152.86 also does not frustrate the purpose of Juv.R. 37(B), 
which is to protect children by keeping their juvenile court records confidential.  
First, the proceedings in juvenile court maintain their confidential status because 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
44 
 
the obligation to register does not trigger until the successful completion of the 
juvenile disposition, see R.C. 2152.86(A)(2); thus, because the welfare of “a 
child” is no longer at stake, the underlying interest in confidentiality no longer 
exists.  Second, the confidentiality requirement imposed by Juv.R. 37(B) is not 
applicable when statutes provide for disclosure; thus, R.C. 2152.86 supersedes the 
confidentiality provision of Juv.R. 37. 
{¶ 111} For the foregoing reasons, the requirements of R.C. 2152.86 are 
not punitive and do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.  The General 
Assembly enacted R.C. 2152.86 pursuant to its authority and with the intent to 
protect the safety and welfare of the public.  Moreover, it cannot be disputed that 
preventing crime “persists undiluted in the juvenile context.”  Schall v. Martin, 
467 U.S. 253, 264, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984).  Thus, the statute is 
not unconstitutional. 
R.C. 2152.86 Meets the Requirements of Due Process  
and Fundamental Fairness 
{¶ 112} Courts have rejected challenges to registration statutes based 
alleged violations of due process.  In Connecticut Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 
U.S. 1, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003), the Supreme Court construed 
Connecticut’s version of Megan’s Law and held that procedural due process did 
not entitle a convicted sex offender to a hearing on current dangerousness before 
requiring registration.  The court found it unnecessary to determine whether 
registration deprived offenders of a liberty interest "because even assuming, 
arguendo, that [an offender] has been deprived of a liberty interest, due process 
does not entitle him to a hearing to establish a fact that is not material under the 
Connecticut statute."  Id. at 7.  The court further explained that "[persons] who 
assert a right to a hearing under the Due Process Clause must show that the facts 
they seek to establish in that hearing are relevant under the statutory scheme."  Id. 
at 8.  See also People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill.2d 185, 909 N.E.2d 783 
January Term, 2012 
45 
 
(2009) (rejecting argument that due process requires jury trial before court may 
impose registration requirements on juveniles); People ex rel. C.B.B., 75 P.3d 
1148 (Colo.App.2003) (“C.B.B. has no procedural due process right to a hearing 
to prove a fact immaterial to the state’s statutory scheme before being required to 
register as a sex offender under the Act”). 
{¶ 113} Rejecting a similar argument, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
Juvenile Male, explained: 
 
Additional process is only necessary where it gives a sex offender 
the ability to prove or disprove facts related to the applicability of 
the registration requirement.  In other words, where "the law’s 
requirements turn on an offender’s conviction alone—a fact that a 
convicted offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded 
opportunity to contest"—no additional process is required for due 
process.  Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 596 (9th Cir.2004).  In 
this case, juvenile sex offenders are required to register on the 
basis of their adjudicated juvenile status, which explicitly triggers 
SORNA’s requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 16913.  Thus, because 
defendants are not challenging whether they received adequate due 
process in their juvenile proceedings, there is no basis for a 
procedural due process claim. 
Further, adequate procedural safeguards at the conviction 
stage are sufficient to obviate the need for any additional process at 
the registration stage. * * *  
 
Juvenile Male, supra, 2012 WL 206263, *13. 
{¶ 114} As applied here, C.P. cannot establish a due process violation 
based on the fact that R.C. 2152.86 imposes automatic registration, as opposed to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
46 
 
registration imposed by an exercise of judicial discretion, because whether a 
juvenile sex offender has been sufficiently rehabilitated is not material to the 
statute’s operation; it is the adjudication that triggers the duty to register.  There is 
no constitutional requirement that juveniles must receive greater due process than 
adults. 
{¶ 115} Discretion is a matter of grace and not of right.  Thus, the General 
Assembly was within its authority to impose automatic registration on juvenile 
sex offenders when it enacted R.C. 2152.86.  Accordingly, the statute meets the 
requirements of due process and does not offend notions of fundamental fairness. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 116} R.C. 2152.86 is constitutional and does not violate the prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution or the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9, nor does 
it violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution or the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 16. 
{¶ 117} The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2152.86 pursuant to its 
proper authority and in furtherance of the legitimate goals of public safety and 
public welfare.  It is not the function of this court to substitute its judgment for 
that of the General Assembly. 
{¶ 118} For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals and hold that R.C. 2152.86 is constitutional. 
_________________ 
 
CUPP, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 119} For a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment, as a general matter the punishment in question 
must be “grossly disproportionate” to the crime’s severity.  See Graham v. 
Florida, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2037, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment) (the Eighth Amendment does not require 
January Term, 2012 
47 
 
strict proportionality between the crime and the sentence, but forbids only 
extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime).  This “narrow 
proportionality” standard is highly deferential and strongly favors upholding a 
punishment that has been imposed as authorized by a particular statute.  It sets a 
very high bar for a challenger claiming a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s 
ban to overcome.  Judges do not possess blanket authority to second guess 
decisions of legislatures or sentencing courts.  Id.  Successful Eighth Amendment 
challenges to noncapital sentences are “ ‘exceedingly rare.’ ”  Id., quoting 
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980). 
{¶ 120} This court has similarly recognized the high bar a challenger 
asserting cruel and unusual punishment must overcome.  In State v. Chaffin, 30 
Ohio St.2d 13, 17-18, 282 N.E.2d 46 (1972), this court upheld the imposition of a 
20- to 40-year prison sentence for a defendant convicted of selling cannabis, 
rejecting the defendant’s contention that his punishment was cruel and unusual.  
Paragraph three of the Chaffin syllabus held that a punishment is not cruel and 
unusual unless the punishment is “so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to 
shock the sense of justice of the community.”  See also State v. Hairston, 118 
Ohio St.3d 289, 2008-Ohio-2338, 888 N.E.2d 1073, ¶ 13-14 (reiterating the 
validity of the “gross disproportionality” standard and acknowledging that it can 
be met only in a very limited number of cases). 
{¶ 121} When reviewing a particular juvenile punishment for an Eighth 
Amendment violation, an offender’s status as a juvenile must be taken into 
account because juveniles are typically less culpable than adults due to their youth 
and immaturity.  Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2039-2040, 176 L.Ed.2d 
825 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment).  However, the general standards of 
gross disproportionality and substantial deference to the legislative judgment 
expressed within the relevant statute are not to be abandoned merely because the 
offender is a juvenile. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
48 
 
{¶ 122} I dissented in State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-
3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, because I could not find, as the majority did, that certain 
portions of 2007 Am.Sub. S.B. No. 10 (“S.B. 10”) are punitive in nature for 
purposes of a retroactivity analysis pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, Article II, 
Section 28.  I acknowledge, however, that Williams must be regarded as 
established precedent on the issues it resolved.  Further, as the majority opinion 
recognizes, the United States Supreme Court in Graham recently held that the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of the infliction of cruel and unusual 
punishment is violated when a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide 
receives a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. 
{¶ 123} But the sex-offender registration and notification provisions at 
issue in this case are so significantly different from the punishment at issue in 
Graham—lifetime imprisonment with no chance of parole, with its fundamental 
loss of liberty—that I am left wondering how the two can possibly be considered 
comparable for constitutional purposes. 
{¶ 124} Although the provisions of R.C. 5152.86 subjecting certain 
juveniles to automatic lifetime registration and notification requirements, with a 
potential for reclassification after 25 years, may be viewed as highly burdensome 
or even onerous, they do not reach that high level of punishment that the United 
States Supreme Court has held categorically unconstitutional.  The punishments 
held by the United States Supreme Court to violate the Eighth Amendment ban 
when applied to juveniles are the death penalty, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), and lifetime imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole for serious, but non-homicide, crimes.  Graham, ___ U.S. 
___, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825.  I do not find the requirements at issue 
here pertaining to registration and notification to rise to such a level as to be even 
remotely comparable. 
January Term, 2012 
49 
 
{¶ 125} The statutory requirements at issue apply only to a small and 
select category of juvenile offenders—those who have committed the most 
serious sex offenses after reaching the age of 14 and who have ultimately received 
a disposition as a serious youthful offender (“SYO”) after all the procedural steps 
of the SYO process have been fulfilled.  The General Assembly has determined 
that these offenders pose a special danger to public safety that separates them 
from all other juvenile offenders.  R.C. 2152.86 assigns only offenders of this 
type to the special category of public-registry-qualified juvenile-offender 
registrants, or PRQJORs. 
{¶ 126} Under R.C. 2152.86, all juveniles who commit sex offenses 
before their fourteenth birthday, those juvenile sex offenders over the age of 14 
who commit less serious offenses than C.P. committed, and those offenders who 
have not received a SYO disposition are not considered PRQJORs.  R.C. 
2152.86(A)(1).  The General Assembly’s differentiations in this regard are not 
unreasonable in light of its objective of protecting the public, and the 
determinations are entitled to substantial deference. 
{¶ 127} Justice O’Donnell’s dissenting opinion makes clear that C.P.’s 
offenses, if committed by an adult, would have potentially resulted in convictions 
for three first-degree felonies and a very long prison sentence, thus highlighting 
the seriousness of C.P.’s conduct that the majority opinion merely mentions in 
passing.  C.P.’s status of PRQJOR is a direct consequence of his own actions. 
{¶ 128} The Graham court majority’s decision to adopt a categorical rule 
as to the particular issue raised in that case was driven by two critical 
considerations.  First, juvenile offenders who did not kill or intend to kill have a 
“twice diminished moral culpability,” Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 
2027, 176 L.Ed.2d 825, because (1) they are juveniles, who in general lack 
maturity, are vulnerable to negative influences, and are more capable of change 
than adults, id. at 2026, and (2) their offenses are not deserving of the most 
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50 
 
serious forms of punishment, which should be reserved for adults who commit 
murder.  Id. at 2026-2027.  Second, sentences of life in prison without parole 
“share some characteristics with death sentences that are shared by no other 
sentences,” including irrevocability, and therefore must be regarded as “especially 
harsh punishment for a juvenile.”  Id. at 2027 and 2028.  The court in Graham 
thus concluded that the high bar that must be overcome for a punishment to be 
deemed cruel and unusual was met largely because of the exceptionally harsh 
punishment a sentence of life imprisonment without parole entails. 
{¶ 129} In the present case, however, the majority unjustifiably relies on 
the offender’s juvenile status to minimize the substantial bar the challenger must 
surmount to establish cruel and unusual punishment.  In place of that substantial 
bar, the majority substitutes a threshold that bears no resemblance to the threshold 
applied in the review of the death penalty in Roper or the review of the sentence 
of life imprisonment with no possibility of parole in Graham.  The punishment of 
life without parole under scrutiny in Graham deprived the juvenile offender in 
that case of “the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration” because 
the offender was to be unconditionally imprisoned for life with absolutely no 
prospect of parole.  Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2027, 176 L.Ed.2d 825.  In 
contrast, most courts have held that sex-offender requirements of the type at issue 
in this case are not even “punishment” for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, 
even if the requirements do place heavy burdens on an offender.  See United 
States v. Juvenile Male, ___ F.3d ___, 2012 WL 206263 *9 (9th Cir.2012), and 
other cases cited and discussed in Justice O’Donnell’s dissent.  The sex-offender 
notification and registration requirements at issue here, while burdensome, simply 
do not approach the severity of the punishments at issue in Graham or Roper. 
{¶ 130} The majority opinion, unfortunately, fails to acknowledge this 
fundamental difference, even as it repeatedly compares the requirements in this 
case to the punishment of lifetime imprisonment in Graham.  Instead, it appears 
January Term, 2012 
51 
 
to stage-manage the Graham factors in order to reach its own preferred policy 
result. 
{¶ 131} In so doing, the majority opinion completely loses sight of the 
overriding meaning of the standards applicable in cases of this nature.  Although 
the registration and public-disclosure provisions at issue in this case are criticized 
by some as imprudent and too harsh, a demonstration of simple disproportionality 
is not enough to support a finding of an Eighth Amendment violation—the 
disproportionality must be great.  Taking into account the very serious offenses 
C.P. 
committed, 
as 
delineated 
in 
Justice 
O’Donnell’s 
dissent, 
the 
disproportionality here is not of such a magnitude that it contravenes the 
constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. 
{¶ 132} Additionally, I am unable to agree with the majority’s 
determination that R.C. 2152.86 violates due process principles.  The majority’s 
finding of fundamental unfairness fails to take into account that PRQJORs such as 
C.P. reach that status only by undergoing a rigorous narrowing process designed 
to eliminate most juvenile sex offenders.  R.C. 2152.13.  The statute at issue 
provides adequate procedural safeguards for those offenders who are not 
eliminated, and who are ultimately assigned PRQJOR status, to satisfy due 
process concerns. 
{¶ 133} Finally, the majority’s analysis leaves unanswered a multitude of 
additional issues that its conclusions generate.  As a result, the trial court will be 
forced to guess what is actually required in this case upon remand.  I note just two 
of these unanswered questions. 
{¶ 134} First, the majority opinion concludes that the lack of discretion 
afforded to a juvenile judge by R.C. 2152.86 in assigning the PRQJOR 
designation is a significant infirmity in the statute bearing upon its 
constitutionality.  The majority opinion’s syllabus paragraph states that the 
statutory provisions are unenforceable only “[t]o the extent that” R.C. 2152.86 
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52 
 
“imposes automatic, lifelong registration and notification requirements on 
juvenile sex offenders tried within the juvenile system.”  (Emphasis added.)  Does 
this mean that a juvenile judge may now, notwithstanding the statute, exercise 
discretion as to whether to impose sex-offender notification and reporting 
requirements on PRQJOR-status offenders such as C.P.?  If so, what are the 
boundaries of that discretion? 
{¶ 135} Second, another constitutional infirmity of the statute, according 
to the majority opinion, is that the registration and notification requirements are 
lifelong (with a possibility for adjustment after 25 years).  May a juvenile judge in 
the exercise of discretion now impose requirements of shorter duration on 
offenders such as C.P. and overcome the constitutional deficiencies?  If so, what 
duration will satisfy the majority’s concerns? 
{¶ 136} It is not just the juvenile judge in this particular case who must 
decipher the meaning of this court’s analysis.  This decision will also affect other 
juvenile offenders and the juvenile judges who will preside over their cases.  This 
court apparently leaves it to those judges to unravel the mysteries of this 
decision’s application.  Moreover, should the General Assembly seek to revise the 
statute to conform with this court’s decision, it will have a difficult time 
discerning the new Eighth Amendment boundaries that this court’s majority today 
creates. 
{¶ 137} I am unable to agree that the provisions of R.C. 2152.86 at issue 
violate either the United States or Ohio constitutional prohibitions against cruel 
and unusual punishment and the requirements of due process.  I would hold that 
the provisions under consideration survive constitutional scrutiny and would 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
C. David Warren, Athens County Prosecuting Attorney, and George 
Reitmeier, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee state of Ohio. 
January Term, 2012 
53 
 
Timothy Young, State Public Defender, and Brooke M. Burns, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellant C.P. 
Nadia Seeratan, urging reversal for amici curiae National Juvenile 
Defender Center, Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, Central 
Juvenile Defender Center, Juvenile Justice Coalition, Ohio Justice and Policy 
Center, Dr. Elizabeth J. Letourneau, and Dr. Morris Jenkins. 
Kim Tandy, urging reversal for amicus curiae Children’s Law Center, Inc. 
Gamso, Helmick & Hoolahan and Jeffrey M. Gamso; and James L. 
Hardiman and Carrie L. Davis, urging reversal for amicus curiae American Civil 
Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor 
General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Laura 
Eddleman Heim, Deputy Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio 
Attorney General. 
______________________