Case Title: LYAL D. MCCORMACK v. STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES and DIANA L. MCCORMACK

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0173

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-10-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
LYAL D. MCCORMACK v. STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES and DIANA L. MCCORMACK2008 WY 119193 P.3d 1147Case Number: No. S-08-0173Decided: 10/08/2008
October 
Term, A.D. 2008

 
 
LYAL D. 
McCORMACK,Appellant(Respondent),v.STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY 
SERVICES,Appellee(Petitioner),andDIANA L. 
McCORMACK,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 
Order 
Granting Motion to Dismiss Appeal 

 
 

[¶1]      This 
matter came before the 
Court upon a "Motion to Dismiss Appeal," filed herein September 9, 2008, by the 
State of Wyoming, Department of Family Services.  After a careful review of the motion, 
the Brief of Appellant, and the file, this Court finds that the motion to 
dismiss this appeal should be granted.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
finds and concludes as follows:

 
 

1.      
On or about 
July 30, 2007, there was filed, on Appellant's behalf, a Petition to Modify 
Child Support;

 
 

2.      
On April 2, 
2008, the district court entered its "Order Denying Relief Requested by 
Respondent Lyal D. McCormack in his Petition to Modify 
Support;"

 
 

3.      
On April 11, 
2008, the Department of Family Services filed a motion to correct the order, nunc pro tunc; 

 
 

4.      
On May 21, 
2008, the district court entered its "Order Denying Relief Requested by 
Respondent Lyal D. McCormack in his Petition to Modify Support Nunc Pro Tunc" (the nunc pro tunc order).  This order made the following correction 
to two paragraphs:  the original 
order stated that the "judgment is entered against Lyal D. McCormack in the sum 
of $6,123.76 through December 31, 2008; the correct date is December 31, 2007, 
and the judgment should be awarded to Diana L. McCormack."  The order indicates that these clerical 
errors were corrected "pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(a);"

 
 

5.      
On June 13, 
2008, Appellant mailed his notice of appeal from a correctional facility.  Under what is known as the "prisoner 
delivery rule," the notice of appeal was deemed filed on that date.  W.R.A.P. 14.04; 

 
 

6.      
In his 
notice of appeal, Appellant indicates that he is appealing from the order 
entered on May 21, 2008, the nunc pro 
tunc order; 

 
 

7.      
Appellant's 
notice of appeal, June 13, 2008, is timely as to the May 21stnunc pro tunc 
order;

 
 

8.      
Appellant's 
notice of appeal is not timely as to the original order, the April 2nd 
"Order Denying Relief Requested by Respondent Lyal D. McCormack in 
his Petition to Modify Support."  
W.R.A.P. 2.01; 

 
 

9.      
On September 
29, 2008, Appellant filed his "Brief of Appellant" in this Court; 

 
 

10. 
 In his Brief of Appellant, Appellant 
challenges the original order.  
Appellant does not challenge the corrections made in the nunc pro tunc 
order;

 
 

11. 
 This Court finds that, although the 
appeal from the nunc pro tunc order 
is proper, this appeal should be dismissed because Appellant, in his brief, does 
not challenge the nunc pro tunc 
order.  Instead, Appellant 
challenges only the original order.  
However, he has not filed a timely appeal to challenge that order.  Thus, without a challenge to the nunc pro tunc order, this Court finds 
that this appeal should be dismissed; 

 
 

12. 
 Cases from other jurisdictions support 
this result.  In Breslow v. Breslow, 713 N.E.2d 642, 
649-50 (Ill.App.Ct. 1st Dist. 1999) an Illinois court wrote:

 
 
A 
nunc pro tunc order may itself 
properly be treated as an appealable order, because it would be manifestly 
unfair to allow a party no avenue in which to seek appellate review of the 
propriety of such an order. Accordingly, although a nunc pro tunc order for some purposes 
"relates back" to the time of the order it corrects, it does not relate back "in 
such a manner as to make it impossible to file a notice of appeal within the 
time required" by the supreme court rules. . . .

 
 
However, 
we are aware of no authority for the proposition that the entry of a nunc pro tunc order somehow has the 
effect of "unfinalizing" a prior final judgment. . . . The fact that a nunc pro tunc order is itself appealable 
does not connote that once a nunc pro 
tunc order has been entered a party may, in an appeal from the nunc pro tunc order, challenge 
provisions of the underlying order which was corrected nunc pro tunc.  In fact, the only authority of which we 
are aware holds directly to the contrary, that a party may not use an appeal 
from a nunc pro tunc order as a 
vehicle for attacking portions of a final judgment from which the time to appeal 
has elapsed.

 
 

(Underline 
supplied.)

 
 

13. 
 To state the rule somewhat more 
succinctly, we quote the Arkansas Supreme Court, which has 
written:

 
 
An 
appeal from a nunc pro tunc order "is 
not from the original order, or judgment, but from the order purporting to 
correct it."  Kindiger v. Huffman, 307 Ark. 465, 466-67, 821 S.W.2d 33, 34 (1991). Thus, an appeal from a nunc pro tunc order contests the 
propriety of the corrections made and may not be used to challenge issues 
that should have been appealed from the original order but were 
not.

 
 

Holt 
Bonding Co. v. State, 
114 S.W.3d 179, 183 (Ark. 2003) (citations omitted); see also Kelly v. Morrison, 118 S.W.3d 155, 
157-58 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) ("appellant only appealed from the nunc pro tunc November order correcting 
the August order, and consequently, appellant could challenge on appeal only the 
propriety of the corrections made"); Francis v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 371 
Ark. 285, 293-94 (Ark. 2007) ("We have dismissed appeals as untimely when 
appellants, after the time for appealing from the original order had expired, 
attempted to appeal issues not addressed in or corrected by the nunc pro tunc order"); 

 
 

14. 
 We agree with these authorities.  Thus, given the circumstances of this 
case, and for the reasons noted above, 

 
 

IT IS ORDERED that the 
"Motion to Dismiss 
Appeal," filed herein September 9, 2008, be, and hereby is, granted; and it is 
further

 
 
[¶2]      ORDERED that the captioned appeal be, 
and hereby is, dismissed. 

 
 

DATED this 7th day of October, 2008.

 
 
                                    
BY THE COURT:

 
 
                                                                        
/s/ William U. Hill                              

WILLIAM U. 
HILL

Justice