Case Title: West Lewinsville Heights Cit. Ass'n v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 042274

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present: All the Justices 
 
WEST LEWINSVILLE HEIGHTS  
CITIZENS ASSOCIATION, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 042274 
 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS  
OF FAIRFAX COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
September 16, 2005 
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS 
OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
 
v.  Record No. 042326 
 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS  
OF FAIRFAX COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Dennis J. Smith, Judge 
 
 
These appeals present two major issues.  The first issue, 
which is procedural in nature, is whether a petition for a writ 
of certiorari from a decision of a board of zoning appeals was 
timely when it was filed within 30 days after a letter sent  
from the board’s clerk stating the board’s final decision.  The 
second issue, involving the merits of the case, is whether a 
zoning ordinance permitted a county park authority to allow a 
private institution regular use of a field in a public park 
without altering the park’s public use classification. 
Lewinsville Park (the Park) is a public park of about 38 
acres located in a residential zoning district (the R-3 
district) in Fairfax County.  The Park is owned and operated by 
 
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the Fairfax County Park Authority (the Park Authority) and 
provides a variety of recreational facilities.  Included among 
these facilities is a lighted rectangular field, known as Field 
#2. 
The Park currently is classified as a “public use.”  In the 
R-3 district in which the Park is located, “public uses” are 
permitted by right.  See Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance (Zoning 
Ordinance) § 3-302.  Certain other uses, such as “[c]olleges 
[or] universities,” and “[s]ports arenas [or] stadiums,” are 
permitted in an R-3 district only by special exception.  Zoning 
Ordinance § 9-301. 
In January 2003, the Park Authority entered into a 
Memorandum of Agreement (the Agreement) with McLean Youth 
Soccer, Inc. (MYS), a private, non-profit organization that 
operates several youth soccer leagues in Fairfax County.  Under 
the Agreement, MYS agreed to finance and install a synthetic 
turf playing surface and other related improvements to Field #2, 
at a cost not to exceed $800,000.  In exchange, the Park 
Authority agreed to allocate to MYS approximately 3,187 hours 
per year of reserved playing time on Field #2.  The Agreement 
had an initial term of five years, with an automatic renewal 
provision for an additional five-year term. 
 
In the Agreement, the Park Authority also authorized MYS to 
assign to Marymount University (Marymount), a private 
 
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institution located in neighboring Arlington County, the right 
to use Field #2 for up to 300 hours of MYS’s total yearly 
allocation.  Marymount, in turn, was required to contribute up 
to one half the cost of the purchase and installation of the 
synthetic turf.  Marymount uses the improved Field #2 for 
intercollegiate soccer and lacrosse matches and practices.  
During the hours not allocated to MYS or Marymount, Field #2 is 
available for advance reservation or “walk on” use by the 
general public. 
 
In April 2003, the West Lewinsville Heights Citizens 
Association, and several nearby property owners (collectively, 
the residents), sent a letter by counsel to Jane W. Gwinn, 
Fairfax County Zoning Administrator (the Zoning Administrator), 
requesting a written opinion whether Marymount’s proposed use of 
the Park required a special use permit or special exception 
under the Zoning Ordinance.  The Zoning Administrator issued a 
decision stating that Marymount did not need a special use 
permit or special exception for the activities Marymount is 
allowed to conduct under the Agreement. 
 
In May 2003, the residents appealed the Zoning 
Administrator’s decision to the Board of Zoning Appeals of 
Fairfax County (the BZA).  The residents argued that Marymount’s 
proposed use of Field #2 would transform it into a “college 
 
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athletic facility,” which would require a special exception 
under the Zoning Ordinance. 
 
After a public hearing on September 16, 2003, the BZA 
unanimously voted to overturn the Zoning Administrator’s 
decision.  The BZA concluded that Marymount’s use of the Park 
was not “exclusively for public purposes” and required a special 
exception for a college or university facility under Zoning 
Ordinance § 9-301(1). 
 
On September 24, 2003, Kathleen A. Knoth, Deputy Clerk of 
the BZA, stated in a letter to counsel for the residents: 
At its September 16, 2003 meeting, the Board of Zoning 
Appeals took action to OVERTURN the determination of 
the Zoning Administrator for the above-referenced 
appeal application.  The final decision date is 
September 24, 2003. 
 
 
On October 24, 2003, the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax 
County, the Park Authority, and William E. Shoup, Gwinn’s 
successor as Zoning Administrator (collectively, the County), 
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the circuit court 
seeking review of the BZA’s decision.  The County alleged that 
the BZA was plainly wrong and applied erroneous principles of 
law in overturning the Zoning Administrator’s determination.  
The County asserted that the Park continues to be used 
“exclusively for public purposes” under the Agreement because 
the Park Authority continues to “own, operate, and regulate all 
of the activities of the public” at the Park. 
 
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The residents and the BZA opposed the County’s petition for 
a writ of certiorari.  The BZA also filed a plea in bar, arguing 
that the County’s appeal should be dismissed because it was not 
filed within 30 days of the BZA’s “final decision,” as required 
by Code § 15.2-2314.  The BZA argued that the “final decision,” 
within the meaning of the statute, was the BZA’s unanimous vote 
on September 16, 2003, overturning the Zoning Administrator’s 
decision.  The BZA argued that, therefore, the County’s petition 
was filed eight days after expiration of the 30-day appeal 
period fixed by Code § 15.2-2314. 
 
The circuit court denied the BZA’s plea in bar, granted the 
County’s petition for a writ of certiorari, and reversed the 
BZA’s decision.  The court concluded that the BZA’s decision 
became final on September 24, 2003, as stated in Knoth’s letter 
to counsel and pursuant to the BZA’s by-laws.  Thus, the court 
concluded that the County filed its petition within the 30-day 
time limit required by Code § 15.2-2314. 
The circuit court further held that the BZA was plainly 
wrong and applied erroneous principles of law in concluding that 
Marymount’s use of Field #2 changed the nature of the Park’s 
public use and required a special exception under the Zoning 
Ordinance.  The residents and the BZA (the residents) appeal 
from the circuit court’s judgment. 
 
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The residents argue that the circuit court erred in 
denying the BZA’s plea in bar, because the County’s 
petition for a writ of certiorari was filed more than 30 
days after the meeting at which the BZA voted to overturn 
the Zoning Administrator’s decision.  The residents assert 
that the BZA’s vote was the “final decision” for purposes 
of the 30-day appeal period set forth in Code § 15.2-2314, 
because the statute no longer requires the BZA to “file” 
its decision with the office of the board before the BZA’s 
decision becomes final. 
 
In response, the County argues that the circuit court 
correctly held that the County’s petition was timely filed, 
because Code § 15.2-2314 does not specify when a decision 
of a board of zoning appeals becomes final but only states 
that the 30-day appeal period begins to run from the date 
of the final decision.  The County contends that the BZA 
may determine for itself when its decisions become final, 
and that the BZA has done so by enacting Article VII, 
paragraph 8, of its by-laws.  The County asserts that its 
position is supported by the action of the BZA’s own deputy 
clerk, who stated in writing to the parties that “[t]he 
final decision date is September 24, 2003,” rather than the 
date of the BZA vote on September 16, 2003.  We disagree 
with the County’s arguments. 
 
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Established principles govern our interpretation of 
the statutory, ordinance, and by-law provisions relevant to 
this issue.  These principles also direct the order of 
priority to be given the provisions of the different 
enacting bodies. 
 
We employ the plain and natural meaning of the words 
contained in the enactments before us.  Capelle v. Orange 
County, 269 Va. 60, 65, 607 S.E.2d 103, 105 (2005); Lee 
County v. Town of St. Charles, 264 Va. 344, 348, 568 S.E.2d 
680, 682 (2002); Donovan v. Board of Zoning Appeals of 
Rockingham County, 251 Va. 271, 274, 467 S.E.2d 808, 810 
(1996).  However, when current and prior versions of a 
statute are at issue, there is a presumption that the 
General Assembly, in amending a statute, intended to effect 
a substantive change in the law.  Virginia-American Water 
Co. v. Prince William County Serv. Auth., 246 Va. 509, 517, 
436 S.E.2d 618, 622-23 (1993); Dale v. City of Newport 
News, 243 Va. 48, 51, 412 S.E.2d 701, 702 (1992).  Further, 
we assume that the General Assembly’s amendments to a 
statute are purposeful, rather than unnecessary.  AAA 
Disposal Servs. v. Eckert, 267 Va. 442, 446, 593 S.E.2d 
260, 263 (2004); Virginia-American Water Co., 246 Va. at 
517, 436 S.E.2d at 623; Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National 
Gypsum Co., 229 Va. 596, 600, 331 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1985). 
 
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County and municipal ordinances must be consistent 
with the laws of the Commonwealth.  Blanton v. Amelia 
County, 261 Va. 55, 63, 540 S.E.2d 869, 873-74 (2001); 
Klingbeil Mgmt. Group Co. v. Vito, 233 Va. 445, 449, 357 
S.E.2d 200, 202 (1987); King v. County of Arlington, 195 
Va. 1084, 1090, 81 S.E.2d 587, 591 (1954); see Code § 1-
13.17.  Such ordinances are inconsistent with state law 
when they cannot coexist with a statute.  Blanton, 261 Va. 
at 64, 540 S.E.2d at 874; King, 195 Va. at 1091, 81 S.E.2d 
at 591. 
 
The fact that a county or municipal ordinance enlarges 
on a statute’s provisions does not create a conflict with 
the statute unless the statute limits the requirements for 
all cases to its own terms.  Blanton, 261 Va. at 64, 540 
S.E.2d at 874; Allen v. City of Norfolk, 196 Va. 177, 181, 
83 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1954); King, 195 Va. at 1090, 81 S.E.2d 
at 591.  Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance both can 
be given effect, courts must harmonize them and apply them 
together.  Blanton, 261 Va. at 64, 540 S.E.2d at 874; 
Klingbeil, 233 Va. at 449, 357 S.E.2d at 202; King, 195 Va. 
at 1091, 81 S.E. at 591. 
 
By-laws adopted by a board of zoning appeals must be 
“consistent with ordinances of the locality and general 
laws of the Commonwealth.”  Code § 15.2-2308; see also Code 
 
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§ 1-13.17.  Therefore, in examining the BZA by-law on which 
the County relies, we review any statutes and local 
ordinances that may affect the application of this by-law. 
 
We consider the current and former versions of Code 
§ 15.2-2314, the Zoning Ordinance, and the BZA by-laws.  
Code § 15.2-2314, which governs appeals from a decision of 
a board of zoning appeals, states in relevant part: 
Any person or persons jointly or severally aggrieved 
by any decision of the board of zoning appeals, or any 
aggrieved taxpayer or any officer, department, board 
or bureau of the locality, may file with the clerk of 
the circuit court for the county or city a petition 
specifying the grounds on which aggrieved within 30 
days after the final decision of the board. 
 
Id.  Before 2001, however, the prior version of this statute 
stated that a petition must be filed “within [30] days after the 
filing of the decision in the office of the board.”  Former Code 
§ 15.2-2314 (1997). 
 
Pursuant to Code § 15.2-2308, the BZA has enacted by-laws, 
which govern its internal operating procedures.  Article VII, 
paragraph 8 (the BZA by-law) states: 
Within five (5) days of the action of the Board, the 
Clerk shall prepare and provide to the applicant the 
Board’s decision or final resolution setting forth the 
decision on the application. 
 
No decision shall be officially filed in the Office of 
the Board until the day following the next official 
meeting day of the Board, but not less than eight (8) 
days, whichever is the latter, unless the Board waives 
this requirement.  Within five (5) days of the action 
of the Board, the Clerk shall prepare and provide to 
 
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the applicant the Board’s final resolution setting 
forth the decision on the application. 
 
Finally, Zoning Ordinance § 19-211 provides, in relevant part, 
that “[a]ll decisions and findings of the BZA shall be final 
decisions.” 
 
The BZA by-law complemented the pre-amendment text of Code 
§ 15.2-2314.  The former statute identified the date of a 
specific action, the filing of the BZA’s decision in the office 
of its board, as the date from which the 30-day appeal period to 
the circuit court began to run.  The BZA by-law, in turn, served 
to specify when a decision was “officially filed” in the office 
of the board, namely, at least eight days following the BZA’s 
decision.  Therefore, under those former provisions, the crucial 
date from which an appeal period was measured was not the actual 
date of the BZA’s vote but the date that the recorded decision 
was filed in the office of the board. 
 
In amending Code § 15.2-2314, the General Assembly changed 
the focal point for the commencement of the appeal period from 
the date the BZA’s final decision was filed to the date of the 
final decision itself.  This change was a substantive one, 
reflecting a legislative determination to achieve uniformity 
throughout the Commonwealth by measuring the appeal period from 
the actual final decision date, rather than from the different 
dates that various local boards had identified as their 
 
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“official filing date.”  Therefore, we hold that the “official 
filing date” provisions of the BZA by-law are inconsistent with 
the present text of Code § 15.2-2314 and are no longer valid for 
determining when the appeal period begins to run from a final 
decision of the BZA. 
Because Code § 15.2-2314 uniformly measures the 30-day 
appeal period from the date of the “final decision” of a board 
of zoning appeals, we must determine when the BZA reached its 
“final decision” in the present case.  The BZA’s unanimous vote, 
taken on September 16, 2003, was the action deciding the merits 
of the residents’ appeal from the Zoning Administrator’s 
decision.  The vote taken on that date was not changed in any 
respect on a later date. 
 
Under Zoning Ordinance § 19-211, quoted above, every BZA 
decision is a “final decision.”  This provision plainly 
addresses only those decisions and findings that resolve the 
merits of an appeal or application before the BZA, or dismiss 
such filings with prejudice on a procedural basis.  The term 
“final decision” does not encompass other actions that may be 
taken regarding such appeals and applications that do not decide 
their merits or effect a dismissal of the case with prejudice.  
Therefore, we conclude that this ordinance section is consistent 
with the language of Code § 15.2-2314, and the two enactments 
may be harmonized and construed together as providing that a 
 
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“final decision” of the BZA is the decision that resolves the 
merits of the action pending before that body or effects a 
dismissal of the case with prejudice. 
 
Here, the decision ultimately resolving the merits of the 
residents’ appeal was the vote taken by the BZA on September 16, 
2003.  The BZA did not take any further action amending that 
decision.  Therefore, the date of the BZA’s “final decision,” 
within the meaning of Code § 15.2-2314, was September 16, 2003, 
and the County was allowed 30 days from that date to file its 
petition for a writ of certiorari in the circuit court.  Because 
the County’s petition was not filed within this 30-day period, 
the petition was untimely. 
Our decision is not altered by the fact that the letter to 
the parties from the BZA’s clerk stated that the final decision 
date was September 24, 2003.  The date of a “final decision” of 
a board of zoning appeals, as we have stated above, is 
determined by the nature of the action taken by that body, not 
by the mistaken representation of its deputy clerk applying a 
BZA by-law that is inconsistent with the governing statute. 
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in 
denying the BZA’s plea in bar.  Further, because the County’s 
petition to the circuit court was untimely, we are obliged to 
dismiss the County’s appeal and are unable to reach the merits 
of the case considered by the circuit court. 
 
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For these reasons, we will reverse the circuit court’s 
holding that the County’s petition was timely, vacate the 
court’s holdings on the merits of the case, and enter final 
judgment dismissing this appeal. 
    Reversed in part, 
   vacated in part, 
and final judgment.