Case Title: DAVIS v. CHADWICK

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
DAVIS v. CHADWICK2002 WY 15755 P.3d 1267Case Number: 02-2Decided: 10/18/2002
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002   

W. TOM DAVIS, Trustee of the Doyle 
F. 

Child Family Living Revocable Trust dated June 1, 1992, 

Appellant (Plaintiff) ,
v.  

RUSSELL CHADWICK, a single man, 
ALAN CHADWICK and DENISE CHADWICK, husband and wife, 
Appellees (Defendants) . 

Appeal from the District Court of 
Lincoln County       
The Honorable Frank Zebre, Judge
Representing Appellant:
Ted C. Frome of Afton, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. 
Frome.
Representing Appellees:
John D. Bowers of Bowers Law Office, P.C., Afton, Wyoming. 
Argument by Mr. Bowers.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.
*Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

HILL, Chief Justice.
[¶1] W. Tom Davis (Appellant), as trustee of the Doyle F. Child Family Living 
Revocable Trust, appeals an order of the district court quieting title in 
approximately .36 acres in Russell, Alan, and Denise Chadwick (Appellees). The 
land in dispute has been enclosed with Appellees' land since the initial 
construction of a fence on the property over 50 years ago. The district court 
rejected Appellant's claim that the fence was one of convenience and quieted 
title in Appellees on the basis of adverse possession. After carefully reviewing 
the record, we affirm.
ISSUES
[¶2] Appellant sets forth two issues in his brief:
Issue No. 1:
Did the Defendants prove all of the elements of adverse 
possession where they rely on grazing to establish their 
claim?
Issue No. 2:
Did the trial court err when it determined the fence was not a 
fence of convenience?
Appellees rephrase the issues slightly:
ISSUE NO. 1:
Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial for the court 
to find that the Defendants have proven all of the elements of adverse 
possession regarding the disputed property?
ISSUE NO. 2:
Was there sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that 
the fence separating the disputed property was not a fence of 
convenience?
FACTS
[¶3] This is a dispute over the ownership of land located in 
the Town of Afton. The parties are adjoining landowners. The area in controversy 
has been enclosed with lands owned by the Appellees and their predecessors in 
interest since the fence was initially constructed over 50 years ago. Appellant 
has paid taxes on all the property contained within his deed, which includes the 
contested parcel. Historically, the parties have allowed the Town of Afton to 
temporarily remove the fence along the disputed area during the winter months. 
The Town uses the property as a recreational area for winter sports including 
skiing, snowmobiling, and sledding.
[¶4] The discrepancy between the fence line and the property 
line came to light in August of 1997 when Appellant commissioned a survey. The 
fence is about 429 feet in length and runs in a straight line. It is 23 feet 
west of the survey line on the north and 49 1/2 feet west of that line on 
the south end. The fence is located on relatively flat ground that gradually 
increases in elevation from north to south. Constructing a fence on the survey 
line would be slightly more difficult and expensive due to a hill that rises 
steeply east of the fence line. The fence, as it existed, resulted in about .36 
acres of Appellant's property being enclosed within Appellees' land. Until the 
survey, the parties had assumed the fence was on the true property line.
[¶5] The existing fence line continues south beyond the 
property boundary between the parties and separates Appellees' land from those 
of other owners. The fence runs in a straight line from the disputed property 
over a hill with an incline even steeper than the hill to the east of the 
disputed property. This fence also does not follow the true property line.
[¶6] Appellant filed an action to quiet title in the disputed 
property. The Appellees countered with a claim for adverse possession.

[¶7] The district court concluded that Appellees had met their 
burden and demonstrated adverse possession of the disputed area. The court found 
that allowing the Town of Afton to use the property during the winter months did 
not negate the exclusivity element because the Town was acting as the Appellees' 
agent. The court also concluded that Appellant had failed to negate the showing 
of adverse possession by a showing that the fence was one of convenience. 
Specifically, the court noted that the fence ran in a straight line past the 
disputed area up a steep grade on a hill and was not on the true property line 
separating Appellees' land from the other adjoining owners. The court also noted 
that all of the parties believed that the fence was the true boundary until the 
survey. Based on these facts, the district court concluded that the fence was 
not one of convenience and quieted title to the disputed parcel in Appellees. 
Appellant now challenges that ruling before us.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶8] When a trial court has made express findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in a bench trial, we review the factual determinations under 
the clearly erroneous standard and the legal conclusions de novo. 
State v. Campbell County School District, 2001 WY 19, ¶ 41, 19 P.3d 518, ¶ 41 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Rennard v. Vollmar, 997 P.2d 1277, 1279 
(Wyo. 1999)). "A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence 
to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Campbell 
County School District, ¶ 41 (citing Hopper v. All Pet Animal 
Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 1993)). In the alternative: "[A] 
determination that a finding is against the great weight of the evidence means a 
finding will be set aside even if supported by substantial evidence." 
Id.

DISCUSSION
[¶9] In Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 1995), 
we set out in detail the legal framework of adverse possession and fences of 
convenience:
In order to establish adverse possession, the claiming party 
must show actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of 
another's property which is hostile and under claim of right or color of title. 
Rutar Farms & Livestock, Inc. v. Fuss, 651 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Wyo. 
1982); City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 502, 273 P. 908, 910 
(1929). Possession must be for the statutory period, ten years. W.S. 
1-3-103(1988); Connaghan v. Eighty-Eight Oil Co., 750 P.2d 1321, 1323 
(Wyo. 1988); Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 935 (Wyo. 1983). Where there 
is no clear showing to the contrary, a person who has occupied the land for the 
statutory period, in a manner plainly indicating that he has acted as the owner 
thereof, is entitled to a presumption of adverse possession; and the burden 
shifts to the opposing party to explain such possession. Meyer v. Ellis, 
411 P.2d 338, 342 (Wyo. 1966) (quoting City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 
Wyo. at 517, 273 P. at 915-16). However, if a claimant's use of the property is 
shown to be permissive, then he cannot acquire title by adverse possession. 
Ellis, 411 P.2d  at 344 (quoting Johnson v. Szumowicz, 63 Wyo. 211, 
228-29, 179 P.2d 1012, 1017 (Wyo. 1947)).
In some circumstances, enclosing land in a fence is sufficient 
to "raise the flag' of an adverse claimant." Ellis, 411 P.2d  at 343; 
Doenz, 665 P.2d  at 936 (presence of fence and continuing farm operations 
put record landowners on notice of adverse claim). The pasturing of animals 
within a substantial enclosure is sufficient to establish the elements of 
adverse possession. Farella v. Rumney, 649 P.2d 185, 186-87 (Wyo. 1982) 
(quoting Shores v. Lindsey, 591 P.2d 895, 902 (Wyo. 1979)). However, a 
fence kept only for the convenience of the parties or to separate pastures or 
irrigated meadows from grazing lands has no effect on the true boundary between 
tracts. Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d 295, 297 (Wyo. 1983); State v. 
Vanderkoppel, 45 Wyo. 432, 439, 19 P.2d 955, 957 (Wyo. 1933).
. . . .
. . . [In] the context of adverse possession, a presumption 
arises in favor of the claimant when a prima facie case has been made, 
requiring a conclusion in favor of adverse possession absent explanation. 
Similarly, it could be said that a presumption in favor of the record title 
holder exists, unless and until the adverse claimant makes out his prima 
facie case, because the initial burden of proof is on the party claiming 
adverse possession. Sowerwine, 671 P.2d  at 302; Miller v. Bell, 
764 P.2d 389, 390 (Colo.App. 1988) ("An initial presumption favors the record 
title holder as against the adverse possession claimant."); Accord Gonthier 
v. Horne, 576 A.2d 745 (Me. 1990); Miceli v. Foley, 83 Md.App. 541, 
575 A.2d 1249 (1990). Once the adverse possession claimant has made out his 
prima facie case, and absent any explanatory circumstances to the 
contrary, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidence contrary 
to the presumption. Sturm, 39 Wyo. at 517, 273 P. at 915-16; Turner v. 
Floyd C. Reno & Sons, Inc., 769 P.2d 364, 368 (Wyo. 1989); accord 
Szombathy v. Shell Oil Co., 676 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Mo.App. 
1984).
888 P.2d at 1258-60; see also Hovendick v. Ruby, 10 P.3d 1119, 1122-23 (Wyo. 2000) and Kimball v. Turner, 993 P.2d 303, 305-06 
(Wyo. 1999).
[¶10] Appellant begins by challenging the district court's 
conclusion that Appellees had established adverse possession. First, Appellant 
claims that the trial court adopted an improper legal standard in its findings 
and conclusions by not including the requirements that the grazing on the 
disputed tract was for the entire growing season and within a substantial 
enclosure. Further, Appellant contends that there is no substantial evidence in 
the record to support a finding that Appellees did graze during the growing 
season or that the grazing was within a substantial enclosure. Specifically, 
Appellant asserts that there was no testimony as to the numbers grazed and the 
period of time during the year when they were grazed. Regarding the substantial 
enclosure requirement, he argues that there was no evidence establishing the 
extent of the area enclosed by the fence, the nature of the fence, or whether or 
not it was even capable of containing livestock.
[¶11] We have recognized that adverse possession can be 
established by the pasturing of livestock during the growing season within a 
substantial enclosure. Farella v. Rumney, 649 P.2d 185, 186-87 (Wyo. 
1982). A person who claims adverse possession based on the grazing of livestock 
does not have to demonstrate continuous pasturing throughout the year; rather, 
dominion and control is established when land suitable for grazing and pasturage 
is occupied and used as such during the full period of the growing season. 
Shores v. Lindsey, 591 P.2d 895, 900 (Wyo. 1979). Appellees provided 
testimony that each summer since 1957 they had grazed up to half a dozen horses 
or cattle on the disputed property so long as vegetative and weather conditions 
permitted. The testimony indicated that the number of livestock grazed on the 
disputed property was the maximum that could be supported without damaging the 
pasturage. The district court specifically cited this testimony in its decision 
letter. Appellant's contention that the court did not properly recognize the 
extent of Appellees' grazing or that there was no evidence to support a finding 
that the grazing did not fully utilize the disputed property is without 
merit.
[¶12] We disagree with Appellant's characterization of the 
meaning of the term "substantial enclosure." While we have cited that term as a 
requirement for the adverse possession of land by pasturing, we have not defined 
it. See Hillard, 888 P.2d  at 1259; Farella, 649 P.2d at 186-87; 
and Shores, 591 P.2d  at 902. The term "substantial enclosure" does not 
refer to the area enclosed by a fence. Instead, we use the term to refer to the 
extent and nature of the enclosure of the disputed property. In other words, the 
term "substantial enclosure" means whether or not the land adversely claimed is 
enclosed in a manner that puts the title owner on notice of the adjoining 
landowners' adverse claim of ownership and the extent of that claim 
(i.e., over what specific lands the adverse claimant is asserting 
ownership). One authority has explained the term "substantial enclosure" in this 
fashion:
To constitute the basis for an adverse possession claim, a 
claimant's enclosure should be appropriate for the purposes to which the 
premises are adapted, or for which the occupant may desire to use them.
 Observation: The adequacy of an enclosure may be 
affected by statutory requisites in some states. For example, under a statutory 
requirement that a fence must be substantial to support a claim of adverse 
possession, the court must look to the whole fencing pattern and the use made of 
the fence, as well as all other facts and circumstances.
If an enclosure is essential or is relied on as the evidence of 
possession, it must, to be effective, be complete and so open and notorious as 
to charge the owner with knowledge of it. The basic question is whether the 
enclosure, like other acts of possession, is sufficient to "fly the flag" over 
the land and put the true owner on notice that the property is held under an 
adverse claim of ownership. This rule is applicable if a fence or a hedgerow or 
the like is relied on to delineate the boundaries of the adverse claim; even if 
it is insufficient to turn livestock, a fence may be sufficient to "fly the 
flag" and put the owner on notice of adverse possession. In fact, an enclosure 
having no purpose of physical exclusion may be sufficient to indicate the 
boundaries of an adverse claim even though it is only a mere furrow turned with 
a plow around the land, or a line marked by cutting away the brush.
Constructing a fence and using the enclosed land for grazing 
constitutes adverse possession, even if the fence is not maintained in a perfect 
state of repair.
3 Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession § 38 (2002). While we do 
not delineate the scope of what would constitute a "substantial enclosure" 
sufficient to indicate the boundaries of an adverse claim today, there is no 
question that the fence in this case was sufficient to "fly the flag" and put 
Appellant on notice of Appellees' claim. By his own admission, Appellant 
believed the fence demarcated the property line between the parties. Likewise, 
there is no question in this case over what land is claimed by Appellees based 
on the location of the fence. The evidence showed that although the fence 
deteriorated over the years, it was still sufficient to allow Appellees to 
engage in grazing operations on the disputed parcel. Therefore, the "substantial 
enclosure" requirement was met in this case, and Appellant's claim must 
fail.
[¶13] Appellant raises two more claims challenging the district 
court's adverse possession decision. First, he contends that grazing was not the 
best use of the disputed property. Appellant insists the best use was housing or 
recreation. We have stated that the general principle underlying adverse 
possession cases is that "the acts of dominion must be adapted to the particular 
land, its condition, locality and appropriate use." Shores, 591 P.2d  at 
900 (quoting Brumagim v. Bradshaw, 39 Cal. 24, 46 (1870)). Appellant's 
claim is undercut by his admission at trial that the use of the land for grazing 
was the common use for that type of property in that part of Wyoming. In 
conjunction with Appellant's admission and the testimony from Appellees that the 
land was suitable for grazing, we can only conclude that grazing activities on 
the disputed parcel were an appropriate use sufficient to assert dominion over 
the land for the purposes of adverse possession.
[¶14] Next, Appellant argues that Appellees' possession of the 
disputed land did not satisfy the exclusivity element of adverse possession. 
Appellant relies on the Town of Afton's use of the disputed property during the 
winter months for public recreation. For the past 30 years the Town of Afton 
has, with the permission of both parties, temporarily removed about half of the 
disputed fence from early November to early May to allow the public access to 
skiing, snowmobiling, and sledding on the hill. The district court concluded 
that the permissive use by the Town of Afton did not negate the exclusive and 
continuous possession of the disputed land by Appellees. In essence, the court 
concluded that the Town was simply acting as Appellees' agent. Appellant 
counters that since he was the record title owner of the disputed land, only he 
had the authority to lease or grant use of the property to a third party, and 
that the Town, as a tenant of Appellant, took occupancy of the area in 
controversy interrupting Appellees' exclusive and continuous possession of the 
land.
[¶15] In support of its conclusion, the district court cited 
Nelson v. Vandemarr, 573 P.2d 1232 (Or. 1978). In that case, the 
plaintiffs used a portion of the defendants' land as a driveway. The parties 
believed the driveway was on plaintiffs' land and, on occasion, the defendants 
would use the driveway with the plaintiffs' permission to prune some trees that 
grew on the defendants' property. The defendants claimed their use of the 
driveway negated the exclusiveness of the plaintiffs' possession. The Oregon 
Supreme Court replied:
We have held that "exclusive" does not mean absolutely 
exclusive, but only such use as would be "expected of an owner under the 
circumstances." [Grimstad v. Dordan, 256 Or. 135, 141, 471 P.2d 778, 781 
(1970).] Allowing a neighbor on one's driveway for the purpose of pruning trees 
is just the sort of use one would expect. Therefore, this evidence does not 
negate the element of exclusiveness. In Norgard et al. v. Busher et ux., 
220 Or. 297, 308, 349 P.2d 490, 496 (1960), a case similar in aspects, we 
stated, "The claimants' possession need not be absolutely exclusive; it need 
only be a type of possession which would characterize an owner's use." We 
therefore find, as did the trial court, that plaintiff's continuous and open use 
of the area described as the driveway was sufficient to make out a title by 
adverse possession in plaintiffs.
Nelson
[¶16] In his final argument, Appellant contends that the 
district court erred when it found the fence was not one of convenience. To set 
the context for our review of Appellant's claim, we set out the district court's 
findings:
The plat of the Kennington Trust . . .  shows 
the true boundary line continuing in a southerly direction past the area in 
controversy between the Plaintiff [Appellant] and the Defendants [Appellees]. 
Said plat also shows the existing fence line continuing in a southerly 
direction, and west of the true boundary line, beyond the area in controversy 
between the Plaintiff and the Defendants. As stated above, the southerly 
continuation of this existing fence separates additional land of the Defendants 
from property of another adjoining land owner. According to the plat, this 
portion of the fence also does not follow the true property line. Said 
fence does continue up the steep grade of a hill in a direction that would not 
be convenient. Clearly, building that fence further to the west would have been 
more convenient.
There is no evidence as to exactly who built either section of 
fence. As stipulated fact #4 above indicates as far as is known, the parties' 
predecessors in interest, either together or separately, built the fence in the 
area in controversy. Given the evidence presented to this Court it appears just 
as likely that the Defendants, or their predecessors in interest, may have 
constructed the additional portion of fence that continues in a southerly 
direction past the area in controversy between this Plaintiff and the 
Defendants. If all of the fence had been constructed for the convenience of the 
parties given the terrain, then it appears clear that the fence would not have 
continued in a straight line in a southerly direction. The fence is indeed in a 
straight line from the northern end of the area in controversy to the southern 
end of the fence where it takes a 90 [degree] turn to the east beyond the area 
in controversy between these parties. The fence does not deviate from that 
straight line because of topography.
All parties testified that up until the survey of August of 
1997 everyone believed the fence constituted the true boundary line between the 
parties. This is further support for a finding that the fence was constructed by 
either the parties, or their predecessors in interest, on what they believed to 
be the true boundary line and not as a fence of convenience.
In the [Kimball v. Turner, 993 P.2d 303 (Wyo. 1999)] 
case, the District Court also found the fence involved to be one of convenience. 
The Court found that the physical appearance of the fence clearly demonstrated 
that it could not have been constructed as a boundary fence. The fence meandered 
between trees, bushes, and fence posts in an irregular fashion. The Court 
indicated that the irregular course of the fence clearly indicates that it was 
not constructed on a section line, a quarter section line or any other line of a 
U.S. Governmental subdivision parcel. Again, the evidence in this case is to the 
contrary. The fence is constructed in a straight line. It does not meander 
between trees, bushes, and fence posts in an irregular fashion. The straight 
line of the fence indicates that the fence was constructed as a boundary. The 
straight fence would be consistent with its construction on line with a U.S. 
governmental subdivision parcel. The Plaintiff has failed in his burden of 
producing evidence of any explanatory circumstances contrary to the presumption 
of adverse possession in favor of the Defendants created upon their 
establishment of a prima facie case. The Court finds the existing fence to be 
[a] boundary fence and not one merely of 
convenience.
Appellant takes issue with the district court's conclusions. 
Appellant argues that a fence situated on the true property line would have been 
more difficult to build and maintain because of the existence of the hill to the 
west of the existing fence line. He also notes that the fence runs south in 
order to intersect the Appellees' south boundary fence and that building the 
fence on the true property line would have accomplished that. Appellant insists 
that it makes more sense to believe that the fence was constructed where it was 
because the builders realized that it would be easier to build and maintain the 
fence there and because livestock would not have to walk over the hill to reach 
water. In other words, the fence was built as it was because of convenience. 
Appellees counter that Appellant has made assumptions not supported by the 
record. According to Appellees, the key consideration is the fact that the 
parties, including Appellant, have historically treated the fence as the true 
boundary line.
[¶17] The question of whether or not a fence is one of 
convenience or delineates a boundary is one of fact. Kimball, 993 P.2d  at 
305. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the district court's 
findings and conclusions are not clearly erroneous. The only evidence in support 
of Appellant's position is the testimony that building the fence on the boundary 
line would entail more labor and financial expense because of a steep hill. 
However, neither the additional labor nor the cost of materials would have been 
prohibitive. Furthermore, a witness for Appellant testified that he had never 
seen anyone put a fence of convenience in a similar location when the true 
boundary was known. Another witness testified that it would have been easier to 
build the fence elsewhere and that the existing fence appeared to constitute a 
boundary. This evidence, taken in consideration with the nature of the existing 
fence as noted by the district court and the fact that all parties believed the 
fence was the true boundary for at least 40 years, does not leave us with a 
"definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed" by the district 
court. Accordingly, we must affirm the district court's decision.
CONCLUSION
[¶18] The evidence in the record supports the district court's 
order quieting title in the disputed property in the Appellees, based on adverse 
possession. The determination that Appellant had failed to meet his burden to 
demonstrate that the fence was one of convenience was not clearly erroneous. The 
district court's decision is affirmed.
FOOTNOTES

1The Appellees 
also filed a claim for acquiescence. The district court denied that claim, and 
Appellees have not cross-appealed.

2 The district 
court's decision letter cites 1947 as the date. This is clearly a typographical 
error since the testimony referred exclusively to 1957. Since the Appellees 
possessed the land in question at least from 1957 until the 1997 survey, the 
discrepancy is not material to Appellees' claim in light of the ten-year 
possession requirement for adverse possession.