Case Title: Mackenzie Fandrey v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company

Citation: 2004 WI 62

Docket Number: 2002AP002628

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 62 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2628 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Mackenzie Fandrey, a minor, by James B.  
Connell, her Guardian ad Litem,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
Wisconsin Physicians Service Insurance  
Corporation,  
          Plaintiff, 
     v. 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company,  
          Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff- 
          Respondent, 
     v. 
Michelle M. Egner,  
          Third-Party Defendant. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 3, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 4, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon   
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick M. Brady   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For plaintiff-appellant there were briefs (in the court of 
appeals) by James B. Connell and Crooks, Low & Connell, S.C., 
Wausau, and oral argument by James B. Connell. 
 
For the defendant-third-party plaintiff-respondent there 
was a brief by John A. Kramer, Michael J. Roman and Zalewski, 
Klinner & Kramer, LLP, Wausau, and oral argument by John A. 
Kramer. 
 
2004 WI 62 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-2628  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 950) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Mackenzie Fandrey, a minor, by James B.  
Connell, her Guardian ad Litem,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
Wisconsin Physicians Service Insurance  
Corporation,  
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff- 
          Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michelle M. Egner,  
 
          Third-Party Defendant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 3, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Marathon 
County, Patrick M. Brady, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case involves two questions 
certified to us by the court of appeals.  First, the court of 
appeals has asked us to determine whether a court may use 
No. 
02-2628   
 
2 
 
traditional public policy factors1 to limit liability under 
Wis. Stat. § 174.02 (1999-2000),2 commonly known as the "dog bite 
statute," 
when 
liability 
under 
the 
statute 
is 
otherwise 
established.3  Second, if we determine that liability under 
§ 174.02 may be precluded based on public policy factors, the 
court of appeals has asked us whether the Marathon County 
Circuit Court, Patrick M. Brady, Judge, properly applied those 
factors to limit liability in this case.  We hold that a court 
may preclude liability under § 174.02 based on public policy 
factors and that the circuit court correctly applied those 
factors in granting summary judgment in the case before us.  
                                                 
1 In Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 598-99, 85 N.W.2d 345 
(1957) this court first articulated the following six public 
policy factors that could be used by courts to limit liability 
in negligence claims:  1)  "[T]he injury is too remote from the 
negligence"; 2)  Recovery is "too 'wholly out of proportion to 
the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor'"; 3)  "[I]n 
retrospect 
it 
appears 
too 
highly 
extraordinary 
that 
the 
negligence should have brought about the harm"; 4)  Allowing 
recovery "would place too unreasonable a burden upon [the 
tortfeasor]"; 5)  Allowing recovery would be "too likely to open 
the way to fraudulent claims"; or 6)  Allowing recovery "would 
'enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.'"   
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version, unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Section 174.02(1) provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) Liability for injury. (a) Without notice.  Subject 
to s. 895.045 [comparative negligence] and except as 
provided in s. 895.57(4) [immunity for damage due to 
unauthorized release of animals], the owner of a dog 
is liable for the full amount of damages caused by the 
dog injuring or causing injury to a person, domestic 
animal or property. 
No. 
02-2628   
 
3 
 
Therefore, we affirm the decision of the circuit court, which 
granted American Family Mutual Insurance Company's motion for 
summary judgment.   
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND  
¶2 
This case comes before us following a grant of summary 
judgment in favor of American Family Mutual Insurance Company 
(American Family).  The operative facts are straightforward and 
undisputed, as the plaintiff, Mackenzie Fandrey (Mackenzie), did 
not submit any competing summary judgment materials.   
¶3 
On December 23, 2000, Michelle Rausch (formerly known 
as Michelle Egner) and her three-year-old daughter, Mackenzie, 
drove to the home of Nicole Beliunas (formerly known as Nicole 
Patton) to deliver Christmas cookies.  Michelle and Nicole had 
been best friends for a number of years and frequently visited 
each other.  On the day in question, the Beliunases did not 
invite Michelle over, and Michelle had not called ahead to 
determine if the Beliunases were home.  Upon reaching the 
Beliunases' home, Michelle knocked on the back door, opened it, 
stepped inside, and called out.  No one answered.  Apparently, 
the Beliunases were at a movie and had left their door unlocked.  
Michelle proceeded to place the cookies on the kitchen table, 
which was a short distance from the door.  She then put 
Mackenzie on a chair.  While Michelle was writing a note to 
Nicole, Mackenzie, unbeknownst to Michelle, left the chair and 
proceeded 
into 
the 
Beliunases' 
living 
room. 
 
Michelle 
subsequently heard Mackenzie scream and turned to see Mackenzie 
No. 
02-2628   
 
4 
 
bleeding from the mouth and standing near the Beliunases' dog, 
Molly.   
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
Mackenzie, by her guardian ad litem, brought suit 
against the Beliunases' insurer, American Family, alleging a 
cause of action under § 174.02.  American Family answered, 
arguing 
as 
an 
affirmative 
defense 
that 
Mackenzie 
was 
a 
trespasser in the Beliunases' home and that the claim should be 
precluded based on public policy.  American Family also filed a 
third-party complaint against Michelle, seeking contribution and 
indemnification due to Michelle's alleged negligent supervision 
of Mackenzie.  Additional facts are set forth below in the 
opinion.  
¶5 
The circuit court found that Michelle and Mackenzie 
did not have implied consent to enter the Beliunases' house.  It 
also found that Michelle knew the Beliunases kept Molly in their 
house.  The court, relying on Alwin v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co., 2000 WI App 92, 234 Wis. 2d 441, 610 N.W.2d 218, 
then found that public policy precluded Mackenzie's claim under 
§ 174.02.  The court stated: 
I don't know what else they could have done as 
responsible 
dog 
owners 
that 
would 
be 
any 
more 
restrictive 
than 
to 
keep 
the 
dog 
inside 
their 
home. . . . [S]trict liability under Section 174.02 
for the child's injury is wholly out of proportion to 
the culpability on the part of the homeowners and that 
allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable of 
a burden on the homeowners. 
No. 
02-2628   
 
5 
 
 
And I believe that allowance of recovery under 
this set of facts would enter a field that has no 
sensible or just stopping point. 
Mackenzie appealed, and we accepted certification of the 
aforementioned questions from the court of appeals. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶6 
Whether public policy acts as a bar to a claim in any 
given case is a question of law that this court decides de novo.  
Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 425, 541 N.W.2d 742 
(1995).  Mackenzie contends that public policy cannot be used by 
courts to modify or curtail the effect of a legislative 
enactment that imposes strict liability because "[t]he ultimate 
source of public policy in this state is the state legislature." 
(Appellant's Br. at 8).  Mackenzie further contends that courts 
should not interfere with the legislature's decision regarding 
the 
sensible 
stopping 
point 
of 
the 
law, 
and 
that 
the 
legislature, not the judiciary, is the appropriate forum for 
determining whether a homeowner should be liable under the dog 
bite statute.  Mackenzie principally relies upon two cases in 
support of this argument:  Borgins v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 
133 N.W. 209 (1911), and Meunier v. Ogurek, 140 Wis. 2d 782, 412 
N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App. 1987).   
¶7 
In Borgins, this court decreed: 
Public policy on a given subject is determined either 
by the constitution itself or by statutes passed 
within constitutional limitations.  In the absence of 
such constitutional or statutory determination only 
may 
the 
decisions 
of 
the 
courts 
determine 
it. . . . When 
acting 
within 
constitutional 
limitations, the legislature settles and declares the 
public policy of a state, and not the court. 
No. 
02-2628   
 
6 
 
Borgins, 147 Wis. at 351.  Similarly, in Meunier, when 
interpreting § 174.02, the court of appeals stated: 
[The statute] unambiguously states the conditions 
under which a dog owner is liable, we may not add more 
by implication or statutory construction. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [The statute] simply states that the owner is 
liable for damages caused by the dog injuring or 
causing injury to a person, livestock or property. 
Meunier, 140 Wis. 2d at 786. 
¶8 
American Family responds that Borgins is inapposite 
because the term "public policy" was used in Borgins in the 
context of the broader notion of the state's public policy, 
whereas the "public policy" as used in the present case refers 
to the courts' long practice of precluding liability for a 
tortious act in a particular case based on Wisconsin's view of 
"cause."  For the reasons discussed below, we agree with 
American Family's argument and hold that courts may use the six 
traditional public policy factors to bar a claim under § 174.02, 
even if a plaintiff otherwise establishes liability.   
¶9 
Resolution of this issue requires not only an inquiry 
into the nature of § 174.02, but also an analysis of the history 
of the six "public policy" factors and their relation to 
Wisconsin's view of "cause" in tort claims.  Our analysis begins 
with the recognition that § 174.02 is a codified tort action.  
Also, we note the fact that § 174.02 imposes strict liability on 
No. 
02-2628   
 
7 
 
a dog owner for injuries caused by the dog.4  "'Strict liability' 
is a judicial doctrine which relieves a plaintiff from proving 
specific acts of negligence and protects him from certain 
defenses."  Meunier, 140 Wis. 2d at 785.5  Thus, § 174.02 
obviates the need for a plaintiff to prove specific acts of 
negligence in each case.  However, the statute still requires a 
plaintiff to establish the other elements common to all 
negligence claims, causation and damages.6   
¶10 It is with this understanding that we now examine the 
history behind the application of the six public policy factors 
used to preclude liability and the relationship between "public 
                                                 
4 Armstrong v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 202 Wis. 2d 258, 
262, 549 N.W.2d 723 (1996); Malik v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
2001 WI App 82, ¶¶21-23, 27, 243 Wis. 2d 27, 625 N.W.2d 640; 
Alwin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2000 WI App 92, ¶1, 234 
Wis. 2d 441, 610 N.W.2d 218; Fifer v. Dix, 2000 WI App 66, ¶7, 
234 
Wis. 2d 117, 
608 
N.W.2d 740; 
Malone 
v. 
Fons, 
217 
Wis. 2d 746, 758, 580 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1998); Pattermann v. 
Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d 143, 149, 496 N.W.2d 613 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
5 Strict liability is to be contrasted with "absolute 
liability," a "judicial doctrine which imposes civil liability 
on proof of a statutory violation, such as violation of child 
labor laws."  Meunier v. Ogurek, 140 Wis. 2d 782, 785-86, 412 
N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App. 1987).   
6 "[T]he owner of a dog is liable for the full amount of 
damages caused by the dog injuring or causing injury to a 
person, 
domestic 
animal 
or 
property."  
Wis. Stat. § 174.02(1)(a).  
No. 
02-2628   
 
8 
 
policy" and "proximate cause."7  In Wisconsin, when "public 
policy" is used in the context of precluding tort liability, the 
term is being used as a synonym for "proximate cause."  See 
generally Morden v. Continental A.G., 2000 WI 51, ¶60, 235 
Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659 (discussing the relationship between 
the terms "causation," "proximate cause," "legal cause," "cause-
in-fact," and "public policy"); Morgan v. Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 87 
Wis. 2d 723, 735-38, 275 N.W.2d 660 (1979) (same); Kendall W. 
Harrison, Wisconsin's Approach to Proximate Cause, 73 Wisconsin 
Lawyer 20 (Feb. 2000)(discussing the historic evolution of the 
term "proximate cause" and the public policy factors used to 
limit tort liability).  
¶11 Early in Wisconsin jurisprudence, the term "proximate 
cause" referred to two distinct concepts.  The first use of the 
term was to describe "limitations on liability and on the extent 
                                                 
7 This discussion is not intended as an invitation to 
reintroduce the term "proximate cause" into Wisconsin's legal 
lexicon or to alter the current state of Wisconsin's tort 
jurisprudence.  Rather, this discussion represents an accurate 
historical analysis of Wisconsin's use of the term "proximate 
cause" in relation to public policy factors.  We are simply 
recognizing that what has previously been labeled as "proximate 
cause," i.e. the second step in the legal cause analysis, is now 
referred to as "public policy factors."  This concept has not 
changed; only the label has done so.  We emphasize that this 
opinion does nothing to change Wisconsin's common law relating 
to duty, breach, and cause in negligence claims.  Once it is 
established that a plaintiff's negligence was a substantial 
factor in producing an injury, the only limitation on liability 
is public policy factors——what was previously referred to as 
"proximate cause."  We use the terms "proximate cause" and 
"public 
policy 
factors" 
interchangeably 
only 
because, 
historically, 
Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
used 
these 
terms 
interchangeably.   
No. 
02-2628   
 
9 
 
of liability based on [] lack of causal connection in fact."  
Richard V. Campbell, Duty, Fault, and Legal Cause, 1938 Wis. L. 
Rev. 402, 403.  The second use of the term was to describe 
"limitations on liability and on the extent of liability based 
on . . . policy factors making it unfair to hold the party 
[liable]."  Id.  The second use of the term probably had its 
origins from the venerable Judge Andrews:  "What we do mean by 
the word 'proximate' is that, because of convenience, of public 
policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily 
declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.  
This is not logic.  It is practical politics."  Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., 
dissenting)(emphasis added).   
¶12 The first use and meaning of the term "proximate 
cause" has long since been abandoned in Wisconsin in favor of 
the "substantial factor" test used to establish cause-in-fact, 
which is a jury issue.  Blashaski v. Classified Risk Ins. Corp., 
48 Wis. 2d 169, 174-75, 179 N.W.2d 924 (1970); Pfeifer v. 
Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 237-38, 55 
No. 
02-2628   
 
10 
 
N.W.2d 29 (1952).8  However, the second use and meaning of the 
term "proximate cause" still remains a part of Wisconsin's legal 
cause analysis.  
The court has acknowledged that legal cause in 
negligence consists of two parts, the first being 
cause-in-fact, 
the 
second 
"proximate 
cause."  
Regarding the first component, or cause-in-fact, this 
court has stated that the test is whether the 
negligence was a "substantial factor" in producing the 
plaintiff's injury." 
 . . . . 
 . . . "[P]roximate cause," the second component of 
causation in negligence cases, which is separate from 
the cause-in-fact determination, may deny recovery.  
"Proximate 
cause" 
involves 
public 
policy 
considerations and is a question of law solely for 
judicial determination. 
Sanem v. Home Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 530, 537-58, 350 N.W.2d 89 
(1984) (citations omitted).  See also Morgan, 87 Wis. 2d at 735 
                                                 
8 While it was clear under Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway 
Theater, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 238, 55 N.W.2d 29 (1952), that a 
court could limit tort liability based on public policy, the six 
factors currently used were first delineated in relation to 
proximate cause in Colla, 1 Wis. 2d at 598-99.  Some of these 
factors were previously used to determine the question of 
"duty."  Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497 
(1935), abrogated by Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 
176, 183-85, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956).  However, Wisconsin has long 
since followed the minority rationale in Palsgraf v. Long Island 
Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928), which posits that 
everyone owes a duty of care to the entire world.  A.E. Inv. 
Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 483-84, 214 
N.W.2d 764 (1974).  In addition to Wisconsin's broad formulation 
of duty, it is important to note that Wisconsin's substantial 
factor test for cause-in-fact is equally as broad, as it 
eliminates the doctrines of superseding and intervening cause.  
See Ryan v. Cameron, 270 Wis. 325, 331, 71 N.W.2d 408 (1955).  
As noted infra, these doctrines are now subsumed in the public 
policy analysis.   
No. 
02-2628   
 
11 
 
(noting that "[l]egal cause in negligence actions is made up of 
two components, cause-in-fact and 'proximate cause,' or policy 
considerations").  "These public policy considerations are an 
element of legal cause, though not a part of the determination 
of cause-in-fact."  Id. at 737. 
¶13 This relation between public policy factors and the 
second step in the legal cause analysis is still recognized 
today.   
To discern whether [cause] exists, we must determine 
whether the defendant's actions were a "cause-in-fact" 
of the injuries.  If they were, we explore whether the 
conduct of the defendant was a "proximate cause" of 
the harm sustained by the plaintiff.  Proximate cause 
involves public policy considerations for the court 
that 
may 
preclude 
the 
imposition 
of 
liability. . . . After the determination of the cause-
in-fact of an injury, a court may still deny recovery 
after 
addressing 
policy 
considerations, 
or 
legal 
cause. 
Morden, 235 Wis. 2d 325, ¶60; See also Alvarado v. Sersch, 2003 
WI 
55, 
¶42, 
262 
Wis. 2d 74, 
662 
N.W.2d 350 
(Sykes, 
J., 
dissenting)("What we in Wisconsin refer to as public policy 
limitations on liability, Judge Andrews catalogued as factors 
that govern the court's determination of legal or 'proximate 
cause.'"); World Wide Prosthetic Supply, Inc. v. Mikulsky, 2002 
WI 26, ¶25, 251 Wis. 2d 45, 640 N.W.2d 764 ("tort damages are 
limited only by the concept of 'proximate cause' or certain 
public policy considerations."); Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 261, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998)(noting that 
legal 
cause 
consists 
of 
cause-in-fact 
and 
public 
policy 
considerations, or "proximate cause"); Kempfer v. Automated 
No. 
02-2628   
 
12 
 
Finishing, 
Inc., 
211 
Wis. 2d 100, 
119, 
564 
N.W.2d 692 
(1997)("'In tort actions, the only limitations [on damages] are 
those 
of 
"proximate 
cause" 
or 
public 
policy 
considerations.'")(quoting Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 
Wis. 2d 561, 575, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983)).  Thus, when a court 
precludes liability based on public policy factors, it is 
essentially concluding that despite the existence of cause-in-
fact, the cause of the plaintiff's injuries is not legally 
sufficient to allow recovery.  Despite the historical origins of 
the public policy factors in relation to "proximate cause," we 
note that Wisconsin has largely "[j]ettison[ed] the term 
'proximate cause' in favor of 'public policy.'"  Kendall W. 
Harrison, Wisconsin's Approach to Proximate Cause, 73 Wisconsin 
Lawyer 20, 54 (Feb. 2000).   
¶14 When Wisconsin courts currently speak of "cause," they 
do so in the context of the substantial factor test for cause-
in-fact.  Given Wisconsin's broad formulation of duty and 
causation (cause-in-fact) it is true that "the determination to 
deny liability is essentially one of public policy rather than 
of duty or causation," Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 425, if 
"causation" is understood in its current context as referring to 
No. 
02-2628   
 
13 
 
"cause-in-fact," or "substantial factor."9  Thus, this court has 
stated:  "Even though a jury has found negligence and that such 
negligence was a 'cause' (or substantial factor) in producing a 
plaintiff's damages, liability may be denied under factors that 
we have termed public policy considerations."  Beacon Bowl, Inc. 
v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 176 Wis. 2d 740, 761, 501 N.W.2d 788 
(1993)(parenthetical in original).  See also Bowen v. Lumbermens 
Mut. 
Cas. 
Co., 
183 
Wis. 2d 627, 
654, 
517 
N.W.2d 432 
(1994)("These public policy considerations are an aspect of 
legal cause, although not a part of the determination of cause-
in-fact."); Rieck v. Med. Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 517, 
219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) (stating "negligence plus an unbroken 
sequence 
of 
events 
establishing 
cause-in-fact 
does 
not 
necessarily lead to a determination that a defendant is liable 
for 
plaintiff's 
injuries"); 
Alwin, 
234 
Wis. 2d 441, 
¶12 
(recognizing that "public policy considerations may preclude 
                                                 
9 It is clear that in Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 
425, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995), we utilized the term "causation," as 
courts currently do, in reference to "cause-in-fact."  See id. 
at 426 ("'It is recognized by this and other courts that even 
where the chain of causation is complete and direct, recovery 
against the negligent tort-feasor may sometimes be denied on 
grounds 
of 
public 
policy . . . .'")(emphasis 
added)(quoting 
Colla 1 Wis. 2d at 598-99).  Thus, two years after Rockweit was 
decided, this court, in an opinion written by the author of 
today's decision, declared:  "'In tort actions, the only 
limitations [on damages] are those of "proximate cause" or 
public policy considerations.'"  Kempfer v. Automated Finishing, 
Inc., 211 
Wis. 2d 100, 119, 
564 
N.W.2d 692 
(1997)(quoting 
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 575, 335 
N.W.2d 834 (1983))(emphasis added).   
 
No. 
02-2628   
 
14 
 
liability even where negligence and negligence as a cause-in-
fact of injury are present").  
¶15 However, it is important to recognize and appreciate 
this relationship between "public policy" and the second step in 
the legal cause analysis, formerly referred to as "proximate 
cause."  Whether public policy is conceptualized as the second 
step in the legal cause analysis,10 or a fifth step following the 
duty, breach, cause, damage inquiry,11 the fact remains that 
"public policy" is inexorably tied to legal cause in Wisconsin.12  
                                                 
10 Sanem v. Home Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 530, 537-58, 350 
N.W.2d 89 (1984); Morgan v. Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 
735, 275 N.W.2d 660 (1979). 
11 Hicks v. Nunnery, 2002 WI App 87, ¶86, 253 Wis. 2d 721, 
643 N.W.2d 809 (Dykman, J., dissenting). 
12 It is true that the last two public policy factors bear 
little relation to cause-in-fact.  Hicks, 253 Wis. 2d 721, ¶92 
(Dykman, J. dissenting).  Yet, this misses the point, as the 
public policy factors are related to the legal sufficiency of 
the cause-in-fact.  The other four factors directly bear on 
older judicial doctrines regarding cause-in-fact and duty. 
The court's first public policy factor, "whether the 
injury is too remote from the negligence," is a 
restatement of the old chain of causation test. . . .  
What 
this 
factor 
does . . . is 
to 
revive 
the 
"intervening" or "superseding" cause doctrine and 
dress it in new clothes. . . .  
The second factor, "whether the injury is wholly out 
of proportion to the culpability of the negligent 
tortfeasor," helps to determine . . . the discrepancy 
between the degree of negligence and the degree of 
injury . . . . 
The third factor, "whether in retrospect it appears 
too extraordinary that the negligence should have 
brought 
about 
the 
harm," 
is 
a 
variant 
of 
the 
No. 
02-2628   
 
15 
 
When we preclude liability based on "public policy factors," 
formerly referred to as "proximate cause," we are simply stating 
that the cause-in-fact of the injury is legally insufficient to 
allow recovery.  In doing so, we are engaged in judicial line 
drawing, "endeavor[ing] to make a rule in each case that will be 
practical and in keeping with the general understanding of 
mankind."  Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 104 (Andrews, J., dissenting).  
We do so in order to assure that "in cases so extreme that it 
would shock the conscience of society to impose liability, the 
courts may step in and hold as a matter of law that there is no 
liability."  Pfeifer, 262 Wis. at 238. 
                                                                                                                                                             
reasonable foreseeability test [used previously to 
determine 
duty]. . . . Because 
the 
court 
has 
determined that everyone owes a duty of ordinary care 
to others, this third factor is necessary to provide 
some limit for bizarre consequences and unforeseeable 
plaintiffs. 
The fourth factor, "whether allowance of recovery 
would place an unreasonable burden on the negligent 
tortfeasor" recognizes that tort law should not seek 
to deter all conduct that involves risk, just conduct 
that involves too much risk.  Many of the cases in 
which the public policy factors are necessary involve 
situations where the actual harm was not reasonably 
foreseeable. 
Kendall W. Harrison, Wisconsin's Approach to Proximate Cause, 73 
Wisconsin Lawyer 20, 55-56 (Feb. 2000); See also Morgan, 87 
Wis. 2d at 738 (noting that "[o]ne policy ground for relieving a 
negligent tortfeasor from liability for conduct which has been a 
substantial factor in producing injury is the intervening and 
superseding cause doctrine. . . . The doctrine is another way of 
saying the negligence is too remote from the injury to impose 
liability."). 
No. 
02-2628   
 
16 
 
¶16 Thus, it should be manifest that what we mean by 
"public policy" as referred to in tort law is completely 
different 
than 
the 
use 
of 
the 
term 
in 
Borgins. 
 
The 
legislature's determination of "public policy" in a broader 
context relates to what is politically appropriate for the state 
as a whole.  When "public policy" is used in this context, it is 
true that the judiciary is limited to applying the policy the 
legislature has chosen to enact, and may not impose its own 
policy choices.  See Columbus Park Hous. Corp. v. City of 
Kenosha, 2003 WI 143, ¶34, 267 Wis. 2d 59, 671 N.W.2d 633.  This 
stands in stark contrast to the judiciary's use of "public 
policy," formerly referred to as "proximate cause," which refers 
to the practice of limiting tort liability as part of the legal 
cause analysis "on a case-by-case basis."  Beacon Bowl, 176 
Wis. 2d at 763. 
¶17 While public policy as a limit on liability was 
conceived in negligence law, the doctrine has grown and 
progressed to other areas of tort law.  Wisconsin has since 
rendered public policy factors applicable in strict liability 
tort actions.  See Ransome v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 87 
Wis. 2d 605, 625, 275 N.W.2d 641 (1979)(discussing public policy 
factors in context of strict liability claim but concluding 
liability should not be denied in that particular case); Beacon 
Bowl, 176 Wis. 2d at 763 (concluding that under Ransome, public 
policy factors could be applied to cut off liability under 
strict liability action, but that liability should not be denied 
in that particular case). 
No. 
02-2628   
 
17 
 
¶18 In Physicians Plus Insurance Corp. v. Theresa Mutual 
Insurance Co., 2002 WI 80, ¶32, 254 Wis. 2d 77, 646 N.W.2d 777, 
this court concluded that public policy could be utilized to bar 
a claim for maintaining a public nuisance.  In Physicians Plus, 
the court noted that liability for a public nuisance does not 
depend upon proof of the plaintiff's lack of ordinary care.  
Id., ¶27.  The court then compared liability for failure to 
abate a public nuisance to violations of the safe place statute 
and stated that liability for maintaining a public nuisance may 
arise solely on the basis of notice of a dangerous condition.  
Id., ¶28 & n.24.  The court further noted that when all the 
elements for failure to abate a public nuisance are proven, 
liability is analogous to negligence per se——failure to act in 
accordance with statutory minimum duties.  Id., ¶43.  The court 
then proceeded to apply the public policy factors.  Id., ¶44.  
Therefore, Physicians Plus supports the proposition that public 
policy factors may be applied even where the underlying cause of 
action does not involve proof of specific acts of negligence.   
¶19 Moreover, the fact that liability in this case is 
predicated upon a statute rather than a common-law cause of 
action is not dispositive, as § 174.02 still sounds in tort; it 
is a codified cause of action for a civil wrong.  This court has 
in the past noted that public policy may preclude liability 
based on the safe-place statute, Wis. Stat. § 101.11.  Fondell 
v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 85 Wis. 2d 220, 227 & n.5, 270 N.W.2d 205 
(1978).  While we are aware that the safe-place statute does not 
itself create a cause of action, it is the violation of the 
No. 
02-2628   
 
18 
 
statute that constitutes negligence.  Krause v. Veterans of 
Foreign Wars Post No. 6498, 9 Wis. 2d 547, 552, 101 N.W.2d 645 
(1960).  Further, in Fondell, we noted that "when a safe-place 
violation has been proven, the law presumes the damage was 
caused by the failure to perform the safe-place duty [under 
§ 101.11] to maintain the premises as safe as the nature of the 
place reasonably permits."  Fondell, 85 Wis. 2d at 230-31.  
Despite the fact that causation is presumed to flow from the 
statutory violation, we also stated in Fondell that: 
There is no liability upon the failure to meet 
the required duty until such negligence is found to be 
the legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries. . . .    
This is not to ignore case law supporting the use 
of public policy factors in cutting off liability even 
where negligence and a causal relation have been 
established. 
Id. at 227 & n.5.  Therefore, even when causation is presumed 
from the violation of a statute, that cause must still be the 
legal cause of the injury, such that public policy may act as a 
bar to recovery.   
¶20 Similarly, the fact that § 174.02 does not require 
proof that the plaintiff was negligent, but rather imposes 
strict liability, does not preclude application of public policy 
factors.  First, while § 174.02 creates a strict liability 
action, negligence principles are still applicable to § 174.02, 
as the dog owner's liability is expressly "subject to" the 
doctrine of comparative negligence under Wis. Stat. § 895.045.  
Wis. Stat. § 174.02(1)(a).   
No. 
02-2628   
 
19 
 
¶21 Also, § 174.02 requires that the dog "cause" the 
injuries of the plaintiff.  "Legislation is presumed to employ 
terminology consistent with that used by the courts."  State v. 
Foley, 153 Wis. 2d 748, 752, 451 N.W.2d 796 (Ct. App. 1989).  
Under Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1), "technical words and phrases and 
others that have a peculiar meaning in the law shall be 
construed according to such meaning."  Thus, the legislature, in 
using and retaining the word "cause" in § 174.02, is presumed to 
be aware that "cause" in Wisconsin consists both of a factual, 
cause-in-fact inquiry, and a legal determination as to the 
sufficiency of that cause-in-fact based on public policy 
factors.  Therefore, even where it is proven that a dog is the 
cause-in-fact 
of the plaintiff's 
injuries 
under 
§ 174.02, 
liability may still be denied on the basis of the public policy 
factors used to determine legal cause.   
¶22 In addition, the court of appeals has twice indicated 
that public policy factors may be used to limit liability under 
§ 174.02.  In Becker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co., 141 Wis. 2d 804, 807-08, 416 N.W.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1987), 
the defendant's dog ran into the street, causing damage to the 
plaintiff's car.  The circuit court found that § 174.02 (1983-
84) did not apply to "innocent acts" of a dog.  Id. at 808.  In 
reversing the circuit court's judgment, the court of appeals 
noted that the statute was a strict liability statute subject to 
the defense of contributory negligence.  Id. at 816.  The court 
of appeals also noted the language from Meunier, supra, in 
rejecting the defendant's argument that the statute did not 
No. 
02-2628   
 
20 
 
apply to innocent acts of a dog.  Id. at 816-17.  However, the 
court of appeals also stated:  "we note that the strict 
liability rule which we recognize in this case is tempered by 
three considerations:  public policy, the rules of comparative 
negligence and the rules of causation."  Id. at 817 (emphasis 
added).   
¶23 At oral argument, much was made of the fact that the 
applicable statute in Becker, Wis. Stat. § 174.02(1)(a)(1983-
84), provided that "[t]he owner of a dog may be liable," and 
that the statute was subsequently amended by 1985 Wis. Act 92 to 
read, as it does currently, that "the owner of a dog is liable."  
The Becker court was cognizant of this change but, after 
examining the legislative history, determined that "the purpose 
of the amendment of sec. 174.02, Stats. (1983-84), was to 
clarify that comparative negligence principles applied to the 
strict liability provisions of the statute."  Becker, 141 
Wis. 2d at 815.  Apparently, while some circuit courts correctly 
interpreted the "may be" language in § 174.02 (1983-84) as 
permitting the application of comparative negligence principles, 
other circuit courts concluded that the statute was not subject 
to comparative negligence.  Id.  Hence the legislature removed 
"may be liable" and in its place inserted "is liable," but also 
specifically 
made 
the 
statute 
subject 
to 
§ 895.045, 
the 
comparative 
negligence 
statute. 
 
1985 
Wis. 
Act 
92.  
Specifically, the Becker court found that there was "[n]o other 
motivating 
factor 
for 
the 
change 
in 
the 
statutory 
language . . . ."  Becker, 141 Wis. 2d at 815.  Thus, the fact 
No. 
02-2628   
 
21 
 
that the statute currently reads "is liable" does not diminish 
the significance of the court of appeals' recognition in Becker 
that the public policy factors are applicable to § 174.02.   
¶24 While Becker discussed the applicability of public 
policy factors, it did not apply them to the facts of the case; 
thus, the language is arguably dicta.  However, in Alwin, 234 
Wis. 2d 441, ¶¶11-14, the court of appeals specifically applied 
the public policy factors to preclude liability where the 
plaintiff was injured after tripping over the defendant's 
sleeping dog.  While it is true that the issue of whether the 
public policy factors could be applied to the case was not 
specifically before the court, the court of appeals' conclusion 
in Alwin that application of those factors prevented liability 
presupposed that public policy could be applied to the statute.  
¶25 Therefore, 
Mackenzie's 
reliance 
upon 
Meunier 
is 
misplaced.  As noted above, the court of appeals in Meunier 
stated:  "The statute is complete.  It permits no additions."  
Meunier, 140 Wis. 2d at 786.  However, Mackenzie takes this 
language entirely out of context.  The plaintiff's wife in 
Meunier was riding a farm tractor when she noticed a dog running 
under the machine.  Startled, she popped the clutch and the 
tractor tipped over, killing her.  Id. at 785.  At issue was 
whether the applicable statute imposed liability on the dog's 
owner even in the absence of proof that the dog was mischievous 
or vicious.  Id. at 784.  Under the previous version of the 
statute, liability ensued only if the dog was mischievous or 
vicious.  Id. at 787 n.4.  However, the statute at issue in 
No. 
02-2628   
 
22 
 
Meunier had since been amended to eliminate the reference to 
mischievous or vicious dogs.  Id.  Apparently, the circuit court 
relied on the older version of the statute in granting summary 
judgment to the defendant.  Id. at 784.  It was in this context 
that the above-quoted language was used.  The defendant was 
arguing that despite the change in the statutory language, a dog 
owner could not be liable unless the dog was mischievous, 
vicious, or had unusual characteristics.  Id.  Meunier did not 
discuss the application of public policy factors to § 174.02.  
Thus, Meunier does not stand for the proposition that a court 
may not use public policy factors to limit liability under 
§ 174.02.  
¶26 Wisconsin courts have at least twice indicated that 
strict 
liability 
under 
§ 174.02 
can 
be 
tempered 
by 
the 
judiciary.  The court of appeals in Becker suggested that public 
policy could be used to cut off liability under the statute, and 
the court of appeals in Alwin actually precluded liability based 
on public policy.  As this court has previously indicated:  
Where a law passed by the legislature has been 
construed by the courts, legislative acquiescence in 
or refusal to pass a measure that would defeat the 
courts' construction is not an equivocal act.  The 
legislature is presumed to know that in absence of its 
changing the law, the construction put upon it by the 
courts will remain unchanged[.]   
Zimmerman v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 633-34, 157 
N.W.2d 648 (1968).  Thus, "[l]egislative silence with regard to 
new court-made decisions indicates legislative acquiescence in 
those decisions."  State v. Olson, 175 Wis. 2d 628, 641, 498 
No. 
02-2628   
 
23 
 
N.W.2d 661 (1993), cited in State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶155 
n.8, 
245 
Wis. 2d 689, 
629 
N.W.2d 223 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting).  The legislature has not in any way indicated that 
the judiciary is precluded from applying public policy factors 
to temper the sometimes-harsh results of strict liability under 
§ 174.02.  Thus, we hold that Wisconsin courts may utilize the 
traditional six public policy factors, formerly referred to as 
"proximate cause," to limit liability in appropriate cases under 
§ 174.02.   
¶27 Mackenzie contends that even if public policy factors 
may be applied to § 174.02, the circuit court should have 
conducted a trial before applying them.  It is true that we have 
declined to apply the public policy factors if "[t]he factual 
connections are so attenuated that a full trial should precede 
this court's determination of policy considerations."  Coffey v. 
City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 543, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).  
However, a full trial is not always necessary, as "[t]his court 
can, and has, decided such public policy questions [before a 
trial]."  Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 2002 WI 30, 
¶42, 251 Wis. 2d 171, 641 N.W.2d 158.  When the policy questions 
are 
fully 
presented 
to 
us 
and 
the 
facts 
are 
easily 
ascertainable, this court can utilize public policy to preclude 
liability before a trial.  See Alvarado v. Sersch, 2003 WI 55, 
¶18, 262 Wis. 2d 74, 662 N.W.2d 350 
¶28 Here, the underlying facts are easily ascertainable 
and are not disputed, as the depositions of Michelle and Nicole 
are consistent with each other.  This case comes to us after a 
No. 
02-2628   
 
24 
 
grant of summary judgment, and Mackenzie did not submit any 
competing summary judgment materials to the circuit court.  
Michelle admitted that she did not have express permission to 
enter the Beliunases' home.  Further, she admitted that the two 
usually set up visits in advance and this was the first time she 
(Michelle) had actually ventured into the inside of the 
Beliunases' home when they were away.  These are the essential 
facts that are relevant to the application of public policy 
factors.  Further, the parties have fully briefed the relevant 
public policy factors applicable in this case.  As the facts 
supporting application of public policy factors are easily 
ascertainable and undisputed and the relevant policy issues have 
been fully presented, there is no need to conduct a trial before 
this court can apply those factors.  
¶29 Having determined that public policy may be used to 
limit liability under § 174.02, we now turn to address whether 
the circuit court properly applied those factors to dismiss 
Mackenzie's claim.  This court reviews a circuit court decision 
to 
grant 
summary 
judgment 
independently, 
using 
the 
same 
methodology as the circuit court.  Fuchsgruber v. Custom 
Accessories, Inc., 2001 WI 81, ¶9, 244 Wis. 2d 758, 628 
N.W.2d 833.  The application of public policy factors to a 
specific set of facts to deny recovery is a question of law that 
this court decides de novo.  Beacon Bowl, 176 Wis. 2d at 761.  
Liability may be denied solely on the basis of one of the 
factors.  Rieck, 64 Wis. 2d at 518.  In reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, this court examines the evidence in the 
No. 
02-2628   
 
25 
 
summary judgment materials and reasonable inferences therefrom 
in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Kraemer 
Bros. Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 555, 566-67, 278 
N.W.2d 857 (1979). 
¶30 The circuit court dismissed Mackenzie's claim on the 
basis of three of the public policy factors:  1) recovery would 
be too out of proportion with the culpability of the Beliunases; 
2) allowing recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on 
the homeowners; and 3) allowing recovery would enter a field 
that has no sensible or just stopping point.  Specifically, the 
circuit court took into account the fact that Michelle and 
Mackenzie did not have implied consent to enter the Beliunases' 
home and that Michelle was aware that the Beliunases kept Molly 
in the house.  Finally, the court commented that requiring the 
homeowners to do something more than keep their dogs inside with 
the door shut when the homeowners are away would be too 
unreasonable.   
¶31 Mackenzie alleges that these policy factors are not 
applicable to the case at bar.  Mackenzie argues that the first 
two policy factors relied upon by the circuit court are 
irrelevant because this is a strict liability action and the 
negligence or culpability of the tortfeasor is inapposite.  She 
also argues that the third factor does not apply because the 
legislature has already determined the just and sensible 
stopping point of the statute.  
¶32 In rejecting these arguments, we note that the court 
in Beacon Bowl, 176 Wis. 2d at 761-63, determined that the six 
No. 
02-2628   
 
26 
 
public 
policy 
factors 
were 
applicable 
in 
strict 
product 
liability actions, but did not suggest that certain factors 
categorically would not apply.  Mackenzie's argument that 
culpability is not a factor is unavailing.  While strict 
liability relieves a plaintiff from proving specific acts of 
negligence, Meunier, 140 Wis. 2d at 785, it does not preclude a 
court from considering the extent of such negligent activity, if 
any, in determining whether public policy factors bar the claim.  
See Beacon Bowl, 176 Wis. 2d at 760-66 (considering public 
policy factors in light of Wisconsin Electric Power Company's 
negligence in failing to trim trees after the jury found that 
the electricity it provided was defective and unreasonably 
dangerous).   
¶33 Further, the court in Alwin, 234 Wis. 2d 441, ¶14, 
denied liability, in part, because "to impose liability under 
the dog owner statute for injuries arising solely from a 
sleeping dog would effectively result in a pure penalty for dog 
ownership."  This is synonymous with saying that allowing 
recovery 
would 
place 
too 
unreasonable 
a 
burden 
on 
the 
tortfeasor.  Finally, Mackenzie's argument as to the third 
factor is little more than a reiteration of her argument that 
public policy factors cannot be used to limit liability under a 
strict liability statute.  We conclude that all three factors 
relied upon by the circuit court are applicable to the case at 
bar.   
¶34 Applying these factors to the case, we agree with the 
circuit court that recovery here would be too out of proportion 
No. 
02-2628   
 
27 
 
with the culpability of the Beliunases.  Essentially the only 
thing the Beliunases did "wrong" here was to leave their door 
unlocked.  Nicole testified that, knowing Molly did not like to 
be around children, she always made a conscious effort to 
separate Molly from Mackenzie or other children when they were 
present.  We also note that Nicole's uncontroverted testimony 
establishes that the Beliunases also had another dog, Casey, 
that Mackenzie would play with by jumping on and pulling his 
tail and ears.   
¶35 Further, we agree that liability here would place too 
unreasonable a burden on the Beliunases.  The circuit court 
indicated that requiring homeowners to do anything more than 
keep their dogs in the house when the homeowners are away would 
be unreasonable.  We concur with American Family that to allow 
recovery here would result in clearly unreasonable consequences, 
as dog owners would be forced, prior to leaving their homes, to 
kennel their dogs, muzzle them, or lock them in cages.  We think 
it unreasonable to force homeowners to keep their homes and dogs 
under lock and key at all times to avoid liability. 
¶36 Perhaps the strongest factor weighing against imposing 
liability is that to do so would enter a field that has no 
sensible or just stopping point.  While we need not determine 
whether Mackenzie, as a young child, would qualify as a 
technical trespasser, we do note that it is undisputed that 
Michelle and Mackenzie did not have express consent to enter the 
Beliunases' home.  The uncontested summary judgment materials 
submitted by the defendants establish that neither Nicole nor 
No. 
02-2628   
 
28 
 
her husband gave permission to Michelle or Mackenzie to enter 
their home.  Michelle admits to this and further admits that she 
did not call ahead the day the injury occurred to notify the 
Beliunases that she would be stopping over.  Further, even 
viewing the summary judgment materials in the light most 
favorable to Mackenzie, there is no evidence, or reasonable 
inferences therefrom, that support the claim that Michelle and 
Mackenzie had implied consent to enter the Beliunases' home.13   
¶37 While Mackenzie attempts to characterize Michelle's 
unauthorized entry into the Beliunases' home as a routine 
occurrence between friends, the summary judgment materials do 
not support this contention.  Michelle stated at her deposition 
that it was the usual practice for her and Nicole to set up 
visits in advance, and the two would visit each other's home 
approximately once a month.  Michelle stated that she had 
stopped by the Beliunases' home unannounced on only three 
occasions and Michelle could recall only one other time when she 
entered the Beliunases' home when they were not present.  
                                                 
13 "[C]onsent may be implied from the conduct of the owner, 
from the relationship of the parties, or by custom."  Baumgart 
v. 
Spierings, 
2 
Wis. 2d 289, 
293, 
86 
N.W.2d 413 
(1957).  
Likewise, "consent . . . may be implied from custom, or when the 
owner's conduct is such as would warrant a reasonable person 
having knowledge thereof to believe that the owner had given 
consent to come upon the premises." Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper 
Corp., 192 Wis. 2d 235, 243, 531 N.W.2d 341 (Ct. App. 1995).  
Thus, the landowner's knowledge of another entering his land and 
his resulting behavior is a key factor in determining implied 
consent.  See also Baumgart, 2 Wis. 2d at 294 (finding implied 
consent where landowner knew children would play on his property 
and never warned them to leave or stay off of his land).   
No. 
02-2628   
 
29 
 
However, Michelle noted that the day the injury occurred was the 
first time that she actually walked inside the home, as opposed 
to just standing in the doorway and calling out.  Further, 
Nicole had entered Michelle's home on only one prior occasion 
when it was vacant, but this incident occurred when the two were 
in high school and after the two had previously arranged for 
Nicole to pick up a game.  Thus, there is no evidence of a 
"custom" between the parties of entering each other's homes when 
they were vacant.  The fact that the parties were best friends 
is not sufficient to establish implied consent.   
¶38 In addition, the evidence unequivocally demonstrates 
that the Beliunases did not have any knowledge of Michelle 
previously entering their home.  Nicole stated that she was not 
aware that Michelle had ever entered their home when they were 
not present.  Further, Nicole was not aware that Michelle would 
sometimes step inside the doorway to her home and call out to 
see if the Beliunases were home.  These facts are not 
contradicted by Michelle's testimony.  Michelle agreed that the 
Beliunases did not know that she was coming over the day in 
question and that she did not have permission to enter their 
home.  Thus, viewing the summary judgment evidence in a light 
most favorable to Mackenzie, we conclude that the undisputed 
facts contained in the record support the circuit court's 
conclusion that Michelle and Mackenzie did not have actual or 
implied consent to enter the Beliunases' home.   
¶39 Were we to allow liability in such a case, liability 
would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.  
No. 
02-2628   
 
30 
 
For example, were we to allow liability here, the door would be 
open to imposing liability on a homeowner when a burglar enters 
his or her home and is injured by a dog.  While Mackenzie 
contends that this contingency is better dealt with by the use 
of comparative negligence 
principles, 
public 
policy 
would 
undoubtedly 
preclude 
liability 
even 
if 
a 
putative 
thief 
meticulously picked a locked door and gingerly entered the 
premises, only to unexpectedly encounter a vigilant hound.  We 
conclude that to allow liability in this case, where the 
plaintiff entered the dog owner's home without express or 
implied permission, would enter a field that has no sensible or 
just stopping point.   
IV. SUMMARY 
¶40 In conclusion, we hold that the six traditional public 
policy factors the judiciary uses to preclude liability in tort 
actions are applicable to Wis. Stat. § 174.02.  Further, we hold 
that public policy precludes the imposition of liability under 
the facts of this case because:  1) recovery would be too out of 
proportion with the culpability of the homeowners; 2) allowing 
recovery 
would 
place 
too 
unreasonable 
a 
burden 
on 
the 
homeowners; and 3) allowing recovery would enter a field that 
has no sensible or just stopping point.   
By the Court.—The order of the Marathon County Circuit 
Court is affirmed. 
 
 
No.  02-2628.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶41 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  The first 
certified question is whether a court may use traditional public 
policy factors to limit liability under Wis. Stat. § 174.02.  I 
agree with the majority that the answer to the inquiry is "yes." 
Because the majority engages in an expansive discussion, I write 
separately to focus on two parts of the majority opinion that 
answer the inquiry. 
¶42 I focus first on a part of paragraph 22.  I agree with 
the majority that because § 174.02 uses the word "cause" and 
implicates negligence by providing for a defense of contributory 
negligence, public policy factors can limit liability here.  
Majority op., ¶22. 
¶43  As it traces the paths of Wisconsin jurisprudence, 
the majority explains that "cause" refers to two distinct 
concepts:  cause-in-fact and proximate cause.  Id., ¶12.  It 
expands the discussion to address the historic evolution of the 
six 
public 
policy 
factors 
and 
their 
relationship 
to 
proximate/legal cause.  Id., ¶10.   
¶44 The majority announces that "[w]hether public policy 
is conceptualized as the second step in the legal cause 
analysis, or a fifth step following the duty, breach, cause, 
damage inquiry, the fact remains that 'public policy' is 
inexorably tied to legal cause in Wisconsin."  Id., ¶15.  
Finally, after using the terms "proximate cause" and "public 
policy" interchangeably, it ultimately concludes that public 
policy factors can limit liability.  Id., ¶40.  Lest the focus 
No.  02-2628.awb 
 
2 
 
be lost, I emphasize that the answer as I see it lies in the 
above-referenced part of paragraph 22. 
¶45 I focus next on footnote 7 of the majority opinion.  
The majority, at times, uses the terms "proximate cause" and 
"public policy" interchangeably.  This may leave the reader 
wondering about the continued vitality of using proximate cause 
to limit liability.  Footnote 7, however, provides the answer.  
Simply put, in Wisconsin we use public policy factors, not 
proximate cause, to limit liability. 
¶46 For the reasons stated above, I respectfully concur. 
¶47 I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J. joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  02-2628.awb 
 
 
 
1