Case Title: Wolford v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Della Lou WOLFORD v. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY

97-385                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 12, 1998


1.   Courts -- rules -- use of "may" -- implies permissive rather than
     mandatory action. -- The word "may" as used in a rule implies
     permissive or discretional, rather than mandatory, action.

2.   Civil procedure -- trial court did not abuse discretion in acting within
     authority given by Ark. R. Civ. P. 25. -- The word "may" in Ark. R.
     Civ. P. 25 implies that dismissal of an action as to a
     deceased party is not mandatory under the circumstances
     outlined in the rule; it is, however, discretionary with the
     trial court; accordingly, the supreme court could not say that
     the trial court abused its discretion in acting expressly
     within the authority given to it under Rule 25.

3.   Civil procedure -- motions for substitution of parties and for enlargement
     or extension of time -- trial court did not abuse discretion in denying. -
     - Where appellant did not allege that she was mistaken about
     the time during which she was required to respond to a notice
     of death or that the failure to file a motion for substitution
     of parties in a timely manner was the result of surprise,
     excusable neglect, or other just cause, the supreme court
     could not say that the trial court abused its discretion in
     denying both appellant's motion for substitution and her
     motion for enlargement or extension of time.
4.   Civil procedure -- involuntary dismissal -- standard of review -- such
     dismissals are without prejudice. -- Rule 41(b) of the Arkansas
     Rules of Civil Procedure gives the trial court the authority
     to dismiss cases in which the plaintiff has failed to comply
     with any order of the court; the standard of review of such a
     dismissal is whether the trial court abused its discretion;
     such dismissals are to be without prejudice.

5.   Civil procedure -- decision to dismiss case against deceased party not
     abuse of discretion -- dismissal modified to be without prejudice. -- The
     supreme court concluded that the trial court's decision to
     dismiss the case against a deceased party was not an abuse of
     discretion; because, after several amendments to Ark. R. Civ.
     P. 41, the supreme court has consistently decided that such
     dismissals be without prejudice, the court affirmed the
     dismissal but modified it to be without prejudice.

6.   Appeal & error -- modified dismissal rendered consideration of voluntary-
     nonsuit issue unnecessary. -- Because the supreme court modified
     the dismissal with regard to a deceased party to be one
     without prejudice, it was not necessary to reach appellant's
     argument that the trial court erred in not granting her motion
     for voluntary dismissal without prejudice.

7.   Evidence -- expert testimony -- when required to prove action for medical
     injury. -- Arkansas case law requires a plaintiff to present
     expert testimony to prove an action for medical injury when
     the asserted negligence does not lie within the jury's
     comprehension as a matter of common knowledge.

8.   Physicians & surgeons -- medical expert -- similar-locality rule. -- A
     medical expert need not be familiar with the practice in the
     particular locality, but must demonstrate a familiarity with
     the standard of practice in a similar locality, either by his
     testimony or by other evidence showing the similarity of
     localities; the supreme court looks at geographical location,
     size, and character of the community, basing the similarity
     not on population or area but on the similarity of the medical
     facilities, practices, and advantages.

9.   Physicians & surgeons -- medical specialists from dissimilar fields -- when
     opinion is competent. -- Where medical specialists from dissimilar
     fields testify, the physician must merely exhibit knowledge of
     the subject; where a duly licensed and practicing physician
     has gained knowledge of the standard of care applicable to a
     specialty in which he is not directly engaged but regarding
     which he has an opinion based on education, experience,
     observation or association with that specialty, his opinion is
     competent.

10.  Physicians & surgeons -- medical expert -- evidence established foundation
     showing physician was familiar with standard of practice in similar
     locality. -- The evidence established an appropriate foundation
     showing that an out-of-state physician whose testimony was
     excluded was familiar with the standard of practice in a
     locality similar to the town where the action arose.

11.  Evidence -- expert testimony -- weak or questionable opinion bears on
     weight and not admissibility. -- If there is a reasonable basis for
     saying a witness knows more of the subject at hand than a
     person of ordinary knowledge, his evidence is admissible; if
     an expert's opinion is merely weak or questionable, that fact
     bears on the weight to be given the testimony and not its
     admissibility.

12.  Evidence -- expert testimony -- jury could have benefited from hearing. --
     The medical treatment administered, and not administered, to
     the deceased was clearly a matter outside a person's ordinary
     knowledge, and, the supreme court concluded that, in the
     circumstances surrounding the case, a jury could have
     benefited from hearing expert testimony.

13.  Evidence -- determination of expert witness's qualification -- trial
     court's discretion not absolute. -- The determination of an expert
     witness's qualification to testify is within the sound
     discretion of the trial court; the exercise of this discretion
     is not absolute, and the appellate court will reverse where it
     finds that the trial court has abused its discretion. 

14.  Evidence -- expert testimony -- exclusion constituted abuse of discretion.
     -- The supreme court concluded that an out-of-state physician
     possessed the required credentials and experience to testify
     in the case and held that excluding his testimony constituted
     an abuse of the trial court's discretion.

15.  Judgment -- summary judgment -- appellee not entitled to -- case reversed
     and remanded. -- Because it held that the trial court abused its
     discretion in excluding a physician's expert testimony, it
     also concluded that appellee was not entitled to judgment as
     a matter of law; summary judgment should only be granted where
     there exists no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving
     party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; here, the
     testimony of the medical expert would have provided the
     requisite background to support a genuine issue of material
     fact as to whether the medical center's nurses and staff
     provided the deceased with adequate medical treatment; the
     resolution of this issue should have been within the province
     of the jury; accordingly, the supreme court reversed the trial
     court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of
     appellee and remanded with instructions for the trial court to
     accept the out-of-state physician as an expert witness.


     Appeal from Independence Circuit Court; John Dan Kemp, Judge;
affirmed in part, as modified; reversed and remanded in part.
     George Bailey, for appellant.
     Womack, Landis, Phelps, McNeill & McDaniel, by:  Paul McNeill,
for appellee.

     Ray Thornton, Justice.
     Appellant, Mrs. Della Lou Wolford, brought this medical-
malpractice action against her deceased husband's physician, Dr.
Nathan Strickland; White River Medical Center and its agents,
servants, and employees; and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Company.  St. Paul was the liability insurance carrier for the
medical facility and for Dr. Strickland.  While litigation was
pending, Dr. Strickland died.  The trial court dismissed the claim
against him with prejudice when appellant failed to file a motion
for substitution of parties within ninety days following the notice
of death.  The White River Medical Center was dismissed without
prejudice, and the case proceeded to trial against St. Paul on the
remaining issue of medical malpractice of the Medical Center's
nurses and staff.  The trial court ordered a mistrial because of
the relationship of a juror to a witness.
     In preparation for a new trial, St. Paul made a motion in
limine to preclude appellant's expert witness, Dr. Richard
Williams, from testifying because he testified as to a national
standard of care for nurses and did not demonstrate a familiarity
with the standard of nursing care in Batesville, Arkansas, where
the Medical Center was located.  As Dr. Williams was the only
expert-medical witness prepared to testify for appellant at the new
trial, St. Paul orally requested that the court allow it to make a
motion for summary judgment in the event that its motion in limine
to suppress Dr. Williams's testimony was granted.  St. Paul argued
that summary judgment would be appropriate because appellant would
not have a medical expert available to testify in the event of Dr.
Williams's disqualification.  The trial court granted both motions,
and the case was dismissed.
     Appellant brings this appeal from the circuit court's
decision.  For reversal, appellant makes four separate allegations
of error: (1) that the trial court erred either in refusing to
grant her motion for substitution of the deceased surgeon's estate
as a party pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1), or in refusing to
extend her period of time under Ark. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) for filing
the motion for substitution; (2) that the trial court erred in
granting the motion to dismiss the claim against Dr. Strickland
with prejudice; (3) that the trial court erred in refusing to grant
her motion for voluntary dismissal of the claim against Dr.
Strickland prior to submission of the case to the court; (4) that
the trial court erred in its application of the law in striking the
testimony of her only expert medical witness, Dr. Williams, and
subsequently granting summary judgment.
     We conclude that the trial court did abuse its discretion in
determining that appellant's proposed witness, Dr. Williams, was
not qualified as an expert to testify as to the standard of nursing
care applicable in 1992 in the area around Batesville, Arkansas,
and therefore, summary judgment was not appropriate.  We conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the
action against Dr. Strickland because the motion for substitution
of parties was not timely filed; however, in accordance with Ark.
R. Civ. P. 41(b), we hold that the dismissal should have been
without prejudice.

I.   Substitution of Parties
     First, appellant argues that the trial court's refusal to
grant either her motion for an extension of time or her motion for
substitution constituted an abuse of its discretion.  We disagree
and affirm on this point.
     A notice of fact of death was filed on January 12, 1995,
informing appellant that Dr. Strickland had died on September 22,
1994.  On May 3, 1995, Dr. Strickland's counsel filed a motion to
dismiss based on the fact that appellant had not filed a timely
motion for substitution of parties.  Dr. Strickland's counsel
alleged that the motion for substitution of parties should have
been made within ninety days from the January 12 filing date, and
no such motion had been filed.  He also noted in the supporting
brief that appellant had filed a notice of claim against the estate
shortly after the notice of death, and therefore argued that lack
of notice of the fact of death should not be an excuse.
     On May 8, 1995, appellant filed a motion for substitution of
parties, well outside of the ninety-day period provided by Ark. R.
Civ. P. 25(a)(1).  Appellant's counsel stated in a supporting
affidavit that he and defendants' counsel had decided in a
telephone conversation that they would choose a mutually convenient
time to accomplish several changes "at one time" to make the
parties proper.  Dr. Strickland's counsel filed his own affidavit,
responding to this allegation by saying that, according to his
billing records, this conversation took place prior to Dr.
Strickland's death and pertained to substituting parties for the
medical facility and for the parties who were individual plaintiffs
at the time.  On May 16, 1995, appellant filed a supplemental
motion for substitution of parties and motion for enlargement and
extension of time pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2).
     On August 15, 1995, the trial court mailed a letter in which
it set out its findings.  In its letter, the trial court found that
appellant did not file the motion for substitution of parties
within the time period required under Ark. R. Civ. P. 25, and the
court expressed its intention to grant Dr. Strickland's motion to
dismiss this case pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 25.
     In our review, we look first to our applicable rule of civil
procedure.  The pertinent portion of Ark. R. Civ. P. 25 reads as
follows:
     If a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the Court may order substitution of the
proper parties. . . .  Unless the motion for substitution
is made not later than ninety (90) days after the death
is suggested upon the record by the service upon the
parties of a statement of the fact of death, the action
may be dismissed as to the deceased party.
Ark. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) (emphasis added).  It is not disputed by
either party that the motion for substitution was made later than
ninety days after appellant received notice of Dr. Strickland's
death.
     Appellant argues correctly that the use of the word "may" in
the rule connotes that dismissal is not mandatory.  We have stated
that "the word `may' as used in [a] rule implies permissive or
discretional, rather than mandatory, action, . . ."  Lovett v.
State, 267 Ark. 912, 914,