Case Title: Ex parte Hurbert Maiers & Melissa Maiers. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Hurbert Maiers & Melissa Maiers v. Bennie Gibbs)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1090626

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 8/20/10
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2010
_________________________
1090626
_________________________
Ex parte Hurbert Maiers and Melissa Maiers
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  Hurbert Maiers and Melissa Maiers
v.
Bennie Gibbs)
(Houston Circuit Court, CV-08-320;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2080178)
WOODALL, Justice.
The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, without an opinion,
the summary judgment entered by the Houston Circuit Court in
1090626
A bond for title is an installment contract for the sale
1
of land, under which "[t]he seller[] [retains] legal title
until the buyer pays the purchase price."  Black's Law
Dictionary 193 (8th ed. 2004).
2
favor of Bennie Gibbs in the action Gibbs filed against
Hurbert Maiers and Melissa Maiers pursuant to the Alabama
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, § 35-9A-101 et
seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the Act"), which became effective
January 1, 2007. Maiers v. Gibbs (No. 2080178, Nov. 20, 2009),
___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (table).  This Court
granted certiorari review to consider, in pertinent part,
whether a landlord and tenant relationship existed between
Gibbs and the Maierses when Gibbs filed his action.  See § 35-
9A-102(c) ("This chapter shall be construed as applying only
to the residential landlord and tenant relationship.").  We
reverse and remand. 
The legal relationship between Gibbs and the Maierses
began in August 2004, when Gibbs, as the seller, and the
Maierses, as the purchasers, entered into a bond-for-title
agreement regarding a residence in Houston County ("the
agreement").   The purchase price of the residence was
1
$60,000.  The Maierses made payments totaling $10,000 and
agreed to pay the balance, along with interest at the rate of
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3
7 percent, in 144 monthly payments of $514.19, the first
payment being due on September 5, 2004. The Maierses' initial
occupancy of the residence under the agreement was not subject
to the Act.  See § 35-9A-122(2), Ala. Code 1975 (generally
excluding "occupancy under a contract of sale of a dwelling
unit or the property of which it is a part" from the
application of the Act). 
Paragraph 3 of the agreement provided that if the
Maierses failed to pay "any [monthly] installment[] within
thirty (30) days after receipt of written notice by [Gibbs] of
such default and demand for such payment, then [Gibbs] [would]
have the right and option to declare [the agreement] null and
void by giving [the Maierses] written notice thereof."  In
such case, according to paragraph 3, the Maierses would "be
deemed tenants of [Gibbs] from the date of execution [of the
agreement]," and Gibbs would "have the right to the immediate
possession of the property."  Further, with regard to the
money paid by the Maierses before any such default and
declaration, paragraph 3 provided that it would first be
applied to the payment of any interest due and then to certain
expenditures that Gibbs may have made.  Any "balance [would
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4
then] be taken and considered as a reasonable rental for said
property."  
For 
three 
years, 
the 
Maierses 
paid 
each 
monthly
installment in full. However, in September 2007, the Maierses
tendered to Gibbs only $215, promising to pay the balance of
$299.19 later. Gibbs accepted the partial payment.  In October
2007, the Maierses tendered $514.19, but Gibbs refused to
accept the payment.
On October 25, 2007, Gibbs sent a letter to the Maierses,
demanding the amounts due for September and October, a late
fee for each of those two months, and an amount to pay an air-
conditioner-repair bill on the property.  The letter did not
include any deadline for payment and did not purport to
exercise Gibbs's option to declare the agreement void. The
amounts were not paid.  
The next correspondence between Gibbs and the Maierses
was a letter dated March 19, 2008, to the Maierses from
Gibbs's attorney.  The letter stated that Gibbs had elected to
declare the agreement void as of April 1, 2008, based upon the
Maierses' failure to make the installment payments and to pay
the related late fees.  The letter also demanded that the
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5
Maierses surrender possession of the residence before April 1
or else "an eviction proceeding" would be initiated.
After receiving the March 19 letter, the Maierses
contacted Gibbs, seeking to resolve the issues surrounding the
past-due payments. On April 3, 2008, the Maierses and Gibbs
entered into a separate agreement by which the Maierses would
be given the opportunity to "cure" the breach of the bond for
title.  More specifically, in order to pay the past-due
amounts and to bring the monthly payments up to date, the
Maierses agreed to pay, and Gibbs agreed to accept, three
payments of $2,208, the first due by April 7; the second by
May 6; and the third by June 6.  
The Maierses were unable to make the payment that was due
by April 7. On that date, Gibbs filed an action for eviction
pursuant to the Act.  See § 35-9A-461. Then, on April 16,
Hurbert's mother, who was trying to help the Maierses obtain
a mortgage loan, paid Gibbs $900, and Gibbs agreed not to
pursue the pending eviction action until May 5, 2008.  
The Maierses were unable to obtain a mortgage loan.
However, in June 2008, Gibbs accepted an installment payment
of $514.19 from the Maierses.  Ultimately, the Houston
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6
District Court entered a judgment in favor of Gibbs in the
amount of $5,598.27, representing "back rent" and late fees.
The Maierses appealed to the Houston Circuit Court. By
complying with the requirements of § 35-9A-461(d), the
Maierses were able to retain possession of the residence
during the pendency of the appeal.  
Shortly after the case was appealed to the circuit court,
Gibbs filed a motion for a partial summary judgment, seeking
immediate possession of the residence.  Gibbs, who never
mentioned the Act in his motion, grounded the motion on
paragraph 3 of the agreement.  In response, the Maierses
argued, in pertinent part, that Gibbs had waived any right to
terminate the agreement by his acceptance of payments after
the Maierses' default.  On November 12, 2008, the circuit
court granted Gibbs's motion, awarding him possession of the
residence.  The circuit court later certified the partial
summary judgment as a  final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b),
Ala. R. Civ. P. Gibbs  appealed from the judgment, and the
Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment without an
opinion.  By continuing to make the payments required by § 35-
9A-461(d), the Maierses have retained possession of the
1090626
7
residence during the pendency of the appeal.  
A summary judgment is proper only where it is "show[n]
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Thus, "'[i]t has been
well said that summary judgment may not substitute for the
trial of issues of fact.'" Borom v. Thagard, 926 So. 2d 331,
333 (Ala. 2005) (quoting State v. Robinson, 510 So. 2d 834,
836 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987)).
In seeking to bring his action within the scope of the
Act, Gibbs relies upon paragraph 3 of the agreement, arguing
that, "[o]n the terms of the contract ... the Maiers[es]
defaulted, breaching the contract and as a result, [a]
landlord/tenant relationship was created."  Gibbs's brief, at
20.  In response, the Maierses argue, in pertinent part, that
"the trier of fact should determine if Gibbs ... waived strict
compliance with the terms of the [agreement] through his
actions."  The Maierses' brief, at 54.  We agree with the
Maierses.
A bond for title "is an installment contract for the sale
of land."  Rogers v. Triple S Ventures, Inc., 752 So. 2d 1220,
1090626
8
1221 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).  In such contracts, "vendors often
contractually reserve unto themselves the power to treat the
contract as having been rescinded upon a default by the
purchaser, and after a rescission may retake possession of the
property." 752 So. 2d at 1222 (citing Joel Rebecca Donelson,
The Bond for Title: A Modern Look at Alabama's Land
Installment Contract, 46 Ala. L. Rev. 137, 140 (1994)).  Also,
it is not uncommon for installment contracts for the sale of
land to provide that, upon a default by the purchaser, all
money paid by the purchaser under the contract shall be taken
and held as payment of rent for the property. See Eurton v.
Smith, 357 So. 2d 324, 326 (Ala. 1978). In this case, the
agreement contains such a provision.  The Maierses and Gibbs
refer to such provisions, as do our cases, as "forfeiture
provisions."  Eurton, 357 So. 2d at 326.
The parties agree that "[t]he authorities establish that
forfeiture provisions in lease-sale agreements are not
favored."  Killen v. Akin, 519 So. 2d 926, 929 (Ala. 1988).
However, "they will be upheld when the [purchaser] has actual
or constructive notice that strict compliance is necessary."
Id.  "Prior decisions of this court have long recognized that
1090626
9
such forfeiture provisions may be waived by the [seller]."
Eurton, 357 So. 2d at 326.  Also, it is well established that
"[w]aiver of strict compliance is a question of fact."
Killen, 519 So. 2d at 929.  
Absent a default triggering the forfeiture provisions in
paragraph 3 of the agreement, there was no landlord-tenant
relationship between Gibbs and the Maierses.  In such a case,
the Act simply would not apply.  The Maierses correctly argue
that the issue whether Gibbs waived the forfeiture provisions
by failing to insist upon strict compliance by the Maierses is
a question of fact unsuitable for resolution by summary
judgment.  Indeed, Gibbs agrees that "a question of fact
rather than a matter of law is presented."  Gibbs's brief, at
22.  Although Gibbs argues that "after a review of the record,
the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals could have
determined that [he] sufficiently communicated an intent to
insist upon strict compliance," id., a summary judgment may
not substitute for the trial of issues of fact.  
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court
of Civil Appeals and remand the case to that court for the
entry of an order consistent with this opinion.  
1090626
10
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and
Shaw, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.