Case Title: Howard v. Cullman County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1140748

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2015-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 12/4/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1140748
____________________
Michael A. Howard
v.
Cullman County and Barry Willingham,
Revenue Commissioner of Cullman County
Appeal from Cullman Circuit Court
(CV-13-900495)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Michael A. Howard appeals the summary judgment entered
against him by the Cullman Circuit Court in the action he
commenced on behalf of himself and all other similarly
1140748
situated taxpayers in Cullman County against Cullman County
and its Revenue Commissioner Barry Willingham, in 
his 
official
capacity ("the revenue commissioner"), seeking a refund of
property taxes he and other taxpayers paid in 2013.  We affirm
the summary judgment.
I. Facts
The revenue commissioner for each county is responsible
for the assessment of property for the purpose of taxing the
property, 
collecting those taxes, 
and 
making 
reports
concerning the same.  County property taxes are due on
October 1 of each year and must be paid by December 31 to
avoid incurring a late fee.
Before its amendment during the course of this action,
§ 40-7-42, Ala. Code 1975 (hereinafter "former § 40-7-42"),
provided:
"The county commission, at the first regular
meeting in February in each year, shall levy the
amount of general taxes required for the expenses of
the county for the current year, not to exceed one
half of one percent of the value of the taxable
property as assessed for revenue for the state as
shown by the book of assessments after it shall have
been corrected, at the same time levying the amount
of special taxes required for the county for the
current year, which levy shall be made upon the same
basis of valuation provided above and, when such
levy shall be made, shall certify the rate or rates
2
1140748
of taxation and the purpose or purposes for which
the tax is levied to the tax assessor of the
county."
(Emphasis added.)
On February 14, 2013, the Cullman County Commission ("the
Commission") held its first regular meeting of the month.  It
is undisputed that the Commission did not levy any property
taxes during that meeting.  Instead, the Commission levied
property taxes at a meeting held in May 2013; the levy was set
at the same level as the prior year.  There is also no dispute
that the Commission was aware of the requirements of former
§ 40-7-42.   Based on the May 2013 levy, the revenue
1
commissioner assessed general and special property taxes
against owners of property in the county, issued tax notices,
and collected property taxes for the 2013 tax year.  The
county 
administrator 
for 
the 
Commission 
testified 
by 
affidavit
that, "[w]ithout the levy of ad valorem taxes, Cullman County
Howard notes that notice of the timing provision in
1
former § 40-7-42 was regularly provided to county commissions
by the Association of County Commissions of Alabama.  The
notice dated January 22, 2013, stated:  "For your agenda in
February:  Here's a reminder that the commission is required
to levy taxes for the coming year at its first regular meeting
in February, according to Ala. Code Section 40-7-42.  (This
applies only to ad valorem taxes.)."  Howard also notes that
the Commission set the levy in 2014 during its first meeting
in February of 2014. 
3
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could not pay for either the necessary general expenditures of
the County, including its various contracts, or [its] bond
debts."
Howard owns real property in Cullman County.  He was
assessed general and special property taxes for the period
October 1, 2012, to September 30, 2013.  He timely paid those
taxes without filing any protest.
On December 27, 2013, Howard commenced this action
against 
Cullman 
County 
and 
the 
revenue 
commissioner
(hereinafter sometimes referred to collectively as "the
defendants") on behalf of himself and a putative class of
taxpayers in Cullman County.  Howard sought a judgment
declaring that, 
pursuant to former § 40-7-42, 
the 
Commission's
levy of property taxes for October 1, 2012, through
September 30, 2013, was invalid because it was done in May
2013 rather than at the Commission's first regular meeting in
February 2013.  He also sought the return of property taxes
collected in 2013.  Howard filed a first amended complaint on
February 4, 2014.
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Because of the present action and similar actions that
had been filed against other county commissions,  the Alabama
2
Legislature amended § 40-7-42, effective April 10, 2014, by
enacting Act No. 2014-433, Ala. Acts 2014.  The amended
version of § 40-7-42 provides:
"(a) The 
county 
commission, 
at 
the 
first 
regular
meeting in February 2015, shall levy the amount of
general taxes required for the expenses of the
county, not to exceed one half of one percent of the
value of the taxable property as assessed for
revenue for the state as shown by the book of
assessments after it shall have been corrected, at
the same time levying the amount of special taxes
required for the county, which levy shall be made
upon the same basis of valuation provided above and,
when the levy shall be made, shall certify the rate
or rates of taxation and the purpose or purposes for
which the tax is levied to the tax assessor of the
county. The levies established as provided herein
shall be assessed and collected in all subsequent
tax years unless altered by the county commission in
compliance with a change in the tax rate by general
law not later than the last day of February prior to
the effective date of the change in tax rate.
"(b) Any general or special taxes levied by the
county commission prior to April 10, 2014, are
The defendants inform us that property-tax levies have
2
been challenged in at least five other counties:  Pickens
County 
(Mary 
Hammett 
v. 
Pickens 
County, 
Case 
No.
CV-2014-900015); Walker County (Donald Joe Stephens v. Walker
County, 
Case 
No. 
CV-2014-900038); 
Fayette 
County 
(Lori 
Mancone
Cain v. Fayette County, Case No. CV-2014-900004); Elmore
County (James A. Sutherland v. Elmore County, Case No.
CV-2014-900211); and Autauga County (Mark A. Sheridan v.
Autauga County, Case No. CV-2014-900096). 
5
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hereby ratified and confirmed irrespective of
whether the general or special taxes were levied
during the first county commission meeting held in
February of any year."
Thus, the amended version of § 40-7-42 purported to
retroactively validate any past levies of property taxes by
county commissions that were not levied during the first
regular meeting in February of a given year.
On April 24, 2014, Howard filed a second amended
complaint 
adding 
various 
claims 
challenging 
the
constitutionality of Act No. 2014-433.  In accordance with
§ 6-6-227, Ala. Code 1975, Howard served notice upon the
attorney general of his constitutional challenges to Act No.
2014-433.
On May 12, 2014, the defendants filed a motion for a
summary judgment.  On September 8, 2014, Howard filed a motion
for a summary judgment.  The trial court held a hearing on the
motions on October 24, 2014.  On December 15, 2014, the trial
court issued its order in which it granted the summary-
judgment motion filed by the County and the revenue
commissioner and denied the summary-judgment motion filed by
Howard.  In a lengthy order, the trial court concluded that
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"the timing provision in [former § 40-7-42] is directory in
nature," rather than mandatory, and that 
"[t]he mandatory clause -- the essence of the former
version of Ala. Code [1975,] § 40-7-42 -- is the
requirement that a county commission 'shall levy the
amount of general taxes required for the expenses of
the county for the current year.'  Interpreting the
adverbial clause regarding the timing of the levy to
be mandatory in nature would have the absurd result
of thwarting the very purpose of the statute, which
is to ensure that each county has sufficient revenue
to meet its legal responsibilities. Indeed, if the
Cullman County Commission had refused to do so, the
caselaw suggests that a writ of mandamus would lie
in favor of the County's debtors and, arguably, its
citizens, requiring such a levy.  See State v.
Laurendine, 199 Ala. 312, 314-15, 74 So. 370, 371
(Ala. 1917).
"To be clear:  in deciding in Cullman County's
favor as to this issue, the Court is not condoning
the failure of the Cullman County Commission to levy
the taxes as required by law. While not commendable,
however, levying the taxes after the statutorily
directed time is not, in and of itself, sufficient
to render the whole of the levy void and thus
entitle Howard to a refund. Because this Court finds
that the timing provision in the former version of
Ala. Code [1975,] § 40-7-42[,] is directory,
judgment is due to be granted in favor of Cullman
County and Revenue Commissioner Willingham, in his
official capacity as Revenue Commissioner of Cullman
County, Alabama."
(Footnote omitted.)  
Because the trial court concluded that the Commission's
2013 levy of property taxes was not invalidated by its failure
7
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to levy the taxes in February 2013, the trial court also
concluded 
that 
Howard's 
claims 
concerning 
the
constitutionality of Act No. 2014-433 were moot.  The trial
court reasoned that Howard's constitutional challenges
"all rest on the contention that the ratification of
previous irregular tax levies interferes with his
right to a refund of the allegedly void taxes, which
he claims vested either at the moment of taxation
or, at the latest, upon the filing of this lawsuit.
... Because Howard never had a right to a refund of
his 2013 taxes, it is axiomatic that such a right
never vested in him, so that the ratification of the
previous tax levies does not violate Section 13, 22,
or 95 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901."   
3
The trial court 
likewise 
concluded that Howard's argument that
the retroactivity provision of Act No. 2014-433 violated his
right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment was
mooted by its decision that the May 2013 levy was valid.
Finally, the trial court noted:  "Howard has generally
asserted that he is immune from retroactive tax liability;
however, he has asserted no legal basis for this claim." 
Accordingly, the trial court rejected Howard's immunity
argument.  
Howard 
specifically 
states 
in 
his 
brief 
that, 
because 
his
3
challenges to the constitutionality of Act No. 2014-433 "were
not considered or decided by the Circuit Court[, they] should
not be reviewed by this Court in this appeal."
8
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On January 14, 2015, Howard filed a Rule 59(e), Ala. R.
Civ. P., motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment. The
trial court denied the postjudgment motion on March 4, 2015. 
Howard appealed.
II. Standard of Review
"'This Court's review of a summary
judgment is de novo.  Williams v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So. 2d 72, 74
(Ala. 2003). We apply the same standard of
review 
as 
the 
trial 
court 
applied.
Specifically, 
we 
must 
determine 
whether 
the
movant has made a prima facie showing that
no genuine issue of material fact exists
and that the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.  Rule 56(c),
Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949,
952-53 (Ala. 2004).  In making such a
determination, we must review the evidence
in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant.  Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d
756, 758 (Ala. 1986).  Once the movant
makes a prima facie showing that there is
no genuine issue of material fact, the
burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
produce "substantial evidence" as to the
existence of a genuine issue of material
fact.  Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin
County, 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98 (Ala. 1989);
Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12. "[S]ubstantial
evidence is evidence of such weight and
quality that fair-minded persons in the
exercise 
of 
impartial 
judgment 
can
reasonably infer the existence of the fact
sought to be proved."  West v. Founders
Life Assur. Co. of Fla., 547 So. 2d 870,
871 (Ala.1989).'
9
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"Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035,
1038-39 (Ala. 2004)."
Ex parte Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 4 So. 3d 1099, 1102 (Ala.
2008).
III. Analysis
As noted above, the trial court concluded that the timing
provision of former § 40-7-42 was directory rather than
mandatory, the effect of which is that a failure by the
Commission to levy property taxes at its first regular meeting
in February did not extinguish the Commission's power to levy
property taxes at a later time.  The trial court concluded
that the mandatory portion of former § 40-7-42 was the
Commission's responsibility to levy the amount of property
taxes "required for the expenses of the county for the current
year."  
The distinction drawn by the trial court between
directory and mandatory provisions of a statute is well
established, having been employed by this Court at least as
early as 1844, see Anderson v. Rhea, 7 Ala. 104, 106 (1844).
Our courts have continued to apply this distinction to the
interpretation of statutes up to the present day. See, e.g.,
Cox v. Mobile Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 157 So. 3d 897, 902
10
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(Ala. Civ. App. 2013), reh'g denied (Dec. 6, 2013), cert.
denied (July 18, 2014).  As succinct a summary of the
distinction as this Court has made is found in Mobile County
Republican Executive Committee v. Mandeville, 363 So. 2d 754,
757 (Ala. 1978):
"The distinction between a mandatory provision
and one which is only directory is that when the
provision of a statute is the essence of the thing
to 
be 
done, 
it 
is 
mandatory. 
Under 
these
circumstances, where the provision relates to form
and manner, or where compliance is a matter of
convenience, it is directory. Rodgers v. Meredith,
274 Ala. 179, 146 So.2d 308 (1962); Board of
Education of Jefferson County v. State, 222 Ala. 70,
131 So. 239 (1930). In making this determination, it
is legislative intent, rather than supposed words
[of] art such as 'shall,' 'may' or 'must,' which
ultimately controls."
Thus, a statutory requirement is directory if it "merely
prescrib[es] a rule of legislative procedure that to violate
would not avoid the enactment."  Coleman v. Town of Eutaw, 157
Ala. 327, 333, 47 So. 703, 705 (1908).  A requirement is
mandatory if it "'relate[s] to the essence of the thing to be
done.'"  Alabama Pine Co. v. Merchants' & Farmers' Bank of
Aliceville, 215 Ala. 66, 67, 109 So. 358, 359 (1926) (quoting
25 R.C.L. 767 § 14).  The Court has also noted:
"[I]t may be stated as a general proposition that a
mandatory statute is one which prescribes, in
11
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addition to the requirement of performing the thing
specified, the result obtained if that performance
is not done; if the statute is directory only, the
statute's content is limited to the performance
required."
Ex parte Hood, 404 So. 2d 717, 718 (Ala. 1981). 
A helpful discussion of the distinction between directory
and mandatory provisions in the context of a tax statute is
contained in State Auditor v. Jackson County, 65 Ala. 142
(1880):
"It is contended before us, that in the
assessment of the railroad valuations, and in the
levy of the county taxes, many irregularities
intervened, which render the proceedings void.  The
question has been much discussed, what regulations
for the levy and assessment of taxes are mandatory,
and what are simply directory.  All directions given
in the statutes, concerning the levy and assessment
of taxes, ought to be substantially followed by
courts and officers charged with the duties. They
would not be enacted, if this were not the intention
of the law-making power.  'But the negligence of
officers, their mistakes of fact or of law, and many
other 
causes, 
will 
often 
prevent 
a 
strict
observance; and when the provisions which have been
disregarded constitute parts of an important,
perhaps complicated system, it becomes of the
highest importance to ascertain the effect the
failure to obey them shall have on the other
proceedings with which they were associated in the
law.' -- Cooley on Tax. 213.  In French v. Edwards,
[80 U.S.] 13 Wall. 506 [20 L.Ed. 702 (1871)], the
Supreme Court of the United States said:  'There
are, 
undoubtedly, 
many 
statutory 
requisitions
intended for the guide of officers in the conduct of
business devolved upon them, which do not limit
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their power, or render its exercise in disregard of
the requisitions ineffectual.  Such, generally, are
regulations designed to secure order, system and
dispatch in proceedings, and by a disregard of which
the 
rights 
of 
parties 
interested 
cannot 
be
injuriously affected.  Provisions of this character
are not usually regarded as mandatory, unless
accompanied by negative words, importing that the
act required shall not be done in any other manner
or time than that designated.  But, when the
requisitions 
prescribed 
are 
intended 
for 
the
protection of the citizen, and to prevent a
sacrifice of his property, and by a disregard of
which his rights might be, and generally would be,
injuriously affected, they are not directory, but
mandatory.  They must be followed, or the acts done
will be invalid.  The power of the officer, in all
such cases, is limited by the measure and conditions
prescribed for its exercise.'
"....
"In Torrey v. Milbury, [38 Mass.] 21 Pick. 64
[(1838)], the court said:  'In considering the
various statutes regulating the assessment of taxes,
and the measures preliminary thereto, it is not
always easy to distinguish which are conditions
precedent to the legality and validity of the tax,
and which are directory merely, and do not
constitute conditions.  One rule is very plain and
well settled -- that all those measures which are
intended for the security of the citizen, for
ensuring an equality of taxation, and to enable
every one to know with reasonable certainty for what
polls and for what real and personal estate he is
taxed, and for what all those who are liable with
him are taxed, are conditions precedent; and if they
are not observed, he is not legally taxed, and he
may resist it in any of the modes authorized by law
for contesting the validity of the tax.  But many
regulations are made by statute, designed for the
information of assessors and officers, and intended
13
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to promote method, system and uniformity in the
modes 
of 
proceeding, 
the 
compliance 
or
non-compliance with which does in no respect affect
the rights of tax-paying citizens.  These may be
considered directory; officers may be liable to
legal animadversion, perhaps to punishment, for not
observing them; but yet their observance is not a
condition precedent to the validity of the tax.'"
65 Ala. at 149-51 (emphasis added).  See also Court of Comm'rs
of Washington Cnty. v. State, 172 Ala. 242, 249-51, 55 So.
623, 625-26 (1911) (reaffirming the discussion in State
Auditor v. Jackson Cnty.); Brasher v. State, 555 So. 2d 184,
190–91 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988), affirmed, 555 So. 2d 192 (Ala.
1989) (describing the distinction in a similar manner).  
As the final quoted portion of State Auditor v. Jackson
County emphasized above noted, labeling a provision directory
in nature does not relieve public officials from following the
statutory direction in the provision.  The Court noted in
State Auditor v. Jackson County that for directory and
mandatory provisions "it is the duty of the assessor to
observe and obey; but a failure to conform to those falling
within the first class, does not invalidate the assessment,
while a non-observance of the mandatory duties renders it
wholly void."  65 Ala. at 155.  Likewise, in Birmingham
Building & Loan Ass'n v. State, 120 Ala. 403, 25 So. 52
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(1899), the Court stressed that in considering a provision to
be directory "it is not meant that a duty does not rest upon
the officer to act within the time, a duty which he may be
compelled to perform, but simply that his power to act does
not expire with the time."  120 Ala. at 409, 25 So. at 54.  In
other words, the failure to follow a directory provision does
not affect the essential power granted to a public official or
a public body in a particular statute, but officials still may
be compelled to perform the directory duty in the future.
The trial court quoted and cited several of the
authorities provided above in reaching the conclusion 
that the
timing provision of former § 40-7-42 is directory, while the
requirement to levy the amount of property taxes necessary to
fund a county's expenses is mandatory.  The trial court deemed
the essence of former § 40-7-42 to be the grant to a county
commission of the power to levy property taxes for funding
county expenses.  It considered the timing provision to relate
to form and manner, a provision "'intended for the guide of
officers in the conduct of business devolved upon them,'"
which was "'designed to secure order, system and dispatch in
proceedings'" concerning the levy and subsequent assessment
15
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and collection of property taxes.  State Auditor v. Jackson
Cnty., 65 Ala. at 150 (quoting French v. Edwards, 80 U.S. 506,
510 (1871)).  Confirming this determination was the fact that
former § 40-7-42 did not contain any language detailing a
consequence for a failure to follow the timing provision. See
Ex parte Hood, 404 So. 2d at 718.
In addition to the above-related general observations as
to why the trial court reached the conclusion it did, the
trial court also discussed and relied upon a case from this
Court that appears to be directly on point to the statute in
issue.  Perry County v. Selma, Marion & Memphis R.R., 58 Ala.
546 (1877), was a consolidated appeal consisting of three
cases: Perry County v. Selma, Marion & Memphis R.R.; Western
R.R. of Alabama v. Chambers County; and Savannah & Memphis
R.R. v. Weaver.  The decision pertinent to the present case
involved Western Railroad of Alabama v. Chambers County, in
which the railroad company alleged that Chambers County had
"attempted to assess and levy a county tax for the
year 1875, on that part of [Western Railroad's]
road-bed, main and side track, situated in said
county, and that said county is now proceeding by
and through its tax collector, Julius G. Weaver, to
collect said tax by a levy upon property of [Western
Railroad], located in said county."  
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58 Ala. at 549-50. Chambers County levied the property tax
under the authority of § 93 of the Revenue Law of 1875-76.
Section 93 provided: 
"Be it further enacted, That it shall be the
duty of the court of county commissioners, at the
July term, to proceed to levy the amount of taxes
required for their county for that year, not to
exceed one-half of one per centum on the value of
all taxable property therein as assessed for revenue
to the State; and after the commissioners shall have
received the books from the tax assessor, and they
shall have corrected errors as provided in this act,
the Probate Judges shall make a book containing in
a concise form, the amount of taxes due by each tax
payer, which book shall show the amount of tax on
real estate and personal property separately,
together with the fees of the assessor and
collector, which book shall be turned over by the
Judge to the tax collector on or before the first
day of September in each year; Provided, this act
shall not be construed as to repeal any acts
authorizing commissioner's courts to levy special
taxes for special purposes."
(Emphasis added.)  
Western Railroad contended that Chambers County was not
entitled to collect the property taxes, arguing, among other
things, that "the commissioners' court of said county did not
levy the tax for county purposes at their July term for 1875,
but all the action was taken at their August term for said
year."  58 Ala. at 550.  In other words, Western Railroad made
the same argument Howard makes in this case, i.e., that the
17
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county could not levy and collect the property tax in question
because it did not levy the tax at the time it was directed by
the statute to do so.  
This Court 
rejected 
Western 
Railroad's 
argument, stating:
"The only other question we consider it
necessary to determine, arises on the averment of
the bill of the Western Railroad Company against
Chambers county, that the county tax of 1875 was
levied in August of that year, when it should have
been done in July, under section 93 of the revenue
law of 1875. We hold this provision of the law to be
directory, and that such levy made at the regular
August term of the court, as this was done, is
valid.-- See Hilliard on Taxation, 299, et seq.;
Burroughs on Taxation, 249; Cooley, do. 212, et
seq."
58 Ala. at 562.
The trial court here compared the pertinent language from
§ 93 of the Revenue Law of 1875-76 ("That it shall be the duty
of the court of county commissioners, at the July term, to
proceed to levy the amount of taxes required for their county
for that year ....") to the pertinent language of former
§ 40-7-42 ("The county commission, at the first regular
meeting in February in each year, shall levy the amount of
general taxes required for the expenses of the county for the
current year ....").  The trial court observed that, "[i]n
both statutes, the timing provision is set off as an adverbial
18
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phrase, separate and apart from the requirement that the
commission levy taxes."  The trial court concluded that it was
"clear that the logic of Perry County applies to the statute
at issue."  
Howard contends that the trial court committed various
errors in determining that the timing provision of former
§ 40-7-42 was directory rather than mandatory and that those
errors require the reversal of the trial court's decision. 
Howard first argues that the trial court violated the cardinal
rule of statutory construction that a court must apply the
plain language of a statute, i.e., that it cannot change the
words of a statute to fit a desired outcome.
"The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation
is to determine and give effect to the intent of the
legislature as manifested in the language of the
statute. Gholston v. State, 620 So. 2d 719 (Ala.
1993). Absent a clearly expressed legislative intent
to the contrary, the language of the statute is
conclusive. Words must be given their natural,
ordinary, commonly understood meaning, and where
plain language is used, the court is bound to
interpret that language to mean exactly what it
says."
Ex parte State Dep't of Revenue, 683 So. 2d 980, 983 (Ala.
1996).
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Howard argues that the plain language of former § 40-7-42
dictates that the Commission must levy property taxes at its
first regular February meeting and that, therefore, 
because 
it
did not do so in February 2013, its levy in May 2013 is void. 
Howard states:
"Section 40-7-42 is not ambiguous in any
respect. The Defendants never alleged § 40-7-42 to
be ambiguous.  And, the Circuit Court made no
finding that § 40-7-42 is ambiguous. In that
situation, the Circuit Court lacked authority to
interpret § 40-7-42.  Nonetheless it proceeded to
rewrite § 40-7-42 to remove the timing limitation
for the purpose of avoiding what the Circuit Court
perceived to be an absurd result if the statute were
followed as enacted. Instead of judicially rewriting
the statute, the Circuit Court should have simply
applied § 40-7-42 to the undisputed facts of this
case."
The 
problem 
with 
Howard's 
argument 
is 
that 
his
interpretation of the statute is not buttressed by the plain
language of former § 40-7-42 any more than is the trial
court's interpretation.  Howard contends that a county
commission's failure to follow the timing provision of the
statute prevents the county commission from levying property
taxes during a particular year.  In other words, Howard
insists that the statutorily directed timing of the levy is a
prerequisite to a valid levy.  But the statute does not, on
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its face, state that that is the case. The trial court held
that the timing provision directed county commissions when to
levy property taxes but that the power to levy those taxes
existed independent of that direction. The statute likewise
does not, on its face, state that this is so. Thus, in order
to decide this case, the trial court was required to place a
judicial construction on the language of the statute that
manifested the intent of the legislature.
Howard repeatedly states throughout his brief in one form
or another that the trial court "remove[d] the timing
limitation" from the statute, but it did no such thing.  The
trial court never stated that the Commission did not have to
follow the legislative directive to levy property taxes at the
first regular February meeting of the Commission or that, in
a proper action, a court could not order such compliance.  The
trial court expressly stated that it did not condone the
Commission's action of instituting a levy in May 2013 rather
than in February.  What the trial court also said, however,
was that a failure to follow the timing provision did not
negate the Commission's power to levy property taxes.  That is
not the same thing as removing the timing provision from the
21
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statute.  In short, the trial court's interpretation of former
§ 40-7-42 did not fly in the face of the "plain language" of
the statute.4
In keeping with his assertion that the trial court read
the timing provision out of the statute, Howard argues that
the result of the trial court's interpretation is that a
property-tax levy can occur at any time.  He argues that "a
levy can occur after a collection, or even before an
assessment.  That is legally impossible."  This exaggerates
the trial court's holding.  As we have already observed, the
trial court did not state that the Commission did not have to
follow the timing provision of the statute, nor did it hold
that a levy could occur at any time.  As Howard notes, this
Court has stated:  "It is elementary that there can be no tax
due until there is a levy."  W.S. Brewbaker, Inc. v. City of
Montgomery, 270 Ala. 460, 463, 119 So. 2d 887, 890 (1960). 
The trial court did not say otherwise.  The trial court was
Howard's separate argument that the trial court
4
"engag[ed] in an impermissible exercise of legislative power
in violation of section 43 of the Alabama Constitution" is
simply a reiteration of his charge that the trial court did
not apply the plain language of the statute and instead
interpreted it the way the trial court thought it should read. 
It therefore requires no further response.
22
1140748
not presented with a scenario in which the Commission
attempted to levy taxes before the assessments on property or
after the collection of the taxes.  The trial court simply
held that a levy that occurred after the first regular meeting
of the Commission in February is not invalid solely based on
its timing.  
Howard also argues that, in concluding that the timing
provision was directory but that the provision empowering the
Commission to levy property taxes was mandatory, the trial
court "got it backwards."  He asserts that "[t]he County
Commission's limited authority to levy county ad 
valorem 
taxes
is permissive. It is the timing of any levy that is
mandatory."  This is so, Howard insists, because "the date for
levy of taxes is a component of the annual process of
assessment, levy, and collection of ad valorem taxes by the
Commission.  Timing cannot be considered a 'mere matter of
form' because without a levy there can be no valid tax." 
Howard goes so far as to say that the trial court's reading of
the statute "requir[es] a county to exercise its taxing
authority each year regardless of its financial needs." 
Howard
contends that such a reading is incorrect because, he argues,
23
1140748
the Commission has the power, but not a duty, to levy property
taxes for county purposes.  For support, Howard cites § 11-3-
11(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975, which states that "[t]he county
commission shall have authority ... [t]o levy a general tax,
for general county purposes and a special tax, for special
purposes, according to this Code."  
Again, Howard exaggerates the trial court's holding. In
finding the provision of the statute pertaining to levying
property taxes to be mandatory, the trial court necessarily
did so within the confines of the language of the statute. 
Former § 40-7-42 provides that "[t]he county commission ...
shall levy the amount of general taxes required for the
expenses of the county for the current year." (Emphasis
added.)  The statute itself empowers a county commission to
levy only the amount of taxes necessary to meet county
expenses. Nowhere in the trial court's order did it state that
the Commission was required to levy taxes even if the county
had enough funds to cover its expenses without those taxes. 
The trial court concluded that the provision for levying
property taxes was mandatory for the purpose of meeting county
expenses.  The provision is mandatory because the essence --
24
1140748
or focus -- of the statute is the power to levy taxes; the
timing of the levy is ancillary to that essence.
Howard may be correct that former § 40-7-42 included a
timing provision that mentions an early date in the year
because a levy is only the first step in the process of
obtaining annual property taxes.  But, if true, this fact does
not make the timing provision the essence of the statute; it
simply 
constitutes 
an 
acknowledgment 
that 
the 
process 
requires
enough time to assess property in each county and to collect
property taxes from each owner of property in each county.  In
other words, the timing provision is "designed for the
information of assessors and officers, and intended 
to 
promote
method, system and uniformity in the modes of proceeding." 
State Auditor v. Jackson Cnty., 65 Ala. at 151.  
Howard insists that the timing provision "serves as
notice to taxpayers that any levy will occur during the county
commission meeting each February" and that "[t]axpayers have
a right to rely upon this notice."  It is certainly true that
the timing provision could have the effect of giving taxpayers
notice of when a levy will occur, but Howard cites no
authority stating that that is the purpose of the timing
25
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provision.  Moreover, the fact that the timing provision can
serve as notice to taxpayers of when a levy of property taxes
will occur does not demonstrate that the timing provision is
an essential prerequisite to the power granted in the statute
to levy the taxes.  If this were so, then timing provisions in
all tax statutes would be mandatory because each could be said
to provide notice to taxpayers, but this Court has established
no such blanket rule.  
Howard also takes issue with the trial court's reliance
upon the Perry County decision.  Howard argues that the
situation on which the holding in Perry County is based is
distinguishable from the situation in this case because
"[t]here are significant and meaningful differences in the
language of each statute."  Specifically, Howard highlights
several differences in wording between the two statutes, and
he attempts to distinguish Perry County on the basis of those
differences. 
Howard argues as follows: 
"In 
§ 
40-7-42, 
the 
legislature 
clearly 
and
unambiguously mandated that if the county commission
exercises its discretion to levy county ad valorem
taxes, it must do so at the first regular meeting in
February in each year. In comparison, § 93 merely
recognized a [']duty of the court of county
26
1140748
commissioners, at the July term, to proceed to levy
...' There is no usage of the phrase 'shall levy' or
the resultant imposition of a deadline as in
§ 40-7-42 (i.e., 'at the first regular meeting in
February')."
Howard 
also 
posits 
that 
there 
is 
a 
substantive
distinction between the phrases "proceed to levy" and "shall
levy."  As he puts it:  "'[T]o proceed to levy,' as utilized
in § 93, anticipates commencement of a process during the July
term without a mandated deadline, while 'shall levy' in § 40-
7-42 is a mandatory command with a definitive deadline for
action -- 'at the first regular meeting in February in each
year.'"  Howard's only support for this distinction is a
citation to the Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary that
defines "proceed," in part, as "to continue to do something." 
One problem with this distinction is that the Perry
County Court did not read § 93 as saying that all the court of
county commissioners had to do was start the process of
levying sometime in the July term but that it could finish the
process at some other time.  The specific argument presented
in Perry County was that the taxes were supposed to be levied
in July but instead were levied in August.  The Court held
that instituting the levy in August rather than in July did
27
1140748
not invalidate the levy.  In other words, the Perry County
Court adopted the common-sense understanding of the timing
provision in § 93, which was that it was directing the court
of county commissioners as to when it should levy property
taxes but that a failure to follow this directive did not
negate that body's power to levy property taxes.  
In Howard's final attempt to distinguish the language of
§ 93 from the language in former § 40-7-42, he argues:
"[T]he phrase 'at the July term' in § 93 does not
identify a specific date for action, as does the
phrase 'at the first regular meeting in February,'
included in  § 40-7-42. The 'July term' is a vague
term referring to an extended period of time that
could be altered and extended at the discretion of
the 
court 
of 
county 
commissioners. 
More
specifically, the 'July term' could have encompassed
multiple meetings strung out over a period of weeks
or months, just as if it were a term of court. Thus,
§ 93 did not impose a limitation on the power to
levy taxes, as does § 40-7-42."
We first note that Howard cites absolutely no authority
for his interpretation of the phrase "at the July term" in
§ 93.  Second, Howard once again ignores the facts presented
in Perry County. Again, Western Railroad argued in Perry
County that "the commissioners' court of said county did not
levy the tax for county purposes at their July term for 1875,
28
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but all the action was taken at their August term for said
year."  58 Ala. at 550. The Court later reiterated that 
"the county tax of 1875 was levied in August of that
year, when it should have been done in July, under
section 93 of the revenue law of 1875. We hold this
provision of the law to be directory, and that such
levy made at the regular August term of the court,
as this was done, is valid."
Id. at 562.  The clear implication from the Perry County
Court's discussion is that the phrase "at the July term" meant
at the court of county commissioners' July meeting, not some
period extending over the course of several weeks or months.
Consequently, this difference in wording does not mark a
substantive difference between § 93 and former § 40-7-42 that
would warrant distinguishing the decision in Perry County.
Howard also faults the trial court for failing to follow
the interpretation of former § 40-7-42 provided in opinions of
the attorney general over the years.  It is true that several
attorney general opinions have discussed the timing provision
of former § 40-7-42.  Most of them did so in merely a
descriptive way.  See, e.g., Ala. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2001-141
(March 30, 2001) ("The statute requires the county commission
to levy, each year, general and special taxes at its first
regular meeting in February."); Ala. Op. Att'y Gen. No.
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1986-00340 (Aug. 21, 1986) ("The County Commission sets the
millage rate in February of each year under the provisions of
§ 40-7-42, Code of Alabama 1975, for all general and special
county taxes."); Ala. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-00427 (July 8,
1982) ("We further observed that § 40-7-42, Code of Alabama
1975, provides for the levy of ad valorem taxes at the first
regular meeting in February of each year of the county
commission."). 
 
One 
attorney 
general 
opinion, 
however, 
appears
to take the view that the timing provision triggers a county
commission's power to levy property taxes.  See Ala. Op. Att'y
Gen. No. 2011-093 (Aug. 30, 2011) (stating that "[s]ection
40-7-42 of the Code makes clear that the Commission must levy
the tax at the first regular meeting in February" and
concluding that the Monroe County Commission "is not
authorized to amend the levy of a tax after the appropriate
time for such tax to be levied").5
Howard asserts that a second attorney general opinion
5
provided the same interpretation, namely Ala. Op. Att'y Gen.
No. 2001-184 (May 15, 2001), which states that "[i]f the
[Chilton] county commission did not levy the tax at its
February 2001 meeting, it may do so at its first regular
meeting in February 2002."  The attorney general was not asked
in that opinion, however, whether a levy initiated in a
meeting 
after 
the 
Chilton 
County 
Commission's 
February 
meeting
was invalid.  It was simply asked when a special tax
authorized under a specific act (Act No. 2000-370, Ala. Acts
30
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Howard notes that this Court has stated that "[t]he
interpretation 
by 
the 
attorney 
general 
and 
popular
interpretation as exemplified in practice for a number of
years will be given weight as a factor in judicial
construction of a statute where its meaning is doubtful."
Cherokee Cnty. v. Cunningham, 260 Ala. 1, 4-5, 68 So. 2d 507,
510 (1953).  Although this is true, we also have observed that
attorney general opinions "are not controlling, but merely
advisory."  State Dep't of Revenue v. Arnold, 909 So. 2d 192,
194 (Ala. 2005).  The reason for their advisory nature is
abundantly clear in a situation such as this one.  None of the
attorney general opinions cited by Howard directly addressed
the question whether a levy by a county commission done
outside the time frame of the timing provision in former
§ 40-7-42 is void for that reason.  This is not surprising,
given that when public officials ask for attorney general
opinions those officials are usually seeking advice on
prospective actions.  Because of this fact, it is also not
2000) was supposed to be collected, and the attorney general's
opinion referred the Chilton County Commission to former
§ 40-7-42 for guidance because Act No. 2000-370 stated that
"the tax collector of Chilton County shall collect the tax in
the same manner and method that other ad valorem taxes are
collected."
31
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surprising that the office of the attorney general does not
advise public officials to ignore a statutory directive.
Instead, the attorney general advises public officials as to
what the law commands.  In this instance, it is indisputable
that former § 40-7-42 required county commissions to levy
property taxes in their first regular February meeting of a
given year. The question before the trial court and before us
in this appeal, however, concerns the effect of a failure to
follow that directive, a question not posed or answered in the
attorney general opinions.  
Moreover, as we have already noted, our own opinion in
Perry County contradicts the interpretation in Attorney
General Opinion No. 2011-093.  Our own precedent obviously
takes priority over an opinion of the attorney general.  In
addition, other decisions of this Court concur with the
interpretation in Perry County that timing provisions 
like the
one in former § 40-7-42 are directory rather than mandatory.
Stickney v. Huggins, 10 Ala. 106 (1846), concerned an
action by the Mobile County treasurer against a county tax
collector for failure to forward the full amount of taxes he
had collected on behalf of the county.  A judgment was
32
1140748
rendered against the tax collector for $2,134.33, but the
judgment was reversed by this Court and the case remanded for
further proceedings.  Upon commencement of the new trial, the
defendant tax collector argued that the trial court was
without jurisdiction to try the case because, 
in 
contravention
to the statutory basis for the action, the cause was heard
more than 20 days after the Mobile County treasurer had filed
a complaint against the tax collector.  The trial court
dismissed the action, and the Mobile County treasurer
appealed.  The statute in question provided:
"'If any person authorized by law to collect the
taxes in any of the counties of this State, shall
fail to collect and pay the same to the county
treasurer, within the time prescribed by law, the
Judge of the county court, if of his own knowledge,
or on complaint of the treasurer, shall hold a
special court within twenty days thereafter, to try
such delinquent collector; and if it appear that he
has so failed to collect, or pay over such taxes,
said court shall enter judgment in favor of the
treasurer, against such collector and his security,
or securities in office, for the amount of such
county tax so due and unpaid, together with ten per
centum as damages, on the amount,' &c. Clay's Dig.
575, § 96."
10 Ala. at 108 (emphasis added).  This Court reversed the
judgment dismissing the action, reasoning:
"Although this section addresses itself in
mandatory terms to the Judges of the county courts,
33
1140748
yet it cannot be understood, that in requiring him
to act within twenty days from the time the default
is developed, his right to act is limited to that
period. Time was not prescribed for the benefit of
the collector, but rather to quicken the diligence
of the Judge, so that justice might be promptly
administered, 
and 
the 
greater 
certainty 
of
collections insured.
"According to all analogies, in directing the
proceedings to be instituted within a definite time,
the act must be considered as directory merely. It
is the duty of the Judge to yield a ready obedience
to its directions, but if he fails to do this, his
authority to act under it is not gone."
10 Ala. at 108-09 (emphasis added).  See also Boring v.
Williams, 17 Ala. 510, 518 (1850) (reaching the same
conclusion concerning the act at issue in Stickney). Despite
the wording of the statute that the judge "shall hold a
special court within twenty days" of the filing of the
complaint, this Court interpreted the timing provision to be
directory rather than mandatory. 
A similar decision was reached in Birmingham Building &
Loan Ass'n v. State, 120 Ala. 403, 25 So. 52 (1899).  In
Birmingham Building & Loan Association, the Birmingham
Building & Loan Association ("BB&L") paid its taxes to the tax
assessor of Jefferson County for the year 1896 within the time
prescribed by law.  On July 2, 1896, the Jefferson County
34
1140748
Board of Tax Equalization ("the Board") issued a citation
notifying BB&L that in a regular session held on July 2, 1896,
the Board had raised the tax assessment on BB&L's property and
that the cause was set for a hearing at the next regular
session of the Board, to be held on July 10, 1896.  BB&L
appeared at the hearing, and it filed a motion to dismiss the
cause on the ground that the Board had not performed the
equalization at its May meeting as it was statutorily required
to do. This Court explained:
"By section 5 of the 'Act to amend the revenue
laws of Alabama,' approved February 18, 1894 (Acts
1894-95, p. 1192), a county board of equalization of
taxes in each county is created, in the manner
therein specified.
"Section 31 of said act provides that said board
will convene at the court house of the county on the
first Monday in May, and shall rigidly examine each
assessment list, and compare all such lists
carefully with the book of assessment, and institute
inquiry as to the correctness of any assessment of
real or personal property, or subject of taxation;
and if upon such inquiry any assessment, whether
made by the tax-payer, his agent, or by the
assessor, is supposed not to be full and complete,
or the property assessed at less or more than its
actual value, or that property has been omitted that
should have been assessed, the said board of
equalization shall enter the same on a docket to be
kept for that purpose by said board in the name of
the state of Alabama as plaintiff and the tax-payer
as defendant, and shall issue a notice and copy
thereof, addressed to the tax-payer, stating the
35
1140748
substance 
of 
the 
supposed 
error, 
improper
assessment, under-valuation or over-valuation, and
citing such tax-payer to appear before said of
equalization on the first Monday in June, to show
cause why such error, omission, or under-valuation
should not be corrected, and in what respect. ..."
120 Ala. at 404-05, 25 So. at 53 (emphasis added).  This Court
stated:
"[T]he principal question presented for our decision
is whether or not it was essential to the lawful
exercise of the jurisdiction which the act confers
upon the board that the preliminary ex parte action
in reference to raising the assessment and issuing
the citation should have been had at the May term,
in strict conformity to the statute."
120 Ala. at 407, 25 So. at 54.  The Court concluded that "the
proceeding was not without the jurisdiction of the board,
either of the subject-matter or person."  120 Ala. at 410, 25
So. at 55.  The Court reasoned:
"'A statute specifying a time within which a public
officer is to perform an official act affecting the
rights of others is directory merely, as to the time
within which the act is to be done, unless, from the
nature of the act or the phraseology of the statute,
the designation of the time must be considered a
limitation on the power of the officer.  ...
"'By this it is not meant that a duty does not rest
upon the officer to act within the time, a duty
which he may be compelled to perform, but simply
that his power to act does not expire with the time.
...
36
1140748
"'When a statute directs an officer to do a thing in
a 
certain 
time, 
without 
any 
negative 
words
restraining him from doing it afterwards, the naming
of the time will not be construed as a limitation of
his authority.'"
120 Ala. at 409, 25 So. at 54 (quoting Commissioners' Court v.
Rather, 48 Ala. 433, 440 (1872) (emphasis added)).
In short, our cases confirm that timing provisions such
as the one in former § 40-7-42 are directory rather than
mandatory and that a failure to follow such a timing provision
is not a prerequisite to being able to exercise the power that
is the essence of the statute.  That interpretation was
confirmed in the one case directly on point, Perry County, in
which this Court was called upon to interpret a predecessor to
former § 40-7-42, and the Court turned aside the exact kind of
argument made by Howard in this case.  The understanding that
the timing provision is directory rather than mandatory also
flows naturally from the language of the statute.  For all
those reasons, we conclude that the trial court correctly held
that the timing provision is directory in nature and that the
Commission's May 2013 levy was valid.
Howard next argues that the trial court erred in denying
his due-process claims.  Howard argues that the Commission's
37
1140748
failure to follow the timing provision of former § 40-7-42
violated his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution in two ways.
First, he contends that the revenue commissioner's collection
of taxes without a valid levy constituted a taking of his
property without due process of law.  Second, he contends that
the levy in May 2013 violated his due-process right of notice
and opportunity to be heard before the taxes were levied.
The problem with these arguments is that they are
premised on the notion that the timing provision of former
§ 40-7-42 was mandatory.  Because the timing provision was, in
fact, directory, the Commission's May 2013 levy of property
taxes was valid.  Therefore, Howard's property was not taken
without due process of law.  Moreover, because the timing
provision was directory, and thus primarily intended for the
benefit of Cullman County's public officials rather than for
the protection of the taxpayers, the statute did not grant a
constitutional right of notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
Accordingly, as the trial court concluded, Howard's due-
process claims lacked merit.
38
1140748
Howard's final argument is that the trial court erred in
concluding that his assertion of immunity to the allegedly
retroactive tax liability imposed by Act No. 2014-433 lacked
a legal basis.  Howard states that his basis for being immune
from the "retroactive" taxes "arises from the protections
afforded by §§ 13, 22, 43, and 95 of the Alabama Constitution
and from the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution."  Although Howard does
not elaborate on his "immunity" claim, its premise is the same
as his other claimed constitutional violations pertaining to
Act No. 2014-433, i.e., that the legislature cannot ratify an
illegal tax.  Because the trial court concluded that the May
2013 tax levy was valid, however, Act No. 2014-433 did not
ratify an illegal tax.  Therefore, Howard's immunity argument
is immaterial.  
IV. Conclusion
The trial court correctly concluded that the Commission's
failure to follow the timing provision of former § 40-7-42 did
not invalidate its subsequent levy in 2013 of property taxes
upon Howard and other property owners in Cullman County. 
Therefore, we affirm the summary judgment on all of Howard's
39
1140748
claims 
in 
favor 
of 
Cullman 
County 
and 
the 
revenue
commissioner.
AFFIRMED.
Moore, C.J., and Main, J., concur.
Bolin and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result.
40