Case Title: Guess v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 111, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MARK A. GUESS,
§
§
No. 111, 2005
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
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Court Below--Superior Court 
§
of the State of Delaware, in and
v.
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for Sussex County in IS01-08-
§
0369-0371, 0379, 0393-0396,
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
0400; IS01-09-0772, 0773;
§
S01-10-0166, 0169, 0175, 
Plaintiff Below,
§
0176, 0178, 0181, 0226, 0227.
Appellee.
§
§
Def. ID No. 0107018161
Submitted: May 9, 2005
Decided:
August 5, 2005
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices.
O R D E R
This 5  day of August 2005, upon consideration of the appellant’s
th
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The appellant, Mark A. Guess, has appealed from the Superior
Court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior
Court Criminal Rule 61.  The State of Delaware has moved to affirm the
judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of
Guess’ opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm.
Guess was also convicted of the charge of attempted burglary and a related
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conspiracy charge, but those convictions were vacated, sua sponte, by the Superior Court
prior to sentencing.
Guess v. State, 2003 WL 60491 (Del. Supr.).
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(2)
In September 2001, Guess and a co-defendant, Jackie Jackson,
were charged with having committed three hotel burglaries the previous
summer in Rehoboth Beach and Dewey Beach, Delaware.  Guess, who drove
the duo’s get-away car, was also charged with several motor vehicle offenses
for having led the police on an extended high speed car chase while fleeing
from a fourth attempted hotel burglary.
(3)
Guess was convicted of two counts each of Burglary in the Second
Degree, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, Theft, and one count each of
Receiving Stolen Property, Unlawful Use of a Credit Card, and Criminal
Impersonation.   Guess was also convicted of Aggressive Driving, Reckless
1
Driving, and several other motor vehicle offenses.  He was sentenced to a total
of twenty-one years at Level V, suspended after ten years, for eleven years of
probation.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior
Court.2
(4)
In January 2005, Guess filed a motion for postconviction relief.
Guess alleged that (1) a hotel employee’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay
See Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 734 (Del. 1988) (establishing guidelines governing
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admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts).
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997) (citing Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d
4
1100, 1152-1153 (Del. 1993)).
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
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and violated his right of confrontation; (2) the same testimony was in the nature
of bad act evidence and should have been subject to a Getz analysis;  and (3)
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his counsel’s failure to object to the same testimony constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel.
(5)
By order dated February 25, 2005, the Superior Court denied
Guess’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim as without merit.  The Superior
Court denied as procedurally barred Guess’ claims challenging the admissibility
of the hotel employee’s testimony.  In this appeal that followed, Guess has not
advanced the claim that his counsel was ineffective.  As a result, that claim is
waived and will not be addressed by this Court.4
(6)
When reviewing the Superior Court’s denial of a postconviction
motion pursuant to Rule 61, this Court first must consider the procedural
requirements of the rule before addressing any substantive issues.   Rule
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61(i)(3) provides that any ground for relief that was not asserted in the
proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction is procedurally barred,
See Del. Unif. R. Evid. 803(2) (providing that an “excited utterance,” defined as “[a]
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statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition . . .” is not excluded by the hearsay
rule).
The same claim raised by Jackson on appeal from the denial of postconviction relief
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was rejected as procedurally barred.  See Jackson v. State, 2005 WL 528673 (Del. Supr.)
(affirming denial of confrontation clause claim as procedurally barred pursuant to Rule
61(i)(3) and (i)(4)).  See also Gannon v. State, 704 A.2d 272 (Del. 2001) (holding that
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unless the movant demonstrates “cause for relief” and “prejudice” stemming
from the alleged grievance.  Rule 61(i)(5) states in pertinent part that the
procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(3) shall not apply to a colorable claim that there
was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation.
(7)
At trial, the Superior Court admitted, over Guess’ hearsay
objection, the testimony of a hotel employee describing a telephone call that the
employee had received from a hotel patron reporting an attempted break-in. 
The Superior Court determined that the hotel patron’s statements made over the
telephone to the hotel employee qualified as an “excited utterance” and thus
were  not excluded by the hearsay rule.   In his postconviction motion and now
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on appeal, Guess alleges that the admission of the hotel employee’s testimony
as to the hotel patron’s statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation.  
(8)
We agree with the Superior Court that Guess’ confrontation clause
claim is procedurally barred.   Guess has not demonstrated cause for his failure
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statements admitted as “excited utterance” exception to the hearsay rule did not violate the
defendant’s right to confrontation).  But cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)
(holding that prior out-of-court testimonial statement by witness is inadmissible if witness
is unavailable and there is no opportunity to cross-examine the witness).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
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Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 
9
Jackson raised a similar claim that was denied as moot on direct appeal.  See
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Jackson v. State, 2003 WL 161250 (Del. Supr.) (concluding that hotel employee’s testimony
offered as evidence on charges eventually vacated did not prejudice Jackson in connection
with other charges for which he was convicted). 
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
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Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
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to raise the claim on direct appeal and prejudice from the alleged violation of
his rights.   Moreover, Guess has not made the requisite showing of a colorable
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claim of a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation to warrant
application of the exception to the procedural bar.9
(9)
Guess’ claim that he was prejudiced by the admission of the hotel
employee’s testimony in the absence of a prior Getz analysis is also
procedurally barred.   Guess has not demonstrated cause for his failure to
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previously raise the claim, prejudice from the alleged violation of his rights,11
or that he is entitled to relief from the procedural bar because of a constitutional
violation.12
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(10)
We find it manifest on the face of the opening brief that the
judgment of the Superior Court should be affirmed.  The issues on appeal are
controlled by settled Delaware law.  To the extent that judicial discretion is
implicated, clearly there was no abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm
is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Myron T. Steele
Chief Justice