Case Title: NIXON v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01-55

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
NIXON v. STATE2002 WY 11851 P.3d 851Case Number: 01-55Decided: 08/05/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

TODD 
LUTHER NIXON 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Todd Luther Nixon, pro se 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ. 

* 
Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference

GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]           
Todd 
Luther Nixon appeals pro se from the district court's order which denied his 
post-sentence and post-direct appeal motion to withdraw his guilty pleas filed 
pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 32(d).  In 
that motion, Nixon raised several claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel and a claim that the district court and his trial counsel failed to 
advise him about mitigation matters he could have presented during the 
sentencing phase of his capital case.  
In this appeal, Nixon raises those issues and the issue whether the 
district court erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing on Nixon's motion 
to withdraw his guilty pleas.  
Although the State responds substantively to those issues, it first asks 
this Court to consider whether Nixon's appeal should be dismissed on grounds 
that the district court was without jurisdiction to entertain Nixon's 
post-sentence and post-direct appeal motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas.

 

[¶2]           
Having 
carefully considered the jurisdictional question raised by the State, we hold 
that the district court was without jurisdiction to entertain Nixon's 
post-sentence and post-direct appeal motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  Consequently, we dismiss this 
appeal.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
In early 
June of 1997, law enforcement authorities charged Nixon with first degree murder 
(felony murder in the perpetration of child abuse) in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-101(a) and with aggravated assault and battery in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) arising from the death of his three-year-old, 
CL.  Nixon v. State, 4 P.3d 864, 866 (Wyo. 2000).  As the case 
proceeded, Nixon changed his pleas of not guilty to pleas of guilty pursuant to 
a plea agreement with the State.  
Id.  

 

[¶4]           
On 
August 22, 1997, a written plea agreement between Nixon and the State was 
consummated pursuant to which the State relinquished its option to seek the 
death penalty and Nixon entered pleas of guilty to the two charges.  Id.  On October 7, 1997, before 
sentencing, Nixon filed a motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty.  Nixon asserted that his pleas were 
involuntary because the district court at the August 22 change of plea hearing 
had erroneously advised him that probation was a possibility although "extremely 
unlikely."  Id. at 867.  Nixon claimed that this improper and 
misleading advice influenced his decision to plead guilty.  Id. at 868.  The district court considered Nixon's 
motion, conceded that the advice was in error, but ruled that the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the totality of the record.  Id.  The district court denied Nixon's 
motion.

 

[¶5]           
At the 
sentencing hearing on October 10, 1997, the district court imposed a sentence of 
life imprisonment for first degree murder, which was to run concurrent to a 
sentence of seven to ten years imprisonment for aggravated assault and battery; 
and the district court ordered Nixon to pay attorney fees, a sum to the crime 
victim's compensation fund, and restitution.  Id. at 868.  

 

[¶6]           
Nixon 
filed a notice of appeal on October 31, 1997, from the judgment and sentences, 
asserting as error the district court's denial of his pre-sentence motion to 
withdraw his pleas of guilty and the requirement for restitution.  Id.  This Court considered those assertions, 
found no error, and affirmed Nixon's judgment and sentence in a decision 
published April 10, 2000.  
Id. at 872.  On 
January 8, 2001, some nine months after this Court's affirmance of Nixon's 
direct appeal and some three years and three months after the district court's 
imposition of sentence, Nixon pro se filed his motion to withdraw his pleas of 
guilty pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 32(d).

 

[¶7]           
In this 
motion, Nixon again challenged the voluntariness of his pleas of guilty, albeit 
on grounds different from those asserted in his pre-sentence motion to withdraw 
his pleas of guilty.  This time 
Nixon's asserted grounds concerned instances of alleged ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel, specifically whether his trial counsel, and the district 
court, failed to advise him of any matters in mitigation he could present during 
the sentencing phase; whether his trial counsel failed to investigate the case 
and failed to advise him of potential defenses and of strengths and weaknesses 
of the State's case; whether his trial counsel failed properly to advise him of 
the sentence he was facing; and whether the above and foregoing errors 
cumulatively denied him his right to effective assistance of counsel.  We note that these claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel were not raised in Nixon's direct appeal of his 
conviction, judgment and sentence.  
Nixon, 4 P.3d  at 865-66.  
The district court denied this motion without conducting an evidentiary 
hearing.  This appeal followed in 
which Nixon challenges the district court's failure to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing and the district court's denial of the motion to withdraw guilty 
pleas.

 

[¶8]           
As 
explained below, this Court's precedent, as well as policy considerations 
including the interest in the finality of criminal decisions, mandate that such 
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, filed after an appeal of right from a 
judgment and sentence has been concluded, cannot be considered by the district 
court because of a lack of jurisdiction over such matters.  Further, because this Court enjoys no 
greater jurisdiction than that of the district court in such matters, this Court 
must dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this 
Court.

 

 

ANALYSIS

 

[¶9]           
Rule 
32(d) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure addresses the withdrawal of 
guilty pleas:

(d) 
Plea withdrawal. - If a motion for withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere is made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit withdrawal 
of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason.  At any later time, a plea may be set 
aside only to correct manifest injustice.

Although 
this Rule does not, in and of itself, set a time limit for filing such a motion 
with the district court after sentencing, such a limit must exist as a 
logical corollary to the general rule that a case becomes final after judgment 
and sentence is entered and an appellate decision affirming the conviction has 
been made, or the time for taking an appeal expires without perfection of an 
appeal, or after the voluntary dismissal of such an appeal.  See Schuler 
v. State, 771 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Wyo. 1989) (citing Attletweedt 
v. State, 684 P.2d 812 (Wyo. 1984); State v. 
Duswalt, 379 A.2d 1278 (N.J. Super. 1977)), for the proposition that a case is no longer 
pending after a final judgment (in Wyoming, that is the judgment and sentence) 
has been entered in the trial court.  
Unless a specific, express exception is created to this general 
rule by statute or court rule, a district court's jurisdiction to consider a 
motion to withdraw a plea -- or any other motion not specifically provided for 
by statute or rule -- ends when the case becomes final because of the expiration 
of the time for taking an appeal.  
In sum, once a criminal case becomes final pursuant to the general rule, 
a trial court loses the power to act in that case unless it is expressly 
permitted to do so by statute or court rule.

 

[¶10]       
In fact, 
this Court and the Wyoming Legislature have provided specific methods in both 
statutes and court rules for seeking review of prior and otherwise final 
criminal proceedings.  With two 
exceptions, both confined to challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court -- 
correcting an illegal sentence pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
35(a) and state habeas corpus relief pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
1-27-101 et seq. -- all available methods contain time limits for taking such 
actions.  For instance, a motion for 
sentence reduction must be made within one year after the sentence is imposed or 
probation is revoked, or within one year after receipt by the court of a mandate 
issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within one 
year after entry of any order or judgment of the Wyoming Supreme Court denying 
review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction or 
probation revocation.  W.R.Cr.P. 
35(b).  After expiration of that 
period, the district court no longer has jurisdiction to reduce a sentence.  Stewart 
v. State, 654 P.2d 727 (Wyo. 1982).  

[¶11]       
Similarly, 
Wyoming statutes provide two additional avenues for presenting a challenge of a 
conviction to a district court:  by 
way of the post-conviction relief statutes at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
7-14-101 through 108, and state habeas corpus relief at Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 
1-27-101 through 134.  Review by way 
of a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed within the five-year 
limitation period, and 
the scope of such review is strictly limited.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-14-103 (LexisNexis 2001).  

 

[¶12]       
Review 
in a state habeas corpus action is not time limited, but is seriously limited in 
scope so that defendants may only raise a claim going to the subject matter or 
personal jurisdiction of the court.  
Hovey v. 
Sheffner, 16 
Wyo. 254, 265-67, 93 P. 305, 307-08 (1908).  This remedy is also unique in that the 
petition must be made to the court most convenient in distance to the 
petitioner.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 
1-27-104 (LexisNexis 2001).  In 
other words, this particular remedy is not even a continuation of the criminal 
proceeding, but is a separate civil proceeding, so the continuing jurisdiction 
of the district court in the original criminal action is not of 
concern.

[¶13]       
In 
short, except where there has been a remand following an appeal in a criminal 
case, or where one of the statutes or rules mentioned above otherwise expressly 
permits a district court to continue to assert jurisdiction over that criminal 
case, no authority exists for the court to act in the case -- and its 
jurisdiction over the case should end -- once the defendant's conviction has 
become final because of his exercise or forfeiture of his right to appeal from 
that conviction.  See 
Frenzel 
v. State, 938 P.2d 867, 870 (Wyo. 1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 959 (1997) (recognizing the legislative mandate denying district courts 
jurisdiction to hear a second petition for post-conviction 
relief).

 

[¶14]       
In fact, 
if this Court were to decide that courts do not lose jurisdiction to hear 
motions to withdraw guilty pleas after the time for appeal has run, such would 
seem to create a substantive right which has been expressly denied to criminal 
defendants by the legislature in the statutes relating to post-conviction 
relief.  Such would clearly be in 
violation of Wyoming's constitutional provisions relating to the separation of 
powers.1  That is, unlike the Federal system2, in Wyoming, the creation of rules 
which do no more than govern procedures in the courts is exclusively the 
province of the courts and such rules govern procedure in the courts, while laws 
conferring substantive rights, such as the availability of post-conviction 
relief, must come from the legislature.  
This is a separation of powers issue under the Wyoming Constitution that 
this Court has long recognized.  For 
instance, in Squillace 
v. Kelley, 990 P.2d 497, 501 (Wyo. 1999), this Court found:

 

Article 
5, § 2 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides in pertinent part 
that this Court "shall have a general superintending control over all inferior 
courts, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law."  This general superintending control 
"encompasses the authority to prescribe rules of practice and procedure in those 
courts."  White v. 
Fisher, 689 
P.2d [102] at 106 [(Wyo. 1984)]. We have consistently upheld this Court's 
plenary power to control the course of litigation in the trial courts.  Id.  The legislature recognizes these 
pertinent constitutional provisions which afford this Court full authority over 
rules of practice and procedure and the Court's inherent power to prescribe 
rules.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
5-2-114, 115 (LEXIS 1999).  The 
prescription of the practice and procedure attending the imposition of sanctions 
for the signing and filing of papers with the courts is a procedural, not a 
substantive, matter.  The 
legislature is prohibited from enacting statutes pertaining to such matter.  White v. 
Fisher, 689 P.2d  at 107.  In Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 
1-14-128, the legislature has impermissibly enacted a statute pertaining to a 
procedural matter; therefore, we hold that this statute is 
unconstitutional.

 

See 
also, 
Hopkinson 
v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 50 (Wyo. 1983), superseded by rule as stated in Grainey v. 
State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Wyo. 2000) ("This court has approved the 
proposition that the power to determine what acts are crimes, and the punishment 
for prohibited acts belongs to the legislative branch as an absolute, exclusive 
and inherent power not shared with the courts.").

 

[¶15]       
The 
Wyoming Legislature has provided a substantive right to re-open otherwise final 
criminal judgments in creating jurisdiction in district court's over 
post-conviction review, but it has determined it necessary both to place a time 
limit on such review and to limit the scope of that review.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
7-14-101 through 108 (LexisNexis 2001).  However, such limitations on the 
substantive right provided to a petitioner under that act, and on the 
jurisdiction accorded to district courts under the act, would be rendered 
meaningless if this Court were to permit temporally unlimited challenges to a 
guilty plea under Rule 
32(d).

 

[¶16]       
If this 
Court were to permit such challenges, defendants could ignore the limitation of 
post-conviction relief and bide their time in prison until witnesses are dead or 
scattered and evidence is lost before seeking identical relief pursuant to 
Rule 
32(d).  Moreover, they could do so 
unencumbered by the res judicata effect, inherent in the post-conviction 
statutes, of having earlier pursued or declined to pursue their claims in a 
timely appeal from conviction.  
Taking the argument to its extreme would also mean no limit exists on the 
number of such motions which may be filed.  
Further, "at any time" may include after a defendant's sentence has 
already been served.  In other 
words, the concept of finality would be rendered a fiction.  

 

[¶17]       
Recognizing 
the many consequences of allowing a defendant to file a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea "at any time," this Court, in a line of orders since March of 1998, 
has declared that trial courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under W.R.Cr.P. 
32(d), if that motion is filed after an appeal of right from a conviction has 
been concluded, after the time for such an appeal has run and no appeal has been 
taken, or after such an appeal has been taken but then voluntarily 
dismissed.  See 
Harrison 
v. State, No. 
01-187, Order Denying Petition For Reinstatement As Moot Following Discovery 
That This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Entertain This Appeal (Wyo. 10/23/2001) 
(petition for reinstatement of appeal denied; motion to withdraw guilty plea not 
filed until 20 years after entry of plea); Springfield 
v. State, No. 
01-132, Order Dismissing Appeal (Wyo. 10/23/2001) (appeal dismissed, as motion 
to withdraw guilty plea not brought until over 27 years after entry of plea); 
Chavez 
v. State, No. 
99-182, Order Dismissing Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction (Wyo. 10/7/1999) (7 
days between lapse of appeal time and motion to withdraw guilty plea); 
Pfeil v. 
State, No. 
99-142, Order Granting Motion To Dismiss Appeal For Lack of Jurisdiction (Wyo. 
6/29/1999) (motion to withdraw guilty plea filed at least 14 months after right 
of direct appeal from the judgment and sentence expired); Rude v. 
State, No. 
98-302, Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction (Wyo. 
5/25/1999) (motion for withdrawal of guilty plea filed "some six years after the 
appellant's direct appeal from the plea in question"); Watson 
v. State, No. 
99-14, Order Dismissing Appeal from District Court's Order Denying Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Pleas (Wyo. 4/7/1999) (21 years between entry of plea and motion 
to withdraw guilty plea); Harlow 
v. State, No. 
98-276, Order Denying Jurisdiction Over Late-Filed Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Pleas (Wyo. 9/22/1998) (10 years lapse between entry of guilty plea and motion 
to withdraw); Solis v. 
State, No. 
97-192, Minute Order of Dismissal (Wyo. 4/22/1998) (30 days between voluntary 
dismissal of appeal and motion to withdraw guilty plea); Parazoo 
v. State, No. 
97-193, Minute Order of Dismissal (Wyo. 3/4/1998) (12 years between entry of 
judgment and sentence and motion to withdraw guilty plea).  To now hold otherwise would require 
reversal of the above line of orders.

 

[¶18]       
It 
should also be noted that the Court's current position on this subject, as set 
forth in the line of orders noted above, is entirely consistent with this 
Court's suggestion  before the adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure  
that a motion to withdraw a plea must be made "promptly, at the earliest 
possible moment, or at least within a reasonable time after entry of the 
plea."  Hubble 
v. State, 41 
Wyo. 275, 283, 285 P. 153, 156 (1930) (finding a violation of the "rule of 
promptness" where the appellant filed a pre-sentencing motion to withdraw 
his plea two years and three months after entry of the plea).  Unquestionably, "a reasonable time after 
entry of the plea" is before the time for appeal expires.  Nixon's motion comes over three years 
after entry of his plea and such cannot even remotely be said to be 
"reasonable."

 

[¶19]       
Moreover, 
if this Court should now choose not to limit the time period for filing a motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea, contrary to the above-cited line of authority, such a 
choice would also conflict with this Court's legal precedent that failure to 
raise an issue on direct appeal waives review of that issue.  "It is a long-standing rule of law that 
issues that could have been raised on appeal are not open to challenge by a 
petition for post-conviction relief because they are foreclosed by the doctrine 
of res judicata."  Kallas 
v. State, 776 P.2d 198, 199 (Wyo. 1989) (citing Cutbirth 
v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1261 (Wyo. 1988)).  
Allowing a defendant another shot at an appeal-like proceeding, any 
number of years after their conviction has become final, would allow an end run 
around this waiver doctrine.   

 

[¶20]       
Recognizing 
the importance of finality in criminal proceedings, Rule 
32(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has been limited in its reach, 
as well.  F.R.Cr.P. 32(e) 
provides:

 

(e) PLEA 
WITHDRAWAL.  If a motion to withdraw 
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is made before sentence is imposed, the 
court may permit the plea to be withdrawn if the defendant shows any fair and 
just reason.  At any later time, a 
plea may be set aside only on direct appeal or by motion under 28 
U.S.C. §2255.

 

[¶21]       
The 
pre-1983 version of present Rule 
32(e) (then Rule 32(d)) provided:

(d) 
WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA OF GUILTY.  A 
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may be made only 
before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to 
correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment 
of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his 
plea.

 

18 
U.S.C. app. at 624 ( 1982).

 

[¶22]       
In 1983, 
the last part of the rule was deleted and the phrase "At any later time, a plea 
may be set aside only on direct appeal or by motion under 28 
U.S.C. 2255" was added to clarify when such motions may be made after 
sentencing, as the earlier version seemed to some courts to allow for such "at 
any time".  See 
United 
States v. Watson, 548 F.2d 1058, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("It will be noted from the foregoing language 
of the Rule that there is no limitation upon the time within which relief 
thereunder may, after sentencing, be sought.").  As it now stands, the rule makes it 
clear that a motion to withdraw guilty plea may only be raised before the 
imposition of sentence.  After that 
time, the relief earlier available through such a motion may only be sought on 
direct appeal -- which, pursuant to F.R.A.P 
4(b), must be initiated within ten days after entry of either the judgment or 
order being appealed -- or pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §2255, which requires that the petition be filed in the trial court 
within one year of:

 

(1)  the date on which the judgment of 
conviction becomes final;

(2) the 
date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the 
movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental 
action;

(3) the 
date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, 
if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the 
date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been 
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

 

28 
U.S.C.S. §2255 (2002).

 

[¶23]       
As noted 
in the 1983 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 
32:

 

Moreover, 
because §2255 
and Rule 
32(d) are properly characterized as the "two principal procedures for collateral 
attack of a federal plea conviction," Borman, 
The Hidden Right to Direct Appeal From a Federal Conviction, 64 Cornell 
L.Rev. 319, 327 (1979), this amendment is also in keeping with the 
proposition underlying the Supreme Court's decision in United 
State v. Timmreck, supra, 
namely, that "the concern with finality served by the limitation on collateral 
attack has special force with respect to convictions based on guilty 
pleas."

 

F.R.Cr.P. 
32 Advisory Committee Note; 18 U.S.C. app. at 799 (1982) (emphasis 
added).

 

[¶24]       
The need 
for finality in criminal cases when a defendant has voluntarily and knowingly 
agreed to plead guilty has been recognized on a number of occasions by this 
Court.  When considering the 
circumstances under which a defendant may appeal after entering into an 
agreement to plead guilty, this Court has  
recognized the need for finality in holding that an individual may only 
raise issues concerning either the jurisdiction of the trial court or the 
voluntariness of the plea.  In that 
regard, this Court has stated:

 

In 
reaching this result, we are aware of the argument that, for the sake of 
judicial economy, a criminal defendant should not be forced to go to trial 
merely to preserve his right to appeal pretrial objections.  United 
States ex rel. Rogers v. Warden of Attica State Prison, 381 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1967).  However, 
against that interest, we must weigh the need for finality in the judicial 
process.  

"A 
guilty plea should mark the end of a criminal case, not a gateway to future 
litigation.  More than a confession, 
a guilty plea signals defendant's intention not to litigate the question of his 
guilt, and necessarily involves the surrender of certain constitutional rights * 
* *.'"  People 
v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 154, 478 N.E.2d 755, 757 (1985), quoting 
People 
v. Lynn, 28 N.Y.2d 196, 201-02, 321 N.Y.S.2d 74, 269 N.E.2d 794 
(1971).

 

Sword v. 
State, 746 P.2d 423, 426 (Wyo. 1987).  In 
addition, in Smith v. 
State, 871 P.2d 186, 188 (Wyo. 1994), this Court noted:

 

A guilty 
plea prohibits appellate review of all but a few defenses.  Ochoa v. 
State, 848 P.2d 1359, 1361-62 (Wyo. 1993); Sword v. 
State, 746 P.2d 423, 425 (Wyo. 1987).  

 

"When a 
criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty 
of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent 
claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior 
to the entry of the guilty plea."

Davila 
v. State, 831 P.2d 204, 206 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Zanetti 
v. State, 783 P.2d 134, 138 (Wyo. 1989) and Tollett 
v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235 
(1973)).

 

[¶25]       
Moreover, 
this Court has recognized the importance of finality in criminal cases in other 
areas as well.  This Court has 
limited the doctrine of retroactivity in the interests of the finality of a 
criminal case.  See 
Farbotnik 
v. State, 850 P.2d 594, 602 (Wyo. 1993) ("The interest of the State in achieving finality 
justifies limited retroactivity."); Brown v. 
State, 816 P.2d 818, 847 (Wyo. 1991) (Discussing the viability of recanted testimony 
presented in a motion for a new trial, this Court stated:  "But the viability of the system also 
requires that criminal justice be administered efficiently and that the public 
have faith in the finality of judgments.").

 

[¶26]       
This 
Court has likewise restricted post-conviction review of claims after conclusion 
of an appeal, in part, because of the importance of finality in a criminal 
action.

 

It is 
true that we have adopted a disciplined approach to post-conviction relief and 
have concluded that it is not to be invoked as a substitute for a direct appeal, 
nor should it be treated like a direct appeal.  Cutbirth 
v. State, 751 P.2d 1257 (Wyo. 1988); Pote v. 
State, 733 P.2d 1018 (Wyo. 1987); Munoz v. 
Maschner, 590 P.2d 1352 (Wyo. 1979).  The effect 
of our rulings is to foreclose from consideration under post-conviction relief 
those questions which could have been presented on direct appeal.  In so doing, we honor the rule of res 
judicata and promote the concept of finality.  This stance is supportive of those 
considerations of judicial economy which suggest that a review of certain issues 
is best accomplished by direct appeal.  Furthermore, we limit consideration of 
post-conviction relief to those motions which raise questions of constitutional 
magnitude and manifest a miscarriage of justice.  Cutbirth; 
Wright 
v. State, 718 P.2d 35 (Wyo. 1986).

 

Gist v. 
State, 768 P.2d 1054, 1055 (Wyo. 1989) (emphasis added).

 

[¶27]       
We note, 
too, the societal interests at stake in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-40-204 (LexisNexis 2001), which provides that victims and witnesses of crimes 
are to be informed during the criminal justice process. For those victims or 
witnesses who opt to be informed about criminal proceedings relating to the 
crime in which they were victimized or which they witnessed, § 
1-40-204(a)(ii) requires notification to the victim or witness of the status of 
a case through "the final appellate review."  If the phrase "at any time" in 
Rule 
32(d) is construed as Nixon would have this Court construe it, crime victims 
would effectively be subjected to re-victimization upon notification -- 20, 30 
or 50 years after the crime -- that the person that victimized them gets yet 
another appeal, this time from the denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea.  Such simply cannot serve to 
promote any sense of finality.

 

[¶28]       
The 
detrimental effect of collateral attacks on final judgments has also been noted 
by the United States Supreme Court:

 

Nonetheless, 
we repeatedly have recognized that collateral attacks raise numerous concerns 
not present on direct review.  Most 
profound is the effect on finality.  
It goes without saying that, at some point, judicial proceedings must 
draw to a close and the matter deemed conclusively resolved; no society can 
afford forever to question the correctness of its every judgment.  "The writ," however, "strikes at 
finality," McCleskey 
v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1468, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1991), depriving the 
criminal law "of much of its deterrent effect," Teague 
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1074, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion), 
and sometimes preventing the law's just application altogether, see 
McCleskey, supra, 499 U.S., at 491, 111 S.Ct., at 1468.  "No one, not criminal defendants, not 
the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefitted by a judgment 
providing a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day 
thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh 
litigation."  Mackey 
v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691, 91 S. Ct. 1160, 1179, 28 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also McCleskey, 
supra, 499 
U.S., at 492, 111 S.Ct., at 1469.

 

Withrow 
v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 698, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1756-57, 123 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993) (emphasis 
added).

 

[¶29]       
The 
United States Supreme Court especially recognizes the particular importance of 
finality in criminal cases where the defendant has entered into a guilty 
plea:  

 

We have 
strictly limited the circumstances under which a guilty plea may be attacked on 
collateral review.  "It is well 
settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused 
person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally 
attacked."  Mabry v. 
Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2546-2547, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1984) (footnote 
omitted).  And even the 
voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea can be attacked on collateral 
review only if first challenged on direct review.  Habeas review is an extraordinary remedy 
and " will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.'" Reed v. 
Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354, 114 S. Ct. 2291, 2300, 129 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1994) (quoting 
Sunal v. 
Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178, 67 S. Ct. 1588, 1590-1591, 91 L. Ed. 1982 (1947)).  Indeed, "the concern with finality 
served by the limitation on collateral attack has special force with respect to 
convictions based on guilty pleas."  
United 
States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784, 99 S. Ct. 2085, 2087, 60 L. Ed. 2d 634 (1979).

 

Bousley 
v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1610, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998) (emphasis 
added).  

 

[¶30]       
In sum, 
the above-noted authorities and policy arguments require the conclusion that the 
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Nixon's motion to withdraw his 
plea, and the further conclusion that the instant appeal must be dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction in this Court, for "[n]o one, not criminal defendants, not 
the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing 
a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter 
his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation on issues 
already resolved." Williams 
v. United States, 401 U.S. 675, 691, 91 S. Ct. 1171, 1179, 28 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part).

FOOTNOTES

1Article 2, § 1 of the Constitution 
of the State of Wyoming provides:

The powers of the government of this 
state are divided into three distinct departments:  The legislative, executive and judicial, 
and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers 
properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution 
expressly directed or permitted.

 

2In the Federal system, court rules 
are subject to approval by Congress, the result being that Federal court rules 
have the force and effect of a legislative enactment.  In Wyoming, court rules are issued 
solely by the courts and are not subject to approval of the 
legislature.