Case Title: Jamison v. Division of Family Services

Citation: 

Docket Number: 107, 2000

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
WILLIAM JAMISON,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent Below, 
 
) 
No. 107, 2000 
 
 
Appellant.  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Court Below:  Family Court 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
of the State of Delaware in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
and for New Castle County 
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
File No.: 99-06-26TN 
 
 
Petitioner Below,  
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  November 21, 2000 
Decided:  March 8, 2001 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, Justices. 
O R D E R 
 
This 8th day of March, 2001, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
William Jamison1 appeals the February 23, 2000 judgment of the 
Family Court terminating his parental rights.  Jamison argues that the Family Court 
wrongfully granted the Division of Family Services (“DFS”) custody of his 
children when it violated his constitutional due process rights by holding a  
                                                 
1 Pseudonyms have been used pursuant to Del. Supr. Ct. R. 7(d). 
 
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dependency/neglect hearing2 that he did not attend.3  Jamison also argues that the 
Family Court erred in finding that DFS satisfied the statutory requirements of 29 
Del. C. § 9003(3)(a)(3) to provide preventive services and reunification services 
with him because DFS did not contact him or attempt to arrange visitation of the 
children with him while he was incarcerated, despite Family Court orders, while 
his children were in the custody of DFS. 4 
2. 
Jamison and Candace McColley are the natural parents of six children 
who were born between 1989 and 1995.5  Before the Family Court terminated the 
parental rights of Jamison, the children had been in and out of the custody of DFS 
since approximately 1994.  During this period, Jamison was incarcerated and had 
little contact with the children.   
3. 
Jamison was incarcerated from March 1989 to sometime in 1994.  
Three months after his release in 1994, he was again incarcerated, then released on 
October 28, 1997.  On November 26, 1997, only one month after his release,  
                                                 
2 Once DFS shows probable cause pursuant to Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 202 that a child is in imminent 
risk of physical, mental or emotional danger, the Family Court conducts an adjudicatory hearing 
pursuant to Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 203 to determine whether a child is dependent, neglected or abused.  
In this case, once the Family Court found the children dependent and neglected, it granted 
custody of the children to DFS pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 1009(b), which lists eleven actions the 
Family Court may take to serve best the needs of the children. 
3 Rule 203 does not require that the parents be present at the hearing. 
4 Although Jamison contends that DFS disregarded a 1998 Family Court order ordering DFS to 
establish visitation with him and his children, he neither cites with specificity nor includes a copy 
of the order in his opening brief, reply brief or appendix. 
5 Jamison and McColley were never married. 
 
3 
Jamison was convicted of first degree robbery, sentenced to twenty years 
imprisonment and is not scheduled to be released until 2019.  In 2019, his youngest 
child will be twenty-four years old.   
4. 
In 1994, DFS received four complaints between January and May 
regarding physical neglect of the children.  On October 11, 1994, DFS took the 
children into custody because McColley left them unsupervised for forty-five 
minutes in an unfit dwelling.  In March 1995, DFS received a complaint regarding 
physical neglect of the children.  In November 1996, DFS again received a 
complaint regarding physical neglect of the children.  At that time, McColley and 
the children were homeless, and the children had missed several days of school.  
DFS obtained emergency custody of the children.  Approximately two years later 
on October 28, 1998, the Family Court returned custody to McColley.   
5. 
On May 25, 1999, DFS received a complaint about physical neglect of 
the children.  An investigation revealed that the children’s home was uninhabitable 
because of trash, the smell of urine and inadequate plumbing facilities.  Two days 
later, on May 27, 1999, the Family Court granted an ex parte order granting DFS 
emergency custody of the children.  DFS maintained custody through June 4, 1999 
when the Family Court held a probable cause hearing pursuant to Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 
202 at which Jamison and McColley appeared pro se.  During the hearing, Jamison 
 
4 
and McColley received notice of a dependency/neglect hearing scheduled for July 
2, 1999.6   
6. 
On July 2, 1999, the Family Court held the dependency/neglect 
hearing.  McColley failed to appear despite notice of the hearing at the June 4, 
1999 probable cause hearing.7  The Department of Corrections did not bring 
Jamison to the hearing.  The Family Court ruled that DFS would retain custody of 
all six children, that DFS had made reasonable efforts towards reunification with 
the parents and that it would not be necessary for DFS to continue making efforts 
towards reunification.8  
7. 
Jamison argues that the Family Court violated his due process rights 
when it granted DFS custody of his six children, in his absence, at the July 2, 1999 
dependency/neglect hearing.  Jamison cites In re Heller9 for the proposition that 
“[n]atural parents possess a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and 
management of their children … [and] before the State can intercede and deprive a 
parent of this fundamental liberty interest, it must afford the parent with the 
requisite due process protection.”10  Jamison contends that, through no fault of his  
                                                 
6 See supra n. 2. 
7 The Family Court noted that McColley knew at that time that DFS had filed a Termination of 
Parental Rights Petition on June 30, 1999. 
8 The Family Court terminated McColley’s parental rights on October 6, 1999. 
9 Del. Supr., 669 A.2d 25 (1995). 
10 Id. at 30. 
 
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own, the Department of Corrections did not transport him to the July 2, 1999 
hearing.  Jamison argues that the State’s failure to transport him to the hearing 
denied him due process and deprived him of his fundamental liberty interest in the 
custody of his children.  Jamison contends that DFS wrongfully and unlawfully 
gained custody of his children in violation of his due process rights.  Because DFS 
did not have a legal basis to file a Termination of Parental Rights Petition until it 
had lawfully been granted custody of the children, Jamison urges this Court to 
reverse the judgment of the Family Court terminating his parental rights on 
February 23, 2000.  
8. 
In a termination of parental rights proceeding, we analyze the due 
process standards in accordance with the factors established by the United States 
Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.11  These factors are: 
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) 
the risk that there will be an erroneous deprivation of the interest 
through the procedures used and the probable value of any additional 
or substitute procedural safeguard; and (3) the government interest 
involved, including the added fiscal and administrative burdens that 
additional or substitute procedures would require.12 
 
Here the interests of Jamison and the State, through DFS, are equally compelling.13 
                                                 
11 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
12 In re Burns, Del. Supr., 519 A.2d 638, 645 (1986). 
13 See In Re Heller, at 31 (comparing the sufficiency of the termination of parental rights 
proceedings to the possible additional safeguards that may have protected the mother against the 
possible erroneous deprivation of her parental rights). 
 
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9. 
In In re Heller, this Court held that the Family Court did not violate 
the due process rights of an incarcerated mother who participated in a termination 
of parental rights hearing by telephone.  This Court found that “an incarcerated 
parent does not have a constitutional right to be physically present at a termination 
of parental rights hearing.”14  That the decision “allowing a parent who is 
incarcerated or otherwise confined in custody of a government to attend the 
termination hearing is within the discretion of the trial court, whose decision on 
appeal will be upheld in the absence of an abuse of discretion.”15   
10. 
In In re Heller, this Court also found that the mother had received 
ample notice of the termination of parental rights hearing, that the mother had 
adequate opportunity to consult with counsel and prepare for trial, that the mother 
knew the ramifications of the termination of her parental rights, that the mother 
showed no prejudice in not being present at the termination hearing and that the 
mother did not show that had she been present, the Family Court would have 
decided the case the other way.16    
11. 
In this case, the Family Court found that although Jamison did not 
attend the dependency/neglect hearing, that fact alone did not prejudice him or  
                                                 
14 Id. at 32. 
15 Id. (quoting In re Interest of L.V., Supr., 240 Neb. 404, 482 N.W.2d 250, 258 (1992)). 
16 See Id. at 31-32. 
 
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prevent him in any way from objecting to the placement of his children with DFS.  
On June 4, 1999, one month before the dependency/neglect hearing, Jamison 
attended a probable cause hearing in the Family Court.  He received notification at 
that time about the future dependency/neglect hearing.  The Family Court found 
that Jamison knew that his children were in the custody of DFS and could have 
challenged that placement at any time before the termination of parental rights 
hearing.  DFS filed a petition for termination of parental rights on June 30, 2000.  
Jamison received a copy of the Termination of Parental Rights Petition.  Family 
Court appointed counsel for Jamison at the termination of parental rights hearing.  
Moreover, the Family Court noted that while Jamison had filed several pro se 
appeals regarding his criminal matters, he did not petition the Family Court for a 
review of the July 2, 1999 dependency/neglect order or for visitation with his 
children. 
12. 
Based on the facts in this case and our decision in In re Heller, we 
find that the Family Court afforded Jamison due process despite the fact that he did 
not appear at the dependency/neglect hearing.  Under the facts of this case, the 
mere fact that the Department of Correction did not bring Jamison to the hearing, 
did not deprive him of due process.  We find that Jamison failed to take advantage 
of the entire process for objecting to the placement with DFS despite knowledge of 
 
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that possibility, the opportunity to challenge the action and an understanding that it 
served as a precursor to the termination of his parental rights.    
13. 
Jamison argues that the Family Court erred in finding that DFS met 
the statutory requirement to provide preventive services and reunification services 
pursuant to 29 Del. C. § 9003.  Jamison contests DFS’s determination that because 
of his anticipated lengthy incarceration, any attempts at reunification were not 
feasible.  Jamison contends that by not involving him in any manner regarding the 
custody of his children, DFS could not have any knowledge of whether the 
children could be placed with one of Jamison’s family members.  Specifically, 
Jamison asserts that the children could have been placed with his mother, noting 
that during the termination hearing a social worker acknowledged that she was not 
aware that Jamison’s mother may have been a placement option.     
14. 
The clear and convincing standard of proof must be met when the 
termination of parental rights is sought.17  On appeal from a decision of an order 
terminating parental rights, this Court will conduct a limited review of the factual 
findings to “assure that they are sufficiently supported by the record and result 
from an orderly and logical deductive process.”18  Absent those assurances, or if 
the factual findings are clearly erroneous, this Court can make independent 
                                                 
17 Patricia A.F. v. James R.F., Del. Supr., 451 A.2d 830 (1982). 
18 In Interest of Kelly Stevens, Del. Supr., 652 A.2d 18, 23 (1995). 
 
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findings.19  Additionally, as to appellate issues which “implicate rulings of law, 
[this Court’s] review is de novo and this Court will set aside erroneous 
interpretations of applicable law.”20 
15. 
Under Delaware law, termination of parental rights can only occur if 
the Family Court is satisfied that DFS exerted all reasonable efforts to prevent 
removal of the children from their natural parent and to reunify them with their 
natural parent.21  Once DFS has satisfied this requirement, it must show, by clear 
and convincing evidence, at least one statutory ground under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a).  
DFS must then show that the termination of parental rights would be in the best 
interests of the child.  
16. 
In In re Heller, this Court upheld the Family Court’s holding that 
DFS had no statutory obligation to attempt reunification between an incarcerated 
father and his son because “it would not have been feasible.”22  The Family Court 
also found that the father had attempted to contact his son on only two occasions 
before the termination of his parental rights.      
                                                 
19 Levitt v. Bouvier, Del. Supr., 287 A.2d 671, 673 (1972). 
20 In Interest of Kelly Stevens, 652 A.2d at 23 (citing Black v. Gray, Del. Supr., 540 A.2d 431, 
432 (1988)). 
21 See In the Matter of Derek W. Burns, a Minor Child, Del. Supr., 519 A.2d 639, 644 (1986).   
22 See In re Heller, at 29 (discussing that while 29 Del. C. § 9003(3)(a)(2) provides that DFS 
will provide reunification services, subsection (13) clarifies that provision that DFS will provide 
“whenever feasible, reunification services for children and their families).  29 Del. C. § 9003(13) 
(emphasis added). 
 
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17. 
In this case, the Family Court found that DFS had exhausted all 
possible means of keeping the children with their natural parents.  DFS provided 
McColley several opportunities to demonstrate that she could properly care for the 
children, but she failed each time.  McColley’s parental rights were terminated 
only after showing that the children were severely neglected and possibly abused.   
18. 
The Family Court found that DFS met its statutory obligation of 
reunifying Jamison with his children, finding that DFS made efforts to arrange 
visitation for the children with Jamison but to no avail.  The Family Court found 
that Jamison had no contact with any of the children for the two years preceding 
the termination of parental rights hearing and that Jamison had made no efforts to 
contact the children.  The Family Court found that these reasons coupled with 
Jamison’s lengthy incarceration showed that DFS had met its statutory obligation 
to provide reunification services. 
19. 
Contrary to Jamison’s argument that DFS made no efforts to place the 
children with one of his family members, specifically his mother, the record shows 
that DFS, in fact, attempted reunification efforts with Jamison’s relatives, but that 
option was not available.  DFS discussed placement options with Jamison’s 
 
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mother, but she stated to a DFS social worker that she was not in a position to care 
for the children because she was in a drug and alcohol center.23  The Family Court  
found that Jamison had previously stated that he knew of no family members 
available to care for the children.   
20. 
Having reviewed the decision of the Family Court, we find the factual 
findings of the Family Court are sufficiently supported by the record and result 
from an orderly and logical deductive process.  We find that Jamison’s physical 
absence from the dependency/neglect hearing did not violate his due process 
rights, and we find that DFS met its statutory obligation pursuant to 29 Del. C. § 
9003 in its efforts at reunifying Jamison with his children.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, the judgment of the Family Court 
is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele___________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
                                                 
23 App. to Appellant’s Op. Br. at A-46 – A-47.