Case Title: Richland County Children Services. v. Richland County. Court of Common Pleas

Citation: 2017-Ohio-9160

Docket Number: 2017-0604

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2017-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Richland Cty. Children Servs. v. Richland Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 
2017-Ohio-9160.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-9160 
THE STATE EX REL. RICHLAND COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES ET AL. v. 
RICHLAND COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Richland Cty. Children Servs. v. Richland Cty. 
Court of Common Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-9160.] 
Prohibition—Mandamus—Domestic-relations court patently and unambiguously 
lacked jurisdiction to order that child be placed in immediate custody of 
children-services agency—Case presents pure question of law, decision 
does not depend on resolution of factual disputes, and additional briefing 
is unnecessary—Motion to dismiss denied, peremptory writ of prohibition 
granted, and writ of mandamus denied as moot. 
(No. 2017-0604—Submitted June 6, 2017—Decided December 22, 2017.) 
IN PROHIBITION and MANDAMUS. 
________________ 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In the midst of a parentage action, respondent Richland County Court 
of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, ordered relator Richland County 
Children Services to take immediate custody of the minor child at the center of the 
action.  Richland County Children Services and its executive director, relator 
Patricia A. Harrelson (collectively, “RCCS”), filed this original action for writs of 
prohibition and mandamus, asserting that the domestic-relations court lacked 
jurisdiction to issue the order.  Respondents Judge Heather Cockley and Magistrate 
Steve McKinley have filed a motion to dismiss. 
{¶ 2} For the reasons discussed below, we deny the motion to dismiss, grant 
a peremptory writ of prohibition, and deny the requested writ of mandamus as moot. 
Background 
{¶ 3} The relevant facts, as alleged in the complaint, are not in dispute. 
{¶ 4} K.R. filed an action in the Richland County domestic-relations court 
against M.W. to establish paternity and to allocate parental rights and 
responsibilities for M.W.’s minor child.  On Friday, April 14, 2017, the court held 
a hearing in the case on its own motion. 
{¶ 5} Later that day, Magistrate McKinley issued a decision in which he 
found probable cause to believe that the child was a neglected, abused, and/or 
dependent child, that she was in immediate danger, and that removal was necessary 
to prevent immediate or threatened physical or emotional harm.  He ordered the 
child placed in the immediate custody of RCCS and ordered RCCS joined as a 
third-party defendant.  Finally, the magistrate ordered the case transferred to the 
Richland County juvenile court for further proceedings. 
{¶ 6} On April 17, 2017, the following Monday, RCCS filed a motion to set 
aside the magistrate’s decision and a motion for a stay.  Two days later, on April 
19, Judge Cockley signed a judgment entry adopting the magistrate’s decision.  
Later that day, the court issued an order denying RCCS’s motions as moot. 
January Term, 2017 
 
 
3
Procedural History 
{¶ 7} RCCS filed this action in this court on May 5, 2017.  The complaint 
seeks (1) a writ of mandamus to compel a ruling on RCCS’s motion to set aside 
Magistrate McKinley’s decision and (2) a writ of prohibition vacating the decision 
and barring the domestic-relations court from issuing future custody orders “that 
are squarely within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”  Judge 
Cockley and Magistrate McKinley have filed a motion to dismiss. 
Legal Analysis 
Prohibition 
{¶ 8} To be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, RCCS must 
establish that (1) Judge Cockley and Magistrate McKinley have exercised judicial 
power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the 
writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the 
ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 
2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 9} In their motion to dismiss, Judge Cockley and Magistrate McKinley 
argue that prohibition is not appropriate because the domestic-relations court is no 
longer about to exercise judicial power given that in his decision, the magistrate 
already certified the matter to the juvenile court.  But it is well established that when 
a lower court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, prohibition will lie to 
correct the results of previous unauthorized actions.  State ex rel. V.K.B. v. Smith, 
142 Ohio St.3d 469, 2015-Ohio-2004, 32 N.E.3d 452, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 10} RCCS contends that an order of removal to protect a child from 
abuse, neglect, or dependency is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court and that the domestic-relations court therefore patently and unambiguously 
lacked jurisdiction to issue the removal order.  Judge Cockley and Magistrate 
McKinley maintain that the two courts, juvenile and domestic-relations, have 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
concurrent jurisdiction under these facts and that the magistrate therefore was 
acting within the scope of his judicial authority when he issued his decision. 
{¶ 11} By statute, a juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction 
“[c]oncerning any child who on or about the date specified in the complaint, 
indictment, or information, is alleged * * * to be a[n] * * * abused, neglected, or 
dependent child.”  R.C. 2151.23(A)(1).  RCCS focuses on the second half of the 
provision, reading it as a grant of exclusive jurisdiction over every child who is 
alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent. 
{¶ 12} That is a misreading of the statute.  For one thing, the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court arises only in cases initiated by “complaint, 
indictment, or information.”  Thompson v. Valentine, 189 Ohio App.3d 661, 2010-
Ohio-4075, 939 N.E.2d 1289, ¶ 31 (12th Dist.) (holding that “R.C. 2151.23(A)(1) 
does not provide the juvenile court with exclusive original jurisdiction concerning 
a child who is alleged by any person to be abused, neglected, or dependent” 
[emphasis sic], but only over those children alleged to be abused, neglected, or 
dependent in a complaint, indictment, or information).  In this case, there was no 
complaint, indictment, or information to trigger the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court. 
{¶ 13} Moreover, the Revised Code makes clear that the juvenile court’s 
jurisdiction over children alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent is not 
always absolute and exclusive.  For example, if, in the course a divorce proceeding, 
there is “reason to believe that either parent has acted in a manner resulting in a 
child being a neglected child,” the domestic-relations court must “consider that fact 
against” naming the neglectful parent as the residential parent and against granting 
a shared parenting decree.  R.C. 3109.04(C).  What the domestic-relations court is 
not required to do, when presented with evidence of neglect, is to surrender 
jurisdiction automatically to the juvenile court. 
January Term, 2017 
 
 
5
{¶ 14} The Richland County domestic-relations court has concurrent 
jurisdiction with the Richland County juvenile court “to determine the care, 
custody, or control of any child not a ward of another court of this state.”  R.C. 
2301.03(G)(1).  The only exception to this concurrent jurisdiction is for cases “that 
are subject to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”  Id.  Judge 
Cockley and Magistrate McKinley are correct that the juvenile court does not have 
exclusive jurisdiction over the child alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent 
in this case. 
{¶ 15} But it does not resolve this case to conclude that the domestic-
relations court had general subject-matter jurisdiction over the proceeding or even 
over the child.  When asked to issue a writ of prohibition, a court must also consider 
whether the lower tribunal has jurisdiction to take the action alleged to be 
unauthorized.  See State ex rel. Dir., Dept. of Agriculture v. Forchione, 148 Ohio 
St.3d 105, 2016-Ohio-3049, 69 N.E.3d 636, ¶ 29 (granting writ of prohibition after 
determining that judge patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to order 
return of dangerous wild animals seized by the Department of Agriculture).  
Therefore, we consider whether Magistrate McKinley patently and unambiguously 
lacked jurisdiction to issue his decision. 
{¶ 16} The scope of relief available in a paternity action is limited; any 
claim for custody or parenting time must be made in a separate proceeding.  R.C. 
3111.13(A) and (C).  And in an action for allocation of parental rights and 
responsibilities, the Revised Code limits the options available to the court: it may 
designate one parent as legal custodian, order shared parenting, commit the child 
to the care of a relative, or certify the matter to the juvenile court for further 
proceedings.  R.C. 3109.04(A)(1) and (2) and (D)(2).  In cases involving 
certification to the juvenile court, the statute does not authorize a provisional order 
of custody to a children-services agency.  See R.C. 3109.04(D)(2). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
{¶ 17} Judge Cockley and Magistrate McKinley cite R.C. 2151.31(A), 
which provides that a child may be taken into custody “[p]ursuant to an order of 
the court.”  If “the court” in R.C. 2151.31(A) were intended to apply to the 
domestic-relations court, then it should say so, given that the statute appears in the 
section governing juvenile courts and that adopting the juvenile court’s argument 
would mean that “the court” has a different meaning in R.C. 2151.31 than it does 
in the rest of the chapter. 
{¶ 18} The domestic-relations court’s only recourse, upon suspicion of 
abuse, neglect, or dependency, is to transfer the matter to the juvenile court.  
Magistrate McKinley and Judge Cockley patently and unambiguously lacked 
jurisdiction to order that the child be placed in the immediate custody of RCCS. 
{¶ 19} Finally, the motion to dismiss argues that the requested writ of 
prohibition should not issue because RCCS has an adequate remedy at law.  But if 
the absence of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, then a petitioner need not 
establish the lack of an adequate remedy at law.  State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. 
Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 20} In an original action before this court, our rules provide for four 
possible judgments: the court may (1) dismiss the complaint, (2) issue an alternative 
writ, thereby requiring the parties to submit evidence and additional briefing, (3) 
issue a peremptory writ of mandamus or prohibition, or (4) deny the writ outright.  
Sup.Ct.Prac.R. 12.04(C). 
{¶ 21} This case presents a pure question of law.  Our decision does not 
depend on the resolution of factual disputes, and additional briefing by the parties 
is unnecessary.  For this reason, pursuant to Sup.Ct.Prac.R. 12.04(C), we hereby 
grant a peremptory writ of prohibition directing Judge Cockley to vacate her 
judgment entry adopting the decision issued by Magistrate McKinley.  See Sapp at 
¶ 32 (granting peremptory writ of prohibition “[b]ecause the pertinent facts are 
uncontroverted”). 
January Term, 2017 
 
 
7
Mandamus 
{¶ 22} RCCS also seeks a writ of mandamus to compel a ruling on RCCS’s 
motion to set aside Magistrate McKinley’s decision.  On April 19, 2017, two days 
after RCCS filed its action, the domestic-relations court issued an order denying 
RCCS’s motion.  We therefore deny the requested writ of mandamus as moot. 
Motion denied, 
writ of prohibition granted, 
and writ of mandamus denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, FRENCH, O’NEILL, FISCHER, and 
DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only. 
_________________ 
Edith A. Gilliland, for relators. 
Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, Linda L. Woeber, and Lisa M. Zaring, for 
respondents. 
_________________