Case Title: Edler v. Rogers

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-09-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Edler v. Rogers1991 WY 123817 P.2d 886Case Number: 91-51Decided: 09/25/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
RITA EDLER, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
DONNA ROGERS, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

 
 
Patrick E. Hacker and 
Bruce S. Asay, Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

 
 
Rodger McDaniel, 
Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

 
 
Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ. 

 
 
OPINION

 
 

MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Rita Edler 
appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of Appellee Donna Rogers. Edler 
claimed that she loaned money to Wesley Cranmore to be used in an automobile 
purchasing partnership between Rogers and 
Cranmore and that Rogers is liable as a partner for the money 
Edler loaned to Cranmore.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     The issue is simple and 
straightforward. Edler claims there are genuine issues of material fact 
regarding whether Rogers and Cranmore were partners and, therefore, under this 
Court's prevailing standard for the review of summary judgments, the summary 
judgment is erroneous.

 
 

[¶4.]     Edler filed a complaint 
on October 4, 1989, alleging she loaned money to Cranmore and Rogers. According 
to the complaint, Edler advanced $5,000 on April 5, 1989; $5,000 on April 11, 
1989; $5,000 on April 14, 1989; and $10,000 on April 18, 1989. These checks were 
made out to Cranmore, and he negotiated them. Each check contained a notation 
that it was a loan for the purchase of automobiles or farm equipment. Edler 
claimed Cranmore convinced her he could make money by buying and selling cars 
and farm equipment. Edler was to be repaid her loans and to receive one-half of 
the profits. Edler claimed Rogers assisted Cranmore in this enterprise. 
Rogers answered 
the complaint, but Cranmore did not. A default judgment was entered against 
Cranmore on April 4, 1990.

 
 

[¶5.]     On November 6, 1990, 
Rogers filed a 
motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss. Her pleadings included an 
affidavit from Cranmore in which he attested, inter alia, that (1) he met Rogers 
in December 1988, but he never intended to go into business with Rogers nor had 
they ever been partners; (2) he had a personal relationship with Rogers, and she 
loaned money to him for living expenses and, occasionally, to buy automobiles at 
auction; (3) Edler did not meet Rogers until April 19, 1989; (4) all loans from 
Edler were made to him in Colorado, no writing existed concerning the loans, and 
he and Edler had no discussions as to the terms of repayment or interest on the 
loans; (5) he never shared any of the profits of his business with Rogers; (6) 
he never told Edler, or anyone else, that he and Rogers were partners nor had he 
and Rogers ever held themselves out to be partners; (7) Rogers never received 
any part of the proceeds of the loans Edler made to him; and (8) he did not 
fight Edler's lawsuit against him because he recognized that he owed the money 
Edler advanced to him, and he intended to repay it when he 
could.

 
 

[¶6.]     Rogers also submitted 
her own affidavit, and in it she attested that (1) she never was Cranmore's 
business partner nor did she ever hold herself out to anyone as being his 
business partner; (2) she was never paid for any assistance she gave to Cranmore 
on the few occasions when she assisted him with his business; (3) she never 
received, nor was it ever intended that she would receive, any profit from 
Cranmore's business activities; (4) she never received any of the proceeds of 
the loans Edler made to Cranmore, either directly or indirectly, nor did she 
ever ask for or receive any money or loans from Edler; and (5) she never entered 
into any agreement, either orally or in writing, to repay moneys Edler loaned to 
Cranmore.

 
 

[¶7.]     To counter this 
assertion of facts, Edler introduced her own answers to interrogatories in which 
she related that, from the very beginning, Cranmore represented to her that 
Rogers was his partner and that Rogers was actively 
involved in the purchase of cars and farm equipment for which Edler advanced 
money. She also related that, during a period of time after the loans had been 
made to Cranmore, Rogers acted in a capacity to suggest she and 
Cranmore were business partners. Edler attested Rogers picked up and delivered cars, made 
numerous telephone calls related to business, and attended automobile auctions. 
Throughout her answers, Edler repeatedly said she was told by Cranmore that 
Rogers was his partner, but beyond that she was 
unable to offer any evidence that Rogers was, in fact, Cranmore's partner. Edler 
did not dispute in her affidavit and other evidence that she did not meet 
Rogers until 
after the loans had been made to Cranmore. Edler did testify the agreement she 
had with Cranmore was oral and no writing of any sort existed. Basically, Edler 
lent money to Cranmore, and he told her she would be repaid for the loans as 
well as receive one-half of any profits realized by the venture. Edler also 
introduced Rogers' deposition in which Rogers related she had a 
personal relationship with Cranmore, lent money to him, assisted him 
occasionally in his automobile business, and had been repaid by him for the 
loans she made to him. The repayments were in the forms of cash and art 
work.

 
 

[¶8.]     In resolving the issue 
presented in this appeal, we must employ our well-established principles for 
reviewing the award of a summary judgment. Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341 
(Wyo. 1989). 
In her brief, Edler addressed both the grant of the summary judgment and the 
dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim. The parties presented 
matters outside the pleadings, and they were considered by the district court. 
Only the part of the district court's judgment and order which granted summary 
judgment in favor of Rogers is effective. See W.R.C.P. 12(b) and 
Robinson v. Bell, 767 P.2d 177 (Wyo. 
1989).

 
 

[¶9.]     Edler argues Cranmore 
convinced her she could make money by investing in his business, and, therefore, 
she loaned money to Cranmore and Rogers. However, the record does not 
support her claims. Despite Edler's assertions that Rogers was actively involved 
in Cranmore's business from the very beginning and that Cranmore told her Rogers 
was his partner, she did not dispute the fact she did not meet Rogers until 
after she had made the loans to Cranmore. Edler has not presented any authority 
for the proposition that, under the circumstances presented by this case, the 
evidence she presented to counter Rogers' denial of the existence of a 
partnership, or any other business relationship, is sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact. The only evidence Edler could muster in 
counterpoint to the evidence offered by Rogers 
was that Cranmore told Edler that Rogers was his partner. The basic elements of a 
partnership or a joint venture are that the parties agree to share in some way 
the profits and losses of the business venture. True v. HiPlains Elevator 
Machinery, Inc., 577 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1978). See also 12 Am.Jur. P.O.F.2d 295, 
Existence of Joint Venture (1977), and 4 Am.Jur. P.O.F.2d 355, Status as 
Partners (1975). The only facts Edler had at her disposal which could serve as 
evidence of the existence of a partnership or joint venture were events which 
occurred after she had made the loans to Cranmore. The things which 
Rogers did, and 
which Edler was aware of after she had loaned the money to Cranmore, cannot 
serve to establish the existence of a partnership at the time the loans were 
made. Edler could not have been relying upon those facts when she made the 
loans, and her decision to loan the money could not have been affected by them. 
Miller v. Cooney, 416 So. 2d 1196 (Fla.App. 1982); Scott v. Bryn Mawr Arms, Inc., 
454 Pa. 304, 
312 A.2d 592 (1973); Piggly-Wiggly Stores v. Lowenstein, 197 Ind. 62, 147 N.E. 771 (1925); 31A C.J.S., Evidence § 298 (1964).

 
 

[¶10.]  Even considering all matters which were 
presented to the district court in the light most favorable to Edler, we are 
compelled to hold that no genuine issue of material fact existed which prevented 
the district court from entering a summary judgment in favor of Rogers.

 
 

[¶11.]  Affirmed.