Case Title: Gerald Tyler v. The Riverbank

Citation: 2007 WI 33

Docket Number: 2005AP002336

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 33 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2336 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Gerald Tyler, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
The Riverbank, 
          Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
 
ABC Insurance Company, 
          Defendant, 
 
     v. 
 
Bianca Tyler, 
          Third-Party Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 21, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 31, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Polk   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert Rasmussen 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Stephanie L. Finn, Jay E. Heit, Dennis M. Sullivan, and Herrick 
& Hart, S.C., Eau Claire, and oral argument by Dennis M. 
Sullivan. 
 
For the defendant-third-party plaintiff-respondent there 
was a brief by Peter M. Reinhardt and Bakke Norman SC, 
Menomonie, and oral argument by Peter M. Reinhardt. 
 
2007 WI 33
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2336  
(L.C. No. 
2002CV98) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Gerald Tyler, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
The RiverBank, 
 
          Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
 
ABC Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant, 
 
     v. 
 
Bianca Tyler, 
 
          Third-Party Defendant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 21, 2007 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of an unpublished 
court of appeals order that dismissed Gerald Tyler's (Tyler) 
No. 
2005AP2336   
 
2 
 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.1  Tyler appealed after a jury 
found in favor of The RiverBank (RiverBank) and the Polk County 
Circuit Court, Robert H. Rasmussen, Judge, denied his post-
verdict motions. 
¶2 
The issue presented is whether Tyler filed a timely 
notice of appeal2 subsequent to the circuit court entering the 
final 
judgment 
or 
final 
order 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1)(2005-06).3  We hold that Tyler filed a 
timely notice of appeal because the June 16, 2005 Judgment, and 
                                                 
1 Tyler v. The RiverBank, No. 2005AP2336, unpublished order 
(Wis. Ct. App. March 3, 2006). 
2 Section 808.04(1)(2005-06) states: 
Initiating an appeal. An appeal to the court of 
appeals must be initiated within 45 days of entry of a 
final judgment or order appealed from if written 
notice of the entry of a final judgment or order is 
given within 21 days of the final judgment or order as 
provided in s. 806.06 (5), or within 90 days of entry 
if notice is not given, except as provided in this 
section or otherwise expressly provided by law. Time 
limits for seeking review of a nonfinal judgment or 
order are established in s. 809.50. 
3 Section 
808.03(1) 
provides, 
in 
pertinent 
part, 
the 
following:  
Appeals as of right. A final judgment or a final order 
of a circuit court may be appealed as a matter of 
right to the court of appeals unless otherwise 
expressly provided by law. A final judgment or final 
order is a judgment, order or disposition that 
disposes of the entire matter in litigation as to one 
or more of the parties, whether rendered in an action 
or special proceeding . . . . 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version, unless otherwise stated. 
No. 
2005AP2336   
 
3 
 
not the May 24, 2005 Order, constituted the § 808.03(1) 
document.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.4 
¶3 
The 
bench 
and 
bar 
should 
note 
the 
focus 
when 
identifying the final document for purposes of appeal: a final 
document must include an explicit statement either dismissing 
the entire matter in litigation as to one or more parties or 
adjudging the entire matter in litigation as to one or more 
parties.  Focusing on the existence of an explicit statement 
will clarify when a document disposes of the entire matter in 
litigation and is final for purposes of appeal.   
I 
¶4 
This case arose from Tyler’s lawsuit against RiverBank 
for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, 
exemplary damages, and actual attorney’s fees.  Tyler claimed 
that 
RiverBank 
allowed 
unauthorized 
withdrawals 
from 
his 
individual retirement account and certified deposit accounts 
held at the bank.  
¶5 
RiverBank filed a motion for summary judgment on all 
of Tyler's claims.  The circuit court granted RiverBank summary 
judgment in part, specifically for Tyler’s claims related to 
exemplary damages, actual attorney’s fees, and breach of 
fiduciary duty associated with the certified deposit accounts.   
                                                 
4 The court's holding in this matter is consistent with our 
holding in Wambolt v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 2007 WI 
___, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, which has been released 
the same day.  For a more elaborate discussion of the finality 
of judgments and orders pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1), see 
Wambolt.    
No. 
2005AP2336   
 
4 
 
¶6 
Tyler's remaining claims were tried before a jury.  On 
March 31, 2005, the jury found that RiverBank was not liable and 
that Tyler was not damaged.   
¶7 
Tyler filed post-verdict motions.  He challenged the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict. In 
the alternative, he requested a new trial. The court heard his 
motions on May 4, 2005, and denied both.  On May 24, 2005, the 
court entered a document titled "Order Denying Post-Trial 
Motions" (Order).  In the Order, the court denied Tyler’s 
motions and made findings to support its rulings.   
¶8 
On June 16, 2005, the court entered a document titled 
"Judgment" (Judgment).  It read as follows: "Based upon the jury 
verdict of March 31, 2005, the claims of Plaintiff are dismissed 
with prejudice."  
¶9 
Neither party filed a notice of entry of judgment or 
order pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1), meaning Tyler had 90 
days to file a notice of appeal.  Tyler filed a notice of appeal 
88 days after the circuit court entered the Judgment and 110 
days after the circuit court entered the Order.   
¶10 As 
a 
preliminary 
matter, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
questioned 
the 
timeliness 
of 
Tyler's 
notice 
of 
appeal.  
Specifically, it asked the parties whether the Order denying 
Tyler's post-trial motions was the final document for purposes 
of appeal, making Tyler's filing untimely.  RiverBank argued 
that because no substantive issues remained after the court 
denied Tyler's post-trial motions, the Order constituted the 
final document.  Conversely, Tyler argued that the Judgment was 
No. 
2005AP2336   
 
5 
 
the final document for purposes of appeal because the Order 
failed to dispose of all the substantive issues. 
¶11 The court of appeals dismissed Tyler’s appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction.  It agreed with RiverBank that the Order was 
the final document because there was "abundant credible evidence 
to support the jury’s verdict, there were either no errors or 
harmless error at trial, [and] the verdict was not inadequate 
and was consistent with the findings in the verdict form."  The 
court of appeals concluded that after the Order denying post-
trial motions, there were no additional substantive issues to be 
disposed.  Therefore, the Order constituted the final document, 
Tyler failed to file a timely notice of appeal, and the court of 
appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear Tyler's appeal. 
¶12 Tyler filed a petition for review, which was granted.  
The issue presented is whether Tyler filed a timely notice of 
appeal subsequent to the circuit court entering the final 
judgment or order pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  This 
presents a question of law, which is reviewed de novo.  Harder 
v. Pfitzinger, 2004 WI 102, ¶8, 274 Wis. 2d 324, 682 N.W.2d 398.  
II 
¶13 Whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction over 
Tyler's appeal turns on which of two documents constitutes the 
§ 808.03(1) document.  If the Order is the final document, Tyler 
failed to file a timely notice of appeal: he would have been 20 
days late.  If the Judgment is the final document, Tyler 
succeeded in filing a timely notice of appeal: he would have had 
two days to spare.  The opposing potential outcomes of this case 
No. 
2005AP2336   
 
6 
 
highlight the significance of accurately identifying the final 
document.   
¶14 The statutory language providing that a final judgment 
or a final order triggers a litigant's ability to appeal as of 
right, provides, in pertinent part, the following:  "A final 
judgment or final order is a judgment, order or disposition that 
disposes of the entire matter in litigation as to one or more of 
the parties."  Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  This court has recently 
held that: 
when an order or a judgment that disposes of all of 
the substantive issues is entered in the litigation, 
as to one or more parties, as a matter of law, the 
circuit court intended it to be the final document for 
purposes of appeal, notwithstanding the label it bears 
or subsequent actions taken by the circuit court. 
Harder, 274 Wis. 2d 324, ¶2.  Viewing the documents presented in 
the Harder case, we concluded that the circuit court's order for 
judgment was final because it was an "unequivocal order to 
dismiss all of the claims against each party."  Id., ¶17.   
¶15 As we noted in Wambolt v. Illinois Farmers Insurance 
Co., 2007 WI ___, ¶29, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, Harder 
does three things.   
First, it ties the determination of whether a circuit 
court intends a document to be final to the question 
of 
whether 
that 
document 
disposes 
of 
all 
the 
substantive issues in litigation as to one or more 
parties.  Second, it establishes that a document 
containing explicit language dismissing an entire 
matter as to one or more parties disposes of the 
entire matter as to those parties.  Third, it 
demonstrates that neither the label of a document nor 
the subsequent actions taken by the circuit court is 
No. 
2005AP2336   
 
7 
 
dispositive 
of 
that 
document's 
finality 
under 
§ 808.03(1). 
¶16 In spite of this court's effort in Harder, confusion 
remains 
as 
parties 
and 
courts 
attempt 
to 
identify 
the 
§ 808.03(1) document.  Two scenarios seem to cause confusion.  
Scenario one is when a document, other than a judgment or order, 
arguably disposes of the entire matter in litigation as to one 
or more parties.5  Scenario two is when a court enters two 
documents and each arguably disposes of the entire matter in 
litigation as to one or more parties.  This case falls into 
scenario two because the court entered the Judgment subsequent 
to entering the Order.  The parties each argue that a different 
document constitutes the final document for purposes of appeal.   
¶17 A common area of confusion in both scenarios is the 
meaning of the term "dispose."  To dispose of an entire matter 
in litigation, a court must make an explicit statement of 
finality.  A court disposes of the entire matter in litigation 
in one of two ways: (1) by explicitly dismissing the entire 
matter in litigation as to one or more parties or (2) by 
explicitly adjudging the entire matter in litigation as to one 
or more parties.  To define "dispose" in the negative, a court 
merely addressing, or deciding, substantive issues is not enough 
to qualify as disposing of them. 
¶18 This case provides an example of the difference 
between disposing of the entire matter of litigation as to one 
                                                 
5 Although the first scenario does not arise in this case, 
the court dealt with that issue in Wambolt, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
which was released today.          
No. 
2005AP2336   
 
8 
 
or more parties and addressing all of the substantive issues.  
With 
Harder and § 808.03(1) as our guides, we turn to 
determining which of the two documents in this case was final.   
¶19 The Order, in and of itself, does not dispose of the 
entire matter in litigation.  Its language is narrowly focused 
on deciding Tyler's post-trial motions.  The Order stated the 
following, in pertinent part: 
This 
matter 
came 
before 
the 
Honorable 
Robert 
Rasumussen on May 4, 2005, pursuant to Plaintiff's 
Motions 
after 
Verdict. . . .  
The 
Court 
having 
considered the parties' briefs and upon hearing the 
parties' oral arguments, 
FINDS AND ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:   
1. 
Plaintiff's motion to change answers in the 
verdict, pursuant to Wis. Stats. Section 805.14, 
is denied. 
2. 
The Court finds that the record is replete with 
abundant credible evidence to support the jury's 
verdict in this case.  The statutory grounds to 
change answers in the verdict are, therefore, not 
present in this case. 
3. 
Plaintiff's request for a new trial based upon 
errors in the trial is denied. 
4. 
The Court finds that there were no errors in the 
trial. 
5. 
The Court finds that, in the event errors did 
occur, 
any 
errors 
would 
constitute 
harmless 
error. 
6. 
Plaintiff's request for a new trial based upon 
his 
contention that the jury's verdict was 
against the weight of the credible evidence is 
denied. 
7. 
The Court finds that there was abundant credible 
evidence to support the verdict and that the 
No. 
2005AP2336   
 
9 
 
verdict was not against the weight of the 
credible evidence. 
8. 
Plaintiff's request for a new trial based upon 
his contention that the jury's verdict [is] 
against the weight of the credible evidence is 
denied. 
9. 
The Court finds that the jury verdict was not 
inadequate 
and 
the 
portions 
of 
the 
jury's 
verdict, 
as 
challenged 
by 
plaintiff, 
were 
consistent with its findings in the verdict form 
and its answers to the questions preceding the 
challenged questions. 
10. 
Plaintiff's request for a new trial, in the 
interests of justice is denied.  
11. 
The Court finds that the plaintiff was afforded, 
in all respects, a fair trial, that there is 
substantial evidence in the record to support the 
jury's verdict, and that there is nothing in the 
record to justify a new trial. 
12. 
Plaintiff's request for a new trial, in the 
interests of justice, is denied. 
Although the Order includes a series of motion denials and 
findings to support them, it does not include any language 
related to the disposal of Tyler's claims.  The Order lacked any 
language such as, "the claims of the Plaintiff are dismissed 
with prejudice."    
¶20 Likely, because of our lack of precision in defining 
"dispose" previously, the court of appeals focused on whether 
the court decided the substantive issues.  It agreed with 
RiverBank that the Order was the final document because there 
was "abundant credible evidence to support the jury’s verdict, 
there were either no errors or harmless error at trial, [and] 
the verdict was not inadequate and was consistent with the 
No. 
2005AP2336   
 
10 
 
findings in the verdict form."  The court of appeals concluded 
that after the Order denying post-trial motions, there were no 
additional substantive issues to be disposed.   
¶21 The court of appeals' analysis focuses on Tyler's 
chances of prevailing on his claims after the denial of his 
post-verdict motions, rather than whether the court actually 
disposed of Tyler's claims.  It considered the evidence, the 
potential nature of any errors at trial, and characteristics of 
the verdict, but did not consider that the Order lacked an 
explicit statement disposing of Tyler's claims.  Because the 
Order lacked an explicit statement that disposed of Tyler's 
claims, we conclude that the Order did not constitute the 
§ 808.03(1) document.       
¶22 The Judgment, while simple, disposed of the entire 
matter in litigation by stating the following: "Based upon the 
jury verdict of March 31, 2005, the claims of Plaintiff are 
dismissed with prejudice."  The language leaves no doubt that 
the court disposed of all of Tyler's claims.  It constitutes the 
§ 808.03(1) document because it is the first and only document 
to dispose of the entire matter in litigation after the jury 
verdict. 
¶23 We hold that Tyler filed a timely notice of appeal 
because the Judgment, and not the Order, constituted the 
§ 808.03(1) document. 
III 
¶24 The Harder court took the opportunity to "stress again 
the desirability of drafting the final document—be it an order 
No. 
2005AP2336   
 
11 
 
or judgment—to specifically state that it is intended to be the 
final document in the litigation for purposes of appeal."  
Harder, 274 Wis. 2d 324, ¶18.  Unfortunately, the friendly 
suggestion failed to take hold as a uniform practice.  
¶25 Today, the court has taken a further step to provide a 
definitive 
means 
of 
knowing 
whether 
a 
document 
is 
the 
§ 808.03(1) document.  From September 1, 2007 forward, the final 
document will have "a statement on the face of [it] that it is 
final for the purpose of appeal.  Absent such a statement, 
appellate 
courts should liberally construe ambiguities to 
preserve the right of appeal."  Wambolt, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶3.  
This rule, when applied with § 808.03(1), provides a clear means 
of determining when the time to file a notice of appeal 
commences.   
¶26 For clarity, note that a document constitutes the 
final document for purposes of appeal when it satisfies each of 
the following conditions: (1) it has been entered by the circuit 
court, (2) it disposes of the entire matter in litigation as to 
one or more parties, and (3) it states on the face of the 
document that it is the final document for purposes of appeal.  
In the (hopefully) rare cases where a document would otherwise 
constitute the final document, but for not including a finality 
statement, courts will construe the document liberally in favor 
of preserving the right to appeal.       
IV 
¶27 We conclude that Tyler filed a timely notice of appeal 
because the Judgment constituted the § 808.03(1) document.  
No. 
2005AP2336   
 
12 
 
Although the Order addressed the substantive issues of the case, 
it did not dispose of the entire matter in litigation as to one 
or more parties.  The Judgment disposed of the entire matter in 
litigation as to one or more parties.  Because Tyler filed a 
timely notice of appeal, the court of appeals had jurisdiction.     
¶28 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No. 
2005AP2336   
 
 
 
1