Case Title: Commonwealth v. Robinson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2024-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-08464 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CHARLES ROBINSON. 
 
 
 
Barnstable.     September 11, 2023. - March 22, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Appeal, Competency to stand 
trial, Assistance of counsel, Presumptions and burden of 
proof, Judicial discretion, New trial.  Evidence, 
Competency, Expert opinion.  Constitutional Law, Assistance 
of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 1, 2000. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 482 Mass. 741 (2019), a 
second amended motion for a new trial, filed on September 2, 
2020, was considered by Mark C. Gildea, J. 
 
 
 
Joseph F. Krowski for the defendant. 
 
Rose-Ellen El Khoury, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
 
1 Justice Lowy participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  On August 21, 2000, the defendant, Charles 
Robinson, was convicted of murder in the first degree in 
connection with the shooting death of Edward Figueroa.  The 
defendant appealed from the conviction.  He also filed a motion 
for a new trial alleging multiple errors by trial counsel, which 
we remanded to the Superior Court.  The direct appeal was argued 
before the motion for a new trial was heard and decided.  After 
plenary review, we affirmed the conviction and declined to grant 
extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See 
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 482 Mass. 741, 742 (2019).  The 
defendant's motion for a new trial thereafter was denied.  He 
appealed from the denial, arguing that the judge erred in 
concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial 
due to incompetency and ineffective assistance of counsel.  We 
now affirm that ruling.   
Background.  We present the relevant factual and procedural 
background as taken from the record, reserving certain details 
for later discussion.   
1.  The homicide.2  The victim sold marijuana for the 
defendant and relied on friends to drive him to the defendant's 
 
2 The evidence presented in the defendant's trial is 
summarized in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 482 Mass. 741, 742-744 
(2019).  We provide a condensed version of events as the jury 
could have found them.  
 
3 
 
home to pick up the marijuana.  On the evening of the murder, 
the defendant went to the victim's apartment, where he scolded 
the victim and threatened to slap and punch him because he did 
not have access to a car.  When the victim's girlfriend returned 
to the apartment later that evening, she found the victim dead 
with multiple gunshot wounds. 
2.  The lockup conversation.  On the fifth day of trial, 
trial counsel had a conversation with the defendant in the court 
house lockup area about whether the defendant would testify.  
During the conversation, the defendant made various 
nonresponsive comments.3  However, the defendant ultimately 
 
3 Trial counsel had a stenographer present for the 
conversation.  The following is excerpted from the transcript: 
 
Trial counsel:  "What is your -- what do you -- what do you 
want to say about whether or not you will testify?"  
 
. . . 
 
The defendant:  "Well, I feel that I shouldn't take part -- 
excuse my English on that one.  This is not my court." 
 
Trial counsel:  "No.  I understand. . . .  Do you have any 
-- do you have any questions for me about what we're doing 
now, what I'm asking you to comment on?" 
 
The defendant:  "Well, it's just this is -- this is a very 
Godly, Christly, Jesus Christ type of situation.  And I'm 
not sure you're representing me correctly here."  
 
. . . 
 
Trial counsel:  "And the question I'm asking now of you 
about whether or not you wish to give testimony, I 
personally don't think there is much you could say that 
4 
 
stated that he was "clear on" what trial counsel was asking and 
"would not like to take the stand."  During the conversation, 
trial counsel suggested to the defendant that he might require a 
 
could assist you in the trial; and that's why I'm asking 
you these things." 
 
The defendant:  "My testimony would be in my music." 
 
. . . 
 
Trial counsel:  "Well, Charles, do you know what you're 
here for?  I mean, you understand my function and the 
District Attorney's and the Judge's function, right?  I 
mean, you're not getting into something --" 
 
The defendant:  "All right."  
 
Trial counsel:  "-- where you're confused, are you?"  
 
The defendant:  "No."  
 
Trial counsel:  "I know you're an extremely intelligent 
man.  So you're not confused about what's going on this 
week, right?"  
 
The defendant:  "Well, yes, I am rather confused." 
 
Trial counsel:  "What are you confused about?" 
 
The defendant:  "Excuse me.  Excuse my English.  Nothing." 
 
Trial counsel:  "Your English isn't bad.  What do you mean?  
What's the matter with your English?  I'm having no trouble 
understanding you." 
 
The defendant [to stenographer]:  "Put down some laughs." 
 
. . . 
 
Trial counsel:  "[T]his concerns me when you start talking 
like this, laughing like you don't really know what's going 
on.  You almost seem to me to [be] calling out for me to 
get a psychiatrist or something to talk to you." 
5 
 
psychiatric examination.  However, trial counsel did not raise 
any concerns related to the defendant's competency or mental 
health with the judge after the lockup conversation or at any 
time during trial.   
3.  Postconviction.  On August 22, 2000, the day after his 
conviction, and at the request of his appellate counsel, Dr. 
Carol E. Montgomery evaluated the defendant and concluded in her 
report that he had no symptoms of mental illness and that no 
follow up was necessary.  A little over seven months later, the 
defendant was committed involuntarily to Bridgewater State 
Hospital (Bridgewater) for "symptoms of a manic psychosis."  See 
G. L. c. 123, § 18 (a).  Later that year, the defendant filed a 
motion for a new trial alleging that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence on 
the defendant's lack of competency to stand trial.   
The defendant was transferred back and forth between 
Bridgewater and State prison over the next few years.  In 
December 2003, Dr. David Rosmarin diagnosed the defendant with 
schizoaffective disorder and "periods of mania" that could be 
controlled with medication.  Rosmarin also opined that a 
psychiatric evaluation at the time of trial "would have clearly 
shown [the defendant] to be incompetent."  In June 2004, at an 
evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial 
based on the issue of competency, the judge suspended the 
6 
 
hearing and ordered a psychological evaluation for the defendant 
due to the defendant's behavior.  See G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a).  
Because proceedings were delayed due to the defendant's ensuing 
periods of incompetency and consequent institutionalizations, on 
March 16, 2011, the judge issued an order:  
(a) "that the court will take no further action on the 
prior motions"; 
 
(b) "that the defendant may file an amended motion . . . 
that clearly sets forth the factual and legal bases for 
relief";  
 
(c) "that the amended motion must be accompanied by either 
a detailed supporting affidavit of an appropriate mental 
health professional or the affidavit of counsel together 
with the detailed clinical report of an appropriate mental 
health professional"; and  
 
(d) "that in the event the court conducts a hearing on the 
amended motion[,] said hearing will commence anew, without 
reliance upon the testimony and arguments presented on past 
occasions."   
 
In support of his amended motion submitted in 2014, the 
defendant employed Dr. Ronald S. Ebert to evaluate the 
defendant's competency.  Based on his "clinical opinion to a 
reasonable degree of psychological certainty," Ebert concluded 
in his report that the defendant "was not competent to stand 
trial on [the day of the lockup conversation]."  He also noted 
that the defendant "was demonstrating signs of major mental 
illness" during the lockup conversation "but was, as usual, 
trying to hide them." 
7 
 
In 2016 and 2019, respectively, the Commonwealth and 
appellate counsel each had an expert assess whether the 
defendant was competent at the time of trial.  They arrived at 
nearly opposite conclusions.  The Commonwealth's expert, Dr. 
Martin J. Kelly, concluded that the defendant "did not suffer 
from a mental disease, mental defect or other psychiatric 
condition that resulted in the inability to have a rational and 
factual understanding of the proceedings and to cooperate with 
his attorney."  The defendant's expert, Dr. Frank DiCataldo, 
concluded that the defendant was psychotic at the time of trial, 
and that his psychosis "likely" distorted his ability to 
understand the proceedings and impaired his ability to consult 
with his attorney.     
In September 2020, the defendant amended his motion for a 
new trial, submitting DiCataldo's report to support his claim of 
incompetency.  In addition to claiming ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failing to raise the incompetency issue, the 
defendant included three additional reasons that his trial 
counsel was ineffective:  (1) failure to move to dismiss the 
case based on an error in the grand jury proceedings, (2) 
failure to move to suppress cell site location information 
(CSLI) that tied the defendant to the crime scene at the 
relevant time period, and (3) failure "reasonably to 
communicate" with the defendant.  On July 30, 2021, a different 
8 
 
judge (motion judge) denied the motion without a hearing, and 
the defendant appealed.    
Discussion.  1.  Scope and standard of review.  The 
defendant's direct appeal initially was stayed so that his first 
motion for a new trial could be decided.  When the hearing on 
that motion was suspended, the stay on the direct appeal was 
lifted, and we heard and decided the direct appeal.  Because the 
defendant filed his first motion for a new trial prior to the 
issuance of the rescript for the direct appeal, he need not 
petition the single justice as gatekeeper for leave to appeal 
from the denial of the claims in that original motion.  See 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See also Commonwealth v. Raymond, 450 
Mass. 729, 729 n.1 (2008).  However, the claims added to the 
defendant's amended motion for a new trial after the direct 
appeal was decided -- namely, the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims unrelated to his competency to stand trial -- are 
not reviewable without first seeking leave from the gatekeeper.  
See G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We review the remaining claims 
underlying the defendant's first motion for a new trial for an 
abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 
491, 498 (2020) ("A motion for a new trial is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the judge.  '[A]n appellate court will 
examine the motion judge's conclusion only to determine whether 
9 
 
there has been a significant error of law or other abuse of 
discretion'" [citation omitted]).   
2.  Evidentiary hearing.  As an initial matter, the 
defendant claims that the motion judge erred by denying the 
motion without an evidentiary hearing on the question of the 
defendant's competency to stand trial.  Like the decision on a 
motion for a new trial, the decision whether to hold an 
evidentiary hearing or to decide the motion based on affidavits 
and other documents "is left largely to the sound discretion of 
the judge."  Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 579 (1982), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 253, 257 (1981).   
A judge may decide a motion for a new trial on the papers 
alone "if no substantial issue is raised by the motion or 
affidavits."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3), as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001).  "In determining whether a 'substantial 
issue' meriting an evidentiary hearing under rule 30 has been 
raised, we look not only at the seriousness of the issue 
asserted, but also to the adequacy of the defendant's showing on 
the issue raised."  Stewart, 383 Mass. at 257-258.  Although the 
judge recognized the question of the defendant's competency as a 
serious issue, he determined that an evidentiary hearing was not 
required based on the defendant's submissions.  There was no 
abuse of discretion.   
10 
 
The documents presented to the judge included, among 
others, expert reports and other evaluations of the defendant's 
mental health, the trial transcript, and the transcribed 
conversation in the lockup between the defendant and trial 
counsel.4    
The judge determined that an evidentiary hearing was not 
necessary to decide the motion where the dispute centers on the 
conclusion each party draws from an undisputed record.  See 
Commonwealth v. Shuman, 445 Mass. 268, 279 (2005) (dispute among 
experts does not automatically require evidentiary hearing).  
This is especially true here, where the defendant requested an 
evidentiary hearing in 2021 that would involve the testimony of 
expert witnesses who opined in 2016 and 2019 respectively on the 
defendant's competency at a trial that took place in 2000.  See 
Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 631, 640 (2001) 
("Given the passage of time, the dimming of memories, and the 
deaths of the primary witnesses . . . an evidentiary hearing was 
likely to be of more theoretical than actual assistance").  At 
bottom, there was no showing that, in addition to the evidence 
 
4 The defendant also submitted affidavits from the 
defendant's mother and the mother of his children, describing 
the defendant's unusual behavior in the years prior to the 
murder.  The judge concluded that testimony from these affiants 
would be unhelpful as there was no indication that they would 
provide information beyond what was contained in the affidavits.  
See Commonwealth v. DeVincent, 421 Mass. 64, 68 (1995).    
 
11 
 
submitted, an evidentiary hearing would have aided the judge in 
deciding the issue.  See Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 442 Mass. 
341, 348 (2004).  Thus, the judge did not abuse his discretion 
by deciding the motion without one.5 
3.  Claims.  a.  Incompetency claim.  It is 
unconstitutional under both the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights to try (and convict) a person who is not 
competent to stand trial.  See Commonwealth v. Chatman, 473 
Mass. 840, 846 (2016) (Chatman II).  Rather than being dependent 
upon the "presence or absence of any particular psychiatric 
diagnosis," whether a defendant is competent to stand trial 
depends on his or her "functional abilities."  Id. at 846-847, 
quoting Goodreau, 442 Mass. at 350.  That is, a defendant is 
competent to stand trial if he or she (1) has "sufficient 
present ability to consult with his [or her] counsel with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding," and (2) has a 
 
5 The defendant also argues that he is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing because the 2011 order directing the 
defendant to file an amended motion for a new trial "presumed a 
future hearing."  This argument is misplaced.  The order 
provides that "in the event the court conducts a hearing on the 
amended motion[,] said hearing will commence anew" (emphasis 
added).  Thus, contrary to the defendant's contention, there was 
never an underlying presumption that a new hearing would be held 
on his motion.   
12 
 
"rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings" 
(citation omitted).  Chatman II, supra at 847.   
If a defendant raises the issue of his competency before or 
during trial, the Commonwealth has the burden to prove both 
prongs by a preponderance of the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 449 Mass. 747, 760 (2007).  However, where, as here, the 
defendant failed to raise the issue until after his conviction, 
it is he who has the burden of proof.  The defendant must 
demonstrate "by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
Commonwealth would not have prevailed had the issue been raised 
at trial."  Chatman II, 473 Mass. at 847, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Chatman, 466 Mass. 327, 336 (2013) (Chatman I).  That is, the 
"defendant bears the burden of establishing that, had the issue 
been raised before or during trial, the Commonwealth could not 
have proved either the first or the second prong of the 
competency test."  Chatman II, supra.  To satisfy this burden, 
"the defendant need not make a showing that he was incompetent; 
instead, [he] may satisfy his . . . burden by showing 'that the 
weight of the evidence of competenc[y] and the weight of the 
evidence of incompetenc[y] are in equipoise.'"  Id., quoting 
Chatman I, supra at 336 n.7.  The judge concluded that the 
defendant did not make such a showing.  We agree. 
The defendant and the Commonwealth each engaged an expert 
to render an opinion as to whether the transcribed lockup 
13 
 
conversation evidenced that the defendant had a mental illness 
at that time affecting his competency to stand trial.   
The defendant's expert, DiCataldo, contended that the 
defendant's unusual statements during the lockup conversation 
were "indicative of underlying psychotic thinking."  DiCataldo 
concluded that the defendant was "psychotic" at the time of 
trial, and that the "psychosis likely distort[ed] his rational 
understanding of the proceedings against him and significantly 
impair[ed] his ability to meaningfully consult with his 
attorney."6   
Although DiCataldo referenced Montgomery's report, in which 
she arrived at the opposite conclusion after examining the 
defendant four days after the lockup conversation, he made no 
attempt to explain the variance.  Moreover, in noting that other 
evaluators subsequently opined that the defendant was mentally 
ill, DiCataldo did not contend with the fact that the first such 
diagnosis did not occur until almost eight months after his 
trial.   
The Commonwealth's expert, Kelly, opined that the lockup 
conversation was not an indication that the defendant was 
 
6 DiCataldo did not reach a conclusion regarding the 
defendant's competency to stand trial, stating, "To observe his 
psychosis would have required directly talking with him and 
asking him about his perceptions and beliefs about the trial 
proceedings." 
14 
 
mentally ill, and that he was competent to stand trial.  
Remarking that an acute psychiatric condition would have 
manifested itself during the trial, Kelly noted that there was 
nothing in the trial transcript indicating that the defendant 
behaved in an unusual manner at all.   
Kelly also found relevant the results of Montgomery's 
evaluation of the defendant the day after he was convicted (four 
days after the lockup conversation).  Specifically, Montgomery 
observed that the defendant was calm and cooperative, his speech 
was "well modulated," and his thought process was "organized" 
and "goal oriented."  She also noted that the defendant did not 
complain of problems with sleep, concentration, or 
hallucinations.  Montgomery concluded that the defendant did not 
suffer from any mental illness at that time and that a follow-up 
appointment was not necessary.  As a result, it was Kelly's 
opinion that rather than documenting a "delusional or psychotic 
mental condition," the transcribed lockup conversation reflected 
a realization on the part of the defendant that "it was not 
particularly in his interest" to have the conversation recorded.   
Given the record, the judge credited the opinion of Kelly, 
the Commonwealth's expert, which was based on the information 
closest in time to the defendant's condition at trial, and thus 
15 
 
the most salient.7  The judge ultimately concluded that the 
defendant made a logical decision not to testify in his own 
defense and communicated that decision to his attorney.  There 
was no abuse of discretion.   
b.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
contends that his counsel was ineffective on a number of fronts, 
including counsel's (1) failure to raise the competency issue, 
(2) failure to "reasonably . . . communicate with" the 
defendant, (3) failure to move to dismiss the case based on an 
error in the grand jury proceedings, and (4) failure to move to 
suppress CSLI that tied the defendant to the crime scene at the 
relevant time period.  However, as mentioned supra, only claims 
raised before the issuance of the rescript for the direct appeal 
are reviewable under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, without a preliminary 
determination by a gatekeeper.  As the first motion for a new 
trial raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for 
trial counsel's failure to raise the competency issue at trial, 
we limit our review accordingly.   
When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
under § 33E, we evaluate whether a substantial likelihood of a 
 
7 As for the affidavits from the family members, the judge 
considered the credibility of the affidavits in light of the 
family members' motives and ultimately afforded them little, if 
any, weight.  See Commonwealth v. Grant, 426 Mass. 667, 673 
(1998). 
16 
 
miscarriage of justice occurred.  See Commonwealth v. Yat Fung 
Ng, 489 Mass. 242, 249 (2022), S.C., 491 Mass. 247 (2023).  That 
is, we determine whether any error on the part of defense 
counsel was likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion.  
See id.  In order to prevail on the theory that failing to raise 
competency as an issue constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the defendant must show that the claim "would have been 
successful."  Commonwealth v. Comita, 441 Mass. 86, 91 (2004).  
As the motion judge correctly concluded that the competency 
claim lacked merit, the defendant failed to make the necessary 
showing.  There was no error.   
Relatedly, the defendant contends that trial counsel was 
ineffective because he failed "reasonably to communicate with 
[the defendant]."  Although the defendant's argument encompasses 
the entire attorney-client relationship, for the reasons 
explained supra, we focus on trial counsel's work during and 
after the lockup conversation.  According to the defendant, had 
trial counsel "better appreciated [the defendant's] psychosis 
during the lockup conversation," counsel would have requested a 
mental health evaluation and the defendant would not have been 
convicted.  This argument is without merit for reasons stated 
supra.  
Moreover, "to provide a ground for a new trial, the 
breakdown of the attorney-client relationship must be such that 
17 
 
it leads to an apparently unjust verdict, prevents an adequate 
defense or threatens the defendant's right to a fair trial" 
(citations and quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Tuitt, 393 
Mass. 801, 806 (1985).  The defendant's unusual comments 
notwithstanding, the lockup conversation provides no evidence of 
a breakdown of the attorney-client relationship at all, much 
less one that requires a new trial.   
4.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant 
requests relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, in the form of a new 
trial.  We reviewed the entire record of this case when it was 
before this court on direct appeal and rejected the defendant's 
request for extraordinary relief under § 33E at that time.  See 
Robinson, 482 Mass. at 753.  We see no basis to revisit that 
ruling. 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the order denying 
the defendant's motion for a new trial is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.