Case Title: STATE v GRIFFIN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1975-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12784 I N THE SUPKEME C O U R T O F THE STATE OF MONTANA 1975 THE STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and ~ e s p o n d e n t , -vs - FREDDIE STARR GRIFFIN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Paul Hatfield, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Dennis Conner argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, He1 ena, Montana Carl J. Kraft argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana Michael T. Greely, appeared, Deputy County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: January 14, 1975 Decided : MAY - 6 1975 F i l e d : :yibj 5 ~ t j / S - Clerk M r . ~ u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment of conviction f o r the s a l e of dangerous drugs entered i n the d i s t r i c t court, Cascade County. Defendant Freddie S t a r r Griffin was charged i n the d i s t r i c t court on August 31, 1973, on Count I with t h e crime of the s a l e of dangerous drugs and on Court I1 with a s s a u l t on a juvenile boy with the i n t e n t t o commit a felony, to-wit: In- famous crime against nature. Court appointed counsel appeared with defendant and he was arraigned before Hon. Truman Bradford on September 5 , 1973. A plea of not g u i l t y was entered and t r i a l was s e t f o r September 24, 1973 a t the hour of 9:30 a.m. The s t a t e on September 10, 1973 f i l e d notice of i n t e n t t o seek increased punishment pursuant t o section 95-1506, R.C.M. 1947, a s a prior convicted felon pursuant t o section 94-4713, R.C.M. 1947. The s t a t e l i s t e d 8 p r i o r convictions of robbery and burglary i n the s t a t e s of California, Nevada and Montana on which defendant was sentenced t o prison on 6, and given proba- t i o n on 2. The 1957 Montana robbery conviction indicates a ten year sentence a t Deer Lodge, Montana. O n September 19, 1973 defendant f i l e d pro s e three handwritten motions i n good and acceptable form with the court: (1) That the $25,000 b a i l was excessive and he, being of Indian blood and poor, suggested b a i l of $10,000 t o uphold the fairness of the court t o a l l concerned. (2) That defendant's court appointed attorney be dismissed. That defendant i s t o r e t a i n counsel of h i s choice, alleging it imperative the request be granted a s soon a s possible because he had been i n custody four weeks and had had one court appearance with the court appointed counsel. (3) A motion t o disqualify Judge Bradford on t h e grounds t h a t various sources had informed him t h a t Hon. Bradford i s prejudiced against Indians and defendant i s an American Indian; t h a t Judge Bradford be dismissed from the case, with no disrespect, but only a s a well intentioned request. Hon. Truman Bradford heard the motions on September 19, 1973. The court granted defendant on an order t o show cause u n t i l September 21, 1973 t o hear the motion f o r disqualification of the judge f o r a c t u a l b i a s ; the court further gave defendant u n t i l September 20, 1973, a t 5 p.m., t o n o t i f y t h e court a s t o whether he had retained h i s own counsel. O n September 21, 1973, Hon. Paul Hatfield, s i t t i n g f o r Judge Bradford, and defendant appearing with o r i g i n a l court appointed counsel, granted t h e motion f o r substitution of counsel, a public defender, a s de- fendant had no funds f o r private counsel. The remaining two pro s e motions were not acted on and were stricken a t t h a t time; the court r u l i n g defendant would have t o a c t through counsel. Hon. Robert Nelson heard the motion t o disqualify Hon. Truman Brad- ford f o r b i a s on September 21, 1973, defendant appeared i n court with the second public defender. Notion was denied and t r i a l r e s e t f o r November 26, 1973. O n September 26, 1973, new counsel f i l e d disqualification of Judge Bradford under the s t a t u t e . Judge Paul Hatfield accepted jurisdiction on September 28, 1973 and on the same day Judge Hatfield reduced bond t o the sum of $2,000. The bond was approved October 15, 1973, and defendant was released. N e w counsel f i l e d and argued a motion t o suppress evidence which the court denied on November 28, 1973 a f t e r b r i e f s had been f i l e d . Meantime, the November 26, 1973 t r i a l date had been vacated. O n December 5, 1973, t r i a l date was s e t f o r January 14, 1974. O n December 10, 1973, motion was f i l e d by second court appointed counsel t o be relieved a s counsel, a t defendant's re- quest. Defendant appeared with paid counsel on December 12 and the court granted the motion f o r the public defender t o with- draw. Paid counsel then, on January 7 , 1974 on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l grounds, f i l e d motions f o r dismissal and continuance. O n January 10, 1974 hearing was had, the motions denied, and t r i a l r e s e t f o r January 15, 1974. O n January 14 defendant, with paid counsel, moved the court t o withdraw the plea of not g u i l t y t o the charge of s a l e of dangerous drugs and enter a plea of guilty. Court s e t the date f o r sentencing a s February 14, 1974, t o allow time f o r pre- sentence investigation. Defendant continued on bond. O n February 14 defendant's paid counsel appeared with a deputy county attorney but defendant f a i l e d t o appear and a bench warrant of a r r e s t was issued. Defendant was l a t e r arrested i n California, returned t o Montana, and appeared with paid counsel on March 27, 1974. The court granted defendant's motion t o con- tinue sentencing u n t i l A p r i l 3 , 1974 a t 2 p.m. O n April 3, 1974, a t 11:40 a.m. defendant f i l e d pro s e a 5 page handwritten motion and b r i e f t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y plea and requested he be given ample time t o r e t a i n another attorney and prepare f o r t r i a l . H i s motion was aimed generally a t h i s paid counsel. H e alleged he was coerced and threatened by h i s paid counsel and t h e deputy I t county attorney with imprisonment of lengthy endurance"; t h a t he was forced t o change h i s plea t o g u i l t y i n the f i r s t instance; t h a t he was promised a term of s i x months i n the county j a i l f o r h i s plea,and the dismissal of the a s s a u l t charge and p e t i t i o n f o r increased punishment. The t r i a l judge, Hon. Paul Hatfield, heard the motion a t 2 p.m. t h a t day, April 3 , 1974, denied t h e motion t o withdraw defendant's plea, and pronounced sentence, i.e. ten years a t hard labor. H e further granted paid counsel's request t o be relieved of further obligation a s counsel and appointed the public defender a s counsel f o r defendant f o r appeal. O n A p r i l 5 , 1974 t h e s t a t e moved f o r , and was granted, dismissal of the remaining charges against defendant. Judge Hatfield granted a p e t i t i o n by defendant (through counsel) t o proceed with an appeal i n forma pauperis and t h a t he be furnished a t r a n s c r i p t . Counsel f i l e d notice of appeal on behalf of defendant. I n the meantime, defendant proceeded pro s e with a handwritten 5 page motion t o vacate t h e sentence of t h e t r i a l court which he based, i n t h e main, on alleged: undue influence by people who were financially involved when he violated h i s bond agreement; lack of assistance a t sentencing; t h r e a t s by t h e deputy county attorney; and general VIP pressure by people of great influence and prestige. A separate motion was f i l e d 11 requesting a specific" attorney by name t o replace t h e attorney assigned t o him by the court. Defendant was assigned new counsel who appears on t h i s appeal i n h i s behalf but he is not t h e counsel designated i n h i s pro s e motion t o the t r i a l court. Two issues a r e presented t o t h i s Court f o r review: 1. Did the d i s t r i c t court e r r i n accepting defendant's plea of g u i l t y without f i r s t determining t h a t t h e plea was made voluntarily and with an understanding of the charge? 2. Did t h e d i s t r i c t court e r r i n denying defendant's motion t o withdraw h i s plea of g u i l t y ? Defendant alleges t h e court erred i n accepting h i s plea of g u i l t y without f i r s t determining i f the plea was made volun- t a r i l y and with an understanding of the charge. Defendant plead g u i l t y on January 14, 1974 t o the charge of s a l e s of dangerous drugs before d i s t r i c t judge Hon. Paul Hatfield. Defendant a l - leges t h a t a t the time t h e judge did not advise him of h i s r i g h t s nor of the possible sentence he could receive r e s u l t i n g from h i s plea of guilty. Defendant c i t e s two s t a t u t e s which he r e l i e s upon t o support h i s argument. (1) Section 95-1606, R.C.M. 1947, which reads i n pertinent p a r t : 11 Procedure on arraignment. The arraignment i n any court i n t h i s s t a t e must be conducted i n the following manner : 11 (e) * * * The court may refuse t o accept a plea of g u i l t y and s h a l l not accept the plea of g u i l t y without f i r s t determining t h a t the plea i s voluntary with an understanding of the charge. 11 (2) Section 95-1902, R.C.M. 1947, which reads: "Plea of gpilty. Before o r during t r i a l a plea of g u i l t y may be accepted when: "(a) the defendant enters a plea of g u i l t y i n open court; and "(b) the court has informed the defendant of the consequences of h i s plea and of the maximum penalty provided by law which may be imposed upon acceptance of such plea. " A t any time before o r a f t e r judgment the court may f o r good cause shown permit the plea of g u i l t y t o be withdrawn and a plea of not g u i l t y substituted. I I A t the outset, we note the two s t a t u t e s c i t e d t o the Court and heretofore quoted. Each i s properly i d e n t i f i e d and i s designed t o control i t s own specific function i n the criminal procedural process. I f it were otherwise, we would not have two s t a t u t e s on the same subject matter. It would appear from t h e record here t h a t we a r e only concerned with section 95-1902, R.C.M. 1947. Defendant points out t h a t section 95-1902, R.C.M. 1947, was taken from the I l l i n o i s Code of Criminal Procedure, Chap. 38, section 115-2, and c i t e s People v. Washington, 5 I11.2d 58, 124 N.E.2d 890, a s support f o r h i s proposition t h a t t h e judge must inform t h e defendant of h i s r i g h t s and the consequences of a g u i l t y plea before he can accept a g u i l t y plea from defendant. In Washington t h e record did not contain a statement by the court advising defendant, who was represented by counsel, of the e f f e c t of h i s plea of g u i l t y t o the charge of murder. The judgment was reversed and remanded on the basis of I l l i n o i s Revised Statutes 1953, Chap. 38, par. 732, which s t a t e s : 1 I I n cases where t h e party pleads ' g u i l t y ' , such plea s h a l l not be entered u n t i l t h e court s h a l l have f u l l y explained t o the accused the conse- quences of entering such plea; a f t e r which, i f the party p e r s i s t s i n pleading ' g u i l t y ' , such plea s h a l l be received and recorded, and the court s h a l l proceed t o render judgment and execution thereon, a s i f he had been found g u i l t y by a jury." It was a l s o reversed and remanded on Court Rule 27A ( I l l , Rev.Stat. 1953, Chap. 110, par. 259.27a) which provides i n part: "The inquiries of t h e court, and the answers of the defendant t o determine whether t h e accused understands h i s r i g h t s t o be represented by counsel, and comprehends the nature of t h e crime with which he i s charged, and the punishment thereof fixed by law, s h a l l be r e c i t e d i n , and become a part of t h e common law record i n the case * * *." Montana does not have a similar r u l e t o the I l l i n o i s Rule 27A nor a s t a t u t e similar t o Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, Chap. 38, par. 732. Their combined e f f e c t i s d i f f e r e n t than ~ o n t a n a ' s section 95-1902, R,.C.M. 1947. Therefore Washington is not applicable here. In h i s b r i e f , defendant c a l l s t o the c o u r t ' s a t t e n t i o n : "It i s important t o note a t t h e outset t h a t two a f f i d a v i t s appear i n the Court f i l e , presently before the Supreme Court. wherein Petitioner has submitted a motion t o vacate h i s skntence and a motion t o withdraw h i s plea of I n u i l t v ' . Until these a f f i d a v i t s a r e opposed by counter a z f i d a b i t s , everything must be assumed as t r u e &hich i s contained therein. State v. McAllister, supra, a t 353. I1 (Emphasis added) A review of these two pro s e motions demonstrates they a r e not a f f i d a v i t s and a r e not v e r i f i e d o r sworn t o i n any respect. A review of the e n t i r e court f i l e discloses defendant's e a r l i e r pro s e pleadings were sworn t o before deputy s h e r i f f Richard W. Donovan, a notary public, indicating t h a t the opportunity t o present a f f i d a v i t s was available t o persons confined i n t h e Cascade county j a i l . I n any case State v. McAllister, 96 Mont, 348, 353, 30 P.2d 821 (1934), no longer controls on t h a t point i n those absolute terms since t h i s c o u r t ' s decision i n S t a t e v. Pelke, 143 Mont. 262, 268, 389 P.2d 164, which s t a t e d : "* * * we do not t r e a t S t a t e v. McAllister, supra, a s s e t t i n g f o r t h the i n f l e x i b l e r u l e * * *. U l t i - mately much l a t i t u d e must be given t o the discretion of the t r i a l judge, who has a f i r s t hand acquaintance with the circumstances of the case * * *." Pelke reached t h e fundamental purpose of these r u l e s : "* * * a plea of g u i l t y need be deemed involuntary only when it appears that t h e defendant was laboring under such a strong inducement, fundamental mistake; o r serious mental condition, t h a t the p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s he may have pleaded g u i l t y t o a crime of which he i s innocent." (Emphasis added). Defendant c i t e s Boykin v. A.labama, 395 U. S. 238, 239, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L ed 2d 274, f o r the proposition t h a t a g u i l t y plea cannot be presumed t o be voluntary where: I I So f a r a s the record shows, t h e [ t r i a l ] judge asked no questions of [defendant] concerning h i s plea, and [defendant] did not address the court. l I Defendant alleges t h e t r i a l court must employ the utmost s o l i c i t u d e of which courts a r e capable i n canvassing the matter with the accused t o make sure he has f u l l understanding of what the plea connotes and of i t s consequences. In Boykin the court s e t down three areas of inquiry (1) self-incrimination, (2) r i g h t t o t r i a l by jury, and (3) r i g h t t o confront accusers. Defendant i n the i n s t a n t case argues t h a t these procedural steps announced i n Boykin a r e mandatory i n - a l l cases under any conditions. I n a case t r i e d i n the Cascade County d i s t r i c t court, S t a t e v. Wilkins, a murder case, a plea change was involved during t r i a l . Wilkins f i l e d a w r i t of habeas corpus i n the federal d i s t r i c t court, Great F a l l s Division, C i v i l No. 3167, 30 St.Rep. 1207, and an evidentiary hearing was held on the question: Is a g u i l t y plea voluntarily and i n t e l l i g e n t l y made under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 Ta ed 2d 274 (1969) and cases following, i f the defendant a t t h e time of pleading g u i l t y i s not s p e c i f i c a l l y advised by t h e S t a t e court judge t h a t by pleading g u i l t y he w i l l waive h i s privilege against s e l f - incrimination, h i s r i g h t t o t r i a l by jury, and h i s r i g h t t o confront h i s accusers? The federal d i s t r i c t court i n denying the p e t i t i o n on December 20, 1973, determined t h a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r language i n Boykin was merely advisory and concluded t h a t a plea could be voluntarily and i n t e l l i g e n t l y made without specific a r t i c u l a t i o n of t h e three Boykin r i g h t s , a s long a s t h e court passing on the application for a w r i t , be able t o find from the whole record before it, without a i d of presumptions, t h a t a plea of g u i l t y was voluntarily made. 9 x 1 November 6, 1974, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, by opinion, Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761, 763, affirmed the federal d i s t r i c t court. After s e t t i n g out the l e g a l question con- cerning the three areas of inquiry i n Boykin, the Court observed: "Wilkins r e l i e s on t h e following language from Boykin : 11 1 W e cannot presume a waiver of these three i m o r t a n t federal r i g h t s from a s i l e n t record. I R Then the court pointed out t h a t Boykin involved an arraignment on f i v e counts of robbery and the court asked no questions, and the defendant did not address the court---the record w a s s i l e n t . The court went on t o say: I I The d i s t r i c t court's decision, however, is supported by Supreme Court decisions subsequent t o Boykin and several c i r c u i t s . The r i g i d interpreta- tion of Boykin urged by Wilkins has not been adopted by the Supreme Court i n subsequent decisions on volun tariness of g u i l t y pleas. In Brady v. United States, U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, (1970), the Court c i t i n g Boykin, upheld a g u i l t y plea a s voluntar and i n t e l l i g e n t even though defendant had not been s ~ e c i f i c a l l v advised of the three r i g h t s discussed i n ~ b y k i n . s he Brady Court c l a r i f i e d kin by s t a t i n g , ' [ t l h e new element added i n Boykin was the requirement t h a t the record must affirmatively disclose t h a t a defendant who pleaded g u i l t y entered h i s plea under- standingly and voluntarily.'397 U.S. a t 747-748 fn.4. 90 S.Ct. a t 1468. In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 4 1 6 , (1970), the Court s t a t e d t h a t i n determining the v a l i d i t y of I g u i l t y pleas the standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and i n t e l l i g e n t choice amon the a l t e r n a t i v e courses of action open t o the defendant Specific a r t i c u l a t i o n of the Boykin r i g h t s i s not the sine qua non of a valid g u i l t y plea. "The Ninth Circuit has apparently not passed on the question. Accordingly, we hold t h a t Boykin does not require specific a r t i c u l a t i o n of the above mentioned three r i g h t s i n a s t a t e proceeding. Brady v. United States 397 U.S. a t 747-748 * J C JX and cases supra." (Emphasis added). In t h e i n s t a n t case, the e n t i r e record before us from arraignment on the drug charge i n the j u s t i c e o f the peace court, arraignment i n the d i s t r i c t court on the multiple charges, t h e participation pro s e by defendant throughout the e n t i r e record, and the discharge of counsel each time it appeared the case would be brought on f o r t r i a l , together with the repeated references t o "plea bargaining" each time, would indicate t h a t the g u i l t y plea was entered with f u l l understanding of the charge, voluntarily made and with f u l l appreciation of h i s constitutional r i g h t s and possible penalty, without indulging i n presumptions. Cer- t a i n l y a more i n depth examination by the court i s desirable and mandatory i n cases where the record requires it. Each case must be examined on i t s own record and i n the i n s t a n t case the f a c t t h a t the court did not s p e c i f i c a l l y a r t i c u l a t e a t t h e time of the plea change on the matters contained i n section 95-1902(b), R.C.M. 1947, does not amount t o reversible error. Defendant's second issue on review concerns the f a i l u r e of the t r i a l judge t o permit defendant t o withdraw h i s pleas of g u i l t y on the day s e t f o r sentence, April 3 , 1974, based on pro heretofore s e t f o r t h Those motions s e motions f i l e d t h a t daylamount t o a v i t r i o l i c a t t a c k on h i s paid counsel, t h e deputy county attorney, and t h e trial judge and a pleading of proof of h i s innocence a s the r e s u l t of a polygraph examination, administered by the a u t h o r i t i e s ; and proclaiming he had been promised a s i x month county j a i l term i n exchange f o r a plea of g u i l t y t o possession of drugs. Defendant a t t h i s point had suffered a considerable erosion of h i s c r e d i b i l i t y . The t r i a l judge was i n possession of the presentence investigation containing t h e r e s u l t s of t h e polygraph examination, which, j u s t t o demonstrate lack of credi- b i l i t y , i s reported here t o contain the opinion of t h e operator t h a t defendant did give marijuana t o the victim, did force the victim t o remove clothes and did force victim t o have sex. Additionally, the paid counsel and the deputy county attorney, both competent and credible o f f i c e r s of the court, denied these allegations i n open court a s they pertained t o them individually and t o the circumstances generally asserted by defendant. The record does indicate there were three separate times the s t a t e was ready f o r t r i a l and each time new counsel was ob- tained and defendant entered i n t o plea bargaining, a l l a t the request of defendant. The t r i a l judge admits he was agreeable t o a l i g h t e r sentence t o avoid exposing the juvenile boy t o the public view on the t r i a l of the sex crime. N o one but defendant ever mentioned a reduction i n sentence t o s i x months i n the county j a i l . The maximum exposure on conviction of the two crimes charged with the p e t i t i o n f o r increased punishment could be two l i f e sentences. A t sentencing the judge asked defendant i f he would l i k e t o t e s t i f y i n h i s own behalf and received t h i s response: "MR. GRIFFIN: Well, your honor, I haven't dis- cussed any s i t u t a t i o n of sentencing with m y family, because they a r e under t h e impression, j u s t l i k e me, t h a t I would get a break i n a white man s court ----- "THE COURT: You have had l o t s of breaks i n t h i s case----- "MR. GRIFFIN: But I a m not going t o get no break i n a white man's court, I can see t h a t , anyway, because I am an Indian, and you a r e wrong, and I was wrong i n m y i m - pression, and t h a t ' s a l l I can say about t h e whole thing. "THE C O U R T : You don't wish t o present any f u r t h e r testimony with regard t o mitigation of sentence? "MR. GRIFFIN: There i s n ' t anything e l s e t h a t would help, because everybody e l s e has t h e i r mind made up against me. 1 1 The t r i a l judge imposed a ten year sentence. The s t a t e dismissed a l l remaining charges against defendant. The e n t i r e argument based on the record must be the connotation of "light sentence". The t r i a l judge has complete discretion i n t h i s matter, section 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947, and must have f e l t t h a t "light" is viewed i n r e l a t i o n to"possiblel'. Viewed i n t h i s context we do not find an abuse of discretion. A s this Court s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Nance, 120 Mont. 152, 166, 184 P.2d 554: 11 It w i l l not lend i t s assistance t o an accused criminal i n escaping the obligations of h i s agreement a f t e r accepting the benefits thereof. " See also: State v. Scalise, 131 Monte 238, 309 P.2d 1010. The judgment of the district coufze is affirmed. / Justice f We Concur: - "2 ---.&--------d,------------------ Chief Justice L ' Justices.