Case Title: BRETT PATRICK DOHERTY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-24

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
BRETT PATRICK DOHERTY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 39131 P.3d 963Case Number: 05-24Decided: 03/31/2006
OCTOBER TERM, 
A.D. 2005

 
 
BRETT PATRICK 
DOHERTY,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Ken Koski, State Public Defender; 
Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Public 
Defender. 

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; 
Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; Dee Morgan, Senior Assistant Attorney General.            

            

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, 
VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]       A jury 
found Brett P. 
Doherty guilty of one count of felony possession of a controlled 
substance, methamphetamine.  He 
appeals from his 
judgment and sentence alleging insufficient evidence to support the conviction 
and prosecutorial misconduct.  Mr. 
Doherty also claims the 
district court improperly denied his request for a new trial and contends that 
he was denied a fair sentencing hearing.  
We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]       Mr. Doherty 
presents four issues for review:

 
 

I.                     
Was the 
evidence sufficient to prove [Mr. Doherty's] "actual" or "constructive" 
possession of methamphetamine and was the jury properly instructed on the 
crime?

 
 

II.                   
Did the 
prosecutor commit misconduct by "testifying" to facts not in evidence and 
characterizing [Mr. Doherty] as a liar?

 
 

III.                  
Did the 
trial judge abuse its discretion by denying a motion for new trial due to the 
prejudice caused by the prosecutor's violation of W.R.E. 
404(b)?

 
 

IV.                
Did the 
argumentative contents of the presentence investigation report and the 
character-impugning remarks of the prosecutor deny [Mr. Doherty] a fair 
sentencing hearing?

 
 
The State rephrases the issues 
as:

 
 
I.          
Was the jury properly instructed as to the elements of the crime of 
felony possession of methamphetamine, and was the evidence sufficient to show 
[Mr. Doherty] intentionally and actually possessed methamphetamine?

 
 
II.          
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct during closing 
argument?

 
 
III.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied [Mr. 
Doherty's] motion for a new trial?

 
 
IV.        Did 
[Mr. Doherty] receive a fair sentencing hearing?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]       On May 1, 
2004, Mr. Doherty and his friends, Mr. Esterline and Mr. Wolfe, were at the 
Subway store in Mills, Wyoming, when they were approached by a 
sheriff's deputy.  The deputy was 
conducting a follow-up investigation related to another case.  The deputy asked Mr. Esterline to step 
outside so that they could speak in private.  They went to the parking lot behind 
Subway.  After a few minutes, the 
deputy reentered Subway to get Mr. Wolfe.  
Mr. Esterline remained outside.  
Mr. Wolfe accompanied the deputy to the parking lot where they spoke for 
a few minutes.  The deputy then 
asked Mr. Wolfe to go back inside to get Mr. Doherty.  

 
 
[¶4]       After Mr. 
Doherty entered the parking lot, the deputy asked him if he had any outstanding 
warrants.  Mr. Doherty replied, "I 
shouldn't."  The deputy, by radio, 
checked with the communication center regarding the existence of arrest warrants 
for Mr. Doherty.  During this time, 
Mr. Doherty asked permission to dispose of his ice cream cone.  Mr. Doherty walked toward the trash 
receptacle, but stopped after he realized the deputy was following him.  

 
 
[¶5]       The deputy 
was notified that Mr. Doherty had an active arrest warrant.  After that notification, Mr. Doherty 
became visibly nervous.  The deputy 
directed him to discard the ice cream cone while he watched.  He placed Mr. Doherty in handcuffs and 
conducted a quick pat down search for weapons.  During the search, the deputy discovered 
money and a lighter in Mr. Doherty's front pocket and handed them to Mr. 
Wolfe.  As the deputy did so, Mr. 
Doherty began to move his leg "like he was trying to shake something out" of his 
pants.  The deputy asked Mr. Doherty 
to stop.  The deputy then advised 
Mr. Esterline and Mr. Wolfe that they were free to leave.  As he was talking to them, the deputy 
observed Mr. Doherty again moving his leg in an unusual way.  He saw a small plastic, zip-lock-type 
bag on the ground approximately eight inches from Mr. Doherty's left leg.  When the deputy picked up the baggie, he 
noted that it felt warm to the touch.  
The substance in the baggie was subsequently identified as 
methamphetamine and weighed 4.97 grams.

 
 
[¶6]       Mr. Doherty 
was charged with one count of felony possession of methamphetamine, in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).  He pled not guilty.  Prior to trial, Mr. Doherty filed a 
Demand for Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence Under 404(b).  The State did not respond to the demand 
or provide any notice of its intent to introduce evidence pursuant to W.R.E. 
404(b).

 
 
[¶7]       A jury 
trial was held and Mr. Doherty testified.  
The jury returned a guilty verdict.  
Mr. Doherty subsequently filed a motion for new trial which was denied by 
the district court.  Mr. Doherty was 
sentenced to a term of 36 to 72 months at the Wyoming State Penitentiary.  The sentence was suspended upon the 
condition that he complete 36 months of supervised probation.  One of the conditions of probation 
required Mr. Doherty to complete the Adult Community Corrections felony 
program.  This appeal 
followed.

            

DISCUSSION

            
 

Sufficiency of the 
Evidence

 
 
[¶8]       Mr. Doherty 
contends that insufficient evidence was presented to the jury to convict him of 
knowingly and intentionally possessing a controlled substance.  We review claims concerning the 
sufficiency of the evidence according to the following 
standard:

 
 
We must determine whether a rational 
trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt. We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by the 
unsuccessful party, and afford every favorable inference which may be reasonably 
and fairly drawn from the successful party's evidence. We have consistently held 
that it is the jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence. "We 
will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury, . . . our only duty is to 
determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even 
could, have come to the same result as the jury actually 
did."

 
 

Simmons v. State, 2003 WY 84, ¶ 28, 72 P.3d 803, 813 
(Wyo. 2003) (internal citations omitted).

 
 
[¶9]       Three jury 
instructions and the verdict form are relevant to Mr. Doherty's claim of 
error.  The elements of the crime of 
possession of a controlled substance were set forth by the district court in 
Jury Instruction No. 7 which states:

 
 
The elements of the crime of 
Knowingly or Intentionally Possessing a Controlled Substance, to-wit:  Methamphetamine, as charged in this 
case, are:

 
 

1.        
On or 
about the 1st day of May, 
2004;

2.        
In 
Natrona County, Wyoming;

3.        
The 
Defendant, Brett Patrick Doherty;

4.        
Did 
knowingly or intentionally;

5.        
Possess a 
controlled substance, to-wit:  
Methamphetamine; 

6.        
In an 
amount greater than 3 grams [of] a controlled substance in powder or crystalline 
form.

 
 
If you find from your consideration 
of all the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant 
guilty.

 
 
If, on the other hand, you find from 
your consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has not been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not 
guilty.

 
 
[¶10]     The district court 
defined "knowingly or intentionally" in Jury Instruction No. 8 as 
follows:

 
 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that an act is 
"knowingly" or "intentionally" done if it is done voluntarily and purposely; not 
accidentally, because of a mistake or for some other innocent reason.  Whether acts were knowingly or 
intentionally done must be determined or inferred from all of the evidence in 
the case.  In making that finding 
you may consider the acts themselves, the manner in which they were done, the 
means used, and all the circumstances surrounding the 
acts.

 
 
[¶11]     Jury Instruction No. 9 
defined the element of possession.  
It stated:

 
 
You are instructed that 
"possession," as that term is used in this case, may be of two kinds:  Actual possession and constructive 
possession.  A person who knowingly 
has [direct] physical control over a thing at a given time is in actual 
possession of it.

 
 
A person who, although not in actual 
possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention, at a given time, to 
exercise dominion or control over a thing, is in constructive possession of 
it.

 
 
You may find that the element of 
possession, as the term is used in these instructions, is present if you find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual or constructive 
possession.

 
 
[¶12]     The verdict form was 
general in nature and simply stated:

 
 
            
We the jury, duly empanelled and sworn to try the above entitled cause, 
do find that as to the crime of Knowingly or Intentionally Possessing a 
Controlled Substance, to-wit:  
Methamphetamine, in a Powder or Crystalline Form Exceeding 3 Grams, as 
charged in the Second Amended Information in this case, the Defendant, Brett 
Patrick Doherty, is:

 
 
                        
______  Not 
Guilty

 
 
                        
______  
Guilty

 
 
[¶13]     Mr. Doherty did not 
object at trial to the instructions or the verdict form.  He does not claim in this appeal that 
the instructions or the verdict form are erroneous.  His insufficiency of the evidence 
argument is twofold.  First, he 
contends that there is a difference in the proof required to establish that he 
"intentionally" possessed methamphetamine and "knowingly" possessed 
methamphetamine.  He suggests that 
such difference creates alternative theories for conviction, that it is 
impossible to tell from the general verdict form which alternative the jurors 
selected, and that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction on 
both alternatives.

 
 
[¶14]     He makes a similar 
argument with regard to Jury Instruction No. 9.  He contends that Instruction No. 9 
contains alternative theories for satisfying the possession element, actual or 
constructive, and that it is impossible to determine which alternative was 
selected by the jurors.  He contends 
that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction on both 
alternatives.

 
 
[¶15]     Mr. Doherty relies upon 
our holding in Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 
1995) and its progeny as support for his position.  His reliance is misplaced.  Our recent decision in Miller v. State, 2006 WY 17, 127 P.3d 793 (Wyo. 2006) governs our disposition of Mr. Doherty's claim of error.  In Miller, we stated:

 
 
Citing to the language of 
Instruction No. 19, Miller asserts that his convictions cannot stand under the 
principles espoused in Bush v. State, 
908 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 1995), and its progeny.  Miller claims that, because Instruction 
No. 19 contained three alternative theories for satisfying the delivery element, 
and because the general verdict form did not specify which alternative the jury 
based its verdict, sufficient evidence on all three alternatives must exist to 
sustain his conviction on each count.  
According to Miller, the evidence supports a finding of an "actual" 
delivery of methamphetamine to Justin on the dates in question, but fails to 
show a "constructive" or "attempted" delivery.  Miller contends that the absence of 
evidence proving a "constructive" or "attempted" delivery mandates reversal of 
his convictions.  Miller misreads 
the holding of those cases.

 
 
In the Bush line of cases, we held that when a 
crime may be committed in alternative ways, and the jury is instructed on each 
alternative and returns a general verdict of guilt, the verdict must be set 
aside unless sufficient evidence exists to support a finding of guilt as to each 
alternative.  Bush, 908 P.2d at 966-67; Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, ¶ 42, 67 P.3d 1207, 1224 (Wyo. 2003); May v. 
State, 2003 WY 14, ¶ 13, 62 P.3d 574, 579 (Wyo. 2003); Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, ¶ 8, 57 P.3d 1242, 1244 (Wyo. 2002); King v. 
State, 2002 WY 27, ¶ 24, 40 P.3d 700, 706 (Wyo. 2002).  The holding of those cases pertain[s] to 
elements instructions which quote directly from a criminal statute containing 
alternative grounds for conviction of the crime charged.  For example, Bush and Tanner concerned Wyoming's burglary 
statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a) (LexisNexis 2005).  In each case, the jury was instructed 
that it could find the defendant guilty of the crime of burglary if the evidence 
showed he entered a building without authority with the intent to commit larceny 
or the intent to commit a felony.  
Because the evidence was not sufficient to show entry with the intent to 
commit both larceny and a felony, we reversed the burglary conviction in each 
case.

 
 
The problem that existed in Bush and the other cases, however, does 
not exist in this case.  Here, the 
elements instruction given to the jury on the charged offense did not contain 
alternative elements upon which Miller's convictions could be based.  Miller's jury was only required to 
determine if the evidence proved Miller delivered a controlled substance to 
Justin Miller, nothing more.  
Instruction No. 19 merely defined the term "deliver" and did not have the 
effect of charging an alternative ground for conviction.  Bush and its progeny simply are 
inapplicable to the definitional instruction given in this 
case.

 
 

Id., ¶¶ 24-26 (footnote 
omitted).

[¶16]     We find in this case, 
as we did in Miller, that the problem 
identified in Bush is not 
present.  The elements instruction 
did not contain alternative elements upon which Mr. Doherty's conviction could 
be based.  The term "knowingly or 
intentionally" as defined by Jury Instruction No. 8, required the jury to find 
that Mr. Doherty possessed a controlled substance "voluntarily and purposely not 
accidentally, because of mistake or for some other innocent reason."  Jury Instruction No. 9 merely defined 
the word possession.  Pursuant to 
the instruction, possession could be "actual" or "constructive."  Either would suffice to constitute 
possession.  The use of the terms 
"actual" and "constructive" did not "have the effect of charging an alternative 
ground for conviction."  Miller, ¶ 26.

 
 
[¶17]     Our review of the 
record reveals sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Doherty possessed a controlled substance as 
charged.  Methamphetamine was 
discovered inches away from Mr. Doherty after he made several unusual movements 
with his leg.  The baggie containing 
the methamphetamine was warm to the touch.  
Mr. Doherty was under arrest and was aware he would be taken to jail 
giving him motive to dispose of the substance.  Reasonable inferences from this evidence 
support the jury's verdict.  

 
 
Prosecutorial Misconduct

 
 
[¶18]     For his next claim of 
error, Mr. Doherty asserts prosecutorial misconduct occurred during closing 
arguments because the State:  (1) 
argued facts not in evidence; (2) implied that Mr. Doherty was a liar; (3) 
misstated the law and impermissibly shifted the burden to Mr. Doherty to prove 
his innocence; and (4) improperly testified to an ultimate fact.  No objection was made to the State's 
closing argument at trial.  

 
 
The general rule in Wyoming is that a failure 
to interpose a timely objection to improper argument is treated as a waiver, 
unless the prosecutor's misconduct is so flagrant as to constitute plain error, 
requiring reversal.  A plain error 
analysis requires the appellant to demonstrate the violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law, clearly reflected in the record, resulting in the 
abridgment of a substantial right of the party to his material prejudice. We are 
reluctant to find plain error in closing arguments "lest the trial court becomes 
required to control argument because opposing counsel does not 
object."

Helm v. State, 1 P.3d 635, 639 (Wyo. 
2000) (internal citations omitted).  
We measure the propriety of closing arguments in the context of the 
entire argument and compare them with the evidence produced at trial.  Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 26, 49 P.3d 975, 986 (Wyo. 2002).  
"[U]nless a reasonable probability exits, absent the error, that the 
appellant may have enjoyed a more favorable verdict," we will not reverse the 
conviction.  Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 542 (Wyo. 
2000).  

 
 
[¶19]     First, Mr. Doherty 
asserts that the State impermissibly argued facts not in evidence during closing 
argument.  He cites to the following 
portion of the State's closing in support of his claim:  

 
 
People who crave methamphetamine do 
not go around throwing $400 bags of methamphetamine into the alleys behind 
Subway. . . .  

 
 
Folks, when methamphetamine becomes 
part of your life, it becomes your life.  
There is nothing you will not say or do.  Counsel can say, well, it wasn't found 
on his person.  Folks, if the 
methamphetamine had been found in his shirt pocket, the defendant would have 
come in here and said, you know, I borrowed that shirt from somebody.  I mistakenly picked it up at the park 
after throwing a Frisbee; . . . 

 
 
It doesn't matter, ladies and 
gentlemen.  There is no tale that is 
too tall to tell.  There is no 
person too sacred to lie to or about if methamphetamine has become part of your 
life.  There is no person or 
possession you will not sacrifice in order to protect yourself and your drugs 
even if it means taking the stand and lying to 12 jurors of your 
peers.

 
 
[¶20]     We agree with Mr. 
Doherty that no evidence was introduced at trial concerning the general habits 
and characteristics of methamphetamine users.  Although wide latitude is allowed in 
discussing inferences to be drawn from the evidence, prosecutors must limit 
their closing arguments to commenting on the evidence.  Condra v. State, 2004 WY 131, ¶ 22, 100 P.3d 386, 392 (Wyo. 2004).  While we 
find the prosecutor's comments troubling, they are not sufficient by themselves 
to warrant reversal.  Even if the 
comments were improper, Mr. Doherty must also establish that he was materially 
prejudiced by the error.  He has 
failed to do so.   

 
 
[¶21]     The record reflects 
that defense counsel endeavored to utilize the prosecutor's comments to the 
advantage of Mr. Doherty.  During 
closing argument, defense counsel stated:

 
 
And [prosecutor] wants you to 
believe that these people have methamphetamine, they're going to do anything 
they can possibly to keep it until the last possible moment.  They live for it.  They're going to hide it.  Well, that may be true, I don't know, 
but let's take that a little bit further.  
If that is true and he's out there pounding on the podium saying that's 
what's going to happen, ask yourself this.  
Mr. Doherty is in Subway.  
The officer comes in.  He 
sees Deputy Hotard wants to talk to his friends.  The light should go on if he's got 
methamphetamine in his pocket, uh-oh.

 
 
Deputy Hotard walks out of the 
building leaving Mr. Doherty alone in there with Mr. Wolfe.  What do we know? We know Mr. Doherty 
goes to the vehicle.  Common sense 
should tell you, well, if he's so worried about getting rid of it, what a great 
place to get rid of it.  Deputy 
Hotard is not paying any attention to him.  
He could have left it in the car.  
They want you to believe that he just keeps it on him and heads back out 
there.

 
 
            
Well, what else do we know?  
He's in the restroom when Rusty Wolfe comes and knocks on the door.  Doesn't say, Hey, Joe Bob wants to talk 
to you out here; he says, the cop wants to talk to you.  Well, holy cow, a cop wants to talk to 
me; I've got meth on me.  What a 
great place to leave it, in the bathroom.  
I'll come back for it.  
Common sense will tell you he would have left it 
there.

 
 
In light of Mr. Doherty's failure to 
object to the statements and defense counsel's efforts, as a trial tactic, to 
utilize such comments to benefit Mr. Doherty, we are unable to find any 
prejudice to Mr. Doherty and therefore reject Mr. Doherty's claim of plain 
error. 

 
 
[¶22]     We must also reject Mr. 
Doherty's remaining allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.  Mr. Doherty has failed to properly cite 
to the record in his argument to enable us to identify the offending 
prosecutorial statements.  W.R.A.P. 
7.01(f)(1); Bhutto v. State, 2005 WY 
78, ¶ 44, 114 P.3d 1252, 1268 (Wyo. 2005) (discussing the lack of detailed 
analysis of particular facts alleged to be prejudicial).  To the extent that we are able to glean 
the basis of Mr. Doherty's contention, we are unable to find a violation of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law or prejudice to Mr. Doherty.  For example, Mr. Doherty contends that 
it was error for the prosecutor to refer to him as a "liar."  We have previously recognized that such 
a reference does not constitute plain error when the evidence supports a 
reasonable inference:

 
 
We have previously analyzed similar 
statements. In Barnes v. 
State, 642 P.2d 1263, 1265-66 (Wyo. 1982), we said "calling 
a defendant a thief and a liar may not be in good taste" but, when the evidence 
supports a reasonable inference that such is in fact the case, it does not 
constitute reversible error to argue the question. In Tennant 
v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo. 1990), we considered a prosecutor's reference to a 
defendant as a leech, bloodsucker, and predator on society and the prosecutor's 
suggestion that perhaps next time the defendant could choose crippled children 
as his victims. We concluded that, although the prosecutor's remarks were 
unprofessional, they did not fit within the kind of statements this Court has 
deemed prosecutorial misconduct under the plain error analysis. 786 P.2d  
at 346.

 
 
After reviewing the prosecutor's 
closing argument, we conclude his remarks were made to highlight the way Lane's 
statements changed over the course of his several interviews with the police and 
to emphasize the fact that the physical evidence was not consistent with Lane's 
version of the events. Although the prosecutor's repeated labeling of Lane 
as a liar might have been in bad taste, the evidence supported the reasonable 
inference that such was the case. The references, therefore, did not rise to the 
level of plain error.

 
 

Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1064 (Wyo. 
2000).  On cross-examination, Mr. 
Doherty admitted that he lied to Deputy Hotard concerning his outstanding 
warrant.  This admission is 
sufficient to justify the State's comment.  
Additionally, the evidence adduced at trial shows the methamphetamine was 
discovered inches away from Mr. Doherty after he made several unusual movements 
with his leg.  The baggie containing 
the methamphetamine was warm to the touch.  
Mr. Doherty testified that the methamphetamine was not his.  The State is permitted to emphasize the 
fact that the physical evidence is inconsistent with the defendant's version of 
the events.  See, e.g., Lane, 12 P.3d  at 1064.  

 
 
[¶23]     Mr. Doherty has failed 
to provide record support for his other contentions regarding prosecutorial 
misconduct that would establish that the prosecution misstated the law, shifted 
the burden of proof to Mr. Doherty, or improperly testified to an ultimate 
fact.  He has also failed to 
establish prejudice associated with such allegations.  Merely asserting prejudice without a 
proper showing is not enough to meet the plain error standard.  Bhutto, ¶ 44 (holding that bald 
assertions, in lieu of factual presentation from the record, are not enough to 
show prejudice). 

 
 
Motion for New 
Trial

            

[¶24]     Decisions to grant or 
deny a motion for new trial are reviewed under our abuse of discretion 
standard.  Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 12, 46 P.3d 309, 313 (Wyo. 2002).  "Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously."  Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 
(Wyo. 
1986).  

 
 
[¶25]     Mr. Doherty contends 
that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new 
trial.  He claims that the State 
elicited improper W.R.E. 404(b)1 testimony from Mr. Doherty 
concerning his prior contacts with law enforcement: 

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:           
And I think you told us on direct that you knew you did have outstanding 
warrants?

 
 
[MR. DOHERTY]:           
Yes.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:           
It really wasn't a might, you 
knew you had an outstanding warrant?

 
 
[MR. DOHERTY]:           
Yes.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:           
And that's why you wanted to throw your ice cream cone 
away?

 
 
[MR. DOHERTY]:           
Yes.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:           
I think you said because you knew you were going to 
jail?

 
 
[MR. DOHERTY]:           
Yes.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:           
So your contact with Mr. Hotard was not the first time that you had had 
any contact with a law enforcement officer, was it?

 
 
[MR. DOHERTY]:           
No.

 
 
[DEFENSE]:      Your Honor, I'm 
going to object at this point.  Can 
we approach?

 
 
(Emphasis in original.)  In response to the objection, the State 
explained that it was attempting to prove Mr. Doherty's familiarity with law 
enforcement procedures in an effort to establish a motive for Mr. Doherty to 
dislodge the methamphetamine from his person.  Defense counsel responded, stating that 
the questioning was getting "dangerously close" to inadmissible 404(b) 
evidence.  The district court found 
the question to be improper, sustained the objection, and struck the answer from 
the record.  

 
 
[¶26]     Even if the questions 
were improper pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b), Mr. Doherty has failed to establish 
prejudice.  On direct examination, 
Mr. Doherty testified that he knew he had an outstanding warrant and was going 
to jail.  Mr. Doherty's testimony 
implies that he had prior contact with law enforcement.  A similar question asked on 
cross-examination can hardly be said to have had a prejudicial effect. 

 
 
[¶27]     During the hearing on 
the motion for a new trial, the district court determined that no prejudice 
resulted from the State's question.  
The court stated: 

 
 
            
In the context of the entire trial, the prejudicial effect of this one 
fairly minor evidentiary matter in my opinion would have little or no 
effect.  And to the extent that it 
may have had some effect, I do feel that the jury would have complied with the 
directions that were given I think in the preliminary jury instruction and then 
later in the instruction before the case was submitted to them, that from time 
to time there would be objections and there would be rulings that they would 
need to understand were within the province of the Court and that they were to 
disregard any evidence that was ordered . . . to be subject to objection and 
being stricken.  

 
 
[¶28]     A presumption exists 
that a limiting instruction can cure prejudice caused by references to prior bad 
acts.  Ramirez v. State, 739 P.2d 1214, 1220 
(Wyo. 
1987).  The district court gave 
Instruction Nos. 2 and 4, both of which instructed the jury to disregard any 
evidence that was ordered to be stricken.  We presume that the jury followed the 
instructions.  Miller, ¶ 18.  The trial judge was satisfied that no 
prejudice resulted and we will not second guess that determination on 
appeal.  Ramirez, 739 P.2d  at 1220.  We find no abuse of discretion in the 
district court's denial of the motion for new trial.

 
 
Sentencing 
Hearing

 
 
[¶29]     In his final issue, Mr. 
Doherty contends that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing.  Mr. Doherty was convicted of felony 
possession of a controlled substance which carries a maximum sentence of seven 
years.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).  
He was sentenced to a suspended term of 36 to 72 months in the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary conditioned upon successful completion of supervised 
probation and residency at Adult Community Corrections.  Mr. Doherty acknowledges that his 
sentence was well below the statutory maximum and that his sentence could have 
been less favorable.  Nevertheless, 
he argues that both the writer of the presentence investigation (PSI) report and 
the prosecutor made unnecessary comments and remarks impugning his 
character.  He claims that these 
remarks were so unwarranted and unprofessional that they tainted his 
sentencing.  

 
 
[¶30]     We review sentencing 
decisions under our abuse of discretion standard:

 
 
"Sentencing decisions are normally 
within the discretion of the trial court.  
A sentence will not be disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless 
the defendant can show an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to 
him, and circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or 
conduct which offends the public sense of fair play.  An error warrants reversal only when it 
is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial rights.  The party who is appealing bears the 
burden to establish that an error was prejudicial."

 
 

Bitz v. State, 2003 WY 140, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 257, 259 
(Wyo. 2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  Mr. Doherty relies upon the principle 
that, in sentencing, due process provides a right to be sentenced only on 
accurate information.  Manes v. 
State, 2004 WY 70, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 289, 292 (Wyo. 2004).  To demonstrate a violation of this 
right, he must show a "manifest injustice from the inclusion of the statements" 
and he must "demonstrate that the trial court relied upon the statements in 
sentencing" him.  Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1117 
(Wyo. 
1993).

 
 
[¶31]     First, Mr. Doherty 
claims that the PSI writer improperly accused him of lying to the evaluator who 
performed the Addiction Severity Index (ASI) assessment.2  The writer suggested that Mr. Doherty 
"obtain a new substance abuse evaluation due to his dishonesty during the . . . 
first assessment, and the evaluator should be provided with the Defendant's 
accurate substance abuse history prior to the interview."  Defense counsel objected during the 
sentencing hearing:

[The writer] in her recommendation 
section basically accuses Mr. Doherty of lying to the substance abuse provider 
who did the ASI.  These have been a 
problem in my opinion where we get the information in the ASI, and then 
apparently the PSI writer gets other information and then makes a judgment call 
that the person is lying.

 
 
I don't know that under 7-13-1301 
anything other than whether there's a need for treatment and a level of 
treatment services required should be contained in the PSI instead of all of the 
other information that the ASI contains.  
Basically what I'm saying is the recommendation of the PSI should be 
whether there's a need and what that need is.  The other information in my opinion is 
confidential and is not needed for the Court to consider that.  And so that would be my comment on that, 
Your Honor.

 
 
COURT:  Okay. Your comment is concerning, and I 
will consider your argument and point of view on that matter. 

 
 
[¶32]     Second, Mr. Doherty 
claims that the prosecutor's argument was improper.  At the time of sentencing, Mr. Doherty 
also had a misdemeanor possession charge pending.  The prosecutor referred to the PSI 
writer's comments and Mr. Doherty's criminal history, including the pending 
charge:

 
 
One of the things that I've, I think, 
consistently argued to this Court when we consider a defendant's chances for 
consideration of supervised probation is the acceptance of responsibility.  Without owning up to a problem, you're 
never going to solve the problem. . . .  
And Mr. Doherty has never owned up to this 
problem.

 
 
Even in the PSI, Your Honor, he still 
maintains that the deputy just happened to put him  place him that night 
somewhere where somebody had dropped five grams, $4- or $500 worth of 
methamphetamine right below his leg.  
The jury rejected that, Your Honor.  
The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that that defense didn't 
work.  It didn't add up.  It wasn't plausible.  And yet even to this day, Your Honor, 
Mr. Doherty is still maintaining that position.

 
 
. . . So Mr. Doherty has never owned up 
to his criminal behavior.

And I think the point that the probation 
 that the PSI writer is trying to make is that he really doesn't own up in his 
report to the ASI writer as to his involvement with controlled substances.  In fact, although the ASI writer states 
on page 7 that this is based on information provided by the client and then at 
the bottom of that same page, she reaches the conclusion that Brett has no 
significant substance abuse problem at this time even though as [the PSI writer] 
points out, he has two prior convictions for controlled substances plus this 
one, plus another one that's pending.

 
 
Whose responsibility was that to bring 
to the ASI writer?  It was Mr. 
Doherty.  But he doesn't own up to 
that problem either, Your Honor.  He 
doesn't accept the responsibility for his criminality, and he doesn't accept the 
fact that he apparently has a problem with controlled 
substances.

 
 
Your Honor, the State recommends that he 
be sentenced to the Wyoming State Penitentiary for a period of 30 to 60 
months.  This is an ongoing problem 
with Mr. Doherty.  And the fact that 
he shows no remorse, no acceptance of responsibility demonstrates that there 
really is very little hope that he is going to successfully complete probation. 

 
 
Mr. Doherty claims it was error for the 
prosecutor to argue that he failed to take responsibility.  Specifically, he challenges the 
reference to the pending charge, claiming that he pled not guilty pursuant to 
his constitutional right and that no negative connotation should be attributed 
to an unproven and contested charge.  Additionally, he implies that the 
prosecutor's argument only emphasized the problematic portions of the PSI to 
which he had objected.

 
 
[¶33]     At the hearing, defense 
counsel argued for a term of probation and voiced no objection to the 
prosecutor's remarks, other than to characterize them as improper for suggesting 
that Mr. Doherty be punished for exercising his right to trial.  Although the district court found both 
arguments persuasive, it ultimately rejected the State's recommendation for a 
prison sentence and the defense's request for straight 
probation.

 
 
[COURT]:  And I would say that as I see it, it's a 
real close call as to whether you're deserving of a sentence to the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary with a recommendation for a treatment program there.  I think the opinion of the Presentence 
Investigation writer as I see it is very thorough and is right on.  And since this is a first felony 
offense, I'm basically going to adopt that recommendation for a suspended 
sentence and a probationary term with a requirement that you complete the ACC 
program. 

 
 
[¶34]     We conclude that Mr. 
Doherty was not deprived of a fair sentencing.  The district court agreed to consider 
Mr. Doherty's point of view regarding the comments in the PSI concerning the 
ASI.  Mr. Doherty has not 
demonstrated that the district court based its decision upon that portion of the 
report to which he objected.  The 
writer's comment "merely summarized what was apparent elsewhere in the report 
and provided the rationale for the agent's sentencing recommendation."  Janssen v. State, 2005 WY 123, ¶ 18, 120 P.3d 1006, 1011 (Wyo. 2005).  Apart 
from the writer's evaluation, the criminal history, as documented in the PSI, 
supported the district court's conclusion that Mr. Doherty had "difficulties 
with substance abuse."  
Additionally, Mr. Doherty has failed to demonstrate that the PSI writer's 
criticism of the ASI assessment impacted the sentencing decision.  The district court ordered the treatment 
recommended by the ASI evaluatorparticipation in a Thinking Errors Class 
dealing with addiction.  Contrary to 
the PSI recommendation, the Court did not order a supplemental ASI assessment. 

 
 
[¶35]     Additionally, Mr. 
Doherty has failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor's comments amounted to 
manifest injustice.  He argues that 
only proven, documented offenses, i.e. convictions, should be admitted at 
sentencing.  However, the district 
court is permitted to consider a defendant's criminal background and his 
character when exercising its discretion in imposing a sentence.  Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1116.  In evaluating character, it may consider 
a broad range of reports and information.  
Id.

 
 
In imposing sentence, the trial court is 
permitted to go beyond the record to consider the defendant's past conduct 
and activities including evidence of crimes for which charges were filed but no 
conviction resulted.  The scope of 
inquiry may include the factual basis of dismissed charges as well as hearsay 
reports implicating the defendant in other crimes if such reports are deemed 
sufficiently reliable.  Such 
evidence of prior criminal activity is highly relevant to the sentencing 
decision and may be considered by the court despite the fact that no prosecution 
or conviction may have resulted.

 
 
Id. 
at 1117 (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  The 
pending charge was pertinent to the district court's sentencing decision, and it 
was listed in the PSI. The prosecutor was allowed to refer to it.  Had an objection been made, the charge 
and its factual basis could have been verified.  Additionally, the prosecutor's remarks 
about needing to "own up" and "take responsibility" were fair arguments, given 
the evidence adduced at trial and Mr. Doherty's criminal history, neither of 
which was disputed at the hearing.  
The prosecutor was explaining why the State was recommending a prison 
term and considered Mr. Doherty unsuitable for 
probation.

 
 
[¶36]     More importantly, 
however, the district court did not ultimately accept the prosecutor's 
recommended sentence.  The 
prosecutor requested imposition of a lengthy prison sentence.  The district court rejected such request 
and ordered a probationary disposition.  
Mr. Doherty's contentions that the prosecutor's argument improperly 
influenced the district court to impose a harsher sentence than he would have 
otherwise received constitute mere speculation and 
conjecture.

   

[¶37]     There is sufficient 
evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict of guilt.  Mr. Doherty has failed to demonstrate 
prosecutorial misconduct constituting reversible error, or an abuse of 
discretion by the district court in denying him a new trial.  Finally, we find that Mr. Doherty did 
not receive an unfair sentencing hearing.  
We therefore affirm the Judgment and Sentence entered by the district 
court.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1W.R.E. 404(b) 
provides:

            

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that 
he acted in conformity therewith.  
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 
of mistake or accident.

 
 

2As a convicted felon, Mr. Doherty was 
required to receive a substance abuse assessment pursuant to the Addicted 
Offender Accountability Act. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1302 (LexisNexis 
2003).  A substance abuse assessment 
"means an evaluation conducted 
by a qualified person using practices and procedures approved by the department 
of health to determine whether a person has a need for alcohol or other drug 
treatment and the level of treatment services required to treat that person[.]" 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1301(a)(v) (LexisNexis 
2003).