Case Title: DMM v. DFH

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-97-1

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
DMM v. DFH1998 WY 37954 P.2d 976Case Number: C-97-1Decided: 03/24/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

DMM, 
Appellant (Defendant/Petitioner),

v.

DFH, Appellee (Plaintiff/Respondent), and In The 
MATTER OF AEH, a Minor Child.

 

Appeal from The District Court, Natrona County, W. 
Thomas Sullins, J.

 

Robert J. O'Neil (argued), 
Gillette, for Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and Dan S. Wilde (argued), 
Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

LEHMAN, Justice.

 [¶1] DMM (Father) appeals from a district court order 
denying his motion for relief from a default judgment which established 
paternity and directed the payment of child support. We affirm and award 
attorney fees to DFH (Mother).

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶2] Father, as appellant, 
presents four issues:

 

1. 
Is there a requirement for an Informal Hearing in a paternity proceeding when a 
default is issued against the putative father?

 

2. 
Is there a requirement for an evidentiary hearing to be held in a paternity 
proceeding when a default has been entered against a putative 
father?

 

3. 
Is there a requirement for genetic tests to be ordered when a request for 
genetic tests made by a putative father is made to the attorney for the mother 
and not directly to the Court, but when the request for genetic tests is 
communicated to the Court?

 

4. 
Under the totality of the circumstances of the paternity proceeding in question, 
is the Judgment and Order issued void?

 

The State of Wyoming, 
Department of Family Services, Child Support Enforcement, responds on behalf of 
Mother:

 

1. 
Is the District Court required to hold hearings as provided by WYO. STAT. §§ 
14-2-108(a) and 14-2-107 when the putative father has 
defaulted?

 

2. 
Is a verbal request made to the opposing party's attorney's secretary an 
effective application to the court for an order for genetic 
testing?

 

          
3. Is the default judgment of paternity and support 
enforceable?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶3]On July 29, 1993, Mother 
filed a petition to determine the existence of a father and child relationship 
and for child support. The court appointed a guardian ad litem and made the 
minor child a party to the action. Father was served with the petition on August 
3, 1993, but did not answer or otherwise appear. On August 24, 1993, in response 
to Mother's application, the clerk of the district court entered default. Mother 
filed an application for a default judgment on August 26, 1993. The court 
entered judgment on September 7, 1993, finding Father to be the natural father 
of the child and directing the payment of child support. An income withholding 
order was entered the same day. Father 
did not appeal from the judgment and paid over $12,000 in child support and fees 
in accordance with the judgment and order over the next three 
years.

 

[¶4] On June 10, 1996, 
Father filed a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) 
on the basis that the judgment was void. Father challenged the judgment on the 
grounds that the court did not comply with certain provisions in the paternity 
statutes and the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. The court conducted a hearing 
on Father's motion for relief from the judgment and subsequently denied the 
motion on August 20, 1996. Father timely appeals.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

[¶5] "The granting or 
denying of relief pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b) is a matter within the discretion 
of the trial court, and our review is limited to the question of whether there 
has been an abuse of discretion." State ex rel. TRL by Avery v. RLP, 772 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Wyo. 1989). When a judgment is attacked pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), 
however, there is no question of discretion in granting or denying relief - 
either the judgment is void, or it is valid. Id. Once that determination is 
made, the trial court must act accordingly. Id. "A judgment is not void merely 
because it is erroneous. It is void only if the court that rendered it lacked 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, or 
of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of 
law." WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2ND § 
2862, at 326-29 (1995) (footnotes omitted); see also, In Interest of WM, 778 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Wyo. 1989).

 

[¶6] Father assigns as error 
the court's failure 1) to hold an informal hearing as required by W.S. 
14-2-108(a); 2) to hold an evidentiary hearing pursuant to W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) 
prior to entering a default judgment; and 3) to order genetic tests pursuant to 
W.S. 14-2-109(b). Personal jurisdiction is not at issue in this case. The 
district court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case pursuant to W.S. 
14-2-106 (1997). It is true that a plain usurpation of power or the extension of 
jurisdiction beyond the scope of the court's authority will result in a void 
judgment. In Interest of WM, 778 P.2d  at 1110. However, that is to be 
distinguished from an error in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court, which must 
be addressed by appeal or other direct review rather than by a Rule 60(b) 
motion.  Id.; Matter of TRG, 665 P.2d 491, 498 (Wyo. 1983). Father does not contend, nor does the record support 
a contention, that the court usurped the power extended to it by statute or 
acted outside its authority when it entered the default 
judgment.

 

[¶7] Father is left, then, 
with the argument that the court acted in a manner which deprived him of his due 
process rights. We conclude that it did not. In A.P. v. State, Dep't of Health 
& Human Servs. ex rel. B.L.S., 849 P.2d 703 (Wyo. 1993), we upheld a default 
judgment on paternity and child support entered after A.P. failed to appear at a 
scheduled hearing. In so holding, we evaluated whether the procedures followed 
by the district court were adequate to guard the appellant's interests: 

 

We 
are well aware that failure to adhere to the procedural requirements of these 
statutes may cause a judgment rendered under them to be void. Matter of TLB, 771 P.2d 811 (Wyo. 1989). * * * Nonetheless, we are comfortable that AP had notice 
of the hearing, an opportunity to be heard, and was accorded the process due 
under all the circumstances of this case. That he was not heard is attributable 
only to himself. The result achieved was appropriate.  The district court did not err, under 
the circumstances of this case, in entering default against AP, nor did it abuse 
its discretion in refusing AP relief from that default.

 

Id. at 
705.

 

[¶8] Here, Father was 
personally served with the petition to establish paternity and set child 
support. He chose not to answer the petition or to otherwise appear in the 
action. One effect of his failure to answer was his admission of the allegations 
in Mother's petition. See W.R.C.P. 8(d). As such, there was no practical purpose 
to be served by holding an informal hearing or ordering genetic testing. See 
Matter of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1261 (Wyo. 1991) (informal hearing 
and genetic testing mandatory in the case of an initial, contested paternity 
determination). In addition, the rules of civil procedure do not require that 
notice of the application for default 
judgment be given the defaulting party except when that party has appeared in 
the action. W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2).  Rule 
55(b)(2) authorizes the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing when necessary, 
but does not mandate such a hearing. In any case, the record demonstrates that 
Father had notice of Mother's application for default judgment, and he therefore 
could have sought a hearing at that time.

 

[¶9] Father was given proper 
notice of the allegations against him. As in A.P., Father's failure to be heard 
was attributable only to himself. He cannot now be heard to complain that he was 
denied due process of law. The Judgment and Order is valid, and the court 
properly denied Father's motion for relief.

 

[¶10] Mother seeks attorney 
fees and costs pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05, contending that there was no 
reasonable cause for an appeal. We do not normally award damages or attorney 
fees under Rule 10.05 when the appellant presents issues regarding discretionary 
rulings of the trial court. Hedrick v. Hedrick, 902 P.2d 723, 724 (Wyo. 1995). 
As discussed above, however, a ruling under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) is not 
discretionary. Father failed to ascertain relevant governing authorities or cite 
pertinent authority to substantiate his claims of error. Phifer v. Phifer, 845 P.2d 384, 387 (Wyo. 1993). We therefore certify that there was no reasonable 
cause for Father's appeal. Mother shall 
submit a statement of costs and attorney fees to this court and, upon review, 
appropriate costs, fees and penalty will be awarded.

 

[¶11] 
Affirmed.