Case Title: P. v. Doolin

Citation: 45 Cal. 4th 390 original opinion

Docket Number: S054489

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2009-01-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
 
Filed 1/5/09 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S054489 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
KEITH ZON DOOLIN, 
) 
 
) 
Fresno County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 554289-9 
___________________________________ ) 
 
A jury convicted defendant Keith Zon Doolin of the first degree murders1 of 
Inez Espinoza and Peggy Tucker, and the attempted murders2 of Alice Alva, 
Debbie Cruz, Marlene Mendibles, and Stephanie Kachman.  For each crime, the 
jury found that defendant personally used a firearm.3  For each attempted murder, 
the jury found defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim.4  
The jury found true the special circumstance allegation of multiple murder,5 and 
returned a verdict of death. 
                                              
1  
Penal Code section 187.  Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 
otherwise indicated. 
2  
Sections 187 and 664. 
3  
Section 12022.5, subdivision (a). 
4  
Section 12022.7. 
5  
Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3). 
 
 
2
 
The court denied defendant’s motions for a new trial6 and penalty 
modification7 and sentenced defendant to death.  The court imposed and stayed a 
determinate sentence on the noncapital felony counts and enhancements. 
This appeal is automatic.8  We affirm the judgment in full. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
A.  Guilt Phase  
1.  Overview of Prosecution’s Case 
Between November 2, 1994, and September 19, 1995, defendant murdered 
two Fresno prostitutes and attempted to murder four others.  At trial, each 
surviving victim identified defendant as her assailant.  One decedent’s boyfriend 
saw her enter a car defendant was driving on the night she was murdered.  
Ballistics evidence established defendant’s Firestar .45-caliber handgun was used 
to kill Espinoza and Tucker.  Shell casings found at the Espinoza and Kachman 
crime scenes were fired from that same weapon.  Defendant’s sister lived with him 
during the time the shootings occurred.  Her Lorcin .25-caliber pistol “probably” 
fired the shell casings found at the Alva crime scene.  Tire impressions left at the 
Mendibles and Espinoza crime scenes were similar to the tread on defendant’s 
truck tires. 
Incriminating statements and other evidence linked defendant to the crimes. 
The defense consisted of evidence of alibi, mistaken identification, and 
third party culpability. 
A summary of the evidence adduced at trial follows. 
                                              
6  
Section 1181. 
7  
Section 190.4, subdivision (e). 
8  
Section 1239, subdivision (b). 
 
 
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a.  The Two Murders and Four Attempted Murders 
(1)  Attempted murder of Alice Alva 
On the night of November 2, 1994, Alice Alva was working as a prostitute.  
Defendant pulled up next to her in his pickup truck and offered her $30 for sex.  
Alva got into the truck, and defendant drove to a nearby cul-de-sac.  When Alva 
asked for payment, defendant pointed a silver gun at her and said, “I’m going to 
fuck you all night.”  Frightened, Alva told him, “I’ll do whatever you want, but 
before we have sex, I need to use the bathroom.”  Defendant agreed, but warned 
Alva, “Don’t try anything stupid because you won’t be the first girl I shot and 
killed.”  Alva left the truck and ran.  She heard three or four shots, was shot in the 
leg, and fell to the pavement. When she saw defendant approach with the gun in 
his hand, she pretended to be dead.  Defendant got in the truck and sped off.   
The police recovered three .25-caliber shell casings in the roadway near 
where Alva had fallen.  Dr. Ralph Koo treated Alva, who had a bullet lodged in 
her fractured right tibia.  Because of the risk of complications, including paralysis, 
Dr. Koo did not remove the bullet. 
(2)  Attempted murder of Debbie Cruz 
Around midnight on December 29, 1994, Debbie Cruz was working as a 
prostitute when defendant picked her up in his truck and drove to an alley.  As 
Cruz began to undress, defendant said, “I guess you’re waiting for money.”  He 
then pulled a small silver gun from his pocket and shot her.  Cruz opened the 
passenger door, fell out, and crawled away.  She collapsed at a nearby house and a 
resident called police. 
Officer Jack Gordon responded.  Based on the size of Cruz’s wound, Gordon 
believed she had been shot by a small caliber gun, possibly a .22.  A treating 
physician determined the bullet entered Cruz’s left hip, passed through her 
 
 
4
 
abdomen, and perforated her small intestine.  The bullet was left in place 
following emergency surgery.  
(3)  Attempted murder of Marlene Mendibles 
Around 1:00 a.m. on July 29, 1995, Marlene Mendibles was working as a 
prostitute and accepted defendant’s offer of a ride in his truck.  Defendant drove 
for a while, pulled over, and ordered her to disrobe, threatening to shoot her if she 
did not comply.  When defendant pulled out a large silver gun, Mendibles grabbed 
her bag, opened the passenger door, and told him she would walk.  Standing 
beside the truck, Mendibles told defendant, “I bet you remember me,” and he 
replied, “I bet you remember me, too.”  She then heard a “pop.”  Defendant drove 
away and Mendibles fell to the ground.  She was rendered a paraplegic by the 
shooting. 
(4)  Murder of Inez Espinoza 
At 4:20 a.m., the same morning of the Mendibles shooting, Alice Trippel 
heard a gunshot.  At 4:30 a.m., Carmen Ramos, who lived nearby, heard 
screaming.  Around 11:00 a.m., Ramos’s daughter, drove to her mother’s home.  
As she approached the carport, she saw the dead body of prostitute Inez Espinoza 
in an alley near the home. 
Detective Robert Schiotis examined Espinoza’s body and saw a gunshot 
entry wound in her lower right back with an exit wound several inches below her 
navel.  He removed a large caliber bullet and a piece of the copper casing from 
Espinoza’s clothing.  He also recovered a spent .45-caliber shell casing, a condom, 
and a torn Trojan brand condom wrapper.  He also noted tire tracks and “traction 
marks of a car taking off in a hurry.” 
The autopsy surgeon observed a gunshot wound above Espinoza’s right hip.  
The presence of powder marks near the entry wound indicated the gun had been 
 
 
5
 
pressed against her clothing when fired.  The bullet had severed a major artery.  
She died from internal bleeding. 
 (5)  Attempted murder of Stephanie Kachman 
On August 11, 1995, about 3:00 a.m., defendant drove up beside Stephanie 
Kachman in a small white truck.  She agreed to have sex and got in the truck.  
Defendant drove into an alley and stopped.  When Kachman asked to be paid, he 
pointed a gun at her head and told her to take off her clothes.  Kachman told 
defendant she needed to get out of the truck because a leg injury made undressing 
difficult.  They both left the truck. 
While Kachman undressed, defendant put on a condom and placed his gun on 
the truck seat.  They began to have intercourse, but Kachman lost her balance and 
stumbled.  As she ran out of the alley, she heard defendant’s truck approaching.  
She looked back and saw defendant shooting at her through his window.  
Kachman was hit twice and fell to the ground.  A nearby resident summoned the 
police. 
Seven shell casings were recovered near the scene.  Kachman sustained two 
through and through bullet wounds, one in her back and the other in one of her 
thoracic vertebrae. 
 (6)  Murder of Peggy Tucker 
On the night of September 18, 1995, Peggy Tucker and Rick Arreola left 
their motel and walked to an area in West Fresno.  Tucker walked ahead with 
Arreola trailing at a distance. 
Arreola saw a Lincoln Town Car drive up next to Tucker, who spoke to the 
driver and then got into the front passenger seat.  Arreola watched as the car drove 
into an empty lot and out of his sight. 
 
 
6
 
As Arreola stood on the center divider waiting for Tucker to return, he saw 
the Lincoln drive by.  The car’s dome light was turned on and the driver, whom 
Arreola identified as defendant, appeared be alone. 
On the following morning, Tucker’s body was found in an alley.  When told 
of Tucker’s death, Arreola spoke with police and described the Lincoln Town Car 
by color and license plate number.  Defendant’s mother, Donna Doolin Larsen, 
owned a similar vehicle. 
Tire tracks at the Tucker murder scene reflected an “acceleration mark” 
indicating the vehicle left at high speed.  Two packages of condoms were 
recovered from Tucker’s right hand.  There was blood on her back, in her mouth, 
and on the ground nearby. 
Tucker’s autopsy revealed that she had been shot in the right hip.  The gun 
was probably fired from two to four inches from the body based on stippling and 
soot marks.  The perforation of two major blood vessels and the intestines caused 
fatal blood loss and shock.  Three bullet fragments were recovered from the body. 
b.  Defendant’s Arrest and Statements to Police 
(1)  First police interview 
On October 18, 1995, defendant was arrested and read his Miranda9 rights.  
Defendant said he understood them and was taken to police headquarters.  There, 
Detectives Robert Schiotis and Albert Murrietta again explained defendant’s 
Miranda rights, which he waived. 
Defendant told the detectives he was a trucker and recently had been working 
for a towing company and a recycling center.  He reported he had been a civilian 
employee of the Army, Navy, and Marines. 
                                              
9  
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. 
 
 
7
 
Defendant admitting owning a 1984 Toyota pickup.  He initially denied 
knowing about the prostitute shootings, but then conceded he had heard that 
prostitutes were being robbed and shot. 
The detectives said they knew defendant owned a gun and that one of the 
victims had identified him as her assailant.  Defendant said he owned a .45-caliber 
Firestar Compact, which was in his house.  It was his “personal gun,” which he 
alone used.  He bought the Firestar for protection because it “shoots with both 
hands,” and he was ambidextrous.  He had fired the gun about 150 times at an 
indoor shooting range but did not carry it. 
Defendant had previously owned and sold two rifles.  In his safe, he 
occasionally kept guns belonging to friends.  Currently his safe contained a .44-
caliber automatic and possibly a nine-millimeter Taurus.  When asked about a 
bulletproof vest found in his house, defendant said he bought it for protection 
because he had been robbed at a Walgreens store two years earlier and while 
clerking at a 7-Eleven store. 
When informed of the charges against him, defendant claimed he was 
innocent and asked what he could do to vindicate himself.  He told the detectives 
he did not leave the house at night, except to go to the store to get away from 
“tension at home.”  He admitted that a friend of his knew prostitutes.  He had seen 
prostitutes near a tavern and near the 7-Eleven store where he had worked.  He 
denied ever having hired a prostitute, although one had approached him once.  He 
felt Fresno was “flooded” with prostitutes and believed prostitution should be 
legalized. 
When told a witness had watched him pick up Peggy Tucker in the Lincoln 
Town Car the night she was murdered, defendant replied, “I have not picked up a 
prostitute in the car.”  Defendant had heard on television that the suspect drove a 
white truck with red letters on the tailgate and a larger “Cadillac-type vehicle.”  
 
 
8
 
Told that the tire track evidence implicated him, defendant responded that he had 
put new tires on the Lincoln about two weeks earlier and on his truck in May 
1995. 
He could not explain why the surviving victims identified him from a photo 
lineup.  He denied shooting them, using drugs, or drinking alcohol.  Asked when 
he last had sex, defendant paused a long time, and then replied, “That doesn’t 
count.”  He explained he had had oral sex with a woman three weeks earlier and 
paused because he did not know if oral sex “counted for having sex with a girl.”    
Defendant maintained his innocence and again asked what he could do to 
vindicate himself.  The interview was concluded, and defendant agreed to talk 
with detectives again. 
(2)  Second police interview 
Detective Schiotis reinterviewed defendant later that day.  Schiotis said a 
search of defendant’s house revealed the box for a second .45-caliber Firestar.  
This second Firestar would later be proven to have been used in several of the 
incidents.  Asked why he had not disclosed the existence of the second Firestar, 
defendant said, “it just didn’t come up when we were talking,” and claimed the 
second gun “hardly ever had been used.”  Defendant initially said that the second 
Firestar was in the headboard of his bed, and then that he had given the gun to his 
cousin, Bill Moses, about three weeks earlier.  Upon further questioning, 
defendant told the detectives his sister, Shana Doolin, had a .25-caliber handgun.  
 (3)  Third police interview 
The next day, defendant was questioned after again hearing and waiving his 
Miranda rights.  He reported that he had loaned the second Firestar to Bill Moses 
three or four weeks earlier, and that no one else had used his gun.  When told 
another victim had identified him as her assailant, defendant looked at the photo 
 
 
9
 
lineup and commented that one of the suspects looked “close enough to be his 
brother.”  He also said, “We’re going in circles here.”  
c.  Search of Defendant’s Home and Inspection of Defendant’s 
Truck 
Defendant’s home was searched on the day of his arrest.  Police found a 
videotape entitled Pro Sniper, which showed firing positions and types of guns 
used by a sniper.  They also found photographs of defendant and others with guns.  
In defendant’s bedroom, they found body armor, a bulletproof vest with FBI 
stenciled on the back, three ski masks, black military clothing, a camouflage shirt, 
Soldier of Fortune and Combat Arms magazines, some pornographic magazines, 
information on mail-order brides, and two boxes of .45-caliber ammunition.  A 
fully loaded .45-caliber Firestar in a black waist holster, a loaded magazine, and a 
radio scanner were found in the living room. 
A gun safe in the garage held a Taurus PT-99 nine-millimeter handgun, three 
magazines for that weapon, two empty Firestar gun boxes with consecutive serial 
numbers, and two sets of handcuffs.  The safe also contained a metal belt buckle 
with an opening for a .22-caliber handgun; an Omega taser; paperwork showing 
purchases of, and repairs to, guns owned by defendant; an unloaded .44-magnum 
handgun; three plastic starter guns; a variety of rifles and shotguns; and several 
kinds of ammunition, including over 600 .22-caliber rounds.  Three unopened 
condoms were recovered from the ashtray in defendant’s truck. 
d.  Further Investigation 
Detective Frank Rose recovered an unloaded .45-caliber Firestar, two empty 
magazines, and a nylon holster from Bill Moses.  Moses said that he got the gun 
from defendant two or three weeks earlier, but he had not fired the weapon. 
Detective Todd Fraizer retrieved a Lorcin .25-caliber semiautomatic handgun 
from Shana Doolin at her residence in Stockton. 
 
 
10
 
e.  Defendant’s Purchase of the Firestar Handguns and 
Accessories 
On March 19, 1995, following the mandatory 15-day waiting period, 
defendant had picked up the two Firestar .45-caliber handguns he had purchased.  
The registered serial numbers were the same as the numbers on the boxes found at 
his home.  Defendant also purchased two holsters that could be worn inside pants 
and two magazines that allowed for one additional bullet in each magazine.  The 
store owner testified the Firestar had only been on the market a few months and 
“would carry the greatest power — most powerful bullet for its size.”  He said that 
handgun was designed to be concealable.  He also identified bullets seized from 
defendant’s residence as containing Federal brand .45-automatic hydroshock 
hollowpoint cartridges, designed to expand upon impact.   
f.  Testimony of Defendant’s Sister, Shana Doolin 
Defendant’s sister, Shana Doolin, testified that she, her mother, and her 
stepfather were living with defendant when the shootings occurred.  She bought 
the Lorcin .25-caliber handgun retrieved by police.  It jammed occasionally. 
Shana gave her gun to defendant in mid-July 1995 because he said “one of 
our relatives needed it.”  She claimed at trial that defendant returned the gun to her 
in mid-August 1995.  She admitted that she testified at defendant’s preliminary 
hearing that he returned the gun in early September 1995. 
g.  Ballistics Evidence 
Before defendant was arrested, Criminalist Stephen O’Clair examined a .45-
caliber shell casing found near Espinoza’s body and seven shell casings found at 
the Kachman crime scene.  He concluded they were all fired from the same gun.  
O’Clair also concluded these shell casings “most likely” contained Federal brand 
hydroshock hollowpoint bullets. 
 
 
11
 
O’Clair later compared bullets test-fired from the .45-caliber Firestar 
retrieved from Bill Moses (the second Firestar) with rounds recovered from the 
Espinoza crime scene and Tucker’s body.  Both bullets were fired from the second 
Firestar that defendant initially failed to mention to the detectives.  O’Clair 
determined these bullets were “probably” Federal brand hydroshock hollowpoint 
bullets. 
O’Clair also test-fired Shana Doolin’s .25-caliber Lorcin and compared the 
characteristics of the spent shell casings with the shell casings found at the Alva 
crime scene.  He concluded the casings recovered from the Alva scene were 
“probably” fired from that gun.  O’Clair explained that a defect in the Lorcin left 
“gross types of marks” rather than “finer striated marks” on spent casings.  This 
defect precluded a positive match of the shell casings. 
Criminalist Charles Morton also examined Shana Doolin’s Lorcin and the 
second Firestar.  He test-fired each and compared bullets and shell casings from 
those weapons with those found at the Espinoza, Kachman, and Alva scenes and 
the bullet recovered from Tucker’s body.  Morton concluded the shell casings 
found at the Espinoza and Kachman scenes were fired by the second Firestar.  The 
Espinoza and Tucker bullets were also fired from that gun. 
Morton agreed with O’Clair that a .25-caliber weapon like Shana Doolin’s 
was used in the Alva shooting.  He explained that the number of guns that could 
have been used in this shooting “probably”could be reduced based on irregularities 
he observed on the Alva scene shell casings that were caused by imperfections on 
the breech face of the gun that fired those casings.  
h.  Tire Tread Evidence 
O’Clair examined, made impressions, and created photographic 
transparencies of the tires on defendant’s truck.  He compared these transparencies 
 
 
12
 
with actual-size photographs of the tire tracks found at the Mendibles and 
Espinoza crime scenes.  Except for differences in tread wear that could have 
resulted from the passage of time, the tire impressions from both crime scenes 
were similar to the tread on both front tires and the right rear tire on defendant’s 
truck.  The left rear tire of defendant’s truck had a different tread design and 
appeared to be newer than the other three tires.  
O’Clair examined what he described as “fairly new tires” on the Lincoln 
belonging to defendant’s mother.  The tread on these tires did not match the tire 
impressions found at the Tucker murder scene. 
2.  The Defense Case 
a.  Defendant’s Testimony 
Defendant testified he did not know the two decedents and first saw the 
surviving victims when they appeared in court.  He claimed that when the Alva 
and Cruz assaults occurred, he was in Watsonville and Wasco, respectively.   
On he night of the Mendibles and Espinoza shootings, defendant helped his 
family pack for an upcoming move.  Around 2:45 or 3:00 a.m., he drove to David 
Daggs’s house to unload two motorcycles.  He left around 4:30 a.m. and returned 
home about an hour later after stopping at a gas station.  Daggs began his 
newspaper delivery route around 4:30 a.m.  Defendant could not explain why his 
mother wrote in her journal that he left the house that morning around 2:00 a.m. 
On the night of August 10, 1995, through the early morning hours of 
August 11, 1995, when Kachman was shot, defendant was at home with his 
mother and cleaned the house in anticipation of listing it for sale.  
During the night of the Tucker murder, he was at his mother’s house.  He 
did not “remember ever going out or doing anything special.”  He confirmed his 
mother’s Lincoln was at that residence. 
 
 
13
 
He described himself as a gun collector who used ammunition of different 
types, including hollowpoints.  He described the latter as “made to expand, double 
its size” upon impact and more accurate than “a full metal projectile” at short 
ranges. 
Defendant denied watching the Pro Sniper video found at his home.  He 
bought matching .45-caliber Firestar handguns because he is ambidextrous.   He 
could not explain what had happened to 18 hydroshock hollowpoint bullets 
missing from a box of Federal brand bullets found at his home.  He suggested his 
cousin Bill Moses might be responsible for the shootings but acknowledged that 
there are “still a lot of unanswered questions, of course, . . . some that are positive 
and some that are negative” about Moses’ possible involvement.   
b.  Defense Psychiatrist Dr. Howard Terrell 
Dr. Howard Terrell, a psychiatrist, testified that defense counsel initially had 
asked him to evaluate defendant and review the police reports.  Dr. Terrell 
concluded, “I found a man who showed no evidence that I could see of mental 
disorder, either in my examination of him or my review of the [police reports] that 
I have available.”  The psychiatrist found no evidence of psychosis, manic 
depression, drug addiction, personality disorders, or sadism.  Dr. Terrell had 
evaluated over 100 murderers and probably a dozen serial killers during his career.  
In his opinion, defendant did not match any of the “typical profiles”10 he would 
expect to see in a murderer, “let alone a serial killer.”  
                                              
10  
The “typical profiles” of murderers that Dr. Terrell considered in his 
evaluation of defendant are described in more detail in part II.C.1, below. 
 
 
14
 
c.  Alibi Witnesses 
James Bacon testified that he had known defendant since 1985 or 1986.  On 
November 2, 1994, the night of the Alva assault, defendant was visiting him in 
Freedom, California.  Bacon was not certain but thought defendant left for Fresno 
on Friday, November 5, 1994.  Defendant also stayed with Bacon in late July 
1995, and returned to Fresno on the afternoon of July 28, 1995, with two 
motorcycles in his truck.   
On cross-examination, Bacon admitted he attended the preliminary hearing, 
listened to witnesses testify, and took notes.  Bacon had compared these notes with 
those taken by defendant’s sister, Shana Doolin.  He had also looked at notes taken 
by defendant’s mother. 
David Daggs testified that from December 1994 to September 1995, he dated 
Shana Doolin.  Around 3:30 a.m. on July 29, 1995,11 the morning of the 
Mendibles and Espinoza shootings, defendant came to his residence and unloaded 
motorcycles from his truck.  Defendant finished before Daggs began his 
newspaper route at 5:00 a.m.  According to Daggs, Shana told him that defendant 
had purchased the Lorcin for her.  
Defendant’s mother, Donna Doolin Larsen, testified that defendant watched 
television in his bedroom the night of the Kachman shooting, and did not leave the 
house.  On cross-examination, when pressed on whether she actually remembered 
him being at home that evening, Larsen said, “I know he was. I will go to my 
death saying that he was at home on that date.” 
Regarding the night of the Tucker murder, Larsen testified defendant was 
home and left once from about 11:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. to buy her ice cream, 
                                              
11  
During his police interview, Daggs said defendant came to his house at 
either 4:00 a.m. or 7:00 a.m., but he could not remember which time. 
 
 
15
 
cleaning supplies, and gasoline.  She and defendant cleaned her house “for hours” 
that night, to prepare for a real estate showing.  
On cross-examination, Larsen invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination when asked several questions about her character for 
honesty and whether she had ever falsely represented herself as a registered nurse 
or submitted false documents at her place of employment. 
Bill Moses testified he received the second Firestar from defendant on 
September 1, 1995.  He remembered the date because it was his father’s birthday 
and he helped pack Shana Doolin’s moving truck that evening.  Moses stated he 
was mistaken when he told Detective Rose that he had gotten the gun during the 
last week of September or the first week of October 1995.  He explained he had 
been suffering from the side effects of a chemotherapy drug that can cause 
amnesia.   
Defendant unloaded hollowpoint bullets from the gun before giving it to 
Moses, who owned three handguns himself.  He acknowledged that Tucker was 
murdered on September 19, 1995, and understood the implications of his claim 
that he had defendant’s gun on that date. 
Moses further testified that he and defendant once took Shana Doolin’s 
Lorcin without her knowledge.  He had borrowed this handgun from defendant 
from the end of July 1995 until August 18, 1995.12  
3.  Prosecution’s Rebuttal Witnesses 
The prosecution presented numerous rebuttal witnesses whose testimony is 
discussed in part II.C.2, below. 
                                              
12  
Michelle Moses, Bill Moses’ wife, testified they borrowed Shana’s gun 
from the first week of July 1995 until August 18, 1995.  
 
 
 
16
 
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  The Prosecution Case 
Dana Peterson, a registered nurse, assisted in a sexual assault examination of 
D. on November 3, 1992.  D. had a fresh bruise on her right lower leg, which she 
claimed she had sustained in a struggle with defendant.13 
Criminalist John Hamman testified as a ballistics expert.  Hamman stated a 
hollowpoint bullet is designed to “mushroom or expand” upon impact and make 
almost twice as large a “wound track” through the body, causing more damage.  
Angel C., the 16-year-old daughter of murder victim Inez Espinoza, testified 
she and her two half brothers (ages nine and six) and a half sister (age three) all 
missed their mother.  She testified that in losing her mother, she lost “a big part of 
my life.”  
Nina Mandrell, the sister of murder victim Peggy Tucker, testified Tucker 
was survived by her mother, two sisters, a brother, a husband, and two children 
ages five and three.  She and Tucker were very close.  Tucker’s murder had been 
devastating to her. 
2.  The Defense Case 
Allan Hedberg, a clinical psychologist, interviewed and tested defendant for 
eight and a half hours the week before the penalty phase began.  Dr. Hedberg 
found defendant did not fit the profile of a person who is psychotic, mentally ill, 
psychopathic, or sociopathic.  He described defendant as a “little paranoid” and 
having “some unresolved resentment from his childhood that he has not worked 
out,” causing him feelings of sadness, mild depression, anxiety, or hostility.  Dr. 
                                              
13  
In anticipation of this evidence, David Daggs had testified for the defense 
during the guilt phase that his sister D. had been “very untruthful” in the past and 
that he had difficulty believing her rape allegation.  
 
 
17
 
Hedberg also found defendant to be a person “who has difficulty dealing with 
conflict, dealing with threat, dealing with anger, dealing with feelings of 
resentment and wants to be seen as favorable by other people, wants to be 
accepted by other people. . . .” 
Dr. Hedberg stated that defendant’s mother had been married four times and 
that defendant, who suffered from a learning disability, had been verbally and 
emotionally abused by two of his stepfathers.   
 Based on his observations, Dr. Hedberg said defendant appeared to have 
“adjusted quite well” to the jail environment, interacting positively with guards 
and inmates. 
II.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Alleged Conflict of Interest Based on Counsel’s Compensation 
Agreement 
“Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties. 
Counsel’s function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a 
duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest.”  (Strickland v. Washington 
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688 (Strickland.)  Fundamental to counsel’s role is “a duty to 
make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary.”  (Id. at p. 691.)   
In this case, defendant contends Fresno County Superior Court’s 
compensation agreement created an inherent and irreconcilable conflict of interest 
because both counsel’s compensation and the costs for investigative and expert 
services were covered by a lump sum fee.  Defendant asserts this circumstance 
created a financial disincentive for counsel to adequately investigate and prepare 
his case.  Any such agreement, he argues, creates a conflict requiring reversal 
under the judicially declared rule of People v. Barboza (1981) 29 Cal.3d 375 
(Barboza).   
 
 
18
 
In the alternative, defendant contends the fee agreement violated his state 
and federal Constitutional rights to conflict-free counsel as well as his federal 
Constitutional rights to equal protection, due process, and a reliable verdict.  Each 
of defendant’s contentions is without merit. 
1.  The Terms of Counsel’s Compensation Agreement 
At the time of defendant’s trial, Fresno County Superior Court’s policies 
for  capital cases provided for three categories of compensation depending on the 
complexity of the case.14  Appointed counsel were paid a lump sum, as follows:  
$40,000 for a noncomplex case with one defendant and one victim; $60,000 for a 
case involving multiple victims or defendants, complicated special circumstances, 
or complex factual or legal issues; and $80,000 for a case involving multiple 
victims or defendants, highly unusual publicity, complicated special 
circumstances, or complex factual or legal issues (Category 3 cases).  The lump-
                                              
14  
We have granted defendant’s unopposed motion for judicial notice filed on 
October 15, 2007, and have taken judicial notice of the following Fresno County 
Superior Court documents:  (1) a one-page memorandum entitled “Revised 
Special Circumstance Case Policy” dated December 8, 2003, and (2) a 20-page 
document entitled “Policy on Special Circumstance Case Appointments Effective 
January 1, 2004.”  (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459(a).)  In addition, at 
respondent’s request, we have taken judicial notice of the following Fresno 
County Superior Court policy documents on capital case compensation:  (1) a 
three-page letter memorandum dated August 4, 1994, from Fresno County 
Superior Court addressed to “All Criminal Defense Attorneys,” providing “Notice 
of Adoption of a Joint Court Policy on Capital Case Appointments,” (2) a 15-page 
document entitled “Fresno County Superior Court/Consolidated Fresno Municipal 
Court/Central Valley Municipal Court Joint Policy on Capital Case 
Appointments” with attached appendices A through E, and (3) a one-page letter 
dated April 14, 1995, from the Court Executive Officer of Fresno County Superior 
Court to the “Capital Case Review Committee” regarding attachment appendix F 
(statutes of limitations form waiver) to the policy documents.  (Evid. Code, §§ 
452, subd. (d), 459(a).) 
 
 
19
 
sum amount covered all attorney fees as well as costs for ancillary services under 
section 987.9.15  Under these agreements, appointed counsel received periodic 
payments throughout the pendency of the case.16  Upon written justification, 
appointed counsel could obtain additional “Category fees” for cases that received 
extensive publicity or that involved numerous victims or crimes.  As the case 
progressed, appointed counsel could request additional funding for expenditures 
under section 987.9.  The agreement here provided that investigative and expert 
costs were included in the authorized Category 3 compensation of $80,000, unless 
additional amounts were authorized by the Capital Case Review Committee.   
                                              
15  
At the time of defendant’s trial, section 987.9 provided, in relevant part:  
“In the trial of a capital case or a case under subdivision (a) of Section 190.05, the 
indigent defendant, through the defendant’s counsel, may request the court for 
funds for the specific payment of investigators, experts, and others for the 
preparation or presentation of the defense.  The application for funds shall be by 
affidavit and shall specify that the funds are reasonably necessary for the 
preparation or presentation of the defense.  The fact that an application has been 
made shall be confidential and the contents of the application shall be confidential. 
Upon receipt of an application, a judge of the court, other than the trial judge 
presiding over the case in question, shall rule on the reasonableness of the request 
and shall disburse an appropriate amount of money to the defendant’s attorney.  
The ruling on the reasonableness of the request shall be made at an in camera 
hearing.  In making the ruling, the court shall be guided by the need to provide a 
complete and full defense for the defendant.”  The quoted text is now designated 
subdivision (a) of the same statute. 
16  
Counsel was paid 15 percent of the total fee at the time of appointment; 25 
percent upon completion of the preliminary hearing; 10 percent upon trial 
confirmation; 15 percent upon conclusion of the prosecution’s case-in-chief; 15 
percent upon conclusion of the trial; and 20 percent after sentencing and 
submission of final accounting under section 987.9. 
 
 
20
 
Thus, the agreement provided for the express authorization of increased 
expenditures.17   
Based on the record, it appears the capital case compensation system 
operated in the following way.  Upon appointment, private counsel would make an 
initial evaluation of the case by rating its complexity and projecting the kind and 
extent of ancillary services that might be required.  Based on this evaluation the 
court would determine what category of compensation to authorize.  Counsel 
                                              
17  
Defendant contends the following handwritten notations that appear on the 
fee agreement nullify the provision that “the above [Penal Code] 987.9 costs are 
included in the authorized case compensation, unless additional amounts are 
authorized by the [Fresno County Superior Court]”:  “Category fees to pay for all 
attorney and expert costs” and “All attorney and expert costs included within 
Category 3 authorization.”  Where, as here, the meaning of counsel’s 
compensation agreement does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence, 
interpretation is a question of law, and we will independently determine the 
agreement’s meaning.  (Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 
865-866.)  “ ‘If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs.’ ”  (Foster-
Gardner, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 857, 868.) 
 
Defendant cites nothing in the record to substantiate his claim.  Our 
interpretation of the agreement is guided by the basic principle that “[a]ny contract 
must be construed as a whole, with the various individual provisions interpreted 
together so as to give effect to all, if reasonably possible or practicable.”  (City of 
Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 
445, 473, citing Civ. Code, § 1641; Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.)  Courts must 
interpret the contractual language to give force and effect to every provision and 
avoid an interpretation that “renders some clauses nugatory, inoperative or 
meaningless.”  (City of Atascadero, at p. 473.)  No inconsistency arises by giving 
full effect to the provisions quoted above.  The category fees did include all 
attorney and expert fees.  The printed proposal form refers to section 987.9 five 
times.  In his attachment, counsel refers to that section twice and makes clear that 
the potential costs listed are merely estimates of possible “cold dollar amounts.”  
The record does not support a conclusion that the parties intended to nullify 
defendant’s statutory rights under section 987.9 and preclude counsel from 
seeking additional funding if necessary. 
 
 
21
 
could then agree, or not, to accept appointment under the court-approved category.  
Under both the agreement and section 987.9, counsel could seek additional funds 
for ancillary services upon a showing of need. 
Here, in connection with his appointment, counsel proposed that 
defendant’s case be designated as a Category 3 matter, calling for the highest 
compensation rate.  He outlined an estimated $60,000 in investigative and expert 
costs in a two-page attachment.  He made clear his outlined costs were merely 
estimates.  He stated he could not set out fixed costs “in cold dollar amounts” at so 
early a stage of the proceedings and explained why.  As discussed in greater detail 
below, he identified a number of potential expenditures that ultimately were not 
required.  After defendant’s trial, counsel submitted a final accounting.  According 
to that accounting, counsel received $80,000.  Of that amount, $8,676.15 was to 
cover ancillary costs under section 987.9.  The amount of ancillary costs included 
a “professional courtesy discount” of $780.  It does not include expenditures of 
$2272.88 paid to the public defender before he declared a conflict in this case. 
2.  Assertedly Invalid Compensation Agreement 
Defendant relies primarily on Barboza, supra, 29 Cal.3d 375, in arguing 
this judgment should be reversed because counsel’s lump sum compensation 
agreement inherently created an irreconcilable conflict of interest.  His reliance 
fails.  In Barboza, two codefendant brothers appealed their assault convictions 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to conflict of interest.  Both were 
represented by the county public defender’s office.  Under an agreement with the 
county, the public defender’s office was to be paid $104,000 annually.  From that 
amount, $15,000 was set aside in a reserve account to pay appointed private 
counsel if the public defender’s office declared a conflict of interest.  On a 
monthly basis, any deficiency in the reserve account was deducted from the public 
 
 
22
 
defender’s compensation and budget and deposited in the reserve account.  (Id. at 
p. 378.)  At the end of the year, any unexpended funds from the reserve account 
were paid to the public defender.  If the account was overspent, “the public 
defender was liable for any deficiency.”  (Id. at p. 379.) 
The court held that as a “ ‘judicially declared rule of criminal procedure’ ” 
the fee agreement created an inherent and irreconcilable conflict of interest that 
required reversal of the codefendants’ convictions.  (Barboza, supra, 29 Cal.3d at 
p. 381.)  The agreement created a “real and insoluble tension” between the public 
defender’s duty to investigate and declare a conflict on the one hand and his 
interest in maximizing his office budget on the other.  (Id at pp. 380-381.)  The 
fewer conflicts declared, the fewer demands on the reserve account, leaving more 
income and operating funds for the public defender. 
Notably, the court in Barboza did not reach the question of whether, even 
in the absence of the fee agreement, there was an actual conflict of interest 
between the codefendants.  (Barboza, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 381.)  Relief was 
based on the judicially created procedural rule.  In the court’s view, the public 
defender’s declaration of a conflict would directly affect the financial interests of 
that office.  In such a circumstance, the potential for bias was neither remote nor 
tenuous.  (Id. at p. 380.)  The court acknowledged that in order to assure that joint 
representation of multiple defendants is conflict free, trial courts rely in large 
measure on the ethical obligations of counsel representing multiple defendants to 
declare conflicts.  (Id. at p. 378, 381.)  The agreement in Barboza precluded such 
reliance on the public defender’s conflict determinations, however, because, “[n]o 
matter how well-intentioned the public defender might [have] be[en],” his 
decisions “directly affected” his income and office budget.  (Id. at p. 381.) 
We emphasize, however, that the agreement in Barboza operated in the 
context of multiple representation cases, a situation rife with potential for 
 
 
23
 
conflicts.  (See People v. Mroczko (1983) 35 Cal.3d 86, 103-104 (Mrozcko).)  
Barboza specifically concerned the public defender’s duty to investigate and 
declare conflicts between multiple defendants.  Even in this context, the court 
stressed the unique circumstances of the conflict confronting the public defender.  
“Unlike the typical conflict which may arise when single counsel represents 
multiple defendants, the initial conflict [in Barboza] arose the moment that the 
public defender was appointed to represent the two defendants.”  (Barboza, supra, 
29 Cal.3d at p. 379, italics added.)  He was immediately confronted with 
investigating and discovering any conflict existing between defendants as well as 
maintaining his salary and office budget.  (Ibid.) 
This case is clearly distinguishable from Barboza.  The agreement 
concerned appointed counsel’s representation of defendant alone and thus did not 
exacerbate a situation in which conflicts already were inherent.  To be sure, 
defendant’s complaint ultimately concerns the impact of an asserted financial 
disincentive created by the fee agreement on counsel’s performance at trial.  
Barboza, however, confronted a very different kind of problem involving the 
public defender’s duty to declare conflicts of interest in multiple representation 
cases.  The county’s compensation agreement with the public defender related to 
his salary, office budget, and payment for alternate counsel appointed in conflicts 
cases.  The court’s chief concern was that the public defender’s determinations 
about whether to remove that office from a case were affected by the actual 
conflict of interest created by the agreement.  (Barboza, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 
380-381.)  The court’s inability to rely on the public defender’s conflict 
determinations could impact its ultimate obligation to assure indigent defendants 
conflict-free representation.  Nothing in Barboza suggests that there was a 
provision for the public defender to apply for augmentation to his budget.   
 
 
24
 
Defendant accurately argues that under the agreement his lawyer could 
maximize his own compensation by cutting expenses for investigative and expert 
services.  This theoretical possibility, however, is qualitatively no different from 
other flat fee agreements that have been held acceptable.  For example, in People 
v. Knight (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 337, 346-348, the Court of Appeal rejected a 
contention that the county’s compensation agreement with private attorneys for 
representation of indigent defendants contained an inherent conflict of interest 
because it paid a flat fee whether the defendant pleaded guilty or went to trial, 
permitted attorneys to engage in private practice, and limited the amount of 
investigators’ fees.  The court declined to hold that the provisions presented a 
potential conflict of interest that led to impairment of counsel’s representation.  
(Id. at p. 348.)  Similarly, in Phillips v. Seely (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 104, 117, the 
Court of Appeal concluded a county’s flat fee agreement with an attorney for daily 
representation of indigent defendants that included investigative costs in the 
attorney’s monthly fee did not give rise to a conflict of interest.   
We have observed that:  “ ‘[A]lmost any fee arrangement between attorney 
and client may give rise to a “conflict.” An attorney who received a flat fee in 
advance would have a “conflicting interest” to dispose of the case as quickly as 
possible, to the client’s disadvantage; and an attorney employed at a daily or 
hourly rate would have a “conflicting interest” to drag the case on beyond the 
point of maximum benefit to the client. [¶] The contingent fee contract so common 
in civil litigation creates a “conflict” when either the attorney or the client needs a 
quick settlement while the other’s interest would be better served by pressing on in 
the hope of a greater recovery. The variants of this kind of  “conflict” are infinite.  
Fortunately most attorneys serve their clients honorably despite the opportunity to 
profit by neglecting or betraying the client’s interest.’ ”  (Maxwell v. Superior 
Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 606, 618-619, fn. 8 (Maxwell).)   
 
 
25
 
The agreement here permits appointed counsel to responsibly and ethically 
carry out professional obligations to clients.  As with certain contracts described in 
Maxwell, some attorneys might conceivably take advantage of the agreement’s 
terms to increase their income at the expense of their clients’ interests.  In general, 
however, we assume attorneys are not so unethical as to neglect their clients’ 
interests to advance their own.  Any such obvious malfeasance is clearly the 
exception not the rule.  In any event, a mere possibility for misconduct is 
insufficient to invalidate this agreement.  (See Phillips v. Seely, supra, 43 
Cal.App.3d at p. 117.) 
For these reasons, we decline to extend Barboza’s judicially declared rule 
of criminal procedure to Fresno County Superior Court’s lump-sum compensation 
agreement.18  Accordingly, defendant can prevail on his claim only if he can 
demonstrate a violation of his constitutional rights. 
3.  Asserted Conflict of Interest Under the State and Federal 
Constitutions 
A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to the assistance of counsel by 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of 
the California Constitution.  This constitutional right includes the correlative right 
to representation free from any conflict of interest that undermines counsel’s 
loyalty to his or her client.  (See Glasser v. United States (1942) 315 U.S. 60, 69-
70 (Glasser); People v. Douglas (1964) 61 Cal.2d 430, 436-439.)  “It has long 
been held that under both Constitutions, a defendant is deprived of his or her 
                                              
18  
We limit our conclusion in this regard to the facts before us.  We note that 
as of January 1, 2004, Fresno County Superior Court’s policies require that any 
unexpended section 987.9 funds be returned to the court upon filing the final 
accounting.  
 
 
26
 
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in certain circumstances when, 
despite the physical presence of a defense attorney at trial, that attorney labored 
under a conflict of interest that compromised his or her loyalty to the defendant.”  
(People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 168 (Rundle).)  “As a general proposition, 
such conflicts ‘embrace all situations in which an attorney’s loyalty to, or efforts 
on behalf of, a client are threatened by his responsibilities to another client or a 
third person or his own interests. [Citation.]’ ”  (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 
618, 653 (Cox I), quoting People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 835.)  In this 
case, defendant claims counsel labored under a financial conflict of interest in 
violation of his federal and state constitutional rights. 
In Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162 (Mickens), the high court 
confirmed that claims of Sixth Amendment violation based on conflicts of interest 
are a category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims that, under Strickland, 
supra, 466 U.S. at page 694, generally require a defendant to show (1) counsel’s 
deficient performance, and (2) a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s 
deficiencies, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  (Rundle, 
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 169, citing Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 166.)  In the 
context of a conflict of interest claim, deficient performance is demonstrated by a 
showing that defense counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest “that 
affected counsel’s performance — as opposed to a mere theoretical division of 
loyalties.”  (Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 171; Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 
169.)  “[I]nquiry into actual conflict [does not require] something separate and 
apart from adverse effect.”  (Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 172, fn. 5.)  “An 
‘actual conflict,’ for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that 
adversely affects counsel’s performance.”  (Ibid.) 
This court has suggested that a determination of whether counsel’s 
performance was “adversely affected” under the federal standard “requires an 
 
 
27
 
inquiry into whether counsel ‘pulled his punches,’ i.e., whether counsel failed to 
represent defendant as vigorously as he might have, had there been no conflict. 
[Citation.] In undertaking such an inquiry, we are . . . bound by the record. But 
where a conflict of interest causes an attorney not to do something, the record may 
not reflect such an omission. We must therefore examine the record to determine 
(i) whether arguments or actions omitted would likely have been made by counsel 
who did not have a conflict of interest, and (ii) whether there may have been a 
tactical reason (other than the asserted conflict of interest) that might have caused 
any such omission.”  (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 948-949 (Cox II).) 
With regard to the prejudice requirement, the high court has recognized a 
presumption of prejudice applies when defense counsel “actively represented 
conflicting interests.”19  (Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 166.)  It stressed “the high 
probability of prejudice arising from multiple concurrent representation, and the 
difficulty of proving that prejudice” justified application of the presumption.20  
                                              
19  
In Glasser, supra, 315 U.S. at page 75, counsel’s “ ‘struggle to serve two 
masters’ ” was demonstrated in the record by his failure to develop evidence and 
failure to object to arguably inadmissible evidence as a result of his desire to 
protect defendant’s codefendant.  After identifying this conflict of interest, the 
court reversed the defendant’s conviction without a showing of prejudice.  
(Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. 172, fn. 5, citing Holloway, supra, 435 U.S. at p. 482.)   
20  
In dicta, the high court indicated that its jurisprudence does not establish or 
support the lower courts’ expansive application of a presumption of prejudice 
“ ‘unblinkingly’ to ‘all kinds of alleged attorney ethical conflicts.’ ”  (Mickens, 
supras, 535 U.S. at p. 174, quoting Beets v. Scott (5th Cir. 1995) 65 F.3d 1258, 
1266 (en banc) (Beets); Mickens, at pp. 174-175 [noting a presumption of 
prejudice was applied when the defendant’s representation implicated counsel’s 
personal or financial interests, employment with the prosecutor’ office, instruction 
to Internal Revenue Service agents, romantic involvement with the prosecutor, or 
fear of provoking the trial judge].)  The question whether the presumption should 
apply to other conflicts remains open.  (Mickens, at p. 176.) 
 
 
28
 
(Id. at p. 175, citing Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335, 348-349 (Sullivan); 
Holloway v Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 490-491 (Holloway).)  We have agreed 
with the high court that “the presumption of prejudice is a prophylactic measure 
established to address ‘situations where Strickland itself is evidently inadequate to 
assure vindication of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.’ ”  
(Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 173, quoting Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 176.) 
In this case, defendant contends that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
was violated because counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest arising 
from counsel’s compensation agreement.  That is, his conflict of interest claim 
arose not because of a conflict among clients but between his lawyer’s interest in 
maximizing fees and defendant’s interest in full investigation.  He urges the 
compensation agreement created an actual conflict of interest that divided 
counsel’s loyalties and adversely affected his performance.  In support, defendant 
asserts numerous deficiencies by counsel as part of his federal constitutional 
claim, state constitutional claim, or both.  As discussed below, we adopt the 
federal constitutional standard for evaluating claims of conflict of interest under 
our state constitution and thus analyze defendant’s claims under only the federal 
standard. 
Under our state Constitution, the right to counsel includes the correlative 
right to conflict-free representation.  (People v. Douglas, supra, 61 Cal.2d at pp. 
436-439.)  We have formulated a different standard of review of conflict of 
interest claims than that employed under federal law to analyze analogous Sixth 
Amendment claims.  In order to establish a violation of the right to conflict-free 
counsel, we require a defendant to (1) show counsel labored under a potential 
conflict of interest, and (2) raise an informed speculation that the potential conflict 
adversely affected counsel’s performance.  (Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 175.)  
 
 
29
 
The phrase “ ‘informed speculation’ ” was first employed in People v. 
Chacon (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765, 776, footnote 3 (Chacon).  We borrowed the 
informed speculation concept from Lollar v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1967) 376 
F.2d 243 (Lollar), to assess prejudice resulting from a conflict of interest arising 
from counsel’s joint representation of codefendants in violation of the state and 
federal Constitutions. (Chacon, 9 Cal.2d at p. 776, fn. 3, quoting Lollar, 376 F.2d 
at p. 247.)  The court wrote:  “ ‘[O]nly where “ ‘we can find no basis in the record 
for an informed speculation’ that [the defendant]’s rights were prejudicially 
affected” can the conviction stand.’ ”21  (Ibid.)  
 Over the course of the ensuing 40 years, a precise definition of our 
informed speculation concept has proven elusive and the concept has been 
somewhat variously applied.  (Compare Chacon, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 776, fn. 3 
[equating the concept of informed speculation in assessing prejudice resulting 
from a conflict of interest with the reasonable doubt standard under Chapman] and 
In re Watson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 831, 845 [finding no “no basis in the record for even 
an ‘informed speculation’ that petitioner’s rights were prejudicially affected”; any 
conflict based on counsel’s joint representation was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt]; with People v. Cook (1975) 13 Cal.3d 663, 670 [a denial of the right to 
effective assistance of counsel is shown “if the record provides an adequate basis 
for an ‘informed speculation’ that there was a potential conflict of interest which 
                                              
21  
In effect, Lollar, supra, 376 F.2d at page 247, had “ ‘adopt[ed] the standard 
of “reasonable doubt,” a standard the Supreme Court recently said must govern 
whenever the prosecution contends the denial of a constitutional right is merely 
harmless error.’ ”  (Chacon, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 776, fn. 3.)  Under that 
standard, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court 
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).) 
 
 
30
 
prejudicially affected the defendant’s right to effective counsel”]; Mroczko, supra, 
35 Cal.3d at p. 105 [“even a potential conflict may require reversal if the record 
supports ‘an informed speculation’ that [defendant]’s right to effective 
representation was prejudicially affected”]; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 
998 [a violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel is established if “the 
record supports an ‘informed speculation’ that the asserted conflict adversely 
affected counsel’s performance”]; and Rundle, 43 Cal.4th at p.  175 [“under the 
state Constitution we have required only that the record support an ‘informed 
speculation’ that a ‘potential conflict of interest’ impaired the defendant’s right to 
effective assistance of counsel”].) 
Moreover, contrary to defendant’s assertions, although this court has 
applied a presumption of prejudice to conflicts of interest arising from an 
attorney’s concurrent representation of adverse clients (Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th 
at p. 172, citing People v. Easley (1988) 46 Cal.3d 712 (Easley); Mroczko, supra, 
35 Cal.3d 86; Chacon, supra, 69 Cal.2d 765), we have never eliminated our 
general requirement that a defendant demonstrate outcome-determinative 
prejudice from a violation of his state constitutional right to conflict-free counsel 
in order to obtain relief.  “[A]ll trial court error under California law is governed 
by article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution: ‘No judgment shall be set 
aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, 
or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, ... or for any error as to any 
matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the 
evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted 
in a miscarriage of justice.’ ”  (People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 364.)  
“[A] ‘miscarriage of justice’ should be declared only when the court, ‘after an 
examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,’ is of the ‘opinion’ that it 
is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would 
 
 
31
 
have been reached in the absence of the error.”  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 
Cal.2d 818, 836; see Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 175-176 [defendant failed to 
demonstrate under the state constitutional standard that he was prejudiced by the 
conflict of interest, which did not impact the presentation of the defense case].) 
As noted, post-Strickland, the high court’s analysis of Sixth Amendment 
conflict of interest claims has evolved into one of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
which requires a defendant to show counsel’s deficient performance and a 
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficiencies, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  (Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 169, citing 
Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 166.)  Upon close examination of the federal 
standard and our own, we discern no ultimate substantive difference between the 
two.  Our elusive and somewhat varied application of our state standard over the 
past four decades, moreover, strongly suggests that our informed speculation 
formulation is too amorphous to provide meaningful guidance to either the bench 
or bar. 
We therefore conclude that employing both standards is unnecessary and 
confusing.  In the final analysis, both standards involve a consideration of 
prejudice in the outcome. The federal constitutional approach zealously protects a 
criminal defendant’s constitutional right to conflict-free counsel.  The federal 
articulation of the constitutional requirements is clear and provides a more 
meaningful framework for review.  Today, we therefore harmonize California 
conflict of interest jurisprudence with that of the United States Supreme Court and 
adopt the standard set out in Mickens. 
Accordingly, we reject defendant’s state conflict of interest claim for the 
reasons stated below in our federal analysis.  We disapprove those earlier cases to 
the extent that they can be read to hold that attorney conflict claims under the 
 
 
32
 
California constitution are to be analyzed under a standard different from that 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court.22 
As a preliminary observation applicable to each of the subclaims below, 
counsel’s final accounting shows he spent a total of $8,676.15 in ancillary 
expenses.  Although the amount does not include funds expended by the public 
defender, or take into account the professional discount for services, it is certainly 
less than the original $60,000 estimate.  Counsel was therefore entitled to retain 
$71,323.85 of the $80,000 Category 3 fee.  We consider these disparities in the 
context of the facts and the asserted deficiencies in counsel’s performance to 
determine whether an actual conflict of interest adversely affected counsel’s 
representation. (Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 172, fn. 5.)  In any circumstance in 
which defendant succeeds in demonstrating an actual conflict affected counsel’s 
performance, we will then address the prejudice prong of the federal standard, 
applying the standard under Strickland.  We note that defendant’s reliance on 
these facts is different from a general attack on the contract itself.  Rather than 
arguing that any lawyer operating under the contract would have an irreconcilable 
conflict, defendant argues that these facts show that his lawyer had an actual 
conflict of interest that affected his performance.    
                                              
22  
We therefore disapprove to this extent the following cases:  Rundle, supra, 
43 Cal.4th 76; People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082; People v. 
Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50; People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861; People v. 
Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646; Cox II, supra, 30 Cal.4th 916; People v. Frye, 
supra,18 Cal.4th 894; People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1; People v. 
Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988; People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950; Cox I, 
supra, 53 Cal.3d 618; Easley, supra, 46 Cal.3d 712; People v. Belmontes (1988) 
45 Cal.3d 744; Mroczko, supra, 35 Cal.3d 86; Maxwell, supra, 30 Cal.3d 606; 
People v. Cook, supra, 13 Cal.3d 663; In re Watson, supra, 6 Cal.3d 831; and 
Chacon, supra, 69 Cal.2d 765. 
 
 
 
33
 
a.  Investigator Jeff Gunn and prospective prosecution penalty 
phase witnesses 
Defendant asserts that defense investigator Jeff Gunn’s invoices show he 
worked only 13.5 hours before counsel announced ready for trial; had spoken to 
no alibi witnesses except Donna Doolin Larsen by the first day of trial; had not 
prepared written reports on alibi witnesses Jim Bacon and David Daggs until two 
days before the defense case opened; and never contacted prospective prosecution 
penalty phase witnesses D., Denise Hamblen, Faith Ruacho, or Florence April 
Chavez.   
(1)  Alibi witnesses Jim Bacon and David Daggs 
Defendant’s complaint is misleading.  He fails to mention that Gunn had 
originally worked on this case for about two and one-half months as the 
investigator for the Fresno County Public Defender and had conducted 
approximately 90 hours of investigation before the public defender declared a 
conflict.  Defendant does not account for this work nor does he establish that Gunn 
did not interview Bacon and Daggs when he worked for the public defender.  
Moreover, it is certainly possible that Gunn interviewed Bacon and Daggs while 
working for the public defender but did not complete his reports of these two 
interviews until later.  Even considering the disparity between counsel’s estimated 
and actual ancillary expenses noted above, defendant has not established that 
either Gunn’s performance or counsel’s representation, was affected by the 
asserted conflict.  He therefore fails to satisfy the deficient performance prong 
under Strickland.  (Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 171.) 
(2)  Prospective prosecution penalty phase witnesses 
By statute, before trial begins, the prosecutor must give a capital defendant 
notice of any aggravating evidence it may seek to offer during the penalty phase.  
(§ 190.3.)  The prosecution’s notice included evidence of “aggressive conduct” 
 
 
34
 
toward prospective witnesses D., Hamblen, Ruacho, and Chavez.  Ruacho did not 
testify at all.  The other three women were not identified as witnesses for the 
prosecutor’s case-in-chief.  They testified only at the guilt phase in rebuttal to Dr. 
Terrell’s testimony that defendant suffered from no mental disorder and did not 
match the “typical profiles” he would have expected to see in a murderer (Evid. 
Code, §§ 721, subd. (a), 780), and to impeach defendant’s testimony regarding his 
own good character (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (c)).  D. testified, in  part, that 
defendant forced her to have sexual intercourse with him.  The jury was instructed 
at the penalty phase that it could consider this evidence as aggravating other-
crimes evidence under section 190.3, factor (b). 
Counsel’s primary “duty is to investigate the facts of his client’s case and to 
research the law applicable to those facts.”  (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 
171, 222.)  Counsel’s decisions regarding strategy and tactics must be rational and 
“ ‘founded upon adequate investigation and preparation.’ ”  (In re Thomas (2006) 
37 Cal.4th 1249, 1258.) 
There is no discernable tactical explanation on the record for counsel’s 
failure to investigate the prospective prosecution penalty phase witnesses.  
Unconflicted counsel reasonably would investigate the prosecution’s aggravating 
evidence both to make informed tactical decisions and to advise defendant about 
whether to testify.  Our inquiry does not end here, however.  Defendant has not 
established that counsel’s failure to interview these witnesses was motivated by 
his asserted desire to keep for himself funds initially budgeted for this 
investigation.  It does not follow logically that the absence of an explanation 
discernable in the record for the absence of interviews can be attributed only to the 
financial conflict defendant urges.  Explanations unrelated to counsel’s fee 
agreement could account for counsel’s omission.   Counsel may have delayed 
conducting this investigation until after the guilt phase in anticipation that these 
 
 
35
 
witnesses would testify only at the penalty phase.  The record shows that, with the 
exception of Ruacho who did not testify, the prosecutor called the prospective 
witnesses listed on the notice of aggravating evidence only in rebuttal after 
defendant presented evidence of his good character.  In any event, we do not  
conclude that the only explanation for counsel’s failure to investigate the 
prospective prosecution rebuttal witnesses is the asserted conflict of interest.  
Defendant therefore fails to show the asserted conflict adversely affected counsel’s 
performance regarding this investigation.       
b.  Ballistics analysis 
Defendant complains that the defense ballistics expert did not analyze the  
evidence until four days before the guilt phase of the trial began.  Any delay, for 
whatever reason, is immaterial.  The analysis was completed before trial.  The 
defense expert agreed with the two prosecution experts.  Defendant’s .45-caliber 
Firestar was used to kill Tucker and Espinoza, and shell casings found near 
Espinoza and Kachman were fired from that same gun.  The casings recovered 
from the Alva crime scene could have been fired from Shana Doolin’s Lorcin.  
Defendant’s bare assertion fails to satisfy the deficient performance prong under 
Strickland.  
c.  Blood analysis 
Defendant claims that defense counsel failed to retain an expert to perform 
blood analysis even though he included a blood analysis expert in his initial 
estimate of costs.  Merely because defense counsel originally believed he might 
need expert blood analysis does not establish that he failed to obtain expert 
assistance because of the asserted conflict.  Further, there is no evidence that 
counsel’s performance was in any way substandard.  No evidence suggested the 
shooter left blood at any of the crime scenes.  No blood was found in either 
 
 
36
 
defendant’s truck or his mother’s car.  The prosecution’s evidence, moreover, 
provided  overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt.  Ballistics evidence 
confirmed defendant’s gun was used to shoot Tucker, Espinoza, and Kachman.  
Each of the four attempted murder victims identified defendant in court as her 
assailant.  Tucker’s boyfriend identified defendant as the driver who picked up 
Tucker shortly before her murder.  Defendant’s sister lived with defendant at the 
time of the shootings.  Her .25-caliber handgun could have been used in the Alva 
shooting.  Under these circumstances, unconflicted counsel could reasonably have 
decided a blood analysis expert would contribute nothing to the defense.  
Defendant’s assertions do not show deficient performance under Strickland.   
d.  DNA analysis 
Defendant complains that defense counsel delayed his request for retesting 
of DNA evidence obtained from victim Espinoza’s body until after the jury 
returned its guilty verdicts, and failed to seek DNA analysis of the vaginal samples 
obtained from D., who testified during guilt phase rebuttal about defendant’s 
forcible rape. 
The record, however, belies any reasonable inference that the compensation 
agreement affected counsel’s decision making about DNA analyses.  In 
responding to defendant’s Marsden motion at the sentencing hearing, defense 
counsel explained that DNA analysis of the semen obtained from victim Espinoza 
was not relevant.  The victims all were working prostitutes.  Based on the 
testimony of the survivors, they were shot because they refused to have sexual 
intercourse with the shooter unless they were paid first.  Three of the women 
testified there was no act of intercourse with defendant, and during the incident 
with victim Kachman, defendant wore a condom.  Any DNA obtained at the scene 
or from the victims could certainly have belonged to other customers.  There is no 
 
 
37
 
hint in this logical explanation that counsel was influenced by a desire to 
maximize his income.  Again, ballistics and identification testimony were strong 
evidence of defendant's guilt.23  Faced with these circumstances, reasonable and 
unconflicted counsel could legitimately decide that retesting of Espinoza’s DNA 
would be pointless. 
Vaginal samples were originally obtained from D. following her earlier 
police compliant that defendant raped her.  The prosecution established that sperm 
was present in the vaginal samples.  Even though defendant testified that he never 
had intercourse with D., he admitted to having an intermittent relationship with her 
and told D.’s brother that she had stayed overnight with him around the time of the 
alleged rape.  At trial, defendant denied he told police during the rape 
investigation that “if they had found any semen, it would be because she had saved 
it in a cup and poured it on herself.”  He explained, “I—I don’t remember that—
that statement. It might have been made. I don’t know.  I was very upset of course, 
you know somebody making that allegation. . . .”  Defendant later testified that he 
“might have” made such a statement but had “no idea” because the incident 
occurred so long ago.  Finally, when D. became pregnant by her former boyfriend, 
defendant wanted her to sign a letter he drafted stating, in essence, that he was not 
the father of the baby.  Any decision by counsel to forgo DNA testing to determine 
the identity of the sperm donor thus appears to have been a reasonable, tactical 
choice, not one motivated by the asserted conflict of interest.  Had testing shown 
defendant to have been the donor, his credibility would have suffered a significant 
                                              
23  
No eyewitness testified regarding the circumstances of Espinoza’s murder.  
Ballistics evidence established shell casings found at the Espinoza and Kachman 
crime scenes were fired from defendant’s Firestar .45-caliber handgun, and 
Kachman identified defendant.   
 
 
38
 
blow.  Evidence of a different donor would have been susceptible of various 
explanations and of limited value in light of all the other evidence on this topic.  
e.  Tire tread analysis 
Defendant complains that defense counsel failed to consult with an expert 
to analyze the tire tread evidence even though the prosecutor provided him with 
reports from his expert before trial.  As noted, the prosecution’s evidence pointed 
unerringly to defendant’s guilt.  The tire tread evidence, in contrast, was neither 
conclusive nor crucial on the issue of identity.  The People’s own expert could 
conclude only that the tire impressions depicted in the photographs were “similar” 
to the tire treads on defendant’ truck.  Evidence this insubstantial did not require 
expert refutation.  Sound defense tactics would counsel that the less said about this 
evidence the better. 
f.  Defense experts and background investigation  
Defendant complains that psychiatrist Howard Terrell, who testified in the 
guilt phase, only spent one hour with him and conducted a four-hour document 
review.  As a result, the prosecutor exploited the expert’s unfamiliarity with the 
contents of police reports of prosecution witnesses and defendant’s uncharged 
conduct.  Defendant also finds fault with counsel because psychologist Hedberg 
did not administer any tests to defendant until a few days before the penalty phase 
began.  He also claims Dr. Hedberg “did no work” regarding his testimony on the 
limitations of eyewitness testimony until the day he testified in the guilt phase.  
Defendant does not otherwise explain this assertion.  The record shows Dr. 
Hedberg had testified as an expert on this subject “several hundred times.”  
Defendant alleges counsel delayed asking Dr. Hedberg to conduct his tests hoping 
that a favorable guilt phase verdict would obviate the need for a penalty phase.  
Finally, defendant asserts that defense counsel never conducted the background 
 
 
39
 
investigation and “extensive psychiatric and social study” he estimated might be 
necessary at the outset of his involvement in this case. 
(1)  The defense psychiatrist and psychologist 
When counsel was appointed, he indicated an “extensive” psychiatric 
evaluation of defendant was necessary because defendant intended to plead not 
guilty by reason of insanity.  Counsel hired an experienced psychiatrist, Dr. 
Terrell, who testified at the guilt phase that he had examined over one hundred 
murderers and a dozen serial killers.  This defense expert concluded that defendant 
was neither psychotic nor the victim of disordered personality, thus undermining 
any potential insanity defense as a viable tactic and the need for a more extensive 
psychiatric study.  Terrell’s conclusion was corroborated by Dr. Hedberg who also 
interviewed and tested defendant and testified at the penalty phase.   
There is nothing in the record to support even a suspicion that these 
experts’ conclusions were in any way influenced by the asserted conflict of 
interest.  Nor is there a basis in this record from which we can speculate that any 
delay in retaining or preparing these experts was attributable to the asserted 
conflict.24   
                                              
24  
As a result, we need not consider defendant’s contention that the asserted 
delay in retaining Dr. Hedberg’s services rendered counsel “unprepared to 
question prospective jurors whether mental issues might impact their penalty 
deliberations.”  The record shows that defense experts discovered no 
psychological condition to support an insanity defense.  Throughout the trial 
defendant maintained he was innocent.  He does not identify what “mental health 
issues” counsel would have been better prepared to address during voir dire had 
Dr. Hedberg been retained earlier.    
 
 
40
 
(2) Background investigation and social study 
Defendant contends that counsel failed to conduct a background 
investigation and social study of defendant because of the asserted conflict of 
interest.  Before trial, counsel budgeted $15,000 for “Background (lifetime) 
investigation of Defendant for penalty phase social study report” and $10,000 for 
engaging the services of a “Psychiatrist and Social Worker.”  His final accounting 
shows that he spent approximately $4,500 for services provided by the defense 
psychiatrist and psychologist.   
At the hearing on his motion for a continuance, brought three days before 
the penalty phase was scheduled to begin, counsel related he had not contacted 
defendant’s 16 potential character witnesses.  The prosecutor had complained he 
had not received discovery regarding statements of witnesses the defense intended 
to call in the penalty phase.  Defense counsel responded that he had intentionally 
not interviewed those witnesses.  In counsel’s view, statements defendant made to 
counsel about what the witnesses would say were privileged and not subject to 
discovery. 
At the penalty trial, Dr. Hedberg, the clinical psychologist, was the sole 
witness called on defendant’s behalf.  Dr. Hedberg’s testimony focused on his 
psychological testing of defendant and his conclusion that defendant was not 
psychotic, psychopathic, sociopathic, or suffering from any mental illness.  The 
remainder of this expert’s testimony outlined defendant’s family history.  
Defendant’s mother had been married four times.  Two of defendant’s stepfathers 
were verbally and emotionally abusive.  Defendant “carries some unresolved 
resentment from his childhood that he has not worked out” that may periodically 
cause him to unintentionally express hostility or resentment.  Counsel also 
introduced some of defendant’s school records.  Defendant’s mother, sister, 
cousin, and several friends had testified during the guilt phase.  These friends and 
 
 
41
 
relatives were able to provide counsel with information about defendant’s 
childhood, relationships, and history. 
In preparation for the penalty phase of a capital murder trial, counsel has an 
“obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.”  
(Williams v. Taylor (2000) 529 U.S. 362, 396; see also Wiggins v. Smith (2003) 
539 U.S. 510, 522 (Wiggins); In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 728.)  
“[I]nvestigations into mitigating evidence ‘should comprise efforts to discover all 
reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating 
evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.’ [Citation.]”  (Wiggins, supra, 
539 U.S. at p. 524.)  
Counsel spoke with defendant’s mother, sister, cousin, and friends.  Two 
experienced mental health professionals found no evidence defendant manifested 
any significant psychological conditions.  Defense counsel expressly made a 
tactical choice to rely on defendant’s own information about what potential 
character witnesses might say in order to evade the discovery procedure by relying 
on attorney-client privilege.  The court made no ruling with regard to counsel’s 
mention of his reliance on the privilege and neither side raises the issue of 
privilege on appeal.  We do not express an opinion on how the court should have 
ruled had the issue of privilege been pressed.  Likewise, nothing in this opinion 
should be interpreted as the approval of an attempt by either side to suppress 
discoverable material.  In an abundance of caution, and in order to provide 
defendant with the broadest scope of reasonable review, we assume without 
deciding that defendant satisfies the deficient performance prong under Strickland.   
We now address the prejudice requirement.  Preliminarily, defendant 
asserts we should apply a presumption of prejudice under Sullivan and reverse his 
death judgment.  We disagree.  In Mickens, the high court suggested that a 
presumption of prejudice need not attach to every conflict, but was appropriate for 
 
 
42
 
conflicts giving rise to a high probability of prejudice and corresponding difficulty 
of demonstrating such prejudice.  (Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 175.)  Moreover, 
we share the view of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that Strickland provides 
the appropriate analytic framework for assessing prejudice arising from attorney 
conflicts of interest outside the context of multiple concurrent representation.  
(Beets, supra, 65 F.3d at p. 1265.) 
In Beets, the court explained that a presumption of prejudice should be 
limited to the context of multiple concurrent representation because only in that 
context “is the duty of loyalty so plain. Only then is the risk of harm high enough 
to employ a near- per se rule of prejudice.  While loyalty may be implicated in 
other judgments a lawyer makes, in no other category of conflicts is the risk of 
prejudice so certain as to justify an automatic presumption. [Citation.] When the 
duty of loyalty is challenged by an attorney’s self-interest, the range of possible 
breaches. . . .is virtually limitless. Likewise, their consequences on the quality of 
representation range from wholly benign to devastating. [Citations.] Applying a 
near- per se rule of prejudice to this spectrum of potential ethical problems is a 
draconian remedy. [¶] . . . [¶]  In stark contrast to multiple representation 
situations, there is little meaningful distinction between a lawyer who 
inadvertently fails to act and one who for selfish reasons decides not to act. The 
‘conflict’ between the lawyer’s self-interest and that of his client is not a real 
conflict in the eyes of the law. Rather than being immobilized by conflicting 
ethical duties among clients, a lawyer who represents only one client is obliged to 
advance the client’s best interest despite his own interest or desires.”  (Beets, 
supra, 65 F.3d at pp. 1270-1271, fn. omitted.) 
Even the dissenting judge in Beets recognized that not every conflict of 
interest warrants a presumption of prejudice.  (Beets, supra, 65 F.3d at p. 1297 
(dis. opn. of King, J.).)  “ ‘[I]n a sense, every representation begins with a lawyer-
 
 
43
 
client conflict. If the representation is for a fee, the lawyer’s economic interest will 
be to maximize the amount of the fee and the client’s will be to minimize it.’ 
[Citation.] Conversely, if the representation is for a flat fee, the attorney’s interest 
will be to minimize the amount of time spent on the case, and the client’s interest 
will be to maximize it. . . . [¶] Thus, the [application of a presumption of 
prejudice] would swallow the Strickland rule if it were applied to every case in 
which a criminal defendant complains that his lawyer failed to investigate a 
witness or a defense, neglected to perform an experiment, did not hire a witness, 
or otherwise failed to take action because the attorney decided that it was not 
worth the time or the expense. . . . Strickland appropriately governs claims for 
failure to investigate and the like, and courts have had little difficulty in treating 
such claims under Strickland’s ineffectiveness rubric.”  (Ibid., fn. omitted.)  We 
adopt the reasoning from Beets and therefore conclude that, because the asserted 
conflict does not arise from multiple concurrent representation, a presumption of 
prejudice is not appropriate in this case.  Here, our ability to gauge the impact of 
the asserted conflict on the penalty phase defense presented is not hampered by 
any concern that the Strickland standard is inadequate “to assure vindication of the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”  (Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 
176.)  It is the record that undermines defendant’s claim.  He can point to nothing 
any witness might have presented by way of mitigation.  Nor does he offer any 
indication that other witnesses beyond the friends and family members identified 
could have assisted him.  We note that defendant has the opportunity to expand 
upon the record in the context of his right to pursue a writ of habeas corpus.  
(Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 174, fn. 48.) 
Accordingly, because defendant has not established the asserted conflict of 
interest had any effect on either the guilt or the penalty phase verdict, he does not 
“demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
 
 
44
 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ”  (Mickens, supra, 
535 U.S. at p. 166, quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) 
g.  Investigation of defense witnesses25 
Defendant claims that defense counsel failed to investigate and discover 
material relevant to the credibility of defense witnesses, including (1) alibi witness 
Bacon’s notes that he claimed corroborated his explanation for remembering 
defendant’s visit to him during the weekend of the Alice Alva assault; (2) medical 
records of Clara Larsen that contradicted Donna Doolin’s alibi testimony for 
defendant on December 28; and (3) Donna Doolin’s employment records 
contradicting her claim she was in Fresno during the weekend Alice Alva was 
assaulted.     
The extent of reasonable investigation into witnesses identified by the 
defendant is a very complex question.  We assume without deciding that defendant 
shows deficient performance under Strickland; that is, the asserted conflict 
adversely affected counsel’s performance regarding the investigation of defense 
alibi witnesses. 
In terms of prejudice, we have concluded a presumption of prejudice is not 
applicable to the conflict asserted here.  On the merits, defendant fails to 
demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have obtained a more 
favorable result in the absence of counsel’s failure to investigate defense alibi 
witnesses.  He fails to show, for example, what fruitful course of action counsel 
would have taken, if any, had he discovered the above material before Donna 
Doolin, other family members, and Bacon testified.  He does not suggest counsel 
                                              
25  
These assertions do not appear in defendant’s state claim.  
 
 
45
 
would have declined to call them.  Moreover, both Donna Doolin and Bacon were 
impeached regarding other aspects of their alibi testimonies.  Donna Doolin’s 
credibility was significantly undermined.  Bacon admitted he had taken notes 
during the preliminary examination testimony of other witnesses and looked at 
notes taken by defendant’s sister and mother before testifying.  
In sum, defendant’s federal constitutional conflict of interest claim fails.26 
4.  Alleged Equal Protection Violation  
Defendant contends use of the lump sum fee agreement by the Fresno 
County Superior Court violated the equal protection clause because it imposed 
                                              
26  
The derivative claim that, because counsel labored under an 
unconstitutional conflict of interest, defendant was denied his rights to due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, confrontation under the Sixth Amendment, and 
a reliable determination of guilt and penalty in a capital case under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments also fails.  In arguments elsewhere, defendant asserts 
violation of his federal constitutional rights to due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a fair trial by jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment, or a reliable determination of guilt and 
penalty in a capital case under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  What we 
observed in People v. Boyer  (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, footnote 17, applies:  “In 
most instances, insofar as defendant raised the issue at all in the trial court, he 
failed explicitly to make some or all of the constitutional arguments he now 
advances. In each instance, unless otherwise indicated, it appears that either (1) the 
appellate claim is of a kind (e.g., failure to instruct sua sponte; erroneous 
instruction affecting defendant’s substantial rights) that required no trial court 
action by the defendant to preserve it, or (2) the new arguments do not invoke 
facts or legal standards different from those the trial court itself was asked to 
apply, but merely assert that the trial court’s act or omission, insofar as wrong for 
the reasons actually presented to that court, had the additional legal consequence 
of violating the Constitution. To that extent, defendant’s new constitutional 
arguments are not forfeited on appeal. [Citations.] [¶] In the latter instance, of 
course, rejection, on the merits, of a claim that the trial court erred on the issue 
actually before that court necessarily leads to rejection of the newly applied 
constitutional ‘gloss’ as well. No separate constitutional discussion is required in 
such cases, and we therefore provide none.” 
 
 
46
 
“the burden of financially-conflicted counsel solely on that class of indigent 
criminal defendants who could not be represented by the Public Defender.”  In 
essence, this claim is a repackaging of his argument relying on the judicially 
declared rule from Barboza, which we have already rejected.  (See ante, pt. 2.) 
B.  Request for Second Counsel 
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 
pretrial request for the appointment of second counsel, thereby depriving him of 
due process, the right to counsel, and the right to a reliable guilt and penalty phase 
determination.   
Defense counsel filed a written pretrial request for the appointment of 
second counsel because (1) defendant was facing the death penalty; (2) the charges 
involved six victims and six crime scenes; (3) the issues involved ballistics, 
possible blood spatter evidence, psychiatric and psychological issues, a possible 
insanity defense, and eyewitness identifications; and (4) the trial was scheduled to 
begin in three weeks.  The trial court denied defendant’s request for “lack of 
cause.” 
An indigent criminal defendant’s right to a second attorney in a capital case 
is statutory, not constitutional.  Appointment is permitted in the discretion of the 
trial court under section 987, subdivision (d).27  (People v. Roldan, supra, 35 
                                              
27  
Section 987, subdivision (d) provides:  “In a capital case, the court may 
appoint an additional attorney as a cocounsel upon a written request of the first 
attorney appointed. The request shall be supported by an affidavit of the first 
attorney setting forth in detail the reasons why a second attorney should be 
appointed. Any affidavit filed with the court shall be confidential and privileged. 
The court shall appoint a second attorney when it is convinced by the reasons 
stated in the affidavit that the appointment is necessary to provide the defendant 
with effective representation. If the request is denied, the court shall state on the 
record its reasons for denial of the request.” 
 
 
47
 
Cal.4th at p. 686; Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 428-430.)  In 
ruling on an application for second counsel, the trial court must be guided by the 
need to provide a capital defendant with a full and complete defense.  (Keenan, 
supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 431.)  In exercising its discretion, the trial court must weigh 
“the importance this court has attached to pretrial preparation in providing a 
criminal defendant effective legal assistance” (ibid.) and “focus on the complexity 
of the issues involved, keeping in mind the critical role that pretrial preparation 
may play in the eventual outcome of the prosecution” (id. at p. 432).  The initial 
burden is on the defendant to present a specific factual showing of “genuine need” 
for the appointment of second counsel.  (Id. at p. 434.)  We review the decision 
whether to grant a request to appoint second counsel under section 987 for abuse 
of discretion.  (People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 688.)   
We need not decide whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s 
request for second counsel because any error was harmless.  Defendant fails to 
explain or substantiate his claim that, because Keenan counsel was denied, defense 
counsel was unprepared for trial.  The extensive evidence of defendant’s guilt 
demonstrates that there is no reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome 
had Keenan counsel been appointed.28  (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 
                                              
28  
Defendant contends a trial court’s error in denying Keenan counsel is 
reversible per se, but he offers no persuasive authority in support.  People v. 
Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 744, on which defendant primarily relies, is 
inapposite in that it held a trial court’s failure to exercise its discretion concerning 
the appointment of advisory counsel for a self-represented capital defendant in a 
capital case is reversible per se.  Defendant also argues he should be accorded a 
presumption of prejudice under United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 
based on his assertion that the denial of defense counsel’s request for second 
counsel resulted in counsel’s failure to interview a single background witness for 
the penalty phase and to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
48
 
836; see People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 300-302 [error by the trial 
court in revoking the appointment of Keenan counsel is evaluated under the 
Watson standard].)  Further, although there is some indication in the record that 
counsel could have prepared differently for the penalty phase, there is no 
indication that counsel’s penalty phase presentation might have differed if he had 
the assistance of second counsel.  Assuming that the trial court erred in denying 
counsel’s request for second counsel and that this state law error impacted the 
penalty phase, we conclude there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would 
have rendered a different verdict had second counsel been appointed.  (See People 
v. Jackson, (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1232.) 
C.  Evidence of Defendant’s Character 
Defendant contends that the trial court permitted improper impeachment of 
the defense psychiatrist.  He claims the prosecutor’s questions were an improper 
attempt to offer specific instances of irrelevant and inadmissible character 
evidence to prove conduct on a specific occasion, in violation of Evidence Code 
sections 1101, subdivision (a), and 1102, and were more prejudicial than probative 
under Evidence Code section 352.  In addition, he argues the court also erred by 
admitting rebuttal evidence in the form of specific instances of defendant’s bad 
character.  Defendant urges both errors violated his right to due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  We reject defendant’s contentions. 
Preliminarily, as to both contentions, defendant argues that the items seized 
by police from his home on the day he was arrested, including the Pro Sniper 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
testing at the penalty trial.  He supports this contention neither factually nor 
legally. 
 
 
49
 
videotape, Soldier of Fortune magazine, the .44-magnum handgun and various 
rifles and shotguns, pornographic magazines, mail-order bride materials, gun 
magazines, a bulletproof vest and other paraphernalia were irrelevant.  Defendant 
has forfeited this issue because he failed to object to admission of any of the items 
except the Pro Sniper videotape.  (Evid. Code, § 353.)  In any event, on the merits, 
we conclude all of the items seized were probative of defendant’s identity as the 
assailant, his intent to kill, and his motive for the shootings.  (Evid. Code, § 210.) 
1.  The Prosecution’s Cross-examination of Dr. Terrell 
Over objection, the trial court ruled that the testimony of defense 
psychiatrist, Dr. Terrell, was admissible character evidence under Evidence Code 
section 1102,29 relevant to show defendant was not disposed to commit the 
charged offenses. 
Dr. Terrell had evaluated more than 100 murderers and a dozen serial 
killers.  He considered whether defendant matched any of the following typical 
profiles that he would expect to see in a murderer:  (1) the sadist who enjoys 
inflicting pain on others and watching them suffer and die; (2) the sexual sadist 
who enjoys inflicting pain during sexual encounters, then beats, rapes, or kills his 
partners; (3) the antisocial career criminal; (4) the drug addict or alcoholic who 
kills when intoxicated; (5) the individual with no history of murder who kills 
because of anger or jealousy; (6) the killer for hire; (7) gang members who kill to 
protect their “turf”; (8) the psychotic individual who “hears voices” that command 
                                              
29  
Evidence Code section 1102, subdivision (a), provides that opinion 
“evidence of the defendant’s character or a trait of his character” is admissible “to 
prove his conduct in conformity with such character or trait of character.”  Under 
subdivision (b) of the same statute, such evidence is admissible when “[o]ffered 
by the prosecution to rebut evidence adduced by the defendant under subdivision 
(a).”  (Evid. Code, § 1102, subd. (b).) 
 
 
50
 
him or her to kill; and (9) the mercy killer who assists in a suicide to alleviate 
suffering. 
On cross-examination, Dr. Terrell confirmed he had not received police 
reports that defendant had raped D. or told her he disliked prostitutes.  Dr. Terrell 
was also unaware of any reports that defendant was obsessive about cleanliness 
when he stayed in motel rooms with his girlfriends; frequently carried a duffel bag 
full of guns; led a different life around his family; hid his girlfriends when his 
mother came to visit; had advertised in adult magazines; was twice rebuffed by a 
prostitute he approached on Fresno streets; consumed alcohol to the point of 
intoxication; called a woman a “bitch” when she declined a date with him; and 
showed photographs of people he claimed to have killed. 
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting 
this cross-examination, in violation of Evidence Code sections 1101, 1102, and 
352.  He has forfeited this claim by failing to object on these grounds at trial.  
(People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 613; People v. Lucero (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 692, 715.)  The claim is also meritless. 
At the outset, we observe that the matters about which Dr. Terrell was 
questioned on direct examination were ultimately offered as substantive evidence 
of defendant’s character.  The cross-examination questions were permitted for the 
limited purpose of impeaching the expert’s opinion.  An expert witness may be 
cross-examined about “the matter upon which his or her opinion is based and the 
reasons for his or her opinion.”  (Evid. Code, § 721, subd. (a).)  The scope of this 
inquiry is broad and includes questions about  whether the expert sufficiently 
considered matters inconsistent with the opinion.  (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 641, 695.)  Thus, an adverse party may bring to the attention of the jury 
that an expert did not know or consider information relevant to the issue on which 
the expert has offered an opinion.  (People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 532.) 
 
 
51
 
The cross-examination of Dr. Terrell was proper.  The incidents were all 
relevant to the validity of his opinion that defendant’s character was inconsistent 
with that of a murderer.30  The prosecutor’s questions fell within the scope of Dr. 
Terrell’s direct testimony.  The jury was properly instructed that questions and 
answers about the reported incidents could be considered only in determining the 
weight to be given to Dr. Terrell’s opinion, and that the questions themselves were 
not evidence that the reported incidents were true.  (CALJIC No. 2.42.)  
2.  Prosecution’s Rebuttal Evidence of Defendant’s Bad Character 
Defendant testified on direct examination he did not hate women, was not 
hostile toward prostitutes, and thought prostitution should be legalized.  On cross-
examination, defendant denied ever using the services of a prostitute or telling 
anyone that prostitutes were dirty, sleazy, and cheap and should be removed from 
the earth.  He denied drinking to the point he could not drive, using drugs, talking 
about his cocaine use with Justus Swigart, or allowing people to use drugs at his 
home.  Defendant said he did not treat women differently when he was away from 
his family.  He denied striking his girlfriend, Hamblen, or being indifferent to pain 
she experienced during sex.  He denied advertising in an adult magazine, carrying 
a bag of guns, calling Sherry Saar a “bitch” because she turned him down for a 
                                              
30  
See, e.g., People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 492 [evidence of 
defendant’s prior hit-and-run misdemeanor conviction was properly admitted on 
cross-examination to impeach the defense expert’s testimony that defendant had 
no juvenile or adult convictions, to the extent that this conclusion affected the 
expert’s opinion of defendant’s mental state]; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 
287, 334-335 [the prosecutor’s cross-examination regarding the expert 
psychologist’s knowledge of the defendant’s prison record was relevant to 
impeach expert’s opinion testimony concerning defendant’s work history]; People 
v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 642 [the prosecutor properly impeached the 
expert witness’s opinion of the defendant’s mental state with other-crimes 
evidence]. 
 
 
52
 
date, or asking a girlfriend to hide when his mother came to visit.  He denied that 
D. was his girlfriend, that he had sex with her, or that he had used soap during 
intercourse.  He explained that he bought a taser, or stun gun, for self-protection 
and purchased a set of handcuffs “just to have them.” 
Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel objected to the admission 
of proposed rebuttal testimony by Margie Galloway, Sherry Saar, Justus Swigert, 
Christina Bills, Hamblen, D., and Chavez.  Counsel argued the evidence was 
irrelevant and should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 as unduly 
prejudicial and time-consuming.  The prosecution urged the defense had opened 
the door to impeachment by eliciting character testimony from both defendant and 
Dr. Terrell.  The trial court ruled that the proffered evidence was proper rebuttal 
and denied the motion.  It did not expressly expand on its ruling, but the 
arguments of counsel indicate the court admitted the proffered evidence under 
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (c), which provides that the prohibition 
against the admission of character evidence to prove a person’s criminal 
disposition under that code section does not “affect[] the admissibility of evidence 
offered to support or attack the credibility of a witness.” 
The prosecution’s rebuttal witnesses testified as follows: 
Margie Galloway had seen defendant drink beer and had seen him 
intoxicated on two occasions.  She frequently observed defendant carrying a gym 
bag with guns in it and had heard him comment several times that he did not like 
“whores and sluts.” 
Sherry Saar recounted that defendant “flew off the handle” and called her a 
“bitch” when she declined to date him. 
Defendant’s friend, Justus Swigert, usually saw him carrying guns in a 
duffel bag.  Swigert knew defendant drank alcohol.  Once, defendant became so  
 
 
53
 
intoxicated he had to spend the night at Swigert’s residence.  Defendant told 
Swigert he had used cocaine. 
Christina Bills attended a party at defendant’s apartment where alcohol and 
marijuana were consumed.  She often saw defendant carrying guns in a duffel bag.  
Defendant told her he was involved with the Mafia. 
Hamblen, one of defendant’s former girlfriends, testified the first time she 
had sexual intercourse was with defendant, and he covered her mouth when she 
screamed in pain.  On one occasion, defendant placed ice cubes “on” her vagina 
and then had intercourse despite Hamblen’s protests of pain.  On another occasion, 
when Hamblen acceded to defendant’s request to have intercourse on a  bathroom 
floor, defendant would not stop the encounter when Hamblen told him her back 
was hurting.  Defendant put soap on his penis before having sexual intercourse 
because “he was told that it would kill sperm.”  He did not stop this practice when 
told it caused painful burning.  He once struck Hamblen on the face.  Defendant 
put posters of naked women over his headboard during intercourse and said he had 
advertised himself in pornography magazines.  When Hamblen was diagnosed 
with a kidney infection, defendant flushed her medication down the toilet because 
his mother had told him the medicine was “no good.” 
D. testified she met defendant 10 years earlier, when she was 13 years old.  
She eventually became defendant’s girlfriend and described their relationship as 
“mostly sexual.”  Defendant was obsessed with cleanliness.  When they had sex in 
motels, he would lay towels on the bed to avoid leaving any stains.  D. recalled 
that defendant described prostitutes as “dirty and disgusting.”   He told her “they 
shouldn’t be here,” “they shouldn’t exist,” and “somebody should remove them.”  
D. said defendant collected guns and often showed them to her.  He bragged that 
he had mob connections and could get guns any time he wanted.  He showed D. 
photographs of people he claimed to have killed.  When she was homeless, D. 
 
 
54
 
accepted defendant’s invitation to use the shower in his apartment.  He then forced 
her to have sexual intercourse with him.  She reported this incident to police but 
received no response to her follow-up inquiries.  During this incident and others, 
defendant put soap on his penis as a method of birth control. 
Prostitute Chavez testified that defendant twice approached her on the street 
between July and September 1995 soliciting sex.  She declined his proposition 
because she felt “funny” about him.   
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erroneously admitted the above 
prosecution rebuttal evidence, contending the evidence was irrelevant and 
inadmissible under Evidence Code sections 352, 1101, and 1102.  We review a 
trial court’s evidentiary rulings under these code sections for abuse of discretion.  
(People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 335; People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 
168, 202; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1195.) 
Because defendant objected only that the evidence was irrelevant and 
unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352, he has forfeited his claim 
that the trial court admitted this evidence in violation of Evidence Code sections 
1101 and 1102.31  (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 520.)  This claim is 
also without merit. 
The prosecution’s rebuttal evidence was properly admitted to attack the 
basis of Dr. Terrell’s testimony.  (Evid. Code, §§ 721, subd. (a), 780.)  It was 
relevant to the jury’s determination of the weight and credibility of his opinion.  
                                              
31  
The record does not support defendant’s implied assertion that the trial 
court admitted the prosecution’s rebuttal evidence under Evidence Code section 
1102, subdivision (b), which permits the admission of evidence of a defendant’s 
character only in the form of opinion or reputation evidence and not evidence of 
specific acts.    
 
 
55
 
(See, e.g., People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 965-966 [the rebuttal 
testimony of a prosecution expert critical of forensic psychiatry and of the 
opinions of the defense experts was relevant to the weight of those opinions, and 
its admission was neither improper nor prejudicial]; People v. Prince (1988) 203 
Cal.App.3d 848, 856-858 [the testimony of a prosecution expert was relevant to 
the weight and credibility of the defense expert opinions on the defendant’s 
competency to stand trial].) 
The testimony of the rebuttal witnesses was also properly admitted as direct 
impeachment of defendant’s own testimony.  Here, “[b]y taking the stand, 
defendant put his own credibility in issue and was subject to impeachment in the 
same manner as any other witness.”  (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 
1139; see Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (c).)   
Defendant further contends the trial court did not adequately weigh the 
potential prejudice of the evidence against its probative value under Evidence 
Code section 352.  He specifically complains the court did not consider the 
inflammatory nature of the uncorroborated testimony he raped D. and mistreated 
Hamblen.  He has forfeited these issues by failing to argue them below.  (Evid. 
Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 666-667 [a claim of 
the erroneous admission of evidence is preserved for appeal if the timely objection 
to admission of the evidence alerted the trial court to the nature of the anticipated 
evidence and the basis on which exclusion was sought and afforded the opposing 
party an opportunity to establish its admissibility]; see also People v. Marks 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 228 [“A general objection to the admission or exclusion of 
evidence, or one based on a different ground from that advanced at trial, does not 
preserve the claim for appeal”].) 
Further, “a court need not expressly weigh prejudice against probative 
value or even expressly state that it has done so, if the record as a whole shows the 
 
 
56
 
court was aware of and performed its balancing functions under Evidence Code 
section 352.”  (People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1169.)  Our independent 
review of the record shows the trial court carefully considered defendant’s motion  
and performed the requisite weighing process under Evidence Code section 352.  
The court heard argument from both sides before it ruled on the rebuttal evidence, 
finding “under [section] 352, . . .that [its] relevance and materiality …outweighs 
[any] prejudicial effect.” 
Contrary to defendant’s arguments, none of this testimony was unduly 
prejudicial.  “ ‘Prejudice’ as contemplated by [Evidence Code] section 352 is not 
so sweeping as to include any evidence the opponent finds inconvenient. Evidence 
is not prejudicial, as that term is used in a section 352 context, merely because it 
undermines the opponent’s position or shores up that of the proponent. The ability 
to do so is what makes evidence relevant. The code speaks in terms of undue 
prejudice. Unless the dangers of undue prejudice, confusion, or time consumption  
‘ “substantially outweigh” ’ the probative value of relevant evidence, a section 352 
objection should fail.  (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 609.)  ‘ “The 
‘prejudice’ referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which 
uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual 
and which has very little effect on the issues. In applying section 352,  
‘prejudicial’ is not synonymous with ‘damaging.’ ” [Citation.]’ (People v. Karis 
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638.) [¶] The prejudice that section 352 ‘ “is designed to 
avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from 
relevant, highly probative evidence.” [Citations.] “Rather, the statute uses the 
word in its etymological sense of ‘prejudging’ a person or cause on the basis of 
extraneous factors. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 
929, 958.) In other words, evidence should be excluded as unduly prejudicial 
when it is of such nature as to inflame the emotions of the jury, motivating them to 
 
 
57
 
use the information, not to logically evaluate the point upon which it is relevant, 
but to reward or punish one side because of the jurors’ emotional reaction. In such 
a circumstance, the evidence is unduly prejudicial because of the substantial 
likelihood the jury will use it for an illegitimate purpose.”  (Vorse v. Sarasy (1997) 
53 Cal.App.4th 998, 1008-1009.) 
The challenged evidence was directly relevant to impeach defendant’s own 
testimony and that of his witnesses.  Although evidence of D.’s rape and 
Hamblen’s mistreatment is unpleasant, it paled in comparison to the testimony 
from four witnesses that defendant tried to kill them.  The jury was properly 
instructed not to be influenced by passion, sympathy, or prejudice and to 
conscientiously consider and weigh the evidence in applying the law and reaching 
its verdict.  (CALJIC No. 1.00.) 
In the interest of complete review, we note that even if we were to assume 
evidentiary error, any error would be harmless, whether assessed under the federal 
constitutional (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24) or state (People v. Watson, 
supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836) standard of review.  There was overwhelming evidence 
of defendant’s guilt.   
D.  Asserted Errors Regarding the Testimony of Defendant’s Mother 
and Claims of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant contends that several evidentiary errors and prosecutorial 
misconduct cumulatively rendered his trial fundamentally unfair and deprived him 
of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  He claims the trial court erred by “forcing” his mother to invoke her 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination seven times in front of the jury 
and by permitting the prosecutor to impeach her with evidence that she had tried to 
steal from her employer.  He argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by 
 
 
58
 
violating the trial court’s order limiting that cross-examination.  We reject each 
claim.  Thus, there was no error to accumulate. 
1.  Defense Witness Donna Doolin Larsen’s Trial Testimony and 
Related Trial Proceedings 
Donna Doolin Larsen testified as an alibi witness for her son.  On the night 
Tucker was murdered, defendant was at home with her, cleaning house, except for 
a half-hour when he left to buy ice cream.  On the night Kachman was shot, 
defendant spent the evening with Larsen at home. 
Before Larsen’s cross-examination, the court conducted an in limine  
hearing.  The prosecutor informed the court that he and defense counsel had 
previously discussed Larsen’s potential impeachment.  The prosecutor said that if 
Larsen were to testify for the defense, he would seek to impeach her with evidence 
she had falsely told police and others that she was a registered nurse, that she had 
altered her daughter’s nursing license for her own use, and that she had been 
suspected of taking a computer from the school where she worked.  The 
prosecutor argued these specific instances of misconduct were proper 
impeachment. 
Defense counsel insisted that the prosecutor had said he did not intend to 
impeach Larsen with that information at trial and the defense had relied on that 
representation in putting Larsen on the stand.  The prosecutor asserted no such 
promise was given.  He stated only that he would raise the issue with the court 
when the defense called Larsen to testify.  The court ruled it would allow the 
impeachment. 
 
 
59
 
After a brief recess, the court reconvened and read to the parties the 
relevant portion of the reporter’s transcript of a related pretrial hearing.32  The 
court did not recall any representation by the prosecutor that he would not 
impeach Larsen with the specific instances described above.  The court reminded 
defense counsel that he did not request a hearing before he brought Larsen into the 
courtroom and called her as a witness. 
Counsel informed the court that Larsen would invoke her Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination if the prosecutor’s questions were allowed.  He 
asked that Larsen be permitted to invoke the Fifth Amendment outside the 
presence of the jury.  The trial court denied that request, stating:  “The Court is 
going to deny the motion. You deliberately brought her in here and asked her 
questions, and now the District Attorney wants to ask her questions and impeach 
her, and now you want it all done outside the presence of the jury.”  (Italics 
added.)   
Larsen’s own attorney was present and advised Larsen just before the 
cross-examination.  Larsen invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege seven times in 
response to the prosecutor’s questions whether she had ever purposely tried to 
mislead people, been dishonest, submitted false documents to an employer, 
submitted a false copy of a nursing license to a school official, altered a nursing 
                                              
32  
At a hearing held on March 18, 1996, defense counsel informed the trial 
court that Larsen had been charged with a misdemeanor for misrepresenting 
herself as a registered nurse and that if she were asked about the matter while 
testifying in defendant’s trial, she would invoke her Fifth Amendment rights.   
Counsel then requested a ruling on Larsen’s anticipated impeachment based on 
this charge.  The prosecutor indicated he would seek a ruling regarding 
impeachment if and when defendant called Larsen to testify.  The trial court asked 
the parties to address all issues related to impeachment at a hearing before Larson 
testified.    
 
 
60
 
license to add her name, used her daughter’s nursing license with her name typed 
on it, or used a business card falsely representing she was a registered nurse. 
The prosecutor moved to strike all of Larsen’s testimony.  Outside the 
presence of the jury, defense counsel again objected that the prosecutor had said 
that if Larsen admitted lying he would not question her about specific acts.  He 
recalled that when the prosecutor asked her whether she lied, Larsen responded:  
“Everyone does, I suppose, everyone does.”  The court gave counsel an 
opportunity to find a hearing transcript that supported his claim.  No such 
transcript was ever offered. 
The court subsequently ruled defense counsel could not question Larsen on 
redirect because Larsen’s invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights, in effect, 
limited the scope of prosecutor’s cross-examination.  The court also denied the 
prosecutor’s motion to strike Larsen’s earlier testimony and ruled he could 
continue to cross-examine her “on other issues.”  The prosecutor concluded his 
cross-examination of Larsen the following day.33  
2.  Larsen’s Assertion of Her Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination 
Defendant now contends the trial court abused its discretion by compelling 
Larsen to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination before 
the jury.  We reject this contention.  
The jury may not draw any inference from a witness’s invocation of a 
privilege.  (Evid. Code, § 913, subd. (a); People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 
441.)  Upon request, the trial court must so instruct jurors.  (Evid. Code, § 913, 
                                              
33  
For reasons that do not appear on the record, after the prosecution 
completed cross-examination, the trial court permitted defense counsel to briefly 
examine Larsen on redirect. 
 
 
61
 
subd. (b); People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 441.)  “To avoid the potentially 
prejudicial impact of having a witness assert the privilege against self-
incrimination before the jury, we have in the past recommended that, in 
determining the propriety of the witness’s invocation of the privilege, the trial 
court hold a pretestimonial hearing outside the jury’s presence.”  (People v. 
Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 441, italics added.)  Such a procedure makes sense 
under the appropriate circumstances.  If there is a dispute about whether a witness 
may legitimately rely on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
to avoid testifying, that legal question should be resolved by the court .  Given the 
court’s ruling and the nature of the potential testimony, the witness may not be 
privileged to testify at all, or counsel may elect not to call the witness as a matter 
of tactics. 
Mincey provides a clear example.  There, the defendant sought to call 
Sandra B. who had also been charged with the murder for which defendant was on 
trial.  Outside the jury’s presence, Sandra invoked the privilege on advice of 
counsel.  Defendant sought to compel her to repeat her invocation before the jury.  
(People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 440-441.)  We held that allowing her to 
do so would invite the jury to speculate that she, not defendant, was the murderer.  
Clearly such speculation is improper.  (Id. at p. 442; Evid. Code, § 913.) 
The situation here is different.  Apparently for tactical reasons, the defense 
decided not to request a Mincey hearing before calling Larsen to testify.  The court 
had asked both parties to address Larsen’s impeachment and her assertion of the 
privilege before she testified, but defendant did not do so.  Thus the defense 
knowingly risked Larsen’s impeachment and her invocation of the privilege. 
As noted, the jury was properly instructed not to draw any inference from 
Larsen’s invocation of her Fifth Amendment privilege.  (CALJIC No. 2.25.)  We 
 
 
62
 
assume they followed that instruction.  (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 
1295.)  
3.  Asserted Trial Court Error in Allowing the Prosecutor to Question 
Larsen about the Computer Equipment 
The prosecutor also asked Larsen whether she had stolen computer 
equipment from Duncan Polytechnical High School.  Larsen denied doing so but 
confirmed she had been asked by an administrator if she had taken the equipment.  
Defendant challenged the propriety of this impeachment. 
During the in limine hearing, the prosecutor sought a ruling on the 
admissibility of the theft evidence.  One night a witness saw Larsen and someone 
else take computer equipment from the school and load it into their car.  A few 
days later the witness saw Larsen return the equipment around 6:00 a.m.  The 
prosecutor directly addressed Evidence Code section 352 in arguing the question.   
The trial court ruled the prosecutor could question Larsen on this issue. 
On appeal, defendant acknowledges that, under People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 
Cal.4th 284, 292-293, the court has broad discretion to admit acts of moral 
turpitude to impeach a witness’s credibility.  “[I]mpeachment evidence other than 
felony convictions entails problems of proof, unfair surprise, and moral turpitude 
evaluation which felony convictions do not present. Hence, [under Evidence Code 
section 352,] courts may and should consider with particular care whether the 
admission of such evidence might involve undue time, confusion, or prejudice 
which outweighs its probative value.”  (People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 
296-297.)   A court also may consider issues of “fairness, efficiency, and moral 
turpitude” when evidence other than a felony conviction is proffered for 
impeachment.  (Id. at p. 297, fn.7.)  Defendant complains the court failed to weigh 
the pertinent Wheeler factors. 
 
 
63
 
Larsen’s theft was relevant to the issue of her credibility.  At the hearing 
discussed above, counsel directly addressed Evidence Code section 352 in his 
argument.  The record makes clear that the trial court was aware of and performed 
its duties in that regard. 
Further, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:  “Evidence has been 
introduced for the purpose of showing that a witness engaged in past criminal 
conduct amounting to a misdemeanor.  Such evidence may be considered by you 
only for the purpose of determining the believability of that witness.  The fact that 
the witness engaged in past criminal conduct amounting to a misdemeanor, if it is 
established, does not necessarily destroy or impair a witness’ believability. It is 
one of the circumstances that you may take into consideration in weighing the 
testimony of such witness.”  (CALJIC No. 2.23.1, italics added.)  We presume the 
jury followed this instruction. 
4.  Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct in Questioning Larsen About 
Other Instances of Falsely Representing Herself as a Registered 
Nurse 
The prosecutor asked Larsen, in several ways, whether she had falsely 
presented herself as a registered nurse.  Larsen asserted her Fifth Amendment 
privilege seven times in response to those questions.  Larsen’s attorney objected 
that the questioning was cumulative.  Defendant’s counsel joined in the objection, 
which the trial court sustained.  The prosecutor then asked Larsen whether she had 
written a letter in October 1995 to Gary Kirby, a program coordinator for the 
Fresno Unified School District.  After the trial court sustained Larsen’s attorney’s   
objection on the ground the question was cumulative, the prosecutor asked Larsen 
whether she had written a letter to John Lockey, another district employee, in May 
1993.  Larsen’s attorney objected and asked that similar questions be disallowed in 
 
 
64
 
light of the court’s ruling.  The court sustained this objection and asked the 
prosecutor if he had other questions.     
On appeal, defendant contends the prosecutor’s posing of these two questions 
was misconduct.  “A prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make 
the conviction a denial of due process.”  (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 
44; accord, Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181; Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo (1974) 416 U.S. 637, 643.)  Under California law, a prosecutor 
who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods of persuasion commits misconduct 
even if such actions do not render the trial fundamentally unfair.  (People v. Cook 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 606.)  Generally, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not 
cognizable on appeal unless the defendant made a timely objection and requested 
an admonition.  (Ibid.)  Here, although defendant preserved this claim to the extent 
he joined in the objections by Larsen’s attorney, defendant failed to request an 
admonition.  In any event, we conclude the prosecutor did not engage in 
misconduct by asking Larsen the above questions.   
Each of the prosecutor’s questions related to factually distinct circumstances 
in which Larsen allegedly held herself out as a registered nurse.  The prosecutor 
had not addressed these factual circumstances in any of his previous questions.  
Neither question involved the prosecutor’s use of deceptive or reprehensible 
methods in an attempt to improperly influence the jury on any material issue.  
These questions went unanswered.  The jury was instructed that neither statements 
nor questions by attorneys constituted evidence and that it should not speculate 
about the answer a witness might have given to a question to which an objection 
was sustained.  We presume the jury followed the court’s instructions and ignored 
the above questions.  (People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1295.) 
 
 
65
 
5.  Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct In Closing Argument 
During his closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that “[a] matter of 
general or common knowledge is that at the time of final argument [defense 
counsel] cries, so when that happens —”  The trial court overruled counsel’s 
objection to his remark.  The prosecutor continued:  “When that happens, I want 
you to understand that it’s nothing unique to this case.” 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly referred to “facts not in 
the record” and attacked the integrity of defense counsel by suggesting he “was a 
dishonest charlatan, an attorney without integrity, who would resort to theatrical 
gestures to sway a jury.”   
The prosecutor’s brief remark was harmless, and jurors were instructed that 
the statements of counsel were not evidence.  They were also instructed that they 
must not be influenced by sentiment, sympathy, passion or prejudice.  We 
presume the jury followed these instructions, ignored the prosecutor’s remark, 
along with any displays of “sentiment” and “passion” by counsel, and decided the 
case based on the evidence admitted at trial. 
6.  Cumulative Effect 
Having rejected defendant’s claims, we reject his assertion of cumulative 
error.  
E.  Admissibility of DNA Evidence 
Defendant contends that the DNA test results on samples from the Espinoza 
autopsy were erroneously admitted in violation of the standard enunciated in 
People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 (Kelly).  Under Kelly, the proponent of 
evidence derived from a new scientific technique must establish that:  (1) the 
reliability of the new technique has gained general acceptance in the relevant 
scientific community, (2) the expert testifying to that effect is qualified to give an 
 
 
66
 
opinion on the subject, and (3) the correct scientific procedures were used.  (Id. at 
p. 30.) 
Defendant concedes that under Kelly, the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) 
DQ-Alpha testing method used in this case is generally accepted in the relevant 
scientific community.  He asserts, however, that the dot-intensity analysis relied 
upon by the prosecution’s expert is a separate testing method, and because the trial 
court did not separately rule that the dot-intensity method was valid under Kelly, 
the DNA test results were inadmissible.  We need not determine whether the dot-
intensity analysis was subject to exclusion under Kelly, because its admission was 
harmless in any event.  We reject defendant’s additional contention that the 
prosecution’s population frequency statistics were inadmissible without proof of 
the perpetrator’s ethnicity. 
1.  Procedural Background 
a.  Kelly hearing 
The court held a Kelly hearing to consider the DNA test results.  The 
prosecution elicited extensive testimony from state Department of Justice (DOJ) 
criminalists Rodney Andrus and Edwin Scruggs about the PCR DQ-Alpha method 
and its general acceptance in the scientific community.  PCR DQ-Alpha testing is 
a subtype of PCR DNA testing methods that tests a single genetic marker.  (See 
also People v. Henderson (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 769, 777.)  Neither of the 
prosecution’s experts discussed “dot-intensity analysis” during the Kelly hearing, 
but  Andrus did give his preliminary conclusion that that defendant was a possible 
contributor of the DNA samples obtained from Espinoza.34 
                                              
34  
Andrus explained that his conclusions were considered preliminary and not 
final or “verified” by DOJ standards because he had not yet completed the 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
67
 
Counsel argued the results should be excluded under Evidence Code 
section 352 on the grounds the PCR DQ-Alpha test method was unreliable and 
would confuse the jury because they could not identify an individual as a source of 
the DNA tested but could only include an individual in a group of potential 
sources. 
Relying on People v. Morganti (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 643, 671, the trial 
court found that PCR DQ-Alpha testing is generally accepted in the relevant 
scientific community and no significant controversy exists with respect to its 
reliability.  The court also found the prosecution’s experts “were eminently 
qualified” and employed the correct scientific procedures.  In rejecting defendant’s 
argument under Evidence Code section 352, the court found the probative value of 
the method was not so undermined by any limitation that the results should be 
excluded.    
b.  DNA evidence introduced at trial 
Again at trial, Andrus gave his qualifications and testified about both blood 
and DNA testing.  He described the PCR DQ-Alpha method, which tests for the 
presence or absence of the six common identifiable alleles at the DQ-Alpha 
genetic marker, denominated as 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2, 3, and 4.  Andrus explained that an 
individual’s genotype for the DQ-Alpha marker is composed of a pair of alleles.  
The six DQ-Alpha alleles can be paired to form 21 distinct genotypes, meaning the 
human population can be divided into 21 population groups.  Ultimately, the DQ-
Alpha genotype of the sample is determined by the presence of blue dots on test 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
required documentation of the tests he conducted.  We note that the final test 
results Andrus subsequently provided at trial were consistent with the preliminary 
test results he provided at the Kelly hearing. 
 
 
68
 
strips that indicate an allele of the sample DNA bonded with a specific DNA 
sequence or “primer” on the test strip.  
The DNA found in the fingernail scrapings and vaginal sample taken from 
Espinoza revealed sperm from more than one individual (i.e., mixed sperm 
samples).  Andrus performed PCR DQ-Alpha tests on these samples as well as on 
DNA obtained from defendant’s blood.  Because the samples from Espinoza 
contained mixed sperm, Andrus used dot-intensity analysis to identify the 
genotype of the “primary alleles represented”35 in these samples.  Andrus briefly 
described dot-intensity analysis as a visual comparison of the “relative dot 
intensity” of the blue color that developed on the dots of the test strips with the 
mixed DNA sample.  A “minor” contributor to the mixed DNA sample, for 
example, has “significantly less” color intensity than that of a “major” contributor.    
Based on these dot-intensity analyses, Andrus determined that the DQ-
Alpha genotypes of defendant and the primary contributor of each of the mixed 
sperm DNA samples were the same.  Andrus concluded that defendant could not 
be eliminated as a possible contributor of these samples.  He eliminated defendant 
as the source of the semen extracted from the condom found near Espinoza’s 
body.  
2.  Applicable Law 
Whether a new scientific technique has gained general acceptance is a 
mixed question of law and fact.  (People v. Reilly (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1127, 
1134.)  “[W]e review the trial court’s determination with deference to any and all 
supportable findings of ‘historical’ fact or credibility, and then decide as a matter 
                                              
35  
Andrus also referred to the “primary alleles represented” interchangeably as 
“primary contributors” to, or “major components” of, the sample DNA.  
 
 
69
 
of law, based on those assumptions, whether there has been general acceptance.”  
(Id. at p. 1135.)  Once a published appellate decision has affirmed admission of a 
scientific technique, the technique’s general acceptance are established as a matter 
of law.  Further hearings on general acceptance is unnecessary “at least until new 
evidence is presented reflecting a change in the attitude of the scientific 
community.”  (Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 32; People v. Bolden (2002) 29 
Cal.4th 515, 545.) 
The trial court’s determination on the qualifications of an expert is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion (Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 39) as is its ruling 
on the use of correct scientific procedures in the particular case (People v. Venegas 
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 91). 
3.  Discussion 
a.  Dot-intensity analysis 
Defendant does not dispute that People v. Morganti, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th 
at page 669, published just before his trial began, established that the PCR DQ-
Alpha method has gained general acceptance as a reliable technique.  (See also 
People v. Wright (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 31, 41.)  Instead, he argues that the dot-
intensity analysis that criminalist Andrus used was a new scientific technique,  
requiring independent proof of  general acceptance. 
Defendant did not object to Andrus’s testimony about dot-intensity analysis 
at trial and has forfeited his appellate challenge to this evidence.  (Evid. Code, § 
353 [an objection to the admission of evidence must be timely and clearly specify 
the basis of the objection]; see also People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 610-
611  [defendant’s failure to timely object to the admissibility of the population 
frequency statistics associated with the DNA test results forfeited the issue on 
appeal]; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 414 [a failure to object at trial to 
 
 
70
 
the admission of evidence under Kelly forfeits the claim for appeal]; People v. 
Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 776-778 [an objection to the expert’s selection of 
the test used to analyze semen samples did not preserve defendant’s challenge to 
the expert’s conclusions concerning the statistical significance of the test results].) 
Whether “dot-intensity analysis” is a novel technique requiring its own 
proof of general acceptance has not been addressed in a California published 
opinion.36  Assuming, without deciding, the results of the dot-intensity analysis 
were erroneously admitted in this case, the error would have been harmless in light 
of the overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence of defendant’s guilt.  In 
particular, with regard to the Espinoza murder, undisputed ballistics evidence 
established the victim was killed by a bullet shot from defendant’s gun.  There is 
no reasonable probability the verdict would have been more favorable to 
defendant had the DNA evidence been excluded.  (People v. Watson, supra, 46 
Cal.2d at p. 836.)     
b.  Population statistics 
Andrus also testified that, based on the relevant population frequency 
statistics for the primary contributor to the mixed samples in this case, the donor  
could have come from 7 percent of the African-American population, 10 percent 
of the Caucasian population, including defendant, or 20 percent of the Hispanic 
population.  (See People v. Venegas, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 63 [identification as a 
possible source of the sample DNA “places the suspect within a class of persons 
                                              
36  
The Court of Appeal, in dicta, has recognized criticism of dot-intensity 
analysis.  (People v. Pizarro (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 530, 618-620, quoting State 
v. Harvey (1997) 151 N.J. 117 [699 A.2d 596] (dis. opn. of Handler, J.) 
[questioning the validity of dot-intensity analysis as a scientific method], 
disapproved on another ground by People v. Wilson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1237, 1250-
1251.). 
 
 
71
 
from whom the sample could have originated”].)  Andrus explained the number of 
possible DNA contributors could be reduced by excluding the percentage of 
females in each group, as well as adult males not present in Fresno at the time of 
Espinoza’s murder, and prepubescent males. 
Defendant first complains the statistics were inadmissible because Andrus 
presented statistics for only the genotype of the primary alleles represented in the 
mixed samples rather than all alleles in the samples.  But this claim, in essence, is 
premised upon the argument that the dot-intensity technique improperly focused 
only on the primary contributor in the mixed samples.  As noted, defendant 
forfeited any such argument by failing to raise the issue at trial, and any assumed 
error was harmless. 
Second, defendant contends that, even if Andrus correctly identified the 
DQ-Alpha genotype of the primary contributor, the DNA evidence should have 
been excluded because the population frequency statistics were irrelevant without 
proof of the perpetrator’s ethnicity.  Again, defendant failed to object on this 
ground at trial and has forfeited this issue for appeal.  (Evid. Code, § 353; People 
v. Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 610-611.)  The claim is also meritless.  The 
prosecution in this case presented DNA frequency statistics for the African-
American, Caucasian, and Hispanic population groups.  Since defendant’s trial, we 
have concluded that expert testimony on DNA profiling frequencies for these 
specific population groups is admissible even in the absence of independent 
evidence the perpetrator’s ethnicity.  (People v. Wilson, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 
1249-1250, disapproving to the extent inconsistent People v. Pizarro, supra, 110 
Cal.App.4th 530.)  Even assuming the population frequency statistics were 
erroneously admitted, any error was harmless in light of the other weighty 
evidence of defendant’s guilt.  (See People v. Venegas, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 93, 
 
 
72
 
citing People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; People v. Pizarro, supra, 110 
Cal.App.4th at p. 634.) 
III.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Denial of Request for Continuance  
The jury returned its guilty verdicts on Tuesday, May 7, 1996.  The penalty 
phase was to begin on Thursday, May 16, 1996.  The parties had until Friday, May 
10, 1996, to complete penalty phase discovery.   
On Monday, May 13, 1996, defense counsel moved for the release of DNA 
evidence for retesting and for a 48-day continuance under section 1050.  Counsel 
claimed retesting was necessary because it might eliminate defendant as a source.  
Counsel estimated the testing alone would take about four weeks.  The 
continuance would permit counsel time to interview the prosecution penalty phase 
witnesses.  Counsel admitted he had not contacted any of defendant’s 16 potential 
character witnesses but would obtain their telephone numbers and might contact 
them.  Counsel was concerned that these individuals might not testify as defendant 
anticipated and that he would have to consult with defendant before calling them 
to testify.  The trial court denied both motions. 
On appeal, defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
his motion to continue and thereby deprived him of due process, effective 
assistance of counsel, and a reliable penalty verdict under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.  We disagree. 
A continuance in a criminal case may be granted only for good cause.  (§ 
1050, subd. (e).)  Whether good cause exists is a question for the trial court’s  
discretion.  (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1037.)  The court must 
consider “ ‘ “not only the benefit which the moving party anticipates but also the 
likelihood that such benefit will result, the burden on other witnesses, jurors and 
 
 
73
 
the court and, above all, whether substantial justice will be accomplished or 
defeated by a granting of the motion.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  While a showing of good cause 
requires that both counsel and the defendant demonstrate they have prepared for 
trial with due diligence (ibid.), the trial court may not exercise its discretion “so as 
to deprive the defendant or his attorney of a reasonable opportunity to prepare.”  
(People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 646.) 
A reviewing court considers the circumstances of each case and the reasons 
presented for the request to determine whether a trial court’s denial of a 
continuance was so arbitrary as to deny due process.  (People v. Frye, supra, 18 
Cal.4th at p. 1013.)  Absent a showing of an abuse of discretion and prejudice, the 
trial court’s denial does not warrant reversal.  (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 
1044, 1126.) 
Here, there was no abuse of discretion.  Defendant’s request rested, in  
large part, on his claim that new test results might provide exculpatory evidence.  
Retesting DNA would not have been beneficial to defendant, however, in light of 
the extensive evidence linking him to each crime and, specifically, uncontroverted 
ballistics evidence establishing Espinoza was killed by a bullet fired from 
defendant’s gun.  Defendant had long been on notice of the existence of the DNA 
evidence and the district attorney’s intent to use it.  In addition, the evidence 
showed that defendant actually engaged in intercourse with only one of his six 
victims.  During that encounter, he wore a condom.  Even if he were excluded as 
one of the multiple semen donors, the evidence would have little impact.  
Although the prosecutor did present DNA evidence, he ultimately invited the jury 
to reject it if they were in doubt as to its significance because the remaining 
evidence pointed convincingly to defendant’s guilt.  Under these circumstances, 
the 48-day continuance requested by defendant was both untimely and unlikely to 
 
 
74
 
affect the outcome of the proceedings.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the continuance. 
With respect to defendant’s requested  continuance to interview prospective  
witnesses, defendant made only a general assertion in his written motion that he 
needed more time to prepare a defense to the prosecution’s case in aggravation.  
Counsel provided no explanation why he could not prepare such a defense or 
interview the prosecution’s prospective witnesses in the six days leading up to the 
penalty phase.37  As previously discussed, defense counsel had given a tactical 
reason to delay interviews of defendant’s potential character witnesses.  In 
addition, for the first time on appeal, defendant speculates that a continuance 
might have allowed him time to develop childhood abuse issues that Dr. Hedberg 
mentioned in testifying on his behalf at the penalty phase.  But he made no 
showing that he could produce specific, relevant mitigating evidence within a 
reasonable time.  (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1038.)  Certainly 
defendant and his defense team were aware of whether such evidence existed.  
They were in contact with defendant’s close relatives.  The defense provided no 
insight into why any such extant evidence had not been shared with Dr. Hedberg.  
In sum, defendant’s vague and speculative reasons for the continuance failed to 
support a showing of good cause.  The court was within its discretion in refusing 
to grant a continuance. 
                                              
37  
Four witnesses testified for the prosecution at the penalty phase:  the nurse 
who examined D. following her alleged rape;  a criminalist who testified about the 
hydroshock hollowpoint bullets used in the shootings;  the daughter of murder 
victim Inez Espinoza; and  the sister of murder victim Peggy Tucker. 
 
 
75
 
B.  Faretta Motion 
On May 21, 1996, the jury returned a death verdict.  Defendant contends that 
the trial court erroneously denied his request for self-representation under Faretta 
v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, made at his sentencing hearing on June 18, 
1996.  The motion was untimely. 
1.  Procedural background 
On the day scheduled for sentencing, June 18, 1996, defendant moved for the 
substitution of counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, and for 
a two-week continuance.38  Immediately after both motions were denied, 
defendant asked to represent himself and to also have “an assistant to prepare a 
motion for new trial, motion for reduction of sentence.”  The court responded:  “In 
effect what you’re asking is to represent yourself and have this Court do exactly 
what it denied you already, that is, a Marsden motion to relieve your attorney and 
appoint a new attorney.  You’re not going to come in the back door.”  When 
defendant repeated his request to relieve defense counsel and have an assistant 
appointed to prepare motions, the trial court denied his requests.  
The court then asked defendant if he knew what a motion for new trial was.  
Defendant answered it was a motion to point out “differences that should have 
been dealt with differently and [to] bring [those] to the attention of the court and 
also try to enter any new evidence that might open the court’s eyes and allow for a 
new trial.”  When the trial court questioned whether defendant had any new 
evidence, defendant said, “Not at this exact moment, but maybe in a period of 
                                              
38  
The trial court had denied defendant’s two previous attempts to substitute 
counsel under Marsden, one made during the guilt phase trial, on April 3, 1996, 
and the other on the day the penalty phase began, May 16, 1996.  He does not 
challenge these rulings on appeal.  
 
 
76
 
time, yes.”  The court asked if defendant could find any new evidence over the 
next two weeks, and defendant responded, “I can assure the Court that, yes, there 
are still things that need to be done that could be presented to the Court in fact of, 
yes, new evidence.” 
The court asked defendant about his education and learned that defendant 
dropped out of high school and had obtained a high school general education 
development (GED) certificate while in custody.  The court additionally noted 
“there is some evidence that you were a slow learner” and defendant agreed.   
The court also inquired about how defendant would address a motion for new 
trial and motion for reduction of penalty.  Defendant essentially stated he would 
first address the jury’s “conduct” and then present evidence that he had never been 
in trouble with the law, had always held a job, and had obtained letters of 
recommendation from employers when applying to new jobs.  Defendant added he 
would submit letters from his family and friends providing their impressions of 
him. 
The court then advised defendant that if his motion were granted, he could 
not complain on appeal that he was inadequate to represent himself.  Defendant 
said he understood and was asking for an “assistant” to “draw up that way 
different timelines . . . to propose to the Court” for his motions.  The court 
informed defendant that if it permitted him to represent himself, it did not have to 
grant a continuance and asked whether defendant was ready to proceed that day.  
Defendant said he was not ready and needed a continuance to “draw up the proper 
papers and also present the Court with my findings. . . .” 
The court then ruled as follows:  “Well, the Court is very concerned and 
going to deny your Faretta motion to permit you to represent yourself on the basis 
that the Court feels that you are not adequate to represent yourself, that is, the 
evidence during the course of the trial was that you did not finish high school, that 
 
 
77
 
— and that by itself is not the reason, but you were described as being a slow 
learner and that you had problems in school.  And the Court is not going to grant 
you a continuance in order for you to prepare to represent yourself.  Therefore, the 
Court is going to deny your motion to represent yourself.”  (Italics added.) 
2.  Discussion 
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to counsel at all critical stages 
of a criminal prosecution, including sentencing.  (Mempa v. Rhay (1967) 389 U.S. 
128, 134-137; People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 930.)  The right to counsel 
may be waived by a criminal defendant who elects to represent himself at trial.  
(Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 807, 834-835.)  The right of self-
representation is absolute, but only if knowingly and voluntarily made and if 
asserted a reasonable time before trial begins.  Otherwise, requests for self-
representation are addressed to the trial court’s sound discretion.  (People v. 
Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 127-129.)  Moreover, whether timely or untimely, 
a request for self-representation must be unequivocal.  (People v. Marshall (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 1, 22-23.) 
On appeal, a reviewing court independently examines the entire record to 
determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently invoked his right to 
self-representation.  (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 932.)  
As a preliminary matter, we agree with the parties that the trial court 
incorrectly referred to defendant’s educational background and evidence that he 
was a “slow learner” in denying defendant’s request for self-representation.  
Following United States Supreme Court precedent in Godinez v. Moran (1993) 
509 U.S. 389, 399-400, we have held that a trial court may not measure a 
defendant’s competence to waive his right counsel by evaluating the defendant’s 
“technical legal knowledge” (People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 908) or his 
 
 
78
 
ability to represent himself (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 733).  The 
right to self-representation may be invoked by any defendant competent to stand 
trial.  (People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 908.)   
The trial court’s remarks, however, also touch on its legitimate concern that 
defendant’s request was untimely and would needlessly delay the proceedings.  
The timeliness requirement “serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the 
motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of 
justice.” (People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1110.)  Here, defendant argues 
that his motion was timely because defense counsel’s performance was inadequate 
throughout trial, the two-week continuance he requested was not unreasonable, 
and granting self-representation for sentencing would not inconvenience the jury. 
“We have held that, for purposes of assessing the timeliness of a motion for 
self-representation, the guilt and penalty phases in a capital prosecution are not 
separate trials but parts of a single trial, and a motion made between the guilt and 
penalty phases is thus untimely and subject to the trial court’s discretion.”  (People 
v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 810; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 193-
195; see People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 434 [capital defendant’s 
motion for self-representation brought seven months before jury selection in the 
penalty retrial was timely].)  We have not addressed, however, the timeliness of a 
request for self-representation made after the penalty phase verdict.  (See 
Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 810 [declining to decide whether a post-penalty-
phase Faretta motion would be timely if made “a ‘reasonable time’ before 
sentencing”].)  We need not do so here. 
Defendant’s request was manifestly untimely.  He never requested self-
representation during the guilt or penalty phase.  He appeared on the day set for 
sentencing and sought, not to act as his own counsel, but to replace his appointed 
lawyer with a new one and to secure a continuance.  Only when this approach 
 
 
79
 
failed did defendant seek self-representation, and only then with the appointment 
of an assistant to actually draft his moving papers.  Defendant had no new 
evidence to support the motion for new trial he intended to file.  When pressed on 
the question of new evidence, defendant answered vaguely that “there are still 
things that need to be done that could be presented to the Court.”  Defendant 
provided no specific information about any new evidence he expected to find, 
when he expected to find it, or how long he might need to prepare his motions.  He 
was not prepared to proceed and could not provide a reasonable estimate of when 
he would be ready.  The trial court’s ruling was well within the scope of its 
discretion.39   
                                              
39  
The circumstances of defendant’s posttrial request for self-representation 
are in stark contrast to a recent Court of Appeal decision that held such a motion in 
a noncapital case is timely if made “a reasonable time prior to commencement of 
the sentencing hearing.”  (People v. Miller (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1024.)  
In Miller, the defendant moved for self-representation after the jury rendered its 
verdict and a new trial motion was made and denied, but more than two months 
before the scheduled sentencing hearing.  At the time he made his motion, the 
defendant indicated to the court he planned to conduct his own investigation and 
that he would be prepared on the date the court had set.  (Id. at pp. 1020, 1024.)  In 
holding the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion as untimely, the 
court observed that concerns about trial delay or disruption do not apply to 
separate sentencing hearings.  (Id. at p. 1024.)  Because the defendant’s request 
was timely, he “had an absolute right to represent himself at sentencing and the 
trial court was required to grant his request for self-representation, which was 
unequivocal, as long as he was mentally competent and the request was made 
‘knowingly and intelligently, having been apprised of the dangers of self-
representation.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 729.)  In 
this case, for the reasons stated, defendant’s right to self-representation at 
sentencing was not absolute but subject to the court’s discretion.   
 
 
80
 
C.  Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Law 
Defendant challenges California’s death penalty law on various grounds we 
have repeatedly rejected.  He offers no persuasive reason to reconsider our prior 
decisions.  We continue to hold: 
Section 190.2 does not unconstitutionally fail to narrow the class of persons 
eligible for the death penalty.  (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 410.)  
Section 190.3, factor (a), permitting the penalty phase jury to consider the 
circumstances of the offense and the existence of any special circumstances, is 
neither vague nor overbroad, and does not unconstitutionally permit arbitrary and 
capricious imposition of the death penalty.  (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 
1067, 1165.)  “The jury may properly consider evidence of unadjudicated criminal 
activity involving force or violence under factor (b) of section 190.3.”  (People v. 
Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 402.) 
Neither the state nor federal Constitution requires the jury to make written 
findings or agree unanimously as to specific aggravating circumstances.  (People 
v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 730.)  Nor is California’s death penalty law 
unconstitutional for failing to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a 
preponderance of the evidence “as to the existence of aggravating circumstances, 
the greater weight of aggravating circumstances over mitigating circumstances, or 
the appropriateness of a death sentence.”  (People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 
401.)  Therefore, the trial court here did not err by not instructing on burden of 
proof.  (People v. Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 321.)  The United States Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona 
(2002) 536 U.S. 584, and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, do not 
require us to alter these conclusions.  (People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 
1031) 
 
 
81
 
The trial court is not constitutionally required to instruct the jury that 
certain sentencing factors are relevant only to mitigation.  (People v. Panah, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 499.)  The use of the phrase “whether or not” in certain 
statutory factors (e.g., section 190.3, factor (d), “[w]hether or not the offense was 
committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance”) does not unconstitutionally suggest “that the absence of 
such factors amount[s] to aggravation.”  (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 
1079.)  The use of certain adjectives (i.e., “extreme” and “substantial”) in the list 
of sentencing factors neither acts as a barrier to the jury’s consideration of 
mitigation facts nor renders the statute unconstitutional.  (People v. Panah, supra, 
35 Cal.4th at p. 500.) 
“Intercase proportionality review is not constitutionally required.  
[Citation.]  Nor does equal protection require that capital defendants be afforded 
the same sentence review afforded other felons under the determinate sentencing 
law.”  (People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 940.) 
D.  International Law 
Defendant contends that California’s death penalty violates international 
law.  Specifically, he argues California’s use of capital punishment “as regular 
punishment for substantial numbers of crimes—as opposed to extraordinary 
punishment for extraordinary crimes,” violates international norms of human 
decency and hence, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  We have rejected these arguments before and do so again. 
“International law does not compel the elimination of capital punishment in 
California.”  (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 127.)  Moreover, California 
does not impose capital punishment as “ ‘regular punishment for substantial 
numbers of crimes.’ ”  (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 43.)  “The 
 
 
82
 
death penalty is available only for the crime of first degree murder, and only when 
a special circumstance is found true; furthermore, administration of the penalty is 
governed by constitutional and statutory provisions different from those applying 
to ‘regular punishment’ for felonies. (E.g., Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; §§ 190.1-
190.9, 1239, subd. (b).)”  (Id. at p. 44.) 
IV.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
In this capital case, the County of Fresno agreed to pay the fees of the 
appointed defense attorney.  Under the contract, counsel received an $80,000 flat 
fee that included $60,000 for defense expenses; counsel was allowed to keep any 
of the money not spent.  The contract thus had a built-in incentive for counsel to 
spend as little as possible on the defense so he could pocket more money.  That is 
what happened here, where counsel spent less than 20 percent of the money 
allocated for defense expenses, keeping the remaining funds for himself.  
One cannot tell from the record whether there were reasonable tactical 
decisions justifying defense counsel’s small expenditures and minimal efforts to 
prepare for the guilt phase of trial.  Therefore, I join the majority in rejecting 
defendant’s claim that his right to counsel was violated at the guilt phase; 
defendant may, of course, raise that claim again in a habeas corpus petition, 
relying on evidence outside the appellate record.   
With respect to the penalty phase, however, the record shows that there was 
no tactical justification for counsel’s substandard preparations.  Consequently, 
unlike the majority, I am of the view that the fee agreement in question violated 
defendant’s right to counsel, thus requiring reversal of the sentence of death. 
I 
Defendant was charged in Fresno County with two counts of murder and 
four counts of attempted murder, as well as special circumstances that made him 
eligible for the death penalty.  Initially the Fresno County Public Defender 
 
 
2
 
represented him, but when the public defender declared a conflict of interest, the 
trial court appointed Attorney Rudy Petilla to represent defendant.  
To obtain the appointment, the attorney filled out a form entitled “Proposal 
Setting Compensation,” in which he requested a fee of $80,000; at the time, that 
was the amount Fresno County paid for “Category 3” cases — those with multiple 
victims or defendants, highly unusual publicity, complicated special 
circumstances, or complex factual or legal issues.  The attorney estimated total 
defense expenses at $60,000 ($40,000 for investigation and $20,000 for expert 
witnesses), leaving the remaining $20,000 as his fee.  The county agreed.   
Counsel represented defendant at the guilt and penalty phases of the capital 
trial.  But instead of spending the estimated $60,000 on the defense, he spent less 
than $9,000, keeping the remaining $71,000 of the $80,000 Fresno County had 
paid him.   
II 
Defendant contends the fee agreement between his trial counsel and Fresno 
County gave rise to a conflict of interest that violated his right to counsel under 
article I, section 15 of the state Constitution.   
“The right to effective assistance of counsel, secured by the Sixth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution, and article I, section 15 of the California 
Constitution, includes the right to representation that is free from conflicts of 
interest.”  (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 948.)   
“Although the federal Constitution . . . requires proof of an actual conflict of 
interest, that is, proof that counsel’s conflict adversely affected his or her performance 
during the proceedings [citation], under the state Constitution we have required only 
that the record support an ‘informed speculation’ that a ‘potential conflict of interest’ 
impaired the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel.  [Citations.]  Because 
a conflict of interest may retard counsel’s development of evidence or arguments in 
 
 
3
 
support of the defense . . . we have retained this stricter standard in order to ‘closely 
guard’ the fundamental right to the assistance of counsel.  ‘The very failure to 
produce or emphasize such information . . . produces a void and results in a record 
which shields the fact of any possible conflict and makes it difficult to demonstrate on 
appeal that a conflict did in fact exist.  [Citation.]  Accordingly, a [defendant] . . . 
need not establish that there was an actual conflict of interest, but rather it is sufficient 
if the record provides an adequate basis for an “informed speculation” that there was a 
potential conflict of interest which prejudicially affected the defendant’s right to 
effective counsel.’ ”  (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 174-175, italics added, 
fn. omitted.) 
“Conflicts of interest may arise in various factual settings.  Broadly, they 
‘embrace all situations in which an attorney’s loyalty to, or efforts on behalf of, a 
client are threatened by his responsibilities to another client or a third person or by 
his own interests.’ ”  (People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1134, italics added.)   
Here, the nature of defense counsel’s fee agreement with Fresno County 
gave him an incentive to spend as little as possible on the defense.  Did this create 
a potential conflict of interest?  I explore this question below. 
As a general rule, fee agreements do not violate a defendant’s right to 
conflict-free counsel.  “ ‘[A]lmost any fee arrangement between attorney and 
client may give rise to a “conflict.”  An attorney who received a flat fee in advance 
would have a “conflicting interest” to dispose of the case as quickly as possible, to 
the client’s disadvantage; and an attorney employed at a daily or hourly rate would 
have a “conflicting interest” to drag the case on beyond the point of maximum 
benefit to the client.  [¶]  The contingent fee contract so common in civil litigation 
creates a “conflict” when either the attorney or the client needs a quick settlement 
while the other’s interest would be better served by pressing on in the hope of a 
greater recovery.  The variants of this kind of “conflict” are infinite.  Fortunately 
 
 
4
 
most attorneys serve their clients honorably despite the opportunity to profit by 
neglecting or betraying the client’s interest.’ ”  (Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982) 
30 Cal.3d 606, 618, fn. 8.) 
Occasionally, however, a fee agreement can create a potential conflict of 
interest.  For example, “[c]onflicts may . . . arise in situations in which an attorney 
undertakes representation of a defendant in exchange for the literary rights to a 
portrayal or account based on information relating to the representation.”  (People 
v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 836.)  And in In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 
Justice Werdegar’s concurring opinion, which I signed, concluded there was a 
conflict of interest when trial counsel “engineered his appointment in a capital 
case, doing so by extraordinary, dishonest means, and for the apparent purpose of 
quickly obtaining a fee while expending as little time and effort on the case as 
possible.”  (Id. at p. 833 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) 
The situation here is one of those rare instances in which the fee agreement 
has created a “ ‘potential conflict of interest.’ ”  (People v. Rundle, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 175.)  By allowing defense counsel to keep any of the money not 
spent on defendant’s behalf, Fresno County gave counsel a considerable financial 
incentive to spend as little as possible on defense expenses, so counsel could keep 
most of the flat fee the county had paid him.1 
                                              
1  
Recently, flat fee contracts of this nature were criticized in a report by the 
California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, a group that was 
chaired by former Attorney General John Van de Kamp, and whose members 
included the current Attorney General; the District Attorneys of Santa Clara, San 
Mateo, and Ventura Counties; several law enforcement officers; and members of 
the criminal defense bar.  The report recommended that “legislation be enacted to 
provide that when Counties contract for indigent defense services in criminal 
cases, the contract shall provide separate funding for . . . investigators and expert 
witnesses.”  (Cal. Com. on Fair Admin. of Justice, Final Rep. (2008), Professional 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
5
 
But this potential conflict of interest does not, by itself, “support an 
‘informed speculation’ that . . . [it] impaired the defendant’s right to effective 
assistance of counsel” (People v. Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 175), because 
most attorneys abide by their commitment to spend the allocated funds on the 
defense.  Nor is spending only a fraction of the funds on defense expenses in itself 
a violation of the defendant’s right to conflict-free counsel, because tactically 
reasonable decisions may underlie that decision.  For example, at an early stage of 
the proceedings, before defense counsel has spent the money allocated for 
investigation and experts, a defendant may be offered a highly favorable plea 
bargain, which counsel has reason to believe will be withdrawn if not accepted 
immediately.  In that situation, it makes sense for counsel to advise the defendant 
to accept the offer; if the defendant does so, counsel has no need to spend the 
money allocated for investigation and experts.   
If there is a plausible explanation here for defense counsel’s failure to 
spend the money allocated for investigation and expert testimony, or if it cannot be 
determined from the record whether counsel’s actions were justified, defendant’s 
claim must be rejected on this direct appeal, although he may still have a remedy 
on habeas corpus.  (See p. 7, fn. 2, post.)  As explained below, the record does not 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
Responsibility and Accountability of Prosecutors and Defense Lawyers, Rep:  
Funding Defense Studies, p. 96.)   
In light of the above-mentioned problems associated with this type of fee 
agreement, this court should exercise its supervisory powers to prospectively 
declare fee agreements of this type invalid.  (See generally, People v. Barboza 
(1981) 29 Cal.3d 375, 381 [announcing a “ ‘judicially declared rule of criminal 
procedure’ ” invalidating fee agreements between counties and public defender’s 
offices that create a financial incentive for the Public Defender not to declare a 
conflict of interest].)   
 
 
6
 
show that counsel’s minimal preparation for the guilt phase of trial was tactically 
unjustified, but there is such a showing with regard to the penalty phase. 
A.  Guilt Phase 
According to defendant, defense investigator Jeff Gunn did only 13.5 hours of 
guilt phase preparation before counsel announced that the defense was ready for trial.  
But, as the majority points out, investigator Gunn “had originally worked on this case 
for about two and one-half months as the investigator for the Fresno County Public 
Defender and had conducted approximately 90 hours of investigation before the 
public defender declared a conflict.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 34.)   
Defendant complains that his counsel did not hire a ballistics expert until 
shortly before commencement of the guilt phase.  But the fee agreement’s built-in 
financial incentive for defense counsel not to hire experts provided no incentive 
for counsel to delay the retention of experts.   
Defendant criticizes his counsel for not hiring an expert to perform a blood 
analysis or to perform a tire tread analysis.  But the evidence presented at trial 
does not show that a blood analysis was significant to the question of guilt.   
Defendant faults his counsel for not conducting DNA testing of evidence 
obtained from victim Espinoza’s body.  But even if that evidence had not 
contained defendant’s DNA, defendant would not have been exculpated, because 
Espinoza was a prostitute and was thus likely to have had sex with other men.  
Also, counsel may have chosen to rush this case to trial in the expectation that the 
trial would occur before the prosecution’s completion of its own DNA testing; if 
so, counsel can hardly be faulted for not having any DNA testing done himself. 
Because the record on this appeal does not show whether defense counsel’s 
preparations for the guilt phase were unreasonable, there can be no “informed 
speculation” (People v. Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 175) that the representation 
 
 
7
 
at the guilt phase violated defendant’s right to conflict-free counsel.2  Not so with 
respect to the penalty phase, however. 
B.  Penalty Phase 
With respect to certain aspects of penalty phase preparation — the hiring of 
potential expert witnesses and the investigation of potential defense witnesses — 
counsel here shortchanged defendant by not using the allocated money in a 
reasonably competent manner. 
Before trial, counsel budgeted $15,000 for “Background (lifetime) 
investigation of Defendant for penalty phase social study report” and $10,000 for a 
“Psychiatrist and Social Worker.”  Instead, he paid a total of $4,500 for a defense 
psychiatrist (who testified at the guilt phase) and a psychologist (who testified at 
the penalty phase), and he spent no money on preparation of a social study report.  
There is no legitimate tactical justification for not having such a report done. 
Counsel also failed to conduct an adequate investigation of potential 
character witnesses who could have testified on defendant’s behalf at the penalty 
phase.  At a hearing on a defense motion for a continuance, held three days before 
the penalty phase was scheduled to begin, counsel told the trial court that 
defendant had given him a list of 16 potential character witnesses but that he had 
                                              
2  
Rejection of such a claim on direct appeal does not foreclose defendant 
from making a more persuasive showing on habeas corpus, based on matters 
outside the appellate record.  Such a showing may well be possible:  Defendant’s 
habeas corpus petition (pending in this court), alleges that while representing 
defendant, counsel incurred huge gambling debts; that to pay those debts, counsel 
borrowed money without intending to repay it, which led the State Bar in 2001 to 
temporarily suspend his right to practice law; and that in 2004 he resigned from 
the State Bar with additional charges pending.  But these matters are not fully 
included in the appellate record and therefore may not be considered on this direct 
appeal. 
 
 
8
 
not contacted any of them.  None of them testified at the penalty phase of trial, 
where the only defense witness was a psychologist.  Counsel made the self-serving 
claim that he deliberately did not interview these witnesses so he could avoid 
furnishing the prosecution with witness discovery.  But this is not a legitimate 
tactical justification — to determine whether these potential witnesses would be 
helpful to the defense, they needed to be interviewed, a task that a reasonably 
competent attorney would ordinarily have assigned to a hired investigator. 
To prepare for the penalty phase of a death penalty trial, defense counsel 
must “conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.”  
(Williams v. Taylor (2000) 529 U.S. 362, 396.)  “[I]nvestigations into mitigating 
evidence ‘should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating 
evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced 
by the prosecutor.’ ”  (Wiggins v. Smith (2003) 539 U.S. 510, 524.)  Here, as 
discussed earlier, defense counsel’s investigation and preparation for the penalty 
phase of trial was virtually nonexistent, and he spent only a fraction of the funds 
Fresno County had allocated for the defense.  This circumstance supports an 
“informed speculation” (People v. Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 175) that the 
defense has been compromised by the attorney’s conduct, resulting in a violation 
of defendant’s right under the California Constitution to be represented by an 
attorney unencumbered by a conflict of interest. 
Does this violation require reversal of the sentence of death?  As explained 
below, that question is not an easy one to resolve because case law provides no 
definitive answer on the test to be applied. 
III 
To determine in a particular case whether the right to conflict-free counsel 
requires reversal under either the state or the federal Constitution, this court has 
long relied on the high court’s decision in Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335 
 
 
9
 
(Sullivan).  That case held that when a conflict of interest adversely affects defense 
counsel’s representation, reversal is required without an evaluation of whether the 
result of trial would have been different had there been no conflict.  Put 
differently, there is a presumption of prejudice.  (See Strickland v. Washington 
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 692 [Sullivan “held that prejudice is presumed when counsel 
is burdened by an actual conflict of interest”].)   
We explained in People v. Easley (1988) 46 Cal.3d 712, 725:  “It is 
important to recognize that ‘adverse effect on counsel’s performance’ under 
Sullivan . . . is not the same as ‘prejudice’ in the sense in which we often use that 
term.  When, for example, we review a ‘traditional’ claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel (i.e., one involving asserted inadequate performance as opposed to 
‘conflicted’ performance, we require the defendant to show a reasonable 
probability that the result . . . would have been different.  [Citations.]  This, 
however, is not the inquiry called for under Sullivan.”  Instead, reversal is required 
when “counsel ‘pulled his punches,’ i.e., failed to represent the defendant as 
vigorously as he might have had there been no conflict.”  (Ibid, see also People 
v. Mroczko (1983) 35 Cal.3d 86, 104, fn. 16 [“the Supreme Court’s formulation 
seems to envision an analysis of whether there has been some identifiable 
prejudice to the right of effective representation, but not an analysis of whether 
that prejudice affected the outcome of the case”]; Maxwell v. Superior Court, 
supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 612 [“When a conviction is attacked validly on the ground 
that an appointed lawyer was influenced by conflict of interest the appellate court 
may not ‘ “indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of [resulting] prejudice 
. . . .” ’ ”].) 
In Sullivan, the alleged conflict of interest arose from defense counsel’s 
multiple concurrent representation; that is, counsel simultaneously represented 
more than one client.  (Sullivan, supra, 446 U.S. at pp. 337-339.)  Rather recently, 
 
 
10
 
the United States Supreme Court noted in Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 
174 (Mickens), that several federal circuit courts have applied Sullivan’s 
presumption of prejudice standard in cases in which a defense attorney’s 
representation implicated “counsel’s personal or financial interests.”  But, Mickens 
pointed out, “the language of Sullivan itself does not clearly establish, or indeed 
even support, such expansive application.”  (Id. at p. 175.)  Mickens concluded 
that “[w]hether Sullivan should be extended to such cases remains, as far as the 
jurisprudence of this Court is concerned, an open question” (id. at p. 176), one that 
it did not resolve in that case. 
Thus, it is not clear what test of prejudice to apply where, as here, the 
defense attorney’s professional duty to competently represent the client collides 
with the attorney’s personal or financial interests.  I note that after the high court’s 
decision in Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. 162, this court in People v. Rundle, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at pages 168-176, did not apply Sullivan’s presumption of prejudice 
standard.  In Rundle, the attorney’s narrow conflict of interest pertained only to an 
allegation of jury misconduct, not to any other aspect of the case.  Here, by 
contrast, defense counsel’s conflict of interest adversely affected the entire penalty 
phase, and it was the government (Fresno County) that, through its fee agreement, 
created the conflict. 
The nature of the fee agreement was such that the less money counsel spent 
on the defense, the more money he could pocket for himself, thus creating a strong 
financial incentive to enrich himself at the expense of the defense.  Because it was 
the government’s fee agreement that made this possible, I would apply the 
standard of presumed prejudice that the high court established in Sullivan, supra, 
446 U.S. 335.  And I would conclude, based on an “informed speculation” (People 
v. Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 175) supported by the record, that Fresno 
 
 
11
 
County’s fee agreement with counsel did adversely affect his representation at the 
penalty phase of trial, thus requiring reversal of the judgment of death.  
IV 
I question the soundness of the majority’s reasoning in rejecting 
defendant’s conflict of interest claim.  
Disapproving decades of this court’s case law, the majority blithely 
discards a well-established rule, which goes back some 40 years, that a criminal 
defendant need only show ‘that the record support an “informed speculation” that 
a “ ‘potential conflict of interest’ impaired the defendant’s right to effective 
assistance of counsel.”  (People v. Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 175; see, e.g., 
People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 998; People v. Mroczko, supra, 35 Cal.3d at 
p. 105; People v. Cook (1975) 13 Cal.3d 663, 670; People v. Chacon (1968) 69 
Cal.2d 765, 776, fn. 2.)  The majority’s conclusory explanation is that “a precise 
definition of our informed speculation concept has proven elusive and the concept 
has been somewhat variously applied” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 30), and that the 
standard “is too amorphous to provide meaningful guidance to either the bench or 
bar” (id. at p. 32).  How so?  The majority does not say.  It simply cites six 
decisions of this court, each containing in brackets a quoted sentence fragment 
describing, each in a slightly different manner, the informed speculation standard.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 30-31.)  But those quoted sentence fragments offer no 
insight into the majority’s reasons for tossing the informed speculation standard on 
the rubbish heap of discarded legal principles. 
This court does not lightly cast aside established principles of law.  When it 
does, it is generally because the old standard has proven unworkable or inequitable, or 
because it has led to inconsistent results.  (See, e.g., In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 
1181, 1218, 1220 [abandoning the “minimum elements inquiry” for appellate review 
of parole decisions because it proved to be “unworkable in practice” and  
 
 
12
 
“substantially undermine[d] the rehabilitative goals of the governing statutes”].)  
Here, the majority makes no attempt to show that the informed speculation standard is 
unworkable in practice or that it has led to inconsistent results.   
The prejudice standard the majority prefers, and adopts, for cases (like this 
one) in which the conflict of interest does not stem from an attorney’s concurrent 
representation, is the one that the high court established in Strickland v. 
Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668 (Strickland), a case involving incompetent 
representation.  The inquiry under that test is whether there is “a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”  (Id. at p. 694.)  Applying that test here, 
and assuming for the sake of argument that Fresno County’s fee agreement with 
defense counsel gave rise to a conflict of interest, the majority concludes that any 
violation of defendant’s right to counsel arising from that conflict was harmless.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 45.) 
Application of the Strickland test would indeed lead to the majority’s 
conclusion, for defendant has not shown that he suffered any prejudice from the 
violation of his right to counsel.  This is why:  The record does not show what 
mitigating evidence would have been offered had defendant been represented by 
an attorney unencumbered by the conflict of interest at issue here.  
But, for reasons discussed earlier (see ante, pp. 9-11), that is not the test I 
would use here.  Because it was the government (Fresno County) that, through the 
particular fee agreement it had with defense counsel, created the conflict of 
interest, I would apply the presumption of prejudice standard that the high court 
established in Sullivan, supra, 446 U.S. 335.   
 
 
13
 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given above, I would reverse the judgment of death. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
I CONCUR: 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Doolin 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S054489 
Date Filed: January 5, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Fresno 
Judge: James L. Quaschnick 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Robert Derham, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Eric Chistoffersen and Lloyd G. Carter, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Robert Derham 
1010 B Street, Suite 212 
San Rafael, CA  94901 
(415) 485-2945 
 
Lloyd G. Carter 
Deputy Attorney General 
2550 Mariposa Mall, Room 5090 
Fresno, CA  93721 
(559) 477-1669 
 
 
 
 
3