Case Title: State v. Hutchins

Citation: 116 N.J. 457, 561 A.2d 1142

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 1989-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
116 N.J. 457 (1989) 561 A.2d 1142 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. BOBBY ERIC HUTCHINS, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. The Supreme Court of New Jersey. Argued April 25, 1989. Decided August 11, 1989. *458 Hillary L. Brunell, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Herbert H. Tate, Jr., Essex County Prosecutor, *459 attorney, Barbara A. Rosenkrans, Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs). Susan Green, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Alfred A. Slocum, Public Defender, attorney, Susan Green and David L. Kervick, on the briefs). Cherrie M. Black argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (Peter N. Perretti, Jr., Attorney General, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by STEIN, J. In this case, as in State v. Lewis, also decided today, 116 N.J. 477 (1989), we consider the legality of a warrantless entry into a home following an informant's tip of suspected drug activity. In the present case, police were told by an informant that a black male named Bob, dressed in blue, was selling heroin from a certain address in Newark. Two officers, in plainclothes, proceeded to the address to attempt an undercover drug buy. Defendant, a black male wearing a blue jogging suit, answered the door but did not respond to the officers' attempted solicitation of a sale of drugs. Observing that defendant's right fist was clenched in a manner suggesting possible concealment of narcotics, the officers identified themselves. At that point, according to one officer's testimony, defendant turned around and fled into the house. The police pursued defendant into the house, apprehending him and recovering ten glassine envelopes containing heroin from his right hand. According to defendant's testimony, he backed into the house, but the officers pursued him and, in effect, "planted" the heroin on him. Without resolving the factual dispute between the officers and defendant, the trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress the narcotics primarily on the basis that the police should have obtained a search warrant before entering the house. The Appellate Division affirmed on the ground that the asserted exigency in this case, the potential destruction of *460 narcotics, was improperly created by the police and thus failed to support the warrantless entry under the "exigent circumstances" exception to the fourth-amendment warrant requirement. State v. Hutchins, 226 N.J. Super. 454 (1988). The Appellate Division reasoned that the suppression order was properly granted because the police created the "exigency," and the "exigency" was not an "unintended and collateral residual effect" of the officers' announcement that they were police officers. Id. at 461. We conclude that although the exigent circumstance can properly be described as "police-created," it may have arisen as a result of reasonable police investigative conduct intended to generate evidence of criminal activity. In that context, the exigency of potential destruction of narcotics, if accompanied by probable cause, could support a warrantless entry into the premises. Thus, we reverse and remand the matter to the Law Division to resolve the disputed factual issues and determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest defendant and whether their warrantless entry was justified based on the existence of "exigent circumstances." On April 4, 1984, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Detective Thompson of the Newark Police Department received information from an informant he had used previously that a black male named Bob "dressed in blue" was "dealing heroin" from 118 Eleventh Avenue, Newark. At about 8:00 p.m., Detective Thompson and his colleague Detective Lemon proceeded to this address to effect an undercover drug purchase. Detective Lemon was familiar with the house based on an arrest he had made there during the prior winter of a person engaged in narcotics distribution. Detective Lemon testified at the suppression hearing that it was normal police procedure to attempt an undercover purchase of narcotics in order to confirm an informant's tip that drug distribution was occurring at a specified *461 location. According to Lemon, "it would be very stupid to waste time to get a search warrant knowing he probably won't be there tomorrow. In this town we just basically get information, we go there and try to make an undercover buy." When they arrived, Lemon knocked on the door, which was opened by a black male wearing a blue jogging suit, "fitting a description we received." Lemon testified that when defendant opened the door, he asked the defendant, "do you have anything?" Defendant did not respond. Lemon observed that defendant's right fist was clenched. Based on his experience and the information that Detective Thompson had received, Lemon suspected that defendant had contraband in his hand. He announced that he and Detective Thompson were police officers. Lemon testified that defendant then turned and ran into the corridor and up a flight of stairs. Detectives Lemon and Thompson pursued defendant into the house, where they apprehended him on the staircase. Detective Lemon recovered ten glassine envelopes, containing what was subsequently confirmed to be heroin, from defendant's clenched right hand. The police then checked the house for other occupants. Lemon testified that Willie Griffin, the person he had arrested there previously, was also present at the time of defendant's arrest. Defendant's testimony disputed Lemon's account of the facts. Defendant testified that at approximately 6:00 p.m. on April 4, 1984, he went to visit his friend, William Griffin. At approximately 8:00 p.m., defendant responded to a knock at the door and saw a man dressed in civilian clothes. Defendant recalled that he "asked for something." When defendant did not respond within a few seconds, the caller entered the house and announced that he was a police officer. According to defendant, at this point he "backed up" into the house. Lemon then took defendant upstairs and searched him, finding sixty-four dollars on his person. Detective Thompson also entered the house and searched all other rooms. According to defendant, Thompson later arrested defendant upstairs, showed him the glassine bags, and stated, "[t]his is yours." *462 Defendant was charged with possession of Controlled Dangerous Substance (C.D.S.), N.J.S.A. 24:21-20, and possession of C.D.S. with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 24:21-19(a)(1). On defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court found that the informant's tip established probable cause to search the residence for drugs and that the officers' failure to obtain a warrant was "fatal to the search." Without resolving the factual conflict between the officer's and defendant's testimony, the court found that the events following the officers' attempt to buy drugs did not justify their warrantless entry and arrest of defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress. State v. Hutchins, 226 N.J. Super. 454 (1988). For purposes of the appeal the Appellate Division accepted Officer Lemon's version of the facts. Id. at 456. The court acknowledged the stringent standard traditionally applied by the United States Supreme Court in cases involving warrantless searches in the home. Id. at 457. Declining to consider the question of probable cause, the court focused on "whether an exigency created by police action can justify a warrantless search." Id. at 456. The court found that the police in this case impermissibly created the asserted exigency, the potential destruction of evidence. It reasoned, "[o]nce the police identified themselves the destruction of evidence was highly probable. But that exigency was the result of voluntary action taken by the police." Id. at 457. We granted the State's motion for leave to appeal. In State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579 (1989), a case involving application of the exigent circumstances exception to a warrantless entry into the home of a defendant suspected of various motor vehicle offenses, we recently reiterated the principle that "warrantless searches or arrests in the home must be subjected to particularly careful scrutiny." Id. at 583. As the United *463 States Supreme Court has acknowledged, "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752, 764 (1972). Accordingly, it is well established that "searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable," Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 651 (1980), and hence "prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2097, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732, 743 (1984). The parameters of the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement referred to by the Court in Welsh are not definitively established. One of the earliest references to the exception is found in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369, 92 L. Ed. 436, 440-41 (1947): The exigent circumstances exception was relied on by the government in Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 90 S. Ct. 1969, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1970). In that case police officers had a valid arrest warrant for defendant, a suspected drug dealer, and arrested him after they observed him make a drug sale. Id. at 32-33, 90 S. Ct. at 1970-71, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 412. The Court rejected the government's contention that the subsequent search of his home was validated by exigent circumstances: *464 The Supreme Court has held that exigent circumstances consisting of the need to apprehend and subdue an armed felon supported a search of a residence into which the felon under "hot pursuit" by police had fled. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967). The Court observed that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others." Id. at 298-99, 87 S. Ct. at 1645-46, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 787. The Court has also considered the potential destruction of evidence to be an exigent circumstance that would support a warrantless entry. In United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1976), police officers effected a drug purchase with marked money and then proceeded to the residence of defendant, the source of the drugs. Identifying themselves as police, the officers pursued defendant from her doorway to the vestibule of her house into which she retreated. A search uncovered heroin and the marked money. The Court upheld the entry based on the exigency that the evidence might otherwise be destroyed. Most recently, in Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732, the Court invalidated the warrantless night entry by police into a home to effect an arrest for commission of a "nonjailable" traffic offense, holding that so minor an offense could not serve as an exigent circumstance sufficient to "overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries." Id. at 750, 104 S. Ct. at 2098, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 743. The federal courts have encountered the exigent circumstances doctrine in a wide variety of factual contexts, inducing some courts to offer criteria relevant to its proper application. In Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir.1970) (en *465 banc), the court advanced this formulation to guide application of the doctrine: In Dorman, the Court of Appeals upheld the warrantless entry and search of the residence of defendant who earlier that evening had committed an armed robbery of a clothing store, concluding that the commission of a crime of violence and the possibility of escape were exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless entry. Id. at 393. In United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (1973), the Third Circuit offered standards for determining the validity of warrantless home entries in drug cases based on exigent circumstances: In Rubin, the court upheld the warrantless search of a home in the investigation of a "reliable" tip that "a bronze statue containing a large shipment of illicit drugs, from a point somewhere in Europe, would be shipped to a hospital" in the Philadelphia area. As a result of this information, federal agents located a crate at the Philadelphia International Airport answering the general description given to the agents by the informant. Id. at 264. The agents removed a small sample of the contents of the statue for chemical analysis. It was confirmed to be hashish. The statue, addressed to a doctor at a local hospital, contained approximately ninety pounds of hashish. The crate was then resealed and placed under constant surveillance. The following ensued: Inside, the officers found the co-defendants, including Rubin, "in the process of packing the `hashish' for possible distribution." Ibid. The court upheld the warrantless search on the basis that "the customs agents `might reasonably have believed that [they were] confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary *467 to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened `the destruction of evidence.'" Id. at 269 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1835, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 919-20 (1966)). The court relied on the fact that when arrested, Agnes yelled "call my brother" to individuals present at the scene. 474 F.2d at 269. Based on this utterance, the court concluded that "[i]t was not unreasonable for agents to believe that this might well be a signal to alert persons still at 1819 South 9th Street of Agnes' arrest and of imminent police intervention into their activities, even though the agents did not see a telephone call made and had no knowledge of the existence of any brother of Agnes." Ibid. It further observed, "[t]he nature of the narcotics business necessitates rapid distribution of goods in order to prevent apprehension. Hashish is easily destroyed." Ibid.[1] *468 Although the exigent circumstance in Rubin the threatened destruction of the drugs was "police-created" in the sense that the custom agents' arrest of defendant at the gas station precipitated the concern that the drugs in his residence might be destroyed, the court apparently did not perceive that the agents' role affected its conclusion that the warrantless entry *469 was justified. Other courts, however, have frequently expressed a concern that police-created exigent circumstances, particularly where the officers' conduct was unreasonable or unnecessary, would not justify a warrantless entry. See, e.g., United States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir.1988) ("An exception to the warrant requirement that allows police fearing the destruction of evidence to enter the home of an unknown suspect should be * * * supported by clearly defined indicators of exigency that are not subject to police manipulation or abuse."); United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir.1986) ("the government [can]not justify a warrantless search on the basis of exigent circumstances of its own making"); United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 327 (5th Cir.1984) cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1106, 105 S. Ct. 2340, 85 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1985) ("Agents, of course, cannot deliberately create exigent circumstances in order to subvert the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30, 34 (9th Cir.1974) ("If exigency arises because of unreasonable and deliberate delay by officers, it is not an exigent circumstance capable of dispensing with the requirement of a warrant."); accord People v. Foskey, 175 Ill. App.3d 638, 125 Ill.Dec. 82, 529 N.E.2d 1158, 1161 (1988) ("the police may not through their own actions create the exigent circumstances used to justify the arrest"); People v. Lott, 102 A.D.2d 506, 478 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (App.Div. 1984) ("[p]olice `cannot by their own conduct create an appearance of exigency'"); Latham v. Sullivan, 295 N.W.2d 472, 478 (Iowa Ct. App. 1980) ("the State may not profit by an officer's choice to forego the constitutional process by attempting to create an exigency by his own actions"); cf. Baldassano, Police Created Exigencies: Implications for the Fourth Amendment, 37 Syracuse L.Rev. 147, 149 (1986) ("the current approach to analyzing warrantless entry cases creates a genuine possibility that *470 police officers will justify warrantless entries with exigencies caused by police conduct"). Two Circuit Courts of Appeals have specifically attempted to distinguish between police-created exigent circumstances designed to subvert the warrant requirement and police-created exigencies that naturally arise in the course of an appropriate police investigation. In United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied sub nom. 471 U.S. 1106, 105 S. Ct. 2340, 85 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1985), defendants sought to suppress evidence found in the course of a warrantless search of their hotel room, arguing that Drug Enforcement Administration agents deliberately delayed obtaining a search warrant and deliberately refrained from apprehending defendants until they entered the room, whereupon the agents made a warrantless entry and search and uncovered evidence of their involvement in illegal drug activity. The Fifth Circuit rejected defendants' contentions and upheld the warrantless entry and search: An illuminating discussion of police-created exigent circumstances that were held to justify a warrantless home-entry and search is found in United States v. Socey, 846 F.2d 1439 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 152, 102 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1988). In that case District of Columbia police officers had learned from informants that defendants were major distributors of cocaine and marijuana in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia. According to the informant, defendants purchased the drugs in Florida from a Cuban supplier and transported the drugs by automobile to defendant Robert Socey's residence on Military Road in the District of Columbia. In March 1987, District police officers learned that two of the defendants had left Florida in a brown Datsun containing large quantities of drugs. Id. at 1441-42. Police officers maintained surveillance on Socey's residence. When the Datsun arrived, additional officers were summoned to watch the house and were instructed to stop the Datsun if it was driven out of the area. One officer was dispatched to secure a search warrant. Id. at 1442. Later that day defendant Soper was observed depositing three large trash bags in the trunk of the Datsun. He then entered the car and drove down the street. Police officers stopped him when he was beyond view of the Socey residence. A search revealed twenty-four pounds of marijuana, scales, packaging materials, and $5,000 in cash. Ibid. Shortly thereafter *472 another officer stopped a Camaro automobile after it left the Socey residence. Although the stop occurred at the end of the street, it was within view of the Socey residence. Two police cars arrived to assist the officer, and the activity attracted the attention of neighbors, who began to congregate and view the events. Ibid. The officers were fearful that the "commotion" would alert the occupants of Socey's house to the presence of police. To prevent the destruction of evidence, they entered the house. The officers gathered the occupants on the first floor into one room. They entered a bedroom and observed defendants Robert and Daniel Socey "shaving marijuana off of large bales, weighing the drug and bagging it." The officers placed both Soceys under arrest. Id. at 1442-43. Shortly thereafter the officers in the house were advised that a warrant had been secured and that a full search could be commenced. Defendants Robert and Daniel Socey moved to suppress the evidence seized prior to issuance of the warrant, as well as that obtained pursuant to the warrant. Although the prosecution argued that exigent circumstances the fear that defendants were alerted to the police presence and would destroy evidence justified the warrantless entry, defendants contended that "the police improperly created the exigency by stopping the Camaro `unnecessarily and unreasonably' close to their house." Id. at 1448. The District Court granted the suppression motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that even if the exigency was "police created," the officers conduct was reasonable and not designed deliberately to subvert the warrant requirement: Preliminarily, we note that the trial court's disposition of the suppression motion appears to be based predominantly on its view that the officers should have attempted to obtain a search warrant on the strength of the facts learned from the informant. In the course of its ruling the court observed: Similar observations appear throughout the trial court's ruling, which concludes with a citation to State v. Williams, 168 N.J. Super. 352, 358 (App.Div. 1979), where the court supported its refusal to condone a warrantless search by referring to the failure of the police officers to have obtained a search warrant. Although the trial court referred to the events at the front door, it did not attempt to resolve the significant differences between the testimony of defendant and that of Detective Lemon. The court's only reference to the "exigent circumstance" doctrine related not to the events at the front door but rather to the facts obtained from the informant, the court observing that those facts did not indicate the existence of any exigency. We are thus left with the clear sense that the trial court did not focus substantially on the issue that was dispositive in the Appellate Division whether exigent circumstances existed at the moment of entry that, if combined with probable cause, could justify the warrantless entry and arrest. Moreover, we disagree with the trial court's conclusion that the facts gleaned from the informant were sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. Although the informant's credibility and basis of knowledge are no longer mandatory elements of probable cause, see State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 122 (1987) (adopting the totality-of-the-circumstances test as the standard for determining probable cause), the unverified facts revealed by this informant were plainly insufficient to support issuance of a search warrant. See id. at 122-29. Apparently recognizing that the trial court's rationale for suppressing the evidence was faulty, the Appellate Division did not rely on any fact-finding by the trial court but accepted Officer Lemon's version of the critical events. 226 N.J. Super. at 456. The Appellate Division acknowledged that under the circumstances the police officers "had the right to investigate *475 the tip by attempting to purchase drugs at the specified address." Id. at 457. The Appellate Division also acknowledged that exigent circumstances inadvertently resulting from "police action of reasonably anticipated potential benefit to an investigation" may justify a warrantless entry and search based on probable cause. Id. at 461. The State argued that all of the facts learned from the informant, defendant's appearance at the door dressed as the informant described him, his clenched fist suggesting to the officers the presence of drugs, and his turning and fleeing up the stairs when the officers identified themselves combined to afford the officers probable cause to believe defendant was engaged in drug distribution. The State asserts that the existence of probable cause, coupled with the exigent circumstance that defendant would try to destroy the drugs before he was apprehended, justified the warrantless entry and arrest. The Appellate Division did not consider the issue of probable cause, id. at 461, focusing instead on whether the exigent circumstance relied on by the State the threatened destruction of the drugs was impermissibly created by the police. The court determined, apparently based on its review of the evidence, that the officers' identification of themselves to defendant had no "reasonably anticipated potential benefit to the * * * investigation." The court implied that the officers' disclosure to defendant may have been deliberately designed to create an "exigent circumstance." Our difficulty with the Appellate Division's disposition of this issue does not derive from any difference concerning the degree of caution that must be exercised in reviewing a claim that exigent circumstances resulting from a police investigation support a warrantless search of a home. We acknowledge, as *476 other courts have acknowledged, the potential for abuse inherent in the exigent-circumstance exception to the warrant requirement and share the concern that "the police not be placed in a situation where they can create the exception, because well-meaning police officers may exploit such opportunities without sufficient regard for the privacy interests of the individuals involved." United States v. Aquino, supra, 836 F.2d at 1272. Rather, our disagreement is based on the Appellate Division's assumption, without any fact-finding by the trial court focusing on the critical issues, that although the attempted drug purchase was a reasonable police-investigative effort, 226 N.J. Super. at 457, the officers' disclosure of their identity to defendant was unreasonable as a matter of law and may have been done deliberately to create the exigency on which the State relies. Id. at 461. In our view, the record of the suppression hearing does not lead inescapably to the Appellate Division's conclusion. Cf. State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 219 (1983) (adopting standard of objective reasonableness in evaluating appropriateness of police officers' conduct), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S. Ct. 1295, 79 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1984). More importantly, it is an issue that should be resolved initially by the trial court that heard the testimony and had the opportunity to observe and evaluate the witnesses. As we have stated, because of the trial court's belief that the officers should have obtained a search warrant based solely on the informant's tip, we do not have the benefit of adequate fact-finding by the trial court, focused appropriately on the issues that determine the validity of the warrantless entry. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the Law Division to resolve the pivotal factual issues that affect the justification for the warrantless entry the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances, including whether the exigency, if it existed, was permissibly or impermissibly created by the police officers and to redetermine the suppression motion. The trial *477 court must also resolve the conflict in testimony concerning the events at the front door, focusing on whether defendant fled from the officers in a manner that evidenced involvement in criminal activity, or retreated unremarkably into the house after the officers identified themselves. The trial court may in its discretion permit the record to be supplemented. The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the matter remanded to the Law Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. For reversal and remandment Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN 6. Opposed None. [1] Numerous other circuit courts of appeal have upheld warrantless home entries in drug cases on the basis of exigent circumstances. See United States v. Socey, 846 F.2d 1439, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 152, 102 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1988) (warrantless entry justified where court determined police had "objectively reasonable belief" of imminent destruction of evidence); United States v. Cattouse, 846 F.2d 144 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 316, 102 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1988) (warrantless in-home arrest of defendant upheld in "buy bust" drug case where agents "concluded that there was a substantial risk that [defendant], or another person, would be able to leave the building undetected and remove the marked buy money;" exigent factors included observation that "narcotics dealers are frequently armed"); United States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir.1988) (warrantless home entry justified by police officers' "reasonable basis for believing" that narcotics would be destroyed prior to estimated time necessary (three hours) to procure a warrant); United States v. Chavez, 812 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir.1987) (warrantless search of garage upheld where "officers could reasonably believe that to ensure their own safety and to protect against the loss of incriminating evidence on the premises, an immediate and forcible entry was necessary"); United States v. Mabry, 809 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 874, 108 S. Ct. 33, 98 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1987) (warrantless entry into and "protective sweep" of defendant's home justified where "experience had taught that if the [drug] sellers did not return to the residence of the source within a short period of time, the supplier would either proceed to destroy the cocaine on the premises and secret the cash or depart the premises with the cocaine and the cash"); United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.1984) (warrantless search justified in course of "immediate, ongoing investigation" where "[a]gents * * * testified unequivocally that they feared the destruction of evidence;" important factors include "(1) the agents' subjective belief; (2) information indicating that suspects are aware that police are on their trial; and (3) the knowledge that `efforts to dispose of narcotics and to escape are characteristic behavior of persons engaged in the narcotics traffic;'" United States v. Palumbo, 735 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934, 105 S. Ct. 332, 83 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1984) (warrantless entry and arrest justified where "officers fear[ed]" defendant would become suspicious when party cooperating with authorities failed to return at expected time and that he would destroy or remove the cocaine before they could obtain a warrant); United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir.1983) (warrantless search upheld where agents had "reasonable grounds to believe [defendant] might become alarmed and either destroy" cocaine or leave with the drugs and money if co-conspirator cooperating with agents failed to return as expected); United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30 (9th Cir.1974) (threat of imminent destruction or removal of marijuana, and discovery by occupant of dwelling of investigation, constituted exigent circumstances to justify warrantless search); United States v. Doyle, 456 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir.1972) (warrantless search justified where defendant was under investigation for possession of narcotics, and informant notified police that defendant was aware of the investigation and was planning to leave town, thus threatening the destruction of evidence and Doyle's departure). But see United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 295 (5th Cir.1986) (claim of exigency rejected where police created exigency and court was "unable to construct even so much as a hypothetical justification for [their] actions);" United States v. Driver, 776 F.2d 807 (9th Cir.1985) (warrantless search not justified by "exigent circumstances" exception where government failed to prove that removal or destruction of narcotics was imminent); United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied sub nom. 469 U.S. 1105, 105 S. Ct. 777, 83 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1985) (claim of exigency rejected where there was "ample opportunity to obtain a warrant" and where court determined that the government created the exigency); United States v. Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314 (3rd Cir.1980) (warrantless arrest and search in home invalid where "there [was] nothing in [the] record to suggest that the contraband was about to be destroyed"); United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.1974) (warrantless entry into apartment not justified where evidence did not "adequately explain why no attempt to obtain a warrant was made, or why no consideration was given to placing the defendant's apartment under surveillance while an attempt to secure a warrant was being made").