Case Title: Hoffer v. Shappard

Citation: 

Docket Number: 42087

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2016-09-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 42087 
 
RANDY HOFFER and GALYENA  
HOFFER, husband and wife, as guardians of  
the minor child plaintiff, J.S.H., 
 
       Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
 
SCOTT A. SHAPPARD, D.O.; SAINT  
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL  
CENTER, dba SAINT ALPHONSUS  
MEDICAL GROUP; and GENESIS  
MEDICAL CENTER, P.A., 
 
       Defendants-Appellants, 
 
and 
 
STANLEY J. WATERS, M.D; STANLEY J.  
WATERS, dba AMERICANA  
ORTHOPAEDICS; SHANA L. TUBACH,   
M.D.; and SAINT ALPHONSUS  
PHYSICIANS, P.A., an Idaho corporation,  
 
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Boise, September 2015 Term 
 
2016 Opinion No. 105 
 
Filed:  September 28, 2016 
 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of  
Idaho, Ada County.  Hon. Gerald F. Schroeder, Senior District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.  
 
Powers Tolman Farley, PLLC, Boise, for appellants Scott A. Shappard, D.O. and  
Genesis Medical Center, P.A.  Raymond D. Powers argued. 
 
 
Brassey Crawford, PLLC, Boise, for appellant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical  
 
Center.  Andrew C. Brassey appeared. 
 
 
Rossman Law Group, PLLC, Boise, for respondents.  Eric S. Rossman argued. 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
HORTON, Justice. 
 
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Scott Shappard, D.O., Genesis Medical Center, P.A., and St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center (collectively “Providers”) appeal from an $847,974.46 judgment entered against 
them after a jury trial. Randy and Galyena Hoffer brought this action on behalf of their minor 
child, J.H. The jury found that Dr. Shappard negligently and recklessly failed to diagnose J.H.’s 
medical condition. The district court denied Providers’ post-trial motions seeking to correct the 
verdict, a new trial, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Providers appeal from the 
denial of these motions and further assert that the district court erred at trial by refusing to send 
an exhibit back to the jury room for deliberations and in its jury instructions. We affirm.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This case relates to J.H.’s developmental dysplasia of the hip (DDH), which is an 
abnormality involving a joint dislocation at the hip. Early diagnosis of DDH in children is 
important because early treatment is much easier, less invasive, less complicated, and more 
effective. Risk factors for a child to develop DDH include: breach birth, female gender, 
premature birth, first-born child, and high birth weight. In order to diagnose DDH, a physician 
examines the child, looking for palpable hip instability, unequal leg lengths, asymmetrical skin 
folds, and irregular gait.  
J.H., a female child, was born five weeks short of full term in September of 2008. She 
was Galyena’s first child. Various doctors who examined J.H. during the first six weeks of her 
life did not observe signs of DDH.  
Between November 13, 2008, and October 5, 2009, Dr. Shappard saw J.H. for five well-
baby examinations. Evidence presented at trial indicated that J.H. had an asymmetrical skin fold 
at all five examinations. Galyena repeatedly asked Dr. Shappard, through verbal and written 
questions, about the fold but Dr. Shappard did not recognize the fold as a concern. Galyena 
repeatedly expressed concern, both verbally and in writing, that J.H.’s legs were not the same 
length. Dr. Shappard did not find a difference in leg length. At J.H.’s final examination by Dr. 
Shappard, Galyena asked Dr. Shappard about J.H. walking tip-toe on only one leg. Galyena’s 
testimony and notes regarding her questions reflect that Dr. Shappard responded that such tip-toe 
walking was normal for children until age two. Galyena also testified that Dr. Shappard never 
asked to see J.H. walk with parental assistance. 
One of the Hoffers’ expert witnesses, Dr. David Butuk, opined that Dr. Shappard failed to 
comply with the community standard of health care practice because of his disregard for the 
 
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presence of an obvious asymmetrical skin fold, a difference in leg length, and repeated 
expressions of parental concern. Dr. Butuk testified that: “Any parent complaint that comes on 
repeated visits of any concern like that, it’s a big red flag. The standard of care is that you have 
to address that and start moving forward with other ways.”  
 
J.H. subsequently had problems while learning to walk that appear to have resulted from 
DDH. Because of these problems, the Hoffers took her to an orthopedic specialist, Dr. Stanley 
Waters, for two visits in February and December of 2010. Dr. Waters recognized that J.H. had 
DDH, but did not tell the Hoffers that she needed immediate treatment. Galyena testified that Dr. 
Waters told her that “God and nature will take care” of J.H.’s hip.  
 
In May of 2012, the Hoffers took J.H. to Dr. Larry Showalter. Dr. Showalter identified an 
inch and a half leg difference and the presence of an asymmetrical skin fold. Dr. Showalter 
immediately ordered x-rays and subsequently performed open reduction surgery in August of 
2012, when J.H. was four years old. He testified that the results of the surgery have “so far” been 
good, but there are risks of “big complications” in the future.  
The jury received evidence for nearly two weeks. In addition to medical testimony, the 
jury heard testimony about J.H.’s future damages. The Hoffers’ vocational rehabilitation expert, 
Douglas Crum, testified that J.H. would need two to three hip replacement surgeries during her 
lifetime, each resulting in about a 15% loss of function. The Hoffers’ economic expert, Dennis 
Reinstein, testified as to the present value of an individual’s expected earning capacity based on 
four different levels of education.  
 
By special verdict, the jury found that Dr. Shappard had failed to meet the applicable 
standard of health care practice and that Dr. Shappard’s conduct was reckless. The jury 
apportioned 20% fault to Dr. Waters1 and the remaining 80% to Dr. Shappard. The jury awarded 
$289,000 in non-economic damages and $750,000 in economic damages. Providers’ counsel 
received permission from two jurors to speak with them. The two jurors told Providers’ counsel 
that the jury had inadvertently switched the numbers for the non-economic and economic 
damages award on the special verdict form, but the figures were otherwise correct. Affidavits to 
this effect from both jurors were filed. The other ten jurors, including the presiding juror, did not 
speak with Providers’ counsel. 
                                                          
 
1 Dr. Waters settled with the Hoffers prior to trial but was included on the special verdict form for the purpose of 
apportioning fault. 
 
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The district court entered judgment against Providers. Providers moved for JNOV, a new 
trial, and to correct the verdict. The district court denied these motions. Providers timely 
appealed. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial.” Blizzard v. 
Lundeby, 156 Idaho 204, 206, 322 P.3d 286, 288 (2014). When considering a challenge to a 
discretionary decision by the trial court, we consider: 
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standard applicable to the specific choices available to 
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Id. (quoting Burggraf v. Chaffin, 121 Idaho 171, 173, 823 P.2d 775, 777 (1991)). “The trial court 
is in a far better position to weigh the demeanor, credibility, and testimony of witnesses, and the 
persuasiveness of all the evidence. Appellate review is necessarily more limited.” Quick v. 
Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 770, 727 P.2d 1187, 1198 (1986). “Although this Court necessarily must 
review the evidence, it primarily focuses on the process by which the district court reached its 
decision, not on the result of the district court’s decision.” Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 
568, 97 P.3d 428, 435 (2004).  
This Court reviews jury instructions to determine “whether the instructions as a whole 
fairly and adequately presented the issues and stated the law.” Schmechel v. Dillé, 148 Idaho 
176, 187, 219 P.3d 1192, 1203 (2009). “Whether the jury instructions fairly and adequately 
present the issues and state the applicable law is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review.” Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d 816, 
821 (2000). “Reversible error occurs if an instruction misleads the jury or prejudices a party.” Id. 
“[T]he interpretation of a rule of evidence, like the interpretation of a statute, is reviewed 
de novo.” State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 821, 965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998). 
This Court employs the same standard of review as the district court when reviewing a 
decision to grant or deny a motion for JNOV. April Beguesse, Inc. v. Rammell, 156 Idaho 500, 
509, 328 P.3d 480, 489 (2014). 
A jury verdict must be upheld if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and 
probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to 
that of the jury. In reviewing a grant or denial of a motion for JNOV the court 
may not reweigh evidence, consider witness credibility, or compare its factual 
findings with that of the jury. The court reviews the facts as if the moving party 
 
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had admitted any adverse facts, drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the 
non-moving party. 
Id. (quoting Athay v. Rich Cnty., 153 Idaho 815, 825, 291 P.3d 1014, 1024 (2012)). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
Providers raise trial-related issues concerning an exhibit and the jury instructions in 
addition to challenging the denial of their post-trial motions for correction of the verdict, a new 
trial, and JNOV. We address these issues in turn. 
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for new trial 
under Rule 59(a)(7) based upon its refusal to provide the jury with Exhibit LL 
during deliberations.  
Exhibit LL was an article from Pediatrics, the “Official Journal of the American 
Academy of Pediatrics.” The exhibit contained a diagram depicting a clinical algorithm for use 
in diagnosing DDH. During the trial, defense counsel used the algorithm to demonstrate that Dr. 
Shappard followed correct procedures. The parties later disputed whether the exhibit should be 
provided to the jury during its deliberations. The district court held the jury would not be given 
Exhibit LL, stating:  
The information is before the jury, reference is made to it, they take notes, 
they know what that is. I don’t know what is in the rest of that article other than 
that diagram, and the risk of sending something in at this point that may have 
information that has not been explored may or may not exist, but I’m going to 
treat it as if it does exist, so I will not send that into the jury. 
Afterward, Providers challenged this ruling in the motion for a new trial but the district court did 
not change its ruling. The district court observed that even if the failure to send the exhibit back 
to the jury room was error, such error would be harmless because the algorithm was discussed 
before the jurors who had the opportunity to take notes.  
Providers attack this ruling, arguing that the exhibit should have been admitted under 
I.R.E. 803(18) and Idaho Code section 9-402, that the Hoffers waived any objection to Exhibit 
LL’s admission by waiting too long to object, and the Hoffers waived their argument that Exhibit 
LL should not be admitted because they did not object on hearsay grounds. Providers further 
argue that this resulted in prejudice because defense counsel told the jurors during closing 
argument that they would be able to view the algorithm during their deliberations.  
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) authorizes a trial court to grant a new trial on several 
grounds. “[T]he trial court’s standard for different grounds enumerated in I.R.C.P. 59(a) varies 
considerably.” Quick, 111 Idaho at 771, 727 P.2d at 1199; see also Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 
 
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152 Idaho 741, 749, 274 P.3d 1256, 1264 (2012). “Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
trial court may order a new trial if it determines that legal error occurred during the trial.” 
Goodspeed v. Shippen, 154 Idaho 866, 870, 303 P.3d 225, 229 (2013) (citing I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7)). 
However, the Court does not consider errors that do not affect the parties’ substantial rights. Id.; 
see also I.R.C.P. 61.  
The district court did not err by refusing to send Exhibit LL to the jury room during 
deliberations. Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(18) provides: 
Learned Treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert 
witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct 
examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or 
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or arts, established 
as a reliable authority by testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert 
testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into 
evidence but may not be received as exhibits, except upon motion and order for 
good cause shown. 
We have not previously interpreted this rule with regard to allowing learned treatises in the jury 
room. When a federal rule is identical in material respects to an Idaho rule, this Court may 
consider decisions of the federal courts interpreting the federal rule when interpreting the Idaho 
rule. Martin v. Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372, 376 n. 3, 987 P.2d 284, 288 n. 3 (1999). The last sentence 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18) is materially identical to the Idaho rule, omitting only  
Idaho’s exception which permits the statements to be received as an exhibit upon a showing of 
good cause. The final sentence of the federal rule has been interpreted as: 
A safeguard against jury misuse of the published authority . . . . This provision 
attempts to prevent jurors from overvaluing the written word and from roaming at 
large through the treatise thereby forming conclusions not subjected to expert 
explanation and assistance.  
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr. & Michael H. Graham, Rule 803(18): Statements in Learned Treatises, 
Periodicals, or Pamphlets, 30C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 7059 (2014 ed.). 
 
Exhibit LL was a complete article, but the diagram of the diagnostic algorithm was the 
subject of primary focus during the trial. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
determined that there were risks associated with the jury being provided the entire article when 
its contents had not been completely explored. Providers have not shown good cause why the 
district court should have sent Exhibit LL to the jury room. The jury was presented with the 
algorithm during trial. The fact that Providers’ counsel represented that the jury would have the 
 
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algorithm during closing arguments, without having received an advance favorable ruling, does 
not constitute good cause.  
 
Providers did not refer to Idaho Code section 9-402 before the district court. Even if they 
had, the argument would have been unavailing. The statute provides: “Historical works, books of 
science or art, and published maps or charts, when made by persons indifferent between the 
parties, are prima facie evidence of facts of general notoriety and interest.” I.C. § 9-402. 
Assuming, without deciding, that the article contained “evidence of facts of general notoriety and 
interest,” the statute is of no force or effect to the extent that it conflicts with the rule. I.R.E. 802 
(“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or other rules promulgated by the 
Supreme Court of Idaho.”); I.R.E. 1102 (“Statutory provisions and rules governing the 
admissibility of evidence, to the extent they are evidentiary and to the extent that they are in 
conflict with applicable rules of Idaho Rules of Evidence, are of no force or effect.”). Because 
there was no basis under the rule for providing the exhibit to the jury, any violation of the statute 
is not a ground for the relief sought by Providers. 
 
Providers also argue that the Hoffers waived an objection to Exhibit LL being provided to 
the jury during deliberations because they did not make a hearsay objection and otherwise waited 
too long to object. This argument fails because from the very beginning the Hoffers made it clear 
that the contents of Exhibit LL would only be admissible as a learned treatise. When admitted 
the Hoffers’ counsel stated: “I don’t object to admitting it as a learned treatise, your Honor, that’s 
fine, not a substantive admission.”  
Finally, even if Exhibit LL should have been given to the jury during deliberations, the 
failure to give the exhibit to the jury did not affect Providers’ substantial rights. As noted by the 
district court, the jury was presented with the algorithm and considerable accompanying expert 
testimony during trial, had the opportunity to take notes, and the jury did not request the exhibit 
during deliberations.  
For these reasons, we find no basis for disturbing the verdict based upon the district 
court’s refusal to provide Exhibit LL to the jury during deliberations. 
B. The district court did not err when instructing the jury on negligence and 
recklessness.  
Providers argued that the district court should have refrained from instructing the jury 
regarding recklessness until Dr. Shappard had been found to have been negligent. The district 
court disagreed and instructed the jury of the law regarding recklessness as well as negligence. 
 
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On appeal, Providers argue that an instruction regarding recklessness was unnecessary until the 
jury found Dr. Shappard to have been negligent2 and that the recklessness instruction confused 
the jury or misled the jury into believing that the district court had found Dr. Shappard to have 
been negligent. The Hoffers respond that there is no legal basis for requiring the district court to 
bifurcate the proceedings and there is no indication that the jury was confused or misled by the 
instructions.  
The Hoffers are correct. Providers do not identify any rule of law that would require the 
trial court to require bifurcated deliberations on negligence and recklessness. As the Hoffers 
point out, in Carrillo, 152 Idaho at 747, 274 P.3d at 1262, we considered an appeal from a 
decision where the jury was instructed as to both negligence and recklessness, although we were 
not asked to decide whether such dual instruction constituted error. Providers point to Schmechel 
v. Dillé, 148 Idaho 176, 219 P.3d 1192 (2009), in support of their contention that the district 
court should have bifurcated the proceedings. However, Schmechel did not announce a 
requirement that the district court bifurcate deliberations as to negligence and recklessness. See 
Schmechel, 148 Idaho at 187, 219 P.3d at 1203. Instead, this Court merely held that that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by choosing to not instruct the jury on recklessness until 
the jury returned a verdict in excess of the statutory cap. Id. 
There is no factual support for Providers’ argument that the jury was actually confused. 
The special verdict form submitted to the jury was not confusing. The final question, asking 
whether Dr. Shappard was reckless, was distinct from an earlier question asking whether Dr. 
Shappard breached the applicable standard of health care practice.  
Providers direct our attention to a question from the jury, contending that the question 
demonstrates that the jury was confused by the recklessness instruction and did not fully 
appreciate the significance of a finding that he was reckless. During their deliberations, the jurors 
asked: “Are there penalties for Dr. Shappard and/or Dr. Walters for willful and wanton, or 
reckless misconduct as defined in these instructions? What are they?” Far from suggesting 
confusion on the part of the jurors, this question shows the jury fully understood that a finding 
                                                          
 
2 During oral argument, Providers’ counsel advanced an argument that the substantive content of the recklessness 
instruction was erroneous. However, the record does not reveal such an objection before the trial court. A party 
cannot raise an issue on appeal that relates to “the giving of a jury instruction that misstates the law unless the party 
timely objected to the specific instruction on the record, stating the grounds of the objection.” Bolognese v. Forte, 
153 Idaho 857, 867 n.6, 292 P.3d 248, 258 n.6 (2012); see also I.R.C.P. 51(b). Therefore, we do not consider this 
claim. 
 
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that Dr. Shappard was reckless was distinct from finding that he had breached the applicable 
standard of health care practice.  
Because there was no legal requirement that the district court bifurcate the jury’s 
deliberations and there is nothing to suggest that the jury was, in fact, confused by the 
instructions, we can find no error in the district court’s decision to simultaneously instruct the 
jury on recklessness and negligence. 
C. The district court did not err in denying the motion to correct the verdict. 
The district court determined that the plain language of Idaho Rule of Evidence Rule 
606(b) (“Rule 606(b)”) precluded consideration of juror affidavits that alleged that the special 
verdict form was erroneously filled out. On appeal, Providers argue that they seek a “ministerial 
correction” of the verdict rather than an inquiry into the “validity” of the verdict. Providers argue 
that Idaho case law allows ministerial correction of a verdict and that Rule 606(b) only governs 
the inquiry into the validity of a verdict when a party is seeks to impeach the verdict.  
The plain language of Rule 606(b) does not allow clerical corrections as Providers claim. 
The rule provides: 
(b) Inquiry to Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an inquiry into the 
validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or 
statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of 
anything upon the juror’s or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the 
juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the 
juror’s mental processes in connection therewith, nor may a juror’s affidavit or 
evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror 
would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes, but a juror 
may testify on the questions whether extraneous prejudicial information was 
improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was 
improperly brought to bear upon any juror and may be questioned about or may 
execute an affidavit on the issue of whether or not the jury determined any issue 
by resort to chance. 
“We begin with an examination of the literal words of the rule and give the language its plain, 
obvious and rational meaning.” Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 350, 924 P.2d 607, 612 (1996) 
(discussing Rule 606(b)). Interpreting this rule, this Court has stated:  
In addition to specifying which matters jurors are prohibited from testifying 
about, the Idaho Rules of Evidence expressly describe the only matters jurors may 
testify to: “[A] juror may testify on the questions whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside 
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror and . . . whether or not 
the jury determined any issue by resort to chance.”   
 
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Levinger v. Mercy Med. Ctr., Nampa, 139 Idaho 192, 197, 75 P.3d 1202, 1207 (2003) (quoting 
Rule 606(b)). This Court’s interpretation is consistent with the maxim of construction expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius, meaning that where a law expressly designates something, the 
“designation of such things excludes all others.” Idaho Press Club, Inc. v. State Legislature of 
the State, 142 Idaho 640, 642, 132 P.3d 397, 399 (2006) (quoting Local 1494 of Int’l Ass’n of 
Firefighters v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 639, 586 P.2d 1346, 1355 (1978)). 
However, Providers argue that they only seek a “ministerial correction” to the verdict, 
rather than an inquiry into the “validity” of the verdict. Providers correctly observe that, for a 
significant time, the corresponding federal rule of evidence was identical and many federal 
courts held that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) did not apply to clerical errors because 
corrections of such errors do not concern the validity of a verdict or the jurors’ mental processes. 
Committee Notes on Rules—2006 Amendment. However, as noted by the rules advisory 
committee, this exception represented a “divergence” from the “text of the rule.” Id. 
Consequently, in 2006, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) was amended to create an exception for 
when “a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.”  
Some state courts have taken a plain language approach to interpreting provisions similar 
to Rule 606(b). See, e.g., Waste Mgmt. of Arkansas, Inc. v. Roll Off Serv., Inc., 199 S.W.3d 91, 
95 (Ark. 2004) (“[W]e are reluctant to craft an exception to Rule 606(b) that goes beyond those 
stated in the rule itself.”). We are likewise reluctant to create an exception to I.R.E. 606(b) that is 
not found within the rule’s text.  
Providers point to Umphrey v. Sprinkel, where this Court held “that courts may consider 
affidavits in order to clarify what the verdict was, but not to impeach the verdict.” 106 Idaho 700, 
707, 682 P.2d 1247, 1254 (1983). Umphrey does not assist us in our decision. The decision 
predated our adoption of Rule 606(b) in 1985 and, unlike the congressional action taken as to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), this Court has not amended Rule 606(b) to provide an 
exception for clerical error. Based upon the plain language of the rule, we hold that the district 
court did not err by ruling that consideration of the two juror’s affidavits would violate Rule 
606(b). 
D. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Providers’ motion for new 
trial. 
Providers’ unsuccessful motion for a new trial rested on two distinct grounds. We will 
discuss those grounds in turn. 
 
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1. Motion for new trial based on Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6) (“Rule 
59(a)(6)”) 
The district court determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 
finding of recklessness. Providers challenge this finding, contending that the district court abused 
its discretion by failing to acknowledge evidence and testimony that conflicted with the jury’s 
finding of recklessness. As will be discussed more fully in Part III(E)(2), infra, our determination 
that Rule 606(b) does not permit consideration of juror affidavits for purposes of correcting 
alleged clerical errors in a special verdict form means that the jury’s finding of recklessness is 
without legal significance. Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to reiterate our position as to 
the sufficiency of trial courts’ findings for appellate review of decisions on a motion for new 
trial. 
Under Rule 59(a)(6), a court may grant a new trial for “[i]nsufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the verdict.” “Under Rule 59(a)(6), the trial judge must weigh the evidence and determine 
(1) whether the verdict is against his or her view of the clear weight of the evidence; and (2) 
whether a new trial would produce a different result.” Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 
749, 274 P.3d 1256, 1264 (2012) (emphasis original) (quoting Harger v. Teton Springs Golf and 
Casting, LLC, 145 Idaho 716, 718, 184 P.3d 841, 843 (2008)). If a disparity in the amount that 
the trial judge would have awarded “is so great that it appears to the trial court that the award 
was given under the influence of passion or prejudice, the verdict ought not stand.” Id. (quoting 
Harger, 145 Idaho at 718–19, 184 P.3d at 843–44).  
Here, the district court determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 
finding of recklessness because “continued concerns” were expressed by the Hoffers, there were 
objective signs of DDH, imaging was simple and would have been conclusive, and the problem 
compounded with the passage of time. In light of this evidence, the district court determined that 
“[t]he jury verdict is not against the clear weight of the evidence” and “[i]t is not likely that a 
different result would occur if the case were retried.” While the district court did not expressly 
state it was considering the motion under Rule 59(a)(6), its analysis addressed the inquiries 
necessary to decide a motion based upon Rule 59(a)(6). The district court properly determined 
whether, in its view, the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence and whether a new 
trial would produce a different result. There is no procedural error in the district court’s 
approach.  
 
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Providers argue that the district court should have more thoroughly addressed other 
testimony and evidence, such as testimony that DDH is difficult to diagnose and the algorithm, 
previously discussed, which Providers allege shows that Dr. Shappard followed the correct 
procedure for diagnosing DDH.3 Providers argue the district court’s new trial analysis 
“commit[ted] the fatal mistake of piggy-backing its new trial analysis on its analysis under the 
JNOV standard” because it only addressed evidence that supported the jury’s findings. However, 
the district court expressly recognized the different standards which apply to the different 
motions, stating:  
In considering a motion for new trial the trial court is not required to draw all 
inferences in favor of the non-moving party and accept the truth of the prevailing 
party’s evidence. In considering a motion for new trial the trial judge evaluates 
whether the verdict is consistent with the clear weight of the evidence. 
Our reading of the district court’s memorandum decision shows that, when fulfilling its duty to 
independently evaluate the weight of the evidence, the district court simply discussed the 
evidence that it found to be most persuasive. See Sheridan v. St. Luke’s Reg’l Med. Ctr., 135 
Idaho 775, 781, 25 P.3d 88, 94 (2001) (holding a district court’s “determination to discount the 
testimony of the defendant’s expert witnesses was a proper exercise of his discretion in weighing 
the demeanor, credibility and persuasiveness of the evidence” when ruling on a motion for a new 
trial). We can find no error simply because the district court did not exhaustively discuss all 
evidence presented in the course of trial. Providers have not shown that the district court abused 
its discretion by denying the motion for new trial based on Rule 59(a)(6). 
2. Motion for new trial based on Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5) (“Rule 
59(a)(5)”) 
“To uphold a ruling under Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5), it must be evident that the trial court 
(1) contemplated what it would have awarded if it had been the finder of fact and (2) determined 
that any difference between the jury award and what the trial court would have awarded is not so 
great as to show a verdict based on prejudice or passion.” Hei v. Holzer, 145 Idaho 563, 569, 181 
P.3d 489, 495 (2008) (citing Tuttle v. Wayment Farms, Inc., 131 Idaho 105, 107, 952 P.2d 1241, 
1243 (1998)). When denying the motion for new trial, the district court stated: “The court cannot 
                                                          
 
3 Providers also contend that Dr. Shappard’s conduct was not nearly as culpable as that of Dr. Waters because Dr. 
Waters was an orthopedic surgeon (in contrast to Dr. Shappard, who was a family doctor) who diagnosed J.H.’s 
DDH but told the Hoffers that God and nature would cure her. The district court correctly observed that “[t]he 
conduct of Dr. Waters is irrelevant to the finding as to Dr. Shappard. His conduct came after Dr. Shappard’s. The 
jury could evaluate the conduct of each, as it did, and assign[] fault as it did.”  
 
13 
 
say the jury verdict on the issue of recklessness, or any other issue, is against the clear weight of 
the evidence.” Providers contend that the jury’s award of special damages for lost future income 
was “excessive given the lack of evidence to support such an award and was the result of passion 
and prejudice.”   
 
A preliminary issue is whether the district court adequately analyzed the motion under 
Rule 59(a)(5). The district court’s opinion does not cite Rule 59(a)(5) and Providers point out 
that the district court did not discuss the differences between Rule 59(a)(5), (6), and (7). 
 
This Court has ruled a district court “must disclose [the] reasoning for granting or 
denying motions for a new trial . . . unless those reasons are obvious from the record itself.” 
Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 772, 727 P.2d 1187, 1200 (1986). Providers rely on Quick to 
support their claim that the district court inadequately discussed the grounds for refusing to grant 
the motion for new trial. In Quick, this Court remanded a case to a district court so that the 
district court could state its reasons for denying each of a defendant’s separate motions when the 
extent of the court’s explanation for its decision was: 
I am going to at this time deny the motion for a new trial and the motion for 
judgment notwithstanding a verdict and motion for remittitur. Its [sic] the court’s 
feeling that there is ample evidence before this jury to justify these verdicts. 
Id. at 763, 727 P.2d at 1191. This Court ruled that “since the trial court made no reference to 
either I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) or the language contained in that rule, it is impossible for this Court to 
determine whether the trial court even ruled on that part of the defendants’ motion, let alone 
whether he applied the correct standard for that rule.” Id. at 771, 727 P.2d at 1199. The Court 
reasoned that it was difficult to review a decision under the abuse of discretion standard, which 
focuses on the district court’s process, when all that the record contained was the district court’s 
conclusion. Id. at 772, 727 P.2d at 1200.  
 
Here, the district court’s written opinion went far beyond the summary conclusion that 
was before the Court in Quick. Although the district court did not specifically cite to Rule 
59(a)(5), it did state that it had weighed the evidence and determined that the jury verdict was not 
against the clear weight of the evidence. Although the district court did not state what specific 
award it would have made, this Court has not required that the trial judge’s Rule 59(a)(5) 
analysis include “any specific evaluation of the award he would have made;” rather, it is 
sufficient if the trial court’s decision reflects that the judge examined the damage award to 
ascertain whether it was the product of passion or prejudice. Highland Enters., Inc. v. Barker, 
 
14 
 
133 Idaho 330, 347, 986 P.2d 996, 1013 (1999). Thus, the district court’s failure to identify the 
sum it would have awarded to the Hoffers does not require us to remand for further findings.  
Although a motion for JNOV and a motion for new trial present distinct inquiries, the 
district court’s JNOV analysis assists us in determining the basis for the denial of the motion for 
new trial. In the context of Rule 59(a)(6) motions, we have stated: “A trial court need not 
separately restate and reanalyze the same facts or evidence in deciding an I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) 
motion for a new trial that were previously applied in deciding a motion for J.N.O.V. where a 
proper disposition of each motion necessarily rests upon the same facts or evidence.” Karlson v. 
Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 570, 97 P.3d 428, 437 (2004). In its JNOV analysis, the district court 
stated there was “extensive and complex” evidence that J.H. would have “likely limitations” in 
the workforce and in earning capacity. These statements clearly reflect that the district court had 
weighed the evidence and concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the award for 
lost future earnings. We can find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion for new trial.  
E. The district court did not err in denying Providers’ JNOV motion. 
The district court denied Providers’ motion for JNOV, holding that substantial and 
competent evidence supported the jury’s findings that (1) Dr. Shappard was reckless and (2) J.H. 
suffered $750,000 in economic damages. Providers challenge these determinations. We address 
them in turn. 
1. We do not address the jury’s finding of recklessness because the verdict can be 
upheld on the independent finding that Dr. Shappard’s conduct was negligent. 
The district court determined that adequate evidence supported the jury’s finding that Dr. 
Shappard was reckless and negligent. On appeal, Providers argue that substantial and competent 
evidence does not support the jury’s recklessness finding but do not challenge the jury’s finding 
that Dr. Shappard was negligent. The Hoffers argue that whether Dr. Shappard was reckless “has 
no effect on the verdict” because the jury’s verdict can be upheld simply on the basis of Dr. 
Shappard’s negligence.  
The parties’ dispute centers on Idaho Code section 6-1603. The statute imposes an 
inflation-adjusted4 cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury cases. The cap does not 
                                                          
 
4 Idaho Code section 6-1603 was amended in 2003 to establish a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages, with 
adjustments calculated as follows: “beginning on July 1, 2004, and each July 1 thereafter, the cap on noneconomic 
damages established in this section shall increase or decrease in accordance with the percentage amount of increase 
or decrease by which the Idaho industrial commission adjusts the average annual wage as computed pursuant to 
section 72–409(2), Idaho Code.” 2003 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 122, § 2, p. 371. 
 
15 
 
apply to “[c]auses of action arising out of willful or reckless misconduct.” The parties do not 
dispute that $289,000 is less than the cap provided by Idaho Code section 6-1603. 
As discussed in Part III(C), supra, Rule 606(b) precludes consideration of juror affidavits 
as a basis for “correcting” a verdict. Providers have not identified another legal basis for this 
Court to direct the trial court to amend the jury’s verdict by substituting $750,000 for $289,000 
as the amount of noneconomic damages award. Thus, for purposes of the JNOV, the jury’s 
noneconomic damages award of $289,00 continues to stand. Because this figure is less than the 
statutory cap and Providers do not challenge the jury’s finding that Dr. Shappard was negligent 
apart from the grounds previously discussed, the jury’s finding of recklessness is without legal 
significance.     
“The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” I.R.C.P. 61; see also 
Goodspeed v. Shippen, 154 Idaho 866, 870, 303 P.3d 225, 229 (2013). Because the jury’s award 
may be sustained solely upon its finding of negligence, there is simply no reason for us to 
consider whether substantial and competent evidence supports the jury’s finding of recklessness. 
Providers argue that we should address whether Dr. Shappard’s conduct was reckless 
because a label of recklessness will have future, unspecified impacts on Dr. Shappard and this 
case will establish precedent affecting other physicians. We are not so persuaded. “Because an 
appellant can only prevail if the claimed error affected a substantial right, the appellant must 
present some argument that a substantial right was implicated.” H.F.L.P., LLC v. City of Twin 
Falls, 157 Idaho 672, 686, 339 P.3d 557, 571 (2014). Providers have failed to identify any 
impact on Dr. Sheppard resulting from the recklessness finding. Even if other physicians might 
benefit from a ruling on this issue—a dubious proposition—such benefit would have no effect on 
Providers’ substantial rights. For these reasons, we do not reach the substance of Providers’ 
arguments.  
2. Substantial and competent evidence supported the jury’s award of damages for lost 
future income. 
The district court determined that the evidence supporting the economic damages award 
was “extensive and complex” in light of medical, vocational, and economic testimony presented 
at trial. Providers argue that the jury’s award of special damages for lost future income was not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence.  
 
16 
 
The jury awarded $750,000 in economic damages. Although the special verdict did not 
specify the components of this award, Providers acknowledge that the evidence presented at trial 
would support an award of approximately $438,0005 for past and future medical expenses, 
meaning that the jury awarded approximately $312,000 for future lost earnings. Providers 
challenge the sufficiency of evidence supporting the award for lost future income.  
“[D]amages for lost earnings in the future must be shown with reasonable certainty and 
compensatory awards based on speculation and conjecture should not be allowed.” Bailey v. 
Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 751, 86 P.3d 458, 465 (2004) (quoting Warren v. Furniss, 124 Idaho 
554, 559–60, 861 P.2d 1219, 1224–25 (Ct. App. 1993)). “To show future lost earnings with 
reasonable certainty, the claimant must prove the extent to which her future earning power was 
impaired.” Id. “Reasonable certainty requires neither absolute assurance nor mathematical 
exactitude; rather, the evidence need only be sufficient to remove the existence of damages from 
the realm of speculation.” Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 157 Idaho 
106, 116, 334 P.3d 780, 790 (2014) (quoting Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 146 Idaho 
613, 618, 200 P.3d 1162, 1167 (2009)).  
 
The Hoffers’ vocational rehabilitation expert, Douglas Crum, testified that he understood 
that medical opinions showed J.H. would have “between two and three hip replacement surgeries 
during her lifetime” and that there would be “about a 15 percent loss of function each time those 
surgeries were performed.” Crum also testified that J.H. would lose employment opportunities 
because she would be limited to sedentary work. He further testified that disabled workers have 
higher unemployment rates; disabled “individuals in the labor market ages 21 to 64 have a 
median income that is 28 percent less than those with no disability;” disabled workers are 
perceived as problem workers; J.H. would lose time at work in connection with hip replacement 
surgeries and would have a period of reduced function prior to each surgery; and he had worked 
with hundreds of people with orthopedic problems and it is not uncommon for complications to 
occur.  
 
The Hoffers’ economic expert, Dennis Reinstein, provided the jury with tables showing 
the present value of a person’s expected earning capacity based on four different levels of 
educational attainment. Reinstein testified that the present value of the earning capacity of a 
                                                          
 
5 J.H.’s past medical care cost $38,928.82 and Dennis Reinstein testified that the present value of future medical 
care is $398,752, for a total of $437,680.82. The balance of the jury’s award for future loss of earnings would thus 
be $312,319.18.  
 
17 
 
person with a college degree is reduced by $12,513 for each percent of impairment. The Hoffers 
correctly note that $12,513 multiplied by an impairment rating of 25% ($312,825) is almost 
exactly equal to the amount of the jury’s award that the parties attribute to lost future earnings. 
Although we cannot know how the jury arrived at its award, it is clear that the amount of the 
award is consistent with the expert testimony presented to the jury by the Hoffers.  
Providers contend that Crum’s testimony was insufficient to support the award of 
damages for loss of future earnings, arguing it was speculative because it was not supported by 
medical testimony. Providers clarify that they do not challenge the admission of Crum’s 
testimony; rather, they claim the lack of supporting medical testimony means that Crum’s 
testimony provided too uncertain a basis to support the award for lost future earnings.  
As to the “medical foundation” for his testimony, Crum testified that he had primarily 
relied upon the opinions of one of the Hoffers’ expert witnesses, Dr. Eric Gordon, a pediatric 
orthopedic surgeon. Those opinions were contained in a deposition and disclosures that Crum 
reviewed. Dr. Gordon had previously testified at the trial. Crum testified that his understanding 
of J.H.’s future medical needs was also “supported” by a disclosure from Dr. Bozic that he had 
read. Dr. Bozic, who did not testify at trial, is a joint replacement specialist.  
Providers challenge Crum’s reliance on these physicians’ opinions, noting that Dr. Bozic 
was not a witness at trial and that Dr. Gordon did not quantify J.H.’s degree of impairment or 
testify that J.H. would require three future hip replacements. However, Providers identify 
nothing in the rules of evidence that require Dr. Bozic to have testified in order for Crum to have 
relied upon his opinions when formulating his own. Indeed, our rules of evidence explicitly 
permit experts to base their opinions on evidence that may not be admissible. I.R.E. 703. 
Significantly, Providers did not object to Crum’s opinions.  
Dr. Gordon testified that J.H. “will end up having arthritis probably in [J.H.’s] 30s to 
40s” and that DDH would affect J.H.’s future ability to work and limit J.H. to sedentary jobs. He 
testified that: “My best guess is that probably [J.H.] will end up starting to get arthritis sometime 
in 30s to 40s and probably ultimately a total hip [replacement], I would guess, probably around 
40 or somewhere along those lines.”  
Providers’ argument that insufficient evidence was presented at trial relating to J.H.’s 
future medical needs overlooks the testimony of one significant witness. Kelly Lance, a family 
nurse practitioner, testified extensively regarding her consultations with Dr. Gordon regarding 
 
18 
 
J.H.’s future medical needs in the preparation of J.H.’s life care plan. Lance testified that Dr. 
Gordon held the opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, that J.H. would require 
hip replacement surgeries approximately twenty years apart, for a total of three such procedures. 
Providers did not object to this testimony.  
While Providers are correct that it is impossible to predict the exact frequency with which 
J.H. will require surgical intervention that interferes with her future earning capacity, we have 
recognized that justice and public policy require the wrongdoer to bear the risk of uncertainty 
that is inherent in claims for prospective loss. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., 157 Idaho 
at 116, 334 P.3d at 790. Lost future earnings need only be shown with reasonable certainty, not 
absolute assurance or mathematical exactitude. Id. We hold that the award for lost future 
earnings was supported by substantial and competent evidence.  
F. The Hoffers are entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
The Hoffers seek attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-121. The parties 
dispute whether the issues argued by Providers have been frivolous. Although we will address 
these arguments, we take this opportunity to announce that the courts of this state will apply a 
different standard to claims for attorney fees under the statute, effective March 1, 2017. The 
future standard to be applied is that which the Legislature has specified.    
Idaho Code section 12-121 provides: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or 
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney’s fees. The 
term “party” or “parties” is defined to include any person, partnership, 
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
“The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent.” State v. 
Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). “When interpreting a statute, the 
Court begins with the literal words of the statute . . . .” Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 
Idaho 515, 521, 260 P.3d 1186, 1192 (2011). “If the statutory language is unambiguous, the 
clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect . . . .” Idaho Youth Ranch, 
Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 157 Idaho 180, 184–85, 335 P.3d 25, 29–30 (2014) 
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting St. Luke’s Reg’l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Ada 
Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)). This Court does not have the authority to 
modify an unambiguous legislative enactment. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 
 
19 
 
Idaho 889, 895, 265 P.3d 502, 508 (2011) (quoting Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 177, 369 
P.2d 1010, 1013 (1962)). 
Idaho Code section 12-121 was enacted in 1976 and amended by addition of the second 
sentence in 1987. 1976 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 349, p. 1158; 1987 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 263, p. 555. For 
a period of time after its enactment in 1976, the decision to award attorney fees was committed 
entirely to the sound discretion of the court. Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 660, 651 
P.2d 923, 925 (1982); Odziemek v. Wesely, 102 Idaho 582, 583, 634 P.2d 623, 624 (1981); 
Futrell v. Martin, 100 Idaho 473, 479, 600 P.2d 777, 783 (1979).  
Effective March 1, 1979, this Court adopted Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) 
(“Rule 54(e)(1)”),6 which limited courts’ previous broad discretion to award attorney fees to 
those instances where the case was “brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation.”7 I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1).  
The language that was initially adopted by the legislature plainly granted broad authority 
to judges overseeing civil actions to award reasonable attorney fees. The plain language of the 
statute did not evince the bias against attorney fee awards that is exhibited by the restrictive 
“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” standard of the court rule. The Legislature’s 
decision to employ the word “may” reflects a clear intent to grant discretion to courts to award 
attorney fees to prevailing parties. See Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848, 908 P.2d 143, 150 
(1995) (“This Court has interpreted the meaning of the word ‘may’ appearing in legislation, as 
having the meaning or expressing the right to exercise discretion.”). This discretion is broad 
since, unlike this Court’s rule, Idaho Code section 12-121 contains no language limiting the 
court’s discretion.  
Since the rule was adopted, the Legislature has expressed an intention to confer greater 
discretion to courts than is found within the rule. House Bill 263, the 1987 legislation that 
resulted in the amendment to Idaho Code section 12-121, contained an uncodified statement of 
legislative intent: “It is the intent of the legislature of the state of Idaho that this act grant 
                                                          
 
6 On July 1, 2016, Rule 54(e)(1), was divided into distinct subsections. The provisions relating to Idaho Code 
section 12-121 are now designated as Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2).    
7 The rule was adopted because proponents of the rule were concerned by a lack of uniform application of the statute 
by judges, result in “judge shopping.” Hon. Justice Jesse R. Walters, Jr., A Primer for Awarding Attorney Fees in 
Idaho, 38 Idaho L. Rev. 1, 18 (2001). Opponents of Rule 54(e)(1) contended that its adoption violated separation of 
powers principles because the Court had effectively amended Idaho Code section 12-121 by adopting the rule. See, 
e.g., Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 922, 591 P.2d 1078, 1089 (1979) (Bistline, J., specially 
concurring). 
 
20 
 
prevailing litigants in civil actions the right to be made whole for attorney’s fees and costs when 
justice so requires.” 1987 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 263, § 1, p. 555.8 This Court had previously 
recognized that this was the purpose for which Idaho Code section 12-121 was originally 
adopted. Futrell, 100 Idaho at 479, 600 P.2d at 783 (“The purpose of I.C. § 12-121 was in proper 
cases to impose the actual costs of litigation on the unsuccessful parties, in the court’s 
discretion.”). We are unable to continue to ignore the clear intention of the Legislature by 
continuing to apply the court rule. Thus, in the near future, the courts of this state will apply the 
standard expressed by the Legislature: prevailing parties in civil litigation have the right to be 
made whole for attorney fees they have incurred “when justice so requires.”  
We recognize that today’s decision overturns a vast body of case law interpreting Idaho 
Code section 12-121 through the distorting lens of Rule 54(e)(1) and are fully mindful of the 
constraints imposed by the doctrine of stare decisis. Stare decisis requires that this Court follow 
“controlling precedent unless that precedent is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be 
unjust or unwise, or overruling that precedent is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles 
of law and remedy continued injustice.” State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4–5, 343 P.3d 30, 33–34 
(2015).  
We can conceive of no principles of law that are more plain or obvious than these: (1) it 
is the province of the Legislature to make and amend laws; and (2) this Court is without 
authority to amend laws enacted by the Legislature because we think them unwise. See Idaho 
Const. art. III, § 1 (The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a senate and house of 
representatives. . . .”); Idaho Const. art. II, § 1 (“no . . . collection of persons charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belong to one of these departments shall exercise any powers 
properly belong to either of the others. . . .”). Because the court rule is inconsistent with the 
constitutional allocation of powers between the coordinate branches of Idaho’s state government, 
it may no longer be applied. 
We recognize that this Court’s long-belated recognition of express legislative intent may 
have profound effects on litigants. Thus, we have determined that it is appropriate to give the 
                                                          
 
8 All portions of a bill that is passed by the Legislature become law in the absence of a gubernatorial veto, even if 
not compiled in the Idaho Code. We recently explored this issue in Peterson v. Peterson, 156 Idaho 85, 320 P.3d 
1244 (2014). There, the district court held that a retroactivity clause contained within a bill which was not assigned a 
statutory designation within the Idaho Code “was merely legislative history” and could not be considered when 
reviewing unambiguous statutes. Id. at 88, 320 P.3d at 1247. We held that the district court erred in so holding, 
stating: “The entire bill became a law regardless of how it was compiled in the Idaho Code.” Id. When House Bill 
253 became law in 1987, Section 1 became law, despite the absence of a statutory designation. 
 
21 
 
bench and bar advance notice of the effective date of the new rule. This new rule of law will 
become effective on March 1, 2017, and will have prospective effect, applying to all cases that 
have not become final as of that date.9    
Next, we turn to the Hoffers’ claim for attorney fees on appeal where we will apply the 
current standard and evaluate whether Providers’ appeal was pursued “frivolously, unreasonably 
or without foundation.” We find this to be such an instance. In our view, Providers’ appeal was 
little more than a request that this Court ignore the plain language of Idaho Rule of Evidence 
803(18) and second-guess the jury and district court by reweighing the evidence. For this reason, 
we award the Hoffers attorney fees incurred in the defense of this appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment of the district court. We award attorney fees and costs on appeal 
to the Hoffers. 
 
Chief Justice J. JONES and Justice EISMANN, CONCUR. 
 
BURDICK, J., concurring and dissenting. 
I concur in all portions of the opinion; however, I cannot agree with Part III(F), where the 
majority decides to repeal Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2) and, in doing so, to overturn a 
vast body of Idaho law. I see no reason in light of the many attorney fee statutes that the Idaho 
legislature has imposed upon its citizens to make such a drastic change.  
The majority decides to replace Rule 54(e)(2)’s enumerated grounds—frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation—with a standard permitting attorney fees to be awarded 
“when justice so requires.” The majority highlights awarding attorney fees “when justice so 
requires” honors the Legislature’s intent and Idaho Code section 12-121’s plain language. Yet 
the majority leaves trial judges at bay, with no guidance to decipher when justice will “so 
require” attorney fees to be awarded. I believe that Rule 54(e)(2)’s enumerated grounds filled 
this void by accurately defining “when justice so requires.” Additionally, Rule 54(e)(2)’s 
enumerated grounds gave sideboards to trial courts’ discretion. However now, with such an 
amorphous standard, there will be no effective appellate review of attorney fee awards. 
                                                          
 
9 On September 7, 2016, this Court voted to amend Rule 54(e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, by rescinding 
subsection 2, effective March 1, 2017.  
 
22 
 
I agree that the Idaho Legislature may pass attorney fee statutes, but on the other hand, I 
believe that the Idaho judiciary has the right to promulgate reasonable rules that will in fact help 
trial courts follow that statutory enactment. E.g., I.C. § 1-212 (“The inherent power of the 
Supreme Court to make rules governing procedure in all the courts of Idaho is hereby recognized 
and confirmed.”). To that end, I see Rule 54(e)(2) as nothing more than a guide to help Idaho’s 
trial judges define “when justice so requires.”  
Moreover, I believe that the majority’s analysis will further inhibit access to justice and 
tilt the table even further toward moneyed interests in our courts. The majority’s analysis 
signifies a prominent step toward adopting the English Rule of attorney fee awards, whereby the 
losing party must pay for the prevailing party’s attorney fees. It is well established that broad, 
discretionary fee-shifting statutes raise the stakes in litigation—that is, parties will litigate not 
just for a judgment, but to obtain payment of their attorney fees and to avoid the other party’s 
attorney fees.10 As a result, the majority’s analysis will chill litigation. And, with litigants 
reluctant to vindicate their rights in court, I perceive that litigants will actually have to spend 
more on litigation costs. The cost of litigation in Idaho will now reflect the prospect of having to 
pay the adverse party’s attorney fees. Indeed, I draw attention to Chief Justice Jones’s concurring 
opinion in Eyer v. Idaho Forest Grp., S. Ct. No. 43532 (2016) (Jones, C.J., concurring) 
(acknowledging “the legal system catastrophically failed [the appellants]” because they were 
required to pay a minimum of $185,755.30 of attorney fees after unsuccessfully seeking redress 
for a $1,600 timber trespass). This, in turn, will inhibit the valuable advancement of Idaho 
common law and deter litigation for new causes of action. In this case, the Court could have and 
did assert that attorney fees were proper under existing Idaho Code section 12-121 and Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2). Therefore, this drastic action should not have been taken 
without further input from judges and attorneys.   
 
Justice W. JONES CONCURS. 
                                                          
 
10 The United States Supreme Court recognized in 1967 that “[i]n support of the American rule, it has been argued 
that since litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, 
and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for 
losing included the fees of their opponents’ counsel.” Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 
714, 718 (1967). The widely respected Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit similarly recognized that “[t]he English rule deters litigation by (1) increasing the variance of the expected 
outcome of a lawsuit, and hence reducing the utility of litigation compared to settlement for the risk averse, and (2) 
penalizing more heavily errors in predicting the outcome of a lawsuit.” Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach 
to Law, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 757, 782 (1975).