Case Title: State v. Dale Pultz

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1994AP002806

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1996-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 94-2806 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :               
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN and 
CITY OF MILWAUKEE, 
 
  
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
 
v. 
 
DALE PULTZ, 
 
 
Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
MISSIONARIES TO THE PREBORN, ET AL., 
 
 
Defendants. 
FILED 
 
DEC 20, 1996 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded for a new contempt hearing. 
 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.    Petitioner Dale Pultz ("Pultz") seeks 
review of a court of appeals decision affirming a remedial 
contempt order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Judge 
Robert W. Landry.
1  The circuit court found Pultz in contempt for 
his violation of a permanent injunction enjoining him and others 
                                                          
 
1  State v. Pultz, No. 94-2806, unpublished slip op. at 6 
(Ct. App. Oct. 3, 1995). 
Historically, contempt was referred to as "civil" or 
"criminal" contempt.  Chapter 257, laws of 1979, repealed and 
recreated ch. 785 of the Wisconsin Statutes, which now refers to 
contempt proceedings that may result in either "remedial" or 
"punitive" sanction(s).  We treat the question presented here as 
involving a remedial contempt sanction, given that none of the 
parties assert that this case involves a punitive sanction.   
 
 
94-2806 
 
2
from engaging in particular activities at Milwaukee medical 
clinics.  The questions presented are these: was the circuit 
court constitutionally required to inform the defendant that, if 
indigent, he had a right to appointed counsel at public expense 
in this remedial contempt proceeding brought by the State of 
Wisconsin and the City of Milwaukee, and was the notice of the 
original contempt hearing adequate to notify Pultz of the 
adjourned contempt hearing.
2  We hold that due process required 
the circuit court to advise Pultz of his right to appointed 
counsel at public expense if he could not afford counsel.  
Because our holding requires that we remand for a new hearing on 
the contempt motion, we need not address the adequacy of notice 
issue.  We therefore reverse the order of the circuit court 
finding contempt and remand to the circuit court for a new 
hearing on the contempt motion.  
FACTS 
 
On August 22, 1994, Dale Pultz was personally served with a 
notice of motion and motion for contempt, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.03(1),
3 based on four separate alleged violations of a 
permanent injunction order dated December 10, 1992.  The contempt 
hearing date was set for August 31, 1994, at 9:00 a.m.  Between 
the time Pultz was served with the notice of motion and the date 
                                                          
 
2  In the court of appeals, Pultz presented two other 
questions: whether the sentence imposed exceeded the circuit 
court's authority, and whether the circuit court failed to obey 
an appellate order.  We granted review on the two issues raised 
in Pultz' petition for review. 
3  Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this 
opinion are to the 1993-94 Wisconsin Statutes. 
 
 
94-2806 
 
3
of the scheduled hearing, Pultz was arrested on outstanding 
municipal warrants unrelated to the December 10, 1992 permanent 
injunction order.
4  Upon his arrest on August 26, 1994, Pultz was 
confined to the Milwaukee County House of Correction. 
Pultz remained incarcerated and did not appear for the 
August 31, 1994 contempt hearing.  The circuit court adjourned 
the contempt hearing until September 7, 1994 at 9:00 a.m.  Pultz 
remained incarcerated and so did not appear at the scheduled time 
for the September 7, 1994 hearing.  The circuit court was then 
informed that Pultz was being held in the House of Correction.  
Accordingly, the court adjourned the motion hearing until 1:30 
p.m. that afternoon and ordered the Milwaukee County Sheriff's 
Department to produce Pultz from the House of Correction. 
Pultz appeared in court later on September 7, 1994, but 
without counsel. Pultz objected to the contempt hearing taking 
place on the grounds that he desired, but did not have a chance, 
to obtain a lawyer, and that he was not properly notified of the 
hearing.
5  In response, the Assistant City Attorney told the 
                                                          
 
4  The basis for the municipal warrants is not in the record 
before us, and in any event is not germane to our decision on the 
issue of right to appointed counsel.  
5  The pertinent dialogue between the circuit court and Mr. 
Pultz follows: 
The Court: Seated at the table to my left, you are Dale 
Pultz.  Are you represented by counsel? Do you have an attorney? 
Mr. Pultz: No. I have not had a chance to get it.  I was 
issued a copy of this contempt thing four days before I was 
picked up from court and I did not have time to seek counsel as 
of yet.  I had a friend do some motions, but I didn't get a 
chance to submit them as I was taken from court that Friday on a 
supposed municipal commitment. 
 
 
94-2806 
 
4
court that the court clerk did not have Pultz' current address 
and, therefore, had been unable to notify him of the adjournment.  
Despite Pultz' objections, the hearing proceeded. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
. . .  
The Court: What was the date?  What was that date? 
Mr. Pultz: That was August 26th.  I would like to say that I 
have not had a chance to seek proper counsel and I have no, very 
few statements to make before I do get the chance, before I see 
proper counsel. . . . 
Mr. Halbrooks:  He was served August 22nd.  We filed that 
affidavit with the court.  He's had plenty of time, both before 
that time and since that time to have contacted a lawyer.  He, 
the order in this case allows for 72 hours to be proper notice.  
So he even had more time than that before he went to the House of 
Correction. 
Additionally, the Court may inquire of the defendant the 
number of times he's been in court and any knowledge.  He's never 
been represented by counsel on any civil matters.  So, I'm not 
certain how much stock to put in that from the perspective of his 
desiring of counsel at this point. . . . 
The Court: With respect to an attorney, it would appear 
there is no prohibition, no impediment that Mr. Pultz, with 
respect to contacting an attorney, except for the fact that he 
was in custody of the Sheriff's Department and held in custody 
since, it's not clear exactly when. 
Mr. Pultz: 26th. 
The Court: But at the time of notice and he would be under 
no impediment to use a telephone to make such contact. 
It is perfectly proper for a person who is in custody to 
obtain leave from such contact.  Seems willful action on his part 
to choose and he elects not to retain counsel. 
This is a civil case.  It's not a criminal proceeding and as 
a matter of law, the defendant is not necessarily required to 
have an attorney, or the court is not required to appoint an 
attorney for him, in the event that he is indigent. 
There is be (sic) no claim of indigency here.  There is just 
a claim of insufficient time."   
 
 
94-2806 
 
5
 
At the close of the hearing, the circuit court found Pultz 
in contempt of the permanent injunction order.  As a sanction for 
the four injunction violations, Pultz was given the option to pay 
a $9,500.00 aggregate forfeiture or take an oath that he would 
not violate the permanent injunction.  If Pultz refused to pay 
the forfeiture or take the oath within five days, he would be 
jailed for a total of 380 days at the House of Correction.  As a 
further provision, Pultz was given the opportunity to purge the 
contempt order and avoid the balance of his incarceration at any 
time by agreeing not to violate the permanent injunction. 
 
Pultz refused to take the oath and failed to pay the 
forfeiture.  After the five days passed, the circuit court issued 
a writ of commitment and Pultz was taken into custody. 
 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's finding of 
contempt.  The court of appeals agreed with the circuit court's 
ruling that Pultz had sufficient time to hire an attorney between 
the time he was served on August 22, 1994 and the time of the 
contempt hearing on September 7, 1994.  The appellate court 
determined that the circuit court did not unconstitutionally fail 
to advise Pultz of his right to appointed counsel.  The court of 
appeals also concluded that Pultz' due process right to notice 
was not violated because on August 22, 1994 he was effectively 
served with notice of the August 31, 1994 adjournment.  The court 
of appeals acknowledged that it would have been preferable to 
have served Pultz with the notice of adjournment, and if he had 
shown up on August 31, 1994, Pultz would have been notified of 
the adjournment.  Pultz failed to notify the circuit court of his 
 
 
94-2806 
 
6
inability to attend the originally scheduled hearing.  The court 
of appeals ruled that Pultz was effectively served on August 22, 
1994. 
DUE PROCESS 
The constitutional due process right to appointed counsel 
for an indigent defendant in a state initiated contempt 
proceeding is the primary issue before us.
6  The applicability of 
a constitutional right is a question of law that we review 
independently of the lower courts.  State v. Turner, 136 Wis. 2d 
333, 344, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987).  Questions of constitutional 
fact are also subject to independent review, and require 
independent application of the constitutional principles involved 
to facts as found by the trial court.  Id. 
This action arose from a motion brought jointly by the State 
of Wisconsin and the City of Milwaukee.  The plaintiffs moved for 
a remedial contempt hearing against Pultz based on Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.03(1).
7  They alleged that Pultz violated a permanent 
                                                          
 
6  U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, sec. 1 provides in part: "No 
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or  
property, without due process of law". 
7  Wis. Stat. §  785.03 Procedure. (1) Nonsummary Procedure. 
 
(a) Remedial sanction.  A person aggrieved by a contempt of 
court may seek imposition of a remedial sanction for the contempt 
by filing a motion for that purpose in the proceeding to which 
the contempt is related.  The court, after notice and hearing, 
may impose a remedial sanction authorized by this chapter. 
 
 
94-2806 
 
7
injunction order entered more than one year earlier.  Our 
statutes provide sanctions for a contempt of court stemming from 
"disobedience, resistance or obstruction of the authority, 
process or order of a court."  Wis. Stat. §  785.01 (1)(b)(1993-
94).  The statutes also provide for a variety of remedial 
sanctions.
8  A person aggrieved by a contempt of court may seek 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(b) Punitive sanction.  The district attorney of a county, 
the attorney general or a special prosecutor appointed by the 
court may seek the imposition of a punitive sanction by issuing a 
complaint charging a person with contempt of court and reciting 
the sanction sought to be imposed.  The district attorney, 
attorney general or special prosecutor may issue the complaint on 
his or her own initiative or on the request of a party to an 
action or proceeding in a court or of the judge presiding in an 
action or proceeding.  The complaint shall be processed under 
chs. 967 to 973.  If the contempt alleged involves disrespect to 
or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from 
presiding at the trial of the contempt unless the person charged 
consents to the judge presiding at the trial. 
8  Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1) Remedial sanction.  A court may 
impose one or more of the following remedial sanctions: 
(a) Payment of a sum of money sufficient to compensate a 
party for a loss or injury suffered by the party as the result of 
a contempt of court. 
(b) Imprisonment if the contempt of court is of a type 
included in s.785.01(1)(b),(bm),(c) or (d).  The imprisonment may 
extend only so long as the person is committing the contempt of 
court or 6 months, whichever is the shorter period. 
(c) A forfeiture not to exceed $2,000 for each day the 
contempt of court continues. 
(d) An order designed to ensure compliance with a prior 
order of the court. 
(e) A sanction other than the sanctions specified in pars. 
(a) to (d) if it expressly finds that those sanctions would be 
ineffectual to terminate a continuing contempt of court. 
(2) Punitive Sanction. (a) Nonsummary procedure.  A court, 
after a finding of contempt of court in a nonsummary procedure 
under s.785.03(1)(b), may impose for each separate contempt of 
court a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment in the 
county jail for not more than one year or both. 
 
 
94-2806 
 
8
imposition of a remedial sanction, and an agent of the state may 
seek imposition of a punitive sanction.  Whether the sanctions 
sought are deemed remedial or punitive, they both may include 
incarceration of the alleged contemnor. 
Pultz asserts that, under decisions of both the United 
States Supreme Court and this court, indigent civil litigants are 
entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel when they face 
the prospect of incarceration.  Pultz argues that the circuit 
court 
failed 
to 
make 
several 
necessary 
inquiries 
before 
continuing with the contempt hearing.  First, the circuit court 
did not advise Pultz of his right to counsel; second, the circuit 
court did not determine whether Pultz knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel; third, the circuit court made no 
inquiry as to Pultz' indigency status; and fourth, the circuit 
court did not inform Pultz that if he were indigent, the court 
would appoint counsel for him at public expense.   
Pultz asks us to reaffirm the rule established in Ferris v. 
State, 75 Wis. 2d 542, 249 N.W.2d 789 (1977) and Brotzman v. 
Brotzman, 91 Wis. 2d 335, 283 N.W.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1979) that 
when an unrepresented litigant comes before the court on a civil 
or remedial contempt motion brought by the State, and his or her 
liberty is threatened, the court must inform the defendant of the 
right to appointed counsel if he or she cannot afford one. 
 
The State acknowledges that the due process right to 
appointed counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment was extended by 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1972) to all state 
prosecutions that result in imprisonment.  The State also 
 
 
94-2806 
 
9
recognizes that it is not the type of proceeding, whether 
punitive or remedial, that determines whether due process 
requires a right to appointed counsel.  In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 
36 (1967). 
 
The Supreme Court has recognized a limitation on the right 
to appointed counsel in civil actions.  In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973), the Court refused to recognize an 
absolute right to appointed counsel in civil proceedings.  There, 
the Court concluded that a parolee or probationer had only a 
conditional liberty interest at stake, dependent upon the 
observance of special parole restrictions. 411 U.S. at 788-89.  
Several years later the Court enunciated a sliding scale to 
measure the nature of the threat to a defendant's physical 
liberty, and thereby assess the need for appointed counsel.  
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham County, 452 
U.S. 18, 26 (1981).  The Court observed that as the civil 
defendant's risk of incarceration diminishes, so does his or her 
right to appointed counsel.  Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26. 
 
The Lassiter Court held that the Constitution does not 
require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every 
parental status termination proceeding.  Instead, the Court ruled 
that an indigent litigant is presumed to have a right to 
appointed counsel only when a loss on the merits would deprive 
him or her of personal liberty.  452 U.S. at 26-27.  Set against 
that presumption are the three elements from Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), namely, the private interests at stake, 
 
 
94-2806 
 
10
the government's interest, and the risk that the procedures used 
will lead to erroneous decisions.  Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.  
 
The State cites these Supreme Court cases, and additional 
authority from other jurisdictions, to urge us to at most, adopt 
a case-by-case balancing approach in this case.  We decline to do 
so.  Because in this remedial contempt hearing Pultz' liberty was 
threatened at the instance of the State and the City in the 
exercise of their police power, we rely on the rule of our 
earlier decision in Ferris. 
In Ferris, the Department of Natural Resources sought to 
enforce an order for cleanup of a salvage yard.  When the salvage 
yard owner failed to comply with a court order to remove salvage 
from his yard, he was found in contempt.  Ferris, 75 Wis. 2d at 
544.  Nothing in the record indicated that the salvage yard owner 
had requested the assistance of counsel or that it was offered.  
Id.  The salvage yard owner began serving an indeterminate period 
in jail after failing to meet the court's deadline for 
compliance.  The circuit court granted a writ of habeas corpus, 
and discharged the salvage yard owner after he had been held in 
jail for 37 days.  Id. at 544-45.  We held that "where the state 
in the exercise of its police power brings its power to bear on 
an individual through the use of civil contempt as here and 
liberty is threatened, we hold that such a person is entitled to 
counsel."  Id. at 546.  In other words, we established the rule 
that, when an arm of government brings a motion for a remedial 
contempt hearing against an individual, and that person's liberty 
is threatened, "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of 
 
 
94-2806 
 
11
counsel, the court, prior to the hearing on contempt, must advise 
the alleged contemnor of his right to counsel and advise him that 
if he is indigent, the court will appoint counsel for him at 
public expense."  This same rule applies here, where the motion 
for contempt was filed by two governmental bodies, the State of 
Wisconsin and the City of Milwaukee. 
The court of appeals held that an indigent defendant was 
entitled to court-appointed counsel in a civil contempt action 
initiated by the district attorney.  Brotzman v. Brotzman, 91 
Wis. 2d 335, 339, 283 N.W.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1979) (considering 
action brought under former civil contempt statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 295 (1977)).  There, the court of appeals concluded that the 
distinction 
between 
coercive 
imprisonment 
and 
punitive 
imprisonment was immaterial to deciding whether an indigent 
defendant in a civil contempt proceeding was entitled to court-
appointed counsel when the state commenced the action.  91 Wis. 
2d at 339.  The touchstone was that it was the State, the real 
party in interest in an action to recover child support payments, 
that brought the action threatening the defendant's liberty.  Id. 
at 339.  The Brotzman court held that in such circumstances the 
circuit court should have informed the defendant of his right to 
 
 
94-2806 
 
12
counsel, and of the availability of counsel furnished at public 
expense.  Id.; Wis. Stat. § 967.06.
9   
 
The State asserts that the Ferris rule is superseded by the 
United States Supreme Court's holding in Lassiter, and should be 
abandoned.  The Lassiter Court ruled that an indigent litigant is 
presumed to have a right to appointed counsel only when a loss on 
the merits would deprive him or her of personal liberty.  452 
U.S. at 26-27.  The State contends that we must balance that 
presumption against the three elements evaluated in Lassiter.  
Those 
elements 
are 
the 
private 
interests 
at 
stake, 
the 
government's interest, and the risk that the procedures used will 
lead to erroneous decisions.  452 U.S. at 27. 
Under the State's proposed balancing approach, the State 
first asserts that we would find that Pultz' liberty interest was 
diminished by the terms of his contempt sanction.  Because Pultz 
held the "keys to the jail" in his hand, either by taking an oath 
or paying the forfeiture, the threat to his liberty was not 
direct.  See State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 126-30, 262 N.W.2d 80 
(1978) (applying earlier civil contempt statutes, ch. 295 and 
Wis. Stat. §§ 256.03 through 256.07 to a proceeding against union 
                                                          
 
9  967.06 Determination of indigency; appointment of 
counsel; preparation of record.  As soon as practicable after a 
person has been detained or arrested in connection with any 
offense which is punishable by incarceration, or in connection 
with any civil commitment proceeding, or in any other situation 
in which a person is entitled to counsel regardless of ability to 
pay under the constitution or laws of the United States or this 
state, the person shall be informed of his or her right to 
counsel.  Persons who indicate at any time that they wish to be 
represented by a lawyer, and who claim that they are not able to 
pay in full for a lawyer's services, shall immediately be 
permitted to contact the authority for indigency determinations 
specified under s. 977.07(1). 
 
 
94-2806 
 
13
members alleged to have violated a temporary injunction to 
refrain from picketing and return to work).  Second, the State 
asserts that the government's interest in avoiding a blanket rule 
is significant, primarily based on avoiding undue delay and 
economic and administrative burdens.  Third, the State contends 
that the risk to Pultz of an erroneous deprivation of his liberty 
by virtue of proceeding without appointed counsel was not 
insupportably high.  The State points out that no expert 
testimony was offered at the contempt hearing, and asserts that 
the case presented only "straight forward factual issues."  
Respondents' brief at 20.  The State relies most heavily, 
however, on testimony and findings from a hearing several months 
after Pultz was incarcerated for this contempt, to assert that 
the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty was slight.   
We decline to undertake a balancing here like that conducted 
by the Lassiter Court.  Contrary to the State's assertion, Pultz' 
opportunity to purge is of no consequence in our decision to cast 
Ferris as a bright line rule.
10  The point is that the jail loomed 
                                                          
 
10  While not engaging in a balancing of interests, we note 
several other flaws in the State's argument. There are already 
mechanisms in place to prevent undue delay of the contempt 
hearing.  For instance, Wis. Stat. §§ 967.06, 977.02 and 977.07 
together provide for a prompt determination of indigency and 
appointment of a public defender.  Wis. Stat. § 977.07 (1)(a) 
provides, "Determination of indigency for persons entitled to 
counsel shall be made as soon as possible and shall be in 
accordance with the rules promulgated by the board under s. 
977.02(3)."  Similarly, the circuit court has inherent power to 
appoint counsel for indigent defendants at public expense.  
Contempt in State v. Lehman, 137 Wis. 2d 65, 76, 403 N.W.2d 438 
(1987); Joni B. v. State, 202 Wis. 2d 1, 10-11, 549 N.W.2d 411 
(1996).   In addition, we note that Pultz was served with notice 
of the contempt hearing in August, 1994, for four incidents 
occurring on January 24, 1994, April 23, 1994, May 11, 1994 and 
June 20, 1994.  The permanent injunction had been in effect since 
 
 
94-2806 
 
14
before Pultz, and his decision whether or not to "use the keys" 
was made without counsel.
11  Affording counsel after a defendant 
is found in contempt is too late.  As even the Lassiter Court 
observed, "accurate and just results are most likely to be 
obtained through the equal contest of opposed interests."  452 
U.S. at 28. 
We have applied the Lassiter balancing test on several 
occasions since our decision in Ferris.  We addressed the due 
process right to appointed counsel for an indigent defendant who, 
at the time of the civil tort proceeding, was already deprived of 
his liberty.  Piper v. Popp, 167 Wis. 2d 633, 428 N.W.2d 353 
(1992).  There we held that the defendant had no constitutional 
right to appointment of counsel.  167 Wis. 2d at 655-65.  We 
observed that a state court may use a number of means to avoid 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
December, 1992.  If there was delay here, it was delay by the 
State in enforcing the injunction in the face of violations as 
far back as eight months before notice was served.  Finally, the 
State relies on testimony and findings from a hearing several 
months after Pultz, without the benefit of appointed counsel, was 
found in contempt.  Those later findings are irrelevant to Pultz' 
right to appointed counsel at the September 7, 1994 hearing.  
 
11  To continue the analogy, an indigent defendant may not 
even "have the keys" if he is not presently able to comply with 
the forfeiture requirement.  Mead v. Batchlor, 460 N.W.2d 493, 
501-02 (Mich. 1990) (citing Walker v. McLain, 768 F.2d 1181, 1183 
(10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986)).  See also 
McBride v. McBride, 431 S.E.2d 14, 18-19 (N.C. 1993) noting that 
trial courts do not always make a determination as to whether the 
contemnor is presently able to comply with a court ordered 
forfeiture.  Nothing in the record before us indicates that the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court here made any effort to determine 
whether Pultz was financially able to comply with the forfeiture 
condition.  We held that if a circuit court grants a purge 
condition, the purge condition should serve remedial aims, the 
contemnor should be able to fulfill the proposed purge, and the 
condition should be reasonably related to the cause or nature of 
the contempt. In re Marriage of Larsen, 165 Wis. 2d 679, 478 
N.W.2d 225 (1990).  
 
 
94-2806 
 
15
depriving indigent incarcerated defendants of the opportunity to 
defend themselves in civil actions.  Those methods include 
postponing the trial until the prisoner is released from 
incarceration, granting a continuance until the prisoner can 
retain counsel, allowing the prisoner to appear in circuit court 
pro se, or appointing counsel.  Piper, 167 Wis. 2d at 638, 651-
52.  We did not apply the Ferris rule to the facts before us in 
Piper, because Mr. Popp's liberty was not in jeopardy.  No period 
of incarceration could result if Mr. Popp were to lose the civil 
claim for damages. Thus, application of the Lassiter balancing 
test was appropriate. "A presumption against appointment of 
counsel for an indigent civil litigant exists when a litigant 
will not likely be deprived of personal liberty if unsuccessful 
in the litigation."  Piper, 167 Wis. 2d at 655. 
We applied the Lassiter balancing test more recently in  
Joni B. v. State, 202 Wis. 2d 1, 549 N.W.2d 411 (1996).  There we 
considered a facial challenge to Wis. Stat. § 48.23(3), which 
prohibited a court from appointing counsel for any party other 
than the child in a proceeding under Wis. Stat. § 48.13.
12  Id. at 
5.  We recognized that there was no direct threat to liberty in 
the proceedings under that chapter, so we considered the three 
factors set out in Lassiter against the presumption that a right 
to appointed counsel exists only when personal freedom is 
jeopardized.  Id. at 12-13.  We weighed the private interests at 
                                                          
 
12  Wis. Stat. § 48.13 delineates the court's jurisdiction 
over children alleged to be in need of protection or services, 
commonly known as CHIPS actions. 
 
 
94-2806 
 
16
stake in the proceeding,
13 the government's interest, and the risk 
that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions.  Id. 
at 13.  We acknowledged that there is no absolute right to 
appointed 
counsel 
in 
civil 
cases 
carrying 
no 
threat 
of 
incarceration.  Id. at 18.  We concluded, however, that the act 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because it precluded any case-by-case determination of the 
necessity for appointment of counsel for any party other than the 
child in a CHIPS action.  Id. 
We disagree that the Lassiter decision has superseded our 
ruling in Ferris.  Unlike the facts presented in Lassiter, Piper 
and Joni B., the facts here and in Ferris demonstrate that the 
liberty of the litigants was threatened if the State prevailed.  
Based upon that threat to liberty, we conclude that a defendant 
in a remedial contempt proceeding, if indigent, is entitled to 
appointed counsel at public expense. 
 
By adopting a blanket rule here, where the threat to liberty 
is real, we endorse the reasoning that "procedural norms are 
devised to ensure that justice may be done in every case, and to 
protect litigants against unpredictable and unchecked adverse 
governmental action."  Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 50 (Blackmun, J. 
dissenting).  Other jurisdictions have adopted a rule similar to 
that which we adopt here, based on similar reasoning.  Every 
                                                          
 
13  In assessing the private interests at stake, we did note 
that "[i]f the CHIPS action was initiated on the basis of 
allegations of neglect or abuse, as is commonly the case, the 
parent may also be facing criminal prosecution.  Once freedom of 
liberty is implicated, numerous additional due process concerns 
arise."  202 Wis. 2d at 15. 
 
 
94-2806 
 
17
federal circuit court that has addressed the question has 
determined that due process requires an automatic appointment of 
counsel for an indigent facing incarceration in a civil or 
remedial contempt proceeding.
14  McBride v. McBride, 431 S.E.2d 
14, 17 (N.C. 1993).  The majority of states that have decided 
this issue have adopted the same rule.
15  Id.  Admittedly, some 
jurisdictions have chosen to conduct a case-by-case analysis for 
                                                          
 
14  McBride v. McBride, 421 S.E.2d 14, 18, n.1 (N.C. 1993).  
United States v. Bobart Travel Agency, Inc., 699 F.2d 618, 620 
(2d Cir. 1983); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1221 (4th Cir. 1973); 
Ridgway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409, 1413-14 (5th Cir. 1983); Sevier 
v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 266-67 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Anderson, 553 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (8th Cir. 197)(per curiam);  
Walker v. McLain, 768 F.2d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986).  For a recent discussion of the 
trend to recognize the right to appointed counsel in civil or 
remedial contempt proceedings, see Hausler, Kurt F., The Right to 
Appointment of Counsel for the Indigent Civil Contemnor Facing 
Incarceration for Failure to Pay Child Support - McBride v. 
McBride, 16 Campbell L. Rev. 127 (Winter, 1994).  
 
 
94-2806 
 
18
civil contempt proceedings.  In New Hampshire, for example, the 
court maintains a distinction between civil and criminal 
contempt, reserving the right to appointed counsel for indigent 
defendants in criminal proceedings.  Duval v. Duval, 114 N.H. 
422, 322 A.2d 1 (1974).  The Duval court characterized a civil 
contempt proceeding as one that arises out of a private wrong in 
which the defendant harms the plaintiff by his or her failure to 
comply with a court order.  This characterization overlooks 
remedial contempt actions instituted by government agencies.  
Further, our current statute focuses on the purpose of the 
sanction for a finding of contempt, and no longer distinguishes 
between "civil" and "criminal" contempt.  Wis. Stat. § 785; see 
footnote 1, supra. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15  McBride v. McBride, 431 S.E.2d 14, 18, n.2 (N.C. 1993). 
Even when some of the following jurisdictions apply the Lassiter 
balancing test, they all conclude that due process requires 
appointment of counsel for an indigent facing incarceration in a 
civil contempt proceeding: Otton v. Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537, 538 
(Alaska 1974); County of Santa Clara v. Santa Clara County Super. 
Ct., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 7, 10-12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (indigent in a 
contempt for nonsupport proceeding has a right to court-appointed 
attorney based on very real threat of incarceration); Padilla v. 
Padilla, 645 P.2d 1327, 1328 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Dube v. 
Lopes, 481 A.2d 1293, 1294 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); In re 
Marriage of Stariha, 509 N.E.2d 1117, 1121-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1987); Johnson v. Johnson, 721 P.2d 290, 294 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1986); Mead v. Batchlor, 460 N.W.2d 493, 504 (Mich. 1990); Cox v. 
Slama, 355 N.W.2d  401, 402-03 (Minn. 1984); Carroll v. Moore, 
423 N.W.2d 757, 766 (Neb. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019 
(1989); State ex rel. Gullickson v. Gruchalla, 467 N.W.2d 451, 
453 (N.D. 1991) (due process gives indigent defendant absolute 
right to court-appointed counsel in paternity proceeding); In re 
Marriage of Gorger, 728 P.2d 104, 105 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); 
Bradford v. Bradford, 1986 WL 2874, *3-*5 (Tenn. Ct. App.); Ex 
parte Gunther, 758 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam) 
(statutory right to appointment of counsel for indigent defendant 
if incarceration is possible result of contempt proceeding); 
Tetro v. Tetro, 544 P.2d 17, 19-20 (Wash. 1975); Smoot v. 
Dingess, 236 S.E.2d 468, 471 (W.Va. 1977).  
 
 
94-2806 
 
19
The Colloquy 
 
We reaffirm that when a defendant's liberty is threatened in 
a remedial contempt action brought by the government, the court 
must advise the defendant of his or her due process right to 
appointed counsel, if the defendant cannot afford counsel.  We 
then look at how a court is to advise the defendant of such a 
right.  The court of appeals read the lower court record as 
demonstrating that Pultz did not claim to be indigent, and 
moreover, that Pultz did not request a court-appointed attorney 
at the time of hearing.  Slip op. at 5. 
We agree with the court of appeals that Pultz complained 
that by virtue of his incarceration up to the time of the 
adjourned hearing, he did not have a chance to obtain an 
attorney.  Nonetheless, it is incorrect for a circuit court to 
rely on a defendant to spontaneously reveal his state of 
indigency and/or to know to request a court-appointed attorney.  
Rather, the court must advise the defendant of this right and 
make the appropriate inquiry.  See Keller v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 
502, 509, 510, 249 N.W.2d 773 (1977) (holding in a criminal case 
that the trial judge must ensure that the record unconditionally 
and unequivocally demonstrates that the defendant intelligently, 
voluntarily and understandingly waived the constitutional right 
to counsel, whether or not defendant is indigent). 
Further, timing is critical.  See State v. Wollman, 86 Wis. 
2d 459, 468-69, 273 N.W.2d 225 (1979) (ruling that determination 
of whether the court has abused its discretion by denial of a 
continuance 
requires 
the 
balancing 
of 
the 
defendant's 
 
 
94-2806 
 
20
constitutional right to adequate representation by counsel 
against the public interest in the prompt and efficient 
administration of justice). See also Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (discussing harm that can result when a 
criminal defendant is denied the effective assistance of 
counsel).  The Strickland Court noted that in certain Sixth 
Amendment contexts, actual or constructive denial of the 
assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in 
prejudice.  In those situations, "prejudice  . . . is so likely 
that a case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the 
cost."  466 U.S. at 692. 
To assure that the defendant who faces a threat to liberty 
at a contempt hearing is properly advised of the right to 
appointed counsel if he or she is found indigent, the circuit 
court must take the initiative.  The circuit court must engage in 
a colloquy that clearly conveys the existence of this right to 
the defendant.  Further, the colloquy must be initiated by the 
judge to inquire whether the defendant believes him or herself 
indigent.  Piper, 91 Wis. 2d at 646-47.  It is not sufficient, as 
the State would have here, that silence by the defendant in the 
absence of specific questioning means that indigency is not 
present. 
Before the court proceeds on the contempt motion, it should 
advise the pro se defendant that if he or she is found to be in 
contempt, the court could impose sanctions which may include the 
defendant having to spend time in jail.  The court must also 
instruct that the defendant is entitled to be represented by an 
 
 
94-2806 
 
21
attorney.  If the defendant wants an attorney but is financially 
unable to pay for a lawyer, the court must advise the defendant 
that an attorney will be appointed at public expense.
16  The 
circuit court must be satisfied that the defendant understands 
those rights and must make the necessary findings based upon the 
defendant's answers and any other evidence the court receives.  
If the defendant wants to obtain counsel, the court should give 
the defendant a reasonable time either to retain counsel or, if 
indigent, to receive appointed counsel before proceeding on the 
contempt motion. 
Finally, Pultz also asserted that he was not given adequate 
notice of the adjourned hearing.  Inherent in that assertion is 
the argument that Pultz was denied due process based on the 
circuit court's denial of his adjournment request.  That denial, 
according to Pultz, prevented him from having adequate time to 
prepare his defense to the contempt motion.  Because the circuit 
court failed to advise Pultz of his right to appointed counsel 
should he need one, we remand for a new hearing and thus need not 
consider the adequacy of the notice provided to Pultz. 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court 
erred by failing to advise Pultz of his right to appointed 
counsel if he could not afford one, and so reverse the order of 
the circuit court and remand for a new hearing on the State and 
City's motion for contempt.  
                                                          
 
16  If the defendant states that he or she cannot afford 
counsel, a determination of indigency will be undertaken. 
 
 
94-2806 
 
22
 
We deny the petitioner's request for costs and reasonable 
attorney fees.  
 
By the Court.The order of the circuit court finding 
contempt is reversed and the cause remanded for a new contempt 
hearing. 
 
 
94-2806 
 
23
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
Case No.:  
94-2806 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case:  
 
State of Wisconsin and City of Milwaukee, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
Dale Pultz, 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
Missionaries to the Preborn, et al. 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  197 Wis. 2d 955, 543 N.W.2d 867 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed:  
December 20, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
September 25, 1996 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
 
ROBERT W. LANDRY 
 
 
 
JUSTICES:  
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the appellant-petitioner there were briefs and 
oral argument by Kenneth M. Fleck, Grafton. 
 
 
 
94-2806 
 
24
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents the cause was argued by Laura 
Sutherland, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general and Grant F. Langley, city 
attorney and David R. Halbrooks, assistant city attorney.