Case Title: Wilson Advisory Comm. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-12-0095

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILSON ADVISORY COMMITTEE, a Wyoming Nonprofit Corporation v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, TETON COUNTY, WYOMING and C&J, LLC, a Wyoming Limited Liability Company2012 WY 163Case Number: S-12-0095Decided: 12/21/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before final publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2012 
 
WILSON 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE, a Wyoming Nonprofit 
Corporation,Appellant(Petitioner),v.BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS, TETON COUNTY, 
WYOMING,Appellee(Respondent),andC&J, 
LLC, a Wyoming Limited Liability 
Company,Appellee(Intervenor/Respondent).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County
The 
Honorable Timothy C. Day, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Peter F. Moyer, Esq., 
Jackson, Wyoming
 
Representing Appellee 
Board of County Commissioners, Teton County, Wyoming:
Nicole G. Krieger, 
Deputy County Attorney, Teton County Attorney’s Office, Jackson, 
Wyoming
 
Representing 
C&J, LLC:
            
No appearance.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and HILL, VOIGT, BURKE, and DAVIS, JJ.
 
DAVIS, Justice.
 
[¶1]      
The Teton County Board of Commissioners (the Board) approved a Final 
Development Plan Application by C&J, LLC 
(C&J). C&J owns 2.04 acres of property in Wilson, 
Wyoming. The northern portion of the property is zoned for commercial use, while 
the southern portion is zoned for a single-family residence.  
The plan approved by the Board allowed C&J to construct 
five residential units and one affordable housing unit in the single-family 
residential zone.  It also allowed commercial parking and 
other commercial uses.  The number of residential units 
permitted has since been reduced to four.
 
[¶2]      
Appellant Wilson Advisory Committee, a non-profit corporation 
representing citizens concerned about the development of Wilson, petitioned the 
district court for review. The district court affirmed the Board’s decision, and 
the Wilson Advisory Committee appealed.  We affirm in part and 
remand to require the Board to make findings called for by its own 
regulations.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶3]      
1.         Did the 
approved plan’s increase of the overall residential density of the southern 
tract violate Teton County’s Land Development Regulations?
 
2.         
Did the Board make the findings required by its Land Development 
Regulations as a predicate to allowing more intense use of the single-family 
residential portion of a dual-zoned property? 
 
3.         
If so, were the Board’s findings arbitrary and capricious or contrary to 
law?
 
FACTS
 
[¶4]      
C&J, LLC owns 2.04 acres of land in Wilson, Wyoming. The 
property originally consisted of two separate parcels, each located in a 
different zoning district. The northern parcel of 0.58 acres was originally 
zoned Auto-Urban Commercial (AC). The southern, 1.46-acre tract was zoned 
Neighborhood Conservation – Single Family (NC-SF), meaning that only one 
single-family dwelling could ordinarily be constructed on it. 
 
[¶5]      
In 2007, a Minor Boundary Adjustment permitted by Teton County Land 
Development Regulations combined the two tracts into a single parcel for 
development.  See Teton County Land Development 
Regulation § 6300 (Oct. 2006) (hereinafter LDRs). 
  Notice of this action was given to 
adjacent landowners. None of them contested or appealed the boundary 
adjustment.  The property continued to be located in two 
different zoning districts, limiting the use of each tract to that permitted 
within the applicable district. 
 
[¶6]      
In 2008 the northern portion of the property was rezoned to Wilson 
Commercial (WC) by an amendment to the county’s official zoning district map. 
The WC zoning designation was created to encourage the development of 
nonresidential uses which would serve the neighboring population. In contrast, 
NC-SF districts served to preserve the character of existing residential 
neighborhoods.  There was no objection to or appeal from the 
2008 rezoning of the northern portion of the property. 
 
[¶7]      
On December 22, 2010, C&J submitted a Final Development 
Plan Application to the Teton County Planning Department. C&J 
was the first entity to attempt development in the new WC zoning district. It 
requested approval to construct three commercial buildings, five residential 
units, two accessory residential units, and one affordable housing unit on the 
property. The plan called for five regular residential units, one affordable 
housing unit, and commercial parking to be built on the 1.46 acres zoned for a 
single-family residence under the NC-SF designation. 
 
[¶8]      
The Teton County Planning and Zoning Commission (the Planning Commission) 
held two public meetings on C&J’s application.1 At the first, held on November 29, 
2010, several citizens voiced concerns about the project’s impact on adjacent 
wetlands, parking, and local traffic. 
 
[¶9]      
The Planning Commission extended its consideration of the application to 
another meeting held on January 24, 2011. At that meeting, public comment 
included additional expressions of concern about wetland preservation and the 
project’s compliance with zoning regulations applicable to the NC-SF parcel. The 
Planning Commission staff explained its belief that the 2007 boundary adjustment 
allowed for commercial construction on the NC-SF portion of the property in 
accordance with applicable LDRs and that the project’s proposed 
location of structures allowed for mitigation of any possible adverse wetland 
impacts.  The Planning Commission voted unanimously to 
recommend approval of the proposed development to the Board. 
 
[¶10]   C&J’s 
application came before the Board at a public meeting held on March 1, 
2011.  The Board considered a Planning Commission staff report 
on the proposed project. The staff report indicated that the project complied 
with applicable LDRs, but acknowledged that local residents had raised a 
number of objections to the planned development. The Board postponed a decision 
on the project until its next regular meeting, which was to be held on March 15, 
2011. 
 
[¶11]   
In the interim, the Planning Commission staff prepared a revised report. 
The revised staff report included the following additional discussion of the 
project’s compliance with the Teton County Comprehensive Plan: 
 
The proposal contains 
elements that would promote and support diverse economic and social populations 
that do not adversely affect environmental quality or wildlife and scenic 
resources. It offers a spectrum of housing types, especially for resident 
workers. The development is proposed in a location that is served by existing 
transportation and utility infrastructure, and the intensity of use proposed for 
this property is consistent with the stewardship goals of this chapter. 

 
It also described the 
density and location of developments located in more than one zoning 
district:
 
Density calculations 
are based on the acreage in each zoning district. The more intense commercial 
portion of the development is located in the WC district; however, due to the 
presence of Edmiston Spring Creek and its 
associated wetlands, there is considerable residential density permitted in the 
portion of the property zoned 
NC-SF.
 
The revised report 
contained an extensive discussion of the project’s impact on adjacent wetlands 
and recommended approval of the proposed development. 
 
[¶12]   
At the March 15, 2011 Board meeting, counsel for Appellant Wilson 
Advisory Committee spoke in opposition to the project, as did some local 
residents.  Counsel for C&J and 
representatives of the Planning Commission staff responded to the citizens’ 
concerns, including those relating to environmental impacts. County Commissioner 
Schwartz moved to approve C&J’s application, subject to a number 
of conditions, “based upon finding that the application meets with all 
applicable standards set forth in the Teton County Land Development Regulations 
and Comprehensive Plan.” The Board approved the application subject to the 
adoption of written findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
 
[¶13]   
On April 11, 2011, the Board issued its “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order Granting Final Development Plan Approval.” It found, among other 
things, the following:
 
10.       
On March 9, 2011, Planning Staff submitted a Revised Staff Report 
accompanied by a Memo . . . , a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B 
and made a part hereof. The Revised Staff Report reflected that the applicant 
had modified his site plan to avoid any encroachment into the wetland setback . 
. . . 
 
It 
continued:
 
16. 
      The application of C&J, 
LLC for Final Development Plan approval complies with all applicable provisions 
of the Teton County Comprehensive Plan as more fully set forth on pp. 10-11 of 
the staff report dated 3.9.11 (Exhibit B).
 
17. 
      The application of C&J, 
LLC for Final Development Plan Approval complies with all applicable provisions 
of the Teton County Land Development Regulations as more fully set forth on pp. 
12-20 of the staff report dated 3.9.11 (Exhibit B) . . . .
 
The Board approved 
the project with thirty-two conditions which are not relevant to this 
appeal.   
 
[¶14]   
Appellant timely petitioned for review of the Board’s decision by the 
Ninth Judicial District Court. The district court affirmed the Board’s order in 
almost all respects, but remanded to the Board for the limited purpose of 
recalculating the number of residential dwelling units. At oral argument before 
the district court, counsel for the Board admitted that the final development 
plan provided for five regular residential units, but the LDRs only 
allowed four. Counsel further indicated this error would not affect overall 
square footage calculations. The Board promptly held a hearing and ordered a 
reduction in the number of permissible residential units from five to four 
without waiting for remand. All other density calculations remained unaffected, 
and Appellant does not challenge this modification. This minor error has 
therefore been corrected.2
 
[¶15]   
Appellant timely appealed the decision upholding approval of the 
development application.  It does not take issue with the 
proposed density recalculation.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶16]   
The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act governs our review. Gilbert 
v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Park Cnty., 2010 WY 68, 
¶ 10, 232 P.3d 17, 23 (Wyo. 2010) (“The issues before the Court in 
this appeal require application of our standard for reviewing the actions of an 
administrative agency.”); Northfork Citizens For 
Responsible Dev. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Park 
Cnty., 2010 WY 41, ¶ 50, 228 P.3d 838, 855 (Wyo. 2010) 
(“By definition, a board of county commissioners is an 'agency’ subject to the 
WAPA.”) (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(i); Holding’s 
Little America v. Bd. of Cnty. Commr’s of Laramie 
Cnty., 670 P.2d 699, 701-02 (Wyo. 1983)); Bd. of 
Cnty. Comm’rs of Teton Cnty. v. Teton 
Cnty. Youth Servs., 652 P.2d 400, 410-12 (Wyo. 
1982) (clarifying that boards of county commissioners’ decisions are reviewed in 
the same manner as other administrative actions).
 
[¶17] Under Wyoming 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.09, our review is limited to a determination of 
matters specified in § 16-3-114(c) of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act.  W.R.A.P. 12.09(a). Section 
16-3-114 defines our scope of review as follows:
 
(c) To the extent 
necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret . . . statutory provisions, and 
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action.  In making the following determinations, the court 
shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due 
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The 
reviewing court shall:
 
.     
.     .
 
(ii) Hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:
 
(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;
 
.     
.     .
 
 (E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2011). As part of our review, we “give no special 
deference to the decision of the district court, but consider the case as if it 
came directly from the agency.” Gilbert, ¶ 10, 232 P.3d  at 23 
(quoting Northfork, ¶ 16, 228 P.3d at 
844).
 
[¶18]   
Section 16-3-114(c) contains several different standards of review, not 
all of which apply in any given instance. Northfork, ¶ 17, 
228 P.3d  at 844-45 (citing Dale v. S & S Builders, 
LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶¶ 8-26, 188 P.3d 554, 557-62 (Wyo. 2008)). In 
Northern Laramie Range Found. v. Converse Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs, 2012 WY 158, ¶¶ 13-18, --- P.3d --- (Wyo. 2012), 
we reemphasized the distinction between substantial evidence review and review 
under the arbitrary and capricious standard which had previously been explained 
in Dale.   We apply the substantial evidence 
standard in contested cases, with the added “safety net” analysis under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard.  However, we apply only the 
arbitrary and capricious standard when reviewing agency action resulting from 
informal non-contested case proceedings.  
Id.  
 
[¶19]   
The briefs in this case were filed before Northern Laramie Range 
Foundation was decided.  Appellant asserted that both 
standards govern our review of this administrative proceeding. The Board 
recognized that no contested case hearing took place, but also asserted that the 
substantial evidence standard applies.  
 
[¶20]   
The Board’s public meetings were not formal trial-type or contested case 
hearings. No witnesses were sworn in or examined, comment times were limited, 
and the Board did not receive evidence as it would in a contested 
case.  No statute or agency regulation provides for or 
requires a contested case or evidentiary hearing on development plan 
applications within unincorporated areas of Teton County. We will therefore 
review the decision resulting from this informal agency proceeding using the 
arbitrary and capricious standard. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E) (limiting 
application of the substantial evidence standard to “case[s] reviewed on the 
record of an agency hearing provided by statute”); Northern Laramie Range 
Foundation, ¶¶ 10, 18; 33 Charles A. Wright & Charles H. Koch, Jr., 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 8334 (2006) (“Arbitrariness review 
generally applies to the results of an informal process.”).
 
[¶21]   
The arbitrary and capricious standard generally requires a rational basis 
for agency action: 
 
The arbitrary and 
capricious test requires the reviewing court to review the entire record to 
determine whether the agency reasonably could have made its finding and order 
based upon all the evidence before it. The arbitrary and capricious standard is 
more lenient and deferential to the agency than the substantial evidence 
standard because it requires only that there be a rational basis for the 
agency’s decision.
 
 
Gilbert, ¶ 10, 
232 P.3d 17 at 24 (quoting Dale, ¶ 12, 188 P.3d 
at 559). See also N. Mun. Distribs. Grp. v. 
F.E.R.C., 165 F.3d 935, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
(“Upon examining the record the court inquires whether it can discern a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made by the 
[agency] . . . .”). This standard also works as a “'safety 
net’ to catch agency action which . . . is not easily 
categorized or fit to any one particular standard.” Dale, ¶ 23, 
188 P.3d  at 561 (quoting Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 23, 49 P.3d 163, 172 
(Wyo. 2002)).   Whether specific findings are required 
when the arbitrary and capricious standard is applied is addressed 
below.
 
[¶22]   
In all cases, we review an agency’s conclusions of law de novo. 
Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyo. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 
2010 WY 25, ¶ 5, 226 P.3d 809, 813 (Wyo. 2010) (citing Kennedy 
Oil v. Dep’t of Revenue, 2008 WY 154, ¶ 7, 205 P.3d 999, 1002 
(Wyo. 2008)).  An agency’s own rules and regulations “have the 
force and effect of law, and an administrative agency must follow its own rules 
and regulations or face reversal of its action.” Northfork, 
¶ 27, 228 P.3d  at 848 (citation omitted). However, “we defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own rules and regulations unless that 
interpretation is clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the plain language of 
the rules.” Powder River Basin, ¶ 6, 226 P.3d  at 
813.
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶23]   
This appeal involves three separate actions regarding the property in 
question. The first was the Minor Boundary Adjustment which took place in 2007. 
A challenge to the boundary adjustment would have had to have been made in 2007 
when the decision to combine the parcels for development was made. Wyoming Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 12.04 imposes a thirty-day time limit for petitions for 
review of administrative action. This requirement is both mandatory and 
jurisdictional. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 2007 WY 62, ¶ 
7, 155 P.3d 1041, 1043 (Wyo. 2007).  No appeal was 
taken from the original boundary adjustment, and the Court need not evaluate 
that decision, but must instead determine which LDRs apply to it and 
determine the meaning of those regulations to the extent they are 
disputed.

[¶24]   
The second action was an amendment to the Teton County zoning map in 
2008. It effectively changed the zoning of the smaller parcel from AC to WC. 
 Like the boundary adjustment, this rezoning was not 
challenged at the time and cannot now be for the same reasons.
 
[¶25]   
The third action to be considered is the approval of the Final 
Development Plan.  This Board decision was timely challenged 
and will be considered on the merits.  Appellant claims this 
action was improper for two reasons: (1) the overall density of the development 
planned in the residential portion of the property violated applicable 
LDRs; and (2) the Board failed to make a required finding that it had 
been demonstrated that the development plan approved would improve scenic views 
and lessen adverse environmental impacts.  The Board contends 
that the overall density allowed was permissible under its LDRs, and that 
evidence exists which would support the findings necessary to permit increased 
density in the portion of the property zoned for a single family 
residence.
 
A. Overall 
Density
 
[¶26]   
Wyoming Statute § 18-5-201 grants county commissioners broad authority to 
promulgate zoning ordinances:
 
To promote the public 
health, safety, morals and general welfare of the county, each board of county 
commissioners may regulate and restrict the location and use of buildings and 
structures and the use, condition of use or occupancy of lands for residence, 
recreation, agriculture, industry, commerce, public use and other purposes in 
the unincorporated area of the 
county.           

 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-201 (LexisNexis 2011); 
Snake River Venture v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Teton 
Cnty., 616 P.2d 744, 752 (Wyo. 1980) (“The language [of 
the predecessor to Section 201] is a broad grant of authority.”). 
 
[¶27]   
This broad grant of authority derives from the “police power inherent in 
government, the constitution, and statutes passed pursuant to it.” 
 1 E.C. Yokley, Zoning Law and 
Practice § 3-1 (4th ed. 2008). It 
includes both the express power to enact zoning ordinances, and the “implied 
power to do those things which would make its express power to regulate and 
restrict the use of buildings and land in unincorporated areas of the county 
meaningful.” Snake River Venture, 616 P.2d  at 752 
(quoting Schoeller v. Bd. of 
Cnty. Comm’rs of Park Cnty., 568 P.2d 869, 874 (Wyo. 1977)). However, “the zoning authority of counties and 
municipalities is limited to that derived from state statute, and county actions 
inconsistent with the statutes may mandate reversal.” 
Northfork, ¶ 23 n.5, 228 P.3d  at 847 
n.5.
 
[¶28]   
The Board adopted the most recent version of the LDRs in 
October 2006. Several different sections of the LDRs govern the 
permissible zoning density of dual-zoned property like that involved in this 
case.  Appellant points to LDR 
§§ 2520.C and 6300, and argues that “a parcel combination was used 
to increase density and uses by moving commercial density and uses to acreage 
which was and remains zoned for one single family residence.” 
 
[¶29]   LDR 
§ 2520  states that  “[t]he number of units 
permitted on a single lot or parcel in the NC-SF District shall be limited to 
one (1) single-family dwelling unit.” LDRs, supra, at § 
2520.A.1. The regulation further provides that “[l]ots or parcels 
may not be combined with other lots, parcels or tracts for the purpose of 
subdividing to increase density. However, subdivision for other purposes where 
overall existing densities are retained or reduced shall be permitted.” Id. 
at § 2520.C. On a similar note, LDR § 6300 governs the 
permissible density of parcels combined by a Minor Boundary 
Adjustment:
 
A.        
Applicability. Only those boundary adjustments specified below 
shall be permitted as a minor boundary adjustment according to this subsection. 
. . .
 
.     
.     .
 
2.         
Adjustment to combine with an adjacent parcel. The adjustment of 
the boundary of a parcel not within a platted subdivision for the purpose of 
combining portions thereof with an adjacent parcel subject to the 
following:
 
.     
.     .
 
(3)       
No net increase in density. The acreage transferred from one 
parcel to another does not allow for increased density on the subject 
parcels.
 
Id. at § 
6300.A.2.b(3) (emphasis added). 
 
[¶30]   
Appellant argues that these regulations prohibit the approved development 
in the larger parcel zoned for a single-family residence.  The 
Board responds that § 2520.C applies to subdivisions, a separate 
issue, and that other regulations permit increased density in the larger parcel 
when they are developed together. 
 
[¶31]   
To the extent that we must construe Teton County’s Land Development 
Regulations to resolve the issues before us, the rules of statutory construction 
apply to the interpretation of administrative rules and regulations. Bailey 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 152, ¶ 10, 
243 P.3d 953, 956 (Wyo. 2010) (citing Powder River Basin, ¶ 
6, 226 P.3d at 813).  We construe statutes as a 
whole, “giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all 
parts of the statute in pari 
materia.” Redco Const. v. Profile Props., 
LLC, 2012 WY 24, ¶ 26, 271 P.3d 408, 415-16 (Wyo. 2012) (quoting 
Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Bldg. Code Bd. of Apps. of City of Cheyenne, 
2010 WY 2, ¶ 9, 222 P.3d 158, 162 (Wyo. 2010)); see 
82 C.J.S. Statutes § 475 (2009) (“[A] statute is to be 
explained in conjunction with other statutes to the end that they may be a 
harmonious and consistent body of law.”).  
 
[¶32]   
We agree with the Board that § 2520.C applies to 
subdivisions, and that it is therefore inapplicable in this case.  
Section 6300 does apply to minor boundary adjustments, but the propriety 
of the adjustment in this case is not and cannot be an issue in this appeal for 
reasons already stated. 
 
[¶33]   
We have often held that a specific statute controls over a general 
one.  Laramie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Cheyenne 
Newspapers, Inc., 2011 WY 55, ¶ 2, 250 P.3d 522, 525 (Wyo. 
2011); Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. State ex rel. Wyo. Att’y 
Gen., 2009 WY 143, ¶ 39, 221 P.3d 306, 318 (Wyo. 
2009).   LDR § 2560 specifically addresses 
the permissible density of the development approved by the Board in this case: 

 
f. 
         Developments in 
more than one zoning district. Where land is in the WC District and other 
zoning districts, the land may be designed and developed as a single 
development.
 
(1) 
      Density or intensity 
calculation. The entire parcel of land may be used to meet minimum site area 
requirements in either zoning district, but the density or intensity 
calculations shall be based on the acreage existing in each zoning 
district.
 
LDRs, 
supra, at § 2560.A.1.f(1). Section 2560.A.1.f(1) applies 
here because the northern portion of the development is zoned WC, and the 
southern portion is zoned NC-SF. It imposes overall density limitations on 
dual-zoned parcels such as C&J’s property. The record reflects 
that the square footage calculations for the overall project were done in 
compliance with the overall density limitations of LDR 
2560.A.1.f(1):
 
What is the maximum 
density/square footage allowed?
 
The NC-SF portion of 
the property allowed one market single family dwelling unit with a square 
footage allowance of 5,892 square feet, based on the 1.43 acre base site area 
(BSA) of the parcel. The 0.58-acre base site area of the WC portion of 
the property is derived by taking the square footage of BSA (19,853) 
and multiplying it by an FAR3 of 0.35, which allows 6,942 square 
feet.
 
The LDRs 
permit combining the total allowable development on parcels with more than one 
zoning district, for a total FAR allowed on the site of 12,834, with a 
requirement that a minimum of 50% of the FAR be commercial. The applicant is 
proposing a total of 12,790 square feet of floor area on the property. The 
proposal includes 6,390 square feet of residential floor area. 
The ARUs [Accessory Residential Units] and the affordable unit are 
not included in the FAR, as they are exempt from FAR pursuant to Section 2560. 
The applicant is proposing 6,400 square feet of commercial square footage, which 
is less than the 6,492 square feet of allowable commercial and is just 
over 50% of the total FAR.
 
[¶34]   
However, LDR § 2560.A.1.f. also governs the location 
of the proposed development as between the differently-zoned parcels:
 
f. 
         Developments in 
more than one zoning district. Where land is in the WC District and other 
zoning districts, the land may be designed and developed as a single 
development.
 
.  
   . 
    .
 
(2) 
      Locate in area of higher 
intensity use. Development shall be located in the district that is 
designated for higher intensity use. This standard may be deviated from if it 
can be demonstrated that the location proposed will improve scenic views and 
lessen adverse environmental impacts.
 
LDRs, 
supra, at § 2560.A.1.f(2) (emphasis added).  The 
first sentence of subparagraph (2) allows development of the entire parcel based 
on the combined density of that allowed on the two separately zoned 
tracts.  Any increased development must generally be located 
in the district zoned for higher intensity use.  In this case, 
that part of the regulation would require any increase in density to be in the 
smaller parcel zoned Wilson Commercial. However, commercial development can 
occur in the larger NC-SF portion of the property if “it can be demonstrated 
that the location proposed will improve scenic views and lessen adverse 
environmental impacts.” See id.  
 
[¶35]   
As to the overall square footage calculations, the Board and the Planning 
Commission on which it relied have considerable experience and expertise in 
dealing with matters of zoning density. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-208(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) 
(describing how with inter-agency coordination and planning efforts, “a board of 
county commissioners shall be deemed to have special expertise on all subject 
matters for which it has statutory responsibility”); Bonnie M. Quinn 
Revocable Trust v. SRW, Inc., 2004 WY 65, ¶ 18,  
91 P.3d 146, 151 (Wyo. 2004) (“The board of county 
commissioners and its lower level adjudicators have the expertise and are best 
situated to supply those definitions [of ambiguous terms in a revocable trust] 
within the meaning of the zoning resolution.”).  The 
calculations require substantial agency expertise and have been corrected after 
an initial error as to the number of permissible residential units. 
See Ninilchik Traditional Council v. United 
States, 227 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[D]eference 
is especially appropriate here as the challenged decision implicates substantial 
agency expertise.”).  The overall density calculations are not 
arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the applicable regulations.
 
B. Required Findings 
under LDR § 2560.A.1.f(2)
 
[¶36]   
Whether the Board was required to make a specific finding as to 
improvement of scenic views and lessening of adverse environmental impacts, and 
whether its decision in that respect was arbitrary and capricious are separate 
questions.  In a series of recent cases, we have examined an 
agency’s failure to provide necessary findings of fact. See, 
e.g., Decker v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm’n, 
2005 WY 160, ¶¶ 24-25, 36, 124 P.2d 686, 694, 697 (Wyo. 2005) 
(reversing and remanding a formal adjudication of the Medical Commission for its 
failure “to make findings that adequately explain the rationale for [its] 
decision”);  Olivas v. State ex rel. Workers’ 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2006 WY 29, ¶¶ 10, 
16-19, 130 P.3d 476, 481, 485-86 (Wyo. 2006) (reversing and 
remanding a hearing examiner’s denial of disability benefits because a lack of 
necessary factual findings “inhibits our ability to properly perform our review 
on appeal”); Cotton v. McCulloh, 2005 WY 159, ¶¶ 40-41, 
125 P.3d 252, 265 (Wyo. 2005) (affirming an agency’s decision 
following a formal arbitration proceeding because it “[could] not be 
characterized as arbitrary or capricious for failing to make adequate findings 
of fact and conclusions of law”); Padilla v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 10, ¶¶ 3, 6, 
84 P.3d 960, 962 (Wyo. 2004) (reviewing a formal proceeding for 
workers’ compensation benefits under the “umbrella of arbitrary and capricious 
action” for “potential mistakes such as inconsistent or incomplete findings of 
fact”). These cases repeatedly emphasize how an agency’s failure to make required findings inhibits 
our ability to review the issues on appeal.
 
[¶37]   
However, these cases were appeals from administrative decisions rendered 
in contested case or similar formal proceedings. The plain language of § 
16-3-110 requires agencies to make factual findings in contested case hearings. 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110 
(LexisNexis 2011) (“A final decision or order adverse to a party in a contested 
case shall . . . include findings of fact and conclusions of law 
separately stated.”). Moreover, we review these formal proceedings for 
substantial evidence first and foremost, resorting to the arbitrariness standard 
only as a “'safety net’ to 
catch agency action which . . . is not easily categorized or fit 
to any one particular standard.” Dale, ¶ 23, 188 P.3d  at 561 
(quoting Newman, ¶ 23, 49 P.3d at 172). 
 If and when specific findings are required in an 
informal proceeding reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard has not 
been clearly established.
 
[¶38]   
A  United States Supreme Court administrative law case 
provides some guidance for resolution of this issue. See Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 
91 S. Ct. 814, 28 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971), superseded by 
statute on other grounds, Pub. L. 94-974, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976), as stated 
in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104-05 
(1977). In Overton Park, a number of citizens and 
conservation groups challenged a federal agency’s authorization of funds to 
build an interstate highway through a public park in Tennessee. Id. at 
406, 91 S. Ct.  at 818. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed this 
“non-adjudicatory, quasi-legislative” proceeding to determine whether the agency 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Id. at 414-15, 91 S. Ct.  at 
822-23. Applying that standard of review, the Supreme Court found as 
follows:
 
The final inquiry is 
whether the Secretary’s action followed the necessary procedural requirements. 
Here the only procedural error alleged is the failure of the Secretary to make 
formal findings and state his reason for allowing the highway to be built 
through the park. 
 
Undoubtedly, review 
of the Secretary’s action is hampered by his failure to make such findings, but 
the absence of formal findings does not necessarily require that the case be 
remanded to the Secretary. Neither the Department of Transportation Act nor 
the Federal-Aid Highway Act requires such formal findings. Moreover, the 
Administrative Procedure Act requirements that there be formal findings in 
certain rulemaking and adjudicatory proceedings do not apply to the Secretary’s 
action here.
 
Id. at 417, 91 S. Ct.  at 824 (emphasis added).
 
[¶39]   
The Court also noted that the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
had adopted a general order which did require specific findings, but that it did 
so after DOT had made the decision in that case.4  It remanded the 
case to the district court for a review of the record on which 
the DOT decision had been made, because that court had relied on 
affidavits not before the DOT instead of the actual administrative 
record.  It suggested that perhaps the district judge might 
choose to require the Secretary of Transportation to provide some explanation 
for the DOT’s decision, and that the Secretary might simply prepare 
the formal findings the DOT order required. Id. at 417-20, 91 S. Ct.  at 824-26. 
 
[¶40]   
Overton Park stands for the proposition that an agency need not 
always make specific findings in an informal administrative proceeding, although 
they may be necessary to permit review.  However, if a statute 
or regulation requires specific findings, they must be made.  
As already discussed, agencies are required to follow their own 
regulations.  Northfork, ¶ 27, 
228 P.3d  at 848; MB v. Laramie County Dep’t of Family 
Servs., 933 P.2d 1126, 1130 (Wyo. 
1997).  If an agency’s regulations require findings to 
be made after an informal proceeding, the Court cannot adequately review a 
decision for arbitrariness and caprice without a finding complying with the 
regulation’s requirements.  
 
[¶41]   
Administrative law 
treatises lend further support to the notion that agencies may be required to 
make factual findings in informal proceedings if required to do so by their own 
regulations. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & William T. 
Mayton, Administrative Law § 13.5, at 467 (2d ed. 2001) 
(describing a “convergence theory” followed by some courts, in which the 
arbitrary and capricious test governs the need for factual support in certain 
informal proceedings); 3 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law & 
Practice § 10.4, at 37 (2d ed. 1997) (“In the review of an [informal] 
adjudicative decision, arbitrariness review must focus attention on the findings 
of specific facts.”); 6 Jacob A. Stein et al., Administrative Law § 51.03 
(2008) (“While this standard [arbitrary and capricious] is often applied to 
cases requiring no formal record, the agency must still provide the court with 
some factual basis for its decision.”).  
 
[¶42]   
In this case, LDR § 2560 governs whether a development 
permit may authorize greater density in the larger portion of the property. The 
regulation allows that increase in density only if “it can be 
demonstrated that the location proposed will improve scenic views and 
lessen adverse environmental impacts.” See LDRs, supra, at 
§ 2560.A.1.f(2). A requirement that certain factors be demonstrated 
obligates the agency to decide whether they have been and to make a finding 
reflecting its decision.5  Cal. 
Energy Comm’n v. Dep’t of Energy, 585 F.3d 1143, 
1153-54 (9th Cir. 2009) (interpreting a statute that required establishment of 
certain facts to require an agency to make adequate findings of such facts) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 6297(d)(4) (2007)); Dysert 
v. United States Sec’y of Labor, 105 F.3d 607, 
609-10 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding an agency’s reasonable interpretation of 
statutory language where the agency found in part that the word “demonstrate” 
means to “prove or make evident by reasoning or adducing evidence”); Phillips 
v. Phillips, 219 S.W.2d 249, 270 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949) (defining 
“demonstrated” as “to show outwardly by sign or to give visible evidence of”) 
(citing Webster’s International Dictionary (1947)); Cent. Va. Obstetrics 
& Gynecology Assocs., P.C. v. Whitfield, 42 Va. App. 264, 277, 
590 S.E.2d 631, 638 (2004) (“To demonstrate a fact [as required 
under the relevant statute] to the satisfaction of the factfinder 
means to persuade the actual factfinder, not merely to demonstrate 
the plausibility of the proffered fact to a sufficient degree that any 
rational factfinder could be persuaded.”).

[¶43]   
We recently clarified our view of the word “and” with regards to 
statutory interpretation, and not surprisingly found that “and” means 
“and:”
 
We have previously 
recognized, when interpreting statutes, that the word “and” is conjunctive. 
Clark v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety and Comp. Div., 
968 P.2d 436, 438 (Wyo. 1998). Webster’s recognizes that the word 
“and” is “used in logic as a sentential connective that forms a complex sentence 
which is true only if both constituent sentences are true.” Webster’s New 
Collegiate Dictionary 43 (1977) (emphasis added).
 
Prickett v. 
Prickett, 2007 WY 153, ¶ 11, 
167 P.3d 661, 664 (Wyo. 2007). The regulation’s use of the 
conjunction “and” thus requires a finding of both: (1) improvement of scenic 
views; and (2) lessening of environmental impacts. See Powder River 
Basin, ¶ 30, 226 P.3d  at 819 (“The rules of statutory 
interpretation also apply to the interpretation of administrative rules and 
regulations.”) (quoting Powder River Coal Co. v. Wyo. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 2002 WY 5, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 423, 426 (Wyo. 
2002)).   
 
[¶44]   
The Court interprets the LDR in question to require a 
demonstration that the proposed development’s density would improve scenic views 
and reduce environmental impacts when compared to those which would result from 
development consistent with each parcel’s zoning.  It can 
hardly be read otherwise – there is no requirement that the development improve 
scenic views and reduce environmental impacts in the abstract if the parcels are 
developed consistent with their specific existing zoning.  
With that in mind, we scrutinize the record for the required 
findings.
 
            
1. Improvement of Scenic Views 
 
[¶45]   
The record does contain some discussion of the project’s impact on scenic 
views in Teton County. In a letter to the Planning Commission attached to its 
initial staff report, Kathy Harrington, a local resident, commented that “[t]he 
size of this property does not lend itself to a design of this 
magnitude.” C&J’s Final Development Plan Application also 
described the project’s overall visual impact:
 
Compliance with 
Wilson Commercial Standards:
 
.     
.     .
 
Development in more 
than one zone district: The applicant has 
made every effort to keep as much of the development out of the NC zone district 
as possible, while providing for individual residential units that maintain the 
community character of Wilson, rather than providing units that are all 
incorporated in a single, 6,000 plus square foot monolithic 
structure.
 
[¶46]   
A design sketch created by the developer demonstrates that the project 
involved a number of small two-story buildings, rather than a taller commercial 
structure.  The staff may have believed that the views 
provided by the proposed project were better than they would have been if the 
developer had built a large, monolithic structure on the portion of the property 
zoned for a single-family residence.  But the staff or Board’s 
reference to that evidence does not constitute a finding that scenic views were 
improved over those which would have resulted if the smaller WC-zoned parcel was 
developed in a manner consistent with the existing zoning.  
The Board argues on appeal that permitting a number of smaller structures 
on the larger parcel would provide a better view than if a multi-story structure 
were built on the smaller parcel zoned WC.  This may be true, 
but it is an argument unrelated to a finding.
 
[¶47]   
As already noted, the Board’s order indicated only that “[t]he 
application of C&J, LLC for Final Development Plan Approval complies 
with all applicable provisions of the Teton County Land Development Regulations 
as more fully set forth on pp. 12-20 of the staff report.” That language might 
be sufficient to adopt a conclusion made by the staff or Planning Commission if 
the report contained the proper determination.  However, the 
staff report included only the following statement in this respect:
 
Density calculations 
are based on the acreage in each zoning district. The more intense commercial 
portion of the development is located in the WC district; however, due to the 
presence of Edmiston Spring Creek and its associated wetlands, there 
is considerable residential density permitted in the portion of the property 
zoned NC-SF.
 
This portion of the 
staff report does not amount to a staff finding as to whether the project would 
improve scenic views as required by LDR § 2560.A.1.f(2); it 
does not even refer to that topic.  Consequently, it was 
insufficient to comply with the applicable regulation even if we could say it 
was adopted by the general language of the Board’s order.  

 
[¶48]   
The Board argues that we should uphold its decision because of: 
(1) a requirement that the buildings be soil-colored; and (2) a finding 
that the proposed development complied with applicable portions of the Teton 
County Comprehensive Plan. The requirement of soil-colored buildings does not 
amount to a finding that the proponent of the proposed location 
has shown that it will improve scenic views. In fact, LDR 
§ 2560.A.7.a already requires the use of “muted colors and earth 
hues” for all buildings constructed in the WC district. The general statement 
that the project complied with all requirements is not the specific finding as 
to the scenic views that the Board required by its own regulations.  
As counsel for the Board conceded in argument, the same statement would 
be found in every approved application.  
 
2. Lessening Adverse 
Environmental Impacts
 
[¶49]   
The initial staff report described a number of written objections to the 
development from local residents, some of which were based on concerns about 
adverse environmental consequences. Local citizens also provided public comment 
on what they perceived to be the project’s negative environmental impacts. The 
Planning Commission’s revised report recommending approval of the project 
contained the following statements which relate to environmental 
concerns:
 
Staff recommends the 
applicant mitigate for wetland impacts along Edmiston Spring Creek 
at a rate of 2:1 on site. Mitigation for wetland impacts for this essential 
crossing will serve as a public benefit to the community by creating additional 
wetlands that will help buffer Edmiston Spring Creek, a tributary of 
Fish Creek. 
 
.     
.     .
 
Are all wetlands on 
and adjacent to the applicant’s property being protected?
 
. . . All 
the proposed development is outside of the wetlands and wetland setback 
associated with Edmiston Spring Creek, which runs through the 
western portion of the subject property. . . .
 
.     
.     .
 
After hearing 
concerns from neighbors and the Board about impacts to the Ward property wetland 
setback, the applicant revised the site plan to meet all wetland setback 
requirements . . . .
 
[¶50]   
The Board considered these concerns at the March 1, 2011 public meeting, 
as reflected in the minutes of that meeting:
 
Another key issue was 
wetlands. The project met all setbacks from wetlands found on the property 
itself. A wetland delineation was performed on the property. The top three 
commercial units touch the wetland setback. Wetlands were found on the adjacent 
property to the east (Ward property), which came to light through public 
comment. The road was placed about 18-20 feet from the wetlands on the Ward 
property which was within the thirty foot setback.
 
[¶51]   
As already discussed in connection with the issue of scenic views, the 
Board’s findings and conclusions contained only a general statement that “[t]he 
application of C&J, LLC for Final Development Plan Approval complies 
with all applicable provisions of the Teton County Land Development Regulations 
as more fully set forth on pp. 12-20 of the staff report.”  

 
[¶52]   
The Board also referred to a number of pages in the staff report which 
might support the conclusion that the plan would mitigate wetland 
impacts.  Unfortunately, the report is not clear as to whether 
the development’s proposed location would lessen adverse environmental impacts 
over those which might occur if each parcel were developed within the 
limitations of the applicable zoning regulations.  The record 
is likewise unclear as to whether the applicant would have been required to take 
the same steps to reduce wetland and environmental impacts if density remained 
as permitted under the zoning for each portion of the 
property.   The Board did not make findings as to other 
environmental impacts.  
 
C.  
Absence of Required Findings
 
[¶53]   
While there may be information in the record which would support a finding that the proposed development improved 
scenic views and lessened adverse environmental impacts, deciding whether the 
record justifies making those findings in the first instance is the Board’s 
task, and not that of the courts. See JSG Trading 
Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 176 F.3d 536, 546 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (“This court, of course, cannot sift through the record evidence to find 
support for the result reached by the agency.”) (citing Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983) (“It is well established that an agency’s action must be upheld, 
if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself.”)); Teton County 
Youth Services, 652 P.2d  at 416 (explaining how agencies are 
responsible for developing a record sufficient for meaningful judicial 
review).
 
[¶54]   
At oral argument, counsel for the Board argued 
that it would be an undue burden to require it to make more than the general 
finding it did due to the large number of applications for site plans it must 
review, analyze, and approve or deny.  As noted above, the 
Board had considerable discretion in the formulation of its land development 
regulations. It chose to require that when a combined parcel is dual-zoned, the 
development in each zone can exceed the applicable zoning intensity only upon a 
demonstration that the location would improve scenic views and lessen adverse 
environmental impacts.  As the Board imposed this limitation 
on itself, it is not too much to require that the necessary finding be made in 
this particular circumstance so that the Court can determine if the Board acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously, or whether it instead acted reasonably and 
followed its own rules. See Sierra Club v. Johnson, 
436 F.3d 1269, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2006) (reversing and remanding an 
informal permit adjudication because the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
when it failed to abide by its own regulations); Northfork, 
¶ 27, 228 P.3d  at 848 (requiring administrative agencies to follow 
their own rules and regulations). 
 
[¶55]   
Contrary to the Board’s assertions, the project’s compliance with 
applicable portions of the Teton County Comprehensive Plan is also irrelevant to 
the issue presented here.  Findings on the project’s general 
compatibility with the Comprehensive Plan are no substitute for the specific 
findings required by the county’s own land development regulations.  
Ford v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Converse 
Cnty., 924 P.2d 91, 95 (Wyo. 1996) (“A comprehensive plan 
should not be confused with, or used as a substitute for, comprehensive zoning, 
nor may a comprehensive plan be equated with comprehensive zoning in legal 
significance.”).
 
[¶56]   
We conclude that the Board did not make the 
necessary finding that it had been “demonstrated that the location proposed will 
improve scenic views and lessen adverse environmental impacts” pursuant 
to LDR § 2560.A.1.f.(2), and this lack of necessary 
findings renders the record insufficient to permit 
judicial review. See Olivas, ¶¶ 17-19, 130 P.3d  at 
485-86 (describing how an agency’s failure to make basic findings of fact on 
material issues inhibits any kind of meaningful judicial review). See 
also Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2529-30, 
168 L. Ed. 2d 467 (2007) (holding an agency’s decisions are arbitrary 
and capricious if it fails to consider an important aspect of the problem); 
Perry v. United Food & Commercial Workers Dist. Unions 405 & 442, 
64 F.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining how the 
arbitrariness standard ensures that reasoned explanation supports agencies’ 
final decisions).  
 
[¶57]   
On remand, the Board must make findings as to whether or not the proposed 
location and density improves scenic views and lessens adverse environmental 
impacts.  See Ezbery v. City of Sheridan, 
982 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Wyo. 1999) (“In cases where the findings do not 
adequately explain the rationale for the agency’s decision, we remand the matter 
to the agency so that it can make additional findings.”); 33 Wright & 
Koch, supra, § 8372, at 289 (“Where a court finds 
that the agency factfinding is inadequate but that the agency has 
the procedural authority to correct the inadequacy then the court’s proper 
function is to return the matter to the agency with instructions as to how to 
correct the inadequacy.”). In reaching this conclusion, we must emphasize that 
not every informal agency adjudication must be supported by specific findings 
when reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard. This opinion decides 
only that those findings must be made when they are required by an agency 
regulation.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶58]   
For the reasons stated above, we remand the matter to the district court 
with instructions to further remand to the Board to decide whether or not the 
record before it supports findings required by LDR § 
2560.A.1.f.  We affirm the district court as to all 
other issues presented by this appeal.
 
FOOTNOTES
1Teton County conducts a two-stage review of 
development applications such as the one involved in this case. The Planning 
Commission conducts an initial review of development applications, holds a 
public meeting on these applications, and submits its recommendations to the 
Board of County Commissioners (the Board). The Board has the power to hear, 
consider, and grant or deny development applications. See Bd. of 
Cnty. Commr’s of Teton Cnty. v. Teton Cnty. 
Youth Servs., Inc., 652 P.2d 400, 402 (Wyo. 1982) 
(explaining the general county planning and permit process); Teton County 
LDRs, supra, at §§ 5010, 5020 (defining the Board and Planning 
Commission’s respective roles and decision-making authority).
2In Board of Trustees of Memorial Hospital of 
Sheridan County v. Martin, 2003 WY 1, ¶ 16,  
60 P.3d 1273, 1277 (Wyo. 2003), we held that a district court 
order remanding a case to a county hospital for further proceedings was not an 
appealable order under Wyoming Rule of Appellate Procedure 1.05.  
In this case, the remand was to be for a minor correction which the Board 
immediately made, and we therefore reach the merits.  

3It is 
unclear from the available record what the “FAR” acronym stands for. However, 
the New York City Department of City Planning provides a helpful description of 
this term:
 
The floor area ratio is 
the principal bulk regulation controlling the size of buildings. FAR is the 
ratio of total building floor area to the area of its zoning lot. Each zoning 
district has an FAR which, when multiplied by the lot area of the zoning lot, 
produces the maximum amount of floor area allowable on that zoning lot. For 
example, on a 10,000 square foot zoning lot in a district with a maximum FAR of 
1.0, the floor area on the zoning lot cannot exceed 10,000 square 
feet.
 
New York City Department 
of City Planning , Zoning Glossary, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/ glossary.shtml (last visited 
Dec. 17, 2012).
4The order was 
treated as having the force of a regulation.  
5Whether a requirement that an agency must only 
consider scenic views and environmental impacts would obligate it to make a 
specific finding is an issue not before us in this case.