Case Title: State v. Shonna Hobson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP000914-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-05-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-0914-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Shonna Hobson,  
 
Defendant-Respondent.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 27, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
December 15, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit  
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
James Welker 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. (Opinion filed) 
 
 
BABLITCH, J., (Opinion filed) 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins 
 
 
GESKE, J., (Opinion filed) 
 
 
STEINMETZ and WILCOX, J., joins 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued 
by Gregory M. Posner-Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by 
Keith A. Findley, John A. Pray and University of Wisconsin Law 
School, Madison and oral argument by Keith A. Findley. 
 
 
 
Amicus Curiae was filed by Suzanne Hagopian, 
assistant state public defender, Madison, for the Office of the 
State Public Defender. 
 
 
 
Amicus Curiae was filed by Dean A. Strang and 
Fitzgerald & Strang, S.C., Milwaukee for the Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Shonna Hobson, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 27, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Rock County, 
James E. Welker, Judge.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.   The question certified to this 
court is whether Wisconsin recognizes a common law right to 
forcibly resist an unlawful arrest.  In this case, the State 
does not challenge the circuit court's determination that Beloit 
police officers lacked probable cause to arrest the mother of a 
five-year-old boy after she refused to allow officers to speak 
to her son about a stolen bicycle.  When the officers decided to 
arrest the mother for obstruction of an officer, the mother 
resisted and struck one of the officers.  This action resulted 
in her arrest for an additional charge of battery to a peace 
officer.  On certification the State, while denying that a 
common law privilege to forcibly resist an unlawful arrest has 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
2 
ever existed in Wisconsin, asks us to abrogate1 that privilege 
and also seeks reversal of the order dismissing the battery 
charge.  
¶2 
We conclude, based on the common law in this state, 
that Wisconsin has recognized a privilege to forcibly resist an 
unlawful arrest in the absence of unreasonable force.  However, 
based upon public policy, we now decide to abrogate that common 
law 
affirmative 
defense. 
 
Our 
decision 
to 
abrogate 
has 
prospective application only.  We therefore affirm the order of 
the circuit court dismissing the battery charge against Ms. 
Hobson. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. Facts underlying charges of obstruction and disorderly 
conduct 
 
¶3 
The facts recited herein are taken from the complaint 
and testimony at the hearing on the motion to dismiss.  The 
defendant, Ms. Shonna Hobson was the mother of a five-year-old 
boy.  On July 31, 1995, a member of the Beloit Police 
Department, Officer Nathan Shoate, went to a home address to 
interview a child suspected in a bike theft.  Another juvenile 
had reported to Officer Shoate that he had seen Ms. Hobson's son 
riding the juvenile's sister's stolen bicycle.  When Officer 
Shoate reached the address reported by the juvenile, he saw Ms. 
                     
1 To 'abrogate' is defined as "To annul, cancel, revoke, 
repeal, or destroy."  Black's Law Dictionary 8 (6th ed. 1990).  
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
3 
Hobson's son near a bicycle.  When the officer got out of his 
car, he saw Ms. Hobson's son run upstairs.  
¶4 
The juvenile who had reported the theft was in Officer 
Shoate's car at the time.  The juvenile pointed out Ms. Hobson's 
son as the person he had seen on the stolen bicycle.  Officer 
Shoate met Ms. Hobson at her home, and told her that her son was 
suspected in a bike theft.  Specifically, the officer told Ms. 
Hobson that her son was seen on a stolen bike and that the 
officer would need to talk to the boy about where the boy got 
the bike.  
¶5 
Ms. Hobson told her son to go in the house.  She then 
told Officer Shoate that her son was not on a bicycle, and that 
he had his own bike.  Ms. Hobson, according to the officer, 
became a bit irritated, and refused to allow Officer Shoate to 
speak with her son.  She said that her son did not do anything, 
and had not stolen any bike.  Officer Shoate then told Ms. 
Hobson that he would have to take her son to the police station 
to be interviewed about the stolen bicycle, and gave Ms. Hobson 
the opportunity to go along to the station. She replied that the 
officer was not taking her son anywhere. 
¶6 
At that point in the conversation, because of Ms. 
Hobson's resistance, Officer Shoate called for backup police 
officers to assist him.   Shortly thereafter, Officers Eastlick, 
Anderson and Alisankus arrived at the Hobson address.  According 
to Officer Eastlick's report, when the three backup officers 
arrived Ms. Hobson was standing with her son on the front steps 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
4 
of her residence yelling, swearing and saying "bullshit" in a 
very loud voice.  Officer Shoate then repeated to Ms. Hobson 
that they had to take her son to the police station, to which 
Ms. Hobson again replied "You aren't taking my son anywhere."  
Officer Shoate then advised Ms. Hobson that she was under arrest 
for obstructing an officer. 
2.  Facts giving rise to charge of resisting an officer 
¶7 
Officers Eastlick and Alisankus proceeded to attempt 
to handcuff Ms. Hobson.  When Officer Eastlick tried to take 
hold of Ms. Hobson's arm and advise her that she was under 
arrest, Ms. Hobson pushed the officer away.  Ms. Hobson became 
combative and struck Officer Alisankus across the face.  Ms. 
Hobson then was taken to the ground by other officers.  Both 
Officers Shoate and Eastlick reported that once she was on the 
ground, Ms. Hobson continued to fight with Officer Alisankus and 
kicked at Officer Eastlick.  
3. Facts giving rise to charge of resisting arrest and 
battery to a peace officer 
 
¶8 
On August 1, 1995, Ms. Hobson was charged with 
obstructing an officer, disorderly conduct, and resisting an 
officer.2   In an amended complaint filed August 15, 1995, the 
prosecutor added a fourth count.  The amended complaint also 
charged Ms. Hobson with the felony of causing intentional bodily 
                     
2 The charges in the complaint alleged violation of Wis. 
Stat. §§  946.41(1) and 947.01 (1995-96).  All future statutory 
references will be to the 1995-96 volume, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
5 
harm (battery) to a peace officer.3  The amended complaint 
included a report by Officer Alisankus, stating that he assisted 
other officers in arresting Ms. Hobson for obstructing at her 
residence.  He reported that Officer Shoate advised Ms. Hobson 
that she was under arrest for obstructing, and that Officer 
Eastlick then attempted to take Ms. Hobson into custody.  Ms. 
Hobson then forcibly pulled her arm away from Officer Eastlick, 
stating "let me go."  Officer Alisankus then took Ms. Hobson's 
right hand and wrist in an effort to apply a compliance hold.4  
At that point Ms. Hobson began to struggle and tried to pull 
away from Officer Alisankus.  Ms. Hobson successfully pulled 
away and then began to swing her fist and kick at Officer 
Alisankus.  Ms. Hobson's fist struck Officer Alisankus on the 
left cheek.  Ms. Hobson also kicked Officer Alisankus in the 
left leg and right forearm.  Officer Alisankus was later treated 
at Beloit Memorial Hospital for injuries sustained during this 
incident. 
4. Motions to the circuit court 
¶9 
At the preliminary hearing on August 23, 1995, defense 
counsel for Ms. Hobson moved to dismiss the obstructing and 
resisting counts of the amended complaint.  The circuit court 
determined at the preliminary examination that there was 
                     
3 The battery charge of the amended complaint alleged a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.20(2).  
4 As Officer Alisankus described a compliance hold, it 
involves locking the individual's elbow and pushing down on the 
wrist while putting pressure on the fingers. 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
6 
probable cause to arrest Ms. Hobson, and bound her over for the 
filing of an information.5  See Wis. Stat. § 970.03.  On that 
same day, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss the amended 
complaint in its entirety for lack of personal jurisdiction, and 
alternatively to suppress evidence arising from Ms. Hobson's 
arrest.  Defense counsel requested an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether Ms. Hobson had been brought before the court 
as the result of an unlawful arrest.   
¶10 On January 2, 1996 the circuit court conducted an 
evidentiary hearing on the motions to dismiss and suppress.  The 
court dismissed the obstructing and resisting counts, finding no 
probable cause for Ms. Hobson's arrest.  The circuit court also 
concluded that Ms. Hobson had a common law privilege to forcibly 
resist her arrest.  In the circuit court's view, a "superior 
social policy is advanced by a rule which modifies the common 
law rule so as to not permit resistance to an unlawful arrest 
unless the health or safety of the individual or a member of his 
or her family is threatened in a way that is not susceptible of 
cure later in a court room."  The circuit court also held that 
Ms. Hobson's actions stemming from the unlawful arrest were 
caused by the police.  The circuit court concluded that the 
battery charge was incident to the unlawful arrest, and that Ms. 
Hobson had no intent to assault an officer, but that the police 
                     
5 Subsequently, the information was filed on August 29, 
1995.  Two days later, the circuit court entered a plea of not 
guilty on all counts on behalf of the defendant, and vacated the 
warrant against Ms. Hobson. 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
7 
officer assaulted her.6  The circuit court then dismissed the 
entire complaint.7  The State appealed8 only the dismissal of the 
battery charge. 
¶11 This court is faced with two questions.  First, we 
must ascertain whether a common law privilege to forcibly resist 
unlawful arrest, in the absence of unreasonable force, has 
                     
6 Although the circuit court found that the officers used 
physical force against Ms. Hobson, the circuit court did not 
find that the officers used unreasonable force.  
7 At the outset, we underscore the unusual procedural 
history of this case.  As amicus curiae Wisconsin Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers puts it, "Ordinarily, of course, self-
defense would be played out at trial and decided there."  Amicus 
Brief at 8 n.1.  Before trial Ms. Hobson moved to dismiss the 
criminal complaint against her.  Such a motion is authorized by 
Wis. Stat. § 971.31(2). See also Lampkins v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 
564, 570, 187 N.W.2d 164 (1971).  Some evidence was taken at the 
hearing on Ms. Hobson’s motion.  Based on that evidence, the 
State, as appellant, has declined to challenge the circuit 
court's order for dismissal due to a lack of probable cause to 
arrest 
Ms. 
Hobson 
for 
disorderly 
conduct, 
resisting 
and 
obstructing.  The State only seeks reversal of the order 
dismissing the battery charge.  Simultaneously, the State asks 
us to abrogate the common law privilege to forcibly resist 
unlawful arrest.  In light of our decision to abrogate that 
privilege prospectively, Ms. Hobson was entitled to invoke the 
privilege in this case.  Her act of resistance cannot both be 
lawful resistance and form the basis for a separate battery 
charge.  Our conclusion in this case is limited to the narrow 
and peculiar procedural facts presented. Our decision does not 
authorize citizens faced with arrest to invoke other affirmative 
defenses in pretrial motions.  See, e.g., State v. Mendoza, 80 
Wis. 2d 122, 153-54, 258 N.W.2d 260 (1977) (ruling that when a 
reasonable construction of the evidence will support a theory 
that the defendant properly acted in self-defense to resist the 
use of unreasonable force by an arresting officer, the question 
goes to the jury); State v. Kuta, 68 Wis. 2d 641, 649, 229 
N.W.2d 580 (1975) (concluding that whether conduct is privileged 
is a question of fact to be resolved by a jury).   
8 The State filed its appeal pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.05(1)(a).  
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
8 
existed in Wisconsin until now.  Second, if that privilege 
exists, we must decide whether public policy is best served by 
continuing to recognize that privilege, or by abrogating it. 
II. ORIGIN OF COMMON LAW PRIVILEGE TO RESIST UNLAWFUL 
ARREST 
¶12 The nature and scope of a common law privilege is a 
question of law which this court reviews de novo.  See generally 
Kensington Development v. Israel, 142 Wis. 2d 894, 899-900, 419 
N.W.2d 241 (1988); State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 
(1974).  Our review discloses that over its 400 year history, 
the nature and scope of this particular privilege has expanded 
and 
contracted 
based 
on 
prevailing 
legal 
and 
societal 
conditions. 
¶13 Article XIV, section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
preserves the English common law in the condition in which it 
existed at the time of the American Revolution until modified or 
abrogated.9  See State v. Boehm, 127 Wis. 2d 351, 356 n.2, 379 
N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1985); see also, Davison v. St. Paul Fire 
and Marine Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 2d 190, 201, 248 N.W.2d 433 (1977). 
¶14 Ms. Hobson and  amicus curiae Wisconsin Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers (WACDL) and the State Public Defender 
                     
9 Art. XIV of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: 
Common law continued in force.  SECTION 13. Such parts 
of the common law as are now in force in the territory 
of Wisconsin, not inconsistent with this constitution, 
shall be and continue part of the law of this state 
until 
altered 
or 
suspended 
by 
the 
legislature. 
(Emphasis added). 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
9 
make numerous citations to an article by Professor Paul G. 
Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 Yale L.J. 
1128 (1969).  Professor Chevigny's article traces the history of 
the English common law privilege and its adoption in this 
country.  See id. at 1129-32.  The English common law right to 
forcibly resist unlawful arrest appeared in reported decisions 
as early as the 17th century.  See Rodgers v. State, 373 A.2d 
944, 947 (Md. Ct. App.) (1977).  As we explain more fully below, 
the privilege originally was part of the right to resist any 
unlawful official process.  Action by an official exceeding his 
lawful authority constituted a trespass and a provocation, and 
could be resisted by physical force.  See Right to Resist, 78 
Yale L.J. at 1129.  If a person committed a battery against an 
officer when resisting arrest, it was a defense to criminal 
prosecution that the arrest was unlawful.  If a person killed an 
officer when resisting arrest, it was a partial defense to 
criminal prosecution that the arrest was unlawful; murder was 
mitigated to manslaughter.  See id. 
¶15 For a time, the privilege to forcibly resist unlawful 
arrest accrued not only to the subject of the arrest, but also 
to anyone who assisted him or her.  In one 17th century case, a 
constable illegally attempted to impress a man into the army.  
See Hopkin Huggett's Case, 84 Eng. Rep. 1082 (K.B. 1666).  The 
man initially offered no resistance, but others came to his aid 
and killed the constable.  As Ms. Hobson notes in her brief, the 
majority of the Hopkin court initially concluded that the crime 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
10
committed in the course of the rescue was manslaughter, not 
murder: 
if a man be unduly arrested or restrained of his 
liberty by three men, altho' he be quiet himself, and 
do not endeavour any rescue, yet this is a provocation 
to all other men of England, not only his friends but 
strangers also for common humanity sake, as my Lord 
Bridgman said, to endeavour his rescue[.] 
 
On certiorari it appears, however, that the Hopkin judges agreed 
that the defendant had committed murder, but also agreed to 
reduce his sentence from execution to one more consistent with 
manslaughter.  See Hopkin, 84 Eng. Rep. at 1083. 
¶16 Almost 50 years later the English court decided a 
seminal case on the privilege to resist unlawful arrest.  A 
constable tried to arrest a woman because she was suspected of 
acting disorderly at some time in the past, although she was not 
acting disorderly at the time of her attempted arrest.  See The 
Queen v. Tooley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349, (K.B. 
1710).  Strangers who had not seen the unlawful arrest came to 
assist the woman and killed the constable.  At that time, a 
person who killed another without provocation was guilty of 
murder, but if provocation existed, the crime was manslaughter. 
 The Tooley court reduced the charge against the strangers from 
murder to manslaughter, reasoning: 
a man ought to be concerned for Magna Charta and the 
laws; and if any one against the law imprison a man, 
he is an offender against Magna Charta.  We seven hold 
this to be sufficient provocation, and we have good 
authority for it: in Hopkin Huggett's case . . . (and 
this case is stronger than that). 
92 Eng. Rep. at 353. 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
11
¶17 Reexamining Tooley just last year, the supreme court 
of Washington offered this perspective:   
 
The important point to note is that Tooley is not 
about Mistress Anne Dekins' right to resist her 
unlawful arrest.  It is about the right of others, 
strangers, to resist her unlawful arrest.  The 
"provocation" the Tooley court spoke of was not the 
provocation 
of 
Mistress 
Dekins. 
 
It 
was 
the 
provocation of the three strangers at seeing someone 
unlawfully imprisoned, and whether that provocation 
provided sufficient reason to reduce their conviction 
from murder to manslaughter.  Nevertheless, the Tooley 
rule has come down to us as a rule permitting an 
arrestee to use the necessary force (but no more) to 
resist an unlawful arrest. 
State v. Valentine, 935 P.2d 1294, 1300 (Wash. 1997)(footnote 
omitted). 
¶18 As Professor Chevigny traces it, the English rule that 
eventually emerged was that facially valid legal process must be 
obeyed.  See Right to Resist, 78 Yale L.J. at 1131.  Patently 
unlawful 
legal process, 
on 
the other 
hand, 
was such a 
provocation that it gave rise to a privilege to forcibly resist. 
 See id. 
III. FROM THE ENGLISH RULE TO THE AMERICAN RULE 
¶19 American courts adopted the English common law rule 
that unlawful arrest was a justified provocation to resist with 
physical force.10  American common law broadly recognized a 
                     
10 Professor Chevigny notes that by adopting the English 
common law rule permitting forcible resistance to unlawful 
arrest, 
the 
American 
courts 
also 
imported 
the 
doctrinal 
difficulties in distinguishing patently unlawful arrests from 
arrests flawed by mere technical deficiencies.  See Right to 
Resist, 78 Yale L.J. at 1131-32.  Several early cases reflect 
this dilemma.  See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 28 F. Cas. 
89, 90  (C.C.D.C. 1823) (No. 16,484) (warrant signed in pencil, 
alleging act outside the signing magistrate's jurisdiction); 
United States v. Goure, 25 F. Cas. 1381 (C.C.D.C. 1834) (No. 
15,240) (no warrant). 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
12
privilege to forcibly resist an unlawful arrest throughout the 
19th and 20th centuries.  As identified by the United States 
Supreme Court, the American version had the same contours as the 
English version.  See Brown v. United States, 159 U.S. 100, 102-
03 (1895).  The Court considered it reversible error for a trial 
court to fail to instruct a jury that the privilege to forcibly 
resist an unlawful arrest could mitigate murder to manslaughter, 
based on all the circumstances at the time of the killing.  Five 
years after Brown, the Supreme Court reiterated that the 
privilege not only mitigated murder to manslaughter, but also 
could merit acquittal: 
 
At common law, if a party resisted arrest by an 
officer without warrant, and who had no right to 
arrest him, and if in the course of that resistance 
the officer was killed, the offence of the party 
resisting arrest would be reduced from what would have 
been murder, if the officer had had the right to 
arrest, to manslaughter. . . . If the officer have no 
right to arrest, the other party might resist the 
illegal attempt to arrest him, using no more force 
than was absolutely necessary to repel the assault 
constituting the attempt to arrest. . . . What might 
be murder in the first case might be nothing more than 
manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show 
that no offence had been committed. 
John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 535, 537-38 (1900). 
 The court concluded that there was no authority for a 
warrantless arrest on a misdemeanor charge.  See id. at 535.  
Because the jury was improperly instructed in that regard, the 
conviction was reversed and the case remanded.  
¶20 Midway through the 20th century, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed that "[o]ne has an undoubted right to resist an 
                                                                  
 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
13
unlawful arrest, and courts will uphold the right of resistance 
in proper cases."  United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 594 
(1948).11   
 
IV.  WISCONSIN LAW AND THE PRIVILEGE TO FORCIBLY RESIST AN 
UNLAWFUL ARREST 
¶21 We first consider whether, with the adoption of the 
state constitution, Wisconsin recognized a privilege to forcibly 
resist an unlawful arrest.  As noted above, article XIV, section 
13 of the Wisconsin Constitution preserves the English common 
law as it existed at the time of the American Revolution until 
modified or abrogated.  We agree with Ms. Hobson that the common 
law privilege to forcibly resist unlawful arrest is no exception 
to this constitutional mandate.  We conclude that Wisconsin has 
recognized this privilege since achieving statehood. 
¶22 Next we consider whether the legislature has modified 
or abrogated this privilege.  Ms. Hobson makes a limited 
statutory argument on which to ground this privilege.  She first 
cites Wis. Stat. § 939.48, the current version of the statute 
recognizing the privilege of self-defense and defense of 
others.12  At oral argument, Ms. Hobson’s counsel argued that the 
                     
11 Responding to the prosecution's attempt to prove probable 
cause for a warrantless arrest by virtue of the arrestee's lack 
of protest, the Di Re Court held that ". . . Probable cause 
cannot be found from submissiveness, and the presumption of 
innocence is not lost or impaired by neglect to argue with a 
policeman."  United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 594-95 
(1948).  
12 Wis. Stat. § 939.48 Self-defense and defense of 
others. (1) A person is privileged to threaten or 
intentionally 
use 
force 
against 
another 
for the 
purpose of preventing or terminating what the person 
reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference 
with his or her person by such other person.  The 
actor may intentionally use only such force or threat 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
14
privilege to resist an unlawful arrest is a “subspecies” of the 
statutory privilege of self-defense.  She argued that Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.1013 also protects the common law privilege to forcibly 
resist an unlawful arrest, and based on Wis. Stat. § 939.45(6),14 
Ms. Hobson's privileged conduct is a defense to any prosecution 
based on her conduct.  We disagree that the legislature, by 
expressly codifying several defenses, has also codified the 
privilege to forcibly resist an unlawful arrest in the absence 
of unreasonable force.  
                                                                  
thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary 
to prevent or terminate the interference.  The actor 
may not intentionally use force which is intended or 
likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the 
actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary 
to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to 
himself or herself.  
. . . 
(4) A person is privileged to defend a third person 
from real or apparent unlawful interference by another 
under the same conditions and by the same means as 
those under and by which the person is privileged to 
defend himself or herself from real or apparent 
unlawful 
interference, 
provided 
that 
the 
person 
reasonably believes that the facts are such that the 
third person would be privileged to act in self-
defense 
and 
that 
the 
person's 
intervention 
is 
necessary for the protection of the third person. 
 
13 Wis. Stat. §  939.10 Common-law crimes abolished; common-
law rules preserved. Common-law crimes are abolished.  The 
common-law rules of criminal law not in conflict with chs. 939 
to 951 are preserved.  
14 Wis. Stat. § 939.45 Privilege.  The fact that an actor's 
conduct is privileged, although otherwise criminal, is a defense 
to prosecution for any crime based on that conduct.  The defense 
of privilege can be claimed under any of the following 
circumstances: 
(6) When for any other reason the actor's conduct is 
privileged by the statutory or common law of this state. 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
15
¶23 Indeed, our early statutes did not codify the common 
law right to resist an unlawful deprivation of liberty in the 
absence of unreasonable force.  In statutes enacted shortly 
after Wisconsin achieved statehood, the legislature recognized 
that 
a 
homicide 
would 
be 
justifiable, 
excusable, 
or 
manslaughter, if committed in self-defense as resistance to 
actual or perceived attempted murder, great personal injury or 
the commission of a felony against that person.15  Cases 
interpreting 
the 
early 
statutory 
self-defense 
privilege 
distinguish that privilege from one justifying the right to 
resist an unlawful arrest.  See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 133 
Wis. 601, 615, 114 N.W. 112 (1907) (construing sec. 4366, Rev. 
Stat. (1898) and concluding that it was not prejudicial error to 
charge that an ordinary arrest without violence, although a 
restraint 
of 
liberty, 
is 
not 
the 
great 
personal 
injury 
contemplated by the statute in the resisting of which one may be 
justified in committing homicide, whether the attempted arrest 
was legal or not); see also Imperio v. State, 153 Wis. 455, 459, 
141 N.W. 241 (1913)(without directly referring to statute, court 
                     
15 Chapter 133, Rev. Stats. (1849) provided:  Sec. 5.  Such 
homicide is also justifiable, when committed by any person, in 
either of the following cases: 
  1. When resisting any attempt to murder such person, 
or to commit any felony upon him or her, or upon or in 
any dwelling house, in which such person shall be; or, 
  2. When committed in the lawful defence of such 
person, or of his or her husband, wife, parent, child, 
master, mistress, or servant, when there shall be a 
reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a 
felony, or to do some great personal injury, and there 
shall 
be 
imminent 
damage 
of 
such 
design 
being 
accomplished: or . . . . 
  
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
16
concluded that an officer's conduct, although not technically 
correct in arresting without a warrant, did not justify or 
excuse homicide by defendants in their attempt to escape, when 
the defendants knew the officer's official capacity). 
¶24 Nor has the current version of the self-defense 
statute codified the common law privilege to forcibly resist an 
unlawful arrest.  None of the published opinions applying the 
current self-defense statute 
includes 
an unlawful arrest, 
without unreasonable force, within the statutory term "unlawful 
interference with his or her person."16  Instead, those cases 
uniformly concern the actual or perceived threat of physical 
harm as the "unlawful interference" with the person asserting 
the privilege.  For example, in Maichle v. Jonovic, 69 Wis. 2d 
622, 627, 230 N.W.2d 789 (1975), this court confirmed that "it 
is crucial to the defense (of self-defense) that the actor had a 
reasonable belief that his life was in danger or that he was 
                     
16 Other cases applying Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1) all concern 
an unlawful interference with the person that was allegedly 
forceful.  See, e.g., State v. Camacho, 176 Wis. 2d 860, 501 
N.W.2d 380 (1993)(defendant claimed deputy grabbed his hair and 
pointed gun in defendant's face); State v. Daniels, 160 Wis. 2d 
85, 465 N.W.2d 633 (1991) (defendant, victim and two others in 
an altercation, victim allegedly threatened defendant who shot 
him with victim's own gun); State v. Jones, 147 Wis. 2d 806, 434 
N.W.2d 380 (1989) (victim hit and threatened several family 
members, pushed defendant down steps, then came toward defendant 
and took a swing while defendant held a knife); State v. Gomaz, 
141 Wis. 2d 302, 414 N.W.2d 626 (1987) (victim had beaten 
defendant the day before the stabbing; victim then approached 
her with hands stretched toward her neck); State v. Giwosky, 109 
Wis. 2d 446, 326 N.W.2d 232 (1982) (argument, followed by 
physical struggle between the victim and the defendant, and the 
approach of the victim's friend); Walker v. State, 99 Wis. 2d 
687, 299 N.W.2d 861 (1981) (victim pulled a gun on defendant); 
Werner v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 736, 226 N.W.2d 402 (1975) (victim 
pushed defendant; defendant fell; altercation ensued).   
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
17
likely to suffer bodily harm."  In another opinion, this court 
recognized that "the privilege of self-defense rests upon the 
need to allow a person to protect himself or herself or another 
from real or perceived harm when there is no time to resort to 
the law for protection."  State v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 44, 318 
N.W.2d 370 (1982).  In that case, the defendant violated the 
traffic speed limit statute because of what he perceived to be 
threatening driving by the operator of another vehicle, which 
turned out to be an unmarked police car.  The Brown court held 
that if the law enforcement officer's conduct caused the actor 
reasonably to believe that violating the law was the only means 
of preventing bodily harm to the actor or another, the actor 
could claim the defense of legal justification.17 
¶25 Finally, we consider whether the privilege to resist 
an unlawful arrest has been modified or abrogated by our own 
common or judge-made law.  One month after the United States 
Supreme Court decided Di Re, the privilege to resist unlawful 
arrest was first mentioned by the Wisconsin courts in State v. 
                     
17 The 
chief 
justice's 
concurrence 
contends 
that 
our 
reasoning is inconsistent because this opinion does not abrogate 
a person's common law right to use force when resisting an 
arrest in which a law enforcement officer uses unreasonable 
force.  See Abrahamson concurring op. at 6. However, we 
discussed in the preceding pages Ms. Hobson's argument that the 
right she asserts is a "subspecies of the statutory privilege of 
self-defense."  (Emphasis added.)  We ultimately conclude that 
the legislature codified a right to self-defense distinguishable 
from the right to resist an unlawful arrest.  The chief 
justice's concurrence asserts that our holding should encompass 
those 
situations 
in 
which 
the 
arresting 
officer 
uses 
unreasonable force.  See Abrahamson concurring op. at 7.  
Neither of the parties have asked this court to invalidate the 
statutory right to self-defense.  We see no need to consider 
that question. 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
18
Gibbs, 252 Wis. 227, 31 N.W.2d 143 (1948).  The Gibbs court 
referred to the privilege in passing, while directly addressing 
the question of whether an officer, without a warrant, has cause 
to arrest a person merely because that individual refuses to 
consent to a search of his person.  As part of that discussion, 
the court favorably cited Di Re for the "undoubted right to 
resist an unlawful arrest."  Gibbs, 252 Wis. at 234.  The 
primary issue confronting the Gibbs court was the reverse of 
that posed to the Di Re court.  Neither case answers the 
question of whether Wisconsin common law has modified or 
abrogated the privilege to resist an unlawful arrest.  
¶26 The privilege to forcibly resist unlawful arrest in 
the absence of unreasonable force was again mentioned, but not 
modified or abrogated, in State v. Reinwand, 147 Wis. 2d 192, 
433 N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1988).  There, the court's discussion 
recognized an ongoing contraction in the common law privilege to 
resist an unlawful arrest: 
 
[s]ince Mendoza [State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 122, 258 
N.W.2d 260 (1977), where the defendant claimed self-
defense in resisting a police officer's alleged use of 
excessive force], there has been a trend toward 
limiting the common law right to resist an unlawful 
arrest.  By 1984, seventeen states had done so by 
statute or supreme court decision, and several federal 
appellate 
courts 
generally 
deny 
such 
a 
right  
[citation omitted]. But whatever may be the status of 
the privilege in Wisconsin today, we need not decide 
that issue, for the evidence in this case was 
insufficient to justify submitting any instruction on 
self-defense. 
Id. at 199-200. 
 
¶27 Reinwand implicitly addressed the statutory right of 
self-defense, as described above. Id. at 200.  Reinwand relied 
on Mendoza, which analyzed Wis. Stat. § 939.48.  As recognized 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
19
in Reinwand, self-defense codified in § 939.48, is separate from 
the common law right to forcibly resist an unlawful arrest.  A 
citation by the Reinwand court to a New Jersey supreme court 
decision suggests that the common law privilege to resist an 
unlawful arrest had already been abrogated.18  But that citation, 
without more, is not controlling. 
¶28 While Wisconsin courts have mentioned the right to 
forcibly resist an unlawful arrest, they have not had the 
opportunity to apply it to circumstances as presented by the 
case at bar.  The State argues that because no state case law 
directly adopts this privilege, the common law right to violent 
self-help has not existed in Wisconsin.  We disagree, and 
conclude that the common law privilege has existed in Wisconsin, 
by virtue of article XIV, § 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
until today. 
¶29 Nothing in our statutes or case law demonstrates that 
this common law privilege has been, until now, modified or 
                     
18 The court in State v. Reinwand, 147 Wis. 2d 192, 201, 433 
N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1988), included the following quotation in 
its opinion: 
"Despite his [or her] duty to submit quietly without 
physical resistance to an arrest made by an officer 
acting in the course of his [or her] duty, even though 
the arrest is illegal, his [or her] right to freedom 
from unreasonable seizure and confinement can be 
protected, 
restored 
and 
vindicated 
through 
legal 
processes.  . . Simply stated, the law recognizes that 
liberty can be restored through legal processes but 
life or limb cannot be repaired in a courtroom.  And 
so it holds that the reason for outlawing resistance 
to an unlawful arrest and requiring disputes over its 
legality 
to 
be 
resolved 
in 
the 
courts 
has 
no 
controlling application on the right to resist an 
officer's excessive force.  State v. Mulvihill, 270 
A.2d 277, 280 (N.J. 1970). 
 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
20
abrogated.  We agree with the State that this court may adopt or 
refuse to adopt such a privilege.  See State v. Esser, 16 
Wis. 2d 567, 581, 115 N.W.2d 505 (1962).  However, our judicial 
recognition of such a privilege only makes explicit what our 
state constitution has already generally incorporated. 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
¶30 Against this historical backdrop, we turn to the 
second question confronting us.  Is public policy best served by 
continuing to recognize the common law privilege to use physical 
force to resist an unlawful arrest, or by abrogating it?  "It 
has been said so often as to have become axiomatic that the 
common law is not immutable but flexible, and by its own 
principles adapts itself to varying conditions."  Dippel v. 
Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 457, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967), quoting Funk 
v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933). The State's brief 
quoted an earlier statement by this court, the common law is 
judge-made law, designed to accomplish the effectuation of 
recognized social policies within the framework of legal 
history.  When a rule of law thwarts social policy rather than 
promotes it, it is the obligation of a common-law court to undo 
or modify a rule that it has previously made. 
Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d at 15-16. 
 
¶31 Ms. Hobson urges that any change in the privilege to 
forcibly resist an unlawful arrest be left to the legislature.  
However, in other cases we have deemed it our responsibility to 
change a common law rule when we concluded that the change was 
necessary in the interest of justice.  This was true even though 
the legislature had failed to make the change.  See, e.g., 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
21
Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 29, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) 
(abrogating the principle of governmental immunity from tort 
claims);  Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 
N.W.2d 578 (1983) (adopting discovery rule for all tort actions 
other than those already governed by a legislatively created 
discovery rule).  As with the governmental immunity doctrine 
addressed in Holytz, we are satisfied that the privilege to 
forcibly resist an unlawful arrest has judicial origins.  See 
Holytz, 17 Wis. at 37.  The legal and societal developments 
since that right was first enunciated provide "compelling 
reasons" for us to conclude that it is now appropriate for this 
court to abolish that right, despite apparent legislative 
inaction.  See State v. Michels Pipeline Construction, Inc., 63 
Wis. 2d 278, 296, 219 N.W.2d 308 (1974) (instructing that where 
common law rules govern intentional conduct, changes should only 
be made for compelling reasons). 
¶32 Many other states have faced the question of whether 
to abrogate the right to forcibly resist an unlawful arrest, 
with varying results.  The overall trend has been toward 
abrogation of the right.19  Treatment of this issue by the 
                     
19  Eleven states have judicially abrogated the common law 
right to use physical force to resist an arrest which is 
unlawful but which does not utilize unreasonable force.  See 
Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421, 427 (Alaska 1969); State v. 
Hatton, 568 P.2d 1040, 1046 (Ariz. 1977); State v. Richardson, 
511 P.2d 263, 268 (Idaho 1973); State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 607, 
610-11 (Iowa 1978); State v. Austin, 381 A.2d 652, 655 (Me. 
1978); In re Welfare of Burns, 284 N.W.2d 359, 360 (Minn. 1979); 
State v. Nunes, 546 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); State 
v. Koonce, 214 A.2d 428, 436 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965); 
State v. Doe, 583 P.2d 473, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 583 
P.2d 464, 467 (N.M. 1978); State v. Peters, 450 A.2d 332, 335 
(Vt. 1982); State v. Valentine, 935 P.2d 1294, 1304 (Wash. 
1997). 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
22
American Law Institute represented a turning point in the 
evolution of this right.  After significant debate, the A.L.I. 
in 1958 promulgated a version of the Model Penal Code abrogating 
the right, and declaring "[t]he use of force is not justifiable 
. . . to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by 
a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful."  Model Penal 
Code §  3.04(2)(a)(i) (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1958).  The A.L.I. 
comment in support of this section asserts that it "should be 
possible to provide adequate remedies against illegal arrest, 
without permitting the arrested person to resort to forcea 
course of action highly likely to result in greater injury even 
to himself than the detention (citation omitted)."  Model Penal 
Code §  3.04(2)(a)(i) at 19 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1958).  
Judge 
Learned 
Hand 
succinctly 
characterized 
the 
risk 
of 
continuing the right: 
 
[t]he idea that you may resist peaceful arrest . . . 
because you are in debate about whether it is lawful 
or not, instead of going to the authorities which can 
determine [lawfulness], . . . [is] not a blow for 
liberty but on the contrary, a blow for attempted 
anarchy. 
                                                                  
Seventeen other states have signaled their agreement by 
legislatively abrogating the common law defense.  See Ala. Code 
§ 13A-3-28 (1994); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-612 (Michie 1993); Cal. 
Penal Code § 834a (West 1985); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-103(2) 
(1990); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-23 (1985); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 
§ 464(d) (1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 776.051(1) (West 1992); Ill. 
Ann. Stat. ch. 720, para. 5/7-7 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Mont. Code 
Ann. 45-3-108 (1995); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409(2) (1995); N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 594:5 (1986); N.Y. Penal Law § 35.27 (McKinney 
1987); Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.260 (1990); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 505(b)(1)(i) (1983); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-10 (1994); S.D. 
Codified Laws Ann. § 22-11-5 (1988); Tex. Penal Code Ann. 
§ 9.31(b)(2), § 38.03 (West 1994). 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
23
1958 Proceedings, American Law Institute, at 254, quoted in 
Rodgers, 373 A.2d at 950-51. 
¶33 Courts and legislatures have terminated the right to 
forcibly resist unlawful arrest because legal and societal 
circumstances have changed dramatically since the inception of 
that right.  In the early development of the common law, 
physical resistance used to be an effective response to the 
problem of unlawful arrest.  There were few if any means of 
effective redress for unlawful arrest.  None of these reasons 
remains valid today.20 
 
[Our law regarding arrests] not only antedates the 
modern police department, but was developed largely 
during a period when most arrests were made by private 
citizens, 
when 
bail 
for 
felonies 
was 
usually 
unattainable, and when years might pass before the 
royal judges arrived for a jail delivery.  Further, 
conditions in the English jails were then such that a 
prisoner had an excellent chance of dying of disease 
before trial. [citation omitted].  Today, with few 
exceptions, arrests are made by police officers, not 
civilians. . . . When a citizen is arrested, his 
probable fate is neither bail nor jail, but release 
after a short detention in a police station. 
Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315 
(1942). 
¶34 The common law right to forcibly resist unlawful 
arrest 
developed 
out 
of 
necessity 
in 
response 
to 
those 
circumstances.  "The rule developed when long imprisonment, 
often without the opportunity of bail, 'goal (sic) fever', 
physical torture, and other great dangers were to be apprehended 
from arrest, whether legal or illegal."  Uniform Arrest Act, 28 
                     
20 It appears from the record that Ms. Hobson has filed a 
civil suit against the Beloit Police Department and the officers 
involved in this incident. 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
24
Va. L. Rev. at 330.  With those dire possibilities, and no 
viable judicial or administrative redress, forcibly resisting an 
unlawful arrest was the only effective option a citizen had.  
But circumstances have changed.  Unhealthy conditions in jails 
have decreased, while the physical risks of resisting arrest 
have increased. 
 
When the law of arrest developed, resistance to an 
arrest by a peace officer did not involve the serious 
dangers it does today.  Constables and watchmen were 
armed only with staves and swords, and the person to 
be apprehended might successfully hold them off with 
his own weapon and thus escape.  Today, every peace 
officer is armed with a pistol and has orders not to 
desist from making an arrest though there is forceful 
resistance. 
Id.  A California court described the change in circumstances 
more explicitly: 
 
In a day when police are armed with lethal and 
chemical weapons, and possess scientific communication 
and detection devices readily available for use, it 
has become highly unlikely that a suspect, using 
reasonable force, can escape from or effectively deter 
an 
arrest, 
whether 
lawful 
or 
unlawful. 
 
His 
accomplishment 
is 
generally 
limited 
to 
temporary 
evasion, merely rendering the officer's task more 
difficult  or prolonged. Thus self-help as a practical 
remedy is anachronistic, whatever may have been it 
original justification or efficacy in an era when the 
common law doctrine permitting resistance evolved. 
People v. Curtis, 450 P.2d 33, 36 (Cal. 1969). 
¶35 Not only is forcible resistance now a substantially 
less effective response to unlawful arrest, there are many 
safeguards and opportunities for redress.  No longer must 
individuals languish for years in disease-ridden jails.  Now, 
bail is available.  See generally Chapter 969, Wis. Stats.  No 
longer are individuals detained indefinitely on dubious charges. 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
25
 Now, prompt arraignment and determination of probable cause are 
mandated.  See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124-25 (1975); 
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991) 
(existence of probable cause must be reviewed within 48 hours). 
 No longer are individuals left to fend for themselves in the 
legal system.  Now, there is a right to counsel.  See Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970).  No longer must individuals 
violently resist to prevent the fruits of an unlawful arrest 
from being used to prosecute them.  Now, the exclusionary rule 
is in operation.  See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 
(1975); State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 240, 388 N.W.2d 601 
(1986).  No longer must unlawful police action go undetected or 
undeterred.  Now there are internal review and disciplinary 
procedures in police departments.  No longer must patterns of 
police misconduct go unchecked.  Now, civil remedies and 
injunctions are available.  See 42 U.S.C. §  1983.21 
¶36 The State Public Defender, in its amicus curiae brief, 
disputes the adequacy or efficacy of the safeguards described 
above.  Some of the Public Defender's arguments, however, are 
broad 
generalizations 
that 
illustrate 
why 
a 
bright 
line 
prohibition of citizen resistance to an unlawful arrest is 
                     
21 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides: 
Every 
person 
who, 
under 
color 
of 
any 
statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
or Territory or the district of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress.  
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
26
preferable.  For example, the Public Defender characterizes Ms. 
Hobson's 
resistance 
as 
a 
"measured 
response." 
 
That 
characterization may be apt in this case.  However, perpetuating 
the privilege to resist an unlawful arrest offers no guarantee 
that other resisting citizens will act in a measured fashion.  
The Public Defender acknowledges that a citizen may not resist 
with force "disproportionate to the effort made to take the 
individual into custody." John Bad Elk, 177 U.S. at 535.  But in 
arrest situations that are often ripe for rapid escalation, 
one's "measured" response may fast become excessive.  Our ruling 
today, abrogating the privilege, is a step toward deescalation.22 
¶37 Ms. Hobson disputes that the common law rule was 
founded because of "particular hazards of a primitive local 
jail," and instead suggests that the privilege emerged from a 
respect for personal liberty, and the idea that unlawful 
interference with such liberty was a provocation justifying 
                     
22 At oral argument, Ms. Hobson’s counsel also urged that we 
keep the privilege as modified by the circuit court.  The 
circuit court concluded that the blanket common law privilege to 
forcibly resist an unlawful arrest should be modified “so as to 
not permit resistance to an unlawful arrest unless the health or 
safety of the individual or a member of his or her family is 
threatened in a way that is not susceptible of cure later in a 
court room.”  Ms. Hobson’s counsel contended that adoption of 
the rule as modified by the circuit court would involve 
application 
of 
an 
“objectively 
reasonable 
standard.”  
Specifically, the fact-finder would have to determine whether 
the arrestee was reasonable in judging, at the moment of 
attempted arrest, that the threat to health or safety was not 
susceptible to a 
later 
legal cure. 
 
That 
standard, as 
articulated by Ms. Hobson's counsel, would also apply in 
assessing whether the arrestee used “reasonable force” to resist 
what he or she perceived to be an unlawful arrest.  We decline 
to maintain a modified privilege, because even in modified form 
the privilege runs counter to the public policy concerns 
identified herein. 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
27
reasonable resistance.  See Respondent's brief at 11.  For 
support, Ms. Hobson cites both Professor Chevigny's article, and 
the dissenting opinion in Valentine, 935 P.2d 1294.  In 
particular, Ms. Hobson quotes from the Chevigny article: "The 
freedom to refuse to obey a patently unlawful arrest is 
essential to the integrity of a government which purports to be 
one of laws, and not of men.  Unless it is desirable to kill the 
impulse to resist arbitrary authority, the rule that such an 
arrest is a provocation to resist must remain fundamental."  
Respondent's brief at 12, quoting Right to Resist, 78 Yale L.J. 
at 1147. 
¶38 This 
position 
is 
reminiscent 
of 
the 
position 
advocated, unsuccessfully, by petitioners in Walker v. City of 
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).  There, individuals asserted 
that 
they 
were 
free 
to 
disobey 
an 
injunction 
against 
participating in a mass street parade without a permit, because 
the ordinance on which the injunction was based had been 
administered in an arbitrary fashion.  See 388 U.S. at 317.  The 
petitioners failed to challenge the ordinance in court prior to 
disobeying it by publicly marching.  Violence ensued during one 
of the marches.  The petitioners were found in contempt.  The 
United States Supreme Court declined to hold that an injunction 
issued by a court with jurisdiction over the defendants was 
constitutionally impermissible: 
 
The rule of law that Alabama followed in this case 
reflects a belief that in the fair administration of 
justice no man can be judge in his own case, however 
exalted his station, however righteous his motives, 
and irrespective of his race, color, politics, or 
religion.  This Court cannot hold that the petitioners 
were 
constitutionally 
free 
to 
ignore 
all 
the 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
28
procedures of the law and carry their battle to the 
streets.  One may sympathize with the petitioners' 
impatient commitment to their cause.  But respect for 
judicial process is a small price to pay for the 
civilizing hand of law, which alone can give abiding 
meaning to constitutional freedom. 
Id. at 320-21.  Accordingly, an injunction arising under an 
arguably unlawful ordinance was not sufficient "provocation" to 
permit disregard of the injunction. 
¶39 In sum, the majority of jurisdictions has concluded 
that violent self-help is antisocial and unacceptably dangerous. 
 We agree that there should be no right to forcibly resist an 
unlawful arrest in the absence of unreasonable force.  When 
persons resist arrest, they endanger themselves, the arresting 
officers, and bystanders. Although we are sympathetic to the 
temporary deprivation of liberty the individual may suffer, the 
law permits only a civilized form of recourse.  We disagree with 
the statement of amicus WACDL that our holding "will have 
imposed a rule that forbids the individual to resist the 
sovereign's own wrongs."  WACDL brief at 12.  Justice can and 
must be had in the courts, not in the streets.  We adopt the 
conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of Alaska: 
 
The 
control of man's 
destructive 
and 
aggressive 
impulses is one of the great unsolved problems of our 
society.  Our rules of law should discourage the 
unnecessary use of physical force between man and man. 
 Any rule which promotes rather than inhibits violence 
should 
be 
re-examined. 
 
Along 
with 
increased 
sensitivity to the rights of the criminally accused 
there should be a corresponding awareness of our need 
to develop rules which facilitate decent and peaceful 
behavior by all.  
. . . 
To us the question is whether any amount of force 
should be permitted to be used by one unlawfully but 
peaceably arrested.  We feel that the legality of a 
peaceful arrest should be determined by courts of law 
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
29
and not through a trial by battle in the streets.  It 
is not too much to ask that one believing himself 
unlawfully arrested should submit to the office and 
thereafter seek his legal remedies in court.  Such a 
rule helps to relieve the threat of physical harm to 
officers who in good faith but mistakenly perform an 
arrest, as well as to minimize harm to innocent 
bystanders.  The old common law rule has little 
utility to recommend it under our conditions of life 
today.  We hold that a private citizen may not use 
force to resist peaceful arrest by one he knows or has 
good reason to believe is an authorized peace officer 
performing his duties, regardless of whether the 
arrest 
is 
illegal 
in 
the 
circumstances 
of 
the 
occasion. 
Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421, 426-27 (Alaska 1969) (footnote 
omitted).  Accordingly, we hold that Wisconsin has recognized a 
privilege to forcibly resist an unlawful arrest, but based on 
public policy concerns, we hereby abrogate that privilege.23 
V. PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF ABROGATION 
¶40 Because we decide to abrogate the common law defense 
of resisting an unlawful arrest in the absence of unreasonable 
force, we next must determine how this abrogation affects Ms. 
Hobson's invocation of the defense.24  We conclude that the 
effect 
of 
our 
abrogation 
of 
the 
affirmative 
defense 
is 
prospective only. 
                     
23 Our conclusion to abrogate the privilege in no way means 
that "police are above the law" as amicus State Public Defender 
predicts.  Our conclusion is instead an affirmation of the 
protections the law presently affords to persons unlawfully 
arrested.  Ms. Hobson has apparently invoked some of those 
protections by filing a claim against the Beloit Police 
Department under  § 1983. 
24 The defendant has the burden of raising an affirmative 
defense, at least where evidence of the exempting fact is 
especially within the knowledge or control of the defendant.  
See Blenski v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 685, 697, 245 N.W.2d 906 
(1976).  
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
30
¶41 The Ex Post Facto clauses of both the United States 
and Wisconsin Constitutions prohibit the state from enacting any 
law which imposes punishment for acts not punishable at the time 
they were committed.  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 12.25  This principle of due process applies also to 
law arising from judicial decisions.  See State v. Kurzawa, 180 
Wis. 2d 502, 510-11, 509 N.W.2d 712 (1994).  The ex post facto 
prohibition applies as well when a new rule of law deprives a 
defendant of a previously available defense.  See Beazell v. 
Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 (1925); State v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 
703, 524 N.W.2d 641 (1994). 
¶42 In addition to urging us to abrogate the common law 
defense of forcibly resisting an unlawful arrest in the absence 
of unreasonable force, the State asks that we reverse the 
circuit court's order dismissing the battery charge against Ms. 
Hobson and remand for further proceedings.  We decline to do so. 
 In this case, the acts which constitute Ms. Hobson’s lawful 
resistance to her unlawful arrest for obstructing, disorderly 
conduct and resisting are the same acts which the State alleges 
constitute the basis for the charge of battery to a peace 
                     
25 Art. I of the United States Constitution provides: 
Section 10.  No State shall . . . pass any Bill of 
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of 
Nobility. 
 
Art. I of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: 
Attainder; ex post facto; contracts.  Section 12.  No 
bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law 
impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be 
passed, and no conviction shall work corruption of 
blood or forfeiture of estate.  
No. 96-0914-CR  
 
31
officer.  Contrary to the State's position, Ms. Hobson’s 
privilege, though hereafter closed to others, compels us to 
reverse the order dismissing the battery charge. 
VI. HOBSON'S ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS 
¶43 Because we affirm the circuit court's order dismissing 
the charges against Ms. Hobson, we need not address the 
alternative arguments she raises of outrageous governmental 
conduct, and a right to suppression of the evidence.  
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
No. 96-0914-CR.ssa 
 
1 
¶44 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).   I 
concur in the mandate. 
¶45 The majority opinion overturns a rule of law dating to 
the 1600s in England and to the 1848 adoption of the Wisconsin 
constitution.  Neither the facts of this case nor public policy 
provides adequate cause to overturn this long-standing body of 
precedent. 
¶46 The majority opinion holds that when an officer makes 
an unlawful, but nonviolent, arrest the person arrested does not 
have the right to resist.  Thus, a person who resists an 
unlawful arrest, even without force, can be prosecuted for 
battery to an officer (Class D felony), disorderly conduct 
(Class B misdemeanor), resisting or obstructing an officer 
(Class A misdemeanor), the charges brought against Ms. Hobson in 
this case.  The majority opinion, although allowing Ms. Hobson's 
criminal charges to be dismissed, would subject another parent 
in Ms. Hobson's situation to criminal prosecution and a possible 
criminal record. 
¶47 This case presents a classic situation for the right 
to resist unlawful arrest.  It illustrates why the common law 
right protecting victims of unlawful arrest was developed and 
why it should be retained.  I discuss in turn:  (1) the facts in 
this case; (2) the majority opinion's misconstruction of the 
rationale underlying the common law right to resist an unlawful 
arrest; (3) the majority opinion's internal inconsistency in its 
stated concerns about escalation of violence; and (4) the 
majority opinion's misplaced reliance on various legal remedies 
No. 96-0914-CR.ssa 
 
2 
to redress the wrong of unlawful arrest.  For the reasons set 
forth I write separately. 
I 
¶48 In this case a law enforcement officer attempted to 
question a 5-year-old boy at his home about another child's 
bike, which reportedly had been stolen.  A youth had reported 
seeing the 5-year-old riding the bike.  The mother of the 5-
year-old refused to allow the officer to speak to the child.  No 
one asserts that the mother was required to allow the 5-year-old 
child to be questioned by the officer.  Indeed, the circuit 
court found that the mother's refusal to allow the child to be 
questioned by the officer was neither disorderly conduct nor 
obstruction of the officer.  
¶49 Following the mother's refusal to allow the officer to 
question her 5-year-old son, the officer said that he would take 
the boy to the police station for questioning.  When the mother 
refused this request, the officer called for backup and 
attempted to take the mother into custody.   
¶50 The circuit court correctly found that "the officer 
had no authority to take a citizen who refuses to be interviewed 
to the police station to compel an interview there, especially a 
five-year-old boy."  Wisconsin statutes provide that if an 
officer has probable cause to believe that a child under the age 
of 12 has committed an offense, the officer must immediately 
make every reasonable effort to release the child to a parent.  
See Wis. Stat. § 48.20(2).  In this case the parent was present 
No. 96-0914-CR.ssa 
 
3 
when the officer approached the child; yet the officer sought to 
remove the child from the parent's charge.  
¶51 The officer then decided to arrest the mother.  The 
circuit court correctly concluded that there was no lawful basis 
for the mother's arrest.  No one disputes this conclusion. 
¶52 In a careful and scholarly examination of the same 
legal authorities relied upon by the majority opinion, the 
circuit court concluded that the mother's right to resist the 
unlawful arrest should be protected.  The circuit court made 
plain that it was deeply offended by the officer's conduct in 
this incident.  In the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the 
circuit court expressed its dismay:   
 
You and I both know that they don't take five-year-
olds into custody because they think they stole a 
bicycle.  Now, that's not the standard in this or any 
other community that I know of.  They took this kid 
down there because they were hacked off because she 
wouldn't 
let 
them 
interview 
the 
child 
at 
her 
home . . . .  When have you ever heard of them 
arresting a five-year-old and taking them into custody 
because they believe that a bicycle had been stolen? 
 . . . [Y]ou and I know that it isn't done.  A report 
is filled out.  It goes to the probation people and 
they decide whether to file a petition.  That's what 
happens. 
Further, the circuit court wrote, "Nothing would permit the 
officer to take a five-year-old child to a police station for a 
junior version of the 'third degree.'" 
¶53 If the circuit court was so angered by this incident 
months after it occurred, imagine how the mother felt when the 
officers threatened to interrogate her 5-year-old son and to 
No. 96-0914-CR.ssa 
 
4 
take him to the police station.  Her distress and anger were 
understandably reflected by her actions. 
¶54 The record is silent as to whether anyone witnessed 
the events at Ms. Hobson's home.  It is unfortunate that no one 
intervened and persuaded her to comply with the officer's 
demands.  Had the mother complied with the officer's demands, it 
might have been better in the short and long run for the mother, 
the child, law enforcement and the community.  Nevertheless, the 
existence of rights, "such as the right to remain silent or to 
be free from unlawful searches, does not depend upon whether it 
is prudent for the individual to assert them."  Paul G. 
Chevigny, The Right to Resist Arrest, 78 Yale L.J. 1128, 1137 
(1969). 
II 
¶55 The majority's decision to abrogate the common law 
right to resist unlawful arrest rests on an important public 
policy consideration, one with which I wholeheartedly agree:  
all of us must promote peaceful settlement of disputes, not 
violence on the streets.  Calling its ruling "a step toward 
deescalation," majority op. at 28, the majority opinion reasons 
that force begets force, violence begets violence.  In other 
words, when an unlawfully arrested person responds with measured 
resistance, that resistance increases the likelihood that the 
arresting officer will respond with greater force to subdue the 
person.   
¶56 In choosing to abrogate the common law right to resist 
an unlawful arrest for reasons of public policy, the majority 
No. 96-0914-CR.ssa 
 
5 
ignores the rationale behind the right.  The common law right to 
resist an unlawful arrest was not designed to foster resistance 
to law enforcement officers or to encourage people to disobey 
them.  Instead the common law right to resist unlawful arrest 
was designed to protect a person provoked by a wrongful arrest 
from being criminally charged with obstructing an officer.  
Professor Chevigny, a commentator upon whom the majority relies, 
explains that it is fundamentally unfair to punish a person who 
has been unlawfully arrested for expressing his or her deep 
emotion with measured resistance: 
 
The right does not exist to encourage citizens to 
resist, but rather to protect those provoked into 
resistance by unlawful arrests.  In the excitement of 
an arrest, a person is likely to respond to his 
emotions, and if his impulse to resist is provoked by 
arbitrary police behavior, it is fundamentally unfair 
to punish him for giving in to that impulse with 
measured resistance. 
Paul G. Chevigny, The Right to Resist Arrest, 78 Yale L.J. 1128, 
1133-34 (1969).   
¶57 Although I share the majority's concern about avoiding 
the escalation of violence between law enforcement officers and 
those 
who 
are 
unlawfully 
arrested, 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
majority's decision to abrogate the common law privilege is not 
really a step toward "deescalation."  As Professor Chevigny 
notes, a person unlawfully arrested may understandably act out 
of passion; in the heat of the moment a person does not, indeed 
cannot, carefully consider his or her alternatives.  The mother 
in this case did not contemplate the state of the law before 
No. 96-0914-CR.ssa 
 
6 
responding to the unlawful arrest of her child; nor would other 
persons facing her situation in the future.   
¶58 The real question here is not about escalating 
violence; it is about whether a person ought to be prosecuted 
for resistance of the kind in this case.  In contrast to Justice 
Geske's characterization in her concurrence of other possible 
fact situations, in this case Ms. Hobson did not fight with the 
police and she was not violent.  The circuit court found that 
Ms. Hobson "clearly used only force sufficient to attempt to 
prevent her illegal arrest.  She flailed her legs and arms about 
as the police officer had 'taken her to the ground.' She did not 
chase an officer down the street.  There is a complete absence 
of an intent to assault an officer.  Her only evident intent was 
to prevent her illegal arrest.  She did not assault the police 
officer; the police officer assaulted her." 
¶59 The common law right to resist unlawful arrest was 
designed for just the situation presented in this case.  A 
person is unlawfully arrested and is provoked to anger and 
emotion 
to 
resist 
the 
unlawful 
arrest. 
 
Under 
such 
circumstances, 
according 
to 
the 
common 
law, 
the 
person 
wrongfully 
arrested 
should 
not 
be 
subject 
to 
criminal 
prosecution.   
III 
¶60 The majority opinion does not abrogate a person's 
common law right to use force when resisting an arrest in which 
a law enforcement officer uses unreasonable force.  The 
No. 96-0914-CR.ssa 
 
7 
reasoning 
of 
the 
majority 
opinion 
is 
thus 
internally 
inconsistent. 
¶61 The majority opinion retains the common law rule that 
a person arrested unlawfully has the right to use reasonable 
force when the arresting officer uses excessive force.  This 
right to use reasonable force is a right of self-defense 
designed to protect a person's bodily integrity and health based 
on the rationale that while liberty can be restored through 
legal process, life and limb cannot be repaired in a courtroom. 
¶62 If 
the 
majority 
is 
principally 
concerned 
with 
decreasing the physical risks associated with unlawful arrests, 
then the holding of the majority opinion should encompass those 
situations 
presenting 
the 
greatest 
risk 
of 
dangerthose 
situations in which the arresting officer uses excessive force. 
 The majority opinion's holding thus does not follow from its 
stated concern about "deescalation."  
IV 
¶63 The majority opinion attempts to bolster its holding 
with the explanation that in modern society it is no longer 
justifiable to resist unlawful arrest because legal remedies are 
available for victims of unlawful arrest.  By asserting that 
adequate remedies exist to redress unlawful arrests, the 
majority opinion misconstrues the rationale underlying the right 
to resist unlawful arrest which, as I have explained, is to 
protect from criminal prosecution a person who is provoked by 
the police to resist an unlawful arrest. 
No. 96-0914-CR.ssa 
 
8 
¶64 Furthermore, the remedies at law are not effective in 
this situation.  The majority opinion explains that unlawfully 
arrested persons should go down to the police station, secure 
their freedom by making bail and later bring a civil rights 
action against the police.  In adopting this reasoning, the 
majority opinion treats the experience of undergoing arrest, 
fingerprinting, 
photographing, 
interrogation, 
detention 
and 
trying to make bail as minor deviations from a person's daily 
routine. 
¶65 Unfortunately the legal system does not always work so 
smoothly.  The right to counsel, although constitutionally 
guaranteed, is unfortunately not available to those not poor 
enough to qualify for a public defender but too poor to hire 
their own private counsel.26  The majority opinion's reliance on 
civil damages actions is similarly problematic.  Although a 
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is in theory 
available for victims of unlawful arrest, in practice such 
relief is contingent on the availability and willingness of 
attorneys to bring such actions.  Attorneys are hesitant to 
accept such cases when monetary damages are insignificant or 
difficult to prove.  Likewise internal review and disciplinary 
procedures in police departments do not provide an adequate 
remedy for victims of unlawful arrest. 
                     
26 According to a survey completed by the Office of the 
Wisconsin State Public Defender 32 percent of persons seeking 
representation in 1997 did not meet the Public Defender's 
indigency criteria. 
No. 96-0914-CR.ssa 
 
9 
¶66 Thus, contrary to the reasoning of the majority 
opinion, the various procedural safeguards in the criminal 
justice system often fail to provide adequate redress for 
victims of unlawful arrest.  In evaluating the legal remedies 
afforded to victims of unlawful arrest, this court should not 
wear blinders to what happens in real life or discount the 
indignity of being subjected to unlawful arrest, the potential 
physical 
harm 
of 
being 
incarcerated, 
and 
the 
negative 
consequences to reputation and employment. 
¶67 There is no legal remedy that can rectify the harm to 
a young child is interrogated by the police.  In this case Ms. 
Hobson sought only to protect her 5-year-old son, and as the 
circuit court recognized, the threatened injury Ms. Hobson 
sought to avoid could not be remedied by the various procedural 
safeguards in the criminal justice system.  Once her son was 
taken 
to 
the 
precinct 
and 
interrogated, 
no 
procedural 
safeguardthe right to bail, counsel, probable cause hearing, or 
 civil rights actionwould provide a sufficient remedy or cure. 
  
¶68 Although the majority opinion correctly notes that the 
common law right to resist arrest has fallen into disfavor in a 
number of American states, I join the many judges in the United 
No. 96-0914-CR.ssa 
 
10
States27 and the British commonwealth nations28 who have continued 
to recognize the common law right to resist unlawful arrest with 
a measured response. 
¶69 The circuit court concluded in this case that a 
superior social policy is advanced by a rule permitting 
                     
27 The right to resist unlawful arrest is recognized in the 
following cases:  Ex parte Wallace v. City of Dothan, 497 So.2d 
96, 97 (Ala. 1986) (a person may use reasonable force to resist 
unlawful arrest); Smith v. Holeman, 441 S.E.2d 487, 491 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1994) (a person has the right to resist unlawful arrest 
with all force necessary); White v. Morris, 345 So.2d 461, 465 
(La. 1977) (every person has a right use such force as may be 
necessary under the circumstances to resist unlawful arrest); In 
re Albert S., 664 A.2d 476, 486 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (right 
exists to resist unlawful, warrantless arrest); People v. Krum, 
132 N.W.2d 69, 72 (Mich. 1965) (a person may use such reasonable 
force as is necessary to resist an unlawful arrest); Murrell v. 
State, 655 So.2d 881, 888 (Miss. 1995) (self-help is limited to 
those situations where the arrest is unlawful and the officer 
and person arrested have reason to know that it is, or where the 
arrest is accompanied by excessive force); Brown v. Oklahoma 
City, 721 P.2d 1346, 1351-52 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986) (recognizes 
right to resist unlawful arrest); Foote v. Commonwealth, 396 
S.E.2d 851, 855 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (a person has the right to 
use reasonable force to resist unlawful arrest; rules of self-
defense determine whether the force used is reasonable). 
28 In the oft-cited case Christie v. Leachinsky [1947] AC 
573, [1947] 1 All ER 567, Lord Simonds said, "it is the 
corollary of the right of every citizen to be thus free from 
arrest that he should be entitled to resist that arrest unless 
that arrest is lawful . . . ." 
In recent years England and the Canadian province of 
Alberta have reaffirmed the common law right to resist unlawful 
arrest.  See Regina v. Howell, [1982] QB 416 (in cases of 
unlawful arrest a person is entitled to use reasonable force to 
resist the arrest); Carr v. Gautheir, [1992] 97 D.L.R. 4th 651, 
1992 DLR LEXIS 544, *18, 36 A.C.W.S. 3d 694 (right to resist 
unlawful arrest is an absolute defense if at the time of the 
arrest the officer knows he or she has no reasonable and 
probable grounds and the resistance is not excessive).  
No. 96-0914-CR.ssa 
 
11
resistance to unlawful arrest when the health or safety of the 
person being arrested, or of a family member, is threatened in a 
manner not susceptible of subsequent cure in a courtroom.  Under 
these circumstances the common law rule excusing a person who is 
provoked to reasonable resistance by unlawful state action 
should be retained.  At a minimum, the majority opinion should 
adopt the circuit court's position. 
¶70 As the circuit court wrote, "it is difficult to 
imagine a mother who would allow her five-year-old son to be 
dragged off to the station house and subjected to an illegal 
interrogation.  It certainly would be hollow to suggest that she 
submit to that process and then argue about it in court after 
whatever harm to the child will have already occurred.  The 
circumstances under which an individual should be allowed to 
resist an unlawful arrest are narrow.  This case represents one 
of those exceptions."   
¶71 For the foregoing reasons, I join the court's mandate 
and write separately. 
 
No. 96-0914-CR.wab 
 
1 
¶72 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (Concurring).    The majority 
opinion completely abrogates the common law right to forcibly 
resist an unlawful arrest in the absence of unreasonable force. 
 By so doing, the majority refuses to admit any exceptions for 
the future such as the one the facts so compellingly present 
here.  
¶73 I would admit a very narrow exception to the general 
rule enunciated by the majority.  Like the majority, I would not 
permit resistance to an unlawful arrest in the absence of 
unreasonable force; however, I would allow resistance if the 
individual reasonably believes that serious and substantial 
mental or physical health concerns of the individual or a member 
of his or her family are threatened in a way that are not 
susceptible of cure later in a court room.  I would require an 
objective, reasonableness standard.  This holding would be 
similar to, but not in complete accord with, the holding of the 
circuit court, reprinted below.29  
¶74 This holding would not commit us to the rigidity of 
the majority’s rule of law which could lead to future injustice: 
witness the facts of this case.  It would also comport more with 
common sense and reality than does adherence to the common law 
that allows resistance to any unlawful arrest.  Finally, it 
                     
29"[T]he superior social policy is advanced by a rule which 
modifies the common law rule so as to not permit resistance to 
an unlawful arrest unless the health or safety of the individual 
or a member of his or her family is threatened in a way that is 
not susceptible of cure later in a court room.”  Order of 
Dismissal, at 6.  
No. 96-0914-CR.wab 
 
2 
would recognize the reality that courts cannot always provide 
adequate redress for the harm caused by an unlawful arrest.  
¶75 I agree with the circuit court’s persuasive statement 
in dismissing this case: 
 
In the case now before the court, the defendant 
was acting to prevent the unlawful arrest of herself, 
an arrest which would result in the police taking her 
five-year-old son to the police station for an 
interrogation.  While it probably has no legal 
relevance, it may be noted that all of this furor 
occurred because another child said the boy was riding 
a stolen bicycle.  The harm to a typical five-year-old 
child of being taken to a police station and being 
grilled 
under 
these 
circumstances 
can 
be 
as 
devastating as watching a family member being beaten. 
 The harm to the child is not of such a nature that it 
can be vindicated later in a courtroom.  The necessity 
of protecting the child at that moment from the 
illegal police activity is paramount.  
 
Any other rule would be futile.  What parent 
would stand by while the police treated a five-year-
old child in that way?  To adopt a contrary rule would 
have no effect on the way people conduct their 
affairs.  
Order of Dismissal, at 7. 
¶76 Although Ms. Hobson escapes prosecution as a result of 
the prospectiveness of the majority opinion, an undoubtedly just 
result, what about any future Ms. Hobsons? Under similar 
circumstances, it is simply not reasonable to expect a parent to 
sit back and do nothing.  Our common law should reflect that 
reality.   
¶77 I am authorized to state that Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley joins in this concurrence. 
 
No. 96-0914-CR.jpg 
 
1 
¶78 JANINE P. GESKE, J.  (Concurring).  I write separately 
to 
address 
the 
concurrence 
of 
Chief 
Justice 
Abrahamson.  
Although the majority opinion abrogates a common law defense, I 
believe that few persons actually assumed that because of early 
common law, citizens still had the right to physically resist an 
unlawful, nonviolent arrest.  In fact, this is the first time in 
our state's history that this specific issue has been raised 
before this court. 
¶79 The majority opinion discusses why historically such a 
right to resist developed.  However, over time our system of 
justice has substantially changed, giving arrestees increased 
legal protections.  Any argument in favor of the protection 
against prosecution afforded by the right to resist is far 
outweighed by the substantial harm that can certainly occur.  I 
am convinced that if the chief justice's concurrence's position 
became the majority opinion, violence toward police officers and 
others would only escalate after our opinion was issued.  A 
widespread belief that one could legally fight with the police 
and be immune from prosecution if a judge later concludes that 
the arresting officers lacked probable cause could certainly 
increase the violence that police already frequently face. 
¶80 Although the facts of this case are troubling, Ms. 
Hobson has a potential remedy for the unlawful arrest of her 
child.  The chief justice's concurrence criticizes the majority 
opinion because it advocates "that unlawfully arrested persons 
should go down to the police station, secure their freedom by 
making bail and later bring a civil rights action against the 
No. 96-0914-CR.jpg 
 
2 
police."  Chief Justice Abrahamson concurring op. at 7.  The 
concurrence contends instead that there is a need to continue to 
recognize immunity for those arrestees and family members who 
resist and fight with the police when an officer is making what 
turns out later to be an unlawful, but nonviolent arrest.  In 
other words, persons who, from their vantage point, do not 
believe that an officer is lawfully arresting either themselves 
or a family member, could start fighting with that officer in 
order to try to stop the arrest.  Protection against criminal 
prosecution in those instances could lead not only to serious 
injuries of officers, but could escalate the violence among the 
participants and observers of the challenged arrest because the 
officers then would be compelled to use force to stop the attack 
on themselves. 
¶81 Many people, subjected to an arrest, will fight with 
the police.  Police, arrestees, and others are often injured in 
the course of those arrests.  If this court would continue to 
recognize immunity for physical resistance of an arrest by an 
officer 
who 
is 
not 
exerting 
unreasonable 
force 
and 
who 
mistakenly believed that he or she had probable cause to arrest, 
we would be encouraging arrestees to violently settle their 
legal dispute with the officer in the street rather than with 
the judge in a courtroom.  This court ought to discourage 
citizens from engaging in violence against police officers and 
tell them to challenge the lawfulness of any arrest in court. 
No. 96-0914-CR.jpg 
 
3 
¶82 I am authorized to state that Justice Donald W. 
Steinmetz and Justice Jon P. Wilcox join in this concurrence. 
     
 
No. 96-0914-CR.jpg 
 
1