Case Title: Royster v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.

Citation: 2001-Ohio-212

Docket Number: 20001076

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Royster v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 92 Ohio St.3d 327, 2001-
Ohio-212.] 
 
 
 
ROYSTER, APPELLANT, v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Royster v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (2001), 92 Ohio 
St.3d 327.] 
Consumer sales practices — Nonconforming new motor vehicles — Lemon Law 
— Consumers enjoy a presumption of recovery under R.C. 1345.73(B), 
when. 
(No. 00-1076 — Submitted February 28, 2001 — Decided June 28, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 75634. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A consumer enjoys a presumption of recovery under R.C. 1345.73(B) if his or her 
vehicle is out of service by reason of repair for a cumulative total of thirty 
or more calendar days in the first year of ownership regardless of whether 
the vehicle was successfully repaired at some point beyond that thirty-day 
period. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  In this case, we address Ohio’s Lemon Law, specifically the 
portion of R.C. 1345.73 that addresses whether a manufacturer has had a 
reasonable opportunity to repair a defective automobile.  We hold that a consumer 
enjoys a presumption of recovery under R.C. 1345.73(B) if his or her vehicle is 
out of service by reason of repair for a cumulative total of thirty or more calendar 
days in the first year of ownership regardless of whether the vehicle was 
successfully repaired at some point beyond that thirty-day period. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
The facts here are not in dispute.  On February 3, 1996, appellant 
Kimberly G. Royster leased a new 1996 Toyota 4-Runner at the Toyota on the 
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2 
Heights dealership in Cleveland Heights, Ohio.  The vehicle was warranted by 
appellee, Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. (“Toyota”).  Toyota issued Royster a 
three-year/thirty-six-thousand-mile warranty on the vehicle.  Approximately nine 
months after gaining possession of the vehicle, on November 7, 1996, Royster 
noticed that it was leaking a red fluid.  The vehicle was towed to the dealership 
that day.  At that time it had an odometer reading of approximately 10,129 miles. 
 
The dealership determined that the 4-Runner had a leaking head gasket 
that needed to be replaced.  However, the dealership had difficulty locating the 
correct part.  Thus, the dealership did not complete the repair until December 31, 
1996, after the vehicle had been unavailable to Royster for fifty-five days.  Toyota 
on the Heights had provided Royster with a used Toyota Camry as a loaner at no 
charge beginning on November 15, 1996. 
 
On January 6, 1997, Royster returned the vehicle to the dealership to 
correct problems with the paint on a door and with the brakes.  The brakes 
required resurfacing due to disuse during the extended repair period.  The repairs 
were made, and Royster picked up her vehicle.  After that, Royster experienced 
no further mechanical difficulties with the 4-Runner. 
 
On May 30, 1997, Royster filed a Lemon Law claim against Toyota.  Both 
parties filed motions for summary judgment.  On June 9, 1998, the trial court 
granted Royster’s motion.  The court held that Royster had demonstrated her right 
to recovery based upon the Lemon Law’s presumption in favor of recovery if a 
vehicle is “out of service by reason of repair for a cumulative total of thirty or 
more calendar days” in the first year of ownership.  The court awarded her and 
her lienholder $38,565.54 and also entered an additional $7,649 judgment against 
Toyota for Royster’s attorney fees.  Toyota appealed the ruling. 
 
The Eighth District Court of Appeals overturned the trial court’s decision.  
The court held that the trial court had erred in finding that the car’s fifty-five days 
out of service created a presumption of recovery for Royster under the Lemon 
January Term, 2001 
3 
Law.  The appellate court held that the dealership made a reasonable number of 
attempts to repair the vehicle and was ultimately successful in conforming the car 
to its warranty.  The court reasoned that Royster would have had a valid Lemon 
Law claim only if the vehicle had not conformed to its warranty after the 
dealership’s “reasonable number of repair attempts.”  The cause is before this 
court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
Law and Analysis 
 
The car-buying experience may be the most complicated mating dance in 
all of the animal world.  It seems a given that both parties must engage in half-
truths (“I don’t know if I can afford this”), double meanings (“Let’s see if we can 
make the numbers work”), semantic gymnastics (“Priced below invoice”), 
expressions of powerlessness (“Let me talk to my manager”/”Let me talk to my 
spouse”), and white lies (“I’m talking to someone at another dealership”) before 
the relationship finally culminates in a deal.  Once the deal for a new automobile 
is complete, however, the clear language of the General Assembly takes over, 
without any hidden meanings or purposely confusing wordplay. 
 
Ohio’s Lemon Law is designed to protect consumers from chronically 
defective new automobiles.  It requires new vehicles to live up to warranties given 
by manufacturers.  The Lemon Law attaches a clear duty to sellers, and provides a 
clear remedy to buyers should the seller breach its duty. 
 
Pursuant to R.C. 1345.72(A), a vehicle must abide by its warranty, and if 
the condition of the automobile does not meet what is warranted, the seller must 
repair it: 
 
“If a new motor vehicle does not conform to any applicable express 
warranty and the consumer reports the nonconformity to the manufacturer, its 
agent, or its authorized dealer during the period of one year following the date of 
original delivery or during the first eighteen thousand miles of operation, 
whichever is earlier, the manufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer shall 
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4 
make any repairs as are necessary to conform the vehicle to such express 
warranty, notwithstanding the fact that the repairs are made after the expiration of 
the appropriate time period.” 
 
While R.C. 1345.72(A) attaches a clear duty on sellers and gives them the 
opportunity to preclude recovery by making prompt repairs, R.C. 1345.72(B) 
provides consumers a swift and simple remedy should the car not be made right 
within a reasonable number of attempts.  During the time at issue R.C. 
1345.72(B) stated: 
 
“(B) If the manufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer is unable to 
conform the motor vehicle to any applicable express warranty by repairing or 
correcting any defect or condition that substantially impairs the use, safety, or 
value of the motor vehicle to the consumer after a reasonable number of repair 
attempts, the manufacturer shall, at the consumer’s option, and subject to division 
(D) of this section replace the motor vehicle with a new motor vehicle acceptable 
to the consumer or accept return of the vehicle from the consumer and refund 
each of the following: 
 
“(1) The full purchase price including, but not limited to, charges for 
undercoating, transportation, and installed options; 
 
“(2) All collateral charges, including but not limited to, sales tax, license 
and registration fees, and similar government charges; 
 
“(3) All finance charges incurred by the consumer; 
 
“(4) All incidental damages, including any reasonable fees charged by the 
lender for making or canceling the loan.” 1987 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 232, 142 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 3011. 
 
Thus, if a manufacturer cannot repair a new automobile after a reasonable 
number of attempts, a buyer may request a refund or a replacement.  Lest there be 
a doubt, and subsequent exhaustive litigation, as to what constitutes “a reasonable 
January Term, 2001 
5 
number of repair attempts,” R.C. 1345.73 sets limits.  During the time at issue it 
provided: 
 
“It shall be presumed that a reasonable number of attempts have been 
undertaken by the manufacturer, its dealer, or its authorized agent to conform a 
motor vehicle to any applicable express warranty if, during the period of one year 
following the date of original delivery or during the first eighteen thousand miles 
of operation, whichever is earlier, any of the following apply; 
 
“(A) Substantially the same nonconformity has been subject to repair three 
or more times and continues to exist; 
 
“(B) The vehicle is out of service by reason of repair for a cumulative total 
of thirty or more calendar days; 
 
“(C) There have been eight or more attempts to repair any nonconformity 
that substantially impairs the use and value of the motor vehicle to the consumer; 
 
“(D) There has been at least one attempt to repair a nonconformity that 
results in a condition that is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury if the 
vehicle is driven, and the nonconformity continues to exist.” 142 Ohio Laws, Part 
II, 3012. 
 
R.C. 1345.73 is at the heart of this case.  The appellate court held that R.C. 
1345.73(B) does not create a presumption of recovery “but rather a presumption 
that a reasonable number of attempts to conform the vehicle to warranty have 
been made.”  According to the appellate court, the buyer must further show that 
after that “reasonable number of attempts” the vehicle still does not conform to its 
warranty.  Because Royster had failed to prove that the 4-Runner remained 
defective after Toyota’s nearly two-month repair attempt, the court ordered 
judgment in Toyota’s favor. 
 
We disagree with the appellate court’s interpretation.  The Lemon Law 
recognizes that occasionally new cars do have problems, but if those problems 
keep happening, or cannot be repaired in a reasonable amount of time, then the 
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consumer did not get what he or she bargained for.  R.C. 1345.73 is the “enough 
is enough” portion of the statute.  That section makes the amount of repair activity 
on the vehicle define whether the vehicle is a lemon.  R.C. 1345.73 is a kind of 
statute of limitations—it sets in well-defined terms the limit of frustration a 
consumer must endure. 
 
R.C. 1345.73 sets the cutoff point of reasonableness.  Under R.C. 
1345.73(A), (C), and (D), respectively, a manufacturer gets three tries to repair a 
particular nonconformity, 
eight 
tries 
to 
correct 
any 
combination 
of 
nonconformities that substantially impair the use and value of the vehicle, and one 
try to repair a nonconformity that results in a condition that makes the vehicle 
extremely dangerous to drive.  The statute does its best to avoid leaving 
reasonableness open to interpretation, instead defining what is reasonable in strict 
terms. 
 
The subsection applicable in this case, R.C. 1345.73(B), marks as thirty 
days the limit that a consumer need tolerate having his or her vehicle out of 
service in the first year of ownership.  Whether the vehicle is driveable after those 
thirty days is irrelevant.  Indeed, the statute speaks in terms of a cumulative thirty 
days out of service.  Thus, the vehicle could have entered the shop on numerous 
occasions and been repaired each time.  The unavailability of the new car is the 
key element.  The fact that a consumer cannot drive a newly purchased vehicle for 
a full month in the first year of ownership defines the vehicle as a lemon.  The 
General Assembly struck thirty days as the balance between what a consumer 
must endure and the time a manufacturer needs to make necessary repairs.  
Nothing beyond thirty days is statutorily reasonable.  Once the boundaries of 
reasonableness have been passed, the vehicle at that point becomes, legally, a 
lemon. 
 
By leaving little room for interpretation, R.C. 1345.73 leaves little room 
for litigation. As a consumer-protection law, the Lemon Law must be simple and 
January Term, 2001 
7 
must have teeth in order to be effective.  The law is designed for self-help without 
protracted litigation.  To work well, the statute needs a harsh remedy at a time 
certain.  Ohio’s Lemon Law does that better than most states’ laws: 
 
“Ohio’s standards for ‘reasonable number of attempts’ are among the most 
stringent in the nation in that the number of repair attempts before liability 
attaches is low. * * *  Under the lemon law, the consumer need only show that his 
automobile has been unsuccessfully repaired the requisite number of times and 
the Act takes effect.  Unless the manufacturer can show that the defects were not 
substantial or were the fault of the consumer, the manufacturer will be forced to 
replace the car or refund the purchase price.” Comment, Ohio’s Lemon Law: 
Ohio Joins the Rest of the Nation in Waging War Against the Automobile 
Limited Warranty (1989), 57 U.Cin.L.Rev. 1015, 1032. 
 
Despite its pucker-inducing remedy, the Lemon Law does have 
protections for manufacturers.  The law does not create remedies for buyers who 
have soured on their new vehicle for cosmetic or other trivial reasons.  The 
vehicle’s problem must “substantially impai[r] the use, safety, or value of the 
motor vehicle to the consumer.”  Besides the requirement of a major defect and 
the right of the manufacturer to preclude recovery by prompt repair, the Lemon 
Law also provides defenses to manufacturers.  A consumer cannot recover under 
the Lemon Law if the nonconformity is “the result of abuse, neglect, or the 
unauthorized modification or alteration of a motor vehicle by anyone other than 
the manufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer.” R.C. 1345.75. 
 
Still, the Lemon Law remains a powerful tool for consumers.  A tangential 
effect of a tough Lemon Law may be to persuade manufacturers to be hyper-
vigilant when new car buyers bring their vehicles in for repair.  In most cases, the 
threat of a remedy may be enough to achieve a positive result with which both 
parties can be happy.  Unfortunately, that did not happen in this case. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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We agree with the trial court in this case that a leaking head gasket 
“certainly maintains the look, feel, and potential expense of a disaster” and meets 
the statutory definition of a substantial impairment.  Toyota obviously failed to 
repair the problem within thirty days, and failed to assert that any of the statutory 
affirmative defenses were applicable.  The appellate court seemed to consider the 
dealership’s providing of a loaner car a de facto affirmative defense.  While an 
admirable gesture, lending a car to a consumer with a Lemon Law claim provides 
no statutory defense.  The true focus of the Lemon Law is on the automobile.  In 
enacting the Lemon Law, the General Assembly defines for consumers when an 
automobile becomes a lemon, not when a dealer is not being considerate enough. 
 
Royster demonstrated that she enjoyed a presumption of recovery under 
R.C. 1345.73(B).  Toyota had no defenses available.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.  
Further, we grant appellant’s motion to remand the cause to the trial court for a 
determination of additional attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  By entering 
judgment for Toyota on the basis that Royster failed to show that her vehicle 
“remained defective * * * after” (emphasis sic) fifty-six days of repairs, the court 
of appeals rendered R.C. 1345.73(B) nugatory.  Under the appellate court’s 
reasoning, so long as a dealer eventually repairs a vehicle that is out of service for 
a cumulative total of thirty or more calendar days during the first year of 
ownership or eighteen thousand miles, the vehicle cannot be a “lemon,” for it 
January Term, 2001 
9 
would not have “remained defective * * * after” those repairs finally and 
favorably concluded.  This approach conflicts with the General Assembly’s stated 
intent to provide a possible remedy for consumers whose new vehicles are “out of 
service” for thirty days or more.  See R.C. 1345.73. 
 
As the majority notes, the General Assembly envisioned three typical 
categories of lemons that it described with reference to the number of repair 
attempts undertaken.  See R.C. 1345.73(A), (C), and (D).  But it also envisioned a 
fourth typical category of lemons, describing this category with reference to 
cumulative time out of service—regardless of any ultimately favorable repair 
outcome.  R.C. 1345.73(B).  With its dispositive focus on Royster’s favorable 
repair outcome, the appellate court inserted a nonexistent condition into this 
fourth category, and today’s majority correctly reverses the court of appeals’ 
decision on that basis. 
 
I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority’s syllabus and much of 
its analysis.  The syllabus provides that a consumer enjoys a “presumption of 
recovery” under R.C. 1345.73(B) if his or her vehicle is out of service for thirty or 
more calendar days in the first year of ownership.  The trial court applied similar 
reasoning in its opinion and order granting Royster’s motion for summary 
judgment, stating—without citation of supporting legal authority—that “a 
presumption of recovery exists when the vehicle has been out of service by reason 
of repair for a cumulative total of thirty or more calendar days, and Plaintiff’s 
vehicle was out of service for 56 days.” 
 
As the court of appeals correctly noted, however, the problem with the 
“presumption of recovery” theory applied by both the trial court and today’s 
majority is that there simply is no presumption of recovery contained in the 
statutory scheme created by the General Assembly.  The statutory presumption 
that does appear in R.C. 1345.73 may indeed assist a consumer in meeting one of 
the elements of a Lemon Law claim under R.C. 1345.72(B)—a showing that the 
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dealer has made a reasonable number of repair attempts.  But to label R.C. 
1345.73’s presumption a “presumption of recovery” is to muddle the relationship 
between R.C. 1345.72 and 1345.73.  These are two separate statutes with distinct 
functions.  See Stepp v. Chrysler Corp. (Nov. 7, 1996), Knox App. No. 
95CA000052, unreported, 1996 WL 752794. 
 
As the Stepp court reasoned, “R.C. 1345.73 merely establishes a statutory 
presumption as to what constitutes a reasonable number of repair attempts by the 
manufacturer.  The statute does not obviate the requirement that the claimant 
prove a non-conformity which substantially impairs the use, safety, or value of the 
vehicle pursuant to R.C. 1345.72(B).”  Id.  See, also, Kademenos v. Mercedes-
Benz of N. Am., Inc. (Mar. 3, 1999), Richland App. No. 98 CA 50, unreported, 
1999 WL 174390, at *3 (citing Stepp); Laberdee v. Smith (July 14, 1997),  Lucas 
C.P. No. 95-0700, unreported, 1997 WL 808591 (“R.C. 1345.73 merely 
establishes a statutory presumption as to that which constitutes a reasonable 
number of repair attempts.  [Citing Stepp.]  Meeting one of them shifts the burden 
on [an] element of a lemon law case—reasonable opportunity to conform.  Not 
meeting one of them means the consumer has the burden of proving the 
manufacturer had been given reasonable opportunity but failed to conform the 
vehicle to its warranty”). 
 
For these reasons, I cannot agree with the rule of law set forth in today’s 
syllabus.  The syllabus inserts a presumption of recovery into a statute—R.C. 
1345.73—that already contains a distinctly different (and more limited) statutory 
presumption.  A syllabus saying that R.C. 1345.73 creates a presumption of 
recovery is especially confusing, given that recovery under the lemon scheme 
actually occurs not “under R.C. 1345.73,” as the majority’s syllabus suggests, but 
under R.C. 1345.72 instead.  See R.C. 1345.72(B) (allowing the aggrieved 
consumer to recover either a new vehicle or a refund of the purchase price plus 
associated charges). 
January Term, 2001 
11 
 
I disagree with another aspect of the majority’s analysis.  In support of her 
second proposition of law, Royster suggests that “under no circumstances should 
the time limit set by the Ohio lemon law presumptions be extended as the 
legislature has clearly spoken on this issue.”  The majority apparently agrees, 
stating, “The General Assembly struck thirty days as the balance between what a 
consumer must endure and the time a manufacturer needs to make necessary 
repairs.  Nothing beyond thirty days is statutorily reasonable.  Once the 
boundaries of reasonableness have been passed, the vehicle at that point 
becomes, legally, a lemon.”  (Emphasis added.)  The majority appears to have 
adopted Royster’s suggestion that the statutory presumption contained in R.C. 
1345.73(B) is a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption. 
 
The problem with this approach is that, as this court has previously noted, 
“statutory presumptions not specifically designated to be conclusive, may be 
rebutted by other evidence.”  State v. Myers (1971), 26 Ohio St.2d 190, 201, 55 
O.O.2d 447, 453, 271 N.E.2d 245, 252, citing State ex rel. Olsen v. Indus. Comm. 
(1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 47, 50, 38 O.O.2d 126, 127-128, 223 N.E.2d 362, 364; State 
ex rel. Pivk v. Indus. Comm. (1935), 130 Ohio St. 208, 212, 4 O.O. 153, 155, 198 
N.E. 631, 633.  No language in R.C. 1345.73(B) designates the presumption as 
irrebuttable.  R.C. 1345.73(B).  See, also, Black’s Law Dictionary (7 Ed.1999) 
1204, citing Wigmore, A Student’s Textbook of the Law of Evidence (1935) 454 
(“ ‘ “Conclusive presumptions” or “irrebuttable presumptions” are usually mere 
fictions, to disguise a rule of substantive law * * *; and when they are not fictions, 
they are usually repudiated by modern courts’ “). 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent from the 
majority decision that a thirty-day delay in a repair creates a virtually irrebuttable 
presumption of recovery. 
 
The purpose and spirit of the Lemon Law is to provide a remedy to a 
consumer who has lost confidence in the operation of his or her new vehicle due 
to a significant or persistent defect that cannot be repaired at all or cannot be 
repaired in a reasonable number of attempts.  Consequently, a Lemon Law claim 
arises only where the manufacturer is unable to repair a defect that “substantially 
impairs the use, safety, or value” of the vehicle or alternatively is unable to repair 
the defect in a reasonable number of attempts.  R.C. 1345.72(B).  As the majority 
recognizes, “[t]he Lemon Law recognizes that occasionally new cars do have 
problems, but if those problems keep happening, or cannot be repaired in a 
reasonable amount of time, then the consumer did not get what he or she 
bargained for.” 
 
In this case, the engine was subject to a single repair, which completely 
corrected the defect.  The majority opinion focuses on the thirty-day presumption 
in R.C. 1345.73(B) and holds that if a vehicle is out of service for a cumulative of 
thirty days, the owner enjoys a presumption of recovery.  I agree with Justice 
Cook’s dissent to the extent that R.C. 1345.73(B) does not provide a presumption 
of recovery, but merely a presumption that the manufacturer has undertaken a 
reasonable number of attempts to repair the vehicle, which is only one element of 
a Lemon Law claim.  However, I also believe that, contrary to the import of the 
majority’s opinion, the presumption in R.C. 1345.73(B) is rebuttable and in fact 
has been rebutted in this case. 
 
R.C. 1345.73(B) states that if a vehicle is out of service due to repair for a 
cumulative total of thirty days or more, then a presumption arises that the 
manufacturer has had a reasonable number of attempts to repair the defect.  The 
presumption in R.C. 1345.73(B) is essentially an evidentiary tool to aid 
January Term, 2001 
13 
consumers in proving when a manufacturer has exhausted its reasonable number 
of attempts to repair the defect for purposes of filing a Lemon Law complaint.  
However, a presumption may be rebutted.  See Evid.R. 301. 
 
It is undisputed that the 4-Runner was unavailable to Royster for more 
than thirty days.  However, the reason for the delay was not an inability by Toyota 
to promptly diagnose or repair the defect.  Rather, the delay was due to the 
unavailability of the replacement head gasket.  But for the delay in receiving the 
replacement head gasket, the 4-Runner would have been in the shop for less than 
thirty days and the presumption under R.C. 1345.73(B) would never have arisen.  
I do not believe that a delay in acquiring a part deprives the consumer of what he 
or she bargained for, because it does not lessen the consumer’s confidence in the 
operation of the vehicle.  I believe that the presumption set out in R.C. 
1345.73(B), that the manufacturer has undertaken a “reasonable number of 
attempts to repair,” is rebutted where the sole reason for the delay was a back-
ordered part.  Thus, I believe that Toyota has rebutted the presumption that it had 
undertaken a reasonable number of attempts to repair Royster’s 4-Runner.  
Therefore, Royster’s complaint would fail because she cannot prove an essential 
element of the Lemon Law statute. 
 
I do not intend to trivialize losing the use of a vehicle for almost two 
months.  However, Toyota provided Royster a loaner vehicle to use free of charge 
while the 4-Runner was in the shop. 
 
The majority’s holding distorts the spirit and purpose of the Lemon Law 
and opens the floodgates for consumers to return new vehicles that are not 
genuine lemons as envisioned by the Lemon Law to the unjustified financial 
detriment of auto manufacturers.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would 
affirm the court of appeals’ judgment. 
__________________ 
 
Kahn & Associates, L.L.C., and Craig A. Kahn, for appellant. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
Frost & Jacobs, L.L.P., and Jeffrey G. Rupert, for appellee. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Valerie A. Roller, Assistant 
Attorney General, and Peter M. Thomas, Assistant Solicitor, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Attorney General Betty Montgomery. 
 
Young & McDowall and Laura McDowall, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
__________________