Case Title: State ex rel. Ames v. Portage County Bd. of Commissioners

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3382

Docket Number: 2022-0148

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2023-09-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3382.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-3382 
THE STATE EX REL. AMES, APPELLANT, v. PORTAGE COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, APPELLEE, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., Slip 
Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3382.] 
Mandamus—Public 
Records 
Act—Open 
Meetings 
Act—Law-of-the-case 
doctrine—On remand, court of appeals correctly granted summary 
judgment on relator’s Open Meetings Act claim but erred in its analysis of 
whether relator is entitled to statutory damages under the Public Records 
Act—Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part and cause remanded. 
(No. 2022-0148—Submitted January 10, 2023—Decided September 26, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Portage County, 
No. 2019-P-0125, 2022-Ohio-336. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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KENNEDY, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal from a judgment of the Eleventh District Court of 
Appeals, we consider whether the court of appeals correctly decided that appellant, 
Brian Ames, is not entitled to relief under the Open Meetings Act, R.C. 121.22, or 
to an award of statutory damages under the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43(C)(2). 
{¶ 2} This is not the first time that this case has come before us.  In State ex 
rel. Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 165 Ohio St.3d 292, 2021-Ohio-2374, 
178 N.E.3d 492 (“Ames I”), we reversed the Eleventh District’s judgment granting 
summary judgment in favor of appellee, the Portage County Board of 
Commissioners (“the board”), and the Portage County Solid Waste Management 
District Board of Commissioners (“SWMD”) and the Portage County Court of 
Common Pleas.  We remanded the case to the court of appeals with instructions 
that it determine whether Ames is entitled to relief under the Open Meetings Act 
and to an award of statutory damages under the Public Records Act.  Ames I at ¶ 28.  
On remand, the court of appeals granted the board and the SWMD summary 
judgment on Ames’s Open Meetings Act claim and denied Ames’s request for an 
award of statutory damages. 
{¶ 3} Though the court of appeals correctly granted summary judgment on 
Ames’s Open Meeting Act claim, it erred in its analysis of the statutory-damages 
issue.  We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Eleventh 
District and remand this matter to the court of appeals to determine the amount of 
statutory damages, if any, to which Ames is entitled under R.C. 149.43(C)(2). 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
A.  Board Meetings and SWMD Business 
{¶ 4} The board established the SWMD in 1988, as authorized by R.C. 
3734.52(A) and (B).  Under R.C. 3734.52(A), the board also serves as the board of 
directors of the SWMD.  See Danis Clarkco Landfill Co. v. Clark Cty. Solid Waste 
Mgmt. Dist., 73 Ohio St.3d 590, 596, 653 N.E.2d 646 (1995). 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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{¶ 5} This case arose from Ames’s challenge to the board’s method of 
conducting SWMD’s business in 2019.  The board generally began a regularly 
scheduled public meeting at 9:00 a.m., recited the Pledge of Allegiance, and then 
immediately recessed the board meeting and began a public meeting of the SWMD.  
When the SWMD meeting adjourned, the board immediately reconvened its public 
meeting regarding non-SWMD county business.  This entire process was open to 
the public.  The board’s clerk kept separate minutes for the two meetings. 
{¶ 6} In 2019, the board adopted a consent-agenda procedure, which was 
used for the meetings at issue in this case.  The procedure allowed for board 
approval of “routine items” as defined in the consent-agenda rules.  Under these 
rules, a board member’s “yes” vote on the consent agenda was a “yes” vote on each 
of the items included on the consent agenda. 
{¶ 7} In practice, the consent agenda and documents relating to it would be 
distributed to the members of the board.  Board members would not discuss 
consent-agenda items in private, and individual board members could request that 
an item be removed from a consent agenda.  At a meeting, there would be no 
discussion of consent-agenda items; a roll-call vote would be taken concerning the 
items.  However, the meeting minutes would contain the full text of the resolutions, 
reports, or recommendations that were adopted as part of the consent agenda.  
Therefore, according to the board’s evidence in the record, consent-agenda items 
were not known to the public before a meeting; the first time the public would learn 
what had been adopted in a consent agenda was when the minutes became 
available. 
{¶ 8} On September 17, 2019, the board began its meeting at 9:00 a.m. and 
recessed at 9:01 a.m. to begin the SWMD meeting.  At the SWMD meeting, there 
was a consent agenda containing (1) an approval of minutes from the previous 
meeting and (2) three resolutions for approval.  The board adopted the consent 
agenda and adjourned without conducting any other SWMD business. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 9} The September 26, 2019 meetings were conducted similarly.  The 
board recessed its county meeting at 9:00 a.m. and immediately convened the 
SWMD meeting.  At the SWMD meeting, there was a consent agenda containing 
an approval of minutes from the September 17 meeting and three resolutions for 
approval.  The board adopted the consent agenda.  After concluding its action on 
one regular-agenda item, the board adjourned the SWMD meeting at 9:02 a.m. and 
immediately resumed its meeting on non-SWMD county business. 
{¶ 10} On December 26, 2019, Ames submitted a public-records request for 
“the meeting minutes of September 17 and September 26, 2019 for the Portage 
County Board of Commissioners and the Portage County Solid Waste Management 
District Board of Commissioners.”  The following day, the board’s clerk emailed 
the minutes to Ames.  The minutes for the September 17 meeting reflect the 
adoption of Resolution No. 19-137, which the board approved as part of the consent 
agenda, and the language of the resolution indicates that an “Exhibit A” was 
attached.  See State ex rel. Myers v. Meyers, 169 Ohio St.3d 536, 2022-Ohio-1915, 
207 N.E.3d 579, ¶ 37 (indicating that a document can be incorporated by reference 
in a public record).  The exhibit, however, was not attached to the minutes that had 
been approved by the board or produced in response to Ames’s public-records 
request. 
B.  Ames I 
{¶ 11} On December 27, 2019, Ames filed a petition for writs of mandamus 
in the court of appeals against the board, the SWMD, and the Portage County Court 
of Common Pleas.  Ames alleged that the SWMD was a “fictitious body” that 
“ha[d] no basis in law” and that the board violated the Open Meetings Act by 
conducting SWMD business during recesses of the September 17 and September 
26 board meetings.  Ames further alleged that the SWMD’s use of a consent agenda 
violated the Open Meetings Act and that the failure to provide full and accurate 
minutes in response to his public-records request violated the Open Meetings Act 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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and the Public Records Act.  Ames sought (1) a judgment finding that the board 
had violated the Open Meetings Act, (2) a writ of mandamus compelling the board 
to prepare, file, and maintain accurate minutes for the September 2019 meetings 
and all future meetings and ordering all SWMD business to be conducted in open 
meetings except for properly called executive sessions, (3) a writ of mandamus 
compelling the court of common pleas to perform the acts set forth in R.C. 
121.22(I), namely issuing an injunction to compel compliance with the Open 
Meetings Act, and (4) an award of costs and attorney fees under R.C. 2731.11 and 
149.43(C).  Ames also alleged an entitlement to statutory damages under R.C. 
149.43(C)(2). 
{¶ 12} The Eleventh District granted the board summary judgment and 
denied Ames’s petition for writs of mandamus.  11th Dist. Portage No. 2019-P-
0125, 2020-Ohio-4359, ¶ 16-17.  The court of appeals held that the SWMD “is a 
valid public body authorized to conduct business with regard to implementing a 
solid waste management plan that complies with R.C. 3734.55,” id. at ¶ 11, and that 
its meeting minutes satisfied the requirements of R.C. 121.22(C), id. at ¶ 14.  The 
court further concluded that the Open Meetings Act did not prohibit the use of 
consent agendas.  Finally, the court found nothing actionable in the alleged 
omission of exhibit A from the September 17 minutes.  The court did not address 
Ames’s claim for relief under the Public Records Act or his claim against the court 
of common pleas. 
{¶ 13} On Ames’s appeal, we affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment in 
part and reversed it in part.  We agreed with the court of appeals that neither the 
Open Meetings Act nor R.C. 343.01, which authorized the creation of the SWMD, 
prohibited the board from holding a public meeting of the SWMD separate and 
apart from the board’s meeting.  Ames I, 165 Ohio St.3d 292, 2021-Ohio-2374, 178 
N.E.3d 492, at ¶ 15.  But we further held that “the court of appeals erred in finding, 
as a matter of law, that the use of a consent agenda in the manner described [by the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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parties] did not violate the Open Meetings Act.”  We also explained that although 
the Open Meetings Act “does not appear to prevent the board from using consent 
agendas as a general matter,” Ames had raised “a plausible theory—sufficient to 
survive a motion for summary judgment—that the board’s use of a consent agenda 
* * * constructively closes its public meetings and is an impermissible end run 
around the Open Meetings Act.”  Id. at ¶ 19.  We directed the court of appeals to 
consider whether the board’s alleged violation of the Open Meetings Act entitled 
Ames to further relief. 
{¶ 14} We also reversed the court of appeals’ judgment pertaining to 
Ames’s mandamus claim seeking the production of “full and accurate minutes” of 
the September 17 and 26 meetings.  The minutes of the September 17 meeting 
“expressly incorporate[d] an ‘Exhibit A’ that the board * * * admitted [it had] not 
included in the approved minutes and was not produced to Ames in response to his 
public-records request.”  Id. at ¶ 23.  We explained that “the uncontroverted 
evidence shows that the board did not produce full and accurate minutes of the 
September 17 SWMD meeting in response to Ames’s public-records request.”  Id. 
at ¶ 24.  We ordered the board to “produce Exhibit A to the minutes of the 
September 17 SWMD meeting to Ames in response to his public-records request,” 
and we remanded the case to the court of appeals with orders “to consider * * * 
whether Ames should be awarded statutory damages under the Public Records 
Act.”  Id. at ¶ 28. 
C.  Proceedings on Remand 
{¶ 15} On remand, the court of appeals issued an alternative writ and 
ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs.  Following the parties’ submissions, 
the court of appeals again granted summary judgment in favor of the board and the 
SWMD. 
{¶ 16} As to whether Ames was entitled to further relief under the Open 
Meetings Act, the court of appeals denied the writ.  To the extent that Ames was 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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seeking to compel the board’s general compliance with the Open Meetings Act in 
the future, the court determined that he was not entitled to that relief.  11th Dist. 
Portage No. 2019-P-0125, 2022-Ohio-336, ¶ 43, citing State ex rel. Am. Civ. 
Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 128 Ohio St.3d 
256, 2011-Ohio-625, 943 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 27 (“ACLU”), and State ex rel. Kirk v. 
Burcham, 82 Ohio St.3d 407, 409, 696 N.E.2d 582 (1998) (a writ of mandamus will 
not lie to compel general observance of laws in the future).  And to the extent that 
Ames was seeking to prohibit the board from using a consent agenda for SWMD 
business, the court of appeals noted that the board had already stopped using a 
consent agenda for SWMD business.  Id. at ¶ 44.  For this conclusion, the court of 
appeals relied on affidavits from two board members, who each averred that the 
board had discontinued its use of the consent-agenda procedure.  Id. 
{¶ 17} The court of appeals also determined that Ames was not entitled to 
statutory damages.  Although we had determined in Ames I, 165 Ohio St.3d 292, 
2021-Ohio-2374, 178 N.E.3d 492, that the board violated the Public Records Act 
by failing to produce exhibit A, the court of appeals concluded that “Ames is not 
entitled to statutory damages under the Public Records Act because he has not 
established that respondents failed to comply with an obligation imposed by R.C. 
149.43(B).”  2022-Ohio-336, ¶ 4.  That is, contrary to our prior decision in this 
case, the Eleventh District determined that Ames had not proved that the board 
violated the Public Records Act.  In fact, the court of appeals interpreted our 
decision in Ames I as holding that the board’s failure to prepare full and accurate 
minutes of the September 17 meeting did not violate R.C. 149.43(B).  2022-Ohio-
336 at ¶ 49-54. 
{¶ 18} Ames appealed to this court as of right. 
II.  Standard of Review 
{¶ 19} This court reviews de novo a court of appeals’ grant of summary 
judgment in a mandamus action.  State ex rel. Manley v. Walsh, 142 Ohio St.3d 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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384, 2014-Ohio-4563, 31 N.E.3d 608, ¶ 17.  Summary judgment is proper when an 
examination of all the relevant materials that have been filed in the action reveal 
that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Civ.R. 56(C).  To obtain a writ of 
mandamus, Ames had to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) a clear 
legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of appellee to 
provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  
See ACLU, 128 Ohio St.3d 256, 2011-Ohio-625, 943 N.E.2d 553, at ¶ 22. 
III.  The Open Meetings Act Claim 
A.  The Court of Appeals’ Decision Is Consistent with the Remand Order 
{¶ 20} Ames argues that the court of appeals failed to comply with this 
court’s mandate when it granted the board and the SWMD summary judgment on 
his Open Meetings Act claim.  Because we reversed the court of appeals’ prior grant 
of summary judgment on Ames’s mandamus claim against the board and the 
SWMD, Ames argues that this court’s “decision that the [board and the SWMD 
were] not entitled to summary judgment became the law of the case.”  But Ames I 
did not go as far as Ames argues it did. 
{¶ 21} The law-of-the-case doctrine provides that “the decision of a 
reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions 
involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing 
levels.”  Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984).  However, “ 
‘[t]he doctrine of law of the case comes into play only with respect to issues 
previously determined.’ ”  Giancola v. Azem, 153 Ohio St.3d 594, 2018-Ohio-1694, 
109 N.E.3d 1194, ¶ 16, quoting Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 
59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979), fn. 18.  And “ ‘[w]hile a mandate is controlling as to matters 
within its compass, on the remand a lower court is free as to other issues.’ ”  Id., 
quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Natl. Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 
1184 (1939). 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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{¶ 22} To understand the scope of this court’s remand order, we look first 
to the relief that Ames requested in his complaint.  Ames sought a writ of mandamus 
commanding the board to (1) “prepare, file, and maintain full and accurate minutes 
for its meetings of September 17, 2019, September 26, 2019 and future meetings” 
and (2) “conduct all business of [the SWMD] in open meetings of the [board], 
except for properly called executive sessions.”  And in Ames I, we directed the court 
of appeals on remand to determine whether the board’s alleged violation of the 
Open Meetings Act—the use of a consent agenda—entitled Ames to further relief 
beyond the board’s production of exhibit A to Ames.  Ames I, 165 Ohio St.3d 292, 
2021-Ohio-2374, 178 N.E.3d 492, at ¶ 28. 
{¶ 23} We reversed the court of appeals’ determination that the board’s use 
of a consent agenda did not violate the Open Meetings Act as a matter of law.  Id. 
at ¶ 19.  But that decision did not foreclose the possibility that the board could 
prevail on Ames’s mandamus claim.  Ames is incorrect when he says it is the law 
of the case that the board is not entitled to summary judgment. 
{¶ 24} Ames also cites the language in Ames I ordering the court of appeals 
“to consider * * * whether the [board’s] alleged violation of the Open Meetings Act 
entitles Ames to further relief” (emphasis added), Ames I at ¶ 28.  The “further 
relief” language, according to Ames, means that this court already decided that the 
board was not entitled to judgment in its favor and the only question on remand 
was the relief to which he was entitled. 
{¶ 25} As with his law-of-the-case argument, Ames’s further-relief 
argument misinterprets Ames I.  By “further relief,” we meant that the court of 
appeals was to consider whether Ames was entitled to relief in addition to what we 
had already ordered, i.e., that the board produce exhibit A to the minutes of the 
September 17 meeting.  With respect to Ames’s request for a writ of mandamus 
ordering the board to comply with the Open Meetings Act, we held only that he had 
raised a genuine issue of fact “sufficient to survive a motion for summary 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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judgment,” Ames I, 165 Ohio St.3d 292, 2021-Ohio-2374, 178 N.E.3d 492, at ¶ 19.  
We did not hold that Ames had proved that the board violated the Open Meetings 
Act by using a consent agenda in the September 17 and 26, 2019 meetings, much 
less that he was entitled to a writ of mandamus as a remedy for any violation.  See 
id. 
B.  Is Ames Entitled to a Writ of Mandamus on His Open Meetings Act Claim? 
{¶ 26} Ames also argues that the court of appeals erroneously evaded the 
issue whether the board’s use of a consent agenda violated the Open Meetings Act.  
The court of appeals determined that to the extent that Ames sought “to compel the 
board’s general compliance with the [Open Meetings Act] in the future,” a writ of 
mandamus would not issue.  2022-Ohio-336 at ¶ 43.  And to the extent Ames sought 
to “prohibit the board from using a consent agenda for SWMD business,” because 
the board discontinued its use of the consent-agenda procedure, the court of appeals 
observed that “that act ha[d] already been performed.”  Id. at ¶ 44.  Therefore, the 
court of appeals held that Ames had not established a clear legal right or a clear 
legal duty that would entitle him to a writ of mandamus.  Id. at ¶ 45; see also State 
ex rel. Carlton v. Heekin, 165 Ohio St.3d 248, 2021-Ohio-2822, 177 N.E.3d 275, 
¶ 3 (performance of the requested act renders mandamus action moot). 
1.  Compelling General Observance of the Open Meetings Act in the Future 
{¶ 27} In challenging the court of appeals’ reasoning, Ames cites State ex 
rel. Long v. Cardington Village Council, 92 Ohio St.3d 54, 748 N.E.2d 58 (2001).  
In Long, the relator claimed that a village council had violated R.C. 121.22 because 
its minutes for numerous meetings were inadequate and incorrect.  Id. at 55.  The 
relator also claimed that the council had failed to state with requisite specificity the 
reasons for convening closed executive sessions.  Id.  She requested a writ of 
mandamus to compel the respondents “to prepare, file, and maintain full and 
accurate minutes for all meetings and to conduct all meetings in public except for 
properly called executive sessions.”  Id. at 56. 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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{¶ 28} We granted the relator’s requested relief.  We held that (1) the 
written minutes challenged by relator did not provide a “full and accurate record” 
of council proceedings, because they contained numerous inaccuracies and 
inadequate detail, (2) the meetings of committees composed of council members 
were meetings of a public body that were subject to the Open Meetings Act and the 
minutes of those meetings were inadequate, and (3) the council’s minutes failed to 
specify the appropriate statutory purpose before conducting executive sessions.  Id. 
at 57-59.  Based on these conclusions, we held that the relator had “established her 
entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus,” and we granted the 
requested writ “to compel [the] respondents to prepare, file, and maintain full and 
accurate minutes and to conduct all meetings in public, except for properly called 
executive sessions.”  Id. at 61, citing State ex rel. Inskeep v. Staten, 74 Ohio St.3d 
676, 678, 660 N.E.2d 1207 (1996) (granting writ of mandamus “ordering [the] 
respondents to open all council meetings to the public, as required by” a city 
charter). 
{¶ 29} Ames argues that he is requesting the same relief that this court 
granted in Long and that in requesting such relief, he has used the same language 
that this court used in Long.  Ames therefore contends that the court of appeals 
erred in determining that he was not entitled to relief compelling general 
compliance with the Open Meetings Act in the future. 
{¶ 30} With respect to Ames’s request for a writ compelling the board to 
prepare, file, and maintain full and accurate minutes for all future meetings, the 
court of appeals correctly denied the writ.  We have denied similar relief in 
mandamus, characterizing it as a request to compel the general observance of laws.  
See State ex rel. Findlay Publishing Co. v. Hancock Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 80 Ohio 
St.3d 134, 135, 684 N.E.2d 1222 (1997), fn. 1 (denying writ seeking an order 
compelling a board to keep minutes and records in accordance with R.C. 305.10 
and directing the board to permit the public to inspect and copy those records).  And 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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in Long, 92 Ohio St.3d 54, 748 N.E.2d 58, upon which Ames principally relies, this 
court did not order the respondents to generally comply with the Open Meetings 
Act in the future with regard to the preparation, filing, and maintenance of full and 
accurate meeting minutes.  This court’s writ of mandamus compelled the 
respondents in that case to prepare, file, and maintain full and accurate minutes for 
the meetings that were at issue. 
{¶ 31} As to a writ of mandamus compelling the preparation, filing, and 
maintenance of accurate minutes for the September 17 and 26, 2019 meetings, we 
have already awarded relief in one respect.  See Ames I, 165 Ohio St.3d 292, 2021-
Ohio-2374, 178 N.E.3d 492, at ¶ 22-24, 28 (ordering the board to produce exhibit 
A to the September 17 SWMD meeting minutes).  Indeed, this court ordered no 
further relief in mandamus with respect to these meetings and Ames does not argue 
that he is entitled to further relief as to these meetings.  Stated another way, Ames 
has not shown that the board should be further compelled to prepare, file, and 
maintain accurate minutes of the September 17 and September 26 meetings. 
2.  Challenge to the Use of the Consent Agenda 
{¶ 32} The court of appeals also denied further relief to Ames on the ground 
that the board is no longer using a consent agenda.  As noted earlier in this opinion, 
evidence in the record indicates that the board discontinued its consent-agenda 
procedure and has not utilized a consent agenda since 2019. 
{¶ 33} Ames does not cite case law to undermine the court of appeals’ 
treatment of this issue.  In cases in which this court granted a writ of mandamus 
ordering a public body to comply with the Open Meeting Act, it has been in the 
context of an ongoing failure of the public body to open its meetings to the public.  
See Long, 92 Ohio St.3d at 59, 61, 748 N.E.2d 58 (ordering the respondents to 
conduct all meetings in public except properly called executive sessions; evidence 
reflected that the respondents had often failed to properly specify the purpose for 
conducting closed executive sessions); Inskeep, 74 Ohio St.3d at 676, 678, 660 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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N.E.2d 1207 (ordering the respondents to open all meetings to the public; evidence 
showed that the respondents had routinely been adjourning public meetings to 
conduct unauthorized closed executive sessions).  Ames argues, however, that the 
court of appeals’ finding that the consent-agenda issue is now essentially moot is 
flawed because there is nothing “that would prevent [the board] or any future board 
of commissioners from again using a consent agenda in the same manner.”  He 
therefore asks this court to hold that “a public body violates the Open Meetings Act 
when it takes official action by voting to approve a consent agenda without 
informing the public of the resolutions being voted on.” 
{¶ 34} Ames’s arguments show that he is not seeking a writ of mandamus 
to compel the board to open its meetings to the public but is instead seeking a 
declaration that the consent-agenda procedure violated the Open Meetings Act and 
an injunction to prohibit the board from using it prospectively.  Actions for a 
declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction, however, are not within a court 
of appeals’ original jurisdiction.  State ex rel. Ministerial Day Care Assn. v. Zelman, 
100 Ohio St.3d 347, 2003-Ohio-6447, 800 N.E.2d 21, ¶ 22; State ex rel. Forsyth v. 
Brigner, 86 Ohio St.3d 71, 72, 711 N.E.2d 684 (1999). 
{¶ 35} Even if we did not agree that Ames’s mandamus claim is moot or 
that his claim is a disguised action for declaratory and injunctive relief, his 
mandamus claim would still fail.  We acknowledge that there is authority to support 
the assertion that a public body violates the Open Meetings Act when the manner 
in which it conducts official business runs counter to the purpose of the statute.  
See, e.g., State ex rel. MORE Bratenahl v. Bratenahl, 157 Ohio St.3d 309, 2019-
Ohio-3233, 136 N.E.3d 447, ¶ 20-21 (a public body may not take an official action 
by secret ballot of its members, even if the balloting was done at an open meeting 
and the ballot slips were maintained as public records); White v. King, 147 Ohio 
St.3d 74, 2016-Ohio-2770, 60 N.E.2d 1234, ¶ 15, 24-25 (a public body may not 
discuss public business in private, prearranged discussions that are later ratified at 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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a public meeting); Manogg v. Stickle, 5th Dist. Licking No. 97 CA 104, 1998 WL 
516311, *2, 4 (Apr. 8, 1998) (a public body violates the Open Meetings Act when 
its members conceal their deliberations at a public meeting by communicating in 
whispers and secretly passing notes), cited with approval in MORE Bratenahl at 
¶ 16.  But these were not mandamus cases.  They all originated in courts of common 
pleas as actions for declaratory and/or injunctive relief.  See White at ¶ 4-6; MORE 
Bratenahl at ¶ 4; Manogg at *1-2.  They do not stand for the proposition that Ames 
may enjoin the use of a consent agenda through a mandamus action. 
{¶ 36} Because the relief Ames seeks is not cognizable in mandamus, the 
court of appeals on remand properly granted summary judgment to the board. 
IV.  The Public Records Act Claim 
{¶ 37} The second issue to be determined on remand was whether Ames 
was entitled to recover statutory damages under the Public Records Act.  Ames I, 
165 Ohio St.3d 292, 2021-Ohio-2374, 178 N.E.3d 492, at ¶ 28.  R.C. 149.43(C)(2) 
provides: 
 
If a requester transmits a written request by hand delivery, 
electronic submission, or certified mail to inspect or receive copies 
of any public record in a manner that fairly describes the public 
record or class of public records to the public office or person 
responsible for the requested public records, except as otherwise 
provided in this section, the requester shall be entitled to recover the 
amount of statutory damages set forth in this division if a court 
determines that the public office or the person responsible for public 
records failed to comply with an obligation in accordance with 
[R.C. 149.43(B)]. 
The amount of statutory damages shall be fixed at one 
hundred dollars for each business day during which the public office 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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or person responsible for the requested public records failed to 
comply with an obligation in accordance with [R.C. 149.43(B)], 
beginning with the day on which the requester files a mandamus 
action to recover statutory damages, up to a maximum of one 
thousand dollars. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  There is no dispute that Ames transmitted a public-records 
request to the board by email on December 26, 2019.  Further, we ordered the board 
in Ames I to produce exhibit A, a document that was not provided to Ames in 
response to his request because it was not maintained in the board’s records.  In 
doing this, we necessarily determined that the board had violated R.C. 
149.43(B)(2), which requires a public-records custodian to “organize and maintain 
public records in a manner that they can be made available for inspection or copying 
in accordance with [R.C. 149.43(B)].”  The court of appeals, however, denied 
statutory damages on the basis that there was no predicate violation of R.C. 
149.43(B) upon which to base a statutory-damages award.  2022-Ohio-336 at ¶ 50. 
{¶ 38} We have explained that “[an inferior] court is without authority to 
extend or vary the mandate issued by a superior court.”  Giancola, 153 Ohio St.3d 
594, 2018-Ohio-1694, 109 N.E.3d 1194, at ¶ 16.  “[W]here at a rehearing following 
remand [an inferior] court is confronted with substantially the same facts and issues 
as were involved in the prior appeal, the court is bound to adhere to the appellate 
court’s determination of the applicable law.”  Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d at 3, 462 N.E.2d 
410.  “[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, such as an intervening decision by 
this court, an inferior court has no discretion to disregard the mandate of a superior 
court in a prior appeal in the same case.”  Id. at 5. 
{¶ 39} Our mandate in Ames I, directed the court of appeals to determine 
whether statutory damages should be awarded.  That mandate did not permit the 
court of appeals to reopen the question whether the board had violated the Public 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
16 
Records Act.  The court of appeals therefore failed to comply with our mandate, 
and reversal of its judgment is required “to preserve the structure of superior and 
inferior courts as designed by the Ohio Constitution,” Nolan at 3. 
{¶ 40} We note, however, that statutory damages are not necessarily 
available any time a public-records custodian violates R.C. 149.43(B)(2) by failing 
to organize and maintain public records in a manner that records can be made 
available for inspection or copying.  The General Assembly did not empower the 
courts to award statutory damages based solely on the failure to properly organize 
and maintain public records. 
{¶ 41} Statutory damages may be awarded when a records custodian fails 
to comply with an obligation imposed by R.C. 149.43(B).  R.C. 149.43(C)(2).  But 
only a person who is aggrieved by a violation of the Public Records Act may bring 
a mandamus action against the records custodian, R.C. 149.43(C)(1), and 
“ ‘[a]ggrieved’ is commonly defined as ‘having legal rights that are adversely 
affected; having been harmed by an infringement of legal rights,’ ” Rhodes v. New 
Philadelphia, 129 Ohio St.3d 304, 2011-Ohio-3279, 951 N.E.2d 782, ¶ 18, quoting 
Black’s Law Dictionary 77 (9th Ed.2009).  A person is aggrieved by a custodian’s 
failure to organize and maintain records only if that failure prevents the custodian 
from producing a public record.  R.C. 149.43(C)(2) drives this point home by 
expressly providing that the injury compensated by statutory damages is the “lost 
use” of the information in the requested public record.  Statutory damages, then, 
are intended to remedy the injury caused by the public-records custodian’s failure 
to timely produce the public records requested. 
{¶ 42} The failure to organize and maintain records is not actionable by 
itself.  Standing alone, that violation will not support an award of statutory 
damages.  It is the failure to timely produce a public record that triggers an award 
of statutory damages.  Here, the board failed to produce exhibit A in response to 
Ames’s public-records request, and for that reason, statutory damages may be 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
17 
available to him.  Therefore, the court of appeals on remand must determine 
whether statutory damages are available to Ames under R.C. 149.43(C)(2) for his 
loss of use of the information in the requested public record. 
{¶ 43} So while we recognize that the law-of-the-case doctrine is not a limit 
on a court’s power and does not prevent a court from revisiting a prior decision that 
is clearly wrong, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 
391 (1997); Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 
108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988), this court’s decision in Ames I, 165 Ohio 
St.3d 292, 2021-Ohio-2374, 178 N.E.3d 492, remanding this matter to the court of 
appeals to determine whether statutory damages are available to Ames was not 
clearly wrong.  The General Assembly has broadly provided in R.C. 149.43(C) that 
statutory damages may be available when a public-records custodian has failed to 
comply with an obligation imposed by R.C. 149.43(B), and R.C. 149.43(B)(2) 
obligates a public-records custodian to organize and maintain public records so that 
they are available for inspection or copying.  Although the General Assembly has 
cabined the right to statutory damages by limiting “compensation for injury arising 
from lost use of the requested information,” R.C. 149.43(C)(2), to those who are 
aggrieved by the failure to produce the record, R.C. 149.43(C)(1), that does not 
mean that this court was clearly wrong when it determined that statutory damages 
may be available to Ames in this case.  And because that determination was not 
clearly wrong, this court will abide by the law of the case remanding this matter to 
the court of appeals to determine in the first instance whether statutory damages are 
in fact available. 
{¶ 44} Ames is entitled to an award of statutory damages unless 
circumstances justify a reduction of the award pursuant to R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a) and 
(b).  Those provisions authorize a court to reduce an award of statutory damages if 
it finds (1) that “a well-informed public office * * * reasonably would believe that 
the conduct * * * that allegedly constitutes a failure to comply with an obligation” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
18 
imposed by R.C. 149.43(B) “did not constitute a failure to comply with an 
obligation * * * based on the ordinary application of statutory law and case law as 
it existed at the time of the conduct,” R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a), and (2) that “a well-
informed public office * * * reasonably would believe that [its] conduct * * * 
would serve the public policy that underlies the authority that is asserted as 
permitting that conduct,” R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b).  These provisions require that the 
board’s “conduct” in violating R.C. 149.43(B)(2) “had a reasonable basis in legal 
authority and public policy,” State ex rel. Armatas v. Plain Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 
163 Ohio St.3d 304, 2021-Ohio-1176, 170 N.E.3d 19, ¶ 28. 
{¶ 45} Because the court of appeals denied statutory damages on the 
erroneous basis that there was no violation of R.C. 149.43(B), neither the parties 
nor the court of appeals has had the opportunity to evaluate whether R.C. 
149.43(C)(2) warrants a reduction or elimination of statutory damages that would 
otherwise be payable to Ames.  We leave it to the court of appeals to determine in 
the first instance the amount of statutory damages that Ames should be awarded 
and to consider whether statutory damages should be reduced or eliminated under 
R.C. 149.43(C)(2). 
V.  Conclusion 
{¶ 46} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Eleventh District Court of 
Appeals’ grant of summary judgment on Ames’s Open Meetings Act claim, reverse 
its grant of summary judgment on his Public Records Act claim, and remand this 
matter to the court of appeals to determine whether Ames is entitled to statutory 
damages for the failure of the board to comply with his public-records request. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part 
and cause remanded. 
DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
19 
DEWINE, J., concurs in judgment only in part and dissents in part, with an 
opinion joined by FISCHER and DETERS, JJ. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., concurring in judgment only in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 47} “Boom.  Gotcha.”  Today, the majority makes public-records 
requests a gotcha game.  And it does so without any basis in law. 
{¶ 48} Brian Ames asked for copies of some meeting minutes of the board 
of the Portage County Solid Waste Management District.  A clerk emailed Ames 
the minutes the next day, inviting him to let her know if he needed anything else.  
But a one-page exhibit to the minutes was not included with the clerk’s email, 
apparently because the exhibit hadn’t been attached to the official minutes approved 
by the board.  Rather than pick up the phone and ask for the missing exhibit, Ames 
filed a lawsuit within hours of receiving the clerk’s response. 
{¶ 49} The majority blesses Ames’s conduct, reversing the court of appeals’ 
determination that Ames was not entitled to statutory damages under Ohio’s Public 
Records Act, R.C. 149.43.  I would not.  Nothing in the Public Records Act allows 
for damages in this situation.  And the majority’s decision has the perverse effect 
of encouraging parties to rush to the courthouse any time a page is inadvertently 
left out of a public-records response, instead of simply letting the public office 
know that it made a mistake.  So, I dissent from that portion of the majority’s 
judgment. 
I.  A Missing Exhibit 
{¶ 50} The underlying lawsuit centers on the waste-management board’s 
use of consent agendas to conduct public business.  The meetings at issue in this 
case took place in September 2019.  During those meetings, the waste-management 
board convened, adopted the consent agenda, and quickly adjourned.  The consent 
agendas contained an approval of minutes from the previous meeting and various 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
20 
resolutions.  There was no other business conducted at the meetings, and the board 
did not publicly discuss the items contained in the consent agendas. 
{¶ 51} On December 26, 2019, Ames requested certified copies of the 
minutes from the board’s September 17 and 26 meetings.  The board’s clerk 
emailed the minutes to Ames the next day, telling him: “If you need anything 
further, please let me know.”  At the September 17 meeting, the board had passed 
a resolution approving a “Then and Now Certification” from the county auditor, 
which verified that sufficient funds had been appropriated for payments due under 
certain county contracts.  The minutes from that meeting contain the full text of the 
resolution, which specifies the total amount certified by the county auditor and 
indicates that the auditor’s certificate was attached to the resolution as exhibit A.  
But the auditor’s certificate was not included as part of the minutes approved by 
the board.  Consequently, when the clerk sent Ames a copy of the minutes that had 
been approved, the certificate was not produced. 
{¶ 52} Ames filed a mandamus action against the waste-management 
board.  His claims were primarily focused on the board’s use of the consent agenda, 
which he maintained constructively closed the meetings to the public and thus 
violated Ohio’s Open Meetings Act, R.C. 121.22.  He additionally challenged the 
accuracy of the minutes approved by the board for the September 17 meeting, 
noting that the text of the resolution in the minutes referred to exhibit A, but the 
exhibit had not been attached to the minutes.  He asserted that this amounted to a 
violation of the Open Meetings Act as well as the Public Records Act, see R.C. 
149.43. 
{¶ 53} In State ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 165 Ohio St.3d 
292, 2021-Ohio-2374, 178 N.E.3d 492 (“Ames I”), this court determined that “the 
board did not produce full and accurate minutes of the September 17 [waste-
management] meeting in response to Ames’s public-records request,” id. at ¶ 24.  
We therefore concluded that the Eleventh District Court of Appeals had “erred in 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
21 
granting summary judgment on Ames’s mandamus claim as it relates to the minutes 
of that meeting.”  Id.  In short, Ames was entitled to a copy of the missing exhibit, 
and we ordered the board to produce it.  Id. at ¶ 28.  We then remanded the case to 
the court of appeals for it to determine “whether Ames should be awarded statutory 
damages under the Public Records Act.”  Id. 
{¶ 54} On remand, the court of appeals found that Ames had failed to 
establish a violation of the Public Records Act.  In keeping with this court’s holding 
that the board had not produced “full and accurate minutes” of the September 17 
meeting, the court of appeals reasoned:   
 
[T]here is no evidence suggesting that the “manner” in which the 
board organized and maintained its meeting minutes was faulty 
pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(2) [of the Public Records Act].  * * * 
Rather, the evidence establishes that the board failed to 
prepare full and accurate meetings for the September 17 meeting by 
neglecting to attach a referenced exhibit.  As a result, the September 
17 minutes the board approved and produced to Mr. Ames were 
necessarily not full and accurate.  The fact that the minutes the board 
produced to Mr. Ames contained an inaccuracy does not constitute 
a failure to comply with R.C. 149.43(B). 
 
(Emphasis in original.)  11th Dist. Portage No. 2019-P-0125, 2022-Ohio-336, ¶ 53, 
54. 
{¶ 55} The majority disagrees with that analysis, insisting that by granting 
the relief that we did in Ames I, “we necessarily determined that the board had 
violated R.C. 149.43(B)(2)” of the Public Records Act.  Majority opinion, ¶ 37.  It 
thus concludes that the court of appeals erred in finding that the board did not 
violate the Public Records Act. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
22 
II.  Three Problems 
{¶ 56} There are three problems with the majority’s decision.  First, it 
renders Ames eligible to recover statutory damages under the Public Records Act 
even though Ames has failed to establish that the board violated any duty under that 
act.  Second, it misreads our mandate to the court of appeals and misapplies the 
law-of-the-case doctrine.  Third, it encourages gamesmanship and unnecessary 
litigation. 
A.  Ames has failed to show a violation of the Public Records Act 
{¶ 57} Ohio’s Open Meetings Act, R.C. 121.22, mandates “the preparation, 
filing, and maintenance of a public body’s minutes.”  State ex rel. Long v. 
Cardington Village Council, 92 Ohio St.3d 54, 56, 748 N.E.2d 58 (2001).  “Once 
these minutes are prepared, Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, requires the 
public body to permit public access to the minutes upon request.”  Id.  This court 
has observed that public bodies have a duty to “maintain a full and accurate record 
of their proceedings.”  White v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 76 Ohio St.3d 416, 
667 N.E.2d 1223 (1996), paragraph one of the syllabus.  But that does not mean 
that a person is entitled to damages under the Public Records Act every time a 
public body fails to adhere to the minutes requirement of the Open Meetings Act. 
{¶ 58} The Public Records Act imposes obligations on public offices and 
their records custodians to (1) organize and maintain records so that they are 
available for public inspection, R.C. 149.43(B)(2), (2) provide records in response 
to public-records requests, R.C. 149.43(B)(1) and (B)(7), and (3) give an 
explanation for any denial of a public-records request, R.C. 149.43(B)(3).  A 
requester is eligible for an award of statutory damages “if a court determines that 
the public office or the person responsible for public records failed to comply with 
an obligation in accordance with [R.C. 149.43(B)].”  R.C. 149.43(C)(2).  Ames 
alleges, and the majority agrees, that by failing to attach exhibit A to the meeting 
minutes, the waste-management board violated a duty under the Public Records 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
23 
Act.  But when we try to pin down exactly what duty the board violated, things get 
a little fuzzy. 
{¶ 59} The majority says that in Ames I we “necessarily determined” that 
the board violated R.C. 149.43(B)(2) of the Public Records Act.  That provision 
requires a public office to “organize and maintain public records in a manner that 
they can be made available for inspection or copying in accordance with [the Public 
Records Act].”  The problem is that this court never mentioned any deficiency in 
the manner in which the board organized its records for public inspection in Ames 
I, 165 Ohio St.3d 292, 2021-Ohio-2374, 178 N.E.3d 492.  We didn’t even cite R.C. 
149.43(B)(2) in that decision.  To the contrary, our holding in Ames I was explicitly 
premised on the board’s failure “to maintain a full and accurate record of its 
proceedings,” id. at ¶ 23.  We concluded that the official minutes from the 
September 17 meeting of the waste-management board were inaccurate because 
those minutes referenced an exhibit that had not been attached.  Id. at ¶ 22.  Those 
conclusions refer to duties that are imposed by the Open Meetings Act.  See R.C. 
122.22(C); White at 423. 
{¶ 60} Of course, Ames’s claim for damages is premised not on the Open 
Meetings Act,1 but on the Public Records Act.  Determined to locate some violation 
of the public-records law, the majority now says—for the first time—that the board 
failed in its obligation to maintain records for public inspection because exhibit A 
“was not maintained in the board’s records,” majority opinion at ¶ 37.  I’m not 
convinced that’s true.  The clerk’s affidavit says that had Ames told her about the 
omission, she “would have and could have retrieved the exhibit A * * * and 
provided it to him.”  It goes on to note that “[t]he auditor’s office also maintains 
 
1.  A party may recover damages in the form of a civil forfeiture under the Open Meetings Act when 
a court of common pleas issues an injunction based on a violation of the Open Meetings Act.  R.C. 
121.22(I)(2)(a).  Because this case was not filed in the common pleas court and no injunction has 
been issued, that provision is inapplicable. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
24 
this record.”  (Emphasis added.)  Nothing in her affidavit compels the conclusion 
that the exhibit was not maintained by the board. 
{¶ 61} But even if that were the case, it still doesn’t amount to a failure in 
the clerk’s response to Ames’s public-records request.  Ames requested a certified 
copy of the board’s September 17 meeting minutes, and that’s what he got.  The 
board produced the responsive record the very next day.  The issue is simply that 
the minutes themselves contained an omission: when the board approved the 
minutes, exhibit A was not attached.  In other words, the exhibit was not made a 
part of the minutes approved by the board. 
{¶ 62} Inaccuracies in the record of a public body’s proceedings might in 
some instances amount to a violation of the Open Meetings Act.  See White, 76 
Ohio St.3d at 424, 667 N.E.2d 1223.  But nothing in statute converts these defects 
into a violation of the Public Records Act simply because a public body produces 
the record in response to a public-records request.  In this case, the law required 
disclosure of the minutes approved by the waste-management board.  But it did not 
require the records custodian to comb through the minutes to review their content. 
{¶ 63} Admittedly, this court has not always been clear in differentiating 
between the Open Meetings Act and the Public Records Act.  See, e.g., Long, 92 
Ohio St.3d 54, 748 N.E.2d 58; White.  And our decision in Ames I, 165 Ohio St.3d 
292, 2021-Ohio-2374, 178 N.E.3d 492, could have done a better job of 
distinguishing the distinct duties that arise under the two enactments.  But there is 
no reason to double down.  There is no basis to award damages under the Public 
Records Act for what might be a violation of the Open Meetings Act. 
B.  The court of appeals did not disregard our mandate in Ames I, 
and even if it had, the law-of-the-case doctrine 
does not preclude us from deciding this case correctly 
{¶ 64} The majority doesn’t seriously argue with any of the above.  Instead, 
its view seems to be that (1) we conclusively determined that the board violated the 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
25 
Public Records Act in Ames I, (2) the court of appeals disregarded our mandate in 
Ames I by concluding that there was no Public Records Act violation, and (3) 
because our purported determination in Ames I that there was a violation of the 
Public Records Act was not “clearly wrong,” majority opinion at ¶ 43, the law-of-
the-case doctrine prohibits us from revisiting that determination.  I disagree with 
all three propositions. 
{¶ 65} In my view, a plain reading of our decision in Ames I left open the 
question whether the board had violated the Public Records Act, and, therefore the 
court of appeals did not violate our mandate.  But if one adopts a contrary view, 
and reads Ames I as finding a violation of the Public Records Act, nothing in the 
law-of-the-case doctrine precludes us from revisiting that decision. 
{¶ 66} The majority reads Ames I, 165 Ohio St.3d 292, 2021-Ohio-2374, 
178 N.E.3d 492, as having conclusively determined that the board violated the 
Public Records Act and opines that the purpose of our remand order was to 
determine whether Ames was entitled to statutory damages.  That’s certainly not 
the way I read Ames I.  While the majority now states that in Ames I “we had 
determined” that “the board violated the Public Records Act,” majority opinion at 
¶ 17, there is no statement to that effect in Ames I.  What the majority calls a 
“determination” is simply its own inference—one that I cannot make, and that the 
court of appeals did not make. 
{¶ 67} To the contrary, our mandate was “to consider * * * whether Ames 
should be awarded statutory damages under the Public Records Act.”  Ames I at  
¶ 28.  On remand, the court of appeals did exactly what we asked: it considered 
whether Ames was entitled to statutory damages under the Public Records Act and 
determined that he was not.  2022-Ohio-336 at ¶ 4. 
{¶ 68} The majority reads our directive “to consider * * * whether Ames 
should be awarded statutory damages under the Public Records Act,” Ames I at  
¶ 28, as directing the court of appeals to only consider whether damages should be 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
26 
reduced.  But the plain language of our mandate also left the court of appeals with 
the option of determining that Ames was not entitled to damages at all because there 
was no violation of the Public Records Act.  And, since Ames I identified only 
violations of duties under the Open Meetings Act, not the Public Records Act, the 
court of appeals was on solid ground with its holding. 
{¶ 69} For the same reasons that the court of appeals did not violate our 
mandate, it is not the law of the case that the board violated the Public Records Act.  
See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Law of the Case, Section 
4478 (3d Ed.) (“Law of the case [doctrine] does not reach a matter that was not 
decided”).  But suppose Ames I did hold that the board violated the Public Records 
Act.  Even then, the doctrine wouldn’t bind our hands.  See Hopkins v. Dyer, 104 
Ohio St.3d 461, 2004-Ohio-6769, 820 N.E.2d 329, ¶ 15 (The law-of-the-case 
doctrine is “a rule of practice, not a binding rule of substantive law”).  The doctrine 
doesn’t prevent us from reconsidering our erroneous prior judgment in this case.  
That’s because the law-of-the-case doctrine “directs a court’s discretion, it does not 
limit the tribunal’s power.”  Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, 103 S.Ct. 
1382, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983).  Indeed, it would make little sense to say that this 
court has the authority to overrule its prior precedent, see State v. Harper, 160 Ohio 
St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 5, and the authority to reconsider 
its own decisions, see S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.02, but somehow lacks the authority to 
correct an obvious error it made at an earlier stage in a case. 
{¶ 70} The majority’s view is that the law-of-the-case doctrine prevents us 
from correcting an erroneous decision unless that decision was “clearly wrong,” 
majority opinion at ¶ 43.  I will leave to others the distinction between a decision 
that is “clearly wrong” and one that is only wrong.  But by any measure, if we had 
held in Ames I that the board violated a duty under the Public Records Act, such a 
decision would have been clearly wrong. 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
27 
{¶ 71} The majority’s theory is that the board violated the Public Records 
Act by not maintaining public records so they are available for inspection and 
copying.  Majority opinion at ¶ 37.  But there is no dispute that the board maintained 
the minutes of the meeting and that the board produced the official minutes to 
Ames; the problem was that the minutes themselves were incomplete because an 
exhibit was missing.  As explained above, supra Part II.A., not preparing accurate 
meeting minutes might be a violation of the Open Meetings Act, but it is not a 
violation of the Public Records Act. 
{¶ 72} The problems with the majority’s resolution of this case come into 
even sharper focus when one looks at its new remand order.  The majority now says 
that on remand the court is to determine whether the board is entitled to a reduction 
in the amount of damages it must pay.  A court may only reduce an award of 
statutory damages if it finds that a well-informed public office would have 
reasonably believed, based on the law at the time, that its conduct did not amount 
to a violation of the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a), and that its conduct 
served the public policy underlying the legal authority it relied on, R.C. 
149.43(C)(2)(b). 
{¶ 73} The trouble is that this provision presumes that the public office 
made a deliberate choice not to turn over the requested record.  That didn’t happen 
here.  The clerk intended to provide a complete response to Ames’s request; the 
“denial” in this case was simply the result of a clerical error. 
{¶ 74} The remand order thus leaves the court of appeals with some 
unanswerable questions on remand.  Would a well-informed public office have 
reasonably believed that its denial of a public-records request was legally proper 
even though the office never meant to deny the request in the first place?  See R.C. 
149.43(C)(2)(a).  If so, does the office’s denial serve the “public policy” that the 
office relied upon in failing to produce the minutes, even though the office didn’t 
rely on public policy at all?  See R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
28 
{¶ 75} Quite simply, the Public Records Act’s damage-reduction factors are 
inapplicable to the facts of this case because this case does not involve a Public 
Records Act violation.  The majority leaves the court of appeals with a square peg 
and a round hole. 
C.  The gotcha game 
{¶ 76} The majority not only sows confusion about the meaning of the 
Public Records Act, but it also incentivizes litigiousness and gamesmanship, and 
creates perverse incentives for future litigants. 
{¶ 77} Consider, for instance, an employee who receives a public-records 
request and promptly responds by scanning the documents and emailing them to 
the requester.  It turns out that two pages got stuck together, and as a result, one of 
the pages was not scanned.  Under the logic of the majority opinion, the requester 
would be better off filing a mandamus action to recover statutory damages than 
simply picking up the phone or replying to the email to let the employee know about 
the missing page.  Indeed, that is exactly what happened here.  Rather than take the 
clerk up on her invitation to “let her know” if he needed anything else, Ames filed 
this mandamus action within hours of receiving the documents, noting in his 
complaint that exhibit A was not attached. 
{¶ 78} A public office unquestionably has a duty to respond promptly and 
thoroughly to public-records requests.  At the same time, though, “[a] public-
records requester has an obligation to cooperate with the public-records custodian 
fulfilling a request, including an obligation to inform the public agency when she 
feels that a request has been incomplete or slow.”  State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. 
Euclid, 144 Ohio St.3d 565, 2015-Ohio-4914, 45 N.E.3d 981, ¶ 25.  This court’s 
decision today turns public-records compliance into a gotcha game, where every 
missing page becomes grounds for a lawsuit. 
 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
29 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 79} The waste-management board maintained the minutes of its 
meetings and made them available to the public.  And it promptly responded to 
Ames’s request for the September 17 minutes by sending him a copy of the minutes 
approved by the board.  That the exhibit in question was not made a part of the 
board’s official minutes does not amount to a violation of a duty imposed by the 
Public Records Act.  I therefore dissent from the court’s judgment holding that 
Ames is eligible for an award of statutory damages and remanding the case to the 
court of appeals to consider whether there is a basis to reduce the damages award. 
{¶ 80} I concur in the majority’s judgment that Ames’s claim regarding the 
consent-agenda procedure is moot.  I would therefore affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals in full. 
 
FISCHER and DETERS, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Brian M. Ames, pro se. 
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, and Christopher 
J. Meduri, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
_________________